Full text of "U.S. participation in Somalia peacekeeping : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, October 19 and 20, 1993"

See other formats

\ / S. Hrg. 103-318

^ U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA PEACEKEEPING

■. F 76/2: S. HRG, 103-318

Participation in Sonalia Peace...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 19 AND 20, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

n < '■■■ ".. ••

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-388CC WASHINGTON : 1993

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-043333-9

\ / S. Hrg. 103-318

^ U.S. PARnClPAHON IN SOMALIA PEACEKEEPING

. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-318

Participation in Sonalia Peace...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 19 AND 20, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-388CC WASfflNGTON : 1993

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Document.s, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-043333-9

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CLAIBORNE PELL,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
JOHN F. KERRY, MassachuBetts
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

Rhode Island, Chairman

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
HANK BROWN, Colorado
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire

HARLAN MATHEWS, Tennessee

GeryLD B. CHRISTIANSON, staff Director
James W. Nance, Minority Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

October 19, 1993

Page

Tamoff, Peter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 3

Prepared statement 6

October 20, 1993

Albright, Madeleine K., U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 66

Biden, Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement 64

Appendix

OCTOBER 19, 1993

Responses of Mr. Tamoff to Questions Asked by Senator Brown 109

Responses of Mr. Tamoff to Questions Asked by Senator Pressler 110

OCTOBER 20, 1993

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Pell Ill

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Feingold ... Ill

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Lugar 112

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Helms 113

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Pressler .... 117

(in)

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA
PEACEKEEPING

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1993

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Kerry, Simon, Feingold, Helms,
Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, Brown, Coverdell, and
Gregg.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

We are holding this hearing today to look into the U.S. involve-
ment in Somalia. I am very pleased to welcome Under Secretary
of State Peter Tarnoff and Under Secretary of Defense Walter
Slocombe to our committee to provide a detailed account of the ad-
ministration's policy on this issue.

American forces have played a leading role in the successful U.N.
effort to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia. However, U.S. in-
volvement in UNOSOM II has been criticized for its emphasis on
military action instead of diplomacy in attempting to establish a se-
cure environment to ensure that starvation is not used once again
as a weapon in the clan rivalries.

Unnecessary confrontations with General Aideed cost the lives of
many U.N. peacekeepers, including over 25 Americans. As we
know, last week there was an extensive debate on this issue cul-
minating in a Senate vote to withdraw our combat troops from So-
malia by March 31, 1994, the date proposed by the President. Con-
gress has demonstrated its grave concern about our involvement.
Many questions remain concerning the perceived inconsistencies of
our mission there and the events leading up to and including the
October 3, 1993, raid which cost so many lives.

I believe it is the responsibility of this committee to continue its
public examination of this issue. There will be a hearing tomorrow
with Madeleine Albright, our Ambassador to the U.N., and Ambas-
sador Robert Oakley will be briefing our committee tomorrow after-
noon as well. Actually, it will be this afternoon that he will be with
us.

I certainly look forward to hearing Mr. TarnoflF and Mr. Slocombe
address these issues, and I would now turn to the ranking minority
member.

Senator Helms. And how are you this morning?

The Chairman. Fine.

(1)

Senator Helms. Good. Grood morning. Mr. Slocombe, we must
stop meeting like this.

Mr. Slocombe. That is right.

Senator Helms. People will begin to talk.

Mr. Tarn off, I am not certain that any of us on this committee,
and certainly not this Senator, have any reason to be self-assured
about any statement we may make or any question we may ask re-
garding the tragic events in Somalia. And let me tell you why. Be-
fore any finger-pointing starts, members of this Foreign Relations
Committee would do well to engage in some genuine self-assess-
ment.

We muffed our chance and we muffed it badly back in the sum-
mer. When you appeared right there before the committee, we
could have taken you on then, and should have, but we did not. Be-
cause it was on July 29 that you testified as follows: "UNOSOM
n," that is the U.N. operation in Somalia, "is a model worth cul-
tivating. We should welcome the opportunity to advance our hu-
manitarian values with limited U.S. military involvement."

Now, I heard the buzz words, military involvement, but none of
us, including me, picked up on them. I do recall — if this is any com-
fort to me and it is not, I do recall thinking "what if." But the con-
sciousness of the people who are supposed to be the leaders of the
American people scarcely ever give a thought to what the U.S. Con-
stitution says and means about who can declare war and who can-
not, even if we decide what is a declaration of war, and there is
a lot of trouble with that this very day in this town.

Now, a lot of things that have happened in recent years have
bothered me. Somalia has bothered me from the very beginning,
and I am sure it has bothered you. On the other hand, our tele-
vision screens were filled night after night with scenes of pitiful,
emaciated people in Somalia, especially women and little children
with their bloated bellies and their empty, staring eyes.

And, of course, it suited all of us. We thought it was great for
America to send food over there, even thou^ as a member for
some years of this committee I knew that the very same pitiful peo-
ple and things are going on in dozens of countries around the
world, including in our own hemisphere. Did we select Somalia as
a place where we could ease our consciences because Somalia just
happens to be a country with access from the sea? I am afraid the
answer to that is really yes. I do not know, but I think it is.

In any case, all of us should have heard the firebell ringing when
we convened this committee in July, but we did not. We were
bound to be aware that the Security Council's resolution authoriz-
ing UNOSOM n is impossibly broad and dangerously vague, but
there it came and we let it float by like a ship passing in the night.

Its scope includes "building a nation," whatever that means in

Eractical terms. It envisions the reconciliation of people who have
een engaged in furious wars against each other for centuries. It
specifies the disarming of a population that has been in chaos for
at least 2 years, and it proposes to create a viable judicial and law
enforcement system out of thin air.

The problem with your colorful endorsement of UNOSOM II on
July 29 as a model worth advocating, Mr. Tarnoff, is that
UNOSOM II was already then beginning to unravel.

History is replete with leaders who preferred slogans and prom-
ises to sensible assessments, and I am old enough to remember
Neville Chamberlain's fatuous observation that peace in our time
was going to happen. That ought to ring in our ears down through
the generations.

What I have learned from this, Mr. Tamoff — and I do not criti-
cize you because we are equally remiss in our responsibility. All of
us in Congress need to ask harder questions, and some of you need
to tighten up your answers so that they will amount to more than
comfortable conversation.

It is not enough for the Secretary of State to say, as he did to
the Washington Post this past weekend, that the highest levels of
the administration were not focused on Somalia. My Lord, what an
understatement. Any time U.S. soldiers are taking fire and are cas-
ualties in a far off land, day after day, night after night in an
undeclared war, I would think the State Department and the whole
administration would want to be focused on that situation.

Even now a hearing on Somalia by the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations apparently is not important enough for the Sec-
retary of State to attend, because he has flown off somewhere. A
Member of the House of Representatives had it about right when
he asked Les Aspin: "How can I tell the mother of one of those
young men that he died protecting the vital interests of this coun-
try."

And maybe you can offer a suggestion about that sort of dialog,
but those questions should be asked before the tragedies occur and
before the undeclared wars begin. And you and your superiors, I
think, are obliged to respond somewhat more thoughtfully, always
bearing in mind what the U.S. Constitution says about who can de-
clare war and who cannot. And I look forward to your explanations
and your answers, sir.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tamoff, we are glad to hear your statement and any part of
it you do not read will be inserted in the record as if read.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TARNOFF, UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Tarnoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Grood
morning to the members of this committee.

I would like to thank you and the other members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee for the opportunity to come before
you today to discuss U.S. policy in Somalia. This committee, this
Congress, and the American people require a clear explanation of
the administration's goals and missions in Somalia, how our efforts
relate to the U.N.'s role, and why we believe our strategy is sound.

I would like to provide you with this explanation and answer
your questions. My colleague, Walter Slocombe, from the Defense
Department, will speak to questions about the nature, size, and
plan for the return of our military forces in Somalia, as well as
their current activities.

Our goals in Somalia are humanitarian. We seek to support
UNOSOM in its efforts to help the Somali people help themselves

in fashioning a political solution to their civil conflict and produce
a secure environment to enable the free flow of humanitarian aid.

We believe firmly that these goals are worthy and that they
serve America's interests. Our commitment to achieve these goals
is firm, but it is not open-ended. Despite the intense focus on south
Mogadishu, remarkable progress toward ending the famine and fos-
tering political development at the district level has been made. We
believe that the reinvigoration of the political process outlined by
the President and reported to the Congress on October 13 will pre-
serve these gains and fulfill U.S. objectives by March 31, 1994.

In determining our goals and missions, we have described both
the mission of the U.N. and the mission of the U.S. forces. The
U.N., supported by the U.N. Security Council and by the 27 govern-
ments with forces in Somalia, has taken on a broad mission in
UNOSOM II; to help Somalia develop basic political institutions
and to assist in establishing a judiciary and police force so Somalis
can keep order in their country and prevent a return to the chaos
and famine which caused the international community to intervene
last year.

Having led the first phase of the U.N. mission by providing the
vast majority of the forces for the UNITAF operation, the American
contribution to UNOSOM II is now much more limited. We are pro-
viding military logistical support to U.N. forces so they can main-
tain order in Somalia. Logistical troops are under the operational
control of the U.N. force command.

We are providing an interim force protection supplement, a quick
reaction force, to U.N. forces to deal with emergencies. All U.S.
combat forces are under U.S. operational control and all U.S. forces
are under U.S. command.

We are helping accelerate the process of political reconciliation,
which will come from African leaders such as Presidents Meles of
Ethiopia and Issaias Eritrea working with Somali leaders, by dis-
patching Ambassador Robert Oakley to the region to help the U.N.
encourage this process. We will maintain our military presence
until March 31, 1994, after which we will leave several hundred
noncombat advisers in Somalia.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, we are providing the U.N. with sup-
port for a transition to civilian contractors and non-U.S. forces, and
assistance in accelerating political reconciliation. We believe that
we can accomplish these goals by March 31, 1994. This timefi^ame
is necessary to allow for a smooth turnover of responsibility, an
adequate signal to the Somalis that their opportunity to take the
process of reconciliation into their own hands while enjoying the
physical and financial support of the international community is fi-
nite.

We believe our strategy is sound because it protects our people,
protects the gains of the mission so far and, frankly, protects our
interests as a world leader. It has two primary components. First,
temporarily strengthening our military posture so we fulfill our
transition role from a position of strength and, second, refocusing
UNOSOM's efforts onto political reconciliation.

The President recently ordered additional Army combat person-
nel and additional armored vehicles to Somalia. This will allow us
to complete our mission in Somalia from a position of strength and

safety. Our troops will be supported offshore by an aircraft carrier
and two marine amphibious groups, all under American command.

Their mission is, first and foremost, to protect American troops
in Somalia. Second, they are to keep open and secure the roads, the
port, the lines of communication that are essential for the U.N. and
relief workers to keep the flow of food, supplies, and people moving
freely throughout the entire country. Third, they are to keep the
pressure on those who threaten to cut off relief assistance and at-
tack our people. Fourth, our troops, along with forces from 30 other
countries, will help to restore order and make it possible for Soma-
lis to work together to resolve their own problems.

They will protect our forces, but also protect the accomplish-
ments of our presence in Somalia. We must recall that thanks to
the U.S. -led relief effort, starvation in Somalia has virtually ceased.
Life is returning to normal in many areas, although millions of So-
malis still depend on relief supplies to survive. Crops are growing,
tens-of-thousands of children being inoculated, and markets are
opening in most of the country.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the only lasting solution to Soma-
lia's problems is a political one. We understood when we supported
the organization of the first Addis Ababa conference, there must be
a political process that allows Somalis to reconcile their differences
and to begin to rebuild their country. This emphasis was neglected
during the military effort to respond to the brutal attack on the
Pakistani peacekeepers last June. The President's course correction
is designed to put this effort front and center. The U.N. under-
stands our views and supports our position.

The course of reviving the process of political reconciliation began
last week. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who served as the special
envoy to Somalia from December 1992 until May 1993, has trav-
eled to the region and consulted with regional leaders. During the
October 10-14 period. Ambassador Oakley spoke to President
Issaias of Eritrea, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, Ethiopian
President Meles, and held discussions with UNOSOM officials and
Somalis representing the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions, and oth-
ers, in Mogadishu.

Presidents Meles and Issaias and the Organization of African
Unity are willing to assume an active role in bringing together the
different Somali factions, and other regional leaders to support this
effort. We have already begun to see this emphasis bear fruit.

Regional African leaders are fully engaged in efforts to keep the
peace and encourage political reconciliation in Somalia. An infor-
mal cease-fire has held up in Mogadishu for more than a week.
General Aideed's militia have removed a number of the barricades
on roads in southern Mogadishu. Most important, Aideed's forces
released unconditionally the two UNOSOM detainees they were
holding, American Chief Warrant Officer Durant and Nigerian Pri-
vate Shankali.

Mr. Chairman, we will also ensure that the interests of justice
for the murdered peacekeepers are served as well, working with
UNOSOM, through Ambassador Oakley, to look for ways to com-
plete the necessary inquiries into the events of June 5, 1993, in a
manner consistent with the U.N. resolutions. However, UNOSOM

is responsible for ensuring that justice is done. It is not the mission
of U.S. forces to act as a poHce force in SomaHa.

There are some Americans who beHeve that we should withdraw
from Somalia immediately. We are convinced that this would be
wrong: wrong for American interests and wrong for American val-
ues. We believe that our plan is the right one, because it protects
our people, preserves the humanitarian gains of two administra-
tions, and projects American leadership as it should, America act-
ing as a reliable and responsible leader and partner. We believe the
Senate's vote is an essential part of the President's plan.

Our plan protects U.S. forces through our enhanced deplo3anent.
By allowing a reasonable time for a political and military transi-
tion, we can fulfill our mission and preserve the humanitarian
gains of two administrations. A precipitous withdrawal would like-
ly have caused the collapse of the UNOSOM mission and devalue
tne brave efforts of the civilian and military personnel in Somalia
to date.

Our responsibilities as a world leader, as a power with forces de-
ployed in many parts of the world, as a proponent of the view that
other nations must share the burdens of relieving humanitarian
distress are protected as well.

First, because we keep our word to those allies who came to So-
malia because we asked them to join us. If we abandon those who
trusted us, we would raise serious doubts in the minds of friends
and allies around the world.

Second, by maintaining the credibility of America's commitment
as a deterrent to those who oppose our policies. By bolstering our
military presence to protect our troops we show the aggressors and
terrorists of the world that, as the President stated, you cannot
change our policy by killing our people.

Third, by playing a responsible, albeit limited, role in UNOSOM's
mission, we show the international community that we will play
our part in collective efforts to relieve humanitarian distress and
others to do the same, but that our commitments and our contribu-
tions are not open-ended.

Mr. Chairman, we started this mission, as the President has
said, for the right reasons, and intend to finish it the right way.
This is a commitment to finish our mission responsibly and to
bring our troops home safely and on time.

In order for our policy and our soldiers to succeed, we need your
support and that of the American people. Let us, this Congress and
this administration, work together to bring our troops home in a
way that honors our commitments and accomplishes our important
mission. With your support we can remove all of our combat troops
by March 31, and leave behind a Somalia where starvation has
ended and political reconciliation can be well advanced.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tarn off follows:]

Prepared Statement of Mr. Tarnoff
i. introduction

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you and the other members
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the opportunity to come before you
today to discuss U.S. policy in Somalia.

This committee, this Congress, and the American people require a clear expla-
nation of the administration s goals and missions in Somalia, how our efforts relate
to the U.N.'s role, and why we believe our strategy is sound.

I want to provide you with this explanation and answer your questions. My col-
league, Walter Slocombe from the Defense Department can address your questions
about the nature, size and plan for return of our military forces from Somalia.

II. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Our goals in Somalia are humanitarian. We seek to support UNOSOM in its ef-
forts to help the Somali people help themselves in fashioning a lasting political solu-
tion to their civil conflict, and to produce a secure environment to enable the free
flow of humanitarian aid.

We believe firmly that these goals are worthy, and that they serve America's in-
terests. Our commitment to achieve these goals is firm, but it is not open ended.
Despite the intense focus on south Mogadishu, remarkable progress towards ending
the famine and fostering political development at the district level has been made.
We believe that the reinvigoration of the political process outlined by the President,
and reported to Congress on October 13, will preserve these gains and fulfill U.S.
objectives by March 31, 1994.

III. THE U.S. role/the U.N. MISSION

In determining our goals and missions, we have described both the mission of the
United Nations and the mission of United States forces. The United Nations sup-
ported by the U.N. Security Council and by the 27 governments with forces in So-
malia, has taken on a broad mission in UNOSOM II — to help Somalia develop basic
political institutions and to assist in establishing a judiciary and police force so So-
malis can keep order in their country and prevent a return to the chaos and famine
which caused the international community to intervene last year.

Having led the first phase of the U.N. mission by providing the vast majority of
the forces for the UNITAF operation, the American contribution to UNOSOM 11 now
is more limited.

• We are providing military logistical support to U.N. forces so they can maintain
order in Somalia. These logistical troops are under the operational control of the
U.N. force command.

• We are providing an interim force protection supplement, the quick reaction
force, to U.N. forces to deal with emergencies. All U.S. combat forces are under
U.S. operational control and all U.S. forces are under U.S. command.

• We are helping accelerate the process of political reconciliation — which will
come from African leaders such as Presidents Meles of Ethiopia and Issaias of
Eritrea working with Somali leaders — by dispatching Ambassador Robert Oak-
ley to the region to help the U.N. encourage this process.

• We will maintain our military presence until March 31, 1994 after which we
will leave several hundred non-combat advisers in Somalia.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, we are providing the U.N. with support for a transition
to civilian contractors and non-U.S. forces and assistance in accelerating political
reconciliation. We believe that we can accomplish these goals by March 31, 1994.
This timeframe is necessary to allow for a smooth turnover of responsibility and
adequate to signal to the Somalis that their opportunity to take the process of rec-
onciliation into their own hands — while enjoying the physical and financial support
of the international community — is finite.

rv. THE AMERICAN STRATEGY

We believe our strategy is sound because it protects our people, protects the gains
of the mission so far and, frankly, protects our interests as a world leader.

It has two primary components: First, temporarily strengthening our military pos-
ture so we fulfill our transition role from a position of strength; and second,
refocusing UNOSOM's efforts on political reconciliation.

A Position of Strength

The President recently ordered additional Army combat personnel and additional
armored vehicles to Somalia. This will allow us to complete our mission in Somalia
from a position of strength and safety. Our troops will be supported offshore by an
aircraft carrier and two marine amphibious groups, all under American command.

Their mission is first and foremost to protect American troops in Somalia.

Second, they are to keep open and secure the roads, the pwrt, and lines of commu-
nication that are essential for the U.N. and relief workers to keep the flow of food,
supplies, and people moving freely throu^out the entire country.

Third, they are to keep up the pressure on those who threaten to cut off relief
assistance and attack our people.

Fourth, our troops, along with forces from 30 other countries, will help to restore
order and make it possible for Somalis to work together to resolve their own prob-
lems.

They will protect our forces, but also protect the accomplishments of our presence
in Somalia. We must recall that thanks to the U.S. -led relief effort, starvation in
Somalia has virtually ceased and life is returning to normal in many areas although
millions of Somalis still depend on relief supplies to survive. Crops are growing,
tens-of-thousands of children are being inoculated, and markets are opening in most
of the country.

Refocusing on Political Reconciliation

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the only lasting solution to Somalia's problems is
a political one. As we understood when we supported the organization of the first
Addis Ababa Conference, there must be a political process that allows Somalis to
reconcile their differences and to begin to rebuild their country. This emphasis was
neglected during the military effort to respond to the brutal attack on the Pakistani
peacekeepers last June but the President s course correction is designed to put this
effort front and center. The U.N. understands our views and supports our position.

The process of reviving the process of political reconciliation began last week. Am-
bassador Robert Oakley, who served as the special envoy to Somalia from December
1992 until May 1993, has travelled to the region and consulted with regional lead-
ers. During the October 10-14 period. Ambassador Oakley spoke to President
Issaias of Eritrea, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, Ethiopian President Meles,
and held discussions with UNOSOM officials and Somalis representing the Aideed
and Ali Mahdi factions in Mogadishu.

Presidents Meles and Issaias and the Organization of African Unity are willing
to assume an active role in bringing together the different Somali factions and other
regional leaders to support this effort.

We have already begun to see this emphasis bear fruit.

• Regional African leaders are fully engaged in efforts to keep the peace and en-
courage political reconciliation in Somalia.

• The informal cease fire has help up in Mogadishu for more than a week.

• General Aideed's militia have removed a number of the barricades on roads in
south Mogadishu. Most important, Aideed's forces released unconditionally the
two UNOSOM detainees they were holding — American Chief Warrant Officer
Durant and Nigerian Private Shankali.

Mr. Chairman, we will also ensure that the interests of justice for the murdered
peacekeepers are served as well. We are working with UNOSOM, through Ambas-
sador Oakley, to look for ways to complete the necessary inquiries into the events
of June 5, 1993 in a manner consistent with U.N. resolutions. However, UNOSOM
is responsible for ensuring that justice is done. It is not the mission of U.S. forces
to act as a police force in Somalia.

V, A SOUND STRATEGY

There are some Americans who believe that we should withdraw from Somalia
immediately. We are convinced this would be wrong — wrong for American interests
and wrong for American values. We believe our plan is the right one — because it
protects our people, preserves the humanitarian gains of two administrations and
projects American leadership as it should — with America acting as a reliable and
responsible leader and, partner. We believe the Senate's vote is an essential part of
the President's plan.

• Our plan protects U.S. forces through our enhanced deployment.

• By allowing a reasonable time for a political and military transition, we can ful-
fill our mission and preserve the humanitarian gains of'^two administrations. A
precipitous withdrawal would likely cause the collapse of the UNOSOM mission
and devalue the brave efforts of the civilian and military personnel in Somalia
to date.

• Our responsibilities as a world leader, as a power with forces deployed in many
parts of^ the world, and as a proponent of^ the view that other nations must
share the burdens of relieving humanitarian distress are protected as well:

— First, because we keep our word to those allies who came to Somalia because
we asked them to join us. If we abandon those who trusted us, we would raise
serious doubts in the minds of friends and allies around the world.

— Second, by maintaining the credibility of America's commitment as a deter-
rent to those who oppose our policies. By bolstering our military presence to

protect our troops we show the aggressors and terrorists of the world that,
as the President stated, you cannot change our policy by killing our people.
— Third, by plajdng a responsible, albeit limited, role in UNOSONTs mission, we
show the international community that we will play our part in collective ef-
forts to relieve humanitarian distress, and help others to do the same, but
that our commitments and our contributions are not open ended.

VI. CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, we started this mission, as the President said, "for the right rea-
sons, and we intend to finish it in the right way." This is a commitment to finish
our mission responsibly and to bring our troops home safely and on time.

In order for our policy and our soldiers to succeed we need your support and that
of the American people.

Let us — the Congress and the administration — work together to bring our troops
home in a way that honors our commitments and accomplishes our important mis-
sion. With your support we can remove all of our combat troops by March 31 and
leave behind a Somalia where starvation has ended and political reconciliation can
be well advanced.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much indeed. I think now we
will have a series of questions. I would suggest that we limit our-
selves now to 9 minutes so that everybody gets a chance. I will
start out.

I believe it is correct to say that President Clinton's announce-
ment of the March 31 deadline for withdrawing U.S. combat troops
will make our interim role there a lame duck exercise, since Aideed
and the other factional leaders will hide their weapons, bide their
time until our forces depart, and then resume. What is your own
reaction to this view?

Mr. Tarnoff. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that we will have
a lame duck presence in Somalia and in the region between now
and March 31 for several reasons. First of all, we will be enhancing
our military presence so as to protect American forces and make
sure that the U.N. humanitarian activities continue. Second, be-
cause starting with the efforts of Ambassador Oakley last week, we
are playing an active role in the political process both within Soma-
lia and in the region.

As I reported in my opening statement, we have some encourag-
ing results from Ambassador Oakley's initial mission and, finally,
I think that we have received reports from the other troop-contrib-
uting countries that while some may ask themselves whether or
not they will remain in Somalia after March 31, we have no indica-
tion that these forces are coming out before that time unless they
had previously decided to do so.

There are some governments that announced their intention to
withdraw forces at the end of this year or early next year. They
will probably withdraw those forces, but additional forces are, of
course, on the way from Egypt, from India, from Pakistan, and we
think that it is because of the President's commitment, endorsed by
Congress, to keep our forces there until March 31, that the U.N.
and U.S. presence will be significant during that period of time.

The Chairman. Could you repeat, just for me to absorb, what are
the other countries that will be sending troops in?

Mr. Tarnoff. Other countries with troops on the way, and I
would like to ask Mr. Slocombe to supplement that, but which have
forces currently on the way to Somalia, and which are expected to

deploy in the coming weeks, are Egypt, India, and Pakistan. There
may be others.

The Chairman. Mr. Slocombe.

Mr. Slocombe. Nepal will be sending additional forces. As you
know, there are some very considerable number of countries, some-
thing like 20, who have forces in Somalia at present. The list which
Peter Tamoff has just given is a list of those who are now in the
process of increasing their forces.

The Chairman. And then what troops will be taken out to bal-
ance them? In other words, what countries will be withdrawing
when we withdraw?

Mr. Slocombe. As Secretary Tamoff has said, there are a num-
ber of countries who, prior to recent events, had announced that
they plan to remove their forces at various dates. That includes the
French and the Belgians.

The Chairman. Where do the Italians stand?

Mr. Tarnoff. My recollection is that the Italians have not set a
definite date for pulling their forces out.

The Chairman. The assumption that many people make is that
when we withdraw, as sort of the strongest element there, it will
be very hard for the others to continue their presence. Would you
concur with that statement, or is that an incorrect statement?

Mr. Tarnoff. I think, Mr. Chairman, that would be a premature
judgment. We have received indications from many of the countries
with troops in Somalia that they will wait and see. They will wait
and see whether this process of^^ political reconciliation is effective,
whether the reduced level of violence is sustained, whether the
U.N. itself is able to take on increased responsibilities, or some of
the logistical and other duties, and that they have at least deferred
their decisions on a firm withdrawal date until the situation on the
ground is clearer.

So in answer to your question, I think it is too early to tell what
the other troop-contributing countries may want to do after March
31.

The Chairman. While I was there a little while back, I was
struck by the number of weapons. They were very visible. Would
that be the case now?

Mr. Tarnoff. Again, in Mogadishu itself, in parts of Mogadishu,
south Mogadishu primarily, where most of the fighting has been
going on, there has been quite a bit of restraint on the part of the
clans, especially General Aideed's clan, in the last 10-day period.
We do not claim that these weapons have been put away forever,
but they are certainly not being used hostile fashion as had been
the case in the preceding months.

The Chairman. Why was an attempt made to seize the various
Aideed lieutenants on October 4, after President Clinton had been
stressing the need to de-emphasize the military confrontation with
Aideed and focus on a political resolution?

Mr. Tarnoff. The mandate of the U.N. has been since early
June to make a determined effort to apprehend those individuals
responsible for that tragic event on June 5 in which, as all of you
know, of course, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed, and as part
of that overall mission the U.N., occasionally assisted by the Unit-
ed States, has been pursuing leads, when it seemed possible to ap-

prehend some of the individuals responsible, and some, in the
course of the last 3 or 4 months, have been detained.

Since that time, Mr. Chairman, we have been in close touch with
the U.N. about such missions, and the U.N. now understands that
the United States will not be party to attempts to apprehend either
General Aideed or those responsible, because we feel that it is im-
portant to give the political reconciliation a chance. This, of course,
must involve the leaders of the Aideed faction and probably Gen-
eral Aideed himself, so I think the mission that you were referring
to is part of a continuation of the previous strategy.

The Chairman. In view of Aideed's success in eliminating Barre
and the previous regime, is he not he looked on as sort of like
George Washington over there by his own compatriots?

Mr. Tarnoff. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. He is one of 15
clan leaders. He is certainly in many ways the most single powerful
leader politically and militarily, and he does have a strong hold in
southern Mogadishu, but much of the violence in Somalia over the
last year or so has been among the Somali factions itself, and I
think it is too much to say that General Aideed is regarded as the
most popular leader in his own country by a majority of his own
countrymen.

The Chairman. But he was mainly responsible for throwing out
the previous corrupt and unfortunate regime, is that not correct?

Mr. Tarnoff. He was one of the several people most responsible
for that, but nonetheless, given the clan loyalties in Somalia, I
think it is fair to say the vast majority of the Somali people do not
necessarily favor him as a national leader.

The Chairman. Thank you. Thank yoii very much indeed. Sen-
ator Helms.

Senator Helms. Mr. Tarnoff, the news reports over the weekend,
one of which I will insert for the record, told us that Secretary
Christopher, Secretary Aspin, and the President of the United
States all were unaware that the U.N. policy in Somalia continued
to be one of hunting down General Aideed to the exclusion of the
concerted effort of political reconciliation.

Now, what I have just said is a fair assessment of what Sec-
retary Christopher himself said. Now, how is it possible that the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, not to mention the
President of the United States, were not aware of a U.N. policy
that depends almost entirely on U.S. armed forces for its execu-
tion?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, I discussed this issue with Secretary
Christopher after those reports came out. Let me tell you what he
authorized me to say, and I can only speak for Secretary Chris-
topher in this regard.

Secretary Christopher confirms that he was aware of policy as it
evolved. He was not necessarily following it in every detail on an
everyday basis, but at key decision points, including the point in
early June when the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution au-
thorizing U.N. forces in Somalia to pursue those responsible for the
June 5 attack on the Pakistani forces. Secretary Christopher was
fully aware of that development.

Senator Helms. But what prompted him to say that in an article
titled "Inattention Led to U.S. Deaths," if he said, oh, by the way,
I was aware?

[The article referred to may be found in committee files.]

Mr. Tarnoff. Well, again, I do not have. Senator, the exact quo-
tations that you may have in front of you.

Senator Helms. Has anybody heard from Les Aspin that he said
he knew or did not know?

Mr. Tarnoff. I cannot speak for the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Slocombe. Senator, I can answer that question. Secretary
Aspin was certainly aware, of course, of both military and political
policies in Somalia throughout this period of time. There was a
very strong concern on the part of the administration that the po-
litical process, the effort to build a political settlement, would allow
for us to get our forces out and was not being given the emphasis
that it required.

Senator Helms. Well, why did he not say, look, I do not know
what Warren is talking about, but I knew? Was anything like that
said?

Mr. Slocombe. Said when?

Senator Helms. You know what I said.

Mr. Slocombe. Said when? Do you mean in response to this
press story?

Senator Helms. Yes, sir.

Mr. Slocombe. I have no idea whether he discussed it with Sec-
retary Christopher or not.

Senator Helms. No, no, I am talking about the Defense Depart-
ment ought to have said, wait a minute, the Secretary of Defense
did know.

Mr. Slocombe. I just said that.

Senator Helms. When did he say it?

Mr. Slocombe. I just said it. I do not know that the question has
been put to Secretary Aspin.

Senator Helms. Well, it is a long time since this past weekend
to be hanging on a limb on this thing, Mr. Secretary. Well, I hope
you folks will get your acts together. When you have a Secretary
of State making a statement like that, and then I do not care when
he says, oh, by the way, I did know, after all, it worries me, and
I think it worries a lot of people in the Congress, and I expect it
worries a lot of people among the American people.

Well, let me move on to something else. One of the fundamental
concerns that I have had, and I think many other Senators and
Members of the House have had with participation in these U.N.
military exercises, is that the differing national agendas of the
countries represented could very well put our own troops in life-
threatening positions.

Now, it has been reported that one reason that Greneral Aideed
has such a bountiful and steady supply of weaponry is because the
Italian contingent allowed trucks coming from the Aideed strong-
hold north of Mogadishu to pass through their checkpoints without
inspection. Now, it is believed that those trucks carried weapons,
mines, ammunition, and so forth.

Mr. Tarnoff, in earlier testimony I think I am correct in saying
that I recall that you assured us tnat the Italian contingent in So-

malia, despite many reports to the contrary, were cooperating fully
with the United States and with UNOSOM, but the President's
own report, which he submitted to Congress on October 13 — that
is last week — the President stated that, "nations arriving with dif-
fering opinions of how their forces would relate to the United Na-
tions force commander and their national capitals," and the delays
in following UNOSOM orders, resulted in what the President called
"mutual recrimination."

All right. To whom was the President referring if he was not re-
ferring to the Italian contingent?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, let me try to answer that in two ways.
First of all, with respect to the Italians I would say today what I
said on July 29. We have absolutely no evidence that there was a
deliberate or even occasional attempt by the Italians to collaborate
with General Aideed and with his forces. Again, I would like to re-
iterate that statement that I made before.

I think with respect to what is in the President's report to the
Congress, he was referring to the fact that many of these countries
were getting used to a command and control arrangement with the
U.N. for the first time. This was a very different operation than
anything the U.N. had undertaken.

It was, as you know, Senator, the first chapter 7 on-the-ground
operation managed by the U.N. This involved a good deal of dialog
between individual governments, the individual commanders, and
the U.N. command both in the field and in New York with respect
to exactly what their obligations and responsibilities were.

It is a very difficult affair to manage, with some 25 countries,
with contingents with different experiences, different roles, dif-
ferent capacities on the ground, and I think this is the primary rea-
son that there was the kind of confusion that the President re-
ferred to in his report.

Senator Helms. Well, it is confusing here to me. I am not sure
what the President was saying. Can you say in open session where
you think Aideed got his weaponry?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes. We think that he got them primarily through
purchasing — ^he has supporters outside Somalia in his clan.

Senator Helms. What nationality?

Mr. Tarnoff. Somali. There is a very large Somali community
outside of the country itself.

Senator Helms. Did he get any of the weapons fi'om the United
States, Mr. Slocombe?

Mr. Slocombe. I would not be surprised if he had some Amer-
ican weapons that have been captured and left over from various
previous regimes and incidents, but we have no

Senator Helms. Well, can the CIA, the FBI, or anybody working
on this

Mr. Slocombe. I am trying to answer your question. I have no
reason to believe — we have no reason to believe that he has cur-
rently or is currently receiving any weapons supplied from the
United States. Somalia is a country which is awash in weapons as
a result of a long history of civil war supplies by various countries,
by the Russians, by us.

The Chairman. Would you hold the microphone a little closer?

Mr. Slocombe, There is, as the committee is certainly aware, a
very extensive international black market in arms, and Aideed is
one of the purchasers in that market.

Senator Helms. I tell you, I am going to have to follow this up
with some written questions which I would hope that you would be
able to be a little more precise than you are in public, and I am
not being critical of you. This is an important point, at least to me.
It may not be to anybody else on this committee.

I do not know how much more time I have, Mr. Chairman, but
back in the latter part of September, I think it was September 29,
this committee received official communication from the adminis-
tration that the President intended to draw down up to $25 million
into DOD commodities and services to support UNOSOM II to
build a Somali police force.

It also said that the President intended to authorize $2 million
in economic support funds to be made available to UNOSOM to pay
the salaries of the Somali police forces, and the memorandum of
justification said — and I have it in my file if you do not have it —
"UNOSOM II is a landmark operation. In a world rife with human-
itarian crises caused by armed conflict, it is indeed important to
U.S. national interests to support multinational efforts that help us
by achieving a more equitable sharing of the responsibility for cri-
sis management and relief."

Now, the obvious question to me in all of this, with all due re-
spect, since the American taxpayers seem to be paying for most of
these police-building, not to mention the $1 billion -plus we paid so
far, how do you see this as an example of more equitable sharing
of responsibility, and ancillary to that is, did the President know
what he was signing when he said that?

Mr. Slocombe. I am sure the President knew what he was sign-
ing. The reason that we made the request was that we need to
transfer the responsibility for maintaining a kind of basic level of
order in that country to allow relief to go forward. It is obviously
better to do that through a local police force.

That is the reason we made that request, and is the reason we
continue to think it was a constructive step, precisely because it
transfers the responsibility for keeping order from American and
other foreign forces to locally recruited police forces.

Senator Helms. Do you tnink it is more equitable for the Amer-
ican taxpayers?

Mr. Slocombe. It is more equitable for the American taxpayer
and the American military that it be Somalis who keep order in So-
malia than Americans. Yes, it is more equitable.

Senator Helms. Let me ask one more ancillary question. More
equitable compared to whom?

Mr. Slocombe. Compared to our doing it ourselves. It is also im-

Eortant to observe that other countries are supporting the effort to
uild a police force in Somalia.
Senator Helms. But not to the degree that we are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling these hearings. I am afraid continued public discussion
about our mission in Somalia and about U.N. peacekeeping in gen-

eral is essential as we struggle and experiment with a post-Soviet
U.S. foreign policy.

I have to say that I have had reservations about this operation
ever since I came to office 9 months ago. I have heard consistent
criticism of it back home in Wisconsin. For that reason, I did not
cosponsor Senate joint resolution 45 because I thought such a
broad mission could be a recipe for a quagmire.

Last month I was one of seven Senators to vote against a first
attempt to limit the action. I voted against it because I thought it
was too weak, and since that time we lost a young man in Wiscon-
sin who lives just 45 minutes from my home.

Last week I voted against a resolution which authorized in-
creased U.S. forces to remain in Somalia until March 31. I do not
question the intentions of the administration or the people who are
pursuing that course, but I just believe it is too long.

I am not convinced that we will be able to accomplish more by
staying there until March 31, and my opposition is really twofold.
First, it is procedural, if you will. I think it is more than something
procedural. I still believe that the war powers resolution has some
meaning, and that its procedures and requirements have not been
followed.

I believe under that resolution that our troops should have been
withdrawn within 90 days, or there should have been congressional
authorization. There has been no congressional authorization. Sen-
ate joint resolution 45 has never come out of conference, and the
item that was passed last week has not gone through, so I believe
that procedure has not been followed.

But second, I oppose this action on the merits. I think it is a
drawn-out mission. I think we should withdraw immediately. It
started, without a doubt, as a noble and compassionate humani-
tarian effort, but it has gone awry, and I think it has become a
dangerous, muddled adventure that to some resembles trying to
colonialize a poor east African nation.

I am very waiy to support an action where the U.S. military sup-
posedly tries to Duild a nation in a warring country where we may
not even be welcome.

May I say, though, in wanting to be as conciliatory as possible,
that certainly I do not believe there is no role for U.N. peacekeep-
ing. Many have said that the recent activities and efforts in Cam-
bodia were successful, so I do not want to have my remarks taken
as isolationist or certainly as against the U.N., but I simply think
this action does not make sense, and we should get out now.

In that spirit, let me ask, why did the United States choose to
become involved in combat operations in Somalia only after the
bulk of our U.S. combat forces had been withdrawn?

Mr, Tarnoff. There had. Senator, of course, been much larger
U.S. combat forces in Somalia from the end of last vear when the
UNITAF operation under U,S, leadership was launcned. It so hap-
pens that possibly because of the very large presence of U.S. com-
bat units, possibly because of the degree of need of the people and
the degree of deprivation in the people welcoming the relief sup-
plies at that point, there was not sustained opposition to those
forces at that time. There was some opposition, but it was not any-
thing like what happened half a year later.

In terms of why the violence increased, there were a couple of
reasons why this may have been the case. One is that as the U.S.
forces left, some of those who felt that their own power base in So-
malia was being eroded took advantage of the fact that as U.S.
forces were leaving, other forces were coming in a bit more slowly,
not necessarily in every case as well-equipped and well-trained as
U.S. forces.

Also, it may be that some of these leaders. General Aideed in
particular, saw that the political process which had started in
March of this year at Addis Ababa resulting in agreements among
the leaders, including General Aideed himself to disarm, would
have the effect of reducing their power base. I think that at least
is a fair analysis of why the violence may have increased at that
time.

Senator Feingold. And why we then responded.

Well, let me ask specifically, why was there an attempt to seize
Aideed and his lieutenants on October 4, after we stated there was
a need to focus on a political and not military solution?

Mr. Tarnoff. We had felt, from early September, and made our
views known to our allies and to the U.N., that it was necessary
to begin to focus greater attention on the political reconciliation
process, which had been, quite frankly, neglected since the events
of early June.

However, at no time was there a decision reached between our-
selves, the U.N., and the other troop-contributing countries, that
pressure would not continue to be exercised on those who were
challenging, militarily, U.N. forces. This was only a day or so after
the events in which significant U.S. losses occurred; and we were
still in the process of deliberating with our allies and with the U.N.
at that point, exactly what the modification should be on our own
procedures, so that the forces in the field were operating on pre-
vious instructions.

Senator Feingold. Which were to pursue Aideed?

Mr. Tarnoff. That is correct.

Senator Feingold. In the October 13 report to Congress fi^om the
administration, it stated, "At no time have U.S. forces been tasked
with such missions as nation-building." But in your testimony of
July 29, it stated, "Maintaining a secure environment in a country
where a 2-year civil war has destroyed nearly all civilian institu-
tions and services, is a formidable task. Unfortunately, this cannot
be accomplished ^either quickly or bloodlessly. The process of na-
tion-building will take time."

Please explain where the U.S. policy on nation-building stands
today, with regard to Somalia, both today and for the foreseeable
future.

Mr. Tarnoff. I think it is important to distinguish, Senator, be-
tween what the U.N. objectives have been since earlier this year,
and what U.S. objectives have been. The so-called nation-building
task, which is really a task regarding the reconstruction of Soma-
lia, economically and politically, was a task that the Somali leaders
themselves agreed to in March in Addis Ababa.

That was reinforced when the U.N. Security Council passed Res-
olution 814, after the meeting in Addis Ababa, in maintaining that

it was in the interests of the U.N. Security Council to assist the
SomaHs in these efforts.

So when I referred at that time to our interest in the reconstruc-
tion of SomaHa, I was talking specifically about our support to the
U.N. effort that was going on at that time, with the agreement of
the principal Somali leaders. I think that will continue to be the
case.

It was a U.N. effort over time, to help in the reconstruction of
Somalia, and to help political reconciliation. The United States will
support that in appropriate ways. That is very different from the
specific U.N. military mission, to which we are now committed
until March 31.

Senator Feingold. So, nation-building has never been our goal?

Mr. Slocombe. Nation-building has never been part of the Amer-
ican military mission. It has been, in a broad sense, a part of the
U.N. program for Somalia, and we support that program. But it
has not been part of the mission of the U.S. forces in country.

Senator Feingold. Has not the military effort been used, in part,
to assist in nation-building?

Mr. Slocombe. The U.S. military effort, at least since the end of
the UNITAF period at the beginning of May, has been devoted to
really three kinds of operations: One, to provide security under the
quick reaction force concept; to provide security and backup, as
necessary, for the U.N. forces, which constitute the vast majority
of the forces in Mogadishu; and second, to provide logistic support
for the U.N. forces; and third, for the period of time that we have
been discussing, to try with special forces to capture Aideed and his
senior lieutenants.

None of those missions are nation-building. Nation-building
would involve being out in the countryside, doing civic action and
that sort of thing; and we have not been involved in that exten-
sively, since the UNOSOM II operation was stood up, in early May.

Senator Feingold. Let me ask you a question about the costs.
Senator Helms began this. But is the Department of Defense going
to receive any kind of reimbursement from the U.N.?

Mr. Slocombe. For the operation as a whole?

Senator Feingold. For our contribution of more than $1 billion.

Mr. Slocombe. My understanding is, this is an assessed oper-
ation.

Senator Feingold. Did we receive any reimbursement?

Mr. Slocombe. We have not received any yet. The main reason
for everybody being in arrears on the reimbursements is the delay
of the United States paying its own contribution. But I will check,
and get you the numbers on the reimbursements.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense has received $27.5 million in reimbursements from
the U.N. This was the total amount billed to the U.N. for support provided to eligi-
ble nations during the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope. The Department has billed
the U.N. an additional $52.1 million for costs incurred in support of UNOSOM II
(also known as Operation Continue Hope). Most of the $1 billion in costs to the U.S.
will not be eligible for reimbursement from the U.N., as the efforts involved were
voluntary rather than requested by the U.N.

Mr. Slocombe. There is no question that we will bear the great
bulk of the cost.

Senator Feingold. And what is the figure that you would expect
would be involved?

Mr. Slocombe, I would not quarrel with $1 billion. However, I
can get you that number.

Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Lugar?

Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In fact, our staff points out in a memorandum that the cost of
UNOSOM II through September 30 of this year has been more
than $1 billion, and that 30.4 percent will be assessed to us. And
the meter is still running on both of those.

Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

Senator Lugar. So apparently, we have that much invested.
What I was struck by was the comment you made, Secretary
Tarnoff, that there has been remarkable progress toward ending
the famine and fostering political development at the district level.
That may be true. I have tried to clip from the press every bit of
data about both of those; and there apparently are village councils
or district councils forming in as many as 40 regions as I recall;
and there is evidence, as you have mentioned, that crops are com-
ing in, and there is some self-sufficiency.

But just for the record, could it be possible for the Department
to produce the data you have from private voluntary people, as well
as officials of UNOSOM, on how many people have been saved or
fed, or the sufficiency of crops? These data seem to be very sparse.
Of necessity, perhaps, most of the reporting is in south Mogadishu.

If there is to be a claim made for this entire mission of two ad-
ministrations, it has to be in terms of the nutrition that has
changed substantially. And we do not know much about that. I
think it is a case that needs to be made, or at least fleshed out.

Mr. Slocombe. We can get you the most precise information.
The most dramatic statistic that I know in this connection is that
the private voluntary organizations have, essentially, stopped the
general relief, the general supply of food to the population. Now,
there remains a very large number, like a million people, who live
in camps and who do depend on outside relief supplies.

But in general, it has been possible, as a result of the U.N. effort,
in which the United States made a very dominant contribution, it
has been possible to dispense with general relief supplies for the
population. That is a very substantial accomplishment. The evi-
dence is, it has saved literally hundreds of thousands of lives.

Senator Lugar. And that was, of course, the purpose of our origi-
nal mission,

Mr. Slocombe. Yes, and the purpose of staying until March 31,
is to maximize the chance that it does not go back to the same situ-
ation we were in when President Bush made the decision to send
in the forces, with the support of then President-elect Clinton.

Senator Lugar. I would like to follow up on some of the reason-
ing of Senator Feingold. He raised the question of why our military
operations commenced at a time when the overall strength that we
had in Somalia was relatively low. As you pointed out in your re-
sponses, initially we had over 20,000 troops; and one reason, I sus-
pect, that there was little opposition, was that we had overwhelm-
ing strength at that point.

It is reasonable, as you suggested, Secretary Tarnoff, as our
troops left, that if there were those who were unhappy about our
being there to begin with, that they would begin to surface. And
they did; and, of course, they killed the 24 Pakistani peacekeepers
in May, which precipitated one of the resolutions.

Let me just say, however, it appears that, in our decision to use
force in trying to capture Aideed or other perpetrators of the acts
against the Pakistanis and the ambush of our own four people
shortly thereafter, we operated at a time in which we did not have
many people there. Perhaps the strategy was that special forces
would do special missions, without having overwhelming strength.

Was it not logical then, with so very few persons there of our
military, that we were likely to encounter problems, that we no
longer had overwhelming force or respect; or no longer intimidated
General Aideed or others, at that point?

And, the disconnect between the time of overwhelming force and
then, the application of force, is peculiar in this situation. When we
had the overwhelming force, the orders were not to do general dis-
arming, or to go after Aideed or others. Indeed, that was precisely
what we were not supposed to do.

Now, how did things shift to a point where we used military
force, when we really did not have much force to use?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, let me try to answer that, from a political
perspective. There were two or three things that we were trying to
achieve in early June, after the attack on the Pakistani forces
which, of course, as you've correctly cited, was followed by the U.N.
Security resolutions, authorizing UNOSOM to seek out those re-
sponsible for those attacks.

The first was, to get a higher degree of involvement on the part
of those other forces arriving in Somalia at that time. We felt, at
the time of the handover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, that it was
very important that those forces be more active; that they accept
more responsibility. The whole philosophy of the handoflF was for
the UNOSOM forces themselves to be more aggressive; and there-
fore, we hoped at that time that the same forces would have the
capacity to be more robust when it came to military operations in
general, and the pursuit of the people responsible for the other op-
erations in particular.

With respect to our own forces, I will let Secretary Slocombe
comment on that, specifically. But, as you can well imagine, in a
case like this, there is always a tendency on the part of the U.N.
to want the United States to come back and forth, to do a job that
was not being carried out as well by the successive forces. We were
resisting that, with a view toward reinforcing the U.N.'s own capac-
ities in this regard; and it was very much in our minds at this
time.

Mr. Slocombe. I would only add that that is exactly right; that,
during this period of time, we were trying to get additional third-
country forces in, and very substantial third-country forces did
come in, and are pledged and are on their way in now.

The mission of the U.S. quick reaction force was, from the very
beginning, to provide assistance to those other U.N. forces, when
they were in situations they could not handle; and that was the
reason why we began being more active in patrolling and in provid-

ing escort and support. In addition, for the reasons Secretary
Tarnoff has explained, during this period we adopted the objective
of trying to apprehend Aideed and his principal lieutenants, in
order to pursue the question of their accountability for the attack
on the Pakistani forces in early June.

Senator Lugar. So, to underline the point you are making, we
were prepared to take military action, even though we had very
few people and to encourage other nations to take military action?
Is that, essentially, the point?

Mr. Slocombe. We were, and indeed still are, trying to provide
a U.N. structure in which the U.S. force is a relatively small part
of the engaged ground forces, because of the logistics, and the peo-
ple at sea are not being engaged in anything like the same sense.

It was clear when we were trying to stand up that very large
multinational force, that those countries were vastly more willing
to make contributions if they knew that there was the highly mo-
bile, high tech, highly sophisticated American force available to
back them up if they got into trouble. That was, essentially, the
mission we were carrying out.

Senator Lugar. Let me just saw that in your statement. Sec-
retary Tarnoff, you mentioned, among our missions now, are to
keep open and secure the roads, and to keep up the pressure on
those who threaten to cut off relief assistance, and help restore
order.

But the accounts, at least in the press — and you may have more
information on this — are that our troops in south Mogadishu are in
the compound; that, essentially, the only people out and active are
in helicopters who are surveying the roads. And that those who
were arguing last week, for instance — and I was not among them —
that, if that is our purpose, why should we not be out of Somalia?

In other words, what I am curious about is: How much work is
being done by our forces, to do the relief assistance, open up the
roads, and keep them open?

The evidence does not seem to be that there is great activity by
our troops, in any of these regards. Now, can you illuminate what
they are doing?

Mr. Tarnoff. Well, in that respect, I think the press accounts
are inaccurate. Senator. Our troops are out of the compound; partly
because they are arriving in greater numbers; and partly, quite
frankly, because there has been some restraint shown on the part
of the Aideed forces.

These convoys ^are now functioning fairly normally throughout
southern Mogadishu. Those supply lines are restored. And it is
simply not the case that our forces are hunkered down in the
compound, anywhere near close to the situation of 2 or 3 weeks
ago.

Mr. Slocombe. That is absolutely right. We are not using our
forces for offensive missions, so long as the current calm holds. We
do continue to maintain a high state of readiness, to observe and
to move around, to maintain Tines of communication. We are mak-
ing clear that we will retaliate if attacked, and will defend our-
selves if our forces are in threat situations.

I agree with you, it would be easy to gather from the press, al-
though there were some stories to the contrary today, that our

forces are simply locked into their compounds. It is not true. They
are not going out and aggressively launching sweep operations; but
there is a big difference between that and being hunkered down in
the compounds.

Senator Lugar. Well, the impression of these press stories is that
there are two convoys going to the airport a day. The U.N. people
say they would not dare go out, aside from being in one of the con-
voys; that roadblocks occur, and that our troops are trying to nego-
tiate their way with whomever is stopping the traffic. In other
words, there seems to be an overwhelming number of anecdotal
stories of this sort.

Are you saying, in essence, our troops are out all over the place?

Mr. Slocombe. No, they are not out all over the place. That
would constitute an effort to sweep through the slums of
Mogadishu and round up weapons and round up people. We could
do that, if we thought that was a good idea; but it would involve
risks, and would not be an appropriate strategy, at this point.

What we are doing — I cannot confirm the number of two convoys.
There are different counts. It is not the number that I believe is
the correct one. It may depend on what somebody is counting as
a convoy.

As you probably know, the U.S. and U.N. forces are located at
various places all over the city; both in order to avoid this
"hunkered down in the compound" mentality, and simply to main-
tain communications. There are regular convoys, as I say, I am
puzzled at the two a day figure; it is not what I have been told,
and not what I believe to be the case. There are regular convoys
that move along on the main roads.

One of the issues that we are working with the SNA now, on
which some progress has been made, has been precisely to get the
roadblocks removed, so that you do not have to face the question
of a confrontation at roadblocks, which would be contrary to what
we want to have happen. We want to get the supplies through; we
do not want to fight around the convoys.

Because of this activity, relief supplies and other regular com-
mercial supplies move tnrough the city. The situation is vastly
calmer than it was a few weeks ago.

Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Kassebaum. Secretary Slocombe, there have been a
number of press reports that suggest Iran may have been supply-
ing arms to Greneral Aideed. Can you comment on that?

Mr. Slocombe. Not in public session. I would be glad to go into
it in detail, on a classified basis.

Senator Kassebaum. Well, there have been press reports. Do you
suggest that there is any merit to those press reports?

Mr. Slocombe. There are press reports to a lot of effect, and I
would be glad to go into it. You cannot have a policy of saying, I
will confirm all the true press reports and denounce all the false
ones, and still keep any secrets.

Senator Kassebaum. That is very true; and I can appreciate that.
But I would value being able to have some guidance.

Mr. Slocombe. I would be delighted to arrange a briefing, either
for you or subject to whatever the committee's procedures are, for

the committee, on a classified basis, on our information about
where we beheve Aideed is getting his miHtary supplies. I will say,
he gets an awful lot of them in-country. It is a country full of arms.
This is not the Yom Kippur War; this is low tech.

Senator Kassebaum. They seem to just keep getting more and
more technical, with greater proficiency as it goes along.

Mr. Slocombe. Yes. And as I say, I will be happy to provide the
information; but I cannot do it in open session.

Senator Kassebaum. When the President stated that all forces
would be home by March 31, obviously, everyone would hope they
would be home before then; but I think many of us had severe res-
ervations about ever specifically setting a deadline whenever our
forces are engaged, wherever they may be; in Somalia, or anywhere
else.

I would like for either of you to comment — perhaps Secretary
Tarnoff, first? — on the effect this has on possible negotiations. And
then. Secretary Slocombe, how you view this, from a military
standpoint?

I think, when you put down that kind of marker, you imme-
diately put up some parameters that make it difficult, from both
the political and the military side.

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, we will know closer to the time, clearer
than we can tell you today, exactly what the effect is.

But going back to what I said, with respect to the handoff be-
tween UNITAF and UNOSOM II, I think that it is understood in
the region, including among Somalis — ^the vast majority of Somalis
who support the presence of UNOSOM and the United States in
Somalia — it is assumed, I think, by them that ultimately the re-
sponsibility for peace and reconstruction of Somalia is in the hands
of the Somali people.

For some in the region, there will never be a perfect time for
that. And I must say uiat we should not imagine that the so-called
nation-building exercise will be an easy one that can take place in
a very few years.

But, insofar as we have indicated that there is a time limit on
our own commitment with respect to the forces on the ground, I
think that we have given the Somalis themselves, above all, an in-
centive which they may not have had: To accelerate the political
reconciliation process, something that Bob Oakley is promoting. We
have certainly gotten many of the contributing countries of troops,
and of goods and of money, to frontload their effort.

And it is our hope that this concentration of diplomatic effort, as
well as the continued presence of substantial forces in the area,
will, by March 31, lead to an improvement in the situation. But I
cannot tell you, at this point, what the effect of that date will be,
until we are closer to the time.

Mr. Slocombe. Obviously, from a strictly military point of view,
it would be better not to have a deadline; there is no question
about that.

On the other hand, the U.S. commitment is not indefinite. And,
as Peter Tarnoff says, to some degree — leaving even aside the do-
mestic politics of the problem, which is the question from Senator
Feingold; and it would suggest that the other people would take a
different view — even leaving that aside, one gets to a point where.

if you mean not to have an indefinite commitment, you have to say
that it has a definite end. Then, we beHeve that the March 31
deadline gives us the reasonable chance.

Senator Kassebaum. Well, that is true; and we could all wish it
would be December.

Mr. Slocombe. Or October.

Senator Kassebaum. But once you set that date down, every-
thing really goes to that date. And I think, from a political stand-
point, it could well be that everyone will sit there in Somalia, po-
tentially; which would lead me to ask further: You have mentioned
several times the agreement in March in Addis Ababa.

Are the other leaders of the clans participating, at this point, ac-
tively, in negotiations? Have the other war lords laid down and
turned in their arms, as was agreed to in the March agreements?
It is my understanding that, indeed, many did; General Aideed
never did. Could you clarify that, and where it stands now, as far
as reaching some of the points that were agreed to at that March
meeting, which General Aideed attended?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, in his meeting in Mogadishu last week.
Ambassador Oakley did meet the leaders of all principal factions,
including the leaders of the Ali Mahdi faction, which is probably
the most second most important in the country.

Since Ambassador Oakley returned, there have been contacts by
U.N. people and others with the clan leaders, and there is still a
degree of contact among them.

But with respect to the agreements in March in Addis Ababa,
where you correctly stated that the leaders themselves agreed to
lay down their arms or, in fact, to disarm themselves, these were
not carried out partly because the clans themselves did not trust
each other. And it is our view that unless the process of political
reconciliation advances more rapidly, it is not likely that they
would lay down their arms or give their arms up to the U.N. to
control.

And that is the reason that we have initiated, on an accelerated
basis, the conversations with the east African leaders themselves.
It is certainly the intention of President Meles and President
Issaias, and others of the east African community who have become
seized again with this issue, to look for ways to implement as soon
as possible many of the provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement
in March.

And they are working on this with the Somalis themselves, and
they may want to be convening meetings of the Somali groups in
order to achieve this purpose.

Senator Kassebaum. Well, given the success General Aideed has
seem to have, I am sure that does not send a very good signal to
the others as far as wanting to try to comply with this agreement.
And it seems to me the other clan leaders, and they have signifi-
cant power, have not stepped forward and taken much of a leader-
ship position in trying to begin to pull things together. No one has
seemed to raise in the last several months a very strong voice in
Somali affairs.

Mr. Tarnoff. I think that is a fair statement. I think part of the
reason is that, although not a dominant figure in the country by
any means, Aideed reached a position where he had a very strong

position of strength in Mogadishu which of course is the capital,
the principal focus of governmental and U.N. activity.

This served to intimidate many of the other leaders, and it is
partly for that reason, Senator, that we feel that the political proc-
ess the east Africans themselves are leading is especially important
in order to draw the leaders of other factions, as well as the Aideed
people themselves, into a political process and make the case as
strongly as possible that Aifrican leaders themselves in the region
have a high stake in some sort of accommodation.

Senator Kassebaum. Maybe iust to clarify at the end my own
thinking on this, and what has been muddled a bit, it seems to me
the question is of logistical support versus nation building and
what we were doing there.

As I recall. General Powell as well as President Bush, but par-
ticularly General Powell, in laying out the mission said that
troops — some troops would remain when the main body was with-
drawn to provide logistical support. This as you point out. Sec-
retary Slocombe, was not nation building and we were never in-
tended to be a part of that effort.

Unfortunately, our logistical support got caught somewhat in
June when General Aideed attacked Pakistani forces, and became
involved in trying to resolve it in what we assumed would be a very
short time. Is that correct?

Mr. Slocombe. It was not so much logistical support, which I
should explain. You know and I know, but I want to make sure it
is clear for the record.

Senator Kassebaum. Fine, but some of those were serving as po-
lice personnel from Fort Riley.

Mr. Slocombe. Just for the record, though, it is important to
make clear that the logistical support is not for the country as
whole. It is logistical support for military forces that are there.

Senator Kassebaum. That is right. And our quick reaction sup-
port, which was always there as a backup, is under our command
and control.

Mr. Slocombe. Exactly.

Senator KASSEiiAUM. And always has been as well as, of course,
the Rangers that we sent in just recently. But there has been a lot
of confusion about command and control. And I think that it is im-
portant to clarify that the quick reaction forces that were there for
support for the logistical groups were always under our command
and control.

Mr. Slocombe. Absolutely, as were the Rangers.

Senator Kassebaum. As were the Rangers, yes.

Mr. Slocombe. In that connection, so that the committee is fully
informed, this is probably an appropriate point to let you know
about the arrival of the two Marine units that President Clinton
ordered to go. These include about 3,600 Marines and helicopters
and armored vehicles offshore. They also include a special oper-
ations capability.

With these forces present. President Clinton has approved the
recommendation of Secretary Aspin that the U.S. Army special
command elements, that is the Rangers, be returned to the United
States within the next few days. This rotation is part of the overall

deployment that was originally approved, so the Rangers will be
out in a few days.

Senator Kassebaum. My time is up, but I would just like to sec-
ond what Senator Lugar said, that I think that it is important that
somehow we have clarification of exactly what we are doing right
now in Mogadishu. I think it is a disservice to our Armed Forces
to somehow believe they are hunkered down behind barricades, and
that is indeed diminishing of the important role that they have
played there, to somehow have that conveyed. I think it is impor-
tant to know exactly what they are doing.

Mr. Slocombe. I appreciate that. We are trying to maintain a
posture in which it is clear that the forces are ready and able to
defend themselves, will do so, are out doing necessary observation,
helping keep the lines of communication open, but not conducting
offensive operations.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Kerry.

Senator Kp:rry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have not
been able to be here because we have had another meeting on
other areas of foreign policy concern, but no doubt questions nave
pointedly made some of the criticism that you have heard in recent
weeks. And I think in fairness one has to acknowledge in biparti-
sanship that there is a strong sense on both sides of the aisle here
that at least the communication process, if not the actual imple-
mentation of policy, has been wanting to a certain degree so that
a lot of questions have loomed larger perhaps than some of them
maybe ought to have been. And certainly in some cases, appro-
priately they loomed large.

I do not want to go backward. I mean, there are others here who
may want to do that. I do not think it serves us now. We seem to
know where we are going, but I want to make certain of that, and
I would like to just ask some questions about where we are today
and where we seem to be heading.

Is there any dissention or difterence of opinion between us now
and the U.N. as to what the definition of this mission is?

Mr. Taiwoff. No, there really is not, Senator. It has been, of
course, an important time for the United States and the U.N. Both
the Secretary General of the U.N. and the members of the Security
Council of the U.N. as well as the troop-contributing countries,
those 30 governments which have men and women on the ground
in Somalia, are to be in touch closely, inform each other of our as-
sessment of the situation, what our plans are, and I think that I
can answer an unqualified yes to your question. There is total
agreement on all of these elements with respect to future missions
involved.

Senator Kerry. Is the United States committed to the continu-
ation of the U.N. mission as defined in the resolution in future
months with other forces participating?

Mr. Tarnoff. The UNOSOM mission itself is up for review at
the end of this month. We will certainly favor the continuation of
a UNOSOM effort, but we are considering ourselves, and in con-
sultation with others, and beginning to form a judgment on wheth-
er there should be some modification on the UNOSOM resolution
as such.

But I expect that we will be in favor of it. I cannot tell you at
this time whether it will be in its present form.

Senator Kerry. In July of this year you testified before the com-
mittee saying, "it is an important accomplishment that the U.N.
Security Council organized UNOSOM II as a peace enforcement
mission with teeth. The authorization of such a force is a landmark
accomplishment which it is in our interest to cultivate. UNOSOM
II is a model worth promoting."

Do we approach this review with the sense that that is still true,
that it is still a model worth promoting?

Mr. Tarnoff. I think. Senator, that certain aspects of the oper-
ation of the UNOSOM activity are worth promoting. The humani-
tarian side — the ability of the U.N. as well as others, private orga-
nizations, to sponsor the development of the country, opening
schools, et cetera, throughout the country.

But clearly there are parts of the operation which we have been
reviewing in past days. We would certainly reflect those lessons in
future U.S. policies with respect to peacekeeping or peace enforce-
ment resolutions, and we expect that there are lessons to be
learned for the U.N. as well, and the troop-contributing countries.

Senator Kerry. In recent days we had a very healthy debate
here. I think the more we debate these issues the more important
it is. I might add, I think there is an enormous amount of mis-
understanding in the country about the nature of conflict and what
we are going to face as we go down the road here in the future.

I mean, these really are the first events, the first conflicts of the
post-cold war period. And for years it was very easy for us to say,
Grenada is a beachhead of communism and we have got to stamp
it out, or Panama, instant disorder, boom, we go in, and there
seemed to be an acceptance of those definitions.

Now, with the fall of the Wall and the fall of the former Soviet
Union and, I might add, with enormous tension in our workplace
I think that is playing into all of this, it is much harder for Ameri-
cans to quickly find the handle to get a hold of the interest, if you
will.

Now, some on the floor have been articulating that interest in
various ways, particularly in the context of a $300 billion a year
annual defense budgets which we were spending to build a certain
architecture for the world, if you will, and part of that architecture
was the U.N.

I would like to ask you, speaking for the administration, to help
give Americans that handle to the degree it may or may not exist
in Somalia, and perhaps define for us in the wake of this turmoil
of the last few weeks what are the interests of the United States,
and what are the limits, if you see any, of our ability to advance
that interest?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, in the case of Somalia

Senator Kerry. But most specifically, what does it mean to the
average tax-paying citizen?

Mr. Tarnoff. In Somalia, I think the interest of the United
States, starting almost a year ago, has been constant. More impor-
tantly, the President-elect approved the mission undertaken by
President Bush in the late months of last year and continued under

our administration. And that was essentially a humanitarian mis-
sion.

I think that it is in the U.S. interest to participate on a case-by-
case basis in humanitarian missions around the world. I think
what we are learning in Somalia is we have to help the inter-
national community, beginning with the United States, to accept
these missions and assume these missions more easily than they
have been able to.

Part of the reason is, as you correctly indicated, that the U.N,
is being called on to organize efforts the likes of which they have
never had to assume in the history of the world organization. There
have simply not been these kinds of challenges. There have not the
kinds of efforts that the U.N. is now being called upon to manage.

Therefore, as we go ahead deciding on a case-by-case basis ex-
actly what the U.S. interests are, what it is appropriate for us to
do unilaterally or in conjunction with other governments and with
the U.N., I think it is terribly important for us to be mindful of the
fact that over time the U.N. itself has to be strengthened in ways
that will allow not only the United States but the international
community to have greater confidence in an organization which
will be entrusted with missions of this sort.

To go back, I think our interest has always been primarily hu-
manitarian in Somalia.

Senator Kerry. Would you say that the humanitarian mission is
in fact complete or was complete at the time that we were chasing
around after Aideed?

Mr. Tarnoff. I think, Senator, certain aspects of the humani-
tarian mission were satisfied. There was, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no more starvation in the country. There were not somewhere
between 1,000 and 3,000 Somalis dying every day as had been the
case before.

It was not complete because some 700,000 Somalis were dis-
placed in their own country, some 550,000 Somalis are in refugee
camps outside that country, and as Mr. Slocombe mentioned before
you arrived, while we can take comfort from the fact that there
does not appear to be any need for the Somalis living in their home
areas to be fed by relief organizations, this is a fragile situation.
And despite the improvements there is going to have to be contin-
ued attention for some time.

Senator Kerry. Well, my light is on, and we cannot go into all
the implications here. I must say to you that I think there are com-
pelling reasons that you have not articulated, and I think that may
be part of the problem today.

I mean, I think there are a host of reasons that deserve more
forceful advocacy. To me it is important that the United States
does not just care about Caucasian nations, and we ought to assert
that. It is also important that the international community's efforts
in this post-cold war really have an architecture around which to
coalesce. And I do not feel the forcefulness of the need for that.

We have seen what happens when we leave the world to despots,
and pretend these things are not going on. And we have a museum
here in this city that honors the memory of those in that period.

I am not saying we can involve ourselves everywhere. We cannot.
But when and where we do, we had better make sure that we are

more compelling about why we are, because I am not sure that ev-
erybody understands the full breadth of the humanitarian — the
limitations that we ran into here. And I think there is more at
stake, but my light is on and we must move on.

The CHAmMAN. Thank you. Senator Murkowski?

Senator Murkowski. lliank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
commend you gentlemen for what has been, under the cir-
cumstances, a rather complete narrative on what those of us who
attended the briefing by Secretary Aspin as well as Secretary
Christopher thought was clearly an ill-prepared briefing on their
part. And as a consequence, I think there has been an effort to do
damage control here, and the explanations which you have offered
have been well thought out.

It is too bad that there was not appropriate forethought given
prior to the briefings that were given to Members of the House and
Senate together approximately 2 weeks ago.

I would rather not dwell on the past, there is one area that I
think deserves perhaps a little rehashing. In February 1993, this
year, I cosponsored a Senate resolution authorizing U.S. forces to
assist in the humanitarian relief operations. That was the last time
that I felt that Congress had anytning to say in the Somalia oper-
ation. Senator Brown has made a number of requests for hearings
previous to this, but I trust he will go into that in his questions.

But it seems like the foresight that was promulgated by some
Members of Congress and some of us on this committee for the
most part was ignored. I am curious to know why.

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, on the question on the requests from the
committee or other committees for hearings or access to adminis-
tration officials, I would have to look at the record.

Senator Murkowski. Would you provide that for the record as to
why the requests were ignored by the administration?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of State has no record of a letter from Senator Brown requesting
a witness for a hearing on Somalia. The letters you have mentioned may be letters
to the Committee Chairman or the Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, who nor-
mally would have made requests to the Department to provide a witness for hear-
ings on Somalian issues.

The Department's files indicate that there was a written request for a hearing on
Somalia from Senators Pell and Simon dated December 4. My understanding is that
because a military operation was ongoing, the Bush Administration preferred to con-
duct a closed briefing rather than testify in open session. In any case, this was a
decision made during the past Administration.

As far as requests for hearings on Somalia in this Administration, we are aware
of two requests to testify before this Committee. With regards to these two requests,
I was honored to represent the Administration and Secretary Christopher and tes-
tify on our Somalian policies before this Committee on July 29 and October 19.

Senator Murkowski. So, you have no explanation, either one of
you gentlemen?

Mr. Tarnoff. I would like to, at least for the Department of
State, see what the record of request was and what the nature of
our response was.

Senator Murkowski. Well, I am sure Senator Brown will be
more articulate than myself. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Slocombe. I would do the same. I am aware of various con-
sultations and discussions with members through the year, but as

far as requests for presentations being turned down, I do not know
and I will have to find out.

[The information referred to follows:!

We are not aware of any congressional requests for presentations on Somalia
which were denied or ignored. DOD has given numerous informal consultations and
briefings to Congressmen and their stafTs. A list of briefings and testimony given
is as follows:

25 March 93 SASC U.S. Operations in Somalia Joint staff.

29 March 93 HFAC Transition to UNOSOM Interagency.

28 April 93 HASC Funding of operations MGen Wilhelm.

17 June 93 Separate member briefings Recent events in Somalia OSO

Joint staff.
25 August 93 SASC staffers Ranger deployment OSD

Joint staff.

2 September 93 HASC Ranger deployment Joint staff.

HFAC

Senator MuRKOWSKi. It seems we are all in agreement that we
moved from a humanitarian mission that everybody agrees was
largely successful into a rather ill-defined, poorly executed, and
open-ended effort which was — ^you can use any term you want —
"political agenda," "nation-building" under the U.N. And, of course,
at the same time we were in pursuit of Aideed.

I do not recall one instance of the administration coming before
this committee and asking us to support a combat mission with
U.S. troops under the U.N. And my question is specific. Does the
administration believe that consultation with Congress was ade-
quate?

Mr. Tarnoff. Well, on the mission I will let Mr. Slocombe com-
ment on it more specifically. I might say that the combat forces
that have been in Mogadishu and in the region have never been
under U.N. command. I would like to make that particular point
that Mr. Slocombe can amplify.

With respect to your first point, again, I will have to look at the
record of consultation after June 5. I think, as you certainly know,
after June 5 and passage of Resolution 837, that the U.N. Security
Council mandated the forces in country take a much more active
profile primarily to bring to justice, to apprehend those responsible
for the killing of the 24 Pakistanis.

So, at that point the nature of the mission changed to the extent
that the U.N. Security Council voted a resolution which specifically
asked the forces in country to assume that mission.

Senator Murkowski. But the point is, we used U.S. troops in a
combat mission and there was no notification, not that there had
to be, but it would seem that since we moved our mission from a
humanitarian mission, it might have been more prudent had the
administration sought some consultation with Congress. Would you
agree or disagree?

Mr. Tarnoff. Again, Senator, I would like to go back to the
record to see whether there was an effort to consult, whether there
was any communication. I just do not have the information.

[The information referred to follows:!

We are strongly committed to ensuring that Congress is fully consulted on Soma-
lia and other important foreign policy issues which we face.

We believed that we were making a good effort to keep Congress informed and
consulted on our Somalia policy, but obviously the fact that you are raising the
question with me indicates we could have done more.

I would only note, however, that the State Department's Coordinator for Somalia
and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs participated in more than forty meet-
ings and briefings on Somalia with Members of Congress or their staffs from March
through October.

I also testified in open session before this Committee on July 29 and October 19.

Finally, President Clinton has sent two letters to Congress (June 10, 1993 and
July 1, 1993), consistent with the War Powers Resolution, which reported on the ac-
tivities of our troops in Somalia.

Let me assure you that in the months ahead we will redouble our efforts to stay
in closer touch with Congress.

Meetings and Hearing on Somalia Issues — Department of State

[March 1-October 30, 1993]
March:

8 US Coordinator David Shinn met with HFAC StafTers.

22 US Coordinator Shinn and Representative from Bureau oflntemational Orga-
nizations met with HFAC Majority stafTers to discuss UNITAF/UNOSOM II
Operation in Somalia.
25 US Coordinator Shinn joined DOD Representatives to testify before the Sen-
ate Armed Service Committee on Somalia. Senators Nunn, Lieberman,
Levin, Thurmond and Warner participated in the hearing.

29 US Coordinator Shinn joined DOD Representatives to brief the House Armed

Services Committee on Somalia. Chairman Dellums and 10 Members were
present for most of the hour and a half session.

30 US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from DOD and AID briefed Chair-

man Hamilton, Congressman Payne and Congressman Hastings on
UNITAF/UNOSOM transition and other Somalia issues.
April:

22 State Department Representatives participate in HFAC Africa Subcommittee

MarkUpofS.J. Res. 45.

27 State Department Representatives participate in HFAC International Security

Subcommittee Mark Up of S.J. Res. 45.

28 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Senator DeConcini to discuss US policies

toward Somalia.
May:

3 US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from DOD and JCS briefed bipar-
tisan group of staffers fix)m HFAC and HASC on the transition in Somalia
from UNITAF to UNOSOM.

5 US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from DOD and JCS met with a bi-
partisan group of about a dozen SFRC stafTere for tour d'horizon discussion
of Somalian issues.

5 State Department Representatives participate in full HFAC Mark Up of S.J.

45. More than 30 Members attended the two-hour Mark Up Hearing.

20 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Alycee Hastings to discuss

US policies toward Somalia.

25 House passes S.J. Res. 45 by vote of 243-179.

June:

17 Assistant Secretaries Moose and Oxman brief House Members on Somalia and

Macedonia. Thirty Members attended the briefing.

17 Assistant Secretaries Moose and Oxman brief Senators on Somalia and Mac-
edonia. Seven Senators attended the briefing.

22 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Albert Wynn to discuss US

f>olicies toward Somalia.

24 US Coordinator Shinn briefs members of Congressional Delegation to Somalia

led by Congressman Johnston.
July:

13 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Robert Torricelli to discuss

US policies toward Somalia.

14 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Chairman Hamilton. Ranking Member

Burton and Congressmen Lantos, Payne, Hastings and Burton to discuss
the findings of the Johnston Codel to Somalia and to discuss US policies to-
ward Somalia.

29 Assistant Secretary Moose and Representative from JCS testified before the

African Subcommittee of HFAC on US policies toward Somalia. Chairman
Johnston and Congressmen Burton, Oilman, Payne, Hastings and Royce
participated in the hearing.

29 Under Secretary TamofT and Representative from JCS testified before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
August:

3 US Coordinator Shinn briefed Chairman Hamilton, Chairman Dellums and

about eight other Members of Congress on the findings of his visit to Soma-
lia and US policies toward Somalia.

11 US Coordinator Shinn briefed SFRC Staff Director and bipartisan group of

eight SFRC staffers on the findings of his visit to Somalia and US policies
toward Somalia.

11 US Coordinator Shinn met with HFAC Counsel for Minority to discuss US

policies toward Somalia.

12 US Coordinator Shinn met with Chairman Hamilton to discuss US policies to-

ward Somalia.

12 US Coordinator Shinn met with HFAC African Subcommitee staffer to discuss

US policies toward Somalia.
23 US Coordinator Shinn met with HASC Committee staffer to discuss US poli-
cies toward Somalia.
September:

8 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Dan Burton to discuss US

policies toward Somalia. Assistant Secretary Ward and CIA Representative
briefed Senate Intelligence Committee on developments in China and Soma-
ha.

9 Senate passes amendment to DOD Authorization Bill by vote of 90-7 requir-

ing submission of a report on US policy towards Somalia.

15 US Coordinator Shinn and Representative from AID briefed bipartisan group

of HFAC staffers on US assistance package for Somalian Police and Judici-
ary.

17 US Coordinator Shinn and Representative from AID briefed bipartisan group

of staffers fi:x)m House Appropriations Foreign Ofjerations Subcommittee.

21 UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Mem-
bers of HFAC to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Mem-
bers of HASC to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Sen-
ators to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 UN Special Envoy Admiral Howe and US Coordinator Shinn met with Speak-
er Foley and House Leadership to discuss developments in Somalia.

21 AID and State Representatives brief bipartisan group of staffers from SFRC

on US assistance to the Somalian Police and Judiciary.

22 US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from JCS and CIA briefed House

Intelligence Committee on developments in Somalia.

22 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Jack Reed to discuss the

findings of his Codel visit to Somalia.

22 Assistant Secretary Moose met with Congressman Harry Johnston to discuss

US policies toward Somalia.

28 House passes amendment to DOD Authorization Bill by vote of 406-26 requir-
ing submission of a report on US policy towards Somalia.
October:

4 US Coordinator Shinn met with bipartisan group of staffers from SFRC to dis-

cuss October 3rd battle and other developments in Somalia.

5 Secretary Christopher and Secretary Aspin met with large bipartisan group of

Members of House and Senate to discuss October 3rd battle and other devel-
opments in Somalia.
12 US Coordinator Shinn briefed bipartisan group of staffers from House Appro-
priations Foreign Operations Subcommittee on US assistance to Somalian
Police and Judiciary.

14 US Coordinator Shinn briefed Chairman Obey and Members of House Appro-

priations Foreign Operations Subcommittee on US assistance to Somalian
Police and Judiciary.

15 US Coordinator Shinn briefed Congressman Karan English on recent develop-

ments in Somalia.

18 US Coordinator Shinn makes presentations at Library of Congress Seminar on

Somalia for Congressional Staffers.

19 Under Secretary Tamoff and DOD Under Secretary Slocum testified before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

19 Special Envoy Oakley briefed Members of Senate Foreign Relations Commit-

tee on developments in Somalia. Nine Senators attended the briefing.

20 Special Envoy Oakley briefed Speaker Foley and Chairmen and Ranking

Members of HFAC, HASC, HPSCI, DOD Appropriations Subcommitee and
Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommitee on developments in Soma-
lia.

21 Special Envoy Oakley briefed Senator Nunn on developments in Sonutlia.

28 US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from AID and DOD briefed bipar-
tisan group of staffers from SFRC on US assistance to Somalian Police and
Judiciary.

28 US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from AID and DOD briefed bipar-
tisan group of staffers from Foreign Operations Appropriations Subconrunit-
tee.

28 US Coordinator Shinn and Representatives from AID and DOD briefed Major-
ity and Minority staffers from African Subcommittee of HFAC.

28 US Coordinator Shinn met with HASC staffer to discuss recent developments

in Somalia and US policies toward Somalia.

Senator Murkowski. Well, as a member of this committee I do
not feel I had an opportunity to participate in any consultation. I
think the point has been made and I will move to my second ques-
tion.

I voted for Senator McCain's amendment because I feel that the
U.S. mission is basically complete and successful, and that it is
time to bring our troops home. But I am interested in having vou
give me the oest estimate of what the situation in Somalia will be
in 6 months from now due to the presence of our U.S. troops.

In other words, you gentlemen are policymakers involved in the
determination of moves that are going to affect where we will be
at the end of 6 months. Are we going to have a continuation of the
U.S. presence there that is necessary to maintain our additional
mission as humanitarian, or will we find secondary reasons to re-
main, to extend, or modify the missions as has happened already
in Somalia whether under U.S. or U.N. control? Has the adminis-
tration made a firm commitment that in 6 months we are going to
be out?

Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

Senator Murkowski. Regardless of the humanitarian need?

Mr. Slocombe. Let me read a statement that is the authoritative
statement on that subject from the President's report to the Con-
gress on Somalia.

After March 31, 1994, there will be no U.S. military units in So-
malia with the possible exception of approximately 200 or 300 mili-
tary personnel providing assistance and protection to the U.S. liai-
son office, which is the equivalent of the Embassy. The drawdown
of U.S. military personnel is not conditioned upon the successful
completion of any steps bv the Somali people or the U.N.

I do not think it would be possible to make a more definitive
commitment.

Senator MURKOWSKI. No, but clearly there is an inconsistency
there in the sense of the decision that has been on the terms for
pulling out and the justification of going in in the first place, which
was humanitarian, and then extending it to nation building or sta-
bility.

But I think that the administration's stance and the way they
have handled it clearly speaks for itself. They have rallied to the
reaction of the American people and determined that they are

going to pull out regardless of whether the mission is complete or
incomplete.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to try to get a better feel for the his-
tory of this involvement. Originally, the U.N. put some forces into
Somalia; is that correct?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes, that is true, Senator. I do not have the figures
at hand, but in the UNOSOM I phase, before the U.S. forces ar-
rived at the end of the year, there were, if my memory serves me
correctly, several hundred Pakistani forces in Mogadishu. But they
were unable to function. So there was a U.N. presence in
Mogadishu before U.S. forces arrived there.

Senator Sarbanes. Now, they were in there to monitor a cease-
fire agreement, is that correct, which had been reached by the var-
ious factions?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes, I believe that was their primary attention, al-
though, again, they were not able to fulfill much oi their mission.

Senator Sarbanes. They were unsuccessful. And meanwhile, of
course, people were starving and dying, correct? How many people
died in Somalia last year?

Mr. Tarnoff. It is our estimate that in the year preceding the
arrival of U.S. forces in December 1992, the figures were some-
where between 400,000 and 500,000 people had died in country.
We cannot be sure of those estimates, but that is the approximate
figure.

Senator Sarbanes. 400,000 to 500,000?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes.

Mr. Slocombe. To underscore one of the reasons that we went
in in the first place, the estimates that I have been given are that
included half the children of the country.

Senator Sarbanes. Now, we sent troops in December; is that cor-
rect?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes.

Senator Sarbanes. 28,000?

Mr. Tarnoff. Approximately, yes.

Senator Sarbanes. And did troops go in from other countries as
well?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes, there were some troops from other countries
coming in about that time.

Senator Sarbanes. Do you have any idea how many?

Mr. Slocombe. I do not have the numbers. I have the number
that eventually got in and are there now. We can provide it as of
any date you pick I suspect. But I do not have it now.

Senator Sarbanes. Well, how many other troops are in there
now?

Mr. Slocombe. Something like 28,000.

Senator Sarbanes. Not counting our troops?

Mr. Slocombe. Not counting ours. [Pause.]

I am sorry, as of October 19, which is today, 24,274.

Senator Sarbanes. From other countries?

Mr. Slocombe. From countries other than the United States.

Senator Sarbanes. And how many countries are involved in
that?

Mr. Slocombe. I have 22 on this chart.

Senator Sarbanes. And which are the largest ones in terms of
the number of troops and their numbers?

Mr. Slocombe. Pakistan and India.

Senator Sarbanes. And what are the numbers?

Mr. Slocombe. Pakistan — I will give them in round numbers —
5,000. And there are additional on the way. India, 4,600. Again,
more are on the way. Italy, 2,300. Grermany, 1,700.

Senator Sarbanes. Now, when we handed this thing over to the
U.N. in May and started — we then started taking our troops out;
is that right?

Mr. Tarnoff. That is correct.

Senator Sarbanes, And other countries had put their troops in
or they started putting their troops in?

Mr. Slocombe. There were some other country troops when we
began the pullout, yes.

Senator Sarbanes. How many?

Mr, Slocombe. I do not have the exact number.

Senator Sarbanes. Were other countries putting their troops in
on any understanding of whether there would be a continued
American presence and what that American role would be?

Mr. Slocombe, Very definitely, yes.

Senator Sarbanes. What was that understanding?

Mr. Slocombe. The understanding was that the United States
would maintain forces with two purposes. One, to provide logistics
support to third-country forces that were present in the UNOSOM
II operation. And, second, that we would provide a quick reaction
force that would be available as the name implies to respond rap-
idly if the other countries' forces needed assistance.

Senator Sarbanes. Now, was it envisioned that over time we
would no longer carry out those functions as well, that they would
be carried out by forces from other countries?

Mr. Slocombe. Forces from other countries and, in the case of
the logistics requirements, to a very considerable degree by con-
tracting to private operations.

Senator Sarbanes. And what was the timetable for that, if there
was one?

Mr. Slocombe, There was not a fixed timetable for, I think, more
or less the reasons that Senator Kassebaum asked about earlier.
But there was certainly an intention that it would not be an indefi-
nite U.S. commitment.

Mr. Tarnoff, If I could add. Senator, we had hoped that it would
be possible to reduce the logistical component from about 3,000 to
about half that size in the first quarter of next year. There was not
a firm commitment, as Mr, Slocombe indicated, but those were our
rough projections about what might be possible.

Senator Sarbanes, Well, now, if you were simply to take our
forces out overnight, would that, in effect, undercut the under-
standing on the basis of which other countries put their forces in?

Mr, Tarnoff, Most definitely. I think that while they have un-
derstood I think quite well the rationale for the policy the Presi-
dent announced 10 days ago, if we were to have a precipitous with-

drawal several things would happen. In effect, virtually all of those
forces would be out of country even before the U.S. forces with-
drew, leading to the kind of chaos and famine of the status quo
ante.

But they would feel, to a large measure, betrayed by the United
States because, as Mr. Slocombe indicated, when they committed
forces, often at the urging of the U.S. Government, it was under-
stood that we would have the kind of presence that we described.

Senator Sarbanes. Now, when the United States first went in,
was it part of the plan that other countries were to put their forces
in and assume the broader peacekeeping responsibilities and then
we would come out? Was that part of the original plan?

Mr. Tarnoff. It was certainly part of the plan that we developed
in the early weeks of the Clinton administration. Because we devel-
oped a strategy which would lead to what was called a handoff
from UNITAF, 27,000 or so U.S. forces, to UNOSOM, where we
would have only 4,000 U.S. forces, which took place in May. And
the handoff would be to a UNOSOM force, a majority of which, an
overwhelming majority of which of course was foreign, including
combat units.

Senator Sarbanes. Well, what was the strategy when the forces
were first put in that would lead to being able to bring the forces
out?

Mr. Tarnoff. The U.S. forces you are referring to?

Senator Sarbanes. Yes.

Mr. Tarnoff. The intention was to have U.S. forces there in suf-
ficient numbers during whatever period of time was necessary to
stabilize the situation, to allow emergency relief to take place,
given the situation that we described a moment ago, but then, even
in the Bush administration but certainly in the Clinton administra-
tion, to look quite urgently to have those U.S. troop forces replaced
in large measure as soon as possible.

Senator Sarbanes. Well, it was my understanding at the time,
when President Bush put the forces in, prompted of course by a
desperate humanitarian situation which had riveted the Nation's
attention, and where you had literally thousands and thousands of
people dying daily, that the premise was that the troops would go
in; they would be able to control that situation immediately in
order to allow feeding to resume. But that still of course left you
with the problem, well, how do you establish a situation where,
when we come out, the feeding can continue so you do not simply
revert back to the situation that led you to put the troops in in the
first place?

I am not clear on my recollection, but I thought that part of
President Bush's strategy at the time was that this would be
transitioned over to a U.N. responsibility. In fact, I think at the
time they thought that maybe then the cease-fires would stand and
the negotiations going on amongst the various factions in Somalia
would be such that a stable situation could be established.

But I do not recall that it was part of that strategy that we will
establish stability, feeding will resume and then we will simply
leave without having worked something out for stability to con-
tinue so feeding can continue. Otherwise, you would be back in the

same situation and the very events that led to your going in could
occur once again.

Now, am I mistaken in that impression?

Mr. Tarnoff. You are absolutely accurate in every respect, Sen-
ator.

Let me add that another element in the strategy was the political
reconciliation process among the Somalis themselves, which was
initiated early this year and which resulted in two major meetings
of the Somali leaders in Addis Ababa; the second of which was in
March of this year, and resulted in an accord among those leaders.

So it was thought early on that it was necessary for the Somali
political leaders themselves to reach a degree of accommodation in
order to better guarantee the kind of stability you are talking
about.

Senator Sarbanes. I thank the chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Brown.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I
had first asked for hearings on this subject back on December 1,
after President Bush had dQscussed the potential of sending troops
in, and had committed that to a written request.

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, the White House was a little
reluctant then to publicly discuss it. They did have a briefing on
December 4, but would not subject themselves to questions and an-
swers in public.

I was concerned about that, because I think a key part of com-
mitting troops anywhere is laying out clearly what the mission is.
If there were one thing we would do differently, I suspect it is try-
ing to define the mission before we would commit troops.

We had still not had hearings by February, either with the old
administration or the new administration, i^d on February 25, I
again submitted a request for hearings. My recollection is that
hearings were scheduled on the African subcommittee I believe. I
know Senator Simon was very interested and willing to go ahead.
At that time, we ran into problems with the administration's will-
ingness to testify.

We did finally have one hearing, and our record is far better
than the Armed Services Committee. We have had one hearing;
they have had none. We had public hearings. That was on July 29,
but it was unfortunately not with the Secretary of State or the Sec-
retary of Defense.

After the disaster of October 3, I again requested hearings, and
followed up with a letter on October 9, my third request for hear-
ings. They were originally scheduled for October 15, with the Sec-
retary of State. I do not know about the Secretary of Defense.

Later, we moved the hearing to this date, because of the conven-
ience of the Secretary of State. My understanding is the Secretary
of State is in town but is preparing for a trip.

One gets the impression that it is a little like in school, when you
ask a girl out on four different occasions and she tells you she is
washing her hair on each occasion, that she may not be really in-
terested in going out with you.

I get the impression that neither the Secretary of Defense or the
Secretary of State are really interested in talking to us or discuss-
ing these issues openly,

I think this issue is much more important than what is conven-
ient for a Secretary of State or a Secretary of Defense. I think it
is important enough that they owe the American people a response,
even if they do not care to talk to us. And I guess my question is:
Is the Secretary of State, is the Secretary of Defense going to come
and finally testify before us some day?

The Chairman. I would insert here that the Secretary is sched-
uled to be with us on November 4.

Senator Brown. I wonder if you can confirm that?

The Chairman. Sure.

Senator Brown. What about the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. Slocombe. I am not aware of any pending request for the
Secretary of Defense to come before the committee.

Senator Brown. Well, I have written three letters, but if we have
not, let me make it clear now. I think the Secretary of Defense
ought to come. Our jurisdiction is very clear. This happened under
a U.N. mandate, under a U.N. operation, that it falls squarely
under the jurisdiction of this committee. And my hope is the Sec-
retary of Defense will be willing to testify before this committee.

Mr. Slocombe. I will certainly take that message back.

Senator Brown. Let me ask, just to get the air clear, we have
had reports in the press and some on the Hill that returning troops
have been asked or directed to not speak with Members of Con-
gress or not speak with the press. Can you advise me if that is ac-
curate or inaccurate and what the facts are on that?

Mr. Slocombe. I have not heard those reports. I would be dumb-
founded if they are true. But I will check.

[The information referred to follows:!

The reports alleging that soldiers have been instructed not to speak to Congress
or the press are untrue. We do request that soldiers not discuss certain operational
aspects of the mission for obvious security reasons. Reporters have been given ex-
tensive access to U.S. troops and their commanders in Somalia. To illustrate the ac-
cess that the media has had to the troops, it should be noted that Chief Warrant
Officer Michael Durant and three other Rangers who had recently returned from So-
malia were recently interviewed on the Larry King talk show. Further, there have
been a number of interviews with wounded Rangers from their hospital beds and
within the last few days an article in the New Republic by Joshua Hammer. This
article detailed an extended interview with Sgt Richard Knight and his platoon, part
of the 10th Mountain Division.

Senator Brown. Do you know of any requests to military person-
nel to not speak to the press or to not speak to members of Con-
gress?

Mr. Slocombe. As to members of Congress, certainly not. And as
to members of the press, I have no knowledge. Obviously, people
are told not to talk about operational details and that sort of thing.

The Chairman. Excuse me.

It would be a good idea to insert in the record perhaps a copy
of your letter to me asking for hearings.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have copies of all three, and I will submit those, with your per-
mission, in the record.

The Chairman. And my reply.

Thank you.

Senator Brown. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,

December 1, 1992.

The Honorable Claiborne Pell,

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

The Honorable Jesse Helms,

Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Helms: The situation in Somalia is tragic. The
country is filled with thousands of armed bandits and dozens of Somali warlords.
There is no civil authority and no government. Many have described it as a country
in utter chaos. The result is extreme suffering by the Somali people.

The great tragedy unfolding in Somalia is one that the American people strongly
empathize with. The U.S. must continue its humanitarian efforts there. However,
it would be a mistake to send U.S. combat forces to Somalia without a clearly de-
fined military mission or without the strong support of the American people. Any
decision to commit America's brave servicemen and women must have the full and
complete backing of our nation.

In other conflicts in our country's modem history, our troops were committed
without the full support of the American people. I am convinced that one of the rea-
sons for the great success of Operation Desert Storm was the large volume of na-
tional support.

Consequently, it is imperative that our Conmiittee convene hearings at the earli-
est opportunity to understand current plans for U.S. forces in Somalia and to ex-
plore other possible alternatives. Congress must not abrogate its responsibility to be
intimately involved in the commitment of American troops to conflict situations.

Please feel free to contact me if I can be any assistance in ensuring our Commit-
tee's earliest action.
Sincerely,

Hank Brown,

U.S. Senator.

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,
February 25, 1993.

The Honorable Claiborne Pell,

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

The Honorable Jesse Helms,

Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Helms: The great tragedy in Somalia is one
with which the American people strongly empathize. Our humanitarian efforts have
greatly helped these starving men, women and children. Yet, our troops still remain
m Somalia without the benefit of a clear American policy propounded Iby the Admin-
istration or a Congress that has carefully reviewed that policy.

The recent reports of riots in Somalia directed against the American troops there
underscore the need for the active support of the American people for our militaiy
men and women who are in Somalia. In addition, their willingness to sacrifice their
lives demands that we provide a set of clear goals that outline when our troops have
accomplished their mission.

It is us, the Nation's legislators together with the country's policymakers, who
must take the lead in defining our mission in Somalia. To date, our Committee has
held no hearings nor marked up any legislation on this vital issue.

With events there deteriorating, it is imperative that our Committee convene
hearings at the earliest opportunity. The goal of these hearings must be a clear ex-
position of current plans for U.S. forces in Somalia. As mentioned in my December
1, 1992 request for hearings on this same subject, we in Congress must not abrogate
our responsibility to be intimately involved in the commitment of American troops.

Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any assistance in ensuring our Com-
mittee's earliest action.
Sincerely,

Hank Brown,

U.S. Senator.

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,

March 9, 1993.

Honorable Hank Brown,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC

Dear Hank: Thank vou for your letter concerning the situation in Somalia.
The Senate, as you know, has acted on a resolution authorizing the U.S. military
presence in Somalia, and it is my understanding that the goal is to turn over on-
going responsibilities to a U.N. force by May 1. Unless something goes awry be-
tween now and May 1, I am satisfied that the U.S. role has been satisfactorily de-
fined and limited.

I am, however, concerned that the Somalia operation may serve as a precedent
for other interventions. Consequently, I am giving thought to holding a hearing on
Somalia as a case study for intervention in disintegrating nation states. I would
welcome any thoughts you may have on that subject.
With every good wish.
Ever sincerely,

Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,

October 6. 1993.

The Honorable Claiborne Pell,

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC

Bear Mr. Chairman: More than nine months ago, I wrote asking that our com-
mittee hold extensive hearings before U.S. combat troops were committed to Soma-
lia. Instead, we were provided numerous closed-door briefings.

A few months later, I again wrote asking that we hold extensive hearings. None-
theless, not until July, 1993 did our committee hold a public hearing on the commit-
ment of U.S. troops to Somalia. Only an Undersecretary of State and the Director
of Operations for the Joint Staff testified. Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the
Secretary of State has appeared before the Senate to specifically discuss the commit-
ment of American troops in Somalia.

Today, some of America's finest young men and women are risking their lives for
our Nation in Somalia. Without a full, public vetting of the many complex issues
concerned with the commitment of U.S. troops and without clear authorization by
the CongT^ess, the early euphoria for a humanitarian commitment in Somalia has
evaporated.

We owe these young men and women and their families a lull, public debate of
our commitment in Somalia. Such a debate rightly should begin in our Committee
with a hearing attended by the Secretaries of ^ate and Defense.

Please let me know what I can do to assist in scheduling extensive hearings on
Somalia at the earliest opportunity.
Sincerely,

Hank Brown,

U.S. Senator.

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,

October 13. 1993.

Honorable Hank Brown,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC

Dear Senator Brown: Thank you for your letter requesting the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to hold Cabinet-level hearings on U.S. involvement in Somalia.

I agree that an open debate on our commitment in Somalia should be held in the
Foreign Relations Committee. Accordingly, I have received agreement from Sec-
retary of State Warren Christopher to testify before this Committee on October 19.
Secretary Christopher will be focusing his testimony not only on Somalia but on
other aspects of U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations. In fact,
I am considering that this hearing might be a starting point for a series of oversight
hearings dealing with peacekeeping.

I expect that the Foreign Relations Committee hearing with Secretary Chris-
topher will complement the Senate's recent activities regarding Somalia. Tne hear-

ing was timed to follow today's submission of the Presidential Report on the Somalia
operation, requested by the Senate during consideration of the Department of De-
fense Authorization Bill.

In addition to the recent lull Senate briefing on Somalia by the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense, you will remember that the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee held comprehensive hearings regarding Somalia within the last year at both
the full and subcommittee levels. On Jmy 29, 1993 we held a ftill committee hearing
on Somalia; on March 22, 1993 we had a Members Briefing on U.S. and U.N. oper-
ations in Somalia; and on October 1, 1992 we held a subcommittee hearing on the
U.N. humanitarian operation in Somalia.

In reference to your request that Les Aspin testify before the Foreign Relations
Committee, the Secretary of Defense customarily declines to testify on aefense relat-
ed issues before this Committee because of the jurisdictional concerns of the Armed
Services Committee.

With every good wish.
Ever sincerely,

Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Brown. I should add, Mr. Chairman, you have bent over
backward to be accommodating and helpful, and I very much ap-
preciate the cooperation and I think the very helpful attitude that
you have had.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Brown. When our troops were given the task to capture
Aideed, do you recall when that was, when our troops were first
tasked with that responsibility?

Mr. Tarnoff. I might be able to supply some of that information.
It was in the aftermath of the events of June 5. The U.N, Security
Council Resolution 837, which I think passed on June 6 or 7, man-
dated not only U.S. troops, but all U.N. troops to pursue those who
were responsible for the attack against the Pakistani peacekeepers.

Senator Brown. What were U.S. casualties? What were U.S.
losses in Somalia before that date?

Mr. Tarnoff. I do not have that figure.

Mr. Slocombe. It would have been very low.

Senator Brown. Could you supply that to me for the record?

Mr. Slocombe. I will supply it as of any date you want, but give
me a date.

Senator Brown. Well, I think before they were tasked with cap-
turing Aideed. I would be interested in the casualties. Also, after
they were tasked.

Mr. Slocombe. There is no question that it involved some cas-
ualties.

[The information referred to follows:!

Although there were no specific orders to arrest General Aideed, there was broad-
er mission guidance that allowed for the detention of Aideed if encountered during
security operations. The Ranger force that conducted many of these types of oper-
ations was deployed in late August. Since the beginning of the Somalia operation
in December 1992 to the time of the Ranger deployment there had been 8 US KIA,
53 WIA. Casualties figures from 23 August 1993 through mid-November 1993 were
22 KIA, 118 WIA.

Senator Brown. When did General Johnston first request armor
to protect his personnel in country?

Mr. Slocombe. Do you mean the recent request?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Mr. Slocombe. The Secretary of Defense first became aware of
the request on September 23, when it would have been initiated a
few days before that. As you know, it went first to General Hoar,

who made some modifications in it, and then went up through the
chain. But I do not have that.

Senator Brown. Could you supply that for me for the record,
along with a copy of that request if you have it.

Mr. Slocombe, I cannot commit to supplying a copy of the re-
quest, but I will provide the date of it.

[The information referred to follows:]

The date of General Hoar's memorandum to General Powell outlining MG Mont-
gomery's request was [deleted].

Senator Brown. You cannot supply a copy of it because?

Mr. Slocombe. I have learned from experience that there are is-
sues as to whether or not internal executive branch documents,
particularly those relating to transactions in the military chain of
command get made available outside the executive branch. I have
not seen it. I have not.

Senator Brown. Well, can you supply a copy of it on a secure
basis?

Mr. Slocombe. That is the question I will take back.

Senator Brown. And you will respond to us on that?

Mr. Slocombe. Sure.

Senator Brown. So you do not know when, but you will try to
supply that, when General Johnston made the request?

Mr. Slocombe. There is no question that it was made within in
a few days before September 23.

Senator Brown. How many tanks and Bradley vehicles do we
have?

Mr. Slocombe. In the entire military?

Senator Brown. Yes.

Mr. Slocombe. I do not know. It is very large.

Senator Brown. Thousands?

Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

Senator Brown. Were some of them located in the Marine con-
tingent just offshore of Somalia?

Mr. Slocombe. The Marine contingent is not always just off-
shore. There are tanks with the embarked Marine units, a limited
number.

Senator Brown. A limited number of them.

Were there Bradley fighting vehicles, armored personnel car-
riers?

Mr. Slocombe. I would assume so. I do not know for a fact.

Senator Brown. Can you supply that for the record, what was
available?

Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

The complement of equipment assigned to a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
does not include BRADLEY fighting vehicles or tanks. A MEU is equipped with
tracked Amphibious Assault vehicles and wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAV),
An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that carries the MEU was not off the coast of
Somalia in early October. Two ARGs arrived on 8 October.

Senator Brown. How long does it take those vehicles to be deliv-
ered onshore?
Mr. Slocombe. It depends on where they are coming from.

Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, could I just — should not some
of this be done in a closed session? I mean if we are going to lay
out in great detail

Senator Brown. My time is running out. I assume this will not
count against my time.

Senator Sarbanes. Well, hopefully not. But I think it is an im-
portant point. If we are going to lay out in great detail our military
capabilities, which may be called upon in the existing cir-
cumstance, I do not know that we should lay it out in a public ses-
sion. I mean I have no problem with the information you are trying
to get.

Senator Brown. Well, I have not gotten a lot of answers thus far.
I do not know why you are worried. But maybe we will for the
record. But, let me say, I just think it is relevant to our inquiry
to know what we had, if they were available, and how close they
were.

Senator Sarbanes. And how long it takes them to get there.

Senator Brown. Sure.

Senator Sarbanes. Right now.

Senator Brown. Sure.

Senator Sarbanes. Because I assume that the time that applied
then applies right now.

Well, I have trouble with putting that out in the public domain.

Senator Brown. Well, I guess the question is how long it took
to get them there. And if you do not know that or cannot supply
it, I would appreciate you supplying it for the record.

Mr. Slocombe. I know the answer to that. And it is a matter of
public record. The first of the armored imits went out after October
4 arrived within a couple of days.

They went out by air. And it is not a military secret that you can
fly an airplane around the world in a limited period of time.

Senator Brown. Well, I will try to supply the other questions.
Let me just conclude quickly. We have had some time delay here.

There have been reports in the press that General Powell favored
the recommendation of supplying armored personnel carriers and
armor. There have been reports that he opposed it.

What did General Powell do? Did he favor the request by Gen-
eral Johnston?

Mr. Slocombe. As a matter of principle, I think questions as to
what advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense rec-
ommended ought to be addressed to them and not come from third-
party sources, which I would be.

Senator Brown. Well, you know, we have been through 10
months of trying to get people to testify. They have not showed up.
They have delayed. You are telling me you cannot supply the infor-
mation as to what General Powell did or did not do or recommend?

Mr. Sl>ocombe. Yes.

Senator Brown. Will you supply it for the record?

Mr. Slocombe. I do not believe it is appropriate to provide infor-
mation other than from the person who gave the advice regarding
who gave what advice to the Secretary of Defense and the Presi-
dent in the course of deciding on military operations.

The Chairman. I must say I would agree. But if you want to
make the request to General Powell, we could relay it to him from
the committee if you would like.

Senator Brown. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will try to submit that for
the record and ask that it be answered.

I would simply note that the Secretary himself was the one who
commented on General Powell and his advice.

And I have a number of other questions I will try to supply for
the record if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Simon.

And I am sorry to have delayed you as long as we have.

Senator Simon. Not at all.

And let me apologize. I have been involved in another meeting
on foreign policy, and I am going to have to leave right away after
my questioning to get back on the floor on that.

First, if I may comment on Senator Brown's question in terms of
the request for hearings. There was clearly reluctance on the part
of the administration to testify on the Somalia situation for a
while. Now, I understand that in the sense that it is a new admin-
istration coming into power. I do not think, for the future, that that
can be an excuse for the administration, whether it is Somalia or
what the country is.

A few other comments, and then a question. There have been
comments that nation building was not part of the original mission.
That is absolutely false. Nation building — and I think the adminis-
tration ought to say that and say it clearly — maybe it was not ar-
ticulated as well as it should have been, but clearly, that was part
of the mission from the very beginning. Humanitarian was the one
that dominated, but nation building was there.

And General Powell made clear that there would have to be a re-
sidual force of Americans who would assist other nations in the
process of the nation building, and primarily technical people,
noncombat people. And prior to the recent infusion by the Presi-
dent of the 4,500 people there, 2,700 were noncombat people work-
ing on transportation problems, water problems, things like that.

In terms of consultation, what we say in fairness to the previous
administration, there was consultation. This idea that there was no
consultation with Congress prior to the action in Somalia simply
was not true. I was on the phone from that Monday up until Thurs-
day. Senator Brown was there in the White House when we had
a meeting prior to the President's announcement of his decision.

I do not know how many others were consulted, but there clearly
was consultation.

Senator Brown's question on casualties is important, because the
majority of casualties came as a result of a skewed policy that
got — we got obsessed with grabbing Greneral Aideed. And I am not
here defending General Aideed. But the large majority of our cas-
ualties came as a result of that. Then, since we have had the
course correction, I think that things have improved.

On the question about humanitarian assistance, there are still
roughly a million people who need help. And there are 31 U.S.
agencies over there right now helping to provide that assistance,
and I think we can be proud of that.

And, then, finally, and then I will get to a question here, I also
think that Senator Kerry's point is one we should mention; that we
cannot just be responding to the needs in the Caucasian world;
that we have to be responding to others. And I would add, not sim-
ply to the Christian or Jewish world. That when there are needs
in Moslem countries or Buddhist countries or countries of other
backgrounds and cultures and religions, we are going to be a coun-
try that is going to do the humanitarian thing.

Now, first, I welcome Ambassador Oakleys presence. I think he
is a solid, stable, balanced person who can really help in a situation
where sometimes we have not had that — real candidly.

In specific terms, what are his immediate goals going to be? Like,
the meeting in Addis this week has been called off. In specific
terms, what is Ambassador Oakley going to be doing there?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, the Ambassador himself is coming up this
afternoon to talk to the committee in closed session. So he will be
able to give you a more complete account of this. But, for the bene-
fit of the more general audience, I can say that he was recalled be-
cause of the very heavy emphasis that we are playing on the politi-
cal reconciliation process.

And I think there are two aspects to this, internally, within So-
malia, Ambassador Oakley's presence in Mogadishu last week,
which led to the conversations that he held not only with the clan
leaders and representatives of the Somali factions, but with U.N.
representatives in Somalia itself. As a result, the two prisoners,
one American, one Nigerian, were released. And he indicated to
them that he thought that there were ways to start the process
within the country for meetings to take place among the clan lead-
ers of the sort that he had brokered when he was in the country
earlier this year.

So that is part of his mission.

The other part of his mission is to work with the leaders of sev-
eral of the east African countries, primarily President Meles from
Ethiopia and President Issaias, but others as well, to see whether
it would not be possible to have some sort of gathering, conference,
or some other meeting of the principal Somali leaders, not only the
warlords, but some of the individuals who were coming up through
the local and district election with the east African leaders them-
selves, with a view toward establishing a political entity. Probably
not a full-fledged government, but at least an interim political au-
thority in Somalia.

Senator Simon. And are we doing anything? You have 36 or 38
local areas. I do not know how they are specifically defined, but
where — and elections have been held in about half of them, as I un-
derstand it. Are we doing anything, either the United States or the
U.N. or voluntary agencies, to support these new structures that
are getting developed?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes. We are supporting the U.N. in this regard.
This is not a mission of the United States, as such. It is not part
of our defined mission, but we are assisting the U.N. through per-
sonnel and through our contributions. And we are also encouraging
NGO's, private, voluntary organizations many of which are Ameri-
cans, to make a contribution to that effort.

Senator Simon. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Coverdell.

Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Simon. If my colleague could holdoff for 1 minute, my
staff just handed me a note. Four U.S. soldiers were killed prior
to June 6, 25 since that time, so that the huge bulk of those casual-
ties came when we started moving — got this dream we could solve
everything militarily by grabbing General Aideed.

The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.

Senator Simon. I apologize to my colleague.

Senator Coverdell. No, I thank the Senator. I was going to re-
port a very similar number, also from the same source.

You have described, both of you, a rather elaborate process by
which we moved to this new mission. And on October 7 the Presi-
dent suggested to the Copley News Service that the U.N. had
changed its mission unwisely and failed to provide military oper-
ation to back up peacekeepers, and staffed the units with troops
untrained for their jobs who refused to venture outside their areas
and refused to take orders. The President also referred to U.N. ac-
tions as if he and his U.N. Ambassador had no role in formulating
or approving them.

Now, this report — I spoke to this on the Senate floor and asked
for clarification of this confusion. You added to it for me, because
as you have responded to the questions you have demonstrated a
rather precise forethought in terms of preparation for a changed
mission and sanctioning in concurrence. What would be the reason
for such disparate statements as we have heard here today and
this statement? Which was repeated; this was not the only time we
had this inference.

Mr, Tarnoff. Senator, I think part of the reason may be the dif-
ference between the intention of the U.N. Security Council resolu-
tion on June 6 with respect to pursuing those responsible for the
attack against the Pakistani peacekeepers — I think that intention
was fairly clear — and the execution.

It is certainly true, as I indicated in response to a different ques-
tion earlier, that managing a military operation of this sort, given
the disparity of forces involved, the lack of experience in the U.N,
command structure for an operation of this sort, led to the ele-
ments of confusion and the lack of success in the operation.

It is my understanding that when the President was talking
about the factors that you cited, he was referring more to the un-
wieldy nature of the U,N, military operation which followed the
passage of U,N. Security Coimcil Resolution 837. The intention of
that resolution was fairly clear.

Senator Coverdell. If that were the case, is the President inad-
vertently taking to task our own decisionmaking process in evalu-
ating the nature of the alliance that would be available for the pur-
suit of Aideed, and that we underestimated the communication dif-
ficulties and that there was an intelligence or a communication
flaw?

Mr. Tarnoff, I obviously cannot speak for what the President
may have meant by those comments. But, clearly, the demands on
the U,N,, even before June 5, in Somalia have been unprecedented.
Starting from the time that the UNOSOM II took up responsibility

in early May and then after the June 5 episode when the respon-
sibihties of the U.N. forces were increased to pursue those respon-
sible for the June 5 attack, there were demands on the U.N. struc-
ture in terms of mission, in terms of personnel, which really had
never been assumed by the U.N. anywhere before.

We assumed at the time that the U.N. structure would be able
to deal with the new requirements that were placed on it. It turns
out that the demands were probably excessive given the experience
and capabilities of the U.N. at that time.

Senator CovERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I am going to move to another point and another apparent incon-
gruity. Secretary Slocombe, you have described a circumstance that
reinforced the decision, that other U.N. participants would have
been dissuaded from their role without U.S. presence. And, in par-
ticular, you spoke to the rapid response capacity.

And you can see why that would raise a question in anybody's
mind. Given the mission that the other U.N. participants look to
the United States to perform, why, then, would the Secretary —
what would be your view of why would the Secretary deny a re-
quest for equipment that is specifically related to a rapid response
and the securing of our allies there in the Bradley and the tanks?

Mr. Slocombe. As the Secretary has said, the reason that he did
not approve the request when it was first presented was it was pre-
sented in the context of a more active, a more offensive, a more ag-
gressive, if you will, U.S. role. That was basically, for reasons that
have been expressed by most of the members of this committee, not
the direction that we would go in, and he decided not to approve
the request on that basis.

Obviously, with hindsight, he said that if he had it to do over
again, knowing what was to come in the future, he would make a
different decision. But the request was asked in terms of facilitat-
ing a more active U.S. role, and it came at a time when the admin-
istration itself had all the pressure from Congress which was going
in the opposite direction.

Senator Coverdell. I am sure that as we have the chance — I
will not pursue it — that it does raise a rather significant question.
And I think some of the questions Senator Brown has asked for,
which you have agreed to supply to the extent you can, and per-
haps in the coming hearing it would be best to ask the Secretary
directly questions related to the incident.

Let me move .to the third subject very quickly. In terms of
using — I have heard Somalia be described as a model — this is be-
fore circumstances unfolded — of something pointed to the future.
And Senator Kerry has referred to the longer term definition, so to
speak.

And the President, when he spoke to the U.N., said we support
the creation of a genuine U.N. peacekeeping headquarters with a
planning staff, with access to timely intelligence and a logistics
unit that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and a modern op-
erations center with global communications. Now this statement
strongly suggests a role for U.S. personnel that would be sub-
jugated to a U.N. command. It does not say that exactly.

I have noted in the statements following this incident there has
been great effort to clarify that the combat personnel were not

under U.N. command. There has been a lot of concern about it. I
share the concern. Would you comment on what this statement
does mean? Would you elaborate on that?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, what I think the President meant was
that over time we think it is important for the U.N. to build up its
own organizational capacities with respect to managing peacekeep-
ing operations around the world where there are, as you know, 17
or 18 U.N, peacekeeping operations are around the world, most of
which involve no U.S. personnel.

Now, in this particular citation that you give, he is talking about
having better communications, having more qualified military per-
sonnel at U.N. headquarters. These are not field operations that he
was talking about, but simply to increase the chances that there
will be a greater degree of professionalization in the way the U.N.
manages its own security affairs, given its peacekeeping respon-
sibilities around the world.

There is certainly no implicit commitment on the part of the
United States either to have personnel or to commit our forces to
U.N. peacekeeping operations as a result of this. I think he was
talking primarily about the need to have a better administrative
structure within the U.N. itself to organize these activities around
the world.

Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have one other
question that relates to — I will submit it in writing — a quote from
your designee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democratiza-
tion and Peacekeeping, Mort Halperin. It deals with this subject
and it raises rather far-ranging implications. I will submit that in
writing.

And let me just say that U.S. military personnel cannot be
looked upon as an equivalent to, say, a Norwegian peacekeeper. We
are such an international target because of our standing and stat-
ure, and I do not think that equation can be made. And I would
exercise great care in trying to equate us on a level playing field.
We simply are not, for better and for worse.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Gregg.

Senator Gregg. Thank you.

Secretary Slocombe, how many helicopters were involved in the
October 3 incident and where shot down?

Mr. Slocombe. Two were shot down, one took a hit and was able
to land safely.

Senator Gregg. And how many soldiers were on helicopters that
went down, approximately?

Mr. Slocombe. On the one that went down to the south, I be-
lieve there were six. As to the one that went on the north, I will
have to get that for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

There were 6 soldiers (4 crewmen, 2 passengers) on the first helicopter and 4 sol-
diers (all crewmen) on the second.

Mr. Slocombe. The reason I am puzzled and not clear in my
mind is that the one that went down to the north may have had
a load of

The Chairman. Would you hold the microphone closer.

Mr. Slocombe. I am sorry. May have had a load of Rangers in
passage.

Senator Gregg, And when the helicopters went down, how many
Americans had died at that point? When the heHcopters were shot
down on the ground, at that point how many casualties were there?

Mr. Slocombe. I do not know, and I am not sure anyone knows
at the moment when the helicopters hit, how many people were hit.
There are maximums, the crews, but there was not the entire crew
in either of the helicopters.

Senator Gregg. Now about what time of day was that, when the
helicopters went down?

Mr. Slocombe. My impression is it was midday.

Senator Gregg. Midnight?

Mr. Slocombe. Middav.

Senator Gregg. And from midday — would that be on the second
or the third?

Mr. Slocombe. The problem is the time difference as to Wash-
ington. I am not sure.

Senator Gregg. Well, we will call it midday day 1.

Mr. Slocombe. Day 1, yes.

Senator Gregg. From middav, day 1, when the helicopters were
down, how much time elapsed before the last American was out of
the fire zone?

Mr. Slocombe. It was a substantial period of time. It may have
been as long as 12 hours.

Senator Gregg. Twelve hours. During that 12 hours, did the
American people who were on the ground run out of ammunition?

Mr. Slocombe. Not to my knowledge. But let me say, Senator,
before we go too much farther, on the details of what happened a
military inquiry is still proceeding, and one of the things which I
think is most — one of the few things which is true about initial
operational reports is that they are inaccurate or at least incom-
plete.

I think until we have an opportunity — and I know it has not
been completed — to complete the regular military process of talking
to people in a systemic way and collecting reports, we will not have
a full understanding of exactly what happened and when it hap-
pened.

Senator Gregg. Do you have a timeframe for that report being
available?

Mr. Slocombe. No, but I can find out.

[The information referred to follows:!

USCENTCOM, USSPCOM and their components, are in the process of evaluating
all U.S. operations in Somalia, including the events of 3 October. There is no esti-
mate presently available as to when that process will be completed.

Senator Gregg. Well, I presume it is going to be before the end
of the month. That will be 30 days.

Mr. Slocombe. Since the inquiry is being made through military
channels, I do not know how long it will be.

Senator Gregg. They were there for 12 hours.

Mr. Slocombe. That 12 hours is approximate, but it was a sig-
nificant period of time.

Senator Gregg. What chain of command did they have to go
through in order to get reinforcements?

Mr. Slocombe. Well, the American chain of command ran di-
rectly up to General Garrison, who was in charge of the Rangers.

The problem arose, according to the reports that we have in now,
of ways of communicating with the U.N. But the deputy U.N. com-
mander is an American General, General Montgomery, and he or
his people then communicated with the Malaysian contingent
which provided the armor that eventually went into the scene.

Senator Gregg. When you say the problem arose in communica-
tion with the U.N., could you be more specific as to what was the
problem?

Mr. Slocombe. Well, there is obviously no question — simply for
the very reason that Senator Coverdell has in mind when he gives
his very sound advice, there is no question that the U.N. command
structure is not as effective or as taut as it should be. There is no
question.

Senator Gregg. Were we sensitive to that command structure?
Had there been any internal memos written within the Pentagon
or from the field commander relative to that problem of the U.N.
command structure prior to this instance?

Mr. Slocombe. There is no question that we have been long
aware that the U.N. — more or less for the reasons that Secretary
Tarnofif identifies, the U.N. has not got the kind of experience and
capability necessary to run with a desirable level of effectiveness
in international, multilateral military operations in anything like
the kind of stressing environment that Mogadishu represents.

Senator Gregg. This leads to the obvious question, why, then,
were we structured in this way and putting Americans into that
very difficult situation?

Mr. Slocombe. That is one of the important reasons that the
United States insisted that all of our combat forces be under strict-
ly U.S. chain of command.

Senator Gregg. So to the extent that American forces were on
the ground for 12 hours and were not relieved, were not able to be
removed, and may well have run out of ammunition, that was an
American failure? To the extent any of that happened, and it may
not have happened.

Mr. Slocombe. The point about running out of ammunition I
cannot confirm or deny.

Senator Gregg. It is just a representation that has been out
there.

Mr. Slocombe. I understand.

Senator Gregg. But we do know they were on the ground for 12
hours. We do know we could not get them out when we should
have gotten them out. To the extent those failures occurred, they
occurred not because of any U.N. command structure problem but
because of an American command, but because of American dif-
ficulties?

Mr. Slocombe. No. Insofar as there was a problem in getting a
rapid response and lining up the necessary cooperation with third-
country forces that, I think, was in part due to the fact that there
is not any integrated multinational force there.

Senator Gregg. Now, hold on, you are being inconsistent. When
I asked you the question of why did we put them in this position
you said well, we never gave up control over American forces.

Mr. Slocombe. Over U.S. forces. But a situation developed in
which it was necessary to have the assistance of third-country
forces, and we are not in an integrated military command.

Senator Gregg. Well, then, it must have been an error on our
part that we did not foresee that we would be put in a position
where we would have people on the ground for 12 hours and we
could not relieve them with our people, and we were going to have
to turn to U.N. support.

Mr. Slocombe. The question of what was — what was or was not
foreseen by the commanders on the ground is one that I think will
have to await the result of the inquiry.

Senator Gregg. But I am trying to figure out

Mr. Slocombe. Like you, I can sit here in Washington after the
fact and think of all kinds of questions that people should have
asked, things people should have done. The distinction between
that and what people actually thought of and whether they made
a misjudgment, I am not prepared to say until we have access to
the kind of information that we need to know, in detail, what actu-
ally happened.

Senator Gregg. Well, I guess I am just like a lot of other folks
who want to know where and why — or why there were American
troops on the ground for 12 hours and they were not supported.

And all I am asking, and I think it is a fairly legitimate question
in light of the fact that a number of weeks have transpired here
since the event occurred — that I would have presumed that you
folks would have made an initial assessment as to whether or not
the failure to get support to these troops was a structural problem
within our command structure or a structural problem within the
U.N. command structure, as we have still got troops there and I
presume they may be confronted with the same situation?

And so that is not an unusual question,

Mr. Slocombe. There is nothing unusual or unreasonable about
the questions. It is just that they require, for their answer, not
speculation but the best possible facts, and those facts have not
been developed.

Senator Gregg. But if the incident occurs again today. Because
we still have the troops there, they could still be confronted with
the exact same — well, not the exact same, but a very similar fact
pattern. Do we know that we have taken the action necessary so
that the mistake that occurred on October 3 will not reoccur, or do
we have to wait for this study to occur to find out?

Mr. Slocombe. I suppose, like most things, we have taken steps
to make sure that what happened in the past does not happen
again. That is rather different from guaranteeing against things
going wrong.

Senator Gregg. But that is not what I am asking.

Mr. Slocombe. Wait a minute. War is a very uncertain business.
Combat operations are a very uncertain business. And you are ab-
solutely right. As long as there are American combat forces any-
where, in any situation, when they make it into combat there are
risks. I am not disputing that.

Obviously, steps have been taken to — the situation which arose
in the Olympic Hotel attack will not arise again because as of now
we would not do such an attack which involved putting very lightly

armed, highly mobile, if you will, snatch and grab forces into place
to do a particular operation, which may become engulfed in a full-
scale firefight with hundreds of opposing forces. That is not going
to happen again since we are not doing that kind of operation.

Senator Gregg. Just one more question. Do we know approxi-
mately how many Somali casualties there were as a result of this
incident?

Mr. Slocombe. As a matter of principle and practice, we do not
try to estimate adversary casualties. We have reason to believe,
recognizing the softness of this figure, that the number of Somalis
killed was on the order of several hundred.

Senator Gregg. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.

Senator Pressler. Yes, thank you. I am sorry, I had to be in an-
other meeting. I do have one question I want to pursue just a little
bit, and I will ask the rest of my questions for the record, and that
is, organizationally, how this administration makes decisions?

Now, I know on Somalia that there have been a number of
phases. But we have the CIA, we have the State Department, we
have Defense, and we have the White House Office of— the White
House adviser, Anthony Lake. Now how do you folks get together?

For example, I would — and this is not on Somalia, but Mr.
Aristide. Now, we are told that he has all kinds of emotional prob-
lems, that he has all kinds of human rights violations when he was
running Haiti. We are told that he was not a Democrat once he
was elected, with a small D. But something like that, is that
phased through these agencies? Do you talk about it and then do
you present it — who presents it to the President?

It appears to me that the Defense Department has a we/they
mentality: the military "they," the civilians "we." The State Depart-
ment, very frankly, I think is— at the top levels I do not know if
people know who is reporting to whom. You might comment on
that.

But, for example, how do you staff through a thing like what to
do with Aristide or Somalia? What sorts of meetings occur?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, there is really a three-tiered system
which is place. And it is identical to the system that we inherited
from the Bush administration, although some of the names of the
groups are different and obviously the players are especially dif-
ferent. At roughly the Assistant Secretary level in the Departments
and Agencies that you are talking about,^ there are a whole series
of interagency working groups called IWG's.

Senator Pressler. Right, I know that, I know that. But I am
talking about the top level.

Mr. Tarnoff. They staff something called the Deputies Commit-
tee, which is chaired by the Deputy National Security Adviser,
Sandy Berger, and also with representatives

Senator Pkessler. A deputies committee.

Mr. Tarnoff. Right.

Senator Pressler. Now, are those Deputy Secretaries?

Mr. Tarnoff. Deputy and Under Secretaries.

Senator Pressler. Deputy and Under Secretaries.

Mr. Tarnoff. From the five Departments. I can give them to you
specifically: State Department, Defense Department, the Central

Intelligence Agency, JCS, and the Office of the Permanent Rep-
resentative to the U.N.

Senator Pressler. OK, wait a minute now. Five offices, I have
got seven down here. I have got CIA, State, Defense, White House,
JCS — oh, JCS is Defense there.

Mr. Tarnoff. No it is separate from OSD. The Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense is represented and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is also represented.

Senator Pressler. So there are seven, seven people that sit
around and a table, then, when you get down to the final thing.
Chaired by?

Mr. Tarnoff. Chaired by, at the Deputies level, the Deputy Na-
tional Security Adviser.

Senator Pressler. Who is Sandy Berger.

Mr. Tarnoff. Sandy Berger.

Senator Pressler. All right. And these meetings occur at the
White House, is that right?

Mr. Tarnoff. They occur at the White House.

Senator Pressler. Now, did several of these occur on Somalia
early on?

Mr. Tarnoff. Yes.

Senator Pressler. They did. And they are occurring on Aristide
now? ^

Mr. Tarnoff. They are continuing on a whole range of issues.

Senator Pressler. Do they meet every day, the Deputies Com-
mittee.

Mr. Tarnoff. Well, it is an irregular pattern. I would say that
the Deputies probably meet three or four times a week, but not on
the same subject, because they are monitoring a whole range of is-
sues. Above the Deputies — just to complete the picture. Senator,
above the Deputies level is what is called the Principals Commit-
tee.

Senator Pressler. The Principals Committee.

Mr. Tarnoff. Right.

Senator Pressler. Now, who is on the Principals Committee?

Mr. Tarnoff. Exactly as was during the Bush administration, it
is chaired by the National Security Advisers. You have as members
the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, and the Ambas-
sador to the U.N.

Senator Pressler. So, there are five there?

Mr. Tarnoff. Well, there may be assorted

Senator Pressler. How often did the principals meet on Somalia
before the thing — let us say, 3 months ago?

Mr. Tarnoff. Since I am not involved in those meetings I cannot
give you an exact figure.

Senator Pressler. OK, then the principals meet. Then who takes
it to the President?

Mr. Tarnoff. Then either collectively or through the National
Security Adviser the report on the deliberations of the principals
is taken to the President so they can meet with the President,
which they do on occasion, or they could submit their recommenda-
tions through the National Security Adviser to the President.

Senator Pressler. Well, I said in my speech on the floor on So-
malia that it was not so much a difference between the Byrd
amendment and the McCain amendment, but what we were crying
out for was a formulation of foreign policy so that we knew what
our objectives were, so that we knew what our troops were sent
there tor, what the plan was.

And it just appears to me, as a Member of the Senate here, that
for the first time in a long time — and I am not being critical nec-
essarily of the Clinton administration per se. But there seems to
be such drift in terms of public administration at the top levels of
those agencies. There does not seem to be a formulation of policy.

Now, probably this has been covered, but we seem to have a lot
of trouble getting witnesses up here quickly, or maybe we are not
asking at the highest level, at the Foreign Relations Committee on
some of these issues. Maybe that is our fault, but we have not, in
my judgment, had enough speedy hearings. And I am told it is be-
cause the administration does not want to send the Secretary up,
et cetera, et cetera.

Has this been covered before? It has been. OK, then I will read
the record.

But there is something amiss organizationally here in the formu-
lation of policy, and maybe I am talking to the wrong people here,
but I am very bothered by it because those agencies should work
together with the information they have.

If the CIA brings in something on Aristide that is as bad as what
I have heard it is, I am surprised that the group keeps going for-
ward and presents him as a Democrat. He was elected in a free
election, but when you rule by mob scene, and when you force
death sentences on people, and when you rule as a dictator for 2
years it seems that it is very strange that we are supporting that
fellow. That is what I am saying. What is going on?

I hope that this is being discussed by the principals and Depu-
ties, and I hope that it is not sort of an ad hoc thing going on oyer
here in Defense and an ad hoc thing going on over here. It is being
sent through. It does go up through the channels. You are listening
to the military, because some said that there were lessons learned
in Somalia, maybe by some of the civilians at the top.

But, I mean, I served as a mere second lieutenant in the Army
in Vietnam. I think a lot of these lessons have been learned before
by the military. I think that if we listen to them on some of these
occasions we can have those.

But what I am saying is that I feel, as one Senator, that there
has been — on this whole Somalia thing that we have not had our
policy act together with all these agencies. It might not be your
fault. I do not know what is going on. I get a feeling now that there
is a more intense effort.

But on Haiti, I have not seen the foreiOTi policy objectives of the
United States enunciated by the principals or whoever is supposed
to enunciate them. If I go back to my State and explain — because
I like to support the President, I like the Senator Vandenberg tra-
dition and all that. I just wanted to get that off my chest. Do you
have any response?

Mr. Slocombe. Senator, you made one observation that I do
want to respond to, and that is that in the Defense Department

there is a we/they mentality between the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the mihtary Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is simply not
true.

I served in the Pentagon during the Carter administration, and
one of the things that I have been impressed by is the degree to
which, largely I think because of Goldwater-Nichols, there is a
much more open and much better relationship between the staff
levels of the military staff and the civilian leadership in the De-
partment.

There may be various problems in this Government, in this ad-
ministration, but a we/they mentality in the Pentagon is not one
of them. Obviously it is important that the civilians let the military
do their business and an inquiry into what went wrong in a mili-
tary operation is preeminently a military function.

Senator Pressler. Well, I have a feeling — and I appreciate your
comments, and I have known you a long time so I appreciate your
integrity. But I have a distinct feeling tnat just below the surface
over there there is a very we/they mentality. And I have the feeling
that it is going to get worse as time goes along, and I hope that
it is resolved.

But we want to help you out. We want to work with you, at least
I do. But we have got to have some foreign policy formulated, and
we have got to have some defense policy formulated. Some of the
stuff that is coming out of this that must be from the Deputies and
the principals is very helter-skelter in this Senator's view.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. I have two specific ques-
tions.

Mr. Slocombe. Senator Pell, I am not as young as I was when
I was in the Government before. I need a very brief break.

The Chairman. Certainly. We will recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator Pressler. May I ask just one followup question?

The Chairman. Surely.

Senator Pressler. May I get for the record dates of the meetings
of the principals and the Deputies regarding Somalia over the last
5 months?

Mr. Tarnoff. Certainly.

[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested is classified, and is in the committee files in room 8—
116 of the Capitol.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. I have two very specific
questions. One is a press report here reads: "a month before his mi-
litia killed 18 U.S. soldiers on October 3, Somali warlord Moham-
med Farah Aideed offered to cease hostilities and begin a mutual
dialog with the U.N., according to a confidential U.N. document.
But tne peace overture was rejected by the senior U.S. representa-
tive in Somalia, retired U.S. Adm. Jonathan Howe, and senior U.N.
and American military commanders in Somalia, according to John
Diysdale who resigned last month as Howe's political adviser."

Can you just say, is that a correct or an incorrect story?

Mr. Tarnoff. Mr. Chairman, the only communication that we
were aware of or are aware of from Aideed during that period was
a letter that he wrote in late August, I believe, to President Carter.

In that letter he did make a proposal for the convening of a com-
mission that would look into the responsibility for the events of
June 5, notably the attack against the Pakistanis.

In return for that he indicated that there could be a relative ces-
sation of hostilities, and through other channels he even indicated
that he might be willing to leave the country for a period of time
while that investigation was occurring.

This is the only communication that we were aware of. And I
might say that after it was received the President, Secretary Chris-
topher, Mr. Lake, and others met with President Carter, and this
was one of the factors in our decision early in September to begin
exploring actively the political process. So, that is the only commu-
nication that I am aware of that came from Greneral Aideed on that
same general subject.

The Chairman. Thank you. Now, on a different subject, we are
all glad the Michael Durant has been returned to us. At the same
time, I understand that the U.N. still holds many Somali prisoners
and that, at the urging of the United States, the U.N. was imwill-
ing to consider a prisoner exchange. And so far Somali prisoners
are not being released in response to the release of the American
and Nigerian prisoners.

My understanding is that the legal viewpoint, is that it is be-
cause there is no international conflict in Somalia, and because the
U.N. is an international organization and is not a party to the Gre-
neva Conventions, and there is no war in the technical sense of the
word.

So, what would be the status of the prisoners on each side? I do
not believe the Red Cross has been called in, and this is a question
that may come up more in the future.

Mr. Tarnoff. It is true that the U.N. is holding some 20 to 25,
I believe, Somalis who have been captured in the course of the op-
erations over the summer.

The Chairman. Excuse me. Are they being treated as prisoners
of war, or just detainees?

Mr. Slocombe. For the reasons you state they are not prisoners
of war because there is not an international armed conflict. They
are, however, being given a treatment which is the equivalent to
that which would be given to prisoners of war.

The Chairman. Somewhat off the subject but in the same line of
questioning, has Durant received the Purple Heart?

Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

The Chairman. So, that would indicate that there is a war.

Mr, Slocombe. No, not necessarily, because we take the position
which I think makes a lot of sense that the eligibility for American
service personnel who are wounded in the line of auty by hostile
action should not depend on the niceties of international law. He
is properly entitled to receive the Purple Heart without that having
any legal implications on the character of the war or the character
of his confinement. As a technical matter, he was also in the view
of the United States a detainee rather than a prisoner of war.

The Chairman. You say that the treatment given to the Somali
detainees is equivalent to the treatment they would receive as
POWs?

Mr. Slocombe. That is correct.

The Chairman. In that case, have they been visited by the
ICRC?

Mr. Slocombe. I have not asked that specific question, but we
can get the answer.

The Chairman. Maybe you could for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes. While not soldiers or prisoners of war, the detainees are afforded the same
privileges that a POW is guaranteed under the International Law of Land Warfare,
They are visited by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross
twice a week. The ICRC officials have made no complaints about the conditions
under which the detainees are being held. Acconunodations are sparse, but clean
and dry and the detainees are fed three meals a day. High level detainees are also
given an exercise period. As necessary, medical treatment is also available.

The Chairman. The record will stay open until the end of the
day for additional questions.

I would turn now to Senator Brown.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to go back
to the discussion of armor or supplying armor, and the decision not
to supply that armor that was requested by General Johnston.

Secretary Slocombe, did you participate in meetings where the
question of supplying armor was discussed?

Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

Senator Brown. Can you tell us what Greneral Hoar's rec-
ommendation was? I believe the recommendation was sent through
him.

Mr. Slocombe. For the same reason that I said — the same an-
swer that I gave with respect to your question about General Pow-
ell's recommendation, I think it is inappropriate for me to describe
or characterize the advice given, particularly by the military chain
of command to, in this case of course. General Powell, and beyond
that to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Brown. Are you aware that the Secretary of Defense has
already characterized that advice in the press publicly?

Mr. Slocombe. Yes. I assume you mean his statement to the ef-
fect that there were differences of — that the advice was mixed, I
think was the basic thing. I think there is a distinction between
the person to whom the advice was rendered talking about it and
people who happened to be in the room or who happened to have
access to documents describing what they hear or, indeed, what
they personally recommended for the same reason that I suspect
you would not appreciate members of your staff describing on the
public record the advice they gave you on various matters.

Senator Brown. Well, do I understand you to say that it was in-
appropriate for Secretary Aspin to characterize that advice?

Mr. Slocombe. No, because I draw a distinction between the per-
son who receives the advice, in this case the Secretary of Defense,
who may choose to talk about the advice he got, rather than some-
body who simply happens to be in the room or happened to have
had access to the document.

Senator Brown. How would you characterize people who give ad-
vice to you? Is that something inappropriate for you to speak
about?

Mr. Slocombe. I believe that as a Presidential appointee I am
responsible for the decisions that I make, and I would not normally
think, in the absence of some allegation of wrongdoing or some-

thing like that, it appropriate for me to characterize the views of
my staff.

Senator Brown. But it was appropriate for Secretary Aspin to
characterize them?

Mr. Slocombe. I am in an intermediate position. Secretary
Aspin is a decisionmaker with the responsibility for the operation
of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense depends,
as all the other Government agencies, on people being able to g^ve
candid advice and not have that advice then become a subject of
public

Senator Brown. Well, I think my questions are pretty straight-
forward.

Mr. Slocombe. Your questions are very straightforward, very
reasonable, and I understand why you are asking.

Senator Brown. Let us take a look at where we are at. The Sec-
retary turned down a request for armored personnel carriers and
tanks that were needed for the safety of the troops.

Mr, Slocombe. I do not agree with that characterization.

Senator Brown. Well, I think those are public statements.

Mr. Slocombe. There is no question that what he has said is
that if he had had it to do again, knowing what he knows now, that
with the light of hindsight he would have made a different deci-
sion.

Senator Brown. But nevertheless, the troop commander re-
quested the equipment. The Secretary did not respond to that re-
quest positively.

The Secretary has publicly characterized the advice that he got
and the Secretary, in spite of repeated requests, has not been will-
ing to come forward and testify before the committee. You have
come in his place and you are unwilling to testify.

Mr. Slocombe. The Secretary is testifying this morning before
the House Armed Services Committee, and I assume this will be
one of the subjects discussed.

Senator Brown. Well, I think that is very nice for the House.
The question is here. And let me ask you, are you asserting a privi-
lege against testifying?

Mr. Slocombe. No.

Senator Brown. You are not asserting a privilege, you are just
refusing to testify.

Mr. Slocombe. I am saying that I believe it is inappropriate for
a staff person who was in the room at a time when military advice
was given to the Secretary of Defense, again absent some extraor-
dinary circumstance, allegations of impropriety or something like
that, to characterize that advice.

Senator Brown. Well, let us pin it down so I understand. You
were in the room. You heard discussions relevant to the subject.
You are unwilling to answer questions before this committee about
that information. Is that correct?

Mr. Slocombe. If it gets to be a question of the legal instruction,
I would then do what as a lawyer it seems to me makes sense, and
that is to consult the advice of counsel or the advice of the depart-
ment of what they want me to do.

My personal view is that absent some instruction otherwise, I
think it is inappropriate for staff people to characterize other peo-
ple's advice to the decisionmaker.

Senator Brown. Well, when you went through confirmation hear-
ings, did you not commit to answer questions from Congress?
. Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

Senator Brown. Is this not a question from Congress?

Mr. Slocombe. Look, if you want to make this an issue of an in-
struction from the committee to answer, I will consult with the De-
partment of Defense as to what I am supposed to do. I am only say-
ing what I believe is an appropriate scale of inquiry.

Senator Brown. Well, if I understand where we are at, I have
asked a question about the comments of General Hoar on this mat-
ter with regard to honoring a request for equipment that was need-
ed for the safety of troops. You have declined to answer.

I have asked a question with regard to General Powell's rec-
ommendation with regard to honoring a request for equipment nec-
essary for the safety of troops and you have declined to answer,
even though the Secretary himself has commented in public on this
subject.

If I imderstand your refusal to answer it does not relate to as-
serting a privilege.

Mr. Slocombe. I do not know whether the Department would
want that privilege asserted. A privilege may well exist, but I am
not in a position — as I understand it, I am not in a position to as-
sert it personally.

Senator Brown. Well, I thought you came here to testify and to
answer questions. I do not know how we get to the facts of this
case.

Mr. Slocombe. I will be glad if you would like, Senator, to con-
sult with the legal officers of the Department of Defense as to
whether they have a view on my answering the question. And I be-
lieve I would also need to consult with the Secretary of Defense,
and I would like to consult with General Powell bewre I am the
person who characterizes the advice that he gave to the Secretary
of Defense.

Senator Brown. Well, I would appreciate it. We have only been
waiting 9 months for the hearings. Would you follow up on it? I
thought that is what you were prepared to do when you came up
today, to answer the questions. Now when we get to the questions
I find you will not answer them; that you do have the answers but
you will not respond, and you are not asserting a privilege.

Mr. Slocombe. Well, for the record, I will reserve the question,
whether the Department wishes to assert a privilege. I do not hold
myself out as an expert on the law of executive privilege, and
therefore I am certainly not waiving it. It is not mine to waive.

Senator Brown. Can you tell me who at the Pentagon — the Sec-
retary's statement is, "I found the views at the Pentagon were kind
of mixed on the issue as to whether we ought to grant that," refer-
ring to the request. Can you tell me who at the Pentagon opposed
sending armor?

Mr. Slocombe. It is the same question.

Senator Brown. And you decline to answer?

Mr. Slocombe. Yes.

Senator Brown. What was the backup plan to rescue our men
or backup our men on the October 3 mission?

Mr. Slocombe. That is a question that will have to be addressed
to the military authorities. I do not know.

Senator Brown. Well, I thought you came here representing the
Defense Department. You are not aware of a backup plan to rescue
the men?

Mr. Slocombe. I will be glad to take that question. The fact is
that the operation was planned by the U.S. officers in the field, on
the ground, and I am simply telling you as a matter of fact that

I do not know what the details of that plan were, just as I do not
purport to know in detail the events.

I mean, like many of us I sat in briefings and I heard reports
on what happened. I do not hold myself out as an expert on the
details of what happened or what the plan was or what the defects
of the plan may or may not have been or what various alternatives
were.

Senator Brown. Mr. Chairman, I thought we had finally gotten
to hearings so we would have answers. What I find is they are un-
prepared to answer.

My hope is two things, Mr. Chairman. One, that we would hold
additional hearings where we can get answers so that they will be
prepared, and I will do my part and try to submit the questions
in advance, if that is helpful.

Mr. Slocombe. That would be very helpful on such issues as
this.

The Chairman. I think you might care to submit them today.

Senator Brown. I will submit them today. I wonder, can you give
me an idea as to when you might have answers for me?

Mr. Slocombe. Obviously, I will consult immediately when I get
back to the building. I have been making a list, and the people sit-
ting behind me have been making a list as to your areas of request.

Senator Brown. And I will try to get written questions to you.

Mr. Slocombe. Some of them will take a while to answer. Some
of them we will be able to answer immediately. On all of the ques-
tions, I do not know how long it will take to answer them. If, for
example, they require getting information through military chan-
nels, through people in the field, that will take a while.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I would just observe, I have been in the Govern-
ment, in the Senate for 33 years, and in the executive branch for

II years, and I completely sympathize with Mr. Slocombe because
you stand responsible for what you do. And I do not blame my leg-
islative assistant for giving me bad advice, I have to live or hang
by it, and I think this is what Mr. Slocombe is saying here. But
I just wanted to make that observation.

Senator Brown. I guess the reason I feel so strongly about it is
the only way we make sure we do not endanger American's lives
in the future again needlessly is if we learn from our mistakes.
And if the response to this tragedy is to cover everything up and
to not get at the facts and find out who it was that did not want
them to have armored vehicles and so on, if we try to cover it up
we do not learn from the mistakes.

The Chairman. There is a good argument on both sides, but I
think I come out a Httle more on the Slocombe side. It did not used
to be that way when you were representing the administration in
Vietnam.

Mr. Slocombe. Excuse me? I have held this view from service in
various administrations and when I was in private life.

The Chairman. Senator Coverdell?

Senator Coverdell. Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to the
discussion we were having about looking proactively about future
policy.

I am reading to you a quote from Assistant Secretary Designate
Halperin. This article appeared in Foreign Policy this year. He
said, "the United States should explicitly surrender the right to in-
tervene unilaterally in the internal affairs of other countries by
overt military means or by covert operations. Such self-restraint
would bar interventions like those in Grenada and Panama unless
the United States first gained the explicit consent of the inter-
national community acting through the Security Council or a re-
gional organization."

I wondered if you share this view? Is he beginning to articulate
a policy that is on the agenda of the administration? Is this some-
thing the Department of Defense is beginning to see as, so to
speak, the strokes of the new manner in which we will engage in
these kinds of affairs?

Mr. Slocombe. The answer as to the view of the Department of
Defense to the question of whether that is the position of the De-
partment of Defense or Secretary Aspin is no.

Senator Coverdell. Good.

Mr. Slocombe. I think the right place to pursue the question of
what Mort Halperin's views are would be in a hearing on his con-
firmation, and I hope that such a hearing will be scheduled shortly.

Senator Coverdell. Well, I would agree with that except, as we
said a little earlier in our discussion, and I think Senator Kerry
pointed to it and Senator Simon to some extent, that out of what
as I, even in this hearing, think has been the acceptance of hopes
that were not necessarily met and that out of Somalia will come
lessons, I have been concerned about statements such as the one
I read of the President's and then you match it with a statement
by Mr. Halperin.

I am just curiQus. I can go back and I would read to you a state-
ment by Secretary Christopher in his confirmation hearing, "I
think we have to find ways to make available to the U.N. a rapid
response force." That sounds very similar to what we have been
talking about, "so that the U.N. can go into situations and not
leave it to the United States to be the action officer in the situa-
tion."

You see sort of a thread that is tying these together, and I am
probing to understand where you feel this is pointing us. Do you
generally embrace these ideas: You have said that this is not the
policy of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Slocombe. That we should never intervene.

Senator Coverdell. Right. I am saying, is this something that
you have before you at the State Department?

Mr. Tarnoff. Senator, let me respond to the broader issue to
which I think you are referring, and that is the question of whether
the United States acts alone in certain circumstances, or whether
we act with others, and with others might not always be in a U.N.
context. It might be a NATO context.

Senator Coverdell. Or a coalition.

Mr. Tarnoff. Or a coalition. I think the policy of the administra-
tion as defined very clearly by the President himself when he was
in New York and by various other senior administration officials
last month was that we will reserve at all times our right to act
unilaterally, but it may on some occasions be in the interests of the
United States to work with others — coalitions, NATO, with the
U.N.

Even when we act in concert with others, there will be certain
criteria that we will apply to our participation. We will ask for a
defined mission statement, we will ask for a high degree of support
from other nations, and of course we are going to consult very ac-
tively with the Congress of the United States.

So there are a series of criteria when the President would make
the judgment that it is in our interest to act multilaterally. That
will be determined on a case-by-case basis. There is certainly no
blanket policy with respect to multilateral operations at all.

Senator Coverdell. Well, you may want to have some internal
discussions prior to his confirmation hearings, because this state-
ment is very explicit, and a dramatic departure from past U.S. pol-
icy.

I have one other, and I am using these all as guideposts. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali recently admitted that the operation — and I assume
he was talking about Somalia — "is moving into uncharted waters
in Somalia and deals with operational concepts that lie beyond the
realm of peacekeeping."

I think one of the things we have seen here — and there is no way
to exactly document this, but one almost gets the sense of an impo-
sition of a broader international view, and that crosses a threshold
that is somewhat uncomfortable for me. From your inside observa-
tion, what do you think the Secretary General is referring to here
when he says, lie in the realm beyond peacekeeping? What is he
headed toward?

Mr. Tarnoff. It is difficult for me to interpret, but I guess that
when I saw that statement, Senator, I thought he was talking
about a degree of uncertainty with respect to future relationships
between the U.N. and the principal members of the Security Coun-
cil, the principal potential troop-contributing countries, and that
quite frankly we needed a lot more definition of roles of the United
States and of the member nations.

One of the things that struck me when I was in New York last
month after President Clinton addressed the U.N. was the very
positive reaction in delegations among chiefs of state and in the
U.N. structure itself to his requirement that countries impose cri-
teria on their participation in U.N. operations, because I think peo-
ple in the U.N. are understanding that they, too, need criteria so
that when countries, not usually the United States but other coun-
tries, ask them to do things, they will have some commonly accept-
ed criteria.

73-388 0-93-3

Therefore, I take the Secretary General's statement to mean that
we are going to have to work together, and this administration will
have to work internally and with Congress refining the definition
of when peacekeeping is appropriate, when we should be acting
unilaterally, and in many cases these are uncharted waters for rea-
sons we have been talking about here, because we are all facing sit-
uations that are different from what we encountered during the
cold war.

Senator Coverdell. I will conclude. I do think that Senator
Byrd very eloquently described what I would feel is a very broad
view among our people with regard to ultimate accountability, our
system of election, and therefore acceptance, ratification of account-
ability, which is exceedingly difficult to do under a U.N. jurisdic-
tion, so it is all part of this process of formulating how we are going
to go ahead in the future.

I appreciate your response.

The Chairman. Thank you both very much indeed for being here.
We will meet again at 10 a.m., tomorrow morning, and the record
will be kept open for 2 days.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I was hoping
until we receive responses to the questions, obviously responses
may not constitute answers.

The Chairman. The record will be kept open until the end of the
week.

Senator Brown. That is fine.

The Chairman. There is a 4:30 p.m. briefing, too, with Mr. Oak-
ley.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10:04 a.m., October 10, 1993.1

SOMALIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND U.N.

PEACEKEEPING

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1993

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Brown, Jeffords, and Coverdell.

The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order to receive the testimony of Ambassador Albright. It is truly
a timely discussion that we will have.

Today, the air is thick with cries to pull American troops out of
Somalia, to abandon the U.N. peacekeeping operations of which we,
the United States, were a major architect. Some critics would de-
mand that the President cease all support for U.N. peace oper-
ations. Yet, before these drastic steps are hastily taken, time needs
to be taken to reflect on an alternative policy path.

Yesterday, we heard public testimony from Under Secretary of
State Tarnoff and the Under Secretary of Defense, Walter
Slocombe. We received closed testimony from Ambassador Oakley
concerning our policy toward Somalia.

In his letter on Monday to the majority leader. President Clinton
welcomed the opportunity to engage the Congress in a full, con-
structive dialog about the process of executive legislative relations
regarding America's engagement in a changed world. Our hearing
today provides an opportunity to begin that dialog with the execu-
tive branch.

Having been present at the creation, when the U.N. Charter was
adopted in 1945, I am a strong believer in increased consultation,
not information but consultation about the U.N. and our policies to-
ward it. Ambassador Albright is an equally strong proponent of
such an approach toward the Congress. I welcome her testimony.
I turn to the ranking minority member, Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is good
to have you here. Ambassador Albright. We appreciate your coming
for testimony today.

During your testimony perhaps you will cover the points that are
made in a statement in the Washington Post this morning entitled,
"A Grand Bargain." I quote so that you will have sorne idea of the
context I suspect of some of our questioning this morning.

(63)

Washington Post writers Martin Gelman and Daniel Williams
say:

The Clinton administration gave three clear signals yesterday that it would rath-
er switch than fight. It announced the withdrawal of Army Rangers, the latest rein-
forcements that barely arrived, it ordered U.S. troops in Somalia to stay quietly in
their garrisons, and it allowed that Aideed probably will have to be a paol, of the
Somali political settlement.

Exactly what form that political settlement will take is not so much a matter of
indifference to the Clinton administration as it is a matter of acknowledged impo-
tence. President Clinton is far more concerned at this point with settling two gnaw-
ing conflicts between American soldiers and Aideed's militia on the streets of
Mogadishu, and between the executive branch and Congress in Washington.

Clearly, these are substantial allegations, and I am hopeful in
your testimony today or in your additional responses you will clar-
ify what is at hand.

I thank the Chair.

Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Biden?

Senator Biden. I realize it is slightly out of order, but I could I
be yielded 30 seconds?

The Chairman. Certainly.

Senator Biden. Ambassador Albright, I chair the Judiciary Com-
mittee, and once a year we hear from the National Drug Coordina-
tor regarding the administration's national drug policy. Unfortu-
nately, that hearing was scheduled prior to the scheduling of this
hearing so I am going to have to leave.

I would like to ask unanimous consent that my statement, which
I would have made at the appropriate time, be entered in the
record at the appropriate place, and say only that I hope that the
administration does not take from the Somali experience the lesson
that the promise of collective security cannot be fulfilled.

I know you do not feel that way, and I hope the administration
does not draw the wrong lessons from the mistakes and some of the
inadvertent obstacles that it has run into in Somalia and other
places.

I thank the Chair and I thank my colleagues for the interruption,
and I apologize, Madame Ambassador, for not being able to stay.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Btoen

Madam Ambassador, at the outset let me state that I am extremely sympathetic
to the foreign policy challenges facing this administration. You were dealt a difficult
hand, and inherited numerous problems that began during the last administration —
problems that went largely unattended during the heat oi the election campaign.

These challenges are compounded by the complexity of a multipolar world marked
by a multiplicity of threats — albeit threats far less serious than those that faced the
United States during the cold war.

But the administration must not take from the Somalia experience the lesson that
the promise of collective security cannot be fulfilled.

As the world's lone superpower, only the United States is equipped to strengthen
the commitment of the international community to contribute to — and support —
U.N. interventions to protect international peace and stability.

Unfortunately, on this central question, the administration has signaled not U.S.
leadership but growing U.S. doubt.

I have been somewhat dismayed to see administration officials engage in elabo-
rate exercises enumerating the obvious problems of collective action while failing to
come to grips with how we will overcome those problems.

I myself remain convinced that we have at hand — in an unused article of the U.N.
Charter, Article 43 — the means to achieve the objective we seek. This goal was ar-

ticulated quite well by President Clinton during his inaugural speech: "Together if
we can; alone if we must."

Article 43 does not, as some may believe, mandate a standing U.N. Army. Nor
does it mandate that U.S. forces be assigned to a foreign commander.

Rather it envisages an effective process — by making forces and capabilities avail-
able to the U.N. Security Council in advance of any contingency that may arise.

From an American perspective. Article 43 represents all benefit and little cost.
Through Article 43, the forces and faciUties of many nations would be committed
to the Security Council, but could only be used by the Security Council pursuant
to a decision — a decision over which the United States would exercise a positive in-
fluence and an absolute veto.

As matters now stand, each contingency faced by the U.N. requires a new initia-
tive in "rounding up the posse." Under Article 43, the posse would be assembled in
advance — but used only when the key members of the Security Council, always in-
cluding the United States, saw fit.

This is not a question of ceding American sovereignty or of contracting out Amer-
ican foreign policy. This is a question of advancing and protecting our national in-
terests— in a manner that shares the burden equitably with other nations.

I recognize that the President may feel twice burned on multilateral military ac-
tions: once in the Somalia action he inherited; again, by the Bosnia action our allies
would not permit.

These mishaps may offer a sobering reminder that we cannot always expect that
U.N. actions will be successful or that the U.N. will even try to do the right thing.

But they offer no reason for not acting to fiilfill the U.N.'s full potential — as one
instrumentality of American foreign pohcy.

I say all this not to lecture, but to encourage you, amidst the current tempest over
the United Nations, to not lose sight of the possibilities for collective action — at the
United Nations and elsewhere.

Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very briefly, the
Ambassador knows of my opposition to the SomaHa action, but I
would Hke to take this opportunity to say that it does not mean I
do not believe that the U.N. does not potentially play a very con-
structive role.

We do have a problem now with people saying, looking what hap-
pened in Somalia, you cannot have an effective U.N. operation. I
would like to say today that I do not think that is always the case.
In fact in Cambodia it appears that there has been a very effective
operation.

The goal, I think, of all members of this committee is to find the
right balance, and make sure that the U.N. actions are the type of
action that the American people can be comfortable with. I would
like to be a part of that process and avoid the possibility of pure
isolationism or feeding a frenzy of belief that we have no role with
regard to promoting these activities throughout the world. And it
also, of course, could cost our country less if we are able to do this.

So, I think it is important at this time to make it clear that even
though some of us have severe reservations, and in fact I think we
ought to get out of Somalia right now, does not mean in the future
that we should not work together to make the U.N. as effective as
possible in these situations.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. I would now turn to Am-
bassador Albright, and say how glad we are to have you, and look
forward to hearing your testimony.

I would add that there is going to be a rollcall vote at 10:30 a.m.,
and another one at 11:30 a.m., so there will be a certain amount
of coming and going, but I know you will understand and sym-
pathize. Ambassador Albright.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, U.S.
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Grood morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. It
is a pleasure to be here today to discuss international peace oper-
ations and America's role in them. I do not even need to say that
it is always a pleasure to appear before you.

A vigorous debate has arisen in recent weeks surroimding these
issues, and it is vital not only that the executive branch and Con-
gress conduct a substantive dialog, but that the American people
be engaged as well.

Yesterday, as you mentioned. Under Secretary of State Peter
Tarnoff testified before you concerning U.S. policy toward Somalia,
and although the focus of my testimony today will be on our overall
approach to U.N. peacekeeping, there are a few things that need
to be said right up front about the United States, the U.N., and de-
cisionmaking concerning Somalia.

President Kennedy once observed that in Washington a success-
ful policy has a thousand parents, while an unsuccessful policy is
an orphan. The recent finger pointing regarding Somalia is a fine
example of that.

The fact is that it is illogical for anyone to say that they favor
the humanitarian mission of feeding starving children but not the
mission of preventing it from happening again.

From the time President Bush ordered U.S. troops into Somalia
last December, it was understood that there would De a division of
labor on this. The United States would guarantee a secure environ-
ment for the delivery of relief, and then the U.N. would work with
the local population to create a civic structure within Somalia that
would make relapse into famine and anarchy unlikely.

The handoff of primary responsibility and the resulting modifica-
tion of mission was authorized in March with the adoption of Secu-
rity Council Resolution 814. I should emphasize that this step was
designed not to increase American involvement in Somalia, but the
reverse. It allowed us to reduce the number of American troops
from 25,000 to 4,500.

Significant problems did not arise until after the murder of 24
Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, which set back efforts to main-
tain a secure climate within Mogadishu. The U.N.'s decision to au-
thorize the arrest of those responsible for the murders was strongly
supported by the United States and by me. Security Council Reso-
lution 837 was approved unanimously.

It would have been extraordinary if we had not responded to the
ambush of U.N. peacekeepers this way. There remains nothing
wrong with the principles set forth in that resolution. Unfortu-
nately, some serious problems did arise in the course of its imple-
mentation.

Clearly, the difficulty of apprehending those thought responsible
for killing the Pakistanis was underestimated. Further, while the
U.N. was increasing military pressure, the targets of that pressure
were gaining strength.

Meanwhile, more and more resources were devoted to the compo-
nents of the" military mission at the expense of other aspects. As
a result, top level officials in our Government, and some at the

U.N. and in other governments, came to the conclusion that a far
greater emphasis on the track of poHtical reconciliation was need-
ed.

Although the policy was moving in that direction by late Septem-
ber, it took the shock of October 3 to turn the train completely
around. We are now firmly embarked on a corrected course, and
encouraging progress is being made.

Looking back, I would caution against drawing sweeping conclu-
sions about the institutions involved in these events based on what
were in fact differences in individual judgments about tactics.
Based on my own visit to Somalia in early July I think the better
lesson, which I will discuss later in my testimony, is that the more
comprehensive the approach to a peace operation, the more likely
it is that it will succeed.

If UNOSOM had had more robust military capabilities last sum-
mer, better military results might have been achieved. A stronger
political and communications staff at U.N. headquarters in
Mogadishu would have helped, and greater international support
for the training and development aspects of the peace operation
would have brought closer the day that Somali affairs could be re-
turned entirely to Somali hands.

We should also not forget what has been accomplished in Soma-
lia since Operation Restore Hope began 10 months ago. American
service men and women have abundant grounds for pride. Because
of their efforts and their sacrifice, thousands of children are alive,
crops are being planted, and political development at the district
level is underway.

Our commitment to humanitarian goals in Somalia continues al-
though, as the President has made clear, it is not open-ended. In
some respects the same applies to our commitment to U.N. peace-
keeping in general.

Now, let me turn a little bit more generally to U.N. peacekeep-
ing. In that connection let me recall for you where the issue of U.N.
peacekeeping stood only 9 months ago, when I first came before
this committee.

Consider the Bush administration's assessment in January 1993,
and I quote, "with the paralyzing divisions of the cold war now
oyer, the U.N. has been given a new lease on life, emerging as a
central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts
and the preservation of peace. In concert with others, the United
States must renew its efforts to improve the recent effectiveness of
the U.N. As was demonstrated in the Gulf war and in subsequent
crises, we now have the opportunity to make the U.N. a key instru-
ment of collective security."

President Bush's views were widely shared. His predecessor,
President Reagan, went even further, calling in a speech in 1992
for, "a standing U.N. force. An army of conscience that is fully
equipped and prepared to carve out humanitarian sanctuaries
through force if necessary."

At the U.N. itself, the end of the Soviet obstructionism had pro-
duced an explosion in the demand for help in preventing, contain-
ing, or ending conflicts. The result was more peacekeeping oper-
ations in the last 5 years than in the previous 43, a sevenfold in-
crease in troops, and a tenfold increase in cost, and as we have

been reminded so tragically in recent days, a dramatic rise in com-
plexity and danger.

The Clinton administration took office intending to provide
strong support for U.N. peace operations but concerned about the
potential for problems. For example, in my testimony to this com-
mittee at my confirmation hearing one day after the President's in-
auguration I noted, "if more and more nations are inclined to say,
let the U.N. do it, and at the same time do not push comprehensive
reform and build a sound financial base, then the United Nations
stands in peril of collapsing under the weight of the new burdens
placed upon it."

In the months since, it has been increasingly apparent that the
rapid rise in peacekeeping activity has caused great stress in the
U.N. Events in Somalia, and to some extent Bosnia and Haiti over
the last few months have also caused dramatic swings in American
public opinion.

Depending on the month or the place, the U.N. is accused of at-
tempting to do too much or of not doing enough, of relying too
heavily on force or of reacting passively to the use of force by oth-
ers, of trying to run things or of failing to be assertive enough.

It is both necessary and appropriate in the wake of the tragic
death of American servicemen in Somalia that we who make policy
take stock. Clearly, the bipartisan consensus that so recently guid-
ed our approach to the U.N. peacekeeping has broken down. It is
essential that we, the executive branch and Congress, work to-
gether to reestablish that consensus so that we may have a clear
and politically sustainable policy governing America s role in U.N.
peace operations.

This is necessary to maintain the credibility of American leader-
ship, minimize the likelihood of harmful miscalculations abroad,
and to keep faith with the American people, particularly those who
serve in our Armed Forces.

This morning, I will outline the broad elements of what I believe
could be the basis of consensus on U.N. peacekeeping. This outline
has two guiding principles — realism about what the U.N. can and
cannot be expected to do, especially in the short-term, and concern
that we not overreact to setbacks and thereby forfeit opportunities
for enhanced international cooperation that have been a long time
in coming and may not come again soon.

What are the elements of this potential consensus? The first ele-
ment of consensus should be the easiest. I think most of us can
agree that both American character and American interests dictate
that we remain active and engaged on the world stage not as a
global policeman but as consistent and persistent proponents of
free markets, democratic values, and adherence to international
law.

Second, I would hope we would all agree that although multilat-
eral peacekeeping is a potentially valuable foreign policy tool, it
cannot serve as a guarantor of our own vital interests, nor should
it lessen our resolve to maintain vigorous regional alliances and a
strong national defense.

We want a stronger U.N., but we are not about to substitute elu-
sive notions of global collective security for battle-proven and time-
tested concepts of unilateral and allied defense.

Third, we should recognize that current U.N. peacekeeping ca-
pacities and decisionmaking procedures are not adequate and must
be strengthened. Unfortunately, the U.N. emerged from 40 years of
cold war paralysis overweight and out of shape, and since the fall
of the Berlin Wall its responsibilities have grown faster than its ca-
pabilities.

Today, U.N. peacekeepers need reformed budget procedures,
more dependable sources of military and civilian personnel, better
training, better intelligence, better command and control, better
equipment, and more adequate resources.

In his speech to the Greneral Assembly 2 weeks ago. President
Clinton called for, "the creation of a genuine U.N. peacekeeping
headquarters with a planning staff, access to timely intelligence, a
logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and a
modern operations center with global communications."

The administration is also insisting that the U.N. decisionmak-
ing process on peacekeeping be overhauled. We are seeking to do
that by asking that fundamental questions are asked before, not
after new obligations are undertaken.

Does there exist a real threat to international peace? Does the
proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identi-
fied? What are the projected costs? If it a peacekeeping as opposed
to a peace enforcement operation, is there a cease-fire in place?
Have the parties to the conflict agreed to a U.N. presence?

These criteria are not intended as rigid guidelines, but they are
questions that must be asked whenever new peacekeeping missions
are considered.

Fourth, the United States should provide appropriate levels of
personnel, technical assistance, and equipment credited against our
assessment to improve the management and to improve the effec-
tiveness of U.S. peacekeeping capabilities.

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and the
total collapse of governmental authority in some states are now
among the principal threats to international peace and security. Al-
though many of these conflicts may not impinge directly on the na-
tional security interests of America or its allies, the cumulative ef-
fects of continuing conflict include economic dislocation, humani-
tarian disaster, terrorism and other forms of international lawless-
ness, regional political instability, and the rise of leaders and soci-
eties that do not share our values.

These problems can and do affect us, and concern us. If we do
not wish to assume responsibility for containing these conflicts our-
selves, we must either enhance the U.N.'s capability to do so, or ac-
cept a future ruled not by the law of nations but by no law at all.

Fifth, the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping expenses should be re-
duced. We now pay more than 30 percent under a scale of assess-
ments that has not changed in 20 years. Fairness dictates that our
portion should go down and the amount owned by nations whose
economic power has increased dramatically over the past two dec-
ades should go up.

Sixth, where it is in our interests the United States should sup-
port and sometimes participate in well-planned U.N. peace oper-
ations. Let me repeat that. Where it is in our interests the United

States should support and sometimes participate in well-planned
U.N. peace operations.

I anticipate that the U.S. contribution to such operations will
most often be in areas such as logistics, intelligence, public affairs,
and communications rather than combat.

Seventh, under no circumstances should American servicemen or
servicewomen be sent into situations where involvement in hos-
tilities is likely in the absence of competent command and control,
nor under this administration or under prior administrations to my
knowledge have they ever done so. The issues of command and
operational control will always be central.

As General Shalikashvili put it during his confirmation hearing
for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he said, "we should reserve the
right, it seems to me, on a case-by-case basis to decide whether we
should get involved in any particular operation. And one of those
considerations should be just how robust the command and control
arrangement is, and even who the commander is, whether in fact
we consider the commander to be competent to lead our soldiers in
that operation."

As a practical matter, this means that when large-scale or high-
risk operations are contemplated and American involvement is nec-
essary, we will be unlikely to accept U.N. leadership. Rather, we
will ordinarily rely on our own resources, or those of a regional alli-
ance such as NATO, or an appropriate coalition such as that as-
sembled during Operation Desert Storm.

I should note here for purposes of precision that the President
will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces even if
the President should determine that U.S. forces can be placed tem-
porarily under the operational control of a U.N. commander. The
fundamental elements of U.S. command will always apply. The
chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. com-
mander in the field will remain inviolate.

The eighth element of our consensus is consultations. Consulta-
tions between the executive branch and Congress on U.N. peace op-
erations must be conducted on a far more routine basis than in the
past. There are several reasons why ad hoc or crisis-driven con-
sultations are not sufficient.

The changing nature of U.N. peace operations has led us into un-
charted territory. Traditional peacekeeping was a dispute resolving
mechanism conducted between nations with the clear consent of
the parties concerned, with neutrality rigidly observed, and with
the minimum use of force.

Recent and current operations in places like Cambodia, Croatia,
Bosnia, and Somalia are far riskier and far more complicated. The
ways and means of each are unique to that mission. We are all in
the process of being educated about what will work and what will
not.

Television's ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage
into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for imme-
diate engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate
disengagement when events do not go according to plan. Because
we live in a democratic society none of us can be oblivious to those
pressures. But regular consultations between us can nevertheless
contribute to steadiness of policy and purpose.

The relationship of the United States to the U.N. is in the proc-
ess of begin redefined. The outcome of this process, which involves
issues of financing, reform, priorities, and approach, will be deter-
mined by decisions made not only at the White House but on Cap-
itol Hill. The better the working relationship we have, the better
the outcome will be.

Finally, the fluidity of world events dictates that we continually
examine and reexamine our assumptions and policies. If lines of
communication are clear, this will produce needed flexibility. If
they are not, it will produce confusion.

I can tell you that either I or my office are ready to come to the
Hill on a monthly basis to consult with you concerning the Security
Council's agenda for that month, and any or all of the peacekeeping
and other issues before the U.N.

The ninth element are the lessons learned in Somalia and else-
where. The ninth and last element of this proposed outline for con-
sensus on international peacekeeping is simply that we must be
honest about and must continually learn from past successes and
past setbacks.

Recent difficulties should not obscure the fact that multilateral
peacekeeping has made a significant contribution to international
peace and security. Historically, U.N. peacekeeping operations have
separated combatants and preserved cease-fires in such areas as
south Asia, the Middle East, and Cyprus.

More recently, in Cambodia a landmark election has been held
under U.N. supervision, a new government has been formed, hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees have returned to their homes, and
fields that were once red with blood are now green with crops.

One reason for success may have been the decision of UNTAC of-
ficials to avoid being drawn into violent confrontations despite re-
peated provocations by the Khmer Rouge. Another reason was that
the magnitude of the challenges in Cambodia was matched by the
magnitude of the U.N.'s most expensive and far-reaching operation
ever.

Another success story is Namibia, where the U.N. helped to man-
age a transition from guerrilla war to independence. The change-
over was remarkably peaceful, and Namibia has become a stable
democracy.

In El Salvador, we are seeing the value of confidence-building
measures and a step-by-step approach to demobilization and rec-
onciliation following a bitter civil war.

The difficulties of peace operations in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia,
and Haiti demonstrate that traditional approaches are not ade-
quate where government and civil society have broken down, or
where one or more of the parties is not prepared to end the conflict.
It is not only the United States but officials at the U.N. from other
states, large and small, that are now grappling with such questions
as when to use force, how to structure multilateral coalitions, and
how to guarantee strong command and control.

In these areas, there are many opinions but few established ex-
perts, no immutable guidelines, and a multitude of partial prece-
dents which like the Bible can be cited to prove just about anything
you want.

The complexity of modern peacekeeping missions underlines the
importance of being very clear about what the mission is and how
the mission is to be accomplished.

Today, we have a mission in Somalia that is clear. Provide
logistical support to U.N. forces so they can maintain order, supple-
ment the ability of U.N. forces to deal with emergencies, help the
U.N. accelerate the process of political reconciliation, and to ensure
that our own troops are protected.

The goals that mission are worthy. They protect the gains made
in Somalia so far. They maximize the prospects for further
progress, and they serve our interests by preserving American lead-
ership.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, America under
President Clinton is being called upon to develop a new framework
for protecting our territory, our citizens, and our interests in a dra-
matically altered world.

In devising that framework we will depend for the most part on
our own reserves of military and economic power. We will look for
help from old friends and new. And we will need a consensus that
includes you and the members of this committee for according an
appropriate role to the U.N., an institution which has accomplished
much despite a turbulent past, and which if streamlined and
strengthened can contribute greatly in the future of interests that
we share with other states.

Certainly, U.N. peacekeeping is not a panacea. It is one tool
among many, and it cannot operate in isolation from a political
process. But we cannot afford to abandon either peacekeeping or a
multilateral approach to solving difficult problems.

As much as we would wish otherwise, conflicts are going to con-
tinue. The world is going to look to the United States for leader-
ship. It will be in our interest to provide that leadership, but we
cannot and should not bear the full burden alone.

America will be stronger and more secure if the U.N. becomes
more capable and effective at preventing, containing, and ending
international conflict.

I hope that we, as members of different branches of the same
Government, will continue to work together to find common ground
that will enable us, in cooperation with friends and allies, to get
that job done.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I think some of
you know that I have been a professor in my past life and have
studied history fairly closely. And it is my sense, as I have said to
some of you before, that we are living in one of the major water-
shed periods; that what we are looking at is what the world was
like in 1815 or 1945; and that as we all go back and look at what
people say about that period or have been writing about what it
was like 1945, more often than not there is language similar to
what Chairman Pell just stated about being present at the cre-
ation.

I think this is the most challenging job for all of us, and I con-
sider it my major challenge and, frankly, a major honor to be one
of those that is in a position to be present at this recreation of an
international framework, and I hope very much that we are able

to do this work closely together because the world is really looking
at us for answers.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, indeed. I think we will
limit ourselves to 9 minutes each, which should permit everybody
who will be here to ask a question.

I agree with you about the fact that the U.N. is coming into its
own. In fact, Rip Van Winkle has been asleep for 40 years, asleep
because of the cold war, and unable to do the functions that we in-
tended in San Francisco. And now with the removal of the cold
war, the removal of the Wall, we are in the position to do what we
originally designed in 1945.

A couple of questions on specifics. One, you say that one of our
missions is the adherence to international law. Does that mean
that the administration will be pushing toward compulsory juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice?

Ambassador Albright. We are obviously very concerned about
abiding by international law. We also are concerned, obviously,
about our sovereign rights within an international entity, and we
are always examining that issue, Senator.

The Chairman. I would hope we do move in that direction. When
you used the word robust to describe the command and control,
what do you mean by robust? Does that mean strong?

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think that it obviously means
strong, but also better planned and better coordinated. I think that
one of the problems that we see is the diflficulty of coordinating our
actions with those of the U.N., and that it will require more com-
prehensive planning.

The Chairman. In connection with the U.N., I was wondering if
you had had the chance to peruse the final report of the Commis-
sion on Improving the Effectiveness of the U.N. that that group put
out about 2 months ago?

Ambassador Albright. I have seen various versions of the draft.
I was in fact summoned to meet with that group, and I think some
of their suggestions are excellent. And they are the kinds of sugges-
tions that need to be looked at because, as I said in my testimony,
I think we are all looking for ways to improve the functioning of
the U.N. As I say, it is kind of an elephantine bureaucracy that is
now being asked to do gymnastics.

The Chairman. Right, and as a commission it is kind of unique
in that it received absolutely no government money at all. Support
for it was entirely from private sources. Also, have you had a
chance to look at tne staff report of our committee, "Reform of U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations: a Mandate for Change"?

Ambassador Albright. Yes, I have in a general way.

The Chairman. I think both of these puolications have come out
at a singularly significant time. Could you elaborate for a moment
on the review process by which the Government defines its position
toward the U.N.? Do you meet in the National Security Council?
How do you present your views to the Grovernment?

Ambassador Albright. Let me explain in a general way how we
do this. Obviously, as a member of the National Security Council
Principal's Committee, I am there at the initiation of the policy
process, and therefore am a part of the overall decisionmaking.

However, in the bureaucratic way that this is carried out
through the State Department, the process on actual resolutions or
instructions that we take in New York are delivered to me via the
Department of International Organization and Assistant Secretary
Bennett. That is the normal procedure for receiving instructions for
various resolutions.

Let me say, however, that there also is a great deal of back and
forth. I enjoy comparing with my colleagues what it is like to have
your capital an hour away versus having it across on the other side
of the world, and the fact that mine is an hour awav means that
we do a lot of talking on the phone and elaboration of instructions.
But it goes through technically what we call 10, the department.

The Chairman. I believe that the administration has been con-
ducting a review of our participation in the peacekeeping process.
If that is correct, I was wondering what the status was of that re-
view. Will you be consulting with the Congress before a final ver-
sion is agreed on?

Ambassador Albright. Mr. Chairman, we are conducting such a
review, and I think if you put it into also the context of my testi-
mony today and others who have spoken about this, this is clearly
one of the more complex issues that this administration is dealing
with. We have been doing some consulting at staff level. We obvi-
ously will consult further in order to have congressional input, con-
gressional views about the process.

The Chairman. Right. And as you know, there is some disagree-
ment about what consultation means. To my mind, consultation
means the exchange of ideas. The administration in the past seems
to think it is more a question of informing. I would hope that as
much as possible it be true consultation.

Ambassador Albright. I would certainly agree with that, Mr.
Chairman.

The Chairman. The Secretary General recently announced
changes in the organization of the U.N. peacekeeping functions.
Could you give us just a very brief outline of what those changes
are and what the effect will be at the U.N.?

Ambassador Albright. Well, first of all I think this is very much
to do with the Secretary Greneral's own realization that the peace-
keeping operations were inadequate for this larger load. So, what
he has been trying to do is to make some changes in the structure.

He has expanded the staff of the department that deals with
peacekeeping. He is in the process of creating an operation division
to support these peacekeeping operations. He is very concerned
about the lack of professionalism within the public affairs aspect of
the peacekeeping operation.

He is working on the enhancement of the capability to support
the development and training of various parts of the peacekeeping
forces as well as the police forces, and he is working on coordinat-
ing the standardization of training and peacekeeping.

We are pressing him further to make some major changes in the
budget reforms of peacekeeping, and we also have been instrumen-
tal in helping the U.N. set up a functional operations center so that
we have g^ven them technical advice on manning it 24 hours, on
having the right information. We are assisting in that particular
regard.

Also, Mr. Chairman, we are, through the Security Council, work-
ing on regularizing the whole peacekeeping operation. I had the
honor of being president of the Security Council in August, and
during the American presidency there we made it a point of saying
that we could not authorize peacekeeping operations without know-
ing what the preliminary budget was, that new peacekeeping man-
dates had to have sunset clauses in them, and that it was impor-
tant to send out an observer or a reconnaissance mission before we
actually deployed the peacekeepers.

So, we in the United States are doing as much as we can to press
the Secretary General even further on his own desire to really re-
furbish and restructure the peacekeeping operations.

The Chairman. We wish a fair proportion of the troops to be
American and the budget to be American, and I believe as you
point out that it is more than 30 percent now, which compared
with today's share of the world gross product would not be fair. We
would like it to be a quarter or somewhere in that order.

In that regard, should there not also be an understanding of the
number of troops involved, that there would also be a smaller num-
ber, a small proportion? And I know that I shivered when I read
the administration's proposed 25,000 Americans and 25,000 others
to go into Bosnia, and to my mind the proportion should be 1 out
of 5 or 1 out of 6 as it is in Somalia.

Ambassador Albright. On that issue, Mr. Chairman, I think
first of all it is very important to get the U.S. assessment of the
peacekeeping operation down. That has to be done. We bear an un-
fair burden tor that.

Also, as I said, we are not likely to have American troops in most
of these peacekeeping operations. We will only have them where we
consider it vital to our interests.

But in terms of the numbers about what the proportion should
be, I think that it should be commensurate with what the mission
is, and so that our troops when they do participate in a multilat-
eral effort of this kind are there in numbers with which our com-
manders feel comfortable.

I think one of the issues that we have to deal with is the whole
support system by other contributing countries. I went to Somalia
and I saw what it looks like with 30 coimtries contributing to a
peacekeeping operation. I think one of the lessons that we are
learning from all of this is that each country trains its people some-
what differently.

We do not yet have interoperability of weapons. We have to do
a great deal more about the training of these peacekeepers. And I
think that the percentages should not be such as to limit what is
most important in the American case, which is the safety and well-
preparedness of our own troops when we decide to participate.

The Chairman. We should recognize too there is no fixed num-
ber. I remember the pride that I had when President Eisenhower
put me on the U.S. delegation to a conference that set up IMCO,
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. And
we were able to get it down to, I think it was about 8 percent of
the total budget was American. That would be a good target to
shoot at. I believe it still is around 10 or 11 percent.

What will be the Secretary Greneral's procedure to get a truly ef-
fective military staff, one on which we can call?

Ambassador Albright. What would be the Secretary General's
procedure?

The Chairman. Is he making efforts to get a truly effective gen-
eral staff?

Ambassador Albright, I think he is. I think he is having a hard
time because a number of countries, and this is why the Secretary
General is always going around with a tincup trying to determine
which countries are willing to contribute and to what particular
peacekeeping operation.

Obviously, each country has a different set of criteria or a dif-
ferent set of needs for contributing to these operations. I think that
the Secretary Greneral is making an effort. I think that we need to
press him even harder on moving this process forward. If there is
going to be as much reliance on peacekeeping as he would like to
have, then I think it behooves him and his staff to get that peace-
keeping office into order.

Let me say in that regard that I have reorganized the mission
in New York, and changed the portfolios of the Ambassadors up
there. As you know, there are several Ambassadors at the top and
Ambassador Inderfurth, who I believe has testified before you, his
major portfolio is to deal with peacekeeping and how it evolves
within the U.N. system, and he presses all the time.

He has been instrumental in helping to set up a contact group
of countries that contribute peacekeepers so that within the U.N.
system there is also a group that is dedicated to thinking about
how to assist and press the Secretary General to have better budg-
eting as well as better operations.

The Chairman. Excuse me, I must interrupt. I have to go over
and vote. This committee will stand in recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator Feengold [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
Senator Jeffords would be next.

Senator Jeffords. Madame Ambassador, one of the problems in
U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces of late is the unwill-
ingness to send U.S. troops into dangerous situations in areas far
from our traditional spheres of interest. The American public does
not think that a young person who is willing to die for his country
but is placed in a place like Somalia is there for that purpose. Yet,
there are very real American interests in participating in the U.N.
in regional peacekeeping missions.

I have been working on a proposal of specially designated, spe-
cially trained units within our Armed Forces that the President can
call upon for participation in unique situations. These units would
be comprised of people who have volunteered, specifically under-
standing and knowing that this is not in the national interest
under the ordinary perception.

I wonder if you think, either in our own forces or in the U.N.,
that it would be wise to look at least at that option to see whether
it would be preferable to the American public to have units made
up in that respect?

Ambassador Albright. Senator, you have raised a very impor-
tant point and I think also made an excellent suggestion. Let me
elaborate on this.

I do think that the idea of serving within an international oper-
ation such as the peacekeeping operations is obviously different
than some people signed up for and therefore there has to be some
clarification. But let me also say, I did go to Somalia this summer
and I was deeply moved by the dedication of the American men
and women, the service people there, by their commitment to what
they were doing and their understanding that they were fulfilling
a humanitarian mission which obviously had wider ramifications.

I think that any American would have been very proud of those
people. I have to say I have never reviewed troops before in my life,
therefore I was not quite adept at what it was that one did. So, I
decided to shake hands with every one of those people to thank
them for what they were doing, and they really I think felt that
they were doing something that was very important.

I also must say that if one looked at some of the quotes on tele-
vision from some of the service people in Mogadishu after the acci-
dent of October 3, most of them said they wanted to finish the job,
that they were not feeling that they ought to leave, that they were
not looking for a way out. So, I have great admiration for the
Americans that are serving there.

I do think, however, that your idea about some kind of des-
ignated troops is an excellent one. First of all, it would obviate this
problem that Boutros-Ghali has of, as I said earlier, going around
with a tincup trying to figure out who from where.

Second, it would obviate a different problem which is, and I
think this is the most serious problem in peacekeeping, that these
troops have not trained together. They do not know each other.
They arrive in a place and they have not had the same training.
They come often different cultures, have different weapons, and I
think anything that we can do to regularize the aspect of the
peacekeeping operations — and I think kind of have honesty in
packaging I guess is the label I would put on your proposal, which
is that those people know what they are getting into because I
think that they think that it is a good idea.

Again, if I just might add, there was a Marine I met not long ago
who was part of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning peacekeeping oper-
ation who talked about it as one of the most important military ex-
periences he had ever had. So, I think for the most part our mili-
tary, when they know why they are doing what they are doing, are
comfortable with it. So, I would welcome your suggestion.

Senator Jeffords. Thank you. I know we had one of our former
aids go to Mogadishu as a volunteer, basically pretty close to being
in harms way. And I know she is going to stay there, and she be-
lieves very sincerely in what she is doing in helping humanitarian
delivery.

I have discussed it both with high school young people who think
that, yes, volunteer to go if you want to do that. It would be no
problem. I think it would try to get us over that basic question that
people ask. Why are we there? Why is my child there?

Well, if your child wanted to be there because they felt they were
doing something appropriate, I think that alleviates that concern.
Thank you.

Ambassador Albright. I think also, if I might add, that I think
we ought to figure out a way to have commendations for those peo-
ple that have served in peacekeeping operations, and it ought to be
something that helps people's careers and does not hurt them, and
that they need to know that what they are doing is not only in the
service of the international system but also to their own country.

Senator Jeffords. Thank you. Well, I will keep going if I still
have some time. To follow up on that, I think that we have to put
more emphasis on what the image of the United States would be
if we decline to participate in the U.N., and the impact that will
have on the positive aspects of opening markets and being able to
participate, because we are not going to increase our standard of
living and improve upon it if we do not actively participate in the
world.

I wonder if you would agree with that view, that there are mar-
kets opening up out there and it is to our advantage to have a good
reputation for being able to help in those areas?

Ambassador Albright. Yes, sir. My feeling is that an overriding
objective of American foreign policy has to be to make sure that we
have a vibrant economy that exists within a functioning inter-
national system, and that there are various obstacles in the way
of that such as these regional disputes.

I will not elaborate on that, but the gist of what you are getting
at is that there are many problems along the way. It is essential,
I think, to the average American that we have the options for hav-
ing the greatest economic opportunities worldwide, and that dis-
ruptions in various places create a barrier to those options being
available.

I think that it is essential that we have a great dialog with the
American people about how we fit into the world and that it is im-
possible for us to live behind two oceans in this day and age. And
our participation in the U.N. and in other organizations or our gen-
eral behavior internationally should be directed toward that goal of
the United States having a functioning — ^not functioning, a vibrant
economy within a functioning system.

Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.

The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much. Senator
Feingold.

Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador
Albright, I appreciate your being here, and I want to start off with
just a couple of questions relating to Somalia and then maybe a lit-
tle broader.

Ambassador Oakley I think has done a good job in incorporating
other African leaders into the political process that has to be pur-
sued in Somalia. But independent of his involvement, how much
cooperation has the U.N. received from Somalia's neighboring coun-
tries in that action?

Ambassador Albright. Well, first of all as I mentioned, I had
been in the area in July and spent time with the President of Ethi-
opia who was particularly concerned about what was going on

there. I have on the Security Council talked with the permanent
representative of Djibouti, who is also nearby.

I cannot give you an exact number in terms of troop contributors,
but they are very concerned about what is going on there and are
willing, as we now know, to be very much a part of assisting in the
solution.

Also the OAU, as the regional organization, is desirous of being
of assistance. And I think that what Ambassador Oakley is doing
is exactly right in moving toward the energizing of an African solu-
tion to an African problem.

Senator Feingold. What about the Arab league? Have they
given an indication?

Ambassador Albright. Well, they have also been a part of this
group that actually Boutros-Ghali has tried to energize. He just
met with them in Cairo in order to move that process forward. I
will have to give you the exact — ^you need a breakdown in terms
of finances.

Senator Feingold. That would be helpful, and I actually have a
question following from that that is more general. What is the reac-
tion of the other African nations to what we are doing there? I can
see at least two different possible responses. One would be that
this is in effect another example of colonialism, almost a Western
display of arrogance to come into a region.

On the other hand, I can see situations such as Angola where
they are maybe concerned that we would be abandoning our con-
cern for Africa. I am just wondering how recent events are playing
out with the various nations.

Ambassador Albright. I think that is a very wise question be-
cause one of the things we are talking about is there are a number
of peacekeeping operations in Africa as we speak and they range
from an operation in the Sahara, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Somalia, and those are really major operations in which there are
cease-fires that have existed, that there is a variety of ways that
the U.N. could be of assistance. As I mentioned in my testimony,
the U.N. was of major assistance in Namibia. So, the U.N. has per-
formed an important role.

I think that for most part, and obviously these are generaliza-
tions, is that Africans appreciate international interest in what is
going on in their continent, and more likely they are afraid of being
marginalized if we decide that we have no interest in them and
that we are willing to participate in keeping activities in other con-
tinents but are not interested in theirs.

My sense has been that until recently there was not an anti-U.N.
feeling within these countries. I must say again, and if I might
take this minute to say, I specifically wanted to see how peacekeep-
ing operations work. Most of my predecessors as permanent rep-
resentatives have taken a large trip to consult before the General
Assembly. I decided that I did not want to do that, that I wanted
to make my trip very specific, and I went to visit three peacekeep-
ing operations. I went to Somalia, Cambodia, and El Salvador.

And to speak about Somalia outside of Mogadishu, I was in
Kismayo and there is no question that the activities of the U.N.
were deeply appreciated and were not viewed as an intrusion. But
obviously. Senator, there will be some~we will find elements of

people who do not want us there. But my sense from my work in
New York is that the African countries want us to be involved be-
cause they see us as — and when I say us, I mean in this case the
U.N. They see the U.N. as a way of assisting their progress and
not as a colonial aspect.

Senator Feingold. Thank you for your answer. On the cost of
the Somali operation our witness yesterday said that he would not
quarrel with an estimate that our operations in Somalia cost us
more than $1 billion, and he also indicated it seemed that we
would not receive any reimbursement from the U.N.

DOD has estimated that we may be eligible for as much as $193
million of reimbursement. Is that your understanding?

Ambassador Albright. I will have to get clear on the numbers,
but let me say that the major cost is from the cost of UNITAF,
which was an American operation, and the cost was decided to be
born by the United States in a decision made by President Bush.
And on the UNOSOM, our costs are according to the percentage.

We also are reimbursed through a special fund when we have as-
sisted Third World countries in their logistical support, and that is
what that fund is for is to reimburse us for that. But the major cost
of this was UNITAF, a decision made by the previous administra-
tion.

Senator Feingold. What about the U.N. trust fund for Somalia?
Is that what you were referring to?

Ambassador Albright. Yes, right.

Senator FEINGOLD. Who contributes to that fund?

Ambassador Albright. Well, the major contributor has been
Japan.

Senator Feingold. And it is to be used for?

Ambassador Albright. It is used to reimburse the countries that
have assisted in the transportation. The logistical support for Third
World countries that could not be there otherwise. I will have to
get you the exact numbers.

Senator Feingold. Did you say we could expect some return?

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

Senator Feingold. There have also been some suggestions to im-
prove the U.N.'s ability to meet the cost of immediate peacekeep-
ing, for example, establish a $50 million humanitarian revolving
fund for emergency situations, creating a $1 billion U.N. peace en-
dowment fund against which the Secretary General would be al-
lowed to borrow 'funds commercially. What is you opinion of these
kinds of proposals or are there other ideas for budgeting?

Ambassador Albright. Well, clearly the funding of the U.N. is
a problem not just for us but for other countries, and there are var-
ious attempts and suggestions made through reports about dif-
ferent ways of doing things. I do think that it would be useful to
have money on hand for humanitarian assistance. We cannot al-
ways predict when the need is there.

On the other hand, you know, I think there is kind of a catch-
22 here. I do think that it is very important for member states to
maintain complete control over the activities of the U.N. The U.N.
cannot and should not be some kind of a totally independent body
that acts on its own. It is a composite part of its member states.

And by contributing, that is one way that the states keep some
strings on them, and there is a question about how large an inde-
pendent fund should be before the U.N. is then totally independent
to spend it how it wants. But as you can see, there is kind of a
between. It would be good if they had something that they could
use for emergency situations. On the other hand, I think the U.N.
needs to be dependent on the way that its member states — because
how you contribute is a sign of your support.

Senator Feingold. One further question, Mr. Chairman. Is my
time used up? Real quickly, on Macedonia we sent 300 troops as
part of a U.N. mission to Macedonia as one of our responses to the
situation in the former Yugoslavia. Briefly, what is the command
and control situation there?

Ambassador Albright. That is one situation where the oper-
ational control of that unit is under UNPROFOR. As I explained
in my testimony, overall command is always under the President
of the United States, but there is operation control there by a Nor-
dic commander.

Senator Feingold. Thank you. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Helms.

Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Ambas-
sador, I do not know what the distinguished chairman said in wel-
coming you here this morning, but I know it was gracious and I
would like to associate myself, as we say in the Senate, with his
remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to have an opening statement.
You do not happen to live in Virginia, do you?

Ambassador Albright. Well, actually I have a farm in Virginia,
yes.

Senator Helms. But you do not have to cross the 14th Street
Bridge every morning?

Ambassador Albright. No.

Senator Helms. Well, it is the nearest thing to a demolition
derby I ever saw, but anyway we get here somehow.

The Chairman. The Rochambeau Bridge.

Senator Helms. Pardon?

The Chairman. The Rochambeau Bridge.

Senator Helms. What did I say?

The Chairman. You said 14th Street Bridge. It is also called the
Rochambeau Bridge.

Senator Helms. Oh, I see. I tell you, the city of Washington is
doing a pretty good job of demolishing the streets in this city, too.
You try to get here and you cannot do it.

Ambassador Albright. Come to New York.

Senator Helms. Ma'am?

Ambassador Albright. Come to visit the streets of New York.

Senator Helms. Right. Well, I have been tempted to recommend
that they build a dormitory for Senators and Congressmen and lock
us in at night.

Anyway, the President spoke at the U.N, I believe it was on Sep-
tember 27, and he specified four criteria for U.S. participation in
U.N. peacekeeping operations. Just for the record, I will mention
them. I know you know what they are.

One, is there a real threat to international peace? Two, does the
mission have clear objectives? Three, can the end point be identi-
fied for those being asked to participate? And four, how much will
the mission cost?

I thought at the time, oh, well, it looked pretty good. The Presi-
dent outlined then, as I understood it, that this would be a litmus
test before we would embark on a mission or the mission began.
I listened to the radio this morning about 6 a.m., and I know you
have heard about the shot that was fired at another helicopter and
missed, thank the Lord.

I mention all this just to emphasize the quandary in which the
American people and a great many of us in the Congress find our-
selves, wanting to support the President who is, after all, the Com-
mander in Chief, but there are a lot of things I frankly do not un-
derstand.

Anyway, a couple of weeks after the President spoke in New
York or the U.N., the U.N. Security Council voted to approve three
brand new peacekeeping missions, Haiti, Rwanda, and Liberia, and
these are going to cost something in the neighborhood of a quarter
of a billion dollars. Is that pretty much correct? — $253 million or
something like that.

Now, I do not believe, Madame Ambassador, that any one of
these missions met the President's clearly stated criteria. And you
can see why some of us are confused. We do not understand what
appears to be double talk.

The President said if the American people are to say yes to U.N.
peacekeeping, the U.N. must learn to say no. I do not know wheth-
er you helped him with that line or not, but it was a good line. And
the last time I checked, the United States has a veto over all Secu-
rity Council resolutions, meaning that the United States alone can
vote to say no, and no is it. Up to this point we have not.

It seems to me that we might be like Cool Hand Luke, a movie
I saw an eternity ago. What we have here is a failure to commu-
nicate. If the U.N. cannot say no and the administration does not
say no to these peacekeeping missions, then why is anybody sur-
prised when people in Congress say, wait a minute?

Maybe we have — let me confine it to myself. Maybe I have a
strict constructionist view on the question of who can declare war
and who cannot, but it prompts me and I think it prompts others
to say wait just a minute. If the administration is not going to do
this, the U.N. is. not going to do it, then we have got to do it.

All right. In August — ^you have met Ben Oilman, my counterpart
over in the House, a nice guy. I think he is smart. We agree on
some things. We wrote jointly to the administration, specifically the
State Department, about all of this. We got a letter back from the
administration saying that Somalia was not considered, "a sus-
tained military action," and therefore congressional authorization
and approval were not required.

Maybe you can help me. What did the administration mean when
it used the words, sustained military action?

Ambassador Albright. Can I go back and deal with some of the
other issues you raised about the criteria?

Senator Helms. Yes, ma'am. I know this is sort of a winding
road, and I apologize for that.

Ambassador Albright. I think the issue here is the following.
We are very concerned about what really looks like the growth in-
dustry in peacekeeping. These peacekeeping operations are pro-
liferating and it is something that has concerned me ever since I
got up to New York.

In August, the United States was President of the Security Coun-
cil, and we decided that under that presidency we would begin to
turn the screws on a series of peacekeeping operations. And specifi-
cally as a result of our action, from now on the following things
happen whenever anybody thinks of a peacekeeping resolution
which has fit within the President's criteria.

First of all, we ask what the cost is going to be going in, not com-
ing out, and the Secretariat has to give us a preliminary cost esti-
mate on it.

Second, we are insisting that every peacekeeping operation have
in it a sunset clause so that the burden of proof has be to renew
it, not just that it kind of has to go along. And third, we would first
send out a small mission to find out whether this is something that
ought to be done or not.

So, being typically American, we wanted openness and account-
ability, and that is what is happening on those particulars from
now on.

I also was concerned about Rwanda, and I asked my staff up
there specifically how does Rwanda live up to the President's cri-
teria? And I can, if you want, go through this with you because it
does.

And does the U.N. peacekeeping operation meet the guidelines?
There is a threat to international peace and security. Rwanda rebel
troops invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990. Almost 1 million
people were displaced from their homes or made refugees by the
fighting, requiring an aid effort of $100 million this year alone. And
an international community of interest exists for dealing with the
problem.

Several countries, including the United States, participated in
the peace talks and the OAU have deployed — I will not bore you
with all of this, but we basically were able to answer all those
questions.

I have now asked the same questions about the possibility of re-
newing the mandate on Angola that comes up. I do not know if
that is going to meet the criteria. We are subjecting it to these cri-
teria, and I promise you that we will continue to do that.

Now, let me sav, there is really a two-tiered process to the cri-
teria. One is, under what circumstances would I vote for a peace-
keeping operation which in no way commits U.S. troops to any-
thing? It commits the fact that we would pay our fair share, or
more than fair share as it turns out, of the assessments but does
not mean that we contribute troops. There is a different set of cri-
teria that the administration is working on which would explain
under what circumstances we would commit American troops to it.
So, there really is a two-tiered process.

I think we are well aware of the question that you have asked,
which is why should the United States be interested in this series
of peacekeeping operations all over the place? And what we are

doing, Senator, is our very best to get a handle on it because we
have exactly the same concerns that you have.

Senator Helms. That is fair enough. I wish you would send me
what you summarize.

Ambassador Albright. I will do that. I will be happy to do that,
Senator,

Senator Helms. If you would do that I would appreciate it. Mr.
Chairman, I did not begin my questioning period until 5 minutes
after that light. Can we assume that the first 5 minutes was my
opening statement?

The Ambassador: Yes.

Senator Helms. I will not be long.

Senator Kerry. Does that double it for everybody, Mr. Chair-
man?

Senator Helms. Every ranking member will get it, and every
chairman. There have got to be some prerogatives, have there not,
Mr. Chairman?

Has anybody asked you about proposals for approximately 18
new observer missions? Is there any comment on that?

Ambassador Albright. Nobody has asked me. I do not know if
there are 18 observer missions.

Senator Helms. You do not know anything about it?

Ambassador Albright. No.

Senator Helms. Well, this is pending before the U.N. Security
Council.

Ambassador Albright. Not 18 new observer missions, no.

Senator Helms. Well, I wanted to be sure that I was briefed ac-
curately.

Ambassador Albright. Senator, one thing that I said when you
were not here is that I would be pleased to come once a month my-
self or send somebody from my office to go over with you the
month's work that the Security Council has. We have a program
of work that is put out. A lot of it has to do with the renewal of
various of the Security Council mandates and also upcoming mis-
sions and things. We will be very happy to consult with you on
those on a regular basis.

Senator Helms. Well, I think that would be good and I certainly
am interested in that sort of relationship because, y6u know, we
dangle out here and do not know what is going on, and then I ask
you a question and nobody briefed you on it. So, let us agree to do
that.

And since I had some objection to taking more time, I will yield
back my time, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. And now we will turn to Senator
Sarbanes.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If the U.N. does
not do peacekeeping in some of these instances, what will happen?

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think that they will go back into
a situation where fighting resumes among various groups. That is
the question in Rwanda. It is the problem in Liberia. Certainly, as
we know, we are concerned about the return to anarchy in Somalia,
which is why the President felt it important for us to stay to give
them, as he put it, survival rights.

I think you ask a crucial question, Senator, which is that the
U.N. I do not think is making work for itself. The U.N. is not on
a power grab. What has happened is that basically countries where
strife has taken place or where there is cross-border aggression
have come to the U.N. as a way of trying to, in a peaceful way,
move into a post-chaotic situation. And if the U.N. does not do it,
then that chaos is there.

Senator Sarbanes. Is not the problem really more to scrub down
how the U.N. does the operation and how they get paid for it, and
how the command and control works rather than saying no to the
operation?

But let me ask this question. What recent peacekeeping has the
U.N. undertaken that it should not have done?

Ambassador Albright. I happen to believe that all the peace-
keeping operations that have been mandated are appropriate ones.
I do think that there is a danger of people wanting peacekeepers
without us having rigorous criteria. And so I think we will find
agreement among other members of the Security Council that they
also want to know what is going on, but I do not think that there
have been peacekeeping operations to date which were unneces-
sary.

I do think. Senator, that we have to be concerned sometimes
about the length of the peacekeeping operations, which is why we
thought that the sunset clause was a good idea in order for the Se-
curity Council to maintain some control over what is going on.

Senator Sarbanes. Well, it is my perception that a lot of work
needs to be done in how the peacekeeping is carried out, how it is
funded, and how it is conducted, and how the whole organization
operates including, of course, the other problems we have with
making the U.N. a more efficient, austere organization. But I am
hard put to see at the moment, in terms of peacekeeping functions
that have been taken on, what could have been done as an alter-
native, because in most instances it seems that failure to do that
would have led to tremendous loss of life in various places.

Let me ask about Somalia specifically. Was the plan that over
time the United States would disengage entirely and other nations
would move their forces in and assume the role in Somalia for sus-
taining a secure environment?

Ambassador Albright. Yes, and the plan I think, to keep the
chronology here, is that as we know initially there was a relief ef-
fort that went forward in Somalia. Then the Pakistanis took over
UNOSOM I. As we know, that did not work because they were not
capable of dealing with a vast tragedy, and then President Bush
decided to send in UNITAF forces, American forces, which num-
bered around 38,000. And then we transferred from UNITAF to
UNOSOM, and already the number of Americans there fell from
28,000 to 4,000 or so. That was part of the drawdown.

Then the subsequent plan was for the United States first of all
to fulfill the mission that it was there to perform, and I think here
there is increasing confusion between the U.S. mission and the
U.N. mission. The United States had only a part of the U.N. mis-
sion, and the U.S. mission there was to assist in the humanitarian
delivery of food and to help secure the supply lines.

We were going to draw down on a regular basis and also pursue
part of a U.N. mission, which was to begin to make available police
forces so that they could take over the roles of some of the manage-
ment of the environment. So, there had been a process whereby we
would become increasingly disengaged, with the U.N. out of there
by 1995. That was the plan.

Senator Sarbanes. Now, were the other countries putting in
their forces on the assumption or on an understanding that the
United States would play a certain role, continue to play a certain
role in Somalia?

Ambassador Albright. I think that each one of them probably
came in with different assumptions. They had been recruited by
the Secretary Greneral, who is the one that basically tries to get the
countries to provide. I think they did see the United States as
being there in order to provide that particular duty.

But let me say, Senator, when I reported to the Security Council
about the President's decision to end our part of the mission March
31, every member of the Security Council understood that the Unit-
ed States had made the major contribution through UNITAF and
then subsequently, and they said that they would provide addi-
tional troops.

And Pakistanis have provided additional troops, the Indians, and
the Nepalese, and I think some others. It is not going to be easy,
however.

Senator Sarbanes. How many troops are in there from other
countries in Somalia?

Ambassador Albright. I believe about 30 at this point.

Senator Sarbanes. 30,000.

Ambassador Albright. No, 30 countries. I think there are about
30,000 all together.

Senator Sarbanes. The Security Council then, I take it, accepts
or has a policy consistent with the U.S. plan now to disengage all
of our forces by the end of March?

Ambassador Albright. Well, the Security Council understands
what the U.S. position is. However, the Security Council has not
yet decided about the length of the UNOSOM mandate.

Let me say that on October 31 the UNOSOM mandate comes up
for renewal. The Secretary General has now requested a 2-week ex-
tension of that mandate so that he can return his— whether he
goes to Somalia or not I think is still an open question, but he has
been in the area. He is going to report to the Security Council and
then I think the- Security Council as a whole, as they review the
renewal of the UNOSOM mandate, will make a determination
about the length of time for which to renew it.

Senator Sarbanes. What was the last length of time?

Ambassador Albright. Well, the plan was that we would — when
Admiral Howe came to report the last time, he felt that the U.N.
would be there until 1995, with the idea that the renewals I think
were for every 6 months that the Security Council had to express
its will on how that mandate worked.

We had just mandated that UNOSOM in March, so this was the
6-month review on it.

Senator Sarbanes. Have there been divisions within the Security
Council with how to deal with Somalia over this year?

Ambassador Albright. Not really. I think what has been hap-
pening in Somalia is that the Security Council was very supportive
of the resolution, the transfer of UNITAF to UNOSOM, felt it was
an important transfer, supported us. The Americans wanted there
to be a transfer from UNITAF to UNOSOM, and I think there has
been surprising unanimity. For instance, on resolution

Senator Sarbanes. I think you just ought to, instead of using all
those acronyms, spell out who it was being transferred from and
to whom and what that represented.

Ambassador Albright, UNITAF was an operation that was run
by the Americans. It was American forces there following a U.N.
desire to have U.S. forces there, but it was an American operation.

UNOSOM is specifically a U.N. operation which has its own
mandate in Resolution 814, and of which the United States is an
integral part. That is the difference.

Senator Sarbanes. But the UNOSOM mandate was designed,
was it not, to provide a way over time to disengage the American
forces. Is that correct? Otherwise, we would have had a situation
of having a large number of American forces. What would we have
done with them if we had not arranged the procedure whereby re-
sponsibilities would be shifted over to U.N. forces?

Ambassador Albright. Well, that was exactly the purpose was
to have an orderly transfer from a U.S. operation to one in which
the international community through the U.N. would take over. We
would, in an organized way, draw down our forces, and other forces
from various countries that the Secretary General had recruited for
this would take up the slack and then would move toward the next
phase of trying to get police in there.

This is a moving target. I think that there was a real desire to
keep the train moving here.

Senator Sarbanes. Designed to prevent the reoccurrence of the
very events of starvation and death which led President Bush to
put American forces in in the first place.

Ambassador Albright. Absolutely. And the point here is, and I
think this point should not be missed, that the work that was done
by the U.S. -led force and now the U.N. force has prevented the
starvation of hundreds of thousands of people, and that everybody
acknowledges the fact that that was a vital and viable humani-
tarian operation.

As I said in my testimony, it is sometimes very hard to just sepa-
rate out a humanitarian aspect of it. A secure environment is an-
other part of it. And may I say that it was clear to me when I vis-
ited Somalia that for the most part, except for this part of southern
Mogadishu, it has worked. And those of you that have been there
also know that. So, I think that that mandate is one that is prop-
erly being followed through.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Lugar.

Senator LuGAR. Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Albright, with the
capture of Army WO Michael Durant, many veterans organiza-
tions, the American Legion specifically, have raised an important
point, that the Geneva Convention of 1949 deals with treatment of
prisoners of war. But the Greneva Convention, at least in this par-

ticular instance — the capture of Michael Durant — did not appear to
apply.

The State Department refers to Dursint as a hostage and the De-
partment of Defense as a detainee. Now, would it not be a useful
point of policy for our Nation to obtain an amendment to the Gene-
va Convention that would provide the same rights and protections
for persons captured when serving in U.N. operations. We have
such a situation in Somalia.

Ambassador Albright. I think that is absolutely right, Senator.
And one of the issues the President did talk about was the neces-
sity of having the rights of the Geneva Convention apply.

Again, I think there are a whole series of issues like this which
are new to the situation that the international legal system has to
get up to date with.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that and know you cannot do that
instantly. Yet, I raise it as an important point in terms of your own
leadership in our country so that it can be moved along, because
we now have a whole new class of international conflict occasions.

Ambassador Albright. Absolutely.

The Chairman. Excuse me. I think yesterday this was raised and
I think Ambassador Oakley, I am not sure which witness it was,
said that the prisoners we had, the U.N. had, were being treated
like prisoners of war although they do not have the legal status of
prisoners of war.

Senator Lugar. I understand that, Mr. Chairman, I heard that
and I am pleased to hear that, but at the same time the status of
captured U.S. combatants is important.

Ambassador Albright. I agree.

Senator LuGAR. I appreciate the comment you made to Senator
Helms, that you would be prepared to make a monthly report on
U.N. activities so that the committee can review what has occurred
or to raise questions. There may be months that pass in which not
much happens. Nonetheless, I suspect that will not be the case
given the agenda you have mentioned this morning.

Likewise, on the cost issue which has been touched upon, what
is involved here is a kind of international entitlement program. The
meter is running at 30.4 percent of the peacekeeping account. It es-
sentially becomes an increased liability for us. I think there is an
inexact idea on the part of the committee and the Senate as a
whole as to the obligations that are piling up.

From time to time when we have crises we all become very con-
scious of that. Perhaps as a part of your monthly reports, if that
is to be institutionalized, you might give some idea of what the tab
is, because otherwise the U.S. cost is going to come as a surprise,
and the appropriators will find it very surprising. If they do not ap-
propriate the money and we go further into arrears at the U.N.,
that becomes an international embarrassment for us.

I also want to raise a question that gets back to a complex situa-
tion that might be extremely difficult for you as well as the Presi-
dent to try to work through. In his message on Thursday, October
7, the President indicated that although the U.N. Security Council
had passed two resolutions dealing with nation building and the
capture of General Aideed or other malefactors, that we were going
to move as a Nation unilaterally away from those positions.

The problem that I perceive, and I am certain that you do, ac-
cording to reports of your visit with Boutros-Ghali, was that the
rest of the U.N, was still bound by those resolutions, still on that
track, and that still appears to be the case. This creates a dilemma
because on the one hand the most powerful Nation — the United
States — is on one horse while the U.N. would appear to be on an-
other.

Now, it could very well be that through the administrations of
Ambassador Oakley a cease-fire had occurred and Mr. Durant's
freedom has been obtained. But the reports we are getting are that
essentiallv our forces are hunkered down in the Dunker, in the
compouna in Mogadishu, that they are not out pressing the situa-
tion either in terms of making certain that food is flowing and that
order is obtained.

In other words, their orders are essentially that if attacked, de-
fend yourselves but do not look for trouble and stay out of harms
way. Yet, it appears that the rest of the U.N. mission still contin-
ues on, whatever may be our current predicament.

How is this all going to work out? In other words, our forces are
coming out in some time sequence, that is, some forces are coming
in and others are coming out presently. What happens meanwhile,
and what does the U.N. do? And in your responsibilities in that ca-
pacity, what are you advising them?

Ambassador Albright. First of all, as I mentioned there, I think
that most of the countries that I have dealt with on the Security
Council are well aware of the fact that the United States has borne
the major burden on the Somali issue through the original role that
we played when the Americans were in charge, so as not to use the
acronyms, but they also are there in large numbers doing work
themselves.

It is very important, and I must say again the Security Council
was most interested in hearing my report, about the efforts that
Ambassador Oakley — successful ones that he had made to kind of
kick-start the political negotiating process.

Let me say parenthetically that the last time that Admiral Howe
came to report to the Security Council, which I think was now
about 3 weeks ago, he was asked a number of questions about
where the political process was going. This is not something that
was just on the minds of Americans but others, and he reported at
some length about the number of district councils that have been
set up, and he got pressed by other nations about the necessity to
move that process forward.

It is our optimistic sense at the moment, and you heard from
Ambassador Oakley yourselves yesterday, that that process is in
fact moving and that some of the requirements for an active mili-
tary presence may decrease as a result of the political process mov-
ing forward. We are hopeful that there will be a conference under
various auspices at which the clan leaders will be able to meet.

And if I might again say something parenthetically here, this
concept of nation building is not — it has become kind of a slogan,
but the bottomline is it does not exist in the resolution, and none
of us believe that we can build a nation for anybody. Every country
has to build its own nation. The people within that country have
to do it themselves.

If you read the resolutions carefully, what they say is we will as-
sist, we will promote, we will help, which is frankly what all our
assistance legislation always says. And that particular way of oper-
ating is what we think will continue in Somalia, helped by others,
and the humanitarian programs that go forward.

It is important, I think, for everybody to see the political process
move forward and not have Somalia be an armed camp in perpetu-
ity. So, the UNOSOM mandate goes forward with a real hope that
the military part of this will have to be — can be less and less, not
more.

Senator Lugar. Well, the military part of it I suppose was two-
fold. First of all, we had a large force there to make sure that order
could be obtained while we did the humanitarian feeding. The sec-
ond military mission occurred after the massacre of the Pakistanis
and others, and the reentry of our Rangers and other troops.

It appears to me that we still have some ambiguity. The Presi-
dent has talked about maintaining pressure on the malefactors, at
least in his initial statement. But apparently now, as far as the
United States is concerned, we are not attempting to capture Gen-
eral Aideed. It is not really clear whether all other elements of the
U.N. share that view.

What happens if some elements of the U.N. are afler Aideed
while we are busy trying to start the political process and even
mentioning Mr. Aideed, as Mr. TamofF did at the same table yes-
terday, as a possible participant? I just find this very, very difficult
to work my way through.

Ambassador Albright. With all due respect, sir, I do not think
it is ambiguous in the following way. As we all know, force and di-
plomacy go together. What the President has said is he intends to
maintain military pressure there, which he has done. There is a
Marine amphibious unit that has come in. He has beefed up the
number of troops that we have there, and that is designed to keep
military pressure on. There also are efforts at diplomacy, which is
what Ambassador Oakley is involved in.

It is my understanding that the U.N. is not actively pursuing a
search mission for Aideed because Under Secretary Kofi Anan, who
is in charge of the peacekeeping, said that the cost of it outweighed
its usefulness.

Now, another aspect of what is going on in trying to deal with
this highly complex situation is to live up to Resolution 837, which
does call for a way to hold accountable those that were involved in
the Pakistani massacre. I think, we all think, the U.S. Government
thinks and other members of the U.N. Security Council believe that
you cannot have people shooting up peacekeepers with impunity
because what it does is send a message for peacekeepers every-
where. Therefore, the idea of holding people responsible for that,
accountable, continues.

What is being explored now that is being explored through this
African initiative is the possibility of an investigatory commission
which would assess the responsibility of those involved in it. That
is another way. I mean, frankly, what we are doing is dealing with
the same problem and trying to sort out better ways to do it. I
think that nobody wants to see the loss of life.

The political process has been kick-started bv Oakley. But the
general approach is that the Africans have to begin to deal with
this, and every indication that we have is the President of Ethiopia
and the President of Eritrea as well as leaders of Djibouti and
Kenya are taking hold of this issue with the assistance of Ambas-
sador Oakley and others in the area. So, I do not see an incompati-
bility between the force and the diplomacy on this.

The Chairman. Thank you ven^ much. Senator Dodd.

Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambas-
sador Albright for your presence here today. I just want to empha-
size the last sentence or two of your statement, which I think de-
serves repeating. And that is tnat America will be stronger and
more secure as the U.N. becomes more capable and effective in pre-
venting and ending international conflict. I think that thought is
not unanimously embraced, but I believe it is embraced by most of
us here in the U.S. Senate.

There are some who question that statement, but yesterday we
had a debate before the Senate, and obviously on particular amend-
ments the political outcomes will be determined by many factors.
The fact that by a vote of almost 2 to 1 the Senate rejected the no-
tion that U.S. forces under any and all circumstances ought never
to be under non-U. S. command. I think this is a healthy message,
that we do support peacekeeping, but preferably with forces under
U.S. command.

Maintaining that U.N. peacekeeping role is critically important
if in the post-cold war period we are going to continue to play a
powerful and meaningful role in the world, and if we are going to
have institutions that are capable of dealing with these problems.
So, I just wanted to commend you for that particular comment.

Let me come to a different issue. I have raised this with you in
the past but I gather it is coming to a head next week. The Sixth
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly is scheduled to turn to
the report of the International Law Commission, which includes a
68-article draft statute on the international criminal court. As you
know, I have a deep interest in this and I subscribe to the notion
that in the absence of having some basic, fundamental principles
established in international law, we then function on an ad hoc
basis in many ways.

For example, you have some disagreement over who is the out-
law in Somalia or what are the outlaw elements. We can establish
some basic principles of what is considered by most as outlaw be-
havior, renegade behavior, actions that clearly violate the rights of
people.

If there is some basic body of law to which we can all refer, then
it becomes easier, it seems to me to begin to address some of the
questions that surround peacekeeping. When is it proper and ap-
propriate for peacekeeping forces to take some action? Not that it
establishes this in all cases, but at least it moves us in that direc-
tion.

There are many who have argued, for instance, that had there
been some basic principles of international law in operation at the
end of World War I, the world might have spoken at rather than
watching those basic principles violated piecemeal, ultimately cul-
minating in World War II. I subscribe to the view that, in fact, had

there been more of an ability of the international community to re-
spond we might have avoided the conflict of World War II.

So, I would ask you — and I have raised this with you in the
past — what role will the United States take in trying to promote
progress on this issue? I realize we have not taken a position on
it definitively yet, but I am very interested in what the position
will be of the administration.

Ambassador Albright. Senator, we agree with vou that it is es-
sential for there to be some code here that would assist this in-
creasingly varied group of nations to know how to behave. As you
know, like everything else it is not a simple matter but we are pur-
suing it.

In fact, David Scheffer on my staff here in Washington spends
a great deal of time working on this particular issue so that the
United States will be in a position to be supportive. It will be some-
thing that in principle we very much want to see happen. I can tell
you from experience now up there is that it is interesting how dif-
ficult it is to get agreement on a universal set of anything.

We have now 184 nations within the U.N. There are those who
want very hard, for instance, when we set up a war crimes tribunal
as we are tying to do on Bosnia, to make sure that it is sui generis.
They are always very concerned to kind of put limits around
things.

So, we who believe in universality of human rights and a whole
series of other universal truths want to see something like this
happen, but we do not underestimate the difficulty of it.

Senator Dodd. Well, I appreciate that. I just hope at some point
we will take a leadership role on this issue. It was the leadership
of the United States at the end of World War II that established
the genocide convention. The great irony, of course, was that we
were one of the last nations to ratify it.

Again, I think very legitimate questions about sovereignty and
constitutional law need to be addressed, but I hope our fixation on
those issues would not cause us to miss an opportunity here to es-
tablish some of those basic principles that we have championed for
decades as a Nation. We ought not to miss an opportunity to help
establish some of those principles and thus to clarify the appro-
priate role of peacekeeping.

I was interested on the consultation issue. Let me commend you
for your comments on that today. The only thing I caution you is
to be careful becajuse there has been in my view an absence of ap-
propriate consultation. I am not speaking specifically of you at all,
but I think a lot of the difficulties that we faced in the last few
weeks were because a simple phone call to people saying here is
our problem, here is what we are doing, just did not happen often
enough.

The danger at moments like this is to go to the other extreme
and start making unrealistic commitments. We will be up here
every 3 or 4 weeks for example. We are not going to be able to do
that as often as you think. Filing reports once a month can just be-
come another bureaucratic burden. There is a need for it, but I
would urge you to strike a healthy balance about keeping the ap-
propriate members or committees informed as to where we are
going on this on a regular basis as appropriate.

I think what is needed is some balance rather than institutional-
izing something that can sometimes end up having the
countereffect. It becomes so institutionalized no one seems to pay
attention to it. So, I commend you for your comments on consulta-
tion, but I just urge you to be cautious about going overboard on
it.

Last, if I could, I was intrigued with a recommendation I was
looking at recently regarding reforming the peacekeeping oper-
ations. One of the elements suggested is providing U.N. peace-
keepers with access to timely intelligence. Having read that, it just
sort of struck me to inquire as to what people are envisioning here.

Are we talking about establishing within the U.N. system its own
intelligence operation, or relying on the intelligence data of mem-
bers of the Security Council? What is the current thinking on that?

Ambassador Albright. Well, the question of intelligence is a sen-
sitive one here, as well as at the U.N. We believe that they some-
times do not have timely information on the peacekeeping oper-
ations that they have, and we have in fact assisted them with time-
ly information on what is going on in Somalia through our informa-
tion networks. But this is not something where the United States
would all of a sudden take over the intelligence capability of the
U.N. We are talking about timely information because they have
not had it.

We do now, through a system, assist them in getting timely, on
the ground information about Somalia. But let me just mention as
well, and I want to add this to my opening comments, I think at
moments like this where there is tremendous and appropriate at-
tention being paid to areas where there have been mistakes and
shortcomings, do not let people forget where there have been some
great successes.

Senator Dodd. Senator Sarbanes raised it in his question about
where you think there has been improper involvement. I have
spent a great deal of time focusing attention on this hemisphere,
and but for the U.N. involvement in El Salvador I do not know
where that situation would be today, frankly. It was a herculean
effort that brought together people that I never thought would be
able to sit down and resolve their differences and come up with
some answers, and it is still bumpy along that road. In the absence
of the U.N. involvement there, 70,000 people lost their lives in that
little country, it might still be going on.

I happen to think that in Haiti, while there is appropriate con-
cern about the role of U.S. forces becoming engaged in a dangerous
situation, the fact that the President did not inject those forces
when the dangerous situation presented itself, and the efforts made
at the insistence and support of the United States to come up with
a sequential approach on how we might restore democracy in that
country is something no one ought to apologize for.

In fact it is a demonstration, a success in my view, of how this
can work. So while veiy legitimate questions have been raised
about confusion in Somalia, my fear is that as legitimate as those
concerns are we will lose sight of the success and the tremendous
ability that this approach can have in terms of resolving some of
these questions. And in the absence of doing that, the burden more

73- "^RR n _ Q-5 _ /I

clearly falls on ourselves or others who may not have the same in-
terests that we do in the long or short term.

So, I think that it is important that that be emphasized at a time
like this as well. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thankyou very much. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Kassebaum. Triank you, Madame Ambassador. I apolo-
gize for not being here for your opening statement, we are trying
to health care hearings along with this, but I have had a chance
to read it since I have been nere and I hope everybody takes the
opportunity to read it. I think it is an excellent statement, a clear
analysis oi Somalia, and even then the broader context that you go
into of peacekeeping and our relationship to the U.N. It really is
a very concise, important statement I think.

Senator DODD. I would like to second that. I think it is terrific.

Ambassador Albright. Thank you very much.

Senator Kassebaum. Just a couple of observations, and I believe
you touched on it in response to Senator Helms' question regarding
the differences of roles in peacekeeping, that the United States
would vote for a number of peacekeeping operations but as partici-
pants with our own forces playing a role there have been very few.
The fact is, it is my understanding Somalia and Macedonia are the
two largest operations we have ever participated in with our own
forces. Is that correct?

Ambassador Albright. That is correct.

Senator Kassebaum. In Angola, which is where there is a peace-
keeping effort that played earlier on certainly an important role as
elections were held, I think we have had five observers. El Sal-
vador, which is a success, and Cambodia, a success where we have
had minimal participation. So, I think it is important for people to
understand when you alluded to that, but it is important to reit-
erate the difference in types of participation.

Haiti, and Senator Dodd mentioned that, is an example where I
think it poses some real problems, and I guess I would like to raise
this with you. As far as a commitment, and it goes back again to
Senator Helms mentioning the President as Commander in Chief,
it is something that I feel. The President should not have his hands
tied, nor Congress micromanage.

On the other hand, we will be doing that of course, and we have
the power of the purse as has been endlessly argued through these
arguments. And Haiti I think is a good example where the past
history of the United States in relationship to Haiti should, I think,
have been a warning sign that we are a lighting rod there. But
once a commitment has been made on our part to be a major par-
ticipant, then what kind of signal does it send when we in Con-
gress have some real reservations about that commitment?

Now, true, the President withdrew that when he realized there
were diflTiculties. But I think should there not have been some
point earlier on where before that commitment was made on our
part we took some historical context into account? I would just like
your analysis of that because once a commitment is made then
there are all kinds of other issues that arise and problems for us.

Ambassador Albright. Well, let me say you have raised several
very important aspects in this. I think that what is going on in
other places in these revered buildings is one of those 200 year dis-

cussions about the role of Congress and the role of the executive
branch and the Commander in Chief and all of that. It is one that
I love, I have to say, having taught about it. I love to teach about
it and read about it. I am not sure I love being involved in it, but
it is going on and it is there.

It has become, obviously, more complex as a result of this addi-
tional way of doing business through peacekeeping. I think clearly
the writers of the Constitution, the Founding Fathers, had not
thought through what happens in this kind of multinational world.

I do think that it is necessary for the Commander in Chief to be
able to have control over actions on a day-to-day basis, or we will
not be able to function as the leader that we must be. On the other
hand, I also believe fully that Congress has an essential role to
play, and I must say I appreciate what Senator Dodd said about
not regularizing consultations because I see the real downside of
that.

But I think that we should, and we all welcome the chance to
discuss issues with you more and see where they are coming down
the pike. That would be the only thing, I think, is to alert to the
issues that are coming up.

But I think that in a general way there ought to be a place
where there are more executive-legislative consultations on general
commitments to issues.

Senator Kassebaum. Well, Haiti might have been one.

Ambassador Albright. It might have been.

Senator Kassebaum. Because, again, I am not sure but it seems
to me the past history there, there is a place it would seem it
would be best to draw other nations and be supportive of their par-
ticipation which could have worked better than ours.

Senator Dodd. If my friend would yield, and I give her my time
on this one, I think her point is very well taken. Some of us talked
with Larry Pezzulo, frankly, about these issues, and I have got to
tell you I raised some real concerns about it as well, about whether
or not they are going to be able to reform the Haitian military. It
was a rather optimistic view, frankly, but maybe they could have
done more of it, I think. I think your point is well taken.

Senator Kassebaum. Well, I just raise it.

Ambassador Albright. If I might add, I do think to a great ex-
tent we were being as sensitive as we could to problems of an over-
whelming U.S. presence in the area, the necessity to include the
OAS, and the necessity to have this not be an American military
force.

If I might say, as the President said, Haiti was not a peacekeep-
ing or a peacemaking operation the way it was set up. It was to
be a technical — or the American part there was to be a technical
assistance aspect, to go and help train the military. Therefore we
were, believe me, very sensitive to not kind of overwhelming every-
body with Americans.

Ajid there was again within the Security Council discussion of
this a great point of saying that the OAS was a part of this, that
President Aristide, for instance, in the most recent thing that we
did in the sanctions, had requested it.

But that does not in any way obviate what you say, which is con-
sultations at a certain level.

Senator Kassebaum. Well, I bring it up as an example which on
paper might have looked fine. I think that we realized that as it
is viewed it really looks very different, and then to say there is a
ripple effect of problems that come from that I think is important.

But I would like to go on with the time I have with just a couple
of questions on Somalia. You mentioned also, of course, that the
U.N. mandate on Somalia expires on October 31, and maybe you
addressed it before I came. But could you share with us perhaps
your thoughts on ways that UNOSOM II should be changed, and
if we are contemplating putting forward any different thoughts on
the mandate?

Ambassador Albright. Well, this is something that has just
evolved recently. We are waiting for the Secretary General to re-
turn from the area.

The way that the mandate normally becomes renewed is on the
basis of a report from him. We are beginning some preliminary
thoughts, but I think actually this is a perfect example of where
we might be in closer consultation with you on your ideas for this,
I think.

The idea as I see it, in a preliminary way, is that more and more
be done to transfer from a military to a civil authority within the
area, to really add greater depth to the attempts for the political
reconciliation and the evolution of — this is for the U.N. mandate,
not the United States. The U.N. mandate to help there to be struc-
tures that would allow for law and order, and that is where we
have to concentrate on.

Of course, obviously, a great deal now depends on the success
that the Oakley initiative, along with the Africans, brings.

Senator Kassebaum. Thank you. My time is up, and there are
many questions that we could exchange. I just would like to call
attention to chapter 8 in the U.N. Charter regarding regional ar-
rangements. I believe, particularly in Africa, the opportunity which
exists with ECOWAS, which exists with the OAU, and it says were
that before something is referred to in the Security Council these
regional arrangements should perhaps be strengthened as conduits
to perhaps resolve some of these problems.

Ambassador Albright. Agreed.

Senator Kassebaum. It has never really been implemented. It
has been difficult to get any real participation and strength
through OAU and ECOWAS, but maybe that is coming. Maybe
some time we can explore that.

Ambassador Albright. That is definitely something that we are
doing.

Senator Kassebaum. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Kerry.

Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Ma-
dame Ambassador. I do not want to dwell too much on the past
stuff because I think there have been a lot of clarifications, and I
think it is a different policy today basically.

And I think frankly what is a lot more interesting and, frankly,
important to us is a better definition and understanding of the
process by which we are going to proceed in this new world and
understand better what this concept of peacekeeping, peacemaking,
nation building, et cetera will demand of us and how we are going

to do it. And I think that is where the American people need more
understanding and education.

We are not going to be able to do all of that in the time that I
have, obviously, or in the time we have here, but I do want to ask
a couple of quick process questions that still trouble me because I
think, depending on the truth of what happened or did not happen,
it could be a precursor to problems in the future and I just want
to understand it.

On the Somalia sort of expansion into this UNOSOM II nation-
building strategy, the President has suggested that he was un-
aware of the expansion of the U.N. operation in Somalia, and by
extension the mission that we were involved in. You have, on the
other hand, said very clearly that according to press reports the
White House was well-informed.

The reason I ask this is, obviously, that if there is something in
the process that is not informing the President or if there is some
way in which these decisions are not being fully vetted, clearly that
is something we ought to understand or perhaps you can clarify for
us so that we understand if there are any weaknesses in that proc-
ess.

Ambassador Albright. Well, first of all I believe that the issue
about the President is what he was saying was that he was dis-
turbed by the fact the political process had gone off track. He was
not aware of the extent to which it had gone off track from the mis-
sion that he knew it to be.

He had pressed us to make sure that it got back on the political
track. Secretary Christopher and I met with Boutros-Ghali. The
President himself said that to Boutros-Ghali when he was up there
for the General Assembly, and that he was disturbed by the fact
that it had not moved faster into the political track than he had
wanted.

Senator Kerry. Fair enough. Accepting that, there are reports
that the political adviser to Admiral Howe, John Douglas, in I
think September had negotiated a cease-fire with Aideed, but that
Howe and other UNOSOM officials said no, that they refused to
pursue it. Are those reports true, do you know?

Ambassador Albright. I know only what I have read in the
newspaper on that, and when Admiral Howe was in and reported
to the Security Council there was no indication of that.

Senator Kerry. So, to whatever degree the political process may
have gotten off track, it could have happened at that point and you
may have never known it either. Is that correct?

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

Senator Kerry. Well, I appreciate it.

Ambassador Albright. If I might. Senator, one of the difficulties
of all of these peacekeeping operations is it is difficult to
micromanage them from either the U.S. mission or in the Secretar-
iat. One of the problems is they are out there, the umbilical cords
are

Senator Kerry. Is that an inherent problem in the peacekeeping
effort or is that a current problem of the command and control
structure of the U.N.?

Ambassador Albright. I think it is both. I think that the peace-
keeping effort is a brand new way of doing things, where the peace-

keepers are now being asked to do much more than kind of sit
somewhere between two groups that have agreed to their presence
and who are there literally as a buffer, whereas peacekeepers are
asked to do a great deal more and the links that exist between
them and the peacekeeping operation in New York, which all of us
have said from the beginning needs to be better attuned to the
needs of this very rapidly changing situation.

Senator Kerry. Well, I think I want to impress upon you the
perceptions of colleagues here, which I am sure you do not need to
have impressed on you, but I think it is important to understand
that we are not going to be successful going down the road here
unless there is a better structure at the U.N. for that, tracking and
commanding. I mean, we are just not going to do that. It is evident
in yesterday's turmoil over the Nickles amendment. It is evident in
other emotions that are being expressed.

And for those of us who want these operations to succeed, we
cannot at the same time be sops or excusers of a rather antiquated
or not modem command structure and information flow and intel-
ligence gathering. I think we have really got to work those out be-
cause the interests of this new structure depend on that.

Ambassador Albright. I might say. Senator, in response to that,
that is why I appreciate so much what Senator Dodd had said and
Senator Sarbanes, that there are problems here, there is no ques-
tion about it, but we have to be incredibly careful not to throw the
baby out with the bath water.

There is a need for the U.N. to act in these peacekeeping oper-
ations, and it is up to us to be supportive of what they are and
then to be tough in order to make sure that these issues that you
have raised and the other Senators have raised take place, because
this is a process in the making and we have our opportunity to put
our imprimatur on how things ought to be done.

Senator Kerry. Well, you know what is interesting, it is a proc-
ess in the making, but the more I have been thinking about it in
this last days the more I think it is also not a process in the mak-
ing. I mean, what is new is that we do not have the superpowers
dominating the superstructure of these things. But, frankly, we
have done these things even in the context of the cold war, and we
have had the capacity to resolve these, and we know fundamentally
what has to be done.

In Cambodia, and maybe this is the way to lead into the next
question, you had a political structure. You had a consensus among
parties and within the country itself, and that really helped the dif-
ficulties to be leapfrogged.

In Somalia we had no such political structure, et cetera, and that
begs the question of whether or not you have to be prepared to only
be a buffer until such time as you have achieved that political ca-
pacity to move forward, and that it is easier to sell and safer to
implement if you are exclusively in that sort of buffer situation ver-
sus what we have leaped into in Somalia.

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think it is a genuine question as
to what the roles are. As I said earlier, I went to three peacekeep-
ing operations to see just this, Somalia, the way you just described
it, Cambodia, which is the next step where there was a structure.

and El Salvador which Senator Dodd mentioned which had more
of a structure to work with.

I think clearly it is harder to operate where there is no structure.
The question that I think we all have to ask ourselves is, does that
mean that we do not go in there at all or do we go in there with
some different way of doing things?

And I think here the problem is, and this is why these criteria
are so important and why we are actually pressing the U.N. to look
at criteria, the Secretary General always says there are thousands
of people dying or starving in other places and we are not paying
attention. And the question is, what is the selection process? Which
ones do we do and how?

Senator Kerry. Well, that is where I think there has to be a
greater capacity to set sort of a priority. It is a cruel priority but
it is cruel world, and there are realities of limitations. We are going
to have get more resolute about setting linkages of interest, if you
will, and declaring those linkages of interest up front and trying
to define it.

I have suggested a number of times in the course of the debate
over the last week that we ought to think about — and the more I
do think about it, the more I think it can work — creating a volun-
teer force within our Volunteer Army. We have a Volunteer Army
but it is not strictly speaking volimteers. We had a lot of people
go into it with the assumption the only thing they might ever have
to do is defend the United States of Ajnerica. They are not, per se,
signing on to this broad peacekeeping effort. Therefore, families
have not bought into it and the constituency has not.

But if we said to a lot of people within the military, look, there
is thing within the military called peacekeeping and if you volun-
teer for it that will be your billet and there will be a special under-
standing of how to achieve that.

Thinking back to my own service during the Vietnam period, I
volunteered for Vietnam. A lot of people did, and a lot of people
thought, gee, there might be a war but that is what I am choosing
to experience at that point in time. And for career soldiers it was
particularly attractive because it is the route to command. If you
do not have that experience it is hard to be a seasoned commander.

I would suspect you would have a lot of young Americans bujdng
into the idea that this is a bold endeavor, that this is a way to
serve the world as well as their Nation, and that peacekeeping is
a noble endeavor that they are going to take the risks for, and that
they might move up the command and control faster.

I still believe that must not become an excuse for leaving Con-
gress out or not having the consensus of the Nation. But if you do
build a consensus of the Nation you will greatly facilitate our ca-
pacity to sustain these efforts if the people being injured are choos-
ing to be injured and not against their will being put there.

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think it is a very good idea, one
exceptionally worth following because, and I now — first of all, I
have in my job here spent a great deal of time consulting with the
military. General McAffrey in fact is kind of my JCS military ad-
viser who comes up to New York and we spend a great deal of'^time
talking about peacekeeping. I have spoken at the invitation of Gen-

100

eral Sullivan to his officers on the issue of peacekeeping. Spoken
is the wrong word — exchanged views with all of them.

They see peacekeeping as a very important part of the American
military mission but designate it in a way that people know what
they are doing, your point and I think very well taken.

The other is that the peacekeepers that I have met out there,
and I mentioned this earlier, the men and women in Somalia that
I met with knew that they were doin^ something really important,
and they felt — and even now, after this tragedy, many of them said
that they wanted to continue the job.

Again, a Marine that had been part of the Nobel Peace Prize-
winning peacekeeping operation said that this was a highly impor-
tant part of his military training. I suggested earlier that I think
we need to do more to command those who are operating in peace-
keeping operations, that it does not mean that they are out of the
system, that in fact it helps them in their command structure so
that they are not in effect punished for having taken a sidestep.

And I think your suggestion is very well worth exploring, and it
would make it easier to get support or consensus. So, we would
welcome working with you on that.

Senator Kerry. I appreciate it. My time, I see, is up.

The Chairman. Thank you. I think it is a wonderful idea, and
if you put it in legislative form I would love to cosponsor it.

Senator Kerry. We are working on it. We have a cosponsor al-
ready. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Brown.

Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Ambas-
sador, we do not know whether to be angry with you here or sym-
pathetic with you. It might be a little of both.

You took what I thought was one of the most extraordinary, ca-
pable staffers who had worked for members of this committee,
Frances Zwenig, to be your chief of staff. So, for that we should be
angry with you.

Senator Kerry. I am.

Senator Brown. But knowing how Frances ran her former boss
into the ground, we should be a bit sympathetic. He had not a sin-
gle gray hair when she went to work for Senator Kerry originally.

You have mentioned cost- sharing at the U.N., actually a difficult
subject. My recollection is that we are somewhere in the neighbor-
hood of 22 percent of the world's GNP. What is your view of the
appropriate share of the U.N. operational fund, not peacekeeping
but operations, general operations that we should be bearing?

Ambassador Albright. Senator, I have no specific view on the
percentage, but I do think that we bear too large a percentage.
First of all, the way that the percentages are calculated puts us,
in peacekeeping for instance, somewhere around 31 percent, which
is more than our regular assessment. We have been, through a va-
riety of ways, pressing at the President's direction to lower that
amount and to get there to be a different calculation on the basis
of which those investments are made.

They are made on a 10-year GNP calculation when clearly things
have changed and there are now countries who have increased
their GNP that are not being properly assessed. Part of various re-
ports that have come out have argued for reassessment. We are

101

pressing for that, and believe me it is something that we feel very
strongly about.

Now, one of the reasons frankly that we are also pressing for an
expansion of the Security Council to include Germany and Japan
is we believe that those two countries specifically should be bearing
the larger share of the burden.

Senator Brown. But the 10-year calculation of GNP would not
give us a 31 share, would it?

Ambassador Albright. No, but the peacekeeping is done on a
different basis, calculating on exchange rates. We will send you a
paper on it.

Senator Brown. So, the general maintenance, the general cost of
the U.N. is on a GNP allocation in a 10-year form.

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

Senator Brown. And we pay what, about 25 percent now?

Ambassador Albright. Twenty-five percent.

Senator Brown. And that I assume will be going down. Is that
adjusted automatically each year as we calculated?

Ambassador Albright. No, it is not. That is the problem. It has
not been calculated.

Senator Brown. Oh, it is a historic figure?

Ambassador Albright. Right. So, we are pressing for recalcula-
tion.

Senator Brown. So, your position is that it should be
recalculated on a regular basis?

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

Senator Brown. The peacekeeping allocation, have you a formula
or a proposal in that area other than just to reduce our share?

Ambassador Albright. Well, we are pressing to reduce it. There
is no particular formula, but we believe that at least it ought to be
the 25 percent and not beyond the 25 percent until the 25 percent
is recalculated.

Senator Brown. Your proposal is to base it on the GNP or GDP?
I guess we use GDP.

Ambassador Albright. GDP.

Senator Brown. Does this come for a vote? How is it effected?
Is it a recommendation by the Secretary?

Ambassador Albright. It is something that has to come through
the General Assembly and it is not going to come rapidly, but what
we are pressing for is we have a whole kind of agenda of reform
items that we are looking for at the U.N. We want there to be an
inspector general. We want there to be a reassessment of various
ways that things are done. This is a part of that.

Senator Brown. Is there a point that we take action unilaterally,
that is withhold donations?

Ambassador Albright. Well, there are those who have done
that. Personally, I do not think that is a good idea because then
it ties our hands to take action. As I said, there is a fine line some-
times between losing your credibility and having leverage.

Senator Brown. Would it be fair to say you are studying alter-
natives at this point?

Ambassador Albright. Studying alternatives.

Senator Brown. There has been something written of late which
I think is perhaps part of the operation of a free press about the

102

potential that you had cast votes in the U.N. for the expanded mis-
sion in Somalia that the White House was unaware of or had not
approved.

You dealt with this previously, I think, with Senator Kerry and
others, but just to put it clearly on the record, have you cast any
votes for the United States that did not have the approval of the
State Department and the White House?

Ambassador Albright. Absolutely not. I cast votes under in-
struction.

Senator Brown. The votes in March, and I think there was a
later one that clarified and expanded somewhat the mission in So-
malia, were those ones that specifically you had clearance on from
the White House?

Ambassador Albright. Yes, sir.

Senator Brown. I appreciate that, and I do not mean to rub salt
in the wound but I think it is important to have that on the record.

You mentioned that the mission in Somalia is now clear or is
clear, and I believe that includes maintaining order. My recollec-
tion is that the resolutions at the U.N. in the past were interpreted
at one point as authorizing the apprehension of Aideed and the
capture of weapons in Somalia, that those resolutions have not
been changed, and I am assuming that while the resolutions have
not been changed you are comfortable that the direction to the
forces in the field is different.

Ambassador Albright. Sir, on that I just happen to have the
resolution with me, and that paragraph which specifically states
what the mandate is it is to secure the investigation — this is those
who are responsible — their actions, their arrest, their prosecution,
and their punishment. It does not state any names whatsoever, and
it talks about accountability. That is what this is about. That was
a resolution which we took in emergency session after the killing
of the Pakistanis.

The President has said that while we wish to depersonalize this
particular effort, we must hold accountable those who were respon-
sible, because if we do not hold accountable those who were respon-
sible then you get into the position of having open field day on
peacekeepers.

If I might just make a kind of aside here about the difficulties
of how we personalize foreign policy, what happened during the
cold war is everybody was pretty much aware of who the enemy
was, and even before that we had Hitler, and before that and after
that you had Stalin and you had the Red Menace, and various
ways that were easy enough for the public to deal with.

In the post-cold war world one of the reasons I think that we
have difficulty in mobilizing support for these various actions is
that it is very hard for people to understand what it is that we are
doing in these various places. So, the tendency is, with some of the
rapidity of this news and television, to personalize the enemy,
which is what President Bush did with Saddam Hussein and tele-
vision did with Aideed.

The problem then is if you do not get that person, as we did not
with Saddam Hussein, how do you depersonalize it? And this is one
of the crucial problems in how you mobilize support for policy these
days. I think it behooves us all, and why I always welcome a dialog

103

and I love to give speeches to make clearer what our policy is
about — and by the way, Senator, I am goine to our mutual home
State of Colorado next weekend to give speeches. And I just believe
that it is very important for us to try to explain this new era to
the American public so that we are not always stuck with putting
a face on the enemy and then having problems when we want to
depersonalize it.

Senator Brown. I know you will have a warm welcome there. We
highly recommend speeches during ski season.

Ambassador Albright. That too.

Senator Brown. Mr. Chairman, I have just one thought on the
clarification of the mission, if I could complete it.

The Chairman. Please.

Senator Brown. I guess to put you on the spot, but would our
forces be tasked with arresting Aideed now?

Ambassador Albright. No.

Senator Brown. What about capturing weapons?

Ambassador Albright. At this time tne mission that we have is
we are not a part of the search for Aideed, and as described now
our mission is to be there to assist the logistic mission of making
sure that humanitarian goods are available, and also to protect the
Americans that are there.

Others within UNOSOM are in fact engaged in making sure —
not in disarming but in kind of monitoring tnese weapons caches.

Senator Brown. I appreciate it. Basically, the resolution states
the specific tasks assigned to U.S. forces are somewhat different
now?

Ambassador Albright. And again, sir, something that I think
that we have probably not made clear enough, there is a difference
between the U.N. mission and the U.S. mission as a part of it.

Senator Brown. That is quite helpful, and I might say your testi-
mony today stands in sharp contrast to some we have had from
others recently. And if you ever want to move into the Defense De-
partment you will have many boosters.

The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.

Senator CovERDELL. Thank you, Madame Ambassador. I am
going to be brief, and I may submit several questions in writing.

To follow up both the question of Senator Brown and your com-
ments that we were maintaining a military pressure, I was reading
this morning from Greneral Montgomery. And I will read you this
quote. "But Montgomery also made clear that contrary," and this
is the point I want to make, "contrary to the expectations of many
U.N. officials and much of the American public, the newly commit-
ted 6,600 combat troops will not be given the task of retaking the
streets of Mogadishu," et cetera.

It bothers me that he would say, "contrary to the expectations of
many U.N. officials" at this junction. Why would you think he
would say that?

Ambassador Albright. I am sorry. Senator, but I do not think
I can answer that question. I mean, the way that we understand
that the U.S. forces were there is as backups for the U.N. forces
as a division of labor. I also have to say, and this may be part of
my new skepticism, but I do not always believe every quote I have
read in the paper.

104

Senator Coverdell. I recognize that. That probably ought to be
a caveat that goes with all of us. We have all experienced that.
Nevertheless we all have to use these as a device of information.
It often leads to some clarification and I think that is an interest-
ing statement.

It goes on to explain his description of the mission pretty suc-
cinctly, but I think that is an interesting comment.

Ambassador Albright. I will check into it, sir.

Senator Coverdell. Now, I will not belabor this nor read the
quote that I did yesterday to Secretary Tamoff, but shortly after
the events of early October, the President characterized to Copley
News Service that he did not realize the mission had changed. He
made reference to you as well.

You have been very candid here and direct this morning, this
afternoon too, stating that it was a methodical process. How do you
think that happened? Has he been mischaracterized in terms of
stating that the mission was not clear to him?

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think obviously the President as
the President and Commander in Chief is aware of overall Amer-
ican policy. But this is a process that evolved, and it is my under-
standing from having spoken with him that he is satisfied with the
explanations that he has had about the process and procedure on
this evolution.

Senator Coverdell. That is an important point, a distinction.
Just to share part of it with you it said, and it was to the Copley
News Service, that "the U.N. had changed its mission unwisely,
failed to provide military operation to back up peacekeepers, and
staffed the units with troops untrained for their jobs who refused
to venture outside their areas and refused to take orders."

Now, that is very serious allegations. I spoke to this on the Sen-
ate floor. Then he went on to say, and it says — there is an editorial
comment as well, although this has appeared in several periodicals.
The President also referred to U.N. actions as if he and his U.N.
Ambassador had no role in formulating or approving them.

This in particular was a comment that I thought you do not take
carte blanche, but if this were so it is very serious.

Ambassador Albright. If I might say, what I see as having real-
ly happened on this is that the President was aware of the mission
of the U.N. in Somalia, as what it was, and I will not spend my
time quoting to you, but basically of securing the environment.
This is the U.N. mission, of providing humanitarian relief and
working toward reconciliation.

What happened, and this is where the President said that he did
not feel that we had enough of a role, was that that mission got
off track. And this goes to the other parts of your quote, that there
was not enough attention being paid to the political track of this,
and that what had begun to happen was that seizing Aideed, just
to put that in, had become too dominant and that the political as-
pect of it had not been supported as strongly.

I reported to the President when I came back from Somalia and
told him and others that I thought that what was going on outside
of Mogadishu, that the political process was moving well, but that
in southern Mogadishu there was this kind of operation which was
dedicated to dealing with the violence in Mogadishu.

105

The President asked us, me and others, to make clear to the Sec-
retary General and the Secretariat that we wanted there to be
greater emphasis put on the political track, and we did that. And
I met with the Secretary General, the Secretary of State did. We
did this at a number of lower levels. The President voiced that con-
cern himself when he met with me.

And where I think he felt we were not able to push it enough
was to make sure that that political track was being carried on as
vigorously as he wanted us to in fulfillment of the mandate that
was set out by 814. So, I think it is a matter of emphasis.

Senator Coverdell. I think the whole incident, in addition to
the hope that thousands of people will have been spared a death
by starvation, we have all alluded to that, Somalia probably will
be a historical incident that has a great deal to do with some of
these prospective questions that everybody has been alluding to
here today, not the least of which is the role of Commander in
Chief

I would suggest that some review of the flow of information
might be in order because he is ultimately the Commander in Chief
and bears, therefore, the responsibility for what may happen in the
flow.

Ambassador Albright. I am sure that the President thinks that
also.

Senator Coverdell. I am sure. Madame Ambassador, yesterday
I read this quote to Secretary Slocombe regarding the Clinton
nominee for Assistant Secretarv of Defense for Democratization
and Peacekeeping, from an article that Morton Halperin wrote this
year, 1993, in Foreign Policy on multilateralism.

The quote is, "the United States should explicitly surrender the
right to intervene unilaterally in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries by overt military means or by covert operations. Such self-re-
straint would bar interventions like those in Grenada and Panama
unless the United States first gained explicit consent of the inter-
national community acting through the Security Council or a re-
gional organization."

Now, this is important as it relates to you because it is this new
section in the Department of Defense for peacekeeping, and I am
wondering if you agree with this fairly serious departure from our
current standard or could elaborate on that, £ind how you see your
interaction with this DOD section on peacekeeping?

Now, let me quickly say that Secretary Slocombe said that this
was not the Department of Defense view m his response.

Ambassador Albright. Well, may I say — I mean this is, as I un-
derstand it and the date that you read it, an article that Mr.
Halperin wrote before he was appointed. It is not the view of the
Department of Defense. It is not my view. It is not the view of the
President. It is not the view of the Secretary of State.

What we have said is that there are now any number of ways
that the United States has to deal with the serious problems with
which we are faced internationally, and that when our vital na-
tional interests are threatened we do not exclude any means. We
are there. We will have unilateral means when they are appro-
priate as we did. For instance, the more recent one that I was in-
volved in was when we decided that we had to take some action

106

against Baghdad after it became evident that there had been an as-
sassination attempt on Mr. Bush. And, therefore, unilateral means
are the means that we will use when we see that our vital national
interests are threatened.

Where I think we need to look at is under what circumstances
are multilateral means an appropriate tool for the United States to
use in the fulfillment of our national interests. I think we will find
that there are circumstances where international multilateral
means are useful. And again, let me cite something very recent —
Haiti.

In the last week, because we are very concerned about the fulfill-
ment of the Governor's Island agreement in Haiti, we believed that
it would add strength if the international community were mobi-
lized in support of that action. So, we first had a resolution of the
U.N. reimposing the sanctions, and sanctions are most effective
when they are multilateral. And then another resolution in which
we were able to get multilateral enforcement of those sanctions so
that now the American ships have been assisted by Canadian, Ar-
gentinian, and British I think just saw most recently, so that the
interest that we have, and we do have interests as mr as Haiti is
concerned that have to do with the restoration of democracy, pro-
tection of our people, and trying to make sure that there is not an
outflow of refugees, that American interest is strengthened by the
presence of a multilateral action.

So, my view and those of the President, the Secretary of State,
and the Defense Department are that we take unilateral action
where it serves our interests best, and that multilateral action is
an available tool to pursue American interests.

Senator Coverdell. I appreciate your clarification, and I also
join with the others in complimenting you on the definitive opening
statement. I thought it was a very thoughtful document and will
lead to a lot of meaningful discussion.

Ambassador Albright. Thank you very much. Senator.

Senator Coverdell. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ambassador Albright. I
share those thoughts and congratulate you on your statement.

I have a couple of further questions. Following up on Senator
Kassebaum's reference to the OAU, I believe that the role of re-
gional organizations in settling disputes is an important one. I am
curious what your own thought was, whether the OAU would play
a role in Somalia.

Ambassador Albright. Senator, first of all one of the things that
we have worked on at the U.N. is to get regional organizations
more involved in cooperation. That is true of Haiti with the OAS.
As far as some of the issues in Nagorno-Karabakh we have been
talking about the CSCE, the Minsk process.

And also there is very much the attempt to get the OAU involved
in Somalia. President Meles is, I believe, now Vice Chair of the
OAU, and there are regional African interests there, but also the
OAU specifically. Also, ECOWAS and OAU have been instrumental
in Liberia and in the western Sahara, so every attempt is always
made to try to share the burden with the regional organizations.

The Chairman. On a completely separate matter, but I believe
you are familiar with it, could you tell us what can be done to keep

107

the Cambodian mine action center that has been in charge of the
demining activities in Cambodia for the last several years? I under-
stand that the expatriate military staff is being pulled out.

I am just curious what you saw onsite because obviously there
is a huge danger to the population if thev are pulled out.

Ambassador Albright. Absolutely. The issue here, I think any
number of you as well as we have said that we see in Cambodia,
the UNTAC is a major success for the U.N. and therefore for all
of us, and most of all for the Cambodian people who are however
concerned about not just kind of leaving there. And the United
States is specifically interested in having an initiative to pursue
the demining, and we are working very hard on making sure that
the demining process continues and that there are funds for it.

The Chairman. Is there any possibility you might raise this with
the Secretary General to extend the funding and authority at least
on a temporary basis until a longer term solution can be worked
out?

Ambassador Albright. We have. We have talked to him about
that. We have talked about any number of kind of post-UNTAC ac-
tivities and getting different countries, a larger group of countries,
involved in the post-UNTAC activity in Cambodia. We have. We
will press that.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. The record will be kept
open for 2 days and we thank you very much, indeed. We now ad-
journ.

Ambassador Albright. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

Responses of Mr. Tarnoff to Questions Asked by Senator Brown

(October 19, 1993)

Question. Sunday's (October 17, 1993) Washington Post led off with a story by Ann
Devroy and Jeffrey Smith entitled "Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under
Siege." The first paragraph states that at 8 am. on last Sunday:

" * * * as far as the U.S. action was concerned, Somalia was all over but the
leaving."
The story goes on to explain that by later in the day the message had "turned to
fog." The result was eventually the President's current Somalia policy — a heavy
build-up and then a puU-out on March 31st.

Before this fast-paced reordering of U.S. policy in Somalia last week, what had
been the U.S. plan?

Had a puUout date been set?

Answer. Our involvement in Somalia has never been an open-ended commitment.

Before the President's October 7 speech, we had planned to reduce our logistics
force by 50 percent to around 1,400 troops by December 31 and to withdraw the
remaining logistics troops during 1994. As circumstances permitted, we planned also
to remove our combat troops — the Quick Reaction Force — offshore and eventually
out of the region.

We had not set a deadline for troop withdrawal before the President's speech.

Question. In selecting the current pull-out date, what criteria were used?

Answer. The President and his nulitary advisers believe that 6 months is a rea-
sonable time in which to achieve the objectives he outlined to the nation on October
7.

We also wanted to be sure that UNOSOM can plan appropriately for our depar-
ture by turning over the functions our military now performs to other countries or
to private contractors. Six months offers enough time to accomplish this.

As the President noted, there is no guarantee that Somalia will be without prob-
lems after March 31st. However, this is sufficient time for the Somali people to
make reasonable progress toward the reconciliation so necessary to their country's
future.

Question. What caused the initially-selected early pull-out date to lengthen into
5 additional months — ESPECIALLY after the initial engagement promised by the
Bush Administration was for a 30-60 day commitment?

Answer. The reference to an "early pull-out" date is unclear. With the exception
of the logistical troops, there never has been a set date for withdrawing any of the
U.S. forces.

A limited number of U.S. forces remained in Somalia after completion of Oper-
ation Restore Hope to participate in a U.N. -led operation. U.S. forces remained in
Somalia beyond the initial period projected when Restore Hope began because it was
clear that their presence was required to fulfill the mission's objectives. The U.S.
troops accomplished this mission.

Question. What effect would accelerating the pull-out by 2 months have had?

Answer. An accelerated pull-out would raise serious problems.

First, accelerating the pull-out from March 31 to January 31 would increase the
difficulty of ensuring a smooth hand-off to the United Nations. There simply would
not be enough lead time to identify troops to replace the U.S. and get them into
position inside Somalia.

Second, it also would increase the difficulty of supporting the political reconcili-
ation process. This is part of the mission President Clinton outlined to the nation
on October 7.

(109)

110

Question. Secretary Tamoff mentioned that the "Somali people help themselves
in fashioning a lasting political solution to their civil conflict, and to produce a se-
cure environment to enaole the free flow of humanitarian aid."

Can this mission be achieved by March 31, 1994?

Answer. There is no guarantee that the Somali people can resolve their dif-
ferences before U.S. troops withdraw. However, we think that there is a reasonable
chance that the Somahs can make progress toward a lasting political settlement.

Question. What is the difference between what has been achieved to date and
what will be achieved by March 31, 1994?

Answer. We are hopefiil that the Somalis, helped bv others including the U.S.,
will have made major progress toward a lasting political reconciliation.

In addition, our expectation is that the U.N. will have made considerable progress
toward its major goals, including establishment of the district and regional councils
and revival of the police and judicial systems.

Finally, by March 31, we will have withdrawn U.S. troops.

Question. What is the role of U.S. troops between now and March 31, 1994?

Answer. U.S. troops will be escorting supply convoys and helping to keep supply
routes clear. They wUl also continue carrying out their force protection and heli-
copter supply operations.

U.S. logistical supply troops will continue to perform their functions both on and
off the four U.S. compounds in Mogadishu.

These tasks are consistent with the policy President Clinton outlined on October
7.

Question. Will life in Somalia be normal after April 1, 1994?

Answer. We can only speculate about Somalia's future.

Outsiders can help them revive their economy and civic institutions but it will be
up to the Somali people to prevent their country from sliding back into the chaos
that prompted the original international intervention.

We think our policy will offer them signiflcant help toward that end.

Question. I am very concerned with the mission objectives, or the lack thereof,
with respect to the Somalia operation. In fact, I believe that the historic debate that
took place last week in the Senate was more about our frustration with our ever-
evolving, always murky mission objectives in Somalia.

Could both of you please state for this Committee, what exactly is our mission
in the remaining few months of our mission in Somalia?

Answer. As outlined in the October 13 report on Somalia issued by President Clin-
ton, the mission of the U.S. troops in Somalia is to "assist in providing a secure en-
vironment to enable the free flow of humanitarian relief by providing U.S. military
logistic services to UN forces."

We also have provided "U.S. combat units to act as an interim force protection
supplement to U.N. forces in emergencies."

Question. Have all American troops been accounted for in Somalia?

Answer. No U.S. troops are unaccounted for.

Responses of Mr. Tarnoff to Queotions Asked by Senator Pressler

Question. What role have you and the Secretary of State played in the decision-
making process in Somalia?

Answer. As Under Secretary for Political Affairs, I have assisted the Secretary of
State in following developments in Somalia since the beginning of the Clinton Ad-
ministration. Senior Administration officials, and the Secretary of State, have al-
ways been deeply involved in the Somalia policy process.

The Administration is strongly committed to ensuring that the Congress is fully
consulted on Somalia and other foreign policy matters. In this vein, I testified before
the Congress on July 29, and welcome future opportunities to work closely with the
Congress.

Question. Did the State Department play any role or make any recommendation
to the Defense Department against sendmg additional armor to Somalia, as re-
quested by the U.S. Commander there and recommended by Central Command?

Answer. The Department of State made no such recommendation to the Depart-
ment of Defense.

Question. What role does the National Security Council have in general? And
what specific role has the NSC played with respect to Somalia?

Answer. The National Secunty Council plays an essential coordinating role, en-
suring that all the viewjaoints and perspectives of the agencies with a role in na-
tional security and the formulation of foreign policy are reflected in the policy-mak-
ing process.

Ill

The NSC has coordinated the Administration's Somalia policy process. The Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Ambassador to the United Nations, and their key
deputies have all participated in the formulation of U.S. policy in Somalia. The Prin-
cipals and Deputies Committees have deliberated and reached decisions on various
aspects of U.S. Somalia policy during the past several months.

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Pell

(October 20, 1993)

Question. Could you provide a detailed account of our attempts to involve the
OAU in the resolution of the Somalia crisis?

Answer. Although the OAU and other outside parties made numerous but unsuc-
cessftil attempts to end the fighting in Somalia in 1991-1992, the OAU generally
has had a limited role in Somalia. It lacks the resources (staff, communications, etc.)
to mount the type of operation required to resolve a complicated situation like the
conflict in Somalia. Thus, while we have encouraged the OAU to play a helpful role,
we have looked to the United Nations to assume most of the burden. As recognized
in Security Council Resolutions 751, 794, and 814 we nonetheless have supported
the United Nations' decision to work with the OAU and other regional organizations
in the search for peace.

Since early 1992, we have had an extensive series of diplomatic contacts on the
Somalia question with the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the principal mem-
bers of the OAU's Standing Committee on the Horn of Africa. Since mid-July, the
importance we attach to the active involvement of both governments has increased.
Our continuing interest in working with the states of tne region has been under-
scored recently by President Clinton, who asked Ambassador Oakley to worii closely
with the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments in the effort to re-energize the rec-
onciliation process in Somalia.

In addition to our frequent contacts with Ethiopia and Eritrea, we remain in regu-
lar contact with the senior officials of the OAU Secretariat, including the Secretary
General, and with this year's chairman of the organization. President Mubarak of
Egypt. President Clinton anticipates a full discussion on Somalia with President
Mubarak during his visit in late October.

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Feingold

un trust fund for somalia

Question. Please describe the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia.

— When was it created?

— What is it to be used for?

— How much money is in it?

— Who contributes to it?

— Are there any conditions on the contributions?
Please submit for the Record the amounts each donor has contributed and to
which countries the money has been disbursed.

Answer. The Somalia Trust Fund was authorized by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 794 of December 1992 and formally established by an agreement
between the U.S. and the UN on January 29, 1993. The Fund was to be used to
help pay some of the costs for developing nations to participate in UNITAF, the
U.S.-led operation President Bush initiated in December 1992 to guarantee the safe
delivery oi food and medicine to the Somali people. Reimbursement was authorized
to help pay U.S. incremental costs for support oithese countries resulting from their
participation in UNITAF; in addition, the Fund authorized direct payment to these
developing nations for their incremental expanses relating to:

• transportation of military forces to, from, and within Somalia;

• food and clothing for these military forces;

• vehicles, equipment, spare parts, and petrol;

• goods and services.

On September 22 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 865,
which welcomed contributions to the Fund for the additional purposes of reestab-
lishing the Somali pwlice, penal, and judicial systems. To date, Norway has contrib-
uted $1 million to the Fund for the Somali police program, and the U.S. has given
$6 million for the judiciary. The U.S. and UN are in the process of actively soliciting
contributions from other nations.

112

On October 6 the Somalia Trust Fund Committee, comprised of representatives
from the United States, Japan, and the United Nations, met to determine the status
of claims submitted against the Fund thus far. Some claims were reduced because
the expenses were not reimbursable; in other cases, claimants were asked to submit
additional documentation by November 15. Nigeria and Turkey have not submitted
any claims, but may do so before November 15. Once claims have been settled and
final payment has been made, a surplus is expected to remain, which we propose
using toward paying for the reestablishment of the Somali police. Japan has indi-
cated it would consider this after all claims have been settled.

A complete Ust of donors, amounts contributed, claimants, and amounts paid to
date follows.

List of Donors to Somalia Trust Fund

„,,;„. Amount contributed

'*'"'•" (US dollats)

Antigua $500

Austria 1,000,000

Brunei 100.000

Denmark 1,000,000

Finland 677,295

Iceland 50,000

Ireland 115,000

Japan 100,000,000

Korea (South) 2,000,000

Malaysia 50,000

Philippines 5,000

Singapore 25,000

UNITAF subtotal 105,022,795

Norway 1,000,000

United States 6,000,000

Police/judiciary subtotal 7,000,000

Interest 322,000

Grand total

112,344,795

List of Claimants to Somalia Trust Fund

Nation Amount claimed

Amount paid to date

$11,253,288

$3,474,753

15,280,063

6,624,712

54,053,459

17,000,000

3,589,432

1,000,000

1,279,250

1,100,000

27,541,015

987,454

250,000

Botswana

Egypt

Morocco

Pakistan

Tunisia

United States

Zimtwbwe

Total 113,983,961 56,991,350

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Quections Asked by Senator Lugar

UN peacekeeping funding

Question. According to the Christian Science Monitor U.N. peacekeeping and
peacemaking commitments in the current fiscal year are expected to be about $4.4
billion. We contribute about 31% of this amount through our assessed contribution.
This will amount to more than 10% of our entire foreign operations budget (e.g.,
10% of $12.9 billion). This cost does not include the cost oT deploying American rehef
forces in Somalia and Haiti which would drive the $4.4 billion figure much higher.
Moreover, arrearages from previously assessed contributions for peacekeeping are
being carried forward and this is more than $1 billion.

We are in effect, paying for the U.N. peacekeeping activities of other countries in
places that have little or no direct national security interest to the United States.

113

— Shouldn't the U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping be made throu^ vol-
untary contributions, rather than throu^ assessed payments, so that the Congress
can judge the necessity of each operation?

— Is this the best use of our scarce resources?

— In a time of budget shortages, should the President be making such costly com-
mitments to the U.N. without weighing the impact of diverting scarce funds from
other programs in the budget?

Answer. Experience has shown that exclusively voluntary funding of peacekeeping
operations cannot provide the assured financing that most nations view as nec-
essary for deployment of their troops.

The Department is instead pursuing a combination approach by which host coun-
tries and those who benefit (such as for operations in Cyprus and Iraq/Kuwait) as-
sume large parts of the costs and thereby reduce the gross amount payable throu^i
assessments by the U.S. and other member countries.

It costs us less to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations than to go
it alone. Our national security is dependent on a democratic world order and inter-
national peacekeeping and peacemaking bring order out of chaos. We recognize
there are competing demands for resources, but we believe this is a cost-effective
use of our scarce resources.

Question. Is the State Department taking steps to see that the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions will be applied to U.N. peacekeepers? (And I don't just mean
Americans, but anyone engaged in a peacekeeping mission.)

Answer. Yes. We have insisted that peacekeepers be accorded at least all the pro-
tections offered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In Somalia, peacekeepers were de-
tained illegally, in violation of Security Council resolutions. We demanded their im-
mediate release.

Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, which applies to internal
armed conflicts such as that in Somalia, requires humane treatment and that the
wounded and sick be collected and cared for. It prohibits violence to life and person,
humiliating treatment, and extrajudicial punishments.

We share your concerns about the attacks and use of force against aU persons en-
gaged in U.N. peacekeeping operations. We are examining further the application
of the Geneva Conventions to U.N. peacekeepers. Proposals, including a proposed
convention, to clarify international law or establish any necessary new law concern-
ing the protection of personnel engaged in peacekeeping and other operations, have
been formally presented in the United Nations. We support the goals underlying
such proposals and will be an active participant in the future consideration of this
important subject.

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Helms

PROPOSED observer MISSIONS

Question. Could you please address the status of observer missions for the com-
mittee, as well as the difierence between an observer mission and a peacekeeping
mission? Has the United States ever vetoed a proposal to upgrade an observer mis-
sion to a full-scale peacekeeping mission?

Answer. There are currently 18 UN p>eacekeeping missions mandated by the UN
Security Council. A list of those missions is attached.

— A number of additional peacekeeping missions have periodically been pro-
posed to address particular problem areas, but none are now under active
consideration by the Security Council.

• Sixteen of the current 18 missions are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter, which allows UN mission personnel to monitor and observe, but does
not allow them to use armed force, except in self-defense, to fiilfiU their mis-
sions.

— However, the personnel deployed in the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia and
the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and Croatia (but not in Macedonia, which
is Chapter VI) are authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which
allows them to use armed force, if necessary.

— In some of the 16 missions, the tasks of monitoring and observation are car-
ried out by military units, usually of battalion size. In other cases, such as
in Liberia and Georgia, observers operating individually or as small teams
perform these tasks.

• The U.S. has never formally vetoed a proposal to change the authority of an
ongoing peacekeeping operation from a reliance on Chapter VI to a reliance on
Chapter VU.

114

— Resolutions of that nature are rarely brought to a vote if it is known in ad-
vance that they will not be approved.

CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
Africa

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

Established: April 29, 1990; Personnel: 348 (30 U.S.).
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM H).

Established: May 30, 1991; Personnel: 69 (0 U.S.).
UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) (Chapter VII).

Established: April 24, 1993; Personnel: 26,112 (2,821 U.S.).
UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

Established: December 16, 1992; Personnel: 6,498 (0 U.S.).
UN Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR).

Established: June 22, 1993; Personnel: 81 authorized (0 U.S.).
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Established: October 5, 1993. Personnel: 800 authorized (0
U.S.)

(Note: UNOMUR and UNAMIR will become one mission in December).
UN Military Observers in Liberia (UNOMIL).

Established: September 22, 1993; Personnel: 650 (330 military, 320 civilian) re-
quested.

Americas

UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

Estabhshed: May 20, 1991; Personnel: 363 (0 U.S.).
UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIHAT).

Established: September 23, 1993; Personnel: 1,267 authorized, to include ap-
proximately 600 U.S. Sea Bees and military trainers.

Asia

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP),

Established: January 5, 1949; Personnel: 39 (0 U.S.).
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Established: February 28, 1992; Personnel: 9,354 (32 U.S.).

Europe

UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

Established: March 4, 1964; Personnel: 1,076 (0 U.S.)
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (former Yugoslavia).

Estabhshed: February 21, 1992; Personnel: 25,612 (584 U.S.).
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

Established: August 24, 1993; Personnel: 88 authorized (0 U.S.).

Middle East

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

Established: 1948; Personnel: 220 (17 U.S.).
UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (UNDOF).

Established: May 31, 1974; Personnel: 1,071 (0 U.S.).
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Established: March 19, 1978; Personnel: 5,215 (0 U.S.).
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

Established: April 9, 1991; Personnel: 367 (15 U.S.).
Note: Personnel data is as of September 30, 1993.

NATO WARNING TO THE SERBS

Question. Serbian military attacks against the beleaguered capital of Bosnia con-
tinue. In response, NATO airplanes have increased low level sorties over Serb posi-
tions in Bosnia. Yesterday, Secretary Christopher stated that NATO is considering
the implementation of its threat to protect the city by military force.

— Is the United Nations supportive of air strikes against Serb targets?

— What would the United States do if any of these low flying NATO planes were
shot down?

Answer. Under the terms of its August 9 decision on the use of air strikes in re-
sponse to the strangulation of Sarajevo or other areas in Bosnia, NATO would seek
initial authorization for the use of air power from UN Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali. There would not need to be any formal Security Council action.

115

Should the decision be taken to implement air strikes, the U.S. and participating
NATO Allies would be prepared to take whatever steps we deemed necessary and
appropriate to protect our aircraft and their crews.

CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA

Question. Two weeks ago Assistant Secretary Oxman came to the Committee to
brief on the status of peace negotiations in Bosnia. He reiterated the administra-
tion's willingness to commit tens of thousands of U.S. troops to Bosnia to enforce
a peace settlement but was rather vague about any other U.S. policy options in the
region.

— Is the United States considering committing U.S. forces to Bosnia, either in a
multilateral context or unilaterally, for any reason other than enforcing a peace
settlement?

— Will any additional forces be dispatched to Bosnia, including for humanitarian
reasons, without Congressional authorization?

Answer. As previously indicated, the U.S. is prepared to participate in implement-
ing the August 9 NATO air strike decision should circumstances warrant. We have
no plans to send ground forces to Bosnia for any purpose other than implementing
a fair and viable Bosnian settlement.

In his recent letter to Senators Mitchell and Dole on Bosnia, President Clinton
stated that it would be helpful to have a strong expression of support from the Con-
gress prior to the participation of U.S. forces in implementing a Bosnian peace ac-
cord. The President added that for this reason, he would welcome and encourage
Congressional authorization of any military involvement in Bosnia.

RUSSIA

Question. I understand that just last ni^t the Security Council approved an ob-
server mission to Georgia. This is the second United Nations observer mission to
that country.

I consider this a major step toward United Nations involvement in the former So-
viet Union.

The Russian Foreign Minister himself has asked for United Nations support and
funding for Russian peacekeeping while stating at the same time that these oper-
ations are necessary because Russia is "losing geographical positions that took cen-
turies to conquer."
— What is the Administration's response to Foreign Minister Kozyrev's request

that the United Nations underwrite Russian peacekeeping?
— WUl the Administration support and fund Russian peacekeeping operations in

the former Soviet Union?
— Is the Administration contemplating any other peacekeeping operations in the
former Soviet Union? Would the U.S. military serve any role in these oper-
ations?
— Is Russia capable of being a neutral mediator or is peacekeeping a means to

bring former Soviet republics back into the Russian fold?
Answer. With respect to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), the Se-
curity Council, in resolution 858 on August 24, 1993, authorized dispatch of 88 ob-
servers to monitor the cease-fire agreement reached between the Republic of Geor-
gia and Abkhaz separatist forces on July 27. No new observer mission was created
by the Security Council resolution of October 19.
— Four UNOMIG military observers and four civilian support staff members had
arrived when the fighting initiated by Abkhaz forces in violation of the cease-
fire agreement caused UN deployments to be suspended.
— We support a continued UNOMIG presence in Georgia. However, the Security
Council is considering changes related to UNOMIG's mandate and deployment
in light of changed circumstances on the ground.
On the more general question of peacekeeping in the New Independent States, we
are aware of the Russian proposal, the essence of which is that the international
community would make voluntary financial contributions to peacekeeping oper-
ations in the New Independent States carried out by Russia and Russian-led coali-
tions. In return, Russia would accept UN oversight and act only with the consent
of all parties concerned.

We are prepared to consider carefully the proposal and are seeking clarification
of a number of issues related to it.

Because of current financial circumstances, it is unclear how much, if anything,
the U.S. could contribute to a voluntary fund.

116

There are UN and CSCE efForts underway to find a resolution to the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh and to work for an eventual political reconciliation in Tajiksitan.
The CSCE is also engaged on the ground both in Georgia and Moldova.

In the absence of cease-fire agreements it is premature to consider peacekeeping
operations.

We do not anticipate U.S. military personnel serving in peacekeeping operations
in the New Independent States.

We believe a Russian peacekeeping role in former Soviet republics could be con-
structive, and we would consider supporting such a role, under certain cir-
cumstances: if such a role is desired by the parties to the particular dispute; it is
carried out under the principles of CSCE and the UN Charter; and it is based on
maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the New Inde-
pendent States.

UNOSOM II EXTENSION

Question. On October 31, the mandate for UNOSOM II (the peacekeeping oper-
ation in Somalia) expires. The UN Security Council will review the mandate and
move to renew, extend, or modify the broad sweeping scope of the Somalia mission.
The U.S. has expended over $1 billion in Somalia, in support of all the combined
operations— UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II. The Administration, as I un-
derstand it, has not recruested any reimbursement, credit, or offset against the UN
assessment to the U.S. for 30.4% of the total cost of operation.

• With this in mind, I want to know, as the United States Permanent Represent-
ative to the United Nations, will you support the extension of UNOSOM II
without change?

• WiU you use this opportunity to force a reevaluation of the expansive nature
of the mission statement?

• Will you use your Security Council veto to insure UNOSOM II complies with
the President's criteria?

Answer. The U.S. Government supported an interim extension of UNOSOM II to
November 18; no substantive changes were addressed in this exercise.

Now that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has returned from Africa, the Security
Council is engaging in an intensive discussion of UNOSOM II. The U.S. has advo-
cated that the Resolution extending UNOSOM II take into account new realities
and has encouraged the UN to focus its attention on a specific number of realisti-
cally attainable oDJectives.

We will work to ensure that UNOSOM's mandate meets the President's guide-
lines. I would not like to speculate at this point on vetoing the renewal of UNOSOM
II's mandate.

HAITI SANCTIONS

Question. United Nations sanctions against Haiti have oscillated between posi-
tions of "on again" and "off again" over the last few years. United States businesses
who have been attempting, in good faith, to comply with these United Nations sanc-
tions, have been whiplasned between these differing policies. U.SAJ.N. policy dic-
tates that they not cooperate with the Haitian junta. However, U.S. pohcymakers
have encouraged U.S. businesses to be prepared to support our policy of rebuilding
the Haitian economy when the political tension abates. The situation is untenable
for U.S. companies who are caught between U.S. policymakers on the one hand and
the Treasury Department, specifically the Office of Foreign Assets Control, on the
other.
— What are you doing to insure that the impact of U.N. sanctions on Haiti do not
unfairly penalize U.S. companies that are attempting to comply with ever-
changing U.S./U.N. -policies?
— Have you and/or will you raise this issue with the Secretaries of State and

Treasury?
Answer. UN sanctions on Haiti have contributed significantly to our foreign policy

foals in Haiti. They apply to all U.N. member states and do not unfairly penalize
I.S. companies.

The United Nations Security Council imposed limited economic sanctions on Haiti
on June 16, 1993 to compel the de facto authorities of Haiti to negotiate in good
faith to restore the legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The
sanctions played a key role in convincing the Haitian parties to conclude the Gov-
ernor's Island Agreement, in which they committed themselves to take the specific
steps necessary to restore democracy to Haiti.

Broader Organization of American States sanctions on Haiti were in place long
before the U.N. iniposed sanctions on petroleum products and arms. U.N., OAS and
U.S. sanctions on Haiti were temporarily suspended after progress in implementing
the Governor's Island Agreement, then reimposed when that progress faltered. We

117

have consistently viewed Haitian sanctions — and supported them — not as an end in
themselves, but as a means of promoting a political objective: the restoration of de-
mocracy to Haiti.

My staff and their colleagues at the State Department in Washington have
worked with the Treasury Department to ensure that U.S. companies are aware of
the U.N. sanctions regime and are able to comply with the least disruption possible.
We look forward to the Haitian parties' compliance with the terms of the Governor's
Island Agreement, and the subseqruent suspension, then lifting, of the multilateral
and bilateral sanctions on Haiti. We also look forward to the vital contribution the
American business community can make to the reconstruction of Haiti once a politi-
cal settlement there is consolidated.

PEACEKEEPING COST

Question. Ambassador Albright, for fiscal year 1994 peacekeeping operations, we
owe $545 million (more) than has been appropriated by Congress. Projections are
that, if the United Nations continues to spend money on peacekeeping operations
that have already been approved, the United States government will owe ONE BIL-
LION DOLLARS more than has been appropriated tms fiscal year.

How does the Administration intend to pay the ONE BILLION DOLLAR U.N. bill
for which Congress has not appropriated any money?

Could you provide the committee with a summary of your plan for paying this
bill — do you intend to request a supplemental? — do you intend to submit a resassion
request to offset funds from some other account? — do you intend to transfer fiinds
appropriated for foreign assistance?

Answer. The President signed on October 27 the FY 1994 State Department Ap-
propriations bill which provides $402 million for contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities. This means we will face major shortfalls in FY 1994, and
significant funding obligations in the years ahead.

We share your concern about this issue. I can assure you that under the leader-
ship of the White House interagency efforts are underway to address this funding
shortfall, but we do not yet have a final plan.

Obviously we will need to work closely with the Congress on a variety of ap-
proaches to meeting these important obligations. We also are working with the UN
on necessary reforms in how peacekeeping operations are conducted, managed and
funded.

Responses of Ambassador Albright to Questions Asked by Senator Pressler

reducing peacekeeping assessments

Question. Madame Ambassador, as you well know, the United States is obligated
to pay approximately one-third of all costs associated with United Nations peace-
keeping activities. Tne formula used to determine this extraordinary amount was
established in the 1970s, when the United States was disproportionately wealthier
than fellow UN member-nations. Times have changed. The United States remains
an economic giant, but she does not stand alone. Our peacekeeping assessment
needs reflect these changing times. So I was very pleased to hear President Clinton
call for a re-evaluation oi UN peacekeeping assessments. I stand ready to assist him
in this effort.

What was the Secretary General's response to President Clinton's request for a
re-evaluation of f>eacekeeping assessments?

How will the State Department and the U.S. mission pursue this mission?

Answer. The UN Secretary General does not, as a matter of course, respond to
statements made by member states in the General Assembly. Moreover, a decision
to change the peacekeeping assessment rates can only be made by UN member
states, not by the Secretary General.

We face an enormous challenge in convincing other UN member states to take on
higher assessments for peacekeeping in order to offset the reduction for the United
States. We are woricing closely with other member states in the General Assembly
(particularly with the Contact Group composed of other countries making a signifi-
cant contribution) to identify possible modalities and formulas for effecting change
as soon as possible.

SUPPLEMENTAL PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

Question. The U.N. Secretariat submitted to the 48th General Assembly a pro-
posed peacekeeping support budget of $32 million. This budget is to finance, for the
remainder of 1993, all administrative costs at the U.N. Headquarters in direct sup-

118

port of peacekeeping activities. It is my understanding that many of the expendi-
tures in the proposed peacekeeping support budget are unrelated to peacekeeping.
In other words, the U.N. may be attempting to inflate our nation's legal obligations
to the U.N. In other words, we would be required to pay 31.7 percent of those ex-
penditures of which we normally would pay 25 percent.

On September 27 of this year, I sent a letter to you, asking that you investigate
this matter and take all steps to ensure that any proposed peacekeeping support
budget fund only those activities that support peacekeeping operations. I have yet
to receive a response.

Are you aware of this peacekeeping support budget?

Do you and your staii at the U.S. mission have reason to believe that there are
non-peacekeeping activities that would be funded under this peacekeeping support
budget?

Do you recall my September 27th letter? What actions have you taken to ensure
that the support budget funds only peacekeeping-related activities?

Has the U.S. mission taken any position on this support budget?

Answer. The Department is aware that a proposal of this type was suggested
within UN working committees. The Department has been calling for the UN pro-
vide proper support for peacekeeping operations but is, at the same time, insistent
that only costs related to UN peacekeeping support be included in this account.

The profwsal, when it is t£iken up by the relevant committees will receive close
scrutiny. Since it has not yet been formally taken up, the Department has not tdten
a formal position on this item.

We have received your September 27th letter and are preparing a thorough re-
sponse.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. I am very concerned about the chain of command in UNOSOM II, and
any other peacekeeping operations that utilize American forces. In the case of Soma-
lia, U.N. forces and U.S. lo^stics forces are under the command of a Turkish Gen-
eral, General Bir ("Beer"). However, American combat forces are under the com-
mand of General Montgomery. This creates an interesting, if not perplexing, chain
of command problem. General Montgomery must take orders from the Pentagon,
and ultimately, the White House. However, he and his troops are part of a multi-
national unit that must also take orders from U.N. headquarters in New York.

What is the administrative relationship between General Bir and General Mont-
gomery?

When the UN sends orders to General Bir to utilise U.N. peacekeeping forces, are
U.S. forces obligated to participate in such activities?

If there is a disagreement between General Bir and General Montgomery on the
use of U.N. peacekeeping forces, who ultimately has the final say on how U.S.
troops are utilized?

Could you explain the succession of events that caused the command and control
in New York not to authorize Pakistani and Malaysian peacekeeping forces to come
to the aid of U.S. combat troops pinned down in Mogadishu for up to 12 hours on
October 3?

Answer. General Montgomeiy has two jobs. He serves as both Commander of U.S.
forces in Somalia and as Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II. In the former capac-
ity, he reports directly to General Hoar, Commander-in-Chief of Central Command
and through the latter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
of Defense, and the President. In the latter role, General Montgomery repwrts to
General Bir, the Commander of UNOSOM II.

The only U.S. military personnel that are normally under UN operational control
are those in logistics units. Even these forces are also subject to separate, U.S.-only
chain of command. All U.S. combat forces are under a strictly U.S. chain of com-
mand, answering to General Montgomery in his capacity as Commander of U.S.
Forces in Somalia.

The UN does not command U.S. combat forces. U.S. combat forces may be placed
under the operational control of a UN force commander on a case-by-case basis at
the request of the UN, but only upon approval by the U.S. chain of command. Gen-
eral Bir's decisions result from directives from the UN Secretary General and the
latter's representative in Somalia, Admiral Howe, and are discussed with national
contingent commanders, including his deputy. General Montgomery. The UN com-
mander, in consultation with the United States, may direct non-combatant U.S. lo-
gistic units in their mission of supporting UN units.

In all cases, the U.S. reserves the right to cease participation in UN peace oper-
ations.

119

The Rangers were returning after their mission had been completed when their
helicopters were shot down. Within twenty minutes after the helicopters were
grounded, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force responded. The Quick Reaction Force per-
sonnel were on the way to assist the Rangers when they, too, came under attack
and had to withdraw.

General Montgomery then decided to request assistance from the Italian, Paki-
stani, and Malaysian troops serving in UNOSOM II. However, unlike the Quick Re-
action Force (which has rapid response capability) it takes more time for these
UNOSOM II troops to respond, assemble, and assist troops in distress. The situation
was complicated by the fact that the UNOSOM II troops had to fight their way to
the scene, at night, through a densely populated section of the city.

The decision was made by General Montgomery to authorize Pakistani and Ma-
laysian forces to come to the aid of U.S. combat troops, and the Pakistani and Ma-
laysian troops fully participated in that mission.

73-388 O - 93 (124)

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

3 9999 05982 037 1

ISBN 0-16-043333-9

9 780160"433337

90000

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "U.S. participation in Somalia peacekeeping : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, October 19 and 20, 1993"

See other formats