The valor of ignorance, with specially prepared maps

HE VALOR

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

T^fTJUY <L*

y

THE VALOR
OF IGNORANCE

BY

HOMER LEA

WITH SPECIALLY
PREPARED MAPS

NEW YORK AND LONDON
HARPER 6s BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

Copyright, 1909, by HARPER & BROTHERS.
Printed in (he United States of America.

TO
THE HON. ELIHU ROOT

LIST OF CHARTS

CHART I F«***i9a

CHART II 252

CHART III

CHART IV 2?°

CHARTS V AND VII 27*

CHART VI 276

CHART VIII 296

CHART IX 3°o

CHART X *O2

CHART XI 3°6

PREFACE

THIS book was partially completed just sub-
sequent to the signing of the Portsmouth
Treaty. But it was put aside in order to allow
sufficient time to verify or disprove its hypotheses
and conclusions.

In all but inessential details it remains as orig-
inally written. Succeeding events have so con-
firmed the beliefs of that time that I now feel justi-
fied in giving the book to the public.

H. L.

March, 1909.

INTRODUCTION

BY

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ADNA R. CHAFFEE

LATE CHIEF-OF-STAFP, UNITED STATES ARMY

To THE AUTHOR:

Hail! — The Valor of Ignorance!!

AFTER careful reading of the manuscript, we
believe that when it is given publication it
will greatly interest public officials, National and
State, as well as the mass of intelligent citizens in
private life, who have not hitherto had arranged
for them a series of pictures equal in importance
to the collection that is to be found in the twenty-
one chapters of this book.

We do not know of any work in military literature
published in the United States more deserving the
attention of men who study the history of the
United States and the Science of War than this —
The Valor of Ignorance. And, as the government of
the United States is "Of the people, for the people,
and by the people," it is quite in order to invite

xi

INTRODUCTION

citizens who control in military matters of the na-
tion, as they do in other important national affairs,
to "know thyself."

The popular belief that the United States is free
of opportunities for invasion is all "tommy rot,"
if allowable to use an expression that we think more
apt for our purpose than elegant in style. Briefly,
and to the point — no nation offers more numerous
opportunities for invasion by a foreign nation than
does the United States whenever cause therefor is
sufficiently great to induce preparations by any
other nation that will beat aside our resistance on
the sea. The world is a grand stage whereon are
many players. In the game of cards called "poker,"
the straight flush, headed by the ace, is occasionally
held by one player. It wins. In the course of time
no one knows when or how soon, the family of na-
tions may get to playing at cards, and beyond the
sea, perhaps, will be found a "full hand" against our
three "aces" — the Navy, Coast fortifications, and
the Militia.

Our mobile Army is so ridiculously small in the
World's War game that it amounts to nothing better
than a discard! What will the Militia do under
circumstances when, in the game of War, as in the
game of poker, there is a call for show of hands — the
very time in the game when " I. O. U." will not have
the value of coin? Rush into the jaws of death?
Let all who believe in the value of Militia for war

xii

INTRODUCTION

turn to the preface you have chosen for Volume II.
We quote it here, to save the trouble of doing so :

"Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies
of modern ^war, as well for defence as offence, and
when a substitute is attempted, it must prove
illusory and ruinous.

" No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary
to resist a regular force. The firmness requisite for
the real business of fighting is only to be attained
by constant course of discipline and service.

"I have never yet been a witness to a single in-
stance that can justify a different opinion, and it is
most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of
America may no longer be trusted, in a material
degree, to so precarious a defence.

"WASHINGTON."

It is with no lack of appreciation of the military
enthusiasm and skin-deep experience which the
organized Militia of the country has that we quote
this passage from Washington, for every little effort
helps. But who does not know that the sentiment
for cohesion that enables the Militia organizations
to " keep in the swim " is chiefly the social sort rather
than the sterner sentiment — duty to the Nation?
So, as Washington's observation had reference par-
ticularly to the condition of soldiery that results
from a levy of volunteers, under our present system
of raising armies for war purposes, we are justified

xiii

INTRODUCTION

in saying that his words are as true to-day as when
penned. They were true then and will be true until
the time when the author of the sentiment shall be
no longer affectionately regarded as a man who
would not deceive his countrymen; as one who
wisely advised of future dangers out of his great
experience and his true appreciation of the natures
of men.

We do not find that Washington was an advocate
of coast-defence fortifications to anything like the
fad of to-day. The few he had were useful then, just
as the many we have now are useful, to divert the
enemy to wayside landings — not very hard to find
then, nor impossible to find now.

So when the enemy attempts to invade the United
States he will land, for such is the power of nations
now for the offensive, unless the Almighty who hath
power greater than he to control the waves of the
sea opposes relentlessly his efforts; and when that
time comes, as come it may, nothing short of mobile
armies, trained to discipline in service, can prevent
an enemy's occupation of lines of supply and, as a
result of such occupation, quick capitulation of
any city of first rank in the United States, plus its
fortified places; this, too, the fate of any such city
in the world. Why, therefore, divert more millions
of money to ineffectual use when we have enough
coast-defence works now ? Possibly one excuse for
further construction may be, as was said by a military
genius interested in the defence of his country:

xiv

INTRODUCTION

"Coast-defence fortifications served well two pur-
poses :

"r. To preserve, and make progress from ex-
perience, the science of manufacturing large guns.

"2. For testing the skill of military engineers."

When we arrive at the conclusion that it is a mis-
take to rely upon untrained, undisciplined men for
serious war operations (all our war history can be
cited in proof that it is so), we have not far to look
and find what seems to be the popular reason for
such reliance since the Nation has become a grand
factor in the world. It is because the Nation is
wonderfully rich in natural resources and artificially
made wealth — so great a Crcesus that it can afford
to pay, at all events it seems willing to pay, for the
extravagance in money and life which follows on
occasions of war and left-handed business, as reg-
ularly as night follows day.

The popular belief in our country that money is the
controlling factor in war needs to be materially
shocked and greatly modified. The better senti-
ment would be — and it is a national harm that it is
not so now — all men and women in love with
military service, obligatory in peace and war!

The shades of night are not yet so dense as to shut
from memory the recollection that certain states,
having small treasury accounts and poor credit,
fought near to bankruptcy wealth much superior to
theirs. Thus, an example at our door where great

xv

INTRODUCTION

wealth was no scarecrow to men of courage when
long-standing causes (real or fancied) for war arose.

No Hague Conference could have stopped that
conflict, based, as it was, on limitation in opposition
to expansion of the rights of a race.

The second part of your Book I treats of problems
provocative of war so evidently within the realm of
exalted wisdom for correct solution that the citizen
and state legislator will serve his country best by
following the advice of statesmen charged with that
vision which comprehendeth the American universe
and its glory.

The best way to determine whether an apple is
sweet or sour is to eat it. Only thus can one de-
cide what at sight is a doubtful condition of the
apple.

The several chapters of Book I we regard as in
the category of " gradual approaches " to obtain view
of the Apple to be found in Book II, which the
reader should attentively examine and determine
the flavor of, through close study of the text and
maps.

It is quite probable, because of the very general
indifference throughout the country for things
military, which serves excellently to heighten the
ignorance of the purpose for and value of armies
to nations, many readers will find the apple to have
a neutral flavor, and in the valor of their ignorance
will answer your well -prepared practical demon-

xvi

INTRODUCTION

stration of our actual and possible military situations
in their usual way: "Just let 'em try it and you'll see
what we can do."

The statesmen and the technically informed
will more likely pass in review one of Napoleon's
maxims: "The frontiers of states are either large
rivers or chains of mountains or deserts. Of all
these obstacles to the march of an army, the most
difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come
next, and broad rivers occupy the third place."

We can think of nothing better suited with which
to end this letter than the following quotation from
a page of your book: "Nations, being but composite
individuals, all that which moves or is part of an
individual, in a larger sense, moves or is part of a
nation.

"To free a nation from error is to enlighten the
individual, and only to the degree that the individual
will be receptive of truth can a nation be free from
that vanity which ends with national ruin."
Yours truly,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE, .
Lieutenant-General, U. S. A., Retired.

INTRODUCTION

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL J. P. STORY,

U. S. A., RETIRED

" '"THE Valor of Ignorance " is the striking title
1 of a most remarkable book by Homer Lea.
The title, however, does not indicate the scope of
the undertaking, which is a military work that should
be carefully read by every intelligent and patriotic
citizen of the United States.

The book consists of two parts — the first made up
of philosophical deductions, founded upon the un-
changing elements of human nature as established
by historical precedent.

Man in his evolution from primitive savagery has
followed laws as immutable as the law of gravitation.
No nation has long been permitted to enjoy the
blessings of peace, unless able to safeguard such
blessings by force of arms. The richer a nation may
be in material resources, the more likely it has been
to fall a prize to a more militant people. The con-
tinuous enjoyment of peace and national indepen-

xix

INTRODUCTION

dence has always cost dear, but is well worth the
price.

A few idealists may have visions that, with ad-
vancing civilization, war and its dreadful horrors
will cease. Civilization has not changed human
nature. The nature of man makes war inevitable.
Armed strife will not disappear from the earth until
after human nature changes. Words extolling
peace are worthless for national defence, and a too
clamorous gospel of peace may paralyze the best
efforts to meet our military necessities.

The most persistent lovers of peace, since the his-
torical period, have been the Chinese. China is now
reaping the logical reward of "peace at any price."
It is a subject nation, its destiny controlled by
alien Manchus, and its fairest possessions ravished
from its littoral.

The most Christian nations of Europe have for
several centuries, in Asia and Africa, exacted tribute
as mercilessly as did the robber barons of the Middle
Ages.

A Century of Dishonor shows that the United
States have seized from an unwilling people nearly
every foot of their soil.

The United States, within ten years, have ruth-
lessly suppressed in the Philippines an insurrection
better justified than was our Revolution of glorious
memory. This insurrection was inspired, from the
Philippine point of view, by a passionate aspiration
to be freed from the domination of a people alien in

xx

INTRODUCTION

language, customs, and religion; yet it was impos-
sible for the United States, in honor, or in the inter-
ests of humanity, to avoid the action taken.

The second part of Mr. Lea's book consists in
making a logical application of the principles de-
duced in the first part to the United States under its
present conditions. If the data published by Mr.
Lea be correct, and there seems to be no reason to
question its substantial accuracy, Germany could,
if it has sea supremacy in the Atlantic, land within
two weeks two hundred and fifty thousand troops
on our eastern coast.

Japan now has sea supremacy in the Pacific. In
the event of war, that supremacy could not be
challenged until after we had constructed a suf-
ficient fleet of colliers. Japan can within three
months land on the Pacific Coast four hundred
thousand troops, and seize, with only insignificant
resistance, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles.

A barrier of mountains and deserts makes the
defence of the Pacific Slope an easy matter against
attack from the East, and only from that direction
could the United States hope to recapture its lost
territory.

Never has there been on this earth so rich a prize,
now so helpless to defend itself, as the Philippine
and Hawaiian Islands, the Panama Canal, Alaska,
and the States of the Pacific coast.

Mr. Lea has lived in the Orient and carefully

xxi

INTRODUCTION

studied it. He sees clearly the menace of the
"Yellow Peril," yet it is less than sixty years since
the United States went to the uncharted shores of
Japan with an olive branch in one hand and in the
other a naked sword. Then was removed the lid
of Pandora's box with the enthusiastic approval of
the American people.

It is very remarkable that the author should
have so just a conception of the true value of coast
fortifications in the general defence of the country.
The sole function of such fortifications is to defend
a port against direct naval attack. Against an
enemy powerful enough to land, the coast fort
has no defensive value, and may even prove an
element of weakness, as did Port Arthur to Rus-
sia.

Not the least of Mr. Lea's service to the country
is in his republication of the solemn warnings of
George Washington against the employment of
militia in war. Within the last one hundred and
twenty -five years disaster and humiliation to our
arms have fully confirmed Washington's judgment.

The system of organization in the militia is the
cancer which destroys its usefulness. It is futile to
hope the militia may by a change of name escape
the curse of its inherent inefficiency.

Mr. Lea shows clearly that we are confronted by
conditions which may imperil our national security,
peace, and welfare. No candid mind, who carefully
reads Mr. Lea's book, can draw any other conclusion.

xxii

INTRODUCTION

It is to be hoped this book may arouse a public
sentiment throughout the country which will lead
to a full and serious consideration of a problem
which should no longer be ignored.

J. P. STORY,
Major-General, U. S. A., Retired.

BOOK I
THE DECLINE OF MILITANCY

AND THE

CONTROL OF
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

" . . . As a principle in which the rights and interests
of the United States are involved . , . the American
continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered
as subject for future colonization by any European
power. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the
amicable relations existing between the United States
and those powers to declare that we should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety. MONROE."

THE
VALOR OF IGNORANCE

THE diversity of man's beliefs is as wide as the
uncounted millions that have been or are now
cluttered upon earth; enduring no longer than a
second of time, yet in that brief and broken moment
doubting, affirming, denying. It is this unstable,
widening difference in the viewpoint of man that has
filled the world with so much contention and error;
the setting up and tearing down of so many transi-
tory ideals, the making of fallible laws, constitutions,
and gods.

Truth, outside of the exact sciences, can only be
approximated. The degree to which that approxi-
mation approaches completeness depends upon the
exactitude of empirical knowledge and freedom
from error in deductions, which means, principally,
a freedom from antipathies or attachments.

Under such limitations we are to write this book.
So the reader, for the time being, must also put

3

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

aside his hates and desires, since that which we are
about to write will arouse his passions, support or
rage according to his view-point. If he is not equi-
table his prejudices will distort, these unwelcome
truths and leave undiscovered the fount of their
bitterness.

A man who wishes to be just or seeks after per-
fection has no immutable sentiments of his own,
but will make, as far as possible, the mind of man-
kind his possession. Calmly he looks upon the
world; upon all its transitory institutions, and his
passions are aroused in no manner. He preserves
for all mankind the same regard and consideration.

The just perusal of any work demands such a state
of mind, and requires a temporary obliteration of
such preconceived ideas as have, through their un-
disturbed sway over his mind, become prejudices or
attachments.

In this book many conditions may be met that
will appear impossible or unbelievable, since they are
contrary to what has heretofore been held up as
perfection. When certain beliefs, though false or
dangerous, pass to the stage of national fetichism
they often become invulnerable even to the shafts
of truth itself.

Of the few virtues that appertain to or are emana-
tions of mankind in the aggregate, patriotism is fore-
most in being universally impersonated and put to a
wide variety of uses ; turned to all degrees of roguery.
When it becomes a national fetich, virtue goes out

4

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of it. Under its borrowed cloak crimes are not only
committed, but nations betrayed and given over to
pillage; hence the truth of the old statement, that
in patriotism rogues find their final refuge.

Besides being the subterfuge of rogues, patriotism
is divisible into three forms : two that are false and
— common; one that is true and — rare. The com-
monest of the accepted forms, also the most errone-
ous, is to be found in uncompromising and general
contempt for all nations, together with an inveterate
prejudice against some one of them. The next or-
dinary and false form shows itself in vainglorious-
ness, whether over great deeds or greater crimes;
the condoning of national faults or their concealment
by the exaltation of this fetich worship.

True patriotism would rot away if its exemplifica-
tion lay only in contempt or prejudice toward others.

To inspire pride it is not necessary to arouse
hatred.

In peace, and not in war, is the time to judge the
worth of a man's or a nation's patriotism. Those
who are indifferent to their country's welfare in
peace will be of no use to it in time of war: while
those who make it a practice to rob the public ex-
chequer of its virtues, as well as gold, or to condone
such thievery, are, during warfare, so delinquent in
patriotism as not to be removed from the sphere of
negative treason.

Patriotism in its purity is a political virtue, and
as such is the antithesis of commercial vanity. To

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

boast of a nation's wealth, under the delusion that it
is patriotic, is to commit a crime against patriotism.

To boast does not liquidate the debt of duty.

As patriotism does not hibernate in the time of
peace, it is by no means difficult to discover the true
patriot from the false. He is made noticeable by
two characteristics causing him to stand out from
among other men. And though he may be humble
and unknown, yet these two virtues make him pre-
eminent even among those who are vain of their
honors and wealth.

To die for one's country, while not less patriotic
than to live for it, is by no means as beneficial. But
it is in this proposal to die in battle that cowards,
rogues and treasonable men find subterfuge befitting
their evil practices. When, in peace, men postpone
their patriotic activity to a time of war, their pro-
crastination is only indicative of their worthlessness.

As it is impossible after death to distinguish the
coward from the hero, so in national defeat dis-
tinctions cannot be made as to the cause of it. The
world and the victor take no note of post-bellum
explanations. For a nation to suffer defeat through
unpreparedness is, to all practical purposes, as bad
as though it were through cowardice on the field.
In consequence, the man who opposes, in time of
peace, suitable preparations for war, is as unpatriotic
and detrimental to the nation as he who shirks his
duty or deserts his post in time of battle.

To those who have within themselves the spirit of

6

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

true patriotism, this book will appeal with a passion
peculiarly its own, for it is not other than an emana-
tion of their own thoughts. To those in whom it
arouses wrath we would suggest that if they will look
to the origin of their feelings they will find that what
they have heretofore regarded as patriotism is not
even the sham of it.

The third matter of importance that the reader
should bear in mind as he makes his way through
this book, attendant with many doubts and perhaps
much passion, is not to set up the transitory fabrica-
tions of man against conditions that are eternal
because such ephemeral works exist in his time.

National existence is not a haphazard passage of
a people from an unknown beginning to an unfore-
seen end. It is not an erratic phantasm of dreams
that has fallen upon the sleeping consciousness of a
world; but is, on the other hand, a part of life itself,
governed by the same immutable laws.

No state is destroyed except through those avert-
ible conditions that mankind dreads to contemplate.
Yet nations prefer to evade and perish rather than
to master the single lesson taught by the washing-
away of those that have gone down before them.
In their indifference and in the valor of their igno-
rance they depart, together with their monuments
and constitutions, their vanities and gods.

II

IN the works of many philosophers, the birth,
growth and decay of nations is made analogous
to the life history of individuals, wherein they pass
from the cradle to manhood, expanding in intellect,
accumulating vigor and strength until, in due time,
they grow old, die and are forgotten, down in the
deep, vast ossuary of time.

This similarity in the lives of men and nations is in
actuality true, although it should not be precisely so.
As the body of man is made up of volitionless mole-
cules allowing the natural course of age, disease and
decay to destroy it, the body politic of a nation is an
aggregation of rational beings, atoms supposedly
possessed of the ability to reason, and who should,
if they are obedient to laws governing national
growth and deterioration, prolong the existence of
a nation far beyond the years and greatness ordina-
rily allotted to it.

The analogy, however, contains this melancholy
truth: that only so long as a man or nation con-
tinues to grow and expand do they nourish the
vitality that wards off disease and decay. This
continuous growth and expansion in human beings

8

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

is their childhood, youth and manhood; the gradual
cessation of it, old age or disease; its stoppage —
death. But among nations, though the progress and
consummation are identical, we take but little note
of it and name it not at all.

As physical vigor constitutes health in the in-
dividual, so does it among nations, and it is ex-
emplified by strength among them as in mankind.
A brilliant mind, a skilful hand has nothing to do
with the health or duration of life in the individual,
so neither has mental brilliancy compositely taken,
as in a nation of scholars, anything to do with the
prolongation of national existence.

The duration of life in an individual is determined
by his power to combat against disease, age and his
fellow-men, resulting in the gradual elimination of
those possessed of least combative power and the
survival of those in whom these qualities are best
conserved. So it is with nations. So it has ever
been from the first dawn, when protoplasmic cells
floated about in a pallid ether devouring one an-
other, and so in the last twilight shall these same
cells, evoluted even beyond what man now conceives,
pass into endless night.

The beginnings of political life are not hidden ab-
solutely from us, and though there is no exactitude
in our knowledge, we are nevertheless cognizant of
the fact that at one time, when primitive man lived
in continuous, individual strife, there occurred,
somewhere in the sombre solitudes of a preglacial

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

forest, what has proven to be to mankind a mo-
mentous combat. It was when the brawniest
paleolithic man had killed or subdued all those who
fought and roamed in his immediate thickets that he
established the beginning of man's domination over
man, and with it the beginnings of social order and its
intervals of peace. When the last blow of his crude
axe had fallen and he saw about him the dead and
submissive, he beheld the first nation; in himself
the first monarch; in his stone axe the first law,
and by means of it the primitive process by which,
through all succeeding ages, nations were to be
created or destroyed.

Wars — Victory — a nation. Wars — Destruc-
tion— dissolution. Such is the melancholy epitome
of national existence, and such has it been from the
beginning of human association until to-day. From
the time, six thousand years past, when the wild
highlander rolled down from the mountains of Elam
and moulded with sword and brawn the Turanian
shepherds into the Chaldean Empire, until within
the last decade, when the Samurai of Nippon rose out
of their islands in the Eastern Sea and carved for
themselves a new empire on the Continent of Asia,
there has been no cessation nor deviation from this
inexorable law governing the formation and extinc-
tion of national entities.

All kingdoms, empires, and nations that have
existed on this earth have been born out of the
womb of war and the delivery of them has occurred

10

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

in the pain and labor of battle. So, too, have these
same nations, with the same inevitable certainty,
perished on like fields amid the wreckage and cin-
ders of their defenceless possessions.

As physical vigor represents the strength of man
in his struggle for existence, in the same sense
military vigor constitutes the strength of nations:
ideals, laws and constitutions are but temporary
effulgences, and are existent only so long as this
strength remains vital. As manhood marks the
height of physical vigor among mankind, so the
militant successes of a nation mark the zenith of its
physical greatness. The decline of physical strength
in the individual is significant of disease or old age,
culminating in death. In the same manner deteri-
oration of military strength or militant capacity in
a nation marks its decline; and, if there comes not a
national renascence of it, decay will set in and the
consummation shall not be other than that sombre
end which has overtaken the innumerable nations
now no more, but who, in the vanity of their great-
ness, could conjecture the end of time yet not the
downfall of their fragile edifices.

An analysis of the history of mankind shows that
from the fifteenth century before Christ until the
present time, a cycle of thirty-four hundred years,
there have been less than two hundred and thirty-
four years of peace. Nations succeeded one another
with monotonous similarity in their rise, decline and
fall. One and all of them were builded by archi-

ii

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

tects who were generals, masons who were soldiers,
trowels that were swords and out of stones that were
the ruins of decadent states. Their periods of great-
ness were entirely coincident with their military
prowess and with the expansion consequent upon it.

The zenith of these nations' greatness was reached
when expansion ceased. As there is no stand-still
in the life of an individual, so neither is there in the
life of a nation. National existence is governed by
this invariable law: that the boundaries of political
units are never, other than for a moment of time,
stationary — they must either expand or shrink.
It is by this law of national expansion and shrink-
age that we mark the rise and decline of nations.

Expansion culminates, or, in other words, nations
begin to decline with the subordination of national
to individual supremacy. When the debasement of
this formative capacity of empires is complete, the
state is given over to devitalizing elements — social
and economic parasites. It is in these, valorous with
fat pride, that the nation takes its final and in-
glorious departure, as did its predecessors, forever
from mankind.

The hunt for old empires has now become the pas-
time of solitary men who find on the willow-fringed
banks of rivers only a mud mound and a silence;
in desert sands, a mummy and a pyramid; by the
shores of seas, a temple and a song. The shattered
signs of kingdoms are but few, for most of the van-
ished empires have in their departure remitted to

12

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

posterity neither broken marbles, teopali, Alhambras,
nor Druid stones. In the manner of nomads they
have gone away and left no sign of habitation in the
sands behind them.

Theorists, in contradiction of this view, with un-
conscious superficiality bring China out of the mists
and mystery of her antiquity and present her as a
nation created and enduring in endless peace. Such
observations, unfortunately, only betray the profun-
dity of their ignorance. The law of national ex-
pansion or shrinkage has governed the development
of the Chinese Empire with the same inexorable
invariability as it has that of nations in the West.

Not only does the history of the political develop-
ment of China resemble the history of the remainder
of mankind, but has, perhaps, within itself the sol-
emn prophecy of the world's political future. China,
from the obscure hour of its deep antiquity until
modern times, has worked out its own advancement
and civilization in no way benefited by other civiliza-
tions of the world. Yet China, in its political evo-
lution and expansion, has been subject to all those
elements, those periods of physical vigor and de-
terioration, such as have controlled the destinies of
the separate successive nations that have thundered
so loudly in the Occident. China, like every great
empire, is made up of the cleavage and multipli-
cation of political units, alternately decadent and
renascent through the unnumbered years of its ex-
istence.

13

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

When the brawling Elamite mountaineers came
down from their high places and founded the
Chaldean Empire on the plains of Mesopotamia,
there were, in what is now the Chinese Empire, a
number of political units surrounded on the north,
south, and west by less civilized peoples. The state
upon which the present empire was founded was a
small kingdom on the loess plains of Shensi. From
this primitive state has been developed the vast
empire we now watch crumbling and falling away
from its former greatness in a manner wherein time
is less the vandal than the childish vanity of man.

The cycles of decay and renascence that mark the
development of this race have, in cause and effect,
been homogeneous, though thousands of years have
separated a portion of them. This homogeneous
expansion can be compared to the still waters of a
lake where a cast stone causes to extend outward
in widening sphere a series of ripples with inter-
vening spaces. In this manner has been marked the
evolution of the Chinese race from the time a small
splinter of them was cast thither by the hand of
Panku. Each ripple marks a cycle of development,
each depression a period of decadence, similar in
every characteristic except their widening sphere.

The inexorable law of combat has governed in all
its various phases the development of the Chinese
Empire. Its political evolution, in a manner no
different from that of European nations, has been
through the battle-field. The edifice of its greatness

14

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

has been builded by no other than those who have
fought its wars. Of the twenty-five dynasties that
have ruled over China, each was founded by a soldier
and each in due time heard from surrounding armies
the melancholy taps of its approaching end.

The reasons for and the conditions contributing to
the long continuance of the Chinese Empire, while
other kingdoms almost as great have survived the
erosion of time but a generation in comparison to
the ages through which it has passed and grown
great, are apparently unknown in the West. The
beliefs ordinarily expressed have nothing whatever
to do with it. They are fanciful, speculative or
otherwise, but worthless. The Chinese as a people,
their laws or customs, have had nothing to do with
the preservation of their nation against the wearing
away by time or that wilfuller element — man.

The preservation of the Chinese race for these
thousands of years has been due solely to the nat-
ural environment wherein the race began its na-
tional growth; an environment ramparted by in-
accessible mountains, moated by uninhabitable
deserts or seas as shipless as they were vast. On
the north and northwest are the deserts of Gobi
and Shamo; beyond these, the impenetrable forests
of Siberia and steppes where rests a gloom that is
white. On the southwest is the Roof of the World
and the blue-black gorges of the Himalayas. On
the south, jungles and the Indian Ocean. On the
east is the vast and lonely Pacific, a purple solitude

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

through which only a few years ago the ships of
man found their way.

Until the nineteenth century China was as secure
in her isolation as if illimitable space intervened be-
tween her borders and the nations of Europe. To
the rest of mankind China was only the mythical
Kingdom of Cathay, situated somewhere on the
jewelled banks of Eastern seas.

The Chinese, therefore, and their system of govern-
ment have had nothing to do with the preservation
of their race. Isolation alone has been responsible
for its continuation through the storms of more than
fifty centuries. Had the Celestial Kingdom been
surrounded by other powerful nationalities, as were
European and Central Asian Empires, ancient and
modern, it would have gone down in due time as
they did and now be but a memory hidden away in
the old tales of the tribes of man.

In six cycles of decadence China has fallen into
such sick corruption and internal desolation that
Xenophon's Ten Thousand could have conquered
the whole of it. But, fortunately, when China sank
into these periods, of national decay there were none
to attack her but the elements, her own hungers, or
the Tartars tending their herds on her northern
frontiers ; a wild, snout-nosed race that lived without
government or kings. Yet during every period of
decadence and dynastic struggle China has been
subject to attack by these frontier nomads. The
greatest task incumbent upon succeeding dynasties

16

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

during the beginning of each period of renascence
was to drive back beyond the borders of the empire
the yak-tail banners of these marauders.

To such a low plane of self-defence did the Chinese
fall in the fourth and fifth cycles of decadence that
we find the vast empire conquered by these desert
tribes. And it is in relation to these two periods of
national disintegration, during which China became
a subject nation, that the present cycle must be
considered, since conditions are basically the same.
In these periods of decadence, during which occurred
the destruction of the Sung Dynasty and the es-
tablishment of the Mongol Dynasty of Yuen, and
later the dissolution of the Ming Dynasty and the
enforcement of Manchu sovereignty, China had but
to protect herself from the squat horsemen that
screamed along her northern frontiers. To-day, in a
period of national depression and decay that is in
no degree removed from the defencelessness of the
fourth and fifth cycles of disintegration, this race
has now for the first time to face enemies, not alone
on her northern borders, but also upon the east and
south and west, nations whose morality of conquest
is no different, no better than was that of the Mongol
and Manchu tribes who made her ten thousand fields
a barren tenure.

The Chinese people — not the government nor the
dynasty, for dynasties and governments are but the
playthings or temporary utensils of races — have now
to confront the most critical period in all the ages

17

that have been allotted to them since that dim morn-
ing when first they gathered themselves together and
Fuki ruled over them on the plains of Shensi.

Shall the Chinese as a nation survive this old in-
ternal struggle now about to break forth and enter
into the seventh cycle of their evolution, or shall
they utter themselves, thunderously but with finality,
into such oblivion as awaits the decadent nation?
The Chinese people were in former times propor-
tionately manyfold stronger and more capable of
resisting foreign conquest by nomadic hordes than
they are to-day able to resist the European or Japan-
ese powers that now so relentlessly hang upon all the
borders of the empire.

Unless there rises out of the uttermost depths of
her bosom the militancy of another Martial Monk1
the still hour has come when this ancientest kingdom
shall make its solemn salutation to mankind, in-
different in the noisy buzz of his diurnal flight.

1 Hung-wu, founder of the Ming Dynasty.

Ill

THE contemplation of empires that have splut-
tered and flickered out on this windy earth is
not -without value. For as the ancients were able,
after cycles of time, to predict with certainty lunar
eclipses from no other knowledge than the inevita-
bility of their recurrence, so we, by the recurrence
of the same causes and effects, the same beginnings
and ends, are able to understand those eternal phases
that alternately cast their glare and darkness over
the orbit wherein nations move.

It is in such a manner that we now come to con-
sider the American commonwealth towering as it
does so mightily among nations that to those who
compose it and are part of it it appears a pyramid
amid the sand-dunes of time. This national vanity
is justifiable so long as the existence of the na-
tion's vastness, its grandeur, and the part it has
taken — as great as any other state — in the evolution
of human society continues. We only propose to
examine into the valor of that ignorance now en-
deavoring to destroy the true basis of national great-
ness and to replace it with a superstructure of papier-
mache", not unlike a Mardi-gras creation, around

19

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

whose gilded and painted exterior the nation is
asked to dance in boastful arrogance, neither be-
holding nor caring at all for the sham of it nor its
weakness.

As an individual can form no conception of per-
sonal death, so neither can nations. While individ-
uals readily realize the inevitability of death in the
greatest of men or a world of them, they cannot com-
prehend their own extinction, though their hours be
ever so pitifully few. So it is with nations; and
though the most insignificant of them can com-
placently witness the death-throes of the greatest of
world empires, they are utterly unable to compre-
hend the possibility of a similar fate.

The American commonwealth stands in no dif-
ferent relation to time and the forces of time than
any other nation that has ever existed. The same
elements brought about its birth and the same causes
will prolong or shorten its existence as prolonged or
shortened theirs. Up to the present time the life
history of this republic has varied only in the slight-
est degree from the elemental forces that brought all
other nations into existence and governed the growth
of their youth and manhood.

It is unnecessary to recall the battle-fields upon
which this republic was born or the subsequent
wars that have marked its growth and expansion,
other than to recall the invariability of that universal
law governing the beginnings and rise of nations.
This country, as others that have gone before, has

20

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

been built up from the spoils of combat and con-
quest of defenceless tribes. Its expansion has been
no more merciful nor merciless than the expansion
of any other nation. The same inexorable law of
physical strength has governed it as all others. But
its conquests have been over nations and aborigines
so disproportionately weak and incapable of wag-
ing war on a basis of equality that its wars have
been destructive rather than inculcative of equita-
ble military conceptions. The very ease with which
this commonwealth has expanded is responsible for
the erroneous beliefs now prevalent concerning the
true basis of its future greatness. The people have
come to look upon themselves in a false though
heroic manner, and upon other nations with the
same indifference as they did the untutored savage
whose sole defences were the solitudes of his swamps
and forests and a God that thundered in vain.

This republic has forgotten that during the last
few decades its relation to other countries has been
completely altered, not only because the ripple of its
expansion has, by a law of national growth, reached
out to other portions of the earth, but that modern
means of transportation and communication have
reduced the whole world into a greater compactness
than were the United States in 1830. To-day it takes
less time to reach Washington from the most dis-
tant nations than it took senators from their respec-
tive states seventy years ago. No longer, therefore,
has this nation to carve its way onward to further

21

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

greatness by defeating kingdoms months from their
base; by devouring uncouth republics and whole
tribes of aborigines, or laying bare a skeleton that
went forth to battle in no other manner than did the
corpse of the Cid concealed in the robes of royalty.

The time of this nation's youthful achievements
is past. Yet proportionately as defenceless as were
the peoples it has conquered the republic goes on,
heedless of its fate, complacently contemplating the
restless shadow of vast armed forces to the east and
west of it. Only perhaps in that inevitable hour
when this bluster, tragic or otherwise, shall end will
this republic understand the retribution of national
vanity and become cognizant of the end issuing from
the fiat of that inexorable law, a law that never
hesitates nor in its application varies or is found
wanting.

Why mankind remains age after age blind to this
unchangeable and universal ordinance controlling
the destiny of nations is because he believes that in
his own myopic life rests the raison d'etre of national
existence. But never until he emerges from the
petty traffic, from the hurrying crowds of the streets,
and ascends those heights where its clamor finds no
echo, can he hope to see the endless procession of
nations as they move onward majestically, tragically
to their predestined end. On the thoroughfares of life
he sees only the particles that constitute his country,
not the nation itself; he can only comprehend their
ambition, their momentary struggle for gain, and

22

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

takes no note of nor makes any effort to under-
stand the noble or melancholy destiny of his father-
land as a whole. This is hidden from him in the dust
and pitiable cries that reach, as he believes in his
self -exaltation, to the ear of God; but do not in fact
struggle upward higher than the roof-tops.

In considering the future of this Republic one must
do so, not from the closets of its politicians, not from
its alleyways with their frenzied crowds, not from
theorists nor feminists, for these are but the feverish
phantasms and sickly disorders of national life.
It must be regarded from the heights of universal
history and empirical knowledge which appertains
to national existence. The transitory tribes of man
are not for themselves worthy of momentary con-
sideration. They can only be considered in the same
light as are organic particles constituting the body
of an individual. As these molecules come into
existence to perform their predetermined function,
then die and are replaced by others, endlessly and
without cessation until the body itself ceases to be,
so is mankind in the body-politic of a nation, and
as such must be considered.

The future life of this Republic has not only been
predetermined by the primordial laws already men-
tioned, but it has blazed the way of the future by its
acts of the past. This irrepressible expansion will
no longer bring it into contact with inferior nations,
but with those whose expanding capacity and mili-
tary ability are far in excess of this Republic. We

23

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

have before called attention to the fact that modern
transportation and communication has reduced the
world to such compactness that no future ripple of
national growth can expand without breaking against
some similar ripple emanating from another nation.
When this occurs, it is war.

If this Republic is to achieve the greatness and
duration its founders hoped to secure for it ; if it is to
continue to spread abroad over the earth the prin-
ciples of its constitutions or the equity of its laws
and the hope it extends to the betterment of the
human race, then it must realize that this can only
be done by possessing an ability and potentiality to
be supreme over those nations whose ambitions and
expansion are convergent. Preparations for wars
consequent upon the growing compactness of the
world and increasing convergence of all the world
powers must go on ceaselessly and in proportion to
the increase of expansion and fulness of years.

In the life of most nations the era of decadence has
been more or less proportionate, in time, to that of
their growth and the consummation of their great-
ness. The deterioration of the military forces and
the consequent destruction of the militant spirit
has been concurrent with national decay. When
this deterioration of armies and militant ideals was
complete, the nation was destroyed. In the history
of no country other than this Republic do we find
militant deterioration progressing other than in ac-
cordance with conditions consonant to an environ-

24

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ment naturally productive of militant decay. In this
nation, however, we find that the natural disin-
tegration of militancy is artificially increased, not only
by the indifference of the people to military enter-
prise, but by organized efforts to destroy not only
the Republic's armament, but its militant poten-
tiality.

High or low, the ambitions of the heterogeneous
masses that now riot and revel within the confines
of this Republic only regard it in a parasitical sense,
as a land to batten on and grow big in, whose re-
sources are not to be developed and conserved for
the furtherance of the Republic's greatness, but only
to satisfy the larval greed of those who subsist upon
its fatness.

If there is any patriotism worth having it belongs
alone to the primitive principles of the Republic,
to the militant patriotism of those who in simple,
persistent valor laid with their swords the founda-
tion of this national edifice and who after seven
years of labor cemented with their own blood the
thirteen blocks of its foundation. The continua-
tion of this building, and the endless extension of the
Republic, the maintenance of its ideals and the con-
summation, in a world-wide sense, of the aspirations
of its founders, constitutes the only pure patriotism
to which an American can lay claim or, in defence of,
lay down his life.

What we have said, or what we will say, as regards
commercialism should not be misunderstood. If,

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

in the development of the industries and potential
wealth of the land, industrialism is regarded as in-
cidental to national progress and not the goal of
national greatness, then it is in its proper sphere.
Industrialism is only a means to an end and not an
end in itself. As the human body is nourished by
food, so is a nation nourished by its industries.
Man does not live to eat, but secures food that his
body may be sustained while he struggles forward
to the consummation of his desires. In such relation
does industrialism stand to the state. It is sus-
tenance, a food that builds up the nation and gives
it strength to preserve its ideals; to work out its
career among the other nations of the world; to
become superior to them or to go down before them.
Never can industrialism, without national destruc-
tion, be taken from this subordinate place. When
a man has no aspirations, no object to attain during
life, but simply lives to eat, he excites our loathing
and contempt. So when a country makes industrial-
ism the end it becomes a glutton among nations,
vulgar, swinish, arrogant, whose kingdom lasts pro-
portionately no longer than life remains to the swine
among men. It is this purposeless gluttony, the
outgrowth of national industry, that is commer-
cialism. The difference between national industry
and commercialism is that while industry is the labor
of a people to supply the needs of mankind, com-
mercialism utilizes this industry for the gratification
of individual avarice. Commercialism might be

26

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

defined, not as an octopus vulgaris, which is self-
existent, but as a parasite of the genus terrubia, a
fungoid growth that is the product of industrial de-
generation. It is this commercialism that, having
seized hold of the American people, overshadows and
tends to destroy not only the aspirations and world-
wide career open to the nation, but the Republic.

On the other hand, we do not consider military
activity as something in itself. It is a condition of
national life in the same sense as industrialism, but
with this difference: though military development
and industrialism are both factors subordinate to
the ultimate aim of national existence, the militant
spirit is a primordial element in the formative process
and ultimate consummation of the nation's existence ;
while industrialism, in its normal function, is na-
tional alimentation, and the only other part it ever
plays in national life is where, by degenerating into
commercialism, it brings about the final corruption
of the state.

Commercialism is only a protoplasmic gormandiza-
tion and retching that vanishes utterly when the
element that sustains it is no more. Military or
national development, on the other hand, is not only
responsible for the formation of all nations on earth,
but for their consequent evolution and the peace of
mankind. It makes that which is dearest to man
—his life — no dearer than principle or loyalty for
which he yields it, while commercialism sacrifices
without the slightest compunction every principle

27

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and honor to gain the basest and paltriest possession
of which man can boast.

Whenever a nation becomes excessively opulent
and arrogant, at the same time being without mili-
tary power to defend its opulence or support its
arroganc2, it is in a dangerous position. Whenever
the wealth and luxury of a nation stand in inverse
ratio to its military strength, the hour of its desola-
tion, if not at hand, approaches. When the opulence
and unmartial qualities of one nation stand in inverse
ratio to the poverty and the military prowess of an-
other, while their expansion is convergent, then
results those inevitable wars wherein the commercial
nation collapses and departs from the activities of
mankind forever.

IV

FAWS governing national growth are as simple
I—* as they are immutable. The increasing wisdom
of man and the varying conditions of his political
existence give but an altered utterance to these
changes. The political boundaries of nations con-
tinue to expand only as their military capacity is
superior to the countries whose interests are con-
vergent or whose frontiers are in common; while
nations whose ambitions conflict with those of
stronger powers or whose frontiers stand in the way
of their expansion will, as in former ages, be over-
come and absorbed by them.

The political frontiers of nations are never other
than momentarily quiescent; shrinking on the sides
exposed to more powerful military nations and ex-
panding on frontiers where they come in contact
with weaker states. This expansion of military
powers and the shrinkage or extinction of those less
capable of withstanding them is determined by their
hungers and ambitions, by the supply and demand
of natural resources and that immeasurable, theorem-
less ambition of man as a nation.

The older the world grows and the more compact

29

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

it becomes through man's inventions, the more
strenuous and continuous becomes this struggle.
No longer is it possible for any Great Power to expect
the expansion of its geographical area at the expense
of aboriginal tribes or petty kingdoms alone, for they
have now fallen within the sphere of some greater
nation.

It was the recognition of these ordinances that led
Monroe to enunciate his doctrine providing for the
inviolability of the Western Continents. By re-
moving them from the sphere of European expansion
he hoped to prevent the widening boundaries of
these militant powers from coming in contact with
the natural growth of the Republic. No doctrine
proclaimed by any statesman of this nation or of the
Old World ever portrayed truer insight into the
nature of national life.

In the time of Monroe, it was impossible to fore-
see the changes mechanical inventions were to make
in the political development of the world after his
time. While human nature is no different from
what it was then and will remain unaltered eons
yet to come, this world has been whittled down to a
small ball and time has been scoffed at. No longer,
as in Monroe's time, does a vast Atlantic Ocean
separate this continent from Europe. Man's in-
genuity has reduced it to a small stream across which
the fleets of European Powers can cross in less time
than it took Monroe to post from Washington to
Boston. No longer is the Pacific hidden in the

30

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

purple solitudes of illimitable vastness nor do its
waters splash on toy shores of porcelain and green
tea. The smiling mists and mysteries of these
Oriental lands have not only been cleared away, but
their very fields have been ploughed up and harrowed
by the bayonets of Western Nations. In their lust
for the Golden Fleece they have sown over them the
teeth of the Twin Sleeping Dragons from which
have sprung up vast and terrible armies, warships
as swift and ruthless as the swooping Kite that is the
symbol of their valor.

Monroe could not perceive the possibilities of such
changes ; and while his doctrine is as correct in prin-
ciple as when enunciated by him, it has, unprovided
with such ordinances as would make it effective,
been handed down to the present age nullified
by man's new means of transportation and the
changed military as well as political conditions
that now govern international intercourse. But
to the average American, as to Monroe, the At-
lantic and Pacific are still such vast seas that no
enemy will have the temerity to cross them, hence
this nation, without armies and without navies pro-
portionate to its new responsibilities and their
concomitant dangers, hopes to remain secure and
immune, without effort, from foreign invasion. It
is this vanity, which can be called the Valor of Dis-
tance, that will be considered in this chapter.

In a military or naval sense, distance is not meas-
ured by miles. Napoleon found all the capitals of

31

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Europe closer to Paris than the sea-coasts of England.
On the other hand, in the Boer War, the English
discovered that the five thousand miles from Ports-
mouth to Cape Town were shorter than a few hun-
dred miles from Cape Town to Pretoria.

Distance from a base in a military sense is meas-
ured by the time, ease and capacity it takes to move
bodies of troops and munitions to a secondary base
in the theatre of war or to armies in the field. The
space lying between an army and its base, instead of
being measured by miles, is determined by the speed
of the means of transportation, the immunity of the
lines of communication from attack, and the number
of lines converging from the main base to the theatre
of war.

Two places a thousand miles apart, but connected
by a railroad, are closer together than two places
only one hundred miles apart with no other means of
communication than a country road. The sea,
when free from the enemy's warships, offers the best
means of communication, not only on account of the
speed of modern steamers and their carrying capacity,
but from the fact that their lines are immutable and
can be as numerous as are the ports controlled on
the enemy's seaboard.

Those who hold to the belief that the remoteness
of the United States from Europe renders it in-
accessible to attack point to Napoleon's Moscow
campaign and the defeat of the Russians in the
Japanese War as failures resulting from the con-

32

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

duct of a war at great distances. The truth is that
distance in these two distinct campaigns was not
responsible for the disasters consequent upon them.
The Moscow campaign, moreover, has nothing what-
ever to do with modern or future conditions of war-
fare or with the military relation Europe now bears
to the United States. It required several months for
troops to march from Paris to Moscow or for supplies
to be transported over this distance ; while Washing-
ton, New York, or Boston are but seven days distant
from the capitals of Europe. The transport by sea
of Japanese troops to America would involve that
nation in no greater difficulties than did the carry-
ing of them to Manchuria.

The campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, of Frederick
the Great, and numerous other great captains were
conducted many weeks from their main bases. The
campaigns of Napoleon in Italy, Spain, Austria, and
Germany were carried on in the heart of an enemy's
country, many weeks and in some instances months,
from his base. In the war with Mexico the forces of
the United States operated several months from their
source of supplies, while in the Civil War, Union
armies conducted campaigns and operated many
weeks from their depots: as Grant in his Vicksburg
campaign; Burnside advancing from Louisville to
Knoxville ; Sherman in his march from Chattanooga
to Atlanta, thence to the north; as General Banks'
advance in Texas and Sherman's march across the
State of Mississippi. The Union Army in New

33

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Orleans drew its supplies, even its beef, from New
York City, thirty-six hundred miles away.

The significance of these statements belongs to the
comparison between them and the distances that
separate the United States from European bases of
operation, which in no instance exceeds ten days.

Grant, in the state of Mississippi, was twenty days
marching from Brunes-burgh to Vicksburg. To-day
an army of the same size could be embarked at
Bremen, carried across the Atlantic and debarked
on the seaboard of this Republic in one half the
time.

When in 1865 the Fourth Army Corps of the Union
Army was transported from Carter's Station to
Nashville, three hundred and seventy- three miles,
it required fourteen hundred and ninety-eight cars.
An army corps of the same size, together with all
necessary equipment, could be transported from
Germany to the United States on five steamers of
the Hamburg - American or Norddeutscher Lloyd.
Twenty-five of these steamers could transport from
Germany to the American sea-coast seventy-five
thousand troops, together with their equipment, in
less time than it would have taken Grant to march
the same number of men from Washington to
Appomattox.

Germany can transport to the United States a
quarter of a million soldiers in a fortnight.1

1 German General Staff.
34

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

In the Virginia campaign of 1864, the supply train
for General Grant's army of one hundred and twenty-
five thousand men consisted of forty-eight hundred
wagons drawn by some twenty-five thousand mules
and horses. This train transported twenty thousand
tons of supplies. The entire tonnage could be trans-
ported from Europe to America in the Deittschland,
Amerika, Kaiser Wilhelm or any other one vessel of
the same class in less time than Grant's train could
have traversed the distance from the southern bank
of the Rapidan to the northern bank of the James,
unhindered by the vicissitudes of war and delays
of battle.

Such is the isolation of this Republic, a condition
that does not exist. The only isolation of which
this nation can afford to boast is that rendered by
fleets of battleships and mobile armies. When they
do not exist or are inferior or are destroyed, the
defence of the Republic has been thrown down.

To maintain national isolation it is necessary to
possess fleets not less than twice the size of any
European navy and a standing army not less than
one -half the size of the largest standing army in
Europe or Asia. At the present time England alone
can array against the American navy in the Atlantic
fleets three times greater, while at the same time
British warships will be ten times more numerous in
the Pacific. Both Germany and France could place
in the Pacific a fleet four times greater than the
American Pacific squadrons and at the same time

35

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

maintain a sufficient number of ships in the Atlantic
to prohibit the departure of a single American
battleship from their Atlantic stations. This can
be comprehended more clearly by considering a
state of war, under present naval and military condi-
tions, between any one of these powers and the United
States. England, France, or Germany not only
possess territory, but naval stations, docks, and
troops in the Orient. Initiating a war, any of these
nations could previously mobilize in the Pacific a
fleet as many times greater than the American
squadrons as would insure their destruction. The
American fleet could not be reinforced from the
Atlantic without reducing the Atlantic squadrons to
a state of inutility and exposing the remainder to
destruction by an overwhelming attack from the
enemy's Atlantic fleets. Since the time necessary
to reinforce the American fleets in either ocean is not
less than four months, it allows the enemy, based
only six days distant from the Atlantic coast, to
seize by land attack the American harbors and naval
bases and thus prevent the return of the American
fleets to the Atlantic should they attempt the relief
of the Pacific.

With the destruction of the American Pacific
fleet the Philippines, Hawaii, Samoa, and Alaska
would pass into the hands of the enemy. The towns
along the seaboard of the Pacific coast would be
destroyed and the American flag would no longer
be seen loitering over the wide waters of this sea.

36

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

To such a small area has man's ingenuity pared
down this once vast world that nations can now
conduct war on any portion of it, no matter how
remote, as measured by miles, the theatre of combat
may be from their base. The difficulties of trans-
portation are reduced to a minimum. Oceans no
longer prevent the successful invasion of distant
lands, but on the other hand make such attack
possible.

To march a body of troops two hundred and fifty
miles, together with their train and general im-
pedimenta, has never been considered in warfare
other than an insignificant undertaking. But Ger-
many or France cr England can land a similar force
on the American shores in no longer time. Japan
could land an army in California in less time than a
force could march from Los Angeles to San Francisco.

Within a given time a single vessel of the Mau-
retania or Deutschland class could transport more
troops from Europe to the American shores than
could all the fleets of England have done at the time
of the Revolution or War of 1812. Vessels of this
class will carry a brigade, together with all of its
equipment, from Europe to the United States in six
days. The entire merchant marine of Germany and
Japan can be converted into transports immediately
upon declaration of war and land within a month
more than a quarter of a million men on either
shore.

Nations lulled into somnolent security because they

37

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

are separated by wide expanses of water from the
vast armaments of these Powers will find that their
airy bastions of space will fall down about them and
their resistance will be measured only by weeks or
months; the end of the year shall see their battle
flags furled and laid away to rot dryly in ignominious
dusk.

A knot added to the speed of a transatlantic
steamer and the width of the sea grows less and the
armed frontiers of Europe brought closer to these
shores. When the vessel's size or carrying capacity
is increased, the ocean shrinks again and the armies
of distant nations draw nearer.

The great rampart of ocean has utterly vanished,
only the delusion of it still remains. Its illusionary
defence and the dreams of peace born out of it must
give way to that which belongs to man in his com-
bats, the blood and iron of military preparation pro-
portionate to the dangers and difficulties that sur-
round American sovereignty in the Western Hemi-
sphere.

No longer, as in Monroe's time, does the passage
of the seas require weeks or months. No longer are
the ships buffeted about by unruly winds, nor
drawn hither and thither by uncharted currents.
Straight and unswerving are these enormous steel
vessels hurled through seas, timed as accurately
as the movement of the constellations overhead.
No longer do fragile craft, with the destiny of a
nation in their cargo of souls and shot, drift un-

38

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

known, unspoken, over an abyss of stormy seas.
The very winds that once shrieked through their
broken rigging now mutter with man's speech or
scream with the commands of monarchs three
thousand miles away.

THIS Republic has not only been foremost in the
utilization of scientific discoveries, but from
its activities have come the most important of
modern inventions. The economic phases of its
career have been altered; its social and political
fabric changed through the advance of science and
general knowledge. But in its military system there
has been no progress. In this regard the altered
conditions of human society and international re-
lationship have passed over the nation as clouds
hurrying through the azure heavens, leaving no
deeper imprint upon it than is possible from the
erosion of fleeting shadows.

The modern American's conception of military
efficiency is but a succession of heroics culminating
in victory. This heroism of dreams, this valor of
the rostrum, is based, not upon the real history of
past military achievements, but upon the illusions
of them. Like bubbles these fragilest of militant
deeds are tinctured with an iridescence that does
not belong to them.

This nation, denying in a practical manner the
fact that military science is subject to change and

40

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

evolution, as all other phases of human activity,
still clings with the tenacity of evasion to the laissez-
faire military system of Colonial days, or rather to
the skeleton of it, for that which made it vigorous
and effective, the militancy of the individual, has
now all but departed, naturally and in accordance
with the laws that govern the preservation or de-
struction of national militancy during the career of
a state and the evolution of its society.

As the social and industrial, ethical and political
organism of this nation becomes more and more
complex, absorbing or diverting the activities of the
people from national to individual achievements,
the self-deception of the people as regards their in-
herent military capacity becomes more dominant
and unreasonable. It is this national self-deception
now so rampant in the Republic that we will con-
sider in this chapter and show that natural laws
govern, as they do all other forms of human pro-
gression, the growth and decay of national militancy.

If no provision is made by a nation for enforced
military service among its inhabitants, the militant
capacity of a race or state decreases proportionately
as is increased the complexity of its social organism
and the diversity of its economic activities.

The self-deception of a nation concerning its true
militant strength increases at the same ratio as its
actual militant capacity decreases.

We find that the uttermost limits of national
self-beguilement, in relation to military capacity, are
4 41

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

reached when the social, political and economic
phases have become so intangibly complex that the
ideals of the people, ceasing to be national — have
become individual. While this condition is the an-
tithesis of militancy, yet we discover in it — strange
as it may seem — the maturity of military conceit.
At this stage national decomposition sets in and
patriotism rots serenely.

The first and most difficult task of statesmen is
the preservation of the national or militant instinct
intact in the virtues of the people. However dis-
agreeable the thought may be, militancy is alone
responsible for the creation of every state and the
preservation of it through manifold disasters. Only
when this militancy deteriorates is the state doomed.

By the formation of political entities the evolution
of mankind has been made possible. All human
progress, together with individual freedom, has been
hewn out for man by the very agencies that so many
to-day labor to destroy, agencies that, so long as
man gathers himself together in separate states,
will never cease to determine the greatness of a race,
or by the lack of it the ushering into the Infinite
Past of a whole people and their institutions.

Military strength or incapacity is never constant,
but varies almost from hour to hour as does the
thermometer in registering the heat and chills of the
passing hours. It is relative to innumerable condi-
tions; not more of man with his hungers and loud
noises than the seas and rocks and the winds that

42

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

blow over them and the unpanned dust that hides
in their clefts and fissures.

The heights and depths of theatres of war, their
topography and climate, the militancy of hostile
peoples, their armaments and science, as well as
innumerable other conditions that enter into the
transient phases of human conflict, determine the
continuous and consistent readjustment of military
forces in numbers, armament, discipline, tactics and
logistics; conforming concurrently with new me-
chanical inventions and scientific discoveries that
each year alter to a greater or less degree the con-
duct of war. A nation with an inflexible military
system, determined by a national constitution and
controlled by civilian politicians, will soon end by
having no military forces, spirit or capacity.

Warfare, either ancient or modern, has never
been nor will ever be mechanical. There is no such
possibility as the combat of instruments. It is the
soldier that brings about victory or defeat. The
knowledge of commanders and the involuntary
comprehension and obedience to orders is what de-
termines the issue of battles. An army controlled
by more than one mind is as many times useless
as are numbered the minds that direct it. But
what mankind does not take cognizance of is that,
in the alteration of modes of combat by mechanical
and scientific inventions, there must be a psycho-
logical readjustment of the militant spirit of the
combatant. As the instruments of warfare become

43

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

more intricate, the discipline and esprit de corps
must be increased accordingly. Because of this
fact volunteer forces become more and more use-
less as the science of warfare progresses.

The causes of militant degeneration in a race or
nation are not generally understood. In primitive
times militancy was conditioned by necessity, and as
this necessity passed the militancy dependent upon
it deteriorated. This necessity might return to the
race or nation at any subsequent moment, but
militancy could not return simultaneously with it.
Hence it is that nations having reached such military
greatness and commanding position as to appear to
themselves impregnable, the military spirit is allow-
ed to degenerate. When this decadence reaches a
certain point the nation, regardless of its wealth,
area and population, is destroyed by, perhaps, an
insignificant though warlike race.

Laws that govern the militancy of a people are
not laws of man's framing, but belong to the primi-
tive ordinances of Nature and govern all forms of
life from a single protozoa awash in the sea to the
empires of man.

We divide militancy into three distinct phases:

(1) The militancy of the struggle to survive.

(2) The militancy of conquest.

(3) The militancy of supremacy or preservation
of ownership.

It is in the first, the struggle to survive, that the
military genius of a people reaches its height, for it

44

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

is that militancy which is common to all forms of
life. Moreover, we find that the harder the struggle
for a race or tribe to survive in its combats both with
man and the elements, the more highly developed
becomes their military spirit. It is because of this
that we find conquerors rising up out of desolate
wastes or rocky islands.

Success in the struggle for survival is followed by
the second degree of militancy, that of conquest,
in which militancy becomes a positive instead of a
negative factor. It is in this metamorphosis, out
of this red chrysalis, that the race rises upward on
the pinions of an eagle.

In the third stage the natural militancy of a na-
tion declines. This going to pieces is hastened by
the institution of new ideals. Commercialism grows
as militancy deteriorates, since it is in itself a form
of strife, though a debased one — a combat that is
without honor or heroism. The relegation of the
militant ideal to a secondary place in national ac-
tivity is succeeded by accumulative ignorance con-
cerning military efficiency, while the spirit of it —
that intuitive perception of what constitutes mili-
tancy— vanishes utterly, and to most nations that
have reached this dwelling-point of fraud it returns
not again forever.

Only when a nation endeavors to return to mili-
tant ideals, and battles for self-preservation, does
it realize the gulf that separates it from such a
possibility. Few are they that have recrossed this

45

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

wide abyss of their neglect and scorn. This final
period of militant decay is succeeded by an age of
subterfuge, an era of evasion, that ends in national
dissolution.

In attempting to determine the probability of an
effective national uprising to repel an invasion of this
Republic by a foreign Power it is necessary to con-
sider it from two sources only: first, by an examina-
tion into circumstances analogous to this probability
as they have existed in other countries; second, by
deductions made from actual conditions existent
in this nation.

From the beginning of the formation of national
entities until the present time, the idea of popular
uprisings to repulse foreign invaders has ever been
a universal conceit, an indelible vanity that neither
the erosion of ages has erased nor the deluges of
blood issuing from them have washed away. Yet,
while there exists not an age nor a nation that has
not resounded with the triumphant hoof-beats of
invading armies, the truth is there is not a single
instance in the whole military history of the world
where the mobile armies of a warlike race have been
destroyed or defeated by the popular uprisings of a
militantly decadent state. Such warring multitudes
have been but the wild windstorms of human beings
that, without direction or intelligence, have passed
by in no long period of time.

In the wars of mankind, popular uprisings, in the
full meaning of the phrase, are only possible to a

46

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

primitive despotism. The more diffused national
civilization becomes with the political elevation and
liberty of the individual, the less probable is a uni-
fied resistance. The idea of repelling invasion has
always found a prominent place in popular super-
stitions— the myths of man's credulity and vanity.
Such uprisings were possible only in primitive times,
ceasing with the establishment of armies that re-
quired training and cohesion: diminishing propor-
tionately as science entered more and more into the
conduct of war. Modern warfare is the conversion
of the nation's potential military resources into
actual power and its consequent utilization in a
unified and predetermined manner by men more
scientifically trained than lawyers, doctors or en-
gineers.

To repel an invasion of this nation ideals remote
from those that now litter and ferment abroad over
this land must be created. The soldier spirit, that
spark, illuminating not alone the abysses wherein
nations move, but those chambers of souls ordinarily
dark and forgotten, must be struck. This requires
not months but years. Whole armies of men must
be animated to this by discipline and exalted by the
quest of idealistic honor, such as distinguishes them
from those enriched by trade or those who are able
to purchase with gold all but that which alone is
bought by blood.

This preparation now belongs to the time of peace.

Once a country is invaded the machinery of govern-

47

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ment, which determines unity of effort, is thrown
down and the entire arsenal of national strength is
strewn fragmentary over the whole land. Like the
ignition of scattered grains of loose powder, resistance
is reduced to a sporadic flaring-up, a sickly sputter-
ing of small flames and much smoke, sulphuric and
bitter.

No one is justified in saying that there would be
no defence of this Republic in event of invasion:
such a statement would be manifestly untrue. But
the defence would be no greater nor worse than
that heretofore made by nations heterogeneous and
opulent as this Republic: a defence, in innumer-
able instances, Alamodian, heroic, even Gracchian,
but in the end proving to be no more stable than a
defence of tumble-weeds and loud noises.

Why public confidence in the infallibility of volun-
teer forces still survives in this Republic would be a
military enigma were it not known that such is the
case in every nation where man's aspirations are
measured by the ephemeral and immaterial.

Volunteers are purely a mediaeval institution,
effective only in those ages when weapons of warfare
differed little or not at all from those used by men
during times of peace: when, in fact, the mechanism
of war was crude and the science of it was no science
other than to kill or be killed in the simplest and
most natural hand-to-hand manner.

The weapons used in American wars up to a time
subsequent to the Civil War were the same used

48

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

during peace by men struggling through forests or
over plains, shooting, hunting, killing. In times of
war these men were formed into regiments and went
on hunting and killing, but, instead of fowls and
beasts, they hunted their fellow-men, no better
armed nor trained, nor more valorous than they.
So it is not strange to hear men who are in truth
patriots by right of blood and deed proclaim that
in the event of invasion they will seize from their
nooks and mantel-pieces such arms as hang or re-
pose there and go forth to the slaughter of the in-
vader. We doubt not that such would be their
actions ; but how far would they go, these stern and
uncompromising patriots ? The nobility of patriot-
ism will not, unfortunately, increase the initial
velocity of antiquated weapons; and armaments
change so rapidly in modern times that a soldier of
one generation is more or less worthless in a war of
a succeeding period.

Battles are no longer the spectacular heroics of
the past. The army of to-day and to-morrow is a
sombre, gigantic machine devoid of all melodramatic
heroics, but in itself all-heroic, silent and terrible:
a machine that requires years to form its separate
parts, years to assemble them together, and other
years to make them work smoothly and irresistibly.
Then, when it is set in motion, naught shall stop it
but a similar machine stronger and better.

Battles are now fought, won or lost on wide, de-
serted fields, and no combatants are seen, only here

49

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and there small blue clouds and distant noises mark
the dumb heroism of modern armies. Volunteers,
patriotic, heroic as the mind of man can make them,
are of no use in this mile-away war, since they know
nothing of its science. They are led forward into
death nullahs by officers who never saw an army in
the field, and whose military knowledge is only
reminiscent of Bunker Hill and the Minute-men of
Concord. Who shall blame them if they scamper
off on all fours to the rear when the pilfering bullets,
dropping from heaven itself, begin to loot whole
squads and companies of their souls ?

It is the hour and terror of helpless death.

The time of volunteer forces has forever passed.
Nations that expect to make war in the future with
hastily raised levies of volunteers against standing
armies are doomed to disaster.

It is natural that both the North and South should
preserve out of the four years of battles and night-
marches only that which is heroic and noble. But
this glamour does not obscure within its brilliancy
some dark spots, such spots as men love not to dwell
upon, howsoever beneficial their contemplation may
be. So the most valuable lessons taught by the Civil
War have been buried as the dead were buried in
graves not again to be opened. We will not commit
this sacrilege, though it were for the good and just
cause of tempering down the crude, fragile valor of
this nation.

The history of the volunteer in the Civil War ends

50

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

as soon as the war enters upon its serious phase;
thence come enormous bounties, drafts, conscripts,
riots and incipient rebellions. We will only make two
statements as regards these volunteers in the Union
Army, but in these rest volumes of foreboding facts.
In the Union Army from 1861 to 1865 there were
more officers discharged and cashiered for dishonor
and incapacity than were killed on the field of battle ;
more discharged "without stated reasons" than died
during that time from disease. In other words, the
casualties of dishonor and incapacity among officers
during these years were greater than that of the
battle-field and disease.

Who is there that will make out that sad roster of
the unnamed ten thousand dead among enlisted
men that these incompetent officers led about to die ?
Yet we lay no blame upon their shoulders. Their
crimes were the crimes, not of themselves, but of the
ignorance and worthlessness of the military system
still extant.

Snatched suddenly, as they were, out of the
peaceful round of civil life, with its orderless, un-
disciplined equality, they knew nothing concerning
the duties that devolve upon military officers.
Skilled as these men might be in every phase of
human activity, yet they knew not the primary
principles of the endless technique that belongs to
the vast science of war; a science that is alone the
relentless determinant, not only in the creation of
nations, but the length of their duration, their great-

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ness or littleness upon earth, and in the hour of their
desolation to be the inexorable umpire of their
unfit ness.

An army possesses a heart and brain as does every
other living organism. This heart and brain of an
army is made up of the officers composing it, while
the soul of it is the spirit that inspires them. The
worth of an army must be measured primarily by the
character of this soul. In volunteer armies it is
little more than embryonic, and in its absence armies
are but mobs. It is immaterial how numerous they
may be, how vast their armament, or how perfect
their utensils of war, these things shall avail them
not at all.

The soul of the soldier can only be developed by
discipline, by honor and martial deeds. It cannot
be constructed to order or dressed up with false
shoulders in twenty -four days by uniforming a
civilian volunteer or by commissioning and spurring
him with purchased valor or the transient glory of
loud -mouthed multitudes. The creation of this
martial soul necessitates year after year of sternest
labor and toil that callouses not alone the hands and
wrings sweat from the brow, but also callouses the
weakness inherent in man and wrings sweat from
his heart. It is moulded by Regulusian discipline,
and lives are thrown carelessly away, mechanically,
almost irrationally. In the lessons of these years
they learn that in warfare a relentless absorption
of individuality must supervene, an annihilation of

52

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

all personality. Only then can they reach that
pinnacle of human greatness, to seek glory in death.

The second fact that it is our duty to record in
determining the efficiency of American volunteers
as well as the valor and loyalty of those who, we are
assured, would rise en masse against invading armies,
causes us again to revert to the records of the Civil
War, wherein we find that from 1861 to 1865 there
were nearly two hundred thousand deserters from the
Union Army — one-fifth the size of the army at the
close of the war. One man out of every twelve who
enlisted was a deserter. The Union Army lost near-
ly four times as many men from desertion as were
killed on the field. To this melancholy intelligence,
annotations or commentaries would be superfluous.
But it will be well for the people of this Republic
to think of the solemn portent of these facts when
the braggart spirit steals upon them, when imaginary
hosts of unarmed patriots rise up and destroy this
mighty and sadly turbulent world.

When science entered into warfare, volunteers
made their exit. They become soldiers only after
they cease to be volunteers, at the end of the second
or third year; while militia are made into soldiers
only after they have had their minds freed from the
tangled skein of false notions, which takes a year
longer than a raw recruit.

To hit a bull's-eye in a shooting-gallery or a quail
on the wing does not constitute military marks-
manship. The hunter of animals who kills at two

53

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and three hundred yards has no relationship to the
hunter of men who kills at ranges exceeding a thou-
sand yards. The former is practice, the latter
science. The military marksman must be able to
calculate distance under varying atmospheric and
topographical conditions. At a range exceeding a
thousand yards he must make calculations for
temperature, wind and humidity. If his rifle has
an initial velocity of two thousand feet, and the
wind is blowing a dozen miles an hour, he must allow
a deviation of eighteen feet for the bullet. For
every degree of temperature he must allow one inch
deviation; and fourteen inches for every fifteen
degrees of humidity. But marksmanship alone
does not constitute, in any degree whatsoever, a
soldier, and it can be said that it affects in no manner
the issue of modern battles, if the other primary
elements that go to make up an efficient and power-
ful army are absent.

Rifle, pistol and all other similar civilian associa-
tions are not only negatively but positively harm-
ful to the nation, inasmuch as they produce an
erroneous conception of the knowledge and duties
necessary to a modern soldier. After three years'
service in a regular army not more than twenty-
five per cent, of the men can be qualified as military
marksmen. To believe that the scatter-gun marks-
manship of civil life is a factor in warfare is not other
than a yellow-flamed ignis fatuus, starting up out of
the Dismal Swamp of ignorance and national vanity.

54

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Before the final hour is tolled over this careless and
somnolent nation it should realize that in the per-
formance of military duty there must be no sub-
stitution of the immaterial for that which is essential;
no evasion of responsibility nor subterfuge.

A vast population and great numbers of civilian
marksmen can be counted as assets in the com-
bative potentiality of a nation as are coal and iron
ore in the depths of its mountains, but they are, per
se, worthless until put to effective use. This
Republic, drunk only with the vanity of its resources,
will not differentiate between them and actual
power. Japan, with infinitely less resources, is
militarily forty times more powerful. Germany,
France or Japan can each mobilize in one month
more troops, scientifically trained by educated
officers, than this Republic could gather together in
three years. In the Franco-Prussian War, Ger-
many mobilized in the field, ready for battle, over
half a million soldiers, more than one hundred and
fifty thousand horses and twelve hundred pieces of
artillery in five days. The United States could not
mobilize for active service a similar force in three
years. A modern war will seldom endure longer
than this.

Not only has this nation no army, but it has no
military system. It has neither arms nor equip-
ment. No preparation for war is made. No or-
ganization, no staffs, no plans for feeding, supplying
or transporting forces; while the militancy of the

55

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

nation has been washed away in the most transient
and fouling of summer floods.

The spirit of militancy is born in a man, but a
soldier is made. Not, however, machine-made, nor
hand-made, nor tailor-made, nor put together in
twenty-four hours. A soldier cannot be created by
a formula of speech nor by the vanity of valor. It
takes not less than a dozen men six-and-thirty long
months to hammer and temper him into the image
of his maker and fit him for the performance of his
duties.

A man who enlists in an army has the right to
demand that those who are his leaders shall know
to the fullest extent the duties appertaining to their
office. Lives unnumbered are placed in their hands,
but they are offered upon the altar of their country
and not to satisfy the vanity of individuals ; they are
in the field to fight the enemy, not disease: if they
must perish, let it be by the kindly singing bullets
and not by the ignorance of their commanders.

In civil life a butcher is not called upon to exercise
the skill of an oculist nor to remove a cataract from
the dulled eye; barbers do not perform the opera-
tion of laparotomy; nor farmers navigate sea-going
vessels, nor stone-masons try cases at the bar, nor
sailors determine the value of mines, nor clerks per-
form the functions of civil-engineers. Yet, in the
time of war in this Republic, these same men, to-
gether with all other varieties of humanity, go forth
in the capacity of volunteer officers to be learned by

56

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the end of one-and-thirty days in the most varied of
all sciences, the science of war.

The most promiscuous murderer in the world is
an ignorant military officer. He slaughters his men
by bullets, by disease, by neglect; he starves them,
he makes cowards of them and deserters and crimi-
nals. The dead are hecatombs of his ignorance ; the
survivors, melancholy spectres of his incompetence.

5

VI

BELIEF in the potency of gold is not new; it is
as old as the Jews and prevails wherever wealth
constitutes power in civil life and forms the highest
consummation of individual effort. In any nation
where wealth is the source of political power, the
criterion of rank and the mark of social eminence,
it becomes impossible for the people not to see in
it also a complete source of military strength.
People that can turn patriotism into cash and their
gods into profit could not believe otherwise.

A nation that is rich, vain, and at the same time
unprotected, provokes wars and hastens its own
ruin. This is a law so old and invariable that man
thinks no more of it than he does of the forces of
gravity, the tides of the sea or the inevitability of
death. Neither does he realize that a nation never
becomes opulent that it does not become arrogant,
nor opulent and arrogant that it does not become de-
fenceless. And no nation, as we have heretofore
stated, ever becomes defenceless that it does not
sooner or later suffer the penalty of its deterioration.
Opulence, instead of being a foundation of national
strength, is liable to be the most potent factor in its

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

destruction. Instead of adding power to a nation,
' it simply increases the responsibility of its rulers
and necessitates a greater diligence for defence.
National opulence is a source of danger instead of
power, for the arrogance that comes of it is only
Hebraic, hence trade, ducats, and mortgages are
regarded as far greater assets and sources of power
than armies or navies. It produces national ef-
feminacy and effeteness, hence there spring up whole
tribes of theorists, feminists and, in fact, all the
necrophagan of opulent decadence. When wealth
forms the criterion of all human ambitions, justice,
emoluments, nay, of worth itself, then corruption
sets in and patriotism departs.

To reason analogically is oftentimes erroneous.
In fact, it can be said that analogy is a source of in-
numerable misconceptions, and whoever makes de-
ductions or attempts to construct universal axioms
solely from analogical reasoning will sooner or later
land in a quagmire of untruthfulness. Analogy can
only form true and irrefutable conclusions when it
deals with identical causes producing under various
and widely divergent conditions the same results.
Thus, it is possible to state, more or less accurately,
that a volcano upheaves its ashes and molten lava
in a more or less constant and identical manner,
whether in Italy or Java, in ancient or modern times.
These volcanic causes and effects, identical at all
times, though occurring under widely separated
geographical or chronological conditions, differ little

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

from the periodical eruptions of the elemental scoria
of mankind.

But only so long as the elemental characteristics
of mankind form in themselves the basis of analogical
reasoning can analogy be considered reliable or a
source of truth when dealing with man, his institu-
tions or customs. Each succeeding age regards
itself as infinitely wiser than the age that has pre-
ceded, though in fact it may be a dark and villainous
affair, as were the Middle Ages, and even recent times,
in comparison to the antique Greek and Roman,
Indian and Chinese civilizations. Each succeeding
religion, likewise, regards the efforts of its pred-
ecessor as futile, and that it alone hath the ear of
God. Each age regards its customs alone sensible,
and those that have gone before ridiculous; its
morality more pure, its equity more perfect, and so
on, ad infinitum, through the whole list of transient
vanities that are as mutable as though written on
fluxing sands that the veriest froth waves, rolling in
from the illimitable oceans of time, toss into con-
fusion and nothingness.

Only in the ever-recurring tracing on the sands
and obliteration thereof do we discern human char-
acteristics that are immutable; characteristics that
bring about the formation of the human race into
political entities, and in due time their inevitable
dissolution. These characteristics are of them-
selves the elemental instincts of the human race,
instincts that as a whole are but momentarily affect-

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ed by the transient caprices of theories or morals,
styles or religions. It is in these ever-recurring
forces innate in mankind that we alone reason
analogically concerning the present and the future;
not so much from the sand-dunes of the past as from
the inevitable tides that form and shatter them.

So while, within the brevity of this work, it is im-
possible to take up each nation and deal minutely
with the causes of its formation, its decay and
melancholy end, the reader can determine for him-
self, with no great amount of exertion, the exact
part and proportion wealth has contributed to their
strength and duration, or to what degree it has
undermined their foundations and rotted the great
beams of their edifices.

Unlike theories and moral codes, religions and
customs, the part wealth has played in national
existence has never been sporadic nor transient, nor
the political exudence of a single period or race, nor
varied one jot in any age on any portion of earth
nor among any people. Its effect has been in-
variable, whether applied to the Empire of the Pha-
raohs or to Korea, to China or Rome, to India or
Spain; and likewise, with the same inevitability will
it lay its heavy hand upon this nation. The law of
its application is inexorable.

The wealth of a nation, as a factor in warfare,
possesses certain potential but entirely subordinate
capabilities, which appear in themselves as actual
conquering forces of warfare, though the truth is

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

otherwise. War between wealth and militant energy
has but one end, the old doom of the Purple Persian.
Such a conflict is only a contest between the hollow
panoply of warfare and an actual combatant; the
plumed cadaver of a Cid against a live Moor; thunder
and smoke on one side, lightning and fire on the
other. The Battle of Issus, the Sack of Rome,
Marengo, Sedan, Liaou Yang — such are the endless
epitaphs of gold against steel, corpulence against
muscle, pomposity against discipline.

Not unlike Midas, nations succumbing to the
excess of gold soon come to beg deliverance from it.
But not unto them is it given that they may turn to
the waters of Pactolus for the washing away of it.
The cleansing of their folly belongs only to those
streams that drain down from the hearts of nations.

Wealth in the time of war, no matter how limit-
less, can do no more than provide arms and muni-
tions, pay the salaries of soldiers, provide their
subsistence, clothing and transportation. Gold illim-
itable cannot buy them valor, nor self-sacrifice, nor
endurance, nor discipline nor military knowledge.
Gold-purchased heroism is a conception only possible
to a nation sunk in the lowest depths of commer-
cialism. In fact, no heroic action has ever, in all
the turbulency of the human race, been conceived
and executed with ducats before and behind it.
Gold may harness men for war, but it has never been
able to make them conquer when opposed to those
whose discipline has been kneaded into the marrow

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of their bones and the inner chambers of their
hearts.

The expense of conducting a war is not, simul-
taneously, the same with any two nations, notwith-
standing the fact that the price of armaments may
be identical to all of them. War expenditures are
in proportion to the wealth of the nation itself.
The cost of a war carried on by England or this
Republic is manifold greater than if waged by any
other nation. Should the United States to-day be
obliged to place in the field the same number of
men, for the same length of time, under the same
conditions, as did the Japanese in their war with
Russia, the salaries alone would nearly equal the
entire war expense of the Japanese; while the total
expense would equal a sum as proportionately
greater as is the wealth of this Republic greater than
that of Japan, plus its concomitant corruption.

In the Civil War of the United States, nearly two
hundred millions were alone expended in bounties.
Taking into consideration the increased values now
prevailing in this country as compared to the values
of that period, bounties would, under this head, be
treble, or alone equalling the entire expenditure of
Japan in the war with Russia. In addition to this,
the non- American population at that time was com-
paratively insignificant, hence patriotism stood in
proportionately high ratio, while to-day the hetero-
geneity of population is over fifty per cent. How
much gold, therefore, would now be required to en-

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

list these people into the pain and sacrifice of war —
to coax them from their rich labors to die for a land
they regard only as the wide, fat fields of the harvest
moon?

The cost of prosecuting a war is not only propor-
tionate to the wealth of the nation, but the actual
maintenance of the individual soldier stands in ratio
to the cost of living and rate of wages. The wage
of a stone-mason, which is high or low according to
the opulence or the frugality of a nation, is in the
United States from four to five dollars a day; in
Japan, forty-five cents ; in Europe, about ninety cents,
and other labor in like proportion. The high cost of
living that prevails in an opulent nation not only
necessitates high wages, but this in turn brings about
an increase, perhaps proportionate, perhaps excessive
as inflated by trusts, in the price of all materials,
foodstuffs, and munitions used in war as well as in
peace.

Thus, European nations in time of peace maintain
armies from three hundred and fifty thousand to
five hundred thousand men and officers, together
with reserves of regulars varying from two to five
million, with a proportionate number of horses and
guns, for the same money that the United States is
obliged to expend to maintain fifty thousand troops
with no reserve of regulars. Japan could support a
standing peace army exceeding one million men for
the same amount of money this Republic now spends
on fifty thousand. This proportion, which exists

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

in time of peace, becomes even more excessive in
time of war; for whenever war involves a country
there exists in all preparation an extravagance that
is also proportionate to the wealth of the nation.

During the last few years of peace, from 1901 to
1907, the United States Government has expended
on the army and navy over fourteen hundred million
dollars : a sum exceeding the combined cost to Japan
of the Chinese War and the Russian War, as well
as the entire maintenance of her forces during the
intervening years of peace. Yet to-day the United
States possesses no army, while the navy is only one-
half the size it should be to defend its shores.

Poverty never begets extravagance, and frugality
is never the offspring of wealth. Poverty is pro-
ductive of every human exertion, while wealth is the
parent of every form of corruption. The richer a
nation is in time of peace, the poorer it is in time of
war.

Corruption exists in direct ratio to the wealth of a
nation, or, if the nation is in a decadent state, as
India, China, and Spain, it is extant in vaster pro-
portions. Though the wealth of a nation may de-
cline, corruption remains constant in ratio to the
maximum wealth of the past.

A nation can become so rich that its wealth will
bankrupt it in a war with a country poor but frugal
and warlike.

Excessive national wealth is responsible for an-
other factor that even in itself is productive of utter

6s

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

incapacity to execute warlike measures or even to
prevent the collapse of a nation in war — the ener-
vation through luxury, feminism, theorism, or the
decay of martial inclination and military capacity.
This sooner or later begins to show itself in every
phase of life, from National Assemblies to Debating
Societies, Communism, Idealism, Universalism, and
innumerable other bright, fantastic tapestries that
the ingenuity of man weaves through woof and warp
of human hopes and their follies.

Wealth is a factor in the naval and military
strength of a nation only so long as it is regarded
in its true and subordinate capacity : to build battle-
ships, but not to fight them; to buy arms, not valor;
to manufacture powder, not patriotism. But when
wealth becomes so paramount in a nation's life that
it forms the chief ambition of individual efforts, then
the factors that constitute military strength fall
away.

The only poverty from which a nation suffers
in war is poverty resulting from the excesses of
opulence.

Only so long as national wealth remains entirely
subordinate to public honors and aspirations can it
be utilized to increase the greatness of a nation;
and only so long as the chivalry and virtue of a
people are held aloof from it can the country be con-
sidered as either free or rich. When wealth, how-
ever, becomes the master, no words can fitly de-
scribe the poverty of the state.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The contemplation of the inutility of wealth to
defend itself is not without bitterness, hence it is
that man and whole nations of men shrink from the
knowledge of its impotency. The sad sophistry
of commercialism points to vast cities adorned by
every accessory of luxury and art, to factories, crafts
and sciences innumerable; to education, the hum of
industry, millionaires, constitution and statistics as
illustrative of the power and resources of riches.
How, therefore, for in such manner do men reason,
can any nation or body or men lacking in these
capabilities, these apparently illimitable potential-
ities of civilization and power, contemplate other
than annihilation in war?

How pitiable is all this! Yet it has ever been
that man wilfully hides, not alone from those whom
they would deceive, but from themselves, the fact
that the forces of war are not identical with those of
peace. What is necessary to one has nothing to do
with the other. The genius of battle has no more
to do with that of peace than have the tides of the
sea to do with the building of the sand-dunes they
wash away; or lightning with the growth of the cen-
tury-old oak that it blasts forever in a second of
time.

Commercial acumen is necessary to accumulate
wealth, but that capacity possesses not the slightest
ability to prevent the destruction of its edifices or
accumulations. Nay, more, wealth so benumbs
man's ability to comprehend its limitations that,

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

unless both combatants are simultaneously suf-
fering from the same green sickness of this mis-
conception, it is self-destructive and its riches only
add to the splendor of its sarcophagus.

Who were there among the marble cities of Greece,
or within the purple empires of Darius, Egypt or
India, with their wealth, scholars, merchants,
theorists, commerce and gold -studded soldiery,
that could conceive of a beardless youth coming
down from the wild highlands of Epirus, from the
bleak hillsides of Macedonia, to conquer, not one,
but all of them?

Who, in the luxurious kingdoms of Asia, feared
the skin-robed Hun; who, in Rome, dreaded the
canine-toothed Goths and Vandals whose wealth
did not exceed the skins that clothed them or the
spear-heads and swords in their hands; whose rev-
enues were no more than the leaves of forest trees,
the thunder of heaven, the flints of earth ?

Who, some thirteen centuries ago, could surmise
that a melancholy epileptic would find in the rocks
and sands and wandering tribes of Arabia a force to
grind into small dust the most powerful empires, in
the world; and from India to France destroy gov-
ernments, alter laws, customs and religions? Yet
these things happened, and the fragile edifices of
wealth crumbled in a day, and through his roaring
funnel balance sheets of trade vanished like so much
waste paper.

Who, in the fabulously rich empires of China,

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

India, Persia and the whole Asian world, as well as
that of Europe, contemplated the issuance of the
Scourge of God from the semi-mythical depths of
Tartary? Yet this also came about one sombre
day when, on the desolate banks of the Orkhan,
Genghis gathered together his cow-tail banners from
the nine desolate wastes of Shamo and swooped
down upon the world. His numbers were fewer
than the cities he razed ; while his revenues were but
his genius, his horsemen's valor and the milk of his
desert mares.

A century ago, Europe watched complacently the
self -devastation of France. The monarchy had
been murdered; the nobility guillotined; commerce
ruined; manufactures destroyed; the country-side
was a tangled thicket presided over by a half -starved
and tattered people. The wealth of the nation had
gone up in the bonfire of the Republic. Suddenly, a
little sallow man took hold of these famished peo-
ple, this nation devoid of commerce, manufactures
or revenues, and with its poverty conquered the
whole of incredulous Europe.

Only a few years since, on some mountainous isl-
ands, a people little known fought among them-
selves with weapons as primitive as those of the siege
of Troy. Their entire revenues were less than an
American city, the cultivable land of the whole
empire less than one-half the area of Illinois. Sud-
denly they also rose up, and, with the perennial
power of poverty, in less than one decade disem-

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

bowelled the two vainest and vastest empires on
earth, causing the whole world to whisper in old and
stale wonder at this New Sun that rose, with the
suddenness of an unknown comet, out of the Eastern
Sea.

In these widely separated incidents of history we
perceive how futile it is to consider wealth in the
remotest degree a factor of military prowess. Every
age with its diversity of weapons, every sociological
and ethnological phase of humanity, whether in the
Orient or the Occident, past or present, proves the
invariability of these conclusions. The truth of
this lies in the fact that wealth, no matter how vast,
can never supply a nation with what constitutes the
true material of warfare. All the riches of the
world cannot supply national unity nor that per-
severance which is unappalled by disaster. Yet
unity of action and fearlessness of purpose has never,
nor ever will, be lacking in whatever resources are
necessary to carry on their conquests.

In a nation ruled by opulence, men and the souls
of men are not only the valets of wealth, but the
nation itself is obsequious to it. The government
pursues its course through a labyrinthine way:
the interests of countless individuals are paramount
to those of state, and national ambition ceases to
exist. The commonwealth in protecting individual
interests resorts to expedients that are as temporary
as the lives of those who make them. Yet to these
transitory acts the integrity of national greatness is

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

sacrificed. When war falls upon such a nation it
becomes disunited. In the same myriad-minded
manner that it carried on the mercantile projects of
peace it attempts the conduct of a war; then dis-
integration, disaster and destruction ensue.

On the other hand, in a military power where in-
dividuals are considered only as instruments of its
greatness, the dreadful intentness of its aims knows
no discouragement, the straightforwardness of its
progress no hesitation, the terribleness of its energy
no fatigue. Neither property nor mankind disturb
its calculations. It is systematic, simple in design,
relentless in prosecution. Theories of finance carry
with them no awe; revenues and commerce it takes
as it finds them; millionaires and economists strike
no terror to its heart, for the excise and stamp duties
it levies are not on material resources, but on the
souls and passions and ambitions of men. These
resources are exhaustless, and so long as nations con-
ceal these facts from themselves, so long must they
suffer and be vanquished and die.

VII

IN the history and biography of national life, from
remote periods to the present era, there are cer-
tain immutable elements that are characteristic of the
life of political entities, regardless of their smallness
or greatness, their barbarity or civilization; and
while the means and manner of both the birth and
dissolution of them change with every age, the
formative processes are the same and the causes of
deterioration identical.

In states and nations, as in all other phases of life
wherein man. desires to act as a reformative agent,
he invariably attaches his own transitory and change-
ful characteristics to elemental forces, forces that are
immutable to all but endless eons of time. The
judgments of men are formed not from facts as they
are, but as they wish them to be. They root through
tons of good wheat to find three pieces of chaff, if
the chaff lends weight to their belief and argument.
It is not that they want others to know the truth,
but to have them believe as they do. Beyond this
they do not care. The conceit of man ordinarily
forms his criterion of truth. His judgment is con-
temporaneously governed by the most trivial ex-

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

tenors ; a live militia general is infinitely greater than
a dead Caesar, and the dictum of a complacent bour-
geois in frock-coat and top-hat is not to be gainsaid.

Elemental forces from which are derived all the
acts of man are few in number and are only im-
perceptibly altered through long periods of time.
While climatic and topographical conditions, de-
grees and kinds of civilization, laws, customs and
innumerable other local and transitory phases of life
may give infinitely varied expressions to the por-
trayal of these forces, the tendency of mankind is to
base his judgments on the most trivial of their ex-
pressions and regard them as fundamental, though
they are no more enduring than the plumage of a
summer or the roosting - place of a few seasons.
Nevertheless, the elemental characteristics of the
human race are considered changed and the em-
pirical knowledge of ages passes as naught.

Mankind will probably never realize how useless
is his antlike diligence and labor to fill up with his
formulas and ordinances the fissures of this world.
Yet his conceit is such that he lays on to this task
with the utmost nonchalance, as if it were the most
petty of affairs. As he indifferently commanded
the sun to stand awhile upon Gibeon, so again he
would set nature at naught by the application of his
formulas to those forces governing the rise and fall
of the tides of nations, that they may be checked and
tideless as the Dead Sea, and so remain through eons
yet to come.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The utmost that man can do individually or na-
tionally is to exist in obedience to the laws that
govern him. To live as free as possible from pain,
to better his condition and to postpone the inevi-
table hour of final dissolution. To exist thus, in-
dividually or as a nation, man must ceaselessly en-
deavor, not to thwart, but to comprehend and live
in accordance with those laws that know not of him
nor his vain progeny.

It is through empirical knowledge alone that man
is able to ascertain what laws do or do not regulate
his activities. Inventors do not invent; they only
apply in a new manner laws and forces that have
existed from the beginning of time. Chemists do
not create; they only make known the presence of
elements and conditions existent already in nature.
Thus it is that sophists and theorists and all that
category have not left to mankind, throughout the
ages of the human race, one single substantial legacy,
and for no other reason than that they try to invent
out of airy nothings that which the laws and forces
governing the world deny; or labor to create, out of
the nebulosity of their own sick brains, elements un-
known to nature. As far as the world is concerned
they might as well be a louse on the back of a wild
duck as it wings its way through the stormy night.

It is in relationship to these forces that govern the
formation, duration, and dissolution of political
entities, that International Arbitration and Dis-
armament are to be considered. Not that they them-

74

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

selves are worth even a passing word, but for the
fact of the mischief that their illusive ideas are ca-
pable of bringing about, especially in this Republic,
where education is so prevalent, while knowledge
and capacity to discern between what is true and
what is superficial is proportionately absent. No
people are so visionary and none hang more persist-
ently onto the coat-tails of false gods as those who
have enough education to read but not enough
learning to be able to distinguish between what is
false and what is true. It is on account of the
prevalency of this smattering of education in the
United States that every ism has its followers, every
form of religious dementia its sanctuary and apostles,
every visionary his devotees; and it matters in no
way from what depths of absurdity they may come
up, they have their adherents. Usually these delu-
sions are harmful only to the individual, and as such
are not worthy of concern, but when the hallucina-
tion is apt to become so widespread as to affect the
welfare of the nation, then it is time to point out
the mockery of their hopes and the quicksands into
which their aspirations have led them. In this
class of visionaries we place International Arbi-
trationists and Disarmamentists, who are so per-
sistently striving through subservient politicians,
through feminism, clericalism, sophism and other
such toilers to drag this already much deluded Re-
public into that Brobdingnagian swamp from whose
deadly gases there is no escape.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

It has been shown, in the fore part of this work,
how irrevocably national entities, in their birth,
activities and death, are controlled by the same laws
that govern all life, plant, animal or national; the
Law of Struggle, the Law of Survival. These laws,
so universal as regards life and time, so unalterable
in causation and consummation, are only variable
in the duration of national existence as the knowl-
edge of and obedience to them is proportionately true
or false. Plans to thwart them, to short-cut them,
to circumvent, to cozen, to deny, to scorn and
violate is folly such as man's conceit alone makes
possible. Never has this been tried — and man is
ever at it — but what the end has been gangrenous
and fatal.

In theory International Arbitration denies the
inexorability of natural laws and would substitute
for them the veriest Cagliostroic formulas, or would,
with the vanity of Canute, sit down on the ocean-
side of life and command the ebb and flow of its
tides to cease.

The idea of International Arbitration as a sub-
stitute for natural laws that govern the existence of
political entities arises not only from a denial of their
fiats and an ignorance of their application, but from
a total misconception of war, its causes and its
meaning.

All nations experience at one time or another the
same internal phases of fiery activity or a smoulder-
ing-out of it, and though no two of them may ever

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

be subjected simultaneously to this internal rum-
bling and tendency to belch forth masses of mankind
with their residue of scoria and trail of cinders, never-
theless war will result whenever such causative con-
ditions occur within the body politic of a single
state. The source or origin of war must always be
searched for, not in disputes between states, but
deep down in the bowels of one or all of them. There
alone will be heard those bruised noises, political,
industrial or revolutionary, sooner or later to end
in that eruption of mankind called — war.

International Arbitration not only does not dif-
ferentiate between the source or origin of all wars
and their precipitating causes, but ever miscon-
strues the latter to be the sulphurous smoke of
quarrels and disputes that flutter about between
the crater-tops and heaven.

War is not the result of disputes per se. Inter-
national disagreements are, on the other hand,
themselves the result of the primordial conditions
that sooner or later cause war. Disputes or dis-
agreements between nations, instead of being the
source or cause of war, are nothing more nor less
than the first manifestations of approaching combat,
or are the preliminaries thereto. To remove them
by arbitration, or any other means, is at best but
procrastination.

The possibility of settling international disputes
is proportionately great or small as is distant or at
hand the hour for ushering in a successive period

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of national expansion on the part of one or the
other nation: a crisis or crucial moment in their
evolution such as is marked by war. Sometimes
disputes may arise when the time of war is so far
away that they hardly cause a passing notice and
give no thought to the need of arbitration. At
other times disputes between two or more powers
may take place so near the outbreak of war that
they merge imperceptibly into that inevitable hour
when it is declared — hence, in history, are considered
the cause of it.

The sources of war are basic, not ephemeral. They
are not the passing of cyclonic storms of human
passion, but are the ever-recurring manifestations,
violent as they may appear to be, of national evolu-
tion. They mark, in the life of political entities, the
successive periods of their greatness or vicissitudes.

Nations in their nature are transitory; the laws
that govern them everlasting. What laws man
wishes for his own regulation he may change and
shift from day to day as he pleases; but to those
decrees issuing from nature, illimitable and eternal,
he must bow down. The laws of man are only the
expedients of a day, illusive, fleeting, transitory;
those of nature predetermined, imperishable. Yet
International Arbitration means nothing more nor
less than the reversal of these conditions: the sub-
stitution of the ephemeral for the everlasting and
the erratic phantasms of human hope for the majes-
tic grandeur of unchangeable law.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

International Arbitration deals, and only can
deal, with effects or causes of war. It can never
touch, even remotely, the primordial elements that
bring it about. Hence it is that International
Arbitration is only brought into action when the
results of the causes of war are being felt by the
nations involved. Disputes may take place be-
tween two nations, but not be derivable from those
inherent causes that terminate in warfare, and will,
as is customary, with much smoke and noise pass
away of their own accord.

It is upon these ephemeral controversies that
International Arbitration bases the premises of its
raison d'etre and its policy of universal quietude by
unrestricted loquacity. With quixotic valor they
lay on most industriously, and charge not wind-
mills, nay, only the terrifying shadows that thresh
themselves about upon earth.

If we admit the cause of warfare to be the result —
as Arbitrationists wish us to believe — of the second-
ary effects of elementary conditions, and concede
the events that usher in a war, or occur just prior
to its commencement, to be the cause thereof, then
we find that International Arbitration is involved
in even greater impossibilities. Investigation shows
that whenever two nations have become engaged in
warfare they have been for decades, and perhaps
centuries, advancing on converging lines of self-
interest and aggrandizement. When the contact
takes place, the struggle for supremacy, or even

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

survival, is at hand. As these lines approach one
another, difficulties due to increasing proximity
of interests arise between the countries and result
in disagreements, the seriousness and frequency of
which stand in inverse ratio to the distance at
which they take place from the point of contact.
When these lines meet, war ensues. This inevitable
hour is approximately fixed and determined by the
angles of convergence plus the sum of the relative
speed by which the nations are moving along their
respective lines. Thus it is that, when the angle of
convergence of both or even one of the nations is
acute and the speed or progress along one or both
of the converging lines correspondingly great, war
results in a few years or decades. If, on the other
hand, the angles of convergence are obtuse and the
speed correspondingly slow, centuries may pass
before the nations are involved in a struggle for
domination or survival.

No two nations or tribes of men move on parallel
lines, though they may for centuries have the ap-
pearance of so doing. Circumstances and condi-
tions, changing from age to age, or from decade to
decade, alter imperceptibly the angle of the line and
accelerate or retard the speed of the advancing
power. When a nation enters into a decadent state
and ceases to advance along any line, but in de-
terioration recedes along the line it has formerly
traversed, the convergence of surrounding nations
at once becomes acute and their speed accelerated

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

proportionately and in direct ratio to the increasing
defencelessness of the decadent country.

As these converging lines of advancement have
their beginnings in the body-politic of a single state,
so within the body-politic of the nation itself is
determined the angle of convergence and their rate
of speed. The people, their wants and their needs,
the various phases of their internal political economy
or decay, the ascendency of militancy or commercial-
ism, the centralization or decentralization of their
government, as well as innumerable other factors,
determine these angles' convergence and the speed
by which nations thunder or creep toward the goal
of their ideals and the summit of their greatness.

Arbitration, to do away with war, must prevent
the contact of these converging lines along which
all nations ever have and ever will continue to move.
Shall they, then, with their colossal lever — not
unlike the hypothetical lever of Archimedes — pry
these lines of national advancement into a state of
parallelism by placing their fulcrum at the angle
of their source or not far distant from the point of
contact, somewhere in fact between the first em-
broilment and the final outburst that culminates in
war? Arbitration, denying the elementary origin
and purpose of combat, declares that its prevention
can take place at the latter point and always in
the angle of contact. With their great lever they
would, at the last moment, prevent these lines from
meeting, and by no other means than attempting

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the cessation of extraneous disagreements and in-
ternational troubles that the proximity of converg-
ing national interests bring about.

It is apparent that even if it were possible to pry
apart or block the converging paths of national in-
terests, such success would be less than temporary,
and not more than procrastination. By settling
disputes — in themselves more or less trivial — that
arise between states and increase in intensity and
frequency as nations draw toward a common point,
they do not stop the advance of a nation nor their
evolution, nor have they anything to do with the
raison d'etre of national progress.

War is but a composite exemplification of the
struggle of man upward: the multiplication of his
individual efforts into one, and the aspirations of
his diurnal strife turned toward a greater and
nobler end, not of himself but of his race. War
cannot be averted by mollifying those extraneous
embroilments that take place as nations in their
advancement converge upon a common objective —
an objective that is necessary to the future growth
of both of them or to the duration of their existence
as a dominant political entity. This objective may
be political, geographical, commercial or ethical;
but, whatever it is, once its acquisition or control is
deemed necessary by more than one nation, then do
they converge upon it, and those international dis-
agreements that eventually take place are only the
manifestations of the approach of their conflicting

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

interests. But so vain is man and so blind is he in
his vanity that he refuses to believe, until it is too
late, that these disputes are the premonitory growls
of an approaching struggle.

So it has been left to this age and to arbitration to
discover that it is only necessary to mollify these
growls. It does not matter if the causes that give
vent to them continue to exist, and the fangs that
are wetted and drooling with human passion draw
nearer. The growls have been stilled, and sign-
boards admonishing peace have been tacked up
along the roads of nations!

Yet we are unable to deny this primitive and
eminently self-satisfying philosophy of arbitration.
It is based on the credulous timidity of man, which
causes him to tremble more at thunder than light-
ning ; more at the smoke as it rolls out of the windows
than the fire; more at the fall of volcanic dust that
obscures the heavens than the molten lava seething
within the crater. If these resultant terrors can
be done away with, even though it is temporary,
mankind should not be troubled at the causes there-
of and burrow down into the cavernous depths where
they abide.

We do not dispute these things, for we recognize
only too \vell that the labors of arbitration are but
human and inspired by human hope. They are the
expedients of a single day. Temporarily, they care
naught for laws that are changeless and which are
in no manner cognizant of them. Transitory and

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

fleeting, momentary and full of faith, they do not
seek to comprehend in any manner the immutable.

Nevertheless, paradoxical as it may appear, while
man cannot arbitrate peace into the world, he can
lengthen the periods of peace by preparation for
war: by recognizing and acting in accordance with
those invariable laws that govern not a portion of
the human race, but the whole of it; not applicable
only for yesterday and to-day, but for all time, for-
ever unto the end; by being cognizant of the fact
that the control of such laws over nations differs
from that over individuals and even lower forms
of animal life only in duration of time and manner
of application.

Arbitration denies, however, the orderly sequence
that follows and is part of the application of natural
laws. Besides being vain even beyond the vanity
of man, it is arbitrary in due proportion as the name
implies. Not only would it substitute its dictum for
laws not of man's making, but would controvert the
application of laws man himself has been forced to
make and uphold and recognize the necessity of their
enforcement.

Arbitration is a denial of the application of dynamic
force in the control of human affairs as they stand in
relation to one another internationally: that when-
ever those difficulties — mentioned herein as rising
out of the increasing proximation of their several in-
terests— shall be settled by formula, then the final
outburst, resulting from a direct contact of these

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

converging lines, may be settled in a similar manner.
In failing to comprehend that the origin of war is
in the evolution of a political entity, and not the
result of it, Arbitrationists fail to differentiate be-
tween the disputes and disagreements that take
place afar from the point of contact and near to it.
They fail to understand that in a republic, or in any
government where the popular voice is listened to,
the nearer these disputes take place to the point of
contact the less do they come within the sphere and
control of statesmen, and the less are they subject
to reason, either in the abstract or in the practical.
When these disputes arise within the acute angle
of convergence they take on a new phase wherein all
the passions that actuate individuals in stress or
anger dominate the actions of the state.

The morality of any nation whose people have
electoral rights is no greater than the morality of its
people. No republic can be free from any of the
motives, passions, ambitions, hate or delinquencies
to which the majority of its people are subject.
And the ability to substitute arbitration without
the use of dynamic force in dealing with interna-
tional affairs must first be substituted in the nation
itself for all laws whose enforcement depends upon
might.

Whenever the time comes that nations are not
obliged to enforce their own laws with a power
superior to that of individuals and communities,
then and then only can they hope to substitute In-

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ternational Arbitration for the power of armies. But
from whence and when will that devoutly wished-
for day come wherein states may discard the use
of power in enforcing justice and in exacting obe-
dience to their laws? When will that Golden Age
be ushered in upon this unhappy earth, and ar-
bitration between individuals substituted for law
and dynamic force in which it originates and ends ?
When will laws made by man for the government of
man, together with his courts, his penal institutions,
be put aside and voluntary arbitration between man
and man take their place ?

Only when arbitration is able to unravel the
tangled skein of crime and hypocrisy among in-
dividuals can it be extended to communities and
nations. Thence will International Arbitration come
of its own accord as the natural outgrowth of
national evolution through the individual. As na-
tions are only man in the aggregate, they are the
aggregate of his crimes and deception and de-
pravity, and so long as these constitute the basis
of individual impulse, so long will they control the
acts of nations.

When, therefore, the merchant arbitrates with the
customer he is about to cheat ; when trusts arbitrate
with the people they are about to fleece; when the
bulls and bears arbitrate with the lambs they are
about to shear; when the thief arbitrates with the
man he is about to rob, or the murderer with his
victim, and so on throughout the category of crime,

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

then will communities be able to dispense with laws,
and international thievery and deception, shearing
and murder, resort to arbitration. But crimes of
individuals — hence nations — stand in inverse ratio
to the power of the state to enforce law. Thus in
1906 in the United States there were one hundred
and eighteen murders to each million of population;
in England less than nine, in Germany less than
five.

All law presupposes the exercise of force in its
execution; hence we find that crime increases pro-
portionately as this power deteriorates.

So completely do Arbitrationists misconstrue the
application of force by a nation in dealing with other
states that they do not differentiate between the
means and the power itself.

VIII

IT is strange a belief should prevail that standing
armies are a menace to the world's quietude,
while it has only been due to the formation of
permanent military forces that intervals of peace
have been lengthened. This misconception of mod-
ern peace is responsible for the theory of national
disarmament.

To attribute to the utensils of combat the cause
of war is the same as saying that man is not re-
sponsible for his good deeds nor guilty of his crimes ;
that he has no self-initiative and is only the will-less
creature of some inanimate instruments that happen
to be in his possession.

Modern civilization began with the invention of
gunpowder. As these black grains were scattered
about, not other than as tiny acorns over the earth,
there sprang up oaks of national strength in the
form of armaments under which, protected from the
vicissitudes and storms that previously assailed
national life as well as individual existence, the arts
and sciences of mankind flourished.
. Prior to the introduction of gunpowder into
Europe no large standing armies existed and no

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

practical peace. All men were considered soldiers,
and, excepting the priesthood, held themselves ready
at all times to respond to their leaders' call. In-
stead of a small fraction of the male population be-
ing on war footing, the whole nation was so con-
stituted ; instead of being the profession of a few men,
it was the business of them all. Each possessed
weapons inexpensive and requiring little or no skill
in their use, so that not only were they ready for
combat at any time, but so long as military duties
were shared by all, instead of by a small portion of
the nation, the avocations of peace were of secondary
importance and that of war primary, not to a few,
but to the entire population.

No continuity marked the pursuit of peaceful
industry, for men were, at all times, liable to be
dragged away from their occupations to that of war.
There was no certainty in the duration of their
labors, no stability nor permanence nor incentive.
Consequently nations could not develop their re-
sources, or the skill or the intellectuality of their
people, or the arts and sciences that come of them.

The invention of gunpowder and weapons for its
use necessitated the organization by the state of per-
manent armies, since the weapons required were not
only too expensive for the people to purchase indi-
vidually, but their use demanded a skill that was
not only the result of personal knowledge, but col-
lective training. When, therefore, nations were
obliged to provide weapons for their troops and to
» 89

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

assemble them together for training, they created a
separate institution. No longer could they assemble
raw levies at a day's notice and hurry them into
combat. The entire people, except those especially
employed in the profession of arms, now turned
their attention to the occupations of peace with the
assurance that there was ever ready a fraction of
the population especially trained for their pro-
tection. Industries and the products of their skill
and genius now thrived with new vigor. Diligently
they went about their work, no longer perturbed
with the thought of being dragged out in the middle
of the night or from their half-completed labor to
march and fight and starve or to die from the in-
numerable diseases that afflicted their unorganized
hordes. Once again orderly civilization and prog-
ress came to man.

So, in due time, all nations changed, and most
happily, from a condition of disarmament and na-
tional militia to armament and conscription. For-
ever and gladly should they pay the expense of it,
for the returns are the civilization and advancement
of mankind. Only by such means can men pursue
with continuity and cumulative returns industries
that bring them not only wealth, but happiness and
wisdom, individually and collectively, over and
above all that which they are called upon to pay.

In the history of nations it will be found that the
growth of their higher civilization is subsequent to
the utilization of permanent armaments, a complete

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

segregation of the militant forces from the in-
dustrial.

Disarmament of standing armies means the arma-
ment of the whole nation. Instead of training to a
high degree of efficiency an insignificant fraction of
the people to protect the whole, the entire male
population is called upon to defend no greater in-
terests. The number of men required to undertake
successfully any military enterprise stands in inverse
ratio to the skill and efficiency of their training.
A most insignificant people can, by a high degree of
military capacity, force the entire male population
of a vast non-militant country into the field and then
destroy them.

Means of self - protection, advancement in all
phases of life, or domination are comparative. So
in nations, armaments are great or small, effective
or worthless as they stand in relation to the arma-
ments of other states with whom their interests
come in contact.

The first introduction of gunpowder caused a
complete segregation of the military forces from
ordinary civil life and necessitated standing armies,
but, as the manufacture of these new weapons grew
apace, they became cheaper, commoner, and event-
ually found their way into each household. For a
considerable period there again existed very little
difference between weapons of chase and warfare, so
that, especially in new countries where the struggle
against aborigines and wild beasts was constant,

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

there was a return, in a certain degree, to that state
of universal militarism or dependence upon the
entire male population to carry on war, instead of
standing armaments proportionate to the need of
the time.

The Napoleonic wars were followed by two phases
of national activity that lengthened the periods of
peace between nations and reduced the number of
wars. First, the introduction by Schornhorst of
conscription in times of peace. Second, the ab-
sorption and unification into large political entities
of smaller states, as the unification of Germany,
Italy, and the Austrian Empire; the supremacy of
the Federal power in the United States; and the
absorption into the British Empire of innumerable
petty potentates and decadent principalities.

The amalgamation of small states into great po-
litical entities is the reason for the diminution in
number and frequency of wars, a lessening of inter-
national conflict that has nothing to do with the
so-called increasing morality of man. International
wars can only be proportionate to the number of
separate political entities into which mankind is
divided. As this absorption goes on by the might
of the strongest state, so wars, while concurrent with
this unification, will in the end diminish. There-
fore, as nations grow less in number the greater must
be their armaments. Wars will diminish numerical-
ly, but the effects will be proportionately greater.

Modern science has, with its inventions, brought

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THE VALOR .OF IGNORANCE

about another cycle in warfare, new as regards
means, but not in cause and effect. The invention
of modern military instruments and mechanical
contrivances has produced the same condition, in
relation to the nation as a whole, as existed some
hundreds of years ago just subsequent to the inven-
tion of gunpowder — i. e., a complete segregation of
the military from civil life, doing away with mili-
tarism, its dangers and evils.

As the single introduction of gunpowder into
warfare caused nations to establish permanent forces
of men trained in its uses, so each new science, as
it is introduced into war, requires more and more
special training on the part of officers and men in
the army. The more science enters into warfare,
the more perfect must be the training of the men
who handle the machine of combat — the army.

Therefore, it will be found that in proportion to
the complexity of the sciences and mechanical in-
ventions employed in war, the longer and more per-
fect must be the training and construction of na-
tional armaments. So, instead of the disarmament
of nations becoming possible through increased
civilization, it becomes more and more impossible
as science increases the number of inventions, not
only of those appertaining directly to war, but in
all other phases of human activity. To the science
of war belongs, or is utilized in one way or another,
every science and invention of mankind. It is
the utilization of them for the purpose of war that

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

will constitute the strength of nations in the future.
Therefore, armies must have long and minute train-
ing in those sciences that are in warfare interde-
pendent. They must act harmoniously or the result
will be a chaotic condition wherein the ignorant
application of a single part will cause the inefficiency
of the whole. This knowledge can be acquired by
the nation in but one way — the unification of the
sciences appertaining to war and by a knowledge of
their practical application. It, therefore, can be
considered an axiom, that as the complexity of
science and mechanical invention increases and
enters more fully into the conduct of war, the less
difference which exists between the peace and war
armaments of a nation, the greater will be its chances
of success.

Science to-day has reached that point in the con-
duct of war wherein the use of volunteers or militia
as against regular troops has become impossible.
And the time is not far distant when nations will
be forced to increase the size of their standing armies,
constituting them only of long-serviced men, and do
away with those ex -regular, short - serviced troops
that now constitute their reserves.

The use by a nation of reserves against regular
troops in the future will only end in defeat, the
dangers of which increase proportionately each
year, while the use of volunteers and militia drawn
from civil life means complete annihilation to what-
ever nation attempts their use.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

As the weakest link in a chain determines the
strength of the chain, so the efficiency and size of
the armament of a single great power determines
the proportionate size and efficiency of all other
nations, according to the part they do or expect to
play in the affairs of the world. Thus, to urge the
reduction of the armament of one's country while
that of other powers increases or remains stationary,
invites the destruction of the government and the
subordination of the fatherland. The need of
armaments must not only be proportionate to the
importance of the state in the comity of nations and
increase proportionately, but the difference between
the peace and war footing must diminish as civiliza-
tion with its science and inventions progresses.
The demands of the future will be, not for less but
for greater armament in all dominant powers.

It has been shown in the earlier part of this work
how man's inventive genius in the means of trans-
portation and communication has reduced the size
of the world to less than the size of the United States
two generations ago. No longer, therefore, can
nations consider themselves safe behind their moats
of space. The peoples of the whole world are now
elbowed together with all their racial antipathies
and convergent ambitions to struggle and war in a
theatre of action no greater than that in which
European nations only a few years ago sweated and
strove for supremacy. On the one hand, while the
causes of war have diminished by the elimination and

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

unification of innumerable smaller nations, on the
other the shrinkage of the world by man's inventions
has brought the remaining nations, different not
only in race, but in civilization, ideals and purposes,
so closely together and with so little hope of amalga-
mation that we cannot say that the possibilities of
war have in the sum total decreased. The peace of
the future must be, as in the past, an armed peace.

There is one element we have not yet considered
in relation to disarmament, viz., the so-called eco-
nomic— the eventual impoverishment of nations by
the burden of armament and diversion of a large
proportion of the population into the class of non-
producers.

It seems most pitiable that men will, in their
fruitless endeavor to find support for their argu-
ments, reduce the sublime to the ridiculous, so that
by getting it down to their level they can better
demolish that which, in its original form, is beyond
them. In this manner of attack calculators excel
all others. They have succeeded in reducing the
evolution of nations to dollars and cents; the sum
totals of which are cataclysms or Utopias according
to the object they have in view. Thus these econo-
mists, piling up the figures of yearly budgets, crying
abroad that nations are impoverishing themselves by
the burden of their armaments, would have us regard
a nation in the same light as a spendthrift individual
who scatters his wealth until poverty is upon him.

It was thought many years ago that Adam Smith

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

had put an effective quietus on this kind of reasoning,
though evidently it will not down, but, not unlike
Banquo's ghost, seems doomed to haunt a certain
species of pretenders even unto the end.

The truth is, if the amount of money expended by
a nation on its army were increased a thousandfold,
the wealth of the nation would not be diminished
one iota, nor would it be impoverished one cent.
Budgets are but the sums total of the symbols of
wealth. Whether they are great or small, the
wealth of the nation varies not one potato. An
individual measures his wealth by coinage, but a
nation only by that which coinage represents. As a
man squanders his money, he becomes impoverished ;
but it is only when the resources and means of pro-
ducing that which money represents is destroyed or
diminished that the wealth of a nation is lessened.
The armament of a nation, instead of being indica-
tive of its impoverishment, is rather an indication of
its capacity. In a single soldier is represented the
various gradations of its wealth; instead of being
prophetic of its destruction, he stands in no other
relation than its protector.

The wealth of a nation, what it produces, is de-
pendent on the natural resources of its territorial
possessions, on the intelligence of its people, the
means they employ, and, lastly, the size of the pop-
ulation. Thus the wealth of France with thirty-
eight million people is infinitely greater than that of
India with two hundred million.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

It is in consideration of these facts, wherein the
statement that national armaments impoverish na-
tions by withdrawing a large number of men from
its productive energy, becomes preposterous. Under
the ordinary definition given by Disarmamentists
two-thirds of the world's population can be classed
as non-producers.

The German Empire possesses the greatest arma-
ment of any nation proportionate to its population ;
yet the entire army — considered as non-producers —
consists of only 1.17 per cent, of the population,
the other 98.83 per cent, carrying on their custom-
ary vocations. While 1.17 per cent, of Germany's
population is in military service, man's inventive
genius during the last generation has increased the
productive energy of the remaining portion of the
population more than a thousand per cent. It is
on account of this increasing productivity of man,
due to the use of mechanical inventions, that nations
will suffer in the future, not from under but over
developed industrialism.

The law of diminishing returns applies only to
the natural resources of the territorial possessions
of a nation. These possessions are great or small,
permanent or temporary, capable of systematic ex-
ploitation or a surface rummaging, in ratio to the
strength or weakness of the nation. On the other
hand, the law of productive energy increases in geo-
metrical ratio to the increase of civilization. The
task in the future will not be to find men to exploit

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the natural resources of a country, but natural re-
sources for the utilization of their inventions and
labor-saving devices. The number of men a state
can withdraw from productive occupations is pro-
portionate to the intelligence of the remainder in
their utilization of mechanical inventions and the
diminishing of natural resources.

A law of national progress might be stated as
follows: A nation, in order to preserve an equilib-
rium between over-industrial production and under-
political development, should withdraw from indus-
trial occupations for military purposes a proportion
of the male population that is (i) not greater than
what labor-saving inventions can, by being sub-
stituted therefor, more than replace the productive
energy lost by the withdrawal of men from indus-
trial production; (2) the number of men so with-
drawn not to be more nor less than that number
which is deemed imperative to acquire or to hold
whatever additional natural resources are neces-
sary for the increasing productive energy of the
nation.

In other words, while the productive energy of a
nation increases in geometrical ratio to the increase
of civilization, the resources of the country diminish
in inverse ratio to the increase of both population
and productive energy. So the nation destined to
survive above all others and to absorb them will be
the sovereign country that maintains this equilib-
rium. Natural resources, therefore, that come with

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

territorial possessions are to be in the future the
first requisite of national greatness.

In the first portion of this work is enunciated the
law that the boundaries of nations are never, other
than momentarily, at rest; and that there are two
phases to this state of agitation, expansion or shrink-
age. Expansion of a nation's boundaries is indica-
tive, not only of its external growth, but of the
virility of its internal constitution; the shrinkage
of its boundaries, the external exemplification of its
internal decay. Both growth and decay have their
origin, not along the rims of national boundaries,
but within the very heart of the state itself, and are
governed by those laws to which we have just given
expression. These laws are not and could not be
new, for they are of man and are as old as the rise
and fall of the first nations. Modern conditions of
life can in no manner affect them. The primitive-
ness of this truth and its material proof is the rise
of the German and Japanese empires. A few dec-
ades ago Japan was almost a myth and the Ger-
man Empire only a geographical possibility. To-day
they are considered equal, and in many respects
superior, in strength and greatness to the other
powers of the world, and for no other reason than
that they have not become top-heavy with indus-
trialism, but have, from Bismarck's time until the
present, recognized the immutability of these laws
and have maintained and are continually preparing
to maintain in the future the equilibrium between

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

their industrial expansion and political develop-
ment. Should Germany on the one hand and Japan
on the other continue to adhere rigorously to these
laws, resisting the deteriorating influence of in-
dustrialism, feminism, and political quackery, they
will, in due time, by the erosive action of these ele-
ments on other nations, divide the world between
them.

Economic disarmamentists propose that all na-
tions mutually exploit the resources of the world
in harmonious and equal division, for by so doing
armies would be disposed of and more men added to
the productive energy of mankind. We have
heretofore shown the impossibility of this proposal
in that political entities are not other than collec-
tions of individuals, and their governments only the
expression of their ideals. Changes in government
for good or bad originate in the people. What the
people are, so is the state, together with all their
passions, wants, hates and struggles ; and whatever
their ideals are, they are exemplified in the conduct
of the government. When, therefore, individuals
voluntarily do away with ideas of possession, so that
complete socialism and harmonious anarchy prevail,
then only will it be possible for such ideals to be
extended to the conduct of international affairs so
that the nations of the world may dwell peacefully
and happily together in a condition of international
communism.

IX

HPHE military preparation of a nation must be
1 determined by its relationship to the balance
of the world geographically, politically and racially.
If the United States were geographically situated
in a sphere of its own, removed from the pathway
of foreign expansion and economic interests, its
foreign policy non - assertive and ductile to the
demands of other nations, the attitude of the pop-
ulace politically and sociologically so constituted
that they would not involve the government in
disputes and entanglements with the people of other
powers, then armies and navies for the Republic
might be dispensed with. Otherwise, its armament
and military preparation must be proportionately
as great as the above hypotheses are categorically
untrue.

Geographically, the territorial possessions of a
nation are provocative of war when they possess a
positive valuation to other nations under three
separate heads — commercial, strategic and racial.

The territorial dominions of the United States are
not only those possessions governed by its laws, but
that vast region of Mexico, the West Indies, Central

JO2

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and South America, which, as far as being causative
of war, are as much under the political sovereignty
of the United States as are the states of the Union.
The preservation of the Constitution is not more
vital than the inviolability of the Monroe Doctrine.

It is, however, necessary in considering these
questions not to regard the world in the old sense
of distance by area or miles, but only in the modem
sense of distance by time. Not many years ago it
took six months to cross from New York to Califor-
nia ; at present it requires four days ; consequently,
to the people in all their practical activities the size
of the United States is less than one-fortieth what
it was fifty years ago. The world, on account of
modern means of communication, is more compact,
as far as the intercourse and conflict of man is con-
cerned, than were the dominions of Caesar or the
kingdoms over which Napoleon cast his shadow.

The possessions of the United States, therefore,
owing to this shrinkage of the world, concern the
great powers geographically, strategically and polit-
ically in as vital a sense as did those territories con-
cern Caesar that finally constituted his dominions,
or the kingdoms of Europe that made up Napoleon's
empires, or the states that constitute this Union;
hence, we must consider them in such light and in
no manner removed from their spheres of activity,
whether it is commercial, political or military.

Europe, having within its borders the greatest
nations of the world and nearly a quarter of its

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

population, consists of less than one- twelfth of the
world's land. Japan, greater in population than the
United Kingdom, possesses only one-two-hundred-
and-fiftieth part of the earth's surface; while the
suzerainty of the United States extends over one-
fourth.

Of the world's territory that comes under the
political jurisdiction of the Republic, two-thirds is
covered by Mexico, Central and South America,
capable of supporting three times as many empires
as now divide Europe. This vast and fabulously
rich continent, practically uninhabited, lies midway
between Europe and Asia and is less distant from
Europe than Poland was from France at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, while the people
of Japan and China can reach its western seaboard
in less time than it took travellers not many years
ago to pass from Prussia to Portugal.

In, however, considering the exploitation of the
Western Hemisphere by the crowded populations
overflowing from Europe on the East and Asia on
the West, innumerable modern factors not only
hasten but increase beyond computation the need
by nations of virgin territory. Not only is the
knowledge of the wealth of every portion of the
world now common to all of mankind through the
rapidity and universality of intercommunication,
but improvements in the arts and sciences extend
more or less over the entire world, resulting in a
common demand by all nations for the primitive

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

materials that enter into the fabrication of modern
arts and sciences.

Accompanying the augmented needs of civilized
man for the almost limitless necessities and luxuries
that modern science has created, but have never-
theless their origin in natural resources, is the de-
mand for unexploited territory. This is not in pro-
portion to the increase of the population, but is due
to that intense cumulative demand brought about
by science and invention, both in consumption and
in the means of exploitation. Formerly, the in-
creased production of necessities and luxuries was
dependent more directly upon the increase of popula-
tion. That condition no longer exists. The in-
crease of production due to increase of population is
insignificant when compared to that due to science
and invention. The very machines that the in-
genuity of man has contrived have become in them-
selves monstrous consumers. The inanimate has
been given teeth and bowels and a hunger that
knoweth not satiety. Man, in order to meet this
ever-increasing thousandfold-by-day consumption of
the world's resources, has turned to science and in-
vention to improve the efficiency and augment the
capacity of exploitation.

While, therefore, the resources of the world are
governed in their exploitation by the law of diminish-
ing returns, and the population of mankind goes
on increasing by the law of nature, there is no law
of nature nor of man that regulates the increase and

8 10$

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

consumption of the devouring, tireless machines by
which man now furrows and devastates the earth
in quest of those things that whole nations to-day
and to-morrow demand. There is no end to this
universal thievery, and the earth continues to be
rooted and drilled and sucked. Day is not time
enough, and night glares and resounds with mon-
strous throbbing. Pathways of cinders mark its
surface and mountains of tailings rise upon it. Man
and nations of men go on struggling even more
madly and deliriously to gain new lands whither
their engines may whistle and scream in Franken-
stein delight as they claw and rend and prod the
virgin earth.

How unreasonable is it, therefore, to expect that
the combined nations of Europe, with all their
military strength, shall remain restricted to one-
twelfth of this world's land, burrowed into and hewn
over for the last thousand years, while this Republic,
without armies, shall maintain dominion over one-
half the unexploited lands of the world! Or that
Japan, possessed of two-thirds the population of
this nation and a military organization fifty-fold
greater, shall continue to exist on her rocky isles
that are, inclusive of Korea, but one-two-hundred-
and-fiftieth of the earth's lands, while an undefended
one-half lies under the guns of her battleships!

What prevents the occupation of this vast and
rich continent by powers having military capacity?
The defensive ability of the Latin republics is, pro-

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

portionately, no greater against European or future
Asiatic military aggression than was the defensive
capacity of the aborigines against the first European
conquerors. Ordinarily, it is believed that the dic-
tum of this Republic, the Monroe Doctrine, has been
responsible for their immunity against foreign
aggression. Nothing could be further from the truth.

There have been five separate causes productive
of Mexican, Central and South American exemp-
tion from foreign conquest:

(r) Inadequacy of transportation and communi-
cation.

(2) Adjustment of European political conditions.

(3) Duration of the pre-inventive or non-me-
chanical period.

(4) A correspondingly low demand for natural
resources.

(5) The seclusion of the Oriental races.

One by one we have seen these sources of im-
munity vanish and antithetic conditions imper-
ceptibly take their place, increasing each year in
cumulative intensity. Herein lies the inevitability
of war between this Republic and European as well
as Asiatic nations, or a complete repudiation of the
Monroe Doctrine. Jn the history of mankind never
before has one nation attempted to support so com-
prehensive a doctrine as to extend its political
suzerainty over two continents comprising a fourth
of the habitable earth and one -half of its unex-
ploited wealth, in direct defiance of the whole world,

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and without the slightest semblance of military
power, nor possessing any right to regulate the
domestic or foreign policy of numerous and irre-
sponsible political entities that simmer and sweat
within two-thirds of its suzerainty.

The Monroe Doctrine is Promethean in concep-
tion, but not so in execution. It was proclaimed in
order to avoid wars; now it invites them. This
great statesman fully realized the inevitable con-
clusions of his doctrine though he could not com-
prehend that, in the vital hour of its need, the
militant power necessary to its enforcement would
all but have vanished in a quagmire of sophistry.

The Republic was at that time separated by vast
oceans from European nations, across which small
wooden craft struggled over their unmapped cur-
rents, and against winds that blew down from the
mysterious regions of an unknown world. Had
Monroe been able to foresee that science and in-
vention would, in a few generations, bring both
continents within less distance of Europe than,
during his life, separated Virginia from New Eng-
land, that the armies of five European nations
would exceed the population of the thirteen colonies,
and that beyond the Western, mystic ocean would
suddenly emerge out of impenetrable mists even
greater empires to struggle and war for the pos-
sessions encompassed by his proclamation, how
much more insistent would he have been upon the
strict and inviolable maintenance of it! How care-

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ful would he have been to command the augmenta-
tion of military force proportionate to the increasing
probability of its violation.

The Monroe Doctrine, if not supported by naval
and military power sufficient to enforce its observ-
ance by all nations, singly and in coalition, becomes
a factor more provocative of war than any other
national policy ever attempted in modern or ancient
times. Yet it is given to us, in this swift-ebbing
age, to witness the sad spectacle of this great
national doctrine slowly but surely vanishing in
a slough of national self-beguilement, an all-encom-
passing mud-puddle of mediocrity. Societies, relig-
ions, unions, business men and politicians, on the
one hand, spare no effort to debase every militant
instinct and military efficiency or preparation neces-
sary for its enforcement, while, on the other, they
demand that the Chief Executive shall assert to the
entire world this Republic's intention to maintain,
by the force of arms if necessary, this most warlike
and encompassing policy ever enunciated by man
or nation.

The Old World smiles at this childish credulity
as it goes calmly on ploughing the fields of the world
with its fire-breathing, brazen teams, sowing the
teeth of dragons, reaping the harvest of warriors,
and in due time to gain by this husbandry the
golden fleece of the Western Hemisphere.

The possessions that come within the jurisdiction
of the Monroe Doctrine are not, however, the only

iog

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

territories under the political sovereignty of this
Republic that are geographically so located as to
be considered provocative of war. We divide these
foreign possessions into three groups: (i) the Carib-
bean Sea; (2) the Central Pacific; (3) the Asiatic.
While these islands are not a source of war com-
mercially, they are strategically. The value of all
possessions is as much determined by the control
of the intervening lines of communication as by
their intrinsic wealth. The oceans, constituting
seventy- three per cent, of the globe, are the main
lines of trade between nations, and to the extent
that these ways of commerce are controlled does a
a nation or group of nations, so commanding them,
possess the wealth of the world. If the United
States controlled the ways from Europe and Asia
to this hemisphere, neither Europe nor Asia could
gain possessions in North or South America. If,
on the other hand, the Atlantic and Pacific are con-
trolled by the European and Asiatic nations, re-
spectively, then the United States is powerless not
only to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, but to protect
its insular possessions or the commerce of the
Union.

In order for a nation or coalition of nations to
gain control over lines of communication, whether
on land or sea, it is first necessary to secure points
of vantage; in other words, territorial possessions
for strategic purposes only. Napoleon declared the
intent of war to be a struggle for position. All great

no

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

wars are preceded by these conflicts. The possession
by a nation of highly strategic points is, unless de-
fended beyond a question of doubt, even more
provocative of war than territories sought after on
account of their intrinsic wealth. The possession of
strategic positions determines to a greater extent
than any other factor the issue of an international
conflict. Hence, there must come in due time those
inevitable struggles for position which will precede
all wars for conquest of the unexploited territories
of the Western Hemisphere by the nations of
Europe and Asia.

In the Atlantic, the future theatre of war in
which to secure strategic position will be the Carib-
bean Sea. No one locality in or bordering on the
Atlantic possesses such strategic possibilities as does
the control of this sea. Whatever powers gain un-
disputed command over it will gain supremacy
over one-half the Western Hemisphere. We divide
its strategic possibilities under four heads:

(1) The command of the Panama Canal and
Central America.

(2) The command of the Gulf of Mexico and the
Atlantic seaboard of Mexico.

(3) The command of the Atlantic seaboard from
Cape Hatteras to Key West.

(4) The command of the Atlantic seaboard of
South America.

The control of the Panama Canal is the most im-
portant factor of these four divisions, since it belongs

in

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

only to the nation that militarily commands its ap-
proaches; who builds it is immaterial. Should any
nation expend in the same period of time an equiv-
alent amount of money on battleships as is being
expended by the United States in the canal's con-
struction, not only would Panama become its
property, but in addition all those possessions that
centre and are dependent on the control of the
Caribbean Sea; viz., the southern half of the Western
Hemisphere.

With the exception of the Monroe Doctrine, no
undertaking since the formation of this Republic is
more fraught with possibilities of warfare, or calls
for greater military and naval expansion than the
building of the Panama Canal. Unless the United
States is willing to increase the military and naval
strength proportionate to the dangers that at once
become existent with its completion, it is a mistake
to proceed with its construction.

The Isthmian Canal, by reducing the distance
from Europe to the Western seaboard of North and
South America, makes probable what is now im-
possible— the commercial and military invasion of
the Eastern Pacific by Europe. In other words, it
centres the attention of the world to five hundred
feet of waterway.

For a European fleet to reach San Francisco or
Valparaiso via the Panama Canal, the distance is
only three-eighths greater than for an American fleet
steaming from New York harbor. While hereto-

112

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

fore the Western seaboards were completely re-
moved from the sphere of European naval activities,
that condition no longer exists on the completion
of the canal.

The eventual control of the Panama Canal is fore-
told by the history of the Suez, which, diminishing
the distance between Europe and the Orient to one
half, became the main channel of communication
between the West and the East. Built by France,
it soon passed into English possession. The con-
trol of the Suez by England resulted from her
masterful position in the Mediterranean and the
Red Sea — the strategic possessions of Gibraltar,
Malta, Egypt and Aden. That France built the
canal determined in no way its final ownership.
The possessions of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt
and Aden, together with a navy maintained on a
basis of being equal to the navies of any possible
coalition, determined to whom, in time of war, the
canal would belong. Great Britain not only con-
trols, by means of it, the Oriental trade, but domi-
nates the political relationship that Europe bears to
Asia. What has brought about English commercial
supremacy throughout the world has been, not
alone the supremacy of the English navy, but the
possession of strategic bases. The existence of a
great navy is entirely dependent on the ownership
of strategic positions in different quarters of the
globe and maintained by force.

The Panama Canal is as important to the world
"3

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

as the Suez, and not less so to European nations
than to the American republics. The control of
it is as vital to the nation that desires to command
the commercial as well as political destiny of the
Eastern Pacific as the Suez is to England in the
control of Asiatic hegemony.

The Caribbean Sea corresponds to the Mediter-
ranean, and its islands and neighboring coasts to
Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Crete and Egypt. In
the Pacific, Hawaii corresponds to Aden. At the
present time the United States, England, France,
as well as the Netherlands — which in the future can
be considered as German — have possessions in or
adjacent to the Caribbean Sea; i. e., a basis of mili-
tary expansion and control. Nations possessing
territory adjacent to the canal must be considered
as factors in determining its future ownership.

The United States, at the present time, is strateg-
ically superior in the Caribbean to all the rest of
the world, not only on account of the adjacency of
its mainland, but the possession of the Canal Zone,
Puerto Rico, Cuba and Hawaii, which gives it
strategic possibilities that should make it the un-
disputed arbiter of the Western Hemisphere. But
the strategic positions now held by this Republic,
completely naked of defence, have for the future
only one significance — that of wars for their pos-
session.

The command of the Caribbean Sea by a Eu-
ropean nation would not only control the Panama

114

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Canal, the Western seaboard of North and South
America, the Atlantic seaboard from Cape Hat-
teras to Cape Horn, but it would separate the
United States from the southern continent and
nullify completely the Monroe Doctrine. These are
the inducements to tempt European nations, singly
or in coalition, to secure command of the Caribbean
Sea, which, as we look into the future, is the second
most important strategic sphere on the globe.

The Pacific insular possessions of the United
States are also geographically so situated that they
are as necessary for the command of the Pacific as
are the islands of the Caribbean Sea for the com-
mand of the southern portion of the Western
Hemisphere. Whatever nation possesses them con-
trols the Pacific, upon whose seaboard dwell one
half of the human race.

The consideration of the inevitable struggle for
the dominion of the Pacific we have left to the con-
cluding chapters of this work, where, in detail,
will be shown the fallacies of this nation's military
system, the falsity of the glamour that surrounds
it, the primitiveness of its conception, its inherent
elements of deterioration and incapacity to engage
in successful warfare with a great power.

X

WHILE the sources of war have their origin deep
down in that primitive struggle of nations and
races to survive, to conquer and be supreme, the
precipitating causes of international conflicts are
found generally in the unreasoning vanity, acts
and passions of the diverse tribes of man, as they
strive along in that old and endless struggle which
is Life.

The previous chapter dealt with the sources of
international strife into which this Republic will,
sooner or later, be plunged. In this chapter we will
consider the causes that hasten and will precipitate
these wars — a consideration of the diverse peoples
that come under the suzerainty of the United States.

We divide these people into two classes:

(r) The inhabitants of the nation's insular pos-
sessions and the Latin republics encompassed by
the Monroe Doctrine.

(2) The heterogeneity of the electoral populace
of the Union, constituting the government of the
nation by and for them.

Homogeneity of race has been recognized as an
invariable principle in determining the stability of

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

national institutions. The formation and execution
of national ideals are possible only as this principle
remains inviolable. The theorem and corollary gov-
erning, in this relation, the condition of national
existence can be stated as follow:

(r) The vitality of national life, being depend-
ent upon the harmony of its component parts, is
capable of resisting temporal erosion in proportion
to its racial homogeneity.

(2) The deterioration of a political entity, sub-
ject to the diversity of its constituent elements, is
slow or rapid in proportion to the fractional facets of
its racial heterogeneity.

To these laws, in the past, there has been no
variation, and that modification due to greater
assimilativeness on account of the universality and
rapidity of intercommunication is so remote that
it cannot be considered; for at the present time it
acts only in the closer cementation of peoples of
common ancestry, and defines even more sharply
the lines between races.

When a nation is composed of different peoples,
its comparative stability can be said to be great or
fragile as its government is in the hands of one
dominant race or is diffused proportionately through
the various racial and political elements that com-
pose it.

Political history shows us again that only so long
as the political and military power of a heterogene-
ous nation remains in the hands of a single element

117

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

does it endure. As this power gradually slips away
on account of the deterioration of the dominant
race and becomes diffused throughout the nation,
political dissension and territorial disintegration
begins. Anciently, this was true of the Chaldean,
Egyptian, Persian, Indian, Macedonian, Roman,
the Mongol empires, and all other nations composed
of variant racial elements. At the present time
similar conditions are existent in a number of great
nations scattered abroad over the world. The true
significance of the break-up of the Chinese Empire
is not other than the final passage of the Manchus
and a natural reversion of the empire, if not de-
stroyed in the dissolution of the dominant race, to
the control of a single homogeneous people. For
three centuries the Manchus have maintained them-
selves by retaining all political and military power
over the entire Chinese race. This they are now
about to abdicate, and, with the relinquishment of
their political prerogatives heretofore guarded so
zealously, the empire will pass over into the keep-
ing of a more virile people. Soon shall the world
witness their melancholy, and perhaps tragic, exit
from the Palace of the Dragon and their vanishing
through the sombre portals of the half-shadowed
tombs that await them in the Valley of Liaoho.

In the racial dissimilarity of the Austrian and
Turkish empires are to be found similar sources of
political weakness and eventual dissolution. In
Russia the ruling and racially homogeneous portions

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of the empire, having lost their autocratic rights,
the nation is being given over to a babble of ele-
ments struggling for political supremacy, and the
Russian policy of world -empire has, for the time
being, come to an end.

The Marquis of Salisbury, in a few words, enun-
ciated the future of the British Empire;

"There have been great colonial and maritime
powers, four or five, but they have always fallen.
... If we ever allow our defences at sea to fall to
such a point of inefficiency that it is as easy, or nearly
as easy, to cross the sea as it is to cross a land fron-
tier, our great empire, stretching to the ends of the
earth, supported by maritime force in every part of
it, will come clattering to the ground when a blow
at the metropolis of England is struck."

In other words, when the power of the British
Empire ceases to emanate in all its absolutism from
the gloom of a London street, then will it and all
its greatness fall away.

Under the wide, fitful shadow of the American
flag is found a heterogeneity of mankind racially,
politically, religiously and geographically more di-
vergent than has heretofore ever come under the
political jurisdiction of a single nation; and in the
sense of being provocative of war, a source of tur-
moil and struggle, there has seldom existed one more
resonant with the alarums of future combat.

It is not always necessary to consider the racial
elements involved, for that sinks into comparative

119

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

insignificance when the political looseness govern-
ing this heterogeneity of mankind is considered;
the vast geographical area over which a portion of
these elements, as distinct racial and political en-
tities, are scattered ; the manner in which they have
come to be subordinate or subject to the decrees
of the Republic; or that other heterogeneity,
through which, by the electoral franchise, is diffused
the political and military integrity of this nation.

In considering the people of the insular posses-
sions of -the United States as causative of war, they
must be so regarded in three different lights:

(1) The manner of their subordination; whether
voluntary or due to the physical might of this
Republic.

(2) Their racial character; whether it is similar
to and assimilative by the people of the United
States, or whether it is similar to and assimilative
by a power other than this nation.

(3) The geographical location of these racially
different possessions as regards their worth to other
powers.

The Philippines, Puerto Rico, and in a sense Cuba,
can be considered as conquered nations over whom
the sovereignty of this Republic was extended in
principle no different from that of Spain. The in-
habitants of these countries opposed by force the
dominion of Spain, and sacrificed thousands of their
people that they in the end might become politically
independent states. The spirit that "actuated their

120

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

struggles against Spain has not been lessened by a
transfer of dominion. As, in the Philippines, each
family paid its toll of blood to Spanish dominion,
so have they to American conquest. The heroisms
of the Spanish War, and the tales of valor such as
speed from threshold to threshold, have now been
replaced by those newer acts of self-sacrifice that
tell of combats with the soldiery of this Republic.

While time mollifies the spirit of conquerors or
erodes it into small dust, the spirit — which is hate —
of the conquered endures on, apparently without
end. As the inhabitants of these islands, both in
the East and West, were continually in revolt
against Spanish domination, so will they be against
this nation whenever the military power over them
is withdrawn or deteriorates. Moreover, by educa-
tion, the United States is increasing the compre-
hension of their subjugation and combative ability.
Nothing is more erroneous than the belief that pa-
triotism to an alien conqueror is evolved out of
general education. The education of the masses,
under such conditions, only develops and gives ex-
pression to instincts and propensities already exist-
ent. Not unlike Pandora's box does it open to the
hungry nature of conquered man new diseases of
vanity, new epidemics of unrest, new fevers of
ambition.

As these peoples forced Spain into war with the
United States to gain their ends, they will not hesi-
tate to involve this nation in war, if by so doing its
9 121

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

military efficiency will be destroyed or crippled to
the extent of making possible a successful war of
independence, the right of which this country must
concede, since it owes its own origin as a sovereign
state to such procedure.

That hatred of Americans exists in these islands
is disputed by none but politicians. The expendi-
tures of the United States to improve the education
of the people and the administration of the govern-
ment have in no way diminished the spirit of revolt.
Whatever wounds have been closed have been by
scarification. The hatred of the conquered is the
most enduring of all human passions, and it must
never be forgotten by a conquering nation that,
whatever they get by force, by force they must con-
tinue to hold.

The impossibility of the American people assimi-
lating the inhabitants of these foreign possessions
is apparent.

(1) Distinct racial differences.

(2) The number of Americans who will live per-
manently in the possessions will be so insignificant
that their presence racially will have no effect upon
the inhabitants. But on the other hand, they, being
numerically so inferior and unfitted by nature to
withstand the erosive action of the climatic condi-
tions, will soon vanish in the gloom of tropic depths,
whither the marsh-lights of their fancied superiority
led and abandoned them.

Assimilation of races is governed by the same

122

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

natural law that determines the assimilation of all
forms of animal life. The characteristics belonging
to a race numerically predominant and physically
fittest to the environment will dominate completely
a race alien to the land and climate and numerically
inferior.

The government of foreign possessions and con-
quered lands is an old task of mankind, and the
empirical knowledge concerning it, co-extensive with
antiquity, permits us to form more or less positive
conclusions as to the means that make it possible
or circumscribe the bounds beyond which the am-
bitions of man must not go. Knowledge gained
through the devastation of so many lands and the
going down of so many great empires should deter-
mine the policy of the United States in its relation-
ship to that vast one-fourth of the world over which
it has tossed with careless boldness the thirteen
folds of its flag.

However confident one may feel of a greater future
for this Imperial Republic, it is only possible to be-
lieve in its triumphs if it prepares for them ; if not,
then must one look forward to the washing-away of
all that was destined to be great in it.

The difference between the political heterogeneity
of empires and that of population is as wide as is
their capacity to provoke war and their incapacity
to wage it. A nation that is made up of various
minor peoples of distinct racial characteristics is
exposed to the probabilities of war in proportion to

123

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the number of nationalities that, constituting its
suzerainty, possess political franchise and voice in
its government. Nevertheless, such a nation might
endure indefinitely, provided that the military forces
are always proportionate to the possibilities of war,
and the governmental and military powers securely
held within the hands of a homogeneous people.
When, however, the exercise of government and the
command of national resources passes into the con-
trol of heterogeneous elements, the possibilities of
national dissolution are correspondingly increased.

There are, within maritime countries, two latent
elements of decay: the racial heterogeneity of its
component states, and a heterogeneous admixture
of the ruling people. This latter condition is al-
ways the resultant of the former. It is the first of
that sickness which has not only dissipated national
aspirations, but has been instrumental in the dissolu-
tion of dynasties and nations, whether republics or
kingdoms. Of the tribes of man that have, in this
manner, made their final melancholy trek across
those illimitable steppes they traverse but once,
they have left behind, at the most, but a crumbling
tumulus of statutes and human decrees, by which
they sought to nullify the simple yet imperishable
laws of nature.

A nation may be kept intact only so long as the
ruling element remains homogeneous. When, how-
ever, the political and military power passes from
it to racial elements that are dissimilar, and political-

124

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ly as well as numerically constitute the main por-
tion of the country, then the ideal of national
supremacy is lost in the endless controversies of
internal legislation and petty ambitions.

In the previous chapter is shown how the depend-
encies of this Republic, covering one-fourth of the
earth, and bound together only by the fragilest of
chains, are each provocative, to a greater or lesser
degree, of war with the expanding nations of Europe
and Asia. In this chapter will be considered the
people who now rule this one-quarter of the globe,
showing not only their incapacity to control de-
pendencies, but the difficulty of controlling them-
selves; and that the wider this power becomes the
greater are the probabilities of war.

While racial similarity is recognized as the primi-
tive basis of all national security, it is by no means
as essential in an autocratic form of government as
in a republic, inasmuch as in an autocracy the ruling
power, however small it may be, is generally kept
free from admixture with other elements. But in
a republic all participate in the government, and
it is only a question of numerical superiority for an
element alien in race, alien in aspiration, and alien
to the spirit of the government to completely sup-
plant the race that founded the republic, together
with their ideals and ambitions.

This Republic, together with its declarations, its
statutes and constitutions, was founded by men not
only alike in race, but in ideals and intentions.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Until the time of the Civil War the American could
be considered a homogeneous people. But the stat-
utes and declarations made at that time for con-
serving the national ideals were only fitted to con-
trol and direct the growth and course of the nation
so long as it remained a country one in race and
spirit.

At the beginning of the Civil War the foreign non-
Anglo-Saxon element in this country was less than
one- twelfth of the population. In 1900 this homo-
geneity of population had declined to less than
seven-twelfths. Since that time this declination of
primitive Americanism has gone on at even greater
speed.

Not alone, however, must the admixture of alien
races inhabiting the states of the Union be con-
sidered as provocative of war because they exceed
the Anglo-Saxon race in numbers, but rather be-
cause of their peculiar geographical distribution.
In a number of Southern States the negro out-
numbers the white inhabitants, while in most of
the other states in the South they exceed one-third
the population. Of these negroes forty-four per
cent, are wholly illiterate. In the Northern States
ninety-four per cent of the European immigrants
become domiciled, and at the present time there are
in this country over thirty million persons of foreign
parentage.

In the great cities of the world are to be found,
more or less entire, those factors that determine the

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

course and eventual end of nations within whose
boundaries they are placed. From such cities, in
proportion to their size, emanate determinate factors
in the good and evil of nations. Especially is this
so in republics, where the government is dependent
upon the will of majorities. In cities such as Boston,
Buffalo, Chicago, Hartford, Cleveland, Milwaukee
and San Francisco over a third of the population is
foreign-born; while in other cities, as Lowell, Fall
River and New York, over half the population are
foreigners. The racial character of these popula-
tions not Anglo-Saxon is exemplified in New York,
where it is approximately divided as follows : three-
quarters of a million German, more than a quarter
of a million Russian, nearly half a million Italian,
as well as half a million Poles, Austrians, and Hun-
garians, while another quarter of a million is made
up of other nationalities. Each month the foreign
population of these cities increases, and so rapidly
that in a few years the Anglo-Saxon American will
stand in inverse ratio to what he does now. In due
time the strategic positions of this Republic, polit-
ical, moral and social, will be in the hands of those
who know in no manner the truth of human equality,
nor the spirit of those who made it possible in seven
thin and ragged years, years that tried not alone
the hearts of men, but the souls of them.

If there is any such thing as patriotism, then a
naturalized citizen is an anomaly. What fidelity can
be attributed to a man who not only forswears the

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

land of his birth, but that of his forefathers, their
dust and their deeds ? If, on the other hand, he is
not an apostate in this act of naturalization, then
he is a liar. But by neither one nor the other con-
dition is it possible to expect from him other than
that which impelled his immigration to this Repub-
lic— the betterment of his personal condition. He
not only cannot share in national ideals, but he
cannot comprehend them. If national ideals are
capable of being aroused in him, then they must be
for his native country. Patriotism, as ordinarily
understood, does not permit the forswearing of one's
nationality and the adoption of another with a con-
comitant display of greater virtue in adopted than
in native patriotism. It is not possible that a Slav
will be a better American than Slav, or that an
Italian possesses more virtues in America than in
Italy.

American nationalization is not a racial anti-
septic.

The hereditary instincts of unnumbered genera-
tions are not erased from the fibre of men by the
word of an official.

The application of American institutions to the
control of the lower elements of Europeans who
constitute the vast majority of immigrants has
proven to be productive of crime rather than civic
virtues, while the liberty given them is but a Pan-
dorean gift of winged felonies.

Crime is an index to national character, as well as
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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

individual, and it is by this index that we make
note of the character of the naturalized citizen as
well as the citizen born of foreign parents. By this
same index of crime, expanding in direct ratio to
increasing heterogeneity of population, do we find
greater incompatibility existing between their in-
herent character or propensities and American in-
stitutions. With the increase of individual crime
is an expansion of national lawlessness that tends
externally to international warfare, and internally
to eventual dissolution or the introduction of a
strongly centralized form of government, monar-
chial, autocratic, or what not, but that the homo-
geneous element shall rule, and shall with its great
iron ladle alone stir this potpourri of mankind and
skim off the scum that rises from it.

In considering the probabilities of war due to
mixed populations, it must be understood that the
morality of a nation, especially a republic, is not
that morality expressed in its constitutions, its
statutes, or declarations, but is, on the other hand,
the composite morality of the major portion of the
population which, as it becomes more immoral and
criminal, hastens onward to those vaster excesses
of unrestraint that are wars.

Beginning with the increase of European immi-
gration, about fifty years ago, crime has become
more multitudinous and rampant. Prior to the
Civil War there were only twenty-nine prisoners to
every hundred thousand of the population. From

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the time of the war up to the present, crime has in-
creased more than five hundred per cent., while there
has been considerably less than two hundred per
cent, increase in population. That this is due to the
relationship existing between the immigrant and
American institutions is shown by the fact that
they are less criminal in their own countries than in
the United States.

In 1906 there were in England to each million of
the population eight murders committed, in Ger-
many four, in the United States one hundred and
eighteen. The average number of murders during
each of the last twenty years was thirty times greater
than the total number of men killed on the field dur-
ing the Spanish-American War. The annual number
of soldiers slain in the Civil War was but slightly in
excess of persons now murdered each year in these
times of peace, in this land, not of liberty, but of li-
cense. The cost of crime in the United States annual-
ly exceeds the entire expenditure made necessary by
any of the American wars other than the Rebellion.

The distribution of criminality in this Republic,
according to nationality, is approximately as fol-
lows: twenty-four per cent, of the prisoners are
born of native white parents, while seventy-six per
cent, are either foreigners, born of foreign parents,
or negroes. The criminality of natives born of
foreign parents exceeds that of the foreign - born,
while the foreign-born criminals exceed those born
of native parents in ratio of 56.81 to 43.19. In

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

this Republic the Germans exceed all other for-
eigners in criminality, while in their native land,
under a form of government suited to them, crime
is reduced to a minimum.

Denial of obedience to law may occur collectively
as well as individually, if tendency to crime in the
individual is prevalent. When the refusal to obey
the law comes from an individual, it is a felony of
some sort. When it occurs collectively, by a section
of a nation as against the whole, it is rebellion;
when it occurs collectively against international law
and usage, it is war. The origin of a collective re-
fusal of a nation to obey international law is very
little removed, if at all, from the breaking of a local
law by an individual, which is called a crime. It
can be justly said that the criminality of a nation
is a true index as to proportionate probabilities of
war having cause in the acts and passions of peo-
ple; and in ratio to the progression or retrogression
of crime in a people, may war — as far as the people
are productive of it — draw near or recede.'

Tendencies toward crime individually, as well as
nationally, increase in greater ratio when the hetero-
geneity of a country is of a lower moral status than
the original population of the nation and exceeds
it in numbers. Not only is it physiologically im-
possible for a superior portion of mankind to assimi-
late the inferior without the concomitant loss of
superiority, but in this Republic there is, in addi-
tion to the deterioration by intermarriage, the in-

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

fection of social contact, the erosive effect of in-
ferior morals, a bastard patriotism, and finally the
giving over into the hands of foreigners, in no man-
ner imbued with the true spirit of American insti-
tutions, the preservation of those primitive rights
upon which the great but fragile edifice of this Re-
public was builded.

We have already shown that ninety-four per cent,
of the European immigrants settle in those very
states, the Eastern and Northern, where is held the
balance of political power, and that in most of the
great cities from New York to San Francisco the
foreign population varies from one-third to over
one-half. Should the present rate of immigration
continue, it is only a question of a few years when
the voting majorities in all great cities will be
foreign. The character of the present immigration
is not rural; to them the meanest tenement in a
city is preferable to the fairest field in the world.

Prior to the influx of European immigrants im-
mediately preceding the Civil War, the ratio of ur-
ban to the total population was only twelve per
cent.; in 1900 it had increased to over thirty-one
per cent. In a few years it will exceed fifty per
cent., and will be in an electoral sense foreign.

Republics, governed by the divine right of ma-
jorities, that illegitimate offspring of the divine
right of kings, are controlled, not by rural districts
nor sparsely settled states, but by centres of popu-
lation, where radiate not alone political predomi-

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

nance, but the moral and social tendencies of the
nation. Thus New York City, with one-half of its
population foreign, not only in birth, but foreign
in their appreciation of American institutions, has
more representatives in Congress than nine West-
ern states.

The status of morals in rural districts has no
effect whatsoever on urban populations, while, on
the other hand, the morality of a city, whether high
or low, is, within the radius of its influence, the
determining factor as regards general morality of
that section of the nation.

We have pointed out four salient conditions aris-
ing from heterogeneity of population in this Repub-
lic that tend to phases of human activity other
than those of peace.

(1) The precipitating causes of all future wars
rests with the people.

(2) In direct ratio to the criminality of the
populace are to be found concomitant probabilities
of war.

(3) This Republic exceeds all other civilized na-
tions in crime.

(4) Most of this criminality arises from its hete-
rogeneous population, which is increasing and con-
fining itself to cities, the strategic points morally,
socially, and politically of the Republic.

Were there no other probabilities of war than
those arising from the variant racial classes that
make up the Republic, that alone should suffice to

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

keep this country prepared instead of denying its
possibilities. Through the excessive criminality of
any nation there will always exist concomitant vio-
lation of the rights and privileges of other countries
as guaranteed to them by the usage of international
law, and which must, in due time, culminate in
war.

XI

TJERETOFORE, in various phases, have been
11 considered probabilities of future wars that
should be sufficient at least to turn the attention
of this Republic to preparation for them rather
than to continue in its present course of not only
indifference, but active antagonism to any better-
ment of its military inefficiency.

In the last few decades the wearing down of this
never over-large world into the communicable con-
fines of what, three generations ago, would not have
been considered a great state, has gone on without
cessation. The shrivelling up of the political sphere
of man has its corollary in the expansion of its com-
ponent parts — the nations that constitute it. Man
has now caught up to Time in its flight. Distance
is no longer distance whole and vast, for it has been
so pared down that only the shavings of it are left
in the workshops of man. There are no longer
oceans nor deserts nor abysses behind and beyond
which nations of men can live secure. Upon this
hour-encompassed world, dwindling down each dec-
ade, must nations wrestle interminably.

In Europe there is no expansion eastward; in

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Asia there is no westward course of empire. West
must the peoples of Europe go, and eastward those
of Asia, until in this hemisphere, on American con-
tinents, these two tides, inundating all before them,
shall meet and struggle and subside. To prevent
this the Monroe Doctrine was framed, exclusion laws
enacted, new insular territory appropriated. Then
— somnolent with the opiate of transitory power —
this nation passes into the wild delirium of those
dreams where chimeras give chase to phantoms.

In conjunction with the heterogeneity and con-
comitant criminality of those who would rule the
Western Hemisphere, we will consider probabilities
of war from a source that is fraught with more
dangers than any heretofore examined — the con-
trol of the government by the populace.

In consideration of the relationship that popular
control of government bears to the causes of war,
the character of the populace is more or less im-
material; the essential point to be considered is the
degree of control the populace has over the central
government. As the populace becomes more ab-
solute in the control of governmental affairs, the
chances of war increase accordingly; and to the
degree that it is racially heterogeneous the prob-
abilities of international strife are augmented.

In proportion to the greatness of the sphere over
which a government by the people extends its sway
is to be found a corresponding increase in the dan-
gers of war. And when, in .addition, the political

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and territorial expansion of such a nation comes in
contact with similar expansion of any oligarchic or
autocratic form of government, the result is con-
tention; in defeat, dissolution or reversion to a
similar form of monarchy. As is increased or de-
creased the number of individuals who direct the
affairs of a nation, so is altered the wisdom of its
acts, its stability and power of survival. Five wise
men can better direct, and to superior greatness,
the destiny of a nation than can fifty million of
men possessed of similar wisdom. But, as the
number of individuals who are in control of national
affairs increases, there is a concomitant decrease of
intelligence, until finally the whole nation is flounder-
ing about in the wide, shallow slough of mediocrity.
Out of this there is no relief until that which is
mud shall subside, and that which is clear shall
again reflect the iridescence of not common — but
superior — sense.

It is unfortunately true that with increasing popu -
lar control of governmental affairs, such as marks
the evolution of this nation, there is not, and never
will be, a proportionate increase in the intelligence
of the masses to the point that they will be able to
comprehend the complex obligations that constitute
the international rights and duties of governments.
Even if the wisdom of the masses should rise to im-
probable heights, there would be no diminution in
the improbabilities of just observance of the rights
of foreign nations.

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The success of negotiations between nations, as
among individuals, is in proportion to the number
of negotiators, interests and prejudices involved.
When the government of a country is the govern-
ment of the masses, the number of negotiators is
increased to the whole nation, and involves not only
their mediocrity, but unending self-interests and
prejudices. It was this perversion of government
that confirmed John Hay in the belief that this
Republic would not again be able to make an im-
portant treaty.

By treaties international affairs are governed, and
inability to make such stipulations is only another
way of stating the impossibility of observing treaties
already made. Of the failure on the part of the
United States to observe the rights and privileges
due other nations, we have had many and melan-
choly instances.

The mind of a nation in dispute is its mob-mind,
credulous and savage. It is primitive, hence brutal.
It is feminine, hence without reason. It is instinc-
tive to the degree of an animal, and is cognizant only
of its own impulses and desires. It is full of hates
and frivolities. While the mind of an individual is
more or less constructive, the mob-mind is intelli-
gent only in devastation. Reason roams sullenly
in the dim labyrinths of its brain: a Minotaur to
whom the world ever and endlessly yields up its
tribute; seven Youths that are Empires; seven
Maidens that are Progress. Mob-minds can be

138

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

active only in a destructive sense. As the sum
total of the collective efforts of man under individual
direction constitutes the upbuilding of a nation,
so the sum total of their collective acts uncontrolled
is marked by ruin. Whenever the mob-mind rules,
mankind shudders. Its voice is the evil banshee
of nations.

To the divine right of majorities should be added
the will of constituents — a condition that aborts
nationalism and benumbs where it would rule. In
Republics every office down to the pettiest of magis-
trates is supposedly subject to the approval of the
populace. But in actuality politicians are sub-
servient to it only in its wrath, hence they abet a
popular demand for war, instead of opposing it.
The will of constituents has resulted in a continual
struggle to localize the efforts . of government by
the paramount interests of sectional legislation.
Whatever may be the foreign policy of the national
government, that policy must be sacrificed if it in-
terferes with their self-interests.

As the government of a nation passes under
popular control, its energies and progress are more
and more consumed in the contention of internal
affairs, while the nation as a whole drifts along
among Scyllas and shoals innumerable. It is in this
drifting that the tempests of war are encountered.
A nation to withstand the tides and storms of ero-
sive time must progress internationally ; its internal
affairs made subordinate to its foreign policy, and

139

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

controlled to conform with its needs and vicissi-
tudes. In republics, however, the reverse of these
conditions exists, so that the nation as a derelict
drifts along toward the Great Port whither others
have also drifted, a port without shores or tempests.

When the inhabitants of one nation are prejudiced
against the people and institutions of others, they
designate this prejudice patriotism; but when such
foreign antipathy is not brought in active use this
kind of patriotism hibernates, and the nation gives
itself over to sectional prejudices, which are strong
or weak in proportion to the strength or weakness
of the central government. When the national
government becomes subordinate to delegates rep-
resenting the will of constituencies, then the nation
becomes more or less incoherent. The will of con-
stituencies, or the mob-minds of them, has three
salient characteristics: it is selfish, with a selfish-
ness that never rises above the flattest mediocrity;
improvident, with an improvidence of children;
inflammable as tinder, its conflagrations are war;
its embers, rebellions; while over the cinders, over
the ash and slag of its going out, other nations pass
or flare up.

As the government of a nation passes under the
control of the populace, it passes, to a certain degree,
beyond the pale of peaceful association with other
nations. It enters into a condition of arrogant un-
rest, an isolation, insolent and impatient as to the
rights of others. Out of these demeanors come wars.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

An electoral populace is at its best a gigantic
creation, loud like a demagogue, with the head of
a tradesman, and given over to as much self-decep-
tion as a woman. It is charitable to those who
tickle its vanity, brutal to those it hates, unrelent-
ing to those it has condemned. Without capacity
to reason, it has intuition, but like a child delights to
be humbugged. It has laughter but no tears, and
this is the brute of it.

Peaceful international relationship not only de-
mands the highest intelligence and justice on the
part of arbitrators, but a complete subjection by
the people to their decision. When, however, gov-
ernments are under popular control, this condition
is reversed; the negotiators become only the repre-
sentatives of the real arbitrators, the populace;
mediocre in intelligence, violent and quick in tem-
per, submissive to none but themselves. Should the
negotiator acting for them yield in any degree their
most extreme demands, he would at once be cast
aside. Consequently the negotiator, knowing that
the slightest variation from the wishes of the popu-
lace would mean his condemnation, acts only in
accordance with popular feeling. He is but a creat-
ure of their making, and the tenure of his greatness
endures only so long as he pleases them.

It was this phase of popular control that led the
late Secretary of State to make the sombre prophecy
that never again could this Republic, under its
present form of government, conclude an important

141

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

treaty. In other words, this nation's future is to
be rather of war than of peace. Since it has reached
that point wherein it is impossible for it to make
treaties with other powers, it has fallen to that
degree of incoherence that it will violate treaties
already in force. The reply to such violation is
battle.

The difficulty of making treaties, or respecting
those already made, increases with the increase of
popular control over the conduct of national gov-
ernment.

In this Republic almost every phase of inter-
national relationship, in which are concerned the
rights and privileges of foreign nations, is indiffer-
ently regarded or directly violated with legislative
acts, by powerful political sections or classes when-
ever it is to their interests or appeals to their passions.

The political history of the United States betrays
the difficulties, not only of inaugurating, but con-
tinuing, just and friendly relations with foreign
nations; while its diplomatic records lay bare the
inability of the national government to constrain
sectional or class legislation, though contrary to the
stipulations of existing treaties. This arbitrary in-
difference to international obligations, and their in-
creasing violation by sections and classes, cannot
be attributed to ignorance. The unlettered savage,
hidden away amid the wild thickets of the world,
has been known to keep his unrecorded obligations
inviolate from generation to generation. There

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

were no laws to bind him but the law of the torrent
before his wigwam, the law of the winds overhead,
the law of the illimitable forests about him; yet
out of this he evolved the very spirit of human
obligation that this great Republic is coming to
know not of. Its disregard for such pacts is not
only increasing, but its violations are, in many
instances, unworthy of the nation's potential great-
ness.

The violation of treaties, and the increasing in-
capacity to maintain friendly relationship with for-
eign countries, have their origin in the popular con-
trol of the national government: (i) by the political
power of sections and classes • (2) by the subordina-
tion of legislators to the will of these sections and
classes, or to such corporate interests as may control
their election. As foreign nations are without votes
or lobbyists, their demands are of little or no im-
portance to the average politician. This subser-
viency of politicians to the will of their constituencies
makes possible anti-foreign legislation. Yet, on the
other hand, this subserviency is a natural but un-
reasonable outgrowth of governmental control by
the populace, and as it is augmented the subser-
viency of politicians will increase, and will be followed
by a concomitant increase in legislative acts orig-
inating in prejudice and arrogance or utter con-
tempt for the rights of other nationalities.

The intelligence of a national legislator or ne-
gotiator in a nation controlled by the populace

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

cannot, in the execution of his duties, rise above
the average intelligence of his constituents. If it
does, he is in conflict with them, and the tenure of
his office is at an end. It is useless for a politician
to possess, in such a nation, superior intelligence,
for he can make use of it only to the degree that
his constituency can comprehend. By this fact it
is possible to account for the mediocrity of the
average American politician and the refusal of the
more intelligent citizens to enter into the conduct
of the affairs of the Republic.

When diplomacy is unable to settle such differ-
ences as continually arise among nations, their set-
tlement is relegated to the sphere of physical might.
Whatever lessens the efficiency of diplomatic action
increases the probabilities of war. And whenever
there exists constitutional restriction on the freedom
of diplomatic action, as is the case in a government
by the populace, the possibilities of war are increased
accordingly. It is only by just and comprehensive
recognition of this weakness, and a corresponding in-
crease in the armament and military efficiency of
the nation, that the probabilities of war can be
minimized.

In a government where the spoils of office belong
to the political victor, the consular service has been
relegated to awarding the cheaper class of politi-
cians for their past services. This policy of placing
transitory ignorance in positions where wide range
of knowledge and long training is necessary will

144

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

become more apparent as the world grows smaller
and the Republic's relationship to foreign countries
becomes more intimate and complex. As the in-
ternal growth of all nations forces them to external
expansion, and their national needs and ambitions
come in vital conflict with those of the United
States, the dangers of international war — as pre-
cipitated by the ignorance of the politician diplomat
— become apparent.

As the difficulties of settling international con-
troversies increase with the augmentation of ne-
gotiators and interests involved, the inability of the
negotiators is increased in proportion to the in-
terest the people take in the controversy. If this
is very great, and moves the passions of the popu-
lace, then the individual intelligence of the ne-
gotiators, or their superior knowledge of the facts,
or their higher sense of justice will avail them not
at all. They become subservient to the populace
as soon as its angers begin to brood sullenly over
the land. Whatever intelligence and capacity the
negotiators may personally possess, they are sub-
ordinate to the prejudices and hate of the mob-
mind. Consequently, in the adjustment of inter-
national controversies, wisdom may be opposed
by arrogance, justice by prejudice to the extent
that should the negotiators, representing a govern-
ment of the populace, grant the just claims of the
other nations, or yield even the extreme demands
of their own country, they will be bitterly arraigned

i4S

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

by the masses that have made no effort to under-
stand the true merits of the controversy or to con-
sider any arguments except their own.

The diplomatic history of this Republic shows
the fixed indisposition of the masses to view foreign
relations except in subordination to their own
sectional or class interests; hence the difficulty of
a republic, in moments of stress, adjusting peace-
ably international disputes when they affect the
vital interests or passions of the masses.

BOOK II
THE DECLINE OF MILITANCY

AND THE

CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC

"Regular troops alone are equal to the exigences
of modern war, as well for defence as offence, and
when a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory
and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits
necessary to resist a regular force. . . . The firmness
requisite for the real business of fighting is only to
be attained by a constant course of discipline and
service. I have never yet been witness to a single
instance that can justify a different opinion, and it
is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of
America may no longer be trusted, in any material
degree, to so precarious a dependence"

WASHINGTON.

WE now pass, in this portion of our work, from
the exposition of conditions to the demon-
stration of them, to the facts and bitterness of
which they are made. We pass from the contem-
plation of war to the combat itself.

The battlefield — that old and harrowed field —
whereon this Republic has so often labored, and is
destined yet through undetermined time to furrow,
we have heretofore regarded from those high places
where life is viewed, not in its drift and struggle of
particles, but in the aggregate, as a river is perceived
from a mountain-top.

We are now, however, about to transfer to the ac-
tivities of actual war the conditions we have consid-
ered and the principles we have enunciated, in order to
determine whether or not our deductions have been er-
roneous and our ideas speculative, nebulous and vain.

What has been written we realize does not readily
find agreement. The average citizen holds — and
fast onto them — quite the opposite beliefs. His
opinions, being not other than human, are not im-
partial. In proportion as facts or errors have been
pleasing to him have they secured firm and unmo-
lested lodgment in his mind. None are free from this

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

unfortunate credulity, and it is only by great effort
that man can become incredulous to soothing fancies
and believe in the truth of that which is painful.

We also became conscious of the fact, after writ-
ing the first portion of this work, that while the
truth of it could not be gainsaid, the good we hoped
it might do was liable to be nullified by that nega-
tive form of unbelief so inherent in the nature of
man — his reliance on chance. Nations, as indi-
viduals, lay on the red or black, and, with the old,
old credulity of luck, await serenely the shuffling of
the thumbed and fateful pack.

While the past of this Republic may appear to
have been under the ever-watchful and unwinking
eye of Fortune, investigation shows us that the most
ordinary, and by no means unnatural, conditions
have been responsible for its welfare. And while
we would not say that Fortune has deserted this
great Tower of Babel, yet another god hath spoken —
the old and material god that takes no note of the
dust towers builded to-day; on the morrow pulled
down and — laughed at.

While the probabilities of an international war
at the present time tend more to a struggle with
Japan than any other country, the chances of war
are equally possible with other powers, and are
existent in a modified form with still other nations.
At any time an unforeseen incident, affecting the pre-
cipitating causes of war, may again transfer the imme-
diate zone of danger from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The political responsibilities that this Republic
has so unconcernedly assumed in establishing its
suzerainty over the Western Hemisphere and a
tentative dominion over the Pacific are so vast and
so intimately affect the nations of the world in their
struggle for the potentialities of power that it is
impossible to foretell whence shall come not alone
alarums of war, but war itself. The smoke of un-
numbered arsenals now hangs heavily on the four
horizons of this nation, and the clangor of strange
anvils enters even into the very heart of it.

In a war with Japan, the conflict itself and the
results ensuing from such a struggle, we but ex-
emplify what will happen, different only in time
and place, when this Republic undertakes to stop
the expansion of European and Asian empires, and
attempts, without adequate naval and military
power, to preserve intact to itself the Pacific and
the Western Hemisphere, calling halt to the migra-
tion of kingdoms and that hunger-trek made from
time to time by the races of man.

Japan must overcome difficulties such as would
not exist in a war with Germany or other European
powers. From Hamburg to the Atlantic coast is
six days; from Japan to California, seventeen. But
when Germany lands her forces on the Atlantic
coast they are within a few days' march of the
political and financial centres of the Republic, while
Japan is removed by immeasurable distance from
them. By these means we give to the United

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States military advantages that would be impos-
sible in a war with such a power as Germany; so
that we are exaggerating, not the capacity of Japan
to make war, but the capacity of the United States
to defend itself. If the probabilities of victory
should rest with the Asian kingdom, it will be under-
stood how ineffectual would be the efforts of this
Republic against a European power.

A war with Japan demonstrates the truth of the
statement that no one can foretell from age to age,
or even from decade to decade, in what quarter of
the world will rise up a great military nation. This
Minerva birth of militant power has always been
to mankind an enigma, a dread, but never as yet a
lesson. By these things he never profits. He for-
gets when he should remember, and scorns where
he should inquire. So from time to time do war-
ring, conquering tribes burst upon the incredulous
world; sometimes from rocky places; sometimes
out of wreckage; down from the alcoves of God,
or up from abysses, they thunder and destroy.

So it has come about that on islands, beautiful in
their poverty, terrible in their serenity, brews and rum-
bles another such tempest as has heretofore swept over
the abodes of kingdoms that have thought naught of
them.

To the over-industrial development of the United
States we have the corresponding political growth
of Japan; to the under-political development of the
Republic, there is to be found in Japan a production

152

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of wealth unequal to its political growth. The
quotient of this equation has been, throughout the
entire career of the human race, war.

The American people, and not Japan, are respon-
sible for this approaching conflict. In sacrificing
the national ideal to that of the individual the ex-
pansion of this nation has been determined by his
wants. All national growth, following in the wake
of individual desires, has been industrial, while po-
litical development, together with its concomitant
military and naval expansion, has been relegated
to secondary consideration. Man becoming para-
mount over the nation, legislation has, accordingly,
been directed to the end most advantageous to his
personal interests, while that of the nation, per se,
in its relation to the rest of the world, has been re-
garded as of minor importance. Man, his welfare
and ambitions, taking precedence over that of the
Republic, has caused the national legislature to
occupy itself with internal and petty plunderings,
sectional and class legislation. The true significance
of the Republic's position in the world has been put
aside. It is this neglect that invites war and turns
into loot the nation's treasure, the high spires of its
gods, and the spangled panoply of its greatness.

Due to science and invention, international re-
lationship, heretofore existent, has been completely
revolutionized, and those lands and nations once
without the sphere of conquest are wholly within it.
Conquest, moreover, has ceased to be an imperial

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progress wherein monarchs were wont to display
their greatness and crime and generosity. It has
now become the conquest of peoples to gain such
means of wealth as are yet unlooted in the vaults
of nature. In this conquest there is little glory;
nay, naught is displayed but relentless, nightless
theft to appease, not the vanity of kings, but the
hunger of multitudes.

The under-political development of China, and
her failure to comprehend the revolution that
modern science brought into international affairs
within the last two decades, has laid open the em-
pire to dismemberment. And when it is said that
the realization of this change is scarcely better com-
prehended by the populace of the United States
than by the people of China, it is stating only one
of those melancholy truisms that have been uttered
heretofore by American statesmen.

Vessels crossing the Atlantic in four and a half
days, carrying several thousand persons and some
thirty thousand tons of freight, are regarded only
in an economic aspect, whereas the political and
military significance is so infinitely greater that na-
tions will vanish or grow great because of it. The
Western Hemisphere has in this manner alone been
brought within the demesne of Europe, while their
armies of millions are now closer to the city of
Washington than are the small and scattered forces
of the United States.

The error of the subordination of national great-

ness to the material gains of the individual, con-
comitant with the assumption of world-wide power,
with all the dangers and disasters it involves, has
already been made clear. Now we are brought face
to face with the actualities of a great war, in a study
of which will be shown the logical consummation of
this Republic's neglect.

In the consideration of a war between Japan and
the United States we will make no assumptions, but
will deal only with actualities. Moreover, we will
not arbitrarily assume that this war will take place,
but will, on the other hand, examine carefully into
the chances of peace and weigh them against the
probabilities of war. Likewise, before entering
upon the study of the war itself, we will examine
into its precipitating causes as well as its primordial
sources, the armaments of the two nations, and their
military potentiality. To chance, to patriotism,
to prejudice, to hope, we leave nothing. Upon the
airy tapestry of our desires we weave no bright
threads to fade as they are woven.

We have written this work with a full knowledge
of its bitterness. But we have done so because the
time is now at hand when this nation must emerge
from its policy of subterfuge. The national evasion
of this Republic's international responsibilities must
cease, as its isolation ceased when science winged
the larvae of man.

n

THERE are certain conditions that tend to the
preservation of peace, just as there are other
phases of national life productive of war. While
the sources and causes of international conflicts
might belong to conditions both basic and necessary
for the future development and existence of nations,
yet there may be peace factors that more than
counterbalance the provocations to war. Condi-
tions that prevent war, while numerous and pe-
culiar to each combination of combatants, can be
determined more or less accurately, and their poten-
tiality measured against that of the causes of inter-
national conflict.

In a general sense, wars between nations are de-
termined by certain principles already considered
in the first part of this work.1 In some instances,
however, conditions demanding peace intervene.
These peace factors have a relative value to the
causes of war, and their potentiality must be con-
sidered in two more or less distinct phases: first,
the possibility of the prevention of war; second, the

1 See Book I, chap, vii, pp. 79-81.
156

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

probability of postponing the struggle to some in-
definite period in the future.

Conditions potential enough to prevent war be-
tween two racially different nations, as Japan and
the United States, can only exist when the causes
of war, in either nation, are less imperative than the
necessities of peace. Nations do not plunge into
warfare without some comprehension of the possi-
bilities of victory as weighed against, not only the
disasters to be endured through defeat, but such
losses as are incurred on account of the war per se.

We have shown that wars between great nations
are resultant, not of passions, but of economic or
political convergence. Man may, by his passions,
increase, or by forbearance decrease this conver-
gence, but he cannot do away with war.

Before taking up the causes of war that now or
in the future may exist between Japan and the
United States, we will consider whether or not the
necessities and tendencies for peace between these
two powers are great or insignificant, and whether
conditions that make for peace predominate over
those that tend to war.

Two general phases of international relationship
may exist between nations so as to modify hostile
competition and lessen the probabilities of war.

(1) Racial relationship, with concomitant similari-
ties in religion, ethical and sociological conditions.

(2) Economic interdependence.

Racially, there exists no relationship between

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the people of Japan and of the United States. And
the perverse reluctance of man to forget his own
tribal gods and fetiches postpones to such a remote
time the assimilation of these two nations that it
cannot now be considered. The ethical and sociolog-
ical conditions extant in Japan, while antithetic to
those existent in the United States, are nevertheless
the product of two thousand years of Japanese
development . To remake the Japanese racial charac-
ter in order to conform with that of the Occident
would require, even were it possible, a longer period
of time than we can conceive. Such a racial change
in Japan can no more take place than could the West
alter its civilization to conform with that of the
Orient. Both civilizations will, in due time, by
natural but slow process, become so modified that
it will be difficult to distinguish the outward forms
of one from the other; but racial distinctions and
antipathies will continue to remain even unto an
unknown time.

A great race is like a rock in the wash of the sea,
whereon, as birds of passage, transient civilizations
momentarily pause in their flight ere they go on
down into the dim twilight of a departed day. It
is only the Undefined Sea, or the storms that come
out of it, that batter, incrustate, erode, festoon,
then swallow up this race-rock that seems in the
eye of man made to endure forever.

No national ideals could be more antithetic than
are the ethical and civic ideals of Japan to those

158

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

existent in this Republic. One nation is a militant
paternalism, where aught that belongs to man is
first for the use of the state; the other an individ-
ualistic emporium where aught that belongs to man
is for sale. In one is the complete subordination
of the individual, in the other his supremacy.

When national religions differ, racial difference
creates antagonism. Thus the Japanese, with their
sword-girded gods and militant bonzes, are heathen
in the eyes of this Republic, heathen in all the con-
temptuous, naked inferiority that that term in a
Christian nation implies. This feeling will never
decrease except with the deterioration of Christian-
ity, since such a decadence is, as far as the Japanese
are concerned, more probable than the Christiani-
zation of their country.

The ethical, sociological, or religious conditions
as existent in Japan and this Republic have noth-
ing in common, nor are their ways convergent or
even parallel. Neither now nor at any time in the
distant future will these nations coalesce to the
extent that the sociological or religious phases of
their national life will have a deterrent effect on
war, or will alter in any way, other than to accent-
uate their racial ambitions, their perverse activities,
their hates and their cries.

The only conditions that may have the power of
preserving peace between Japan and the United
States, or at least retarding hostilities, are to be
found in the political relationship that these two

'59

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

nations bear to the world, and the economic inter-
dependence they have with each other.

Political conditions that have, in an international
sense, a restraining influence upon the ambitions
of a nation, and are instrumental in the prevention
of war, are determined by the effect that such a
war would have on these interests.

In a struggle between Japan and the United
States for the supremacy of the Pacific, all nations
have more or less interest in the outcome, but the
interests of Japan and this Republic are so para-
mount that the aggregate interests of the remainder
of the world are less than the interests of these two
nations. This condition of affairs has been brought
about by Japan on three momentous occasions :

(1) The elimination of China as a Pacific power
by the war of 1894.

(2) The elimination of Russia as a possible
Pacific power by the war of 1904.

(3) The elimination of Great Britain and the
balance of Europe by the ten-year Offensive and
Defensive Alliance of 1905.

The interests of European nations in the Pacific
are only tentative. Conditions that are vital to
their welfare are in Europe, or in those continents
upon whose shores the same sea breaks.

The centralization of power in the Pacific is im-
possible to any nation other than China, Japan or
the United States, since such power would be with-
out and far removed from the geographical, political,

160

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and military interests of any nation other than these
three. But China, while geographically a Pacific
empire, cannot be taken into consideration as a
possible claimant for suzerainty over the Pacific,
not only on account of her defeat by Japan, but
because of the weakness and decentralization of the
present system of government.

At present, and for some time to come, there are
only two powers, Japan and this Republic, that
can, with geographical and political conditions
favorable, enter into a war for the supremacy of the
Pacific. Japan's interest and inherent advantage
in this struggle is due to the fact that her entire
empire is not only in this ocean, but in the strategic
centre of it.1

A second political condition that oftentimes re-
strains nations from entering into international war
is when the strength of hostile states, on more than
one frontier, exceeds the quotient of military power
remaining from such forces as are necessary to suc-
cessfully prosecute a war determined upon. If
Japan became involved in war with the United
States to the extent that her entire naval and mili-
tary forces were engaged, what would prevent
Russia or China, or both in coalition, from attempt-
ing to recover their kingdoms lost, and their pres-
tige— now so small in the eyes of the world?

It was the realization of this fact that led Japan-

1 See Chart I.
161

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ese statesmen, at the conclusion of the Russian War,
to enter into an Offensive and Defensive Alliance
with the greatest of world powers for a period of
ten years.1 By this alliance the undefended fron-
tiers of Japan in northern Asia are without danger
of attack. She is free to divert her entire military
forces upon any war that she may deem necessary
to her especial interests and security. By the terms
of this treaty, war-coalitions are impossible on the
part of this Republic without forcing Great Britain
into the field as Japan's ally.

Politically there are no conditions that can restrain
Japan from entering into war with this nation.
Strong in faith and in the Red Sun of her destiny,
Japan began more than two decades ago her pre-
determined march to the Empire of the Pacific. One
nation after another, by one means and another, she
has removed them from her way. Nothing now re-
mains but the overthrow of this Republic's power
in the Pacific — and nothing, as far as political re-
strictions are concerned, prevents her from entering
upon this conquest: a war that shall bring greater
glory to her samurai than they have gained here-
tofore, and new satrapies, more vast than any now
within her realm, shall be given over to her princes
and daimios.

There remains to be considered but one phase of
international relationship that has within itself the

1 Appendix, Table I.
162

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

possibilities of preventing war, or at least prolonging
the present period of peace: the economic inter-
dependence of these two nations and their freedom
from commercial competition in markets common to
both.

The belief most often expressed in this Republic
concerning the impossibility of war between Japan
and the United States is based on a fanciful and
erroneous conception of the economic interdepend-
ency of these two nations. This belief has come
about through a misconception on the part of the
public as to the real significance of international
trade and the laws that govern it. Because of this
misconception commercialism has taken unto itself
the habiliments of uncrowned monarchy — a power
that would scowl down from the alcove of kings.

In considering the supremacy of trade over in-
ternational relationship, and especially its dominion
over the destinies of Japan and the United States, we
will do so by an examination into a paper on this
subject by Baron Kaneko, a Privy-Councillor to the
Emperor of Japan.1

This paper, by such an eminent economist, en-
deavoring to show that the economic interdepend-
ency of Japan and this Republic is such as to pro-
hibit the possibility of war, contains most of the
arguments devoted to the exposition of this belief.
Hence, we feel that a consideration of Baron Ka-

1 North American Review, March, 1907.
163

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

neko's statements will tend to show clearly the
wisdom or deception of such ideas.

Baron Kaneko lays down the hypothesis that the
American people are so dependent upon Japanese
goods, and the Japanese so dependent upon Ameri-
can merchandise, that war is impossible, since both
nations, being deprived of these necessaries of life,
will come to a plainly foreseen and miserable
end.

This premise is not original with Baron Kaneko.
Writing on this subject for an American magazine,
he has only endeavored to exemplify the argu-
ments of American economists and calculators.
Were we not convinced of his sincerity, we might
have been led to believe that, as he assembled these
arguments together, he viewed them with that
sarcastic nonchalance that has within itself a signifi-
cance entirely its own.

"So I can fairly state," continues the Baron, with
that complacency peculiarly characteristic of econo-
mists, "that no lady in the United States can get a
silk dress if we stop the export of silk to that coun-
try, and that the average American citizen cannot
drink tea if our tea is excluded from America. So
much for the dependence of the American people
on Japanese products."

This remarkable statement is followed by a list
of American commodities consumed in Japan, viz.,
flour, cotton, tobacco, and petroleum. He concludes
the list with the enunciation of the startling formula

164

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

that "the Japanese cannot live a single hour without
American supplies."

In order to show to what degree these conclusions
are erroneous, we need but to examine one of them,
since all are based on the same hypothesis.

In modern wars, the interchange of commodities
still remains governed by the law of supply and de-
mand, much in the same manner as in peace, owing
to the diversity of trade routes and complexity of
international exchange. This condition of affairs
is only affected by the destruction of the means of
production or the relative impoverishment of the
consumers or the naval command of the routes of
trade emanating from the exporting country.

Nations do not stop their own exports in the time
of war, as Baron Kaneko would lead us to believe.
On the contrary, it is essentially a part of national
endeavor to protect by every means possible their
avenues of trade. If Japanese silks were not ex-
ported from Japan during a conflict, it would not be
through their decrees.

If, in a war between these two nations, the trans-
Pacific commerce did, temporarily, cease to exist
and at the same time there continued, in both na-
tions, a demand for their respective commodities,
the interchange would go on as before, differing only
in the route and means of transference. Neutral
vessels via the Suez would continue the trade tem-
porarily lost to the Pacific. This would modify the
interchange of Japanese and American goods only

16$

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

in time and expense of transshipment in European
ports. Whatever this additional cost of transpor-
tation might be, it would only be equivalent to a
raise in price of the merchandise, affecting the con-
sumers in the manner of an ad valorem tariff, but
would make little or no difference to the government
or people of either nation.

Japanese tea or silk is not so essential to America
that without them the Americans can have neither
tea nor silks. The relative value of these com-
modities that Japan annually exports to the United
States is, to the world's total production of silk or
tea, so insignificant that the entire failure of the
Japanese product would make but little difference
to the consumers of such articles in the United
States.

The merchandise of individual and national con-
sumption has, in these modern times, become so
general to the whole of mankind that the world
has become one vast emporium, and what in the
time of war cannot be gotten directly from a nation
can be secured indirectly through transshipments
and devious routes of neutral trade. The delusion
that the inter-commerce relationship between two
nations is destroyed by war, and that economic inter-
dependence is such that it prohibits war, should be
put aside in the same manner as mankind has here-
tofore laid away some of his most cherished notions.

Japan, on the other hand, is no more dependent
upon American products than is this Republic de-

166

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

pendent on Japanese tea and silks. So long as
Japan controls the trade routes to Europe, her im-
ports will differ from what they are now only as
the demands of her people for these commodities
increase or decrease. Whatever American commod-
ities Japan needs she will get in war as in peace.

It will be shown later on that the United States
can never, under its present system of military and
naval constraint, have any appreciable effect on
the trade routes west of the Hawaiian Islands.
Nor can any nation, except by blockade, affect trade
on neutral bottoms. Baron Kaneko's statement
that "the Japanese cannot live a single hour with-
out American supplies" is no more true than his
statement that "the average American citizen can-
not drink tea if Japanese tea is excluded from
America."

The second and last consideration of the economic
prevention or postponement of this international
conflict is the freedom from commercial competition
in markets common to both Japan and the United
States. In regard to this phase of commercial re-
lationship existing between nations, Baron Kaneko
observes :".... In the twentieth century it is the
increase and expansion of international commerce
that guides the policy of nations. . . . All nations
are looking for new markets for their industries,
and the only market now remaining which can be
exploited with benefit is the continent of Asia."

American and Japanese partnership in the ex-
167

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ploitation of the Asian continent could be possible
under the reverse of existent conditions, wherein
the opportunities of commercial exploitation in
Asia and the Pacific were less than the interchange
of commodities between the United States and Japan.
But it is in the control and exploitation of those vast
empires whose swagging godowns burden the shores
of the Pacific that are to be found the riches of the
world.

"European thought, European commerce, and
European enterprise, although actually gaining in
force, and European connections, although becom-
ing more and more intimate, will nevertheless rel-
atively sink in importance in the future, while the
Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and adjacent
territories will become the chief theatre of human
events and activities in the world's great hereafter." 1

Among nations, coalitions in a military sense are
possible, since such combinations are brought about
by governments, but in the struggle for commercial
supremacy there can be no such alliances ; this war-
fare is the endless conflict of multitudinous man,
the tribal swarms of them and their spawn.

Neither to Japan nor to the United States is the
trade now going on between them worthy of con-
servation. Their efforts are directed to that van-
tage-point where one of them can swing the nine-
knotted knout and drive to new wants nations

1 William H. Seward.
168

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

that now sit on their heels and dream in the endless
Orient dusk.

Baron Kaneko states that the United States and
Japan stand, geographically, in the most advan-
tageous position to garner the fruit of the Pacific
and Asiatic trade, but he conceals the fact that they
are so favorably situated that, as European nations
are isolated from this trade dominion, the rivalry
between them will increase proportionately until
the commercial struggle for supremacy merges im-
perceptibly into that of political control, based on
military prowess. It would be difficult to find in
history an example more perfectly exemplifying the
manner in which the struggle for commercial su-
premacy involves the competitors in warfare.

In the national fabric of Japan and the United
States, in their international and human relation-
ship, conditions potential of peace are not to be
found. In their racially different characters, no
harmonious similarity exists, only divergent and in-
compatible ideals; in their international politics,
no restraining influence that might, at least, post-
pone into the indefinite future the probabilities of
war. All political restraints have been removed;
one after another pulled down and thrown aside by
the relentless, predetermined policy of Japan. In
their economic relationship conditions that might
tend to the prevention of wrar not only do not exist,
but in this economic struggle is to be found the near
source of the approaching conflict.
« 169

lit

IN the first part of this work we differentiated
between precipitating causes and primordial
sources of international war. We will now con-
sider them relative to a conflict between Japan and
the United States.

While the sources of this approaching war are to
be found in the expansion and imperial ambitions
of Japan, the causes of it, nevertheless, have their
origin in the acts of this nation. In this chapter,
will be considered these causes, originating as they
do in this Republic, before taking up the sources of
the struggle belonging to the destiny of Japan.

It has heretofore been shown that international
strife results from a natural convergent expansion
of two or more nations, bringing about in due time
the inevitable contact of interests that culminates
in a struggle for supremacy of one over the other.
These angles of national convergence are seldom
equal, as in the approaching war for the command
of the Pacific. The angle of Japan's convergence
is as much more acute than the American as their
interests are more vital in the struggle for possession
of this vast Empire of Waters.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The sources of war— as in this case — are existent
for many decades before nations are cognizant of
them, though their sullen growl falls, from time to
time, ominously upon the heedless ear of their
multitudes. Twenty years ago Japan recognized the
inevitability of war for the suzerainty of the Pacific.
It was this prescience that caused the Mikado five
years later to voice solitarily his objections to the
United States establishing dominion over the Ha-
waiian Islands.

Only when the interests of these two nations be-
gan to converge did the probabilities of war become
apparent. The acuteness of the angles of this con-
vergence was increased: first, by the further ac-
quisition of Pacific possessions by this Republic,
thereby endangering not only Japan's commercial
hegemony in the Orient, but her opportunity to
become the Overlord of Asia; secondly, by Japan's
success over China and Russia, with their consequent
elimination from any immediate future struggle for
power in the Pacific.

Since the Russian War, Japan has directed her
undivided attention to that conflict which — should
it end in victory — will give half the world over to
the imperious barony of her daimios and samurai.
Baron Kaneko, in his paper heretofore quoted, notes
these ambitions concerning the Pacific.

"The United States," he writes, "occupies almost
two-thirds of the whole coast of the Pacific Ocean,
while the remaining one-third is held by Japan. . . .

171

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Therefore, these two nations need have no fear of
any rival."

In actuality this Republic does not possess two-
thirds of the Pacific littoral, nor Japan the remaining
one-third. Baron Kaneko does not consider Brit-
ish Columbia, Mexico, Central and South America,
Australia, New Zealand, the East Indies, Siam, Co-
chin China, the Chinese Empire, nor Siberia: these
nations have no right of sovereignty in the Pacific
if the United States possesses a military and naval
command of two-thirds of it and Japan the other
third.

But this nation does not undertake the military
effort necessary to carry out this policy, and Japan,
perceiving its indifference, as exemplified in the
Pacific defences, the complete lack of an army, and
the division of the naval forces into two widely
separated oceans, has gone calmly about in her
preparations for that war which will make the
empire sovereign over that two -thirds of the
Pacific she does not now claim to possess.

The suddenness with which the precipitating
causes of war break upon public consciousness al-
most invariably hides the true reasons — in all
probability extant many years prior — that tend to
bring on the conflict; hence it happens — as is the
case with this Republic — that nations go rushing
blindly along acutely converging lines to that point
of contact — which is war. Whenever a nation
fails or scorns to differentiate between the sources

172

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and causes of war, it enters into the conflict unpre-
pared. But those nations whose affairs of state are
carried on by men fully cognizant of the difference
between the trivial and the immutable are not only
always prepared for battle, but they determine the
time and place of the conflict; which, more often than
otherwise, is an assurance of success.

Subsequent to her victory over Russia, Japan laid
upon herself that labor, burdened with immeasur-
able grandeur, of encompassing the Pacific and be-
coming the Shogun of half the human race. Her
preparations for war prior to her conflict with Russia
were insignificant with what have gone on subsequent
to that war; now equalling in military and naval
preparation alone over one-half the entire revenues
of the empire.

This Republic and Japan are approaching, careless
on the one hand and predetermined on the other,
that point of contact which is war.

It sometimes happens that both the primordial
sources and the precipitating causes of war originate
within one nation. When this is the case, that na-
tion must bear the odium of preconceived, if not in-
excusable, conquest. History is clangorous with
wars of this kind. But at the present time the
necessity of conquest, affecting in varying propor-
tion all great nations, has brought about such condi-
tions that conquest, per se, cannot be entered into.
In order to pursue this policy there has been in-
troduced into world policies an era of subterfuge,

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

an Age of Preconceived Provocative. The tenta-
tive dismemberment of China is an example of this.

Japan, to establish herself in the sympathies of
the world, rather than incur their jealous antago-
nism by bringing on a war that has for its ultimate
object the sovereignty of the Pacific, must shape
her affairs so that the precipitating causes of the
conflict shall originate in this Republic. These
causes do exist, and, fortunately for Japan, through
no agency of her statesmen nor people; because of
them the Hawk of her Valor shall scream and dart
over seas and lands now unknown to it ; new guests
shall go into the Spirit -Invoking Temple of Sho-
konsha, and the prayers of a nation shall find their
way to the Sacred Hillsides of Kudan.

While war between Japan and the United States
originates, and primarily belongs to the natural ex-
pansion of the Japanese Empire, the responsibility
for its causes will fall upon this nation, by violation
of those rights, privileges and immunities hereto-
fore granted Japan by treaty stipulations. From
this relationship, as it now exists, and which will
remain until war ensues, we have in these two
nations antithetic conditions wherein one is not
only the corollary of the other, but is subservient
and controllable.

Inasmuch as the primordia^ sources of future con-
flict have their origin in Japan's predetermined in-
tention to become supreme in the Pacific, her prog-
ress toward warfare is orderly and her preparations

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

consistent. Not only can Japan postpone or cause
a precipitation of hostilities, according to the im-
perfection or completion of her preparations, but
she can select her successive theatres of action, as
they suit her general plan for the conduct of the
war. Every move is planned, every emergency
taken into consideration; the American armament
and preparation, or lack of it, are in all its phases
tabulated ; the topography of the country surveyed,
climatic conditions noted, depths of streams, heights
of mountains, food supplies, means of transporta-
tion and subsistence belonging to each section of
possible spheres of military activity have been care-
fully investigated and preparations made accord-
ingly. In this manner, years before war is de-
clared, the most insignificant details and possibili-
ties of hypothetical campaigns and battles have
been so worked out, and all exigencies so minutely
taken into consideration, that the war itself, when
once begun, proceeds with invincible orderliness to
a predetermined end.

In such a manner Germany overthrew the French
Empire in less than two months ; while the irresisti-
bleness with which Japan converged her widely-
separated armies to the ultimate defeat of Russia
was carried on by plans so completely prearranged
that in the entire war Russia gained not a single
victory.

It is in this manner that Japan prepares, not for
war with this nation, but for victory over it. In

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

response to these manifest preparations the United
States has done nothing other than go on denying
the possibilities of war, while it continues to pile up,
one groaning on top of the other, new provocations
for this very conflict over which it has no control.
Now and then some one rises up against this general
sophistry that is leading the country into a dismal
bog of national subterfuge, but it is seldom more
than a sputtering in the deadliest of marsh gases, a
momentary glimmering of truth that soon vanishes
into that old gloom out of which it cannot again
come.

Nothing can better serve the interests of Japan,
or any other nation under similar conditions, than
the present characteristic indifference of this Re-
public to dangers threatening it. Not only indif-
ferent to military preparation, but likewise making
no effort to prevent the recurrence of acts and legis-
lation that will serve as casus belli whenever Japan
has determined that conditions are favorable for
beginning the conflict. Moodily and at any time
the Mikado may make known from his moated
Castle of Yeddo his ultimatum of the wrongs and
indignities laid upon his people.

In the first part of this work we showed numerous
general causes that will eventually precipitate this
Republic in a series of wars. In addition, there are
special causes logically derived from conditions that
are alone relative to the Orient and Japan. To
deal with all these elements in detail is unnecessary.

176

An exposition of one of them, in its various phases,
will show the manner in which the precipitating
causes of this war are inherent in the political fabric
of the Republic, and in the overt acts of a portion
of the people, as well as in that fatal nonchalance —
itself an invitation to war — with which the entire
nation regards the approach of that inevitable day
when the pencilled hopes of peace and its paper
prayers are cast upon the winds and the sea groans
with the burden of conflict.

In considering the facts of which we are now
about to take note, the reader must put aside his
nationality, together with what he considers the
rights of American people, in part or as a whole, and
look upon these conditions -as would a Samurai
opportunist to whom they appear only in the double
light as being derogatory to his country's honor, and
potential with the possibilities of a war for which
his empire now prepares or dreams of when the
drooping eyelid of night stills the clangor of its arse-
nals and the brooding care of its council-chambers.

Where there is racial non-assimilability there is
apt to be friction, but few realize that political non-
assimilability in a nation where the political power
rests in the hands of the masses is a source of greater
friction than that coming from racial differences.
Racial unlikeness does not produce inequality, but
when a people are deprived of political franchise,
together with its rights and privileges, which are
granted to all others among whom they dwell, they

177

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

are at once branded as inferior. This arbitrary de-
termination by one class of the inferiority of another
establishes that anomalous condition — caste in a
Republic. The creation of an inferior caste by
political disfranchisement soon permeates, by that
osmose peculiar to man, every phase of daily exist-
ence. Those who are disfranchised are treated by
the populace, not alone with social unconcern, but
indignities. Municipalities direct restrictive or-
dinances against them so that they become the
natural prey, not only of the lawless element, but
the police. Their status being already fixed by
public opinion, their voice in protesting against in-
dignities may, in the beginning, be vehement, but
their protestations soon die away in hoarse and
broken whispers.

They cannot appeal to the courts where their
case may be determined by a jury, for the jury, being
of the people, has already decided that as heathen
they cannot be believed under oath. It has come
to pass on the Pacific coast that the word of one
Occidental is considered more worthy of credence
than the oaths of an entire colony of Orientals.
They have ceased to look for justice in cases de-
termined by juries.

State legislation further deprives them of many
civil rights enjoyed by all other residents. They
are segregated and participate in none of the ac-
tivities common to other aliens. In some portions
of the country their presence is not tolerated, ancj

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

they are stoned and driven out as though unclean.
They become as racial lepers whose residence in a
locality is permitted only by such isolation as the
citizens and European aliens consider necessary.
In this manner Orientals are not alone subject to
individual mistreatment, but to that of mobs. The
motives, moreover, that actuate mob-lawlessness are
identical with the spirit that directs municipal or-
dinances against them, the legislation of the state
and the injustice of the judiciary.

We are making no comments concerning the right
of a portion of the American people to do these things.
We are alone establishing conditions that do exist,
and in consequence are provocative of a legitimate
casus belli on the part of the nation whose people
have thus been treated, in variance with the rights
and immunities granted them by existing treaties.

In a republic, where the political power resides
in the populace, embroilments between a disfran-
chised class and those who possess the right do not
originate in the former, but grow out of that
tyranny which an empowered populace invariably
directs against those whom they have ordained as
inferior.

The rights of a class in a republic are determined
quantitatively by the number of their votes, and
qualitatively by the political acumen of their leaders.
When, however, a class or race finds itself in a re-
public without political franchise, then as a race or
class its rights are ground into broken dust. Over

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

them the populace lifts its threatening, relentless
hand. Politicians, from ward-heelers to congress-
men, from mayors to governors, from police judges
to supreme justices, are indifferent to the rights and
justice due such aliens. They have come out of the
populace that rules in this manner, and the pointing
shadow of the people's forefinger marks their narrow
course.

What we have here expressed are not hypothetical
considerations, but a statement of facts that have
for more than two decades piled up their mis-
demeanors against Orientals in the western portion
of this Republic. What has occurred to the Chinese
will — as is now being done — be directed against the
Japanese, but with this difference: the oppressive
acts will be as much more violent as is lacking that
submission characteristic of the Chinese. To ex-
pect the Japanese to submit to indignities is to be
pitifully incomprehensive of their national character.
And the American people should realize that it is
this cumulative memoranda of wrongs that they
must, on some certain, sombre day, make answer
to in a manner we will dwell upon presently.

The recognition of the fact by Japan that so long
as Japanese resident in this nation were denied
electoral rights they would suffer indignities and in-
justice led the Imperial Government to demand
those rights of naturalization granted the aliens of
other countries. In addition, Japan has demanded
— as existing treaties give her the unquestioned right

1 80

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

to do — that her people be accorded the same rights,
privileges and immunities granted the subjects of
European nations. These demands give rise to the
consideration of four separate conditions:

(1) The attitude of the people of the Pacific
States toward the Federal Government if the Japan-
ese are granted these demands.

(2) Their attitude toward the Japanese} to what
degree their antipathy and belligerency may be
aroused against them.

(3) If the Federal Government, acquiescing to the
West, refuses to grant the Japanese demands, local
injustice and additional restrictions will, taking on
new vigor, be directed against them throughout
the states of the Pacific coast.

(4) Japan, recognizing the fact that in a republic
domestic legislation takes precedence over ques-
tions involving foreign nations, will not make a
positive demand for the fulfilment of these obliga-
tions until prepared for war. She can thus deter-
mine the outbreak of the war by the conservation
of her demands until conditions are favorable to
her for the commencement of hostilities.

The relationship that exists between the states
and the Federal Government is such that, while the
Federal Government makes treaties, and is held
responsible by foreign nations for the inviolability
of their stipulations, it has but little power to en-
force these foreign agreements when their violation
— as is almost invariably the case — occurs within

181

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the jurisdiction of state laws. On account of this
anomalous condition, offenders against the rights
of foreigners, if the popular opinion of the state is
with them — as is the case on the Pacific coast in
overt acts against the Japanese— are not only im-
mune, but receive the approbation of their fellow-
citizens.

Anti-Japanese sentiment may have been dormant
prior to the conclusion of the Russian War, but
since then it has openly manifested itself, and is not
restricted, as may be supposed, to union-labor or
socialistic elements, but permeates the entire social
and political fabric of the West.1

In the wild gorges of Siskiyou, on moss-grown
boulders, and half effaced by the lichens of two
decades, can even now be deciphered this legend:
"The Chinese must go. Vote for O'Donnell." We
have seen it on the red-wood shacks of Mendocino;
on the outhouses of cities and towns ; on the board
fences in the Valley of the Santa Clara, and from
there to the Mojave Desert. Even by the border
of Death Valley, in the dreariest of solitudes, the
West stencilled the epitome of its racial hatred, a
hatred that was taken up and put into public ordi-
nances— into the statute-books of the state, and
finally, finding its way to Washington, violated
under political pressure such treaty stipulations as
existed between the United States and China.

1 Appendix, Table II.
182

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

This racial antagonism has now been extended to
the Japanese, and, indifferent to the rights and
immunities guaranteed them by treaty, the people
of the West are proceeding with the same sullen
contempt of consequences as, two decades ago, they
moved against the Chinese.1

Strangely oblivious to the militant character of
the Japanese, to the vast military and naval power
in their hands, to the spirit of conquest in their
bosoms, to their predetermined struggle with the
Republic for sovereignty over the Pacific, a portion
of the American people go on indifferently, each
day adding new provocations to precipitate a con-
flict, and yet with the utmost unconcern make no
preparations for it. This indifference and lack of
preparation has as much to do with hastening the
conflict as has the positive circumscription of Japan-
ese rights. When Japan presents the memoranda
of her wrongs to the world and declares war, the
world will regard Japan's position as not only law-
ful, but justly taken. They also have their people in
this Republic, and each year piles up in the archives
of their State Departments the grim protests of their
subjects.

The indiscriminate violation in different sections
of the United States of the rights of aliens, and the
inability of the Federal Government to protect
them, is a matter of as vital concern to those nations

1 Appendix, Table III.
183

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

whose subjects dwell in this Republic as a similar
condition in China, where all nations, including the
United States, have made war because of this very
failure on the part of China to preserve inviolate
such rights and immunities as are specified in the
stipulations of existent treaties.

Japan, by making the cause of war the violation
of treaty rights, shoulders the complaint of the
world; and in giving battle to enforce the common
riglits of the Old World in the Western Hemisphere,
Japan, and not the United States, will receive the
world's approbation and sympathy.

IV

THE incomparable tranquillity with which man-
kind views his own immediate achievements is
only equalled by the disdain with which he views
the successes or failures of the human race in other
ages. Yet there is no difference in these old and
new works, except in the manner and place of their
doing. It is only his vanity that prevents him
from making use of the accumulative empirical
knowledge that races have left in their flight, here
and there on this great Guano Rock, fertilized with
their failures and fat with their dead.

As we look backward through thirty dim cen-
turies, we see that there existed in the Mediterranean
conditions that at the present time have come up
again to be determined in the Pacific Ocean. In the
same manner as China and Japan maintained their
exclusion from contact with Western nations, so had
there existed in Egypt this same system of isolation
until overthrown by Psammetichus.

Psammetichus was the predecessor of Perry.

As China and Japan have been, and in a measure
still are, vast, dim regions of mysteries, so to the
ancients was the Valley of the Nile.
13 185

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

In this analogy, however, there is a difference, a
differentiation that has its own terrors. The Greeks
endeavored to understand the riddle of Egypt; the
West scorns the inquiry of the East.

What shall the Occident find in Asia — a slave-
mart, or a master? Unanswered doubts do not
alone belong to the Sphinx; nay, they are part of
Time, and their apparent unsolvableness lies in the
fact that the riddles of the future have all been
answered and written down by the works of the
Past.

The opening of the Egyptian ports thirty centuries
ago gave to Europe on the one hand its greatest in-
tellectual impulse, but on the other it demonstrated
to Egypt that, if she would continue to exist she
must become a maritime power greater than the
nation that forced the passage of her ports or any
other that might rise on the shores of the Medi-
terranean. As Egypt had for so many ages rec-
ognized the principle of quietude that is inherent
in national isolation, so she became at once cognizant
of that other great principle determining national
existence : that once the barriers are broken all future
greatness depends upon militant and maritime
supremacy among those countries into whose affairs
and ambitions the nation may be suddenly plunged.
The difficulty in the way of Egypt becoming a
naval power was a lack of timber, since there grew
not enough in Egypt for those little barks that car-
ried the dead across the Lakes of Osiris. Egypt was

186

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

obliged to go into wars of foreign conquest, not with
one state, but with all bordering on the Mediterra-
nean, for possession of that which she lacked and
upon which depended the continuance of her
nationality.

Now, though several tens of centuries have made
their predetermined passage, we find another nation,
which is Japan, facing the same old problem that
lay upon Egypt those years past. As the supremacy
of the Mediterranean was necessary to whatever
nation was to be supreme upon its shores, so to
Japan is the control of the Pacific not alone vital
to her mastery among nations, but to her existence.

While Egyptian power in the Mediterranean de-
pended upon material, Japanese dominion in the
Pacific is consequent upon the possession of such
naval bases as will in the future prevent the es-
tablishment of a Pacific naval power by any other
nation. In other words, Japan must enunciate in
new form the oldest of all international doctrines —
commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine — and
control unto herself the Pacific.

The dissolution of Egyptian naval supremacy was
followed by the desolation of the Valley of the Nile ;
and, though now twenty-nine centuries have passed,
never again has Egypt regained her independence,
never again has Egypt smiled.

It is this fate that Japan intends to avoid.

The study of maritime supremacy, ancient or
modern, shows vividly among certain salient charac-

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

teristics that the size of the nation is an immaterial
factor. The smallest powers have, by superior
naval and military force, held in check the greatest
of nations.

At one time Tyre, a single city, so dominated
the Mediterranean that no other country, notwith-
standing its wealth and greatness of empire, could
develop power or commerce upon it. In a thirteen-
years war this city held off from her rock the
Babylonian Empire. It was only when every head
was bald and every shoulder peeled that Tyre fell,
and so terrible was her going down that it is said the
very islands of those seas were troubled at her
departure.

It is this singular and undue power that naval and
military supremacy gives to a nation possessing it
that has confirmed Japan's determination to become
the Shogun of the Pacific.

The greatness of Japan will depend upon naval
strength. Such power, in modern times, depends
primarily upon possession of widely extended and
militarily protected naval bases controlling routes of
trade. It might be considered as axiomatic that
the worth, or even the possibility of the existence,
of naval power is proportionate to the number and
strategic importance of its bases.

While Japan cannot expect the immediate con-
quest on land, other than the sea-bordering prov-
inces, of such vast countries as China, India, and the
Americas, yet, if she is once secure in the possession

188

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of certain naval bases in the Pacific, she will be able
to dominate these and other nations; and, so long
as her naval and military efficiency do not deteri-
orate, their wealth and populations shall count as
naught.

As the supremacy of the Mediterranean affected
only those nations dwelling and brawling on its
shores, and while the control of the Atlantic covers
only a larger portion of mankind, the mastery of the
Pacific will concern the entire world, for upon its
waters the divided portions of the races of man have
met. The Pacific Ocean consists of over thirty-
four per cent, of the world's surface, and not only do
more than one-half of the human race rest some-
where about upon its littoral, but two-thirds of the
undeveloped resources of the earth are in the lands
upon whose shores its waters break.

It is this vast combination of mankind and un-
squandered riches that determine the true signifi-
cance of the Pacific. Whether the world in the future
is to be dominated, politically, militarily, or indus-
trially by any one nation, or a coalition of them, in
the dominion of the Pacific shall it be determined.

Japan, militarily supreme in the Pacific, becomes
industrially the controlling factor in Asia. And in
due time, with the mastery of the major portion of
the undeveloped wealth of the earth, Asiatic mili-
tancy and industrialism shall reign supreme in this
world and the Mikado shall become the Mikado of
kings.

189

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

When we contrast the everlasting and huge travail
of sectional and class legislation that now absorbs
the energies of this Republic with the aims and
progress of Japan, we are overcome with shame and
bitterness. On the one hand, a ragout of politicians,
on the other, the grandeur of national ambition
moving irresistibly to a predetermined end.

As we look back over the entire history of man
since he has been gathering himself together in
separate political entities, we can find no condition
analogous with opportunities for world supremacy
as now lie before the bushido of Japan. The states-
men of this Asian Tyre have become cognizant of this,
and even so have the masses in that dim, uncertain
way masses comprehend, hence has come about the
expansion of that mystical word — bushido. To this
ambition of Japan there shall be no end — and rightly
there should not be — until her islands have been
razed as bare as rocks upon which fishermen spread
their nets, or until the Japanese become the samurai
of the human race and the remainder of man shall
toil and trade for them and their greatness.

There is no more complete surety to world-wide
supremacy for Japan than for the nations of the
Occident to allow the present progressive deteriora-
tion of active militancy to continue without check
or end. If Japan continues in the opposite course,
and holds the bushido of her people aloof from the
contamination of feminism and commercialism,
the spirit of her samurai unsullied in the Temple of

190

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the Forty Ronins, then shall the rest of mankind
play Atlas to the Islands of the Eastern Sea.

As maritime mastery of ancient nations depended
upon the possession of provinces supplying material
for naval construction, in modern times the posses-
sion of military and naval bases bears the same
relation to the control of the sea. The power of
nations in a comparative sense should be appor-
tioned to the number and security of such bases.

The future of Japan depends basically upon the
possession of a sufficient number of such positions,
so distributed in the Pacific that they command
all trade routes to and from the East and West.
Failure to secure these will, in time, relegate her
to the environs of her rocky islands, and, like Egypt,
though twenty-nine dim centuries shall pass, she
shall rise up not again forever.

Fifteen years ago Japan eliminated China from
the Pacific ; four years ago she crushed for all time
the power of Russia in this same ocean. Her pres-
ent strategic position on the north Asian coast gives
her complete control of it and all the trade routes
that diverge from its shores. The island of Hok-
kaido commands the sea of Okhotsk and the north-
ern Siberian littoral; the island of Nippon com-
mands the Sea of Japan, southern Russia littoral
and the Amur; Port Arthur commands the Gulf of
Pechili, the sea-coasts of Pechili, Manchuria, and
Shantung, the Laiho, Peiho and Yalu rivers; the
island of Kinshu and Korea command the Yellow

191

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Sea and the Chinese coast as far south as the mouth
of the Yangtze, while the islands of Kinshu and
Formosa hold dominion from the Yangtze to the
southern borders of the province of Fokien.1

Japan is now supreme, in a military and naval
sense, on the Asian coast north of Hong -Kong.
China has been eliminated from these seas, as has
Russia. And by Japan's alliance with Great Brit-
ain, the elimination of British power in the Pacific,
as we will hereafter show, has been accomplished
subtly; even with the smile of Buddha has this been
done. There now remains but one power for Japan
to put aside in order to make her supreme in the
Pacific, with all which we have shown that term
implies.

That nation is the United States.

As has been heretofore stated, Japan's future de-
pends upon secure and widely distributed naval
bases so strategically placed that they give her
command over all routes of trade in the Pacific.
Japan's next war will be a war for position, con-
cerning which we have already commented upon
in a previous chapter.2

Fortunate is it for Japan that this Republic not
only possesses the very positions essential to Japan's
security in the Pacific, but is sovereign over such
territories as, under the dominion of Japan, will
make her wholly and without doubt the Shogun of

1 Chart I. 2 Book I, chap, ix, pp. 104-1 1 5.

192

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the Great Still Sea. But, more than that, Japan
would, at the same time, eliminate the only rival
she needs to fear in her struggle for supremacy,
political or industrial, over the vast littoral of the
Pacific. Should this Republic share the fate of
China and Russia, then no nation or coalition of
nations — as will hereafter be shown — can destroy
Japan's supremacy, so long as her samurai do not
wither away or bloom into feminism, and, like the
Agave Americana, perish in florescence.

As has been shown (Chart I), the present stra-
tegic positions of Japan are, though relegated to the
Asian coast, absolute in the command of those
seas. By consulting the chart of the Pacific it will
be seen that Japan cannot strengthen her position
nor lay foundation for future supremacy by war
with any country other than this Republic. The
value the Pacific possessions of this nation bear to
Japan is that they determine her possible suprem-
acy of Pacific littoral. These territories consist of
Alaska in the North Pacific, Hawaii in the Central,
Samoa in the South, and the Philippines in the East.

To show graphically the strategic importance of
these places, we have on the chart * circumscribed
circles about them with approximate radii equal
to two and a half to three days' steaming at
seventeen knots an hour. The circumference of
these circles, hence their value, is increased with

' Chart I.

193

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the speed of warships or the number of hours dis-
tant from a naval base that a commander is justified
in giving battle. The sphere of naval supremacy,
as circumscribed by these circles, is not fixed, but
is constantly expanding, concurrently with the in-
creasing speed of warships. As each ripple wells
outward their value is enhanced. Their ultimate
extent or power cannot be computed, for it is cor-
relative to the progress of invention as applied to
naval warfare.

In order to show how irresistible are the incentives
that force Japan to the acquisition of this Republic's
insular possessions, we will consider her position
as a Pacific and World Power augmented by
sovereignty over those territories, singly and as a
whole. These possessions have two valuations to
Japan — their intrinsic wealth, and the value of their
strategic position. However rich they may be in
natural resources, their strategic worth is infinitely
greater.

Intrinsically, the Philippines and Ladrones would
more than double the territorial extent of Japan, as
well as the empire's natural resources. This valua-
tion, however great in itself, is insignificant in com-
parison to the strategic worth that these islands
possess for Japan in their dominion over Asia and
Asiatic hegemony.

We have shown that Japanese domination over
the Asian coast, from the Sea of Okhotsk to the
Formosan Strait, is absolute. The Philippine Isl-

194

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ands bear the same strategic relationship to the
Southern Asian coast as the Japanese islands do
to the Northern, with the exception that the Philip-
pines have the additional strategic value of com-
manding all ship -routes from Europe to the Far
East. Their possession is more essential to Japan
than either Korea or Manchuria. Without the
Philippines, Japan's dominion in Asian seas will
be no more than tentative, and her eventual domi-
nation or destruction will depend upon who holds
these islands.

The Philippines command the Asian coast from
the Formosan Strait to Cape Camao; the whole of
Southern China, together with the Tsing-Kiang,
the Min and West rivers; the Gulf of Tong-King;
the whole of French Indo-China, together with the
China Sea, and the Sungoi and Me -Kong rivers.
On the south, these islands command the entire
East Indies, the Macassar and Malacca passages.
Within the sphere of Philippine naval bases can be
included the Gulf and Kingdom of Siam, the Malay
Peninsula, Singapore, Strait of Malacca, Carimata
and Sunda.

The Philippines are only three days' steaming
from the main naval bases in Japan, hence Japanese
bases in the Philippines would be but a continua-
tion of her naval stations, and would allow Japan
to concentrate in Philippine waters her entire navy
within a comparatively few hours — lessening in time
as naval invention progresses.

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

With the Philippines in possession of Japan, the
dominion of European powers in Asia and the
Pacific seas ends, and ends forever. By the time
England's alliance with Japan ceases, her fortresses
in the Far East will possess for her no value other
than what affection may still hold for ruins and
ambitions that are no more. Each of these Southern
straits will become a Strait of Tsu-Shima — if there
are Rojestvenskys to steam thither.

Sovereignty over the Philippines is not only im-
perative to Japan in her overlordship of Asia and
the Pacific, but is essential to the very preservation
of her national existence. The Philippines, in the
possession of a great power, forms on her most
vulnerable flank a point of attack that is more dan-
gerous than would be Korea in the hands of the
same power.

Possessed of the Philippines, Japan would com-
plete her chain of island fortresses from the penin-
sula of Kamchatka to the Indian Ocean, by which
she would bind in Asia from the West. With her
castles put up on the mountain-tops of these seas,
races of man could bay in vain.

The channel of Balintang is the Rubicon of Japan.

The relationship the Philippines bears to the East-
ern Pacific is similarly held by Samoa in relation to
the Southern Pacific. The harbor of Pago-Pago,
on the island of Tutuila, is the most valuable an-
chorage in the South Pacific, and is equal if not
superior to any in the entire ocean. This harbor

196

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

can hold twice the entire navy of Japan, and is so
surrounded by towering bluffs that it cannot be
reached by shell-fire from the outside, while the en-
trance is so narrow that two battleships cannot
enter at the same time. In such a manner has
Panku, in chiselling out this world for the wilful
tribes of man, hereon cut the perfectest of harbors
in the most strategic position in the South Pacific,
a position that can be made to determine the event-
ual sovereignty over Oceania, Australia, and New
Zealand; and in possession of Japan would, in cor-
relation with her other positions, constitute the
pivot of naval supremacy in the Antipodes.

As the control of the South Pacific is determined
by a proper naval utilization of Pago-Pago, so is
the naval dominion of the North Pacific determined
by the possession of Alaska, and the strategic posi-
tions of the harbors on the peninsula. As far as
this Republic is concerned, Alaska is as insular as
the Philippines, and sovereignty over it is deter-
mined by the same factors.

To Japan, the intrinsic value of Alaska is greater
than any other American possession. Not alone
would the territorial extent of the empire be trebled,
but trebled with almost inexhaustible wealth. Fish-
eries, iron, coal, timber, copper and gold in such
abundance that the crowded coolies of that nation
could scarce indent or scratch the lid of this treas-
ure— by which nature has redeemed its inhospitable

197

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

shores. But if, with a single exception, Alaska were
as barren as the sea-gnawed rocks upon which the
walrus lolls in the cold sunlight of the inner Arctic,
it would even then possess a determinate condition,
outside of its strategic value, in the sovereignty of
the Pacific.

A navy without adequate bases is almost as use-
less as a navy without guns or sailors, but a fleet
without coal needs neither bases nor guns nor men;
hence the command of coal-fields on or adjacent to
the seas of naval strife does now, and in the future
more so, determine the outcome of maritime strug-
gles. We therefore establish this fact, that in the
approaching combat for the dominion of the Pacific
the control of the Alaskan coal-fields will be eventu-
ally necessary to the victor, and without them com-
plete supremacy cannot be maintained.

As in ancient times the possession of timber-bear-
ing provinces was essential to naval supremacy, so
the command of bordering coal-fields is imperative
to the nation that would extend its dominion over
the Pacific. Whether in the Eastern or Western
Hemisphere, the entire littoral of the Pacific, with
the exception of Japan, North China, and Alaska,
is lacking in coal of good quality. As we have here-
tofore shown, Japan commands, so far as maritime
use is concerned, the coal-fields of North China and
Manchuria. With Alaska in her possession she will
control the coal supply of the Pacific to the extent,
and so strategically placed, that it will be impossible

198

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

for any other power to carry on naval or military
enterprises against her.

The harbors along the Alaskan peninsula, where
vast deposits of Welsh coal are eroding in the wash
of the sea, and where the winters are so modu-
lated by the Japan Current as to be no severer
than in New York harbor, are three degrees nearer
Japan than are the Hawaiian Islands, and command
the entire ocean west of the one hundred and thirty-
fifth degree of longitude and north of the fortieth
degree parallel.

Had Russia not sold Alaska, her dreams for the
conquest of Asia might have been realized and the
battle of Tsu-Shima never fought.

Hawaii, in conjunction with the strategic posi-
tions heretofore described, can be considered the
most important position in the Pacific. Not only
would it be impossible for any nation to hope for
sovereignty over the Pacific without being in pos-
session of these islands, but no power could under-
take without them any continuous naval operations
or maritime expansion. Their great value is due
to the fact that they are situated almost in the
centre of the Pacific, and that the ports nearest to
them are distant over two thousand miles. They
sever the North Pacific from the South, the East
from the West. In this segmentation lies their
mastery.

The desert and the sea are in themselves the

199

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

barrenest of tenures, but while one has oases, in the
other are islands, and when the caravans of man,
whether by camel or ship, start across their wastes,
these oases and islands determine the way of their
passage.

The value of such a position is not due to its own
productivity, but to the wealth of all the nations
whose trade routes pass its turreted shores.

Nearly fifteen years ago the value of the Hawaiian
Islands, and the necessity of their possession to any
nation who would be sovereign over the Pacific, was
recognized by Japan. When this Republic annexed
the islands at that time, Japan alone protested and
notified the American Government that she would
not then, nor at any time in the future, acquiesce
in the control of the Hawaiian Islands by this
nation.

Years have now passed, but the protest of Japan
has never been withdrawn, nor have preparations
ever ceased to bring about in due time its enforce-
ment. This Republic may forget, or after its con-
quests sleep, but in that Silent Pentagon1 where
rests together the sceptre of the Mikado and the
sword of the samurai there is no forgetfulness, and
in their slumbers — dreams.

However great may be the singular value of each
of the American Pacific possessions to the future
development of Japan, it is in the strategic relation-

1 The Genro, or Five Elder Statesmen.
200

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ship each bears to the other, and their relation in
the aggregate to Japanese maritime power, that is
to be found their greatest value — not the price of
one, but a dozen wars.

The primary laws governing naval supremacy in
an ocean surrounded, but not divided, by continents
may be formulated as follows:

(i) The number of naval bases must be increased
in a proportionate ratio to the increase of the navy.

(2) The efficiency of the navy is lessened whenever
the number and capacity of naval bases is less than
required by such fleets as conditions of warfare
may force to base on them.

(3) The possession of too few or not widely spaced
bases means the restriction of naval activity to a
defined and perhaps unimportant portion of the
theatre of war, as well as periods of complete in-
activity consequent upon undue concentration.

(4) The efficiency of the navy is correspondingly
weakened where there are, within such strategic
triangles as are formed by two, three, or more of its
bases, fortified positions belonging to the enemy.

While the converse of some of the above conditions
may qualitatively determine success in maritime
warfare, there are certain positive factors that in-
crease the value of these conditions :

(i) Success in naval warfare, as on land, is largely
controlled by the number and directness of its lines
of communication to widespread and divergent
bases.

14 201

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

(2) The greatest possible number of strategic
triangles formed by these divergent bases, in which
one of the vertices rests on the nation's main naval
base while the subordinate bases constitute the
vertices of more than one strategic triangle, inde-
pendent of or in conjunction with the main naval
base.

(3) The value of these strategic triangles, outside
of their homogeneity and number, is determined
by the location and number of the enemy's bases;
whether or not they exceed or are less in number
and are within or without these strategic trian-
gles.

In land warfare strategic positions held in the
beginning of hostilities often determine its eventual
conclusion. In maritime war this condition is even
more significant, inasmuch as without a certain num-
ber of these positions war cannot be begun. In
proportion to their number, defence and strategic
value can maritime supremacy be proportionately
determined prior to hostilities.

The value of a series of naval and military bases
in such an ocean as the Pacific is determined by
three positive conditions:

(1) The number of strategic triangles they form.

(2) The number of times one vertex, resting on
the main naval base of the nation, is common to the
aggregate of triangles.

(3) The absence of foreign naval bases within
such triangles, or the distance of their separation as

202

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

determined by the number of intervening lines of
offence.

It is in consideration of these principles that we
will deal with Japan in the Pacific subsequent to a
successful war with this Republic, to determine
whether or not her future strategic position, inde-
pendent of the economic and geographical advan-
tages, will be sufficiently augmented as to warrant
a war with this Republic.

If, at the end of such a struggle, Japan should
retain empire over the American Pacific provinces,
we know of no war between single states so signifi-
cant in its results and so basic for the formation of
world empire under the hegemony of one nation.
By chart has been shown graphically what will be
Japan's position subsequent to such a war, and its
relationship to the future control of the world.
Radiating from Japan, with one vertex resting
therein and common to all, do eight strategic
triangles spread abroad over the Pacific, while four
similar triangles with vertices independent of Japan,
but connected with the main vertex resting therein,
surround these others with an outward sphere of
defence.1

Within these twelve triangles there is not to be
found a single stronghold belonging to another
nation, while every naval base held by other powers,
together with their lines of intercommunication,
would be subject to Japanese attack from two to

1 Chart I.

203

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

eight divergent bases. Any foreign fleet on the
Pacific would always be open to attack in any part
of the ocean by the whole of the Japanese navy.
No power could attempt to transfer from one naval
base to another, across Japan's intervening lines, a
fleet less than the Japanese navy.

Anywhere on the trade routes of the Pacific
Japan could fight a naval battle and always be
within three days' steaming of not less than two
divergent bases. Connecting Alaska and Samoa
with Hawaii by submarine cable, the Mikado, within
his Castle of Yeddo, could at all times be in direct
and simultaneous communication, not only with
these widely scattered harbors, but with every
Japanese warship steaming about over the Pacific.
These different bases are so situated, together
with subordinate isles, that no Japanese warship
would ever be without the sphere of wireless com-
munication with some one of them. Should the Mi-
kado before dawn demand, "Where are my ships of
war?" the admiral of the fleet could lay before him
the chart of the Pacific and by pins in the painted
ocean show whither each torpedo-boat and battle-
ship was at that moment steaming its way through
the sea and the night.

To such small space has science relegated this vast
sea that the fleets of Japan could be scattered over
it and yet be as much under the control of the
commanding admiral in Tokio as though they were
a small fleet within the vision of his eye.

204

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Not within these twelve strategic triangles com-
manding the Pacific can be found a spot wherein
Japan could not concentrate in ten days seven-
tenths of her entire navy, free from colliers, free
from supply and hospital ships, free from all the
dead impedimenta of the sea. Regardless in what
corner of the ocean the rendezvous might be, these
fleets would at all times be within three days of one
or more naval bases.1

By such a war Japan would be placed in a naval
and military position so invulnerable that no nation
or coalition of them could attack her. Calmly,
from this vast Gibraltar of the ocean, she could look
down upon the world and smile at its rage and
trepidation — this island tribe that owns no heaven
and annoys no god.

Upon this foundation of one-third the world,
Japan would begin the building of a new empire;
and as the militant capacities of the nations in the
West continued to deteriorate through Hague Con-
ferences, the crumbling diseases of feminism, com-
mercialism and socialism, one by one should they
go into the great tumulus upon which, in due time,
shall be raised the throne of the Three-Toed Dragon.

We know not lor how many years the Occident
has been muttering to itself of a peril that it has
called yellow. In the penumbra of its dreams it
has seen indistinct shadows lightened, or rather

•Chart I.
205

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

made pallid, with uncertain consciousness, in which,
sicklied over with fear, phantoms have rioted. These
chimeras in the fear and dreaming of Western nations
are what might be called probabilities, monstrous,
terrifying, but for all that only phantoms, having
their origin in truth, but transferred by that strange
somnolence — the public mind — to the shadowiest
of realms.

To this dim region belongs the Yellow Peril.

Ever since the Occident entered into close contact
with the Orient, politically as well as commercial-
ly, it has intuitively become cognizant of a peril.
This intuition has been as correct as the reasons
concerning its origin and consummation have been
somnolently wrong. In this misplacement of the
source of the Yellow Peril, the Occident has only
repeated what has been done innumerable times
before among all portions of mankind.

When the dread of the Orient instinctively en-
tered and permeated the consciousness of the West,
the whole Occident asked:

"Whence will it come?" The reply, based quite
naturally on the old and popular misconception of
what constitutes capacity to conquer, laid upon
China the responsibility of the Yellow Peril because
of its immensity.

The world never learns until too late what deter-
mines the militant qualities of a nation.

True militancy belongs to primitive, homogeneous
peoples, wherein political control is restricted to the

206

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

fewest number of persons, or even to a single in-
dividual. National militancy deteriorates in in-
verse ratio to the increasing complexity of social
and political organisms, hence the larger a nation
is and the more individualistic its inhabitants be-
come through the multiplicity of avocations the
less capable is a nation to be a conquering power.
On account of this we invariably find that the con-
questing period of a nation appears in the earliest
portion of its career — that is, when it first enters
into the comity of nations.

The Chinese period of conquest ended with Tsin-
Chi-Hoangti, twenty-one centuries ago. The build-
ing of the great wall marked its consummation.

The mistake of the Occident is an old error.

If, in the third century B.C., such great empires
as Persia and Egypt were somnolently conscious of
threatening peril — as no doubt they were — they
committed the same error the West is making at
the present time. Not one of them could imagine
that out of the barren mountains of the Balkans,
without wealth or numbers — nay, with nothing
other than beak and talons — a young gray eagle
would swoop down and destroy them as so many
bleating lambs. Nor any more did the empires
of the seventh century dread the wild horsemen
in the barren tenure of the Arabian Desert. Not
one of them ; though in due time all were trampled
under hoof by these same nomads.

Among the great empires of the thirteenth cen-
207

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

tury not one was free from the dread of the same
peril or was not haunted by the same phantoms.
Yet neither China nor India, neither the empires
of Central Asia nor the kingdoms of Eastern Eu-
rope, could conceive, though this ill-defined fear
brooded heavily over them, of any source of danger
other than from those nations whose immensity
they dreaded. Upon them fell no terror of certain
snout-faced marauders who roamed with their herds
over the deserts of Gobi. But with the suddenness
of the terrible winds that sweep across Shamo these
herders fell upon the world and wagged their cow-
tail banners in the faces of a hundred kings.

In such a manner, in the immensity of China's
shadow, four rocky islands have been overlooked.

IT is difficult to make a just comparison between
the naval and military capacity of one's own
country and that of a nation which, through circum-
stances beyond the sphere of its control, has en-
tered into a struggle for supremacy permitting of
no consummation except through a conflict of arms.
However sincere one's efforts may be to free him-
self from prejudice and exaggerated confidence in
his country's prowess, yet so innumerable are the
intricacies of modern warfare, and so limitless are
the possibilities of self-deception, that, even in the
sincerest efforts to be exact, one is apt to be unfair
and his deductions unjust.

Conditions pre-eminent in peace are fondly hoped
to manifest themselves in war, though they are lack-
ing in attributes necessary to the prosecution of a
modern conflict. Unfortunately or otherwise, as
the case may be, those phases of warfare that are
so firmly imbued in the popular mind no longer
exist, except in greatly modified forms. In conse-
quence of this, indiscriminate patriotism is almost
always erroneous in its ideas concerning the con-
duct of modern war and the conditions necessary
to its success.

209

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

These errors in popular judgment have two phases
that fit one into the other, and thus complete, under
the guise of discrimination, their self-beguilement.
The positive factor is due to that thoughtless pa-
triotism that exaggerates the capacity of one's own
nation, and the negative factor that exaggerates
the deficiencies of the enemy. While we fasten our
thoughts ever on victory, we close our eyes to the
difficulties of gaining it. It is in this voluntary
blindness that we do not perceive our weakness nor
elements of strength belonging to the enemy. Their
prowess has among us no partisans, no voice.

In individual life a man who deceives himself,
whether through arrogance or ignorance, as to his
own ability or capacity, and in consequence ends
in disaster, is regarded as a boaster, a man not only
unworthy of confidence, but deserving of no com-
passion. His misfortunes the public regards com-
placently as being retributive of his vain-glorious-
ness and failure to take such ordinary precautions
as would have laid bare the strength of his competitor.

Nations being but composite individuals, all that
which moves or is part of an individual, in a larger
sense, moves or is part of a nation. To free a nation
from error is to enlighten the individual. And only
to the degree that the individual will be receptive
of truth can a nation be freed from that vanity
which ends in national ruin.

The first duty a man owes his country is to realize
that he cannot liquidate his indebtedness to it by

210

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

vain complacency; his boasts are not only without
value, but are a counterfeit of the real emotions to
which he should give expression. In the survival
of nations the vanity of man has no place.

In making a comparison between the naval
strength of Japan and the United States, that which
most commonly does service is to compare the
number and tonnage of ships belonging to each
navy, and then, by no other means than subtrac-
tion, determine which is the more powerful. This
manner of judgment is common to man when all
questions involving power are determined by visual
comparison. The true criterion of naval supremacy
in this epoch, when science enters into every detail
of naval construction, is determined according to
the efficiency of such construction, supplemented
by scientific direction prior to and in battle. To
this must be added strategic considerations that
circumscribe or augment the opportunities of com-
manders, diminishing or increasing their chances of
victory. Such are the conditions that must be in-
vestigated by all who wish to arrive at some just
approximation of the outcome of modern war.

In recent times no means of deception are so
widely employed as statistical tables. They have
become in this age of calculators a fetich more po-
tent than the wonder-working charms of a primi-
tive people. In the beginning of 1904 these tables
made the Russian navy third, and the Japanese
least, of the great powers.

211

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

In a few hours, one May afternoon, the Russian
navy ceased to exist.

In statistical tables to-day, we find that by vessels
and tonnage the United States navy ranks third,
and that of Japan fifth. Ordinarily this is as far as
the casual observer goes. To him it is self-evident
that a naval power of the fifth rank could not hope
to compete with one that is third in naval suprem-
acy. To determine the truth or error of this be-
lief, and whether or not the true elements of naval
superiority are proportionate to this catalogue of
vessels, or are to a degree lacking, is the first duty
of every citizen who wishes to arrive at a just con-
clusion.

In modern naval warfare there are three fight-
ing lines, consisting of battleships, armored cruisers,
and torpedo craft. According to statistical tables
the United States is superior to Japan in battle-
ships, though correspondingly inferior in armored
cruisers and torpedo craft. But since the battle
of Tsu-Shima a new type of battleship has been
introduced into the world, that possesses a fighting
capacity equal to any three battleships, now in the
American navy. While the American battleships
exceed in number those of the Japanese,1 yet the
latter possess nearly thirty per cent, more big guns.2

1 Appendix, Table IV.

8 " It was the powerful guns of our batteries that inflicted their
casualties upon the Japanese, and it was with their large-caliber
guns that they destroyed our fleet." — Admiral ROJESTVENSKY.

212

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The efficiency of the means employed in naval
warfare are supposed to determine the probabilities
of victory, yet these chances are great or small as
the commanders are proficient or inexperienced in
the duties devolving upon them, each year becom-
ing more intricate, the strain more constant and
wearing, so that the faculties and strength of men
commanding these vast ships endure only so long
as their vigor is unimpaired and their mentality still
possesses the keen alertness of youth.

Never have the gods of all the tribes put upon
the seas such monsters as man now sends over
them. To contemplate them is to wonder; to
know them is to look up to these gods and smile.
That which is as soft as iron belongs in no way to
them. Their steel bowels, grinding and rumbling be-
low the splash of the sea, are fed on quarried rock.
Their arteries are steel, their nerves copper, their
blood red and blue flames. With the prescience of
the supernatural, they peer into space. Their voices
scream through gales, and they whisper together
over a thousand miles of sea. They reach out and
destroy that which the eye of man cannot perceive.

But all this cyclopean activity depends upon,
fulfils its purpose or is worthless as is active or
wearied the tiny brain of a single man. All this
terribleness will vanish, returning again into the
inanimate whenever the capacity and vigor of the
guiding mind deteriorates or is worn down by the
years that have stolen away the quick grasp of youth.

213

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Because of this natural deterioration in man the
American navy, even if it were perfect in every
other phase of its construction and government, its
present system of command would counteract this
efficiency, and all that which had gone to make up a
great navy would, in some few hours of an afternoon,
vanish. For in this nation, captains are not com-
missioned until they reach the age of fifty-six, while
in Japan the average age of such officers is thirty-
eight; a difference of nearly twenty years. This is
not all. While captains in the American navy have
only four and a half years in this grade, the Japanese
have eight, giving them twice as much experience
though they are twenty years younger.1

As the success of armies depends primarily upon
the ability of general officers, so in the great naval
engagements of the future, where fleets instead of
single vessels will engage in battle, success will de-
pend upon the ability, vigor, and experience of sea-
going flag-officers. In the American navy rear-
admirals are not commissioned until they reach the
advanced age of sixty, wrhile in Japan officers receive
this rank at forty-four. In America, sea-going flag-
officers only pass one and a half years in this grade,
while in Japan such officers are on duty for eleven
years.2

Whatever faults exist in the American navy,
the nation and not the navy is responsible. That

1 Appendix, Table V, * Appendix, Table V.

214

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

in many of the vessels armor does not exist in vital
parts,1 that the main armor-belt itself is wrongly
placed,2 that the gun-ports are so large and the
secondary batteries so placed as to expose both
guns and gun-crews to destruction,3 that the navy
is without adequate torpedo protection,4 and that
the gun-decks are so low as to render useless a
portion of the ship's armament under various con-
ditions of the sea5 are in no way the fault of the
navy. For these and many other deficiencies that
relegate the combative power of the American navy
to a comparatively low degree, the nation is alone
responsible. By its indifference, as expressed through
its legislative representatives, these things have come
about — to efface, in due time, all the victories of
the past.

These deficiencies, however, do not affect the naval
situation existing between Japan and this Republic;
conditions governing their relative naval strength
in the Pacific are not confined to catalogues of ships.
Whether perfect or useless, these vessels last for no
great period of time. Transient, fragile, these gi-
gantic fabrications of man cannot endure for long.
Their life is but a score of years, if they do not vanish
in the tragedy of a single hour.

True naval comparison is, therefore, not based on
naval tables nor good nor poor ships, but on condi-

1 Appendix, Table Via. J Appendix, Table VIb.

•Appendix, Table Vic. * Appendix, Table VId.

5 Appendix, Table Vie.

2IS

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

tions that shape, not only the building of navies
but the destinies of nations. In such a comparison
alone can we determine what naval forces are
necessary for this Republic to maintain in order to
be superior over Japan so long as their interests
clash in the Pacific. In modern times, wherein all
the phases of warfare are modified from year to year
by science and invention, there must be in the army
and navy of every nation a progress concurrent with
these changes. The old idea, still prevalent in this
Republic, that armies and navies are but transitory
expedients, brought into existence only in the time
of war and put aside when it ends, will sooner or
later plunge the nation into that abyss out of which
few have corne forth. Now, and in the future more
so, must all preparations for war be made in time
of peace, even to the extent of working out hy-
pothetical campaigns in probable theatres of
war. Whatever nation neglects these precautions
is doomed to defeat.

The navy must be considered as being co-existent
with the nation, and to be constantly prepared for
war so long as the nation shall endure ; expanding in
size and efficiency as the nation expands in political
greatness; progressing as science and invention pro-
gress, so that it is always ready to encounter those
old storms that fall upon nations out of clear skies.
In modern times there are four conditions that
demand continuity in the building of a navy and a
prescience in the nation's naval policy.

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THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

While a battleship endures less than a score of
years, its usefulness may cease in a few months.
Not only does it take years to build such ships, but
the facilities for their construction are limited. A
half-dozen wars could be lost and won before the
destroyed fleets of a nation, or those made useless
through the development of naval science, could be
replaced. The potential naval strength of a nation
is determined not by the products of a single year,
but by the term of years that marks its duration;
not by alternating cycles of renascence and de-
terioration, but by a continuous policy of production
and excellence as determined from year to year by
the increasing political importance of the nation
and the progress in naval invention. To accomplish
this the navy must be removed far from the sphere
of politics — that state of transitory ideals, that ideal
of transitory greatness. But this nation has not put
aside the characteristics, so prominent in republican
forms of government, of treating the army and navy
as the expedients of a struggle, rather than the per-
manent source of a nation's safety. If this policy
were possible in the past, it is no longer so, and each
succeeding year diminishes its probabilities.

The present navy, being the greatest ever possessed
by this Republic, is an illustration of the evils of
sporadic growth upon the debris piles of deteriora-
tion. Instead of it being the result of a national
ideal, it was only gained through the strenuous ef-
forts of the executive. Should this administration
« 217

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

be succeeded by a non-militant one, then in less
than four years the American navy will be the least
efficient among the navies of the great powers.

The continuity of a nation's naval policy forms, in
one phase, a truer basis for naval comparison be-
tween two powers.

In Japan the army and navy are placed above
and beyond the reach of politics.1 Ministries may
rise and fall, but the military and naval develop-
ment goes on unhindered, co-existent with the life
and greatness of the empire itself. But in this Re-
public, not only is there no continuity in naval de-
velopment, but no freedom from political circum-
scription.

While the effective life of a battleship is very
brief, its efficiency may be so diminished at any time
as to render it practically obsolete. An example of
this is seen in changes of naval architecture fol-
lowing the Japanese - Russian War, when, by the
introduction of the Dreadnaught type of vessel,
the fighting capacity of a single ship was trebled.
Whenever, therefore, sudden and radical changes oc-
cur in naval construction, that nation which possesses
a flexible naval system, freed from all political re-
strictions, will alter its naval policy in the shortest
time, and adjust itself to new conditions before the
nation whose naval department is the shuttlecock

1 Changes in the Japanese cabinet do not affect the ministers
of war or navy. They are almost as free from political in-
fluences as the Mikado.

218

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of contending political factions can even realize the
necessity of such a departure. It is due to this that
the Japanese navy is so superior in modern fighting
capacity to that of the United States.1

Japan constructs a twenty -thousand -ton battle-
ship of the new type in two years, and an armored
cruiser in less time. In the United States it has re-
quired over five years to build a sixteen-thousand-ton
battleship, and five years and two months to build
an armored cruiser. In 1909 Japan will have four
of these new battleships and the United States none ;
in 1911 Japan will have eight and this nation two.
This ratio will continue so long as the American navy
remains subject to public indifference and political
control : in one administration or Congress, sporadic
in energy but obsolete in construction; in another,
dormant, decadent, forgotten.

We now come to the consideration of the deter-
minate factor in naval warfare wherein is to be found
the true comparison of naval strength — the strategic.
No nation's naval power is constant in its relation
to all countries. The efficiency of a fleet decreases
or is augmented as the distance from its main base
to the theatre of war is lengthened or diminished.
The area of naval efficiency is determined by the
multiplicity, dispersion, and efficiency of its naval
bases. Without these depots a navy decreases in
efficiency as it increases in size.

1 Appendix, Table IV.
219

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

We have, in the previous chapter,1 made clear the
strategic possibilities of the Pacific and Japan's re-
lationship to them as well as the commanding po-
sition she already possesses. The strategic situa-
tion, concretely, is that the entire Japanese naval
power, not alone her fleets, but her navy yards, docks,
arsenals, people, and resources are situated in the
strategic centre of the Pacific, while the naval bases
and naval resources of the United States are in the
Atlantic Ocean, seventeen thousand miles from the
sphere of this approaching struggle. The larger
the American navy becomes under these conditions
the less capable is it to wage war in the Pacific.

To overcome these difficulties must be the first
consideration of this Republic; hence it is the pri-
mordial basis of naval comparison between the two
nations. In the previous chapter was made apparent
what this nation must accomplish in order to main-
tain a fleet in the Pacific Ocean, viz., the establish-
ment of naval bases in the Philippines, Hawaii,
Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California, to-
gether with their complete protection against land
attack, and the maintenance in the Pacific of fleets
equal to the entire navy of Japan. None of these
things exist, even in an embryonic state, and, instead
of preparation being made to remedy them, active
opposition is manifest throughout the Republic.
Unless this is done in time of peace Japan will ac-

v.

220

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

complish in war what has been shown to be her
ambitions.

In the succeeding chapters will be shown, step by
step, the ultimate conquest of the Pacific, and the
elimination of this Republic from its government
and its destinies in a manner no different from the
fate of China and Russia.

Were the American navy twice its tonnage, twice
the number of vessels, all other conditions remaining
the same, it would affect in no way nor in any degree
the culmination of this approaching struggle. The
conquest of the Pacific is beyond the ton weight of
steel or the old, old catalogue of ships.

VI

NATIONS, especially republics, oftentimes go to
extremes in the advocacy of some popular
measure that for the time being finds favor with
the masses. This has been true during the last few
years in the struggle to gain a navy commensurate
with the political development of the Republic.
The advocates of naval expansion have, however,
given a wrong impression to the public, not as to
the necessity of a navy, but as to the accomplish-
ment of enterprises that are beyond its sphere.

A nation without a navy proportionate to its
political responsibilities will soon be deprived of
its power beyond the sea; but a country that risks
its entire dependence upon a navy places itself in
a position, not only to lose the navy but its insular
possessions, and, suffering defeat within its boun-
daries, be deprived of world significance.

Neither now nor in the future will international
conflicts be determined by naval engagements. In
some instances naval victories may produce con-
ditions that will tend to hasten the conclusion of
a war, but such a state of national weakness is prob-
lematical. Only those who overlook the natural

222

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

laws governing international struggles fail to com-
prehend that victory or defeat is relative to the
power or weakness of a nation as a whole.

To affect, to cripple, or destroy a nation in war-
fare can only be done by injuring to that degree its
power of government, its resources, and its ability
to defend itself against the enforcement of hostile
demands. If the entire German navy were sunk
in the North Sea, England could get no nearer
Berlin than she is to-day, and the demands that she
might then make upon the German Empire could
no more be enforced than at any time prior to the
destruction of that nation's navy. The multiplicity
of the arteries of modern trade and interchange
prevents the possibility of blockade.

If the entire American navy should suddenly be
destroyed in a storm or war, it would have no effect
whatsoever upon the government of the Republic,
upon its resources or power. As all wars have been, so
in the future will they be, determined by land warfare.

Naval engagements, being remote from a nation,
affect it only as a single battle. The number of men
destroyed is, compared to the nation, insignificant.
Neither the political constitution of the country,
nor means to wage war, nor the belligerent attitude
of the people are affected. When a nation's navy
is destroyed it will then assume a land defence, and
only subsequent to the defeat of its armies, the pass-
ing of its territory and resources into the hands of
an enemy, will it consider surrender.

223

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The navy is but a portion of the military forces of
a nation, and was originally composed of soldiers.
In recent years it has the appearance of being a
separate institution, but to consider it as such is to
mistake the essential characteristics of warfare. A
navy to-day is more dependent upon the land forces
of a nation than heretofore.

Navies are not self-sustaining in any degree what-
soever. Nothing that is necessary for their main-
tenance can be gotten by them out of the sea. The
vast theatre of war, where their campaigns are made
and battles fought, is as barren as the desert. In
consequence, naval bases are as necessary as fleets
in every sea where nations have established or ex-
pect to extend their suzerainty.

As we have shown in a previous chapter and by
chart,1 every naval base is the centre of a naval
sphere of activity, the radii of which are determined
by the steaming capacity of the fleets based upon it.

The value of naval bases diminishes as the square
of the distance between the extremes of their radii
increases.

A nation that expects to be supreme in any ocean
must be governed by the principle that the distance
between its naval bases must never exceed the sum
of the radii of any two of them.

The security of naval bases rests fundamentally
with their land defence. To depend upon the navy

1 Chart I.
224

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

to protect its own bases in all emergencies is to re-
duce naval and military science to absurdity. To
attempt the protection of naval bases by permanent
batteries alone is only to be ignorant of the changes
modern means of transportation have made in re-
gard to the value of harbor defences. If once the
enemy gains temporary command of the sea, and
at the same times possesses adequate transport
fleets, it will be able to seize every naval base by
land attack, unless prevented by mobile armies in
their rear. Modern harbor fortifications consist of
series of detached batteries, and their only defence
rests on armies equal in size and efficiency to any
that an enemy may land adjacent to or distant from
the harbors they intend to capture.

For the United States to lose temporary posses-
sion of the Pacific Ocean, as will necessarily be the
case, owing to the complete lack of protected naval
bases and a navy sufficiently great to overcome the
natural strategic difficulties of a naval war with
Japan, means, as we will hereafter show, that it
could not in the same war undertake a second naval
enterprise in this sea. War between the United
States and Japan will be upon land. Armies rather
than navies will constitute from beginning to end
the determinate factors in this approaching strug-
gle.

To make a just comparison between the Japanese
and American armies, their military systems in
general, as well as their potential military power, is,

225

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

in some respects, a difficult undertaking. Patriot-
ism on the one hand and prejudice on the other are
apt to circumscribe facts, though every effort has
been made to avoid partisanship as well as an-
tipathy. It is due to this cold exactitude of truth
that there may come into our work another bitter-
ness more sombre and foreboding than has here-
tofore been expressed.

The worth of armies is not measured by their
magnitude, but by the perfection of their con-
struction, by the spirit that inspires them, and by
the skill displayed in their use.

The capacity of armies is not constant in all
theatres of war nor against all nations. The maxi-
mum military strength Germany could put into the
field against China would be much less than she
could place in New Jersey or against the frontiers of
Austria and France. As in naval comparison, it is
erroneous to say that one nation is first in military
power and another sixth or seventh. In armies,
as in naval forces, generalizations are not permissible
if a just comparison of strength between two na-
tions is sought.

The armies of two combatants must be considered
intrinsically, comparatively, then in relation to the
theatre of war and the strategic conditions extant.
The strategic position of one power may be so
favorable, as to require an excessive increase of force
on the part of the other in order to overcome nat-
ural impediments. Again, that which appears in

226

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

peace to be an obstacle, oftentimes in war becomes
an actual aid.

The first consideration must be given to the
intrinsic merits or deficiencies of the two armies.
This comparison in modern times, while not exact,
is possible to a greater extent than in the past.
And as science enters more fully into the construc-
tion and employment of armies, the more must their
training be confined to the time of peace and the
longer must that training be carried on. To the
degree of its thoroughness or superficiality, to its
approximation of war conditions and actualities,
are we able to form, in times of peace, an estimation
of an army's capacity in war.

The force that Japan could almost immediately
place in the field exceeds a million and a quarter of
men,1 all of whom have had three years' training in
the regular army and in specific branches of service.
Over eight hundred thousand have had the addi-
tional experience of from one year to a year and a
half on the battlefields of Manchuria. The officers
of these forces are technically trained in military
science and in all the strange emergencies of actual
war.

In the struggle with Russia the efficiency of the
Japanese forces exceeded, to the most minute de-
tails, that of any army which has heretofore taken

"The Japanese put into the field against us troops of various
categories to the number of 1,500,000 — or more than three
times the estimate of our general staff." — KUROPATKIN.

227

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the field. This effectiveness is due primarily
to the fact that the armies of modern Japan
were not organized until after the Franco-Prussian
War.

Moreover, there were in Japan none of those prej-
udiced associations that have prevented, from time
to time, the reorganization of national armies,
The character of the Japanese people, in addition,
permitted the development of German militarism
to a high degree. It was only necessary to congeal
the feudal system of old Japan into the modern
feudalism of Germany, while in the Mikado was re-
tained the first attribute of a military nation —
absolute centralization of power.1 In all phases of
national life Japan is pregnant with the spirit of
militarism. The religion of the nation is militant,
and the empire is ridged with Hills of Kudan, within
whose temples are enshrined the spirits of those who
have gone down in battle. Their social organism
is based upon supremacy of the samurai ; the trades-
man ranks below the toiler of the soil and sea. The
national ideal is the bushido, the lists of the armed
knight, the way of the knightly man.

The American army in time of peace is limited by
Congress to one hundred thousand men, but public
indifference and prejudice against military activity
has reduced this force to less than fifty thousand.

1 " The strength of Japan was in the complete union of her
people, army, and government, and it was this union that gave
her the victory." — KUROPATKIN.

228

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

While Japan in modern military development came
into existence subsequent to the Franco-Prussian
War, the United States, in the same sense, came into
being prior to the Napoleonic struggles, and the
American military system of to-day was the system
of Europe one hundred and fifty years ago ; and there
has been, not only a lack of development, but in
many respects deterioration. The regular army as
now constructed and stationed could not mobilize
on the Pacific coast, in event of war with Japan, a
field force of twenty thousand men, while six hun-
dred thousand are necessary.

In the regular army and militia of the United
States, the essentials of military organization on a
war basis are absent. No staffs exist; no organiza-
tion of units ; no plans for mobilization ; no means of
transportation or caring for large bodies of troops;
no military equipment nor means to produce it.
While Japan has over fifty thousand scientifically
trained military officers, the United States has less
than four thousand. A war with Japan, necessitat-
ing the mobilization of a force equal to that which
Japan could put in the field, would result in placing
the American armies under the command of officers,
ninety-two per cent, of whom would be, not only
wholly ignorant of the science of war, but, being
appointed through political preference, would repre-
sent only an inferior quality of incapacity.1 Were it

1 Appendix, Table Villa.
229

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

possible for the rank and file of the volunteer forces
to be as efficient as the Japanese line, they would
only be led to disaster and slaughter through the
incompetence of their civilian officers.

The efficiency of every army is determined by the
efficiency of its corps of officers. Though self-
evident, it is not fully understood that in great
wars the genius and knowledge, the ability and
experience of general officers determine more than
any other factor the success or failure of campaigns.
Owing to the American system, there would not be,
in event of war, a single American officer who has
ever handled, in peace or war, a corps of troops.
Japanese generals, on the other hand, have fed,
marched, cared for, placed on the field of battle,
supplied with food and ammunition, manoeuvred,
and fought several army corps simultaneously with
science and exactitude.

Success in military operations depends primarily
upon the excess of rapidity that one army has over
another in reaching a theatre of war and moving
therein. As the theatre of war increases in distance
from the main bases of the combatants and extends
in area, armies become more dependent upon the
rapidity and capacity of means of transportation.
As an army is limited or retarded in gaining strategic
positions in a theatre of war, its worth is decreased
accordingly. If a theatre of war is trans-oceanic,
and the means of transportation limited, then a
great army at home dwindles down to the size of a

230

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

single contingent, as determined by the capacity of
the transport fleet per voyage,

Modern means of transportation and communica-
tion, while shrinking in a practical sense the size
of the world, have to a corresponding degree in-
creased the area of modern and future warfare. It
has become necessary for all nations having isolated
possessions to defend, or a vast area of continental
territory to protect, to provide in times of peace
adequate means of transportation.

If, at the present time, a state of war existed be-
tween this Republic and another country which
necessitated the transportation of one hundred
thousand troops to the Philippines, and to this end
the United States should utilize the eight American
trans-Pacific steamers that constitute the entire
American merchant marine in the Pacific, it would
require two years to transport this number of men.
To oppose their landing, a force no larger than the
capacity of the transports per voyage would be
necessary. The value of the American army for
use in transoceanic warfare is determined in one
phase by the capacity of its means of transportation.
The complete absence of these means was recently
made clear to the Republic when it witnessed that
melancholy and foreboding spectacle of sixteen
American battleships convoyed by twenty -eight
vessels flying a foreign flag, without which they
could not have steamed beyond the sphere of
their Atlantic bases, and the journey to the

231

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Pacific would have been but an idle specula-
tion.

Japan, being an Island Empire, was forced to
realize early in her association with the world as a
whole that her political sphere would remain cir-
cumscribed to her islands so long as she was unable
to move freely over the seas. This necessity has
developed, under governmental inspiration and con-
trol, a system of merchant marine, which in time
of war passes, as conditions necessitate, under direct
control of the government. The Japanese trans-
port fleets consist of a hundred steamers, ranging
from one thousand to fourteen thousand tons each.1
On these fleets can be transported at one time two
hundred thousand men, together with their entire
equipment. These vessels, leaving the ports of
Japan, would be able to reach the Philippines in
five days; Hawaii in fourteen; the coast of Cali-
fornia in twenty- two days; the coasts of Alaska,
Washington, and Oregon in less than twenty.

We have, in the first part of this work,2 shown the
worthlessness of volunteers in modern warfare, and
the inefficiency of the American volunteers as dem-
onstrated in the past wars of the nation. We will
now consider the regular army of the United States,
in order to determine whether or not it can be
utilized in a war with Japan as a nucleus upon
which to build an army of suitable proportions in

» Appendix, Table VII.

1 See Book I, chap, iv; Appendix, Table VIII.
232

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

the course of two or three years. In this considera-
tion we will, by the exemplification of permanent
peace conditions, show the actual state in which
each branch of the army exists, so that each for
himself may judge of its efficiency or inadequacy.

In an international war the harbor and coast
fortifications are supposed to be the first line of a
nation's defence, if the enemy has command of the
sea. In Alaska, Hawaii, Samoa, and the Philip-
pines there are no such fortifications. On the
Pacific coast, San Diego, San Francisco, the Colum-
bia River, and Puget Sound depend upon their forts
for protection, with a serenity that, in light of their
defencelessness and incapacity, is but a grave ex-
ample of public indifference and ignorance concern-
ing military affairs. The cry for more fortifications
that from time to time goes up from different parts
of the nation is, in its true significance, nothing other
than the evil banshee of this Republic : the shirking
of military duties, and laying upon the inanimate in-
struments of warfare the responsibility of this
nation's safety.

The coast defences of the United States consist of
sixty-seven forts, defending twenty-eight harbors.
In December, 1906, Congress was informed by the
Secretary of War that of the batteries then con-
structed two hundred and sixty-eight were out of
commission, and only one hundred and twenty-four
in commission. This means that of the eleven
hundred guns emplaced only three hundred and
16 233

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

ninety could be brought into action. To fully man
these sixty-seven forts requires sixteen hundred and
thirty-four officers, forty thousand six hundred and
seventy-five men. There are now available only
three hundred and fifty-seven officers and ten thou-
sand seven hundred men — not enough to keep the
guns or machinery from rusting.

The coast artillery is one of the most highly spe-
cialized corps in the army, and requires men of
superior intelligence and training. To fill their ranks
with civilians recruited after a war is begun would
be the same as detailing a salesman to make a
topographical survey, or a tinsmith to complete a
work of electrical engineering.

The Regular Army of the United States, inclusive
of all branches of the service, is more than thirty
per cent, below the minimum required by law, show-
ing that it is not the fault of the government so
much as it is public contempt for military enterprise
that is responsible for the depleted condition of the
American army, not only numerically, but in the
sense of vigor and esprit de corps.

In the grade of second-lieutenant the army, even
in its depleted condition, is almost thirty-eight per
cent, short. In the Coast Artillery, thirty per cent,
of the companies are without captains; sixty- three
per cent, without the prescribed number of lieu-
tenants. In the Field Artillery, comprising thirty
batteries, twenty-two of them are without the pre-
scribed number of officers. Some batteries are re-

234

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

duced to two guns and forty men. The infantry is
in no better condition. In the Eleventh Regiment
we find seven privates and four non-commissioned
officers constituting a battalion.

It was said long ago by Marshal St. Cyr that every
army is made up of three kinds of soldiers: one-
third naturally brave, one-third naturally cowards,
the other third capable of being made brave by
good officers and stern discipline. If, however, the
proper officers are lacking or discipline is inadequate,
the middle third naturally gravitates to the coward-
ly third. Examples of this have been seen on many
an American field of battle. Instead of this serving
as a warning, the present military organization of
the Republic shows, in time of peace, the total
absence of the very conditions that not only Mar-
shal St. Cyr but the experience of the whole world
has shown to be necessary in the organization and
conduct of armies.1

To judge, in time of peace, the worth of an army
in warfare will oftentimes prove erroneous. It is
only possible to judge the respective merits of na-
tional armaments, military systems and the numeri-
cal strength of the forces. By such comparisons
one may come to reasonable conclusions as to the
probabilities of victory. But, in addition, there
must be considered the militancy of the race or
nation, upon which, more than any other factor,

1 Appendix, Table IX.
235

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

depends the success or failure of military works.
This is by no means an intangible something that
the vicissitudes of war alone develops. The pres-
ence or lack of it can be determined quantitatively,
and to a degree qualitatively, in all nationalities
prior to war. The presence or absence of this ability
is, in peace, determined by the attitude of the na-
tion as a whole toward military activity, and by the
relative position that men in the army and in civil
life bear to society.

When the ideal of a nation, its religion, its aspira-
tions, national and individual, are militant, as in
Japan, then one can expect to find militancy de-
veloped to a high degree. In this country, how-
ever, there exists not only individual prejudice
against military ideals, but public antipathy; the
antagonism of politicians, newspapers, churches,
colleges, labor unions, theorists, and organized
societies. They combat the military spirit as if it
were a public evil and a national crime. Under
these conditions it is impossible to find the spirit
of militancy other than in a most debased form,
and this, terrible as is its significance, has come to
be the normal condition of the Republic.

To judge the discipline, morale, and fighting ca-
pacity of troops, their loyalty and self-sacrifice, is
possible in two ways: during active service, by
cowardice and desertion; in peace, by disobedience
and desertion. The Ten Commandments of a sol-
dier's honor are all broken in the one act of de-

236

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

sertion. By the lack of or prevalency of this
military crime are we able to judge the degree that
national non-militancy and antipathy to military
ideals have on the soldier. The deserter is the
product of civil life, not of militant institutions.

In Japan desertion is unknown.

In the United States during 1906 there occurred
in the national army of only sixty thousand men,
sixty-two hundred and eighty desertions.1

Whenever a recognizable deterioration exists in
some portion of the government, instead of meet-
ing this condition frankly and undertaking in a just
and reasonable manner its renascence, the nation
endeavors by substitution to evade responsibility.
With war near at hand, public evasion is found in
the formation of shooting or rifle clubs, under the
delusion that to shoot constitutes the sole duty of
a soldier and is the source of all military success.
The fatal error of this belief is shown in a single
comparison of the internal economy of the Japanese
and American armies, demonstrating that in those
phases of military activity least considered rests not
only an army's efficiency but existence. To shoot
is less important than to march ; to shoot accurately
less important than to obey implicitly; to kill less
important than to survive.

The energy of an army, or its fighting capacity,
depends primarily upon the physical vigor of the

1 Appendix, Table VHIb.
237

men that compose it. A body of men to fight and
march and endure the hardships of war must be as
physically perfect as possible. A sick man entails
a greater loss than a man killed on the field, so that
the ability of an army to conquer decreases geo-
metrically as sickness and mortality increase in
excessive ratio over the number killed in battle.

In the American Civil War more than four men
died from preventable sickness to every one killed.1
In the Spanish-American War fourteen men died of
disease to one on the battle-field.2 In the Japanese
army during the Russian War four deaths resulted
from bullets to one from sickness.3

In a war between Japan and the United States,
should the ratio of deaths in the American army
remain the same as during the Civil War, while in
the Japanese forces the ratio of the Russian War
should continue, the result would be that for every
ten thousand American soldiers killed on the field
more than forty thousand would die from prevent-
able sickness; while for every ten thousand Japan-
ese killed only twenty-five hundred would die from
disease. Should the total deaths on the battle-
field during the war amount to fifty thousand for
each nation, the American casualties from disease
alone would be more than two hundred thousand,
while the Japanese losses would only amount to
twelve thousand five hundred. Should the Spanish-

1 Appendix, Table Xa. 2 Appendix, Table Xb.

3 Appendix, Table Xc.

238

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

American War form the true basis for comparison,
then the total American losses from disease would
amount to seven hundred thousand, as against
twelve thousand five hundred Japanese.

VII

WHENEVER a nation's attitude toward war is
evasive, its conduct indecisive and its prepa-
ration an indifferent, orderless assembling of forces,
it prepares for defeat.

Preparation for war must be definite in purpose,
specific in application. There is no uncertainty in
determining a nation's probable adversaries within
such periods of time as to permit preparedness,
the adaptation of armaments to specific purposes
and defined theatres of war.

The objective of military activity must determine
the character of its preparation. But there can
be no adaptation of military means to a definite
end when this preparation is purposeless and the
government of it nebulous and vain. A nation's
military preparedness cannot be constant nor apply
equally to all countries, but must vary with each
combatant, and must be determined by the strategic
advantages or difficulties extant. The character of
military preparation is not identical in any two wars
where exist chronological, racial or topographical
differences.

Whenever a nation denies the basic and evolu-
240

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

tionary character of warfare in the development
and expansion of nationalities, rigid military sys-
tems come into being. This rigidity in military
science is an anomaly that has time and again
brought about the defeat and eventual dissolution
of nations.

The evolution of warfare is constant in cause and
effect, whether we consider the time and phalanxes
of Alexander, the legions of Cassar, or the changes
in armament and tactics that were introduced by
Charles XII., Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Schorn-
horst, Von Moltke, or Yamagata. The successes of
these captains were made certain by the application
of new means and methods of warfare.

No phase of national activity demands so much
flexibility in administration and development as the
military and naval departments; no part of the
government tends more quickly to deterioration if
once they become subject to fixed and unalterable
systems. Not only must all preparation for war
be flexible as regards armament and training, but
also capable of instant change, as the probabilities
of war shift from one theatre of combat to another.

Conditions governing military preparedness in a
conflict with Mexico have nothing to do with factors
controlling military preparations for a war with
Germany. Moreover, the purposes of the enemy in
making war, his armaments, objective theatres of
war and innumerable other conditions must deter-
mine, in variant gradations, concurrent changes in

241

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

this nation's preparations; these must be approxi-
mated and prepared for in times of peace.

Whenever preparation for war is regarded only as
an expedient applicable to abnormal conditions,
and is postponed to the beginning of hostilities,
then the nation, in modern times, is plunged into
a struggle that shall terminate only in destruc-
tion.

The chances of success in modern warfare are
proportionate to the rapidity with which the military
and naval power of a nation can adapt itself to new
conditions and diverse theatres of war. When spe-
cific preparation against a known enemy and in
a predetermined theatre of war is lacking, though
general preparedness has not been neglected, the
difficulties of conducting the war are diminished
only in a small degree. In some instances unfore-
seen conditions will prove so restrictive that war
cannot be carried on in the enemy's principal theatre
of war, though the nation is possessed of both armies
and navies. Governed by these facts, it must be
ascertained what preparation this nation has made
for conducting a war against Japan before the con-
flict itself can be considered.

The theatre of this war, as a whole, will be the
Pacific Ocean, divisible into six spheres of combat:
the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, Washington, Ore-
gon, and California. The salient characteristic that
forms the determinate factor in the conduct and
conclusion of this conflict is found in the vast dis-

242

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

tances that must be traversed by the armies and
fleets of both nations.

In this approaching war, as in all international
combats, the possession of strategic positions con-
stitutes the main struggle of both nations, since it
is in the permanent control of these that are to be
found those elements of military and naval power
that will determine the eventual consummation of
the war. The strategic positions forming the de-
terminate factors in a war between Japan and this
Republic are entirely American, and if they were
defended to the extent that an attack on them was
doubtful of success, then the probabilities of war
would be remote. But these territories are naked
of defence, and because of this nakedness they con-
stitute an irresistible inducement to the ambitions
of a martial race.

The conditions that determine the seizure and
control of the American Pacific possessions apply to
this Republic as much as they do to Japan. They
equalize both nations' opportunities so long as
Alaska, the Pacific coast, Hawaii, Samoa, and the
Philippines are not defended prior to the beginning
of hostilities. Their subsequent control, whether
by Japan or this Republic, will be determined by
which nation first occupies them in force and makes
secure their possession.

The seizure and control of these territories are
determined equally to both nations by three con-
ditions :

243

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

(1) Temporary naval supremacy in the Pacific.

(2) Rapid mobilization of trained armies.

(3) Possession of efficient means of transporta-
tion.

The disinclination of this Republic to render ade-
quate military and naval protection to its posses-
sions in the Pacific gives to Japan not only temporary
command of the entire ocean, but time enough for
the temporary character of its control to pass into
permanency. Unless the United States establishes
sufficient naval bases in its four quarters of the
Pacific, making them militarily secure against land
attack, and maintains in the Pacific fleets as much
superior to the entire navy of Japan as adverse
strategic conditions demand, the United States will
lose in the beginning what she will never be able
to regain during the continuation of the war — the
entire American littoral on the Pacific.

The seizure and control of the Pacific does not
alone depend upon naval supremacy. So vast is
this ocean, and so widely separated are the differ-
ent American possessions, that the military defence
of them is of primary importance. The efficiency
of navies and the sphere of their combatability is
determined not only by widely spaced bases, but
by their security from attack. Port Arthur was
only impregnable to ships of war. This is true of
all naval bases, if the command of the sea is lost
to the extent of allowing the enemy an opportunity
of transporting troops and making a land attack.

244

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Temporary possession of the sea by the enemy
must always be considered in military calculations
as not only possible but probable. When it occurs,
then all territories, harbors, and their fortifications
are exposed to land attack. Their protection de-
pends upon mobile armies sufficient in themselves
to repulse any force the enemy is capable of landing
— not in specific harbors, but on any portion of the
sea-coast.

A war between Japan and the United States will
be determined not by naval but land battles. The
rapidity of mobilization and celerity with which
trained armies are placed in the field at the begin-
ning of hostilities compose the primary factors in
securing and making permanent military command
over these possessions.

Under the present military system this Republic
could not mobilize in any one place a field army of
nineteen thousand regular soldiers in the same
period of time that Japan could assemble, ready
to take the field, half a million veteran troops. For
the United States to enlist, equip and train to the
same degree of efficiency a similar force would re-
quire not less than three years.

As the determinate character of this theatre of
war is its vastness, the possession of means to trans-
port armies and to transfer them from one place
to another constitutes the most vital element in
determining the issue of the conflict. The move-
ment of armies, their mobility or inertia, will be, in

245

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

this war, dependent wholly upon the efficiency of
their means of transportation. If Japan were with-
out sea transports equal to the needs of her armies,
the Pacific coast and the American provinces in
the Pacific would be beyond the sphere of Japanese
enterprise. On the other hand, if the United States
possessed a standing army of two million men, but
no other means of military transportation than
exist at the present time, this Republic could not
conduct a single campaign beyond the frontiers of
the Union. Unfortunately, the United States does
not possess a field army of even fifty thousand men,
while Japan has such complete means of oceanic
transportation that she can move her vast armies
to any portion of the Pacific with greater ease than
Napoleon moved similar armies from Paris across
the river Elbe or beyond the Danube, or Grant
across the theatre of war during the American Civil
War.

This Republic is without means of military trans-
portation. In the Spanish - American War two
months elapsed before transports could be gotten
together sufficient to embark a single army corps,
though Havana lies only three days distant from
the main centre of American commerce. In the
Russian War Japanese armies had landed and were
marching on the Asian continent eight days after
the declaration of war. In 1907, nearly ten years
after the Spanish War, the American government
was obliged to charter foreign vessels to transport

246

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

six thousand troops from the mainland to Cuba.
The Japanese government, on the other hand, pos-
sesses sufficient transportation facilities to carry in
a single voyage, if necessary, more than two hundred
thousand troops.1

In the United States there is no nucleus upon
which, in the time of war, a system of military
transports can be created in the Pacific or Atlantic.
At the present time so devoid is this Republic of
trans-oceanic shipping that ninety-one per cent, of
the entire American trade is carried on foreign vessels.

The strategic harbors in the Alaskan peninsula,
commanding the North Pacific, and Samoa, capable
of controlling the southern portion of the ocean,
are equidistant from Japan and San Francisco.
Undefended, they necessitate neither naval nor mili-
tary effort to secure them, for they belong to the
nation that controls the ocean at large. But mid-
way between these, likewise undefended, are the
Hawaiian Islands, the portal through which Japan
expects to gain the grail of her Genro.2 For two
decades has she planned and warred toward this
end. There has been no hesitancy nor doubt nor
delay. Without hurry, calmly, with the inexorable
certitude of a glacier, Japan has moved toward this
predetermined point. At the conclusion of the
Russian War her plans for taking possession of
these islands assumed a positive phase.

'Appendix, Table VII. 'The Elder Statesmen.

247

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

If this Republic had created at any time a great
naval and military base in Hawaii, Japan's oppor-
tunity of seizing the islands would have been
lessened if not prohibited; and so long as these
islands formed an invulnerable American base, the
mainland of the Republic would be removed from
the sphere of military enterprise. While the estab-
lishment of American naval and military power in
the Pacific or Hawaii has not been attempted, yet
Japan has prepared for this eventuality in so effective
a manner that, notwithstanding what the naval
forces of the United States may be in the future,
these islands can be seized from within and con-
verted into a Japanese naval and military base so
quickly that they will be impregnable to the power
of this Republic, regardless of what it may be on the
mainland.

The tenure of any territory is determined primarily
by military supremacy. Only when the attacking
forces exceed on land those of the defence, or when
a naval blockade assumes the character of a siege,
does this tenure become insecure. If the military
occupation of the Hawaiian Islands is in sufficient
force, whether by the United States or Japan, they
could not be gained or regained by naval attack.
The control of these islands is a military and not
a naval problem.

Japanese immigration into Hawaii has been polit-
ical rather than economic, and is divided into three dis-
tinct political decades, as determined by two factors:

248

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

(1) American Pacific Expansion:

(a) The establishment of the Hawaiian
Republic.

(b) The annexation of Hawaii.

(c) The conquest of the Philippines.

(2) Japanese Political Development:

(a) Protest of Japan against annexation
of Hawaii.

(b) Japanese victory over China.

(c) Japanese victory over Russia.

(d) Anglo- Japanese Alliance.

In the first political decade, 1884-1896, there
occurred :

(1) The overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy
and the establishment of an American republic.

(2) Japan's protest against annexation.

(3) Japan's victory over China; the elimination
of that nation from the Pacific, and the begin-
ning of Japan's political development as a Pacific
power.

Simultaneous with these events the Japanese
population in Hawaii increased from 116 in 1884,
to 22,329 in 1896.

In the second political decade, 1896-1900, there
occurred :

(1) The annexation of Hawaii.

(2) The conquest of the Philippines.

(3) The development of the Japanese army and
navy.

Simultaneous with these events the Japanese
17 249

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

population increased from 22,329 in 1896, to 61,115
in 1900.*

In the third political decade, 1900-1908, there
occurred :

(1) Japan's victory over Russia, the elimination
of that nation in the Pacific, and Japan's increased
development as a Pacific power.

(2) The Anglo- Japanese Alliance, and Japan's
advent as a world power.

(3) Unprecedented development of the Japanese
army and navy.

Simultaneous with these events, Japanese immi-
gration into the Hawaiian Islands, from 1900 to
1908, has been 65,708. The departures during this
period were 42,313. The military unfit have in this
manner been supplanted by the veterans of a great
war, and the military occupation of Hawaii tenta-
tively accomplished.2

In these islands at the present time the number
of Japanese who have completed their active term
of service in the imperial armies, a part of whom
are veterans of the Russian War, exceeds the en-
tire field army of the United States. Within twen-
ty-four hours after a declaration of war the sol-
itary American battalion that stands guard over
these islands will disappear.3 As Hawaiian sover-
eignty passed forever in a single day, so shall this

1 Total population of the Hawaiian Islands, 1900, was 154,001.

2 Appendix, Table XI.

3 Twelve officers and 209 men.

250

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Republic be put aside in the same manner and in
no longer period of time.

The seizure of the Philippines constitutes an en-
tirely different problem from that of Hawaii, and
belongs to the sphere of military operations. In a
military sense, the Philippines are closer to Japan
than were the shores of Manchuria in the Russian
War. There are no Port Arthurs, with guarded
fleets to threaten the transportation of her troops;
no armies of a quarter of a million men to oppose
their landing; no rigorous winters; no tempestuous
waters, such as swirl and break over the Yellow
Sea; no storm-girded shores over whose billows
and in the teeth of ice-laden gales landings must
be made by lighters; no Liao-Yangs nor Mukdens
with five hundred thousand men to drive back;
no wide plains to cross in parched heat or blizzards ;
no half-frozen rivers to swim; no mountain-sides
to clamber up, honeycombed with hidden mines; no
abysses nor labyrinths; only a solitary division of
troops must be overcome on these undefended islands.

The conquest of these islands by Japan will be
less of a military undertaking than was the seizure
of Cuba by the United States; for while Santiago
de Cuba did not fall until nearly three months after
the declaration of war, Manila will be forced to
surrender in less than three weeks. Otherwise the
occupation of Cuba portrays with reasonable exact-
itude the manner in which the Philippines will be
taken over by Japan.

251

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

No naval force, unless equal in combative ability
to the entire Japanese navy, and based on the Phil-
ippines at the beginning of hostilities, could have
any appreciable effect on the invasion of these isl-
ands. With the American navy no larger than at
present, and the Philippines devoid of naval bases,
t.his manner and degree of defence is recognized
as impossible. Should there be a division of the
American navy, the fate of the warships in Philip-
pine waters would be but a repetition of Cervera's
disaster, unless the land forces on Luzon were
sufficient to prevent Manila from sharing the fate
of Santiago de Cuba.

Harbor defences in the Philippines, unless they
form the base of a fleet strong enough to prevent
the transportation of the enemy's troops, or are in
turn defended by mobile armies of sufficient strength
to prevent their investment, will prove of no more
defensive value than Morro Castle in the defence of
Cuba. Port Arthur has again demonstrated the
vulnerability of permanent fortifications and the
old fallacy of their making. These stone castles of
nations are but the dream castles of their vanity.
Chimeras alone stand guard upon their bastions,
simulacra alone throng their casements.

The fortification of Manila or Subig Bay, or any
other port, will not prevent nor retard the seizure
of the islands by Japan, if other elements necessary
to their defence are wanting. As the conquest of
Cuba was accomplished by landing forces distant

252

CHART U MA

ISLAND OF LUZON

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

from any fortified port, so will the Philippines fall.
Lingayan Gulf on the north coast of Luzon, or
Polillo Bight on the east coast, will form the Guanta-
namo Bays of the Japanese.

The conquest of the Philippines is no complex
military problem, but is, on the other hand, so simple
and direct that a few words will make it apparent.
The American forces defending these islands do
not exceed fourteen thousand, plus five thousand
native troops, all of whom are based on Manila.
Japan, by landing simultaneously one column of
twenty thousand men at Dagupan (Chart II) and
another column of the same size at Polillo Bight,
would, strategically, render the American position
untenable. These points of debarkation are al-
most equidistant from Manila, and are connected
with it by military roads, while a railroad also con-
nects Dagupan with the capital.

The impossibility of defending Manila with the
force now stationed on the islands is seen (Fig. 2,
Chart II) in the strategic advantages inherent in
Japan's convergent attack. These two columns,
more than double the strength of the American
force, converge on Manila at right angles. Advanc-
ing at equal speed, they remain at all times equi-
distant from the American position. Should the
American force advance to meet either column, the
unattacked column, being as close to Manila as the
American force, could throw itself in between (Fig.
3). The Americans, separated from their base by

253

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

an army equal to their own irj strength, and facing
a second army also as large, would be in a position
wherein their capitulation could alone prevent their
complete destruction.

If the American forces, on the other hand, should
remain behind their lines at Manila, they would, in
two weeks after the declaration of war, be sur-
rounded by overwhelming numbers. The lines about
Manila, as was demonstrated during the Spanish-
American War, are incapable of prolonged defence.
An aggressive enemy in control of the surrounding
country can render them untenable in a short period
of time.

With the occupation of the Philippines by Japan,
one-fourth of the American army, which means one
fourth of the trained military men of the Republic,
would be eliminated from any further participation
in the war; while not again could an American fleet,
regardless of its size, enter the Asiatic seas during
the continuation of this conflict.

If the American forces should be increased prior
to the war, and no other military efforts made tow-
ard a general defence of the Philippines, it would only
result in increasing proportionately the size of the
enemy's advancing columns. The military and
strategic conditions would not be altered nor the
inevitable end retarded.

The defence of the Philippines belongs, not alone
to an army or navy or fortified harbors, but to
an intelligent combination of them all. This de-

254

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

fence cannot be relegated to those expedients that
are alone consequent upon sudden war, but must
be inherent in the national policy of the Republic
and the military preparations of prior years. It
cannot be left to the shifts of unforeseen combat,
but must be predetermined by existent conditions
and such works as the knowledge and labor of man
may evolve out of the Science of War.

VIII

WHILE the seizure of Hawaii and the Philip-
pines includes, by the mere fact of their posses-
sion, all other insular territories of this Republic,
as well as Alaska, and the naval supremacy of the
Pacific, yet their occupancy is only incidental to
Japan's main objective. In other words, the pos-
session of the Pacific coast would have the same ef-
fect in establishing Japanese supremacy over these
territories as would their direct seizure. As a game
of chess is won by position, so, in this approaching
conflict, the king's square toward which Japan
moves is the Pacific coast. That Japan will in the
beginning of the war take possession of these insular
territories is manifest, because their occupation will
cost her no appreciable effort nor detract in any
degree from the naval and military power necessary
for the conquest of the mainland. The occupancy
of these territories will be relegated to the second
line of reserves, fleets of protected cruisers and
second-class battle-ships, leaving the principal naval
and military forces intact.

While Japan is occupying Hawaii and the Philip-
pines a fleet of transports carrying one hundred

256

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

thousand men,1 convoyed by battleships, armored
cruisers, and torpedo craft, makes its way across the
Pacific. Steaming at ten knots an hour, this fleet
will reach the Pacific coast within five or possibly
four weeks after the declaration of war. Then
somewhere on fifteen hundred miles of sea-coast
will these armies be debarked and the invasion of
the United States begun.

The principal consideration that now concerns this
Republic is the defence of the Pacific coast, for once
it passes under the military sovereignty of Japan
the Pacific and its possessions are not alone lost, but
the fairest and richest portion of the Union. If
Japan once gains control of Washington, Oregon
and California, these states will not only be segregat-
ed from the rest of the Union by her armies, but by
uninhabitable deserts that moat their eastern fron-
tiers and mountains that rampart them. No number
of men nor amount of treasure, as we will hereafter
show, can bring about their restoration. The de-
fence, therefore, of the Pacific coast depends solely
upon the power of the Republic to prevent Japan
from gaining a foothold. To rely upon the un-
tried hope of reconquering these coast states is but
the slothful procrastination of that evasion and
national vanity now so rampant in the Republic.

Primarily, the defence of the Pacific coast belongs
to a navy. But so long as the necessary naval ex-
Appendix, Table VII.

257

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

pansion of the Republic remains circumscribed by
venality and ignorance, as well as public indif-
ference, it is impossible to foresee the time when the
Pacific coast will be defended by a navy powerful
enough to prevent invasion by Japan. So long as
it continues to be the policy of this nation to main-
tain a navy in its present proportion to the navies
of other powers, then that navy, as has been shown,
must remain united in one ocean ; and, as the Atlantic
constitutes the most vital naval sphere of the Re-
public, it will be necessary to continue it in that sea.

When Japan declares war, one of two naval con-
ditions will be existent: either the American navy
will be divided between the Pacific and Atlantic, or
the whole of it will be in the latter sea. Either con-
dition will insure instant Japanese naval supremacy.
A division of the American navy means the destruc-
tion of those portions in the Pacific ; while the fleets
in the Atlantic will have no effect upon the conflict,
whether they constitute the remaining portion or the
entire navy.

In the time of peace, under the most favorable cir-
cumstances, it required four months for an American
fleet to pass from the Atlantic bases to the Calif ornian
coast. But unfortunately there are many condi-
tions in the time of war that would curtail, hinder
or prohibit this transference.

During hostilities the fleets of this nation can
make no use of South American ports, as was recently
the case in the transference of the battleship fleet

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

to the Pacific. International laws prohibit bellig-
erents from sending more than three warships into
a neutral port at one time. They cannot remain
longer than twenty-four hours and cannot take on
men, munitions nor supplies other than enough coal
to proceed to the next port. The same ships cannot
again enter that port within a space of three
months. These prohibitions force the American
navy in transit to depend entirely upon auxiliary
ships for their sustenance and coal.

We have now come upon this strange paradox:
that the mobility or war value of the Atlantic fleets
decreases in inverse ratio to their increase in number
whenever the theatre of war is in the Pacific. The
size of the American navy, even, at this time, pro-
hibits its transference to the Pacific in time of war.
The recent cruise of sixteen ships necessitated the
chartering of twenty-nine foreign transports, without
which they could not have left the Atlantic. When
this fleet is augmented by the remainder of the
navy, the number of transports must be increased
not only proportionately to the increase of warships,
but by such additional numbers as is necessitated
by this nation's inability to use neutral ports. But
in the time of war belligerents cannot charter neutral
vessels — a prohibition that deprives this Republic
of the means upon which any extended movement
of the navy must depend.

Whenever the naval defence of a nation or any
portion of its territory is lacking, or when there is a

259

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

measurable equality between the navies of the bellig-
erents, the main defence of their respective posses-
sions must be relegated to their military forces.
Only when the naval superiority of one nation over
another is so positive as to prohibit the hazard of
battle can it be said that that nation is in a position
to neglect with impunity its military forces and
l^nd defences.

In a war with Japan the defence of the Pacific
coast concerns the military forces of the Republic
rather than the navy, even if the policy of this
government did not prevent the maintenance of
adequate naval forces in the Pacific. Under pres-
ent conditions the defence of Washington, Oregon
and California falls upon the army as completely as
though not a single American battleship existed.
Notwithstanding this fact, we find that the military
defence of the Pacific coast has been as completely
neglected as the naval.

The defence of Washington, Oregon and Califor-
nia against invasion by Japan presents three obvious
characteristics :

(1) The long extent of sea-coast constitutes three
spheres of defence that are so widely separated as
to be wholly independent of one another. Their
forces cannot be shifted from one theatre of war to
another, and they must maintain separate lines of
communication with the Eastern States.

(2) The short period of time with which Japan is
able to transport her armies to this continent —

260

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

two hundred thousand men in four weeks, a half-
million in four months, and more than a million in
ten months — necessitates in this Republic a corre-
sponding degree of preparedness and rapidity of
mobilization.

(3) Within one month after the declaration of
war this Republic must place, in each of the three
defensive spheres of the Pacific coast, armies that
are capable of giving battle to the maximum num-
ber of troops that Japan can transport in a single
voyage. This is known to be in excess of two
hundred thousand men. If the defence is restricted
to any one portion of the coast, it will only have
the effect of diverting the attack to one or both of
the others.

At the present time there is not in any one of
these defensive spheres a full regiment of regular
infantry nor two regiments of militia; while in the
whole of the Union are not to be found ten thousand
infantry of the Federal army.

During the Spanish War a call for volunteers was
issued a few days following the declaration of war,
but not until after four months had two hundred
and sixteen thousand men been enlisted, assigned,
and their instruction begun. At the end of the
war the\- were partially equipped, and were acquir-
ing the rudiments of camp-life.

The first defence of the Pacific coast will fall upon
such portions of the United States Army as are
available, which, under the present military system

261

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and necessities, will never exceed thirty thousand
men. In addition to this force it is possible that
sixty thousand state militia x may be available for
immediate service, or ninety thousand troops and
one hundred and fifty guns in all. These forces are
scattered over the entire Union. They must be
gathered together, equipped and brigaded, as well
as innumerable other contingencies met and ad-
justed. When this is done they must be trans-
ported by rail over a distance that is practically
greater than that which separates the Golden Gate
from the Inland Sea of Japan.

We have heretofore made clear that distance, in
a military sense, is never measured by miles, but by
the rapidity and capacity of the means of trans-
portation. The efficiency or lack of these means
correspondingly decrease or prolong the intervening
spaces over' which armies and their supplies must
pass.

The Pacific coast has not a single point upon
which the railroads crossing this continent con-
verge. The roads that enter Washington and
Oregon have no relation with those that go to
California. They start from a different base and
traverse another region. In a war on the Pacific
coast, troops cannot be despatched to southern

1 This is 67 per cent, of the organized militia. But in the
Spanish War it was proven conclusively that only 40 per cent,
of the militia could be counted on to enter the service. Should
this continue, then only 42,000 militia could be depended upon.

262

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

California by the Great Northern or Northern Pacific
or the Oregon Short Line. Neither can troops be
sent into Washington and Oregon by the Southern
Pacific or Santa Fe. The Pacific coast is, in a mil-
itary sense, restricted to the maximum of two lines
of railway.

Troops for Washington and Oregon must be gath-
ered from the various parts of the Union, together
with their supplies, and taken, in all probability,
to the vicinity of St. Paul, which would form the
main base of all armies destined for those states.
Similarly other and distinct bases must be taken
for troops directed to southern and central Cali-
fornia.

The transportation of great bodies of troops to
the Pacific coast, with their vast amount of sup-
plies and equipment, constitutes a more serious
undertaking than confronted Russia in the Japanese
War. Russia possessed two manifest advantages
denied the United States:

(1) She owned the Siberian Railroad and its
equipment.

(2) It traversed a region uninhabited or possessed
of a thinly scattered population, more or less prim-
itive in its civilization, and in consequence not
dependent upon the railroad for sustenance or
maintenance.

When, however, the civilization of a country be-
comes highly developed and complex, as in this
nation, the interdependence of man is increased

263

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

accordingly. There is scarcely to be found in the
Republic an independent and self-sustaining com-
munity. Every farmer and town and county in the
western portions of the United States is dependent
upon railroads, not only for their supplies, but for
their funds with which to buy the necessities of
life.

The distance from the Mississippi Valley to the
Pacific coast is two thousand miles, and upon the
few lines that traverse these Western States live a
people so dependent upon them that they could not
continue their livelihood if deprived of these means
of communication. They must not only receive
supplies, but their grain, wool, cattle, ores, timber
and other products must be shipped to Eastern
markets that they may purchase the means of pro-
duction as well as the needs of daily existence. This
traffic the government cannot stop, and it is the con-
tinuance of it during war that will make the trans-
portation of troops and their supplies to the Pacific
coast a more difficult problem than confronted
Russia.

In the beginning of the war Japan possesses an-
other advantage that is completely denied this Re-
public. By her vast fleets, her armies are moved
in great units and are restricted to no portion of the
coast. The United States, on the other hand, can
only transport by train-loads. While Japan can
land over two hundred thousand men on the Pacific
coast in less than four weeks, it is apparent that, even

264

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

if this Republic had that number of men under arms
prior to the declaration of war, it would take con-
siderably longer than four weeks to mobilize them
in a single theatre of war on the Pacific coast.

In a military sense Japan is one-third closer to
Washington, Oregon and California than the military
power of the United States, and will remain so until
all transcontinental railways are double- tracked, one
track reverting to the government in the event of
war.

We will not consider the time it will take to ac-
complish this mobilization, organization, equipment
and transportation of so many widely scattered
units which constitute the American forces, but
will pass on to the consideration of their destination.
There are two alternatives:

(1) The mobilization of all forces, regulars and
militia, in camps of instruction wherein they are to
constitute the nucleus of an army of a million men;
allowing the Japanese to take possession of the
coast without opposition.

(2) To rush these thirty thousand regulars and
sixty or forty thousand militia to the coast and dis-
pute the landing of the Japanese.

We do not believe that the first alternative would
be entertained by the Republic at large. Rather
would there surge over the entire land one thought,
echoed on all sides by a single cry: On to the coast!

To what portion of the coast?

If they were seat to southern California, the
is 265

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

central part of the state, Oregon and Washington
would still remain defenceless, as if these troops had
never been mobilized. If they were sent to San
Francisco, the same conditions would still hold in
Washington, Oregon and southern California. If
mobilized on Puget Sound, then all to the southward
would be without protection. It is evident, more-
over, that there can be no division of this force.
To place thirty thousand men in each of these three
spheres of defence would be to sacrifice the whole
in detail, without even the ordeal of battle or delay
of invasion.

The economic interests of central California ap-
proximate those of the south and north combined,
while the strategic value is infinitely greater. The
San Francisco peninsula is, moreover, the only
position in which seventy to ninety thousand men
might hold out against the great armies of Japan for
any length of time. If San Francisco could be held
permanently, and communication kept open with
the East, the Republic might, by accumulating its
military resources at that point, move in due time
against the Japanese forces in southern California
or those in Washington and Oregon. These con-
siderations should, in the aggregate, influence the
government as well as popular opinion in con-
centrating the existent military forces on the San
Francisco peninsula immediately subsequent to the
declaration of war. However disastrous it might
prove to leave unprotected the northern and

266

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

southern coasts, San Francisco constitutes, never-
theless, the true point of concentration under the
military conditions now extant in this Republic.

Japan's invasion of Washington and Oregon, the
conditions that circumscribe it and the manner of
its accomplishment constitutes the simplest of
military problems. The mouth of the Columbia
River is defended by three forts. These fortifica-
tions are the entire defence of the state of Oregon
against invasion, yet the combined power of all their
guns is less than that of the guns on a single Japanese
Dreadnaught.

This is not all.

To man these solitary guns requires sixty-seven
officers, fourteen hundred and forty-six men. Ac-
cording to the Secretary of War, there are now
available in these forts but ten officers and two
hundred and forty-six men, which means that five-
sixths of the guns emplaced could not be used. If
these fortifications were not only not lacking in guns
and men, but were, on the other hand, a hundredfold
more powerful, they would still have no more re-
tarding effect upon the invasion of Oregon than if
they did not exist, as will, later on, become apparent.

The defence of the state of Washington is relegated
to three forts on the upper reaches of Puget Sound.
These fortifications are in a more impoverished con-
dition and state of unpreparedness than those on
the Columbia. While one hundred and twenty-nine
officers, thirty -one hundred and eighty men are

267

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

necessary to man the guns already emplaced, there
are, according to the Secretary of War, only twenty-
seven officers, nine hundred and two men available,
which means that four-fifths of these guns could not
be served.

As a defence against invasion the fortifications on
Puget Sound are as valueless as those on the Colum-
bia, and for the same reason, that they are remote
from any possible base for invasion that could be
selected by Japan in the debarkation of her first
expedition. This landing will occur (Chart III) in
Gray's and Willapa Harbors. Should these harbor
entrances be mined, then debarkation will be on
the open beaches between the bays, or north of the
entrance to Gray's Harbor.

The first objective of the Japanese armies will not
be the cities on Puget Sound nor Portland nor the
cities on the Columbia, but will be directed toward
Chehalis and Centralia, two small towns fifty-seven
miles eastward. These places, four miles apart,
constitute the strategic centre of both states, whether
in relation to a defending force or invading armies.
By schedule time Gray's Harbor and Willapa Har-
bor are but three hours westward; Seattle three
hours to the north; Portland three hours and forty-
five minutes to the south; the fortifications at the
mouth of the Columbia seven hours and a quarter;
the fortifications commanding the entrance to Puget
Sound five hours and a half; Tacoma two hours;
Olympia, the capital of the state, one hour and

268

t-t u-j sj

III T:

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

twenty-five minutes; the United States Navy Yard
at Bremerton, four hours. Should it be necessary
to march to any of these places, they could be made
in as many days as hours are given in the railroad
schedule.

Within seven hours by rail of this centre is to be
found fifty-eight per cent, of the entire population
of Oregon, while sixty-one per cent, of the entire
population of Washington is within six hours. This
strategic centre, midway between the centres of
population in Oregon and Washington, is on and
commands the only line of railroad that traverses
these states north and south. Within three hours
of this centre are eight land-locked and deep-water
harbors — two on the south, two to the west, and four
on the north, together with ship-yards and naval
stations.

Portland, forming the right centre of the Japanese
position, is connected with eastern Oregon and
Washington by the Columbia River and two parallel
lines of railway. Seattle and Everett, forming the
Japanese left centre, are connected with eastern
Washington and Oregon by three parallel lines of
railway.

The full significance inherent in the seizure of this
strategic centre is only realized when the results are
viewed in the concrete. No opposition against the
landing of Japanese armies is possible unless the
American forces are equal in numbers and efficiency,
and are, moreover, in occupation of this position in

269

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

less than four weeks subsequent to the declaration
of war. The forts at the mouth of the Columbia
and on Puget Sound possess no defensive value
whatever when concerned with the invasion of
these states.1 The cities which they are supposed
to protect will be occupied by the Japanese without
the invading forces coming within fifty or a hundred
miles of either fortification. As Portland and the
cities on Puget Sound are possessed by the Japanese,
these ports will pass into their control without the
firing of a shot.

By this single movement Japan not alone possesses
these states in a military sense, but economically
and politically as well. She commands all lines of
communication, all harbors, and practically the en-
tire personal wealth of a territory that is larger and
richer than the Japanese Empire. By the occupa-
tion of this position she segregates and dominates the
inhabitants, controls them and their activities, their
productions and industries, to a degree of unity and
absolutism now unknown in this Republic. With
the seizure and fortification of the Bitter Root Moun-
tains east of Spokane, together with the Blue Moun-
tains in eastern Oregon,2 the dominion of Japan over
these two American states becomes complete.

» See Chart III. • See Chart IV.

CHART IV
JAPANESE DEFENCE

EASTERN WASHINGTON

To Seattle and
fuget Sound

To Central
Washington

To Walla W,
and Columbia R

JAPANESE DEFENCE

OF

EASTERN OREGON

U>ngitudell9- West from IIS- Greenwich 1

IX

AS the defencelessness of Washington and Oregon
is due primarily to the failure on the part of
this Republic to recognize the changes that modern
science and invention have brought about in in-
creasing the possibilities of invasion, and in altering
to a corresponding degree the manner and means
of defending seaboard states, so is the undefended
condition of southern California due to the same
general reasons.

These two localities, forming the extreme flanks
of the Pacific coast, are equally remote from the
main centres of the Republic, separated therefrom
by deserts and mountain - chains. And while the
forts of the north are without value, not only on
account of their worthlessness, but because of their
remoteness from any avenue of invasion, southern
California is without even the delusive dependence
of such fortifications.

We have shown how simple, and yet how deci-
sive, is the conquest of Washington and Oregon, how
quickly it can be accomplished by Japan without
even the probability of a battle ; yet the seizure of
southern California presents less difficulties than are
to be found in the Northern States.

271

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Southern California is less in area than one-half
of the state of Oregon, but of this area three-fourths
belong to deserts and mountains, while only a por-
tion of the remaining one-fourth is inhabited. The
cities and cultivated areas are all adjacent to the
sea, so that over ninety per cent, of the entire
population dwells within thirty miles of the ocean,
while 94.25 per cent, of the total wealth lies within
this same distance of the sea.1

The seizure of southern California is simplified
by an increased concentration of wealth and popu-
lation in a single seaboard county, where is to be
found two-thirds of the entire population of this
territory and more than two-thirds of its wealth.
This delimitation of the strategic area is finally re-
duced to the environs of a single city, so that the
conquest of the southern flank of the Pacific coast
is relegated to and depends upon the seizure of the
city of Los Angeles. Within this city alone is to
be found more than half of the entire population
and wealth of southern California. It constitutes
the political, economic and railroad centre of this
entire territory. All other cities, communities and
industries are dependent upon it. If every city in
this region except Los Angeles were seized by the
enemy, southern California would still remain,
militarily, politically and economically a part of
the Republic; but if Los Angeles passed into pos-

1 Chart V.
272

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

session of an invading force, the whole of southern
California would fall though not another blow were
struck. There is not a city nor community in this
region that can exist for any portion of time after
Los Angeles is in the possession of the enemy, though
no hostile demonstrations were made against them.
There is not a town, nor even a rural community, that
is self-dependent nor interdependent, but are, as a
whole, suburban to Los Angeles.

San Diego in a military sense, politically and
economically, is without relative importance. This
city, as all other towns in southern California, is
but a distant suburb of Los Angeles, connected to
it by a single strand of railway. With the severance
of this artery of trade, whether it occurs a mile
north of San Diego or at Los Angeles, one hundred
and twenty-seven miles distant, is immaterial — the
fate of that city is the same. With the enemy in
control of the ocean, the isolation of San Diego is
complete. Like ancient Carthage, it is built where
the sea and desert meet. Westward is the ocean;
eastward, southward and northeastward, just be-
yond its environs, reclaimed from the deserts, rise
hillsides as barren as those that are beyond the
Valley of the Tombs.

The single line of railroad, which is this city's
means of communication, runs northward along
the coast for a distance of seventy-four miles, within
four hundred to nine hundred yards of tide-water.
Thus a single vessel can blockade this city by land

273

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

and by sea. So complete is the geographical and
strategic isolation of San Diego that a rampart of
Gibraltars would not increase its military signifi-
cance nor add a single element to the defence of
southern California. Its capitulation will be brought
about by ignoring its existence. This, under simi-
lar conditions, has happened many times before in
the wars of man.

Though Los Angeles constitutes, as will be seen,
the single strategic point upon which depends the
security of southern California, no effort, up to
the present time, has been made to render it secure
from attack. One regiment can now occupy the
city with impunity. The only effort made toward
its defence has been the advocacy of fortifying
Point Fermin at the entrance of San Pedro Harbor.
This proposal but demonstrates that to which we
have already called attention, the prevailing igno-
rance concerning modern warfare.

We have heretofore shown the general state of
deterioration inherent in the existent fortifications
of the Republic, together with the depleted condi-
tion of the Coast Artillery, a state of decadence that
has resulted in rendering useless four-fifths of the
guns already emplaced. Until there is a complete
reorganization of the Republic's military system,
it is not only useless to construct new fortifications,
but in so doing the nation is involved in new dangers
to which we have already called attention.

Fortifications for the entrance of San Pedro Har-
274

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

bor possess no intrinsic or relative importance as
regards the defence of Los Angeles. They belong,
not to the land defences of this region, but to the
naval, and their erection presupposes the presence
of an active fleet in these waters. San Pedro may
be made a naval base, but beyond that it possesses
no defensive value whatsoever. The purpose of
such fortifications are specific — the defence of the
harbor itself, or a fleet based upon it. The sphere
of actual defence belonging to such fortifications is
determined by a semicircle, the radii of which are
the effective range of their guns. Modern harbor
fortifications are not self - defensive. Their pro-
tection depends upon either a fleet of sufficient
strength to prevent the transportation and landing
of the enemy's forces, or mobile armies able to pre-
vent the enemy from gaining a foothold on any
portion of the coast, whether adjacent to or distant
from the fortifications to be attacked.

We have already shown the impossibility of naval
defence for the Pacific coast whenever the American
navy is in the Atlantic prior to the beginning of
hostilities, or whenever the American fleets in the
Pacific are inferior to the entire Japanese navy.
The fortification of San Pedro presupposes a navy
many times larger than at present; the size of the
fleets in the Pacific, and their efficiency, being deter-
mined by Japanese naval development.

Fortifications at San Pedro, without a fleet rela-
tively as strong as that of the enemy, are useless.

275

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

As Los Angeles is the objective point, landings will
be made upon the closest available seaboard. And
in a military sense San Pedro is twice as far from
Los Angeles as Santa Monica Bay.1 This harbor,
moreover, is so contracted that the danger of sub-
marine mines and torpedoes would, under all cir-
cumstances, prohibit its utilization by the Japanese
until the harbor itself and the surrounding country
passed into their control. Santa Monica Bay, on
the other hand, gives a free seaboard of over twenty
miles in extent — adjacent to the environs of Los
Angeles.

So long as this city forms the objective of in-
vading armies their forces will not, under any cii-
cumstances, land within twenty miles of San
Pedro Harbor, and the forts at that point must, re-
gardless of their strength, capitulate whenever Los
Angeles is seized. To hold these proposed fortifica-
tions against a land attack would require as great an
army as might, in the beginning, delay the in-
vasion of southern California. Once an enemy
gains the shores of Santa Monica Bay, San Pedro
must, owing to the peculiar topographical features
of the peninsula, either fall to an inferior force or be
defended on a continuous front of a number of
miles.

Extending across the San Pedro peninsula almost
east and west is a range of barren hills, similar to

1 Fig. 2, Chart VI.
276

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

those north of Port Arthur, with an irregular crest
exceeding a thousand feet in height and nearly
twelve miles in length.1 Sixteen hundred yards
north of the proposed fortifications the contour
rises to two hundred and eighty feet ; at three thou-
sand yards the elevation is five hundred feet; at
five thousand yards the elevation increases to nine
hundred feet; while at six thousand five hundred
yards is the crest of the ridge, fourteen hundred feet
above the proposed batteries. This ridge continues
westward to Santa Monica Bay, so that any attack
upon the forts defending San Pedro would be by
that bay, the enemy moving eastward and occupy-
ing this range of hills. Once these heights are seized
the harbor and forts would be rendered untenable.
The base of an attack on San Pedro is identical with
that of an advance on Los Angeles — the Bay of
Santa Monica.

As the whole of southern California will pass into
the hands of an invading force once Los Angeles is
occupied, all means employed for the defence of
this region must be directed toward the security of
this city, its environs and communications.

So extensive is the seaboard by which Los Angeles
can be attacked, and so close is the city to the sea,
that the only means — once command of the sea is
lost — which can insure it from capture is to pre-
pare before war systematically and thoroughly such

'Chart VI.
277

means for the defence of the entire seaboard by mo-
bile armies as modern warfare demands. Isolated
fortifications, small and inefficient forces, will not
only not hinder nor even delay the conquest of this
region a single day, but will, on the other hand, re-
sult in useless destruction of life and devastation of
the country.

We have called attention to the brevity of modern
wars in general and naval movements in particular;
how, within a few weeks after war is declared, con-
current with the seizure of the Philippines, Hawaii,
and Alaska, will the conquest of Washington and
Oregon be consummated. In the same manner
and within three months after hostilities have been
begun other armies will land upon the seaboard of
southern California.

The question that now rises naturally in the
thoughts of the reader is, What will the United States
be doing during these three months ? Instantly the
mind is crowded, not alone with the speculations of
victory, but with the vague grandeur of a nation's
hope. The Old Lamp is rubbed and vast armies are
suddenly mobilized; armaments are brought out of
hidden recesses; great generals are made in the
twinkling of an eye ; then winged, these legions take
their flight across the mountains and deserts of the
West. But what will actually take place in the Re-
public after war is declared is so well known as to
make it unnecessary to again refer to the confusion,
ignorance, peculation and complete lack of every

278

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

form of military preparation, armaments, supplies,
or means of securing them.

To conduct a war on the Pacific coast against the
forces of Japan, this Republic is at present less pre-
pared and less capable than it has ever been prior
to any war undertaken by it in the past. Due to
the scorn of consequence, to the vanity of ignorance
and indifference toward military preparation, no
force can be placed on the seaboard of southern Cal-
ifornia either within three months or nine months
that would delay the advance of the Japanese armies
a single day.

Irrespective of armament and ante-bellum prepara-
tion, however, we find other conditions that would
prevent the mobilization of an army in southern
California capable of defending it against invasion
and conquest.

The maximum force that can be mobilized in the
Republic immediately following a declaration of
war is less than one hundred thousand men, of whom
two-thirds are militia. This force, made up of more
than forty miniature armies, is scattered, each un-
der separate military and civil jurisdiction, over the
entire nation. By the time these heterogeneous ele-
ments are gathered together, organized into prop-
er military units and made ready for transportation
to the front, the states of Washington and Oregon
will have been invaded and their conquest made
complete by a vastly superior force.

At this stage the nation is brought face to face

279

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

with the weakness inherent in republican forms of
government during war — the supremacy of popular
control over military movements. With the seizure
of the Philippines, Hawaii and Alaska, the excite-
ment and clangor in the nation would be very great ;
but with the invasion and conquest of two states
forming an integral part of the Union, the tide of
patriotism and of wrath would well still higher, and
the populace would be satisfied with nothing less
than an immediate advance against the Japanese.
Being ignorant or indifferent as to the military
efficiency of Japan or what even constitutes it, vain
in their valor and in the victories of the past, the
entire country, from the most remote hamlet to the
Congress of the nation, would urge the diversion of
the mobilized forces against the Japanese occupying
Washington and Oregon.

Whether popular demand would succeed in divert-
ing the American forces in the direction of thes3
states or not is immaterial as far as the present
strategic situation is concerned, for it is certain that
they would not be turned to the extreme southern
flank of the Pacific coast, placing them in a posi-
tion almost as remote from the invading armies
as if they had not been moved west of the Mississippi,
still leaving the whole coast, except a small area,
exposed to invasion. If popular opinion did not
prevail or the forces were not retained in the East,
the only point upon which they could concentrate,
as stated before, would be San Francisco. If mobi-

280

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

lized there prior to the invasion of southern Cali-
fornia, this flank would still remain defenceless, in-
asmuch as these forces could not move five hundred
miles to the southward without diverting the
Japanese attack upon San Francisco and exposing
the most strategic point on the Pacific coast to
capture. This would permit the union of the
Japanese armies seizing San Francisco with those
occupying Washington and Oregon, relegating the
American position to an extreme and strategically
unimportant flank.

The probabilities of the American armies being
directed against the Japanese forces in Washington
and Oregon through the force of popular agitation
presents this apparently anomalous condition, that
the larger the American armies are at the time of
invasion — regardless of what portion of the coast
it may be — the more certain are these forces to be
directed against that point. Two factors determine
this:

(r) The numerical equality or superiority of the
first Japanese expedition over the entire American
land forces, preventing an American army of corre-
sponding strength from being sent against it simul-
taneously with the despatch of similar forces
against other probable points of invasion.

(2) The power of popular opinion to direct the
available military establishment against the in-
vading forces, regardless of the general military
situation or strategic considerations.

x« 281

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Japan, to make this condition constant, needs
but to have the strength of her first column pro-
portionate to that of the entire American forces,
which would be relatively small as regards her
military establishment, even if the American stand-
ing army were five times its present size. So long
as the existent military system continues in the
Republic there can be no adequate defence of any
single portion of the Pacific coast within a year
after a declaration of war, nor the three spheres
within as many years.

Three or four months after war is declared will
find Japan in occupation of all insular possessions,
Washington and Oregon with an American army
of less than one hundred thousand men either
assembling in the East, moving against the Japanese
in the North or concentrating at San Francisco.

Japan, landing an army on the shores of southern
California at this time, would occupy, without op-
position, the strategic centre of this region on the
following day, and the conquest of southern Cali-
fornia would be, in a practical sense, complete.

We now come to the consideration of the most
important phase of the military occupancy of south-
ern California by Japan. It has nothing to do with
the intrinsic worth of this region, neither its economic
nor political significance, but appertains alone to its
strategic value, its necessity for and capacity of
defence against subsequent efforts on the part of
this Republic to reconquer the Pacific States.

282

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

There are only three avenues by which armies
can gain entrance to the Pacific coast from the
eastern portion of the United States, and southern
California constitutes one of these avenues, hence
the possession of this region early in the war is
essential to Japanese control and security.

The conformation of this section1 is peculiarly
adapted to effective defence from the Pacific side.
The sea-coast from Mexico to Point Conception is an
elongated, irregular crescent, and with but isolated
exceptions — as the valley holding the towns and
orange orchards of San Bernardino, Riverside and
Redlands — the inhabitable area follows the sea-
line and extends back but a comparatively few miles.
North and eastward of this oasis region are four
principal mountain ranges: the San Jacinto, San
Bernardino, San Gabriel and Tehachapi, with the
crest - line ranging from five to eleven thousand
feet. Beyond these mountains are deserts, lava
beds and Valleys of Death.

Entrance into southern California is gained by
three passes — the San Jacinto, Cajon and Saugus,
while access to the San Joaquin Valley and central
California is by the Tehachapi. It is in control of
these passes that determines Japanese supremacy
on the southern flank of the Pacific coast, and it is
in their adaptability to defence that determines the
true strategic value of southern California to the
Japanese.

1 Chart VII.
283

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

Los Angeles forms the main centre of these three
passes,1 and lies within three hours by rail of each
of them, while San Bernardino, forming the im-
mediate base of forces defending Cajon and San
Jacinto passes, is within one hour by rail of both
passes.

The mountain-chains encompassing the inhabited
regions of southern California might be compared
to a great wall thousands of feet in height, within
whose enclosures are those fertile regions which
have made the name of this state synonymous with
all that is abundant in nature. These mountains,
rugged and inaccessible to armies from the desert
side, form an impregnable barrier except by the
three gateways mentioned.

Standing upon Mt. San Gorgonio or San Antonio
one can look westward and southward down upon
an endless succession of cultivated fields, towns and
hamlets, orchards, vineyards and orange groves;
upon wealth amounting to hundreds of millions;
upon as fair and luxuriant a region as is ever given
man to contemplate; a region wherein shall be
based the Japanese forces defending these passes.
To the north and east across the top of this moun-
tain-wall are forests, innumerable streams, and abun-
dance of forage. But suddenly at the outward rim all
vegetation ceases ; there is a drop — the desert begins.

The Mojave is not a desert in the ordinary sense

» Chart VII.
284

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of the word, but a region with all the characteristics
of other lands, only here Nature is dead or in the
last struggle against death. Its hills are volcanic
scoria and cinders, its plains bleak with red dust; its
meadows covered with a desiccated and seared vege-
tation; its springs, sweet with arsenic, are rimmed,
not by verdure, but with the bones of beast and
man. Its gaunt forests of yucca bristle and twist
in its winds and brazen gloom. Its mountains,
abrupt and bare as sun-dried skulls, are broken
with canons that are furnaces and gorges that are
catacombs. Man has taken cognizance of this
deadness in his nomenclature. There are Coffin
Mountains, Funeral Ranges, Death Valleys, Dead
Men's Canons, dead beds of lava, dead lakes, and
dead seas. All here is dead. This is the ossuary of
Nature; yet American armies must traverse it and
be based upon it whenever they undertake to regain
southern California. To attack these fortified places
from the desert side is a military undertaking
pregnant with greater difficulties than any ever
attempted in all the wars of the world.1

The value of Japan's strategic position in southern
California is not alone determined by the limited
area of the inhabitable region and its adjacency to
the sea, nor the concentration into a single sea-board
county of two-thirds of its wealth and population,
but is due to the strategic advantages afforded by

1 Appendix, Table XII.
285

the location of the Cajon, San Jacinto, and Saugus
passes, their proximity to Los Angeles and to one an-
other, the shortness of their interior lines, and the
location of their fortified positions in mountains not
only inaccessible to armies from the east, but, while
their redans point out upon a desert, their rear rests
immediately upon one of the most fertile sections of
the Republic.

The strategic position of the American forces at-
tacking these passes presents the reverse of these
conditions. While the Japanese fortifications are
built among and enclose an abundance of resources
of every kind, the American armies must attack
these positions with forces resting upon a desert that
is not only without resources, but is without water
sufficient to supply a single regiment within striking
distance of these passes.

If an attempt were made to force the San Jacinto
Pass, the nearest water adequate for the needs of an
army is in the Imperial Valley, one hundred and
thirty miles distant. If the Cajon were to be at-
tacked, the nearest water available for the use of
an army is the Colorado River, two hundred and
twenty miles distant. If an attempt were made to
force the Tehachapi, the nearest water-supply is two
hundred and sixty miles away.

In modern warfare the increased effective use of
gun-fire gives forces established in semi-permament
fortifications the advantage to the extent that the
attacking force must be several times stronger, ac-

286

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

cording to the character of the defences and the
efficiency of the troops manning them. Considering
the opposing forces equally efficient, there would be
to every hundred thousand Japanese a minimum
force of several hundred thousand Americans. But
the Japanese would possess still another strategic
advantage that would increase this disproportion to
an almost exaggerated degree. Their interior lines,
connecting these passes and uniting them on the
main base at Los Angeles, are so contracted that
a small force can accomplish, on account of the
rapidity of transportation, what would otherwise
require a great army.

For the Japanese to transfer a train of troops or
munitions from Cajon to the San Jacinto Pass would
require but two hours, while a change on the same
front by the attacking forces would necessitate
several days. Only forty-odd miles separate the
Japanese forces defending the Cajon from those
in the San Jacinto, while nearly fourteen hundred
miles must be traversed by the American forces in
changing from one front to the other.

This shortness of the Japanese lines and the
excessive length of the American would of necessity
restrict the main attack to one pass. Neither the
Saugus Canon nor the Tehachapi could be attacked
with the enemy in possession of the Cajon unless the
American forces were -vast enough to mask Cajon
while attempting to force these positions. But the
desert not only minimizes the number of troops

287

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

resting upon it, but these two latter passes are of
secondary importance, their value and possession
being determined entirely by the control of the
Cajon and the San Jacinto. Hence the reconquest
of southern California will be by one or both of
these main passes.

If the American advance is directed against San
Jacinto, not only must they make their assaults on
fortified positions one hundred and thirty miles from
water, but their communications with the first base
of supply would be restricted to a single line of desert
railway one thousand miles long. If, on the other
hand, the main advance is directed against the Ca-
jon, the American forces would have two lines of rail-
way. This advantage of increased means of com-
munication is, however, nullified by the fact that the
nearest available water supply sufficient for a sin-
gle brigade is two hundred and twenty miles distant.

Such are the conditions that render southern
California impregnable against attack once these
passes are fortified and held in force. No fortitude,
no vastness of numbers, no amount of patriotism,
no human ingenuity can overcome these inaccessible
ramparts and desert glacis once an enemy militarily
as efficient as the Japanese occupies the three gate-
ways through which alone armies may pass.

In a later chapter we will show how other condi-
tions increase — if it were possible — the impregna-
bility of this position to such a degree that not
even the contemplation of an attack is possible.

288

THE duration and causes of war are never con-
stant, although the factors that determine the
length or brevity of wars are invariable in their
application. These determinate conditions may, in
modern wars, be divided into three general principles :

(1) Whenever the state of military preparedness
among nations is proportionately developed and
continues constant in peace, ensuing wars are me-
dium in duration and minimum in destruction of
life and property.

(2) Whenever the state of military unprepared-
ness among nations is proportionately the same in
peace, ensuing wars are longest in duration and
maximum in destruction of life and property.

(3) Whenever the state of military preparedness
is highly developed in one nation and lacking in
another, ensuing wars are short in duration and one-
sided in destruction of life and property.

As the art of war passes from the brutish valor
of the individual to the calm, angerless domain of
science, the more absolute becomes the application
of these principles in the consummation of modern
conflicts.

289

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The relative state of preparedness for war in
Japan and the United States is such that, unless
there is an immediate military renascence in this
Republic, the approaching struggle will be rele-
gated to that class of conflicts exemplified in the
Chinese- Japanese War of 1894, the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870, the German-Austrian War of 1866,
and the Japanese-Russian War of 1904, the deter-
minate conditions of which are the inherent factors
of the third principle.

In a war with Japan there are other conditions of
preparedness that will augment the rapidity of her
conquest — viz., the movement of her troops and
naval forces to positions adjacent to the theatre
of war prior to a formal declaration of hostili-
ties.

This initiative is characteristic of Japanese mili-
tary activity; and though naturally condemned in
this Republic on account of military unprepared-
ness, the initiation of war without the formality of
a declaration does not alone adhere to Japan. Of
the hundred and twenty wars that were fought in
the Occident between 1790 and 1870, one hundred
and ten were begun without notification. A formal
declaration of war is not other than a survival of
the age of chivalry, when challenges were sent cere-
moniously by a herald to the camp of the enemy.
All such formality in modern conflicts has been
and is considered by nations prepared for war as
superfluous. Only those countries unprepared groan

290

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

at such activity, and the overpowering advantage
this initiative gives to their adversaries.

It will therefore be found that the rapidity of
Japanese movements against the possessions of the
United States will be greater than we have in this
work set down.

In considering the seizure of this nation's insular
possessions, as well as Washington, Oregon and
southern California, we have minimized the mili-
tary efficiency of the Japanese and the capacity of
their transportation. By this minimization we have
increased unduly the defensive capacity of the Re-
public. Yet we are forced to witness, in spite of
this, its complete and utter helplessness.

There now remains but the seizure of San Francisco
to bring about the final dissolution of American
power upon the Pacific and complete the victory
of Japan. That the seizure of San Francisco would
occur earlier in the war than we state is admit-
ted by all strategicians conversant with conditions.
But in order to permit the maximum defence pos-
sible to San Francisco under present military condi-
tions, we have postponed any attack until the entire
available military forces of the Republic have been
concentrated in its immediate vicinity — an im-
probable, if not impossible, mobilization as regards
time.

San Francisco is the most important point on the
Pacific coast, commercially, politically and strateg-
ically. Its proximity to the Central Pacific, to-

291

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

gether with its great harbor, makes it the centre
of American Pacific trade.

From the standpoint of naval strategy, San
Francisco is the most essential position on the
Pacific littoral. With the enemy in control of this
bay, in addition to the territories already con-
sidered, no American fleet, regardless of its size
and efficiency, could enter upon the Pacific so long
as war continued. San Francisco Bay is the main
naval base of the Republic on the Pacific, and with
its loss all hope of regaining naval control over
this ocean will be gone forever.

Militarily its strategic importance also exceeds
that of any other locality of the Pacific slope. Mid-
way between the northern and southern flanks of
the coast, it makes them both, when in possession
of an enemy, vulnerable to a rear attack. It not
only divides the enemy's forces occupying these ter-
ritories, but by holding this position their union
is made impossible. San Francisco, commanding
the San Joaquin, Sacramento and Santa Clara Val-
leys, controls the whole of central and northern
California to nearly the same degree as Los Angeles
dominates southern California. Once San Francisco
Bay is seized by the Japanese, this entire region
passes into their hands.

Should Japan occupy in force both flanks of the
coast, as we have heretofore described, and the
United States should retain command of San Fran-
cisco and its lines of communication with the East,

292

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

this nation would still be possessed of a position
strategically equal to that of Japan, provided:

(1) That the military establishment of the Re-
public permitted the immediate mobilization in the
environs of San Francisco Bay of armies capable of
defending it against attack.

(2) That additional military forces existed in the
Republic adequate in numbers and efficiency to
counterbalance any attempt on the part of Japan
to gain a preponderance of strength north and
south of this locality.

If these conditions, determined by ante-bellum
preparation, were possible, then the American posi-
tion, piercing the Japanese centre and segregating
their flanks, would equalize the strategic situation
and permit the consummation of the war to be deter-
mined by battles. But, unfortunately, the issuance
of these problematical combats concerns us in no
way, for we are forced to deal alone with facts, not
fancies nor hopes nor delusions.

It is generally believed that the defences of San
Francisco are not only effective, but are particularly
well adapted to ward off any attack that may be
made upon it; the truth, however, is that this city,
under existent military conditions, is defenceless.
And so long as the armies of this Republic are so
inadequate as to relegate the defence of San Francisco
to the peninsula on which it is situated its capitula-
tion will be without even the trial of battle.

The defence of San Francisco does not depend
293

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

upon holding fortified positions, but in maintain-
ing military control of the entire region surrounding
San Francisco Bay. Because of its peculiar situa-
tion, the weakness of this city is strategic and not
tactical, and its fate depends upon the issuance of
battles fought many miles from its present fortifica-
tions.

The existing defences of San Francisco are re-
stricted to several forts commanding the entrance
to the bay. These forts, situated partly on the
north side of the channel and partly on the south,
are neither self-protective nor inter-protective from
any attack except naval. To man them and serve
the guns already emplaced requires one hundred and
seventy - five officers, and forty - two hundred and
sixty-two men. But there are available only forty-
two officers and fourteen hundred men. Due to
this depletion, two-thirds of the guns cannot be
served while the fire-power of the remaining one-
third is less than that of two Japanese battleships.

The general public does not comprehend the
limitations of permanent fortifications in modern
warfare. They not only do not force an attack,
but, on the other hand, serve to divert the direction
of the enemy's advance. This freedom of move-
ment and attack was at one time restricted to small
bodies of troops in the nature of raids, the general
advance or occupation first necessitating the naval
seizure of fortified harbors. But modern means of
sea transportation have changed this, and raids or

294

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

landings upon sequestered shores are now possible
to armies of two hundred thousand men.

There are, however, other factors inherent in
modern warfare that serve to prevent the naval
seizure of any harbor regardless of its fortifica-
tions :

(r) The development and extensive use of sub-
marine mines.

(2) The increased effective range of torpedoes.

These two means of marine warfare alone prohibit
the naval occupancy of any land-locked harbor until
the surrounding territory has been possessed. The
defence or seizure of San Francisco is unaffected
by its harbor fortifications, as no Japanese fleet
would approach the Golden Gate until the bay and
its entire environs were in possession of their armies.

The defence of San Francisco is only insured by
the use of mobile armies, and is concerned with three
distinct theatres of action, separate from its present
system of fortifications:

(1) The defence of the San Francisco peninsula.

(2) The defence of the Sausalito peninsula.

(3) The defence of its inland lines of communi-
cation.

To defend the San Francisco peninsula belongs to
an army stationed, not on the peninsula, but in the
Santa Clara Valley, fifty miles southward. This
position also shields the inland lines south and east
of the bay. Whichever combatant gains command
of this valley is in a position to attack or hold the

295

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

San Francisco peninsula and seize or command all
southern lines of communication.

To defend the Sausalito peninsula, on the other
hand, belongs to an army stationed, not adjacent
to forts Barry and Baker, but fifty miles northward
in the county of Sonoma. Whichever combatant
gains control of this region is also so strategically
placed as to attack or hold the Sausalito peninsula
and to seize or command the northern lines of
communication.1

The mobilization of American forces in the vicinity
of San Francisco must be for the defence of the entire
territory adjacent to the bay, since no one part can
be defended to the exclusion of the others. The
topographical features of this region are such that
its inherent strategic difficulties cannot be overcome
except by the operation of two quasi-independent
forces ; one restricted to operations north of the bay
and the other to the south. If these armies are not
self-sustaining, nor in size adequate to the defence
of their respective theatres of action, they become
as a whole incapable of effective defence of San
Francisco. Should the Japanese column moving
northward from Monterey Bay be materially larger
than the American forces in the Santa Clara Valley,
it will either necessitate this army's reinforcement
from the forces defending the northern shores of the
bay, or its retirement in that direction, or the de-

1 Chart VIII.

• 296

r;

k-* "i
•«.

Oo/d«i Go* e

San Fran

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

struction in detail of both forces. If reinforced, then
the north shores of the bay and San Francisco
would be open to attack by the Japanese column
advancing southward from Bodega. If the southern
army, on the other hand, retired north, then the
southern shores of the bay, the peninsula, and city
of San Francisco would be undefended.

Reversing this hypothesis so as to deal with the
Japanese column advancing east and south from
Bodega, we have practically the same conditions
in Sonoma, and so north of the bay, as existed
southward :

(1) Reinforcements drawn from the Santa Clara
Valley, exposing that region to attack by the Japa-
nese column advancing northward from Monterey
and leaving San Francisco open to capture, or

(2) Retirement to the south or east shores, leaving
Sausalito open to seizure and San Francisco to
bombardment.

(3) The destruction of both forces in detail.
The security, therefore, of the American position

rests on the superiority of both armies over the
Japanese columns advancing simultaneously north
and south.1

Under present military conditions the maximum
number of troops that this Republic, by denuding
every fort and post in the nation, and by utilizing
the available militia, can mobilize in the vicinity of

•o

1 Chart VIII.
297

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

San Francisco in five months after hostilities have
been begun is less than one hundred thousand, two-
thirds being state militia.

In this entire force neither the regular infantry
nor cavalry would exceed twelve thousand men,
while the field artillery would consist of less than
four regiments. It is evident, therefore, that the
size and elements composing this army would pre-
vent any division of it into the two independent
forces mentioned: one in Sonoma County, fifty
miles north of San Francisco, and the other fifty
miles southward in Santa Clara. Moreover, the
smallness of this force would not only forbid its
separation into two independent theatres of action,
but would prohibit its giving battle to a numerically
superior enemy upon a field that did not provide
protection to its contracted flanks.

The specific raison d'etre of this army is the de-
fence of San Francisco, and if it is not possessed of
numerical equality to either act on the offensive or,
separated, to remain on the defensive, there is but
one alternative — the selection of a single main de-
fensive position. This main position cannot be
north of the bay nor east nor southeast without
leaving open to attack the objective point of the
enemy — the city and peninsula of San Francisco.
This leaves but two positions to select from — the
San Francisco Peninsula or the Santa Clara Valley.
While this latter locality constitutes the true de-
fence of San Francisco from an attack by armies

298

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

landing on the southern coast, the smallness of the
American force prevents it from taking a position
where it can be flanked at will and cut off from its
base by armies numerically superior. This consider-
ation, therefore, relegates the army to its final main
position south of San Francisco, with lines thrown
across the peninsula, one flank resting on the shores
of the Pacific and the other on San Francisco Bay.

That, which most vitally concerns a beleaguered
city and the armies defending it is the water supply.
In former ages this was usually found within the
environs of the city itself in the shape of wells and
cisterns; but in modern times, especially in the
United States, the sources of a city's water supply
are generally situated at some distance from it.
Whenever this is the case the main line of defence
must always include the city's water-works and
reservoirs.

The sources of the water supply of San Fran-
cisco are in the San Mateo Mountains, between thirty
and forty miles to the south, consisting principally
of the San Mateo Creek, Alameda Creek, Pilarcitos
Creek, and Crystal Springs Lake. There are three
reservoirs: the Pilarcitos, thirty-two miles from
San Francisco, holding one billion gallons of water;
the San Andreas reservoir, with a capacity of six
billion gallons, and the Crystal Springs reservoir,
storing nineteen billion gallons. If these reservoirs
and watershed fall into possession of the enemy,
San Francisco must capitulate.

299

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

To protect the Andreas and Pilarcitos reservoirs,
consisting of less than a third of the water supply,
the line of defence must extend across the peninsula
south of these reservoirs, a distance, as determined
by the contours of probable fortified positions, of
nearly thirty miles of front. The centre of this line
would be thirty-five miles from San Francisco. If
the entire water supply were to be protected, the
line of fortified positions and intrenchments would
have to extend across the peninsula, south of the
Crystal Springs Lake, which would greatly lengthen
the line as the peninsula widens toward its base.1

The difficulties of defending this peninsula at such
a distance from San Francisco by a limited and in-
experienced force are very great. The east side of
the peninsula consists of a very narrow valley run-
ning parallel with the San Francisco Bay on the
east and the mountains on the west. The eastern
and lower slopes of these mountains consist of roll-
ing hills with contours free from woods, except
scattering oak and thickets in the ravines. But
higher up, on the top of the ridges and on the west-
ern slopes, the contours are broken, irregular and
rugged. They are covered with a dense chaparral,
heavy thickets of scrub and poison oak, redwood
and manzanita.

The American lines, as a whole, must be con-
structed at right angles to the ridges and contours

1 Chart IX.
300

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

of these mountains. And with the exception of
the narrow valley along the bay and rolling east
slopes, the rugged, thicket-masked character of this
peninsula deprives the defence of those essential
advantages that modern weapons give to intrenched
positions.

Outside of the valley hills there are no slopes with
bare glacis such as make possible the defence of an
intrenched army. There are no wide zones of fire
which the veldt and kopjes of South Africa gave
to the Boers, rendering possible the maximum ef-
fectiveness of modern armaments. On the other
hand, in these mountains, except on the east slopes,
it is rare to find exposed fronts of a few hundred
yards. Declivities and thickets in endless succession
so cut up and screen the topography that modern
artillery would be comparatively useless and the
effect of infantry fire reduced to a minimum. The
defenders, their positions being known, will be in
many respects at a greater disadvantage than the
attacking forces. In the assaults and repulses that
must characterize the fighting in these mountains,
discipline will constitute the necessary element of
success.

The defence of San Francisco is not, however, re-
stricted to such lines as may be thrown across the
peninsula south of the city, but is subject to bom-
bardment whenever the enemy gains possession
of the Sausalito peninsula. So, in considering the
final intrenched defence of San Francisco, the lines

301

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

thrown across the northern peninsula must be con-
sidered of not less importance than the lines south
of the city.

Forts Barry and Baker, situated at the extrem-
ity of the peninsula, are in themselves defenceless
against a land attack. This is due to the fact that
they are backed by a continuous series of ascending
heights (see diagram) , until Mt. Tamalpais is reached
at the northern end of the peninsula. The last
defence of San Francisco from the north cannot be
made south of a line running westward from a point
east of the town of San Rafael, across the north end
of the peninsula, to the ocean. This line is approxi-
mately from twelve to fifteen miles in length, and,
should the Japanese break through it, San Francisco
is doomed.1

We have now considered the conditions governing
the final defence of San Francisco, by no means the
true one, but the only one that is possible so long
as the indifference of this nation restricts its im-
mediate defence to less than a hundred thousand
men, composed principally of undisciplined militia
under the command of political appointees, or rele-
gates it to forts that are useless.

As one-fourth of the Regular Army is lost in the
seizure of the Philippines, these seventy to ninety
thousand men would constitute the entire available
military establishment of the Republic, and yet, ir-

1 Charts X and XI.
302

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

respective of its heterogeneity and military worth-
lessness, this force is so inadequate in numbers that
the only position it can occupy for the defence
of San Francisco, without meeting destruction on
an open field of battle, is the one just considered —
the last line of intrenched defence. This means —
as must every defence of San Francisco — a division
north and south of the bay:

(1) Across the base of the Sausalito peninsula,
with a front of nearly fifteen miles.

(2) Adjacent to the base of the San Francisco
peninsula, with a front exceeding thirty miles.

This is an aggregate of approximately forty-five
miles of front to be defended by less than three di-
visions of regular troops and three corps of militia.
A defence of such a length of front against superior
forces for any length of time is manifestly im-
possible, even if the positions were contiguous. In
this case, however, one-third of the line bears no
more relationship to the other two-thirds, and vice
versa, than if they were one- third in Oregon and
two-thirds in southern California.1

Japan, after seizing the American insuiar posses-
sions, Washington, Oregon and southern California,
can, within five months after war is declared, land
simultaneously at Monterey and Bodega bays a
total force exceeding one hundred and seventy
thousand veteran troops. Debarking fifty thousand

1 Chart VIII.
3°3

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

at or above Bodega Bay, from three to five days'
march north of the Sausalito defences, and the
balance at Monterey Bay, six days' march south
of the American defences across the San Francisco
peninsula, the Japanese have the alternative of
five strategic moves to bring about the seizure or
capitulation of the American forces, together with
San Francisco and central California.

The southern Japanese army of one hundred and
twenty thousand men move north and front the
American lines across the San Francisco peninsula
simultaneously as the northern Japanese army of
fifty thousand move south and front the American
force extending westward from San Rafael. Al-
lowing two thousand men per mile in the defensive
works, the American forces would approximate sev-
enty thousand on the south line and thirty thou-
sand on the north. The Japanese could:

(1) Simultaneously attack both positions — on the
north, fifty thousand Japanese regulars against less
than ten thousand American regulars and twenty
thousand militia on lines fifteen miles in extent; on
the south, one hundred and twenty thousand Japan-
ese regulars against less than twenty-five thousand
American regulars and forty-five thousand militia
on lines over thirty miles in extent.

(2) Leaving a sufficient force before the American
north line, so as to prevent any aggressive action
and to take advantage of any retrograde movement,
the balance of the northern Japanese army to re-

304

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

inforce the southern army by Point Costa, Oak-
land, and Niles, their combined forces assaulting the
American defences on the south.1

(3) Leaving a sufficient force before the American
southern lines, so as to prevent any aggressive action
and to take advantage of any retrograde movement,
the balance of the southern army to reinforce the
northern army, their combined forces assaulting the
American north line. In this movement the Japan-
ese would have one hundred thousand regulars to
ten thousand American regulars and twenty thou-
sand militia. American defeat would give the Sau-
salito peninsula into the hands of the Japanese
and expose the city of San Francisco to a more
complete destruction by bombardment than was
recently brought about by earthquake and fire.2

(4) The Japanese northern army remaining before
the American north line, and the southern Japanese
army, with the exception of one corps, remaining
before the south lines. This detached corps, with
siege batteries to occupy Oakland and vicinity; and,
if the Oakland Mole has been destroyed, to seize
Goat Island under cover of batteries placed on
Point Gibbon. Establishing batteries on Goat Isl-
and, the entire city is again exposed to destruction
by bombardment.8

(5) The Japanese northern army to remain before
the American north lines, with the exception of one

1 Chart VIII. • Chart XI. » Chart XI.

305

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

division. The southern Japanese army to remain
before the American south lines, except two corps.
One corps to occupy the east shores of the bay,
one flank joining the left flank of the northern army
at Vallejo Junction, the other forming a junction
with the right flank of the southern army at Alviso,
thus completely surrounding the bay and cutting
off all American communications. The second corps
to occupy the Sacramento Valley, one division at
Sacramento and the other at Stockton. The de-
tached division from the northern army to move
eastward over the Union Pacific and establish a
fortified position in the Truckee Valley on the east
slopes of the Sierras, thus completing the isolation
of California and the Pacific coast.

The destruction and demoralization consequent
upon the recent earthquake and fire shows that if
San Francisco were bombarded from either Goat
Island or Sausalito that it would be destroyed within
a single day. But whatever course the Japanese
pursue, whether by battle, by bombardment or by
seizure, San Francisco will be forced to capitulate
within a fortnight after its investment is completed,
though defended by the entire military establish-
ment of the Republic.

The inevitable consummation that follows the in-
vestment of San Francisco becomes apparent in the
utter helplessness of the Republic. In the entire
nation is not another regiment of regular troops;
no generals, no corporals. Not months, but years,

306

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

must elapse before armies equal to the Japanese
are able to pass in parade. These must then make
their way over deserts such as no armies have ever
heretofore crossed ; scale the intrenched and stupen-
dous heights that form the redoubts of the desert
moats; attempting, in the valor of their ignorance,
the militarily impossible; turning mountain-gorges
into the ossuaries of their dead, and burdening the
desert winds with the spirits of their slain. The re-
pulsed and distracted forces to scatter, as heretofore,
dissension throughout the Union, brood rebellions,
class and sectional insurrections, until this heteroge-
neous Republic, in its principles, shall disintegrate,
and again into the palm of re-established monarchy
pay the toll of its vanity and its scorn.

APPENDIX

TABLE I

SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

governments of Great Britain and Japan, be-
ing desirous of replacing the agreement concluded
between them on January 30, 1902, by fresh stipulations,
have agreed upon the following articles, which have for
their object:

A. The consolidation and maintenance of general peace
in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

B. The preservation of the common interests of all
the powers in China by insuring the independence and
integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of
all nations in China.

C. The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high
contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of
India, and defence of their special interests in the said
regions.

ARTICLE I. — It is agreed that whenever in the opinion
of either Great Britian or Japan any of the rights and
interests referred to in the preamble to this agreement
are in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate
with one another fully and frankly, and will consider

309

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

in common the measures which should be taken to safe-
guard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II. — Should either of the high contracting
parties be involved in war in defence of its territorial
rights or special interests, the other party will at once
come to the assistance of its ally, and both parties will
conduct a war in common and make peace in mutual
agreement with any power or powers involved in such
war.

ARTICLE III. — Japan, possessing paramount political,
military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain
recognizes Japan's right to take such measures for the
guidance, control and protection of Korea as she may
deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance
those interests, providing the measures so taken are not
contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the
commerce and industry of all nations.

ARTICLE IV. — Great Britain having a special interest
in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier,
Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the
proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for
the safeguarding of her Indian possessions.

ARTICLE V. — The high contracting parties agree that
neither will, without consulting the other, enter into a
separate arrangement with another power to the prej-
udice of the objects described in the preamble.

ARTICLE VI. — As regards the present war between
Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to main-
tain strict neutrality unless some other power or powers
join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great
Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, will conduct
war in common, and will make peace in mutual agree-
ment with Japan.

ARTICLE VII. — The conditions under which armed as-
sistance shall be offered by either power to the other in

APPENDIX

the circumstances mentioned in the present agreement,
and the means by which such assistance shall be made
available, will be arranged by the naval and military au-
thorities of the high contracting parties, who will from
time to time consult one another fully and freely on all
questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VIII. — The present agreement shall be sub-
ject to the provisions of Article VI, and come into effect
immediately after the date of signature and remain in
force for ten years from that date. In case neither of
the parties shall have been notified twelve months before
the expiration of the said ten years of an intention of
terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expira-
tion of one year from the day on which either of the
parties shall have renounced it ; but if, when the date for
the expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in
war, the alliance shall ipso facto continue until peace
shall be concluded.

Signed, August 12, 1905, by Lord Lansdowne, on behalf
of Great Britain, and by Baron Hayashi, on behalf of
Japan.

TABLE II

THE first expression of anti- Japanese sentiment did
not occur until 1900, when a mass-meeting was held
in San Francisco.

In 1904, at the twenty-fourth annual session of the
American Federation of Labor (2,500,000 members), res-
olutions were passed to permanently exclude the Japan-
ese from the United States and its insular territories.
These resolutions were reaffirmed at the annual sessions
in 1905 and 1906. During 1905, twelve great national
conventions endorsed and adopted the same resolutions,
as did 539 other organizations, comprising civic, frater-
nal, political and labor associations.

In 1906 the Japanese- Korean Exclusion League was
organized. The membership of this league in California
numbers about one hundred and twenty-five thousand,
composed as follows:

Labor bodies 169

Fraternal societies 18

Civic bodies 12

Benevolent societies 3

Political and military 3

Total 232

This number does not include branch leagues, with
their affiliated organizations, outside of San Francisco.

In 1908 there was established, in general convention,
the Asiatic Exclusion League of North America, the

312

APPENDIX

outgrowth of the Japanese- Korean Exclusion League of
1906. This league has branches in all of the Western
States.

The demands of this league are expressed in their
following Memorial to Congress, and is expressive of the
general sentiment in the West to act, on this question,
in direct contravention of treaty stipulations:

MEMORIAL

The first annual convention of the Asiatic Exclusion
League of North America, in regular session, Seattle,
Washington, February, 1908, do hereby most respect-
fully

REQUEST, The immediate passage of a law which will
exclude, absolutely and emphatically, all Asiatics from
the mainland and insular possessions of the United States,
and your memorialists do hereby emphatically

PROTEST, Against the administrative and executive offi-
cers of the United States entering into any agreement
which will permit the ruler of any foreign country to
make stipulations as to what class of persons and in
what numbers shall leave said foreign country for the
purpose of immigrating to the United States' and your
memorialists

DECLARE, That any such agreement with a foreign
power is a subversion of the traditions and policies of the
United States, and a betrayal of the rights of American
citizens. Your memorialists further

PROTEST, Against the employment of Asiatics on board
vessels flying the American flag, to the exclusion of
American seamen, and in violation of American law;
therefore, your memorialists pray for the speedy enact-
ment of a law which will prohibit the employment of
Asiatics upon all vessels flying the American flag, or in

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

any branch or department of the public service. Your
memorialists again emphatically

PROTEST, Against the continuance of Asiatic immigra-
tion upon the exalted grounds of American patriotism,
for the reasons:

FIRST, That these Asiatics come to the United States
entirely ignorant of our sentiments of nativity and pa-
triotism, and utterly unfit and incapable of discharg-
ing the duties of American citizenship.

SECOND, The introducton of this incongruous and non-
assimilable element into our national life will inevita-
bly impair and degrade, if not effectually destroy, our
cherished institutions and our American life.

THIRD, These Asiatics are alien to our ideas of patri-
otism, morality, loyalty and the highest conceptions of
Christian civilization.

FOURTH, Their presence here is a degrading and con-
taminating influence to the best phases of American life.

FIFTH, With their low standard of living, immoral sur-
roundings and cheap labor, they constitute a formidable
and fierce competition against our American system, the
pride and glory of our civilization, and unless prohibited
by effective legislation will result in the irreparable de-
terioration of American labor.

SIXTH, The living in our midst of a large body of
Asiatics, the greatest number of whom are armed, loyal
to their governments, entertaining feelings of distrust,
if not of hostility, to our people, without any allegiance
to our government or our institutions, not sustaining
American life in times of peace, and ever ready to re-
spond to the cause of their own nations in times of war,
make these Asiatics an appalling menace to the Ameri-
can Republic, the splendid achievements wrought by the
strong arms and loyal hearts of Caucasian toilers, patri-
ots and heroes in every walk of life.

APPENDIX

Senator Lodge, in commenting upon this movement
to exclude the Japanese from the United States, in a
speech given at Boston, said:

"Such a movement of people as this is, in itself, a
historic event of great magnitude, deserving the most
careful consideration; but what we are concerned with
is its effect upon and its meaning to the people of the
United States and the future of our country," etc.

Careful investigation shows that on the Pacific slope
the people are not only anti- Japanese in sentiment as
regards economic competition, but they are becoming
more subject to racial antipathies. They may, in regard
to Japanese immigration and naturalization, be divided
into four classes,

8 per cent, of whom are pro-Japanese

22 " " " " " indifferent

30 " " " " " hostile

40 " " " " " belligerently hostile

TABLE III

THE first official act directed toward the exclusion
of the Japanese from the United States was that of
Governor Henry T. Gage, in his biennial message to the
Legislature of California in 1900. Pursuant to his sugges-
tions, a joint resolution was adopted by the Legislature
and forwarded to the National Congress in which the
exclusion of the Japanese was urged. Concurrent resolu-
tions were again adopted by the California Legislature
on March 22, 1905, and by unanimous vote both the
Senate and the Assembly declared that "unrestricted
Japanese immigration is a menace to the state."

A similar resolution was unanimously adopted by the
Senate and Assembly of the Nevada Legislature. Since
that time, over the entire Pacific Slope, like action has
been taken in state, county and municipal bodies,
culminating in the act of the San Francisco Board of
Education in excluding the Japanese from the public
schools, and which so nearly caused serious internation-
al complications. While these acts are clearly contrary
to all treaty stipulations, yet the California Supreme
Court declared them constitutional, thus showing the
difficulties of maintaining just and peaceful relationship
with foreign powers when the popular sentiment of the
state is opposed to the policy of the Federal Government.

In reply to President Roosevelt's message to Con-
gress, December, 1906, relative to the Japanese trouble,
Governor Pardee addressed a message to the California

316

APPENDIX

Legislature, January, 1907, expressing, in part, the senti-
ment of the people as follows:

" It is safe to say that the President, when he penned
that portion of his annual message in which he referred
to the treatment of the Japanese in the San Francisco
schools, was not aware of the conditions on this coast,
especially in California. . . . The President does not un-
derstand the racial differences between the Japanese
and Chinese and people of Caucasian blood. . . . Our
laws and customs regard intermarriage with them mis-
cegenation. . . . Were the racial differences in civilization,
thought, manners and customs not inseparable between
these Asiatics and Caucasians, whatever inhospitable-
ness our people might show toward them would insen-
sibly disappear. ... It is useless to expect that people
with such different racial characteristics and such dif-
ferent civilization can ever mix with our people and be-
come absorbed into our body politic. They cannot be-
come good American citizens ; it is useless to attempt to
make them such."

It is only to be expected that such popular sentiments
and official acts would soon become incorporated in the
aspirations of the political parties of the Pacific Slope,
and in due time, as these sentiments merged into the
politics of the West, becoming inherent in a fixed and
settled policy, they would be incorporated in the national
platforms of the great political parties. This has ac-
cordingly come about, showing the development of this
sentiment from a sectional to a national issue. Sub-
sequent to 1900, increasing in number and intensity,
municipal conventions, county and state conventions
of all political parties, and in all portions of the Pacific
Slope, have incorporated in their resolutions declarations
for the absolute exclusion of Japanese. So thoroughly

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

has this sentiment permeated the political fabric of the
West that it has been incorporated into the platforms
of two of the national parties.

INDEPENDENCE PLATFORM

Adopted in National Convention, July 28, 1908.

We oppose Asiatic immigration, which does not
amalgamate with our population, creates race issues and
un-American conditions, and which reduces wages and
tends to lower the high standard of living and the high
standard of morality which the American civilization has
established.

We demand the passage of an exclusion act which
shall protect American workingmen from competition
with Asiatic cheap labor, and which shall protect Amer-
ican civilization from the contamination of Asiatic con-
ditions.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

Adopted in National Convention, July 10, 1908.

We favor full protection, by both national and state
governments within their respective spheres, of all for-
eigners residing in the United States under treaty, but
we are opposed to Asiatic immigrants who cannot be
amalgamated with our population, or whose presence
among us would raise a race issue and involve us in
diplomatic controversies with Oriental powers.

In 1907, Baron Hayashi, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
replied to this government, relative to the proposed
Japanese exclusion and anti-naturalization legislation,
that the Imperial Government would continue its de-
mand (in accordance with treaty stipulations) for the same

APPENDIX

rights, privileges and immunities for the Japanese going
to and resident in the United States as are granted the
aliens of other nations.

TENTATIVE ANTI-JAPANESE LEGISLATION— 1908-09

California Legislature
Oregon Legislature
Washington Legislature
Nevada Legislature
Arizona Legislature
Colorado Legislature
Wyoming Legislature
Idaho Legislature
Hawaiian Legislature

TABLE IV

IT has been difficult heretofore to find a true basis for
comparison of the strength of the various navies.
A statement of the total number of ships in each navy
means nothing, because these ships and their personnel
vary so widely as to make any such comparison useless.
A comparison on the basis of armor protection is like-
wise worthless, since a fleet powerful only in defensive
qualities, as a fleet of monitors, would be of no use under
modern conditions; so a comparison by speed is also
erroneous, since a fleet of exceedingly swift but mod-
erately armed and armored cruisers would possess no
combative qualities if engaged with a fleet of battle-
ships. Moreover, in all comparisons between ships the
question must be considered : War-ships built to-day have
four times the fighting value of those constructed a few
years ago.

Since the naval battle of Tsu Shima new conditions
were brought to light that make possible a more accurate
comparison between the fighting qualities of two fleets.
The victory of future naval engagements will go to the
fleet that is able to bring the greatest number of heavy
guns within the shortest line of battle. In this com-
parison the guns included are those that can pierce
heavy armor at 5000 yards: i. e., the 5o-caliber 9.2-in.,
the 45-caliber io-in., the 4o-caliber n-in., the 35-caliber
i2-in., and the 35-caliber i3~in. and i3|-in.

The Japanese battleships built prior to the Russian

320

APPENDIX

TABLE OP JAPANESE BATTLESHIPS (FIRST-CLASS), 1909

Ship

Displacement,
tons

Number of big guns

Speed,
knots

Shikishima

I5,OOO
I5,OOO
13.566
12,700
12,674
12,674
12,300
II,OOO

15,200
16,400
16,400
19,200
19,800
21,000

4 12-
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

12

in., 4 10-

4 '
4 '
4 '
4 '
4 '
4 '
4
4 '
4
4

12

12 '

in.

18-3

18
18
18
19
19
18.5
18
18
19-5

19 . 2

20. 5
2I-5

21-5

Asahi

Iwami

Hizen

Suwo

Sagami

Fuji .

Tango

Mikasa

Katori

Kashima

Satsuma

Aki

Huki

14 ships 132 heavy guns

TABLE OF AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS (FIRST-CLASS), 1909

Ship

Displacement,
tons

Number of big guns

Speed,
knots

New Hampshire

l6,OOO

H'552
l6,OOO
14,948
I3,OOO
II.552
11,348
l6,OOO
II,52O
11,520
l6,OOO
12,500
l6,OOO
l6,OOO
I3,OOO
I2,5OO
14,948
14,948
I2,5OO
14,948
l6,OOO
l6,OOO
14,948
11-552

4 1 2 -inch

4 13 ;

4 12
4 12 '
4 12 "

4 13 '
4 12
4 12
4 13
4 13 .
4 12

4 12
8 12

4 12
4 12

4 12
4 12
4 12 '
4 12 "
4 12 "

8 12 '

4 12 "
4 12 "
4 13 "

18

18
19
17
17

18
17
17
18

18
18
18

17
18

19
19
18

19
18

18
19

Alabama

Connecticut

Georgia

Idaho

Illinois

Iowa

Kansas

Kearsarge

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Michigan

Mississippi

Missouri

Nebraska

New Jersey

Ohio

Rhode Island

South Carolina

Vermont

Virginia

Wisconsin

2 4 ships 104 heavy guns

321

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

War and the vessels captured from Russia have, in ac-
cordance with these ideas, been reconstructed and the
armaments altered so as to double their fighting strength.
The vessels of the Mikasa type, which have heretofore
carried four i2-in. guns and fourteen 6-in., will carry four
lo-in. instead of the 6-in. guns, so that their main arma-
ment will be brought up to eight guns of heavy caliber.
The Russian battleships have likewise been re-armed
with eight guns of heavy caliber.

The preceding tables show the fighting qualities of the
two fleets.

By these tables it is seen that the Japanese navy, in
its battleships, possesses nearly thirty per cent, more
big guns than the American navy, while its battle-line
is only slightly over one half as long.

JAPANESE ARMORED CRUISERS
1909

Cruiser

Displacement,
tons

Number of big guns

Speed,
knots

Tokiwa

0,700

2?

Asama

Q.7OO

22 . I

Idzuma

0,7 CO

22

Iwate

0,7 co

22

Yakumo

0,8 so

2O

Adzuma

0,436

2O

Aso

7,726

22

Kasuga

7,220

i io-inch

22

Nisshin

7,7OO

2O

Tsukuba

i-z.7 co

4 1 2 -inch

21

Ikoma

j-z,7 co

4 12 "

2O.43

Kurama

14,600

4 12 "

2O

Ibuki

14,600

4 12 "

27

18,000

4 12 " 8 io-inch

25

14 cruisers

29 heavy guns

322

APPENDIX

AMERICAN ARMORED CRUISERS
1909

Cruiser

Displacement,
tons

Number of big guns

Speed.

knots

Brooklyn

0,21 C

22

California

13,680

22

Colorado

13,680

22

Maryland

13,680

22

Montana

I4,5OO

4 io-inch

22

New York

8, i so

21

North Carolina

i 4 , 500

4 io-inch

22

Ppnpsylvania ...........

13,680

22

South Dakota

13,680

22

Tennessee . .

14,500

4 10 -inch

22

Washington ....

14,500

4

22

West Virginia

13,680

22

12 cruisers

1 6 heavy guns

Torpedo-boats

Torpedo-boat destroyers,

United States
36

16

Japan
79
54

TABLE V

THE following table shows the ages of the captains
and flag officers, with their average years in the
two grades, in the navies of Great Britain, France,
Germany, Japan, and the United States:

Captains

Sea-going flag officers

Age

Average years in
grade

Age

Average years in
grade

Great Britain

35
47
42

38

55

II .2

9-5

6.2

8
4-5

45
53

51

44
59

8

14.2

6
ii
i-5

France

Germany

Japan. .

United States

PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE
NAVIES

United States

Japan

Flag officers

18

4O

Captains and commanders

182

185

Other line officers and engineers

607

I,4Ci

Medical officers

2>C4

711

Pay officers

188

240

Warrant officers

624

1,064

Enlisted men

32,000

•7 C.3I2

TABLE VI

"TN twelve of the American battleships there is to
1 be found in the after-end of the superstructure a
section that is entirely unarmored. Being just in front
of the after- turret, this unprotected portion of some fifty
square feet exposes the shafts that pass down into the
auxiliary magazines of the vessels."

B

" In all the American battleships the main armor belt
does not extend more than six inches above water when
the vessel is fully equipped and ready for sea. It was
this sunken condition of the main armor that resulted in
the sinking of so many Russian warships in the battle
of Tsu Shima. This belt of armor should extend several
feet above the water-line, as is the case in the principal
foreign navies. In France it reaches from five to eight
feet above the water, while in the modern British war-
ships it extends eight feet below and five above the
water-line."

C

"In twelve of the American battleships the gun-
ports are so large that the guns and gun-crews are ex-
posed to destruction. The turret-ports in the Kearsarge
and the Kentucky are so large that a number of twelve-

325

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

inch shells could enter them at the same time. The
open spaces above and below the guns in these turrets are
ten feet square. In some of the battleships the broad-
side guns are in exposed openings as wide as six feet.
While foreign navies observe the principle of isolating
the guns of the secondary armament by pairs in turrets,
or singly in casements, it is not done in the American
navy, except the last five ships. In the Kearsarge and
Kentucky there are fourteen guns in one compartment.
A shell exploding in this compartment would not only
put all of the guns out of commission, but would prob-
ably kill or wound the one hundred and forty men
stationed there."

D

"In the evolutions of the Atlantic fleet recently it
was found that sea-going torpedo-boats or destroyers,
when directed against the fleet of battleships, could get
into a position to destroy them. To protect this one
fleet it was made apparent at that time that it would be
necessary to have a cordon of forty-eight torpedo-
destroyers to defend the fleet from the destroyers of the

enemy."

E

" As was shown in Admiral Evans' report concerning
the cruise of the battleship fleet to the Pacific, the low-
ness of the American ships affects seriously their fighting
qualities. Three of the battleships have their bows
but eleven feet above water; two others, thirteen feet.
The latest battleships have their bows only eighteen feet
over the water-line, and the latest cruiser but twenty.
In foreign navies modern battleships have their forward
decks from twenty- two to twenty-eight feet above water,

lSee Table IV, last paragraph.
326

APPENDIX

while the forward decks of armored cruisers are from
twenty-five to thirty-two feet high.

In a naval battle, where high speed is essential, the
disasters that may ensue on account of this lowness of
the gun-decks are vividly portrayed in the trial trip of one
of the latest American battleships, the Virginia. Steam-
ing at 19.04 knots, the bow wave of solid water reached
the height of fifteen feet, while an impenetrable spray
rose forty feet above the water level. This battleship,
with all her ports closed by steel bucklers, shipped one
hundred and twenty tons of water into her forward
turret while making the trip from Cuba to Hampton
Roads. Had the ports of this ship been open for action,
immense quantities of water would have poured through
them and rendered the guns of the forward turret useless.
During the cruise to the Pacific it was demonstrated that
if the battleships steamed at high speed in a moderate
sea, or at medium speed in a rough sea, the guns of the
forward turret could not be used. This would reduce,
under such conditions, the main armament of big guns
to one half, since two of the four heavy guns on the
American ships are carried in the forward turret.

The broadside guns, constituting the secondary arma-
ment of the American ships, are on even lower gun
decks. In twelve of the latest battleships — the New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Kansas, Idaho, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Vermont, Georgia, Mississippi, Virginia,
Nebraska, New Jersey — they are only about eleven feet
above water. In each of the new cruisers ten of the
fourteen medium guns are at the same height. These
guns could not be fired to the windward while the ships
were steaming at battle speed in a moderate sea, or at
medium speed in a rough sea. The broadside guns of
foreign warships are, in a general sense, twice as high
as the American, and in some instances three times as high.

327

TABLE VII

VESSELS CONSTITUTING JAPANESE TRANSPORT SYS-
TEM IN TIME OF WAR

MAJOR FLEET, 1909

Steamer

Gross tonnage

Troop capacity,
officers and men

Tenyo Maru

14,000

4 600

Chiyo Maru

I4,OOO

4 600

I4,OOO

4 600

Kanio Maru

8,600

3CQ4.

Hirano Maru

8,600

3. 5O4

Miyazaka Maru

8,600

3. ?O4

Atsuta Maru

8,600

35Q4

Kitano Maru

8,600

35O4

Mishima Maru

8,600

3CO4

Tango Maru

7,46?

3,168

Hitachi Maru

6,7l6

2,886

Aki Maru

6,444

2,842

Shinano Maru

6,388

2,91 6

lyo Maru

6,320

2 o6c

Awa Maru

6,300

2.8C4

Kaga Maru

6,301

2,872

Wakasa Maru

6,26^

2,717

Bingo Maru

6,247

2,805

Sado Maru

6,227

2,74O

Inaba Maru

6,189

2,816

Kanagawa Maru

6.I7O

2,832

Hakata Maru

6,161

2,41 C.

Tamba Maru

6,134

2.7Q4

Kamakura Maru

6,126

2,670

Sanuki Maru

6,112

2,700

Kawachi Maru

6,101

2,532

Hong-Kong Maru

6,000

2,600

America Maru

6,000

2,600

Nippon Maru

6,000

2,600

Tosa Maru ,

5,823

2,88 c.

Nikko Maru

e,e-2Q

2,400

Kumano Maru

5,076

2.3O6

Ceylon Maru

5,o68

2,300

Riojun Maru

4,806

2,840

Takasaki Maru

4,747

2.176

Wakamiya Maru

4,723

2,292

Kageshima Maru

4,687

2,070

Yetorofu Maru

4.l66

2,181;

Colombo Maru1

4.700

1,000

Bombay Maru1

4,629

1,000

40 Steamers

Troop capacity, 114,235
328

APPENDIX

MINOR FLEET NO. I.

Steamer

Gross tonnage

Troop capacity.
officers and men

Kagoshima Maru 4,405

Tenshin Maru 4, 1 73

Yeboshi Maru 4,098

Kasuga Maru 3 ,820

Yawata Maru 3,8 1 7

Moyori Maru 3-773

Shiokubi Maru 3>75S

Benten Maru 3,668

Totomi Maru1 3,412

Miike Maru 3,365

Yamaguchi Maru 3,32 1

Hiroshima Maru 3,283

Matsuyama Maru 3>°99

Mikawa Maru1 2,932

Saikio Maru 2,904

Kobe Maru 2,877

Tategami Maru 2,703

Takeshima Maru 2,673

Hakuai Maru 2,636

Kosai Maru 2,63 5

Kokura Maru 2,596

Yamashiro Maru 2,581

Chikuzen Maru1 2,578

Chiugo Maru1 2,563

Wakanoura Maru 2,527

Yeijo Maru 2,506

Omi Maru 2,501

Yokohama Maru 2,373

Niigata Maru1 2 , 184

Awaji Maru1 2,045

Santo Maru 2,032

Yeiko Maru i ,966

Sakata Maru 1-963

Satsuma Maru i ,939

Sagami Maru i ,934

Chefoo Maru i ,934

Xagato Maru 1,884

Fushiki Maru1 1,839

Takasago Maru i.789

Otaru Maru I.57I

Hanasaki Maru I,57°

Kamikawa Maru1 i ,465

Hirosaki Maru1 1,460

Genkai Maru i ,447

(Continued on p. 330)
aa 339

1,726
1,670
2,140
i, 800
1,900
1,790
1,842
i, 680
900
1,790

1,845

1,500

2,010

800

2,400

,680

,640

>372

-75°

,909

,52°

2,480

700

700

1,500

2,260

i, 800

2,560

650

600

i, 800

1,640

i,944

2,168

i, 600

1,670

1,718

600

1-477

1,822

1,822

55°

55°

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

MINOR FLEET NO. i — Continued.

Steamer

Gross tonnage

Troop capacity,
officers and men

Hiogo Maru

1,4^8

1, 800

Suminoye Maru

1,42 C

I.OQO

Higo Maru

I,42O

1,7-7 e

Takamatsu Maru1

1,33 "?

?OO

Osumi Maru1

1,22 C

t;oo

Ishikari Maru1

1. 113

<oo

Yechigo Maru

1,280

1,000

Ise Maru

1,2 so

1,480

Tokachi Maru

I, IIO

1,642

Kushiro Maru

1,076

I , IQO

Saishu Maru

2,117

1.637

55 Steamers

Troop capacity 85,291

1 Steamers built primarily for carrying freight, hence low troop capacity.

Steamers Troop capacity

TOTAL, Major Fleet 40 114,235

TOTAL, Minor Fleet No. i 55 85,291

GRAND TOTAL 95 199,526

We have not the data of Minor Fleet No. 2.

COMPARATIVE TABLE

AMERICAN TRANSPORTS IN ii

5-1900

Steamer

Gross tonnage

Troop capacity,
officers and men

Knickerbocker

1,642

04 "\

Buford

•2 ,O3Q

1,0^2

Cherokee

2, CC7

I,OOO

Grant . .

C CQO

I QOQ

Logan

"1,672

I,7O6

Warren

4, -27 t

I.2Q2

Thomas

e,7o6

I,78l

Sherman

"5,780

1,888

Sheridan

C.673

2,OOO

Meade

5,641

2,075

330

APPENDIX

While it is true that four or five, or even more, Japanese
can get along comfortably in the same space that an
American deems necessary for one person, this condition
has not been taken advantage of to a very marked degree,
as a comparison of the American and Japanese trans-
ports, with their relative troop capacity proportionate to
their tonnage, will show.

In comparing one of the largest American transports,
the Meade, 5641 gross tonnage and troop capacity of
2075 officers and men, with one of the Tenyo Maru
class of Japanese transports, of 14,000 gross tonnage and
troop capacity of 4600 officers and men, it is seen that
while the. American transport carries one man to every
2.95 tons, in the Japanese vessel 3.04 tons is utilized;
showing that the American ship is carrying not less but
more troops to her tonnage than the Japanese.

In the next largest class is the American transport
Warren, 4375 gross tonnage and troop capacity of 1292
officers and men. Comparing this to the next largest
Japanese transports of the Kamo class, 8600 gross
tonnage and troop capacity of 3594 officers and men, we
find that in the American vessel one man is carried to
every (approximately) 3.38 tons, while in the Japanese
ship approximately 2.4 tons is utilized to each man;
showing in this case that the Japanese vessel is carrying
more men to her tonnage than the American, though
the difference is slight.

In the next highest class is the American transport
Bufard, 3039 gross tonnage and troop capacity of 1052
officers and men as compared to the Japanese third
largest class exceeding 6000 gross tonnage. In this
instance the American transport carries one man to
2.8 tons, while the average for the Japanese vessels is
approximately 2.44 tons, or nearly the equivalent.

In the Japanese vessels of lower tonnage we find,

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

however, that the tonnage proportion to the troop ca-
pacity grows less, until, in some instances, one soldier
is carried to each ton or less of the gross tonnage. This
is due to the fact that these smaller vessels were built
almost exclusively for the use of Orientals, whose char-
acteristics in domicile permit the maximum passenger
capacity with the minimum of space and tonnage.

Should Japan embark on these two fleets an average
of two Japanese to the space and tonnage ordinarily
deemed necessary for one American, then the troop
capacity on a single voyage of these fleets would exceed
three hundred thousand officers and men, together with
their equipment and supplies. That this would be eas-
ily possible and would work no hardship on the men
was demonstrated by the Japanese winter-quarters in
Manchuria during the Russian War. We have, how-
ever, not taken this possibility into consideration, but
have given the troop capacity of the Japanese vessels
per European measurement.

TABLE VIII

following table shows the number of officers
1 who were obliged to leave the Union Army during
the Civil War.

Arms of service

Discharged

Ca-
shiered

Resigned

With
dis-
honor

For

incapacity

Without
stated
reasons

REGULARS
Cavalry

I
X

25

18
79

I

5

97
50

253

Artillery

Infantry

Total

2

122

6

400

VOLUNTEERS
Cavalry

12
IS
*59

33°

i59
2,569

394
163
1,586

38
14
200

3-055
999
17,036

Artillery

Infantry

Total

186

3-058

2,143

252

21,090

COLORED TROOPS
Cavalry

18

8

158

5
9
144

16

34

68

679

Artillery

Infantry

Total

18

166

iS8

16

781

Grand totals

204

3,226

2,423

274

22,271

Grand total, 28,398

333

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

The resignations tabulated in the last column are in
character very little removed, if at all, in the vast ma-
jority of cases, from the factors tabulated in the other
columns. These resignations were almost always the
product of two conditions: (i) to escape being discharged
under the other four heads; (2) after every disaster or
defeat great numbers of resignations were sent in. Carl
Schurz, in his Memoirs, especially mentions the great
number of regimental officers that left the Union Army
immediately after the defeat at Fredericksburg.

Allowing incompetent officers to resign, instead of ca-
shiering them, was only characteristic of official lenien-
cy practised during this war against military offenders.
This was most vividly portrayed relative to desertion,
which in the time of war is punishable by death, yet in
this conflict there occurred nearly two hundred thou-
sand desertions from the Union Army and only seven
executions.

B

Within a short time after the defeat at Fredericksburg
85,000 men deserted. This fact shows, to a certain ex-
tent, the actuating motive in the desertion of short-term
volunteers and the disasters that ensue to the nation
whenever its forces meet defeat on the field. See table
on following page.

All confederated forms of government are only durable
in prosperity and success; in disasters the tendency is
not to greater cohesion and unity, but to disintegration.
Should the armies of this Republic meet with a con-
tinuous series of defeats, as characterized the Japanese-
Russian War or the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the
probable culmination would be the dissolution of the
present form of confederated government.

334

APPENDIX

TABLE OF DESERTIONS IN THE

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Arms of service

REGULARS

Cavalry 2

Artillery

Infantry 3

Total 5

VOLUNTEERS

Cavalry 34

Artillery 4

Infantry 149

Total 187

COLORED TROOPS

Cavalry 4

Artillery 2

Infantry 18

Total 24

Grand totals 216

Grand total, 190,045

Number of deserters

Officers

Enlisted men

1,866
3,162

16,360

31,856

11,942

126,231

170,029

674

1,843

923

3>44°

189,829

While the Civil War shows, in its various activities,
the fallacy of militia and volunteers, the Spanish- Amer-
can War and Philippine Insurrection portray a progres-
sive deterioration. The worthlessness of the American
military system, however, does not alone adhere to these
late wars, but has been co-existent with the Republic
from its inception, as the three following tables, published
by F. L. Huidekoper in the North American Review,
show.

335

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

MILITIA, RAN AWAY OR DESERTED

BATTLE

DATE

ORGANIZATION OR EXPEDITION

Evacuation of New York ....
Brand ywine

Sept. is,
Sept ii,

1776

Parsons' and Fellows' brigades

Camden, S. C

1780

Guilford Court House, N. C..
Indian village near Fort

March 15,

Oct 22

1781

North Carolina regiment

Darke County, Ohio

Nov. 4,

Frenchtown and Raisin
River, Mich
Sackett's Harbor

Jan. 18-20,

1813
1813

Winchester's column

French Creek, N. Y
Chrysler's Field, Canada
Evacuation of Fort George,

Nov. 1-5,
Nov. ii,

1813
1813

General Hampton's column
General Wilkinson's column

Burning of Buffalo and Black
Rock N Y

New Orleans, La

Jan 8

lumbia Militia and Volunteers under
General Winder

Lake Okeechobee, Fla

1837

on the left bank of the Mississippi

Bull Run, Virginia

July 21,

iSfli

Gen. McDowell's entire force of militia

This partial list shows the character of the wholesale
desertions and flights up to the time of the Civil War.
Subsequent affairs are too well known to necessitate rep-
etition. In the Civil War it must always be remem-
bered, when the valorous deeds done there come to the
mind, that in due time, after two or three years' service,
militia ceased to be militia and volunteers had become
regulars.

Even as early as the American War of Independence,
when science and invention had entered very little into
the conduct of war, the worthlessness of militia and
volunteers was fully recognized by the military leaders
of that period. Washington expressed himself as follows :

" Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of
modern war, as well for defence as offence, and when a
substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and
ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits neces-
sary to resist a regular force. . . . The firmness requisite
for the real business of fighting is only to be attained
by a constant course of discipline and service. I have

336

APPENDIX

MILITIA MUTINIED

PLACE

DATE

MUTINEERS

Jan. i, 1781

Jan. 34-28, 1781
une, 1783

June, 1812
uly, 1812

Oct. 19. 1812
Oct.. 1812

Nov., 1812
Oct. 13, 1813
Nov., 1813

Dec., 1813
Dec. 31, 1835

July 16-18. 1861

Pennsylvania line (6 regiments), 1300
men
New Jersey line
80 recruits, joined by two hundred other
malecontents. marched to Philadelphia,
demanded their pay, and held Congress
prisoner on June 21, 1783

General Hull's militia
i So Ohio militia of Hull's command

4000 Kentucky mounted Tmliti^ under
General Hopkins

Kentucky, Virginia, and Ohio militia
under Gen. W. H. Harrison

Nearly all the 3,000 militia under Gen-
eral Dearborn
New York militia under Generals
Rensselaer and Wadsworth
Tennessee militia and volunteers

General McClure's New York militia
Florida militia and volunteers under
Gov. Call, Clinch's expedition

Militia of the Army of the Shenandoah

On the inarch from Urbana,
Ohio, to Detroit, Mich
Detroit, Mich

On the march from Fort
Harrison, Ind., to the Wa-
bash and Illinois rivers.. . .

En route to the rapids of the

En route from Plattsburg,
N. Y,, to Canada

Battle of Queenstown

Fort Strother, Fla

Retreat to Buffalo after
evacuation of Fort George
Withlacoochee River, Fla

Charlestown, W. Va

never yet been witness to a single instance that can
justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be
wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trust-
ed, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence."

STATES DEFY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT BY REFUS-
ING TO FURNISH THEIR MILITIA TO ITS SERVICE

STATE

GOVERNOR

DATE

CAUSE AND REASON FOR REFUSAL

Massachusetts .

Strong

April, 1812

Denied right of President or Congress to

determine when such exigencies arise as

to require railing out of militia. Claimed
that this right is vested in the com-

manders-in-chief of the militia of the

several states"

Connecticut. . . .

Griswold . . .

April, 1812

Substantially the same contention as the

above

Vermont

Chittenden.

Nov. io, 1813

Declared that "the military strength and

resources of this state must be reserved

for its own defence and protection exclu-

sively

Vermont

Chittenden .

Sept.. 1814

Refused to order militia to support Gen.

Macomb in repelling the enemy

Virginia

Letcher. .. .

\orth Carolina.

Ellis

Kentucky

Magoffin. . .

April, 1861

Rebellion

Tennessee

Harris

Missouri

Jackson ....

Arkansas

Rector

337

TABLE IX
WASHINGTON'S ESTIMATION OF MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS

T ETTER to the President of Congress, September
L, 24, 1776:

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly
resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from
the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the
din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of
military skill (which is followed by want of confidence
in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained i
disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and
superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their
own shadows.

" Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living,
particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many,
impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of
returning to their respective homes that it not only pro-
duces shameful and scandalous desertions among them-
selves, but infuses a like spirit in others. Again, men
accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control can-
not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary
to the good order and government of an army, without
which licentiousness and every kind of disorder trium-
phantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of sub-
ordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a
year. . . . Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep

338

APPENDIX

fifty thousand or one hundred thousand in constant pay
than to depend upon half the number and supply the
other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter
are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling
and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consump-
tion of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or req-
uisition of Congress, they must be furnished with or
sent home, added to other incidental expenses conse-
quent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass
all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy
which you could establish among fixed and settled troops,
and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered
to, the ruin of our cause."

TABLE X

THE number of deaths from disease in the Ameri-
can Civil War cannot be positively ascertained, on
account of the great numbers who died subsequent to
discharge due to disability. Careful investigation demon-
strates that an equal, if not greater, number died after
leaving the field and base hospitals than died therein.
Deaths from disease while still in the ranks:

Officers and men 199,720

B

The casualties in the Spanish- American War were as
follows :

Battle Disease

In the Philippines 17 203

In Puerto Rico 3 262

In Cuba 273 567

In U. S. camps 2649

Total 293 3681

The mean strength of the American army during this
war was approximately 170,000. The number of ad-
missions to hospital on September 10, 1898, was over
158,000, i. e., 90 per cent, of the entire force.

These men were, but a few months prior, selected,

340

APPENDIX

after examination by surgeons, on account of their phys-
ical perfectness, so that this vast amount of disease
and death was not due to the physical weakness and
incapacity of the American volunteer, but to the worth-
lessness of the military system of the Republic. While
only about 38,000 men participated in the military op-
erations of the Spanish-American War, and while the
casualties in battle were very few, yet 43,000 pension
claims have been issued or are pending in the Pension
Office of the United States.

JAPANESE-RUSSIAN WAR

A statement of the Japanese casualties from disease
by Baron Takaki, Surgeon -General (Reserve) Imperial
Japanese Navy:

"To be sure, we did lose men from disease, but in all
human history there has never been a record like ours.
We established a record of four deaths from bullets to
one from disease. In the Spanish- American War four-
teen men died from preventable sickness to one man
killed on the field of battle. The following table gives
a comparison of the mortality from disease per one
thousand men in the Japanese-Chinese War and the
Japanese- Russian War:

Japanese-Chinese War

Japanese-Russian War

Cases

Deaths

Cases

Deaths

Cholera

Cholera

82.87

50.96

None

None

Typhoid

Typhoid

37-x4

10.98

9.26

5.16

Malaria

Malaria

102.58

5-29

1.96

0.07

341

THE VALOR OF IGNORANCE

" While Japan put into the field, during the Russian
War, 1,500,000 troops of various categories, the total
number of typhoid cases amounted to only 9722, re-
sulting in 4073 deaths. Dysentery cases amounted to
only 7642, resulting in 1804 deaths."

TABLE XI

JAPANESE immigration to the United States
(mainland) has been governed by the same con-
siderations.

Immigration by political decades:

1891-1900 ....................................... 24,806

1901-1905 ....................................... 64,102

1905-1906 ....................................... 14,243

1906-1907 ....................................... 30,226

133-377

During the last six years there have come to the United
States (Report of Bureau of Immigration) 90,123 Japa-
nese male adults.

In California the Japanese constitute more than one-
seventh of the male adults of military age :

Caucasian males of military age ................... 262,694

Japanese males of military age .................... 45. 72 5

In Washington the Japanese constitute nearly one-
ninth of the male population of military age:

Caucasian males of military age ................... 163,682

Japanese males of military age .................... 17,000

343

TABLE XII

HPHE author spent nearly seven months exploring,
J, from a military view-point, the San Jacinto, San
Bernardino, San Gabriel, and Tehachapi mountains, the
Mojave and its adjacent deserts, traversing between
one and two thousand miles. The results are embod-
ied in the text.

THE END

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