The United States and Pangermania

F s

JLwi

FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF
THE NET IS SPREAD."

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FLAG DAY ADDRESS, JUNE 15, 1917

BY ANDRE CHERADAME

THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED.
Berlin's Formidable Peace-Trap of "The
Drawn War." Introduction by the late
Earl of Cromer, O.M. Illustrated with
maps net $1.25

" It is by all means the most pregnant volume on the
deeper issues of the war that has come under our eyes.
The author has his material reduced to its lowest di-
mensions, and he has it at his finger-tips. It is a book
that every one should read and think about."

—Boston Transcript.

THE UNITED STATES AND
PANGERMANIA

THE UNITED STATES AND
PANGERMANIA

BY
ANDRE CHERADAME

AT7THOB OP "THE PANQERMAN PLOT UNMASKED*

*' From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread."

— President Wilson's flag-Day Address.

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1918

COPYRIGHT, 1918, BT

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

Published January, 1918

TO MY AMERICAN READERS.

For twenty-two years before the frightful
struggle let loose upon the world by Prussian-
ized Germany, I spent all my time and all
that I could command of resources and intelli-
gence in studying the Pangerman conspiracy
by means of systematic investigations which
took me into one hundred and seventy-seven
cities of Europe, America, and Asia. It was
my hope that by exposing the German plans
I might give a timely enough warning of the
approaching , danger to make it possible that
fitting action could avert war.

I did not succeed in gaining a hearing from
those whom it was necessary to convince in
Europe; but the long continuance and persis-
tence of my efforts, evidenced by the works I
published before 1914, prove conclusively that
I am a man of peace, for I have done every-
thing in my power to prevent war. Con-
tinuing my task in the same spirit, it is my
wish at least to contribute toward the ending
of this appalling conflict on such conditions that
it can never be renewed. A decisive victory

vi UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

of the Allies which will make any aggressive
return of Pangermanism impossible is the only
way by which this end can be attained. Toward
gaining this victory, by rejecting from the be-
ginning the crafty manoeuvres of the Berlin
Government unceasingly renewed to divide
and deceive the Allies, the deliberate and pro-
found conviction of every citizen of the United
States can accomplish much I have, there-
fore, brought together in this little book, writ-
ten for you especially, a series of specific facts,
easily verified, which should establish among
you this certain conclusion:

Germany no longer exists. In her
place stands Pangermany, whose ex-
istence is incompatible with the inde-
pendence of the United States and
the freedom of the world.

September 10, 1917.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

PREFACE — To MY AMERICAN READERS - - , - v

CHAPTER I.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. ... 1

I. The Pangerman doctrine.
II. The Kaiser, originator of the Pangerman plan.

CHAPTER II.

THE PANGERMAN PLAN - - 10

I. Its extension from 1895 to 1911.
II. The plan of 1911 regarding Europe and Turkey.

III. Its extension to Asia, Africa, America, and

Oceania.

IV. General view of the German plan of world-wide

domination.
V. The stages toward its fulfilment.

CHAPTER HI.

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 31

I. Why the Treaty of Bucharest suddenly became a

formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan.
II. How political conditions in Austria-Hungary in-
clined Germany to bring on the war.

CHAPTER IV.

PANGERMANY is MADE 41

I. The extent of the realization at the beginning of

1917 of the Pangerman plan of 1911.
II. Economic Pangermany.
III. Military Pangermany.

viii UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA
CHAPTER V.

PAGE

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES TO KEEP THE HAMBURG-PERSIAN
GULF SCHEME FOR GERMANY AS A MINIMUM RESULT
OF THE WAR --------59

I. Strategic and economic conceptions of the Ger-
man General Staff upon which all pacifist ma-
nreuvres are based.

II. Separate peace to be made by Berlin with one of
the Entente. The trick of Alsace-Lorraine.

III. Separate peace to be made with the Entente by ^

Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary.

IV. The democratization of Germany.

V. Peace by the "Internationale" or Socialist party.
VI. The trick of an armistice.

VH. The "Drawn Game," or "Peace without annexa-
tions or indemnities."
VIH. What is Germany's word worth ?

CHAPTER VI.

THE "DRAWN GAME"; THE INSIDIOUS SNARE OF THE
FORMULA, "PEACE WITHOUT ANNEXATIONS OR INDEM-
NITIES" - 86

I. How the hypothesis is brought forward.
II. Cost of the war much greater to the Allies than

to the Germans.

HE. The struggle has allowed Germany to obtain
enormous advantages in the present and for
the future.

IV. The war has brought the Allies only losses.
V. Consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan

in regard to Russia and Asia.
VI. The blatant falsehood of the formula, "Peace

without annexations or indemnities."
VII. The formidable danger of the Hamburg-Persian
Gulf plan to the Allies,

TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

CHAPTER VII.

PAGE

How TO DESTROY PANGERMANY - - - - - 122
I. Why Austria-Hungary is the crucial point of the
universal problem presented by the Hamburg-
Persian Gulf plan.
II. The thesis of the preservation of Austria-Hungary.

III. The application of the principle of nationalities

to Central Europe.

IV. A strong barrier of anti-Pangerman nations can be

established in Central Europe, and there only.

CHAPTER

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT - - 139
I. The moral principles of the American people

make it their duty to take part in the war.
II. The political interests of the United States oblige
them to contribute toward a decisive victory
for the Allies.

III. The United States and the Austro-Hungarian
question.

CONCLUSIONS.

I. Germany's responsibility for bringing on the war
is inexcusable and crushing, since its premedi-
tation by the Prussian Government antedates
the outbreak of hostilities by at least twenty-
one years - 150
EL The Allies should constantly bear in mind not
only the German occupations of Entente terri-
tory, but also the Pangerman seizures which
have been made at the expense of their own
allies 159

UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

PAGE

HI. The Allies should so conduct the war that Pan-
germany shall not only be destroyed, but re-
placed by territorial conditions which will pre-
vent its recurrence, and which conform to the
principles which the Allies have proclaimed - 162

MAPS AND FACSIMILES.

PAGE

The Poles in the east of Germany 1

The Danes in Prussia - 2

Germans and non-Germans in Austria-Hungary 3

The Pangerman plan of 1911 - 12

World-consequences of the Hamburg-to-the-Persian Gulf

project as forecast by the plan of 1911 - 15

Colonial Pangermanism and South America - 19

The anti-German barrier hi the Balkans after the Treaty

of Bucharest August 10, 1913 - 33

The nationalities in Austria-Hungary - 35

The three barriers of anti-Germanic peoples in the Bal-
kans and in Austria-Hungary - 38

Pangermany at the beginning of 1917 - 43

The German fortress at the beginning of 1917 - 63

Results of the move known as the "Drawn Game" - 91

The results in Asia of the realization of the Hamburg-to-
the-Persian Gulf plan - - 109

The knot of the European problem - 123

Map of the Martyrs 141

xii MAtS AND FACSIMILES

PAGE)

Distribution and percentage of Germans born in Germany,
now residing in the United States, in proportion to
the population born in United States (1890) - - 143

Title-page of Kannenberg's book on Asia Minor - - . 152

Facsimile of photograph from Kannenberg's book

facing page 154

"From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread " - 158
Territory occupied by Pangermany at the opening of 1917 160
The Europe of the Peace 165

THE UNITED STATES AND
PANGERMANIA

CHAPTER I.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II.

I. The Pangerman doctrine.
II. The Kaiser, originator of the Pangerman plan.

I.

Pangermanism is a doctrine of purely Prus-
sian origin, which aims at annexing, irrespec-

THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY

tive of race or language, all the various regions
of which the possession is deemed useful to
the power of the Hohenzollerns.

2 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

It was in the name of Pangermanism, a
theory of usefulness based on sheer cupidity
and arbitrary will, that Germany formerly

THE DANES IN PRUSSIA

took, and means to keep, the eastern prov-
inces which should by right belong to the
Slavs, since they still contain a population of
about four million Poles.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 3

It was in the name of Pangermanism that
in 1864 Prussia seized that part of Schleswig
which was entirely Danish.

It is still in the name of Pangermanism that

GERMANS AND NON-GERMANS IN AUSTRIA- HUNGARY

Austria-Hungary has long been coveted by
Germany, although their own figures show that
Germans are in a very small minority there,
having only 12 million against 38 million of
non-Germans.

As far back as 1844 the future Marshal von
Moltke wrote: "We hope that Austria will
uphold the rights and protect the future of

4 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

the Danubian countries, and that Germany
will finally succeed in keeping open the mouths
of her great rivers."* Inspired by this doc-
trine of rapine, the author of a pamphlet which
was published in 1895, just twenty-two years
ago, under the authority of the Alldeutscher
Verband, a powerful Pangerman society which
did its utmost to bring on the present war,
after indicating the vast programme of future
annexations, found it a natural conclusion that
no doubt the newly constituted German Em-
pire will not be peopled by Germans alone,
but "they alone will govern; they alone will
exercise political rights; they alone will serve
in the army and navy; they alone will have
the right to hold land; and they will thus be
made to feel that they are a people of rulers,
as they were in the Middle Ages. They will,
however, allow inferior tasks to be carried
out by the foreign subjects under their domina-
tion." f

Pangermanism means the absolute nega-
tion of the principle of nationalities, which was
the noblest idea given to the world by the
French Revolution. It may be summed up

*Von Moltke, Schriften, vol. II, p. 313.

t Gross Deutschland und Mitteleuropa urn das Jahr 1950, published
by Thormann & Goetsch, Berlin, 1895, p. 48.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 5

as a system of international burglary, and of
slavery imposed by Prussianized Germans
upon other races.

II.

From this Pangerman doctrine sprang the
military and political Pangerman plan, of
which the originator and promoter is the
Kaiser. Shortly after his accession in 1888
he made a speech which showed distinctly his
Pangerman tendencies, and in his answer to
a speech made by the burgomaster of Mayence,
on August 28th, 1898, he said that he intended
to keep inviolate the inheritance bequeathed
to him by his "immortal grandfather," add-
ing, "but this I can only do if our authority
is firmly upheld in regard to our neighbors,
and to this end there must be united co-opera-
tion from all of German blood." On the 28th
of October, 1900, at a reunion of officers, he
declared, "My highest aim is to remove what-
ever separates our great German race," and a
month before, at Stettin, he said: "I have no
fear of the future. I am convinced that my
plan will succeed." In the Kaiser's mind this
plan was summed up in the chief formula of
the Pangerman doctrine, From Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf; and to accomplish this object

6 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

he was resolved to bind Austria-Hungary and
Germany together by increasingly closer ties.
In order to make sure of his supremacy over
the Balkan peoples he counted on the co-op-
eration of such of their Kings as were of Ger-
manic origin, as in Bulgaria and Roumania, or
who would feel strongly the Germanic influ-
ences which he could bring to bear. Thus, in
1889, he married his sister Sophia to the heir
of the throne of Greece, later King Constan-
tine, whose Germanophile role it has been
easy to follow.

The Kaiser had scarcely come to the throne
before he conceived the scheme of flattering
the Turks and Mohammedans, in order that
he might seize the Ottoman Empire later, and
make use of Moslems throughout the world
as a menace to other Powers.

On November 8th, 1898, at Damascus,
William II. pronounced the famous words of
which the significance is fully apparent now
that we have seen the German policy devel-
oped in Russia, in Turkey, in Persia, and in
China, and have witnessed its efforts to stir
up agitation among the Moslem populations:
'May His Majesty the Sultan, as well as the
300 millions of Moslems who venerate him as
their Khalifa, rest assured that the German

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 7

Emperor is their friend forever." In conse-
quence of this adulation of the Red Sultan,
Abdul Hamid, the Kaiser obtained, on the
27th of November, 1899, the first concession
of the Bagdad railway, which, now that it is
nearly finished, is an instrument of the Ger-
man military offensive against Russia and
England. The Germaji naval and military
leagues, which count their members by millions
throughout the Empire, have always been en-
couraged by the Kaiser, and in return they
have backed up his incessant demands for a
larger army and navy. He also encouraged
the formation of the Alldeutscher Verband,
or Pangerman> Union. This association has
many important and influential persons among
its members, and upon it rests an overwhelm-
ing responsibility for the outbreak of the pres-
ent war. Since its foundation in 1894 it has
organized thousands of lectures, and scattered
millions of pamphlets spreading the Panger-
man doctrine, with its lust of aggrandize-
ment, among the German people. It was also
through the Alldeutscher Verband that, with
a view to the present conflagration, all Ger-
mans living outside the Empire were system-
atically organized; this was especially the case
in Austria and in the United States.

8 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

As for the time of the outbreak of war, it
was the Kaiser who determined it. After the
Treaty of Bucharest, August 10th, 1913, the
situation in the Balkan States and the politi-
cal conditions in Austria, for reasons which I
shall show in my third chapter, made him
decide that the time had come to strike.
From November, 1913, he was busy preparing
for early hostilities; he knew that the widen-
ing of the Kiel Canal would be finished by
July, 1914, and made his arrangements to fit
that date. He dazzled the Archduke Francis
Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-
Hungary, by visions of the great advantages
which action in common would give to the
Central Powers; he made the archduke a
visit at Miramar, near Trieste, in April, 1914,
and followed it up by another in June, at the
castle of Konopischt. This time he had for
his companion Von Tirpitz, since so conspicu-
ous as the chief of German submarine piracy,
and it was then that the main outlines of the
combined action of the German and Austrian
forces, by land and sea, were drafted.

The assassination of the archduke on the
28th of June made no difference to the Kaiser's
plans; on the contrary, this murder was an
excellent excuse for intervention against Serbia;

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 9

it precipitated events. War was declared on
the 1st of August, just a few days after the
completion of the Kiel Canal.

The criminal action of the Kaiser in foster-
ing the Pangerman plan for twenty-five years,
was thus revealed to the world. Moreover —
and let there be no mistake about this—
thanks to the Pangerman propaganda carried
on by his express orders, when he came out
for war he was supported in his decision not
only by the leaders of German opinion, but by
a very large majority of the German people.

Maximilian Harden explicitly acknowledged
this when he wrote in the Zukunft of Novem-
ber, 1914:* "This war has not been forced on
us by surprise; we desired it, and were right
to do so. Germany goes into it because of
her immutable conviction that what she has
accomplished gives her the right to wider
outlets for her activities and more room in
the world."

* Le Temps, November 20th, 1914.

CHAPTER II.

THE PANGERMAN PLAN.

I. Its extension from 1895 to 1911.
II. The plan of 1911 regarding Europe and Turkey.
HI. Its extension to Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania.
IV. General view of the German plan of world-wide

domination.
V. The stages toward its fulfilment.

I.

The Pangerman plan was fundamentally
established in 1895, but after that date events
happened in the world which induced the
Pangermanists to extend it further. Chief
among these were: the tension between France
and England because of Fashoda, in 1898; the
defeat of Russia by the Japanese, in 1905;
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
Austria with the approval of Berlin, in 1900;
the agreement at Potsdam by which the Czar
of Russia abandoned all opposition to the
completion of the Bagdad railway, in 1910;
and finally the Franco-German treaty of No-
vember 4th, 1911, by which France ceded
275,000 square kilometres of the Congo to the
Germans, while allowing them to hold heavy

10

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 11

economic mortgages on Moroccan territory.
All these were interpreted by the Pangerman-
ists as signs that Russia, France, and England
desired peace so much that they would keep
it on any terms; and the Pangermanists con-
cluded that their most ambitious hopes might
soon be fulfilled. Thus the basic plan of 1895,
revamped and considerably increased, became
the plan of 1911.

II.

This plan of 1911 provided, in Europe and
western Asia, for:

1. The establishment, under German rule,
of a vast Confederation of Central Europe,
comprising in the west Holland, Belgium,
Luxemburg, Switzerland, and the northern
departments of France to the northeast of a
line drawn from the south of Belfort to the
mouth of the Somme; to the east Russian
Poland, the Baltic provinces of Esthonia,
Livonia, and Courland, and the three Russian
governments of Kovno, Vilna, and Grodno;
to the southeast, Austria-Hungary. These
three groups form a total of 1,182,113 square
kilometres, with 94,323,000 inhabitants. In
this Confederation the territory actually be-

UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

longing to the German Empire only com
prised 540,858 kilometres, with about 68 mil
lion inhabitants, and out of a total of

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 13

million inhabitants only 77 million were Ger-
mans, the other 85 million being of other
nationalities.

2. The absolute submission of all the Bal-
kan States (containing 499,275 square kilo-
metres, and 22 millions of non-Germans) to the
Central European Confederation, thus making
them mere satellites of Berlin.

3. The political and military seizure of
Turkey, which was to be compelled afterward
to add to its dominions by the annexation of
Egypt and Persia, the object being to put
Turkey, with her 1,792,000 square kilometres,
and her 20 millions of non-German inhabitants
(to say nothing of those in Egypt and Persia),
under a strict German protectorate.

This Germanic Confederation of Central
Europe was to form a huge Zollverein or Cus-
toms Union. Treaties of commerce of a spe-
cial -character imposed on the Balkan States
and on subjugated Turkey would have pro-
vided Great Germany with an economic out-
let, and reserved those vast regions for her
exclusively.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 may be summed
up in four formulas: Berlin — Calais; Berlin —
Riga; Hamburg — Salonika; Hamburg — Persian
Gulf. The union of the three groupings —

14 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Central Europe, the Balkan States, and Turkey
—would have made Berlin the predominating
influence over 4,015,146 square kilometres of
territory, inhabited by 204 millions of men,
of whom 127 million were to be ruled, directly
or indirectly, by only 77 millions of Germans.

III.

It was intended that the Pangerman plan
of 1911 should be made still more effective by
important seizures of territory in all the other
parts of the world. These forcible annexa-
tions shown on the map (p. 15) were set forth
in Otto Tannenberg's work, Greater Germany,
the^ Work of the mh Century, published at
Leipsic. The exceptional importance of this
book cannot be disputed since it bears the date
0/1911 and contains the exact programme of
seizures to be effected in Europe and Turkey,
just as they have already been carried out by
the German General Staff. The territorial
acquisitions in Asia, Africa, America, and
Oceania, which Tannenberg proclaims would
be the logical sequence of the Hamburg-Persian
Gulf scheme, would most certainly be realized
if the Allies should abandon the struggle be-
fore their victory was decisive.

THE PANGERMAN PLAN

15

16 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Supposing them to do so, it is certain that
after a treacherous peace the Allied peoples,
exhausted morally and physically, facing the
formidable armies of Pangermany, would be
unable to oppose the colonial expansion of
Great Germany (to which the Hamburg-
Persian Gulf plan would inevitably lead) be-
cause they had already given way on an issue
even more vital to them — that of the inde-
pendence of Europe.

It must be added that this programme, of
which the details are given below, was laid
down by Tannenberg on the supposition,
counted on by the Berlin Government, that Eng-
land would not go into the war. In order to
make sure of her neutrality, Tannenberg ad-
vocated dividing the colonies of the other
European Powers between London and Ber-
lin. Now, however, that England is fully in
the struggle it is certain that in case of defeat
the colonies Tannenberg assigned her would
be taken from her, since she would be power-
less to resist.

A summary of Tannenberg's predictions
follows, and it is well to remember that the
world-wide acquisitions which he assigned to
Germany in 1911 are less than she will be able
to attain if she succeeds in establishing her

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 17

scheme of domination from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf; if she does that, no organized
force on earth will be able to curb the boundless
ambition of Berlin.

In regard to western Asia, Tannenberg ex-
plains that Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia,
Palestine, western Persia, and the greater
part of Arabia would be put under the protec-
torate of the German Empire — that disposes
of 3,200,000 square kilometres, with 16,500,-
000 inhabitants. Once masters of the shores
of the Adriatic, of the ^Egean, of the Darda-
nelles, and of Aden (and here they would be
helped by their Panislamic propaganda), the
seizure of Egypt, and therefore of the Suez
Canal, would be inevitable. Germany, if she
commanded these essential strategic points,
would obviously be able to retake her colonies
in Africa and Oceania: Togo, Kameroon,
southwest Africa, eastern Africa, Kaiser Wil-
helm Land, Bismarck Archipelago, the Caro-
line Islands, Marshall Islands, the Marianes
and Samoa, making a total of 2,952,000 square
kilometres, with 11,787,000 inhabitants. If
the Allies should give way in Europe they
could not prevent Great Germany from snatch-
ing— still according to Tannenberg's pro-
gramme— the Belgian, Portuguese, and Dutch

18 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

colonies, namely, the Belgian Congo, Portu-
guese Angola, and the Dutch East Indies, with
their 5,680,000 square kilometres and 57,306,-
000 inhabitants. Next would come the turn
of the French colonies, the cession of which to
Great Germany is foreseen by Tannenberg.
These are Morocco, the French Congo, Mada-
gascar, Mayotta and the Comores Islands,
Reunion, Obok and its dependencies in east
Africa, Indo-China, and the French islands of
Oceania, making a total of 3,391,000 square
kilometres, with 33,588,000 inhabitants. Tan-
nenberg also informs us that the aim of Ger-
man politics in China was the establishment
of a zone of solely German influence on the
whole lower course of the Yang-tse-Kiang and
the Hoang-ho; that is to say, over that vast
p'ortion of China which forms the hinterland
of Kiao-chau, with its total of about 750,000
square kilometres and 50 millions of inhabi-
tants. He finally gives an exact enumeration
of the various German protectorates which
would be established in the southern part of
South America, which is largely settled by
Germans. A glance at the map will show
these protectorates, as planned in 1911.

"Germany," says Tannenberg, "will take
under her protection the republics of Argen-

THE PANGERMAN PLAN

19

tina, Chili, Uruguay and Paraguay, the south-
ern third of Bolivia, so far as it belongs to the
basin of the Rio de la Plata, and also that part

COLONIAL PANGERMANISM
AND SOUTH AMERICA

of southern Brazil in which German culture
prevails." That is to say, about 6,347,000
square kilometres, with 18,197,000 inhabitants.

20 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

"German South America," he concludes, "will
provide for us, in the temperate zone, a colonial
region where our emigrants will be able to
settle as farmers. Chili and Argentina will
preserve their language and their autonomy,
but we shall require that German be taught in
the schools as a second language. Southern
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are countries
of German culture, and there German will be
the national tongue."

As in every other country, the preparations
for carrying out the Pangerman plan in South
America were conducted by the organizers of
the movement most methodically.

In 1895, when Germany had decided what
she wanted, she proceeded to make a list of all
Germans on the face of the globe, in order to
pick out from among them those who were
most likely to prove useful tools for carrying
out the Pangerman plan. The result of this
registration of the German element throughout
the world may be found in the Pangerman
Atlas of Paul Langhans, published by Justus
Perthes, at Gotha, in 1909.

These are the figures relative to South
America: In Peru, in 1890, there were two
thousand Germans; in Paraguay, in the same
year, three thousand; in Colombia also three

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 21

thousand, and in Brazil four hundred thousand.
In 1894 there were five thousand in Vene-
zuela; in 1895 there were fifteen thousand in
Chili and sixty thousand in Argentina; and in
1897 there were five thousand in Uruguay.

The Pangerman societies have carried on a
vigorous propaganda among all these Ger-
mans, especially since 1900, and in Argentina
and Brazil, which were intended to be the
principal German protectorates, they were or-
ganized with particular care. The German
law of July 22d, 1913, known as Delbruck's,
which deals with nationality under the Empire
and under the State, has greatly favored Ger-
man organization in America, and it is impor-
tant to know at least the gist of it, since it is
full of significance, and marks the last stage of
Pangerman organization prior to the war.

The second part of its article 25 runs as
follows: "If any person before acquiring na-
tionality in a foreign State shall have received
the written permission of a competent au-
thority of his native State to retain his nation-
ality of that State, he shall not lose his nation-
ality of the said native State. The German
consul shall be consulted before this permis-
sion is granted."

From these words we can measure the depth

22 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

of German astuteness. According to this pro-
vision, a German may become a citizen of a
foreign State, but if he obtains a written per-
mission "from a competent authority of his
native State," he still continues to enjoy, for
himself and his descendants, all the rights of
a German citizen, and may claim the protec-
tion of the German Empire.

As this provision is contrary to all general
principles of international law concerning na-
tionality, a German citizen who takes advan-
tage of it is careful not to inform the foreign
State whose nationality he has acquired of the
highly peculiar situation in which he stands.
Thus Germany was able to have, in every
State, agents devoted to her aggressive policy,
while these States were unaware of the danger
to which this secret service exposed them.
Apparently they had only to do with fellow
citizens whom they had no right to suspect.
It was only after many months of war, when
their criminal actions compelled them to take
off their disguise, that the power of these Ger-
mans masquerading under other nationalities
appeared in all its formidable importance. In
South America the German effort at coloniza-
tion has for a long time been concentrated
upon three Bazilian States: Parana, which has

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 23

sixty thousand Germans, Santa Catarina,
where there are one hundred and seventy
thousand, and Rio Grande do Sul, with two
hundred and twenty thousand. In these rich
provinces they preserve the language, the tra-
ditions, and the prejudices of the Fatherland,
and are almost absolute masters. Only forty-
seven thousand of them are still openly citizens
of the German Empire; about four hundred
thousand are apparently Brazilian citizens, but
in virtue of the Delbriick law a large number
have remained or become once more liegemen
of the Kaiser. It may be noted that the
budget of the German Empire included a sum
of 500,000 marks for the establishment and
maintenance of German schools in Brazil, and
in 1912 Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of
William II., landed at the port of Itajahy in
the course of his cruise, to visit his fellow
countrymen in Santa Catarina. Since the
outbreak of the war the German game in Brazil
has gradually been revealed; numerous rifle
clubs were, in fact, societies for military drill,
and dangerous enough to necessitate their
disarmament.

Outside the three provinces mentioned above
Germans are not numerous in Brazil, but they
fill most of the principal posts in business

24 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

houses and banks. In the first period of the
war these men, having established Germano-
phile newspapers published in Portuguese,
were able to prevent Brazil from getting ac-
curate information as to the origin and devel-
opment of the conflict.

To sum up, the result of the Pangerman
programme for countries outside of Europe
would assure to Germany, under the form of
colonies, protectorates, or zones of special in-
fluence, in Asia, 4,753,000 square kilometres,
with a population of 83,490,000; in Africa,
8,906,000 kilometres, with a population of
46,850,000; in Oceania, 2,314,000 kilometres,
with a population of 38,840,000, and in America
6,347,000, with a population of 18,197,000,
making a total of 22,320,000 kilometres, hav-
ing a population of 187,378,000.

IV.

If to these figures we add the 4,015,000 kil-
ometres, with 204 million inhabitants which
the Pangerman plan of 1911 intended to cover
in Europe and Turkey, we find that the Ger-
man project of universal dominion looks for a
total, in round numbers, of 26 million square
kilometres, with 390 million inhabitants.

These figures include at the utmost only 90

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 25

millions of Germans, properly speaking, who
would thus exercise supremacy over 257 mil-
lion belonging to other races. It must be
clearly understood that the enormous posses-
sions of Pangermany in both hemispheres
would be strictly controlled from Berlin. A
glance at the map on p. 15 will show that all
the essential strategic points which command
the seas of the world are included; besides the
Adriatic, the JSgean and the Dardanelles, the
Straits of Gibraltar from the side of Morocco
would be controlled, the Strait of Malacca, also
Cape Horn, Madagascar, and the naval bases
of Oceania.

William II. was well aware that such a
project could only become an enduring reality
through the disappearance of all other great
Powers. When he had finally decided on the
Pangerman plan he was deliberately resolved
on the destruction of five of these Powers.
This essential truth must be kept firmly in
our minds if we wish to understand the pres-
ent war. Austria-Hungary was to disappear
through absorption, disguised at its entry into
the German Zollverein. A fierce aggressive
war was to annihilate the military forces of
France and Russia. To cripple England later
would be an easy job with France and Russia

26 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

dismembered and impotent. As for Italy, it
was intended that she should be a vassal
State, and she was not considered capable of
offering even a slight resistance to Pangerman
ambition. It must be added that the plan of
1911 did not include war with England. When
the Kaiser forced it on France and Russia in
1914 he did not believe that Great Britain
would come in, or at least not immediately.

The initial German plan was upset by Eng-
lish intervention following on the respite gained
by the splendid resistance of armed Belgium.
But Germans are stubborn and crafty; by
adapting themselves to new conditions thrust
upon them, they have almost succeeded in
carrying out, even now, their plan of 1911.

To sum up, the complete Pangerman plan
aims at procuring for Germany all the means
of domination by land and sea which would
enable her to hold the entire world in the
crushing grip of Prussian militarism brought
to the highest point of efficiency. Not for a
moment do the Pangermans pause to reflect
on the criminality of this programme of uni-
versal slavery. "War," says Tannenberg with
his monstrous cynicism, "must leave nothing
to the vanquished but their eyes to weep with.
Modesty on our part would be only madness."

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 27

It is a fundamental truth, of which I wish
to convince my readers, that the Pangerman
plan is solely and entirely based on the achieve-
ment of the scheme "from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf," which forms its backbone. If
this is broken it falls to the ground, and the
projects for German domination are frustrated
forever. The principal problem which the
Allies must solve, if they would insure their
liberty and that of the whole world, is that of
making the plan of "from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf" impossible.

V.

In order to establish the responsibility of
Germany we need only show clearly the ma-
chinery for the realization of the Pangerman
plan as it appears in the light of facts. For
twenty -two years, from 1892 until war broke
out, the Pangerman movement has developed
with ever-growing intensity; a multitude of
publications, giving full details of the Pan-
german plan, have been scattered among the
German people in order to excite in them the
greed of conquest, and prepare them for the
fight by the bait of plunder.

Two of these publications are particularly
important: the pamphlet published under the

28 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

authority of the Pangerman Union, Gross-
deutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950
(Great Germany and Central Europe in 1950),
published by Thormann & Goetsch, S. W.
Beesel Strasse, 17, Berlin, 1895, which gives
the Pangermanist plan of that year; and the
book by Otto Richard Tannenberg: Gross-
Deutschlandy die Arbeit des 20 Jahrhunderts
(Great Germany, the Work of the %Qth Cen-
tury), which was issued by Bruno Volger at
Leipsic in 1911, and which gives nearly all the
information to be desired with regard to that
year's plan.

The great importance of this Pangerman
literature is incontestable, and the reality, the
extent, and the successive stages of the Pan-
german plan of 1911 are shown:

1. By the course which Germany has fol-
lowed in her political and military operations
since August 1st, 1914. Many have supposed
that her object has been to obtain pledges of
security, but it has really been to seize territory
for annexation almost exactly in the manner
set forth in Tannenberg's book in explaining
the plan of 1911.

2. By the memorial presented on May
20th, 1915, to the German Chancellor by the
League of Agriculturists, the League of Ger-

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 29

man Peasants, the Provisional Union of Ger-
man Peasants' Christian Associations (now
called the Westphalian Peasants' Association),
the Central German Manufacturers' Union,
the League of Manufacturers, and the Middle-
Class Union of the Empire. The importance
of this document cannot be overrated, for it
was issued by the most powerful associations
of the Empire, in which were included all the
influential elements of the German nation,
especially the agrarians and the ill-omened
Prussian squires. Now, the object of that
memorial was to demand all the annexations
mentioned in the Pangerman plan of 1911
which had been made possible by the progress
of military operations.

3. By the declarations made at the sitting
of the Reichstag on the llth of December,
1915. The Imperial Chancellor, Von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, said: "If our enemies do not
submit now, they will be obliged to do so later.
. . . When our enemies shall offer us proposals
of peace compatible with the dignity and
security of Germany we shall be ready to dis-
cuss them. . . . But our enemies must under-
stand that the more unrelentingly they wage
war, the higher will be the guarantees which
we shall necessarily exact." One of the depu-

30 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

ties, Spahn, then explained the drift of the
Chancellor's speech with still greater precision:
"We await," he said, "the hour which will
allow of peace negotiations framed to safe-
guard permanently, and by every means, in-
cluding necessary territorial annexations, all
the military, economic, and social interests of
Germany through its whole extent."

CHAPTER III.

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR.

I. Why the Treaty of Bucharest suddenly became a

formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan.
II. How political conditions in Austria-Hungary inclined
Germany to bring on the war.

Although the Pangerman plan is unques-
tionably the underlying and principal cause of
the war, yet when William II. brought it on,
in August, 1914, he did so for immediate and
secondary reasons, a knowledge of which is nec-
essary to a clear understanding of events.

I.

Up to 1911, when Tannenberg published the
programme of annexations, all the important
happenings had furthered the Kaiser's aims;
but after 1912 very serious and quite unlooked-
for obstacles arose to thwart them.

Chief among these was the new condition
of affairs resulting from the Treaty of Bucha-
rest, which was signed August 10th, 1913,
ending the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. This
treaty created in the Balkan Peninsula two

31

32 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

groups of States sharply opposed to each other.
To the first belonged the beaten and sullen
participants, Bulgaria and Turkey; the second
was composed of those peoples who had profited
by the fight, and were satisfied with the re-
sult, namely Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro,
and Greece. These latter, because of their
recent acquisitions, made at the expense of
Turkey and against the will of Germany, to
whom Turkey was already bound, leaned more
and more toward the Triple Entente, while the
conquered States, Turkey and Bulgaria, tended
to uphold Germanism. Before the Balkan
Wars the influence of the Entente was much
less in the peninsula than that of Germany,
but after the Treaty of Bucharest the tables
were turned, and the Entente found support
in that group of States which was most power-
fully organized, and which, as the map shows,
presented a solid barrier to the Pangerman
plan in the East.

If peace had lasted a few more years the
situation would have been consolidated, and
this barrier would have been still more im-
passable; therefore Berlin determined to in-
tervene. Serbia was unquestionably the pivot
on which the new Balkan equilibrium turned;
it was decided to destroy her without delay,

IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 33

THE ANTI-GERMAN BARRIER IN THE BALKANS

AFTER THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST

August 1O, 1913

34 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

and at the same time set fire to Europe, in
order, by one swift stroke, to realize the plan
of 1911. The Treaty of Bucharest was signed
on August 10th, 1913. On November 6th of
the same year the Kaiser told King Albert of
Belgium, during a visit at Potsdam, that in
his opinion war with France was near and un-
avoidable.*

II.

Not only were the consequences of the Treaty
of Bucharest disastrous to Pangerman ambi-
tions in the Balkan Peninsula; to the bound-
less fury of the government at Berlin they ac-
celerated considerably the internal political evo-
lution of Austria-Hungary, which of itself had
already threatened to counteract all the Ger-
man plans.

There are nine different nationalities in the
Hapsburg Monarchy; these are divided among
four races: Germanic, Slavonic, Latin, and
Magyar — this last a peculiar race, of Asiatic
origin. There are about 12 million Germans,
four million Latins (made up of Italians and
Roumanians), 24 million Slavs, and 10 mil-
lion Magyars. Since 1867 the Germans and
Magyars have agreed to exercise and main-

*L'Allemagne avant la Guerre, by Baron Beyens, p. 24.

IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 35

tain supremacy for their own profit over the
Slavs and Latins, although these latter (28
million) outnumber them, and have fought

36 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

hard for the last thirty years to obtain political
rights in the Monarchy proportionate to the
majority they possess of living human beings,
taxable and conscriptable at will. These ef-
forts have disquieted William II. and his
Pangermanists in the highest degree. This is
readily understood, for if the political power
in the Hapsburg Monarchy were vested, as
justice demands, in the Slavs and Latins, who
detest Prussianism, that in itself would be the
ruin of the Kaiser's plan for the economic
absorption of Austria-Hungary, and without
this absorption he cannot carry out his inad-
missible plans of exclusive influence in the Bal-
kans and in the East. His game has therefore
been, especially since 1890, to say to Francis
Joseph and the Magyars: "Above all, do not
concede the claims of your Slay and Latin
subjects. Keep up absolutely the Germano-
Magyar supremacy. I will uphold you in the
struggle with all my power." For a long time
these tactics were successful, but a few years
before the war they were on the point of
breaking down.

The culture of the Slavs and Latins grew
steadily, despite the cynical and ingenious ob-
stacles put in their way by the Germans and
Magyars; their national organization became

IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 37

closer, and they had also the advantage of
being more prolific than their political rivals.
These reasons made it increasingly difficult
for Francis Joseph and his henchmen at
Bucharest to resist their enlarged demands.

The Balkan victories of the Slavs in 1912,
and the success of Roumania in 1913, roused
the Latin and Slav subjects of the Hapsburgs
to the greatest enthusiasm, as in them they
saw the triumph of the principle of nationality
— their own cause. They persisted more than
ever in demanding their rights from Vienna
and Budapest, and the Germano-Magyars
persisted in refusing them, although with
waning energy. If peace had been main-
tained, the cumulative effect of the Bucharest
Treaty would have made these claims irresisti-
ble, while Roumania, exulting over her annexa-
tion in 1913 of the Bulgarian Dobrudja, began
to look upon Transylvania as a fruit ripe for
the plucking at Hungary's expense, at a mo-
ment when all political signs pointed to an
approaching radical transformation in the
Hapsburg Monarchy. If all this had taken
place the influence of Germanism would have
been jeopardized in the Hapsburg Empire
quite as much as in the Balkans.

Under the growing pressure of her Slav and

38 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Latin elements, the partition, or at any rate
the evolution toward federation, of Austria-
Hungary would have become a necessity.

THE THREE BARRIERS OF ANTI- GERMANIC PEOPLES
IN THE BALKANS AND IN. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

This federalism would not have affected the
frontiers of the Hapsburg dominions, but it
would surely have given political preponder-

IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 39

ance to the more numerous and more prolific
Slavs and Latins. Of these a very large ma-
jority were resolutely opposed to any alliance
with Germany. The foreign policy of the
Hapsburg Monarchy would have thus become
progressively more independent of Berlin, and
been drawn closer to Russia, France, and Eng-
land. Germany would have been deprived of
the artificial prop which the Germano-Magyar
predominance at Vienna and Budapest had
given her since the days of Sadowa, and William
II. confronted by conditions opposing a bar-
rier to his Oriental ambitions even more for-
midable than that created by the Treaty of
Bucharest. The Kaiser, therefore, decided
to make war at once.

The three determining causes in eastern
Europe may be summed up in three lines:

1. The defeat of Turkey by the Balkan
peoples and Italy in 1912.

2. The consequences of the Treaty of
Bucharest.

3. The internal evolution of Austria-Hun-
gary.

The three anti-German barriers are shown
on the map (p. 38) by broad black strokes;
these barriers would have effectually broken
up the Pangerman plan, and the Kaiser, fore-

40 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

seeing this, had recourse to war, which Mira-
beau pithily described long ago as "the na-
tional industry of Prussia."

CHAPTER IV.

PANGERMANY IS MADE.

I. The extent of the realization at the beginning of 1917

of the Pangerman plan of 1911.
II. Economic Pangermany.
III. Military Pangermany.

I.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 (see map p. 12)
comprehended :

1. The formation of a great German Con-
federation which was to put under the absolute
supremacy of the present German Empire, with
its 540,858 square kilometres and 68 million
inhabitants, foreign territories situated around
Germany, which have an area of 1,182,113
square kilometres, and contain 94 million in-
habitants.

Early in 1917 the German seizures already
effected in these territories amounted in the
West to 90,478 square kilometres, in the East
to 260,000, and in the South (Austria-Hungary)
to 676,616, making a total of 1,027,094 square

41

42 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

kilometres. Germany has therefore, so far as
concerns the territories to be absorbed into the
Germanic Confederation, achieved her pro-
gramme in the proportion of 86%, or about
nine-tenths.

2. The absolute subordination to Germany
of all the Balkan States, with a superficies of
499,275 square kilometres, holding 22 mil-
lions of inhabitants. Here, in the begin-
ning of 1917, the German seizure extended
over about 285,585 square kilometers. The
German programme concerning the Balkans
had, therefore, been realized in the proportion
of 57%.

3. The German seizures, more or less dis-
guised, in the Ottoman Empire, extended over
1,792,900 square kilometres, holding 20 mil-
lion inhabitants. Early in 1917 (not count-
ing the portions of Persia occupied by the
Turco-Germans, of which the area about bal-
ances the Anglo-Russian occupations in Ar-
menia and Mesopotamia) we may say that
the whole of Turkey is under German influ-
ence exclusively, and therefore the German
plan has been realized in the proportion of
100%.

Let us now group together the figures which
allow us to ascertain how nearly the general

PANGERMANY IS MADE

43

44 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

plan of continental Pangermany, made in 1911,
has been carried out in 1917.

Forecast in
1911.
Square
kilometres

Realization in
the beginning
of 1917.
Square
kilometres

I.

Territories to be included
in the great German
Confederation

1,182,113

1 027 094

TT,

Balkans

499,275

285 585

TTT.

Turkey

1,792 900

1 792 900

Total

3 474 288

3 105 579

These figures are startling evidence that early
in 1917 Germany had realized her Pangerman
plan of 1911 in the enormous proportion of 89%,
or almost nine-tenths. If to each of these
totals we add the superficies of the German
Empire, 540,858 square kilometres, we find the
area of Pangermany, in round numbers, at the
beginning of 1917, to be 3,600,000 square kil-
ometres, a figure which comes very close to
the 4,015,000 square kilometres which represent
Pangermany in the plan of 1911.

This figure is graphically confirmed by the
map on p. 43.

We can see at a glance the geographical as
well as superficial relations which exist between

PANGERMANY IS MADE 45

the boundaries of the plan of 1911 and the
fronts occupied early in 1917 by armies under
the exclusive direction of Berlin.

A new extension of Pangerman invasion
took place in the second half of 1917, following
the capture of . Riga and the advance of the
German armies in Russia. The figures given
above are, therefore, considerably below the
truth; the fact which they demonstrate is
therefore still more convincing.

Our conclusion from the foregoing state-
ments must be that Germany exists no longer;
there is only Pangermany. That is an essen-
tial fact, of which the importance is not yet
fully realized, and as a result the Allies still
continue to speak of Germany, Austria-Hun-
gary, or Turkey as if these States had remained
in the same conditions in which they were
before the war. But that is by no means the
case. The Quadruple Alliance of Central Eu-
rope is a great illusion, carefully fostered by the
astute government at Berlin, because it is of
the greatest service to their game. In reality
Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary are
not allies, but vassals of Berlin, and have less
influence there than Saxony or Bavaria.

46 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

As may be seen by a glance at the map on p.
43, the effective forces of these three States are
closely subordinated to the Prussian militarism
which has helped Germany to reduce to prac-
tical slavery 82 millions of Latins, Slavs and
Semites, belonging to thirteen different nation-
alities. The governments of Constantinople,
of Sofia, of Vienna, and of Budapest have a
thousand reasons in common for complying
with the orders of Berlin, from which this
enormous whole is administered.

Therefore, in order to reason clearly hence-
forth, we must not see only Germany, but
Pangermany; unless we do this, disastrous
errors of judgment will be made by the Allies.
It is only by examining, not Germany but the
actual Pangermany, that is to say, a gigantic
territory counting already at the present time
about 176 million souls, that we can justly
appreciate the resources of every kind, mili-
tary and economical, which the government of
Berlin has at its disposal; more particularly
should we endeavor to form a clear idea of
economic and also of military Pangermany, as
one completes the other.

PANGERMANY IS MADE 47

II.

Economic Pangermany, as it was formerly
outlined by Teutonic economists such as List,
Roscher, Rodbertus, etc., may be thus defined:
A territory grouping together (solely under the
supreme guidance of Berlin) Central Europe,
the Balkans, and Turkey, this territory being vast
enough to contain military and economic re-
sources entirely sufficient for the needs of its
population during war, and to insure its directors,
in time of peace, domination over the world.

As soon as the Hamburg-Bagdad railway was
practically finished, the parcelling out of eco-
nomic Pangermany was hastily carried on by
Berlin under many widely different forms.

Control of customs: As realization of the
great Pangerman Zollverein, or Customs Union,
was not possible all at once, the Kaiser's gov-
ernment set about preparing the necessary
steps. Numerous congresses were held in Ber-
lin, attended by parliamentarians and men of
business, German, Austrian, and Hungarian,
who agreed on these three essential conclusions:

1. An economic customs agreement, of long
duration, in which Germany and Austria-
Hungary should constitute an economic unit;

2. In order to attain this by degrees, each side

48 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

should add to the number of articles already
free from customs duties, and should establish
a unified tariff for certain sorts of merchandise;
3. That Austro-Germany, Bulgaria, and Tur-
key should be brought into close economic
union as rapidly as possible.

Ethnographic control: Certain populations
considerably hinder the consolidation of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan; the Serbian na-
tion, whose spirit cannot be subdued, are an
obstacle to the establishment of the Panger-
man bridge or nexus between Hungary and Bul-
garia, without which bridge all the Pangerman
plan could not be realized. The systematic
destruction of the Serbian nation was confided
to the Bulgarians, who, under pretext of put-
ting down insurrections, slew not only Serbian
men of fighting age, but old people of both
sexes, women, and children in arms. In the
Ottoman Empire, the Armenians occupied the
regions which were indicated by Herr Del-
briick in the Reichstag long ago as destined
to constitute Germanic India. Berlin utilized
the hereditary Turkish liking for the massacre
of Christians, and already more than a million
Armenians have been wiped off the face of the
earth.

Agricultural control: The food crisis from

PANGERMANY IS MADE 49

which Germany suffers has determined Berlin
to make all haste to profit by the rich agri-
cultural regions which the war has brought
under her power. She has, therefore, sent
hundreds of agronomic engineers, with thou-
sands of agricultural machines, to Roumania,
to Serbia, and to Asia Minor. In this latter
country two centres of cultivation have re-
ceived especial attention; in the province of
Adana the production of cotton is being de-
veloped; on the Anatolian plains the intensive
cultivation of cereals is pushed as fast as pos-
sible. These energetic efforts will have this
twofold result: the Turks will not rise against
the German domination, or at least not be-
cause of scarcity of food, and by means of the
ever-increasing yield of Serbian, Roumanian,
and Turkish soil, now scientifically treated,
the food supply of the Central Powers will be
more and more completely assured.

Banking control: As the exploitation of
Oriental Pangermany requires an immense
amount of capital, the German, Austro-Hun-
garian, Bulgarian, and Turkish banks have
formed a group of powerful combinations.
The leaders in Germany are the Deutsche
Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and the Kolnische
Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary, the Kredit

50 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Anstalt in Vienna, and the Hungarian Bank of
Credit in Budapest.

Economic control: As the rapid development
of the latent resources of the Balkans and
Turkey is the chief economic objective of the
Germans, they have recently established, in
co-operation with King Ferdinand, an Institute
for Improving Economic Relations between Ger-
many and Bulgaria, and in order to facilitate
German penetration in Turkey, ten thousand
Turkish boys, from twelve to eighteen years of
age are to come to Germany for their technical
education. They will live in German families,
learn the German language, and be saturated
with German ideas, with the result that they
will become useful underlings and efficient
fellow workers with the real Germans toward
the Germanization of Turkey, and also for ex-
ploiting the concessions of every sort which
the subjects of the Kaiser will exact from the
Ottoman Government on account of the war.

Railway control: The railway system through-
out European Pangermany has been improved
and perfected by every possible means; in
Turkey all the roads are under the absolute
control of German officers. Of the 2,435 kil-
ometres which separate Haidar Pacha (Con-
stantinople) from Bagdad only 583 kilometres

PANGERMANY IS MADE 51

are still to be built, and this distance is already
crossed by automobile roads.

Canal control: The canal project which was
outlined by the Pangermanist, Doctor G. Zoepfl,
at a congress held in Berlin as far back as
April 26th, 1895, was taken up and followed
by the Economic Congress of Central Europe
which met at Berlin on the 19th of March,
1917.

This plan is made up of the following ele-
ments: 1. Union of the Rhine and Danube by
the adaptation of the Main to canal navigation
and by the canal from the Main to the Danube;
2. Completion of the central canal between the
Vistula and Rhine; 3. Canal from the Oder to
the Danube, uniting the Baltic and the Black
Sea; 4. Adaptation of the Rhine as far as Basle;
5. Union of the Weser.and Main by means of
the Fulda-Werra Rivers; 6. Union of the Elbe
and Danube by the Moldau; 7. Union by means
of canals of the Oder to the Danube and Vis-
tula; 8. Union of the Danube and the Dniester
by the Vistula; 9. Canalization of the Save;
10. Canalization of the Morava and the Var-
dar as far as Salonika.

The Danube, being the most powerful flu-
vial artery of central Pangermany, is the basis
of this gigantic scheme.

52 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

"The Danube means everything to us," de-
clared General von Groener in December, 1916.

This rapid sketch of the preparations now
going on in economic Pangermany will enable
any clear-sighted mind to understand the
crushing power which this formidable organ-
ism will possess when all these mighty resources
have been developed by the Germans for the
benefit of their supremacy.

The organization of Pangermany is only be-
ginning, and yet the economic forces which she
is able to put at the service of Berlin are such
as to permit Germany to keep up the war
against enemies who, although much greater
in number, are scattered.

The German dogged power of work, spirit
of enterprise, and skill in organization need
no further demonstration. We must, there-
fore, not doubt for a moment that they would
draw, to their enormous advantage, all possi-
ble profits from Austria-Hungary, where there
are vast regions still to be turned to account.
The same would apply to the Balkan countries,
many of which are still entirely untouched,
and which contain a considerable amount of
unexplored sources of wealth, both agricul-
tural and mineral. This would also be true
of Asiatic Turkey.

PANGERMANY IS MADE 53

What intolerable authority would be wielded
by an economic Pangermany, comprising nearly
three millions of square kilometres, when once
it was completely organized! It is obviously
indisputable that the methodical turning to
account, upon a great scale, of all the economic
products of Pangermany, whether minerals or
crops, live stock or manufactures, transported
by cheap methods (such as a complete net-
work of canals) would allow the Germans, even
if they paid high wages to their own workmen,
to reduce the cost price so considerably in all
fields of production that the world would be
forced to accept the products of Germany be-
cause of their cheapness. Our own good sense
should convince us that any economic renas-
cence of the European countries now allied
would be impossible in face of the overwhelm-
ing methods of economic Pangermany. The
economic ruin of the present Allies, following
so onerous and exhausting a war as this one,
would from the nature of things force them
into political subjection to Berlin. Besides,
not a single country in all the world could
hold out against the pressure of economic
Pangermany on the one hand, and on the
other of the financial crises which would follow
the irremediable ruin of the Allies. The fact

54 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

that economic Pangermany is now being or-
ganized is an ominous event on which the
attention of all free peoples throughout the
world should be concentrated, for it puts into
the hands of Germany all the elements of an
economic power which has no precedent in
history.

III.

From this time forward Germany relies,
above all else, on her military resources in
order to establish indestructibly in the future
the economic Pangermany which will be for
her, in time of peace, an instrument for the
permanent acquisition of wealth, and through
this of world-wide domination. Military Pan-
germany is, therefore, at once the complement
and the guarantee of economic Pangermany.
The seizure by Berlin, under cover of the war,
of new sources of man-power (Austro-Hun-
garian, Bulgarian, and Turkish contingents),
and of bases or regions of exceptional strategic
importance, either in the invaded districts or
in the countries of her allies, has given Ger-
many the foundations of military Panger-
many. In 1914 the rigor of Prussian mili-
tarism was only felt by the 68 million inhabi-
tants of the German Empire; at the beginning

PANGERMANY IS MADE 55

of 1917 it was .exercised, whether they wanted
it or not, over about 176 million belonging to
Pangermany (see maps pp. 12, 43). This re-
sult, the evident consequence of an immense
extension of exclusive influence throughout
Central and Oriental Europe, has allowed the
General Staff of Berlin to organize as it chose
strategic bases and regions where, before the
war, it could exercise no direct action. For
instance, Zeebrugge, on the North Sea, Trieste,
Pola, and Cattaro on the Adriatic, the Bul-
garian coast of the ^Egean, the Ottoman
straits, and the Turkish, Bulgarian, and Rou-
manian shores of the Black Sea have always
been bases or regions of exceptional strategic
value. This value is infinitely enhanced by
the fact that these are now comprised in the
military system which is subject only to the
directing and organizing force of the General
Staff at Berlin.

At the present time the Pangerman frontier
is on these essential strategic bases, which
are connected, one with another, to form a
series of continuous fronts, fortified more
strongly than has ever been known before by
an intensive system of barbed-wire entangle-
ments, deep-dug underground shelters, machine-
guns, and heavy artillery.

56 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

The internal military organization of Pan-
germany is being swiftly and steadily pursued.
Munition factories are judiciously distributed
throughout the country, in order to utilize
raw materials near where they are produced,
and also to minimize the cost of transporta-
tion, and render it easy to send abundant am-
munition quickly to any front which may be
menaced. Thus, at the beginning of the war,
Krupp established a number of very impor-
tant branch munition factories, not only in
Bavaria but also in Bulgaria and Turkey.

The system of strategic railways and auto-
mobile roads in Pangermany is being every-
where developed with great speed, especially
in the Balkans and in Turkey, where it was
relatively rudimentary. Behind every mili-
tary front railways parallel to that front have
been multiplied, to the end that reinforce-
ments may be sent with the greatest, possible
haste to any sector threatened. All this has
already made Pangermany into a gigantic and
exceedingly strong fortress.

A new phase is also in course of preparation.
The Kaiser's General Staff, no longer content
with holding high command over the various
armies of Pangermany, also desires, as far as
is possible, to standardize their weapons, their

PANGERMANY IS MADE 57

munitions, and their methods of instruction.
Frederick Naumann, a deputy who is one of
the protagonists of " Mitteleuropa," is obvi-
ously preparing the way toward this end,
which, for geographical reasons, must first
touch Austria-Hungary. In the Vossische
Zeitung Naumann has advocated a "full and
complete community between the Central
Empires in matters concerning military or-
ganization." He adds firmly — and it is an
avowal worth remembering — " Mitteleuropa clearly
exists to-day; she only lacks the organs of
movement and action. These organs can be
given her by our two Emperors, since they
dispose of the elements which are fundamental
for the creation of a common army."* It is
evident that if this hypothesis of the standardi-
zation of the armies of the two Central Empires
is some day realized, neither Turkey nor Bul-
garia, whose whole military resources seem
likely to be used to their fullest extent by the
German General Staff, could prevent the ab-
sorption of their military organization into the
bosom of Pangermany.

It is easy to calculate the strength which the
latter would be able to control. Even if Ger-
many should evacuate Russia, Poland, Bel-

* Le Temps of June 28th, 1917.

58 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

gium, and France she would still include about
150 millions of inhabitants. As she has mo-
bilized about 20% of her own population and
of those of her allies who have become her
vassals, it is easy to see that central Panger-
many can count upon approximately 30 mil-
lions of soldiers.

Prussian militarism, whose annihilation by
the Allies is the true, the legitimate , and essential
aim of the war, has therefore become, by the carry-
ing out of the Hamburg -Persian Gulf plan, more
wide-spread and more active than it was in 1914.
The events which have already occurred, and
those which are foreshadowed, show, in addi-
tion, that Berlin, while pursuing with system-
atic ardor a peace campaign intended to dupe
and to separate the Allies, is taking every
measure possible to make Pangermany into a
fortress of a strength hitherto unknown.

CHAPTER V.

PACIFIST MAN(EUVRES TO KEEP THE HAMBURG-
PERSIAN GULF SCHEME FOR GERMANY AS A
MINIMUM RESULT OF THE WAR.

I. Strategic and economic conceptions of the German
General Staff upon which all pacifist manoeuvres
are based.

II. Separate peace to be made by Berlin with one of
the Entente. The trick of Alsace-Lorraine.

III. Separate peace to be made with the Entente by

Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary.

IV. The democratization of Germany.

V. Peace by the "Internationale" or Socialist party.
VI. The trick of an armistice.
VII. The Drawn Game, or "Peace without annexations

or indemnities."
VIII. What is Germany's word worth?

The mathematical and geographical evi-
dence given in the preceding chapter, which
establishes the fact that Pangermany is al-
ready nine-tenths made (see map p. 43) en-
ables us to see clearly why Germany has been
anxious, since the end of 1915, to conclude
peace. Berlin wants it simply because, as
the Frankfurter Zeitung said with the utmost
frankness at that time, the objects of the war
had been attained. In December, 1916, one

60 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

of her allies, Count Karolyi, speaking in the
Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, declared
that "Germany is fighting for Berlin-Bag-
dad."* Now the Berlin-Bagdad plan has
been substantially realized since the end of
1915, and the prolongation of the war (by
giving all the nations of the world who were
threatened by it time to understand the huge
danger of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, a for-
mula more exact than Berlin-Bagdad to explain
the framework of the whole Pangerman plan)
could only compromise and finally do away
with the enormous results already achieved
by Germany. The Berlin Government therefore
wants peace — but it wants a Pangerman peace,
which will leave Germany the greatest advantage
possible, whether through the seizures which she
has made at the expense of her own allies, or
through those which she has realized at the expense
of the Entente. As Major Moraht said bluntly
in the Berliner Tageblatt: "Our military lead-
ers are not in the habit of giving up what it
has cost us blood and sacrifice to gain."f

But, as a coalition of three-fourths of the
world was being organized, it* was thought at
Berlin that it would be skilful to appear to

* Le Journal de Geneve, December 30th, 1916.
t Le Matin, December 27th, 1915.

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 61

yield just enough to break up this world-wide
alliance. Germany therefore resolved to give
up — if it was absolutely necessary, and moreover
only for the moment — a fraction of the terri-
tories which she had invaded in the east and
those which she occupied in the west, in order
to make sure, by indirect means (which, how-
ever, should still have practical results) of those
Pangerman seizures and advantages which
were to her of vital importance. With this end
in view Berlin has thought out the most sub-
tle and ingenious manoeuvres, and is carrying
them on with untiring persistence, thanks to
her marvellous equipment for propaganda.

Her one and only aim is to divide and dupe
the Allies, that in the end she may at least
keep Central Pangermany — that is to say the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf — which is the result of
the hegemony established by Germany over Aus-
tria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, because of
the destruction of Serbia. For reasons which
will be given in Chapter VI, Central Panger-
many would provide Germany with all the
means to carry out in full, and within a short
time, her programme of universal domination.

62 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

I.

In order to grasp clearly the true meaning
of the German pacifist manoeuvres (which are
all only intended to secure possession of a
maximum amount of invaded territory and hold
seizures already made), we must have a clear
idea of the strategic and economic plans of
the General Staff at Berlin, upon which these
manoeuvres are based.

The Germans are intrenching themselves
more and more strongly on all the fronts of
Pangermany, which they have made into a gi-
gantic fortress (see map on p. 63), by accumu-
lating everywhere concrete trenches, deep-dug
underground shelters, fields of barbed wire,
machine-guns and heavy artillery, and by
mobilizing, as in Germany, about 20% of the
population of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey. Thanks to this organization, which
is particularly strong in the west, the Germans
hope to be able to continue resistance to the
Allies until the enemy grows weary of the
frightful struggle. The experience of the war
having proved how extremely difficult it is to
pierce strongly fortified lines, the German Gen-
eral Staff appears to have taken this knowl-
edge as the base of the following calculation:

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES

63

"We have achieved nine-tenths of the an-
nexations on which we counted; only Calais,
Verdun, Belfort, Riga, and Salonika are want-

64 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

ing. We will try to obtain possession of these
places if opportunity offers, if not, in order to
avoid excessive risks, we shall remain every-
where in Europe on a keen defensive, pretend-
ing all the time that we wish to attack, in
order to mislead our adversaries. If the Allies
insist on concentrating their efforts above all
against our lines of the eastern front, as these
lines are manifold and constantly strengthened
the enemy losses will be such that, even if they
succeed in making us fall back by successive
stages, their own forces will finally be so ut-
terly exhausted that they will not be able to
cross the Rhine. For that reason, therefore,
they will be powerless to dictate peace to Ger-
many, who will therefore remain mistress of
Central Pangermany under such conditions
that the Pangerman conquests in the west
may be definitely realized once for all after a
short respite."

This strategic conception, which seems to
be that of Hindenburg, is further based on the
following economic considerations: The enor-
mous fortress into which Pangermany has been
made comprises such a vast territory that it
contains, although undeveloped, all the food-
stuffs essential to Germany and her allies.
The only problem consists in creating an effec-

PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 65

tive organization quickly enough to draw out
these latent resources in time to have them
ready when they are needed. It is certain
that the measures recently taken by the
United States will make the blockade of the
Central Powers by sea very stringent. The
neutral States can only supply them to a lim-
ited extent. Until hostilities are over Ger-
many must go without certain products which
need years for their cultivation, but as she
has laid hands on more than half Roumania,
and has taken possession of exceedingly fertile,
although uncultivated, lands in the Balkans,
and also in Asia Minor, it will be possible for
her to prevent the food difficulty from reach-
ing an acute stage.

That is why, for the last two years, those
great tracts of country, whether already under
cultivation or still virgin, have been brought
gradually under intensive culture. The increas-
ing production of cereals in that rich Oriental
soil will solve the food problem.

Germany and her vassals will, no doubt, be
more or less pinched from an alimentary point
of view, but, contrary to the belief held in
many of the allied countries, they cannot be
actually starved. Besides, the effects of the
German submarine warfare, combined with the

66 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

anarchy which has been let loose in Russia
through German propaganda, will considerably
diminish the food supplies of Germany's ad-
versaries. Under these circumstances, and
above all, thanks to the resources of Panger-
many, Germany may hold out at least as long

as the Allies.

*
* *

It would seem that those must be substan-
tially the strategic and economic conceptions
upon which the German Staff grounds its
faith that the war can be carried on as long
as is necessary. But as prolongation of the
struggle carries with it the chances of various
serious contingencies, Berlin would like to
make an end of it under conditions allowing
her to reserve a maximum amount of her
seizures. That is the object of the German
pacifist manoauvres, some of the^ chief of
which are exposed above.

II.

It is clear that the defection of one of the
principal Allies would necessarily place the
others in vastly more difficult, positions for
continuing the struggle. Assuming that such
a thing were to happen, the Germans could,

PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 67

indeed, hope to discuss peace on the base of
the territories which they actually occupy.
It is for that reason that they have made re-
peated proposals for a separate peace to the
Russians, as Berlin especially dreads their
continuance in the war, on account of the in-
exhaustible reserves of man-power still con-
. tained in the old Empire of the Czars. The
moment will probably come when the Ger-
mans will also attempt to draw Italy out of
the coalition by offering her Trent and per-
haps even Trieste, at the expense of Austria;
the latter concession, however, in the mind of
Berlin, would be only for a very brief period.

The Germans desire so strongly to break up
the coalition at any price that we must be
prepared to see them go so far, when the time
comes, as to offer Alsace-Lorraine to France.

We may judge how sincere such a proposi-
tion would be by the words written by Maxi-
milian Harden early in 1915: "If France be-
lieves that peace is only possible through the
restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and if necessity
obliges us to sign such an agreement, the seventy
millions of our German people would soon tear
it up." * Nothing indeed would be easier
than for Germany, helped by the man-power

* Le Temps, February 9th, 1916.

68 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

of Central Pangermany, speedily to retake
Alsace-Lorraine, even if she ceded it for a
short time as a tactical measure.

The allied State which, contrary to its
solemn agreement, should separately treat with
Berlin would be punished for its infamy with-
out delay. By allowing Germany to conclude
peace more or less on the basis of the terri-
tories she holds at present, it would find itself
at once confronted by a formidable Germanic
Empire, and would inevitably soon become one
of its future victims.

III.

One of the most astute manoeuvres of Ber-
lin consists in secretly favoring — not perhaps
a treaty of peace formally signed — but official
negotiations for a separate peace between one
of her allies, Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-
Hungary — and the Entente.

The advantage to be gained from this arti-
fice will be readily seen from its bearing on
the definite consolidation of the Hamburg-
Persian Gulf, if one imagines the Allies con-
cluding a peace by negotiation, from weariness,
with Turkey, for instance. On this hypothesis,
the Allies could only treat with Germany's
liegemen at Constantinople, for all the other

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 69

elements having any value whatever in Turk-
ish politics are already suppressed. Now, if the
Allies were to deal with the Ottoman Govern-
ment, dripping with the blood of a million Ar-
menians, Greeks, and Arabs massacred whole-
sale because they were anti-Germanic and
friends of the Entente, the result of the negotia-
tion would be as follows: The Entente, by con-
doning the unheard-of crimes committed in Tur-
key would abandon her moral standards; she
could never again pretend that she was fighting
in the cause of civilization. The Turkish Gov-
ernment, which is notoriously made up of
assassins, would be officially recognized, and
the group of men who sold the Ottoman Em-
pire to Germany would be confirmed in power.
Their leader, Talaat Pacha, declared in the
Ottoman Chamber in February, 1917: "We
are bound to the Central Powers for life or
death." * The seizure of the Ottoman straits
by Germany, a strategic position of immense
and universal value, to be held by her accom-
plices, would be confirmed; the many agree-
ments signed in Berlin in January, 1917, estab-
lishing a stringent German protectorate over
all Turkey, would be in full force during a
Pangerman peace.

* Le Matin, February 17th, 1917.

70 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Bulgarian intrigues for a pretended sepa-
rate peace with the Allies have been at least
as numerous as Turkish manoauvres of the
same description. As a matter of fact, the
Bulgarian agents who were sent to Switzer-
land, apparently for the purpose of opening
tempting negotiations with the official rep-
resentatives of the Entente, were working in
concert with Berlin, and their real object was
to sound the Allies in order to find out to what
extent they were weary of the war. The Bul-
garians have never been really disposed to
make a treaty of peace with the Allies on any
equitable terms; they want a peace which
will insure them enormous advantages at the
expense of the Greeks, the Roumanians, and
above all the Serbians, for Sofia's chief desire
is to be in direct geographic contact with
Austria-Hungary. Therefore the Allies cannot
have dealings with Bulgaria without commit-
ting themselves to the infamy of sacrificing
their smaller Balkan allies and accepting terri-
torial conditions which would allow Bulgaria
to form a Pangerman bridge between Hungary
and Turkey, over the corpse of Serbia. This
bridge is indispensable to the working of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, and therefore to
Central Pangermany, and is precisely the result

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 71

of the war which Bulgaria wants most of all.
The King of Bulgaria declared in the Neues
Tageblatt of Stuttgart, in August, 1917: "The
economic future of Bulgaria depends on her
close connection with Germany and Austria." *
Further, Doctor Friedrich Naumann, one of
the most ardent advocates of the Hamburg-
Persian Gulf, said in a pamphlet which he pub-
lished at Berlin in 1916, under the title of Bui-
garia and Mitteleuropa, that he had found from
investigations made in Bulgaria that the pros-
pect of a close union with the Germanic Empires
was hailed with real enthusiasm.

A peace made by negotiation between the
Allies and Bulgaria, which would in reality be
a peace made because of weariness, would only
lend further sanction to these conditions.

It is also true that a peace by negotiation
between the Allies and Austria-Hungary could
only definitely consolidate the Hamburg-Per-
sian Gulf. Both from a military and from
a financial standpoint the monarchy of the
Hapsburgs is, as a State, absolutely dependent
on Germany. The Hapsburg Emperor, no
matter what his own feelings may be, can do
nothing without Hohenzollern consent. Any
peace signed by Vienna would have its condi-

* Le Matin, August 14th, 1917.

72 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

tions practically arranged by Berlin. It is
well to have no illusions. Only a complete vic-
tory by the Allies will force Germany to give up
her seizure of Austria-Hungary, for that seizure
is to her the indispensable result of the war.

It is that seizure which, because of its geo-
graphic, military, and economic value insures
to Berlin domination over the Balkans and the
Orient, and therefore over Central Panger-
many and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf strip,
with all the momentous consequences which
their possession entails.

Let us be firmly assured that all attempts at
a separate peace on the part of Turkey, Bul-
garia, or Austria-Hungary which have taken
place already or which may take place in the
future are only, and can only be, manoeuvres
having in view a peace said to be by negotiation,
which would be merely a cloak for a peace not
only German but Pangerman.

Furthermore, the Allies should clearly un-
derstand that if they really wish to destroy
Prussian militarism, so that it cannot again
exist, they must at the same time put an end
to the neo-imperialism of the Turks and Pan-
islamists, Balkan imperialism in Bulgaria, Aus-
trian imperialism at Salonika, and the feudal
imperialism of the Magyars — that is to say, four

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 73

secondary imperialisms, dangerous in a high
degree, as they are the complements of German
imperialism, and would, if allowed to exist, per-
mit a revival of Prussian militarism.

Now, these four secondary imperialisms can-
not possibly be destroyed by a peace by nego-
tiation, which would only be the outcome of war-
weariness ; they must perish through a military
victory on the part of the Allies — that is to say,
by intelligent strength serving the cause of justice.

IV.

As some of the allied groups appeared to
believe that the "democratization" of Ger-
many would suffice to end Prussianism and Ger-
man imperialism automatically, Berlin came
to the conclusion that at least a certain part
of them, tired of fighting, would content them-
selves with merely nominal amends, in order
to end the war. That is the reason why Ber-
lin, in order to throw dust in the eyes of the
Allies, and make them willing to enter into
negotiations, lent herself increasingly, during
the first six months of 1917, to the comedy
of "the democratization of Germany." Dur-
ing this period the most avowed Pangermans
bridled their utterances. They spoke no more

74 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

of annexations nor of war indemnities. They
only talked of "special political organizations,"
which in their own minds meant the same re-
sult, but which had the advantage of not
hindering the action of those pacifists in the
allied countries who wanted peace at any price.
The manoeuvre of the "democratization of
Germany" was supplemented by that of the
Stockholm congress, which, as we know, was
above all meant to convince Russian Socialists
that Russia had nothing to gain by going on
with the war, since Germany in her turn was
firmly resolved to tread the path of democ-
racy, etc.

We must acknowledge that many of the
Allies were, for a time, taken in by this
game, and honestly believed that Germany
meant seriously to undertake internal reforms.
But when these tactics had had the tremen-
dous result of letting anarchy loose in Russia
(a state of things which was at once taken
advantage of by the General Staff of Berlin),
the comedy of "the democratization of Ger-
many" was withdrawn. The Chancellor, Beth-
mann-Hollweg, was sacrificed because it was
necessary to stop a movement which he had
been directing, and was replaced by Michaelis,
Hindenburg's man, who therefore stood for the

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 75

Prussian military party and ultra-Pangerman-
ism.

As this manoeuvre of the "democratization
of Germany" is sure to be tried many times,
it is in the highest degree important that the
Allies should not again be duped by it. They
can never sufficiently safeguard themselves
against bad faith on Germany's part. Should
a German republic be established, the result
would, no doubt, be serious, but even then the
most positive and most effective measures should
be taken by the Allies themselves, if they really
wish to put an end to huge armaments and prevent
any recrudescence of German militarism.

Good sense would seem to indicate the de-
struction of all German munition factories as
among the most important of these measures
on the part of the Allies; destruction which
would only be complete if the Allies did it
themselves or had it done under their direct
supervision. Without that indispensable pre-
caution— to say nothing of many others — the
sacrifices of the Allies during the war would
have been made in vain.

Indeed, the Germans have always had such
an inveterate taste for rapine that they are
perfectly capable of forming a great military
republic and submitting themselves volun-

76 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

tarily to Prussian discipline in order to be able
to start new and great wars for the sake of
plunder.

This truth should be ever in our minds. If,
in Mirabeau's words, the Hohenzollerns have
been able to make war "the national in-
dustry" of the Germans, it is because, since
the beginning of history, the Germans have
always subordinated everything else to their
passion for lucrative fighting. And such is still
the case. For the last twenty years especially
the Berlin Government has instilled into the
people that the creation of Pangermany would
insure them great material advantages. It is
because that conviction is firmly rooted in their
minds that almost all the Socialist workmen
serve the Kaiser without flinching, and are
content to suffer all the horrors of the present
war so long as they are not defeated by force
of arms.

"During the war," said M. E. Laskine,*
"the organs of the workmen's syndicates have
given the most constant and solid support to
the policy of aggression and conquest. The
Internationale Korrespondenz, published in the
name of the General Commission of Syndi-
cates by Legien and Bauermeister, affirms that

* Le Matin, August 27th, 1917.

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 77

Germany has a right to 'solid guarantees,'
whether furnished by annexations or by 'eco-
nomic ties.' Emil Kloth, president of the
syndicate of bookbinders, was applauded by
the Kreuzzeitung, the organ of the Junker
squires, for declaring himself as opposed to
the independence of Belgium. On the 24th
of October, 1914, we might have read in the
Kurier, which is the mouthpiece of the power-
ful syndicate of transportation workers, this
statement: 'The German flag now floats over
the towers of Antwerp — let us hope forever.9 '

Thus even the German Social Democrats use
glibly expressions such as "solid guarantees"
and "economic ties," which, in their practical
application, insure the consolidation of Cen-
tral Pangermany. It is impossible to doubt
that the Pangerman spirit has penetrated into
the very soul of the German working classes.
As this state of feeling has been in accord with
German psychology for hundreds of years, we
should be singularly credulous to imagine that
a few measures of "democratization," more
formal than actual, could change the mental
attitude of the German people. To obtain this
result other and more appropriate measures
must be taken.

78 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

V.

Peace through the Internationale is yet an-
other device invented at Berlin. In fact, as
the Internationale has always followed the
guidance of the German Marxists, it has been
the chief means employed during the last
thirty years to deceive the Socialists of the
countries now allied, by making them believe
that, thanks precisely to the Internationale,
war could never come again. In a report upon
"The International Relations of German Work-
men's Unions," published in Berlin by Hey-
mann in 1914, the Imperial Bureau of Statistics
could announce, on p. 19, as an incontestable
truth, that "In almost all international organ-
izations German influence is predominant."*

The proposed congress at Stockholm, which
was suggested by German agents, and that at
Berne, for which they are working now, are
measures set on foot by German syndicalism
in order to regain in all countries the German
influence which has been lost by the war. It
is a question of subjecting the proletariat of
the world to German guidance. The end offi-
cially avowed is to restore the Internationale in
the interests of democracy, but as a matter of

* M. E. Laskine; Le Matin, August 27th, 1917.

PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 79

fact it is above all to bring class antagonism
again to the fore in all the allied countries, in
order to destroy the sacred union which alone
will allow parties of widely differing opinions
to carry on the war against Pangerman Ger-
many with vigor. The government of Berlin
is well aware that it has nothing to fear from
its Socialists, of whom the great majority, even
when they refuse to call themselves Panger-
mans, are in favor of Central Pangermany.
Any profit from this manoeuvre, based on the
Internationale, would accrue to Germany, who
would keep her powers of moral resistance in-
tact, while the allied States, again the prey of
the most intense social disruptions, would find
their powers of offensive so diminished that
peace would finally be made on the basis of
the actual German occupations of territory.

VI.

All the foregoing manoeuvres, whether em-
ployed separately or in combination, are in-
tended to play the "armistice trick" on the
Allies. This is the result of crafty calculation,
founded on the fatigue of the combatants,
which is easily to be explained by such an ex-
hausting war. Berlin follows this reasoning,

80 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

which has a certain psychological merit: "If
an armistice were signed, the allied soldiers
would think: 'They are talking, therefore it
means peace, and demobilization will soon fol-
low.' Under these conditions the effect will
be the moral slackening of our adversaries."
The Germans could not ask for anything better.
They would open peace negotiations with the
following astute idea: Assuming that the Allies
committed the enormous mistake of discussing
peace on such treacherous terms, Germany,
still intrenched behind her fronts, which would
have been rendered almost impregnable, would
end by saying to the Allies: "I don't agree
with you. After all you cannot exact of me
that I should evacuate territories from which
you are powerless to drive me. If you are not
satisfied, continue the war." As, while nego-
tiations were pending, all needful steps would
have been taken by German agents to aggra-
vate the moral slackening of the soldiers of the
allied country which had felt the strain of the
war most (as they succeeded in doing in Rus-
sia, during the first days of the revolution),
the huge military machine of the Allies could
not again be put in motion as a whole. The
real result would be, in fact, the rupture of
the anti-Germanic coalition, and finally the

PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 81

conclusion of a peace based nearly on actual
occupation. Berlin would thus have gained
her end.

VII.

The last German manoeuvre, and the most
dangerous of all, is one which I foresaw in the
beginning of 1916 as likely to be attempted as
soon as Germany found it necessary to make
peace quickly, in order, above all, to save the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf. I said then: "Peti-
tions against territorial annexations will be
multiplied on the other side of the Rhine. In
an underhand way they will be favored by the
government of Berlin, which will end by saying
to the Allies: 'Let us stop killing each other.
I am perfectly reasonable. I give up my
claims on such of your territories as are occu-
pied by my armies. Let us negotiate peace
on the basis of the "drawn game."

This was exactly what happened when
about April, 1917, the snare of the "drawn
game" was hidden under the formula of
"peace without annexations or indemnities,"
which the government of Berlin suggested to
the Russian Socialists through the innumerable
agents which she maintains in the former Em-
pire of the Czars. This formula has since then

82 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

been the basis of so much discussion that it is
of the highest importance to show in a sep-
arate chapter what in reality lurks behind
those words, "peace without annexations or
indemnities." It is certain that if the trick
of "the apparently drawn game" should suc-
ceed it would, in reality, conceal a formida-
ble success for Germany and an irremediable
catastrophe for the Allies and for the freedom
of the world.

VIII.

Repeated lessons from German history, and
those which have been learned in the present
war, make it imperative that the Allies should
not put the slightest confidence in the Ger-
mans. The treaties which they sign in the
most solemn manner are only "scraps of
paper," the obligations of which they only re-
spect in the measure of their own interest.
This is overwhelmingly proved by Berlin's
cynical violation of the treaty guaranteeing
the neutrality of Belgium, which was signed in
London by Prussia on June 26th, 1831. It is a
fact that the Germans, almost to a man, only
respect might; and this they proclaim them-
selves. Referring to the submarine warfare
on the coast of Norway, the Frankfurter Zeitung

PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 83

did not hesitate to say: "Justice no longer ex-
ists. Only strength counts, and we have still
strength to spare. Norway has felt it."

The Kaiser himself, in the course of a con-
versation about submarine warfare with Mr.
Gerard, the American ambassador at Berlin,
said to him: " There are no more interna-
tional laws." f A Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin announced to Mr. Gerard that: "We
care nothing for treaties." J On July 10th,
1917, the Reichstag passed a vote for a so-
called amicable peace, without annexations,
which the Chancellor then seemed to approve.
But when the results of this manoeuvre, com-
bined with the measure called the "democrati-
zation of Germany," were shown by the letting
loose of Russian anarchy, and the adhesion to
the principles of the Stockholm congress by
some groups of French and English Socialists
who were particularly credulous, and ignorant
of the formidable realities of the war map, the i
Chancellor, Michaelis, declared on August
22d, before a committee of the Reichstag: "I
never said that I agreed with the peace reso-
lution which was proposed by the parties

* Le Temps, November 19th, 1916.
t Le Matin, August 16th, 1917.
$ Le Temps, August 10th, 1917.

84 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

forming a majority in the Reichstag and
adopted by that assembly on the 19th of last
July. In any case, I wish to state that I did
not accept any terms of peace, as I must natu-
rally reserve my freedom of action for peace nego-
tiations"* As the cynicism of this speech
was considered likely to hinder further peace
manoeuvres, the Chancellor pretended later
that he had only made a slip of the tongue,
and that he upheld the peace formula voted
by the Reichstag on July 19th. After words
as plain as those used by him on August 22d,
this excuse of a lapsus linguae can only cheat
those who wish to be cheated.

This incident, coming after so many others,
and after such a number of unquestioned facts,
does not leave the least room for hesitation.
The Allies should be convinced that no faith can
be placed in the German word. All the pacifist
manoeuvres of Berlin have but one object-
to separate and dupe the Allies by means of
negotiations which will be followed by a re-
fusal to accept the terms apparently agreed
upon, and Germany will hold her positions on
the war map, and at least Central Pangermany.
In the end of 1916 the Frankfurter Zeitung
warned its readers very plainly of the exact

* Le Journal, August 24th, 1917.

PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 85

spirit in which all German pacifist manoeuvres
should be undertaken: "This is the point of
view to-day: to formulate our demands pre-
cisely in the East, and in the West to negotiate
on a basis which may be modified. Negotia-
tion is not synonymous with renunciation"*

To sum up: Unless they are willing to be
frightfully and unpardonably duped, the Allies
will not allow themselves to be taken in by any
German manoeuvres framed to induce them to
negotiate before they have gained a military
victory, of which the first proof having any
real value will be the retirement of all German
officers and soldiers from: 1. All the invaded
territories of the Entente. 2. All the terri-
tories in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey,
and any parts of Central Pangermany now held
under military occupation by the Germans as
a result of the war.

*L'Echo de Paris, December 30th, 1916.

CHAPTER VI.

THE "DRAWN GAME"; THE INSIDIOUS SNARE OF
THE FORMULA, "PEACE WITHOUT ANNEXA-
TIONS OR INDEMNITIES."

I. How the hypothesis is brought forward.
II. Cost of the war much greater to the Allies than to
the Germans.

III. The struggle has allowed Germany to obtain enor-

mous advantages in the present and for the future.

IV. The war has brought the Allies only losses.

V. Consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan in

regard to Russia and Asia.

VI. The blatant falsehood of the formula, "Peace with-
out annexations or indemnities."

VII. The formidable danger of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf
plan to the Allies.

I.

It is important first of all to have a clear idea
how and under what circumstances the hy-
pothesis of the "drawn game," or "peace with-
out annexations or indemnities" has been pre-
sented. This formula was proposed to the
Russians by the numerous agents whom the
Germans had been able to smuggle into the
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates
of Petrograd at the beginning of the revolu-
tion. This amazing manoeuvre met with suc-

86

THE "DRAWN GAME" 87

cess because in this famous Soviet there were
rank traitors, unmasked later, like Lenine and
his accomplices, and also Socialists who were
well-meaning but so densely ignorant, not only
of the Pangerman plan, but even of what was
important and necessary for Russia, that in a
few weeks their ardent but unpractical plans
had gravely aggravated the Russian situation,
already serious enough under the Czar, and
had plunged their country not only into an-
archy, but also into extraordinary difficulties,
political, financial, and economic. Whatever
the reason, on March 28th, 1917, the Soviet
proclaimed the formula, "peace without an-
nexations or indemnities," with which it had
been supplied from Berlin. On June 12th,
1917, the imperialistic German Socialists who
had been delegated to Stockholm by the
Kaiser's government also declared for the
adoption of a programme of peace, with "nei-
ther annexations nor indemnities." On July
19th, 1917, at the intervention of Erzberger,
one of its deputies, the Reichstag voted a peace
resolution "rejecting the idea of acquiring ter-
ritory by force," and declared that "the
Reichstag seeks an amicable peace. . . . Any
violent action, political, economic, or social, is
incompatible with such a peace."

88 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Now this formula, due to the intervention of
the deputy Erzberger, rejecting any idea of
"annexations or indemnities," was intended to
be combined with the intervention of the Pope,
which had been already arranged by this same
Erzberger. Indeed, in the spring of 1917,
therefore several months before the vote of
the Reichstag on July 19th, Erzberger founded
"the Catholic International Peace League" in
Switzerland. This organization, which was
made up of Germans, Austrians, and a few
Swiss Catholics, was directed by Erzberger,
and its object was to bring pressure to bear
upon the Vatican. A deputation from this
league went to Rome in June, 1917, to beseech
the Pope to make proposals of peace. On Au-
gust 1st, 1917, Pope Benedict XV (who had in
the meantime been implored to intervene by
the Emperor and Empress of Austria) advanced
in his turn the formula of "peace without an-
nexations or indemnities"; he was noticeably
careful not to condemn the crimes of Ger-
many, and said nothing about the many for-
midable Oriental problems. The Messagero of
Rome explained this silence: "Benedict XV
thinks that the door of the East should be left
open, or at least ajar, for Austria-Hungary, and
through her for Germany. Complete restitu-

THE "DRAWN GAME" 89

tion of territory to Serbia and Roumania would
mean that the highway of the Danube has
been brought back into ante-bellum condi-
tions, and that the road to the East is barred
in the same way as before the war." * It is
true that in his letter the Pope only made a
clear pronouncement as to the restitutions to
be made by Germany in the west and the
east; he said absolutely nothing as to the ter-
ritories necessary for maintaining Central Pan-
germany. That is an essential fact which it is
necessary to notice and to remember. It must
also be noted that some groups of French and
English Socialists, as ignorant as their Russian
brethren concerning the realities of the war
map and the Pangerman plan, have also
adopted the formula of "peace without an-
nexations or indemnities," evidently not un-
derstanding its formidable consequences, po-
litical, economic, and military, which will be
set forth later. It is certain that the effect of
an intensive German propaganda has been to
have this formula of "peace without annexa-
tions or indemnities" (which is part of the
vast encircling manoeuvre of Berlin) adopted
both by the most anarchistic of the Russian
maximalists, and by the most ultramontane

* Le Temps, August 18th, 1917.

90 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

followers of the Vatican. On the face of it,
the German formula, which is summed up in
the words "the drawn game," would seem to
mean that each country should keep the same
frontiers as before the war; also that each
country should bear the burden of the outlays
it had made during the struggle.

But in order to prove beyond doubt and
most emphatically what is really concealed
in this apparent German concession, we will
argue on a hypothesis infinitely more favorable
for the western Allies than that of the "drawn
game." We will suppose (see map on p. 91)
that Germany should declare herself finally
disposed, not only to evacuate altogether Po-
land, the French departments, Belgium, and
Luxemburg, but also to restore Alsace-Lorraine
to France, and even, let us still further suppose, to
give as an indemnity all the rest of the left bank
of the Rhine, under the sole and tacit condition
that Germany should keep her preponderating
influence, direct or indirect, over Austria-Hun-
gary, the Balkans and Turkey.

If matters are probed to the bottom it will
be easily seen that, should the Allies negotiate
peace with Germany on such a basis, the resti-
tution of Alsace-Lorraine could only be tem-
porary, for a peace like that would secure to

THE "DRAWN GAME"

91

Germany all the elements of power which
would allow her, after a very short respite, to
retake Alsace-Lorraine, and in the end to over-

92 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

come all the Allies and to achieve in its en-
tirety the Pangerman plan, not only in Europe
but in Asia, and even throughout the world.

To give up the left bank of the Rhine, ac-
cording to our hypothesis, would mean for
Germany the loss of 47,450 square kilometres,
and 10 million inhabitants. The present Ger-
man Empire would therefore be reduced to
493,408 square kilometres and 58 million in-
habitants. But this loss in the west would
be far more than counterbalanced by the close
union of Austria-Hungary to the German Em-
pire, which would be none the less real because
it would be disguised. On this reckoning Ber-
lin's influence would be exercised directly and
absolutely over the German Empire, curtailed
in the west, with 493,408 square kilometres
and 58 million inhabitants, and Austria-Hun-
gary, with 676,616 square kilometres and 50
million inhabitants.

It is evident that a solid block of States,
established in Central Europe under the di-
rection of Berlin, would exercise, simply by
contiguity, an absolutely preponderant pres-
sure on 499,275 square kilometres in the Bal-
kans, with a population of 22 millions, and in

THE "DRAWN GAME" 93

Turkey on 1,792,000 square kilometres, with
a population of 20 millions, making a total of
2,291,275 square kilometres, holding 42 million
inhabitants.

Therefore Berlin's preponderating influence
would be wielded, directly or indirectly, over
3,461,299 square kilometres, holding 172 mil-
lions of inhabitants. We now see clearly that
in the end the trick of the "drawn game"
would really lead to the consolidation of Cen-
tral Pangermany, as summed up in the formula
Hamburg-Persian Gulf, resulting in formidable
consequences, financial, political, and economic.
As these would be felt universally, it is impor-
tant that we should fully realize them.

II.

Because it was planned long ago, and there-
fore slowly prepared for, the war has cost Ger-
many infinitely less than it has her adversa-
ries. There are six fundamental reasons which
combine to give Berlin the advantage, and are
consequently detrimental to the Allies.

1. Germany has not had to suffer from the
effects of improvising war material, which is
always ruinously expensive.

2. Workmen's wages in Germany, judging

94 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANLA

from peace times, are lower than those paid in
the allied countries.

3. Careful German preparedness enabled
them to avoid enormous waste of raw mate-
rials in munition factories and in food supplies.

4. Two millions of prisoners and nearly 42
million inhabitants of the territories occupied
by the Germans give them a prodigious amount
of almost free labor on which to draw, and of
this they avail themselves largely.

5. The iron, coal, and copper mines and the
petroleum wells seized by the Germans in Po-
land, Serbia, Belgium, and France allow them
to make munitions at a comparatively low net
cost.

6. The geographical conditions of Panger-
many are such that German transportation of
every sort is infinitely cheaper than with the
Allies.

These six factors affect the general expenses
of the war to a very large degree. It is posi-
tive that Germany is running the war under
conditions much less onerous than those of
the Allies.

This is easily further proved by a couple of
figures. During the three years of the war
Germany, with 68 million inhabitants, has
spent about 115 milliards, while France, with

THE "DRAWN GAME" 95

only 40 million, has spent 100 milliards. In
France the State has therefore spent at the
rate of nearly 2,500 francs a head, while the
German State has spent only about 1,690
francs a head. A comparison of the relative
war expenses of the two groups of belligerents
will make this demonstration yet more striking.

III.

Setting aside the inevitable losses which
Germany, like any belligerent, has suffered be-
cause of the war, such as the stoppage of ex-
portations with the consequent heavy fall in
exchange, loss of ships, etc., we must bear
clearly in mind that Germany alone, of all the
combatants, has made profits which far exceed
her losses.

This question of the advantages which Ger-
many has secured from the war, both in the
present and for the future, is (if conditions
such as they are now should continue) of such
paramount importance that it amounts to a
special and separate subject. In this book I
can only point out that these profits are mainly
due to seven chief causes.

First source of war profits: The stupendous
amount of plunder seized by the Germans in the

96 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

500,000 square kilometres which they hold in
Montenegro, in Albania, in Serbia, in Rouma-
nia, in Russia, in Belgium, and in France.

This booty is made up of human beings and
supplies of various kinds, such as free labor,
military stores, foodstuffs, minerals, raw and
manufactured materials, movable objects such
as art treasures and jewels, forced contribu-
tions, specie, and securities, and has been sys-
tematically collected by the Germans for the
past three years. It certainly represents a
value of several tens of billions of francs. The
value of the territories occupied by Germany,
judging by estimates made before the war,
may be reckoned at about 155 billions of
francs.

Second source of war profits: Pangerman
mortgages on her allies held by Berlin. Ger-
many has turned the war to account by swin-
dling her own allies; in order to enable them
to carry on the war (always, moreover, to her
advantage) she has made them loans which
were not burdensome to her, since they were
only oil paper. Now, by the effect of these
loans (which, considering the circumstances
and the terms of their fulfilment, constitute a
new form of "kolossal" knavery) Austria-Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, which represent

THE "DRAWN GAME" 97

a total of 2,583,000 square kilometres, and
which are countries, as the map on p. 43 shows,
indispensable to the carrying out of Central Pan-
germany and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, are
heavily mortgaged for the benefit of Germany.
These mortgages are combined with economic
or political agreements made during the war
between the government at Berlin on the one
hand, and those of Vienna, Budapest, Sofia,
and Constantinople on the other. The trea-
ties signed at Berlin on January llth, 1917,
may be especially instanced, as they practically
put Turkey under a German protectorate.
The result of these loans and agreements (to
which should be added military direction by
the General Staff of Berlin) has been to put
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whose
national riches were valued before the war at
about 269 billion francs, absolutely under the
hegemony of Prussia.

Third source of war profits: The value of the
sole right to develop the latent resources of the
Balkans and Turkey. The Balkans and the
Ottoman Empire contain enormous riches, both
mineral and agricultural, which are still unde-
veloped, and therefore not yet estimated.
The treaties made during the war between
Berlin, Sofia, and Constantinople practically

98 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

put this development almost wholly into Ger-
man hands.

Fourth source of war profits: Value resulting
from the creation of economic Pangermany. It
is clear that if the economic Pangermany (see
Chapter IV., II.), based on the Hamburg-Per-
sian Gulf, which the Germans are beginning to
organize, is to endure and fulfil its natural
consequences, the trade and industry of every
other country in the world will find it abso-
lutely .impossible to struggle against so for-
midable an organization. The fact that Ger-
many has laid hands on the territory of
economic Pangermany, which is intended to be
a permanent source of wealth, may surely be
considered a war profit. It is true that this
profit cannot be estimated in exact figures,
but their sum must certainly be gigantic.

Fifth source of war profits: The value of mili-
tary Pangermany (see Chapter IV., III.), as this
is a guarantee of the duration of economic Pan-
germany.

Sixth source of war profits: The value of the
enormous economic profits which Pangermany
will make for Germany at the expense of Russia.

It stands to reason that if Pangermany is to
exist by cutting Europe in two, her economic
and military pressure will be irresistible in the

THE "DRAWN GAME" 99

east. Russia will finally break up into groups
of anarchical republics, and Germany's influ-
ence will predominate in the development of
the enormous immense natural wealth of Euro-
pean and Asiatic Russia.

Seventh source of war profits : The substitution
of Germany for France, in 21 billion francs at
least of French loans to Russia, Austria-Hun-
gary, the Balkans, and Turkey, these loans pass-
ing as a matter of fact to Germany in conse-
quence of the establishment of Central Pan-
germany. The variety of these war profits is
so great and the mortgages which they impose
upon the present and the future so far-reaching
that it is impossible to calculate them exactly,
but if we could do so the total sum would
surely be extraordinary.

In three years of war Germany has only
spent about 115 billions of francs. If in our
minds we deduct this sum from that of her
war profits one may well imagine that, count-
ing the present and looking to the future, she
has made hundreds of billions. Therefore the
war still going on has brought Germany greater
material advantages than any war recorded in
history has given to a nation.

100 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

IV.

If, on the one hand, the war has allowed
Germany to make enormous gains up to the
present time, on the other it has brought
only heavy losses to the Allies, who found
themselves suddenly forced to resist her
attack.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
peace were concluded with Berlin on the basis
of the "drawn game," which allows of no in-
demnities. Each one of the Allies would have
to bear, without any reduction, the immense
expenses which have been incurred to maintain
a war imposed on it by Germany.

These expenses have been particularly heavy
for exactly opposite reasons from those given
above (see II.), which show how little, rela-
tively, the war has cost Germany. Besides,
the Allies are bound to take care of and to
maintain millions of refugees from invaded
regions, whereas the Germans have only tem-
porarily borne such a burden and merely in a
small part of eastern Prussia. After the war
Belgium, Russia, and especially France will
have to provide some tens of billions of francs'
worth of extra charges for repairs of the enor-
mous damages done by the Germans in invaded

THE "DRAWN GAME" 101

territories, to private persons, State proper-
ties, railways, roads, etc. The Germans would
not have a similar outlay, at least not in any-
thing like the same proportion. In their con-
ception of the "drawn game" the Germans
certainly reckon that these financial differ-
ences would almost insure, after peace, the
ultimate impotence of the allied countries with
regard to Pangermany.

What, for instance, would be the position of
France if a war indemnity were not paid to
her? A few familiar figures will enable us to
form an opinion on that score. As I have
said, in the first three years of the war France
has spent about 100 billion francs. As soon as
peace was concluded she would need at least
30 billion to repair the enormous damages
done to private individuals or to the State;
and when the railways, roads, etc., had been
put in good order again the total sum expended
would probably be about 130 billions of francs.
The national debt of France, which before the
war amounted to 30 billion, would therefore
be at least 160 billion. (This is not counting
the fourth year of the war, which will cost at
least 36 billion.)

In 1914 the budget of France was, in round
numbers, 5 billion francs. After the war, if

102 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

only on account of the increased cost of living,
this sum must be increased at least 10%;
therefore the budget will have a first augmen-
tation of 500 million. Besides, this same bud-
get will have to carry the interest at 5% on
the 130 billions of new debt contracted during
the war, amounting to an annual payment of
6 billion 500 million. The pensions to be paid
to disabled men and to soldiers' widows would
add at least 2 billion more. (These figures are
probably far below what they would be ac-
tually.)

Therefore, the 5-billion budget of 1914 would
be almost trebled by the addition of 9 billion,
making 14 billion in all. This formidable
sum would not leave any funds available for
carrying out important social reforms nor for
the very considerable improvements which
would be necessary in order to bring the eco-
nomic equipment of France up to the standard
necessary for an intensive revival of her eco-
nomic life.

How would it be possible in France to raise
9 billions of francs each year by additional
taxation after a struggle in which her people
had been cruelly decimated, and when all her
industrial machinery would need complete re-
organization ? It is clear that the most crush-

THE "DRAWN GAME" 103

ing taxes levied on every person would not
suffice to provide such a sum regularly.

Such a situation must inevitably tend to
create heavy financial difficulties for the State
and for each individual Frenchman. The same
would apply to economic undertakings. Thou-
sands of share or bond holders would be in a
most precarious condition, as securities would
be immensely depreciated. Landed property,
overburdened by taxes and seriously affected
by the shortage of labor, would lose a great
part of its value.

This situation would lead to an enormous
general rise in the cost of living, and to unend-
ing difficulties which would make the life of
every Frenchman well-nigh intolerable.

Now, this financial situation, which is al-
ready beginning to exist for the Russians,
would also be the lot of the English and the
Italians. As to Belgium, Roumania, and Ser-
bia, it is easy to see that the formula "without
indemnity," if adopted, would be enough to
prevent entirely any reconstruction of those
unfortunate countries.

It is upon these immense financial distur-
bances, which would be still further aggravated by
the commercial competition of economic Panger-
many (whose efficiency would grow with the

104 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

growth of her organization) that the Germans are
counting, their object being to reduce the Allies
to economic slavery from which there will be no
appeal, should peace be concluded on the basis of
the "drawn game."

Now, would it not be a monstrous iniquity
that the people of France, England, Russia,
and Italy should be condemned for tens of
years to terrible poverty and to a condition of
servitude like that which exists to-day in the
occupied territory of France, Belgium, Serbia,
etc., simply to gratify the execrable ambi-
tion of the flohenzollerns, and also, no matter
what may be said to the contrary, that of the
majority of the German people, who, because
they have long been Pangermanists, wish to
condemn the rest of Europe to slavery? It is
the plain truth that only a complete victory
can save the allied countries from absolute
financial ruin, because Germany alone will be
able to pay the costs of the struggle which she
has precipitated. As she is responsible for
the war she already owes to the united Al-
lies a colossal sum, which may be estimated
roundly at between 350 and 400 billions of
francs. Even if the credit of the German
Empire, as a State, is doomed to disappear on
the day of her defeat, the material riches of

THE "DRAWN GAME" 105

Germany, which are very considerable, will
still continue. Herr Helfferich himself valued
them in 1914 at about 412 billions of francs.

Of course Germany will only be able to pay
her fabulous debt very gradually. But when
means for collecting the German revenues shall
have been systematically and attentively stud-
ied by the victorious Allies, when these collec-
tions of revenue shall have become assured (of
course not by written German promises, worth-
less scraps of paper, but by real guarantees in
harmony with those precedents of history
which the government of Berlin strongly con-
tributed to establish in 1870), Germany will be
perfectly able to hand to each of the great
Allied victors about 2 billions of francs a
year, while still keeping enough for her own
subsistence. This annuity, thanks to modern
financial combinations, will be sufficient to
allow each Allied State to raise annual loans at
relatively low rates and therefore easily pro-
curable, and will permit each State to spare
its citizens the burden of taxes which would be
not only crushing but fatal and inevitable if it
had to relinquish the hope of being recouped
for its war expenses by Germany.

Now this solution, which conforms to the
most elementary justice, and which, I insist, is

106 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

indispensable in order to avert the ruin of the
Allied States, which have defended the civiliza-
tion of the world against German barbarism,
would be rendered impossible by a peace through
negotiation, concluded on the basis of the for-
mula "peace without annexations and without
indemnities," which, as can be proved, would
practically allow Germany to keep the Ham-
burg-Persian Gulf and most of her profits
from the war.

V. .

The Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, by its
mere existence, involves results which cannot
be escaped and which must be frankly con-
sidered.

1st. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Russia.
It must be evident to every sane mind that if
an economic and military Central Pangermany,
dividing Europe into two parts, should be per-
manently established, no really independent
Russian federal republic could be formed. The
results which German agitation has already
obtained in Russia suffice to show that the
steady threefold pressure — geographic, eco-
nomic, and military — of Central Pangermany
would, from force of circumstances, insure the
final success of the Teutonic intrigues having

THE "DRAWN GAME" 107

for their object the disintegration of the vast
Russian provinces, according to the plan of
Lenine, into a series of republics, which con-
stant anarchy would keep under the permanent
influence of German agents. The practical
outcome of this state of things from an eco-
nomic point of view would be the preponder-
ance of Germany's influence in the develop-
ment of the immense natural riches of European
and Asiatic Russia, and from a political stand-
point its extension as far as the Pacific Ocean.

German hegemony would thus be expanded,
under forms more or less disguised, but never-
theless effective (besides those of Central Pan-
germany) over the 180 million inhabitants of
the present Russia. Therefore 350 millions of
human beings, more or less, occupying a vast
territory containing inexhaustible mineral and
alimentary riches, and geographically controlled
by Central Pangermany, would be guided and
inspired from Berlin.

2nd. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Pan-
Islamism. Maintenance of the Hamburg-Per-
sian Gulf would allow the government of
Berlin to set on foot a political and military
Pan-Islamist movement which would help Ger-
many to consolidate her victory by putting the
Allied European Powers entirely at her mercy,

108 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

since these hold among their possessions numer-
ous Moslem subjects: France, particularly in
Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco; Italy in Libya;
Russia in the Crimea and in the Caucasus, in
the region of Kazan, in Central Asia, and in
Siberia; England in Egypt, in India, in Burma,
in the Straits Settlements, and in the greater
part of her, African colonies.

As Pan-Islamism is ostensibly founded on the
restoration and wide extension of the influence
and powers of the Sultan of Constantinople,
Commander of the Faithful, it could not fail
to flatter deeply the neo-nationalism of the
Turks, which has manifested itself particularly
since the failure of the Allies at the Darda-
nelles. The result is that, thanks to Pan-
Islamists, the Kaiser's interests are well served
by the Sultan's Moslem subjects; a clever
propaganda has dazzled their eyes with a pros-
pect of the restoration of an empire even
greater than in days of old.

No doubt the Moslem insurrection has not
become general, but the Islamic agitation has
nevertheless yielded local results which will
be better understood after the war, and which
have hampered the Allies in India, in Egypt,
in Libya, and in the French possessions of
North Africa.

THE "DRAWN GAME"

109

110 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

What Germany has already attempted to
achieve with the help of Islam should serve
the Allies as a severe warning of what she
would certainly do in the future if the Ham-
burg-Persian Gulf should become a permanent
reality. There are 18 millions of Moslems in
Russia, who are more and more inclined to
give ear to the suggestions of Berlin, trans-
mitted by way of Constantinople.

In Persia, in the Azerbaijan, there are about
four hundred thousand men who would make
very useful soldiers; in Afghanistan five hun-
dred thousand first-class combatants would be
found. Once armed they could be let loose in
northern India, which contains about 50 mil-
lion Moslems. These, so far, have collectively
remained loyal to Great Britain, but their
feelings might be subject to a change if Ger-
many, by remaining mistress of the route from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, appeared to be
victorious. Hence we conclude that very soon
after a peace leaving Germany this immense
realization, the Pan-Islam movement would
allow Berlin to complete the Pangerman plan of
colonization in Africa and in Asia; especially in
Russia, in India, and, as we shall see, in China.

3rd. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and China.
The German programme of universal domina-

THE "DRAWN GAME" 111

tion has already been extended in China as
far as possible. In the first place, the 20 or
30 millions of Moslems who inhabit the Celes-
tial Empire have been wrought upon by Turco-
German agents, coming by the way of Persia,
Afghanistan, and the old "silk route." Be-
sides, Berlin has employed every imaginable
method in order to plunge China into the dis-
orders which now prey upon her, the object of
these tactics being to make the Chinese situa-
tion so disturbing that in the first place it will
absorb the attention of Japan and turn her
thoughts from sending her troops into Europe
(a question which has already come up, and
may still be possible and desirable) ; and in the
second that the state of affairs resulting from
these disorders may make it possible, when
once \the war has been ended on the basis of
the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, for Germany to
carry out exactly the same political game in
China that she has in Turkey.

When that time comes Berlin will say to the
Chinese, as she has already said to the Turks:
"Your country is completely disorganized;
your lives are no longer safe. Now we are bold
financiers, enterprising manufacturers, ener-
getic business men. We will help you to turn
your country to account. We will procure for

UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

you the experts whom you need. We will give
you the means of defending yourselves against
your neighbors. We, who are the finest soldiers
in the world, will bring up to a proper standard
your endless and magnificent military forces,
now in embryo. With your 300 millions of in-
habitants you can be the absolute rulers of all
Asia. We will, therefore, build up for you a
formidable army and a very powerful navy."

It is easy to perceive what is hidden behind
this programme, with its obvious attraction
for the Chinese. In reality, it is a preparation
for the seizure by Germany of part of China,
and her economic exploitation by Germany
precisely in the same conditions and by the
same proceedings as those which she has al-
ready employed in Turkey with undeniable
success.

4th. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Japan.
The combination of the Pan-Islam movement
in Asia, of the splitting up of Russia as far as
the Pacific into republics more or less anarchis-
tic and of a policy apparently favorable to
China, are for Berlin powerful means of pre-
paring the signal vengeance which Germany
intends, after her victory, to inflict upon Japan
in the future. No doubt in order to break the
union of her adversaries Germany has already

THE "DRAWN GAME" 113

hinted to Tokio the idea of a separate peace,
but that is merely a tactical move exacted by
the need of the moment. Never would Pan-
germany, mistress of the route from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf and exercising a predomi-
nating influence in China and Siberia, forgive
Japan for having driven her out of Kiao-Chau.

Now if an immense Chinese army should be
created and put under the direction of Ger-
man officers, Japan, in spite of the bravery of
her soldiers, would at once be unable to avoid
the consequences of the intolerable situation in
which she would be placed through the relative
smallness of her population (70 million, with
her colonies) opposed to 300 million of Chinese.

Japan is therefore directly aimed at by the
scheme of domination from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf, which seriously endangers her
future. Her interest in its destruction is
therefore vital and she has every reason to
make the greatest sacrifices in order to obtain
this end.

VI.

We have noted (see III.) that the profits
which Germany has already made in the war,
or has insured to herself for the future if the
present conditions are allowed to continue with-

114 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

out essential change, certainly represent hun-
dreds of billions of francs and come from seven
principal sources, which are:

1st. The booty amassed from three hun-
dred thousand square kilometres of invaded
territory.

2nd. The value of the Pangerman mort-
gages.

3rd. The value of the monopoly of exploita-
tion in the Balkans and Turkey.

4th. The value of economic Pangermany.

5th. The value of military Pangermany.

6th. The value of the economic profits
which the existence of Pangermany gives to
Germany at the expense of Russia.

7th. The confiscation of French loans, to
the extent of at least 21 billions, either in Rus-
sia or in the States which constitute Central
Pangermany.

It is important to notice that only the first of
these sources of profit, that is to say, the booty
which Germany has won by her invasion of
enemy territory, can properly be classed as due
to the war; the other six are entirely due to the
creation of Central Pangermany, and do not
come directly from the war, but from the gigantic
and not yet understood swindle which the struggle
has enabled Berlin to work at the expense of her

THE "DRAWN GAME" 115

own allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Tur-
key, because Serbia has been crushed. The oc-
cupation of Serbia is the only positive link
which unites the six last sources of profit with
the first one, but this occupation of Serbia by
Germany, or, to speak more accurately, by her
vassals, is of vital importance to Berlin's plans,
for unless Serbia is held, Pangermany must
crumble.

As a matter of fact, geographically speaking,
Serbia was a water-tight bulkhead which Ger-
many, already in control of the Austro-Hunga-
rian leaders, was absolutely forced to break
down in order to establish her paramount
influence in Bulgaria and Turkey. Besides,
Serbia is indispensable to the working of the
railway from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, as
the Belgrade-Nish-Pirot branch, which runs
through Serbia, is an essential part of it. One
of Germany's allies, Count Karolyi, acknowl-
edged in the Hungarian chamber of deputies
that Germany had made the war for the sake
of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf.*

If it were necessary Germany could easily
afford to give up her first source of profit, that
accruing to her from her invasion of five
hundred thousand square kilometres of enemy

*Le Journal de Geneve, December 30th, 1916.

116 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

country, provided she could keep the six other
sources which are insured to her by the pos-
session of Central Pangermany, always provided
she retained Serbia (about eighty-seven thou-
sand square kilometres), as that Serbian terri-
tory means the Pangerman bridge or nexus
which is indispensable to the working of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan. In the minds of
the Germans "Peace without annexations or
indemnities" is most certainly not meant to
apply to Serbia. There have been very clear
statements in this regard, evidently made with
the consent of the German censorship. The
Kreuzzeitung declared: "Mr. Lloyd George
has said that the restoration of Serbia is an
essential condition of peace, and that English
honor is involved therein. The objects of the
war for which England is fighting, on the one
hand, and Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, on
the other, are therefore absolutely contradictory*
The Hamburger Fremdenblatt added: "Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia.
It is for them alone to decide what shall be done
with the former kingdom of King Peter, "f The
Volksrecht of Zurich announced on August
30th, 1917, that a new map of Central Europe

*Le Matin, August 14th, 1917.
\Le Journal, August 18th, 1917.

THE "DRAWN GAME" 117

had been published in Vienna, showing the
annexation of western Serbia by Austria, which
agrees with the warning of the Neue Preus-
sische Zeitung: "We may be assured that
Germany will only make peace according to
the war map." *

Let us suppose that, taking advantage of the
weariness of the Allies, Germany or her vassals
should declare themselves willing to make
peace by negotiation, and to guarantee the
independence of Serbia. Such a declaration
would not change actual conditions. The
kingdom of Serbia might exist legally, to be
sure, on paper, but the principle of "no indem-
nity" would leave her in her present state of
utter ruin, which is irremediable unless there
should be complete reparation. Is it possible
that if Austro-Germany shall say some day,
"All right, I'll give up my claim to Serbia,"
that the Allies should be taken in by any
such grim jest ? Besides, what assurance could
they have that this promise of evacuation
would be carried out at the same time by Ger-
many, Austria, and Bulgaria, in whose gov-
ernments it is impossible to have the least
confidence ?

Therefore a peace said to be "by negotia-

* Le Journal, August 30th, 1917.

118 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

tion," drawn up on paper, without real guar-
antees, might perfectly well respect the fron-
tiers of 1914 on paper, and might also respect,
on paper, the formula "without annexations";
but in fact Germany would be left mistress of
Pangermany, and would consequently profit in
the future by the six sources of enormous profit
which she has gained by the war. We may
observe that Germany's evacuation of the ter-
ritory invaded by her in the west and in the
east (which we have supposed for the develop-
ment of our hypothesis) would be only tempo-
rary. It would be ignoring completely the
tenacity and ambition of the Hohenzollerns to
imagine that Germany, once mistress of an
empire from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,
would sincerely renounce the ambition of dom-
inating the North Sea and the English Chan-
nel. Hence the evacuation of Belgium and
the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, which on
our hypothesis Germany would have yielded
to France, would only be for a short time.

If economic and military Pangermany is
allowed to exist, the fulfilment of Pangerman
plans in the west and in the east would be an
inevitable and fatal consequence. Indeed, the
commercial competition of economic Panger-
many would in itself irremediably ruin eco-

THE "DRAWN GAME" 119

nomic France, England, and Russia, who, hav-
ing no compensation, would sink under the
burden of their colossal war expenses, while to
Germany the struggle would have brought
gains far exceeding her losses, thanks to her
having kept six out of the seven sources of
profit won through the war. What could the
Allied countries of to-day do if, while they were
still exhausted by a disastrous peace, Germany,
drawing on the 30 millions of soldiers that
Pangermany would put under her orders,
should proceed, after a short respite, to seize
again, both in the west and east, what she had
by our hypothesis) temporarily renounced?

It may then be definitely stated that the for-
mula "Peace without annexations or indemni-
ties" is mendacious in the highest degree, and
only a screen for the most formidable of Ber-
lin's snares. If the German people seemed to
approve this formula it was because its applica-
tion would leave the Allies to bear the unprece-
dented expenses of the war, while it would in-
sure to Germany the enormous profits resulting
from the maintenance of Central Pangermany
and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, with great and
manifold consequences which would enable her,
after a brief pause, to achieve her plan of uni-
versal domination.

120 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

VII.

It is thus clearly proved that the consolida-
tion of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf is a for-
midable danger, both to the Allies and to the
freedom of the world. The economic and mili-
tary power which it would give Germany would
be so intolerable that those who are fighting
for the purpose of putting an end to great ar-
maments would find themselves once more
plunged into the vortex of the most rigid mili-
tarism, for they could not contend with Panger-
many except at the cost of tremendous arma-
ments, which would absorb all their resources
and all their attention. Now, would they be
in a position to undertake such armaments in
the infinitely difficult financial situation in
which, according to our hypothesis, they would
stand? Would they even have the resolution
to undertake them, after the frightful moral
disappointment of their peoples, who would
learn too late the enormous mistake committed
by their governments in negotiating for peace
on the basis of the so-called "drawn game,"
which had allowed Berlin to consolidate her
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan? Besides, even
if the Allies were willing to attempt once more
the overthrow of the atrocious Prussian mili-

THE " DRAWN GAME " 121

tarism, now much more oppressive than before
the war, Pangermany would certainly not leave
them time to prepare. If the Allies were dis-
posed to renew the conflict they would, in their
assumed financial and moral situation, cer-
tainly be reduced to impotence before they
could get ready to hold their own against the
new German colossus.

It is therefore incontestable that France,
England, Russia, Italy, the United States, and
Japan have a common and absolutely vital
interest in this war, far greater than any pri-
vate interest of their own, which should make
them stand firmly, shoulder to shoulder, until
the end, in order that the Hamburg-Persian
Gulf plan, or, in other words, that odious in-
strument of oppression, Pangermany, shall be
destroyed under conditions which will make
its re-establishment impossible forever.

CHAPTER VII.

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY.

I. Why Austria-Hungary is the crucial point of the uni-
versal problem presented by the Hamburg-Persian
Gulf plan.
II. The thesis of the preservation of Austria-Hungary.

III. The application of the principle of nationalities to

Central Europe.

IV. A strong barrier of anti-Pangerman nations can be

established in Central Europe, and there only.

I.

In order to understand how to destroy Pan-
germany, which is the prime necessity of any
decisive victory on the part of the Allies, and
without which there can be no just or lasting
peace, we must study the war as it stretches
over Europe, and see what objective, whether
geographical, military, or political, is common
to all the Allies, the attainment of which would
at the same time frustrate the Hamburg-Per-
sian Gulf plan (and therefore Central Panger-
many), deal Prussian militarism a mortal blow,
and also guarantee permanent attainment of
the legitimate personal objectives which each
of the Allies has in view as they carry on col-

122

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 123

124 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

lectively the formidable war which was forced
upon them.

Now, this common objective, this crucial
point of all the problems, whether geographical,
military, or political, which the Allies must
solve is represented by Austria-Hungary, be-
cause:

1. That State is only the enemy of the
Allies through the Hapsburg dynasty, which,
yielding to the injunctions of Berlin, has be-
trayed its own peoples. In fact, Francis Jo-
seph declared war without even daring to con-
sult his Parliament, for he knew very well that
three-fourths of his subjects, sympathizing
with Russia, France, and England, and being
definitely hostile to Germany, would have op-
posed, by the voice of their representatives,
any bloody struggle destined to turn to
the advantage of Germanism. The Emperor
Charles I. cannot to-day (for irresistible rea-
sons, financial and military, which make Aus-
tria-Hungary the vassal of Germany) conclude
peace without the consent of Berlin.

2. It is manifest that Germany cannot
maintain a war against Europe without the
help of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers whom
she has dexterously contrived to enlist in her
cause, the vast majority of whom only fight

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 125

because they are forced to do so by the brutal
German staff-officers who command them.

3. It is clear that after the peace, if Ger-
many were to evacuate all the territories she
now occupies in the east and the west, to
restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and yet to
keep her hold, more or less disguised, on Aus-
tria-Hungary, she would possess all the means
for retaking, after a short delay, Alsace-Lor-
raine from France, since the German hold on
Austria-Hungary inevitably implies the accom-
plishment of the scheme "from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf," which practically puts at the
disposal of Germany 30 millions of soldiers,
who would represent a formidable power be-
cause of their standardized organization under
the direction of the Berlin General Staff.

4. From this last consideration it follows
that if after the peace Germany were to retain
her disguised hold on Austria-Hungary, the
solemn promise given by France, England, and
Russia to re-establish Serbia in its indepen-
dence and its integrity would be practically in-
capable of fulfilment.

5. It is clear that the new Russia could
not be really independent if the seizure of Aus-
tria-Hungary by Germany were maintained.
Besides, on account of the wide extension of

126 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Prussian militarism resulting therefrom, the
United States and England would be con-
strained to keep up the great armaments which
they have only adopted temporarily. Belgium
would still be imperilled, for the same reason
that Alsace-Lorraine would be, even if given
back to France for a short time. As for Italy,
the German hegemony over Central Europe
would mean the end of all her national hopes
for the freedom of the Adriatic and for Italian
expansion on the eastern shores of the Medi-
terranean. For Serbia and Montenegro this
continued seizure would be a death sentence
from which there would be no appeal.

6. On the other hand, if freedom from Ger-
man control were assured to the non-German
peoples of Austria-Hungary after the peace, it
would absolutely prevent any aggressive re-
vival of Prussian militarism in the future, for
the very effect of that independence would be
to take from the General Staff of Berlin troops
which are indispensable to the realization of
the Pangerman plan. This is shown incontro-
vertibly by the fact that if it were not for the
forces which she draws from Austria-Hungary
and Turkey, Germany would not be able to
continue the war.

7. A glance at the map on p. 38 will show

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 127

that, because of their geographical situation, this
independence of the non-German peoples of
Austria-Hungary in regard to Germany is the
only thing which will enable the Allies to keep
their promises toward Serbia and Roumania,
and also (by definitely breaking the main axis
of the Pangerman scheme, beginning with Bo-
hemia) to eliminate the immense peril of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan. Every ally, with-
out any exception, is most vitally interested in
preventing its consolidation.

II.

The liberation of the oppressed Slav and
Latin inhabitants of Austria-Hungary would
mean the dismemberment of the Hapsburg
Monarchy, and would go against the classic
formula: "If Austria did not exist it would be
necessary to invent her." There was for a long
time some reason for this idea, but it has lost
its value since the complete seizure by the
Hohenzollerns of all the motive power of Aus-
tria-Hungary, and consequently of the Haps-
burg dynasty, which is intertwined with the
constitution of the Austro-Hungarian State.
To wish to preserve that State would be to
play the German game, for it is practically im-

128 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

possible to separate the Hapsburgs from the
Hohenzollerns. It would establish the Ger-
manic yoke on the Slav and Latin subjects of
the Hapsburgs, thus facilitating the accom-
plishment of the plan "from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf." More than that, the house of
Hapsburg has given such ample proofs of its
incapacity, its duplicity, and its readiness to
follow even the most criminal suggestions of
Berlin that its maintenance at the head of the
Austro-Hungarian peoples should not be re-
garded seriously.

I must add — and I insist strongly upon this
point — that this is not only my personal opin-
ion, but also that of those men — few in num-
ber but of keen insight — who, for the last
twenty years and upon the spot, have made a
special study of the Central European problem.
Among them may be particularly mentioned
MM. Louis Leger, professor at the College de
France; E. Denis and Haumant, professors at
the Sorbonne; A. Gauvain, of the Journal des
Debats, and among Englishmen, Sir Arthur
Evans, Seton-Watson, and Wickham Steed,
foreign political editor of the London Times,
who for ten years was the correspondent of
that powerful organ at Vienna.

Now, all these experts say as I do that it is

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 129

absolutely necessary to put the house of Hapsburg
—the vassal of the Hohenzollerns — out of com-
mission. The opinion of these experts is of
peculiar importance, as they were in a position
to study the Austro-Hungarian question under
conditions infinitely better than those which
fall to the lot of professional diplomatists.

An essential point remains to be proved, for
it gives rise to peculiar anxiety in the minds of
that part of the public in the Allied countries
which still harps on the false idea that Austria-
Hungary is a specially German country. This
section of the public doubts whether the appli-
cation of the principle of nationalities, which
the Allies demand, would not have the effect
of necessarily and considerably increasing Ger-
many by incorporating in it the Germans of
the Hapsburg Empire.

It is therefore necessary to demonstrate by
means of figures and accurate geographical and
ethnographical arguments that this fear is quite
chimerical.

III.

On the whole, President Wilson, in common
with the Allies, desires the reconstruction of
Europe according to the principle of nationali-

130 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

ties, a principle which is not founded on race
and language, as is too generally believed, but
upon readiness to live together.

A proof that the principle of nationalities
should be so interpreted is furnished by the
Swiss, where populations of different races
(Germanic and Latin) and of different lan-
guages (French, German, and Italian) yet form
a clearly distinct nationality.

The strongly expressed desire of a group of
the population to live in common is moreover
indispensable before they should have the right
to form a separate State. For instance, in
France the Basques and Bretons, who have
kept their own peculiar languages, still con-
tinue to form part of France. The principle of
nationalities is therefore based upon the demo-
cratic idea of personal liberty, a conception
which spread from France throughout the
earth in 1789.

As nothing in this world is absolute, it is
clear that the principle of nationalities cannot
always receive in practice a complete applica-
tion. In order to constitute States with a po-
tentiality of life, we must take into account
not only the nationalities but also the stra-
tegical, defensive, and economical needs of the
majority. There are, besides, countries like

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 131

Macedonia and certain regions of Austria-
Hungary where nationalities are so intermin-
gled that the application of the principle of
nationality can only be relative. It also hap-
pens that a minority of the population may
have to be sacrificed to the good of the ma-
jority, even though this minority may be quite
alive to its rights. Finally, there are excep-
tional cases where this principle must give way
in the general interests of European peace.
Thus, in the Europe of the future, certain
strategic regions from which an aggressive is
especially possible, should be put out of reach
of those Powers to which war is "the national
industry."

Having given these explanations and made
these reservations, let us see what would be
obtained in the main by the application of the
principle of nationalities to the German Em-
pire. In virtue of this principle the Germans
ought to restore liberty to those peoples who
are included by force within their boundaries,
that is to say about:

Inhabitants

Poles 5,000,000

Inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine 1,500,000

Danes 200>000

Total.. 6,700,000

132 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

The Germany of to-day, which numbered
68 millions of inhabitants in 1914, including
the non-Germans, would be brought down to
about 61,300,000; in round figures, 61 millions
of genuine Germans.

But the logical application of the principle
of nationalities would give to Germany the
power of absorbing those Germans of the
Hapsburg monarchy who on historical, strateg-
ical, and geographical grounds could be legiti-
mately added to Germany after its reduction
from 68 to 61 millions of inhabitants. What
would be the result?

Let us look at the map on p. 35, which
shows the ethnographic situation of Austria-
Hungary.

This map only gives a very imperfect idea
of the ethnographic facts, because it is drawn
from documents which are German and Mag-
yar, and purposely falsified. In reality the
Slav regions are a good deal more extensive
than is indicated by the shaded zones.

The following, however, are the results given
for the whole of the Hapsburg Monarchy by
the official Germano-Magyar statistics in the
census of 1910:

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 133

AUSTRIA.

Round figures in
tens of thousands

Germans 9,950,000

Czechs 6,440,000

Poles 4,970,000

Ruthenians 3,520,000

Slovenes 1,260,000

Serbo-Croatians 790,000

Italians 770,000

Roumanians 280,000

Total 27,980,000

HUNGARY.

Magyars 10,050,000

Roumanians 2,950,000

Serbo-Croatians 2,940,000

Germans 2,040,000

Slovaks 1,970,000

Ruthenians 480,000

Total 20,430,000

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

Serbo-Croatians (orthodox, or Moslems of

Serbian origin) 2,000,000

According to these figures, there are 12 mil-
lions of Germans in the Hapsburg Empire, but
we shall see that not nearly all of these 12 mil-
lions could be united to Germany. In fact:

1. As the table shows, rather more than
two millions of Germans are in Hungary, where
they are scattered in small groups among the

134 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

other nationalities. They could not therefore
be united to Germany.

2. Out of the 10 millions, roughly speaking,
of Germans in Austria, if we deduct those who
are intermixed with the Czechs and discount
the garbling of Vienna statistics, we may allow
that the true number of those who could
be geographically incorporated in Germany
amounts to not more than seven or eight mil-
lions. Let us take this last figure. If these
eight millions were incorporated in Germany,
then Germany of to-day, reduced for the rea-
sons indicated on pages 131, 132, to 61 millions,
would be enlarged, at the expense of Austria,
by eight millions of inhabitants. She would
then have a total of 69 millions of inhabitants.

Therefore, as the present German Empire
had in 1914 a population of 68 millions of in-
habitants, we see that the application of the
principle of nationalities would allow Ger-
many to gain on the southwest just about the
equivalent of what the same principle would
take from her on the circumference of the ex-
isting Empire.

It is by no means certain that the Germans
of Austria would wish to join themselves to
the Germans of Germany, but let us suppose it.

Would a Germany of 69 or 70 millions of

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 135

genuine Germans be really dangerous for
Europe? I do not think so, for, as we shall
see, the application of the principle of nation-
alities would have the effect of withdrawing
totally from the influence of Berlin's Panger-
manism all the rest of the inhabitants of Aus-
tria-Hungary.

In fact, if out of the 50 millions of inhabi-
tants in Austria-Hungary of to-day about 8
millions joined Germany, 42 millions of Aus-
tro-Hungarian subjects would remain. Of this
number :

Five millions of Poles would join Poland;

Four millions of Ruthenians would join Lit-
tle Russia;

Three millions of Roumanians would join
Roumania;

One million of Italians would join Italy;

Making a total of 13 millions of inhabitants.

There would therefore remain a compact
group, composed of 29 millions of inhabitants,
made up of Czech-Slovaks, Magyars, and Ger-
mans, these last diluted in the solid mass of
Magyars and Serbo-Croatians, or Yugo-Slavs.
As these last wish to unite with the five mil-
lion Serbians of Serbia, we thus deduce the
presence in Central Europe of a mass of 34
million inhabitants, containing an infinitesi-

136 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

mal proportion of Germans, and so situated
geographically that they could perfectly well
form united States, in which the rights of each
nationality and the form of government of
each State would be respected, and which,
nevertheless, would constitute an economic
territory extensive enough to correspond to
modern needs.

The obstacle to the creation of such united
States might seem to be the reluctance of the
Magyars (who at present are playing the Ger-
man game) to come to an understanding with
the neighboring nationalities. This will dis-
appear when the day comes which will make
the real Magyar race, now oppressed by a
feudal nobility, master of its own fate. It
will not then be afraid to consider the possible
creation of united States.

In short, we may conclude that there is in
Austria-Hungary and in Serbia a mass of 34
millions of inhabitants, who are practically
free from Germanic elements and could form
in Central Europe a confederacy of States that
might in time develop into the United States
of Europe.

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 137

IV.

The territory of Austria-Hungary therefore
contains all the ethnographic elements which
would allow of the establishment of new States,
constituted on just and durable foundations,
and under such conditions that they would
form for the future an insurmountable barrier
to Pangermanism. It is there, on the road
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, in Central
Europe, that the solution will be found for the
formidable problem set to the world by the
temporary creation of Pangermany. We may
be absolutely certain that this indispensable solu-
tion can be found there, and nowhere else. In-
deed, even without counting her enormous
losses of population, Serbia, with her five mil-
lion inhabitants, could evidently not form a
sufficiently effective barrier to Pangermanism,
if Austria, still combined with Germany, made
a block of 118 millions of inhabitants, all of
whose military strength would be entirely at
the service of Berlin.

The anti-Pangerman barrier necessary to the
freedom of the world can nowhere be organized
with such powerful forces as on the territory of
what is now Austria-Hungary.

We may be definitely assured that, in order

138 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

to break up the scheme of "from Hamburg to
the Persian Gulf," and therefore practically
Central Pangermany, it will be sufficient, but
absolutely necessary, that the Slav and Latin
peoples of Austria-Hungary shall be definitely
freed from the yoke which Berlin has been
able to impose on them because of the war.
The natural consequence of that freedom will
be the almost automatic formation of the three
barriers of anti-Pangerman nations of which
an idea is given by the map on p. 38.

From the foregoing reflections we may conclude
that the Austro-Hungarian question is assuredly
the crucial point of the problem, not only Euro-
pean but universal, set before all the civilized
States by the creation of Pangermany, which is
now an accomplished fact.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT.

I. The moral principles of the American people make

it their duty to take part in the war.
II. The political interests of the United States oblige
them to contribute toward a decisive victory for
the Allies.

HI. The United States and the Austro-Hungarian ques-
tion.

I.

The moral obligation of Americans to take
part in the war is shown by the Map of the
Martyrs. (See map on p. 141.) Not only does
Germany constantly violate the laws of war
between belligerents, but also and above all
the German authorities subject all the civil
anti-Germanic populations of the territories
now under the Pangerman occupation, from
the North Sea to Bagdad, to a frightful reign of
terror. The sufferings inflicted by the Ger-
mans on the French, the Belgians, the Slavs
and Italians of Austria-Hungary, the Rou-
manians, the Greeks, and most of all on the
Serbians and Armenians (whom they have
caused to be massacred wholesale and sys-
tematically by the Turks), represent millions

139

140 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

of unspeakable sorrows, of odious crimes, of
cruel martyrdoms. It is clear that the hu-
mane principles of Americans cannot allow
such prodigious crimes to go unpunished, for
that would be to allow of their being repeated
and extended to still other countries.

These unheard-of crimes are the result of
German imperialism, added to the imperial-
ism of Austria, the feudal imperialism of the
Magyars, the Balkanic imperialism of the Bul-
garians, together with the neo-imperialism of
the Turks, which is based on Pan-Islamism.
Now, all these imperialisms have as their foun-
dation the ties which unite, on a basis of Prus-
sian militarism, the autocrats of Vienna and
Berlin, whose principles are radically opposed
to those of the Allies.

From a moral point of view this frightful
war is essentially one of autocracy against
democracy, of the feudal spirit against the
spirit of the modern world. This being the
case, and as the victory of democracy was
still in suspense on account of various mis-
takes, technical, diplomatic, and military, on
the part of the European Allies, the United
States, by reason of their principles, could
not expose universal freedom to so serious a
risk by refusing to enter the war.

THE U. S. AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT 141

UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

II.

The political interests of the United States
are deeply involved in the struggle, for four
principal reasons:

1st. The danger of German intrigues in
America.

Citizens of the United States can no longer
ignore the ambition of Pangermany toward
America, especially in the South American
countries, more especially Argentina and
Brazil, which are destined, according to the
Pangerman plan, to become German pro-
tectorates. The manifold and incessant in-
trigues of German agents during the war,
throughout the length and breadth of both
North and South America, and particularly
in Mexico, where the German plot against the
United States was unmasked in the most star-
tling manner, give positive proof of the real-
ity of the Pangerman programme concerning
America. It is, therefore, a danger which
Americans can only avert by striking at the
root of the evil, that is to say, by helping to
destroy the basis of Pangermanism, which is
Prussian militarism.

2nd. The intolerable secret German organiza-
tion in the United States.

THE U. S. AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT 143

After having established their fundamental
plan of 1895, the Germans set themselves the
task of making a register of all the German
elements, throughout the universe, which

DISTRIBUTION AND PERCENTAGE
OF GERMANS BORN IN GERMANY,
NOW RESIDING IN THE UNITED
STATES, IN PROPORTION TO THE
POPULATION BORN IN
UNITED STATES (1890J
IMH 25 to 35 percent

15 to 25 percent
5 to »5 percent

might be capable of helping them to carry out
their plan.

The map on this page is drawn up in ac-
cordance with the data of map 5 in the Pan-
german Atlas of Paul Langhans, which gives
the result of the register. The map shows

144 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

what proportion the Germans born in Germany
who had emigrated to the United States bore to
the American population about the year 1890.
We can see that the proportion was consid-
erable, since at some points (see the map) it
amounted to 35 per cent. Further, the gen-
eral view presented by the map enables us to
observe that in the United States the Ger-
mans have planted themselves by preference
in the industrial and commercial regions of
the East and of the Great Lakes. We can
therefore understand what followed. Ever
since 1900 the Alldeutscher Verband, or Pan-
german League, in obedience to secret instruc-
tions from the official authorities in Berlin,
has laid itself out to select from this mass of
Germans in the United States all such as might
best serve the cause of Prussian militarism at
any given moment and at any place, as soon
as the European conflagration should break
out. Hence, for the last twenty years most
of the 10 to 15 million Americans of German
birth have been organized. Little by little,
in the bosom of the United States there has
grown up a veritable State within a State,
endowed with the most powerful means of
influence. In point of fact, among the Ger-
man-Americans there are manufacturers, mer-

THE PANGERMAN PLOT 145

chants, and bankers of colossal fortunes, who
control the lives of hundreds of thousands of
workmen or employees living in dependence
upon them. As the German- Americans also
own many newspapers and have numerous
associations, they are able to exert a consider-
able influence on the policy of the United
States, and even to secure the election to Con-
gress of men on whom they can count. The
Delbriick law has completed the German
organization in the United States, by enabling
an influential party of German-Americans to
preserve the appearance of American citizens,
while at the same time they remain pledged
heart and soul to forward the Kaiser's scheme
of universal slavery.

A multitude of striking facts — political
pressure, monster strikes, plots and outrages
planned and carried out by order of the
Kaiser's agents, such as Von Papen, Boy-Ed,
Von Igel, etc. — have abundantly shown that
the German organization in America threatens
the independence of the United States, and is
of a definitely treasonable character. There
is only one way for America to rid herself of
this criminal and parasitic organization which
the Germans have been able to foster on her
soil, and to prevent it from any future growth,

146 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

and that is, to make victory certain for the
Allies.

3rd. Berlin9 s plan for dealing with the United
States.

In 1898, before Manila, the German Rear-
Admiral von Goetzen, a friend of the Kaiser,
said to Admiral Dewey: "In about fifteen
years my country will begin a great war. . . .
Some months after we have done our job in
Europe we shall take New York, and probably
Washington, and we shall keep them for a
time. We do not intend to take any territory
from you, but only to put your country in its
proper place with reference to Germany. We
shall extract one or two billions of dollars from
New York and other towns."* At the time
these words were regarded as mere bluster,
but they were connected, nevertheless, with the
plan of universal domination which was even
then being worked out at Berlin. Besides, a
phrase in a letter from Baron von Meysenburg,
the German Consul at New Orleans, written
on December 4th, 1915, to Von Papen, the
German military attache at Washington who
organized the principal outrages in the United
States — which letter by the way was seized

* The Naval and Military Record, quoted by L'Echo de Paris, Sep-
tember 24th, 1915.

THE PANGERMAN PLOT 147

by the English— proved that in the minds of
Germans behind the scenes the turn of the
United States would come after that of the
European Allies. The phrase ran: "May the
day of the settling of accounts come here also,
and when that does come may our govern-
ment have found again that will of iron with-
out which no impression can be made on this
country."

Finally, William II. himself said to Mr.
Gerard, the American Ambassador to Ger-
many: "I shall stand no nonsense from
America after the war."f These words from
the head of the Hohenzollerns leave no pos-
sible doubt that the independence of the
United States is directly endangered by the
extension of Prussianism.

4th. The creation of Pangermany.

Let us consider, as a hypothesis, that the
Allies are defeated in Europe. Any one with
common sense can see that Germany, with
the formidable means at her command, could
impose her economic law on South America,
would make herself mistress of Canada, and
practically dominate the United States, where
the German-Americans would help Berlin to

* Le Temps, January 17th, 1917.
t Le Temps, August 14th, 1917.

148 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

carry out the German plan. The freedom of
the United States is therefore strictly in-
compatible with the economic and military
existence of -Central Pangermany, since the
perfection of that organization would give Ger-
many the means of universal domination, and
therefore enable her to intervene effectively in
the affairs of the United States.

As a result of the new order of things for
which Germany is responsible, Pangermany
actually represents the present and future danger
of the United States. It follows, therefore, that
even if the United States do not wish to de-
stroy the Germans as a nation, they should
most energetically desire the destruction of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme and the crushing
of that instrument for world-wide oppression,
Central Pangermany. That objective is the es-
sential and vital reason why the policy of the
United States should be to push the war with
the utmost vigor, in order to insure a decisive
victory for the Allies.

If, on the one hand, the United States felt
it their duty to enter the war that they might
help to put an end to German barbarity and
insure the triumph of democracy over des-
potism, on the other they should now feel that
they have a direct personal interest therein,

THE PANGERMAN PLOT 149

because any sacrifices, no matter how great
they may be, are infinitely less than those
which they would be obliged to make later,
if, from failure to realize the designs of Ger-
many on America, they should allow her to
Pangermanize Europe.

III.

THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

The personal interest of the United States in
the European war consists in the necessity for
doing away with Pangermany. As its destruc-
tion can only come from a complete reorganiza-
tion of Central Europe, it follows that the United
States has a direct and first-hand interest in also
solving the question of Austria-Hungary on the
basis of the principle of nationalities, that solu-
tion being absolutely indispensable if the world
is to see the end of the Pangerman peril, and of
great armaments.

CONCLUSIONS.

If in this war the Allies are to obtain the
decisive victory which is absolutely indis-
pensable, they must keep three things con-
stantly in mind.

I.

Germany }s responsibility for bringing on the
war is inexcusable and crushing, since its pre-
meditation by the Prussian Government ante-
dates the outbreak of hostilities by at least twenty-
one years.

In the Allied countries the responsibility of
the Central Powers for the conflict is usually
placed by reference to the diplomatic docu-
ments which were exchanged in the weeks
immediately preceding it. This process, how-
ever, is inadequate, as it only deals with a
very short time, and gives Germany an op-
portunity to wrangle over dates, and even
over the hours at which telegrams were sent.

In order that the exact and formidable truth
should be known, public opinion among the
Allies must be convinced that the Prussian

150

CONCLUSIONS 151

Government has steadily worked out the Ham-
burg-Persian Gulf plan ever since 1893, that
is to say, for twenty-one years before the war
began.

German covetousness of Turkey goes back
a long way. In 1866 Doctor Spenger wrote
in a pamphlet about Babylonia: "The East
is the only country on earth which has not
been monopolized by one or other of the great
Powers, and yet it offers the finest field for
colonization. // Germany does not let the chance
slip, and will seize it before the Cossacks can
get hold of it, she will have won the best share of
what still remains to be divided in the world." *
This policy had been advocated by many
learned authorities in Germany, but it was
William II., soon after he came to the throne
in 1888, who first thought seriously of laying
hands on Turkey. The oldest proof of prac-
tical preparation for this attempt which I
have been able to unearth dates back to 1893,
but very likely still older ones will come to
light when the war is over.

In 1897 a book was brought out in Berlin
of which the title-page is here reproduced in
facsimile:

* Deutschlands Ansprilche an das turkische Erbe, p. 12.. Lehmann,
Munich, 1896.

UNITED. STATES AND PANGERMANIA

KLEINASIENS NATURSCHATZE

SEINE WICHTIGSTEN

TIERE, KOiTURPFLANZEN OND MINERALSCHiTZB

VOM WIHTSCHAFTLICHEN UNO KUlTURGESCHlCHTLICHEN 3TANOPUNKT

KARL KANNENBERG

VUM.-UCUT. IH THCIUN9. rCLDAATtLURIt-UOlMEKT UN i»

MIT BEITRAGEN

VOM

PREM.- LIEUT S CHAFFER

KOX1UKDISRT tUM OROSStX OCNCIUUTAt

OND

ABBILDCNGEN NACH AUFNAHMEN VON HPTM. ANTOK ( PELDART. - REGT. Hr. «X

KPTM. ?. pBirrmiz UNO GIFFROR (INFANT.-RBOT. Nr. 93)uwo PREM..LIEOT»

SCHAFFEB UNO EANKE5BEB6

MIT XXXI VOLLBILDERN UMD O PtlMEH

BERLIN

VEELAO VON GEBRUDEB BOBNTBAEQES
1897.

CONCLUSIONS 153

The title of this work is: "The native riches
of Asia Minor; her most important wealth in
live stock, minerals, and plants suitable for cul-
tivation''

Because of its statements, and the deduc-
tions which may be made from it, this book
may now be considered as a valuable docu-
ment. It is a painstaking work, being a very
remarkable technical inventory of all the
economic resources of Asia Minor. It is il-
lustrated by photographs, the dates on which
show that the indispensable researches on the
spot were made in 1893. This is proved by
the facsimile here given of a photograph (fac-
ing p. 154), and also by the allusions to the
title-page to be found in the body of the book.
Now, this work is due to the collaboration
of five German officers then in active service:

Karl Kannenberg, first lieutenant in the
19th regiment of field artillery; Captains
Anton of the 17th regiment, also of the light
artillery, Von Prittwitz and Gaffron of the
93rd regiment of infantry, and First Lieutenant
SchafTer of the Great General Staff.

We learn from a note on the fourth page of
the introduction that the last-named officer
went all through Anatolia for the express pur-
pose of making topographical reports.

154 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

It is quite clear that this book embodies part
of the results of an investigation with which
William II. had charged five of his officers.
It was certainly not by accident nor for their
own amusement that five German officers in
active service were able to make a long and
costly stay in Asiatic Turkey, with all the
necessary means for carrying on a very arduous
investigation. It is, therefore, incontestable
that as far back as 1893, twenty-one years
before the war, the German Government sent
its officers to study Turkey, not only from a
military point of view, but also especially from
the standpoint of economics, in order to ascer-
tain the resources in the Ottoman Empire on
which Germany might draw, either during
peace or in the event of war. Thanks to this
precise information, which certainly has not
been lost sight of since 1893, Germany has
been able to undertake the rapid development
of Anatolia, a task which she has pursued with
great zeal for the past two years, and which
has had an important influence on the evolu-
tion of the war.

The German Government in 1893 was that
which felt the first forward pressure exercised
by William II., who had begun to reign in
1888. We may be sure that if in 1893 it was

CONCLUSIONS 155

thought necessary to send five German officers
to search out Asiatic Turkey from an economic
point of view, it was because the Kaiser him-
self (and this was proved by his later actions)
had made up his mind to find out exactly what
Germany might or might not expect to find
in the East. Finally, we must notice care-
fully that prior to 1893 neither the Panger-
man plan nor any movement in that direction
was known. The formula of "from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf" was as yet unheard of.
It is possible to prove, with the help of dates
and indisputable facts, that the preparations
for the Hamburg-Bagdad railway were the
Kaiser's personal work. Indeed, as soon as
investigations like that undertaken by the
five officers mentioned above had convinced
the Kaiser that he could lay his hands on
enormous booty by swindling Turkey, he de-
voted himself to the task energetically, having
first paved the way by appearing to yield to
popular opinion. It was in 1894 that the Pan-
german movement began to take shape, and
its development would have been impossible in
a country so entirely under police rule as Ger-
many unless it had had the secret support of
official authority. It was in 1898 that William
II. went to Damascus, and there assured the

156 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

Moslems, in a famous toast, of his undying
friendship. From Damascus he proceeded to
Constantinople, and there he flattered Abdul
Hamid, the Red Sultan (then under a cloud
on account of the Armenian massacres), so
successfully that on November 27th, 1899, the
Deutsche Bank of Berlin obtained the neces-
sary concession for the railway to Bagdad.
As soon as the news of this concession or
firman reached William II., his delight over
the success of the first step toward the realiza-
tion of his marvellous dream was so great that
it found expression in an ardent telegram to
Abdul Hamid.

When he was at Windsor, in 1907, the
Kaiser tried in vain to remove England's ob-
jections to the Bagdad railway, but in No-
vember, 1910, during the Czar's visit to
Potsdam, he succeeded in getting the better
completely of Nicholas II. Suddenly, on
August 10th, 1913, all the Kaiser's prepara-
tions were hindered by the peace of Bucharest,
and he made up his mind at once to bring on
war. As far back as November 6th, 1913, he
told King Albert of Belgium at Potsdam that
"war was near and inevitable." In April,
1914, the Kaiser, accompanied by Admiral
von Tirpitz, paid a visit to the Archduke

CONCLUSIONS 157

Francis-Ferdinand at Konopischt. Now, it
was also in April, 1914, according to the state-
ment of M. Radoslavoff himself, that the Kaiser
concluded the treaties with Sofia and Constan-
tinople which assured him the military co-opera-
tion of Bulgaria and Turkey in the war which
he meant to bring on within a short time.*

From this long series of undeniable facts
the responsibility of Germany stands out even
more clearly than if we only try to prove it
from the diplomatic papers which were ex-
changed in the days just before hostilities be-
gan. We may therefore state as did Count
Karolyi, one of Germany's allies, that "Ger-
many is fighting for the road from Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf." During twenty -one years
Germany prepared all the means necessary to at-
tain this result; therefore, her responsibility is
crushing and inexcusable.

The people of Germany accepted this war
enthusiastically, because Pangerman propa-
gandists had convinced them beforehand that
it would bring them enormous profits. Maxi-
milian Harden acknowledged this outright in
August, 1914, writing in his review, Zukunft,
at a time when German victory seemed cer-

*Havas despatch, in the Petit Parisien, March 26th, 1916; Le
Temps, April 10th, 1916.

158 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

tain: "Why should we make paltry excuses?
Yes, we brought on the war, and we are glad
of it. We provoked it because we were sure
of winning."

Hambu

'FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF
THE NET IS SPREAD.1*

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FUG DAY ADDRESS. JUNE 15, 19I7.

To-day the facts are before us. In his Flag
Day speech, on June 15th, 1917, President
Wilson made the German premeditation and
aims admirably clear. "The demands made
by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single

CONCLUSIONS 159

step in a plan which compassed Europe and
Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad. ..." The
object of Berlin "contemplated binding to-
gether racial and political units which could
be held together only by force, Czechs, Mag-
yars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Ar-
menians. . . . These peoples did not wish to
be united. They ardently desired to direct
their own affairs. . . . And they [the Ger-
man military statesmen] have actually carried
the greater part of that amazing plan into exe-
cution ! . . . Austria is at their mercy. . . .
The so-called Central Powers are in fact but
a Single Power. . . . From Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf the net is spread."

The map given on p. 158 explains this re-
ality, and German responsibility is once more
made clear, this time by geography.

II.

The Allies should constantly bear in mind
not only the German occupations of Entente
territory, but also the Pangerman seizures which
have been made at the expense of their own
allies.

In point of fact these seizures are still more
serious than the German occupations in the

160 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

east and in the west, since, in combination
with the occupation of Serbia, they make Ger-
many mistress of Central Pangermany, and
thus give Berlin an opportunity to follow out

TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY PANGERMANY
AT THE OPENING OF 1917

all the rest of the Pangerman plan in a very
short time. The truth of this statement may
be proved by reference to the accompanying
map or diagram, which shows the total Pan-
german occupations in the beginning of 1917.
The Germans themselves attach more im-
portance to their seizures in the southeast at

CONCLUSIONS 161

the expense of their own allies than they do
to their occupations in the east and west.

The German review which, considering its
character, is so ironically named Peace, had
in its number of February 1st, 1917, the fol-
lowing avowal: "In two years of war, Germany
has cut for herself, out of an exhausted Europe,
an Empire which reaches from the North Sea
to the Persian Gulf" [sic]. "Should the war go
on, who dare say that this Empire may not be
still further extended by the addition of Greece,
Egypt, Holland, and Scandinavia?"*

Doctor Friedrich Naumann, whose propa-
ganda did much toward the creation of Mittel-
europa, is a member of the democratic group
in the Reichstag. On July 10th, 1917, he voted
for the famous formula "Peace without an-
nexations or indemnities," because he well
knew, for reasons which I have given in my
sixth chapter, that it would allow the Ham-
burg-Persian Gulf plan to go on unhindered.
In his pamphlet, Bulgaria and Middle-Europe,^
Naumann gave away the secret of the Panger-
manizing of Europe by saying: " Whatever is
distinctly national in character, or of a military
order, shall be decentralized." Which means in

* Le Matin, February 28th, 1917.

t Published in 1916, by Reimer, Berlin.

162 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

plain language that the old names and frontiers
of States would be left unchanged for the
present, in order to throw dust in the eyes of
the world for a short time, but that all the
military forces from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf would be centralized under the leader-
ship of Berlin.

It is this military association of at least 150
millions of men, brought under the orders of
Prussian militarism, which makes the very
great peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan
— a peril which sums up all the others rep-
resenting the outcome of Prussian ambition.
That is why President Wilson so justly said
in his message to Russia: "The* day has come
to conquer or submit."

III.

The Allies should so conduct the war that Pan-
germany shall not only be destroyed, but replaced
by territorial conditions which will prevent its
recurrence, and which conform to the principles
which the Allies have proclaimed.

In their answer of January 10th, 1917, to
President Wilson the Allies affirmed: "The civ-
ilized world knows that [the objects of the war]
imply, in all necessity and in the first instance,

CONCLUSIONS 163

the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of
Montenegro, and the indemnities which are
due them; the evacuation of the invaded terri-
tories of France, of Russia and of Roumania,
with just reparation; the reorganization of
Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and
founded as much upon respect of nationalities
and full security and liberty of economic de-
velopment, which all nations, great or small,
possess, as upon territorial conventions and
international agreements, suitable to guarantee
territorial and maritime frontiers against un-
justified attacks; the restitution of provinces
or territories wrested in the past from the
Allies by force or against the will of their
populations; the liberation of Italians, of
Slavs, of Roumanians and of Tcheco -Slovaks
from foreign domination; the enfranchisement
of populations subject to the bloody tyranny
of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of
the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to West-
ern civilization."

In his message to the Senate on January
22-nd, 1917, President Wilson said: "No peace
can last, or ought to last, which does not recog-
nize and accept the principle that governments
derive all their just powers from the consent
of the governed, and that no right anywhere

164 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty
to sovereignty as if they were property.

"I take it for granted, for instance, if I may
venture upon a single example, that statesmen
everywhere are agreed that there should be a
united, independent and autonomous Poland
and that henceforth inviolable security of life,
of worship and of industrial and social develop-
ment should be guaranteed to all peoples who
have lived hitherto under the power of govern-
ments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile
to their own. ... I am proposing . . . that
no nation should seek to extend its policy over
any other nation or people, but that every
people should be left free to determine its own
policy, its own way of development, unhin-
dered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along
with the great and powerful."

In his message to Russia on June 9th, 1917,
President Wilson stated that: "Government
after Government has by their [the German
rulers'] influence, without open conquest of its
territory, been linked together in a net of in-
trigue directed against nothing less than the
peace and liberty of the world. The meshes
of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot
be broken unless wrongs already done are un-
done; and adequate measures must be taken

CONCLUSIONS

165

166 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

to prevent it from ever again being rewoven
or repaired.

"Of course, the Imperial German Govern-
ment and those whom it is using for their own
undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the
war will end in the restoration of the status quo
ante out of which this iniquitous war issued
forth, the power of the Imperial German Gov-
ernment within the empire and its wide-spread
domination and influence outside of that em-
pire. That status must be altered in such
fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing
from ever happening again."

These quotations enable us to see that the
views of the European Allies and those of
President Wilson are identical in regard to
the remaking of Europe. It is by starting
from the principle of nationalities, and by
making allowances for the natural contin-
gencies which are inevitable from its applica-
tion, that we may sketch a map (see map on
p. 165) which will conform to the principles
laid down by the Allies.

This map does not pretend to give any de-
tailed solution as to the reconstruction of Eu-
rope when peace shall have been made, nor
to solve the various problems to which the
constitution of each State may give rise. The

CONCLUSIONS 167

object of this plan is only to show frankly that
the war objectives of the Allies, and the prop-
ositions of President Wilson in regard to a
just and lasting peace, arrive at the same gen-
eral conclusion, based on geography. Besides,
these conclusions are the only means by which
the power of Prussian militarism can be laid
low. As a matter of fact, while adhering
strictly to the modern principles of justice,
they deprive Germany of the regions which
are useful to her for strategic offensives, and
by the creation of a belt of independent States
to the south of her they will take away the
man power which alone allows her to continue
the war. This is shown by the following state-
ments.

After having conformed to the principles of
President Wilson by giving back the territory
of Poland, with its six millions of inhabitants,
the Danish territory (including the portions
necessary to make that source of aggression,
the Kiel Canal to the Elbe, international
property), which would mean about 500,000
inhabitants, and the provinces of Alsace and
Lorraine, which number about 1,500,000 in-
habitants, Germany would find her population
reduced from 68 million before the war to
about 60 million more or less.

168 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

President Wilson's formula that: "Inviola-
ble security of life, of worship and of industrial
and social development should be guaranteed
to all peoples who have lived hitherto under
the power of governments devoted to a faith
and purpose hostile to their own," means the
condemnation of the Empire of the Haps-
burgs, which is a mosaic of peoples held to-
gether in the same State against their will.

Application of the same principle of na-
tionality to Austria-Hungary would scatter
five out of her 12 millions of Germans; one
into Roumania, three into the Czech-Slovak
State, one into the Magyar State. That would
leave only seven millions of Germans, which
would reduce Austria to its normal limits.
We must take into account that this number
contains in reality nearly a million of Czechs,
who are wrongly classed as Germans in Vien-
nese statistics. Now, would these seven mil-
lions of Germans contained in the restricted
Austria wish to join themselves to the Ger-
mans of Germany? Nothing is less certain,
if they still remember the suffering inflicted
on them under the hegemony of Berlin, and
above all if Austria's economic outlet to the
sea is to be assured toward the south.

But let us suppose that these seven millions

CONCLUSIONS 169

of Austro-Germans, invoking the principle of
nationalities, do wish to join the 60 million
Germans of Germany. That would make
67 millions of Germans, or one million less
than before the war. It is, therefore, not cor-
rect to say that to divide Austria-Hungary would
be to increase the numerical strength of Ger-
many. Besides, the seven millions of Austro-
Germans would be reunited to a Germany
which, thanks to the application of the principle
of nationalities, had lost all the regions which
were valuable to her for strategic offensives; Polish
territory, the Emperor William Military Canal,
and Alsace-Lorraine — all of them regions with-
out which the present German offensive would
have been impossible.

But I insist that in order to obtain this re-
sult, which undoubtedly in its general lines
follows the declarations of the Allies, the liqui-
dation of Austria-Hungary, the vassal of Berlin,
is absolutely indispensable. I have studied the
problem of Central Europe from all points of
view for more than twenty years, and I affirm
that victory for the Allies is impossible without
a complete reconstruction of the centre of Europe
on a democratic basis. An independent Poland,

170 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

and also a Czech State, a free Yugo-Slavia, and a
democratic Magyar State, are the essential and
unavoidable conditions necessary for the destruc-
tion of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, and
the creation of a first ethnographic barrier strong
enough to prevent any counter-attack on the part
of Pangermanism.

Unless these barrier States are formed, there
can be no lasting restitution of Alsace-Lorraine
to France, Russia becomes the prey of Germany,
the forces of Prussian militarism are strength-
ened tenfold, the whole of Europe is reduced to
slavery; and, as a consequence, the freedom of
the United States is now actually and directly
threatened.

-f, r

D Chert came, Andre

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