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THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST
[38]
Bonbon
HENRY FROWDE
Oxford University Press Warehouse
Amen Corner, E.G.
MACMILLAN & CO., 66 FIFTH AVENUE
THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST
TRANSLATED
BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS
AND EDITED BY
F. MAX MULLER
VOL. xxxviir
^..^i-'
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1896
[/i// rz^Ais reserved "l
PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
BY HORACE HART, PR:^^rER TO THE UNIVERSITY
THE
vedAnta-sOtras
WITH THE COMMENTARY BY
'^ _ A
5ANKARA^ARYA
TRANSLATED BY
GEORGE THIBAUT
PART II
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1896
[^// rights reserved~\
B
151
CONTENTS.
VEDANTA-StTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY
BY ^ANKARAi^ARYA.
Adhyaya II.
PAGE
Pada III 3
PadalV 74
Adhyaya III.
Pada I loi
Pada II 133
Pada III 184
Pada IV 285
Adhyaya IV.
Pada I -331
Pada II ......... . 364
Pada III 382
Pada IV ......... . 405
Indexes by Dr. M. Winternitz : —
Index of Quotations to Volumes XXXIV (i) and
XXXVIII (ii) 421
Index of Sanslcrit Words to Volumes XXXIV (i) and
XXXVIII (ii) 431
General Index to Volumes XXXIV (i) and XXXVIII (ii) 441
Corrigenda 503
Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Trans-
lations of the Sacred Books of the East . . . 505
VEDANTA-SUTRAS
WITH
5ANKARA BHASHYA.
[38]
SECOND ADHYAYA.
THIRD PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
I. Ether ^ (does) not (originate), on account of
the absence of scriptural statement.
In the Vedanta-texts we meet in different places with
different statements concerning the origination of various
things. Some of those passages declare that ether origi-
nated ; some do not. Some record the origination of air;
others do not. Other passages again make analogous
statements concerning the individual soul and the vital
airs. — Similarly we obser\^e that other scriptural texts con-
tradict one another concerning order of succession and the
like. — Now, as we ourselves have inferred the worthless-
ness of other philosophical doctrines from their mutual
contradictions, a suspicion might arise that our doctrine
is equally worthless, owing to its intrinsic contradictions.
Hence a new discussion is begun in order to clear from all
doubt the sense of all those Vedanta-texts which refer to
creation, and thus to remove the suspicion alluded to.
Here we have to consider in the first place the question
* Here, as generally in the preceding parts of this translation,
akaja is rendered by ' ether.' There is no doubt that occasionally
the appropriate — and in some cases the only possible — rendering is
not ' ether ' but ' space ; ' but the former rendering, after all, best
agrees with the general Vedantic \iew of aka^a. The Vedantins
do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly
fine matter filling all space, and thus it happens that in many
cases where we speak of the former they speak of aka^a, i.e. the
all-per\-ading substratum of sound; which howsoever attenuated
is yet one of the material elements, and as such belongs to the same
category as air, fire, water, and earth.
E 2
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
whether ether has an origin or not. — The purvapakshin
maintains that ether does not originate, since there is no
scriptural statement to that effect. For in the chapter
which treats of the origin (of the world) ether is not
mentioned at all. In the passage ' In the beginning there
was that only which is, one only, without a second ' the
K/iandogya. at first introduces Brahman as the general
subject-matter, by means of the clause *that which is,' and
thereupon (in the passages ' It thought,' ' It sent forth fire,'
&c.) records the origin of three elements, viz. fire, water,
and earth ; giving the first place to fire which (ordinarily)
occupies the middle place among the five elements ^.
Now, as scriptural statement is our (only) authority in the
origination of the knowledge of supersensuous things, and
as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of
ether, ether must be considered to have no origin.
2. But there is (a scriptural statement of the
origination of ether).
The conjunction ' but ' indicates the adoption of another
alternative. — The origin of ether may not be stated in the
K/iandogya ; but it is stated in other scriptural passages.
For the text of the Taittiriyakas, after having introduced
Brahman as the general subject-matter, — in the words, 'The
true, knowledge, without end is Brahman,' — goes on to say,
'From that Self sprang ether' (Taitt. Up. II, i). — Hence
there arises a conflict of scriptural passages, the creation
sometimes being said to begin with fire, sometimes with
ether.— But may we not appropriately assume the two
scriptural passages to form one syntactical whole? — It
would be well indeed if we could do so, but a unity of the
kind desired cannot be admitted, because the creator who
is mentioned only once— in the passage 'he sent forth fire'
— cannot be connected with two things to be created, as
if the construction were ' He sent forth fire, he sent forth
ether.' — But — an objection may be raised — we see that
sometimes an agent, although mentioned once only, is yet
^ The usual order being ether, air, fire, water, earth.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 3.
connected with two objects ; as when we say ' after having
cooked broth he now cooks rice.' We therefore may-
combine the two scriptural sentences into one, ' Brahman
having created ether created fire.' — Such a combination of
sentences, we reply, is not admissible here, because the
KMndogya intimates that fire was created first, while the
Taittiriyaka assigns the same position to ether, and be-
cause it is impossible that both should have been created
first. — The same remarks apply to a further contradiction
involved in the other scriptural passage, ' From that Self
sprang ether,' &c. ; for there also the material cause and
the fact of origination, being mentioned only once, cannot
be connected with fire as well as ether, so as to effect a
sentence of the following kind, 'from that there sprang
ether, from that there sprang fire.' Moreover the Taittiri-
yaka states separately that ' fire (sprang) from air ^.' — With
regard to this conflict of statements somebody now main-
tains the following view.
3. (The Vedic statement concerning the origination
of ether) has a secondary sense, on account of the
impossibility (of the origination of ether).
The ether does not originate on account of the absence
of scriptural statement. — That other passage which (ap-
parently) declares the origination of the ether must be
taken as having a secondary (figurative) meaning. — Why ?
— On account of the impossibility. The origination of
ether cannot be shown to be possible as long as there
exist followers of the opinion of the reverend Ka;/abhu^
(Kawada). For the latter deny the origination of ether
on the ground that it is impossible to demonstrate the
existence of the required apparatus of causes. Whatever
is originated, they say, is originated from inherent causes,
non-inherent causes, and operative causes. Of a substance
the inherent causes are substances belonging to the same
class and more than one in number. But for ether there
are no such originating substances, belonging to the same
^ While the ^/^and. says that fire sprang from the Self.
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
class and more than one in number, from which, as its
inherent cause, it could originate, and consequently there
also exists no non-inherent cause of ether ; for the latter
would have to be looked for in the conjunction of the
primary substances. And as thus there exist no inherent
cause and no non-inherent cause, there is absolutely no
room for an operative cause ; for the only function of the
latter is to assist the two other causes. Those elements
moreover which have an origin, as fire and the like, we
may conceive to exist in different conditions at an earlier
and a later time ; we may conceive e. g. that fire, pre-
viously to its origination, did not give light or produce
any other effects, while it does do so subsequently to its
origination. Of the ether, on the other hand, no such
difference between an earlier and a later period can be
conceived ; for, we ask, would it be possible to maintain
that before its alleged origination there were no large,
minute, and atomic spaces ? — That ether is without an
origin further follows from its characteristic qualities, such
as all-pervadingness and so on, which altogether distinguish
it from earth and the other elements. — Hence, as the word
* ether ' (akaj'a) is used in a secondary sense in such phrases
as ' make room ' (akaja), ' there is room,' and as space
although one only is designated as being of different kinds
when we speak of the space of a jar, the space of a house,
&c. — a form of expression met with even in Vedic passages
such as ' he is to place the wild animals in the spaces '
(akai^eshu)' — we conclude that those Vedic passages also
which speak of its origination must be supposed to have a
secondary meaning.
4. And on account of the word {of the Veda).
The word of the Veda also proclaims the non-originated-
ness of ether; for it declares that 'air and ether (antariksha)
are immortal' (Br/. Up. II, 3, 3), and what is immortal
cannot have an origin. Another scriptural passage (' omni-
present and eternal like ether '), by comparing two attri-
butes of Brahman, viz. omnipresence and eternity with the
other, intimates that those qualities belong to the ether
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 5. 7
also ; in which case no beginning can be attributed to it.
Other passages to be quoted in this connexion are, ' As
this ether is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite ; '
and 'Brahman has the ether for its body, the ether is the
Self.' For if the ether had a beginning, it could not be
predicated of Brahman (as is done in the last passage), as
we predicate blueness of a lotus (' the lotus is blue ').
Hence we understand that the eternal Brahman is of the
same nature as ether,
5. The one (word 'sprang') may be (taken in its
secondary as well as in its primary sense), like the
word ' Brahman.'
This Sutra contains the reply to a doubt. — If we admit
the opinion maintained hitherto, how can one and the same
word ' sprang ' {' from that Self sprang the ether ') be used,
in the same chapter, in its primary (real) meaning with
regard to fire and so on, and in a secondary meaning with
regard to ether ? — The answer to this objection is that the
one word ' sprang ' may, according to the nature of the
things to which it refers, be used in its primary as well as
its secondary sense, just as the word 'Brahman' is used.
For the one word ' Brahman ' is, in the passage Taitt. Up.
Ill, 2-6 (' Try to know Brahman by penance, for penance
is Brahman '), used in a secondary sense with regard to
food, &c., and in its primary sense with regard to bliss ;
and the same word Brahman is, in the way of figurative
identification (bhakti), applied to penance, which is merely
the means of knowing Brahman, and again directly to
Brahman as the object of knowledge. — But how — to raise
another question— can we, on the supposition of ether
having no beginning, uphold the validity of the statement
made in the clause ' one only, without a second ? ' For if
ether is a second entity (co-existing with Brahman from
eternity), it follows that Brahman has a second. And if so,
how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything
is known? (Kk. Up. VI, i). — The word 'one,' the purva-
pakshin replies, may be used with reference to (the absence
of) effects. As in ordinary life a person, who on a certain
8 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
day sees in a potter's house a lump of clay, a stafif, a wheel
and so on, and on the following day a number of finished
vessels, might say, ' Yesterday there was only clay,' mean-
ing thereby only that on the preceding day there were no
things made of clay, not that there were no staff, wheel and
the like ; so the passage under discussion also is to be
understood. — The term 'without a second' (does not ex-
clude the existence from eternity of ether, but) excludes
the existence of any other superintending- being (but
Brahman). While there is a superintending potter in addi-
tion to the material cause of the vessels, i. e. the clay, there
is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the
material cause of the world. Nor does the existence of
ether as a second entity involve Brahman's being associated
v.'ith a second (and therefore not being of a simple nature).
For diversity is founded on difference of characteristic
attributes, and before the origin (of the creation) no differ-
ence of attributes separating Brahman and ether exists ;
the two being mixed like water and milk, and having the
common attributes of all-pervadingness, immateriality and
so on. At the time of creation however a certain diver-
sity of the two determines itself, Brahman putting forth
energy in order to produce the world, while the ether re-
mains immoveable. — And also from the passages quoted
above — such as ' Brahman has the ether for its body ' — it
follows that the two are identical. Thence again it follows
that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is
known. — Moreover every effect, which is produced, is pro-
duced in such a way as not to be separated from ether in
place as well as in time, and ether itself is non-separated in
place and time from Brahman ; hence, if there are known
Brahman and its effects, the ether also is known. The
case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured
into a jug full of milk. Those drops are taken when the
milk is taken ; the taking of the drops does not constitute
something additional to the taking of the milk. Analo-
gously the ether, as being non-separate in place and time
from Brahman and its effects, is comprised within Brahman,
and consequently we have to understand the passages
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6. 9
about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense. — To
this argumentation we make the following reply.
6. The non-abandonment of the promissory state-
ments (results only) from the non-difference (of the
entire world from Brahman), according to the words
of the Veda.
In all the Vedanta-texts we meet with promissory
statements of the following nature : — ' That by which we
hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived,
know what is not known' {Kh. Up. VI, i, 3) ; 'When
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,
then all this is known ' (Brz. Up. IV, ^,^)\ ' Sir, what is
that through which if it is known everything else becomes
known? ' (Mu. Up. I, i, 3) ; ' Outside that which is there is
no knowledge.' These promissory statements are not
abandoned, i. e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate
of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of
knowledge ; for if there were any difference, the affirmation
that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known,
would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of
the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things
originates from the one Brahman. And we understand
from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be
established only through the theory of the non-difference
of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation
contained in the clause ' That by which we hear what is
not heard,' &c., is proved by the analogous instances of
clay, &c., which all aim at showing the identity of effect
and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent
clauses also (' Being only, my dear, this was in the begin-
ning, one only, without a second ; it thought ; it sent forth
fire,' &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs
to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman,
viz. from the passage ' In it all that exists has its Self
(VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the prapa//^aka. — If, now, the
ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not
be known by Brahman being known, and that would
involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation ; an
lO VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of
the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable. — Similarly
in all the Vedanta-texts certain passages are to be found
which, by means of various instances, make the same
affirmation, so e. g. ' This everything, all is that Self ' {Bri.
Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is that Immortal before'
(Mu. Up. II, 2, ii). — Hence, like fire and the other sub-
stances, the ether also is a product. — The averment
made by the purvapakshin that on account of the ab-
sence of scriptural statements the ether is not a product
is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the
origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. ' from
that Self sprang ether.' — True, — the purvapakshin may
reply, — such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but
it is contradicted by another statement, viz. ' It sent forth
fire,' &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no con-
tradiction, because all scriptural passages form one whole,
the reply is that all non-contradictory passages form a
whole ; in the present case, however, a contradiction has
been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned
only once, cannot be connected with two things created ;
because two things cannot both be created first ; and
because an option is, in that case, inadmissible ^. — This
reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it
is impossible to explain the passage of the Taittiriyaka in
any modified sense ; for it distinctly declares that fire was
produced in the third place, ' From that Self sprang the
ether, from ether air, from air fire.' But, on the other
hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage
from the K/iandogya., which may be explained to mean
that ' Brahman, after having created ether and air, created
fire.' For as the purport of this passage is to relate the
origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the
account of the origin of ether given in another passage ;
according to the principle that to one and the same sen-
tence a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the
^ For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the
other was created first.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6. II
other hand, one creator may successively create more than
one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the
two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we
are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on
account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scrip-
tural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator
mentioned only once is to be connected with two created
things ; for the other (second) created thing is supplied
from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as
the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced
from Brahman — which is stated directly in the passage
' Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as begin-
ning, ending and breathing in it' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, i) —
does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to
begin with fire ; so also the statement as to fire being pro-
duced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of
creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to
begin with ether.
But, it may be objected, the passage ' Let a man
meditate with calm mind,' &c. has the purpose of enjoin-
ing calmness, and does not state anything with regard
to creation ; it need not therefore adapt itself to the
order (of creation) established by another passage^. On
the other hand, the passage ' It sent forth fire ' refers to
the creation, and we must therefore accept the order
exactly as stated there. — This objection we refute by the
remark that it is not legitimate to abandon, from deference
to the circumstance of fire occupying the first place (in the
Kh. Up.), the thing, viz. the ether which is known (to
have been created) from another passage ; for order of
succession is a mere attribute of things (and therefore
subordinate to the latter). Moreover, in the passage ' It
sent forth fire ' we meet with no word directly indicating
the order of succession ; but we merely infer the latter
from the sense, and this (merely inferred) order is impugned
by the order established by another direct scriptural state-
^ Yatpara^ j'abda^ sa j'abdarlho na Myaw jabda^ srz'sh/iparo ^ to
na prasiddhaw kramam badhilum alam iti. An. Gi.
12 vedanta-sOtras.
ment, viz. ' From air there sprang fire.' Now with regard
to the question whether ether or fire were created first,
neither option nor addition are permissible, because the
former is impossible in itself, and the latter non-admitted
by the texts ^ Hence the two scriptural passages are not
contradictory. — Moreover, in order to justify the promise
made in the K/iSLtidogya. in the beginning of the chapter
(' That instruction by which we hear what is not heard '),
we have to count the ether, although ' not heard ' (i. e. not
mentioned in the text) among the things produced ; how
much more impossible then is it for us not to accept the
statement actually made about the ether in the Taitti-
riyaka! — To the assertion, made above by the purvapak-
shin, that the ether as occupying the same space with
everything is known together with Brahman and its effects,
and that thus the assertion (of everything being known
through Brahman) is not contradicted ; and that moreover
the scriptural passage ' one only, without a second ' is not
contradicted, because Brahman and the ether may be con-
sidered as non-separate, like milk and water, we make the
following reply. That knowledge of everything through
the knowledge of one thing (of which scripture speaks)
cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed
with water, because we understand from the parallel
instance of a piece of clay being brought forward (K/i. Up.
VI, I, 4) that the knowledge of everything has to be ex-
plained through the relation of the material cause and the
material effect (the knowledge of the cause implying the
knowledge of the effect). Moreover, the knowledge of every-
thing, if assumed to be analogous to the case of the know-
ledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect
knowledge (samyag-vi^^/ana), because the water which is
^ An optional proceeding, i.e. the doctrine that either ether or
fire was the first product is impossible because only actions to be
done, not existing things, fall within the sphere of option ; addition,
i.e. the fact of fire and ether together being the first creation is not
admitted by scripture, which teaches a successive creation of the
elements.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 1 3
apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with
which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge^.
Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like
ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, un-
truth, and deceit ^. And we should do violence to the
emphatic assertion made in the passage ' one only, without
a second,' if we explained it according to the analogy of
milk mixed with water. — Nor must we explain the cog-
nition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion
as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part
of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to
the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case
in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is
said about clay and the like is not something altogether
new and independent ; but has to be understood in con-
nexion with the previous passage ' vSVetaketu, as you are
so conceited/ &c. We therefore must conclude that the
' knowledge of everything ' has all things whatever for its
objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that
everything is the effect of Brahman.
The next Sutra replies to the assertion, made by the
purvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin
of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on
account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin).
7. But wherever there are effects, there is division ;
as in ordinary life.
The conjunction ' but ' is meant to exclude the suspicion
of impossibility. — We must not imagine the origin of ether
to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects
(modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns,
or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and
swords, we also obsei've division ; while, on the other hand.
^ For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different
from it.
2 But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing every-
thing becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning.
14 vedanta-sOtras.
nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided ^ Now,
we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on ; hence
ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circum-
stance of their being divided) place (dis), time, mind
(manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects.
But — an objection may be raised — the Self also is divided
from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an
effect like jars and the like. — This objection we refute by
pointing to the scriptural statement that ' ether sprang from
the Self (Taitt. Up. II, i). For if the Self also were a mere
modification (of something else), it would follow that all
effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self - ; for
scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self
itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect.
And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general
void (jimyavada). Just because it is the Self, it is impos-
sible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable
of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any
person's case, adventitious, not established through the so-
called means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established.
The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means
of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously
non-established objects of knowledge ; for nobody assumes
such things as ether and so on to be self-established inde-
pendently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self,
as being the abode of the energy that acts through the
means of right know^ledge, is itself established previously
to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity
is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be re-
futed, but not that which is the essential nature (of him
who attempts the refutation) ; for it is the essential nature
of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e.
sublated) by the fire itself. — Let us further consider the
relation expressed in the following clauses : ' I know at the
present moment whatever is present ; I knew (at former
moments) the nearer and the remoter past ; I shall know
^ Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever
is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self.
'^ I. e. without a material cause.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 1 5
(in the future) the nearer and the remoter future.' Here
the object of knowledge changes according as it is some-
thing past or something future or something present ; but
the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is
eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal
presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the
body is reduced to ashes ; nay we cannot even conceive
that it ever should become something different from what
it is. — It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its
nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the
other hand, falls under the category of effected things.
To the objection, raised above by the purvapakshin,
that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of
which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an
absolute law that effects should originate only from things
belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to
different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunc-
tions of threads ^ do not belong to the same genus, the
former being admitted to belong to the genus ' substance,'
the latter to the genus ' quality.' Nor again is there a
binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle,
the loom and so on should belong to the same genus. —
Well then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to
the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to
the other causes ^. — But here also there is no absolute rule.
For we see that one and the same rope is made of things
belonging to different genera, such as threads and cow-
hair, and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable
thread and wool. — If it were assumed that the postulate of
the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers
only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c., the
rule would be a superfluous one ; for in that sense every
inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other ^'.
^ Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth ; the con-
junction of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause ; the
loom, shuttle, &c. are the operative causes.
^ So much only was in fact insisted upon by the purvapakshin,
n, .3. 3.
* An inherent cause is always a substance (dravya), and as such
1 6 vedAnta-sOtras.
— Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality
of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate
an efifect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the
mind (manas) originate their first activity ; i. e. one atom
by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their
primary actions, without being in conjunction with other
substances. — And, should it be said that there is an absolute
rule as to several causes only having originating power in
the case of the origination of substances only (not in the
case of the origination of actions, &c.), we again deny that,
because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change
(transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by
you, would exist if substances did originate other sub-
stances, only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent
cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same sub-
stance, when passing over into a different state distin-
guished by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be
an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo
the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and
earth ; in other cases one substance only changes, as when
milk turns into curds. — In short it is none of the Lord's
laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce
an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scrip-
ture, that the entire world has sprung from the one Brah-
man, ether being produced first and later on the other
elements in due succession. A statement to that effect
has already been made above (II, i, 24).
The further assertion made by the purvapakshin, that on
the assumption of ether having had an origin it is impos-
sible to conceive a difference between the former and later
periods (the time before and after the origination of ether)
is likewise unfounded ; for we have to understand that that
very specialising difference \ from which we ascertain at
present that there is a thing such as ether, different from
earth and the other elements, did not exist before the
always falls under the notion of essentiality (satta), which constitutes
the summum genus for substances, qualities, and actions.
^ Viz. the quality of sound.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, "] . I J
origination of ether. And just as Brahman's nature does
not participate in the nature of earth and the other ele-
ments characterised by grossness and similar qualities, —
according to such scriptural passages as ' It is not gross, it
is not subtle,' — so also it does not participate in the nature
of ether, as we understand from the passage ' it is without
ether' (B;-z. Up. Ill, 8, 8). It therefore remains a settled
conclusion that, before ether was produced, Brahman existed
without ether.
The inference, drawn by the purvapakshin, that ether
has no beginning, because it differs in nature from those
substances which avowedly have a beginning, such as earth
and so on, is without any value ; for, as it is contradicted
by scripture, it must be considered fallacious. We, on our
part, have brought forward arguments showing that ether
is an originated thing; and we may moreover reason as
follows : Ether is non-eternal, because it is the substratum
of a non-eternal quality, viz. sound, just as jars and other
things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities,
are themselves non-eternal. — Nor is there any danger of
this latter reasoning being extended to the Self also, for the
philosopher who takes his stand on the Upanishads does
not admit that the Self is the substratum of non-eternal
qualities. Moreover, those who teach ether to have an
origin do not consider it proved that it is all-pervading
and so on.
In reply to the remarks made under II, 3, 4 we point
out that those scriptural passages which speak of the
'immortality of ether' are to be understood in the same
way as the analogous statements about the immortality of
the gods ^, since the origin and destruction of the ether have
been shown to be possible. And if it is said of Brahman
that ' it is omnipresent and eternal like ether,' Brahman is
there compared to ether, whose greatness is well known,
merely in order to indicate its supereminent greatness, not
in order to maintain its being equal to ether. Similarly,
when we say that the sun moves with the speed of an
^ I.e. as referring to a relative immortality only.
[38J C
1 8 vedanta-sOtras.
arrow, we merely mean that he moves fast, not that he
moves at the same rate as an arrow. This remark explains
that scriptural passage also in which Brahman is declared
to be infinite like ether. — On the other hand, such passages
as ' It is greater than ether ' prove that the extent of ether
is less than that of Brahman ; passages like ' there is no
image of him ' [Sve. Up. IV, 19) show that there is nothing
to compare Brahman to ; and passages like ' Everything
else is of evil ' (Brt. Up. Ill, 4, 2) show that everything
different from Brahman such as ether, &c. is of evil. — All
which serves to refute the assertion that the passage which
declares ether to have originated has to be taken in a
secondary sense, as the word Brahman actually has to be
taken in some passages. Scripture and reasoning in com-
bination rather show that ether has an origin, and the final
conclusion therefore is that ether is an effect of Brahman.
8. Hereby air (also) is explained.
The present Sutra extends the reasoning concerning ether
to the air of which the ether is the abode. — The different
views about air also are to be arranged in an analogous
manner. The piirvapakshin maintains that the air is not a
product, because 'it is not mentioned in that chapter of the
isT/^andogya which treats of the origination of things. —
The opposite opinion is, that the air is mentioned in the
parallel chapter of the Taittiriyaka (' from the ether sprang
the air '). — The two scriptural passages being of a conflict-
ing nature, the purvapakshin maintains that the passage
which declares the air to have originated must be taken in
a secondary sense ; firstly on account of the impossibility
(of the literal sense being adopted), as shown (in the adhi-
karawa treating of the ether) ; secondly on account of that
passage which denies that it ever sets, ' Viyu (the air) is the
deity that never sets' (Br/. Up. I, 5, 22); and thirdly on
account of those passages which declare it to be immortal.
The final opinion on the other hand is, that air is a pro-
duct ; in the first place because this conclusion is conform-
able to the general tendency of scripture ; and, in the
second place, because it is generally admitted that whatever
II ADHYAYA, 3 PA DA, Q. 1 9
is divided is an effect. — The denial of its ever setting refers
to the lower knowledge (apara vidya ^) and is merely a
relative one, Vayu not setting in the same way as fire,
&c. The statement as to the immortality, &c. of air has
already received its reply (in the adhikara/^a treating of
the ether). — Here it maybe asked why, ether and air being
equally mentioned and not mentioned in the chapters
treating of the origin of the world, one adhikara;^a is not
considered to suffice for both, and why instead of that there
is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to the
latter case, although there is no difference between the two
cases. — To this we reply that there is indeed some reason
for the question ; that, however, the formal extension is
made for the purpose of removing any doubts which might
possibly be engendered in the minds of slow-witted people
by mere words ^. For as, in the Saw^vargavidya and other
passages, the glory of Vayu is referred to as an object of
worship ; and as scripture says that he never sets, &c.,
some men might think that he is eternal.
9. But there is no origin of that which is (i.e. of
Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such
an origin).
Somebody, who has learned from scripture that ether
and air, although not in themselves likely to have originated,
yet actually are things with a beginning, might feel inclined
to suspect that Brahman itself has sprung from something
else. — And further somebody, who has learned from scripture
that from ether and the other elements which are themselves
mere eff"ects further effects are produced, might think that
also Brahman, from which ether has sprung, is a mere effect.
— In order to remove this doubt the Sutra declares that Brah-
man, whose Self is Being, must not be suspected to have
sprung from anything else 'on account of the impossibility.'
Brahman which is mere Being cannot spring from mere
^ In which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under
the form of Vayu.
- iS'abdanurodhiny eva .rahka na vastvanurodhiniti. An. Gi.
C 2
20 vedanta-sOtras.
being, since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist
without a certain superiority (on the part of the cause).
Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is some-
thing particular, since this would be contrary to experience.
For we observe that particular forms of existence are pro-
duced from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots
from clay, but not that what is general is produced from
particulars. Nor again can Brahman spring from that which
is not (asat), for that which is. not is without a Self^ and
moreover scripture expressly rejects that view, in the pas-
sage ' How could that which is spring from that which is
not ? ' i^Kh. Up. VI, 2, 2). Another passage, moreover,
expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor, ' He is
the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is
of him neither progenitor nor lord' (5ve. Up. VI, 9). — With
regard to ether and air the possibility of an origin has been
shown ; but in Brahman's case there is no such possibility ;
hence the cases are not parallel. Nor does the fact of other
effects springing from effects imply that Brahman also must
be an effect ; for the non-admission of a fundamental causal
substance w^ould drive us to a retrogressus in infinitum. And
that fundamental causal substance which as a matter of
fact is generally -acknowledged to exist, just that is our
Brahman. — Thus there is not any contradiction.
10. Fire (is produced) thence (i.e. from air); for
thus (the text) declares.
In the K/ikndogydi it is said that fire has for its source
that which is (Brahman), in the Taittiriyaka that it has the
air for its source. There being thus a conflict of scriptural
passages with regard to the origin of fire, the pur-
vapakshin maintains that fire has Brahman for its source.
— Why? — Because the text^ after having stated at the outset
that there existed only that which is, teaches that it sent
forth fire ; and because the assertion of everything being
known through Brahman is possible only in case of every-
^ And cannot therefore constitute a cause ; for a cause is the
Self of its effects.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, lO. 21
thing being produced from Brahman ; and because the
scriptural statement as to the ' Ta^^alan ' {Kh. Up. Ill,
14, i) specifies no difference^; and because another scrip-
tural passage (Mu. Up. II, i, 3) teaches that everything
without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittiriyaka
also makes a statement about the entire world without any
exception, 'after having brooded he sent forth all whatever
there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Hence the statement that
'fire was produced from air' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) must be
considered to teach the order of succession only ' fire was
produced subsequently to air.'
To this the Sutra replies that fire was produced thence,
i. e. from air, because the text declares it to be so — ' from
air sprang fire.' For if fire had sprung directly from Brah-
man and not from air, the scriptural statement that ' fire
sprang from air ' would be contradicted thereby. That
that statement should intimate the order of succession
merely, as maintained by the purvapakshin, we cannot admit.
For as in the preceding sentence ('from that Self sprang
ether ') the fifth case (atmana/^) denotes the Self as that
from which the origination proceeds, and as the same verb
(' sprang ') governs our sentence also, and as in the following
sentences also — such as 'from earth the herbs' — the fifth
case (przthivya/^) denotes that from which something pro-
ceeds, we understand that in our sentence also the fifth case
(vayo/z) denotes that from which fire proceeds. Moreover,
if we should explain our sentence to mean ' after air fire was
produced,' we should have to supply some preposition
(or adverb as 'after,' 'subsequently '), while that construction
which rests on the proper sense of the fifth case-affix is
ready made at hand and does not require anything to be
supplied. The passage therefore intimates that fire springs
from air. — But, it may be said, the other scriptural passage
('it sent forth fire') intimates that fire springs from Brahman.
— Not so, we reply ; for this latter passage remains uncon-
tradicted, even if we assume that fire sprang from Brahman
only through intermediate links (not directly).
' But implies the whole world to have sprung from Brahman.
^2 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Even the supposition that Brahman, after having created
ether and air, assumed the form of air and thus created fire
would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman ;
for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that
curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow.
There is, moreover, a scriptural passage declaring that Brah-
man abides as the Self of its effects, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 7,
' That made itself its Self.' And analogously Smrz'ti — in
the passage beginning ' Cognition, knowledge^ steadiness of
mind ' (Bha. Gi. X, 4) — says about the Lord, ' From me
only spring the manifold states of the beings.' For
although cognition and so on are observed to spring
directly from their immediate causes, yet (the assertion
made in the passage quoted holds good), since the entire
aggregate of beings is, directly or indirectly, derived from
the Lord. — Thereby those scriptural passages are accounted
for which speak of the creation (on the whole) without
specifying the order of succession^; for they may be ex-
plained anyhow, while on the other hand the passages
specifying the order of creation cannot be turned in any
other way (i.e. not away from their direct sense). The
general assertion, nioreover, of everything springing from
Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately
proceed from that which is, not that they should be its
immediate effects. — Thus there remains no difficulty.
1 1 . Water (is produced from fire).
We have to supply from the preceding Sutra the words
' thence ' and ' for thus the text declares.' — Water is pro-
duced from fire ; for the text says, ' it sent forth water '
{Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3), and ' from fire (sprang) water ' (Taitt.
Up. II, i). These explicit statements allow no room for
doubt'-. The Sutrakara, however, having explained the
creation of fire, and being about to explain the creation of
^ I.e. it appears from the preceding discussion that those passages
have to be explained in such a way as to agree with those other
passages which state the order of the created beings.
"^ So that the Sfitra might possibly be looked upon as not
called for.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 12. 23
earth, propounds this Sutra in order to insert water (and
thus to point out its position in the sr/sh/ikrama).
1 2. The earth (is meant by the word ' anna '), on
account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other
passages.
We read, ' Water thought, may I be many, may I grow
forth. It sent forth food (anna) ' [Kh. Up. VI, 3, 4). —
Here a doubt arises, whether the word ' anna ' denotes
things fit to be used as food, such as rice, barley and the
like ; or cooked food ; or else the earth.
The purvapakshin maintains that the word is to be
understood in the former sense ; for, he says, the word
' anna ' means ' food ' in ordinary language, and is moreover
confirmed in that sense by the complementary passage,
' Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then
produced ; ' for when it rains, rice, barley and the like, but
not earth, are produced in abundance.
To this we reply that by the word ' anna ' we have to
understand earth as being produced from water. — Why ? —
On account of the subject-matter, on account of the colour,
and on account of other passages. — -The subject-matter, in
the first place, is clearly connected with the elements, as we
see from the preceding passages, ' it sent forth fire, it sent
forth water.' It would therefore be improper to pass over
a further element, viz. earth, when its turn has come, and
to assume without reason that rice and the like are meant
by the word ' anna.' — In the second place, we find that in a
complementary passage there is mentioned a colour which
agrees with earth, ' the black colour (of fire) is the colour
of anna.' Eatable things on the other hand, such as cooked
dishes, and rice, barley and the like, are not" necessarily
black. — But earth too is not necessarily black ; for the soil
of some fields has a whitish colour like milk, and that of
others looks red like glowing coals ! — True, but that does
not affect our argument, since what we have to look to is
the predominant colour. Now the predominant colour of
earth is black, not either white or red. The Paurawikas also
designate the colour of the earth by the term ' night '
24 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
(j-aiA'ari) ; now the night is black, and we therefore conclude
that black is the colour of earth also. — In the third
place other scriptural passages also, which refer to the same
subject, declare that ' from water (sprang) earth ' (Taitt. Up.
II, i), and that ' what was there as the froth of the water,
that was hardened and became the earth ' (Brt. Up. I, 2, 2).
On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like
were produced from the earth. ' From earth sprang herbs,
from herbs food ' (Taitt, Up. II, i). — As, thus, the general
subject-matter as well as other arguments clearly proves
that the word ' anna ' here denotes earth, we can in no way-
accept the view that rice and the like are referred to. The
common use of language to which the purvapakshin appeals
is of no avail against the arguments favouring our interpre-
tation. The complementary passage also (' whenever it
rains,' &c.) is to be viewed as pointing out that, owing to
the earthy nature of food frice, &c.), earth itself mediately
springs from water. — For all these reasons the word ' anna '
denotes this earth.
1 3. But on account of the indicatory mark supplied
by their reflecting (i.e. by the reflection attributed
to the elements),' he (i.e. the Lord is the creative
principle abiding within the elements).
A doubt here arises whether ether and the other elements
do themselves send forth their effects, or if the highest
Lord abiding within certain Selfs produces, after reflection,
certain effects.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the elements them-
selves send forth, because the texts speak of them as acting
independently; compare, for instance, 'from ether sprang air,
from air fire,' &c. The objection that non-intelligent beings
cannot enter on independent activity is invalidated by the
fact that the elements also are spoken of in the sacred texts
as endowed with intelligence, cf. for instance, ' fire thought,'
' water thought ' {K/i. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4).
To this we reply that the highest Lord himself abiding
within certain Selfs sends forth, after reflection, certain
effects. — Why ? — On account of the indicatory marks. For
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4.
texts such as ' he who dwells in the earth, and within the
earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth
is and who rules the earth within ' show that the elements
enter on their activity only if presided over by an intelligent
principle. Texts such as ' He became sat and tyat ' (which
occurs in tlie passage, ' he wished may I be many, may I
grow forth,' Taitt. Up. II, 6) and ' It made itself its Self (i. e.
the Self of everything which exists ; II, 7) show that he
(the highest Lord) is the Self of everything. The thinking
and hearing which the texts attribute to water and fire must
be viewed as due to the fact of the highest Lord having
entered them ; for the passage, ' there is no other seer but
he,' denies there being any other seer (thinker), and that
which is (i. e. Brahman), in the character of seer (or thinker),
constitutes the subject-matter of the whole chapter ; as we
conclude from the introductory passage, ' It thought, may I
be many, may I grow forth ' {Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3).
14. The order (in which the elements are retracted
into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order
in which they are created); this is proved (by its
agreement with observation).
Having considered the order of the creation of the
elements we now proceed to consider the order of their
retractation. — The question here is whether their retracta-
tion takes place in an indefinite order, or in the order of
the creation, or in the inverse order. That the origin, the
subsistence and the retractation of the elements all depend
on Brahman, scripture declares ' That from whence these
beings are born, that by which when born they live, that
into which they enter at their death.'
The purvapakshin maintains that the retractation of the
elements is not bound to any definite order, because scrip-
ture contains no specific information on the point. Or else,
he says, let him who wishes to know the order of the re-
tractation accept the order of creation, since the latter is
expressly mentioned in the texts.
To this we reply that the order of retractation must be
viewed as the reverse of the order of creation. For we see
26 vedanta-sOtras.
in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has, in
descending, to take the steps in the reverse order. More-
over we observe that things made of clay, such as jars,
dishes, &c., on being destroyed pass back into clay, and that
things which have originated from water, such as snow and
hailstones, again dissolve into water. Hence we rightly
assume that earth which has (according to scripture) sprung
from water passes back into water when the period of its
subsistence comes to an end, and that water which has
sprung from fire passes back into fire. In this way each
particular effect passes back into its immediately antece-
dent cause — each cause being of a subtler nature than its
effect — until in the end the last cause is refunded into
Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It
certainly would be irrational to assume that an effect, pass-
ing over its immediate cause, should at once refund itself
into the cause of the cause. Smr/ti also declares that the
order of retractation is the order of origination inverted,
' The earth, the basis of the world, is dissolved into water,
O divine Rishi, the water into fire, the fire into air.' The
order of creation is indeed stated in the sacred texts, but
that statement refers to creation only, and can therefore
not be extended to retractation. We, moreover, cannot
even desire to apply the order in which the elements are
created to their retractation also since it is clearly unsuit-
able in the latter case. For, as long as an effect subsists, it
is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause, since
on the dissolution of the latter the effect also cannot exist.
On the other hand, we may assume a continued existence
of the cause although the effect be destroyed ; for that is
actually observed in the case of clay (and the things made
of it).
15. If it be said that between (Brahman and the
elements) the intellect and mind (are mentioned ;
and that therefore their origination and retractation
are to be placed) somewhere in the series, on
account of there being inferential signs (whereby the
order of the creation of the elements is broken) ; we
11 ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 5. 27
deny that, on account of the non-difference (of the
organs and the elements).
In what precedes we have said that the creation and the
retractation of the elements take place in direct and reverse
order ; further that the creation proceeds from the Self,
and that the retractation terminates in the Self — Now
Srnti as well as Smr/ti enlightens us concerning the exist-
ence of the mind (manas) together with the senses, and of
the intellect (buddhi) ; compare, for instance, the indicatory
marks contained in the passage, Ka. Up. 1, 3, 3. 4, ' Know the
intellect to be the charioteer and the mind the reins ; the
senses they call the horses,' &c. And as the whole aggre-
gate of beings avowedly springs from Brahman, we must
assume that the mind, the intellect and the senses also
originate from it and are again merged in it in due order,
occupying a definite place among the things created and
retracted. Moreover the Atharvawa (Muw^T'aka), in the
chapter treating of the creation, mentions the organs
between the Self and the elements, ' From him is born
breath, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light,
water and the earth the support of all ' (II, i, 3). And
from this there results a break in the previously stated
order of the creation and the retractation of the elements.
This we deny, on account of the non-difference (of the
organs from the elements). If the organs themselves are of
the nature of the elements, their origination and retracta-
tion are the same as those of the elements, and we therefore
have not to look out in their case for a different order.
And that the organs are of the nature of the elements^ for
that we have inferential marks, in passages such as the
following, ' for mind, my child, consists of earth, breath of
water, speech of fire ' (K/i. Up. VI, 6, 5). That the organs
(although in reality belonging to the elements) are some-
times mentioned separately from them, is to be understood
in the same way as when the Parivra^akas (mendicant
Brahma/zas) are spoken of separately from the Br^hmawas.
And supposing even that the organs are not of the nature
of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements
28 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
would not be interfered with by the organs ; for we might
assume either that the organs are produced first and the
elements last ; or else that the elements are produced first
and the organs last. In the Atharva/^a-upanishad quoted
above we have merely a serial enumeration of the organs
and the elements, not a statement as to the order of their
origination. Similarly in other places also the series of the
organs is recorded apart from the series of the elements ; so,
for instance, in the following passage, ' Pra^apati indeed was
all this in the beginning, he reflected on himself; he sent
forth mind ; there was mind only ; mind reflected on itself ; it
sent forth speech,' &c. — Hence the origination of the organs
does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the
elements.
1 6. But the designation (as being born and dying)
abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and non-
moving ; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to
the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends
on the existence of that (i.e. the body).
On account of certain popular modes of expression such
as ' Devadatta is born,' ' Devadatta has died," and the like,
and on account of certain ceremonies such as the Cataka-
karman, some people might fall into the error of thinking
that the individual soul has a beginning, and in the end
undergoes destruction. This error we are going to dispel.
— The individual soul has no beginning and is not subject
to dissolution, since thus only it can be connected with the
results of actions, as the vS'astra teaches. If the individual
soul perished after the body, there would be no sense
in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to
the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant
things in another body (another birth). And scripture says,
' This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the
living soul does not die' {Kh. Up. VI, ii, 3). — But it has
been pointed out above that ordinary language speaks of
the birth and the death of the individual soul ! — True ; but
the terms ' birth ' and ' death,' if applied to the soul, have to
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7. 29
be taken in a secondary sense. — What then is that thing to
which those words apply in their primary sense, and with
reference to Avhich we can speak of a secondary sense ? — ■
They apply, we answer, to whatever moves and whatever
does not move. The words ' birth ' and ' death ' have refer-
ence to the bodies of moving and non-moving beings ; for
such beings are born (produced) and die. To them the
terms 'birth' and 'death' apply in their primary sense;
while they are used metaphorically only with reference to
the soul dwelling in them. For their existence (i. e. their
being used) depends on the existence of the body ; i. e.
the words ' birth ' and ' death ' are used where there take
place the manifestation and disappearance of bodies, not
where they are absent. For nobody ever observes a soul
being born or dying, apart from its connexion with a body.
That the words ' birth ' and ' death ' have reference to the
conjunction with — and separation from — a body merely, is
also shown by the following passage : ' On being born that
person assuming his body, &:c. ; when he passes out (of the
body) and dies,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 8). The ^ata-ceremony
also is to be viewed as having reference to the manifestation
of the body only ; for the soul is not manifested. — Whether
the individual soul is produced from the highest Self like
ether, &c. or not, will be discussed in the next Sutra ; the
present Sutra merely states that the gross origination and
dissolution which belong to the body do not affect the
soul.
1 7. The (living) Self is not (produced) as there is
no scriptural statement, and as it is eternal according
to them (i. e. scriptural passages).
There is a Self called the living one (the individual soul),
which rules the body and the senses, and is connected with
the fruits of actions. With regard to that Self the con-
flict of scriptural passages suggests the doubt, whether it is
produced from Brahman like ether and the other elements,
or if, like Brahman itself, it is unproduced. Some scrip-
tural passages, by comparing it to sparks proceeding from
a fire and so on, intimate that the living soul is produced
30 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
from Brahman ; from others again we learn that the
highest Brahman, without undergoing any modification,
passes, by entering into its effects (the elements), into the
condition of the individual soul. These latter passages do
not thus record an origination of the individual soul.
The purvapakshin maintains that the individual soul is
produced, because on that view the general promissory
statement is not contradicted. For the general assertion
that ' by one thing being known all this is known ' is not
contradicted, only if the entire aggregate of things springs
from Brahman ; while it would be contradicted by the
assumption of the individual soul being a thing of a dif-
ferent kind. Nor can the individual soul be conceived as
mere unmodified highest Self, on account of the difference
of their respective characteristics. For the highest Self is
characterised by freedom from sin and so on, while the
individual soul possesses the opposite attributes. That it
is an effect, follows moreover from its being divided. For
ether and all other things, in so far as divided, are effects,
and we have concluded therefrom that they have an origin.
Hence the soul also, which is distributed through all the
bodies, doing good and evil and experiencing pleasure and
pain, must be considered to originate at the time when
the entire world is produced. We have moreover the fol-
lowing scriptural passage, ' As small sparks come forth
from fire, thus from that Self all vital airs,' &c. (Brz. Up.
II, 1, 20). This text teaches first the creation of the
aggregate of objects of fruition, beginning with the vital
airs, and then (in the words, ' all the Selfs ') separately
teaches the creation of all the enjoying souls. Again we
have the passage, 'As from a blazing fire sparks, being of
the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are
various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my
friend, and return hither also ' (Mu. Up. II, i, 1) ; a passage
descriptive of the origin and the retractation of the souls, as
we infer from the statement about the sameness of nature^.
' That the word bhava/i ' beings ' here means ' individual souls,'
we conclude from their being said to have the same nature as the
Imperishable.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7. 3 1
For the individual souls are of the same nature as Brahman,
because they are endowed with intelligence. Nor can the
fact that in some places (as, for instance, in the accounts of
the creation of the elements) the creation of the soul is
not mentioned, invalidate what is stated about it in other
places ; it being a general principle of interpretation that
whatever new, and at the same time non-contradictory,
matter is taught in some scriptural passage has to be com-
bined with the teaching of all other passages. Hence that
passage also which speaks of the Self entering (into its
effects and thus becoming ^iva) must be explained as
stating the Self's passing over into an effect (viz. the soul),
analogously to such passages as ' that made itself its Self,'
&c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7). — From all which it follows that the
individual soul is a product.
To all this we reply, that the individual soul is not a
product. — Why ? — On account of the absence of scriptural
statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation,
the production of the soul is, in most cases, not mentioned.
— But, it was admitted above that the circumstance of some-
thing not being stated in some places does not invalidate
the statements made about it elsewhere. — True, that was
admitted ; but we now declare that the production of the
soul is not possible. — Why ? — ' On account of the eternity,
&c., resulting from them ' (i. e. the scriptural passages).
The word ' &c.' implies non-originatedness and similar
attributes. For we know from scriptural passages that the
soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging,
that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman,
and that the soul has its Self in Brahman. A being of
such a nature cannot be a product. The scriptural
passages to which we are alluding are the following :—
'The living Self dies not' {Kh. Up. VI, 11, 3); ' This great
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
indeed Brahman ' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; ' The knowing Self
is not born, it dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18) ; 'The Ancient
is unborn, eternal, everlasting' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18) ; ' Having
sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'Let
me now enter those with this livlnof Self and let me then
32 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
evolve Hames and forms ' [Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2) ; ' He entered
thither to the very tips of the finger-nails ' (B;-/. Up. I, 4, 7) ;
' Thou art that ' [I<h. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; ' I am Brahman ' (Brz.
Up. 1, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman knowing all' (Br/. Up.
II, 5, 19). — All these texts declare the eternity of the soul,
and thus militate against the view of its having been pro-
duced.— But it has been argued above that the soul must
be a modification because it is divided, and must have an
origin because it is a modification ! — It is not, we reply, in
itself divided; for scripture declares that 'there is one God
hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all
beings' (5"ve. Up. VI, 11); it only appears divided owing
to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just
as the ether appears divided by its connexion with jars
and the like. Scripture (viz. Brz. Up. IV, 4, 5, ' that Self
is indeed Brahman, made up of knowledge, mind, life, sight,
hearing,' &c.) also declares that the one unmodified Brah-
man is made up of a plurality of intellects (buddhi), &c. By
Brahman being made up of mind and so on is meant, that its
nature is coloured thereby, while the fact of its being entirely
separate from it is non-apparent. Analogously we say that
a mean, cowardly fellow is made up of womanishness. —
The casual passages which speak of the soul's production
and dissolution must therefore be interpreted on the ground
of the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts ; when the
adjunct is produced or dissolved, the soul also is said to be
produced or dissolved. Thus scripture also declares, ' Being
altogether a mass of knowledge, having risen from out of
these elements it again perishes after them. When he has
departed there is no more knowledge' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 13).
What is meant there, is only the dissolution of the limiting
adjuncts of the Self, not the dissolution of the Self itself ^
The text itself explains this, in reply to Maitreyi's ques-
^ Hence the phrase, ' there is no more knowledge,' — which seems
to contradict the term ' a mass of knowledge,' — only means that,
on the limiting adjuncts being dissolved, there is no longer any
knowledge of distinctions.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 33
tion (' Here, Sir, thou hast landed me in utter bewilder-
ment. Indeed I do not understand him, that when he has
departed there is no more knowledge'), in the words, ' I say
nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is
imperishable and of an indestructible nature. But it enters
into contact with the sense organs.' — Non-contradiction
moreover of the general assertion (about everything being
known through one) results only from the acknowledgment
that Brahman is the individual soul. The difference of the
attributes of both is also owing to the limiting adjuncts
only. Moreover the words ' Speak on for the sake of final
deliverance ' (uttered by kanaka with reference to the in-
struction he receives from Ya^wavalkya about the vi^;7ana-
maya atman) implicitly deny that the Self consisting of
knowledge (i.e. the individual soul) possesses any of the
attributes of transitory existence, and thus show it to be
one with the highest Self. — From all this it follows that
the individual soul does not either originate or undergo
destruction.
18. For this very reason (the individual soul is)
intellicrent.
o
Owing to the conflicting views of the philosophical
schools there arises a doubt whether, as the followers
of Kawada think, the soul is in itself non-intelligent, so
that its intelligence is merely adventitious ; or if, as the
Sahkhyas think, eternal intelligence constitutes its very
nature.
The purvapakshin maintains that the intelligence of the
Self is adventitious, and is produced by the conjunction of the
Self with the mind (manas),just as, for instance, the quality
of redness is produced in a jar by the conjunction of the jar
with fire. For if the soul were of eternal (essential) intel-
ligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep
sleep, swoon, and possession, while as a matter of fact, men
when waking from sleep and so on declare in reply to
questions addressed to them that they were not conscious
of anything. Men in their ordinary state, on the other hand,
are seen to be (actively) intelligent. Hence, as intelli-
[38] D
34 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
gence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the Self's
intelligence is adventitious only.
To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence,
for that very reason that it is not a product but nothing
else but the unmodified highest Brahman which, owing to
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, appears as individual
soul. That intelligence constitutes the essential nature of
the highest Brahman, we know from scriptural passages
such as 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Brz. Up. Ill,
9, 28, 7); 'Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite' (Taitt.
Up. II, i); 'Having neither inside nor outside, but being
altogether a mass of knowledge' (Brt. Up. IV, 5, 13).
Now, if the individual soul is nothing but that highest
Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul's
essential nature also, just as light and heat constitute the
nature of fire. In the chapter treating of that which con-
sists of knowledge, there are, moreover, passages (directly
declaring that the individual soul is of the nature of self-
luminous intelligence), ' He not asleep himself looks down
upon the sleeping (senses)' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 11); 'That
person is self-illuminated ' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 14) ; ' For there
is no intermission. of the knowing of the knower' (Br/. Up.
IV, 3, 30). That the soul's nature is intelligence, follows
moreover from the passage [K/i. Up. VIII, 12, 4) where
it is represented as connected with knowledge through all
sense-organs, ' He who knows, let me smell this, he is the
Self,' &c. &c. — From the soul's essential nature being
intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless ;
for they serve the purpose of determining the special object
of each sense, such as smell and so on. This is expressly
declared by scripture, 'Smell is for the purpose of per-
ceiving odour' (K/i. Up. VIII, 12, 4). — The objection that
sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted
by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in
deep sleep, 'And when there he does not see, yet he is
seeing though he does not see. For there is no inter-
mission of the seeing of the seer, because it cannot perish.
But there is then no second, nothing else different from
him that he could see' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 23). That means:
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 35
The absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of
objects, not to the absence of intelligence ; just as the light
pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of
things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.
— The reasoning of the Vaij-eshikas and others is, as contra-
dicting scripture, merely fallacious, and we therefore decide
that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.
19. (On account of the scriptural declarations) of
(the soul's) passing out, going and returning, (the
soul is of atomic size).
We now have to consider of what size the soul is^
whether of atomic size or of a medium size, or of great
(infinite) size. — But, it has been shown above that the soul
is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes
its nature, whence it follows that it is identical with the
highest Self. Now the infinit}^ of the highest Self is clearly-
stated in scripture ; what need then is there of a discussion
of the soul's size ? — True, we reply ; but certain scriptural
passages which speak of the soul's passing out, going and
returning, establish the prima facie view that the soul is
of limited size, and moreover in some places scripture
expressly declares it to be of atomic size. The present
discussion is therefore begun for the purpose of clearing up
this doubtful point.
The purvapakshin maintains that, on account of its being
said to pass out, go and return, the soul must be held to
be of limited, atomic size. Its passing out is mentioned
(Kau. Up. Ill, 3), 'And when he passes out of this body
he passes out together with all these ; ' its going (Kau.
Up. I, 2), 'All who depart from this world go to the
moon ; ' its returning {Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), ' From that world
he returns again to this world of action.' From these
statements as to the soul's passing out, going and re-
turning it follows that it is of limited size. For motion
is impossible in the case of an all-pervading being. And
a limited size being once admitted, we have to conclude
more especially that the size is atomic, since the hypothesis
D 2
$6 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
of the soul being of the same size as the body has already
been refuted in our examination of the Arhata-system.
20. And on account of the two latter (i.e. gohig
and returning) being connected with their Self (i.e.
the agent), (the soul is of atomic size).
We admit that ' passing out ' might possibly be at-
tributed to the soul even if it does not move, viz. if that
expression be taken to mean the soul's ceasing to be the
ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its
former actions having become exhausted ; just as some-
body when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said
to ' go out.' But the two latter activities, viz. going and
returning, are not possible in the case of something which
does not move ; for they are both connected with the own
Self (of the agent), going (and coming back) being activi-
ties abiding in the agent •^. Now going and coming are
possible for a being that is not of medium size, only if it
is of atomic size. And as going and coming must be taken
in their literal sense, we conclude that the passing out also
means nothing but the soul's actual moving out of the
body. For the soul cannot go and return without first
having moved out of the body. Moreover certain parts
of the body are mentioned as the points from which the
soul starts in passing out, viz. in the following passage,
' Either from the eye or from the skull or from other
places of the body (the Self passes out) ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2).
Other passages mention that the embodied soul goes and
comes within the body also ; so, for instance, ' He taking
with him those elements of light descends into the heart '
(Br/. Up. IV, 4, i); ' Having assumed light he again goes to
his place' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 11). — Thereby the atomic size
of the soul is established as well.
21. If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, on
account of scriptural statements about what is not
that (i.e. what is opposed to atomic size); we deny
^ Going is known to be an activity inherent in the agent, from
the fact of its producing effects inherent in him, such as his con-
junction with— or disjunction from — other things.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2 2. 37
that, on account of the other one (the highest Self)
being the subject-matter (of those passages).
Nevertheless, it may be objected, the soul cannot be of
atomic size, because there are scriptural statements of what
is not that, i.e. because there are scriptural statements of
its size being the opposite of atomic size. So that by
accepting the alternative of atomic size we should place
ourselves in opposition to scriptural passages such as the
following, ' He is that great unborn Self who consists of
knowledge, is surrounded by the Pra;/as, the ether within
the heart ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 22) ; ' Like the ether he is omni-
present, eternal ; ' ' Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman '
(Taitt. Up. II. i).
This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is not valid
' on account of the other one forming the subject of dis-
cussion.' For those statements about a size different (from
the atomic one) occur under the heading of the highest
Self which on account of its pre-eminence constitutes the
general object of knowledge in all Vedanta-texts ; and
moreover the passage, ' It is spotless, beyond the ether '
(Brz. Up. IV, 4, 20), specially proves that the highest
Self constitutes the subject-matter (in the passage quoted
above from the Brz. Up.). Thus with regard to the other
passages also. — But from the expressions, 'consisting of
knowledge, surrounded by the pra/zas,' it appears that
the embodied Self only (not the highest Self) is designated
as connected with greatness. — That designation, the purva-
pakshin replies, is founded on an intuition, vouched for by
scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva^. — As therefore the
statements of a different size refer to the highest Self
(pra^/za), they do not militate against the view of the in-
dividual soul being of atomic size.
22. And also on account of direct statement, and
of inference.
The soul is of atomic size for that reason also that
scripture contains a direct statement to that effect, ' By
^ "Who ' paramarthadr/sh/ya ' identifies himself with everything
in the universe. (i?/g-veda Sawhita IV, 26. i fF.).
38 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
thought is to be known that atomic Self into which
breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, 9). That the
Self spoken of there as atomic is the living Self, i.e. the
individual soul, we see from its connexion with breath. —
Inference also favours the conclusion that the soul is of
atomic size ; i.e. we infer that from such passages as 'That
living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part
of the point of a hair divided a hundred times ^ (Sve. Up.
V, 9), and, ' That lower one also is seen small even like the
point of a goad.' — But, an objection may here be raised,
if the soul is assumed to be of atomic size, and therefore
to occupy one point of the body only, the fact of sensation
extending over the whole body would appear contrary to
reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that men
bathing in the Ganges or in a pond experience the sen-
sation of cold over their whole bodies, and again that in
summer people feel hot all over the body. — To this ob-
jection the following Sutra replies.
23. There is no contradiction, as in the case of
sandal-ointment.
Just as a drop of sandal-ointment, although in actual
contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a
refreshing sensation extending over the whole body ; so the
soul, although abiding in one point of the body only, may
be the cause of a perception extending over the entire body.
And as the soul is connected with the skin (which is the seat
of feeling), the assumption that the soul's sensations should
extend over the whole body is by no means contrary to
reason. For the connexion of the soul and the skin abides
in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole
body.
24. If it be said (that the two cases are not
parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode
(present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in
the case of the soul); we deny that, on account of
the acknowledgment (by scripture, of a special place
of the soul), viz. within the heart.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 25. 39
Here it may be objected that the argumentation relied
upon in the last Sutra is not admissible, because the two
cases compared are not parallel. If it were a settled
matter that the soul dwells in one point of the body, the
drop of sandal-ointment might be adduced as a parallel
instance. But, as a matter of fact, we know from per-
ception that the drop of sandal-ointment is in contact with
one spot of the body only, just as we know that it refreshes
the whole body ; while in the case of the soul observation
tells us only that it is percipient all over the body, but
not that it abides in one spot. — Should it be said that the
latter point must be settled by inference, we reply that
inference is here of no use, because it is not capable of
removing the doubt whether the perception extending over
the whole body belongs to a soul which extends over the
whole body like the skin and the sense of touch inhering
in it, or to a soul which is all-pervading like ether, or to
a soul which, like a drop of ointment, is minute and abides
'in one spot only ^.
This objection, the piirvapakshin replies, is unfounded 'on
account of the acknowledgment of a speciality of abode,'
an abiding in one spot of the body being admitted in the
case of the soul no less than in the case of a drop of
ointment. For we read in the Vedanta-texts that the soul
abides within the heart ; cp. for instance, the information
given (in Pr. Up. Ill, 6), ' The Self is in the heart ;' {KJi. Up.
VIII, 3, 3), 'That Self abides in the heart ; ' (Brz. Up. IV,
3, 7)j 'Who is that Self? — He who is within the heart,
surrounded by the Pra;/as, the person of light, consisting
of knowledge.' — As therefore the two cases compared are
not devoid of parallelism, the argumentation resorted to
in Sutra 23 is unobjectionable.
25. Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence),
as in cases of ordinary experience.
^ We cannot reason as follows, ' The soul is atomic because it
produces effects extending (over the whole body), like a drop of
sandal-ointrnent ; ' for that reasoning would apply to the sense of
touch (the skin) also, which we know not to be of atomic size.
40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
That the soul although atomic produces efifects extend-
ing over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on
account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its
quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous
things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only
one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light
which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the
chamber. — This Sutra has the purpose of removing the
doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment,
because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire
body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles ; that,
however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any
parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the
whole body. — But how can a quality extend beyond that
in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere ? We certainly
do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a
piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other
places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is
analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp; for
that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a sub-
stance. The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its
particles crowded close to one another ; the light diffused
from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin
and scattered. — The reply to this objection is given in the
next Sutra.
26- The extending beyond is as in the case of
odour.
Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the
odorous substance — as appears from the fact of our per-
ceiving odour even without actually grasping flowers which
are the seat of odour — so the quality of intelligence also
may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic.
It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain
that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate
itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it
is a quality ; for we see that odour although a mere
quality does separate itself from its substratum. — The ob-
jection that odour also separates itself from its substance
II ADIIYAYA, 3 PADA, 27. 4 1
only with the substance (i. e. parts of the substance) we do
not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away
of the fundamental substance from which the separation of
parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away,
we conclude from its remaining in its former condition ;
otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities
belonging to it in its former state. — Well, but perhaps the
separation of the particles in which odour resides is not
noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the
fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all
directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce
the sensation of smell. — This we cannot admit, because the
atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for
instance, from the blossoms of the nagakei-ara-tree, a very
strong odour is perceived ^. Accoi'ding to the generally pre-
vailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which
is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell
the odour only. — The objection that, because we do not
perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their sub-
stratum, we have no right to assume that odour does
so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that
conclusion-, on account of the (actually existing) per-
ception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance).
Logicians must shape their inferences in such a way as to
make them agree with ordinary obser\'ation, not in any
other way. For, to quote another instance, the circum-
stance that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by
the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general
inference that colour and the other qualities also are per-
ceived by means of the tongue.
27. And thus (scripture also) declares.
Scripture also, after having signified the soul's abiding
in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such
^ Single atoms could not produce any sensations; trasarewus,
i.e. combinations of three atoms even could not produce lively
sensations.
^ Viz. that smell cannot exist apart from the odorous substance,
because it is a quality like colour.
42 vedanta-sOtras.
passages as ' Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails '
(Kau. Up. IV, 20 ; Br/. Up. I. 4, 7), that the soul pervades
the entire body by means of intelligence which is its
quality.
28. On account of the separate statement (of soul
and intelligence).
From the passage ' Having by knowledge taken possession
of the body ' which represents the soul and intelligence as
separate, viz. as respectively the agent and the instrument
of action, we understand that the soul pervades the body
only by means of intelligence, its quality. Again the pas-
sage 'Then (the intelligent person) having through the
intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all
intelligence' (Bri. Up. II, i, 17) shows intelligence to be
different from the agent, i. e. the embodied soul, and so
likewise confirms our view. — The reply to all this is as
follows.
29. But it is designated thus (i.e. as atomic), on
account of its having for its essence the qualities of
that (i.e. the buddhi); as in the case of the intelli-
gent Self (i.e. Brahman).
The word ' but ' is meant to set aside the opinion main-
tained hitherto. — The soul is not of atomic size, since
scripture does not declare it to have had an origin. On
the contrary, as scripture speaks of the highest Brahman
entering into the elements and teaches that it is their Self,
the soul is nothing else but the highest Brahman. And if
the soul is the highest Brahman, it must be of the same
extent as Brahman. Now scripture states Brahman to be
all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading. —
On that view all the statements about the all-pervadingness
of the soul made in 5ruti and Smrz'ti are justified, so, for in-
stance, the passage, • He is that great unborn Self who consists
of knowledge, is surrounded by the prawas &c.' (Br/. Up. IV,
4, 22). Nor again could the soul, if it were of atomic size,
experience sensations extending over the whole body. If
it be said that that is possible owing to the soul's connexion
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 29. 43
with the sense of touch (the skin), we deny that assertion.
For from that it would follow that, when we tread on a
thorn, the sensation extends over the whole body, since the
connexion of the thorn and the skin abides in the entire
skin, and the skin extends over the whole body. While
as a matter of fact, when treading on a thorn we experience
a sensation in the sole of the foot only. — Nor again is it
possible that a quality of an atom should diffuse itself beyond
the atom. For qualities occupy the same place with the
substances of which they are qualities, and a quality not
abiding in its substance would no longer be a quality.
Concerning the light emitted from a lamp we have already
shown that it is, not a quality, but rather a different kind
of substance. Hence odour also, being avowedly a quality,
can exist in so far only as it inheres in its substance ; other-
wise it would cease to be odour. Thus the reverend Dvai-
payana also says, ' Having perceived odour in water some
unthinking people ascribe it to the latter ; but know that it
is in the earth only, and (merely) passes over into air and
water.' If the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole
body, the soul cannot be atomic ; for intelligence consti-
tutes the soul's proper nature, just as heat and light con-
stitute that of fire. A separation of the two as quality
and that which is qualified does not exist. Now it has
already been shown (H, 2, 34) that the soul is not
of the same size as the body ; the only remaining alternative
therefore is that it is all-pervading (infinite). But why
then, our opponent asks, is the soul designated (in some
scriptural passages) as being of atomic size, &c. ? — It is
designated as such ' on account of being of the nature of
the essence of that (i. e. the buddhi).' — The Self is here said
to be of the nature of the essence of the mind's (buddhi)
qualities, because those qualities, such as desire, aversion,
pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e. the
principal characteristics of the Self as long as it is impli-
cated in transmigratory existence. Apart from the quali-
ties of the mind the mere Self does not exist in the saw/sara
state ; for the latter, owing to which the Self appears as an
agent and enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstance of
44 vedanta-sOtras,
the qualities of the buddhi and the other Hmiting adjuncts
being wrongly superimposed upon the Self. That the
non-transmigrating eternally free Self which neither acts nor
enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the buddhi, is
thus due only to its having the qualities of the buddhi for
its essence (viz. as long as it is in fictitious connexion with
the buddhi). Moreover we have the scriptural passage,
* That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth
part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, and
yet it is to be infinite ' (5ve. Up. V, 9), which at first states
the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite.
Now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of
the soul being metaphorical while its infinity is real ; for
both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at
the same time. And the infinity certainly cannot be under-
stood in a metaphorical sense, since all the Upanishads aim
at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.
— The other passage also (Sve. Up. V, 8) which treats of
the measure of the soul, ' The lower one, endowed with the
quality of mind and the quality of body, is seen small even
like the point of a goad,' teaches the soul's small size to
depend on its connexion with the qualities of the buddhi,
not upon its own Self. The following passage again, ' That
small (a;/u) Self is to be knov/n by thought' (Mu. Up. Ill,
I, 9), does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, since the
subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be
fathomed by the eye, &c., but to be apprehended by the
serene light of knowledge, and since moreover the soul
cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word.
Hence the statement about a;/utva (smallness, subtlety) has
to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of
knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts. Similarly
such passages as ' Having by knowledge taken possession
of the whole body ' (Kau. Up. HI, 6), which mention a
difference (between the soul and knowledge), must be under-
stood to mean that the soul takes possession of the whole
body through the buddhi, its limiting adjunct ; or else they
must be considered as mere modes of expression, as when
we speak of the body of a stone statue. For we have
II ADIIYAYA, 3 PADA, 30. 45
already shown that the distinction of quality and thing
qualified does not exist in the case of the soul. — The state-
ments as to the soul abiding in the heart are likewise to
be explained on the ground of the buddhi abiding there. —
That also the soul's passing out and so on depend on
the limiting adjuncts, is shown by the passage, 'What
is it by whose passing out I shall pass out, and by whose
staying I shall stay? He sent forth pra//a,' &c. (Pr. Up. VI,
3, 4). For where there is no passing out, no going and
returning are known ; for what has not left the body cannot
go and return ^. — As thus the soul (as long as involved in
the sa;/zsara) has for its essence the qualities of its limiting
adjuncts, it is spoken of as minute. The case is analogous
to that of Brahman (pra^wa). Just as in those chapters
whose topic is the meditation on the qualified Brahman, the
highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness
and so on, because it has the qualities of its limiting adjuncts
for its essence (cp. ' Smaller than a grain of rice or barley ;'
'He who consists of mind, whose body is pra/za,' &c., Kh.
Up. ni, 14, 2 ; 3) ; so it is also with the individual soul. —
Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory con-
dition of the soul is due to the qualities of the buddhi form-
ing its essence. From this, however, it will follow that, as
the conjunction of buddhi and soul — which are different
entities — must necessarily come to an end, the soul when
disjoined from the buddhi will be altogether undefinable and
thence non-existing or rather non-existing in the sa;//sira
state -. — To this objection the next Sutra replies.
30. The objection (raised above) is not valid, since
(the connexion of the soul with the buddhi) exists as
long as the soul ; It being thus observed (in scripture).
We need not fear that the objection formulated above
can be proved. — Why ? — ' On account of the existence of
the connexion of the soul with the buddhi, as long as the
^ So that the distinction insisted on in Sutra 20 is not valid.
"- Katham asattva?;/ svarupena sattvad ity asahkhyaha sa;«saritvaw
veti. An. Gi.
46 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
soul exists.' That means : as long as this Self is in the
sawsara-state, as long as the sa7;/sara-state is not brought
to an end by means of perfect knowledge, so long the con-
nexion of the soul with the buddhi does not cease. And
as long as its connexion with the buddhi, its limiting
adjunct, lasts, so long the individual soul remains indi-
vidual soul, implicated in transmigratory existence. In
reality, however, there is no individual soul but in so far
as it is fictitiously hypostatized by the buddhi, its limiting
adjunct. For in attempting to determine the object of the
Vedanta-texts we meet with no other intelligent substance
but the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal free-
dom. This appears from innumerable texts, such as the
following : — ' There is no other seer but he, there is no
other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he,
there is no other knower but he' (B;-/. Up. Ill, 7, 23);
' There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it '
(Brz. Up. Ill, 8, II) ; ' Thou art that ' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ;
'I am Brahman' (Brz. Up. I, 4, 10). — How again is it
known that the soul is connected with the buddhi as long
as it exists ? — We reply : because that is seen (viz. in
scripture). For scripture makes the following declaration :
' He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, sur-
rounded by the prawas, the person of light, he remaining
the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as
if moving' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the term 'consisting
of knowledge ' means ' consisting of buddhi,' as we infer
from another passage, viz. ' The Self consisting of know-
ledge, mind, life, sight, hearing' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 5), where
knowledge is enumerated among mind and so on ^ By
' being made up of buddhi ' is meant ' having for one's
essence the qualities of buddhi.' Similarly a phrase like
' Devadatta is made up of womanishness,' which may be
made use of in ordinary language, means that in Devadatta
feminine attributes such as softness of voice and the like
prevail. Moreover, the passage, ' He remaining the same
wanders along the two worlds,' declares that the Self, even
^ And therefore has to be understood in the sense of buddhi.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 3 1. 47
when going to another world, is not separated from the
buddhi, &c. For if we ask whereby it does remain the
same, the answer, based on proximity ^, is ' by means of
the buddhi.' — Further, such modes of expression, ' as if
thinking,' ' as if moving,' lead us to the same conclusion ;
for they mean that the Self does not think and move on its
own account, but thinks as it were and moves as it were,
because the buddhi to which it is joined really moves and
thinks. — Moreover, the connexion of the Self with the
buddhi, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge,
and wrong knowledge cannot cease except through perfect
knowledge ; hence as long as there does not rise the cog-
nition of Brahman being the universal Self, so long the
connexion of the soul with the buddhi and its other limit-
ing adjuncts does not come to an end. Thus scripture
also says, ' I know that great person of sunlike lustre
beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over
death ; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. Ill, 8).
But, an objection is raised, in the states of deep sleep
and retractation (pralaya) no connexion of the Self with
the buddhi can be acknowledged, since scripture declares
that ' then he becomes united with the True, he is gone to
his own' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), and as then all modifications
have avowedly passed away. How then can it be said
that the connexion with the buddhi exists as long as the
Self? — To this objection the following Sutra replies.
31. On account of the appropriateness of the
manifestation of that (connexion) which exists
(potentially) ; like virile power.
As in ordinary life virile power and so on, existing
potentially only in young children, and being then looked
upon as non-existing, become manifest at the time of
puberty — and do not originate at that time from previous
non-existence, because in that case they might originate in
eunuchs also — ; so the connexion of the soul with the
^ I. e. on the proximity of terms clearly indicating the buddhi, viz.
vi^wana-maya^ pra«eshu.
48 vedanta-sOtras.
buddhi exists potentially merely during deep sleep and
the period of general retractation, and again becomes
manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation. —
This explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be
assumed to spring up unless from something else ; other-
wise we should have to suppose that effects spring up
without causes. That the rising from deep sleep is due to
the existence of potential avidya, scripture also declares,
' Having become merged in the True they know not that
they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures
are here, whether a lion or a wolf,' &c. [Kh. Up. VI, 9, 2 ;
3). — It is therefore a proved matter that the connexion of
the soul with the buddhi and the other adjuncts lasts as
long as the soul (in its sawsira-state).
32. Otherwise (if no manas existed) there would
result either constant perception or constant non-
perception, or else a limitation of either of the two
(i.e. of the soul or of the senses).
The internal organ which constitutes the limiting ad-
junct of the soul is called in different places by different
names, such as manas (mind), buddhi (intelligence), vi^;/^na
(knowledge), ^itta (thought). This difference of nomen-
clature is sometimes made dependent on the difference of
the modifications of the internal organ which is called
manas when it is in the state of doubt, &c., buddhi when it
is in the state of determination and the like. — Now we must
necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal
organ ; because otherwise there would result either per-
petual perception or perpetual non-perception. There
would result perpetual perception whenever there is a con-
junction of the soul, the senses and the objects of sense — the
three together constituting the instruments of perception;
or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect
did not follow, there would take place perpetual non-
perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually
observed. — Or else we should have to assume that there
are obstacles in the way of the energy either of the Self or
the sense-organs. But the former is not possible, as the
I
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 49
Self is not capable of any modification ; nor the latter, as
we cannot assume that the energy of the sense-organ which
is non-obstructed in the preceding and the following mo-
ment should, without any cause, be obstructed (in the
intervening moment). Hence we have to acknowledge
the existence of an internal organ through whose attention
and non-attention perception and non-perception take
place. Thus scripture declares, ' My mind was elsewhere,
I did not see ; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear ; for
a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind ' (Br/.
Up. I, ,5, 3). Scripture moreover shows that desire and
similar states are modifications of the mind, ' Desire, repre-
sentation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness,
shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.' The explanation
given in Sutra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.
33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scripture
having a purport (thereby).
In connexion with the doctrine that the soul possesses
for its essence the qualities of the buddhi, another attribute
of the soul is set forth. — The individual soul is an agent,
because thus scripture has a purport. For only on that
assumption scriptural injunctions (such as ' He is to sacrifice,'
' He is to make an oblation into the fire.' ' He is to give,'
&c.) acquire a purport ; otherwise they would be purport-
less. For they all teach special acts to be done by agents ;
which would not be possible if the soul did not possess the
quality of being an agent. — On that supposition a meaning
belongs to the following passage also, ' For it is he who
sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he the person whose
Self is knowledge ' (Pr. Up. IV, 9).
34. And on account of (the text) teaching its
wandering about.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the
soul for that reason also, that, in a chapter treating of the
soul, the text declares it to wander about in the state of
sleep, ' The immortal one goes wherever he likes ' (Brz. Up.
[38] E
50 vedanta-sOtras.
IV, 3, 1 2) ; and again, ' He moves about, according to his
pleasure, within his own body' (Bri. Up. II, r, 18).
35. On account of its taking.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the
soul for that reason also that in the same chapter treating
of the soul the text speaks of the soul taking its instru-
ments, ' Having taken, through the intelligence of the
senses, intelligence/ and ' having taken the senses ' (Brz. Up.
II, I, 18; 17).
36. (The soul is an agent) also because it is
designated as such with regard to actions ; if it were
not such, there would be a change of designation.
The quality of being an agent belongs to the soul for
that reason also that the sacred texts speak of its agency
in sacred and secular actions, * Understanding performs
the sacrifice, it performs all acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5). — But,
an objection may here be raised, we have seen that the
word ' understanding ' applies to the buddhi ; how then
can it indicate the circumstance of the soul being an agent?
— The soul only, we reply, is designated there, not the
buddhi. If the soul were not meant to be designated,
there would be a change in the designation, i. e. the passage
would run, ' through understanding it performs,' &c. For
we see that in another passage where the buddhi is meant
the word 'understanding' is exhibited in the instrumental
form, ' Having through the understanding (intelligence) of
these senses taken all understanding' [Bri. Up. II, t, 17).
In the passage under discussion, on the other hand, the
word ' understanding ' is given in the case characteristic of
the agent (viz. the nominative), and therefore indicates the
Self which is distinct from the buddhi. Hence your ob-
jection is not valid. — Another objection is raised. If the
soul in so far as distinct from the buddhi were the agent,
it would, because it is independent, bring about exclusively
what is pleasant and useful to itself, not the opposite. We,
however, observe that it does bring about the opposite
also. But such an unrestricted proceeding does not become
I
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 38.
the independent Self. — To this objection the following
Sutra replies.
-^j. The absence of restriction is as in the case of
perception.
Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception,
yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as
what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about
what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant. — The
objection that in the act of perception also the soul is not
free because it depends on the employment of the causes
of perception (i.e.. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the
remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely
to present the objects of perception, that however in the
act of perception the soul because endowed with intelli-
gence does not depend on anything else ^. — Moreover in
actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends
on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an
agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance.
A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although
he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a
plurality of co-operating factors is therefore not opposed
to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to
actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant
results.
;^8. On account of the reversal of power.
The soul distinct from 'understanding' has to be viewed
as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi
which is denoted by the term 'understanding' were the
agent, there would take place a reversal of power, i. e. the
instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would
have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an
agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it
must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious-
^ A^'akshuradinaTO vishayopanayakatvat tadupalabdhau ^atmanaj-
^etanatvena svatantryad udaharawasiddhir ity aha neti. An. Gi.
E 2
52 VEDAXTA-SUTRAS.
ness (ahampratyaya) ^, since we see that everywhere activity
is preceded by self-consciousness, ' /go, / come, / eat, / drink,'
&c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an
agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it
another instrument by means of which it effects everything.
For we see that agents although themselves capable of
acting yet become really active only through making use
of instruments. — Hence the whole dispute is about a name
only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that
which is different from the instrument of action is admitted
to be the agent.
39. And on account of the impossibility of medi-
tation (samadhi).
Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedanta-texts,
whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by
the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent ^.
Compare the following passages. 'Verily, the Self is to be
seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked ' (Brz. Up.
II, 4, 5); 'The Self we must seek out, we must try to
understand' [Kh. Up. VIII, 7, i); 'Meditate on the Self
as Om ' (Mu. Up. 11, 2, 6). — Therefrom also it follows that
the Self is an agent.
40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion.
That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by
the reasons set forth in Sutra '^0^, &c. We now have to
consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental
nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts. — If here
it be maintained that for the same reasons uhich were
employed to prove the Self's being an agent its agency
must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the
contrary, we reply as follows.
' And that would virtually identify the buddhi wiih tlie g\\d., the
individual soul.
^ The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the
agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about
final release.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 4O. 53
The Self's being an agent cannot be founded on its real
nature, because (if it were so) the impossibility of final
release would follow. For if being an agent belongs to
the soul's nature, it can never free itself from it — no more
than fire can divest itself of heat, — and as long as man has
not freed himself from activity he cannot obtain his highest
end, since activity is essentially painful. — But, an objection
will be raised, the end of man may be obtained, even as long
as the potentiality of activity remains, viz. by man avoiding
the effects of activity, and this he may accomplish by avoid-
ing its occasions, just as fire, for instance, although endowed
with the potentiality of burning, does, if fuel is withheld
from it, not produce its natural effect, i. e. burning.— This
objection we invalidate by the remark that the occasions,
because connected (with the soul) by means of the peculiar
connexion called ' potentiality ' (power), cannot be avoided
absolutely^. — Nor can it be said that release will be
obtained through the means effecting it being employed,
because whatever depends on means to be employed is
non-eternal. Scripture moreover declares that release
results from the instruction about the eternally pure, intel-
ligent, free Self. Now instruction of this nature would not
be possible, if the agentship of the Self formed part of its
nature. The agentship of the Self is therefore due to the
attributes of its adjuncts being ascribed to it, and does not
form part of its nature. Hence scripture says of the Self, * As
if thinking, as if moving ' {Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7), and ' He (the
Self) when in union with the body, the senses, and the
mind, is called the enjoyer by wise people ' (Ka. Up. I.
3, 4) ; which passages show that the Self passes into the
special condition of being an enjoyer, &c., only through its
^ Kart/v'tvasya dharmadini nimittani tesha;« ^«ananivartyatve
muktav api sambhavat kartr/tvaw syat^/7anena tannivrzttau tesham
a^«anakaryatvat kritam kartr:tvam api tatha syat, jaktcj ka jakta-
jakyasapekshataya sanimittakriyalakshawajakyapekshakatvad anir-
mokshas tasman nimittapariharasya duranush//;anatvan na .raktivade
muktir iti. An. Gi.
SaktasakyasrsLya sakiUi svasatta}ava.vya;/z jakyam akshipati. Bha.
54 vedanta-sCtras.
connexion with the limiting adjuncts. For to the discern-
ing there is no Self called the living Self and being either
agent or enjoyer, apart from the highest Self; according to
the scriptural passage ' There is no other seer but he,' &c.
(H;7. Up. III. 7, 23). Nor must we suppose that, if there
were no intelligent individual Soul, different from the
highest Self and distinct from the aggregate consisting of
buddhi, &c., it would follow that the highest Self is involved
in the sa;«sara-state as agent and enjoyer. For the condi-
tions of being agent and enjoyer are presented by Nescience
merely. Scripture also, after having declared (in the passage,
' For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the
other,' &c., Br/. Up. IV, 5, 15) that the conditions of being
an agent and an enjoyer belong to the state of Nescience only,
excludes them from the state of knowledge, ' But where the
Self only is all this, how should he see another?' And again,
after having declared that the Self, in the states of waking
and of dreaming, suffers weariness owing to the contact with
its limiting adjuncts, like a falcon flying about in the air,
scripture teaches that that fatigue ceases in deep sleep when
the soul is embraced by the intelligent (highest) Self. ' This
indeed is his true form in which his wishes are fulfilled, in
which the Self only is his wish, in which no wish is left, —
free from any sorrow' — up to ' This is his highest goal, this
is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his
highest bliss' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 21-32). — This the teacher
intimates in the Sutra, ' and as the carpenter in both ways.'
' And ' is here used in the sense of ' but.' It is not to be
supposed that the agentship of the Self belongs to its true
nature, as heat belongs to the nature of fire. But just as in
ordinary life a carpenter as long as working with his axe and
other tools undergoes pain, while on the other hand he enjoys
case and leisure after having finished his work, laid his tools
aside and returned to his home ; so the Self also, as long as
it is joined with duality presented by Nescience and is an
agent in the states of waking and dreaming, undergoes pain ;
but as soon as, for the purpose of shaking off its weariness,
it enters into its own highest Self, it frees itself from the
complex of effects and instruments, and enjoys full ease in
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4O. 55
the State of deep sleep. And in the state of final release
also, the Self, having dispelled the darkness of ignorance
by the light of knowledge, and having reached the state
of absolute isolation and rest, enjoys full ease. — The case
of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to
the following extent. The carpenter is, in certain kinds
of work, such as cutting wood, &c., an agent with regard to
certain definite tools, such as the axe and so on^ but a non-
agent with his mere body ; so this Self also is an agent in
all its functions with regard to its instruments, such as the
mind, &c., but is a non-agent by its own Self. On the
other hand, the Self has no parts corresponding to the
hands and other limbs of the carpenter, by means of which
it could take up or put aside its instruments, as the car-
penter takes up and puts aside his tools.
In reply to the reasons brought forward in favour of the
soul's agentship being natural, as, for instance, the reason
based on scripture having a purport, we remark that the
scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose
an agentship established somehow, but do not themselves
aim at establishing the (direct) agentship of the Self Now
we have shown that the agentship of the Self does not consti-
tute part of its real nature because scripture teaches that its
true Self is Brahman ; we therefore conclude that the
Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agent-
ship of the soul which is due to Nescience. Such scrip-
tural passages also as ' The agent, the person whose Self is
understanding "" (Pr. Up. IV, 9), must be assumed, because
being of the nature of anuvadas ^, to refer to an agentship
already established elsewhere, and being the product of
Nescience.
The preceding remarks refute also the reasons founded
on ' the wandering about ' and the ' taking ' (Sutras 34, ^^), as
the statements about them also are mere anuvadas. — -But,
an objection may be raised, the passage which teaches that
the soul while its instruments are asleep, ' moves about,
^ I.e. being only incidental remarks about matters established or
taught elsewhere.
56 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
according to its pleasure, within its own body' (B;x Up. II.
I, 18), clearly implies that the pure Self is an agent. And
in the passage relative to the taking (' (the purusha) having
through the intelligence of the senses absorbed all intel-
ligence '), the fact of the instruments appearing in the
objective and instrumental cases likewise intimates that
the pure Self is the agent. — To this we reply that even in
the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not
altogether at rest ; for scripture states that even then it is
connected with the buddhi, ' Having become a dream,
together with buddhi it passes beyond this world.' Smrzti
also says, ' When, the senses being at rest, the mind not
being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know
to be a dream.' And scripture says that desire, &c., are
modifications of the mind (cp. Bri. Up. I, 5, 3). Now these
are observed in dreams ; therefore the Self wanders about
in dreams together with the mind only. That wandering
about moreover is founded on the mental impressions
(vasana) only, is not real. Thus scripture also in describ-
ing our doings in dreams qualifies them by an 'as it were:'
' As it were rejoicing together with women, or laughing as
it were, or seeing terrible sights' {Bri Up. IV, 3, 13).
Ordinary people also describe their dreams in the same
manner, 'I ascended as it were the summit of a moun-
tain,' ' I saw a tree as it were.' — And although it is true
that, in the statement about the taking, the instruments are
exhibited in the objective and instrumental cases, still the
agentship of the Self must be considered as connected
with those instruments, since we have shown that the pure
Self cannot be an agent.
In ordinary language also we meet with similar variations
of expression ; the two sentences, for instance, ' the warriors
fight ' and ' the king fights by means of his warriors,' really
have the same meaning. Moreover, the statement about
the taking means to express only the cessation of activity
on the part of the instruments, not the independent activity
of any one. — The passage referred to above, ' understanding
performs the sacrifice,' establishes the agentship of the
buddhi merely, as the word ' understanding ' is known to
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40. 57
have that sense, and as the mind is mentioned close by,
and as in the passage, ' Faith is its head,' &c., faith and so
on are declared to be the members of the Self which con-
sists of understanding, and as faith, &c., are known to be
attributes of the buddhi. Another reason is furnished by
the complementary sentence, ' All gods worship under-
standing as the oldest, as Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 5); for
buddhi is known to be the oldest^ i. e, the first produced ^
Another scriptural passage also avers that that sacrifice is
accomplished by means of speech and buddhi, ' The
sacrifice is what results from speech and mind.' Nor can
it rightly be maintained (cp. Stitra 38) that to view the
instruments as agents would lead to an exchange of power
on the part of the buddhi ; for all instruments must neces-
sarily be considered as agents in regard of their special
functions 2. But with reference to perception (upalabdhi)
those instruments are (not agents, but) mere instruments,
and perception belongs to the Self. Nor can agentship
be ascribed to the Self on account of perception, since
permanent perception constitutes its nature (and hence can-
not be viewed as a mere transitory activity). Nor can the
agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent
belong to the perceiving principle (upalabdhr/) ; for self-
consciousness itself is an object of perception (on the part
of the upalabdhrz, i. e. the pure, isolated, intelligent Self).
And on this doctrine there is no occasion for assuming a
further instrument, as we maintain the buddhi itself to be
the instrument.
The objection founded on the impossibility of meditation
(Sfitra 39) is already refuted by the fact, pointed out above,
of scripture having a purport, meditation being enjoined by
scripture with reference to such agentship as is already
established by other passages. — The result of all this is
' According to the jruti : mahad yaksham prathamagaw veda yo
ha vai gyQ^Yiih^m kz, jreshMa/ra /ta veda.
^ Wood, for instance, is an ' agent ' in regard of the function of
burning, while it is a mere instrument with reference to the
action of cookins:.
5S VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
that the agentship of the Self is due to its limiting adjuncts
only.
41. But from the highest (Lord there result
sawsara and moksha). because scripture teaches
that.
We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship,
characterising the individual soul in the state of Nescience
and founded on its limiting adjuncts, is independent of the
Lord or dependent on him.
The purvapakshin maintains that the soul as far as it
is an agent does not depend on the Lord, because the
assumption of such a dependence would serve no purpose.
F"or as the individual soul has motives in its own im-
perfections, such as passion, aversion, and so on, and is
furnished with the whole apparatus of the other con-
stituents of action ^, it is able to occupy on its own account
the position of an agent ; and what then should the Lord
do for it ? Nor does ordinary experience show that in
addition to the oxen which are required for such actions
as ploughing and the like the Lord also is to be depended
upon. Moreover (if all activity depended on the Lord) it
would follow that tfie Lord is cruel because imposing on
his creatures activity which is essentially painful, and at
the same time unjust because allotting to their activities
unequal results. — But it has already been shown (II, 1,
34) that the Lord cannot be taxed with cruelty and in-
justice, on account of his dependence. — True, that has
been shown, but only on the condition of the dependence
on the Lord being possible. Now such dependence is
possible only if there exist religious merit and demerit on
the part of the creatures, and these again exist if the
soul is an agent ; if then the agentship of the soul
again depends on the Lord, whereupon will the Lord's
dependence depend? And (if we should assume the Lord
to determine the souls without reference to their merits and
demerits) it would follow that the souls have to undergo
^ I.e. the constituents of action such as instrument, object, &c.,
exclusive of the agent.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 59
consequences not due to their actions. — Hence the soul's
activity is independent.
Setting aside this prima facie view by means of the word
' but,' the Sutrakara asserts ' from the highest.' For the
soul which in the state of Nescience is blinded by the
darkness of ignorance and hence unable to distinguish
itself from the complex of effects and instruments, the
sa;«sdra-state in which it appears as agent and enjoyer is
brought about through the permission of the Lord who
is the highest Self, the superintendent of all actions, the
witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence ;
and we must therefore assume that final release also is
effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the
Lord.
Why so ? — ' Because scripture teaches that.' For al-
though the soul has its own imperfections, such as passion
and so on, for motives, and is furnished with the whole
apparatus of action, and although ordinary experience does
not show that the Lord is a cause in occupations such as
ploughing and the like, yet we ascertain from scripture
that the Lord is a causal agent in all activity. For scrip-
ture says, ' He makes him whom he wishes to lead up
from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same makes
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do
a bad deed' (Kau. Up. HI, 8); and again, 'He who
dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within ' (5at. Br.
XIV, 6, 7, 30).
But if causal agency thus belongs to the Lord, it follows
that he must be cruel and unjust, and that the soul has
to undergo consequences of what it has not done. — This
objection the following Sutra refutes.
42. But with a view to the efforts made (by the
soul) (the Lord makes it act), on account of the
(otherwise resulting) purportlessness of the injunc-
tions and prohibitions, &c.
The word ' but ' removes the objections started. — The
Lord makes the soul act, having regard to the efforts made
by it, whether meritorious or non-meritorious. Hence
60 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
there is no room for the objections raised. Having regard
to the inequality of the virtuous and vicious actions of the
souls, the Lord, acting as a mere occasional cause, allots
to them corresponding unequal results. An analogous case
is furnished by rain. As rain constitutes the common
occasional cause for shrubs, bushes, corn, and so on, which
belong to different species and spring each from its par-
ticular seed — for the inequality of their sap. flowers, fruits,
and leaves results neither when rain is absent nor when
the special seeds are absent — ; so we also must assume
that the Lord arranges favourable or unfavourable circum-
stances for the souls with a view to their former efforts. —
But if the activity of the soul is dependent on something
else, this having regard (on the part of the Lord) to
former effort is inappropriate. — By no means, we reply ;
for although the activity of the soul is not independent,
yet the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act,
but it acts itself. Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act
now has regard to its former efforts, and he caused it to
act in a former existence, having regard to its efforts
previous to that existence ; a regressus against which, con-
sidering the eternity of the sawsara, no objections can be
raised. — But how is it known that the Lord has regard
to the efforts made (in former existences) ? — The Sutra
replies : from the purportlessness. &c.. of injunctions and
prohibitions. For thus (i. e. if the Lord has regard to
former actions) injunctions such as ' he who is desirous of
the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' and prohibitions such as
' a Brahma«a must not be killed,' are not devoid of purport.
On the other alternative they would be without purport,
and the Lord would in fact be enjoined in the place of
injunctions and prohibitions ^, since the soul would be
absolutely dependent. And then the Lord might requite
with good those who act according to the injunctions, and
with evil men doing what is forbidden ; which would
^ Ijvara eva vidhinishedhayo/z sthane ni)'u^3-eta }'ad vidhinishedha-
yo^ \)hz\a.m tad uvarewa tatpratipaditadharmadharmanirapekshewa
kr/tam iii. Bha.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 6 1
subvert the authoritativeness of the Veda. Moreover, if
the Lord were absolutely without any regard, it would
follow that also the ordinary efforts of men are without
any purport ; and so likewise the special conditions of
place, time, and cause. And also the difficulty mentioned
above ^ would present itself. — All these latter difficulties the
Sutrakara comprises in his ' &c.'
43. {The soul is) a part of the Lord, on account of
the declarations of difference, and (because) in a
different way also some record that (Brahman) is of
the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on.
We have shown that the individual soul and the Lord
stand to each other in the relation of what is being acted
upon and what is acting upon. This relation is observed in
ordinary life to exist only between things connected, such
as a master and a servant, or a fire and its sparks. Now
as the soul and the Lord also are acknowledged to stand
in the relation of what is acted upon and what is acting,
a doubt arises whether their connexion is analogous to
that of a master and a servant, or to that of a fire and
its sparks.
The purvapakshin maintains that either the matter is
to be considered as undetermined, or that the connexion
is like that of master and servant, because that connexion
only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and
subject ruled.
To this the Sutra replies that the soul must be con-
sidered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of
the fire. By 'part' we mean 'a part as it were,' since a
being not composed of parts cannot have parts in the
literal sense. — Why, then, do we not view the Lord, who
is not composed of parts, as identical with the soul ? — ' On
account of the declarations of difference.' For such scrip-
tural passages as ' That (self) it is which we must search
out, that it is which we must try to understand ' {Kh. Up.
^ I.e. the objectionable assumption that men have to undergo
consequences not resulting from their own former actions.
62 vedanta-sCtras.
VIII, 7) ; 'He who knows him becomes a muni' (Brt. Up.
IV, 4, 22) ; ' He who dwelling within the Self pulls the
Self within' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23); which all of them refer
to a difference (between the highest and the individual
Self) would be inappropriate, if there were no difference. —
But, it may be said, these statements of difference would
agree better with a relation similar to that of master
and servant. — Hence the sutrakara adds, 'and otherwise
also.' That the soul is a part (of the Lord) we learn not
only from the passages declaring their difference, but there
are other statements also which teach their non-difference.
The members of a certain jakha of the Atharva-veda
record in a Brahma-sukta that ' Brahman are the fisher-
men, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers,' &c.
Here low creatures such as fishermen, and slaves de-
pending on their masters, and gamblers are called Brah-
man ; whence it appears that all individual souls which
have entered into aggregates of effects and instruments
(i. e. bodies) depending on name and form are Brah-
man. The same view is set forth in other passages such
as ' Thou art woman, thou art man ; thou art youth, thou
art maiden ; thou as an old man totterest along on thy
staff, thou art born with thy face turned everywhere '
(5ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'The wise one who, having produced
all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by
their names)' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7). Passages such as ' There
is no other seer but he ' and other similar ones establish
the same truth. — Non-differenced intelligence belongs to
the soul and the Lord alike, as heat belongs to the sparks
as well as the fire. — From these two views of difference
and non-difference there results the comprehensive view
of the soul being a part of the Lord. — The following Sutra
supplies a further reason.
44. And on account of the mantra.
A mantra also intimates the same view. ' Such is the
greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person. One foot
of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in
heaven' (K/i. Up. HI, 12, 6). Here the word 'beings'
I
II ADIIYAYA, 3 PADA, 46. 63
denotes all moving and non-moving things, among which
the souls occupy the first place ; in accordance with the
use of the word in the following passage, ' Not giving pain tc^
any being (bhuta) except at the tirthas' [Kh. Up. VIII,
15). Herefrom also we conclude that the individual soul
is a part of the Lord. — And again from the following
reason.
45. Moreover it is so stated in Smrzti.
In the Ijvaragitas (Bhagavad-gita) also it is said that the
soul is a part of the Lord, ' an eternal part of me becomes
the individual soul in the world of life ' (Bha. Gi. XV, 7).
With regard to the assertion made above, viz. that in ordi-
nary life the relation of ruler and ruled is known to hold
good in the case of master and servant &c. only, we remark
that, although that may be the case in ordinary life, we
ascertain from scripture that the relation of part and whole
and that of ruler and ruled may go together. Nor is there
anything contradictory in assuming that the Lord who is
provided with superexcellent limiting adjuncts rules the
souls which are connected with inferior adjuncts only.
Here the purvapakshin raises another objection. If we
admit that the souls are parts of the Lord, it follows that
the Lord also, whose part the soul is, will be afflicted by the
pain caused to the soul by its experience of the sa;;zsara-
state ; as we see in ordinary life that the entire Devadatta
suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some
other limb. Herefrom it would follow that they who obtain
Brahman obtain a greater pain ^ ; so that the former saw-
sara-condition would be preferable, and complete knowledge
be devoid of purpose. — To this the following Sutra replies.
46. (As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain)
not so the highest (Lord); as in the case of light and
so on.
We maintain that the highest Lord does not feel the pain
of the sa;;zsara-state in the same way as the soul does. The
soul being engrossed by Nescience identifies itself as it were
^ Viz. by participating in all pain.
64 vedanta-sCtras.
with the body and so on, and imagines itself to be affected
by the experience of pain which is due to Nescience, ' I am
afflicted by the pain due to the body;' the highest Lord, on
the other hand, neither identifies himself with a body, nor
imagines himself to be afflicted by pain. The pain of the
individual soul also is not real, but imaginary only, caused
by the error consisting in the non-discrimination of (the
Self from) the body, senses, and other limiting adjuncts which
are due to name and form, the effects of Nescience. And as
a person feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his
body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so
he feels also the pain affecting others, such as sons or friends,
by erroneously identifying himself with them, entering as it
were into them through love, and imagining ' I am the son,
I am the friend.' Wherefrom we infer with certainty that
the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagi-
nation. At the same conckision we arrive on the ground of
negative instances. Let us consider the case of many men,
each of whom possesses sons, friends, &c., sitting together,
some of them erroneously imagining that they are connected
with their sons, friends, &c., while others do not. If then
somebody calls out '.the son has died,' ' the friend has died,'
grief is produced in the minds of those who are under the
imagination of being connected with sons and friends, but
not in the minds of religious mendicants who have freed
themselves from that imagination. From this it appears
that perfect knowledge is of use even to an ordinary man ;
of how much greater use then will it be to him (i.e. the
Lord) whose nature is eternal pure intelligence, who sees
nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects.
Hence it follows that perfect knowledge is not purposeless.
— To illustrate this view the Sutra introduces a comparison
• like light,' &c. Just as the light of the sun or the moon
which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent
as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in
contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but
does not really become so; and just as the ether, although
imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved,
does not really move; and as the sun docs not tremble,
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 47. 65
although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled
with water in which the sun's light is reflected ; thus the
Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt
by that part of him which is called the individual soul,
is presented by Nescience, and limited by the buddhi and
other adjuncts. That also the soul's undergoing pain is
due to Nescience only, we have already explained. Accord-
ingly the Vedanta-texts teach that, when the soul's individual
state, due to Nescience, is sublated, it becomes Brahman,
' Thou art that &c.' — Thus there is no occasion to conclude
that the highest Self is affected by the pain of the individual
soul.
47. And the Smmis state (that).
Vyasa and others state in their smr/tis that the highest
Self is not afflicted by the pain of the individual soul, 'That
highest Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities, nor is
it stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus
leaf by water. But that other Self whose essence is action
is connected with bondage and release ; again and again
it is joined with the seventeenfold aggregate^.' — On the
ground of the particle 'and' (in the Sutra) we have to supply
' and scripture also records that.' So, for instance, ' One of
them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating '
(Mu. Up. Ill, I, 1), and 'The one Self within all things is
never contaminated by the misery of the world, being him-
self without ' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 11).
Here the purvapakshin raises a new objection. — If there
is only one internal Self of all beings, what room is there
for permissions and prohibitions, worldly as well as Vedic ?
You must not reject this objection on the ground of your
having proved that the individual soul is a part of the Lord,
and that thus injunctions and prohibitions may, without any
mutual interference, apply to the soul which is different from
the Lord. For there are other scriptural passages which teach
that the soul is not different from the Lord, and therefore
not a part of him, as, for instance, the following ones :
^ I. e. the subtle body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five
pra^as, manas, and buddhi.
[38] F
66 VEDANTA-S{JTRAS.
' Having sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt.Up. 11,6);
• There is no other seer but he' {Brt. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; ' From
death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity '
(Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19) ; ' Thou art that ' (KA. Up. VI, 8, 7) ;
' I am Brahman' (Brz. Up. I, 4, 10). Should you say that
just from this concurrence of intimations of difference on the
one hand and non-difference on the other hand it follows
that the soul is a part of the Lord, we reply that such might
be the case if the intention of the texts were to teach differ-
ence as well as non-difference. But the fact is that the texts
aim solely at teaching non-difference, because through the
knowledge of Brahman being the universal Self the highest
end of man is obtained. About difference on the other
hand mere occasional statements (anuvada) are made as
about something already established naturally (i.e. apart
from scripture). Moreover, we have already maintained
that Brahman as not composed of parts can have no parts.
Hence it follows that the one highest Self w^hich is within
all beings appears as individual soul, and it therefore remains
to show how injunctions and prohibitions are possible.
48. (The possibility of) injunctions and prohibi-
tions (results) from the connexion (of the Self) with
bodies ; as in the case of light and so on.
Passages such as ' He is to approach his wife at the
proper time,' and ' he is not to approach the wife of his
guru,' are examples of permissions (or injunctions) and
prohibitions ; or again passages such as 'He is to kill the
animal devoted to Agnishomau,' and ' He is not to hurt any
being.' Corresponding examples from ordinary life are :
' A friend is to be served,' and ' Enemies are to be shunned.'
Permissions and prohibitions of this kind are possible, be-
cause the Self although one only is connected with various
bodies. — Of what kind then is that connexion ? — It consists
in the origination in the Self of the erroneous notion that
the Self is the aggregate consisting of the body and so on.
This erroneous notion is seen to prevail in all living beings,
and finds its expression in thoughts such as the following :
' / go,' ' / come/ ' / am blind,' ' / am not blind,' ' / am con-
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 48. 67
fused,' '/ am not confused.' That erroneous notion cannot
be removed by anything but perfect knowledge, and before
the latter supervenes, it remains spread among all living
beings. And thus, although the Self must be admitted to
be one only, injunctions and prohibitions are possible owing
to the difference effected by its connexion with bodies and
other limiting adjuncts, the products of Nescience. — It then
follows that for him who has obtained perfect knowledge,
injunctions and prohibitions are purportless. — No, we reply,
(they are not purportless for him, but they do not refer to
him), since to him who has obtained the highest aim no
obligation can apply. For obligations are imposed with
reference to things to be avoided or desired ; how then
should he, who sees nothing, either to be wished or avoided,
beyond the universal Self, stand under any obligation ?
The Self certainly cannot be enjoined on the Self. — Should
it be said that injunctions and prohibitions apply to all
those who discern that the soul is something different from
the body (and therefore also to him who possesses perfect
knowledge), we reply that (such an assertion is too wide,
since) obligation depends on a man's imagining his Self to
be (actually) connected with the body. It is true that
obligation exists for him only who views the soul as some-
thing different from the body ; but fundamentally all obli-
gation is an erroneous imagination existing in the case of
him only who does not see that his Self is no more con-
nected with a body than the ether is with jars and the
like. For him, on the other hand, who does not see that
connexion no obligation exists, much less, therefore, for him
who discerns the unity of the Self. — Nor does it result from
the absence of obligation, that he who has arrived at perfect
knowledge can act as he likes ; for in all cases it is only the
wrong imagination (as to the Self's connexion with a body)
that impels to action, and that imagination is absent in the
case of him who has reached perfect knowledge. — From all
this it follows that injunctions and prohibitions are based on
the Selfs connexion with the body ; 'as in the case of
light.' The case under discussion is analogous to cases
such as the following: Light is one only, and yet we shun
F 2
68 vedanta-sCtras.
a fire which has consumed dead bodies, not any other fire.
The sun is one only ; yet we shun only that part of his
light which shines on unholy places, not that part which
falls on pure ground. Some things consisting of earth are
desired^ e.g. diamonds and beryls; other things likewise
consisting of earth are shunned, e.g. dead bodies. The
urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as
such ; those of other animals are shunned. And many
similar cases.
49. And on account of the non-extension (of the
individual soul), there is no confusion (of the results
of actions).
Well, let it be granted that injunctions and prohibitions
are valid, because the Self although one is joined with
particular bodies. — From the admission, however, of the
unity of the Self it follows that there must be a con-
fusion of the fruits of actions, there being only one master
(i.e. one soul to enjoy the fruits of action). — This is not so,
we reply, because there is no extension of the acting and
enjoying Self, i.e. no connexion on its part with all bodies.
For, as we have shown, the individual soul depends on its
adjuncts, and owing to the non-extension of those adjuncts
there is also non-extension of the soul. Hence there is no
confusion of actions or fruits of actions.
50. And (the individual soul is) an appearance
(reflection) only.
And that individual s.oul is to be considered a mere
appearance of the highest Self, like the reflection of the
sun in the water ; it is neither directly that (i.e. the highest
Self), nor a different thing. Hence just as, when one re-
flected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image
does not on that account tremble also ; so, when one soul
is connected with actions and results of actions, another
soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is
therefore no confusion of actions and results. And as that
' appearance ' is the efiect of Nescience, it follows that the
sa;;zsara which is based on it (the appearance) is also the
II ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 50. 69
effect of Nescience, so that from the removal of the latter
there results the cognition of the soul being in reality
nothing but Brahman.
For those, on the other hand, who maintain that there
are many Selfs and all of them all-pervading, it follows
that there must be a confusion of actions and results. — In
what way? — According to the opinion of the Saiikhyas
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, whose nature is pure
intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable ex-
cellence. For the common purpose of all of them there
exists the pradhana, through which the souls obtain enjoy-
ment and release. — According to the followers of Kawada
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, but they are, like so
many jars or stools, mere substances and unintelligent in
themselves. With those Selfs there co-operate the internal
organs (manas), atomic and also unintelligent. From the
conjunction of these two classes of substances, viz. the
Selfs and the internal organs, there spring the nine special
qualities of the Selfs, viz. desire, &c. ^ These qualities
inhere in the individual Selfs separately, without any
confusion, and that constitutes the sa;;/sara- state. Final
release, on the other hand, consists in the absolute non-
origination of those nine qualities.
With regard to these opinions we remark that, as far as
the Sahkhyas are concerned, their doctrine that all Selfs
are of the nature of intelligence, and that there is no
difference between them in the point of proximity (to the
pradhana), &c.^, implies that, if one Self is connected with
pleasure and pain, all Selfs will be so connected. — Well but,
the Sankhya might reply, a difference (in the connexion
of the individual Selfs with pleasure and pain) may result
from the circumstance that the activity of the pradhana
aims at the isolation (emancipation) of the Selfs ^. Other-
^ Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit,
demerit, and bhavana.
^ The &c. implies the non-activity (audasinya) of the Selfs.
^ And therefore proceeds in a special definite direction capable
of effecting in the end the emancipation of some particular Self
70 vedanta-sOtras.
wise the activity of the pradhana would serve no other
end but to manifest the pradhana's power, in consequence
whereof no final release would ever take place. — This argu-
mentation, we reply, is not sound. For we have no right
to assume a difference which has for its only motive the
accomplishment of an end desirable (to us, viz. the emanci-
pation of the Selfs), but we must rather bring forward
some proof for that difference. If no such proof can be
brought forward, the desired end, i. e. the emancipation
of the soul, must be supposed not to take place ; while
at the same time the absence of any cause of difference
establishes the confusion of actions and their results. —
Against the Kawadas we urge that if, on their theory, the
internal organ is connected with one soul, it must in the
same way be connected with all other souls as well, as
there is no difference in the point of proximity, &c.^
Hence, there being no difference of cause and consequently
no difference of effect, it follows that, when one soul is
connected with pleasure and pain, all souls are thus con-
nected.— But may not the limitation (of actions and their
results) be caused by the unseen principle (adn'sh/a) ? By
no means, the following Sutra replies.
51. On account of the unseen principle being non-
limitative.
While there are many souls, all-pervading like ether,
and in equal proximity to all bodies from within as well
as without, the so-called unseen principle (adr/sh/a), which
is of the nature of religious merit or demerit, is acquired
through mind, speech, and body (i. e. thoughts, words, and
actions). — Now, according to the Sahkhyas, that principle
inheres not in the Self, but abides in the pradhana and
cannot, on account of the pradhana being the same (for
all souls), be the limitative cause of the enjoyment of
pleasure and pain for each individual Self. — And according
to the Ka;/adas also the unseen principle is due to the
non-particular conjunction of the Selfs with the internal
' The ' &c.' implies substantiality and so on.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53. 7 1
organs, and as thus there is no h'mitative reason for any
particular adr/sh/a belonging to any particular soul, the
doctrine is open to the same objection. — Well, but there
are at work in every particular Self resolutions, &c., such
as, ' I wish to obtain that result,' ' I wish to avoid that
other result,' ' I am striving for that purpose,' ' I wish to
act in that way,' &c. &c., and these may, we assume,
define the relation of ownership in which particular Selfs
stand to particular adrz'sh/as. — This objection is negatived
in the following Sutra.
52. And this is also the case in resolutions, &c.
The objection pointed out before applies also to resolu-
tions, &c., for they also are made through the non-
particular conjunction of the internal organ and the Self,
in proximity to all Selfs. Hence they also cannot furnish
a reason for limitation.
53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure,
pain, &c., results) from (difference of) place ; we say
no, on account of the (Self's) being v^ithln (all
things).
Here it might be objected that, although all Selfs are
all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ
which is seated in the body must take place in that part
of each Self which is limited by the body ; and that thus
there may result from difference of locality a limitative
distinction of resolutions, &c., of the adrz'sh/a, and of
pleasure and pain. — This also, we reply, is not possible
' on account of the being within.' For, as being equally
infinite, all Selfs are within all bodies. Thus the Vaij'e-
shikas have no right whatever to assume any part of the
Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume
such a part of the Self which in reality is without any
parts, that part because merely assumptive will be in-
capable of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible
to limit the body which originates in proximity to all
(omnipresent) Selfs to one particular Self to the exclusion
of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due
-^l VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two
Selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain might effect their
fruition by one and the same body, since it may happen
that the unseen principle of two Selfs occupies the same
place. For we may observe, e. g. that after Devadatta's
body has moved away from a certain spot in which Deva-
datta had enjoyed a certain amount of pleasure or pain,
and the body of Ya^wadatta has moved into that very same
place, Ya^;7adatta enjoys an equal amount of pleasure or
pain ; a thing which (on the theory discussed) could not
happen if the unseen principles of the two men did not
occupy the same place. From the doctrine that the unseen
principles occupy fixed places it would, moreover, follow
that no enjoyment of the heavenly world, &c. can take
place ; for the adr/sh/a is effected in definite places such
as e. g. the body of a Brahma«a, and the enjoyment of the
heavenly world is bound to a definite different place. — It
further^ is impossible to maintain that there exist many
all-pervading Selfs ^, as there are no parallel instances.
Mention if you can a plurality of other things occupying
the same place ! — You will perhaps bring forward colour
and so on^. But we refuse to accept that instance as
parallel, because colour, &c., although non-different in so
far as they are attributes of one substance, yet differ
through their essential characteristics. On the other hand
there is no difference of characteristics between your
(alleged) many Selfs. If you say that a difference of
characteristics can be established on the ground of the
ultimate special differences (of all substances), we point
out that you implicate yourself in a logical circle as the
assumption of difference of characteristics and the as-
sumption of ultimate differences presuppose each other.
^ And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sahkhyas
as well as of the Vaijeshikas.
- Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same
space.
^ Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one
place as belonging to one material object.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53. "] ^
Should you adduce as parallel instances the all-pervading-
ness of ether, &c, (the ' &c.' implying place and time), we
reply that their all-pervadingness is not proved for him
who holds the doctrine of Brahman and looks upon ether
and so on as mere effects.
All which establishes the conclusion that the only doc-
trine not open to any objections is the doctrine cf the unity
of the Self.
74 vedanta-sOtras.
FOURTH PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
I, Thus the vital airs.
In the third pada it has been shown that a conflict of
Vedic passages as to ether, &c., does not exist. The same
is now done in this fourth pada with regard to the vital
airs. On the one hand the chapters treating of the origin of
things do not record an origin of the vital airs ; so e.g.
{Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3) ' It sent forth fire,' &c. ; and (Taitt. Up.
II, i) ' From that Self sprang ether,' &c. On the other
hand it is said expressly in some places that the vital airs
were not produced. The following passage, e. g. ' Non-
being indeed was this in the beginning ; they say : what
was that non-being? those rz'shis indeed were the non-being
in the beginning ; they say : who are those rz'shis ? the
vital airs indeed are the rz'shis ' (vSat. Br. VI, i, i, i), states
that the vital airs existed before the origin of things. — In
other passages again we read of the origin of the vital
airs also, so e.g. 'As small sparks come forth from fire,
thus do all vital airs come forth from that Self (Brz. Up.
II, I, 20); 'From that is born the vital air, mind, and all
organs of sense' (Mu. Up. II, i, 3) ; 'The seven vital airs
also spring from him' (Mu. Up. II, i, 8) ; ' He sent forth
the vital air ; from the vital air j-raddha, ether, air, light,
water, earth, sense, mind, food ' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Hence
as there is a conflict of scriptural passages, and as no
reason can be made out for deciding in favour of either
alternative, the purvapakshin thinks that either no opinion
can be formed, or that the passages relative to the origin
of the vital airs must be taken in a metaphorical sense, since
scripture expressly states the prawas to have existed before
the creation.
In reply to this the author of the Sutras says, ' thus the
II ADHYAYA, 4 PAUA, I. 75
pra;/as.' — What then, it will be asked, is the fitness of the
word ' thus,' as there is no point of comparison with the
matter under discussion ? The matter under discussion at
the conclusion of the preceding pada was the refutation
of those who maintain a plurality of omnipresent Selfs, and
with this no comparison can be instituted because there is
no similarity. For a comparison is possible only where
there is similarity ; as when we say, e.g. ' as a lion so is Bala-
varman.' Possibly it might be said that the comparison is
meant to intimate similarity with the admh/a ; the meaning
being that as the adr/sh/a is not limited because it is pro-
duced in proximity to all Selfs, so the pra;^as also are not
limited with regard to all the different Selfs. But, on that
explanation, the Sutra would be an idle repetition, as it has
already been explained that that absence of limitation is due
to the non-limitation of bodies. — Nor can the pra;zas be com-
pared with the individual soul, because that would be con-
trary to the conclusion about to be established. For it has
been shown that the individual soul is without an origin,
while the intention is to declare that the pra^as have an
origin. Hence it appears that the word ' so ' is devoid of
connexion. — Not so, we reply. A connexion may be
established by means of a comparison based on the exem-
plifying passages. Under that category fall those passages
which state the origin of the pra;^as, as e. g. ' From that
Self come forth all prawas, all worlds, all gods, all beings'
{Bri. Up. II, I, 20) ; which passage means that as the worlds
and so on are produced from the highest Brahman so the
pri/^as also. Such passages also as (Mu. Up. II, i, 3)
' From him are born pra«a, mind and all organs of sense,
ether, air, light, water, and the earth the support of all,' are
to be considered as intimating that the origin of the pra;/as
is analogous to that of the ether, &c. — Or else, as a con-
nexion with a somewhat remote object of comparison is
resorted to in such cases as the one treated of in Pu. Mi.
Su. Ill, 4, 32 (' and the accident in drinking Soma, in the
same manner')^, we may construe our Sutra in the following
^ The ' tadvat ' in the quoted Sutra refers not to the immediately
preceding adhikarawa but to SQtra III, 4, 28.
76 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
way: in the same way as ether and so on, which are men-
tioned in the beginning of the preceding pada, are under-
stood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the pra;/as
also are effects of the highest Brahman. And if it be
asked what reason we have for assuming the pra;/as to be
so, we reply : the fact of this being stated by scripture. —
But it has been shown above that in some places the
origin of the pra;^as is not mentioned. — That is of no
weight, we reply, as it is mentioned in other places. For
the circumstance of a thing not being stated in some
places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it
in other places. Hence, on account of equality of scrip-
tural statement, it is proper to maintain that the pra;?as
also are produced in the same way as ether and so on.
2. On account of the impossibility of a secondary
(origin of the pra;2as).
Against the objection that the origin of the prawas must
be understood in a secondary sense because the text states
that they existed before the origin of the world, the Sutra-
kara declares ' on account of the impossibility of a
secondary origin.' The statement as to the origin of the
pra^as cannot be taken in a secondary sense because
therefrom would result the abandonment of a general
assertion. For after the text has asserted that the know-
ledge of everything depends on the knowledge of one
(' What is that through which when it is known everything
else becomes known? ' Mu. Up. I, i, 3), it goes on to say,
in order to prove that assertion, that ' From him is born
prawa,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, i, 3). Now the assertion is made
good only if the whole world including the pra;/as is an
effect of Brahman, because then there is no effect in-
dependent of the material cause ; if on the other hand the
statement as to the origin of the pra;/as were taken in a
secondary sense, the assertion would thereby be stultified.
The text, moreover, makes some concluding statements
about the matter asserted, ' The Person is all this, sacrifice,
penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal' (II, i, 10), and
' Brahman alone is all this ; it is the Best.' — That same
II ADIIYAYA, 4 PADA, 3. 77
assertion is to be connected with such passages as the
following, ' When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self,
then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 5). — How then
have we to account for the statement that the prawas
existed before the creation ? — That statement, we reply,
does not refer to the fundamental causal substance ; for we
ascertain from scriptural passages, such as Mu. Up. II, i, 2
(' That heavenly Person is without breath and without mind,
pure, higher than the high Imperishable'), that the funda-
mental causal substance is devoid of all distinctions such
as breath and the like. We must rather view the statement
about the existence of the pra/^as before the creation as
having for its object a subordinate causal substance ^, and
being made with reference to the effects of the latter only.
For it is known from ^ruti and Smrz'ti that even in the
universe of evolved things many states of being may stand
to each other in the relation of causal substance and effect.
— In the adhikarawa treating of the ether there occurred a
Sutra (composed of the same syllables) ' gau/zyasambhavat,'
which as being the purvapaksha-sutra had to be explained
as ' gauwi asambhavat,' ' the statement about the origin
of ether must be taken in a secondary sense on account of
the impossibility (of the primary sense).' There the final
conclusion was established by means of the abandonment
of the general assertion. Here on the other hand the Sutra
is the Siddhanta Sutra and we have therefore explained
it as meaning ' on account of the impossibility of a secondary
meaning.' — Those who explain the present Sutra in the
same way as the previous Sutra overlook the fact of the
general assertion being abandoned (viz. if the passages
referring to the origin of the pra;/as were taken in a
secondary sense).
3. On account of that (word which indicates origin)
being enunciated at first (in connexion with the
pra/^as).
That the scriptural statement about the origin of the
^ Such as Hirawyagarbha.
78 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
pra;/as is to be taken in its literal sense just as the state-
ments about the ether, &c., appears from that circumstance
also that the one word which (in the passage from the Mu.
Up.) indicates origination, viz. ' is born ' (^ayate), is in the
first place connected with the pra;/as and has afterwards to
be joined with ether, &c., also (' from him is born breath,
mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air,' &c.). Now as it is
a settled matter that the phrase ' is born ' must be taken in
its primary sense with reference to ether and so on, it
follows that the origin of the pra;zas also to which the same
word is applied must be understood as a real origin. For
it would be impossible to decide that a word enunciated
once only in one chapter and one sentence, and connected
wnth many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its
primary sense, and in others in a secondary sense ; for such
a decision would imply want of uniformity. — So likewise in
the passage, ' He sent forth pra//a, from pra;/a jraddha,' &c.
(Pr. Up. VI, 4), the phrase 'he sent forth' which the text
exhibits in conjunction with the pra;?as has to be carried
on to j-raddha and the other things which have an origin. —
The same reasoning holds good in those cases where the
word expressing origination occurs at the end and has to be
connected with the preceding words ; as e. g. in the passage
ending ' all beings come forth from the Self,' where the
word ' come forth ' must be connected with the pra;/as, &c.,
mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence.
4. Because speech is preceded by that (viz, fire
and the other elements).
Although in the chapter, ' That sent forth fire,' &c., the
origin of the pra;/as is not mentioned, the origin of the
three elements, fire, water, and earth only being stated,
nevertheless, the fact of the text declaring that speech,
pra;/a, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth — which in
their turn have Brahman for their causal substance — proves
that they — and, by parity of reasoning, all pra;/as — have
sprung from Brahman. That speech, prawa, and mind
presuppose fire, water, and earth is told in the same chapter,
' For truly, my child, mind consists of earth, breath of water.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 5. 79
speech of fire ' {Kh. Up. VI, 5, 4). If their consisting of
earth and so on is taken literally, it follows at once that
they have sprung from Brahman. And if it be taken in a
metaphorical sense only, yet, as the sentence forms part of
the chapter which treats of the evolution of names and
forms effected by Brahman ; and as the introductory phrase
runs, ' That by which we hear what is not heard ' {Kh. Up.
VI, I, 3) ; and as the concluding passage is 'In it all that
exists has its Self [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); and as the matter is
moreover known from other scriptural passages ; we under-
stand that also the statement about mind and so on
consisting of earth, &c., is meant to teach that they are
products of Brahman. — It is therefore an established con-
clusion that the pra/^as also are effects of Brahman.
5. (The pra/^as are) seven, on account of this
being understood (from scriptural passages) and of
the specification (of those seven).
So far we have shown that there is in reality no conflict
of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the prawas.
It will now be shown that there is also no conflict regarding
their number. The chief vital air (mukhya pra;?a) will be
discussed later on. For the present the Sutrakara defines
the number of the other pra«as. A doubt arises here
owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages.
In one place seven prawas are mentioned, ' The seven prawas
spring from him' (Mu. Up. II, t, 8). In another place
eight prawas are mentioned as being grahas, ' Eight grahas
there are and eight atigrahas ' (Brz. Up. Ill, 2, i). In
another place nine, ' Seven are the pra;zas of the head, two
the lower ones ' (Taitt. Sa?«h. V, 3, 2, 5). Sometimes ten,
'• Nine pra^/as indeed are in men, the navel is the tenth '
(Taitt. Sa7«h. V, 3, a, 3). Sometimes eleven, ' Ten are these
prawas in man, and Atman is the eleventh' (Brz. Up. Ill,
9, 4). Sometimes twelve, ' All touches have their centre in
the skin,' &c. (Br/. Up. II, 4, 11). Sometimes thirteen,
'• The eye and what can be seen,' &c. (Pr. Up. IV, 8). — Thus
the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the
prawas.
So VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the pra;/as are in
reality seven in number, on account of understanding, i. e.
because they are understood to be so many, from passages
such as ' The seven pra;/as spring from him/ &c. These
seven prawas are moreover specified in the other passage
quoted above, 'Seven indeed are the pra;^as of the head.'
— But in the same passage we meet with the following
reiteration, ' Resting in the cave they are placed there seven
and seven,' which intimates that there are prawas in addition
to the seven. — No matter, we reply ; that reiteration is
made with reference to the plurality of men, and means
that each man has seven prawas ; it does not mean that
there are two sets of seven pra«as each of different nature.
— But, another objection will be raised^ other scriptural
passages speak of the prawas as eight in number ; how then
should they be seven ? — True, we reply, the number of eight
also is stated ; but on account of the contradictory nature
of the statements we have to decide in favour of either of
the two numbers ; hence we decide in favour of the number
seven, in deference to the (simpler) assumption of a low
number, and consider the statements of other numbers to
refer to the difference of modifications (of the fundamental
seven pra«as). — To this argumentation the next Sutra replies.
6. But (there are also, in addition to the seven
pra;2as mentioned,) the hands and so on. This being
a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude)
thus (viz. that there are seven pra;^as only).
In addition to the seven prawas scripture mentions other
pra^as also, such as the hands, &c., ' The hand is one graha
and that is seized by work as the atigraha ; for with the
hands one does work' (Br/. Up. Ill, i, 8), and similar pas-
sages. And as it is settled that there are more than seven,
the number seven may be explained as being contained
within the greater number. For wherever there is a conflict
between a higher and a lower number, the higher number
has to be accepted because the lower one is contained within
it ; while the higher is not contained within the lower. We
therefore must not conclude that, in deference to the lower
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6.
number, seven pra7?as have to be assumed, but rather that
there are eleven pra;zas, in deference to the higher number.
This conclusion is confirmed by one of the passages quoted,
' Ten are these pra;^as in man, and Atman is the eleventh.'
By the word Atman we have to understand the internal
organ, on account of its ruling over the organs. Should it
be objected that scripture also mentions numbers higher
than eleven, viz. twelve and thirteen, we admit that, but
remark that there are no objective effects in addition to the
eleven (well-known) objective effects on account of which
additional organs would have to be assumed. There are five
distinctions of buddhi having for their respective objects
sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and on their account
there are the five intellectual organs ; again there are five
classes of action, viz. speaking, taking, going, evacuation,
and begetting, and on their account there are the five organs
of action ; finally there is the manas which has all things
for its objects and extends to the past, the present, and the
future; it is one only but has various functions. On account
of the plurality of its functions we find it designated by
different terms in different places, as manas or buddhi or
aha;;zkara or -^itta. Thus scripture also after having enu-
merated the various functions such as desire, &c., says at
the end, 'All this is manas only.' — That passage again which
speaks of the pra;/5s of the head as seven means four prawas
only, which on account of the plurality of their places may
be counted as seven ; viz. the two ears, the two eyes, the
two nostrils, and speech. — Nor can it be maintained that
there are in reality only so many (i.e. seven), the other
pra7/as being mere functions of the seven ; for the functions
of the hands and so on are absolutely different (from the
functions of the seven senses admitted by the purvapakshin).
— Again, in the passage ' Nine prawas indeed are in man, the
navel is the tenth,' the expression ' ten pra/zas ' is used to
denote the different openings of the human body, not the
difference of nature of the pra;?as, as we conclude from the
navel being mentioned as the eleventh. For no pra;za is
known that bears the name of navel ; but the navel as being
one of the special abodes of the chief pra;za is here enu-
[38] G
82 vedanta-sOtras.
merated as a tenth pra//a. — In some places so and so many
are counted for the purpose of meditation ; in other places
so and so many for the purpose of illustration ^. As the
statements concerning the number of the pra;/as are of so
varying a nature we must therefore distinguish in each case
what the object of the statement is. Meanwhile it remains
a settled conclusion that that statement which makes the
pra;/as to be eleven is authoritative, on account of the
objective effects (being eleven also).
The two Sutras (referring to the number of the pranas)
may be construed in the following manner also. The
prawas are seven because scripture mentions the going
(gati) of seven only, ' When he thus departs life departs
after him, and when life thus departs all the other pr^^zas ^
depart after it ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2). — But, it may be objected,
this passage says 'all the other pra;/as ; ' how then does it
declare the going of seven only? — The Sutra replies, 'on
account of their being specified.' Seven senses only, from
seeing up to feeling, are specified there because so many
only are under discussion ; as w'e see from the enumeration
given in the passage, ' When that person in the eye turns
away then he ceases -to know any forms. He has become
one they say, he does not see ' &c. The word ' all ' refers
here only to what is under discussion, i.e. only to the seven
pra;^as mentioned before, not to any other. Analogously
when we say ' all the Brahmawas have been fed,' we mean
only those Brahma;/as who have been invited and concern
us at the time^ not any other. — If it be objected that the
passage quoted mentions understanding (vi^;7ana) as the
eighth thing departing, and that we therefore have no right
to speak of the departing of seven only, we reply that
manas and understanding differ not in essential nature but
only in function, and that on this account we are entitled
to speak of seven pra;/as only. — The answer to this
^ Sapta prawaA prabhavantity ader gatim aha kva/'id iti, ash/au
graha ityader gatwi sfi/tayati gatim iti. An. Gi.
'^ I.e. seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, feeling, and
the manas.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6.
purvapaksha is as follows. — In addition to the seven
senses, other prawas also, such as the hands, are known
to exist, as we see from such passages as ' The hands are
one graha,' &c. (Bri. Up. Ill, 2, 8). By their being a graha
(seizer) is meant that they are bonds by which the indivi-
dual soul (kshetra^;/a) is tied. Now the individual soul is
tied not in one body only, but is equally tied in other bodies
also. Hence it follows that that bond called graha (i.e.
among other things the hands) moves over into other bodies
also. Smrzti also (' He— the Self — is joined with the aggre-
gate of eight, comprising breath, &c. ^, as his mark ; his
bondage consists in being bound by it, his release in being
freed from it ') shows that the Self is, previous to final
release, not freed from the bonds called grahas. And also
in the enumeration of the senses and their objects given
by the Atharva;/a Upanishad (' The eye and what can be
seen,' &c., Pr. Up. IV, 8), the organs of action such as the
hands and so on, together with their objects, are specified
as well, 'the hands and what can be grasped ; the member and
what can be delighted ; the anus and what can be evacuated ;
the feet and what can be walked.' Moreover the passage,
* These ten vital breaths and atman as the eleventh ; when
they depart from this mortal body they make us cry' (Bri.
Up. Ill, 9,4), shows that eleven pra«as depart from the body.
— Moreover the word ' all ' (which occurs in the passage, Br/.
Up. IV, 4,2) must, because connected with the word 'prawas,'
denote all pr^/^as, and cannot, on the ground of general sub-
ject-matter, be limited to the seven prawas ; for a direct state-
ment has greater force than the subject-matter. Even in the
analogous sentence, 'all Brahmawas have been fed,' we have,
on the ground of the words, to understand all Brahmawas
living on the earth ; but because it is impossible to feed all
Brahma;^as in the latter sense, we accept that meaning of
^ The eightfold aggregate of which the Self is freed in final
release only comprises the five pra7zas (vital airs), the pentad of the
five subtle elements, the pentad of the organs of intellect, the pentad
of the organs of action, the tetrad of internal organs (manas, &c.),
avidya, desire (kama), and karman.
G 2
84 vedanta-siDtras.
'all,' according to which it denotes all invited Brahma;/as.
In our case on the other hand there is no reason whatever
for narrowing the meaning of 'all.' — Hence the word 'all '
includes all pra;/as without exception. Nothing on the
other hand prevents the enumeration of seven prawas being
taken as illustrative only. It is therefore an established
conclusion, resting on the number of the effects as well
as on Vedic statement, that there are eleven pra;/as.
7. And (they are) minute.
The author of the Sutras adds another characteristic
quality of the pra;/as. The pra;/as under discussion must
be viewed as minute. By their minuteness we have to
understand subtilty and limited size ; but not atomic size,
as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects
which extend over the whole body. They must be subtle ;
for if they were big the persons surrounding a dying man
would see them coming out from the body at the moment
of death, as a snake comes out of its hole. They must be
limited ; for if they were all-pervading the scriptural
statements as to their passing out of the body, going and
coming, would be contradicted thereby, and it could not
be established that the individual soul is ' the essence of
the qualities of that ' (i. e. the manas ; cp. II, 3, 29).
Should it be said that they may be all-pervading, but at
the same time appear as functions (vr/tti) in the body only,
we rejoin that only a function can constitute an instru-
ment. Whatever effects perception, may it be a function
or something else, just that is an instrument for us. The
disagreement is therefore about a name only, and the
assumption of the instruments (prawas) being all-pervading
is thus purposeless. — Hence we decide that the pra;ms are
subtle and of limited size.
8. And the best (i.e. the chief vital air).
The Sutra extends to the chief vital air (mukhya pra;/a)
a quality already asserted of the other pra/^as, viz. being an
effect of Brahman. — But, an objection may be raised, it has
already been stated of all prawas without difference that
they are effects of Brahman ; e. g. the passage, ' From him
II ADHYAyA, 4 PADA, 9. 85
is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense ' (Mu. Up. II,
I, 3), states the origin of pra;^a separately from the senses
and the manas ; and there are other passages also such
as ' He sent forth pra;/a ' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Why then the
formal extension? — We reply: For the purpose of re-
moving further doubt. For in the Nasadiya-sukta whose
subject is Brahman there occurs the following mantra :
' There was neither death nor the Immortal ; nor mani-
festation of either night or day. By its own law the One
was breathing without wind ; there was nothing differ-
ent from that or higher than it' {Ri. Sa;?zh. X, 129, 2).
Here the words, ' was breathing,' which denote the
proper function of breath, intimate that breath existed as
it were before the creation. And therefrom it might be
concluded that pra;/a is not produced ; an idea which the
Sutrakdra discards by the formal extension (to pra/^a of
the quality of having originated from Brahman). — Moreover
the word ' breathed ' does not intimate that pra;/a existed
before the creation ; for in the first place it is qualified by
the addition 'without wind,' and in the second place
scriptural passages — such as ' He is without breath, without
mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, i, 2) — declare expressly that the
causal substance is without any quahfications such as
pra;/a and so on. Hence the word ' breathed ' has merely
the purpose of setting forth the existence of the cause. —
The term ' the best ' (employed in the Sutra) denotes the
chief vital air, according to the declaration of scripture,
' Breath indeed is the oldest and the best ' [Kh. Up. V, i, i).
The breath is the oldest because it begins its function from
the moment when the child is conceived ; the senses of
hearing, &c., on the other hand, begin to act only when
their special seats, viz. the ears, &c., are formed, and they
are thus not ' the oldest.' The designation ' the best '
belongs to the prawa on account of its superior qualities
and on account of the passage, ' We shall not be able to
live without thee' (Brz. Up. VI, i, 13).
9. (The chief pra^^a is) neither air nor function,
on account of its being mentioned separately.
86 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
An inquiry is now started concerning the nature of that
chief pra;/a. — The purvapakshin maintains that the pra;/a
is, according to 5ruti, nothing but air. For vSruti says,
' Breath is air ; that air assuming five forms is pra;/a,
apana, vyana, udana, samana.' — Or else the purvapaksha
may be formulated according to the view of another
philosophical doctrine, and prkna. may be considered as
the combined function of all organs. For so the followers
of another doctrine (viz. the Sarikhyas) teach, ' The five
airs, pra;/a,&c.,are the common function of the instruments^.'
To this we reply that the pra;/a is neither air nor the
function of an organ ; for it is mentioned separately.
From air pra;^a is distinguished in the following passage,
* Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot
shines as Agni with its light and warms.' If prawa were
mere air, it would not be mentioned separately from air. —
Thus it is also mentioned separately from the functions of
the organs ; for the texts enumerate speech and the other
organs and mention prawa separately from them, and the
function and that to which the function belongs (the organ)
are identical. If it were a mere function of an organ, it
would not be mentioned separately from the organs.
Other passages also in which the pra;/a is mentioned
separately from air and the organs are here to be con-
sidered so, e. g. ' From him is born breath, mind, and all
organs of sense, ether, air,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, i, 3). Nor is
it possible that all the organs together should have one func-
tion (and that that function should be the pra;/a) ; for each
organ has its own special function and the aggregate of
them has no active power of its own. — But — an objection
may be raised — the thing may take place in the manner of
the moving bird-cage. Just as eleven birds shut up in one
cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the
cage by the combination of their efforts ; so the eleven
^ Sahkhya Su. II, 31 ; -where, however, the reading is 'samanya-
karawavrztti^,' explained by the Comm.as sadharam karawasya antay^-
kara^atrayasya vrAtik pariwamabheda iti. 6'ahkara, on the other
hand, understands by kara«a the eleven pra«as discussed previously.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9. 8/
prawas which abide in one body may, although each has
its own special function, by the combination of these
functions, produce one common function called praz/a. —
This objection, we reply, is without force. The birds
indeed may, by means of their separate subordinate efforts,
which all favour the movement of the cage, move the
cage by combination ; that is a matter of observation.
But we have no right to assume that the different pra«as
with their subordinate functions such as hearing &c. can,
by combination, produce the function of vital breath ; for
there is no means to prove this, and the vital breath is in
kind absolutely different from hearing and so on. — More-
over, if the vital breath were the mere function of an organ
(or the organs) it could not be glorified as the ' best,' and
speech and so on could not be represented as subordinate
to it. Hence the vital breath is different from air and the
functions (of the organs). — How then have we to under-
stand the scriptural passage, 'The prkna is air/ &c.? —
The air, we reply, passing into the adhyatma-state, dividing
itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialized condition is
called pra/za. It therefore is neither a different being nor
is it mere air. Hence there is room for those passages as
well which identify it with air as those which do not. —
Well, let this be granted. The pra;/a then also must be
considered to be independent in this body like the
individual soul, as scripture declares it to be the ' best '
and the organs such as speech, &c., to be subordinate to it.
For various powers are ascribed to it in scriptural passages.
It is said, for instance, that when speech and the other
(organs) are asleep the pra;/a alone is awake ; that the
priwa alone is not reached by death ; that the pra;;a is the
absorber, it absorbs speech, &c. ; that the pra/za guards
the other senses (prawas) as a mother her sons^. Hence
it follows that the pra.ua. is independent in the same way
as the individual soul. — This view is impugned in the next
Sutra.
' Cp. Ka. Up. II, 5, 8 ; Bn. Up. I, 5, 2 1 ; A7i. Up. IV, 3, 3 ; Pr.
Up. II, 13.
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
10. But (the pra;za is subordinate to the soul) Hke
the eye, &c., on account of being taught with them
(the eye, &c.), and for other reasons.
The word ' but ' sets aside the independence of the prana.
As the eye and so on stand, like the subjects of a king, in
mere subordinate relation to the acting and enjoying of the
soul and are not independent, so the chief vital air also,
occupying a position analogous to that of a king's minister,
stands in an entirely subordinate relation to the soul and
is not independent. — Why? — Because it is taught (spoken
of) together with them, i. e. the eye and the other organs,
in such passages as the colloquy of the prA;^as, &c. For
to be mentioned together is appropriate only in the case
of things with the same attributes, as e. g. the Brzliat-
saman and the Rathantara-saman ^. The words 'and so
on ' (in the Sutra) indicate other reasons refuting the
independence of the praz/a, such as its being composed of
parts, its being of a non-intelligent nature and the like. —
Well, but if it be admitted that the pri;/a stands to the
soul in the relation of an instrument as the eye and so on,
it will follow that we must assume another sense-object
analogous to colour and so on. For the eyes, &c., occupy
their specific subordinate position with regard to the soul
through their functions which consist in the seeing of
colour and so on. Now we can enumerate only eleven
classes of functions, viz. the seeing of colour and so on,
on whose account we assume eleven different pra^as, and
there is no twelfth class of effects on account of which a
twelfth pra;^a could be assumed. — To this objection the
following Sutra replies.
11. And on account of (its) not being an instru-
ment the objection is not (vaHd); for thus (scripture)
declares.
The objection urged, viz. that there would result another
sense-object, is not valid ; because the pra;/a is not an
^ Wliich go together because they are both samans.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 12. 89
instrument. For we do not assume that the pra;/a is, like
the eye, an organ because it determines a special sense-
object. Nor is it on that account devoid of an effect;
since scripture declares that the chief vital air has a specific
effect which cannot belong to the other pra;/as. For in
the so-called colloquies of the pra//as we read in the be-
ginning, ' The pra;/as quarrelled together who was best ; '
after that we read, * He by whose departure the body seems
worse than worst, he is the best of you ; ' thereupon the
text, after showing how, on the successive departure of
speech and so on, the life of the body, although deprived
of one particular function, went on as before, finally relates
that as soon as the chief pra;?a was about to depart all
other pra//as became loosened and the body was about to
perish ; which shows that the body and all the senses sub-
sist by means of the chief pra;/a. The same thing is de-
clared by another passage, ' Then prlna. as the best said to
them : Be not deceived ; I alone dividing myself fivefold
support this body and keep it' (Pr. Up. II, 3). Another
passage, viz. ' With prawa guarding the lower nest ' (Br/. Up.
IVj 3, 12), shows that the guarding of the body depends on
prawa. Again, two other passages show that the nourish-
ing of the body depends on pra«a, ' From whatever limb
prana goes away that limb withers' {Brt. Up. I, 3, 19), and
' What we eat and drink with it supports the other vital
breaths.' And another passage declares that the soul's
departing and staying depend on pra;/a, ' What is it by
whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying
I shall stay? — The created prawa ' (Pr. Up. VI, 3 ; 4).
12. It is designated as having five functions like
mind.
The chief vital air has its specific effect for that reason
also that in scripture it is designated as having five
functions, prawa, apana, vyana, udana, samana. This dis-
tinction of functions is based on a distinction of effects.
Prawa is the forward-function whose work is aspiration, &c.;
apana is the backward-function whose work is inspiration,
&c.; vyana is that which, abiding in the junction of the two.
90 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
is the cause of works of strength ^ ; udana is the ascending
function and is the cause of the passing out (of the soul) ;
samana is the function which conveys the juices of the
food equally through all the limbs of the body. Thus the
pra;/a has five functions just as the mind (manas) has.
The five functions of the mind are the five well-known
ones caused by the ear, &c., and having sound and so on
for their objects. By the functions of the mind we cannot
here understand those enumerated (in Br/. Up. I, 5, 3),
'desire, representation,' &c., because those are more than
five. — But on the former explanation also there exists yet
another function of the mind which does not depend on
the ear, &c., but has for its object the past, the future, and
so on ; so that on that explanation also the number five
is exceeded. — Well, let us then follow the principle that
the opinions of other (systems) if unobjectionable may be
adopted, and let us assume that the five functions of the
manas are those five which are known from the Yogaj-astra,
viz. right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber, and re-
membrance. Or else let us assume that the Sutra quotes
the manas as an analogous instance merely with reference
to the plurality (not the fivefoldness) of its functions. —
In any case the Sutra must be construed to mean that the
pra;/a's subordinate position with regard to the soul follows
from its having five functions like the manas.
13. And it is minute.
And the chief vital air is to be considered as minute like
the other pra;/as. — Here also we have to understand by
minuteness that the chief vital air is subtle and of limited
size, not that is of atomic size ; for by means of its five
functions it pervades the entire body. It must be viewed
as subtle because when passing out of the body it is not
perceived by a bystander, and as limited because scripture
speaks of its passing out, going and coming. — But, it may
be said, scripture speaks also of its all-pervadingness ; so,
Viz. the holding in of the breath ; cp. Kh. Up. I, 3, 3-5.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 4. 9 1
e. g. ' He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an
elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this
Universe' (Br/. Up. I, 3, 22). — To this we reply that the
all-pervadingness of which this text speaks belongs to the
Self of the pra;/a in its adhidaivata relation, according to
which it appears as Hirawyagarbha in his double — universal
and individual — form, not in its adhyatma relation. More-
over the statements of equality ' equal to a grub,' &c.,
just declare the limited size of the pra;/a which abides
within every living being. — Thus there remains no difficulty.
14. But there is guidance (of the pra;^as) by fire,
&c., on account of that being declared by scripture.
Here there arises a discussion whether the pra;/as of
which we have been treating are able to produce their
effects by their own power or only in so far as guided by
divinities. — The purvapakshin maintains that the pra;^as
being endowed with the capacity of producing their effects
act from their own power. If we, moreover, admitted that
the pra;/as act only in so far as guided by divinities, it
would follow that those guiding divinities are the enjoyers
(of the fruits of the actions), and the individual soul would
thus cease to be an enjoyer. Hence the pra;^as act from
their own power. — To this we reply as follows. ' But there
takes place guidance by fire,' &c. — The word ' but ' excludes
the purvapaksha. The different classes of organs, speech,
&c.,the Sutra says, enter on their peculiar activities, guided
by the divinities animating fire, and so on. The words,
' on account of that being declared by scripture,' state the
reason. For different passages declare this, cp. Ait. Ar, H,
4, 2, 4, ' Agni having become speech entered the mouth.'
This statement about Agni (fire) becoming speech and
entering the mouth is made on the assumption of Agni
acting as a ruler with his divine Self (not as a mere
element). For if we abstract from the connexion with the
divinity we do not see that there is any special con-
nexion of fire either with speech or the mouth. The sub-
sequent passages, ' Vayu having become breath entered
into the nostrils,' &c., are to be explained in the same way.
92 VEDANTA-Sl(jTRAS.
— This conclusion is confirmed by other passages also, such
as ' Speech is indeed the fourth foot of Brahman ; that foot
shines with Agni as its light and warms ' i^KJi. Up. IV,
1 8, 3), which passage declares that speech is made of the
light of Agni. Other passages intimate the same thing by
declaring that speech, &c., pass over into Agni, &c., cp.
Brz. Up. I, 3, 12, 'He carried speech across first; when
speech had become freed from death it became Agni.'
Everywhere the enumeration of speech and so on on the
one side and Agni and so on on the other side — wherein is
implied a distinction of the personal and the divine element
— proceeds on the ground of the same relation (viz. of that
which is guided and that which guides). Smr/ti-passages
also declare at length that speech, &c., are guided by
Agni and the other divinities, cp. for instance, ' Brahmawas
knowing the truth call speech the personal element, that
which is spoken the natural element and fire (Agni) the
divine element.' — The assertion that the pri;zas being
endowed with the capability of producing their effects act
from their own power is unfounded, as we see that some
things which possess the capability of motion, e. g. cars,
actually move only if dragged by bulls and the like.
Hence, as both alternatives are possible \ we decide on the
ground of scripture that the prawas act under the guidance
of the divinities. — The next Sutra refutes the assertion that
from the fact of the divinities guiding the pra;/as it would
follow that they — and not the embodied soul — are the
enjoyers.
15. (It is not so) (because the pra//as are con-
nected) with that to which the pra;^as belong (i.e.
the individual soul), (a thing we know) from scrip-
ture.
Although there are divinities guiding the prawas, yet we
learn from scripture that those pra^/as are connected with
the embodied soul which is the Lord of the aggregate of
^ Viz. that something should act by itself, and that it should act
under guidance only.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 7. 93
instruments of action. The following passage, e.g. 'where
the sight has entered into the void there is the person of
the eye ; the eye itself is the instrument of seeing. He
who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self; the nose is
the instrument of smelling,' declares that the pra;^as are
connected with the embodied soul only. Moreover the
plurality of the divinities guiding the organs renders it
impossible that they should be the enjoyers in this body.
For that there is in this body only one embodied enjoyer
is understood from the possibility of the recognition of
identity and so on ^.
16. And on account of the permanence of this
(viz. the embodied soul).
This embodied soul abides permanently in this body as
the enjoyer, since it can be affected by good and evil
and can experience pleasure and pain. Not so the gods ;
for they exist in the state of highest power and glory and
cannot possibly enter, in this wretched body, into the con-
dition of enjoyers. So scripture also says, ' Only what is
good approaches him ; verily evil does not approach the
devas ' (Br/. Up. I, 5, 20). — And only with the embodied
soul the pra;/as are permanently connected, as it is seen
that when the soul passes out &c. the pr^/zas follow it.
This we see from passages such as the following : 'When
it passes out the pra;za passes out after it, and when the
prawa thus passes out all the other pra;/as pass after it'
{B?'i. Up. IV, 4, 2). Hence although there are ruling divi-
nities of the organs, the embodied soul does not cease to be
the enjoyer ; for the divinities are connected with the organs
only, not with the state of the soul as enjoyer.
17. They (the pra/zas) are senses, on account of
being so designated, with the exception of the best
(the mukhya pra;^a).
We have treated of the mukhya pra«a and the other
^ Yoiha/« rfipam adraksha;;/ so^ham jr/«omity ekasyaiva praty-
abhi^wanam pratisamdhanam. Go. An.
94 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
eleven pra;/as in due order. — Now there arises another
doubt, viz. whether the other pra//as are functions of the
mukhya prawa or different beings. — The purvapakshin main-
tains that they are mere functions, on account of scriptural
statement. For scripture, after having spoken of the chief
pra;/a and the other pra;/as in proximity, declares that those
other prawas have their Self in the chief prawa, ' Well, let us
all assume his form. Thereupon they all assumed his form '
(Br/. Up. I, 5, 2i). — Their unity is moreover ascertained
from the unity of the term applied to them, viz. pri«a.
Otherwise there either would result the objectionable cir-
cumstance of one word having different senses, or else the
word \vould in some places have to be taken in its primary
sense, in others in a derived sense. Hence, as pra;/a, apana,
&c. are the five functions of the one chief pra;/a, so the eleven
prawas also which begin with speech are mere functions of
the chief pra;/a. — To this we reply as follows. Speech and
so on are beings different from the chief pra;/a, on account
of the difference of designation. — Which is that difference
of designation ? — The eleven pra;/as remaining if we abstract
from the best one, i.e. the chief pra;/a, are called the sense-
organs (indriya), as \ve see them designated in 6"ruti, ' from
him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense ' (Mu.
Up. II, I, 3). In this and other passages pra/za and the
sense-organs are mentioned separately. — But in that case
the mind also would have to be excluded from the class of
sense-organs, like the pra«a ; as we see that like the latter
it is separately mentioned in the passage, ' The mind and all
organs of sense.' True ; but in Smr/ti eleven sense-organs
are mentioned, and on that account the mind must, like the
ear, and so on, be comprised in the sense-organs. That the
pra?/a on the other hand is a sense-organ is known neither
from Smrz'ti nor 6"ruti. — Now this difference of designation
is appropriate only if there is difference of being. If there
were unity of being it would be contradictory that the prawa
although one should sometimes be designated as sense-
organ and sometimes not. Consequently the other prawas
are different in being from the chief pra;/a. — For this con-
clusion the following Sutra states an additional reason.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 95
18. On account of the scriptural statement of
difference.
The pra;/a is everywhere spoken of as dififerent from
speech, &c. The passage, e.g. beginning with ' They said
to speech ' (Brz. Up. I, 3, 2), enumerates speech, &c., which
were overwhelmed by the evil of the Asuras, concludes
thereupon the section treating of speech, &c., and then
specially mentions the mukhya pra;za as overcoming the
Asuras, in the paragraph beginning ' Then they said to the
breath in the mouth,'— Other passages also referring to that
difference maybe quoted, so, for instance, ' He made mind,
speech, and breath for himself (Brz. Up. I, 5, 3). — For this
reason also the other pra;^as are different in being from the
chief pra;/a. — Another reason follows.
19, And on account of the difference of character-
istics.
There is moreover a difference of characteristics between
the chief pra^a and the other prawas. When speech &c. are
asleep, the chief pr^;/a alone is awake. The chief prana.
alone is not reached by death, while the other pra«as are.
The staying and departing of the chief prawa — not that of
the sense-organs — is the cause of the maintenance and the
destruction of the body. The sense-organs, on the other
hand, are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects,
not the chief pra;/a. Thus there are manifold differences
distinguishing the prawa from the senses, and this also shows
the latter to be different in being from the pra«a. — To infer
from the passage, ' thereupon they all assumed his form,'
that the sense-organs are nothing but pra«a is wrong,
because there also an examination of the context makes us
understand their difference. For there the sense-organs are
enumerated first ('Voice held, I shall speak/ &c.) ; after
that it is said that speech, &c. were seized by death in the
form of weariness (' Death having become weariness held
them back ; therefore speech grows weary ') ; finally pra;/a
is mentioned separately as not having been overcome by
death (' but death did not seize the central breath '\ and is
96 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
asserted to be the best (' he is the best of us '). The assum-
ing of the form of prawa has therefore, in accordance with
the quoted passages, to be understood to mean that
the energizing of speech and so on depends on the
pra;za, but not that they are identical with it. — Hence it
follows that the word 'pra;za' is applied to the sense-organs
in a secondary sense. Thus ^ruti also says, 'Thereupon
they all assumed his form, and therefore they are called
after him pra;/as;' a passage declaring that the word prawa,
which properly refers to the chief prawa, is secondarily
applied to the sense-organs also. Speech and the other
sense-organs are therefore different in being from the pra«a.
20. But the fashioning of names and forms belongs
to him who renders tripartite, on account of the
teaching (of scripture).
In the chapter treating of the Being (sat), subsequently
to the account of the creation of fire, water, and food (earth),
the following statement is made, ' That divinity thought,
let me now enter those three beings with this living Self
(^iva atma), and let nie then evolve names and forms ^ ; —
let me make each of these three tripartite ' {^Kh. Up. VI,
3, 2 ; 3). — Here the doubt arises whether the agent in that
evolution of names and forms is the^iva (the living, i.e. the
individual Self or soul) or the highest Lord. — The purva-
pakshin maintains the former alternative, on account of the
qualification contained in the words 'with this living Self '
The use of ordinary language does, in such phrases as
' Having entered the army of the enemy by means of a spy
I count it,' attribute the counting of the army in which the
spy is the real agent to the Self of the king who is the
causal agent ; which attribution is effected by means of the
use of the first person, ' I count.' So here the sacred text
attributes the evolving of names and forms — in which the
^iva is the real agent — to the Self of the divinity which is
the causal agent ; the attribution being effected by means
' Literally, with this living Self having entered let me evolve, &c.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 97
of the use of the first person, ' let me evolve.' — Moreover
we see in the case of names such as Z^ittha, Z^avittha, &c.,
and in the case of forms such as jars, dishes and the like
that the individual soul only is the evolving agent ^. Hence
the evolution of names and forms is the work of the^iva.
To this the Sutra replies : 'But the fashioning of names and
forms belongs to him who renders tripartite.' The particle
' but ' discards the purvapaksha. Fashioning means evolv-
ing. The term ' he who renders tripartite ' denotes the
highest Lord, his agency being designated as beyond con-
tradiction in the case of the rendering tripartite (of fire, &c.).
The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen, e.g.
in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in difTerent plants such as
kuj-a-grass, kaj-a-grass, palaj-a-trees, or in various living
beings such as cattle, deer, men, all this manifold evolution
according to species and individuals can surely be the
work of the highest Lord only, who fashioned fire, water,
and earth. — Why ? — On account of the teaching of the
sacred text. — For the text says at first ' that divinity,' &c.,
and then goes on in the first person ' let me evolve ; ' which
implies the statement that the highest Brahman only is the
evolving agent. — But we ascertain from the qualification
contained in the words ' with this living Self,' that the agent
in the evolution is the living Self! — No, we reply. The
words 'with this living Self are connected with the words
' having entered,' in proximity to which they stand ; not
with the clause ' let me evolve.' If they were connected
with the former words, we should have to assume that the
first person, which refers to the divinity — viz. ' let me
evolve ' — is used in a metaphorical sense. And with regard
to all the manifold names and forms such as mountains,
rivers, oceans, &c., no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses
the power of evolution ; and if any have such power, it is
dependent on the highest Lord. Nor is the so-called
' living Self absolutely different from the highest Lord, as
the spy is from the king ; as we see from its being qualified
^ Names being given and vessels being shaped by a class of
^vas, viz. men.
[38] H
98 vedanta-sOtras.
as the living Self, and as its being the^iva (i. e. an individual
soul apparently differing from the universal Self) is due to
the limiting adjuncts only. Hence the evolution of names
and forms which is effected by it is in reality effected by
the highest Lord. And that the highest Lord is he who
evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged
by all the Upanishads ; as we see from such passages as 'He
who is called ether is the evolver of all forms and names '
[^Kh. Up. VHI, 14). The evolution of names and forms,
therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who
is also the author of the tripartite arrangement. — The
meaning of the text is that the evolution of names and
forms was preceded by the tripartition, the evolution of
each particular name and form being already explained by
the account of the origin of fire, water, and earth. The act
of tripartition is expressly described by Sx\x\\ in the cases
of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, ' The red colour of burning
fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour
of water, the black colour of fire the colour of earth,' &c.
In this way there is evolved the distinctive form of fire, and
in connexion therewith the distinctive name ' fire,' the name
depending on the thing. The same remarks apply to the
cases of the sun, the moon, and lightning. The instance
(given by the text) of the tripartition of fire implies the
statement that the three substances, viz. earth, water, fire,
were rendered tripartite in the same manner ; as the begin-
ning as well as the concluding clause of the passage equally
refers to all three. For the beginning clause says, ' These
three beings became each of them tripartite; ' and the con-
cluding clause says, ' Whatever they thought looked red
they knew was the colour of fire,' &c. &c., up to ' Whatever
they thought was altogether unknown they knew was some
combination of these three beings.' Having thus described
the external tripartition of the three elements the text goes
on to describe another tripartition with reference to man,
' those three beings when they reach man become each of
them tripartite.' This tripartition in man the teacher sets
forth (in the following Sutra) according to scripture, with a
view to the refutation of some foreseen objection.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2. 99
2 1. The flesh, &c., originates from earth, accord-
ing to the scriptural statement ; and (so also) in the
case of the two other (elements).
From tripartite earth when assimilated by man there are
produced as its effects flesh, &c., according to scripture.
For the text says, ' Food (earth) when eaten becomes three-
fold ; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion
flesh, its subtlest portion mind.' The meaning is that the
tripartite earth is eaten in the shape of food such as rice,
barley, &c. ; that its grossest parts are discharged in the
form of fecesj that its middle parts nourish the flesh of the
body, and its subtlest parts feed the mind. Analogously
we have to learn from the text the effects of the two other
elements, viz. fire and water ; viz. that urine, blood, and
breath are the effects of water ; bone, marrow, and speech
those of fire. — Here now an objection is raised. If all
material things are tripartite (i.e. contain parts of the three
elements alike) — according to the indifferent statement, ' He
made each of these tripartite' — for what reason then has
there been made the distinction of names, ' this is fire, this
is water, this is earth ? ' And again, why is it said that
among the elements of the human body, flesh, &c., is the
effect of the eaten earth only ; blood, &c., the effect of the
water drunk ; bone, &c., the effect of the fire eaten ? — To
this objection the next Sutra replies.
22. But on account of their distinctive nature
there is a (distinctive) designation of them.
The word ' but ' repels the objection raised. By ' dis-
tinctive nature' we have to understand preponderance.
Although all things are tripartite, yet we observe in
different places a preponderance of different elements ;
heat preponderates in fire, water in all that is liquid, food
in earth. This special tripartition aims at rendering possible
the distinctions and terms of ordinary life. For if the
tripartition resulted in sameness, comparable to that of the
three strands of a tripartite rope, we could not distinguish —
and speak of as distinguished— the three elements. — Hence,
H 2
lOO VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
although there is a tripartition, we are enabled ' on account
of distinctive nature ' to give special designations to the
three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth and their pro-
ducts.— The repetition (of ' designation of them ') indicates
the termination of the adhyaya.
THIRD ADHYAYA.
FIRST pADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
I. In obtaining a different (body) (the soul) goes
enveloped (by subtle parts of the elements), (as
appears from) question and explanation.
In the second adhyaya we have refuted the objections
raised against the Vedantic view of Brahman on the ground
of Smrz'ti and reasoning ; we have shown that all other
opinions are devoid of foundation, and that the alleged
mutual contradictions of Vedic texts do not exist. Further
we have demonstrated that the entities different from — but
subordinate to — the individual soul (such as pra/^a, &c.)
spring from Brahman. — Now in the third adhyaya we shall
discuss the following subjects: the manner in which the
soul together with its subordinate adjuncts passes through
the sa;;zsara (III, i); the different states of the soul and
the nature of Brahman (III, 2) ; the separateness or non-
separateness of the vidyas and the question whether the
qualities (of Brahman) have to be cumulated or not (III, 3);
the accomplishment of man's highest end by means of per-
fect knowledge (sa;/zyagdar.$-ana), the different injunctions
as to the means of perfect knowledge and the absence of
certain rules as to release which is the fruit (of perfect
knowledge ^) (III, 4). As occasion leads some other matters
also will be explained. — The first pada explains, on the ground
of the so-called vidya of the five fires [Kh. Up. V, 3-10), the
different modes of the soul's passing through the sawsara ;
the reason of that doctrine being (the inculcation of) absence
^ I.e. the absence of a rule laying down that release consequent
on knowledge takes place in the same existence in which the means
of reaching perfect knowledge are employed.
I02 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
of all desire (vairagya), in accordance with the scriptural
remark at the end (of the vidya), ' hence let a man take care
to himself.' — The soul accompanied by the chief vital air,
the sense-organs and the mind, and taking with itself
nescience (avidya), moral good or ill-desert (karman), and
the impressions left by its previous existences ^, leaves its
former body and obtains a new body; this is known from
the scriptural passage extending from Bri. Up. IV, 4, i
(' Then those prawas gather around him ') up to IV, 4, 4
(' It makes to itself another newer and more beautiful
shape'); which passage forms part of a chapter treating of
the sa;«sara-state. And it moreover follows from the pos-
sibility (thus resulting) of the soul enjoying the fruits of
good and evil actions. — Here the question arises whether
the soul when going to the new body is enveloped or not by
subtle parts of the elements constituting the seeds of the
body. — It is not so enveloped; the purvapakshin says. —
Why? — Because scripture, while stating that the soul takes
the organs with itself, does not state the same with regard
to the elements. For the expression ' those parts of light '
(te^omatra//) which occurs in the passage ' He taking with
him those parts of light,' &c., intimates that the organs only
are taken (and not the elements), since in the complement-
ary portion of the passage the eye, &c., are spoken of, and
not the subtle parts of the elements. The subtle parts of
the elements can moreover easily be procured anywhere ;
for wherever a new body is to be originated they are pre-
sent, and the soul's taking them with itself would, therefore,
be useless. Hence we conclude that the soul when going
is not enveloped by them.
To this the teacher replies, ' in obtaining another it goes
enveloped.' That means : we must understand that the soul
when passing from one body to another is enveloped by the
subtle parts of the elements which are the seeds of the new
' I read avidya with the commentators (Go. An., however, mentions
the reading ' vidya ' also) ; although vidya appears preferable. Cp.
Max Mailer's note 2, p. 175, Upan. 11; Deussen, p. 405. — Purva-
pra^wa ^anmantariya-sawzskara.^. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO3
body. — How do we know this? — 'From the question and
the explanation,' The question is, ' Do you know why in
the fifth Hbation water is called man ? ' (V, 3, 3.) The
explanation, i.e. answer, is given in the entire passage which,
after having explained how the five libations in the form of
.yraddha. Soma, rain, food, seed are offered in the five fires,
viz. the heavenly world, Par^anya, the earth, man and
woman, concludes, ' For this reason is water in the fifth obla-
tion called man.' Hence we understand that the soul goes
enveloped by water. — But — an objection will be raised —
another scriptural passage declares that like a caterpillar
the soul does not abandon the old body before it makes an
approach to another body^. (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 3, 'And as a
caterpillar.') — We reply that what there is compared to the
(action of the) caterpillar is (not the non-abandonment of
the old body but) merely the lengthening out of the crea-
tive effort whose object is the new body to be obtained,
which (new body) is presented by the karman of the soul"^.
Hence there is no contradiction. — As the mode of obtaining
a new body is thus declared by 5ruti, all hypotheses
which owe their origin to the mind of man only are to be
set aside because they are contradicted by scripture. So
e.g. the opinion (of the Sahkhyas) that the Self and the
organs are both all-pervading -^ and when obtaining a new
body only begin to function in it in consequence of the kar-
man ; or the opinion (of the Bauddhas) that the Self alone
^ 'Evam hi sukshmadehaparishvakto ra7;/het yady asya sthula»z
jarira7« ra;;zhato na bhavet, asti tv asya vartamanasthulaj-arirayoga-^
adehantarapraptes tr/«a^alayukanidarjanena, tasman nidarsa^a-
jrutivirodhan na sukshmadehaparishvakto rawhatiti. Bha.
^ Pratipattavya>^ praptavyo yo dehas tadvishayaya bhavanaya
utpadanaya dirghibhavamatra?« ^alukayopamiyate. Bha. — An. Gi.
explains: praptavyo yo dehas tadvishayabhavanaya devo:sham
ityadikaya dirghibhavo vyavahitarthalambanatva;/z tavanmatram
ityadi.
' Karawanam aha»/karikatvat tasya vyapitvat tesham api tadat-
makanaw vyapitvam. Go. An. — The organs are, according to the
Sahkhya, the immediate effects of the ahawkara, but why all-
pervading on that account?
I04 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
(without the organs) begins to function in a new body, and
that as the body itself, so new sense-organs also are pro-
duced in the new abode of fruition ^ ; or the opinion (of the
Vaij-eshikas) that the mind only proceeds to the new abode
of fruition ^ ; or the opinion (of the Digambara 6"ainas) that
the individual soul only flying away from the old body
alights in the new one as a parrot flies from one tree to
another. — But — an objection will be raised — from the
quoted question and answer it follows that the soul goes
enveloped by water only, according to the meaning of the
word made use of by scripture, viz. water. How then can
the general statement be maintained that the soul goes
enveloped by subtle parts of all elements ? — To this doubt
the next Sutra replies.
2. But on account of (v^^ater) consisting of three
(elements) (the soul is enveloped not by water
merely; the latter alone is, however, mentioned)
on account of preponderance.
The word ' but ' disposes of the objection raised. — Water
consists of three elements, as we know from the scriptural
statement regarding tripartition. If, therefore, water is
admitted to originate (the new body) the other two elements
also have necessarily to be admitted (as taking part in the
origination). The body moreover consists of three elements,
as the eff'ects of the three, i.e. fire, water, and earth, are
observed in it, and further as it contains three materials,
viz. wind, bile, and phlegm ^. Being such it cannot originate
from mere water, the other elements being left aside.
Hence the term water made use of in the scriptural ques-
tion and answer refers to the fact of water preponderating,
^ Atma khalv alaya^«anasamtanas tasya vrz'ttaya^ ssLbda.dign3.na.ni
tallabha/^ j-arirantare bhavati, kevala^abdas tu karawasahityam atmano
varayati. Go. An.
^ Kevala;;/ kara7;air atmana /'a rahitam iti yavat, karawani nutan-
any eva tatrarabhyante atma lu vibhutvad akriyoipi tatra vr/ttima-
tram apnoti. An. Gi.
" The last of which only is of prevailingly watery character.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. IO5
not to its being the only element. As a matter of fact we
see that in all animated bodies liquid substances such as
juices, blood, and the like preponderate. — But we likewise
observe in bodies a large amount of earthy matter! — True,
but the amount of water is larger than that of any other
matter. Moreover, liquid matter prevails in that which is
the seed of the body. Further, we know that works (kar-
man) constitute the efficient cause for the origination of a
new body, and (sacrificial) works such as the agnihotra, &c.,
consist in the offering of liquid substances such as Soma,
butter, milk and the like. Thereby also the preponder-
ance of water is established. And on account of that
preponderance the word ' water ' implies the subtle parts of
all the elements which constitute the seed of the body.
3. And on account of the going of the pra7ms.
Scripture states that, when a new body is obtained^ the
prawas also go (from the old body to the new one). Cp.
' When he thus departs the (chief) pra/za departs after him,
and when the prawa thus departs all the other pra;zas
depart after it ' (B;v. Up. IV, 4, 2), and similar passages.
Now this going of the prawas is not possible without a base ;
hence we infer that water also — mixed with parts of the
other elements — goes (from the old body to the new one),
serving the purpose of supplying a base for the moving
pra;/as. For the pra;/as cannot, without such a base, either
move or abide anywhere ; as we observe in living beings.
4. If it be said (that the pra;^as do not go) on
account of the scriptural statement as to entering
into Agni, &c., we deny this on account of the
metaphorical nature (of those statements).
Well, the purvapakshin resumes, we deny that at the
time when a new body is obtained the pra«as go with the
soul, because scripture speaks of their going to Agni, &c.
For that at the time of death speech and the other pra;^as
go to Agni and the other gods the following passage ex-
pressly declares : ' When the speech of the dead person
I06 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
enters into the fire, breath into the air,' &c. (Br/. Up. Ill, 2.
13). — To this we reply that the objection is of no force on
account of the metaphorical character of those statements.
The entering of speech, &c., into Agni is metaphorical,
because we observe no such entering in the case of the
hairs of the head and body. For although the text says
that ' the hairs of the body enter into the shrubs and the
hairs of the head into the trees ; ' still we cannot under-
stand this to mean that the hairs actually fly away from the
body and enter into trees and shrubs. On the other hand,
the soul could not go at all if we denied to it the limiting
adjunct formed by the prawas, and without the latter it
could not, in the new body, enter into the state of fruition.
Besides, other passages distinctly declare that the prawas
go with the soul.— From all this we conclude that the
passage about speech, &c. entering into Agni, metaphoric-
ally expresses that Agni and the other divinities who act as
guides of the pra;/as and co-operate with them stop their
co-operation at the time of death.
5. If an objection be raised on the ground of
(water) not being mentioned in the first fire, we
refute it by remarking that just It (viz. water) (is
meant), on the ground of fitness.
Well, the purvapakshin resumes, but how can it be
ascertained that ' in the fifth oblation water is called man,'
considering that water is not mentioned by scripture with
reference to the first fire (altar) ? For the text enumerates
five fires — the first of which is the heavenly world — as the
abodes of the five oblations. With reference to the first of
those fires — introduced by the words ' The fire is that
world, O Gautama,' it is stated that i-raddha (faith) is the
material constituting the oblation (' on that altar the devas
offer jraddha'); while nothing is said about water being
the offered material. If, with reference to the four follow-
ing fires, viz. Par^anya, &c., water is assumed to constitute
the offering, we have no objection because in the substances
stated there as forming the oblations, viz. Soma, and so on,
water may preponderate. But to set aside, in the case of
in ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. IO7
the first fire, jraddha (i.e. faith) which is directly mentioned
in the text, and to substitute in its place the assumption of
water, about which the text says nothing, is an arbitrary
proceeding. In reality jraddha must be explained, in con-
formity with its ordinary meaning, as a kind of mental
state, viz. faith. Hence it is objectionable to maintain that
water, in the fifth oblation, becomes man.
To this view of the purvapakshin we demur, because, in
the case of the first fire, the word j-raddh^ is to be taken in
the sense of 'water.' — On what ground ? — On the ground of
fitness. For on that explanation only beginning, middle,
and end of the passage harmonise so that the syntactical
unity of the whole remains undisturbed. On the other
explanation (i. e. j'raddha being taken in the sense of
' faith '), if the question were asked how water, in the fifth
oblation, can be called man, and if, in way of reply, the
text could point only to faith, i.e. something which is not
water, as constituting the material of the oblation ; then
question and answer would not agree, and so the unity of
the whole passage would be destroyed. The text, moreover,
by concluding ' For this reason is water in the fifth oblation
called man,' indicates the same interpretation^. — Further,
the text points out, as effects of jraddha, substances in
which water in its gross form preponderates, viz. Soma,
rain, &c. And this again furnishes a reason for interpreting
i-raddha as water, because the effect generally is cognate in
nature to the cause. Nor again can the mental conception
called faith be taken out from the mind or soul, whose
attribute it is, and be employed as an offering, as the heart
can be cut out of the sacrificial animal. For this reason
also the word i-raddha must be taken to mean ' water.'
Water can, moreover, be fitly called by that name, on the
ground of Vedic usage, cp. ' j-raddha indeed is water ' (Taitt.
Sa;;/h. I, 6, 8, i). Moreover, water when forming the seed
of the body enters into the state of thinness, subtilty, and
herein again resembles faith, so that its being called j-raddha
^ Upasawzharalo/^anayam api jraddha^abdatvam apam evety aha
tv iti. An. Gi.
I08 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
is analogous to the case of a man who is as vahant as a Hon
being himself called a lion. — Again, the word iraddha may
fitly be applied to water, because water is intimately con-
nected with religious works (sacrifices, &c.) which depend
on faith ; just as the word ' platform ■" is applied to men
(standing on the platform). And finally the waters may
fitly be called .yraddha, on account of their being the cause
of faith, according to the scriptural passage, ' Water indeed
produces faith in him for holy works ^'
6. (Should it be said that the souls are not en-
veloped by water) on account of this not being
stated by scripture, we refute the objection on the
ground of those who perform ish/is, &c., being
understood.
Well, let it be granted that, on account of question and
answer, water, passing through the forms of jraddha, &c.,
may in the fifth oblation obtain the shape of man. But
still we cannot allow that the souls when moving from one
body into another are enveloped by water. For this is not
directly stated by scripture, there being in the whole
passage no word referring to the souls, while there are
words referring to water. Hence the assertion that the
soul goes enveloped by water is unfounded. — This objection
is invalid, we reply, ■■ on account of those who perform ish/is,
&c., being understood.' For in the passage beginning 'But
they who living in a village practise sacrifices, works of
public utility and alms, they go to the smoke' (V, 3, 10), it
is said that those who perform ish/is reach, on the road of
the fathers leading through smoke, &c., the moon, ' From
ether they go to the moon ; that is Soma, the king.' Now
these same persons are meant in the passage about the five
fires also, as we conclude from the equality of scriptural
statement in the passage, ' In that fire the devas offer
^ Ape heti, asmai pawse^dhikariwe sa/«namante ^anayanti
darjanamatrewa snanadipuwyakarmasiddhyarthaw jraddham ity
arthaA. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. IO9
jraddhd. From that oblation rises Soma the king^.' To
those ^ (persons who have performed ish^is, &c.) water is
supphed in the shape of the materials employed to perform
the agnihotra, the darj-apurwamasa and other sacrifices,
viz. sour milk, milk, &c., which substances, as consisting
mostly of water, may directly be considered as water. Of
these, when offered in the ahavaniya, the subtle parts
assume the form of an apurva resulting from the oblation ^,
and attach themselves to the performer of the sacrifice.
Then (when the sacrificer dies) the priests offer his body,
with the funeral ceremonies ^, into the crematory fire, with
the mantra, '(may) he (go) to the heavenly world, svaha.'
Then the water forming the oblation — which was connected
with deeds resulting from faith ^ — having assumed the form
of an apurva envelops the souls of those who had performed
the sacrifices, and leads them up to the heavenly world to
receive their reward. — In accordance with the preceding
interpretation scripture says in the agnihotra chapter also —
in the complementary passage constituting the reply to the
six questions — that the two agnihotra-oblations go up to
the other world in order to originate the fruit (of the work
of the sacrificer), ' Those two oblations when offered go up,
&c.' (^at. Br. XI, 6, 2, 6). — Hence we conclude that the
^ Both passages speak of something reaching, i.e. becoming
the moon. Now, as that something is, in the passage about the road
of the fathers, the ^ivas of those who have performed ish/is, &c., we
conclude that by the jraddha also, from which in the other passage
the moon is said to rise, those ^ivas are meant, or, properly speak-
ing, the subtle body of water which envelops those ^ivas. — Dhumadi-
vakye pa;//^agnivakye /^a somara^atvapraptijravawavijeshad ish/adi-
kari«a/i i'raddhajabditadbhir vesh//^ita dyulokaw yantiti bhatity
artha-^. An. Gi.
^ An. Gi. introduces this clause by: nanu mahad iha jrutyor vaila-
ksha«yaw, jraddha^abditanam apa?;^ kva/Jid dyuloke homa>^ i-ruta^
kva/?'id ish/adikari«am dhumadikramewakai-apraptir na -^a tesham
apa^ santi yena tadveshZ/^itanawz gatis tatraha teshawz y^ed.
^ I read, with a MS. of An. Gi., ahutyapfirvarupa/^.
* The so-called antyesh/i.
^ And is on that account properly called jraddha.
I lO VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
souls, when going to the enjoyment of the fruits of their
works, are enveloped by the water of which the oblations
consist ^.
But how can it be maintained that those who perform
sacrifices, &c., go to the enjoyment of the fruit of their
works, considering that scripture declares them when having
reached the moon — by the path leading through smoke,
&c. — to become food, ' That is Soma the king ; that is the
food of the gods; the gods do eat it' (/f//. Up. V, lo, 4);
and the corresponding passage, ' Having reached the moon
they become food, and then the Devas feed on them there
as sacrificers feed on Soma as it increases and decreases'
{Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16)? If, in accordance with these passages,
they are eaten by the gods as by tigers, &c., it is not
possible that they should enjoy the fruit of their deeds. —
To this the following Sutra replies.
7. Or (the souls' being the food of the gods is)
metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the
Self For thus (scripture) declares.
The word ' or ' is meant to set aside the started objection.
The souls' being food has to be understood in a metaphorical,
not a literal, sense, as otherwise all scriptural statements of
claims (adhikara) — such as ' He who is desirous of the
heavenly world is to sacrifice' — would be contradicted. If
^ -Sahkara's attempts to render plausible the interpretation of
jTaddha by ' water,' and to base thereon the doctrine of the souls
when going to a new body being enveloped by a subtle involucrum
of water (and the other elements contained therein) are, of course,
altogether artificial. I do not, however, see that he can be taxed
with inconsistency (as he is by Deussen, p. 408). 6'raddha is to him
in the first place the gross water which constitutes the chief material
employed in the sacrifices ; in the second place the apurva which
results from the sacrifice, and which is imagined to consist of the
subtle parts of the water whose gross parts have been consumed by
the sacrificial fire. These subtle parts attach themselves to the soul,
accompany it as an involucrum when it goes to another world, and
form the base of any new body which the soul may have to assume
in accordance with its previous deeds.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. Ill
the performers of sacrifices, &c., did not, in the sphere of
the moon, enjoy the fruits of their works, why should they
undertake works such as sacrifices, which are to him who
performs them the cause of great trouble ? We see, more-
over, that the word ' food,' as denoting in general whatever
is the cause of enjoyment, is metaphorically used of that
also which is not food (in the narrower sense), as, for in-
stance, in such phrases as 'the Vaijyas are the food of
kings, the animals are the food of the Vaii-yas.' Hence
what is meant there by the term ' eating ' is the rejoicing
of the gods with the performers of sacrifices, &c., who
stand in a subordinate (instrumental) relation to that rejoic-
ing— a rejoicing analogous to that of an ordinary man with
beloved persons such as wife, children, friends, and so on —
not actual eating like the chewing and swallowing of sweet-
meats. For that the • gods eat in. the ordinary way a
scriptural passage expressly denies {Kh. Up. Ill, 6, i),
' The gods do not eat or drink ; by seeing the nectar they
are satisfied.' At the same time the performers of sacrifices,
although standing in a subordinate relation to the gods,
may themselves be in a state of enjoyment, like servants
who (although subordinate to the king) themselves live on
the king. — That the performers of sacrifices are objects of
enjoyment for the gods follows, moreover, from their quality
of not knowing the Self. For that those who do not know
the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods the following
scriptural passage shows, ' Now, if a man worships another
deity, thinking the deity is one and he is another, he does
not know. He is like a beast for the Devas ' (Br/. Up. I, 4,
10). That means: he, in this life, propitiating the gods by
means of oblations and other works, serves them like a beast,
and does so in the other world also, depending on them like
a beast and enjoying the fruits of his works as assigned by
them. — The latter part of the Sutra can be explained in
another manner also ^. Those who do not know the Self
are those who perform works only, such as sacrifices, &c.,
^ Anatma.yabda.yruter mukhyarthatvanurodhena sutrawjasyartham
uktva prakarawanurodhenarthantaram aha. An. Gi.
I I 2 VEDANTA-Sl^TRAS.
and do not join knowledge to works. We then take the
expression, ' the knowledge of the Self,' as indirectly denot-
ing the knowledge of the five fires ; an explanation which
rests on the general subject-matter. And on account of the
performers of sacrifices being destitute of the knowledge of
the five fires the circumstance of their serving as food is
brought forward as a mere gu;^avada ^ for the purpose of
glorifying the knowledge of the five fires. For the latter is
what the text aims at enjoining, as we infer from the
general purport of the passage. — ' For thus ' another scrip-
tural passage 'declares,' viz. that enjoyment (on the part of
the^iva) takes place in the sphere of the moon, ' Having
enjoyed greatness in the Soma world he returns again ' (Pr.
Up. V, 4). Another scriptural passage also declares that
the performers of sacrifices dwelling together with the gods
obtain enjoyment, 'A hundred blessings of the fathers who
have conquered this world make one blessing of the work-
gods, who obtain their godhead by work ' (Br/. Up. IV, 3,
^^). — As thus the statement about the performers of sacri-
fices becoming food is metaphorical only, we understand
that it is their souls which go, and hence there is no longer
any objection to the doctrine that they go enveloped by
water.
8. On the passing away of the works (the soul
redescends) with a remainder, according to scripture
and Smmi, as it went (i. e. passing through the same
stations) and not thus (i.e. in the inverse order).
Scripture states that the souls of those who perform
sacrifices, and the like, rise on the road leading through
smoke, and so on, to the sphere of the moon, and when
they have done with the enjoyment (of the fruits of their
works) again descend, 'Having dwelt there, yivatsampatam^,
they return again that way as they came,' &c., up to ' Those
whose conduct has been good obtain some good birth, the
^ See part i, p. 221.
^ About which term see further on.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. I 1 3
birth of a Brahma;m, &c. — Those whose conduct has been
evil obtain the birth of a dog, &c.' {Kh. Up. V, lo, 5-7).
Here it must be considered whether the souls, after having
enjoyed the fruits of all their works, descend without a
remainder (anuj"aya, of their works), or with such a re-
mainder (of unrequited works). — The purvapakshin says :
without such a remainder. — Why? — On account of the
specification * yavat sampatam.' The word sampata here
denotes the aggregate of works (karmaj-aya)^, which is so
called because by it the souls pass from this world to that
world for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of the works.
So that the entire clause ' Having dwelt there as far as the
aggregate of the works extends ' indicates their works being
completely requited there. The same thing is indicated by
another scriptural passage, ' But when in their case that
(i.e. the effect of their works) ceases ' (Brz. Up. VI, 2, 16). —
Well, but why should we not assume that these passages
(do not mean that all works are requited there but) only
indicate that the soul enjoys in the other world so long as
there are works to be enjoyed there ? — It is impossible to
assume this, because elsewhere a reference is made to the
totality of works. For the passage, Bn. Up. IV, 4, 6, ' Having
obtained the end of whatever deed he does here on earth,
he again returns from that world to this world to action,'
intimates, by means of the comprehensive term ' whatever,'
that all works done here are exhausted there. — Moreover,
death has the power of manifesting those works whose fruit
has not yet begun ^ ; the manifestation of those works not
being possible previously to death because then they are ob-
structed by those works whose fruits have already begun.
Now death must manifest alike all works whose fruits had
not begun previously, because the cause being the same the
effects cannot be different. Analogously a lamp which is
placed at the same distance from a jar and a piece of cloth
^ The Comm. on Kh. Up. V, 10, 5, explains it by ' sampatanti
yeneti sampata-^ karmawa/^ kshaya^, yavat sampatam yavat
karmawa^ kshaya^.'
^ Abhivyaktij kz. karma«a»z phaladSnayonmukhatvam. An. Gi.
[38] I
114 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
illuminates the latter as well as the former. — Hence it
follows that the souls descend without a remainder of
unrequited works.
To this we reply as follows : ' On the passing away of the
works with a remainder.' That means : when the aggregate
of works with which the souls had risen to the moon for the
purpose of the enjoyment of their fruits is, by such enjoy-
ment, exhausted, then the body, consisting of water, which
had originated in the moon for the purpose of such enjoy-
ment, is dissolved by contact with the fire of the grief
springing from the observation that the enjoyment comes to
an end ; just as snow and hail are melted by contact with
the rays of the sun, or the hardness of ghee by contact with
the heat of fire. Then, at the passing away of the works,
i.e. when the works performed, such as sacrifices, &c., are,
by the enjoyment of their fruits, exhausted, the souls
descend with a remainder yet left.— But on what grounds
is that remainder assumed ? — On the ground of what is seen
(\Sruti) and Sm;Vti. For scripture declares manifestly that
the souls descend joined with such a remainder, ' Those
whose conduct {k3LTa.?ia.) has been good will quickly attain
some good birth, the birth of a Brahma;m, or a Kshattriya,
or a Vaij-ya. But those whose conduct has been evil will
quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or
a KsLudala..' That the word >^ara;/a here means the re-
mainder (of the works) will be shown later on. Moreover,
the different degrees of enjoyment which are implied in the
difference of birth on the part of the living beings point, as
they cannot be accidental, to the existence of such a
remainder of works. For we know from scripture that
good fortune as well as misfortune is caused by good and
evil works. Smrz'ti also teaches that the members of the
different castes and ai'ramas do, in accordance with their
works, at first enjoy the fruit of their works and then enter
into new existences, in which they are distinguished from
each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life,
knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure, and intelligence ;
which doctrine implies that they descend with a remainder
of their works. — Of what kind then is that so-called re-
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. I 1 5
mainder ? — Some say that thereby we have to understand
a remainder of the works which had been performed (in the
previous existence) for the sake of the heavenly world, and
whose fruits have (for the greater part) been enjoyed.
That remainder might then be compared to the remainder
of oil which sticks to the inside of a vessel previously filled
with oil even after it has been emptied. — But you have no
right to assume a remainder in the case of works, the fruits
of which have been enjoyed already, since the adr/sh/a
(which springs from works) is opposed to the works (so as
to destroy them completely^). — This objection, we reply, is
not valid, as we do not maintain that the works are com-
pletely requited (previously to the new existence). — But the
souls do ascend to the sphere of the moon for the express
purpose of finding there a complete requital of their works !
— True ; but when only a little of the effects of their works
is left, they can no longer stay there. For as some courtier
who has joined the king's court with all the requisites
which the king's service demands is unable to remain at
court any longer, when in consequence of his long stay most
of his things are worn out, so that he is perhaps left with a
pair of shoes and an umbrella only ; so the soul, when
possessing only a small particle of the effects of its works,
can no longer remain in the sphere of the moon. — But all
this reasoning is in fact altogether unfounded ^. For it has
already been stated that, on account of (the adr/sh^a) being
opposed to the work, the continued existence of a remainder
cannot be admitted in the case of works which had been
performed with a view to the heavenly world, and which
have been requited in the moon. — But has it not also been
said above that not all the work whose fruit the heavenly
world is meets with requital there ? — Yes, but that state-
ment is not defensible. For works which are performed for
^ Bhaw</anusari«a// snehasyavirodhad yukta^ j-esha,^, karma tu
phalodayavirodhitvat phahm ktg gatam nash/am eveti na tasya
.yeshasiddhir iti jahkate nanv iti. An. Gi.
^ Ivakaro madhuroktya prayukto vastutas tv evakaro vivakshita/^
An. Gi.
I 2
Il6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world produce their
entire heavenly fruit for the soul only as long as it stays in
heaven, and if we take our stand on scripture we have no
right to assume that they produce even a particle of fruit
for the souls after those have again descended from heaven.
That some part of the oil continues to remain in the vessel
is unobjectionable because we see it, and we likewise see
that some part of the courtier's equipment continues to
remain with him ; but that some part of those works which
led the soul to heaven continues to exist, that we neither
see nor are able to surmise, because it would contradict the
texts declaring that the heavenly world (alone) is the fruit
of the works. — That of works whose fruit is heaven, such as
sacrifices and the like, no remainder continues to exist, we
must necessarily acknowledge for the following reason also.
If some part of those good works, such as sacrifices, &c., on
account of which the agents enjoyed the heavenly world,
were surmised to continue in existence as a remainder, that
remainder would in all cases be itself a good one, would never
be of a contrary nature. But then our supposition would be
in conflict with the scriptural passage which distinguishes
remainders of a different kind, viz. ' Those whose conduct
has been good ; — those whose conduct has been evil,' &c.
Hence after the fruits of that set of works which is requited
in the other world have been (completely) enjoyed, the
remaining other set of works whose fruits are to be enjoyed
in this world constitutes the so-called anuj-aya with which
the souls re-descend. — It was said above that we must assume
the souls to descend without any such remainder, after
having reached, by the enjoyment of the fruits, the end of
all the works done here below, on account of the compre-
hensive statement implied in the expression ' whatever.'
But that assertion cannot be upheld as the existence of
such a remainder has been proved. Hence we have to
understand that the souls re-descend after having exhausted,
by the enjoyment of its fruits, only that entire part of the
works done here below whose fruit belongs to the other
world and is begun to be enjoyed there. — The proof given
by us of the existence of the remainder refutes at the same
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. II7
time the other assertion made above, viz. that death mani-
fests equally all works the enjoyment of whose fruits was
not begun here below, and that on that account we are not
entitled to draw a line between works whose fruits begin in
the other world and works whose fruits begin in this world
only (i.e. in a new existence on earth). — We, moreover, have
to ask for what reason it is maintained that death manifests
(i.e. lays open and makes ready for requital) those works
whose fruits have not begun here below. The answer will
be that in this life the operation of certain works cannot
begin because it is obstructed by other works whose fruits
already begin here below, that, however, that operation does
begin as soon as, at the moment of death, the obstruction
ceases. Well, then, if previously to death those actions
whose fruits have already begun prevent other actions from
beginning their operation, at the time of death also certain
works of less force will be obstructed in their operation by
other works of greater force, it being impossible that the
fruits of works of opposite tendency should begin at the
same time. For it is impossible to maintain that different
deeds whose fruits must be experienced in different exist-
ences should, merely because they have this in common
that their fruits have not begun (previously to death), be-
come manifest on the occasion of one and the same death,
and originate one new existence only; against this militates
the fact of the definite fruits (attached to each particular
work) being of contrary natures^. Nor, on the other hand,
can we maintain that at the time of death some works
manifest themselves while others are altogether extin-
guished ; for that would contradict the fact that absolutely
all works have their fruits. No work in fact can be
extinguished except by means of expiatory actions, &c. ^
Smr/ti also declares that works whose operation is ob-
^ On which account they cannot be experienced in one and the
same existence.
^ Works are extinguished either by expiatory ceremonies or by
the knowledge of Brahman or by the full fruition of their conse-
quences.
I I 8 VEDANTA-St^TRAS.
structed by other works leading to fruits of a contrary-
nature last for a long time, ' Sometimes a good deed
persists immovable as it were, the doer meanwhile remain-
ing immerged in the sawsara, until at last he is released
from pain.'
Moreover, if all unrequited works becoming manifest on
the occasion of one and the same death were to begin one
new existence only, the consequence would be that those
who are born again in the heavenly world, or in hell, or as
animals, could, as not entitled thereto, perform no religious
works, and being thus excluded from all chance of acquiring
religious merit and demerit could not enter on any new
forms of existence, as all reason for the latter would be
absent i. And that would further contradict Smrhi, which
declares that some single actions, such as the murder of a
Brahmawa, are the causes of more than one new existence.
Nor can we assume, for the knowledge of the particular
results springing from religious merit and demerit, any
other cause than the sacred texts ^. Nor, again, does death
manifest (bring about the requital of) those works whose
fruit is observed to be enjoyed already here below, as, for
instance, the kariresh/i, &c.^ How then can we allow the
assumption that death manifests all actions ? The instance
of the lamp (made use of by the purvapakshin) is already
refuted by our having shown the relative strength of
actions ■*. Or else we may look on the matter as analogous
to the manifestation (by a lamp) of bigger and smaller
objects. For as a lamp, although equally distant from a
big and a very small thing, may manifest the former only
* And in consequence of this they could never obtain final
release.
^ We have the sacred texts only to teach us what the effects of
particular good or evil actions may be.
' The kariresh/i is a sacrifice offered by those who are desirous
of rain,
* I.e. by our having shown that death does not equally manifest
all works, but that, after death has taken place, the stronger works
bring about their requital while the operation of the weaker ones is
retarded thereby.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, Q. 1 19
and not the latter, so death provokes the operation of the
stronger works only, not of the weaker ones, although an equal
opportunity presents itself for both sets of works as hitherto
unrequited. — Hence the doctrine that all works are mani-
fested by death cannot be maintained, as it is contradicted
by 6"ruti, Smriii, and reason alike. That the existence
of a remainder of works should stand in the way of final
release is a misplaced fear, as we know from 5ruti that all
works whatever are destroyed by perfect knowledge. It
therefore is a settled conclusion that the souls re-descend
with a remainder of works. They descend ' as they came '
(mounted up); 'not thus/ i.e. in inverted order. We con-
clude that they descend ' as they came ' from the fact of
ether and smoke, which the text includes in the road of the
fathers, being mentioned in the description of the descent
also, and from the expression ' as they came.' That they
follow the inverted order we conclude from night, &c., not
being mentioned, and from the cloud, &c., being added.
9. Should it be objected that on account of con-
duct (the assumption of a remainder is not needed),
we deny this because (the scriptural expression
' conduct ') is meant to connote (the remainder) ; so
Karsh?/a^ini thinks.
But — an objection may be raised — the scriptural passage,
which has been quoted for the purpose of proving that the
existence of a remainder of works {' those whose conduct
has been good,' &c.), declares that the quality of the new
birth depends on Tarawa, not on anuj-aya. Now /^ara;^a and
anujaya are different things ; for karans. is the same as
ksLvitra., a^ara, ^ila, all of which mean conduct \ while
anuj-aya denotes work remaining from requited work.
Scripture also speaks of actions and conduct as different
things, 'According as he acts and according as he conducts
himself so will he be' {Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5); and 'Whatever
' .Sila also means here ' conduct ' only, as we see from its being
co-ordinated with -Tarawa, ^aritra, &c. ; not character.
1 20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
works are blameless those should be regarded, not others ;
whatever our good conduct was that should be observed by
thee' (Taitt. Up. I, ii^ 2). From the passage which pro-
claims the dependence of the quality of birth on conduct
the existence of an unrequited remainder of works cannot
therefore be proved. — This objection is without force, we
reply, because the scriptural term ' conduct ' is meant to
connote the remainder of the works. This is the opinion of
the teacher Karsh«a^ini.
10. If it be said that piirposelessness (of conduct
would result therefrom), we deny this on account of
the dependence (of work) on that (conduct).
That may be ; but for what reason should we abandon
that meaning which the term ' /Tarawa ' directly conveys,
viz. the meaning ' conduct,' and accept the merely connota-
tive meaning ' remainder of the works ? ' Conduct, which the
text directly mentions, may be supposed to have for its
fruit either a good or an evil birth, according as it is
enjoined or prohibited, good or evil. Some fruit will have
to be allowed to it in any case ; for otherwise it would
follow that it is purposeless. — This objection is without
force ' on account of the dependence on it.' Such works as
sacrifices, and the like, depend on conduct in so far as
somebody whose conduct is not good is not entitled to
perform them. This we know from Smrzti-passages, such
as the following, ' Him who is devoid of good conduct the
Vedas do not purify.' — And also if conduct is considered as
subservient to man ^ it will not be purposeless. For when
the aggregate of works such as sacrifices, &c., begins to
originate its fruit, the conduct which has reference to the
sacrifice will originate there (i.e. in the fruit) some addition.
^ I.e. as something which produces in man a sawskara analogous
to that produced by other preparatory or purificatory rites such as
bathing, &c. — In the preceding sentences conduct had been spoken
of not as purushartha but as karmahga. In that case it produces
no separate result ; while if considered as purushartha it has a
special result of iis own.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 12 1
And it is known from 5ruti as well as Smrz'ti that work
effects everything ^. It is, therefore, the opinion of Karsh-
«a^ini that the remainder of works only — which is connoted
by the term ' conduct ' — is the cause of the souls entering
on new births. For as work may be the cause of new
births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause.
If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will
surely not creep on his knees.
11. But (/§ara;^a means) nothing but good and
evil works ; thus Badari opines.
The teacher Badari, however, thinks that the word
'Tarawa' denotes nothing else but good works and evil
works. It means the same as anush///ana (performance) or
karman (work). For we see that the root kzx (to walk, to
conduct oneself) is used in the general sense of acting. Of
a man who performs holy works such as sacrifices, &c.,
people say in ordinary language, ' that excellent man walks
in righteousness.' The word akava. also denotes only a kind
of religious duty. That works and ^ara;/a (conduct) are
sometimes spoken of as different things is analogous to the
distinction sometimes made between Brahma;/as and Pari-
vra^akas^. We, therefore, decide that by men of good
ka.ra.Ha. are meant those whose works are worthy of praise,
by men of evil /Tarawa those whose w^orks are worthy of
blame.
12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices
(the ascent to the moon) is stated by scripture.
It has been said that those who perform sacrifices, &c., go
to the moon. The question now arises whether those also
who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon or not. — The
purvapakshin maintains that it cannot be asserted that
men belonging to the former class only go to the moon.
^ A clause added to guard against the assumption — which might
be based on the preceding remarks — that conduct is, after all,
the cause of the quality of the new birth.
^ Although the latter are a mere sub-class of the former.
122 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
because scripture speaks of the moon as being resorted to
by those also who have not performed sacrifices. For the
Kaushitakins make the following general statement, 'AH
who depart from this world go to the moon ' (Kau, Up. I, 2).
Moreover, the origination of a new body in the case of those
who are born again is not possible without their having
(previously) reached the moon, on account of the precise
definition of number contained in the statement, ' In the
fifth oblation' i^Kh. Up. V, 9, i)\ Hence all men must be
supposed to resort to the moon. If it be objected that it
does not appear proper that those who perform sacrifices
and those who do not should go to the same place, we reply
that there is no real objection, because those who do not
perform sacrifices do not enjoy anything in the moon.
13. But of the others, after having enjoyed the
fruits of their actions in Sa;;^yamana, ascent and
descent take place ; as such a course is declared (by
scripture).
' But ' discards the purvapaksha. It is not true that all men
go to the moon. For the ascent to the moon is for the purpose
of enjoyment only ; it is neither without a special purpose nor
for the mere purpose of subsequent re-descent. Just as a man
climbs on a tree for the purpose of breaking fruit or
blossoms, not either without any aim or for the mere
purpose of coming down again. Now it has been admitted
already that for those who do not offer sacrifices there is
not any enjoyment in the moon ; hence those only who
perform sacrifices rise to the moon, not any other persons.
The latter descend to Sawyamana, the abode of Yama,
suffer there the torments of Yama corresponding to their
evil deeds, and then again re-ascend to this world. Such is
their ascent and descent ; as we maintain on the ground of
such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural
passage embodying Yama's own words declares that those
who die without having offered sacrifices fall into Yama's
^ Which statement presupposes four other oblations, the first of
which is the one from wliich • Soma the king rises.'
Ill ADHYAYA, I TADA, I J. 1 23
power. ' The other world never rises before the eyes of the
careless child deluded by the delusion of wealth. This is
the world, he thinks, there is no other ; thus he falls again
and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2. 6). Scripture con-
tains many other passages likewise leading us to infer that
men fall into Yama's power ; cp. e.g. ' Yama, the gathering-
place of men ' [Ri. Sa;«h. X, 14, 1).
14. The Smr/tis also declare this.
Moreover, authorities like Manu, Vyasa, &c., declare that
in the city Sawyamana evil works are requited under
Yama's rule ; cp. the legend of Na^iketa and others.
15. Moreover there are seven (hells).
Moreover, the pura;/a-writers record that there are seven
hells, Raurava, &c., by name, which serve as abodes of
enjoyment of the fruits of evil deeds. As those who do not
sacrifice, &c. go there, how should they reach the moon ?
— But, an objection is raised, the assertion that evil doers
suffer punishments allotted by Yama is contradicted by the
circumstance that Smr/ti mentions different other beings,
such as /f itragupta, &c., who act as superintendents in Rau-
rava and the other hells. — This objection the next Sutra
refutes.
16. On account of his activity there also no
contradiction exists.
There is no contradiction, as the same Yama is admitted
to act as chief ruler in those seven hells. Of /fitragupta
and others Smrz'ti merely speaks as superintendents em-
ployed by Yama.
17. But on (the two roads) of knowledge and
works, those two being under discussion.
In that place of the knowledge of the five fires, where the
answer is expected to the question, ' Do you know why that
world never becomes full ? ' the text runs as follows : ' On
neither of these two ways are those small creatures continu-
ally returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. Theirs
is a third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.'
r
124 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
By the two ways mentioned in this passage we have to
understand knowledge and works. — Why ? — On account of
their being the subjects under discussion. That means :
knowledge and works are under discussion as the means for
entering on the road of the gods and the road of the fathers.
The clause, 'those who know this,' proclaims knowledge to
be the means whereby to obtain the road of the gods ; the
clause, ' sacrifices, works of public utility, and alms,' proclaims
works to be that by which we obtain the road of the
fathers. Under the heading of these two paths there stands
the subsequent passage, ' on neither of these two ways, &c.'
To explain. Those who are neither entitled, through
knowledge, to follow the road of the gods, nor, by works,
to follow the road of the fathers, for those there is a third
path on which they repeatedly return to the existence of
small animals. For this reason also those who do not
perform sacrifices, &c. do not reach the moon. — But why
should they not first mount to the sphere of the moon and
thence descending enter on the existence of small animals ?
— No, that would imply entire purposelessness of their
mounting. — Moreover, if all men when dying would reach
the sphere of the moon, that world would be filled by the
departed, and from that would result an answer contrary to
the question (viz. ' why does not that world become full ? ').
For an answer is expected showing that that world does
not become full. — Nor can we admit the explanation that
the other world possibly does not become full because
re-descent is admitted; since this is not stated by scripture.
For it is true, indeed, that the not becoming full might be
explained from their re-descending ; but scripture actually
explains it from the existence of a third place, ' Theirs is
a third place ; therefore that world never becomes full.'
Hence the fact of the other world not becoming full must
be explained from their not-ascending only. For, other-
wise, the descent equally taking place in the case of those
who do perform sacrifices, &c., it would follow that the
statement of a third place is devoid of purpose. — The word
' but ' (in the Sutra) is meant to preclude the idea — arising
from the passage of another jakha (i.e. the Kaush. Up.)
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9. 12$
— that all departed go to the moon. Under the circum-
stances the word ' all ' which occurs in that passage has
to be taken as referring only to those qualified, so that
the sense is 'all those who depart from this world properly-
qualified go to the moon.' — The next Sutra is directed
against the averment that all must go to the moon for
the purpose of obtaining a new body, in accordance with
the definite statement of number ('in the fifth oblation &c.').
18. Not in (the case of) the third place, as it is
thus perceived.
With regard to the third place, the rule of the oblations
being five in number need not be attended to for the
purpose of obtaining a new body. — Why ? — On account
of it being perceived thus. That means : because it is
seen that the third place is reached in the manner de-
scribed without any reference to the oblations being
limited to the number five, ' Live and die. That is the
third place.' — Moreover, in the passage, ' In the fifth obla-
tion water is called man,' the number of the oblations is
stated to be the cause of the water becoming the body of
a man, not of an insect or moth, &c. ; the word ' man '
applying to the human species only. — And, further, the
text merely teaches that in the fifth oblation the waters
are called man, and does not at the same time deny that,
where there is no fifth oblation, they are not called man ;
for if it did the latter, the sentence would have the imper-
fection of having a double sense. We therefore have to
understand that the body of those men who are capable of
ascending and descending originates in connexion with
the fifth oblation, that in the case of other men, however,
a body forms itself from water mixed with the other ele-
ments even without a settled number of oblations.
19. It is, moreover, recorded in the (ordinary)
world.
There are, moreover, traditions, apart from the Veda,
that certain persons like Dro«a, Dhnsh/adyumna, Sita,
Draupadi, &c., were not born in the ordinary way from
126 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
mothers. In the case of Dro«a and others there was
absent the oblation which is made into the woman ; while
in the case of Dhr/sh^adyumna and others, even two of
the oblations, viz. the one offered into woman and the one
offered into man, were absent. Hence in other cases also
birth may be supposed to take place independently of the
number of oblations. — It is, moreover, commonly known
that the female crane conceives without a male.
20, And on account of observation.
It is, moreover, obsei'ved that out of the four classes of
organic beings — viviparous animals, oviparous animals, ani-
mals springing from heat, and beings springing from germs
(plants) — the two latter classes are produced without sexual
intercourse, so that in their case no regard is had to the
number of oblations. The same may therefore take place
in other cases also. — But, an objection may here be raised,
scripture speaks of those beings as belonging to three
classes only, because there are three modes of origin only ;
' That which springs from an egg, that which springs from
a living being, that which springs from a germ ' {K/i. Up.
VI, 3, 1). How then can it be maintained that there
are four classes ? — To this objection the next Sutra
replies.
21, The third term comprises that which springs
from heat.
The third term in the scriptural passage quoted, i.e.
' that which springs from a germ,' must be understood as
implying those beings also which spring from heat ; the
two classes having in common that they spring from earth
or water, i.e. from something stable. Different from their
origin is the origin of those beings which spring from moving
things (viz. animals). — In other places the beings springing
from heat and those springing from germs are spoken of as
constituting separate classes. — Hence there is no contra-
diction.
22, (On the part of the soul's descending from the
Ill ADHVAYA, I PADA, 2 2. 1 27
moon) there is entering into similarity of being (with
ether and so on); as this (only) is possible.
It has been explained that the souls of those who perform
sacrifices, &c., after having reached the moon dwell there as
long as their works last and then re-descend with a remain-
der of their works. We now have to inquire into the mode
of that descent. On this point scripture makes the follow-
ing statement : 'They return again the way they came, to
the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer
having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke
he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud,
having become a cloud he rains down.' — Here a doubt arises
whether the descending souls pass over into a state of
identity with ether, &c., or into a state of similarity. — The
purvapakshin maintains that the state is one of identity,
because this is directly stated by the text. Otherwise there
would take place so-called indication (lakshawi). Now
whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and
a merely indicated meaning the former is to be preferred.
Thus the following words also, ' Having become air he be-
comes smoke,' &c., are appropriate only if the soul be under-
stood to identify itself with them. — Hence it follows that
the souls become identical with ether, &c. — To this we reply
that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether, &c.
When the body, consisting of water which the soul had
assumed in the sphere of the moon for the purpose of en-
joyment, dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes
to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes there-
upon into the power of the air, and then gets mixed with
smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the clauses, * They return
as they came to the ether, from the ether to the air, &c.' —
How is this known to be the meaning? — Because thus only
it is possible. For it is not possible that one thing should
become another in the literal sense of the word. If, more-
over, the souls became identified with ether they could no
longer descend through air, &c. And as connexion with
the ether is, on account of its all-pervadingness, eternal, no
other connexion (of the souls) with it can here be meant
128 vedanta-siDtras.
but their entering into a state of similarity to it ^. And in
cases where it is impossible to accept the literal meaning of
the text it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is
merely indicated. — For these reasons the souls' becoming
ether, &c., has to be taken in the secondary sense of their
passing into a state of similarity to ether, and so on.
23. (The soul passes through the stages of its
descent) in a not very long time ; on account of the
special statement.
A doubt arises with reference to the period beginning
with the soul's becoming ether and extending up to its
entering into rice, &c., viz. whether the soul remains a long
time in the state of similarity to each of the stages of its
way before it enters into similarity to the next one, or only
a short time.— The purvapakshin maintains that, on ac-
count of the absence of a definite text, no binding rule
exists. — To this we reply that the souls remain in the state
of similarity to ether, &c., for a short period only before they
fall to the earth in raindrops. We infer this from the
circumstance of the text making a special statement. For
after having said that the souls enter into rice, &c., it adds,
' From thence the escape is beset with more pain ; ' a state-
ment implying that the escape from the previous states was
comparatively easy and pleasant. Now this difference in
point of pleasantness must be based on the comparative
shortness or length of the escape ; for as, at that time, the
body is not yet formed, enjoyment (in the ordinary sense)
is not possible. Hence we conclude that, up to the
moment when the souls enter into rice, &c., their descent
is accomplished in a short time.
' It might be said that the relation to ether, &c., into which the
souls enter, is the relation of conjunction (sa/«yoga), not the relation
of similarity. But as nothing can enter into the relation of sa.myoga.
with ether (everything being in eternal sawyoga with it) we must
assume that 'becoming ether' means 'becoming like ether,' and by
parity of reasoning, that ' becoming air, &c.,' means ' becoming like
air.'
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24. 1 29
24. (The descending souls enter) into (plants)
animated by other (souls), as in the previous cases,
on account of scriptural declaration.
In the description of the souls' descent we read, after their
coming down in raindrops has been mentioned, ' Then they
are born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and
beans.' — Here a doubt arises whether, at this stage of their
descent, the souls to which a remainder of their works con-
tinues to cling really pass over into the different species of
those immoveable things (plants) and enjoy their pleasures
and pains, or if they enter merely into a state of conjunction
with the bodies of those plants which are animated by
different souls. — The purvapakshin maintains that they pass
over into those species and enjoy their pleasures and pains,
on account of the remainder of works still attaching to
them ; firstly, because that enables us to take the verb ' to
be born ' in its literal sense ; secondly, because we know from
5ruti and Smrzti that the condition of a plant may be a
place of enjoyment (of the fruits of actions) ; and thirdly,
because sacrifices and similar actions, being connected
with harm done to animals, &c., may lead to unpleasant
results. We therefore take the 'being born as rice,' &c.,
of those to whom a remainder of their works attaches, in its
literal sense, and consider the case to be analogous to that of
a man who is born either as a dog or a hog or a Ka.uda.la,
where we have to understand that the man really becomes
a dog, and so on, and experiences the pleasures and pains
connected with that condition.
To this reasoning we reply as follows: — The souls to which
a remainder attaches enter merely into conjunction with rice
plants, &c., which are already animated by other souls ; and
do not enjoy their pleasures and pains ; ' as in the previous
cases.' As the souls' becoming air, smoke, &c., was decided
to mean only that they become connected with them ^, so
here too their becoming rice, &c. merely means that they
^ This does not agree well with what had been said above about
the souls becoming similar to ether, air, &c.
[38] K
I '^O VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
become connected with those plants. — How is this known?
— From the fact of the statement here also being of the
same nature. — Of what nature ? — Here, also, as in the case
of the souls becoming ether, &c., down to rain, the text does
not refer to any operation of the works ; hence we conclude
that the souls do not enjoy pleasure and pain. Where, on
the other hand, the text wants to intimate that the souls
undergo pleasure and pain, there it refers to the operation
of the former works ; so. e. g. in the passage which treats of
men of good or evil conduct. Moreover, if we should take
the souls' being born as rice, &c., in its literal sense, it would
follo.v that when the rice plants are reaped, unhusked, split,
cooked and eaten, the souls which have descended into them
and are animating them would have to leave them ; it being
generally known that when a body is destroyed the soul
animating it abandons it. And then (if the souls left the
plants) the text could not state (as it does state, V, lo, 6)
that the souls which had entered into the plants are trans-
mitted by animal generation (on the part of those who eat
the plants). Hence it follows that the souls which have
descended are merely outwardly connected with the plants
animated by other souls. This suffices to refute the asser-
tions that • to be born ' must be taken in its literal sense ;
and that the state of vegetable existence affords a place
for enjoyment. We do not entirely deny that vegetable
existence may afford a place for enjoyment ; it may do so
in the case of other beings which, in consequence of their
unholy deeds, have become plants. We only maintain that
those souls which descend from the moon with an un-
requited remainder of works do not experience the enjoy-
ment connected with plant life.
25. Should it be said that (sacrificial work is)
unholy ; we deny this on the ground of scripture.
We proceed to refute the remark made by the purva-
pakshin that sacrificial works are unholy because involving
harm done to animals, &c., that they may therefore lead
to unpleasant results, and that hence the statement as to
the souls being born as plants, &c., may be taken in its
Ill ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 26. I3I
literal sense ; in consequence of which it would be uncalled-
for to assume a derived sense. — This reasoning is not valid,
because our knowledge of what is duty and the contrary of
duty depends entirely on scripture. The knowledge of
one action being right and another wrong is based on
scripture only; for it lies out of the cognizance of the
senses, and there moreover is, in the case of right and wrong,
an entire want of binding rules as to place, time, and occa-
sion. What in one place, at one time, on one occasion
is performed as a right action, is a wrong action in
another place, at another time, on another occasion ; none
therefore can know, without scripture, what is either right
or wrong. Now from scripture we derive the certain know-
ledge that the ^otish/oma-sacriflce, which involves harm
done to animals (i.e. the animal sacrifice), &c., is an act of
duty ; how then can it be called unholy ? — But does not
the scriptural precept, 'Do not harm any creature,' intimate
that to do harm to any being is an act contrary to duty? —
True, but that is a general rule, while the precept, ' Let him
offer an animal to Agnishomau,' embodies an exception ;
and general rule and exception have different spheres of
application. The work (i.e. sacrifice) enjoined by the Veda
is therefore holy, being performed by authoritative men and
considered blameless ; and to be born as a plant cannot be
its fruit. Nor can to be born as rice and other plants be
considered analogous to being born as dogs, &c. For the
latter birth scripture teaches with reference to men of evil
conduct only ; while no such specific qualification is stated
in the case of vegetable existence. Hence we conclude that
when scripture states that the souls descending from the
moon become plants^ it only means that they become en-
closed in plants.
26. After that (there takes place) conjunction (of
the soul) with him who performs the act of genera-
tion.
The conclusion arrived at under the preceding SCltra is
confirmed also by scripture stating that the souls, after
having entered into plants, ' become ' beings performing the
K 2
1 32 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
act of generation, ' for whoever eats the food, whoever per-
forms the act of generation, that again he (the soul)
becomes.' Here again the soul's 'becoming ' he who performs
the act of generation cannot be taken in its literal sense ;
for a person becomes capable of generation a long time
after his birth only, viz. when he reaches puberty. How
then should the soul contained in the food eaten enter into
that condition in its true sense ? Hence we must interpret
the passage to mean only that the soul enters into conjunc-
tion with one who performs the act of generation ; and
from this we again infer that the soul's becoming a plant
merely means its entering into conjunction with a plant.
27. From the yoni a (new) body (springs).
Then, subsequently to the soul having been in conjunc-
tion with a person of generative power^ generation takes
place, and a body is produced in which the soul can enjoy
the fruits of that remainder of works which still attaches to
it. This scripture declares in the passage, ' Those whose
conduct has been good,' &c. From this, also, it appears that
the souls to which a remainder clings, when descending and
becoming rice plants, and so on, do not enter into the state
of forming the body of those plants with its attendant
pleasure and pain, but are ' born as plants ' in so far only
as they enter into conjunction with them.
in ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2.
SECOND pAdA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
1. In the intermediate place there is (a real)
creation ; for (scripture) says (that).
In the preceding pada we have set forth, with reference
to the knowledge of the five fires, the various stages of
the soul's passing through the sa;«sara. We shall now
set forth the soul's different states (waking, dreaming, &c.)
— Scripture says (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 9 ; 10), ' When he falls
asleep — ; there are no chariots in that state, no horses, no
roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads,'
&c. — Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking
place in dreams is a real one (paramarthika) like the crea-
tion seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of
illusion (maya). — The purvapakshin maintains that ' in the
intermediate place (or state) there is (a real) creation.' By
intermediate place we have to understand the place of
dreams, in which latter sense the word is used in the Veda,
' There is a third intermediate state, the state of dreams '
{Brt. Up. IV, 3, 9). That place is called the intermediate
place because it lies there where the two worlds, or else the
place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join.
In that intermediate place the creation must be real ; be-
cause scripture, which is authoritative, declares it to be so,
'He creates chariots, horses, roads,' &c. We, moreover,
infer this from the concluding clause, ' He indeed is the
maker' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 10).
2. And some (state the Self to be) the shaper
(creator); sons and so on (being the lovely things
which he shapes).
Moreover the members of one .yakha state that the Self
is, in that intermediate state, the shaper of lovely things,
' He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep,
shaping one lovely thing after another' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).
i'34 vedanta-sOtras.
Kama (lovely things) in this passage means sons, &c.,
that are so called because they are beloved. — But may
not the term 'kama,^' denote desires merely? — No, we reply;
the word kama is here used with reference to sons, &c. ;
for those form the general subject of discussion, as we see
from some preceding passages, ' Choose sons and grand-
sons,' &c., and 'I make thee the enjoyer of all kamas'
(Ka. Up. I, I, 23 ; 24). — And that that shaper is the highest
Self (prAgna.) we infer from the general subject-matter and
from the complementary sentence. That the highest Self
is the general subject-matter appears from II, 14, ' That
which thou seest as neither this nor that.' And to that
highest Self there also refers the complementary sentence
II, 5, 8, 'That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that
alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained
in it, and no one goes beyond.' — Now it is admitted that
the world (creation) of our waking state of which the highest
Self (pra^wa) is the maker is real ; hence the world of our
dreaming state must likewise be real. That the same reason-
ing applies to the waking and the sleeping state a scriptural
passage also declares, 'Here they say: No, this is the same
as the place of waking, for what he sees while awake the
same he sees while asleep' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 14). — Hence the
world of dreams is real. — To this we reply as follows.
3. But it (viz. the dream world) is mere illusion
(maya), on account of its nature not manifesting
itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality).
The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha. It is not true
that the world of dreams is real ; it is mere illusion and
there is not a particle of reality in it. — Why? — 'On account
of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality,' i.e.
because the nature of the dream world does not manifest
itself with the totality of the attributes of real things. —
What then do you mean by the ' totality ' ? — The fulfilment
of the conditions of place, time, and cause, and the circum-
stance of non-refutation. All these have their sphere in real
things, but cannot be applied to dreams. In the first place
there is, in a dream, no space for chariots and the like ; for
Ill ADIIYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. 1 35
those cannot possibly find room in the limited confines of
the body. — Well, but why should not the dreaming person
see the objects of his dream outside of his body ? He does
as a matter of fact perceive things as separated from him-
self by space; and 6Vuti, moreover, declares that the dream
is outside the body,' Away from the nest the Immortal moves;
that immortal one goes wherever he likes ' (Brz. Up. IV,
3, 12). And this distinction of the conceptions of staying
and going would have no good sense if the being (the soul)
did not really go out. — What you maintain is inadmissible,
we reply. A sleeping being cannot possibly possess the
power to go and return in a moment the distance of a
hundred yo^anas. Sometimes, moreover, a person recounts
a dream in which he went to some place without returning
from it, ' Lying on my bed in the land of the Kurus I was
overcome by sleep and went in my dream to the country
of the Pa;}>^alas, and being there I awoke.' If, now, that
person had really gone out of his country, he would on
waking find himself in the country of the Pa/7/^alas to which
he had gone in his dream ; but as a matter of fact he awakes
in the country of the Kurus. — Moreover, while a man
imagines himself in his dream going, in his body, to another
place, the bystanders see that very same body lying on the
couch. Further, a dreaming person does not see, in his
dream, other places such as they really are. But if he in
seeing them did actually go about, they would appear to
him like the things he sees in his waking state. vSruti,
moreover, declares that the dream is within the body, cp.
the passage beginning 'But when he moves about in dream,'
and terminating ' He moves about, according to his plea-
sure, within his own body' (Br/. Up. II, i, 18). Hence the
passage about the dreamer moving away from his nest
must be taken in a metaphorical sense, as otherwise we
should contradict scripture as well as reason ; he who while
remaining within his own body does not use it for any pur-
pose may be said to be outside the body as it were. The
difference of the ideas of staying within the body and going
outside must, therefore, be viewed as a mere deception. —
In the second place we see that dreams are in conflict with
1 36 vedanta-sC)tras.
the conditions of time. One person lying asleep at night
dreams that it is day in the Bharata Varsha ; another lives,
during a dream which lasts one muhurta only, through many
crowds of years. — In the third place there do not exist in
the state of dreaming the requisite efficient causes for either
thought or action ; for as, in sleep, the organs are drawn
inward, the dreaming person has no eyes, &c. for perceiving
chariots and other things ; and whence should he, in the
space of the twinkling of an eye, have the power of — or
procure the material for — making chariots and the like ? —
In the fourth place the chariots, horses, &c., which the
dream creates, are refuted, i.e. shown not to exist by the
waking state. And apart from this, the dream itself refutes
what it creates, as its end often contradicts its beginning ;
what at first was considered to be a chariot turns, in a
moment, into a man, and what was conceived to be a man
has all at once become a tree. — Scripture itself, moreover,
clearly declares the chariots, &c., of a dream to have no
real existence, 'There are no chariots in that state, no
horses, no roads, &c.' — Hence the visions of a dream are
mere illusion.
4. (Not altogether) for it (the dream) Is indicative
(of the future), according to vSruti ; the experts also
declare this.
Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not
contain a particle of reality ? — Not so, we reply ; for
dreams are prophetic of future good and bad fortune. For
scripture teaches as follows, ' When a man engaged in
some work undertaken for a special wish sees in his dreams
a woman, he may infer success from that dream-vision.'
Other scriptural passages declare that certain dreams
indicate speedy death, so, e.g. ' If he sees a black man
with black teeth, that man will kill him.' — Those also who
understand the science of dreams hold the opinion that to
dream of riding on an elephant and the like is lucky; while
it is unlucky to dream of riding on a donkey, &c. ; and that
certain other dreams also caused by special mantras or
devatas or substances contain a particle of truth. — In all
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 4. I37
these cases the thing indicated may be real ; the indicating
dream, however, remains unreal as it is refuted by the
waking state. The doctrine that the dream itself is mere
illusion thus remains uncontradicted. — On this account the
Vedic passage to which the first Sutra of this pada refers is
to be explained metaphorically. When we say ' the plough
bears, i.e. supports the bullocks,' we say so because the
plough is the indirect cause of the bullocks being kept\
not because we mean that the plough directly supports
the bullocks. Analogously scripture says that the dream-
ing person creates chariots, &c., and is their maker, not
because he creates them directly but because he is the
cause of their creation. By his being their cause we have
to understand that he is that one who performs the good
and evil deeds which are the cause of the delight and
fear produced by the apparition, in his dream, of chariots
and other things 2. — Moreover, as in the waking state,
owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and
the resulting interference of the light of the sun, &c., the
self-luminousness of the Self is, for the beholder, difficult
to discriminate, scripture gives the description of the
dreaming state for the purpose of that discrimination. If
then the statements about the creation of chariots, &c.,
were taken as they stand (i.e. literally) we could not
ascertain that the Self is self-luminous ^. Hence we have
to explain the passage relative to the creation of chariots,
&c., in a metaphorical sense, so as to make it agree with
the statement about the non-existence of chariots, &c.
This explains also the scriptural passage about the
shaping (III, 2, 2). The statement made above that in
the KaZ/mka the highest. Self is spoken of as the shaper
^ Bullocks have to be kept because the fields must be tilled.
^ The dreams have the purpose of either cheering or saddening
and frightening the sleeper ; so as to requite him for his good and
evil works. His adrzsh/a thus furnishes the efficient cause of the
dreams.
* Because then there would be no difference between the dream-
ing and the waking state.
I ^8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
of dreams is untrue; for another scriptural passage
ascribes that activity to the individual soul, ' He him-
self destroying, he himself shaping dreams with his
own splendour, with his own light' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 9)^
And in the KaZ/mka Upanishad itself also we infer from
the form of the sentence, ' That one who wakes in us
while we are asleep,' — which is an anuvada, i.e. an
additional statement about something well known — that
he who is there proclaimed as the shaper of lovely things
is nobody else than the (well-known) individual soul. The
other passage which forms the complementary continuation
of the one just quoted (' That indeed is the Bright, that is
Brahman ') discards the notion of the separate existence of
the individual soul and teaches that it is nothing but Brah-
man, analogously to the passage ' That art thou.' And this
interpretation does not conflict with Brahman being the
general subject-matter. — Nor do we thereby deny altogether
that the highest (pra^-^a) Self is active in dreams ; for as
being the Lord of all it may be considered as the guide
and ruler of the soul in all its states. We only maintain
that the world connected with the intermediate state (i.e.
the world of dreams) is not real in the same sense as the
world consisting of ether and so on is real. On the other
hand we must remember that also the so-called real crea-
tion with its ether, air, &c., is not absolutely real ; for as
we have proved before (II, i, 14) the entire expanse of
things is mere illusion. The world consisting of ether, &c.,
remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul
cognizes that Brahman is the Self of all ; the world of
dreams on the other hand is daily sublated by the waking
state. That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be
understood with a distinction.
5. But by the meditation on the highest that
which is hidden (viz. the equality of the Lord and
* Svayaw vihatya purvadehaw n\skesh/\im kr/tva svayaw nirmd-
yapurvaw vasanamaya;// dehum sampadya svcna bhasa svakiyabu-
ddhivr/ttya svena ^yotisha svarupa/^ailanyenety artha/5. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 6. 139
the soul, becomes manifest) ; for from him (the
Lord) are its (the soul's) bondage and release.
Well, but the individual soul is a part of the highest Self
as the spark is a part of the fire. And as fire and spark
have in common the powers of burning and giving light, so
the individual soul and the Lord have in common the
powers of knowledge and rulership ; hence the individual
soul may, by means of its lordship, effect in the dreaming
state a creation of chariots and the like, springing from its
wishes (sawkalpa). — To this we reply that although the
Lord and the individual soul stand to each other in the
relation of whole and part, yet it is manifest to perception
that the attributes of the two are of a different nature. —
Do you then mean to say that the individual soul has
no common attributes with the Lord ? — We do not maintain
that ; but we say that the equality of attributes, although
existing, is hidden by the veil of Nescience. In the case
of some persons indeed who strenuously meditate on the
Lord and who, their ignorance being dispelled at last,
obtain through the favour of the Lord extraordinary
powers and insight, that hidden equality becomes mani-
fest— just as through the action of strong medicines the
power of sight of a blind man becomes manifest ; but it
does not on its own account reveal itself to all men. — Why
not? — Because 'from him,' i.e. from the Lord there are
bondage and release of it, viz. the individual soul. That
means : bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of
the Lord's true nature ; release is due to the presence of
such knowledge. Thus 5ruti declares, ' When that god is
known all fetters fall off; sufferings are destroyed and
birth and death cease. From meditating on him there
arises, on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that
of universal Lordship ; he who is alone is satisfied ' (5vet.
Up. I, ii), and similar passages.
6. Or that (viz. the concealment of the soul's
pov^ers springs) from its connexion with the body.
But if the soul is a part of the highest Self, why should
its knowledge and lordship be hidden ? We should rather
t^O VEDANTA-S^'TRAS.
expect them to be as manifest as the light and the heat of
the spark. — True, we reply ; but the state of concealment
of the soul's knowledge and lordship is due to its being
joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs, mind,
buddhi, sense-objectSj sensations, &c. And to this state
of things there applies the simile : As the heat and light of
the fire are hidden as long as the fire is still hidden in the
wood from which it will be produced by friction, or as long
as it is covered by ashes ; so, in consequence of the soul
being connected with limiting adjuncts in the form of a
body, &c., founded on name and form as presented by
Nescience, its knowledge and lordship remain hidden as
long as it is possessed by the erroneous notion of not being
distinct from those adjuncts. — The word ' or ' in the Sutra
is meant to discard the suspicion that the Lord and the
soul might be separate entities. — But why should not the
soul be separate from the Lord^ considering the state of
concealment of its knowledge and power? If we allow the
two to be fundamentally separate, we need not assume
that their separateness is due to the soul's connexion with
the body. — It is impossible, we reply, to assume the soul
to be separate froni the Lord. For in the scriptural pas-
sage beginning with 'That divinity thought' &c. (K/i. Up.
"VI, 3, 2) we meet with the clause, ' It entered into those
beings with this living Self (^iva atman) ; where the
individual soul is referred to as the Self. And then we
have the other passage, ' It is the True ; it is the Self ;
that art thou, O 5vetaketu,' which again teaches that the
Lord is the Self of the soul. Hence the soul is non-
different from the Lord, but its knowledge and power are
obscured by its connexion with the body. From this it
follows that the dreaming soul is not able to create, from
its mere wishes, chariots and other things. If the soul
possessed that power, nobody would ever have an un-
pleasant dream ; for nobody ever wishes for something
unpleasant to himself. — We finally deny that the scriptural
passage about the waking state (' dream is the same as the
place of waking ' &c.) indicates the reality of dreams. The
statement made there about the equality of the two states
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. I4I
is not meant to indicate that dreams are real, for that would
conflict with the soul's self-luminousness (referred to above),
and scripture, moreover, expressly declares that the chariots,
&c., of a dream have no real existence ; it merely means
that dreams, because due to mental impressions (vasana)
received in the waking state, are equal to the latter in ap-
pearance.— From all this it follows that dreams are mere
illusion.
7. The absence of that (i.e. of dreams, i.e. dream-
less sleep) takes place in the na^^is and in the Self;
according to scriptural statement.
The state of dream has been discussed ; we are now
going to enquire into the state of deep sleep. A number
of scriptural passages refer to that state. In one place we
read, ' When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest
so that he sees no dream, then he has entered into those
na^is' [Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 3). In another place it is said
with reference to the na^is, ' Through them he moves forth
and rests in the surrounding body' (BW. Up. II, i, 19). So
also in another place, ' In these the person is when sleeping
he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with the prawa
alone' (Kau. Up. IV, 20). Again in another place, 'That
ether which is within the heart in that he reposes ' (Br/.
Up. IV, 4, 22). Again, ' Then he becomes united with that
which is ; he is gone to his Self {Kh. Up. VI, 8, i). And,
' Embraced by the highest Self (pra^/^a) he knows nothing
that is without, nothing that is within' (B/-/. Up. IV, 3, 21).
Here the doubt arises whether the na^is, &c., mentioned in
the above passages are independent from each other and
constitute various places for the soul in the state of deep
sleep, or if they stand in mutual relation so as to constitute
one such place only. The purvapakshin takes the former
view on account of the various places mentioned serving one
and the same purpose. Things serving the same purpose,
as, e.g. rice and barley ^, are never seen to be dependent
^ Either of which may be employed for making the sacrificial
cake.
142 vedanta-sOtras.
on each other. That the na^is, &c., actually serve the
same purpose appears from the circumstance of their being
all of them exhibited equally in the locative case, ' he has
entered into the na^is,' ' he rests in the pericardium/ &c.^
— But in some of the passages quoted the locative case is
not employed, so, e.g. in ' He becomes united with that
which is' (sata, instrumental case)! — That makes no differ-
ence, we reply, because there also the locative case is
meant. For in the complementary passage the text states
that the soul desirous of rest enters into the Self, 'Finding
no rest elsewhere it settles down on breath ' {Kh. Up. VI,
8, 2) ; a passage in which the word ' breath ' refers to that
which is (the sat). A place of rest of course implies the
idea of the locative case. The latter case is, moreover,
actually exhibited in a further complementary passage,
' When they have become merged in that which is (sati),
they know not that they are merged in it.' — In all these
passages one and the same state is referred to, viz. the
state of deep sleep which is characterised by the suspension
of all special cognition. Hence we conclude that in the
state of deep sleep the soul optionally goes to any one of
those places, either the na^iis, or that which is, &c.
To this we make the following reply — 'The absence of
that,' i.e. the absence of dreams — which absence constitutes
the essence of deep sleep — takes place 'in the na^is and in
the Self;' i.e. in deep sleep the soul goes into both to-
gether, not optionally into either. — How is this known? —
' From scripture.' — Scripture says of all those things, the
na^is, &c., that they are the place of deep sleep ; and those
statements we must combine into one, as the hypothesis of
option would involve partial refutation^. The assertion
^ The argument of the purvapakshin is that the different places
in which the soul is said to abide in the state of deep sleep are all
exhibited by the text in the same case and are on that account
co-ordinate. Mutual relation implying subordination would require
them to be exhibited in different cases enabling us to infer the
exact manner and degree of relation.
^ By allowing option between two Vedic statements we lessen the
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. 1 43
made above that we are compelled to allow option because
the na^is, &c., serve one and the same purpose, is without
foundation ; for from the mere fact of two things being
exhibited in the same case it does not follow by any means
that they serve the same purpose, and that for that reason
we have to choose between them. We on the contrary see
that one and the same case is employed even where things
serve different purposes and have to be combined ; we say,
e.g. ' he sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on the couch ^. ' So
in the present case also the different statements can be
combined into one, ' He sleeps in the na<^is, in the sur-
rounding body, in Brahman.' Moreover, the scriptural
passage, ' In these the person is when sleeping he sees no
dream ; then he becomes one with the prana. alone,' de-
clares, by mentioning them together in one sentence, that
the na^is and the pra;/a are to be combined in the state of
deep sleep. That by pra«a Brahman is meant we have
already shown (I, i, 28). Although in another text the
naa^is are spoken of as an independent place of deep sleep
as it were (' then he has entered into those na^is '), yet, in
order not to contradict other passages in which Brahman is
spoken of as the place of deep sleep, we must explain that
text to mean that the soul abides in Brahman through the
na^is. Nor is this interpretation opposed to the employ-
ment of the locative case (' into — or in — those na<^is ') ; for
if the soul enters into Brahman by means of the na.d\s it is
at the same time in the na^^is ; just as a man who descends
to the sea by means of the river Ganga is at the same time
on the Ganga. — Moreover that passage about the na^is,
because its purpose is to describe the road, consisting of
the rays and na^^is, to the Brahma world, mentions the
entering of the soul into the nkdis in order to glorify the
latter (not in order to describe the state of deep sleep) ; for
the clause following upon the one which refers to the enter-
authority of the Veda; for the adoption of either alternative
sublates, for the time, the other alternative.
^ Where the two locatives are to be combined into one statement,
' he sleeps on the couch in the palace.'
144 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ing praises the na^is, ' There no evil touches him.' The
text, moreover, adds a reason for the absence of all evil, in
the words, ' For then he has become united with the light.'
That means that on account of the light contained in the
na^is (which is called bile) having overpowered the organs
the person no longer sees the sense-objects. Or else Brah-
man may be meant by the 'light;' which term is applied
to Brahman in another passage also, ' It is Brahman only,
light only ' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 7). The passage would then
mean that the soul becomes, by means of the na^is, united
with Brahman, and that hence no evil touches it. That the
union with Brahman is the reason for the absence of all
contact with evil, is known from other scriptural passages,
such as, ' All evils turn back from it ; for the world of
Brahman is free from all evil ' [Kh. Up. VIII, 4, i). On
that account we have to combine the na^is with Brahman,
which from other passages is known to be the place of deep
sleep. — Analogously we conclude that the pericardium also,
because it is mentioned in a passage treating of Brahman,
is a place of deep sleep only in subordination to Brahman.
For the ether within the heart is at first spoken of as the
place of sleep (' He lies in the ether which is in the heart,'
Brz. Up. II, I, 17), and with reference thereto it is said
later on, ' He rests in the pericardium ' (II, i, 19). Peri-
cardium (puritat) is a name of that which envelops the
heart ; hence that which rests within the ether of the heart
— which is contained in the pericardium — can itself be said
to rest within the pericardium ; just as a man living in a
town surrounded by walls is said to live within the walls.
That the ether within the heart is Brahman has already
been shown (I, 3, 14). — That again the na^is and the peri-
cardium have to be combined as places of deep sleep appears
from their being mentioned together in one sentence
(' Through them he moves forth and rests in the puritat).
That that which is (sat) and the intelligent Self (pra^«a)
are only names of Brahman is well known; hence scripture
mentions only three places of deep sleep, viz. the na^is,
the pericardium, and Brahman. Among these three again
Brahman alone is the lasting place of deep sleep ; the
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, '] . 1 45
na^is and the pericardium are mere roads leading to it.
Moreover (to explain further the difference of the manner
in which the soul, in deep sleep, enters into the na^is, the
pericardium and Brahman respectively), the na<^is and the
pericardium are (in deep sleep) merely the abode of the
limiting adjuncts of the soul ; in them the soul's organs
abide ^ For apart from its connexion with the limiting
adjuncts it is impossible for the soul in itself to abide any-
where, because being non-different from Brahman it rests
in its own glory. And if we say that, in deep sleep, it
abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a
difference between the abode and that which abides, but
that there is absolute identity of the two. For the text
says, ' With that which is he becomes united, he is gone to
his Self; ' which means that the sleeping person has entered
into his true nature. — It cannot, moreover, be said that the
soul is at any time not united with Brahman — for its true
nature can never pass away — ; but considering that in the
state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, into something else,
as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts cease
in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. Hence it
would be entirely wrong to assume that, in deep sleep, it
sometimes becomes united with Brahman and sometimes
not ^. Moreover, even if we admit that there are different
places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result,
from that difference of place, any difference in the quality
of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the ces-
sation of special cognition ; it is, therefore, more appro-
priate to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognize
on account of its oneness, having become united with Brah-
man ; according to the 5ruti, ' How should he know an-
other ? ' (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15). — If, further, the sleeping soul
did rest in the na^is and the puritat, it would be impossible
^ An. Gi. explains karawani by karmawi : na</ishu puritati k■^
^ivasyopadhyantarbbQlani karawani karma«i tish//;anlity upadhya-
dharatvam, ^ivasya tv adharo biahmaiva.
"^ But with the na</is or the pericardium only.
[38] L
146 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
to assign any reason for its not cognizing, because in that
case it would continue to have diversity for its object ;
according to the 6"ruti, ' When there is, as it were, duality,
then one sees the other,' &c. — But in the case of him also
who has diversity for his object, great distance and the like
may be reasons for absence of cognition ! — What you say
might indeed apply to our case if the soul were acknow-
ledged to be limited in itself; then its case would be
analogous to that of Vish;/umitra, who, when staying in
a foreign land, cannot see his home. But, apart from its
adjuncts, the soul knows no limitation. — Well, then, great
distance, &c., residing in the adjuncts may be the reason
of non-cognition ! — Yes, but that leads us to the conclu-
sion already arrived at, viz. that the soul does not cognize
when, the limiting adjuncts having ceased, it has become
one with Brahman.
Nor do we finally maintain that the na^is, the pericar-
dium, and Brahman are to be added to each other as
being equally places of deep sleep. For by the knowledge
that the uadis and the pericardium are places of sleep,
nothing is gained, as scripture teaches neither that some
special fruit is connected with that knowledge nor that it is
the subordinate member of some work, &c., connected with
certain results. We. on the other hand, do want to prove
that that Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state
of deep sleep ; that is a knowledge which has its own
uses, viz. the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of
the soul, and the ascertainment of the soul being essentially
non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking
and in the dreaming state. Hence the Self alone is the
place of deep sleep.
8. Hence the av^^aking from that (viz. Brahman).
And because the Self only is the place of deep sleep, on
that account the scriptural chapters treating of sleep inva-
riably teach that the awaking takes place from that Self.
In the Brt. Up. when the time comes for the answer to the
question, 'Whence did he come back?' (II, i, 16), the text
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. I47
says, 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all pra«as
come forth from that Self (II, i, 20). And Kh. Up. VI,
10, 2, we read : 'When they have come back from the True
they do not know that they have come back from the True.'
If there were optional places to which the soul might resort
in deep sleep, scripture would teach us that it awakes some-
times from the na^is, sometimes from the pericardium,
sometimes from the Self.— For that reason also the Self is
the place of deep sleep.
9. But the same (soul returns from Brahman) ; on
account of work, remembrance, text, and precept.
Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking
from the union with Brahman is the same which entered
into union with Brahman, or another one. — The purvapak-
shin maintains that there is no fixed rule on that point.
For just as a drop of water, when poured into a large quan-
tity of water, becomes one with the latter, so that when we
again take out a drop it would be hard to manage that it
should be the very same drop; thus the sleeping soul, when
it has become united with Brahman, is merged in bliss and
not able again to rise from it the same. Hence what
actually awakes is either the Lord or some other soul. — To
this we reply that the same soul which in the state of sleep
entered into bliss again arises from it, not any other. We
assert this on the ground of work, remembrance, sacred
text, and precept ; which four reasons we will treat sepa-
rately. In the first place the person who wakes from sleep
must be the same, because it is seen to finish work left un-
finished before. Men finish in the morning what they had
left incomplete on the day before. Now it is not possible
that one man should proceed to complete work half done
by another man, because this would imply too much ^
^ There would follow from it, e. g. that in the case of sacrifices
occupying more than one day, there would be several sacrificers,
and that consequently it would be doubtful to whom the fruit
of the sacrifice, as promised by the Veda, belongs. And this
would imply a stultification of the sacred text.
L 2
148 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who
finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former. —
In the second place the person rising from sleep is the
same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he
could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day
before ; for what one man sees another cannot remember.
And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of
personal identity (atmanusmara;/a) expressed in the words,
' I am the same I was before,' would not be possible. — In
the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the
same person rises again, ' He hastens back again as he
came, to the place from which he started, to be awake '
{Brt. Up. IV, 3, 16) ; ' All these creatures go day after day
into the Brahma- world and yet do not discover it ' (K/i. Up.
VIII, 3, 2) ; 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a
lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat,
or a musquito, that they become again and again ' (K^.
Up. VI, 10, 2). These and similar passages met with in
the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper
sense only if the same soul rises again. — In the fourth place
we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the in-
junctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different
theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did
rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final
release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be
the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period,
and of knowledge ? — Moreover on the hypothesis of another
person rising from sleep, that other person would either be
a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal
life in another body; in that case it would follow that the
practical existence carried on by means of that body would
be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to
sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B
would rise in A's body and A in B's body), we reply that
that would be an altogether useless hypothesis ; for what ad-
vantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises
from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to
sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in
another ? — Or else the soul rising (in A's body) would be
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 TADA, lO. 1 49
one which had obtained final release, and that would imply
that final release can have an end. But it is impossible
that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience
should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby
it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the
Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience. — Further,
on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be diffi-
cult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of
deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited
for what they have done. — From all this it follows that the
person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.—
Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the
soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge
from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from
the mass of water into which it had been poured. We
admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of
water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all
the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there
are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge
(of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not
analogous. — Further, we point out that the flamingo, e. g.
is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when
mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of
distinguishing. — Moreover, what is called individual soul is
not really different from the highest Self, so that it might
be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop
of water from the mass of water ; but, as we have explained
repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion
with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual
soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as
long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and
the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as
long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts.
Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep
as well as of waking ; in the former it is like a seed, in the
latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper
inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.
10. In him who is senseless (in a swoon, &c.)
1 50 vedanta-sOtras.
there is half-union ; on account of this remaining (as
the only possible hypothesis).
There now arises the question of what kind that state
is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that we know only of
three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body,
viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep ;
to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul's passing
out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from ^ruti
nor Smr/ti ; hence what is called fainting must be one of
the four states mentioned. — To this we make the following
reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be
said to be awake ; for he does not perceive external objects
by means of his senses. — But, it might be objected, may
not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker?
Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is
so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else ; so the
man also who is stunned^, e.g. by a blow, may be awake,
but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain
caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time
perceive anything else. — No, we reply, the case is different, on
account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker
says, ' For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but
the arrow ; ' the man, on the other hand, who returns to con-
sciousness from a swoon, says, ' For such a length of time
I was shut up in blind darkness ; I was conscious of nothing.'
— A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may
be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright ;
while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on
the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake. — Nor,
in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is alto-
gether unconscious. — Nor, in the third place, is he dead ;
for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man
has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he
be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in
order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body
or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain
whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive
Ill ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, lO. I5I
neither warmth nor breathy they conclude that he is dead,
and carry off his body into the forest in order to burn it ;
if, on the other hand, they do perceive warmth and breath,
they decide that he is not dead, and begin to sprinkle him
with cold water so that he may recover consciousness. —
That a man who has swooned away is not dead follows,
moreover, from the fact of his rising again (to conscious
life); for from Yama's realm none ever return. — Let us then
say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep, as he
is unconscious, and, at the same time, not dead ! — No, we
reply ; this also is impossible, on account of the different
characteristics of the two states. A man who has become
senseless does sometimes not breathe for a long time ; his
body trembles ; his face has a frightful expression ; his
eyes are staring wide open. The countenance of a sleeping
person, on the other hand, is peaceful, he draws his breath
at regular intervals ; his eyes are closed, his body does
not tremble. A sleeping person again may be waked by
a gentle stroking with the hand ; a person lying in a swoon
not even by a blow with a club. Moreover, senselessness
and sleep have different causes ; the former is produced
by a blow on the head with a club or the like, the latter
by weariness. Nor, finally, is it the common opinion that
stunned or swooning people are asleep. — It thus remains
for us to assume that the state of senselessness (in swoon-
ing, &c.) is a half-union (or half-coincidence) \ as it coin-
cides in so far as it is an unconscious state and does not
coincide in so far as it has different characteristics. — But
how can absence of consciousness in a swoon, &c., be called
half-coincidence (with deep sleep) ? With regard to deep
sleep scripture says, ' He becomes united with the True '
{Kh. Up. VI, 8, i) ; 'Then a thief is not a thief (Br/. Up.
IV, 3, 22) ; ' Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old
age, death, and grief, neither good nor evil deeds ' [Kh. Up.
VIII, 4, i). For the good and evil deeds reach the soul in
that way that there arise in it the ideas of being affected by
pleasure or pain. Those ideas are absent in deep sleep, but
^ Vi25. with deep sleep, as will be explained below.
152 vedanta-sOtras.
they are likewise absent in the case of a person lying in a
swoon ; hence we must maintain that, on account of the
cessation of the limiting adjuncts, in the case of a senseless
person as well as of one asleep, complete union takes place,
not only half-union. — To this we make the following reply.
— We do not mean to say that in the case of a man who
lies in a swoon the soul becomes half united with Brahman ;
but rather that senselessness belongs with one half to the
side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the
other state (i.e. death). In how far it is equal and not
equal to sleep has already been shown. It belongs to death
in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains (un-
requited) work of the soul, speech and mind return (to the
senseless person) ; if no work remains, breath and warmth
depart from him. Therefore those who know Brahman
declare a swoon and the like to be a half-union. — The ob-
jection that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged, is
without much weight ; for as that state occurs occasionally
only it may not be generally known. All the same it is
known from ordinary experience as well as from the Ayur-
veda (medicine). That it is not considered a separate fifth
state is due to its being avow^edly compounded of other
states.
II, Not on account of (difference of) place also
twofold characteristics can belong- to the highest ;
for everywhere (scripture teaches it to be without
any difference).
We now attempt to ascertain, on the ground of vSruti, the
nature of that Brahman with which the individual soul
becomes united in the state of deep sleep and so on, in
consequence of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts. — The
scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double
character ; some indicate that Brahman is affected by dif-
ference, so, e.g. ' He to whom belong all works, all desires,
all sweet odours and tastes' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14,2); others,
that it is without difference, so, e.g. ' It is neither coarse nor
fine, neither short nor long,' &c. (Br?. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Have
we, on the ground of these passages, to assume that Brah-
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. I 5 ;;
man has a double nature, or either nature, and, if either,
that it is affected with difference, or without difference ?
This is the point to be discussed.
The purvapakshin maintains that, in conformity with the
scriptural passages which indicate a double nature, a double
nature is to be ascribed to Brahman.
To this we reply as follows. — At any rate the highest
Brahman cannot, by itself, possess double characteristics ;
for on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is im-
possible to admit that one and the same thing should by
itself possess certain qualities, such as colour, &c.,and should
not possess them. — Nor is it possible that Brahman should
possess double characteristics 'on account of place,' i.e. on
account of its conjunction with its limiting adjuncts, such as
earth, &c. For the connexion with limiting adjuncts is
unavailing to impart to a thing of a certain nature an alto-
gether different nature. The crystal, e.g. which is in itself
clear, does not become dim through its conjunction with a
limiting adjunct in the form of red colour ; for that it is
pervaded by the quality of dimness is an altogether erro-
neous notion. In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts
are, moreover, presented by Nescience merely^. Hence (as
the upadhis are the product of Nescience) if we embrace
either of the two alternatives, we must decide in favour of
that according to which Brahma is absolutely devoid of all
difference, not in favour of the opposite one. For all pas-
sages whose aim it is to represent the nature of Brahman
(such as, 'It is without sound, without touch, without form,
without decay,' Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) teach that it is free from
all difference.
12. If it be objected that it is not so, on account of
the difference (taught by the Veda) ; we reply that it
is not so on account of the declaration of (Brahman)
^ The limiting adjunct of the crystal, i.e. the red colour of a thing,
e.g. a flower with which the crystal is in contact, is as real as the
crystal itself; only the effect is an illusion. — But the limiting
adjuncts of Brahman are in themselves illusion.
154 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
being not such, with reference to each (declaration of
difference).
Let this be, but nevertheless it cannot be maintained
that Brahman is devoid of difference and attributes, and
does not possess double attributes either in itseff or on
account of difference of station. — Why not? — ' On account
of difference.' The various vidyas teach different forms of
Brahman ; it is said to have four feet {Kh. Up. Ill, i8, i) ;
to consist of sixteen parts (Pr. Up. VI, i) ; to be charac-
terised by dwarfishness (Ka. Up. V, 3) ; to have the three
worlds for its body (Br/. Up. I, 3, 22) ; to be named Vai-
.fvanara {Kh. Up. V, 11, 2), &c. Hence we must admit
that Brahman is qualified by differences also. — But above
it has been shown that Brahman cannot possess twofold
characteristics! — That also does not contradict our doctrine;
for the difference of Brahman's forms is due to its limiting
adjuncts. Otherwise all those scriptural passages which
refer to those differences would be objectless.
All this reasoning, we say, is without force 'on account of
the declaration of its being not such, with reference to each,'
i.e. because scripture declares, with reference to all the
differences produced by the limiting adjuncts, that there is
no difference in Brahman. Cp. such passages as the follow-
ing: 'This bright immortal person in this earth, and that
bright immortal person incorporated in the body; he indeed
is the same as that Self (Br/. Up. II, 5, i). It, therefore,
cannot be maintained that the connexion of Brahman
with various forms is taught by the Veda.
1 3. Some also (teach) thus.
The members of one j-akha also make a statement
about the cognition of non-difference which is preceded by
a censure of the perception of difference, ' By the mind
alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He
who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to
death' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 19). Others also ('By knowing the
enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been de-
clared to be threefold, and this is Brahman,' 5vet. Up. I, 12)
Ill ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 1 4. 155
record in their text that the entire world, characterised
by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed, and a ruler, has Brahman
for its true nature. — But as among the scriptural passages
referring to Brahman, there are some which represent it as
having a form, and others teaching that it is devoid of form,
how can it be asserted that Brahman is devoid of form, and not
also the contrary? — To this question the next Sutra replies.
14. For (Brahman) is merely devoid of form, on
account of this being the main purport of scripture.
Brahman, we must definitively assert, is devoid of all form,
colour, and so on, and does not in any way possess form,
and so on. — Why ? — ' On account of this being the main
purport (of scripture).' — ' It is neither coarse nor fine,
neither short nor long' {Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8); 'That which is
without sound, without touch, without form, without decay '
(Ka. Up. I, 3) 15) ; ' He who is called ether is the revealer
of all forms and names. That within which forms and
names are, that is Brahman' (/T/z. Up. VIII, 14, i) ; 'That
heavenly person is without body, he is both without and
within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, i, 2) ; ' That Brahman
is without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside, this Self is Brahman, omnipresent and om-
niscient' (Bri. Up. II, S, 19). These and similar passages
have for their purport the true nature of Brahman as non-
connected with any world, and have not any other purport,
as we have proved under I, 1,4. On the ground of such
passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brah-
man is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the
other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form
do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but
rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as
those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class,
they are to be accepted as they stand ; where, however,
contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is
Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those
of the other kind. — This is the reason for our deciding that
although there are two different classes of scriptural texts,
Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not
156 VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.
at the same time of an opposite nature. — But what then is
the position of those passages which refer to Brahman as
possessing form ? — To this question the next Sutra replies.
15. And as light (assumes forms as it were by its
contact with things possessing form, so does Brah-
man ;) since (the texts ascribing form to Brahman)
are not devoid of meaning
o
Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having
passed through space enters into contact with a finger or
some otiier Hmiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is
straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were ;
so Brahman also assumes, as it were, the form of the earth
and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into
connexion. Hence there is no reason why certain texts
should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that
Brahman has that and that form. We thus escape the
conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to
Brahman are devoid of sense ; a conclusion altogether un-
acceptable since all parts of the Veda are equally authori-
tative, and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning.
— But does this not imply a contradiction of the tenet main-
tained above, viz. that Brahman does not possess double
characteristics although it is connected with limiting ad-
juncts ? — By no means, we reply. What is merely due to a
limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a sub-
stance, and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented
by Nescience only. That the primeval natural Nescience
leaves room for all practical life and activity — whether or-
dinary or based on the Veda — we have explained more
than once.
16. And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist
of that (i.e. intelligence).
And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelli-
gence, is devoid of any other characteristics, and is alto-
gether without difference; 'As a mass of salt has neither
inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus,
indeed, has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is alto-
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8. 1 57
gether a mass of knowledge' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 13). That
means : That Self has neither inside nor outside any cha-
racteristic form but intelligence ; simple non-differentiated
intelligence constitutes its nature ; just as a lump of salt
has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste,
not any other taste.
1 7. (This scripture) also shows, and it is likewise
stated in Smr/ti.
That Brahman is without any difference is proved by
those scriptural passages also which expressly deny that it
possesses any other characteristics; so, e.g. 'Next follows
the teaching by No, no' (Brz. Up. II, ^^ ^) > ' I^ is different
from the known, it is also above the unknown ' (Ke. Up. I,
4) ; ' From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away
unable to reach it ' (Taitt. Up. II, 9). Of a similar purport
is that scriptural passage which relates how Bahva, being
questioned about Brahman by Vashkalin, explained it to
him by silence, 'He said to him, "Learn Brahman, O friend,"
and became silent. Then, on a second and third question,
he replied, " I am teaching you indeed, but you do not
understand. Silent is that Self." ' The same teaching
is conveyed by those Smr/ti-texts which deny of Brah-
man all other characteristics; so, e.g. 'I will proclaim
that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which
one reaches immortality ; the highest Brahman without
either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to
be or not to be' (Bha. Gita XIII, 12). Of a similar pur-
port is another Smrz'ti-passage, according to which the
omniform Naraya;/a instructed Narada, ' The cause, O Na-
rada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all
beings is the Maya emitted by me ; do not cognize me as
being such (in reality).'
18. For this very reason (there are applied to
Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of
the sun and the like.
Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid
of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be
158 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
described only by denying of it all other characteristics,
therefore the Moksha ^"astras compare it to the images
of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning
thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due
to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the
two following passages : ' As the one luminous sun when
entering into relation to many different waters is himself
rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts ; so also the
one divine unborn Self;' and 'The one Self of all beings
separately abides in all the individual beings ; hence it
appears one and many at the same time, just as the one
moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.'
The next Sutra raises an objection.
19. But there is no parallelism (of the two things
compared), since (in the case of Brahman) there is
not apprehended (any separate substance) compar-
able to the water.
Since no substance comparable to the water is appre-
hended in the case of Brahman, a parallelism between Brah-
man and the reflected images of the sun cannot be
established. In the case of the sun and other material
luminous bodies, there exists a separate material substance
occupying a different place, viz. water ; hence the light of
the sun, 6cc., may be reflected. The Self, on the other
hand, is not a material thing, and, as it is present everywhere
and all is identical with it, there are no limiting adjuncts
different from it and occupying a different place. — There-
fore the instances are not parallel.
The next Sutra disposes of this objection.
20. Since (the highest Brahman) is inside (of the
limiting adjuncts), it participates in their increase
and decrease ; owing to the appropriateness (thus
resulting) of the two (things compared) it is thus
(i.e. the comparison holds good).
The parallel instance (of the sun's reflection in the water)
is unobjectionable, since a common feature — with reference
to which alone the comparison is instituted — does exist.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 21. 1 59
Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with
reference to some particular point they have in common.
Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated ;
indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end
of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison.
Nor does the sutrakara institute the comparison objected
to on his own account ; he merely sets forth the purport of
a comparison actually met with in scripture. — Now, the
special feature on which the comparison rests is ' the par-
ticipation in increase and decrease.' The reflected image
of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands ;
it contracts when the water shrinks ; it trembles when the
water is agitated ; it divides itself when the water is divided.
It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of
the water ; while the real sun remains all the time the same.
— Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never
changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states
of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it
abides ; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them
as it were, and so on. As thus the two things compared
possess certain common features no objection can be made
to the comparison.
2 1, And on account of the declaration (of
scripture).
Scripture moreover declares that the highest Brahman
enters into the body and the other limiting adjuncts, 'He
made bodies with two feet, he made bodies with four feet.
Having first become a bird he entered the bodies as
purusha' (Br/. Up. H, 5, tH) ; and 'Having entered into
them with this living (individual) Self {Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2).
— For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sutra
18 is unobjectionable.
Some teachers assume that the preceding discussion
(beginning from Sutra 11) comprises two adhikarawas, of
which the former discusses the question whether Brahman is
an absolutely uniform being in which all the plurality of the
apparent world vanishes, or a being multiform as the
apparent world is ; while the latter tries to determine
1 6o VEDANTA-st^TRAS.
whether Brahman — whose absolute uniformity was es-
tablished in the former adhikara;/a — is to be defined as
that which is (sat), or as thought (intelligence ; bodha), or as
both. — Against this we remark that in no case there is a
valid reason for beginning a second adhikarawa. For what
should be the subject of a special second adhikara;/a? Sutra
15 and foil, cannot be meant to disprove that Brahman
possesses a plurality of characteristics ; for that hypothesis
is already sufficiently disposed of in Sutras 11-14. Nor can
they be meant to show that Brahman is to be defined only
as ' that which is,' not also as ' thought ; ' for that would
imply that the scriptural passage, ' consisting of nothing
but knowledge' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 12), is devoid of meaning.
How moreover could Brahman, if devoid of intelligence, be
said to be the Self of the intelligent individual soul ?
Nor again can the hypothetical second adhikarawa be
assumed to prove that Brahman must be defined as
'thought' only, not at the same time as 'that which is;'
for if it were so, certain scriptural passages — as e.g. Ka.
Up. II, 6, 13, ' He is to be conceived by the words, He is ' —
would lose their meaning. And how, moreover, could we
admit thought apart from existence ? — Nor can it be said
that Brahman has both those characteristics, since that
would contradict something already admitted. For he who
would maintain that Brahman is characterised by thought
diff"erent from existence, and at the same time by existence
different from thought, would virtually maintain that there
is a plurality in Brahman, and that view has already been
disproved in the preceding adhikara;/a. — But as scripture
teaches both (viz. that Brahman is one only and that it
possesses more than one characteristic) there can be no
objection to such a doctrine ! — -There is, we reply, for one
being cannot possibly possess more than one nature. — And
if it finally should be said that existence is thought and
thought existence and that the two do not exclude each
other ; we remark that in that case there is no reason for
the doubt ^ whether Brahman is that which is, or intelligence,
' And hence no reason for a separate adhikara«a.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. l6l
or both. — On the other hand we have shown that the Stitias
can be explained as constituting one adhikara;za only. More-
over, as the scriptural texts concerning Brahman disagree in
so far as representing Brahman as qualified by form and
again as devoid of form we, when embracing the alternative
of a Brahman devoid of form, must necessarily explain the
position of the other texts, and if taken in that sense the
Sutras (15-21) acquire a more appropriate meaning. And
if it is maintained that those scriptural passages also which
speak of Brahman as qualified by form have no separate
meaning of their own, but likewise teach that Brahman is
devoid of all form, viz. by intimating that the plurality
referred to has to be annihilated ; we reply that this
opinion also appears objectionable. In those cases, indeed,
where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters
treating of the highest knowledge, we may assume them
to be mentioned merely to be abstracted from; so e.g. in
the passage, Brt. Up. II, 5, 19, 'His horses are yoked
hundreds and ten. This is the horses, this is the ten and
the thousands, many and endless,' which passage is
immediately followed by the words, ' This is the Brahman
without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside.' But where elements of plurality are referred
to in chapters treating of devout meditation, we have no
right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set
aside. This is the case e.g. in the passage, ' He who con-
sists of mind, whose body is prawa, whose form is light '
[Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 2), which is connected with an injunction
of devout meditation contained in the preceding passage,
' Let him have this will and belief In passages of the
latter kind, where the determinations attributed to Brahman
may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the
purposes of devout meditation, we have no right to assume
that they are mentioned with the indirect purpose of being
discarded. Moreover, if all texts concerning Brahman
equally aimed at discarding all thought of plurality, there
would be no opportunity for stating the determinative
reason (why Brahman is to be viewed as devoid of all
form) as was done in Sutra 14. And further scripture
[38] M
l62 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
informs us that devout meditations on Brahman as charac-
terised by form have results of their own, viz. either the
warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else
release by successive steps. All these reasons determine
us to view the passages concerning devout meditation on
the one hand and the passages concerning Brahman on the
other hand as constituting separate classes, not as forming
one whole. In what way moreover, we ask, could the two
classes of texts be looked upon as constituting one whole ?
— Our opponent will perhaps reply, 'Because we apprehend
them to form parts of one injunction, just as we do in the
case of the darjapur«amasa-sacrifice and the oblations
called pray^^as.' — But this reply we are unable to admit,
since the texts about Brahman, as shown at length under
I, I, 4, merely determine an existing substance (viz.
Brahman), and do not enjoin any performances. What
kind of activity, we moreover ask, are those texts, accord-
ing to our opponent's view, meant to enjoin ? For whenever
an injunction is laid upon a person, it has reference to
some kind of work to be undertaken by him. — Our oppo-
nent will perhaps make the following reply. The object
of the injunction iS; in the present case, the annihilation of
the appearance of duality. As long as the latter is not
destroyed, the true nature of Brahman is not known ; hence
the appearance of duality which stands in the way of true
knowledge must be dissolved. Just as the Veda prescribes
the performance of certain sacrifices to him who is desirous
of the heavenly world, so it prescribes the dissolution of
the apparent world to him who is desirous of final release.
Whoever wants to know the true nature of Brahman must
first annihilate the appearance of plurality that obstructs
true knowledge, just as a man wishing to ascertain the
true nature of some jar or similar object placed in a dark
room must at first remove the darkness. For the apparent
world has Brahman for its true nature, not vice versa ;
therefore the cognition of Brahman is effected through the
previous annihilation of the apparent world of names and
forms.
This argumentation we meet by asking our opponent
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 21. 1 63
of what nature that so-called annihilation of the ap-
parent world is. Is it analogous to the annihilation of
hardness in butter which is effected by bringing it into
contact with fire ? or is the apparent world of names and
forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience
to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a
double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is
removed by the application of medicine^? If the former,
the Vedic injunctions bid us to do something impossible ;
for no man can actually annihilate this whole existing
world with all its animated bodies and all its elementary
substances such as earth and so on. And if it actually
could be done, the first released person would have done it
once for all, so that at present the whole world would be
empty, earth and all other substances having been finally
annihilated. — If the latter, i.e. if our opponent maintains
that the phenomenal world is superimposed upon Brahman
by Nescience and annihilated by knowledge, we point out
that the only thing needed is that the knowledge of
Brahman should be conveyed by Vedic passages sublating
the apparent plurality superimposed upon Brahman by
Nescience, such as 'Brahman is one, without a second;'
' That is the true, it is the Self and thou art it.' {Kh. Up.
VI, 2, I ; 8, 7.) As soon as Brahman is indicated in this
way, knowledge arising of itself discards Nescience, and
this whole world of names and forms, which had been
hiding Brahman from us, melts away like the imagery of a
dream. As long, on the other hand, as Brahman is not
so indicated, you may say a hundred times, ' Cognize
Brahman ! Dissolve this world ! ' and yet we shall be
unable to do either the one or the other.
But, our opponent may object, even after Brahman has
been indicated by means of the passages quoted, there is room
for injunctions bidding us either to cognize Brahman or to
dissolve the world. — Not so, we reply ; for both these
^ I. e. does the injunction bidding us to annihilate the phenomenal
world look on it as real or as fictitious, due to Nescience only ?
M 2
164 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
things are already effected by the indication of the true
nature of Brahman as devoid of all plurality ; just as the
pointing out of the true nature of the rope has for its
immediate result the cognition of the true nature of the
rope, and the dissolution of the appearance of a snake or
the like. And what is done once need not be done again *.
— We moreover ask the following question : Does the
individual soul on which the injunction is laid belong to
the unreal element of the phenomenal world or to the real
element, i.e. Brahman, which underlies the phenomenal
world? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as
earth and the other elements are, as soon as the knowledge
of Brahman's true nature has arisen, and on whom then
should the dissolution of the world be enjoined, or who
should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release? — If
the latter, we are led to the same result. For as soon as
there arises the knowledge that Brahman, which never can
become the subject of an injunction, is the true being of the
soul while the soul as such is due to Nescience, there
remains no being on which injunctions could be laid, and
hence there is no room for injunctions at all.
What then, it may be asked, is the meaning of those
Vedic passages which speak of the highest Brahman as
something to be seen, to be heard, and so on ? — They aim,
we reply, not at enjoining the knowledge of truth, but
merely at directing our attention to it. Similarly in
ordinary life imperative phrases such as 'Listen to this!'
' Look at this ! ' are frequently meant to express not that we
are immediately to cognize this or that, but only that we
are to direct our attention to it. Even when a person is
face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge
may either arise or not ; all that another person wishing
to Inform him about the object can do is to point it out to
him ; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of
itself, according to the object of knowledge and according
*I. e. after the true nature of Brahman has been once known,
there is no longer room for a special injunction to annihilate this
apparent world.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 pAdA, 21. 1 65
to the means of knowledge employed. — Nor must it be
said that an injunction may have the purpose of modifying
the knowledge of a thing which was originally obtained by
some other means of knowledge ^. For the modified
knowledge due to such injunctions is not knowledge in the
true sense of the word, but merely a mental energy (i.e. the
product, not of an object of knowledge presented to us
through one of the means of true knowledge, but of an
arbitrary mental activity), and if such modification of
knowledge springs up in the mind of itself (i.e. without a
deliberate mental act) it is mere error. True knowledge
on the other hand, which is produced by the means of true
knowledge and is conformable to its object, can neither be
brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked
by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on
the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably
exists. — For this reason also injunctions of the knowledge
of Brahman cannot be admitted.
A further point has to be considered here. If we
admitted that injunctions constitute the sole end and aim
of the entire Veda, there would remain no authority for the,
after all, generally acknowledged truth that Brahman —
which is not subject to any injunction — is the Self of all.
— Nor would it be of avail to maintain that the Veda may
both proclaim the truth stated just now and enjoin on man
the cognition of that truth ; for that would involve the
conclusion that the one Brahma-.yastra has two — and more-
over conflicting — meanings. — The theory combated by us
gives moreover rise to a number of other objections which
nobody can refute ; it compels us to set aside the text as it
stands and to make assumptions not guaranteed by the
text ; it implies the doctrine that final release is, like the
results of sacrificial works, (not the direct result of true
knowledge but) the mediate result of the so-called unseen
^ The purvapakshin might refer e.g. to the Vedic injunction, * he
is to meditate upon woman as fire,' and maintain that the object of
this injunction is to modify our knowledge of woman derived from
perception &c., according to which a woman is not fire.
1 66 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
principle (adr/sh/a), and non-permanent &c. &c. — We
therefore again assert that the texts concerning Brahman
aim at cognition, not at injunction, and that hence the
pretended reason of ' their being apprehended as parts of
one injunction ' cannot induce us to look upon the entire
Veda as one whole.
And finally, even if we admitted that the texts concern-
ing Brahman are of an injunctive character, we should be
unable to prove that the texts denying plurality, and the
texts setting forth plurality enjoin one and the same thing ;
for this latter conclusion cannot be accepted in the face of
the several means of proof such as difference of terms ^, and
so on, which intimate that there is a plurality of injunctions.
The passages respectively enjoining the darj-apur/^amasa-
sacrifice and the offerings termed praya^as may indeed be
considered to form one whole, as the qualification on the
part of the sacrificer furnishes an element common to the
two ". But the statements about the Brahman devoid of
qualities and those about the qualified Brahman have not
any element in com.mon ; for qualities such as 'having light
for one's body' contribute in noway towards the dissolution
of the world, nor again does the latter help in any way the
former. For the dissolution of the entire phenomenal world
on the one hand, and regard for a part of that world on
the other hand do not allow themselves to be combined
in one and the same subject. — The preferable theory, there-
fore, is to distinguish with us two classes of texts^ accord-
ing as Brahman is represented as possessing form or as
devoid of it.
2 2. For (the clause 'Not so, not so') denies (of
Brahman) the suchness which forms the topic of
^ 'Difference of terms' (i-abdantaram) is according to the Purva
Mima7«sa the first of the six means of proof showing karmabheda
or niyogabheda. Cp. ^S'abara bhashya on II, i, i.
^ For the sacrifice as well as its subordinate part — the offering of
the praya^as — has to be performed by a sacrificer acting for one
end, viz. the obtainment of the heavenly world.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2. 1 67
discussion ; and (the text) enounces something more
than that.
We read, Bri. Up. II, 3, ' Two forms of Brahman there
are indeed, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and
the immortal, the solid and the fluid, sat and tya.' The
text thereupon divides the five elements into two classes,
predicates of the essence of that which is immaterial — which
it calls purusha — saffron-colour, and so on, and then goes on
to say, ' Now then the teaching by Not so, not so ! For
there is nothing else higher than this (if one says) : It is
not so.' Here we have to enquire what the object of the
negative statement is. We do not observe any definite
thing indicated by M^ords such as ' this ' or ' that ; ' we
merely have the word ' so ' in ' Not so, not so ! ' to which
the word ' not ' refers, and which on that account indicates
something meant to be denied. Now we know that the
word 'so' (iti) is used with reference to approximate things,
in the same way as the particle ' evam ' is used ; compare,
e.g. the sentence ' so (iti) indeed the teacher said ' (where the
'so' refers to his immediately preceding speech). And, in
our passage, the context points out what has to be con-
sidered as proximate, viz. the two cosmic forms of Brah-
man, and that Brahman itself to which the two forms
belong. Hence there arises a doubt whether the phrase,
' Not so, not so ! ' negatives both Brahman and its two
forms, or only either ; and if the latter, whether it negatives
Brahman and leaves its two forms, or if it negatives the two
forms and leaves Brahman. — We suppose, the purvapakshin
says, that the negative statement negatives Brahman as well
as its two forms; both being suggested by the context. As
the word ' not ' is repeated twice, there are really two nega-
tive statements, of which the one negatives the cosmic form
of Brahman, the other that which has form, i.e. Brahman
itself Or else we may suppose that Brahman alone is
negatived. For as Brahman transcends all speech and
thought, its existence is doubtful, and admits of being nega-
tived ; the plurality of cosmic forms on the other hand falls
within the sphere of perception and the other means of right
1 6 8 vedanta-sOtras.
knowledge, and can, therefore, not be negatived. — On this
latter interpretation the repetition of 'not' must be con-
sidered as due to emphasis only.
To this we make the following reply. It is impossible that
the phrase, ' Not so, not so ! ' should negative both, since
that would imply the doctrine of a general Void. When-
ever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to
something real; the unreal snake, e.g. is negatived with
reference to the real rope. But this (denial of something
unreal with reference to something real) is possible only if
some entity is left. If everything is denied, no entity is left,
and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which
we may wish to undertake, becomes impossible, i.e. that
latter entity becomes real and as such cannot be negatived.
— Nor, in the second place, can Brahman be denied ; for
that would contradict the introductory phrase of the chapter,
' Shall I tell you Brahman ? ' (Brz. Up. II, i, i) ; would show
disregard of the threat conveyed in Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He who
knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-
existing ; ' would be opposed to definitive assertions such
as ' By the words " He is "' is he to be apprehended ' (Ka.
Up. II, 6, 13); and would involve a stultification of the
entire Vedanta. — The phrase that Brahman transcends all
speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that
Brahman does not exist ; for after the Vedanta-part of
scripture has established at length the existence of Brahman
— in such passages as ' He who knows Brahman obtains the
highest ;' 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman ' — it cannot
be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence. For, as
the common saying is, ' Better than bathing it is not to touch
dirt at all.' The passage, ' from whence all speech with the
mind turns away unable to reach it ' (Taitt. Up. II, 4), must,
therefore, rather be viewed as intimating Brahman.
The passage of the B;x Up. under discussion has, there-
fore, to be understood as follows. Brahman is that whose
nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom ; it
transcends speech and mind, does not fiill within the cate-
gory of 'object,' and constitutes the inward Self of all. Of
this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms ; but
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2. 1 69
Brahman itself it leaves untouched. This the Sutra expresses
in the words, 'for it denies the suchness which forms the
topic of discussion.' That means : The passage ' Not so,'
&c., denies of Brahman the limited form, material as well
as immaterial, which in the preceding part of the chapter is
described at length with reference to the gods as well as the
body, and also the second form which is produced by the
first, is characterised by mental impressions, forms the
essence of that which is immaterial, is denoted by the term
purusha, rests on the subtle Self (lihgatman) and is described
by means of comparisons with saffron-colour, &c., since the
purusha, which is the essence of what is immaterial, does
not itself possess colour perceivable by the eye. Now these
forms of Brahman are by means of the word ' so ' (iti), which
always refers to something approximate brought into con-
nexion with the negative particle ' not.' Brahman itself, on
the other hand (apart from its forms), is, in the previous
part of the chapter, mentioned not as in itself constituting
the chief topic, but only in so far as it is qualified by its
forms ; this appears from the circumstance of Brahman
being exhibited in the genitive case only ('These are two
forms of Bralunaji '). Now, after the two forms have been
set forth, there arises the desire of knowing that to which
the two forms belong, and hence the text continues. ' Now
then the teaching by means of "Not so, not so."' This pas-
sage, we conclude, conveys information regarding the nature
of Brahman by denying the reality of the forms fictitiously
attributed to it ; for the phrase, ' Not so, not so ! ' negatives
the whole aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman.
Effects we know to have no real existence, and they can
therefore be negatived ; not so, however, Brahman, which
constitutes the necessary basis for all fictitious superimpo-
sition. — Nor must the question be asked here, how the
sacred text, after having itself set forth the two forms of
Brahman, can negative them in the end, contrary to the
principle that not to touch dirt is better than bathing after
having done so. For the text does not set forth the two
forms of Brahman as something the truth of which is to be
established, but merely mentions those two forms, which in
1 70 vedanta-sOtras.
the sphere of ordinary thought are fictitiously attributed to
Brahman, in order finally to neg^ative them and establish
thereby the true nature of the formless Brahman.
The double repetition of the negation may either serve
the purpose of furnishing a special denial of the material as
well as the immaterial form of Brahman ; or the first ' Not
so ' may negative the aggregate of material elements, while
the second denies the aggregate of mental impressions. Or
else the repetition may be an emphatic one, intimating that
whatever can be thought is not Brahman. This is, perhaps,
the better explanation. For if a limited number of things
are denied each individually, there still remains the desire
to know whether something else may not be Brahman ; an
emphatic repetition of the denial on the other hand shows
that the entire aggregate of objects is denied and that
Brahman is the inward Self; whereby all further enquiry
is checked. — The final conclusion, therefore, is, that the text
negatives only the cosmic plurality fictitiously superimposed
on Brahman, but leaves Brahman itself untouched.
The Sutra gives another argument establishing the same
conclusion, ' and the text enounces something more than
that,' i.e. more than "the preceding negation. The words
of the text meant are ' (not) is there anything beyond.' —
If the negation, ' Not so, not so ! ' were meant to negative
all things whatever, and this terminated in absolute non-
existence, the text could not even allude to ' anything
beyond.' — The words of the text are to be connected as
follows. After the clause, ' Not so, not so ! ' has given infor-
mation about Brahman, the clause next following illustrates
this teaching by saying : There is nothing beyond or sepa-
rate from this Brahman ; therefore Brahman is expressed
by ' Not so, not so ! ' which latter words do not mean that
Brahman itself does not exist. The implied meaning rather
is that different from everything else there exists the ' non-
negatived ' Brahman. — The w^ords of the text admit, how-
ever, of another interpretation also ; for they may mean
that there is no teaching of Brahman higher than that
teaching which is implied in the negation of plurality ex-
pressed by ' Not so, not so ! ' On this latter interpretation
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 24. 17I
the words of the Sutra, ' and the text enounces something
more than that,' must be taken to refer to the name men-
tioned in the text, ' Then comes the name, the True of the
True ; the senses being the True and he the True of them.'
— This again has a sense only if the previous negative
clause denies everything but Brahman, not everything but
absolute non-existence. For, if the latter were the case,
what then could be called the True of the True ? — We there-
fore decide that the clause, ' Not so, not so ! ' negatives not
absolutely everything, but only everything but Brahman.
23. That (Brahman) is unevolved ; for (thus
scripture) says.
If that highest Brahman which is different from the world
that is negatived in the passage discussed above really
exists, why then is it not apprehended? — Because, the
Sutrakara replies, it is unevolved, not to be apprehended by
the senses ; for it is the witness of whatever is apprehended
(i.e. the subject in all apprehension). Thus 5ruti says,
' He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech, nor by
the other senses^ not by penance or good works' (Mu. Up.
Ill, I, 8) ; 'That Self is to be described by No, no ! He is
incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended ' (Brz.
Up. HI, 9, 26); 'That which cannot be seen nor appre-
hended' (Mu. Up. I, I, 6); 'When in that which is invis-
ible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported ' &c. (Taitt. Up.
II, 7). Similar statements are made in Smrz'ti-passages;
so e. g. ' He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by
thought, unchangeable.'
24. And in the state of perfect conciliation also
(the Yogins apprehend the highest Brahman),
according to ^'ruti and Smritl.
At the time of perfect conciliation the Yogins see the
unevolved Self free from all plurality. By 'perfect con-
ciliation ' we understand the presentation before the mind
(of the highest Self), which is effected through meditation
and devotion. — This is vouched for by 6^ruti as well as
172 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Smritl. So, e.g. Ka. Up. IV, i, 'The Self-existent pierced the
openings of the senses so that they turn outward ; there-
fore man looks without, not within himself. Some wise
man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for
immortality, saw the Self within.' And Mu. Up. III. i, 8,
' When a man's mind has become purified by the serene
light of knowledge then he sees him, meditating on him
as without parts.' Smrz'ti-passages of the same tendency
are the following ones, ' He who is seen as light by the
Yogins meditating on him sleepless, with suspended breath,
with contented minds, with subdued senses ; reverence be
to him^l' and 'The Yogins see him, the august, eternal one.'
But if in the state of perfect conciliation there is a being
to be conciliated and a being conciliating, does not this
involve the distinction of a higher and a lower Self? — No,
the next Siitra replies.
25. And as in the case of (physical) light and the
like, there is non-distinction (of the two Selfs), the
light (i.e. the intelligent Self) (being divided) by
its activity ; according to the repeated declarations
of scripture.
As light, ether, the sun and so on appear differentiated
as it were through their objects such as fingers, vessels,
water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts^, while
in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiated-
ness ; so the distinction of different Selfs is due to limiting
adjuncts only, while the unity of all Selfs is natural and
original. For on the doctrine of the non-difference of the
individual soul and the highest Self the Ved^nta-texts
insist again and again ^
^ Whose Self is Yoga.
^ Light is differentiated as it were by the various objects on
which it shines ; the all-pervading ether is divided into parts as it
were by hollow bodies ; the sun is multiplied as it were by its
reflections in the water.
^ It certainly looks here as if the Bhashyakara did not know
what to do with the words of the Sutra. The ' karmawi,' which is
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 27. 1 73
26. Hence (the soul enters Into unity) with the
infinite (i.e. the highest Self) ; for this scripture
indicates.
Hence i. e. because the non-difference of all Selfs is
essential and their difference due to Nescience only, the
individual soul after having dispelled Nescience by true
knowledge passes over into unity with the highest Self. For
this is indicated by scripture, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9,
' He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even
Brahman ; ' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6, ' Being Brahman he goes to
Brahman.'
27. But on account of twofold designation, (the
relation of the highest Self to the individual soul
has to be viewed) like that of the snake to its coils.
In order to justify his own view as to the relation of the
conciliating individual soul and the conciliated highest Self,
the Sutrakara mentions a different view of the same matter.
— Some scriptural passages refer to the highest Self and
the individual soul as distinct entities, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. Ill,
1,8,' Then he sees him meditating on him as without parts,'
where the highest Self appears as the object of the soul's
vision and meditation ; Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8, ' He goes to the
divine Person who is greater than the great ; ' and Bri. Up.
Ill, 7, 15, ' Who rules all beings within ;' in which passages
the highest Self is represented as the object of approach
and as the ruler of the individual soul. In other places
again the two are spoken of as non-different, so e.g. K/t.
Up. VI, 8, 7, 'Thou art that;' Bri. Up. I, 4, 10, ' I am
Brahman;' Bri. Up. Ill, 4, i, 'This is thy Self who is
within all;' Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 15, 'He is thy Self, the ruler
within, the immortal.' — As thus difference and non-differ-
ence are equally vouched for by scripture, the acceptation
of absolute non-difference would render futile all those
as good as passed over by him, is explained by Go. An. as
' dhyanadikarmawy upadhau.' An. Gi. says, ' atmapraka.yai'abdi-
tOx^«anatatkarye karmawy upadhau savijeshas ' &c.
I 74 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
texts which speak of difference. We therefore look on the
relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to
that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the
snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference
appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect
posture and so on.
28. Or else like that of light to its substratum,
both beinor fire.
Or else the relation of the two may be viewed as follows.
Just as the light of the sun and its substratum, i.e. the sun
himself, are not absolutely different — for they both consist
of fire — and yet are spoken of as different, so also the soul
and the highest Self.
29. Or else (the relation of the two is to be
conceived) in the manner stated above.
Or else the relation of the two has to be conceived in
the manner suggested by Sutra 25. For if the bondage of
the soul is due to Nescience only, final release is possible.
But if the soul is really and truly bound — whether the soul
be considered as a certain condition or state of the highest
Self as suggested in Sutra 27, or as a part of the highest
Self as suggested in Sutra 28 — its real bondage cannot be
done away with, and thus the scriptural doctrine of final
release becomes absurd. — Nor, finally, can it be said that
Sruti equally teaches difference and non-difference. For
non-difference only is what it aims at establishing ; while,
when engaged in setting forth something else, it merely
refers to difference as something known from other sources
of knowledge (viz. perception, &c.). — Hence the conclusion
stands that the soul is not different from the highest Self,
as explained in Sutra 25.
30. And on account of the denial.
The conclusion arrived at above is confirmed by the fact
of scripture expressly denying that there exists any intel-
ligent being apart from the highest Self. Cp. ' There is no
other seer but he' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23). And the same
in ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3 1. I 75
conclusion follows from those passages which deny the
existence of a world apart from Brahman and thus leave
Brahman alone remaining, viz. ' Now then the teaching,
Not so, not so!' (Brz. Up. II, 3, 6); 'That Brahman is
without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside^ (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19).
31. Beyond (Brahman, there is something) further,
on account of the designations of bank, measure,
connexion, separation.
With reference to this Brahman which we have ascer-
tained to be free from all plurality there now arises the
doubt — due to the conflicting nature of various scriptural
statements — whether something exists beyond it or not.
We therefore enter on the task of explaining the true
meaning of those scriptural passages which seem to indicate
that there is some entity beyond, i.e. apart from Brahman.
The purvapakshin maintains that some entity must be
admitted apart from Brahman, because Brahman is spoken
of as being a bank ; as having size ; as being connected ;
as being separated. — As a bank it is spoken of in the
passage, K/i. Up. VIII, 4, i, 'That Self is a bank, a
boundary.' The word ' bank ' (setu) ordinarily denotes
a structure of earth, wood and the like, serving the purpose
of checking the flow of water. Here, being applied to the
Self, it intimates that there exists something apart from
the Self, just as there exists something different from an
ordinary bank. The same conclusion is confirmed by the
words, 'Having passed the bank' (VIII, 4, 3). For as in
ordinary life a man after having crossed a bank reaches
some place which is not a bank, let us say a forest ; so,
we must understand, a man after having crossed, i. e. passed
beyond the Self reaches something which is not the Self. —
As having size Brahman is spoken of in the following
passages, ' This Brahman has four feet (quarters), eight
hoofs, sixteen parts.' Now it is well known from ordinary
experience that wherever an object, a coin, e.g. has a
definite limited size, there exists something different from
that object; we therefore must assume that there also
I '](i VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
exists something different from Brahman. — Brahman is
declared to be connected in the following passages, ' Then
he is united with the True' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, i), and 'The
embodied Self is embraced by the highest Self (B;'/.
Up. IV, 3, 31 ). Now we observe that non-measured
things are connected with things measured, men, e.g.
with a town. And scripture declares that the individual
souls are, in the state of deep sleep, connected with
Brahman. Hence we conclude that beyond Brahman
there is something unmeasured. — The same conclusion
is finally confirmed by those texts which proclaim
difference, so e. g. the passage, I, 6, 6 ff. (' Now that
golden person who is seen within the sun' &c.), which at
first refers to a Lord residing in the sun and then mentions
a Lord residing in the eye, distinct from the former (' Now
the person who is seen within the eye '). The text dis-
tinctly transfers to the latter the form &c. of the former^
("The form of that person is the same as the form of the
other' &c.), and moreover declares that the lordly power of
both is limited, ' He obtains through the one the worlds
beyond that and the wishes of the devas ' &c. ; which is
very much as if one should say, ' This is the reign of the
king of Magadha and that the reign of the king of Videha.'
From all this it follows that there exists something
different from Brahman.
32. But (Brahman is called a bank &c.) on account
of (a certain) equality.
The word ' but ' is meant to set aside the previously
established conclusion. — There can exist nothing different
from Brahman, since we are unable to observe a proof for
such existence. That all existences which have a beginning
spring from, subsist through, and return into Brahman
we have already ascertained, and have shown that the
effect is non-different from the cause. — Nor can there
exist, apart from Brahman, something which has no
beginning, since scripture affirms that ' Being only this was
^ Which would be unnecessary if the two were not distinct.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3.'^. 1 77
in the beginning, one, without a second.' The promise
moreover that through the cognition of one thing every-
thing will be known, renders it impossible that there
should exist anything different from Brahman. — But does
not the fact that the Self is called a bank, &c. indicate
that there exists something beyond the Self? — No, we
reply ; the passages quoted by the purvapakshin have no
power to prove his conclusion. For the text only says
that the Self is a bank, not that there is something beyond
it. Nor are we entitled to assume the existence of some
such thing, merely to the end of accounting for the Self
being called a bank ; for the simple assumption of some-
thing unknown is a mere piece of arbitrariness. If, more-
over, the mere fact of the Self being called a bank implied
the existence of something beyond it, as in the case of an
ordinary bank, we should also be compelled to conclude
that the Self is made of earth and stones ; which would
run counter to the scriptural doctrine that the Self is not
something produced. — The proper explanation is that the
Self is called a bank because it resembles a bank in a
certain respect ; as a bank dams back the water and
marks the boundary of contiguous fields, so the Self
supports the world and its boundaries. The Self is thus
glorified by the name of bank because it resembles one. —
In the clause quoted above, ' having passed that bank,'
the verb ' to pass ' cannot be taken in the sense of ' going
beyond,' but must rather mean ' to reach fully.' In the
same way we say of a student, ' he has passed the
science of grammar,' meaning thereby that he has fully
mastered it.
33. (The statement as to Brahman having size)
subserves the purpose of the mind ; in the manner
of the four feet (quarters).
In reply to the purvapakshin's contention that the state-
ments as to Brahman's size, prove that there exists some-
thing different from Brahman, we remark that those state-
ments merely serve the purposes of the mind, i.e. of devout
meditation. — But how can the cognition of something con-
[38] N
178 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
sisting of four, or eight, or sixteen parts be referred to
Brahman? — Through its modifications (effects), we reply,
Brahman is assumed to be subject to measure. For as some
men are of inferior, others of middling, others again of
superior intelligence, not all are capable of fixing their mind
on the infinite Brahman, devoid of all effects. ' In the
manner of the four I'eet,' i.e. in the same way as [Kh. Up.
Ill, 18), for the purpose of pious meditation, speech and
three other feet are ascribed to mind viewed as the personal
manifestation of Brahman, and fire and three other feet to
the ether viewed as the cosmic manifestation of Brahman.
— Or else the phrase, ' in the manner of the four quarters,'
may be explained as follows. In the same way as to facili-
tate commerce, a karshapawa is assumed to be divided into
four parts — for there being no fixed rule as to the value of
bargains, people cannot always carry on their transactions
with whole karshapa;/as only — , (so, in order to facilitate
pious meditation on the part of less intelligent people, four
feet, &c., are ascribed to Brahman).
34. (The statements concerning connexion and
difference) are due to difference of place ; in the
manner of light and so on.
The present Sutra refutes the allegation that something
different from Brahman exists, firstly, because things are
said to be connected with Brahman, and secondly, because
things are said to be separate from it. The fact is, that all
those statements regarding connexion and difference are
made with a view to difference of place. When the cog-
nition of difference which is produced by the Selfs con-
nexion with different places, i.e. with the buddhi and the
other limiting adjuncts, ceases on account of the cessation
of those limiting adjuncts themselves, connexion with the
highest Self is metaphorically said to take place ; but that
is done with a view to the limiting adjuncts only, not with
a view to any limitation on the part of the Self. — In the
same way, all statements regarding difference have reference
to the difference of Brahman's limiting adjuncts only, not
to any difference affecting Brahman's own nature. — All this
Ill ADHVAYA, 2 PADA, 2)^. I 79
is analogous to the case of light and the like. For the light of
the sun or the moon also is differentiated by its connexion
with limiting adjuncts, and is, on account of these adjuncts,
spoken of as divided, and, when the adjuncts are removed, it
is said to enter into connexion (union). Other instances of
the effect of limiting adjuncts are furnished by the ether
entering into connexion with the eyes of needles and the
like.
35. And because (only such a connexion) is
possible.
Moreover, only such a connexion as described above is
possible. For scriptural passages, such as ' He is gone to
his Self (K/i. Up. VI, 8, i), declare that the connexion of
the soul with the highest Self is one of essential nature.
But as the essential nature of a thing is imperishable, the
connexion cannot be analogous to that of the inhabitants
with the town, but can only be explained with reference
to an obscuration, owing to Nescience, of the soul's true
nature. — Similarly the difference spoken of by scripture
cannot be real, but only such as is due to Nescience ; for
many texts declare that there exists only one Lord. Ana-
logously, scripture teaches that the one ether is made
manifold as it were by its connexion with different places
' The ether which is outside man is the ether which is
inside man, and the ether within the heart' (K/i. Up.
Ill, 12, 7 ff.).
36. (The same thing follows) from the express
denial of other (existences).
Having thus refuted the arguments of the purvapakshin,
the Sutrakara in conclusion strengthens his view by a
further reason. A great number of Vedic passages — which,
considering the context in which they stand, cannot be
explained otherwise — distinctly deny that there exists any-
thing apart from Brahman ; ' He indeed is below ; I am
below; the Self is below' {K/i. Up. VII, 25, i ; 2}; 'Who-
soever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self was
abandoned by everything' (Brz. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman
N 2
l8o VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, ii) ; 'The Self is all this'
{Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2) : 'In it there is no diversity' (Br/. Up.
IV, 4, 19) ; 'He to whom there is nothing superior, from
whom there is nothing different' (^'vet. Up. Ill, 9); 'This
is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without
anything inside or outside' (Brz. Up. II, 5, 19). — And that
there is no other Self within the highest Self, follows from
that scriptural passage which teaches Brahman to be within
everything (Bn. Up. II, 5, 19).
"^"j. Thereby the omnipresence (of Brahman is
established), in accordance with the statements about
(Brahman's) extent.
The preceding demonstration that the texts calling
Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally,
and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality
must be accepted as they stand, moreover, serves to prove
that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken
literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon
as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the
Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were
not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive
of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited. —
That the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts pro-
claiming its extent, &c., cp. iiT/z. Up. VIII, i, 3, 'As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart ; '
' Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal ; ' * He is
greater than the sky, greater than the ether' (5at. Br. X,
6, 3, 2) ; ' He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable '
(Bha. Gita II, 24) ; and other similar passages from .Sruti and
Smr/ti.
38. From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the
fruit (of works) ; for (that only) is possible.
We now turn to another characteristic belonging to
Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day
world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of
his rule. — There arises the question whether the threefold
fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 39. 181
sa;«sara-state — viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the
two — spring from the actions themselves or come from the
Lord. — The Sutrakara embraces the latter alternative,
on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler
of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsist-
ence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all
the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of
effecting all those modes of requital which are in accord-
ance with the merit of the agents ; actions, on the other
hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of
bringing about results at some future time, since nothing
can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be
overcome by the assumption that an action passes away
only after having produced some result according to its
nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy
that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such
only through being enjoyed by the agent ; only at the
moment when some pleasure or some pain— the result of
some deed — is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people
understand it to be a ' fruit.' — Nor, in the second place,
have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some
future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous
principle (apurva), which itself is supposed to be a direct
result of the deed ; for that so-called supersensuous
principle is something of non-intelligent nature, compar-
able to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act
unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover
there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an
apurva. — But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are
actually requited ? — By no means, we reply ; for the fact of
requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.
39. And because it is declareci by scripture.
We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions,
not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but
also because we have direct scriptural statement on our
side. Cp. e.g. the passage, ' This indeed is the great, unborn
Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth ' {Bri. Up. IV,
4, 24).
1 82 vedanta-sOtras.
40. 6^aimini (thinks) for the same reasons that
rehgioLis merit (is what brings about the fruits of
actions).
6^aimini bases a contrary opinion on the reasons specified
in the last two Sutras. Scripture, he argues, proclaims
injunctions such as the following one, ' He who is desirous
of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' Now as it is ad-
mitted that such scriptural injunctions must have an object,
we conclude that the sacrifice itself brings about the result,
i.e. the obtainment of the heavenly world ; for if this were
not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby
scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless. —
But has not this view of the matter already been aban-
doned, on the ground that an action which passes away as
soon as done can have no fruit? — We must, the reply is,
follow the authority of scripture and assume such a con-
nexion of action and fruit as agrees with scriptural state-
ment. Now it is clear that a deed cannot effect a result
at some future time, unless, before passing aw^ay, it gives
birth to some unseen result ; we therefore assume that
there exists some result which we call apurva, and which
may be viewed either as an imperceptible after-state of the
deed or as an imperceptible antecedent state of the result.
This hypothesis removes all difficulties, while on the other
hand it is impossible that the Lord should effect the results
of actions. For in the first place, one uniform cause
cannot be made to account for a great variety of effects ;
in the second place, the Lord would have to be taxed with
partiality and cruelty ; and in the third place, if the deed
itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless
to perform it at all. — For all these reasons the result
springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or non-
meritorious.
41. Badaraya;za, however, thinks the former (i. e.
the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of action),
since he is designated as the cause (of the actions
themselves).
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 4I. 1 83
The teacher Badarayawa thinks that the previously-
mentioned Lord is the cause of the fruits of action. The
word ' however ' sets aside the view of the fruit being pro-
duced either by the mere deed or the mere apurva. — The
final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord
acting with a view to the deeds done by the souls, or, if it
be so preferred, with a view to the apurva springing from
the deeds. This view is proved by the circumstance of
scripture representing the Lord not only as the giver of
fruits but also as the causal agent with reference to all
actions whether good or evil. Compare the passage, Kau.
Up. Ill, 8, ' He makes him whom he wishes to lead up
from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same makes
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a
bad deed.' The same is said in the Bhagavadgita (VII,
21), ' Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship
with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding
that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains
from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me.'
All Vedanta-texts moreover declare that the Lord is the
only cause of all creation. And his creating all creatures
in forms and conditions corresponding to — and retributive
of — their former deeds, is just what entitles us to call the
Lord the cause of all fruits of actions. And as the Lord
has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the
objections raised above — as to one uniform cause being
inadequate to the production of various effects, &c. — are
without any foundation.
1 84 vedanta-sOtras.
THIRD pAdA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
I. (The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedanta-
texts (are identical), on account of the non-difference
of injunction and so on.
In the preceding part of this work we have explained
the nature of the object of cognition, i. e. Brahman. We
now enter on the discussion of the question whether the
cognitions of Brahman, which form the subject of the
different Vedanta-texts, are separate cognitions or not.
But, an objection may here be raised, so far we have
determined that Brahman is free from all distinctions
whatever, one, of absolutely uniform nature hke a lump of
salt ; hence there appears to be no reason for even raising
the question whether the cognitions of Brahman are
separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition. For
as Brahman is one and of uniform nature, it certainly cannot
be maintained that the Vedanta-texts aim at establishing
a plurality in Brahman comparable to the plurality of
works (inculcated by the karmaka;/^a of the Veda). Nor
can it be said that although Brahman is uniform, yet it
may be the object of divers cognitions ; for any difference
in nature between the cognition and the object known
points to a mistake committed. If, on the other hand,
it should be assumed that the different Vedanta-texts aim
at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it would
follow that only one cognition can be the right one while
all others are mistaken, and that would lead to a general
distrust of all Vedanta. — Hence the question whether each
individual Vedanta-text teaches a separate cognition of
Brahman or not cannot even be raised. — Nor, supposing
that question were raised after all, can the non-difference of
the cognition of Brahman be demonstrated (as the Sutra
attempts) on the ground that all Vedanta-texts are equally
injunctions, since the cognition of Brahman is not of the
nature of an injunction. For the teacher has proved at
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, I. 1 85
length (I, I, 4) that the knowledge of Brahman is pro-
duced by passages which treat of Brahman as an existing
accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoining any-
thing.— Why then begin at all this discussion about the
difference or non-difference of the cognitions of Brahman ?
To all this we reply that no objection can be raised
against a discussion of that kind, since the latter has for its
object only the qualified Brahman and pra;^a and the like.
For devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like
acts, be either identical or different. Scripture moreover
teaches that, like acts, they have various results ; some of
them have visible results, others unseen results, and others
again — as conducive to the springing up of perfect know-
ledge— have for their result release by successive steps.
With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise
the question whether the individual Vedanta-texts teach
different cognitions of Brahman or not.
The arguments which may here be set forth by the
purvapakshin are as follows. In the first place it is known
that difference may be proved by names, as e.g. in the case
of the sacrificial performance called ' light ' (^yotis) ^. And
the cognitions of Brahman which are enjoined in the
different Ved^nta-texts are connected with different names
such as the Taittiriyaka, the Va^asaneyaka, the Kauthum-
aka, the Kaushitaka, the 5a/yayanaka, &c. — In the second
place the separateness of actions is proved by the difference
of form (characteristics; rupa). So e.g. Avith reference to
the passage, ' the milk is for the Vii-vedevas, the water for
the va^ins ^.'
' See the sawz^Mkntakarmabhedadhikarawa, Pu. Mi. Su. II, 2,
22, where the decision is that the word ^yotis (in ' athaisha ^yotir '
&c.) denotes not the ^yotish/oma but a separate sacrificial per-
formance.
"^ See Pu. Mi. Su. II, 2, 23. The offering of water made to the
divinities called va^in is separate from the offering of milk to the
Vijvedevas ; for the material offered as well as the divinity to
which the offering is 'made (i.e. the two rupa of the sacrifice)
differs in the two cases.
1 86 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Now similar differences of form are met with in the
Vedanta-texts ; the followers of one 6"akha, e. g. mention,
in the chapter called ' the knowledge of the five fires,' a
sixth fire, while other 5akhas mention five only ; and in
the colloquy of the prawas some texts mention a lesser,
others a greater number of organs and powers of the body.
— In the third place differences in qualifying particulars
(dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such
differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts ; only in
the Mu;/^aka-Upanishad. e. g. it is said that the science of
Brahman must be imparted to those only who have per-
formed the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. Ill,
2, lo). — In the same way the other reasons which are
admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repe-
tition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to
the different Vedanta-texts also. — We therefore maintain
that each separate Vedanta-text teaches a different cogni-
tion of Brahman.
To this argumentation of the purvapakshin we make the
following reply.— The cognitions enjoined by all the
Vedanta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference
of injunction and so on. The ' and so on ' refers to the
other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are
enumerated in the Siddhanta-sutra of the adhikara;?a
treating of the different 5akhas (Pu. Mi. II, 4, 9, ' (the act) is
one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form,
of injunction, and of name '). Thus, as the agnihotra
though described in different 5akhas is yet one, the same
kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of
the words, ' He is to offer ; ' so the injunction met with in
the text of the V%-asaneyins (Br/. Up. VI, i, i), ' He who
knows the oldest and the best,' &c., is the same as that
which occurs in the text of the K/iandogas, 'He who knows
the first and the best' {K/i. Up. V, i, 1). The connexion
of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the
same in both texts, 'He becomes the first and best among
his people.' In both texts again the cognition enjoined
has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge
is the true nature of the pra;^a which is characterised by
Ill ADHYAyA, 3 PADA, 2. 1 87
certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just
as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the
sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the
cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name,
viz. the knowledge of the pra«a. — For these reasons we
declare that the different Vedanta-texts enjoin identical
cognitions. — A similar line of reasoning applies to other
cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedanta-
text, so e. g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the know-
ledge of Vaijvanara, the knowledge of Sa^idilya. and so on.
— Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the
purvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are
not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the
Purva Mima;;2sa-sutras II, 4, 10 ff.
The next Sutra disposes of a doubt which may remain
even after the preceding discussion.
2. (If it be said that the vidyas are separate) on
account of the difference (of secondary matters),
we deny that, since even in one and the same vidya
(different secondary matters may find place).
In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit
that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally
intimated by all Vedanta-texts, because we meet with
differences in secondary matters (gu7/a). Thus the Va-
^asaneyins mention in their text of the knowledge of the
five fires a sixth fire ('And then the fire is indeed fire,'
Bri Up. VI, 2, 14), while the AV^andogas mention no sixth
fire but conclude their text of the pawMgnividya with
the express mention of five fires (' But he who thus knows
the five fires,' K/i. Up. V, 10, 10).
Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those
who admit that particular qualification (i. e. the sixth fire)
and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor
may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the
sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vidyi of the
AT/zandogas ; for that \yould contradict the number ' five '
expressly stated by them. — In the colloquy of the pra/zas
1 88 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
again the iT/zandogas mention, in addition to the most
important pra«a, four other pranas, viz. speech, the eye, the
ear, and the mind ; while the Va^asaneyins mention a fifth
one alsOj ' Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that
becomes rich in offspring and cattle' [Bri. Up. VI, i, 6). —
Now a difference of procedure in the point of addition and
omission effects a difference in the object known, and the
latter again effects a difference in the vidya, just as a
difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes
one sacrifice from another.
To this we make the following reply. — Your objection
is without force, since such differences of qualification
as are met with in the above instances are possible
even in one and the same vidya. In the AT/zandogya-
text a sixth fire is indeed not included ; yet, as five fires,
beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as
the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot
effect a split of the vidya ; not any more than the
atiratra-sacrifice is differentiated by the sho<^ai'in-rite
being either used or not-used. Moreover, the K/iandogya-
text also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage,
V, 9, 2, ' When he has departed, his friends carry him, as
appointed, to the fire.' — The Va^asaneyins, on the other
hand, mention their sixth fire (' and then the fire is indeed
fire, the fuel fuel,' &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the
fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which
runs through the description of the five fires with which the
heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified.
Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not
the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but)
is merely a remark about something already established
(known) ^. And even if we assume that the statement
about the sixth fire has the purpose of repres&nting that
fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be
inserted in the vidya of the KMndogas without any fear of
its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there ;
^ Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which
is known from perception.
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 3. 1 89
for that number is not an essential part of the injunction^,
but merely makes an additional statement regarding some-
thing known already from the text, viz. the five fires with
which the heavenly world and so on are identified '^. Simi-
larly nothing stands in the way of some additional quali-
fication being included in the vidya concerning the colloquy
of the pra«as and so on. The addition or omission of
some particular qualification is unable to introduce differ-
ence into the object of knowledge and thereby into the
knowledge itself; for although the objects of knowledge
may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same
time the knowing person are understood to be the same.
Hence the vidya also remains the same.
3. (The rite of carrying fire on the head Is an
attribute) of the study of the Veda (of the Athar-
vawikas) ; because in the Sama-lara (it is mentioned)
as being such. (This also follows) from the general
subject-matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the
Atharva;^ikas) is analogous to that of the libations.
With reference to the purvapakshin's averment that the
rite of carrying fire on the head is connected wdth the vidya
of the followers of the Atharva-veda only, not with any
other vidya, and that thereby the vidya of the Atharvawikas
is separated from all other vidyas, the following remarks
have to be made. — The rite of carrying fire on the head is
an attribute not of the vidya, but merely of the study of the
Veda on the part of the Atharvawikas. This we infer from
the circumstance that the Atharvawikas, in the book called
'Sama-^ara' which treats of Vedic observances, record the
above rite also as being of such a nature, i.e. as constituting
an attribute of the study of the Veda. At the close of the
Upanishad moreover we have the following sentence, ' A
^ I.e. the iOandogya-text contains no injunction that five fires
only are to be meditated upon.
"^ So that there stands nothing in the way of our amplifying our
meditation by the addition of a sixth fire.
IQO vedanta-sOtras.
man who has not performed the rites does not read this;'
here we conclude from the word ' this ' which refers to the
subject previously treated, and from the fact of ' reading '
being mentioned, that the rite is an attribute of the study of
the Upanishad of the Atharva;nkas (but has nothing to do
with the Upanishad itself). — But what about the immediately
preceding passage, ' Let a man tell this science of Brahman
to those only by whom the rite of carrying fire on the head
has been performed according to rule ? ' Here the rite in
question is connected with the science of Brahman, and as
all science of Brahman is one only, it follows that the rite
has to be connected with all science of Brahman ! — Not so,
we reply ; for in the above passage also the word ' this '
refers back to what forms the subject of the antecedent part
of the Upanishad, and that subject is constituted by the
science of Brahman only in so far as depending on a par-
ticular book (viz. the Mu;/(^aka-Upanishad); hence the rite
also is connected with that particular book only. — The
Sutra adds another illustrative instance in the words ' and as
in the case of the libations there is limitation of that.' As
the seven libations — from the saurya libation up to the
jataudana libation— since they are not connected with the
triad of fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with the
one fire which is taught in the Atharvan, are thereby en-
joined exclusively on the followers of the Atharvan ; so the
rite of carrying fire on the head also is limited to the study
of that particular Veda with which scriptural statements
connect it. — The doctrine of the unity of the vidyas thus
remains unshaken.
4. (Scripture) also declares this.
The Veda also declares the identity of the vidyas ; for all
Vedanta-texts represent the object of knowledge as one ;
cp. e.g. Ka. Up. I, 2, 15, 'That word which all the Vedas
record ;' Ait. Ar. Ill, 2, 3, 12, 'Him only the Bahyrtkas con-
sider in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial
fire, the K/iandogas in the Mahavrata ceremony.' — To quote
some other instances proving the unity of the vidyas : Ka.
Up. I; 6, 2, mentions as one of the Lord's qualities that he
Ill ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 5. I9I
causes fear; now this very same quality is referred to in
the Taitt. Up. II, 7, in order to intimate disapprobatfon of
those who are opposed to the absolute unity of that which
is, ' For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the
Self), there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him
who knows (A difference) and does not know (the oneness).'
— Similarly the Vaij'vanara, who in the Va^asaneyaka is
imaginatively represented as a span long, is referred to in
the K/2andogya as something well known, ' But he who
worships that Vaij-vanara Self which is a span long,' &c.
{K/i. Up. V, 18, i).
And as, on the ground of all Vedanta-texts intimating
the same matters, hymns and the like which are enjoined in
one place are employed in other places (where they are not
expressly enjoined) for the purposes of devout meditation, it
follows that all Vedanta-texts intimate also (identical) devout
meditations.
5. In the case of (a devout meditation) common
(to several ^'akhas) (the particulars mentioned in
each ^'akha) have to be combined, since there is no
difference of essential matter ; just as in the case of
what Is complementary to Injunctions.
[This Sutra states the practical outcome of the discussion
carried on in the first four Sutras.] It having been deter-
mined that the cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated
by all Vedanta-texts, it follows that as long as the cognition
is one and the same its specific determinations mentioned in
one text are to be introduced into other texts also where
they are not mentioned. For if the matter of these deter-
minations subserves some particular cognition in one place,
it subserves it in another place also, since in both places
we have to do with one and the same cognition. The
case is analogous to that of the things subordinate to
some sacrificial performance, as, e. g. the agnihotra. The
agnihotra also is one performance, and therefore its
subordinate members, although they may be mentioned in
different texts, have to be combined into one whole. — If the
192 vedanta-sCtras.
cognitions were separate, the particulars mentioned in
different texts could not be combined ; for they would be
confined each to its own cognition and would not stand to
each other in that relation in which the typical form of a
sacrifice stands to its modifications *. But as the cognitions
are one, things He differently. — The above Sutra will be
explained and applied at length further on, in Sutra 10 ff.
6. If it be said that (the udgitha vidya of the Br/.
Up. and that of the AV^and. Up.) are separate on
account (of the difference) of the texts ; we deny this
on the ground of their (essential) non-difference.
We read in the Va^asaneyaka I, 3, i, 'The Devas said,
well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means
of the Udgitha. They said to speech : Do thou sing out for
us. — Yes, said speech,' &c. The text thereupon relates how
speech and the other pra;/as were pierced by the Asuras
with evil, and therefore unable to effect what was expected
from them, and how in the end recourse was had to the
chief vital air, ' Then they said to the breath in the mouth :
Do thou sing for u^. — Yes, said the breath, and sang.' — A
similar story is met with in the K/ia.ndogya. I, 2. There we
read at first that ' the devas took the udgitha, thinking they
would vanquish the Asuras with it ; ' the text then relates
how the other pra;/as were pierced with evil and thus foiled
by the Asuras, and how the Devas in the end had recourse
to the chief vital air, ' Then comes this chief vital air ; on
that they meditated as udgitha.' — As both these passages
glorify the chief vital air, it follows that they both are in-
junctions of a meditation on the vital air. A doubt, how-
ever, arises whether the two vidyas are separate vidyds or
one vidya only.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that for the reasons
specified in the first adhikarawa of the present pada the two
^ The Purva Mimawsa teaches that all subordinate things which
the Veda prescribes for some typical sacrifice are eo ipso prescribed
for the modified forms of the sacrifice also.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 1 93
vidyds have to be considered as one. — But, an objection is
raised, there is a difference of procedure which contradicts
the assumption of unity. The Va^asaneyins represent the
chief vital air as the producer of the udgitha (' Do thou sing
out for us'), while the K/ia.ndoga.s speak of it as itself being
the udgitha (' on that they meditated as udgitha '). How
can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the
unity of the vidy^s ? — The difference pointed out, the purva-
pakshin replies, is not important enough to bring about
a separation of the two vidyas, since we observe that
the two both agree in a plurality of points. Both texts
relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting ;
both at first glorify speech and the other pra«as in their
relation to the udgitha, and thereupon, finding fault with
them, pass on to the chief vital air ; both tell how through
the strength of the latter the Asuras were scattered as
a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone.
And, moreover, the text of the Va^asaneyaka also co-
ordinates the chief vital air and the udgitha in the clause,
' He is udgitha ' (Brz. Up. I, 3, 23). We therefore have to
assume that in the K/ia.ndogya. also the chief prawa has
secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the udgitha.
— The two texts thus constitute one vidya only.
7. Or rather there is no (unity of the vidyas),
owing to the difference of subject-matter.
Setting aside the view maintained by the purvapakshin,
we have rather to say that, owing to the difference of sub-
ject-matter, the two vidyas are separate. — In the KMndogya.
the introductory sentence (I, i, i), ' Let a man meditate on
the syllable Om (as) the udgitha,' represents as the object
of meditation the syllable Om which is a part of the
udgitha ; thereupon proceeds to give an account of its
qualities such as being the inmost essence of all ('The full
account, however, of Om is this,' &c.) ; and later on tells,
with reference to the same syllable Om which is a part of
the udgitha, a story about the Gods and Asuras in which
there occurs the statement, ' They meditated on the udgitha
[38] O
194 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
as that breath \' If now we should assume ^ that the term
' udgitha ' denotes here the whole act of worship (not only
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha), and that
(in the passage, ' they meditated on the udgitha as that
breath') the performer of that worship, i.e. the Udgatrz-
priest, is said to be meditated upon as breath ; our inter-
pretation would be open to two objections : in the first
place it would be opposed to the introductory sentence
(which directly declares the syllable Om to be the object
of devotion) ; and in the second place it would oblige us
to take the word udgitha (in ' they meditated on the ud-
githa '), not in its direct sense, but as denoting by impli-
cation the udgatrz. But the rule is that in one and the
same connected passage the interpretation of later pas-
sages has to adapt itself to the earlier passages. We
therefore conclude the passage last quoted to teach that
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha is to be
meditated upon as prawa. — In the Va^asaneyaka on the
other hand there is no reason for taking the word udgitha
to denote a part of the udgitha only, and we therefore
must interpret it to denote the whole ; and in the
passage, 'Do thou sing out for us,' the performer of the
worship, i.e. the Udgatrz-priest, is described as pra«a.
In reply to the purvapakshin's remark that in the Va^sa-
neyaka also the udgitha and the pra;/a occur in co-ordi-
nation (in the passage, ' He is udgitha '), we point out that
that statement merely aims at showing that the Self of all
is that pra//a which the text wishes to represent as udgatr/.
The statement, therefore, does not imply the unity of the
two vidyas. Moreover, there also the term udgitha denotes
the whole act of worship (while in the K/iandogya. it denotes
the omkara only). Nor must it be said that the prd;/a can
' From which it appears that the A7iandogya enjoins throughout
a meditation on the syllable Om which is only a part of the
udgitha ; while the object of meditation enjoined in the Br/had-
arawyaka is the whole udgitha.
^ Viz. for the purpose of making out that the object of medita-
tion is the same in the -ff^andogya and the Br/had-ara«yaka.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 1 95
impossibly be an udgatri, and that on that account our inter-
pretation of the Brzhad-^ra//yaka passage is erroneous ; for
with a view to pious meditation scripture may represent
the prawa as udgatr/ as well as udgitha. And, moreover,
the Udg^trz actually performs his work by the strength of
his breath ; hence the prawa may be called udgatr/. In
accordance with this the text says (I, 3, 24), ' He sang it
indeed as speech and breath.' — And if we understand that
the text clearly intends to convey a difference of matter we
have no right to conclude from merely apparent similarities
of expression that only one matter is intended to be ex-
pressed. To quote an analogous instance from the karma-
kanda. : In the section relative to the unexpected rising of
the moon during the dari-a-sacrifice, as well as in the section
about the offering to be made by him who is desirous of
cattle, we meet with identical injunctions such as the follow-
ing one, ' He is to divide the grains into three portions,
and to make those of medium size into a cake offered on
eight potsherds to Agni the Giver,' &c. ; nevertheless it
follows from the difference of the introductory passages of
the two sections that the offerings to be made on account
of the moon's rising are indeed not connected with the
divinities of the dari-a-sacrifice (but do not constitute a new
sacrifice separate from the dar^a), while the section about
him who is desirous of cattle enjoins a separate sacrificial
performance ^. — Analogously a difference in the nature of
the introductory clauses effects a difference of the vidyas,
' As in the case of that which is greater than great.' That
means : Just as the meditation on the udgitha enjoined in
the passage, ' Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest ;
he is indeed the udgitha, greater than great, he is without
end ' (K/i. Up. I, 9, i), and the other meditation on the ud-
githa as possessing the qualities of abiding within the eye
and the sun, &c. {K/i. Up. I, 6), are separate meditations,
although in both the udgitha is identified with the highest
Self; so it is with vidyas in general. The special features
of different vidyas are not to be combined even when the
^ Cp. Taitt. Sarah. II, 5, 5, 2 ; Pu. Mi. Su. VI, 5, i.
O 2
196 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
vidy^s belong to one and the same 6"akha ; much less then
when they belong to different wSakhas.
8. If it be said (that the vidyas are one) on account
of (the identity of) name ; (we reply that) that is
explained (already) ; moreover that (identity of name)
is (found in the case of admittedly separate vidyas).
Here it might be said that after all the unity of the two
vidyas discussed must be admitted, since they are called by
one and the same name, viz. ' the science of the udgitha.'
— But this argument is of no avail against what has been
said under the preceding Sutra. The decision there advo-
cated has the advantage of following the letter of the
revealed text; the name ' udgitha-vidya ' on the other
hand is not a part of the revealed text, but given to the
vidyas for convenience sake by ordinary men for the reason
that the word ' udgitha ' is met with in the text. — More-
over, we observe that admittedly separate meditations such
as the two mentioned under the last Sutra have one and
the same name. Similarly altogether separate sacrificial
performances, such' as the agnihotra, the dari-apur/^amasa,
and so on, are all comprised under the one name Ka//^aka,
merely because they are recorded in the one book called
Ka//^aka. — Where, on the other hand, there is no special
reason for assuming the difference of vidyas, their unity may
be declared on the ground of identity of name ; as, e.g. in
the case of the Sawvargavidyas.
9. And on account of the (omkara) extending over
the whole (Veda), (the view that the term udgitha
expresses a specialisation) is appropriate.
In the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
(as) the udgitha,' the two words ' omkara ' and ' udgitha '
are placed in co-ordination ^. The question then arises
^ Samanadhikarawya, i.e. literally, 'the relation of abiding in a
common substratum.' — The two words are shown to stand in that
relation by their being exhibited in the same case.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9. 1 97
whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these
two words stand to each other is the relation of super-
imposition (adhyasa) or sublation (apavada) or unity
(ekatva) or specification (vij-esha;^a) ; for prima facie each
of these relations may present itself to the mind. — Adhyasa
takes place when the idea of one of two things not being
dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is
superimposed on that of the first thing ; so that together
with the superimposed idea the former idea remains
attached to the thing on which the second idea is super-
imposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman
superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the
latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out
by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the
superimposition of the idea of the god Vishwu on a statue
of Vish;^u. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea
of the udgitha may be superimposed on the omkara or the
idea of the omkara on the udgitha. — We, in the second
place, have apavada when an idea previously attached to
some object is recognised as false and driven out by the
true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when
the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the
Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later — and
expressed by judgments such as 'Thou art that' — that the
idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to
quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion
as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced
by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgitha
may drive out the idea of the omkara or vice versa. — The
relation would, in the third place, be that of ' unity ' if the
terms ' omkara ' and ' udgitha ' were co-extensive in mean-
ing ; just as the terms, ' the Best of the Twice-born,' ' the
Brahma/za,' ' the god among men,' all denote an individual
of the noblest caste. — The relation will, finally, be that of
specification if, there being a possibility of our understand-
ing the omkara in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas,
the term 'udgitha' calls up the idea of the sphere of action
of the udgatrz. The passage would then mean, ' Let a man
meditate on that omkara which is the udgitha,' and would
1 98 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
be analogous to an injunction such as ' Let him bring that
lotus-flower which is blue.'
All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and
as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the
question must remain an unsettled one.
To this purvapaksha-view the Sutra replies, 'And on
account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate.'
The word ' and ' stands here in place of ' but,' and is
meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out
of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable ;
the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be
adopted. — The objections lying against the first three
alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyasa we
should have to admit that the word which expresses the
idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense,
but in an implied sense ^ ; and we should moreover have to
imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind ^. Nor
can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as
scripture itself mentions it in the passage, 'He becomes
indeed a fulfiUer of desires' (I, i, 7); for this passage
indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the
udgitha on the omkara, but of the meditation in which the
omkara is viewed as the fulfilment of desires. — Against the
hypothesis of an apavada there likewise lies the objection
that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong know-
ledge can certainly not be alleged as such ; for we see no
reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkara
is udgitha and not omkara or vice versa should be bene-
ficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other
is moreover not even possible in our case ; for to the
omkara the idea of the omkara remains always attached,
and so to the udgitha the idea of the udgitha. The
passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true
^ I.e. in the present case we should have to assume that the word
udgitha means, by implication, the omkara. — Recourse may be had
to implied meanings only when the direct meaning is clearly
impossible.
"^ For a special adhyasa-meditation must be attended with a
special result.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 9. 1 99
nature of something, but at enjoining a meditation of a
certain kind. — The hypothesis of unity again is precluded
by the consideration that as in that case one term would
suffice to convey the intended meaning, the employment of
two terms would be purposeless. And moreover the term
' udgitha ' is never used to denote the omkara in its
connexion with the Rtg-veda. and Ya^ur-veda ; nor is the
word 'omkara' used to denote that entire second sub-
division of a saman which is denoted by the word ' udgitha.'
Hence it cannot be said that we have to do with different
words only denoting one and the same thing. — There thus
remains the fourth alternative, 'On account of its compris-
ing all the Vedas.' That means : In order that the omkara
may not be understood here as that one which comprises
all the Vedas, it is specified by means of the word ' udgitha,'
in order that that omkara which constitutes a part of the
udgitha may be apprehended. — But does not this inter-
pretation also involve the admission of implication, as
according to it the word ' udgitha ' denotes not the whole
udgitha but only a part of it, viz. the omkara ? — True, but
we have to distinguish those cases in which the implied
meaning is not far remote from the direct meaning
and those in which it is remote. If, in the present case,
we embrace the alternative of adhyasa, we have to
assume an altogether remote implication, the idea of one
matter being superimposed on the idea of an altogether
different matter. If, on the other hand, we adopt the
alternative of specification, the implication connected there-
with is an easy one, the word which in its direct sense
denotes the whole being understood to denote the part.
And that words denoting the whole do duty for words
denoting the part is a matter of common occurrence ; the
words ' cloth,' ' village,' and many others are used in this
fashion ^ — For all these reasons we declare that the appro-
priate view of the ^//andogya-passage is to take the word
' udgitha ' as specialising the term ' omkara ''^.'
^ We say, e.g. ' the cloth is burned,' even if only a part of the
cloth is burned.
2 We therefore, according to .Safikara, have to render the passage
200 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
lo. Those (qualities which are attributed to the
subject of a vidya in one .Sakha only) (are to be
inserted) in other places (also), since (the vidyas) are
non-different on the whole.
In the colloquy of the pra;/as recorded by the Va^asane-
yins and the K/iandogas the pra;?a, endowed with various
qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as
the object of meditation, and various qualities such as being
the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other
organs. And these latter qualities are in the end attributed
to the pra«a also, ' If I am the richest thou art the richest,'
&c. Now in other 5akhas also, as e.g. that of the Kaushi-
takins, the former set of qualities such as being the best and
so on is ascribed to the pra^^a (cp. Kau. Up. II, 14, 'Now
follows the Ni/«reyasadana,' &c.), but at the same time the
latter set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on, is
not mentioned. — The question then is whether those quali-
ties which are mentioned in some places only are, for the
purposes of meditation, to be inserted there also where
nothing is said about them.
They are not so -to be inserted, the purvapakshin main-
tains, on account of the employment of the word ' thus.' In
the Kaushitakin-text we meet with the clause, ' He who
knows thus, having recognised the pre-eminence in prawa.'
Now the word 'thus' which here indicates the object of
knowledge always refers to something mentioned not far off,
and cannot therefore denote a set of qualities mentioned in
other ^akhas only. We therefore maintain that each of
the colloquies of the pra;/as must be considered complete
with the qualities stated in itself.
To this we make the following reply. The qualities
mentioned in one text are to be inserted in the other cor-
responding texts also, ' Since on the whole they are non-
different,' i.e. because the prana-vidyas are recognised to be
the same in all essential points. And if they are the same,
under discussion as follows, ' Let a man meditate on the syllable
Om which is (i. e. which is a part of) the udgitha.'
HI ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, II. 20I
why should the quahties stated in one not be inserted in the
others also? — But how about the objection founded by the
purvapakshin on the employment of the word ' thus ? ' —
Although it is true, we reply, that the word ' thus ' in the
Kaushitakin-brahmawa does not denote the set of qualities
mentioned in the Va^asaneyin-brahmawa, yet that set of
qualities is denoted by the 'thus' met with in the Va^a-
saneyin-brahmawa, while the vidya is, as proved by us, one
and the same ; hence no difference has to be made between
qualities mentioned in one's own ^Sakha and qualities men-
tioned in another Sakha, as long as the vidya is one and the
same. Nor does this by any means imply a disregard of the
text of scripture, and the assumption of things not warranted
by the text. The qualities declared in one vS^kha are valid
for all scripture as long as the thing to which the qualities
belong is the same. Devadatta, who in his own country is
known to possess valour and certain other qualities, does
not lose those qualities by going to a foreign land, although
the inhabitants of that land may know nothing about them.
And through better acquaintance his qualities will become
manifest to the people of the foreign country also. Similarly
the qualities stated in one ^Sakha may, through special
application, be inserted in another 5akha. — Hence the attri-
butes belonging to one and the same subject have to be
combined wherever that subject is referred to, although
they may be expres.sly stated in one place only.
II. Bliss and other (qualities) as belonging to the
subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to
Brahman everywhere).
Those scriptural texts which aim at intimating the
characteristics of Brahman separately ascribe to it various
qualities, such as having bliss for its nature, being one mass
of knowledge, being omnipresent, being the Self of all and
so on. Now the doubt here presents itself whether in each
place where Brahman is spoken of we have to understand
only those qualities which actually are mentioned there,
or whether we have to combine all qualities of Brahman
mentioned anywhere.
/
202 VEDANTA-sC'TRAS.
The purvapakshin maintains that only the attributes
actually stated are to be understood as referred to in each
particular scriptural text. — But this view the Sutrakara dis-
cards by declaring that delight and all the other qualities
which belong to the subject, i.e. Brahman, are all of them
to be understood in each place. The reason for this conclu-
sion is the one given in Sutra lo. In all the passages treat-
ing of Brahman the subject to which the qualities belong is
one, non-different ; hence, as explained at length under the
preceding Sutra, the qualities attributed to Brahman in
any one place have to be combined wherever Brahman is
spoken of.
But in that case also such qualities as having joy for its
head, &c., would have to be ascribed to Brahman every-
where ; for we read in the Taittiriyaka with reference to the
Self consisting of Bliss, 'Joy is its head, satisfaction is its
right arm, great satisfaction its left arm, bliss is its trunk,
Brahman is its tail, its support' (II, 5).
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
12. (Such qualities as) joy being its head and so
on have no force (for other passages) ; for increase
and decrease belong to plurality (only).
Attributes such as having joy for its head and so on,
which are recorded in the Taittiriyaka, are not to be viewed
as having force with regard to other passages treating of
Brahman, because the successive terms, 'Joy,' ' Satisfaction,'
' Great Satisfaction,' ' Bliss,' indicate qualities possessing
lower and higher degrees with regard to each other and to
other enjoyers. Now for higher and lower degrees there is
room only where there is plurality ; and Brahman is without
all plurality, as we know from many scriptural passages
(' One only, without a Second'). — Moreover, we have already
demonstrated under I, i, 12, that having joy for one's head
and so on are qualities not of Brahman, but of the so-called
involucrum of delight. And further, those qualities are
attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of
fixing one's mind on it, not as themselves being objects of
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 3. 203
contemplation, and from this also it follows that they are
not valid everywhere^. — That the AMrya refers to them, in
the Sutra, as attributes of Brahman (while in reality they are
attributes of the anandamaya koj-a) is merely done for the
purpose of establishing a general principle to be extended
to all attributes of Brahman — also the undoubted ones —
which are stated with a view to a special form of meditation
only ; such as the quality of being that towards which all
blessings go [Kh. Up. IV, 15, 2), or he whose desires are true
{Kh. Up. VIII, 7, i). For those passages may all indeed
have to do with the one Brahman as the object of medi-
tation, but as owing to the different nature of the opening
sentences the meditations are different ones, the attributes
mentioned in any one are not valid for the others. The
case is analogous to that of two wives ministering to one
king, one with a fly-flap, the other with an umbrella ; there
also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of
ministration themselves are distinct and have each their
own particular attributes. So in the case under discussion
also. Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be
distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which
plurality is admitted, not to the highest Brahman raised
above all qualification. Such attributes therefore as having
true desires and the like which are mentioned in some
particular place only have no validity for other meditations
on Brahman.
1 3. But other (attributes are valid for all passages
relative to Brahman), the purport being the same.
Other attributes, however, such as bliss and so on which
scripture sets forth for the purpose of teaching the true
nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages
referring to Brahman ; for their purport, i.e. the Brahman
^ For if they are not real attributes of Brahman there is all the
less reason to maintain them to be universally valid. The mere
means of fixing the mind, moreover, are special to each separate
upasana.
204 vedanta-sOtras.
whose nature is to be taught, is one. Those attributes are
mentioned with a view to knowledge only, not to meditation.
14. (The passage, Ka///aka I, 3, 10, gives informa-
tion about the person) for the purpose of pious
meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of
the objects being higher than the senses and so on).
We read in the Ka///aka (I, 3, 10), ' Higher than the senses
are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind,
&c. &c. ; higher than the person there is nothing — this is
the goal, the highest road.' — Here the doubt arises whether
the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the
things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding
one, or only that the person is higher than all of them.
The purvapakshin maintains the former alternative, for
the reason that the text expressly declares the objects to be
higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects
and so on.
The objection that the assumption of the passage intend-
ing to represent many things as successively superior to
their antecedents would involve a so-called split of the
sentence, he meets by the remark that the passage may be
viewed as containing a plurality of sentences. Many sen-
tences may represent many things as superior to their
antecedents, and hence each clause of the passage must be
viewed as containing a separate statement of the superiority
of something to other things.
To this we reply as follows.
We must assume that the whole passage aims at intimat-
ing only that the person is higher than everything. Any
information as to the relative superiority of the preceding
members of the series would be devoid of all purpose ; for
of the knowledge derived from such observation a use is
neither to be seen nor declared by scripture. Of the know-
ledge, on the other hand, of the person being higher than
the senses and everything else, raised above all evil, we do
see a purpose, viz. the accomplishment of final release. And
so scripture also says, ' He who has perceived that is freed
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 6. 205
from the jaws of death' (I, 3, 15). Moreover, the text by
declaring that nothing is higher than the person and that he
is the highest goal intimates reverence for the person, and
thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated
only to the end of giving information about the person. —
' For the purpose of pious meditation,' i.e. for the purpose
of perfect knowledge which has pious meditation for its
antecedent. For the passage under consideration does not
teach pious meditation by itself.
15. And on account of the word ' Self.'
The above conclusion is confirmed by the circumstance
that the person under discussion is called the Self in I,
3, 12, 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not
shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their
sharp and subtle intellect.' From this we conclude that
the text wishes to represent the other beings enumerated
as the Non-Self. The passage quoted, moreover, indicates
that the person is hard to know, and to be reached by sharp
minds only. — Again, the passage (I, 3, 13), 'A wise man
should keep down speech and mind,' enjoins pious medi-
tation as a means of the knowledge of the highest person,
as we have explained under I, 4, i. — It thus follows that
scripture indicates various excellences in the case of the
purusha only, and not in that of the other beings enu-
merated.— The passage, moreover, ' He reaches the end of
his journey and that is the highest place of Vish/m,' sug-
gests the question as to who is the end of the journey
and so on, and we therefore conclude that the enumera-
tion of the senses, objects, &c., has merely the purpose of
teaching the highest place of Vish;/u (not of teaching any-
thing about the relation of the senses, objects, and so on).
16. The (highest) Self has to be understood (in
Ait. Ar. II, 4, i), as in other places; on account of
the subsequent (qualification).
We read in the Aitareyaka (II, 4, i), 'Verily, in the
beginning all this was Self, one only ; there was nothing
206 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth
worlds ? He sent forth these worlds, the (heavenly) waters,
the rays, the mortal (earth), and water.' — Here the doubt
presents itself whether the term 'Self denotes the highest
Self or some other being.
The purvapakshin maintains the latter view, which is
borne out, he says, by an examination of the connected
sense of the whole passage. — But, an objection is raised, an
examination of that kind rather leads to the conclusion that
the highest Self is meant ; for the passage says that before
the creation the Self only existed and that the creation was
preceded by thought. — No such conclusion is possible, the
purvapakshin replies, since the passage relates the creation
of the worlds. If it aimed at representing the highest Self
as the creator, it would speak of the creation of the elements,
of which the worlds are only certain combinations. That
the worlds are meant by the terms ' water,' &c., appears
from the subsequent clause (4), ' That water is above the
heaven,' &c. — Now vSruti and Smr/ti teach that the creation
of the worlds is accomplished by some inferior Lord dif-
ferent from — and superintended by— the highest Self; cp.
e.g. Bri. Up. 1,4, i, '*In the beginning this was Self alone, in
the shape of a person,' and the Smrz'ti-passage, ' He is the
first embodied soul, he is called the person ; he the prime
creator of the beings was in the beginning evolved from
Brahman.' And the Aitareyins themselves record in a pre-
vious prakara;/a (II, i, 3, i, ' Next follows the origin of
seed. The seed of Pra^apati are the Devas ') that this
manifold creation was accomplished by Pra^apati. That
to the latter being the word 'Self is sometimes applied
appears from the passage quoted above from the Brz. Up.
And Pra^apati also may be spoken of as being before the
creation one only, if we consider that then his products did
not yet exist ; and thought also may be ascribed to him as
he, of course, is of an intelligent nature. Moreover, the
passages, ' He led a cow towards them ; he led a horse
towards them ; he led man towards them ; then they said,'
&c. (11,4, 2, 2), which are in agreement with what is known
about the various activities of particular qualified Selfs be-
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7. 207
longing to the apparent world, show that in the Aitareyaka
also some such qualified Self is meant.
To this we reply that the highest Self is meant in the Aita-
reyaka 'as in other places.' As in other accounts of the
creation (' From that Self ether was produced,' Taitt. Up. II,
I, &c.) the highest Self has to be understood, and, as in other
cases where the term 'Self is applied to particular Selfs, the
' Self within ' (i.e. the highest Self) has to be understood in
the first place ; so it is here also. — In those passages, on the
other hand, where the Self is qualified by some other attri-
bute, such as ' having the shape of a person,' we must un-
derstand that some particular Self is meant. — In the Aitare-
yaka, however, we meet with a qualification, subsequent to
the first reference to the Self, which agrees only with the
highest Self; we mean the one implied in the passage, 'He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these
worlds.' — Hence we maintain that the highest Self is
meant.
1 7. Should it be said that on account of the con-
nected meaning (of the whole passage) (the highest
Self cannot be meant) ; (we reply that) it is so, on
account of the assertion.
We now have to refute the objection, made above by the
purvapakshin, that the highest Self cannot be meant ' on
account of the connected meaning of the passage.' — The
Sutrakara remarks, ' It is so, on account of the assertion.'
That means : It is appropriate to understand the passage
as referring to the highest Self, because thus the assertion
that the Self, previously to the creation, was one only, gives
a fully satisfactory sense, while on the other interpretation
it would be far from doing so. The creation of the worlds
recorded in the Aitareyaka we connect with the creation of
the elements recorded in other Vedic texts, in that way that
we understand the worlds to have been created subsequently
to the elements; just as we showed above (11,4, 1) that
the passage, ' It sent forth fire,' must be understood to say
that the creation of fire followed on the creation of ether
2o8 vedAnta-sCtras.
and air as known from other texts. For, as proved by us
before, particulars mentioned in one scriptural text have to
be combined with particulars mentioned in other texts, if
only the chief subject of the passages is the same. — The
details about the activity of the Self referred to by the pur-
vapakshin have likewise to be understood in such a way as
to agree with the general matter about which the text de-
sires to make assertions. For we must by no means assume
that the text is interested in setting forth all the details of
the story on their own account ; the knowledge of them
would be in no way beneficial to man. The only thing the
text really means to teach is the truth that Brahman is the
Self of everything. Hence it first relates how the different
w^orlds and the guardians of the worlds, viz. Agni and so
on, were created ; explains thereupon the origination of the
organs and the body, their abode ; and shows how the
creator having thought, ' How can all this be without me ? '
(H, 4, 3, 4), entered into this body, ' Opening the suture of
the skull he got in by that door' (7). Then again the text
relates how the Self after having considered the activities
of all the organs (' if speech names,' &c. ; 6) asked himself
the question, 'What am I?' and thereupon 'saw this person
as the widely spread Brahman' (10). The aim of all which
is to declare that Brahman is the universal Self. The same
truth is inculcated in a subsequent passage also, viz. H, 6,
ij 5; 6, where the text at first enumerates the whole aggre-
gate of individual existences together with the elements,
and then continues, 'All this is led by knowledge (i.e. the
highest Self) ; it rests on knowledge. The world is led by
knowledge, knowledge is its rest, knowledge is Brahman.'
— For all these reasons the view that the highest Brahman
is meant in the Aitareyaka is not open to any objections.
The two preceding Sutras may also be explained with
reference to some other Vedic passages. We read in the
Va^asaneyaka (Brz. Up. IV, 3, 7), ' Who is that Self? —
He who is within the heart, surrounded by the pra;zas,
consisting of knowledge, the person of light.' Of the Self
here first mentioned the text goes on to show that it is
free from all contact and thus proves it to have Brahman
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7. 209
for its Self, the concluding statement being, ' This great
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
indeed Brahman ' (IV, 4, 25). — In the K/ikndogya. again
we have a chapter in which the introductory statement
does not use the term ' Self'' (' Being only this was in the
beginning, one, without a second '), while at the conclusion
the term 'Self"" is used in the declaration of identity ('That
is the Self. Thou art that'). — A doubt here arises whether
these two scriptural texts treat of the same matter or not.
• They do not, the purvapakshin maintains, since they are
not equal. Since the determination of the sense depends
on the letter of the text, we have no right to maintain
equality of sense where the texts differ. In the Va^asa-
neyaka the initial statement about the Self shows that the
whole passage conveys instruction about the true nature of
the Self. In the K/iandogya., on the other hand, the initial
clause is of a different kind, and we therefore must assume
that the whole passage imparts instruction differing in nature
from that of the Va^asaneyaka. — But has it not been said
that the iT/^andogya-passage also teaches in the end the
doctrine of universal identity with the Self? — That has been
said indeed (but wrongly) ; for as the concluding passage
must be made to agree with the initial passage (which latter
does not say anything about the identity of the Self and
Brahman), we assume that the concluding passage merely
enjoins an imaginative combination (sampatti) of the Self
and Brahman.
To this we reply that also the passage, ' Being only this
was in the beginning,' has to be understood as referring
to the Self; 'as other places,' i.e. in the same way as
the passage quoted from the Va^asaneyaka. For what
reason? — 'On account of the subsequent (statement),' viz.
the statement as to identity. And if it be said that ' on
account of the connected meaning ' of the initial passage
in which no mention is made of the Self, the chapter
cannot be understood to refer to the Self; we reply 'that
it may be so understood on account of the assertion ' made
in the passage about that ' by which we hear what is not
heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not
[38] P
2IO VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
known.' For this passage asserts that through the know-
ledge of one thing all things become known, and to make
good this assertion the text later on declares that ' Being
onh^ this was,' &c. Now this knowledge of all things
through one thing is possible only if we understand the pas-
sage last quoted to refer to the Self; for if the principal
Self were not known, how could all things be known?
Moreover the assertion that, before creation, there existed
one thing only, and the reference to the individual soul
by means of the word ' Self,' and the statement that in
deep sleep the soul becomes united with the True, and the
repeated inquiries on the part of 5vetaketu, and the
repeated assertions, ' Thou art that.'^all this is appropriate
only if the aim of the whole section is not to enjoin an
imaginative meditation on all things as identical with the
Self, but to teach that the Self really is everything. — Nor
must it be said that, in the section under discussion, the
concluding passage must be interpreted so as to agree
with the introductory clause (and cannot on that account
teach anything about the Self) ; for the introductory
passage declares neither that the Self is everything, nor
that the Non-self is everything (but merely makes a
statement regarding what is in general), and such an
altogether general statement cannot be in conflict with
any particular statement made in a supplementary passage,
but rather is in want of some such particular statement
whereby to define itself^. — And moreover (to view the
matter from a different point of view), the word ' Being '
if looked into closely can denote nothing else but the
principal Self, since we have proved, under II, i, 14, the
unrealit}' of the whole aggregate of being different from
the Self. — Nor, finally, does a difference of expression
necessarily imply a difierence of sense ; not any more than
in ordinary language the two phrases, ' Bring that vessel
^ I.e. the definite statement about the Self in the concluding
passage may be used for defining the sense of the indefinite initial
statement about that which is. 'That which is' comprises the
Self as well as the Not-Self.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 211
over there,' and, 'That vessel over there, bring it,' have
different meanings. — It therefore remains a settled con-
clusion that in texts such as discussed above, the matter
of instruction is the same, however much the mode may-
vary in which the instruction is conveyed.
1 8. As (scripture where speaking of the rinsing of
the mouth with water) makes a reference to an act
(established by Smr/ti), (that act is not enjoined by
6ruti, but rather) the new (act of meditation on the
water viewed as the dress of pra;^a).
The ir//andogas as well as the Va^asaneyins record, in
the colloquy of the prawas, that the food of Breath com-
prizes everything even unto dogs and birds, and that water
is its dress. To this the K/iandogSLS add, ' Therefore when
going to eat food they surround it before and after with
water' (K/i. Up. V, 2, 2). And the Va^asaneyins add
(BW. Up. VI, 1, 14), '.Srotriyas who know this rinse the
mouth with water when they are going to eat and rinse
the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking that
thereby they make the breath dressed. Therefore a man
knowing this is to rinse the mouth with water when going
to eat and after having eaten ; he thereby makes that
breath dressed.' — These texts intimate two things, rinsing
of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed.
The doubt then arises whether the texts enjoin both these
matters, or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the
meditation on breath as dressed.
The purvapakshin maintains that the text enjoins both,
since the one as well as the other is intimated by the text,
and since both matters not being settled by any other
means of knowledge are worthy of being enjoined by the
Veda. — Or else, he says, the rinsing of the mouth only is
enjoined, since with reference to the latter only the text
exhibits the particular injunctive verbal form ('he is to
rinse '). In this latter case the mention made in the text
of the meditation on breath as dressed has merely the
purpose of glorifying the act of rinsing.
P 2
212 VEDANTA-sOtRAS.
To this we make the following reply. — The rinsing of
the mouth cannot possibly be enjoined by the quoted
passages ' since they merely contain references to an act,'
i.e. since they merely contain remarks concerning the
purificatory act of rinsing the mouth which is known from
and settled by Smr/ti. — But are not the very 6"ruti-passages
under discussion to be looked upon as the fundamental texts
on which the Smrzti-injunctions regarding the rinsing of
the mouth are based ? — This is not possible, we reply, since
the ^'ruti and Smrz'ti-passages refer to different matters.
All the Smr/ti-passages enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth
only in so far as it purifies man ; while the quoted Sruti
texts which occur in pra;/a-vidy^s, if enjoining the rinsing of
the mouth at all, enjoin it with reference to the knowledge
of pra;/a. And a 6"ruti-passage cannot constitute the basis
of a Smr/ti-passage referring to an altogether different
matter. Nor can it be maintained that the ^ruti-passage
enjoins some altogether new rinsing of the mouth connected
with the prawa-vidya, as we recognise the rinsing mentioned
in 6"ruti as the ordinary rinsing performed by men for the
sake of purification. — The preceding argumentation already
precludes the alternative of two matters being enjoined,
which would moreover lead to a so-called split of the sen-
tence.— We therefore conclude that the text — with reference
to the rinsing of the mouth before and after eating which is
enjoined by Smritl — enjoins (by means of the passage,
'thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed') a
new mental resolve with regard to the water used for rinsing
purposes, viz. that that water should act as a means for
clothing the pra/za. The statement about the clothing of the
pra;/a cannot (as suggested by the purvapakshin) be taken
as a glorification of the act of rinsing the mouth ; for in the
first place the act of rinsing is not enjoined in the Vedic
passage ', and in the second place we apprehend that the
passage itself conveys an injunction, viz. of the mental
' A glorifying arthavada-passage would be in its place only if
it were preceded by some injunction; for the glorification of
certain acts is meant to induce men to comply with the injunctions
concernino: those acts.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8. 213
resolve to provide clothing for the pra«a. Nor must the
objection be raised that in that case two purposes are
admitted for the one act of rinsing the mouth, viz. the
purpose of purification and the purpose of providing the
pra«a with clothing. For we have actually to do not with
one action, but with two separate actions. For one action
is the rinsing of the mouth which serves the purpose of
purifying man, and another action is the mental resolve
that that water should serve the purpose of clothing the
pra;/a. Similarly the preceding passage, ' Whatever there
is, even unto dogs, &c., that is thy food,' does not enjoin
the promiscuous use of food of all kinds — for that would be
contrary to scripture and impossible in itself — but merely
enjoins the meditation on all food as food of the prawa. We
therefore conclude that also the passage, ' Water is thy dress,'
which forms the immediate continuation of the passage last
quoted does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth but
merely the act of meditating on the rinsing-water as con-
stituting the dress of the prawa.
Moreover the mere present-form, ' they rinse the mouth
with water,' has no enjoining force. — But also in the passage,
'They think that thereby they make the breath dressed,' we
have a mere present-form without injunctive power (and yet
you maintain that that passage conveys an injunction}! —
True ; but as necessarily one of the two must be enjoined^,
we assume, on the ground of what the text says about the
making of a dress, that what is enjoined is the meditation
on water being the dress of prawa ; for this is something
'new,' i.e. not established by other means of knowledge^.
The rinsing of the mouth with water, on the other hand, is
already established by other means (i.e. Smrz'ti), and there-
fore need not be enjoined again. — The argument founded
■^ Because otherwise we should have only arlhavadas. But
arthavadas have a meaning only in so far as connected with an
injunction.
^ The above argumentation avails itself of the Sutra, putting a
new construction on it. — Tarhi dvayor avidheyatvam ity a^ahkyanu-
vadamatrasya^ki?7/Jitkaratvad anyataravidher avajyakatve samkalpa-
nam eva vidheyam iti vidhantarewa sutrafji yo^ayati. An. Gi.
2 I 4 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
by the purvapakshin on the circumstance that, in the Bri.
Up., the verb 'to rinse' is found in the injunctive form
(' therefore a man, &c., is to rinse '), is already refuted by
our showing that the act of rinsing the mouth is not a new
one (and therefore requires no Vedic injunction).
For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoin-
ing the rinsing of the mouth, the Ka/^vas (in their recension
of the Br/. Up.) conchide the chapter with the clause, ' They
think,' &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the
Madhyandinas, 'Therefore a man,' &c. From this we have
to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Madhy-
andinas also is ' the knowledge of that,' i. e. the knowledge
of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned
pra;/a. — Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place
(i.e. the M^dhyandina-jakha) the rinsing of the mouth
is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water
as the dress of pra;/a ; for the introductory passage, ' Water
is the dress,' is the same everywhere. — We are therefore
entitled to conclude that w^hat is enjoined in all vSakhas is
the cognition of water being the dress of the prawa.
19. In the same (^'akha also) it is thus (i.e. there
is unity of vidya), on account of the non-difference
(of the object of meditation).
In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Va^asaneyi-j-akha
there is a vidya called the 6'a;/^ilya- vidya, in which we
meet with the following statement of particulars, ' Let him
meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the
prawa for its body and light for its form,' &c. — In the Bri-
had-ara;/yaka again, which belongs to the same .Sakha, we
read (V, 10, 6), ' That person consisting of mind, whose being
is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or
barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all — he rules all
this whatsoever exists.' — A doubt here presents itself
whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidya in
which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be
combined or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two
separate vidyas whose particulars cannot be combined. For
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 215
Otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the
reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do
with texts belonging to different 5akhas we can rebut the
charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the
texts are read and known by separate classes of men ; we
can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the
particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned
in the others ; so e.g. in the colloquy of the pra/zas. On the
other hand, texts belonging to one and the same 5akha
cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same
persons study and know them, and passages occurring in
different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidya.
Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the
texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one
text to enjoin the vidya and that of the other to enjoin the
particulars of the vidya. For in that case each of the
two passages would mention only such particulars as are
not mentioned in the other one ; while as a matter of
fact particulars common to both as well as not common to
both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the
one passage are not to be combined with those of the other.
To this we make the following reply. Just as passages
met with in different vSakhas form one vidya in which the
different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages
under discussion also, although belonging to one and the
same 6"akha, constitute one vidya only, since the object of
meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise
Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of
mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes
the character of a meditation ; as long as there is no differ-
ence of character we cannot determine difference of vidya ;
and if there is no difference of vidya the particulars men-
tioned in different places cannot be held apart. — But has it
not been demonstrated above that the vidyas have to be
held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise ? — Tautology
does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be
understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them
enjoining the vidya, and the other the particulars of the
vidya. — But in that case the Br/had-ara;/yaka ought to
2 1 6 vedanta-sOtr AS.
mention only those points which are not mentioned in the
Agnirahasya, as e.g. ' he is the Lord of all ; ' while it ought
not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agni-
rahasya, as e. g. the Self's consisting of mind ! — Not so, we
reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is
already mentioned in the other passage enables us to
recognise the vidya. The Brzliad-araz/yaka-passage, by
mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to
recognise the 5a;z^ilya-vidya, and then teaches certain
particulars with reference to the latter ; how otherwise
should we know that the Brz.-passage is meant to enjoin
particulars for the vSa;/('/ilya-vidya ? Moreover, as in a
passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it
teaches something not yet established, a reference to some-
thing already established is justified on the ground of its
being a (so-called) nityanuvada, we cannot overlook the
recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one)
which is rendered possible through that anuvada. Hence,
although the two passages belong to one and the same
5akha, they yet constitute one vidya only, and their particu-
lars have to be combined into one whole.
20. Thus in other cases also, on account of the con-
nexion (of particulars with one and the same vid} a).
We read in the Brzliad-ara/^yaka (V, 5), 'The true is
Brahman,' and, further on, 'Now what is the true, that is the
Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person
in the right eye.' Having thus declared the different abodes
of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with
reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified
its body with the sacred syllables {hhCi/i, &c.), the text
teaches its two secret names (upanishad), ' Its secret name
is ahar ' with reference to the gods ; and ' its secret name is
aham ' with reference to the body. — A doubt here arises
whether these two secret names are both to be applied to
the deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode,
or only one name to each.
The above Sutra maintains the purvapaksha view. Just
as certain particulars though recorded elsewhere are yet
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 2 1. 217
to be combined with the vSaw^ilya-vidya, so we have to
proceed in other cases also, as e. g. the one under discus-
sion, because the particulars mentioned are all connected
with one vidya. The vidya of the True with its double
reference to the Devas and to the body is one only, as we
infer from the fact of its having one exordium only (' The
true is Brahm.an'), and from the way in which the text
interconnects Aditya and the person in the eye. Why
then should an attribute belonging to one of the latter
not belong to the other also ? For, to quote an analogous
case, certain rules of life which are prescribed for a teacher
— as e. g. having a following of pupils — remain equally valid
whether the teacher be in a village or in a wood. For
these reasons both secret names equally belong to the
Aditya as well as to the person within the eye. This view
the next Sutra refutes.
21. Or this is not so, on account of the difference
(of place).
The two secret names do not apply quite equally to
the two persons mentioned, because they are connected
with different places in the vidya. For the clause, ' Its
secret name is ahar,' the text exhibits in connexion with
the person in the solar orb, while the clause, ' Its secret
name is aham,' occurs in connexion with the person in the
eye. Now the pronoun ' its ' always refers to something
mentioned close by ; we therefore conclude that the text
teaches each secret name as belonging to one special abode
of Brahman only. How then can both names be valid for
both ? — But, an objection is raised, the person wnthin the
orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only ;
for the text teaches them both to be abodes of the one
true Brahman ! — True, we reply ; but as each secret name
is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as con-
ditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman
only in so far as it is in that state. We on our part also
illustrate the case by a comparison. The teacher always
remains the teacher ; yet those kinds of services which the
pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be
2 1 8 vedanta-sOtras.
done when he stands ; and vice versa. — The comparison,
on the other hand, instituted by the purvapakshin is ill
chosen, since the duties of the disciple towards his teacher
depend on the latter's character as teacher, and that is not
changed by his being either in the village or the forest. —
Hence the two secret names have to be held apart.
2 2. (Scripture) also declares that.
Scripture moreover contains a distinct intimation that
the attributes under discussion are to be held apart. We
read, Kh. Up. I, 8, 5, ' The form of that person is the same
as the form of the other person, the joints of the one are
the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of
the other.' — But how does this passage convey the desired
intimation? — By expressly transferring the attributes of
the person within the sun to the person within the eye ;
for this express transfer shows that the text looks upon
the attributes of the two as separated by the difference
of abode and therefore not to be combined (unless specially
enjoined to be so combined). — The conclusion therefore
is that the two secret names are to be held apart.
23. And for the-same reason the holding together
and the pervading the sky (attributed to Brahman
in the Ra;/ayaniya-khila) (are not to be inserted in
other vidyas).
In the khilas (supplementary writings) of the Ra«a-
yaniyas we meet with a passage, ' Held together are the
powers among which Brahman is the best ; the best
Brahman in the beginning stretched out the sky \' which
mentions certain energies of Brahman, such as holding
together its powers, entering into the sky^ &c. And in the
^ Virya viryawi parakramabheda//, anye hi purusha^ sahayan
apekshya vikraman bibhrati tena tatparakramawam na ta eva niyat-
apurvatvarupakara«atvena ^yesh//za bhavanti Ywi tu tatsahakariwo
:ipi, brahmavirya;/a7;i tu brahmaiva gyQ.shthd.jn brahma ^yesh/^am
yeshaw tani tatha brahma khalv ananyapeksha??z ^aga^^anmadi
karoti. Ki/;/ Mnj-eshaOT parakrama«am balavadbhir madhye
bhahga^ sambhavati tena te svaviryawi na bibhrati, brahmaviryawi
tu brahmawa sambhr/tani avighnena sambh/vtany ity artha/z. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 23. 219
Upanishad of the same (i. e. the Ra;/ayaniyas) we meet
with vidyas of Brahman among which the 5a7/<^ilya-vidya
is the first. — The question then arises whether the energies
of Brahman just mentioned are to be inserted in those
Brahma-vidyas or not. To the plarvapaksha view that
they are to be so inserted because they are connected with
Brahman, the Sutrakara repHes that the holding together
and pervading the sky are not to be inserted in the
Sandilysi-vidya. and other vidyas, for the same reason,
i, e. on account of their being connected with different
abodes. In the .Sa/z^ilya-vidya, Brahman is said to have
its abode in the heart, ' He is the Self within the heart '
(K/i. Up. Ill, 14, 3); the same statement is made in the
dahara-vidya, ' There is the palace, the small lotus (of the
heart), and in it that small ether' (VIII, i, i). In the
Upakoi-ala-vidya again, Brahman is said to reside within
the eye, 'That person that is seen in the eye' (IV, 15, i).
In all these vidyas Brahman is described as residing within
the body ; it is therefore impossible to insert into them
the energies of Brahman which the khila of the Ra«a-
yaniyas mentions, and which are connected with the Devas
(i. e. external nature). — But the vidyas of the K/iindogya.
likewise mention such powers of Brahman as are connected
with the Devas ; cp. e.g. Ill, 14, 3, ' He is greater than the
heaven, greater than these worlds;' IV, 15, 4, 'He is also
Bhamani, for he shines in all worlds ;' VIII, 1, 3, 'As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart.
Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' And again
there are other vidyas of Brahman^ such as the one which
represents Brahman as comprising sixteen parts, in which
not any special abode is mentioned. — True ; but there is a
special reason why the attributes stated in the Rawayaniya-
khila cannot be introduced into the other vidyas. Par-
ticulars mentioned in one place can indeed be inserted in
vidyas met with in another place if the latter are suggested
to the mind by containing some reference to agreeing par-
ticulars ; the qualities of holding together, however, on one
side and those mentioned in the .SaWilya-vidya, &c., on
the other side are of such a nature as to exclude each
2 20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Other, and therefore do not mutually suggest each other.
The mere circumstance of all the particulars being con-
nected with Brahman does not suffice to suggest vidyas
occurring in other places ; for even in vidyas which are
avowedly separate, all the particulars may be connected
with Brahman. And it is an established fact that Brahman,
although one only, is, owing to the plurality of its powers,
meditated upon in more than one way, as shown under
Sutra 7. — The conclusion therefore is that the attributes
of holding together its powers and so on are not to be
inserted in the Sa/idilya. and similar vidyas.
24. And as the record of others (viz. the Taittiri-
yaka) is not such as in the purusha-vidya (of the
K/iandogys), (the two purusha-vidyas are not to be
combined).
In the Rahasya-brahmawa of the Ta;/<^ins and the
Paingins (the K/mndogya) there is a vidya treating of
man, in which man is fancifully identified with the sacrifice,
the three periods of his life with the three libations, his
hunger and so on, with the diksha, &c. And other par-
ticulars also are mentioned there, such as formulas of
prayer, use of mantras and so on. — A similar fanciful
assimilation of the sacrifice and man the Taittiriyakas
exhibit, ' For him who knows thus the Self of the sacrifice
is the sacrificer, Faith is the wife of the sacrificer,^ and so
on (Taitt. Ar. X, 64). — The doubt here arises whether the
particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the iT/zandogya
are to be inserted in the Taittiriyaka or not.
Against the view of the purvapakshin that they are so
to be inserted because in both places we have a purusha-
ysigndi, we maintain that they are not to be inserted because
the characteristics of the purusha-ya^?/a of the AV^andogas
are not recognised in the Taittiriya-text. This the Sutra-
kara expresses by saying, ' As (the record of the followers ■
of some vSakhas, viz. the Tkndms and Paingins, is) in the
purusha-vidya, not such is the record of others,' viz. the
Taittiriyakas. For the latter exhibit an identification of
man with the sacrifice, in which the wife, the sacrificer, the
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 24. 221
Veda, the vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter,
the sacrificial animal, the priest, &c., are mentioned in
succession ; none of which particulars are mentioned in the
K/iandogya.. The use also to which the Taittiriyaka turns
the three libations is different from the ^Mndogya. And
the few points in which the two texts agree, such as the iden-
tification of the Avabrztha-ceremony with death, lose their
significance side by side with the greater number of dis-
similarities, and are therefore not able to effect the recog-
nition of the vidya. — Moreover the Taittiriyaka does not
represent man as the sacrifice (as the K/isLndogya. does) ;
for the two genitives (' of him who thus knows ' and ' of
the sacrifice ') are not co-ordinate, and the passage there-
fore cannot be construed to mean, ' The knowing one who
is the sacrifice, of him the Self is,' &c. For it cannot be
said that man is the sacrifice, in the literal sense of the
word ^ The two genitives are rather to be taken in that
way, that one qualifi.es the other, ' The sacrifice of him
who thus knows, of that sacrifice,' &c. For the connexion
of the sacrifice with man (which is expressed by the geni-
tive, ' the sacrifice of him ') is really and literally true ;
and to take a passage in its literal meaning, if possible at
all, is always preferable to having recourse to a secondary
metaphorical meaning ^ Moreover the words next follow-
ing in the Taittiriyaka-passage, 'the Self is the sacrificer,'
declare that man (man's Self) is the sacrificer, and this
again shows that man's relation to the sacrifice is not that
of co-ordination ^. Moreover as the section beginning with
' Of him who thus knows ' forms an anuvada of something
previously established (and as such forms one vakya to
which one sense only must be ascribed), we must not
bring about ' a split of the sentence ' by interpreting it as
^ And therefore we are not warranted in taking the two genitives
as co-ordinate, as otherwise they might be taken.
^ Which latter would be the _ case if we should take the two
genitives as co-ordinate and therefore expressing an imaginative
identification of the man and the sacrifice.
^ If man is the sacrificer he cannot be identified with the
sacrifice ; he is rather the Lord of the sacrifice.
2 22 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
teaching in the first place that man is the sacrifice, and
in the second place that the Self and the other beings
enumerated are the sacrificer and so on. And as we see
that the passage, ' Of him who thus knows,' &c., follows
upon some instruction about the knowledge of the Self
coupled with sawnyasa, we apprehend that the Taittiri-
yaka-chapter is not an independent vidya but merely
supplementary to the instruction previously given. In
agreement with this conclusion we observe that the Tait-
tiriyaka promises only one result for both chapters, viz.
the one stated in the passage, ' He obtains the greatness
of Brahman.' — On the other hand the text embodying the
purusha-vidya in the K/ia.ndogya. is an independent text ;
for we see that an independent result is attached to it,
viz. an increase of length of life, ' He who knows this lives
on to a hundred and sixteen years.' — Hence the particulars
mentioned in the purusha-vidya of another 6"akha, such as
formulas of prayer, mantras and so on, are not to be com-
bined with the Taittiriya-text of the vidya.
25. Because the matter (of certain mantras) such
as piercing and so on is different (from the matter
of the approximate vidyas) (the former have not to
be combined with the latter).
At the beginning of an Upanishad of the Atharva;^ikas
the following mantra is recorded, ' Pierce him (the enemy)
whole, pierce his heart : crush his veins, crush his head ;
thrice crushed,' &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad
of the Ta;/</ins we have the mantra, ' O God Savitar, pro-
duce the sacrifice.' At the beginning of that of the Satya-
yanins, ' Thou hast a white horse and art green as grass,'
&c. ; at the beginning of that of the Ka///as and theTaitti-
riyakas, ' May Mitra be propitious to us and Varu;/a,' &c.
At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Va^asaneyins we
have a Brahmawa-passage about the pravargya-ceremony,
' The gods indeed sat down to a sattra ; ' and at the begin-
ning of that of the Kaushitakins there is a Brahmawa-passage
about the agnish/oma, 'Brahman indeed is the Agnish/oma,
Brahman is that day ; through Brahman they pass into
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 25. 223
Brahman, immortality those reach who observe that day.' —
The point to be inquired into with reference to all these
mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the Brahma7?a-pas-
sages is whether they are to be combined with the vidyas
(contained in the Upanishads) or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that they are so to be
combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to
the Upanishad-portions of the Brahma;/as whose chief
contents are formed by the vidyas. — But we do not observe
those mantras and sacrifices to be actually enjoined as sub-
ordinate members of the vidyas ! — True, but in spite of this
we, on the ground of proximity, infer them to be connected
with the vidyas. For we have no right to set aside the
fact of proximity as irrelevant as long as an inference can
be established on it. — But we are unable to see that the
mantras have anything to do with the vidyas, and how can
it be assumed that ceremonies, such as the pravargya which
scripture enjoins with reference to other occasions, sacrifices,
and so on, stand in any relation to the vidyas ! — Never mind,
the purvapakshin replies. In the case of mantras we can
always imagine some meaning which connects them with
the vidyas; the first mantra quoted, e.g. may be viewed as
glorifying the heart. For the heart and other parts of the
body are often represented, in the vidyas, as abodes of
meditation, and hence mantras glorifying the heart, &c.,
may appropriately form subordinate members of those
vidyas. Some mantras, moreover, we clearly see to be
enjoined with reference to vidyas, so, e.g. the mantra, ' I
turn to Bhu/i with such and such' {KA. Up. Ill, 15, 3).
Sacrificial acts again may indeed be enjoined in connexion
with other occasions ; yet there is no reason why they
should not also be applied to the vidyas, just as the
offering called Br/haspatisava is a subordinate part of the
Va^apeya-sacrifice ^.
To this we make the following reply. The mantras and
^ The Br/haspatisava, although enjoined with special reference to
him who is desirous of Brahmavar/^as, is yet at the same time a
subordinate part of the Va^apeya-sacrifice. Cp. Pu. Mi. Su. IV,
3. 29.
2 24 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
ceremonies mentioned cannot be drawn into connexion
with the vidyas, ' because their matter, such as piercing the
heart, &c., is different (from the matter of the vidyas),' and
therefore cannot be connected with the latter. — But has
it not been said above that the mantras may be connected
with the meditations enjoined in the vidyas, on the ground
of their coming of use in meditations on the heart, &c. ? —
The mantras, we reply, might be so employed, if their
entire contents were glorification of the heart, and the like ;
but this is by no means the case. The mantra first quoted,
e. g. clearly expresses hostility to somebody, and is there-
fore to be connected, not with the vidyas of the Upanishads,
but with some ceremony meant to hurt an enemy. The
mantra of the Taw^ins again, ' O God Savitar, produce the
sacrifice,' indicates by its very words that it is connected
with some sacrifice ; with what particular sacrifice it is
connected has to be established by other means of proof.
Similarly other mantras also — which, either by ' indica-
tion ' (linga), or ' syntactical connexion ' (vakya), or some
other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to
certain sacrificial actions — cannot, because they occur in
the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyas on the
ground of mere proximity. For that ' proximity,' as a
means of proof regarding the connexion of subordinate
matters with principal matters, is weaker than direct enun-
ciation (.Sruti), and so on, is demonstrated in the former
science (i.e. in the Purva Mimawsa) under III, 3, 14. Of
sacrificial works also, such as the pravargya, which are pri-
marily enjoined with reference to other occasions, it cannot
be demonstrated that they are supplementary to vidyas
with which they have nothing in common. The case of
the BWhaspatisava, quoted by the purvapakshin, is of an
altogether different kind, as there we have an injunction
clearly showing that that oblation is a subordinate member
of the Va^apeya, viz. ' Having offered the Va^apeya he
offers the Br/haspatisava.' And, moreover, if the one
pravargya-ceremony has once been enjoined for a definite
purpose by a means of proof of superior strength, we must
not, on the strength of an inferior means of proof, assume
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26. 225
it to be enjoined for some different purpose. A proceeding
of that kind would be possible only if the difference of the
means of proof were not apprehended ; but in our case this
latter possibility is excluded since the relative strength
and weakness of the various means of proof is fully appre-
hended (on the ground of the conclusions arrived at in the
Purva Mimawsa). — For these reasons the mentioned man-
tras and acts are not, on the ground of mere textual collo-
cation, to be viewed as supplementary to the vidyas of the
Upanishads. To account for the fact of their textual colloca-
tion with the latter we must keep in view that the mantras, &c.
as well as the vidyas have to be studied, &c. in the woods.
26. Where the getting rid (of good and evil) is
mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by
others has to be added) because the statement about
the obtaining is supplementary (to the statement
about the getting rid of), as in the case of the kui"as,
the metres, the praise and the singing. This (i.e.
the reason for this) has been stated (in the Purva
Mima;;i?sa).
In the text of the Ta/ZfT'lns we meet with the following
passage : ' Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,
and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from
the mouth of Rahu, I obtain self made and satisfied the
uncreated world of Brahman ' iyKJi. Up. VIII, 13). Again,
in the text of the Atharva;nkas, we read, * Then knowing,
shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness,
free fi'om passion' (Mu. Up. III. i, 3). The 5a/yayanins
read, ' His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the
good, his enemies the evil he has done.' And the
Kaushitakins, ' He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.
His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved
relatives the evil he has done ' (Kau. Up. I, 4). — Of these
texts two state that the man who has reached true know-
ledge rids himself of his good and evil deeds ; one, that his
friends and enemies obtain his good and evil deeds respec-
tively; and one finally declares that both things take place.
[38] Q
2 26 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
This latter text calls for no remark ; nor again that one which
refers only to his friends and enemies obtaining his good
and evil deeds ; for in order that they may obtain those
he must necessarily first have got rid of them, and the act
of getting rid of them has therefore to be supplied in the
text. Those passages, however, which merely mention a
man's shaking off his deeds, give rise to a discussion
whether those deeds, when shaken off, are obtained by
his friends and enemies, or not. Here the purvapakshin
maintains that the latter circumstance is not to be supplied
in the two passages mentioned — firstly because the text
does not state it ; secondly because what other 5akhas
say about it falls within the sphere of a different vidya ;
and thirdly because the getting rid of the evil and good
deeds is something done by the man himself, while the
obtaining of them is the work of others. As thus there
is no necessary connexion between the two, we have no
right to supply the latter on the basis of the former.
To this we make the following reply. Although the
text mentions only the getting rid of the deeds, yet the
obtaining of them by others must necessarily be added,
because the staternent concerning the latter is merely
supplementary to the statement about the former, as
appears from the text of the Kaushitakins. — In reply to
the arguments brought forward by the purvapakshin we
offer the following remarks.
The separation of the different passages would indeed
have to be insisted upon, if anybody intended to introduce
an injunction about something to be done, which is con-
tained in one text only, into some other text also. But
in the passages under discussion the act of getting rid of —
and the act of obtaining — the good and evil deeds are
not mentioned as something to be performed, but merely
as implying a glorification of knowledge ; the intended
sense being, ' Glorious indeed is that knowledge through
whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the
sawsara, are shaken off by him who knows, and are trans-
ferred to his friends and enemies.' The passage thus
being glorificatory onh', the teacher is of opinion that,
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26. 22/
to the end of strengthening the glorification, the obtaining
of the good and evil deeds by the friends and enemies —
which in some passages is represented as the consequence
of their being shaken off by the man who knows — must
be suppHed in those passages also which mention only the
shaking off. That one arthavada-passage often depends
on another arthavada-passage is a well-known fact ; the
following passage, e.g. 'The twenty-first indeed from this
world is that sun,' would be unintelligible if no regard
were paid to the other passage, ' Twelve are the months,
five the seasons, three these worlds ; that sun is the twenty-
first.' Similarly the passage, ' The two Trish/ubh verses
are for strengthening,' necessarily requires to be taken in
connexion with the other passage, ' Strength of the senses
indeed is Trish/ubh.' And as the statement about the
obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose
of glorifying knovv'ledge (and is not made on its own
account), we need not insist too much on the question how
the results of actions done by one man can be obtained
by others. That the obtaining of the deeds by others is
connected wath their being got rid of by the man who
knows, merely for the purpose of glorifying knowledge,
the Sutrakara moreover indicates by making use of the
expression, 'because the statement about obtaining is
supplementary to,' &c. ; for if he wished to intimate that
the actual circumstance of other persons obtaining a man's
good and evil deeds is to be inserted in those vidyas where
it is not mentioned he would say, 'because the fact of
obtaining.' &c. The Sutra therefore, availing itself of the
opportunity offered by the discussion of the combination of
particular qualities, shows how mere glorificatory passages
have to be inserted in texts where they are wanting.
The remaining part of the Sutra, • Like the ku^as, the
metres, the praise and the singing,' introduces some analo-
gous instances. — The case under discussion is analogous
to the case of the kuj'as ^. Those, a mantra of the Bhal-
' I.e. according to the commentators, small wooden rods used
by the Udgatr/s in counting the stotras.
Q 2
2 28 vedanta-sCtras.
lavins (' You ku^as are the children of the tree, do you
protect me ! ') represents as coming from trees in general,
without any specification. The corresponding mantra of
the ^aA'ayanins on the other hand is, ' You kujas are
the children of the Udumbara-tree ; ' a particularizing
statement which must be considered as valid for the ku^as
in general. — Another analogous case is that of the metres.
In some places no special statement is made about their
order of succession ; but the text of the Paihgins, ' The metres
of the Devas come first,' determines the general priority
of the metres of the Devas to those of the Asuras ^. —
Similarly the time of the stotra accompanying the perform-
ance of the Sho(^ai-in-rite which in some texts is left
undefined is settled by the text of the 7?zg-vedins (arM/z),
' when the Sun has half risen.' — And similarly a particu-
larizing text of the Bhallavins defines what priests have
to join in the singing ; a point left unsettled in other
5rutis ^. — As in these parallel cases, so we have to proceed
in the case under discussion also. For if we refused to
define a general text by another more particular one,
we should be driven to assume optional procedure (vikalpa),
and that the latter is if possible to be avoided is a well-
known principle. This is stated in the Purva Mimawsa-
sutras X, 8, 15.
The passages about the shaking (off) can be viewed as
giving rise to a different discussion also, and the Sutra
can accordingly be explained in a different manner. The
question can be raised whether the ' shaking ' means the
getting rid of one's good and evil deeds or something else. —
The purvapaksha will in that case have to be established
in the following manner. Shaking (dhu) here does not
mean 'getting rid of,' since the root 'dhu' according to
grammar means shaking in an intransitive sense or
trembling ; of flags streaming in the wind we say, for
^ Metres of less than ten syllables belong to the Asuras, those of
ten and more to the Devas.
^ The general text is, according to the commentators, 'The
priests join in the singing;' the defining text of the Bliallavins, 'The
adhvaryu does not join in the singing.'
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 27. 2 29
instance, ' the flags are shaking ' (dodhuyante). We there-
fore take the word in the same sense in the passages under
discussion and understand by the ' trembhng ' of the good
and evil deeds the fact of their not meeting, for a certain
time, with their results.
To this purvapaksha we make the following reply. The
word ' shaking ' has to be taken in the sense of ' getting
rid of,' because it is supplemented by the statement of
others obtaining the good and evil deeds. For those
deeds cannot be obtained by others unless they are got
rid of by their former owner. Hence although it is not
easily imaginable that the deeds got rid of by one man
should be obtained by others, we yet, on the ground of
its being mentioned, may determine accordingly that
' shaking ' means ' getting rid of.' And although only in
some passages the statement about the obtaining is
actually found in proximity to the statement about the
shaking, it yet has, on the ground of the latter, to be
supplied everywhere and thus becomes a general reason
of decision (viz. that 'shaking' means 'getting rid of).
Against the purvapakshin's view we further remark that
good and evil deeds cannot be said to ' tremble ' in the
literal sense of the word, like flags in the wind, since
they are not of substantial nature. — (Nor must it be
said that of the horse which exemplifies the shaking^
the text only says that it shakes its hair, not that it
casts anything ofl", for) the horse when shaking itself
shakes off dust and also old hairs. And with that shaking
(which at the same time is a shaking off) the text expressly
compares the shaking (off) of evil. — Nor do we when
assigning different meanings to one and the same root
enter thereby into conflict with Smrz'ti (grammar). The
clause ' this has been stated ' we have already explained.
27. At the (moment of) departing (he frees him-
self from his works), there being nothing to be
reached (by him, on the way to Brahman, through
those works); for thus others (declare, in their sacred
texts).
2 ^O VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
The Kaushitakins record in the paryafika-vidya how the
man (who possesses true knowledge) when approaching
Brahman seated on the couch frees himself on the way
from his good and evil deeds, ' He having reached the path
of the gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3),
and later on (1, 4), ' He comes to the river Vi^ari and crosses
it by the mind alone and there shakes off his good and evil
deeds.' — The question here arises whether in strict agree-
ment with the text we have to understand that the deceased
man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way
to Brahman, or rather that he does so at the outset when he
departs from his body.
The letter of the text favouring the former alternative,
the Sutrakara rebuts it by declaring 'at the going,' i.e. at
the time of departing from the body the man frees himself,
through the strength of his knowledge, from his good and
evil deeds. The reason for this averment is assigned in the
words, 'On account of the absence of anything to be reached.'
For when the man possessing true knowledge has departed
from the body and is, through his knowledge, about to reach
Brahman, there exists nothing to be reached by him on the
way through his good and evil works, and we therefore
have no reason to assume the latter to remain uneffaced
during a certain number of moments. We rather have to
conclude that as the results of his good and evil works are
contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by
the power of the latter ; and that hence the moment of their
destruction is that moment in which he sets out toward the
fruit of his knowledge (i.e. the world of Brahman). — The
conclusion thus is that the deliverance of the man from his
works takes place early, and is only mentioned later on in
the text of the Kaushitakins. — Thus other 5akhas also, as
that of the Ta;/^ins and ^a/ydyanins, declare that he frees
himself from his deeds at an earlier stage ; cp. the passages,
' Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,' and ' His
sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies
the evil he has done.'
28. And because (on the above interpretation)
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 29. 23 1
there is no contradiction to both (i.e. man's making
an effort to free himself from his deeds and actually-
freeing himself) according to his liking.
Moreover if we assumed that the man frees himself from
his good and evil deeds on the way — after having departed
from the body and having entered on the path of the gods
— we should implicate ourselves in impossibilities ; for after
the body has been left behind, man can no longer accomplish,
according to his liking, that effort which consists in self-
restraint and pursuit of knowledge, and which is the cause
of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds, and con-
sequently that obliteration also cannot take place. We
therefore must assume that the requisite effort is made —
and its result takes place — at an earlier moment, viz. in the
state in which man is able to effect it, and that in conse-
quence thereof man rids himself of his good and evil deeds.
Nothing then stands in the way of the conditioning and
the conditioned events taking place, and the assumption
moreover agrees with the statements of the Ta/^rt'ins and
vSa/)'ayanins.
29. A purpose has to be attributed to the going
(on the path of the gods) in a twofold manner ;
otherwise there would be contradiction of scripture.
In some scriptural texts the (dead man's) going on the
path of the gods is mentioned in connexion with his freeing
himself from good and evil ; in other texts it is not men-
tioned. The doubt then arises whether the two things go
together in all cases or only in certain cases. — The purva-
pa':shin maintains that the two are to be connected in all
cases, just as the man's freeing himself from his good and
evil deeds is always followed by their passing over to his
friends and enemies.
To this we make the following reply. That a man's
going on the path of the gods has a purpose is to be
admitted in a twofold manner, i.e. with a distinction only.
His going on that path has a sense in certain cases, in
others not. For otherwise, i.e. if we admitted that men,
2'; 2 VEDANTA-sfTRAS.
in all cases, proceed on that path, we should have to
assume that even the passage, Mu. Up. Ill, 1,3,' Shaking
off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the highest
unity,' refers to actual going through which another place
is reached, and that would clearly be contrary to reason.
For a person free from all desire and therefore non-moving
does not go to another place, and the highest unity is not
to be reached by a man transporting himself to another
locality.
30. (The twofold view taken above) is justified
because we observe a purpose characterised thereby
(i.e. a purpose of the going); as in ordinary life.
Our view of the matter, viz. that a man's proceeding on
the path of the gods has a meaning in certain cases but not
in others, is justified by the following consideration. In
meditations on the qualified Brahman such as the paryahka-
vidya we see a reason for the man's proceeding on the path
of the gods ; for the text mentions certain results which can
be reached only by the man going to different places, such as
his mounting a couch, his holding a colloquy with Brahman
seated on the couch, his perceiving various odours and so
on. On the other hand we do not see that going on the
path of the gods has anything to do with perfect know-
ledge. For those who have risen to the intuition of the
Selfs unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the
potentiality of all suffering is already destroyed here below,
have nothing further to look for but the dissolution of the
abode of activity and enjoyment of former deeds, i.e. the
body; in their case therefore to proceed on the road of the
gods would be purposeless. — The distinction is analogous
to what is observed in ordinary life. If we want to reach
some village we have to proceed on a path leading there ;
but no moving on a path is required when we wish to attain
freedom from sickness. — The distinction made here will be
e.stablished more carefully in the fourth adhyaya.
31. There is no restriction (as to the going on the
path of the gods) for any vidya; nor any contra-
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 3 1.
diction (of the general subject-matter), according to
scripture and inference (i.e. Smr/ti).
We have shown that the going on the path of the gods
is vahd only for the vidyas of the quahfied Brahman, not for
the knowledge of the highest Brahman which is destitute of
all qualities. — Now we observe that the going on the path
of the gods is mentioned only in some of the quahfied
vidyas, such as the paryanka-vidya, the paw/'agni-vidya, the
upakoi-ala-vidya, the dahara-vidya ; while it is not men-
tioned in others, such as the madhu-vidya,the s^udi\ya.-vidya.,
the sho^/ajakala-vidya, the vaii-vanara-vidy^. — The doubt
then arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to
be connected with those vidyas only in which it is actually
mentioned or generally with all vidyas of that kind.
The purvapakshin maintains the former view ; for, he
says, the limitative force of the general subject-matter of
each particular section compels us to connect the going on
the path of the gods with those vidyas only which actually
mention it. If we transferred it to other vidyas also, the
authoritativeness of scripture would suffer ; for then any-
thing might be the sense of anything. Moreover, the
details about the path of the gods beginning with light and
so on are given equally in the upakojala-vidya and the
pa«/^agni-vidya, which would be a useless repetition if as a
matter of course the going on the path of the gods were
connected with all vidyas.
To this we make the following reply. The going on the
path of the gods is not to be restricted but to be connected
equally with all those qualified vidyas which have exaltation
(abhyudaya) for their result. The objection above raised
by the purvapakshin that thereby we contradict the general
subject-matter, we refute by appealing to scripture and
Smriti. Scripture in the first place declares that not only
those 'who know this,' i.e. the pawMgni-vidya {K/i. Up. V,
10, i), proceed on the path of the gods, but also those who
understand other vidyas, ' and also those who in the forest
follow faith and austerities.' — But how do we know that the
latter passage refers to those who are conversant with other
2 34 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
vidyas ? The text certainly speaks of those only who are
intent on faith and austerities ! — Not by faith and austerities
alone, we reply, unaided by knowledge, can that path be
attained ; for another scriptural passage says, ' Through
knowledge they mount to that place from which all wishes
have passed away ; those who are skilled in works only do
not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge' {Sat. Bra.
X,5, 4, 16). We therefore conclude that faith and austerities
denote at the same time other vidyas. — The Va^'asaneyins
again read in the Pa/H'agni-vidya, ' Those who thus know
this and those who in the forest worship faith and the True.'
The latter part of this passage we must explain to mean,
'Those who in the forest with faith worship the True, i.e.
Brahman ; ' the term ' the True ' being often employed to
denote Brahman. And as those who know the pa.7lka.gm-
vidya are in the above passage referred to as ' those who
thus know this,' we must understand the clause, ' and those
who in the forest,' &c., as referring to men in the possession
of other vidyas. And, moreover, also the passage, ' Those,
however, who know neither of these two paths become
worms, birds, and creeping things ' (VI, 2, 16), which teaches
that those who miss the two paths have to go downwards,
intimates that those who possess other vidyas have to pro-
ceed either on the path of the gods or that of the fathers,
and as their vidyas are as such not different from the
pa;7Mgni-vidya, we conclude that they proceed on the path
of the gods (not on that of the fathers) \
In the second place Smr/ti also confirms the same
doctrine, ' These two, the white and the black path, are
known as the eternal paths of the world ; on the one man
goes not to return, on the other he again returns ' (Bha. Gi.
VIII, 26).
With regard, finally, to the circumstance that the details
about the path of the gods are given in the Upakoj-ala-
^ Ita^ k^L vidjantarajilina;;^ gatir iii lihgadar^ana?;/ samuX'/zinoli
alheti, etan iti vidyantarapara gr/hyante, tathapi katha»^ deva-
yanayogas tesham ity a^ankya yogyalayety aha tatrapiti. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 235
vidya as well as the PawHgni-vidya, we remark that the
repetition is meant to assist reflection.
For all these reasons the going on the path of the gods
is not limited to those vidyas in which it is actually
mentioned.
32. Of those who have a certain office there is
subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts.
The question here is whether for him who has reached
true knowledge a new body originates after he has parted
with the old one or not. — But, an objection is here raised
at the outset, there is really no occasion for inquiring
whether knowledge when reaching its perfection brings
about its due effect, viz. complete isolation of the Self
from all bodies or not ; not any more than there is room
for an inquiry whether there is cooked rice or not, after
the process of cooking has reached its due termination ;
or, for an inquiry whether a man is satisfied by eating or
not. — Not so, we reply. There is indeed room for the
inquiry proposed, as we know from itihasa and pura/^a that
some persons although knowing Brahman yet obtained new
bodies. Tradition informs us, e. g. that Apantaratamas,
an ancient r/shi and teacher of the Vedas, was, by the
order of Vish;ni, born on this earth as Kmhwa Dvaipayana
at the time when the Dv^parayuga was succeeded by the
Kaliyuga. Similarly Vasish//^a, the son of Brahman's
mind, having parted from his former body in consequence
of the curse of Nimi, was, on the order of Brahman, again
procreated by Mitra and Varu;,?a. Smrz'ti further relates
that Bhrz'gu and other sons of Brahman's mind were again
born at the sacrifice of Varu;/a. Sanatkumara also, who
likewise was a son of Brahman's mind, was, in consequence
of a boon being granted to Rudra, born again as Skanda.
And there are similar tales about Daksha, Narada, and
others having, for various reasons, assumed new bodies.
Stories of the same kind are met with in the mantras and
arthavadas of vSruti. Of some of the persons mentioned
it is said that they assumed a new body after the old body
had perished ; of others that they assumed, through their
2 "^6 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
supernatural powers, various new bodies, while the old
body remained intact all the while. And all of them are
known to have completely mastered the contents of the
Vedas.
On the ground of all this the purvapakshin maintains
that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either
be or not be the cause of final release.
This we deny, for the reason that the continuance of
the bodily existence of Aparantamas and others — who
are entrusted with offices conducive to the subsistence
of the worlds, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and
the like — depends on those their offices. As Savitar (the
sun), who after having for thousands of yugas performed the
office of watching over these w^orlds, at the end of that period
enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises
nor sets, according to Kh. Up. Ill, ii, i, 'When from
thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He
is alone, standing in the centre;' and as the present knowers
of Brahman reach the state of isolation after the enjoyment
of those results of action, which have begun to operate,
has come to an end, according to Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2, ' For
him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered from
the body ; ' so Aparantamas and other Lords to whom the
highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, last — although
they possess complete knowledge, the cause of release — as
long as their office lasts, their works not yet being ex-
hausted, and obtain release only when their office comes
to an end. For gradually exhausting the aggregate of
works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to
enable them to discharge their offices ; passing according
to their free will from one body into another, as if from
one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties
of their offices ; preserving all the time the memory of their
identity ; they create for themselves through their power
over the material of the body and the sense organs new
bodies, and occupy them either all at once or in succession.
Nor can it be said that when passing into new bodies they
remember only the fact of their former existence (not their
individuality) ; for it is known that they preserve the sense
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 237
of their individuality^. Sm7-zti tells us, e.g. that Sulabha, a
woman conversant with Brahman, wishing to dispute with
6^anaka, left her own body, entered into that of Canaka,
carried on a discussion with him, and again returned into her
own body. If in addition to the works the consequences of
which are already in operation, other works manifested them-
selves, constituting the cause of further embodiments, the
result would be that in the same way further works also,
whose potentiality would in that case not be destroyed, would
take place, and then it might be suspected that the know-
ledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the
cause of final release. But such a suspicion is inadmissible
since it is known from 5ruti and Smriti that knowledge
completely destroys the potentiality of action. For 5ruti
says, ' The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are
solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld
who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); and, 'When the
memory remains firm, then all the ties are loosened ' {Kk.
Up. VII. 26, 2), And Smr/ti similarly says, 'As a fire
well kindled; O xA.rcoma, reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire
of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes ; ' and, ' As seeds
burned by fire do not sprout again, so the Self is not again
touched by the afflictions which knowledge has burned.'
Nor is it possible that when the afflictions such as ignor-
ance and the like are burned, the aggregate of works
which is the seed of affliction should be partly burned,
but partly keep the power of again springing up ; not any
more than the seed of the ^ali, when burned, preser\-es
the power of sprouting again with some part. The
aggregate of works, however, whose fruits have once
begun to develop themselves comes to rest through
effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the
body, just as an arrow discharged stops in the end owing to
the gradual cessation of its impetus ; this in agreement
with K/i. Up. VI, 14, 2; ' For him there is only delay,' &c.
We have thus shown that persons to whom an office is
^ Utpadyamananam aparimushitasmaratve^pi ^atismaratvam eva
na vasishMadinanatvam ity arahkyaha na ^eti. An. Gi.
238 vedanta-siOtras.
entrusted last as long as their office lasts, and that never-
theless there is absolutely only one result of true know-
ledge.— In accordance with this, scripture declares that
the result of knowledge on the part of all beings is
equally final release, cp. ' So whatever Deva was awakened
he indeed became that, and the same with i^zshis and
men' {Bri Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover^ it may be the case
that (some) great n'shis had attached their minds to other
cognitions whose result is lordly power and the like, and
that later on only when they became aware of the tran-
sitory nature of those results they turned from them and
fixed their minds on the highest Self, whereby they
obtained final release. As Smr/ti says, ' When the maha-
pralaya has arrived and the highest (i.e. Hira;/yagarbha)
himself comes to an end, then they all, with well-prepared
minds, reach together with Brahman the highest place.' —
Another reason precluding the suspicion that true know-
ledge may be destitute of its result is that that result is
the object of immediate intuition. In the case of such
results of action as the heavenly world and the like which
are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a
doubt; but not so in 'the case of the fruit of true know-
ledge, with regard to which scripture says. ' The Brahman
which is present to intuition, not hidden' (B/'Z. Up. Ill,
4, i), and which in the passage, 'That art thou.' is referred
to as something already accomplished. This latter passage
cannot be interpreted to mean, 'Thou wilt be that after
thou hast died ;' for another Vedic passage declares that
the fruit of complete knowledge, viz. union with the
universal Self, springs up at the moment when complete
knowledge is attained, ' The 7?zshi Vamadeva saw and
understood it, singing, " I was Manu, I was the sun." '
For all these reasons we maintain that those who possess
true knowledge reach in all cases final release.
33. But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the
^ Api X'a nadhikaravata/« sarvesham n'shma.m aimatatLva^«ana?«
tenavyapako^py ayam purvapaksha ity aha^;7anantareshu /{'eti. Bha.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, ^2- ^39
akshara are to be comprehended (In all meditations
on the akshara), on account of the equality and of
the object being the same, as in the case of the
upasad; this has been explained (in the Purva Mi-
ma#2sa).
We read in the Va^asaneyaka, 'O Girgi, the Brahma/?as
call this the Akshara. It is neither coarse, nor fine, nor
short, nor long,' &c. (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Similarly the
Atharvawa says, ' The higher knowledge is that by which
the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be
seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste,' &c.
(Mu. Up. I, I, 5 ; 6). In other places also the highest
Brahman, under the name of Akshara, is described as
that of which all quaHties are to be denied. Now in some
places qualities are denied of Brahman which are not
denied in other places, and hence a doubt arises whether
the mental conception of these particular denials is to
form part of all those passages or not.
To the assertion of the purvapakshin that each denial
is valid only for that passage in which the text actually
exhibits it, we make the following reply. — The concep-
tions of the akshara, i.e. the conceptions of the particular
denials concerning the akshara, are to be included in all
those passages, ' on account of the equality and on account
of the same object being referred to.' The equality con-
sists therein that all the texts alluded to convey an idea
of Brahman in the same way, viz. by denying of it all
attributes ; and we recognise in all of them the same ob-
ject of instruction, viz. the one undivided Brahman. Why
then should the conceptions stated in one passage not be
valid for all others also ? To the present case the same
argumentation applies which had been made use of under
III, 3, II. There positive attributes were discussed ; here
we are concerned with negative ones. The division of the
discussion into two (instead of disposing of positive and
negative attributes in one adhikara;^a) is due to the wish
of explaining the differences in detail — The clause, ' as in
the case of the upasads/ introduces a parallel case. For
240 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the Camadagnya-ahina-sacrifice -^ the text enjoins that the
upasad offerings are to consist of puro^a^as. Now although
the mantras accompanying the offering of the puro^aj-as are
originally enjoined in the Veda of the Udgatr/s [Ta^idys.
Bra. XXI, 10. u, ' Agni, promote the hotra,' &c.), yet they
are to be enounced by the adhvaryu ; for the offering of
the puro^aj-as is the work of the adhvaryu, and subordinate
matters (i.e. here, the mantras) are governed by the prin-
cipal matter (i.e. the offering of the purodisa). Similarly,
in the case under discussion, the attributes of the akshara
have, because they are subordinate to the akshara itself,
to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever
places the text may originally state them. — The principle
of decision employed is explained in the Purva Mimawsa-
sutras III, 3, 9.
34. On account of (the same) number being re-
corded.
The Atharva;nkas exhibit, with reference to the Self,
the following mantra, ' Two birds, inseparable friends, cling
to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the
other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. Ill, i, i). The
same mantra is found in the text of the ^vetajvataras
(IV, 6). The Ka/Z/as again read, ' There are the two
drinking their reward in the world of their own works,
entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit.
Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, like-
wise those householders who perform the Tri;/a/^iketa-sacri-
fice.' — The doubt here arises whether the two sections in-
troduced by these mantras constitute one vidya or two
vidyas. Here the purvapakshin maintains that we have to
do with two separate vidyas, because the texts exhibit certain
differences. For the mantra of the Mwidaka. and vSVeta-
.yvatara Upanishads represents one bird as enjoying and the
other as not enjoying ; while in the mantra of the Ka///as
^ I.e. a sacrifice lasting four days, called Gamadagnya, because
first off"ered by Camadagni. Cp. Taitt. Sawh. VII, i, 9.
Ill ADHVAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 24I
both are said to enjoy. — As thus the objects of knowledge
differ in character, the vidyas themselves must be looked
upon as separate.
To this we make the following reply. The vidyi is one
only because both mantras exhibit the character of the
objects of knowledge as one and the same, viz. as defined
by the number two. — But has not the purvapakshin shown
that there exists a certain difference of character ? — By no
means, we reply. Both texts intimate one and the same
matter, viz. the Lord together with the individual soul. In
the Mu;z^aka-text the clause, ' The other looks on without
eating,' intimates the highest Self which is raised above all
desire ; the same highest Self forms also the subject of the
complementary passage, ' But when he sees the other Lord
contented.' And the Ka//^a-text intimates the same highest
Self which is raised above all desire ; only, as it is mentioned
together with the enjoying individual soul, it is itself meta-
phorically spoken of as enjoying ; just as we speak of the
' men with the umbrella,' although only one out of several
carries an umbrella. For that in the Ka//^a-text also the
highest Self forms the general subject-matter we have to
conclude from the preceding passage, ' That which thou
seest as neither this nor that ' (I, 2, 14), and from the com-
plementary passage referring to the same Self, 'Which is
a bridge for sacrificers, which is the highest imperishable
Brahman' (I, 3, 2). All this has been explained at length
under I, 2, 11. As therefore there is one object of know-
ledge only, the vidya also is one. — Moreover, if we carefully
examine the context of the three mantras quoted, we observe
that they are concerned merely with the knowledge of the
highest Self, and that they mention the individual soul not
as a new object of instruction but merely to show its identity
with the highest Self. And that, as far as the knowledge of
the highest Self is concerned, the question as to the oneness
or separateness of vidyas cannot be even raised, we have
already shown above. The present Sutra therefore merely
aims at a fuller discussion of the matter, the practical out-
come of which is that any particulars stated in one of the
texts only have to be supplied in the others also.
[38] R
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
35. As the Self is within all, as in the case of the
aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of
vicl}a).
The Va^asaneyins record, in the questions asked by
UshastaandbyKahola, the same passage twice in succession,
' Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not
hidden j the Self who is within all ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 4, i ; 5, i).
— The question here presents itself whether the two sections
introduced by the questions constitute one vidya only or
two separate vidyas.
Two separate vidyas, the purvapakshin maintains ; owing
to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added
nothing to — or took nothing away from — the contents of
the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless.
We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the
separateness of the two vidyas, just as in the Purva
Mimawsa repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be
separate.
To this w^e make the following reply. As both texts
equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be
taken as constituting' one vidya only. In both passages
question and answer equally refer to a Self which is
within everything. For in one body there cannot be
two Selfs, each of which is inside everything else. One
Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything,
but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any
more than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case
of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of
the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element
of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the
element of fire within the element of water ; but each of
these elements is ' within all ' in a relative sense only, not
in the literal sense of the phrase. — Or else the ' like the
aggregate of the elements (or beings) ' of the Sutra has to
be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. Sve.
Up. VI, II, ' He is the one god, hidden in all beings, all-
pervading, the Self within all beings.' As this mantra re-
cords that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings,
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 36. 243
the same holds good with regard to the two Brahmawa-
passages. And the object of knowledge being one, the
vidya also is one only.
36. If it be said that otherwise the separation (of
the statements) cannot be accounted for ; we reply
that it is (here) as in the case of other instructions.
We yet have to refute the remark made by the purva-
pakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyas be
admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be
accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases.
In the sixth prapa//zaka of the upanishad of the TziJidlns
the instruction conveyed in the words, ' That is the Self,
thou art that, O .Svetaketu,'' is repeated nine times, and
yet the one vidya is not thereby split into many. Simi-
larly in our case. — But how do you know that the vidya
remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repeti-
tion ? — Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding
clauses show that all those passages have the same sense.
For the repeated request on the part of vSvetaketu, ' Please,
Sir, inform me still more,' shows that one and the same
matter is again and again proposed for further discussion,
and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by
means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the
case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two
introductory questions and the equality of the concluding
clauses, ' Everything else is of evil,' show that both sections
refer to one and the same matter. — Moreover, in the second
question the text adds the word ' just ' (eva), ' Tell me just
that Brahman,' &c., which shows that the second question
refers to the same matter as the first one. That the
matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish
by pointing out that the former section declares the
existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor
effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends
all the attributes of the Sa;;zsa.ra state, such as hunger,
thirst, and so on. — The two, sections, therefore, form one
vidya only.
R 2
244 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
37. There is exchange (of meditation), for the
texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other
cases.
The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in
the sun, ' What I am, that is he ; what he is, that am I '
(Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6). And the Gkhk\a.s say, ' I am thou
indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.' — The
doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this
text is to be a double one 'by means of exchange' (i.e.
whether the soul is to be meditated upon as iditya and
^ditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being
meditated upon as aditya).
The purvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says,
the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation
anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the
Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of
meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul's being the
Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord's being the Self
of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former
meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by
the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation
is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which
the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness
of the Self.
To this we make the following reply. ' Exchange ' is
expressly recorded in the text for the purposes of medita-
tion, just as other qualities (of the Self), such as its being
the Self of all, &c., are recorded for the same purpose.
For both texts make the distinctive double enunciation,
' I am thou,' and 'Thou art I.' Now this double enunci-
ation has a sense only if a twofold meditation is to be
based upon it ; otherwise it would be devoid of meaning,
since one statement would be all that is required. — But
has not the purvapakshin urged above that this your ex-
planation involves a lowering of the Lord, who is thereby
represented as having the transmigrating soul for his Self?
— Never mind, we reply ; even in that way only the unity
of the Self is meditated upon. — But does your explanation
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, T^S. 245
then not come to that of the purvapakshin, viz. that the
double statement is merely meant to confirm the oneness
of the Self? — We do not, our reply is, deny that the text
confirms the oneness of the Self; we only want to prove
that, on the ground of the text as it stands, a twofold me-
ditation has to be admitted, not a simple one. That this
virtually confirms the unity of the Self we admit ; just as
the instruction about (the Lord's) possessing such qualities
as having only true wishes, and so on — which instruction is
given for the purpose of meditation — at the same time
proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities.
— Hence the double relation enounced in the text has to be
meditated upon, and is to be transferred to other vidyas also
which treat of the same subject.
38. For the True and so on are one and the same
(vidya).
The text of the Va^asaneyaka, after having enjoined the
knowledge of the True, together with a meditation on the
syllables of its name (' Whosoever knows this great glorious
first-born as the true Brahman,^ &c., Bri. Up. V, 4, i), con-
tinues, ' Now what is the True, that is the Aditya, the person
that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye '
(V, 5, 2). — The doubt here arises whether the text enjoins
two vidyas of the True or one only.
Two, the purvapakshin maintains. For the text declares
two different results, one in the earlier passage, ' He con-
quers these worlds' (V, 4, i) ; the other one later on, 'He
destroys evil and leaves it ' (V, 5, 3). And what our oppo-
nent may call a reference to the subject-matter under dis-
cussion^, is merely due to the circumstance of the object of
meditation being the same (in the two vidyas).
To this we make the following reply. — There is only
one vidya of the True, because the clause, ' That which is
the True,' &c., refers back to that True which is treated
^ Viz. the clause in V, 5, 2, 'That which is the true,' which
apparently — or really — connects the vidya of V, 5 with that of
V, 4.
246 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
of in V, 4. — But has not the purvapakshin shown that the
clause alluded to can be accounted for even on the sup-
position of there being two vidyas ? — The reasoning of
the purvapakshin, we reply, w^ould be admissible only if
the separateness of the two vidyas were established by
some other clear and undoubted reason ; in our case, how-
ever, there is a general possibility of both (viz. of the
vidyas being separate or not), and the very circumstance
that the mentioned clause contains a back reference to the
True spoken of in V, 4, determines us to conclude that
there is only one vidya of the True. — To the remark that
there must be two vidyas because the text states two
different results, we reply that the statement of a second
result merely has the purpose of glorifying the new in-
struction given about the True, viz. that its secret names
are ahar and aham. Moreover, as in the case under dis-
cussion, the fruit of the vidya has really to be supplied
from its arthavada part ^, and as there is unity of vidya,
all those fruits which the text states in connexion with
the single parts of the. vidya are to be combined and put
in connexion with the vidya taken as a whole. — The con-
clusion therefore is that the text records only one vidya
of the True, distinguished by such and such details, and
that hence all the qualities mentioned, such as Truth and
so on, are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.
Some commentators are of opinion that the above Sutra
refers (not to the question whether Br/. Up. V, 4 and V, 5
constitute one vidya but) to the question whether the
Va^asaneyaka-passage about the persons in the sun and in
the eye, and the similar AV/andogya-passage (I, 6, 6, 'Now
that golden person who is seen within the sun,' &c.) form
one vidya or not. They conclude that they do so, and
that hence truth and the other qualities mentioned in
^ For the vidya contains no explicit statement that a man
desirous of such and such a fruit is to meditate on the True in such
and such a way. — That in cases where the fruit is not stated in a
vidhi-passage it must be supplied from the arthavada-passages, is
taught in the Pu. I\Ii. Su. IV, 3, eighth adhikara7/a.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 39. 247
the V^^asaneyaka are to be combined with the K/ian-
dogya-text also. — But this interpretation of the Sutra
appears objectionable. For the iT/zandogya-vidyi refers
to the udgitha and is thus connected with sacrificial acts,
marks of which connexion are exhibited in the beginning,
the middle, and the end of the vidya. Thus we read at
the beginning, ' The Rik is the earth, the Saman is fire ; '
in the middle, ' Rik and Saman are his joints and there-
fore he is udgitha ; ' and in the end, ' He who knowing
this sings a S^man ' {K/i. Up. I, 6, i ; 8 ; 1,7, 7). In the
Va^''asaneyaka, on the other hand, there is nothing to
connect the vidya with sacrificial acts. As therefore the
subject-matter is different, the vidyas are separate and the
details of the two are to be held apart.
39. (Having true) wishes and other (qualities)
(have to be combined) there and here, on account of
the abode and so on.
In the chapter of the K/iandogya which begins with the
passage, ' There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace,
the small lotus, and in it that small ether' (VIII, i, i), we
read, ' That is the Self free from sin, free from old age,
from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires
are true, whose imaginations are true.' A similar passage
is found in the text of the Va^asaneyins, ' He is that great
unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by
the Pra//as, the ether within the heart. In it there reposes
the ruler of all ' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22).
A doubt here arises whether these two passages con-
stitute one vidya, and whether the particulars stated in one
text are to be comprehended within the other text also.
There is oneness of vidya ^ — Here (the Sutrakara) says,
' Wishes and so on,' i. e. ' The quality of having true wishes
and so on' (the word kama standing for satyakama, just
^ This clause must apparently be taken as stating the siddhanta-
view, although later on it is said that the two vidyas are distinct (that,
however, in spite of their distinctness, their details have to be com-
bined).
248 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
as people occasionally say Datta for Devadatta and Bhama
for Satyabhama). This quality and the other qualities, which
the K/ia.ndogya. attributes to the ether within the heart,
have to be combined with the Va^asaneyaka-passage, and
vice versa the qualities stated in the Va^asaneyaka, such as
being the ruler of all, have also to be ascribed to the Self
free from sin, proclaimed in the KAandogya.. The reason
for this is that the two passages display a number of
common features. Common to both is the heart viewed
as abode, common again is the Lord as object of know-
ledge, common also is the Lord being viewed as a bank
preventing these worlds from being confounded ; and
several other points. — But, an objection is raised, there
are also differences. In the K/iandogya. the qualities are
attributed to the ether within the heart, while in the
Va^asaneyaka they are ascribed to Brahman abiding in
that ether. — This objection, we reply, is unfounded, for we
have shown under I, 3, 14 that the term 'ether' in the
K/ia.ndogya. designates Brahman.
There is, however, the following difference between the
two passages. The iT/^andogya-vidya has for its object
the qualified Brahman, as we see from the passage VIII, i,
6, ' But those who depart from hence after having dis-
covered the Self and those true desires,' in which certain
desires are represented as objects of knowledge equally as
the Self. In the Va^asaneyaka, on the other hand, the
highest Brahman devoid of all qualities forms the object
of instruction, as we conclude from the consideration of the
request made by G^anaka, ' Speak on for the sake of eman-
cipation,' and the reply given by Yac^;^avalkya, ' For that
person is not attached to anything ' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 14 ;
15). That the text ascribes to the Self such qualities as
being the Lord of all and the like is (not for the purpose
of teaching that the Self really possesses those qualities,
but is) merely meant to glorify the Self Later on also
(IV, 5) 15) the chapter winds up with a passage clearly
referring to the Self devoid of all qualities, ' That Self is
to be described by No, no ! ' But as the qualified Brahman
is (fundamentally) one (with the unqualified Brahman), we
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4O. 249
must conclude that the Sutra teaches the combination of
the qualities to the end of setting forth the glory of
Brahman, not for the purpose of devout meditation.
40. On account of (the passage showing) respect,
there is non-omission (of the pra;zagnihotra) (even
when the eating of food is omitted).
We read in the KMndogya. under the heading of the
Vaij-vanara-vidya, ' Therefore the first food which comes is
in the place of Homa. And he who offers that first oblation
should offer it to Pra;^a, saying Svahi' (K/i. Up. V, 19, i).
The text thereupon enjoins five oblations, and later on
applies to them the term ' Agnihotra ; ' ' He who thus
knowing this offers the agnihotra,' and 'As hungry children
here on earth sit round their mother, so do all beings sit
round the agnihotra ' (V, 24, 2 ; 4).
Here the doubt arises whether the agnihotra offered to
the pra;/as is to be omitted when the eating itself is omitted
or not. — As, according to the clause, ' The first food which
comes,' &c., the oblation is connected with the coming of
food, and as the coming of food subserves the eating, the
agnihotra offered to the pra;/as is omitted when the eating
is omitted. — Against this conclusion the Sutra (embodying
the purvapaksha) declares, 'It is not omitted.' — Why? —
' On account of the respect.' This means : In their version
of the Vaijvanara-vidya the (7abalas read as follows : ' He
(i. e, the host) is to eat before his guests ; for (if he would
make them eat first) it \vould be as if he without having
himself offered the agnihotra offered that of another
person.' This passage, which objects to the priority of the
eating on the part of the guests and establishes priority
on the part of the host, thereby intimates respect for the
agnihotra offered to the pra;/as. For as it does not allow
the omission of priority it will allow all the less the
omission of that which is characterised by priority, viz.
the agnihotra offered to the pra/zas. — But (as mentioned
above) the connexion — established by the K/ia.ndogya.-
passage — of the oblation with the coming of food — which
subserves the eatins;— establishes the omission of the ob-
250 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
lation in the case of the eating being omitted ! — Not so,
the purvapakshin replies. The purpose of that passage is
to enjoin some particular material (to be offered). For the
fundamental agnihotra certain materials, such as milk and
so on, are exclusively prescribed. Now, as through the
term ' agnihotra ' (which the text applies to the offering
to the pra/^as) all the particulars belonging to the funda-
mental agnihotra are already established for the secondary
agnihotra also (viz. the oblation made to the pra;^as), just
as in the case of the ayana of the Ku;/^/apayins ^ ; the
clause, 'the first food which comes,' &c., is meant to enjoin,
for the pra;mgnihotra, some particular secondary matter,
viz. the circumstance of food constituting the material of
the oblation^. Hence, considering the Mimaw/sa principle
that the omission of a secondary matter does not involve
the omission of the principal matter, we conclude that even
in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered
to the pra/^as has to be performed by means of water or
some other not altogether unsuitable material, according
to the Mimawsa principle that in the absence of the
prescribed material some other suitable material may be
substituted.
To this purvapaksha the next Sutra replies.
41. When (eating) is taking place, (the pra;/agni-
hotra has to be performed) from that (i.e. the food
first eaten); on the ground of the passage declaring
this.
When eating is actually taking place, ' from that,' i.e. with
that material of food which first presents itself, the agni-
hotra offered to the pra;/as is to be effected. — On what
^ For one of the great sacrifices lasting a whole year — called the
ayana of the Kuwa'apayins — the texts enjoin the offering of the
'agnihotra' during a full month (cp. e.g. Tindyz ]Mahabrahma;za
XXV, 4). Now from the term 'agnihotra' we conclude that all the
details of the ordinary agnihotra are valid for the agnihotra of the
ayana also.
^ Whereby the materials offered in the ordinary agnihotra are
superseded.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4I. 25 1
ground ? — ' On the ground of the passage declaring this.'
For the clause, ' The first food which a man may take is in
the place of a homa,' enjoins the circumstance of the obla-
tions to the pranas being effected by means of a material
(primarily) subserving another purpose (viz. eating), as
appears from its referring to the presentation of food as
something accomplished (i. e. accomplished independently
of the oblations ; not tending to accomplish the oblations).
How then should these oblations — which are characterised
as not having any motive power with regard to the employ-
ment of the food — be capable of causing us to substitute, in
the absence of eating, some other material (than food) ? —
Nor is it true that there are already established, for the
pra;^agnihotra, all the details belonging to the fundamental
agnihotra. In the case of the ayana of the Ku;?(7'apayins,
the term 'agnihotra' forms part of the injunctive pas-
sage, ' They offer the agnihotra during a month,' and
therefore may have the force of enjoining a general
character of the sacrifice identical with that of the funda-
mental agnihotra ; and it is therefore appropriate to con-
sider the details of the latter as valid for the agnihotra of
the Ku;/<^apayins also. In the case of the so-called
prawagnihotra, on the other hand, the term 'agnihotra'
occurs in an arthavada-passage only, and does not therefore
possess an analogous injunctive force. If, again, we admitted
that the details of the fundamental agnihotra are valid for
the pra//agnihotra also, such details as the transference of the
fire (from the garhapatya fire to the two other fires) would be
likewise valid. But this is impossible, as the transference
of the fire is made for the purpose of establishing a fire-
place in which the oblations are made ; in our case, on the
other hand, the oblations are not made in the fire at all —
because that would interfere with their being used as food,
and because they are connected with a material procured
for the purpose of eating, — but are made in the mouth (of
the eater). Thus the text of the G^abalas also, ' He is to
eat before the guests,' shows that the accomplishment of the
oblation has the mouth for its abode. For the same reason
(i. e. because the details of the fundamental agnihotra are
2^2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
not valid for the pra;/agnihotra) the text declares the sub-
ordinate members of the agnihotra to be present here (i.e.
in the pra^zagnihotra) in the way of fanciful combination
only, ' the chest is the vedi, the hairs the sacrificial grass,
the heart the Garhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharya-
pa^ana fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire.' By the vedi
mentioned in this passage we have to understand a levelled
spot, as in the fundamental agnihotra there is no vedi, and
as the intention of the passage is to effect a fanciful combi-
nation of the members of the fundamental agnihotra (with
members of the pra/mgnihotra). — And as the prawagnihotra
is connected with eating which has its definite times, it is
also not possible that it should be restricted to the time
enjoined for the fundamental agnihotra. In the same way
other particulars also of the fundamental agnihotra, such as
the so-called upasthana, cannot be reconciled with the re-
quirements of the prcL;/agnihotra. From all this it follows
that the five oblations, as connected with their respective
mantras, materials, and divinities, have to be performed only
in the case of food being eaten. — With reference to the pas-
sage showing ' respect,' we remark that it is meant to inti-
mate priority (of the host), in the case of food being actually
eaten. But the passage has no power to declare that the
offering of the prawagnihotra is of permanent obligation. —
It therefore is a settled conclusion that the pra;mgnihotra
is omitted when the eating of food is omitted.
42. There is non-restriction of the assertions
concerning them (i.e. the assertions made concerning
certain sacrificial acts are not permanently connected
with those acts), because this is seen (in scripture);
for a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction (of the
success of the sacrifice), (belongs to them).
We meet in the Vedanta-texts with certain vidyas which
are founded on matters subordinate to sacrificial acts. To
this class belongs, e. g. the first vidya of the KMndogyd.
Upanishad, ' Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as
udgitha.' — We now enter on an inquiry whether those
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 253
vidyas are permanently connected with the acts in the
same way as the circumstance of being made of par«a-wood
is permanently connected with all sacrifices in which the
^uhu (the sacrificial ladle) is used ; or if they are non-
permanent like the vessel called godohana ^. The purva-
pakshin maintains that the meditations are permanently
connected with the sacrificial acts, because they also are
comprised within the scriptural enouncements concerning
performances. For they also do not stand under some
special heading -, and as they are connected with the sacrifice
through the udgitha and so on, they combine themselves,
like other subordinate members, with the scriptural state-
ments as to the performance of the sacrifice.
If against the doctrine of the meditations forming per-
manent parts of the sacrificial performances it should be
urged, that in the chapters containing them special results
are mentioned (which seem to constitute the meditations
into independent acts), as e. g. in the passage, ' he indeed
becomes a fulfiller of desires' [Kh. Up. I, i, 7); we reply
that those statements of results being given in the text in
the present form only (not in an injunctional form), are mere
' The question is raised whether the meditations, enjoined in the
Upanishads, on certain parts or elements of sacrificial acts, are per-
manently connected with the latter, i.e. are to be undertaken when-
ever the sacrificial act is performed, or not. — In the former case
they would stand to the sacrifice in the same relation as the
parwamayitva, i.e. the quality of being made of par;/a-wood, does.
Just as the latter is connected with the sacrifice by means of the
^uhu — the sacrificial ladle, — so the meditation on the syllable Om,
e.g. would be connected with the sacrifice by means of that syllable.
— In the latter case, i.e. in the case of being connected with the
sacrifice on certain occasions only, the upasana is analogous to the
godohana-vessel which is used in the dar.yapur;2amasa-sacrifice
instead of the usual /^amasa, only if the sacrificer specially wishes for
cattle.— See Pu. Mi. Su. Ill, 6, i ; IV, i, 2.
^ Like the statement about the parwamayitva of the ^uhu which
the sacred text does not exhibit under some particular prakarawa,
but ex abrupto as it were ; on which account it is to be connected
with the sacrifice in general.
2 54 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
arthavada-passages — like the statement about him whose
^hu is made of par;/a-wood hearing no evil sound — and
thus do not aim at enjoining certain results. — Hence, just
as the statement about being made of par;^a-wood — which
does not occur under a definite prakara;/a — connects itself,
by means of the sacrificial ladle, with the sacrifice, and thus
forms a permanent element of the latter no less than if it
were actually made under the heading of the sacrifice ; so
the meditations on the udgitha, &c., also form permanent
parts of the sacrifices.
To this we make the following reply. ' There is non-
restriction of the assertions concerning them.' That means :
the assertions which the text makes concerning the nature
of certain subordinate members of sacrificial acts such as
the udgitha and so on — as e. g. that the udgitha is the best
of all essences [Kh. Up. I. i, 3), the fulfiller of desires
(I, I, 7), a gratifier of desires (I, i, 8), the chief pra//a
(I, 2, 7), Aditya (I, 3, i) — cannot be permanently connected
with the sacrificial acts in the same way as other permanent
members are, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because scripture
shows that they are not so permanently connected. For
scripture allows also such as are not acquainted with the
details mentioned above to perform the sacrificial actions
(cp. the passage I, i, 10, ' Therefore both he who knows
this, and he who does not. perform the sacrifice'), and declares
that even those priests, Prastotr/ and so on, who are devoid
of the knowledge of the divinities of the prastava and the
like, do perform the sacrifices ■ Prastotrz, if you without
knowing the deity which belongs to the prastava are going
to sing it.' &c. (I, 10, 9 and ff.). — The sacred text moreover
declares that the vidyas founded on certain elements of
sacrificial acts have results of their own, apart from those
acts, viz. * non-obstruction ' in the accomplishment of the
fruit of the sacrifice, i. e. a certain additional success of the
sacrifice, cp. the passage I, i, 10, 'Therefore he who knows
this and he who does not perform the sacrifice. But
knowledge and ignorance are separate. The sacrifice which
a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad
is more powerful.' The declaration made in this passage
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 42. 255
that the performances of him who knows and of him who
does not know are separate, and the employment of the
comparative form {' more powerful ') show that even the
sacrifice destitute of the vidy^ is powerful. But how would
that be possible if the vidya formed a permanent necessary
part of the sacrifice ? In the latter case a sacrifice devoid
of that vidya could never be admitted to be powerful ; for
it is an established principle that only those sacrifices are
effective which comprise all subordinate members. Thus
the text also teaches definite results for each meditation, in
the section treating of the meditation on the Saman as the
worlds and others : ' The worlds in an ascending and in a
descending line belong to him,' &c. (K/i. Up. II, 2, 3). —
Nor must we understand those declarations of results to be
mere arthavadas ; for in that case they w^ould have to be
taken as stating a secondary matter only, while if under-
stood to teach certain results they may be taken in their
principal (i. e. direct, literal) sense ^. The case of the results
which scripture declares to be connected with the praya^as
e. g. is of a dift'erent nature. For the praya^as are en-
joined with reference to a sacrifice (viz. the darj-apur«amasa)
which requires certain definite modes of procedure (such as
the offering of the praya^as and the like), and hence sub-
serve that sacrifice ; so that the passage stating a fruit for
the praya^as has to be considered as a mere arthavada-pas-
sage 2. In the case again of the quality of consisting of
parwa-wood — which quality is stated ex abrupto, not under
a definite heading — no special result can be assumed ; for
as a quality is not an act it cannot be connected with any
result unless it be joined to something to abide in. The
use of the godohana indeed may have its own injunction of
^ The statement as to the result of an action is a 'statement of
a principal matter' if it is really meant to inform us that a certain
result will attend a certain action. It is a statement of a 'secondary
matter' if it is only meant to glorify the action.
^ Not as a passage enjoining a special result for the praya^as;
for the latter merely help to bring about the general result of the
darjapur;zamasa and have no special result of their own.
2^6 VEDANTA-sC'TRAS.
result, for it does possess such an abode — viz. the act of
water being carried (in it) — with reference to which it is
enjoined. So again a special fruit may be enjoined for the
case of the sacrificial post being made of bilva-wood ; for
this latter quality likewise has an abode, viz. the sacrificial
post with reference to which it is enjoined. But in the case
of the quality of consisting of par;/a-wood there is no such
established abode under the heading of which that quality
is enjoined ; and if we assumed that the sentence (' He
whose ^uhu is made of par;/a-wood hears no evil sound ')
after intimating that the quality of consisting of par;za-wood
resides in the^uhu is also meant to enjoin the fruit thereof,
we should impute to the text the imperfection called ' split
of the sentence.' — The meditations on the other hand are
themselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunc-
tion ; hence there is no reason why a special result should
not be enjoined for those meditations which are based on
sacrificial acts. The conclusion therefore is that the medi-
tations on the udgitha, &c., although based on sacrifices, are
yet not necessary members of the latter, because they have
results of their own like the use of the godohana-vessel.
For this reason the authors of the Kalpa-sutras have not
represented such meditations as belonging to the sacrificial
performances.
43. As in the case of the offerings, (Vayu and
Pra;2a must be held apart). This has been ex-
plained (in the Purva Mtma;;^sa-siitra).
The section of the Va^asaneyaka which begins, ' Voice
held, I shall speak' {Bri. Up. I, 5, 21), determines Pra/^a
to be the best among the organs of the body, viz. speech
and so on, and Vayu to be the best among the Devas,
viz. Agni and so on. — Similarly in the AV^andogya, Vayu is
affirmed to be the general absorber of the Devas, 'Vayu in-
deed is the absorber' (IV, 3, i), while Pra;/a is said to be the
general absorber of the organs of the body, ' Breath indeed
is the absorber' (IV, 3, 3). — The doubt here arises whether
Vayu and Pra;/a are to be conceived as separate or not.
As non-separate, the purvapakshin maintains; because in
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43. 257
their true nature they do not differ. And as their true
nature does not differ they must not be meditated upon
separately. Another scriptural passage also declares that
the organs of the body and the divinities are non-different
in their true nature, ' Agni having become speech entered
the mouth,' &c. (Ait. An II, 4, 2, 4). Moreover, the passage
Br/. Up. I, 5^^3> '^ These are all alike, all endless,' declares
that the powers of the Devas constitute the Self of the
organs of the body. And various other passages also
testify to the fundamental non-difference of the two. In
some places we have even a direct identification of the
two, ' What Prawa is, that is Vayu.' And in the j-loka
concluding the Vao-asaneyaka-chapter to which the passage
under discussion belongs, the text refers to pra//a only (' He
verily rises from the breath and sets in the breath '), and
thus shows the breath to be one with the previously men-
tioned Vayu. This conclusion is moreover confirmed by the
fact that the observance enjoined in the end refers to pra«a
only, ' Therefore let a man perform one observance only,
let him breathe up and let him breathe down ' (Br/. Up. I,
5, 23). Similarly, the AV/indogya-passage, IV, 3, 6, ' One
god swallowed the four great ones,' intimates that there
is one absorber only, and does not say that one god is the
absorber of the one set of four, and another the absorber of
the other set of four. — From all this it follows that Vayu
and Pra;^a are to be conceived as one.
To this we make the following reply. Vayu and Pra;/a
are to be conceived separately, because the text teaches
them in separation. The separate instruction given by the
text with reference to the organs and the Devas for the
purposes of meditation would be meaningless if the medi-
tations were not held apart. — But the purvapakshin main-
tains that owing to the essential non-difference of Vayu and
Pra;/a the meditations are not to be separated ! — Although,
we reply, there may be non-difference of true nature, yet
there may be difference of condition giving rise to dif-
ference of instruction, and, through the latter, to difference
of meditation. And although the introduction of the con-
cluding j-loka may be accounted for on the ground of its
[38J S
258 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
showing the fundamental non-difference of the two, it
yet has no power to sublate the previously declared dif-
ference of the objects of meditation. Moreover, the text
institutes a comparison between Vayu and Pra/m, which
again shows that the two are different, 'And as it was with
the central breath among the breaths, so it was with Vayu,
the wind among those deities ' (Br/. Up. I, 5, 22). — This
explains also the mention made of the observance (I, 5, 33).
The word ' only ' (in ' Let a man perform one observance
only ') has the purpose of establishing the observance with
regard to Pra;^a, by sublating the obsei-vances with regard
to speech and so on, regarding which the text had re-
marked previously that they were disturbed by Death
(' Death having become weariness took them '), and does
not by any means aim at sublating the observance with
regard to Vayu ; for the section beginning ' Next follows
the consideration of the observances ' distinctly asserts
that the observances of Vayu and Prawa were equally
unbroken. — Moreover, the text, after having said, ' Let a
man perform one observance only,' declares in the end
that the fruit of that observance is the obtaining of (union
with) Vayu (' Then he obtains through it union and one-
ness with that deity "), and thus shows that the observance
with regard to Vayu is not to be considered as sublated.
That by that ' deity ' we have to understand Vayu, we
conclude from the circumstance that what the worshipper
wishes to obtain is non-limitation of his Self^, and that
previously the term ' deity ' had been applied to Vayu,
' Vayu is the deity that never sets.' — Analogously in the
/sTZ-andogya-passage the text represents Vayu and Pri«a
as different, ' These are the two absorbers, Vayu among the
Devas, Pra^^a among the prawas,' and in the concluding para-
graph also (IV, 3, 8) refers to them as distinct, 'These five and
the other five make ten, and that is the Krz'ta.' — For these
reasons Vayu and Pra;^a are to be conceived as different.
The Sutra compares the case under discussion to a
^ Agnyadin apekshyanava>^^^ino devo vayus te tu tenaivava-
H'^inna ill sa^^vargaguwo vayur anavaX'X'^inna devata. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 44. 259
parallel one from the karmakanddi, by means of the clause,
'as in the case of the offerings.' With regard to the ishri
comprising three sacrificial cakes, which is enjoined in the
passage, Taitt. Sa;«h. II, 3, 6, ' A purofl'aj'a on eleven
potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the over-ruler, to
Indra the self-ruler,' it might be supposed that the three
cakes are to be offered together because they are offered
to one and the same Indra, and because the concluding
sentence says, ' conveying to all (gods) he cuts off to pre-
clude purposelessness.' But as the attributes (viz. 'ruler'
and so on) differ, and as scripture enjoins that the ya^a
and anuvakyamantras are to exchange places with regard
to the different cakes ^, the divinity is each time a different
one according to the address, and from this it follows that
the three offerings also are separate. — Thus, in the case
under discussion, Vayu and Pra;za, although fundamentally
non-different, are to be held apart as objects of meditation,
and we have therefore to do with two separate medita-
tions.— This is explained in the Sankarsha-ka;/</a, ' The
divinities are separate on account of their being cognized
thus.'
But w^hile in the case of the three puro^^ajas the dif-
ference of material and divinity involves a difference on the
part of the oblations, we have in the case under discussion
to do with one vidya only ; for that the text enjoins one
vidya only we conclude from the introductory and con-
cluding statements. There is contained, however, in this
one vidya a double meditative activity with regard to the
bodily organs and the divinities, just as the agnihotra which
is offered in the morning as well as in the evening requires
a double activity. In this sense the Sutra says, 'as in the
case of the offerings.'
44. On account of the majority of indicatory marks
(the fire-altars built of mind, &c. do not form
elements of any act) ; for this (i. e. the indicatory
^ The ya^ya-mantra of the first offering being used as anuvakya
in the second one and so on.
S 2
26o VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
mark) is stronger (than the general subject-matter) ;
this also (has been explained in the Pu. Mi. Sutras).
In the Agnirahasya of the Va^asaneyins, in the Brahmawa
beginning 'for in the beginning indeed this was not exis-
tent,' we read with reference to mind (manas), ' It saw thirty-
six thousand shining fire-aUars, belonging to itself, made of
mind, built of mind.' And, further on, the text makes similar
statements about other fanciful fire-altars built of speech,
built of breath, built of sight, built of hearing, built of
work, built of fire. — A doubt here arises whether these
fire-altars built of mind and so on are connected with the
act (i.e. the construction of the fire-altar made of bricks),
and supplementary to it, or whether they are independent,
constituting a mere vidyd.
Against the prima facie view that those agnis are con-
nected with the sacrificial act under whose heading the
text records them, the Sutra maintains their independence,
' on account of the majority of indicatory marks.' For we
meet in that Brahma//a with a number of indicatory marks
confirming that those agnis constitute a mere vidya ; cp.
e. g. the following passages : • Whatever these beings con-
ceive in their minds, that is a means for those fire-altars,'
and 'All beings always pile up those fire-altars for him
who thus knows, even when he sleeps,' and so on \ — And
that indicatory marks (liriga) are of greater force than the
leading subject-matter (prakarawa) has been explained in
the Purva Mima;/«a (III, 3, 14).
45. (The agni built of mind, &c.) is a particular
form of the preceding one (i.e. the agni built of
bricks), on account of the leading subject-matter; it
is (part of) the act; as in the case of the manasa cup.
Your supposition, the purvapakshin objects, as to those
fire-altars being not supplementary to the sacrificial act,
^ For something which forms part of an act cannot be brought
about by something so indefinite as ' whatever these beings conceive
in their minds,' nor can it be accomplished indifferently at any
time by any beings.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 46. 26 1
but altogether independent of it, is untenable. The in-
fluence of the leading subject-matter rather compels us to
conclude that the instruction given by the text about the
agni made of mind and so on, enjoins some particular mode
of the same agni which the preceding sections describe as
the outcome of a real act ^. — But are not indicatory marks
stronger than the leading subject-matter ? — True in general ;
but indicatory marks such as those contained in the pas-
sages quoted above are by no means stronger than the
general subject-matter. For as those passages are of the
nature of glorifications of the fanciful fire-altars, the liiigas
(have no proving power in themselves but) merely illustrate
some other matter (viz. the injunction to which those
passages are arthavadas) ; and as they are of that nature
they may, there being no other proof, be taken as mere
gu;^avadas. and as such are not able to sublate the influence
of the prakara;/a. On the ground of the latter, therefore,
all those fanciful agnis must be viewed as forming parts of
the sacrificial action.
The case is analogous to that of the ' mental ' (cup). On
the tenth day of the Soma sacrifices occupying twelve days
— which day is termed avivakya — a soma cup is offered
mentally, the earth being viewed as the cup, the sea as the
Soma and Pra^apati as the divinity to which the offering is
made. All rites connected with that cup, viz. taking it up,
putting it down in its place, offering the liquid in it, taking
up the remaining liquid, the priests inviting one another to
drink the remainder, and the drinking, all these rites the
text declares to be mental only, i.e. to be done in thought
only-. Yet this mental quasi-cup, as standing under the
heading of a sacrificial act, forms part of that act. — The
same then holds good with regard to the quasi-agnis made
of mind and so on.
46. And on account of the transfer (of particulars).
That those agnis enter into the sacrificial action follows
^ I.e. of the agni made of bricks which is the outcome of the
agni;^ayana. — An. Gi. explains vikalpavi^esha by prakarabheda.
^ Cp. Ta.fidya. Brah. IV, 9; Taitt. Sa;«h. VII, 3, i.
262 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
moreover from the fact that the text extends to them (the
injunctions given about the agni made of bricks). Com-
pare the passage, 'Thirty-six thousand shining Agnis ; each
one of them is as large as the previously mentioned Agni.'
Such extension of injunctions is possible only where there
is general equality. The text therefore by extending the
determinations relative to the previous agni, i.e. the agni
built of bricks, which forms a constituent element of the
sacrificial action, to the fanciful agnis, intimates thereby
that they also form part of the sacrificial performance.
47. But (the agnIs rather constitute) a vidya, on
account of the assertion (made by the text).
The word ' but ' sets aside the purvapaksha. — The agnis
built of mind and so on are to be viewed not as comple-
mentary to a sacrificial action, but as independent and con-
stituting a vidya of their own. For the text expressly
asserts that 'they are built of knowledge (vidya) only,' and
that ' by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.'
48. And because (indicatory marks of that) are
seen (in the text). "
And that there are to be observed indicatory marks
leading to the same conclusion, has already been declared
in Sutra 44. — But, under Sutra 45, it was shown that
indicatory marks unaided by other reasons cannot be
admitted as proving anything, and it was consequently
determined that, owing to the influence of the leading
subject-matter, the Agnis form part of the sacrificial
action ! — To this objection the next Sutra replies.
49. (The view that the agnis constitute an inde-
pendent vidya) cannot be refuted, owing to the
greater force of direct enunciation and so on.
Our opponent has no right to determine, on the ground
of prakarawa, that the agnis are subordinate to the sacri-
ficial action, and so to set aside our view according to which
they are independent. For we know from the Purva
Mima;;2sa that direct enunciation (5ruti), indicatory mark
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 49. 263
(liiiga), and syntactical connexion (vakya) are of greater
force than leading subject-matter (prakara;/a), and all those
three means of proof are seen to confirm our view of the agnis
being independent. In the first place we have the direct
enunciation, ' These agnis are indeed knowledge-piled only.'
In the second place we have the indicatory mark supplied
by the passage, ' All beings ever pile for him sleeping,' &c.
And in the third place we have the sentence, ' By know-
ledge indeed those (agnis) are piled for him who thus
knows.'
In the first of these passages the emphatical expression,
'built by knowledge only,' would be contradicted if we ad-
mitted that the agnis form part of the sacrificial action. —
But may this emphatical phrase not merely have the pur-
pose of indicating that those agnis are not to be accom-
plished by external means ? — No, we reply, for if that were
intended, it would be sufficient to glorify the fact of know-
ledge constituting the character of the agnis by means of
the word 'knowledge-piled,' and the emphatical assertion
(implied in the addition of the word ' only '} would be
useless. For it is the nature of such agnis to be accom-
plished without any external means. But, although the
agnis are clearly to be accomplished without external
means, yet it might be supposed that, like the mental cup,
they form part of the sacrificial action, and the object of
the emphatical assertion implied in ' only ' is to discard
that suspicion. — So likewise (to pass over to lihga) the
continuity of action implied in the passage, ' For him who
thus knows whether sleeping or waking all beings always
pile these agnis, ' is possible only on the supposition of
those agnis being independent. The case is analogous to
that of the imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and
breath, with reference to which the text says at first, ' He
offers his breath in his speech, he offers his speech in his
breath,' and then adds, ' These two endless and immortal
oblations he offers always whether waking or sleeping'
(Kau. Up. II, 6). — If, on the other hand, the imaginary
agnis were parts of the sacrificial action it would be
impossible for them to be accomplished continually, since
264 vedanta-sOtras.
the accomplishment of the sacrificial action itself occupies
only a short time. — Nor may we suppose the passage
(which contains the linga) to be a mere arthavada-passage
(in which case, as the purvapakshin avers, the liriga would
be unable to refute prakarawa). For in those cases where
we meet with an unmistakeable injunctory passage —
marked out as such by the use of the optative or imperative
form — there indeed we may assume a glorificatory passage
(met with in connexion with that injunctory passage) to
be an arthavada. In the present case, however, we observe
no clear injunctory passage, and should therefore be obliged
to construct one enjoining the knowledge of the various
fanciful agnis, merely on the basis of the arthavada-
passage. But in that case the injunction can be framed
only in accordance with the arthavada, and as the arthavada
speaks of the continual building of the agnis, the latter item
would have to appear in the injunction also. But, if so, it
follows (as shown above) that the mental construction of
those agnis constitutes an independent vidya (and does not
form part of the actual agni/^ayana). — The same argument-
ation applies to the second lihga-passage quoted above,
'Whatever those beings conceive in their minds,' &c. — And
the sentence finally shows, by means of the clause, '.For
him who thus knows,' that those agnis are connected with
a special class of men (viz. those who thus know), and are
therefore not to be connected with the sacrificial action. —
For all these reasons the view of those agnis constituting an
independent vidya is preferable.
50. On account of the connexion and so on (the
agnis built of mind, &c. are independent); in the
same way as other cognitions are separate. And
there is seen (another case of something having to
be withdrawn from the leading subject-matter) ; this
has been explained (in the Purva Mima;;2sa-sutras).
Independence has, against the general subject-matter, to
be assumed for the fire-altars built of mind and so on, for
that reason also that the text connects the constituent
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 50. 265
members of the sacrificial action with activities of the
mind, &c. ; viz. in the passage. ' With mind only they
are estabhshed, with mind only they are piled, with
mind only the cups were taken, with mind the udgatr/s
praised, with mind the hot;7s recited ; whatever work is
done at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work, was done as
consisting of mind, by mind only, at those fire-altars made
of mind, piled by mind,' &c. For that connexion has for
its result an imaginative combination (of certain mental en-
ergies with the parts of the sacrifice), and the obtainment
of the parts of the sacrifice which are objects of actual
perception cannot be made dependent on such imaginative
combination \ Nor must it be supposed that, because here
also, as in the case of the meditation on the udgitha, the
vidya is connected with members of the sacrificial action,
it enters into that action as a constituent part; for the state-
ments of the text differ in the two cases. For in our case
scripture does not say that we are to take some member of
a sacrificial action and then to superimpose upon it such
and such a name ; but rather takes six and thirty thousand
different energies of the mind and identifies them with the
fire-altars, the cups, and so on, just as in some other place
it teaches a meditation on man viewed as the sacrifice.
The number given by the text is originally observed as
belonging to the days of a man's life, and is then transferred
to the mental energies connected therewith. — From the con-
nexion (referred to in the Sutra) it therefore follows that
the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent. — The clause
' and so on ' (met with in the Sutra) must be explained as
comprehending 'transference' and the like as far as possi-
ble. For if the text says, ' Each of those Agnis is as great
as that prior one,' it transfers the glory of the fire-altar
consisting of the work (i. e. the real altar piled of bricks) to
the altars consisting of knowledge and so on, and thereby
^ Kimartham idam anubandhakarawaw tad aha, sampad iti, upa-
styartho by anubandhas tathapi manaj-z^idadinam akri}ahgatve
kim ayatawz tad aha, na /^eti, tesha;7z kriyahgatve sakshad evadha-
nadiprasiddher anarthika sampad ity artha/^. An. Gi.
266 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said
that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacri-
ficial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may
optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of
bricks (as was asserted by the purvapakshin in Sutra 45).
For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial
action by means of those energies with which the original
agni assists it, viz. by bearing theahavaniya fire and so on. —
The assertion, again, made by the purvapakshin (Sutra 46)
that 'transference' strengthens his view in so far as transfer-
ence is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted
by the remark that also on our view transference is possible,
since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so
far as both are fire-altars. — And that direct enunciation and
so on favour our conclusion has been shown. — From con-
nexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled
of mind, &c. are independent. — ' As in the case of the
separateness of other cognitions.' As other cognitions, such
as e. g. the SandWya-vidya, which have each their own parti-
cular connexion, separate themselves from works and other
cognitions and are independent ; so it is in our case also. —
Moreover 'there is seen' an analogous case of independence
from the leading subject-matter. The offering called avesh/i
which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of
the ra^asuya-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading
because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the
ra^asuya can be offered by a member of the warrior caste
only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in
the Purva Mim^;«sa-sutras).
51. Not also on account of its resembling (the
manasa cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an
action); for it is observed (on the ground of ^'ruti,
&c., that they are independent); as in the case of
death ; for the world does not become (a fire)
(because it resembles a fire in some points).
Against the allegation made by the purvapakshin that
the present case is analogous to that of the manasa cup, we
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 52. 267
remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be
assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they
may resemble the manasa cup, since on the ground of direct
enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of
man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action).
Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or
other ; but in spite of that there remains the individual
dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case
is analogous to that of death. In the passages, 'The man
in that orb is death indeed' (.Sat. Bra. X, 5, 2, 3), and 'Agni
indeed is death ' (Taitt. Sawh. V, i, 10, 3), the term 'death '
is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun ; all the
same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if
the text says in another place, ' This world is a fire indeed,
O Gotama ; the sun is its fuel,' &c. {Kh. Up.V, 4, i), it
does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that
the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case.
52. And from the subsequent (Brahma/^a) it
follows that being of that kind (i.e. injunction of a
mere vidya) (is the aim) of the text. The connexion
(of the fanciful agnis with the real one) is due to the
plurality (of details of the real agni which are
imaginatively connected with the vidya).
With regard to a subsequent Brdhmawa also, viz. the one
beginning, 'That piled agni is this world indeed,' we appre-
hend that what is the purpose of the text is ' being of that
kind,' i.e. injunction of a mere vidya, not injunction of the
member of a mere action. For we meet there with the fol-
lowing j-loka, ' By knowledge they ascend there where all
wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there,
nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.' This
verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former
Brahmawa also, viz. the one beginning, ' What that orb
leads' (6"at. Bra. X, 5, 2, 23), concludes with a statement of
the fruit of knowledge ( 'Immortal becomes he whose Self is
death '), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief
thing. — The text connects the vidya (of the agnis built of
2 68 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those
agnis are members of the act of building the real agni,
but because many of the elements of the real agni are
imaginatively combined with the vidya.
All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars
built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidya.
53. Some (maintain the non-existence) of a
(separate) Self, on account of the existence (of the
Self) where a body is (only).
At present we will prove the existence of a Self different
from the body in order to establish thereby the qualifica-
tion (of the Self) for bondage and release. For if there were
no Self different from the body, there would be no room for
injunctions that have the other world for their result ; nor
could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self —
But, an objection is raised, already in the first pada which
stands at the head of this ^astra (i. e. the first pada of the
Purva Mima7«sa-sutras) there has been declared the exist-
ence of a Self which is different from the body and hence
capable of enjoying the fruits taught by the 5astra. — True,
this has been declared there by the author of the bhashya,
but there is in that place no Sutra about the existence of
the Self. Here, on the other hand, the Sutrakara himself
establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed
of a preliminary objection. And from hence the teacher
Sahara Svamin has taken the matter for his discussion of
the point in the chapter treating of the means of right
knowledge. For the same reason the reverend Upavarsha
remarks in the first tantra — where an opportunity offers
itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self — ' We
will discuss this in the vSariraka,' and allows the matter to
rest there. Here, where we are engaged in an inquiry into
the pious meditations which are matter of injunction, a
discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced in order
to show that the whole 6"astra depends thereon.
Moreover, in the preceding adhikara;^a we have shown
that passages may be exempted from the influence of the
leading subject-matter, and that for that reason the fire-
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 54. 269
altars built of mind and so on subserve the purpose of man
(not of the sacrifice). In consequence thereof there naturally
arises the question who that man is whose purposes the
different fire-altars subserve, and in reply to it the existence
of a Self which is separate from the body is affirmed. — The
first Sutra embodies an objection against that doctrine ;
according to the principle that a final refutation of objec-
tions stated in the beginning effects a stronger conviction
of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is aimed at.
Here now some materialists (lokayatika), who see the
Self in the body only, are of opinion that a Self separate
from the body does not exist ; assume that consciousness
(/^aitanya), although not observed in earth and the other
external elements — either single or combined — may yet
appear in them when transformed into the shape of a
body, so that consciousness springs from them ; and thus
maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating
quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in
certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified
by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no
Self separate from the body and capable of going to the
heavenly world or obtaining release, through which con-
sciousness is in the body ; but the body alone is what is
conscious, is the Self. For this assertion they allege the
reason stated in the Sutra, ' On account of its existence
where a body is.' For wherever something exists if some
other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing
does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a mere
quality of the latter ; light and heat, e. g. we determine to
be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness,
remembrance and so on — which by the upholders of an
independent Self are considered qualities of that Self — are
observed only within bodies and not outside bodies, and as
an abode of those qualities, different from the body, cannot
be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body
only. The Self therefore is not different from the body. —
To this conclusion the next Sutra replies.
54. There is separation (of the Self from the
2 70 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
body) because Its existence does not depend on the
existence of that (viz. the body), but there is not
(non-separation) ; as in the case of perceptive con-
sciousness.
The assertion that the Self is not separate from the body
cannot be maintained. The Self rather must be something
separate from the body, ' because the existence (of the Self)
does not depend on the existence of that (i. e. the body).'
For if from the circumstance that they are where the body
is you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities
of the body, you also must conclude from the fact that
they are not where the body is that they are not qualities
of the body, because thereby they show themselves to be
different in character from the qualities of the body. Now
the (real) qualities of the body, such as form and so on, may
be viewed as existing as long as the body exists ; life,
movement, &c., on the other hand, do not exist even when
the body exists, viz. in the state of death. The qualities of
the body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by
others ; not so the qualities of the Self, such as conscious-
ness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can indeed
ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as
the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain
their non-existence when the body does not exist ; for it is
possible that even after this body has died the qualities of
the Self should continue to exist by passing over into
another body. The opposite opinion is thus precluded
also for the reason of its being a mere hypothesis. — We
further must question our opponent as to the nature of
that consciousness which he assumes to spring from the
elements ; for the materialists do not admit the existence
of anything but the four elements. Should he say that
consciousness is the perception of the elements and what
springs from the elements, we remark that in that case the
elements and their products are objects of consciousness
and that hence the latter cannot be a quality of them, as it
is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire
is hot indeed but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 54. 27 1
trained as he may be, cannot mount on his own shoulders.
As httle could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of
the elements and their products, render them objects of
itself. For form and other (undoubted) qualities do not
make their own colour or the colour of something else their
objects ; the elements and their products, on the other
hand, whether external or belonging to the Self (the
organism) are rendered objects by consciousness. Hence
in the same way as we admit the existence of that per-
ceptive consciousness which has the material elements and
their products for its objects, we also must admit the
separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And
as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the
Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness
is permanent, follows from the uniformity of its character
(and we therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is
permanent also ; as also follows) from the fact that the
Self, although connected with a different state, recognises
itself as the conscious agent — a recognition expressed in
judgments such as ' I saw this,' — and from the fact of
remembrance and so on being possible^.
The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of
the body because it is where a body is, is already refuted
by the reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive con-
sciousness takes place where there are certain auxiliaries
such as lamps and the like, and does not take place where
those are absent, without its following therefrom that per-
ception is an attribute of the lamp or the like. Analogously
^ The 'nityatvaw X-a' of the text might perhaps be connected
directly with ' atmano.' Ananda Giri on the entire passage :
Bhavatu tarhi bhutebhyo ^ tirikta svatantryopalabdhls tathapi katham
atmasiddhis tatraha upalabdhiti, ksha«ikatvat tasya nityatmaru-
patvam ayuktam ity aj-ahkya^anatas tadbhedabhavad vishayoparagat
tadbhanad asav eva nityopalabdhir ity aha nityatvaw /^eti, kirn ka.
sthuladehabhimanahinasya svapne pratyabhi^wanad atiriktatma-
siddhir ity aha aham iti, svapne sthuladehantarasyaivopalabdhrz-
tvam ity a^ahkyaha smrztyaditi, upalabdhrzsmartror bhede saty
anyopalabdhe^snyasya smrz'tir iX'/J/zadayaj ka, net! na tayor anyatety
artha^.
2 72 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the fact that perception takes place where there is a body,
and does not take place where there is none, does not imply
that it is an attribute of the body ; for like lamps and so
on the body may be used (by the Self) as a mere auxiliary.
Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as
an auxiliary of perception ; for in the state of dream we
have manifold perceptions while the body lies motionless. —
The view of the Self being something separate from the
body is therefore free from all objections.
55. But the (meditations) connected with members
(of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to (particular)
^'akhas, according to the Veda (to which they
belong).
The above occasional discussion being terminated, we
return to the discussion of the matter in hand. — We meet
in the different 5akhas of each Veda with injunctions of
vidyas connected with certain members of sacrificial acts,
such as the udgitha and the like. Cp. e. g. • Let a man
meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgitha ' {Kh. Up. I,
I, i) ; 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold Saman as the
five worlds' (i^//. Up. II, 1, i) ; 'People say: "Hymns,
hymns ! " the hymn is truly this earth ' (Ait. Ar. II, 1,2, 1) ;
• The piled up fire-altar truly is this world ' (vSat. Bra. X, 5,
4. i). A doubt here arises whether the vidyas are enjoined
with reference to the udgitha and so on as belonging to a
certain vSakha only or as belonging to all 6"akhas. The
doubt is raised on the supposition that the udgitha and so
on dift'er in the different 5akhas because the accents.. &c.
differ.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the vddyas are
enjoined only with reference to the udgitha and so on which
belong to the particular 5akha (to which the vidya belongs).
— Why ? — On account of proximity. For as such general
injunctions as ' Let a man meditate on the udgitha ' are in
need of a specification, and as this need is satisfied by the
specifications given in the same 6"akha which stand in
immediate proximity, there is no reason for passing over
that 5akha and having recourse to specifications enjoined
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 56. 2^ \
in other 6"akhas. Hence the vidyas are to be held apart,
according to the .Sakhas to which they belong.
To this the Sutra replies ' but those connected with
members/ &c. — The word ' but ' discards the prima facie
view. The meditations are not restricted to their own
vSakhas according to the Veda to which they belong, but
are valid for all ^akhas. — Why?- — Because the direct state-
ments of the texts about the udgitha and so on enounce
no specification. For to such general injunctions as ' Let a
man meditate on the udgitha' — which say nothing about
specifications — violence would be done, if on the ground of
proximity we restricted them to something special belong-
ing to its own 6"akha, and that would be objectionable
because direct statement has greater weight than proximity.
There is, on the other hand, no reason why the vidya
should not be of general reference. We therefore conclude
that, although the vSakhas differ as to accents and the like,
the vidyas mentioned refer to the udgitha and so on belong-
ing to all 6'akhas, because the text speaks only of the
udgitha and so on in general.
56. Or else there is no contradiction (implied in
our opinion) ; as in the case of mantras and the like.
Or else we may put the matter as follows. There is no
reason whatever to suspect a contradiction if we declare
certain vidyas enjoined in one 5akh^ to be valid for the
udgitha and so on belonging to other 6"akhas also ; for
there is no more room for contradiction than in the case of
mantras. We observe that mantras, acts, and qualities of
acts which are enjoined in one ^akha are taken over by
other vSakhas also. So e. g. the members of certain Ya^ur-
veda 5akhas do not exhibit in their text the mantra, ' Thou
art the ku/aru^,' which accompanies the taking of the stone
(with which the rice-grains are ground) ; all the same we
meet in their text with the following injunction of applica-
tion, ' Thou art the cock, with this mantra he takes the
stone ; or else with the mantra, Thou art the ku/aru.'
^ Maitrayawiya Sawhita I, i, 6.
[38] T
2 74 vedanta-sOtras.
Again, the text of some 5akha does not contain a direct
injunction of the five offerings called pray^^as which are
made to the fuel and so on, but it contains the injunction
of secondary matters connected with the pray^^as, viz. in
the passage, ' the seasons indeed are the praya^as ; they
are to be offered in one and the same spot ^.' — Again, the
text of some Sakha, does not contain an injunction as to
the species of the animal to be sacrificed to Agnishomau —
such as would be ' a he-goat is sacrificed to Agnishomau ^ ;'
— but in the same ^akha we meet with a mantra which
contains the required specification, ' Hot/'/, recite the
anuvakya, for the fat of the omentum of the he-goat ^.'
Similarly mantras enjoined in one Veda only, such as
' O Agni, promote the hautra, promote the sacrifice,' are
seen to be taken over into other Vedas also. Another
example (of the transference of mantras) is supplied by the
hymn, ' He who as soon as born showed himself intelligent,'
&c. (Rtk. Sa;;zh. II, 12), which although read in the text of
the Bahvr/-^as is employed in the Taittiriya Veda also,
according to Taitt. Sa;/^h. VH, 5, 5, 2, ' The Sa^aniya hymn
is to be recited.' — Just as, therefore, the members of sacri-
ficial actions on which certain vidyas rest are valid every-
where, so the vidyis themselves also which rest on those
members are valid for all Sakhas and Vedas.
57. There is pre-eminence of the (meditation on)
plenitude (i.e. Agni Vaii"vanara in his aggregate
form), as in the case of sacrifices; for thus scripture
shows.
In the legend beginning ' Pri/^inai-ala Aupamanyava,'
the text speaks of meditations on Vaij^vanara in his dis-
^ As this passage states the number of the praya^as (viz. five,
which is the number of the seasons) and other secondary points, we
conclude that the injunction of the offering of the praya^as, which is
given in other 6'akhas, is valid also for the 6"akha referred to in the
text (the Maitrayamyas, according to the commentators).
^ But only says 'they offer an animal to Agnishomau.'
' Wherefrom we infer that not any animal may be offered to
Agnishomau, but only a he-goat.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 57. 275
tributed as well as his aggregate condition. References
to him in his distributed state are made in the passage,
' Aupamanyava, whom do you meditate on as the Self?
He replied : Heaven only, venerable king. He said : The
Self which you meditate on is the Vai^vanara Self called
Sute^as ; ' and in the following passages {Kh. Up. V,
12-17). A meditation on him in his aggregate state, on
the other hand, is referred to in the passage (V, 18), 'Of
that Vai.yvanara Self the head is Sute^as, the eye Vij'va-
rupa, the breath Pr/thagvartman, the trunk Bahula, the
bladder Rayi, the feet the earth/ &c. — A doubt here arises
whether the text intimates a meditation on Vaij-vanara in
both his forms or only in his aggregate form.
The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with
meditations on Vaij-vanara in his distributed form, firstly
because the text exhibits a special verb, viz. ' you meditate
on,' with reference to each of the limbs, Sute^as and so on ;
and secondly because the text states special fruits (con-
nected with each special meditation) in the passage,
' Therefore every kind of Soma libation is seen in your
house,' and the later similar passages.
To this we make the following reply. We must sup-
pose that the entire section aims at intimating ' the pre-
eminence,' i. e. at intimating as its pre-eminent subject, a
meditation on ' plenitude,' i. e. on Vaij-vanara in his aggre-
gate state, who comprises within himself a plurality of
things ; not a number of special meditations on the limbs
of Vaij-vanara. ' As in the case of sacrifices.' In the same
way as the Vedic texts referring to sacrifices such as the
darj-apurwamasa aim at enjoining the performance of the
entire sacrifice only, i. e. of the chief sacrificial action to-
gether with its members — and not in addition the perform-
ance of single subordinate members such as the praya^as,
nor again the performance of the chief action together with
some of its subordinate members ; so it is here also. —
But whence do you know that ' plenitude ' is the pre-
eminent topic of the passage ? — It is shown by scripture,
we reply, since we apprehend that the entire section forms
a connected whole. For on exan;ining the connexion of
T 2
276 vedanta-sOtras.
the parts we find that the entire section has for its subject
the knowledge of Vaij'vanara. The text at first informs
us that six 7?zshis — Pr^/l'inaj-ala, &c., up to Uddalaka —
being unable to reach a firm foundation in the knowledge
of Vaij-vanara, went to the king Ajvapati Kaikeya ; goes
on to mention the object of each /i^zshi's meditation, viz.
the sky and so on ; determines that the sky and so on are
only the head and so on of Vaij-vdnara — in the passage
' he said : that is but the head of the Self,' and the later
similar passages ; — and thereupon rejects all meditations
on Vaij-vdnara in his distributed form, in the passage, ^Your
head would have fallen if you had not come to me,' and
so on. Finally having discarded all distributed meditation
it turns to the meditation on the aggregate Vai^vanara and
declares that all results rest on him only, ' he eats food in
all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs.' — That the text
mentions special fruits for the special meditations on
Sute^as and so on we have, in accordance with our view,
to explain as meaning that the results of the subordinate
meditations are to be connected in their aggregate with
the principal meditation. And that the text exhibits a
special verb — ' you do meditate ' — in connexion with each
member is not meant to enjoin special meditations on those
members, but merely to make additional remarks about
something which has another purpose (i. e. about the medi-
tation on the aggregate Vaij-vanara). — For all these reasons
the view according to which the text enjoins a meditation
on the aggregate Vaijvanara only is preferable.
Some commentators here establish the conclusion that
the meditation on the aggregate Vaij"vanara is the prefer-
able alternative, but assume, on the ground of the Sutra
employing the term ' pre-eminence ' only, that the Sutra-
kara allows also the alternative of distributed meditation.
But this is inadmissible, since it is improper to assume
a 'split of the sentence' (i.e. to ascribe to a passage a
double meaning), as long as the passage may be under-
stood as having one meaning only. Their interpretation,
moreover, contradicts those passages which expressly blame
distributed meditations ; such as ' Thy head would have
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 58. 277
fallen.' And as the conclusion of the section clearly in-
timates a meditation on the aggregate Vaij'vanara, the
negation of such meditation could not be maintained as
purvapaksha ^. The term ' pre-eminence ' which the Sutra
employs may moreover be explained as meaning (not mere
preferability, but exclusive) authoritativeness.
58. (The vidyas are) separate, on account of the
difference of words and the like.
In the preceding adhikara;/a we have arrived at the con-
clusion that a meditation on Vai^-vanara as a whole is the
pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special results
are stated for meditations on Sute^as and so on. On the
ground of this it may be presumed that other medita-
tions also which are enjoined by separate scriptural
texts have to be combined into more general medita-
tions. Moreover, we cannot acknowledge a separation of
vidyas (acts of cognition ; meditations) as long as the
object of cognition is the same ; for the object constitutes
the character of a cognition in the same way as the
material offered and the divinity to which the offering is
made constitute the character of a sacrifice. Now we
understand that the Lord forms the only object of cog-
nition in a number of scriptural passages, although the
latter are separate in enunciation ; cp. e, g. ' He con-
sisting of mind, whose body is pra;/a ' [KJi. Up. Ill, 14, 2);
'Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha' [KJi. Up. IV, to, 5);
' He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' i^KJi.
Up. VIII, 7, 3). Analogously one and the same Prawa is
referred to in different texts ; cp. ' Pra;^a indeed is the
end of all ' {Kh. Up. IV, "^^^ '^)\ ' Pra«a indeed is the oldest
and the best ' {Kh. Up. V, i , i ) ; ' Pra«a is father, Prawa is
mother' [Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And from the unity of the
object of cognition there follows unity of cognition. Nor
^ Yadobhayatropastisiddhantas tada vyastopastir evatra sama-
stopastir eva va purvapaksha,^ syan nadya ity aha, spash/e ^eti,
dviiiyai- k-^ tatrayukto vakyopakramasthavyastopastidhivirodhat.
An. Gi.
278 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
can it be said that, on this view, the separateness of the
different scriptural statements would be purposeless, since
each text serves to set forth other qualities (of the one
pradhdna which is their common subject). Hence the
different qualities which are enjoined in one's own and in
other KSakhas, and which all belong to one object of know-
ledge, must be combined so that a totality of cognition
may be effected.
To this conclusion we reply, ' Separate,^ &c. Although
the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be
considered as separate ' on account of the difference of
words and the like.' — For the text exhibits a difference of
words such as 'he knows,' 'let him meditate,' 'let him
form the idea' (cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, i). And difference of
terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts,
according to Purva Mimawsa-sutras II, 2, i. — The clause
'and the like' in the Sutra intimates that also qualities
and so on may be employed, according to circumstances,
as reasons for the separateness of acts. — But, an objection
is raised, from passages such as ' he knows ' and so on we
indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference
of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such
clauses as ' he sacrifices ' and the like (ya^ate, ^uhoti,
dadati). For all these words (viz. veda, upasita, &c.)
denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind,
and another meaning is not possible in their case ^. How
then does difference of vidya follow from difference of
words? — This objection is without force, we reply; for
although all those words equally denote a certain activity
of the mind only, yet a difference of vidya may result from
a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only
object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according
to its general purport each passage teaches different
qualities of the Lord ; and similarly, although one and the
same Prawa is the object of meditation in the other series
^ VedopasitetyadijabdanaOT kvaX'i^ gnanzm kva^^id dhyanam ity
arthabhedam ajahkya ^;7anasyavidheyatvad vidhiyamanam upasa-
nam evety aha arthantareti. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 58. 279
of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated
upon in one place and another in another place. From
difference of connexion there thus follows difference of
injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separate-
ness of the vidyas. Nor can it be maintained (as the purva-
pakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction
of the vidya itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities;
for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidya-
vidhi and which the gu«avidhis), and as in each passage
more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that
those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a
vidya established elsewhere ^. Nor should, in the case of
the purvapakshin's view being the true one, the qualities
which are common to several passages, such as ' having
true wishes,' be repeated more than once. Nor can the
different sections be combined into one syntactical whole,
because in each one a certain kind of meditation is en-
joined on those who have a certain wish, whence we
understand that the passage is complete in itself^. Nor
is there in the present case an additional injunction of a
meditation on something whole — such as there is in the
case of the cognition of the Vaii-vanara — owing to the
force of which the meditations on the single parts which
are contained in each section would combine themselves
into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cog-
nition being one we should admit unity of vidya without
any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether im-
possible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere
in the Upanishads). The Sutra therefore rightly declares
the separateness of the vidyas. — The present adhikarawa
being thus settled, the first Sutra of the pada has now to
be considered ^
^ For to enjoin in one passage several qualities — none of which is
established already — would involve an objectionable vakyabheda.
^ A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger
whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but
evince an akahksha, a desire of complementation.
^ I.e. the present adhikarawa ought in reality to head the entire
pada.
2 8o vedanta-sCtras.
59. There is (restriction to) option (between the
vidyas), on account of their having non-differing
results.
The difference of the vidyas having been determined, we
now enter on an inquiry whether, according to one's Hking,
there should be cumulation of the different vidyas or option
between them ; or else restriction to an optional proceed-
ing (to the exclusion of cumulation). For restriction to
cumulation (which might be mentioned as a third alterna-
tive) there is no reason, because the separation of the
vidyas has been established. — But we observe that in the
case of the sacrifices, agnihotra, dar^apur;/amasa and so on,
there is restriction to cumulation (i. e. that those sacrifices
have all of them to be performed, not optionally one or the
other) although they are different from each other. — True ;
but the reason for the obligatory cumulation of those
sacrifices lies therein that scripture teaches them to be of
absolute obligation. No scriptural passage, on the other
hand, teaches the absolute obligatoriness of the vidyas, and
it cannot therefore be a rule that they must be cumulated.
— Nor can it be a rule that there must be option between
them, because a person entitled to one vidya cannot be
excluded from another vid3^a. It therefore only remains to
conclude that one may proceed as one likes. — But — an
objection is raised — we must rather conclude that option
between them is the rule, because their fruits are non-
different. For vidyas such as ' He who consists of mind,
whose body is prawa ; ' ' Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha;'
' He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true,' have
all of them equally the obtaining of the Lord for their fruit.
— This does not affect our conclusion ; for we see that it is
allowed to proceed as one likes also with regard to certain
sacrificial acts which are the means of obtaining the
heavenly world, and thus have all of them the same result.
It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in the case of
vidyas one may proceed as one likes.
To this we reply as follows. There must be option
between the vidyas, not cumulation, because they have the
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, 61. 28 1
same fruit. For the fruit of all of them is the intuition of
the object meditated upon, and when this object, e. g. the
Lord, has once been intuited through one meditation a
second meditation would be purposeless. It would, more-
over, be impossible even to effect an intuition through the
cumulation of several meditations, since that would cause
distraction of attention. And that the fruit of a vidya is
to be effected through intuition various scriptural passages
declare; cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4, • He who has this faith
and no doubt ; ' B;x Up. IV, 1,3, ' Having become a god
he goes to the gods,' and others. Also Smrz'ti-passages
such as Bha. Gita VIII, 6, and others. — One therefore has to
select one of those vidyas the fruit of which is the same,
and to remain intent on it until, through the intuition of
the object to be meditated upon, the fruit of the vidya is
obtained.
60. But (vid)as) connected with wishes may,
according to one's liking, be cumulated or not ; on
account of the absence of the former reason.
The above Sutra supplies a counter-instance to the
preceding Sutra. — We have, on the other hand, vidyas
connected with definite wishes ; as e. g. Kh. Up. Ill, 15, 2,
' He who knows that the wind is the child of the regions
never weeps for his sons;' Kh. Up. VII, i, 5, ' He who
meditates on name as Brahman, walks at will as far as
name reaches.' In these vidyas which, like actions, effect
their own special results by means of their ' unseen ' Self,
there is no reference to any intuition, and one therefore
may, according to one's liking, either cumulate them or
not cumulate them ; ' on account of the absence of the
former reason,' i. e. because there is not the reason for
option which was stated in the preceding Sutra.
61. With the (meditations on) members (of sacri-
ficial acts) it is as with their abodes.
Are those meditations — enjoined in the three Vedas —
which rest on members of sacrificial actions such as the
282 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
udgitha to be superadded to each other, or may we proceed
with regard to them as we Hke? — To this doubt the Sutra
repHes, ' it is according to the abodes.' As the abiding-
places of those meditations, viz. the Stotra and so on, are
combined (for the performance of the sacrifice), so those
meditations also. For a meditation is subject to what it
rests on.
62. And on account of the teaching.
As the Stotra and the other members of the sacrifice on
which the meditations under discussion rest are taught in
the three Vedas, so also the meditations resting on them.
The meaning of this remark is that also as far as the mode
of information is concerned there is no difference between
the members of a sacrificial act and the meditations refer-
ring to them.
63. On account of the rectification.
The passage, 'From the seat of the Hotrz he sets right
any mistake committed in the udgitha ' (K/i. Up. I, 5) 5)>
declares that, owing to the might of the meditation on the
unity of prawava and udgitha, the Hotrz sets right any
mistake he may com_mit in his work, by means of the work
of the Hotrz.
Now, as a meditation mentioned in one Veda is con-
nected (with what is mentioned in another Veda) in the
same way as a thing mentioned in another Veda, the
above passage suggests the conclusion that all meditations
on members of sacrificial acts — in whatever Veda they may
be mentioned — have to be combined ^.
64. And because the text states a quality (of the
vidya) to be common (to the three Vedas).
The text states that the syllable Om which is a quality,
^ A ' thing' belonging to the i??g-veda, viz. the pra«ava, is, accord-
ing to the iiV/andogya-passage, connected with the Sama-veda
meditation on the udgiiha. Hence meditations also which belong
to different Vedas may be combined; for there is no difference
between them and things as far as connexion is concerned.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 65. 283
i. e. the abode of a meditation, is common to the three
Vedas, ' By that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds.
With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders, with Om the Hotri
recites, with Om the Udgatrz sings.' This suggests that,
as the abode of the vidya (viz. the Omkara.) is common,
the vidyas which abide in it are common also. — Or else
the Sutra may be explained as follows. If the udgitha
and so on, which are matters qualifying the sacrificial
action, were not all of them common to all sacrificial
performances, the vidyas resting on them would not go
together. But the scriptural passages which teach the
sacrificial performances and extend over all subordinate
matters, state that the udgitha and so on are common to
all performances. As thus the abodes of the vidyas go
together, the vidyas abiding in them go together likewise.
65. (The meditations on members of sacrificial
actions are) rather not (to be combined), as the text
does not state their going together.
The words * rather not ' discard the purvapaksha. The
meditations resting on members of actions are not to be
treated like what they rest on, because scripture does not
state their going together. Scripture actually states the
going together of the Stotras and other subordinate
members of sacrificial action which are enjoined in the
three Vedas ; cp. passages such as ' After the taking of
the graha or the raising of the /^amasa he performs the
Stotra ; ' ' After the Stotra he recites ; ' ' Prastotrz sing the
Saman ; ' ' HotW recite the Y^^ya for this ; ' and so on.
But, on the other hand, there are no analogous texts
expressly teaching the going together of the meditations. —
But the going together of the meditations is established
by those texts which intimate the successive performance
of the different constituent members of a sacrifice ! — By
no means, we reply. The meditations subserve the end
of man, while the texts referred to by you establish only
the going together of the udgitha and the like which
subserve the purpose of the sacrifice. That the medita-
tions on the udgitha and so on — although resting on
284 VEDANTA-sdTRAS.
members of sacrificial acts — yet subserve the end of man
only in the same way as the godohana vessel does, we
have already explained under III, 3, 42. — And this very
difference between members of sacrificial action and the
meditations resting on them, viz. that the former subserve
the purpose of the sacrifice while the latter subserve the
end of man, is founded on the express teaching of
scripture^. — And the further two indicatory marks (pointed
out by the purvapakshin in Sutras 6^ and 64) supply no
reason for the going together of the meditations, because
no direct scriptural statement may be constructed from
them. Nor ^ does the fact that in each sacrificial perform-
ance all foundations of meditations are comprised, enable
us to conclude that the meditations founded on them are
to be combined also ; for the meditations are not caused
by what they rest on. The meditations, as resting on
their foundations, would, it may be admitted, not exist
if those foundations did not exist. But therefrom it does
not follow that the going together of the foundations
implies a necessary going together of the meditations ; for
as to this we have no direct scriptural statement. — From
all this it results that the meditations may be performed
according to one's liking.
66. And because (scripture) shows it.
Scripture moreover shows that the meditations do not
go together, viz. in the following passage, ' A Brahman
priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer,
and all the priests' (K/i. Up. IV, 17, 10). For if all
meditations were to be combined, all priests would know
them all, and the text could not specially announce that
the Brahman priest possessing a certain knowledge
thereby saves the others. — The meditations may there-
fore, according to one's liking, be either combined or
optionally employed.
^ A remark refuting the averment made in Sutra 62.
^ And this is meant to refute the second interpretation given of
Sutra 64.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 285
FOURTH PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
1. The purpose of man (is effected) thence (i. e.
through the mere knowledge of Brahman), thus
Badaraya?/a opines.
The Sutrakara at present enters on an inquiry whether
the knowledge of the Self which is derived from the
Upanishads, is connected with works through him who is
entitled to perform the works ^, or is an independent means
to accomplish the purpose of man. He begins by stating
the final view in the above Sutra, 'Thence' &c. The
teacher Badaraya;/a is of opinion that thence, i. e. through
the independent knowledge of Brahman enjoined in the
Vedanta-texts, the purpose of man is effected. — Whence
is this known ? — ' From scripture,' which exhibits passages
such as the following : 'He who knows the Self overcomes
grief [Kh. Up. HI, 4, 1); 'He who knows that highest
Brahman becomes even Brahman ' (Mu. Up. HI, 2, 9) ;
' He who knows Brahman attains the Highest ' (Taitt. Up.
n, i) ; ' For him who has a teacher there is delay only so
long as he is not delivered ; then he will be perfect ' [Kh.
Up. VI, 14, 2) ; ' He who has searched out and under-
stands the Self which is free from sin, &c. &c., obtains
all worlds and all desires' [Kh. Up. VHI, 7, i); 'The Self
is to be seen ' &c. up to ' Thus far goes immortality ' (Brz.
Up. IV, 5, 6-15). These and similar texts declare that
mere knowledge effects the purpose of man. — Against this
the opponent raises his voice as follows.
2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supple-
mentary relation (to action), (the statements as to
^ The purvapakshin (see next Sutra) maintains that the know-
ledge of the Self is subordinate to (sacrificial) action through the
mediation of the agent, i. e. in so far as it imparts to the agent a
certain qualification.
2 86 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are artha-
vadas, as in other cases, thus G'aimini opines.
As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands
in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the
Self also is connected with action through the mediation of
its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the
rice-grains with water ; hence as the purpose of the know-
ledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of
the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere artha-
vadas. Such is the opinion of the teacher 6"aimini^ The
case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to
the fruits of certain materials, sa;;/skaras and works ; which
statements have likewise to be understood as arthavadas.
Cp. the passage, ' He whose sacrificial ladle is made of
par;za-wood hears no evil sound ; ' ' By anointing his eye
he wards off the eye of the enemy ; ' ' By making the
praya^a and anuya^a-oblations he makes an armour for
the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he over-
comes his enemies".' — But how can it be supposed that
^ The contention of the purvapakshin — (xaimini — is that the
knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because
it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This rela-
tion is mediated by the Self — the object of knowledge — which is
the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate
relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body
the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will
only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires
is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled
with water ; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modifiica-
tion (or purification, saz^^skara) they become fit to be used in the
sacrifice. — As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent
position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and con-
sequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as
' injunctions of fruits,' but merely as arthavadas, making some
additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to
which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary.
^ The material, i. e. the ladle made of par«a-wood, is auxiliary
to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz.
hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 287
the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit
under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action
as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of
the means of proof — general subject-matter and so on —
which determine such subordinate relation ? — The purva-
pakshin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters
into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent,
on the ground of the means of proof called vakya
(sentence ; syntactical unity) ^ But this we deny because
in the present case ' sentence ' has no force to teach the
application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacri-
fices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things
which the text states under no particular heading may
indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of
' sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not
of too wide an application " ; but the agent is an inter-
mediate link of too wide an application, since it is common
to all action whether worldly or based on the Veda. The
agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to
establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with
the sacrifice. — Your objection is not valid, the purva-
pakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different
from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based
on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly
works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be
guided by visible purposes ; with reference to Vedic works,
on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only
after the death of this body no activity would be possible
the entire sacrifice. Analogously in the case of the sawskara —
the anointing — which fits the sacrificer for performing the sacrifice,
and in the case of the praya^as and anuya^as which are merely
subordinate members of the dar^apurwamasa.
^ The entire Veda constituting an extended syntactical whole,
in which the agent is the same.
^ Thus the quality of being made of par;za-wood is connected
with the sacrifices on the ground of the vakya implied in ' yasya
parwamayi guhur bhavati,' because here we have as an intermediate
link the guhu, i. e. a special implement which is used at sacrifices
only, and therefore is not of too wide an application.
288 VEDANTA-stlTRAS.
were it not for the knowledge of a Self separate from the
body, and such knowledge therefore has its uses there. —
But, another objection is raised, from attributes given to
the Self, such as ' free from sin,' and the like, it appears
that the doctrine of the Upanishads refers to that Self
which stands outside the sawsara and cannot therefore
be subordinate to activity. — This objection too is without
force ; for what the Upanishads teach as the object of
cognition is just the transmigrating Self, which is clearly
referred to in such terms as 'dear' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5).
Attributes such as being free from sin, on the other hand,
may be viewed as aiming merely at the glorification of
that Self — But in more than one place Brahman, the
cause of the world, which is additional to the trans-
migrating Self and itself not subject to transmigration
has been established, and the Upanishads teach that this
very Brahman constitutes the real nature of the trans-
migrating Self! — True, that has been established; but
in order to confirm that doctrine, objections and their
refutation are again set forth with reference to the question
as to the fruit (of the knowledge of the Self).
3. On account of scripture showing (certain lines
of) conduct.
' 6'anaka the king of the Videhas sacrificed with a sacri-
fice at which many presents were given to the priests' {Brt.
Up. Ill, I, 1) ; 'Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice'
{K/i. Up. V, II, 5); these and similar passages — which
occur in sections that have another purport — show that
those who know Brahman are connected with sacrificial
action also. And similarly we apprehend from the fact
that according to scripture Uddalaka and others taught
their sons and so on, that they were connected with the
condition of life of householders. If mere knowledge could
effect the purpose of man, why should the persons men-
tioned have performed works troublesome in many respects?
' If a man would find honey in the Arka tree why should
he go to the forest ? '
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 7. 289
4. Because scripture directly states that.
' What a man does with knowledge, faith and the
Upanishad is more powerful' {Kh. Up. I, i, 10); this
passage directly states that knowledge is subordinate to
work ^, and from this it follows that mere knowledge
cannot effect the purpose of man,
5. On account of the taking hold together.
' Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of
him' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2); as this passage shows that
knowledge and work begin together to manifest their
fruits, it follows that knowledge is not independent.
6. And because scripture enjoins (works) for such
(only as understand the purport of the Veda).
' He who has learnt (lit. " read ") the Veda from a family
of teachers, according to the sacred injunction, in the
leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the
Guru ; who after having received his discharge has settled
in his own house, studying his sacred texts in some sacred
spot' {KJi. Up. VIII, i^); such passages also show that
those who know the purport of the whole Veda are qualified
for sacrificial action, and that hence knowledge does not
independently bring about a result. — But the expression
'who has read' directly states only that the Veda is read,
not that its purport is understood ! — Not so, we reply. The
reading of the Veda extends up to the comprehension of
its purport, as thus the reading has a visible purpose ^.
7. And on account of definite rules.
* Performing works here (i. e. in this life) let a man wish
to live a hundred years ; thus work will not cling to thee,
man ; there is no other way than that ' (Ij-a. Up. 2) ; ' The
^ For the instrumental case ' vidyaya ' directly represents know-
ledge as a means of work.
^ According to the Mima;«sa principle that, wherever possible,
actions enjoined must be understood to have a visible purpose
(a supersensuous result being admitted only where no visible resuk
can be made out),
[38] U
290 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Agiiihotra is a sattra lasting up to old age and death ; for
through old age one is freed from it or through death '
(Sat. Bra. XII, 4, J, i); from such definite rules also it
follows that knowledge is merely supplementary to works.
Against all these objections the Sutrakara upholds his
view in the following Sutra.
8. But on account of (scripture teaching) the
additional one (i.e. the Lord), (the view) of Badara-
ya?^a (is valid) ; as that is seen thus (in scriptural
passages).
The word ' but ' discards the purvapaksha. — The assertion
made in Sutra 2 cannot be maintained ' on account of the
text teaching the additional one.' If the Vedanta-texts
taught that the transmigrating embodied Self which is an
agent and enjoyer is something different from the mere
body, the statements as to the fruit of the knowledge of
the Self would, for the reasons indicated above, be mere
arthavadas. But what the Vedanta-texts really teach as
the object of knowledge is something different from the
embodied Self, viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is
free from all attributes of transmigratory existence such as
agency and the like and distinguished by freedom from sin
and so on, the highest Self. And the knowledge of that Self
does not only not promote action but rather cuts all action
short, as will be declared in Sutra 16. Hence the view
of the reverend Badarayawa which was stated in Sutra i
remains valid and cannot be shaken by fallacious reasoning
about the subordination of knowledge to action and the
like. That the Lord who is superior to the embodied
Self is the Self many scriptural texts declare ; compare
' He who perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, i, 9) ;
' From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun
rises' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'It is a great terror, a raised
thunderbolt' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2); 'By the command of that
imperishable one, O Gargi ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 9) ; ' It
thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth
fire ' (K/i. Up. VI, 2, 3). There are indeed passages in
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9. 29 1
which the transmigrating Self— hinted at by such terms as
' dear ' — is referred to as the object of knowledge, such as
' But for the love of the Self everything is dear. Verily
the Self is to be seen ' {Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) ; ' He who
breathes in the up-breathing he is thy Self and within all '
(Bri. Up. Ill, 4, i) ; 'The person that is seen in the eye
that is thy Self,' up to ' But I shall explain him further to
you' (K/i. Up. VIII, 7 ff.). But as there are at the same
time complementary passages connected with the passages
quoted above — viz. ' There has been breathed forth from
this great Being the Rtg-veda, Ya^r-veda,' &c. (Bri. Up.
II, 4, 10) ; ' He who overcomes hunger and thirst, sorrow,
passion, old age and death ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 5, i) ; * Having
approached the highest light he appears in his own form.
That is the highest person' (K/i. Up. VIII, 12, 3) — which
aim at giving instruction about the superior Self; it follows
that the two sets of passages do not mean to teach an
absolute difference of the two Selfs and that thus con-
tradiction is avoided. For the Self of the highest Lord is
the real nature of the embodied Self, while the state of
being embodied is due to the limiting adjuncts, as appears
from scriptural passages such as ' Thou art that ; ' ' There
is no other seer but he.' All which has been demonstrated
by us at length in the earlier parts of this commentary in
more than one place.
9. But the declarations (of scripture) are equal
(on the other side).
In reply to the averment made in Sutra 3, we point out
that there are declarations of scripture, of equal weight,
in favour of the view that knowledge is not complementary
to action. For there are scriptural passages such as,
' Knowing this the rz'shis descended from Kavasha said :
For what purpose should we study the Veda ? for what
purpose should we sacrifice ? Knowing this indeed the
Ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra ; ' and ' When
Brahmawas know that Self and have risen above the desire
for sons, wealth, and worlds, they wander about as men-
dicants' (Br/. Up. Ill, 5). Scripture moreover shows that
U 2
2 92 vedanta-sOtras.
Ya^/7avalkya and others who knew Brahman did not take
their stand on works. 'Thus far goes immortahty. Having
said so Ya^wavalkya went away into the forest ' (Br/. Up.
IV, 5, 15). With reference to the indicatory sign (as to
the dependence of knowledge to work) which is iniphed
in the passage, ' Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice,' we
remark that it belongs to a section which treats of Vaij-va-
nara. Now, the text may declare that a vidya of Brahman
as limited by adjuncts is accompanied by works ; but all
the same the vidya does not stand in a subordinate relation
to works since 'leading subject-matter' and the other
means of proof are absent.
We now reply to the averment made in Sutra 4.
10. (The direct statement is) non-comprehensive.
The direct scriptural statement implied in ' What a man
does with knowledge ' &c. does not refer to all knowledge,
as it is connected with the knowledge forming the subject-
matter of the section. And the latter is the knowledge of
the udgitha only, ' Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
(as) the udgitha.'
11. There is distribution (of the work and know-
ledge) as in the case of the hundred.
In reply to the averment (Sutra 5) that the passage,
' Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him,'
indicates the non-independence of knowledge, we point out
that the passage must be understood in a distributed sense,
knowledge taking hold of one man and work of another.
The case is analogous to that of the ' hundred.' When it
is said, ' Let a hundred be given to these two men,' the
hundred are divided in that way that fifty are given to one
man and fifty to the other. — Moreover what the text says
about the laying hold does not refer to him who is about
to obtain final release ; for the concluding passage, ' So
much for the man who desires,' indicates that the whole
section refers to the soul implicated in the sa;//sara, and
a new beginning is made for him who is about to be
released, in the clause, ' But as to the man who does not
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 3. 293
desire.' The clause about the laying hold thus comprises
all knowledge which falls within the sphere of the trans-
migrating soul whether it be enjoined or prohibited ^ since
there is no reason for distinction, and to all action whether
enjoined or prohibited, the clause embodying a reference
to knowledge and work as established elsewhere. And on
this interpretation there is room for the clause even without
our having recourse to the distribution of knowledge and
work.
The next Sutra replies to the averment made in Sutra 6.
12. Of him who has merely read the Veda (there
is qualification for works).
As the clause, ' Having learnt (read) the Veda from
a family of teachers,' speaks only of the reading, we de-
termine that acts are there enjoined for him who has
only read the Veda. — But from this it would follow that
on account of being destitute of knowledge such a person
would not be qualified for works ! — Never mind ; we do
not mean to deny that the understanding of sacrificial acts
which springs from the reading of the texts is the cause
of qualification for their performance ; we only wish to
establish that the knowledge of the Self derived from the
Upanishads is seen to have an independent purpose of its
own and therefore does not supply a reason of qualification
for acts. Analogously a person who is qualified for one
act does not require the knowledge of another act.
Against the reasoning of Sutra 7 we make the following
remark.
13. There being no specification (the rule does)
not (specially apply to him who knows).
In passages such as ' Performing works here let a man
live ' &c., which state definite rules, there is no specification
^ Pratishiddha kz. nagnastridarjanadirupa. An. Gi. — Pratishid-
dha ^a yathasa/J/^/iastradhigamanalaksha72a (not ' yatha sa>^/^Mstra '
as in the Biblioth. Indica edition). Bhamati.
294 vedanta-sOtras.
of him who knows, since the definite rule is enjoined with-
out any such specification.
14. Or else the permission (of works) is for the
glorification (of knowledge).
The passage ' Performing works here ' may be treated
in another way also. I^ven if, owing to the influence of
the general subject-matter, only he who knows is to be
viewed as he who performs works, yet the permission to
perform works must be viewed as aiming at the glorifica-
tion of knowledge ; as appears from the subsequent clause,
' no work clings to the man.' The meaning of the entire
passage thus is : To a man who knows no work will cling,
should he perform works during his whole life even, owing
to the power of knowledge. And this clearly glorifies
knowledge.
15. Some also by proceeding according to their
liking (evince their disregard of anything but know-
ledge).
Moreover some who know, having obtained the intuition
of the fruit of knowledge, express, in reliance thereon, the
purposelessness of the means of all other results, viz. by
proceeding according to their liking (and abandoning those
means). A scriptural text of the Va^asaneyins runs as
follows : ' Knowing this the people of old did not wish for
offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we
who have this Self and this world' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 22).
And that the fruit of knowledge, being present to intuition,
does not manifest itself at a later time only as the fruits
of actions do, we have explained more than once. From
this also it follows that knowledge is not subordinate to
action, and that the scriptural statements as to the fruit of
knowledge cannot be taken in any but their true sense.
16. And (scripture teaches) the destruction (of
the qualification for works, by knowledge).
Moreover scripture teaches that this whole apparent
world — which springs from Nescience, is characterised by
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 8. 295
actions, agents and results of actions and is the cause of
all qualification for works — is essentially destroyed by the
power of knowledge. Compare such passages as ' But
when all has become the Self of him, wherewith should
he see another, wherewith should he smell another?' {Bri.
Up. IV, 5, 15). For him now who should teach that the
qualification for works has for its necessary antecedent the
knowledge of the Self which the Vedanta-texts teach, it
would follow that the qualification for works is cut short
altogether. From this also it follows that knowledge is
independent.
17. And (kno\v]edge belongs) to those who are
bound to chastity ; for in scripture (that condition of
life is mentioned).
Scripture shows that knowledge is valid also for those
stages of life for which chastity is prescribed. Now in
their case knowledge cannot be subordinate to work
because work is absent ; for the works prescribed by the
Veda such as the Agnihotra are no longer performed by
men who have reached those stages. — But, an objection is
raised, those stages of life are not even mentioned in the
Veda! — This is not so, we reply. Certain Vedic passages
clearly intimate them ; so e. g. ' There are three branches
of the law' {K/i. Up. II, 23, i); 'Those who in the forest
practise faith and austerity' (K/i. Up. V, 10, i); 'Those
who practise penance and faith in the forest ' (Mu. Up. I,
10, 11); 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander
forth ' {Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22) ; ' Let him wander forth at once
from the state of studentship.' — That the stages requiring
chastity are open to men whether they have reached house-
holdership or not, and whether they have paid the debts (of
procreating a son, &c.) or not, is known from scripture
and Smr/ti. Herefrom also follows the independence of
knowledge.
18. 6^aimini (considers that scriptural passages
mentioning those stages of life in which chastity is
obligatory, contain) a reference (only to those stages);
296 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
they are not injunctions ; for (other scriptural pas-
sages) forbid (those stages).
The Vedic texts which have been quoted to the end of
showing the existence of the stages of Hfe on which chastity-
is binding — such as ' There are three branches of the law '
and so on — have no power to estabhsh those stages. For
the teacher G^aimini is of opinion that those passages
contain only a reference to the other stages of life, not an
injunction (of them). — Why? — Because they contain no
words expressive of injunction such as imperative verbal
forms, and because each of them is seen to have some
other purport. In the passage, 'There are three' &c., the
text at first refers to three stages of life (' Sacrifice, study,
and charity are the first ' &c. &c.), thereupon declares them
not to have unbounded results (' All these obtain the world
of the blessed '), and finally glorifies ' the state of being
grounded on Brahman ' as having unbounded results
('the Brahmasa;/2stha obtains immortalit)''). — But is not
a mere reference even sufficient to intimate the existence
of those stages of life ? — True ; but they are estabUshed
(enjoined) not by direct scriptural statements, but only by
Smr/ti and custom, and therefore when contradicted by
direct scriptural statement ^ are either to be disregarded or
else to be viewed as concerning those who (for some reason
or other) are disqualified (for active worship, sacrifices and
the Hke). — But together with the stages demanding chastity
the text refers to the condition of the householder also ^.
(' Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first.') — True; but the
existence of the state of the householder is established (not
by that passage but) by other scriptural passages, viz. those
which enjoin on the householder certain works such as the
Agnihotra. Hence the reference in the passage under
discussion aims at glorification only, not at injunction.
^ Such as that concerning the permanent obligation of the Agni-
hotra and so on.
^ And we therefore may conclude that those stages are as valid
as the — notoriously valid — state of householdership.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 297
Moreover, direct scriptural enunciations forbid other stages
of life ; cp. ' A murderer of the gods is he who removes
the fire ; ' ' After having brought to thy teacher his proper
reward do not cut off the line of children ' (Taitt. Up. I,
II, i) ; ' To him who is without a son the world does not
belong; all beasts even know that' — Similarly the passages,
' Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity '
[Kh. Up. V, 10, i), and the analogous passage (from the
Mu;/<a^aka), contain instruction not about the other stages
of life but about the going on the path of the gods. And
of clauses such as ' austerity is the second ' it is doubtful
whether they speak of a stage of life at all. And a
passage like ' Wishing for that world only mendicants
wander forth,' does not enjoin the wandering forth but
merely glorifies that world. — But there is at any rate one
scriptural text which directly and unambiguously enjoins
the condition of life of the wandering mendicant, viz. the
one of the Cabalas, ' Let him wander forth at once from
the state of studentship.^ — True, but our discussion is
carried on without reference to that passage.
19. (The other stage of life) is to be accom-
plished, (according to) Badaraya;/a ; on account of
the scriptural statement of equality.
The teacher Badaraya;?a is of opinion that that other
stage of life is something to be accomplished. The view
that there is a contradiction because the other stage of
life is stated in the Veda and, on the other hand, works
such as the Agnihotra must necessarily be performed, and
that, in order to remove this contradiction, that other
stage of life must be entered upon by those only who are
not qualified for active worship, he rejects ; being of opinion
that that other stage is to be entered upon, in the same
way as the state of the householder, even by him who
does not wish to do so. — On what ground? — ' On account
of the scriptural statement of equality.' For we have
a passage (viz. 'There are three branches of the law,' &c.)
which refers equally to that other stage as to the state
of the householder. As the state of the householder which
298 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
is enjoined in other passages only is here referred to, so
also that other stage of life. The case is analogous to
the reference made to the wearing of the sacrificial thread
round the neck or on the right shoulder — which two modes
are established in other scriptural passages — in a passage
the purpose of which it is to enjoin the wearing of the thread
on the left shoulder. The other stage must therefore be
entered upon in the same way as the state of the house-
holder.— Analogously in the passage, ' Wishing for that
world only mendicants leave their homes,' the last stage
of life is mentioned together with the study of the Veda,
sacrifice and so on, and in the passage, ' Those who in the
forest,' &c., with the knowledge of the five fires. — The
remark, made above by the purvapakshin, that in such
passages as ' austerity is the second ' there is unambiguous
reference to a further stage of life, is without force, since
there is a reason enabling us to determine what is meant.
The text proclaims in the beginning that there are three
subdivisions (' There are three branches of the law '). Now
the sacrifice and the other duties (which the text enumerates
subsequently to the introductory clause) can, because they
are more than three, and rest on separate originative
injunctions, be comprised within the three branches only
if they are connected with one of the stages of life. Now
the terms ' sacrifice ' and so on indicate that the stage
of householdership constitutes one branch of the law, and
the term ' Brahma/l'arin ' clearly denotes another stage ;
what then remains but to assume that the term ' austerity '
also denotes a stage of life, viz. the one in which austerity
is the chief thing? Analogously the reference to the
forest — in the passage, 'Those who in the forest,' — indicates
that by the austerity and faith mentioned there we have to
understand that stage of life in which austerity and faith
are the chief thing. — From all this it follows that the
further stage of life has to be gone through, even if the
passage under discussion should do nothing but refer to it.
20. Or (the passage rather is) an injunction, as in
the case of the carrying (of the firewood).
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 299
Or the passage is rather to be understood as containing
an injunction, not a mere reference. — But, an objection is
raised, if we assume it to be an injunction we thereby
oppose the conception of the entire passage as a coherent
whole, while yet the passage has clearly to be conceived
as constituting such a whole, viz, as meaning that while
the three branches of the law have for their result the
world of the blessed, the condition of being grounded in
Brahman has immortality for its result. — True, but all the
same we must set aside the conception of the passage as
a whole — well founded as it is — and assume it to be an
injunction. For it is a new injunction because no other
injunction is observed, and as the conception of the other
stage of life clearly arises from the passage it is impossible
to interpret it as a coherent whole by means of the
assumption that it is a mere gu;/avada ^.
The case is analogous to that of the ' carrying.' There
is a scriptural text (relating to the Agnihotra which forms
part of the mahapitrzya^^^a), ' Let him approach carrying
the firewood below (the ladle holding the offering) ; for
above he carries it for the gods.' Now this passage may
be conceived as an unbroken whole if we view it as
referring to the carrying below only ; nevertheless we
determine that it enjoins the carrying above because that
^ In the clause ' vidhyantaradarranat ' I can see nothing more
than an explanation of — or reason for — the ' apurvatvat.' If we
viewed the passage as glorifying the brahmasa/^zsthata compared to
the three branches of the law through the statement of its super-
sensuous results (so that it would constitute an arthavada of the
kind called gu«avada), we should indeed preserve the unity of the
passage — which is destroyed if we view it as enjoining the different
stages of life. But all the same the latter explanation is the true
one ; for a glorificatory passage presupposes an injunctive one, and
as no such injunctive passage is met with elsewhere, it is simpler
to assume that the present passage is itself injunctive than to con-
strue (on the basis of it if viewed as a guwavada) another injunctive
passage. (In Ananda Giri's gloss on this passage — Biblioth. Indica
edition — read ' vihitatvopagamaprasaktya' and 'stutilakhha«ayaika°.')
^OO VED \XTA-SUTRAS.
is not enjoined anywhere else^. This is explained in the
chapter treating of ' complement.' in the Sutra. 'But it is
an injunction,' &c. (Pu. Mim. Su.i. In the same way we
assume that our passage referring to the different a^ramas
is an injunctor^' passage only.
Even if (to state an alternative conclusion ) the passage
contains references only to the other ajramas, it must be
viewed as enjoining at any rate the condition of being
grounded in Brahman, owing to the glorification of that
condition. The question here arises whether that state
belongs to any one comprised within the four ajrramas,
or only to the wandering mendicant. If now a reference
to the mendicant also is contained within the references
to the airamas up to the Brahma>^arin (i. e. the three
^j-ramas the text refers to before the passage about the
brahmasa;;/stha) ; then, as all four ^j-ramas are referred
to equally and as somebody not belonging to any aj-rama
could not possibly be called brahmasawstha, it follows that
the term ' brahmasa;;/stha ' denotes any one standing
within one of the four a^-ramas. If. on the other hand,
the mendicant is not comprised within the references to
the three ajrramas. he alone remains, and this establishes
the conclusion that the brahmasa;«stha is the mendicant
only. (We therefore have to inquire which of the two
alternatives stated has to be adopted.) — Here some
maintain that the term ' austerity ' which denotes the
hermit in the woods implies a reference to the mendi-
cant also. But this is wrong. For as long as any other
explanation is possible, we must not assume that a term
which expresses a distinctive attribute of the hermits
living in the forest comprises the wandering mendicants
also. Both the Brahma/^arin and the householder are
^ The ekavakyata is preserved if we take the clause from 'above'
as an arthavada meant to give the reason why in sacrifices offered
to the Fathers the firewood has to be carried below. Nevertheless
the clause must be taken as a vidhi enjoining the carrying above in
all sacrifices offered to the gods, because this particular is not
enjoined elsewhere.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 3OI
referred to by distinctive terms applying to them only,
and we therefore expect that the mendicant and the
hermit also should be referred to by analogous terms.
Now ' austerity ' is a distinctive attribute of the hermits
living in the woods ; for the principal conventional
meaning of the word ' austerity ' is mortification of the
body. The distinctive attribute of the mendicant, on the
other hand, viz. restraint of the senses and so on, cannot
be denoted by the term ' austerity.' Moreover it would
be an illegitimate assumption that the ^j-ramas which are
known to be four should here be referred to as three.
And further the text notifies a distinction, viz. by saying
that those three reach the world of the blessed, while one
enjoys immortality. Now there is room for such a distinc-
tion if the hermits and the mendicants are separate ; for
we do not say ' Devadatta and Ya^;7adatta are stupid, but
one of them is clever,' but we say ' Devadatta and Ya.gna-
datta are stupid, but Vishwumitra is clever.' The passage
therefore has to be understood in that sense, that those
belonging to the three former ij-ramas obtain the world
of the blessed, while the remaining one, i. e. the wandering
mendicant, enjoys immortality. — But how can the term
' brahmasa;«stha,' which according to its etymological
meaning may be applied to members of all ai'ramas, be
restricted to the mendicant? and, if we agree to take it
in its conventional meaning, it follows that immortality
may be reached by merely belonging to an aj-rama, and
hence that knowledge is useless ! — To these objections we
make the following reply. The term ' brahmasa;«stha '
denotes fulfilment in Brahman, a state of being grounded
in Brahman to the exclusion of all other activity. Now
such a state is impossible for persons belonging to the
three former djramas, as scripture declares that they suffer
loss through the non-performance of the works enjoined
on their aj-rama. The mendicant, on the other hand, who
has discarded all works can suffer no loss owing to non-
performance. Such duties as are incumbent on him, viz.
restraint of the senses and the like, are not opposed to
the state of being grounded in Brahman, but rather helpful
302 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
to it. For the only work enjoined on him by his ajrama
is the state of being firmly grounded in Brahman, wherein
he is strengthened by restraint of the senses and so on —
just as sacrifices and the like are prescribed for the other
ajramas — and loss he incurs only by neglecting that work.
In agreement herewith texts from scripture and Smriti
declare that for him who is grounded in Brahman there
are no works. Compare ' Renunciation is Brahman ; for
Brahman is the highest ; for the highest is Brahman ;
above those lower penances, indeed, there rises renuncia-
tion ; ' ' Those anchorites who have well ascertained the
object of the knowledge of the Vedanta and have purified
their nature by the Yoga of renunciation ' (Mu. Up. Ill,
2, 6) ; and similar scriptural passages. And Smr/ti-texts
to the same effect, such as ' They whose minds are fixed
on him, who have their Self in him, their stand on him,
their end in him' (Bha. Gita V, 17). All these passages
teach that for him who is founded on Brahman there are
no works. From this there also follows the non-validity of
the second objection raised above, viz. that the mendicant's
reaching immortality through the mere stage of life in
which he stands would imply the uselessness of knowledge.
— In this way we understand that, although there is a
reference to the other stages of life, that which is indicated
by the quality of being grounded in Brahman is the state
of the wandering mendicant.
This whole discussion has been carried on by the teacher
without taking into account the text of the 6^abalas, which
enjoins the other stage of life. But there exists that text
which directly enjoins the other stage, ' Having completed
his studentship he is to become a householder; having
been a householder he is to become a dweller in the forest ;
having been a dweller in the forest he is to wander forth ;
or else he may wander forth from the student's state ;
or from the house ; or from the forest.' Nor can this
text be interpreted as referring to those who are not
qualified for works ; for it states no difference, and there
is a separate injunction (of the parivra^ya-state) for those
who are not qualified, viz. in the passage, ' May he have
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 1. 303
taken vows upon himself or not, may he be a snataka or
not, may he be one whose fire has gone out or one who
has no fire,' &c. That the text does not refer to such
only as are not qualified for works, further follows from
the fact that the state of the mendicant is meant to
subserve the development of the knowledge of Brahman-^,
as scripture declares, ' The wandering mendicant, with
colourless dress, shaven, wifeless, pure, guileless, living on
alms, qualifies himself for the intuition of Brahman.' — From
all this it follows that the stages of life for which chastity
is obligatory are established by scripture, and that know-
ledge— because enjoined on persons who have entered on
those stages — is independent of works.
21. If it be said that (texts such as the one about
the udgitha are) mere glorification, on account of
their reference (to parts of sacrifices) ; we deny that,
on account of the newness (of what they teach, if
viewed as injunctions).
'That udgitha is the best of all essences, the highest,
holding the highest place, the eighth' [Kh. Up. I, i, 3);
' This earth is the Rik, the fire is Saman ' {Kh. Up. I,
6, i); 'This world in truth is that piled-up fire-altar'
(5at. Bra. X, i, 2, 2); 'That hymn is truly that earth'
(Ait. Ar. II, I, 2, i); with reference to these and other
similar passages a doubt arises whether they are meant
to glorify the udgitha and so on, or to enjoin devout
meditations.
The purvapakshin maintains that their aim is glorifica-
tion, because the text exhibits them with reference to
subordinate members of sacrificial actions, such as the
udgitha and so on. They are, he says, analogous to
passages such as ' This earth is the ladle ; ' ' the sun is the
tortoise ; ' ' the heavenly world is the Ahavaniya,' whose
^ Which has to be acquired in the regular prescribed way of
Brahmanical studentship.
304 vedanta-sOtras.
aim it is to glorify the ladle and so on. To this the Sutra-
kara replies as follows. We have no right to consider the
purpose of those passages to be mere glorification, on
account of the newness. If they aim at injunction, a new
matter is enjoined by them ; if, on the other hand, they
aimed at glorification they Avould be devoid of meaning.
For, as explained in the Pu. Mim. Su., glorificatory
passages are of use in so far as entering into a comple-
mentary relation to injunctive passages; but the passages
under discussion are incapable of entering into such a
relation to the udgitha and so on which are enjoined in
altogether different places of the Veda, and would there-
fore be purposeless as far as glorification is concerned.
Passages such as ' This earth is the ladle ' are not
analogous because they stand in proximity to injunctive
passages. — Therefore texts such as those under discussion
have an injunctive purpose.
22. And on account of the words expressive of
becoming.
Moreover the text exhibits words of clearly injunctive
meaning, in connexion with the passages quoted above,
viz. 'Let him meditate on the udgitha' {Kh. Up. I,
1, i) ; 'Let him meditate on the S^man ' {Kh. Up. II,
2, i) ; 'Let him think: I am the hymn' (Ait. Ar. II,
I, 6). Now these injunctive forms would be rendered
futile by the assumption of the texts under discussion
aiming at glorification only. Compare the following
saying of those who know Ny^ya, ' Let him do, let it be
done, it is to be done, let it become, let it be ; these forms
are in all Vedas the settled signs of injunction.' What
they mean thereby is that injunction is the sense of all
potential, imperative, &c., verbal forms. — Moreover in each
of the sections to which the passages under discussion
belong the text states special fruits, 'He becomes indeed
a fulfiller of desires ' [KJi. Up. I, 1,7);' He is able to
obtain wishes through his song ' {Kh. Up. I, 7, 9) ; ' The
worlds in an ascending and a descending line belong to
him ' {KJi. Up. II, 2, 3). For this reason also the texts
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 24. 305
about the udgitha and so on are meant to enjoin devout
meditations.
23. (The stories told in the Upanishads) are for
the purpose of the pariplava ; we deny this on
account of (certain stories only) being specified.
' Ya^^/avalkya had two wives, Maitreyi and Katyayani '
(Bn. Up. IV, 5, i) ; ' Pratardana, forsooth, the son of
Divodasa came to the beloved abode of Indra ' (Kau. Up.
Ill, i) ; 'There Hved once upon a time G^anaj-ruti Pautra-
ya;/a, who was a pious giver, giving much and keeping
open house' [Kh. Up. IV, i, i); with regard to these and
similar stories met with in the Vedanta portions of
scripture there arises a doubt whether they are meant to
subserve the performance of the pariplava^ or to introduce
the vidyas standing in proximity to them.
The purvapakshin maintains that those scriptural stories
subserve the pariplava because they are stories like others,
and because the telling of stories is enjoined for the pari-
plava. And from this it follows that the Vedanta-texts
do not chiefly aim at knowledge, because like mantras
they stand in a complementary relation to sacrificial per-
formances.
This conclusion we deny ' on account of the specifica-
tion.' Under the heading ' he is to recite the pariplava,'
scripture specifies certain definite stories such as that of
' Manu Vivasvat's son the king.' If, now, for the reason
that all tales as such are alike, all tales were admitted for
the piriplav^a, the mentioned specification would be devoid
of meaning. We therefore conclude that those scriptural
stories are not meant to be told at the pariplava.
24. This follows also from the connexion (of the
stories with the vidyas) in one coherent whole.
And as thus the stories do not subserve the pariplava it
^ I.e. have to be recited at stated intervals during the year
occupied by the ajvamedha sacrifice.
[38] X
3o6 vedanta-sCtras.
is appropriate to assume that they are meant to bring
nearer to our understanding the approximate vidyas with
which they are seen to form connected wholes ; for they
serve to render the latter more acceptable and facilitate
their comprehension.
In the Maitreyi-brahma;^ we see that the story forms
a whole with the vidya beginning, ' The Self indeed is to
be seen,' &c. ; in the account of Pratardana with the vidya,
'I am pra;^a, the conscious Self;' in the legend of 6^anai-ruti
with the vidya, 'Air indeed is the end of all.' The case
of all these stories is analogous to that of stories met with
in scriptural texts referring to works, whose purpose is the
glorification of injunctions standing in proximity ; as e.g.
' He cut out his own omentum.' — The stories under discus-
sion therefore do not subserve the pariplava.
25. For this very reason there is no need of the
lighting of the fire and so on.
The expression ' For this very same reason ' must be
viewed as taking up Sutra III, 4, i, because thus a satis-
factory sense is established. For this very same reason,
i.e. because knowledge subserves the purpose of man, the
lighting of the sacrificial fire and similar works which are
enjoined on the different aj-ramas are not to be observed,
since man's purpose is effected through knowledge.
The Sutrakara thus sums up the result of the first
adhikara;/a, intending to make some further remarks.
26. And there is need of all (w^orks), on account
of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like ;
as in the case of the horse.
We now consider whether knowledge has absolutely no
need of the works enjoined on the different aj-ramas, or
whether it has some need of them. Under the preceding
Sutra we have arrived at the conclusion that as knowledge
effects its own end the works enjoined on the aj-ramas
are absolutely not required. With reference to this point
the present Sutra now remarks that knowledge has regard
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 27. 307
for all works enjoined on the ai"ramas, and that there is
not absolute non-regard. — But do not the two Sutras thus
contradict each other? — By no means, we reply. Know-
ledge having once sprung up requires no help towards the
accomplishment of its fruit, but it does stand in need of
something else with a view to its own origination. — Why
so? — On account of the scriptural statements of sacrifices
and so on. For the passage, ' Him Brahmawas seek to
know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by
penance, by fasting' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22), declares that
sacrifices and so on are means of knowledge, and as the
text connects them with the 'seeking to know,' we conclude
that they are, more especially, means of the origination of
knowledge. Similarly the passage, ' What people call
sacrifice that is really brahma/^arya ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 5, i),
by connecting sacrifices and so on with brahma>^arya
which is a means of knowledge, intimates that sacrifices
&c. also are means of knowledge. Again the passage,
' That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances
proclaim, desiring which men live as religious students.,
that word I tell thee briefly, it is Om ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 15),
likewise intimates that the works enjoined on the airamas
are means of knowledge. Similarly Smr/ti says, 'Works
are the washing away of uncleanliness, but knowledge is
the highest way. When the impurity has been removed,
then knowledge begins to act.'
The phrase, ' as in the case of the horse,' supplies an
illustration on the ground of suitability. As the horse,
owing to its specific suitability, is not employed for
dragging ploughs but is harnessed to chariots ; so the
works enjoined on the aj'ramas are not required by know-
ledge for bringing about its results, but with a view to its
own origination.
27. But all the same he (who is desirous of know-
ledge) must be possessed of calmness, subjection of
the senses, &c., since those (states) are enjoined as
auxiliaries to that (viz. knowledge), and must (on
that account) necessarily be accomplished.
X 2
108 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Perhaps somebody might think that we have no right
to look upon sacrifices and the Hke as means of knowledge
because there is no injunction to that effect. For a passage
like ' By sacrifice they seek to know ' is of the nature of an
anuvada, and therefore does not aim at enjoining sacrifices
but rather at glorifying knowledge, ' so glorious is know-
ledge that they seek to obtain it through sacrifices and the
like.'
But even should this be so the seeker for knowledge
must possess calmness of mind, must subdue his senses
and so on ; for all this is enjoined as a means of knowledge
in the following scriptural passage, 'Therefore he who knows
this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and
collected, sees self in Self (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 23). And what
is enjoined must necessarily be carried out. — But in the
above passage also we observe only a statement as to
something actually going on — ' Having become calm, &c.,
he sees,' not an injunction ! — Not so, we reply. The
introductory word ' therefore ' which expresses praise of
the subject under discussion makes us understand that the
passage has an injunctive character^.
Moreover the text of the Madhyandinas directly reads
'let him see' (not 'he sees'). Hence calmness of mind
and so on are required even if sacrifices, &c., should not
be required. — Sacrifices and so on, however, are required
likewise, because (as said in Sutra 26) scripture teaches
them. — But it has been said that in the passage, ' Him they
seek to know by sacrifices,' no injunction is observed ! —
True ; but nevertheless we must assume the passage to
be an injunction, because the connexion of the search for
knowledge with sacrifices and so on is something new ;
i.e. is not established by another text, and therefore the
^ For if there were no injunction, the praise would be without
meaning. The ' therefore ' connects the passage with the pre-
ceding clause, ' he is not sullied by any evil deed.' The sense
then is, ' Because he who knows the Self as described before is
not sullied by any evil deed, therefore let him, after having become
calm, &C.J see the Self, and so on.'
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2S. 3O9
passage under discussion cannot be an anuvada referring
to it. The case is analogous to that of passages such as
' therefore Pushan ^ receives a well-crushed share of food,
for he is toothless.' There also no injunction is directly-
stated ; but as the matter of the passage is new we assume
an injunction and understand that the grains for Pushan
are to be crushed at all vikr/tis of the darj-apur/zamasa ; as
was explained in the Purva Mimdwsa.
An analogous conclusion was arrived at under Sutra
20. — Smr/tis also such as the Bhagavadgita explain that
sacrifices and the like if undertaken without a view to their
special results become for him who is desirous of final
release a means of knowledge. Hence sacrifices and the
like, on the one hand, and calmness of mind and so on, on
the other hand, according to the ajramas, i.e. all works
enjoined on the aj-ramas must be had regard to with a
view to the springing up of knowledge. Calmness of mind,
&c., are, on account of the expression ' he who knows this '
connecting them with knowledge, to be viewed as approxi-
mate— direct — means of knowledge, while sacrifices and so
on which scripture connects with the search of knowledge
are to be looked upon as remote — indirect — means.
28. And there is permission of all food, (only) in
the case of danger of life ; on account of this being
shown (by scripture).
In the colloquy of the pra^zas the K/iandogas record, ' To
him who knows this there is nothing which is not food '
[K/i. Up. V, I, 2) ; and the Va^asaneyins, ' By him nothing is
eaten that is not food, nothing is received that is not food'
(Brt. Up. VI, I, 14). The sense of the two passages is
that anything may be eaten by him. — A doubt here arises
whether the texts enjoin the permission of eating anything
^ The passage quoted occurs in the Veda under the heading of
the dar^apurwamasa. But as Pushan has no share in the funda-
mental forna of that sacrifice, we conclude that the injunction
implied in the passage is valid for those vikmis of the darj-a-
purwamasa in which offerings are made to Pfishan.
; I O VE D AN TA- SU T R A S.
as an auxiliary to knowledge — as calmness of mind, &c.,
are— or mention them for the purpose of glorification. —
The purvapakshin maintains that the passages are injunc-
tions because thus we gain an instruction which causes
a special kind of activity. What, therefore, the text teaches
is the non-operation of a definite rule, in so far as auxiliary
to the knowledge of the pra;/as in proximity to which it is
taught. — But this interpretation implies the sublation of the
scriptural rules as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful
food ! — Such sublation, we reply, is possible, because the
present case is one of general rule and special exception.
The prohibition of doing harm to any living creature is
sublated by the injunction of the killing of the sacrificial
animal ; the general rule which distinguishes between such
women as may be approached and such as may not, is
sublated by the text prescribing, with reference to the
knowledge of the Vamadevya. that no woman is to be
avoided (' Let him avoid no woman, that is the vow,' Kh.
Up. II, 13, 2) ; analogously the passage which enjoins, with
reference to the knowledge of the pra/^as, the eating of all
food may sublate the general rule as to the distinction of
lawful and unlawful food.
To this we reply as follows. The permission to eat any
food whatever is not enjoined, since the passages do not
contain any word of injunctive power ; for the clause, ' To
him who knows this there is nothing,' &c., expresses only
something actually going on. And where the conception
of an injunction does not naturally arise we may not
assume one from the mere wish of something causing
a special line of activity. ^Moreover the text says that
' for him who knows this there is nothing that is not food,'
only after having said that ever\-thing even unto dogs and
the like is food for the Pra;/a. Now food such as dogs
and the like cannot be enjoyed by the human body; but
all this can be thought of as food of the Pra«a. From
this it follows that the passage is an arthavada meant to
glorify the knowledge of the food of the Pra;/a, not an
injunction of the permission of all food. — This the Sutra
indicates in the words, ' and there is permission of all food
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3O. 3II
in danger of life.' That means : Only in danger of life, in
cases of highest need, food of any kind is permitted to
be eaten. ' On account of scripture showing this.' For
scripture shows that the r/shi A'akrayawa when in evil
plight proceeded to eat unlawful food. In the brahma/za
beginning, 'when the Kurus had been destroyed by hail-
stones,' it is told how the r?shi Arakraya;/a having fallen
into great wretchedness ate the beans half eaten by a chief,
but refused to drink what had been offered on the ground
of its being a mere leaving ; and explained his proceeding
as follows : ' I should not have lived if I had not eaten
them ; but water I can drink wherever I like.' And again
on the following day he ate the stale beans left by himself
and another person. Scripture, in thus showing how the
stale leaving of a leaving was eaten, intimates as its
principle that in order to preserve one's life when in
danger one may eat even unlawful food. That, on the
other hand, in normal circumstances not even a man
possessing knowledge must do this, appears from Kcikra-
ya;/a's refusing to drink. — From this it follows that the
passage, ' For to him who knows this,' &c., is an arthavada.
29. And on account of the non-sublation.
And thus those scriptural passages which distinguish
lawful and unlawful food, — such as K/i. Up. VII, 26, 3,
' When the food is pure the whole nature becomes pure,' —
are non-sublated.
30. And this is said in Smmi also.
That in cases of need both he who knows and he who
does not know may eat any food Smrz'ti also states ;
compare e.g. 'He who being in danger of his life eats
food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the
lotus leaf by water.' — On the other hand, many passages
teach that unlawful food is to be avoided. ' Intoxicating
liquor the Brahma;/a must permanently forego ; ' ' Let
them pour boiling spirits down the throat of the Brahmawa
who drinks spirits ; ' ' Spirit-drinking worms grow in the
3 I 2 VEDANTA-st^TRAS.
mouth of the spirit-drinking man, because he enjoys what
is unlawful,'
31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to
non-proceeding according to liking.
There is also a scriptural passage prohibiting unlawful
food, the purpose of which it is to stop procedure therein
according to one's liking, viz. in the Sa?;^hita of the Ka///as,
' Therefore a Brahma;/a is not to drink spirits.' This text
also is more appropriate if we take the passage, ' To him
who knows this,' as an arthavada. — Hence passages of that
kind are arthavadas, not injunctions.
^2. The works of the ai'ramas (are incumbent on
him) also (who does not desire release) ; because
they are enjoined.
Under Sutra 26 it has been proved that the works
enjoined on the ajramas are means of knowledge. Now
we will consider whether those works have to be performed
also by him who does not desire final release and therefore
takes his stand on his aj-rama merely without wishing for
knowledge. — Here the purvapakshin maintains that as the
works incumbent on the a^ramas are enjoined as means of
knowledge by the passage, ' Him the Br^hma;/as seek to
know by the study of the Veda' &c., the works of per-
manent obligation are not to be performed by him who,
not desirous of knowledge, wishes for some other fruit.
Or else they are to be performed by him also ; but then
they cannot be means of knowledge, since it would be
contradictory to attribute to them a permanent and a non-
permanent connexion ^
Against this conclusion the Sutrakara remarks that the
works of permanent obligation are to be performed by
^ I. e. we must not think that because they enjoin the ' nityata '
of certain works, other passages may not enjoin the same works
as mere means of kno\vled":e.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, $^. 313
him only who, not desirous of release, takes his stand on
the ajramas merely, because they are enjoined by texts
such ' as long as his life lasts he is to offer the agnihotra.'
For to such texts no excessive weight must be ascribed. —
The next Sutra replies to the objection raised above in the
words, ' but then they cannot be means of knowledge.'
2,3. And through the co-operativeness (of the
works towards the origination of knowledge).
Those works are also co-operative with knowledge just
because they are enjoined as such, viz. in passages such as
' Him the Brahma;/as seek to know by the study of the
Veda,' &c. This has been explained under Sutra 26. Nor
must you think that the texts stating the co-operation of
the works of the aj-ramas towards knowledge refer to the
fruit of knowledge, as e. g. the offerings called praya^as
co-operate towards the fruit of the darj-apur;/amasa of which
they are auxiliary members ; for knowledge is not charac-
terised by injunction, and the fruit of knowledge is not
to be effected by means. Means characterised by injunctions
such as the dari-apur;/amasa-sacrifice which aim at bringing
about certain fruits such as the heavenly world require
other (subordinate) means co-operating towards the fruit
(such as the praya^as). But not so knowledge. Compare
on this point Sutra 25. Therefore texts stating the co-
operation of works (with knowledge) have to be interpreted
as stating that works are means for the origination of
knowledge. — Nor need we fear that thus there arises a
contradiction of permanent and non-permanent connexion.
For there may be difference of connexion even where there
is no difference of work. One connexion is permanent,
resting on the texts about the life-long performance of the
agnihotra and so on ; of this knowledge is not the result.
The other connexion is non-permanent, resting on texts
such as 'Him the Brahmawas seek to know,' &c. ; of this
knowledge is the result. The case is analogous to that
of the one khadira, which through a permanent connexion
serves the purpose of the sacrifice, and through a non-
permanent connexion the purpose of man.
3 I 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
34. In any case the same (duties have to be per-
formed) on account of the twofold indicatory marks.
In any case, i. e. whether viewed as duties incumbent
on the a^ramas or as co-operating with knowledge, the very
same agnihotra and other duties have to be performed. —
What, it may be asked, does the teacher wish to preclude
by the emphatic expression 'the very same?' — The sus-
picion, we reply, that those works might be separate
works \ In the ayana of the Kwi dap-ay ins indeed the
injunctive statement, ' They offer the agnihotra for a month V
enjoins a sacrifice different from the permanent (ordinary)
agnihotra ; but in our present case there is no analogous
separation of works. — Why? — On account of the twofold
indicatory mark ; i. e. on account of both scripture and
Smr/ti supplying indicatory marks. In the first place, the
scriptural passage, ' Him the Brahmawas seek to know
through the study of the Veda,' &c., directs that sacrifices
and the like — as things already established and the form of
which is already in existence (viz. through previous in-
junctions)— are to be employed as means in the search for
knowledge ; and does not originate a new form of those
works, while the passage quoted above, ' They offer the
agnihotra for a month,' does originate a new separate
sacrifice. — In the second place the Smr/ti-passage, ' He
who performs the work to be done without aiming at the
fruit of the work,' shows that the very same work which is
already known as something to be performed subserves the
origination of knowledge. Moreover the Smr/ti-passage,
' He who is qualified by those forty-eight purifications,' &c.,
refers to the purifications required for Vedic works, with
a view to the origination of knowledge in him who has
undergone those purifications. — The Sutrak^ra therefore
rightly emphasizes the non-difference of the works.
^ That the works referred to in the Upanishads as means of
knowledge, might be works altogether different from those enjoined
in the karmakawa^a as means of bringing about certain special
results such as the heavenly world.
^ See above, p. 250.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 37. 315
35. And scripture also declares that (those per-
forming works) are not overpowered (by passion
and the like).
This Sutra points out a further indicatory mark fortifying
the conclusion that works co-operate towards knowledge.
Scripture also shows that he who is furnished with such
means as Brahma/{^ar)-a. &c.. is not overpowered by such
afflictions as passion and the like. Compare the passage,
'That Self does not perish which they find out by Brahma-
^arya' {Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 3). — It is thus a settled conclusion
that sacrifices and so on are works incumbent on the
ayramas as well as co-operative towards knowledge.
36. But also (persons standing) between (are
qualified for knowledge) ; for that is seen (in scrip-
ture).
A doubt arises whether persons in want who do not
possess means, &c., and therefore are not able to enter
one or the other of the aj"ramaS; standing between as it
were, are qualified for knowledge or not. — They are not
qualified, the purvapakshin maintains. For we have ascer-
tained that the works incumbent on the aj-ramas are the
cause of knowledge, and those persons have no opportunity
to perform those works. — To this the Sutrakara replies,
* But also between.' Even a person who because he does
not belong to an aj^rama stands between, as it were, is
qualified for knowledge. ' For that is seen.' For we meet
with scriptural passages declaring that persons of that
class — such as Raikva and the daughter of Va^aknu —
possessed the knowledge of Brahman [Kh. Up. IV, i ;
BW. Up. Ill, 6, 8).
37. This is stated in Smr/ti also.
It is recorded in itihasas also how Sa7;A'arta and others
who paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the
a^ramas, in going naked and so on, became great Yogins
all the same. — But the instances quoted from scripture
and Sm;-/ti furnish merely indicatory marks ; what then is
3 I 6 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
the final conclusion ? — That conclusion is stated in the next
Sutra.
38. And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed
on them) through special acts.
Also for widowers, &c., the favour of knowledge is
possible through special acts of duty, such as praying,
fasting, propitiation of divinities, &c., which are not opposed
to their a^-rama-less condition and may be performed by
any man as such. Thus Smr/ti says, ' By mere prayer no
doubt the Brahma;/a perfects himself May he perform
other works or not, the kindhearted one is called Brah-
ma«a' (Manu Sa;//h. II, 87), which passage shows that
where the works of the aj-ramas are not possible prayer
qualifies for knowledge. Moreover knowledge may be
promoted by aj-rama works performed in previous births.
Thus Smriti also declares, ' Perfected by many births he
finally goes the highest way ' (Bha. Gita VI, 45) ; which
passage shows that the aggregate of the different purifi-
catory ceremonies performed in former births promotes
knowledge. — Moreover knowledge — as having a seen
result (viz. the removal of ignorance) — qualifies any one
who is desirous of it for learning and so on, through the
mere absence of obstacles ^. Hence there is no contra-
diction in admitting qualification for knowledge on the
part of widowers and the like.
39. Better than this is the other (state of be-
longing to an ai"rama), on account of the indicatory
marks.
'Than this,' i.e. 'than standing between,' a better means
of knowledge it is to stand within one of the aj^ramas,
since this is confirmed by 5ruti and Smrz'ti. For scripture
supplies an indicatory mark in the passage, ' On that path
goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done holy
^ I.e. any one who wishes to learn may do so, if only there
is no obstacle in the way. No special injunction is wanted.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 40. 317
works (as prescribed for the ai-ramas) and obtained splen-
dour' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 9) ; and Smr/ti in the passage, ' Let
a Brahma;?a stay not one day even outside the ^i-rama ;
having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin.'
40. But of him who has become that (i.e. entered
on a higher a.i'rama) there is no becoming not that
(i.e. descending to a lower one), according to Gai-
mini also, on account of restrictive rule, absence of
such like (i.e. statements of descent), and non-
existence (of good custom).
It has been established that there are stages of life
for which chastity is obligatory. A doubt here arises
whether one who has entered them may for some reason
or other fall from them or not. — The purvapakshin main-
tains that as there is no difference a person may descend
to a lower stage, either from the wish of well performing
the duties of that stage, or influenced by passion and the
like. — To this we reply as follows, ' Of him who has
become that,' i. e. of him who has reached the stages for
which chastity is obligatory, there is no ' becoming not
that,' i.e. descending thence. — Why? — 'On account of
restrictive rule, absence of such like, and non-existence.'
That means : there are, in the first place, restrictive rules
declaring that a descent may not take place. Compare
' for life mortifying the body in the house of a tutor '
{K/l Up. II, 23, 2) ; ' He is to go into the forest, that is
he is not to return thence, that is the Upanishad ; ' ' Having
been dismissed by the teacher he is to follow one of the
four ai-ramas, according to rule, up to release from the
body.' — In the second place there are texts teaching the
ascent to higher a^-ramas (' Having completed the Brahma-
karya. state he is to become a householder ; he may wander
forth from the Brahma/^arya state ') ; but there are none
teaching the descent to lower ajramas. — And in the third
place there exists no good custom of that kind. — The
descent to a lower ajrama can in no way be based on the
wish of well performing the duties of that ^srama. ; for
, 1 8 vedanta-sCtras.
Smriil says, 'One's own duty, however badly performed, is
better than another duty well carried out ' (Bha. Gita III, 35).
And the principle is that whatever is enjoined on a certain
person constitutes his duty, not what a person is able to
perform well ; for all duty is characterised by injunction.
Nor is a descent allowed owing to the influence of passion,
&c. ; for restrictive rules are weightier than passion. — By
the word ' also ' the Sutrakara indicates the consensus of
6^aimini and Badarayawa on this point, in order to confirm
thereby the view adopted.
41. And not also (can the expiation take place)
prescribed in the chapter treating of qualification,
because on account of the inference of his lapse
from Smr/ti he (the NaishZ/^ika) is not capable
of it.
If a BrahmaMrin for life breaks from inattention the
vow of chastity, is he to perform the expiatory sacrifice
enjoined by the text, ' A student who has broken the vow
of chastity shall sacrifice an ass to Nirr/ti^' or not? — He
is not, the purvapakshin says. For although in the chapter
which treats of qualification (Pu. Mim. Su. VI, 8, 22) that
expiatory ceremony has been settled (for Brahma>^arins in
general), it does not yet hold good for the professed
BrahmaMrin. For Smr/ti declares that such sins can-
not be expiated by him any more than a head once
cut off can again be healed on to the body, ' He who
having once entered on the duties of a Naish//zika again
lapses from them, for him — a slayer of the Self — I see
no expiation w^hich might make him clean again.' The
Upakurva;^a (i.e. he who is a BrahmaMrin for a certain
time only, not for life) on the other hand, about whose sin
Smrz'ti makes no similar declaration, may purify himself
by the ceremony mentioned.
42. But some (consider the sin) a minor one, (and
' Cp. e.g. Apastamba Dharma-sutra I, 9, 26, 8. The passage
quoted in the text is, however, a scriptural one.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 42. 319
hence claim) the existence (of expiation for the
Naish///ika also) ; as in the case of the eating (of
unlawful food). This has been explained (in the
Purva Mima;;2sa).
Some teachers, however, are of opinion that the trans-
gression of the vow of chastity, even on the part of
a professed Brahma/^arin, is a minor sin, not a mortal one,
excepting cases where the wife of the teacher and so on are
concerned. For they plead that that sin is not anywhere
enumerated among the deadly ones such as violating
a teacher's bed and so on. Accordingly they claim the
expiatory ceremony to be valid for the Naish//^ika as well
as the Upakurva;^a ; both being aHke Brahma,^arins and
having committed the same offence. The case is analogous
to that of eating. Just as Brahma/^arins (in general) who
have broken their vow by eating honey, flesh, and the like
may again purify themselves by a ceremony, so here also. —
The reason for this decision is that for those who assume
the absence of all expiation on the part of the Naish/z^ikas
no scriptural passage supporting their view is met with ;
while those who admit expiation can base their view on
the passage quoted above (' A student who has broken the
vow^' &c.), which makes no distinction between Upakur-
va;/as and Naish^'/akas. It therefore is more appropriate
to assume the validity of the ceremony for Naish///ikas
also. The principle guiding the decision has been explained
in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge
(Pu. Mi. Su. I, 3, 8). — On this view the Smrzti -passage
which declares that there is no expiation for the Naish//nka
must be explained as aiming at the origination of weighty
effort on the Naish//nka's part. — Similarly in the case of
the mendicant and the hermit. The hermit, when he has
broken his vows, undergoes the Y^xikkhx^. penance for twelve
nights and then cultivates a place rich in plants. The
mendicant proceeds like the hermit, with the exception of
cultivating the Soma-plant, and undergoes the purifications
prescribed for his state. The rules given by Sm/'/ti for
those cases have to be followed.
320 VEDANTA-SUTRAS,
43. But (they are to be kept outside) in either
case, on account of Sm;7ti and custom.
But whether lapses from the duties of one's order, com-
mitted by those who are bound to chastity, be mortal sins
or minor sins, in either case such persons are to be excluded
by honourable men (j-ish/as). For Smriti refers to them
in terms of the highest reproach ; cp. passages such as the
one quoted under Sutra 41 ; and the following one, ' He who
touches a Brahma;/a that has broken his vow and fallen
from his order, or a hanged man or one gnawed by worms
must undergo the iTandraya/za penance.' And good custom
also condemns them ; for good men do not sacrifice, study,
or attend weddings with such persons.
44. To the lord (of the sacrifice) only (the agent-
ship in meditations belongs), because scripture de-
clares a fruit ; this is the view of Atreya.
With regard to meditations on subordinate members of
sacrificial actions there arises a doubt whether they are to
be carried out by the sacrificer (i.e. him for whom the sacri-
fice is performed) or by the ofiiciating priests. — By the
sacrificer, the purvapakshin maintains, because scripture
declares fruits. For a fruit is declared in such texts as the
following one, ' There is rain for him, and he brings rain
for others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold
Saman as rain' {Kk. Up. II, 3, 2); and we must conclude
that that fruit goes to the Lord of the sacrifice, because it
is he who is entitled to the sacrificial performance together
with its subordinate members, and because such meditations
fall within the sphere of that to which he is entitled. And
that the fruit belongs to him who carries out the medita-
tions scripture states when saying, ' There is rain for him
who meditates.' — But scripture declares a fruit for the
priest also, viz. in the passage, 'Whatever desire he may
desire either for himself or for the sacrificer he obtains by
his singing.' — That passage, we reply, is of no force because
it expressly declares the fruit (as belonging to the priest in
a special case only). Hence the lord of the sacrifice only
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 46. 32 I
is the agent in those meditations which have a fruit ; this
is the opinion of the teacher Atreya.
45. (They are) the work of the priest, this is the
view of Aurt'ulomi ; since for that (i.e. the entire
sacrificial work) he is feed.
The assertion that the meditations on subordinate
members of the sacrifice are the work of the sacrificer is
unfounded. They rather are the work of the priest, as the
teacher Aui^ulomi thinks. For the priest is rewarded for
the work together with its subordinate members ; and the
meditations on the udgitha and so on fall within the per-
formance of the work since they belong to the sphere of
that to which the person entitled (viz. the lord of the
sacrifice) is entitled. Hence they are to be carried out by
the priests only, the case being analogous to that of the
restrictive rule as to the work to be performed by means
of the godohana vessel. In agreement herewith scripture
declares the udgatrz to be the agent in knowledge, in
the following passage, 'Him Vaka Dalbhya knew. He
was the udgatrz of the Naimishiya-sacrificers ' {Kh. Up. I,
2, 13). With reference to the circumstance noted by the
purvapakshin that scripture states the fruit to belong to
the agent, we remark that this makes no difference ; for
with the exception of cases expressly stated the priest can-
not be connected with the sacrifice since he subserves the
purposes (acts for) another (viz. the lord of the sacrifice).
46. And on account of scriptural statement.
' Whatever blessing the priests pray for at the sacrifice,
they pray for the good of the sacrificer ; thus he said '
(vSat. Bra. I, 3, i, 26); 'Therefore an udgatrz who knows
this may say : what wish shall I obtain for you by my
singing ? ' {Kh. Up. I, 7, 8). These scriptural passages
also declare that the fruit of meditations in which the priest
is the agent goes to the sacrificer. — All this establishes the
conclusion that the meditations on subordinate parts of
the sacrifice are the work of the priest.
[38] Y
32 2 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
47. There is the Injunction of something else co-
operating (towards knowledge) (which is) a third
thing (with regard to balya and pa^^^itya), (which
injunction is given) for the case (of perfect know-
ledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such
(i. e. the Sa^/^nyasin possessing knowledge) ; as in
the case of injunctions and the like.
' Therefore let a Brahma;/a after he has done with learning
wish to stand by a childlike state ; and after he has done
with the childlike state and learning (he is, or, may be)
a Muni ; and after he has done with what constitutes Muni-
ship and non-Muniship (he is, or, may be) a Brahmawa'
(Br/. Up. Ill, 5). With reference to this passage a doubt
arises whether it enjoins the state of a Muni or not. — The
purvapakshin maintains that it does not enjoin it, since the
injunction is completed with the clause, ' Let him wish to
stand by a childlike state.' The following clause 'then
a Muni' contains no verbal form of injunctive force and there-
fore must be viewed as a mere anuvada (making a remark
concerning the state of a Muni which is already established).
Should it be asked how this conclusion is reached, we reply
that Muniship is established by the clause 'having done with
learning ' (which forms part of the injunctive portion of the
passage), as ' Muni ' and ' learned man ' both denote know-
ledge ^ It is, moreover, clear also that the last clause, ' and
after he has done with what constitutes Muniship and non-
Muniship (he is) a Brahma;/a,' does not enjoin the condition
of a Brahmawa, as that state is previously established
(independently of that clause) ; but the words ' then a
Brahmawa' are a mere glorificatory anuvada. Now as
the words ' then a Muni ' show an analogous form of
enunciation (to the clause 'then a Br^hma;/a'), they also
can embody a glorificatory anuvada only.
^ The state of a Muni is already enjoined by the clause ' pa«</i-
tyara nirvidya;' the clause ' atha muni/^,' therefore, may be viewed
as an anuvada (as which it could not be viewed, if there were no
previous injunction of mauna).
Ill ADHYAVA, 4 PADA, 47. 323
To all this we reply as follows. ' There is an injunction
of something else which co-operates.' The passage must
be understood as enjoining the state of a Muni — which
co-operates towards knowledge — in the same way as it
enjoins learning and a childlike state, because that state is
something new (not enjoined before). — But it has been said
above that the word ' learning ' already intimates Muni-
ship ! — This, we reply, does not invalidate our case since
the word ' muni ' denotes (not only knowledge as the term
' learned man ' does, but) pre-eminence of knowledge, on
the ground as well of its etymology from ' manana,' i.e.
thinking, as of common use, shown in such phrases as 'I
am the Vyasa of Munis also.' — But the term ' Muni' is also
seen to denote the last order of life ; cp. passages such
as ' Householdership, studentship, the order of Munis,, the
order of hermits in the woods.' — Yes, but it has not that
meaning exclusively, as w^e see that it does not apply to
phrases such as ' Valmiki is the foremost among Munis.'
In the passage quoted (about the four orders) the last order
is referred to, by the term ' Muni,' because there it stands
in proximity to the other orders of life, and, as the state of
the Ascetic is the only one which remains (after we have
assigned the three other terms to the stages of life clearly
denoted by them), the last order may be denoted ' mauna '
because knowledge is its principal requirement. — We there-
fore conclude that in the passage under discussion the state
of the Muni — whose characteristic mark is pre-eminence of
knowledge — is enjoined as something third — -with regard
to the childlike state and learning. — Against the objection
that the injunction terminates with the childlike state, we
remark that all the same we must view the Muniship also
as something enjoined, as it is something new, so that we
have to supplement the clause as follows : ' then Jie is to be
a Muni.' That the state of a Muni is something to be
enjoined, in the same way as the childlike state and learning,
also follows from its being referred to as something to
be done with (like balya and pa;/^itya). It is enjoined
' on him who is such,' i. e. on the Sawnyasin possessing
knowledge. — How do we know this latter point ? — Because
Y 2
,24 vedanta-s{)tras.
the Sa;«nyasin who possesses knowledge forms the topic,
as we see from the preceding passage, ' Having cognized
the Self and risen above the desire for sons, &c., they
wander about as mendicants.' — But if the Sawnyasin
possesses knowledge, pre-eminence of knowledge is already
established thereby ; what then is the use of the injunction
of Muniship?— To this the Sutra replies 'in the case of.'
That means : in the case of pre-eminence of knowledge
not being established owing to the prevailing force of the
(erroneous) idea of multiplicity; for that case the injunction
(of Muniship, i.e. of pre-eminence of knowledge) is given.
'As in the case of injunctions and the like.' With reference
to sacrifices such as are enjoined in the passage, ' He who
is desirous of the heavenly world is to offer the darj-apurwa-
masa-sacrifice,' the aggregate of subordinate members,
such as the establishment of the sacred fires^ is enjoined as
something helpful ; similarly in this text whose topic is
knowledge and which therefore does not chiefly aim at
injunction, Muniship is enjoined as something helpful to
knowledge.
As thus the order of the ascetic, as distinguished by
a childlike state and so on, is actually established by
scripture, for what reason does the K/iandogya Upanishad
wind up with the householder, viz. in the passage, ' After
having received his discharge from his teacher he settles
in his own house,' &c. ? For by concluding with the
householder, scripture manifests special regard for him. —
To this doubt the next Sutra replies.
48. On account of his being all, however, there
is winding up with the householder.
The word ' however ' is meant to lay stress on the house-
holder's being everything. For the performance of many
works belonging to his own aj-rama, such as sacrifices and the
like, which involve not a little trouble, is enjoined on him
by scripture ; and at the same time the duties of the other
aj-ramas — such as tenderness for all living creatures, restraint
of the senses and so on — are incumbent on him also as far
as circumstances allow. There is therefore nothing con-
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 50. 325
tradictory in the KMndogys. winding up with the house-
holder.
49. On account of there being injunction of the
others also, in the same way as of the state of a
Muni.
As the state of the Muni (Sawmyasin) and the state of the
householder are enjoined in scripture, so also the two other
orders, viz. that of the hermit and that of the student. For
we have already pointed above to passages such as
' Austerity is the second, and to dwell as a student in the
house of a teacher is the third.' As thus the four a.yramas
are equally taught by scripture, they are to be gone through
equally, either in the way of option (between them) or in
the way of comprehension (of all of them). — That the
Sutra uses a plural form (of ' the others') when speaking
of two orders only, is due to its having regard either to
the different sub-classes of those two, or to their different
duties.
50. (The passage enjoining balya means that the
ascetic is to live) not manifesting himself; on
account of the connexion (thus gained for the
passage).
The passage, ' Therefore let a Brahma;^a after he has
done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state,'
speaks of the childlike state as something to be under-
taken. Now by the ' childlike state ' we have to understand
either the nature or the actions of a child. Childhood in
so far as it means a period of life cannot be brought about
at will, and we therefore must take the 'childlike state' to
mean either the behaviour of a child — such as attending
to the calls of nature without any respect of place, &c. —
or inward purity, i. e. absence of cunning, arrogance, force
of the sensual passions, and so on^. — With regard to the
^ I am doubtful as to the true reading in this place. The ' va '
of the Calcutta edition (p. 1039, last line) has certainly to be struck
326 vedanta-sOtras.
doubt thus arising the purvapakshin maintains that by
' childlike being ' people more commonly understand be-
having, talking, and eating according to one's liking, freely
attending to the calls of nature and so on, and that there-
fore the word is to be understood here also in that sense. —
But such free conduct is improper, because sinfulness and
so on would follow from it ! — Not so, the purvapakshin
replies ; for the Sawnyasin possessing knowledge is, through
express scriptural statements, free from all sinfulness thus
incurred ; just as the sacrificer is declared to be free from
the sin he might incur in slaying the sacrificial animal.
To this we reply that it is not so because the statement
of the text may be understood in a different sense. For as
long as another rational interpretation of the word ' balya '
is possible we have no right to adopt an interpretation
which involves the assumption of another injunction being
rendered futile. Moreover subordinate matters are enjoined
with a view to the furtherance of the principal matter, and
what here is the principal matter is the endeavour after
knowledge which ascetics have to take upon themselves.
Now if we accepted the entire conduct of a child as what
is enjoined here we 'could in no way show that the en-
deavour of knowledge is furthered thereby. We therefore
understand by ' balya ' the special inward state of a child,
i. e. absence of strong sensual passions and the like. This
the Sutra expresses by saying ' Not manifesting.' The
meaning of the clause under discussion thus is : Let him
be free from guile, pride, and so on, not manifesting himself
by a display of knowledge, learning, and virtuousness, just
as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed
themselves does not strive to make a display of himself
before others. For thus the passage gains a connexion
with the entire chapter on the ground of co-operating
towards the principal matter. In agreement herewith
Smrz'ti- writers have said, ' He whom nobody knows either
out. Some good MSS. read : — balaX-aritam antargata bhavavjjud-
dhir aprarufl'^endriyatvaz^z dambhadirahitatvawi va. — The 'antar-
gata' seems to mean the same as the 'antara/^,' p. 1041, 11. 1-2.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 5 1. 327
as noble or ignoble, as ignorant or learned, as well-
conducted or ill-conducted, he is a Brahmawa. Quietly
devoted to his duty, let the wise man pass through life
unknown ; let him step on this earth as if he were blind,
unconscious, deaf.' Another similar passage is, ' With
hidden nature, hidden conduct,' and so on.
51. In this life also (the origination of know-
ledge takes place) if there is no obstruction of what
is ready at hand ; on account of this being seen (in
scripture).
Beginning from Sutra 26 of the present pada we have
discussed the various means of knowledge. We are now
to consider whether knowledge — the fruit of those means —
when accomplishing itself accomplishes itself only here in
this life, or sometimes in the next life only. — The purva-
pakshin maintains that it accomplishes itself here in this
life only. For, he argues, knowledge has for its antecedent
the learning of scripture and so on, and nobody applies
himself to learning, 8ic., with the intention that knowledge
should result therefrom in the next life only ; we rather
observe that men begin to learn with a view to knowledge
already springing up in this life. And also sacrifices and
the like produce knowledge only mediately through
learning and so on ; for knowledge can be produced
(directly) through the means of right knowledge only^.
Hence the origination of knowledge takes place in this
life only. — To this we reply, ' The origination of knowledge
takes place in this life if there is no obstruction of that
which is ready at hand.' That means: When the means
of knowledge which is operative is not obstructed by some
other work the results of which are just then reaching
maturity, knowledge already reaches maturity in this life.
^ Of which study is one. — Sacrifices indeed may bear their
special fruits in the next life only ; but in so far as they co-operate
towards knowledge they are effective in this life. For their only
action in that line is to purify the mind and thus to render it fitter
to receive knowledge.
3 28 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
But when such an obstruction takes place, then in the next
hfe. And a work's reaching maturity depends on place, time,
and operative cause presenting themselves. Nor is there
any binding rule according to which the same time, place,
and operative cause which ripen one work should ripen
another work also ; for there are works the fruits of which
are opposed to each other. And scripture also goes only
so far as to teach what the fruit of each work is, without
teaching the special conditions of place, time, and operative
cause. And owing to the specific strength of the means
employed the supersensuous power of one work manifests
itself (i. e. the fruit of that work realizes itself), while that
of another is obstructed thereby and comes to a standstill.
Nor is there any reason why a man should not form,
with regard to knowledge, an unspecified intention ^ ; for
we may freely form the intention that knowledge should
spring up from us either in this life or in some subsequent
life. And knowledge although springing up through the
mediation of learning and so on, springs up only in so far
as learning destroys the obstacles in the way of knowledge.
Thus scripture also declares the difficulty of knowing the
Self, ' He of whom many are not even able to hear, whom
many even when they hear of him do not comprehend ;
wonderful is a man when found who is able to teach him ;
wonderful is he who comprehends him when taught by an
able teacher ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 7). — Moreover scripture relates
that Vamadeva already became Brahman in his mother's
womb, and thus shows that knowledge may spring up in
a later form of existence through means procured in
a former one ; for a child in the womb cannot possibly
procure such means in its present state.
The same is shown by Smre'ti. Vasudeva being asked
by Ar^una, ' What will be the fate of him, O Kr/sh;;a, who
has not reached perfection ? ' replies, ' None who performs
good works undergoes an evil fate ; ' declares thereupon
^ I.e. there is no reason for the assertion made by the purva-
pakshin that men form a specified intention only, viz. that know-
ledge should spring up in this life only.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 52. 329
that such a man reaches the world of the blessed and is,
later on, born again in a good family ; and iinall}' states
just what we at present m.aintain in the passage beginning,
' There he obtains that knowledge which corresponds to
his former bodily existence,' and closing. ' Perfected by
many states of existence he then goes the highest way.' —
It therefore is an established conclusion that knowledge
originates, either in the present or in a future life, in
dependence on the evanescence of obstacles.
52. No such definite rule (exists) as to the fruit
v\hich is release, on account of the assertions as to
that condition, on account of the assertions as to
that condition.
We have seen that in the case of persons desirous of
release who rely upon the means of knowledge there exists
a definite difference of result, in so far as the knowledge
resulting springs up either in this life or a future life
according to the degree of strength of the means employed.
It might now be supposed that there exists a similar
definite difference with regard to the fruit characterised as
final release, owing to the superior or inferior qualification
of the persons knowing.
With reference to this possible doubt the Sutra now
says, ' No such definite rule as to that fruit which is release.'
That means : We must not suppose that in the case of that
fruit which is release there exists an analogous definite rule
of difference. — Why? — 'On account of the assertions (by-
scripture) about that condition.' For all Vedanta-texts
assert the state of final release to be of one kind only.
The state of final release is nothing but Brahman, and
Brahman cannot be connected with difterent forms since
many scriptural passages assert it to have one nature only.
Compare e.g. '• It is neither coarse nor fine' (Bn. Up. Ill,
8, S) ; 'That Self is to be described by No, no' (BW. Up.
Ill, 9, 26); 'Where one sees nothing else' {Kh. Up. VII,
24, i) ; 'That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II,
2, 11); 'This everything is that Self (Br/. Up. II, 4, 6);
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal,
fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'When
the Self only is all this how should he see another ? ' (Br/.
Up. IV, 5, 15). — Moreover the means of knowledge might
perhaps, according to their individual strength, impart
a higher (or lower) degree to their result, viz. knowledge,
but not to the result of knowledge, viz. release ; for, as we
have explained more than once, release is not something
which is to be brought about, but something whose nature
is permanently established, and is reached through know-
ledge. Nor does, in reality, knowledge admit of lower or
higher degree ; for it is, in its own nature, high only, and
would not be knowledge at all if it were low. Although
therefore knowledge may differ in so far as it originates
after a long or short time, it is impossible that release
should be distinguished by a higher or lower degree. And
from the absence of difference of knowledge also there
follows absence of definite distinction on the part of the
result of knowledge (viz. release). The whole case is
analogous to that of the results of works. In that know-
ledge which is the means of release there is no difference
as there is between works. In those cognitions, on the
other hand, which have the qualified Brahman for its
object — such as ' he who consists of mind, whose body is
pra;/a ' — a difference is possible according to the addition
or omission of qualities, and hence there may be a definite
distinction of results, just as there is between the results
of actions. This is also indicated by the passage,
'according as they meditate on him they become.' But
in meditations on Brahman devoid of qualities it is other-
wise. Thus Smr/ti also says, ' No higher road is possible
for any one ; for they speak of inequality only where there
are qualities.' — The repetition of the clause ' on account of
the assertions as to that condition ' indicates the termina-
tion of the adhyaya.
FOURTH ADHYAYA.
FIRST pAdA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
I. Repetition (of the mental functions of know-
ing, meditating, &c., is required) on account of the
text giving instruction more than once.
The third adhyaya was taken up chiefly with a discussion
of the means of knowledge as related to the higher and
lower vidyas. In the fourth adhyaya we shall now discuss
the fruits of knowledge, and as occasion suggests some
other topics also. — In the beginning, however, we shall
carry on, in a few adhikara;^as, a special discussion connected
with the means of knowledge. 'Verily the Self is to be
seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on ' [Bri.
Up. II, 4, 5) ; ' Let a wise Brahmawa after he has discovered
him practise wisdom' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'That it is
which we must search out, that it is which we must try to
understand ' (iT^. Up. VIII, 7, i).
Concerning these and similar passages a doubt arises
whether the mental action referred to in them is to be
performed once only or repeatedly. — Once only, the pur-
vapakshin says ; as in the case of the praya^a-offerings
and the like. For thereby the purpose of scripture is
accomplished ; while to practise repetitions not demanded
by scripture would be to accomplish w^hat is not the pur-
pose of scripture. — But passages have been quoted which
teach repetition ' it is to be heard, to be thought, to be
reflected on,' &c. ! — Let us then repeat exactly as scripture
says, i. e. let us hear the Self once, let us think it once, let
us reflect on it once, and nothing more. But where
scripture teaches something once only — viz. in such
passages as ' He knows,' ' Let him meditate,' &c. — no
repetition has to be practised. — To this we reply as
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
follows. Repetition is to be performed because scripture
gives repeated instruction. For the repeated instruction
contained in passages such as ' He is to be heard, to be
thought, to be reflected on ' intimates the repetition of the
required mental acts. — But the purvapakshin has said
above that the repetition is to extend exactly to what
scripture says and not to go further! — This is wrong, we
reply, because all those mental activities have for their end
intuition. For hearing and so on when repeated terminate
in intuition, and thus subserve a seen purpose, just as the
action of beating, &c.. terminates in freeing the rice grains
from their husks. Moreover also such terms as ' medi-
tating,' ' being devoted to,' and ' reflecting ' denote actions
in which repetition is implied as a quality. Thus we say
in ordinary life that a person ' is devoted ' to a teacher or
a king if he follows him with a mind steadily set on him ;
and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say
that she thinks of him, only if she steadily remembers him
with longing. And (that also ' knowing ' implies repetition,
follows from the fact that) in the Vedanta-texts the terms
' knowing ' and ' meditating ' are seen to be used one in
the place of the other. In some passages the term ' know-
ing ' is used in the beginning and the term ' meditating ' in
the end ; thus e.g. 'He who knows what he knows is thus
spoken of by me,' and ' Teach me, sir, the deity which you
meditate on' [K/i. Up. IV, i. 4 ; 2, 2). In other places
the text at first speaks of ' meditating ' and later on of
'knowing;' thus e.g. 'Let a man meditate on mind as
Brahman,' and ' He who knows this shines and warms
through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance ' {Kk.
Up. Ill, 18, I ; 6). — From this it follows that repetition
has to be practised there also, where the text gives in-
struction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated
instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is
directly intimated.
2. And on account of an indicatory mark.
An indicatory mark also gives to understand that repe-
tition is required. For, in the section treating of meditation
IV ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 2. 33
on the udgitha, the text rejects the meditation on the
udgitha viewed as the sun. because its result is one sun only,
and (in the clause ' Do thou resolve his rays,' &c.) enjoins
a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the pos-
session of many suns {Kh. Up. I^ 5, t ; 2) ; which shows that
the repetition of meditations is something well known.
Now as other meditations are meditations no less than the
one referred to, it follows that repetition holds good for all
of them.
Here the following objection may be raised. With
regard to those meditations whose fruit is something to
be effected repetition may hold good, because thereby
superior strength may be imparted to them. But of what
use can repetition be with regard to the meditations having
for their object the highest Brahman, which present to us
Brahman as the uni\-ersal Self characterised by eternal
purity, thought, and freedom ? Should it be said that
repetition has to be allowed because the knowledge of
Brahman being the Self cannot spring up on hearing
a text once only, we reply that in that case it wall not
spring up even when it is heard repeatedly. For if a text
such as ' Thou art that ' does not originate the true notion
of Brahman if heard once, what hope is there that the
desired effect should be produced by its repetition ? —
Perhaps it will be said that a sentence alone is not able
to lead to the intuition of a thing; but that a sentence
assisted by reasoning may enable us to intuite Brahman
as the universal Self. But even in that case repetition
would be useless ; for the reasoning will lead to the desired
intuition even if gone through once only. — Again it will
perhaps be said that the sentence and reasoning together
effect only a cognition of the generic nature of the object
known, not of its specific individual character. When, to
exemplify this, a man says that he feels a pain in his heart
another person can infer from this statement — and certain
accompanying symptoms such as trembling of the limbs —
only that there exists a pain in general but is unable to
intuite its specific character ; all he knows is ' This man
suffers a pain.' But what removes ignorance is (not
334 vedanta-sOtras.
a general knowledge but) the intuitive knowledge of the
specific character of something. And repetition serves to
produce such knowledge. — This also is not so. For if so
much only is done repeatedly even, no specific knowledge
can spring up. When a specific character is not cognized
through scripture and reasoning being applied once, it will
not be cognized through them if applied a hundred times
even. Hence whether scripture and reasoning produce
specific knowledge or general knowledge, in either case
they will do so even if acting once only ; and repetition
therefore is of no use. Nor can it be laid down as a bind-
ing rule that scripture and reasoning, applied once, in no
case produce intuitive knowledge ; for their effect will after
all depend on the various degrees of intelligence of those
who wish to learn. Moreover a certain use of repetition
may be admitted in the case of worldly things which
consist of several parts and possess generic character as well
as individual difference ; for there the student may grasp
by one act of attention one part of the object, and by
another act another part ; so e. g. in the case of long
chapters to be studied. But in order to reach a true
knowledge of Brahmian whose Self is mere intelligence and
which therefore is destitute of generic character as well as
specific difference there clearly is no need of repetition.
To this we make the following reply. Repetition would
indeed be useless for him who is able to cognize the true
nature of Brahman even if enounced once only in the
sentence ' Thou art that.' But he who is not able to do
that, for him repetition is of use. For this reason the
teacher in the K/iandogya, having given instruction in the
sentence ' Thou art that, O 5vetaketu,' and being again and
again asked by his pupil — ' Please, sir, inform me still
more ' — removes his pupil's reasons for doubt, and again
and again repeats the instruction ' Thou art that.' We
have already given an analogous explanation of the passage
' The Self is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected
upon.' — But has not the purvapakshin declared that if the
first enunciation of the sentence ' Thou art that ' is not
able to effect an intuition of its sense, repetition will like-
IV ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, 2. 335
wise fail of the desired effect ? — This objection, we reply, is
without force, because the alleged impossibility is not con-
firmed by observation. For we observe that men by again
and again repeating a sentence which they, on the first
hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid
themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full under-
standing of the true sense. — Moreover the sentence ' Thou
art that ' teaches that what is denoted by the term ' thou '
is identical with what is denoted by ' that.' Now the latter
term denotes the subject of the entire section, viz. the think-
ing Brahman which is the cause of the origin and so on of
the world ; which is known from other passages such as
'Brahman which is true knowledge, infinite' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ;
' Brahman that is knowledge and bliss ' (Bn. Up. Ill, 9, 28) ;
' That Brahman is unseen, but seeing ; unknown, but know-
ing' (Br?. Up. Ill, 8, 11); 'not produced' (Mu. Up. II,
1,2); ' not subject to old age, not subject to death ^ (Br/.
Up. IV, 4, 25) ; ' not coarse, not fine ; not short, not long '
(Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 8). In these passages terms such as 'not
produced ' deny the different phases of existence such as
origination ; such terms as ' not coarse ' deny of it the
qualities of substances such as coarseness ; and such terms
as ' knowledge' declare that the luminousness of intelligence
constitutes its nature. The entity thus described — which is
free from all the qualities of transmigratory existence, has
consciousness for its Self and is called Brahman — is known,
by all students of the Vedanta, as what is denoted by the
term ' that.' They likewise know that what is denoted by
the term ' thou ' is the inward Self (pratyagatman) ; which
is the agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) appre-
hended as the inward Self of all the outward involucra
beginning with the gross body (cp. Taitt. Up.), and finally
ascertained as of the nature of intelligence. Now in the
case of those persons for whom the meaning of these two
terms is obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception,
the sentence ' Thou art that ' cannot produce a right know-
ledge of its sense, since the knowledge of the sense of
a sentence presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the
words ; for them therefore the repetition of the scriptural
33^ vedanta-sOtras.
text and of reasoning must be assumed to have a purpose,
viz. the discernment of the true sense of the words. — And
although the object to be known, viz. the Self, does not
consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the
attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body,
the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses,
the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we
may discard one of these parts, and by another act of
attention another part ; so that a successively progressing
cognition may very well take place. This however is
merely an antecedent of the (true) knowledge of the Self
(in which there can be no successive stages).
Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose
mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance,
doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of
the sentence ' Thou art that' on its first enunciation even,
and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the
knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all
ignorance ; so that in this case no progressive process of
cognition can be acknowledged. — All this might be so — an
objection is raised — if cognition did spring up in any mind
in the way described. (But this is not the case) ; for the
cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has
such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all
absence of pain and so on. — This objection, we reply, is
without force ; for it can be shown that the conceit of the
Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less
than the conceit of the body being the Self For we clearly
obser\'e that when the body is cut or burned a wrong
notion springs up, ' I am being cut,' ' I am being burned ;'
and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c. — who
are even more external to the Self than one's own body —
suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the
Self Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self
being subject to pain, &c. ; for like the body and so on, the
condition of being subject to pain is observed as something
external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its
not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and
the like ; while scripture expressly declares that in deep
IV ADIIYAYA, I PADA, 3. 337
sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, ' And when there
he does not see, yet he is seeing,' &c. (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 22).
Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge,
' My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.' For him
who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work.
Thus scripture says, ' What shall we do with offspring, we
who have this Self and this world ' {Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22).
And Smrz'ti also says, ' But that man who loves the Self, is
satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the
Self only, for him there is no further work-* (Bha. Gita III,
12). — For him, on the other hand, who does not reach
that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order
that the desired intuition may be brought about. He
also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in
such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the
teaching, ' Thou art that.' In the mind of one on whom
repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions
opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as ' I have
a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent ; this is
to be done by me^.' But if a learner, naturally slow-
minded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind
the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal
itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the under-
standing of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts
relative to repetition and so on. — All this establishes the
conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the
highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition
may be repeated.
3. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge
and make us comprehend (the Lord).
The Sutrak^ra now considers the question whether the
highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is
^ Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a
learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent
on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end
aimed at, i. e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is
identical with Brahman's Self, to which no nodons of duty or acdon
apply.
[38] Z
338 vedanta-sCtras.
to be understood as the ' I ' or as different from me. — But
how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits
the term ' Self whose sphere is the inward Self? — This
term 'Self — a reply maybe given — ^may be taken in its
primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual
soul and the Lord as non-different ; but in the other case
the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical)
sense only^.
The purvapakshin maintains that the term 'Self is not
to be taken as meaning the ' I.' For that which possesses
the qualities of being free from all evil. &c., cannot be under-
stood as possessing qualities of a contrary nature, nor can
that which possesses those contrary qualities be understood
as being free from all evil and so on. But the highest
Lord possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c.,
and the embodied Self is characterised by qualities of
a contrary nature. — Moreover, if the transmigrating soul
constituted the Self of the Lord, it would follow that he
is no Lord, and thus scripture would lose its meaning ;
while, if the Lord constituted the Self of the individual
soul, the latter would not be entitled (to works and know-
ledge), and scripture would thus also lose its meaning.
The latter assumption would moreover run counter to
perception and the other means of proof. — Should it
be said that, although the Lord and the soul are different,
they yet must be contemplated as identical, on the basis
of scripture, just as Vish;/u and other divinities are con-
templated in images and so on ; the answer is that this
contemplation may take place, but that therefrom we must
not conclude that the Lord is the real Self of the trans-
migrating soul.
To all this we make the following reply. The highest
Lord must be understood as the Self. For in a chapter
treating of the highest Lord the Cabalas acknowledge
him to be the Self, ' Thou indeed I am, O holy divinity ;
I indeed thou art, O divinity!' — In the same light other
^ And in that case the identity of the highest Self and the ' I '
would not follow from the term ' Self.'
IV ADHYAYA, I TADA, 3.
texts have to be viewed, which also acknowledge the Lord
as the Self, such as ' I am Brahman' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 10).
Moreover certain Vedanta-texts make us comprehend the
Lord as the Self, ' Thy Self is this which is within all '
(Bn. Up. Ill, 4, i) ; 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the
immortal' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 3); 'That is the True, that is
the Self, thou art that ' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7).— Nor can we
admit the truth of the assertion, made by the piirvapakshin,
that all these passages teach merely a contemplation (of
the Lord) in certain symbols, analogous to the contem-
plation of Vish;m in an image. For that would firstly
involve that the texts have not to be understood in their
primary sense ^ ; and in the second place there is a difference
of syntactical form. For where scripture intends the con-
templation of something in a symbol, it conveys its meaning
through a single enunciation such as ' Brahman is Mind '
{Kh. Up. Ill, 18, i), or 'Brahman is Aditya' {Kh. Up. Ill,
19, i). But in the passage quoted above, scripture says,
'I am Thou and thou art I.' As here the form of ex-
pression differs from that of texts teaching the contem-
plation of symbols, the passage must be understood as
teaching non-difference. This moreover follows from the
express prohibition of the view of difference which a
number of scriptural texts convey. Compare e. g. ' Now
if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one
and he another, he does not know' (Brz. Up. I, 4, 10);
' From death to death goes he who here perceives any
diversity ' (Bre. Up. IV, 4, 19); ' Whosoever looks for any-
thing elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything '
(Br/. Up. II, 4, 6). — Nor is there any force in the objection
that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical ; for
this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false. — Nor
is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the
Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone
is authoritative, and we, moreover, do not at all admit that
scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmi-
^ And this is objectionable as long as it has not been demon-
strated that the primary meaning is altogether inadmissible.
Z 2
!40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
grating soul, but maintain that by denying the transmi-
grating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the
soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the
non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to
ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error. — Nor is it
true that the doctrine of identity would imply that nobody
is entitled to works, &c., and is contrary to perception and
so on. For we admit that before true knowledge springs
up, the soul is implicated in the transmigratory state, and
that this state constitutes the sphere of the operation of
perception and so on. On the other hand texts such as ' But
when the Self only has become all this, how should he see
another? ' &c., teach that as soon as true knowledge springs
up, perception, &c., are no longer valid. — Nor do we mind
your objecting that if perception, &c., cease to be valid, scrip-
ture itself ceases to be so ; for this conclusion is just what we
assume. For on the ground of the text, ' Then a father is
not a father ' up to ' Then the Vedas are not Vedas ' (Br/.
Up. IV, 3, 22), we ourselves assume that when knowledge
springs up scripture ceases to be valid. — And should you
ask who then is characterised by the absence of true know-
ledge, we reply : You yourself who ask this question ! —
And if you retort, ' But I am the Lord as declared by
scripture,' we reply, ' Very w^ell, if you have arrived at that
knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess
such knowledge.' — This also disposes of the objection, urged
by some, that a system of non-duality cannot be established
because the Self is affected with duality by Nescience.
Hence we must fix our minds on the Lord as being the
Self.
4. Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contem-
plated) ; for he (the meditating person) (may) not
(view symbols as being the Self).
' Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman ; this is said
with reference to the body. Let a man meditate on ether
as Brahman ; this is said with reference to the Devas ' [Kh.
Up. III. t8, i) ; ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine'
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 34 1
{Kh. Up. Ill, ly, 1); 'He who meditates on name as
Brahman' {Kh. Up. VII, i, 5). With regard to these and
similar meditations on symbols a doubt arises whether the
Self is to be apprehended in them also, or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that it is right to apprehend
the Self in them also because Brahman is known from
scriptural passages as the (universal) Self. For those symbols
also are of the nature of Brahman in so far as they are effects
of it, and therefore are of the nature of the Self as well.
We must not, our reply runs, attach to symbols the idea
of Brahman. P^or he, i.e. the meditating person, cannot
comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the
nature of the Self. — Nor is it true that the symbols are
of the nature of the Self, because as being effects of Brahman
they are of the nature of Brahman ; for (from their being of
the nature of Brahman) there results the non-existence of
(them as) symbols. For the aggregate of names and so on
can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far
as the individual character of those effects of Brahman
is sublated ; and when that character is sublated how then
can they be viewed as symbols, and how can the Self be
apprehended in them ? Nor does it follow from the fact of
Brahman being the Self that a contemplation of the Self
can be established on the ground of texts teaching a con-
templation on Brahman (in certain symbols), since a
contemplation of the latter kind does not do away with
agentship and the like. For the instruction that Brahman
is the Self depends on' the doing away with agentship and
all other characteristics of transmigratory existence; the
injunction of meditations, on the other hand, depends on the
non-removal of those characteristics. Hence we cannot
establish the apprehension of the Self (in the symbols) on
the ground of the meditating person being the same as the
symbols. For golden ornaments and figures made of gold
are not identical with each other, but only in so far as gold
constitutes the Self of both. And that from that oneness
(of symbol and meditating person) which depends on
Brahman being the Self of all there results non-existence
of the symbols (and hence impossibility of the meditations
^4- VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
enjoined), we have explained above. — For these reasons the
Self is not contemplated in symbols.
5. A contemplation of Brahman (is to be super-
induced on symbols of Brahman), on account of the
exaltation (thereby bestowed on the symbols).
With regard to the texts quoted above there arises
another doubt, viz. whether the contemplation of Aditya
and so on is to be superimposed on Brahman, or the
contemplation of Brahman on Aditya and so on ^. — But
whence does this doubt arise? — From the absence of
a decisive reason, owing to the grammatical co-ordination.
For we observe in the sentences quoted a co-ordination of
the term ' Brahman ' with the terms 'Aditya,' &c. 'Aditya
is Brahman,' ' Pra;/a is Brahman,' ' Lightning is Brahman ; '
the text exhibiting the two members of each clause in the
same case. And here there is no obvious occasion for
co-ordination because the words ' Brahman ' on the one
hand, and 'Aditya' and so on on the other hand, denote
different things ; not any more than there exists a relation
of co-ordination which could be expressed by the sentence
' The ox is a horse.' — But cannot Brahman and Aditya
and so on be viewed as co-ordinated on the basis of the
relation connecting a causal substance and its effects,
analogously to the case of clay and earthen vessels ? — By
no means, we reply. For in that case dissolution of the
effect would result from its co-ordination with the causal
substance, and that — as we have already explained — would
imply non-existence of the symbol. Moreover, the scrip-
tural passages would then be statements about the highest
Self, and thereby the qualification for meditations would
be sublated - ; and further the mention of a limited effect
would be purposeless ^. It follows herefrom that we have
^ I. e. whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as Aditya, or
Aditya as Brahman.
^ While, as a matter of fact, scripture enjoins the meditations.
^ It would serve no purpose to refer to limited things, such as
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 343
to do here with the superimposition of the contemplation
of one thing on another thing — just as in the case of the
text, ' The Brahmawa is Agni Vaij-vanara,' — and the doubt
therefore arises the contemplation of which of the two
things is to be superimposed on the other.
The piirvapakshin maintains that there exists no fixed
rule for this case, because we have no scriptural text
establishing such a rule. — Or else, he says, contemplations
on Aditya and so on are exclusively to be superimposed
on Brahman. For in this way Brahman is meditated upon
by means of contemplations on Aditya, and scripture
decides that meditations on Brahman are what is pro-
ductive of fruits. Hence contemplations on Brahman are
not to be superimposed on Aditya and so on.
To this we make the following reply. The contemplation
on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Aditya
and so on. — Why ? — ' On account of exaltation.' For thus
Aditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the con-
templation of something higher than they being super-
imposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular
rule, viz. the one enjoining that the idea of something
higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as
when we view — and speak of — the king's charioteer as
a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters,
because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous ;
for should we view a king as a charioteer, we should thereby
lower him, and that would be no ways beneficial. — But, an
objection is raised, as the whole matter rests on scriptural
authority, the suspicion of any disadvantage cannot arise ;
and it is, further, not appropriate to define contemplations
based on scripture by secular rules ! — That might be so, we
reply, if the sense of scripture were fully ascertained ; but
as it is liable to doubt, there is no objection to our having
recourse to a secular rule whereby to ascertain it. And as
by means of that rule we decide that what scripture means
the sun and so on, as being resolved into their causal substance,
i. e. Brahman. True knowledge is concerned only with the
resolution of the entire world of effects into Brahman.
344 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
is the superimposition of a higher contemplation on some-
thing lower, we should incur loss by superimposing a lower
contemplation upon something higher. — As moreover in
the passages under discussion the words 'Aditya' and so on
stand first, they must, this being not contradictory, be
taken in their primary sense. But, as our thought is thus
defined by these words taken in their true literal sense, the
word ' Brahman,' which supervenes later on, cannot be
co-ordinated with them if it also be taken in its true literal
sense, and from this it follows that the purport of the
passages can only be to enjoin contemplations on Brahman
(superinduced on Aditya and so on). — The same sense
follows from the circumstance that the word ' Brahman ' is,
in all the passages under discussion, followed by the word
' iti,' 'thus^' 'He is to meditate (on Aditya, &c.) as
Brahman.' The words 'Aditya' and so on, on the other
hand, the text exhibits without any such addition. The
passages therefore are clearly analogous to such sentences
as ' He views the mother o' pearl as silver,' in which the
word ' mother o' pearl ' denotes mother o' pearl pure and
simple, while the word ' silver ' denotes, by implication, the
idea of silver ; for tlie person in question merely thinks
' this is silver ' while there is no real silver. Thus our
passages also mean, ' He is to view Aditya and so on as
Brahman.' — The complementary clauses, moreover, which
belong to the passages under discussion (' He who knowing
this meditates (upon) Aditya as Brahman ;' ' Who meditates
(on) speech as Brahman ; ' ' Who meditates (on) will as
Brahman'), exhibit the words 'Aditya' and so on in the
accusative case, and thereby show them to be the direct
objects of the action of meditation". — Against the remark
that in all the mentioned cases Brahman only has to be
meditated upon in order that a fruit may result from the
meditation, we point out that from the mode of proof used
^ Which in the translations given above of the texts under dis-
cussion is mostly rendered by 'as' before the words concerned.
'^ While the word ' Brahman ' does not stand in the accusative
case.
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 345
above we infer that (not Brahman but) only Aditya and so
on have to be meditated upon. But as in the case of
hospitahty shown to guests, Brahman, that is the supreme
ruler of all, will give the fruit of meditations on Aditya and
so on as well. This we have already shown under III, 2, 28.
And, after all, Brahman also is meditated upon (in the cases
under discussion) in so far as a contemplation on Brahman
is superinduced on its symbols, analogously as a contem-
plation on Vish/zu is superinduced on his images.
6. And the ideas of Aditya and so on (are to be
superimposed) on the members (of the sacrificial
action) ; owing to the effectuation (of the result of
the sacrifice),
' He who burns up these, let a man meditate upon him as
udgitha' [Kh. Up. I, 3, i) ; 'Let a man meditate on the
fivefold Saman in the worlds' {Kh. Up. II, 2, i) ; 'Let
a man meditate on the sevenfold Saman in speech ' {Kh. Up.
II, 8, i) ; ' This earth is the Rik, fire is Saman ' [Kh. Up.
I, 6, i). — With regard to these and similar meditations
limited to members of sacrificial action, there arises a doubt
whether the text enjoins contemplations on the udgitha and
so on superinduced on Aditya and so on, or else contem-
plations on Aditya, &c., superinduced on the udgitha and
so on.
No definite rule can here be established, the purvapakshin
maintains, since there is no basis for such a rule. For in
the present case we are unable to ascertain any special
pre-eminence, while we were able to do so in the case of
Brahman. Of Brahman, which is the cause of the whole
world and free from all evil and so on, we can assert
definitively that it is superior to Aditya and so on ; the
udgitha and so on, on the other hand, are equally mere
effects, and we cannot therefore with certainty ascribe to
any of them any pre-eminence. — Or else we may decide
that the ideas of the udgitha and so on are to be superin-
duced exclusively on Aditya and so on. For the udgitha
and so on are of the nature of sacrificial work, and as it is
known that the fruit is attained through the work, Aditya
346 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
and so on if meditated upon as udgitha and so on will
themselves become of the nature of work and thereby be
causes of fruit. — Moreover, the text, ' This earth is the Rik,
the fire is the Saman,' is followed by the complementary
passage, ' this Saman is placed upon this Rik^ where the
word ' Rik ' denotes the earth and the word ' Saman ' the
fire. Now this (viz. this calling the earth ''Rik ' and calling
the fire ' Saman ') is possible only if the meaning of the
passage is that the earth and the fire have to be viewed as
Rik and Saman ; not if the Rik and the Saman were to be
contemplated as earth and fire. For the term ' king ' is
metaphorically applied to the charioteer — and not the term
' charioteer' to the king — the reason being that the charioteer
may be viewed as a king. — Again in the text, ' Let a man
meditate upon the fivefold Saman in the worlds,' the use of
the locative case ' in the worlds ' intimates that the medi-
tation on the Saman is to be superimposed on the worlds as
its locus. This is also proved by the analogous passage,
' This Gayatra Saman is woven on the vital airs ' {Kh. Up.
II, II, i). — Moreover (as proved before), in passages such
as ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the instruction,' Brahman,
which is mentioned last, is superimposed on Aditya, which
is mentioned first. In the same way the earth, &c., are
mentioned first, and the hink^ra, &c., mentioned last in
passages such as 'The earth is the hinkara' [Kh. Up. II, 2, i).
— For all these reasons the idea of members of sacrificial
action has to be transferred to Aditya and so on, which are
not such members.
To this we make the following reply. The ideas of
Aditya and so on are exclusively to be transferred to mem-
bers of sacrificial action, such as the udgitha and so on.
For what reason ? — ' On account of effectuation ' — that
means : Because thus, through their connexion with the
supersensuous result (of the sacrificial work under dis-
cussion), when the udgitha and so on are ceremonially
qualified by being viewed as Aditya and so on, the sacri-
ficial work is successful^. A scriptural passage — viz. Kh.
^ Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action — such as
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 347
Up. I, 1, 10, ' Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith,
and the Upanishad is more powerful ' — moreover expressly
declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial
work. — Well then, an objection is raised, let this be admitted
with regard to those meditations which have for their result
the success of certain works ; but how is it with meditations
that have independent fruits of their own? Of this latter
nature is e.g. the meditation referred to in KJi. Up. II, 2, 3,
' He who knowing this meditates on the fivefold Saman in
the worlds (to him belong the worlds in an ascending and
a descending scale).' — In those cases also, we reply, the
meditation falls within the sphere of a person entitled to
the performance of a certain work, and therefore it is proper
to assume that it has a fruit only through its connexion
with the supersensuous result of the work under the heading
of which it is mentioned ; the case being analogous to that
of the godohana-vesseP. — And as Aditya and so on are of
the nature of fruits of action, they may be viewed as superior
to the udgitha and so on which are of the nature of action
only. Scriptural texts expressly teach that the reaching of
Aditya (the sun) and so on constitutes the fruit of certain
works. — Moreover the initial passages, 'Let a man meditate
on the syllable Om as the udgitha,' and ' Of this syllable the
full account is this' {KJi. Up. I, i, i), represent the udgitha
only as the object of meditation, and only after that the
the udgitha — undergo a certain ceremonial purification (sa?;/-
skara) by being meditated upon as Aditya and so on. The
meditations therefore contribute, through the mediation of the
consdtuent members, towards the apurva, the supersensuous result
of the entire sacrifice.
^ The sacred text promises a special fruit for the employment
of the milking- pail (instead of the ordinary ^amasa), viz. the
obtainment of cattle ; nevertheless that fruit is obtained only
in so far as the godohana subserves the accomplishment of the
apurva of the sacrifice. Analogously those meditations on mem-
bers of sacrificial works for which the text promises a separate
fruit obtain that fruit only in so far as they effect a mysterious
sa»2skara in those members, and thereby subserve the apijrva of
the sacrifice.
348 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
text enjoins the contemplations on Aditya and so on. — Nor
can we accept the remark that Aditya and so on being
meditated upon as udgitha, &c., assume thereby the nature
of work and thus will be productive of fruit. For pious
meditation is in itself of the nature of work, and thus capable
of producing a result. And if the udgitha and so on are
meditated upon as Aditya, &c., they do not therefore cease
to be of the nature of work. — In the passage, ' This Saman
is placed upon this Rikl the words ^ Rik' and 'Saman' are
employed to denote the earth and Agni by means of impli-
cation (lakshawa), and implication may be based, according
to opportunity, either on a less or more remote connexion
of sense. Although, therefore, the intention of the passage
is to enjoin the contemplation of the Rik and the Saman as
earth and Agni, yet — as the Rik and the Saman are
mentioned separately and as the earth and Agni are men-
tioned close by — we decide that, on the ground of their
connexion with the Rik and Saman, the words ' Rik ' and
' S^man ' are employed to denote them (i. e. earth and
Agni) only. For we also cannot altogether deny that the
word ' charioteer ' may, for some reason or other, meta-
phorically denote a king. — Moreover the position of the
words in the clause, ' Just this (earth) is Rik,' declares that
the Rik is of the nature of earth ; while if the text wanted
to declare that the earth is of the nature of Rik, the words
would be arranged as follows, ' this earth is just RikJ —
Moreover the concluding clause, ' He who knowing this
sings the Saman,' refers only to a cognition based on
a subordinate member (of sacrificial action), not to one
based on the earth and so on, — Analogously in the passage,
' Let a man meditate (on) the fivefold Saman in the worlds,'
the worlds — although enounced in the locative case — have
to be superimposed on the Saman, as the circumstance of
the ' Saman' being exhibited in the objective case indicates
it to be the object of meditation. For if the worlds are
superimposed on the Saman, the S^man is meditated upon
as the Self of the worlds ; while in the opposite case the
worlds would be meditated upon as the Self of the Saman.
— The same remark applies to the passage, ' This Gayatra
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. 349
Saman is woven on the pra;/as' [Kh. Up. II, ii, i). —
Where again both members of the sentence are equally
exhibited in the objective case, viz. in the passage, ' Let a man
meditate on the sevenfold Saman (as) the sun' (A'//. Up. II,
9, i), we observe that the introductory passages — viz.
' Meditation on the whole Saman is good ; ' ' Thus for the
fivefold Saman ; ' ' Next for the sevenfold Saman ' [KJi. Up.
II, I, ] ; 7, 2; 8, i) — represent the Saman only as the
object of meditation, and therefrom conclude that Aditya
has to be .superinduced on it, and not the reverse. — From
this very circumstance of the Saman being the object of
meditation, it follows that even in cases where the two
members of the sentence have a reverse position — such as
' The earth (is) the hinkara,' &c. — the hihkara, &c., have to
be viewed as earth and so on ; and not the reverse. — From
all this it follows that reflections based on things not
forming constituent members of the sacrifice, such as Aditya
and so on, are to be superimposed on the udgitha and the
like which are such constituent members.
7. Sitting (a man is to meditate), on account of
the possibility.
As meditations connected with members of sacrificial
action depend on action, we need not raise the question
whether they are to be carried on in a sitting, or any other
posture. The same holds good in the case of perfect
intuition, since knowledge depends on its object only.
With regard to all other meditations, on the other hand,
the author of the Sutras raises the question whether they
may be undertaken indifferently by a person standing,
sitting, or lying down ; or only by a person sitting.
The purvapakshin here maintains that as meditation is
something mental there can be no restriction as to the
attitude of the body. — No, the author of the Sutras rejoins;
'Sitting' only a man is to meditate. — Why? — 'On account
of the possibility.' By meditation we understand the length-
ened carrying on of an identical train of thought ; and of
this a man is capable neither when going nor when running,
since the act of going and so on tends to distract the mind.
,50 vedanta-sOtras.
The mind of a standing man, again, is directed on main-
taining the body in an erect position, and therefore incapable
of reflection on any subtle matter. A man lying down,
finally, is unawares overcome by slumber. A sitting person,
on the other hand, may easily avoid these several untoward
occurrences, and is therefore in a position to carry on
meditations.
8. And on account of thoughtfulness.
Moreover also the word 'thoughtfulness' denotes a
lengthened carrying on of the same train of ideas. Now
' thoughtfulness ' we ascribe to those whose mind is concen-
trated on one and the same object, while their look is fixed
and their limbs move only very slightly. We say e.g. that
the crane is thoughtful, or that a wife whose husband has
gone on a journey is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness
is easy for those who sit ; and we therefore conclude here-
from also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting
person.
9. And with reference to immobility (scripture
ascribes thought to the earth, &c.).
Moreover, in the passage ' The earth thinks as it were '
scripture ascribes thought to the earth, with regard to its
immobility. This also helps us to infer that meditation is
the occupation of one who is sitting.
10. And Smmi-passages say the same.
Authoritative authors also teach in their Smr/tis that
a sitting posture subserves the act of meditation : cp. e.g.
Bha. Gita VI, 11, ' Having made a firm seat for one's self
on a pure spot.' For the same reason the Yogajastra
teaches different sitting postures, viz. the so-called lotus
position and so on.
11. Where concentration of mind (is possible),
there (meditation may be carried on), on account of
there being no difference.
A doubt here arises with regard to direction, place, and
IV ADIIYAYA, I PADA, 12. 35 1
time, viz. whether any restrictive rules exist or not. — Against
the view of those who maintain that such rules exist because
we have analogous rules concerning the locality, &c., of
Vedic works, the Sutrakara remarks that all rules concerning
direction, place, and time depend on the aim merely ; that
is to say : Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever
place and facing whatever region, he may with ease manage
to concentrate his mind. For while scripture prescribes an
easterly direction, the time of forenoon, and a spot sloping
towards the east for certain sacrifices, no such specific rules
are recorded for meditation, since the requisite concentra-
tion may be managed indifferently anywhere. — But, an
objection is raised, some passages record such specific rules,
as e. g. the following one, ' Let a man apply himself (to
meditation) in a level and clean place, free from pebbles,
fire and dust, noises, standing water, and the like, favourable
to the mind, not infested by what hurts the eyes, full of
caves and shelters' (Svet. Up. II, 10). — Such particular
rules are met with indeed ; but the teacher being friendly-
minded says that there is no binding rule as to the particulars
mentioned therein. The clause 'favourable to the mind'
moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever
concentration of the mind may be attained.
1 2. Up to death (meditations have to be repeated) ;
for then also it is thus seen in scripture.
The first adhikara;za (of the present adhyaya) has estab-
lished that repetition is to be observed with regard to all
meditations. But now a distinction is made. Those
meditations which aim at complete knowledge, terminate —
in the same way as the beating of the rice grains is
terminated by the husks becoming detached from the
grains — with their effect being accomplished ; for as soon
as the effect, i. e. perfect knowledge, has been obtained, no
further effort can be commanded, since scriptural instruction
does not apply to him who knows that Brahman — which
is not the object of injunction — constitutes his Self. On
the other hand a doubt arises whether the devotee is to
repeat those meditations which aim at certain forms of
352 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
exaltation for a certain time only and then may stop ; or
whether he is to repeat them again and again as long as
he lives.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that such meditations
are to be carried on for some time only and then to be
given up, since this satisfies the demands of those scriptural
passages which teach meditations distinguished by repetition.
To this we make the following reply. The devotee is
to reiterate those meditations up to his death, since the
supersensuous result (of such meditations) is reached
by means of the extreme meditation. For such works
also as originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future state
of existence presuppose, at the time of death, a creative
cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced ; as appears
from such passages as, 'Endowed with knowledge (i.e. the
conception of the fruit to be obtained) he (i.e. the individual
soul) goes after that (viz. the fruit) which is connected with
that knowledge' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 2) ; ' Whatever his thought
(at the time of death), with that he goes into Pra;^a, and
the Pra;za united with light, together with the individual
Self, leads on to the world as conceived (at the moment of
death)' (Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10). This also follows from the
comparison to the caterpillar (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 3). But the
meditations under discussion do not, at the time of death,
require any other creative cognition but a repetition of
themselves. Such meditations therefore as consist in the
creative conception of a fruit to be obtained must be
repeated up to the moment of death. Analogously the
scriptural text, ^at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 1 — 'With whatever thought
he passes away from this world ' — declares that the medita-
tion extends up to the time of death. Similarly Smrz'ti
says, ' Remembering whatever form of being he in the end
leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes,
assimilated to its being' (Bha. Gita VIII, 6) ; and 'At the
time of death with unmoved mind' (Bha. Gita VIII, 10).
And that at the moment of death also there remains some-
thing to be done, tlie scriptural passage (K/i. Up. Ill, 17, 6)
also proves. ' Let a man, at the time of death, take refuge
with this triad.'
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3. 353
13. On, the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there
take place) the non-cHnging and the destruction of
later and earlier sins ; this being declared (by scripture).
The supplement to the third adhyaya is finished here-
with, and an inquiry now begins concerning the fruit of
the knowledge of Brahman. — The doubt here presents
itself whether, on the attainment of Brahman, sins the
results of which are opposed in nature to such attainment
are extinguished or not. They cannot possibly be extin-
guished, the purvapakshin maintains, before they have
given their results, because the purpose of all works is their
result. For we understand from scripture that work
possesses the power of producing results ; if, therefore,
the work would perish without the enjoyment of its result,
scripture would thereby be rendered nugatory. Smrz'ti
also declares that 'works do not perish.' — But from this
it would follow that all scriptural instruction regarding
expiatory ceremonies is meaningless I — -This objection is
without force, we reply, because expiatory ceremonies may
be viewed as merely due to certain special occurrences ;
as is the case with the offering enjoined on the occasion
of the house (of one who has established the sacred fire-
place) being burned ^ — Let us moreover admit that expiatory
ceremonies, because enjoined on account of a person being
afflicted by some mischief, may be meant to extinguish
that mischief But there is no analogous injunction of the
knowledge of Brahman. — But if we do not admit that the
works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished, it
follows that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his
works and thus cannot obtain release ! — This follows by no
means ; but in the same way as the results of works, release
will take place in due dependence on place, time, and special
causes. — For these reasons the obtainment of Brahman
does not imply the cessation of (the consequences of) mis-
deeds.
^ Scripture enjoins the ish/i in question merely on ihe occasion
of the house being burned, not as annulling the mischief done.
[38] A a
354 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
To this we make the following reply. On the obtain-
ment of Brahman there take place the non-clinging (to the
agent) of the posterior sins and the annihilation of anterior
ones. — ' On account of this being declared.' For in
a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman scrip-
ture expressly declares that future sins which might be
presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him
who knows : ' As water does not cling to a lotus-leaf,
so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' {Kh. Up.
IV, J4, 3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction
of previously accumulated evil deeds : ' As the fibres of
the Ishika reed when thrown into the fire are burned,
thus all his sins are burned' [Kh. Up. V, 24, 3). The
extinction of works the following passage also declares,
* The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved,
extinguished are all his works when He has been beheld
who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8). — Nor is there
any force in the averment that the assumption of works
being extinguished without their fruits having been enjoyed
would render scripture futile. For we by no means deny
the fiuit-producing power of works ; this power actually
exists ; but we maintain that it is counteracted by other
causes such as knowledge. Scripture is concerned only
with the existence of this power in general, not with its
obstruction and non-obstruction. Thus also the Smr/ti
passage, ' For work is not extinguished,' expresses the
general rule ; for as fruition of the result is the purpose of
work, work is not extinguished without such fruition. But
it is assumed that evil deeds are extinguished through
expiatory ceremonies and the like, on account of scriptural
and Smr/ti passages such as 'All sins transcends he, the
murder of a Brahma;/a transcends he who ofi'ers the
aj-vamedha-sacrifice and who knows it thus ' (Tai. Sa;;zh.
V, 3, 12, i). — Nor is there any truth in the assertion that
expiatory ceremonies are due to certain special occurrences
(without possessing the power of extinguishing the evil
inherent in such occurrences). For as these expiatory acts
are enjoined in connexion with evil events, we may assume
that they have for their fruit the destruction of such evil,
IV ADIIVAVA, I PADA, I 3. 355
and are therefore not entitled to assume any other fruit.
— Against the objection that knowledge is not actually
enjoined with reference to the destruction of evil while
expiatory acts are so enjoined, we make the following
remark. In the case of the meditations on the qualified
Brahman there exists such injunction, and the corresponding
complementary passages declare that he who possesses such
knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin.
Now there is no reason why the passages should not
expressly aim at declaring these two things ', and we
therefore conclude that the fruit of those vidyas is the
acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the annulment
of all sin. In the case of vidyas referring to Brahman
devoid of qualities we indeed have no corresponding in-
junction ; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows
from the cognition that our true Self is not an agent.
(With relation to these vidyas about Brahman as devoid
of qualities) the term 'non-clinging' shows that, as far as
future works are concerned, he who knows Brahman does
not enter at all into the state of agency. And as to works
past, although he has entered as it were into that state
owing to wrong knowledge, yet those works also are
dissolved when, through the power of knowledge, wrong
cognition comes to an end ; this is conveyed by the term
' destruction.' ' That Brahman whose nature it is to be
at all times neither agent nor enjoyer, and which is thus
opposed in being to the (soul's) previously established state
of agency and enjoyment, that Brahman am I ; hence
I neither was an agent nor an enjoyer at any previous time,
nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such
at any future time ; ' this is the cognition of the man who
knows Brahman. And in this way only final release is
possible; for otherwise, i.e. if the chain of works which have
been running on fi-om eternity could not be cut short, release
^ I. e. there is no reason to assume that those passages mention
the acquisilion of lordly power and the cessation of sin merely for
the purpose of glorifying the injunction, and not for ihe purpose of
stating the result of our compliance with the injunciion.
A a 2
356 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
could never take place. — Nor can final release be dependent
on locality, time, and special causes, as the fruit of works is ;
for therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is
non-permanent and cannot be.
It therefore is an established conclusion that on attaining
Brahman there results the extinction of all sin.
14. Of the other (i.e. good works) also there is,
ill the same way, non-clinging ; but at death.
In the preceding adhikara;?a it has been shown that,
according to scriptural statements, all natural sin — which
is the cause of the soul's bondage — does, owing to the
power of knowledge, either not cling to the soul or undergo
destruction. One might now think that works of religious
duty which are enjoined by scripture are not opposed to
knowledge also founded on scripture. In order to dispel
this notion the reasoning of the last adhikarawa is formally
extended to the case under discussion. For him who
knows there is ' in the same way,' i. e. as in the case of
sin, 'non-clinging" and destruction 'of the other also,' i.e. of
good works also ; because such works also, as productive
of their own results, would be apt to obstruct thereby the
result of knowledge. Scripture also — in passages such as
' He overcomes both ' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22) — declares that
good works are extinguished no less than evil ones, and
the extinction of works which depends on the cognition
of the Self not being an agent is the same in the case
of good and of evil works, and moreover there is a passage
making a general statement without any distinction, viz.
'And his works are extinguished' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).
And even there where the text mentions evil works only,
we must consider good works also to be implied therein,
because the results of the latter also are inferior to the
result of knowledge. Moreover scripture directly applies the
term ' evil works ' to good works also, viz. in the passage,
Kh. Up. VIII, 4, I, ' Day and night do not pass that bank,'
where good works are mentioned together with evil works,
and finally the term ' evil ' is without any distinction
applied to all things mentioned before, ' All evil things
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5. 357
turn back from it.' — 'But at death.' The word 'but' is
meant for emphatical assertion. As it is estabhshed that
good as well as evil works — which are both causes of
bondage — do, owing to the strength of knowledge, on the
one hand not cling and on the other hand undergo de-
struction, there necessarily results final release of him who
knows as soon as death takes place.
15. But only those former (works) whose effects
have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge) ;
because (scripture states) that (i. e. the death of the
body) to be the term.
In the two preceding adhikara;/as it has been proved
that good as well as evil works are annihilated through
knowledge. We now have to consider the question whether
this annihilation extends, without distinction, to those
works whose effects have already begun to operate as well
as to those whose effects have not yet begun ; or only
to works of the latter kind.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that on the ground of
scriptural passages such as 'He thereby overcomes both,'
which refer to all works without any distinction^ all works
whatever must be considered to undergo destruction.
To this we reply, ' But only those whose effects have
not begun.' Former works, i.e. works, whether good or
evil, which have been accumulated in previous forms of
existence as well as in the current form of existence before
the origination of knowledge, are destroyed by the attain-
ment of knowledge only if their fruit has not yet begun
to operate. Those works, on the other hand, whose effects
have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed —
i.e. those very works to which there is due the present state
of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises —
are not destroyed by that knowledge. This opinion is
founded on the scriptural passage, ' For him there is delay
only as long as he is not delivered (from the body) ' (AV/.
Up. VI, 14, 2), which fixes the death of the body as the
term of the attainment of final release. Were it otherwise,
T.,^S VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
i.e. were all works whatever extinguished by knowledge,
there would be no reason for the continuance of the current
form of existence, and the rise of knowledge would there-
fore be immediately followed by the state of final release ;
in which case scripture would not teach that one has to
wait for the death of the body. — But, an objection is raised,
the knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active
does by its intrinsic power destroy (all) works ; how then
should it destroy some only and leave others unaffected ?
We certainly have no right to assume that when fire and
seeds come into contact the germinative power of some
seeds only is destroyed while that of others remains un-
impaired ! — The origination of knowledge, we reply, can-
not take place without dependence on an aggregate of
works whose effects have already begun to operate, and
when this dependence has once been entered into, we must
— as in the case of the potter's wheel — wait until the
motion of that which once has begun to move comes to
an end, there being nothing to obstruct it in the interim.
The knowledge of our Self being essentially non-active
destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge ;
but wrong knowledge — comparable to the appearance of
a double moon — lasts for some time even after it has been
refuted, owing to the impression it has made. — Moreover
it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of
him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time
or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another
possessing the knowledge of Brahman — vouched for by his
heart's conviction — and at the same time continuing to
enjoy bodily existence ? This same point is explained in
scripture and Smrz'ti, where they describe him who stands
firm in the highest knowledge. — The final decision therefore
is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works
only — whether good or evil — whose effects have not yet
begun to operate.
1 6. But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) tovi^ards
the same effect ; scripture showing this.
The reasoning as to evil deeds has been extended to the
IV ADHVAYA, I PADA, 1 6. 359
non-clinging and destruction of good deeds also. Against
a notion which now might present itself, viz. that this
extension comprehends all good works alike, the Sutrakara
remarks, ' But the Agnihotra and so on.' — The word ' but '
is meant to set that notion aside. Works of permanent
obligation enjoined by the Veda, such as the Agnihotra,
tend 'towards the same effect,' i.e. have the same effect as
knowledge. For this is declared by texts such as the
following one, ' Brahmawas seek to know him by the study
of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 22). —
But, an objection is raised, as knowledge and works have
different effects, it is impossible that they should have one
and the same effect ! — It is observed, we reply, that sour
milk and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death
have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of
the body, if the sour milk is mixed with sugar and the
poison taken while certain mantras are recited ; in the
same way works if joined with knowledge may effect final
release. — But final release is something not to be effected
at all ; how then can you declare it to be the effect of
works ? — Works, we reply, may subserve final release
mediately. For in so far as furthering knowledge, work
may be spoken of as an indirect cause of final release.
For the same reason the equality of effect spoken of above
extends only to works past (at the time when knowledge
springs up). Because for him who knows Brahman no future
Agnihotras and the like are possible, since the attainment
of the Self of Brahman — which Brahman is not subject to
injunction — lies outside the sphere of sacred precept. In
those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to
the qualified Brahman, the Self does not cease to be an
agent, and consequently future Agnihotras and the like are
not excluded. Such works also — because they have no
other effect if undertaken without a view to reward — may
be brought into connexion with knowledge.
To what works then, it may be asked, does the statement
refer made above about the non-clinging and the destruction,
and to what works the following statement made in some
Jiikha about the application of works, ' His sons enter upon
360 vedanta-sOtras.
his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies
upon his evil works?' — To this question the next Sutra
replies.
17. For (there is) also (a class of good works)
other than this, according to some. (There is agree-
ment) of both (teachers) (as to the fate of those
works.)
' For also one other than this,' i. e. there is also a class of
good works different from works of permanent obligation,
viz. those good works which are performed with a view to
a fruit. Of those latter works the passage quoted above
from some 5akha (' His friends enter on his good works ')
teaches the application. And first of those works Sutra 14
teaches that, in the same way as evil deeds, they do not
cling to the doer or else are destroyed. Both teachers,
Caimini as well as Badarayawa, are agreed that such works,
undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish, do not
contribute towards the origination of true knowledge.
18. For (the text) ' whatever he does with know-
ledge ' (intimates that).
In the preceding adhikara;/a the following conclusion
has been established : — Works of permanent obligation
such as the Agnihotra, if performed by a person desirous
of release with a view to release, lead to the extinction of
evil deeds committed, thus become a means of the purifi-
cation of the mind, and thereby cause the attainment of
Brahman, which leads to final release ; they therefore
operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of
Brahman. Now the Agnihotra and similar works are
either connected with a special knowledge based on the
constituent members of the sacrificial work, or absolute
(non-connected with such knowledge). This appears from
scriptural texts such as ' He who knowing this sacrifices ;
he who knowing this makes an offering ; he who knowing
this recites ; he who knowing this sings ; therefore let
a man make him who knows this his Brahman-priest
IV ADHYAyA, I PADA, 1 8. 361
[Kh. Up. IV, 17, i) ; therefore both perform the work, he
who knows this and he who does not know it ' [Kh. Up. I,
I, 10). — We have now to consider the question whether
only such Agnihotras and so on as are connected with
knowledge cause knowledge on the part of him who desires
release and thus operate towards the same effect as
knowledge; or whether both kinds of works — those con-
nected with knowledge and those not so connected — equally
act in that way. The doubt concerning this point arises on
the one hand from scriptural passages such as ' That Self
they seek to know by sacrifice ' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22), which
represent sacrifices and the like, without difference, as
auxiliary to the knowledge of the Self; and on the other
hand from our observing that a superiority is conceded to
Agnihotras, &c., if connected with knowledge.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that only such sacri-
ficial works as are connected with knowledge are helpful
towards the cognition of the Self, since we understand from
various scriptural and Smrz'ti passages that works connected
with knowledge are superior to those destitute of know-
ledge ; cp. e. g. ' On the very day on which he sacrifices on
that day he overcomes death again, he who knows this '
(Brz. Up. I, 5, 3) ; and ' Possesser of this knowledge thou
wilt cast off the bonds of action ; ' ' Action is far inferior
to concentration of mind ' (Bha. Gita II, 39 ; 49).
To this the Sutrakdra replies, ' For what with knowledge
only.' It is true that works such as the Agnihotra if joined
with knowledge are superior to works destitute of knowledge,
in the same way as a Brahma/^a possessed of knowledge is
superior to one devoid of knowledge. Nevertheless works
such as the Agnihotra even if not connected with know-
ledge are not altogether ineffective ; for certain scriptural
texts declare that such works are, all of them without any
difference^ causes of knowledge ; so e. g. the passage, • That
Self they seek to know through sacrifices.' — But, as we
understand from scripture that works connected with
knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge,
we must suppose that the Agnihotra and the like if un-
accompanied by knowledge are inoperative towards the
'^62 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
cognition of the Self! — By no mean?, we reply. The
proper assumption is that the Agnihotra and so on, if
accompanied by knowledge, possess a greater capability of
originating knowledge and therefore are of superior causal
efficiency with regard to the cognition of the Self; while
the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such
superiority. We cannot, however, admit that the Agni-
hotra and similar works which scripture, without making
any distinction, declares to subserve knowledge (cp. ' they
seek to know through sacrifices') should not subserve it.
With this our conclusion agrees the scriptural text, 'What-
ever he performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad
that is more powerful' {Kh.\]^. I, i, to); for this text —
in speaking of the greater power of work joined with
knowledge and thus proclaiming the superiority of such
work with regard to its effect — intimates thereby that
work destitute of knowledge possesses some power towards
the same effect. By the ' power ' of work we understand
its capacity of effecting its purpose. We therefore accept
as settled the following conclusion : All works of perma-
nent obligation, such as the Agnihotra — whether joined
with or devoid of knowledge— which have been performed
before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present
state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous
of release with a view to release ; all such works act,
according to their several capacities, as means of the
extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of
Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment,
subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing
of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devo-
tion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect
as the knowledge of Brahman.
19. But having destroyed by fruition the two
other (sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman.
It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose
effects have not }et begun are extinguished by the power
of knowledge. ' The two others,' on the other hand, i. e.
those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9. 363
has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences,
and then he becomes one with Brahman. This appears
from scriptural passages such as ' For him there is delay so
long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will
become one with Brahman' {Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2); and
' Being Brahman he goes to Brahman ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 6),
— But, an objection is raised, even when perfect intuition
has risen the practical intuition of multiplicity may continue
after the death of the body, just as it continued before
death ; analogously to the visual appearance of a double
moon (which may continue even after it has been cognized
as false). — Not so, we reply. After the death of the body
there no longer exists any cause for such continuance ;
while up to death there is such a cause, viz. the extinction
of the remainder of works to be enjoyed. — But a new
aggregate of works will originate a new fruition ! — Not so,
we reply ; since the seed of all such fruition is destroyed.
What, on the death of the body, could originate a new
period of fruition, is only a new set of works, and works
depend on false knowledge ; but such false knowledge is
completely destroyed by perfect intuition. When therefore
the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the
man who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect
isolation.
364 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
SECOND PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
I. Speech (is merged) in mind, on account of this
being seen, and of the scriptural statement.
Being about to describe the path of the gods which leads
those who possess the lower kind of knowledge towards
the attainment of their reward, the Sutrakara begins by
explaining, on the basis of scriptural statements, the
successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body ;
for, as will be stated later on, the departure of the soul
is the same in the case of him who possesses the (lower)
knowledge and of him who is devoid of all knowledge.
About the process of dying we have the following passage,
' When a man departs from hence his speech merges in his
mind, his mind in his breath, his breath in fire, fire in the
highest deity' (AV/. Up. VI, 6, 1). A doubt here arises
whether the passage means to say that speech itself, together
with its function, is merged in the mind, or only the
function of speech.
The purvapakshin maintains that speech itself is merged
in the mind. For this explanation only is in agreement
with the direct statement of the sacred text, while the other
alternative compels us to have recourse to an implied
meaning ; now wherever direct enunciation and implied
meaning are in conflict the preference has to be given to
the former, and we therefore maintain that speech itself is
merged in the mind.
To this we reply that only the function of speech is
merged in the mhid. — But how can this interpretation be
maintained, considering that the teacher (in the Sutra)
expressly says ' Speech in the mind ? ' — True, we reply ;
but later on he says ' There is non-division, according to
scriptural statement' (Sutra 16), and we therefrom conclude
that what is meant in the present Sutra is merely cessation
of the function of speech. For if the intention were to
IV ADHVAYA, 2 PADA, 2. 365
express absorption of the thing (i.e. the organ of speech)
itself, there would be 'non-division' in all cases, and for
what reason then should ' non-division ' be specially stated
in another case (i.e. in the case of which Sutra 16 treats)?
The meaning therefore is that the different functions are
retracted, and that while the function of the mind continues
to go on the function of speech is retracted first. — Why
so ? — ' Because this is seen.' It is a matter of observation
that while the mind continues to act the function of speech
comes to an end ; nobody, on the other hand, is able to
see that the organ of speech itself, together with its function,
is merged in the mind. — But are we not justified in assuming
such a merging of speech in the mind, on the ground of
scriptural statement? — This is impossible, we reply, since
mind is not the causal substance of speech. We are entitled
to assume only that a thing is merged in what is its causal
substance; a pot e.g. (when destroyed) is merged in clay.
But there is no proof whatever for speech originating from
mind. On the other hand we observe that functions originate
and are retracted even where they do not inhere in causal
substances. The function of fire, e.g. which is of the nature
of heat, springs from fuel which is of the nature of earth,
and it is extinguished in water. — But how do you, on this
interpretation, account for the scriptural statement that
'speech is merged in the mind?' — 'And on account of the
scriptural statement,' the Sutrakara replies. The scriptural
statement also may be reconciled with our interpretation,
in so far as the function and the thing to which the function
belongs are viewed as non-different.
2. And for the same reason all (sense-organs)
(follow) after (mind).
' Therefore he whose light has gone out comes to a new
birth with his senses merged in the mind ' (Pr. Up. Ill, 9) ;
this passage states that all senses without difference are
merged in the mind. 'For the same reason,' i.e. because
there also as in the case of speech, it is observed that the
eye and so on discontinue their functions, while the mind
together with its functions persists, and because the organs
^66 vedanta-sOtras.
ihemselves cannot be absorbed, and because the text
admits of that interpretation ; we conclude that the dififerent
organs follow after, i.e. are merged in. the mind only as far
as their functions are concerned. — As all organs^ without
difference are merged in the mind, the special mention
made of speech (in Sutra i) must be viewed as made in
agreement with the special example referred to by scripture.
' Speech is merged in mind.'
3. That mind (is merged) in breath, owing to the
subsequent clause.
It has been shown that the passage, ' Speech is merged
in mind,' means a merging of the function only. — A doubt
here arises whether the subsequent clause, ' mind in breath,'
also means to intimate a merging of the function only or
of that to which the function belongs. — The purvapakshin
maintains the latter alternative. For that, he says, agrees
with scripture, and moreover breath may be viewed as the
causal substance of mind. For scripture — ■ Mind is made
of earth, breath of water ' [Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5) — states that
mind comes from earth and breath from water, and scripture
further states that ' Water sent forth earth ' [Kh. Up. VI,
2, 4). When mind therefore is merged in breath, it is the
same as earth being merged in water ; for mind is earth
and breath is water, causal substance and effect being non-
different.
To this we reply as follows. ' The subsequent clause '
intimates that the mind, after having absorbed within itself
the functions of the outer senses, is merged in breath only
in the way of its function being so merged. For we
observe in the case of persons lying in deep sleep or about to
die that, while the function of breath persists, the functions
of the mind are stopped. Nor is the mind capable of being
itself merged in breath, since breath does not constitute
its causal substance. — But it has been shown above that
breath is the causal substance of mind! — This is not valid,
^ I. e. the functions of all or;?ans.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 4. 367
we reply. For the relation of causality, made out in such
an indirect way, does not suffice to show that mind is really
merged in breath. Were it so, then mind would also be
merged in earth, earth in water, breath in water. Nor
is there, on the alternative contemplated, any proof of mind
having originated from that water which had passed over
into breath. — Mind cannot therefore, in itself, be merged
in breath. And that the scriptural statement is satisfied
by a mere merging of the function — the function and that
to which the function belongs being viewed as identical —
has been shown already under the preceding Sutra.
4. That (viz. breath) (is merged) in the ruler
(i. e. the individual soul), on account of the (state-
ments as to the pra;^as) coming to it and so on.
We have ascertained that a thing which has not originated
from another is not itself merged in the latter, but only
through its functions. A doubt now arises whether, accord-
ing to the word of scripture, the function of breath is merged
in heat, or in the individual soul which is the ruler of the
body and senses. — According to the purvapakshin we must
conclude that the breath is merged in heat only, since the
scriptural statement allows no room for doubt and we are
not entitled to assume something not declared by scripture.
The breath under discussion persists 'in the ruler,' i.e.
the intelligent Self (the individual soul) which possesses
nescience, work, and former knowledge as limiting adjuncts;
i.e. the function of breath has that soul for its substratum.
— Why so? — 'On account of (the pra/^as) going towards
him,' &c. — Another scriptural passage declares that all
pra;^as without any difference go to the soul, ' All the pra;/as
go to the Self at the time of death when a man is thus
going to expire ' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38). Another passage
again specially declares that the pra;/a with its five functions
follows the individual soul, 'After him thus departing the
pra;^a departs,' and that the other pra;/as follow that pra7?a,
' And after the pra/^a thus departing all the other pra«as
depart' (BW. Up. IV, 4, 2). And the text, ' He is furnished
with intelligence ' (ibid.), by declaring the individual soul to
368 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
be of intimately intelligent nature, suggests that in it, viz.
the soul, the pra//a — into which the different organs of
knowledge have been merged — has taken its abode. — But
scripture also says, * The pra;/a (is merged) in heat ; ' why
then make the addition implied in the doctrine — that breath
is merged in the individual soul ? — We must make that
addition, we reply, because in the process of departure &c.
the soul is the chief agent, and because we must pay regard
to specifications contained in other scriptural passages
also. — How then do you explain the statement, ' Breath is
merged in heat ? ' — To this question the next Sutra replies.
5. To the elements (the soul, with pra,;/a, goes),
on account of the subsequent scriptural clause.
The soul joined by the pra«a takes up its abode within
the subtle elements which accompany heat and form the
seed of the (gross) body. This we conclude from the clause,
' Breath in heat.' — But this passage declares, not that the
soul together with the pra;/a takes up its abode in heat,
but only that the pra/^a takes up its abode ! — No matter,
we reply; since the preceding Sutra intercalates the soul
in the interval (between prawa and te^as). Of a man who
first travels from .Srughna to Mathura and then from
Mathura to Pa^aliputra, we may say shortly that he travels
from vSrughna to Pa/aliputra. The passage under discussion
therefore means that the soul together with the pra«a
abides in the elements associated with heat. — But how are
you entitled to draw in the other elements also, while the
text only speaks of heat? — To this question the next Sutra
replies.
6. Not to one (element) (the soul goes); for both
(i. e. scripture and Smmi) declare this.
At the time of passing over into another body the
individual soul does not abide in the one element of heat
only ; for w'e see that the new body consists of various
elements. This matter is declared in the question and
answer about the waters called man [KJi. Up. V, 3, 3) ;
as explained by us in III, i, 2. — Scripture and Sm/7ti alike
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7. 369
teach this doctrine ; compare e. g. ' Consisting of earth,
water, wind, ether, heat' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 5); and 'The
subtle perishable parts of the five (elements) from them all
this is produced in due succession' (Manu I, 27). — But is
there not another scriptural text — beginning ' Where then
is that person ? ' — which teaches that at the time of the
soul attaining a new body, after speech and the other
organs have been withdrawn within the soul, work
constitutes the soul's abode, ' What those two said, as work
they said it ; what they praised, as work they praised it '
(B;-/. Up. Ill, 2, 13)? — That passage, we reply, describes
the operation of bondage consisting of the senses and their
objects — there called grahas and atigrahas — and therefore
work is spoken of as the abode ; here on the other hand
the elements are said to be the abode because we have
to do with the origination of a new body out of the matter
of the elements. The expression ' they prayed ' moreover
intimates only that work occupies the chief place in the
process, and does not exclude another abode. The two
passages therefore do not contradict each other.
7. And common {to him who knows and him who
does not know) (is the departure) up to the beginning
of the wa)- ; and the immortality (of him who knows)
(is relative only) without having burned (nescience
and so on).
The question here arises whether the departure of the
soul, as described hitherto, is the same in the case of him
who knows and him who is destitute of knowledge ; or
whether there is any difference. — There is a difference, the
purvapakshin maintains. For the departure as described
has for its abode the elements, and this abiding in the
elements is for the purpose of a new birth. But he who
possesses true knowledge cannot be born again, since
scripture declares that 'He who knows reaches immor-
tality.' Hence only he who is devoid of knowledge departs
in the way described. — But as that departure is described
in chapters treating of knowledge it can belong only to him
L3«J B b
70 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
who knows! — Not so, the purvapakshin replies. In the
same way as sleep and the like, the departure of the soul
is only referred to in the texts as something established
elsewhere (not as something to be taught as part of true
knowledge). Passages such as ' When a man sleeps, — is
hungry, — is thirsty ' {K/i. Up. VI, S), although forming
part of chapters concerned with true knowledge, mention
sleep and so on which are common to all living beings,
because they assist the comprehension of the matter to be
taught, but do not aim at enjoining them specially for those
who know. Analogously the texts about the soul's
departure refer to that departure only in order to teach
that ' that highest deity in which the heat of the dying
man is merged, that is the Self, that art thou.' Now that
departure is (in other scriptural passages) specially denied
of him who knows ; it therefore belongs to him only who
does not know.
To this we make the following reply. That departure
which is described in the passage, ' speech is merged in
mind,' &c., must be ' common ' to him who knows and him
who does not know ' up to the beginning of the way ; '
because scripture records no distinction. The soul des-
titute of true knowledge having taken its abode in the
subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body and
being impelled by its works, migrates into a new body ;
while the soul of him who knows passes into the vein,
revealed by true knowledge, which is the door of release.
In this sense the Sutra says 'up to the beginning of the
way.' — But he who knows reaches immortality, and im-
mortality does not depend on a change of place ; why then
should the soul take its abode in the elements or set out
on a journey? — That immortality, we reply, is 'without
having burned,' i. e. for him who, without having altogether
burned nescience and the other afflictions, is about to
obtain, through the power of the lower knowledge, a relative
immortality only, there take place the entering on the
way and the abiding in the elements. For without a sub-
stratum the pra;/as could not move. There is thus no
difficulty.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9. 37I
8. This (aggregate of the elements) (conthiues to
exist) up to the (final absolute) union (with Brah-
man) ; on account of the declarations of the sa;;/sara
state (made by scripture).
With regard to the final clause, ' Heat in the highest
deity,' the force of its connexion with what precedes shows
that the meaning is 'the heat of the dying man is — together
with the individual soul, the prawa, the aggregate of the
organs and the other elements — merged in Brahman.' — We
now have to consider of what kind that merging is. — The
purvapakshin maintains that it is an absolute absorption
of the things merged, since it is proved that those things
have the highest deity for their causal matter. For it has
been established that the deity is the causal substance of
all things that have an origin. Hence that passing into
the state of non-separation is an absolute one.
To this we reply as follows. Those subtle elements —
heat and so on — which constitute the abode of hearing and
the other organs persist up to the ' union,' i. e. up to final
release from the sawsara, which is caused by perfect
knowledge. 'On account of the declarations of the sa;«sara
state ' made in passages such as ' Some enter the womb,
for embodied existence as organic beings ; others go into
inorganic matter, according to their work and according to
their knowledge'' (Ka. Up. H, 5, 7). Otherwise the limiting
adjuncts of every soul would, at the time of death, be
absorbed and the soul would enter into absolute union
with Brahman; which would render all scriptural injunction
and scriptural doctrine equally purportless. Moreover
bondage, which is due to wrong knowledge, cannot be
dissolved but through perfect knowledge. Hence, although
Brahman is the causal substance of those elements, they
are at the time of death — as in the case of deep sleep and
a pralaya of the world — merged in it only in such a way
as to continue to exist in a seminal condition.
9. And (heat is) subtle in measure ; as this is thus
observed.
The elementary matter of heat and the other elements
B b 2
72 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which form the substratum for the soul when passing out
of this body, must be subtle in its nature and extent. This
follows from the scriptural passages, which declare that it
passes out by the veins and so on. Their thinness renders
them capable of passing out, and their transparency (per-
meability) is the cause of their not being stopped by any
gross substance. For these reasons they, when passing out
of the body, are not perceived by bystanders.
10. For this reason (it is) not (destroyed) by the
destruction (of the gross body).
On account of this very subtlety the subtle body is not
destroyed by what destroys the gross body, viz. burning
and the like.
11. And to that same (subtle body) that warmth
(belongs), on account of the proof (which observation
furnishes).
To that same subtle body belongs the warmth which we
perceive in the living body by means of touch. That
warmth is not felt in the body after death, while such
qualities as form^ colour and so on continue to be perceived;
it is. on the other hand, observed as long as there is life.
From this it follows that the warmth resides in something
different from the body as ordinarily known. Scripture
also says, ' He is warm if going to live, cold if going
to die.'
12. Should you say that on account of the denial
(made by scripture) (the soul of him who knows
Brahman does not depart) ; we deny this, (because
scripture means to say that the pra/^as do not
depart) from the embodied soul.
From the distinction conveyed by the clause, ' and
(relative) immortality without having burned' (Sutra 7), it
follows that in the case of absolute immortality being
reached there is no going and no departure of the soul
from the body. — The idea that for some reason or other
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 3. ^73
a departure of the soul might take place in this latter case
also, is precluded by the following scriptural passage, ' But
as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed
from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self
only, of him the vital spirits do not depart, — being Brahman,
he goes to Brahman ' {Brt. Up. IV, 4, 6). From this
express denial — forming part of the higher knowledge — it
follows that the pra;^as do not pass out of the body of him
who knows Brahman.
This conclusion the purvapakshin denies. For, he says,
the passage quoted does not deny the departure of the
prawas from the body, but from the embodied (individual)
soul. — How is this known ? — From the fact that in another
5akha we have (not the sixth, genitive, case ' of him,' but)
the fifth, ablative, case ' from him ' — ' From him the vital
spirits do not depart ' (Madhyandina 5akha). For the
sixth case which expresses only relation in general is
determined towards some special relation by the fifth case
met with in another .Sakha. And as the embodied soul
which has a claim on exaltation and bliss is the chief topic
of the chapter, we construe the words * from him ' to mean
not the body but the embodied soul. The sense therefore
is ' from that soul when about to depart the pra;/as do not
depart, but remain with it.' The soul of him who dies
therefore passes out of the body, together with the pra;^as.
This view the next Sutra refutes.
13. For (in the text) of some (the denial of the
soul's departure) is clear.
The assertion that also the soul of him who knows
Brahman departs from the body, because the denial states
the soul (not the body) to be the point of departure, cannot
be upheld. For we observe that in the sacred text of some
there is a clear denial of a departure, the starting-point of
which is the body. — The text meant at first records the
question asked by Artabhaga, ' When this man dies, do
the vital spirits depart from him or not ? ' then embraces
the alternative of non-departure, in the words, No, replied
Ya^wavalkya ; thereupon — anticipating the objection that
374 VEDANTA-S{JTRAR.
a man cannot be dead as long as his vital spirits have not
departed — teaches the resolution of the pra/^as in the body
' in that very same place they are merged ; ' and finally, in
confirmation thereof, remarks, ' he swells, he is inflated,
inflated the dead man lies.' This last clause states that
swelling, &c., affect the subject under discussion, viz. that
from which the departure takes place (the ' tasmdt ' of the
former clause), which subject is, in this last clause, referred
to by means of the word ' He.' Now swelling and so on
can belong to the body only, not to the embodied soul.
And owing to its equality thereto^ also the passages, 'from
him the vital spirits do not depart ; ' 'in that very same
place they are resolved,' have to be taken as denying
a departure starting from the body, although the chief
subject of the passage is the embodied soul. This may be
done by the embodied soul and the body being viewed as
non-different^. In this way we have to explain the passage
if read with the fifth case. — If again the passage is read
with the sixth case ('of him the vital spirits do not depart'),
it must be understood as denying the departure of him who
knows, as its purport manifestly is to deny a departure
established elsewhere. But what it denies can only be
a departure from the body ; for what is established (viz.
for ordinary men not possessing the highest knowledge) is
only the departure (of the soul, &c.) from the body, not the
departure (of the pra;/as, &c.) from the embodied soul. —
Moreover, after the passage, ' Either through the eye or
through the skull or through other places of the body, him
thus departing the pr^7/a departs after, and after the de-
parting prawa all pra;/as depart,' &c., has at length described
the departure and transmigration of the soul as belonging
to him who does not know, and after the account of him
^ I. e. its belonging to the same chapter and treating of the same
subject.
"^ The two being viewed as non-different, the pronoun (tasmat),
which properly denotes the soul, the person, may be used to denote
the body. — Abhedopa^are?^ dehadehinor dehiparamarjina sarva-
namna deha eva paramrzsh/a iti. Bha.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 4. 375
who does not know has been concluded with the words,
' So much for the man who has desires,' the text designates
him who knows as ' he who has no desires ; ' a designation
which would be altogether inappropriate if the text wanted
to establish departure, &c., for that person also. The
passage therefore has to be explained as denying of him
who knows the going and departing which are established
for him who does not know. For thus only the designation
employed by the text has a sense. — And for him who
knowing Brahman has become the Self of that omnipresent
Brahman, and in whom all desires and works have become
extinct, departing and going are not even possible, as
there is not any occasion for them. And such texts as
'there he reaches Brahman ' [Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7) indicate the
absence of all going and departing.
14. And Sm/'/ti also says that.
In the Mah^bharata also it is said that those who know
do not go or depart, ' He who has become the Self of all
beings and has a complete intuition of all, at his way the
gods themselves are perplexed, seeking for the path of him
who has no path.'— But, an objection is raised, other
passages speak of men knowing Brahman as going, so e.g.
' 6"uka the son of Vyasa being desirous of release travelled
to the sphere of the sun ; being called by his father who
had followed him, he gave an answering shout.' — That
passage, we reply, describes (not the effects of the highest
knowledge but only) how an embodied person, through the
power of Yoga (which is of the nature of the lower know-
ledge), reached some special place and freed himself from the
body. This appears from it being mentioned that he was
seen by all beings ; for the beings could not see a person
moving without a body. The conclusion of the story
makes all this clear, ' ^uka having moved through the
air more rapidly than wind, and having shown his power,
was known by all beings.' — It thus follows that he who
knows Brahman neither moves nor departs. To what
sphere the scriptural texts about going and so on refer we
shall explain later on.
376 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
15. Those (elements, &c.) (are merged) in the
highest Brahman ; for thus (scripture) says.
Those, i. e. the sense organs — denoted by the term ' pra;za'
— and the elements of him who knows the highest Brahman,
are merged in that same highest Brahman. — Why ? —
Because scripture declares that ' Thus these sixteen parts
of the spectator that go towards the person, when they
have reached the person, sink into him ' (Pr. Up. VI, 5). —
But another text which refers to him who knows teaches
that the parts also are merged in something different from
the highest Self, ' The fifteen parts enter into their elements'
(Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 7).— No, we reply. This latter passage is
concerned with the ordinary view of the matter, according
to which the parts of the body which consist of earth and
so on are merged in their causal substances, earth and so
on. The former passage, on the other hand, expresses the
view of him who knows ; according to which the whole
aggregate of the parts of him who knows the highest
Brahman is merged in Brahman only. — There is thus no
contradiction.
16. (There is absolute) non-division (from Brah-
man, of the parts merged in it) ; according to
scriptural declaration.
When the parts of him who knows are merged in
Brahman, is there a remainder (which is not so merged),
as in the case of other men ; or is there no such remainder?
As the merging of him also who knows falls under the
general heading of merging, it might be assumed that of
him also there remains a potential body, and the Sutra-
kara therefore teaches expressly that the elements, &c., of
him who knows enter into the relation of (absolute) non-
division from Brahman. — On what ground? — Because
scripture declares this. For after having taught the
dissolution of the parts, the text continues, ' Their name
and form are broken, and people speak of the person only ;
and he becomes without parts and immortal' (Pr. Up. VI,
5). And when parts that are due to nescience are dissolved
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7. 377
through knowledge it is not possible that a remainder
should be left. The parts therefore enter into absolute
non-division from Brahman.
1 7. (There takes place) a lighting up of the point
of its (the soul's) abode (viz. the heart) ; the door
(of its egress) being illuminated thereby ; owing to
the power of knowledge and the application of
meditation to the way which is part of that (know-
ledge) ; (the soul) favoured by him in the heart
(viz. Brahman) (passes upwards) by the one that
exceeds a hundred (i. e. by the hundred and first
vein).
Having absolved the inquiry into a point of the higher
knowledge into which we were led by a special occasion,
we now continue the discussion connected with the lower
knowledge. — It has been stated that up to the beginning
of the way the departure of him who knows and him who
does not know is the same. The present Sutra now
describes the soul's entering on the way. The abode of
the soul, when — having taken within itself speech and the
other powers — it is about to depart, is the heart, according
to the text, ' He taking with him those elements of light
descends into the heart' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 1). Of the heart
the point becomes lighted up, 'and subsequent to that is
the departure of the soul, starting from the eye or some
other place, according to the passage, ' The point of his
heart becomes lighted up, and by that light the Self
departs, either through the eye or through the skull or
through other places of the body' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 2).
The question here arises whether that departure is the
same for him who knows and him who does not know, or
if there is a special limitation in the case of the former ;
and the prima facie view might be upheld that there is
no such limitation since scripture records no difference.
Against this the teacher states that although, equally for
him who does know and him who does not know, the point
of the heart becomes shining and the door of egress thereby
378 VEDAXTA-SUTRAS.
is lighted up, yet he who knows departs through the skull
only, while the others depart from other places. — Why so?
— ' On account of the power of knowledge.' If also he who
knows departed, like all others, from any place of the body,
he would be unable to reach an exalted sphere ; and then
all knowledge would be purportless. 'And on account of
the application of meditation on the way forming a part of
that.' That means : in different vidyas there is enjoined
meditation on the soul's travelling on the way connected
with the vein that passes through the skull ; — which way
forms a part of those vid}-as. Now it is proper to conclude
that he who meditates on that way should after death
proceed on it^. Hence he who knows, being favoured by
Brahman abiding in the heart on which he had meditated,
and thus becoming like it in nature departs by the vein
which passes through the skull and ' exceeds the hundred,'
i. e. is the hundred and first. The souls of other men pass
out by other veins. For thus scripture says, in a chapter
treating of the knowledge of Brahman dwelling in the
heart, ' There are a hundred and one veins of the heart ;
one of them penetrates the crown of the head ; by that
moving upwards a riian reaches immortality ; the others
serve for departing in different directions ' (A"//. Up. VIII,
6,5)-
18. (The soul after having passed forth from the
body) follows the rays.
There is the vidya of him within the heart, which begins,
' There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the
small lotus, and in it that small ether'' {Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1).
A subsequent section of that chapter — beginning with the
words, ' Now these veins of the heart ' — describes at length
the connexion of the veins and the rays, and the text then
continues, ' When he departs from this body, he departs
upwards by those very rays,' and further on, ' By that
^ For otherwise the meditation enjoined would be ' adnsh/artha '
only ; an alternative not to be admitted anywhere as long as a
' seen ' purpose can be demonstrated.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I Q. 379
moving upwards he reaches immortality.' From this we
understand that the soul passing out by the hundred and
first vein follows the rays. — A doubt here arises as to
whether the soul of him who dies by night as well as of
him who dies by day follows the rays, or the soul of the
latter only. — Since scripture mentions no difference, the
Sutra teaches that the souls follow the rays in both cases.
19. (Should it be said that the soul does) not
(follow, the rays) by night ; (we reply) not so,
because the connexion (of veins and rays) exists
as long as the body ; and (scripture) also declares
this.
It might perhaps be said that the veins and rays are
connected during the day, so that the soul of a person who
dies during the day may follow those rays ; but not the soul
of one who dies by night when the connexion of the veins
and rays is broken. — But this is a mistaken assumption,
because the connexion of rays and veins lasts as long as
the body exists. This scripture also declares, ' They (the
rays) stretch out from yonder sun and slip into these veins ;
they stretch from these veins and slip into yonder sun '
{KJi. Up. VIII, 6, 2). We moreover observe that the rays
of the sun continue to exist in the nights of the summer
season ; for we feel their warmth and other effects. During
the nights of the other seasons they are difficult to perceive
because then few only continue to exist; just as during
the cloudy days of the cold season. — This the following
scriptural passage also shows, ' Day he makes in the night.'
— If, moreover, he who dies at night mounted upwards
without following the rays, the following of the rays would
be generally meaningless. For the text gives no special
direction to the effect that he who dies by day mounts
upwards by means of the rays, while he who dies by night
mounts without them. — Should, on the other hand, even
he who knows be prevented from mounting upwards, by
the mere mischance of dying by night, knowledge would
in that case produce its fruit eventually only, and the
consequence would be that— as the time of death is not
380 VEDANTA-SIjTRAS.
fixed — nobody would apply himself to knowledge. — If,
again, a man dying at night should wait for the dawn (to
mount upwards), it might happen that, owing to the action
of the funeral fire, &c., his body would, at the time of
daybreak, not be capable of entering into connexion with
the rays. Scripture moreover expressly says that he does
not wait, ' As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to
the sun ' {I\]i. Up. VIII, 6, 5). — For all these reasons the
soul follows the ra}'s by night as well as by day.
20. And for the same reason (the departed soul
follows the rays) also during the southern progress
of the sun.
For the same reason, viz. because waiting is impossible,
and because the fruit of knowledge is not a merely eventual
one, and because the time of death is not fixed, also that
possessor of true knowledge who dies during the southern
progress of the sun obtains the fruit of his knowledge.
Because dying during the northern progress of the sun is
more excellent, and because Bhishma is known to have
waited for that period, and because scripture says, ' From
the light half of the month (they go) to the six months
when the sun goes to the north,' it might be thought that
the northern progress of the sun is needful for dying.
This notion the Sutra refutes. The greater excellence of
the sun's northern progress applies to those only who do
not possess the highest knowledge. — Bhishma's waiting for
the sun's northern progress was due to his wish of upholding
good customs and of showing that by the favour of his
father he could choose the time of his death. — And the
sense of the scriptural passage quoted will be explained
under IV, 3, 4. — But we have the following Smr/ti-text,
' At w^hat times the Yogins depart either not to return or
to return, those times I will declare to thee' (Bha. Gita VIII,
23), which determines specially that to die by day and so
on causes the soul not to return. How then can he who
dies by night or during the sun's southern progress depart
not to return ? Concerning this point the next Sutra
remarks :
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 1. 38 1
2 1. (These details) are recorded by Smrz'ti with
reference to the Yogins ; and both (Sahkhya and
Yoga) are Smrz'ti (only).
The rules as to dying by day and so on in order not to
return are given by Smrzti for the Yogins only. And
those two, viz. Yoga and Sankhya are mere Smn'ti, not of
scriptural character. As thus it has a different sphere of
application and is based on a special kind of authority, the
Smrz'ti rule as to the time of dying has no influence on
knowledge based on scripture. — But, an objection is raised,
we have such passages as the following one, ' Fire,
light, the day, the light half of the month, the six months
of the northern progress ; smoke, night, the dark half of
the month, the six months of the southern progress ' (Bha.
Gita VIII, 24; 25) ; in which though belonging to Smrzti
we recognise the path of the gods and the path of the
fathers just as determined by scripture! — Our refutation,
we reply, of the claims of Smriti applies only to the
contradiction which may arise from the teaching of Sm/'/ti
regarding the legitimate time of dying. ' I will tell you the
time,' &c. In so far as Smrzti also mentions Agni and the
other divinities which lead on the departed soul, there is no
contradiction whatever.
382 VEDAXTA-StJTRAS.
THIRD PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
T. On the road beginning with Hght (the departed
soul proceeds), on account of that being widely
known.
It has been explained that up to the beginning of the
way, the departure is the same. About the way itself,
however, different texts make different declarations. One
passage describes it as constituted by the junction of the
veins and rays, 'Then he mounts upwards by just those rays'
{Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5), Another passage describes it as
beginning with light, ' They go to the light, from light to
day' {KJi. Up. V, 10, i). Another way is described, Kau.
Up. I, 3, 'Having reached the path of the gods, he comes to
the world of Agni.' Another, Brz. Up. V, 10, i, 'When
the person goes away from this world, he comes to the
wind.' Another again, INIu. Up. I, 2, 11, 'Free from passions
they depart through the gate of the sun.' A doubt here
arises whether these ways are different from each other,
or whether there is only one road of which the different
texts mention different particulars. — The purvapakshin
embraces the former alternative, for the reason that those
roads are referred to in different chapters and form parts
of different meditations. If, moreover, we regarded the
statements about light and so on, the emphatical assertion^
made in the first of the passages quoted above would be
contradicted ; and the statement about the quickness of
mounting, ' As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes
to the sun,' would also be interfered with. We therefore
conclude that the roads described are different roads.
To this we reply, ' On the road beginning with light ; '
^ The emphasis Hes in the word ' eva,' i.e. 'just' or 'only,'
which seems to exclude any stages of the way but those rays.
IV ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, I. 38
J"-0
i.e. we maintain that every one who desires to reach
Brahman moves on the road beginning with light. — Why
so ? — ' On account of its being widely known.' That road
is known to all who possess knowledge. Thus the chapter
of the vidya of the five fires (' And those also who in the
forest meditate on the True as faith,' &c., Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15)
expressly states that the road beginning with the light
belongs to those also who practise other meditations. —
That road, an objection is raised, may present itself to the
mind in the case of those meditations which do not mention
any road of their own ; but why should it be accepted for
such meditations as mention different roads of their own ?
— This objection would be valid, we reply, if the various
roads mentioned were entirely different ; but as a matter
of fact there is only one road leading to the world of
Brahman and possessing different attributes ; and this road
is designated in one place by one attribute and in another
place by another attribute. For this relation of attributes
and what possesses attributes is established by the circum-
stance that we recognise, in all the passages quoted, some
part of the road^. And if the chapters which mention the
roads are different, we, as long as the meditation is one,
have to combine the dift'erent attributes of the road (men-
tioned separately in the different chapters), in the same way
as (in general) the different particulars of one meditation
(which are stated in different chapters) have to be combined.
And even if the meditations (in which the particulars of the
road are mentioned) are different, the road must be viewed
as one and the same, because we recognise everywhere
some part of the road and because the goal is everywhere
the same. For all the following passages declare one and
the same result, viz. the obtainment of the world of Brahman:
' In these worlds of Brahman they dwell for ever and ever '
(Br/. Up. VI; 2, 15) ; 'There he dwells eternal years' (Br/.
^ Each passage mentions at least one of the stages of the road
leading to the world of Brahman, and we thus conclude that the
same road — of which the stations are the attributes — is meant
everywhere.
384 vedanta-sOtras.
Up. V, 10, i); 'Whatever victory, whatever greatness
belongs to Brahman, that victory he gives, that greatness
he reaches ' (Kau. Up. 1,2); ' Those who find the world of
Brahman by Brahma/^arya ' {KJi. Up. VIII, 4, 3). — To the
remark that the emphatical assertion (made in the passage,
'Just by those rays,' &c.) would be contradicted by our
admitting light and so on as stages of the road, we reply
that no such difficulty exists, because that passage aims
only at establishing the rays (as part of the road). For the
one word 'just' cannot at the same time establish the rays
and discard light and so on. The passage therefore must
be understood as only emphasising the connexion with the
rays. — Nor does the regard paid by us to the statements
about light and so on being stages of the way contradict
what one passage says about speed ; for that passage means
to say that one goes (to the world of Brahman) more
quickly than anywhere else, so that its sense is, ' In the
twinkling of an eye one goes there ^.' — Moreover the passage,
'On neither of these two ways' {^KJi. Up. V, 10, 8) — in
teaching that there is a third inferior road for those who have
missed the other two roads — shows that besides the road of
the fathers there is only one further road, viz. the road of the
gods, of which light and so on are stages. The text about
light and so on mentioning a greater number of stages
while other texts mention a smaller number, it stands to
reason that the less numerous should be explained in
conformity with the more numerous. For this reason also
the Sutra says, 'On the road beginning with light, on account
of its being widely known.'
2. From the year to Vayu ; on account of the
absence and presence of specification.
But by what special combination can we establish between
^ Read in the text — tvarava-^anara tv ar,('iradyapekshayam api
gantavyantarapekshaja kshaipryartha°. — Anandagiri comments —
tvareti, arX'iradimargasyaikye^pi kutaj/^id anyato gantavyad aneno-
payena satyalokaz?^ gz.t iti ga^/^/^antid gantavyabhedapekslia} a
va-^ana/w yuktam ity artha^.
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2. 385
the different attributes of the road the relation of what is
determined by attributes and of determining attributes? The
teacher out of kindness to us connects them as follows. —
The Kaushitakins describe the road of the gods as follows,
' Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the
world of Agni, to the world of Vayu, to the world of
Varuwa, to the world of Indra, to the world of Pra^^pati,
to the world of Brahman' (Kau. Up. I, 3). Now the world
of Agni means the same as light, since both terms denote
burning, and we therefore need not, with regard to them,
search for the order in which they are to be combined.
Vayu, on the other hand, is not mentioned in the road
beginning with light ; in what place then is he to be
inserted? — We read, Kh. Up. V, 10, i, 'They go to the
light, from light to day, from day to the waxing half of
the moon, from the waxing half of the moon to the six
months when the sun goes to the north, from those months
to the year, from the year to Aditya.' Here they reach
Vayu after the year and before Aditya. — Why so ? — ' On
account of the absence and presence of specification.' About
Vayu — concerning whom the passage, ' He goes to the
world of Vayu,' contains no specification — another passage
does state such a specification, viz. Br/. Up. V, 10, i, 'When
the person goes away from this world he comes to Vayu.
Then Vayu makes room for him like the hole of a wheel,
and through it he mounts higher, he comes to Aditya.'
On account of this specification which shows Vayu to come
before Aditya, Vayu must be inserted between the year
and Aditya. — But as there is a specification showing that
Vayu comes after Agni, why is he not inserted after the
light? — There is no such specification, we reply. — But
a scriptural passage has been quoted which runs as follows,
' Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the
world of Agni, to the world of Vayu.' — In that passage,
we reply, we have only two clauses, of which the text
exhibits one before the other, but there is no word express-
ing order of succession. We have there only a simple
statement of facts, ' He goes to this and to that.' But in
the other text we perceive a regular order of succession ;
[38] c c
7,86 vedanta-sCtras.
for it intimates that after having mounted on high through
an opening as large as the wheel of a chariot, granted by
Vayu, he approaches the sun. The Sutra therefore rightly
says, ' On account of the absence and presence of specifica-
tion.'— The V^^asaneyins in their text record that he
proceeds ' from the months to the world of the gods, from
the world of the gods to the sun' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15}.
Here, in order to maintain the immediate succession of
Vayu and Aditya, we must suppose the souls to go from
the world of the gods to Vayu. What the Sutra says
about the soul going to Vayu from the year has reference
to the text of the K/rkndogya.. As between the Va^asane-
yaka and the K/ia.ndogya, the world of the gods is absent
from one, the year from the other. As both texts are
authoritative, both stages have to be inserted in each, and
the distinction has to be made that, owing to its connexion
with the months, the year has the first place (i.e. after the
months and before the world of the gods), and the world of
the gods the second place.
3. Beyond lightning (there is) Varu;^a, on account
of the connexion (of the two).
The K/i^ndogya continues, ' From Aditya to the moon,
from the moon to lightning.' Here Varu;/a (mentioned in
the Kaushitaki-upan.) has to be brought in so that above
that lightning he goes to the world of Varu;/a. For there
is a connexion between lightning and Varu«a ; the broad
lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds with the
sound of deep thunder, and then water falls down. And
a Brahma//a also says, 'It lightens, it thunders, it will rain'
(K/i. Up. VII, II, 1). But the lord of all water is Varu;/a,
as known from 6"ruti and Smrz'ti. — And above Varu/za
there come Indra and Pra^apati, as there is no other place
for them, and according to the force of the text, as it stands.
Varu«a and so on should be inserted at the end, for that
reason also that they are merely additional, no particular
place being assigned to them. And lightning is the end of
the road beginning with light ^.
' So that Varu«a and so on are to be placed after lightning.
i
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4. 387
4. (They are) conductors, this being indicated.
With regard to those beginning with Hght a doubt arises
whether they are marks of the road, or places of enjoyment,
or leaders of the travelling souls. — The first possible view
of the question is that light and so on are marks of the
road, because the instruction has that character. For as in
ordinary life a man wishing to go to a village or a towai is
told, ' Go from here to that hill, from there to a fig-tree,
from that to a river, from that to a village ; after that you
will reach the town;' so here the text also says, 'from light
to day, from day to the waxing half of the month/ &c. —
Or else light and so on may be viewed as places of enjoy-
ment. For the text connects Agni and so on with the
word 'world'; ' He comes to the world of Agni,' &c. Now
the term ' world ' is used to denote places of enjoyment of
living beings, as when we say, ' The world of men ; the
world of the Fathers ; the world of the gods.' A Brahma;/a
passage also says, ' They remain attached to the worlds
which consist of day and night ' (Sa.t. Bra. X, 2, 6, 8).
Therefore light and the rest are not conductors. Moreover,
they cannot be conductors because they are without intelli-
gence. For in ordinary life intelligent men only are
appointed by the king to conduct travellers over difficult
roads.
To all this we reply as follows. They must be con-
ductors, because the text indicates this. For we read,
' From the moon to the lightning ; there a person that is
not a man leads them to Brahman ; ' which shows their
conductorship to be something settled. Should it be
objected that this last sentence exhausts itself in conveying
its own purport ^ ; we say No ; for the attribute (' that is
not a man ') has only the meaning of excluding his
previously established humanity. Only if in the case of
the light and the rest personal conductors are settled, and
those of human nature, it is appropriate to use the attribute
^ And has not the additional power of indicating, i. e. enabling
us to infer that also the beings previously mentioned are ' leaders '
of the soul.
C C 2
o
SS VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
' amanava,' to the end of excluding this (previously estab-
Hshed) humanity^.
But mere indication has no force, as there is nothing
to prove (that there must be such personal conductors). —
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
5. (There are personal conductors) because that
is established on the ground of both (i. e. road and
travellers) being bewildered (i. e. unconscious).
As, owing to their separation from a body, the organs of
those who go on the road beginning with light are wrapped
up, they are incapable of ruling themselves ; and the light
&c., as they are without intelligence, are equally incapable.
Hence it follows that the particular intelligent deities who
represent light and the rest are appointed to the conductor-
ship. For in ordinary life also drunken or senseless people
whose sense-organs are wrapped up follow a road as com-
manded by others. — Again light and the rest cannot be
taken for marks of the road because they are not always
present. A man who dies in the night cannot come to day
in its true (physical) nature ; and he cannot wait (for the
break of day), as we have already explained above (IV, 2,
19). But this objection does not apply to gods who are
permanent. And gods may be called light and so on,
because they represent light and so on. Nor is the ex-
pression, ' From light to day,' &c. objectionable, even if we
adopt the sense of conductorship ; for it means, through
the light as cause they come to the day ; through the day
as cause, to the waxing half of the moon. And such
instruction is seen also in the case of conductors known in
ordinary life, for they say, Go hence to Balavarman, thence
(i.e. Balavarman conducting you) to 6^ayasiwha, thence to
^ Why should it be specially slated tijat this last ' conducdng
person ' is amanava .-* Only, because it is a settled matter that the
previously mentioned beings are also ' conducting persons,' and at
the same time ' manava.' The last clause therefore does not only
directly teach that a person conducts the souls to Brahman, but at
the same time ' indicates ' that the beings mentioned before in
connexion with the road are also ' personal conductors.'
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. 389
Krzsh;/agupta. Moreover, in the beginning where the text
says that they go to the light, a relation in general only
is expressed, not a special relation ; at the end, however,
where it is said he leads them to Brahman, a special
relation is expressed, viz. that between conducted and
conductor. Therefore this is accepted for the beginning
also. — And as the organs of the wandering souls are wrapped
up together there is no possibility of their enjoying any-
thing. Although, however, the wanderers do not enjoy
anything, the word 'world' may be explained on the
ground that those worlds are places of enjoyment for other
beings dwelling there. — The conclusion therefore is that
he who has reached the world of Agni is led on by Agni,
and he who has reached the world ruled by Vayu, by Vayu.
But how, if we adopt the view of conductorship, can this
apply to Varu;/a and the rest ? Varu;/a and the rest were
inserted above the lightning ; but scripture states that
after the lightning until Brahman is reached a person leads
who is not a man. — To this doubt the next Siitra replies.
6. From thence (the souls are led) by him only
who belongs to the lightning ; the sacred text
stating that.
From thence, i. e. after they have come to the lightning
they go to the world of Brahman, being led through the
worlds of Varu;/a and the rest by the person, not a man,
who follows immediately after the lightning. For that
that person leads them is stated in the following passage,
' When they have reached the place of lightning a person,
not a man, leads them to the world of Brahman' (Br/.
Up. VI, 2, 15). Varu//a and the rest, we must understand,
favour them either by not hindering or somehow assisting
them.— Therefore it is well said that light and so on are
the gods who act as conductors.
7. To the effected (Brahman) (the souls are led) ;
(thus opines) Badari ; because going to him is
possible.
With regard to the passage, ' He leads them to Brahman,'
390 VEDAXTA-SUTRAS.
the doubt arises whether that person leads the souls to the
effected, lower, Brahman, or to the highest, non-modified,
chief Brahman. — Whence the doubt ? — Because the (am-
biguous) word Brahman is used, and because scripture
speaks of going. — The opinion of the teacher Badari is that
the person, who is not a man, leads them to the lower,
qualified, effected Brahman : because it is possible to go to
that. For the effected Brahman which occupies a definite
place can be the goal of a journey. With the highest
Brahman, on the other hand, we cannot connect the ideas
of one who goes, or object of going, or act of going ; for
that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner Self
of all.
8. And on account of (the Brahman to which the
souls are led) being qualified (in another passage).
That the soul's going has for its object the effected
Brahman, we conclude from another scriptural passage
also which qualifies Brahman in a certain way, ' He leads
them to the worlds of Brahman ; in these worlds of Brahman
they live for ever and ever' (Br/. Up. VI, 2, 15). For it
would be impossible to qualify the highest Brahman by
means of the plural number (• worlds J ; while the plural
number may be applied to the lower Brahman which may
abide in different conditions. — The term ' world ' also can
directly denote only some place of enjoyment falling
within the sphere of effects and possessing the quality of
being entered into, while it must be understood in a meta-
phorical sense in passages ^ such as ' Brahman is that
world ' (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 23). — And also what the text
says concerning an abode and some one abiding within
it (-in these worlds of Brahman,' &c.), cannot be directly
understood of the highest Brahman. — For all these reasons
the leading of the souls has the lower Brahman for
its goal.
But even on this interpretation the word ' Brahman ' is
inappropriate, as it has been proved that Brahman is the
' Where ihe term 'world' is applied to the highest Brahman.
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, lO. 39 1
cause of the origination and so on of the entire world. —
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
9. But on account of its proximity (to the higher
Brahman) there is designation (of the lower Brahman)
as that.
The word 'but' indicates the setting aside of the doubt. —
As the lower Brahman is in proximity to the higher one,
there is nothing unreasonable in the word ' Brahman' being
applied to the former also. For when the higher Brahman
is, for the purposes of pious meditation, described as
possessing certain effected qualities — such as consisting of
mind and the rest — which qualities depend on its connexion
with certain pure limiting adjuncts ; then it is what we call
the lower Brahman. — But with the assumption of the lower
Brahman there does not agree what scripture says about
the souls not returning ; for there is no permanence any-
where apart from the highest Brahman. And scripture
declares that those who have set out on the road of the
gods do not return, ' They who proceed on that path do not
return to the life of man ' [KJi. Up. IV, 15, 6) ; ' For them
there is no return here ' (B;-/. Up. VI, 2, 15) ; ' Moving
upwards by that a man reaches immortality' [KJi. Up.
VIII. 6, 5).
To this objection we make the following reply.
10. On the passing away of the effected (world of
Brahman) (the souls go) together with the ruler of
that (world) to what is higher than that ; on account
of scriptural declaration.
When the reabsorption of the effected Brahman world
draws near, the souls in which meanwhile perfect knowledge
has sprung up proceed, together with Hira;/yagarbha the
ruler of that world, to 'what is higher than that/ i.e. to the
pure highest place of Vish;m. This is the release by
successive steps which we have to accept on the basis of
the scriptural declarations about the non-return of the
souls. For we have shown that the Highest cannot be
directly reached by the act of going.
;92 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
11. And on account of Smr/ti.
Smrz'ti also agrees with this view ; cp. the following
passage, ' When the pralaya has come and the end of the
highest (i.e. Hirawyagarbha), then they all, together with
Brahman, with purified minds enter the highest place.' —
The final conclusion (siddhanta) therefore is that the going
of the souls, of which scripture speaks, has for its goal the
effected Brahman. — But what is the prima facie view, with
regard to which this final conclusion has been established
in Sutras 7-11 ? — This required prima facie view is now set
forth in the following Sutras.
12. To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led) ;
6^aimini (opines) ; owing to this being the principal
sense (of the word ' Brahman ').
The teacher Caimini is of opinion that the passage,
' He leads them to Brahman,' refers to the highest
Brahman. For the highest Brahman constitutes the prin-
cipal, primary sense, of the word ' Brahman,' which denotes
the lower Brahman only in a secondary, metaphorical way.
And where both senses are possible, the primary sense has
to be preferred.
1 3. And because scripture declares that.
The text, 'Going upwards by that he reaches immortality,'
declares that immortality is reached by going. But im-
mortality is possible only in the highest Brahman, not in
the effected one, because the latter is transitory. So
scripture says, ' Where one sees something else, that is
little, that is mortal' (AV/. Up. VII, 24, i). According to
the text of the Ka//^a-upanishad also the going of the soul
is towards the highest Brahman ; for after the highest
Brahman has been introduced there as general subject-
matter — in the passage, ' That which thou seest,' Slc, I, 2,
14, no other kind of knowledge is taken up later on.
14. And the intention of entering (can) not (be
referred) to the effected (Brahman).
Moreover the intention of entering into which is expressed
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. 393
in the passage, ' I enter the hall of Pra^apati, the house '
{Kh. Up. VIII, 14, i), cannot have the lower Brahman for
its object. For the immediately preceding passage, ' That
within which these forms and names are contained is the
Brahman/ shows that the highest Brahman, different in
nature from the effected one, is the general subject-matter ;
and the subsequent passage, 'I am the glory of the
Brahmans,' represents the soul as the Self of all ; it being
known from another scriptural passage that ' Glory ' is
a name of the highest Brahman, 'There is no likeness of
him whose name is great glory' (Va^. Sa;/^h. XXXIl, 3).
And in the vidya of Brahman within the heart it is said of
this same entering the house that it is preceded by going \
' There is the city of Brahman Apara^ita, and the golden
hall built by Prabhu ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 3). And that
the performing of a journey is intended follows also from
the use of the verb ' pad,' which denotes going (prapadye,
I enter). — The other (prima facie) view therefore is that all
the passages about the soul's going refer to the highest
Brahman.
These two views have been embodied by the teacher in
the Sutras ; one in the Sutras 7-1 1, the other in the Sutras
12-14. Now the arguments contained in the former set
are capable of proving the fallaciousness of the arguments
in the latter set, but not vice versa ; from which it follows
that the former set states the final view and the latter
set the prima facie view only. — For nobody can compel
us to accept the primary sense of a word (such as Brahman)
even where it is impossible to do so. — And although met
with in a chapter that treats of the highest knowledge, the
reference to the going to Brahman — which belongs to
another kind of knowledge — may be explained as aiming
merely at the glorification of the highest knowledge (not at
teaching that the going to Brahman is the result of higher
^ I am not quite sure which passage in the daharavidya is
supposed to prove that the entering of Brahman's house is preceded
by going. Probably VIII, 6, 5, ' He departs upwards ; he is going
to the sun.'
;94 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
knowledge). — And with reference to the passage, ' I enter
the hall of Pra^apati, the house,' there is no reason why we
should not separate that passage from what precedes and
refer the intention of entering to the effected Brahman.
And the qualified Brahman also may be spoken of as being
the Self of all, as shown by other passages such as ' He
to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. {Kh. Up. Ill,
14, 2). The texts about the going therefore all belong to
the lower knowledge. — Others again, in accordance with
the general principle that the earlier Sutras set forth the
prima facie view, while the later ones contain the siddhanta
view, maintain that the passages about the soul's going fall
within the sphere of the higher knowledge. But this is
impossible, because nothing may go to the highest Brahman.
■ Omnipresent and eternal like the ether;' 'The Brahman
which is visible, not invisible, the Self that is within all '
(BW. Up. Ill, 4, i); 'Self only is all this' {Kh. Up. VII,
25, 2) ; ' Brahman only is all this, it is the best ' (Mu. Up.
II, 2, 11): from all these passages we ascertain that the
highest Brahman is present everywhere, within everything,
the Self of everything, and of such a Brahman it is altogether
impossible that it ever should be the goal of going. For
we do not go to what is already reached ; ordinary ex-
perience rather tells us that a person goes to something
different from him. — But we observ^e in ordinary experience
also that something already reached may become an object
of going, in so far as qualified by a different place ; a man
living on the earth, e. g. goes to the earth, in so far as he
goes to another place on the earth. In the same way we
see that a child reaches the adult state which in reality
belongs to the child's identical Self, but is qualified by
a difference of time. Analogously Brahman also may be
an object of going in so far as it is possessed of all kinds
of powers. — This may not be, we reply, because scripture
expressly negatives Brahman's possessing any distinctive
qualities. — ' Without parts, without actions, tranquil, without
fault, without taint' (wSvet. Up. VI, 19); 'Neither coarse
nor fincj neither short nor long' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8) ; ' He
who is without and within, unproduced ' (Mu. Up. II, 1,2);
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. 395
' This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal,
fearless^ is indeed Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; 'He is to
be described by No, no!' (Brz. Up. Ill, 9, 26); from all
these scriptural texts, as well as from Smr/ti and reasoning,
it follows that the highest Self cannot be assumed to possess
any differences depending on time or space or anything
else, and cannot therefore become the object of going.
The cases of places on the earth and of the different ages
of man are by no means analogous ; for they are affected
by differences of locality and so on, and therefore can be
gone to or reached. — Nor will it avail our opponent to say
that Brahman possesses manifold powers, because scripture
declares it to be the cause of the world's origination,
sustentation, and final retractation ; for those passages
which deny difference have no other sense (but just the
absolute denial of all difference). — But in the same way
also those passages which state the origination and so on
of the world have no other sense ! (i. e. cannot be under-
stood to teach anything but just the origination and so on
of the world). — This is not so, we reply ; for what they
aim at teaching is the absolute oneness of Brahman. For
texts which by means of the simile of the lump of clay,
&c., teach that only that which is, viz. Brahman, is true,
while everything effected is untrue, cannot aim at teaching
the origination, &c. of the world. — But why should the
passages about the origination, &c. of the world be sub-
ordinate to those which deny all difference, and not vice
versa ? — Because, we reply, the texts which negative all
difference effect the cessation of all desire. For when the
absolute oneness, permanence, and purity of the Self have
once been apprehended, w^e cognize that the highest aim
of man has been attained, and therefore conceive no further
desires. Compare the following texts : ' What trouble, what
sorrow can there be to him who beholds that unity ?' (Ij-a-up.
7); 'Thou hast reached fearlessness, O 6'anaka ' (Brz. Up.IV,
2, 4) ; ' He who knows does not fear anything; he does not
distress himself with the thought. Why did I not do what is
good ? Why did I do what is bad ? ' (Taitt. Up. II, 9.) This
also follows from our observing- that those who know realise
396 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
contentment of mind ; and from the fact that scripture
blames the false notion of (the reaHty of) effects, 'From
death to death goes he who sees here any difference '
(Ka. Up. II, 4, lo). The texts negativing all difference
cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other
texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the
origination of the world and so on have no similar power
of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire.
At the same time it is manifest that they have another
(than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having
said at first, ' Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot
be without a root' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end
that Being which is the root of the world is the only
object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. Ill, i, ' That from
which these beings are born, that by which when born they
live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know
that ; that is Brahman." As thus the passages about
origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self,
Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers,
and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going. —
And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text
Br?'. Up. IV, 4, 6 (' Of him the pra;zas do not depart ; being
Brahman he goes to Brahman '), denies any going to the
highest Brahman.
Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes,
i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to
which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from
Brahman ; for if the two were absolutely identical no going
could take place. — Well, what then ? — We reply as follows.
If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot
go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the
part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot
be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be
without parts. — The same objection lies against the hypo-
thesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman ; for also that
which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by
the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from
the clay which constitutes its Self; were it so apart it
would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to
IV ADIIYAYA, 5 PAD A, 1 4. 397
which the parts or the effects would belong, i. e. Brahman
is altogether unchanging, its entering into the Sawsara
state could not be accounted for. — Let then, in the third
place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case
it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some
intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go
anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be
permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation
extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for.
The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have
moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this
work (II, 3, 19 ff.). And from the soul's being different
from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such
texts as 'Thou art that' are futile. This latter objection
also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an
effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it
being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different
from the whole and the causal substance ; for that kind
of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense. — From
all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the
soul cannot obtain final release, because its Sawsara con-
dition could never come to an end. Or else, if that
condition should come to an end, it would follow that the
very essence of the soul perishes ; for those theories do not
admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self
of the soul.
Here now some come forward with the following con-
tention. Works of permanent obligation and works to be
performed on special occasions are undertaken to the end
that harm may not spring up ; such works as are due to
special desires, and such as are forbidden, are eschewed, in
order that neither the heavenly world nor hell may be
obtained, and those works whose fruits are to be enjoyed
in the current bodily existence are exhausted by just that
fruition. Hence, as after the death of the present body,
there is no cause for the origination of a new body, that
blessed isolation which consists in the soul's abiding within
its own nature will accomplish itself for a man acting in
the way described above, even without the cognition of his
398 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Self being identical with Brahman's Self. — All this is
inadmissible, we reply, because there is no proof of it.
For scripture nowhere teaches that he who desires release
should conduct himself in the way described. To say that
because the Sa;;/sara state depends on works, it will cease
when works are absent, is an altogether arbitrary style of
reasoning. And (whether arbitrary or not) this reasoning
falls to the ground, because the absence of the cause is
something that cannot be ascertained. It may be supposed
that each living being has, in its former states of existence,
accumulated many works which have part of them pleasant,
part of them unpleasant results. As these works are such
as to lead to contrary results, which cannot be enjoyed all
of them at the same time, some works whose opportunity
has come, build up the present state of existence ; others
sit inactive waiting for a place, a time, and operative causes
(favourable to them). As these latter works cannot thus
be exhausted in the present state of existence, we cannot
definitely assert, even in the case of a man who conducts
himself as described above, that at the end of his present
bodily existence all cause for a new bodily existence will
be absent. The existence of a remainder of works is,
moreover, established by scriptural and Smr/ti passages,
such as, ' Those whose conduct has been good ' {Kh. Up.
V, 10, 7); 'Then with the remainder.' — But may not,
an objection is raised, those remaining works be wiped
out (even in the present existence) by the performance of
works of permanent obligation and such works as are due
to special occasions? — This may not be, we reply, because
the two sets of works are not of contrary nature. Where
there is contrariety of nature, one thing may be wiped out
by another ; but good deeds performed in previous states
of existence, and works of permanent obligation and so on
(performed in the present life), are both of them equally
pure and therefore not of opposite nature. Bad works
indeed, as being of impure nature, are opposed to works
of permanent obligation, &c., and therefore may be extin-
guished by the latter. But even from this admission it
docs not follow that the causes for a new embodied existence
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4. 399
are altogether absent ; for those causes may be supplied by
good deeds, and we do not know that the evil works have
been extinguished without a remainder. Nor is there
anything to prove that the performance of works of per-
manent obligation, &c., leads only to the non-origination of
harm, and not at the same time to the origination of new
results (to be extinguished in future states of existence) ;
for it may happen that such new results spring up collater-
ally. Thus Apastamba says, 'When a mango tree is planted
for the sake of its fruits, it in addition gives shade and
fragrance ; thus additional advantages spring from the
performance of religious duty.' — Nor can anybody who has
not reached perfect knowledge promise to refrain altogether,
from birth to death, from all actions either forbidden or
aiming at the fulfilment of special wishes ; for we observe
that even the most perfect men commit faults, however
minute. This may be a matter of doubt ; all the same it
remains true that the absence of causes for a new existence
cannot be known with certainty. — If, further, the soul's
unity with Brahman's Self — which is to be realised through
knowledge — is not acknowledged, the soul whose essential
nature it is to be an agent and enjoyer cannot even desire
the state of blissful isolation ; for a being cannot divorce
itself from its true essence, not any more than fire can cease
to be hot. — But, an objection is raised, what is of disad-
vantage to the soul is the state of agentship and fruition in
so far as actually produced, not its mere potentiality.
Release of the soul may, therefore, take place if only that
actual condition is avoided while its potentiality remains.
— This also, we reply, is not true ; for as long as the
potentiality exists it will inevitably produce the actuality.
—But, our opponent resumes, potentiality alone, without
other co-operative causes, does not produce its effect ; as
long therefore as it is alone it cannot, though continuing
to exist, do any harm ! — This also, we reply, is not valid ;
for the co-operative causes also are, potentially, permanently
connected (with the acting and enjoying soul). If, therefore,
the soul whose essence is acting and enjoying is not
considered to possess fundamental identity with Brahman
400 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
— an identity to be realised by knowledge — there is not
any chance of its obtaining final release. Scripture, more-
over (in the passage, 'There is no other way to go,' Svet. Up.
III, 8), denies that there is any other way to release but
knowledge. — But if the soul is non-different from the highest
Brahman, all practical existence comes to an end, because
then perception and the other means of right knowledge
no longer act ! — Not so, we reply. Practical life will hold
its place even then, just as dreamlife holds its place up to
the moment of waking. Scripture, after having said that
perception and the rest are operative in the sphere of those
who have not reached true knowledge (' For where there is
duality, as it were, there one sees the other,' &c. ; Brt. Up.
IV, 5, 15), goes on to show that those means of knowledge
do not exist for those who possess that knowledge (' But
when the whole of him has become the Self, whereby
should he see another,' &c.). As thus for him who knows
the highest Brahman all cognition of something to be gone
to, &c. is sublated, his going cannot in any way be shown to
be possible.
To what sphere then belong the scriptural texts about
the soul's going? — To the sphere of qualified knowledge,
we reply. Accordingly the soul's going is mentioned in
the chapter treating of the knowledge of the five fires,
in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman's
couch, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Agni
Vai^vanara {K/i. Up. V, 3-10; Kau. Up. I; AV/. Up. V,
1 1-24). And where the soul's going is spoken of in
a chapter treating of Brahman— (as e.g. in the passages,
' He leads them to Brahman,' &c., K/i. Up. IV, 15, 6, in
a chapter treating of Brahman, as shown by ' Breath is
Brahman,' &c., IV, 10, 5; and 'He departs upward,' &c.,
K/i. Up. VIII, 6, 5, in the chapter beginning ' There is this
city of Brahman,' VIII, i, i) — such attributes as 'vamani,'
i.e. Leader of blessings {K/i. Up. IV, iS, 3), and 'satyakama,'
i.e. having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman
has to be meditated upon, and to that Brahman the soul
can go. No passage, on the other hand, speaks of the soul's
going to the highest Brahman ; while such going is specially
IV ADHVAVA, 3 PAD A, 1 4. 4OI
denied in the passage, ' Of him the pra//as do not depart.'
In passages, again, such as ' He who knows Brahman obtains
the Highest' (Taitt. Up. H, i), we indeed meet with the verb
'to reach/ which has the sense of going; but because, as
explained before, the reaching of another place is out of
question, ' reaching ' there denotes only the obtainment
(realisation) of one's own nature, in so far as (through true
knowledge) the expanse of names and forms which Nescience
superimposes (on Brahman) is dissolved. Such passages
are to be understood analogously to the text, ' Being
Brahman he enters into Brahman ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 6). —
Besides, if the going were understood as connected with
the highest Brahman, it could only subserve the purpose
either of satisfying (the mind of him who knows) or of
reflection. Now, a statement of the soul's going cannot
produce any satisfaction in him who knows Brahman, since
satisfaction is already fully accomplished through his perfect
condition, bestowed on him by knowledge, of which he is
immediately conscious. Nor, on the other hand, can it be
shown that reflection on the soul's going in any way
subserves knowledge, which is conscious of eternally perfect
blessedness, and has not for its fruit something to be
accomplished. — For all these reasons the soul's going falls
within the sphere of the lower knowledge. And only in
consequence of the distinction of the higher and lower
Brahman not being ascertained, statements about the soul's
going which apply to the lower Brahman are wrongly put
in connexion with the higher Brahman.
But are there really two Brahmans,a higher one and a lower
one? — Certainly there are two! For scripture declares this,
as e.g. in the passage, ' O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the
higher and also the lower Brahman ' (Pr. Up. V, 2). — What
then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower ? — Listen !
Where the texts, negativing all distinctions founded on name,
form, and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as that
which is not coarse and so on, the higher Brahman is spoken
of. Where, again, for the purpose of pious meditation, the
texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction
depending on name, form, and so on, using terms such as
[38] D d
402 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
' He who consists of mind, whose body is pra;^a, whose
shape is light' [Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2), that is the lower Brah-
man.— But is there not room here for the objection that
this distinction of a higher and a lower Brahman stultifies
the scriptural texts asserting aduality ? — Not so, we reply.
That objection is removed by the consideration that name
and form, the adjuncts (of the one real Brahman), are due to
Nescience. Passages such as 'If he desires the world of
the fathers ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 2, i), which the text exhibits in
proximity to a meditation on the lower Brahman, show that
the fruit of such meditation is lordship over the worlds ;
a fruit falling within the sphere of the Sawsara, Nescience
having not as yet been discarded. And as that fruit is
bound to a special locality, there is nothing contradictory
in the souls going there in order to reach it. That the soul,
although all-pervading, is viewed as going because it enters
into connexion with the buddhi and the rest of its adjuncts,
just as general space enters into connexion with jars and
the like, we have explained under II, 3, 29.
For all these reasons the view of Badari as set forth in
Sutra 7 is the final one; while Sutra 12, which states
Caimini's opinion, merely sets forth another view, to the
end of the illumination of the learner's understanding.
15. Those who do not take their stand on symbols
he leads, thus Badaraya;^a (opines); there being no
fault in the twofold relation (resulting from this
opinion) ; and the meditation on that (i. e. Brahman)
(is the reason of this twofold relation).
It is a settled conclusion that all going has reference
to the effected Brahman, not to the highest Brahman.
Another doubt now arises here. Does that person who is
not a man lead to the world of Brahman all those who take
their stand on the effected Brahman, without any difiference ;
or only some of them ?
The purvapakshin maintains that all those who possess
knowledge — provided that knowledge be not of the highest
Brahman — go to the world of Brahman. For in Sutra III,
I
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 6. 403
3, 31 that going was put in connexion with all the dif-
ferent vidyas (of the qualified Brahmans), without any
distinction.
To this the Sutrakara replies, ' Those who do not take
their stand on symbols.' That means : Excepting those
who take their stand on symbols (i. e. who meditate on
certain things as symbolically representing Brahman), that
person who is not a man leads all others who take their
stand (i. e. who meditate) on the effected Brahman, to the
world of Brahman ; this is the opinion of the teacher
Badaraya;^a. For in acknowledging in this way a twofold
relation there is no fault ; since the argumentation as to
the non-restriction of going (Sutra III, 3, 31) may be under-
stood as referring to all meditations with the exception of
those on symbols. The words, ' and the meditation on
that,' state the reason for this twofold relation. For he
whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship
like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation,
' In whatever form they meditate on him, that they
become themselves.' In the case of symbols, on the
other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the
symbol being the chief element in the meditation. — But
scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed
on Brahman go to it ; so in the knowledge of the five fires,
' He leads them to Brahman ' {Kh. Up. V, 10, 2). — This
may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration.
We only mean to say that where there is no such declar-
ation the general rule is that those only whose purpose is
Brahman go to it, not any others.
16. And scripture declares a difference (In the
case of meditations on symbols).
With reference to the meditations on symbols, such as
name and so on, scripture declares that each following
meditation has a different result from the preceding one,
' As far as name reaches he is lord and master : — speech is
greater than name ; — as far as speech reaches he is lord and
master ; — mind is greater than speech ' {Kh. Up. VII, i, ff.)-
D d 2
404 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Now this distinction of rewards is possible because the
meditations depend on symbols, while there could be no
such distinction if they depended on the one non-different
Brahman. — Hence those who take their stand on symbols
cannot have the same reward as others.
IV ADHVAVA, 4 PADA, I. 4O5
FOURTH pAdA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
I. (On the soul's) having entered (into the highest
light), there is manifestation (of its own nature); (as
we infer) from the word ' own.'
' Thus does that serene being, having risen out of this
body and entered into the highest hght. manifest itself by-
its own nature' [KJi. Up. VII, 12, 3). Regarding this text
a doubt arises whether the Self ^ manifests itself through
some adventitious distinction — as the Self (of him who
possesses the lower knowledge only) does in the world of
the gods and other abodes of enjoyment— or only through
its own Self — The purvapakshin maintains that, as in
other places, here also the manifestation takes place
through some adventitious characteristic ; because release
also is a fruit (like other fruits, e.g. svarga), and because
' manifestation ' means as much as origination. If the
manifestation took place only through the Self's own
nature, it would already appear in the Self's former states ;
for a thing's own nature is never absent from it. The Self
therefore manifests itself by means of some adventitious
distinction.
To this we make the following reply. It manifests itself
through its Self only, not through any other attribute. —
Why so ? — On account of the word ' own ' in the clause
' by its own nature.' For on the other view the qualification
conveyed by ' own ' would be unmeaning. — But may not
the term ' own ' merely indicate that that form belongs to
that which manifests itself? — Not so, we reply. This is
a point which would not require to be stated. For as in
^ Sawzprati /^aturthe pade paravidyaphalaikadej'O brahmabhava-
virbhava^, sagu«avidyaphala;ra kz sarvcyvaratulyabhogatvam ava-
dharayishyate, tatraparavidyaprapyam uktva paravidyaprapyam aha
sa/wpadyeti. An. Gi.
406 VEUANTA-SUTRAS,
whatever form a thing manifests itself that form necessarily
belongs to it, the qualification ' own ' would be devoid of
purport. It has a meaning, on the other hand, if it denotes
the Self, the sense conveyed then being that the manifesta-
tion takes place only through the nature of the Self, not
through any other, adventitious, nature. — But, as a thing
cannot be without its own nature, what difference is there
betv>'een the Self's former states and its present state (after
the manifestation) ? — To this question the next Sutra
replies.
2. (The Self whose true nature has manifested
itself is) released ; according to the promise (made
by scripture).
That soul, of which the text says that it manifests itself,
is released from its former bondage and abides in its own
pure Self; while previously its Self was stained by the
three states (i. e the state of waking, dreaming, and dream-
less sleep), according to Kh. Up. VIII, 9-IT, ' It is blind ;'
— 'it weeps as it were;' — 'it goes to utter annihilation.'
This is the difference. — But how is it known that in its
present condition the soul is released? — 'On account of the
promise,' the Sutra says. For after the teacher has
promised to give further instruction about the Self as free
from the imperfections of the three states (' I shall explain
him further to you,'' KJi. Up. VIII, 11, 3), he introduces
the topic (of the released Self) in the words, ' Him being
free from the body neither pleasure nor pain touches,' and
concludes, ' By his own nature he manifests himself; that
is the highest Person.' The words at the beginning of the
tale also, 'The Self which is free from sin' (VIII, 7, i),
make a promise regarding the released Self. And release
is a fruit in so far only as it is a cessation of all bondage,
not as implying the accession of something new. And with
reference to the assertion that manifestation is the origi-
nation of something new we remark that it is so only with
regard to a former condition (which ceases to be), as when
we say of a convalescent person that he now manifests
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 4. 407
himself free from sickness. Hence there is no room for
objections.
3. (The light uito which the soul enters is) the
Self; owing- to the subject-matter of the chapter.
But how can the soul be called ' released,' considering
that the clause ' having entered into the highest light '
speaks of it as within the sphere of what is a mere effect ?
For the word ' light,' according to general usage, denotes
physical light. And none who has not passed beyond the
sphere of what is effected can be released, it being known
that whatever is an effect is tainted with evil. — This objection
is without force, we reply ; because in the passage referred
to the word ' light ' denotes the Self, in accordance with the
subject-matter of the chapter. For as such the highest
Self is introduced in the words, ' The Self which is free from
sin, old age, death,' &c., and we therefore may not all at
once pass over to physical light ; incurring thereby the fault
of abandoning the topic under discussion and introducing
a new one. Besides, the word ' light ' sometimes denotes
the Self, as e. g. in the passage, ' That the gods meditate
on as the light of lights' (B;-z. Up. IV, 4, 16). We have
discussed this at length under I, 3, 40.
4. (The released soul abides) in non-division
(from the highest Self) ; because that is seen from
scripture.
A doubt here arises whether that soul of which the text
says, ' Having entered the highest light it manifests itself by
its true nature,' remains separate from the highest Self, or
abides in the state of non-division from it. — Somebody
might be inclined to think that — because in the passage, ' He
moves about there." a distinction is made between the abode
and him who abides ; and because the clause, ' Having entered
the highest light,' mentions an agent and an object (of the
agent's activity) — the soul remains distinct from the highest
Self — This view the Sutra sets aside. The released soul is
non-separate from the highest Self. — Why so ? — Because
408 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
that is seen from scripture. For passages such as ' Thou
art that' [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (Br/. Up. I,
4, 10) ; 'Where he sees nothing else' {Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1) ;
' But there is then nothing second, nothing else different
that he could see ' (B;-/. Up. IV, 3, 23), show that the highest
Self abides in the state of non-division. And the fruit
must be assumed to correspond to the cognition, according
to what was explained under IV, 3, 15. And also such
passages as 'Just as pure water poured into pure water
remains the same, thus, O Gautama, is the Self of a thinker
who knows " (Ka. Up. II, 4. 15). whose object it is to describe
the nature of the released soul, declare that there is non-
separation only. The same follows from the comparisons
(of the soul entering Brahman) to rivers falling into the
sea. Passages where separation (of abode and abiding
thing, &c.) is expressed, may be explained as, in a secondary
sense, expressing non-separation; so e.g. Kh. Up. VII,
24, I, 'In what does the Infinite rest? — In its own great-
ness;' and Kh. Up. VII. 25, 2, 'Loving the Self, playing
with the Self.'
5. By (a nature) like that of Brahman (the soul
manifests itself) ; (thus) 6^aimini (opines); on account
of reference and the rest.
It has been concluded that the clause, ' by its own nature,'
means that the soul manifests itself by its own Self only,
not by some other adventitious character. What has now
to be inquired into is the specific qualities of that nature.
Here the Sutra at first states the opinion of the teacher
6^aimini. According to him the soul's own nature is ' like
that of Brahman,' i.e. it comprises all the qualities beginning
with freeness from sin and concluding with truthfulness of
conception (i.e. the qualities enumerated in Kh. Up. VIII,
7, i), and also omniscience and omnipotence; and in this
nature the soul manifests itself.— Why so ? — Because this is
known from reference' and the rest. For the reference
^ The commentators say that the ' and the rest ' of the Sutra
comprises vidhi and vjapade^a, and give the following definitions.
IV ADHVAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 4O9
to certain qualities made in VIII, 7, 1, teaches that the
Selfhood of the Self is such (i.e. such as made up of those
qualities). — Again, the passage, ' He there moves about
eating, playing, rejoicing,' shows that the Self possesses
lordly power ; so also the passage, ' For him there is free
movement in all worlds ' {Kh. Up. VIII, i, 6). — And thus
also there is justification for such designations as 'All-
knowing ; all-powerful.'
6. By the sole nature of intelligence (the soul
manifests itself), as that is its Self; thus Au^^ulomi
(opines).
Although the text enumerates different qualities, such as
freeness from sin, &c., these qualities rest only on fanciful
conceptions due to difference of words; for what the text
intimates is only absence in general of all qualities such as
sin and the rest. Intelligence alone constitutes the nature
of the Self, and hence it is proper to conclude that it mani-
fests itself in a nature consisting of that only. This con-
clusion will also agree with other scriptural texts, such as
BW. Up. IV, 5, 13, 'Thus this Self has neither inside nor
outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.' — Qualities,
on the other hand, such as having true wishes, are indeed
mentioned by the text as real (positive) attributes, the
meaning being that his wishes are true, i.e. truly existent ;
but all the same they, as depending on the connexion with
limiting adjuncts, cannot constitute the true nature of the
Upanyasa is the reference to something known (established else-
where), which reference is made with a view to a vidhi, i. e. the
establishing of something not yet known (upanyaso namoddeja,^ sa
X'a^^nyatra ^Mtasya^-rnyavidhanayanuvadaA). Thus here the qualities
— freeness from sin — are referred to as known, for the purpose of
establishing the vidhi, ' That it is which we must search out.' — The
passage, ' He there wanders about,' &c., is a vidhi ; for it teaches
what is not already known from elsewhere. — -The mentioning of
such qualities as omniscience and omnipotence is vyapade.ra, i.e.
simple expression of something known without reference to a
vidhi.
4 I O VEDANTA-SU TR AS.
Self, as intelligence does. For all manifoldness of character
has to be denied of Brahman, as we have shown under
III, 2, II. For the same reason the mention made of
eating and so on, means only the absence of all pain in
general, and aims at glorification, just as the passage about
' loving the Self {Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2), For love, play, and
the like cannot in their literal sense be ascribed to the action
of the Self, because they presuppose something second
(beyond the Self). Hence the soul manifests itself in the
nature of pure intelligence, free from all manifoldness, calm,
not capable of being expressed by any terms. This is the
view of the teacher Aurt'ulomi.
7. Thus also, on account of the existence of the
former (qualities), (admitted) owing to reference and
so on, there is absence of contradiction, (as) Badara-
ya;^a (thinks).
Thus also, i. e. although it be admitted that intelligence
only constitutes the true nature of the Self, also the former
nature, i.e. lordly power like that of Brahman, which is
intimated by reference and the rest, is — with a view to the
world of appearances — not rejected ; and hence there is no
contradiction. This is the opinion of the teacher BadarA-
ya«a.
8. But by mere will (the released effect their
purposes) ; because scripture states that.
In the meditation on Brahman within the heart we read
as follows : ' If he desires the world of the fathers, by his
mere will the fathers rise,' &c. {Kk. Up. VIII, 2, i). — A doubt
here presents itself whether the will alone is the cause of the
rising of the fathers, or the will joined with some other
operative cause. — The purvapakshin maintains that although
scripture says '' by his mere will,' some other cause must be
supposed to co-operatCj as in ordinary life. For as in our
ordinary experience the meeting with one's father is caused
by one's will, and, in addition, by the act of going and so
on, so it will be in the case of the released soul also ; and
IV ADIIYAYA, 4 PADA, lO. 4II
thus we do not assume something contrary to observation.
When the text says ' by his mere will,' it implies, as in the
case of a king, the whole apparatus of other easily pro-
curable instrumental causes by which the desired object is
obtained. Besides, if the fathers and so on rose owing to
a mere wish, they would be of unstable nature, like the
imaginary representation of some desired object, and thus
not be able to procure any solid enjoyment. — To this we
reply that the rising of the fathers and so on is due to the
will only. — Why so? — Because scripture declares this. If
any other cause were required, the direct scriptural state-
ment 'by his will only' would thereby be contradicted.
And even if we admit some other cause accompanying the
act of will, it cannot be a cause to be realised by an effort ;
for therefrom it would follow that before the realisation of
that cause the will would be barren. Nor can the analogies
of ordinary experience be applied to something to be learned
from scripture. For as the will of the released differs in
nature from the will of ordinary men, it may have the
power of effecting something that possesses as much
stability as the special purpose requires.
9. And for this very same reason (the released
soul is) without another lord.
For this very same reason, i. e. owing to the fact of the will
of the released person not being barren, he who knows has
no other lord over himself. For not even an ordinary person
when forming wishes will, if he can help it, wish himself to
be subject to another master. And scripture also declares
this when saying, ' Those who depart from hence, after
having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them
there is freedom in all worlds' [Kh. Up. VIII, i, 6).
10. The absence (of a body and sense-organs, on
the part of the released) Badari (asserts) ; for thus
scripture says.
The passage, ' By his mere wish the fathers rise,' shows
that the released possesses a mind (internal organ, manas)
whereby he wills. A question however arises whether he
4 I 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
who knows, after having reached lordly power, possesses
a body and senses, or not. Here the teacher Badari is of
opinion that the glorified possessor o{ knowledge is without
body and sense-organs. — Why so ? — Because scripture de-
clares this, ■ With the mind seeing those wishes he rejoices *
(K/i. Up. VIII, 12, j). If he rejoiced with the mind, the
body, and the senses, scripture would not specially say
' with the mind.' Hence there are neither body nor sense-
organs in the state of release.
11. The presence (of a body and senses) 6^aimini
(asserts); because the text records option (of the
released person multiplying himself).
The teacher 6^aimini is of opinion that the released
person possesses a body and sense-organs as well as a mind.
For passages like ■ He is onefold, he is threefold ' (K/i. Up.
VII, 26, 2) declare that the Self has the option of manifold
existence which cannot be brought about without manifold-
ness of bod}-. — The capability of optionally multiplying one's
self is, indeed, mentioned in the knowledge of plenitude
(bhuman) which refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities,
but this lordly power which is valid only for the qualified
state is there mentioned only in order to glorify the know-
ledge of the (unqualified) plenitude ; and it therefore presents
itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge ^.
12. For this reason Badaraya/^ia (opines that the
released person is) of both kinds ; as in the case of
the twelve days' sacrifice.
The teacher Badarayawa, again, thinks that for this reason,
i.e. because scripture contains indications of both kinds, the
proper conclusion is that the released person exists in both
^ Manifoldness of the Self is mentioned in a vidya referring to
the highest Brahman ; but its introduction there is not due to the
wish of teaching something about that state, but merely of, rhe-
torically, glorifying it. We, therefore, are entitled to view that
passage as teaching something about him who possesses the lower
knowledsre.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 5. 413
conditions. When he wishes to have a body, he appears
with one ; when he wishes to be disembodied, he is without
one. For he has various wishes, and all his wishes are
realised. — ' As in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice.'
As the soma sacrifice extending over twelve days may be
viewed either as a sattra or as an ahina sacrifice, because
both alternatives are indicated by scriptural passages^; so
it is here also.
13. When there is no body, (the process) may
take place as in the dreaming state.
When there is no body and no sense-organs, the process
in the state of release may be viewed as analogous to that
in the state of dream, when objects wished, such as a father
and so on, have a perceptional existence only while body,
senses, and objects do not really exist.
14. When there is (a bod)), (it may be) as in the
waking state.
When, on the other hand, the released person has a body,
then the objects of his wishes — fathers and so on — may have
real existence, as in the waking state.
15. The entering (of one soul into several bodies)
is like (the multiplication of) the flame of a lamp ;
for thus scripture declares.
Under Sutra 11 it has been shown that the released person
is embodied. The question now arises whether the bodies
which the released create for themselves when rendering
themselves threefold and so on are soulless like wooden
figures, or animated by souls like the bodies of us men. —
The purvapakshin maintains that as neither the soul nor
the manas can be divided they are joined with one body
only, while the other bodies are soulless. — To this the
Sutrakara replies,' Like the flame of a lamp is their entering,'
i. e. just as the one flame of a lamp can pass over into several
flames (lighted at the original flame), because it possesses
^ See Purva ^limawsa-suiras II, 3, 5ih adhikara«a.
4 1 4 vedanta-sOtras.
the power of modifying itself, thus the soul of him who
knows, although one only, multiplying itself through its
lordly power, enters into all those bodies. For scripture
declares that in this way one may become many. ' He is
onefold, he is threefold, fivefold, sevenfold' [KJi. Up. VII,
26, 2). And this is not possible, if we should accept the
simile of the wooden puppets^ or the entering of other
souls into those additional bodies^. Nor again can there
be any motion on the part of bodies destitute of souls. —
Nor is there any force in the objection that, because the
Self and the Manas cannot be divided, they cannot be in
connexion with more than one body. For the Self, because
possessing the quality of having true wishes (i. e. wishes
which become real), may be supposed to create other bodies
with internal organs, conformable to the original one organ ;
and, the Self dividing itself through the division of its
limiting adjuncts, it may be possible to give a soul to each
created body. This is the topic which the books on Yoga
treat, in the chapters explaining the connexion of one soul
with several bodies. — But how can lordly power, enabling
the released soul to enter into several bodies, be admitted,
if we consider that different scriptural texts declare that
the soul in that state has not any specific cognition? so e.g.
' Whereby should he know another ? ' ' For there is then
no second, nothing else diiTerent from him that he could
know ; ' ' An ocean is that one seer, without any duality '
(Brz. Up. II, 4, 14 ; IV, 3, 30 -, 32).
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
16. (What scripture says about absence of all
specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or
union (release) ; for this is manifested (by the texts).
By 'entering into one's own Self is meant dreamless
^ I. e. the scriptural statement about one Self rendering itself
manifold can neither be reconciled with the hypothesis of the other
bodies being moved by the one soul as puppets are moved by one
person through strings, nor with the hypothesis of a new separate
soul entering each new body.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 7. 415
sleep ; according to the text, ' He is gone to his own Self,
he sleeps they say' {KJi. Up. VI, 8, 1). 'Union' means
blissful isolation (final release), according to the text, 'Being
Brahman he goes to Brahman ' (B/V. Up. IV, 4, 6). What
the texts say about absence of specific cognition is said
with reference to either of those two states, dreamless sleep
or final release. — How do we know this? — Because this is
' manifest,' owing to the fact that those two states form the
topic there (where absence of all cognition is mentioned).
Compare the passages/ Having risen from out of these ele-
ments it perishes again after them. Having departed there
is no more knowledge;' ' But where the Self only is all this ; '
' Where when asleep he desires no more desires, and dreams
no more dreams' (BW. Up. II, 4, 12 ; IV, 5, 15 ; IV, 3, 19).
— Those passages, on the other hand, which describe lordly
power refer to an altogether different condition, which —
like the heavenly world and so on — is an abode where
qualified knowledge produces its results. — Thus there is no
contradiction.
17. With the exception of world-business (the
released possess all lordly power), (the Lord) being
the topic (where world-business is referred to), and
(the souls) not being near (to such business).
The following doubt here presents itself. Do those who
through meditations on the qualified Brahman enter,
together with their manas, into a condition of equality with
the Lord, possess unlimited lordly power, or power limited
to some extent ? — The purvapakshin maintains that their
power must be unlimited, because we meet with texts such
as 'He obtains Self-lordship' (Taitt. Sa;«h. I, 6, 2); 'All
the gods bring an offering for him ' (Taitt. Sa/z^h. I, 5, 3) :
' For them there is freedom in all worlds' {KJi. Up. VIII,
I, 6). — To this the Siitra replies, 'Excepting the world-
business.' With the exception of the origination and so ox\
of the world all other lordly powers, as e. g. rendering one's
self of atomic size, must belong to the released. The world-
business, on the other hand, can belong to the everlastingly
4l6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
perfect Lord only. — Why so ? — Because there (where the
origination and so on of the world are referred to) the
Lord forms the general topic, and because the other (souls)
do not stand near (to the world-business). The highest
Lord only is appointed to do all work referring to the
entire world ; for the world's origination and so on are
taught only where he constitutes the general subject-matter,
and moreover he (only) is eternal; and described in scripture
(as the creator, &c. of the world) ^ The lordly power of
the other souls, on the contrary, scripture shows to have
a beginning, because it depends on their searching for and
striving to know the Lord. They are therefore remote
from all world-business. And just because they have
minds, they might be of different minds, and one might
have the intention of preserving the world while another
might wish to destroy it. Such conflicts can only be
avoided by assuming that the wishes of one should conform
to those of another, and from this it follows that all other
souls (but the Lord) depend on the highest Lord.
1 8. (Should it be said that the souls must possess
unlimited power) On account of manifest teaching ;
we reply No, because scripture states him who,
entrusted with office, abides in the spheres (of the
sun and so on), (to be that one on whom the soul's
obtaining lordly power depends).
It remains to refute the remark, made by the purvapa-
kshin, that absolute power on the part of those who know
must be inferred from texts directly asserting such power,
as e.g. 'He obtains self-lordship.' — This refutation the
above Sutra undertakes. Scripture declares that the ob-
tainment of rulership on the soul's part, depends on the
^ Kim ka paraisyaiva nityatvena svahetvanapekshawasya k/z'pta-
jaktitva^_§'agatsar^ana/« prati kalpyasamarthya>^ H vidusham uvara-
vishayaiva ^agatsr/sh/ir esh/av}a, ki?;; ^a. paurvaparyaloX'anayam
uvarasyaiva ^agatsarga>^ jabdad gamyate ^anmadisutram arabhya
^aitad upapaditam. An. Gi.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20. 417
highest Lord who, as entrusted with definite offices, abides
in certain definite abodes, such as the sphere of the sun, &c.
This is shown by the text going on to say (after the clause
quoted above), ' He obtains the lord of Mind.' For that
means that he obtains the lord known to be the lord of all
minds. In accordance herewith the text later on says that
he becomes lord of speech, lord of the eye, lord of the ear,
lord of understanding. — Similarly in other passages also the
lordly power of the other souls has to be viewed, according
to circumstances, as depending on the eternally perfect
Lord.
19. And (there is also a form of the highest Lord)
not abiding in effected things ; for thus scripture
declares his abiding.
Moreover, according to scripture, there is also an eternal
form of the highest Lord which does not abide in effects ;
he is not only the ruling soul of the spheres of the sun and
so on which lie within the sphere of what is effected. For
the text declares his abiding in a twofold form, as follows :
' Such is the greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person.
One foot of him are all beings ; three feet of him is what is
immortal in heaven' [Kh. Up. Ill, 12, 6). And it cannot
be maintained that that form of him which is divorced from
all effects is reached by those who put their trust on his
other form ; for their minds are not set on the former.
Hence as he who does not reach that form of the double-
natured highest Lord which is divorced from all qualities
stops at that form which is distinguished by qualities, so
also, unable to reach unlimited power within the latter
form, he stops at limited lordly power.
20. And thus perception and inference shov;^.
Scripture and Smrzti both declare that the highest light
does not abide within effected things, ' The sun does not
shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings,
and much less this fire' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10). 'The sun
does not illume it, nor the moon^ nor fire' (Bha. Gita XV, 6).
— The Sutra is meant to show that the non-abiding of the
[383 E e
4l8 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
highest Hght within effected things is a well-known cir-
cumstance.
21. And on account of the indications of equality
of enjoyment only.
The lordly power of those who take their stand on the
effected Brahman is not absolute, for that reason also that
scripture teaches that their enjoyment only is equal to that
of the eternally-perfect Lord. For scripture contains state-
ments and indications of the difference (of the Lord and the
released soul) ; compare ' To him he says, Water indeed is
enjoyed^ (by me); that world (is to be enjoyed by thee
also) ' (Kau. Up. I, 7) ; ' As all beings honour that deity, so
do all beings honour him who knows that ' (Br/. Up. I,
5, 20) ; ' He obtains through it equality (in body) and
sameness of abode with that deity ' (Brz. Up. I, 5, 23). But
from the circumstance of the lordly power of the released
souls not being absolute it follows that it comes to an end,
and then they will have to return from the world of
Brahman ! — To this objection the reverend Badaraya«a
replies in the following Sutra.
22. (Of them) there is non-return, according to
scripture ; non-return, according to scripture.
Those who, in following the road of the gods, to which
the vein and the ray are leading, and on which light is the
first stage, reach the world of Brahman as described by
scripture — where ' there are the two lakes Ara and TVya in
the world of Brahman, in the third heaven from hence,' and
where ' there is the lake Airammadiya and the Aj-vattha
tree showering down Soma, and the city of Brahman
Apara^ita and the golden hall built by Prabhu ' {Kh.
Up. VIII, 5, 3) — and set forth at length in mantras,
^ All the commenlators explain the reading ' miyante.' — An. Gi.
says — \2.m brahmalokagatam upasaka^/i hirawyagarbha^ svasamipam
upagata^/z sanunayam aha maya khalv apa evamr/tamayyo miyante
dmyante bhu^yante tavap}' asav am;7'tarupodakalaksha;?o loko
bhogyo yathasukha;^ bhu^yalam.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2. 419
arthavadas, and so on ; those, we say, who reach that world
do not return from there after having finished the enjoyment
of their deeds ; as those do who have gone to the world of
the moon and other places. — Why so ? — Because scriptural
passages teach that they do not so return. Compare
' Moving upwards by it he reaches the immortal ' {Kh.
Up. VIII, 6, 6); 'For them there is no return' (Brz.
Up. VI, 2, 15) ; ' Those who proceed on that path do not
return to the life of man' {KJi. Up. IV, 15, 6); 'He
reaches the world of Brahman and does not return'
{Kh. Up. VIII. 15, i). That the finality of their lordly
power does not imply their return to the life of man, we
have shown under IV, 3, 10. It is a settled matter that
those who through perfect knowledge have dispelled all
mental darkness and are devoted to the eternally perfect
Nirva;^a do not return. And as those also who rely on the
knowledge of the qualified Brahman in the end have
recourse to that (Nirva;/a), it follows that they also do not
return. — The repetition of the words, ' Non-return, accord-
ing to scripture,' indicates the conclusion of this body of
doctrine.
£62
INDEX OF QUOTATIONS
TO
VOLUMES XXXIV (i) AND XXXVIII (ii).
Aitareya-
IV, II . . .
i, 359
arawyaka
V, 14; 15 .
i, 330
II, I, 2, I . .
ii, 272, 303
17 . .
ii, 302
I, 2, 6 . .
i, 56 ; ii, 304
VI, II . . .
ii, 350
I, 3, I . .
ii, 206
45 . •
ii, 316
2, 4, 6 . .
i, p. Ixxii ; ii, 244
VII, 6 . .
i, 293
3, 2, I .
i, 63
19 . .
i, 282
4, I . .
. ii, 205-208
21 . .
ii, 183
4, I, I .
i, p. Ixix, 22,332
VIII, 6 . . .
i, 63; ii, 281,
35
4> I, I ; 2
i, 265
10 . .
ii, 352
4, I, 2 .
i, 48
23 . .
ii, 380
4> I. 2 ; 3
i, 263
24 . .
i, 128
4, 2, 2 .
ii, 206
24; 25 .
ii, 381
4, 2, 4 .
J, 304; ",91,257
26 . .
11, 234
4, 3, 4; 6
X, 2 . . .
i, 307
7; 10.
. ii, 208
4 . . .
ii, 22
6, I, 5 ; 6
ii, 208
41 . .
i, 63, 80
III, 2, 3, 12 .
. i, 94 ; ii, 190
42 . .
i, 96
XIII, 2 . .
1, 113, 122, 2
82
Aitareya-
12 . .
ii, 157
brahmawa
27 . .
. i, 282
III, 8, I . .
• i, 35, 222
31 . .
XIV, 17 . .
i, 187
i, 46
Apastamba-
XV, 3 . . .
. i, 361
dharma-sutra
6 . . .
ii, 417
I, 7, 20, 3 .
• ii, 399
6; 12 .
i, 195
ii,63
8, 23, 2 .
• i, 293
7 . .
9,26,8 .
. ii, 318 n.
20 . ,
i, 36
J J
XVIII, 6i .
i, "3, 330
Arsheya-
brahma«a
Br/had-ara«yaka
I . . . .
• i, 314
upanishad
I, I, 4 . .
. i, p. cv
Bhagavad-gita
2, 2 . .
. ii, 24
11,24. . .
. ii, 180
2,4 . .
• i, 203
39; 49 •
ii, 361
3, I . .
. ii, 192
54 • •
. i, 43, 282
3, 2 . .
• i, 303; >i, 95
III, 12 . .
ii, 337
3, 12 . .
• ii, 92
13 . .
i. Ill
3, 19 • .
. ii, 89
35 . .
ii, 318
3, 22 . .
. ii, 91, 154
422
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
1,3,23 . .
ii, 193
III, 2, 11 . .
. i, pp, Ixxxi,
3,24 . . .
'i, 195
Ixxxix
4, 1 . . .
ii, 206
2, 13 . .
• i, 359; ii, 105
4,6 . .
i, 117
seq., 369
4,7 . .
i, 25, 242, 264,
4 . . .
. i, p. Ixxii, 231
267; ii, 32, 42
4, I . .
. ii, 173, 238,242,
4,10 . .
i, 29, 31, 219,
291, 339, 394
282; 11,32,46,
4, 2 . .
. i, 32, 133, 169;
66, loi, III,
ii, 18
173, 238, 339,
5 . . .
. i, p. Ixxii ; ii,
408
291, 322
4, 15 • .
. i, 25
5, I . .
. i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
5, 2 . .
ii, 361
242, 291
5, 3 . •
11,49, 56, 90,95
6, 8 . .
• ii, 315
5, 13 ■ . •
ii, 257
7 . . .
. i, p. xxviii
5, 20 . .
11, 93, 418
7, I seqq.
. i, 130
5,21 . .
11, 8711., 94, 256
7, 2 . .
• i, 154
5, 22 . . .
ii, 18, 258
7, 3 • •
. i, p. XXXV, 125;
5, 23 . . .
ii, 257, 258, 418
ii, 339
II, I, I . .
ii, 168
7,4 • .
• ', 370
I, 16 . . .
i, 273; ii, 146
7, 9 . .
. i,8i
1,17. . .
11, 42, 50, 144
7, 15 . .
• ii, 173
I, 18 . .
li, 50, 56, 135
7> 22 . .
• i, 134
I, 19 . .
11, 141
7, 23 . .
• i, 51, 70, 113,
I, 20 . . .
",30,74,75,147
115, 133, 282;
2, 3 . .
1, 254
ii, 46, 54, 62,
2, 4 . . .
i, 217
66, 174
3 . . .
ii, 167
8, 7; 8 .
. i, 169
3, 3 . •
ii, 6
8, 8 . .
. 1, 62, 99, 171,
3,6 . .
1,62; ii,i57,i75
327, 349,355;
4,5 • .
i, p. xl, 17, 25,
li, 17, 152,155,
26, 297, 344,
239, 329, 335,
356; ii, 52,77,
394
288,291, 331
8,9 • •
. i, 170, 181, 355,
4,6 . .
i, 36, 282, 309,
370; ii, 290
311, 321; ii,
8, II . .
• i, 171, 243, 282;
10, 179, 329,
. ii, 46, 335
339
9, I ; 2 .
. i, 200
4, 10 . .
. 1, 20; ii, 291
9, 4 . .
• ii, 79,83
4, II . .
• ii, 79
9, 9 . .
. 1, 269
4, 12 . .
i, 154, 349; ii,
9, 16 . .
• i, 131
160, 415
9, 26 . .
• i, 37, 299, 327,
4, 13 . .
1, 22, 31, 323,
349; ii, 171,
329
329, 395
4, 14 . .
• ii, 414
9, 28 . .
• i, 65, 75, 83; ii.
5, I • •
• ii, 154
34,335
5, 18 . .
• i, 178; ii, 159
IV, I, 3 . .
. ii, 281
5, 19 . •
• i, 22, 31, 36,
2, 4 . .
• i, 29, 194, 327,
100; ii, 32,
352 ; ii, 395
155, 161, 175,
3, 5 . .
• i, 91
180
3,6 . .
• '' ^94
III, I, 1 . .
ii, 288
3, 7 • •
. i, p. xxxviii, 234;
I, 9 . .
• i, 30
ii, 39, 46, 53,
2 . . .
• 1, 239
208
2, I . .
• ii, 79
3, 8 . .
• ii, 29
2, 8 . .
. ii, 80, 83
3, 9 • .
• ii, 133, 138
INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.
42,
IV, 3
3
3
9; 10
13 .
14 .
14; 15
14-16
15
16
19
21
21-3
23
30
32
33
35
38
I
1-4
2
5
4, 6
4j
6;
7
4,
7
4>
8;
9
4,
9
.
4,
12
.
4,
16
•
4j
17
.
4,
18
.
4>
19
•
4,
20
4,
21
.
4,
22
•
4, 23
11, 133
i, 353; ii, 133
ii, 34, 36
ii, 49 seq., 89,
135
ii, 56
ii, 34, 134
ii, 248
i, 235
i, 28
i, 298 ; ii, 148
ii, 415
i,6o; ii,i4i,i76
ii, 54
i, 235; ii, 151,
337, 340
ii, 34, 408
i, 188; ii, 34,414
i,74, 168; ii,4i4
ii, 112
i, 345
ii, 367
ii, 36, 377
ii, 102
ii, 36,82, 83,93,
105, 289, 352,
367, 377
ii, 103, 352
i, pp. Ixxx, Ixxxi,
Ixxxix ; ii, 32,
46, 119, 369
i, p. cxii ; ii, 35,
"3, 173, 363,
373, 396, 401,
415
1, p. cix
i, 43, 157; ii,
144, 375
i, pp. cvii, cviii
ii, 317
i, 36
i, 91,193; ii, 407
i, p. xl, 257
i, 84, 87, 230
i, 66, 262, 282,
323; ii, 154,
180, 339
ii, 37
i, 157; ii, 331
i, p. Ixxiii, 79,
182, 234, 330;
ii, 37, 42, 62,
141, 247, 294,
295, 307, 337,
356, 359, 361
ii, 308, 390
IV, 4, 24
4, 25
5, I •
5,6 .
5, 6-15
5,8 .
5, 13 .
5, 15 .
V,
VI,
4&V, 5
4, I
4, 5
5 .
5, 2
5, 3
6 .
8 .
9 •
10 .
10, I
10, 6
I, I
1,6
I, 7
I, 13
1, 14
2, 9
2, 14
2, 15
2, 15 seqq.
2, 16 . .
i, 92, 282 ; ii, 181
i, 321, 327; ii,
31, 209, 330,
335, 395
ii, 305
i, 274, 285; ii,9
ii, 285
i, 285
i, 156; ii, 32,34,
156 seq., 409
i, 36, 62, 123,
168 ; ii, 54,
145, 248, 292,
295, 330, 400,
415
i, 84
ii, 245-247
ii, 245
i, p. Ixxii
i, p. Ixx ; ii,2i6
i, 124; ii, 245
i, 89; ii, 245
i, p. Ixvii
i, 257
i, 144
i, p. cvii
ii, 382, 383 seq.,
385
11, 214
ii, 186
ii, 188
i, 303
i, 304; ii, 85
ii, 211, 309
i, 257
ii, 187
i, p. cix ; ii, 383,
386, 389, 390,
391, 419
. i, pp. cvii, cviii
. ii, no, 113, 23
34
Gabala-upanishad
? ... 11, 244, 249, 251,
295, 297, 302
seq., 338
I i, 153
IV i, 298
Gaimini-(pijrva-
mima»jsa-)sutra
I, I, I ...
I, 2 ...
1,5 ...
I, 25 . . .
i, 24, 26, 44
i, 24,29111.
i, 24
i, 24
424
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
1,2,1 . . .
i, 20 seq., 24
I, 3, 2 . . .
ii, 241
2, 7 . . .
i, 21
3, 3 • • •
i, 121
3, 3 • • •
i, 293
3, 3 seqq. .
i, 239
3,8 . . .
ii, 319
3, 3; 4 . •
ii, 27
II, 2, I . . .
ii, 278
3, 4 . • •
i, 34; li, 53
2, 22 . . .
ii, 185 n.
3,9 . . •
i, 121
2, 23 . . .
ii, 185 n.
3, 10 . . .
i, p. cxix, 252 ;
3, 5 ■ • •
ii, 413 n.
ii, 204
4, 9 . . .
ii, 186
3, 10 ; II .
i, pp. xxxix, Ixix
4, lo seqq. .
ii, 187
3, II . . .
i, 37, 237 seq.
111,3,9 .
ii, 240
3, 12 . . .
ii, 205
3, 14 • •
ii, 224, 260
3, 13 . . .
ii, 205
4, 32 . . .
ii, 75
3, 15 . . .
i, 246; li, 153,
IV, 1,1 . . .
i, 44
155, 205
3,8 . . .
ii, 246 n.
11,4,1 . . .
ii, 172
3, 29 . . .
ii, 223 n.
4, 4 . . .
i, 250
VI, I . . . .
i, 197
4, 10 . .
i, 250; ii, 396
5, I . . .
ii, 195 n.
4, 1 1 . .
i, 156
8, 22 . .
ii, 318
4, 12 . .
i, pp. xxxvii.
X, 8, 15 . . .
ii, 22S
4, 12; 13 .
xxxviii, xliv
i, 195
Gau//apada-karik£
I
4, 15 . .
ii, 408
I, i6 . . .
i, 312
5, 3 • •
ii, 154
111,15 . . •
i, 266
5, 5 • •
5, 6 ; 7 .
i, 104, 230
i, 248
tja-upanishad
5, 7 . •
ii, 371
2 . . .
ii, 289
5, 8 . .
ii, 87 n., 133,
7 . . .
. i, 29, 282,
295;
134
ii, 395
5, II . .
ii, 65
8 . . .
. i, 34
5, 15 • •
. i, pp. xxxvi,
xxxviii, 192
Ka/>&a-upanishad
6, 2 . .
i, p. xxxvii, 229;
I, I, 13 . •
. i, 248
ii, 190, 290
I, 13; 20 ; 2
)
6, 2 ; 3 .
. i, p. xxxviii
14 . .
I, 15 . .
. i, 116 n.
6, II . .
• i, 297
i, 248
6, 13 . .
. ii, 160, 168
I, 20 . .
. i, 118, 248,
249,
6, 17 . •
. i, p. xxxviii, 198
251, 252
6, 18 . .
■ i, 297
I, 23 ; 24
2,4 . .
2,6 . .
• ii, 134
. i, 250
• ii, 123
Kaushitaki-brah-
mawa-upanisha
d
2, 7 . .
. ii, 328
I . . . .
i, p. cxxi seq. ;
2, 9 . .
• i, 307
ii, 400
2, 12 . .
. i, 120, 121,
251
2 . . .
• ii, 35, 122, 384
2, 14 . .
. i, 28, 118,
196,
2 seqq, .
. i, pp. cvii, cviii
231, 248,
251,
3 • • •
• ii, 230, 382, 385
252; ii,
134,
3, 15 • •
. i,78
241, 392
4 . . .
. ii, 225, 230
2, 15 . .
. ii, 190, 307
7 . • •
. ii, 418
2, 18 . .
. i, 118, 248
; 'i,
II, 5, 15 • •
• i, 91
31
6 . . .
• ii, 263
2, 22 . .
. i, 28, 187, 2
52
14 . . .
• i, 304; ", 200
2, 25 . .
. i, p. XXXV,
16
Ill, I . . .
. ii, 305
3, I
. i, pp. XXXV,
xlii,
1-3; 8 .
• i, 97
Ixxii, 118
; ii,
2 . . .
. i, p. xxxiv, 100
240
n., 164
INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.
425
111,3 . . .
i, 60, 86, 212 ;
II
2, 3
• 11, 255, 304, 347
ii, 35
3, 2
. ii, 320
6 . . .
ii, 44
7, 2
. 11, 349
8 . . .
. i, 99, 359; ii,
8, I
• ii, 345, 349
59, 183
9, I
ii, 349
IV, 19 . . .
i, p. xl, 269
II, I
ii. 346, 349
20 . . .
i, 270; 11, 42,
13, 2
ii, 310
141
23, I
• ",295
Kena-upanishad
1,3 ... .
i, 31
III
23, 2
23, 4
I
ii, 317
. i, 169
1, 257
4 . . . .
ii, 157
I, I
. i, 216
5 . . . .
11,3 .. .
i, 31 seq., 105
i, 32
4, I
6,1
6,4
ii, 285
ii, III
. i, 217 n.
AT/^andogya-
upanLshad
10, 4
11, I
II, 3
. i, p. xxii
. ii, 236
• i, 94
I, I, I . .
i, p. Ixviii ; ii.
12 .
I, 90
193, 272, 304,
12, 6
. i, 350; ii, 62,417
347
12, 7
• i, 96
I, 3 . .
I, 7 . • .
ii, 354, 303
11, 198, 253, 254,
12, 7 seqq.
13,6 . .
ii, 179
. i, 96, 261
304
13, 7
i, p. xxxiv, 87
1, 8 . .
ii, 254
13, 7;
8 .
i, 89
I, 10 . .
11, 254, 289,347,
361, 362
14 •
. i, pp. xxxiv,
Ixvii, cxiv, 91,
2 . . .
11, 192
107
2,7 . . .
ii, 254
14, I
i, 63, 94, 311 ;
2, 13 . . .
ii, 321
ii, II, 21, 278
3, I . .
11, 254, 345
14, 2
i, 80, 106, 147,
5, i; 2 .
1", 333
193; ii, 152,
5, 5 . •
. ii, 282
161, 277, 394,
6 . . .
i, p. xxxiv; ii.
402
195
14, 2;
3 . .
ii, 45
6, I . .
• ii, 247,303, 345
14, 3
i, 83; ii, 219
6,6 . .
i, p. xxxiii ; ii,
246
14, 4
i, 109, 112, 355;
ii, 281
6, 6 seqq.
i, 77 seq.; ii, 176
15, 2
. ii, 281
6, 7 ; 6 .
i, 125
15, 3
ii, 223
6, 8 . .
ii, 247
17, 6
11, 352
7, 7 . .
ii, 247
18 .
ii, 178
7, 8 . .
ii, 321
18, I
i, 30, 147; ii.
7, 9 . •
• 11, 304
154, 339,340
8, 5 • •
ii, 218
18, i;
6 .
• ii, 332
8, 8 . .
i, 83
18, 2
i, 216
9 • . .
i, p. xxxiv, 81
19, I
*, 30, 263, 267,
9, I . .
i, 182, 287; ii.
333; ii, 339.
10, 9 . .
195
i, 84
IV,
I
341
ii, 315
10, 9 seqq.
11, 254
I, I
ii, 305
II, 4; 5 .
1,84
I, 3
i, 225
II, 5 • .
i, p. xxxiv
I, 4
ii, 332
II, I, I . .
ii, 349
2, 2
ii, 332
2, I . .
ii, 272, 304, 345,
346
2, 3
3, I
i, 224
i, 216 ; ii, 256
426
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
IV, 3, I ; 3 • •
i, 30
V, 24, 3 .
• • ', 145; 11,354
3, 3 . • •
ii,87n., 256,277
VI, I . .
. . ii, 7
3, 5 . . •
i, 226
h 3 •
■ • 1, 285, 341 seq.,
3,6 . . .
ii, 257
343 ; 11, 9, 79
3,8 . . .
i, 95; 11, 258
1,4 .
. . i, 266, 285, 320;
4, 5 • • •
i, 228
ii, 12
loseqq. . .
i, 126 n.
2 . .
• • i, 47 seq., 53 n.
10, 5 . . .
i, 84; ii, 277,
2 seqq.
• . i, 53, 55
400
2, I .
. . i, 22, 267, 282,
14, 3 . • •
ii, 354
332, 341 ; ii,
15 ... .
i, pp. cvii, cviii
163
15, I . . .
i, p. XXXV, 124 ;
2, I ; 2
. . 1, 264
ii, 219
2, I ; 3
. . i, 265
15, 2 . . .
i, 125; ii, 203
2, 2 .
. . ii, 20
15, 3 • • •
ii, 400
2, 3 .
• • i, 263; ii, 22,25,
15, 4 . . .
ii, 219
74, 290
15, 5 • •
i, 128
2, 3 ; 4
• • i, 52, 303; ii, 24
15, 6 . . .
ii, 391, 400, 419
2, 4 .
. . ii, 23, 366
17, 1 . .
ii, 361
3, I .
. . ii, 126
17, 10 . .
ii, 284
3, 2 .
. . i, 233, 268, 329,
18, 3 . .
11,92
343, 361 ; ii,
V, I, I . . .
ii, 85, 186, 277
32, 140,159
I, 2 . .
ii, 309
3, 2 ; 3
. . ii, 96
I, 7 • .
i, 304
3, 3
. . i, 88n.
2, 2 . .
ii, 211
4 •
• • i, 332
3-10 . . .
ii, 101-132, 400
4, I
. . i, 321
3, 3 . •
ii, 103, 368
5, 4
• • ii, 79
3, 10 . .
ii, 108
6,1
. . ii, 364
4, I . .
ii, 267
6,5
. . ii, 27, 366
7, I ; 8, I
i, 35
8 .
• . ii, 370
9, I . .
ii, 122
8,1
• . i, 59, 180, 345;
9, 2 . .
. ii, i88"
ii, 47, 141,
10 . . .
i, pp. cvii, cviii
151, 176, 179,
10, 1 . .
• i, 27; ii, 233,
415
295, 297, 382,
8,2
. . i, 59 n., 84, 87,
385
272 ; ii, 142
10, 2 . .
. 11, 403
8,3
. . ii, 396
10,4 . .
. ii, no
8, 3; 5
• • i, 59
10, 5-7 •
ii, 112 seq.
8, 4
. . i, 155, 266
10, 6 . .
. ii, 130
8,7
. • i, 23, 31, 54,
10, 7 . .
• li, 398
321, 343; 11,
10, 8 . .
• ii, 384
9, 32, 46, 66,
10, 10 . .
. ii, 187
79, 163, 173,
II seqq. .
. i, pp. Ixxiii, Ixxv,
339, 408
.. ^43
8,7&c
-16,3 11,243
11-24 • •
. ii, 400
9, 2; :
; • . i, 313; ii, 48
11,2 . .
. ii, 154
10, 2
. . . ii, 147, 148
II, 5 . •
. ii, 288
", 3
. . . ii, 28, 31
11,6 . .
. i, p. xxxv
14, 2
. . . i, 17; ii, 236,
11,7 . .
. i, 227
237, 285, 357,
12-17 . .
. ii, 275
363
18 . . .
• i, 143; ii, 275
16 .
. . . 1,56,323
18, I . .
. ii, 191
VII, I .
. . . i, 189
18, 2 . .
. i, 146
I seqq
. . . ii, 403
19, I . .
• i, 146; ii, 249
I, I
. . . i, 227
24, 2; 4 .
. ii, 249
h 3
. . . i, 29, 167, 266
INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.
427
VII, 1,5 . .
, ii, 281, 341
VIII, 7, 2 . . .
i, 219
II, I . .
. ii, 386
7, 3 • •
1, 184; li, 277
12, 3 . .
. ii, 405
9-1 1 . . .
ii, 406
15, I . .
. i, 162, 164, 261 ;
9, 1 . .
i, 129
ii, 277
9, 3 • •
i, 184
16 . . .
. i, 166
9, 3 seqq. .
i, 232
18, 2 . .
. i, 326
10, I . .
i, 184
23 . . .
. i, p. XXXV, 163
10, 4 . .
i, 184
23; 24 .
. i, 162
II, I . .
. i, 184
24 . . .
• i, 74
II, 2 . .
i, 184
24, I . .
. i, 62, 78, 163,
II, 3 . .
1, 199; 11,406
168, 329; ii.
12, I . .
i, 27, 41, 232
329,392, 408
12, 3 . .
, i, pp. xxxvi,
25, I ; 2 .
. ii, 179
xxxviii, Ixxxv,
25, 2 . .
. i, 282, 311, 321;
231, 232,277;
ii, 180, 394,
ii, 291
408, 410
12, 4 . .
ii, 34
26, I . .
. i, 60, 167
12, 5 . .
ii, 412
26, 2 . .
. i, 29, 167, 440;
13 . . .
. ii, 225
ii, 237, 311,
14 . . .
i, p. xxxviii, 82,
414
182 ; ii, 98
VIII, I . . .
. i, pp.xxxvi, Ixxiii
14, I . .
i, 233, 329; ii.
I, I . .
. i, 174, 274; ii,
155, 393
2x9, 247, 378,
15 . . .
. ii, 63, 289
400
15, I . .
■ ",419
I, 3 . .
. ii, 180, 219
I, 6 . .
. i, 12, 178; ii.
Mahabharata
248, 409, 411,
111,16763. .
i, 195
415
2 . . .
. i, pp. Ixxiii, Ixxxv
Maitraya«iya-
2, I . .
. ii, 402, 410
sawhita
3,2 . .
. i, 180 ; ii, 148
I, I, 6 . .
ii, 273 n.
3, 3 • •
. i, 59 ; ii, 39
3, 4 • •
. i, p. xxxvi, 182,
Maitrayawiya-
191
upanishad
4, I . .
• ii, 144, 151,175,
VI, 30 . . . .
i, pp. cvii, cviii,
356
seq.
4, 2 . .
4, 3 . •
. 11, 175
. ii, 384
Manu
5, I . .
. ii, 307
I, 5 . . .
i, 133
5, 3 • •
. ii, 315, 393, 418
21 . . .
i, 204
6, 2 . .
• ii, 379
27 . . .
ii, 369
6,3 . •
. ii, 141
11,87 . . .
• ii, 316
6,5 . •
. i, pp. cvii, cviii,
X, 4 . . .
i, 227
232; ii, 378,
126 . .
. i, 227
380, 382, 391,
XII, 91 . .
. i, 294 seq.
393 n-, 400
105, 106 .
. i, 315
6, 6 . .
• ii, 419
7 • ■
7 . . .
7 seqq. .
. ii, 61 seq.
• ii, 291
MuK^aka-
upanishad
7, I . .
. i, p. Ixxxiv, 25,
I, I, 1 . .
. i, 138
79, no, 184,
I, 3 . .
. i, p. XXXV, 138,
232, 344, 355;
159,285; ii,9,
ii, 52, 203,
76
285, 330, 406,
I, 4 . .
. i, p. cxvi
408, 409
I, 5; 6 .
. ij 135; ii, 239
428
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
1,1,6 . .
. i, p. xliii, 288 ;
Nyaya-sutra
ii, 171
I, I, 2 ...
i, 30
I, 7 • •
. i, 285
I, 18 . . .
i, 435
1,9 . .
• i, 48, 136, 137,
158, 355; ii,
Purva-mimawzsa-sutra, see
290
Gaimini-sQtra
2, 7 . .
. i, 138 seq.
2, 9 seqq.
. i, pp. cvii, cviii
Pa«i^adaji
2, II . .
. ii, 295, 382
I, 7 ... .
i, p. xcii
2, 12 . .
• i, n9
Pacini
2, 13 . .
. i, 137
II, I, I . .
• ii, 30
I, 4, 30 . . .
i, 285
I, 2 . .
. i, p. cxix, 28,
II, 1,50 .. .
i, 260
107 seq., 139,
VI, 4, 158 . . .
i, 162
243, 349; ii,
77, 85, 155,
Prajna-
335, 394
upanishad
I, 3 . .
• ii, 21, 27,74-76,
1,1 ....
i, 227
85, 86, 94
9 seqq. . .
i, p. cvii
I, 4 . .
. 1, 140
10 ... .
i, p. cviii,
128
I, 4-9 . .
• I, 142, 142 n.
11,3 ....
i, 102 ; ii
89
I, 8 . .
• ii, 74, 79
13 ... .
ii, 87 n.
I, lO . .
• i, 142, 143 n-,
111,3 ....
i, 60
155; ii, 76
6 . . . .
ii, 39
2,5 . .
. i, p. XXXV, 15-1,
9 . . . .
ii, 365
194
10 . . .
ii, 352
2,6 . .
• li, 52
IV, 2 ...
i, 168
2, 8 . .
• i, 29, 31, 98,
2 ; 3 . .
i, 163
157; ii, 237,
6 . . .
i, 163
354. 356
8 . . . .
ii, 79, 83
2, 10 . .
. i, p. xliii, 192 ;
9 . . .
ii, 49, 55
ii, 417
V, 2 ...
i, 171 ; ii,
401
2,11 . .
• i, 22, 155, 282,
4 . . . .
ii, 112
311, 321; 11,
5 . . . .
i, p. XXXV,
178
10, 180, 329,
7 • . .
i, 173
394
VI, I ...
ii, 154
HI, I . .
. i, p. Ixxii
3 . . .
1,48
I, I .
• i, 34, 117, "9,
3; 4 • •
i, 284; ii.
45,89
121, 159; ii,
4 . . .
i, 263;
ii, 74
65,240
78,85
I, 5 •
. i, 288; ii, 225,
5 • . .
ii, 376
232
8 . . .
. i,29
1,8 .
. ii, 171-173
I, 9 .
. . |i, 38,44
Rig-veda-sawhita
2, 6 .
. . i, 282 ; ii, 302
2, 7 .
• ii, 376
I, 98, I . ■
i, 144
2, 8 .
. , i, 157, 278 ; ii.
104, I
. i, 288
173
164, 39 .
. i, 83 seq.
2, 9
. i, 25, 29, 31,
II, 12 . . .
• ii, 274
186; ii, 173,
IV, 26, I seqq.
. ii, 37 n.
285
VIII, 53,7 .
. i, 262
2, lO .
. . ii, 186
IX, 46, 4 . .
X, 14, I . .
. i, 242
. ii, 123
Niriikta
71, 3 • •
88, 3 . .
. i, 211
• i, 147
1,2 . .
. . i,i6
88,12. .
. i, 144
INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.
429
X, 90 . . . .
I, 95seq.
IV, 3 ...
i, III ; ii, 62
121, I . .
I, 142
5 . . .
i, p. xxxix, 253
129,2. .
ii, 85
6 . . .
ii, 240
129,6. .
i, 307
10 . . .
i, 243
190, 3 • • •
i, 215, 361
10 ; 1 1
1, 255
19 . . .
ii, 18
Sankhya-karika
V,2 . . . .
i, 292
3 . . .
i, 257, 364 n.
8 . . .
i, 175 ; ii, 44
12,13. .
i, 364 n.
9 . . .
ii, 38, 44
15 . . .
1,364 n-, 367".
VI, 8 . . . .
i, 51, 347
9 . . .
i, 61 ; ii, 20
Sankhya-sQtras
II . . .
h 34, 74; ii, 32,
I, 129 seqq.
i, 36411.
242
11,31 . . .
ii, 86 n.
12 . . .
i, 329
13 . . .
. i, 298
Sha^viwja-
15 . . .
• 1, 167, 231
brahmawa
18 . . .
i, 213, 240
1,1 ...
i, 219
19 . . .
i, 62, 284, 349;
", 394
5atapatha-
Taittinya-
brahmawa
arawyaka
I, 3, I, 26 .
ii, 321
111,12,7 . .
. i, 62, 278, 329;
VI, I, I, I . .
ii, 74
ii, 62
I, 3, 2; 4
i, 303
X,64 . . .
ii, 220
X, I, 2, 2 . .
ii, 303
2, 6, 8
ii, 387
Taittiriya-
3, 3, ^ • •
i,85
brahmawa
5, 2, 3 . .
ii, 267
II, 2, 4, 2 .
i, 204
5, 2, 23 . .
ii, 267
111,1,4,1 .
i, 215
5, 4, I •
ii, 273
12,9,7 .
i, 91, 299
5) 4) 16 .
ii, 234
6, I, II . .
i, 146, 148
Taittiriya-
6, 3 . .
i, p. Ixvii
sawhita
6, 3, I .
ii, 352
1,5,3 • •
ii, 415
6, 3, 2 .
i, 112, 177 ; ii,
6, 2 . .
li, 415
180
6, 2, 2
i, 258
XI, 5, 3, 13 •
• i, 227
6, 3, 3 •
1, 91
6, 2, 6 .
ii, 109
6, 8, I .
11, 107
XII, 4, 1,1 .
ii, 290
II, 2, 10, 2 .
i, 294
XIV, 6, 7, 30 .
• ii, 59
3, 6 . .
ii, 259
5, 5, 2 .
11, 195 n.
Svetajvatara-
V, I, 10, 3 .
ii, 267
upanishad
3, 2, 3 •
ii, 79
1,1 ...
i, 255
3, 2, 5 •
ii, 79
II.
ii, 139
3,12,1 .
ii, 354
12 . . .
ii, 154
VII, I, 1, 6 .
i, 224
11,8 ...
i, 297
I, 9 . .
ii, 24011.
10 . . .
• ii, 351
3, I . .
ii, 261 n.
12 . . .
. i, 223
5, 5, 2 .
ii, 274
111,1 . . .
8 . . .
i, 98
. i, 98, 252, 266,
298 ; ii, 47,
Taittiriya-
upanishad
400
1,6 ...
. i, p. cvii
9 . . .
. ii, 180
II, I . .
. ii, 297
19 . . •
i, 51,355
11, 2 . .
. ii, 120
430
vedanta-sOtras.
n,
I . . .
. i, 12, 6o, 68, 72,
III, 2-6 . .
ii, 7
76, 82, 120,
6 . . .
1, 19, 65, 68, 70,
167, 263, 264,
84
266, 283, 328;
10, 6 . .
i, 141
ii,4, 14, 21, 22,
24, 34, 37, 74,
207, 285, 335,
Ta«^ya-maha-
brahmawa
401
IV, 9 . . . .
ii, 261 n.
I seqq. .
. i, 264
XX, 12, 5. .
i, 226
1-5 . .
• 1,64
XXI, 10, II . .
ii, 240
4 . . .
. ii, 168
XXV, 4 . .
ii, 250 n.
5 . . .
. i, p. xxxiii ; ii,
50, 57, 202
Vaijeshika-sutras
6 . . .
• i, 65, 77, 264,
I, I, 10 . .
i, 396
264 n., 283,
IV, I, I
], 392
287, 303, 319;
I, 4
i, 392
ii, 21, 25, 31,
1,5
i, 392 seq.
66, 168
2, 2
i, 385
7 . . .
• 1,67,69,71,82,
263, 264 n.,
266, 287; ii,
22,25,31,171,
VII, 1,9
I, 10
I, 17
I, 20
i, 384
i, 384
i, 384
i, 382 n.
191
7; 8; 9 .
. i,65
Va^asaneyi-
8 . .
• ', 67,75; 11, 290
sawhita
9 . . .
• i, 29, 74; ii, 157,
XXXII, 3 . .
ii, 393
III
I . . .
395
• i, 13,16, 19, 199;
Yoga-sutra
ii, 396
11,44 .
i, 223
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS
TO
VOLUMES XXXIV (i) AND XXXVIII (ii).
iimsa, part, Part i, pages Ivii, Iviii, Ixv,
xcvii seq.
akshara, the Imperishable, i, 169-
171, 243 ; ii, 239 seq.
— syllable, i, 169.
akhyaLivadin, i, 5 n.
Agni = agrawi, i, 150.
— fire, i, 255.
— fire-altar, ii, 260-268.
agni^ayana, the building of the fire-
altar, ii, 261 n., 264.
agnihotra, ii, 313.
ahga, subordinate member (of a sacri-
ficial act), i, 199.
ahgush^/^amatra, of the size of a
thumb, i, pp. xxxvii, xxxviii,
xliv.
aiigush/^amatrata, the being of the
size of a thumb, i, 196 n.
a^id vastu, non-sentient matter, i,
p. Ixv.
a^a, its meaning discussed, i, 252-
257.
— unborn, i, 253.
- — she-goat, i, 253, 256 n.
— = maya, i, 256 n.
a^iva, non-soul, i, 428.
a«u, of very minute size, i, pp. liv.
Ivi, Ivii, lix, 384 n. ; ii, 44.
a«utva, minuteness, i, 382.
— smallness, subtlety, ii, 44.
atigraha, objects of the senses, i,
p. cxi seq., 239 ; ii, 369.
atiratra, i, 351.
ativadin, i, 163, 165 seqq.
atijaya, reaching beyond itself, i, 334,
341.
adrishta, the unseen principle, i, p. Ii,
382, 406; ii, 70 seqq., 75, 115,
137 n., 166.
adr;sh/artha, ii, 378 n.
adrejya, that which is not seen, i,
p. xlii.
advaita, non-duality, monism, i, pp.
XXX, cxxv,
adharma, demerit, i, 26, 429.
adhika, additional to, i, p. xcviii,
adhikara, statement of claim, ii,
1 10.
adhidaivata, relating to the gods, ii,
91.
adhipatipratyaya, the defining cause
(Bauddhaj, i, 409 n.
adhish;^ana, superintendence, guid-
ance, i, 7 n.
adhyatma, relating to the Self, ii, 91.
adhyaropita, fictitiously ascribed, i,
130.
adhyasa, superimposition, i, 3 n,, 4 n. ;
ii, 197, 198.
anartha, object of aversion, i, 378.
anarthin, the non-desiring person,
. '' 378. ^
anarabdhakarya, works which have
not yet begun to produce their
effects, i, p. Ixxviii.
anajrama, not belonging to any one
of the four stages of life, i,
p. Ixxvi.
anija, impotence, i, 122.
anubhava, perception, i, 300 n.
anuya^a, ii, 287 n.
anuvakya, ii, 259, 259 n,
anuvada, a statement referring to
something already known, i,
221; ii, 55, 66, 138, 216, 221,
308, 309, 322, 322 n.
anujaya, remainder of works, i,p. lix;
ii, 113, 116, 119.
anush/Aana, performance, ii, 121.
antariksha, ether, ii, 6.
antaryamana, ruling within, i, 131.
432
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
antaryamin, the ruler within, i, pp.
xxviii, XXXV, xlii, Ixii seqq.,
xcviii, c, cxiii, 131.
antyesh/i, funeral ceremony, ii, 109 n.
anna, food, earth, ii, 23 seq.
anyathakhyativadin, i, 4 n., 5 n.
aparam brahma, lower Brahman, i,
pp. XXX, xxxiii n.
apara vidya, lower knowledge, i,
pp. Ixxx, Ixxxi, Ixxxiv, cix, cxvi ;
ii, 19.
aparokshatva, immediate presenta-
tion, i, 6 n.
apavada, sublation, ii, 197.
apahatapapmatva, i, p. Ixxxiv.
apahatapapman, free from all evil,
i, p. Ixii.
apana, the descending vital air, i,
342; ii, 86, 89.
apijrva, supersensuous principle, i,
p. Ixv ; ii, 109, 1 10 n., 181, 182,
183, 347^n.
apratisawkhyavirodha, cessation not
dependent on a sublative act of
the mind, i, 412.
abhavamatra, of a merely negative
character, i, 410.
abhigamana, approach to the temple,
i, 440.
abhij-valana, kindling, i, 403.
abhidhayaka, i, 204 n.
abhivimana, i, 143, 153.
abhyudaya, exaltation, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
233.
amanava, not a man, ii, 388, 388 n.
ayana, ii, 250, 250 n., 251, 314.
ayutasiddha, incapable of separate
existence, i, 396, 397.
ayutasiddhatva, i, 396.
ayutasiddhi, i, 395.
artha, an object of desire, i, 377 n.
arthadhihetu, i, 204 n.
arthavattva, i, p. Ixxi.
arthavada, glorifying passage, i, p.
Ixxv, 218, 220 seqq. ; ii, 212 n.,
213 n., 227, 235, 246, 246 n.,
251, 254, 255, 261, 264, 286,
290, 299 n., 310, 311, 312.
alpajruti, i, p. xliv.
ava^^i^edavada, the doctrine that the
soul is the highest Self in so far
as limited by its adjuncts, i,
pp. Iviii, xcviii.
avabhasa, consciousness, i, 418 n.
avasthiti, permanent abiding, i, p. c,
avantaraprakr/ti, i, 256 n.
avidya, Nescience, i, pp. Ixxix, xcvii,
xcviii, 6, 357 n., 393 n. ; ii, 48,
83 n., 102.
— ignorance as to Brahman, i, p.
cxv.
avidvan, destitute of knowledge of
Brahman, i, pp. Ixxix, Ixxxii.
avibhaga, non-separation, i, p. Ixxxiv.
avimukta, the non-released soul, i,
153-
avimoksha, i, 316.
avivakya, ii, 261.
avesh^i, an offering mentioned under
the heading of the ra^asuya-
sacrifice, ii, 266.
avyakta, unevolved (matter), i, p.
xxviii.
— the Undeveloped, i, p. xxxix,
^237-242, 238^ n., 245, 252.
avyakr/ta, the Undeveloped, i, p.
cxix.
ajanaya, hunger, i, 59.
ajvakarwa, horse-ear, a certain plant,
i, 261 n.
ajvamedha, horse sacrifice, ii, 305 n.
asawyagdarjin, a person w ho has not
risen to perfect knowledge, i,
p. cxiii.
asat, that which is not, non-existent,
i, 333 n. See also General
Index,
asatkaryavadin, i, 334, 339.
astikaya, category, i, 429.
ahahkartr/', principle of egoity, i, 34.
ahahkara, the principle of egoity, i,
p. xxiii, 364 n., 376 n., 440, 441 ;
ii, 81.
aham, secret name of Brahman, ii,
216 seq., 246.
ahampratyaya, self-consciousness, ii,
52.
ahar, secret name of Brahman, ii,
216 seq., 246.
akahksha, a desire of complementa-
tion, ii, 279 n.
akaja, ether, or space, i, 81-84, i75>
232^, 243, 412, 429 ; ii, 3 n., 6.
akr/ti, elSos, i, 202 n.
a^ara, conduct, ii, 119.
— religious duty, ii, 121.
atmakhyativadin, i, 4 n.
atman anandamaya, the Self consist-
ing of bliss, i, p. Ixix seq.
— purushavidha, the Self in the
shape of a person, i, p. cv seq.
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.
-Jv)
atman prawamaya, i, p. Ixix seq.
— vaijvanara, i, p. xxxv.
atmanusmarawa, consciousness of
personal identity, ii, 148.
aditya, sun, ii, 244.
adrava«a, the rushing on, i, 225.
ananda, bliss, i, 74.
anandamaya, consisting of bliss, i,
pp. xxxiii, xlii, Ixix seq., 66-71.
— its true meaning, i, 71-76.
— koja,involucrumof delight, ii, 203.
abhasa, reflection, i, pp. Iviii, xcviii.
• — = hetvabhasa, a fallacious argu-
ment, i, pp. Ivili seq., xcviii.
ayurveda, medicine, ii, 152.
arabdhakarya, works which have
begun to produce their effects,
i, p. Ixxviii.
ar^a^, Rigvedins, ii, 228.
alambanapratyaya, the substantial
cause, i, 409 n.
alayavi_g-«ana, internal cognition, i,
426 seq., 426 n.
alayavi^wana-pravaha, the train of
self-cognitions, i, 403.
avarawabhava, absence of any cover-
ing, 1,41 2 n.
avirbhava, i, p. xxxvi.
avirbhutasvarupa, i, 185 n.
ajrama, stage of life, ii, 300-303,
306 seq., 309, 315 seq., 317,
324 seq.
ajramakarma«i, duties of the four
stages of life, i, p. Ixxv.
asrava, the issuing outward, i, 428,
428 n.
i^ya, oblation, i, 440.
itara, the other one, i. e. the indi-
vidual soul, i, p. xcviii.
iti, so, ii, 167, 169, 344.
indriya, sense-organ, ii, 94.
iva, i, p. cxx seq.
ish/i, sacrificial oblation, ii, 108-110,
259, 353 n.
ija, Lord, i, 122.
ijvara, the Lords, i, 213.
— divine being, i, 307.
utkranti, departure (of the soul
from the bodyj, i, p. Ixxxi.
udanya, thirst, i, 59.
udana, the ascending function of
the chief vital air, ii, 86, 89 seq.
udgitha. See General Index.
[38] ]
udgitha-vidya. See General Index,
udbhid, name of a sacrifice, i, 261,
261 n.
upakurva«a, a Brahma/tarin for a
certain time only, not for life,
ii, 318 seq.
upanishad, secret name, ii, 216.
upanyasa, reference to something
known, ii, 409 n.
uparati, discontinuance of religious
ceremonies, i, 1 2 n.
upalabdhi, perception, ii, 57.
upalabdhr/, the perceiving person,
i, 413.
— perceiving principle, ii, 57.
upasad, ii, 239 seq.
upasthana, ii, 252.
upadana, the material cause of the
world, i, pp. XXV, xciii, xciv.
— activity, i, 405 n.
— procuring of things to be offered,
i, 440.
upadhi, limiting adjunct, i, pp. xxvi,
Ivii, Ixii, Ixiv, xcv, cxxi ; ii, 153.
upasana and upasana, devout medi-
tation, i, pp. Ixxviii, cxiv, 22 ;
ii, 203 n., 253 n.
ubhayalingatva, i, pp. Ixiii, Ixiv.
urdhvaretas, ascetic, i, p. Ixxv seq.
ekatva, unity, ii, 197.
evam, so, ii, 167.
owkara, the syllable Om, i, p. Ixviii ;
ii, 194, 196-199, 283.
ai.fvarya, lordly power, i, p. Ixxxiv,
130.
audasinya, non-activity, ii, 69 n.
ka, pleasure, i, 126 seq.
kapila, i, 292 n.
karmakaWa. See General Index.
karman, work, action, i, p. Ixxi, 270,
357 n., 390 n.; ii, 83 n., 102,
103, 105, 121.
■ — motion, i, 387.
karmabheda, ii, 166 n.
karmahga, ii, 120 n.
karmajaya, aggregate of works, ii,
113-
kama, desire, ii, 83 n.
— desire, lovely thing, ii, 134.
— ■ wish, for satyakama, ii, 247.
f
434
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
karawavastha, causal condition, i,
p. xxix.
karireshn, a sacrifice offered to bring
about rain, ii, ii8, ii8 n.
karyam brahma, effected Brahman,
i, p. Ixxxii.
karyavastha, condition of an effect,
i, p. xxix.
karshapawa, ii, 178.
kuja, small wooden rod, ii, 225, 227
seq., 227 n.
ku/astha, absolutely changeless, i,
327.
ku/asthanitya, eternal without un-
dergoing any changes, i, 28.
kaivalya = sampatti, i, p. Ixxxv.
kratu, determination, i, 107.
kratvartha, subordinate to action,
i, p. Ixxv, 291 n.
kshawikatva, momentariness, i, 403 n.
kshetra^«a, individual soul, i, 122 ;
ii, 83.
kha, ether, i, 126 seq.
khadira, ii, 313.
ga«a, troop, i, p. Ixxxiii.
gu«a, the three constituent elements
of the pradhana, i, 46, 48 seq.,
364 n.
— the three qualities (SSnkhya), i,
254, 353-
— quality, i, 336 n., 390.
— secondary matter, ii, 187.
gu«avada, a statement of a quality,
i, 221 ; ii, 112, 261, 299, 299 n.
gu^zavidhi, enjoining some secondary
matter, i, 108 n. ; ii, 279.
godohana, a certain sacriiicial vessel,
ii, 253, 253"-, 255seq.,284, 321,
347, 347 n.^
gauwyasambhavat, ii, 77.
graha, seizers, i. e. senses and organs,
i, p. cxi seq., 239; ii, 79, 83,
369.
ghana = sanghata, i, 173.
— = miartta, shape, i, 173 n.
^amasa, a sacrificial vessel, ii, 253 n.,
347 n.
Parana, conduct, ii, 114, 119 seq.
— ' remainder of works,' ii, 120 seq.
— 'good and evil works,' ii, 121.
^aritra, conduct, ii, 119,
^it, intelligence, i, 3 n.
^itta, mind, thought, i, 402 ; ii, 48, 81.
>^aitanya, pure intelligence, i, pp.
xxiv, liv, Ixxxiv.
— consciousness, ii, 269.
^aitta, mental, i, 402.
^agadvyapara, world-business, i, p.
xxxix.
^ana, i, 261 n.
^ara, decay, i, 405 n.
^ati, species, i, 405 n.
^iva, individual soul, i, p. xxxii and
often.
— intelligent principle, i, 53.
j-ivaghana, of the shape of the indi-
vidual soul, i, 173.
^ivapura, city of the individual soul,
i, 178.
^ivatman, the living Self, i, p. cxxii,
62 n., 233 ; ii, 96, 140.
— the object of self-consciousness,
i, 37.
^uhu, sacrificial ladle, ii, 253, 253 n.,
254, 256, 287 n.
gna, intelligent, intelligence, i, pp,
liv, xcvii.
— individual soul, i, 122.
gnltri, knowing agent, i, pp. Iv, Ivii.
^«ana, pure intelligence or thought,
i, pp. XXV, Ixv,
■ — knowledge, i, pp. Iv, cxiv.
^yotish/oma. See ^yotis.
^yotis, light, also =^yotish/oma, a
certain sacrificial performance,
i, pp. xxxviii, xliv, 54 seq., 57,
87, 88-93 ; ii, 185, 185 n.
ta^^alan, i, 108 ; ii, 21.
tat tvam asi, that art thou, i, p.
Ixxxiv.
tattva, category, i, 428.
tadatmya, identity, i, 436.
titiksha, patience in suffering, i,
12 n.
tr/shwa, desire, i, 405 n.
te^as, elementary fire, heat, i, 255 ;
ii, 368.
te^omatra/6, parts of light, ii, 102.
tyat, that, ii, 25, 167.
trasare«u, a combination of three
atoms, lit. a speck of dust, ii,
41 n,, 392 n.
tritva, the being three, i, 384 n.
dakshiwayana, southern progress of
the sun, i, p. Ixxxii.
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.
435
Datta for Devadatta, ii, 248.
daina, self-restraint, i, 12 n.
darjapur/zamasa, the full and new
moon sacrifice, ii, 255, 275,
287 n., 309, 309 n., 313, 324.
daharavidya. See General Index.
d'ls, place, ii, 14.
duiikha, pain, i, 405 n.
durmanas, mental affliction, i, 405 n.
devayana, path of the gods, i, p. cvii.
dehin, the embodied Self, the indi-
vidual soul, i, 33.
dravya, substance, ii, 15 n.
dvitva, the being two, i, 384 n.
dharma, religious duty, i. 26, 299,
300.
— merit, i, 429,
— qualifying particulars, ii, 1S6.
dhu, to shake, ii, 228 seq.
dhvani, tone, i, 208.
n%d\, vein. See General Index.
namarupavyakara«a, evolution of
names and forms, i, p. lix.
Nasi, i, 153.
nitya, permanent, i, p. Ixxviii.
nityata, permanency, ii, 312 n.
nityanuvada, ii, 216.
nididhyasa, mental concentration,
i, 297 n.
nimitta, operative cause, i, p. xl,
331 n.
niyogabheda, ii, 166 n.
nirguwa, non-qualified, i, pp. xxxiii,
cxvi, cxxiv.
nirguwam brahma, i, pp. xxx, Ixxi,
Ixxii.
nir^ara, destruction, i, 428, 428 n.
nirvijeshatva, absence of distinctive
attributes, i, p. Ixi.
neti neti, ' not so, not so,' i, pp. Ixiii,
Ixiv.
naimittika, i, 331 n.
naish/Aika, a Brahmai^arin for life,
ii, 318 seq.
paw^a^anaA, five-people, i, p. xl, 257-
262, 258 n.
paw-^apQli, one bundle made of five
bundles, i, 259.
pawHgnividya, knowledge of the
five fires, i, pp. Ixxxiii, cviii ; ii,
187.
pad, to go, ii, 393.
para, higher, highest, i, 173.
paramarthadr/sh/i, intuition, ii, 37 n.
param brahma, higher Brahman, i,
pp. xxx, xxxiii n.
paragrupatva, externality, i, 130.
para vidya, highest knowledge, i,
pp. Ixxxiii, cix, ex, cxvi.
pariwama, change, modification, i,
pp. xxix, xl, xcv, cxviii, 393 n.
pariwamavada, i, p. xcv.
pari«aminitya, eternal, although
changing, i, 28.
parimaWala, spherical, i, 382 n.
parivedana, lament, i, 405 n.
par«amayitva, the quality of being
made of par«a-wood, ii, 253 n.
pa«i/itya, learning, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
322, 323.
paramarthika, real, i, p. Ixxiii ; ii,
133-
pariplava, recitation of certain stories
at stated intervals during the
year occupied by the ajvamedha
sacrifice, ii, 305 seq., 305 n.
parivra^ya, the state of the wander-
ing mendicant, ii, 302.
pudgala, body, i, 429.
— atom (Gaina), i, 431.
purijaya, dwelling in the city, i, 172,
178.
puritat, pericardium, ii, 144.
purusha, the Person, i, pp. cxix,
cxxiii seq., 298 ; ii, 205.
— purijaya, the person dwelling in
the castle (of the body), i, 172,
178.
— soul, i, 36 ; ii, 167, 169.
— individual soul (in the Sankhya
sense), i, pp. xl, xlvi, 45, 238 n.,
370.
purushaya^wa, man-sacrifice, ii, 220.
purushartha, beneficial to man (soul),
i, 291 n. ; ii, 120 n.
puro^aja, cake, ii, 240, 259.
purva-paksha, the prima facie
view, i, 22, 316 and often,
przthagbhuta, separate, i, p. Ixxxiv.
prakara«a, subject-matter, i, 68 n.,
166, 256 n.; ii, 253 n., 254, 260-
264.
prakara, mode, i, pp. xxviii, liii, Ixiv.
prakaja, luminousness, i, p. Ixv.
prakajarupata, i, p. Ixiii.
prakWti, i, p. Ixxxiii, 329.
— = pradhana of the Safikhyas, i,
p. xciii, 16 n., 238 n., 253.
prakr/taitavattva, i, pp. Ixiv, xcvi.
f2
436
vedaxta-sOtras.
pra^aya, accumulation, i, 384 n.
pra^wa, intelligence, i, 100, 103,
105.
pra^atinan, the intelligent Self, i,
97.
pra«ava, the syllable Om, ii, 282,
282 n.
pratibimbavada, the doctrine that
the soul is a reflection of the
Self in the buddhi, i, pp. Iviii,
xcvii seq.
pratisawkhyavirodha, cessation de-
pendent on a sublative act of
the mind, i, 412.
pratika, symbol, i, pp. Ixxvii, Ixxxii,
Ixxxiii, 147 n.
pratikopasana, meditation in which
Brahman is viewed under a
symbol, i, p. Ixxvii.
pratyaksha, intuition, i, 266.
pratyagatman. the interior Self, i,
5 n-, 32; ii, 335.
pratya«>^, internal, i, 133.
prathama^atva, i, p. Ixxxiii.
pradeja, part, i, 388.
pradhana, principal element, i, pp.
Ixiii, xcviii ; ii, 278.
— as a Sankhya term. See General
Index.
prapa«,^avijish/ata, the quality of
being differentiated by the
world, i, p. Ixv,
prabalakarmfintara, another very
strong work, i, p. Ixxvi.
pramawa, means of proof, i, p. xli.
pramatr-/, knowing subject, i, 418 n.
praya^a, five offerings made to the
fuel, &c., ii, 255, 274, 274 n.,
275, 287, 313, 351.
prayo^ana, final end, i, 38.
pralaya. See General Index,
pravr/ttivi^wana, quasi-external cog-
nition, i, 426 n., 427.
pravra^in, mendicant, i, p. Ixxv.
prastava, i, 84, 86, 87 ; ii, 254.
pra/^urya, abundance, i, 77.
pra^wa, intelligent, i, 60, 234.
— (atman), the highest Self, i, 192
seqq., 195; », 45, i34, 138,
141, 144.
prawa, vital air, a generic name de-
noting the sense-organs, and
the manas, i, p. lix, 261, 269
seqq. ; ii, 65 n., 94, 96. See
also Prawas in the General
Index.
prawa, (chief) vital air, breath, i,
p. Ixxix, 84-87, 97-106, 162
seqq., 172, 229-231. See also
General Index.
— the forward-function of the chief
vital air, i, 342 ; ii, 86, 89.
— air, i, 229.
pra.fia.hh.rit, individual soul, i, 158.
pra«amaya (atmanj, ii, p. Ixix seq.
pra«a-vidya, i, p. Ixviii ; ii, 200 seq.,
212.
prawajariratva, i, p. Ixvii.
prawasawvada, the colloquy of the
vital airs, i, p. Ixx.
prade^amatra, measured by a span,
i, 151.
priyajirastva, i, p. Ixix.
bandha, bondage, i, 428.
bahutva, plurality, i, 384 n.
balya, childlike state, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
322, 323, 325 seq.
bahyarthavadin, i, p. Ii.
buddhi, intelligence, i, p.lv seqq., 239
seq.; ii, 27, 42-48, 50, 51, 56,
57, 65, 65 n., 81, 178, 336, 402.
— mind, i, 104, 1 18 seqq., 418.
— the apprehending agent, i, 206,
209, 210.
— ' the great one ' (technical San-
khya term), i, 238 n.'
— internal organ, i, 331.
— the generic name for buddhi,
ahankara, and manas, i, 376 n.
bodha, thought, inteUigence, ii, 160.
brahma bhrantam, i, p. cxxii.
brahma mayopadhikam, i, p. cxxii.
brahma/^arya, ii, 307.
brahmapura, city of Brahman, i, 178.
brahmaloka, world of Brahman, i,
180.
brahmavidya, knowledge of Brah-
man, i, pp. xxxvii, Ixx, 216 seq.
brahmasawstha, grounded on Brah-
man, ii, 296, 300, 301.
brahmasawsthata, ii, 299 n.
bhakti, figurative identification, ii, 7.
bhagavat, holy, i, 440.
Bhamani, name of the Lord, i, 125.
Bhama for Satyabhama, ii, 248.
bharupatva, i, p. Ixvii.
bhava, being, individual soul, ii, 30 n.
bhavana, ii, 69 n.
bhavavikara/', six forms of existence,
i, t6 n.
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.
437
bhuta, element, i, 402.
— beings, moving and non-moving
things, ii, 63.
bhutasukshma, subtle material ele-
ments, i, p. lix.
bhuman. See General Index.
bheda, individual existences, i,p,xxv.
bhedabhedavada, i, 277 n.
bhoga, fruition, i, p. Ixxviii.
bhautika, elementary, i, 402.
madhu-vidya, ' knowledge of the
(sun as) honey,' i, 216 seq. ; ii,
233.
manana, thinking, ii, 323.
manas, internal organ, mind, i, pp.
xxiii, xxvi, Ii, Ixxix, cxxi, 175,
239, 376 n., 398 n., 440 ; ii, 14,
1^3 27, 33, 48, 65 n., 69, 81, 82,
84, 89, 90, 260, 336, 411, 413
seq., 415.
mano-buddhi, mind, i, 113, 277.
manomaya, consisting of mind, i,
III.
manomayatva, i, p. Ixvii.
-maya, the affix, 'abounding in,'
i, 67.
marawam, death, i, 405 n,
mahat, great, i, 252.
— the great principle (of the San-
khyas), i, 252, 364 n., 370.
— big, i, 384 n.
mahattva, bigness, i, 383, 384 n.
mahapitr/ya^;7a, ii, 299.
mahapralaya, general annihilation of
the world, i, 212 seqq.; ii, 238.
matra, the elements and the sense
organs, i, 281.
mana, knowledge, i, 418 n.
inanava, human being, ii, 388 n.
manasa, mental, ii, 260, 266 seq.
maya, illusion, i, pp. Ix, xcvi seq.,
243, 256 n., 329, 371; ii, 133,
134-
— wonderful nature (Ramanug-a), i,
p. Ixi.
— creative power, i, p. cxvii n.
mayavada, theory of illusion, i, p.
xcviii.
mayavadin, i, p. cxx.
mukti, final release, i, pp. Ixxv,
Ixxvii, Ixxxix.
mukhya pra«a, the chief vital air, i,
p. lix; ii, 79, 84, 93 seq., 95.
muni, derived from manana, ' think-
ing,' ii, 323.
muni. See General Index,
muhurta, moment, ii, 136.
murta rupa, i, p. cxx,
murti, solid size, i, 394.
moksha, final release, i, 27, 28, 283,
428; ii, 58.
mauna, muni-ship, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
332 n., 323.
ya^amana, sacrificer, i, p. Ixxvi.
ya^ya, ii, 2^59, 259 n.
yavatsampatam, ii, 112, 113.
yupa, a wooden post, i, 261, 261 n.
yoga, devout meditation, i, 440.
yoni, source, i, 136, 288.
— place, i, 288.
— womb, ii, 132.
yaugika, etymological (meaning),
i, 261 n.
ra^as = avidya, i, 1 2 3 n,
rakshasa = rakshas, i, 150.
TudA'i, conventional meaning, i, 2 56 n.,
261 n.
rupa, form, ii, 185.
rijpaskandha, the group of sensation,
i, 402, 402 n.
rupopanyasat, i, 142 n.
laksha«a, indication, i, 258 n,, 261 n. ;
ii, 127.
— implication, ii, 348.
laya, merging, i, p. Ixxix.
lihga, indicatory or inferential mark,
i, p. Ixv, 68 n., 196 n., 225 n. ; ii,
224, 260, 261, 263, 264.
lihgatman, the subtle Self, ii, 169,
lokayatika, materialist, ii, 269.
Varawa, 'that which wards off,' i,
vajitva, i, p. Ixxiii.
vakya, syntactical unity, i, 196 n. ;
ii, 221, 224, 263, 287, 287 n.
vakyabheda, split of the sentence,
i, 108 n., 177 n. ; ii, 279 n.
va^aka, i, 204 n.
vamani, leader of blessings, i, 125;
ii, 400.
vayasa = vayas, i, 150.
vasana, mental impression, i, 420 n. ;
ii, 56, 141.
vikalpa, optional procedure, ii, 228.
vikara, modification, i, p. cxviii.
vikaja, expansion, i, pp. xxix, liii.
vikriti, ii, 309, 309 n.
438
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
vi^ara, free from old age, i, p. Ixii.
vi^;7ana, individual soul, i, p. Ivi.
— knowledge (Bauddha), i, 404 n.
— cognition, idea, i, 418.
— knowledge, internal organ, ii, 48,
^82.
vi^wanakoja, i, 66.
vi^wanamaya, he who consists of
knowledge, i, p. xxxviii, 273 ; ii,
33-
vi^^anavadin, an idealist, 1, p. li, 401,
418 n.
vi^wanaskandha, the group of know-
ledge, i, 402, 402 n., 426 n.
vi^«anatman, cognitional Self, soul,
i, 70, 120, 124, 174, 329.
vidya, knowledge, cognition, medi-
tation, i, pp. Ixvii-lxxvi, 6,
152; ii, loi, 187-284, 355,
378.
vidyamahatmya, i, p. Ixxi.
vidyavidhi, ii, 279.
vidvan, he who knows, i, pp. Ixxvii-
Ixxxiv.
vidhi, the establishing of something
not yet known, ii, 408 seq. n.
vidhriti, a limitary support, i, 181.
vimr/'tyu, free from death, i, p.
Ixii.
vivakshita, desired to be expressed,
i, 1 10 n,
vivarta, illusory manifestation of
Brahman, i, pp. xcv, xcviii.
vivartavada, i, p. xcv.
viiishm advaita, qualified non-
duality, i, p. XXX.
vijeshawa, specification, ii, 197.
vijvanara, i, 150.
vr/tti, function, ii, 84.
vedana, feeling, i, 405 n.
vedanaskandha, the group of feeling,
i, 402, 402 n.
vedi, a levelled spot, i, 261 ; ii,
252.
vairag)'a, absence of all desire, ii,
102.
vailaksha«ya, difference of charac-
ter, i, 308 n.
vyakta, developed, manifested, i,
242, 245.
vyapadeja, expression of something
known without reference to a
vidhi, ii, 408 seq. n.
vyavahara, the phenomenal world,
i, p. xxvi, 326 n.
vyavaharapekshaya, with a view to
the world of appearances, i,
pp. Ixxxiv, xc.
vyakriyata, it became developed, i,
268.
vyana,the cause of works of strength,
ii, 86, 89 seq.
vyapin, all-pervading, i, p. liv,
inn.
vyuha, the four forms of Vasudeva,
i, p. xxiii, 440.
vyoman, ether, i, 84.
jakti, potentiality, i, 214.
— power, i, 329.
jabda, word, i, p. xxxvii, 196 n., 201.
jabdantaram, difference of terms, ii,
166 n.
jama, tranquillity, i, 12 n.
jarvari, 'night '= earth, ii, 24.
jarira, embodied, i, p. xcviii, in.
jish/a, honourable man, ii, 320.
/ila, conduct, ii, 119, 119 n.
juk, grief, i, 225.
junyavada, hypothesis of a general
void, ii, 14.
junyavadin, a nihilist, i, 401.
joka, grief, i, 405 n.
jraddha, faith, also explained as
water, ii, 12 n., 103, 106-108,
109 n., no n.
jruti, direct enunciation, i, 196 n. ;
ii, 262.
sha</ayatana, the abode of the six
(senses), i, 405 n.
sho^ajin, i, 351.
sawzyagdarjana, complete intuition,
perfect knowledge, i, p. Ixxvii,
172 n. ; ii, loi.
sawyag-vi^;7ana, perfect knowledge,
ii, 12.
Sawyadvama, a name of the Lord,
i, 125, 128, 130.
sawjyoga, conjunction, i, pp. Ixxix,
Ixxxi, 335 seq., 336 n., 385, 390,
396 seq., 436 ; ii, 128 n.
sawradhana, worship, i, p. Ixv.
sawvara, restraint, i, 428, 428 n.
sawvargavidya, i, 224-226.
sa»;vid svayamprabha, the self-lumi-
nous principle of thought, i,
p. xcii.
sawjlesha, intimate connexion, i,
399-
sawsara. See General Index.
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.
439
sawzsarin, the transmigrating soul, i,
51, 66. _
sawskara, ceremonial purification, i,
33; ii, i2on., 286, 286 n., 287 n.,
347 n.
— impression, affection (Bauddha),
i, 404 n.
sawskaraskandha, the group of im-
pressions, i, 402, 402 n.
sawskr/ta, produced, i, 410.
sawsthanavijesha, special arrange-
ment, i, p. Ixv.
sagu«a, qualified, i, pp. xxxiii, Ixxxii,
ci, cxvi, 330.
sagu^zam brahma, the qualified
(lower) Brahman, i, pp. xxx,
Ixvii, Ixxi, Ixxii.
sagu«a-vidya, qualified knowledge, i,
pp. Ixxii, Ixxvi.
sankalpa, determination, wish, i,
p. Ixxxv ; ii, 139.
sanko>la, contraction or non-mani-
festation (of intelligence), i,
pp. xxix, liii seq.
sahghata = ghana, i, 173.
sa/^-^id-ananda, i, p. xcii.
sa»z§-«askandha, the group of verbal
knowledge, i, 402, 402 n.
sat. See General Index.
satta, the quality of being, i, 63 n,,
306.
— essentiality, ii, 16 n.
sattva, goodness, i, 49 n.
— internal organ, i, 122 seq., 161.
— being, that which is, i, 333.
sattva-gu«a, the quality of goodness,
i, 379-
satyakama, having true wishes, i,
pp. Ixiii, Ixxiii ; ii, 247, 400.
satyakamatvn, i, p. Ixxiii.
satyabhedavada, i, 278 n.
satyaloka, the world of the True, i,
181.
satyasawkalpa, of truthful concep-
tion, i, pp. Ixiii, Ixxxv.
satyasawkalpatva, truthfulness of
conception, i, pp. Ixvii, Ixxxiv.
sawnyasa, ii, 222.
sawnyasin, an ascetic, a man in the
fourth stage of life, ii, 322-324,
325, 326.
sanmatra, ' only that which is,' i,
p. Ixiv.
saptabhanginaya, i, 429.
samanantarapratyaya, the immediate
cause (Bauddha), i, 409 n.
samavaya, inherence, i, 335 seq.,
335 n., 336 n., 341, 389 seq.,
396 seq.
samadhana, concentration of the
mind, i, 12 n.
samadhi, meditation, ii, 52.
samana, the function of the chief
vital air which conveys food
equally through all the limbs of
the body, ii, 86, 89 seq.
sampatti, combination, i, p. Ixxix ;
ii, 209.
— = marawam, dying, i, p. Ixxxv.
— = kaivalya, i, p. Ixxxv.
sampata, aggregate of works, ii,
samprasada, serene being, i, p.
xxxvi.
— bliss, i, 164.
sarvagata, omnipresent, i, p. liv.
sarvava^itva, i, p. Ixvii.
sarvastitvavadin, realist, i, p. Ii, 401.
savijesha, distinguished by qualities,
_ i, 74, 76, 78 n.
savijeshatva, presence of distinctive
attributes, i, p. Ixi.
sahakaripratyaya, the auxiliarycause
(Bauddha), i, 409 n.
sakshatkara, intuition, i, p. Ixv, i8n.,
300.
sakshin, a witnessing principle, i, 49,
samanadhikara«ya, co-ordination, ii,
196 n.
siddhanta, the final conclusion, i,
pp. liv, Ivi, 316 ; ii, 392.
sushupti, deep sleep, i, p. Ixxxv.
sushum/za, the vein passing through
the crown of the head, i, pp.
Ixxxii, cvii, cix, ex.
sukshmajarira, the subtle body, i,
p. xxxix.
sutratman, the lower Brahman, i,
p. Ixix, 172 n.
sr/sh/ikrama, the order of creation,
ii, 23.
setu, bridge, i, 156.
— bank, ii, 175.
skandha, group, i, 402 seq.
stuti, glorification, i, p. Ixxv.
sparja, touch, i, 405 n.
spho/a, manifestor, i, p. xxxvii, 204
seqq., 204 n., 209, 210.
syadvada, sceptical doctrine, i, 431.
svapiti, to sleep, i, 59.
svabhava, nature, i, 357 n.
440 vedanta-sCtras.
svayamprakaja, self-luminous, i, 5 n. svadhyaya, recitation, i, 440.
svara, accent, i, p. Ixxiv. svapyaya = sushupti, deep sleep, i,
svarupa, true nature, i, 186. p. Ixxxv.
svarupanyathabhava, change of es-
sential nature, i, p. liv. hira«yagarbha. See General Index.
svarga, heaven, ii, 405. hr/daya, heart, i, 59.
svargaloka, heavenly world, i, pp. hetvabhasa, fallacious argument, i,
cviii, ex. p. xcviii.
GENERAL INDEX
VOLUMES XXXIV (i) AND XXXVIII (ii)
Abhipratarin. See iTaitraratha.
Accents, udatta, anudatta, svarita,
depend on the tone, Part i, page
208.
Action, five classes of, and five
organs of, ii, 81.
Actions (karman) : birth, a. and
death, i, p. xxvii.
— there is no confusion of a., or
fruits of a., because there is no
extension of the acting and en-
joying Self, ii, 68.
— the soul takes with itself the
results of good and evil a., when
leaving the body, ii, 102.
— some single a. are the causes of
more than one new existence,
ii, 118.
— not the fruits of all a. are brought
about by death, the fruits of
some a. being enjoyed in this
life already, ii, 118, 119.
— the fruits of, according to
Gaimini, are brought about by
the a. themselves, ii, 182.
— see also Works.
Adhikarawas, 'heads of discussion,'
i, p. xxxi.
Adhvaryu priest, ii, 240.
Aditya, the sun, i,^2r6, 217.
— the ideas of A. &c. are to be
superimposed on the members
of the sacrificial action, i, p.
Ixxvii ; ii, 345-349.
— is A. to be meditated upon as
Brahman, or Brahman as A.?
ii, 342-345.
— the reaching of A. constitutes
the fruit of certain works,
ii, 347-
— Vayu comes before A. (on the
path of the gods), ii, 385.
Adityas, class of gods, i, 202, 216.
Adribh/a. See Unseen principle.
Advaita, non-duality or monism
taught both by 5afikara and
Ramanu^a, i, p. xxx.
A^a does not mean pradhana, i,
p. xxxix, 252-257.
— the elements beginning with light
are meant by, i, 254 seq.
— denotes the causal matter meta-
phorically, i, 256 seq.
A^atajatru, i, p. cv.
— dialogue of Balaki and A., i, 268-
274.
Agent, every action requires an, i,
337 seqq.
Aggregate, the seventeenfold, ii,
65, 65 note.
Aggregates, the dyad of, assumed
by the Bauddhas with its two
causes, cannot be established,
i, 400-409,
— the Gaina doctrine that a. are
formed from the atoms, i, 430
seq,
Agni, the eater of food, i, 116,
117.
— the highest Self, from the etymo-
logy agni = agrani, i, 150.
— off'ers to Agni, i, 215.
— fire, i, 217.
— having become speech entered
the mouth, ii, 91 seq.
— speech enters into, at the time
of death, ii, 105 seq.
— and the man in the sun are not
equal, though the term ' death '
is applied to both, ii, 267.
— means light, when mentioned on
the path of the gods, ii, 383.
— Vaijvanara. See Vaijv.anara,
— see also Fire.
442
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
Agnihotra, ii, 191.
— the permanent obligation of the,
ii, 296, 296 n., 297.
— a text relating to the, which
forms part of the mahapitr/-
ya^wa, ii, 299 seq.
— offered to the pra«as, ii, 249-
252.
— offered during a whole month at
the ayana of the KuWapayins,
ii, 250 n., 251, 314.
— transference of the fire from the
Garhapatya-fire to the two other
fires, at the, ii, 251.
— the details of the fundamental A,
are not valid for the Pra«agni-
hotra, ii, 251 seq.
— the imaginary A. consisting of
speech and breath, ii, 263.
— the A. and other works of per-
manent obligation enjoined by
the Veda, tend towards the
same effect as knowledge,
i, p. Ixxviii; ii, 358-360.
— and similar works are either con-
nected with a special knowledge
based on the constituent mem-
bers of the sacrifice, or not,
ii, 360 seq.
Agnirahasya, i, p. Ixxiv.
— the 5aWilya-vidya part of the, ii,
214, 216.
— of the Va^asaneyins, ii, 260.
Agnishomau, a he-goat sacrificed to,
ii, 274, 274 n.
Air, springs from ether, i, p. Hi ; ii,
18 seq.
— is it * the abode of heaven, earth,
and so on'? i, 154, 158.
— in the a., when it manifests itself
in the form of Par^anya,
lightning, thunder, rain, and
thunderbolts manifest them-
selves, i, 229.
— with its five forms, i, 229.
— is founded on space (ether),
1,413.
— origination of, ii, 3, 18 seq.
— is a product, ii, 18 seq.
— fire is produced from, ii, 20-22.
— fire is dissolved into, ii, 26.
— is dissolved into Ether, ii, 26.
— passing into the adhyatma-state,
dividing itself fivefold and thus
abiding in a specialised con-
dition is called pra«a, ii, 87.
Akaja. See Ether.
Akshara. See Imperishable.
Alms, less meritoriuus than sacrifices,
i, 27.
— lead to the road of the fathers,
ii, 124.
Anandagiri mentions Dravi/iaiarya,
i, p. xxii.
Anandamaya. See Self consisting of
bliss.
Animal sacrifice is an act of duty,
as we know from Scripture,
ii, 131.
and the prohibition of doing
harm to any living creature,
ii, 310.
Animals and men compared, i, 7 seq.
— gods, and rishis excluded from
the study of the Veda, i, 197 n.
Aniruddha, a manifestation of the
highest being, i, p. xxiii.
— a form of Vasudeva, denotes the
principle of egoity, i, 440.
— cannot spring from Pradyumna,
i, 441, 442.
— taken as a Lord, i, 441 seq.
Antaryamin brahma«a (i. e. Br;h.
Up. Ill, 7), i, p. xxviii.
Anudatta. See Accents.
Apantaratamas was born on this
earth as Kr/sh«a Dvaipayana,
ii, 235.
— the bodily existence of A. and
others who are entrusted with
offices conducive to the sub-
sistence of the worlds lasts as
long as the office lasts, ii, 235-
238.
Arhat = Gina, i, 430, 434.
Artabhaga, instructed by Ya^waval-
kya, i, pp. Ixxxi, cxii ; ii, 373 seq.
Arthavadas, i, 219 seq., 304, 348,
355-
— the corporeality of the gods ap-
pears from, i, 198, 217, 223.
— as means of knowledge, i, 218,
220 seq.
— are either anuvada or guwavada,
i, 221.
■ — possess authoritative power, i,
222.
— have no authority if not con-
nected with a corresponding
injunctive passage, i, 225 n.
— have occasionally to be taken in
a secondary sense, i, 318, 318 n.
GENERAL INDEX.
443
Arthavadas, the non-return of the
released soul is set forth in
Mantras and A., ii, 418 seq.
Asat (non-being, non-existent, non-
entity, that which is not), the
origin &c. of the world cannot
proceed from it, i, 17 seq.
— the passages speaking of the A.
do not intimate absolute non-
existence, i, 266-268.
— denotes ' Being ' previous to the
differentiation of names and
forms, i, 267.
— the term a. denotes another
quality only, i, 332-334.
— compared with 'the son of a bar-
ren woman,' i, 338 seq.
■ — the cause of the world, i, 341,
— entity does not spring from a. or
non-entity, i, 415-418.
— Brahman cannot spring from it,
for the a. is without a self, ii,
20.
Ascetic who has broken his vow
of chastity, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii. 317-
320.
— the passage enjoining a childlike
state means that the a. is to
live not manifesting himself, ii,
325-327-
— see Muni.
— see Sawnyasin.
Ash^akas, i, 297 n.
Ajmarathya, i, pp. xix, xcix, 1 50 seq.,
276 seq., 279, 280.
Ajramas. See Stages of life.
Asuras among the pa«/^a^ana/', i,
262.
— metres of the A., i.e. metres of
less than ten syllables, ii, 228,
228 n.
Asuri, a Smr/ti writer, i, 291.
Ajvapati Kaikeya, i, 227 n.; ii,
276.
Atharvawikas, their rite of carrying
tire on the head before the study
of the Veda, ii, 186, 189 seq.
— the seven libations (from the sau-
rya libation up to the jataudana
libation) are limited to the A.,
ii, 189, 190.
Atiratra-sacrifice, ShoJajin-cup at
the, i, 262 seq. ; ii, 188.
Atman means the internal organ,
ii, 81.
— see Self.
Atomistic doctrine refuted, i, p. xlviii ,
289, 317 seq., 354, 381,394-400.
Atoms, refutation of the Vaijeshika
tenet that the world originates
from a. set in motion by the
adr/sWa, i, p. 1 seq., 16, 381-
400.
— conjunction of a. the material
cause of the world, i, 46, 382,
382 n., 387 n.
— conjunction cannot take place
between the a., the soul, and
the internal organ, because
they have no parts, i, 398.
— conjunction of the soul with the
a. cannot be the cause of the
motion of the a., i, 398 n.
— during the period of each pralaya
they are isolated and motion-
less, i, 382 n.
— subsist during a certain period
without producing any effect,
1,382.
— possess the qualities of colour,
&c., according as they are a. of
earth, water, fire, or air, i, 382,
382 n., 386, 402.
— are of spherical form, i, 382,
382 n.
— the form of extension of an effect
depends on the number of, not
on their form of extension, i,
382 seq., 383 n.
— cannot be divided themselves, i,
386 seq.
— action of the a. is impossible,
whether the adr/sh/a is assumed
to adhere in the a. or in the
soul, i, 386-389.
— Ka«ada's reasons for the perman-
ence of, i, 392 seq.
— difficulties in the relation of the
a. and the four elements, i, 393
seq.
— maybe decomposed by their pass-
ing back into the indifferenced
condition of the highest cause,
i, 400.
— the cause of the aggregate of
the elements and elementary
things (Bauddha), i, 403.
— external things can neither be a.
nor aggregates of, i, 419.
— the Gaina doctrine that aggregates
are formed from the a., refuted,
i, 430 seq.
444
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Atreya, i, p. xix ; ii, 320.
Au</ulomi, i, pp. xix, Ixxxiv, xcix,
277 seq., 278 n., 279, 280.
— thinks that the meditations on
subordinate members of the
sacrifice are the work of the
priest, ii, 32 i.
— thinks that the released soul mani-
fests itself by the sole nature of
intelligence, ii, 409 seq.
Aupanishadas or Vedantins, i, p. xx
seq.
Austerity, the path of the gods can-
not be attained by faith and a.,
unaided by knowledge, ii, 234.
— the stage of life, in which a. is the
chief thing, ii, 298.
— the term a. denotes the hermit
in the woods, and not the men-
dicant, ii, 300 seq.
Avabhr/tha-ceremony, identification
of the A. with death, ii, 221.
Avidya. See Maya.
— see Nescience.
Avyakta. See Undeveloped.
Badaraya«a, i, p. xi, 198, 218; ii,
182 seq., 285, 290, 297 seq., 318,
360, 402 seq., 410, 412 seq.
— and the chief distinguishing doc-
trines of 5ahkara a«d Rama-
nu^a, i, pp. Ixxxvii-ci.
— the system of B. had greater af-
finities with that of the Bhaga-
vatas and Ramanu^a than with
that of ^afikara, i, p. c.
— quotes the Bhagavadgita as an
authority, i, p. cxxvi.
Badari, i, pp. xix, Ixxxii seq., xc seq.
— on the highest Lord as ' measured
by a span,' i, 151.
— on the meaning of >^ara«a, ii, 121.
— thinks that the souls are led to
the lower Brahman, ii, 389-392,
393-402.
— asserts the absence of a body and
sense-organs on the part of the
released, ii, 411 seq.
Bahva, questioned about Brahman
by Vashkalin, explained it to
him by silence, ii, 157.
Balaki and A^atajatru, dialogue of,
i, 268-274.
Bauddha doctrines refuted, i, p. Ii,
340, 400-428.
three principal, i, 401,
Bauddha philosophers, i, 15 n.
— schools, their idealistic doctrine
rejected, i, p. xxvi.
— sects, teach the eternal flux of
everything that exists, i, 403 n.
Bauddhas deny the authoritativeness
of Scripture, i, 412.
— the opinion of the B. that the Self
alone begins to function in a
new body, and that new sense-
organs are produced in a new
body, ii, 103 seq.
Beatitude, highest, not to be at-
tained by the knowledge of the
Sahkhya-smr/ti irrespective of
the Veda, nor by the road of
Yoga-practice, i, 298.
there is no other means of
obtaining it but the knowledge
of the unity of the Self which
is conveyed by the Veda, i, 298.
Being. See Sat.
Bhagavadgita, as an authority for
Badaraya«a, i, p. cxxvi.
— the doctrine of the Bh. a fusion
of the Brahman theory of the
Upanishads with the belief in
a personal highest being, i,
p. cxxvi.
Bhagavatas, or Paw^aratras, the fore-
runners of the Ramanu^as, i,
p. xxii seq.
— their views refuted according to
5ankara, approved of accord-
ing to Ramanu^a, i, p. Ii seq.,
439-443-
— their system nearer to Badara-
yawa than that of 5ahkara, i, p. c.
and the Bhagavadgita, i, p.
cxxvi.
and the Mahabharata, i, p.
cxxvii.
■ contradictions in, i, 442 seq.
— the theory of the Bh. that Brah-
man carries within its own
nature an element from which
the material universe originates,
i, p. cxvii.
— the doctrine of the Bh. stated,
^ i, 440.
Bhallavins, amantraofthe,ii,2 27seq.
Bharuy^i quoted by Ramanu^a, i,
p. xxi.
Bhashika-sutra for the accentuation
of the 5atapatha-brahma«a,
i, 258 note.
GENERAL INDEX.
445
Bhashyakara, i. e. Dramid'a, i, p. xxii.
Bhedabheda relation of the soul to
Brahman, i, p. xix.
Bhishma chooses the time of his
death, ii, 380.
Bhr/gu Varuwi, disciple of Varu«a,
i, 199.
— and other sons of Brahman's mind
were again born at the sacrifice
of Varu«a, ii, 235.
Bhu^yu Sahyayani, i, p. cv.
Bhuman (that which is much) is
Brahman, i, p. xxxv, 162-169.
— is it the vital air? i, 162-168.
— is bliss, i, 163.
— is immortality, i, 163, 168.
— in it the ordinary activities of
seeing, &c., are absent, i, 168
seq.
— knowledge of, ii, 412.
Birth, action, death, i, p. xxvii.
— when applied to the sprout, i,
340.
— the terms *b. ' and 'death,' if
applied to the soul, have a meta-
phorical meaning, ii, 28 seq.
— may take place without the ' five
oblations,' i. e. not in the ordi-
nary way, ii, 125 seq.
Blind man who had caught hold of
the ox's tail, i, 55.
Bliss is Brahman, i, 65, 75.
— of Brahman is absolutely supreme,
i, 67,
— Brahman is the cause of b.,
i, 67.
— absolute b. the result of higher
knowledge, i, 138.
— (Brahman asj the bhuman is b.,
i, 163, 168.
— attaches to the state of deep
sleep, i, 163, 164, 168.
— constitutes the nature of the Self,
i, 168.
— and other qualities ascribed to
Brahman in different scriptural
texts, have to be attributed to
Brahman everywhere, ii, 201-
204.
— see also Self consisting of b.
Bodhayana, author of a VWtti on the
Vedanta-sutras, i, p. xxi.
Bodhayana quoted by Ramanuj^i-a,
i, p. xxi.
Body, the product of Nescience,
i, 244.
— the Undeveloped, i, 246.
— is the b. the sufferer, or the soul ?
i, 379-
— the Sahkhya cannot admit a real
connexion of the soul and the
b.. i, 379-
— consists of three elements, fire,
water, and earth, ii, 104.
— water (liquid matter) prepon-
derates in the b., ii, 104 seq.
— Brahman's secret names with
reference to the Devas and to
the b., ii, 216 seq.
— embodied soul and b. viewed as
non-different, ii, 374.
— subtle, due to the soul's higher
knowledge, not due to Karman
or works, i, p. Ixxi.
is beyond the soul, i, 244.
is meant by the term avyakta,
i, 241 seq., 244.
and the gross b., i, 244, 245.
consisting of the ten sense-
organs, the five pra«as, manas,
and buddhi, ii, 65 note.
— — is not destroyed by what
destroys the gross b., ii, 372.
the warmth which we per-
ceive in the living b. belongs to
the s. b., ii, 372.
Brahma/^arin, ii, 298, 300.
— who breaks the vow of chastity,
ii, 318 seq., 320.
Brahma>^arya, ii, 315.
Brahman ', according to .Jahkara and
Ramanu^a, i, p. xxviii.
— a certain vague knowledge of B.
common to all the Upanishads,
i, p. civ seq.
— of iSankara is impersonal, i, p. xxx.
— becomes a personal God through
Maya, i, p. xxx.
— with Ramanu^a is a personal
God, i, pp. xxx, cxxiii, cxxiv n.
— only exists, i, p. xxvii.
— is ' that which is,' and cannot have
originated from anything else,
i, p. lii, 266 seq., 332 ; ii, 19 seq.
' Arranged in the following order: — (i) names, definitions, and symbols of B. ; (21 nature,
qualities, powers, forms, parts, abodes of B.; (3) higher and lower B. ; (4) unity of, and oneness
with B. ; (5) B. is everything; (6) B. and the world; (71 B. and the soul; (8) B. and Scripture ;
(9) knowledge of B. ; (,10) meditation on B. ; (11; B. and final release ; (12J world of B.
446
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Brahman is ' thought ' and ' that
which is,' ii, i6o.
— cannot spring from that which is
not, ii, 20.
— is called Non-being, previously to
the origination of the world,
1,267.
— unborn, i, 349.
— the highest Self is B., i, 79.
— derivation of the word from br/h,
— identified with Vish«u or Nara-
ya«a, i, p. xxxi note.
— defined as that from which the
origin, subsistence, and disso-
lution of this world proceed,
i, pp. xxxii, xcii seq., 15-19,
107, 109, 117, 283.
— in its causal condition, i, p. xxix.
— in the condition of an eifect, i,
p. xxix.
— later definitions of B., e.g. as
sa/^-y^id-ananda, i, p. xcii.
— is anandamaya, or, the Self con-
sisting of bliss, i, 65, 66-68, 75.
— only is bliss as bhuman, i.e. in its
plenitude, i, 169.
— is called the tail, i. e. a member of
the Self consisting of bliss,
i, 72 seq., 75, 76 seq.
— not a member, but the support
or abode, the one nest of all
worldly bliss, i, 73.
— the bliss of B. is absolutely
supreme, i, 67.
— is declared to be the cause of
bliss, i, 67.
— neuter, can it be designated by
a masculine noun ? i, 76.
— that which consists of mind, is
B., i, 107-112.
— whose Self is pleasure intimated
by Ka and Kha, i, 126 seq.
— that which is much (bhuman) is
B., i, 162-169.
- — is the source of all beings, i,
135-139,288.
— the Imperishable is B., i, 169-17 1.
— Bahva explained B. by silence,
ii, 157.
— why it is called a bank, ii, 1 76 seq.
— the two secret names of B. with
reference to the gods and to
the body, ii, 216-218.
— is the True, i, 167, 267; ii, 216
seq., 234.
Brahman, breath (prawa) is, i, 84-87,
97-106, 229-231, 272.
— ether is, i, 81-84, 144, 174-192,
232 seq. ; ii, 8, 12, 248.
— is like the ether, i, no, 114; ii,
6 seq., 17 seq.
— is the Self of the ether, i, no.
— before ether was produced, B.
existed without ether, ii, 17.
■ — ether is an effect of, ii, 18.
— ether is dissolved into, ii, 26.
— light is, i, 87-93, 96, 97, 185, 191,
194, 231 seq.
— the gastric fire a symbol of, i, 92.
— B.'s name a symbol of, i, 92.
— denoted by the metre Gayatri,
i, 93-95, 95 seq.
— why it is compared to the images
of the sun and the like, ii, 157-
159.
— nature of, i, pp. Ixiv seq., xcv seq. ;
ii, lor, 133-183.
uniformity of it, i, 156.
does not resemble the world,
i, 284.
the break in it is a mere fig-
ment of Nescience, i, 352.
matter and souls are real con-
stituents of it, i, p. xxviii.
— the only universal being, of an
absolutely homogeneous nature,
i, pp. xxiv, XXX.
— is of the nature of intelligence,
i, p. xxiv seq., 68, 264; ii, 156
seq., 168.
— is an intelligent principle and
cannot be identified with the
non-intelligent pradhana of the
Sankhyas, i, p. xxxii, 47-64, 300.
— superior to the gods, i, p. xiv.
— is incapable of receiving any ac-
cretion and eternally pure, i, 34.
— is all-knowing, i, 19, 25, 47, 49,
362.
— is the internal ruler over the
Devas and so on, i, 130-132.
— that which possesses the attri-
butes of invisibility and so on is
B., i, 135-139-
— is the bridge of the Immortal, i,
154, 156.
— a cause of fear, i, 230 seq.
— eternal and changeless,!, 25, 327.
— is all-knowing, all-powerful, and
possessing the great power of
Maya, i, 362.
GENERAL INDEX.
447
Brahman is not apprehended, because
it is unevolved, ii, 171.
— is omnipresent, i, 91, 120, 125,
172 ; ii, 180.
— is altogether unchanging, ii, 397.
— there is nothing either beneficial
to be done by it or non-bene-
ficial to be avoided by it, i,
344-
— qualities of, i, 107, 328 ; ii, loi,
201-204,
— without any distinctive qualities,
i, p. XXV ;ii, 239, 394 seq.
— endowed with auspicious qualities,
i, p. xxviii.
• — the limiting adjuncts of B. are
presented by Nescience merely,
. ii, 153.
— is endowed with various powers,
. i, 354 seq.
— is not devoid of powers though
it is devoid of organs of action,
i, 355 seq.
— powers of B. which are connected
with the Devas, ii, 219.
— is devoid of form, i, pp. Ixiii, Ixiv,
306 seq. ; ii, 154-166, 166-175.
— is different from name and form,
i, 232 seq.
— is devoid of parts, i, 349-352 ;
ii, 396.
— represented as comprising sixteen
parts, ii, 219.
— has four feet (quarters), i, 90, 95.
— the idea of place does not apply
to B., i, 89.
— a special locality may be ascribed
to the omnipresent B., i, 91, 120,
125.
— a multiplicity of abodes ascribed
to B., i, 92.
— spoken of as in heaven and
beyond heaven, i, 96 seq.
— its abode in the heart, i, 1 13 seq.,
350.
the smallness of, i, 113 seq.
— as abiding within the sun, and
within the eye, i, p. Ixx, 123-
128 ; ii, 216-218.
— * city of B.' may mean the body,
or the city of the highest B.,
h 174, 175, 178.
— described as residing within the
body, ii, 219.
— statements as to B. being con-
nected or separated are only
made with a view to difference
of place, ii, 178 seq.
Brahman, highest and lower B. dis-
tinguished, i, pp. xix, XX, xxxii
seq., xxxvi (masc. and neut.),
61-64, 171-174; ii, 7, 166, 202
seq., 401 seq.
5arikara's distinction be-
tween, not valid, i, pp. xci-xciv.
not distinguished by Ra-
manu^a, i, p. xxxi.
not distinguished by Bada-
rayawa, i, p. c.
not distinguished in the
Upanishads, i, pp. cxiii, cxv seq.
— to which B. does the soul of the
worshipper repair on death?
i, p. xc seq.
— the highest, all beings spring from
it, i, 83, 85.
is a place of rest, i, 83.
endlessness a characteristic
mark of it, i, 83.
the highest Person is nothing
but the h. B., i, 174.
the vital airs are the effects
of it, ii, 76.
is the agent in the evolution
of names and forms, ii, 97.
is inside of the limiting ad-
juncts, ii, 158 seq.
the Yogins, in the state of
perfect conciliation, apprehend
it, ii, 171 seq.
the sense-organs and the
elements of him who knows the
h. B. are merged in that same
h. B., ii, 376 seq.
with it we cannot connect
the idea of going, or of one
who goes ; for that B. is present
everywhere and is the inner self
of all, ii, 390, 391, 394, 396.
immortality is possible only in
the h. B., not in the effected one,
ii, 392.
to it the souls are led, Gai-
mini opines, ii, 392 seq. ; refu-
tation of this view, ii, 393-
402.
glory is a name of it, ii,
393-
— the lower, associated with Maya,
i, p. XXV
called ijvara, the Lord, i, pp.
XXV, xxvii.
448
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Brahman, the lower, to it the de-
parted soul is led by the guar-
dians of the path of the gods,
i, p. Ixxxii ; ii, 389-402.
is the vital principle in all
creatures, i, 172 n.
the world of the 1. B. is called
Satyaloka, i, 181.
is fundamentally one with the
unqualified B., ii, 248.
for the purpose of worship or
meditation, i, 330; ii, 155, 156,
161 seq., 391.
is the object of the discussion
on the difference or non-differ-
ence of the cognitions of B.,
ii, 185.
— — worlds of B. can only refer
to the 1. B., ii, 390.
on account of its proximity
to the higher B., can be desig-
nated by the word ' B.,' ii, 391.
• also may be spoken of as being
the Self of all, ii, 394.
— sons of B.'s mind, ii, 235.
— is one and undivided, i, p. 1, 349-
354, 395 seq.
— one only without a second, i, p.
xxviii, 286 ; ii, 12, 13.
— has in itself elements of mani-
foldness, so that unity and mani-
foldness are both true of him,
i, 321 seqq., 345 seq.
— although one only, is, owing to
the plurality of its powers,
meditated upon in more than
one way, ii, 220.
— there cannot be any plurality in
B., ii, 158, 160, 202, 327 seq.,
329, 410.
— comprises elements of plurality,
i, p. xxviii.
— is free from all difference, and two-
fold characteristics cannot be-
longto him, ii, 152-154, i56seq.
— oneness with B., i, 319 seq.; ii,
355, 362 seq.
— I am B., i, 31, 44, 104, 115, 185,
326; 11,32,46,66,173, 339,408,
— is the real giver of the gifts be-
stowed by princes on poets and
singers, i, 80 n.
— Indra declares that he is one
with B., i, 1 01 seq.
— the fishermen, the slaves, the
gamblers are B., ii, 61, 62.
Brahman, union with B. is the reason
for the absence of all contact
with evil, ii, 144.
— there is absolute non-division
from B., of the parts merged in
it, ii, 376 seq.
— whatever is, is B., i, p. xxx, 94.
— all things are effects of B., or
are B. itself, i, p. cxix seq.
— all this indeed is B., beginning,
ending, and breathing in it, i,
107, 109, 156.
— is the Self of everything, i, 23,
no seq., 267, 357; ii, 138, 165,
208, 341.
— is the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., i, 154-162, 230.
— the ten objects and the ten sub-
jects cannot rest on anything
but B., i, 104.
— some metaphorical expressions,
seemingly implying that there
is something different from B.,
explained, i, p. Ixv; ii, 175-
180.
— the existence of anything apart
from B. distinctly denied by
Scripture, i, 321; ii, 168-171,
179 seq.
— there is nothing further beyond
B., ii, 175-179-
— subsists apart from its effects,
i, 350.
— not only the operative but also
the material cause of the world,
i, pp. xl, xciv seq., 49, 60 seq.,
264 seq., 283-288, 317,320-330,
346 seq., 361 seq.
— creates the world without instru-
ments, i, p. xlix seq., 346-349,
354-356.
from a mere sportive im-
pulse, i, p. 1, 356 seq.
by means of a modification
of itself, i, p. xcv.
— creative power of, i, p. 1, 233, 344,
361 seq.
— as a creator and dispenser, acts
with a view to the merit and
demerit of the individual souls,
and has so acted from all
eternity, i, p. 1, 357-361.
— the origin of the world from B.
proved on the ground of the
system of the Vaijeshikas, i,
3S1-386.
GENERAL INDEX.
449
Brahman, the world originates from,
i, p. xl, 202, 267, 268-274 j "> i3>
16, 21, 22.
— objections against this view
refuted, i, p. xlvii seq., 299-
317, 352 seq., 381-386.
— and the world, i, pp. xxx, lii, 50 ;
ii, 3-73, 391 seq.
see also Cause and effect.
— compared to a magician, i, p.
XXV.
— relation of the non-sentient mat-
ter to, i, p. Ixv.
— the source of Fire, ii, 20-22.
— the order in which the elements
are retracted into B. is the re-
verse of that in which they are
created, ii, 25 seq.
— relation of the individual soul to,
i, pp. xix, Ivii seqq. ; ii, 61-
73-
according to 5ankara
and Badarayawa, i, pp. xcvii-c.
— broken up, as it were, into indi-
vidual souls, i, p. XXV.
— only is real in each ^iva, i, p. xxv.
— discussions as to whether certain
passages refer to B. or to the
individual soul, i, p. xxxii seq.,
64-289.
— the souls are parts of B., accord-
ing to Ramanu^a, i, p. Iviii.
— the identity of the individual soul
with it, i, pp. XX, xxvii, 104,
114-116, 322, 343 seq.; ii, 30,
3ij 33, 34, 42 seqq., 138, 146,
149.
— 5ankara's individual soul is B.
through Maya, i, p. xxx.
— Ramanu^a's individual soul has
sprung from B. and is never
outside B., i, p. xxxi.
— the Self is 13., i, 14, 30 seq., 36,
45, 105, 241, 264 seq.; ii, 209,
288.
— is ' that,' the inward Self is ' thou,'
ii, 335.
— the soul cannot be a part of B.,
nor an effect of B., nor different
from B., ii, 396 seq.
— and the individual soul, difference
of nature between, i, 11 4-1 16.
both different and non-
different, i, 277 n., 345.
— the individual souls go to, i, 178,
180 seq., 191.
Brahman, separate from the indi-
vidual souls, is the creator, i, 344
seq.
— is superior to the individual soul,
i, 345.
— and the released soul, i, p. xxx ;
ii, 408 seq.
— in which the individual soul is
merged in the state of deep
sleep, i, p. Ixi seq., 180, 273 ;
ii, 144-149, 152-166, 176.
— the only real topic of Scripture,
i, p. xxxii, 22-47, 265 seq.
— is the source of the Veda, i, p.
xxxii, 19-22.
— Scripture does not contradict
itself on the all-important point
of B., i, p. xl, 263-268.
— is not the object of any other
means of proof but Scripture,
i, p. Ixiv seq., 22-47, 307, 35°-
352, 355-
— the Veda intimates B. only as the
object of certain injunctions,
i, 23 seqq.
— not the subject of injunctions,
ii, 162-166, 185.
— the attainment of the Self of B.
lies outside the sphere of sacred
precept, ii, 359.
— knowledge of, i, pp. x, Ixxviii
seq., 9-15, 19, 31, 73, 138, 157,
159, 324; ii, 8, 162 seqq., 378,
393-
its fruit or result, i, 11, 14,
i8,24seq.,26 seqq., 29,231, 266,
300, 327 ; ii, 117 n., 229 seq.,
236, 353-363, 372-375, 419-
is not subordinate to action,
but independent, i, p. Ixxv, 10-
12, 29; ii, 285-295.
the purpose of man is effected
through it, ii, 285, 290-306.
reading of the Veda an ante-
cedent for those desirous of it,
i, 10.
— he who knows B. becomes B.,
i, 25, 29, 31, 186; ii, 375.
to be the Selt is free
from his body, i, 41-43.
— the body is an abode for the per-
ception of, i, 178.
— texts exhorting us to strive to see
B., i, 349.
— some persons although knowing B.
yet obtained new bodies, ii, 235.
[38]
Gg
450
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
Brahman, thestate of being grounded
in B. belongs to the wandering
mendicant, ii, 300-303.
— meditation on, i, pp. Ixvi-lxxv, 31,
94, 105 seq., 107-1 ] I ; ii, 19 n.
(as Vayu), 177 seq., 184-284,
333-337, 342-345-
its result, i, p. Ixv, 25, 174;
ii, 402.
see also Meditation.
— only those \vho have not wor-
shipped B. under a symbol, are
led to B., i, p. Ixxxii ; ii, 402-
404.
— the state of final release is
nothing but B., i, 28 seq., 34 ;
ii, 329.
— the released have to resort to,
i, 157.
— has to be inquired into because
it is the cause of absolute
beatitude, i, 283.
— on the attainment of B. there
take place the non-clinging and
the destruction of sins, ii, 353-
356.
— world of, i, p. xxix, 173, 174;
ii, 383. See also Brahma-world.
• — see also Self, highest.
— see also Lord.
Brahma«a-accent, i, 258. _
Brahmanical studentship, ii, 303 n.
Brahmans, he to whom the B. and
the Kshattriyas are but food is
the highest Self, i, p. xxxv, 116-
118,
— are not qualified for the ra^asuya-
sacrifice, i, 218.
— the world with its, i, 275 seq.
Brahma-.-ukta of a jakha of the
Atharva-veda quoted, ii, 62.
Brahma-Futras, another name for
Vedanta-siJtras, i, p. xiv n.
Brahma - upanishad = Veda - upani-
shad, i, 94.
Brahma-vidya, Gaimini maintains the
non-qualification of the gods for
it, i, 216 seq.
— gods are qualified for, i, 218-
223.
Brahmavidyabhara«a on the three
Bauddha sects, i, 401 n.
— on the Bauddha scries beginning
with Nescience, i, 404 seq. n.
Brahma-world applied to the small
ether, i, 180.
Brahma-world, not ' the world of
Brahman,' but 'the world which
is Brahman,' i, 180 seq.
— see Brahman, world of.
Breath (Pra«a) is the highest Brah-
man, i, p. xxxiv, 84-87, 97-106.
— in which everything trembles, is
Brahman, i, p. xxxvii, 229-
231,
— is the deity of the Prastava, i, 84,
86.
— of b., i, 87.
— beings enter into and proceed
from it, i, 85, 86.
■ — is most beneficial for man, i, 98.
— strength is, i, 99.
— denotes either the individual soul
or the chief vital air or both, i,
102 seq.
— is the abode of the power of
action, i, 105.
— is pra^wa, i, 105.
— is the one god, the gods are all
forms of, i, 200.
— one of the pan^a^anaA, i, 260-
262.
— spoken of as a 'person,' i, 261.
— speech, b., and mind presuppose
fire, water, and earth, ii, 78 seq.
— acts under the guidance of Vayu,
ii, 91 seq.
— meditation on all food as food of,
ii, 211, 213.
— water is the dress of, ii, 211-214.
— is water, ii, 366.
— may be viewed as the causal sub-
stance of mind, ii, 366.
— mind is merged in, ii, 366 seq.
— is merged in the individual soul,
on the departure of the soul, ii,
367 seq.
— is merged in heat, ii, 367, 368.
— the soul, with the b., goes to the
elements, ii, 368.
— see Prawa, and Vital air, chief.
Br/hadara«yaka-upanibhad, germs of
Maya doctrine in the, i,pp.cxvii,
cxx seq.
— on the embodied soul, i, 134 seq.
— the Udgitha-vidya of the, ii, 192-
199.
Brihaspatisava, an offering enjoined
for one who is desirous of Brah-
mavar^as, ii, 223, 223 n., 224.
Buddha, variety of Bauddha doc-
trines due either to the dif-
GENERAL INDEX.
451
ference of the views maintained
by B., or else to the difference
of capacity on the part of the
disciples of B., i, 401.
Buddha, though he propounded the
doctrine of the reality of the ex-
ternal world, was himself an
idealist, i, 418.
— teaches three mutually contra-
dictory systems, i, 428.
Buddhi. See Intelligence.
Castes, men only of the three higher
c. entitled to the study of the
Veda, i, 197.
— all the four c. are fit for the know-
ledge of the itihasas and pu-
ra«as, i, 229.
— pafika.gan%ii = the four c. and the
Nishadas, i, 262.
Categories, twenty-five, of the San-
khya system, i, 257-260.
— difficulties with regard to the six
c. of the Vaijeshikas, i, 394
seqq.
— seven, two, or five c. of the
Gainas, i, 428 seq., 430.
— five, of the Saivas, i, 435.
Caterpillar, soul compared to a, ii,
103, 352.
Causal matter is metaphorically re-
presented as a she-goat, i, 256
seq.
Cause, only the one highest c. is
true, i, 322.
— and effect are non-different,
i, pp. xxix, xlix, 300-305, 309,
311, 320-343, 399, 456; ii, 9.
their absolute equality impos-
sible, i, 305 seq.
real effects may sometimes
arise from unreal (imaginary)
causes, i, 324 seq.
the internal organ is affected
by them jointly, i, 331.
connected by samavaya, i, 335
seq., 396 n.
difference of, i, 350.
the relation of, is no reason
for assuming that all effects
whatever have a non-intelli-
gent principle for their ante-
cedent, i, 367.
according to the Vaije-
shikas, i, 396 seq.
impossible on the as-
sumption of the Bauddha that
everything has a momentary
existence only, i, 407 seq., 409.
Cause and effect, the relation of,
requires some superiority on
the part of the cause, i, 442 ; ii,
20.
between them conjunction
and disjunction do no longer
take place, i, 397.
chain of causes and effects, be-
ginning with Nescience (Baud-
dha), i, 404 seq., 410, 41C n.
Causes, whatever is originated, the
Sahkhyas say, is originated from
inherent c, non-inherent c,
and operative c, i, 5 seq.
— four kinds of, admitted by the
Bauddha, i, 409, 409 n.
Cave, the two entered into the c.
are Brahman and the individual
soul, i, pp. XXXV, xlii, 1 18-123.
Ceremonial purifications, the 5udras
excluded from them, i, 227.
referred to in the Vidyas, i, 227.
Cessation, the two kinds of c. which
the Bauddhas assume cannot be
proved, i, 410 seq., 413.
Chariot, the simile of the, i, 121,
239 seq., 244, 248.
Chastity, knowledge belongs to
those who are bound to, ii,
295 seq.
— the stages of life for which ch. is
obligatory, established by Scrip-
ture, ii, 297-303.
— he who has entered them cannot
fall from them, ii, 317 seqq.
— expiatory sacrifice for a Brahma-
/^arin who breaks his vow of,
ii, 3 18 seq.
— persons bound to ch. who have
broken their vow condemned,
ii, 320.
Chief vital air. See Vital air, chief.
Childlike state, which is enjoined
for the ascetic, means absence
of strong sensual passions,
absence of guile, pride, and the
like, ii, 325-327.
Cognition, the Self whose nature is
unchangeable, eternal c, i, 185
seq.
Cognitions (vidyas), discussion on
the separateness or non-sepa-
rateness of the c. of Brahman,
Gg
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which form the subject of the
different Vedanta-texts, ii, loi,
184-279.
Cognitions, in the same 5akha also
there is unity of, ii, 214-216.
— connected with members of
sacrificial acts, are not perman-
ently connected with those acts,
ii, 252-256.
are valid for all 5akhas
and Vedas, ii, 274.
— compared with sacrifices, ii, 280.
— should there be cumulation of
the different c. or option be-
tween them ? ii, 280-284.
■ — the fruit of all c. is the intuition
of the object meditated upon, ii,
281.
— which have the qualified Brahman
for their object, ii, 330,
Colebrooke, i, p. cxvi.
Conjunction (sawyoga), the distinc-
tion of the Vaijeshikas between
c. and inherence, i, 390, 396 seq.
— the connexion between the Lord
and the souls and pradhana
cannot be c, i, 436.
Consciousness of external things, i,
418-424.
Crane, female, conceives without a
male, i, 348 ; ii, i26._
— conceives from hearing the sound
of thunder, i, 348.
Creation owing to an act of volition
on the Lord's part, i, p. xxix.
— according to Ramanu^a, i, pp. 1,
liii seq.
— accounts given in the Upanishads
of the c, their divergence, i, p.
cv seq.
— ■ have no mention of
Rlaya, i, p. cxviii.
discussion of, i, 263-266 ;
ii, 3, 22.
— has thought for its antecedent, i,
47 seq.; ii, 206.
— Brahman, before thee, i, 50, 2S6;
ii, 8.
— cannot possibly belong to any
Self different from the highest
Self, i, 69.
— Brahmni the cause of it, i, 117 ;
ii, 183.
— descripiion of it in the MuWaka-
upanishad alluded to, 1, 140-
142.
Creation is preceded by the word,
i, 203 seq.
— each new c. is the result of the
religious merit and demerit of
the animated beings of the pre-
ceding c, i, 214.
— the relation of senses and sense-
objects is the same in different
creations, i, 214 seq.
— the world was evolved at the
beginning of the c. in the same
way as it is at present seen to
develop itself by names and
forms, viz. under the rulership
of an intelligent creator, i, 268.
— Scripture when relating the c. of
the elements, does not mention
a separate c. of the individual
soul, i, 279; ii, 31.
— a multiform c. exists in the indi-
vidual Self, and in gods, &c., i,
352 seq.
— the scriptural doctrine of c. refers
to the apparent world only, i,
357-
— the c. of this world is mere play
to the Lord, i, 357.
— in consequence of the Lord's
conjunction with Maya, the c.
is unavoidable, i, 357 n.
— neither c. nor pralaya could take
place, if the atomic theory were
adopted, i, 3S6-389, 391.
— according to the Vaijeshika sys-
tem, i, 387.
• — order of, ii, 3-24.
the origination of the organs
does not cause a break in it, ii,
26-28.
— passage on the c. in the Kban-
dogya-upanishad, ii, 4.
— Brahman and ether before and
alter, ii, 8.
— is the c. taking place in dreams
a real one, or does it consist of
illusion ? ii, 133-141.
— the so-called real c. is not abso-
lutely real, ii, 13 8.
— accomplished by Pra^apati,ii, 206.
— of the worlds is accomplished by
some inferior Lord different
from, and superintended by, the
highest Self, ii, 206.
— of the elements, different from
the c. of the worlds, ii, 206,
207 seq.
GENERAL INDEX.
45>
Creator, the Vedanta-texts differ
with regard to the order of
creation, but not with regard to
the C, i, 264.
— described as all-knowing, the
Lord of all, the Self of all, with-
out a second, i, 264 seq.
— is non-different from the created
effects, i, 265.
— see also Brahman.
Daharavidya, the knowledge of
Brahman within the heart, i,
p. Ixxv; ii, 219, 233, 393 n., 410.
Daksha, assumed a new body, ii, 235.
Darkness is called black on account
of its covering and obscuring
property, i, 253.
— Goodness, Passion, and Darkness,
the three guwas, i, 353,
the three constituent ele-
ments of the pradhana, i, 364 n.,
36 seq.
— the gu«a D. is eternal, i, 380.
— see also Gu«as.
Death, the round of birth, action,
and, i, p. xxvii.
— the fate after d. of those whom
their good works do not entitle
to pass up to the moon, i, p. Ix ;
ii, 121-126.
of him who possesses know-
ledge, i, p. Ixxviiiseq. ; ii, 364-
419.
— not necessary for the condition
of being free from the body,
i, 41, 43.
— is a condiment, i, 116, 117.
— release from the jaws of d. by
knowledge of the highest Self,
i, 247.
not by perceiving the pra-
dhana, i, 247.
— when applied to the sprout, i, 340.
— the terms ' birth ' and ' death,' if
applied to the soul, have a meta-
phorical meaning, ii, 28 seq.
— has the power of manifesting
those works whose fruit has not
yet begun, ii, 113, 11 7-1 19.
— the state of swoon is the door of,
ii, 152.
— identification of the AvabhWtha-
ceremony with, ii, 221.
• — the term 'd.' applied to Agni, and
to the man in the sun, ii, 267.
Death, the d. of the body is the term
of the attainment of final release,
ii, 357 seq., 363.
— see Departure.
— see also Yama.
Debts, the three, ii, 295.
Deceased, the, on his way to Brah-
man, shakes off his good and
evil deeds, ii, 229-231.
Deeds. See Works.
Deities, if the elements and the
sense-organs are spoken of in
Scripture as of an intellectual
nature, the superintending d.
are denoted, i, 303-305.
— the particular intelligent d. who
represent light, &c., on the soul's
journey to Brahman, are ap-
pointed as personal conductors
of the soul, ii, 388 seq.
— see also Devas, Divinities,
Gods.
Departure (from the body), the
highest Self different from the
individual soul in the state of,
1,233-236.
Deussen, ' System des Vedanta,' i,
pp. xxiv, xxiv n., xxxiii n.,
xxxiv n., xxxv n., xli, xlv, xlvi,
Ixxxvii.
Devala, author of a Dharma-sutra,
i, 289.
Devas, the eternal ruler over the,
&c., is Brahman, i, 130-132.
— Brahman's secret names with
reference to the D. and to the
body, ii, 216 seq.
— powers of Brahman which are
connected with the, ii, 219.
— metres of the D., i. e. metres of
ten and more syllables, their
priority to those of the Asuras,
ii, 228, 228 n.
— the powers of the D. constitute
the Self of the organs of the
body, ii, 257.
— see also Deities, Divinities, Gods.
Dhr/shMdyumna, not born in the
ordinary way, ii, 125, 126.
Digambara Gainas, their opinion that
the individual soul only flying
away from the old body alights
in the new one as a parrot fhes
from one tree to another, ii,
104.
Divinitv, highest. See Brahman.
454
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Divinities, in meditations connected
with constitutives of sacrificial
worlcs the idea of the d. is to
be transferred to the sacrificial
items, not vice versa, i, p. Ixxvii ;
ii, 345-349-
— intelligent presiding d. are con-
nected with everything, i, 304.
— the vital airs act under the
guidance of, ii, 91 seq.
— who act as the guides of the vital
airs and co-operate with them,
stop their co-operation at the
time of death, ii, 106.
— even priests who do not know
the d. of sacrifices, perform
them, ii, 254.
— the organs of the body and the d.
are non-different, ii, 257.
Drami^a quoted by Ramanu^a, i,
pp. xxi, xxii.
— preceded 5ahkara, i, p. xxii.
Dramid'a-bhashya, i, p. xxii.
Drami^abhashyakara quoted by Ra-
manu^a, i, p. xlix.
Draupadi, not born in the ordinary
way, ii, 125.
Dravia'a or DramiJa, i, p. xxii n.
Dravi^a^arya. See Drami^a.
Dreams, Ramanu^a on d. as the
work, not of the individual soul,
but of the highest Lord, i, p.
Ix seq.
— the unreal phantom of a d. may
have a real result, i, 325.
— some d. are auspicious omens,
others the reverse, i, 325 ; ii,
136 seq.
— variety of d. while the dreaming
person remains one, i, 346.
— the idealist's example of the ideas
in, i, 420.
— the ideas of the waking state are
not like those of, i, 424 seq.
— in the stale of d. the instruments
of the Self are not altogether at
rest, ii, 56.
— place of d. = intermediate place,
ii, 133.
— the soul in the state of, i, p. Ix ;
ii, 133-141-
— the Self is the shaper of lovely
things in, ii, 133 seq., 137 seq.
— the world of d. is mere illusion,
ii, 134-136, 140 seq.
— moving about in, ii, 135.
Dreams are outside the body, ii,
135-
— • experts in the science of, ii,
136-
— their purpose and cause, ii, 1 37 n.
— in d. we have perceptions while
the body lies motionless, ii,
272.
Dro«a, not born in the ordinary way,
ii, 125, 126.
Duties. See Works.
Dvaipayana, ii, 43.
Dying, certain times for, ii, 379-381.
Earth, springs from water, i, p. Hi ;
ii, 23 seq.
— called 'night' (jarvari) by the
Paura«ikas, ii, 23 seq.
— is meant by the word 'anna'
(' food '), ii, 23 seq.
— (predominant) colour of e. is
black, ii, 23 seq.
— is dissolved into water, ii, 26.
— is the Rik, ii, 345-349.
Eater, the e. who is the highest Self,
i, pp. XXXV, xlii, 1 16-1 18.
Effect. See Cause and effect.
Ego and Non-Ego, the spheres of
the object and subject, i, 3.
Egoity, the principle of, Aniruddha
identical with it, i, p. xxiii, 440.
accomplishes all actions and
enjoys their results, i, 34.
Elements, the origination of the e.
is due to Brahman acting in
them, i, p. lii ; ii, 24 seq.
— the reabsorption of the e. into
Brahman takes place in the
inverse order of their emission,
i, p. lii; ii, 25 seq.
— the subtle e. are completely
merged in Brahman only when
final emancipation is reached,
i, p. Ixxix seq. ; ii, 371 seq.
— the three e., fire, water, earth,
denoted by the three colours
red, white, black, i, 254 seq.
— and the sense-organs, the product
of Nescience, i, 281.
— the atoms and their respective,
i, 393 seq., 402.
— origin of the three, fire, water,
earth, according to the Kban-
dogya Upanishad, ii, 4.
— usual order of the five e. : ether,
air, fire, water, earth, ii, 4, 4 n.
GENERAL INDEX.
455
Elements spoken of as endowed
with intelligence, ii, 24 seq.
— the origin, the subsistence, and the
retractation of the e. all depend
on Brahman, ii, 25 seq.
— the order of the creation of the
e. is not broken by the origina-
tion of the organs, ii, 26-2 8.
— in obtaining a different body the
soul goes enveloped by subtle
parts of the, ii, 101-104, 371 seq.
— the aggregate of the five e. in the
body, ii, 242.
— the soul, with the breath, goes to
the, ii, 368 seq.
— the aggregate of the e. continues
to exist up to the final union
with Braliman, ii, 371, 376 seq.
Emancipation, final, i, p. xxix.
depends on the true nature of
the cause of the world, i, 316.
—a being desirous of it becomes
a deva, i, 223 n.
— by degrees, i, 174, 223.
— the Sahkhya doctrine about the
e. of the Selfs, ii, 69 seq.
— see also Release.
Entity does not spring from non-
entity, i, 415-418.
Ether is the highest Brahman, i,
pp. xxxiv, xxxviii, 81-84, 182,
232 seq., 273, 287 ; ii, 6 seq., 8,
12, 248.
— the small e. within the heart is
Brahman, i, p. xxxvi, 174-192 ;
ii, 144.
cannot mean the individual
soul, i, 177.
spoken of as the place of
sleep, ii, 144.
— is not co-eternal with Brahman,
but springs from it as its first
effect, i, p. Hi ; ii, 3-18.
— is the Udgitha, i, 83,
• — although all-pervading, is spoken
of as limited and minute, if
considered in its connexion
with the eye of a needle ; so
Brahman also, i, 114.
— the highest Lord is greater than,
i, 177-
— distinction between the outer
and the inner, i, 175, 176 seq.
— origination of, discussion of
Vedanta-texts concerning it, ii,
3-18.
Ether, origination of, the Safikhyas
deny it, ii, 5 seq.
— is divided, therefore must be an
effect, ii, 14, 15.
— is non-eternal, because it is the
substratum of a non-eternal
quality, viz. sound, ii, 17.
— is the abode of air, ii, 18.
— is dissolved into Brahman, ii, 26.
— air is dissolved into, ii, 26.
— the body consisting of water
which the soul assumes in the
moon, becomes subtle like e.,
but not identical with e., ii, 127.
— the one e. is made manifold, as it
were, by its connexion with
different places, ii, 179.
— see also Space.
— see also Brahman, above, p. 446.
Expiation cannot take place, if a
Brahma>^arin for life breaks
his vow of chastity, ii, 318 ; can
take place, according to some
teachers, ii, 318 seq.
Expiatory ceremonies and the
results of works, ii, 117 n., 353,
354.
Eye. See Person in the eye.
Faith, the path of the gods cannot
be attained by f. and austerities,
unaided by knowledge, ii, 234.
Fathers, among the pa.H^cLg^na.b, i,
262.
— create many things by their mere
intention, i, 347 seq.
— rise owing to their mere will, ii,
410 seq.
— see Path of the fathers.
Fire springs from air, i, p. lii, 20-
22.
— has for its source that which is,
i. e. Brahman, ii, 20-22.
— water is produced from, ii, 22
seq.
— water is dissolved into, ii, 26.
— is dissolved into air, ii, 26.
— gastric, within man, i, 89.
characterised by the noise it
makes and by heat, i, 90.
as a symbol of Brahman, i,
92. ^ .
Vaijvanara is the, i, 143 seq.,
146 seq.
the perception of the highest
Lord in the, i, 147.
456
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Fire, gastric, either the outward
manifestation, or the limiting
condition of the Lord, i, 149.
— the simile of the sparks and the
f. (individual souls and Brah-
man), i, 277 n., 279; ii, 29, 30,
61, 62, 139.
— the rite of carrying f. on the head
is an attribute of the study of
the Veda of the Atharva«ikas,
ii, 186, 189 seq.
— sacrificial, the lighting of it not
to be observed, since man's
purpose is effected by know-
ledge, ii, 306.
— is Saman, ii, 345-349.
— see also Agni.
Fire-altars made of mind, &c., do not
constitute part of the sacrificial
action, i, p. Ixxiv ; ii, 259-
268.
Fires, the fiction concerning the
three sacred, i, 146.
— five, viz. the heavenly world,
Par^anya, the earth, man and
woman, ii, 103.
jraddha the oblation in the
first of them, ii, 106.
knowledge (vidya) of the
( = Kh. Up, V, 3-10), i, pp.
Ixxxiii, cviii ; ii, 101-132, 186,
187 seqq., 233, 234 seq., 298,
383, 400, 403.
a sixth fire mentioned by
the Va^asaneyins in their, ii,
187-189.
Fire-sacrifice, individual soul, and
the higiiest Self, the three
points of discussion in the
colloquy between Yama and
Na-^iketas, i, 247-252.
Five-people, five, of the Br/h. Up. are
not the twenty- five principles of
the Sahkhyas, i, p. xl, 257-263.
are the breath and so on, i,
260-262.
explained as Gods, Fathers,
Gandharvas, Asuras, and Rak-
shas, i, 261 seq.
as the four castes together
with the Nishadas, i, 263.
created beings in general, i,
262.
Flamingo, able to distinguish and
separate milk and water when
mixed, ii, 149.
Food, certain relaxations of the
laws regarding f. are allowed
only for cases of extreme need,
i, p. Ixxv ; ii, 309-312.
— Sruti and Smr/ti on lawful and
unlawful, ii, 311 seq.
— the word ' f.' denotes 'earth,' ii,
23 seq.
— meditation on all f. as f. of the
breath, ii, 211, 213.
Fruition, Brahman is not, like the
embodied Self, subject to, i,
114-1 16, 117, 119.
— not even the embodied soul is
really subject to, i, 116.
— is the figment of false knowledge,
i, 116.
— • characteristic of the individual
soul, i, 159 seq., 269.
— see also Works.
Gabala was initiated by Gautama, i,
228.
Gabalas, the, speak of the highest
Lord in the interstice between
the top of the head and the chin
which is measured by a span, i,
152 seq.
— their text on the fourth stage
of life, ii, 295, 297, 302 seq.
— on the highest Lord as the Self,
ii, 338.
Gaimini, i, pp. xi, xc seq.
— quoted in the Vedanta-sutras, i,
pp. xix, Ixxxii seq., Ixxxiv,
1 49 seq., 151 seq., 216 seq., 272-
274; ii, 295-297, 317 seq., 360,
392-402.
— thinks that religious merit brings
about the fruits of action, i,
p. Ixv ; ii, 180-182.
that the statements as to the
fruits of the knowledge of the
Self are arthavadas, ii, 285-
288.
that the released soul mani-
fests itself by a nature like that
of Brahman, ii, 408 seq.
— asserts the presence of a body
and sense-organs, on the part
of the released, ii, 412.
— Sutra, its subject is dharma, i, 26.
Gainas, refutation of their doctrine,
i, p. Ii, 428-434.
— acknowledge seven, two, or five
categories, i, 428 seq., 430.
GENERAL INDEX.
457
Gainas. See Digambara Gainas.
Gamadagnya - ahina - sacrifice, the
upasad offerings for it are to
consist of puro^ajas, ii, 240,
240 n.
Ganaka, Sulabha entered into his
body to carry on discussion
with him, ii, 237.
Ganaj-ruti, Raikva called him 5udra,
i, 223-226.
— must have been a Kshattriya, not
a 5udra, i, 226 seq.
— legend of, ii, 305, 306.
Gandharva, possessing a maiden,
teaches Bhu^yu Sahyayani, i,
p. cv.
— colloquy of the G. and Ya^«aval-
kya, i, 219.
Gandharvas, among the pa«ia^ana>6,
i, 262.
Gargya, i, p. cv.
Garhapatya-fire, as the G. the highest
Self may be represented, because
it is the Self of all, i, 150.
Gatakakarman, or ^ata ceremony,
the birth ceremony, ii, 28, 29.
Gau</apada, i, pp. xcix, cxxvii.
Gautama, having ascertained Gabala
not to be a Sudra, proceeded
to initiate and instruct him, i,
228.
Gayatri is everything whatsoever
exists, i, 90, 93-95.
— Brahman denoted by the metre
G., i, 93-95, 95 seq.
— has four feet. Brahman has four
feet, i, 95.
— the beings, the earth, the body,
and the heart are the feet of, i,
. 95- ^
Gina or Tirthakara, i, 429.
Giva. See Soul.
Glory is a name of the highest Brah-
man, ii, 393.
G;7anakaWa, systematised by the
Uttara Mimawsa, i, pp. x, xii.
— necessity of systematising it, i,
p. xi.
— two different parts of it, i, p. xxvii.
— final escape from the sawsara to
be obtained by the, i, p. xxix.
Goat. See A^a,
God, 5ahkara's personal, is some-
thing unreal, i, p. xxx.
— Ramanu^a's Brahman is a per-
sonal, i, pp. xxx, cxxiii, cxxiv n.
Gods capable of the knowledge of
Brahman, i, p. xxxvii, 198 seq.,
2 1 8-2 2 3 ; not capable according
to Gaimini, i, 216 seqq.
- — the soul is led by g. on the way
up to Brahman, i, p. Ixxxii ; ii,
387-389.
— create many things by their mere
intention, i, p. xciv, 347 seq.
— possess unobstructed knowledge,
i, 99.
— their deathlessness only means
their comparatively long exis-
tence, and their lordly power
depends on the highest Lord,
i, 130; ii, 17.
• — cannot perform sacrifices, hence
not entitled to the study of the
Veda, i, 197 n.
— are qualified for the study and
practice of the Veda, i, 198
seq.
— may have the desire of final re-
lease, i, 198.
— their corporeality appears from
mantras, arthavadas, itihasas,
purawas, and ordinary experi-
ence, i, 198, 217.
involves no contradiction to
sacrificial works, i, 199-201.
— to them the Veda is manifest of
itself (without study), i, 199.
— undergo discipleship, i, 199.
— their number, i, 200.
— are all forms of Breath, i, 200,
269.
— naturally possess all supernatural
powers, i, 200, 219.
— their power to render themselves
invisible, i, 201.
— all comprised in the Vasus, Ru-
dras, Adityas, Vijvedevas, and
Maruts, i, 202 n.
— the Vedic injunctions presuppose
certain characteristic shapes of
the individual g., without which
the sacrificer could not repre-
sent the g. to his mind, i, 221
seq.
— Vyasa and others conversed with
the g. face to face, i, 222 seq.
— among the pa;7^aj-ana^, i, 262.
— multiform creations exist in them,
i, 353-
— possess bodily organs of action,
i, 355.
45S
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Gods exist in the state of highest
power and glory, and cannot
enter, in this wretched body,
into the condition of enjoyers,
ii, 93.
— the vital airs, at the time ot death,
enter into them, ii, 105 seq.
— the souls are the food of the, ii,
I I o- 1 1 2 .
— do not eat, ii, in.
— the performers of sacrifices are
objects of enjoyment for the,
ii, II I.
— the souls of sacrificers enjoy them-
selves with the, ii, 112.
^ the soul goes from the world of
the g. to Vayu, ii, 386.
— may be called light and so on,
because they represent light
and so on, ii, 388.
— are permanent, ii, 388.
— see Path of the gods.
— see also Devas, Deities, Divinities.
Goodness, knowledge an attribute
of the gu«a of, i, 46, 48 seq.
■ — by means of g. men are known
to be Yogins, i, 46, 49.
— is called white, because it is of
the nature of Light, i, 253.
— Passion and Darkness, the three
gu«as, i, 353-
the three constituent ele-
ments (gu«a) of the pradhana,
i, 364 n., 366 seq.
— see Gimas.
Gough (A.) on 5ahkara, i, p. xvii
seq.
— his sketch of 5ahkara Vedanta,
i, p. xxiv.
— on Maya in the Upanishads, i,
pp. cxvii, cxxv.
— on Viraj-, i, p. cxxiii.
Great one, the, * beyond the G. there
is the Undeveloped, beyond the
Undeveloped there is the Per-
son,' i, 237 seq.
is the technical Sahkhya term
for buddhi, i, 238 n.
originates from the Unde-
veloped, if the G. one be the
intellect of Hirawyagarbha, i,
244.
the individual soul, i, 244.
has a different meaning as a
Sankhya term, and in Vedic use,
i, 252.
Great principle, the, the Undevel-
oped (pradhana), and the soul,
are the three entities of the
Sahkhyas, i, 238, 296.
of the Yoga-smWti, i, 296.
the subtle elements of material
things proceed from it, i, 376.
Groups. See Skandhas.
Guhadeva quoted by Ramanu^a, i,
p. xxi.
Gu«as, the three (Goodness. Passion,
and Darkness) of the Sahkhyas,
i, 28.
the pradhana is the state of
equilibrium of the, i, 353, 370.
passing out of the state of
equipoise and entering into the
condition of mutual subordina-
tion and superordination, origin-
ate activities tending towards
the production of particular ef-
fects, i, 367.
the relation of principal and
subordinate matter is impossible
between them, i, 374 seq.
absolute independence their
essential characteristic, i, 375.
Gymnosophists. See Gainas.
Hall, Fitz-Edward, i, p. xvi.
Hari is contemplated in the sacred
stone called 5alagram, i, 114.
Heaven, that within which the h.,
the earth, &c., are woven, is
Brahman, i, p. xxxv, 154-162.
Heavenly world, if the Gaina main-
tains that it exists or does not
exist, and is eternal or non-
eternal, nobody will act for the
purpose of gaining it, i, 430.
Hell, degree of pleasure and pain
enjoyed by the inmates of, i,
27.
Hells, there are seven, ii, 123.
Hermit in the woods is referred to
by the term ' austerity,' ii, 300
seq.
— when he has broken his vows,
undergoes the Yirikkb\-?i pen-
ance for twelve nights, ii,
319.
Highest being manifests itself in a
fourfold form, i, p. xxiii.
see Brahman, Lord, Self high-
est.
Hirawyagarbha, i.e. the effected Brah-
GENERAL INDEX.
459
mail, i, pp. Ixxxiii, cix, cxxiii,
172 n,
Hira«yagarbha = Pra^apati, i, 142,
142 n,
— is the Self of all organs, and
dwells in the Brahma- world, i,
173.
— Lords such as, i, 213.
— the intellect of the first-born H.,
which is the basis of all intel-
lects, may be called ' the great
Self,' i, 240, 244.
— a subordinate causal substance,
ii, 77 n.
— the Self of the pra«a appears as
H. in his double — universal and
individual — form, ii, 91.
— himself comes to an end, ii, 238.
— the ruler of the Brahman world,
ii, 391, 392.
Honey means the sun by a metaphor,
i, 256 seq.
Hotri, by the meditation on the
unity of pra«ava and udgitha,
the H. sets right any mistake he
may commit in his work, ii,
282.
Householder is everything, for the
performance of many works be-
longing to his own ajrama is
enjoined on him, and at the
same time the duties of the
other ajramas, ii, 324 seq.
Householdership, the duties of, ii,
296 seqq.
Idealists maintain that thought only
is real, i, 401.
— are the Yoga>^aras, i, 401 n.
— controverted, i, 418-427.
Ideas and mental impressions suc-
ceed each other as causes and
effects, i, 420, 423.
— the variety of, explained by the
idealist, i, 420.
— • — cannot be explained from the
variety of mental impressions, i,
425-427.
— two, cannot apprehend, or be
apprehended by, each other, i,
422.
— require an ulterior intelligent
principle, i, 424.
— the i. of the waking state are not
like those of a dream, as the
idealist asserts, i, 424 seq.
Ignorance, cessation of, the fruit of
the cognition of Brahman, i, 31.
Illusion, this apparent world an, i,
345-^
— see Maya.
Immortality, of him who knows the
lower Brahman only, is merely
a relative, j, pp. Ixxix, Ixxx ;
ii, 369 seq.
— of him who knows Brahman,
according to Ramami^a, i, pp.
Ixxix, Ixxx.
— bhuman is, i, 163, 168.
— of all effected things is merely a
relative one, i, 169.
— is not to be reached but through
the knowledge of the highest
Self, i, 275.
— the result of the knowledge of
the soul, i, 279.
— of ether is to be understood, like
that of the gods, as a relative
i. only, ii, 17.
— is possible only in the highest
Brahman, ii, 392.
Imperishable, the, (akshara), is Brah-
man, i, p. xxxv, 1 69-1 7 1.
— that element in Brahman, from
which the material universe
springs, i, p. cxix.
— the Indestructible is higher than
the high I., i, 136, 137, 140.
— the knowledge of the I. is the
knowledge of Brahman, i, 138.
— the term explained, i, 140.
— cannot be the embodied soul, i,
171.
— the denials of conceptions con-
cerning the I. are to be com-
prehended in all meditations on
the, ii, 238-240.
Indestructible, the higher know-
ledge is this by which the I. is
apprehended, i, 135-138.
Indra, the legend of I. and Pratar-
dana, i, 97-99, loi.
— may be called prawa, i, 99.
— is the god of strength, i, 99,
— is one with Brahman, i, 101 seq.
— disciple of Praj-apati, i, 199.
— with a thunderbolt, i, 217 n.
— three cakes offered to, ii, 259.
— above Varuwa there come I. and
Pra^apati, on the path of the
gods, ii, 386.
Inference denotes Sm/-/ti, i, 203.
460
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Inherence (samavaya), the distinc-
tion of the Vaijeshikas between
conjunction (sawyoga) and i.,
i, 389 seq., 396 seq.
— the connexion between the Lord
and the soul and the pradhana
cannot be i., i, 436.
Injunction is the sense of all poten-
tial, imperative, &c., verbal
forms, ii, 304.
Injunctions and prohibitions, what
room is there for them, if there
is only one internal Self of all
beings? ii, 65-68.
■ do not refer to him who has
obtained perfect knowledge, ii,
67.
are possible on account of the
connexion of the Self with
bodies, ii, 66-68.
Intellect (buddhi) is higher than
the mind, i, 239 seq.
— higher than the i. is the great
Self, i, 240.
— the pervadingness of, ii, 40.
— abides in the heart, ii, 45.
— the connexion of the soul with
the i. exists as long as the soul,
ii, 45-48.
- — is the first produced, ii, 57.
— there are five distinctions of i.,
and on their account five intel-
lectual organs, ii, 81.
Intelligence the substance of Brah-
man, i, p. XXV.
Intermediate place, i.e. state of
dreams, ii, 133.
Internal cognition cannot be the
abode of mental impressions, i,
426 seq.
— organ, Pradyumna identical with
it, i, p. xxiii.
(sattva), and the individual
soul, i, 122 seq.
conjunction cannot take place
between the atoms, the soul,
and the, i, 398.
conjunction of soul and i. o.
cannot be the cause of cognition,
i, 398 n.
■ called by different names,
manas, buddhi, vi^;7ana, ^itta, ii,
48.
if no i. o. existed there would
result either constant percep-
tion or constant non-perception,
or else a limitation either of
the soul or of the senses, ii, 48
seq.
Internal organ, called Atman, ii,
81.
— organs, the Sankhyas sometimes
speak of three, sometimes of
one only, i, 376.
co-operate with the Selfs, ac-
cording to Ka«ada, ii, 69.
Intuition a means of knowledge, i,
18.
— is the final result of the en-
quiry into Brahman, i, 18 ; ii,
332.
— vouched for by Scripture, i, loi
seq.
— the highest Self corresponds to
the mental act of complete, i,
172.
■ — true knowledge cannot be de-
stitute of its result, since that
result is the object of im-
mediate, ii, 238, 295.
— the fruit of all meditations is to be
effected through, ii, 281.
— repetition not necessary to bring
about, ii, 333.
Invisibility, that which possesses the
attributes of i. is Brahman, i,
p. XXXV, 135-142.
— may be an attribute of the pra-
dhana, i, 136.
Involucrum of delight, ii, 202 seq.
Ijvara, the Lord, i, p. xxv.
— as a retributor and dispenser, i,
p. xxvi.
— retracts the material world and
sends forth a new one, i, pp.
xxvi, xxvii.
— or the lower Brahman, i, pp.
xxvii, xci, xcii.
— is something unreal according to
iSankara, i, p. xxx.
— no distinction between I. and
Brahman, i, p. xxx.
— of Ramanu^a, i, p. cxxiv.
— see also Lord.
!jvaragitas = Bhagavadgita, ii, 63.
Itihasas, ii, 315.
— and Purawas, i, 198, 217, 222, 223,
304, 348; ii, 235.
are of human origin, hence do
not constitute an independent
means of authoritative know-
ledge, i, 218.
GENERAL INDEX.
461
Itihasas and PuraKas based on
mantra and arthavada, i, 222.
based on perception, i, 222.
all the four castes are qualified
for acquiring the knowledge of
the, i, 229.
Kahola, the questions of K. and
Ushasta constitute one vidya, ii,
242 seq.
^aitraratha Abhipratarin, Ganajrutl
being mentioned together with
the Kshattriya K. must have
been a Kshattriya himself, i, 226
seq.
ATakrayawa, the Rish'i, when in danger
of life, ate unlawful food, but
refused to drink, ii, 311.
Kalpas, the great world periods, i,
p. xxvi, 212.
— there is no measure of the past
and the future, i, 361.
Kalpa-sQtras, i, p. xii.
Kawabhu^. See Kawada.
Ka^ada, i, 315.
— his Vaijeshika-sutras, i, 384.
— his doctrine, i, 386 seq.
— his reasons for the permanence
of the atoms, i, 392 seq.
— his followers deny the origina-
tion of ether, ii, 5.
declare the soul to be non-
intelligent, ii, 33.
their doctrine about the unin-
telligent Selfs and the internal
organs, ii, 69.
Kawadas. See Vaijcshikas.
Ka«vas and Madhyandinas, the two
jakhas of the Brihad-arawyaka,
i, p. Ixxxix, 134, 260 n., 262
seq. ; ii, 214, 308.
Kapardin quoted by Ramanu^a, i,
p. xxi.
Kapeya, ^aitraratha Abhipratarin
connected with, i, 226.
Kapila and other supreme r/shis
maintain the doctrine of the
pradhana being the general
cause only because it is based
on the Veda, i, 237.
— his Sahkhya/astra, i, 291.
— his knowledge r/shi-like and un-
obstructed, i, 292, 293, 294,
315-
— the dvaitavadin, not mentioned
in 5ruti, i, 294.
Kapila Vasudeva who burned the
sons of Sagara, another, i, 294.
— by acknowledging a plurality of
Selfs, does not admit the doc-
trine of there being one uni-
versal Self, i, 295.
— blamed by IManu, i, 295.
— his great principle, i, 296.
Kapila Smr/ti, i, 291.
KarmakaWa, systematised by the
Purva INIimawsa, i, p. ix.
— concerned the higher castes only,
i, p. xi.
— cannot lead to final release, i, pp.
xxvii, xxix.
— its subject-matter, i, 21, 24.
— activity depends on the, i, 322,
— works enjoined in the, ii, 184,
Karsh«a^ini, i, p. xix.
— his view of the remainder of
works with which the soul re-
descends, ii, 119 seq.
Kajakr/tsna, i, pp. xix, xcix.
— on the highest Self existing in
the condition of the individual
soul, i, 278-283.
Ka^-6aka, ii, 196.
Ka//^a-upanishad quoted in the
Vedanta-sfltras, i, p. xlii.
— its topic the boons granted by
Yama to Na/^iketas, i, 249.
Kaushitaki-upanishad quoted in the
Vedanta-sfitras, i, p. xlii.
^i;andogya-upanishad, most of the
passages discussed in the Ve-
danta-sutras are taken from
the, i, pp. xli seqq., xliv seq.
— creation according to the, ii,
4 seq.
— the Udgitha- vidya of the, ii, 192-
199.
Altragupta and others are employed
by Yama as superintendents of
hells, ii, 123.
/Titraratha connected with the Ka-
peyas, i, 226.
Knowing, repetition of the mental
functions of k., meditating, &c.
is required (even where the text
gives instruction once only), ii,
331-357.
— and ' meditating ' are used one
in the place of the other, ii,
332-
Knowledge, he v>'ho consists of k. is
462
vedanta-sOtras.
not the individual soul, but
Brahman, i, p. xxxviii, 233-
236.
Knowledge, when does it arise, in
this life or in the next ? i, p.
Ixxvi ; ii, 327-330.
■ — defined, i, 6.
— is not an activity, {,35 seq.
— an attribute of goodness, i, 46,
48 seq.
— the individual soul consists of,
i, 134-
— ' when he has departed, there is
no more,' i, 280 seq.
— the act of k., the object of k., and
the result of k., an internal pro-
cess, i, 418.
— the act of k. and the object of k.
are simultaneous, hence in
reality identical, i, 419.
— the means of k., the object of k.,
the knowing subject, and the act
of k. are all alike indefinite, i,
429.
— nescience, work, and former k.,
limiting adjuncts of the soul, ii,
367.
— and works are the two roads for
entering on the road of the
gods and the road of the fathers,
ii, 123-125.
— the path of the gods cannot be
attained by faith and aus-
terities, unaided by, ii, 234.
■ — works inferior to, ii, 267, 307.
— mere k. cannot effect the purpose
of man, ii, 288 seq.
• — good works also are apt to
obstruct the result of, ii, 356
seq.
— works connected with k. are
superior to those destitute of,
ii, 361.
— means of, sacrifices and other
works are, i, p. Ixxviii ; ii, 292
seq., 306-309, 313-315) 358-
362.
procured in a former exis-
tence, i, 228 ; ii, 316, 328.
discussion of the various, ii,
306-327.
calmness &c. are direct means
of k., sacrifice Szc. are indirect
means, ii, 307-309.
Muniship is enjoined as, ii,
322-324.
Knowledge belongs to those who are
bound to chastity, ii, 295.
— works are co-operative for the
origination ofk., but not for the
fruits of, ii, 313.
— also persons ' standing between,'
i. e. not belonging to one or
other of the stages of life, are
qualified for, ii, 315 seq.
— works if joined with k. may effect
final release, ii, 359.
— higher and lower, distinguished
by 5ahkara, i, pp. xxxi, Ixxviii,
i37seqq. ; this distinction not
valid, i, pp. Ixxxviii-xci.
not distinguished by Ra-
manu^a, i, pp. xxxi, Ixxviii seq.
not distinguished by Ba-
daraya«a, i, pp. c, ci.
not distinguished in the
Upanishads, i, pp. cviii-cxi, cxv
seq.
— the lower, departure of the soul
of him who possesses, i, p.
Ixxix ; ii, 364-404.
— — the greater part of the
Vedanta-sutras is taken up
with, i, p. ci.
comprises the i?/g-veda and so
on, i, 137, 138.
leads to mere worldly exalta-
tion, the higher to absolute
bliss, i, 138.
he who possesses it obtains
lordly power and cessation of
all sin, ii, 355.
— the highest, the fate of the soul
of him who has reached it, i,
p. Ixxx seq.; ii, 372-377-
is this by which the Indes-
tructible is apprehended, i, 135,
137 seq.
— true (or perfect, or k. of the
highest Self), thepractical world,
perception, &c., vanishes in the
sphere of, i, 135, 281; ii, 340,
400.
is irrefutable, i, 282.
cannot be founded on reason-
ing, i, 316 seq.
rests on the Veda, i, 317.
as long as it is not reached,
the ordinary course of secular
and religious activity holds on
undisturbed, i, 324.
injunctions and prohibitions
GENERAL INDEX.
463
do not refer to him who has
obtained, ii, 67.
Knowledge, true, will spring up of
itself, it cannot be enjoined,
ii, 163, 164 seq.
has pious meditation for its
antecedent, ii, 205.
there is no difference in it
as there is between works, ii,
330.
there can be no successive
stages in it, ii, 336.
when t. k. springs up, Scrip-
ture ceases to be valid, ii,
340.
it is impossible for any one
who has not reached t. k. to re-
frain altogether, from birth to
death, from all actions, ii, 399.
a man dying in the possession
of t. k. shakes off his good and
evi! deeds, i, p. Ixx; ii, 119, 225-
229, 230, 294 seq., 357 seq.
even beings who have reached
t. k. may retain a body for the
discharge of certain offices, i,
p. Ixxii ; ii, 235-238.
in all cases brings about its
fruit, viz, final release, i, 229;
ii, 235-238.
by means of it, there is
effected the Selfs dissociation
from the matras, i, 281.
is the door to perfect beati-
tude, i, 283.
• Smr/tis composed with refer-
ence to t. k. as the means of
final release, i, 291.
is not purposeless, ii, 64,
the accomplishment of man's
highest end by means of t. k., the
different injunctions as to the
means of t. k., and the absence
of certain rules as to release
which is the fruit of, ii, loi,
285-330.
for those who have risen to
t. k. it would be purposeless to
proceed on the path of the
gods, ii, 232.
completely destroys the po-
tentiality of action, ii, 237.
— • — alone effects the purpose of
man, ii, 285, 290-306.
its fruit, being present to
intuition, does not manifest
itself at a later time only, as the
fruits of actions do, ii, 294.
Knowledge, true, he who possesses
t. k. cannot be born again, ii,
369 seq., 419.
is the door of release, ii, 370,
371, 400.
— - — owing to the power of t. k.
the soul departs through the
hundred and first vein, ii, 377
seq.
through t. k. the expanse of
names and forms which Nes-
cience superimposes on Brah-
man is dissolved, ii, 401.
see also Brahman, knowledge
of, p. 449.
see also Self, knowledge of
the.
— (vidya) of the pra«a, ii, 186 seq.
— of Brahman's couch, ii, 400.
— of Brahman within the heart, ii,
410. See also Daharavidya.
— of Agni Vaijvanara. See Vaij-
vanara-vidya.
— of the five fires. See Fires.
— of the udgitha. See Udgitha-
vidya.
Yirikkhvd. penance, prescribed for
hermits and mendicants who
have broken their vows, ii, 319.
Kr/sh«a or Vish«u, and the Bhaga-
vadgita, i, p. cxxvi.
Kr/sh«a Dvaipayana, Apantaratamas
was born again as, ii, 235.
KuWapayins, the ayana of the, a
great sacrifice lasting a whole
year, ii, 250, 250 n., 251, 314.
Legends recorded in the Vedanta-
texts have the purpose of glori-
fying (as arthavadas) the in-
junctions with which they are
connected, i, p. Ixxv; ii, 305
seq.
Libations, five !. in the form of
5raddha, Soma, rain, food, seed
are offered in the five fires, viz.
the heavenly world, Par^anya,
the earth, man, and woman, ii,
103.
— the seven 1. (from the saurya
libation up to the jataudana 1.)
are limited tothe Atharva«ikas,
ii, 189, 190,
Light is the highest Brahman, i,
464
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
pp. xxxiv, xxxviii, 87-97, 1S5,
191, 231 seq.
Light, Brahman is the 1. of lights, i,
193, 194-
— of Brahman, by it everything is
lighted, i, p. xxxvi, 192-195.
is the cause of the manifes-
tation of this entire world, i,
194.
— the first-born (original) 1. which
has not yet become tripartite,
i, 88 seq.
— the highest I. identified with the
gastric fire within man, i, 89.
— the pragna. Self is the universal,
i, 195.
— on the road beginning with 1. the
departed soul proceeds, ii, 382-
384, 386.
— and the other stations on the
soul's journey to Brahman are
conductors of the souls, not
marks of the road, nor places of
enjoyment, ii, 387-389.
— the 1. into which the soul enters
is the highest Self, ii, 407.
— highest. See also Lord, highest.
Lightning is the end of the road
beginning with light, ii, 386,
— beyond 1. there is Varuwa (on the
path of the gods), ii, 386.
— after the 1. has been reached, the
souls are led through the worlds
of Vanina, Sec, by the person,
not a man, who follows im-
mediately after the, ii, 389.
Lokayatikas, i, 14.
Lord, the, or the highest Self, or
Brahman, i, p. xxvii.
— matter and souls constitute his
body, i, p. xxviii.
— pervades all things as their an-
taryamin, i, p. xxviii.
— modes of him (prakara), i, p.
xxviii.
— creation owing to an act of
volition on his part, i, p. xxix.
— is Brahman in the condition of
an effect, i, p. xxix.
— highest, all-knowing,all-powerful,
J, 15, 79, 136 seq., 329, 357.
his knowledge does not require
a body, i, 50 seq., 438.
the one within the sun and
the eye is the, i, 77-81, 134
seqq. ; ii, 416 seq.
Lord, highest, has no special abode,
but abides in his own glory, 1,78.
the sole topic of all worldly
songs, i, 80.
of Scripture, i, 160.
may assume a bodily shape
formed of Maya, i, 80, 370
seq.
also resides in the body, but
not in the body only, for he is
all-pervading, i, in.
although present everywhere,
he is pleased when meditated
upon as dwelling in the heart,
i, 114, 196.
immortality and fearlessness
ascribed to him, i, 125.
free from all evil, i, 125.
the lordly power of the gods
is based on the, i, 130 ; so also
that of other souls, ii, 416-
418.
is the source of all beings, i,
135-142.
' measured by a span,' i, 144,
150-153, 192, 195 seq.
has a shape consisting of the
threefold world, i, 145 seq.
the perception of the h. L. is
the gastric fire, i, 147, 149.
has the heaven for his head
&c., and is based on the earth,
i, 148.
forms the head &c., and is
based on the chin of the devout
worshipper, i, 148.
is everlastingly free from Nes-
cience, ii, 149.
worship of the h. L. as Vaij-
vanara, i, 149 seq.
the supporting of all things up
to ether can be the work of the
h. L. only, i, 170.
is greater than ether, i, 177.
is a limitary support, i, 181
seq.
there is only one h. L. ever
unchanging, whose substance is
cognition, and who, by means
of Nescience, manifests himself
in various ways, i, 190.
besides the h. L. there is no
other substance of cognition, i,
190.
is the absolute ruler of the
past and the future, i, 196.
GENERAL INDEX.
465
Lord, highest, his nature is Maya
joined with time and karman, i,
357 n.
cannot be reproached with
cruelty, on account of his re-
garding merit and demerit, i,
357-360 ; ii, 180-183.
his essentia! goodness affirmed
by ^ruti and Smr/ti, i, 358.
his position analogous to that
of Parian ya, i, 358.
Scripture the production of
the oinniscient L., and the
omniscience of the L. based on
Scripture, i, 437.
we are to meditate on him, i,
441.
from him there result sawsara
and inoksha, ii, 58 seq.
is the evolver of names and
forms, i, 328 seq. ; ii, 96-98.
meant by the term ' he who
renders tripartite,' ii, 97.
is free from all qualities, ii, 340.
there is also a form of the
h. L. not abiding in efTectcd
things, ii, 417 seq.
— the Bauddhas do not admit a
ruling, i, 403.
— on the Sahkhyaand Yoga systems
the L. acts as the ruler of the
pradhana and of the souls, i,
434 seq.
— Pajupati, 5iva, i, 435.
— the pradhana cannot be ruled by
the L. in the same way as the
organs are ruled by the soul, i,
437 seq.
— such terms as L. and the like
cannot be applied to the in-
dividual soul, i, p. xxxix.
— highest, is not, like the individual
soul, the cause of evil, i, p. xlix,
343-346.
who abides within the soul,
is not affected by the imper-
fections clinging to the soul, i,
pp. Ixii-lxiv.
the intelligent Self is the, i,
15, 234, 290 ; ii, 337-340.
difl^erent from the individual
soul, i, p. xcviii, 70, 81, 159
seq., 187, 234; ii, 290 seq.
the released soul, ii, 418.
is himself the individual soul,
not anything else, i, 279 ; ii,
65 seq., 138 seq., 140, 244 seq.,
291, 338, 339 seq.
Lord, highest, stands in the realm
of the phenomenal in the rela-
tion of a ruler to the individual
souls, i, 329.
with a view to the efforts
made by the soul the L. makes
it act, ii, 59-61.
— — as the soul is affected by
pleasure and pain not so the,
ii, 63-65.
refutation of the view that
a h. L. is not the material but
only the operative cause of the
world, i, p. Ii, 284, 434-439.
440.
— — the world, according to the
Upanishads, is nothing but a
manifestation of the h. L.'s
wonderful power, i, p. cxix.
the cause of the world, i, 16,
17, 46, 48, 49, 61, 243, 254,
263-266, 270, 271, 328; ii,
183.
dependency of the world on
him, i, 242-245, 290, 370; ii,
415 seq.
arranged at the beginning of
the present kalpa the entire
world just as it had been ar-
ranged in the preceding kalpa,
i, 215.
the creation of this world is
mere play to him, i, 357.
m^Y, although himself un-
moving, move the universe, i,
369.
— — is the creative principle
abiding within the elements, ii,
24 seq.
is a causal agent in all activity,
ii, 59-
only is eternal and the creator
of the world, ii, 416.
— see also ijvara.
— see also Brahman, and Self,
Lords, such as Hirawyagarbha, &c.,
are able to continue their
previous forms of existence in
each new creation, i, 213,
215.
Lotus, as the 1. wanders from one
pond to another without any
means of conveyance, so Brah-
man creates the world, i, 348.
[38]
11 h
466
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Madhii-vidya, i, 216 seq. ; ii, 233.
INIadhyamikas, or nihilists, believe
that everything is void and
nothing whatever is real, i, p. Ii,
5 n., 401 n.
IMadhyandinas. See Kawvas.
Magician, 6'ahkara's illustrative in-
stance of the m. producing
illusive sights is not known to
Badarayawa, i, pp. xxv, xciv n.
Magicians, multiform creations exist
in them, i, 353.
Mahabharata, Vedantic portions in
it referred to by the Sutras of
Badaraya«a, i, p. cxxvii.
— there is one universal Self ac-
cording to the, i, 295.
— quoted to show that those who
know Brahman do not go or
depart, ii, 375.
Mahejvaras. See ^aivas.
Maitrayawiya-upanishad, Maya in
the, i, pp. cxvii n., cxxi n.
Maitreyi, dialogue of M. and Ya-
^^avalkya, i, 274 scqq.
Maitreyi-brahmawa, ii, 305, 306.
]Man, fancifully identified with the
sacrifice, ii, 220, 221, 265.
Man-sacrifice, the particulars of it
given in the K/Andogya. are not
to be inserted in the Taittiri-
yaka, ii, 220-222.
Manas. See Mind.
— see Internal organ.
Mantras, certain m, and brahmawa
passages, met with in the be-
ginning of some Upanishads, do
not belong to the brahmavidya,
i, p. Ixx ; ii, 222-225.
- — do not constitute an independent
means of authoritative know-
ledge for anything, i, 218.
— though subserving other purposes,
are also independent means of
knowledge, i, 220-222.
— have occasionally to be explained
in a secondary sense, i, 318.
— which are enjoined in one ^akha
are taken over by other 6akhas
also, ii, 273 seq.
— enjoined in one Veda are valid
for other Vedas also, ii, 274.
— and arthavadas as authorities on
the gods, i, 198, 203, 217, 219
seq., 223, 304, 348, 355.
stories about men who ob-
tained new bodies, in the, ii,
235.
Mantras and arthavadas on the non-
return of the released Soul, ii,
418 seq.
Manu mentioned in .Sruti, i, 294,
294 n.
— ' Whatever M, said is medicine,'
i, 294.
— blames the doctrine of Kapila,
i, 294 seq.
— recommends reasoning, i, 315.
— the doctrine of pradhana accepted
by, i, 394.
Manu-smr/ti opposed to the San-
khya-smr/ti, i, p. xlvii, 291.
INIaruts, i, 202, 216.
INIaterialists, i, p. Ixxiv.
— consider intelligence to be a mere
attribute of the body, i, 368.
— assert that a Self separate from
the body does not exist, ii, 269.
— do not admit the existence of
anything but the four elements,
ii, 270.
Matter, unevolved (avyakta), i, p.
xxviii.
becomes gross, i, p. xxix.
— and souls constitute the body of
the Lord, i, p. xxviii.
Maya or Avidya, the appearance of
the world due to it, i, p. xxv.
— is neither sat nor asat, i, p. xxv,
243.
— a principle of illusion, i, p. xxv.
— constitutes the upadana, i, p.
xxv.
• — belongs to Brahman as a jakti, i,
p. xxv, 362.
— modifies itself into all the indi-
vidual existences, i, p. xxv.
— bodily organs and mental func-
tions the offspring of, i, p. xxvi.
— the non-enlightened soul is
unable to look through it, i,
p. xxvi.
— the material world merged into
it, i, p. xxvi.
— he whose soul has been en-
lightened withdraws from the
influence of, i, p. xxvii.
— the world is not unreal M., i, p.
XXX.
• — Brahman becomes a personal God
through, i, p, xxx.
— the soul is Brahman in so far as
GENERAL INDEX.
467
limited by the unreal upadhis
due to, i, p. XXX.
Maya, the doctrine of, unknown to
Badarayawa, i, pp. xci-xcvii, c.
— • — not in the Upanishads, i, pp.
cii, cxvi-cxxi.
though not part of the teach-
ing of the Upanishads, does not
contradict it openly, i, p. cxxv.
— is of a non-intelligent nature,
and the world does not spring
from Brahman as being intelli-
gence, but from Brahman as
being associated with, i, p.
xciii,
— occurrence of the word INI. in
the Upanishads, i, p. cxvii n.
— the highest Lord may assume a
shape formed of, i, 81,
— the nature of the Lord is M.
joined with time and karman,
i, 357 n.
— in consequence of the Lord's
conjunction with M. the crea-
tion is unavoidable, i, 357 n.,
369-
— emitted by the omniform Nara-
yawa, ii, 157.
— see also Nescience.
Meditating, repetitions of the men-
tal functions of knowing, m.,
&c., is required even where
the text gives instruction once
only, ii, 331-337-
— and ' knowing ' are used one in
the place of the other, ii, 332.
Meditation on Brahman as possessing
certain attributes, i, p. Ixvii,
107-109.
the devotee engaged in it is
to view it as constituting his
own Self, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
337-340.
— on the lower Brahman may have
different results, ii, 161 seq.,
185.
its fruit lordship over the
worlds, ii, 402.
— is an action, knowledge is not, i,
35.
— the threefoldness of, i, 102-106,
272.
- — as taught in the Vedanta-texts,
is possible only if the soul is an
agent, ii, 52.
— presentation before the mind of
H
the highest Self is effected
through, ii, 171 seq.
Meditation as a means of the know-
ledge of the highest person, ii,
204 seq.
— the double enunciation * I am
thou' and 'Thou art I,' points
to a twofold m. on the oneness
of the Self, ii, 244 seq.
— owing to the might of the m. on
the unity of pra«avaand udgitha,
the Hotr/ sets right any mistake
he may commit in his work,
ii, 282.
— on the udgitha viewed as the sun,
ii. 333-
— is in itself of the nature of work,
and thus capable of producing
a result, ii, 348.
— by the application of m. the
soul departs by the vein passing
through the skull, ii, 377 seq.
Meditations (vidyas), discussions
as to whether certain m. have to
be combined or to be kept apart,
i, pp. Ixvii seq., Ixx, Ixxii seq.;
ii, 184-192, 216-222, 240-249.
— certain m., such as that on the
udgitha, are really separate,
although apparently identical,
i, p. Ixviii ; ii, 192-196.
— on Brahman, in all of them are
all its qualities included, or
only those mentioned in the
special m. ? i, p. Ixviii seq. ; ii,
201-204.
the form under which the
Self of the meditating devotee
has to be viewed in them, i,
p. Ixxiv.
for which the texts assign one
and the same fruit are optional,
i, p. Ixxv; ii, 280 seq.
not m. on symbols, are the
cause of being led to the world
of Brahman, ii, 403 seq.
— on constituent parts of sacrifices,
are not to be considered as
permanently requisite parts of
the latter,i, p. Ixxiv; 11,252-256.
are valid for all jakhas,
i, p. Ixxiv ; ii, 272-274.
and m. which refer to
special wishes may be cumu-
lated or optionally employed,
i, p. Ixxv ; ii, 281-284.
h 2
468
VEDANTA-SUTRAS,
Meditations on constituent parts of
sacrifices, are to be carriedon by
the sacrificer, ii, 320 seq.
by the priest, ii, 321.
— certain clauses forming part of
the m., are not mere glorifi-
cations, but enjoin the m.,
i, p. Ixxv; ii, 303-305-
— which refer to one subject, but
as distinguished by dilTerent
qualities, have to be held apart
as different m., i, p. Ixxv; ii,
277-279.
— on the Self are to be repeated
again and again, i, p. Ixxvi ;
ii, 331-337.
— are to be carried on in a sitting
posture, i, p. Ixxvii ; ii, 349
seq.
— may be carried on at any time,
and in any place, favourable to
concentration of mind, i, p.
Ixxvii ; ii, 350 seq.
— are to be continued until death,
i, p. Ixxvii ; ii, 351 seq.
— are themselves acts, but not sub-
ordinate members of the sacri-
fices, ii, 256.
— subserve the end of man, not of
sacrifice, ii, 283.
— the fruit belongs to -him who
carries out the, ii, 320.
to the sacrificer, ii, 321.
Mendicant, rel igious, meditation only
is prescribed for him, not action,
i, p. Ixxvj ii, 295-303, 306.
and Brahma?;as, ii, 27.
not afflicted by pain, ii, 64.
the term ' austerity ' cannot
refer to him, ii, 300 seq.
the state of being grounded
in Brahman belongs to him,
ii, 300-303.
enjoys immortality, ii, 301.
penance prescribed for the
m. who has broken his vow,
ii, 319.
* Mental ' cup, offered on the tenth
day of Soma sacrifices, ii, 260
seq., 263, 266 seq.
Mental impressions, the variety of
ideas is due to m. i. of former
ideas, i, 420, 420 n.
their existence is not possible
on the Bauddha view, i, 425-
427.
Mental impressions, internal cogni-
tion cannot be their abode, i,
426 seq.
Metres, by means of the m. the
direction of the mind on Brah-
man is declared, i, 93-95.
— their names used to denote other
things resembling those m. in
certain numerical relations, i,
95-
— statements about the order of
succession of m. supplementing
each other, ii, 225, 228.
— of the Asuras and of the Devas,
ii, 228, 228 n.
Milk, as milk transforms itself into
curds, so Brahman is the cause
of the world, i, 346 seq.
Mimawsa, i, p. ix.
— its two branches, purva anduttara,
i, p. ix.
— the word employed already in
the Brahmawas, i, p. x.
— its various means of proof, as
determiningthe proper meaning
and position of Scriptural pas-
sages in the Vedanta-sutras, i,
p. xli,
— the Vedanta-sutras as well as
the Purva-mimawsa-sutras are
throughout M., i, p. xlv.
]\Iimawsa-jastra,a short name for the
Piirva - mimawsa - jastra, i, p.
xi.
Mimawsa-sutras not intelligible with-
out a commentary, i, p. xiii
seq.
Mind (manas), the being which con-
sists of m. &c. is Brahman, not
the individual soul, i, p. xxxiv
seq., 107-1 16.
— Brahman as it differentiates itself
through the m. is called indi-
vidual soul, i, 104.
— is the abode of the power of cog-
nition, i, 105.
— the embodied Self is connected
with the, i, 107.
— the ' two entered into the cave,'
are they the m. and the indi-
vidual soul, or the individual
soul and the highest Self? i, 1 18
seqq.
— constitutes the limiting adjunct
of the individual soul, and chiefly
abides in the heart, i, 175.
GENERAL INDEX.
469
Mind is superior to the sense-objects,
_ i, 239.
— intellect is higher than the, i, 239
seq.
— presupposes the existence of an
aggregate of atoms, viz. the body
(Bauddha), i, 403 n.
— Pradyumna denotes the, i, 440.
— speech, breath, and m. presup-
pose fire, water, and earth, ii, 78
seq.
— has all things for its objects and
extends to the past, the present,
and the future, ii, 81.
— on account of the plurality of its
functions we find it designated
as manas or buddhi or ahaw-
kara or /^itta, ii, 81.
— has five functions, ii, 89 seq.
— accompanies the soul when leav-
ing its body, ii, 102.
— six and thirty thousand different
energies of the m. identified
with the fire-altars, the cups,
&c., ii, 265.
— speech is merged in, ii, 364 seq.
— all sense-organs are merged in, ii,
365 seq.
— breath may be viewed as the
causal substance of, ii, 366.
— is earth, ii, 366.
— i.e. the function of m., is merged
in breath, on the departure of
the soul, ii, 366 seq.
Mitra and Varu«a, Vasish/^i»a again
procreated by them, ii, 235.
Moksha. See Release.
Moksha Sastras, ii, 158.
Momentariness, the Bauddha doc-
trine of universal m., i, 403 n.,
407, 408, 427.
is impossible on account
of remembrance of the perceiv-
ing person, i, 413-415.
Monism. See Advaita.
Moon, men who perform sacrifices
&c. ascend after death to the, i,
p. cvii, 108, no, 112, 114, 121-
125.
— the soul's ascent to, and descent
from the, ii, 101-132.
— the body of the soul in the m.
consists of water, which had
originated in the m. for the
purpose of enjoying the fruits of
works, ii, 114, 115, 127.
Moon, the soul's descending from
the, ii, 126-128.
Mother-of-pearl mistaken for silver,
simile, i, 4_n., 5, 43.
MuWaka-upanishad and the rite of
carrying fire on the head, ii, 186,
189 seq.
Muni, the state of the, enjoined
by the side of learning and
childlike state, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
322-327.
Na^is, veins or arteries of the body,
by means of them the soul
departs from the body, i, pp.
Ixxix, Ixxxii.
— deep sleep takes place in them,
i, 191 ; ii, 141-146.
— glorified, ii, 143.
— light contained in them, ii, 144,
— and pericardium are, in deep
sleep, merely the limiting ad-
juncts of the soul, ii, 145.
— see also Veins.
Na/^iketa, legend of, ii, 123.
Na^iketas, colloquy between Yama
and, i, 247-252.
Names, the two secret, applied to
thedeva-abode of Brahman and
to its bodily abode, are to be
held apart, ii, 216-218.
— and forms, i, p. xxv.
their evolution is the work,
not of the individual soul, but
of the Lord, i, pp. lix, Ixiii ; ii,
96-100.
• — was preceded by the tripar-
tition, ii, 98.
the object of Brahman's know-
ledge before the creation, i, 50.
attributed to Brahman, i, 125.
presented by Nescience, 1,140,
282, 328 seq., 345, 369; ii, 64,
140, 401, 402.
on account of their equality,
there is no contradiction to the
eternity of the Veda in the
renovation of the world, i, 211-
216.
the world periodically divests
itself of them, i, 212.
Brahman only is different
from, i, 232 seq.
the entire world of effects is
evolved exclusively by, i, 233,
242, 268, 357.
470
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
Names and forms, ' Being ' is that
which is differentiated by, i,
267.
abide in the individual soul, i,
277 seq.
cannot abide in the soul, i,
279.
non-existence of the effect
previous to its production only
means the state of n. and f.
being unevolved, i, 333.
the element of plurality cha-
racterised by, i, 352.
in Bauddha terminology, i,
404, 404 n.
the apparent world of n. and f.
to be dissolved by knowledge,
ii, 162 seq.
Narada, dialogue between N. and
Sanatkumara, i, 166 seq.
— instructed by the omniform Na-
raya«a, ii, 157.
— assumed a new body, ii, 235.
Narayawa, another name of Brah-
man, i, p. xxxi n.
— the omniform N. instructed Na-
rada about Maya being the
cause of Narada's seeing him,
ii, 157.
— who is higher than the Unde-
veloped, who is the highest Self,
and the Self of all, reveals
himself by dividing himself in
multiple ways, i, 440.
Nasadiya-sukta quoted, ii, 85.
Nescience (avidya), superimposition
is, i, 6.
— perception &c. have for their
object that which is dependent
on, i, 7.
— the seed of the Sawsara, de-
stroyed by knowledge of Brah-
man, i, 14, 300 ; ii, 68 seq. ; but
not by the lower knowledge,
ii, 370.
— distinctions fictitiously created
by, i, 32.
— Brahman as the object of, i, 62.
— the limiting adjunct, consisting of
the organs of action, presented
by, i, 134.
— the whole practical world exists
only in the sphere of, i, 135,
155; ii, 294.
— names and forms presented by,
i, 139 seq., 282, 328 seq., 345,
357, 369; ii, 64, 67, 140, 163,
401, 402,
Nescience, the conception that the
body and other things contained
in the sphere of the Not-self are
our Self, constitutes N., i, 157.
— from it there spring desires, aver-
sions, fear, and confusion, i, 157,
167.
— compared to the mistake of him
who in the twilight mistakes
a post for a man, i, 185.
— the unreal aspect of the individual
soul, as different from the
highest Self, is a mere presenta-
tion of, i, 189, 241, 244, 251,
252 ; ii, 68, 139, 173, 179, 340.
— by means of N., the highest Lord
manifests himself in various
ways, i, 190, 352.
— the causal potentiality is of the
nature of, i, 243.
— the body the product of, i, 244.
— all the kinds of specific cognition
belonging to the sphere of N.,
are absent in the sphere of true
knowledge, i, 281.
— the elements and the sense-
organs the product of, i, 281.
— the effects both at the time of
creation and reabsorption are
the mere fallacious superimpo-
sitions of, i, 312.
— element of plurality the figment
of, i, 355.
— naturally tends towards effects
without any purpose, i, 357 n.
— cannot be the cause of inequality,
as it is of a uniform nature, i,
360.
— the relation of causes of suffering
and of sufferers is the effect of,
— in the Vaijeshika-siitra, i, 392
seq.
— the mutual causality of N. and so
on (Bauddha) cannot explain
the formation of aggregates, i,
404-409, 404 n.
— Bauddha doctrine of the distinc-
tion, owing to the influence of
N., of the attributes of exist-
ence and non-existence, i, 423.
— the rising from deep sleep is due
to the existence of potential N.,
ii,48.
GENERAL INDEX.
471
Nescience, the conditions of being
agent and enjoyer presented by
N. only, ii, 54, 55.
— the soul being engrossed by N.,
identifies itself as it were with
the body &c., and imagines it-
self to be affected by the expe-
rience of pain which is due to
N., ii, 63 seq., 65.
— the soul when leaving its body
takes N,, with itself, ii, 102.
— the Lord is everlastingly free
from, ii, 149.
— a soul which has freed itself from
N. cannot possibly enter into
phenomenal life, ii, 149.
— limiting adjuncts presented by,
Ji, 67, 153, 156.
— the primeval natural N. leaves
room for all practical life and
activity, ii, 156.
— the bondage of tlie soul due to N.
only, ii, 174.
— a limiting adjunct of the soul,
ii, 367.
Nihilists Bauddha, i, 415.
Nihilists are the Madhyamikas, i,
401 n.
— maintain that everything is void,
i, 401.
— are contradicted by all means of
right knowledge, and therefore
require no special refutation,
i, 427.
Nimi, Vasish^^a cursed by, ii, 235.
Nirvawa, the eternally perfect, ii,
419-
Nishadas and the four castes, the
pdn/^cLga.na.b, i, 262.
Non-being. See Asat.
Non-duality, taught both by 5ankara
and Ramanuj'a, i, p. xxx,
— with a difference, taught by Ra-
manu^a, i, p. xxx.
Non-ego, the object has for its
sphere the notion of the, i, 3.
Non-entity, non-existent. See Asat.
Nyaya philosophy, i, 15 n.
Object and subject cannot be iden-
tified, i, 3.
are not distinguished in con-
sequence of wrong knowledge,
i, 4.
the relation of, cannot exist
in the Self, i, 378 seq.
Objects, the ten, and the ten sub-
jects cannot rest on anything
but Brahman, i, 104.
have reference to pra^wa, i,
105 seq.
— are beyond the senses, i, 239, 244.
— mind is superior to the, i, 239.
Oblations, the five, not always neces-
sary for birth, ii, 125 seq.
Om, the syllable, and the udgitha,
i, p. Ixviii; ii, 193 seq., 196-199.
is all this, i, 169 seq.
a means to obtain Brahman,
i, 170.
meditation on the highest per-
son by means of it, i, 171-174 ;
is the lower Brahman the object
of this meditation? i, 171 seq.;
the highest Brahman is the ob-
ject of it, i, 172 seqq.
— ■ — which is a quality, i.e. the
abode of a meditation, is com-
mon to the three Vedas, ii, 282
seq.
Omnipotence depends on the omni-
potent ruler being the cause of
all created things, i, 132.
Omniscience, ascribed to the Pra-
dhana, i, 46 seq.
Ordeal of the heated hatchet, and
the thief, i, 323 n.
Organic beings, four classes of, ii,
126.
Organs, the creation and reabsorp-
tion of the o. of the soul do not
interfere with the creation &c.
of the elements, i, p. liii ; ii,
26-28,
— five intellectual, and five o. of
action, ii, 81.
— drawn inward in sleep, ii, 136.
— of the body and the divinities
declared to be non- different,
ii, 257.
— see also Internal organ, and Sense-
organs.
Paingi-rahasya Brahmawa, i, 122.
Paingi-upanishad, i, p. xxxv n.,
]6i.
Pa«>^agni-vidya. See Fires, know-
ledge of the five.
Paw/^aratra, the followers of the P.
= the Bhagavatas, i, 442.
Pa«,^aratras = Bhagavatas, quod vide.
Paw^ajikha, a Smr/ti writer, i, 291 n.
47
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Parg-anya, air manifesting itself in
the form of, i, 229.
— the position of the Lord with re-
gard to merit and demerit of
the living creatures is analogous
to that of, i, 358.
Parivra^akas. See Mendicant.
Paryahka-vidya, ii, 230, 232, 233.
Passion is called red on account of
its colouring, i.e. influencing
property, i, 253.
— Goodness, P., and Darkness, the
three gu«as, i, 353.
— Goodness, P., and Darkness, the
three constituent elements of
the pradhana, i, 364 n., 366 seq.
— the gu«a, cannot be that which
causes suffering, i, 379.
— see Gu«as.
Pajupati or 5iva, according to the
■Saivas, the operative cause, i,
435-
Path, the Bauddha instruction as to
the, i, 411.
— of the gods, i, p. xxix, 128 ; ii,
297, 381.
— • — only those who know the
qualified Brahman proceed on
the, while those who know
the unqualified Brahman be-
come one with it without mov-
ing to any other place, i, p. Ixxi ;
ii, 231 seq.
all who meditate on Brahman
proceed on the, i, p. Ixxii.
followed by all who are ac-
quainted with the saguwa-vidyas
of Brahman, i, p. Ixxii ; ii, 232-
235.
stations on it, i, p. Ixxxii ; ii,
382-389.
men who possess knowledge
proceed on it up to the world
of Brahman, from which there
is no return, i, pp. cvii, cix ; ii,
124, 391, 418 seq.
the details about it are given
both in the Upakojala-vidya and
in the Paw^agni-vidya, ii, 233,
234 seq.
cannot be attained by faith
and austerities,unaidedby know-
ledge, ii, 234.
description of it, ii, 364-404.
— of the fathers, ii, 234, 381, 384.
leading through smoke, ii, 108.
Path of the fathers to be obtained,
by means of sacrifices, works of
public utility, and alms, ii, 124.
Perception denotes Scripture, i,
203.
— possible without the body, as in
dreams, ii, 272.
Pericardium, also a place of deep
sleep, ii, 142, 144.
— merely the abode of the limiting
adjuncts of the soul in deep
sleep, ii, 145.
Person (purusha), the highest, to be
meditated upon with the sylla-
ble Om is not the lower, but the
higher Brahman, i, p. xxxv seq.,
171-174-
meditation as a means of the
knowledge of, ii, 205.
— of the size of a thumb is Brahman,
i, p. xxxvii, 195-198.
— which is not the original Brah-
man, but an effect may be called
the internal Self of all beings,
i, 142.
— ' Beyond the Great there is the
Undeveloped, beyond the Un-
developed there is the P.,' i, 237
seq.
— is essentially pure, i, 298.
— is higher than the senses and
everything else, ii, 204 seq.
— called the Self, ii, 205.
— is hard to know, and to be reached
by sharp minds only, ii, 205.
— in the sun, the golden, is the
highest Self, i, 63, 112.
whom the sun does not
know, i, 81.
and Agni are not equal,
though the term ' death ' is
applied to both, ii, 267.
and the p. seen within the
eye are not some individual
soul, but Brahman, i, p. xxxiv,
77-81.
and thep. within the eye are
one, ii, 217, 218, 244-247.
— within the eye, is Brahman, i,
p. xxxv, 123-130.
is not a deity of the sun, i,
124, 130.
Pradhana, the non-intelligent first
cause, the Safikhya doctrine of
the, refuted, i, pp. xxxii, xlvi, 1,
xciii, cxvii, 16, 16 n,, 46 seq.,
GENERAL INDEX.
473
47-64, 70 seq., 135 seq., 139-
142, 237-241, 238 n., 252, 257-
260, 263, 290, 296, 313 seq., 353
seq., 363-381, 437 seq.
Pradhana, the Upanishads teach
nothing like it, i, p. cxix.
— figuratively spoken of as thinking,
i, 52 seq.
- — is not figuratively spoken of as
thinking, i, 53 seqq.
— cannot be designated by the term
' Self,' because release is taught
of him who takes his stand on
that (the Sat), i, 55-57.
because there is no state-
ment of its having to be set
aside, i, 57 seq.
on account of the individual
soul going to the Self, i, 59 seq.
— the internal ruler is not the, i,
132 seq.
-^ absolute bliss cannot result from,
i, 138.
■ — the abode of heaven, earth &c,
cannot be the, i, 154, 157, 158.
— the supporting of all things up to
ether cannot be the work of the,
i, 170, 171.
- — denoted by ' the Undeveloped,' i,
238, 245 seqq.
— by the term p. the Sahkhya un-
derstands the antecedent condi-
tion of the world, i, 242.
— is something to be cognised, i,
246.
— is not spoken of as an object of
knowledge, i, 246 seq.
— not mentioned among the sub-
jectsof discussion in thecolloquy
between Yama and Na-^iketas,
i, 247-252.
— a mere thing of inference and not
vouched for by Scripture, i, 252.
— is not denoted by a^a, i, 252-257.
— why it is treated in the Vedanta-
sutras, i, 288 seq., 317.
— the Smritis teach that it is the
independent cause of the world,
i, 291.
— assumed by the Yoga-Smriti, i,
296.
— the non-intelligent p. cannot pass
into what is intelligent, i, 30S.
— is the state of equilibrium of the
three gu«as. Goodness, Passion,
and Darkness, i, 353.
Pradhana, arguments of the San-
khyas for the threefold, i, 364.
— its three constituent elements,
Goodness, Passion, and Dark-
ness, i, 364 n., 366 seq.
— activities cannot be ascribed to
a non-intelligent, i, 367-369.
— cannot be active, because it stands
in no relation, there being no-
thing beyond it, i, 370 seq.
— does not modify itself spontane-
ously, i, 371 seq.
— absence of a purpose on the part
of the, i, 372 seq., 374.
— the soul may move the p. as the
lame man moves the blind one,
or as the magnet moves the iron,
i, 373 seq.
— the theory of p. adopted by INIanu
and other adherents of the Veda,
i, 394-
— the Lord acts as the ruler of the p.
and of the souls, and the p., the
soul, and the Lord are of mu-
tually different nature (Sahkhya
and Yoga), i, 434 seq.
— the Lord cannot be connected
with the souls and the, i, 436
seq.
— of infinite duration, i, 438.
— the same as sawsara, i, 439.
— through it the souls obtain enjoy-
ment and release, ii, 69.
Pradyumna, a manifestation of the
highest being, i, p, xxiii, 441
seq.
— cannot spring from Sankarshawa,
i, P- li, 441, 442.
— a form of Vasudeva, denotes the
mind (manas), i, 440.
— Aniruddha cannot spring from, i,
441, 442.
Pra^apati, birth of P., whose body
is this threefold world, i, 142.
— is himself an 'effect' and called
the inner Self, i, 142 seq. n.
— his instruction on the Self, i, 183-
191.
— Indra his disciple, i, 199.
— the creator, i, 203 seq. ; ii, 206.
— above Varuwa there come Indra
and P., on the path of the gods,
ii, 386.
Pra^apativakya, in the K/Andogya.-
upanishad, i, p. Ixiii.
Pra-^inajala, ii, 274, 276.
474
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Prakr/ti of the Sahkhyas, i, p. xxx.
— the individual soul as free from,
i, p. Ixxxiii.
Pralaya (re-absorption of the world
into Brahman) at the end of
each kalpa, i, pp. xxix, liv, xciv,
382 n., 386-389 ; ii, 47, 371,
392.
— in it endeavour cannot take
place, because no body exists
then, nor any other seen cause,
required to bring about the
conjunction of the atoms, i,
387.
— would be impossible, if the atoms
were essentially active, i, 391.
— see also World, reabsorption of
the.
Prawa, Vayu and, not to be identi-
fied, i, p. Ixxiv; ii, 256-259,
— is Brahman, i, 229-231, 272 ; ii,
143-
— through knowledge of the p. im-
mortality arises, i, 229-231.
— is a raised thunderbolt, i, 229-
231.
— is the highest Self, i, 231.
— knowledge of the, ii, 186 seq.
— • is the best among the organs of
the body, ii, 256.
— everything is food of the, ii, 309
seq.
— see also Breath, and Vital air.
Pra«agnihotra is not omitted even
when the eating of food is
omitted, ii, 249 seq.
— is omitted when the eating of
food is omitted, ii, 250-252.
— the details of the fundamental
Agnihotra not valid for it, ii,
251 seq.
Pra«as, the word ' person ' applied
to them, i, 261.
— colloquy of the, i, 304 ; ii, 88, 89,
186, 187 seqq., 200, 211, 215,
309.
— the individual soul is the sustain-
ing principle of the, i, 361.
— see also Vital airs.
Pra«avidyas, their unity, i, p. Ixviii ;
ii, 200 seq., 212.
Prajna-upanishad, on the akshara
Om, i, p. xliii.
PrastotW, even those priests, P. and
so on, who are devoid of the
knowledge of the divinities of
the prastava and the like, per-
form the sacrifices, ii, 254.
Pratardana, the legend of Indra and,
i, 97-99, loi ; ii, 305, 306.
Pravargya-ceremony, passages about
the, ii, 222-224.
Prayer, where the works of the
ajramas are not possible, p.
qualifies for knowledge, ii, 316.
Priest, the meditations on subordi-
nate members of the sacrifice
are his work, ii, 321.
— the fruit of meditations in which
the p. is the agent goes to the
sacrificer, ii, 321.
Priests : as a rule sacrificers of one
and the same family employ
officiating p. of one and the
same family, i, 226.
— even those p. who do not know
the divinities of the prastava
and the like, perform sacrifices,
ji, 254.
Purawas, on past and future kalpas,
i, 561.^
— see Itihasas and P.
Purifications, required for Vedic
works, mentioned with a view
to the origination of knowledge
in him who has undergone
those, ii, 314.
Purushas of the Saiikhyas, i, p. xxx.
Purusha-vidya, of the Taittiriyaka
and of the iiT/^andogya-upanishad
are not to be combined, ii, 220-
222.
Piirva-^aryas, ' ancient teachers,'
quoted by Ramanu^a, i, p. xxi.
Pijrva-mimawsa, i, p. ix.
arose at an early date, i, p. x.
enquiry into active religious
duty its subject, i, 10.
means of proof made use of
in the, i, 17 seq. and n. ; ii,
262 seq.
Pijrva-mimawsa-sutras, i, p. xii.
Piishan, the grains for P. are to be
crushed at all vikr/'tis of the
darjapurwamasa, ii, 309,
Ra^asQya-sacrifice, Brahmawas are
not qualified for the, i, 218 ; ii.
266.
— is to be offered by a prince who
wishes to become the ruler of
the whole earth, i, 222, 222 u.
GENERAL INDEX.
475
Rahasya-brahmawa, of the Ta«^/ins
and the Paiiigins (the Kb^n-
dogya), ii, 220.
Raikva, called Ganajruti a ^udra, i,
223-226.
— possessed the knowledge of Brah-
man, ii, 315.
Rakshas, among the paw^a^anai', i,
262.
Rama Mijra Gastrin, PaWit, i, p.
xxii n.
Ramanu^a, hisVedanta-sara, i, p. xvi.
— 5ri-bhashya, i, p. xvi seq,
rests on old and weighty tra-
dition, i, pp. xvii, xxii.
its sectarian feature, i, p.
xxxi n.
— follows the authority of Bodha-
yana, i, p. xxi seq.
— quotes a series of ancient teachers
in his Vedarthasahgraha, i, p.
xxi seq.
— sketch of his philosophical system,
i, pp. xxiv, xxvii seqq.
— and ^ahkara, i, pp. xxii seqq.,
Ixxxv-ci, cxxvi.
— — chief points in which they
agree and differ, i, pp. xxx seq.,
xxxiii-xl, xlviii-li, Ixii-lxvi,
Ixviii-lxxiv, Ixxvi-lxxix, Ixxxi-
Ixxxvi, cxii, cxiv, cxviiin., cxxi.
on the subdivision of the
Vedanta-sutras into Adhika-
ra«as, and the determination of
the Vedic passages discussed in
the SCtras, i, pp. xli-xlvi.
relation of Badarayawa's Sutras
to their chief distinguishing
doctrines, i, pp. Ixxxvii-ci.
— — as interpreters of the Upa-
nishads, i, p. cxxiii seq.
— approves of the system of the
Bhagavatas, i, p. Ii seq.
— on the relation of the individual
soul to Brahman, i, pp. liii seq.,
Iviii.
— according to him the soul is of
minute size, and a knowing
agent, i, pp. liv-lvii.
— on the activity of the soul, i, p.
Ivii.
— on dreams, i, p. Ix seq.
— on the term ' maya,' i, p. Ixi,
— on the combination of the senses
with the manas, &c., at the
death of the vidvan, i, p. Ixxix.
Raman u^a, on the immortality of
him who knows Brahman, i,
pp. Ixxix, Ixxx.
— his explanation preferred to that
of 5ahkara, i, p. Ixxxvi seq.
— denies the distinction of the two
Brahmans and the doctrine of
Maya, i, p. xci.
— denies the distinction between
a higher and a lower knowledge,
i, p. xci.
— denied that the Upanishads teach
INIaya, i, p. cii.
Ramanii_g-as, an important Vaish«ava
sect, i, p. xvii.
— closely connected with the Bha-
gavatas, i, p. xxii seq.
— their fundamental text concern-
ing the soul's fate after death,
i, p. cxxi seq.
— see also Bhagavatas.
Ramayan of Tulsidas, i, p. cxxvii
seq.
Ra«ayaniya-khila, the holding to-
gether and the pervading the
sky attributed to Brahman in
the R. are not to be inserted in
other vidyas, i, p. Ixx ; ii, 218-
220.
Rawayaniyas, the Upanishad of the,
ii, 219.
Raurava, one of the seven hells, ii,
123.
Reabsorption of the world into
Brahman. See World and Pra-
laya.
Real, the, and the Unreal, i. e. the
intelligent Self and the non-real
objects, coupled by wrong
knowledge, i, 4.
Realists, i. e. the Sautrantikas and
the Vaibhashikas, i, 401 n.
— maintain the reality of every-
thing, i, 401.
— controverted, i, 402-418.
Reasoning stands nearer to per-
ception than Sruti, i, 299.
— is there room for objections
founded on r, after the sense of
the sacred texts has once been
settled? i, 299 seq.
— only a subordinate auxiliary
of intuitional knowledge, i,
307.
— which disregards the holy texts
and rests on individual opinion
476
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
only has no proper foundation,
i, 314-317-
Reasoning, the assertion that r. has
no foundation rests on r. only,
h 315-
— recommended by ^lanu, i, 315.
— the want of foundation consti-
tutes the beauty of, i, 315 seq.
Regnaud, M. Paul, i, pp. cv, cxvii.
Release, final, or emancipation, at-
tained by highest knowledge, i,
p. xxvii, 29, 63, 71, 92, 291, 300,
316, 327, 328; ii, 55, loi,
101 n., i65seq., 235-238, 357,
370, 371, 397-400.
persons desirous of, have to
include such qualities as satya-
kamatva in their meditations on
Brahman, i, p. Ixxiii.
the dissolution of the
apparent world prescribed for
them, ii, 162.
could not be in the
possession of irrefutable know-
ledge, if the doctrine of general
identity were not true, i, 282.
is nothing but Brahman, i, 28
seq., 34, 283 n. ; ii, 329.
not the effect of religious
merit, i, 27 seqq.
is an eternally and essentially
disembodied state, i,'2 8, 29, 283,
328.
is of the nature of the eternally
free Self, i, 32.
is something to be ceremoni-
ally purified, i, 33.
is of the nature of Brahman,
which is eternally pure, i, 33.
is it a quality of the Self? i,
33-
taught of him who takes his
stand on the Sat, i, 55-57.
desire of, caused by the re-
flection that all eflfects, objects,
and powers are non-permanent,
i, 198.
a man going to f. r. reaches the
sun, i, 232,
connected with the element of
unity in Brahman, i, 322.
cannot be the purpose of the
pradhana, i, 372 seq.
■ would be impossible on the
pradhana hypothesis, i, 373, 374,
380 seq.
Release, final, is impossible, if the
causes of suffering and the
sufferer (i. e. the world and the
souls) constitute one Self, i, 378.
depends on knowledge, ac-
cording to the Sahkhya also, i,
380 n.
• no being desirous of, could
be assumed, on the Bauddha
doctrine, i, 406 seq.; nor on
the Gaina doctrine, i, 430.
Bauddha doctrine of bondage
and, depending on absence and
presence of right knowledge,
i, 423.
the Gaina doctrine of bondage
and, untenable, i, 432.
the Self which enjoys f.r. must
be the agent in the meditation
which helps to bring it about,
ii, 52 n.
impossibility of f. r. would
follow, if the Self s agency were
natural, ii, 53.
Sa;ws;ira and f. r. result from
the highest Lord, ii, 58 seq.,
139.
consists, according to the
Vaiicshikas, in the absolute
non-origination of the nine
qualities of the Selfs, ii, 69.
— — the Self freed of the aggregate
of eight, in f. r., ii, 83, 83 n.
the existence of a remainder
of works does not stand in its
way, ii, 119.
obtained by sleep only, ii, 148
seq.
by successive steps, one of the
results of meditations on the
qualified Brahman, ii, 162, 185,
391.
is possible, because the bon-
dage of the soul is due to Nes-
cience only, ii, 174.
no definite rule about its
springing up in this life or in
the next, exists as to the fruit
which is, ii, 329 seq.
could never take place, if the
chain of works which have been
running on from eternity could
not be cut short, ii, 355 seq.
cannot be dependent on lo-
cality, time, and special causes,
as the fruit of works is, ii, 356.
GENERAL INDEX.
477
Release, final, the death of the body-
is the term of the attainment
of, ii, 357 seq.
works if joined with know-
ledge may effect it, ii, 359.
is something not to be effected
at all, ii, 359.
is a fruit like other fruits, ii,
405.
in so far only as it is
a cessation of all bondage, not
as implying the accession of
something new, ii, 406.
when the released has a body
and senses, the state of f. r. is
analogous to the waking state,
ii, 413 ; when he has no body
and no senses, it is analogous to
that of a dream, ii, 413.
what Scripture says about
absence of all specific cognition
refers either to deep sleep or to
f. r., not to that abode which is
the result of qualified know-
ledge, ii, 414 seq.
see also Emancipation.
Released, the. See Soul, released.
Religious acts, their performance
has for its fruit transitory feli-
city, i, 1 1.
see also Works, and Sacrifice.
— duty, the enquiry into it carried
on in the Gaimini-siitra, i, 26.
the possession of supernatural
powers depends on the per-
formance of it, i, 293,
is characterised by injunction,
i, 293, 293 n.
— ^ in the case of r. d. we entirely
depend on Scripture, i, 299.
— hunter, i, 228.
— merit, different degrees of plea-
sure the mere effects of it, i, 27.
final release not the effect of
it, i, 27 seq.
is what brings about the fruits
of actions, as Gaimini thinks, ii,
182.
Retractation (of the world into Brah-
man). See Pralaya, and World.
Rig-\eda, the lower knowledge com-
prises the, i, 137, 138.
— the pra«ava belonging to the R.
is connected with the udgitha
belonging to the Sama-veda, ii,
282 n.
Rik, the highest Self is, i, 79.
— meditation on the earth as R.,
and fire as Saman, ii, 345-349.
Rinsing of the mouth with water
before and after eating is en-
joined with reference to the
act of meditation on the water
viewed as the dress of prawa, ii,
211-214.
Rish\, knowledge of the R. necessary
for the performance of a sacri-
ficial action, i, 213 seq.
— the Tantra (Sahkhyajastra) com-
posed by a, i, 291, 292.
i?ishis cannot perform sacrifices,
hence are not entitled to the
study of the Veda, i, 197 n.
— are entitled to acquire know-
ledge, i, 199.
— the Vedas were seen by R., men
of exalted vision, i, 213, 223.
— cannot be qualified for medita-
tions connected with, i, 217.
^ we have no right to measure by
our capabilities their capability,
— create many things by their mere
intention, i, 347 seq.
Rivers, simile of the, i, 277 seq.,
279.
Road of the gods. See Path of the g.
— of the fathers. See Path of the f.
Rudra, in consequence of a boon
being granted to R., Sanatku-
mara was born again as Skanda,
ii, 235.
Rudras, class of gods, i, 202, 216.
Ruler within, or the internal r., is
Brahman, i, pp. xxxv, xlii seq.,
cxiii, I 50-135.
is not the pradhana, i, 132 seq.
— - — cannot mean the embodied
soul, i, 133-135-
5abara Svamin, ii, 268.
Sacrifice must be preceded by the
knowledge of the i?/shi of the
mantra used, i, 2 1 3 seq.
— .S'udra unfit for it, i, 224.
— is accomplished by means of
speech and mind, ii, 57.
— water is intimately connected
with, ii, 105, 108, 109.
— though involving harm done to
animals, &c., is not unholy, ii,
130 seq.
4/8
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Sacrifice, man fancifully identified
with the, ii, 220, 221, 265.
— subordinate members of the,
meditations on them are the
business of the priest, not of
the sacrificer, i, p. Ixxvi ; ii,
320 seq.
though connected with
s., yet are not necessary mem-
bers of the s., because they
have results of their own, ii,
252-256.
contribute towards the
supersensuous result of the en-
tire s., ii, 346 seq.
prescribed for some typical
s. are so prescribed for the
modified forms of the s. also, ii,
192, 192 n.
on which the meditations
rest are taught in the three
Vedas, so also the meditations,
ii, 281 seq.
the ideas of Aditya &c. are
to be superimposed on them,
ii, 345-349-
Sacrifices required as conducive to
the rise of knowledge in the
mind, i, p. Ixxv ; ii, 306-309,
313-315, 327 n.
— which are enjoined permanently,
such as the Agnihotra, do not
lose their efficiency, i, p. Ixxviii;
ii, 358-360.
— the Upanishads distinguish men
who perform s. and meritorious
works only, and men who in
addition possess a certain kind
of knowledge, i, p. cvii.
— the performers of s. only proceed
on the northern path of the sun,
i, 27.
are objects of enjoyment for
the gods, ii, 11 1.
— — dwelling together with the
gods obtain enjoyment, ii, 1 1 1,
112,
only rise to the moon, ii, 122;
the opposite view refuted, ii,
12 1-123, 124.
— animals, gods, and i?/shis do no
perform, i, 197 n.
— men whose only desire is emanci-
pation, do not perform s., as
they do not care for the perish-
able fruits of them, i, 197 n.
Sacrifices, a god may divide himself
into many forms and enter into
relation with many, i, 200.
— those who do not perform s.,
descend to Sawyamana, the
abode of Yama, suffer their
torments, and then again re-
ascend to this world, ii, 122
seq.
— lead to the road of the fathers, ii,
124.
— prescribed for him who is de-
sirous of the heavenly world, ii,
162, 182.
— certain mantras and s,, referred
to in certain passages, the
matter of which is different
from the approximate vidyas,
have not to be combined with
the latter, ii, 222-225.
— performed even by priests who
do not know the divinities of
the, ii, 254.
— Vedic texts referring to s. aim at
enjoining the performance of
the entire s. only, ii, 274,
275.
— cognitions compared with, ii,
280.
— and other duties connected with
householdership, ii, 298.
Sacrificial thread round the neck or
on the right shoulder, ii, 298,
Sadhyas, i, 216.
5aivas maintain that the five cate-
gories were taught by the Lord
Pajupati to tlie end of breaking
the bonds of the soul ; Pajupati
is, according to them, the
operative cause, i, 435.
5akha, in the same S. also there is
unity of vidya, ii, 214-216.
— although they diff"er as to accents
and the like, the vidyas con-
nected with certain members
of sacrificial acts, refer to the
udgitha and so on belonging to
all, ii, 272-274.
— mantras and the like enjoined in
one S. are taken over by other
5akhas also, ii, 273 seq.
5akti, Maya belongs to Brahman as
a, i, p. xxv,
Salagram, Hari is contemplated in
the sacred stone called, i, 114,
126, 178.
GENERAL INDEX.
479
Sama^ara, a book of the Atharva«i-
kas treating of Vedic obser-
vances, ii, 189.
Saman, the highest Self is, i, 79.
— meditation on the fire as S., and
the earth as Rik, ii, 345-349.
Sama-veda, the pra«ava belonging
to the i?;'g-veda is connected
with the S. meditation on the
udgitha, ii, 282 n.
Sawnyasin, in the case of perfect
knowledge not yet having
arisen in the S., INIuniship is
enjoined as a means of know-
ledge, ii, 322-324.
Sawsara (the endless cycle of birth,
action, and death), the Veda
furnishes the means of escaping
from it, i, pp. xxvii, xxix.
— release from it according to
5ahkara and Ramanu^a, i, p.
XXX i.
— Nescience, the seed of it, i, 14 ;
ii, 68 seq.
— non-eternal, of a fleeting, chang-
ing nature, i, 27.
— beginningless, i, 212, 214, 420;
ii, 60.
— gradually all souls are released
from it, i, 439.
— the pradhana which is ruled by
the Lord and which modifies
itself for the purposes of the
soul is what is meant by, i,
459-
— is only due to the qualities of
the buddhi and the other
limiting adjuncts being wrongly
superimposed upon the Self, ii,
43 seq., 46-48.
— and moksha result from the
highest Lord, ii, 58 seq.
— the Lord afflicted by the pain
caused to the soul by its ex-
perience of the, ii, 63.
— the nine qualities of the Selfs
constitute the s. according to
the Vaijeshikas, ii, 69.
— the manner in which the soul
together with its subordinate
adjuncts passes through the, ii,
101-132.
— threefold fruits of action in the
s., viz. pain, pleasure, and a
mixture of the two, come from
the Lord, ii, 180 seq.
Sawsara, the Self which stands out-
side the, ii, 288.
— scriptural declarations of the, ii,
371.
— would be impossible on the as-
sumption of the soul being
either a part, or an effect of,
or different from Brahman, ii,
397-
— because the s. depends on
works, it does not follow that
the s. will cease, when works
are absent, ii, 398.
Sawvarga-knowledge, or S.-vidya, i,
224-226 ; ii, 19, 196.
Sawvarta became a great Yogin, ii,
315.
Sawyamana, those who do not per-
form sacrifices go to S., the
abode of Yama, ii, 122 seq,
— in the city of S. evil works are
requited under Yama's rule, ii,
123.
Sanatkumara, dialogue between Na-
rada and, i, 166 seq.
— a son of Brahman's mind, was, in
consequence of a boon being
granted to Rudra, born again
as Skanda, ii, 235,
ShidWya., i, p. cxv.
— did not find highest bliss in the
Vedas, i, 443.
iSaWilyavidya, i, pp. Ixvii, Ixxv, cxiv,
91 ; ii, 187, 214, 216, 217, 219,
233, 266.
^ankara or ^ankaraMrya, i, p. xiv.
— his commentary represents the
orthodox side of Brahmanical
theology, i, p. xiv.
the oldest of the extant com-
mentaries, i, p. xiv.
the authority most generally
deferred to in India, i, p. xv.
— his authority above doubt and
dispute, i, p. xv.
— how far he represents the true
Vedanta doctrine, i, p. xvii
seq.
— his doctrine of the absolute
identity of the individual soul
with Brahman, i, p. xx.
— refers to other commentators, i,
p. XX,
— his school acknowledges Vedantic
teaching of an essentially dif-
ferent type, i, p. xxi.
48o
vedanta-sOtras.
^ahkara or 5ankara^arya, preceded
by Dramid'a, i, p. xxii.
— and Ramanii^^a, i, pp. xxii seqq.,
XXX seq., xli-xlvi, Ixxxv-ci.
disagree as to the system of
the Bhagavatis, i, p. li seq.
— sketch of his philosophical sys-
tem, i, p. xxiv seqq.
— his doctrine about the soul being
merged in Brahman, faithfully
represents the teaching of the
Upanishads, i, p. cxxi seq.
— his mode of interpretation with
regard to the Upanishads, i, pp.
cxxii-cxxv.
— the philosophy of S. nearer to
the teaching of the Upanishads
than the Sutras of B;1daraya«a,
i, p. cxxvi.
— a translation of his commentary
cannot be combined with an
independent translation of the
Vedanta-sutras, i, p. cxxviii.
■Sahkara system, no tendency among
its followers to keep their doc-
trines secret, i, p. xcix.
Sankarsha-kaWa, ii, 259.
Sankarsha«a, a manifestation of the
highest being, i, pp. xxiii, lii.
— originated from Vasudeva, i, p. li.
— a form of Vasudeva, denotes the
individual soul, i, 440.
— cannot spring from Vasudeva, i,
441, 442.
— Pradyumna cannot spring from,
i, 441, 442.
— taken as a Lord, i, 441 seq.
Sahkhya and Yoga are mere Smr/ti,
not of scriptural character, ii,
381.
Sahkhyas, their prakr/ti and puru-
shas, i, p. XXX.
— refutation of their doctrines, i,
pp. xxxix-xlviii, xciii, 15 n.,
237-289.
is applicable also to other
theories, i, p. xl, 288 seq.
— were anxious to prove that their
views are warranted by scrip-
tural passages, i, p. xlvi.
— Vedantins, and Upanishads, i, p.
cxvii.
— their three guwas, i, 28. See also
Gu«as.
— number of their categories, i,
257-260.
Sahkhyas maintain duality, do not
discern the unity of the Self, i,
298.
— are in harmony with the Veda,
in their description of the soul
as free from all qualities, i,
298.
— hold that the intelligent beings
(i. e. the souls) are incapable of
either taking in or giving out
anything, and are non-active, i,
301.
— the objections raised by them
against the Vedanta doctrine
apply to their view also, i, 313
seq.
— reasons why their system should
be refuted by the Vedantin, i,
363 seq.
— charge the Vedantins with con-
tradictions, i, 376-378.
— think that eternal intelligence
constitutes the very nature of
the soul, ii, 33.
— their doctrine of many Selfs re-
futed, ii, 69 seq.
— teach that the chief vital air is to
be considered as the combined
function of all organs, ii, 86.
— hold that the Self and the organs
are both all-pervading, and
when obtaining a new body
only begin to function in it in
consequence of the Karman, ii,
103.
— see also Pradhana.
Sankhyajastra taught by Kapila, i,
291 n.
Saiikhya-smr/ti, i, 247, 258, 284 n.,
296.
— and other Sm/-/tis, their con-
flicting claims, i, p. xlvii, 290-
296.
— refuted, i, 132 seq.
— ■ the pradhana assumed by the, i,
15B.
— the three entities (the great
principle, the Undeveloped, the
soul) in the, i, 238.
— and Yoga-smr/ti, why singled out
for refutation, i, 297 seq.
— knowledge of the S. does not
lead to highest beatitude, i, 298.
Sariraka Mimawsa-sutras, another
name for Vedanta-sutras, i, p.
xiv n., 9.
GENERAL INDEX.
481
5anraka-jastra, Its aim is to show
that there is only one highest
Lord, i, 190.
Sarvadarjanasa»2graha, Ramanu^a
chapter in the, i, p. xxiv.
Sat, 'being,' 'that which is,' Maya
cannot be called so, i, p.
XXV.
— in the beginning there existed
nothing but the, i, p, cv seq. ;
this passage refers to the Self,
i, p. cxviii ; ii, 209 seq.
— the thought of it not to be un-
derstood in a figurative sense,
i, 54-
— release is taught of him who
takes his stand on it, i, 55-57.
— pradhana is not denoted by the
term, i, 57-60.
— denotes that which is differen-
tiated by names and forms, i,
267.
— Brahman is S., and the world is
S., i, 332.
— there is no origin of S. (i. e. of
Brahman), ii, 19 seq.
— fire has for its source S. (Brah-
man), ii, 20-22.
— 'he became S. and tyat,' ii, 25,
167.
— chapter treating of the, ii, 96.
— a name of Brahman, ii, 142, 144,
160.
— comprises the Self as well as the
Non-Self, ii, 210, 210 n.
— which is the root of the world,
is the only object of cognition,
ii, 396.
Satapatha-brahmawa, its accentua-
tion, and the Bhashika-sutra,
i, 258 n.
iSataudana libation of the Atharvawi-
kas, ii, 190.
Sattva. See Internal organ.
Satyakama, i, p. cv.
Satyaloka, the world of the lower
Brahman is called S., i, 181.
5aunaka on the i?/shis, i, 213.
Saurya libation of the followers of
the Atharva-veda, ii, 190.
Sautrantikas are realists, i, 401 n.
Savitar (the Sun) after having for
thousands of yugas performed
the office of watching over
these worlds, enjoys at the end
of this period the condition of
release in which he neither
rises nor sets, ii, 236.
Scripture allows argumentation, \,i-j.
— and intuition as means of know-
ledge, i, 18.
— Brahman the source of, i, 19-22.
— the means of knowing Brahman,
i, 20 seq., 22-47, 288, 350-352,
355; ii, 339-
— aims at action, i, 20 seq.
— not the source of Brahman, i, 22.
— because it is directly stated in S.
therefore the all-knowing Brah-
man is the cause of the world,
i, 61-64, 3°6, 317-
— intuition vouched for by, i, 10 1
seq.
— Brahman is the special topic of,
i, 160, 265 seq.
— nowhere makes statements re-
garding the individual soul, i,
160.
— in order to be authoritative, is
independent of anything else,
i, 203.
— Smr/ti depends on, i, 203, 440.
— may sometimes have to be taken
in a secondary sense, i, 318.
— its authoritativeness denied by
the Bauddhas, i, 412.
— is the production of the omni-
scient Lord, and omniscience of
the Lord is based on it, i, 437.
— our only authority in the origi-
nation of the knowledge of
supersensuous things, ii, 4.
— our knowledge of what is duty
and the contrary of duty de-
pends entirely on, ii, 131.
— ceases to be valid, when true
knowledge springs up, ii, 340.
— see also 5ruti, and Veda.
Self, the soul looks for its true S.
in the body, &c., i, p. xxvi.
— consisting of bliss (anandamaya),
is the highest Self, not an indi-
vidual soul, i, p. xxxiii seq., 64-
77.
desire mentioned as be-
longing to it, i, 70 seq.
— • scripture teaches the join-
ing of the individual soul with
it, i, 71-77.
Brahman is called the tail,
i. e. a member of it, i, 72 seq.
— the S. (of whose existence all
[38]
I 1
482
VEDANTA-Sl'TRAS.
are conscious) is Brahman, i,
14, 377 : ii, 208 seq.
Self, different opinions about it. i. 14
seq.
— everything has its S. in Brahman,
i, 23.
— passages about the non-trans-
migrating, i, 25 seq.
— not joined to the gross body, not
to the subtle body, independent
of either, i, 28 n.
— the word S. is applied to the
cause of the world, i, 53-55.
— used figuratively in the sense of
' that which effects all purposes
of another,' i, 54, 56.
— pradhana cannot be designatsd
by the term ' Self,' i, 55-60.
— in its primary meaning refers to
what is intellidrent only, i, 56.
— the individual soul goes to the,
i, 59 seq.
— the personal S. of a deity may be
called an intelligent, i, 99.
— the Person called the internal
S. of all beings, i, 142.
— divine, one and the same d. S.
may assume several forms at
the same time, i, 200.
— the intelligent, is the highest
Lord. i. 234. 255.
— the great, may denote the intel-
lect of the first-born Hira«ya-
garbha, i, 240.
• is higher than the intellect,
i, 240.
i. e. the individual soul, or the
fundamental intellect, i, 241.
— is the intelligent soul of the Sah-
khyas. i, 259.
— husband, wife, riches, and other
objects of enjoyment in this
world are dear on account of
the, i, 274.
— is not destroyed, i. 281.
— but by means of true knowledge
there is effected its dissociation
from the matras, i, 281.
— makes itself; which is possible
owing to modification, i, 287.
— the witnessing S. is self-proved,
i, 424.
— is one and permanent i, 424.
— there results from the Gaina
doctrine non-universality of the,
1, 451 seq.
Self, the doctrine of the Upanishads
refers to that S. which stands
outside the sa^/sara and cannot
therefore be subordinate to
activity, ii, 288.
— love, play, and the like cannot
be ascribed to the action of the,
ii, 410.
— has the option of manifold exis-
tence, ii, 412, 413 seq., 414 n.
— the highest, there is no Self apart
from, i, p. xxvii, 113, 115, 155,
190, 240 seq., 249 seqq., 277,
283, 295, 320-330, 3S1; ii,
66-63, 73. 174-180, 244; nor
within it, ii, iSo.
• Vasudeva identical with it, i,
p. xxiii, 440.
or Brahman, i, p. xxvii, 36.
the world is the body investing
it, i, p. XXX.
different from the soul in the
states of deep sleep and de-
parting, i, p. xxxix, 233-236;
li, 54-
the S. to be seen, to be
heard. Sec. is the h. S.. not the
individual soul, i, p. xl. 274-2S3.
higher than everything, i, p.
Ixix : ii, 204 seq.
the S. spoken of in the account
of the creation given in Ait.
Ar. II. 4 is not a lower form of
the S., but the h. S.. i, p. Ixix ;
ii, 205-211.
relation of the individual
soul to the h. S., i, p. cxxi seq.,
37, 1 18-123, 161, 185 seq., 190,
233j 251, 277 seq., 278 n., 278-
283, 441 ; ii, 65 seq., 68 seq.,
138, 149, 173-175, 240 seq.,
407 seq.
its true nature is nothing
either to be endeavoured after
or to be avoided, i, 36.
the golden person in the disc
of the sun is the, i, 63.
although eternally unchanging
and uniform, it reveals itseif in
a graduated series of beings,
i, 63.
is anandamaya, i, 66-68.
only is entirely iree from sin,
i, 79-
is Rik, Siman, Uktha, Ya^us,
Brahman, i, 79 seq.
GENERAL INDEX.
48.
Self, the highest, the knowledge of
the, is most beneficial for man,
i, 98, 167, 250.
' subsequently to it all works
and their effects entirely cease,
1,98.
• through it everything be-
comes known, i, 275.
is self-established, ii, 14.
souls devoid of it are ob-
jects of enjoyment for the gods,
ii, III.
is it connected with works,
or is it an independent means
to accomplish the purpose of
man? ii, 285-306.
does not only not promote
action but rather cuts all action
short, i, 290.
the qualities of having true
desires and true piirposes attri-
buted to the, i, 1 10.
the eater is the h. S. since
what is movable and what is
immovable is mentioned as his
food, i, 1 16-118.
fruition on the part of" the
h. S. denied, i, 117, 119, 120.
the person within the eye is
the, i, 129 seq.
universal rulership an appro-
priate attribute of it, i, 131 seq.
immortal, unseen, unheard, i,
132.
organs of action may be as-
cribed to it, i, 132.
may be represented as the
Garhapatya-fire, i, 150.
as the mere witness, i.e., the
pure Self, non-related to the
limiting conditions, i, 150.
is the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., i, 161.
absence of seeing, &c., charac-
teristic of it, i, 168 seq.
the qualities of being the True,
of resting in its own greatness, of
being omnipresent, and of being
the Self of everything, can
belong to the h. S. only, i, 169.
meditation on the, i, 171-174.
-its reward, i, 174.
' the highest person ' means
'the h. S,' i, 171-174, 205.
corresponds to the mental act
of complete intuition, i, 172.
Self, the highest, its nature is pure
intelligence, {,185 seq.
■ that after which sun, moon,
&c., are said to shine is the,
i, 192-194.
the word ' light ' denotes the,
i, 195 ; ii, 407.
with reference to the heart
the h. S. is said to be of the
size of a span, i, 196-198.
pra«a is the, i, 230 seq.
is the end of the journey, the
highest place of Vishwu, i, 239.
the calm, i.e. the h. S., i, 241.
Na/^iketas' question and Yama's
answer as to the, i, 248.
is above all attributes, i, 249.
the one general cause, i, 274.
is the centre of the whole
world with the objects, the
senses, and the mind, it has
neither inside nor outside, it is
altogether a mass of knowledge,
i, 276.
is the operative as well as ma-
terial cause of the world, i, 286.
is not affected by the world-
illusion, i, 312.
the one unchanging witness of
the three states, the creation,
subsistence, and reabsorption
of the world, i, 312.
though devoid of motion, may
yet move other things, i, 369.
the relation of object and sub-
ject cannot exist in it, i, 378 seq.
appears in manifold forms,
i, 440 ; ii, 66-68.
its nature is eternal presence,
ii, 15.
is not an effect, i, 15.
is not the shaper of dreams,
ii, 137 seq.
the creation of the worlds
was accomplished by some in-
ferior Lord, different from, and
superintended by the, ii, 206.
the passage ' Being only this
was in the beginning ' refers to
it, ii, 209 seq.
is within all, ii, 242 seq.
men wrongly superimpose up-
on it the attribute of being
made up of many parts, such
as the body, the senses, &c., ii,
336.
I 1 2
484
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Self, the highest, affected with
duality by Nescience, ii, 340.
• not to be contemplated in the
symbol, ii, 340-342.
■ see also Brahman, and Lord.
— individual (embodied), can an
existence independent of the
body be assigned to it ? i, p.
Ixxiv ; ii, 268-272.
a reflection of the highest S.,
i, p. xcvii.
is the only reality, i, 4 n.
is the object of the notion of
the Ego, i, 5.
is the witness of all the modi-
fications of the internal organ,
1,9.
■ the identity of the i. S. and
Brahman, i, 30 seq., 41-43, 45,
105; ii, 288, 291, 337-340.
arguments against it, ii,
338.
is purified by certain ritual
actions, i, 33.
cannot be the abode of any
action, i, 33.
cannot become an agent, i,
42.
• — — considered as the agent in
sacrifices, i, 42.
as the ruler of the organs of
action is connected with the
mind, i, 107.
the golden person is in the, i,
112.
difference and non-difference
of the i. S. and the highest S.,
i, 112 seq., 115, 130, 187, 249
seqq., 251 seq., 283.
is the charioteer, the body the
chariot, i, 121.
cannot be the person in the
eye, i, 124, 129 seq.
is not immortal, i, 130.
the effects of Nescience, desire
and works, ascribed to it, i,
130.
is one only, i, 135.
is, by means of merit, and de-
merit, the cause of the origin
of the complex of things, i,
136.
has the qualities of Selfhood
and intelligence, but not those
of omniscience and similar
qualities, i, 158, 268.
Self, individual, of a dreaming per-
son, there exists a multiform
creation in it, i, 352 seq.; ii,
133 seq., 137 seq.
how is it known at all if it is
not the object of perception ? i,
368.
is not produced, but it is
eternal, according to Scripture,
ii, 29-33.
• deep sleep takes place in it, ii,
141-146 ; therefore the awak-
ing takes place from it, ii, 146
seq.
the passages about its having
true wishes and other qualities,
have to be combined, ii, 247-
249.
the existence of a S. different
from the body proved, ii, 268-
272.
not different from the body,
according to the materialists, ii,
269.
— — taught by the Upanishads as
the object of cognition, ii, 288.
— -^ is ' thou,' it is the agent in
seeing and hearing, is succes-
sively apprehended as the in-
ward S. of all the outward
involucra beginning with the
gross body, and finally ascer-
tained as of the nature of intel-
ligence, ii, 335.
the conceit of it being subject
to pain is a wrong conceit, ii,
336 seq.
when released, manifests itself
in its own nature, ii, 405 seqq.
see also Soul.
Self-consciousness, the subtle ele-
ments of material things pro-
ceed from it, i, 376.
Selfs, the real, innermost Self and
secondary, i, 64-66, 68, 72.
— words like aditya, &c., convey
the idea of certain divine, i, 219.
— it is senseless to insist on a plu-
rality of, i, 282 seq.
— plurality of S. acknowledged by
Kapila, i, 295.
— nine qualities of the S., according
to the Vaijeshikas, ii, 69.
— refutation of the Sahkhya and
Vaijeshika doctrine of many, ii,
69-73.
GENERAL INDEX.
485
Selfs, there is no distinction of
different S., such a distinction
being due to limiting adjuncts
only, ii, 172.
Senselessness. See Swoon.
Sense-organs, the elements and the
s. the product of Nescience, i,
281.
— ten, ii, 65 n.
— are the cause of the perception of
the sense-objects, ii, 95.
— the word prawa is secondarily
applied to the, ii, 96.
— accompany the soul when leaving
its body, ii, 102.
— all s., i. e. their functions, are
merged in mind on the depar-
ture of the soul, ii, 365 seq.
— and elements of him who knows
Brahman are merged in Brah-
man, ii, 376 seq.
— see also Organs.
Senses, the objects are beyond the,
i, 239, 244.
— the relation of the s. and their
objects is based on the mind,
i, 239.
— the Sankhyas enumerate some-
times seven, sometimes eleven,
i, 376.
— ' the abode of the six,' in Bauddha
terminology, i, 404, 405 n.
— though the soul is intelligent, the
s. are not useless, ii, 34.
• — seven, ii, 82 seq.
— called grahas, i.e. seizers, because
they are bonds by which the
soul is tied, ii, 83.
— the vital airs are the eleven, ii,
93 seq.
Sejvara-sahkhyas admit the exis-
tence of a highest Lord, but
postulate a pradhana besides,
i, p. xl.
Sho^ajakala-vidya, ii, 233.
Sho^ajin-cup at the atiratra-sacri-
fice, either to be offered or not
to be offered, i, 262 seq.; ii,
188.
Sho^ajin-rite, the time of the stotra
accompanying the performance
of the, ii, 228.
Sin, on the attainment of Brahman
all s. is extinguished, ii, 353-
356.
— he who possesses knowledge ob-
tains lordly power and cessation
^ ^ of all, ii, 355.
SiLa not born in the ordinary way,
ii, 125.
S'wa.. See Pajupati.
Skanda, Sanatkumara was born again
as, ii, 235.
Skandhas (groups), the five, of the
realists, i, 402 seq.
— the atoms and s. cannot be as-
sumed to enter on activity on
their own account, i, 403.
Sleep, the activity of the sense-
organs interrupted during, i, 85,
86.
— a kind of dissolution and origina-
tion takes place in the sleeping
and the waking states, i, 212.
— the undeveloped principle or the
causal potentiality is a universal
s., in which are lying the trans-
migrating souls destitute for the
time of the consciousness of
their individual character, i, 243.
— the soul wanders about in the
state of, ii, 49 seq.
• — in it the organs are drawn in-
ward, ii, 136.
— deep, in the state of it the soul
abides within Brahman in the
heart, i, p. Ixi, 180, 273, 350;
ii, 54 seq., 141-147, 176, 210.
the soul awakening from it is
the same that went to, i, p. Ixi ;
ii, 147-149-
what Scripture says about ab-
sence of all specific cognition,
refers either to d. s. or final re-
lease, i, p. Ixxxv ; ii, 145, 4i4seq.
when a man sleeps he is gone
to his own Self, i, 59.
the soul in the condition of
d. s. is resolved into an intelli-
gent entity, i, 60.
the vital air remains awake in
the state of, i, 162-168.
is characterised by the cessa-
tion of the activity of all bodily
organs, i, 163, 168.
bliss attaches to it, i, 163, 164,
168.
denoted by the word ' seren-
ity,' i, 182.
the highest Self different from
the individual soul in the state
of, i, 233-236.
486
VEDANTA-st}TRAS.
Sleep, deep, the case of the re-
absorption of the world com-
pared with that of, i, 312.
the absence of intelligence in
it is only due to the absence of
objects, but the soul remains
intelligent even in, ii, 33, 34 seq.,
47 seq., 336 seq.
the rising from it is due to the
existence of potential avidya, ii,
48.
takes place in the na^is and in
the Self, ii, 141-146.
in the pericardium, ii,
142, 144.
the state of swoon is half coin-
cident with, ii, 151 seq.
in it the elements are merged
in Brahman in such a way as to
continue to exist in a seminal
condition, ii, 371.
Sleeping man, the doctrine about
the soul, conveyed by the wak-
ing of the, i, 269, 273, 274.
Smr/ti, ' that which the S. assumes,'
viz. the pradhana of the San-
khyas, i, 132 seq.
— inference from it of the meaning
of 5ruti, i, 145 seq.
— in order to be authoritative, de-
pends on Scripture, i, 203,
291 n., 293, 294, 297 ii., 440,
— and 5ruti on the rinsing of the
mouth with water, ii, 21 1-2 14.
— Sahkhya and Yoga are S. only,
without scriptural authority, ii,
381.
Smritis such as the Manu-smriti op-
posed to the Saiikhya-smr/'ti, i,
p, xlvii, 290-296.
— if the doctrine of Brahman being
the cause of the world be ac-
cepted, is there any room for
S.? i, 290-299.
— like the Kapila S. were composed
with reference to perfect know-
ledge as the means of final re-
lease, i, 291.
— men who are unable to ascertain
the true sense of 5ruti, rely on
them, i, 292.
Smr/tis which follow 5ruti are to
be considered as authoritative,
while all others are to be dis-
regarded, i, 293, 294.
Soma sacrifice, on the tenth day of
a S. a soma cup is oflfered men-
tally, ii, 260 seq.
— extending over twelve days, may
be viewed either as a sattra or
as an ahina sacrifice, ii, 413.
Soul ', individual or personal, or ^iva,
i, p. XXV.
■ 5ankarsha«a identical with it,
i, p. xxiii, 440.
according to Ramanu^a, i, pp.
XXX seq., liii.
meant by the serene being, i,
p. xxxvi, 188, 191.
the subject of the Upanishads,
i, 36 seq.
cannot be denied, i, 37.
■ is the Self, i, 37, 54, 103, 361.
sattva and kshetra^;7a, or the
internal organ and the, i, 122
seq.
it is nowhere the purpose of
Scripture to make statements
regarding it, i, 160.
is known from experience to
be the agent and enjoyer, i, 160.
• Sahkhya views about it, i, 238,
259, 298, 370, 372-374, 379 n-,
436-438; ii, 33.
Na/^iketas'questionand Yama's
answer as to it, i, 248.
as it is the support of pra«a, it
may itself be called pra«a, i, 270.
— Ajmarathya's opinion about it, i,
276 seq.
— according to the Vaijeshikas in-
telligence is not essential to it,
i, 388 n.
— conjunction cannot take place
between the atoms, the s., and
the internal organ, i, 398.
— its conjunction with the atoms
cannot be the cause of the mo-
tion of the latter, i, 398 n.
— its conjunction with manas can-
not be the cause of cognition,
i, 398 n.
1 Arranged in the following order: — (i) different designations and notions of different schools
about it ; (2) its nature and characteristics ; (3) its size ; (4) s. and body ; (5) s. and Brahman,
the Lord, the highest Self; (6j its states of dream, sleep, swoon ; (7) its fate after death ; (.8) the
released s.
GENERAL INDEX.
487
Soul, denied by the Bauddhas, i, 403,
406.
— and non-soul of the Gainas, i, 428,
428 n.
— Pajupati taught the five categories
to the end of breaking the bonds
of the animal, i.e. the s., i, 435.
— individual, difference of scriptural
statements regarding it, ii, 3.
is non-intelligent, according to
the followers of Ka«ada, ii, 3 3.
— the non-enlightened s. unable to
look through Maya, i, p. xxvi.
— identifies itself with its adjuncts,
i, p. xxvi.
— in reality pure intelligence, non-
active, infinite, it becomes limit-
ed, i, p, xxvi, 139 seq., 171 ; ii,
140.
— individual, discussion on the na-
ture of it, i, p. liii; ii, 28-73.
is permanent, eternal, not pro-
duced from Brahman at the
time of creation, i, p. liii ; ii,
29-33.
is <§-«a, i, p. liv ; ii, 33-35-
is all-pervading, not a«u, i,
p. liv seqq. ; ii, 35-49-
intelligent, i, pp. Iv, Ivi, xcvii,
53, 103, 133. 134; ii, 33-35,39-
42, 43, 45-48, 367 seq.
is it an agent ? i, pp. Ivii, xcvii ;
ii, 49-58.
■ is imperishable, i, 37, 133, 438 ;
ii, 28 seq.
is eternally unchanging, pure,
and free, i, 37.
its characteristic marks, i, 102,
rules and employs the different
organs of action, i, 102, 133.
is the charioteer driving on
through transmigratory exist-
ence and final release, i, 121,
241.
is the enjoy er, i, 133.
is non-pervading, not omni-
present, i, 158.
is the knower, Brahman the
object of knowledge, i, 159.
eating, i. e. fruition of the re-
sults of works, is characteristic
of it, i, 159 seq., 269.
cannot be denoted by akshara,
i, i7t.
the mind constitutes its limit-
ing adjunct, i, 175.
Soul, individual, carries on the
course of its practical existence
by means of the activities of see-
ing, hearing, cognising; other-
wise no practical existence at
all would be possible, i, 186, 322.
its nature before tlie rise of
discriminative knowledge, i, 186
seq., 189.
as such is real, i, 189 seq.
depending on the Undeve-
loped, i. e. Nescience, i, 241,
244.
— - — name and form abide in it, i,
277 seq. ; cannot abide in it, i,
279.
the 'sufferer,' i, 376 n., 378.
is its suffering real or not ? i,
379 seq.
cannot be the guiding principle
of the adrishta, because at the
time of pralaya its intelligence
has not yet arisen, i, 388.
is not divided, but only ap-
pears divided, ii, 30, 32.
dwells within the heart, ii, 38
seq., 45, 175.
and intelligence represented
as separate, viz. as the agent
and the instrument of action,
ii, 42.
tied by the senses (grahas), ii,
83.
the chief vital air is subordin- .
ate to it, ii, 88.
the vital airs are connected
with it, which is the Lord of
the aggregate of instruments of
action, ii, 92 seq.
— — compared to a caterpillar, ii,
103.
is self-luminous, ii, 141.
— is it to be meditated upon as the
sun, and the sun as the s., or is
it only to be meditated upon as
the sun.? ii, 244.
possesses Nescience, work, and
former knowledge as limiting
adjuncts, ii, 367.
its size minute (a«u), says Ra-
manu^a, i, pp. liv, xcvii.
atomic, ii, 35-45, 397-
that of an awl's point, i,
113.
compared to the point of a
goad, i, 175.
488
vedanta-sCtras.
Soul, individual, its size, the Gainas
believe that it is the same as
that of the body, i, 431-434.
requires a body in order that
knowledge may arise, i, 51.
is in the body only, i, 1 1 1 seq.;
ii, 93.
is the body the sufferer of pain,
or the s. ? i, 379 ; ii, 64, 65.
the Sahkhya cannot admit
a real connexion of it and the
body, i, 379-
endeavour (which is required
for action) originates when it
is connected with the internal
organ which abides in the body,
i, 3S7.
although abiding in one point
of the body only, may be the
cause of perception extending
over the entire body, ii, 38-42.
— —that its knowledge and lord-
ship are hidden, is due to its
connexion with the body, ii, 139
seq.
the ruler of the body and
senses, ii, 367.
and body viewed as non-dif-
ferent, ii, 374.
its relation to Brahman, i, pp.
xix, Ivii seqq., xcvii-c, 59 seq. ;
ii, 61-73, 138.
according to the Upani-
shads, i, p. cxxi seq.
has to be viewed like
that of the snake to its coils, ii,
173 seq.
like that of light to its
substratum, both being fire, ii,
174.
a part of Brahman, i, pp. xxv,
xcvii seq.; ii, 61-63, 39^ seq.
its fundamental identity wnth
the highest Brahman, i, pp.
xxvii, XXX, xxxiv seq., 51, 104,
116, 161, 185, 190 n., 198, 233,
251, 277 seq., 278-283, 322 ; ii,
30, 31, 33, 34, 42 seqq., 65 seq.,
138, 140, 146, 244 seq., 396 seq.,
399 seq.
becomes manifest by
strenuous meditations only ; for
from the Lord are the s.'s bond-
age and release, ii, 138 seq.
only the universal Brahman is
real in each, i, p. xxvi.
Soul, individual, discussions as to
whether certain passages refer
to Brahman or to the, i, p. xxxii
seq., 64-289. See also Brahman.
difference and non-difference
of the Lord and the, i, pp. xxxix,
xlix, 114-116, 183-191, 277 n.,
278 n., 281 seq., 343-346; ii,
68 seq., 149, 339 seq.
in its activity is dependent on
the Lord who impels it with a
view to its former actions, i, p.
Ivii ; ii, 58-61.
do the imperfections clinging
to it affect also the highest Lord
who abides within it ? i, pp.
Ixii-lxiv.
and the Self consisting of bliss
different, i, 69-71 ; to be joined,
i, 71-77.
the ' two entered into the cave'
are the i. s. and the highest Self,
i, 118-123.
called ' the lord of the city of
Brahman,' i, 175.
Brahman in the city of the, i,
178.
the highest Self different from
it in the states of deep sleep and
departing, i, 233-236.
— • — Scripture does not mention a
separate creation of it, i, 279,
441 ; ii, 396 seq.
Brahman is superior to it, i,
345-
a reflection of the highest Self,
ii, 68 seq.
its different states, and the
nature of Brahman, ii, loi,
133-183.
and the highest Self referred
to by the ' two birds, insepara-
ble friends,' &c,, and by 'the
two drinking their reward,' &c.,
ii, 240 seq.
— — the light into which it is said
to enter is the highest Self, ii,
407.
its different states, i, 191; ii,
133-152.
its intermediate state, i. e. the
state of dreams, i, p. Ix ; ii, 1 3 3-
141.
in deep sleep becomes one
with Brahman, i, pp. xxvi, Ixi,
273 ; ii, 54, 141-149, 176, 210.
GENERAL INDEX.
489
Soul, individual, in deep sleep is
resolved into an intelligent
entity, i, 60.
the same s. which entered into
union with Brahman in deep
sleep, returns from Brahman,
when awaking, i, p. Ixi ; ii, 147-
149.
wanders about in the state of
sleep, ii, 49 seq., 56.
essentially non-connected with
the worlds that appear in the
waking and in the dreaming
state, ii, 146.
its state of swoon, i, p. Ixi ;
ii, 149-152.
— actions determine its future em-
bodied existences, i, p. xxvi.
— when passing out of the body at
the time of death, remains
invested with the subtle ma-
terial elements which serve as
an abode to the prawas, i, p.
lix ; ii, loi-i 12.
— descends from the moon with
a remainder of former deeds
which determines the nature of
the new embodiment, i, p. lix
seq. ; ii, 112-121.
— its descent from the moon de-
scribed, i, p. Ix ; ii, 126-
132.
— of him who possesses the lower
knowledge, and of him who
possesses no knowledge of
Brahman at all, their fate the
same up to the entrance of the
s. into the veins, i, pp. Ixxix,
cvii ; ii, 369 seq.
passes into the heart,
and out of the body by the
veins, then up to the sun by
means of a ray of light, i, p.
Ixxxi seq.; ii, 372, 377-381.
stations on its way to
Brahman, i, p. Ixxxii ; ii, 382-
3S9; these stations are con-
ductors of the s., not marks of
the road, nor places of enjoy-
ment, ii, 387-389.
■ — its departure from the
body, ii, 364-404 ; the scrip-
tural texts about it belong to
the sphere of qualified know-
ledge, ii, 400 seq.
— of him also who knows the high-
est Brahman, departs from the
body, i, p. Ixxxi.
Soul is enveloped in the subtle body
until it reaches the river Vi-
^ara, i, p. Ixxxi n.
— of the pious effects its desires by
mere determination, i, p. Ixxxiv
seq. ; ii, 410 seq.
— when it departs from the body
all specific cognition vanishes,
but the Self is not destroyed, i,
281.
— although all-pervading, is viewed
as going because it enters into
connexion with buddhi and the
rest of its adjuncts, ii, 42-45. 402.
— on account of its non-extension,
there is no confusion of the
results of actions, ii, 68.
— its ascent to, and descent from
the moon, ii, 101-132.
— ■ accompanied by the chief vital
air, the sense-organs, and the
mind, and taking with itself
Nescience, moral good or ill-
desert, and the impressions left
by its previous existences, leaves
its former body and obtains
a new body, ii, 102.
— goes enveloped by water, ii, 103-
iio, 112.
— when it descends from the moon,
it enters into similarity (not
identity) with ether, air, smoke,
mist, cloud, and rain.ii, 126-128.
— assumes a body of water in the
moon, ii, 127.
— passes through the stages of its
descent in a not very long time,
ii, 1 28.
— after having entered into plants,
enters into conjunction with
one who performs the act of
generation, ii, 131 seq.
— breath is merged in it, ii, 367 seq.
— with the breath, goes to the ele-
ments, ii, 368 seq.
— when it attains a new body, after
speech and the other organs
have been withdrawn within it,
work constitutes its abode, 11,369.
— of him who knows Brahman does
not depart, ii, 372-375.
— the abode of the s. when about to
depart is the heart, and the point
of it is lighted up, ii, 377 seq.
490
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Soul, the entering of one s. into
several bodies is like the multi-
plication of the flame of a lamp,
ii, 413 seq.
treated in books on
Yoga, ii, 414.
— the released, opinions about its
characteristics, i, pp. xix, xxx,
Ixxxiv; ii, 408-410.
manifests itself through its
own Self, in its own nature, i,
p. Ixxxiii ; ii, 405-407.
is non-separate from Brahman,
i, p. Ixxxiv; ii, 173-175, 407
seq.
is either embodied or disem-
bodied according to its wish and
will, i, p. Ixxxv ; ii, 411-413.
■ how it can animate several
bodies at the same time, i, p.
Ixxxv ; ii, 412-415.
absence of all specific cogni-
tion on the part of it, i, p. Ixxxv ;
ii, 414 seq.
participates in all the perfec-
tions and powers of the Lord,
with the exception of the power
of creating and sustaining the
world, i, p. Ixxxv ; ii, 415-418.
does not return to new forms
of embodied existence, i, p.
Ixxxv; ii, 418 seq.
does not enter on new courses
of existence, i, 243.
effects its purposes by mere
will, ii, 410 seq.
possesses a mind (manas), ii,
411.
is v.'ithout another lord, ii,
411.
is without a body and sense-
organs, says Badari, ii, 411 seq.
■ has a body and senses, says
Gaimini, ii, 412.
the enjoyment only of the
r. s. and the highest Lord is
equal, ii, 418.
— see also Self, individual.
Souls, individual, Brahman appears
to be broken up into, i, p. xxv.
matter and i. s. constitute the
body of the Lord, i, p. xxviii.
not joined to material bodies,
i, p. xxix.
■ — - — enter into material bodies
corresponding to merit or de-
merit previously acquired, i, p.
xxix.
Souls, individual, although the en-
joying 1. s. and tiie objects of
fruition are in reality nothing
but Brahman, yet the two sets
may practically be held apart,
i, p. xlviii, 318-320.
are parts of Brahman, accord-
ing to Ramanu^a, i, p. Iviii.
Lord different from all i. s.,
i, 8 1 ; stands in the relation of
a ruler to them, i, 329.
— the released, have to resort to
Brahman, i, 157 seq., 180 seq.
— the Sahkhyas say that the s. are
non-active, ii, 301.
— the Lord acts as the ruler of the
pradhana and of the s., and the
pradhana, the s., and the Lord
are of mutually different nature
(Sahkhya and Yoga), i, 434
seq.
— gradually all s. obtain release
from sawsara, i, 439.
— their being the food of the gods
is metaphorical, on account of
their not knowing the Self, ii,
I r o- 1 1 2 .
— ascend to the moon for the pur-
pose of finding there a complete
requital of their works, ii, 115.
when descending enter into
plants animated by other s.,
they do not undergo pleasure
and pain in that condition, ii,
129-131.
— are led by the ' person not a
man ' to the lower Brahman, ii,
389-402.
— on the passing away of the
effected world of Brahman the
s. go together with the ruler of
that world to what is higher
than that, ii, 391 seq.
- — the lordly power of the other s.
depends on the highest Lord, ii,
416-418.
Space (akaja), one of the three non-
existences of the Bauddhas, i,
410.
— the doctrine that it is a non-
entity cannot be proved, i, 412
seq.
— the air is founded on, i, 413.
— see also Ether.
GENERAL INDEX.
491
Species, the individuals only have
an origin, not the s., they are
eternal, i, 202 seq.
— words connected with the s., not
with the individuals, i, 202 seq.
Speech, the origin of all effects, i,
346, 381.
— the distinction of names and
forms originates entirely from
s. only, i, 352.
— and pra«a, and mind presuppose
fire, water, and earth, ii, 78 seq.
— acts under the guidance of Agni,
ii, 91 seq.
— is merged in mind fon the de-
parture of the soul), ii, 364 seq.
Spho/a is the word, i, 204-206.
— is eternal, i, 206.
— its assumption gratuitous, i, 209
seq.
Spider, as it emits out of itself the
threads of its web, so Brahman
creates the world, i, 348.
5ri-bhashya. See Ramanuj-a.
5ruti, the meaning of it inferred
from Smriti, i, 145 seq.
— those SmWtis only which follow
S. are to be considered as
authoritative, i, 291 n., 293, 294,
297 n.
— men who are unable to ascertain
the true sense of S., rely upon
Smr/tis, i, 292.
— supersensuous matters cannot be
perceived without, i, 293.
— if in conflict with other means of
right knowledge, has to be bent,
so as to accord with the latter,
i, 299.
— and Smriti on the rinsing of the
mouth with water, ii, 211-214.
— indicatory mark, and syntactical
connexion, are of greater force
than leading subject-matter, ii,
262 seq.
Stages of life (ajrama), the duties
connected with them are ob-
ligatory on him also who does
not strive after mukti, i, p.
Ixxv ; ii, 312-315.
persons who do not belong to
any one of them have also
claims to knowledge, i, p. Ixxvi ;
ii) 315-317 ; but it is better to
belong to one of them, ii, 316
seq.
Stages of life requiring chastity are
open to men whether they have
reached househoidership or not,
ii, 295.
for which chastity is pre-
scribed, knowledge valid for
them, ii, 295.
Gaimini's opinion on
them, ii, 295-297.
established by Scrip-
ture, ii, 297-303.
four, not three, ii, 300 seq.
those belonging to the three
former obtain the world of the
blessed, while the mendicant
enjoys immortality, ii, 301.
the state of being grounded in
Brahman is impossible for the
three former, ii, 301.
all works enjoined on them
must be had regard to with
a view to the springing up of
knowledge, ii, 309.
of him who has entered on a
higher one there is no de-
scending to a lower one, ii, 317
seq.
the duties of the other, are
incumbent on the householder,
as well as those of his own
stage, ii, 324 seq.
as all the four are equally
taught by Scripture, they are
to be gone through equally,
either in the way of option
between them or in the way of
comprehension of all of them,
ii, 325.
Stories told in the L panishads are
not for the purpose of the pari-
plava, ii, 305 seq.
Stotra and other members of the
sacrifice are taught in the three
Vedas, and so also the medita-
tions resting on them, ii, 282 seq.
Subject and object, i, 3.
the relation of, cannot exist in
the Self, i, 378 seq.
Subjects, the ten objects and the
ten s. cannot rest on anything
but Brahman, i, 104.
— the ten s. have reference to ob-
jects, i, 106.
Substance, contradictions in the
Vaijeshika doctrine about s. and
quality, i, 394 seqq.
492
vedanta-sOtras.
Subtle body. See Body.
5udi"as are altogether disqualified for
Brahmavidya, i, p. xxxvii, 223-
229.
— excluded from the study of the
Veda, i, 197 n., 224, 228 seq.
— unfit for sacrifices, i, 224, 228
seq.
— etymologised as ju,^am abhidu-
drava, &c., i, 225 seq.
— excluded from ceremonial purifi-
cations, i, 227.
Suffering and sufferer, objections
against the Vedantin, based on
the relation of, i, 376-381.
5uka, the son of Vyasa, travelled to
the sphere of the sun, ii, 375.
Sulabha entered into the body of
Ganaka, to carry on a discussion
with him, ii, 237.
Sun to be meditated upon under
the form of honey, i, 216, 256
seq.
— a man going to final release
reaches the, i, 232.
— and the other divinities are mere
differentiations of prawa, i, 269.
— is the soul to be meditated upon
as the s., and the s. as the soul,
or is the soul only to be medi-
tated upon as the.' ii, 244.
— dying during the northern pro-
gress of the s. is more excellent,
ii, 380.
— the departed soul follows the
rays also during the southern
progress of the, ii, 380.
— see Person in the sun.
— see also Savitar.
Superimposition, i, 3 n.
— defined, i, 4-9.
— is Nescience, i, 6.
— mutual s. of Self and Non-Self, i,
7-9.
— endless s. the cause of individual
souls appearing as agents and
enjoyers (of the results of their
actions), i, 9.
— explained, ii, 197.
— of something higher upon some-
thing lower is the rule, ii, 343
seq.
Supreme Being, the whole world
a manifestation of it, i, 442.
Sute^as, the head of Vaijvanara, ii,
275, 276.
Sutras, what they are, and what
they aim at, i, pp. xi, xiii.
— the meaning of, i, p. xi.
— preceded by a literature now lost,
i, p. xii.
— see Vedanta-sutras.
Sutratman = Pra^apati, i, 142 n.
Svarita. See Accents,
^■vetaketu, i, pp. cv, cxviii ; ii, 210.
^veta^vatara-upanishad, Maya in the,
i, pp. cxvii n., cxxi n.
Swoon, the nature of it explained, i,
p. Ixi ; ii, 149-152.
— is half-union or half-coincidence
with deep sleep, ii, 151 seq.
— belongs with one half to sleep,
with the other half to death,
it being the door of death, ii,
152.
Symbol, in meditations on Brahman
view^ed under a s., the devotee
is not to consider the s. as con-
stituting his own Self, i, p.
Ixxvii ; ii, 340-342.
the s. is to be medita-
tively viewed as being one with
Brahman, not Brahman as being
one with the, i, p. Ixxvii ; ii,
342-345-
Symbols, only those who do not
take their stand on s. are led to
the world of Brahman, ii, 402-
404.
Taittiriya-upanishad, the ananda-
maya in the, i, p. xlii.
Taiika quoted by Ramanu^a, i, p.
xxi.
— the Vakyakara, i, p. xxii.
Tantra or Saiikhyajastra, i, 291,
291 n.
That art thou, i, pp. xxvii, xlix, 23,
31, 54-56, 104, 113, 115, 116,
122, 125, 185, 197, 250, 251,
266, 279, 321-323, 326, 343,
345; JJ, 32, 46, 65, 66, 138,
140, 173, 197, 209, 210, 238,
243, 291, 333-337, 339, 370,
397, 408.
— which is. See Sat.
— which is not. See Asat.
Thief, the ordeal of the heated
hatchet undergone by the, i,
323 n.
Third place (or path) for those who
are neither entitled to the road
GENERAL INDEX,
493
of the gods, nor to the road of
the fathers, ii, 123 seq.
Third place, the five oblations not
necessary in the case of those
who go to it, ii, 125.
Thunderbolt, the pra«a is a raised,
i, 229-231.
— used to denote ' cause of fear in
general,' i, 230 seq.
Tirthakara or Gina, i, 429.
Transmigration of souls, i, pp. xxvi
seq., xxix seq.
see Soul, p. 489 seq.
— the origin &c. of the world can-
not proceed from a being sub-
ject to, i, 17.
Transmigratory world, a man who
has once understood Brahman
to be the Self, no longer be-
longs to the, i, 41-43.
Tripartition of the three elements,
and t. in man, ii, 98-100.
— on account of it, water consists
of three elements, ii, 104.
True, there is only one vidya of
the, i, p. Ixxii ; ii, 245-247.
— explained as Hirawyagarbha, i,
p. cix.
— ativadin is one who declares
something beyond by means
of the, i, 163, 165 seqq.
— is the highest Brahman, i, 167,
267 ; ii, 216 seq., 234.
— in dreamless sleep the individual
soul is united with the, i, 350 ;
ii, 210.
— the T. of the, ii, 171.
— its secret names, ahar and aham,
ii, 246.
Tulsidas, Ramayan of, i, p.cxxviiseq.
Twelve days' sacrifice. See Soma
sacrifice.
Udatta. See Accents.
Uddalaka, i, pp. cv, cxv, cxviii.
— a i?ishi, ii, 276.
— was a householder and yet taught
his son, ii, 288.
UdgatrZ-priest and the udgitha-
vidya, ii, 194 seq., 321.
— the term udgitha calls up the
idea of the sphere of action of
the, ii, 197.
Udgitha, relation between the u.
and the syllable Om, i, p. Ixviii ;
ii, 193 seq., 196-199.
Udgitha, meditations on the, i, p.
Ixxiv ; ii, 247, 252-256, 272-
274, 282 seq., 282 n., 292, 303-
305, 321, 333, 345-349-
— and Aditya (the sunj, i, p. Ixxvii ;
Ji) 33 3) 346 seq. and n.
— ether is the, i, 83.
— and the Udgatrz, ii, 197.
— never used to denote the syllable
Om in its connexion with the
RJg-\eda. and Ya^ur-veda, ii,
199.
Udgitha-vidya, i, p. Ixviii.
— in the Br/had-ara«yaka and in the
AT^andogya-upanishad, ii, 192-
199.
Uktha, the highest Self is, i, 79.
Undeveloped, the, (a^'^•akta), means
the body, and not the pradhana,
i, p. xxxix, 237-252.
— that element in Brahman, from
which the material universe
springs, i, p. cxix, 243.
— is beyond the Great one, i, 237
seq., 243 seq.
— is the pradhana, i, 238, 238 n.
— is the body in the simile of the
chariot, i, 239.
— means the subtle body, i, 241
seq., 244.
— i. e. Nescience, i, 244.
— is not mentioned as an object of
knowledge, i, 246.
Unseen principle and the activity
of the Lord are the operative
causes of the world, i, 382.
the motion in the atoms due
to it, i, 387, 388.
is it to be considered as in-
hering in the soul or in the
atoms? i, 388.
in both cases it cannot be the
cause of motion in the atoms,
because it is non-intelligent, i,
388,
abides in the pradhana, ii, 70.
is of the nature of religious
merit or demerit and acquired
through mind, speech, and body,
ii, 70.
refutation of the Saiikhya and
Vaijeshika doctrines of the, ii,
70-73-
is due to the non-particular
conjunction of the Selfs with
the internal organs, ii, 70 seq.
494
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Unseen principle, the limitation of
actions and their results cannot
be caused by the, ii, 70 seq.
Upadiiis, soul is Brahman in so far
as limited by the unreal u. due
to IMaya, i, p. xxx.
— see also Brahman, Maya, Names
and forms, Soul.
Upakojala, i, pp. cv, cviii.
— the instruction given to him by
the sacred fires, i, 126 seq.
Upakojala-vidya, ii, 219, 233, 234
seq.
Upanayana ceremony, only men of
the three higher castes are
subject to the precepts about
the, i, 197, 224.
• merely subserves the study of
the Veda, i, 198 seq., 224.
referred to in the vidyas, i,
227. _
■ omitted in a certain case, i,
227 n.
Upanishads, i, pp. x, xi, xxix.
— 5ahkara's commentaries on the,
i, p. XV.
— differing theories claim to be
founded on them, i, p. xviii.
— their teaching according to .Sah-
kara, i, p. xxiv seqq.
according to Ramanu^a, i, pp.
xxvii seqq., xxxi, cii."
— the principle on which the pas-
sages from them have been
selected and arranged in the
Vedanta-sutras, i, pp. xli-xlvi.
— to guard them against misinter-
pretations on the part of the
Sahkhya, was the task of the
Vedantin, i, p. xlvi.
— what is the relation in which
those parts of the U. stand to
each other which enjoin iden-
tical or partly identical medita-
tions ? i, p. Ixvi seq.
— the different accounts of the U.
as to the stations of the way
which leads the vidvan up to
Brahman, i, pp. Ixxxii, cvii-cxi;
ii, 382-386.
— the philosophy of the, its re-
lation to Badarayawa, 5ahkara,
and Ramanu^a, i, pp. ci-cxxvii.
— for the Hindu commentator a
body of revealed truth, i, p.
ciii.
Upanishads, the teachers of the U.
belong to different sections of
Brahminical society, some of
them are even Kshattriyas, i,
p. ciii.
— do not constitute a systematic
whole, i, pp. ciii seqq., cxiv seq.
— together with a certain uni-
formity of general leading con-
ceptions in the U. there runs
throughout divergence in de-
tails, i, p. civ seq.
— texts from the U. as handled by
5ahkara, i, pp. cv-cxiv.
— the doctrine of Maya not in the,
i, pp. cxvi-cxxi.
— on the relation of the individual
soul to the highest Self, i, p.
cxxi seq.
— the soul comprehended by the
U. only, i, 36 seq.
— who has heard the U. or the
secret knowledge, i. e. who
knows Brahman, i, 128, 317.
— mantras and passages referring
to sacrifices which occur in the
U., cannot be viewed as sup-
plementary to the vidyas of the,
ii, 222-225.
— the mantras as well as the vidyas
found in the U., have to be
studied in the woods, ii,
225.
— the stories told in the U. are not
for the purpose of the pariplava,
ii, 305 seq.
Upavarsha, i, p. xxxvii ; ii, 268.
— maintains that the letters only
are the word, i, 206 seq.
Ushasta, the questions of U. and
Kahola constitute one vidya, ii,
242 seq.
Ut, name of the person within the
sun, i, 7^8, 7^9.
Uttara-mhnawsa, i, p. ix.
— later than the Purva-mimawsa, i,
P- X. ^
— or Vedanta-siitras, i, pp. xii,
xiv n.
Va^apeya-sacrifice, the Br/haspati-
sava a subordinate part of it, ii,
223, 223 n., 224.
Va§-asaneyins, i, 146, 148.
Vaibhashikas are realists, i, 401 n.
Vainajika = Bauddha, i, 414, 415.
GENERAL INDEX.
495
Vaijeshikas, the non-difference of
cause and effect defended
against them, i, p. xlix, 320-
343-
— refutation of their tenet that the
world originates from atoms set
in motion by the adr/sh/a, i, p. 1
seq., 381-400.
— their behef in a non-inteUigent
soul, i, p. liv; ii, 33-35.
— teach that the Lord is the opera-
tive cause of the world, i, 17 n.,
435-
— their argument against the Vedan-
tins, i, 381.
— difficulties with regard to their
six categories, i, 394 seqq.
— their doctrine may be called
semi-destructive or semi-nihil-
istic, i, 401, 401 n.
— refutation of their doctrine of
many Selfs, ii, 70.
— their opinion that the mind only
proceeds to the new abode of
fruition, ii, 104.
Vaishwava sects, the most important
of Hindu sects, i, p. xvii.
Vajjvanara is Brahman, i, p. xxxv,
. 143-153-
— is to be meditated upon as a
whole, not in his single parts, i,
p. Ixxv ; ii, 274-277, 279,
— is the gastric fire, i, 143 seq., 146
seq.
— is the elemental fire, i, 144, 147.
— is the divinity whose body is fire,
. i, 144, 147.
— is the embodied Self, i, 144.
— is man, i, 146-148.
— cannot be the divinity of fire, or
the element of fire, i, 148 seq.
— worship of the highest Lord as,
i, 149 seq.
— a span long, ii, 191.
— legend of the six i?/shis who
wished to obtain a knowledge
of, ii, 274-276.
— Sute^as, the head of, ii, 275,
276.
Vaijvanara-vidya, or knowledge of
Agni Vaijvanara, ii, 187, 233,
249, 292, 400.
Va^aknu, the daughter of, possessed
the knowledge of Brahman, ii,
315;
Vakyakara, i.e. Taiika, i, p. xxii.
Vamadeva, i, p. Ixv.
— by intuition identifies himself
with everything in the universe,
ii, 37, 37 n-, loi.
— the i?ishi V. saw and understood
it, singing, ' I was Manu, I was
the sun,' ii, 238.
— became Brahman in his mother's
womb, ii, 328.
Vamadevya, knowledge of the, ii,
310.
Varuwa, Bhr/gu, his pupil, i, 199.
-- with a noose, i, 217 n.
— Bhr/gu and other sons of Brah-
man's mind were again born at
the sacrifice of, ii, 235.
— is the lord of all water, ii, 386.
— above V. there come Indra and
Pra^apati, on the path of the
gods, ii, 386.
— beyond lightning there is V., ii,
386.
— the souls are led through the
worlds of V.,&c., by the person,
not a man, ii, 389.
Vashkalin, Bahva questioned about
Brahman by, ii, 157.
Vasish/Zia, the son of Brahman's
mind, having parted from his
former body in consequence of
the curse of Ximi, was, on the
order of Brahman, again pro-
created by Mitra and Varu«a,
ii, 235.
Vasudeva, a manifestation of the
highest being, i, p. xxiii, 440.
— from it originated Sahkarsha«a, i,
p. Ii.
— a surname of Kapila, who burned
the sons of Sagara, i, 294.
— to be v.-orshipped, i, 440.
— appears in four forms, as V.,
Sankarshawa, Pradyumna, and
Aniruddha, i, 440.
— is the ultimate causal essence, of
which his three other forms
(Sankarsha«a, &c.) are the
efl^ects, i, 440.
— objections to the doctrine of the
Bhagavatas as to the four forms
of, i, 441 seq.
— the only real essence, i, 442.
— and Ar^una, dialogue on know-
ledge originating in a future
life, ii, 328 seq.
Vasus, class of gods, i, 202, 216.
496
vedanta-sOtras.
Vayu (air) and Prawa not to be
identified, i, p. Ixxiv ; ii, 256-
259-
— the deity tliat never sets, ii, 18
seq.
— an object of worship, ii, 19.
— Brahman to be meditated upon
under the form of, ii, 19 n.
— having become breath entered
into the nostrils, ii, 91.
— is the best among the Devas, ii,
256.
— Pra/za and V. identified, ii,
257.
— from the year to V., the departed
soul proceeds, ii, 384-386,
— comes before Aditya (on the
path of the gods), and must be
inserted between the year and
Aditya, ii, 385.
— the soul goes from the world of
the gods to, ii, 386.
Veda furnishes the means of escap-
ing from sawsara, i, p. xxvii.
— its Gwanakaw^a and Karmaka«(^a,
i, p. xxix.
— Brahman is the source of the,
i, p. xxxii, 19-22.
— the reading of it the common
antecedent for those who wish
to enter on an enquiry into
religious duty and ■ for those
desirous of knowing Brahman,
i, 10.
extends up to the comprehen-
sion of its purport, ii, 289.
— cannot aim at conveying infor-
mation about accomplished sub-
stances, i, 21.
— possesses authority as a means of
right knowledge of Brahman,
i, 23, 38, 317.
— aims at action, i, 24, 38 seqq.
— prohibitory passages of the, i, 39
seq. and n.
— in the V. which is not the work
of man no wish can be ex-
pressed, i, no.
— men are entitled to the study of
the, i, 196-198.
— also beings above men (gods, &c.)
are qualified for the study and
practice of the, i, 198 seq.
— to the gods it is manifest of itself
(without study), i, 199.
— its authoritativeness proved from
its independence, basing on the
original (eternal) connexion of
the word with its sense, i, 201,
295.
Veda, from the word of the V. the
world, with the gods and other
beings, originates, i, 202-204.
— its eternity, i, 2 1 1-2 16, 317.
— the i?/shis see the mantras and
brahmawa passages, i. e. the, i,
223.
— study of it demands as its ante-
cedent the upanayana-cere-
mony, i, 224.
— 5iidras prohibited from hearing
and studying the, i, 228 seq.
— Yoga practices enjoined in the, i,
297.
— the real sense of it, that Brahman
is the cause and matter of this
world, i, 361.
— the Bhagavata contains passages
contradictory to the, i, 443.
— all its parts are equally authorita-
tive, and hence must all be
assumed to have a meaning, ii,
156.
— the rite of carrying fire on the
head is an attribute of the study
of the V, of the Atharvawikas,
ii, 189 seq.
— Scripture enjoins works for such
only as understand the purport
of the, ii, 289.
— of him who has merely read the
V. there is qualification for
works, ii, 293.
— see also Scripture, and ^ruti.
Vedanta, what the study of the V.
presupposes, i, p. xxxii, 9-15.
— the doctrines concerning the
origin of the world which are
opposed to it, i, 289.
Vedanta-mimawsa, i, 9.
Vedanta-jastra, i, p. xi.
Vedanta-sutras, the GwanakaWa
systematised only in the, i, p.
xii.
— presuppose the Purva-mimawsa-
sutras, i, p. xiii.
— other names for, i, p. xiv n.,9, 190.
— numerous commentaries on them,
i, p. xvi.
— differences of Vedanta doctrine,
existed before their final com-
position, i, p. xviii seqq.
GENERAL INDEX.
497
Vedanta-sutras quote opinions of
various teachers, i, p. xix.
— conspectus of their contents, i,
pp. xxxi-lxxxv.
— are throughout Mima»?sa,i,p. xlv.
— claim to be systematisations of
the Upanishads, i, p. cii.
— have merely the purpose of
stringing together the flowers
of the Vedanta-passages, i, 17.
Vedanta-texts, Brahman the uni-
form topic of all, i, p. xxxii, 22-
47.
— why they are to be studied, i, 9.
— they all teach that the cause of the
world is the intelligent Brah-
man, i, 6oseq.
— have a twofold purport ; some of
them aim at setting forth the
nature of the highest Self, some
at teaching the unity of the in-
dividual soul with the highest
Self, i, 198.
— there is a conflict of V. with
regard to the things created,
but not with regard to the Lord
as the cause of the world, i,
263-266,
— do not contradict one another
with regard to the mode of crea-
tion and similar topics, i, 290.
— the cognitions of Brahman in-
timated by all the V. are iden-
tical, ii, 184-279 ; Scripture also
declares this, ii, 190 seq.
— they all represent the object of
knowledge as one, ii, 190.
Vedarthasaiigraha of Ramanu^a, i,
p. xxi.
Vedas seen by men of exalted vision
(rishis), i, 213.
— 5a«^ilya did not find highest bliss
in them, i, 443.
— mantras enjoined in one V. only,
are taken over into other V.
also, ii, 274.
— three, the syllable Om common
to them, ii, 282 seq.
the members of the sacrifice
on which the meditations rest,
are taught in them, so also the
meditations, ii, 282.
Veda-upanishad, i, 94.
Vedic texts have for their object
that which is dependent on
Nescience, i, 8.
[38]
K
Veins, a hundred and one v. of the
heart, the hundred and first
passing through the skull, ii,
378.
— connexion between the v. and
the rays, ii, 378, 379.
— the junction of the v. and rays is
the way of the departing soul,
ii, 382.
— see also Na/^is.
Vidura, though born from a .Sudra
mother, possessed eminent
knowledge, i, 224, 228.
Vidya, unity of the, i, 152.
— see also Knowledge, and Medi-
tation.
Vidyas. See Cognitions, and Medi-
tations.
Vi^ara, having reached the river V.,
the soul divests itself of the
subtle body, i, p. Ixxxi n.
Vira^g", the atman purushavidha
identified with the V. of the
latter Vedanta, i, p. cvi.
— Mr. Gough on, i, p. cxxiii seq.
Vish;zu, Brahman identified with V.
or Narayawa, i, p. xxxi n.
— In the Bhagavadgita, i, p. cxxvi.
— contemplated in the sacred 5ala-
gram, i, 126, 178.
— the highest place of, i, 239, 245,
246 ; ii, 205, 391.
the highest Self is the, 1,
239.
— difficulty of knowing it, i,
241.
— contemplated in an image, ii, 338,
^339, 345.
Vijvanara = Vaijvanara, i, 150.
Vijvedevas, class of gods, are non-
eternal beings, because pro-
duced, i, 202.
Vital air (prawa) remains awake in
the state of deep sleep, i, 162-
168.
is the bhuman the? i, 162-
168.
represented as the Self of
everything, i, 164.
is immortality, i, 164.
may be called ' higher ' with
reference to the body, i, 172.
— ■ — is the maker of all the persons,
the person in the sun, the
person in the moon, &c., i,
269.
k
498
vedanta-sOtras.
Vital air, the chief, (mukhya pra«a),
is produced from Brahman, is
distinct from air in general and
from the other vital airs, and is
minute, i, p. lix; ii, 84-91, 94-
96.
called 'the best,' ii, 84 seq.
• 'the oldest and the best,' ii,
85.
is neither air nor function,
ii, 85-87.
according to the Sankhyas,
the combined function of all
organs, ii, 86.
is nothing but air, accord-
ing to a 5ruti, ii, 86, 87.
various powers ascribed to
it in scriptural passages, ii, 87.
-is independent in the body,
like the individual soul, ii, 87,
is subordinate to the soul,
ii, 88.
is not an instrument, ii, 88
seq.
the body and all the senses
subsist by means of it, ii, 89, 95,
is designated as having five
functions like m.ind, ii, 89 seq.
is not a sense-organ, ii, 93
seq.
accompanies the soul when
leaving its body, ii, "102.
the two passages on the
Udgitha-vidya in the Br/h. Up.
and in the KAand. Up. both
glorify it, and are injunctions
of a meditation on it, ii, 192
seq.
represented as Udgatri, as
well as udgitha, ii, 195.
see also Breath, and Prawa.
Vital airs (prawas) spring from
Brahman, are eleven in number,
and are of minute size, i, p. lix ;
ii, 74-84-
are superintended and guided
in their activity by special divi-
nities, they are independent
principles, not mere modifica-
tions of the chief vital air, i, p.
lix ; ii, 91-96.
do not depart from the body,
i, p. cxii.
the instance of the v. a. illus-
trating the identity of cause
and effect, i, 342 seq.
Vital airs, difference of scriptural
statements regarding them, ii, 3.
— discussion of Vedic passages on
the origination of the, ii, 74-79.
the statement that they
existed before the creation
refers to a subordinate causal
substance, ii, 76 seq.
different Vedic statements as
to their number, ii, 79-84.
called graha, seizers, ii, 79,
83.
although guided by divinities,
are yet connected with the in-
dividual soul, ii, 92 seq.
are senses, with the exception
of the chief vital air, ii, 93 seq.
are not functions of the chief
vital air, ii, 94.
when a new body is obtained,
they also go from the old body
to the new one, ii, 105.
at the time of death, go to
Agni and the other gods, ii, 105
seq.
Agnihotra offered to them, ii,
249-252.
all come to the individual soul,
ii, 367 seq.
do not depart from the em-
bodied soul of him who knows
Brahman, ii, 372 seq.
see also Prawas.
Void, doctrine of a general, i, 439 ;
ii, 14, 168.
Vr/ttikara referred to by ^ankara,
i, pp. XX, xxi.
Vyasa and others conversed with the
gods face to face, {,222 seq.
Vyasadhikarawamala, i, p. xxxi.
Water springs from fire, i, p. Hi ; ii,
22 seq.
— from it sprang earth, ii, 23 seq.
— is dissolved into fire, ii, 26.
— earth is dissolved into, ii, 26.
— the soul goes from one body into
another, enveloped by, ii, 103-
105, 106-110, 112.
— is intimately connected with
religious works, sacrifices, &c.,
ii, 105, 108, 109.
— designated by jraddha, ii, 106-
108.
— the soul assumes a body of w. in
the moon, ii, 127.
GENERAL INDEX.
499
Water is the dress of breath, ii, 211-
214.
Woman, no w. to be avoided, with
reference to the knowledge of
the Vamadevya, ii, 310.
Word, the original (eternal) con-
nexion of the w. with its sense,
i, 201.
— connected with the species, not
with the individual, i, 202 seq.
— the world originates from the w.,
as is shown by perception and
inference, i, 201-2 11 ; how is
that origination to be under-
stood? i, 203.
— creation is preceded by the w., i,
203 seq.
— the spho/a is the, i, 204-206.
— the letters are not the, i, 205
seq.
— Upavarsha says that the letters
are the, i, 206-210.
— the spho/a is not the, i, 209 seq.
— and thing are different, i, 222.
Words, 5ahkara on the nature of, i,
p. xxxvii, 204-211.
Works (viz. sacrifices, &c.), know-
ledge is independent of, i, p.
Ixxv; ii, 285-295, 306.
— knowledge and w. are the two
roads for entering on the road
of the gods and the road of the
fathers, ii, 123-125.
— enjoined for such only as under-
stand the purport of the Veda,
ii, 289.
for him who has merely read
the Veda, ii, 293.
— destruction of the qualification
for w., by knowledge, ii, 294
seq.
— obligatory for the three former
ajramas, but not for the men-
dicant, ii, 301 seq.
— are needed for the origination of
knowledge, ii, 306 seq., 313-
315 ; but w. undertaken for the
fulfilment of some special wish
do not contribute towards this
end, ii, 360.
— are the washing away of unclean-
liness, but knowledge is the
highest way, ii, 307.
— are incumbent on him also who
does not desire release, ii, 312
seq.
Kk
Works, those performing w. are not
overpowered by passion and the
like, ii, 315.
— of permanent obligation enjoined
by the Veda, such as the Agni-
hotra, have the same effect as
knowledge, ii, 358-362.
— joined with knowledge may effect
final release, ii, 359.
• — are superior to w. destitute
of knowledge, ii, 361.
— of public utility, less meritorious
than sacrifices, lead through
smoke &c. to the southern path
of the sun, i, 27.
lead to the road of the
fathers, ii, 124.
— (Karman), the reward of w. is
not the independent result of
the w. acting through the
apurva, but is allotted by the
Lord, i, p. Ixv ; ii, 180-183.
— the shaking off of the good and
evil, i, p. Ixx ; ii, 225-229;
takes place at the moment
of the soul's departure from
the body, i, p. Ixx seq. ; ii, 229-
231.
— even he whose w. are entirely
annihilated, is yet connected
with some kind of body, i, p.
Ixxi.
— he who has reached knowledge
of Brahman is not affected by
the consequences of either past
or future evil or good w., i, p.
Ixxvii seq.; ii, 119, 237, 353-
357.
— the non-operation of w. holds
good only in the case of w.
which have not yet begun to
produce their effects, i, p.
Ixxviii; ii, 357 seq.
— which have begun to produce
their effects have to be worked
out fully, whereupon (after
death) the possessor of know-
ledge becomes united with
Brahman, i, p. Ixxviii; ii, 113,
117, 119, 237, 362 seq.
— the Lord regards merit and de-
merit acquired by the w. of
living beings, i, 357-360.
— constitute the efficient cause for
the origination of a new body,
ii, 105.
500
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Works, on the passing away of the w.
the soul redescends with a re-
mainder, ii, 1 1 2-1 19, 398.
— good fortune as well as mis-
fortune is caused by good and
evil, ii, 114.
— the souls are to find in the moon
complete requital of their, ii,
115-
— whose operation is obstructed by
other w. leading to fruits of a
contrary nature last for a long
time, ii, 117 seq.
— definite fruits are attached to
particular, ii, 1 17.
- — the fruits of different w. must be
experienced in diff'erent exis-
tences, ii, 117, 117 n.
— are extinguished either by ex-
piatory ceremonies or by the
knowledge of Brahman or by
the full fruition of their con-
sequences, ii, 117 n.
• — depend on conduct, ii, 120 seq.
— and not conduct are the cause of
new births, ii, 121.
■ — inferior to knowledge, ii, 267.
— knowledge is subordinate to, ii,
289,
— their reaching maturity depends
on place, time, and operative
cause presenting themselves, ii,
328.
— the fruits of which are opposed
to each other, ii, 328.
— do not perish, ii, 353, 354.
— good, are mentioned together
with evil w., and the term ' evil '
is used without any distinction
for both, ii, 356,
of them also there is non-
clinging (to him who knows) ;
but at death, ii, 356 seq.
— depend on false knowledge, ii,
363.
— a limiting adjunct of the soul, ii,
367.
— at the time of the soul attaining
a new body, after speech and
the other organs have been
withdrawn within the soul, w.
constitute the soul's abode, ii,
369.
— refraining from w. of any kind
whatsoever cannot lead to final
release, ii, 397-400.
Works, refraining from, impossible
for one who does not possess
perfect knowledge, ii, 399.
— see also Actions.
World, the appearance of it due to
Maya or illusion, i, p. xxv, 329
seqo 345; ii> 138.
^ upadana the material cause of it,
i, p. xxv.
— springs from Brahman, i, p. xl,
15-19, 202, 305-308, 317, 320-
330, 381-386, 442; ii, 16, 21.
See also Cause and effect, and
Creation.
— is it co-eternal with Brahman, or
does it issue from it and is it
refunded into it at stated
intervals? i, p. lii ; ii, 3-73.
— its origin, subsistence, and dis-
solution proceed from Brah-
man, i, 15-19, 2S6 seq., 328; ii,
395 seq., 416.
the highest Self is the
one unchanging witness of, i,
312.
— originates from the word, i, 201-
211; how that origination is to
be understood, i, 203.
— trembles in the pra«a, i, 229-231.
— is evolved by names and forms,
i, 233, 242, 357.
— a previous seminal condition of
it, i, 242-245, 255.
— evolution of it under the super-
intendence of a ruler, i, 268.
— doctrines concerning its origin
which are opposed to the Ve-
danta, i, 288 seq.
— is different in nature from Brah-
man, i, 299-305.
— is non-intelligent and impure, i,
300 seq.
— can we assume it to be intelli-
gent ? i, 302 seq.
— being based on the individual
soul, cannot have an inde-
pendent existence, i, 322 seq.
— is in all time only that which is,
i, 332.
— is without a beginning, i, 212,
359-36K
— the pradhana cannot be the cause
of the w., on account of the
orderly arrangement of the w.
being impossible on that hypo-
thesis, i, 363-367.
GENERAL INDEX.
501
World cannot be produced without
activity, and therefore cannot
have a non-intelligent cause, i.
367-369.
— the 'cause of sufl'ering,' i, 376 n.,
378.
— non-difference of it from Brah-
man, ii, 9.
— if the text says ' the \v. is a fire
indeed,' this does not mean
that the \v. really is a fire, ii,
267.
— the term ' w.' denotes places of
enjoyment, ii, 387, 389, 390,
— the re-absorption (pralaya) of
the, the material \v. is merged
into Maya at the time of, i,
pp. xxvi, xciv.
objections against the Vedanta
doctrine based on the con-
sequences that would arise at
the time of, i, 309 seq. ; these
objections refuted, i, 310-314.
— — the power of distinction
founded on wrong knowledge
remains even after, i, 313.
would be impossible, if we
adopted the atomic theory, i,
386-389.
— — there exists, potentially, a
connexion between the Self
and the buddhi even in the
state of, ii, 47 seq.
in the state of, the elements
are merged in Brahman only in
such a way as to continue to
exist in a seminal condition, ii,
371.
— the periodical renovation of the,
i, p. xxvii, 211 seq., 214.
there is no contradiction
to the eternity of the word
of the Veda in it, i, 211-
216.
compared to the sleeping
and waking states, i, 212.
— the phenomenal w. is the same in
all kalpas, i, 215.
Worship (of Brahman). See Medita-
tion.
Yag-navalkya, i, p. cxv.
— colloquy of Artabhaga and, i,
pp. Ixxxi, cxii ; ii, 373 seq.
— colloquy of the Gandharva and,
i, 219.
K
Ya^wavalkya, dialogue of Maitreyi
and, i, 274 seqq.
— and others who knew Brahman
did not take their stand on
works, ii, 292,
Ya^us, the highest Self is, i, 79.
Yama with a staff in his hand, i,
217 n,
— colloquy between Y. and Na^i-
ketas, i, 247-252.
— Sawyamana, the abode of, ii, 122
seq.
— men who have not offered sacri-
fices, fall into the power of, ii,
122 seq.
— the evil-doers suffer punishments
allotted by, ii, 123.
— chief ruler in the seven hells, ii,
123.
— from his realm none ever return,
ii, 151.
Year, the departed soul proceeds
from the y. to Vayu, ii, 384-386.
Yoga (practice) leads to the ac-
quirement of extraordinary
powers, i, 223.
— the means of attaining knowledge,
i, 241, 297.
— highest beatitude is not to be
attained by the road of, i, 298.
— is of the nature of lower know-
ledge, ii, 375.
— books on Y. treat of the con-
nexion of one soul with several
bodies, ii, 414.
Yoga^aras are idealists, i, 401 n.
Yoga-jastra, i, 50.
— in giving rules for the condition
of the wandering religious men-
dicant, agrees with the Veda, i,
298.
— the five functions of the manas
known from it, viz. right knov\-
ledge, error, imagination, slum-
ber, and remembrance, ii, 90.
— teaches different sitting postures,
ii, 350-
Yoga-smr/ti refuted, i, p. xlvii, 296-
299,
— like the Safikhya-smr/ti, assumes
a pradhana, as the independent
cause of the world, and the
' great principle ' &c. as its
effects, i, 296.
— and Sahkhya-smr/ti, why singled
out for refutation, i, 297 seq.
k3
502 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Yoga-smr/ti and Sahkhya-smr/ti are Yogin may animate several bodies at
mere Sm?vti, not of scriptural the same time, i, 200.
character, ii, 381. — in the state of perfect conciliation,
Yoga-system, i, 15 n. apprehends the highest Brah-
— and Sankhya-system maintain man, ii, 171 seq.
duality, do not discern the — the rules as to dying by day and
unity of the Self, i, 298. during the northern progress of
— on it the Lord acts as the ruler the sun in order not to return,
of the pradhana, and of the are given by Smr/ti for the Y.
souls, i, 434 seq. only, ii, 380, 381,
Yogin, does the term 'the internal Yogins, their omniscience, i, 46,
Ruler' refer to ? 1, 131. 49, 50.
CORRIGENDA.
VOLUME XXXIV.
Page Ixi, line 25, read {\o)for (9
,, Ixiv, „ 32, read prakr^taitavattva
„ cxvi, „ 3, readl, 1, ^ for I, 4
„ 34. » 20, r^flf/I, 3, 4>r III, I, 4
,, 172, „ f) iiom he\o\\ , read OT for on
„ 191, „ 22, read nkd is for nad is
„ 246, last line, readKa.. Up. I, 3, 15
„ 282, line 23, read IV, 4, 24 /or IV, 24
„ 402, ,, 13, and line 8 from below, read S2imgna° for sam_§-«a°
„ 440, „ 26, read igyafor igya.
VOLUME XXXVIII.
Page 154, line 12, rija^ Vaijvanara/or °i-vanara
„ 182, ,, 4 from below, r^o^ Badaraya«ayi>r Badarayawa
„ T90, last line, read Up. II, 6, 2
„ 221, line 7, read Avabhretha- y2>r Avabrz'tha-
2 ^6 .. Q )
" ^ ' " ^i reaa' Aparantaratamas/jr Aparantamas
>) i> )) 23 I
„ 287, „ 2 from below, r^o^/^uhu/jr guhu
„ 295, ,, II „ „ read 2, 11 for 10, 11
,, 319, „ 6 ,, ,, read Y^rikkhra. for YLAkkhra
» 33O' !> 13 j> ») r^Oif their y^r its
>j 352, „ 18 ,, „ rfd^Pr. Up. Ill, io/o>- Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10
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t^ooojO'-'weo'^ioeot^oooio
Sacred Books of the East
TRANSLATED BY
VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS
AND EDITED BY
F. MAX MULLER.
*^* This Series is published zvith the sanction and co-opei ation of the Secretary of
State for India in Council.
REPORT presented to the ACADEMIE DES IKSCBIFTIONS, May 11,
1883, by M. ERNEST RENAIT.
' M. Renan presente trois nouveaux ime secoiide, dont Tinteiet historique et
volumes de la grande collection des religieux ne sera pas moindie. M. Max
"Livres sacres de rOrient" (Sacred Miiller a su se procurer la collaboration
Books of the East, que dirige a Oxford, des savans les plus eminens d'Europe et
avec une si vaste erudition et une critique d'Asie. L'Universite d'Oxford, que cette
si sure, le savant associe de I'Academie grande publication honore au plus haut
des Inscriptions, M. Max Miiller. ... La degre, doit tenir a continuer dans les plus
premiere serie de ce beau recueil, com- larges proportions une ceuvre aussi philo-
posee de 24 volumes, est presque achevee. sophiquement concue que savamment
M. Max ^IUller se propose d'en publier executee.'
EXTRACT from the QUARTERI.Y REVIEW.
' We rejoice to notice that a second great edition of the Rig- Veda, can corn-
series of these translations has been an- pare in importance or in usefulness with
nounced and has actually liegun to appear. this English translation of the Sacred
The stones, at least, out of which a stately Books of the East, which has been devised
edifice may hereafter arise, are here being by his foresight, successfully brought so
brought together. Prof. Max Miiller has far by his persuasive and organising
deserved well of scientific history. Not power, and will, we trust, by the assist-
a few minds owe to his enticing words ance of the distinguished scholars he has
their first attraction to this branch of gathered round him, be carried in due
study. But no work of his, not even the time to a happy completion.'
Professor E. HARDY, Inaugural Lecture in the University of Freiburg, 1887.
' Die allgemeine vergleichende Reli- internationalen Orientalistencongress in
gionswissenschaft datirt von jenem gross- London der Grundstein gelegt worden
artigen, in seiner Art einzig dastehenden war, die tJbersetzimg derheiligen Biicher
Unternehmen, zu welchem auf Anregung des Ostens' {the Sacred Books of the
Max Miillers im Jahre 1S74 auf dem East).
The Hon. ALBERT S. G. CANNING, ' Words on Existing Religions.'
' The recent publication of the " Sacred a great event in the annals of theological
Books of the East" in English is surely literature.'
Oxford
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LONDON: HENRY FROWDE
OXFORD UN1VER.SITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER, E.G.
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ARYAN SERIES.
Bttddhist Texts from Japan. I. Vacra/'/'/zedika ; The
Diamond-CiLttcr .
Edited by F. Max Muller, 1\I.A. Small 4to, 3^. 6</.
One of the most famous metaphysical treatises of the Mahayana Buddhists.
Buddhist Texts from Japan. II. Sukhavati-Vyuha :
Description of Sukhdvati, the Land of Bliss.
Edited by F. IMax INIuller, M.A., and Bunyiu Nanjio. With
two Appendices : (i) Text and Translation of Safighavarman's
Chinese Version of the Poetical Portions of the Sukhavati-
Vyiiha ; (2) Sanskrit Text of the Smaller Sukhavati-Vyuha,
Small 4to, 7^. 6^/.
The editio p7-mceps of the Sacred Book of one of the largest and most
influential sects ol Buddhism, numbering more than ten millions of followers
in Japan alone.
Buddhist Texts from Japan. III. The A jiciejtt Palm-
Leaves containing the Pra^77a-Paramita-Hr/daya-
Sutra and the Ush;^isha-Vi^f^aya-Dhara7^i.
Edited by F. Max MUller, M.A., and Bunyiu Nanjio, M.A.
With an Appendix by G. Buhler, CLE. With many Plates.
Small 4to, \os.
Contains facsimiles of the oldest Sanskrit MS. at present known.
Dharma-Sa;;2graha, an Ancient Collection of Buddhist
Technical Terms.
Prepared for publication by Kenjiu Kasawara, a Buddhist
Priest from Japan, and, after his death, edited by F. Max
Muller and H. Wenzel. Small 4to, 7^. dd.
Katya)ana's Sarvanukrama/n of the 7?/gveda.
With Extracts from Shart'guru^ishya's Commentary entitled
Vedanhadipika. Edited by A. A. Macdonell, M.A., Ph.D. \(ys.
Oxford)
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