The Vedânta-sutras ... translated by George Thibaut

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THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

[34]

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HENRY FROWDE

Oxford University Press Warehouse
Amen Corner, E.C.

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THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MULLER

VOL. XXXIV

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
I 890

[All rights reserved 1

THE

vedAnta-sutras

WITH THE COMMENTARY BY

5ANKARAi^ARYA

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE THIBAUT

PART 1

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1890

I A II rights rese)~ved ]

6

132.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Introduction ix

\^DANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMINIENTARY
BY ^-ANKARAA'ARYA.

Adhyaya I.

Pada I 3

Padall 107

Pada III 154

Pada IV 237

Adhyaya II.

Pada I 290

Pada II 363

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Trans-
lations of the Sacred Books of the East .... 445

. <

INTRODUCTION.

To the sacred literature of the BrahmanSj in the strict
sense of the term, i. e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain
number of complementary works without whose assistance
the student is, according to Hindu notions, unable to do
more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In
the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be under-
stood, be read together with running commentaries such as
Saya;/a's commentaries on the Sa;//hitas and Brahmawas,
and the Bhashyas ascribed to 5ahkara on the chief Upani-
shads. But these commentaries do not by themselves
conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the
sacred texts, since they confine themselves to explaining
the meaning of each detached passage without investigating
its relation to other passages, and the whole of which they
form part ; considerations of the latter kind are at any rate
introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a com-
prehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a
whole, of systematising what they present in an unsyste-
matical form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or sub-
ordination of single passages and sections, and of reconciling
contradictions — which, according to the view of the orthodox
commentators, can be apparent only — is allotted to a sepa-
rate jastra or body of doctrine which is termed Mima;//sa,
i. e. the investigation or enquiry kut i^oxw^ viz. the enquiry
into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.

Of this Mimawsa two branches have to be distinguished,
the so-called earlier (purva) Mima;«sa, and the later (uttara)
Mimawsa. The former undertakes to systematise the
karmaka;/^a, i. e. that entire portion of the Veda which is
concerned with action,-pre-eminently sacrificial action, and
which comprises the Sa;;/hitas and the Brahma;/as exclusive
of the Ara//yaka portions ; the latter performs the same

X VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

service with regard to the so-called ^/7dnaka;/^a, i. e. that
part of the Vedic writings which includes the Arawyaka
portions of the Brahma;/as, and a number of detached
treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but
knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

At what period these two i-astras first assumed a definite
form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature
of those which constitute the subject-matter of the Purva
Mimawsa must have arisen at a very early period, and the
word Mimawsa itself together with its derivatives is
already employed in the Brahmawas to denote the doubts
and discussions connected with certain contested points of
ritual. The want of a body of definite rules prescribing how
to act, i. e. how to perform the various sacrifices in full
accordance with the teaching of the Veda, was indeed an
urgent one, because it was an altogether practical want,
continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in
ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules
was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one ; for
the members of a certain Vedic j-akha or school had to do
no more than to digest thoroughly their own brahma;/a and
sa;;^hita, without being under any obligation of reconciling
with the teaching of their own books the occasionally con-
flicting rules implied in the texts of other j-akhas. It was
assumed that action, as being something which depends on
the will and choice of man, admits of alternatives, so that
a certain sacrifice may be performed in difi"erent ways by
members of different Vedic schools, or even by the followers
of one and the same j-akha.

The Uttara Mimawzsa-j-astra may be supposed to have
originated considerably later than the Purva Mimawsa. In
the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless
constitute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the
second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call
for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was
in no way connected with practice ; the mental attitude of
the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on
Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definite-
ncss and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through

INTRODUCTION. XI

many generations without any great inconvenience resulting
therefrom.

But in the long run two causes must have acted with
ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic
working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The
followers of the different Vedic j-akhas no doubt recog-
nised already at an early period the truth that, while
conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice
can be got over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i. e. an
optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such
topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the
human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like.
Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and
it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who
look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed
truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a con-
sistent whole free from all contradictions. In addition
there supervened the external motive that, while the karma-
kaz/rt'a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of
brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins
certain sacrificial performances connected with certain re-
wards, the g-uanakandsi, as propounding a certain theory of
the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or
outside the pale of the orthodox comm-unity could not but
take up a definite position, must soon have become the
object of criticism on the part of those who held different
views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood
in need of systematic defence.

At present there exists a vast literature connected with the
two branches of the Mima;;zsa. We have, on the one hand, all
those works which constitute the Purva Mima;;zsa-j-astra — or
as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mima;//sa-
.fastra — and, on the other hand, all those works which are
commonly comprised under the name Vedanta-i-astra. At
the head of this extensive literature there stand two collec-
tions of Sutras (i. e. short aphorisms constituting in their
totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject),
whose reputed authors arc Caimini and B^daraya;/a. There
can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two

xii vedanta-sOtras.

collections of Sutras was preceded by a long series of pre-
paratory literary efforts of which they merely represent the
highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by
the analogy of other jastras, as well as by the exhaustive
thoroughness with which the Sutras perform their task of
systematising the teaching of the Veda, and is further
proved by the frequent references which the Sutras make to
the views of earlier teachers. If wc consider merely the
preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sutras (of the
two Mimawsas as well as of other ^astras) mark the begin-
ning ; if we, however, take into account what once existed,
although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that
they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the
one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over
many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head
spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as
well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to
our days, and may yet have some future before itself.

The general scope of the two Mima/yzsa-sutras and their
relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes.
A difference of some importance between the two has, how-
ever, to be noted in this connexion. The systematisation of
the karmaka;/^a of the Veda led to the elaboration of two
classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sutras on the one hand, and
the Purva Mimi;«sa-sutras on the other hand. The former
give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the
sacrifices enjoined in the Brahma;zas ; while the latter
discuss and establish the general principles which the
author of a Kalpa-sutra has to follow, if he wishes to render
his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda.
The ^7i'dnaka.7ida. of the Veda, on the other hand, is system-
atised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mimawsa or Vedanta-
sutras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the
teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing
the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sutras.
This difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In
the first place, the contents of the karmaka;z^a, as being of
an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as
the Kalpa-sutras, from which all burdensome discussions of

INTRODUCTION. Xlll

method are excluded ; while there was no similar reason for
the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely-
theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place,
the Vedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva
Mimawsa-sutras, and may therefore dispense with the
discussion of general principles and methods already esta-
blished in the latter.

The time at which the two Mima;/zsa-sutras were com-
posed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty ;
a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later
on. Their outward form is that common to all the so-
called Sutras which aims at condensing a given body of
doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and
often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences.
Besides the Mimawsa-sutras this literary form is common
to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems,
on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred
law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mima7/^sa-
sutras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position
in point of style. All Siitras aim at conciseness ; that is
clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary
composition owes its existence. This their aim they reach
by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be
spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repeti-
tions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sutras, by the
employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which
substitutes single syllables for entire words or combination
of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the
Sutra writers is to express themselves with as much clear-
ness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The
aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not
otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the
writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase,
and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps
not without difiiculty, and an irksome strain of memory and
reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without
a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the
ordinary Sutras. Altogether different is the case of the
two Mima7//sa-sutras. There scarcely one single Sutra is

xiv VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

intelligible without a commcntaiy. The most essential
words arc habitually dispensed with ; nothing is, for instance,
more common than the simple omission of the subject or
predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra
occurs whose words construe without anything having to be
supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure
that without the help derived from a commentary we should
be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra refers.
When undertaking to translate either of the Mima;;/sa-
sutras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries ;
and hence the question arises which of the numerous com-
mentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right
understanding.

The commentary here selected for translation, together
with Badarayawa^s Sutras ' (to which we shall henceforth
confine our attention to the exclusion of 6^aimini's Purva
Mimawsa-sutras), is the one composed by the celebrated
theologian 6"ahkara or, as he is commonly called, oahkara-
/^arya. There are obvious reasons for this selection. In
the first place, the vSankara-bhashya represents the so-
called orthodox side of Brahmanical theology which strictly
upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as
something different from, and in fact immensely superior to,
the divine beings such as Vish;m or ^iva, which, for many
centuries, have been the chief objects of popular worship in
India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated by
vS'ankara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and
apart from all theological considerations, the most im-
portant and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil ;
neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the
view represented by 5ahkara nor any of the non-Vedantic
systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox
Vedanta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation.
In the third place, .Sankara's bhashya is, as far as we know,
the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity
is at any rate one of the circumstances which have to be

' The Sutras in which the ^«anaka«(/a of the Veda is systematised go by
various names, being called either Vedanta-sutras, or Uttara Mimawsa-sutras,
or Brahma-sutras, or .Sariraka Mimawsa-sutras.

INTRODUCTION. XV

taken into account^ although, it must be admitted, too much
weight may easily be attached to it. The vSaiikara-bhashya
further is the authority most generally deferred to in India
as to the right understanding of the Vedanta-sutras, and
ever since 5ahkara's time the majority of the best thinkers
of India have been men belonging to his school. If in
addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic
merits of 5ahkara's work which, as a piece of philo-
sophical argumentation and theological apologetics, un-
doubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given
to it will be easily understood.

But to the European — or, generally, modern — translator
of the Vedanta-sutras with 5ahkara's commentary another
question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether
or not ^ahkara's explanations faithfully render the intended
meaning of the author of the Sutras. To the Indian Pa«^it
of .Sankara's school this question has become an indifferent
one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to
its being raised, as he looks on Sahkara's authority as
standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to
make good his position he will, moreover, most probably
not enter into any detailed comparison of wSahkara's com-
ments with the text of Badaraya;/a's Sutras, but will rather
endeavour to show on speculative grounds that vSaiikara's
philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course
follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Bada-
raya;^a, who himself must necessarily be assumed to have
taught the true doctrine. But on the modern investigator,
who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of
a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian
system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative
wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the out-
set in the interpretations given of the Vedanta-sutras — and
the Upanishads — by 5ankara and his school, but to submit
them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation.
This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if
6'ahkara's views as to the true meaning of the Sutras and
Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian
soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered

xvi vedanta-sOtras.

upon with much hope of success ; but it becomes much more
urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet
in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedantic and
based on interpretations of the Sutras and Upanishads
more or less differing from those of vSahkara. The claims
of those systems to be in the possession of the right under-
standing of the fundamental authorities of the Vedinta
must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be
compelled to reject them.

It appears that already at a very early period the
Vedanta-sutras had come to be looked upon as an authori-
tative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to
affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at
any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in
showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by
Badaraya;/a's teaching. Owing to this the commentaries
on the Sutras have in the course of time become very
numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and
accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much
less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward
Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen com-
mentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself.
Some among these (as, for instance, Ramanu^a's Vedanta-
sara, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict
sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the
doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sutras; but, on
the other hand, there are in existence several true commen-
taries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall.
It would hardly be practical — and certainly not feasible in
this place — to submit all the existing bhashyas to a critical
enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single out one or
a few of the more important ones, and to compare their
interpretations with those given by 5ahkara, and with the
text of the Sutras themselves.

The bhashya, which in this connexion is the first to press
itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous
Vaish;/ava theologian and philosopher Ramanu^a, who is
supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The Rama-
nu^a or, as it is often called, the vS"ri- bhashya appears to be

INTRODUCTION. XVll

the oldest commentary extant next to ^aiikara's. It is
further to be noted that the sect of the Ramanu^as occupies
a pre-em.inent position among the Vaishwava sects which
themselves, in their totality, may claim to be considered the
most important among all Hindu sects. The intrinsic value
of the 6"ri-bhashya moreover is — as every student ac-
quainted with it will be ready to acknowledge — a very high
one ; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance
due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argu-
mentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against
the school of .Sankara, it not unfrequently deserves to be
called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows
evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Ramanu^a's
individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty
tradition.

This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance.
If it could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only
that the oldest bhashya which we possess, i. e. the Sa.n.-
kara-bhashya, represents an uninterrupted and uniform
tradition bridging over the interval between Badarayawa,
the reputed author of the Sutras, and Sahkara ; and if, on
the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern
bhashyas are not supported by old tradition, but are
nothing more than bold attempts of clever sectarians to
force an old work of generally recognised authority into
the service of their individual tenets ; there would certainly
be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later
bhashyas can help us in making out the true meaning of
the Sutras. All we should have to do in that case would be
to accept 5ahkara's interpretations as they stand, or at the
utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a
careful comparison of vSahkara's bhashya with the text of
the Sutras, whether the former in all cases faithfully repre-
sents the purport of the latter.

In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the
question as to how far we have to accept 5ahkara as a guide
to the right understanding of the Sutras (Mr. A. Cough's
Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp.
239 ff.) that 5ahkara is the generally recognised expositor

[34] b

xviii vedanta-s<3tras.

of true Vedanta doctrine, that that doctrine was handed
down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between
him and the Sutrakara, and that there existed from the
beginning only one Vedanta doctrine, agreeing in all essen-
tial points with the doctrine known to us from 5ahkara's
writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to prove this view, firstly,
by a comparison of ^ahkara's system with the teaching of
the Upanishads themselves ; and, secondly, by a comparison
of the purport of the Sutras — as far as that can be made
out independently of the commentaries — with the interpre-
tations given of them by vSarikara. To both these points
we shall revert later on. Meanwhile, I only wish to remark
concerning the former point that, even if we could show
with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and
the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of
our being confronted by a considerable number of essen-
tially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on
the Upanishads. And with regard to the latter point I
have to say for the present that, as long as we have
only vSaiikara's bh^shya before us, we are naturally
inclined to find in the Sutras — which, taken by them-
selves, are for the greater part unintelligible — the meaning
which .Sahkara ascribes to them ; while a reference to
other bhashyas may not impossibly change our views at
once. — Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the
unbroken uniformity of Vedantic tradition from another
point of view, viz. by enquiring whether or not the
Sutras themselves, and the 5ahkara-bhashya, furnish any
indications of there having existed already at an early time
essentially different Vedantic systems or lines of Vedantic
speculation.

Beginning with the Sutras, we find that they supply ample
evidence to the effect that already at a very early time,
viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the
Vedanta-sutras in their present shape, there had arisen
among the chief doctors of the Vedanta differences of
opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine,
but affecting the most essential parts of the system. In
addition to Badaraya//a himself, the reputed author of the

INTRODUCTION. XIX

Sutras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following
teachers : Atreya, Aj-marathya, Auc/ulomi, Karsh/za^ini,
Kajrakrztsna, 6^aimini, Badari. Among the passages where
diverging views of those teachers are recorded and con-
trasted three are of particular importance. Firstly, a
passage in the fourth pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 5-7),
where the opinions of various teachers concerning the
characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the
important discrepancy is noted that, according to Au^^ulomi,
its only characteristic is thought (/('aitanya), while Caimini
maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and
Badaraya/^a declares himself in favour of a combination of
those two views. — The second passage occurs in the third
pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 7-14), where Caimini
maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower know-
ledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman,
while Badari — whose opinion is endorsed by vSahkara —
teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman only. — Finally,
the third and most important passage is met with in the
fourth pada of the first adhyaya (Sutras 20-22), where the
question is discussed why in a certain passage of the
Br/hadarawyaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are
strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In con-
nexion therewith the Sutras quote the views of three ancient
teachers about the relation in which the individual soul
stands to Brahman. According to Ajmarathya (if we
accept the interpretation of his view given by 5ahkara and
vSahkaras commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in
thebhedabheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different
nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire.
Aurt'ulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is alto-
gether different from Brahman up to the time when ob-
taining final release it is merged in it ; and Kaj-akr/tsna
finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non-
different from Brahman, which in some way or other
presents itself as the individual soul.

That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose
speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedanta-
sutras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital

b 2

XX VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

importance is sufficiently proved by the three passages
quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as
showing that recognised authorities — deemed worthy of
being quoted in the Sutras — denied that doctrine on which
the whole system of 5ankara hinges, viz. the doctrine of
the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.

Turning next to the vSankara-bhashya itself, we there
also meet with indications that the Vedantins were divided
among themselves on important points of dogma. These
indications are indeed not numerous : ^aiikara does not on
the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to
strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a
peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies
have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than
once 5ahkara also refers to the opinion of ' another,' viz.,
commentator of the Sutras, and in several places vSaiikara's
commentators explain that the ' other ' meant is the Vrz'tti-
kara (about whom more will be said shortly). Those
references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and
hence throw little or no light on important differences of
dogma ; but there are two remarks of ^aiikara's at any
rate which are of interest in this connexion. The one is
made with reference to Sutras 7-14 of the third pada
of the fourth adhyaya ; ' some,' he says there, ' declare those
Sutras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhanta
view, to state merely the ptirvapaksha ; ' a difference of
opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important
question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not
reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman. — And
under I, 3, 19 6'ankara, after having explained at length
that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality,
but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman,
adds the following words, 'apare tu vadina/^ paramarthikam
eva ^aiva;;/ rupam iti manyante asmadiyaj- ^'a ke/^it,' i. e.
' other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of
opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The term
' ours,' here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas
or Vedantins, and it thus appears that 5ankara himself

INTRODUCTION. XXI

was willing to class under the same category himself and
philosophers who — as in later times the Ramanii^s and
others — looked upon the individual soul as not due to the
fictitious limitations of Mayi, but as real in itself; whatever
may be the relation in which they considered it to stand
to the highest Self.

From what precedes it follows that the Vedantins of the
school to which vSaiikara himself belonged acknowledged
the existence of Vedantic teaching of a type essentially
different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire
whether the Ramanu^a system, which likewise claims to be
Vedanta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any
title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a
respectable tradition.

It appears that Ramanu^a claims — and by Hindu writers
is generally admitted — to follow in his bhashya the autho-
rity of Bodhayana, who had composed a vr/tti on the
Sutras. Thus we read in the beginning of the .Sri-bhashya
(Pajidit, New Series, VII, p. 163), ' Bhagavad-bodhayana-
krz'ta;// vistir;/am brahmasutra-vr/tti;;,; purvi/^arya/^ sawZ'i-
kshipus tanmatanusare/^a sutrakshara/H vyakhyasyante.'
Whether the Bodhayana to whom that vr/tti is ascribed is to
be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sutra, and other
works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient vr/tti
on the Sutras connected with Bodhayana's name actually
existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short quotations
from it are met with in a few places of the 5ri-bhashya, and,
as we have seen above, vSankara's commentators state that
their author's polemical remarks are directed against the
Vn'ttikara. In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanu^a appeals to
quite a series of ancient teachers — purvaZ'aryds — who carried
on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedanta and
the meaning of the Sutras. In the Vedarthasaiigraha
— a work composed by Ramanu^a himself — we meet in one
place with the enumeration of the following authorities :
Bodhayana, T^aiika, Drami^a, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu/^i,
and quotations from the writings of some of these are not
unfrequent in the Vedarthasaiigraha, as well as the Sri-

Xxii VEDANTA-st}TRAS.

bhashya. The author most frequently quoted is Dramic/a \
who composed the DramiVa-bhashya ; he is sometimes
referred to as the bhashyakara. Another writer repeatedly
quoted as the vakyakara is, I am told ", to be identified with
the Taiika mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in
this place the information concerning the relative age of
these wi-iters which may be.derived from the oral tradition
of the Ram^nu^a sect. From another source, however, we
receive an intimation that Dramic/aMrya or Dravi^a/('arya
preceded ^ankara in point of time. In his /ika on Sa.n-
kara's bhashya to the AV/andogya Upanishad III, lo, 4,
Anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to
reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the
teaching of Smr/ti on the same point is a reproduction of
the analogous attempt made by the DravifT^a/C'arya.

It thus appears that that special interpretation of the
Ved^nta-sutras with which the ^ri-bhashya makes us
acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of
Ramanu^a, but had authoritative representatives already
at a period anterior to that of 5ankara. This latter point,
moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation
in which the so-called Ramanu^a sect stands to earlier
sects. What the exact position of Ramanu^a was, and of
what nature were the reforms that rendered him so pro-
minent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly
known at present ; at the same time it is generally acknow-
ledged that the Ramanu^as are closely connected with the
so-called Bhagavatas or Pa;//('aratras, who are known to
have existed already at a very early time. This latter point
is proved by evidence of various kinds ; for our present purpose
it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpre-
tation of the most authoritative commentators, the last

' The name of this writer is sometimes given as Drami^/a, sometimes as
Drant/a. In the opinion of Pa«</it Rama Mi^ra Gastrin of the Benares
College — himself a Ramanii^a and thoroughly conversant with the books and
traditions of his sect — the form ' Drami(/a' is the correct one.

'■' Viz. by Pa«(/it Rama Miira ^'astrin. As the Vandit intends himself to
publish all the traditional information he possesses concerning the history of
the Bhagavatas and Ramanu^as, I limit myself in the text to stating the most
relevant results of my study of the 6'ri-bhashya and the Vedarthasangraha.

INTRODUCTION. XXUl

Sutras of the second pada of the second adhyaya (Vedanta-
sutras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhagavatas — which
tenet forms part of the Ramanu^a system also — viz. that
the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyuha)
as Vasudeva, Sahkarsha;/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those
four forms being identical with the highest Self, the indi-
vidual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle
of egoity (ahahkara). Whether those Sutras embody an
approval of the tenet referred to, as Ramanu^a maintains,
or are meant to impugn it, as .Sahkara thinks ; so much is
certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the
Bhagavatas, the direct forerunners of the Ramanu^'-as, are
mentioned in the Sutras themselves, and hence must not
only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree
of importance at the time when the Sutras were composed.
And considering the general agreement of the systems of
the earlier Bhagavatas and the later Ramanu^as, we have
a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also
in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras.

The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to
think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to
enquire how Ramanu^a interprets the Sutras, and wherein
he differs from vSahkara. This in fact seems clearly to be
the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt
at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scho-
liasts to the meaning of the Sutras themselves. A full and
exhaustive comparison of the views of the two com-
mentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the space
which can here be devoted to that task, and will, moreover,
be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete
Sanskrit text of the 5ri-bhashya has been printed, and thus
made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is
possible, and — as said before — even urged upon a translator
of the Sutras to compare the interpretations, given by the
two bhashyakaras, of those Sutras, which, more than others,
touch on the essential points of the Vedanta system ^ This

' Owing to the importance of the .Sankara-bhashya as the fundamental work
of the most influential Hindu school of philosophy, the number of topics which
miyht be discussed in the introduction to its translation is considerable, liut

XXIV VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full
review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/ms of the
Vedanta-sutras, according to ^ankara ; a review which —
apart from the side-glances at Ramanu^a's comments —
will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the
5ankara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that
task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the
philosophical systems of wSaiikara as well as of Ramanu^a,
which may be referred to when, later on, discrepancies
between the two commentators will be noted. In these
sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and
not enter into any details. Of 6"ankara's system we possess
as it is more than one trustworthy exposition ; it may
suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Vedanta, in
which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be
learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and
faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads
which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid
sketch of the 5ankara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-
bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers
belonging to 5ankara's school. With regard to Ramanu^a's
philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ram^nu^a
chapter in the Sarvadari-a;/asa;;/graha ; the short sketch
about to be given is founded altogether on the ^'ri-
bhashya itself.

What in ^aiikara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is
shortly as follows. — Whatever is, is in reality one ; there
truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or
Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an abso-
lutely homogeneous nature ; it is pure ' Being,' or, which
comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/^aitanya.

the limitation of the space at our disposal necessitates a selection, and it can
hardly be doubted that, among the possible tasks of a translator, that of
ascertaining how far the teaching of ^ahkara agrees with that of Badaraya;/a,
and, further, how far either of them represents the true doctrine of the
Upanishads, is the one first to be taken in hand. — Some other topics, such as a
detailed account of ^"ahkara's teaching according to the bhashya, an enquiry as
to the books and authors quoted by .S'ahkara, &c., have, moreover, been treated
not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his ' System des
Vedanta.'

INTRODUCTION. XXV

gnana.). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of
Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance ;
Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It
is absolutely destitute of qualities ; whatever qualities or
attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it, — But,
if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence
the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves
surrounded, and in which we ourselves exist as individual
beings ? — Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a
certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance
of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called
* being ' (sat), for ' being ' is only Brahman ; nor can it be
called ' non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate
produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a prin-
ciple of illusion ; the undefinable cause owing to which there
seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct
individual existences. Being associated with this principle
of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of
the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his
incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory ap-
pearances of animate and inanimate beings. May^ thus
constitutes the upadana, the material cause of the world ; or
— if w^e wish to call attention to the circumstance that
Maya belongs to Brahman as a sakti — we may say that
the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it
is associated with Maya. In this latter quality Brahman is
more properly called Isvara, the Lord.

Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by
a progressive evolution into all the individual existences
(bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of
which the world consists ; from it there spring in due
succession the different material elements and the whole
bodily apparatus belonging to sentient beings. In all
those apparently individual forms of existence the one
indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular
adjuncts into which M^ya has specialised itself, it appears
to be broken up — it is broken up, as it were — into a multi-
plicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called
^ivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each

XXvi VEDANTA-sCtTRAS.

^iva is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole
aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental
functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and
distinguish one ^iva from another, is the offspring of Maya
and as such unreal.

The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience
(vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls
engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of
tlie external material objects with which those cognitions
and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions
nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word,
for both are altogether due to Maya. But at the same
time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain
Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever
truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas
to which no external objects correspond ; for external
things, although not real in the strict sense of the word,
enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional
acts whose objects they are.

The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and
beyond Maya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true
nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it
blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the
fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true
Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ
(manas), i. e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul,
which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite,
thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in
knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through
its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the
consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of
future embodied existences, the Lord — as a retributor and
dispenser — allotting to each soul that form of embodiment
to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end
of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord
retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is
dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the
individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion
with upadhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the

INTRODUCTION. XXVll

consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted,
they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as
the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old
round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all
eternity as it has lasted from all eternity.

The means of escaping from this endless sawsara, the way
out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened
soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmakauda. indeed,
whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead
to final release ; for even the most meritorious works
necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And
in the ^//anakaz/^^a of the Veda also two different parts
have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and
passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the
world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i. e. of
Ij-vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts
which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman tran-
scending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the
individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout medi-
tation on Brahman as suggested by passages of the former
kind does not directly lead to final emancipation ; the
pious worshipper passes on his death into the world of
the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as
a distinct individual soul — although in the enjoyment of
great power and knowledge — until at last he reaches the
highest knowledge, and, through it, final release. — That
student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose soul has
been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher know-
ledge of Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying,
' That art thou,' have taught that there is no difference
between his true Self and the highest Self, obtains at the
moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he withdraws
altogether from the influence of Maya, and asserts himself
in his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute
highest Brahman.

Thus vSahkara. — According to Ramanu^a, on the other
hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised
as follows. — There exists only one all-embracing being called
Brahman or the highest Self or the Lord. This being is

xxviii vedanta-sOtras.

not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all
imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not ' intelligence,' — as
5arikara maintains, — but intelligence is its chief attribute.
The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-
merciful ; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil.
He contains within himself whatever exists. While, accord-
ing to 5ankara, the only reality is to be found in the non-
qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only be
defined as pure ' Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a
mere illusion; Brahman — according to Ramanu^a's view —
comprises within itself distinct elements of plurality which
all of them lay claim to absolute reality of one and the same
kind. Whatever is presented to us by ordinary experience,
viz. matter in all its various modifications and the individual
souls of difi"erent classes and degrees, are essential real
constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/^it
and /('it) constitute, according to Ramanu^a's terminology,
the body of the Lord ; they stand to him in the same
relation of entire dependence and subserviency in which
the matter forming an animal or vegetable body stands to
its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and
rules all things which exist — material or immaterial — as
their antaryamin ; the fundamental text for this special
Ramanu^a tenet — which in the writings of the sect is
quoted again and again — is the so-called antaryamin brah-
ma«a (Brz. Up. Ill, 7) which says, that within all elements,
all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls,
there abides an inward ruler whose body those elements,
sense-organs, and individual souls constitute. — Matter and
souls as forming the body of the Lord are also called
modes of him (prakara). They are to be looked upon as his
eff"ects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual exist-
ence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be
entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in
two different, periodically alternating, conditions. At some
times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not
possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known,
and there is then no distinction of individual name and
form. Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta) ; the

INTRODUCTION. XXIX

individual sovils are not joined to material bodies, and their
intellieence is in a state of contraction, non-manifestation
(saiiko/'a). This is the pralaya state which recurs at the end
of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in its causal
condition (kara;/avastha). To that state all those scriptural
passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as
being in the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman
then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself
matter and souls in a germinal condition ; but as in that
condition they are so subtle as not to allow of individual
distinctions being made, they are not counted as something
second in addition to Brahman. — When the pralaya state
comes to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of
volition on the Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then
passes over into its other condition ; it becomes gross and
thus acquires all those sensible attributes, visibility, tangi-
bility, and so on, which are known from ordinary experience.
At the same time the souls enter into connexion with
material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or
demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence ;
their intelligence at the same time undergoes a certain
expansion (vika^a). The Lord, together with matter in its
gross state and the ' expanded ' souls, is Brahman in the
condition of an effect (karyavastha). Cause and effect are
thus at the bottom the same ; for the effect is nothing but
the cause which has undergone a certain change (pari-
;/ama). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known
likewise.

Owing to the effects of their former actions the indi-
vidual souls are implicated in the sa^/zsara, the endless
cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which
is to be obtained only through the study of the ^/7ana-
kanda. of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of
the karmaka;/^a does not lead outside the sawsara ; but
he w^ho, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes — and
meditates on — him in the way prescribed by the Upani-
shads reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he
passes through the different stages of the path of the
gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an

XXX VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

everlasting blissful existence from which there is no re-
turn into the sphere of transmigration. The character-
istics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman ;
it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and
powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and
retract the entire world.

The chief points in which the two systems sketched
above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other
may be shortly stated as follows. — Both systems teach
advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not
several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the pra-
kr/ti and the purushas of the Saiikhyas, but there exists
only one all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita
taught by vSahkara is a rigorous, absolute one, Ramanu^a's
doctrine has to be characterised as vixish/a advaita, i. e.
qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. Ac-
cording to ^ahkara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman
itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and
plurality must be illusory. According to Ramanu^a also,
whatever is, is Brahman ; but Brahman is not of a homo-
geneous nature, but contains within itself elements of
plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a
diversified world. The world with its variety of material
forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Maya,
but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing
the universal Self. The Brahman of ^ahkara is in itself
impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought,
transcending all attributes ; a personal God it becomes
only through its association with the unreal principle of
Maya, so that — strictly speaking — ^ahkara's personal God,
his ij'vara, is himself something unreal. Ramanu^a's Brah-
man, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the
all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated
and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for
the distinction between a param nirguwam and an apara;/^
sagu;^am brahma, between Brahman and Ij-vara. — .Sah-
kara's individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by
the unreal upadhis due to Maya. The individual soul of
Ramanu^a, on the other hand, is really individual ; it has

INTRODUCTION. XXXI

indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brah-
man, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal exist-
ence and will remain a personality for ever. — The release
from saw/sara means, according to vSankara, the absolute
merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dis-
missal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct
from Brahman ; according to Ramanfi^a it only means
the soul's passing from the troubles of earthly Hfe into
a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever
in undisturbed personal bliss. — As Ramanu^a does not
distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction
of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for
him ; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but
essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one
result only ^.

I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents
of the Vedanta-SLitras according to ^"ahkara in which at the
same time all the more important points concerning which
Ramanu^a disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to
enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it
is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that
we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding
the comparative value of the different modes of interpreta-
tion which have been applied to the Sutras. The line of
investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present
nothing can be taken for granted or known. — In stating the
different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara;^as),
each of which comprises one or more Sutras, I shall follow
the subdivision into adhikarawas adopted in the Vyasadhika-
ra;/amala, the text of which is printed in the second volume
of the Bibliothcca Indica edition of the Sutras.

• The only ' sectarian ' feature of the 5rl-bhashya is, that it identifies Brahman
with Vish;m or Narayawa ; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on
the Sutras and Upanishads. Naraya«a is in fact nothing but another name of
Brahman.

XXxIi VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

FIRST ADHYAYA.

Pada I.

The first five adhikara;/as lay down the fundamental
positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (i)^ treats of
what the study of the Vedanta presupposes. Adhik. II
(2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates,
and so on. Adhik. Ill (3) declares that Brahman is the
source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be
the uniform topic of all Vedanta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11)
is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brah-
man, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of
the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be iden-
tified with the non-intelligent pradhana from which the
world springs according to the Saiikhyas.

With the next adhikara;/a there begins a series of dis-
cussions of essentially similar character, extending up to
the end of the first adhyaya. The question is throughout
whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote
Brahman or some other being, in most cases the ^iva, the
individual soul. .Sankara remarks at the outset that, as the
preceding ten Sutras had settled the all-important point
that all the Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman, the question
now arises why the enquiry should be continued any fur-
ther, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknow-
ledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all
qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities
necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts
of prima facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brah-
man as the object of devout meditation, or the higher
Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an
investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion
of the first adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the
Sutras nor even from vS'arikara's own treatment of the Vedic

* The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara^a ; the figures
in parentheses state the Sutras comprised in each adhikara«a.

INTRODUCTION. XXXIII

texts referred to in the Sutras. In I, i, 20, for instance, the
question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere
of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured
eyes — of whom the AV/andogya Upanishad speaks in I, 6, 6
— is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the
highest Lord. 5ahkara's answer is that the passage refers
to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers,
manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Maya. So that
according to 6"ahkara himself the alternative lies between
the sagu//a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not
between the sagu;/a Brahman and the nirgu;^a Brahman.

Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the ananda-
maya, mentioned in Taittiriya Upanishad II, 5, is merely
a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. vS'ah-
kara begins by explaining the Sutras on the latter suppo-
sition— and the text of the Siatras is certainly in favour of
that interpretation — gives, however, finally the preference to
a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to
which the Siatras teach that the anandamaya is not Brah-
man, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is
the tail or support of the anandamaya ^ — Ramanu^a's in-
terpretation of Adhikara;^a VI, although not agreeing in
all particulars with the former explanation of vSahkara, yet
is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the ananda-
maya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while
5ahkara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of
interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question
whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not,
Ramanu^a separates the adhikarawa from the subsequent
part of the pada and connects it with what had preceded.
In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be

* Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying the second
interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two objections. In the first place,
the passage is accepted and explained by all commentators ; in the second
place, .S'ankara in the passage immediately preceding Sutra 12 quotes the
adhikarawa ' anandamayo^^bhyasat' as giving rise to a discussion whether the
param or the aparam brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched
upon at all in that part of the bhashya which sets forth the former explanation,
but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates the
latter interpretation.

[34] C

XXxiv VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

identified with the pradhana ; Adhik. VI shows that it is
dififerent from the individual soul, and the proof of the
fundamental position of the system is thereby completed ^ — ■
Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person
seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye,
mentioned in KJi. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul
of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman. — Adhik. VIII
(22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to
Kh. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether
has to be understood but the highest Brahman. — Adhik.
IX (23). The pra;/a also mentioned in Kh. Up. I, n, 5
denotes the highest Brahman ^. — Adhik. X (24-27) teaches
that the light spoken of in Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7 is not the
ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman ^. — Adhik.
XI (28-31) decides that the pra;/a mentioned in Kau. Up.
IIIj 2 is Brahman.

Pad A II.

Adiiik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of
mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in KJi. Up.
Ill, 14. is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The
Sutras of this adhikara;^a emphatically dwell on the dif-
ference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence
vSahkara is obliged to add an explanation — in his comment
on Sutra 6 — to the effect that that difference is to be under-
stood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts
of the highest Self.- — The comment of Ramanu^a through-
out closely follows the words of the Sutras ; on Sutra 6
it simply remarks that the difterence of the highest Self

* Evaw ^i,^«asitasya brahma«aj /('etanabhog)'abhuta^afl'arripasattvara_j-astamo-
mayapradhanad \'j^avr2'ttir ukta, idaniw karmavajyat trigii«atinakaprak;-?ti-
sawsarganimittauanavidhanantadukhasagaranima^'j^anenajuddha^ kSi pratya-
gatmano^nyan nikhilaheyapratyanika/« niratuayanandam brahmeti pratipa-
dyate, anandamayo ^ bhyasat.

^ There is no reason to consider the passage ' atra ke/tit ' in 5'ankara's
bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply
contains a criticism passed by .Sahkara on other commentators.

^ To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen
thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the
preceding note.

INTRODUCTION. XXXV

from the individual soul rests thereon that the former
as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works
in the same way as the soul is\ — Adhik. II (9, 10) decides
that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but
food (Ka///a Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.— Adhik. Ill
(11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka//^a
Up. I, 3, i) are Brahman and the individual souP. — Adhik.
IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned
in KJi. Up. IV, 15, I is Brahman. — Adhik. V (18-20) shows
that the ruler within (antaryamin) described in Brz. Up. Ill,
7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20 clearly enounces the difference
of the individual soul and the Lord ; hence 6"ankara is
obliged to remark that that difference is not real. — Adhik.

VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c.,
mentioned in Muw^aka Up. I, i, 3 is Brahman. — Adhik.

VII (24-32) shows that the atman vaii-vanara of Kh. Up. V,
II, 6 is Brahman.

Pada III.

Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven,
the earth, &c. are woven QAwnd. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman. —
Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhuman referred to in Kh.
Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.— Adhik. Ill (10-12) teaches that
the Imperishable in which, according to B/'/. Up. Ill, 8, 8,
the ether is woven is Brahman. — Adhik. IV (13) decides
that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with
the syllable Om, according to Prajna Up. V, 5, is not the

' Civasya iva parasyapi brahma«a/4 i'arirantarvartitvam abhyupagataw /^et
tadvad eva jarirasambandhaprajTiktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir iti ^en na,
hetuvaijeshyat, na hi larirantarvaititvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetu,^ api
tu puwyapaparupakarmaparava^atvaw ta^ Hpahatapapmana/i paramatmano
na sambhavati.

* The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the Sanskrit text (beginning
with apara aha) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the
reference to the Paingi-upanishad in ^ankara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232).
But there is no reason whatever for such an assumption. The passage on
p. 232 shows that ^ankara considered the explanation of tlie mantra given in
the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case
of its ha\nng been quoted before by ^'ankara himself. — That the ' apara ' quotes
the Br/hadara«yaka not according to the Ka«va text — to quote from which is
.Sahkara's habit — but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circum-
stance of his being an ' apara,' i.e. not .5'ankara.

C 2

XXXvi VEPANTA-StjTRAS.

lower but the higher Brahman. — According to Ramanu^a
the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahma (^ivasa-
mash/irupoi;/<'/adhipatij- /^aturmukha/^). — Adhik. V and VI
(comprising, according to 6"ahkara, Sutras 14-21) ^ discuss
the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the
heart mentioned in KJi. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether
or the individual soul or Brahman ; the last alternative
being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative
the purvapakshin pleads the two passages Kh. Up. VIII,
3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasada) ;
for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood,
and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part,
there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness
from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII,
I, of the small ether within the heart. — But the reply to
this is. that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary)
individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true
nature has become manifest, i. e. in which it is Brahman ; so
that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called
individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the
two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account,
but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest
Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests
itself in its true nature. — What Ramanu^a understands by
the avirbhava of the soul will appear from the remarks on
IV. 4.

The two next Sutras (22, 23) constitute, according to
vSahkara, a new adhikara;za (VII), proving that he ' after
whom everything shines^ by whose light all this is lighted '
(Ka//^a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some material luminous body, but
Brahman itself.- — According to Rdmanu^a the two Sutras
do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further
arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the
preceding Sutras 2.

* Sutras 14-2 1 are divided into two adhikarawas by the Adhikarawaratnamala,
but really constitute a simple adhikara;/a only.

^ Itaj ^aitad evam. Anukr/tes tasya /ta. Tasya daharakarasya parabrahma«o
mukarad ayam apahatapapmatvadigu«ako vimuktabandha/^ pratyagatma na
daharakira/i tadanukaras tatsamyaw tatha hi pratyagatmanoipi vimuktasya

INTRODUCTION. XXXVU

Adhik. VIII (24, 25} decides that the person of the size
of a thumb mentioned in Ka/Z/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the
individual soul but Brahman.

The two next adhikara;,?as are of the nature of a dieres-
sion. The passage about the ahgush/Z^amatra was explained
on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a
span ; the question may then be asked whether also such
individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more
particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of
Brahman : a question finally answered in the affirmative. —
This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions,
among which the most important one refers to the problem
in what relation the different species of beings stand to the
words denoting them (Sutra 28). In connexion herewith
^"ankara treats of the nature of words {sa.hda.), opposing the
opinion of the Mimawsaka Upavarsha, according to whom
the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive
letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over
and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-
sensuous entity called ' spho/a,' which is the direct cause of
the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX ; Sutras

26-33)-

Adhik. X (34-38) explains that 5udras are altogether

disqualified for Brahmavidya.

Sutra 39 constitutes, according to ^aiikara, a new adhi-

karawa (XI\ proving that the pra;/a in which everything

trembles, according to Ka//^a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman. —

According to Ramanu^a the Sutra does not introduce a new

topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the

parabrahmanukara/z jruyate yada p&sya/i paj-yate rukmavar«aw kartaram isam
piirashaw brahmayoni;« tada vidvan puwyapape vidhuya nira;/_o-ana/; paramaw
samyam upaitity ato^nukarta pra^apativakyanirdish/'a/i anukarya;;/ paraw
brahma na daharakaja//. Api ka. smaryate. Sawsariz/o ^ pi muktavasthayaw
paramasamyapattilaksha«a// parabrahmanukara/^ smaryate idaw g/ta.nam
upaJiitya, &c. — KeZ-id anukr/tes tasya Hpi smaryate iti ka siitradvayam adhi-
kara«antara/« tarn eva bhantam anubhati sarvaw tasya bhasa sarvam k\a//i
vibhality asya-4 sr\ite/i parabrahmaparatvanirwayaya pravrzttaw vadanti. Tat
tv adr/jyatvadigu«ako dharmokte/i dyubhvadyayatanaw svaj'abdad ity adhi-
kara«advayena tasya prakara«asya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat cryoHs/ca.-
ra«abhidhanat ity adishu parasya brahmawo bliarCipatvavagateJ- /ca. pui-vapaksha-
nutthanad ayukta/« sutiaksharavaiiupya^' .^a.

XXXviii VEDANTA-sfTRA?;.

decision arrived at under Sutras 24, 25, viz. that the arij^ush-
//"amatra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sutras 24-39 foi'm
one adhikara/Ai in which 26-3<S constitute a mere digression
led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.— The
ahgush///amatra is referred to twice in the Ka///a Upanishad,
once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17
(' the Person not larger than a thumb '). To determine
what is meant by the ahgushz/^amatra, Ramanu^a says, we
are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2. 3, which is intermediate
between the two passages concerning the ahgush/Z^amatra,
and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which
alone everything can be said to stand in awe.

The next Sutra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of
opinion. According to .Sankara it constitutes by itself a
new adhikara;/a (XII). proving that the ' light ' (,^yotis)
mentioned in Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.
— According to Ramanu^a the Sutra continues the pre-
ceding adhikara;^a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived
at by a further argument, referring to Ka///a Up. IL 5, 15
— a passage intermediate between the two passages about
the ahgush/'/zamatra — which speaks of a primary light that
cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sutra has in
that case to be translated as follows : ' (The ahgush///a-
matra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening be-
tween the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can
be Brahman only).'

The three last Sutras of the pada are, according to
wSahkara,to be divided into two adhikarawas (XIII and XIV),
Sutra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and
forms (AV/. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but
Brahman ; and 42, 43 teaching that the vi^;7anamaya, ' he
who consists of knowledge,' of Br/. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the
individual soul but Brahman. — According to Ramanu^j^a
the three Sutras make up one single adhikarawa discussing
whether the AV/andogya Upanishad passage about the
ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the
-State of release ; the latter of these two alternatives being
suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the
subject of the passage immediately preceding (' Shaking off

INTRODUCTION. XXXIX

all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sutra 41
decides that ' the ether (is Brahman) because the passage
designates the nature of something else,' &c. (i.e. of some-
thing other than the individual soul ; other because to the
soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed,
&c.) — But, an objection is raised, does not more than one
scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman
are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals
names and forms the soul as well as Brahman ? — (The two,
Sutra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the states of
deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as
different' (from the soul) — which point is proved by the
same scriptural passages which ^Sankara adduces ; — and
' because such terms as Lord and the like ' cannot be
applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to
IV, 4, 14, where all ^agadvyapara is said to belong to the
Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of
release.

Pada IV.

The last pada of the first adhyaya is specially directed
against the S^iikhyas.

The first adhikara;^a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka///a
Up. I, 3, 10 ; II, where mention is made of the Great and
the Undeveloped — both of them terms used with a special
technical sense in the Sahkhya-j-astra, avyakta being a
synonym for pradhana. — ^'ahkara shows by an exhaustive
review of the topics of the Ka/Z:a Upanishad that the term
avyakta has not the special meaning which the Saiikhyas
attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the
subtle body (sukshma j-arira), but at the same time the
gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the
subtle one.

Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to 5ahkara, that
the tricoloured a^^ spoken of in Sve. Up. IV, 5 is not the
pradhana of the Sahkh3'-as, but either that power of the
Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary
causal matter first produced by that power. — What Rama-

xl VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

nii_^a in contradistinction from ^arikara understands by the
primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given
above of the two systems.

Adhik. Ill (11-13) shows that the pa;7/'a pauka^-ana/i
mentioned in Br/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five
principles of the S^rikhyas. — Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that
Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important
point of Brahman, i. e. a being whose essence is intelligence,
being the cause of the world.

Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to vSankara, meant to
prove that ' he who is the maker of those persons, of whom
this is the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not
either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman. —
The subject of the adhikarawa is essentially the same in
Ramanu^a's view ; greater stress is, however, laid on the
adhikarawa being polemical against the Sahkhyas, who
wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradhdna
doctrine.

The same partial difference of view is observable with
regard to the next adhikarawa (VI ; Sutras 19-22) which
decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (Br/. Up.
II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This
latter passage also is, according to Rdm^nu^a, made the
subject of discussion in order to rebut the S^iikhya w^ho is
anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object
of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sahkhya
purusha.

Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only
the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but
its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman
by way of modification (pari;/ima ; Sutra 26). — Ramanu^a
view^s this adhikarawa as specially directed against the
Seivara-sahkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a
highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent
pradhana on which the Lord acts as an operative cause
merely.

Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the
Sahkhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as
the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.

INTRODUCTION. xl

XII

After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhydya
and the succinct indication of the most important points in
which the views of ^arikara and Ram^nu^a diverge, we
turn to a short consideration of two questions which here
naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the prin-
ciple on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sutras
have been selected and arranged ; and, secondly, if, where
6"ahkara and Rdmanu^a disagree as to the subdivision of
the Sutras into Adhikara;/as, and the determination of the
Vedic passages discussed in the Sutras, there are to be met
with any indications enabling us to determine which of the
two commentators is right. (The more general question as
to how far the Sutras favour either vSahkara's or Rama-
nu^a's general views cannot be considered at present.)

The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to
point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic
passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a
certain other one. Their explanations — which have occa-
sionally been referred to in the notes to the translation —
rest on the assumption that the Sutrakara in arranging the
texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities
of the Mima?«si-system, especially by a regard for the
various so-called means of proof which the Mimawsaka
employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning
and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the
guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a
simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to
in the first adhyaya, such as given by Devissen on page 130;
for from the latter it appears that the order in which the
Sutras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in
which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads,
and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that
order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various
prama//as of the Mimawsa in their due systematic suc-
cession.

As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages dis-
cussed are taken from the /^//andogya Upanishad, so many
indeed that the whole first adhyaya may be said to consist
of a discussion of all those AV^andogya passages of which it

xlii VEDANTA-SITRAS.

is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or
not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in
wherever an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent
position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it
hkely that the Sutrakara meant to begin the series of
doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the
AV/andogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara;/a which
treats of the anandamaya mentioned in the Taittiriya
Upanishad has, in agreement with Ramanu^a's views, to be
separated from the subsequent adhikarawas, and to be com-
bined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down
the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.
— The remaining adhikara;/as of the first pada follow the
order of passages in the AV/andogya Upanishad, and there-
fore call for no remark ; v>'ith the exception of the last
adhikarawa, which refers to a Kaushitaki passage, for whose
being introduced in this place I am not able to account. —
The first adhikarawa of the second pada returns to the
AV/andogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage
in the Ka/Z/a Upanishad where a being is referred to which
eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in
this place seems to be correctly assigned in the vSri-bhashya,
which remarks that, as in the preceding Sutra it had been
argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt
arises whether by that being which eats everything the
highest Self can be meant ^. — The third adhikara;/a again,
whose topic is the ' two entered into the cave ' (Ka///a Up.
I, 3, 1), appears, as Ramanu^a remarks, to come in at this
place owing to the preceding adhikara;/a ; for if it could
not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a
doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the
' eater,' since the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater'
stand under the same prakara;/a, and must therefore be
held to refer to the same matter. — The fourth adhikara;/a
is again occupied with a AV/andogya passage. — The fifth
adhikara;/a, whose topic is the Ruler within (antaryamin),
manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Ramanu^a also.

* Yadi paramatma na bhokta eva/« tarhi bhoktrztaya pratiyamano ^iva eva
syad ity asankyaha atta.

INTRODUCTION. xl

Xllll

to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed
in the preceding adhikara;/a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of
strengthening the argument \ — The sixth adhikara;/a, again,
which discusses ' that wiiich is not seen' (adrej-ya ; Muud. Up.
I, 1 , 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the pre-
ceding adhikara;/a it had been said that adr/sh/a, &c. denote
the highest Self. — The reasons to which the last adhikarawa
of the second pada and the first and third adhikarawas of the
third pada owe their places are not apparent (the second
adhikara;/a of the third pada treats of a AV/andogya passage).
The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the
Prajna Upanishad treating of the akshara 07//kara is clearly
due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature,
had been discussed in the preceding adhikarawa. — The fifth
and sixth adhikara;/as investigate AV/andogya passages. —
The two next Sutras (22, 23) are, as remarked above, con-
sidered by vSahkara to constitute a new aclhikara;/a treating
of the ' being after which everything shines '(Mu«<^. Up. II, 2,
10); while Ramanu^a looks on them as continuing the sixth
adhikarawa. There is one circumstance which renders it at
any rate probable that Ramanu^a. and not ^aiikara, here
hits the intention of the author of the Sutras. The general
rule in the first three padas is that, wherever a new Vedic
passage is meant to be introduced, 'the subject of the dis-
cussion, i. e. that being which in the end is declared to be
Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most
cases a nominative form ^. From this rule there is in the
preceding part of the adhyaya only one real exception, viz.
in I, 2, I, which possibly may be due to the fact that there
a new pada begins, and it therefore was considered super-

' Sthanadivyapadera/6 ia ity atra ya/i /C'akshushi tish///ann ity adina prati-
padyamanaw X-akshushi slhitiniyamanadikaw paramatmana eveti siddhaw
krttvj. akshipurushasya paramatmatvaw sadhitam idaniw tad eva samarthayate
antarya°.

^ Arandamaya/^ I, i, 12 ; anta/i I, i, 20 ; akasa/i I. i, 22 ; prana// I, r, 23 ;
^yotiA I, I, 24; prana/i I, i, 2S ; atta I, ?, 9 ; guhaw pravish/au I, 2, 1 1 ;
antara I, 2, 13 ; antaryami I, 2, 18 ; adr/j-yatvadigii;/aka/; I, 2, 21 ; vai^fvanara//
I, 2, 24 ; dyubhvadyayatanam I, 3, i ; bhiima I, 3, 8 ; aksharam I, 3, 10 ; sa//
I, 3, 13; dahara/^ I, 3, 14; pramita/i I, 3, 24; (^yoti/t I, 3, 40;) a.ka.sa./i I,
3.41-

xllv VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

fluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a
special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only
an apparent one ; for, as remarked above, Sutra 19 does not
in reality begin a new adhikara;/a. A few exceptions
occurring later on will be noticed in their places. — Now
neither Sutra 22 nor Sutra 23 contains any word intimating
that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration,
and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with
Ramanu^^a, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhika-
rawa. — This conclusion receives an additional confirmation
from the position of the next adhikaraz/a, which treats of
the being ' a span long' mentioned in Ka//^a Up. II, 4, 12 ;
for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is
almost certainly the reference to the alpa^-ruti in Sutra 21,
and, if so, the aiigushZ/^amatra properly constitutes the sub-
ject of the adhikara;/a immediately following on Adhik. V,
VI ; which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form
an independent adhikara;/a. — The two next adhikarawas are
digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages. —
Sutra 39 forms a new adhikara;^a, according to ^ahkara, but
not according to Ramanu^a, whose opinion seems again to be
countenanced by the fact that the Sutra does not exhibit
any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of
opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from
the translation of the Sutra given above, according to
Ramanu^^a's view, that '^yotUi' need not be taken as a nomi-
native.— The last two adhikara;/as finally refer, according to
Ramanu^a, to one AV/andogya passage only, and here also
we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not comprise any word
intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.

From all this we seem entitled to draw the following
conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three
first padas of the Vedanta-sutras comprise all the doubtful
— or at any rate all the more important doubtful — passages
from the A"//andogya Upanishad. These passages are
arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad
exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are dis-
cussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special
reason why a certain K/iandogya. passage is followed by

INTRODUCTION. xlv

a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those
reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a num-
ber of cases although not in all, and from among those
passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily ac-
counted for some are eliminated by our following the
subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/ms adopted by
Ramanu^a, a subdivision countenanced by the external
form of the Sutras.

The fourth pada of the first adh}-aya has to be taken
by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against
Sahkhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier
part which discusses isolated passages, but also — as is
brought out much more clearly in the ^ri-bhashya than by
wSahkara — in its latter part which takes a general survey
of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the
material as well as the operative cause of the world.

Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the
Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of
Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one.
But this reproach rests on the assumption that the pas-
sages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the
purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this
assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras
as well as the Purva Mima;;/sa-sutras are throughout IVIi-
ma7;/sd, i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as
on a prima facie view admit of different interpretations
and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their mean-
ing. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not
directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular
Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some
important point. But those cases are rare, and it would
be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to
assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the
task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is suf-
ficiently determined in the first fiv'e (or six) adhikarawas ;
but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once
confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning
which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not.
With their discussion all the remaining adhikara;/as of the

xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS

first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta-sutras
view it as a particularly important task to controvert the
doctrine of the Sahkhyas is patent (and has also been fully
pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth adhikara/za
already declares itself against the doctrine that the world
has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana,
and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an
express polemic against Sarikhya interpretations of cer-
tain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying
too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyaya is
due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his
own doctrine against Saiikhya attacks. Whatever the
attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be
towards the Veda, the Sahkhya system is the only one
whose adherents were anxious — and actually attempted —
to prove that their view^s are w^arranted by scriptural pas-
sages. The Sahkhya tendency thus w^ould be to show
that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as
teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole
cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some
product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the
Sahkhya sense, i. e. the individual soul. It consequently
became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads
against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in
the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those
passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some
reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages
singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to
various interpretations ; of others it is less apparent why
it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But
this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find
fault with the Sutrakara ; for no modern scholar, either
European or Hindu, is — or can possibly be — sufficiently at
home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical
views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may
have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the in-
tricacies of the MimsLjnsa., to judge with confidence which
Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.

INTRODUCTION. xlvii

SECOND ADHYAYA.

The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts
unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the
world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that
there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to
establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially
the Sahkhya system. The task of the two first p^das of
the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may
be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely specula-
tive grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show,
again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the sys-
tems irreconcilable with the Vedanta can be satisfactorily
established.

Pada I.

Adhikara;/a I refutes the Sahkhya objection that the
acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection
of the Sahkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part
of Smrz'ti, and as such has claims on consideration. — To
accept the Sahkhya-smr/ti, the Vedantin replies, would
compel us to reject other Smr?tis. such as the Manu-smr/ti,
which are opposed to the Sahkhya doctrine. The con-
flicting claims of Smrz'tis can be settled only on the ground
of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does
not confirm the Sahkhya-smrz'ti, but rather those Smr/tis
which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent
primary cause.

Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to
the Yoga-smr/ti.

Adhik. Ill (4-1 1 ) shows that Brahman, although of the
nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-
intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated
by the quahties of the world when the latter is refunded
into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that
like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities
of effected things when the latter are refunded into their
causes — as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted

xlviii VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

and thereby become simple gold again — do not continue to
exist in those causes. — Here also the argumentation is
specially directed against the Sahkhyas, who, in order to
account for the materiality and the various imperfections
of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal sub-
stance participating in the same characteristics.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol-
lowed in the preceding adhikara;,?a is valid also against
other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, accord-
ing to vSahkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as
the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman,
and on that account identical, yet the two sets may prac-
tically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart,
and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves,
ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves,
ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither
more nor less than sea-water. — The 5ri-bhashya gives a
totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to
which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the
eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to
be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanu^a's view,
the Sutra runs as follows : ' If non-distinction (of the Lord
and the individual souls) is said to result from the circum-
stance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul),
we refute this objection by instances from every-day ex-
perience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from
our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this
w^orld springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it
follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essen-
tially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as
they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does
not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than
in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied
being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain
which his servants have to undergo. — The construction
which Ramanu^a puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either
to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the
latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears

INTRODUCTION. xl

IX

from a quotation made by Ramanu^-a from the Drami-
<'/abhashyakara \

Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the
effect from the cause ; a Vedanta doctrine which is de-
fended by its adherents against the Vaij^eshikas according
to whom the effect is something different from the cause.
— The divergent views of vSaiikara and Ramanu^a on this
important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the
general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the
Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and
the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like
the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the
entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being
the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutra-
k^ra remarks, the creative principle of the world is addi-
tional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference
of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture. — The
way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikarawa
are treated by 5ankara on the one hand and Ramanu^a on
the other is characteristic. Ramanu^a throughout simply
follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formu-
lates the objection based on such texts as ' Thou art
that,' while Sutra 22 replies that Brahman is different
from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scrip-
ture, ^ahkara. on the other hand, sees himself obliged to
add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in
Sutra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting
adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although des-
titute of material and instruments of action, may yet pro-
duce the world, just as gods by their mere power create

* Lokavat. Yatha loke ra^ajasananuvartinaw ka. ra^anugrahanigrahakr/ta-
sukhaflukhayoge=^pi na sarariratvamatrewa jasake ra^ny api .fasananuv;-?ttya-
tivr/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhoktr/tvaprasanga//. Yathaha Dramirt'abha-
shyakara/^ yalha loke ra^a pra/lniradanda^uke ghoie^narthasawka/'e ^pi
pradere vartamano^pi vya^anadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprzVyate abhipre-
taw5 ka. lokan paripipalayishati bhogawj kz gandhadin avi.fva^j;'anopabhogyan
dharayati tathasau lokc^varo bhramatsvasamarthya/'amaro doshair na .sp;-wyate
rakshati kz. lokan brahmalokadiwj Hvijva^anopabhogyan dharayatiti.

[34] d

1 vedanta-sCtras.

palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns
into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express
doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entiret}' pass
over into the world, and, although emitting the world from
itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, ac-
cording to vSahkara, because the world is unreal ; according
to Ramanu^a, because the creation is merely the visible and
tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brah-
man in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although des-
titute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the
world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, ^^) assigns the motive of the creation, or,
more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating
the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but
follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges
of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against
it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various
animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world.
Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the
merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted
from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation
by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman — omniscience
and so on — are such as to capacitate it for the creation of
the world.

Pada II.

The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments
independent of Vedic passages, the more important philo-
sophical theories concerning the origin of the world which
are opposed to the Vedanta view. — The first adhikarawa
(i-ic) is directed against the Sahkhyas, whose doctrine had
already been touched upon incidentally in several previous
places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause,
such as the pradhana of the Sahkhyas, is unable to create
and dispose. — The second adhikara;/a (11-17) refutes the

INTRODUCTION. H

Vaueshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set
in motion by the adr/sh/a. — The third and fourth adliika-
ra;/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha phi-
losophers. Adhik. Ill (18-27) impugns the view of the
so-called sarvastitvavadins, or bahyarthavadins, who main-
tain the reality of an external as well as an internal world ;
Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vi^«anavadins,
according to whom ideas are the only reality. — The last
Sutra of this adhikara;^a is treated by Ramanu^a as a
separate adhikara;/a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas,
who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing what-
ever is real. — Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doc-
trine of the G^ainas ; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philo-
sophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the
material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/za of the pada (42-45) refers, according
to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the
doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pa/I/^aratras. But 6"ahkara
and Ramanu^a totally disagree as to the drift of the
Sutrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to
the former it is condemned like the systems previously
referred to ; according to the latter it is approved of. —
Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise
objections against the system ; Sutra 42 being directed
against the doctrine that from the highest being, called
Vasudeva, there is originated Sarikarsha;/a, i.e. the ^iva,
on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would
be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity ; and Sutra
43 impugning the doctrine that from Sahkarsha;/a there
springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas. — The Sutra on which
the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally trans-
lated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their
being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction
of that.' — This means, according to 5ahkara, ' Or, if in
consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on
the part of Sahkarsha//a, &c. they be taken not as soul,
mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.),
yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection
raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).' —

d 2

lii VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

According to Ram^nu^a, on the other hand, the Sutra
has to be explained as follows : ' Or, rather there is non-
contradiction of that (i. e. the Pa/7/'aratra doctrine) on ac-
count of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account
of their being Brahman).' Which means : Since San-
karshawa and so on are merely forms of manifestation
of Brahman, the Pa/7/^aratra doctrine, according to which
they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted. — The form
of the Sutra makes it difificult for us to decide which of the
two interpretations is the right one ; it; however, appears
to me that the explanations of the 'va' and of the 'tat,'
implied in Ramanu^a's comment, are more natural than
those resulting from 5ahkara's interpretation. Nor would
it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada
with a defence of that doctrine which — in spite of objec-
tions— has to be viewed as the true one.

Pada III.

The third pada discusses the question whether the dif-
ferent forms of existence which^ in their totality, constitute
the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-
eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded
into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikara;/as treat of the five elementary
substances. — Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not
co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first
effect. — Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether ;
Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air,
water from fire, earth from water. — Adhik. Ill (9) explains
by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some
special entity, but quite generally ' that which is,' cannot
have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one
element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to
Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the rcabsorption of the
elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of
their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which

INTRODUCTION. liii

the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary sub-
stances take place is not interfered with by the creation
and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense
organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are
of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted to-
gether with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pada is taken up by a discussion of
the nature of the individual soul, the ^iva. — Adhik. X (i6)
teaches that expressions such as ' Devadatta is born,' ' De-
vadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are
transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with
a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, accord-
ing to. Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like
the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman
at the time of creation. — This Sutra is of course com-
mented on in a very different manner by ^arikara on the
one hand and Ramanu^a on the other. According to the
former, the ^iva is in reality identical — and as such co-
eternal — with Brahman ; what originates is merely the
soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that con-
nexion is moreover illusory. — According to Ramanu^a, the
^iva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in
Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as
a mode (prakara) of Brahman. So indeed have also the
material elements ; yet there is an important distinction
owing to which the elements may be said to originate at
the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the
soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist
in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the
qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary
experience ; hence, when passing over into the gross state
at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The
souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same
essential qualities, i. e. they are cognizing agents ; only,
whenever a new creation takes place, they associate
themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith
undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikaj-a),
contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (saii-

liv VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

ko^a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya.
But this change is not a change of essential nature (svaru-
panyathabhav^a). and hence we have to distinguish the souls
as permanent entities from the material elements which at
the time of each creation and reabsorption change their
essential characteristics.

Adhik. XII (i8) defines the nature of the individual soul.
The Sutra declares that the soul is '^«a.' This means,
according to ^aiikara, that intelligence or knowledge does
not, as the Vaij-eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of
the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is
the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but
knowledge ; not intelligent, but intelligence. — Ramanu^a,
on the other hand, explains '^/7a ' by ' giidLiri' i.e. knower,
knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not
only against the Vai^eshikas, but also against those philo-
sophers who — like the Sahkhyas and the Vedantins of
wSahkara's school — maintain that the soul is not a knowing
agent, but pure >^aitanya. — The wording of the Sutra cer-
tainly seems to favour Ramanu^a's interpretation ; we can
hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views
of 6"ankara should, when propounding the important dogma
of the soul's nature, use the term gn?L of which the most
obvious interpretation is gildlri, not ^;7anam.

Adhik. XIII (19-33) treats the question whether the
individual soul is a;/u, i. e. of very minute size, or omni-
present, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we
meet with diametrically opposite views. — In vS'ahkara's
opinion the Sutras 19-28 represent the purvapaksha view,
according to which the ^iva is a«u, while Sutra 29 formu-
lates the siddhanta. viz. that the ^iva, which in reality is
all-pervading, is spoken of as a//u in some scriptural passages,
because the qualities of the internal organ — which itself is
a;zu — constitute the essence of the individual soul as long
as the latter is implicated in the sawsara. — According to
Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhi-
kara;^a gives utterance to the siddhdnta view, according to
which the soul is of minute size ; the Sutras 20-25 confirm
this view and refute objections raised against it ; while the

INTRODUCTION. h

Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under
Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent
{gnd.iri) stands to knowledge (^/7ana). — In order to decide
between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations
we must enter into some details. — .Sankara maintains that
Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is
finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is
the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima
facie view is carried ; in no other place the Sutras take so
much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be re-
jected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly
feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with
the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned,
but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and
vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not
altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be
treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is
therefore whether we can, with 5ahkara, look upon Sutra 29
as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus im-
plicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul
is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that
^ahkaras interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.
Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word
' pra^wavat') the Sutra runs as follows : ' But on account of
that quality (or "those qualities ; " or else " on account of the
quality^or qualities — of that ") being the essence, (there is)
that designation (or " the designation of that").' This 6"an-
kara maintains to mean, ' Because the qualities of the
buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa;//sara state,
therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a;ni.'
Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the
explanation of the first ' tat ' by buddhi. And — which is
more important — in the second place, it is more than
doubtful whether on 6"ankara's own system the qualities
of the buddhi — such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
&c. — can with any propriety be said to constitute the
essence of the soul even in the sawsara state. The essence
of the soul in whatever state, according to 5ankara's sys-
tem, is knowledge or intelligence ; whatever is due to its

Ivi VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more
strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of Rdmanu^a's
interpretation of the adhikara;;a. He agrees with 5"arikara
in the explanation of Sutras 19-25, with this difference that
he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the
siddh^nta. Sutras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not
very different from 5ahkara's, special stress being laid on
the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a
mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the sub-
stratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise
to the question how it is that Scripture in some places
makes use of the term vi^;/ana when meaning the indi-
vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ' The soul is
designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its
essence,' i. e. because knowledge is the essential character-
istic quality of the soul, therefore the term ' knowledge ' is
employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This
latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It
closely follows the wording of the text and does not
necessitate any forced supplementation. The ' tu ' of the
Sutra which, according to 5ahkara, is meant to discard
the purvapaksha, serves on R^manu^a's view to set aside
a previously-raised objection ; an altogether legitimate
assumption.

Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara^/a (30-32),
30 explains, according to vSahkara, that the soul may be
called awu, since, as long as it exists in the sawsara con-
dition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to
Raman u^a the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called
vi^//^na because the latter constitutes its essential quality as
long as it exists. — Sutra 31 intimates, according to 5ahkara,
that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is poten-
tially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state
that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same
Sutra, according to Ram^nu^a, teaches that ^/7atr/tva is
properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature,
although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul
only. — In Sutra 32, finally, 5ahkara sees a statement of the

INTRODUCTION. Ivii

doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting
adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or perma-
nently non-cognizing; while, according to Rimanu^a, the
Sutra means that the soul would either be permanently
cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure
knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being gjikiri and
a;zu, as it is in reality). — The three Sutras can be made
to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be
noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's
connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39 ; 40) refer to the kartn'tva of
the ^iva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent.
Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according
to vSankara's system, this cannot be the final view, — the soul
being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the
world of upadhis, — he looks upon the next following Sutra
(40) as constituting an adhikara;/a by itself, and teaching
that the soul is an agent when connected with the instru-
ments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when
dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both
ways,' i. e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields
his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside. —
Ramanu^a, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Siitra
40 from the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows ;
Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul ; but
therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually
active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the
requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as
he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41,42) teaches that the soul in its activity
is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its
former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the indivi-
dual soul to Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual
soul is a part (awj-a) of Brahman, and the following Sutras
show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman
is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls,
or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of
other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely

Iviii VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.

different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of
Brahman. According to Ramanu^a the souls are in reality
parts of Brahman^; according to vSahkara the ' a/zzj-a ' of
the Sutra must be understood to mean ' amsa iva,' ' a part
as it were ; ' the one universal indivisible Brahman having
no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its
limiting adjuncts. — One Sutra (50) in this adhikara;/a
calls for special notice. According to .Sankara the words
' abhasa eva ^a. ' mean ' (the soul is) a mere reflection,'
which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the
so-called pratibimbavada, i. e. the doctrine that the so-called
individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in
the buddhi ; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called
avaHVzedavada, i. e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest
Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts. — According to
Ramanu^a the abhasa of the Sutra has to be taken in the

' Civasya kartritvaw paramapurushayattam ity uktam. Idaniw kim ayaw
giva/i parasmad atyantabhinna/; uta param eva brahma bhraiitain uta brahmaivo-
padhyava/('/('/nniiam atha brahmawxa iti saw/j^ayyate jrutivipratipatte// samsa.ya/t.
Nanu tadananyam arambhawajabdadibhya/j adhikaw tu bhedanirde^ad ity
atraivayam artho nir;nta//. Satya/;/ sa eva nanatvaikatvairutivipratipattya
^ kshipya ^ivasya brahmaw^atvopapadanena vij-eshato niiv/iyate. Yavad dhi
^vasya brahmawsatvaw na nir«itam tava^ ^vasya brahmano ^ nanyatva;«
brahma;;as tasmad adhikalvaw /ia na pratitish//;ati. Kiw tavat praptam.
Atyanta/« bhiniia iti. KutaA. Gns.gna.u dvav ityadibhedaniide^at. Gfi^gna.yoT
abhedajrutayas tvagnina si;1/^ed itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa«^arikya/i.
Brahma«o ^ wi-o ^iva ity api na sadhiya/;, ekavastvekadejava^i hy awraj-abda,^ ,
^vasya brahmaikadejatve tadgata dosha brahma;/i bhaveyu//. Na ^a brahma-
kha/^t/o ^iva ity awj-atvopapatli/? kha/^f/anaiiarhatvad biahma«a/i pragukta-
doshaprasahga/i ka, tasmad atyantabhinnasya tadaw.fatvaw durupapadam.
Yadva bhrantaw brahmaiva g\v7i./i. Kuta//. Tat tvam asi ayam atma brah-
metyadibiahmatmabhavopadej-at, nanatmatvavadinyas tu pratyakshadisiddhar-
thanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopadejaparabhi/^ jrutibhi/^ pratyakshadaya^
ki\. avidyantargata/i khyapyante. — Athava brahmaivanad3upadIiyava/^'/&//innaw
g\va.h. Kuta/z. Tata eva brahmatmabhavopadej-at. Na /('ayam upadhir
bhrantiparikalpita ita vaktu;« j'akyaw bandhamokshadivyavasthannpapatter.
Ity evaw prapte s bhidhiyate. Brahmawia iti. Kuta/i. Nanavyapadej-ad
anyatha /C'aikatvena vyapade^ad iibhayatha hi vyapadcj-o dr/jyate. Nanavya-
padcjas tavat srnsh/;-nvasr;]§-yatva — niyant;7'tvaniyamyatva — sarva^^«atva-
^watva — svadhinatvaparadhinatva — juddhatvaj-uddhatva — kalya«agu«akarat-
vaviparitatva — patitvajcshatvadibhir d^vVyate. Anyatha /-abhedena vyapa-
dej'o I pi tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibhir d;vVyate. Api da^akita-
vaditvam apy adhiyate eke, brahma da^a brahma daja brahmeme kitava ity
atharva«ika biahma«o dajakitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tataj k^ sarvai^nvavya-
pitvena abhedo vyapadi^yata ity artha//. Evam iibhayavyapadejamukhyatva-
siddhaye ^vo » yaw brahmawoiW^a ity abhyupagantavya/i.

INTRODUCTION. Hx

sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the Sutra is
explained as being directed against the reasoning of those
Vedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far
as limited by non-real adjuncts ^.

Pada IV.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-4 ; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra;/as (by
which generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-
driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman ; are eleven in
number ; and are of minute size (a«u).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the
mukhya pra;/a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman;
that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from
the priwas discussed above ; and that it is minute (a;m).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-J9) teach that the
prawas are superintended and guided in their activity by
special divinities, and that they are independent principles,
not mere modifications of the mukhya prawa.

Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names
and forms (the namarupavyakara^/a) is the work, not of the
individual soul, but of the Lord.

THIRD ADHYAYA.
PAda I.

Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of
the body at the time of death, remains invested with the
subtle material elements (bhutasukshma) which serve as an
abode to the pra^as attached to the soul.

Adhik. II (8-1 1 ) shows that, when the souls of those who
had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon
descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodi-
ment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anui-aya) of their

"■ Nanu bhrantabrahma^ivavade ^ py avidyakrztopadhibhedad bhogavya-
vasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva ia. Akhawf/aikarasaprakajama-
tratvarupasya svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva.
Prakaj-aikasvariipasya prakajatirodhaiiaw prakaj-anafa eveti prag evopapaditam.
Abhasa eveti va pa/Z/a/;, tatha sati hctava abhasa/i.

Ix VEDANTA-S^TRAS,

former deeds which determines the nature of the new
embodiment.

Adhik. Ill (t2-2i) discusses the fate after death of those
whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the
moon.

Adhik. IV, V, VI (23; 23; 24-37) teach that the subtle
bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the
ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c.,
but only like them ; that the entire descent occupies a short
time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants
and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter,
but are merely in external contact with them.

Pada II.

Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state.
According to 6"ankara the three first Sutras discuss the
question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul
in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those
by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not ; Sutra 3
settles the point by declaring that the creations of the
dreaming soul are mere ' Maya,' since they do not fully
manifest the character of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that
dreams, although mere Maya, yet have a prophetic quality.
Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul,
which after all is a part of the Lord and as such parti-
cipates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in
its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's
knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with
the gross body.

The considerably diverging interpretation given of this
adhikara/i'a by Ramanu^a has the advantage of more
closely connecting the Sutras with each other. According
to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream
are real or not, but whether they are the work of the indi-
vidual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras
1 and 2 set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams
(are the work of the individual soul) ; for thus Scripture
declares : ' And the followers of some i-akhas declare (the

INTRODUCTION. 1

XI

soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sutra states the
siddhanta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Maya,
i. e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be
effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature
(of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the word
' maya,' Ramanu^a remarks, ' mayaj-abdo hy a.ska.rya.vak\
^anakaj-ya kule ^ata devamayeva nirmita ityadishu tatha
darj-anat.' The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in
the ^ri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra,
according to vSahkara, being the sixth according to Rama-
nu^a. Sutras 4 and 5 (according to Ramanu^a's numera-
tion) are explained by Ramanu^a very much in the same
way as by wSarikara ; but owing to the former's statement
of the subject-matter of the whole adhikarawa they connect
themselves more intimately with the preceding Sutras than
is possible on vSaiikara's interpretation. In Sutra 6 (su/'aka^
I'd. hi) Ramanu^a sees a deduction from the siddhanta of
the adhikara;/a, ' Because the images of a dream are pro-
duced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have
prophetic significance.'

Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless
sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.

Adhik. Ill (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to
assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same
that went to sleep. — Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of
a swoon.

Adhik. V(i 1-21) is, according to .Sankara, taken up with
the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in
which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep
sleep. Sutra 1 1 declares that twofold characteristics (viz.
absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirvij^eshatva
and savij-eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman
even through its stations, i. e. its limiting adjuncts ; since
all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature-
declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes. — The
fact, Sutra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman
is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no
relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting ad-
juncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated

Ixii vedanta-si}tras.

that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity ; and — Sutra
13 adds— in some places the assumption of diversity is spe-
cially objected to. — That Brahman is devoid of all form
(Sutra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Veddnta-texts
setting forth Brahman's nature. — That Brahman is repre-
sented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its
connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts ; just as the
light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were,
according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15). —
The Br/hadara«yaka expressly declares that Brahman is
one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the same is
taught in other scriptural passages and in Smriti (17). — At
the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self,
caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural
passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which
remains one although his reflections on the surface of the
water are many (18). — Nor must the objection be raised
that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not
material like the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate
from it as the water is from the sun ; for the comparison
merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of
the sun participates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c.,
which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains
unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the
attributes of the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by
the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20). — That
the Self is within the upadhis, Scripture declares (21).

From the above explanation of this important adhikara/^a
the one given in the 5ri-bhashya differs totally. According
to Ramanu^a the adhikara/^a raises the question whether
the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the dis-
cussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the
highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the
soul as antaryamin. ' Notwithstanding the abode (of the
highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's
imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is repre-
sented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one
hand, free from all evil, apahatapapman, vi^i^ara, vimrityu,
&c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious

INTRODUCTION. h

XIU

qualities, satyakama, satyasawkalpa, &c.) (n). — Should it
be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free
from evil — according to the Pra^apativakya in the AV/an-
dogya — yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion
with a variety of bodies, so the antaryamin also is affected
by abiding within bodies ; we deny this because in every
section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin (in the
Br^Tiadira/zyaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the
ruler within ; which shows him to be free from the short-
comings of the ^iva (12). — Some, moreover, expressly assert
that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body,
the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dva suparwa sayu^a
sakhdya) (13). — Should it be said that, according to the
AT/zandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into
the elements previously to the evolution of names and
forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming
implicated in the sawsara; we reply that Brahman, although
connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form,
since it is the principal element (agent ; pradhana) in the
bringing about of names and forms (according to ' akai-o ha
vai namarupayor nirvahita ') (14). — But does not the pas-
sage ' satyaw ^;/anam anantam brahma ' teach that Brah-
man is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference,
and does not the passage ' neti neti' deny of it all qualities ?
— As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one
quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport, we admit that
Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that
Brahman is satyasawkalpa, and so on ; for if not, the pas-
sages in which those qualities are asserted would become
purportless (15). — Moreover the Taittiriya passage only
asserts so much, viz. the prakaj'arupata of Brahman, and
does not deny other qualities (16). — And the passage 'neti
neti' will be discussed later on. — The ubhayalihgatva of
Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many
places of ^ruti and Smr/ti (ly)- — Because Brahman although
abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfec-
tions, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited
by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18). — Should it be said
that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the

Ixiv vedanta-sOtras.

sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the
antaryamin really abides within all things, and therefore
must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that
what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman
should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in
the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this
view both similes are appropriate (20). — Analogous similes
we obsei"ve to be cmpIo}'ed in ordinary life, as when we
compare a man to a lion (21).

Sutras 22-30 constitute, according to 5ankara, a new
adhikarawa (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause
' not so, not so' (neti neti ; Brz'hadar.) negatives, not Brah-
man itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in
the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26 further
dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive
attributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The
last four Sutras return to the question how, Brahman being
one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as
different fromi it; and, two explanatory hypotheses having
been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference
is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

According to Ramanu^a, Sutras 22 ff. continue the dis-
cussion started in Sutra 11. How, the question is asked, can
the ubhayaliiigatva of Brahman be maintained considering
that the ' not so. not so ' of the Brz'hadarawyaka denies of
Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakara), so
that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra) ? — The
reply given in Sutra 22 is that ' not so, not so ' does not
deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared
previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them,
and finally to deny them again ^), but merely denies the
prakr/taitavattva, the previously stated limited nature of
Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the
previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that
subsequently to ' neti neti ' Scripture itself enunciates
further quaHfications of Brahman. — That Brahman as stated

' All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not
from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, tlien, and then only,
Scripture might at first refer to them 'anuvadena,' and finally negative them.

INTRODUCTION. IxV

above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scrip-
ture is confirmed in Sutra 23, ' Scripture declares Brahman
to be the non-manifest.' — And the intuition (sakshatkara)
of Brahman ensues only upon its sawradhana, i.e. upon its
being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as
Scripture and Smrzti declare (24). — That this interpretation
of 'neti ' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in
the same way as prakai-a, luminousness, ^;7ana, intelligence,
&c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world
(prapa;7/^aviJ•ish/ata) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as like-
wise qualifying Brahman ; and that prakai'a, and so on,
characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice
(on the part of ;7'shis like Vamadeva) in the work of
sa;;/radhana mentioned before (25). — For all these reasons
Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite
number of auspicious qualities ; for thus the twofold indica-
tions (liiiga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26). —
In what relation, then, does the a>^id vastu, i.e. the non-
sentient matter, which, according to the B/-/hadara;;yaka,
is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter? — Non-
sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special
arrangements (sa;//sthanavijresha//) of Brahman, as the coils
are of the body of the snake ; for Brahman is designated
as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is
all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter
into those elements, &c.) (27). — Or, in the second place,
the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to
that of light and the luminous object which are two and
yet one, both being fire (28). — Or, in the third place, the
relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world
is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in
II, 3, 43), a part — a/z/i-a — of Brahman (29, 30).

Adhik. Vn (31-37) explains how some metaphorical
expressions, seemingly implying that there is something
different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.

Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is
not, as 6^aimini opines, the independent result of the works
acting through the so-called apurva, but is allotted by the
Lord.

[34] e

Ixvi vedanta-sCtras.

Pada III.

With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new
section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe
how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brah-
man to obtain final release. The first point to be deter-
mined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman,
and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of
the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical
or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upa-
nishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different
.yakhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly iden-
tical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one
and the same j-akha exhibits the same matter in more
or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that
the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas
which were in circulation at the time of the composition of
the Upanishads found separate expression in the different
priestly communities ; hence the same speculations, legends,
&c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in
more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may
suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined
themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact
that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar
contents would hardly appear to call for special note or
comment ; not any more than the circumstance that the
sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some
particular ^akha were found described with greater or
smaller modifications in the books of other j-akhas also.
But already at a very early period, at any rate long before
the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present
form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the
truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one i-akha may
indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts
of all other i-akhas ; that, however, all texts which aim at
throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation
to it of the human soul must somehow or other be com-
bined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid
for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had
occasion to remark above, A\hile acts may be performed

INTRODUCTION. b

XVII

by different individuals in different ways, cognition is de-
fined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can
be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence
the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful
interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred
text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of
the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the
same matter, and therefore must be combined in one medi-
tation. The latter is the special task of the present pada.

Adhik. I and II (1-4 ; 5) are concerned with the question
whether those vidyas, which are met with in identical or
similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be con-
sidered as constituting several vidyas, or one vidya only.
vSarikara remarks that the question affects only those vidyas
whose object is the qualified Brahman ; for the knowledge
of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely
uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is
set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where
the object of knowledge is the sagu;/am brahma or some
outward manifestation of Brahman ; for the qualities as
well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating
the subject of a later adhikara;/a, we may take for an
example the so-called ^az/rt'ilyavidya which is met with in
KJi. Up. Ill, 14, again — in an abridged form — in Br?'. Up.
V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the 6"atapatha-
brahma;/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a medita-
tion on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of
which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance,
manomayatva, bharupatva), while others are peculiar to
each separate passage (pra/i^a^'ariratva and satyasawkalpatva,
for instance, being mentioned in the AV/andogya Upanishad
and Satapatha-br^ima/za, but not in the Br/hadarawyaka
Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava^-itva, not
referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room
for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object
of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedantin the question
is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical
interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are
three different meditations to be gone through ; if, on the

e 2

Ixvlii VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

Other hand, the vidya is one only, all the dififerent qualities
of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be
combined into one meditation. — The decision is here, as in
all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A
careful examination of the three passages shows that the
object of meditation is one only ; hence the meditation also
is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in
the three texts.

Adhik. Ill (6-8) discusses the case of vid}'as being really
separate, although apparently identical. The examples
selected are the udgithavidyas of the AV/andogya Upanishad
(I, 1-3) and the Br^Tiadarawyaka Upanishad (I, 3), which,
although showing certain similarities — such as bearing the
same name and the udgitha being in both identified with
prawa — yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the
K/mndogya. vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the
sacred syllable Om, while the Brzhadarawyaka Upanishad
represents the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.

Sutra 9 constitutes in vSahkara's view a new adhikara;/a
(IV), proving that in the passage, ' Let a man meditate '
(K/i. Up. I, I, i), the 0;;^kara and the udgitha stand in the
relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being,
' Let a man meditate on that 0;«kara which,' &c. — Ac-
cording to Ramani^o^a's interpretation, which seems to fall
in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the
Sutra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument
for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara;/a. —
Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called pra;^^a-
vidyas and the consequent comprehension of the different
qualities of the pra//a, which are mentioned in the different
texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to 5ahkara, the Sutras
11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the medi-
tations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or
only those mentioned in the special vidya. The decision
is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman,
such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account
everywhere, while those wdiich admit of a more or less (as,
for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, men-

INTRODUCTION. Ixix

tioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special medita-
tions.— Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to vS'ankara, aims at
proving that the object of Ka///a Up. Ill, 10, 11 is one
only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than
everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only.
— Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to vSarikara,
that the Self spoken of in Ait. Ar. II, 4, i, 1 is not a lower
form of the Self (the so-called sutratman), but the highest
Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to
the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self
have to be comprehended in the Aitareyaka meditation.

According to Ramanu^a the Sutras 11-17 constitute a
single adhikara;/a whose subject is the same as that of
^ahkara's sixth adhikara;/a. Sutras 11-13 ^^'^3 ^^ ^^e
whole, explained as by .Sahkara ; Sutra 12, however, is
said to mean, ' Such attributes as having joy for its head,
&c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and
therefore not to be included in every meditation ; for if
they were admitted as qualities, difference would be intro-
duced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a
more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue
the discussion of the passage about the priyaj-irastva. — If
priyaj-irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of
Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them ? —
' Because,' Sutra 14 replies, ' there is no other purpose,
Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious medita-
tion.'— But how is it known that the Self of delight is the
highest Self.'' (owing to which you maintain that having
limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.) — ' Be-
cause,' Sutra 15 replies,' the term "Self" (atma anandamaya)
is applied to it.' — But in the previous parts of the chapter
the term Self (in atma pra;/amaya, &c.) is applied to non-
Selfs also ; how then do you know that in atma ananda-
maya it denotes the real Self.^ — 'The term Self,' Sutra 16
replies, ' is employed here to denote the highest Self as in
many other passages (atma va idam eka, &c.), as we con-
clude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished. May I
be many.' — But, an objection is raised, does not the con-
text show that the term ' Self,' which in all the preceding

Ixx vedanta-sOtras.

clauses about the pra/^amaya, &c. denoted something other
than the Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and
is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent
passage ? — To this question asked in the former half of 1 7
(anva)-ad iti X'et) the latter half replies, ' Still it denotes the
Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the
highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage
also, viz. II, I, ' From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with
the pra//asa;;/vada. — The subject of Adhik. X (19) has
been indicated already above under Adhik. I.— Adhik. XI
(20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature ; in Bri. Up.
V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of
the sun, and then as abiding within the eye ; we therefore,
in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two
separate vidyas. — Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case;
certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra;?aya-
niya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding
AV/andogya vidya, because the stated difference of Brah-
man's abode involves difference of vidya. — Adhik. XIII
(24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be
held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras
and brahma;/a passages met with in the beginning of some
Upanishads — as, for instance, a brahmawa about the maha-
vrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-ara;/yaka
— do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect
them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since
they show unmistakable signs of being connected with
sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the
man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off
all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement,
made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the
good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies
of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to 6"ankara, two adhi-
kara;zas of which the former (XVI ; 27, 2H) decides that the
shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place — not, as

INTRODUCTION. Ixxi

the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world —
but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body;
the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken
literally. — The latter adhikarawa (XVII ; 2q, 30) treats of
the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself
from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods
(as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he
only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu;^am
brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who
knows the nirgu;/am brahma becomes one with it without
moving to any other place.

The 6'ri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara;za
whose two first Sutras are explained as by Sahkara, while
Sutra 39 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at,
' the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense
only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place
in both ways, i. e. partly at the moment of death, partly on
the road to Brahman ; for otherwise there would be a con-
tradiction ' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works
were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body
would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodi-
less soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the
gods). — To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off
of the works at the moment of death is possible, since
matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i. e. since
scriptural passages show that even he whose works are
entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his
true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body ; com-
pare the passage, ' para;« ^yotir upasampadya svena rupe-
//abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krirt'an ramamana// sa
svar^^ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama^aro bhavati.'
That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's
vidyamahatmya. — That the explanation of the 5ri-bhashya
agrees with the text as well as vSaiikara's, a comparison of
the two will show ; especially forced is .Saiikara's explana-
tion of ' arthavattvam ubhayatha,' which is said to mean
that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva
in the other case.

The next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikara;/a (XVIII)

Ixxii vedanta-sOtras.

deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by
those knowing the vidyas which specially mention the
going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the
sagu//a-vidyas of Brahman. — The explanation given in the
5ri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged
places) is similar, with the difference however that all who
meditate on Brahman — without any reference to the dis-
tinction of nirgu;/a and sagu;m — proceed after death on the
road of the gods. (The 5ri-bhashya reads ' sarvesham,'
i. e. all worshippers, not ' sarvasam,' all saguwa-vidyas.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect
of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet
even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may
retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.
— In the 6"ri-bhashya, where the Sutra follows immediately
on Sutra 30, the adhikara/za determines, in close connexion
with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule
divest themselves of the gross body — there remaining only
a subtle body which enables them to move — and no longer
experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although
having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested
with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain
until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of
Brahman mentioned in some vidyas — such as its being not
gross, not subtle, &c. — are to be included in all meditations
on Brahman.— Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Ka///a Up.
Ill, I, and Mu. Up. Ill, i, constitute one vidya only, because
both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According
to Ramanu^a the Sutra contains a reply to an objection
raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding
Sutra. — Adhik. XXII {^g, ^6) maintains that the two
passages, Br/. Up. Ill, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidya
only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman
viewed as the inner Self of all. — Adhik. XXIII (37) on the
contrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 con-
stitutes not one but two meditations. — Adhik. XXIV (38)
again determines that the vidya of the True contained in
Bri. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only. — According to Ram.anu^a,

INTRODUCTION. Ixxili

Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara;/a only whose subject
is the same as that of XXII according to .Saiikara.

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Kh. Up.
VIII, I and Br/. Up. IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidya,
since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities,
while the latter is concerned Avith Brahman as destitute of
quahties. — Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to 5ah-
kara, of a minor question connected with Kh. Up. V, 1 1 fif.
— According to the 5ri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one
adhikarawa whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same
conclusion as ^aiikara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon
discuss a general question concerning the meditations on
Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to re-
mark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of
Brahman — such as vaj-itva, satyakamatva, &:c. — cannot be
considered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha
neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all
qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into
meditations whose purpose is final release. — To this objec-
tion Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left out
(from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passages
under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated
with emphasis ^' — But, another objection is raised. Scrip-
ture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakama,
&c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the
fathers, and similar results specified in KJi. Up. VIII, 2;
hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include
those qualities of Brahman in his meditation. — To this ob-
jection Sutra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming
in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as
proceeding therefrom (i. e. the approach to Brahman which
is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached
Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may
include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)

* Ramanu^ has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities
emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set
aside in any meditation : ' Na kz. matapitr/sahasrebhyo ^ pi vatsalatara/w
jastraw pratarakavad aparamarthikau nirasaniyau gu«au pramawantaraprati-
pannau adare^zopadij-ya sawsara>^akraparivartanena purvam eva bambhramya-
manan mumukshun bhiiyo ^ pi bhramayitum alam.'

Ixxiv VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which
are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts
of sacrificial actions, arc not to be considered as perma-
nently requisite parts of the latter. — Adhik. XXVllI (43)
teaches that, in a Br/. Up. passage and a similar Kh. Up.
passage, Vayu and Pra;/a are not to be identified, but to be
held apart.— Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the fire-
altars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agni-
raha.sya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action
(so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could
optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely
subjects of meditations.

Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to 5arikara, in the
way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an
existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not
(as the Materialists maintain). — According to the .Sri-bha-
shya the adhikara;^a does not refer to this wide question,
but is concerned with a point more immediately connected
with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to
the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the
meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras
then have to be translated as follows : ' Some (maintain
that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be
viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to
it in its embodied state, such as ^;7atr?tva and the like),
because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'
— The next Sutra rejects this view, ' This is not so, but the
separatedness (i. e. the pure isolated state in which the Self
is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil,
&c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because
that will be ^ the state (of the Self in the condition of final
release).'

Adhik. XXXI [^^, 56) decides that meditations connected
w'ith constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the
udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha,
&c., valid, not only for that j-akha in wdiich the medita-
tion actually is met with, but for all j-akhas. — Adhik.

* The 6Yi-bhashj'a as well as several other commentaries reads tadbhava-
bhavitvat for .Sahkara's tadbhavabhavitvat.

INTRODUCTION. 1

XXV

XXXII (57) decides that the Vakvanara Agni of Kh. Up.
V, 1 1 fif. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his
single parts. — Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those
meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished
by different qualities, have to be held apart as different
meditations. Thus the daharavidya, .Saw^ilyavidya, &c.
remain separate.

Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on
Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit
are optional, there being no reason for their being cumu-
lated.— Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations,
on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be
cumulated or optionally employed according to choice. —
Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the
meditations connected with constituent elements of action,
such as the udgitha.

Pada IV.

Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman
is not kratvartha, i. e. subordinate to action, but indepen-
dent.— Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by show-
ing that the state of the pravra^-ins is enjoined by the
sacred law, and that for them vidya only is prescribed,
not action. — Adhik. Ill (21, 22) decides that certain clauses
forming part of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but
themselves enjoin the meditation. — The legends recorded
in the Vedanta-texts are not to be used as subordinate
members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying— as
arthavadas — the injunctions with which they are connected
(Adhik. IV, 23, 24). — For all these reasons the urdhvare-
tasa// require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V,
25). — Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such
as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as
conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26,
27). — Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws
regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need
(Adhik. VII, 28-31). — The a^-ramakarma/H are obligatory
on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII,

Ixxvi VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

32-35). — Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are
ana^-rama have claims to vidya (Adhik. IX, 36-39). — An
urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40). — Ex-
piation of the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42). —
Exclusion of the fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik.
XII, 43). — Those meditations, which are connected with
subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of
the priest, not of the ya^amana (Adhik. XIII, 44-46). —
Bri. Up. Ill, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to
balya and pawc/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49). — -By balya is to
be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik.
XV, 50).

Sutras .51 and 52 discuss, according to Ramanu^a, the
question when the vidya, which is the result of the means
described in III, 4, arises. Sutra 51 treats of that vidya
whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states
that ' it takes place in the present life, if there is not
present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in
which latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of
Scripture declaring this (in various passages).' — Sutra 52,
'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the
time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is releasCj
it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the
same condition (i. e. of sometimes having an obstacle, some-
times not). — 5ahkara, who treats the two Sutras as two
adhikara/^as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while,
putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes
it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the
case of the sagu^a-vidyas.

FOURTH ADHYAYA.

Pada I.

Adhikara;^a I (i, 2). — The meditation on the Atman
enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once
only, but is to be repeated again and again.

Adhik. II (3). — The devotee engaged in meditation on
Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.

INTRODUCTION. lx>

XXVll

Adhik. Ill (4). — To the rule laid down in the preceding
adhikara;/a the so-called pratikopasanas, i.e. those medita-
tions in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or out-
ward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upasita)
constitute an exception, i. e. the devotee is not to consider
the pratika as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. IV (5). — In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to
be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not
Brahman as being one with the pratika. — Ramanu^a takes
Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived
at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new
adhikara;/a.

Adhik. V (6). — In meditations connected with constitu-
tives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati
tam udgitham upasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be
transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the
example quoted, for instance, the udgitha is to be viewed as
Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha.

Adhik. VI (7-10). — The devotee is to carry on his medi-
tations in a sitting posture. — 5ahkara maintains that this
rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is
sawyagdarj-ana ; but the Sutra gives no hint to that effect.

Adhik.VII(ii). — The meditations may be carried on at any
time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12). — The meditations are to be continued
until death. — ^ahkara again maintains that those medita-
tions which lead to sawyagdarj-ana are excepted.

Adhik. IX (13). — When through those meditations the
knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvan is no
longer affected by the consequences of either past or future
evil deeds.

Adhik. X (14). — Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.
— The literal translation of the Sutra is, ' There is likewise
non-attachment (to the vidvan) of the other (i.e. of the
deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on
the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place).' The
last words of the Sutra, ' but on the fall,' are separated by
5ahkara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted
to mean, ' when death takes place (there results mukti of

Ixxvlii VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

the vidvan, who through his knowledge has freed himself
from the bonds of works).' — According to R^manu^a the
whole Sutra simply means, ' There is likewise non-attach-
ment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is
reached), but on the death of the vidvan ^'

Adhik. XI (15). — The non-operation of works stated in
the two preceding adhikara;/as holds good only in the case
of anirabdhakarya works, i.e. those works which have not
yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend
to the arabdhakarya works on which the present existence of
the devotee depends.

Adhik. XII (16, 17). — From the rule enunciated in Adhik.
X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined
permanently (nitya) : so, for instance, the agnihotra, for
they promote the origination of knowledge.

Adhik. XIII (18). — The origination of knowledge is
promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accom-
panied with the knowledge of the upasanas referring to the
different members of those works.

Adhik. XIV (19). — The arabdhakarya works have to be
worked out fully by the fruition of their effects ; whereupon
the vidvan becomes united with Brahman. — The ' bhoga '
of the Sutra is, according to vSahkara, restricted to the
present existence of the devotee, since the complete know-
ledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which other-
wise would lead to future embodiments. According to
Ramanu^a a number of embodied existences may have to
be gone through before the effects of the arabdhakarya
works are exhausted.

Pad A II.

This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya
describe the fate of the vidvan after death. According to
6"ahkara we have to distinguish the vidvan who possesses
the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest

* Nanu vidusho i pi setikartavyatakopasananirvrzttaye vrzshtyannadiphala-
nish/any eva kathaw teshaw virodhad vinaia U/C'yate. Tatraha pate tv iti.
.Sarirapate tu teshaw winksa/i ^arirapatad urdhvaw tu \idyanugu«ad;7'sh/a-
phalani svikritkni najyanlity artha//.

INTRODUCTION. h

XXIX

Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower Brah-
man, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and
others to the latter. According to Ramanu^a the vidvan
is one only.

Adhik. I, II, III (i-6).— On the death of the vidvan (i.e.
of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to
6"ahkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in
the chief vital air (pra;/a), the vital air in the individual
soul (^iva), the soul in the subtle elements. — According to
Raminu^a the combination (sampatti) of the senses with
the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sawyoga), not a
merging (laya).

Adhik. IV (7). — The vidvan (i.e. according to ^ahkara,
he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidv^n,
i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman,
pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto)
up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle
elements, and so on into the ni<:/is. — The vidvan also
remains connected with the subtle elements because he has
not yet completely destroyed avidya, so that the immor-
tality which Scripture ascribes to him (amrz'tatva;// hi vidvan
abhyaj-nute) is only a relative one. — Ramanu^a quotes the
following text regarding the immortality of the vidvan :

' Yada sarve pramu-^yante kama ye^sya hrz'di sthita/^
atha martyo ^ mr/to bhavaty atra brahma samaj-nute,'
and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to
the vidvan as soon as he abandons all desires can only
mean the destruction — mentioned in the preceding pada —
of all the effects of good and evil works, while the ' reaching
of Brahman ' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman
vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

Adhik. V (H-ii) raises, according to 5ankara, the ques-
tion whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says
that they are combined with the highest deity (te^a/^
parasya;/^ devatay^m) are completely merged in the latter
or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the
elements takes place only when final emancipation is
reached ; that, on the other hand, as long as the sawsara
state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with

IxXX VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new
bodies for the soul.

According to Rdmanu^ the Sutras 8-11 do not con-
stitute a new adhikarawa, but continue the discussion of
the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of
does not imply the separation of the soul from the body,
'because Scripture declares sawsara, i.e. embodiedness up
to the reaching of Brahman ' (tasya tavad eva klram yavan
na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8). — That the soul after
having departed from the gross body is not disconnected
from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the
subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority^
(9).^ — Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural
passage quoted is not effected by means of the total
destruction of the body (10).

Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance. — According
to vSahkara the Sutras now turn from the discussion of the
departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to
the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached
the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the
case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidya)
the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on,
depart from the body of the dying devotee ; this implies at
the same time that they do not depart from the body of
the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.
— Against this latter implied doctrine Sutra 12 is supposed
to formulate an objection. ' If it be said that the departure
of the pra;/as from the body of the dying sage is denied
(viz. in B/7. Up. IV, 4, 5, na tasya prawa utkramanti, of him
the pra/zas do not pass out) ; we reply that in that passage
the genitive "tasya" has the sense of the ablative "tasmat,"
so that the sense of the passage is, " from him, i.e. from the
^iva of the dying sage, the pra;/as do not depart, but
remain with it." ' — This objection ^aiikara supposes to be
disposed of in Sutra 13. 'By some there is given a clear
denial of the departure of the prawas in the case of the

* Upalabhyate hi devayanena pantha ga-i',^^ato vidushas tarn pratibnlyat
satyam briiyad iti ^'andramasa sawvadava^'anena jarirasadbhava/;, ata/i sukshma-
■jariram anuvartate.

INTRODUCTION. 1

XXXI

dying sagej' viz, in the passage Bri. Up. Ill, 2, 11, where
Ya^;7avalkya instructs Artabhaga that, when this man dies,
the pra;/as do not depart from it (asmat ; the context
showing that asmat means ' from it,' viz. from the body,
and not ' from him,' viz. the ^iva). — The same view is,
moreover, confirmed by Smriti passages.

According to Ramanii^a the three Sutras forming Sah-
kara's sixth adhikarawa do not constitute a new adhikara;/a
at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sutras.
The topic continuing to be discussed is the utkranti of the
vidvan. If, Sutra 13 says, the utkranti of the prawas is not
admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be
contained in Brt. Up. IV, 4, 5 ; the reply is that the sense
of the tasya there is ' j-arirat ' (so that the passage means,
'from him, i.e. the ^iva, the pra;/as do not depart'); for
this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the
Madhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not
read ' tasya ' but ' tasmat' — With reference to the instruc-
tion given by Ya^/7avalkya to Artabhaga, it is to be
remarked that nothing there shows the ' ayam purusha ' to
be the sage who knows Brahman. — And, finally, there are
Smrz'ti passages declaring that the sage also when dying
departs from the body.

Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to 5ankara,
that, on the death of him who possesses the higher know-
ledge, his prawas, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so
as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.

According to Ramanu^a the two Sutras continue the
teaching about the pra;;as, bhutas, &c. of the vidvan in
general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brah-
man, not merely in the way of conjunction (sa;«yoga), but
completely ^

Adhik. IX (17). — ^aiikara here returns to the owner of
the apara vidya, while Ramanu^a continues the description
of the utkranti of his vidvan. — The ^iva of the dying man

' When the ^iva has passed out of the body and ascends to the world of
Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it reaches the river
Vi^ara. There it divests itself of the subtle body, and the latter is merged in
Brahman.

[34] f

Ixxxil vedanta-sOtras.

passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by
means of the na^is ; the vidvan by means of the na^i called
sushum;/a, the avidvan by means of some other na^i.

Adhik. X (18, 19). — The departing soul passes up to the
sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well
as during day.

Adhik. XI (20, 21). — Also that vidvan who dies during
the dakshi/zayana reaches Brahman.

Pada III.

Adhik. I, II, III (1—3) reconcile the different accounts
given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which
leads the vidvan up to Brahman.

Adhik. IV (4-6). — By the ' stations' we have, however, to
understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also
the divine beings which lead the soul on.

The remaining part of the pada is by 5ahkara divided
into two adhikara;/as. Of these the former one (7-14)
teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led
by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest
Brahman, but the effected (karya) or qualified (sagu;/a)
Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sutras 7-11 by
Badari. and, finally, accepted by vSahkara in his commentary
on Sutra 14. In Sutras 12-14 G^aimini defends the opposite
view, according to which the soul of the vidvan goes to the
highest Brahman, not to the karyam brahma. But Cai-
mini's view, although set forth in the latter part of the
adhikara/^a, is. according to vSankara, a mere purvapaksha,
while Badari's opinion represents the siddhanta. — The
latter of the two adhikara;^as (VI of the whole pada ; 15, 16)
records the opinion of Badaraya/za on a collateral question,
viz. w^hcther,or not, all those who worship the effected Brah-
man are led to it. The decision is that those only are
guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a
pratika form.

According to Ramanu^a, SCltras 7-1 6 form one adhikarawa
only, in which the views of Badari and of Caimini represent
two purvapakshas, while Badaraya;^a's opinion is adopted

INTRODUCTION. 1

XXXlll

as the siddhanta. The question is whether the guardians
of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the
effected Brahman, i. e. Hira/zyagarbha, or those who worship
the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual
soul as free from Prakr/ti, and having Brahman for its Self
(ye pratyagatmanaw prakr/tiviyukta;// brahmatmakam upa-
sate). — The first view is maintained by Badari in Sutra 7,
' The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the
effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the
latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the
highest and as such omnipresent Brahman. — The explana-
tion of Sutra 9 is similar to that of .Sarikara ; but more clearly
replies to the objection (that, if Hira;/yagarbha were meant
in the passage, ' purusho^manava/^ sa etan brahma gama-
yati,' the text would read ' sa etan brahmaz/'am gamayati ')
that Hirawyagarbha is called Brahman on account of his
nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathama^atva. —
The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in San-
kara ; so also of 12-14. — The siddhanta view is established
in Sutra 13, ' It is the opinion of Badaraya/^a that it, i. e. the
ga;;a of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not
take their stand on what is pratika, i. e. those who worship
the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the indi-
vidual Self as dissociated from prakrzti, and having Brahman
for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under
pratikas. For both views — that of 6^aimini as well as that
of Badari — are faulty.' The karya view contradicts such
passages as ' asma/^ khanrki samutthaya para/w ^yotir upa-
sampadya,' &c. ; the para view, such passages as that in the
paw/'agni-vidya, which declares that ya ittha;;z viduh, i. e.
those who know the pa;H'agni-vidya, are also led up to
Brahman.

Pada IV.

Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to vSarikara, to the
owner of the para vidy^i, and teaches that, when on his
death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any
new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true
nature. — The explanation given by Ramanu^a is essentially

f 2

Ixxxiv vedanta-sOtras.

the same, but of course refers to that vidvan whose going to
Brahman had been described in the preceding pada.

Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the
released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhaga, non-
separation. This, on vSaiikara's view, means absolute non-
separation, identity. — According to Ramanu^a the question
to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as
separate (pr/thagbhuta) from Brahman, or as non-separate
because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is
favoured by those 5ruti and Smr/ti passages which speak
of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman ; the latter
by such passages as tat tvam asi and the like^.

Adhik. Ill (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the re-
leased soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to
vSahkara). According to (7aimini the released soul, when
manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those quali-
ties which in Kh. Up. VIII, 7, i and other places are ascribed
to Brahman, such as apahatapapmatva, satyasawkalpatva^
&c., aijTvarya. — According to Au^ulomi the only character-
istic of the released soul is >^aitanya. — According to Badara-
yana the two views can be combined (5ankara remarking
that satyasawkalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul
vyavaharapekshaya).

Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to ^arikara, to the
apar^ vidya, and discusses the question whether the soul of

* Kim aya;« paraw ,.?yotir upasampanna/z sai"vabandhavinirmukta/i pratya-
gatma svatmanaw paramatmana// pr/thagbhutam anubhavati uta tatprakarataya
tadavibhaktam iti vuaye so i j-nute sarvan kaman saha brahma;/a vipaj/tita
pajya/i pafyate rukmavar«aw kartaram \sz.m punishaw brahmayoniw tada
vidvan pu«yapape vidhuya nira«^ana// paramaw samyam upaiti idaw ^;7anara
upajritya mama sadharmyam agata/; sarve s pi nopa^yante pralayena vyathanti
^etyadijTutism;Vtibhyo muktasya parewa sahityasamyasadharmyavagamat
p^/thagbhiitam anubhavatiti prapte u/tyate. Avibhageneti. Parasmad brahma-
nSih svatmanam avibhagenanubhavati mukta//. Kuta/«. Dr/sh/atvat. Paraw
brahmopasampadya nivrz'ttavidyatirodhanasya yathatathyena svatmano drz'sh^a-
tvat. Svatmana/i svariipaw hi tat tvam asy ayam atma brahma aitadatmyam
idaw sarvaw sarvaw khalv idaw brahmetyadisamanadhikara«yanirdejai/i ya
atmani tish//zan atmano ^ ntaro yam atma na veda yasyatma jariraw ya
atmanam antaro yamayati atmantaryamy amr/ta/^ anta// pravish/'a/^ j-asta
^ananam ityadibhij' /'a paramatmatmakaw: taM/mnrataya tatprakarabhulam iti
pratipaditam avasthiter iti karak/'Usnety atrato * vibliagenaiiaw brahmasmity
evanubhavati.

INTRODUCTION. Ix?

XXXV

the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or
uses some other means. The former alternative is ac-
cepted.— According to Ramanu^a the adhikara//a simply
continues the consideration of the state of the released,
begun in the preceding adhikara//a. Of the released soul it
is said in Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has manifested
itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing
with women, carriages, and so on. The question then arises
whether it effects all this by its mere sawkalpa (it having
been shown in the preceding adhikara//a that the released
soul is, like the Lord, satyasawkalpa), or not. The answer
is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the
expHcit declaration made in Kh. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere
will the fathers come to receive him.'

Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied
or disembodied according to their wish and will.

Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released
can animate several bodies at the same time. — Sutra 12 gives,
according to 5ahkara, the additional explanation that those
passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition
on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly
released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the
state of deep sleep (svapyaya = sushupti), or to the fully
released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya). — Ramanu^a
explains that the passages speaking of absence of conscious-
ness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time
of dying (sampatti = mara;/am according to ' van manasi
sampadyate,' &c.).

Adhik. VII (17-21). — The released ^ivas participate in all
the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception
of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They
do not return to new forms of embodied existence.

After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted
with the contents of the Brahma-sutras according to the
views of 5ahkara as well as Ramanu^a, we have now
to consider the question which of the two modes of
interpretation represents — or at any rate more closely
approximates to — the true meaning of the Sutras. That

IxXXvI VEDANTA-St^TRAS.

few of the Sutras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we
have already remarked above; but this does not exclude
the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of cer-
tainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees
better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very
numerous discrepancies, — of which only the more important
ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,—
the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of
the Sutras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the
adhikara;/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing
upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority
of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the
special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large
number of cases the agreement extends to the interpreta-
tion to be put on those passages and on the Sutras. This
far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a
certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition
concerning the meaning of the Sutras on which the bulk of
the interpretations of 5arikara as well as of Ramanu^a are
based.

But at the same time we have seen that, in a not incon-
siderable number of cases, the interpretations of vSahkara
and Ramanu^a diverge more or less widely, and that
the Sutras affected thereby are, most of them, especially
important because bearing on fundamental points of the
Vedanta system. The question then remains which of the
two interpretations is entitled to preference.

Regarding a small number of Sutras I have already (in
the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that
Ramanu^a's explanation appears to be more worthy of
consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number
of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the
literal meaning of a Siitra, but where vSaiikara sees him-
self reduced to the necessity of supplementing his inter-
pretation by certain additions and reservations of his own
for which the text gives no occasion, while Ramanu^a is
able to take the Sutra as it stands. To exemplify this
jremark, I again direct attention to all those Sutras which in

INTRODUCTION. IxXXvii

clear terms represent the individual soul as something dif-
ferent from the highest soul, and concerning which ^"aiikara
is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the
Sutra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of
the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as
true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that San-
kara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of
the Sutras ; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms em-
ployed by Dr. Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an
exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of man-
kind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him
only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while
present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point
which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed. —
We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number
of adhikara;/as and Sutras concerning whose interpretation
6"ahkara and Ramanu^a disagree altogether; and we have
seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the
latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling
in more easily with the words of the text. The most
striking instance of this is afforded by the 1 3th adhikara;za
of II, 3, which treats of the size of the ^iva, and where
Ramanu^a's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to
^ahkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole
adhikarawa and to the wording of the single Sutras. The
adhikara;/a is, moreover, a specially important one, be-
cause the nature of the view held as to the size of the indi-
vidual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of
Vedanta is embodied in Badarayawa's work.

But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpre-
tations of a few detached Sutras, but to make the attempt
at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the
Vedanta-sutras as a whole to the chief distinguishing
doctrines of 5ahkara as well as Ramanu^a. Such an
attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results ;
but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely
negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sutras do not
teach particular doctrines found in them by certain com-
mentators, will not be without its value.

IxXXviii VEDANTA-SC'TRAS.

The first question we wish to consider in some detail is
whether the Sutras in any way favour 6"arikara's doctrine
that we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brah-
man, a higher knowledge which leads to the immediate
absorption, on death, of the individual soul in Brahman,
and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an
exalted form of individual existence. The adhyaya first to
be considered in this connexion is the fourth one. According
to vSankara the three latter padas of that adhyaya are
chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies in
the possession of the lower knowledge, while two sections
(IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him
who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of
the highest Brahman. According to Ramanu^a, on the
other hand, the three padas, referring throughout to one
subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the succes-
sive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord
through the Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of
the gross body which it had tenanted, ascends to the world
of Brahman, and lives there for ever without returning into
the sa;;/sara.

On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears
somewhat strange that the concluding section of the Sutras
should be almost entirely taken up with describing the fate
of him who has after all acquired an altogether inferior
knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the true
sanctuary of Vedantic knowledge, while the fate of the fully
initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sutras. It is, I
think, not too much to say that no unbiassed student of
the Sutras would — before having allowed himself to be
influenced by .Sahkara's interpretations — imagine for a
moment that the solemn words, ' From thence is no return,
from thence is no return,' with which the Sutras conclude,
are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who
has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but
merely a stage on the way of that soul which is engaged in
the slow progress of gradual release, a stage which is
indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of existence,
but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious sa;//sara,

INTRODUCTION. Ixxxlx

and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.
And this a priori impression — which, although no doubt
significant, could hardly be appealed to as decisive — is
confirmed by a detailed consideration of the two sets of
Sutras Avhich .Sahkara connects with the knowledge of the
higher Brahman. How these Sutras are interpreted by
6"ahkara and Ramanu^a has been stated above in the con-
spectus of contents ; the points which render the interpre-
tation given by Ramanu^ more probable are as follows.
With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to note, in the first
place, the circumstance — relevant although not decisive in
itself — that Sutra 12 does not contain any indication of a
new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can
hardly be doubted that the text of Sutra 13, ' spash/o hy
ekesham/ is more appropriately understood, with Rama-
nu^a, as furnishing a reason for the opinion advanced in
the preceding Sutra, than — with ^ankara — as embodying
the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case
we should expect not ' hi ' but ' tu '). And, in the third
place, the 'eke,' i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sutra 13 would,
on vSahkara's interpretation, denote the very same persons
to whom the preceding Siitra had referred, viz. the
followers of the Kawva-jakha (the two Vedic passages
referred to in 12 and 13 being Br/. Up. IV, 4. 5, and III, 2,
II, according to the Ka;/va recension) ; while it is the
standing practice of the Sutras to introduce, by means of the
designation ' eke,' members of Vedic j-akhas, teachers, &c.
other than those alluded to in the preceding Sutras. With
this practice Ramanu^a's interpretation, on the other hand,
fully agrees ; for, according to him, the ' eke ' are the Ma-
dhyandinas, whose reading in Brt. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. ' tasmat,'
clearly indicates that the ' tasya ' in the corresponding
passage of the Ka«vas denotes the j-arira, i.e. the ^iva.
I think it is not saying too much that 6"ahkara's explana-
tion, according to which the ' eke ' would denote the very
same Kawvas to whom the preceding Sutra had referred —
so that the Ka«vas would be distinguished from themselves
as it were — is altogether impossible.

The result of this closer consideration of the first set of

xc vedanta-sOtras.

SQtras, alleged by .Saiikara to concern the owner of the
higher knowledge of Brahman, entitles us to view with some
distrust 6"ahkara's assertion that another set also — IV, 4,
1-7 — has to be detached from the general topic of the
fourth adh}'aya, and to be understood as depicting the
condition of those who have obtained final absolute release.
And the Sutras themselves do not tend to weaken this
preliminary want of confidence. In the first place their
wording also gives no indication whatever of their having
to be separated from what precedes as well as what follows.
And, in the second place, the last Sutra of the set (7)
obliges 5ahkara to ascribe to his truly released souls
qualities which clearly cannot belong to them ; so that
he finally is obliged to make the extraordinary state-
ment that those qualities belong to them ' vyavaharape-
kshaya,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikarawa is
said to be the description of the truly released soul for
which no vyavahara exists ! Very truly 5ahkara's com-
mentator here remarks, 'atra kek'in muhyanti akha;/^a-
/{4nmatra^/7anan muktasya^;7anabbavat kuta a^wanika-
dharmayoga//,' and the way in which thereupon he himself
attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not
improve matters.

In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet
in the fourth adhyaya with another passage, which indeed
has no direct bearing on the distinction of apara and para
vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as
another and altogether undoubted instance of vSarikara's
interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the
Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the
opinions of three different teachers on the question to which
Brahman the soul of the vidvan repairs on death, or —
according to Ramanu^a — the worshippers of which Brah-
man repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanu^a treats
the views of Badari and 6^aimini as two purvapakshas, and
the opinion of Badaraya/za — which is stated last — as the
siddhanta. ^"ahkara, on the other hand, detaching the Sutras
in which Badaraya;za's view is set forth from the preceding
part of the adhikara;/a (a proceeding which, although not

INTRODUCTION. XCl

plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegiti-
mate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded
first, represents the siddhanta, while Caimini's view, set
forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere purva-
paksha. This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it
being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as
well as the Purva Mimawsa-sutras to conclude the dis-
cussion of contested points with the statement of that view
which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is
so patent that ^aiikara feels himself called upon to defend
his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4,
13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but
such as are valid only if vS'ahkara's system itself is already
accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to
think, no choice but to side with Ramanu^a as to the
general subject-matter of the fourth adhyaya of the Sutras.
We need not accept him as our guide in all particular
interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that
the Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate
of one and the same vidvan, and do not afford any basis
for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of
Brahman in ,5"ankara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a
higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the dis-
tinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not
valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the
negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding
which the entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be
consulted. And intimately connected with this investiga-
tion— in fact, one with it from a certain point of view — is
the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of
their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle
of illusion, by the association with which the highest
Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the
lower Brahman or l.fvara. That Ramanu^^a denies the
distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya
we have seen above ; we shall, however, in the subsequent
investigation, pay less attention to his views and inter-

Xcii VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

pretations than to the indications furnished by the Siitias
themselves.

Placing myself at the point of view of a 5ankara, I am
startled at the outset by the second Sutra of the first
adhyaya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman.
'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i. e. the
sustcntation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What,
we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define? — That Brah-
man, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first
Sutra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta ;
that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final
release ; that Brahman in fact which 5arikara calls the
highest. — But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest
Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the
world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors
were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher
absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Maya
or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an
altogether different type. I need only remind the reader
of the current definition of Brahman as sa/i'--('id-ananda, or,
to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory
.flokas of the Fau/cadasi dilating on the sawvid svayam-
prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all
time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes
(P. D. I, 7), ' That from which the world proceeds ' can by
a 6"ankara be accepted only as a definition of Ij-vara, of
Brahman which by its association with Maya is enabled to
project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly
is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a
definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition
there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a
remark made above, it is unlikely that they should con-
clude with a description of the state of those who know
the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from
obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we
discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brah-
man as one only, as the all-enfolding being which some-
times emits the world from its own substance and sometimes
again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its

INTRODUCTION. XCUl

various manifestations — a conception which need not by
any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the
Ramanu^as — the definition of Brahman given in the second
Sutra becomes altogether unobjectionable.

We next enquire whether the impression left on the
mind by the manner in which Badarayawa defines Brah-
man, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute
Brahman and a Brahman associated Avith Maya, is con-
firmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The
Sutras being throughout far from direct in their enun-
ciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms
and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning.
What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being
taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed
by the Sutrakara against the Sahkhya doctrine, which
maintains that the world has originated, not from an
intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhana.
The most important Sutras relative to this point are to be
met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those
Sutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by them-
selves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their
meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investiga-
tion. The sixth Sutra of the pada mentioned replies to the
Sahkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot
spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that ' it
is thus seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that
non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed
with intelligence; hair and nails, for instance, springing from
animals, and certain insects from dung. — Now, an argu-
mentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the
point of view of the true vSahkara. According to the latter
the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in
so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is
associated with Maya. Maya is the upadana of the material
world, and Maya itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing
to which it is by so many Vedantic writers identified with
the prakrz'ti of the Sahkhyas. Similarly the illustrative
instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing
that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub-

Xciv VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Stances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and
that hence the material world also, when being refunded
into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections,
are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with
the doctrine of J\Iaya, according to which the material
world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than
during the period of its subsistence. According to vSahkara
the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms
into which the up^dana of the world, i.e. Maya, had
modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose
relation to Brahman is not changed thereby. — The illus-
tration, again, given in Sutra 24 of the mode in which Brah-
man, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into
the world without employing any extraneous instruments
of action, ' kshiravad dhi,' ' as milk (of its own accord turns
into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to
bring nearer to our understanding the mode in w'hich
Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world ;
and also the analogous instance given in the Sutra next
following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots,
&c. by the mere power of their will) ' — which refers to the
real creation of real things — would hardly be in its place if
meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be
the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of
the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances
(kshiravad dhi ; dev^divat), moreover, seems to show that
the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite
theory as to the particular mode in which the world
springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render
plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being
can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having
recourse to any extraneous means ^

That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of
the Sutrakara, further appears from the latter part of the
fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that
Brahman is not only the operative but also the material
cause of the w^orld. If anywhere, there would have been

* 5'ankara's favonrite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive
sights is — significantly enough — not known to the Sutras.

INTRODUCTION. XCV

the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that
Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya
only, and that the world is unreal ; but the Sutras do not
contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26, on the other
hand, exhibits the significant term ' pari;^amat ;' Brahman
produces the world by means of a modification of itself It
is well known that later on, when the terminology of the
Vedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pariwamavada'
was used to denote that very theory to which the followers
of .Saiikara are most violently opposed, viz, the doctrine
according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an
illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brah-
man undergoing a real change, may that change be con-
ceived to take place in the way taught by Ramanu^a or in
some other manner. — With regard to the last-quoted Sutra,
as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators
indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of ex-
pression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are
in reality reconcilable with it ; to Sutra 26, for instance,
Govindananda remarks that the term ' pariwama ' only
denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying
that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are
fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not
compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators,
such as Rdmanu^a, are satisfied to take ' pariz/ama ' and
similar terms in their generally received sense.

A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is
met with in III, 2, 1 1 ff. It is, according to ^Sahkara's view,
of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brah-
man is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with
qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upadhis), the
offspring of Maya. I have above (in the conspectus of
contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole
section as interpreted by .Sarikara on the one hand, and
Ramanu^a on the other hand, from which it appears that
the latters opinion as to the purport of the group of Sutras
widely diverges from that of 6"ahkara. The wording of
the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it
impossible to decide which of the two commentators — if

XCvi VEDANTA-sf^TRAS.

indeed either — is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide ;
regarding the sense of some Sutras vSaiikara's explanation
seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Rama-
nu^a seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly
prefer, for instance, Ramanu^a's interpretation of Sutra 22,
as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and
more especially with regard to the term ' prakr/taitavat-
tvam,' whose proper force is brought out by Ramanu^a's
explanation only. So much is certain that none of the
Siltras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by
.Sahkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly
miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is
thus by no means improbable that the section is one of
those — perhaps not few in number — in which both inter-
preters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and
to tradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya;/a's
Sutras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philo-
sophic theories.

With special reference to the Maya doctrine one impor-
tant Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which
the term 'maya' itself occurs, viz. Ill, 2, 3. According
to vSahkara the Sutra signifies that the environments of
the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i. e. unsub-
stantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the
character of real objects. Ramanu^a (as we have seen in
the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term
'maya,' but in judging of 5ahkara's views we may for the
time accept 5ahkara's own interpretation. Now, from the
latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams
are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing
the characteristics of reality, the objective world surround-
ing the w'aking soul must not be called Maya. But that
the world perceived by waking men is Maya, even in a
higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming con-
sciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the 5ankara Vedanta ;
and the Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya;/a did
not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world,
or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used
the term ' maya ' in a sense altogether different from that

INTRODUCTION. XCVll

in which vSaiikara employs it. — If, on the other hand, we,
with Ramanii^a, understand the word ' maya ' to denote
a w^onderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing what-
ever on the doctrine of Maya in its later technical sense.

We now turn to the question as to the relation of the
individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sutras indicate any-
where that their author held 5ankara's doctrine, according
to which the^iva is in reality identical with Brahman, and
separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to
avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the souls,
although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute
elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual exist-
ence apart from it ? This question is in fact only another
aspect of the Maya question, but yet requires a short
separate treatment.

In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the
Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed
can hardly be understood in 6"ankara's sense, and rather
seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rama-
nu^a, that the soul is of minute size. We have further seen
that Sutra 1 8 of the third pada of the second adhyaya, which
describes the soul as *^/7a,' is more appropriately under-
stood in the sense assigned to it by Ramanu^a ; and, again,
that the Siltras which treat of the soul being an agent, can
be reconciled with 5ankara's views only if supplemented
in a way which their text does not appear to authorise. —
We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the
soul is distinctly said to be a part (amsa) of Brahman, and
which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in
with ^ahkara's views only if awj-a is explained, altogether
arbitrarily, by 'aj/isa. iva,' while Ramanu^a is able to take the
Sutra as it stands. — We also have already referred to Sutra
50,'abhasa eva ka.,' which 5ankara interprets as setting forth
the so-called pratibimbavada according to which the indi-
vidual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self. But
almost every Sutra — and Sutra 50 forms no exception — being
so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of
various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe
method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous
[34] " g

xcviii vedanta-sCtras.

aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work,
and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favour-
able to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 50,
if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with SOtra
43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman?
For that 43 contains, as vSankara and his commentators
aver, a statement of the avaHV^edavada, can itself be ac-
cepted only if we interpret a;//ja by awi^a iva, and to do so
there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that
Ramanu^a's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is
accepted by several other commentators also) does not
appear to me particularly convincing ; and the Siltras
unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of
which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the
term abhasa, which may mean ' reflection,' but may mean
hetvabhasa, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things
stand, this one S{itra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to
as proving that the pratibimbavada which, in its turn, pre-
supposes the mayavada, is the teaching of the Sutras.

To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the
doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the
individual soul in the sense of 5'ankara, we are further led
by some other indications to be met with here and there
in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had
occasion to direct attention to the important SOtra II, i, 22,
which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i. e.
additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since
Scripture declares the two to be different. Analogously
I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the j-arira is not the
antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the
Ka;/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena
enam adhiyate), and in 22 the i-arira and the pradhana are
referred to as the two ' others ' (itarau) of whom the text
predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the
highest Lord. The word ' itara ' (the other one) appears
in several other passages (I, i, i6; I, 3, i6; II, i, 21) as a
kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in con-
tradistinction from the Lord. The 5ahkaras indeed main-
tain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction

INTRODUCTION. XCIX

due to avidya. But this is just what we should hke to see
proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more
than a reference to the system which demands that the
Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the inter-
pretations of the school of 5ahkara,it remains altogether un-
intelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what
^ahkara is anxious again and again to point out at length,
viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of
exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student
who does not keep in view what its nature is. If other
reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara was
anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a
sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept
vSarikara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons
are forthcoming ; nowhere among the avowed followers of
the 5ahkara system is there any tendency to treat the
kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously
guarded and hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau-
rt'apada down to the most modern writer, consider it their
most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again
in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all
appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord
and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all
knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value.

There remains one more important passage concern-
ing the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self,
a passage which attracted our attention above, when
we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of
opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean
I, 4, 20-22, which three Sutras state the views of A.yma-
rathya, Aurt'ulomi, and Kaj-akr/tsna as to the reason why,
in a certain passage of the Br/hadara/zyaka, characteristics
of the individual soul arc ascribed to the highest Self. The
siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22, 'avasthiter iti Kaj-a-
kr/tsna/^,' i. e. Ka.fak7'ztsna (accounts for the circumstance
mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or
abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' vSahkara understands
the Lord's abiding as, i.e. existing as — or in the condition of
— the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enuncia-

g2

VEDANTA-St^TRAS.

tion of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the
highest Self, 'avikr/ta// paramej-varo^ivo nanya//.' Rama-
nu^a, on the other hand, likewise accepting Kaj-akr/tsna's
opinion as the siddhanta view, explains ' avasthiti ' as the
Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul, as de-
scribed in the antaryamin-brahma;/a. — We can hardly main-
tain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning
ascribed to it by vSaiikara, viz. special state or condition, but
so much must be urged in favour of Ramanu^a's interpreta-
tion that in the five other places where avasthiti (or ana-
vasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4 ; II, 2,
13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent
abiding or permanent abode within something.

If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the pre-
ceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sutras, I must
give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinc-
tion of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman ; that
they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and
Ij-vara in vSaiikara's sense ; that tliey do not hold the
doctrine of the unreality of the world ; and that they do
not, with 5ankara, proclaim the absolute identity of the
individual and the highest Self I do not wish to advance
for the present beyond these negative results. Upon
Ramanu^a's mode of interpretation— although I accept it
without reserve in some important details — I look on the
whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means
of criticising vSankara's explanations than in guiding us
throughout to the right understanding of the text. The
author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature
of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of
wS'aiikara, and yet not agreeing in all points with those of
Ram^nu^a. If, however, the negative conclusions stated
above should be well founded, it would follow even from
them that the system of Badaraya;?a had greater affinities
with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanu^^a than with the
one of which the vSahkara-bhashya is the classical exponent.

It appears from the above review of the teaching of the
Sutras that only a comparatively very small proportion
of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment

INTRODUCTION. CI

as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine advocated
by Badaraya;/a. The reason of this is that the greater
part of the work is taken up with matters which, according
to wSahkara's terminology, form part of the so-called lower
knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical questions
in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is not
without significance. In later works belonging to .Sahkara's
school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidya
is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are
treated with great shortness ; and rightly so, for they are
unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i. e. final
release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that
the subjects of the so-called lower vidya are treated very
fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we observe, for instance,
the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the
unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called sagu;/a, i. e.
lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the fact of
almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the
ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidya ; we cer-
tainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what
6"ahkara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed
in Badarayawa's opinion part of that knowledge higher than
which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the
fullest and most detailed exposition.

The question as to what kind of system is represented
by the Vedanta-sutras may be approached in another way
also. While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to
the meaning of the Sutras by means of the different com-
mentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first
place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras
what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teach-
ing the Sutras doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might
be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to
embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at
the least highly probable that that very same doctrine — of
whatever special nature it may be — is hidden in the enig-
matical aphorisms of Badaraya;/a ^.

I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation

' Cp. Cough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.

cii VEDANTA-S{)TRAS.

a safe one. Even if it could be shown that the teaching of
all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a
subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we
should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to
assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine. What-
ever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there
remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have
existed since very ancient times not one but several essen-
tially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the dis-
tinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of
the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras. Let us suppose,
for argument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Maya
is distinctly enunciated in the Upanishads ; nevertheless
Ramanu^a and, for all we know to the contrary, the whole
series of more ancient commentators on whom he looked
as authorities in the interpretation of the Sutras, denied
that the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence by no
means impossible that Badaraya;/a should have done the
same. The a priori style of reasoning as to the teaching
of the Sutras is therefore without much force.

But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the
meaning of the Sutras there, of course, remains for us the
all-important question as to the true teaching of the Upa-
nishads, a question which a translator of the Sutras and
wSankara cannot afford to pass over in silence, especially
after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the
Sutras and the 5ahkara-bhashya do not agree concerning
most important points of Vedantic doctrine. The Sutras
as well as the later commentaries claim, in the first place,
to be nothing more than systematisations of the Upani-
shads, and for us a considerable part at least of their value
and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the further
question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upa-
nishads has been most adequately systematised, whether
by Badaraya/^a, or .Sahkara, or Ramanu^'-a, or some other
commentator. This question requires to be kept altogether
separate from the enquiry as to which commentator most
faithfully renders the contents of the Sutras, and it is by
no means impossible that .Sahkara, for instance, should in

INTRODUCTION. Clll

the end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with
regard to the teaching of the Upanishads than concerning
the meaning of the Sutras,

We must remark here at once that, whatever commenta-
tor may be found to deserve preference on the whole, it
appears fairly certain already at the outset that none of the
systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded in erecting
on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its
entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the
Upanishads themselves. To the Hindu commentator and
philosopher the Upanishads came down as a body of
revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other, to
be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contra-
dictions ; a system had to be devised in which a suitable
place could be allotted to every one of the multitudinous
statements which they make on the various points of
Vedantic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in
fact to any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine
of i'ruti, it will certainly appear that all such attempts stand
self-condemned. If anything is evident even on a cursory
review of the Upanishads — and the impression so created
is only strengthened by a more careful investigation — it is
that they do not constitute a systematic whole. They
themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmis-
takable indications on that point. Not only are the
doctrines expounded in the different Upanishads ascribed
to different teachers, but even the separate sections of one
and the same Upanishad are assigned to different authorities.
It would be superfluous to quote examples of what a
mere look at the KMndogya. Upanishad, for instance,
suffices to prove. It is of course not impossible that even
a multitude of teachers should agree in imparting precisely
the same doctrine ; but in the case of the Upanishads that
is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the first
place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines
of the Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sec-
tions of Brahminical society, to different Vedic ^akhas ;
nay, some of them the tradition makes out to have been
kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the period, whose

civ VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a
creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to
the analogy of later periods of Indian philosophic de-
velopment. The later philosophic schools as, for instance,
the one of which 5ahkara is the great representative,
were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly
bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred,
which could not be changed or added to, but merely sys-
tematised and commented upon. Hence the rigorous
uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those schools. But
there had been a time when, what later writers received as
a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course
of their speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative
thinkers not fettered by the tradition of any school, but
freely following the promptings of their own heads and
hearts. By the absence of school traditions, I do not in-
deed mean that the great teachers who appear in the
Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and
to assign to their speculations any direction they chose ;
for nothing can be more certain than that, at the period as
the outcome of whose philosophical activity the Upanishads
have to be considered, there were in circulation certain
broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every
member of Brahminical society. But those ideas were
neither very definite nor worked out in detail, and hence
allowed themselves to be handled and fashioned in different
ways by diff"erent individuals. With whom the few leading
conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads
first originated, is a point on which those writings themselves
do not enlighten us, and v.'hich we have no other means
for settling ; most probably they are to be viewed not
as the creation of any individual mind, but as the gradual
outcome of speculations carried on by generations of
Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any
rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which
may be seized and moulded into new forms by any one
who feels within himself the required inspiration. A
certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden
being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be

INTRODUCTION. CV

spread everywhere, and often issues from the most unex-
pected sources. 5vetaketu receives instruction from his
father Uddalaka ; the proud Gargya has to become the
pupil of A^ataj-atru, the king of Ka^-i ; Bhu^yu Sahya-
yani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva
possessing a maiden ; Satyakama learns Avhat Brahman
is from the bull of the herd he is tending, from Agni
and from a flamingo ; and Upakoi^ala is taught by the
sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of course
legend, not history ; but the fact that the philosophic
and theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed
in this legendary garb certainly does not strengthen the ex-
pectation of finding in them a rigidly systematic doctrine.

And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upani-
shads amply confirms this preliminary impression. If we
avail ourselves, for instance, of M. Paul Regnaud's Materiaux
pour servir a THistoire de la Philosophie de I'lnde, in which
the philosophical lucubrations of the different Upanishads
are arranged systematically according to topics, we can see
with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general
leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in
details, and very often not unimportant details. A look,
for instance, at the collection of passages relative to the
origination of the world from the primitive being, suffices to
show that the task of demonstrating that whatever the
Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a
homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The
accounts there given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt,
to different stages of philosophic and theological development
or else to different sections of priestly society. None but
an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be inclined and
sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for in-
stance, the legend of the atman purushavidha, the Self in
the shape of a person which is as large as man and woman
together, and then splits itself into two halves from which
cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are produced in succession
(Bri. Up. I, I, 4), can be reconciled with the account given
of the creation in the AV/andogya Upanishad, where it is
said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat,

cvi vedanta-sOtras.

' that which is,' and that feeling a desire of being many it
emitted out of itself ether, and then all the other elements
in due succession. The former is a primitive cosmogonic
myth, which in its details shows striking analogies with the
cosmogonic myths of other nations ; the latter account is
fairly developed Vedanta (although not Vcdanta implying
the Maya doctrine). We may admit that both accounts
show a certain fundamental similarity in so far as they
derive the manifold world from one original being ; but
to go beyond this and to maintain, as ^aiikara does, that the
atman purushavidha of the Br/hadaraz/yaka is the so-called
Virao- of the latter Vedanta — implying thereby that that
section consciously aims at describing only the activity of
one special form of Ijvara, and not simply the whole pro-
cess of creation — is the ingenious shift of an orthodox
commentator in difficulties, but nothing more.

How all those more or less conflicting texts camiC
to be preserved and handed down to posterity, is not
difficult to understand. As mentioned above, each of the
great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own
sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there
existed more ancient texts which it was impossible to dis-
card when deeper and more advanced speculations began
in their turn to be embodied in literary compositions, which
in the course of time likewise came to be looked upon as
sacred. When the creative period had reached its termina-
tion, and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in
hand, older and newer pieces were combined into wholes,
and thus there arose collections of such heterogeneous
character as the A'/zandogya and Brz"hadara;^yaka Upani-
shads. On later generations, to which the whole body of
texts came down as revealed truth, there consequently
devolved the inevitable task of establishing systems on
which no exception could be taken to any of the texts ;
but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one,
i. e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and
honestly, there really is no reason to deny.

For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the
different commentators employ in systematising the contents '

INTRODUCTION. CVll

of the Upanishads there is no room in this place. In order,
however, to illustrate what is meant by the ' impossibility,'
above alluded to, of combining the various doctrines of the
Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a certain
number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some
few at least of ^"ankara's interpretations, and to render clear
the considerations by which he is guided.

We begin with a case which has already engaged our
attention when discussing the meaning of the Stitras, viz.
the question concerning the ultimate fate of those who
have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we have
seen. 5ankara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to
an insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does
not, at the moment of death, pass out of the body, but is
directly merged in Brahman by a process from which all
departing and moving, in fact all considerations of space,
are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other
hand, who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower
qualified Brahman departs from the body by means of the
artery called sushum;/a, and following the so-called devayana,
the path of the gods, mounts up to the world of Brahman.
A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which vSahkara
founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.

In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads
contrast the fate of two classes of men, viz. of those
who perform sacrifices and meritorious works only, and of
those who in addition possess a certain kind of knowledge.
Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon,
where they live for a certain time, and then return to the
earth into new forms of embodiment ; persons of the latter
kind proceed on the path of the gods — on which the sun
forms one stage — up to the world of Brahman, from which
there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are
KL Up. V, 10 ; Kaush. Up. I. 2 ff. ; Mu;/./. Up. I, 2, 9 ff ;
Br/. Up. VI, 2, 15 ff. ; Prai-na Up. I, 9 ff. — In other passages
only the latter of the two paths is referred to, cp. Kh. Up.
IV, 15 ; VIII, 6, 5 ; Taitt. Up. I, 6 ; Brz. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9 ; V, 10;
Maitr.Up.VI, 30, to mention only the more important ones.

Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows

cviii vedanta-sOtras.

I think, beyond any doubt, that what is meant there by the
knowledge which leads through the sun to the world of
Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the devotee is
capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his know-
ledge enables him to proceed denotes the highest state
which he can ever reach, the state of final release, if we
choose to call it by that name. — KJi. Up. V, lo says, 'Those
who know this (viz. the doctrine of the five fires), and those
who in the forest follow faith and austerities go to light,'
&c. — Kh. Up. IV, i^ is manifestly intended to convey the
true knowledge of Brahman ; Upakoi^ala's teacher himself
represents the instruction given by him as superior to the
teaching of the sacred fires. — Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the
old jloka which says that the man moving upwards by the
artery penetrating the crown of the head reaches the Im-
mortal.— Kaush. Up. I, 2 — which gives the most detailed
account of the ascent of the soul — contains no intimation
whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to
the Brahman world, being of an inferior nature. — Viwnd. Up.
I, 2, 9 agrees with the AV/andogya in saying that ' Those
who practise penance and faith in the forest, tranquil, wise,
and living on alms, depart free from passion, through the
sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is
imperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context coun-
tenances the assumption that not the highest knowledge
and the highest Person are there referred to. — Bn". Up.
IV, 4, 8 quotes old j-lokas clearly referring to the road
of the gods ('the small old path'), on which 'sages who
know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence
higher on as entirely free. — That path was found by Brah-
man, and on it goes whoever knows Brahman.' — Br/. Up.
VI, 2, 15 is another version of the Pa/z/^agnividya, with the
variation, ' Those who know this, and those who in the
forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c. — Praj-na
Up. 1, 10 says, ' Those who have sought the Self by penance,
abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path
Aditya, the sun. There is the home of the spirits, the im-
mortal free from danger, the highest. From thence they do
not return, for it is the end.' — Maitr. Up. VI, 30 quotes

INTRODUCTION. CIX

j-lokas, ' One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing
the solar orb : by it, having stepped beyond the world of
Brahman, they go to the highest path.'

All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The
soul of the sage who knows Brahman passes out by the
sushum;/i, and ascends by the path of the gods to the
world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some bliss-
ful state. But, according to 5ankara, all these texts are
meant to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge
only, of the knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even
in a passage apparently so entirely incapable of more than
one interpretation as Brz. Up. VI, 2, 15, the 'True,' which
the holy hermits in the forest are said to worship, is not to
be the highest Brahman, but only Hira;/yagarbha ! — And
why? — Only because the system so demands it, the system
which teaches that those who know the hisrhest Brahman

o

become on their death one with it, vv^ithout having to resort
to any other place. The passage on which this latter tenet is
chiefly based is Brz. Up. IV, 4, 6, 7, where, with the fate of him
who at his death has desires, and whose soul therefore
enters a new body after having departed from the old one,
accompanied by all the pra//as, there is contrasted the fate
of the sage free from all desires. ' But as to the man who does
not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in
his desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him
(tasya) do not depart — being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'
We have seen above (p. Ixxx) that this passage is referred
to in the important Sutras on whose right interpretation it,
in the first place, depends whether or not we must admit
the Sutrakara to have acknowledged the distinction of a para
and an apara vidya. Here the passage interests us as
throwing light on the way in which vSahkara systematises.
He looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing
what happens to the souls of all those who do not know the
highest Brahman, inclusive of those who know the lower
Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies followed by
all pra;/as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand,
section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not
pass out of the body, but becomes one with Brahman then

ex VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

and there. This interpretation of the purport of the entire
chapter is not impossibly right, although I am rather in-
clined to think that the chapter aims at setting forth in its
earlier part the future of him who does not know Brahman
at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him
who does know Brahman (i. e. Brahman pure and simple,
the text knowing of no distinction of the so-called lower
and higher Brahman). In explaining section 6 6"ahkara
lays stress upon the clause ' na tasya pra;^a utkramanti,'
' his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify that
the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and
thus does not ascend to the world of Brahman ; while the
purport of the clause may simply be that the soul and vital
spirits do not go anywhere else, i. e. do not enter a new
body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman.
On vSahkara's interpretation there immediately arises a
new difficulty. In the j-lokas, quoted under sections S
and 9, the description of the small old path which leads to
the svargaloka and higher on clearly refers — as noticed
already above — to the path through the veins, primarily
the sushum«a, on which, according to so many other pas-
sages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path
is, according to 6'ankara, followed by him only who has
not risen above the lower knowledge, and yet the i-lokas
have manifestly to be connected with what is said in the
latter half of 6 about the owner of the para vidya. Hence
.Sahkara sees himself driven to explain the j'lokas in
iS and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in Professor
Max Muller's version) as follows :

b. ' The subtle old path (i. e. the path of knowledge on
which final release is reached ; which path is subtle, i. e.
difficult to know, and old, i. e. to be known from the eternal
Veda) has been obtained and fully reached by me. On it
the sages who know Brahman reach final release (svarga-
lokajabda// samnihitaprakara//at mokshabhidhayaka//).

9. ' On that path they say that there is white or blue or
yellow or green or red (i. c. others maintain that the path
to final release is, in accordance with the colour of the
arteries, either white or blue, &c. ; but that is false, for the

INTRODUCTION. CXI

paths through the arteries lead at the best to the world of
Brahman, which itself forms part of the sawsara) ; that
path (i. e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true
knowledge) is found by Brahman, i. e. by such Brahma;/as
as through true knowledge have become like Brahman,' &c.

A significant instance in truth of the straits to which
thorough-going systematisers of the Upanishads see them-
selves reduced occasionally!

But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests
us. Whether 6"ahkara's interpretation of the chapter, and
especially of section 6, be right or wrong, so much is
certain that we are not entitled to view all those texts
which speak of the soul going to the world of Brah-
man as belonging to the so-called lower knowledge, be-
cause a few other passages declare that the sage does
not go to Brahman. The text which declares the sage
free from desires to become one with Brahman could not,
without due discrimination, be used to define and limit the
meaning of other passages met with in the same Upanishad
even — for as we have remarked above the Br/hadarawyaka
contains pieces manifestly belonging to different stages of
development ; — much less does it entitle us to put arbitrary
constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads.
Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is
easy to understand. The older notion was that the soul of
the wise man proceeds along the path of the gods to Brah-
man's abode. A later — and, if we like, more philosophic — ■
conception is that, as Brahman already is a man's Self,
there is no need of any motion on man's part to reach
Brahman. We may even apply to those two views the
terms apara and para— lower and higher — knowledge. But
we must not allow any commentator to induce us to
believe that what he from his advanced standpoint looks
upon as an inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the
same light by the authors of the Upanishads.

We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching
upon the point considered in what precedes, viz. the second
Brahma«a of the third adhyaya of the Br/hadaraz/yaka.
The discussion there first turns upon the grahas and ati-

Cxii VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

grahas, i. e. the senses and organs and their objects, and
Ya^'-z/avalkya thereupon explains that death, by which
everything is overcome, is itself overcome by water ; for
death is fire. The colloquy then turns to what we must

A

consider an altogether new topic, Artabhaga asking, 'When
this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart
from him or not?' and Ya^;7avalkya answering, ' No, they
are gathered up in him ; he swells, he is inflated ; inflated
the dead (body) is lying.' — Now this is for .Saiikara an
important passage, as we have already seen above (p. Ixxxi) ;
for he employs it, in his comment on Ved.-siitra IV, 2, 13,
for the purpose of proving that the passage Bri. Up. IV,
4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment
of death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present
passage also must refer to him who possesses the highest
knowledge ; hence the ' ayam purusha ' must be ' that man,'
i. e. the man who possesses the highest knowledge, and the
highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding
clause which says that death itself may be conquered by
water. But, as Ramanu^a also remarks, neither does the
context favour the assumption that the highest knowledge
is referred to, nor do the words of section 11 contain
any indication that what is meant is the merging of the
Self of the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation
given by Ramanu^a himself, viz. that the pra/^as do not
depart from the ^iva of the dying man, but accompany it
into a new body, I can agree as little (although he no doubt
rightly explains the ' ayam purusha ' by ' man ' in general),
and am unable to see in the passage anything more than a
crude attempt to account for the fact that a dead body
appears swollen and inflated. — A little further on (section
13) Artabhaga asks what becomes of this man (ayam
purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire, his
breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much
here is clear that we have no right to understand by the
'ayam purusha' of section 13 anybody different from the
' ayam purusha ' of the two preceding sections ; in spite of
this vSankara — according to whose system the organs of the
true sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly

INTRODUCTION. CXlll

merged in Brahman — explains the ' ayam^ purusha ' of sec-
tion 13 to be the ' asa;;/yagdar^in,' i. e. the person who has
not risen to the cognition of the highest Brahman. And
still a further limiting interpretation is required by the
system. The asa;;^yagdarj-in also — who as such has to
remain in the sawsara — cannot do without the organs, since
his ^iva when passing out of the old body into a new one
is invested with the subtle body ; hence section 13 cannot
be taken as saying what it clearly does say, viz. that at
death the different organs pass into the different elements,
but as merely indicating that the organs are abandoned by
the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them !

The whole third adhyaya indeed of the B;'/hadara//}'aka
affords ample proof of the artificial character of 6'arikara's
attempts to show that the teaching of the Upanishads
follows a definite system. The eighth brahma/za, for in-
stance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest non-
related Brahman, while the preceding brahma/ms had treated
only of Ij-vara in his various aspects. But, as a matter of
fact, brahma;/a 8, after having, in section 8, represented
Brahman as destitute of all qualities, proceeds, in the next
section, to describe that very same Brahman as the ruler of
the world, ' By the command of that Imperishable sun and
moon stand apart,' &c. ; a clear indication that the author
of the Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower
Brahman in 5ahkara's sense. — The preceding brahma;/a (7)
treats of the antaryamin, i. e. Brahman viewed as the internal
ruler of everything. This, according to .Sahkara, is the
lewder form of Brahman called Ij'vara ; but we observe that
the antaryamin as well as the so-called highest Brahman
described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two
sections, characterised by means of the very same terms
(7, 23 : Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There
is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, &c. ;
and 8, 1 1 : That Brahman is unseen but seeing, unheard but
hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that
hears but it, &c.). — Nothing can be clearer than that all
these sections aim at describing one and the same being,
and know nothing of the distinctions made by the developed

[34] h

Cxiv YEDANTA-StjTRAS.

Vedanta. however valid the latter may be from a purely
philosophic point of view.

We may refer to one more similar instance from the
AV/andogya Upanishad. We there meet in III, 14 with
one of the most famous vidyas describing the nature of
Brahman, called after its reputed author the vSa/zrt'ilya-vidya.
This small vidya is decidedly one of the finest and most
characteristic texts ; it would be difficult to point out
another passage setting forth with greater force and elo-
quence and in an equally short compass the central doctrine
of the Upanishads. Yet this text, which, beyond doubt,
gives utterance to the highest conception of Brahman's
nature that ^'awr/ilya's thought was able to reach, is by
vSahkara and his school again declared to form part of the
lower vidya only, because it represents Brahman as possess-
ing qualities. It is, according to their terminology, not
^;7ana, i. e. knowledge, but the injunction of a mere upasana,
a devout meditation on Brahman in so far as possessing
certain definite attributes such as having light for its form,
having true thoughts, and so on. The Ramanu^as, on the
other hand, quote this text with preference as clearly
describing the nature of their highest, i. e. their one Brah-
man. We again allow that 5ankara is free to deny that
any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies abso-
lute truth ; but we also again remark that there is no reason
whatever for supposing that Sa.)idi\ya, or whoever may have
been the author of that vidya, looked upon it as anything
else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man.

We return to the question as to the true philosophy of
the Upanishads, apart from the systems of the commen-
tators.— From what precedes it will appear with sufficient
distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy a philo-
sophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all
contradictions and allowing room for all the different state-
ments made in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of
the Upanishads cannot even be spoken of. The various
lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the human soul of
which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to
be systematiscd simply because they were never meant to

INTRODUCTION. CXV

form a system. ^aWilya's views as to the nature of
Brahman did not in all details agree with those of Ya^;7a-
valkya, and Uddalaka differed from both. In this there is
nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests alto-
gether with those who maintain that a large number of
detached philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed
to different authors, doubtless belonging to different periods,
and not seldom manifestly contradicting each other, admit
of being combined into a perfectly consistent whole.

The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we
take the terms ' philosophy ' and 'philosophical system,' not
in the strict sense in which 5ahkara and other commentators
are not afraid of taking them, but as implying merely an
agreement in certain fundamental features. In this latter
sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of
a philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that
precision in details is not to be aimed at. And here we
finally see ourselves driven back altogether on the texts
themselves, and have to acknowledge that the help we
receive from commentators, to whatever school they may
belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be
asserted that the texts on the whole oppose very serious
difficulties to a right understanding, however obscure the
details often are. Concerning the latter we occasionally
depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by the
scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the
texts are concerned, we are quite able to judge by our-
selves, and are even specially qualified to do so by having
no particular system to advocate.

The point we will first touch upon is the same from which
we started when examining the doctrine of the Sutras, viz.
the question whether the Upanishads acknowledge a higher
and lower knowledge in vSahkara's sense, i. e. a knowledge
of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we find not to
be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently
opposed to avidya, by which latter term we have to under-
stand ignorance as to Brahman, absence of philosophic
knowledge ; and, again, in several places we find the know-
ledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supple-

h 2

cxvi vedanta-sOtras.

mentary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge
of the Self; to which latter distinction the ]\Iu;/(^/aka Up.
(I. 4) applies the terms apara and para vidya. But a formal
recognition of the essential difference of Brahman being
viewed, on the one hand, as possessing distinctive attributes,
and, on the other hand, as devoid of all such attributes is not
to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed sometimes
described as sagu;/a and sometimes as nirgu;^a (to use later
terms) ; but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinc-
tion of two different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether
diftcrent results. The knowledge of Brahman is one, under
whatever aspects it is viewed ; hence the circumstance
(already exemplified above) that in the same vidyas it is
spoken of as sagu;/a as well as nirgu;/a. When the mind
of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from
which all this world originates, and in which it rests, he
naturally applies to it distinctive attributes pointing at its
relation to the world ; Brahman, then, is called the Self and
life of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so on.
When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea
that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious
reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an
outward manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or
term derived from sensible experience can rightly be applied
to it. that nothing more may be predicated of it but that it
is neither this nor that. But these are only two aspects of
the cognition of one and the same entity.

Closely connected with the question as to the double
nature of the Brahman of -the Upanishads is the question
as to their teaching Maya. — From Colebrooke downwards
the majority of European WTiters have inclined towards the
opinion that the doctrine of Maya, i.e. of the unreal illusory
character of the sensible world, does not constitute a feature
of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads. but was
introduced into the system at some later period, whether by
Badaraya;/a or 6"ahkara or somebody else. The opposite
view, viz. that the doctrine of Maya forms an integral
element of the teaching of the Upanishads, is implied in
them everywhere, and enunciated more or less distinctly in

Introduction. cxvii

more than one place, has in recent times been advocated
with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his
Philosophy of the Upanishads.

In his Materiaux, &c. M. Paul Regnaud remarks that
' the doctrine of Maya, although implied in the teaching
of the Upanishads, could hardly become clear and explicit
before the system had reached a stage of development
necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent
eternal principles (which became the basis of the Sahkhya
philosophy), and accepting the predominance of the intel-
lectual principle, which in the end necessarily led to the
negation of the opposite principle.' — To the two alterna-
tives here referred to as possible we, however, have to add
a third one, viz. that form of the Vedanta of which the
theory of the Bhagavatas or Ramanu^as is the most
eminent type, and according to which Brahman carries
within its own nature an element from which the material
universe originates; an element which indeed is not an in-
dependent entity like the pradhana of the Sahkhyas, but
which at the same time is not an unreal Maya but quite as real
as any other part of Brahman's nature. That a doctrine of
this character actually developed itself on the basis of the Upa-
nishads, is a circumstance which we clearly must not lose sight
of, when attempting to determine what the Upanishads them-
selves are teaching concerning the character of the world.

In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the Maya
doctrine or not, we must proceed with the same caution as
regards other parts of the system, i. e. we must refrain from
using unhesitatingly, and without careful consideration of the
merits of each individual case, the teaching — direct or inferred
— of any one passage to the end of determining the drift of
the teaching of other passages. We may admit that some
passages, notably of the Brzhadara/zyaka, contain at any
rate the germ of the later developed Maya doctrine ^ and
thus render it quite intelligible that a system like 6'ahkara's

' It is well known that, with the exception of the 5vet£Lrvatara and Maitra-
yaniya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits the word ' maya.' The term indeed
occurs in one place in the Br^Tiadaraz/yaka ; but that passage is a quotation
from the Rik Sawhita in which maya means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Regnaud,
La Maya, in the Revue de I'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3 (1S85).

cxviii vedanta-sOtras.

should evolve itself, among others, out of the Upanishads ;
but that affords no valid reason for interpreting Maya into
other texts which give a very satisfactory sense without that
doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant to it. This remark
applies in the very first place to all the accounts of the
creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the
illusional character of the world should have been hinted at,
at least, had that theory been held by the authors of those
accounts ; but not a word to that effect is met with any-
where. The most important of those accounts — the one
given in the sixth chapter of the i^//andogya Upanishad —
forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to
assume that the 'sending forth' of the elements from the
primitive Sat, which is there described at length, was by
the writer of that passage meant to represent a vivarta
rather than a pari;/ama, that the process of the origination
of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything else
but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the
primeval Self. The introductory words, addressed to
vSvetaketu by Uddalaka. which are generally appealed to as
intimating the unreal character of the evolution about to be
described, do not, if viewed impartially, intimate any such
thing ■^. For what is capable of being proved, and mani-
festly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of
the lump of clay and the nugget of gold, through which
there are known all things made of clay and gold ? Merely
that this whole world has Brahman for its causal substance,
just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen pot, and
gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process
through which any causal substance becomes an effect is
an unreal one. We — including Uddalaka — may surely say
that all earthen pots are in reality nothing but earth — the
earthen pot being merely a special modification (vikara) of
clay which has a name of its own — without thereby com-
mitting ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form,
which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into
a pot, is not real but a mere baseless illusion.

In the same light we have to view numerous other passages

^ ' As is demonstrated very satisfactorily b) Ramanu^a.

INTRODUCTION. CXIX

which set forth the successive emanations proceeding from
the first principle. When, for instance, we meet in the Ka//^a
Up. I, 3, lo, in the serial enumeration of the forms of exist-
ence intervening between the gross material world and the
highest Self (the Person), with the ' av}'akr/ta,' the Unde-
veloped, immediately below the purusha ; and when again
the Mwidaka. Up. II, i, 2, speaks of the • high Imperishable'
higher than which is the heavenly Person ; there is no
reason whatever to see in that ' Undeveloped ' and that
• high Imperishable ' anything but that real element in
Brahman from which, as in the Ramanu^a system, the
material universe springs by a process of real development.
We must of course render it quite clear to ourselves in what
sense the terms ' real ' and ' unreal ' have to be understood.
The Upanishads no doubt teach emphatically that the
material world does not owe its existence to any principle
independent from the Lord like the pradhana of the
Sarikhyas ; the world is nothing but a manifestation of the
Lord's wonderful power, and hence is unsubstantial, if we
take the term 'substance' in its' strict sense. And, again,
everything material is immeasurably inferior in nature to the
highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated, and
which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither
unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned
constitutes unreality in the sense in which the Maya of
^ahkara is unreal. According to the latter the whole
world is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as
the snake, for which a piece of rope is mistaken by the
belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined
snake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen.
But this is certainly not the impression left on the mind by
a comprehensive review of the Upanishads which dwells on
their general scope, and does not confine itself to the undue
urging of what may be implied in some detached passages.
The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the whole
world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge ;
the great error which they admonish us to relinquish isj
rather that things have a separate individual existence, and|
are not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects'

CXX VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do not say that true
knowledge sublates this false world, as J^ankara says, but
that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world
— the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression
of the Br/hadara;/yaka — and to become one with Brahman
in its highest form. ' We are to see everything in Brahman,
and Brahman in everything;' the natural meaning of this is,
'we are to look upon this whole world as a true manifesta-
tion of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.' .
The mayavadin has indeed appropriated the above saying
also, and interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory ; but
he is able to do so only by perverting its manifest sense.
For him it would be appropriate to say, not that every-
thing, we see is in Brahman, but rather that everything we
see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread
over it and hiding it from us.

Stress has been laid ^ upon certain passages of the
Br/hadarawyaka which seem to hint at the unreality of
this world by qualifying terms, indicative of duality or plur-
ality of existence, by means of an added ' iva,' i. e. ' as it were'
(yatranyad iva syat ; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati ; atma
dhyayativa lelayativa). Those passages no doubt readily
lend themselves to Maya interpretations, and it is by no
means impossible that in their author's mind there was
something like an undeveloped Maya doctrine. I must, how-
ever, remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of
easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the
theory of the unreality of the world. If Ya^;7avalkya refers
to the latter as that ' where there is something else as it
were, where there is duality as it were,' he may simply mean
to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which
the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed
to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one. all
things being one in so far as they spring from — and are
parts of — Brahman. This would in no way involve duality
or plurality being unreal in ^"ahkara's sense, not any more
than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because,
according to that philosopher, there is only one universal

^ Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 243 ff.

INTRODUCTION. CXXl

substance. And with regard to the clause ' the Self thinks
as it were' it has to be noted that according to the com-
mentators the ' as it were ' is meant to indicate that truly
not the Self is thinking, but the upadhis, i. e. especially the
manas with which the Self is connected. But whether
these upadhis are the mere offspring of Maya, as 5ahkara
thinks, or real forms of existence, as Ramanu^a teaches, is
an altogether different question.

I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations,
and am ready to admit that not impossibly those iva's'
indicate that the thought of the writer who employed them
was darkly labouring with a conception akin to — although
much less explicit than — the Maya of ^ahkara. But
what I object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few
passages of, after all, doubtful import should be employed
for introducing the Maya doctrine into other passages which
do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it ^.

The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads
we have to touch upon is the relation of the ^ivas, the in-
dividual souls to the highest Self. The special views
regarding that point held by .Sahkara and Ramanu^a
have been stated before. Confronting their theories with
the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit with-
out hesitation, that ^Sankara's doctrine faithfully represents
the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important
point at least, viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage
— whatever its original relation to Brahman may be — is in
the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the
universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly alluded to before,
has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain texts
of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the
path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells
for unnumbered years, i. e. for ever. Those texts, as a type
of which we may take the passage Kaushit. Up. I — the
fundamental text of the Ramanu^as concerning the soul's

' I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the .Svetajvatara
and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me
from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two
treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true
unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads.

CXxii VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

fate after death— belong to an earlier stage of philosophic
development ; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a con-
tinued individual existence. But mixed with texts of
this class there are others in which the final absolute
identification of the individual Self with the universal Self
is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who
knows Brahman and becomes Brahman ;' ' he who knows
Brahman becomes all this;' ' as the flowing rivers disappear
in the sea losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes
to the divine person.' And if we look to the whole, to the
prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine
embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the
Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently
and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being
merged in Brahman in the state of deep dreamless sleep.

It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching
of the Upanishads concerning the original relation of the
individual soul to the highest Self, although there can be
no doubt that it has to be viewed as proceeding from the
latter, and somehow forming a part of it. Negatively we
are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to v/hich
the soul is merely brahma bhrantam or brahma mayopa-
dhikam, is in no way countenanced by the majority of the
passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the
elements, described in the AV/andogya and referred to
above, is a real process — of which we saw no reason to
doubt— the ^iva atman with which the highest Self enters
into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or
emanation of Brahman itself

After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief ele-
ments of Vedantic doctrine according to the Upanishads, we
may briefly consider 5arikara's system and mode of inter-
pretation—with whose details we had frequent opportunities
of finding fault — as a whole. It has been said before that
the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upa-
nishads to a system consistent and free from contradic-
tions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once
being given, we are quite ready to admit that vSahkara's
system is most probably the best which can be devised.

INTRODUCTION. CXXIU

While unable to allow that the Upanishads recognise a
lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the dis-
tinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge
that the adoption of that distinction furnishes the inter-
preter with an instrument of extraordinary power for
reducing to an orderly whole the heterogeneous material
presented by the old theosophic treatises. This becomes
very manifest as soon as we compare 6"ahkara's system
with that of Ramanu^a. The latter recognises only one
Brahman which is, as we should say, a personal God, and
he therefore lays stress on all those passages of the Upani-
shads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a personal
God. such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages,
on the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent
Brahman as transcending all qualities, as one undifferenced
mass of impersonal intelligence, Ramanu^a is unable to
accept frankly and fairly, and has to misinterpret them
more or less to make them fall in with his system. The
same remark holds good with regard to those texts which
represent the individual soul as finally identifying itself
with Brahman ; Rimanu^a cannot allow a complete identi-
fication but merely an assimilation carried as far as possible.
Sahkara, on the other hand, by skilfully ringing the changes
on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to find
room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where
the text speaks of Brahman as transcending all attributes,
the highest doctrine is set forth. Where Brahman is called
the All-knowing ruler of the world, the author means to
propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And
where the legends about the primary being and its way of
creating the world become somewhat crude and gross,
Hirawyagarbha and Vira^ are summoned forth and charged
with the responsibility. Of Vira^ Mr. Gough remarks (p. ^5)
that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upani-
shads for the purusha of the ancient r/shis, the divine being
out of whom the visible and tangible world proceeded.
This is quite true if only we substitute for the ' poets of
the Upanishads' the framers of the orthodox Veddnta
system — for the Upanishads give no indication whatever

cxxlv vedanta-sOtras.

that by their purusha they understand not the simple old
purusha but the Vir3.^ occupying a definite position in a
highly elaborate system ; — but the mere phrase, 'providing a
place ' intimates with sufficient clearness the nature ofthe work
in which systematisers of thcVedantic doctrine are engaged,
^ahkara's method thus enables him in a certain way to
do justice to different stages of historical development, to
recognise clearly existing differences which other system-
atisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to
be made a further and even more important admission in
favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more
capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other
systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in
greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upani-
shads than those of other Vedantic s}'stems. Above we were
unable to allow that the distinction made by ^ahkara
between Brahman and li-vara is known to the Upanishads ;
but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining
the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made
between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu;za,
and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, 5ahkara
is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind.
The Brahman of the old Upanishads, from which the souls
spring to enjoy individual consciousness in their waking
state, and into which they sink back temporarily in the
state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in death, is
certainly not represented adequately by the strictly per-
sonal li-vara of Ramanu^a, who rules the world in wisdom and
mercy. The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little
stress upon personal attributes of their highest being, and
hence .S'ahkara is right in so far as he assigns to his Iiypo-
statised personal Ij-vara^ a lower place than to his absolute
Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing
spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate

* The Ij'vara who allots to the individual souls their new forms of embodiment
in strict accordance with their merit or demerit cannot be called anything else
but a personal God. That this personal conscious being is at the same time iden-
tified with the totality of the individual souls in the unconscious state of deep
dreamless sleep, is one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going
systematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid altogether.

INTRODUCTION. CXXV

of the soul, we have already remarked above. And although
the Ma}'a doctrine cannot, in my opinion, be said to form
part of the teaching of the Upanishads, it cannot yet be
asserted to contradict it openly, because the very point
which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the
physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls
originate, is left by the Upanishads very much in the dark.
The later growth of the Maya doctrine on the basis of the
Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I fully agree
with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there has
been no addition to the system from without but only a
development from within, no graft but only growth. The
lines of thought which finally led to the elaboration of the
full-blown Maya theory may be traced with considerable
certainty. In the first place, deepening speculation on
Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a
more and more strict sense, as implying not only the ex-
clusion of any second principle external to Brahman, but
also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in
the nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency
agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of texts from the
Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a
manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to
thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny at any rate
its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an unreal
principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated^ but
w^hich is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature
just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second
place, a more thorough following out of the conception
that the union with Brahman is to be reached through true
knowledge only, not unnaturally led to the conclusion that
what separates us in our unenlightened state from Brahman
is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an
act of knowledge ; is. in other words, nothing else but an
erroneous notion, an illusion. — A further circumstance which
may not impossibly have co-operated to further the de-
velopment of the theory of the world's unreality will be
referred to later on^.

^ That section of the introduction in which the point referred to in the text

CXXVl VEDANTA-SITRAS.

We have above been obliged to leave it an open question
what kind ofVedanta is represented by the Vedanta-siitras,
although reason was shown for the supposition that in some
important points their teaching is more closely related to
the system of Ramanu^^a than to that of ^aiikara. If so,
the philosophy of ^"ankara would on the whole stand
nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras
of Badaraya;/a. This would indeed be a somewhat un-
expected conclusion — for. judging a priori, we should be
more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true
doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya;/a to ^ari-
kara— but a priori considerations have ot course no weight
against positive evidence to the contrary. There are. more-
over, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and
theolog}' which help us better to appreciate the possibility
of Badarava;/a"s Sutras already setting forth a doctrine
that lays greater stress on the personal character of the
highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing
tendenc}- of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of
those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather
early period amalgamations with beliefs which most pro-
bably had sprung up in altogether different — priestly or
non-priestl}- — communities is a well-known circumstance ;
it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of
the early literar)- monuments in which an amalgamation of
the kind mentioned is obser\"able, viz. the Bhagavadgita.
The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a fusion of
the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in
a personal highest being — Kr/sh;/a or \*ish;/u — which in
many respects approximates very closely to the system of
the Bhagavatas ; the attempts of a certain set of Indian
commentators to explain it as setting forth pure \'edanta,
i. e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads. may simply
be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in
Badaraya;/a"s Stitras (at least according to the unanimous
explanations of the most eminent scholiasts oi different
schools) as inferior to 5ruti only in authority. The Sutras, .

is touched upon will I hope form part of the second volume of the translation.
The same remark applies to a point concerning which further information had
been promised above on page v.

INTRODUCTION, CXXVll

moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedantic por-
tions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book,
several of which represent forms ofVedanta distinctly dif-
fering from 6"ahkara's teaching, and closely related to the
system of the Bhagavatas.

Facts of this nature — from entering into the details of
which we are prevented by want of space — tend to mitigate
the prima facie strangeness of the assumption that the
Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate position
between the Upanishads and 5ahkara, should yet diverge
in their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gau</apada
and 5ahkara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox
reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of
belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads.
But although this form of doctrine has ever since vSahkara's
time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic
students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching
influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sym-
pathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after
all, are not so very different in India from what they are
elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those
who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence
in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost
for ever, who think it sweet ' to be wrecked on the ocean of
the Infinite^.' The only forms of Vedantic philosophy
which are — and can at any time have been — really popular,
are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has
somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and
the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and
faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the
part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread
influence are such as the Ramayan of Tulsidas. which lay no
stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inac-
cessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy
Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory prin-
ciple of Maya, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion

^ Cos! tra questa

Immensita s' annega il pensier niio,
E il naufrago m' e dolce in qxiesto mare.

Leopardi.

CXXvI VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

We have above been obliged to leave it an open question
what kind ofVedanta is represented by the Vedanta-sutras,
although reason was shown for the supposition that in some
important points their teaching is more closely related to
the system of Ramanu^^'a than to that of 5ahkara. If so,
the philosophy of 6"ahkara would on the whole stand
nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras
of Badarayawa. This would indeed be a somewhat un-
expected conclusion — for. judging a priori, w'e should be
more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true
doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya;/a to 5an-
kara — but a priori considerations have of course no weight
against positive evidence to the contrary. There are, more-
over, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and
theology which help us better to appreciate the possibility
of Badaraya;/a's Sutras already setting forth a doctrine
that lays greater stress on the personal character of the
highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing
tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of
those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather
early period amalgamations with beliefs which most pro-
bably had sprung up in altogether different — priestly or
non-priestly — communities is a well-known circumstance ;
it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of
the early literary monuments in which an amalgamation of
the kind mentioned is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgita.
The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a fusion of
the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in
a personal highest being — Kr/shwa or Vishwu — w^hich in
many respects approximates very closely to the system of
the Bhagavatas ; the attempts of a certain set of Indian
commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedanta,
i. e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply
be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in
Badaraya7/a's Siltras (at least according to the unanimous
explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of different
schools) as inferior to 5ruti only in authority. The Sutras,

is touched upon will I hope form part of the second volume of the translation.
The same remark applies to a point concerning which further information had
been promised above on page v.

INTRODUCTION. CXXVU

moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedantic por-
tions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book,
several of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly dif-
fering from ^"ahkara's teaching, and closely related to the
system of the Bhagavatas.

Facts of this nature— from entering into the details of
which we are prevented by want of space — tend to mitigate
the prima facie strangeness of the assumption that the
Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate position
between the Upanishads and ^aiikara, should yet diverge
in their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gau^T^apada
and ^aiikara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox
reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of
belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads.
But although this form of doctrine has ever since 6"ahkara's
time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic
students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching
influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sym-
pathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after
all, are not so very different in India from what they are
elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those
who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence
in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost
for ever, who think it sweet ' to be wrecked on the ocean of
the Infinite^.' The only forms of Vedantic philosophy
which are — and can at anytime have been — really popular,
are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has
somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and
the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and
faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the
part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread
influence are such as the Ramayan of Tulsidas. which lay no
stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inac-
cessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy
Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory prin-
ciple of Maya, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion

1 Cosl tra questa

Immensita s' annega il pensier niio,
E il naufrago m' e dolce in cjuesto mare.

Leopardi.

CXXviii VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

to one all-wise and merciful ruler, who is able and willing to
lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper.

The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not
aim at rendering that sense which their) author may have
aimed at conveying, but strictly follows 5ahkara's inter-
pretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees
with the views held by Badariya;/a has been discussed
above, with the result that for the present it must, on the
whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be
feasible to combine a translation of ^ahkara's commentary
with an independent version of the Sutras which it ex-
plains. Similar considerations have determined the method
followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads re-
ferred to in the Sutras and discussed at length by 5"ahkara.
There also the views of the commentator have to be followed
closely ; otherwise much of the comment would appear de-
void of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the
whole the critical translation published by Professor Max
Miiller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not
inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render
intelligible ^ahkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope
to find space in the introduction to the second volume of
this translation for making some general remarks on the
method to be followed in translating the Upanishads.

I regret that want of space has prevented me from
extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes
given are based, most of them, on the rikas composed
by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which is
unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.

My best thanks are due to Pa;^^its Rama Mijra 6"istrin
and Gangadhara Gastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College,
whom I have consulted on several difficult passages.
Greater still are my obligations to Pa/zrt'it Ke^ava vSastrin,
of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to
read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and
whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more
than one passage more definite or correct.

VEDANTA-SUTRAS

WITH

5ANKARA BHASHYA.

[34] ,^

^ANKARA'S INTRODUCTION.

FIRST ADHYAYA.
FIRST PAdA.

Reverence to the August Vasudeva !

It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object
and the subject ^ whose respective spheres are the notion of
the ' Thou ' (the Non-Ego 2) and the ' Ego,' and which are
opposed to each other as much as darkness and hght are,
cannot be identified. All the less can their respectiv^e
attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to
superimpose ^ upon the subject — whose Self is intelligence,
and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego — the
object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the
attributes of the object, and vice versa to superimpose the
subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In
spite of this it is on the part of man a natural* procedure —

^ The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence
(^it) ; the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature,
viz. bodies with their sense-organs, internal organs, and the objects
of the senses, i. e. the external material world.

^ The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the ' thou '
(yushmat), not the notion of the ' this ' or ' that ' (idam), in order
better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Lan-
guage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
the third person (' It is I,' ' I am he who,' &c. ; ete vayam, ime
vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the
first and second person.

^ Adhyasa, literally ' superimposition ' in the sense of (mistaken)
ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or
attributes not belonging to it. See later on.

* Natural, i. e. original, beginningless ; for the modes of speech

B 2

vedanta-sOtras.

which has its cause in wrong knowledge — not to distinguish
the two entities (object and subject) and their respective
attributes, although they are absoUitely distinct, but to
superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the
attributes of the other, and thus, coupHng the Real and the
UnreaP, to make use of expressions such as 'That am I,'
' That is mine-.' — But what have we to understand by the
term ' superimposition ? ' — The apparent presentation, in
the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something
previously observed, in some other thing ^.
■ Some indeed define the term ' superimposition ' as the
superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another
thing'*. Others, again, define superimposition as the error

and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed,
with the latter, from all eternity.

^ I. e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real
objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong
knowledge.

^ 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth,
&c., belong to my Self.'

^ Literally ' in some other place.' The clause ' in the form of
remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude
those cases where something previously observed is recognised in
some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic
character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow
again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Deva-
datta whom we first saw in Pa/aliputra again appears before us in
Mahishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object pre-
viously observed again presents itself to our senses ; while in mere
remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed
contact with the senses. IMere remembrance operates in the case
of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is
at the time not present but remembered only.

* The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of
adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are super-
imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-
of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the
case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him
for a piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in
adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ

I ADHYAYA, I PA DA.

founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that
which is superimposed from that on which it is super-
imposed \ Others-, again, define it as the fictitious as-
sumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing
on which something else is superimposed. But all these
definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition
as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in
another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view
which is exemplified by expressions such as the following :
' Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' ' The moon although
one only appears as if she were double.' But how is it
possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an
object there should be superimposed objects and their
attributes ? For every one superimposes an object only on
such other objects as are placed before him (i. e. in contact
with his sense organs), and you have said before that the
interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of
the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we
reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the
object of the notion of the Ego", and the interior Self is
well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive)
presentation*. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects

is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus
itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition.

^ This is the definition of the akhyativadins.

^ Some anyathakhyativadins and the IMadhyamikas according
to Ananda Giri.

^ The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayam-
prakaja, self-luminous, i. e. the subjective factor in all cognition.
But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is
limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Ne-
science, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross
bodies, i. e. in so far as it is ^iva, individual or personal soul. Cp.
Bhamati, pp. 22, 23: 'X'idatmaiva svayampraklyo^pi buddhyadivi-
shayaviX'X'/zurawat kalhaw/tid asmatpratyayavishayo ^ haz^/karaspada/;/
^iva iti ^a^antur iti ^a kshetra^wa iti Hkhyayate.'

* Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector
says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the
ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it

VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

can be superimposed only on such other objects as arc
before us, i. e. in contact with our sense-organs ; for non-
discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the
object of sensuous perception, dark-bhie colour.

Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self
being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.

This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider
to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true
nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimi-
nation of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they
call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge
(neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least
by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual
superimposition ^ The mutual superimposition of the Self
and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre-
supposition on which there base all the practical distinc-
tions— those made in ordinary life as w-ell as those laid
down by the Veda — between means of knowledge, objects
of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural
texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and
prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions),
or with fin:\l release^. — But how can the means of right

may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown),
but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not mani-
fested either by itself or by anything else. — It is known or mani-
fest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation
(aparokshatvat), i. e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we
have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different
way: asmatpratyayavishayatve^py aparokshatvad ekantenavishaya-
tvabbavat tasminn ahahkaradyadhyasa ity arthaA. Aparokshatvam
api kaij^id atmano nesh/am ity ajahkyaha prat3-agatmeti.

' Tatraiva/;/ sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara7ze sati. Bha. Tas-
minn adliyase uktaritya^vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud-
dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa// tena buddhyadi-
na^tmana va kmena^janayadidoshewa X'aitanyagu«ena Mtmanatma
va vastuto na svalpenapi yu^'-yate. Ananda Giri.

"^ Whether they belong to the karmakaWa, i. e. that part of the
Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^Hanaka/za^a, i. e.
that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA.

knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scrip-
tural texts have for their object that which is dependent
on Nescience ^ ? — Because, we reply, the means of right
knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per-
sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends
on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so
on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing
person. For without the employment of the senses, per-
ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot
operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body -) the senses v/
cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body
on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed ^.
Nor can, in the absence of all that ^, the Self which, in its
own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing
agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of
right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence
perception and the other means of right knowledge, and
the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de-
pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity
has for its presupposition the superimposition described
above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect
of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other
sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other
senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived
from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A
cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a
raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and
therefore moves away ; while she walks up to a man who
advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men
also — who possess a higher intelligence — run away when

^ It being of course the function of the means of right know-
ledge to determine Truth and Reality.

^ The Bhamati takes adhishManam in the sense of superintend-
ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super-
intending principle, i. e. the individual soul.

^ If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified
J with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.

* I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self
and the Non-Self and their attributes.

8 vedanta-sOtkas.

they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with
shouts and brandishing swords ; while they confidently
approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour.
We thus see that men and animals follow the same course
of procedure with reference to the means and objects of
knowledge. Now it is well-known that the procedure of
animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non-
Self) ; we therefore conclude that, as they present the
same appearances, men also — although distinguished by
superior intelligence — proceed with regard to perception
and so on, in the same way as animals do ; as long, that
is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non-
Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity
which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is
true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter
on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a
relation to another world ; yet that qualification does not
depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Vedanta-
texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants,
raised above the distinctions of the Brahma/za and Kshat-
triya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory exis-
tence. For such knowledge is useless and even contra-
dictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to
perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before
such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts
continue in their operation, to have for their object that
which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as
the following, ' A Brahmawa is to sacrifice,' are operative
only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed I
particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, out- ,
ward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition ;
we have to understand the notion of something in some
other thing we have already explained. (The superimpo-
sition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely
from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes
are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself
sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife,
children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attri-
butes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.

thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing,
walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if
he thinks ' I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.'
Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself
subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so
on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i. e. the
internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which,
in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the
internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is
the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal
organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on
this natural beginning — and endless superimposition, which
appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of
individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the
results of their actions), and is observed by every one.

With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion
which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the
knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of
the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the Vedanta-texts
have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called
vSariraka-mimawsa ^.

Of this Vedanta-mima;/zsa about to be explained by us
the first Sutra is as follows.

I. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

The word ' then ' is here to be taken as denoting imme-
diate consecution ; not as indicating the introduction of a
new subject to be entered upon ; for the enquiry into
Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman)
is not of that nature^. Nor has the word 'then' the sense

^ The Mimawsa, i. e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that
the embodied Self, i. e. the individual or personal soul is one with
Brahman. This jMimawsa being an enquiry into the meaning of the
Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta-mimawsa.

^ Nadhikarartha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha,^, kim
ayam athajabdo brahma^«aneX'X'/iaya// ki/7z vantarwitavi^arasya
athave^'^Z/avij-eshawa^wanasyarambhaitha/z. Nad}'a^ tasya mima;//-
sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasyaj /('ottaratra

lo vedanta-sOtras.

of auspiciousness (or blessing) ; for a word of that meaning
could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence.
The word ' then ' rather acts as an auspicious term by
being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at
the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as
said above. That the latter is its meaning follows more-
over from the circumstance that the relation in which the
result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of
the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate
consecution ^

If, then, the word ' then ' intimates immediate consecution
it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into
Brahman specially depends ; just as the enquiry into active
religious duty (which forms the subject of the Purva
Mimawsa) specially depends on the antecedent reading of
the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common
antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into
religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing
Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry
into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent
the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is
acquired by means of the Purva Mima7;^sa). To this
question we reply in the negative, because for a man who
has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is possible to
enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in
the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of
the word ' then ' to indicate order of succession ; a purport
which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one
enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other

pratyadhikara??am apratipadandt. Na dviiiyoithajabdenanantar-
yoktidvara vijish/adhikaryasamarpawe sadhanaX'atush/ayasampan-
nanam brahmadhitadvi/^arayor anarthitvad vi>^aranaranibhan na ka
vi^aravidhivaj-ad adhikari kalpya^ prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhi-
kari;jaj /'a vidhyapekshilopadhitvan na triiiya/i brahma^i^;7anasya-
nandasakshatkaratvenadhikaryatve^pyapradhanyad atha^abdasam-

A.

bandhat tasman narambliarthateti. Ananda Girl.

^ Any relation in which the result, i. e. here the enquiry into
Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect
may be comprised under the relation of ananlarya.

I ADHVAYA, I PADA, 1 . II

parts of the sacrificial animaP. (For the intimation of order
of succession could be intended only if the agent in both
cases were the same ; but this is not the case), because
there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious
duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the rela-
tion of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of
qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person
qualified- ; and because the result as well as the object of
the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of
active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and
that again depends on the performance of religious acts.
The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its
fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance
of any acts. Acts^of religious duty do not yet exist at the

are

time when they are enquired into, but are something to
be accomplished (in the future) ; for they depend on the
activity of man. In the Brahma-mimawsa, on the other
hand, the object of enquiry, i. e. Brahman, is something
already accomplished (existent), — for it is eternal, — and
does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries
differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective
fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts
on which active religious duty depends convey information
to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own
particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.) ; while the fundamental
texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without lay-
ing on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction
being their immediate result. The case is analogous to
that of the information regarding objects of sense which
ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the
senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be

^ He cuts off from the hearl, then from the tongue, then from
the breast.

"^ Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the
offering of the praya^g^as is to the darjapurwamasa-sacrifice, or where
one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering
of the darjapurwamasa qualifies a man for the performance of the
Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an inti-
mation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.

1 2 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is pro-
posed.— Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent condi-
tions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is
non-eternal ; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit
(of one s actions) both here and hereafter ; the acquirement
of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means \ and the
desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man
may, either before entering on an enquiry into active
religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into
Brahman and come to know it ; but not otherwise. The
word ' then ' therefore intimates that the enquiry into
Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above-
mentioned (spiritual) means.

The word ' therefore ' intimates a reason. Because the
Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and
similar performances which are means of happiness is non-
eternal (as, for instance, AV/. Up.VIII,i,6, 'As here on earth
whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes
in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious
duty '), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is
realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt.
Up. II, I, ' He who knows Brahman attains the highest ') ;
therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken
subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.

By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of
which will be given in the next Sutra (I, 1,2); it is therefore
not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote
something else, as. for instance, the brahminical caste. In the
Sutra the genitive case (' of Brahman ;' the literal translation
of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of knowledge
of Brahman ') denotes the object, not something generally
supplementary (j-esha -) ; for the desire of knowledge

^ The ' means ' in addition to jama and dama are discontinuance
of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering (titiksha),
attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and faith
(jraddha).

^ According to Pawini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case ex-
presses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary
to, or connected with, some other thing.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I. 13-

demands an object of desire and no other such object is
stated. — But why should not the genitive case be taken as
expressing the general complementary relation (to express
which is its proper office) ? Even in that case it might
constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the
general relation may base itself on the more particular
one. — This assumption, we reply, would mean that we
refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again
indirectly introduce it as the object ; an altogether needless
procedure. — Not needless ; for if we explain the words of
the Sutra to mean ' the desire of knowledge connected with
Brahman ' we thereby virtually promise that also all the
heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated. —
This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold
your interpretation. For the statement of some principal
matter already implies all the secondary matters connected
therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all
objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all
those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman
presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be men-
tioned, especially in the Sutra. Analogously the sentence
' there the king is going ' implicitly means that the king
together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation
(according to which the Sutra represents Brahman as the
direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture,
which directly represents Brahman as the object of the
desire of knowledge ; compare, for instance, the passage,
' That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to
know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1). With
passages of this kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive
case is taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it
in that sense. The object of the desire is the knowledge of
Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires having
reference to results ^ Knowledge thus constitutes the

^ In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be
separate ; so, for instance, when it is said ' gramaw ga^/c/iati,' the
village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the
village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and
result coincide.

14 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman |
is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension '
of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the
root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire
Sawsara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be
entertained.

But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known
(previously to the enquiry into its nature) ? If it is known
we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is
not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.

Wc reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is
all-knowing and endowed wdth all powers, whose essential
nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists.
For if we consider the derivation of the word ' Brahman,'
from the root br/h, ' to be great,' we at once understand
that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman ^. More-
over the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of
its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious
of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks ' I am not.'
If the existence of the Self were not known, every one /
would think ' I am not.' And this Self (of whose existence
all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally
known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it !
Not so, we reply ; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its
special nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas
'are of opinion that the mere body endowed with the quality "^
of intelligence is the Self; others that the organs endowed
with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the inter-
nal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere
momentary idea ; others, again, that it is the Void. Others,
again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge
the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a trans-
migrating being different from the body, and so on, which is
both agent and eajoyer (of the fruits of action) ; others teach

^ That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the
Brahma-mimawsa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c.,
and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's
chief attributes.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 1 5

that that being is enjoying only, not acting ; others believe
that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all-
knowing, all-powerful Lord^. Others, finally, (i. e. the
Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the en-
joyer (i. e. of the individual soul whose individual existence
is apparent only, the product of Nescience).

Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of
them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of
them on fallacious arguments and scriptural texts mis-
understood ^. If therefore a man would embrace some one
of these opinions without previous consideration, he would
bar himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous
loss. For this reason the first Sutra proposes, under the
designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of
the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with the help of con-
formable arguments, and having for its aim the highest
beatitude.

So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired
into. The question now arises what the characteristics of
that Brahman are, and the reverend author of the Sutras
therefore propounds the following aphorism.

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c.
(i. e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this
(world proceed).

The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption.
That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends
on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural
development of a substance. Scripture declares the order

^ The three last opinions are those of the followers of the
Nyaya, the Sahkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The
three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic
schools ; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philo-
sophers.

"^ As, for instance, the passages ' this person consists of the
essence of food ; ' ' the eye, &c. spoke ; ' ' non-existing this was in
the beginning,' &c.

1 6 VEDAN TA-sCtRAS.

of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the
passage, Taitt. Up. Ill, i, 'From whence these beings are
born,' &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it
is known that a substrate of quaHtics can subsist and be
dissolved only after it has entered, through origination,
on the state of existence. The words ' of this ' denote
that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by
perception and the other means of right knowledge ; the
genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin,
&c. The words ' from which ' denote the cause. The full
sense of the Sutra therefore is : That omniscient omnipotent
cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolu-
tion of this world — which world is differentiated by names
and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode
of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite
places, times, and causes^, and the nature of whose arrange-
ment cannot even be conceived by the mind, — that cause,
we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence
(such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination,
subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred
to in the Sutra. As the six stages of existence enumerated
by Yaska- are possible only during the period of the
world's subsistence, it might — were they referred to in the
Sutra — be suspected that what is meant are not the origin,
subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on
the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to
be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination
from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and
final dissolution into Brahman.

The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes
stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else
but a Lord possessing the stated qualities ; not either from
a non-intelligent pradhana'', or from atoms, or from non-

^ So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and
Go. ; the Bha. proposes another less plausible division.

■^ According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara/^ are : origina-
tion, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.

^ The pradhana, called also prakr/ti, is the primal causal matter
of ihc world in the Sankhya-system. It will be fully discussed in

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 1 7

being, or from a being subject to transmigration ^ ; nor,
again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously,
without a cause), since we observe that (for the production
of effects) special places, times, and causes have invariably
to be employed.

(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause
of the world ^, think that the existence of a Lord different
from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by
means of the argument stated just now (without re-
course being had to Scripture at all). — But, it might
be said, you yourself in the Sutra under discussion have
merely brought forward the same argument ! — By no
means, we reply. The Sutras (i. e. literally ' the strings ')
have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers
of the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages
referred to by the Sutras are discussed here. For the
comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertain-
ment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedanta-
texts, not either by inference or by the other means of
right knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages
primarily declare the cause of the origin. &c., of the world,
inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in
so far as it does not contradict the Vedanta-texts, is not to
be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascer-
tained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation ;
for the passages, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5 (' the Self is to be heard,
to be considered'), and K/i. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man,
&c., having been informed, and being able to judge for
himself, would arrive at Gandhara, in the same way a man
who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge '), declare
that human understanding assists Scripture^.

Scriptural text, Sec.*, are not, in the enquiry into Brahman,

later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhana
has been left untranslated. Cp. Sahkhya Karika 3.

^ Ke^it tu hirawyagarbhaOT sa»2sari;/am evagama^ ^agaddhetum
a^akshate. Ananda Girl.

* Viz. the Vai^eshikas.

A A

' Atmana>^ jruter ity artha-^. Ananda Giri.

* Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical

[34] C

1 8 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry
into active duty (i. e. in the Purva Mim^;«s^), but scriptural
texts on the one hand, and intuition \ &c., on the other
hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion :
firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry /
into Brahman ; secondly, because the object of the enquiry
is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of
the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accom-
plished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, ^
&c., \vould be the only means of knowledge. The origina-
tion of something to be accomplished depends, moreover,
on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent
on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done
in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either
by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some
other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples
of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture
with sentences such as the following : 'At the atiratra he
takes the sho^a^-in cup,' and ' at the atiratra he does not
take the short'aj'in cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after
the sun has risen,' and, ' he makes the oblation when the
sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the quoted instances,
injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional pro-
cedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so
they would have their place with regard to Brahman also
(if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the
fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance
is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option
depends on the notions of man ; but the knowledge of the
real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of
man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with
regard to a post, 'this is a post or a man, or something
else,' is not knowledge of truth ; the two ideas, ' it is a man
or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, ' it

connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in
the Purva Mimawsa.

' The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises
inference and so on.

I ADHYAVA, I PADA, 3. 1 9

is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under
the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all
existing things depends on the things themselves, and
hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether
on the thing, i. e. Brahman itself. — But, it might be said,
as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object
of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this
it follows that a discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purpose-
less.— This we deny ; for as Brahman is not an object of
the senses, it has no connection with those other means of
knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature,
only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If
Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive
that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect ;
but as the effect only (i. e. the world) is perceived, it is
impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is
connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore
the Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound in-
ference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to
set forth a Vedanta-text. — Which, then, is the Vedanta-text
which the Sutra points at as having to be considered with
reference to the characteristics of Brahman r — It is the
passage Taitt. Up. Ill, i, ' Bhrz'gu Varu«i went to his father
Varu;/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to ' That
from whence these beings are born, that by which, when
born, they live, that into which they enter at their death,
try to know that. That is Brahman.' The sentence finally
determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6 : ' From
bliss these beings are born ; by bliss, when born, they live ;
into bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also
are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty
Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence,
and freedom.

That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer
from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To
confirm this conclusion, the Sutrakara continues as follows:

3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its

being the source of Scripture.

c 2

20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Brahman is the source, i. e. the cause of the great body
of Scripture, consisting of the Kig-veda. and other branches,
which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar,
nyaya, pura//a, &c.); which lamp-like illuminates all things ;
which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a
body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience can-
not be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is
generally understood that the man from whom some special
body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only
originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pi;/ini possesses
a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive
though it be ; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the
supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being,
which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his
breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the
Rig-veda., Sic, the mine of all knowledge, consisting of mani-
fold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different
classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men ! See what
Scripture says 'about him, ' The i?/g-veda, &c., have been
breathed forth from that great Being' (B/7. Up. II, 4, 10).

Or else w^e may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture
consisting of the Rz'g-veda., &c., as described above, is the
source or cause, i. e. the means of right knowledge through
which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the
sense would be : through Scripture only as a means of know-
ledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c.,
of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been
quoted under the preceding Sutra ' from which these beings
are born,' &c. — But as the preceding Sutra already has pointed
out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman,
of what use then is the present Sutra ? — The w^ords of the pre-
ceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural
passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the
origin. &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining
an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this
suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded.

But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means
of knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that
Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mima;;/sd

I ADHYAVA, I PADA, 3. 21

Sutra I, 2, I, 'As the purport of Scripture is action, those
scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purport-
less '), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not action
are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense,
they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or
the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages en-
joining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining
a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like.
For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information
regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the
latter are the objects of perception and the other means of
proof (which give sufficient information about them ; while
it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information
about what is not known from other sources). And if it
did give such information, it would not be connected with
things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to
man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as ' he
howled, &c.,' which at first sight appear purposeless, are
shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain
actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7, ' Because they stand in syntac-
tical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport
is to glorify the injunctions '). In the same way mantras are
shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as
they notify the actions themselves and the means by which
they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, ' For
strength thee (I cut ; ' which accompanies the cutting of a
branch employed in the darj-apur;/amasa-sacrifice). In
short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have
a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And
injunctions which are defined as having actions for their
objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things.
Hence we maintain that the Vcdanta-texts are mere
supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; noti-
fying the agents, divinities, and results connected with
those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the
ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter
foreign to the Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of
the Karmaka/z^T^a of the Veda), we must admit (the second
of the two alternatives proposed above, viz.) that the

2 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and
similar actions which arc mentioned in those very (Vedanta)
texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not
the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows:

4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scrip-
ture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts)
as their purport.

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the
prima facie view as urged above). That all-knowing, all-
powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, sub-
sistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the
Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the
Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they
have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz.
Brahman). Compare, for instance, ' Being only this was in
the beginning, one, without a second' (AT//. Up. VI, 2, i) ;
' In the beginning all this was Self, one only ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4,
I, i); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without
effect, without anything inside or outside ; this Self is
Brahman perceiving everything ' (Br/. Up. II, 5, 19) ; ' That
immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and
similar passages. If the words contained in these passages
have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their
purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to
assume them to have a different sense; for that would
involve the fault of abandoning the direct statements of
the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can we con-
clude the purport of these passages to be the intimation
of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts
of religious duty) ; for there are certain scriptural passages
which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance,
Br/. Up. II, 4, 13, 'Then by what should he see whom.^'
(which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor
an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can
Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished
thing, be the object of perception and the other means of

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 23

knowledge ; for the fact of everything having its Self in
Brahman cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural
passage ' That art thou ' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7). Nor can it
rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not
connected with something either to be striven after or
shunned ; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman's
Self, which is not something either to be avoided or
endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain, and
thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That
passages notifying certain divinities, and so on, stand in
subordinate relation to acts of devout meditation mentioned
in the same chapters may readily be admitted. But it is
impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous
relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the know-
ledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no
longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the
conception of duality, according to which we distinguish
actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the conception
of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute
unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause
of Brahman being looked upon as the complementary
object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the Veda
may have no authority except in so far as they are con-
nected with injunctions ; still it is impossible to impugn on
that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying
the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their
own result. Nor, finally, can the authoritativeness of the
Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so that it would
be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all
which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a
means of right knowledge of Brahman.

Here others raise the following objection : — Although the
Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brah-
man, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain
injunctions, just as the information which the Veda gives
about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other
objects not known from the practice of common life is
merely supplementary to certain injunctions^. Why so?

^ So, for instance, the passage * he carves the sacrificial post and

24 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to
action or restraining from it. For men fully acquainted
with the object of the Veda have made the following
declaration, ' The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the
injunction of actions' (Bhashya on Caimini Sutra I, i, i);
' Injunction means passages impelling to action ' (Bh. on
Caim. Su. I, 1,3); ' Of this (viz. active religious duty) the
knowledge comes from injunction ' (part of 6^aim. Su. I, i, 5) ;
' The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected
with (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose pur-
port is action ' (Cairn. Su. I, i, 25) ; 'As action is the purport
of the Veda^ whatever does not refer to action is purport-
less ' (Caim. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport
in so far only as it rouses the activity of man with regard
to some actions and restrains it with regard to others;
other passages (i. e. all those passages which are not directly
injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement
injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts
also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have a mean-
ing in the same way only. And if their aim is injunc-
tion, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites
are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the
heavenly world, so the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined
as a means for him who is desirous of immortality. — But —
somebody might object — it has been declared that there is
a difference in the character of the objects enquired into,
the object of enquiry in the karma-ka;/<^a (that part of
the Veda which treats of active religious duty) being some-
thing to be accomplished, viz. duty, while here the object
is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman.
From this it follows that the fruit of the knowledge of
Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of
' the knowledge of duty which depends on the performance
of actions \ — We reply that it must not be such because the

makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being supplementary
to the injunction ' he ties the victim to the sacrificial post/

^ If the fruits of the two j'dstras were not of a different nature,
there would be no reason for the distinction of two jastras ; if they

^J

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 25.

Vedanta-texts give information about Brahman only in so
far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. We meet
with injunctions of the following kind, ' Verily the Self is to
be seen ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 5) ; ' The Self which is free from
sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which
we must try to understand ' (K/i. Up. VIII, 7, i) ; ' Let a
man worship him as Self (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7) ; ' Let a man
worship the Self only as his true state ' (Br/. Up. 1,4, 15) ;
' He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. Ill,
2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire to know
what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the
Vedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they
perform that task by teaching us that Brahman is eternal,
all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelli-
gent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. From the
devout meditation on this Brahman there results as its
fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned
in the ordinary way, is discerned by means of the
j-astra. If, on the other hand, the Vedanta-texts were
considered to have no reference to injunctions of actions,
but to contain statements about mere (accomplished)
things, just as if one were saying ' the earth comprises seven
dvipas,' ' that king is marching on,' they would be pur-
portless, because then they could not possibly be connected
with something to be shunned or endeavoured after. — Per-
haps it will here be objected that sometimes a mere state-
ment about existent things has a purpose, as, for instance,
the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the
purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous
opinion, and that so likewise the Vedanta-passages making
statements about the non-transmigrating Self, have a pur-
port of their own (without reference to any action), viz.
in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of the Self
being liable to transmigration. — We reply that this might

are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of
Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same
way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the
heavenly world and the like.

26 VEDANTA-SUTRAS

be so if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the
rope dispels the fear caused by the imagined snake, so the
mere hearing of the true nature of Brahman would dispel
the erroneous notion of one's being subject to transmigration.
But this is not the case ; for we observe that even men to
whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue
to be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities
attaching to the transmigratory condition. Moreover, we
see from the passage, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be
heard, to be considered, to be reflected upon,' that con-
sideration and reflection have to follow the mere hearing.
From all this it results that the j-astra can be admitted as
a means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is
/ connected with injunctions.

To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following
reply: — The preceding reasoning is not valid, on account
of the different nature of the fruits of actions on the one
side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other side.
The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or
mind, which are known from 6"ruti and Smr/ti, and are
comprised under the name 'religious duty' (dharma), is
carried on in the Caimini Sutra, which begins with the
words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the opposite
of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is
defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of
enquiry to the end that it may be avoided. Thefruits of duty,
which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which
are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally
known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make them-
selves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by
the contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and
affect all animate beings from Brahman down to a tuft of
grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that
there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all em-
bodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From
those differences it is inferred that there are differences
in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in accord-
ance with religious duty ; therefrom again are inferred
differences in degree between those qualified to perform

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 27

acts of religious duty. Those latter differences are more-
over known to be affected by the desire of certain results
(which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain
religious acts), worldly possessions, and the like. It is
further known from Scripture that those only who perform
sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of
their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of
the sun; AV/. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings,
works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke
^ and the other stages to the southern path. And that there
also (viz. in the moon which is finally reached by those
who have passed along the southern path) there are degrees
of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from
the passage ' Having dwelt there till their works are con-
sumed.' Analogously it is understood that the different
degrees of pleasure which are enjoyed by the embodied
creatures, from man downward to the inmates of hell and
to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit
as defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from
the different degrees of pain endured by higher and lower
embodied creatures, there is inferred difference of degree
in its cause, viz. religious demerit as defined in the pro-
hibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This difference in the
degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its antecedent
embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of de-
gree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to
faults such as ignorance and the like, is well known — from
^ruti, Smrz'ti, and reasoning — to be non-eternal, of a fleeting,
changing nature (sawsara). The following text, for instance,
'As long as he is in the body he cannot get free from
pleasure and pain ' i^KIi. Up. VIII, 12, i), refers to the sa;;/-
sara-state as described above. From the following passage,
on the other hand, ' When he is free from the body then
neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the
touch of pain or pleasure, w^e learn that the unembodied state
called ' final release ' (moksha) is declared not to be the
effect of religious merit as defined by Vedic injunctions.
For if it were the effect of merit it would not be denied
that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said

■28 VEDANTA-SbTRAS.

that the very circumstance of its being an uncmbodicd state
is the effect of merit, we reply that that cannot be, since
Scripture declares that state to be naturally and originally
an uncmbodied one. ' The wise who knows the Self as
bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing
things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve ' (Ka. Up.
II, 22); 'He is without breath, without mind, pure ' (Mu.
Up. II, I, 2); 'That person is not attached to anything'
(Brz. Up. IV, 3, 15)^ All which passages establish the fact
that so-called release differs from all the fruits of action,
and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state.
Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal, al-
though changing ' (pari/zaminitya), viz. those, the idea of
whose identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo
changes ; such, for instance, are earth and the other ele-
ments in the opinion of those who maintain the eternity
of the world, or the three gu;/as in the opinion of the
Sahkhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense,
i. e. eternal without undergoing any changes (ku/astha-
nitya), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications,
absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-
luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, to which
merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold
time do not apply, is called release ; a definition agreeing
with scriptural passages, such as the following : ' Different
from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause,
different from past and future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It^ (i. e.
moksha) is, therefore, the same as Brahman in the enquiry
into which we are at present engaged. If Brahman were
represented as supplementary to certain actions, and re-

^ The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross
body ; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body ; the third
that is independent of either.

^ Ananda Giri omits ' ata/z.' His comment is : pr^'thagg-i^wasa-
vishayatva,/^ X'a dharmadyaspr/sh/atvawi brahma^o yuktam ityaha I
tad iti 1 ata^ jabtlapa/Z/e dharmadyasparje karmaphalavailaksha«ya»z
hetukritam. — The above translation follows Govindananda's first
explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilakshawatvad
ity artha-^.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 29

lease were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it
would be non-eternal, and would have to be considered
merely as something holding a pre-eminent position among
the described non-eternal fruits of actions with their various
degrees. But that release is something eternal is acknow-
ledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching con-
cerning Brahman can therefore not be merely supplemen-
^tary to actions.

There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages
which declare release to follow immediately on the cognition
of Brahman, and which thus preclude the possibility of an
effect intervening between the two ; for instance, * He who
knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9) ; 'All
his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher
and the lower' (Mu. Up. H, 2, 8); ' He who knows the bliss of
Brahman fears nothing ' (Taitt. Up. H, 9) ; ' O (kanaka, you
have indeed reached fearlessness ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4) ; ' That
Brahman knew its Self only, saying, I am Brahman. From
it all this sprang' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'What sorrow, what
trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity ? ' [ts. Up.
7.) We must likewise quote the passage, Br/. Up. I, 4, 10,
(' Seeing this the i^/shi Vamadeva understood : I was Manu,
I was the sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action
taking place between one's seeing Brahman and becoming
one with the universal Self; for that passage is analogous
to the following one, ' standing he sings,' from which we
understand that no action due to the same agent inter-
venes between the standing and the singing. Other scrip-
tural passages show that the removal of the obstacles
which lie in the way of release is the only fruit of the
knowledge of Brahman ; so, for instance, ' You indeed are
our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the
other shore ' (Pr. Up. VI, 8) ; ' I have heard from men like
you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief, I am in
grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine ' (K/i. Up. VII,
1,3); ' To him after his faults had been rubbed out, the vener-
able Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness ' (AV/.
Up. VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, sup-
ported by arguments, of (Gautama) Akdvya., ' Final release

-;© VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

results from the successive removal of wrong knowledge,
faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each later mem-
ber of the series depending on the removal of the preceding
member' (Nyay. Su. I, i, 2) ; and wrong knowledge itself is
removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with
the Self of Brahman.

Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman
a mere (fanciful) combination ^, as is made use of, for instance,
in the following passage, ' For the mind is endless, and the
Vuvedevas are endless, and he thereby gains the endless
world ' (B;7. Up. Ill, 1,9)^; nor is it an (in reality unfounded)
ascription (superimposition)^, as in the passages, 'Let him
meditate on mind as Brahman,' and ' Aditya is Brahman,
this is the doctrine' {KJi. Up. Ill, 18, i ; 19, i), where the
contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the mind,
Aditya and so on ; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception
of identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed
as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage,
'Air is indeed the absorber ; breath is indeed the absorber*'
{Kh. Up. IV, 3, I ; 3) ; nor is it a mere (ceremonial) purifi-
cation of (the Self constituting a subordinate member) of
an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c.. Brahman), in the
same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the sacri-

^ Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena
kena/C'in mahato vastuna^^ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.

^ In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on
account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is
identified with the Vijvedevas, which thereby constitute the chief
object of the meditation ; the fruit of the meditation being immor-
tality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is
real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of
intelligence being common to both.

^ Adhyasa// jastrato^tasmiOTs taddhi/;. Sampadi sampadyama-
nasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vi^csha/;.
Ananda Giri.

* Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore,
designated by the same term ' absorber.' Seyaw sawvargadr/sh/ir
vayau pra«e X'a da^ajagata;;/ ^agad dar^ayati yatha ^ivatmani hn'm-
ha«akriyaya brahmadr/sh/ir amr/tatvayaphalaya kalpataiti. Bhamati.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 3 I

ficial butter ^ For if the knowledge of the identity of the
Self and Brahman were understood in the way of combina-
tion and the like, violence would be done thereby to the
connection of the words whose object, in certain passages, it
clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and the Self being
really identical ; so, for instance, in the following passages,
' That art thou ' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; ' I am Brahman ' (Br/. Up.

I, 4, 10) ; ' This Self is Brahman ' (Br/. Up. II, 5, 19). And
other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of
Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted
thereby ; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken,
all doubts are solved' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it
be possible, in that case, satisfactorily to explain the passages
which speak of the individual Self becoming Brahman :
such as • He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman '
(Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of
Brahman and the Self cannot be of the nature of figurative
combination and the like. The knowledge of Brahman
does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of man, but
is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the
objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends
on the object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or
its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning,
any connection with actions.

Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by repre-
senting it as the object of the action of knowing. For
that it is not such is expressly declared in two passages,
viz. 'It is different from the known and again above (i.e.'
different from) the unknown ' (Ken. Up. I, 3) ; and ' How
should he know him by whom he knows all this ? ' (Br/. Up.

II, 4, 13.) In the same way Brahman is expressly declared
not to be the object of the act of devout meditation, viz. in
the second half of the verse, Ken. Up. I, 5, whose first half

^ The butter used in the upa;«j-uya^a is ceremonially purified by
the wife of the sacrificer looking at it ; so, it might be said, the
Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kartr/ — agent —
stands in a subordinate ahga-relation to the karman of meditation)
is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.

32 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

declares it not to be an object (of speech, mind, and so on),
' That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which speech
is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that
on which people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should
be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech,
mind, &c.) the ^astra can impossibly be its source, we refute
this objection by the remark that the aim of the ^astra is
to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience.

— y'The j-astra's purport is not to represent Brahman definitely
as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that

_r- Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward
Self) is never an object, and thereby to remove the dis-
tinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, &c.,
which is fictitiously created by Nescience. Accordingly the
.rastra says, ' By whom it is not thought by him it is
thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it ; un-
known by those who know it, it is known by those who do
not know it' (Ken. Up. II, 3) ; and 'Thou couldst not see the
seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing,
nor perceive the perceiver of perception, nor know the
knower of knowledge ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 4, 2). As thereby (i. e.
by the knowledge derived from the i-astra) the imagination
of the transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience
is discarded, and Release is shown to be of the nature of
the eternally free Self, it cannot be charged with the im-
perfection of non-eternality. Those, on the other hand, who
consider Release to be something to be effected properly
maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech,
or body. So, likewise, those who consider it to be a mere
modification. Non-eternality of Release is the certain
consequence of these two opinions ; for we observe in
common life that things which are modifications, such as
sour milk and the like, and things which are effects, such
as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said
that there is a dependance on action in consequence of
(Brahman or Release) being something which is to be
obtained^ ; for as Brahman constitutes a person's Self it is

^ An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 33

not something to be attained by that person. And even if
Brahman were altogether different from a person's Self
still it would not be something to be obtained ; for as it is
omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to
every one^ just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again,
can it be maintained that Release is something to be cere-
monially purified, and as such depends on an activity.
For ceremonial purification (sawskara) results either from
the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of
some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to
Release as it is of the nature of Brahman, to which no
excellence can be added ; nor, again, does the latter alter-
native apply, since Release is of the nature of Brahman,
which is eternally pure. — But, it might be said, Release
might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and
becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some
action ; just as the quality of clearness becomes manifest
in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by means of the
action of rubbing. — This objection is invalid, we reply,
because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For
an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it
abides. But if the Self were modified by an action its
non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as
the following, ' unchangeable he is called,' would thus be
stultified ; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is
impossible to assume that any action should abide in the
Self. On the other hand, the Self cannot be purified by
actions abiding in something else as it stands in no relation
to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to point
out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self
(dehin, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual
actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing
one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like.
For what is purified by those actions is that Self merely
which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is
under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of per-

obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results
from the two preceding hypotheses.
[34] D

34 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

ception that bathing and similar actions stand in the
relation of inherence to the body, and it is therefore only-
proper to conclude that by such actions only that some-
thing is purified which is joined to the body. If a person
thinks ' I am free from disease,' he predicates health of
that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly
identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter
(i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment
applied to the body (i.e. the ' I ' constituting the subject of
predication is only the individual embodied Self). Analo-
gously that I which predicates of itself, that it is purified by
bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to
the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity
(ahawkartr/), the object of the notion of the ego and the
agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and
enjoys their results. Thus the mantras also declare, ' One
of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without
eating ' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, i); and ' When he is in union with
the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call
him the Enjoyer ' (Ka. Up. Ill, i, 4). Of Brahman, on the
other hand, the two following passages declare that it is
incapable of receiving any accretion and eternally pure,
' He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading,
the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling
in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one ; free
from qualities' (Sv. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all,
bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, un-
touched by evil ' (Is. Up. 8), But Release is nothing but
being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be
purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in
which Release could be connected with action, it is im-
possible that it should stand in any, even the slightest,
relation to any action, excepting knowledge.

But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity
of the mind. By no means, we reply ; since the two are
of different nature. An action is that which is enjoined as
being independent of the nature of existing things and de-
pendent on the energy of some person's mind ; compare, for
instance, the following passages, ' To whichever divinity the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.

offering is made on that one let him meditate when about
to say vasha/' (Ait. Brahm. Ill, 8, i) ; and ' Let him meditate
in his mind on the sandhya.' Meditation and reflection
are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating,
&c.) person they may either be performed or not be per-
formed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the
result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those
have for their objects existing things ; knowledge can there-
fore not be either made or not made or modified, but
depends entirely on existing things, and not either on Vedic
statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it
thus widely differs from meditation and the like.

The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire,
which is founded on Kh. Up. V, 7, i ; 8, i, ' The fire is man,
O Gautama ; the fire is woman, O Gautama,' is on account
of its being the result of a Vedic statement, merely an action
and dependent on man ; that conception of fire, on the other
hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is neither
dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a
real thing which is an object of perception ; it is therefore
knowledge and not an action. The same remark applies to
all things which are the objects of the different means of
right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also
which has the existent Brahman for its object is not de-
pendent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative
and similar forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman
are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because
they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the
edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone.
For they have for their object something which can neither
be endeavoured after nor avoided. — But what then, it will
be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any
rate, have the appearance of injunctions ; such as, ' The Self is
to be seen, to be heard about?' — They have the purport, we
reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity.
For when a man acts intent on external things, and only
anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to eschew
the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the
highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it ; such

D 2

36 vedanta-sOtras.

texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of
natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the
inward (the highest) Self, That for him who is engaged
in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is
nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided,
we learn from texts such as the following: 'This every-
thing, all is that Self (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the
Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should
he know^ another, how should he know the knower?'
(B;-/. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is Brahman' {Bri. Up.
II> 5 J ^9)' That the knowledge of Brahman refers to
something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore
is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance
of any object, is the very thing we admit ; for just that
constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend
Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work
is over. Thus vSruti says, ' If a man understands the Self,
saying, " I am he," what could he wish or desire that he
should pine after the body?' {Bri. Up. IV, 4, 12.) And
similarly Smr/ti declares, ' Having understood this the
understanding man has done with all work, O Bharata '
(Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not represented
as the object of injunctions.

We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who
maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the
purport of making statements about mere existent things,
and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supple-
mentary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the
soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does
not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul
which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only,
which is non-transmigratory. Brahman, different in nature
from the four classes of substances-^, which forms a topic of
its own and is not a complement to anything else ; of that

^ Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/a7« karoti), things
to be obtained (gramas gaX'/7^ati), things to be modified {suvzr?ia.m
kuwr/ala;;/ karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin
prokshati).

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. ^'j

soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ;
for the passage, ' That Self is to be described by No, no ! '
(Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the
Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that
there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from
the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-conscious-
ness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the
Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i. e. of the
object of self-consciousness, viz. the ^ivatman). For neither
from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from
reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different
from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness,
merely witnesses it ; which is permanent in all (transitory)
beings ; uniform ; one ; eternally unchanging ; the Self of
everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be repre-
sented as the mere complement of injunctions ; for of that
very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is
the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided.
All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere
modifications, up to (i. e. exclusive of) the soul. But the
soul is imperishable ^, as there is no cause why it should
perish ; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for
its undergoing any modification ; hence it is in its essence
eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as
' Beyond the soul there is nothing ; this is the goal, the
highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in
the Upanishads, I ask thee' (Br/. Up. 111,9, 26), it appears
that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly
given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To
say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring
to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.

With regard to the quotations made of the views of men
acquainted with the purport of the 5astra (who alone were
stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is
to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry
into duty, refer to that part of the 5astra which consists of

' Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like
transitory things.

-^8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other
passage quoted (' as action is the purport of the Veda, what-
ever docs not refer to action is purportless ') we remark
that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense
(when It would mean that only those words which denote
action have a meaning), it would follow that all information
about existent things is meaningless ^. If, on the other
hand, the Veda — in addition to the injunctions of activity and
cessation of activity — does give information about existent
things as being subservient to some action to be accom-
plished, why then should it not give information also about
the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent
thing, about which information is given, does not become
an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act). —
But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet,
as they are instrumental to action, the information given
about such things is merely subservient to action. — This,
we reply, does not matter; for although the information
may be subservient to action, the things themselves about
which information is given are already intimated thereby as
things which have the power of bringing about certain
actions. Their final end (prayo^ana) indeed may be sub-
serviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease
to be, in the information given about them, intimated in
themselves. — Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is
gained thereby for your purpose ^ ? We reply that the
information about the Self, which is an existing thing not
comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature
(as the information about other existent things); for by
the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false
knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a

^ That, for instance, in the passage ' he is to sacrifice with Soma,'
the word 's-oma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.

^ I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying in-
formation about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the
objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing
information about existent things are admissible, if those things
have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information
about Brahman of which no purpose has been established ?

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 39

purpose is established which renders the passages relative
to Brahman equal to those passages which give information
about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are
found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions)
such passages as ' a Brahmawa is not to be killed,' which
teach abstinence from certain actions. Now abstinence from
action is neither action nor instrumental to action. If,
therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not
express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it
would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which
teach abstinence from action, are devoid of purport — a con-
sequence which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can
the connexion in which the word 'not' stands with the
action expressed by the verb ' is to be killed ' — which action
is naturally established ^ — be used as a reason for assuming
that ' not ' denotes an action non-established elsewhere ^,
different from the state of mere passivity implied in the
abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function
of the particle ' not ' is to intimate the idea of the non-
existence of that with which it is connected, and the concep-
tion of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the
cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected
that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the
state of passivity will again make room for activity ; for)
that idea itself passes away (only after having completely
destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of
a Brahma;?a, &c.), just as a fire is extinguished only after
having completely consumed its fuel. Hence we are of
opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as ' a
Brahma;za is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state,
consisting in the abstinence from some possible action ;
excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Pra^apati-
vow, &c.^ Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be

* It is 'naturally established' because it has natural motives —
not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and
the like.

^ Elsewhere, i. e. outside the Veda.

' The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda

40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

/,

considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but
only) to such statements about existent things as are of the
nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose
of man.

The allegation that a mere statement about an actually
existent thing not connected with an injunction of some-
thing to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the state-
ment that the earth contains seven dvipas) has atready
been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist
in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a
snake, but a rope.' — But how about the objection raised
above that the information about Brahman cannot be held
to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about
a rope has one, because a man even after having heard
about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory

is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently
interpreted by the different commentators. -S'ahkara endeavours to
fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by
an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but
abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be
contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for
instance, ' a Brahma«a is not to be killed,') can be explained as
enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to
the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted
to mean ' a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahma«a is to be
formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression
' a non-Brahma«a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something
else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must at-
tribute to the word ' not ' its primary sense which is the absolute
negation of the word to which it is joined ; so that passages where
it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have
for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only
are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain pro-
hibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows ; for as
a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some
particular action must there be understood as intimating the per-
formance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as
to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all
treatises on the Purva Mima//isa ; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha,
transladon, p. 39 ff.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 4 1

world ? — We reply as follows : It is impossible to show
that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the
Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense
as he did before, because that would be contrary to the
fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that
a person who imagines the body, and so on, to consti-
tul:e the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no
right to assume that the same person after having, by
means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the
Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will
still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose
cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a
rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth,
is grieved when his possessions are taken from him ; but we
do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him
after he has once retired from the world and put off the
conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person
possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure
from the proud conceit of ownership ; but after he has
lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the
pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus ^Sruti also
declares, ' When he is free from the body, then neither
pleasure nor pain touches him ' {KJi. Up. VIII, 12, i). If it
should be objected that the condition of being free from
the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause
of man being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For
it is not possible to establish the state of embodiedness upon
anything else but wrong knowledge. And that the state
of disembodiedness is eternal on account of its not havinsf
actions for its cause, we have already explained. The ob-
jection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and
demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute
by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the
Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance
of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is
likewise not established ; for (if we should try to get over
this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as
caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical
fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de-

42 v::danta-s^tras.

merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And
the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of em-
bodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than
a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another).
Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it
cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should
be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the
same way as kings and other great people are (who without
acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence,
we deny the appositeness of this instance ; for kings may
become agents through their relation to servants whom they
procure by giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to
imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the
cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the
body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the
other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be
joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of
the two (which is not based on any assumption). This ex-
plains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent
in sacrifices and similar acts^. Here it is objected that the
Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to
itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived
(figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the
remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses
of words is known to be applicable only where an actual
difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance,
acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane,
and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea
and word 'lion,' and we are likewise acquainted with per-
sons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine quali-
ties, such as fierceness, courage, &c. ; here, a well settled
difference of objects existing, the idea and the name ' lion '
are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense.
In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects
is not well established, the transfer of the conception and

^ The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c, only in so far as it
imagines itself to he joined to a body ; which imagination is finally
removed by the cognition of Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 43

name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply-
founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man
who at the time of twih'ght does not discern that the object
before him is a post, and appHes to it the conception and
\/ designation of a man ; such is likewise the case of the con-
ception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of
mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then
can it be maintained that the application of the word and the
conception of the Ego to the body, &c., which application
is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not-
Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering
that even learned men who know the difference of the
Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just
as common shepherds and goatherds do.

As therefore the application of the conception of the
Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the
existence of a Self different from the body is simply false,
not figurative, it follovv^s that the embodiedness of the Self
is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence
that the person who has reached true knowledge is free
from his body even while still alive. The same is declared
in the vSruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman :
' And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and
cast away, thus lies this body ; but that disembodied
immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (Br/. Up.
IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were,
with ears without ears as it were, with speech without
speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were,
with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Smrzti also,
in the passage where the characteristic marks are enume-
rated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54),
declares that he who knows is no longer connected with
action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once com-
prehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this
transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other
hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as
before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self.
Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not

44 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a comple-
mentary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about
Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection,
we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves
merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If
Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a
subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be
said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case,
since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are
subservient to comprehension. It follows that the vSastra
cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far
as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that
on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts,
an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully
established. Hence there is room for beginning the new
vSastra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then therefore the
enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Vedanta-
texts were connected with injunctions, a new 5astra would
either not be begun at all, since the .Sastra concerned with
injunctions has already been introduced by means of the
first Sutra of the Purva Mima;;^sa, ' Then therefore the
enquiry into duty ;' or if it were begun it would be intro-
duced as follows : ' Then therefore the enquiry into the
remaining duties ;' just as a new portion of the Purva
Mimawsa Sutras is introduced w'ith the words, 'Then
therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of
the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man ' (Pu.
Mi. Su. IV, I, i). But as the comprehension of the unity
of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in
the previous 5astra), it is quite appropriate that a new
wSastra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon.
Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge '
end with the cognition expressed in the words, ' I am Brah- ;
man ;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension |
of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be /
eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and-
knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be
means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men
knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration : —

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 45

' When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge,
" I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when,
owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives,
and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false
Self has come to an end^; how should then the effect^ (of
that- wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as
the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search
after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject; J
but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz.
(the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as
the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in
ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge
(perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self
is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is
finished^.)

So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages,
whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the
Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively
to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has
further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omni-
potent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of
the world. But now the Sahkhyas and others being of
opinion that an existent substance is to be known through
other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different
causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and there-
upon interpret the Vedinta-passages as referring to the
latter. All the Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which
treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that
the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the
effect by inference ; and the cause which is to be inferred
is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha).
The followers of Ka;/ada again infer from the very same

* The figurative Self, i. e. the imagination that wife, children,
possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i. e. the
imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.

^ I. e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.

^ The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.

46 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the
world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus
other argumentators also taking their stand on passages
apparently favouring their views and on fallacious argu-
ments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher
(Vyasa) — thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, pas-
sages, and means of proof — proceeds to state as p r i m d facie
views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded
on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby
he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedanta-
texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sankhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pra-
dhana consisting of three constituent elements (gu;?a) is the
cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedanta-passages
which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing
all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be
consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pra-
dhana being the general cause. Omnipotence (more liter-
ally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the
pradhana in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-
knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following
manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality
an attribute of the gu;/a of Goodness^, according to the
Smrz'ti passage ' from Goodness springs knowledge ' (Bha.
Gita XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness,
viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which
are effects (of the pradhana) are known as all-knowing
Yogins ; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected
with the very highest degree of ' Goodness.' Now to the
soul (purusha) which is isolated;, destitute of effected organs,
consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite
impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited
knowledge ; the pradhana, on the other hand, because
consisting of the three guwas, comprises also in its pra-
dhana state the element of Goodness which is the cause
of all-knowingness. The Vedanta-passages therefore in

^ The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose
state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 47

a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the
pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover
you (the Vedantin) also who assume an all-knowing Brah-
man can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that
term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman
cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of
everything ; for from this there would follow the absolute
permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want
of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the
activity of knowing. And if you should propose to con-
sider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow
that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself
would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only
in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you
assume that previously to the origination of the world
Brahman is without any instruments of action. But with-
out the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments
of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being.
And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as con-
sisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modi-
fications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like
clay and other substances ; while the uncompounded
homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following
Sutra.

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking being
attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the
world ; the pradhana) is not (to be identified with
the cause indicated by the Upanishads ; for) it is
not founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for
the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Saiikhyas ;
because it is not founded on Scripture. How so .^ Because
the quality of seeing, i. e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed
to the cause. For the passage, Kh. Up. VI, 2, (which
begins : ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,
one only, without a second,' and goes on, ' It thought (saw),

48 VEDANTA-SUTRAf^.

may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,')
declares that this world differentiated by name and form,
which is there denoted by the word ' this,' was before
its origination identical with the Self of that which is and
that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or
' that which is ') sent forth fire and the other elements after
having thought. The following passage also (' Verily in the
beginning all this was Self, one only ; there was nothing
else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth
worlds ? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Ar. H, 4, i, 2) de-
clares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. J
In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person
of sixteen parts, ' He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra;/a.'
By ' seeing ' (i. e. the verb ' seeing ' exhibited in the Sutra)
is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which
have a cognate sense ; just as the verb ' to sacrifice ' is
used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other
passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all-
knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted
here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, i, 9, ' From him who
perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists
of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman^ name and
form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sahkhyas that the pradhana
may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge con-
stituting an attribute of the gu7/a Goodness is inadmissible.
For as in the pradhana-condition the three gu;^as are in a state
of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only
is not possible^. Nor can we admit the explanation that the
pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity
for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of
the gu;/as, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference
to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must
likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power
impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Dark-

^ Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant,
not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one an-
other.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 49

ness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not
connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin)
is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhana
is destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible
to ascribe to the pradhina all-knowingness. The case
of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under
consideration ; for as they possess intelligence, they may,
owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to
omniscience^. — -Well then (say those Sankhyas who believe
in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradhana
possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing
principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is im-
parted to an iron ball by fire. — No, we reply; for if this
were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that
which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of
thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is
the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in
its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity
of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be con-
sidered as independent with regard to it, we refute as
follows. In what way, we ask the Saiikhya, is Brah-
man's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent
cognitional activity.^ To maintain that he, who possesses
eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects,
is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were
considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and
sometimes he would not know ; from which it would
follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault
is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge
to be permanent. — But, it may be objected, on this
latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as
independent with reference to the act of knowing. — Why
not ? we reply ; the sun also, although his heat and light
are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent

^ The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise
to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle in-
dependent of Sattva.

[34] E

.* .

50 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

N

when we say, 'he burns, he gives light ^' — But, it will
again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives
light when he stands in relation to some object to be
heated or illuminated ; Brahman, on the other hand, stands,
before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object
of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel. — This
objection too, we reply, is not valid ; for as a matter of fact
we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying ' the sun shines,'
even without reference to any object illuminated by him,
and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent,
in such passages as ' it thought,' &c., even without reference
to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is
supposed to be required (' knowing ' being a transitive
verb while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing
thought to Brahman will fit all the better.— What then is
that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer
previously to the origin of the world ? — Name and form, we
reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with
Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to
be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-i-astra
assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the
past and the future through the favour of the Lord ; in
what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition
of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the
creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world ! The
objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the
world, is not able to think because it is not connected with
a body, &c. does not apply ; for Brahman, whose nature is
eternal cognition — as the sun's nature is eternal luminous-

^ Ananda Giri comments as follows : paroktanupapattim ni-
rasitum pr/>^^>^ati idam iii. Prakr/tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad
va brahmawo sarva^wateti prajnam eva praka/ayati katham iti. Pra-
thamaw pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta;?^ vyatirekadvara vivr^woti anityatve
hiti. Dviti}a7« jankate g?la.ne\.i. Svato nityasyapi ^;7anasya tatta-
darthavaX'X'/iinnasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brah-
ni2L?i3./i sidhyality aha. — The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and
in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is in-
dependent with regard to each particular act of knowledge ; the
verbal affix in '^^nati ' indicating the particularity of the act.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 51

ness — can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of
knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa;«sarin) indeed,
which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a
body in order that knowledge may arise in it ; but not so
the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge.
The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does
not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any
obstructions. ' There is no effect and no instrument known
of him, no one is seen like unto him or better ; his high power
is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge
and force.' ' Grasping without hands, hasting without feet,
he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows
what can be known, but no one knows him ; they call him
the first, the great person' (Sv. Up. VI, 8 ; III, 19).

But, to raise a new objection, there exists no trans-
migrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by
impediments of knowledge ; for 5ruti expressly declares
that ' there is no other seer but he ; there is no other
knower but he' (B/7. Up. Ill, 7, 23). How then can it be
said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating
soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case
of the Lord ? — True, we reply. There is in reality no
transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the
connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting
of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether
to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such
as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in con-
sequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions
and terms as ' the hollow (space) of a jar,' &c. are generally
current, although the space inside a jar is not really
different from universal space, and just as in consequence
thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there
are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on ;
so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord
and the transmigrating soul are different ; a notion due to
the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul
with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so
on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,
imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like

E 2

52 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due
to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on
antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the
soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that
its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of
several elements, can, like clay and similar substances,
occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded
Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pra-
dhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible
to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but
not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara
will set forth in the second Adhyaya (II, i, 4, &c.).

Here the Sahkhya comes forward with a new objection.
The difficulty started by you, he says, viz. that the non-
intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world,
because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred
texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the
ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figura-
tively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for
instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, ' the
bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak of a
non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the
pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about
to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in
ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed,
and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the after-
noon to his village, necessarily acts according to his
purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its
own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great
principle and the subsequent forms of evolution ; it may
therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent. — But what
reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of
the word ' thought ' and for taking it in a figurative sense ?
— The observation, the Sankhya replies, that fire and water
also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the
two following scriptural passages, ' That fire thought ; that
water thought ' {KJi. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). We therefrom con-
clude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6.

also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned
in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figura-
tive sense ^.

To this argumentation of the Sahkhya the next Sutra
replies :

6. If it is said that (the word ' seeing ') has a
figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the
word Self (being apphed to the cause of the world).

Your assertion that the term ' Being ' denotes the non-
intelligent pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a
figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable.
Why so ? On account of the term ' Self.' For the passage
Kh. Up. VI, 2, which begins ' Being only, my dear, this
was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of
fire, water, and earth (' it thought,' &c. ; ' it sent forth fire,'
&c.), goes on — denoting the thinking principle of which the
whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by
the term ' divinities ' — as follows, ' That divinity thought :
Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self
(^iva atman)and evolve names and forms.' If we assumed that
in this passage the non-intelligent pradhana is figuratively
spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that
the same pradhana — as once constituting the subject-matter
of the chapter — is referred to by the term 'that divinity.'
But in that case the divinity would not speak of the ^iva
as ' Self For by the term ' 6^iva ' we must understand,
according to the received meaning and the etymology of
the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules 'over the
body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a
principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhana? By
' Self ' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear
that the intelligent 6'iva cannot constitute the nature of
the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we
refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to

^ In the second Khaw^a of the sixth PrapaZ/^aka of the Kh. Up.
' aikshata ' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire
and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the
third passage also where it occurs.

54 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Avhich thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the
word 'Self with reference to the 61va is quite adequate.
Then again there is the other passage, ' That which is that
subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the
true. It is the Self. That art thou, O 5vetaketu ' {Kh. Up.
VI, 8, 7, S:c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self designates
the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle
Self, by the word ' Self,' and the concluding clause, ' that
art thou, O 5vetaketu,' declares the intelligent wSvetaketu
to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the
other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of
the mind), and since they are declared to be impHcated in
the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same
time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its
primary sense — while the employment of the word 'Self
furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat — the
thought attributed to them must be explained in a figura-
tive sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover,
the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be under-
stood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat.
On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of
the word ' Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sensed
Here the Sahkhya comes forward with a new objection.
The word * Self,' he says, may be applied to the pradhana,
although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively
used in the sense of ' that which effects all purposes of
another ;' as, for instance, a king applies the word ' Self to
some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, ' Bha-
drasena is my (other) Self.'' For the pradhana, which effects
the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the
latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the
affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one
word ' Self may refer to non-intelligent things as well as
to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as
' the Self of the elements,' ' the Self of the senses,' are made
use of, and as the one word ' light ' (^yotis) denotes a certain

^ So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume
a figurative sense of the word ' thinking ' in any of the three pas-
sages.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. 55

sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then
does it follow from the word ' Self ' that the thinking
(ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a
figurative sense?

To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies :

7. (The pradhana cannot be designated by the
term ' Self) because release is taught of him who
takes his stand on that (the Sat).

The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the
term ' Self ' because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, 2 fif., where
the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to
in the sentence, ' That is the Self,' and where the subsequent
clause, ' That art thou, O ^SVetaketu,' declares the intelligent
^vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage sub-
sequent to the two quoted (viz. ' a man who has a teacher
obtains true knowledge ; for him there is only delay as long
as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect ') declares
final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were
denoted by the term ' Sat,' and did comprehend — by means
of the phrase ' That art thou ' — persons desirous of final
release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only
be 'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would
virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage
of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right know-
ledge. But to assume that the faultless j-astra is not a
means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason.
And if the .yastra, considered as a means of right knowledge,
should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant
of the way to it, a non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he
would — comparable to the blind man who had caught hold
of the ox's taiP — cling to the view of that being the Self,

' A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost
his w-ay, and implores him to lead him to his village ; instead of
doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of
the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place.
The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness,
led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through
which the ox draors him<

O

56 vedanta-sOtras.

and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from
the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de-
barred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur
evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the j-astra
teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their
true nature as means for those who are desirous of the
heavenly world, so the passage ' that is the Self, that art
thou, O 5vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also.
Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are
true can be taught by means of the simile in which the
person to be released is compared to the man grasping the
heated axe {Kh. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the
doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary
meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ' that
art thou ' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination
only\ Hke the knowledge derived from the passage, ' I am
the hymn ' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere
transitory reward ; so that the simile quoted could not
convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ' Self '
is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense.
In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the
word 'Self can — in such phrases as ' Bhadrasena is my
Self — be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference
between master and servant is well established by per-
ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are
sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative
sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also
for which words (i. e. Vedic words) are the only means of
knowledge, is altogether indefensible ; for an assumption of
that nature would lead to a general want of confidence.
The assertion that the word ' Self may (primarily) signify
what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as
the word '^yotis ' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as
light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute
to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather
assume that) the word ' Self in its primary meaning refers
to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative

^ Cp. above, p. 30.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 57

attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the
like also ; whence such phrases as ' the Self of the elements,'
'the Self of the senses.' And even if we assume that the
word ' Self ' primarily signifies both classes of beings, we
are unable to settle in any special case which of the two
meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the
general heading under which it stands, or some determina-
tive attributive word. But in the passage under discussion
there is nothing to determine that the word refers to
something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the
Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, •
and ^"vetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is
mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self
does not agree with 5vetaketu, who possesses intelligence,
we have already shown. All these circumstances determine
the object of the word ' Self here to be something intelli-
gent. The word '^yotis ' does moreover not furnish an
appropriate example ; for according to common use it has
the settled meaning of ' light ' only, and is used in the
sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming
a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible.
The preceding Sutra may be taken completely to refute all
doubts as to the word ' Self having a figurative or double
sense, and then the present Sutra is to be explained as con-
taining an independent reason, proving that the doctrine
of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.

Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by
the word ' Self.' This the teacher now proceeds to prove
by an additional reason.

8. And (the pradhana cannot be denoted by the
word 'Self') because there is no statement of its
having to be set aside.

If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by
the term ' Being ' (Sat), and if the passage ' That is the
Self, that art thou, O vSvetaketu,' referred to the pradhana ;
the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the

58 VEDAXTA- SUTRAS.

true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhana
is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered) ;
for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction
about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter,
looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who
wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhati
at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star,
saying ' that is Arundhati,' although it is really not so ;
and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points
out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he
intended to make his pupil understand the Self through
the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the
Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But no such
statement is made ; for the sixth Prapa//^aka arrives at a
conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but
that which is (the Sat).

The word ' and ' (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that
the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be
implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional
reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result
even if it were stated that the pradhana is to be set aside.
For in the beginning of the Prapa///aka it is intimated that
through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes
known. Compare the following consecutive sentences,
' Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we
hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what
cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot
be known.? What is that instruction.'* As. my dear, by
one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the
modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which
has its origin in speech, wdiile the truth is that it is clay
merely,' &c. Now if the term ' Sat ' denoted the pradhana,
which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects
of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not
to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the
aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an
effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not
denoted by the term ' Sat.' — For this the Sutrakara gives
a further reason.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 59

9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to
the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).

With reference to the cause denoted by the word ' Sat,'
Scripture says, 'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he
becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self).
Therefore they say of him, " he sleeps " (svapiti), because he
is gone to his own (svam apita),' {KJi. Up. VI, 8, i.) This
passage explains the well-known verb ' to sleep,' with refer-
ence to the soul. The word, ' his own,' denotes the Self which
had before been denoted by the word Sat ; to the Self he (the
individual soul) goes, i.e. into it it is resolved, according to the
acknowledged sense of api-i, which means * to be resolved
into.' The individual soul (^iva) is called awake as long as
being connected with the various external objects by means
V ,6f the modifications of the mind — which thus constitute
limiting adjuncts of the soul — it apprehends those external
objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is
one of those external objects^. When, modified by the
impressions which the external objects have left, it sees
dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind-.' When, on the
cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i. e. the subtle and
the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modi-
fications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep,
merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep
(resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word
' hrzdaya ' is given by sx\x\a, ' That Self abides in the heart.
And this is the etymological explanation : he is in the
heart (hrzdi ayam).' {Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words
a.yanaya and udanya are similarly etymologised : ' water is
carrying away what has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries
away what has been drunk by him ' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3 ; 5).
Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of
the soul) into the Self^ denoted by the term ' Sat,' by means
of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent

' So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance
in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A
simpler translation of the clause might however be given.

* With reference to Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2.

6o VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent
pradhana. If, again, it were said that the pradhana is
denoted by the word ' own,' because belonging to the Self
(as being the Self's own), there would remain the same ab-
surd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into
a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage
(viz. ' embraced by the intelligent — prdg-ua — Self he knows
nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' Br/. Up.
IV, 3, 2i) declares that the soul in the condition of dream-
less sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that
into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent
cause of the world, denoted by the word ' Sat,' and not the
pradhana. — A further reason for the pradhana not being the
cause is subjoined.

lO. On account of the uniformity of view (of the
Vedanta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the
cause).

If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the
Vedanta-texts also, there were set forth different views con-
cerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the
theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the
world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine, and
others again tending in a different direction ; then it might
perhaps be possible to interpret such passages as those, which
speak of the cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner
as to make them fall in with the pradhana theory. But the
stated condition is absent since all the Vedanta-texts uni-
formly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent
Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire
sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the
prawas proceed each towards its place ; from the pra;/as the
gods, from the gods the worlds ' (Kau. Up. Ill, 3). And
'from that Self sprang ether '.(Taitt. Up. II, i). And 'all
this springs from the Self (K/i. Up. VII, 26, 1). And ' this
pra;;a is born from the Self (Pr, Up. Ill, 3); all which
passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word
'Self denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.

I ADHYAVA, I PADA, 11. 6l

And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as
to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their
claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just
as the corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened
by their giving us information of a uniform character re-
garding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman is
therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account
of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts).' — A further
reason for this conclusion is advanced.

II. And because it is directly stated in Scripture
(therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of
the world).

That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is
also declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the
all-knowing one), viz. in. the following passage of the man-
tropanishad of the 6'vetaj'vataras (VI, 9) where the word
' he ' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord,
' He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and
there is of him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore
finally settled that the all-knowing Brahman is the general
cause, not the non-intelligent pradhana or anything else.

In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of
appropriate arguments, that the Vedanta-texts exhibited
under Sutras I, i-ii, are capable of proving that the all-
knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin,
subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have
explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view
(I, 10), that all Vedinta-texts whatever maintain an intelli-
gent cause. The question might therefore be asked, ' What
reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedanta-
sutras?' (as the chief point is settled already.)

To this question we reply as follows : Brahman is appre-\
hended under two forms ; in the first place as qualified by
limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolu-
tions of name and form (i. e. the multiformity of the created
world) ; in the second place as being the opposite of this,
i. e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare-

62 VEDANTA-SUTKAS.

the following passages: Br/. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where
there is duality as it were, then one sees the other ; but
when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?'
Kh. Up. VII, 24, I, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears
nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest.
Where one sees something else, hears something else, under-
stands something else, that is the little. The greatest is
immortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7, 'The
wise one, who having produced all forms and made all
names, sits calling (the things by their names-');' Sv. Up.
VI, 19, 'Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil,
without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immor-
tality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' Brz. Up. II,
3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8, 'It is neither
coarse nor fine, neither short nor long ;' and ' defective is one
place, perfect the other.' All these passages, with many
others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, accord-
ing as it is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience.
As long as it is the object of Nescience, there are applied to
it the categories of devotee, object of devotion, and the
like^. The different modes of devotion lead to different
results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation,
some to success in works ; those modes are distinct on
account of the distinction of the different qualities and
limiting conditions *\ And although the one highest Self
only, i. e. the Lord distinguished by those different qualities
constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits (of devotion)
are distinct, according as the devotion refers to different
qualities. Thus Scripture says, ' According as man wor-
ships him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his
thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed

^ The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as ^ivatman is con-
versant with the names and forms of individual things.

^ I. e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the
individual souls ; while in reality all those souls and Brahman
are one.

^ Qualities, i. e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated
on ; limiting conditions, i. e. the localities — such as the heart and
the like — which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, II. 6^

this life' (K/i. Up. Ill, 14, i). Smnti also makes an analo-
gous statement, ' Remembering whatever form of being
he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters,
being impressed with it through his constant meditation '
(Bha. Gita VIII, 6).

Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings
movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual
rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting
conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares that the Self,
although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals itself ^
in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of
various dignity and power ; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II,
3, 2, i), ' He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self
in him ^,' &c. Similarly Smrz'ti remarks, ' Whatever being
there is of power, splendour or might, know it to have
sprung from portions of my glory ^ (Bha. Gita X, 41); a
passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power
and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly
here (i. e. in the Sutras) also the teacher will show that the
golden person in the disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on ac-
count of an indicating sign, viz. the circumstance of his being
unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su. 1, 1,20) ; the same is to
be observed with regard to I, i, 22 and other Sutras. And,
again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the meaning
of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached
concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instan-
taneous release ; for although that knowledge is conveyed
by means of various limiting conditions, yet no special con-
nexion with limiting conditions is intended to be intimated,
in consequence of which there arises a doubt whether it (the

^ Ananda Giri reads avish/asya for avishk/-ztasya.

^ Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the
highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying differ-
ent places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c.
only the satta, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants,
animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap ;
in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man
alone.

64 vedanta-sOtras.

knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for its
object ; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, i, 12 \ From
all this it appears that the following part of the ^astra has
a special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta-
texts teach, on the one hand, Brahman as connected with
limiting conditions and forming an object of devotion, and
on the other hand, as being free from the connexion with
such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.
The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different
from Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity
of the meaning of the Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed
by the Sutrakara, who, while explaining additional passages
relating to Brahman, will preclude all causes of a nature
opposite to that of Brahman.

12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest
Self) on account of the repetition (of the word 'bliss,'
as denoting the highest Self).

The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enume-
rated the Self consisting of food, the Self consisting of the
vital airs, the Self consisting of mind, and the Self consisting
of understanding, says, ' Different from this which consists of
understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.'
Here the doubt arises whether the phrase, ' that which con-
sists of bliss/ denotes the highest Brahman of which it had
been said previously, that ' It is true Being, Knowledge, with-
out end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the

^ Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from ' thus
here also :' na kevalaw dvaividhyam brahma?/a^ irutismrz'tyor eva
siddhara k\m tu sutrakr/to^i^pi matam ity aha, evam iti, jrutismr;'tyor
iva prakr/te^pi ^astre dvairupyam brahma^/o bhavati ; tatra sopa-
dhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara«am udaharati adi-
tyeti ; uktanyayaw tulyadejcshu prasarayati evam iti ; sopadhikopa-
dejavan nirupadhikopadejaw darjayati evam ityadina, almagnanam
nir«etavyam iti sambandha// ; nirwayaprasahgam aha pareti ; an-
namayadyupadhidvaroktasya katham paravidyavishayatvaz?? tatraha
upadhiti ; nir7zayakramam aha vakyeti, uktartham adhikarawaw kva-
siity asahkyokta;/^ yalheti.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 2. 65

Self consisting of food, &c., is dififerent from it. — The
purvapakshin maintains that the Self consisting of bliss is a
secondary (not the principal) Self, and something dififerent
from Brahman ; as it forms a link in a series of Selfs,
beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are
not the principal Self. To the objection that even thus the
Self consisting of bliss may be considered as the primary
Self, since it is stated to be the innermost of all, he replies
that this cannot be admitted, because the Self of bliss is
declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and because it
is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary
Self, joy and the like would not touch it ; but the text
expressly says 'Joy is its head;' and about its being em-
bodied we read, ' Of that former one this one is the em-
bodied Self (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that former Self of
Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self And
of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot
be prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is
nothing but the transmigrating Soul.

To this reasoning we make the following reply : — By the
Self consisting of bliss we have to understand the highest
Self, ' on account of repetition.' For the word ' bliss ' is
repeatedly applied to the highest Self So Taitt. Up. II,
7, where, after the clause ' That is flavour ' — which refers
back to the Self consisting of bliss, and declares it to be of
the nature of flavour — we read, ' For only after having
perceived flavour can anyone perceive delight. Who could
breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in
the ether (of the heart) ? For he alone causes blessedness ;'
and again, II, 8, 'Now this is an examination of Bliss;'
' He reaches that Self consisting of Bliss ; ' and again, II, 9,
' He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing;' and
in addition, ' He understood that Bliss is Brahman ' (III, 6).
And in another scriptural passage also (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 28),
' Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word ' bliss '
applied just to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss'
is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude
that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also. The
objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote
[34] F

66 vedanta-sOtras.

the secondary Self (the Sa;//sarin), because it forms a
hnk in a series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the
one consisting of food, is of no force, for the reason that
the Self consisting of bhss is the innermost of all. The
vSastra, wishing to convey information about the primary
Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it
at first refers to the body consisting of food, which,
although not the Self, is by very obtuse people identified
with it ; it then proceeds from the body to another Self,
which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as
the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the
molten brass had been poured ; then, again, to another one,
always at first representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the
purpose of easier comprehension ; and it finally teaches that
the innermost Self^, which consists of bliss, is the real Self.
Just as when a man, desirous of pointing out the star
Arundhati to another man, at first points to several stars
which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, w^hile only the
star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati ; so here
also the Self consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of
its being the innermost (i. e. the last). Nor can any weight
be allow^ed to the objection that the attribution of joy and
so on, as head, &c., cannot possibly refer to the real Self;
for this attribution is due to the immediately preceding
limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of understanding,
the so-called vi^/'anakoj-a), and does not really belong to the
real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed
to the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link
in the chain of bodies which begins with the Self consisting
of food, and is not ascribed to it in the same direct sense in
which it is predicated of the transmigrating Self. Hence
the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman.

J 13. If (it be objected that the term anandamaya,
consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self)
on account of its beinor a word denoting- a modifica-

^ Afler which no other Self is mentioned.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 67

tion (or product) ; (we declare the objection to be)
not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of
which may be expressed by the affix maya.)

Here the purvapakshin raises the objection that the word
anandamaya (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest
Self. — Why? — Because the word anandamaya is understood
to denote something different from the original word (i. e.
the word ananda without the derivative affix maya), viz. a
modification ; according to the received sense of the affix
maya. 'Anandamaya therefore denotes a modification, just
as annamaya (consisting of food) and similar words do.

This objection is, however, not valid, because ' maya ' is
also used in the sense of abundance, i. e. denotes that where
there is abundance of what the original word expresses. So,
for instance, the phrase ' the sacrifice is annamaya ' means
'the sacrifice is abounding in food ' (not ' is some modifica-
tion or product of food '). Thus here Brahman also, as
abounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman
does abound in bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up.
11. 8), where, after the bliss of each of the different classes
of beings, beginning with man, has been declared to be a
hundred times greater than the bliss of the immediately
preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed to
be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.

14. And because he is declared to be the cause of
it, (i. e. of bliss ; therefore maya is to be taken as
denoting abundance.)

Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that
reason also that Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause
of bliss, ' For he alone causes bliss ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).
For he who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss ;
just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who enriches
others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, there-
fore, maya may be taken to mean ' abundant,' the Self
consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

15. Moreover (the anandamaya is Brahman be-

F 2

68 vedanta-sOtras.

cause) the same (Brahman) which had been referred
to in the mantra is sung, (i. e, proclaimed in the
Brahma;^a passage as the anandamaya.)

The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for
the following reason also ^ On the introductory words ' he
who knows Brahman attains the highest ' (Taitt. Up. II, i),
there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman, which
forms the general topic of the chapter, possesses the quali-
ties of true existence, intelligence, infinity ; after that it is
said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and
then all other moving and non-moving things, and that,
entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman
stays in the recess, inmost of all ; thereupon, for its better
comprehension, the series of the different Selfs (' different
from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and then
finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed,
is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different
from this is the other inner Self, w^hich consists of bliss.'
To assume that a mantra and the Brahmawa passage be-
longing to it have the same sense is only proper, on account
of the absence of contradiction (which results therefrom) ;
for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome in-
ference that the text drops the topic once started, and turns
to an altogether new subject.

Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from
the Self consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self con-
sisting of food, &c. - On the same (i. e. the Self consisting
of bliss) is founded, ' This same knowledge of Bhrz'gu and
Varu//a ; he understood that bliss is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up.
Ill, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss is the highest
Self.

^ The previous proofs were founded on linga ; the argument
which is now propounded is founded on prakara«a.

^ While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a
further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, there-
fore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise
identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.

I ADHYAVA, I PADA, I 7. 69

16. (The Self consisting of bliss is th^ highest
Self,) not the other (i.e. the individual Soul), on
account of the impossibility (of the latter assump-
tion).

And for the following reason also the Self consisting of
bliss is the highest Self only, not the other, i. e. the one
which is other than the Lord, i. e. the transmigrating in-
dividual soul. The personal soul cannot be denoted by the
term ' the one consisting of bliss.' Why ? On account of
the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the
Self consisting of bliss, ' He wished, may I be many, may
I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had thus
brooded, he sent forth whatever there is.' Here, the desire
arising before the origination of a body, &c., the non-
separation of the effects created from the creator, and the
creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to
any Self different from the highest Self.

17. And on account of the declaration of the
difference (of the two, the anandamaya cannot be the
transmigrating soul).

The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the
transmigrating soul, for that reason also that in the section
treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self
of bliss are distinctly represented as different ; Taitt. Up.
II, 7, ' It (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour;
for only after perceiving a flavour can this (soul) perceive
bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that which is per-
ceived.— But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or
attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how
about the following 5ruti- and Smr/ti-passages, ' The Self
is to be sought ;' ' Nothing higher is known than the attain-
ment of the Self ^?' — This objection, we reply, is legitimate
(from the point of view of absolute truth). Yet we see that
in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never anything

^ Yadi labdha na labdhavya/z kathaw tarhi paramatmano vastuto
»bhinnena^ivatmana paramatma labhyata ity artha-^. Bhamati.

70 VEDAXTA-SUTRAS.

but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the truth,
identified with the Non-Self, i. e. the body and so on ;
whereby it becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far
as it is identified with the body, and so on, as something
not searched for but to be searched for, not heard but to
be heard, not seized but to be seized, not perceived but to
be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like.
Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as
' there is no other seer but he ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23), that
there is in reality any seer or hearer different from the
all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it be said that the
Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal
individual soul ; for)^ the Lord differs from the soul(vi^/?a-
natman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the
product of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler
who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler,
who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs up
to the sky by means of a rope ; or as the free unlimited
ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is determined by
its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to this
fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual
Self, the two last Sutras have been propounded.

18. And on account of desire (being mentioned
as belonging to the anandamaya) no regard is to be
had to what is inferred, (i. e. to the pradhana inferred
by the Saiikhyas.)

Since in the passage ' he desired, may I be many, may
I grow forth,' which occurs in the chapter treating of the
anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II, 6), the quality of feeling desire
is mentioned, that which is inferred, i. e. the non-intelligent
pradhana assumed by the Saiikhyas, cannot be regarded as
being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the
world. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the

^ Yatha paramejvarad bhinno ^ivatma drash/a na bhavaty evam
j'lvatmano i pi drash/ur na bhinna/; paramejvara iti ^ivasyanirva^-
yatve paramej-varo^py anirvS/^ya/i syad ity ata aha parame^varas tv
avidyakalpitad ili. Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, T PADA, 1 9. 7 I

cause of the world, has already been refuted in the Sutra I,
I, 5, it is here, where a favourable opportunity presents
itself, refuted for a second time on the basis of the scrip-
tural passage about the cause of the world feeling desire,
for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all
scriptural passages).

19. And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the
joining of this (i.e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e.
the Self consisting, of bliss), on that (being fully
known).

And for the following reason also the term, ' the Self
consisting of bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhana or the
individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul
when it has reached knowledge is joined, i. e. identified,
with the Self of bliss under discussion, i. e. obtains final
release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up. II, 7),
' When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which
is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has
obtained the fearless. For if he makes but the smallest
distinction in it there is fear for him.' That means, if he
sees in that Self consisting of bliss even a small difference
in the form of non-identity, then he finds no release from
/the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by
means of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute
rest in the Self consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the
fear of transmigratory existence. But this (finding absolute
rest) is possible only when we understand by the Self con-
sisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not either the pra-
dhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the
Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made
concerning the true meaning of the word '^nandamaya^'
On what grounds, we ask, can it be maintained that the

^ The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here re-
called, and a different one given. The previous explanation is
attributed by Go. An. to the vrntikara.

/

72 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

affix ' maya ' after having, in the series of compounds begin-
ning with annamaya and ending with vi^;7anamaya, denoted
mere modifications, should all at once, in the word ananda-
maya, which belongs to the same series, denote abun-
dance, so that anandamaya would refer to Brahman? If
it should be said that the assumption is made on account of
the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the
mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt.
Up. II), wc reply that therefrom it would follow that also
the Selfs consisting of food, breath, &c., denote Brahman
(because the governing influence of the mantra extends to
them also). — The advocate of the former interpretation
w'ill here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use
of above, viz. as follow^s : To assume that the Selfs consisting
of food; and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because
after each of them an inner Self is mentioned. After the
Self of bliss, on the other hand, no further inner Self is
mentioned, and hence it must be considered to be Brahman
itself; otherwise Ave should commit the mistake of dropping
the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed
out by the mantra), and taking up a new topic. — But to this
we reply that, although unlike the case of the Selfs con-
sisting of food, &c., no inner Self is mentioned after the Self
consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be considered as
Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of
bliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its
right arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its
trunk. Brahman is its tail, its support.' Now, here the
very same Brahman which, in the mantra, had been
introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called
the tail, the support ; while the five involucra, extending
from the involucrum of food up to the involucrum of
bliss, are merely introduced for the purpose of setting
forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then, can it be
maintained that our interpretation implies the needless
dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction
of a new topic? — But, it may again be objected. Brahman
is called the tail, i. e. a member of the Self consisting of
bliss ; analogously to those passages in which a tail and

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9. *JT,

other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting of food
and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know
that Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i. e. a
subordinate matter) is in reality the chief matter referred to?
— From the fact, we reply, of Brahman being the general
subject-matter of the chapter. — But, it will again be said,
that interpretation also according to which Brahman is
cognised as a mere member of the anandamaya does not
involve a dropping of the subject-matter, since the ananda-
maya himself is Brahman. — But, we reply, in that case one
and the same Brahman would at first appear as the whole,
viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere
part, viz. as the tail ; which is absurd. And as one of the
two alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appro-
priate to refer to Brahman the clause ' Brahman is the
tail ' which contains the word ' Brahman,' and not the
sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman is
not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation
of the phrase, ' Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes
on, ' On this there is also the following i-loka : He who
knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself, non-
existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we
know himself as existing.' As this j-loka, without any refer-
ence to the Self of bliss, states the advantage and disadvan-
tage connected with the knowledge of the being and non-
being of Brahman only, we conclude that the clause,
' Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as
the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter).
About the being or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the
other hand, a doubt is not well possible, since the Self of
bliss distinguished by joy, satisfaction, &c., is well known
to every one. — But if Brahman is the principal matter, how
can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self of bliss
(' Brahman is the tail, the support ') } — Its being called so,
we reply, forms no objection ; for the word tail here denotes
that which is of the nature of a tail, so that we have to
understand that the bliss of Brahman is not a member (in
its literal sense), but the support or abode, the one nest
(resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously another

74 VEDANTA-S^'TRAS.

scriptural passage declares, ' All other creatures live on a
small portion of that bliss ' (B/-/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further,
if by the Self consisting of bliss we were to understand
Brahman, we should have to assume that the Brahman
meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities (savi^esha),
because it is said to have joy and the like for its members.
But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary
passage (II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object
neither of mind nor speech, and so shows that the Brahman
meant is the (absolute) Brahman (devoid of qualities),
' From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable
to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as ' abounding
in bliss \' we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for
the word ' abundance ' in its ordinary sense implies the
existence of a small measure of what is opposed to the
thing whereof there is abundance. But the passage so
understood would be in conflict with another passage [Kh.
Up. VII, 24), ' Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing
else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which
declares that in the Infinite, i. e. Brahman, there is nothing
whatever different from it. Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in
each individual body, the Self consisting of bliss also is a
different one in each body. Brahman, on the other hand,
does not differ according to bodies ; for the mantra at the be-
ginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge,
infinite, and another passage says, ' He is the one God, hidden
in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings ' (5v.
Up. VI, 11). Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent
repetition of the word ' anandamaya ; ' for merely the radical
part of the compound (i. e. the word ananda without the
affix maya) is repeated in all the following passages : ' It
is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one seize
bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that
bliss existed not in the ether ? For he alone causes blessed-
ness;' 'Now this is an examination of bliss;' 'He who

^ In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must
be taken if understood to denote Brahman.

I ADHVAVA, I TADA, I Q. 75

knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing;' 'He
understood that bhss is Brahman.' If it were a settled
matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, ' the Self
consisting of bliss,' then, we could assume that in the subse-
quent passages, where merely the w^ord ' bliss ' is employed,
the term ' consisting of bliss ' is meant to be repeated ; but
that the Self consisting of bliss is not Brahman, we have
already proved by means of the reason of joy being its
head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage,
viz. ' Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Br/. Up. HI, 9, 2cS),
the mere word ' bliss ' denotes Brahman, we must conclude
that also in such passages as, ' If that bliss existed not in
the ether,' the word bliss is used with reference to Brahman,
and is not meant to repeat the term ' consisting of bliss.'
The repetition of the full compound, ' consisting of bliss,'
which occurs in the passage, ' He reaches that Self consisting
of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it
is contained in the enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the
Self of food, &c., all of which are mere effects, and all of
which are represented as things to be reached. — But, it may
be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is said to have
to be reached, were not Brahman — ^just as the Selfs con-
sisting of food, &c. are not Brahman — then it would not be
declared (in the passage immediately following) that he who
knows obtains for his reward Brahman. — This objection
we invalidate by the remark that the text makes its
declaration as to Brahman — which is the tail, the support —
being reached by him who knows, by the very means of
the declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss ; as
appears from the passage, ' On this there is also this sloka.,
from which all speech returns,' &c. With reference, again,
to the passage, ' He desired : may I be many, may I grow
forth/ which is found in proximity to the mention of the
Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality con-
nected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which
is mentioned in the still nearer passage, ' Brahman is the tail,
the support,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self
of bliss is Brahman. And, on account of its referring to
the passage last quoted (' it desired,' &c.), the later passage

76 vedanta-sOtras.

also, ' That is flavour,' &c., has not the Self of bliss for its
subject. — But, it may be objected, the (neuter word) Brah-
man cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word as
you maintain is done in the passage, ' He desired,' &c. — In
reply to this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up.
II, i), 'From that Self sprang ether,' where, likewise, the
masculine word 'Self can refer to Brahman only, since
the latter is the general topic of the chapter. In the know-
ledge of Bhr/gu and Varuwa finally (' he knew that bliss is
Brahman '), the word ' bliss ' is rightly understood to denote
Brahman, since we there meet neither with the affix ' maya,'
nor with any statement as to joy being its head, and the
like. To ascribe to Brahman in itself joy, and so on, as its
members, is impossible, unless we have recourse to certain,
however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman ; and that
the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of
the qualified (savij-esha) Brahman is proved by the passage
(quoted above), which declares that Brahman transcends
speech and mind. We therefore must conclude that the
affix maya, in the word anandamaya, does not denote
abundance, but expresses a mere effect; just as it does in
the words annamaya and the subsequent similar com-
pounds.

The Sutras are therefore to be explained as follows.
There arises the question whether the passage, ' Brahman
is the tail, the support,' is to be understood as intimating
that Brahman is a mere member of the Self consisting of
bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said that it
must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, ' The
Self consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That
means : Brahman, which in the passage ' the Self con-
sisting of bliss," &c., is spoken of as the tail, the support,
is designated as the principal matter (not as something
subordinate). On account of the repetition ; for in the
memorial j-loka, ' he becomes himself non-existing,' Brah-
man alone is reiterated. ' If not, on account of the word
denoting a modification ; not so, on account of abundance.'
In this Sutra the word ' modification ' is meant to convey
the sense of member. The objection that on account of

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 20. 77

the -word ' tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman
cannot be taken as the principal matter must be refuted.
This we do by remarking that there is no difficulty, since
a word denoting a member may be introduced into the
passage on account of pra/^urya ^. Pra/^urya here means a
phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After
the different members, beginning with the head and ending
with the tail, of the Selfs, consisting of food, &c. have been
enumerated, there are also mentioned the head and the other
limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added, ' Brahman
is the tail, the support; ' the intention being merely to intro-
duce some more terms denoting members, not to convey
the meaning of ' member,' (an explanation which is impos-
sible) because the preceding Sutra already has proved
Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the principal
matter. ' And because he is declared to be the cause of it.'
That means : Brahman is declared to be the cause of the
/Entire aggregate of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting
of bliss, in the following passage, ' He created all whatever
there is ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as Brahman is the cause,
it cannot at the same time be called the member, in the
literal sense of the word; of the Self of bliss, which is nothing
but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sutras also (which
refer to the Self of bliss ^) are to be considered, as well as
they may, as conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which
(Brahman) is referred to in the passage about the tail.

20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the
highest Lord), on account of his qualities being
declared ^.

The following passage is found in Scripture {Kh. Up. I,
6, 6 ff.), * Now that person bright as gold who is seen within

^ I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.

'^ See I, I, 15-19.

^ The preceding adhikarawa had shown that the five Selfs (con-
sisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates,
are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognilion of
Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities ; while that Brahman

78 vedanta-sOtras.

the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold,
bright as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose
eyes are like blue lotus ; his name is Ut, for he has risen
(udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above
all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And
further on, with reference to the body, ' Now the person
who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here the following doubt
presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the object
of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye,
merely some special individual soul, which, by means of
a large measure of knowledge and pious works, has raised
itself to a position of eminence ; or do they refer to the
eternally perfect highest Lord ?

The purvapakshin takes the former view. An individual
soul, he says, is referred to, since Scripture speaks of a
definite shape. To the person in the sun special features
are ascribed, such as the possession of a beard as bright as
gold and so on, and the same features manifestly belong to
the person in the eye also, since they are expressly trans-
ferred to it in the passage, ' The shape of this person is the
same as the shape of that person.' That, on the other
hand, no shape can be ascribed to the highest Lord, follows
from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3. 15), 'That which is without
sound, without touch, without form, without decay.' That
an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact
that a definite abode is mentioned, ' He who is in the sun ;
he who is in the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no
special abode, but abides in his own glory, no similar state-
ment can be made ; compare, for instance, the two following
passages, ' Where does he rest? In his own glory?' {Kh.
Up. Vn, 24. i); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent,
eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by
the fact that the might (of the being in question) is said to
be limited ; for the passage, ' He is lord of the worlds
beyond that, and of the wishes of the devas,' indicates the

itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara«a un-
dertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents
he savijesha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.

T ADHYAYA, I PADA, 20. 79

limitation of the might of the person in the sun ; and the
passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of
the wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might
of the person in the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can
be admitted of the might of the highest Lord, as appears
from the passage (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 22), ' He is the Lord of all,
the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a
bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be
confounded ;' which passage intimates that the Lord is
free from all limiting distinctions. For all these reasons
the person in the eye and the sun cannot be the highest
Lord.

To this reasoning the Sutra replies, ' The one within, on
account of his qualities being declared.' The person
referred to in the passages concerning the person within
the sun and the person within the eye is not a trans-
migrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because
his qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest
Lord are indicated in the text as follows. At first the
name of the person within the sun is mentioned — 'his
name is Ut ' — and then this name is explained on the
ground of that person being free from all evil, ' He has
risen above all evil.' The same name thus explained is
then transferred to the person in the eye, in the clause,
* the name of the one is the name of the other.' Now,
entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to the
highest Self only; so, for instance {KJi. Up. VHI, 7, 1),
' The Self which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is
the passage, ' He is Rik^ he is Saman, Uktha, Ya^us, Brah-
man,' which declares the person in the eye to be the Self
of the RiV, Saman, and so on ; which is possible only if
that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is
to be considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text,
after having stated in succession Rik and Saman to have
earth and fire for their Self with reference to the Devas,
and, again, speech and breath with reference to the body,
continues, 'T^z'k and Saman are his joints,' with reference to
the Devas, and ' the joints of the one are the joints of the
other,' with reference to the body. Now this statement

8o VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

also can be made only with regard to that which is the
Self of all. Further, the passage, ' Therefore all who sing
to the Vina sing him, and from him also they obtain
wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic
of all worldly songs ; which again holds true of the highest
Lord only. That absolute command over the objects of
worldly desires (as displayed, for instance, in the bestowal
of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord is meant,
appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-
gita (X, 41), ' Whatever being there is possessing power,
glory, or strength^ know it to be produced from a portion
of my energyV To the objection that the statements
about bodily shape contained in the clauses, ' With a
beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest
Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he
pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of Maya, in order
to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Smriti
also says, ' That thou seest me, O Narada, is the Maya
emitted by me ; do not then look on me as endowed with
the qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that
expressions such as, 'That which is without sound, without
touch, without form, without decay,' are made use of where
instruction is given about the nature of the highest Lord in
so far as he is devoid of all qualities ; while passages such
as the following one, ' He to whom belong all works, all
desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (K/i. Up. Ill, 14, 2),
which represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion,
speak of him, who is the cause of everything, as possessing
some of the qualities of his effects. Analogously he may
be spoken of, in the passage under discussion, as having a
beard bright as gold and so on. With reference to the
objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because
an abode is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of
devout meditation, a special abode may be assigned to
Brahman, although it abides in its own glory only ; for as
Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be viewed as

^ So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets
and singers is Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 22. 8 I

being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally,
about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on
the distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the
body, has likewise reference to devout meditation only.
From all this it follows that the being which Scripture
states to be within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord.

21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who
is different from the individual souls animating the
sun, &c.), on account of the declaration of distinc-
tion.

There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual
souls which animate the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord
who rules within; whose distinction (from all individual
souls) is proclaimed in the following scriptural passage, ' He
who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom the sun
does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the
sun within ; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal '
(Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 9). Here the expression, 'He within the
sun whom the sun does not know,' clearly indicates that the
Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul
whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within we have to
identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet
of the sameness of purport of all Vedanta-texts. It thus
remains a settled conclusion that the passage under dis-
cussion conveys instruction about the highest Lord.

22. The akaj"a, i. e. ether (is Brahman) on account
of characteristic marks (of the latter being men-
tioned).

In the AV^andogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with,
'What is the origin of this world.?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For
all these beings take their rise from the ether only, and
return into the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is
their rest.' — Here the following doubt arises. Does the word
* ether ' denote the highest Brahman or the elemental ether?
— Whence the doubt ? — Because the word is seen to be used
in both senses. Its use in the sense of ' elemental ether '
is well established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech ;
[34] G

82 vedanta-sOtras.

and, on the other hand, we see that it is sometimes used to
denote Brahman, viz. in cases where we ascertain, either
from some complementary sentence or from the fact of
special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant.
So, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, ' If that bliss existed not
in the ether;' and Kh. Up. VIII, 14, ' That which is called
ether is the revealer of all forms and names ; that within
which forms and names are ^ that is Brahman.' Hence the
doubt. — Which sense is then to be adopted in our case? —
The sense of elemental ether, the purvapakshin replies ;
because this sense belongs to the word more commonly,
and therefore presents itself to the mind more readily.
The word ' ether ' cannot be taken in both senses equally,
because that would involve a (faulty) attribution of several
meaning's to one and the same word. Hence the term
' ether ' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical)
sense only ; on account of Brahman being in many of its
attributes, such as all perv^adingness and the like, similar to
ether. The rule is. that when the primary sense of a word
is possible, the word must not be taken in a secondary sense.
And in the passage under discussion only the primary sense
of the word ' ether ' is admissible. Should it be objected
that, if we refer the passage under discussion to the ele-
mental ether, a complementary passage (' for all these
beings take their rise from the ether only, &c.') cannot be
satisfactorily accounted for ; we reply that the elemental
ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air, fire, &c.
in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up.
11, 1), ' From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from
air fire, and so on.' The qualities also of being greater
and of being a place of rest may be ascribed to the elemental
ether, if we consider its relations to all other beings. There-
fore we conclude that the word ' ether ' here denotes the
elemental ether.

To this we reply as follows : — The word ether must here
be taken to denote Brahman, on account of characteristic
marks of the latter being mentioned. For the sentence,

^ Or else ' that which is within forms and names.'

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2 2. 83

' All these beings take their rise from the ether only/ clearly
indicates the highest Brahman, since all Vedanta-texts
agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from
the highest Brahman. — But, the opponent may say, we
have shown that the elemental ether also may be repre-
sented as the cause, viz. of air, fire, and the other elements
in due succession. — We admit this. But still there remains
the difficulty, that, unless we understand the w^ord to apply
to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation
contained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed
by the word ' all ' (in 'all beings') would be out of place.
Moreover, the clause, ' They return into the ether,' again
points to Brahman, and so likewise the phrase, ' Ether is
greater than these, ether is their rest;'' for absolute supe-
riority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the
highest Self only; cp. KJi. Up. Ill, 14, 3, 'Greater than
the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater
than all these worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest
likewise agrees best with the highest Brahman, on account
of its being the highest cause. This is confirmed by the
following scriptural passage : ' Knowledge and bliss is Brah-
man, it istherestof him who gives gifts' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 2(S).
Moreover, Caivali finding fault with the doctrine of vSala-
vatya, on account of (his saman) having an end [I'Ch. Up. I,
8, 8), and wishing to proclaim something that has no end
chooses the ether, and then, having identified the ether with
the Udgitha, concludes, ' He is the Udgitha greater than
great ; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a
characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that
the sense of 'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind
more readily, because it is the better established sense of
the word akaj-a, we reply, that, although it may present
itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be accepted, because
we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the com-
plementary sentences. That the word aklya is also used
to denote Brahman has been shown already ; cp. such
passages as, ' Ether is the revealer of all names and forms.'
We see, moreover, that various synonyma of akaj-a are
employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance, Rik. Sa;;/h.

G 2

84 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are ^. in the Imperishable
one (i. e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on
which all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. Ill, 6,
' This is the knowledge of Bhr/gu and Varu;/a, founded on
the highest ether (vyoman\' And again, ' Om, ka is Brah-
man, ether (kha) is Brahman' {Kh. Up. IV, 10, 5), and 'the
old ether' (Brz. Up. V, i)^. And other similar passages.
On account of the force of the complementary passage we
are justified in deciding that the word ' ether,' although
occurring in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman.
The case is analogous to that of the sentence, ' Agni (lit.
the fire) studies a chapter,' where the word agni, although
occurring in the beginning, is at once seen to denote a boy".
It is therefore settled that the word ' ether' denotes Brahman.

23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).

Concerning the udgitha it is said {Kh. Up I, 10, 9),
' Prastotrz, that deity which belongs to the prastava, &c.,'
and, further on (I, 11,4; 5), 'Which then is that deity? He
said : Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone,
and from breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to
the prastava.' With reference to this passage doubt and
decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated
under the preceding Sutra. For while in some passages — as,
for instance, ' For indeed, my son, mind is fastened to prawa,'
KJi. Up. VI, 8, 2 ; and, 'the pra;/a of pra//a,' Br/. Up. IV, 4,
18 — the word ' breath' is seen to denote Brahman, its use

^ Viz, as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against the
accent of rikkh. Saya;;a explains rikUi as genitive.

^ Owkarasya pralikatvena va/('akatvena lakshakatvena va brah-
matvam uktam, om iii, ka/;/ sukhaw tasyarthendriyayoga^atvaw
varayitu;« kham iti, tasya bhutakajatva;;/ vyaseddhum purawam ity
uktam. An. Gi.

^ The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be
decided by means of a reference to preceding passages ; where that
is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of
some new chapter) complementary, i. e. subsequent passages have
to be taken into consideration.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23. 85

in the sense of a certain modification of air is better estab-
lished in common as well as in Vedic language. Hence
there arises a doubt whether in the passage under dis-
cussion the word pra//a denotes Brahman or (ordinary)
breath. In favour of which meaning have we then to
decide?

Here the purv-apakshin maintains that the word must be
held to denote the fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar
modification of wind (or air); because, as has been re-
marked already, that sense of the word pra;?a is the better
established one. — But no, an objector will say, just as in the
case of the preceding Sutra, so here also Brahman is meant,
on account of characteristic marks being mentioned ; for
here also a complementary passage gives us to understand
that all beings spring from and merge into prawa ; a process
which can take place in connexion with the highest Lord
only. — This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is futile,
since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from
the principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the fol-
lowing statement (5at. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 'When man sleeps,
then into breath indeed speech merges, into breath the eye,
into breath the ear, into breath the mind ; when he awakes
then they spring again from breath alone.' What the Veda
here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during
sleep, while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly,
the activity of the sense organs is interrupted and again
becomes manifest at the time of awaking only. And as the
sense organs are the essence of all material beings, the com-
plementary passage which speaks of the merging and
emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal
vital air also. Moreover, subsequently to prawa being
mentioned as the divinity of the prastava the sun and food
are designated as the divinities of the udgitha and the
pratihara. Now as they are not Brahman, the pra;/a also,
by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.

To this argumentation the author of the Sutras replies :
For the same reason pra;/a — that means : on account of
the presence of characteristic marks — which constituted the
reason stated in the preceding Sutra — the word pra;/a also

86 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of
praz/a also, that it is connected with marks characteristic
of Brahman. The sentence, 'All these beings merge into
breath alone, and from breath they arise,' which declares
that the origination and retractation of all beings depend on
pra;/a, clearly shows prawa to be Brahman. In reply to the
assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can
be reconciled equally well with the assumption of pra;^a de-
noting the chief vital air, because origination and retractation
take place in the state of waking and of sleep also, we remark
that in those two states only the senses are merged into, and
emerge from, the chief vatal air, while, according to the
scriptural passage, ' For all these beings, &c.,' all beings
whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with
their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And
even if the word ' beings ' were taken (not in the sense of
animated beings, but) in the sense of material elements in
general, there would be nothing in the way of interpreting
the passage as referring to Brahman.- — But, it may be said,
that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep,
enter into pra;/a. and again issue from it at the time of
waking, we distinctly learn from another scriptural passage,
viz. Kau. Up. Ill, 3, 'When a man being thus asleep sees
no dream whatever, he becomes one with that pra;za alone.
Then speech goes to him with all names,' &c. — True, we
reply, but there also the word prawa denotes (not the vital
air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks
of Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that
the word prawa cannot denote Brahman because it occurs
in proximity to the words ' food ' and ' sun ' (which do not
refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless ; for proximity is
of no avail against the force of the complementary passage
which intimates that pra«a is Brahman. That argument,
finally, which rests on the fact that the word pra;/a com-
monly denotes the vital air with its five modifications, is to
be refuted in the same way as the parallel argument which
the purvapakshin brought forward with reference to the
word ' ether.' From all this it follows that the pra/^a, which
is the deity of the prastava, is Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24. Z^J

Some (commentators)^ quote under the present Sutra the
following passages, ' the pra;/a of pra;/a ' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 18),
and ' for to pra;/a mind is fastened ' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2). But
that is wrong since these two passages offer no opportunity
for any discussion, the former on account of the separation
of the words, the latter on account of the general topic.
When we meet with a phrase such as ' the father of the
father ' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a
father different from the father denoted by the nominative.
Analogously we infer from the separation of words con-
tained in the phrase, ' the breath of breath,' that the ' breath
of breath' is different from the ordinary breath (denoted
by the genitive ' of breath '). For one and the same thing
cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of — and thus
distinguished from — itself. Concerning the second passage
we remark that, if the matter constituting the general topic
of some chapter is referred to in that chapter under
a different name, we yet conclude, from the general topic,
that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we
meet in the section which treats of the^yotish/oma sacrifice
with the passage, ' in every spring he is to offer the ^^yotis
sacrifice,' we at once understand that the word ^otis
denotes the ^yotish/oma. If we therefore meet with the
clause ' to prawa mind is fastened ' in a section of which
the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment
suppose that the word pra;^a should there denote the
ordinary breath which is a mere modification of air. The
two passages thus do not offer any matter for discussion,
and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the
Sutra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the
passage about the pra;/a, which is the deity of the prastava,
allows room for doubt, purvapaksha and final decision.

24. The ' light ' (is Brahman), on account of the

mention of feet (in a passage which is connected

with the passage about the light).

Scripture says {Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7), ' Now that light which
shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than every-

^ The vn'uikara, the commentators say.

88 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

thing, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no
other worlds, that is the same light which is within man.'
Here the doubt presents itself whether the word ' light '
denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest
Self. Under the preceding Sutras we had shown that some
words which ordinarily have different meanings yet in
certain passages denote Brahman, since characteristic marks
of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has to be
discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted,
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.

The purvapakshin maintains that the word ' light ' de-
notes nothing else but the light of the sun and the like, since
that is the ordinary well-established meaning of the term.
The common use of language, he says, teaches us that the
two word^ ' light ' and ' darkness ' denote mutually opposite
things, darkness being the term for whatever interferes with
the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance, the gloom
of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the
action of the eye is called light. The word ' shines ' also,
which the text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the
sun and similar sources of light ; while of Brahman, which
is devoid of colour, it cannot be said, in the primary sense
of the word, that it ' shines.' Further, the word ^yotis
must here denote light because it is said to be bounded by
the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven').
For while it is impossible to consider the sky as being the
boundary of Brahman, which is the Self of all and the
source of all things movable or immovable, the sky may
be looked upon as forming the boundary of light, which is
a mere product and as such limited ; accordingly the text
says, ' the light beyond heaven.' — But light, although a
mere product, is perceived everywhere ; it would therefore
be wrong to declare that it is bounded by the sky ! — Well,
then, the purvapakshin replies, let us assume that the light
meant is the first-born (original) light which has not yet
become tripartite ^. This explanation again cannot be

' I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according
to Kh. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24. 89

admitted, because the non-tripartite light does not serve
any purpose. — But, the purvapakshin resumes, Why should
its purpose not be found therein that it is the object of
devout meditation ? — That cannot be, we reply ; for we see
that only such things are represented as objects of devotion
as have some other independent use of their own ; so, for
instance, the sun (which dispels darkness and so on). More-
over the scriptural passage, ' Let me make each of these
three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,' does not indicate any
difference^. And even of the non-tripartite light it is not
known that the sky constitutes its boundary. — Well, then
(the purvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-
tripartite light), let us assume that the light of which the
text speaks is the tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection
that light is seen to exist also beneath the sky, viz. in the
form of fire and the like, we invalidate by the remark that
there is nothing contrary to reason in assigning a special
locality to fire, although the latter is obsei"ved everywhere ;
while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the
idea of place does not apply at all, would be most un-
suitable. Moreover, the clause ' higher than everything, in
the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds,'
which indicates a multiplicity of abodes, agrees much better
with light, which is a mere product (than with Brahman).
There is moreover that other clause also, ' That is the same
light which is within man/ in which the highest light is
identified with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now
such identifications can be made only where there is a
certain similarity of nature ; as is seen, for instance, in the
passage, ' Of that person Bhu/i is the head, for the head is
one and that syllable is one ' (Brz. Up. V, 5, 3). But that
the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly
appears from the passage, ' Of this we have visible and
audible proof {K/i. Up. Ill, 13, 7; 8), which declares that

entirely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded
by the latter.

^ So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as non-tri-
partite light exists at all.

90 vedanta-sOtras.

the fire is characterised by the noise it makes, and by heat ;
and Hkewise from the following passage, ' Let a man
meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The
same conclusion may be drawn from the passage, ' He who
knows this becomes conspicuous and celebrated,' which
proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to the
devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have
to be allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire
passage about the light any other characteristic mark of
Brahman, while such marks are set forth in the passages
(discussed above) which refer to pra;^a and the ether. Nor,
again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, ' the
Gayatri is everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (Ill, 12); for
that passage makes a statement about the Gayatri metre
only. And even if that section did refer to Brahman, still
Brahman would not be recognised in the passage at present
under discussion ; for there (in the section referred to) it is
declared — in the clause, ' Three feet of it are the Immortal
in heaven ' — that heaven constitutes the abode ; while in
our passage the words ' the light above heaven ' declare
heaven to be a boundary. For all these reasons the word
^yotis is here to be taken in its ordinary meaning, viz.
light.

To this we make the following reply. The word .^yotis
must be held to denote Brahman. Why ? On account of
the feet (quarters) being mentioned. In a preceding
passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet
(quarters). ' Such is the greatness of it ; greater than it is
the Person (purusha). One foot of it are all the beings,
three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven.' That which in
this passage is said to constitute the three-quarter part,
immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman, which
altogether comprises four quarters ; this very same entity
we recognise as again referred to in the passage under
discussion, because there also it is said to be connected
with heaven. If therefore we should set it aside in our
interpretation of the passage and assume the latter to refer
to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of
dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24. QI

a new subject. Brahman, in fact, continues to form the
subject-matter, not only of the passage about the hght, but
likewise of the subsequent section, the so-called 5a;/<^i]ya-
vidya iyKJi, Up. Ill, 14). Hence we conclude that in our
passage the word ' light ' must be held to denote Brahman.
The objection (raised above) that from common use the
words ' light ' and ' to shine ' are known to denote effected
(physical) light is without force ; for as it is known from
the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is meant,
those two words do not necessarily denote physical light
only to the exclusion of Brahman^, but may also denote
Brahman itself, in so far as it is characterised by the
physical shining light wdiich is its effect. Analogously
another mantra declares, ' that by which the sun shines
kindled with heat' (Taitt. Br. Ill, 12, 9, 7). Or else we
may suppose that the word ^otis here does not denote at
all that light on which the function of the eye depends.
For we see that in other passages it has altogether different
meanings ; so, for instance, Br/. Up. IV, 3, 5, ' With speech
only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3, ' May the
mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever
illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something
else may be spoken of as ' light.' Hence to Brahman also,
whose nature is intelligence, the term ' light ' may be
applied ; for it gives light to the entire world. Similarly,
other scriptural passages say, ' Him the shining one, every-
thing shines after ; by his light all this is lighted ' (Kau. Up.
II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of
lights, as the immortal' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the
further objection that the omnipresent Brahman cannot be
viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that the assign-
ment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to
reason because it subserves the purpose of devout medita-
tion. Nor does it avail anything to say that it is impossible
to assign any place to Brahman because Brahman is out of
connexion with all place. For it is possible to make such

^ Brahmawo vyava^^>^idya te^a/^samarpakatva?// vij-eshakatvam,
tadabhavo^vijeshakatvam. An. Gi.

VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

an assumption, because Brahman is connected with certain
hmiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different
kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially con-
nected with certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the
heart. For the same reason it is also possible to attribute
to Brahman a multiplicity of abodes, as is done in the
clause (quoted above) ' higher than all.' The further ob-
jection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical
light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which
itself is a mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks
such as the heat of the body and a certain sound, is equally
devoid of force ; for the gastric fire may be viewed as the
outward appearance (or symbol) of Brahman, just as Brah-
man's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in the
passage, ' Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as
seen and heard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly
ascribed to Brahman) must be considered as rendered
possible through the gastric fire being the outward appear-
ance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in the objection
that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions
an inconsiderable reward only ; for there is no reason com-
pelling us to have recourse to Brahman for the purpose
of such and such a reward only, and not for the purpose of
such and such another reward. Wherever the text represents
the highest Brahman — which is free from all connexion
with distinguishing attributes — as the universal Self, it is
understood that the result of that instruction is one only,
viz. final release. Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman
is taught to be connected with distinguishing attributes or
outward symbols, there, we see, all the various rewards
which this world can offer are spoken of ; cp. for instance,
Brz. Up. IV, 4, 24, ' This is he who eats all food, the giver
of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although
in the passage itself which treats of the light no charac-
teristic mark of Brahman is mentioned, yet, as the Sutra
intimates, the mark stated in a preceding passage (viz. the
mantra, ' Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be taken
in connexion with the passage about the light as well.
The question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 25. 93

mentioned in a not distant passage can have the power
of divorcing from its natural object and transferring to
another object the direct statement about light implied in
the word ' light,' may be answered without difficulty. The
passage under discussion runs ''■, ' which above this heaven,
the light/ The relative pronoun with which this clause
begins intimates, according to its grammatical force ^, the
same Brahman which was mentioned in the previous
passage, and which is here recognised (as being the same
which was mentioned before) through its connexion with
heaven ; hence the word ^yotis also — which stands in
grammatical co-ordination to ' which ' — must have Brahman
for its object. From all this it follows that the word
'light' here denotes Brahman.

25, If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted)
on account of the metre being denoted ; (we reply)
not so, because thus (i.e. by means of the metre) the
direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared ; for
thus it is seen (in other passages also).

We now address ourselves to the refutation of the asser-
tion (made in the purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that
in the previous passage also Brahman is not referred to,
because in the sentence, ' Gayatri is everything whatsoever
here exists,' the metre called Gayatri is spoken of. — How
(we ask the purvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on
account of the metre being spoken of. Brahman is not
denoted, while yet the mantra ' such is the greatness of
it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman with its four quarters?
— You are mistaken (the purvapakshin replies). The
sentence, ' Gayatri is everything,' starts the discussion of
Gayatri. The same Gayatri is thereupon described under
the various forms of all beings, earth, body, heart, speech,
breath ; to which there refers also the verse, ' that Gayatri

^ If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.

^ Svasamarthyena sarvanamna/i sannihitaparamar^itvavajena.

94 vedanta-sOtras.

has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we meet with the
mHiitra. ' Such is the greatness of it,' &c. How then, we
ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with
reference to the G^yatri (metre) as described in the preceding
clauses, all at once denote Brahman with its four quarters ?
Since therefore the metre Gayatri is the subject-matter of
the entire chapter, the term ' Brahman ' which occurs in a
subsequent passage (" the Brahman which has thus been
described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous
to a previous passage [Kh. Up. Ill, ii, 3, 'He who thus
knows this Brahma-upanishad'), where the word Brahma-
upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As
therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman,
but) to the Gayatri metre, Brahman does not constitute the
topic of the entire section.

This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our
position. ' Because thus direction of the mind is declared,'
i. e. because the Brahma//a passage, ' Gayatri indeed is all
this,' intimates that by means of the metre Gayatri the mind
is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that
metre. Of the metre Gayatri, which is nothing but a certain
special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be said
that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to
understand the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as
the cause of the world, is connected with that product also
whose name is Gayatri, is ' all this ; ' in accordance with that
other passage which directly says, ' All this indeed is
Brahman' {KJi. Up. HI, 14, i). That the effect is in
reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on,
under Sutra H, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under
the form of certain effects (of Brahman) is seen to be men-
tioned in other passages also, so, for instance, Ait. Ar. HI,
2, 3, 12, 'For the Balivr/ztas consider him in the great
hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the AV/andogas
in the Mahavrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the
previous passage speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is
meant, and the same Brahman is again referred to in the
passage about the light, whose purport it is to enjoin
another form of devout meditation.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 26. 95

Another commentator^ is of opinion that the term
Gayatri (does not denote Brahman in so far as viewed under
the form of Gayatri, but) directly denotes Brahman, on
account of the equality of number ; for just as the Gayatri
metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so
Brahman also has four feet, (i. e. quarters.) Similarly we
see that in other psssages also the names of metres are used
to denote other things which resemble those metres in
certain numerical relations ; cp. for instance, Kh. Up. IV,
3, 8, where it is said at first, ' Now these five and the
other five make ten and that is the Kr/ta,' and after that
'these are again the Vira^ which eats the food.' If we
adopt this interpretation. Brahman only is spoken of, and
the metre is not referred to at all. In any case Brahman is
the subject with which the previous passage is concerned.

26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that
Brahman is the subject of the previous passage), be-
cause (thus only) the declaration as to the beings,
&c. being the feet is possible.

That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we
must assume for that reason also that the text designates
the beings and so on as the feet of Gayatri. For the text
at first speaks of the beings, the earth, the body, and the
heart -, and then goes on ' that Gayatri has four feet and is
sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to
Brahman, it would be impossible to say.that the beings and
so on are its feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant,
there would be no room for the verse, ' Such is the great-
ness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes Brahman in its
own nature ; otherwise it would be impossible to represent
the Gayatri as the Self of everything as is done in the words,
' One foot of it are all the beings ; three feet of it are what
is immortal in heaven.' The purusha-sukta also {Ri"^

' The vr/ttikara according to Go. An. in his /ika on the bhashya
to the next Sutra.

- Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp.
Deussen, p. 183. note.

96 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

J

Sa;;/h. X, 90) exhibits the verse with sole reference to
Brahman. Smr/ti likewise ascribes to Brahman a like
nature, ' I stand supporting all this world by a single portion
of myself (Bha. Gita X, 42). Our interpretation moreover
enables us to take the passage, ' that Brahman indeed
which,' &c. (Ill, 12, 7), in its primary sense, (i.e. to under-
stand the word Brahman to denote nothing but Brahman.)
And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of
Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former
passage about the Gayatri is taken as referring to Brahman
(for otherwise the ' Brahman ' in ' men of Brahman ' would
not be connected with the previous topic). Hence Brahman
is to be considered as the subject-matter of the previous
passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is
referred to in the passage about the light where it is recog-
nised (to be the same) from its connexion with heaven,
remains unshaken.

27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former
passage cannot be recognised in the latter) on account
of the difference of designation, is not valid because
in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to
the recognition).

The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of
it are what is immortal in heaven '), heaven is designated
as the abode, while in the latter passage (' that light which
shines above this heaven '), heaven is designated as the
boundary, and that, on account of this difference of desig-
nation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be
recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we
do by remarking that in either designation nothing is
contrary to the recognition. Just as in ordinary language
a falcon, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not
only said to be on the tree but also above the tree, so
Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to
as being beyond heaven as well.

Another (commentator) explains : just as in ordinary
language a falcon, although not in contact with the top of a

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 28. 97

tree, is not only said to be above the top of the tree but also
on the top of the tree, so Brahman also, which is in reality
beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two passages) said
to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the
former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it
remains therefore a settled conclusion that the word ' light '
denotes Brahman.

28. Pra;^a (breath) is Brahman, that being under-
stood from a connected consideration (of the passages
referring to pra/m).

In the Kaushitaki-brahma;/a-upanishad there is recorded
a legend of Indra and Pratardana which begins with the
words, ' Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodasa came by
means of fighting and strength to the beloved abode of
Indra' (Kau. Up. Ill, i). In this legend we read: 'He
said : I am pra;/a, the intelligent Self (pra^>7atman), medi-
tate on me as Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on
(III, 3), ' Prawa alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold
of this body, makes it rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), ' Let
no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the
i/^eaker.' And in the end (III, H), 'That breath indeed is
the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.' — Here the
doubt presents itself whether the word pra/za denotes
merely breatli, the modification of air, or the Self of some
divinity, or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman. —
But, it will be said at the outset, the Sutra I, i, 21 already
has shown that the word pra//a refers to Brahman, and as
here also we meet with characteristic marks of Brahman, viz.
the words ' bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is there
for again raising the same doubt ? — We reply : Because there
are observed here characteristic marks of different kinds.
For in the legend we meet not only with marks indicating
Brahman, but also with marks pointing to other beings.
Thus Indra's words, ' Know me only' (III, i), point to the
Self of a divinity ; the words, ' Having laid hold of this
body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath ; the words,
' Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know
[34] H

98 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

the speaker,' point to the individual soul. There is thus
room for doubt.

If, now, the pOrvapakshin maintains that the term pra;/a
here denotes the well-known modification of air, i. e. breath,
we, on our side, assert that the word prd/za must be under-
stood to denote Brahman. — For what reason? — On account
of such being the consecutive meaning of the passages.
For if we examine the connexion of the entire section
which treats of the pra;/a, we observe that all the single
passages can be construed into a whole only if they are
viewed as referring to Brahman. At the beginning of the
legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra to choose
a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he
selects for his boon, in the following words, ' Do you your-
self choose that boon for me which you deem most beneficial
for a man.' Now, as later on pra;^a is declared to be what
is most beneficial for man, what should prdwa denote but
the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that-
Self a man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial
for him, as many scriptural passages declare. Compare, for
instance, Sve. Up. Ill, 8, 'A man who knows him passes
over death ; there is no other path to go.' Again, the
further passage, ' He who knows me thus by no deed of his
is his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhru;/ahatya ' (III, i),
has a meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object
of knowledge. For, that subsequently to the cognition of
Brahman all works and their effects entirely cease, is well
known from scriptural passages, such as the following, ' All
works perish when he has been beheld who is the higher
and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, tS). Moreover, pra;/a can
be identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman.
For the air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the
intelligent Self. Those characteristic marks, again, which
are mentioned in the concluding passage (viz. those inti-
mated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,' 'immortal') can,
if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with any being
except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following
passages, ' He does not increase by a good action, nor de-
crease by a bad action. For he makes him whom he wishes

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 99

to lead up from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same
makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds
do a bad deed ;' and. ' He is the guardian of the world, he
is the king of the world, he is the Lord of the world ' (Kau.
Up. Ill, 8). All this can be properly understood only if the
highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject-matter
of the whole chapter, not if the vital air is substituted in its
place. Hence the word pra;/a denotes Brahman.

29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted)
0/1 account of the speaker denoting himself; (we
reply that this objection is not valid) because there
is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the
interior Self.

An objection is raised against the assertion that pra;^a de-
notes Brahman. The word prawa, it is said, does not denote
the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates him-
self. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called
Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana.
' Know me only,' and later on, ' I am pri;/a, the intelligent
Self.' How, it is asked, can the pra;/a, which this latter
passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the
Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from
Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be
ascribed ; compare, for instance, Brt. Up. HI, 8, 8, ' It is without
speech, without mind.' Further on, also, the speaker, i. e.
Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attri-
butes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in
no way belong to Brahman, ' I slew the three-headed son
of Tvash/rz ; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to
the wolves,' and so on. Indra may be called pra;/a on
account of his strength. Scripture says, ' Strength indeed
is pr^Lua.,' and Indra is known as the god of strength ; and
of any deed of strength people say, ' It is Indra's work.'
The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an
intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unob-
structed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that
some passages convey information about the personal Self

H 2

lOO vedanta-sOtras.

of some deity, the other passages also — as, for instance, the
one about what is most beneficial for man — must be inter-
preted as well as they may with reference to the same deity.
Hence pra;/a does not denote Brahman.

This objection we refute by the remark that in that
chapter there are found a multitude of references to the in-
terior Self. For the passage, ' As long as pra;/a dwells in this
body so long surely there is life,' declares that that prawa
only which is the intelligent interior Self — and not some
particular outward deity — has power to bestow and to take
back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of
the prawas as founded on the existence of the pra;/a, it
shows that that pra;/a is meant which has reference to the
Self and is the abode of the sense-organs ^.

Of the same tendency is the passage, ' Pra;/a, the intel-
ligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise
up ; ' and the passage (which occurs in the passus, ' Let no
man try to find out what speech is,' &c.), ' For as in a car
the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the
spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects
(the senses) and the subjects on the pra;/a. And that
pra;^a indeed is the Self of pra^/^a, blessed, imperishable,
immortal.' So also the following passage which, referring
to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the
peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up
as follows, ' He is my Self, thus let it be known ;' a summing
up which is appropriate only if pra/^a is meant to denote
not some outward existence, but the interior Self And
another scriptural passage declares 'this Self is Brahman,
omniscient^' (Br/. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at

^ The text runs, ' astitve -^a pra;/ana?« ni^jreyasam,' and Go. An.
explains ' astitve pra«asthitau pra?/ana»z indriyawam sthitir ity
arthata/i jrutim aha.' He as well as An. Gi. quotes as the text of
the scriptural passage referred to ' athato ni/wreyasadanam ity adi.'
But if instead of ' astitve ka. ' we read * asti tv eva,' we get the con-
cluding clause of Kau. Up. Ill, 2, as given in Cowell's edition.

^ Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the
Kau. Up. is Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3O. lOI

the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references
to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regard-
ing Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity. — How
then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring
to himself be explained ?

30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself,
viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through
intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of
Vamadeva.

The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving b)^
means of r/shi-like intuition^ — the existence of which is
vouched for by Scripture — its own Self to be identical with
the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest
Self) by means of the words ' Know me only.'

By intuition of the same kind the r/shi Vamadeva reached
the knowledge expressed in the Avords, ' I was Manu and
Surya ; ' in accordance with the passage, ' Whatever deva was
awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that'
(Br/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the
purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying,
' Know me only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying
of Tvash/rz's son and other deeds of strength, we refute as
follows. The death of Tvash/rz's son and similar deeds are
referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object
of knowledge — in which case the sense of the passage would
be, ' Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore
know me ' — but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the
highest Self For this reason the text, after having referred
to the slaying of Tvash/rz's son and the like, goes on in the
clause next following to exalt knowledge, ' And not one
hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no
deed of his is his life harmed.' — (But how does this passage
convey praise of knowledge?) — Because, we reply, its
meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds,

* I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered
possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.

102 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one
with Brahman ; therefore the life of any other person also
who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his.'
And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is
nothine else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent
passage, ' I am pra//a, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the
entire chapter refers to Brahman.

51. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on
account of characteristic marks of the individual soul
and the chief vital air (being mentioned) ; we say no,
on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation
(which would result from your interpretation) ; on
account of (the meaning advocated by us) being ac-
cepted (elsewhere) ; and on account of (characteristic
marks of Brahman) being connected (with the pas-
sage under discussion).

Although we admit, the purvapakshin resumes, that the
chapter about the prawa does not furnish any instruction
regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude
of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is
concerned with Brahman. — For what reason ? — Because it
mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the
one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The
passage, ' Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him
know the speaker,' mentions a characteristic mark of the
individual soul, and must therefore be held to point
out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which
rules and employs the different organs of action such as
speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage,
' But prawa alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of
this body makes it rise up,' which points to the chief vital
air ; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains
the body. Similarly, w'e read in the colloquy of the vital
airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital
airs, ' Then praz/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to
them : Be not deceived ; I alone dividing myself fivefold
support this body and keep it.' Those, again, who in the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3 1.

passage quoted above read 'this one (masc), the body '^ ' must
give the following explanation, Pra;/a having laid hold of
this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of
the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual
soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated
as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of
intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in
itself) is the abode of other pra;/as, viz. the sense organs,
which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover,
if the word pra;/a be taken to denote the individual
soul as well as the chief vital air, the pra;/a and the
intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as
being non-different on account of their mutual concomit-
ance, or as being different on account of their (essentially
different) individual character ; and in these two different
ways they are actually spoken of in the two following
passages, ' What is prawa that is pra^/7a, what is pra^;7a that
is pra;/a ;' and, ' For together do these two live in the body
and together do they depart.' If, on the other hand, pr^;/a
denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what?
For these reasons pra//a does not denote Brahman, but
either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both.

All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, ' on account
of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your inter-
pretation would involve the assumption of devout medi-
tation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul,
on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inap-
propriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin
three kinds of devout meditation ; and that all the passages
about the pra;/a really constitute one single sentence (one
syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the
concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause
' Know me only,' followed by ' I am pra/za, the intelligent
Self, meditate on mc as Life, as Immortality;' and in
the end we read, ' And that pra;^a indeed is the intelligent
Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' The beginning and
the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we

* Imaw jariram instead of idaw j-ariram.

I04 vedanta-s'Ctras.

therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the
same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman
be so turned as to be appHed to something else ; for the
ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers)^ cannot
rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, prd/za must
denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning) being
accepted/ i. e. because in the case of other passages where
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word
pra/i-a is taken in the sense of ' Brahman.' And another
reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is
that here also, i. e. in the passage itself there is ' connexion '
with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the
reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion
that the passage, ' Having laid hold of this body it makes
it rise up,' contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital
air, is untrue ; for as the function of the vital air also
ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed
to the latter. So Scripture also declares, ' No mortal lives
by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes
down. We live by another in whom these two repose '
(Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). Nor does the indication of the in-
dividual soul which you allege to occur in the passage,
y'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know
the speaker,' preclude the view of pra;/a denoting Brahman.
For, as the passages, ' I am Brahman,' ' That art thou,' and
others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual
soul absolutely different from Brahman, but Brahman, in
so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi)
and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul,
agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded
to, (viz. ' let no man try to find out what speech is, let him
know the speaker,') which, by setting aside all the dif-
ferences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the
mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the

^ PaT/^a j-abdadaya/^ pa«/('a pr/thivyadayai- kz. da^a bbfitamatraA
pa7~tX'a buddhindriyaKi pawX'a buddhaya iti da^a pra^/7amatra/;.
Yadva ^«anendriyartha^ pa«X'a karmendriyarthaj ^a pa?7Xeti daja
bhutamatra/^ dvividhanindriyawi pra^77amatra daj-eti bhava/^. An.Gi.

I ADHYAYA, I TADA, 3 1. IO5

individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of
pljtce. That the Self which is active in speaking and the
like is Brahman- appears from another scriptural passage also,
viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, ' That which is not expressed by speech
and by which speech is expressed that alone know as
Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark
that the statement about the difference of prawa and
pra^/7a (contained in the passage, ' Together they dwell
in this body, together they depart ') does not agree with
that interpretation according to which pra/^a is Brahman,
is without force ; for the mind and the vital air which are
the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition
and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the
internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal
Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those two
adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two
may be identified, as is done in the passage 'prdwa is
pra^/7a.'

The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different
manner also\ as follows : Characteristic marks of the
individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not
out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman.
How so ? ' On account of the threefoldness of devout
meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds
of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman
is viewed under the aspect of pr^7/a, under the aspect
of pra^>7a, and in itself. The passages, ' Meditate (on me)
as life, as immortality. Life is prawa,' and ' Having laid
hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man
worship it alone as uktha,' refer to the pra;?a aspect.
The introductory passage, ' Now we shall explain how all
things become one in that pra^/7d,' and the subsequent
passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the
word is its object placed outside ;' and, ' Having by pra^/7a
taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words
&c.,' refer to the pra^;7a aspect. The Brahman aspect
finally is referred to in the following passage, ' These ten

' Viz. by the vr/ttikara.

I06 VEDANTA-SUTRAS

objects have reference to pra^'/7a, the ten subjects have
reference to objects. If there were no objects there
would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects
there would be no objects. For on either side alone no-
thing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as
in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes
and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on
the subjects and the subjects on the pr^;^a.' Thus we
see that the one meditation on Brahman is here repre-
sented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either
with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In
other passages also we find that devout meditation on
Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified
by limiting adjuncts ; so, for instance (AV/. Up. Ill, 14, 2),
' He who consists of mind, whose body is prawa.' The
hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three
aspects perfectly agrees with the pra;i?a chapter^ ; as, on the
one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the
concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of
the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand,
we meet v>'ith characteristic marks of pra/;a, pra^^Ta, and
Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled con-
clusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

^ Ihapi tad yujyate explaining the ' iha tadyogat ' of the Sutra.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. IO7

SECOND PADA.

Reverence to the highest Self!

In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause
of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire
world, comprising the ether and the other elements. More-
over, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world,
certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-
pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of
all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that
some words which are generally used in a different sense
denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that
some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained
refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present
themselves which because containing only obscure indica-
tions of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to
the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the
second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points.

I. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) be-
cause there is taught what is known from everywhere.

Scripture says, ' All this indeed is Brahman, begmning,
ending, and breathing in it ; thus knowing let a man meditate
with calm mind. Now man is made of determination
(kratu) ; according to w^hat his determination is in this world
so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him there-
fore form this determination : he who consists of mind, whose
body is breath (the subtle body),' &c. [Kh. Up. Ill, 14).
Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether
what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means
of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied
(individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says. — Why ? —
Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of
action is well known to be connected with the mind and so
on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in
several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, i, 2),

I08 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

' He is without breath, without mind, pure.' — But, it may be
objected, the passage, ' All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions
Brahman directly ; how then can you suppose that the
embodied Self forms the object of meditation ? — This objec-
tion does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the
passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman,
but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being :
because Brahman is all this, ta^alAn, let a man meditate
with a calm mind. That is to say : because all this
aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it,
ending in it, and breathing in it ; and because, as everything
constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion ;
therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since
the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot
at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman ^ ; but
meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, ' Let him
form the determination, i. e. reflection.' And thereupon
the subsequent passage, ' He who consists of mind, whose
body is breath,' &c. states the object of the meditation in
words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we
maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual
soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently
stated in the text, ' He to whom all works, all desires belong,'
&c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul.
The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and
of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the pas-
sage, ' He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of
rice, smaller than a corn of barley,' may be ascribed to the
individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad,
but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the
immediately following passage, ' greater than the earth,' &c.,
cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness
and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be
ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute

^ The clause ' he is to meditate with a calm mind ' if taken as a
guwavidhi, i. e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness
of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin
meditation ; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence
(vakyabheda).

T ADIIVAYA, 2 PADA, 2. lOQ

only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smaUness
is preferable because it is mentioned first ; while the great-
ness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so
far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the
whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that
the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage,
' That is Brahman ' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual
soul ^, as it is clearly connected with the general topic.
Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation
indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.

To all this we reply : The highest Brahman only is what
is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes
of consisting of mind and so on. — Why? — ' On account of
there being taught here what is known from everywhere.'
What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense
of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what
is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage,
(• all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we must assume to
be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz.
consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of
dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly
introducing a new topic. — But, it may be said, it has been
shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage,
introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunc-
tion of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating
Brahman itself — True, we reply ; but the fact nevertheless
remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are
spoken of. Brahman only is proximate (i. e. mentioned not
far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred
to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor
intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases
of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.

2. And because the qualities desired to be ex-
pressed are possible (in Brahman ; therefore the
passage refers to Brahman).

' Give I pi dehadibnV^hana^ ^astvanyayad va brahmatety artha^.
An. Gi.

no vedAnta-sCtras.

Althouq-h in the Veda which is not the work of man no
wish in the strict sense can be expressed \ there being no
speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may-
be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental)
comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak
of something which is intimated by a word and is to be
received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as
' desired to be expressed ; ' so in the Veda also whatever is
denoted as that which is to be received is ' desired to be
expressed,' everything else ' not desired to be expressed.'
What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence,
and what not, is inferred from the general purport of
the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to
be expressed, i. e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in
meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c.
are possible in the highest Brahman ; for the quality of
having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self
which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsist-
ence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities
of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to
the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning,
'The Self which is free from sin' {K/i. Up. VIII, 7, i).
The clause, ' He whose Self is the ether,' means ' he whose
Self is like the ether ; ' for Brahman may be said to be
like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other
qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, ' Greater
than the earth.' And the other explanation also, accord-
ing to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the
ether ' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the
whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the
ether. For the same reasons he is called ' he to whom all
works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated
as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman.
We further maintain that the terms ' consisting of mind,' and
' having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts

' The discussion is brought on by the term ' vivakshita ' in the
Sutra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more literally
' desired to be expressed.'

I ADIIYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. Ill

cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is
the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind
and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to
Brahman also. Accordingly 5ruti and Smr/ti say of
Brahman, ' Thou art woman, thou art man ; thou art youth,
thou art maiden ; thou as an old man totterest along on thy
staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere ' {Sve.
^Vp. IV, 3), and ' its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes
and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands
encompassing all in the world ' (Bha. Gita III, 13).

The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without
breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated)
Brahman. The terms ' consisting of mind ; having breath for
its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished
by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible
in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is
represented as the object of meditation.

3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not
possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted
by manomaya, &c.).

The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities
mentioned are possible in Brahman ; the present Sutra
states that they are not possible in the embodied Self.
Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the
qualities of consisting of mind, and so on ; not the em-
bodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in
the words, ' He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the
ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is
greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the
embodied Self. By the term ' embodied ' (jarira) we have
to understand ' residing ' in a body. If it be objected that
the Lord also resides in the body\ we reply, True, he
does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for j-ruti
declares him to be all-pervading ; compare, ' He is greater
than the earth ; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent
like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other

^ Because he is vyapin.

1 1 2 vedanta-sOtras.

hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of
fruition it does not exist.

4. And because there is a (separate) denotation
of the object of activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot
belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there
is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of
the agent. In the passage, ' When I shall have departed
from hence I shall obtain him ' (AV/. Up. Ill, 14, 4), the
word ' him ' refers to that which is the topic of discussion,
viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing
the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an
activity, viz. as something to be obtained ; while the words,
' I shall obtain,' represent the meditating individual Self as
the agent, i. e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be
helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is
spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the
same time. The relation existing between a person medi-
tating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover,
different abodes. — And thus for the above reason, also, that
which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of
mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

5. On account of the difference of words.

That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind,
and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also
that there is a difference of words.

That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of
kindred subject-matter {Sat. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), ' Like a rice
grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a
canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.' There
one word, i.e. the locative ' in the Self,' denotes the embodied
Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative ' person,'
denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of con-
sisting of mind, &;c. We therefrom conclude that the two
are different.

6. And on account of Smr/ti.

Smr^ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self

I ADHYAVA, 2 PADA, 7. II3

and the highest Self, viz, Bha. Gita XVIII, 6r,'The Lord,
O Ar^una, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round
by his magical power all beings (as ■ if they were) mounted
on a machine.'

But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied
Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside
according to the preceding Sutras ? 5ruti passages, as well
as Smr/ti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from
the highest Self; compare, for instance, Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23,
' There is no other seer but he ; there is no other hearer
but he;' and Bha. Gita XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O
Bh^rata, to be the kshetra^/7a in all kshetras.'

True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.)
But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts,
viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is,
by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Simi-
larly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited
owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels.
With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the
distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be
practically assumed, as long as we have not learned —
from the passage, ' That art thou ' — that the Self is one
only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there
is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole
practical view of the world with its distinction _pXj3ondage,
final release, and the like.

7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer
to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the
abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations
of that (i. e. of minuteness) ; we say, no ; because
(Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and be-
cause the case is analogous to that of ether.

On account of the limitation of its abode, which is men-
tioned in the clause, ' He is my Self within the heart,' and
on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained
in the direct statement, ' He is smaller than a grain of rice,'
&c. ; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl's
point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not
[34] I

114 vedanta-sCtras.

the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purva-
paksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the
present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain
that the objection raised does not invaHdate our view of the
passage. It is true that a thing occupying a Hmited space
only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but,
on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore
in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to
occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called
the ruler of AyodhyS. although he is at the same time the
ruler of the whole earth. — But from what point of view can
the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and
to be minute? — He may, we reply, bespoken of thus, 'because
he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under discus-
sion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within
the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and
similar qualities — which apprehension of the Lord is ren-
^dered possible through a modification of the mind — ^just as
Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called 5alagrim.
Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when
meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is,
moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether.
The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited
and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a
needle ; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter
that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness
depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special forms of con-
templation, and are not real. The latter consideration dis-
poses also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode
in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each
body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imper-
fections which attach to beings having different abodes, such
as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity,
being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.

8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of
Brahman and the individual soul being one) there
follows fruition (on the part of Brahman) ; we say,
no ; on account of the difference of nature (of the tvv^o).

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 8. II5

But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether,
and therefore connected with the hearts of -^11 living beings,
and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not dif-
ferent from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also
has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the indi-
vidual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For
in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from
the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no
other knower but he' (Brz. Up. Ill, 7, 23), and similar pas-
sages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition
connected with transmigratory existence.

This is not so, we reply ; because there is a difference of
nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected
with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it
is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between
the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the dif-
ference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and
demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on ; while
the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being
free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference
of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the
other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual
proximity of the two, without considering their essentially
different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in
Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose
that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire).
The same objection and refutation apply to the case of
those also who teach the existence of more than one omni-
present Self. In reply to the assertion, that because
Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside
it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual
soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise
opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will
reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, ' That art
thou,' ' I am Brahman,' ' There is no other knower but he,'
and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about
scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and
that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on
other occasions to be disregarded.

I 2

I 1 6 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that
Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the
embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the em-
bodied soul is subject to fruition ; how then should fruition
on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the
part of Brahman ? — Let, then, the unity of the individual
soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of
Scripture. — In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part
of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause,
and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not
any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in con-
sequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For
this reason the Sutrakara says^ 'no, on account of the
difference.' In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of
the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman ;
because there is a difference. For there is a difference
between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition
being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of
the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the
substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected
by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false
knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of
fruition on Brahman's part.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is
movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as
his food).

We read in the Ka//^avalli (I, 2, 25), ' Who then knows
where He is. He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas
are but food, and death itself a condiment ? ' This passage
intimates, by means of the words ' food ' and ' condiment,'
that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the
eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self;
for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as
well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed
to form, in that Upanished, the subjects of questions^.

^ Another interpretatio 1 of the later part of Sutra.
2 Cp. Ka//^a Up. I, i, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.

I ADHYAVA, 2 PADA, lO. 11/

The purv'apakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire
being known from Scripture as well (cp. Brz. Up. I, 4, 6)
as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else
the individual soul may be the eater, according to the
passage, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up. Ill,
1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman
on account of the passage (which forms the continuation
of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), ' The other looks
on without eating,'

The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self ' because
there is mentioned what is movable and what is immov-
able.' For all things movable and immovable are here
to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the
condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be
the consumer of all these things in their totality; the
highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggre-
gate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is
objected that here no express mention is made of things
movable and things immovable, and that hence we have
no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a
reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded ; firstly,
because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be
meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment ;
and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may
here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed
as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection
that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the
passage quoted (' the other looks on without eating '), we
remark that that passage aims at denying the fruition (on
the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such
fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but
is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world
of effects (into Brahman) ; for it is well established by all
the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the
creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. There-
fore the eater can here be Brahman only.

10. And on account of the topic under discussion.
That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to

I I 8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS

is moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 2, i8),
('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which shows
that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere
to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the
clause, ' Who then knows where he is,' shows that the
cognition is connected with difficulties ; which circumstance
again points to the highest Self.

II, The 'two entered into the cave' (are the in-
dividual soul and the highest Self), for the two are
(intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature),
as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the
same nature).

In the same Ka///avalli we read (I, 3, i), 'There are the
two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e.
the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest
summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and
light ; likewise those householders who perform the Tr'uik-
^iketa sacrifice.'

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and
the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul
and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul,
then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from
the aggregate of the organs of action, (i. e. the body,) among
which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement
on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning
it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, i, 20, 'There is
that doubt when a man is dead — some saying he is ;
others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by
thee ; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other
hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the
highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is
different from the individual soul ; and this also requires
to be declared here, on account of the question contained
in the passage (I, 2, 14), ' That which thou seest as different
from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause,
from the past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. II9

been stated, a caviller starts the following objection : neither
of the stated views can be maintained. — Why? — On account
of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that
the two are said to drink, i. e. to enjoy, the fruit of their
works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent
individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi.
And as the dual form ' drinking ' (pibantau) shows that
both are drinking, the view of the two being the
buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the
same reason the other opinion also, viz, of the two being
the individual soul and the highest .Self, cannot be main-
tained ; for drinking (i. e. the fruition of reward) cannot
be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra
(Mu. Up. Ill, I, i), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just
as we see that in phrases such as ' the men with the
umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking,' the attri-
bute of being furnished with' an umbrella which properly
speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed
to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking
because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may
explain the passage by saying that, while the individual
soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because
he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may
also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual
soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the
agent — a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as
' the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a chapter whose topic
is the soul no two other beings can well be represented
as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt
whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul,
or the individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of
the two stated views is the right one, because the two
beings are qualified as ' entered into the cave.' Whether
we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either
case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken
of as ' entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate,
as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume

1 20 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent
Brahman. Moreover, the words ' in the world of their
good deeds ' show that the two do not pass beyond the
sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest
Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or
bad works ; according to the scriptural passage, ' It does
not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.' Further,
the words ' shade and light ' properly designate what is
intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are
opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we con-
clude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.
To this we make the following reply : — In the passage
under discussion the individual soul (vi^.'7initman) and the
highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both
intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature. For we see that
in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings
of the same class are understood to be meant ; when, for
instance, the order is given, ' Look out for a second (i. e. a
fellow) for this bull,' people look out for a second bull, not
for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of
the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the
individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a
second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood ;
for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same
nature as the soul. — But has it not been said above that the
highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text
stating that it is placed in the cave.? — Well, we reply, jruti as
well as smr/ti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the
cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12), ' The Ancient
who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.
Up. II, I, ' He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the
highest ether;' and, ' Search for the Self entered into the
cave.' That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omni-
present Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer
perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of
existing inthe world of its good works, which properly belongs
to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be
assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of
whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 121

and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of
belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world
are opposed to each other, like light and shade; the quality
of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of
not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by
the two ' entered into the cave,' the individual soul and the
highest Self. — Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities
(mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text
agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self.
For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), ' Know the Self to be
the charioteer, the body to be the chariot,' which contains the
simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a
charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and
final release, while the passage (9), ' He reaches the end of
his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish;m,' repre-
sents the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course.
And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by
means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who
is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is
hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he
indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same two
beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought.
The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And fur-
ther, the clause, ' Those who know Brahman call them,' &c.,
which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its
place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two
beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage
under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest
Self.

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. Ill,
I, i), 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the
Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds
can be meant ; we therefore conclude from the characteristic
mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, ' One of them eats
the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is meant, and from

12 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of in-
telligence, implied in the words, ' The other looks on without
eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent
mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the
object of sight. ' Merged into the same tree (as it were into
water) man grieves at his own impotence (ani^a), bewildered ;
but when he sees the other Lord (isa.) contented and knows
his glory, then his grief passes away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of
the mantra, ' Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra,
he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion
does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the
Pairigi-rahasya Brahma«a. According to the latter the being
which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva ; the other being which
looks on without eating, the individual soul (g'fi^.) ; so that
the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetra^>7a).
The objection that the word sattva might denote the indi-
vidual soul, and the word kshetra^/7a, the highest Self, is to
be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words
sattva and kshetra^yla have the settled meaning of internal
organ and individual soul, and are, in the second place,
expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Paihgi-rahasya,)
'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams;
the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetra^/7a ; the two are
therefore the internal organ and the individual soul.' Nor
does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha
propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth
the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised
by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state,
such as acting and enjoying ; but in so far rather as it
transcends all attributes connected with the sawsira and is
of the nature of Brahman, i. e. is pure intelligence ; as is
evident from the clause, ' The other looks on without eating.'
That agrees, moreover, with .yruti and smrz'ti passages, such
as, ' That art thou,' and ' Know me also to be the individual
soul ' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation
of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the
declaration made in the concluding passage of the section,
' These two are the sattva and the kshetra^>7a ; to him indeed

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 3. 1 23

who knows this no impurity attaches ^.' — But how can, on
the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i. e. the
internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done
in the clause, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit ? ' — The whole
passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact
that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the
intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature
of Brahman. To that end- the passage under discussion
metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to
the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure,
pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the
bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of
the respective nature of internal organ and soul ; while in
reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or
enjoy ; not the former, because it is non-intelligent ; not the
latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And
the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying,
all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agree-
ment with what we have here maintained, Scripture (' For
where there is as it were duality there one sees the other,'
&c. ; Br/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical assump-
tion of agents, and so on — comparable to the assumption of
the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream —
holds good in the sphere of Nescience only ; while the pas-
sage, ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see
another ? ' declares that all that practically postulated exist- y
ence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative
knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on
account of the agreement (of the attributes of that
person v^ith the nature of Brahman).

^ Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge
that the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators
explain ra^^as by avidya.

''' Tadartham iti, ^ivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat, >^aitany-
a^Aayapanna dhi/z sukhadina pariwamata iti, tatra purusho^pi bhak-
tr/tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum adhyaropayati. Ananda
Giri.

1 24 vedanta-siOtras.

Scripture says, 'He spoke : The person that is seen in the
eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this
is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water
on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides,' &c. i^KJi. Up.
IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the
reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual
Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the
sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as
follows : What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the
reflected Self, i. e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye
of another) ; for of that it is well known that it is seen, and
the clause, ' The person that is seen in the eye,' refers to it
as something well known. Or else we may appropriately
take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For
the individual Self (cognitional Self, vi^/mnatman) which
perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account,
in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word ' Self '
(which occurs in the passage) favours this interpretation.
Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to the soul
animating the sun which assists the sense of sight ; compare
the passage (BW. Up. V, 5, 2), ' He (the person in the sun)
rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye).' More-
over, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are
ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) may some-
how belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other
hand ^, cannot be meant, because a particular locality is
spoken of.

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only
can be meant here by the person within the eye. — Why? —
' On account of the agreement.' For the qualities men-
tioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest
Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place,
belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative
or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as ' That

' Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because
immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only,
but in their true sense.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA 1 4. 1 25

is the Self,' ' That art thou.' Immortality and fearlessness
again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location
in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the
highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord v.hom Scrip-
ture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any
imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared
to be free from all stain, as we see from the passage, ' Even
though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs away
on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses
the qualities of sa;;zyadvama, &c. can be reconciled with
the highest Lord only [Kh. Up. IV. 15, 2, 'They call him
Sa;;/yadvama, for all blessings (vdma) go towards him
(sawyanti). He is also vamani, for he leads (nayati) all
blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati)
in all worlds '). Therefore, on account of agreement, the
person within the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and
so on.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree
with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether? — To
this question we reply that there would indeed be a want
of agreement if that one locality only were assigned to
the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so
on, are attributed to him in the passage, ' He who dwells
in the earth,' &c. (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 3). And among those
the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, ' He w^ho dwells
in the eye,' &c. The phrase ' and so on,' which forms part
of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is assigned
to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that
also such things as name and form, although not appro-
priate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are
yet seen to be attributed to it. That, in such passages as
' His name is ut, he with the golden beard ' {Kh. Up. I,
6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken
of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities
depending on name and form, we have already shown. And
we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman

126 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves
the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not con-
trary to reason ^ ; no more than to contemplate Vish;/u in
the sacred j-alagram.

15, And on account of the passage referring to
that which is distinguished by pleasure (i. e. Brah-
man).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether
Brahman be meant in the passage under discussion or not,
because the fact of Brahman beinsr meant is established
' by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure.'
For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised
by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter", viz. in the
clauses, ' Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brah-
man,' that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred
to in the present passage also, it being proper to adhere
to the subject-matter under discussion ; the clause. ' The
teacher will tell you the way^,' merely announcing that
the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher ; not that a
new subject will be started]. — How then, it may be asked,
is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is
spoken of in the beginning of the passage ? — We reply :
On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. ' Breath is Brahman,
Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakoj-ala says, 'I under-
stand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand
that Ka or Kha is Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply,
' What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka.' Now the word
Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.
If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not
applied to qualify the sense of ' Kha,' we should conclude

^ The /ikas say that the contents of this last sentence are hinted
at by the word ' and ' in the Sutra.

^ I.e. at the bcginnin,^ of the instruction which the sacred fires
give to Upakojala, Kh. Up. IV, 10 ff.

•* Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and
introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage
' the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a part.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5. 1 27

that the name Brahman is here symbolically^ given to the
mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to
mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the
word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect
pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs
with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to
qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary
pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words
Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each
other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure.
If ^ in the passage referred to (viz. ' Breath is Brahman,
Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman ') the second Brahman
(i. e. the word Brahman in the clause ' Ka is Brahman ')
were not added, and if the sentence would run ' Ka, Kha
is Brahman,' the word Ka would be employed as a mere
qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality
would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To
prevent this, both words — Ka as well as Kha — are joined
with the word Brahman (' Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brah-
man'). For the passage wishes to intimate that pleasure
also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as some-
thing in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at
the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised
by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and
the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory,
and finally conclude with the words, ' This is our knowledere,
O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they point
back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, ' The
teacher will tell you the way ' (which form the last clause
of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation
of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being
started. The teacher thereupon saying, ' As water does
not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who
knows it ' (which words intervene between the concluding

^ Ajrayantarapratyayasyajrayantare kshepa-^ pratika/?, yatha
brahmajabda^ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate. Bha.

^ The following sentences give the reason why, although there is
only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.

128 vedanta-s()tras.

speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher
about the person within the eye) declares that no evil
attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and
thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears
that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman
which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires ;
to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing
the qualities of Sa;/zyadvama and the like, and to point out
afterwards that he who thus knows passes on to light and
so on. He therefore begins by saying, ' That person that
is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

1 6. And on account of the statement of the way
of him who has heard the Upanishads.

The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for
the following reason also. From i-ruti as well as smr/ti
we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard
the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i. e. who knows
Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is
described (Pra. Up. I, lo), ' Those who have sought the
Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain
by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the
spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From
thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 24),
' Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the
northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know
Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.' Now that
very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him
who knows the person within the eye. For we read [Kh.
Up. IV, 15, 5), ' Now whether people perform obsequies
for him or no he goes to light ; ' and later on, ' From the
sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning.
There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.
This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brah-
man. Those who proceed on that path do not return to
the life of man.' From this description of the way which
is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we
ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7. 1 29

17. (The person within the eye is the highest),
not any other Self ; on account of the non-perma-
nency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the im-
possibihty (of the qualities of the person in the eye
being ascribed to the other Selfs).

To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the
person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cog-X^''^
nitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity
the following answer is given. — No other Self such as, for
instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on account
of non-permanency. — The reflected Self, in the first place,
does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some
person approaches the eye the reflection of that person
is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away
the reflection is seen no longer. The passage ' That
person within the eye ' must, moreover, be held, on the
ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in
a man's own eye is the object of (that man's) devout medi-
tation (and not the reflected image of his own person which
he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another
man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate
on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other
man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make
the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at
the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another
man in order to produce a reflected image in his own
eye. Scripture, moreover, (viz. KJi. Up. VIII, 9, i, ' It (the
reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes,')
declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self. — And,
further, ' on account of impossibility ' (the person in the
eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and
the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are
not to be perceived in the reflected Self. — Of the cogni-
tional Self, in the second place, which is in general con-
nexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can
likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in
the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although
all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be
[34] K

I ^O VEDANTA-SUTRA?.

spoken of as connected with particular places such as the
heart and the like, wc have seen already. The cognitional
Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of
having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to
it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different
from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed
to it (adhydropita) the effects of nescience, desire and
works, viz. mortality and fear ; so that neither immortality
nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the
sawyadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the
cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power
(aij-varya). — In the third place, although the Self of a deity
(viz. the sun) has its station in the eye — according to the
scriptural passage, ' He rests with his rays in him ' — still
Selfliood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of
his externality (paragrupatva). Immortality, &c. also cannot
be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and
his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the
gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And
their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and
does not naturally belong to them ; as the mantra declares,
' From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror
the sun rises ; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death
runs as the fifth.' — Hence the person in the eye must be
viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this
explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in
the eye) as something well known and established, which
is contained in the words ' is seen ' (in the phrase * the
person that is seen in the eye '), has to be taken as referring
to (the mental perception founded on) the j-astra which
belongs to those who know ; and the glorification (of devout
meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.

1 8. The internal ruler over the devas and so on
(is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brah-
man) are designated.

In Brt. Up. Ill, 7, i ff. we read, 'He who within rules
this world and the other world and all beings,^ and later
on, ' He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8. I3I

the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who
rules the earth within,, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the
immortal." &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents)
speaks of a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler),
who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the gods.
the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self. —
Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antar-
yamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self
of some deity which presides over the gods and so on,
or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers,
such as, for instance, the capability of making his body
subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being. What
alternative then does recommend itself?

As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says,
we must assume that the being denoted by it is also an
unknown one, different from all those mentioned above. —
Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no
right to assume something of an altogether indefinite
character, and that, on the other hand, the term antarya-
min— which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within) —
cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antar-
yamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over
the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read {Bri. Up. Ill, 9,
16), ' He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire,
whose mind is light/ &c. A god of that kind is capable of
ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because
he is endowed with the organs of action ; rulership is there-
fore rightly ascribed to him. — Or else the rulership spoken
of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers
enable to enter within all things. — The highest Self, on the
other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs
of action (which are required for ruling).

To this we make the following reply. — The internal ruler,
of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must
be the highest Self, cannot be anything else. — Why so ? —
Because its qualities are designated in the passage under
discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement
that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created
beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate

K 2

132 vedanta-sOtras.

attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends
on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created
things. — The qualities of Selfliood and immortality also,
which are mentioned in the passage, ' He is thy Self, the
ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their primary sense to
the highest Self. — Further, the passage, 'He whom the earth
does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not
known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from
that deity ; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the
earth. — The attributes 'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to
the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible
qualities. — The objection that the highest Self is destitute
of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is
without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to
him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules. —
If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal
ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to
assume again another and another ruler ad infinitum ; we
reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other
ruler (but the highest Self ^). The objection would be valid
only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.
— For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the
highest Self.

19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the
Smrz'ti assumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of
the statement of qualities not belonging to it.

Good so far, a Siiikhya opponent resumes. The attributes,
however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana
assumed by the S^nkhya-smrz'ti, which is acknowledged to
be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their

* According to Scripture, Nirahkuja/// sarvaniyantritva/;/ sv3.utam
na /'a tadrije sarvaniyantari bhedo na X'anumanaw^ jrutibhaditam

A A.

uttishMati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as Go. An. remarks, we may ex-
plain : as the highest Self is not really different from the individual
soul. So also Bhamati : Na Hnavaslha, na hi niyantrantaraw tena
niyamyate kiw tu yo ^ivo niyanla lokasiddha/^ sa paramatmevo-
padhyavaX'Medakalpitabheda//.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 1 33

Smr/ti says, ' Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in
sleep.' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also the attribute of
rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects. Therefore
the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana.
The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the
Sutra I, I, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find
that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and
the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

To this argumentation the SutrakAra replies that the word
' internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because quahties
not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the
pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c., it cannot
be spoken of as seeing, since the Sihkhyas admit it to be
non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the
complement to the passage about the internal ruler (Bri. Up.
Ill, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but
hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'
— And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradhana.

Well, then, if the term ' internal ruler' cannot be admitted
to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self
nor seeing ; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (indi-
vidual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees,
perceives, knows ; which is internal {pva.tya.rik), and there-
fore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because
it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions.
It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not
being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the
agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time
be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural
passages also, as, for instance (Br/. Up. Ill, 4, 2), 'Thou
couldst not see the seer of sight.' The individual soul is,
moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the
organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal
ruler is the embodied soul. — To this reasoning the following
Sutra replies.

20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be under-
stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e. both

A . . _ A.

134 VEDANTA-SUTRAS

recensions of the B/'/had Ara;^yaka) speak of it as
different (from the internal ruler).

The word ' not ' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from
the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c.,
belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by
its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of
dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings
mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of
both j-akhas, i. e. the Ka;^vas as well as the IMadhyandinas,
speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from
the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so
on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka;/vas read
(B/'z. Up. Ill, 7, 32), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the
IMadhyandinas, ' He who dwells in the Self.' If the latter
reading is adopted, the word ' Self denotes the individual
soul ; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the
word ' knowledge ; ' for the individual soul consists of
knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some
being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is
denoted by the term ' internal ruler.' — But how, it may be
asked, is it possible that there should be within one body
two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual
soul different from him? — Why — we ask in return — should
that be impossible.^ — Because, the opponent replies, it is
contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ' There is no other
seer but he,' &c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing,
perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis-
cussion.— May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose
of denying the existence of another ruler? — No, the opponent
replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and
therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the
text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies
the existence of any other seer in general.)

We therefore advance the following final refutation of the
opponent's objection. — The declaration of the difference of
the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in
the limiting adjunct^ consisting of the organs of action, pre-
sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 1 35

Self within is one only ; two internal Selfs are not possible.
But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically
treated as if it were two ; just as we make a distinction
between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence
there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth
the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per-
ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive
knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of
Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In
accordance with this, the scriptural passage, ' Where there
is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that
the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of
Nescience ; while the subsequent passage, ' But when the
Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares
that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true
knowledge.

21. That which possesses the attributes of invisi-
bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the
declaration of attributes.

Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which
the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot
be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities,
without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal,
all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is im-
perishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source
of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5 ; 6). — Here the doubt arises
whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as
characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana, or the
embodied soul, or the highest Lord.

We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the
source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because
(in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted)
only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel in-
stances. ' As the spider sends forth and draws in its
thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living
man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus
everything arises here from the Indestructible.' — But, it

136 vedanta-sOtras.

may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted
as parallel instances are of intelligent nature. — No, the
purvapakshin replies ; for the intelligent being as such is
not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody
knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled
by intelligence is the source of the threads ; and so in the
case of man also. — While, moreover, in the case of the
preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be
accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such
as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being
the seer and the like did not ; we have here to do only
with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the
pradhana. no attribute of a contrary nature being men-
tioned.— But the qualities mentioned in the complementary
passage (Mu. Up. I, 1,9), 'He who knows all and perceives
all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana ; how,
then, can the source of all beings be interpreted to mean the
pradhana ? — To this the purvapakshin replies : The passage,
' The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible
is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,^ &c., points, by
means of the term ' the Indestructible,' to the source of all
beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes.
This same ' Indestructible ' is again mentioned later on in
the passage, ' It is higher than the high Imperishable.'
Now that which in this latter passage is spoken of as
higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities
of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhana
denoted by the term ' the Imperishable ' is the source of
all beings. — If, however, the word ' source ' (yoni) be taken
in the sense of operative cause, we may by ' the source
of the beings ' understand the embodied Self also, which,
by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin
of the complex of things.

To this we make the following reply. — That which here
is spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by
such qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest
Lord only, nothing else. — Whereupon is this conclusion
founded } — On the statement of attributes. For the clause,
' He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,' clearly states an

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 1. 1 37

attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since the
attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be
predicated either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the
embodied soul whose power of sight is narrowed by its
limiting conditions. To the objection that the qualities
of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under
discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the
source of all beings— which latter is denoted by the term
'the Imperishable' — not to the source itself, we reply that
this explanation is inadmissible because the source of all
beings, which — in the clause, ' From the Indestructible every-
thing here arises '—is designated as the material cause of
all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing,
and again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the
passage (I, 1,9), ' From him who knows all and perceives
all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is
born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As therefore
the Indestructible which forms the general topic of dis-
cussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised
(as being referred to in the later passage also), we understand
that it is the same Indestructible to which the attributes
of knowing and perceiving all are ascribed. — We further
maintain that also the passage, ' Higher than the high
Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from
the imperishable source of all beings which is the general
topic of discussion. We conclude this from the circum-
stance that the passage, ' He truly told that knowledge
of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable
true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the
passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable.)
merely declares that the imperishable source of all beings,
distinguished by invisibility and the like — which formed
the subject of the preceding chapter — will be discussed.
The reason why that imperishable source is called higher
than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the next
Sfitra. — Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined
there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of
the lower one it is said that it comprises the i?/g-veda and
so on, and then the text continues, ' The higher knowledge

138 vedanta-sOtras.

is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' Here
the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the
higher knowledge. If we now were to assume that the
Indestructible distinguished by invisibility and like qualities
is something different from the highest Lord, the know-
ledge referring to it would not be the higher one. For
the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on
account of the diversity of their results, the former leading
to mere worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss ; and
nobody would assume absolute bliss to result from the know-
ledge of the pradhana. — Moreover, as on the view we are
controverting the highest Self would be assumed to be
something higher than the imperishable source of all
beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be ac-
knowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds
only, — Further, the reference to the knowledge of every-
thing being implied in the knowledge of one thing — which
is contained in the passage (I, i, 3), ' Sir, what is that
through which if it is known everything else becomes
known ? ' — is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman
the Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which com-
prises only what is non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed
apart from the objects of enjoyment. — The text, moreover,
by introducing the knowledge of Brahman as the chief
subject — which it does in the passage (I, i, i), ' He told the
knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge,
to his eldest son Atharvan ' — and by afterwards declaring
that out of the two kinds of knowledge, viz. the lower
one and the higher one, the higher one leads to the com-
prehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge
of the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the
other hand, the term ' knowledge of Brahman ' would
become meaningless if that Imperishable which is to be
comprehended by means of it were not Brahman. The
lower knowledge of works which comprises the J^t'g-veda,
and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of
Brahman for the mere purpose of glorifying the latter ;
as appears from the passages in which it (the lower know-
ledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I, 2, 7), ' But frail

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 22. 1 39

indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen in
which this lo\ver ceremonial has been told. Fools who
praise this as the highest good are subject again and again
to old age and death.' After these slighting remarks the
text declares that he who turns away from the lower
knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12),
' Let a Brahma/^a after he has examined all these worlds
which are gained by works acquire freedom from all desires.
Nothing that is eternal (not made) can be gained by what
is not eternal (made). Let him in order to understand this
take fuel in his hand and approach a guru who is learned
and dwells entirely in Brahman.' — The remark that, because
the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as
parallel instances, that also which is compared to them,
viz. the source of all beings must be non-intelligent, is
without foundation, since it is not necessary that two
things of which one is compared to the other should be
of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to
which the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth
and the like, are material, while nobody would assume the
source of all beings to be material. — For all these reasons
the source of all beings, which possesses the attributes
of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.

22. The two others (i. e. the individual soul and
the pradhana) are not (the source of all beings) be-
cause there are stated distinctive attributes and
difference.

The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either
of the two others, viz. the pradhana and the individual soul,
on account of the following reason also. In the first place,
the text distinguishes the source of all beings from the
embodied soul, as something of a different nature ; compare
the passage (II, i, 2), 'That heavenly person is without
body, he is both without and within, not produced, with-
out breath and without mind, pure.' The distinctive attri-
butes mentioned here, such as being of a heavenly nature,
and so on, can in no way belong to the individual soul,

140 vedanta-sOtras.

which erroneously considers itself to be limited by name
and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes
their attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly
refers to the Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.
— In the second place, the source of all beings which forms
the general topic is represented in the text as something
diftcrcnt from the pradhina, viz. in the passage, ' Higher
than the high Imperishable.' Here the term ' Imperishable '
means that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal
potentiality of names and forms, contains the fine parts
of the material elements, abides in the Lord, forms his
limiting adjunct, and being itself no effect is high in com-
parison to all effects ; the whole phrase, ' Higher than the
high Imperishable,' which expresses a difference then
clearly shows that the highest Self is meant here. — We do
not on that account assume an independent entity called
pradhana and say that the source of all beings is stated
separately therefrom ; but if a pradhana is to be assumed
at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being
assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed
to the statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all
beings denoted by the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on,
we have no objection to such an assumption, and declare
that, on account of the separate statement therefrom, i. e.
from that pradhana, ' the source of all beings ' must mean
the highest Lord. — A further argument in favour of the
same conclusion is supplied by the next Sutra.

2^. And on account of its form beinof mentioned.

Subsequently to the passage, ' Higher than the high
Imperishable,' we meet (in the passage, ' From hrm is born
breath,' &c.) with a description of the creation of all things,
from breath down to earth, and then with a statement of
the form of this same source of beings as consisting of
all created beings, ' Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and
the moon, the quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas dis-
closed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe ; from
his feet came the earth ; he is indeed the inner Self of
all things.' This statement of form can refer only to the

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23. I41

highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which,
on account of its small power, cannot be the cause of all
effects, or to the pradhana, which cannot be the inner Self
of all beings. We therefore conclude that the source of all
beings is the highest Lord, not either of the other two. —
But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted declara-
tion of form refers to the source of all beings ? — From the
general topic, we reply. The word 'he ' (in the clause, ' He
is indeed the inner Self of all things ') connects the passage
with the general topic. As the source of all beings consti-
tutes the general topic, the whole passage, from ' From him
is born breath,' up to, ' He is the inner Self of all beings,'
refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary
conversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the
talk, the phrase, ' Study under him ; he knows the Veda and
the Veddhgas thoroughly,' as a matter of course, refers to
that same teacher. — But how can a bodily form be ascribed
to the source of all beings which is characterised by invisi-
bility and similar attributes? — The statement as to its nature,
we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the source
of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it is
of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages
as, ' I am food, I am food, I am the eater of food ' (Taitt.
Up. HI, 10, 6). — Others, however, are of opinion ^ that the
statement quoted does not refer to the source of all beings,
because that to which it refers is spoken of as something
produced. For, on the one hand, the immediately pre-
ceding passage (' From him is born health, mind, and all
organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the
support of all ') speaks of the aggregate of beings from air
down to earth as something produced, and, on the other

^ Vrzttikr/dvyakhyam dushayati, Go. An. ; ekadejinaw dushayati,
Ananda Giri ; tad etat paramatenakshepasamadhanabhya;;/ vya-
khyaya svamatena vya/('ash/e, puna/^ jabdo^pi purvasmad vijesha;?/
dyotayann asyesh/ata;« suX'ayati, Bhamati. — The statement of the
two former commentators must be understood to mean — in agree-
ment with the Bhamati — that -Sahkara is now going to refute the
preceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus
Go. An. later on explains ' asmin pakshe ' by ' svapakshe.'

1 4 2 vedanta-sOtras.

hand, a passage met with later on ('From him comes Agni,
the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs and juices') ex-
presses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at
once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the
creation), a statement be made about the nature of the source
of all beings ? — The attribute of being the Self of all beings
(which above was said to be mentioned in the passage about
the creation, ' Fire is his head,' &c.. is not mentioned there but)
is stated only later on in a passage subsequent to that which
refers to the creation, viz. ' The Person is all this, sacrifice,'
&c. (II, I, lo). — Now, we see that j-ruti as well as smrtti
speaks of the birth of Pra^^pati, whose body is this three-
fold world; compare Rz'g-veda. Sa;;/h. X, 121, i, ' Hira;/ya-
garbha arose in the beginning ; he was the one born Lord
of things existing. He established the earth and this sky ;
to what God shall we offer our oblation ? ' where the expres-
sion 'arose' means ' he was born.' And in sm77ti we read,
' He is the first embodied one, he is called the Person ; as
the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in
the beginning.' This Person which is (not the original
Brahman but) an effect (like other created beings) may be
called the internal Self of all beings (as it is called in II, i, 4),
because in the form of the Self of breath it abides in the
Selfs of all beings. — On this latter explanation (according to
which the passage, ' Fire is his head,' &c., does not describe
the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not be
referred to in the Sutra) the declaration as to the Lord
being the ' nature ' of all which is contained in the passage,
' The Person is all this, sacrifice,' &c., must be taken as the
reason for establishing the highest Lord, (i. e. as the passage
which, according to the Sutra, proves that the source of all
beings is the highest Lord ^)

^ The question is to what passage the ' lupopanyasat ' of the
Sutra refers. — According to the opinion set forth first it refers to
I\Iu. Up. II, I, 4 ff, — But, according to the second view, II, i, 4 to
II, 1,9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i.e. the highest
Self, because that entire passage describes the creation, the inner
Self of which is not the highest Self but Pra^apati, i. e. the Hirawya-
garbha or Sutratman of the later Vedanta, who is himself an

I ADHYAYA, 2 TADA, 24. 1 43

24. Vai^vanara (is the highest Lord) on account of
the distinction quahfying the common terms (Vai-?va-
nara and Self).

(In KJi. Up. V, II fif.) a discussion begins with the words,
'What is our Self, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in
the passage, ' You know at present that Vaij-vanara Self,
tell us that;' after that it is declared with reference to
Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they are con-
nected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in
order to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that
they stand to the Vaii^vanara in the relation of being his head,
&c., merely; and then finally (V, 18) it is said, 'But he who
meditates on the Vaij-vanara Self as measured by a span, as
abhivimana ^, he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all
Selfs. Of that Vai^vanara Self the head is Sute^as (having
good light), the eye Vijvarupa (multiform), the breath Prz'thag-
vartman (moving in various courses), the trunk Bahula (full),
the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth, the chest the
altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart theGarhapatya

A

fire, the mind the Anviharya fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya
fire.' — Here the doubt arises whether by the term 'Vai^-va-
nara' we have to understand the gastric fire, or the elemental
fire, or the divinity presiding over the latter, or the embodied
soul, or the highest Lord. — But what, it may be asked, gives
rise to this doubt ? — The circumstance, we reply, of ' Vaij-va-
nara ' being employed as a common term for the gastric fire,
the elemental fire, and the divinity of the latter, while ' Self
is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as to the
highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of
the term is to be accepted and which to be set aside.

Which, then, is the alternative to be embraced? — Vai-
jvanara, the purvapakshin maintains, is the gastric fire,
because we meet, in some passages, with the term used in

' effect,' and who is called the inner Self, because he is the breath
of life (prawa) in everything. — Hence the Sutra must be connected
with another passage, and that passage is found in II, i, 10, where
it is said that the Person (i. e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.
^ About which term see later on.

1 44 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

that special sense; so, for instance (Bri. Up. V, 9), 'Agni
Vaij-vanara is the fire within man by which the food that is
eaten is cooked.' — Or else the term may denote fire in general,
as we see it used in that sense also ; so, for instance {-Kig-
veda Sa;;/h. X, 88, 12), ' For the whole world the gods have
made the Agni Vai.fvanara a sign of the days.' Or, in the
third place, the word may denote that divinity whose body
is fire. For passages in which the term has that sense are
likewise met with ; compare, for instance, Rzg-veda. Sa;«h. I,
98, I, ' May we be in the favour of Vaij'vanara ; for he is the
king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace;' this
and similar passages properly applying to a divinity
endowed with power and similar qualities. Perhaps it
will be urged against the preceding explanations, that,
as the word Vaij-vanara is used in co-ordination with the
term ' Self,' and as the term ' Self alone is used in the intro-
ductory passage (' What is our Self, what is Brahman ? '),
Vai^vanara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as
to be in harmony with the term Self. Well, then, the
purvapakshin rejoins, let us suppose that Vai.yvanara is
the embodied Self which, as being an enjoyer, is in close
vicinity to the Vaij-vanara fire,^ (i. e. the fire within the
body,) and with which the qualification expressed by
the term, ' Measured by a span,' well agrees, since it is
restricted by its limiting condition (viz. the body and so
on). — In any case it is evident that the term Vaij-vanara
does not denote the highest Lord.

To this we make the following reply. — The word Vaij-va-
nara denotes the highest Self, on account of the distinction
qualifying the two general terms. — Although the term ' Self,'
as well as the term ' Vaij-vanara,' has various meanings —
the latter term denoting three beings while the former
denotes two — yet we observe a distinction from which we
conclude that both terms can here denote the highest Lord
only ; viz. in the passage, ' Of that Vaij-vanara Self the head
is Sute^as,' &c. For it is clear that that passage refers to
the highest Lord in so far as he is distinguished by having
heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and in so far as

^ Sai ire lakshawaya vai^vanarajabdopapattim aha tasyeti. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 25. I45

he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state of
being the Self of the threefold world) ; represents him, in
fact, for the purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of
everything. As such the absolute Self may be represented,
because it is the cause of everything ; for as the cause
virtually contains all the states belonging to its effects, the
heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the members
of the highest Self. — Moreover, the result which Scripture
declares to abide in all worlds — viz. in the passage, ' He eats
food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs' — is possible only
if we take the term Vaii-vanara to denote the highest Self. —
The same remark applies to the declaration that all the sins
are burned of him who has that knowledge, ' Thus all his
sins are burned,' &c. {Kh. Up. V, 24, 3). — Moreover, we
meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words ' Self
and 'Brahman;' viz. in the passage, 'What is our Self,
what is Brahman ? ' Now these are marks of Brahman, and
indicate the highest Lord only. Hence he only can be
meant by the term Vaij^vanara.

25. (And) because that which is stated by Smn'ti
(i. e. the shape of the highest Lord as described by
Smr/ti) is an inference (i. e. an indicatory mark from
which we infer the meaning of ^'ruti).

The highest Lord only is Vaii-vanara, for that reason also
that Smr/ti ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape con-
sisting of the threefold world, the fire constituting his mouth,
the heavenly world his hekd, &c. So, for instance, in the
following passage, ' He whose mouth is fire, whose head
the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet the
earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence
to him the Self of the world.' The shape described here in
Smr/ti allows us to infer a 5ruti passage on which the Smr/ti
rests, and thus constitutes an inference, i. e. a sign indicatory
of the word ' Vaij^vanara ' denoting the highest Lord. For,
although the quoted Smr/ti passage contains a glorification^,

^ And as such might be said not to require a basis for its
statements.

[34] L

146 VEDANTA-SUTRAS

still even a glorification in the form in which it there appears
is not possible, unless it has a Vedic passage to rest on. —
Other Smr/ti passages also may be quoted in connexion
with this Sutra, so, for instance, the following one, ' He
whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world, whose
navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the
regions, and whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable
leader of all beings.'

26. If it be maintained that (Vai^vanara is) not (the
highest Lord) on account of the term (viz. Vaii'va-
nara, having a settled different meaning), &c., and
on account of his abiding within (which is a charac-
teristic of the gastric fire) ; (we say) no, on account
of the perception (of the highest Lord), being taught
thus (viz. in the gastric fire), and on account of the
impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c. being the
head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the
Va^asaneyins) read of him (viz. the Vaii'vanara) as
man (which term cannot apply to the gastric fire).

Here the following objection is raised. — Vaij-vanara can-
not be the highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and
on account of the abiding within. The term, viz. the term
Vaij-vanara, cannot be applied to the highest Lord, because
the settled use of language assigns to it a different sense.
Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the pas-
sage (Sa.t. Bra. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vaij'vanara.'
The word ' &c.'' (in the Sutra) hints at the fiction concerning
the three sacred fires, the garhapatya being represented as
the heart, and so on, of the Vaij-v^nara Self (K/i. Up. V,

18, 2^). — Moreover, the passage, 'Therefore the first food
which a man may take is in the place of homa ' (K/i. Up. V,

19, I ), contains a glorification of (Vaij-vanara) being the abode
of the oblation to Pra;za^. For these reasons we have to under-

^ Na ^'a garhapatyadihrz'dayadita brahmawa^ sambhavini. Bha-
mati.

^ Na ka. pra«ahutyadhikara«ata ^ nyatra ^a///aragner yu^yate.
Bhamali.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26. 1 47

stand by Vauvanara the gastric fire. — Moreover, Scripture
speaks of the Vaii'vanara as abiding within, ' He knows hiin
abiding within man ;' which again appHes to the gastric fire
only. — With reference to the averment that on account of the
specifications contained in the passage, 'His head is Sute^as,'
&c., Vai.yvanara is to be explained as the highest Self, we
(the purvapakshin) ask : How do you reach the decision
that those specifications, although agreeing with both inter-
pretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord
only, and not to the gastric fire ? — Or else we may assume
that the passage speaks of the elemental fire which abides
within and without; for that that fire is also connected with
the heavenly world, and so on, we understand from the mantra,
' He who with his light has extended himself over earth
and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmo-
sphere' (Ri'g-veda. Sawh. X, 88, 3).— Or else the attribute of
having the heavenly world, and so on, for its members may,
on account of its power, be attributed to that divinity which
has the elemental fire for its body. — Therefore Vaij-vanara
is not the highest Lord.

To all this we reply as follows. — Your assertions are
unfounded, ' because there is taught the perception in this
manner.' The reasons (adduced in the former part of the
Sutra), viz. the term, and so on, are not sufficient to make
us abandon the interpretation according to which Vaii^dnara
is the highest Lord. — Why? — On account of perception being
taught in this manner, i. e. without the gastric fire being set
aside. For the passages quoted teach the perception of the
highest Lord i n the gastric fire, analogously to such pas-
sages as ' Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman '
(K/i. Up. HI, 18, i).— Or else they teach that the object of
perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the
gastric fire called Vaij-vanara for his limiting condition; ana-
logously to such passages as ' He who consists of mind,
whose body is breath, whose form is light' (K/i. Up. HI,
14, 2 ^). If it were the aim of the passages about the Vaij--

^ According to the former explanation the gastric fire is to be
looked on as the outward manifestation (pratika) of the highest
Lord ; according to the latter as his limiting condition.

L 2

148 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

vanara to make statements not concerning the highest Lord,
but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be no
possibiHty of specifications such as contained in the passage
' His head is Sute^as,' &c. That also on the assumption of
Vaii^vanara being either the divinity of fire or the elemental
fire no room is to be found for the said specifications, we
shall show under the following Sutra. — Moreover, if the
mere gastric fire were meant, there would be room only
for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it i s
man. But, as a matter of fact, the Va^asaneyins speak of
him — in their sacred text — as man, ' This Agni Vai^vanara
is man ; he who knows this Agni Vaii-vanara as man-like, as
abiding within man/ &c. (5at. Bra. X, 6, i, 11). The highest
Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of everything, may
be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within man. — Those
who, in the latter part of the Sutra, read ' man-like ' (puru-
shavidham) instead of ' man ' (purusham), wish to express
the following meaning : If Vai^-vanara were assumed to be
the gastric fire only, he might be spoken of as abiding within
man indeed, but not as man-like. But the Va^asaneyins do
speak of him as man-like, ' He who knows him as man-like,
as abiding within man.' — The meaning of the term man-like
is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen
that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord
has the heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth ;
and with reference to man, that he forms the head, &c., and
is based on the chin (of the devout w^orshipper ^).

27. For the same reasons (the Vaii'vanara) cannot
be the divinity (of fire), or the element (of fire).

The averment that the fanciful attribution of members
contained in the passage ' His head is Sute^as,' &c. may
apply to the elemental fire also which from the mantras
is seen to be connected with the heavenly world, &c., or else
to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its power,
is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons

^ I. e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head and so
on of the devout worshipper.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 1 49

already stated Vauvanara is neither the divinity nor the
element. For to the elemental fire which is mere heat
and light the heavenly world and so on cannot properly
be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot
be the Self of another effect. — Again, the heavenly world
cannot be ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in
spite of the power of the latter ; for, on the one hand, it is
not a cause (but a mere effect), and on the other hand
its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all these
interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded
on the inapplicability of the term 'Self.'

28. 6'aimini (declares that there is) no contradic-
tion even on the assumption of a direct (worship of
the highest Lord as Vai.s-vanara).

Above (Sutra 26) it has been said that Vai^vanara is
the highest Lord, to be meditated upon as having the
gastric fire either for his outward manifestation or for his
limiting condition ; which interpretation was accepted in
deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as
abiding within — and so on. — The teacher 6^aimini however
is of opinion that it is not necessary to have recourse to
the assumption of an outward manifestation or limiting
condition, and that there is no objection to refer the
passage about Vai.fvanara to the direct worship of the
highest Lord. — But, if you reject the interpretation based
on the gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the
statement that Vaij'vanara abides within, and to the reasons
founded on the term, &c. {S\H. 26). — To this we reply that
we in no way place ourselves in opposition to the statement
that Vai^vanara abides within. For the passage, ' He knows
him as man-like, as abiding within man,' does not by any
means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither
the general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned
byname before. — What then does it refer to? — It refers to
that which forms the subject of discussion, viz. that similarity
to man (of the highest Self) which i.'^ fancifully found in the
members of man from the upper part of the head down to
the chin; the text therefore says, ' He knows him as man-like,

150 VEDANTA-SLTRAS.

as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it
abides within the tree^ — Or else we may adopt another
interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been
represented as having the likeness to man as a limiting
condition, with regard to nature as well as to man, the
passage last quoted (' He knows him as abiding within
man ') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness
(sakshin ; i. e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting
conditions). — The consideration of the context having thus
shown that the highest Self has to be resorted to for the
interpretation of the passage, the term ' Vaij-vanara ' must
denote the highest Self in some way or other. The word
' Vijvanara ' is to be explained either as ' he who is all
and man (i. e. the individual soul),' or ' he to whom souls
belong ' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus
denotes the highest Self which is the Self of all. And the
form ' Vaij-vanara ' has the same meaning as ' Vij-vinara,' the
taddhita-sufifix, by which the former word is derived from
the latter, not changing the meaning ; just as in the case
of rakshasa (derived from rakshas), and vayasa (derived
from vayas). — The word ' Agni ' also may denote the
highest Self if we adopt the etymology agni = agra//i, i.e.
he who leads in front. — As the Garhapatya-flre finally, and
as the abode of the oblation to breath the highest Self
may be represented because it is the Self of all.

But, if it is assumed that Vai-rvanara denotes the highest
Self, how can Scripture declare that he is measured by a
span.? — On the explanation of this difficulty we now enter.

29. On account of the manifestation, so Ajrmara-
thya opines.

The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends
all measure being spoken of as measured by a span has
for its reason ' manifestation.' The highest Lord manifests

^ Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that it
forms a part of the tree.— The Vaijvanara Self is identified with the
difterent members of the body, and these members abide within,
i. e. form parts of the body.

I ADIIYAYA, 2 PADA, 3 1. 151

himself as measured by a span, i. e. he specially manifests
himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special
places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be
perceived. Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher

A

A^fmarathya, the scriptural passage which speaks of him
who is measured by a span may refer to the highest Lord.

30. On account of remembrance; so Badari opines.

Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by
a span ' because he is remembered by means of the mind
which is seated in the heart which is measured by a span.
Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means of
prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be ad-
mitted that barley-grains themselves have a certain size
which is merely rendered manifest through their being
connected with a prastha measure ; while the highest Lord
himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest
by his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance
(of the Lord by means of the mind) may be accepted as
offering a certain foundation for the 6"ruti passage concern-
ing him who is measured by a span. — Or else^ the Sutra
may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although not
really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated
upon) as being of the measure of a span ; whereby the
passage is furnished with an appropriate sense. — Thus the
passage about him who is measured by a span may, ac-
cording to the opinion of the teacher Badari, be referred
to the highest Lord, on account of remembrance.

31. On the ground of imaginative identification
(the highest Lord may be called prade^amatra),
6^aimini thinks ; for thus (Scripture) declares.

Or else the passage about him who is measured by a
span may be considered to rest on imaginative combin-
ation.^— Why.'' — Because the passage of the Va^-asaneyi-

^ Parimawasya hr/dayadvararopitasya smaryamaz/e katham aropo
vishayavishayitvena bhedad ity a^ankya vyakhyantaram aha pra-
dejeti. Ananda Giri.

1 5 2 vedanta-sOtras.

brahma//a which treats of the same topic identifies heaven,
earth, and so on — which arc the members of Vaii-vanara
viewed as the Self of the threefold world — with certain
parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between
the upper part of the head and the chin, and thus declares
the imaginative identity of Vai^vdnara with something
whose measure is a span. There we read, ' The Gods
indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span
as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to
you so as to identify him (the Vai^vanara) with that whose
measure is a span ; thus he said. Pointing to the upper
part of the head he said : This is what stands above (i. e.
the heavenly world) as Vaijv^nara (i. e. the head of Vaij-
vanara ^). Pointing to the eyes he said : This is he with
good light (i. e. the sun) as Vaijrvanara (i. e. the eye of
v.). Pointing to the nose he said : This is he who moves
on manifold paths (i. e. the air) as Vaij-vanara (i. e. the
breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether) within his
mouth he said : This is the full one (i. e. the ether) as
Vaij'vanara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he
said : This is wealth as Vaii^^anara (i. e. the water in the
bladder of V.). Pointing to the chin he said : This is
the base as Vaixvanara (i. e. the feet of V.).' — Although
in the Va^asaneyi-brahmawa the heaven is denoted as
that which has the attribute of standing above and the
sun as that which has the attribute of good light, while
in the K/i^ndogya. the heaven is spoken of as having good
light and the sun as being multiform ; still this difference
does not interfere (with the unity of the vidya)^, because
both texts equally use the term ' measured by a span,' and
because all i-akhis intimate the same. — The above explana-
tion of the term ' measured by a span,' which rests on
imaginative identification, the teacher Caimini considers the
most appropriate one.

32. Moreover they (the (S^abalas) speak of him

^ Atra sar^'atra vaij-vanara^'abdas tadangapara^. Go. An.
"^ Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the Sa.t BrS.
for the explanation of the passage from the J^A. Up.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, ^2. 1 53

(the highest Lord) in that (i.e. the interstice between
the top of the head and the chin which is measured
by a span).

Moreover the Cabalas speak in their text of the highest
Lord as being in the interstice between the top of the head
and the chin. ' The unevolved infinite Self abides in the
avimukta (i. e. the non-released soul). Where does that
avimukta abide ? It abides in the Vara«a and the Nasi, in
the middle. What Is that Vara;/a, what is that Nasi ? ' The
text thereupon etymologises the term Vara;/a as that which
wards off (varayati) all evil done by the senses, and the
term Nasi as that which destroys (na^-ayati) all evil done
by the senses ; and then continues, ' And what is its place ?
— The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is
the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the
upper part of the head) and of the other (i. e. the earthly
world represented by the chin).' (6^abala Up. I.) — Thus
it appears that the scriptural statement which ascribes
to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate.
That the highest Lord is called abhivimana refers to his
being the inward Self of all. As such he is directly
measured, i. e. known by all animate beings. Or else
the word may be explained as ' he who is near everywhere
— as the inward Self — and who at the same time is measure-
less ' (as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest
Lord as him who, as the cause of the world, measures it
out, i. e. creates it. By all this it is proved that Vaii-vanara
is the highest Lord.

154 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

THIRD PADA.

Reverence to the highest Self !

I. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is
Brahman), on account of the term ' own,' i. e. Self.

We read (IMu. Up. 11, 2, 5), ' He in whom the heaven, the
earth, and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the
vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other
words ! He is the bridge of the Immortal.' — Here the doubt
arises whether the abode which is intimated by the state-
ment of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the
highest Brahman or something else.

The purvapakshin maintains that the abode is something
else, on account of the expression, ' It is the bridge of the
Immortal.' For, he says, it is known from every-day ex-
perience that a bridge presupposes some further bank to
which it leads, while it is impossible to assume something
further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is
called 'endless, without a further shore ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 12).
Now if the abode is supposed to be something different
from Brahman, it must be supposed to be either the pra-
dhana known from Smnti, which, as being the (general)
cause, may be called the (general) abode ; or the air known
from 5ruti, of which it is said (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 2, ' Air is that
thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama,
this world and the other world and all beings are strung
together'), that it supports all things; or else the embodied
soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be considered as an
abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.

Against this viewwe argue with the sutrakara as follows: —
' Of the world consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which
in the quoted passage is spoken of as woven (upon some-
thing), the highest Brahman must be the abode.' — Why? —
On account of the word * own,' i. e. on account of the word
' Self.' For we meet with the word ' Self ' in the pas-
sage, ' Know him alone as the Self.' This term 'Self is

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I. 1 55

thoroughly appropriate only if we understand the highest
Self and not anything else. — (To propound another inter-
pretation of the phrase ' svaj-abdat' employed in the Sutra.)
Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in Sruti as the
general abode by its own terms (i. e. by terms properly
designating Brahman), as, for instance {K/l Up. VI, 8, 4),
' All these creatures, my dear, have their root in the being,
their abode in the being, their rest in the being ^.' — (Or
else we have to explain ' sva^-abdena ' as follows). In
the passages preceding and following the passage under
discussion Brahman is glorified with its own names - ;
cp. Mu. Up. II, I, 10, ' The Person is all this, sacrifice,
penance. Brahman, the highest Immortal,' and II, 2, 11,
' That immortal Brahman is before, is behind. Brahman is
to the right and left.' Here, on account of mention being
made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of
the co-ordination expressed in the passage, ' Brahman is
all ' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11), a suspicion might arise that Brah-
man is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in the case
of a tree consisting of different parts we distinguish branches,
stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion the text
declares (in the passage under discussion), ' Know him
alone as the Self.' The sense of which is : The Self is not
to be known as manifold, qualified by the universe of effects ;
you are rather to dissolve by true knowledge the universe
of effects, which is the mere product of Nescience, and to
know that one Self, which is the general abode, as uniform.
Just as when somebody says, ' Bring that on which Deva-
datta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair only (the
abode of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the pas-
sage, ' Know him alone as the Self,' teaches that the object
to be known is the one uniform Self which constitutes the
general abode. Similarly another scriptural passage re-
proves him who believes in the unreal world of effects,

^ From passages of which nature we may infer that in the
passage under discussion also the ' abode ' is Brahman.

^ From which circumstance we ma}' conclude that the passage
under discussion also refers to Brahman.

156 VEDANTA-st^TRAS.

' From death to death goes he who sees any difference
here' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 11). The statement of co-ordination
made in the clause ' All is Brahman' aims at dissolving (the
wrong conception of the reality of) the world, and not in any
way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in nature ^ ; for
the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly stated in
other passages such as the following one, ' As a mass of salt
has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of
/ taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside,
but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 13). —
For all these reasons the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the
highest Brahman. — Against the objection that on account
of the text speaking of a ' bridge,' and a bridge requiring
a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of
heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we
remark that the word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only
that that which is called a bridge supports, not that it has
a further bank. We need not assume by any means that
the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay
and wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from
the root si, which means 'to bind,' the idea of holding
together, supporting is rather implied in it than the idea of
being connected with something beyond (a further bank).

According to the opinion of another (commentator) the
word ' bridge ' does not glorify the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., but rather the knowledge of the Self which is glorified
in the preceding clause, ' Know him alone as the Self,' and
the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, ' leave off
other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining
immortality, the expression 'the bridge of the immortal'
applies ^ On that account we have to set aside the assertion
that, on account of the word ' bridge,' something different
from Brahman is to be understood by the abode of heaven,
earth, and so on.

^ Yat sarvam avidyaropita;^^ tat sarva/zz paramarthato brahma
na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha>^. Bhamati.

^ So that the passage would have to be translated, ' That, viz.
knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.'

I ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 2. 1 57

2. And on account of its being designated as that
to which the Released have to resort.

By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to
understand the highest Brahman for that reason also that
we find it denoted as that to which the Released have to
resort. — The conception that the body and other things
contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self,
constitutes Nescience ; from it there spring desires with
regard to whatever promotes the well-being of the body
and so on, and aversions with regard to whatever tends to
injure it ; there further arise fear and confusion when we
obser\'e anything threatening to destroy it. All this con-
stitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with
which we all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other
hand who have freed themselves from the stains of Nescience
desire aversion and so on, it is said that they have to resort
to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. which forms the
topic of discussion. For the text, after having said, ' The
fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his
works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher
and the lower ' (Mu. Up. II; 2, 8), later on remarks, ' The wise
man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person
who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). That
Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the released,
is known from other scriptural passages, such as ' When all
desires which once entered his heart are undone then does
the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman '
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the pradhana and similar entities,
on the other hand, it is not known from any source that they
are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover, the text
(in the passage, ' Know him alone as the Self and leave off
other words ') declares that the knowledge of the abode of
heaven and earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of
all speech ; a condition which; according to another scrip-
tural passage, attaches to (the knowledge of) Brahman ; cp.
Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21, ' Let a wise Brahma//a, after he has dis-
covered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many
words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.^ — For that

I c8 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

reason also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on. is the
highest Brahman.

1

Not (i.e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. can-
not be) that which Is inferred, (i. e. the pradhana), on
account of the terms not denoting it.

While there has been shown a special reason in favour of
Brahman (being the abode), there is no such special reason
in favour of anything else. Hence he (the sutrakira) says
that that which is inferred, i. e. the pradhana assumed by
the Sinkhya-smr/ti, is not to be accepted as the abode of
heaven, earth, &c. — Why? — On account of the terms not
denoting it. For the sacred text does not contain any
term intimating the non-intelligent pradhana, on the ground
of which we might understand the latter to be the general
cause or abode ; while such terms as ' he who perceives all
and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, i, 9) intimate an intelligent being
opposed to the pradhana in nature. — For the same reason
the air also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven,
earth, and so on.

4. (Nor) also the individual soul (pra;/abhm).

Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities
of Selfhood and intelligence do belong, still omniscience
and similar qualities do not belong to it as its knowledge
is limited by its adjuncts ; thus the individual soul also
cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.,
for the same reason, i. e. on account of the terms not
denoting it. — Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode
of heaven, earth, and so on, cannot properly be given to the
individual soul because the latter is limited by certain
adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not omnipresent)^.
— The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is caused
by what follows^. — The individual soul is not to be

^ Bhogyasya bhoktr/jeshatvat tas)ayatanatvam uktam ajahkyaha
na X'eti, ^ivasyadr/sh/advara dyubhvadinimittatve^tpi na sakshat
tadayatanatvam aupadhikatvcnavibhutvad ity artha^. Ananda Girl.

^ It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sutra

I ADHYAVA, 3 TADA, "] . I 59

accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the follow-
ing reason also.

5. On account of the declaration of difference.

The passage 'Know him alone as the Self moreover
implies a declaration of difference, viz. of the difference of
the object of knowledge and the knower. Here the indi-
vidual soul as being that which is desirous of release is the
knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by
the word ' self and represented as the object of knowledge,
is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.
— For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be
accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.

6. On account of the subject-matter.

The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the
entire chapter'', as we see from the passage ' Sir, what is
that through which, when it is known, everything else
becomes known ? ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 3), in which the know^ledge
of everj'thing is declared to be dependent on the knowledge
of one thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes
known if Brahman the Self of all is known, not if only the
individual soul is known. — Another reason against the
individual soul follows.

7. And on account of the two conditions of stand-
ing and eating (of which the former is characteristic
of the highest Lord, the latter of the individual soul).

With reference to that which is the abode of heaven,
earth, and so on, the text says.. ' Two birds, inseparable
friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. Ill, i, j). This passage describes
the two states of mere standing, i.e. mere presence, and of
eating, the clause, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit,' refer-
ring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works,

for the individual soul — which, like the air, is already excluded by
the preceding Sutra — if it were not for the new argument brought
forward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul
only.

1 60 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

and the clause, ' The other one looks on without eating,'

describing the condition of mere inactive presence. The

two states described, viz. of mere presence on the one hand

and of enjoyment on the other hand, show that the Lord

and the individual soul arc referred to. Now there is room

for this statement which represents the Lord as separate

from the individual soul, only if the passage about the

abode of heaven and earth likewise refers to the Lord ; for

in that case only there exists a continuity of topic. On

any other supposition the second passage would contain a

statement about something not connected with the general

topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.— But, it

may be objected, on your interpretation also the second

passage makes an uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it

represents the individual soul as separate from the Lord. —

Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the purpose of Scripture

to make statements regarding the individual soul. From

ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different

individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other

limiting adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and

enjoyer, and we therefore must not assume that it is

that which Scripture aims at setting forth. The Lord, on

the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells

us nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of

all scriptural passages, and we therefore cannot assume

that any passage should refer to him merely casually ^. —

^ If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven,
earth, &c., the statement regarding li'vara made in the passage
about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground
objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with
regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well
known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may
be made. — I subjoin Ananda Giri's commentary on the entire pas-
sage : Givasyopadhyaikyenavivakshitatvat tad^itdne^pi sarva^Tlana-
siddhes tasyayatanatvadyabhave hetvantaraw; va.^yam ity a^afikya
sfitrewa pariharati kutaj^etyadina. Tad vya/^ash/e dyubhvaditi.
Nirde.s-am eva darjayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhyaw /^eti.
Sthityeivarasyadana^ ^nvasa/zigrahe^pi katham ijvarasyaiva vi.rva-
yatanat\'a;;/ tadaha yadiii. Ijvarasyaj-anatvenaprakr/talve ^ivapr/-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 161

That the mantra ' two birds,' &c. speaks of the Lord and
the individual soul we have already shown under I, z, 11.
— And if, according to the interpretation given in the Paiiigi-
upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is under-
stood to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the
individual soul (not to the individual soul and the Lord),
even then there is no contradiction (between that interpre-
tation and our present averment that the individual soul is
not the abode of heaven and earth). — How so? — Here
(i. e. in the present Sutra and the Sutras immediately
preceding) it is denied that the individual soul which, owing
to its imagined connexion with the internal organ and other
limiting adjuncts, has a separate existence in separate
bodies — its division being analogous to the division of
universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces
within jars and the like — is that which is called the abode
of heaven and earth. That same soul, on the other hand,
which exists in all bodies, if considered apart from the limit-
ing adjuncts, is nothing else but the highest Self. Just as
the spaces within jars, if considered apart from their limiting
conditions, are merged in universal space, so the individual
soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the
abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really
be separate from the highest Self. That it is not the
abode of heaven and earth, is therefore said of the indi-
vidual soul in so far only as it imagines itself to be con-
nected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it follows
that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so
on. — The same conclusion has already been arrived at
under I, 2, 21 ; for in the passage concerning the source
of all beings (which passage is discussed under the Sutra
quoted) we meet with the clause, ' In which heaven and

thakkalhananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvaraha anyatheti.
(rivasyayatanatvenaprakr/tatve tulyanupapattir iti i'ahkate nanviti.
Tasyaikyarthawi lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti.
(zivasyapurvatvabhavcnapratipadyatvam eva praka/ayati kshetra^;7o
hiti. Ijvarasyapi lokavadisiddhatvad apraiipadyatety ajahkyaha
uvaras tv iti.

[34] M

1 62 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

earth and the sky are woven.' In the present adhikara;^a
the subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.

8. The bhuman (is Brahman), as the instruction
about it is additional to that about the state of deep
sleep (i. e. the vital air which remains awake even in
the state of deep sleep).

We read {Kh. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much
(bhuman) we must desire to understand. — Sir, I desire to
understand it. — Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing
else, understands nothing else, that is what is much (bhuman).
Where one sees something else, hears something else, under-
stands something else, that is the Little.' — Here the doubt
arises whether that which is much is the vital air (pr^;/a) or
the highest Self. — Whence the doubt? — The word "' bhuman,'
taken by itself, means the state of being much, according to
its derivation as taught by Pa;/ini, VI, 4, 158. Hence
there is felt the want of a specification showing what con-
stitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself
at first the approximate passage, ' The vital air is more than
hope ' [KJi. Up. VII, 15, i), from which we may conclude
that the vital air is bhuman. — On the other hand, we meet
at the beginning of the chapter, where the general topic is
stated, with the following passage, ' I have heard from men
like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am
in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine ; ' from which
passage it would appear that the bhuman is the highest
Self. — Hence there arises a doubt as to which of the two
alternatives is to be embraced, and which is to be set aside.

The purvapakshin maintains that the bhuman is the vital
air, since there is found no further series of questions and
answers as to what is more. For while we meet with a series
of questions and answers (such as, ' Sir, is there something
which is more than a name?' — ' Speech is more than name.' —
'Is there something which is more than speech?' — ' ]\Iind is
more than speech '), which extends from name up to vital air,
we do not meet with a similar question and answer as to what
might be more than vital air (such as, ' Is there something

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 8. 163

:>

which is more than vital air?' — 'Such and such a thing is
more than vital air '). The text rather at first declares at
length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,' &c.)
that the vital air is more than all the members of the series
from name up to hope ; it then acknowledges him who
knows the vital air to be an ativadin, 1. e. one who makes
a statement surpassing the preceding statements (in the
passage, ' Thou art an ativadin. He may say I am an ati-
vadin ; he need not deny it ') ; and it thereupon (in the
passage, ' But he in reality is an ativadin who declares
something beyond by means of the True'^), — not leaving
off, but rather continuing to refer to the quality of an
ativadin which is founded on the vital air, — proceeds, by
means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to
the bhuman ; so that we conclude the meaning to be
that the vital air is the bhuman. — But, if the bhuman is
interpreted to mean the vital air, how have we to explain
the passage in which the bhuman is characterised, ' Where
one sees nothing else?' &c. — As, the purvapakshin replies,
in the state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all
activity, such as seeing, &c., on the part of the organs
merged in the vital air, the vital air itself may be charac-
terised by a passage such as, ' Where one sees nothing else.'
Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV, 2; 3) de-
scribes at first (in the words, ' He does not hear, he does not
see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessa-
tion of the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring
that in that state the vital air, with its five modifications,
remains awake (' The fires of the pra/^as are awake in that
town '), shows the vital air to occupy the principal position
in the state of deep sleep. — That passage also, which speaks
of the bliss of the bhuman (' The bhuman is bliss,' K/i. Up.
Vn, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because
Pra. Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep
sleep (' Then that god sees no dreams and at that time
that happiness arises in his body ').— Again, the statement,
'The bhuman is immortality' {K/i. Up. VII, 24, i), may

^ As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle ' but '
introducing the sentence ' but he in reality,' &c.

M 2

1 64 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

likewise refer to the vital air ; for another scriptural passage
says, ' Pra//a is immortality' (Kau. Up. Ill, 2). — But how
can the view according to which the bhuman is the vital air
be reconciled with the fact that in the beginning of the
chapter the knowledge of the Self is represented as the
general topic (' He who knows the Self overcomes grief,' &c.) ?
— By the Self there referred to, the purvapakshin replies,
nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage,
' The vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air
is brother, the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the
vital air is Brahmawa ' {Kh. Up. VII, 15, i), represents
the vital air as the Self of everything. As, moreover, the
passage, ' As the spokes of a wheel rest in the nave, so
all this rests in pra;/a,' declares the pri;/a to be the Self of
all — by means of a comparison with the spokes and the
nave of a wheel — the pra;/a may be conceived under the form
of bhuman, i.e. plenitude. — Bhuman, therefore, means the
vital air.

To this we make the following reply. — Bhuman can mean
the highest Self only, not the vital air. — Why? — ' On account
of information being given about it, subsequent to bliss.^
The word ' bliss ' (samprasada) means the state of deep sleep,
as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of the
word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether pleased— samprasi-
dati')— and, secondly, from the fact of samprasada being
mentioned in the Brzhadara;^yaka together with the state
of dream and the waking state. And as in the state of
deep sleep the vital air remains awake, the word ' sampra-
sada ' is employed in the Sutra to denote the vital air ; so
that the Sutra means, 'on account of information being
given about the bhuman, subsequently to (the informa-
tion given about) the vital air.' If the bhuman were the
vital air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make
statements about the bhiiman in addition to the statements
about the vital air. For in the preceding passages also we
do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name
subsequent to the previous statement about name (i. e. the
text does not say ' name is more than name '), but after
something has been said about name, a new statement is

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 8. I 65

made about speech, which is something different from name
(i. e. the text says, ' Speech is more than name '), and so on
up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent state-
ment referring to something other than the topic of the
preceding one. We therefore conclude that the bhuman
also, the statement about which follows on the statement
about the vital air, is something other than the vital air. —
But — it may be objected — we meet here neither with a ques-
tion, such as, ' Is there something more than vital air .'' ' nor
with an answer, such as, ' That and that is more than vital
air.' How, then, can it be said that the information about the
bhuman is given subsequently to the information about the
vital air ? — Moreover, we see that the circumstance of being
an ativadin, which is exclusively connected with the vital
air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. ' But in
reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement surpassing
(the preceding statements) by means of the True '). There
is thus no information additional to the information about
the vital air. — To this objection we reply that it is impos-
sible to maintain that the passage last quoted merely con-
tinues the discussion of the quality of being an ativadin, as con-
nected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the clause,
' He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of
the True,^ states a specification. — But, the objector resumes,
this very statement of a specification may be explained as
referring to the vital air. If you ask how, we refer you to
an analogous case. If somebody says, ' This Agnihotrin
speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of
being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth ; that
quality rather depends on the (regular performance of the)
agnihotra only, and speaking the truth is mentioned merely
as a special attribute of that special Agnihotrin. So
our passage also (' But in reality he is an ativadin who
makes a statement, &c. by means of the True ') does not
intimate that the quality of being an ativadin depends on
speaking the truth, but merely expresses that speaking
the truth is a special attribute of him who knows the vital
air ; while the quality of being an ativadin must be con-
sidered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air. — This

1 66 VEDANTA-St^TRAS.

objection we rebut by the remark that it involves an aban-
donment of the direct meaning of the sacred text. For
from the text, as it stands, we understand that the quality
of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth ; the sense
being : An ativadin is he who is an ativadin by means of the
True. The passage does not in any way contain a eulogisation
of the knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected
with the latter only on the ground of general subject-matter
(prakarawa)^; which would involve an abandonment of the di-
rect meaning of the text in favour of prakara;/a ^. — Moreover,
the particle but (' But in reality he is,' &c.), whose purport
is to separate (what follows) from the subject-matter of what
precedes, would not agree (with the prawa explanation).
The following passage also, ' But we must desire to know
the True' (VII, i6), which presupposes a new effort, shows
that a new topic is going to be entered upon. — For these
reasons we have to consider the statement about the ati-
vadin in the same light as we should consider the remark —
made in a conversation which previously had turned on the
praise of those who study one Veda — that he who studies
the four Vedas is a great Brahma;/a ; a remark which we
should understand to be laudatory of persons different from
those who study one Veda, i.e. of those who study all the
four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume that a new
topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer
only ; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is
sufficiently clear from the circumstance that no connexion
can be established between it and the preceding topic.
The succession of topics in the chapter under discussion
is as follows : Narada at first listens to the instruction
which Sanatkumara gives him about various matters, the
last of which is Prawa, and then becomes silent. Thereupon
Sanatkumara explains to him spontaneously (without being

^ It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed
in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding part
of the chapter.

^ And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle
of the I\Iima;wsa.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA. 8. 1 67

asked) that the quality of being an ativadin, if merely based
on the knowledge of the vital air — which knowledge has
for its object an unreal product, — is devoid of substance, and
that he only is an ativadin who is such by means of
the True. By the term ' the True ' there is meant the
highest Brahman ; for Brahman is the Real, and it is
called the ' True ' in another scriptural passage also, viz.
Taitt. Up. II, I, ' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'
Narada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry
('Might I, Sir, become an ativadin by the True?') and
Sanatkumara then leads him, by a series of instrumental
steps, beginning with understanding, up to the knowledge
of bhuman. We therefrom conclude that the bhuman is
that very True whose explanation had been promised in
addition to the (knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see
that the instruction about the bhuman is additional to the
instruction about the vital air, and bhuman must therefore
mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital air.
With this interpretation the initial statement, according to
which the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-
matter, agrees perfectly well. The assumption, on the
other hand (made by the purvapakshin), that by the Self
we have here to understand the vital air is indefensible.
For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to the
vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place,
cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge
of the highest Self ; for, as another scriptural passage
declares, 'There is no other path to go' (vSvet. Up. VI, 15).
Moreover^ after we have read at the outset, ' Do, Sir, lead
me over to the other side of grief ' {Kh. Up. VII, i, 3), we
meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), ' To
him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable
Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness.' The
term ' darkness ' here denotes Nescience, the cause of grief,
and so on. — Moreover, if the instruction terminated with the
vital air, it would not be said of the latter that it rests on
something else. But the brahma;/a {Kh. Up. VII, 26, i)
does say, ' The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it
be objected against this last argument that the concluding

1 68 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

part of the chapter may refer to the highest Self, while, all
the same, the bhuman (mentioned in an earlier part of the
chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the passage (VII,
24, i), (' Sir, in what does the bhuman rest? In its own
greatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhuman forms the con-
tinuous topic up to the end of the chapter. — The quality of
being the bhuman — which quality is plenitude — agrees,
moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of
ever}^thing.

9. And on account of the agreement of the
attributes (mentioned in the text).

The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes
to the bhuman agree well with the highest Self. The
passage, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,
understands nothing else, that is the bhuman,' gives us to
understand that in the bhuman the ordinary activities of
seeing and so on are absent ; and that this is characteristic
of the highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage,
viz. ' But when the vSelf only is all this, how should he see
another ? ' &c. {Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). What is said about the
absence of the activities of seeing and so on in the state of
deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the intention of
declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of describing
the nature of the pra;^a ; for the highest Self (not the vital
air) is the topic of that passage. The bHss also of which
Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned
only in order to show that bliss constitutes the nature of
the Self. For Scripture says (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 32), 'This is
liis highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small por-
tion of that bliss.' — The passage under discussion also
(• The bhuman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is
little (limited). The bhuman only is bliss ') by denying
the reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable
shows that Brahman only is bliss as bhuman, i. e. in its
plenitude. — Again, the passage, 'The bhuman is immor-
tality,' shows that the highest cause is meant ; for the
immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one,

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, lO. 1 69

and another scriptural passage says that 'whatever is
different from that (Brahman) is perishable ' (B;-/. Up.
Ill, 4, 2). — Similarly, the qualities of being the True, and of
resting in its own greatness, and of being omnipresent, and
of being the Self of everything which the text mentions (as
belonging to the bhuman) can belong to the highest Self
only, not to anything else. — By all this it is proved that
the bhuman is the highest Self.

10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of
(its) supporting (all things) up to ether.

We read (Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 7 ; 8), ' In what then is the ether
woven, like warp and woof? — He said : O Gdrgi, the
Br^hma;/as call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is
neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. — Here the doubt arises
whether the word ' akshara ' means ' syllable ' or 'the highest
Lord.'

The purvapakshin maintains that the word ' akshara '
means ' syllable ' merely, because it has, in such terms as
akshara-samamnaya, the meaning of ' syllable ; ' because
we have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word ;
and because another scriptural passage also (' The syllable
Om is all this,' Kh. Up. II, 23,4) declares a syllable, repre-
sented as the object of devotion, to be the Self of all.

To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by
the word 'akshara.' — Why? — Because it (the akshara) is
said to support the entire aggregate of effects, from earth
up to ether. For the sacred text declares at first that the
entire aggregate of effects beginning with earth and differ-
entiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which it is
'woven like warp and woof; ' leads then (by means of the
question, ' In what then is the ether woven, like warp and
woof? ') over to the akshara, and, finally, concludes with the
words, ' In that akshara then, O Girgi, the ether is woven,
like warp and woof.' — Now the attribute of supporting
everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being
but Brahman. The text (quoted from the Kh. Up.) says
indeed that the syllable Om is all this, but that statement

I 70 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

is to be understood as a mere glorification of the syllable
Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman. — Therefore
we take akshara to mean either ' the Imperishable' or 'that
which pcn'adcs ; ' on the ground of either of which explana-
tions it must be identified with the highest Brahman.

But — our opponent resumes— while we must admit that
the above reasoning holds good so far that the circum-
stance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to
be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause,
we point out that it may be employed by those also who
declare the pradhina to be the general cause. How then
does the previous argumentation specially establish Brah-
man (to the exclusion of the pradh^na) ? — The reply to this
is given in the next Sutra.

11. This (supporting can), on account of the
command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the
work of the highest Lord only).

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the
highest Lord only. — Why? — On account of the command. —
For the sacred text speaks of a command (' By the command
ofthat akshara, O Gdrgi,sunand moon stand apart!' 111,8,9),
and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not
of the non-intelligent pradhdna. For non-intelligent causes
such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with
reference to their effects, such as jars and the like.

12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the
akshara) from that whose nature is different (from
Brahman).

Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra
Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and
the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked
upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else.
The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things
other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be
denoted by the term ' akshara,' from the nature of all those
things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 3. I7I

support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage
alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gargi, is unseen
but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving,
unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being
unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhana also, but not
so the designation of seeing, &c., as the pradhana is non-
intelligent. — Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied
soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following
on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different
from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing
that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that
knows but it ') ; and, moreover, limiting conditions are
expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, ' It is
without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,'
&c. (Ill, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting con-
ditions does not exist ^. — It is therefore certain beyond
doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest
Brahman.

13. On account of his being designated as the
object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the
same (is meant in the passage speaking of the medi-
tation on the highest person by means of the syllable
Om).

(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set
forth in the words, ' O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the
highest and also the other Brahman ; therefore he who
knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.'
The text then goes on, ' Again, he who meditates with this
syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c. —
Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of medi-
tation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman
or the other Brahman ; a doubt based on the former pas-
sage, according to which both are under discussion.

The purvapakshin maintains that the other, 1. e. the lower

^ A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the
passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.

172 vedanta-sCtras.

Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a
reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it.
For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be
inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a
fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if
the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no
room for the qualification, ' the highest person,' is not valid,
because the vital principle (pra;/a) may be called ' higher '
with reference to the body ^

To this we make the following reply : What is here taught
as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only.
— Why? — On account of its being spoken of as the object of
sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a com-
plementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act
of seeing, ' He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of
the body ; purusham purij-ayam), higher than that one who
is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself
higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act
of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for
instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the
act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know
from experience ; we therefore conclude, that in the passage
last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds
to the mental act of complete intuition ^ is spoken of as the
object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the
passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in conse-
quence of the term; ' the highest person.' — But — an objection
will be raised — as the object of meditation we have the
highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher
than that one who is himself higher, &c. ; how, then, are we to
know that those two are identical ? — The two passages, we

' Vinddih sthulo deha/^, pra7;a-^ sutratma, Ananda Giri. — The
lower Brahman (hirawyagarbha on sutratman) is the vital principle
(prawa) in all creatures.

^ Sawyagdarjana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same
term which in other places — where it is not requisite to insist on
the idea of ' seeing ' in contradistinction from ' reflecting ' or ' medi-
tating'— is rendered by perfect knowledge.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, I 3. I 73

reply, have in common the terms ' highest ' (or ' higher,'
para) and ' person.' And it must not by any means be
supposed that the term ^ivaghana^ refers to that highest
person which, considered as the object of meditation, had
previously been introduced as the general topic. For the
consequence of that supposition would be that that highest
person which is the object of sight would be different from
that highest person which is represented as the object of
meditation. We rather have to explain the word ^ivaghana
as ' He whose shape- is characterised by the^vas ;' so that
what is really meant by that term is that limited condition
of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and
manifests itself in the form of ^ivas, i. e. individual souls ; a
condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in general) by
means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited
condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher/ if viewed
with regard to the senses and their objects.

Another (commentator) says that we have to understand
by the word '^ivaghana ' the world of Brahman spoken of
in the preceding sentence (' by the Saman verses he is led
up to the world of Brahman '), and again in the following
sentence (v. 7), which may be called 'higher,' because it is
higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may
be called ^ivaghana because all individual souls (<^iva) with
their organs of action may be viewed as comprised (sahghata
= ghana) within Hira;/yagarbha, who is the Self of all organs,
and dwells in the Brahma-world. We thus understand that
he who is higher than that ^ivaghana, i. e. the highest Self,
which constitutes the object of sight, also constitutes the
object of meditation. The qualification, moreover, ex-
pressed in the term ' the highest person ' is in its place
only if we understand the highest Self to be meant. For
the name, ' the highest person,' can be given only to the
highest Self, higher than which there is nothing. So another
scriptural passage also says, ' Higher than the person there
is nothing — this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the

^ Translated above by ' of the shape of the individual soul.'
^ Pawini III, 3, 77, ' murtta/;/ ghana^.'

1 74 vedanta-sOtras.

sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and
the lower Brahman (' the s}-llable Om is the higher and the
lower Brahman'), and afterwards speaks of the highest Person
to be meditated upon by means of the syllable Om, gives
us to understand that the highest Person is nothing else but
the highest Brahman. That the highest Self constitutes the
object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the passage
declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of medita-
tion), ' As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from
evil.' — With reference to the objection that a fruit confined
to a certain place is not an appropriate rev/ard for him who
meditates on the highest Self, we finally remark that the
objection is removed, if we understand the passage to refer
to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the
highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of
three matras, obtains for his (first) reward the world of
Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition, j/

14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of
the subsequent (arguments).

We read {Kh. Up. YUL i, i), ' There is this city of Brah-
man, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that
small ether. Now what exists within that small ether that
is to be sought for, that is to be understood,' &c. — Here the
doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus
of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental
ether, or the individual soul (vi^;7anatman), or the highest
Self. This doubt is caused by the words ' ether ' and ' city
of Brahman.' For the word ' ether,' in the first place, is
known to be used in the sense of elemental ether as well
as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether the
small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest
ether, i. e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression ' city
of Brahman,' in the second place, it might be said either
that the individual soul is here called Brahman and the
body Brahman's city, or else that the city of Brahman
means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i. e. in con-
sequence of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. I 75

the nature of the small ether, according as the individual
soul or the highest Self is understood by the Lord of the
city.

The purx^apakshin maintains that by the small ether we
have to understand the elemental ether, since the latter
meaning is the conventional one of the word akaj-a. The
elemental ether is here called small with reference to its
small abode (the heart). — In the passage, 'As large as this
ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is repre-
sented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a
comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction
between the outer and the inner ether ^ ; and it is said that
'heaven and earth are contained within it,' because the whole
ether, in so far as it is space, is one -. — Or else, the purva-
pakshin continues, the ' small one ' may be taken to mean
the individual soul, on account of the term, ' the city of
Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman
because it is the abode of the individual soul ; for it is
acquired by means of the actions of the soul. On this
interpretation we must assume that the individual soul is
here called Brahman metaphorically. The highest Brahman
cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the body
as its lord. The lord of the city, i. e. the soul, is represented
as dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a
real king resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the
mind (manas) constitutes the limiting adjunct of the indi-
vidual soul, and the mind chiefly abides in the heart ;
hence the individual soul only can be spoken of as dwelling
in the heart. Further, the individual soul only can be
spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere ; 6'vet. Up. V, 8)
compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is com-
pared (in the passage under discussion) to the ether must be
understood to intimate its non-difference from Brahman. —

^ So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be
objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a
thing to itself.

^ So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven
and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.

1 76 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

Nor does the scriptural passage say that the ' small ' one is
to be sought for and to be understood, since in the clause,
* That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as a mere
distinguishing attribute of something else ^

To all this we make the following reply : — The small ether
can mean the highest Lord only, not either the elemental
ether or the individual soul. — Why ? — On account of the
subsequent reasons, i.e. on account of the reasons implied
in the complementary passage. For there, the text declares
at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined
as the object of sight, ' If they should^ say to him,' &c. ;
thereupon follows an objection, ' What is there that deserves
to be sought for or that is to be understood ? ' and thereon
a final decisive statement, ' Then he should say : As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart.
Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' Here the
teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether
within the heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes
the conception that the ether within the heart is small —
which conception is based on the statement as to the smallness
of the lotus, i. e. the heart — and thereby precludes the pos-
sibility of our understanding by the term ' the small ether,'
the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of
language gives to the word ' ether ' the sense of elemental
ether, here the elemental ether cannot be thought of, because
it cannot possibly be compared with itself. — But, has it not
been stated above, that the ether, although one only, may
be compared with itself, in consequence of an assumed dif-
ference between the outer and the inner ether ? — That
explanation, we reply, is impossible ; for we cannot admit
that a comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon
a merely imaginary difference. And even if we admitted

^ Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two
explanations : na ^eti, paravijeshawatvenety atra paro daharaka^a
upadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-taKV/abdasyeti jesha/z. Yadva
parajabdo ^ nta/isthavastuvishayas tadvijeshawatvena tasminn iti
daharakajasyokter ity artha^. TaX'/'/;abdasya samnikr/sh/anvaya-
yoge viprak;7sh/anvayasya ^aghanyatvad aka^antargata^z dhyeyam
iti bhava//.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. I 77

the possibility of such a comparison, the extent of the outer
ether could never be ascribed to the limited inner ether.
Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the extent of
the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural
passage declares that he is greater than ether (^a. Bra. X,
6, 3, 2), we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the
passage (comparing the inner ether with the outer ether) has
the purport of discarding the idea of smallness (of the inner
ether), which is prima facie established by the smallness of
the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and has not
the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner
ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sen-
tence ^ would result. — Nor, if we allowed the assumptive
difference of the inner and the outer ether, would it be
possible to represent that limited portion of the ether which
is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing within
itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with
the nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood,
freeness from sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the
' small ' ether) in the following passage, ' It is the Self free
from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from
hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true purposes.' — Al-
though the term ' Self ' (occurring in the passage quoted)
may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude
all idea of the individual soul being meant (by the small
ether). For it would be impossible to dissociate from the
individual soul, which is restricted by limiting conditions
and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad, the atttri-
bute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being
enclosed in the lotus of the heart. — Let it then be assumed —
our opponent remarks — that the qualities of all-pervading-
ness, &c. are ascribed to the individual soul with the intention
of intimating its non-difference from Brahman. — Well, we
reply, if you suppose that the small ether is called all-
pervading because it is one with Brahman, our own suppo-

^ A vakyabheda — split of the sentence — takes place according
to the Mimawsa \vhen one and the same sentence contains two
new statements which are different.
[34] N

178 vedanta-sCtra?;.

sition, viz. that the all-pcn-adingness spoken of is directly
predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one. —
Concerning the assertion that the term ' city of Brahman '
can only be understood, on the assumption that the indi-
vidual soul dwells, like a king, in one particular spot of the
city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the term is
more properly interpreted to mean ' the body in so far as
it is the city of the highest Brahman ;' which interpretation
enables us to take the term ' Brahman' in its primary sense ^.
The highest Brahman also is connected with the body, for
the latter constitutes an abode for the perception of Brah-
man -. Other scriptural passages also express the same
meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, ' He sees the highest
person dwelling in the city' (purusha = purij-aya), &c., and
Br/. Up. II, 5, iH, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities
(bodies) the dweller within the city (purij-aya).' — Or else
(taking brahmapura to mean ^ivapura) we may understand
the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the city of the
individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as
Vishwu is near to us in the ^Salagrama-stone. — Moreover,
the text (VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works
to be perishable (' as here on earth whatever has been
acquired by works perishes, so perishes whatever is acquired
for the next world by good actions,' &c.), and afterwards
declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a
knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general sub-
ject of discussion ('those who depart from hence after
having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them
there is freedom in all worlds '). From this again it is
manifest that the small ether is the highest Self. — We now
turn to the statement made by the purvapakshin, ' that the
sacred text does not represent the small ether as that

' While the explanation of Brahman by ^iva would compel us
to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual
soul.

* Upalabdher adhishZ/^anam brahma7/a deha ishyate I
Tenasadhara«atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet 11

Bhamatt.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I 5. I 79

which is to be sought for and to be understood, because
it is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of something
else,' and reply as follows : If the (small) ether were not
that which is to be sought for and to be understood, the
description of the nature of that ether, which is given in
the passage (' as large as this ether is, so large is that ether
within the heart '), would be devoid of purport. — But — the
opponent might say — that descriptive statement also has the
purport of setting forth the nature of the thing abiding
within (the ether) ; for the text after having raised an objec-
tion (in the passage, ' And if they should say to him : Now
with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i. e.
the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the
heart, what is there within it that deserves to be sought for
or that is to be understood?') declares, when replying to that
objection, that heaven, earth, and so on, are contained within
it (the ether), a declaration to which the comparison with
the ether forms a mere introduction. — Your reasoning, we
reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow that
heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small
ether, constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But
in that case the complementary passage would be out
of place. For the text carrying on, as the subject of dis-
cussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven, earth, &c. —
by means of the clauses, ' In it all desires are contained,'
'It is the Self free from sin,' &c., and the passage. 'But
those who depart from hence having discovered the Self,
and the true desires ' (in which passage the conjunction 'and'
has the purpose of joining the desires to the Self) — declares
that the Self as well, which is the abode of the desires, as
the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects of know-
ledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the
passage also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of
the heart, together with whatever is contained within it as
earth, true desires, and so on, is represented as the object of
knowledge. And, for the reasons explained, that ether is
the hijjhest Lord.

'fc>'

15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of

N 2

1 80 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

the action of going {into Brahman) and of the word
(brahmaloka) ; for thus it is seen (i. e. that the indi-
vidual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in
Scripture) ; and (this going of the souls into Brahman
constitutes) an inferential sign (by means of which
we may properly interpret the word * brahmaloka').

It has been declared (in the preceding Sutra) that the
small (ether) is the highest Lord, on account of the reasons
contained in the subsequent passages. These subsequent
reasons are now set forth. — For this reason also the small
(ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage
complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether)
contains a mention of going and a word, both of which
intimate the highest Lord. In the first place, we read {Kh.
Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day after day going
into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This passage
which refers back, by means of the word ' Brahma-world,'
to the small ether which forms the general subject-matter,
speaks of the going to it of the creatures, i. e. the individual
souls, wherefrom we conclude that the small (ether) is
Brahman. For this going of the individual souls into
Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of
deep sleep, is seen, i. e. is met with in another scriptural
passage, viz. Kh. Up. VI, 8, i, ' He becomes united with the
True,' &c. In ordinary life also we say of a man who lies
in deep sleep, ' he has become Brahman,' ' he is gone into
the state of Brahman.' — In the second place, the word
' Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether)
under discussion, excludes all thought of the individual
soul or the elemental ether, and thus gives us to understand
that the small (ether) is Brahman.— But could not the word
' Brahma-world' convey as well the idea of the world of him
whose throne is the lotus ^.^ — It might do so indeed, if we
explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of
Brahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the co-
ordination of both members of the compound — so that

^ I. e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.

I ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, 1 6. l8l

' Brahma-world ' denotes that world which is Brahman —
then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only, —
And that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned
above) is, moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the
compound ' Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordina-
tion of its two constituent members. For it would be
impossible to assume that all those creatures daily go into
the world of the effected (lower) Brahman ; which world is
commonly called the Satyaloka, i.e. the world of the True.

1 6. And on account of the supporting also (attri-
buted to it), (the small ether must be the Lord)
because that greatness is observed in him (accord-
ing to other scriptural passages).

And also on account of the ' supporting ' the small ether
can be the highest Lord only. — How.? — The text at first
introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage.
' In it is that small ether; ' declares thereupon that the small
one is to be compared with the universal ether, and that
everything is contained in it ; subsequently applies to it
the term ' Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of
being free from sin, &c. ; and, finally, declares with reference
to the same general subject of discussion, ' That Self is a
bank, a limitary support (vidhr/ti), that these worlds may
not be confounded.' As ' support ' is here predicated of
the Self, we have to understand by it a supporting agent.
Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the
boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self
acts like a limitary dam in order that these outer and
inner worlds, and all the different castes and ajramas may
not be confounded. In accordance with this our text
declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of holding
asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject
of discussion ; and that such greatness is found in the highest
Lord only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as ' By
the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon
arc held apart' (Brz. Up. Ill, <S, 9). Similarly, we read in
another passage also, about whose referring to the highest

I 8 2 VEDANTA-sOtR AS.

Lord there is no doubt, ' He is the Lord of all, the king of
all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a
limitary support, so that these worlds may not be con-
founded ' (B;7. Up. IV, 4, 22). — Hence, on account of the
' supporting,' also the small (ether) is nothing else but the
highest Lord.

I 7. And on account of the settled meaning.

The small ether within cannot denote anything but the
highest Lord for this reason also, that the word ' ether '
has (among other meanings) the settled meaning of ' highest
Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in which the word
' ether ' is used in Kh. LTp. VHI, 14, 'He who is called ether
is the revealer of all forms and names ;' and Kh. Up. I, 9,
I, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On
the other hand, we do not meet with any passage in which
the word ' ether ' is used in the sense of ' individual soul.'
— We have already shown that the word cannot, in our
passage, denote the elemental ether ; for, although the
word certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it
here, because the elemental ether cannot possibly be com-
pared to itself, &c. &c.

18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the indi-
vidual soul) (is meant) on account of a reference to
it (made in a complementary passage), (we say) no,
on account of the impossibility.

If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on
account of a complementary passage, then, the purvapakshin
resumes, we point out that another complementary passage
contains a reference to the other one, i. e. to the individual
soul : ' Now that serene being (literally : serenity, complete
satisfaction), which after having risen out from this earthly
body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true
form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke ' [Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4).
For there the word ' serenity,' which is known to denote, in
another scriptural passage, the state of deep sleep, can
convey the idea of the individual soul only when it is in

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 1 83

that state, not of anything else. The ' rising from the body'
also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose
abode the body is ; just as air, &c., whose abode is the
ether, are said to arise from the ether. And just as
the word 'ether,' although in ordinary language not denoting
the highest Lord, yet is admitted to denote him in such
passages as, ' The ether is the revealer of forms and names,'
because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the
highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul.
Hence the term ' the small ether ' denotes in the passage
under discussion the individual soul, ' on account of the
reference to the other.'

Not so, we reply, ' on account of the impossibility.' In
the first place, the individual soul, which imagines itself to
be limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, can-
not be compared with the ether. And, in the second place,
attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like, cannot be
ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the
attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been
set forth in the first Sutra of the present adhikara;/a, and
is again mentioned here in order to remove all doubt
as to the soul being different from the highest Self. That
the reference pointed out by the purvapakshin is not to the
individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next
Sutras (I, 3, 21).

19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter
it appears that the individual soul is meant), (we
point out that what is there referred to is) rather
(the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has
become manifest (i. e, as it is non-different from
Brahman).

The doubt whether, ' on account of the reference to the
other,' the individual soul might not possibly be meant, has
been discarded on the ground of ' impossibility.' But, like
a dead man on whom amrz'ta has been sprinkled, that doubt
rises again, drawing new strength from the subsequent
chapter which treats of Pra^^pati. For there he (Pra^'-^pati)

184 VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.

at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin
and the like, is that which is to be searched out, that which
we must try to understand [KJi. Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that
he points out that the seer within the eye, i. e. the individual
soul, is the Self (' that person that is seen in the eye is the
Self,' VIII, 7, 3) ; refers again and again to the same entity
(in the clauses ' I shall explain him further to you,' VIII, 9,
3 ; VIII, 10, 4) ; and (in the explanations fulfilling the given
promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual
soul in its different states (' He who moves about happy
in dreams is the Self,' VIII, 10, 1 ; 'When a man being
asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is
the Self,' VIII, 11, i). The clause attached to both these
explanations (viz. ' That is the immortal, the fearless ;
that is Brahman ') shows, at the' same time, the individual
soul to be free from sin, and the like. After that Pra^apati,
having discovered a shortcoming in the condition of deep
sleep (in consequence of the expostulation of Indra, ' In that
way he does not know himself that he is I, nor does he
know these beings,' VIII, it, 2), enters on a further expla-
nation (' I shall explain him further to }'0u, and nothing more
than this '), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the
body, and finally declares the individual soul, when it has
risen from the body, to be the highest person. (' Thus does
that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own
form as soon as it has approached the highest light. That
is the highest person.') — From this it appears that there is a
possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to the
individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the
term, 'the small ether within it,' refers to the individual soul.
This position we counter-argue as follows, ' But in so far
as its nature has become manifest.' The particle ' but ' (in
the Sutra) is meant to set aside the view of the purvapakshin,
so that the sense of the Sutra is, ' Not even on account of
the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small ether being
the individual soul is possible, because there also that which
is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only
as its (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sutra uses
the expression ' he whose nature has become manifest,'

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. I 85

which qualifies ^iv'a, the individual soul, with reference to
its previous condition ^ — The meaning is as follows.
Pra^apati speaks at first of the seer characterised by the
eye (' That person which is within the eye,' &c.) ; shows
thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the
waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in
the body; refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be
explained (in the clauses ' I shall explain him further
to you ') ; and having then spoken p{ him as subject to
the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains
the individual soul in its real nature, i. e. in so far as
it is the highest Brahman, not in so far as it is indi-
vidual soul ('As soon as it has approached the highest
light it appears in its own form '). The highest light
mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be
approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman,
which is distinguished by such attributes as freeness from
sin, and the like. That same highest Brahman constitutes
— as we know from passages such as ' that art thou ' — the
real nature of the individual soul, while its second nature,
i. e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious limiting
conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the indi-
vidual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of
duality— which Nescience may be compared to the mistake
of him who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man — and
docs not rise to the knowledge of the Self, w^hose nature is
unchangeable, eternal Cognition — which expresses itself in
the form ' I am Brahman' — so long it remains the individual
soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body, sense-
organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the
knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does
not form part of transmigratory existence, but is the True,
the Real, the Self, whose nature is pure intelligence ; then

' The masculine ' avirbhutasvarupa^ ' qualifies the substantive
givzh which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the ^iva whose
true nature has become manifest, i. e. which has become Brahman,
is no longer ^iva ; hence the explanatory statement that the term
^iva is used with reference to what the ^iva was before it became
Brahman,

1 86 VKDANTA-StjTRAS.

knowing itself to be of the nature of unchangeable, eternal
Cognition, it lifts itself above the vain conceit of being one
with this body, and itself becomes the Self, whose nature is
unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such
scriptural passages as ' He who kno'tvs the highest Brahman
becomes even Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). And this is
the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it
arises from the body and appears in its own form.

Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we
speak of the true nature (svarupa) of that which is unchanging
and eternal, and then say that ' it appears in its own form
(true nature) ?' Of gold and similar substances, whose true
nature becomes hidden, and whose specific qualities are
rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other
substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered
manifest when they are cleaned by the application of some
acid substance ; so it may be said, likewise, that the stars,
whose light is during daytime overpowered (by the superior
brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in their true nature
at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But it
is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the
eternal light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like
ether, it is free from all contact, and since, moreover, such
an assumption would be contradicted by what we actually
observe. For the (energies of) seeing, hearing, noticing,
cognising constitute the character of the individual soul,
and that character is observed to exist in full perfection,
even in the case of that individual soul which has not yet
risen beyond the body. Every individual soul carries on
the course of its practical existence by means of the activities
of seeing, hearing, cognising ; otherwise no practical existence
at all would be possible. If, on the other hand, that character
would realise itself in the case of that soul only which has
risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical exis-
tence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising,
would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask : Wherein
consists that (alleged) rising from the body.-^ Wherein con-
sists that appearing (of the soul) in its own form ?

To this we make the following reply. — Before the rise of

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I 9. 1 87

discriminative knowledge the nature of the individual soul,
which is (in reality) pure light, is non-discriminated as it
were from its limiting adjuncts consisting of body, senses,
mind, sense-objects and feelings, and appears as consisting
of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly — to quote an
analogous case from ordinary experience — the true nature
of a pure crystal, i. e. its transparency and whiteness, is,
before the rise of discriminative knowledge (on the part of
the observer), non-discriminated as it were from any limiting
adjuncts of red or blue colour; while, as soon as through
some means of true cognition discriminative knowledge has
arisen, it is said to have now accomplished its true nature,
i. e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it had
already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge,
effected by 6"ruti, on the part of the individual soul which
previously is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting
adjuncts, is (according to the scriptural passage under dis-
cussion) the soul's rising from the body, and the fruit of that
discriminative knowledge is its accomplishment in its true
nature, i. e. the comprehension that its nature is the pure
Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness of
the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimi-
nation, in agreement with the mantra, ' Bodiless within the
bodies,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 2, 32), and the statement of Smr/ti
as to the non-difference between embodiedness and non-
embodiedness ' Though dwelling in the body, O Kaunteya,
it does not act and is not tainted' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 31).
The individual soui is therefore called ' That whose true
nature is non-manifest ' merely on account of the absence of
discriminative knowledge, and it is called ' That whose
nature has become manifest ' on account of the presence of
such knowledge. Manifestation and non-manifestation of
its nature of a different kind are not possible, since its
nature is nothing but its nature (i. e. in reality is always the
same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and
the highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to
any reality, since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real
contact with anything.

And wherefrom is all this to be known? — From the instruc-

1 88 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

tion given by Pra^apati who, after having referred to the
^iva (' the person that is seen in the eye,' &c.), continues
' This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman.' If
the well-known seer within the eye were different from
Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fear-
less, it would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the
immortal, the fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on
the other hand, is not spoken of as he who is characterised
by the eye (the seer within the eye), for that would render
Pra^apati obnoxious to the reproach of saying deceitful
things. — So also, in the second section, the passage, ' He
who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a
being different from the seeing person within the eye spoken
of in the first chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as
appears from the introductory clause, ' I shall explain him
further to you.' Moreover \ a person who is conscious of
having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer seeing
it when awake discards in the waking state the object which
he had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake
to be the same person who saw something in the dream. —
Thus in the third section also Pra^^'apati does indeed
declare the absence of all particular cognition in the state
of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity of the
cognising Self (' In that way he does not know himself that
he is I, nor all these beings'). The following clause also,
' He is gone to utter annihilation,' is meant to intimate only
the annihilation of all specific cognition, not the annihilation
of the cogniser. For there is no destruOftion of the knowing
of the knower as — according to another scriptural pas-
sage (Bn. Up. IV, 3, 30)— that is imperishable. — Thus,
again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase
of Pra^apati is, ' I shall explain him further to you and
nothing different from this ; ' he thereupon refutes the con-
nexion (of the Self) with the body and other limiting
conditions (' Maghavat, this body is mortal,' &c.), shows the
individual soul — which is there called ' the serene being ' —

' To state another reason showing that the first and second
chapters of Pra^^ipati's instruction refer to the same subject.

1 ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. I 89

in the state when it has reached the nature of Brahman
(' It appears in its own form '), and thus proves the soul to
be non-difterent from the highest Brahman whose charac-
teristics are immortahty and fearlessness.

Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest
Self is meant (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate
to understand the words ' This (him) I will explain further,'
&c., as referring to the individual soul, and therefore suppose
that the reference is (not to the individual soul forming the
topic of the three preceding sections, but) to the Self
possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which Self
is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII,
i). — Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first
place, it disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i. e.
the 'this' in 'this I will explain') which rests on something
approximate (i.e. refers to something mentioned not far off),
and, in the second place, is opposed to the word ' further' (or
' again ') met with in the text, since from that interpretation it
would follow that what had been discussed in the preceding
sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section.
Moreover, if Pra^apati, after having made a promise in the
clause, ' This I shall explain ' (where that clause occurs for the
first time), did previously to the fourth section explain a
different topic in each section, we should have to conclude that
he acted deceitfully. — Hence (our opinion about the purport
of the whole chapter remains valid, viz. that it sets forth how)
the unreal aspect of the individual soul as such — which is a
mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the desires
and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is con-
nected with evils of various kinds — is dissolved by true
knowledge, and how the soul is thus led over into the
opposite state, i. e. into its true state in which it is one with
the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and
similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by
which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as
the mind of the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous

imagmation.

Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiyaj
kz. ke>^it), are of opinion that the individual soul as such

igO VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

is real. To the end of refuting all these speculators who
obstruct the way to the complete intuition of the unity
of the Self this j-ariraka-j'astra has been set forth, whose
aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever
unchanging, whose substance is cognition ^, and who, by
means of Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just
as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his
magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other sub-
stance of cognition. — If, now, the Sutrakara raises and
refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in
reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul,
as he does in this and the preceding Sutras^, he does so
for the following purpose. To the highest Self which is
eternally pure, intelligent and free, which is never changing,
one only, not in contact with anything, devoid of form, the
opposite characteristics of the individual soul are errone-
ously ascribed ; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to
the colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous
opinion by means of Vedic passages tending either to prove
the unity of the Self or to disprove the doctrine of duality
— which passages he strengthens by arguments — he insists
on the difference of the highest Self from the individual
soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul
is different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of
the soul, refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming
an item of ordinary thought, due to the power of Nescience.
For thus, he thinks, the Vedic injunctions of works which are
given with a view to the states of acting and enjoying,
natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not stultified. —
That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real
purport of the ^astra's teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for
instance, in I, i, 30 ^ The refutation of the reproach of

^ 1. e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.

^ Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual
soul.

^ Nanu ^ivabrahmawor aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato
vadati kim tu sarvatra bhcdam eva, ato naikyam ish/am tatraha
pratipadyam tv iti.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2 1. IQI

futility raised against the injunctions of works has ahxady
been set forth by us, on the ground of the distinction
between such persons as possess full knowledge, and such as
do not.

20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has
a different meaning.

The allefjed reference to the individual soul which has
been pointed out (by the purvapakshin) in the passage
complementary to the passage- about the small ether
('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the
small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither
the worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of
the subject under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is
therefore devoid of meaning. — On that account the Sutra
declares that the reference has another meaning, i. e. that
the reference to the individual soul is not meant to deter-
mine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature
of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The indi-
vidual soul which, in the passage referred to, is called the
serene being, acts in the waking state as the ruler of the
aggregate comprising the body and the sense-organs ;
permeates in sleep the na^is of the body, and enjoys the
dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking
state ; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises
in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion
with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest
light, i. e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and
thus divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears
in its own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul
is to reach and through which it is manifested in its true
nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there
represented as the object of worship. — In this sense the
reference to the individual soul can be admitted by those
also who maintain that in reality the highest Lord is
meant.

21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural

A

192 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord
cannot be meant ; we reply that) that has been ex-
plained (before).

The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of
the ether stated by Scripture ('In it is that small ether')
does not agree with the highest Lord, that it may however
be predicated of the individual soul which (in another
passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark
calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted
already, it having been shown — under I, 2, 7 — that a rela-
tive smalhiess may be attributed to the Lord. The same
refutation is — as the Sutra points out — to be applied here
also. — That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that
scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the
heart) with the known (universal) ether. (' As large as is
this ether, so large is the ether within the heart.')

22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining
after), (that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to
shine is the highest Self), and (because by the light)
of him (all this is said to be lighted).

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The
sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor
these lightnings, much less this fire. After him when he
shines everything shines ; by the light of him all this is
lighted.' The question here arises whether he ' after whom
when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all
this is lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest
Self (pra^/7a atman).

A luminous substance, the purvapakshin maintains.—
Why? — Because the passage denies the shining only of
such luminous bodies as the sun and the like. It is known
(from every-day experience) that luminous bodies such as
the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the
sun, which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we
infer that that thing on account of which all this, includ-
ing the moon, the stars, and the sun himself, does not

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 22. I93

shine is likewise a thing of light. The ' shining after '
also is possible only if there is a luminous body already ;
for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imita-
tion) of any kind takes place only when there are more
than one agent of similar nature ; one man, for instance,
walks after another man who walks himself. Therefore
we consider it settled that the passage refers to some
luminous body.

To this we reply that the highest Self only can be
meant. — Why? — On account of the acting after. The
shining after mentioned in the passage, ' After him when
he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the pra^/za
Self, i. e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that pra^«a
Self another scriptural passage says, ' His form is light,
his thoughts are true ' {KJi. Up. Ill, 14, 2). On the other
hand, it is not by any means known that the sun, &c. shines
after some other luminous body. Moreover, on account
of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies such as
the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other
luminous body after which they should shine ; for we see
that a lamp, for instance, does not ' shine after ' another
lamp. Nor is there any such absolute rule (as the pur-
vapakshin asserted) that acting after is observed only
among things of similar nature. It is rather observed
among things of dissimilar nature also ; for a red-hot iron
ball acts after, i. e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust
of the ground blows (is blown) after the blowing wind. —
The clause ' on account of the acting after ' (which forms
part of the Sutra) points to the shining after (mentioned
in the scriptural jloka under discussion) ; the clause ' and
of him ' points to the fourth pada of the same i'loka. The
meaning of this latter clause is that the cause assigned
for the light of the sun, &c. (in the passage ' by the light
of him everything is lighted ') intimates the pra^/7a Self.
For of that Self Scripture says, ' Him the gods worship
as the light of lights, as immortal time ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4,
16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the
moon, &c. should shine by some other (physical) light is, in
the first place, not known ; and, in the second place, absurd
[34] o

194 vedanta-sOtras.

as one (physical) light is counteracted by another. — Or
else the cause assigned for the shining does not apply only
to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the sloka. ;
but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is — as we may
conclude from the compreliensive statement ' all this ' —
that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of
names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has
for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman ; just
as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the
manifestation of all form and colour. — Moreover, the text
shows by means of the word ' there ' (' the sun does not
shine there,' &c.) that the passage is to be connected with
the general topic, and that topic is Brahman as appears
from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, ' In whom the heaven, the earth, and
the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a passage
subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately pre-
ceding the passage under discussion). ' In the highest
golden sheath there is the Brahman without passion and
without parts ; that is pure, that is the light of lights, that
is it which they know who know the Self.' This passage
giving rise to the question, ' How is it the light of lights ? '
there is occasion for the reply given in ' The sun does
not shine there,' &c. — In refutation of the assertion that
the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun and the
moon can be denied only in case of there being another
luminous body — -as, for instance, the light of the moon and
the stars is denied only when the sun is shining — we point
out that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be
the luminous being referred to, nothing else. And it is
quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so on
with regard to Brahman ; for whatever is perceived is
perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon,
&c. can be said to shine in it ; while Brahman as self-
luminous is not perceived by means of any other light.
Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested
by anything else ; according to such scriptural passages as,
'By the Self alone as his light man sits,' &c. [Bri. Up.
IV, 3, 6), and ' He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be
comprehended ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4).

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 24. 1 95

23. ]\Toreover Smr/ti also speaks of him (i. e. of
the pra^;7a Self as being the universal light).

Moreover that aspect of the pra^;7a Self is spoken of
in Smrz'ti also, viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12),
' Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that ;
having gone into which men do not return, that is my
highest seat.' And ' The light which abiding in the sun
illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon
and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be
mine.'

24. On account of the term, (viz. the term ' lord '
applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is
the highest Lord).

We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of
a thumb stands in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II,
4, 13), 'That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light
without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is
the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.' — The
question here arises whether the person of the size of a
thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional (individual)
Self or the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that on account of the
declaration of the person's size the cognitional Self is
meant. For to the highest Self which is of infinite length
and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the measure of
a span ; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which
is connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size
of a span may, by means of some fictitious assumption, be
predicated. Smrz'ti also confirms this, ' Then Yama drew
forth, by force, from the body of Satyavat the person of
the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and helpless'
(Mahabh. Ill, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by
force the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer
to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a
thumb, and we thence infer that the same Self is meant in
the Vedic passage under discussion.

To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only

O 2

1 96 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

be the highest Lord. — Why? — On account of the term
' lord of the past and of the future.' For none but the
highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the
future. — Moreover, the clause ' this is that ' connects the
passage with that which had been enquired about, and
therefore forms the topic of discussion. And what had
been enquired about is Brahman, ' That which thou seest
as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as
neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, 14). — 'On ac-
count of the term,' i. e. on account of the direct statement,
in the text, of a designation, viz. the term ' Lord,' we under-
stand that the highest Lord is meant^. — But still the question
remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the
omnipresent highest Self. — The reply to this is given in
the next Sutra.

25. But with reference to the heart (the highest
Self is said to be of the size of a span), as men are
entitled (to the study of the Veda).

The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord,
although omnipresent with reference to his abiding within
the heart ; just as to ether (space) the measure of a cubit
is ascribed with reference to the joint of a bamboo. For,
on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be ascribed
directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure,
and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none but
the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the
term ' Lord,' and so on. — But — an objection may be raised —
as the size of the heart varies in the different classes of
living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration

^ This last sentence is directed against the possible objection
that ' jabda,' which the Sutra brings forward as an argument in
favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of ' sentence '
(vakya), and is therefore of less force than linga, i. e. indicatory or
inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the
ahgush///amatrata of the purusha, and favours the ^iva-interpreta-
tion. ^S'abda, the text remarks, here means jruti, i. e. direct enun-
ciation, and j-ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than lihga.

I ADIIVAVA, 3 PADA, 25. 1 97

of the highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be
explained with reference to the heart. — To this objection
the second half of the Sutra replies : On account of men
(only) being entitled. For the jastra, although propounded
without distinction (i. e. although not itself specifying
what class of beings is to proceed according to its pre-
cepts), does in reality entitle men^ only (to act according to
its precepts) ; for men only (of the three higher castes) are,
firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the
j-astra) ; are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions
enjoined by the jastra) ; are, thirdly, not excluded by pro-
hibitions ; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about
the upanayana ceremony and so on ^. This point has been
explained in the section treating of the definition of adhi-
kara (Purva Mim. S. VI, i). — Now the human body has
ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed
size, viz. the size of a thumb. Hence, as men (only) are
entitled to study and practise the i-astra, the highest Self
may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart,
be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb. — In reply
to the purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the
statement of size and on account of Smrzti we can under-
stand by him who is of the size of a thumb the trans-
migrating soul only, we remark that — analogously to such
passages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou' — our passage

^ I. e. men belonging to the three upper castes,

2 The first reason excludes animals, gods, and r/shis. Gods
cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which
is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant
for the gods. i?/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of
whose performance the ancestral r/shis of the sacrificer are invoked.
— The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is
emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable
fruits of sacrifices. — The third and fourth reasons exclude the
5udras who are indirectly disqualified for gastric works because the
Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only,
and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana — indispensable for
all who wish to study the Veda— is not prescribed. — Cp. Purva
Mimawsa Sutras VI, i.

198 vedanta-sOtras.

teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size
of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta-
passages have a twofold purport ; some of them aim at
setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at
teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest
Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual
soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This
point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, ' The
person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always
settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self
forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith
from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the
Immortal' (IL 6, 17).

26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are
qualified for the study and practice of the Veda),
on account of the possibility (of it), according to
Badaraya;^a.

It has been said above that the passage about him who
is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart,
because men are entitled to study and act according to the
jastra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion.
— It is true that the jastra entitles men, but, at the same time,
there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the know-
ledge of Brahman ; the teacher, Badaraya;?a, rather thinks
that the j-astra entitles those (classes of beings) also which
are above men, viz. gods, and so on. — On what account? —
On the account of possibility. — For in their cases also the
different causes on which the qualification depends, such as
having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first
place, the gods also may have the desire of final release,
caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers
are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be
capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras,
arthavadas, itihasas, pura;/as, and ordinary experience. In
the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like
5udras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule
about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title ; for that

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2']. TQQ

ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to
the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study).
That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring
knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears
from such scriptural passages as ' One hundred and one
years Indra lived as a disciple with Pra^ipati ' [Kh. Up.
VIII, II, 3), and ' Bhr/gu Varu;/i went to his father Varu;/a,
saying, " Sir, teach me Brahman" ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, i). — And
the reasons which have been given above against gods and
rz'shis being entitled to perform religious works (such as
sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods
(to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being
no other r/shis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice),
do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra
and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge,
have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on ;
nor have Bhr/gu and other r/shis, in the same case, to do
anything with the circumstance of their belonging to the
same gotra as Bhrz'gu, &c. What; then, should stand in
the way of the gods' and ;7shis' right to acquire knowledge ?
— Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a
thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c.
is admitted ; it has then only to be explained in each par-
ticular case by a reference to the particular size of the
thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).

27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality
of the gods involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial)
works ; we deny that, on account of the observation
of the assumption (on the part of the gods) of several
(forms).

If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men,
to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption
of their corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in conse-
quence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods
stand in the relation of subordinate members (ahga) to
sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person

200 vedanta-sCtras.

just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to 'a
contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance
of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means
of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor
possible. For it is not possible that one and the same
Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many
sacrifices.

To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction. —
Why? — On account of the assumption of several (forms).
For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to assume
several forms at the same time. — How is that known ? — From
observation. — For a scriptural passage at first replies to the
question how many gods there are, by the declaration that
there are 'Three and three hundred, three and three thou-
sand,' and subsequently, on the question w4io they are,
declares ' They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various
powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods '
(Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 1, 2) ; showing thereby that one and the
same divine Self may at the same time appear in many
forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty-
three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five,
&c., and. finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is the one
god ? ' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are
all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the
same time appear in many forms. — Sm/'zti also has a similar
statement, ' A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his
power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in
them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy
the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and,
finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun
retracts the multitude of his rays.' If such Sm/7'ti pas-
sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have
merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as
subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies
at the same time, how.much more capable of such feats must
the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers ?
The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god
may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation
with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. 20I

while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to
render himself invisible.

The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a
different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings
enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere
subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes,
indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into
subordinate relation to different actions ; one Brahma;^a, for
instance, is not at the same time entertained by many enter-
tainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subor-
dinate relation to many actions at the same time ; one
Brahma/^a, for instance, may constitute the object of the
reverence done to him by many persons at the same time.
Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the
parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering)
with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the
same time part Avith their respective offerings, all of them
having in view one and the same individual divinity. The
individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any
contradiction in sacrificial works.

28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result)
in respect of the word ; we refute this objection on
the ground that (the world) originates from the
word, as is shown by perception and inference.

Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the
corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will
result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradic-
tion will result in respect of the ' word ' (j-abda).— How ?—
The authoritativcness of the Veda has been proved ' from
its independence,' basing on the original (eternal) connexion
of the word with its sense (' the thing signified ') ^. But now,
although a divinity possessing corporeal individuahty, such
as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural
powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations

^ The reference is to Purva INIima/z/sa Sutras I, i, 5 (not to I, 2,
21, as stated in ^luir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).

202 VEDANTA-sOtRA?.

which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account
of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just
as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the
eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a
contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative-
ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.

To this we reply that no such contradiction exists. — Why?
— ' On account of their origin from it.' For from that very
same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other
beings, originates. — But — an objection will be raised — in
Siitra I, I, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c. of this
world') it has been proved that the world originates from Brah-
man ; how then can it be said here that it originates from the
word ? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from
the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction
in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the
Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the Vijvedevas, and the
Maruts ^ are non-eternal beings, because produced ; and if
they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non-
eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them ?
For it is known from every-day life that only when the son
of Devadatta is born, the name Ya^/7adatta is given to him
(lit, made for him) ^. Hence we adhere to our opinion
that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ' word.'

This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe
the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow,
and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although
the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow
have an origin, their species^ does not have an origin, since
of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions
the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is
with the species that the words are connected, not with the
individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not
capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although

^ In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.
* Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing
denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.
^ Akmi, best translated by ei8os.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. 2O3

the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises
in the case of words such as cow, and the hke, since the
species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are
admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the
case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species
denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so
on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from
the descriptions of their various personal appearance,
such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such
as ' Indra ' rest on the connexion (of some particular being)
with some particular place, analogously to terms such as
' army-leader ; ' hence, whoever occupies that particular
place is called by that particular name. — The origination
of the world from the ' word ' is not to be understood in that
sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the
world, as Brahman does ; but while there exist the ever-
lasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in
connexion with their eternal sense (i.e. the akrz'tis denoted),
the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable
of having those words applied to them is called an origina-

«

tion from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from
the word ? — ' From perception and inference.' Perception
here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative,
is independent (of anything else). 'Inference' denotes
Smrz'ti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on
something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that
creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural
passage says, 'At the word these Pra^apati created the
gods ; at the words were poured out he created men ; at
the word drops he created the fathers; at the words
through the filter he created the Soma cups : at the words
the swift ones he created the stotra ; at the words to all
he created the j'astra ; at the word blessings he created
the other beings.' And another passage says, ' He with
his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of
the Veda. — Bri. Up. I, 2,4). Thus Scripture declares in
different places that the word precedes the creation. —
Smr/ti also delivers itself as follows, ' In the beginning

204 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed
of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which
all activities proceeded.' By the ' uttering ' of the voice
we have here to understand the starting of the oral
tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without
beginning or end ' uttering ' in any other sense cannot
be predicated. — Again, we read, ' In the beginning Ma-
hej-vara shaped from the words of the Veda the names
and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.'
And again, ' The several names, actions, and conditions of
all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the
Veda ' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observa-
tion that any one when setting about some thing which he
wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting
the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore con-
clude that before the creation the Vedic words became
manifest in the mind of Pra^apati the creator, and that
after that he created the things corresponding to those
words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2)
'uttering bhiir he created the earth,' &c., shows that the
worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were
created from the words bhur, &c. which had become mani-
fest in the mind (of Pra^apati).

Of what nature then is the ' word ' with a view to which
it is said that the world originates from the 'word?' — It
is the spho/a, the purvapakshin says \ For on the as-

' The purvapakshin, i. e. here the grammarian maintains, for the
reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of
words a supersensuous entity called spho/a which is manifested by
the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself mani-
fests the sense of the word. The term spho/a may, according as it
is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or
that which is manifested. — The spho/a is a grammatical fiction, the
word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we
cannot identify it with the ' notion ' (as Deussen seems inclined to do,
p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called va/^aka or abhidhayaka,
and its being represented as that which causes the conception
of the sense of a word (arthadhihetu).

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. 205

sumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that
the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal
words of the Veda could not in any way be proved,
since the letters perish as soon as they are produced
(i. e. pronounced). These perishable letters are more-
over apprehended as differing according to the pronun-
ciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are
able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice
of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is
reading, whether Devadatta or Ya^/^adatta or some other
man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension
of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one;
for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is
refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the ap-
prehension of the sense of a word results from the letters.
For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself
intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assump-
tion ^ ; nor that there takes place a simultaneous appre-
hension of the whole aggregate of letters ; since the letters
succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explan-
ation that the last letter of the word together with the im-
pressions produced by the perception of the preceding
letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For
the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself
apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental
grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the
sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire
only when it is itself apprehended ; but an apprehension
of the last letter combined with the impressions produced
by the preceding letters does not actually take place,
because those impressions are not objects of perception^.
Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those im-

^ For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not
observed ; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have
to be declared useless.

2 In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word,
there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the
impressions of the preceding letters ; just as smoke enables us to

2o6 vedanta-sOtras.

pressions arc not objects of perception, yet they may be
inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual per-
ception of the last letter combined with the impressions
left by the preceding letters — which impressions are appre-
hended from their effects — is that which intimates the sense
of the word ; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the
remembrance of the entire word, is itself something con-
sisting of parts which succeed each other in time. — From
all this it follows that the spho/a is the word. After the
apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the ap-
prehension of the several letters of the word, received
rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have
been matured through the apprehension of the last letter,
the spho/a presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the
object of one mental act of apprehension. — And it must not
be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely
an act of remembrance having for its object the letters
of the word ; for the letters which are more than one
cannot form the object of one act of apprehension. — As
that spho/a is recognised as the same as often as the word
is pronounced, it is eternal ; while the apprehension of
difference referred to above has for its object the letters
merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature
of the spho/a and possesses denotative power, there is
produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists
of actions, agents, and results of action.

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains
that the letters only are the word. — But — an objection is
raised — it has been said above that the letters no sooner
produced pass away! — That assertion is not true, we reply;
for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they
are produced anew). — Nor can it be maintained that the
recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs,
for instance ; for the fact of the recognition being a re-
cognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted
by any other means of proof — Nor, again, can it be said

infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the
smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because
the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.

I ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, 28. 207

that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that
not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only
a letter belonging to the same species as other letters
heard before) ; for, as a matter of fact, the same individual
letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters
rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever
the letters are pronounced different individual letters were
apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as
different individuals belonging to the same species. But
this is actually not the case ; for the (same) individual
letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If,
for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think
not that two difterent words have been pronounced, but
that the same individual word has been repeated. — But,
our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that
the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences
of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend
a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or
Ya^;7adatta reading. — Although, we reply, it is a settled
matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we
admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the
letters ; but as the letters are articulated by means of the
conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate,
the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the
various character of the articulating agents and not to
the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those,
moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are
different have, in order to account for the fact of recogni-
tion, to assume species of letters, and further to admit
that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by ex-
ternal factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume,
as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned
by external factors while the recognition is due to the
intrinsic nature of the letters ? And this very fact of
recognition is that mental process which prevents us from
looking on the apprehension of difference as having the
letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in
denying the existence of such a process). For how should,
for instance, the one syllabic ga, when it is pronounced in

2o8 vedanta-sOtras.

the same moment by several persons, be at the same time
of dififerent nature, viz. accented with the udatta, the
anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal ^ ?
Or else - — and this is the preferable explanation — we
assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not
by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we
have to understand that which enters the ear of a person
who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish
the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near,
affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high
or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the
distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not
on the intrinsic nature of the letters ; for they are recognised
as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory
only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of
the udatta, the anudatta, and the like. For on the theory
first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to
assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due
to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described
above, since the letters themselves, which are ever re-
cognised as the same, are not different. But as those
processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter
of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters
any differences based on those processes, and hence the
apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without
a basis. — Nor should it be urged that from the dif-
ference of the udatta and so on there results also
a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference
in one matter does not involve a difference in some
other matter which in itself is free from difference.
Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals

^ 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that
account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters
themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.

^ With ' or else ' begins the exposition of the finally accepted
theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as
different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the
upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between
articulated letters and non-articulated tone.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28. 2O9

are different from each other the species also contains a
difference in itself.

The assumption of the spho/'a is further gratuitous, be-
cause the sense of the word may be apprehended from the
letters. — But — our opponent here objects — I do not assume
the existence of the spho/a. I, on the contrary, actually
perceive it ; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the
successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the
spho/a all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.
— You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional
act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word.
That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the
apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for
its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the
word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the
circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition
there are included those letters only of which a definite
given word consists, and not any other letters. If that
cognitional act had for its object the spho/a — i.e. something
different from the letters of the given word — then those
letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters
of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows
that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but
an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word
for its object. — Our opponent has asserted above that the
letters of a word being several cannot form the object of
one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas
which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army,
or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show
that also such things as comprise several unities can become
the objects of one and the same cognitional act. The idea
which has for its object the word as one whole is a derived
one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one
sense in many letters ^ ; in the same way as the idea of a

' I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more
than one letter j but it maybe called one in a secondary sense
because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters,
although more than one, express one sense only.

[3-1] P

2IO VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

wood, an army, and so on. — But — our opponent may liere
object — if the word were nothing else but the letters which
in their aggregate become the object of one mental act,
such couples of words as ^ara and ra^a or pika and kapi
would not be cofrnised as different words ; for here the same
letters arc presented to consciousness in each of the words
constituting one couple. — There is indeed, we reply, in
both cases a comprehensive consciousness of the same
totality of letters ; but just as ants constitute the idea of a
row only if they march one after the other, so the letters
also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they follow
each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to
reason that the same letters are cognised as different words,
in consequence of the different order in which they are
arranged.

The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are
the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows.
The letters of which a word consists — assisted by a certain
order and number — have, through traditional use, entered
into a connexion with a definite sense. At the time when
they are employed they present themselves as such (i. e. in
their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after
having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally
comprehends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly
intimate to the buddhi their definite sense. This hypothesis
is certainly simpler than the complicated hypothesis of the
grammarians who teach that the spho/a is the word. For
they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to
assume something which is never perceived ; the letters
apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the
spho/a, and the spho/a in its turn is said to manifest the
sense.

Or let it even be admitted that the letters are differ-
ent ones each time they are pronounced ; yet, as in that
case we necessarily must assume species of letters as
the basis of the recognition of the individual letters, the
function of conveying the sense which we have demon-
strated in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be
attributed to the species.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30. 211

From all this it follows that the theory according to which
the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal
words is unobjectionable.

29. And from this very reason there follows the
eternity of the Veda.

As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence
of the remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard
to it had been raised owing to the doctrine that the gods
and other individuals have sprung from it. That doubt
has been refuted in the preceding Sutra. — The present
Sutra now confirms the, already established, eternity of
the Veda. The eternity of the word of the Veda has to
be assumed for this very reason, that the world with its
definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on, originates
from it. — A mantra also (' By means of the sacrifice they
followed the trace of speech ; they found it dwelling in
the r/shis,' 7?/g-veda Sa;//h. X, 71, 3) shows that the
speech found (by the 77shis) was permanent. — On this
point Vedavyasa also speaks as follows : ' Formerly the
great r/shis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhu, ob-
tained; through their penance, the Vedas together with
the itihasas, which had been hidden at the end of the
yuga.'

30. And on account of the equality of names and
forms there is no contradiction (to the eternity of
the word of the Veda) in the renovation (of the
world) ; as is seen from ^'ruti and Smr/ti.

If — the purvapakshin resumes — the individual gods and so
on did, like the individual animals, originate and pass away
in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break
of the course of practical existence including denominations,
things denominated and agents denominating ; the con-
nexion (between word and thing) would be eternal, and the
objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word
(raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if,
as Sruti and Smrz'ti declare, the whole threefold

P 2

2 I 2 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

world periodically divests itself of name and form, and is
entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that
produced anew ; how can the contradiction be considered to
have been removed ?

To this we reply : ' On account of the sameness of name
and form.' — Even then the beginninglessness of the world
will have to be admitted (a point which the teacher will
prove later on: 11,1,36). And in the beginningless sa;«-
sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and the
dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light
in which we look on the sleeping and waking states, which,
although in them according to Scripture (a kind of) dis-
solution and origination take place, do not give rise to
any contradiction, since in the later waking state (subse-
quent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is carried
on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the
waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated
Kaush. Up. Ill, 3, ' When a man being asleep sees no
dream whatever he becomes one with that pra;/a alone.
Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all
forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.
And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks
proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prizes
proceed, each towards its place ; from the pra;^as the gods,
from the gods the worlds.'

Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no
contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep
of one person the practical existence of other persons suffers
no interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when
waking from sleep may resume the very same form of
practical existence which was his previously to his sleep.
The case of a mahapralaya (i. e. a general annihilation of
the world) is however a different one, as then the entire
current of practical existence is interrupted, and the form of
existence of a previous kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent
kalpa no more than an individual can resume that form of
existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.

This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a
mahapralaya does cut short the entire current of practical

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 3O. 2 I

O

existence, yet, by the favour of the highest Lord, the Lords
(ij-vara), such as Hira;/yagarbha and so on, may continue the
same form of existence which belonged to them in the
preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do
not, as we see, resume that form of existence which belonged
to them in a former birth ; still we cannot judge of the
Lords as we do of ordinary beings. For as in the series
of beings which descends from man to blades of grass a
successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is
observed — although they all have the common attribute of
being animated — so in the ascending series extending from
man up to Hira;/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifes-
tation of knowledge, power, &c. takes place ; a circumstance
which 5ruti and Smr/ti mention in many places, and which
it is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well
be the case that the Lords, such as Hirawyagarbha and so
on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by superior
knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in
the present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord,
continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind of existence
which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa ; just as a man
who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence
which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture
also declares, ' He who first creates Brahman (Hirawya-
garbha) and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is
the light of his own thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for
refuge' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). .Saunaka and others more-
over declare (in the Anukrama;/is of the Veda) that the ten
books (of the Rig-veda.) were seen by MadhuH'/^andas and
other rz'shis ^. And, similarly, Smrz'ti tells us, for every Veda,
of men of exalted mental vision (rz'shis) who ' saw ' the sub-
divisions of their respective Vedas, such as kandas and so
on. Scripture also declares that the performance of the
sacrificial action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by
the knowledge of the nshi and so on,' He who makes another
person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he

^ Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains
not only to Hirawyagarbha, but to many beings.

2 1 4 vedanta-sOtras.

does not know the rishi, the metre, the divinity, and the
Brahma;/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit \ &c. &c.,
therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra '
(Arsheya Brahma;^a, first section). — Moreover, religious duty
is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the
animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain.
Desire and aversion have for their objects pleasure and
pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and
do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore
each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious
v/ merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding
creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of
the preceding creation. Thus Smr/ti also declares, ' To
whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had
turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when
created again and again. Whether those actions were
harmful or harmless, gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true
or untrue, influenced by them they proceed ; hence a cer-
tain person delights in actions of a certain kind.' — More-
over, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is
dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (j-akti)
of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it
is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise
we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor
have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind
(for the different periods of the world). Hence, although
the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series
of different classes of animate beings such as god.-, animals,
and men, and the different conditions based on caste,
dj-rama, religious duty and fruit (of works), although all
these we say are again and again interrupted and thereupon
produced anew ; we yet have to understand that they are, in
the beginningless sa;;^sara, subject to a certain determinate-
ness analogous to the determinateness governing the con-
nexion between the senses and their objects. For it is
impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense-
objects should be a different one in different creations, so

^ Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30. 215

that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a
corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest them-
selves. As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in
all kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their
previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in
each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and
forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and,
owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted
periodical renovations of the world in the form of general
pralayas and general creations do not conflict with the
authoritativeness of the word of the Veda. The permanent
identity of names and forms is declared in .Sruti as well as
Smr/ti; compare, for instance, Rik. Sawh. X, 190, 3, 'As
formerly the creator ordered sun and moon^ and the sky,
and the air, and the heavenly world ; ' which passage means
that the highest Lord arranged at the beginning of the
present kalpa the entire world with sun and moon, and so
on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding kalpa.
Compare also Taitt. Brahm. Ill, 1, 4, i, 'Agni desired:
May I become the consumer of the food of the gods ; for
that end he offered a cake on eight potsherds to Agni and
the Kr/'ttikas.' This passage, which forms part of the
injunction of the ish/i to the Nakshatras, declares equality of
name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the
Agni to whom he offered ^.

Smr/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted
here; so, for instance, 'Whatever were the names of the
r/shis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the
Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced
afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the
various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due
time, thus the same beings again appear in the different
yugas. And of whatever individuality the gods of the

^ Asmin kalpe sarvesham pra«inam dahapakaprakajakari yo
lyam agnir dr/jyate soiyam agni/^ purvasnain kalpe manushya/^
san devalvapadaprapakaw karmanush/Z^ayasmin kalpa eta^^ ^^anma
labdhavan ata/^ purvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini;« saw^Ttam
aj-r/tyagnir iti vyapadi^yate. — Saya//a on the quoted passage.

2 1 6 VEDANTA-SC'TRAS.

past ages were, equal to them arc the present gods in
name and form.'

3 1 . On account of the impossibility of (the gods
being qualified) for the madhu-vidya, &c. Caimini
(maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for
the Brahma-vidya).

A new objection is raised against the averment that the
gods, &c. also are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.
The teacher, G^aimini, considers the gods and similar beings
not to have any claim. — Why?— On account of the impos-
sibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya, &c. If
their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted,
we should have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya ('the
knowledge of the honey ') also, because that also is a kind
of knowledge not different (from the knowledge of Brahman).
But to admit this latter claim is not possible ; for, according
to the passage, ' The Sun is indeed the honey of the devas '
{Kh. Up. Ill, I, i), men are to meditate on the sun (the
god Aditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods
themselves are admitted as meditating worshippers, can
Aditya meditate upon another Aditya ? — Again, the text,
after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one,
&c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five

A

classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and
SidhyaS; live on one of these nectars each, declares that ' he
who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with
Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices,' &c., and
indicates thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed
by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c.
But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus
enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should
they desire to attain ? — We have also to compare the pas-
sages 'Agni is one foot, Aditya is one foot, the quarters are
one foot ' {KJi. Up. Ill, i8, 2) ; ' Air is indeed the ab.'5orber '
{Kh. Up. IV, 3,1); ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine.'
All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of
certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities them-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 21 J

selves are not qualified. — So it is likewise impossible that the
r/shis themselves should be qualified for meditations con-
nected with r/shis, such as expressed in passages like B;-/.
Up. II, 2, 4, ' These two are the r/shis Gautama and Bharad-
xdigdi ; the right Gautama, the left Bharadva^a.' — Another
reason for the non-qualification of the gods is stated in the
following Sutra.

2>2. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on
account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being
(used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

To that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which
is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions
illumines the world, terms such as Aditya, i. e. the names of
devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary
language, and from Vedic complementary passages^. But
of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should
be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart
and the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming
wishes -. For mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely
devoid of intelligence. The same observation applies to
Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our
objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas
is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purawas,
and from the conceptions of ordinary life^; but we contest
the relevancy of this remark. For the conceptions of ordi-
nary life do not constitute an independent means of know-
ledge ; we rather say that a thing is known from ordinary
life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of know-
ledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means
of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the

' As, for instance, ' So long as Aditya rises in the east and sets
in the west ' {Kh. Up. Ill, 6, 4).

^ Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and
therefore not quaUfied for the knowledge of Brahman.

^ Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person
with a staff in his hand, Varu/za with a noose, Indra with a thunder-
bolt, «&c. &c.

2l8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

matter under discussion. Itihasas and pura;^as again being
of human origin, stand themselves in need of other means
of knowledge on which to base. The arthavada passages
also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the injunctory
passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is
enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute
by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality,
&c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground
of direct enunciation, &c., arc to be employed (at the dif-
ferent stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the
purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial
performance, and do not constitute an independent means
of authoritative knowledge for anything ^. — For these reasons
the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the
knowledge of Brahman.

't.'

2,^' Badaraya;/a, on the other hand, (maintains)
the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidya on
the part of the gods) ; for there are (passages
indicatory of that).

The expression ' on the other hand ' is meant to rebut
the purvapaksha. The teacher, Badaraya;/a, maintains the
existence of the qualification on the part of the gods, &c.
For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be ad-
mitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics
of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated,
still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brah-
man, qualification in general depending on the presence of
desire, capability, &c.^ Nor does the impossibility of quali-
fication in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualifi-
cation in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the
case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the case of
men ; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,
Brahma;/as, for instance, not for the ra^asuya-sacrifice ^.

^ On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according to
ihe Mimaz?/sa, cp. Arthasa^^graha, Introduction.
^ See above, p. i' 7.
* Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2,3- 219

And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scrip-
ture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the
devas are quahfied ; compare, for instance, Brz. Up. I, 4, 10,
' Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman)
he indeed became that ; and the same with r/shis ;' K/i.
Up. VIII, 7, 2, ' They said : Well, let us search for that
Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all
desires are obtained. Thus saying, Indra went forth from
the Devas, Viro/l'ana from the Asuras.' Similar statements
are met within Smr/ti, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the
Gandharva and Ya^;7avalkya^. — Against the objection raised
in the preceding. Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words
like aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having
reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of
certain divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and
pre-eminent power ; for they are used in that sense in
mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas possess,
in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of
residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form
they like. Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada
passage explaining the words ' ram of Medhatithi,' which
form part of the Subrahma/^ya-formula, that ' Indra, having
assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the
descendant of Kawva ' (Sha<^v. Br. I, i). And thus SmWti
says that 'Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came
to Kunti.' Moreover, even in such substances as earth, in-
telligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that
appears from such scriptural passages as ' the earth spoke,'
' the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light and
the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is
admitted in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also ; but — as
already remarked — from the use of the words in mantras and

^ iS'rautalihgenanumanabadha/// darjayitva smartenapi tadbadha;;/
darjayati smartam iti. K\m atra brahma amr/tawz kira svid
vedyam anuttamam, X-intayet tatra vai gatva gandharvo mam
apr^H/iata, Vijvavasus tato ra^an vedanta^«anakovida iti moksha-
dharme ^anakaya^«avalkyasa7;/vadat prahlada^agarasaw^vadaX' i^ok-
tanumdnasiddliir ii.y artha//.

2 20 VEDANTA-sOtRAS.

ar'havadas it appears that there are intelligent beings of
divine nature (which animate those material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pur-
vapakshin) that mantras and arthavadas, as merely sub-
serving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the
personality of the devas, and remark that not the cir-
cumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some
other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a
certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the
existence of something. This is exemplified by the case
of a person who, having set out for som.e other purpose,
(nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,
grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road. — But,
the purvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by
you is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer,
perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active,
and through it he forms the conception of their existence.
In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand, which, as
forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory
passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the
latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a
special object of its own. For in general any minor syntac-
tical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive
syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not
possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its
own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination
of the three words constituting the negative sentence, ' (Do)
not drink wine,' one meaning only, i. e. a prohibition of
drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning,
viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last
two words, ' drink wine.' — To this objection we reply, that
the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter
under discussion). The words of the sentence prohibiting
the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that
account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity
included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be
accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the
other hand, the words constituting the arthavada form a
separate group of their own which refers to some accom-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, T^;^. 221

plished tiling^, and only subsequently to that, when it comes
to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on
the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine,
as an ilkistrative example, the injunctiv^e passage, ' He who
is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.'
All the words contained in this passage are directly con-
nected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case
with the words constituting the corresponding arthavada
passage, ' For Vayu is the swiftest deity ; Vayu he ap-
proaches with his own share ; he leads him to prosperity.'
The single words of this arthavada are not grammatically
connected with the single words of the injunction, but form
a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise
of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they
give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected
with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the
-subordinate (arthavada) passage can be known by some other
means of knowledge, the arthavada acts as a mere anuvada,
i. e. a statement referring to something (already known) ^.
When its contents are contradicted by other means of
knowledge it acts as a so-called guwavada, i. e. a statement
of a quality ^. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned
conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavada
is to be taken as a guwavada on account of the absence of
other means of knowledge, or as an arthavada referring to
something known (i. e. an anuvada) on account of the ab-
sence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter
alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting people.
— The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for assuming the personality of
the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial
offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain
characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because

^ As opposed to an action to be accomplished.

^ Of ihis nature is, for instance, the arthavada, ' Fire is a remedy
for cold.'

^ Of this nature is, for instance, the passage ' the sacrificial post
is the sun ' (i. e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness,
&c. ; a statement contradicted by perception).

22 2 VEDANTA-Sl'TRAS.

without such the sacrifice!* could not represent Indra and
the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not
represented to the mind it would not be possible to make
an offering to it. So Scripture also says, ' Of that divinity
for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to
say vausha/' (Ai. Br. Ill, 8, i). Nor is it possible to con-
sider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist
in the word only^; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted)
are different. He therefore who admits the authorita-
tiveness of the scriptural word has no right to deny
that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we
understand it to be from the mantras and arthavadas. —
Moreover, itihasas and pura/^as also — because based on
mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in
the manner described — are capable o'^ setting forth the per-
sonality, &c. of the devas. Itihasa and pura/^a can, besides,
be considered as based on perception also. For what is
not accessible to our perception may have been within the
sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smrz'ti
also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods
face to face. A person maintaining that the people of
ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods
than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incon-
testable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain
that because there is at present no prince ruling over the
whole earth, there w'ere no such princes in former times ;
a position by which the scriptural injunction of the ra^asuya-
sacrificc - w'ould be stultified. Or he might maintain that
in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes
and ajramas were as generally unsettled as they are now,
and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which
define those different duties to be purposeless. It is there-
fore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of
ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious

^ And therefore to suppose tliat a divinity is nothing but a
certain word forming part of a mantra.

"^ The ra^''asuya- sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes
to become the ruler of the whole earth.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 2 2

vD

merit, conversed with the gods face to face. Smr/ti also
declares that ' from the reading of the Veda there results
intercourse with the favourite divinity ' (Yoga Sutra II, 44).
And that Yoga does, as Smriti declares, lead to the
acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of
body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a
mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the great-
ness of Yoga, ' When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether
arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is
no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained
a body produced by the fire of Yoga' (6"vet. Up. II, 12).
Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the
capability of the rz'shis who see the mantras and brahma;^a
passages (i. e. the Veda). — From all this it appears that the
itihisas and purawas have an adequate basis. — And the
conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to
be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.

The general result is that we have the right to conceive
the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground
of mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purawas, and ordinarily
prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the con-
dition of having desires and so on, they must be considered
as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover,
the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual
emancipation ^ agree with this latter supposition only.

34. Grief of him (i. e. of 6'anaiTuti) (arose) on
account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about
himself; on account of the rushing on of that (grief)
(Raikva called him .Sudra) ; for it (the grief) is
pointed at (by Raikva).

(In the preceding adhikarawa) the exclusiveness of the
claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has
been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim.
The present adhikara;/a is entered on for the purpose of
removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the

' In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation
becomes a deva.

2 24 y vedanta-sOtras.

claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the
6"udras also possess such a claim.

The purvapakshin maintains that the .Sudras also have
such a claim, because they may be in the position of
desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of
it ; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (ex-
cluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,
' Therefore ^ the 6"udra is unfit for sacrificing ' (Taitt. Sa7;/h.
VII, I, I, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the
6"udras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the
sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for know-
ledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who
are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark
supporting the claim of the vSudras ; for in the so-called
sawvarga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to 6"anaj-ruti
Pautraya;m, who wishes to learn from him, by the name
of vSudra ' Fie, necklace and carriage be thine, O w.S"udra,
together with the cows ' [Kh. Up. IV, 2, 3). Smr/ti
moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were born from
.Sudra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge. — Hence
the vSudra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

To this we reply that the .Sudras have no such claim,
on account of their not studying the Veda. A person
who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is
indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a 6"udra does not
study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent
the upanayana-cercmony, and that ceremony belongs to
the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance
of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a
reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere
temporal capability again does not constitute a reason
for qualification, spiritual capability being required in
spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case
of the vSudras) excluded by their being excluded from
the study of the Veda. — The Vedic statement, moreover,
that the vSudra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because

^ The commentaries explain ' therefore ' by ' on account of his
being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not,
however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sawh.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 225

founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also ;
for the argumentation is the same in both cases ^ — With
reference to the purvapakshin's opinion that the fact of the
word ' 6"udra ' being enounced in the sawvarga-knowledge
constitutes an inferential mark (of the vS"udra's qualifica-
tion for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark
has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For
the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power
of intimation only in consequence of arguments being
adduced ; but no such arguments are brought forward in
the passage quoted ^. Besides, the word ' ^udra ' which
occurs in the sa;;/varga-vidya would establish a claim on the
part of the 5udras to that one vidya only, not to all vidyas.
In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an
arthavada, to establish the 6"udras' claim to anything. — The
word ' vSudra ' can moreover be made to agree with the con-
text in which it occurs in the following manner. When
CanaiTuti Pautraya;^a heard himself spoken of with dis-
respect by the flamingo (' How can you speak of him, being
what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car ? ' IV, i, 3),
grief (ju/^) arose in his mind, and to that grief the rz'shi Raikva
alludes with the word vSudra, in order to show thereby his
knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be ac-
cepted because a (real) born 5udra is not qualified (for the
sa7«varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief {suk) which
had arisen in 6^anaj-ruti's mind can be referred to by means
of the word 5udra, we reply: On account of the rushing
on (adrava^/a) of the grief. For we may etymologise the
word 5udra by dividing it into its parts, either as ' he rushed
into grief (5u/^am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on

^ The 6'udra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters
in the legitimate way, i. e. through the study of the Veda under the
guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidya.

^ The lihga contained in the word ' ^Sudra ' has no proving
power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority
if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our
case the lihga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted
by those injunctions which militate against the 5'iadras' qualification
for Vedic matters.

[34] Q

2 26 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

him,' or as ' he in his grief rushed to Raikva ; ' while on
the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its
ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the
king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched
upon in the legend^.

35. And because the kshattriyahood (of C^anaiTuti)
is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by
his being mentioned) later on with A'aitraratha (who
was a kshattriya himself).

G'ana^ruti cannot have been a ^Sudra by birth for that
reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from
an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned together (in one
chapter) with the kshattriya A'aitraratha Abhipratarin. For,
later on, i. e. in the passage complementary to the sa;«varga-
vidya, a kshattriya A'aitrarathi Abhipratarin is glorified,
'Once while 5aunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni
were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged
of them ' {Kh. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a
iTaitrarathi (i. e. a descendant of ATitraratha) we have to
infer from his connexion with a Kapeya. For we know
(from vSruti) about the connexion of A'itraratha himself with
the Kapeyas (' the K^peyas made A'itraratha perform that
sacrifice;' Ta;/(^ya Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule sacrificers
of one and the same family employ officiating priests of
one and the same family. Moreover, as w^e understand
from Scripture ('from him a A'aitrarathi descended who was
a prince^') that he (ATaitraratha) was a prince, we must

' Ha7;;savakyad atmano^nadara?« jrutva ^ana^rute/; JUg ut-
pannety etad eva katha/« gamy ate yenasau ^yudrajabdena su/^yate
tatraha spr/jyate X'eti. Ananda Giri.

"^ I translate this passage as I find it in all INISS. of .5'ahkara
consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read /^aitrarathi-
namaikaA). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by X'itrarathad
ity artha,^. — The text of the Ta;/</ya Br. runs : tasma>{' -^aitrarathinam
eka/; kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary explains : tasmat
kara«ad adyapi X'itrava7;/j'olpannana»i madhye eka eva ra^-^a kshatra-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 36. 227

understand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now
of Ganasrutl being praised in the same vidya with the
kshattriya Abhipratarin intimates that the former also was
a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together
with equals. That Canaj^ruti was a kshattriya we more-
over conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from
other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text). —
Hence the 5iidras are not qualified (for the knowledge of
Brahman).

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial
purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and
on account of their absence being declared (in the
case of the ^'udras).

That the ^udras are not qualified, follows from that
circumstance also that in different places of the vidyas such
ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to.
Compare, for instance, Sa.t. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, 'He initiated
him as a pupil;' K/i. Up. VII, i, i, 'Teach me, Sir! thus
he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, i, 'Devoted to Brahman,
firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they,
carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable
Pippalada, thinking that he would teach them all that.' —
Thus the following passage also, ' He without having made
them undergo the upanayana (said) to them ' (K/i. Up. V,
II, 7), shows that the upanayana is a well-established cere-
mony ^ — With reference to the vSudras, on the other hand,
the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned ; so,
for instance. Manu X, 4, where they are spoken of as 'once-
born ' only ('the 5udra is the fourth caste, once-born '), and
Manu X, 126, ' In the 5udra there is not any sin, and
he is not fit for any ceremony.' -

patir baladhipatir bhavati. — Grammar does not authorise the form
^aitraratha used in the Sutra.

^ The king Ajvapati receives some Brahmawas as his pupils
without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the
upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the
general rule.

Q 2

2 28 vedanta-sOtras.

37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to
initiate C'abala) on the ascertainment of (his) not
being that (i.e. a ^'udra).

The 5udras are not quahfied for that reason also that
Gautama, having ascertained 6^abala not to be a 5udra
from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and
instruct him. ' None who is not a Brahma;^a would thus
speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.
You have not swerved from the truth ' {Kh. Up. IV, 4, 5) ;
which scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of
the ^udras not being capable of initiation).

38. And on account of the prohibition, in Smmi,
of (the ^'udras') hearing and studying (the Veda) and
(knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.

The 5udras are not qualified for that reason also that
Smr^'ti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the
Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters.
The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the
following passages : 'The ears of him who hears the Veda
are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and ' For a
5udra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be
read in the vicinity of a 5udra.' From this latter passage
the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once ; for
how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not
even to be read ? There is, moreover, an express prohibition
(of the 5udras studying the Veda). ' His tongue is to be
slit if he pronounces it ; his body is to be cut through if he
preserves it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying
the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge
and performance of Vedic matters ; there are, however,
express prohibitions also, such as ' he is not to impart
knowledge to the 5udra,' and ' to the twice-born belong
study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.' — From those
^udras, however, who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,'
acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of
former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be with-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 39. 229

held, since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit.
Smr/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are
qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and
pura;/as ; compare the passage, ' He is to teach the four
castes' (Mahabh.).- — It remains, however, a settled point that
they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the
Veda.

39. (The pra;^a is Brahman), on account of the
trembling (predicated of the whole world).

The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge—
on which we entered as an opportunity offered — being
finished we return to our chief topic, i. e. the enquiry into
the purport of the Vedanta-texts. — We read (Ka. Up. 11,
6, 2), ' Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth
trembles in the pra;^a. It (the pra;;a) is a great terror, a
raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal ^.'
— This passage declares that this whole world trembles,
abiding in pra;/a, and that there is raised something very
terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge
immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear
what the pra/^a is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a
discussion arises.

The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of the term, pra;/a denotes the air with
its five modifications, that the word ' thunderbolt' also is to
be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole
passage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this
whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms
— which is here called prawa — and the terrible thunderbolts
also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the
air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of
Par^anya, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest
themselves.— Through the knowledge of that air immortality

^ As the words stand in the original they might be translated
as follows (and are so translated by the pfarvapakshin), ' Whatever
there is, the whole world trembles in the pia/za, there goes forth
(from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.'

2 ^o vedAnta-sOtras.

also can be obtained ; for another scriptural passage says,
' Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together.
He who knows this conquers death.' — We therefore con-
clude that the same air is to be understood in the passage
under discussion.

To this we make the following reply. — Brahman only can
be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what
follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part
of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of; how then can it
be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the
air should be referred to? The immediately preceding
passage runs as follows, ' That only is called the Bright, that
is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All
worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.'
That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our
passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity ; and,
secondly, from the circumstance that in the clause, 'The
whole world trembles in pra/za/ we recognise a quality of
Brahman, viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world.
That the word pra;/a can denote the highest Self also,
appears from such passages as ' the pra;/a of pra;/a ' [Bri.
Up. IV, 4, 1 8). Being the cause of trembling, moreover,
is a quality which properly appertains to the highest Self
only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, ' No mortal
lives by the prawa and the breath that goes down. We
live by another in w^hom these two repose ' (Ka. Up. II, 5,
5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under
discussion, (' From terror of it fire burns, from terror the
sun burns, from terror Indra and Vayu, and Death as the
fifth run away,') Brahman, and not the air, must be sup-
posed to be spoken of, since the subject of that passage is
represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole
world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude
that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman,
firstly, on the ground of proximity; and, secondly, because
we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause
of fear, in the words, ' A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.'
The word ' thunderbolt ' is here used to denote a cause of
fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40. 23 1

carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers
in his mind, ' A thunderbolt (i. e, the king's wrath, or
threatened punishment) is hanging over my head ; it might
fall if I did not carry out his command.' In the same
manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so
on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of
Brahman ; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to
a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose
topic is Brahman, declares, ' From terror of it the wind
blows, from terror the sun rises ; from terror of it Agni and
Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.' — That Brahman is what
is referred to in our passage, further follows from the declara-
tion that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that
immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is
known, for instance, from the mantra, ' A man who knows
him only passes over death, there is no other path to go '
(5vet. Up. VI, 15). — That immortality which the purva-
pakshin asserts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of
the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one ; for there
(i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is quoted) at first
the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic
being started [Bri. Up. Ill, 4), and thereupon the inferior
nature of the air and so on is referred to. (' Everything
else is evil.') — That in the passage under discussion the
highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subject-
matter ; for the question (asked by Na/^iketas in I, 2, 14,
' That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither
effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that ')
refers to the highest Self.

40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that
(Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).

We read in Scripture, ' Thus does that serene being,
arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it
has approached the highest light' {K/i. Up. VIII, 12, 3).
Here the doubt arises whether the word ' light ' denotes the
(physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels dark-
ness, or the highest Brahman.

2^2 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

■0

The pOrvapakshin maintains that the word ' light' denotes
the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conven-
tional sense of the world. For while it is to be admitted
that in another passage, discussed under I, i, 24, the word
'light' does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest
itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there
is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary
meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter
treating of the nart'is of the body, that a man going to final
release reaches the sun (' When he departs from this body
then he departs upwards by those very rays ; ' KJi. Up. VIII,
6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes,
in our passage, the ordinary light.

To this we make the following reply. — The word ' light '
can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that
being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is
carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which
is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subject-
matter in VIII, 7, I (' the Self which is free from sin ') ; it is
thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and
to be understood (VIII, 7, i); it is carried on by means of
the clauses. 'I shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9,
3 ff.) ; after that freedom from body is said to belong to it,
because it is one with light (' when he is free from the body
then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' VIII, 12, i) —
and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman —
and it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest
person ' (VIII, 12, 3). — Against the statement, made by the
purvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man going to re-
lease as reaching the sun, we remark that the release there
referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be con-
nected with going and departing upwards. That the ulti-
mate release has nothing to do with going and departing
upwards we shall show later on.

41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as
something different, &c. (from name and form).

Scripture says, ' He who is called ether (aka^-a) is the
revealer of all forms and names. That within which these

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 233

forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immor-
tal, the Self ^ {Kh. Up. VIII, 14, i).

There arisin£r a doubt whether that which here is called
ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental
ether, the purvapakshin declares that the latter alternative
is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the con-
ventional meaning of the word 'ether ;' and, secondly, because
the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well
be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords
room (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no
clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power,
and the like.

To this we reply, that the word ' ether ' can here denote
the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a
different thing, &c. For the clause, ' That within which
these two are contained is Brahman,' designates the ether
as something different from names and forms. But,
excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different
from name and form, since the entire world of effects is
evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the
complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accom-
plished by anything else but Brahman, according to the
text which declares Brahman's creative agency, ' Let me
enter (into those beings) with this living Self (^iva atman),
and evolve names and forms ' {Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). But — it
may be said — from this very passage it is apparent that the
living Self also (i. e. the individual soul) possesses revealing
power with regard to names and forms. — True, we reply,
but what the passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-
difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self).
And the very statement concerning the revealing of names
and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of
Brahman, viz. creative power and the like. — Moreover,
the terms ' the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (VIII, 14)
indicate that Brahman is spoken of.

42. And (on account of the designation) (of the
highest Self) as different (from the individual soul)
in the states of deep sleep and departing.

234 vedanta-sOtras.

In the sixth prapa/Z/aka of the Brzhadara;/yaka there
is given, in reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a
lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, ' He who is
within the heart, among the pra;/as, the person of light,
consisting of knowledge' (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the
doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making
an additional statement about the nature of the transmi-
grating soul (known already from other sources), or at
establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned
with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of
the introductory and concluding statements. For the intro-
ductory statement, ' He among the prawas who consists of
knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the embodied
soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, ' And that
great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c.
(IV, 4, 22). We must therefore adhere to the same subject-
matter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them
as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in
its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.

In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only
at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making
additional statements about the embodied soul. — Why? —
On account of the highest Lord being designated as different
from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of
departing from the body. His difference from the embodied
soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following
passage, ' This person embraced by the intelligent (pra^;7a)
Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.'
Here the term, ' the person,' must mean the embodied soul ;
for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he,
as being the knower, may know what is within and without.
The ' intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord,
because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i. e. — in his
case — all-embracing knowledge. — Similarly, the passage
treating of departure, i. e. death (' this bodily Self mounted
by the intelligent Self moves along groaning '), refers to the
highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There
also we have to understand by the ' embodied one ' the indi-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 235

vidual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the ' intel-
ligent one ' is again the Lord. We thus understand that
' on account of his being designated as something different,
in the states of deep sleep and departure,' the highest Lord
forms the subject of the passage. — With reference to the
purvapakshin's assertion that the entire chapter refers to
the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter
are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark
that in the first place the introductory passage (' He
among the pra/zas who consists of cognition ') does not
aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating
Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of
the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims
at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman ; for
it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage,
'as if thinking, as if moving^,' aims at discarding the
attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding pas-
sage again is analogous to the initial one ; for the words,
' And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean :
We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is
observed among the prawas, is the great unborn Self, i. e.
the highest Lord. — He, again, who imagines that the pas-
sages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting
forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by represent-
ing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who,
setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same
time towards the west. For in representing the states of
waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing
the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but
rather as free from all particular conditions and trans-
migration. This is evident from the circumstance that
on kanaka's question, which is repeated in every section,
' Speak on for the sake of emancipation/ Ya^>7avalkya
replies each time, ' By all that he is not affected, for that
person is not attached to anything' [Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14-16}.
And later on he says (IV, 3, 22), ' He is not followed by

^ The stress lies here on the ' as if,' which intimate that the Self
does not really think or move.

2 ;6 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

•0

good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the
sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore, to conclude that
the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of
the non-transmigrating Self,

43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the
non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that
circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord
and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating
Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating
Self. To the first class belongs, for instance, ' He is the lord
of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things.'
To the latter class belongs the passage, ' He does not be-
come greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.' —
From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the
non-transmigrating highest Lord.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 237

FOURTH PADA.

Reverence to the highest Self !

I. If it be said that some (mention) that which is
based on inference (i. e. the pradhana) ; we deny this,
because (the term alkided to) refers to what is con-
tained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself) ;
and (that the text) shows.

In the preceding part of this work — as whose topic there
has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman — we have at
first defined Brahman (I, 1,2); we have thereupon refuted
the objection that that definition apphes to the pradhana
also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the
latter (I, i, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common
purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that
Brahman, and not the pradha;/a, is the cause of the world.
Here, however, the Sahkhya again raises an objection which
he considers not to have been finally disposed of.

It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there
is no scriptural authority for the pradhana ; for some j-akhas
contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the
pradhana. From this it follows that Kapila and other
supreme rz'shis maintain the doctrine of the pradhana
being the general cause only because it is based on the
Veda. — As long therefore as it has not been proved that
those passages to which the Saiikhyas refer have a different
meaning (i. e. do not allude to the pradhana), all our previous
argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause
of the world must be considered as unsettled. We there-
fore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that
those passages actually have a different meaning.

The Sahkhyas maintain that that also which is based on
inference, i. e. the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some
i-akhas. We read, for instance, they say, in the Ka///aka
(I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped,

238 vedanta-sCtras.

beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There we
recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the
same order, the three entities with which we arc acquainted
from the Sahkhya-smrzti, viz, the great principle, the Un-
developed (the pradhana), and the souP. That by the Un-
developed is meant the pradhana is to be concluded from
the common use of Smr/ti and from the etymological inter-
pretation of which the word admits, the pradhana being
called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other
qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no
scriptural authority for the pradhana. And this pradhana
vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the
world, on the ground of Scripture, Smr/ti, and ratiocination.
Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage
from the Ka//^aka quoted by you intimates by no means the
existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped
which arc known from the Saiikhya-smr/ti. We do not
recognise there the pradhana of the Sarikhyas, i. e. an inde-
pendent general cause consisting of three constituting
elements ; we merely recognise the word ' Undeveloped,'
which does not denote any particular determined thing, but
may — owing to its etymological meaning, 'that which is
not developed, not manifest' — denote anything subtle
and difficult to distinguish. The Sahkhyas indeed give to
the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to the
pradhana ; but then that meaning is valid for their system
only, and has no force in the determination of the sense of
the Veda. Nor does mere equality of position prove
equality of being, unless the latter be recognised indepen-
dently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse
because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We,
moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-
matter, that the passage does not refer to the pradhana the
fiction of the Sankhyas, ' on account of there being referred

^ The Great one is the technical Sahkhya-term for buddhi,
avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prakr/ti, and
purusha is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance,
Sahkh3a Kar. 2, 3.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 239

to that which is contained in the simile of the body.' This
means that the body which is mentioned in the simile of
the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We
infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and
from the circumstance of nothing else remaining. — The
immediately preceding part of the chapter exhibits the
simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared
to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., ' Know the Self to
be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the
intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses
they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads.
When he (the Self) is in union with the body, the senses
and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.' The
text then goes on to say that he wdiose senses, &c. are not
well controlled enters into sawsara, while he who has them
under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest
place of Vish;m. The question then arises : What is the end
of the journey, the highest place of Vishwu ? Whereupon
the text explains that the highest Self which is higher than
the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the journey, the
highest place of Vishwu. 'Beyond the senses there are the
objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the
mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the in-
tellect. Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, beyond
the Undeveloped there is the Person. Beyond the Person
there is nothing — this is the goal, the highest Road.' In this
passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding
simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus
avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and
taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the
mind are referred to in both passages under the same names.
The objects (in the second passage) are the objects which
arc (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the
.senses ; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses
is known from the scriptural passage representing the senses
as grahas, i.e. graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e.
superior to the grahas (Brz. Up. Ill, 2). The mind (manas)
again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the
senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect

240 vedanta-sCtras.

(buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects of enjoy-
ment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect.
Higher than the intellect is the great Self which was repre-
sented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, ' Know the
Self to be the lord of the chariot.' That the same Self is
referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated
use of the word ' Self ; ' that the Self is superior to intelli-
gence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is
naturally superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The
Self is appropriately called great as it is the master. —
Or else the phrase 'the great Self may here denote the
intellect of the first-born Hirawyagarbha which is the basis
of all intellects ; in accordance with the following Smrzti-
passage ' it is called mind, the great one ; reflection, Brahman ;
the stronghold, intellect ; enunciation, the Lord ; highest
knowledge, consciousness ; thought, remembrance V and like-
wise with the following scriptural passage, ' He (Hira;zya-
garbha) who first creates Brahman and delivers the Vedas
to him' (5vet. Up. VI, 18). The intellect, which in the
former passage had beeil referred to under its common name
buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be repre-
sented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter
explanation of the term ' the great Self,' we must assume
that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared
to the charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the
highest person (mentioned last) ; to which there is no objec-
tion, since in reality the personal Self and the highest Self
are identical. — Thus there remains now the body only which
had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore con-

^ Sarakalpavikalparupamananajaktya hairawyagarbhi buddhir
manas tasya/z vyash/imana/zsu samash/itaya vyaptim aha mahan
iti. Sawzkalpadij-aktitaya tarhi sawdehatmatvaw tatraha matir iti.
Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogya^atadharatvam aha pur
iti. Ni^X'ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirtijaktimattvam aha
khyatir iti. Niyamanajaktimatvam aha ij'vara iti. Loke yat
prakr/sh/aff2^;7anam tato^natirekam aha pra^weti. Tatphalam api
tato narthantaravishayam ity aha sawvid iti. ^itpradhanatvam
aha ^itir iti. G;/atasarvarthanusa7;^dhanajaktim aha smr/tij- X'eti.

A.

Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 24 1

elude that the text after having enumerated the senses and
all the other things mentioned before, in order to point
out the highest place, points out by means of the one
remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only thing remaining out
of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the body.
The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the
unity of the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the
soul's passing through saw/sara and release under the form
of a simile in which the body, &c. of the soul — which is
affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses,
mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c. — are compared to a
chariot, and so on. — In accordance with this the subsequent
verse states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of
Vish;/u (' the Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine
forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and
subtle intellect '), and after that the next verse declares Yoga
to be the means of attaining that cognition. ' A wise man
should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down
the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down
within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet
Self.^— That means : The wise man should restrain the
activity of the outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide
within the mind only ; he should further restrain the mind
which is intent on doubtful external objects within intelli-
gence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that
indecision is evil ; he should further restrain intelligence
within the great Self, i. e. the individual soul or else the
fundamental intellect ; he should finally fix the great Self
on the calm Self, i. e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of
which the whole chapter treats. — If we in this manner review
the general context, we perceive that there is no room for
the pradhana imagined by the Sarikhyas.

2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term
avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so
designated).

It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the
term ' the Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general
[34] R

242 VEDANTA-SC'TRAS.

subject-matter and because the body only remains, the
body and not the pradhana of the Sahkhyas. — But here
the following doubt arises : How can the word ' unde-
veloped ' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross
and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta,
i. e. that which is developed or manifested ?

To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term
avyakta denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything
subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross
body indeed cannot directly be termed ' undeveloped,'
but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross
body originates may be called so, and that the term de-
noting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is
a matter of common occurrence ; compare, for instance, the
phrase ' mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk ' (Rt'g-veda. S. IX,
46,4). Another scriptural passage also— ' now all this was
then undeveloped' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7) — shows that this, i. e.
this developed world with its distinction of names and
forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far
as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or
potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of
name and form.

3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world
may be admitted) on account of its dependency on
him (the Lord) ; (for such an admission is) according
to reason.

Here a new objection is raised. — If, the opponent says,
in order to prove the possibility of the body being called
undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent
seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved
can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the
doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For
we Sahkhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing
but that antecedent condition of the world.

Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some
antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of
the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3. 243

pradhana doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a
previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an
independent state. A previous stage of the world such as
the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since
it is according to sense and reason. For without it the
highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he
could not become active if he were destitute of the po-
tentiality of action. The existence of such a causal poten-
tiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls
should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is
destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potenti-
ality is of the nature of Nescience ; it is rightly denoted
by the term ' undeveloped ; ' it has the highest Lord for
its substratum ; it is of the nature of an illusion ; it is
a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating
souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their
individual character ^. This undeveloped principle is some-
times denoted by the term &kasa., ether ; so, for instance,
in the passage, ' In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the
ether is woven like warp and woof (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 11).
Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the
Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, i, 2), 'Higher,
than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it is spoken of
as Maya, illusion ; so, for instance (^ve. Up. IV, 10), ' Know
then Prakrzti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is
affected with M^ya.' For Maya is properly called un-
developed or non-manifested since it cannot be defined
either as that which is or that which is not. — The statement
of the Ka//^aka that ' the Undeveloped is beyond the Great

^ Nana na bi^aj-aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety
aha avidyeti. KeX'it tu prati^ivam avidyajaktibhedam i/('>^//anti
tan na avyaktavyakr/ladijabdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatve^pi
svajaktya viXitrakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na ^a tasya
^ivajrayatvaw ^nva^abdava/'yasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat taX'/(7/a-
bdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity aha paramej'vareti. Maya-
vidyayor bhedad i^varasya mayajrayatva/w ^ivanam avidyajrayateti
vadanta/w pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya paratantra
tathaishapity artha^. Pratitau tasya.? X'ctanapeksham aha mahasuptir
iti. Ananda Giri.

R 2

244 vedanta-sOtras.

one ' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from
the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of
Hira//yagarbha, If, on the other hand, we understand by
the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded
on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending
on the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience. For the continued
existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing
to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The
quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first
place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, is attri-
buted to the body which is the product of Nescience, the
cause and the effect being considered as identical. Al-
though the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience,
the term ' the Undeveloped ' here refers to the body only,
the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned
by their individual names, and the body alone being left. —
Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat
different explanation^. — There are, they say, two kinds of
body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body
is the one which is perceived ; the nature of the subtle one
will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, i, i.) Both
these bodies together were in the simile compared to the
chariot ; but here (in the passage under discussion) only
the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since
the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that
term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and
release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be
beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the
objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity
of the latter depends on the objects. — But how — we ask those
interpreters — is it possible that the word ' Undeveloped '
should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to
your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented
as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of
the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the

' Sutradvayasya vr/iiik^/dvyakhyanam ulthapayati. Go. An.
A^aryadcj-iyamatam utlhapayali. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 4. 245

passage under discussion)?— If you should rejoin that you
are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text
actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not
mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in
the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the
gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest ; we
invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin-
ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the
passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For
if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole
they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment
of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject.
But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be
on the ground of there being a want of a complementary
part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the
connexion of the passages without having regard to the
fact that the latter passage demands as its complement
that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former
passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy
all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from
arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you
think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle
body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily
distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily
so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath-
someness. For the passage does not by any means refer
to such a distinction — as we conclude from the circumstance
of there being no verb enjoining it — but has for its only
subject the highest place of Vish/m, which had been men-
tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a
series of things in which the subsequent one is always
superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying
that nothing is beyond the Person. — We might, however,
accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging
our general argumentation ; for whichever explanation we
receive, so much remains clear that the Ka/Z/aka passage
does not refer to the pradhana,

4, And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because

246 vedanta-sCtras.

there is no statement as to (the avyakta) benig
somethino; to be cocfnised.

The Saiikhyas, moreover, represent the pradhana as some-
thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the
knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements
of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired
isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the
nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to
cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some-
where they teach that the pradhana is to be cognised by
him who wishes to attain special powers. — Now in the
passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned
as an object of knowledge ; we there meet with the mere
word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the
avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is
impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which
(knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage
to man. — For this reason also we maintain that the word
avyakta cannot denote the pradhana. — Our interpretation,
on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it
the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know-
ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on
the highest place of Vish;m, in continuation of the simile in
which the body had been compared to a chariot.

5. And if you maintain that the text does speak
(of the pradhana as an object of knowledge) we deny
that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant,
on account of the general subject-matter.

Here the Sahkhya raises a new objection, and maintains
that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since
the text later on speaks of the pradhana— which had been
referred to as the Undeveloped — as an object of knowledge.
' He who has perceived that which is without sound, without
touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal,
without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the
great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death '
(Ka. Up. n, 3, 1^). For here the text speaks of the pradhana,

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 247

which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the
same qualities which the Sarikhya-sm/'/ti ascribes to it, and
designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con-
clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.

To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre-
sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the
intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from
the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self
continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol-
lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the
passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal,
the highest Road;' it has further to be supplied as the
object of knowledge in the passage, ' The Self is hidden
in all beings and does not shine forth,' because it is there
spoken of as difficult to know ; after that the restraint of
passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the
passage, ' A wise man should keep down speech within
the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is
declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sahkhyas,
on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from
the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but
connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli-
gent Self. — The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all
Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are
mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of
sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is
in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor
denoted by the term avyakta.

6. And there is question and explanation relative
to three things only (not to the pradhana).

To the sarne conclusion we are led by the consideration
of the circumstance that the Ka///avalli-upanishad brings
forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the
fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self.
These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby
the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions
of Na/tiketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired

248 vedanta-sOtras.

about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con-
tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, i, 13), 'Thou knowest, O
Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven ; tell it
to me, who am full of faith.' The question as to the indi-
vidual soul is contained in I, i, 20, ' There is that doubt
when a man is dead, some saying, he is ; others, he is not.
This I should like to know, taught by thee ; this is the third
of my boons.' And the question about the highest Self is
asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as
neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither
past nor future, tell me that.' — The corresponding answers
are given in I, i, 15, ' Yama then told him that fire sacrifice,
the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required
for the altar, and how^ many ; ' in the passage met with con-
siderably later on (II, 5, 6 ; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall
tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens
to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb
in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into
inorganic matter according to their work and according to
their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2,18), 'The knowing
Self is not born nor does it die,' &c. ; which latter passage
dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques-
tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity
for any remarks on it.

Here the Sahkhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks,
the question relative to the Self w^hich is asked in the pas-
sage, ' There is that doubt when a man is dead,' &c., again
resumed in the passage, ' That which thou seest as neither
this nor that,' &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct
new question ? If the former, the two questions about the
Sslf coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether
two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the
other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no
right to speak of questions and explanations relating to
three subjects. — If the latter, you do not consider it a
mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of
boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we
assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the
number of questions asked.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 249

To this we make the following reply.— We by no means
assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted,
being prevented from doing so by the influence of the
opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the
Ka///availi-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic
of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of
the Upanishad — which is thrown into the form of a colloquy
of Yama and Na/^iketas — carries on that topic up to the very
end. Yama grants to Na/^iketas, who had been sent by his
father, three boons. For his first boon Na/?'iketas chooses
kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second
boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon
the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self
is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the
passage (I, i, 20), 'There is that doubt — ; this is the third
of my boons.'- — If we therefore supposed that the passage,
' That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c., raises
a new question, we should thereby assume a question in
excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the
connexion of the entire Upanishad. — But — the S&rikhyawill
perhaps interpose — it must needs be admitted that the pas-
sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject
enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers
to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt ex-
pressed in the words, ' There is that doubt when a man is
dead — some saying, he is ; others, he is not.' Now this
individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot
constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms
as, ' This which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c. ;
the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about
in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance
of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ ; for the
former question refers to existence and non-existence, while
the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite
attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question,
in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate
question, and does not merely resume the subject of the
former one. — All this argumentation is not valid, we reply,
since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the

250 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

individual Self. If the individual Self were different from
the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two
questions are separate independent questions, but the
two are not really different, as we know from other scrip-
tural passages, such as ' Thou art that.' And in the Upani-
shad under discussion also the answer to the question, ' That
which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage,
' The knowing Self is not born, it dies not ' — which answer
is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the
Self — clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest
Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of
something only when that something is possible, and the
possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self
only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the
highest Self — There is, moreover, another passage conveying
the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows
that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in
waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This
passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the
knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses
the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby
declares that the individual Self is not different from the
highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is con-
sequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised
Vedanta tenet. — There is another passage also warning
men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self
as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, ' What is here the same is
there ; and what is there the same is here. He who sees
any difference here goes from death to death.' — The fol-
lowing circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When
Na/u'iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or
non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce
him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of
various objects of desire. But Na/^iketas remains firm.
Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good
and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignor-
ance, praises Na/^iketas, ' I believe Na-l'iketas to be one who
desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear
thee away ' (I, 2, 4) ; and later on praises the question

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 25 I

asked by Na>^iketas, ' The wise who, by means of meditation
on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difificult to be
seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the
cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy
and sorrow far behind ' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to
intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are
non-different. For if NaX'iketas set aside the question, by
asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama,
and after having received that praise asked a new question,
all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly.
Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, ' That
which thou seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes
the topic to which the question in I, i, 20 had referred. —
Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions
differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned
with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires
about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c. ;
the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being
subject to sawsara. For as long as Nescience remains, so
long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c. ; but
as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one
with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts
as ' Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or
inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz.
the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope
lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it,
frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell
him, ' Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake ; ' and he
may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake,
and stop running. But all the while the presence and subse-
quent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being
a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself.
Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which
is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience
makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in
the passage, ' It is not born^ it dies not,' is also to be con-
sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I,
1, 20. — The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the
distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which

2^2 VEDANTA-sOtRAS.

results from Nescience. Although the question relating to
the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, i, 20)
is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a
doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at
the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since
the specific marks of the sawsara-state, such as activity, &c.
are not denied ; while the latter part of the question (I, 2,
14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken
of, clearly refers to the highest Self. — For these reasons the
Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and
explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul,
and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who
assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject
discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon
connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer.
Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our
own.

7. And (the case of the term av3^akta) is like that
of the term mahat.

While the Sankhyas employ the term ' the Great one,' to
denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence ^ (? viz.
the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use.
This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in
such passages as the following, ' The great Self is beyond
the Intellect ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10) ; ' The great omnipresent
•Self (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22) ; ' I know that great person ' {Sve.
Up. Ill, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta
also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the
pradhana. — The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of
inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.

8. (It cannot be maintained that a^a means the

^ The commentators give different explanations of the Satta-
matra of the text. — Sattamatre sattvapradhanapraknter adya-
pari7?ame. Go. An. — Bhogapavargapurusharthasya mahaX'/('//abdi-
tabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakarawaw sad uX-yate tatra
bhavapratya}o ^ pi svarupartho na samanyavaX'i karyanumeyawi
mahan na pratyaksham iti matraiabda/z. Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 8. 253

pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated ;
as in the case of the cup.

Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward
and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for
the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the
following mantra (6"ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is one a^a^ red,
white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same
nature. There is one a^a who loves her and lies by her ;
there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.' —
In this mantra the words ' red,' ' white,' and ' black ' denote
the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is
called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing pro-
perty ; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature
of Light ; Darkness is called black on account of its covering
and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three
constituent elements, i. e. the pradhana, is denoted by the at-
tributes of its parts, and istherefore called red — white — black.
It is further called a^a, i. e. unborn, because it is acknow-
ledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything
springs, not a mere effect. — But has not the word a^a the
settled meaning of she-goat ? — True ; but the ordinary
meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place,
because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter. —
That pradhana produces many creatures participating in its
three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her
and lies by her, i. e. some souls, deluded by ignorance,
approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience
pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness. pass through
the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again,
which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their
attachment to prakr/ti, and leave her after having enjoyed
her, i. e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release.
— On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the

^ As the meaning of the word ag'a is going to be discussed, and
as the author of the Sutras and 6'ahkara seem to disagree as to its
meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in
this place. — ^'aiikara reads — and ex[)lains, — in the mantra, sarupa.;^
(not sarupam) and bhuktabliogam, not bhuktabhogyam.

2 54 vedanta-sOtras.

followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their
pradhana hypothesis.

To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra
by no means proves the Sahkhya doctrine to be based on
Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give;
additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of
some supposition or other, the terms a^a, &c. can be
reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for
the special assertion that the Sahkhya doctrine only is meant.
The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the
mantra, ' There is a cup having its mouth below and its
bottom above' (Br/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just as it is impossible to
decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what
special cup is meant — it being possible to ascribe, somehow
or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward
to any cup — ; so here also there is no special quality stated,
so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself
whether the pradhana is meant by the term a^a, or some-
thing else. — But in connexion with the mantra about the
cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn
what kind of cup is meant, ' What is called the cup having
its mouth below and its bottom above is this head.' — Whence,
however, can we learn what special being is meant by the
a^a of the ^Svetaj-vatara-upanishad ? — To this question the
next Sutra replies.

9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are
meant by the term a^a) ; for some read so in their
text.

By the term a^a we have to understand the causal
matter of the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung
from the highest Lord and begins with light, i. e. comprises
fire, water, and earth. — The word ' but ' (in the Sutra) gives
emphasis to the assertion. — This a^a is to be considered as
comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of
three gu//as in the Sahkhya sense. We draw this conclusion
from the fact that one j-akha, after having related how fire,
water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to
them red colour, and so on. ' The red colour of burniner fire

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9. 255

(agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (te^as), its white
colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of
earth,' &c. Now those three elements — fire, water, and earth —
we recognise in the ^vetaj-vatara passage, as the words red,
white, and black are common to both passages, and as these
words primarily denote special colours and can be applied
to the Saiikhya gu^^as in a secondary sense only. That
passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the
interpretation of doubtful passages, is a generally acknow-
ledsed rule. As we therefore find that in the 5vet^jvatara —
after the general topic has been started in I, i,' The Brahman-
students say. Is Brahman the cause?' — the text, previous
to the passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the
highest Lord which arranges the whole world (' the Sages
devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the
power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own
qualities ') ; and as further that same power is referred
to in two subsequent complementary passages (' Know
then, Prakr/ti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is
affected with Maya ;' ' who being one only rules over every
germ;' IV, 10, 11) ; it cannot possibly be asserted that the
mantra treating of the a^a refers to some independent causal
matter called pradhana. We rather assert, on the ground
of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes
the same divine power referred to in the other passages, in
which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we assume
as the antecedent condition of that state of the world
in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine
power is represented as three-coloured, because its products,
viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours. — But
how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth
having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately
called a three-coloured a^a? if we consider, on the one hand,
that the exterior form of the genus a^a (i. e. goat) does not
inhere in fire, water, and earth ; and, on the other hand, that
Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been pro-
duced, so that the word a^a cannot be taken in the sense
'non-produced ^' — To this question the next Sutra replies.

^ Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the

I

256 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

10. And on account of the statement of the
assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing con-
trary to reason (in a^a denoting the causal matter) ;
just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and
similar cases.

The word a^a neither expresses that fire, water, and earth
belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as
meaning 'unborn;' it rather expresses an assumption, i.e.
it intimates the assumption of the source of all beings (which
source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to
a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be
partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many
young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat
might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat
might leave her after having enjoyed her ; so the universal
causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire,
water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate
beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered
by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which
have attained true knowlege. — Nor must we imagine that
the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the
preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multi-
plicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philo-
sophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to
intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of

views of the Sutra writer and ^Sahkara. Govindananda notes that
according to the Bhashyaknt aga. means simply maya — which
interpretation is based on prakara«a — while, according to the Sutra-
kn't, who explains a^a on the ground of the A7/andogya-passage
treating of the three primary elements, a^a denotes the aggregate of
those three elements constituting an avantaraprakr/ti. — On Sa.h-
kara's explanation the term a^a presents no difficulties, for maya is
a^a, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sutra
writer, however, a^a cannot mean unborn, since the three primary
elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the mdM
signification of a^a, according to which it means she-goat. But
how can the avantara-prakr/ti be called a she-goat .? To this
question the next Sutra replies.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II. 257

the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction
is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as
ordinarily conceived ; that multiplicity, however, depends
altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product
of wrong knowledge merely ; as we know from scriptural
passages such as, ' He is the one God hidden in all beings,
all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c. — The words ' like
the honey ' (in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although
not being honey, is represented as honey [Kh. Up. Ill, i),
and speech as a cow (Br/. Up. V, 8), and the heavenly
world, &c. as the fires (BW. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the
causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphori-
cally represented as one. There is therefore nothing con-
trary to reason in the circumstance of the term a^a being
used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.

II. (The assertion that there is scriptural autho-
rity for the pradhana, &c. can) also not {be based)
on the mention of the number (of the Sahkhya
categories), on account of the diversity (of the
categories) and on account of the excess (over the
number of those categories).

The attempt to base the Sahkhya doctrine on the mantra
speaking of the a^^ having failed, the Sankhya again comes
forward and points to another mantra : ' He in whom the five
"five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the
Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman' (Br?. Up. IV^
4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses
the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another
word, viz. five, which qualifies the former ; these two words
together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e.
twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twenty-
five presupposes, just so many categories the Sahkhya
system counts. Cp. Sdhkhya Karikd, 3 : ' The funda-
mental causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect.
Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so
on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are
effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect.'
[34] S-

258 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

As tlierefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the
scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five
categories taught in the Sahkhya-smr/'ti, it follows that the
doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.

To this reasoning we make the following reply. — It is
impossible to base the assertion that the pradhana, &c.
have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their
number which you pretend to find in the text, ' on account
of the diversity of the Sarikhya categories.' The Sahkhya
categories have each their individual difference, and there
are no attributes belonging in common to each pentad on
account of which the number twenty-five could be divided
into five times five. For a number of individually separate
things can, in general, not be combined into smaller groups
of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for
such combination.- — Here the Sahkhya will perhaps rejoin
that the expression five (times) five is used only to denote
the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its
constituent parts; just as the poem says, 'five years and
seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only that there was no
rain for twelve years. — But this explanation also is not
tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that
it has recourse to indirect indication ^. — In the second
place, the second ' five ' constitutes a compound with the
word ' people,' the Brahma;/a-accent showing that the
two form one word only^. To the same conclusion we
are led by another passage also (Taitt. Sawh. I, 6, 2, 2,
pa;//^anaw tva pa;7/J'a^ananam, &c.) where the two terms
constitute one word, have one accent and one case-

^ Indication (lakshawa, which consists in this case in five limes five
being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable
mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation
only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct
meaning.

^ That pa;7/'a^ana/^ is only one word appears from its having
only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta
becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika
Sutra for the accentuation of the 6'atapatha-brahma;/a.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, TI. 259

termination. The word thus being a compound there
is neither a repetition of the word ' five,' involving two
pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the
mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified
by another word. — But as the people are already denoted
to be five by the compound ' five-people,' the effect of the
other ' five ' qualifying the compound will be that we
understand twenty-five people to be meant ; just as the
expression 'five five-bundles' (pauka. pa;7/^apulya//) conveys
the idea of twenty-five bundles. — The instance is not an
analogous one, we reply. The word '' pa;H'apuH ' denotes
a unity (i.e. one bundle made up of five bundles), and hence
when the question arises, ' How many such bundles are
there.?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating
that there are five such bundles. The word pa/^/'a^ana//,
on the other hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction
(i.e. of five distinct things), so that there is no room at all
for a further desire to know how many people there are,
and hence no room for a further qualification. And if the
word ' five ' be taken as a qualifying word it can only
qualify the numeral five (in five-people) ; the objection
against which assumption has already been stated. — For
all these reasons the expression the five five-people cannot
denote the twenty-fiv^ categories of the Sankhyas. — This
is further not possible ' on account of the excess.' For on
the Saiikhya interpretation there would be an excess over
the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the
ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self
is spoken of as the abode in which the five five-people rest,
the clause 'Him I believe to be the Self being connected
with the ' in whom ' of the antecedent clause. Now the
Self is the intelligent soul of the Sankhyas which is
already included in the twenty-five categories, and which
therefore, on their interpretation of the passage, would
here be mentioned once as constituting the abode and once
as what rests in the abode! If, on the other hand, the
soul were supposed not to be comprised in the twenty-five
categories, the Sahkhya would thereby abandon his own
doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same

S 2

!60 VEDAXTA-SUTRAS.

remarks apply to the separate mention made of the ether.
— How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a certain
number being referred to in the sacred text justify the
assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sahkhya
categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place ?
especially if we consider that the word ^ana has not the
settled meaning of category, and that the number may be
satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the
passage.

How, then, the Sankhya will ask, do you interpret the
phrase 'the five five-people? '-^On the ground, we reply,
of the rule Pa;nni H, i, 50, according to which certain
compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The
word pa;7j^a^ana// thus is not meant to convey the idea of
the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of
beings. Hence the ques^tion may present itself, How many
such classes are there ? and to this question an answer
is given by the added numeral ' five.' There are certain
classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are
five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-
r/shis, where again the compound denotes a class of beings
merely, not their number. — Who then are those five-
people? — To this question the next Sutra replies.

12. (The pa.?7^2L£-ana./i are) the breath and so
on, (as is seen) from the complementary passage.

The mantra in which the pa;7/'a^ana/^ are mentioned is
followed by another one in which breath and four other
things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the
nature of Brahman. ' They who know the breath of
breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of
food, the mind of mind ^' Hence we conclude, on the
ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings
mentioned in this latter mantra. — But how, the Sahkhya
asks, can the word ' people ' be applied to the breath, the
eye, the ear, and so on ? — How, we ask in return, can it be

^ So in the IMadhyandina recension of the Upanishad ; the
Kawva recension has not tlie clause ' the food of food.'

I ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 12. 26 1

applied to your categories? In both cases the common
meaning of the word ' people ' has to be disregarded ;
but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath,
the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary
passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the
word ' people ' because they are connected with people.
Moreover, we find the word 'person,' which means as much
as 'people,' applied to the pra«as in the passage, 'These
are the five persons of Brahman ' [KJi. Up. Ill, 13, 6) ; and
another passage runs, ' Breath is father, breath is mother,'
&c. {Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of
composition, there is no objection to the compound being
taken in its settled conventional meaning \ — But how can
the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no
previous use of the word in that meaning? — That may be
done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and similar
words -. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning
refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion
with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the fol-
lowing words : ' He is to sacrifice with the udbhid ; he cuts
the yupa ; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we conclude
that the term pa;7;^a^ana//, which, from the grammatical
rule quoted; is known to be a name^ and which there-
fore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes
the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with
it through their being mentioned in a complementary
passage. — Some commentators explain the word pa/Ha-

^ This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to ^ana when
applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of
lakshawa ; while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be
explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika
interpretation (the pradhana being ^ana because it produces, the
mahat &c. being ^ana because they are produced). The Vedantin
points out that the compound paw/'a^ana/^ has its own \\xdh\-
meaning, just as ajvakar«a, literally horse-ear, which conventionally
denotes a certain plant.

* We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is
mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that
the yu])a is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.

262 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

gdiWdih to mean the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas,
the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that
the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant.
Again, some scriptural passage (7?/g-veda Saw/h. VIII, $% 7)
speaks of the tribe of ' the five-people,' meaning thereby
the created beings in general ; and this latter explanation
also might be applied to the passage under discussion.
The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other hand, aiming at
showing that the passage does not refer to the twenty-five
categories of the Sankhyas, declares that on the ground of
the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be under-
stood.

Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned
in the Madhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text
mentions food also (and so makes up the number five).
But how shall we interpret the Ka«va-text which does not
mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things
only) ? — To this question the next Sutra replies.

13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka;^vas)
where food is not mentioned, (the number five is
made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding
mantra).

The Ka;^va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up
the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra
preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That
mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, ' Him
the gods worship as the light of lights.'— If it be asked
how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both
texts equally is in one text to be employed for the expla-
nation of the five-people, and not in the other text ; we reply
that the reason lies in the difTerence of the requirements.
As the Madhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra
with breath and four other entities enabling them to interpret
the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light
mentioned in another mantra. The Ka;/vas, on the other
hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous
to that of the Sho</aj-in-cup, which, according to different

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 4. 263

passages, is either to be offered or not to be ofifered at the
atiratra-sacrifice.

We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis
for the doctrine of the pradhana. That this doctrine can-
not be proved either by Smr/ti or by ratiocination will be
shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta-
passages with regard to the things created, such as)
ether and so on ; (there is no such conilict v^ith
regard to the Lord) on account of his being re-
presented (in one passage) as described (in other
passages), viz, as the cause (of the world).

In the preceding part of the work the right definition of
Brahman has been established ; it has been shown that all the
Vedanta-texts have Brahman for their common topic ; and
it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for
the doctrine of the pradhana. — But now a new objection
presents itself

It is not possible — our opponent says — to prove either
that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world,
or that all Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman ; because we
observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict one another.
All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation
enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in
reality speak of different creations. In one place it is said
that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, i) ;
in another place that the creation began with fire [KJi. Up.
VI, 2, 3) ; in another place, again, that the Person created
breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up.VI, 4) ; in another place,
again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above
the heaven), light, tlie mortal (earth), and the water (below
the eartli) (Ait. Ar. II, 4, i, 2; 3). There no order is stated
at all. Somewhere else it is said that the creation oricri-
nated from the Non-existent. ' In the beg-innino- this was
non-existent ; from it was born what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) ;
and, ' In the beginning this was non-existent ; it became
existent; it grew' {Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1). In another place,

264 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the ante-
cedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent men-
tioned in its stead. ' Others say, in the beginning there
was that only which is not ; but how could it be thus, my
dear? How could that which is be born of that which is
not?' {^KJi. Up. VI, 2, I ; 2.) And in another place, again,
the development of the world is spoken of as having taken
place spontaneously, ' Now all this w^as then undeveloped.
It became developed by form and name ' (B;-z. Up. I, 4, 7).
— As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and
as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished
matter \ the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as
authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we
must rather accept some other cause of the world resting
on the authority of Smrz'ti and Reasoning.

To this we make the following reply.— Although the
Vedanta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the
order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they
do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on account of
his being represented as described.' That means : such as
the creator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as
all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a
second, so he is represented in all other Vedanta-passages
also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of
Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, i ff.). There it is said at
first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the
word ' knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made
later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brah-
man is of the nature of intellicrence. Further, the text
declares ^ that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by
representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further
applies to the cause of the world the term ' Self (II, i), and
it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths begin-

^ Option being possible only in the case of things to be accom-
plished, i.e. actions.

^ According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself its
Self (II, 7); according to An. Giii in the passage, 'He created
all ' (II, 6).

I ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 1 4. 265

ning with the gross body ; whereby it affirms it to be the
internal Self within all beings. Again— in the passage,
' May I be many, may I grow forth ' — it tells how the Self
became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non-
different from the created effects. And — in the passage,
' He created all this whatever there is ' — it represents the
creator as the Cause of the entire w^orld, and thereby declares
him to have been without a second previously to the
creation. The same characteristics which in the above
passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of
the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages
also, so, for instance, ' Being only, my dear, w^as this in the
beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I
be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fir^"* [Kh. Up.
VI, 2, 1 ; 3), and ' In the beginning all this was Self, one
only ; there w'as nothing else blinking whatsoever. He
thought, shall I send forth worlds.? ' (Ait. Ar. II, A^\,\\ 2.)
The Vedanta-passages which are concerned with setting
forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony through-
out.— On the other hand, there are found conflicting state-
ments concerning the world, the creation being in some
places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and
so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the
conflict of statements concerning the world affects the
statements concerning the cause, i. e. Brahman, in which all
the Vedanta-texts are seen to agree — for that would be an
altogether unfounded generalization ; — and, in the second
place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those con-
flicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to
consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of state-
ments regarding the world would not even matter greatly,
since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at
all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe
nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends
on those matters in any way ; nor have we the right to
assume such a thing ; because we conclude from the intro-
ductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the
creation and the like form only subordinate members of
passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages

266 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of
teachhig Brahman, Scripture itself declares ; compare Kh.
Up. VI, 8, 4, ' As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root,
viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its
root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its
root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by
means of comparisons such as that of the clay [Kli. Up. VI,
I, 4) the creation is described merely for the purpose of
teaching us that the effect is not really different from the
cause. Analogously it is said by those who know the sacred
tradition, ' If creation is represented by means of (the
similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things ; that is only
a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is
no difference whatever' (Gaurt'ap. Ka. Ill, 15). — On the
other hand. Scripture expressly states the fruits connected
with the knowledge of Brahman, ' He who knows Brahman
obtains the highest ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' He who knows the
Self overcomes grief {I-CJi. Up. VII, i, 3); 'A man who
knows him passes over death' (vSve. Up. Ill, 8). That
fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha),
for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, ' That art thou,' a
man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non-
transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such
as ' Non-being this was in the beginning ' contain conflicting
statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in
the next Sutra.

15. On account of the connexion (with passages
treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the
Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).

The passage ' Non-being indeed was this in the beginning'
(Taitt. Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the
world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of
all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the Upani-
shad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing,
and is defined to be that which is (' He who knows the
Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing.

I ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, I 5. 267

He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know
himself as existing ') ; it is further, by means of the series
of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c., represented as the
inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again
referred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;'
is declared to have originated the entire creation ; and is
finally referred to in the clause, ' Therefore the wise call
it the true,' Thereupon the text goes on to say, with
reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion,
' On this there is also this j-Ioka, Non-being indeed was
this in the beginning,' &c. If here the term ' Non-being '
denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context
would be broken ; for while ostensibly referring to one
matter the passage would in reality treat of a second
altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude
that, while the term ' Being ' ordinarily denotes that which
is differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being'
denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation,
i. e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word,
called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world.
The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage
* Non-being this was in the beginning' {Kh. Up. HI, 19, i);
for that passage also is connected with another passage which
runs, ' It became being ;' whence it is evident that the ' Non-
being' of the former passage cannot mean absolute Non-
existence. And in the passage, ' Others say. Non-being
this was in the beginning ' {Kh. Up. VI, 2, i), the reference
to the opinion of ' others ' does not mean that the doctrine
referred to (according to which the world was originally
absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the
Veda ; for option is possible in the case of actions but not
in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to
be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive
absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some
teachers of inferior intelligence ; a refutation undertaken for
the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world
has sprung from that which is. — The following passage
again, ' Now this was then undeveloped,' &c. (Br/. Up. I,
4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of

268 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

the world took place without a ruler ; as w'e conclude from
the circumstance of its being connected with another
passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into
the evolved world of effects, ' He entered thither to the
very tips of the finger-nails,' &c. If it were supposed that
the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to
whom could the subsequent pronoun ' he ' refer (in the
passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected
with something previously intimated ? And as Scripture
declares that the Self, after having entered into the body,
is of the nature of intelligence (' when seeing, eye by name ;
when hearing, ear by name ; when thinking, mind by
name '), it follow^s that it is intelligent at the time of its
entering also. — We, moreover, must assume that the world
was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same
way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and
formS; viz. under the rulership of an intelligent creator ;
for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to
what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural
passage also declares that the evolution of the world took
place under the superintendence of a ruler, ' Let me now
enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then
evolve names and forms ' [Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). The in-
transitive expression 'It developed itself (vyakriyata ;
it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to
the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought
about that evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance,
that 'the cornfield reaps itself (i.e. is reaped with the
greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to
account for the work being done). — Or else we may look
on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily
implied agent ; as is the case in such phrases as ' the village
is being approached ' (where we necessarily have to supply
' by Devadatta or somebody else ').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because
(the ' work ') denotes the world.

In the Kaushitaki-brahma;^a, in the dialogue of Bal^ki
and A^ataj-atru, we read, ' O Balaki, he who is the maker of

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 6. 269

those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be
known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether
what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the
individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant.
For, in the first place, he says, the clause ' of whom this
is the work' points to the activity of motion, and that
activity rests on the vital air. In the second place, we meet
with the word 'prawa' in a complementary passage (' Then
he becomes one with that prawa alone '), and that word
is well known to denote the vital air. In the third place,
pra//a is the maker of all the persons, the person in the
sun, the person in the moon, &c., who in the preceding part
of the dialogue had been enumerated by Balaki ; for that
the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of
pra;/a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. ' Who
is that one god (in whom all the other gods are contained)?
Pra«a and he is Brahman, and they call him That ' (Br/.
Up. Ill, 9, 9). — Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the
passage under discussion represents the individual soul as
the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be
said that ' this is the work,' if w^e understand by 'this' all
meritorious and non-meritorious actions ; and the soul also,
in so far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker
of the persons enumerated in so far as they are instru-
mental to the soul's fruition. The complementary passage,
moreover, contains an inferential mark of the individual
soul. For A^ataj-atru, in order to instruct Balaki about
the ' maker of the persons ' who had been proposed as the
object of knowledge, calls a sleeping man by various names
and convinces Balaki, by the circumstance that the sleeper
does not hear his shouts, that the pra;/a and so on are not
the enjoyers ; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by
pushing him with his stick, and so makes Balaki compre-
hend that the being capable of fruition is the individual
soul which is distinct from the pra;^a. A subsequent passage
also contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, viz.
' And as the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people
feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with

270 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

the other Sclfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious
Self (Kau. Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the
support of the pra//a, it may itself be called prawa. — We
thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers
either to the individual soul or to the chief vital air ; but
not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks
whatever.

To this we make the following reply. — The Lord only
can be the maker of the persons enumerated, on account
of the force of the introductory part of the section. Balaki
begins his colloquy with A^ata^-atru with the offer, ' Shall
I tell you Brahman ? ' Thereupon he enumerates some
individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on,
which participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman,
and in the end becomes silent. A^ata^^atru then sets aside
Balaki's doctrine as not referring to the chief Brahman —
with the w^ords, ' Vainly did you challenge me, saying, Shall
I tell you Brahman,' &c. — and proposes the maker of all
those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If
now that maker also were merely a soul participating in
the sight of the secondary Brahman, the introductory
statement which speaks of Brahman would be futile.
Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is meant. —
None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being
the maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely
independent. — Further, the clause ' of whom this is the
work ' docs not refer either to the activity of motion nor
to meritorious and non-meritorious actions ; for neither
of those two is the topic of discussion or has been men-
tioned previously. Nor can the term ' work ' denote the
enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned separ-
ately— in the clause, ' He who is the maker of those per-
sons' — and as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and
the singular number of the word karman, work) contradict
that assumption. Nor, again, can the term ' work ' denote
either the activity whose object the persons are, or the
result of that activity, since those two are already implied
in the mention of the agent (in the clause, ' He who is the
maker '). Thus there remains no other alternative than to

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 7. 27I

take the pronoun ' this ' (in ' He of whom this is the work ')
as denoting the perceptible world and to understand the
same world — as that which is made — by the term ' work.'
— We may indeed admit that the world also is not the
previous topic of discussion and has not been mentioned
before ; still, as no specification is mentioned, we conclude
that the term ' work ' has to be understood in a general
sense, and thus denotes what first presents itself to the
mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is, more-
over, not true that the world is not the previous topic of
discussion ; we are rather entitled to conclude from the cir-
cumstance that the various persons (in the sun, the moon,
&c.) which constitute a part of the world had been specially
mentioned before, that the passage in question is concerned
with the whole world in general. The conjunction 'or' (in
' or he of whom,' &c.} is meant to exclude the idea of limited
makership ; so that the whole passage has to be inter-
preted as follows, ' He who is the maker of those persons
forming a part of the world, or rather — to do away with
this limitation — he of whom this entire world without any
exception is the work.' The special mention made of the
persons having been created has for its purpose to show^
that those persons whom B&laki had proclaimed to be
Brahman are not Brahman. The passage therefore sets
forth the maker of the world in a double aspect, at first as
the creator of a special part of the world and thereupon as
the creator of the whole remaining part of the world ; a way
of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of ex-
pression as, ' The wandering mendicants are to be fed, and
then the Brahma;/as ^.' And that the maker of the world
is the highest Lord is afifirmed in all Vedanta-texts.

'c>^

17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of
the inferential marks of the individual soul and the
chief vital air ; we reply that that has already been
explained.

^ By the Brahmawas being meant all those Brahmawas who are
not at the same time wandering mendicants.

272 vedanta-sCtras.

It remains for us to refute the objection that on account
of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the
chief vital air, which are met with in the complementary-
passage, either the one or the other must be meant in the
passage under discussion, and not the highest Lord.^We
therefore remark that that objection has already been
disposed of under I, i, 31. There it was shown that from
an interpretation similar to the one here proposed by the
purvapakshin there would result a threefold meditation,
one having Brahman for its object, a second one directed
on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the
chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself
in our case, and that would be unacceptable as we must
infer from the introductory as well as the concluding
clauses, that the passage under discussion refers to Brah-
man. With reference to the introductory clause this has
been already proved ; that the concluding passage also
refers to Brahman, we infer from the fact of there being
stated in it a pre-eminently high reward, ' Warding off all
evil he who knov»'s this obtains pre-eminence among all
beings, sovereign t}'', supremacy,' — But if this is so, the
sense of the passage under discussion is already settled by
the discussion of the passage about Pratarda/za (I. i, 31);
why, then, the present Sutra ? — No, we reply ; the sense of
our passage is not yet settled, since under I, i, 31 it has
not been proved that the clause, ' Or he whose work is this,'
refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in con-
nexion with the present passage, a doubt whether the
individual soul and the chief vital air may not be meant,
and that doubt has again to be refuted. — -The word pra;/a
occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the passage,
' The mind settles down on pra;/a ' {KJi. Up. VI, 8, 2). —
The inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on
account of the introductory and concluding clauses referring
to Brahman, to be explained so as not to give rise to any
discrepancy.

18. But Caimini thinks that (the reference to the
individual soul) has another purport, on account of

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 18. 273

the question and answer ; and thus some also (read
in their text).

Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with
the individual soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of
the teacher 6^aimini, no matter for dispute, since the
reference to the individual soul has a different purport, i. e.
aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his opinion
on a question and a reply met with in the text. After
A^ataj-atru has taught Balaki, by waking the sleeping
man, that the soul is different from the vital air, he asks
the following question, ' Bal^ki, where did this person here
sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?'
This question clearly refers to something different from the
individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When
sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that
pra;/a alone ;' and, ' From that Self all pra;zas proceed, each
towards its place, from the pra«as the gods, from the gods
the worlds.' — Now it is the general Vedanta doctrine that
at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the
highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the
whole world proceeds, inclusive of pra«a, and so on. When
Scripture therefore represents as the object of knowledge
that in which there takes place the deep sleep of the soul,
characterised by absence of consciousness and utter tran-
quillity, i. e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions
which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul,
and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken ;
we understand that the highest Self is meant. — Moreover,
the Va^asaneyii'akha, which likewise contains the colloquy
of Balaki and A^ataj-atru, clearly refers to the individual
soul by means of the term, ' the person consisting of cog-
nition ' (vi^;7anamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest
Self (' Where was then the person consisting of cognition ?
and from whence did he thus come back?'B;-i. Up. II, i,
16) ; and later on, in the reply to the above question,
declares that ' the person consisting of cognition lies in the
ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word ' ether '
may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in
[34] T

2 74 VEDANTA-StjTKAS.

the passage about the small ether within the lotus of the
heart {Kh. Up. VIII, i, i). Further on the Br/. Up. says,
'All the Selfs came forth from that Self;' by which state-
ment of the coming forth of all the conditioned Selfs it
intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.
— The doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping
person^ viz. that the individual soul is different from the
vital air, furnishes at the same time a further argument
against the opinion that the passage under discussion refers
to the vital air.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the
highest Self) on account of the connected meaning
of the sentences.

We read in the B;'/liadara;^yaka, in the Maitreyi-brah-
ma;za the following passage, ' Verily, a husband is not dear
that you may love the husband, &c. &c. ; verily, everything
is not dear that you may love everything ; but that you
may love the Self therefore everything is dear. Verily, the
Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be
marked, O Maitreyi ! When the Self has been seen, heard,
perceived, and known, then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. IV,
5, 6). — Here the doubt arises whether that which is repre-
sented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is
the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest
Self. — But whence the doubt? — Because, we reply, the
Self is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such
as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it
appears that the passage refers to the individual soul ; and
because, on the other hand, the declaration that through the
knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points to
the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to
the individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial
statement. The text declares at the outset that all the
objects of enjoyment found in this world, such as husband,
wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of the Self, and
thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i. e. the

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 275

individual) Self is meant ; if thereupon it refers to the Self
as the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it
mean than the same individual Self ? — A subsequent passage
also (viz. 'Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited,
consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these
elements, and vanish again after them. When he has departed
there is no more knowledge '), which describes how the
great Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge,
from the elements, shows that the object of sight is no
other than the cognitional Self, i. e. the individual soul.
The concluding clause finally, ' How, O beloved, should he
know the knower?' shows, by means of the term ' knower,'
which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant.
The declaration that through the cognition of the Self
everything becomes known must therefore not be inter-
preted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that
the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its
relation to the enjoying soul.

To this we make the following reply. — The passage
makes a statement about the highest Self, on account of
the connected meaning of the entire section. If we consider
the different passages in their mutual connexion, we find
that they all refer to the highest Self. After Maitreyi has
heard from Ya^;7avalkya that there is no hope of immor-
tality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in
the words, ' What should I do with that by which I do not
become immortal ? What my Lord knoweth tell that to
me;' and thereupon Ya^;7avalkya expounds to her the
knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as Smr/ti
declares that immortality is not to be reached but through
the knowledge of the highest Self. — The statement further
that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes
known can be taken in its direct literal sense only if by the
Self we understand the highest cause. And to take it in a
non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin proposes) is inad-
missible, on account of the explanation given of that state-
ment in a subsequent passage, viz. ' Whosoever looks for
the Brahman class elsewhere than in the Self, is aban-
doned by the Brahman class.' Here it is said that who-

T 2

2 76 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

ever erroneously views this world with its Brahmans and so
on, as having an independent existence apart from the Self,
is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an
erroneous view ; whereby the view that there exists any
difference is refuted. And the immediately subsequent
clause, ' This everything is the Self,' gives us to understand
that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different
from the Self ; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes
of the drum and so on. — By explaining further that the
Self about which he had been speaking is the cause of the
universe of names, forms, and works (' There has been
breathed forth from this great Being what we have as Rig-
veda,' &c.) Ya^;Iavalkya again shows that it is the highest
Self. — To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in
the paragraph which treats of the natural centres of things,
that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the
objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside
nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge, —
•From all this it follows that what the text represents as the
object of sight and so on is the highest Self.

We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin
that the passage teaches the individual soul to be the
object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter,
denoted as something dear.

'a

20. (The circumstance of the soul being repre-
sented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfil-
ment of the promissory statement ; so A^marathya
thinks.

The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight
that Self which is denoted as something dear indicates
the fulfilment of the promise made in the passages,
' When the Self is known all this is known,' ' All this is
that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from
the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not
imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise
that through the knowledge of one thing everything is
to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial

I ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 21. _ 277

statement aims at representing the individual Self and the
highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling
the promise made. — This is the opinion of the teacher
Aj-marathya ^

21. (The initial statement Identifies the Individual
soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it
will depart (from the body) Is such (i. e. one with the
highest Self) ; thus Au^/uloml thinks.

The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact
with its different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and
mind (mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality
of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete
serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some
future time out of the body, to become one with the
highest Self; hence the initial statement in which it is
represented as non-different from the highest Self. This
is the opinion of the teacher Aurt'ulomi. — Thus Scrip-
ture says, ' That serene being arising from this body
appears in its own form as soon as it has approached
the highest light' {Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3).— In another
place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the
rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, 'As

^ The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows : As
the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the
fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire ; and, on the
other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because
in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor
from each other; so the individual souls also — which are effects
of Brahman — are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for
that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence ;
nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case
they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if
they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it
would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the
individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and some-
how non-different. — The technical name of the doctrine here
represented by Ajmarathya is bhedabhedavada.

278 VEDANTA-st!)TRAS.

the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their
name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and
form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great '
(Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). I. e. as the rivers losing the names and
forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual
soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes
united with the highest person. That the latter half of the
passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from
the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the
two members of the comparison \

2 2. (The initial statement is made) because (the
highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual
soul) ; so Ka^akmsna thinks.

Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the
individual soul, therefore, the teacher Kajakr/tsna thinks, the
initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference
of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which
appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahmawa-
passage, ' Let me enter into them with this living Self and
evolve names and forms,' and similar passages. We have
also mantras to the same effect, for instance, ' The wise one
who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits
calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7)^.

^ Bhamati : The individual soul is absolutely different from the

highest Self ; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting

adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different

from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means

of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and

become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad

thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when

difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa«/^aratrikas :

' Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the

highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer

different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of

difference.' — The technical name of the doctrine advocated by

Aufi?ulomi is satyabhedavada.

' Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under
I, I, II.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2. 279

And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the
other elements, it does not at the same time relate a sepa-
rate creation of the individual soul ; we have therefore no
right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self,
different from the latter. — In the opinion of the teacher
Kaj-akr/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the
individual soul, not anything else. Aj-marathya, although
meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different
from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression,
' On account of the fulfilment of the promise ' — which de-
clares a certain mutual dependence — that there does exist
a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest
Self and the individual soul \ The opinion of Au^ulomi
again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference
of the two depend on difference of condition ^. Of these
three opinions we conclude that the one held by Kaj-a-
kr/tsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what
all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, ' That
art thou ') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of
Kisakritsna immortality can be viewed as the result of
the knowledge of the soul ; while it would be impossible
to hold the same view if the soul were a modification
(product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its exist-
ence by being merged in its causal substance. For the
same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as
was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the
rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to
the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same
reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of
which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the
issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based
only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as
to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin's argu-
ments, viz. that the B;7hadara;/yaka passage represents as

^ And not the relation of absolute identity.

^ I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.

2 So VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares
that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of
these elements. 'There is an indication of the fulfilment
of the promise ; so A^ymarathya thinks.' The promise is
made in the two passages, ' When the Self is known, all this
is known,' and ' All this is that Self.' That the Self is every-
thing, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of
names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is
merged in one being ^ ; and by its being demonstrated, with
the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect
and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is,
then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great
Being rises, in the form of the individual soul,from out of these

A

elements ; thus the teacher Aj-marathya thinks. For if the
soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that
through the knowledge of one everything becomes known
is capable of fulfilment. — ' Because the soul when it will
depart is such ; thus Au^ulomi thinks.' The statement as
to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the
declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible,
because the soul when — after having purified itself by
knowledge, and so on — it will depart from the body, is
capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This
is Au^ulomi's opinion. — ' Because it exists in the con-
dition of the soul ; thus Kai^akr/tsna opines.' Because
the highest Self itself is that which appears as the indivi-
dual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the
two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher
Kai-akr/tsna.

But, an objection may be raised, the passage, ' Rising from
out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When
he has departed there is no more knowledge/ intimates the
final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest
Self! — By no means, we reply. The passage means to say

^ Upapaditaw ,^eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti jesha//. Upapa-
danaprakara/// su/tayati ckcti. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinai-
kaprasavalvam, )^atha sarvasam apam ityadina X-aikapralayatva;;/
sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.

I ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 2 2. 28 1

only that on the soul departing from the body all specific
cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For
an objection being raised — in the passage, ' Here thou hast
bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed
there is no more knowledge' — Scripture itself explains that
what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, 'I say nothing
that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable,
and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non-
connexion with the matras.' That means : The eternally
unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot
possibly perish ; but by means of true knowledge there is
effected its dissociation from the matris, i. e. the elements
and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience.
When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition,
which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can
be said, that ' When he has departed there is no more
knowledge.'

The third argument also of the piirvapakshin, viz. that
the word ' knower ' — which occurs in the concluding pas-
sage, ' Hovv^ should he know the knower? ' — denotes an agent,
and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of
sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Kaj-akr/tsna. —
Moreover, the text after having enumerated — in the passage,
' For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the
other,' &c. — all the kinds of specific cognition which belong
to the sphere of Nescience declares — in the subsequent
passage, ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he
see another?' — that in the sphere of true knowledge all
specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And,
again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence
of objects the knower might not know himself, Ya^v7avalkya
goes on, ' How, O beloved, should he know himself, the
knower?' As thus the latter passage evidently aims at
proving the absence of specific cognition, w^e have to con-
clude that the word ' knower ' is here used to denote that
being which is knowledge, i. e. the Self. — That the view of
Kajakr/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above.
And as it is so, all the adherents ofthe Vedanta must admit
that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not

282 vedanta-sOtras.

real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so
on, which are the product of name and form as presented
by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from
Scripture; compare, for instance, ' Being only, my dear, this
was in the beginning, one, without a second ' {KJi. Up. VI,
2, i) ; ' The Self is all this' [Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; ' Brahman
alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is
that Self (BW. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is no other seer but
he ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; ' There is nothing that sees but it '
(Brz. Up. Ill, H, 11). — It is likewise confirmed by Smr/ti ;
compare, for instance, ' V^sudeva is all this ' (Bha. Gi.
VII, 19); 'Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all
bodies' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 2) ; ' He who sees the highest Lord
abiding alike within all creatures' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 27).
— The same conclusion is supported by those passages
which deny all difference ; compare, for instance, ' If he
thinks, that is one and I another ; he does not know ' (Brz.
Up. I, 4, 10) ; ' From death to death he goes who sees here
any diversity' (B;x Up. IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those
passages which negative all change on the part of the Self;
compare, for instance, ' This great unborn Self, undecaying,
undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman ' (Brz. Up.
IV, 24). — Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were
not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in
the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be
no possibility of any matter being well settled ; while yet
the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to
be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks
of those, ' Who have well ascertained the object of the
knowledge of the Vedanta ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 6). Compare
also the passage, ' What trouble, what sorrow can there be
to him who has once beheld that unity?' (li-. Up. 7.) — And
Sm/'zti also represents the mind of him who contemplates
the Self as steady (Bha. Gi. II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self dififer
in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect know-
ledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two ; it
is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and
to maintain that the individual soul is different from the

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 23. 283

highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul.
For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but
it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows
Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the
cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some one cave (different
from the abode of the individual soul) ^. And that nobody
else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a
subsequent passage, viz. ' Having sent forth he entered into
it ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only
entered into the created beings. — Those who insist on the
distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose
themselves to the true sense of the Vedanta-texts, stand
thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door
to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be
something effected, and therefore non-eternal ^. (And if
they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is
eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound
logic.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on
account of (this view) not being in conflict with
the promissory statements and the illustrative in-
stances.

It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to
be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of
happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is
the cause of absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been
defined as that from which there proceed the origination,
sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this
definition comprises alike the relation of substantial caus-
ality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden
ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative

A A

^ So according to Go. An. and An. Gi., although their inter-
pretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the text.
— KaffzX:id evaikam iti ^ivasthanad any am ity artha//. Go. An. —
Givabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity artha^. An. Gi.

^ While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact
not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.

2 $4 vedanta-sOtras.

causality in which the potter and the goldsmith stand to
the things mentioned ; a doubt arises to which of these
two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.

The purvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is
the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture
declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection.
Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3 ; 4 : ' He reflected, he
created pra;/a.' For observation shows that the action of
operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is pre-
ceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some
activity is brought about by the concurrence of several
factors ^ It is therefore appropriate that we should view
the prime creator in the same light. The circumstance of
his being known as ' the Lord ' furnishes another argu-
ment. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are
known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also
must on that account be viewed as an operative cause
only. — Further, the efi"ect of the creator's activity, viz. this
world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and
impure ; we therefore must assume that its cause also is of
the same nature ; for it is a matter of general observation
that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman
does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many
scriptural passages, such as ' It is without parts, without
actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint ' (5ve. Up.
VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to
admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material
cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from
Smr/ti -, and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared
by Scripture^ to operative causality.

To this we make the following reply. — Brahman is to be
acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative
cause ; because this latter view does not conflict with the
promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The
promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one,

^ I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are
separate things.

^ Viz. the Sahkhya-smr;'ti.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 23. 285

' Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which
is not heard becomes heard ; that which is not perceived,
perceived ; that which is not known, known?' [Kh. Up. VI,
I, 3,) This passage intimates that through the cognition of
one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown,
becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is
possible through the cognition of the material cause, since
the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the
other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative
causes ; for we know from ordinary experience that the
carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has
built. — The illustrative example referred to is the one
mentioned {Kh. Up. VI, i, 4), 'My dear, as by one clod
of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification
(i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in
speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely ; ' which
passage again has reference to the material cause. The
text adds a few more illustrative instances of similar
nature, ' As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold
is known ; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of
iron is known." — Similar promissory statements are made
in other places also, for instance, ' What is that through
which if it is known everything else becomes known?' (Mu.
Up. I, I, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the
same place, 'As plants grow on the earth ' (I, i, 7). — Com-
pare also the promissory statement in Br/. Up. IV, 5? ^,
' When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and
know^n, then all this is known ;' and the illustrative instance
quoted (IV, 5, 8), ' Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten
cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when
the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.' — Similar
promissory statements and illustrative instances which are
to be found in all Vcdanta-texts are to be viewed as
proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material
cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage,
' That from whence (yata//) these beings are born,' has to
be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings,
according to the grammatical rule, Ykn. I, 4, 30. — That
Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the

286 VEDANTA-SC'TRAS.

world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that
there is no other guiding being. Ordinary material causes,
indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are
dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and
ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters
and goldsmiths ; but outside Brahman as material cause
there is no other operative cause to which the material cause
could look ; for Scripture says that previously to creation
Brahman was one without a second. — The absence of a
guiding principle other than the material cause can more-
over be established by means of the argument made use of
in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the promissory state-
ments and the illustrative examples. If there were ad-
mitted a guiding principle different from the material
cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known
through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements
as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified. — The
Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other
ruling principle, and the material cause because there is
no other substance from which the world could originate.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection
(on the part of the Self).

The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self
reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as
the material cause. Passages like ' He wished, may I be
many, may I grow forth,' and ' He thought, may I be many,
may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is
the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by
the Self's reflection ; and, in the second place, that it is the
material cause also, since the words ' May I be many '
intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has
the inward Self for its object.

25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and
the dissolution of the world) being directly de-
clared (to have Brahman for their material cause).

This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman's

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 26. 287

being the general material cause. — Brahman is the material
cause of the world for that reason also that the origination
as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken
of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material
cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether
and return into the ether' [Kh. Up. I, 9. i). That that
from which some other thing springs and into which it
returns is the material cause of that other thing is well
known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause
of rice, barley^ and the like. — The word ' directly ' (in the
Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that
all this sprang from the ether only. — Observ^ation further
teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else
but their material causes.

26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account
of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing
to modification.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that
Scripture — in the passage, ' That made itself its Self ' (Taitt.
Up. II, 7)— represents the Self as the object of action as
well as the agent. — But how can the Self which as agent
was in full existence previously to the action be made out to
be at the same time that which is effected by the action ? —
Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full
existence previously to the action, modifies itself into some-
thing special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that
causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by under-
going the process of modification, changed into their pro-
ducts.— The word 'itself in the passage quoted intimates
the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.

The word ' pari;z^mat ' (in the Sutra) may also be taken
as constituting a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of
which would be : Brahman is the material cause of the
world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks
of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect
as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, ' It became sat and
tyat. defined and undefined ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).

288 vedanta-sOtras.

27. And because Brahman is called the source.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it
is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare,
for instance, ' The maker, the Lord, the person who has his
source in Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, 3); and 'That which
the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, i,
6), For that the word ' source ' denotes the material cause
is well known from the use of ordinary language ; the
earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs.
In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but
merely place ; so, for instance, in the mantra, ' A yoni, O
Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' {Rik. Sawh.
I, 104, i). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source'
follows from a complementary passage, ' As the spider sends
forth and draws in its threads,' &c. — It is thus proved that
Brahman is the material cause of the world. — Of the ob-
jection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative
causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded
by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter
in hand is not one which can be known through inferential
reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it.
For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on
Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be
appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord'
who reflects before creation is at the same time the material
cause, we have already explained. The subject will, more-
over, be discussed more fully later on.

28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the
origin of the world which are opposed to the
Vedanta) are explained, are explained.

The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the
cause of the world has, in the Sutras beginning with I,
1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted.
The chief reason for the special attention given to that
doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages
w^hich, to people deficient in mental penetration, may
appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The

I ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 28. 289

doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta
doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference
of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by-
some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala,
and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special
trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine, without paying
much attention to the atomic and other theories. These
latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they
also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the
general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that
they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence
the Sutrak^ra formally extends, in the above Sutra, the
refutation already accomplished of the pradhana doctrine
to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in
detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine,
has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly,
not founded on any scriptural authority ; and are, secondly,
directly contradicted by various Vedic passages. — The
repetition of the phrase ' are explained ' is meant to in-
timate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.

[34]

SECOND ADHYAYA.

FIRST pAdA.

Reverence to the highest Self !

I. If it be objected that (from the doctrine ex-
pounded hitherto) there would result the fault of
there being- no room for (certain) Smmis ; we do
not admit that objection, because (from the rejection
of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want
of room for other Smr/tis.

It has been shown in the first adhyiya that the omniscient
Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the
same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of
golden ornaments ; that by his rulership he is the cause of
the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the
magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical
illusion ; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted
world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the
four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It
has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected
meaning of all the Ved^nta-texts, that the Lord is the Self
of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the pradhana, and
so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as
not being scriptural. — The purport of the second adhyaya,
which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the
doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on
Smnti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the
pradhana, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon,
and that the different Vedanta-texts do not contradict one
another with regard to the mode of creation and similar
topics. — The first point is to refute the objections based on
Smrtti.

Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 29 1

Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be main-
tained, ' because there results from it the fault of there
being no room for (certain) Smr/tis.' Such Sm;7tis are the
one called Tantra which was composed by a rtsh'i and
is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Smr/tis
based on it^; for all of which there would be no room if
your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For
they all teach that the non-intelligent pradhana is the
independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a
raison d'etre) for Smr/tis like the Manu-smrzti, which
give information about matters connected with the whole
body of religious duty, characterised by injunction^ and
comprising the agnihotra and similar performances. They
tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the
different castes are to be initiated ; how the Veda has to be
studied ; in what way the cessation of study has to take
place ; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They
further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to
man, of the four castes and dj-ramas^. The Kipila Smr/ti,
on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with
things to be done, but were composed with exclusive refer-
ence to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If
then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they
would be altogether purposeless ; and hence we must explain
the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them
into conflict with the Smrztis mentioned'*. — But how, some-
body may ask the purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of
there being left no room for certain Smr/tis be used as an
objection against that sense of 5ruti which — from various

* The Smn'ti called Tantra is the Sahkhya^'astra as taught by
Kapila ; the Smr/ti-writers depending on him are Asuri, Pa«/^ajikha,
and others.

^ Wimawsa Su. I, i, 2 : y^odanalakshawo^rtho dharma/^. Com-
mentary : X'odana iti kriyaya/z pravartaka/// vaX'anam ahu//.

' Purushartha ; in opposition to the rules referred to in the
preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according
to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.

* It having been decided by the Purva Mimawsa already that
Smr/tis contradicted by 6'ruti are to be disregarded.

U 2

292 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

reasons as detailed under I, i and ff. — has been ascertained
by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman
alone is the cause of the world? — Our objection, the pur-
vapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons
of independent thought ; but as most men depend in their
reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by them-
selves the sense of ^ruti, they naturally rely on Smrztis,
composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the
sense of Svuti with their assistance ; while, owing to their
esteem for the authors of the Smrztis, they have no trust in
our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila
Sm;7ti declares to have been r/shi-like and unobstructed,
and moreover there is the following vSruti-passage, ' It is he
who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the
r/shi, kapila ^, whom he wishes to look on while he is born '
(Sve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed
to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their
position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and
we must therefore attempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in
conformity with the Smr/tis.

This objection we dispose of by the remark, ' It is not so
because therefrom would result the fault of want of room
for other Smr/tis.' — If you object to the doctrine of the Lord
being the cause of the world on the ground that it would
render certain Smr/tis purposeless, you thereby render
purposeless other Smrz'tis which declare themselves in
favour of the said doctrine. These latter Smr/ti-texts we
will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest
Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, ' That
which is subtle and not to be known ;' the text then goes
on, ' That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,'
and after that remarks ' From that sprang the Unevolved,
consisting of the three gu/^as, O best of Brahma;/as.'
And in another place it is said that ' the Unevolved is

' On the meaning of ' kapila ' in the above passage, compare the
Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Miiller, vol. ii,
p. xxxviii ff. — As will be seen later on, ^Sahkara, in this bhashya,
takes the Kapila referred to to be some n'shl

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I, 293

dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O JBrah-
ma;/a.' — Thus we read also in the Pura/^a, ' Hear thence
this short statement : The ancient Ndriya;/a is all this ;
he produces the creation at the due time, and at the
time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so
in the Bhagavadgit^ also (VH, 6), ' I am the origin and
the place of reabsorption of the whole world.' And

A

Apastamba too says with reference to the highest Self,
' From him spring all bodies ; he is the primary cause,
he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8,
23, 2). In this way Sm;7ti, in many places, declares the
Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause
of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes us on the
ground of Sm;-/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Smr/ti
only ; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Nov/
it has been shown already that the 6"ruti-texts aim at con-
veying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and
as wherever different Sm;7tis conflict those maintaining one
view must be accepted, while those which maintain the
opposite view must be set aside, those Smrz'tis which follow
vSruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others
are to be disregarded ; according to the Sutra met with in
the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3,
3), ' Where there is contradiction (between .S"ruti and Smrz'ti)
(Sm/Vti) is to be disregarded ; in case of there being no
(contradiction) (Smrz'ti is to be recognised) as there is infer-
ence (of Smr/ti being founded on ^Sruti).' — Nor can we assume
that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters
without ^ruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such per-
ception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception
may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who
possessed supernatural powers, and consequently unob-
structed power of cognition. For the possession of super-
natural powers itself depends on the performance of religious
duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by
injunction ^ ; hence the sense of injunctions (i. e. of the Veda)

^ I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages
of the Veda.

294 vedanta-sOtras.

which is estabHshed first must not be fancifully interpreted
in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made
perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) after-
wards only. Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were
accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are
many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases
where the Smrztis contradict each other in the manner
described, no other means of final decision than an appeal
to ^ruti. — As to men destitute of the power of inde-
pendent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that
they will without any reason attach themselves to some
particular Smrz'ti ; for if men's inclinations were so alto-
gether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the
multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We
must therefore try to lead their judgment in the
right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the
Smr/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them
following 5rutl and others not. — The scriptural passage
which the purvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence
of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in
such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary
to Scripture ; for that passage mentions the bare name of
Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and w^e
meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who
burned the sons of Sasi^ara and had the surname Vasudeva.

o

That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the
establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on
that account no force to prove what is not proved by any
other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's know-
ledge.) On the other hand, we have a ^Sruti -passage which
proclaims the excellence of Manu^, viz. 'Whatever Manu
said is medicine ' (Taitt. Sa;;/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself,
where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything
(' he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings
in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-

' After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not
mentioned in ^ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is
mentioned there.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2. 295

luminousness,' i. e. becomes Brahman, Manu Smr/ti XII,
91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila,
by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the
doctrine of there being one universal Self, In the Maha-
bharata also the question is raised whether there are many
persons (souls) or one ; thereupon the opinion of others is
mentioned, ' There are many persons, O King, according to
the Sahkhya and Yoga philosophers ;' that opinion is contro-
verted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,)
for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal
person raised by his quaHties;' and, finally, it is declared
that there is one universal Self, ' He is the internal Self of
me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal
witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the
all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one
moves through all beings according to his will and
liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one
universal Self, ' When to a man who understands the Self
has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can
there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (Is. Up.
7) ; and other similar passages. All which proves that the
system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of
Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality
of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent
pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard
to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just
as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge
of form and colour ; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on
the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it
depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not
immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and
tradition.

Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine)
is want of room for certain Smr/tis, with regard to matters
contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection. —
An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the
following Sutra.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the

* _ _ A.

296 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according
to the Saiikh)a system).

The principles different from the pradhana, but to be
viewed as its modifications which the (Sahkhya) Smn'ti
assumes, as. for instance, the great principle, are perceived
neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things
of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which
are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience,
may be referred to in Smr/ti ; but with regard to things which,
like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda
nor from experience — no more than, for instance, the objects
of a sixth sense — Smrz'ti is altogether impossible. That some
scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things
as the great principle have in reality quite a different
meaning has already been shown under I, 4, t. But if
that part of Smr/ti which is concerned with the effects
(i. c, the great principle, and so on) is without authority,
the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be
so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say. — We
have thus established a second reason, proving that the
circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smrztis
does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine. — The
weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring
the Sankhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, i,
4ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Smmi) is refuted.

This Siitra extends the application of the preceding argu-
mentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the
Sankhya-smr/ti the Yoga-smWti also is to be considered
as refuted ; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to
Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world,
and the ' great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither
the Veda nor common experience favour these views. — But,
if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter
system is already disposed of by the previous arguments ;
of what use then is it formally to extend them to the
Yoga? (as the Sutra does.) — Wc reply that here an ad-

II ADHYAVA, I PADA, 3. 297

ditional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga
being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect
knowledge ; so, for instance, Br/. Up. II, 4, 5, ' (The Self) is
to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon ^' In
the 6"vetaj-vatara Upanishad, moreover, wc find various in-
junctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption
of different positions of the body, &c. ; so, for instance,
' Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).
Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which
(without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for
instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of
the senses, is what is called Yoga ; ' ' Having received this
knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6,
18) ; and so on. And in the Yoga-j-astra itself the passage,
'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c.
defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge.
As thus one topic of the j-astra at least (viz. the practice
of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-
smr/ti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just
as the Sm/'/'ti referring to the ash/akas -. — To this we reply
that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments
primarily directed against the Sankhya) has the purpose
of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines ;
for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/v'ti being authoritative,
the disagreement (between Smrz'ti and .Sruti) on other topics
remains as shown above. — Although ^ there are many
Smr/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refu-
tation the Sankhya and Yoga because they are widely
known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest

' In uhich passage the phrase ' to be meditated upon ' (nidi-
dhyasa) indicates the act of mental concentration cliaracterislic of
the Yoga.

* The ash/akas (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days
after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and jii'ira) furnish the
stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that Smrz'ti
is authoritative in so far as it is based on ^ruti.

' But why — it will be asked — do you apj^ly yourself to the
refutation of the Sankhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of
other Sm/7tis conflicting with the Vedanta views ?

^

298 vedanta-sOtras.

end of man and have found favour with many competent
persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a
Vedic passage referring to them, ' He who has known
that cause which is to be apprehended by Sdnkhya and
Yoga he is freed from all fetters ' (5ve. Up. VI, 13). (The
claims which on the ground of this last passage might be
set up for the Saiikhya and Yoga-smr/tis in their entirety)
we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the
highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the know-
ledge of the S^iikhya-smr/ti irrespective of the Veda, nor
by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares
that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beati-
tude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is
conveyed by the Veda, ' Over death passes only the man
who knows him; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up.
Ill, 8). And the Sdrikhya and Yoga-systems maintain
duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the
passage quoted (' That cause which is to be apprehended
by Sdnkhya and Yoga ') the terms ' Saiikhya ' and ' Yoga '
denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from
proximity^. We wiUingly allow room for those portions
of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In
their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all
qualities the Sahkhyas are in harmony with the Veda
which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure ;
cp. Brz. Up. IV, 3, 16, ' For that person is not attached to
anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the con-
dition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that
state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known
from scriptural passages such as the following one, ' Then
the parivri^aka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven,
without any possessions,' &c. (Cabala Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims
of all argumentative Smr/tis. If it be said that those
Smrztis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cogni-
tion of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain

^ I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage
standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.

II ADIIYAYA, I PADA, 4. 299

all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedinta-
texts only ; as is stated by scriptural passages such as
' None who does not know the Veda perceives that great
one' (Taitt. Br. Ill, 13, 9, 7) ; 'I now ask thee that person
taught in the Upanishads ' (Brz. Up. HI, 9, 26); and others.

4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world)
on account of the difference of character of that,
(viz. the world) ; and its being such, (i.e. different
from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

The objections, founded on Smrt'tl, against the doctrine
of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of
this world have been refuted ; we now proceed to refute
those founded on Reasoning. — But (to raise an objection at
the outset) how is there room for objections founded on
Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been
settled ? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered
absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well
as with regard to religious duty (dharma). — (To this the
purvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and
dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be
known through the holy texts only, and could not be ap-
proached by the other means of right knowledge also.
In the case of religious duties, i. e. things to be done, we
indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are
concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing
thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room
for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance,
the case of earth and the other elements shows. And
just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages
we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them
accord with one, so .Sruti, if in conflict with other means
of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with
the latter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer
something not actually perceived in consequence of its
having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually
perceived, stands nearer to perception than vSruti which
conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge

o

OO VEDANTA-stTRAS.

of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final
release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition —
sakshatkara — of Brahman), and as such must be assumed
to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma) ^
Moreover, the scriptural passage, ' He is to be heard, to
be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and
thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to
with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on
Reasoning is set forth, ' Not so, on account of the difference
of nature of this (effect).' — The Vedantlc opinion that the
intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world
is untenable because the effect would in that case be of
an altogether different character from the cause. For
this world, which the Vedantin considers as the effect
of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and im-
pure, consequently different in character from Brahman ;
and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be
of a character diff"erent from the world, viz. intelligent
and pure. But things of an altogether different character
cannot stand to each other in the relation of material
cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden orna-
ments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is

^ The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava ;
hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely con-
nected with anubhava than -Sruti is, we have the right to apply
reasoning to ^ruti. — Ananda Giri comments on the passage from
anubhavavasanam as follows : brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopa-
yataya pradhanyat tatra jabdad api parokshagO/^arad aparokshar-
thasadharmyagoy^aras tarko^ntarahgam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity
artha/^. Aitihyamatre«a pravadaparamparyamatre?za parokshatayeti
yavat. Anubhavas}a pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn an-
tarahgatvad agamasya lex bahirahgatvad antarahgabahirahgayor
antarahgaz?/ balavad ity nyayad uktawz tarkasya balavattvam.
Anubhavapradhanyaw tu nadyapi siddham ity a^ahkyahanubhaveti.
Nanu Brahma^^;7ana»i vaidikatvad dliarmavad adr/sh/aphalam
esh/avyaw tat kuto ^syanubhavavasanavidyanivariakatvaw talraha
moksheti. Adhish///anasakshatkarasya j-uktyadi^wane tadavidyatat-
karyanivartakatvadrzsh/e/z, brahma^Mnasyapi tarkavaxad asambha-
vanadinirasadvara sakshatkaravasayinas tadavidyadinivartakatve-
naiva muktihetuteti nadrzsh/aphalatety artha^.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 3OI

gold the material cause of earthen vessels ; but effects of
an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the
nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world,
which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and
dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-in-
telligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness ; but
not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character.
The difference in character of this world from Brahman
must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want
of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made
up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight,
grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself
abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on.
It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand
to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency,
being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of
subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on
the basis of equality ; two lamps, for instance, cannot be
said to be subservient to each other (both being equally
luminous). — But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument
also might be subservient to the enjoying soul ; just as
an intelligent servant is subservient to his master. —
This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the
case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent
element in the former is subservient to the intelligent
master. For a being endowed wuth intelligence subserves
another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part
belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c. ;
while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for
nor against any other being. For the Sankhyas are of
opinion that the intelligent beings (i. e. the souls) are in-
capable of either taking in or giving out anything^, and
are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of in-
telligence can be an instrument. Nor^ is there anything

^ Niratijaya>^, upa^anapayadharmajun}atva;7i nirati.s-ayatvam.
An. Gi.

^ A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world,
as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be
intelligent.

302 VEDANTA-SC'TRAS.

to show that things Hke pieces of wood and clods of earth
are of an intelHgent nature ; on the contrary, the dichotomy
of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and
such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world
therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from
which it is altogether different in character. — Here some-
body might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this
world has originated from an intelligent cause ; therefore,
starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause
survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be in-
telligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence
(in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of
the modification ^. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do
not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep,
swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is
not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this
difference produced by the manifestation and non-mani-
festation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on
the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and
in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in
the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the
instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to
the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing,
although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature.
And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the
like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the
relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally
they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of
earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, with-
out there being done any violence to the well-known
distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent). — This
reasoning — the purvapakshin replies — if valid might remove
to a certain extent that difference of character between

' In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent,
intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that
account remains unperceived ; samaste ^agati sato^pi /^aitanyasya
tatra tatranta^karawapariz/amanuparagad anupalabdhir aviruddha.
An. Gi.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 303

Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance
of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent ;
there would, however, still remain that other difference which
results from the fact that the one is pure and the other
impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector
does not even remove the first-named difference ; as is
declared in the latter part of the Sutra, ' And its being such
we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the in-
tellectuality of the entire world — which is supported neither
by perception nor by inference, &c. — must be considered
as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks
of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause ;
but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other
texts which declare the world to be ' of such a nature,'
i. e. of a nature different from that of its material cause.
For the scriptural passage, ' It became that which is know-
ledge and that which is devoid of knowledge ' (Taitt. Up.
II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a
non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intel-
ligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman. — But —
somebody might again object — the sacred texts themselves
sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs,
which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence,
as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance,
attribute intelligence to the elements. ' The earth spoke ; '
'The waters spoke' {Sa.t. Br. VI, i, 3, 2; 4); and, again,
' Fire thought ; ' ' Water thought ' {K/i. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4).
Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs,
' These pra;/as when quarrelling together as to who was the
best went to Brahman' {Bri. Up. VI, i, 7); and, again,
' They said to Speech : Do thou sing out for us ' (Brz. Up.
I, 3, 2). — To this objection the purvapakshin replies in the
following Sutra.

5. But (there takes place) denotation of the super-
intending (deities), on account of the difference and
the connexion.

The word ' but ' discards the doubt raised. We are

304 vedanta-sOtras.

not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and
the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such
passages as ' the earth spoke,' &c. because ' there takes
place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of
actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require
intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere
material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent
divinities which preside over earth, Src, on the one hand,
and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so.-* 'On
account of the difference and the connexion.' The
difference is the one previously referred to between the
enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements
and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the
distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings ;
that difference would not be possible if all beings were
intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of
the dispute of the prawas make express use of the word
'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material
organs being meant, and in order to include the super-
intending intelligent beings. They say, ' The deities con-
tending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'AH
these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra«a '
(Kau. Up. II, 14). — And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas,
Itihasas, Pura«as, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding
divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such
scriptural passages as ' Agni having become Speech entered
into the mouth' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each
bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity.
And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the
pra;/as we read in one place how, for the purpose of
settling their relative excellence, they went to Pra^'-apati,
and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence
and absence, each of them, as Pra^apati had advised, de-
parting from the body for some time (' They went to their
father Pra^apati and said,' &c. ; Kh. Up. V, i, 7); and in
another place it is said that they made an offering to pr^«a
(Br/. Up. VI, I, 13), &c. ; all of them proceedings which are
analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen
the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 305

deities. In the case of such passages as, ' Fire thought,'
we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of
the highest deity which is connected with its effects as
a superintending principle. — From all this it follows that
this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence
cannot have it for its material cause.

To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next
Sutra replies.

6. But it is seen.

The word ' but ' discards the purvapaksha.

Your assertion that this world cannot have originated
from Brahman on account of the difference of its character
is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see
that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-
intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that,
on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter,
such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are pro-
duced.—But — to state an objection — the real cause of the
non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is
itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of
scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung. — Even
thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character
(between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect,
for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some
non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an
intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other
non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the
difference of nature — due to the cause passing over
into the effect — between the bodies of men on the one
side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account
of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable
after all. The same remark holds good with regard to
cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, Src. If absolute
equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being
the effect of another), the relation of material cause and
effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)
would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the
case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and
[34] X

3o6 vedanta-sCtras.

cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which
is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality
of being of an earthy nature ; we reply that in the case of
Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz.
that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are
the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause). —
He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the
attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman
being the cause of the world, must assert that he under-
stands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence
(in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics
of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)
characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic
of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the
negation of the relation of cause and effect in general,
which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect
something over and above the cause (for if the two were
absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The
second assertion is open to the charge of running counter
to what is well known ; for, as we have already remarked,
the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to
Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the
third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting ;
for what instances could be brought forward against the
upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not
to be an effect of Brahman ? (The upholder of Brahman
would simply not admit any such instances) because he
maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman
for its material cause. And that all such assertions are
contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it
to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause
and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained
by the purvapakshin that the other means of proof also
(and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on
account of its being an accomplished entity (not something
to be accomplished as religious duties are) ; but such an
assertion is entirely gratuitous. I"or Brahman, as being
devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 307

perception ; and as there are in its case no characteristic
marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference
also and the other means of proof do not apply to it ; but,
like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground
of holy tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, ' That
doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is
declared by another then, O dearest ! it is easy to under-
stand ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, ' Who in truth knows
it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation
sprang?' (Rtg-v. Sawh. X, i 39, 6.) These two mantras show
that the cause of this world is not to be known even by
divine beings (uvara) ^ of extraordinary power and wisdom.
There are also the following Smrz'ti passages to the same
effect : ' Do not apply reasoning to those things which are
uncognisable '' ; ' ' Unevolved he is called, uncognisable,
unchangeable ; ' ' Not the legions of the gods know my
origin, not the great rz'shis. For I myself am in every way
the origin of the gods and great r/shis ' (Bha. Gi. X, 2).
— And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural
passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to
mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating of Brahman)
shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we
reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken
as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be
understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary
of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type
we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions ;
that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude
each other the Self is not connected with those states ;
that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the
phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that
whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being
apart from the phenomenal world ; that as the world
springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from Brahman,

^ On ijvara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69,
note 41.

^ The line ' prakn'tibhya/^ param,' &c. is wanting in all ]\ISS.
I have consulted.

X 2

;oS VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

according to the principle of the non-difference of cause
and effect, &c.^ The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will
moreover be demonstrated later on (II, i, ii). — He'-^, more-
over, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition
about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this
entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room
for the other scriptural passage quoted above (' He became
knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge ') which
teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for
he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being
sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His
antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sankhya), would not
be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly
teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the
entire world.

If, then, on account of difference of character that which
is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent,
that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the
non-intelligent pradhana of the Sankhyas) cannot pass over
into what is intelligent. — (So much for argument's sake.)
but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference
of character has already been refuted, we must assume an
intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.

' Ananda Girl on the above passage : jrutyakankshitawz tarkam
eva mananavidhivishayam udaharali svapnanteti. Svapnao-agaritayor
mithov)abhi>^arad atmana/i svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha-
dvayena tasya svato ^ sawpr/ktatvam ato ^ivasyavasthavatvena
nabrahmatvam ity artha/i. Tathapi dehaditadatmyenatmano bhavan
na ni//pra})afi/^abrahmatety ajahkyaha sa»/prasade ^eti. Sata somya
tada sa?;/panno bhavatiti .rrute>^ sushupte ni/zprapaw>^asadatmatvava-
gamad aunanas talhavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha/^. Dvaita-
grahipratyakshadivirodhat katham atmano^dvitiyabrahmatvam ity
ajahkya ta^^atvadihetuna brahmaiiriklavastvabhavasiddher adhya-
kshadinam atatvavedakapramawyad avirodhad yuktam atmano
advitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapail/fasyeti.

* Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a
vailakshawya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire
whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an
intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 309

7. If (it is' said that the effect is) non-existent
(before its origination) ; we do not allow that
because it is a mere negation (without an object).

If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of
qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the
cause of an effect which is of an opposite nature, i.e.
non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound,
&c., it follows that the effect has to be considered as
non-existing before its actual origination. But this con-
sequence cannot be acceptable to you — the Vedantin —
who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the
cause already.

This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force,
on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative
the existence of the effect previous to its actual origina-
tion, your negation is a mere negation without an object to
be negatived. The negation (implied in ' non-existent ')
can certainly not have for its object the existence of the
effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be
viewed as ' existent,' through and in the Self of the cause,
before its origination as well as after it ; for at the present
moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart
from the cause ; according to such scriptural passages as.
' Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self
is abandoned by everything' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6). In so
far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self
of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual be-
ginning of the effect (as after it). — But Brahman, which is
devoid of qualities such as sound, &c., is the cause of this
world (possessing all those qualities) ! — True, but the effect
with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the
cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the
effect) ; hence it cannot be said that (according to our
doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual begin-
ning.— This point will be elucidated in detail in the section
treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.

8. On account of such consequences at the time

3IO VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

of reabsorptlon (the doctrine maintained hitherto)
is objectionable.

The piirvapaksbin raises further objections. — If an effect
Avhich is distinguished by the quahties of grossness, con-
sisting of parts, absence of intelhgence, Hmitation, impurity,
&c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows
that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brah-
man), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division
from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As
therefore — on your doctrine — the cause (i. e. Brahman) as
well as the effect is, at the time of reabsorption, character-
ised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the
Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is
the cause of the world, cannot be upheld. — Another ob-
jection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all
distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the
state of non-distinction there would be no special causes
left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and con-
sequently the new world could not arise with all the
distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so
on (which are actually observed to exist). — A third ob-
jection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even
after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes
of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter
into the state of non-difference from the highest Brahman,
we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which
have obtained final release again appear in the new world. —
If you finally say, ' Well, let this world remain distinct from
the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we
reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place
at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate
from the cause is not possible. — For all these reasons the
Vedanta doctrine is objectionable.

To this the next Sutra replies.

9. Not so ; as there are parallel instances.

There is nothing objectionable in our system. — The
objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 3II

cause would inquinate the latter with its quaHties does not
damage our position ' because there are parallel instances,'
i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating
with their qualities the causes into which they are re-
absorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots,
&:c., which in their state of separate existence are of various
descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their
original matter (i. e. clay), impart to the latter their in-
dividual qualities ; nor do golden ornaments impart their
individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold,
into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the
fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from
earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re-
absorption. You (i. e. the purvapakshin), on the other hand,
have not any instances to quote in your favour. For re-
absorption could not take place at all if the effect when
passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist
there with all its individual properties. And ^ that in spite
of the non-difference of cause and effect the effect has its
Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point
which we shall render clear later on, under II, i, 14.

Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its
qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formu-
lated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect
being admitted, the same would take place during the time
of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption).
That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the
world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time
(not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many
scriptural passages, as, for instance, ' This everything is that
Self (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' The Self is all this ' [K/i. Up.
VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is this before' (Mu.
Up. II, 2, ] i) ; 'All this is Brahman ' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, i).

With regard to the case referred to in the vS"ruti-passages
we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the

^ Nanu pralayakale karyadharmaj X'en navatishZ/^eran na tarhi
kara?/adhanna api tish/Zzeyus tayor abhedat tatrahananyatveipili.
An. Gi.

-; T 2 vedanta-sOtras.

effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the
mere fallacious supcrimpositions of nescience, and the very
same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption
also. — We can quote other examples in favour of our
doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by
the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is un-
real, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-
illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by
the illusory visions of his dream because they do not
accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless
sleep ; so the one permanent witness of the three states
(viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of
the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is
not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For
that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere
illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the
rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point
teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedanta have
made the following declaration, 'When the individual soul
which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless
Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dream-
less non-duality' (Gau</ap. Kar. I, 16).

So far we have shown that — on our doctrine — there is no
danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorp-
tion by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the
like. — With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we
assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption)
into the state of non-distinction there would be no special
reason for the origin of a new world affected with dis-
tinctions, we likewise refer to the ' existence of parallel
instances.' For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep
and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an
essential condition of non-distinction ; nevertheless, wrong
knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of
distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes
from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage,
' All these creatures when they have become merged in
the True, know not that they are merged in the True.
Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, lO. 3 1

1

wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a
musquito, that they become again ' i^KJi. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3).
For just as during the subsistence of the world the phe-
nomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong
knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream,
although there is only one highest Self devoid of all dis-
tinction ; so, we conclude, there remains, even after re-
absorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction)
founded on wrong knowledge. — Herewith the objection
that — according to our doctrine — even the finally released
souls would be born again is already disposed of. They
will not be born again because in their case wrong know-
ledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.
- — The last alternative finally (which the purvapakshin had
represented as open to the Vedantin), viz. that even at the
time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from
Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the
Vedantins themselves. — Hence the system founded on the
Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.

10. And because the objections (raised by the
Saiikhya against the Vedanta doctrine) apply to his
view also.

The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same
objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following
manner. — The objection that this world cannot have
sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of
character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana
being the cause of the world ; for that doctrine also assumes
that from a pradhana devoid of sound and other qualities a
world is produced which possesses those very qualities.
The beginning of an effect different in character being thus
admitted, the Saiikhya is equally driven to the doctrine
that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent.
And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sankhya also)
that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into
the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of
the Saiikhya here also is the same as ours. — And, further, if

314 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

(as the Sankhya also must admit) at the thne of reabsorp-
tion the differences of all the special effects are obliterated
and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special
fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the
causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can,
at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined,
there being no cause for them ; and if you assume them to
be determined without a cause, you are driven to the
admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a
state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in
the case of the released and the non-released souls). And
if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the
time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into
the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in
that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the
pradh^na^. — It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised
by the Sankhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore
be urged against either only. But as either of the two
doctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened
— by the outcome of the above discussion — in the opinion
that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties ''.

1 1. If it be said that, In consequence of the ill-
foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our con-
clusions otherwise ; (we reply that) thus also there
would result non-release.

In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is
not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the
thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which
disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion
only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,
which some clever men had excogitated with great pains,
are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and
how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn

' For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such be
reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.

^ And tliat the Vedanta view is preferable because the nullity of
the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, II. 315

by Other men ; so that, on account of the diversity of men's
opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having
a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by
accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of
recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or any-
body else ; since we observe that even men of the most
undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka;/ada, and
other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted
one another.

But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will
fashion our reasoning otherwise, i. e. in such a manner as
not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foun-
dation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning
whatever is well-founded ; for you yourself can found your
assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only;
your assumption being that because some arguments are seen
to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to
the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover,
if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical
human life would have to come to an end. For we see that
men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding
pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the
present, and the future are uniform. — Further, in the case of
passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other,
the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a
preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected
only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences,
and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also
expresses himself: ' Perception, inference, and the j^stra
according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known
well by one desiring clearness in regard to right. — He who
applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda
and the (Smrz'ti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the
law' (Manu Smrzti XII, 105, 106). And that ' want of
foundation,' to which you object, really constitutes the beauty
of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjection-
able arguments by means of the previous refutation of
objectionable arguments ^ (No fear that because the

^ The whole style of argumentation of the Mimawsa would be

1 6 vedanta-sOtras.

purvapaksha is ill-founded tlic siddhrmta should be ill-
founded too ;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that
a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.
— For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be
used as an argument against reasoning.

Against this argumentation we remark that thus also
there results ' want of release.' For although with regard
to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded,
with regard to the matter in hand there will result ' want of
release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill-
foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world
on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of
its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the
help of the holy texts ; for, as already remarked, it cannot
become the object of perception, because it does not possess
qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of
characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and
the other means of right knowledge. — Or else (if we adopt
another explanation of the word ' avimoksha ') all those who
teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results
from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the cha-
racteristic mark of uniformit}', because it depends on accom-
plished actually existing things ; for whatever thing is
permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged
to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about
such is called perfect knowledge ; as, for instance, the
knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now,
it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual
conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions
founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known ; for
we continually observe that what one logician endeavours
to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another,
who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore
can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose
object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect
knowledge? — Nor can it be said that he who maintains the

impossible, if all reasoning were sound ; for then no purvapaksha
view could be maintained.

11 ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 317

pradhana to be the cause of the world (i. e. the Saiikhya) is
the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philoso-
phers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect
knowledge. — Nor can we collect at a given moment and on
a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future
time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion
regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect
knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal
and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for
its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection
of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be
denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future.
We have thus established the perfection of this our know-
ledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from
it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead
to ' absence of final release ' of the transmigrating souls.
Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scrip-
ture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelli-
gent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance
of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not
accepted by competent persons are explained.

Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the
Vedanta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand
on the doctrine of the pradhana being the cause of the world ;
(which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands
near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty
arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by
some authorities who follow the Veda. — But now some dull-
witted persons might think that another objeclion founded
on reasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz, on the
ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore,
extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former,
considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous
adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already
virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance,
the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by

3 1 S ved.Lnta-sCtras.

either Manu or Vy^isa or other authorities, are to be con-
sidered as ' explained,' i. e. refuted by the same reasons
which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine. As
the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same,
there is no room for further doubt. Such common argu-
ments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth
of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness
of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even
in case of the conclusions being shaped ' otherwise ' (see the
preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning,
and so on.

13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the
objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer
(and vice versa) there would result non-distinction
(of the two) ; we reply that (such distinction) may exist
(nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against
the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world. —
Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own
special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of
Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense
in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its
grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras
and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a
secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered
impossible by other means of right knowledge^). Ana-
logously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its
legitimate sphere ; so, for instance, in the case of religious
duty and its opposite^. — Hence Scripture cannot be acknow-
ledged to refute what is settled by other means of right
knowledge. And if you ask, ' Where does Scripture oppose
itself to what is thus established?' we give you the fol-

^ The following arthavada-passage, for instance, ' the sacrificial
post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense ; because
perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal

meaning.

2 Which are to be known from the Veda only.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, IT,. 319

lowing instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects
of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the
enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and
the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance,
is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoy-
ment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to
non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object
of enjoyment, and vice versa. Now this passing over of
one thing into another would actually result from the doc-
trine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the
sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable,
not only with regard to the present time when that distinc-
tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past
and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of
Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it
would lead to the sublation of the well-established dis-
tinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.

To the preceding objection w^e reply, ' It may exist as in
ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the dis-
tinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with
analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam,
bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they
really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes
in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of
conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different
from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over
into each other ; and, again, although they do not pass
over into each other, still they are not different from the
sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The
enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over
into each other, and yet they are not different from the
highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really
an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself,
in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer
(according to the passage. ' Having created he entered into
it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its
effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of
the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal
ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting

VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers
and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-
different from Brahman, Iheir highest cause, as the analogous
instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.

14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and
effect) results from such terms as ' origin ' and the
like.

The^ refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set
forth on the condition of the practical distinction of en-
joyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In
reality, however, that distinction does not exist because
there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause
and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of
ether and so on ; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of
the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different
from the cause, i. e. has no existence apart from the cause. —
How so? — ' On account of the scriptural word " origin " and
others.' The word ' origin ' is used in connexion with a
simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the
knowledge of one thing everything is known ; viz. KJt. Up.
VI, I, 4, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made
of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect ; the thing
made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin
in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely ; thus,'
&c. — The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known
a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay^,
there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay,
such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in
having clay for their true nature. For these modifications
or effects are names only, exist through or originate
from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing
as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual
effects distinguished by names) they are untrue ; in so far

^ Pari;/amavadam avalambyapatato virodhaw/ samadhaya vivar-
tavadam airitya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.

"^ Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramarthato
vi^watam iti sambandha//.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I4. 32!

as they are clay they are true. — This parallel instance is given
with reference to Brahman ; applying the phrase ' having its
origin in speech ' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted
we understand that the entire body of efifects has no existence
apart from Brahman. — Later on again the text,, after having
declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman,
maintains that the effects of these three elements have no
existence apart from them, ' Thus has vanished the specific
nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name
which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours
are what is true' {Kh. Up. VI, 4, i). — Other sacred texts
also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self
are to be quoted here, in accordance with the ' and others '
of the Sutra. Such texts are, ' In that all this has its Self;
it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that ' {Kh. Up. VI,
8, 7) ; ' This everything, all is that Self (B/V. Up. II, 4, 6) ;
'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11) ; 'The Self
is all this' {Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; ' There is in it no diversity '
(Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25). — On any other assumption it would
not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one
thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above
declares). We therefore must adopt the following view.
In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which
are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different
from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a
mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty
steppe — for the nature of that water is that it is seen in
one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover,
it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from
the surface of the desert^) — ; so this manifold world with its
objects of enjoyment, enjoycrs and so on has no existence
apart from Brahman. — But — it might be objected — Brah-
man has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree
has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers

^ Dr?sh/eti kada/^id dr/sh/a;?/ punar nash/am anityam iti yavat. —
Drish/agraha«asuy('ita;?z pratitikale^pi sattarahityaw tatraiva hetvan-
taram aha svarupcweti. An. Gi.

[34] Y

32 2 VEDANTA-sC'TRAS.

and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and mani-
foldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered
in itself is one. but it is manifold if viewed as having
branches ; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having
waves and foam ; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold
if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it.
On this assumption the process of final release resulting
from right knowledge may be established in connexion
with the element of unity (in Brahman), while the two
processes of common worldly activity and of activity ac-
cording to the Veda — which depend on the karmaka;/(/a —
may be established in connexion with the element of mani-
foldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay
&c. agree very well.

This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the in-
stance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase ' as clay they
are true ' asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase
'having its origin in speech' declares the unreality of all
effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the
instance giv^en (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read,
'In that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;'
whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is
true. The following passage again, ' That is the Self; thou
art that, O ^vetaketu ! ' teaches that the embodied soul
(the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must note
that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the em-
bodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established,
not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of
the individual soul having its Self in Brahman, if once
accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the
independent existence of the individual soul, just as the
idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake
(for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the
doctrine of the independent existence of the individual
soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire
phenomenal world — which is based on the individual soul —
having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside.
But only for the establishment of the latter an element
of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 323

addition to the element of unity. — Scriptural passages also
(such as, ' When the Self only is all this, how should he see
another?' Br/. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees
that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole
phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of
actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this
non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by
Scripture) to be limited to certain states ; for the passage
' Thou art that ' shows that the general fact of Brahman
being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.
Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief
{Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true-
minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one
true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong
knowledge. For if both were true how could the man
who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world
be called false-minded ^ ? Another scriptural passage (' from
death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,'
B;'/. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those
who perceive any distinction. — Moreover, on the doctrine,
which we are at present impugning, release cannot result
from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknow-
ledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed
by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal
world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the
cognition of manifoldness if both are true ?

Other objections are started. — If we acquiesce in the
doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right
knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the
absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects ;
just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right
idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a
man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts cm-
bodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their pur-
port if the distinction on which their validity depends

^ In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being
compared to the ' false-minded ' thief who, knowing himself to be
guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.

Y 2

324 vedanta-sOtras.

does not really exist. And further, the entire body of
doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the
distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is
not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how
can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the
Self, which forms an item of that doctrine ?

These objections, we reply, do not damage our position
because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is
considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman
being the Self of all has not arisen ; just as the phantoms
of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper
w^akes. For as long as a person has not reached the true
knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not
enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and
objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is
untrue : he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks
on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as
forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of
Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long
as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason
why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity
should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to
that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold
things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that
his ideas are produced by real perception without sus-
pecting the perception to be a merely apparent one. — But
how (to restate an objection raised above) can theVedanta-
texts if untrue convey information about the true being
of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man
bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in
a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used
for drinking or bathing \ — This objection, we reply, is with-
out force (because as a matter of fact we do see real effects
to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death
sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man
imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)

* I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects
spring from unreal causes.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 325

and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the
bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard
to a dreaming person. — But, it will be said, these effects
themselves are unreal I — These effects themselves^ we reply,
are unreal indeed ; but not so the consciousness which the
dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real
result ; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness.
The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider
the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being
bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but
he does not on that account consider the consciousness he
had of them to be unreal likewise. — (We remark in passing
that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming
person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness)
the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be con-
sidered as refuted^. — Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a
man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some
special wish sees in his dream a wom.an, he is to infer there-
from success in his work ') declares that by the unreal
phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may
be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after
having declared that from the observation of certain un-
favourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not
live long, continues 'if somebody sees in his dream a black
man with black teeth and that man kills him,' intimating
thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz.
death, is notified. — It is, moreover, known from the ex-
perience of persons who carefully observ^e positive and
negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious
omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example
that something true can result from or be known through
something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real
sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written
letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the

^ Svapna^agraddehayor vyabhi>('areipi pratyabh(;?^;7anat tadanu-
gatatmaikyasiddhcj ^aitanyasya ^a. dehadharmatve rupadivat tadanu-
palabdhiprasahgad avagatej ^abadhat tadrupasyatmano dehadvayati-
rekasiddher dehamatratinavado na yiikta ity artha>^. An. Gi.

326 vedanta-sOtras.

Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing
more is required for full satisfaction \ An injunction as,
for instance, ' He is to sacrifice ' at once renders us desirous
of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in
what manner it is to be effected ; but passages such as, 'Thou
art that,' ' I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because
the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object
the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else
remains a desire is possible ; but there is nothing else which
could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brah-
man. Nor can it be maintained that such states of con-
sciousness do not actually arise ; for scriptural passages
such as, 'He understood what he said ' {Kh. Up. VH, i8, 2),
declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to
bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from
a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again,
can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either
of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen
to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because,
secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it
could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the
unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal
course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on
unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final
authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire
course of the world which was founded on the previous
distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any oppor-
tunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various
elements.

But— it may be said — (that would not be a mere assump-
tion, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances
of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman

' As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind, we might
feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness
whereby to account for the vyavahara ; but as soon as we arrive
at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no
longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of
Brahman.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 327

capable of modification ; for we know from experience that
clay and similar things do undergo modifications. — This
objection — we reply — is without force, because a number
of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brah-
man, teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/astha). Such
passages are, ' This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying,
immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25) ;
'That Self is to be described by No, no' (Br/. Up. Ill,
9, 26); ' It is neither coarse nor fine' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8).
For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject
to modification and of being free from it cannot both be
ascribed. And if you say, ' Why should they not be both
predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the
subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of
reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated
(of one body at different times)?' we remark that the quali-
fication, 'absolutely changeless' (ku/astha), precludes this.
For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of
varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation
of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless
has already been demonstrated. — Moreover, while the
cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final
release, there is nothing to show that any independent
result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing
a modification, passing over into the form of this world.
Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the
changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a
result ; for in the passage which begins, ' That Self is to
be described by No, no,' we read later on, ' O 6^anaka, you
have indeed reached fearlessness ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4). We
have then ^ to accept the following conclusion that, in the
sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs
only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes
and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having
no special fruit of its own — as, for instance, the passages
about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this

' Tatreti, sr/sh/yadiirutinaw svarthe phalavaikalye satiti yavat.
An. Gi.

'X2S VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

world — is merely to be applied as a means for the cogni-
tion of the absolute Brahman, but docs not bring about
an independent result ; according to the principle that
whatever has no result of its o\\n, but is mentioned in con-
nexion with something else which has such a result, is
subordinate to the latter ^ For to maintain that the result
of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications
would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would
undergo corresponding modifications ^ would be inappro-
priate, as the state of final release (which the soul obtains
through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brah-
man to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental
tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world,
since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the
distinction of a Ruler and something ruled. — This objection
we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i. e. those
qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is
related to a world) depend on the evolution of the gerpiinal
principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience.
The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance
with such scriptural passages as, ' From that Self sprang
ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, i) is that the creation, sustentation,
and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient,
omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhana or
any other principle. That tenet we have stated in I, i, 4,
and here we do not teach anything contrary to it. — But
how, the question may be asked, can you make this last
assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity
and non-duality of the Self? — Listen how. Belonging to
the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name
and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either

^ A Mimawsa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is inde-
pendent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts ;
an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely
auxiliary to another act.

2 According to the ^"ruti 'in whatever mode he worships him
into that mode he passes himself.'

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 329

as being (i. e. Brahman), nor as different from it ^, the
germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called
in 5ruti and Smr/ti the illusion (maya), power (sakti), or
nature (prakr/ti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from
them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scrip-
tural passages such as the following, ' He who is called
ether is the revealer of all forms and names ; that within
which these forms and names are contained is Brahman' {K/i.
Up. VIII, 14, i); 'Let me evolve names and forms' (A"/a Up.
VI, 3, 2) ; ' He, the wise one, who having divided all forms
and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)' (Taitt.
Ar. III. 12, 7) ; ' He who makes the one seed manifold ' (5ve.
Up. VI, 12). — Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the
limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nes-
cience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited
ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting ad-
juncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands
in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to
the so-called ^ivas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs
(vi^;7anatman), which indeed are one with his own Self — just
as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are
one with the universal ether — but are limited by aggregates
of instruments of action (i, e. bodies) produced from name
and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the
Lord's being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence,
&c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose
Self is Nescience ; while in reality none of these qualities
belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right
knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture
also says, ' Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,
understands nothing else, that is the Infinite' (K/i. Up. VII,
24, J ) ; ' But when the Self only has become all this, how
should he see another?' (Brz Up. 11,4, I3-) I" this manner
the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who has reached the

^ Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na huvaratvena te niru^^yete ^a^/a^aa'ayor
abhedayogat napi tato^nyatvcna niruktim arhata/? svatantryewa
sattasphurtyasambhavat na hi o^art'am a^a^'anapekshya;?/ sattasphCir-
timad upalakshyate ^a^/atvabhangaprasahgat tasmad avidyalmake
namarupe ity ariha//. An. Gi.

" ^O VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

O

state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does
not exist. The Bhagavadgita also (' The Lord is not the
cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or
of the connexion of action and fruit ; all that proceeds
according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one's
sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance ; hence
all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gi. V, 14; 15) declares
that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist.
That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as
far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well
as the Bhagavadgita states ; compare Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22,
'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector
of all things ; he is a bank and boundary, so that these
worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gi. XVIII,
6t, 'The Lord, O Ar^una, is seated in the region of the
heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though)
mounted on a machine, by his delusion.' The Sutrakara
also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with
regard to the state of Reality ; while he had, in the pre-
ceding Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world,
compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison
resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet
having been refuted (i. e. seen to be unreal). — The view of
Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of
use in the devout meditations on the qualified (sagu«a)
Brahman.

15. And because only on the existence (of the
cause) (the effect) is observed.

For the following reason also the effect is non-different from
the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is
observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance,
only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and
the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a gene-
ral rule that when one thing exists another is also observed
to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse
which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist
only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist
only when the potter exists ; for in that case non-difference

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 5. 33 I

does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of
an operative cause and its effect ^ — But — it maybe objected
— even in the case of things other (i. e. non-identical) we
find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on
the existence of another ; smoke, for instance, is observed
only when fire exists. — We reply that this is untrue, because
sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been ex-
tinguished ; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept
by herdsmen in jars.— Well, then — the objector will say — let
us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us to say that
smoke of such and such a kind ^ does not exist unless fire
exists. — Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid,
because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-dif-
ference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ
(buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect
jointly ^ And that does not take place in the case of fire
and smoke. — Or else we have to read (in the Sutra) 'bhavat,'
and to translate, ' and on account of the existence or obser-
vation.' The non-difference of cause and effect results not
only from Scripture but also from the existence of percep-
tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for
instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per-
ceive a thing called ' cloth/ in addition to the threads, but
merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So
again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggre-

^ So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot
conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta
and naimittika, not that of non-difference.

^ For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base
is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.

^ I.e. (as An. Gi. ex})lains) because we assume the relation of
cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence
of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional
ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one
not being possible without the consciousness of the other. — Tad-
bhavanuvidhayibhavatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvawi X'a kar-
yasya kara«ananyatve hetur dhumavijeshasya Mgnibhavanuvi-
dhayibhavatve^pi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya
dhumabhanadhinatvat.

^^2 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

OJ-

gate of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them
again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our
perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can
perceive arc ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red,
white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth,
according to Kh. Up. VI, 4) ; those, again, with air, the latter
with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and
without a second. That all means of proof lead back to
Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world ; not to pra-
dhana, &c.), we have already explained.

16. And on account of that which is posterior
(i. e. the effect) being that which is.

For the following reason also the effect is to be con-
sidered as non-different (from the cause). That which is
posterior in time, i.e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to
have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the
cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages
like, ' In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which
is' (AVz. Up. VI, 3, i); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this
was Self, one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, i, 1), the effect which is
denoted by the word ' this ' appears in grammatical co-ordi-
nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it
appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing,
on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing
by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other
thing ; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence
as there is non-difference before the production (of the
effect), we understand that the effect even after having been
produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As
the cause, i. e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less
than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all
time only that which is. But that which is is one only;
therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.

I 7. If it be said that on account of being denoted
as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before
it is actually produced) ; (we reply) not so, (because

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 7. 333

the term ' that which is not ' denotes) another
quaHty (merely) ; (as appears) from the comple-
mentary sentence.

But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture
speaks of the effect before its production as that which is
not ; so, for instance, ' In the beginning this was that only
which is not' [Kh. Up. Ill, 19, i); and 'Non-existent^
indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence
Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its
production.

This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect
previous to its production is not meant absolute Non-
existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state
of name and form being unevolved, which state is different
from the state of name and form being evolved. With
reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to
its production, non-existent although then also it existed
identical with its cause. We conclude this from the
complementary passage, according to the rule that the
sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning
is determined by its complementary part. With reference
to the passage, ' In the beginning this was non-existent
only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word
'Non-existing' is — in the complementary passage, 'That
became existent' — referred to by the word 'that,' and
qualified as ' Existent.'

The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the
(absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as
connected with prior or posterior time. — Hence with refer-
ence to the other passage also, ' Non-existing indeed,'
&c., the complementary part, ' That made itself its Self,'
shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute
Non-existence is not meant. — It follows from all this that
the designation of ' Non-existence ' applied to the effect
before its production has reference to a different state of
being merely. And as those things which are distinguished

^ For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non-
existing.

334 vedanta-sCtras.

by name and form arc in ordinary language called ' existent,'
the term ' non-existent ' is figuratively applied to them to
denote the state in which they were previously to their
differentiation.

1 8. From reasonino; and from another Vedic
passage.

That the effect exists before its origination and is non-
dififerent from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as
from a further scriptural passage.

We at first set forth the argumentation. — Ordinary expe-
rience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain
effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments,
employ for their purpose certain determined causal sub-
stances such as milk, clay, and gold ; those who wish to
produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who
intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according
to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent
(before its actual production), all this should be possible.
For if before their actual origination all effects are equally
non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds
be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars
from clay only and not from milk as well.^ — Let us then main-
tain, the asatkaryav^din rejoins, that there is indeed an equal
non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same
time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching
beyond itself (atij-aya) for some particular effect only and not
for other effects ; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay,
has a certain capacity for curds ; and clay only, and not milk,
an analogous capacity for jars. — What, we ask in return, do
you understand by that ' atijaya ? ' If you understand by it
the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origi-
nation), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not
exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which
it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by
the atijaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end
of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect
springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can

II ADHYAVA, I PADA, I 8. 335

determine the particular effect only if it neither is other
(than cause and effect) nor non-existent ; for if it were either,
it would not be different from anything else which is either
non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then
should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?)
Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of
the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that
power. — Moreover^ as the ideas of cause and effect on the one
hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are
not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and
a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the
effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be
admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins,
that the cause and the effect, although really different, are
not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the
so-called samavaya connexion \) — If, we reply, you assume
the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have
either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a
certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by
samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new
connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds
together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an
infinite series of connexions ; or else you will have to main-
tain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the
terms which it binds together, and from that will result the
dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of
the samavaya relation ^. — Well then, the opponent rejoins,
let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a
connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins
without the help of any further connexion. — Then, we reply,
conjunction (sawyoga) also must be connected with the two
terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya

^ Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate rela-
tion, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and
its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.

^ Samavayasya svatantryapaksha?« dushayati anabhyupagamya-
mane^eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi// sambandho neshyate kim
tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyaguwadinaw ^-a
viprakarsha// syat sa;;/nidhayakabhavad ity artha/^. An. Gi.

';;6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

."»0

connexion ; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion^. —
Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended
as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the
samavaya relation has really no purport.

In what manner again do you — who maintain that the
cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation —
assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to
abide in its causes, i. e. in the material parts of which it
consists ? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or
in each particular part? — If you say that it abides in all
parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be
perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in
contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be
objected that the whole may be apprehended through some
of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its
substrates together (i. e. in all the many things), is not
apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are
apprehended. — Let it then be assumed that the whole
abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening
aggregates of parts ". — In that case, we reply, we should
have to assume other parts in addition to the primary
originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of
those other parts the whole could abide in the primary
parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that
one thing which abides in another abides there by means
of parts different from those of that other thing), that the
sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts
different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption
of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum,
because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain

^ A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that
sawyoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground
on which il stands, is a quality (gU7/a) inherent in the two conjoined
substances by means of the samavaya relation.

^ So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we
apprehend a certain part only ; analogously to our apprehending
the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as
we apj)rehend some few of the flowers.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8. ^^']

given parts we should always have to assume further parts ^.
— Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that
the whole abides in each particular part. — That also cannot
be admitted ; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot
be present in other parts also ; not any more than Devadatta
can be present in 6"rughna and in Pa/aliputra on one and
the same day. If the whole were present in more than one
part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta
and Ya^/'Jadatta, who, as being two different persons, may
live one of them at 5rughna and the other at Pa/aliputra. —
If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully
present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow
is fully present in each individual cow ; we point out that
the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in
each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived
in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in
each part, the consequence would be that the whole would
produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts ; a cow,
for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But
such things are not seen to take place.

We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed
to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause. — •
That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origi-
nation of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of
substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such
requires an agent ^, just as the action of walking does. To
speak of an action without an agent would be a contradic-

^ Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha kz yathavayavai/i sutram
kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusuinagraha«e ^^pi gnhyate tatha
katipayavayavagrahawe :^ pi bhavaty avayavino grahawam ity arlha/^.
Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta k\m va
tadatiriklavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra yad
vartlate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamanaw dr/sh/am iti
dr/sh/antagarbhaw hetum aX'ash/e kojeti. Dvitiyam dushayati
anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prakrztavayavino
duraviprakarshat tantunish///atvam pa/'asya na syad iti bhava^.
An. Gi.

^ I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal
agent.

[34] Z

■^^S vedanta-sOtras.

00

tion. But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the
cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origi-
nation of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the
jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something
else, and again that when the origination of the two halves
of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but
something else. From this it would follow that the sentence,
' the jar is originated,' means as much as ' the potter and
the other (operative) causes are originated ^.' But as a
matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to
mean the latter ; and it is, moreover, known that at the time
when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in exist-
ence.— Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origi-
nation is the connexion of the effect with the existence of
its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self. — How, we
ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained
existence enter into connexion with something else ? A
connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one
existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing
things. To something non-existing which on that account
is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit
as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is
non-existing before its origination ; for experience teaches
us that existing things only such as fields and houses have
limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,
for instance, a phrase such as the following one, ' The son
of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of
Pur/mvarman,' the declaration of a limit in time implied in
that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the
barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will
be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an
existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal

^ Every action, ^Sahkara says, requires an agent, i. e. a substrate
in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in
the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate
for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the
non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have
to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative
causes of the jar.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8. 339

agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non-
existing effect should be something existing, subsequently
to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the
one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the
non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are
both equally non-entities and can never be. — But, the
asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there
follows the result that the activity of causal agents is alto-
gether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already
fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from
it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than
anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is
already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour.
But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring
about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn
their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non-
existence of the effect previously to its origination. — Your
objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the
endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having
a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in
the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the
effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs
to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of
Selfliood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown
above. — Nor does a substance become another substance
merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta
may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely
drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and
legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial
being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also
by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers,
brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in
continually changing states and attitudes ; for they are
always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on.
If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on
the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the
same substantial beings, because the different states in which
they appear are not separated from each other by birth or
death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after

Z 2

^40 VEDANTA-S^TKAS.

J

the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction
as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as some-
thing altogether different from the cause) ; we rebut this
objection by remarking that causal substances also such as
milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they
have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and
the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause
undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the
continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for
instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there
spring sprouts and trees, the term ' birth ' (when applied to
the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the
seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the
continual accretion of similar particles of matter ; and
the term ' death ' only means that, through the secession of
those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of
visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by
birth and death as described just now it follows that the
non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non-
existing ; for if that were so, it would also follow that the
unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe
stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.

It would further follow that a man is not the same person
in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as
father and the like are illegitimately used. — The preceding
arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine)
of all existence being momentary only \

The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to
its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that
the activity of the causal agent has no object ; for what does
not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than
the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for
striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the
inherent cause ; for that would lead to the erroneous con-
clusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has
for its object the inherent cause, there results something else

^ Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of
this adhyd) a.

II ADIIYAYA, I PADA, 1 8. 34!

(viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous
conckision) the opponent should say that the effect is (not
something different from the cause, but) a certain relative
power (atij-aya) of the inherent cause ; he thereby would
simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect
exists in the cause already.

We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk
and other substances are called effects when they are in the
state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even
within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which
is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all
appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last
effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and
costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current
notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.

The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea-
soning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origina-
tion, and is non-different from its cause, results also from
a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding
Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the
non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present
Sutra is the one (AV/. Up. VI, 2, i) which refers to that
which is. That passage begins, ' Being only was this in the
beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to
the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the
world (• Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'),
raises an objection against that doctrine (' How could that
which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, re-
affirms the view first set forth, ' Only Being was this in the
beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the
effect, which is denoted by the word 'this,' is by Scripture,
with reference to the time previous to its origination, co-
ordinated with the cause denoted by the term ' Being,'
proves that the effect exists in — and is non-different from —
the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing
and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be
something different from the cause, and that would virtually
imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage,
' That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c.

342 vedanta-sOtras.

(\"I, I, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other
hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in —
and is not different from — the cause.

19. And like a piece of cloth.

As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly
whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on
its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing
was a piece of cloth ; and as, so long as it is folded, we per-
haps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite
length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know
these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not
different from the folded object ; in the same way an effect,
such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists
in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes
manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the
operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on. — Applying
this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then
unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we con-
clude that the latter is non-different from the former.

20. And as in the case of the different vital
airs.

It is a matter of observation that when the operations of
the different kinds of vital air — such as pra«a the ascending
vital air, apana the descending vital air, &c. — are suspended,
in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in
their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be ac-
complished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending
and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When,
thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects
also are brought about, in addition to mere life. — Nor must
the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes,
be considered as something else than vital air ; for wind (air)
constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the
manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non-
difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived. —
As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2 1. 343

non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural
passage that ' What is not heard is heard, what is not per-
ceived is perceived, what is not known is known ' {Kh. Up.
VI, I, 3) is fulfilled ^

21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual
soul) being designated (as non-different from Brah-
man) there would attach (to Brahman) various
faults, as, for instance, not doing what is bene-
ficial.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an
intelligent cause of the world. — If that doctrine is accepted,
certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial,
will attach (to the intelligent cause, i. e. Brahman), ' on ac-
count of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares
the other, i. e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman,
as is shown by the passage, ' That is the Self; that art thou,
O 5vetaketu!' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7.)— Or else (if we interpret
' the other ' of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares
the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied
soul. For the passage, ' Having created that he entered
into it,' declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman,
to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence
of his entering into his products. The following passage
also, ' Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve
names and forms ' {Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest
divinity designates the living (soul) by the word ' Self,'
shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman.
Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the
embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an inde-
pendent agent, might be expected to produce only what is
beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such
as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the
other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no
free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his
abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless,

^ Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical ;
hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.

344 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of
its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its
liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions
which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of
those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Fur-
ther, it would remember that it had created this manifold
world ; for every person who has produced some clearly
appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it.
And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the
magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied
soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The
fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its
own body even. As we therefore see that ' what would be
beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having
proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.

22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman
separate from the individual souls) (is the creator) ;
(the existence of which separate Brahman we learn)
from the declaration of difference.

The word ' but ' discards the purvapaksha. — We rather
declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose
essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which
is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the
creative principle of the world. The faults specified above,
such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not
attach to that Brahman ; for as eternal freedom is its charac-
teristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done
by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there
any impediment to its knowledge and power ; for it is
omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the
other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned
faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the
creator of the world, on account of ' the declaration of
difference.' For scriptural passages (such as, ' Verily, the
Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,'
Bri. Up. II, 4, 5 ; 'The Self we must search out, we must
try to understand,' K/i. Up. VIII, 7, i ; ' Then he becomes

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23. 345

united with the True,' Kh. Up. VI, 8, i ; ' This embodied
Self mounted by the intelhgent Self,' Brz. Up. IV, 3, 35)
declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object,
and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from
the individual soul. — And if it be objected that there are
other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance,
' That art thou '), and that difference and non-difference
cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the
possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the
parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited
by a jar. — Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the decla-
ration of non-difference contained in such passages as ' that
art thou,' the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the
transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative
quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of
plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sub-
lated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the
creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and
the like ? For that this entire apparent world, in which good
and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to
the non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a
body, and so on, which spring from name and form the pre-
sentations of Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all,
we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous
to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being
born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs ; while in
reahty the body only dies, is born, &c.}. And with
regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is
not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of
such difference (as, for instance, ' That we must search for,'
&c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul ;
whereby the possibiHty of faults adhering to it is excluded.

23. And because the case is analogous to that
of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be
established.

As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of
earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being

34^ VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others,
such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and
others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows ;
and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same
ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandal-
wood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference
in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c. ; and
as one and the same food produces various effects, such
as blood and hair ; so the one Brahman also may contain
in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest
Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objec-
tions imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman
being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained. — Fur-
ther ^ arguments are furnished by the fact of all effects
having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only,
and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream phan-
toms (while the dreaming person remains one).

24. If you object on the ground of the observation
of the employment (of instruments) ; (we say), No ;
because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman
does).

Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without
a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on
account of the observation of employment (of instruments).
For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other
handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having
put themselves in possession of the means thereto by pro-
viding themselves with various implements, such as clay,
staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand,
you conceive to be without any help ; how then can it act as
a creator without providing itself with instruments to work
with ? — We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause
of the world.

This objection is not valid, because causation is possible

^ Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the
' and ' of the Sutra.

II ADHVAVA, I PADA, 25. 347

in consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal sub-
stance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn
into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous
means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you
object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to
turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat,
we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount
of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated
by heat. If milk did not possess that capability of itself,
heat could not compel it to turn ; for we see that air or ether,
for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn
into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the
milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely com-
pleted. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on
the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any
extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, 'There is no
effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like
unto him or better ; his high power is revealed as manifold,
as inherent, acting as force and knowledge ' {Sve. Up. VI,
8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to
its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold
effects ; just as milk is.

25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of
gods and other beings in ordinary experience.

Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelli-
gent things have the power of turning themselves into sour
milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus
observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelli-
gent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several
work only after having provided themselves with a complete
set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that
Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should
proceed without any auxiliary?

We reply, ' Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, r/shis,
and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent
nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such
as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any.

'I

48 vedanta-sCtras.

extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective
in consequence of those beings' pecuHar power — a fact
vouchsafed by mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, and pura;/as ; —
and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its
web ; and as the female crane conceives without a male ;
and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without
any means of conveyance ; so the intelligent Brahman also
may be assumed to create the world by itself without ex-
traneous means.

Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the
following style. — The gods and other beings, whom you
have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature
different from that of Brahman. For the material causes
operative in the production of palaces and other material
things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent
Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva
which, owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires
a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane con-
ceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus
flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle
the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move
in so far as it is a merely intelligent being ' ; it rather wanders
from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body,
just as the creeper climbs up the tree. — Hence all these
illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of
Brahman.

To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the
case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar
agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods,
&c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelli-
gence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i. e.
means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence
Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require
no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show
by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is
to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which

^ The right reading appears to be ' svayam eva ^etana ' as found
•in some MSS. Other MSS. read ^etana^.

II ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 26. 349

is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not
necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.

26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brah-
man undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else
a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be
without parts.

Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman,
intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without
the employment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the
world. —Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of
throwing additional light on the point under discussion. —
The consequence of the Vedanta doctrine, it is said, will be
that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the
change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts.
If Brahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of
parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the
change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture
distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Com-
pare, ' He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil,
without fault, without taint' (5ve. Up. VI, 19); 'That
heavenly person is without body, he is both without and
within, not produced ' (Mu. Up. II, i, 2); 'That great Being
is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge '
(Br/. Up. 11,4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no'
(Bri. Up. HI, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (Br/.
Up. HI, 8, 8) ; all which passages deny the existence of
any distinctions in Brahman. — As, therefore, a partial modi-
fication is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman
has to be assumed. But that involves a cuttinsr off of
Brahman from its very basis. — Another consequence of the
Vedantic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive ' to
see ' Brahman become purposeless ; for the effects of Brahman
may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them
no Brahman exists. — And, finally, the texts declaring Brah-
man to be unborn are contradicted thereby. — If, on the other
hand — in order to escape from these difficulties — we assume
Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to those
texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts.

,50 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it
is non-eternal. — Hence the Vedantic point of view cannot be
maintained in any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural
passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on
Scripture (onl)).

The word 'but' discards the objection. — We deny this
and maintain that our view is not open to any objections. —
That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means
follows from our doctrine, ' on account of sacred texts.' For
in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the
world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting
apart from its effects. This appears from the passages
indicating the difference of cause and effect (" That divinity
thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this
living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is
the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person ; one foot
of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in
heaven' {Kh. Up. Ill, 12, 6); further, from the passages
declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in
the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep)
the individual soul is united with the True. For if the
entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation
(of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless
sleep which is declared in the passage, ' then it is united
with the True, my dear,' would be out of place ; since the
individual soul is always united with the effects of Brah-
man, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on
that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman
becoming the object of perception by means of the senses
is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For
these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has
to be admitted, — Nor do we violate those texts which
declare Brahman to be without parts ; we rather admit
Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals
it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the holy texts,
and regarding which the holy texts alone are authori-

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 27. 35 I

tative — not the senses, and so on — must be accepted such
as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare,
on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over
into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is
without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems,
spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to
difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce
various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruc-
tion is able to find out by mere reflection the number
of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects,
their purposes, &c. ; how much more impossible is it to
conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of
Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought ! As
the Pura;/a says : ' Do not apply reasoning to what is
unthinkable ! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is
above all material causes ^' Therefore the cognition of
what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.

But — our opponent will say — even the holy texts can-
not make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman,
you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but
not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it
does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety.
If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and
persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that
it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters
connected with action {as, for instance, in the case of the two
Vedic injunctions ' at the atiratra he is to take the sho^a^-in-
cup,' and ' at the atiratra he is not to take the shota'aj-in-cup')
any contradiction which may present itself to the under-
standing is removed by the optional adoption of one of
the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on
man ; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of
the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because
an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action
which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are
therefore met here by a real difficulty.

^ Prakr/tibhya iti, prat}akshad;7sh/apadarthasvabhavebh}0 yat
paraw vilakshawam aX'aryadyupadejagamyawi tad a^intyam ity
artha^ An. Gi.

352 vedanta-sOtras.

No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one ;
as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's
nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of
that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not
any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing
double to a person of defective vision. By that element
of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is
characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well
as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the
Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis
of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on,
while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains
unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as
the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience,
originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate
against the fact of Brahman being without parts. — Nor
have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as
undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of
change ; for such instruction would have no fruit. They
rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self
as raised above this apparent world ; that being an in-
struction which we know to have a result of its own. For
in the scriptural passage beginning ' He can only be
described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction
about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in
the words ' O Canaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness '
(Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4). — Hence our view does not involve any
real difficulties.

28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also,
and various (creations exist in gods ^ &c.).

Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine
that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self,
without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches
us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self

* This is the way in which 5'arikara divides the Siitra ; An. Gi.
remarks to 'loke^pi, &c. : atmani X'cti vyakhyaya viX'itrai' kdi hiti
vya-^'ash/c.'

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29. 353

of a dreaming person, ' There are no chariots in that state,
no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses,
and roads' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too
multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are
seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without in-
terfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform
creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without
divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against
our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view
likewise.

Those also who maintain that the world has sprung
from the pradhana implicitly teach that something not
made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other
qualities— viz. the pradhana — is the cause of an effect — viz.
the world — which is made up of parts, is limited and is
characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows
from that doctrine also either that the pradhana as not
consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety,
or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be
abandoned. — But — it might be pleaded in favour of the
Saiikhyas — they do not maintain their pradhana to be with-
out parts ; for they define it as the state of equilibrium
of the three guwas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so
that the pradhana forms a whole containing the three
gu;/as as its parts. — We reply that such a partiteness as
is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand
because still each of the three qualities is declared to be
in itself without parts ^. And each guwa by itself assisted
merely by the two other gu7/as constitutes the material
cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its
nature^. — So that the objection lies against the Saiikhya

^ So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in
its entirety, or else — against the assumption — consist of parts.

^ The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the
stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three guwas in
combination only to undergo modification ; if this were so the
inequality of the diff"erent efl"ects could not be accounted for.
[34] A a

354 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

view likewise.— Well, then, as the reasoning (on whicli the
doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not
absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists
of parts. — If you do that, we reply, it follows that the
pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on.— Let it then be said
that the various powers of the pradhana to which the
variety of its effects is pointing are its parts. — Well, we
reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who
see the cause of the world in Brahman.

The same objections lie against the doctrine of the
world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine
one atom when combining with another must, as it is not
made up of parts, enter into the combination with its
whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place
we do not get beyond the first atom \ If, on the other
hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the com-
bination with a part only, you offend against the assumption
of the atoms having no parts.

As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objec-
tions raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view
in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently
cleared his doctrine.

30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all
(powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).

We have stated that this multiform world of effects is
possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is
endowed with various powers. — How then — it may be
asked — do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed
with various powers? — He is, we reply, endowed with all
powers, ' because that is seen.' For various scriptural pas-
sages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers,
' He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes
belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is

* As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact
with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is
entire interpenetration ; in consequence of which the compound of
two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.

II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 3I. 355

never surprised' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4); 'He who desires
what is true and imagines what is true' [Kh. Up. VIII, 7,
1) ; ' He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in
its detail '} (Mu. Up. 1, 1,9); ' By the command of that Im-
perishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart ' (Br/. Up.
Ill, 8, 9) ; and other similar passages.

1

,1. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of
powers) on account of the absence of organs ; (we
reply that) this has been explained (before).

Let this be granted. — Scripture, however, declares the
highest divinity to be without (bodil}') organs ©faction^;
so, for instance, in the passage, ' It is without eyes, without
ears, without speech, without mind ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8).
Being such, how should it be able to produce effects,
although it may be endowed with all powers ? For we
know (from mantras, arthavidas, &c.) that the gods and
other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers,
are capable of producing certain effects only because they are
furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover,
how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, ' No,
no.' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers.^

The appropriate reply to this question has been already
given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be
fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning.
Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being
is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has
likewise been explained above that although all qualities are
denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be
endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element
of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience.
Moreover, a scriptural passage (' Grasping without hands,
hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears
without ears,' 5ve. Up. Ill, 19) declares that Brahman,

^ The Sfitra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an
instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already
been disposed of in Sutra 24.

A a 2

356 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

although dcv^oid of bodily organs, possesses all possible
capacities.

32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world),
on account of (beings engaging in any action) having
a motive.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an
intelligent cause of the world. — The intelligent highest Self
cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, ' on account
of actions having a purpose.'— We know from ordinary ex-
perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act
after due consideration only, and does not engage even in
an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose
of his own ; much less so in important business. There is
also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common
experience, 'Verily ev^erything is not dear that you may love
everything ; but that you may love the Self therefore every-
thing is dear' {Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of
creating the sphere of this world, with all its various con-
tents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand,
you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest
Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by
Scripture ; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of
motive on its part, you must afifirm absence of activity
also. — Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intel-
gent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to
his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the
highest Self also created this world without any motive. —
That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the
highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture. — Hence
the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent
Being is untenable.

33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere
sport, such as we see in ordinary life.

The word 'but' discards the objection raised. — We see in
every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men
of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 34. 357

reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere
sportfulness, as. for instance, their recreations in places of
amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation
and exhalation is going on without reference to any
extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own
nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be
supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature \
without reference to any purpose. For on the ground
neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other
purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned ^. —
Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty
and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose
power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos-
sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for
sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions
of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.
— Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like
a senseless person ; for Scripture affirms the fact of the crea-
tion on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the
other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scrip-
tural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality;
it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by
name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover,
aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.

34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the
Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of

^ The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is^ the commentators say,
]\Iaya joined with time and karman.

"^ This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might
remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and
the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction
with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya natm-ally
tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha.

An. Gi. remarks : Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva
nivr/tter api darjanad i^yvarasyapi mayamayya/« lila}'aw tatha-
bhave vinapi saffzyag^nanawz sa??^sarasamu/('y('/nttir iti tatraha na >^eti.
Anirva/'ya khalv avidya jiarasyejvarasya /('a svabhavo lileli X'o^'yate
tatra na pratitikasvabhavayam anupapattir avataratity artha//.

158 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture)
declares.

In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present
defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole
planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly
planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine
of the Lord being the cause of the world. — The Lord, it is
said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that
hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and
cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods
and others, he renders eminently happy ; others, as for
instance the animals, eminently unhappy ; to some again, as
for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a
Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things,
passion and malice w'ould have to be ascribed, just as to
any common person acting similarly ; which attributes
would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord
affirmed by vSruti and Smrz'ti. Moreover, as the infliction of
pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form
part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with
great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For
these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.

The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality
of dispensation and cruelty, ' because he is bound by regards.'
If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous
regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose
himself to blame ; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound
by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit.
Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due
to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and
is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position
of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of
Par^anya, the Giver of rain. For as Par^anya is the com-
mon cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants,
while the difference between the various species is due to the
various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds,
so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods,
men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 35. 359

are due to the different merit belonging to the individual
souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be
reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty. —
And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord,
in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound
by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that ; compare,
for instance, the two following passages, ' For he (the Lord)
makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds,
do a good deed ; and the same makes him, whom he wishes
to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed ' (Kaush.
Up. in. H)^; and, 'A man becomes good by good work,
bad by bad work' (Brz. Up. Ill, 2, 13). Smr/ti passages
also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to de-
pend on the different quality of the works of living beings ;
so, for instance, ' I serve men in the way in which they
approach me' (Bha. Gi. IV, 11).

35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's
having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible
on account of the non-distinction (of merit and
demerit, previous to the first creation) ; we refute
the objection on the ground of (the world) being
without a begrinnincr.

But — an objection is raised — the passage, ' Being only
this was in the beginning, one, without a second,' affirms
that before the creation there was no distinction and conse-
quently no merit on account of which the creation might
have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have
been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living
beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in
the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of

' From this passage we must not — the commentators say — infer
injustice on the part of the Lord ; for the previous merit or demerit
of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he
performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common
cause only (as Par^anya does).

^6o • VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work.
The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to reli-
eious merit after distinction had once arisen ; but as before
that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it
follows that the first creation must have been free from
inequalities.

This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmi-
gratory world is without beginning. — The objection would
be valid if the world had a beginning ; but as it is without
beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout,
caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical
objection to their operation. — To the question how we know
that the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.

36. (The beglnninglessness of the world) recom-
mends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).

The beglnninglessness of the world recommends itself to
reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the
world springing into existence without a cause, the released
souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory
existence ; and further, as then there would exist no deter-
mining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and
pain, we should have to acquiesce in the doctrine of rewards
and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous
sfood or bad actions. That the Lord is not the cause of the
inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience
by itself be the cause, as it is of a uniform nature. On
the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality,
if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from
action produced by the mental impressions of wrath, hatred,
and other afflicting passions ^. Without merit and demerit
nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body
merit and demerit cannot be formed ; so that — on the doc-

^ Ragadveshamoha ragadayas te -^'a purushawz dukhadibhi/^
klijyantiti klej-as tesham vasana^ karmapravr/ttyanuguwas tabhir
akshipta/w dharmadilakshawaw karma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2)7- 3^1

trine of the world having a beginning — we are led into a
logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand,
explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the
seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains. — Moreover,
the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in
vSruti and Smr/ti. In the first place, we have the scriptural
passage, ' Let me enter with this living Self (^iva),' &:c. [Kh.
Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the embodied
Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation,
'the living Self — a name applying to it in so far as it is
the sustaining principle of the pra;/as — shows that this
phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a
beginning, the pra;/as would not exist before that beginning,
and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with
reference to the time of the world's beginning, by a name
which depends on the existence of those pra;/as ? Nor can
it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future
relation to the pra;^as ; it being a settled principle that a
past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than
a mere future relation. — Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As
the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon '
{Ri. Sa;//h. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of
former Kalpas. Smr/ti also declares the world to be
without a beginning, ' Neither its form is known here, nor
its end, nor its beginning, nor its support ' (Bha. Gi. XV,
3). And the Puri//a also declares that there is no measure
of the past and the future Kalpas.

37. And because all the qualities (required in the
cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).

The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as
difference of character, and the like, which other teachers
have brought forward against what he had established as
the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman
is the cause and matter of this world.

Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it
will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teach-
ers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which

•;62 VKDAXTA-StJTRAS.

it was to show why his view should be accepted. — Because,
if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world,
all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen
to be present — Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful,
and possessing the great power of Maya, — on that account
this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to
any objections.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. 363

SECOND PADA.

Reverence to the highest Self !

I. That which is inferred (by the Sahkhyas, viz.
the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world),
on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world)
being impossible (on that hypothesis).

Although it is the object of this system to define the true
meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of
Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocin-
ation, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the
Vedanta to refute the Saiikhya and other systems which
are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this
purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that
the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded
the establishment of the Vedanta position ; for) . as the
determination of the sense of the Vedanta-passages directly
subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of
such a determination, established our own position, since
this is a task more important than the refutation of the
views entertained by others.

Here an opponent might come forward and say that we
are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to
define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to
those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta-
tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing
but hate and anger. — There is a use, we reply. For there
is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon
the Sankhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect
knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appear-
ance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and
profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might
therefore think that those systems with their abstruse argu-

364 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

ments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on
that account have faith in them. For this reason we must
endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.

But, it might be said, the Saiikhya and similar systems
have ah-eady been impugned in several Sutras of the first
adhyaya (I, i, 5, 18 ; I, 4, 2<S); why, then, controvert them
again ? — The task — we reply — which we are now about to
undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.
As the Sahkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in
order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages
and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree
with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to
show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious.
Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an
independent manner, without any reference to theVedanta-
texts.

The Sdhkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue
as follows. — Just as jars, dishes, and other products which
possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen
to have for their cause clay in general ; so we must suppose
that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and ani-
mate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of
pleasure, pain, and dulness ^ have for their causes pleasure,
pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in
their generality together constitute the threefold pradhana.
This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spon-
taneously into multiform modifications-, in order thus to
effect the purposes (i. e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of
the intelligent soul. — The existence of the pradhana is to
be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limita-
tion of all effects and the like ^.

Against this doctrine we argue as follows. — If you Sah-
khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point

^ The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the
three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka. 12, 13.

^ Viz. the great princijjle (mahat), ahaiikara, &c. Sa. Ka. 3.

^ The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sa. Ka.
15 ; Sa. Sutras I, 129 fF.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, I. 365

out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided
by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects
capable of subserving the purposes of some particular
person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather
observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and
the like — things which according to circumstances are con-
ducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of
pain — are made by workmen endowed with intelligence.
Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one
hand, as external (i. e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the
other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of
their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in
the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of
beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are
therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition ;
look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious
workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and
then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is
able to fashion it ! Other non-intelligent things such as
stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess
analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as
clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves
into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like,
so the pradhana also (when modifying itself into its effects)
is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring
to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world),
there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes
only which form part of the nature of material causes such
as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to
extraneous agents such as potters, &c. ^ Nor (if remem-
bering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any
means of right knowledge ; we, on the contrary, are in direct
agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent

If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from
its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that
of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember
that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of
an intelligent being, viz. the potter.

^66 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

cause exists. — For the reason detailed in the above, i. e. on
account of the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement'
(of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to
be inferred. — The word 'and' (in the Sutra) adds other
reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred,
viz. ' on account of the non-possibility of endowment,' &c.
For it cannot be maintained ^ that all outward and inward
effects are ' endowed ' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental)
states, while sound, &c. (i. e. the sense-objects) are known
as being of a different nature (i. e. as outward things), and
moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c. ^
And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and
so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of
the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in
the effects it produces, one person being affected by it
pleasantly, another painfully, and so on ^. — (Turning to the
next Sahkhya argument which infers the existence of the
pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that
he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend
on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited
(a conclusion based on the observation that some limited
effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunc-
tion of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the
three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion,
and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several

^ As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring there-
from, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect,
the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana.

^ And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.

^ Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sahkhya
hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain,
&c. — ' If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then
sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in
summer) would be pleasant in winter also ; for sandal never is
anything but sandal. — And as thistles never are anything but
thistles they ought, on the Sahkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with
enjoyment not only by camels but by men also.' Bha.

II ADIIYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 367

antecedents ^ ; for they also are limited -. — Further ^, it is
impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason
for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent
principle for their antecedent ; for we have shown already
that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs
also, over whose production intelligence presides.

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) ac-
tivity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to
the activity by which it is produced. — The three gu;^as,
passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the
condition of mutual subordination and superordination,
originate activities tending towards the production of
particular effects. — Now these activities also cannot be
ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no
such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in
chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the
like, and chariots — which are in their own nature non-
intelligent — enter on activities tending towards particular
effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings
such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like
in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is
not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not
to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity
without which the world cannot be produced would be
impossible.

But, the Sarikhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe
activity on the part of mere intelligent beings. — True ; we
however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things
such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction
with intelligent beings. — But. the Sahkhya again objects,
we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel-

^ Sawsargapurvakatvaprasafiga iti guna.na.m sawsr^sh/anekava-
stuprakr/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi.

^ For they limit one another.

^ To proceed to the argument ' from the separateness of cause
and effect' (Sa. Ka. 15).

;68 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Hgent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent
thing. — Very well ; the question then arises : Does the
activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as
the Sahkhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction
with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)? — We
must, the Sankhya replies, attribute activity to that in
which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its
abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent
being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of
activity while a chariot is. The^ existence of an intelligent
Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of
activity can be established (by inference) only ; the inference
being based on the difference observed between living bodies
and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like.
For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only
where a body is observed while it is never seen without a
body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere
attribute of the body. — Hence activity belongs only to
what is non-intelligent.

To all this we — the Vedantins — make the following
reply. — We do not mean to say that activity does not
belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed ;
it does indeed belong to them ; but it results from an
intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is
present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just
as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode
in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when
there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire ; as mere
fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the
same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire
is present and are not seen when fire is absent ; so, as the
Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed

^ The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how
the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of per-
ception.— Pratyakshatvabhave kalham atmasiddhir ity asankya
anumanad ity aha, pravr/ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya ^'etanasya na
pravr/ttyajrayateti darjayitum evakara//. Katham anumanam ity
apekshayaw/ tatprakara;// suX'ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha«yaz?i prawa-
dimattvam. An. Gi.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. 369

to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent
things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore
incontrovertible. — But — an objection will be raised — your
Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising mov-
ing power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature
of which is pure intelligence. — A thing, we reply, which is
itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things.
The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves
iron ; and colours and the other objects of sense, although
themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the
eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who
is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful
may, although himself unmoving, move the universe. — If it
finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is
no room for a moving power as in consequence of the
oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place ;
we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted
by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously
connected with Maya, which consists of name and form
presented by Nescience. — Hence motion can be reconciled
with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause ; but not
with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

'£>^

3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like
milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion
is due to intelligence).

Well, the Sahkhya resumes, listen then to the following
instances. — As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own
nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and
as non- sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for
the benefit of mankind ; so the pradhana also, although non-
intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature
merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.

This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again ; for as
the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not
observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such
as chariots, &;c., we infer that water and milk also move
only because they are directed by intelligent powers.
Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ' He who dwells in

[34] B b

370 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

the water and within the water, who rules the water within,'
Brz. Up. Ill, 7, 4 ; and, * By the command of that Akshara,
O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c., Bri. Up. Ill, <S, 9),
declare that ev^erything in this world which flows is directed
by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as
belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our
general principle ^ cannot be used to show that the latter is
too wide. — Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being
and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do
so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking
of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute
independence — for its flow depends on the declivity of the
soil and similar circumstances — or independently of an
intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is
present in all cases. — If, finally, our opponent should point
to Sutra II, I, 24 as contradicting the present Sutra, we
remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of
ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself
independently of any external instrumental cause ; a con-
clusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on
Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.

4. And because (the pradhana), on account of
there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela-
tion ; (it cannot be active.)

The three gu;/as of the Sahkhyas when in a state of equi-
poise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradhana there
exists no external principle which could either impel the
pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul
(purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to — nor
restrains from — action. As therefore the pradhana stands
in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes
modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes
not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord,

* Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence
of intelligence. — Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva;// sadhyavati pakshe
pravish/atvam eva ta-^ ^a sapakshanikshiptatvasyapy upalaksha«ani,
anupanyaso na vyabhi/^arabhumir ity artha//. An. Gi.

IT ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5. 37 1

on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account
of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being con-
nected with the power of ilkisi. n (maya).

5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies
itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (\vhich turn into
milk) ; for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in
the female animal).

Let this be (the Sahkh}'a resumes). Just as grass, herbs,
water. &c. independently of any other instrumental cause
transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk ; so,
we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the
great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know
that grass transforms itself independently of any instru-
mental cause ; we reply, ' Because no such cause is ob-
serv^ed.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly
should apply it to grass. &c. according to our liking, and
thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no
such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like
m-ust be considered to be due to its own nature merely ;
and we ma}- infer therefrom that the transformation of the
pradhana is of the same kind.

To this we make the following reply. — The transformation
of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely
if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the
manner stated by you ; but we are unable to admit that,
since another instrumental cause is observed. How.?
' Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes
milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female
animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull.
If the transformation had no special cause, grass would
become milk even on other conditions than that of entering
a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not
being able to produce milk according to their liking prove
that there is no instrumental cause ; for while some effects
can be produced by men, others result from divine action
only^ The fact, however, is that men also are able, by

^ It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk
no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's

B b 2

37- VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

applying a means in their power, to produce milk from
grass and herbs ; for when they wish to procure a more
abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully
and thus obtain more milk from her. — For these reasons
the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be
proved from the instance of grass and the like.

6. Even if we admit (the Sahkhya position refuted
in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob-
jections) on account of the absence of a purpose
(on the part of the pradhana).

Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Saii-
khya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the
preceding Sutra, viz, that the pradhana is spontaneously
active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ' on
account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the spontaneous
activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to
anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding
principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and conse-
quently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order
to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you
reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding
principle^ but does regard a purpose, we remark that in
that case we must distinguish between the difTerent pos-
sible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the
soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoy-
ment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally
incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) ^ ? Moreover,
there would in that case be no opportunity for release^.
— If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be
purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the

body ; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the
omniscient Lord is active. Bha.

^ Anadheyalii'ayas3-a sukhadukhapraptiparihararupdtijaya,funyas-
yety artha//. An. Gi.

^ For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of
itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims — ex hypothesi —
only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. 2>73

State of release ; moreover, there would then be no occasion
for the perception of sounds, &c.^ — If both, then, on account
of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be
enjoyed (by the soul)-, there would be no opportunity for
final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con-
sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana ; for
neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially
pure soul can feel any desire. — If, finally, you should assume
the pradhana to be active, because otherwise the power of
sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent
nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana)
would be purposeless ; it would follow that, as the creative
power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more
than the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world
would never come to an end, so that no final release of the
soul could take place''. — It is, therefore, impossible to
maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the
purposes of the soul.

7. And if you say (that the soul may move the
pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one)
or as the magnet (moves the iron) ; thus also (the
difficulty is not overcome).

Well then — the Sahkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend
his position by parallel instances — let us say that, as some
lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing
the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind
man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter
move ; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron,
so the soul moves the pradhana. — Thus also, we reply, you
do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings ; for this
your new position involves an abandonment of your old

^ I. c. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.

^ Tmiye »pi katipaya^abdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir
va bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti/^ syad iti
manvano dvitiyaw pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.

^ The INISS. of Ananda Giri omit sa;«saranuX'/7^edat ; the Bha-
mati's reading is : SargajaktyanuX-X'/^edavad dnkjaktyanuK'/^edat.

0/

4 VEDANTA- SUTRAS.

position, according to which the pradhana is moving of
itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no
moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move
the pradhana ? A man, although lame, may make a blind
man move by means of words and the like ; but the soul
which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put
forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves
the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves
the iron ; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul
and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The
proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is
not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the
adjustment of the magnet in a certain position ; hence
the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really
parallel instances. — The pradhana then being non-intelligent
and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle
to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If
we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of
capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of
seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such
capability would imply the impossibility of final release. —
Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra)
the different alternatives connected with the absence of
purpose (on the pradhana's part) have to be considered ^ —
The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of
the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by
non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same
time, by moving power inherent in ?*Iaya and is thus
superior (to the soul of the Saiikhyas).

8. And, a(^ain, (the pradhana cannot be active)
because the relation of principal (and subordinate
matter) is impossible (between the three gu;^as).

For the following reason also activity on the part of the
pradhana is not possible. — The condition of the pradhana

' On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana's
activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the
soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.

II ADHYAVA, 2 PADA, 9, 375

consists in the three gu;/as, viz. goodness, passion, and
darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise
without standing to one another in the relation of mutual
superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu;/as cannot
possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency
because thereby they would forfeit their essential character-
istic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no
extraneous principle to stir up the gu;/as, the production of
the great principle and the other effects — which would
require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the
gu;/as — is impossible.

9. And although another inference be made, (the
objections remain in force) on account of the (pra-
dhana) being devoid of the power of intelligence.

But — the Saiikhya resumes — we draw another inference,
so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do
not acknowledge the gu//as to be ch iracterised by absolute
irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof
for such an assumption. We rather infer the character-
istics of the gu;^as from those of their effects, presuming
that their nature must be such as to render the production
of the effects possible. Now the gu/^as are admitted to be
of an unsteady nature ; hence the gu^as themselves are
able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even
while they are in a state of equipoise.

Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above
w^hich were founded on the impossibility of an orderly
arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account
of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence.
And if (to escape those objections) the Saiikhya should
infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that
the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an
antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent
cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the
Vedantic doctrine of Brahman. — Moreover, if the gu«as
were capable of entering into the relation of mutual in-
equality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two

376 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

things would happen ; they would either not be in the con-
dition of inequality on account of the absence of an opera-
tive cause ; or else, if they were in that condition, they
would always remain in it ; the absence of an operative
cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the
doctrine would again be open to the objection stated
before ^

lo. And moreover (the Sankhya doctrine) is ob-
jectionable on account of its contradictions.

The doctrine of the Sahkhyas, moreover, is full of contra-
dictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, some-
times eleven^. In some places they teach that the subtle
elements of material things proceed from the great prin-
ciple, in other places again that they proceed from self-
consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal
organs, sometimes of one only ^. That their doctrine, more-
over, contradicts ^ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the
cause of the world, and Smr/ti, based on vSruti, is well
known.^For these reasons also the Sankhya system is
objectionable.

Here the Sankhya again brings a countercharge. — The
system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to
be objectionable ; for it does not admit that that which suffers
and that which causes suffering ^ are difterent classes of
things (and thereby renders futile the well-established dis-
tinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For

^ Anantaro dosho mahadadikaryotpadayoga-^. An. Gi.

^ In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon
as mere modifications of the sense of touch.

^ Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi,
ahahkara, and manas.

■* Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal
rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is,
the context has necessitated its retention in some places. — The
sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world
in which the souls live.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, lO. 377

those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of every-
thing and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also
that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering
and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not
to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes
belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of
them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge
for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its
meaning. For — to adduce a parallel case — a lamp as long
as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities
of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should
adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam,
&c.^, we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute
attributes of the water which remain permanently, although
they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into
the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never
really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is
ever destitute of heat and light. — That that which causes
suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes
of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experi-
ence. For (to consider the matter from a more general
point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired^
are understood to be separate existences. If the object
of desire were not essentially different and separate from
the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be
ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to
which alone he can be called desiring would already essen-
tially be established in him (belong to him). The latter
state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for
instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence
the latter never can stand in want of light ; for want or
desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not
yet obtained.

^ In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly
essential ; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the
sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes
pass away while the substance remains.

^ ' Artha/ a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.

"^/S VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

0/

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the
object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially
separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an
object for the desiring person, and would be an object for
itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the
case ; for the two ideas (and terms), ' object of desire' and
' desiring person.' imply a relation (are correlative), and a
relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the
desiring person and the object of desire are separate. — The
same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object
of aversion ; anartha)and the non-desiring person (anarthin).
An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the de-
siring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvan-
tage ; with both one person enters into relation by turns.
On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of
desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of
aversion, both may be comprised under the general term,
' object of aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we
mean when we use the term ' causes of suffering,' while by
the term ' sufferer ' we understand the soul which, being
one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the
objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the
causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self
(as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is im-
possible.— But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to
constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not
excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz.
wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning — we, the Vedantins, reply — is futile,
because on account of the unity of the Self the relation,
whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the suf-
ferer cannot exist (in the Self). — Our doctrine would be
liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and
that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same
Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and sub-
ject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they
are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes,
such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither
burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, lO. 379

one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into
the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer? — Where then,
it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all
cannot be denied altogether) exist ? — That, we reply, is not
difficult to see^. The living body which is the object of the
action of burning is the sufferer ; the sun, for instance, is
a cause of suffering (burning). — But, the opponent rejoins,
burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being
only, not the non-intelligent body ; for if it were an affection
of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body,
cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for
means to make it cease. — But it is likewise not observed, we
reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is
burned and suffers pain. — Nor would you (the Sahkhya)
also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a
mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit^ a real connexion
of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion
impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the
souk^. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how
then, v;e ask, can you explain the relation existing between a
sufferer and the causes of suffering ? If (as a last refuge) you
should maintain that the sattva-gu;;a is that which suffers,
and the gu;^a called passion that which causes suffering, we
again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) can-
not be really connected with these two *. And if you should
say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards ^
the sattva-guwa, we point out that the employment of the
phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not really suffer.

* In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin
had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of
course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in
the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world,

* In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.
^ And that would be against the Sahkhya dogma of the soul's

essential purity.

* So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart
from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.

® Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti jafikate
sattveti. An. Gi.

^8o VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not
object to the phrase ' as it were ^.' For the amphisbena also
does not become venomous because it is ' a serpent as it
were ' (' like a serpent '), nor does the serpent lose its venom
because it is ' like an amphisbena.' You must therefore
admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers
is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit
that, then my (the Vedantic) doctrine also is free from
objections ^.

But perhaps you (the Sarikhya) will say that, after all,
suffering (on the part of the soul) is reaP. In that case,
however, the impossibility of release is all the more unde-
niable *, especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pra-
dhana) is admitted to be eternal. — And if (to get out of this
difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of
suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering
(on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in
order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two
— which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason,
viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul —
and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the con-
junction of the two comes to an absolute termination,
whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible ;
we are again unable to accept your explanation, because
that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the guna.,
called Darkness^ is acknowledged by you to be eternal.

^ For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.

^ The Sahkhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta
doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known
from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and
things causing suffering. — The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to
show that on the Sahkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering
remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real,
but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.

^ Not only ' suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.

* For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive
knowledge on which — according to the Sahkhya also — release
depends.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 381

And as^ there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and
sinking of the influence of the particular gu;^as, there is also
no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which
effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i. e. non-dis-
crimination) ; hence the disjunction of the two is uncer-
tain, and so the Saiikhyas cannot escape the reproach of
absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To
the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release
being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even ; for the
Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot
enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture,
moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates
from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other
hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering
just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor
refute it.

Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the
pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to
dispose of the atomic theory.

We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists
against the upholders of Brahman. — The Vaii"eshikas argue
as follows : The qualities which inhere in the substance con-
stituting the cause originate qualities of the same kind in
the substance constituting the effect ; we see, for instance,
that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not
observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a
piece of cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelli-
gent Brahman is assumed as the cause of the world, we
should expect to find intelligence inherent in the effect also,
viz. the world. But this is not the case, and consequently
the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
— This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the
ground of the system of the Vaixeshikas themselves.

II. Or (the world may originate from Brahman)

^ This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of
soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence
of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of
Truth.

382 VEDANTA-sC'TRAS.

as the great and the long originate from the short
and the atomic.

The system of the Vai^eshikas is the following : — The
atoms which possess, according to their special kind\ the
qualities of colour, Stc, and which are of spherical form -,
subsist during a certain period ^ without producing any
effects^. After that, the unseen principle (adr/sh/a), &c. •'',
acting as operative causes and conjunction constituting the
non-inherent cause '"', they produce the entire aggregate of
effected things, beginning with binary atomic compounds.
At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the
simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects.
Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound,
the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such as
white colour, &c., produce a corresponding white colour in
the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the
simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce cor-
responding sphericity in the binary compound ; for the
forms of extension belonging to the latter are said to be
minuteness (awutva) and shortness. And, again, when two
binary compounds combining produce a quaternary atomic
compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c., inherent in
the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities
in the quaternary compounds ; with the exception, however,
of the two qualities of minuteness and shortness. For it is

^ I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.

^ Parima«(2'ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific
form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms
themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely
small spheres. Cp. Vaij. Sut. VII, i, 20.

^ Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the
atoms are isolated and motionless.

* When the time for a new creation has come.
' The &c. implies the aciivily of the Lord.

* The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the
constituent atoms, the non-inherent cause the conjunction of those
atoms, the operative causes the adr/sh/a and the Lord's activity
which make them enter into conjunction.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 383

admitted that the forms of extension belonging to quater-
nary compounds arc not minuteness and shortness, but
bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens ^ when
many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple
atom and a binary compound combine to produce new
effects.

Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary
compounds are produced; which are minute and short, and
ternary compounds which are big and long, but not anything
spherical ; or as from binary compounds, w^hich are minute
and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which are
big and long, not minute and short ; so this non-intelligent
world may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a
doctrine to which you — the Vaijeshika — cannot, on your
own principles, object.

Here the Vaij^eshika will perhaps come forward with the
following argumentation ^. As effected substances, such as
binary compounds and so on, are engrossed by forms of
extension contrary to that of the causal substances, the
forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz. sphericity
and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.
The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any
quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelli-
gence inherent in the cause should not be able to originate .
a new intelHgence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a
quality contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation.
As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel
one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to
itself.

This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the
qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the
cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with

^ I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect
depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number
of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).

^ In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance
of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a funda-
mental Vaijeshika principle.

384 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

intelligence also ; so that the two cases arc parallel so far.
Nor can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by
a diftcrent form of extension be alleged as the reason of
sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to them-
selves ; for the power of originating effects belongs to
sphericity, &c. before another form of extension .begins
to exist. For it is admitted that the substance pro-
duced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that
thereupon only (i. e. after that moment) its qualities begin
to exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c.
concentrate their activity on originating other forms of
extension ^, and therefore do not originate forms of exten-
sion belonging to the same class as their own ; for it is
admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other
causes ; as the Sutras of Ka;/abhu^ (Ka;/ada) themselves
declare (Vaij-. Sut. VII, i, 9, 'Bigness is produced from
plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause
and from a kind of accumulation ;' VII, i, 10, 'The con-
trary of this (the big) is the minute ; ' VII, i, 17, ' Thereby
length and shortness are explained ^ '). — Nor, again, can it
be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate
(like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in
which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance),
while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do
not ; for when a new substance or a new quality is origin-

^ I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.

^ The first of the three Sutras quoted comprises, in the present text
of the Vaijeshika-sutras, only the following words, ' Kara?2abahutva^
ka;' the ka. of the Sutra implying, according to the commentators,
mahattva and praZ'aya. — According to the Vaijeshikas the form of
extension called a«u, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent
in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute
binary atomic compound originates. — The form of extension called
mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i. e. the
plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big'
thing ; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound,
for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms.
In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others
to pra^aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskara on Vai^-. Siat. VII,
I, 9; 10.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 385

ated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same rela-
tion of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance
in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of
sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained
from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the
same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelli-
gence ^ Moreov^er, from that observed fact also, that from
conjunction (sa;//yoga) there originate substances, &c. be-
longing to a class different (from that to which conjunction
itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belong-
ing to the same class as the causes from which they spring
is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that,
as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brah-
man), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. con-
junction) as a parallel case ; we point out that at present
we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging
to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for
the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as
examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.
Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a
parallel case for a substance (Vaij-. Sut. IV, 2, 2, ' On
account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things
imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not comr
posed of five elements '). Just as the conjunction which
inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether
is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent
cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible,
part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible;
but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible ; hence it is not
composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a
quality and the body a substance. — The origin of effects
different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been
already treated of under II, i, 6. — Well then, this being so,
the matter has been settled there already (why then is it
again discussed here ?) — Because, we reply, there we argued

^ I.e. if the Vaijcshikas have to admit that it is the nature of
sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also may
maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non-
intelligent world.

[34] c c

386 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

against the Sarikhya, and at present we have to do with
the Vaii-eshika. — But, already once before (II, i, 3) a line
of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply
declared to extend to the latter also ; (why then do you
not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the
Sdhkhya are equally valid against the Vai^eshika ?) —
Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examina-
tion of the Vaii^eshika system we prefer to discuss the
point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of
the Vaij'eshikas.

12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adr/sh/a
inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of
the atoms) is not (possible) ; hence absence of that
(viz. creation and pralaya).

The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of
atoms being the cause of the world. — This doctrine arises
in the following manner. We see that all ordinary sub-
stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of
cloth originate from the substances connected with them by
the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc-
tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We
thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists
of parts has originated from those substances with which it
is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co-
operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole
and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into
minuter parts is the atom. — This whole world, with its
mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts ; because
it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end ^ ; an
effect may not be assumed without a cause ; therefore the
atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka;/ada's
doctrine. — As we observe four elementary substances con-
sisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have
to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms
marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can-

* Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of
parts.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 12. 387

not be divided themselves ; hence when the elements are
destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only ; this
state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the
pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After
that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman)
springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due
to the unseen principle-^ joins the atom in which it resides to
another atom ; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced,
and finally the element of air. In a like manner are pro-
duced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus
the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities
inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary
compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth
result from the qualities of the threads. — Such, in short, is
the teaching of the followers of Ka;/ada.

This doctrine we controvert in the following manner. — It
must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state
of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their
conjunction ; for we observe that the conjunction of threads
and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is
itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is
brought about ; for unless some such cause exists, no original
motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative
cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some
cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact.
But in that case original motion could not occur at all in
the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, im-
possible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a
quahty of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists
then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour origi-
nates when the soul is connected with the internal organ
which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the
assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the
like. For they all are possible only after the creation of
the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the

^ Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with
the souls to which merit and demerit belong. — Adnsh/apeksham
adr/sh/avatkshetra^77asa/?;}'Ogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.

C C 2

388 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

causes of the original action (by which the world is
produced). — If in the second place, the unseen principle is
assumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms,
we ask : Is this unseen principle to be considered as
inherinfT in the soul or in the atom ? In both cases it can-

o

not be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non-
intelHszent. For. as we have shown above in our examina-
tion of the Sahkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which
is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself
either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be
the guiding principle of the adr/sh/a because at the time of
pralaya its intelligence has not yet arisen ^. If, on the other
hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul,
it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there
exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that
the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected
with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity
of connexion^, continuity of action, as there is no other
restricting principle. — Hence, there being no definite cause
of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms ;
there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which
depends on action cannot take place ; there being no con-
junction, all the effects depending on it; viz. the formation
of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.

How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with
another to be imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration
of the two or partial conjunction? If the former, then no
increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic
size only would exist ; moreover, it would be contrary to
what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place
between substances having parts (pradej-a). If the latter,
it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts. — Let
then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts. — If so,
imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the
atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non-

^ According to the Vaij'eshikas intelligence is not essential to
the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul
is joined to an internal organ.

^ The soul being all -pervading.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 3. 389

inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent
causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c.
could not originate. And just as at the time of the first
creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction
could not take place, there being no cause of such motion ;
thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could
take place leading to their separation, since for that occur-
rence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor
could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its
purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment
on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya.
There being then no possibility of action to effect either the
conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunc-
tion nor separation would actually take place, and hence
neither creation nor pralaya of the world. — For these reasons
the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must
be rejected.

'to

13. And because in consequence of samavaya
being admitted a regressus in infinitum results
from parity of reasoning.

You (the Vaii-eshika) admit that a binary compound which
originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from
them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence ;
but on that assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the
general cause cannot be established, ' because parity involves
here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary
compound which is absolutely different from the two con-
stituent atoms is connected with them by means of the
relation of inherence (samavaya), so the relation of inherence
itself being absolutely different from the two things which
it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect
it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases.
For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation
of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad
infinitum. — But — the Vaij-eshika is supposed to reply — we
are conscious of the so-called samavaya relation as eternally
connected with the things between which it exists, not as

;90 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

either non-connected with them or as depending on another
connexion ; we are therefore not obh'ged to assume another
connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow
ourselves to be driven into a regress us in infinitum. —
Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the
admission that conjunction (sa7;/yoga) also as being eternally
connected with the things which it joins doeS; like samavaya,
not require another connexion ^. If you say that conjunc-
tion does require another connexion because it is a different
thing -, we reply that then samavaya also requires another
connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can
you say that conjunction does require another connexion
because it is a quality [gwia.), and samavaya does not
because it is not a quality ; for (in spite of this difference)
the reason for another connexion being required is the same
in both cases ^, and not that which is technically called
' quality' is the cause (of another connexion being required)*.
— For these reasons those who acknowledge samavaya to be
a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infini-
tum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term
involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the
origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be
accounted for. — For this reason also the atomic doctrine is
inadmissible.

14. And on account of the permanent existence
(of activity or non-activity).

Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either

^ Which is inadmissible on Vaijeshika principles, because saw-
yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by
samavaya,

^ Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The
argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires
another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each
other in the way of conjunction.

' Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sa/?zyoga from
the terms which they connect.

* Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya relation
to their substrates.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5. 39!

essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both
or neither ; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the
four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially
active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya
could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their
non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take
place. Their being both is impossible because self-con-
tradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non-
activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and
then the operative causes such as the adr/sh/a being in
permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity
would result ; or else the adr/sh/a and so on not being taken
as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent
non-activity on the part of the atoms. — For this reason also
the atomic doctrine is untenable.

15. And on account of the atoms having colour,
&c., the reverse (of the Vaii^eshika tenet would take
place) ; as thus it is observed.

Let us suppose, the "V^aij^eshikas say, all substances com-
posed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts ; a limit
will finally be reached beyond which the process of disin-
tegration cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit
are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to
four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,
and are the originating principles of this whole material
world with its colour, form, and other qualities.

This fundamental assumption of the Vaij-eshikas we
declare to be groundless because from the circumstance of
the atoms having colour and other qualities there would
follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and perma-
nency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate
cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary
experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and
other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non-
permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared
to the threads of which it consists, and non-permanent ;
and the threads again are non-permanent and gross com-

,-^92 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

pared to the filaments of which they are made up.
Therefore the atoms also which the Vai^eshikas admit to
have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which
they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason
also which Kawada gives for the permanence of the atoms
(IV, I, I, 'that which exists without having a cause is
permanent ') does not apply at all to the atoms because, as
we have shown just now, the atoms arc to be considered as
having a cause. — The second reason also which Ka;/ada
brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in
IV, I, 4, 'the special negation implied in the term non-
eternal would not be possible ' ' (if there did not exist some-
thing eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the
permanency of the atoms ; for supposing that there exists
not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative com-
pound such as ' non-eternal ' is impossible. Nor does the
existence of the word ' non-permanent ' absolutely pre-
suppose the permanency of atoms ; for there exists (as we
Vedantins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause,
viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be'
established merely on the ground of a word commonly
being used in that sense, since there is room for common
use only if word and matter are well-established by some
other means of right knowledge.— The third reason also
given in the Vai.f. Sutras (IV, i, 5) for the permanency of
the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we
explain that Sutra to mean ' the non-perception of those
actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,'
it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are
permanent ^. And if we tried to escape from that difficulty
by including (in the explanation of the Sutra as given above)
the qualification 'there being absence of (originating) sub-

' Our Vaij-eshika-sutras read ' pradshedhabhava/^ ; ' but as all
MSS. of 6ankara have ' pratishedhabhava;^ ' I have kept the latter
reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation :
Karyam anityam iti karye vijeshato nityatvanishedho na syad yadi
karawe^py anityatvam ato^wunaw? kara«ana/« nityateti sutrartha/^.

'^ Because they also are not perceptible ; the ternary aggregates,
the so-called trasarewus, constituting the minima perceptibilia.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 6. 393

Stances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause would
furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and-
as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, i,
i) the Sutra IV, i, 5 would be a useless restatement. — Well,
then (the Vaii^eshika might say), let us understand by
' Nescience ' (in the Sutra) the irnpossibility of conceiving a
third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to
the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the
destruction of the causal substance ; which impossibility
involves the permanency of the atoms ^. — There is no neces-
sity, we reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing
must perish on account of either of those two reasons.
That assumption would indeed have to be made if it were
generally admitted that a new substance is produced only
by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it
is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new
substance by passing over into a qualified state after having
previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure
generality, it follows that the effected substance may be
destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hard-
ness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire ^.— Thus there
would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having
colour, &c., the opposite of what the Vai^eshikas mean.
For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be main-
tained.

16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.

Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch,
and is gross ; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine ;
fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet ; air is finest of
all, and has the quality of touch only. The question now
arises whether the atoms constituting the four elements are
to be assumed to possess the same greater or smaller

^ As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or
destroyed.

^ This according to the Vedanta view. If atoms existed they
might have originated from avidya by a mere pariwama and might
again be dissolved into avidya, without either disintegration or
destruction of their cause taking place.

394 vedanta-sOtras.

number of qualities as the respective elements. — Either
assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we
assume that some kinds of atoms have more numerous
qualities, it follows that their solid size (murti) will be
increased thereby, and that implies their being atoms no
longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place
without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our
observations concerning effected material bodies. — If, on the
other hand, we assume, in order to save the equality of
atoms of all kinds, that there is no difference in the number
of their qualities, we must either suppose that they have all
one quality only ; but in that case we should not perceive
touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste,
colour, and touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects
have for their antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or
else we must suppose all atoms to have all the four quali-
ties ; but in that case we should necessarily perceive what
we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in water, smell and
taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air. — Hence on this
account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be unac-
ceptable.

1 7. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted
(by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded
altogether.

O

While the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the
world has been accepted by some adherents of the Veda —
as, for instance, Manu — with a view to the doctrines of the
effect existing in the cause already, and so on, the atomic
doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of authority
in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded
entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

There are, moreover, other objections to the Vaij^eshika
doctrine. — The Vaij-eshikas assume six categories, which
constitute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance,
quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence.
These six categories they maintain to be absolutely dif-
ferent from each other, and to have different characteristics ;

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I J. 395

just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.
Side by side with this assumption they make another which
contradicts the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c.
have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is
altogether inappropriate ; for just as ordinary things, such
as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being absolutely
different from each other do not depend on each other, so
the qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from sub-
stance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities,
&c. depend on substance ; then it follows that, as they are
present where substance is present, and absent where it is
absent, substance only exists, and, according to its various
forms, becomes the object of different terms and conceptions
(such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for instance,
according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the
object of various conceptions and names. But this latter
alternative would involve the acceptation of the Sahkhya
doctrine ^ and the abandonment of the Vaij-eshika stand-
point.— But (the Vaijeshika may say) smoke also is different
from fire and yet it is dependent on it. — True, we reply ;
but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire from the
fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance
and quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived ; for
when we are conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or
a blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognised by means
of the quality ; the latter therefore has its Self in the sub-
stance. The same reasoning applies to action, generality,
particularity, and inherence.

If you (the Vaij-eshika) say that qualities, actions, &c.
(although not non-different from substances) may yet
depend on the latter because substances and qualities stand
in the relation of one not being able to exist without the
other (ayutasiddhi -) ; we point out that things which are

^ The Sahkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as
being the pradhana in various forms. — There is no need of
assuming with Govindananda that by the Sahkhya of the text we
have to understand the Vedanta.

^ Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avinajyad aparajritam evava-
tisliMate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.

59^ VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or non-
separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none
of these alternatives agrees with Vaii'eshika principles. For
the first alternative contradicts your own assumptions ac-
cording to which the cloth originating from the threads
occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the cloth,
while the qualities of the cloth, such as its white colour,
occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the threads.
So the Vai.yeshika-siitras say (I, i, lo), ' Substances originate
another substance and qualities another quality.' The
threads which constitute the causal substance originate the
effected substance, viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the
threads, such as white colour, &c., produce in the cloth new
corresponding qualities. But this doctrine is clearly contra-
dicted by the assumption of substance and quality being
non-separate in place. — If, in the second place, you explain
ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also
that, for instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would
be ayutasiddha. — And if, finally, you explain it to mean
' non-separation in character,' it is impossible to make any
further distinction between the substance and the quality, as
then quality is conceived as being identical with substance.
Moreover, the distinction which the Vaij'eshikas make
between conjunction (sawyoga) as being the connexion of
things which can exist separately, and inherence (samavaya)
as being the connexion of things which are incapable of
separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists
before the effect ^ cannot be said to be incapable of separate
existence. Perhaps the Vaij-eshika will say that his defi-
nition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya
is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is
incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no
avail ;.for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as
long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be con-
nected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing
to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has
begun to exist ; for if the Vaij-eshika admits that the effect

' The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 397

may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is
no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and
thereby the principle that between effect and cause con-
junction and disjunction do not take place is violated ^.
And " just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the con-
nexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has
been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as
ether, &c. — although no motion has taken place on the part
of the effected substance — so also the connexion of the
effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not sama-
vaya.

Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion,
samavaya or sa;;^yoga, apart from the things which it con-
nects. If it should be maintained that sawyoga and sama-
vaya have such an existence because we observe that there
are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and
ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and
the same thing may be the subject of several names and
ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without
it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of
many different names and notions according as he is con-
sidered in himself or in his relations to others ; thus he is
thought and spoken of as man, Brahma;/a, learned in the
Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son,
grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the
same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with,
spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred,
or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are
not only conceived and denoted as connected things, but
in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms
' conjunction ' or ' inherence,^ which however do not prove

^ If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion
with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer
samavaya but sawyoga; and that contradicts a fundamental Vai^re-
shika principle.

^ This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions
which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered
conjunctions.

igS VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

themselves to be separate entities. — Things standing thus,
the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.),
which entities would have to be established on the ground
of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception.
— Nor, again ^, does the circumstance of the word and idea
of connexion having for its object the things connected
involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we have
already shown above that one thing may, on account of its
relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in dif-
ferent ways.

Further-, conjunction cannot take place between the
atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have
no parts ; for we observe that conjunction takes place only
of such substances as consist of parts. If the Vaijreshika
should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be
assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction),
we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing
things would involve the result that anything might be
established ; for there is no restrictive rule that only such
and such non-existing things — whether contradictory to
reason or not — should be assumed and not any other, and
assumptions depend on one's choice only and may be carried
to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no
reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred
or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed
by the Vaij^eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything,
and we could neither stop a compassionate man from
assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause .
of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a
malicious man from assuming that even the released souls
are to enter on a new cycle of existences.

^ A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent
existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence
of the connexion.

^ It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into
sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sawyoga of the soul
with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter,
and that saw/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of
cognition.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 399

Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound,
which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple
indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa;;wlesha)
any more than they can thus be connected with ether ; for
between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind
of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between
wood and varnish^.

Let it then be said (the Vaiyeshika resumes) that the
samavaya relation must be assumed, because otherwise
the relation of that which abides and that which forms the
abode — which relation actually exists between the effected
substance and the causal substance — is not possible. — That
would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence ; for
only when the separateness of cause and effect is established,
the relation of the abode and that which abides can be
established ; and only when the latter relation is esta-
blished, the relation of separateness can be established.
For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness
of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the
relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their
doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause ^. —
Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite exten-
sion), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we
acknowledge regions of spaced whether those be six or
eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent ;
conclusions contrary to the Vai^reshika doctrine of the indi-
visibility and permanency of the atoms. — If the Vaij-eshika
replies that those very parts which are owing to the exist-
ence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible)

^ Ekasambandhyakarshawe yatra sambandhyantarakarsha;?a;«
tatra sa»/jlesha^, sa tu savayavanaw ^atukash///adina?« dn'sh/o
na tu niravayavai// savayavanam, ato dvyawukasya savayavasya
niravayavena parama?iuna sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyabh.

^ In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically
recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and
the effect is accounted for.

^ For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern
end, &c.

400 VEDANTA-st'TRAS.

atoms ; we deny that because all things whatever, forming
a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are
capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is
reached. Earth — which is, in comparison with a binary com-
pound, the grossest thing of all — undergoes decomposition ;
so do the substances following next which belong to the
same class as earth ; so does the binary compound ; and so
does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of
all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with
earth, &c. The objection (which the Vaijcshika might pos-
sibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only
by the separation of their parts \ we have already disposed of
above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take
place in a manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as
the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in con-
sequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their
contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all
the while ; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be
decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced
condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origi-
nation of effects also is brought about not merely in the
way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for
instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and
ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.

It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by
very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural
passages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and
is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand
on Scripture, such as Manu and others. Hence it is to be
altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a
regard for their own spiritual welfare.

1 8. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates
with its two causes, (there takes place) non-estab-
lishment of those (two aggregates).

The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the

^ And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the
ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8. 4OI

Vaii-eshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above.
That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-
nihih'stic^). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches
universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being
taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.

That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due
either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha
at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on
the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal
opinior^s may, however, be distinguished ; the opinion of
those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists,
sarvastitvavadin) ; the opinion of those who maintain that
thought only is real (Idealists, vi^;7anavadin) ; and the
opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (un-
real; Nihilists, i-unyavidin -). — We first controvert those

^ Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes
difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in
animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old
and the continual origination of new substances.

^ The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively
from the commentaries on the -S'ahkarabhashya, and no attempt
has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts
of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha
books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the
Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadarj'a7;asaffzgraha. — The Nihilists are
the Madhyamikas ; the Idealists are the Yoga>^aras ; the Sautran-
tikas and the Vaibhashikas together constitute the class of the
Realists. — I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brah-
mavidyabhara«a. — Buddhasya hi madhyamika-yoga,<'ara-sautran-
tika-vaibhashikasam§^fiakaj X'atvara-^ j-ishya//. Tatra buddhena
prathamaw yan prati sarvaw jfanyam ity upadish/aw te madhya-
mikas te hi guru«a yathoktaw tathaiva jraddhaya gr/hitavanta iti
kr/tva napakr/sh/a/i punaj kz, taduktasyarthasya buddhj-anusa-
re«akshepasyakrnatvan notkr/sh/abuddhaya iti madhyamika^.
Anyais tu jishyair guruwa sarvajunyatva upadish/e ^ilanatiriktasya
sarvasya junyatvam astu nameti guruktir yoga iti bauddai/i pari-
bhashitopeta>^ tad upari >fa ^wanasya tu junyatvawz na sa7«bhavati
tathatve ^'agadandhyaprasahgat junyasiddher apy asawbhava/(' ^eti
buddhamate a/'aratvena paribhashita akshepo^pi kr/ta iti yoga-
kixih, vi^Tianamatrastitvavadina/^. Tadanantaram anyai-^ ^ishyai/i

[34] D d

402 vedanta-S'Ctras.

who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is
real. What is external is either clement (bhuta) or elementary
(bhautika); what is internal is either mind (-(-itta) or mental
(/taitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on ; elemental
are colour, Sic. on the one hand, and the eye and the other
sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three
elements arise from the aggregation of the four different
kinds of atoms ; the atoms of earth being hard, those of
water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile. — The
inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups'* (skan-
dha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of
knowledge (vi^/7anaskandha). the group of feeling (vedana-
skandha), the group of verbal knowledge (sam^waskandha),
and the group of impressions (sa?«skaraskandha) ^ ; which

pratitisiddhasya kathawi sunyztvzm vaktu;« j'akyam ato ^wanavad
vahyartho:ipi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so^stu, parara tu so
inumeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathangikrz'tyaivaOT ^ishyamatim
anusr/tya kiyatparyanta/?/ sutraz?; bhavishyatiti t^ih pr;sh/am atas
te sautrantika^. Anye punar yady zyam gha/a iti pratitibalad
vahyo^rtha upeyate tarhi tasya eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa
katha?;/ paroksho^to vahyo^^^rtho na pratyaksha iti bhasha viruddh-
ety akshipann atas te vaibhashika//.

^ The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects,
colour, &c. ; the sense-organs Nvere above called bhautika, they here
re-appear as /(•aittika on account of their connexion with thought.
Their objects likewise are classed as ^aittika in so far as they are
perceived by the senses. — The vi^wanaskandha comprises the
series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavi^wanapravaha//),
according to all commentators ; and in addition, according to the
Brahmavidyabhara;/a, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate,
of external things (savikalpakaw nirvikalpaka;;/ ^a pravr/tlivi^«a-
nasam^witam). — The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.
— The sam^T/askandha comprises the cognition of things by their
names (gaur a^va ityadijabdasam^alpitapratyaya^, An. Gi. ; gaur _
ai'va ityeva7« namavi^ish/asavikalpaka^ pratyaya-^. Go. An. ; sarngfia.
yag'wadattadipadatadullckhi savikalpapratyayo va, dvittyapakshe
vi^wanapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahya-^, Brahmavidyabh.).
The sa/;/skaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma
and adharma. — Compare also the Bliamati. — The vi^wanaskandha
is >('itta, the other skandhas /^aitta.

II ADHYAYA, 2 TADA, 1 8. 403

taken together constitute the basis of all personal exist-
ence ^

With reference to this doctrine we make the following
remarks. — Those two aggregates, constituting two different
classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas
assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary-
things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the
five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Baud-
dha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained
how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts con-
stituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence,
and the kindling (abhi^alana) of intelligence depends on an
aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously^.
And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelli-
gent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord,
which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can
the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on
their own account ; for that would imply their never ceasing
to be active'^. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked
for in the so-called abode (i. e. the alayavi^;7ana-pravaha,
the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described
either as different from the single cognitions or as not dif-
ferent from them. (In the former case it is either permanent,
and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the
Vedantins ; or non-permanent ;) then being admitted to be
momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and
cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms *.

^ It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as well as
the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kshawikatva),
the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground
controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.

"^ Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of
an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.

^ In consequence of which no release could take place.

* The Brahmavidyabhara?za explains the last clause — from ksha-
wikatva-^ X'a — somewhat differently : Api kz paramawunam api
kshawikatvabhyupagaman melanaz?/ na sambhavati, paramawuna;?^
melana/w parama/zukriyadhinam, tatha /C'a svakriyaw prati parama-
wfinaw kara/zatvat kriyapurvakshawe parama/mbhir bhavyam, kriya

D d 2

404 vedanta-sCtras.

(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than
before.) — For all these reasons the formation of aggregates
cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there
would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which
presupposes those aggregates.

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates
may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing
in the relation of mutual causality ; we say ' No,'
because they merely are the efficient causes of the
origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle
of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul,
under whose influence the formation of aggregates could
take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered
possible through the mutual causality ^ of Nescience and
so on, so that we need not look for any other combining
principle.

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the fol-
lowing members : Nescience, impression, knowledge, name
and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire,
activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation,
pain, mental affliction^ and the like^. All these terms con-

jrayataya kriyakshawe^ipi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva7^^
melanakshane^pi, nahi melanajrayasyabhave melanarupa pravr/tlir
upapadyate, tatha /^a sthiraparamawusadhya melanarupa pravr/tti^
kathaw tesham ksha;nkatve bhavet. — Ananda Giri also divides and
translates differently from the translation in the text.

^ The karawatvat of -5'ankara explains the pratyayatvat of the
Sutra ; karya;« praty ayate ^anakatvena gaHMti.

^ The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of
the terms of this series. — The following is the substance of the
comment of the Brahmavidyabharawa: Nescience is the error of
considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent,
pure, &c. — Impression (affection, sawskara) comprises desire,
aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them. — Knowledge
(vi^;7ana) is the self-consciousness (aham ity alayavi^wanasya
vr/ttilabha^) springing up in the embryo. — Name and form is the
rudimentary flake- or bubble-like condition of the embryo, — The

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IQ. 405

stitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the
Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length.
They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by
the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems.
And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted
chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water-
wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute
bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such
Nescience and so on could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to
accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the
origination of the members of the series, but does not
intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggre-
gates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made
above that the existence of aggregates must needs be
inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we
point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so
on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the
existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for
the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already
shown — when examining the Vaij^eshika doctrine — that the
formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on
the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in

abode of the six (sha^/ayatana) is the further developed stage of
the embryo in ^vhich the latter is the abode of the six senses. —
Touch (sparja) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the
embryo's part. — Feeling (vedana) the sensations of pleasure and
pain resulting therefrom.- — Desire (tr?sh//a) is the wish to enjoy
the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones. — Activity
(upadana) is the effort resulting from desire. — Birth is the passing
out from the uterus. — Species (^ati) is the class of beings to which
the new-born creature belongs. — Decay (o?'ara). — Death (mara«am)
is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die
(mumGrsha). — Grief (.foka) the frustration of wishes connected
therewith. — Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that ac-
count.— Pain (du/ikha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. —
Durmanas is mental affliction. — The ' and the like ' implies death,
the departure to another world and the subsequent return from
there.

4o6 vedanta-sOtkas.

which the acbv'sh/a abides ^ ; how much less then arc aggre-
gates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not
connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e.
souls), and that which abides in them (the ad/v'sh/a). — Let
us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c.
themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate. — But
how — we ask — can they be the cause of that without which
— as their abode — they themselves are not capable of exist-
ence ? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sawsara
the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain,
and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those
aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume
either that each aggregate necessarily produces another
aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled
rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the
former case a human body could never pass over into that
of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions ; in
the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an
elephant or a god and again become a man ; either of which
consequences would be contrary to your system. — Moreover,
that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is
formed is, according to your doctrine, not a permanent
enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and
cannot be desired by anything else ; hence final release also
must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself

A ^ A A

^ Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain : Ajrayajrayibhuteshv
iti bhoktr/vijesha^am ad/vsh/a^rayeshv ity artha/?. — The Brahma-
vidyabharawa says : Nityeshv aj'rayajrayibhuteshv a;mshv abhyupa-
gamyamaneshu bhoktr/shu >^a satsv ity anvaya^. Airayajrayibhu-
teshv ity asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity artha/;. — And with
regard to the subsequent ajrayajrayi^finyeshu : ajrayairayitvaju-
nyeshu, ayara bhava//, sthireshu paramawushu yadanvaye parama-
?7una/« sawghatapatti// yadvyatireke kn na tad upakarakam upakar-
ya^ paramawava/; yena tatkr/to bhoga/z piarlhyate sa tatra karteti
grahituw jakyate, kshawikeshu tu paramawushu anvayavyatireka-
grahasyanekaksha/zasadhyasyasawbhavan nopakaryopakarakabhavo
nirdharayituwz sakya/i. — Ananda Giri remarks on the latter : Adrt-
sh/a.frayakartr/rahityam ahajrayeti. Another reading appears to be
ai'ayajrayaj'iinyeshu.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 407

only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If
a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be
conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoy-
ment and release, and that would be contrary to your
doctrine of general impermanency. — There may therefore
exist a causal relation between the members of the series
consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a
permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on
that ground the existence of aggregates.

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between
Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the
subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand
in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they can-
not be made to account for the existence of aggregates ; we
are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered
as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series
to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary
existence only admit that when the thing existing in the
second moment ^ enters into being the tiling existino- in the
first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible
to establish between the two things the relation of cause and
effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases
or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of
non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary
existence. — Let it then be said that the former momentary
existence when it has reached its full development becomes
the cause of the later momentary existence. — That also is
impossible ; for the assumption that a fully developed
existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion
that it is connected with a second moment (which contra-
dicts the doctrine of universal momentariness). — Then let
the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its

^ Baucldhanawi kshawapadena gha/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate
na tu tadatirikta// ka^/^it kshawo nama kaloxsti. Brahmavidyabh.

4o8 vedanta-sCtras.

causal energy. — That assumption also is fruitless, because we
cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued
with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the
cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the
nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is im-
possible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the
permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandon-
ment of the doctrine of general non-permanency. — Nor can it
be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good
without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect ;
for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases ^. —
]\Ioreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the
Bauddha speaks must either constitute a things own form or
another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But
none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha
principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation
constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the
word ' thing ' and the words ' origination ' and ' cessation '
are interchangeable (which is not the case). — Let then,
secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed,
in consequence of which the terms ' origination ' and ' cessa-
tion ' may denote the initial and final states of that which in
the intermediate state is called thing. — In that case, we
reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz.
the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the
doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned.
— Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation
be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo
is from a horse. — That too cannot be, we reply ; for it would
lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether
disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting.
And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we under-
stood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its
perception and non-perception ; for the latter are attributes
of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself. — Hence

^ And whereupon then could be established the difference of
mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material
causes such as clay, &c. ?

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 1. 409

we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be
untenable.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause ;
while yet the eftect takes place), there results con-
tradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise
simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-
permanency, the former momentary existence, as having
already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause
of the later one. — Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that
an effect may arise even when there is no cause. — That, we
reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by
yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications
originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes^.
Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there
would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate
at any time. — If, on the other hand, you should say that
we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last
until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out
that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and
effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz.
that all things ^ are momentary merely.

^ These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati-
pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate
cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambana-
pratyaya). — I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabharawa :
Adhipatir indriyaw tad dhi .^akshuradirupam utpannasya ^;7anasya
rupadivishayata/// niya-^/^/^ati niyamakax X'a loke:«:dhipatir ity uX'yate.
Sahakari aloka;^. Samanantarapratyaya/^ purvci^'77anam,bauddhamate
hi ksha«ika^«anasa/«tatau purva^wanam uttara^?Ianasya karana?«
tad eva ^a mana ity uXyate. Alambana?;2 gha/adi/^ Etan hetun
pratiya prapya /^akshuradi^anyam ity adi.

* Sa?;;skara iti, tanmate purvaksha«a eva hetubhCila/^ sawskaro
vasaneti X'a vyavahriyate karya/« tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya
sa»iskaia^, tatha ki. karyakarawatmakaw sarvaw bhavarupaw ksha-
mkam iti prati^«artha^. Brahmavidyabhara«a.

4 1 0 VED ANTA-sOtR AS.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the
mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be
established, there being no (complete) interruption.

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is
going on constantly, assume that ' whatever forms an object
of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced
(sa;;^sk;7ta) and momentary.' To the triad there mentioned
they give the names ' cessation dependent on a sublative act
of the mind,' ' cessation not dependent on such an act,' and
' space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a
merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all
positive characteristics. By ' cessation dependent on a sub-
lative act of the mind,' we have to understand such destruc-
tion of entities as is preceded by an act of thought ^ ; by
' cessation not so dependent ' is meant destruction of the
opposite kind - ; by ' space ' is meant absence in general of
something covering (or occupying space). Out of these
three non-existences ' space ' will be refuted later on (Sutra
24) ; the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the
mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both
impossible, ' on account of the absence of interruption.'
For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the
series (of momentary existences) or to the single members
constituting the series. — The former alternative is impossible,
because in all series (of momentary existences) the members
of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and
effect so that the series cannot be interrupted^. — The latter

^ As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the
intention of doing so.

^ I. e. the insensible continual decay of things. — Viparita iti
pratiksha«a?« gha/adinawz yuktya sadhyamano ^ kuxalair avagantum
a^akya// siakshmo vinaroipratisa^wkhyanirodhay^. Brahmav.

^ A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of
causes and effects can never be entirely stopped ; for the last
momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect
or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued ;
the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23. 4II

alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to
maintain that any momentary existence should undergo
complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected
(with the previous state of existence), since we observe that
a thing is recognised in the various states through which it
may pass and thus has a connected existence ^. And in
those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised
(after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the
ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one
and the same thing continues to exist without any interrup-
tion.— For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which
the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

23. And on account of the objections presenting
themselves in either case.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption
of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation
discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of
perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of
its own accord. But the former alternative would imply
the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction
takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would
involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to
the 'path'^. As therefore both alternatives are open to
objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatis-
factory.

exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal
efficiency (cp. Sarvadarja«asa»igraha). And the non-existence of
the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the
whole series.

^ Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form
of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the
powder into which the potsherds are ground. — Analogously we
infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as
a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to
exist in some form.

^ The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.

4 I 2 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of
its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of
its not differing (from the two other kinds of non-
entity).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the
Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and
therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa;;^khyavirodha and
aprati ) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to
show the same with regard to space (ether, akaj-a).

With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that
it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in
the case of space no less than in the case of the two so-
called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras, That
space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain
scriptural passages, such as ' space sprang from the Self.' —
To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us
as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that
the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality
of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things
are the abodes of smell and the other qualities. — Moreover,
if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in
general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow
that while one bird is flying — whereby space is occupied —
there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at
the same time. And if you should reply that the second
bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering
body, we point out that that something by which the
absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a
positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere
non-existence of covering bodies ^. — Moreover, the Bauddha
places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other
parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures,
a series of questions and answers (beginning, ' On what, O
reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following

^ What does enable us to declare that there is avarawabhava in
one place and not in another ? Space ; which therefore is some-
thing real.

II ADMYAYA, 2 PADA, 25. 413

question occurs, ' On what is the air founded?' to which it
is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it
is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the sup-
position of space being a positive entity, not a mere
negation. — Further, there is a self-contradiction in the
Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega-
tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are
not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they
are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-
eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects
and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real
things. Anything with regard to which that distinction
holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and
the like are. not a mere undefinable negation.

25. And on account of remembrance.

The philosopher who maintains that all things are
momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to
the perceiving person (upalabdhrz) also ; that is, however,
not possible, on account of the remembrance which is con-
sequent on the original perception. That remembrance can
take place only if it belongs to the same person who pre-
viously made the perception ; for we observe that what one
man has experienced is not remembered by another man.
How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed
in the sentences, ' I saw that thing, and now I see this
thing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same ?
That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in
the case of the observing and remembering subject being
one, is a matter known to every one ; for if there were, in
the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness
arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, '/
remember ; another person made the observation.' But no
such state of consciousness does arise. — When, on the other
hand, such a state of consciousness docs arise, then every-
body knows that the person who made the original observa-
tion, and the person who remembers, are different persons,
and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows,
' I remember that that other person saw that and that.'—

4 1 4 vedanta-sOtras.

In the case under discussion, however, the Vaina^-ika him-
self— whose state of consciousness is, ' I saw that and that '
— knows that there is one thinking subject only to which
the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs,
and does not think of denying that the past perception
belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire
is hot and gives light.

As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of
perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainijika has
necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari-
ness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent
successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one
and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute
all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the
same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of
himself, that everything has a momentary existence only?
Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as
one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity
(of the different self-cognitions ; each, however, being
momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity
is based on two things, and that for that reason the advo-
cate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of
one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two
similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when
asserting that recognition is founded on similarity.
Should he adm.it, on the other hand, that there is one
mind grasping the similarity of two successive momen-
tary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity
endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of
universal momentariness. — Should it be said that the cog-
nition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition,
not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and
later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark
that the fact of different terms — viz. ' this ' and ' that ' —
being used points to the existence of different things (which
the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the
mental act of which similarity is the object were an
altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate
similar entities), the expression ' this is similar to that '

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26. 415

would be devoid of meaning ; we should in that case rather
speak of 'similarity' only. — Whenever (to add a general
reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary
experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed
establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion
by means of words, but they thereby neither convince
others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained
to be such and such must also be represented as such and
such ; attempts to represent it as something else prove
nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those
attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being
cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought ; for
(in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that
which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely
similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to
an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or
merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made
concerning what lies outside our minds. But the con-
scious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or
only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that
it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a
certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation. —
For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to
be rejected.

26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on
account of that not being observed.

The system of the Vainaj-ikas is objectionable for this
reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent
stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from
non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by
the Bauddhas where they say, ' On account of the mani-
festation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of
the cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only
the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds,
and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it
becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged
causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once.

4 1 6 VEDANTA-SO TR AS.

as then no specification would be required ^ Hence, as we
sec that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after
the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that
entity springs from non-entity.

To this Bauddha tenet we reply, (' Entity does) not
(spring) from non-entity, on account of that not being
observed.' If entity did spring from non-entity, the as-
sumption of special causes would be purportless, since
non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the
non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been
destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns
of hares and the like, i. e. non-existence is in all cases
nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and
hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination
from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced
from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And
if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have
causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that
sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c. — a thing
certainly not actually observed. — If, again, it should be
assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence
having special distinctions — just as, for instance, blueness
and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on —
we point out that in that case the fact of there being such
special distinctions would turn the non-entities into entities
no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non-
existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because,
like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely. — Further,
if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be
affected with non-existence ; while as a matter of fact they
are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by
their various special characteristics. Nor^ does any one

^ If the cause were able, without having undergone any change,
to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the
effects of which it is capable. — Cp. on this point the Sarvadar^a/za-
sawgraha.

^ This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general
rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that
therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 27. 417

think that things of the nature of clay, such as pots and
the hke, are the effects of threads and the Hke ; but every-
body knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects
of clay only. — The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can
become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has
to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence
springs from non-existence only is false ; for it is observed
that only things of permanent nature which are always
recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes
of effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those
cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the
cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, for
instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the sub-
sequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier condition
in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent
particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed
as a whole undergoes decomposition). — Hence as we see
on the one hand that no entities ever originate from non-
entities such as the horns of a hare, and on the other hand
that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the
like, the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing
from non-existence has to be rejected. — We finally point
out that, according to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental
modifications spring from the four skandhas discussed
above and all material aggregates from the atoms ; why
then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful
assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus
needlessly perplex the mind of every one ?

27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be
an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non-
active people also.

If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity,
lazy inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since
' non-existence ' is a thing to be had without much trouble.
Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not
cultivate his field ; vessels would shape themselves even if
the potter did not fashion the clay ; and the weaver too
[34] E e

4 1 S VEDANTA-St^TRAS.

lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless
have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had
been weaving. And nobody would have to exert himself
in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for
obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and
not maintained by anybody. — Thus the doctrine of the
origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to
be futile.

28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot
be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of
them).

There having been brought forward, in what precedes,
the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the
reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such
as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of
aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those Bauddhas
who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vi^^ana)
exist. — The doctrine of the reality of the external world
was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to
the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived
to be attached to external things ; but it does not represent
his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real.

According to this latter doctrine the process, whose con-
stituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of
knowledge, and the result of knowledge ^, is an altogether
internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with
the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that
process could not take place but in connexion with the
mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that
that entire process is internal and that no outward things
exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our

' According to the vi^;7anavadin the cognition specialised by its
various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the
object of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness
(avabhasa) is the result of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it
is power is mana, knowledge ; in so far as it is the abode of that
power it is pramatn", knowing subject.

TI ADHYAYA, 2 TADA, 28. 419

doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if
external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or
aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms
cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the
like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things
as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things
be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because
those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor
as non-different from the atoms ^. — In the same way we
can show that the external things are not universals and
so on ^.

Moreover, the cognitions — which are of a uniform nature
only in so far as they are states of consciousness — undergo,
according to their objects, successive modifications, so that
there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now
the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now
this is not possible without some distinction on the part of
the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit
that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if
we make this admission, from which it follows that the form
of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of
the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuit-
ous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being con-
scious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge
simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical.
When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other
also ; and that would not happen if the two were essentially
distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent
our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this
reason also we maintain that there are no outward things. —

^ If they are said to be dififerent from the atoms tliey can no
longer be considered as composed of atoms ; if they are non-
different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental
representations of gross non-atomic bodies.

^ Avayavavayavirfipo vahyo^^rtho nasti ,^'en ma bhud ^ativyaktya-
dirupas tu syad ity ai-?.hkyaha cvam iti. GaiyMmzm vyaktyadinam
i^atyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasahgad atyantabhinnatve tadvade-
vatadbhavad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe-
dava^ gativyaktyadibhedo^pi nastity artha>^,

E e 2

420 vedanta-sOtras.

Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and
the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a
magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold
form of subject and object, although there is all the while
no external object ; hence we conclude that the ideas of
posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like-
wise independent of external objects : for they also are
simply ideas. — If we be asked how, in the absence of ex-
ternal things, we account for the actual variety of ideas,
we reply that that variety is to be explained from the
impressions left by previous ideas ^. In the beginningless
sawsara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other
as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed
and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there
exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas
actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely
due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas
follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and
negative judgments : we both (the Vedantins as well as
the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents
itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental im-
pressions, without any external object ; we (the Bauddhas)
do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise frorn
external objects, without mental impressions. — Thus we
are again led to conclude that no outward things exist.

To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply. —
The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained
because we are conscious of external things. In every act
of perception we are conscious of some external thing cor-
responding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a
piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious
cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the
words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing
through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is
conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists,

^ Vasana, above translated by mental impression, strictly means
any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the
present actual idea. .

II ADIIYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 421

any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating
and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he
does not eat and does not feel satisfied? — If the Bauddha
should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of
no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart
from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may
indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he
has no arguments to prove what he says. That the out-
ward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily
to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness
itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious
of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and
walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. That such
is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that
even those who contest the existence of external things bear
witness to their existence when they say that what is an
internal object of cognition appears like something external.
For they practically accept the general consciousness which
testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at
the same time anxious to refute it they speak of the external
things as 'like something external.' If they did not them-
selves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the ex-
ternal world, how could they use the expression ' like
something external?' No one says, ' Vish/amiitra appears
like the son of a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as
it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that
the object of perception appears to us as something external,
not like something external.— But — the Bauddha may reply
— we conclude that the object of perception is only like
something external because external things are impossible.
— This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility
or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the
ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of
right knowledge ; while, on the other hand, the operation
and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not
to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or
impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by
perception or some other means of proof; impossible is
what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are,

A

422 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

according to their nature, apprehended by all the instru-
ments of knowledge ; how then can you maintain that they
are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as
that about their difference or non-difference from atoms? —
Nor, again, does the non-existence of objects follow from
the fact of the ideas having the same form as the objects ;
for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the
forms of the objects, and the objects are actually appre-
hended as external. — For the same reason (i. e. because the
distinction of thing and idea is given in consciousness) the
invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be con-
sidered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means
of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when
we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth,
consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what
varies are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness;
just as when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the
distinction of the two perceptions is due to the varying
blackness and whiteness while the generic character of the
cow remains the same. The difference of the one per-
manent factor (from the two — -or more — varying factors) is
proved throughout by the two varying factors, and vice
versa the difference of the latter (from the permanent factor)
by the presence of the one (permanent factor). Therefore
thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to be held
with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a
jar ; there also the perception and the remembrance only
are distinct while the jar is one and the same ; in the same
way as when conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of
milk we are conscious of the smell and taste as different
things but of the milk itself as one only.

Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of
time and pass away as soon as they have become objects
of consciousness cannot apprehend— or be apprehended by
— each other. From this it follows that certain doctrines
forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld ; so
the doctrine that ideas are different from each other ; the
doctrine that everything is momentary, void, &c. ; the doc-
trine of the distinction of individuals and classes ; the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 423

doctrine that a former idea leaves an impression giving rise
to a later idea ; the doctrine of the distinction, owing to
the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and
non-existence ; the doctrine of bondage and release (de-
pending on absence and presence of right knowledge) ^.

Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you
must admit that we are also conscious of the external thing.
And if you rejoin that we are conscious of the idea on its
own account because it is of a luminous nature like a lamp,
while the external thing is not so ; we reply that by main-
taining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make your-
self guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire
burns itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept
the common and altogether rational opinion that we are
conscious of the external thing by means of the idea
different from the thing ! Indeed a proof of extraordinary
philosophic insight ! — It cannot, moreover, be asserted in
any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of
our consciousness ; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as
the object of its own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha)
will rejoin that, if the idea is to be apprehended by some-
thing different from it, that something also must be appre-
hended by something different and so on ad infinitum.
And, moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cogni-
tion is of an essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the
assumption of a further cognition is uncalled for ; for as
they are both equally illuminating the one cannot give
light to the other. — But both these objections are unfounded.
As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently
no necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self
which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the idea), there re-
sults no regressus ad infinitum. And the witnessing Self
and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may
therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing
subject and object known. The existence of the witness-

^ For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas
which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject
in addition to the transitory ideas.

424 vedanta-sOtras.

ing Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied. —
Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests
itself without standing in need of a further principle to
illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which
are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,
and which are without a knowing being; which is no better
than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some
impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if
you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine,
since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself
implies consciousness ; we reply that, as observation shows,
the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other
intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the
eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing
to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior
intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we,
when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely
express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea
is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your
ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being
manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent). —
We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an
ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest.

29. And on account of their difference of nature
(the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of
a dream.

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment
made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of
which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in
the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream,
both being ideas alike. — The two sets of ideas, we maintain,
cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the
difference of their character. They differ as follows. —
The things of which we are conscious in a dream are
negated by our waking consciousness. 'I wrongly thought
that I had a meeting with a great man ; no such meeting
took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the

11 ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3O. 425

false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of
which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic
illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary con-
sciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we
are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like,
are never negated in any state. — Moreover, the visions of a
dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the
waking state are acts of immediate consciousness ; and
the distinction between remembrance and immediate con-
sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being
founded on the absence or presence of the object. When,
for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not
directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive
him. As thus the distinction between the two states is
evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the
inference that waking consciousness is false because it is
mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness ; for
we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny
the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just
because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident
to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate
the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those
ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their
having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the
dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a
thing on account of the latter's own nature, it cannot belong
to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in
common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be
hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of
its having attributes in common with water. And the dif-
ference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state
we have already shown.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not
possible (on the Baiicklha view) on account of the
absence of perception (of external things).

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according
to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the

426 VEDANTA-st^TRAS.

variety of mental impressions, without any reference to
external things, and remark that on your doctrine the
existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you
do not admit the perception of external things. For the
variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by
the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could
various impressions originate if no external things were
perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of
mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus
ad i nfinitum,sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and
would in no way establish your position. — The same argu-
ment, i. e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental
impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes
also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of
which the denier of an external world above attempted to
show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by
external things. We rather have on our side a positive and
a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of
the existence of external things, viz. ' the perception of
external things is admitted to take place also without
mental impressions,' and ' mental impressions are not ad-
mitted to originate independently of the perception of
external things.' — Moreover, an impression is a kind
of modification, and modifications cannot, as experi-
ence teaches, take place unless there is some substratum
which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a
substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that
it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge,

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the
alayavi^;7ana, it cannot be the abode of mental
impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition
(alayavi^/7ana ^) assumed by you may constitute the abode

^ The vi^«anaskandha comprises vi^Mnas of two diflferent kinds,
the alayavi^wana and the pravr/ttivi^wana. The alayavi^«ana com-
prises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego ; the
pravrz'ttivi^wana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently
external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the

IT ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 32. 427

of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that
cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence
non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any
more than the quasi-external cognitions (pravntti-vi^;7ana).
For unless there exists one continuous principle equally
connected with the past, the present, and the future \ or an
absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything,
we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and
so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent
on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you
declare your alayavi^;7ana to be something permanent,
you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^wana as
well as everything else being momentary. — Or (to explain
the Sutra in a difterent way) as the tenet of general momen-
tariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic
as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward
against the doctrines of the former all those arguments
dependent on the principle of general momentariness which
we have above urged against the latter.

We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the
doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the ex-
ternal world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only
exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that
everything is empty (i. e. that absolutely nothing exists), is
contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore
requires no special refutation. For this apparent world,
whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of know-
ledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out
some new truth (based on which he could impugn its
existence) — for a general principle is proved by the absence
of contrary instances.

32. And on account of its general deficiency in
probability.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From

latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent
ideas of the former class.

^ Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself
to consciousness is not non-existent.

4-S VEDAXTA-S^'TRAS.

whatever new points of view the Rauddha s}-stem is tested
with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like
the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has. in fact, no foun-
dation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use
it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly.
— Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually
contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of
the external world, the reality of ideas onl\-, and general
nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he
was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or
else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound
absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become
thoroughl)- confused. — So that — and this the Sutra means
to indicate — Buddha's doctrine has lo be entirely dis-
regarded by all those who have a regard for their own
happiness.

33. On account of the impossibility (of contra-
dictory attributes) in one thing, (the 6~'aina doctrine
is) not (to be accepted).

Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn
to the system of the Gymnosophists (G^ainas).

The G^ainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz,
soul (^nva), non-soul (a^nva), the issuing outward (asrava),
restraint (sawvara), destruction (niri.'^ra), bondage (bandha),
and release (moksha)^ Shortly it may be said that they
acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since
the five other categories mav be subsumed under these two.
— The\- also set forth a set of categories different from the
two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called

^ Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of
their enjoyment ; asrava is the forward movement of the senses
towards their objects ; sawvara is the restrauit of the acuvity of the
senses ; nir^^ara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed ;
the works constitute bondage ; and release is the ascending of the
soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions. — For the
details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter
of the Sarvadarja/;asa///graha.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 33. 429

astikayas ('existing bodies,' i.e. categ-ories), viz. the cate-
gories of soul (^iva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma),
demerit (adharma), and space (akai"a). All these categories
they again subdivide in various fanciful ways^. — To all things
they apply the following method of reasoning, which they
call the saptabhahginaya : somehow it is ; somehow it is
not ; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescrib-
able ; somehow it is and is indescribable ; somehow it is
not and is indescribable ; somehow it is and is not and is
indescribable.

To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even
such conceptions as that of unity and eternity^.

This doctrine we meet as follows. — Your reasoning, we
say, is inadmissible ' on account of the impossibility in one
thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory
attributes such as being and non-being should at the same
time belong to one and the same thing ; just as observation
teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same
moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either
be so many and such or not be so many and such ; the
third alternative expressed in the words ' they either are
such or not such ' results in a cognition of indefinite nature
which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is.
If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of
more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of
true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion
that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself some-
thing, falls as such under the alternative predications 'some-
how it is,' ' somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite
assertion. The same happens to the person making the
assertion and to the result of the assertion ; partly they are,
partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the
object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of
knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara
(Cina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his
followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether

^ Cp. translation of Sarvadar^awasaw/graha, p. 59.

^ And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.

A

430 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a course
of action is known to have a definite result people set about
it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doc-
trine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be
listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. —
Again, if we apply the 6^aina reasoning to their doctrine of
the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the
matter they are five and on another view they are not five ;
from which latter point of view it follows that they are
either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare
the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they
cannot be described ; but, as a matter of fact, they are
described so that to call them indescribable involves a
contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories
on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and
at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such,
and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect
knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect
knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not
the opposite ; you certainly talk more like a drunken or
insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. — If you
further maintain that the heavenly world and final release
exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the
absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in
such statements will result in nobody's acting for the
purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release.
And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-
soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained,
and which you describe as having existed from all eternity,
relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indeter-
mination. — As therefore the two contradictory attributes of
being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories
— being excluding non-being and vice versa non-being ex-
cluding being— the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected.
— The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions
made by the Cainas as to the impossibility of deciding
whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or
plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or
non-separateness, and so on. — The 6'aina doctrine that

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 34. 43 1

aggregates are formed from the atoms — by them called
pudgalas — we do not undertake to refute separately as its
refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic
doctrine given in a previous part of this work.

34. And likewise (th'ere results from the 6^aina
doctrine) non-universality of the Self.

We have hitherto urged against the G^aina doctrine an
objection resulting from the sy^dvada, viz. that one thing
cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the
objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the
individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent. — The
6^ainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the
body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of
infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like
jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different
classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen
that the soul of a man — which is of the size of the human
body — when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on
a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would
not be able to fill the whole of it ; or else that a human
soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be
able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would,
moreover, arise w^th regard to the successive stages of one
state of existence, infancy, youth, and old age. — But why,
the 6^aina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as
consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of under-
going compression in a small body and dilatation in a big
one ? — Do you, we ask in return, admit or not admit that
those countless particles of the soul may occupy the same
place or not? — If you do not admit it, it follows that the
infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body
of limited dimensions. — If you do admit it, it follows that,
as then the space occupied by all the particles may be the
space of one particle only, the extension of all the par-
ticles together will remain inconsiderable, and hence the
soul be of minute size (not of the size of the body).
You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body

432 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

of limited size contains an infinite number of soul par-
ticles.

Well then, the Caina may reply, let us assume that by
turns whenever the soul enters a big body some particles
accede to it while some withdraw from it whenever it
enters a small body. — To this hypothesis the next Sutra
furnishes a reply.

35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from
the succession (of parts acceding to and departing
from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of
the soul).

Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as
the body be satisfactorily established by means of the
hypothesis of the successive accession and withdrawal of
particles. For this hypothesis would involve the soul's
undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually
being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and
withdrawal of parts, it of course follows that it undergoes
change, and if it is liable to change it follows that it is non-
permanent, like the skin and similar substances. From that,
again, it follows that the G"aina doctrine of bondage and
release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the soul,
which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad
of works and sunk in the ocean of sawsara, rises w^hen its
bonds are sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the
water when it is freed from the encumbering clay^.' —
Moreover, those particles which in turns come and depart
have the attributes of coming and going, and cannot, on
that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the
body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some
permanently remaining parts, we remark that it would be
impossible to determine which are the permanent and which
the temporary parts. — We have further to ask from whence
those particles originate when they accede to the soul, and
into what they are merged when they detach themselves
from it. They cannot spring from the material elements

^ Cp. Sarvadar.ra7/asa7;^graha translation, p. 58.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 36. 433

and re-enter the elements ; for the soul is immaterial. Nor
have we any means to prove the existence of some other,
general or special, reservoir of soul-particles. — Moreover, on
the hypothesis under discussion the soul would be of in-
definite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and
departing is itself indefinite. — On account of all these and
similar difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain
particles by turns attach themselves to, and detach them-
selves from, the soul.

The Sutra may be taken in a difTerent sense also. The
preceding Sutra has proved that the soul if of the same
size as the body cannot be permanent, as its entering into
bigger and smaller bodies involves its limitation. To
this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that
although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be
permanent, just as the stream of water is permanent (al-
though the water continually changes). An analogous
instance would be supplied by the permanency of the
stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red
cloth and so on, are non-permanent. — To this rejoinder
our Sutra replies that if the stream is not real we are
led back to the doctrine of a general void, and that, if it
is something real, the difficulties connected with the soul's
changing, &c. present themselves and render the Caina
view impossible.

36. And on account of the permanency of the
final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency
of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of
size, at any time).

Moreover, the Cainas themselves admit the permanency
of the final size of the soul which it has in the state of
release. From this it follows also that its initial size and
its inter\'ening sizes must be permanent \ and that hence

^ The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the
soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its
final size.

[34] F f

434 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

there is no difference between the three sizes. But this
would involve the conckision that the different bodies of
the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul
cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies. — Or else (to
explain the Sutra in a somewhat different way) from the
fact that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows
that its size in the two previous conditions also is perma-
nent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always
of the same size — whether minute or infinite — and not of
the varying size of its bodies. — For this reason also the
doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way
more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

'^^. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world),
on account of the inappropriateness (of that doc-
trine).

The Sutrakara now applies himself to the refutation of
that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of
the world only in so far as he is the general ruler. — But how
do you know that that is the purport of the Sutra (which
speaks of the Lord ' without any qualification ') } — From the
circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved,
in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the
material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if
the present Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of
the Lord in general, the earlier and later parts of the
work would be mutually contradictory, and the Sutrakara
would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore must
assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make
an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who main-
tain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely
the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world; a doctrine
entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the unity of
Brahman.

The theories about the Lord which are independent of
the Vedanta arc of various nature. Some taking their
stand on the Sarikhya and Yoga systems assume that the
Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 37. 435

pradhana and of the souls, and that pradhana, soul, and
Lord are of mutually different nature. — The Mahei'varas
(5aivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, cause,
union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord
Paj-upati (5iva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the
animal (i.e. the soul); Pajupati is, according to them,
the Lord, the operative cause. — Similarly, the Vaij-eshikas
and others also teach, according to their various systems,
that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the
world.

Against all these opinions the Siitra remarks ' the Lord.
on account of the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible
that the Lord as the ruler of the pradhana and the soul
should be the cause of the world, on account of the inap-
propriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed
to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low,
intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it
follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on,
is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we
get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his
dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the
living beings ; for that assumption would lead us to a
logical see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living
beings having to be considered in turns both as acting and
as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the con-
sideration that the works of living beings and the result-
ing dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has
no beginning ; for in past time as well as in the present
mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the
beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men
leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth
by the Naiyayikas themselves that ' imperfections have the
characteristic of being the causes of action' (Nyaya Sutra
I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they
be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of
something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection.
And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting
for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic
motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same ; for the

F f 2

436 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic
motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful
feeling connected with pity). — Your doctrine is finally
inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the
Lord to be a special kind of soul ; for from that it follows
that he must be devoid of all activity.

38. And on account of the impossibility of the
connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the
pradhana).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing
there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from
the pradhana and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter
without being connected with them in a certain way. But
of what nature is that connexion to be ? It cannot be con-
junction (sawyoga), because the Lord, as well as the pra-
dhana and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of
parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible
to define who should be the abode and who the abiding
thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion,
the special nature of which would have to be inferred from
the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just
what is not settled as yet\ — How, then, it may be asked,
do you — the Vedantins — establish the relation of cause and
effect (between the Lord and the world)? — There is, we
reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume
is that of identity (tadatmya). The adherent of Brahman,
moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the
basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his
tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adver-
sary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause
and the like according to instances furnished by experience.

^ The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and
the pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world
considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord ;
for that ilie world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which
the Vedantins do not accept as proved.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 40. 437

may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree
with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that
Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient
Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that
of the Vedintin ; for that would involve him in a logical
see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on
the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture
again being established on the omniscience of the Lord. —
For all these reasons the Sahkhya-yoga hypothesis about
the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses
which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted
by corresponding arguments.

39. And on account of the impossibility of ruler-
ship (on the part of the Lord).

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an un-
tenable hypothesis, for the following reason also. — Those
philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence
the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just as the
potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot
be admitted ; for the pradhana. which is devoid of colour
and other qualities, and therefore not an object of percep-
tion, is on that account of an altogether different nature
from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon
as the object of the Lord's action.

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by
the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we
deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the
Lord rules the pradhana in the same way as the soul rules
the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid
of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.

This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we
infer that the organs arc ruled by the soul, from the
observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like
(which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not
observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused

438 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

by the pradhdna. If the analogy between the pradh^na
and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow
that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than
the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a
different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings,
who are the rulers of countries, are never without some
material abode, i. e. a body ; hence, if we wish to infer the
existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly
rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to
serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body
cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only
subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The
Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a
material substratum ; for experience teaches us that action
requires a material substrate. — Let us then arbitrarily
assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving
as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation).
— This assumption also will not do ; for if the Lord has a
body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigra-
tory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine)
either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on
the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is
invalid, for the following reason also. — They teach that
the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and like-
wise that the pradhana, as well as the individual souls, is
of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either
defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself,
or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doc-
trine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the
pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of
definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration ;
since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite
extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.
The numerical measure of pradhina, souls, and Lord is

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 42. 439

defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual
measure of each of them must Hkewise be considered as
defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The
number of the souls is a high one ^. From among this
limited number of souls some obtain release from the
sa;;^sara, that means their sawsara comes to an end, and
their subjection to the sa;;/sara comes to an end. Gra-
dually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be
an end of the entire sa^wsara and the sawsara state of all
souls. But the pradhina which is ruled by the Lord and
which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is
meant by sawsara. Hence, when the latter no longer
exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his om-
niscience and ruling power have no longer any objects.
But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an
end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they
have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the
doctrine of a general void. — Let us then, in order to avoid
these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative,
i. e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhana,
and the souls, is not defined by the Lord. — But that
also is impossible, because it would compel us to aban-
don a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is
omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative
philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative
cause of the world, appears unacceptable.

42. On account of the impossibility of the ori-
gination {of the individual soul from the highest
Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be
accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those
who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only
the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now

^ I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient
Lord knows its measure.

440 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he
is the material as well as the operative cause. — But, it may
be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a
Lord of exactly the same nature, i. e. a Lord who is the
material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has
been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recog-
nised principle that Smr/ti, in so far as it agrees with
Scripture, is authoritative ; why then should we aim at
controverting the doctrine stated ? — It is true, we reply,
that a part of the system which we are going to discuss
agrees with the Vedanta system, and hence affords no
matter for controversy ; another part of the system, how-
ever, is open to objection, and that part we intend to
attack.

The so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy
(bhagavat) Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is
what really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold,
appears in four forms (vyuha), as Vasudeva, Sahkarshawa,
Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the highest
Self, Sankarsha;/a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind
(manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (ahahkiira).
Of these four Vasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal
essence, of which the three others are the effects. — The
believer after having worshipped Vasudeva for a hundred
years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana),
procuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (i^ya),
recitation of prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation
(yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest
Being.

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend
to controvert the doctrine that Naraya;/a, who is higher
than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the
Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple
ways ; for various scriptural passages, such as ' He is one-
fold, he is threefold' {Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that
the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we
mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentra-
tion of mind on the highest Being which appears in the
Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 44. 44 1

&c. ; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know
full well from Smrzti and Scripture. We, however, must
take exception to the doctrine that Sarikarsha;/a springs
from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Sarikarsha//a, Aniruddha
from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vasudeva,
i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sahkarshawa. i.e.
the individual soul ; for if such were the case, there would
attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imper-
fections which belong to things originated. And thence
release, which consists in reaching the highest Being,
could not take place ; for the effect is absorbed only by
entering into its cause. — That the soul is not an originated
thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this
reason the Bhagavata hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument
is produced from the agent.

The Bhagavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that
reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument,
such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such
as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhagavatas
teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed
Sahkarsha;/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal
organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of
the agent another instrument, viz. the ahahkara termed
Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without
observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural
passage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of
knowledge, &c. (Vasudeva, &c. be taken as Lords),
yet there is non-exclusion of that (i. e. the objection
raised in Sutra 42).

Let us then — the Bhagavatas may say — understand by
Sankarsha;/a, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind,
&c., but rather Lords, i. e. powerful beings distinguished by
all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence
of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory.

442 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a sub-
stratum (not sprung" from pradhana), without any imper-
fections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 docs
not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply,
the 'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the
impossibility of origination, can be established. — Do you, in
the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords,
Vasudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not
constitute one and the same Self? — If so, you commit the
fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all
the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you
offend thereby against your own principle, according to
which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vasu-
deva.— Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one
highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal
attributes? — In that case the objection urged in Sutra 42
remains valid. For Saiikarsha/za cannot be produced
from Vasudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sankarshawa, nor
Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of
them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one
of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and
effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause —
as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where
the cause is more extensive than the effect) — and that
without such superiority the relation is simply impossible.
But the followers of the Pa;?,^aratra do not acknowledge any
difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c.
between Vasudev^a and the other Lords, but simply say that
they all are forms of Vasudeva, without any special distinc-
tions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot properly be limited
to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade
of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme
Being.

45. And on account of contradictions.

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the
Bhagavata system, with reference to the assumption of
qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 45. 443

ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated
as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken
of as Selfs. holy Vasudevas, and so on. — Moreover, we
meet with passages contradictory of the Veda. The follow-
ing passage, for instance, blames the Veda, ' Not having
found the highest bliss in the Vedas ^a;/^ilya studied this
j-astra.' — For this reason also the Bhagavata doctrine can-
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MC0rfil0Ot^00aiO'-<(Me0-*»OOl:^C00iOT-<(Mf0>>!t<»r

Sacred Books of the East

TRANSLATED BY

VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MULLER

*^* T/ii's Si-ries is published tvith the sanction and co-operation of the Secretary of

State for India in Council.

REPORT presented to the ACADEMIE DES IITSCRIPTIOITS, May 11,

1883, by BI. ERNEST RENAN.

• M. Renan piesente trois nouveanx
volumes de la grande collection des
" Livres sacres de I'Orient " (Sacred
Books of the East\ que dirige a Oxford,
avec une si vaste erudition et une critique
si sure, le savant associe de UAeademie
des Inscriptions, M. Max Miiller. ... La
premiere serie de ce beau recueil, com-
posee de 24 volumes, est presque achevee.
M. Max Miiller se propose d'en publier

une seconde, dont I'interet historique et
religieux ne sera pas moindre. M. Max
Miiller a su se procurer la collaboration
des savans las plus eminens d'Europe et
d'Asie. L'Universite d'Oxford, que cette
grande publication honore au plus haut
degre, doit tenir a continuer dans les plus
larges proportions une ceuvre aussi philo-
sophiquement concue que savamment
executee.'

EXTRACT from the QUARTERI.Y REVIEW.

' We rejoice to notice that a second
series of these translations has been an-
nounced and has actually begun to appear.
The stones, at least, out of which a stalely
edifice may hereafter arise, are here being
brought together. Prof. Max Miiller has
deserved well of scientific history. Not
a few minds owe to his enticing words
their first attraction to this branch of
study. But no work of his, not even the

great edition of the Rig- Veda, can com-
pare in importance or in usefulness with
this English translation of the Sacred
Books of the East, which has been devised
by his foresight, successfully brought so
far by his persuasive and organising
power, and will, we trust, by the assist-
ance of the distinguished scholars he has
gathered round him, be carried in due
time to a happy completion.'

Professor E. HARDY^ Inaugural Iiecture in the University of Freiburg-, 1887.

* Die allgemeine vergleichende Reli-
gionswissenschaft datirt von jenem gross-
artigen, in seiner Art einzig dastehenden
Untemehmen, zu welchem auf Anregung
Max Miillers im Jahre 1874 auf dem

internationalen Orientalistencongress in
London der Grundstein gelcgt worden
war, die Ubersetzung der heiligcn Biicher
des Ostens' (Jhe Sacred Books of the
East).

Ojcfoi:^

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
LONDON : HENRY FROWDE

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER, EC.

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

FIRST SERIKS.

Vol. I. The Upanishads.

Translated by F. IVLvx INIuller. Part I. The AV^andogya-
upanishad, The Talavakara-upanishad, The Aitareya-arawyaka,
The Kaushitaki-brahmawa-upanishad, and The Va^asaneyi-
sawhila-upanishad. 8vo,, cloth, los. 6d.

The Upanishads coniaifi the philosophy of the Veda. They have
beco?ne the foundatioyi of the later Veddnta doctrifies, and indirectly
of Buddhism. Schopenhauer, speaking of the Upanishads, says :
' In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevatittg
as that of the Upatiishads. It has been the solace of my life, it will
be the solace of my deaths

[See also Vol. XV.]

VOL. II. The Sacred Laws of the Aryas,

As taught in the Schools of Apastamba, Gautama, Vasish//^a,
and Baudhayana. Translated by Georg Buhler. Part I.
Apastamba and Gautama. 8vo., cloth, \os. 6d.

The Sacred Laws of the Aryas contain the original treatises on
which the Laivs of Manu and other lawgivers ivere founded.

[See also Vol. XIV.]

VOL, III. The Sacred Books of China.

The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by James Legge.
Part I. The Shu King, The Religious Portions of the Shih
King, and The Hsiao King. 8vo., cloth, \2s. 6d.

Cojifucius was a collector of aiicient traditions, not the fotinder of
a neiv religion. As he lived in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C.
his works are of unique interest for the study of Ethology.
[See also Vols. XVI, XXVII, and XXVIII.]

Vol. IV. The Zend-Avesta.

Translated by James Darmesteter. Part I. The Vendidad.
Svo., cloth, \Qs. 6d.

The Zend-Avesta contains the relics of what was the religion of
Cyrus, Darius, aiid Xerxes, and, but for the battle of Marathon,

EDITED BY F. MAX MULLER.

might have become the religion of Europe. It forms to the present
day the sacred book of the Par sis, the so-called fire-ivor shippers.
Tivo more vohimes will complete the translation of all that is left us
of Zoroaster s religion.

[See also Vols. XXIII and XXXI.]

Vol, V. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. West. Part I. The Bundahij, Bahman
Yaj-t, and Shayast la-shayast. 8vo., cloth, 1 2S. 6d.
The Pahlavi Texts comprise the theological literature of the revival^
of Zoroaster's religion, begimiing with the Sassanian dynasty. They
are important for a study of Gnosticism.

Vols. VI and IX. The Quran.

Parts I and II. Translated by E. H. Palmer. 8vo., cloth, 21s.
TJiis translation, carried out according to his own peculiar views
of the origin of the Qur'dn, was the last great work ofE. H. Palmer,
before he was murdered in Egypt.

Vol. VII. The Institutes of Vish;^u.

Translated by Julius Jolly. 8vo., cloth, \os. 6d.

A collection of legal aphorisms, closely connected zvith one of the
oldest Vedic schools, the Ka//^as, but considerably added to in later
time. Of importance for a critical study of the Laws of Manu.

Vol. VIII. The Bhagavadgita, with The Sanatsu^atiya,

and The Anugita.

Translated by Kashinath Trimbak Telang. Bvo., cloth,
\os. 6d.

The earliest philosophical and religious poem of Itidia. It has been
paraphrased in Arnold's 'Song Celestial.'

Vol. X. The Dhammapada,

Translated from Pali by F. Max Muller; and

The Sutta-Nipata,

Translated from Pali by V. Fausboll; being Canonical Books

of the Buddhists. Bvo., cloth, 105-. 6d.
The Dhammapada contains the quintessence of Buddhist morality
The Sutta-Nipata gives the authentic teaching of Buddha on some
of the fundamental principles of religion.

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST:

Vol. XI. Buddhist Suttas.

Translated from Pali by T. W. Rhys Davids, i. The Maha-
parinibbana Suttanla ; 2. The Dhamma-y^akka-ppavattana
Sutta. 3. The Tevi_i,'-^a Suttanta; 4. The Akahkheyya Sutta;
5. The A'etokhila Sutta ; 6. The Maha-sudassana Suttanta ;
7. The Sabbasava Sutta. 8vo., cloth, \os. 6d.
A coUeciioii of the 7nost i/npor/ant religious, moral, and philosophical
discourses lakeJt/rom the sacred canofi 0/ the Buddhists.

Vol. XII. The KS'atapatha-Brahma;^a, according to the
Text of the Madhyandina School.

Translated by Julius Eggeling. Part I. Books I and II.

8vo,, cloth, \2s. 6d.
A minute account of the sacrificial ceremonies of the Vedic age.
It contains the earliest accowit of the Deluge in Lidia.

[See also Vol. XXVL]

VOL. XIII. Vinaya Texts.

Translated from the Pali by T. W. Rhys Davids and Hermann

Oldenberg. Part I. The Patimokkha. The Mahavagga, I-IV.

8vo., cloth, lOi". dd.

The Vinaya Texts give for the first time a translation of the moral

code of the Buddhist religion as settled in the third century B.C.

[See also Vols. XVII and XX.]

VOL. XIV. The Sacred Laws of the Aryas,

As taught in the Schools of Apastamba, Gautama, Vasish//^a,
and Baudhayana. Translated by Georg Buhler. Part II.
Vasish//;a and Baudhayana. Svo., cloth, \os. 6d.

Vol. XV. The Upanishads.

Translated by F. Max Muller. Part II. The Ka//^a-upanishad,
The INIuwfl'aka-upanishad, The Taittiriyaka-upanishad, The
BrzTiadarawyaka-upanishad, The ^S'veta^'vatara-upanishad, The
Praj;7a-upanishad, and The Maitraya«a-brahma;/a-upanishad.
Svo., cloth, 10s. 6d.

VOL. XVI. The Sacred Books of China.

The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by James Legge.
Part 11. The Yi King. Svo., cloth, los. 6d.

Vol. XVII. Vinaya Texts.

Translated from the Pali by T. W. Rhys Davids and Hermann
Oldenberg. Part II. The Mahavagga, V-X. The -^ullavagga,
I-III. Svo., cloth, \os. 6d.

EDITED BY F. MAX MULLER.

Vol. XVIII. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. West. Part II. The Da^^istan-i Dinik
and The Epistles of Manuj/^ihar. 8vo., cloth, \2s. td.

VOL. XIX. The Fo-sho-hino--tsan-king.

A Life of Buddha by Ajvaghosha Bodhisattva, translated from
Sanskrit into Chinese by Dharmaraksha, a.d. 420, and from
Chinese into English by Samuel Beal. 8vo., cloth, 10s. 6d.

This life of Buddha was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese,
A.D. 420. // contains many legends, some of which show a certain
similarity to the Evangelium iyifantiae., etc.

Vol. XX. Vinaya Texts.

Translated from the Pali by T. W. Rhys Davids and Hermann
Oldenberg. Part III. The A'ullavagga, IV-XII. 8vo., cloth,
\os. dd.

Vol. XXI. The Saddharma-pu/^^^arika ; or, The Lotus
of the True Law.

Translated by H. Kern. Bvo., cloth, 1 2s. 6d.

' The Lotus of the true Latv' a canonical book of the Northern
Buddhists, translated frofn Sanskrit. There is a Chinese transla-
tion of this book which ivas finished as early as the year 286 A.D.

VOL. XXII. Caina-Sutras.

Translated from Prakrit by Hermann Jacobi. Part I. The
A-^arahga-Sutra and The Kalpa-Sutra. 8vo., cloth, ios.6d.

The religion of the G^ainas was founded by a contemporary of Buddha.
It still counts numerous adherents in India, while there are no
Buddhists left ifi hidia proper.

VOL. XXIII. The Zend-Avesta.

Translated by James Darmesteter. Part II. The Sirozahs,
YaJts, and Nyayi.r. 8vo., cloth, \os. 6d.

VOL. XXIV. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. West. Part III. Dina-i Mainog-i
Khirart', .Sikand-gumanik Vi^ar, and Sad Dar. 8vo., cloth,
10s. 6d.

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

SECOND SERIES.

VOL. XXV. Manii.

Translated by Georg Buhler. 8vo., cloth, 21^-.

This translation is founded on that of Sir William Jones, which has been
carefully revised and corrected with the help of seven native Commentaries.
An Appendix contains all the quotations from Manu which are found in the
Hindu Law-books, translated for the use of the Law Courts in India.
Another Appendix gives a synopsis of parallel passages from the six
Dharma-sutras, the other Smr/tis, the Upanishads, the Mahabharata, etc.

Vol. XXVI. The 6'atapatha-Brahma;^a.

Translated by Julius Eggeling. Part II. Books III and IV.
8vo., cloth, 1 2.r. 6d.

VOLS. XXVII AND XXVIII. The Sacred Books of
China.

The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by James Legge.
Parts III and IV. The Li K\, or Collection of Treatises on
the Rules of Propriety, or Ceremonial Usages. 8vo., cloth,
i2s. 6d. each.

Vol. XXIX. The G?'/hy a- Sutras, Rules of Vedic

Domestic Ceremonies.

Part I. -S'ahkhayana, Ajvalayana, Paraskara, Khadira. Trans-
lated by Hermann Oldenberg. 8vo., cloth, 1 2s. 6d.

These rules of Domestic Ceremonies describe the home life of the ancient
Aryas with a completeness and accuracy unmatched in any other literature.
Some of these rules have been incorporated in the ancient Law-books.

VOL. XXX. The Gr/hya-Sutras. Part II. [In the Press :\

VOL, XXXI. The Zend-Avesta.

Part III. The Yasna, Visparad, Afrinagan, Gahs, and
Miscellaneous Fragments. Translated by L. H. Mills. 8vo.
cloth, i2s. 6d.

Vol. XXXII. Vedic Hymns.

Translated by F. Max Muller. Part I. [In the Press?\

Vol. XXXIII. The Minor Law-books.

Translated by Julius Jolly. Part I. Narada, Br/haspati.
8vo. cloth, \os, 6d.

RECENT ORIENTAL WORKS.

Vol. XXXIV. The Ved^nta - Sutras, with ^S'ahkara's
Commentary.

Translated by G. Thibaut. ^Immediately?^

Vol. XXXV. Milinda. Translated by T. W. Rhys

Davids. \In the Prcss?\

VOL. XXXIX. The Sacred Books of China.

Tao Teh King. Translated by James Legge. [/« the Press?^

Vol. XL. The Contents of the Nasks, as stated in
the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Dinkar</. Translated by
E. W. West.

*** The Second Series will consist of Twenty-four Volumes in all.

SOME ORIENTAL WORKS

RECENTLY PUBLISHED BY THE CLARENDON PRESS.

A Catalogue of the Chinese Ti'anslatiou of the Bud-
dJiist Tripi/aka, the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists
in China ajid fapan.

Compiled by order of the Secretary of State for India by
BuNYiu Nanjio, Priest of the Temple, Eastern Hongwanzi,
Japan; ]\Iember of the Royal Asiatic Society. 4to., 32^-. 6(1.
'An immense service rendered to Oriental scholarship.' — Saturday Review.

Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms ; being an Account by
the Chinese Monk Fa-hien of his Travels in India and Ceylon
(a.d. 399-414) in search of the Buddhist Books of Discipline.
Translated and annotated, with a Corean recension of the
Chinese Text, by James Legge, M.A., LL.D. Crown 4to.,
boards, lo^-. dd.

Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian
Library and in the College Libraries of Oxford.

Compiled by Ad. Neubauer, ]\I.A, With 40 Facsimiles.
cloth, 5/. 5.V.

Also separately :

The Catalogue. 3/. 13^. ()d.

The Facsimiles. 2/. 12s. 6d.

RECENT ORIENTAL WORKS.

Stnrrtiota ©.vonirnsia.

ARYAN SERIES.

BuddJiist Texts from Japan. I. Vafra/^/(7/ediki ; The
Dia mond- Ciitter.

Edited by F. IMax Muller, I\I.A. Small 4to., 3^. dd.
One of the most famous metaphysical treatises of the Mahayana Buddhists.

Buddhist Texts from Japan. II. Sukhavati-Vyuha :
Description of Snkhdvatt, the Land of Bliss.

Edited by F. INIax INIuller, M.A., and Blnyiu Nan'jio. With

two Appendices: (i) Text and Translation of Sahghavarman's

Chinese Version of the Poetical Portions of the Sukhavati-

Vyuha; (2) Sanskrit Text of the Smaller Sukhavati-Vyuha.

Small 4to., 7^. dd.

The editio princeps of the Sacred Book of one of the largest and most

influential sects of Buddhism, numbering more than ten millions of followers

in Japan alone.

Biiddhist Texts front Japan. III. The Ancient Palm-
Leaves containing the Pra^/'^a-Paramlta-Hr/daya-
Sutra and the Ush;^isha-Vi^aya-Dhara7^i.

Edited by F. INIax INIuller, M.A., and Bunyiu Nanjio, M.A.
With an Appendix by G. Buhler, CLE. With many Plates.
Small 4to., \os.
Contains facsimiles of the oldest Sanskrit MS. at present known.

'Dhsirmsi-S3.7U^raha., a7i A 7icie7it Collection of Buddhist

Technical Terms.

Prepared for publication by Ken'jiu Kasawara, a Buddhist
Priest from Japan, and, after his death, edited by F. Max
MtJLLER and H. Wenzel. Small 4to., 7^. 6d.

Katayana's Sarvaniikrama;n of the 7?zgveda.

With Extracts from Sha</guru,rishya's Commentary entitled
Vedarthadipika. Edited by A. A. INIacdonell, INI.A., Ph.D.
16s.

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y

\

B

132

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1890

pt.l

r-Badarayana^

The Vedanta-sutras

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