BOSTOISI
PUBLIC
UBl^RY
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
SUPPORT PROGRAM
FEBRUARY 17, 18, It), AND 20, AND MARCH 3, 14, 17, AND I'J, 1U70
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Rehition^
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1^70
HEARINGS
, BEFORE fTHB
COMMITTEE ON FOEEIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIEST CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
SUPPORT PROGRAM
FEBRUARY 17, 18, 19, AND 20, AND MARCH 3, 4, 17, AND 19, 1970
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
44-706 WASHINGTON : 1970
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULB RIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
A.LBERT GORE, Tennessee CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE VV. McGEE, Wyoming
Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff
Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk
Note.— Sections of this hearing have been deleted at the request of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense. Deleted material is indicated by the notation "[Deleted]."
(II)
Kf^^
flo
1 1 1 <i k
Gi
CONTENTS
Statements by:
Arthur, Maj. Jamos F., U.S. Army district senior adviser, Binh Page
Chanh District, Gia Diuh Province 159, 190
Clement, Brig. Gen., Wallace L., Director of the MACV Training-
Directorate 446, 510
Colby, Hon. William E., Deputy to General Abrams, Commander of
U.S. Military Assistance Conunand, \'ietnam, for Civil Operations
and Rural Development Support; accom]janied by William K.
Hitchcock, Director, Refugee Directorate; John Vann, Deputy for
CORDS, IV Corps; Hawthorne Mills, Province senior advi.ser,
Tuven Due; Clayton E. McManawaj'^, Director, Plans, Policy and
Programs SJ 87, 188, 269
Geek, Capt. Richard T., U.S. Army, adviser, Mobile Advisory Team,
Kien Giang Province 284
Hitchcock, Wilham K., Director. Refugee Directorate, CORDS 214
Knaur, Peter R., Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International
Security Affairs _. 510
McCarthy, Hon. Eug{>ne J., U.S. Senator from Minnesota 163
McCloskey, Hon. Paul N., Jr., Representative in Congress from the
11th Congressional District of the State of California 636
McDonald, Donald G., Director, U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment, Metnam; accompanied by Willard D. Sharpe, Deputy
Director, Office of Economic Policy, N'ietnam Bvu'eau, AID, Wash-
ington; A. E. Farwell, Associate Director for Local Development
U.S. Aid, \'ietnam; A. H. Ellis, Associate Director for Programs,
U.S. AID, \'ietnam; and Richard H. Herr, assistant program
Officer, U.S. AID, Vietnam 570
Mills, Hawthorne, Province senior adviser Tuyen Due Province 135
Murphy, Cajit. Armand, adviser to Regional and Popidar Forces m
Long An Province ^ 258
Nickel, Edvvard J., Director Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Saigon,
and Otis E. Hayes, Office of USIA Assistant Director for East Asia
and Pacific 654
Vann, John Paul, Deputy for CORDS, IV Corps (Delta region) 89
Wallace Sgt. Richard D., U.S. Marine Corps, Squad Leader, com-
bined action platoon, Quang Nam Province 286
Wheeler, Col Jesse L., Jr., U.S. Army, senior adviser, 1st Infantry
Division, Army of the Republic of A'ietnam 462, 510
Insertions for the record:
Percentage of Vietnamese Pacification Budget Derived from U.S.
Assistance, Department of State 17
Retired Military and Civilian Advisers, Department of State 20'
"U.S. Aides in Vietnam Scorn Phoenix Project," article bv Robert G.
Kaiser, Jr., the Washington Post, February 1 7, 1 970 L 25
Selective assassinations, 1967 and 1968, Department of State 30
South Vietnamese capabilities without U.S. support. Department of
State 34
South Vietnamese civilian war casualties, Department of State 40
South Vietnamese civilian war casualties admitted to hospitals during
the period of January 1967 to December 1969, Department of State.- 54
Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Maj. Gen. William A. Becker,
Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, dated Jan-
uary 9, 1970, enclosing fact sheet on Phoenix program in Vietnam 56
Instructions to U.S. personnel concerning Phoenix activities, Depart-
ment of State 61
"The Hidden War: FAite Phoenix Forces Hunt Vietcong Chiefs in an
Isolated Village," article bv Peter R. Kann, the Wall Street Journal,
March 2.5, 1969 " 67
(in)
IV
Insertions for the record — Continued
"The Invisible Foe: New Intelligence Push Attempts to Wipe Out
Vietcong Underground," article by Peter R. Kann, the Wall Street Page
Journal, September 5, 1968 72
NCO promotions in South Vietnamese Regular and Regional Forces',
1 969, Department of State 77
'"Pacification Head in Viet Sees Hope," article bv Samuel Jameson,
the Chicago Tribune, November 10, 1969 100
Telegram to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Congressman Tran Ngoc
Chau 104
Letter to Congressman Tran Ngoc Chau from Senator J. W. Fulbright,
dated February 17, 1970, enclosing statement bv Senator Fulbright
entitled "The Story of Tran Ngoc Chau" _' 10.3
"Accused Saigon Deputy Blames U.S.," article by Robert G. Kaiser,
the Washington Post, February 18, 1970 1 106
Solatium payments. Department of State 126
■"The Controversial Operation Phoenix: How It Roots Out Vietcong
Suspects," article by James P. Sterba, the New York Times,
February 18, 1970 127
"'Gloomy, if Familiar, Picture — Infighting Could r3estrov South
Vietnamese Democracy," article by Arthur J. Dommen,'the Los
Angeles Times, January 4, 1970 129
"Letter from Saigon, January 20," article from the New Yorker,
January 31, 1970 143
Excerpt from Vietnamese training pamphlet describing rural Vietnam. 164
^'Thieu Contradicts Nixon's Statement on Viet Elections," article
from the Washington Evening Star, September 27, 1969 173
Vietcong infrastructure (VCI), Department of State 204
Refugee benefits, table, Department of State 224
- War victim benefits, table, Department of State 225
Numbers of refugees by categories — 1969, table, Department of State. 22.5
Refugee population, 1969, graph, Department of State 226
Number of refugees returned to village or paid resettlement allowances,
1969, table and graph. Department of State 227
Support for refugee and social welfare program, 1968-70, table.
Department of State 228
CORDS, ^Ministry of Social Welfare, A'oluntary Agencies — personnel
assigned to refugee program as of January 1970, table. Department
of State 228
Refugee sites in I Corps, Department of State 234
"The CIA's Hired Killers," article by Georgie Anne Geyer, True
magazine, February, 1970 347
An open letter of Dejjuty Tran Ngoc Chau 3,57
Self-confession bv Tran Ngoc Hien in relation to Tran Ngoc Chau_- 360
"Mews of Tran Ngoc Chau on GVN/NLF Talks," submitted bv
Daniel EUsberg "_ 36.5
"Colonel Chan's Remarks," submitted by Daniel EUsberg 371
"Revelations in Saigon on the Occasion of a Trial," article bv Jean-
Claude Pomonti, Le Monde, July 7, 1969 .' 381
"Thieu Stakes Prestige on Vote to Condemn 3 House Members,"
article by Arthur J. Dommen, the Los Angeles Times, December 28,
1969 383
"\ let Fugitive Criticizes CIA, Cites Offer on Political Partv," article
by Keyes Beech, the Washington Evening Star, Februarv 2, 1970. . 386
"Thieu Authorized To Try 2 Deputies for Links to Reds,'"' article bv
Robert G. Kaiser, the Washington Post, Februarv .5, 1970 "_ 386
"Thieu Opponent in Saigon Feels Betraved bv U.S.," article bv
Terrence Smith, the New York Time.s, Februarv 7, 1970 ". 387
"Saigon Court Bids Two Deputies Appear," article from the New
York Times, February 11, 1970 388
"Report on Findings of" U.S. Study Team Trip to Vietnam, Mav 2.5-
June 10, 1969, "U.S. Study Team on Religious and Political Free-
dom in A'ietnam 389
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Vietnam hearings, answers to
questions for the hearing record on the CORDS program:
Questions for Ambassador Colby 415
Questions for Mr. Vann . 424
Questions for Mr. Mills 426
Questions for Major Arthur 429
Insertions for the record — Continued
Memorandum to Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Foreign
Affairs Division, Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service,
June 6, 1967, concerning selected statements by members of the Page
executive branch on victory in Vietnam and removal of U.S. troops, 430
Statements by executive officials in 1967 and 1968 on progress in
Vietnam (excerpts), prepared by the Library of Congress 434
"A Selection from Metnam, Familiar Quotations," article by Philip
Geyelin, the Washington Post, July 23, 1969 441
"Let Them Fight It Out — Growing GI Disillusion Casts Doubt on
Morale Claims," article by Donald Kirk, the Washington Evening
Star, November 9, 1969-_' 475
"South Vietnam: Everybody USA," article by Arnold Abrams, the
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 12, 1970 477
"Many GI's Disillusioned on War," article bv B. Drummond Ayres,
Jr., the New York Times, August 4, 1969 478
"Manv GI's Dislike Viet Allies," article by Robert G. Kaiser, the
Washington Post, October 18, 1969 480
General officers for South Metnam, Department of Defense 487
"Empty American Chair — Do United States and Saigon Cooperate
Enough?," article bv George W. Ashworth, the Christian Science
Monitor, December 24, 1969 489
"Being No. 1 Division Can Be An Experience," article bv George
W. Ashworth, the Christian Science Monitor, December 30, 1969_. 490
"Some Glaring Weaknesses in Saigon Military," article by George W.
Ashworth, the Christian Science Monitor, January 5, 1970 492
"Thieu's Move Next — South Vietnamese President Faces Quandry in
Choosing Between Militarj' Politics and Upper-Echelon Profi-
ciency," article bv George W. Ashworth, the Christian Science
Monitor, January's, 1970 495
"How To Cushion GI Withdrawal," article by George W. Ashworth,
I the Christian Science Monitor, January 14, 1970 497
"Vietnamization and Withdrawal — 'What is Needed Are Precise
Timetables'," article by George W. Ashworth, the Christian
Science Monitor, January 24, 1970 498
"Major Tests Ahead for Saigon Forces," article by George W. A.sh-
worth, the Christian Science Monitor, Januarv 12, 1970 501
"Intelligence Gropes for Clues— What Are Reds Up To? U.S. Aides
Ask," article from the Washington Evening Star, February 25, 1970_ 503
Breakout of South Vietnamese military being trained in United States,
Department of Defense 506-
Cost to United States for fiscal vear 1970 off-shore training of
ARVN-AF, Department of Defense 507
Classification of cost of training Republic of Vietnam jet pilot, Depart-
ment of Defense 511
Training cost of U.S. jet jiilot, Department of Defense 51^
"Rate in U.S. Quadrupled — Vietnamization Training Up," article by
Richard Homan, the Washington Post, February 23, 1970 515'
Estimated Department of Defense outlays in support of Southeast
Asia operations, 1965-1970, table, Deijartment of Defen.se 519
Estimates for fiscal year 1971 of U.S. Southeast Asia costs. Depart-
ment of Defense 520
Reason for security classification of U.S. Troop dispositions, Depart-
ment of Defense 523
Costs to train a boat maintenance man. Department of Defense 524
"\'ietnamization. Department of Defense 530
Desertion rate of RVNAF, Department of Defense 532
Percentage of sorties flown by South Vietnamese aircraft. Department
of Defense 532;
Bombs dropped and artillery fired by Republic of Vietnam Air Force,
Department of Defense 533
Total U.S. and GVN artillery fire and air sorties, first quarter 1970,
Department of Defense 533
Medical evacuation provided by RVNAF, Department of Defen.se 534
Training of South Vietnamese in field of electronics equipment. De-
partment of Defense 535
Ground operations conducted by RVNAF, table, Department of
Defense 536-
o
VI
Insertions for the record — Contiuuod ^^^"^
Command and operational control, Department of Defense 537
Monthly pay ranges for All\'N Regidar Forces personnel, table,
Department of Defense 539
Effect on U.S. supporting assistance of AR\'N pay increase, Depart-
ment of Defense 539
Division advisory team — A typical division advisory team organ-
ization, table. Department of Defense 542
Militar}^ construction in South ^'ietnam, Department of Defense 551
Supply flow from North A'ietnam to South Metnam, Department of
Defense 553
U.S. and AR\'N troop strengths in I Corps, table, Department of
Defense -^^64
Attitude of the CI toward the war, Department of Defense 566
Reenlistment options, draftees. Department of Defense 566
Incidents between white and black soldiers, Department of Defense .567
Loss of lives from racial incidents. Department of Defense 567
Black market rate for U.S. dollars, Agency for International Develop-
ment 572
AID educational assistance to South Vietnam, Agency for Inter-
national Develojjment -"^84
USAID/CORDS breakdown, personnel and fimding, Agency for
International Develojjment 587
AID fiscal year 1970 direct hire personal costs for USAID/Vietnam and
CORDS, Agency for International Development 588
Percentage of AID personnel abroad in Vietnam, Agency for Inter-
national Development 589
1969 Payment of income taxes in South Vietnam, Agency for Inter-
national Development 59
AID Program in Vietnam: Percentage of total, Agency for Inter-
national Development 594
Publication of brochure, "Vietnam, The View Beyond the Battle,"
Agency for International Development 594
Government of Vietnam budget, table 596
Payment of AID nurses in South Vietnam, Agency for International
Development 604
"Economy Fragile — U.S. Exit May Add Saigon Woes," article by
George W. Ashworth, the Christian Science Monitor, September
26, 1969 *Jl<»
GVN-tinanced import licensing by source country, calendar years
1965 through 1969, table, Agency for International Development.- 612
"U.S. Diplomat Testifies in Capital that Currency Black Marketeers
Are Undermining War Effort," article from the New York Times,
November 19, 1969 615
"Black Marketing in War Is Traced," article bv Peter Grose, the
New York Times, November 21, 1969 616
"World Council of Churches Report — U.S. Aid to Saigon Widens
Gap Between Rich and Poor?," article by Daniel Southerland,
the Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 1970 __- 619
AID Replies to Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff questions
of April 1, 1970 624
"Marine Veteran Tours Vietnam — (JOP Congressman Says War 'Im-
moral'," article b^' Lou Cannon, February 1970 652
Pav and allowances of militarv in JUSPAO, USIA 660
Newspapers suspended bv GVN From 1968 through March 23, 1970,
USIA - 665
Propaganda efforts against North Vietnamese, USIA 672
Number of South Vietnamese who have seen, "The Silent Majority,"
USIA - 675
USIA's regional service center in Manila, USIA 678
Printing and distribution of "Who Are The Vict Cong," USIA 680
Printing and distribution of "Vietnam: The View Bevond the Battle,"
USIA 681
Exjilanation of lack of attribution of publications, USIA 681
GVN publications in English, USIA 683
USIA third country journalist program, fiscal year 1969, USIA 689
Third country journalist program, USIA 690
Polling by Oliver Quayle, USIA 691
USIA replies to Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff questions.. 694
VII
Appendix I:
Statement for the record on the administrative aspects of pacification Page
and development, by Ambassador VV. E. Colby 701
Statement for the record on the development aspects of pacification
and development, by Ambassador W. E. Colby 70S
Statement for the record on the security aspects of pacification and
development, bj'^ Ambassador W. E. Colby 716
Statement for the record on the Phung Hoang program (Phoenix),
by Ambassador W. E. Colby 723
Appendix II:
Statement of former U.S. Senator Joseph S. Clark 727
Letter to the Committee on Foreign Relations from Dr. Jerome
Davis, dated October 16, 1969 730
Statement of Axel B. Gravem 730
Letter to Senator J. W. Fiilbright from Mr. Albert Lannon, Washing-
ton representive, International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union, dated Octoljer 10, 1969, enclosing a resolution on: "End the
Vietnam War" and an editorial by Sidney Roger, editor, the
Dispatcher, September 9, 1969 731
Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Joseph H. Crown, secretary,
Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam, dated
February 3, 1970, enclosing "Five-Point Program To End the War
in Metnam" 733
Statement by Mr. Klaus Loewald, assistant professor, Depai'tment of
Political Studies, Adelphi University 738
Statement by D. Gareth Porter, Ph. D. candidate. Southeast Asia
program, Cornell L'niversity 738
]\Iemorandum on the justification of our ^'ietnam policy, bv Charles
A. Weil ■---■ 746
Difference in figures on refugees moving south. Department of State.. 748
Examination of witnesses 749
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10 a.m. in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pel], JSIcGee, Aiken,
Case, Cooper, and Javits.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
opening statement
Two weeks ago the committee heard testimony on a number of
legislative proposals concerning the war in Vietnam and related
questions of American foreign policy. Today we initiate a new phase of
these hearings in which primary attention will be given to American
operations in Vietnam connected with pacification, the militaiy advisory
effort, the aid program, and the activities of USIA. Later we expect
to hear testimony on the political and economic effects of the war
within the United States.
All three phases of these hearings are oriented to a single set of
objectives. Their immediate purpose is to provide information which
will assist the committee in acting on the legislative proposals that
have been placed before it. The more general purpose of these hearings
is to help inform American public opinion and to assist the President
in his efforts to bring the war to an early, satisfactory conclusion.
For the next 4 days — 3 in open session and the last in executive
session — the committee will hear testimony on the ci\'il operations
and rural development support program in Vietnam. This program —
usually referred to by its initials as "CORDS" — encompasses most of
the nonmilitary activities of the United States in Vietnam. Although
it is under overall military command, CORDS is executed at all levels
by civilian as well as military personnel. The programs under its
general jurisdiction deal with pacification, refugees, enemy defectors,
the South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces and the Phoenix
program for the "neutralization" of key Vietcong personnel.
In addition to Ambassador William Colby, the director of CORDS,
the committee will hear testimony by representative CORDS per-
sonnel who work at the Corps, province and district levels, helping
(1)
tlio South Vietnamese to j^erform more effectively in the political
sphere. Because of the pertinence of these field activities to the Ad-
ministration's overall policy of Vietnamization, the committee has
dei^arted from normal practice by inviting the testimony of operative
personnel as well as that of the official in overall cluirge of the program
under study. We greatly appreciate the coojieration of these able and
dedicated officials who have taken time from their difficult jobs in
the field in Vietnam to assist the committee in meeting its responsi-
bility to advise and assist the President in his efforts to end this war.
By participathig in these hearings, and by giving the committee
the benefit of their detailed knowledge and candid judgments of
American political activities in Vietnam, the witnesses will perform
a valuable service to the Senate and to the American people. At the
same time, the committee is aware of the special sense of responsi-
bility whicli operative officials quite naturally feel toward their own
])rograms and agencies.
SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES
In order to protect the witnesses from the understiindable ambiv-
alence they may feel with respect to their responsibilities to tlie
agencies they work for, on the one hand, and to this committee and
the Senate on the other, we are asking them to be sworn in before
giving their testimoiw. 1 his practice has been found useful in other
committee inquiries including the examination of security agreements
and commitments abroad currently beiiig conducted by the subcom-
mittee of which Senator Symington is chairman.
The witnesses at the table this morning I believe are Ambassador
William E. Colby; Mr. William K. Hitchcock, the Director of Refugee
Directorate; Mr. John Vann, Deputy for CORDS, IV Corps; Air.
Hawthorne Mills, Province Senior Advisor, Tuyen Due; Mr. Clayton
McManaway, Director, Plans, Policy and Programs; and also appear-
ing this week the military people will be Major James F. Arthur, the
District Senior Advisor of Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province;
Captain Armand Murphy, the Advisor of the Long An Province;
Captain Richard T. Geek, Mobile Advisory Team Advisor for Kien
Giang Province; and Sergeant Richard D. Wallace, Combined Action
Platoon Team Leader, Quang Nam Province.
We, therefore, ask you, Ambassador Colby, and all of your col-
leagues whom I mentioned will appear to testify, to rise if you will.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about
to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the ^^hole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Colby. 1 do.
Mr. Hitchcock. I do.
Mr. Vann. I do.
Mr. Mills. I do.
Mr. McManaway. I do.
Major Arthur. I do.
Captain Murphy. I do.
Cai)tain Geck. I do.
Sergeant Wallace. I do.
The Chairman. Recognizing that, despite differing functions and
responsibilities, we are all committed to the same objective — ^^■hich is
o
O
to l)rino- tlie ^vil^ to an early aiul satisfactorj" conclusion — we now
invite the witnesses to proceed.
We will start with Ambassador Colby.
Do you have a prejjared statement, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Colby. I do, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Will you proceed.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY. DEPUTY TO GENERAL ABEAMS,
COMMANDER OP U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIET-
NAM, FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUP-
PORT (CORDS); ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK,
DIRECTOR, REFUGEE DIRECTORATE; JOHN VANN, DEPUTY FOR
CORDS. IV CORPS; HAWTHORNE MILLS, PROVINCE SENIOR AD-
VISER, TUYEN DUC; CLAYTON E. McMANAWAY, DIRECTOR,
PLANS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman the leaders of North Vietnam call the
conflict in Vietnam a Peoi)le's W^ar. They saw it as a new technicpie
of war, one which would enable them to win des])ite greater military
power on the side of the government and its allies. They believed
they could seize control of the j)opulation and pull it from mider the
government structure, causing its collai)se. For a time it looked as
though they might be correct. Their ])()wer steadily built u]) during
the organizational phase of their effort duiing the late 1950's through
the guerrilla period of the early 196n's to the stage in late 1964 when
they sent North Vietnamese imits to prepare a final assault on the
centers of government authority. The scenario was interrupted, how-
ever, when American couibat forces entered in mid-1965 to keep final
victory from their gras]).
EFFORTS TO FIGHT "pEOPLE's WAR"
Since 1965, the Vietnamese and American Governments have been
increasing their understanding of and foi'giug the tools necessary to
fight on the several levels of a peo|)le's war. The organizational tools
were develoj)ed, the personnel were indoctrinated and the strategy
outlined by which such a war must be conducted. Tliis was a gradual
process to which many Vietnamese, Ameiicans and other nationals
contributed. The ])rocess is by no means complete.
Even more imi)ortant, much of the execution of the program on
the ground still lies ahead and setbacks will occur. However, the funda-
mentals have been identified and the program is well launched. As a
residt, the war called a Peoi)le's War b}" the Comnnuiists is being
increasingly waged by the Vietnamese ])eople, defending themselves
against Communist attack, terror and subversion and at the same
tin.ie building a better future of their own choosing.
president's POLICY FOR REDUCING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM WAR
Wliat I will describe is only a part of our effort to bring the war in
Vietnam to an end. President Nixon has deafly set the policy which
the program I will describe supports. The President has stated three
ways by A\hich our ])articipation in the war can be reduced: nego-
tiations, a reduction of violence hj Hanoi, and a strengthening of the
Vietnamese Government and the people, which we call Vietnamiza-
tion. The program which I will describe falls under the last. Its ob-
jective is an increase in South Vietnam's capacity to defend itself,
thereby permitting a reduction of American participation in the war.
The lessons we have learned in Vietnam can increase Vietnam's
ability to defend itself.
PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
The program is called pacification and development by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam. It operates behind the shield furnished by another
aspect of our efforts in Vietnam, the military operations of the Viet-
namese and allied armies. However bold, however well conceived,
however logical this program, it has been amply proven that it cannot
be effective unless hostile regiments and divisions are kept away.
At the same time, however, we have found that their absence does
not thereby produce pea e nor offer political fulfillment to the people.
While armies can repel armies, and can assist in the consolidation of
security, the very power, organization and procedures which are
essential in large-scale combat make it difficult for them to fight on all
the levels of the people's war. Thus, additional tactics and techniques
had to be developed to fight on these other levels. Pacification and
development is this necessary counterpart to the military efforts of
our forces in this new kind of war.
TERRITORIAL SECURITY
Security is a part of pacification, too, at these other levels. One level
is territorial security, the ability of the farmer to sleej) in his home at
night without fear of guerrillas foraging, conscripting or taxing. This
security is provided bjMocal forces and militia, permanently protecting
the community while the regular troops oi^erate against larger regular
enemy units.
To provide this protection, the Vietnamese regional forces operate
within the provinces, normally in company strength. The popular
forces operate within the village area, normally in ])latoon strength.
Both of these forces are made up of full-time soldiers, uniformed,
armed with modern weapons, and trained to conduct patrols and
ambushes in the outskirts of the villages. Both have been substantially
increased since 1968, so they now total approximately 475,000 men.
Their eft'ectiveness has also been improved under a program which
was instituted between our MiUtary Assistance Command and the
Vietnamese Joint General Staff in October 1967.
As a result, these forces now have M-16 rifles, special advisory teams
of Americans to train and assist them, and effective systems of com-
munications and fire support. They made a major contribution to the
key 1969 strategy of expansion of the government's protection to
hamlets and villages which had been deserted or abandoned to enemy
control for several years, establishing islands of local security around
wliich the ]:)opulation could cluster.
Territorial security, however, is not left only to fulltime soldiers.
In mid-1968, the Vietnamese Government launched a program to
enlist all citizens in the Nation's defense. The General Mobilization
5
Law was passed by the National Assembly, requiring that all men
from 16 to 50 help defend their country. Under this law, any man not
in the expanded armed forces is required to be a member of the People's
Self Defense Force, an unpaid militia, to defend his home community.
To these are added volunteers from the elderly, young people from
12 to 15, and women.
The government has distributed arms and trained these people.
Initially, there were some faint hearts among Vietnamese officialdom
over this distribution of weapons, as they looked back on the former
war lords, the political factions, the possibility of arming the Viet
Cong and the chance the people might choose to act against the govern-
ment itself.
The President and the Prime Minister, ho\\'ever, took the position
that it was only by showing this kind of trust in the people that a
people's war could be properly fought. Today, some 400,000 ^^ eapons
have been made available to the People's Self Defense Force, over a
million Vietnamese have been trained to use them or otherwise assist,
and some 3 million are claimed to have been enrolled. It is no
fearsome military force, to be sure, and the number enrolled is a very
soft statistic, but the Connnunists have identified it clearh^ as a major
threat, a start toward a true ])eoi)le's army and a locally based political
force for the future. As a result, they have attacked it and tried to
destroy it, but it has stood its ground in many, not all, fights, and
fully validated the government's confidence.
USE OF PHOENIX PROGRAM TO COMBAT VC INFRASTRUCTURE
There is another level of security at which this new kind of war nuist
be fought. In Vietnam, there is a secret Communist network within
the society which tries to impose its authority on the people through
terrorism and threat. This network, or as it is called in Vietnam, the
VC infrastructure, provides the jiolitical direction and control of tlie
enemy's war within the villages and hamlets.
It lays down the caches for the troops coming from the border
sanctuaries; it provides the guides and intelligence for the North
Vietnamese strangers; it conscripts, taxes, and terrorizes. Protection
against the North Vietnamese battalion or even the Vietcong guerrilla
group does not give real freedom if the elected village chief is assas-
sinated, the grenade explodes in the market place, or the traitor shoots
the self-defender in the back.
During 1969, for example, over 6,000 people were killed in such
terrorist incidents, over 1,200 in selective assassinations, and 15,000
wounded. Among the dead were some 90 village chiefs and officials,
240 hamlet chiefs and officials, 229 refugees, and 4,350 of the general
populace.
One of the major lessons about the people's war has been the key
role the infrastructure plays in it. This Communist apparatus has
been operating in Vietnam for many years and is well practiced in
covert techniques. To fight the war on this level, the government
developed a special program called Phung Hoang or Phoenix. The
government has i)ublicized the need for this effort to protect the
people against terrorism and has called upon all the citizens to assist
by providing information and they are doing so.
6
Since this is a sophistic atetl aiul ex})erieiiced enemy, experts are
also needed to combat it. Thus, the Phoenix program started in mid-
1968 to bring together the })oUce, and mihtary, and the other gov-
ernment organizations to contribute knowledge and act against this
enemy infrastructure. It secures information about the enemy orga-
nization, identifies the individuals who make it up, and conducts
operations against them.
These operations might consist of two policemen walking down the
street to arrest an individual revealed as a member of the enemy
apparatus or they might involve a three-battalion attack on a jungle
hideout of a district or province committee.
As a result of this program, members of this a])paratus are cajjtured,
turn themselves in as rallicrs or arc killed in fire fights. More needs
to be done for this program to be fully eft'ective, but the government
has a high priority on it. Our own government i)rovides advisory
assistance and sui)port to this internal security ])rogram through the
police, the administration, the information services and the intelligence
services. This is similar to our su})i)ort of the military effort against
the North Vietnamese battalions and Viet Cong guerrilla groups
through the Vietnamese military forces.
PURPOSE OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
But another of the major lessons learned over the years about
the i)eoi)le's war is that security is not enough alone. Security in a
])eople's war cannot be provided to the people, they must particii)ate
in the effort. For Vietnamese to do so, after the years of troubles they
have seen, they must be convinced that one side offers and will de-
liver a better life for themselves and their families, that it has a chance
of succeeding in the contest and that they will have a voice in the
common effort.
To convince them, and thus to engage the ])eople in the endeavor,
the government must develo]) a ])rogram to satisfy these three re-
quirements. Pacification and development is this policy, giving full
weight to the people's security, their betterment and their A'oice in
decisionmaking. The combination of all three enlists the i)eople on
their government's side, the critical step in a people's war.
NEW APPROACH TO VILLAGE COMMUNITIES
Thus as an integral element of its i)acification and develoi)inent
plan in 1969, the Government of Vietnam took a new a})proach to
the village community in Vietnam. Rather than considering it the
lowest of a series of bureaucratic levels through which authority
descends from the Palace to the i)eoi)le, it became the first assemblage
of the population to conduct its own affairs.
Over the past year, elections have been held in 961 ^'illages and
5,344 hamlets, elections which were held in the light of the day and
with general popular ])artici])ation. As a result, 95 percent of the
2,151 villages and 94 percent of the 10,522 hamlets today have elected
local governments. These (dections ha\e been a clear contrast to the
alleged elections held in Vietcong base areas or by individual armed
VC poll takers sneaking into isolated farmhouses at night to require
u siugie vote of ai)proval of the People's Revolutionary Parly
caiidulatc.
These officials need training to become effective. Thus, 1,862 village
chiefs and 8,532 hamlet chiefs from every part of the nation, i)lus a
variety of other government workers at the village and hamlet level,
to a total of over 30,000, have attended a s])ecial 5-week course at a
national training center. There they were told by President Thieu
that they had full autliority over affairs in their communities and
that they were to consider themselves as the leaders of their })eople.
Further to niiike this clear, the black ])ajama clad Rural Develop-
ment Cadre, a natioual corps of 42,000 hamlet level political orga-
nizers, were divided into smaller teams aiul made subject to the
elected village cliief's directions.
In addition, in a reversal of previous practices, wherein the bureauc-
racy decitled what was good for the villagers, development funds
were ])assed directly to the village level for decision by the locally
elected village council as to what kinds of development projects
the local peojjle desired. They chose a vast variety from schools to
pig raising to irrigation to hand tractors; but even more im[)ortantly
they reacted with enthusiasm to this indication that they, not far-
away officials, were determining their future. This same process of
stimulating local responsibility and participation is being applied
to urban neighborhoods in the form of improved walkways through
the slums, rebuilt homes, and firefighting teams.
INVITATION TO ENEMY TO REJOIN NATIONAL CAUSE
The development of the Vietnamese community also includes
inviting members of the enemy camp to rejoin the national cause,
where they are decently received and resettled. Some 47,000 people
during the past year took this road to a new life with the GVN,
almost one-third of the total of 140,000 since 1963. Many of these
former enemies are now serving the Government forces as guides, as
members of the local tlefense forces, and as members of teams inviting
more of their ex-colleagues to join them.
ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND OTHER WAR VICTIMS
In addition, the i)rogram to provide assistance to refugees and other
war victims has been an element of the pacification effort. It, too, is
aimed at the people, to assist them to reestablish their disrupted lives
and to return to the villages where security now permits them to re-
enter. Some 488,000 people during the past year have received financial
and commodity assistance as they returned to their villages. Another
586,000 have been ])aid benefits at their new locations. Mr. William K.
Hitchcock, of our Refugee Directorate, is here to testify in detail on
this imi)ortant part of the effort to bind the nation together.
INFORMATION PROGRAM
To strengthen the national community, an information program
is an element of pacification and development to inform the people
of their rights and privileges and the Government's role in this program.
Mr. Edward J. Nickel, our senior USIA officer in Vietnam and Director
of our joint military-civilian U.S. Public Affairs Office, will give you the
details of this program.
DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS
The development of a better economy for the farmers in the country-
side has also been an element of this total effort, opening lines of
communication to markets, providing a new and more productive
strain of rice and resuming the distribution of land to tenants which
had been stalled during the war years. A variety of other develop-
mental improvements such as new schools, new health stations, et
cetera, also support the overall program. Mr. Donald G. MacDonald,
Director of our USAID Mission in Vietnam, will testify separateh^
on the details of those activities, but I would like to point out that
they are being integrated fully into the one national pacification and
development program.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ROLE IN PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT
If this is the program then how does it work? What is the American
role? How much does it cost? How many people are involved in it?
The first reply is that it is fundamentally a Vietnamese program.
The territorial security forces are Vietnamese. The police are Viet-
namese. The local hamlet and village officials are Vietnamese. Those
who receive and resettle former members of the enemj' camp are
Vietnamese. Those who register and pay benefits to the refugees are
Vietnamese. Those who sow the new rice, those who exi)lain the
government policies are all Vietnamese. In a people's war in Vietnam
the people engaged in it will be Vietnamese.
Thus the Vietnamese play the major role in the program. The
government has been organized to prosecute this program as a highest
priority effort. The President, the Prime Minister and the government
have established a Central Pacification and Development Council at
the national level, with its own staff to draw together the diverse
strands of this program into one effort.
It developed a national pacification and development plan for
1969 and has just completed one for 1970. This structure at the
national level has counter])arts at the regional and the province
levels, where there are similar councils of all the difl'erent officials
engaged in this multifaceted program. Each })rovince had a provincial
plan for 1969 and now has one for 1970, in which it draws together
the threads of the different programs to make one overall effort in
the province.
Using this planning process, and some of the statistical reporting
systems developed to support the program, goals are set, reports are
reqiured, and inspections cionducted. The province chiefs and their
deputies have had a week-long seminar at a national center at which
each of the Ministers in turn described his Ministiy's contribution
to the national plan and answered probing questions from the province
chiefs. Detailed connnents were sent b}^ the national staff to each
province on the province plan, calling for correction or modification
of any aspects which did not follow the overall guidelines. As a result,
the province chiefs and the corps commanders are fully aware of
their program for pacification and development in their area in specific
9
terms, which hamlets are being reentered, how the struggle to identify
the Vietcong infrastructure is going in the various parts of the province,
when the next elections are scheduled in the hamlets and villages,
and where the irrigation ditch is being dug and how well it is pro-
gressing.
The President and Prime Minister ha\'e removed 25 province chiefs
and 162 district chiefs in 1968 and 23 province chiefs and 110 district
chiefs in 1969 and 1970 to date — excluding shifts — many for failing
to measure up.
Even down to the village level, the plan has been pushed. In De-
cember, village chiefs in most provinces joined in meetings at the
province capitals at which a jNIinister and a staff from the various
other Ministries of the National Government explained the total
program to them. The President and many of the Ministers frequently
visit the Corps and the provinces and have many times gone to indi-
vidual villages for detailed question and answer discussions with the
village chief and village council of the situation in their village and
the impact of the pacification and develoi^ment plan there.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT
But I do not pretend that this is a totally Vietnamese effort. It
obviously benefits from the shield produced by American forces as
well as the Vietnamese Army di\dsions. The M-16 rifles carried by
the Territorial Forces were made in America. Many of the funds used
for the support of the refugees or for the village development pro-
grams come from counterpart generated by American imports. Ameri-
can advisers at all levels from national to district and even in some
cases to the village or platoon discuss the program with their counter-
parts, come up with recommendations and ideas, go to the meetings
where the program is discussed in Vietnamese with simultaneous
English translation and help evaluate how well it is really going in
the field.
CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (cORDS)
The American contribution to this program is provided by an orga-
nization which in Vietnam is known as CORDS an integral part of the
U.S. Military Assistance Command MACV. The word CORDS is an
acronym which in itself symbolizes the learning process we have been
through in Vietnam. In the early 1960's, each American agency in
Vietnam had its separate structure and responsibilities, all of course
under the overall control of the Ambassador.
With the military buildup hi 1965 and 1966 the U.S. civil agencies
also expanded their activities and i)articularly moved into the prov-
inces each with its own chain of command. As a result, many of the
American programs, however good in themselves, were uncoordinated
and Vietnamese officials in the provinces might be dealing with as many
as four or five separate Americans, each giving him different advice.
In early 1966 the Deputy U.S. Ambassador was named coordinator
of field programs with a small staff. This authority, however, proved
inadequate and in December 1966 an Office of Civil Operations was
established which had full command authority over the civilian
agencies in the field. Province chiefs then had only two advisors, one
44-706—70 2
10
military and one civilian. In May 1967 the final stei) was taken of
hringing the entire U.S. field effort under one chain of command and
one manager.
Since security is so much a part of pacification, it was decided to
place overall responsibility for pacification on the Commauxler of
U.S. Military Assistance Command, General Westmoreland, and to
establish my predecessor, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, as his
Deputy for CORDS — Civil Operations and Rural Development Su[)-
port. CORDS in the field took responsibility for the local military
aspects of pacification, the Territorial Security Forces, and the civilian
aspect of jjacification, for example, the programs of the USAID Mis-
sion and the Information Agency or Joint U.S. Public Affairs office —
JUSPAO. At the Saigon level, these two civilian agencies maintain
their independence for certain national programs, but their field
operations are now under the single chain of command of the Com-
mander U.S. Military Assistance as a ])art of CORDS.
Thus today CORDIS has teams at the national, regional, provincial
and district levels. It is a part of the military command structure, in
Saigon fully under General Abrams, and in each of the corps zones
it is under the senior U.S. military commander.
PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURE OF CORDS
It consists of 6,31)1 military personnel, 2,395 officers and 3,966
enlisted, and 948 civilians — authorized. Added to these are 188 third
countr}^ personnel and 7,600 local Vietnamese nationals. There is
complete military and civiUan integration at all levels of CORDS.
The staff's in Saigon are i)artly military and i)artly civiliaix.
At the corps level, there also are civilians and military ^^'orking
together on the staffs. In 25 provinces a military officer, a colonel or
lieutenant colonel, is the province senior adviser, and in 19 provinces
and four inxlejicndent cities, a civilian, a Foreign Service officer or a
Foreign Service Reserve officer, is the province senior adviser. The
civilian province senior advisers have military deputies. The military
proxincc senior advisers have civilian deputies. In 190 districts, the
district senior adviser is a major, but in 33 he is a ci\ilian, and at
the district level there are 96 civilians serving in all. The normal dis-
trict level team has about eight members; the teams at province level
vary from 30 to 70; the staffs at region numb(>r about 150 and the
stafi" in Saigon. n.umbors about 600, all levels including civilian as well
as military personnel.
In, addition to these advisory teams, there are two special groups
of personnel who ]-)artici])ate in the i)acificalion mission. Some of these
ai'e in mobile advisory teams, or MAT's. These are Army teams of
two officers and three NCO's whoso job is to live, work with, and
assist in the improvement of Regional Force companies and Popular
Force ])latoons. Another tyi)e of team involved in similar work is the
U.S. Marine Cori)s Combined Action Platoon or CAP.
This consists of a squad of U.S. Marines led by their squad leader,
assigned to work with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon, livuig in
the same area, ])atr()lling and gcMuu'ally helping them with theirjob
and to improve their performanc(\ There are 353 MAT teams which
include 1,985 U.S. Army personnel. There are 114 CAP teams which
include approximately 2,000 Marines and Navy Corpsmeu.
11
Both of those teams are used in. certain areas for a period, with a
special emphasis on. up,2;radino- tlie local reo'ioiial or i)opiilar force
units with which they are working. WIkmi. th(\y reach a satisfactory
[)()sition, the team is moved to another area to repeat the process
with another unit. The planuing, of course, is that they will gradually
complete this job of upgraduig and that the program will then be
[)hased out, leaving the Vietiuunese local force unit to con.tinue
without direct American in\'olvement.
OTHER U.S. PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS
These are the American, personnel who work directly in the i)acif:.-
cation program and with CORDS. In addition, of course, many
American units conduct pacification activities in. their assigned areas.
You have recently heard of the activities of the 173d Airborne Brigade
in Binh Dinh Province. This is matched by a numbcu* of other American
units which collaborate directly with regional and popular force units
to increase the effectiveness of these units and im|)rove the territorial
security of the area.
The pacification program also profits from the many projects
carried out by U.S. units in the form of civic action. Many doctors
from the Army, Na^'y, and Air Force ser\'e on special teams in i)rov-
ince hospitals, and the Navy Seabees carry out many programs which
both support pacification and train Vietnamese in skills for the future.
FUNDING OF CORDS
The funding of the CORDS operation comes from four sources,
DOD's and AID's api)roi)riations, AID's counterpart funds generated
by imjiorts, and the GVN's own budget from taxes, customs and deficit
financing. The greater portion of the expenditures by both the United
States and the GVN is used for the t(>rritorial forces and the police,
with AID supporting developnumt and refugee ju-ograms.
Both the United States and GVN have substantially increased their
investments in pacification over the jjast several years, which is
certainlv a major reason for its improvement. The 1970 contributions
are: DOD, $729 million; AID, $48 million; Counterpart, $114 million
(equivalent); and GVN, $627 million (equivalent).
As can be seen, in funding as in personnel, CORDS is an integration
of the programs of several agencies. It was designed to meet a new
situation on the ground and it cuts across many of our familiar civil-
military or departmental distinctions. It has been called a Rube
Goldberg creation and I suppose hi many respects it is. The key point,
however^ is that it is working and that it works with the Vietnamese.
cords: SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. RELATIONSHIP
Because it is the relationship with the Vietnamese which will decide
w hether the program will work or fail, it cannot be American. Ameri-
cans can assist the Vietnamese temporarily and can help them take
over the full program. Our resources are important. Our imagination
and our energy are also important. But we must address these to
helj)ing Vietnamese to do the job themselves.
12
This process will be described in detail by the officers who are
accompanying me: Mr. John Vann of Colorado, the senior CORDS
officer for IV Corps in the Delta; Mr. Hawthorne Mills of California,
a foreign service officer, the province senior advisor in Tnj^en Due
Province; Maj. James Arthur of North Carolina, the district senior
advisor in Binh Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province ; Capt. Armand J.
Murphy of Florida, RF/PF Advisor, Long An Province; Capt. Rich-
ard T. Geek of New Jersey, who is the leader of a Mobile Advisory
Team presently located at My Lam Village, Kien Thanh District, Kien
Giang Province; and U.S. Marine Sgt. E5 Richard E. Wallace of
California, the leader of Marine Combined Action Platoon 2-1-5 whose
present assignment is at Phu Son Hamlet in Hoa Luong Village in
Hieu Due District of Quang Nam Province.
At each of these levels the Americans work closely with their
Vietnamese counterparts. They discuss jjroblems; they visit the field
together; they ajiproach the job as a joint effort. At the same time,
each has his own resjionsibilities to his own government. The Viet-
namese chain of command has complete authority over the sub-
ordinate levels. No commands can be given through American channels
to Vietnamese. The relationship must be one of mutual exchange,
trust, and respect.
At the same time, the Americans have responsibilities to their own
Government to report difficulties, to criticize where weaknesses exist
and cannot be overcome locally, and to submit reports on their view
of the situation in the area. These reports are in many cases made
available to the Vietnamese counterpart, so he can see how he looks
to his companion, and in some cases are made available to their
superiors.
CHANGES PRODUCED IN VIETNAM SINCE 1968
The combination of the Vietnamese Pacification and Development
Program and American assistance to it have produced the change in
Vietnam since 1968. This change did not occur in 1 year; rather it
culminated the changes which had been occurring over several years.
In 1967 a constitution was promulgated and a national assembly
and a president were elected. This was a beginning of political stability
in Vietnam after years of turbulence. In 1968, it can now be said in
retrospect, the enemy made a major military effort to crack the
shield which was gradually being built by the Vietnamese and Amer-
icans learning how to fight the people's war.
In his attacks at Tet in May and in August, he threw his battalions,
regiments and divisions into a major effort to shatter the Vietnamese
army, seize the centers of government i)ower and si)ark a general
uprising. Despite the real psychological impact of his attacks, the
fact is that he did not achieve any of these three goals.
On the government side a new resolution and drive showed itself
in such develojiments as the General Mobilization Law, the increase
of th(^ regular and territorial forces and the beginning of the People's
Self Defense Program. By autumn it had become clear that the enemy's
massive military assault had not succeeded and new strategies began
to be applied.
In November 1968 President Thieu launched the accelerated
pacification program the first integrated civil-military program to
move into the country, establish security, attack the Vietcong ap-
13
paratus and begin the process of national mobilization under a com-
prehensive and integrated pacification plan.
Its critical feature was the movement of territorial forces into the
areas from which they had been driven during the Tet attacks. This
actually occurred without substantial enemj^ opposition. This 3-
month campaign was followed by the 1969 pacification and develop-
ment plan. The key development of 1969 was further expansion in
the new areas throughout the countryside. The government set very
venturesome goals in early 1969, goals which gave many of its advisors
doubts that it could meet them. In fact, it met most of them although
not all. As a result of these developments, the nature of the war
has changed. The enemy began a People's War of insurgency and
ended by conducting primarily a North Vietnamese Army invasion.
The government and its allies first tried to meet the attack with
conventional forces and tactics but are now utilizing all the techniques
and programs of a People's War.
As a result of this long process, in early 1970 the change in the
countryside is there to be seen. Except in one or two areas, the large
enemy battalions, regiments and divisions are in the border sanc-
tuaries. The roads are open to many markets and, from the air, tin
roofs sparkle throughout the countryside where families are once
again tilling their long-abandoned farms.
We have statistical measures of all of these changes, imperfect but
the best we could develop. But the real difference can only be experi-
enced by driving on the roads, by visiting the markets, and by talking
to a 12-year-old school girl who informs you that she is again attend-
ing school in her village after a 3-year period in which none existed.
A friend once complauied that the pacification program does not pro-
duce dramatic results. From day to day it does not, but the difi'erence
in Vietnam from Tet of 1968 is certainly dramatic to the Vietnamese
peasant.
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM
There is more work to be done. At night there are still guerrillas
in Vietnam, and the roads open in the day are deserted and dark,
occasionally criss-crossed by contending local forces. The grenades
still go off in the theaters or tea shops as the terrorist demonstrates
his continued presence. Some officials have by no means caught the
spirit of the village conmumity and endeavor to assert their JMan-
darinal privileges of dictation from above. There are still refugees and
others Axhose lives have been blighted by the war who must be helped
to a decent place in society. ]\[ost of all, North Vietnamese divisions
are over the border or in jinigle redoubts, and jirejiare for other sallies
against South Vietnam.
At the beginning of 1970, however, there is a vast difference in the
situation. The government is organized to conduct a people's war
and is showing the leadership and drive to create a better and a
safer society for its citizens. Its 1970 Pacification and Development
Plan is in many respects more venturesome and ambitious than the
1969 plan. Its key also lies in consolidation of the admittedly thin
layer of security established in many areas. It also sets high goals in
l)olitical, economic and social development, not all of which may be
reachable.
14
In response to its leadership and its policies, however, its citizens
are beginning to ])articipate in self-defense, self-government and self-
development. And the arni}^ has repelled North Vietnamese assaults
at Bu Prang and Ben Het. It is by no means inevitable that this
process must continue, as several developments could arrest or even
reverse it.
The enemy is still in the field, and while we may have determined
some of the tactics and techniques of this people's war, the lessons
must be reflected in new kinds of action in every hamlet and village
in the land. This process has begun, but the future will include some
dark days and even some local disasters. I believe, however, that a
satisfactory outcome can be achieved so the Vietnamese people will
have a free choice as to their future.
The outcome will depend more and more upon Vietnamese leader-
ship, upon Vietnamese commitment and even upon Vietnamese re-
sources. We Americans have i)layed a substantial role in learning
about this new kind of war, but one of the lessons is that it must be
waged by the people and not merely the Government of Vietnam.
The American contribution in personnel and in resources will
gradually reduce, to be replaced by full mobilization of people willing
to sacrifice to remain free and to carry out the programs to make
these sacrifices meaningful.
The Vietnamese people iuul Government are shouldering more of
the load today than they tlid last year, and their i)lans and programs
envisage a greater effort tomorrow. This is true in the military field;
it is also true in the field of i)acification and develoi)ment.
The lessons learned and a))plied about this new form of war are
making the Vietnamese effort i^ay greater dividends in terms of local
security, political support, and hopes for j^eace. I am neither optimistic
nor pessimistic about the future of this program and of Vietnam, nor
do I offer any [)at solutions to difficult situations. I prefer to rely
upon the determination of the Vietnamese i)eoi)le and Government
and of the Americans who are now assisting them to take over this job.
I am privileged to present to you today several representative
Americans with this determination, and I invite you to hear from
them what we have learned about the i)eo])le's war and how it must
be fought.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
MB.. Colby's attitude towaed future of south Vietnam
Your last paragraph puzzled me a bit. You said you were neither
oi)timistic nor pessimistic. Up to that point I thought you were very
optimistic.
Mr. Colby. No, sir. I know there are going to be a lot of bad
moments ahead from time to time, but I am determined.
The Chairman. What do you have in mind? What bad moments?
Mr. Colby. There will be local defeats, Mr. Chairman. There will
be local incidents which w ill occur in which things won't go right.
The Chairman. They would not be very significant in view of
the overall resurgence of democracy in the country. We have all our
local defeats. That is no reason to be ])essimistic.
Mr. Colby. No, sir. T am not pessimistic.
15
The Chair:\ian. You say you are not either one. I thought you
were optmiistic up to that moment. It is not important. It sort of
struck me.
U.S. OVERALL OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM
There are one or two things you said tluit I would Uke to put in
perspective. You are so famihar with the subject. Yours is an extremelj'
well-prepared and very thoughtful statement. What would you say
is the overall objective of our effort in Vietnam? Could you state it a
little differently than you did in your statement?
Mr. Colby. Of our national effort or of this program, Mr. Chair-
man?
The Chairman. Is there any difference? Aren't they consistent?
Mr. Colby. Very much so. This program's objective is to build
up the strength of the people there, to ])articipate in their defense
and development.
The Chairman. What is the justification? Wliy should we be so
especially concerned about the welfare of these i)articular peoj^le in
South Vietnam as oi)posed to the i)eople in aii}^ African or South
American country? What is the special reason that we are devoting this
extraordinary effort, using some of our ablest men, such as yourself
and your colleagues?
Mr. Colby. Well, this is an overall national decision that has
been made over several years, Mr. Chairman, to send us out there to
do what we can for this
The Chairman. Don't you yourself have any feeling of i)urpose
there other than that you are ordered to do it? What is 3'our own
feeling? I know of no one better to enlighten us. There is some un-
certainty.
We had a remarkable witness before the Subcommittee on Veterans
Affairs the other day. I read the testiint)ny and it said that one of
the things bothering a number of our young men who do the actual
fighting and, particularly, those who suffer the loss of their arms and
legs, is "what is this about?". What is it for and what is the objective?
It was on this I thought you might enlighten us a bit. We are far
away from the scene and do not have the advantages you have. What
do you feel is the real objective that justifies the effort not only that
you ])ut in but that the Army and the young men put in?
U.S. SECURITY involvement IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. Colby. W^ell, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is related to
the security of our own country, the future security of our own country.
The Chairman. I wondered about that. This is what I wish you
would make clear to us and to the public.
Mr. Colby. This is not a missionary effort, Mr. Chairman, but
rather a program which must be conducted in this particular manner
because it is faced with a particular challenge that can only be met
by a program which involves the people.
The Chairman. You said the security of this countrj' is involved.
Did you not?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
16
The Chairman. Could you elaborate a little more. This is a rather
elusive concept. Make it a little more clear to us how the security
of this country is involved. I assume you mean physical security?
Mr. Colby. The overall political and physical security of the
Nation.
The Chairman. How is it involved in this particular area known
as South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. I think over the years, Mr. Chairman, our Presidents
have reviewed the situation and felt that the outcome in Vietnam
was related to the security of our country.
The Chairman. I do not wish to downgrade our Presidents, but
I did not ask you what our Presidents thought. We all know about
that. What do you think? You are the Ambassador there. Don't
you have your own views? Presidents come and go. It is not surely
because President Johnson said our security is involved. Is that the
best reason you h'ove?
Mr. Colby. No, sir.
We all come from our upbringing, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Quite right.
Mr. Colby. And I recall a period during my early years when
Manchuria was very, very far away.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Colby. At another period a little later in my youth the
Sudetanland was very, very far away. Both of these later turned out
to be very closely related to the security of our country. I am not cit-
ing this as a precise example.
The Chairman. I do not recall. Did we do in Manchuria or in
Sudetanland what you are doing in South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. No, we did not, sir.
The Chairman. \Vliat is the relevance of mentioning those two
places?
Mr. Colby. Well, tliose things were far away in the early, and even
in the late 1930's, and by not joining with our alhes and facing up to
some threats at that time, I think we paid a terrible price.
The Chairman. Then you are suggesting that we would have been
better off if we had done in Manchuria what we are now doing in
South Vietnam. Is that what you are suggesting?
Mr. Colby. A great number of my classmates would still be alive,
I believe, sir.
The Chairman. If we had done that?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And also in the Sudetanland?
Mr. Colby. I think it is generally accepted that some action, if it
had been taken at that time, might have avoided a very large con-
flagration later.
The Chairman. Do you think this country is capable of carrying
on in Manchuria and Sudetanland and elsewhere the kind of program
we are financing and carrying out in South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. Given the things we have learned over the years, Mr.
Chairman I think we can carry on a much more modest program and
an effective program than if we wait for the situation to become so
bad that it can only be met by very serious investments.
JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. I would not want to pursue that too long. I thought
perhaps you could clarify, if only for my own purposes, some purpose
which would justify the extent of tliis involvement and the extent of
the expenditures, not only of money but the efforts of such people
as yourself and your colleagues, who are obviously extremely capable
people, whose efforts might be directed even at conditions here at home.
At the end of your statement you remarked what a great change
there was between the past and today in Vietnam. I only wish you
could say that about the United States.
I wish we had made the remarkable progress in the last 2 or 3
years that you have made with CORDS in South Vietnam.
COUNTERPART FUNDS
In reference to the financing of CORDS, you mentioned some of
the basic figures, for instance, the U.S. contribution of $891 million,
including counterpart funds.
I wonder if you would be very precise in explaining the counterpart
funds. Are they what some of my colleagues call funn}' money or
do they represent dollars?
Mr. Colby. They represent, in origin, dollars. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. There is no difference in cost to the taxpayer.
Mr. Colby. No.
The Chairman. This is a term that leads some people to believe
this does not cost us anything.
Mr. Colby. Oh, no.
The Chairman. That is not so.
Mr. Colby. This costs the taxpayers money. The program sends
property over to Vietnam through commercial channels to importers
who pay for it in piasters which are put in a special fund and handled
in a special way. But the origin of it is certainly mone}^ from the
United States.
U.S. PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION BUDGET
The Chairman. Could you tell us what percentage of the South
Vietnamese budget for pacification is derived directly or indirectly
from U.S. assistance?
Mr. Colby. I cannot give you that answer directly Mr. Chairman.
I can find the answer to that and give it to j'ou, perhaps tomorrow.
(The information referred to follows.)
Twentj^-three percent of the Vietnamese budget for pacification is derived
directly or indirectlj' from U.S. assistance.
U.S. PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUDGET
The Chairman. Relevant to that, perhaps you could tell us what
percentage of the budget of the Government of South Vietnam is
derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance.
Mr. Colby. It is a very complicated subject, Mr. Chairman.
I believe that the current percentages are something in the neighbor-
hood of 15 percent of the Government's military budget is provided
18
directly by the United States. The remainder is provided by the
Government of Vietnam.
The Chairman. Does the Government of Sonth Vietnam tax any of
the activities of the Government of the United States in Vietnam? Is
there a tax on the imports or any of our activities?
Mr. Colby. There is a tax on the imi:)orts that is paid by the im-
porter, the Vietnamese importer. It is not paid by the United States.
The Chairman. But the tax on that import is paid into the Govern-
ment of Vietnam. All I am trying to get is some perspective for the
benefit of the committee and the country as to whether this is rela-
tively an American effort or are we a minor partner in this effort.
Are the Vietnamese doing most of it and we are helping them out
a little bit?
Mr. Colby. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you suggesting that only 15 percent of the
overall effort is ours?
Mr. Colby. No, sir; by no means.
The Chairman. Would you give us some idea of what we do?
Mr. Colby. We provide a very substantial amount of the equip-
ment, rifles and so forth, and a very substantial amount of money.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Colby. But in any particular })rogram, Mr. Chairman, the
Vietnamese do by far the greatest amount in terms of the people
involved in the program.
commodity import program
The Chairman. How does this commodity import program, which
you referred to in your statement, fit into the budget picture of
South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. This is held in a special fund, Mr. Chairman. The
l)iasters collected from the importers who pay for the imports are
held in a sjiecial fund which is only spent by joint agreement by the
United States and the Government of Vietnam.
Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, would you yield at that point?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Cooper. May I ask if this kind of transaction is similar
to those which occur in other countries? Is this correct: The United
States exports to South Vietnam commodities of various types.
South Vietnam pays the United States in its currency; is that correct?
Mr. C^OLBY. Yes; I believe that is correct.
Senator Cooper. The currency is then i)laced in a trust fund and
it is used according to agreement between South Vietnam and the
United States. So actually the local currency is the product of our
dollars, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That is right.
1 was trying to get some idea of the proportionate costs to the two
counti-ies of the overall effort and of ])acification.
U.S. AND south VIETNAMESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PACIFICATION
PROGRAM
Would you say the |)acification i)r()gram itself is su])ported [)rimarily
by the Americans?
19
Mr. Colby. Over the past 3 or 4 years, Mr. Chairman, the division
between the American and the Vietnamese Governments' contribution
to i)acification programs has been about 50-50. The sum has, however,
more than doubled over the past 3 years. As a result of this, both the
American contribution and the Vietnamese Government contribution
have increased.
The Chairman. Can you say from your statement how much will
be spent per capita on the pacification program, including all the
military programs?
Mr. Colby. Per capita Vietnamese or per capita American?
The Chairman. Per capita Vietnamese.
Mr. Colby. I cannot answer that directly, sir. I can tell you the
costs of various of the programs.
A popular force soldier, for instance, costs about $2,000 for his first
year of service. A national policeman costs the United States about
$120 and costs the Vietnamese Government about $1,000 a year.
A regional force soldier costs about $4,500 for his first year and
about $2,000 a year thereafter.
The Chairman. The staff says it is about $90 per capita on the basis
of the amounts in your statement.
distribution of U.S. ADVISERS IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
Could you give a little further detail about the advisers and how
they are distributed. In what government ministries and offices are
there U. S. advisers? Are they in all of them or most of them?
Mr. Colby. In most of them there are some advisers at various
levels. Some of them specialize in limited programs; others have a
limited relationship.
The Chairman. Ai"e there any advisers in the office of Prime
Minister?
Mr. Colby. A cou])le of my junior officers have a small liaison office
down there. They do not advise the Prime Minister in that sense, but
they have an office there which we can exchange papers through.
The Chairman. How many U.S. advisers work in the ministry
primarily responsible for the pacification |)rogram?
Mr. Colby. Well, our total Saigon staff, Mr. Chairman, is 600.
Of that, I would say not more than 100 or so would be involved in
the diflerent ministries, 100 to 200.
The Chairman. Is there a ministry of the Saigon Government
primarily resjjonsible for the pacification })rogram?
Mr. Colby. There is not one ministry, Mr. Chairman. There is a
council which includes all of the ministries, the President is the
chairman of it, and the Prime Minister is the secretary general.
It does have a snndl staff of about 20-odd i)eople. We have an
officer, Mr. McManaway, here who meets frec^uently with the head
of that staff, and we have other officers who work with the other
officers in that staff.
The Chairman. Are there any ministries where you do not have
any U.S. advisers?
Mr. Colby. Well, certainly Mr. Chairman, there are several of
them in which we do not have any advisers who come under my
direction. I would say that there are probably a couple of ministries
20
without U.S. advisers. For instance, I do not believe that the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has one.
The Chairman. It has no American advisers.
Mr. Colby. I do not believe so. I would not be sure of that, but I
just do not believe so.
HOW LONG WILL U.S. ADVISERS BE NEEDED?
The Chairman. Could you make a guess as to how long you think
U.S. advisers Avill be needed in the pacification program?
Mr. Colby. Mr Chairman, we are planning to reduce various
advisers at various places and levels gradually, as we think the
situation permits it. 1 do not have a sjiecific timetable that I would
offer at this time.
COST of pacification program OVER NEXT 5 YEARS
The Chairman. Would you care to guess how much it will cost
over the next 5 years?
Mr. Colby. I think our costs will go down in the next year or so
because a substantial percentage of our costs in the past couple of
years have been in hardware for the increased size of the territorial
forces, M-16's, M-79 grenade launchers, mortars, and so forth. These
were pretty much one-time expenditures and so, consequently, I
would believe that the overall costs will go down for the next few
years.
RETIRED MILITARY MEN ACTING AS U.S. CIVILIAN ADVISERS
The Chairman. In your statement, you said there were 6,361
military personnel, and 948 civilians. You said there are a total of 215
military men as senior province and district advisers and 52 civilians.
Do you know how many of the 948 civilians are retired military men?
Mr. Colby. I do not know the exact figure, sir, but about 25
percent of the j^rovince and district senior advisers who are civilians
are retired military.
The Chairman. Would it be out of line to say that of the 948
civilians you mentioned, about 25 percent are military men?
Mr. Colby. I think that would be a little high, Air. Chairman. I
think that would be a little high.
The Chairman. What would you say?
Mr. Colby. If I may correct this figure later, I can give you a veiy
precise answer, but I would guess in the neighborhood of 100, 150,
something like that.
(The following information was later submitted.)
The precise answer is a total of 180 retired military against 1,190 civilian
spaces authorized.
The Chairman. Would it be fair to describe this program as a
quasi-military government?
Mr. Colby. No, sir; I don't think so because it has no authority.
It is an advisory effort. The decisions are made by the Vietnamese
Government. The President of the Republic makes the critical
policy decisions about this })rogram.
21
NEW ELEMENTS IN VIETNAM WAR
The Chairman. I was struck by your mentioning two or three differ-
ent times that this is a new kind of war. We have always heard there is
nothing new under the sun. I wondered in what respect, for example,
does tliis war differ from our Revolutionary War or our Civil War?
What is new about this war that has never occurred in other wars?
Mr. Colby. Some of the various elements are familiar to us from
our background. But the way the doctrine developed by Mao, Lenin,
and Ho Chi Minh, and some of the others had been put together is a
new technique, a strategy of combining various factors together to
make a new attack on the problem.
I think that they looked at the power facing them in several of the
nations of the world. They felt they could not go through the power,
could not go around it, could not go over it, but they thought they
could go under it, grab hold of the people and pull them out from
under.
They tried this in China during the early days there. They tried it
during the first Indochina war against the French and worked it out
to a fairly good system. Now this, I think, was a new technique. This
is not a novel situation
The Chairman. I should have warned you in the beginning that I
am not as fully aware and knowledgeable about the background of all
this as you probably assumed I am.
When you say they apj)lie(l it against the French, who applied what
against the French? Would you make it i)lain.
Mr. Colby. Ho Chi Min, Giap, and some others.
The Chairman. What did they apply against the French that was
new? What is new about this as opposed to other wars that have
occurred? We have had many different kinds of wars.
Mr. Colby. One new factor, for instance, is a new military tactic
w liich w^e have to face in Vietnam. We are familiar in our country with
what we call a logistical tail of an army, the logistics support.
The Chairman. I am not familiar with it. Frankly, I do not know
what you are talking about.
Mr. Colby. That a soldier goes out and faces the enemy and is
pretty much alone as he goes. Behind him, come various things to help
him do his job. There are supporting arms, the ordnance, the quarter-
master, the food, and all the rest.
how does VIETNAM WAR DIFFER FROM OTHER WARS?
The Chairman. I was not thinking so much about military tactics
in the field. The French really, for practical purposes, were driven out
of Vietnam and Indochina by the Japanese. Were they or weren't they?
Mr. Colby. They came back hi after World War II.
The Chairman. Then the war began between the Vietnamese and
the French.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. What was new about that and different from other
wars?
Mr. Colby. The organization of the population, the conduct of a
mass political effort among the population to support the effort, the
22
combination of organizers, terrorists, the guerrilla and the main force
units.
The Chairman. You mean there had never been guerrillas before?
Was tliis the first war in which the guerrillas operated?
Mr. Colby. No, sir. I have been a guerrilla, but there are other
levels of this war.
The Chairman. Didn't Tito have guerrillas against the Germans
in Yugoslavia?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
But his was an experiment which led toward this final technique
which they have developed.
The Chairman. Didn't the Maquis have a war against the Germans
in France? It was a very effective war. What is new about that?
Mr. Colby. Well, I participated in that particular effort, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. In France?
Mr. Colby. I did, sir, and it was not as effective as this one because
we did not not have the same techniques.
The Chairman. It succeeded in the end; didn't it? I thought the
Germans were defeated.
Mr. Colby. They were defeated with the help of the resistance, but
not through the technique that has been develojied in the Far East,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Perhaps I am too limited in my background to
follow this, but I do not see anything particularly new or different
between this war and other wars of a colony seeking its independence
of its colonial master. There are new guns. It is true George Washington
did not have M-16s, but his army had squirrel rifles and they made the
same use of them. I do not see the difference. The difference between
the military hardware and a few other things does not seem to me a
significant difference.
Mr. Colby. No. The military hardware is not the difference, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. What is the difference?
Mr. Colby. The real difference is the involvement of the people in
the war.
During the first Indochina war, the Viet Minh aimed at organizing
the people to participate fully in the war as a part of the war effort.
The Chairman. Against the French.
Mr. Colby. Against the French.
The Chairman. Why was that very tlifferent? Didn't George
Washington and Benjamin Franklin and the rest try to do the same
thing here with great difficulty. They had many people who did not
think much of it, but they finally succeeded; didn't they?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. We had Tories who did not agree.
Mr. Colby. But there was a different style of organization.
The Chairman. What is the difference?
Mr. Colby. The organization of these people, the indoctrination
of the people, mobilization in the Communist sense of the word of
the people, which means regimented participation in an organized
manner in the effort and then supplementing this with guerrilla
eff'orts, and supi)lenienting this again with main force efforts.
23
DOES U.S. POSITION MAKE VIETNAM WAR DIFFERENT?
The Chairman. Could it be the only difference between this and
Yugoslavia and France, the guerrillas who helped George Washington
against those dreadful Hessians and others, is that this is one time
we are not on the side of the guerrillas? We are on the other side with
the guerrillas against us. Is that the new kind of war that you had in
mind?
Mr. Colby. I think the lesson we have learned out there, Mr.
Chairman, is that we cannot fight it by Hessians; that we have to
involve the people of the nation in the effort.
The Chairman. We have tried to fight it with Hessians; haven't we?
Mr. Colby. I don't think with Hessians, Mr. Chairman, but we
have tried
The Chairman. What does Hessians mean to you?
Mr. Colby. Foreign elements, mercenary elements.
The Chairman. That is right. You don't think we have had any
mercenaries?
Mr. Colby. We have had a few, a very few, but I would not charac-
terize the American Army as mercenaries, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No, no, not the American Army. It is a conscripted
army. It is far from being mercenary. It is the opposite.
Mr. Colby. I would not characterize the American Army as
Hessians.
The Chairman. I never have. No one else has. However, there
are more than Americans there. There are some that are called alUes.
They are not Americans.
I do not see the great difference in this war that you seem to see
other than that this is the only time I know of in our history that
we have tried to help a colonial power in trying to maintain control
of a colony. Do you know of any other instances?
Mr. Colby. We have participated in that kind of an effort in other
times.
The Chairman. What is another example?
Mr. Colby. The Philippine insurrection in which the United States
helped put down that insurrection.
The Chairman. W^e helped Spain keep control of the Philippines?
Mr. Colby. No, we helj^ed suppress an insurrection.
The Chairman. Against us?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. It is otkl that you would give this as an example.
My impression was that we had told the Philippines we were there
to deliver them from the colonial power then known as Spain. Is that
not right?
Mr^ Colby. I beheve the explanation was a little more imi)erialist
at that time of the turn of the century, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairiman. What was the origin of the war? Was it not to
deliver both Cuba and the Philippines from Spanish domination?
Mr. Colby. Some people said that and some people said other things
like "manifest destiny", Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Didn't that come a little later? Manifest destiny
developed after we changed our objective, didn't it? I do not want to
pursue this too long, but I think it is really very odd that you would
24
use the Philippines experiment as a precedent for our actions in help-
ing the French maintain their power over the Vietnamese.
Mr. Colby. No. I think you have turned the question slightly,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I wish you would clarify it.
Mr. Colby. I think you asked me whether there w^as any occasion
in which the United States had helped to put down a rebellion and
the answer was yes, there had been.
The Chairmax. I do not believe I put that question. I said it was
the only case I kneW' of in which the United States tried to help a
colonial power maintain control of a colony. I think it is perfectly
logical, having been a colony ourselves, that we have always helped
the colony achieve its independence of the colonial power until
Vietnam. In the case of the Philippines it seems to me we began to
deliver the Philippines from Spain, but after w^e became acquainted
with the Philippines, Mr. McKinley said the Lord had directed him
to Christianize and civilize the PhiHppines. So we took them by brute
force. Is that correct?
Mr. Colby. I think that association
The Chairman. That is right and we killed a great many of them
in the process.
length of time united states intends to remain in VIETNAM
Do 3^ou think there is any possibility that we might decide to
stay in Vietnam for quite a while?
Mr. Colby. I think our policy is fairly clear. We are trying to
end our participation there and remove ourselves from Vietnam.
The Chairman. That is the announced policy. The announced
policy in the Philippines was to free them from the domination of
Spain.
I only ask you that as sort of an historical byline. It has occurred
to some people that things change in the course of donig good to people.
We fall in love with them; don't we?
Mr. Colby. I believe, INIr. Chairman, that the Vietnamese would
not fall in love with us if they thought we were going to stay.
One of the factors of this particular effort today is that the Vietnam-
ese are convinced that we are intending to move out. that we do not
intend to stay there and retain authority there, and that they are
fighting a truly nationalist effort and not a colonial effort.
The Vietnamese leadership, the Vietnamese people who participate
in the self-defense program, the Vietnamese who vote in their local
communities for their own leadership, are looking to a day in which
Vietnam is theirs.
phoenix program
The Chairman. Are you familiar with a man named Robert G.
Kaiser, Jr.?
Mr. Colby. I have met him from time to time, yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Diil you see this article ap])earing in this morning's
Washington Post?
Mr. Colby. I did, Mr. Chairman. i
The Chairman. Do you consider it reasonably accurate?
25
Mr. Colby. I would have a few problems with minor aspects of it,
but I think, in general, it states the fact that we have a difficult prob-
lem of making the Phoenix program work, and that we are working at
it. It has been no great success, but we are working at it.
It is not the kind of a program that it has sometimes been thought
to be, by misunderstanding of some of the terms used.
The Chairman. I will ask to put it in the record for reference and
I will yield to my colleagues for questions at this time.
(The information referred to follows.)
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1970]
U.S. Aides in Vietnam Scorn Phoenix Project
(By Robert G. Kaiser, Jr.)
Saigon, February 16. — The program to neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure
in South Vietnam is called Phoenix, and it is a bird of several feathers.
Some war critics in the United States have attacked Phoenix as an instrument
of mass political murder. Such sinister descriptions are not heard in Vietnam,
where Phoenix has the reputation of a poorly plotted farce, sometimes with
tragic overtones.
The contradiction between Phoenix's lurid reputation as a sort of \ letnamese
Murder, Inc., and the scorn with which it is widely regarded here typifies one of
the most popular grievances of American officials in Vietnam: "They don't
understand at home what's going on out here."
The gulf between homefront and battlefront is likely to appear Tuesday m
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing room, when American pacifica-
tion officials are expected to be questioned closely about the Phoenix program.
Because Phoenix is an offspring of the CIA and because its operations have
always been obscured by the cloak of official secrecy, the Foreign Relations
Committee may discuss the program in a closed session. But Phoenix's secrets
are not well kept in Vietnam. . .
The South Vietnamese-run program does involve killing. American statistics on
Phoenix results (which are radically more conservative than the Vietnamese fig-
ures) show 19,534 members of the so-called Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) "neutral-
ized" during 1969—6,187 of them killed.
The rest were captured (8,51.5) or rallied to the government cause (4,832).
But several officials involved in the program, including some who are sharply
critical of Phoenix, note a fact that is not tabulated in official statistics: A small
fraction, probably one tenth to one fifth, of the VCI neutralized are captured or
killed on purpose. The overwhelming majority are rounded up in military opera-
tions, killed in battles, ambushes or other military action, and described after-
ward as infrastructure. Only a handful are targeted, diUgently pursued and
captured or killed.
phoenix not working
"The most important point about Phoenix," said one official who had access
to all the program's statistics and records, "is that it isn't working."
That view is repeated by official and confid(>ntial U.S. establishments here, and
official and confidential studies, including recent reports by the CIA and the
deputy under secretary of the Army, James V. Siena. Phoenix has failed to neu-
tralize a significant number of important Vietcong officials.
"We are not bothering them now, that's for damn sure," one of the senior
Americans in Vietnam said not long ago.
A common description of Phoenix one hears from oflScials in Vietnam is of a
program without substance. A share of the killing and capturing that goes on in
the war is attributed statistically to Phoenix, but — many officials say — most of
Phoenix's share could easily be attributed to something or somebody else.
Phoenix's unsavory reputation apparently stems from its clandestine nature,
its connections with some deliberate assassinations, and accusations made by
several public figures and army veterans about its activities.
AN IDEA OF THE CIA
Phoenix was the idea of the CIA, and until last July it was run by the agency.
Phoenix operations conducted by Provincial Reconnaissance Units have in-
44-706—70 3
26
volved assassinations. These units, another CIA organization composed of Viet-
namese troops and U.S. advisers, were organized primarily as a counter-terror
group to operate behind enemy Unes. Assassination of Vietcong officials was one
of their assignments.
But the units are now under local Vietnamese control, and have lost much of
their ferocious reputation. "They've lost 50 per cent of their effectiveness,"
according to one U.S. official.
"There's some killing, but this is a war. There are no organized bump-off
squads," one official with no brief for Phoenix insisted recently. Efforts to find
contrary evidence were unsuccessful. Many of the accusations against Phoenix
cannot be verified here. Some seem to be based on misunderstandings of Phoenix
terminology and statistics.
Officials "in Vietnam are critical of Phoenix on many other counts. In recent
interviews with several officials involved in the program, a reporter heard these
points:
Phoenix is potentially dangerous, for it could be used agamst political
opponents of the regime, whether they were Vietcong or not. However, there
is no evidence that this has happened yet.
Phoenix contributes substantially to corruption. Some local officials demand
payoffs with threats of arrests under the Phoenix program, or release genuine
Vietcong for cash.
Phoenix is helping the Vietcong more than hurting it. By throwing people
in prison who are often only low-level operatives — sometimes people forced
to cooperate with the Vietcong when they lived in VC territory— the govern-
ment is alienating a large slice of the population. "We should not jail people,"
said Ho Ngoc Nhuan, chairman of the rural development committee of the
Vietnamese House. "That makes them enemies of the government."
A CAMPAIGN IS NECESSARY
All the officials interviewed were persuaded that a concerted campaign against
the Vietcong organization is necessary if South Vietnam is to have any chance of
independent survival in the long run, but all also agreed that the Phoenix program
had failed to hurt the VC organization so far.
Phoenix was adopted bv the Vietnamese government, at American urging Cor
perhaps insistence), in December 1967. It is supposed to unify the fragmented
intelligence agencies in Vietnam, and share the best information among all opera-
ting units. Provincial security committees, part of the Phoenix structure, also have
the power to trv and sentence suspects to prison for up to two years.
There are 441 Americans attached to Phoenix, all as advisers. Americans play
no direct role in Phoenix operations.
Phoenix offices in the 44 provinces and most of the 242 districts of South
Vietnam (all with U.S. advisers) are supposed to maintain dossiers on Vietcong
officials in their area and a "blacklist" of wanted men and women.
Ideally, Special Branch Police (an inteUigence unit of the National Pohce,
advised and financed by the CIA) , local troops and Provincial Reconnaissance
Units are supposed to conduct operations to arrest these wanted persons. Arrested
individuals are interrogated. When there is some evidence of a Vietcong connection,
they are brought to trial before the provincial security team. High-level suspects
aresupposed to be bound over to a military field court.
REALITY DIFFERS FROM MODEL
As SO often in Vietnam, reality bears small resemblance to this ideal model.
Interviews with officials and observations in the countryside reveal deviations
from the ideal.
The main problem is that Vietnamese don't seem interested in really prosecuting
the program.
"They just aren't interested," said one official. "They don t want to be caught
trying to get the VCI if they think maybe next year the VCI will be in control."
Some local officials have made private accommodations with the Vietcong,'U.S.
and Vietnamese officials say. They are unwilling to upset these arrangements
by chasing VCI.
" Onlv in the last few months has the central government put strong emphasis
on Phoenix. Some officials think this new pressure may improve performance.
Largely because of Vietnamese disinterest, the local Phoenix offices simply
do not work. Many keep no records. Others mount no operations. Phoenix is
often run by poor-quality personnel, chosen for their jobs by local officials who
27
don't want to waste their good people on the pi'ogram. Most district offices are
run by junior army officers who have little sense of the sophisticated political
problems of hunting down Vietcong officials.
NEUTRALIZATION QUOTAS
Perhaps to prod recalcitrant local officials, the central government assigns
Phoenix quotas to the provinces. Thus a province chief has to report neutralization
of a certain number of VCI every month to staj" in good. "They will meet everj^
quota that's established for them," one American adviser noted.
But meeting the quotas often means disregarding any standards. Officials often
count every man arrested, even if he is released immediately for lack of evidence.
American advisers refuse to confirm manj^ of these alleged neutralizations, ac-
counting for much of the difference of almost 100 per cent between U.S. and South
Vietnamese Phoenix statistics.
Quota-conscious district and province chiefs also pad their Phoenix figures with
anv number of citizens captured or killed in military operations, whether genuine
VCI or not.
"^'ietnamization" of Phoenix has, in a sense, already'' been completed — the onl}'^
Americans involved are advisers. But some officials think most of the advisers
should now be withdrawn.
"We've done all we can," one official said. "If they want to get the VCI, they
can do it. We can't do anything more."
The Chairman. Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, it is good to see you, sir.
Mr. Colby. It is nice to see you again, Senator.
MR. Colby's experience in Vietnam
Senator Symington. In my opinion, you are one of the outstanding
public servants that I have known, and I have always gotten a lot of
information from you when we have discussed matters.
When did you first go to Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. In February 1959, Senator.
Senator Symington. In what capacity?
Mr. Colby. I was the deputy to the Special Assistant to the Am-
bassador, American Embassy.
Senator Symington. You were a CIA representative at that time?
Mr, Colby. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And when did you leave?
Mr. Colby. I left there in the summer of 1962, Senator, and came
back to the United States where I became the Chief of the Far East
Division of the CIA.
Senator Symington. Did you go back?
Mr. Colby. I visited Vietnam once or twice a year in those years
when I was in that job.
Senator Symington. When did you leave the CIA to take this job?
Mr. Colby. I left the CIA at the end of January 1968, and went
out to Vietnam, first to take a job as assistant chief of staff of CORDS
and later to succeed to the position of deputj' to the commander for
CORDS.
Senator Symington. Mr. Robert Komer had this job once, didn't
he?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir; he left in early November 1968.
Senator Symington. And he was sent out by the President?
Mr. Colby. By the President; yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Who sent you out?
28
Mr. Colby. Well, my assignment came up in the course of a
discussion between Mr. Helms and the President, I believe.
Senator Symington. President Johnson?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And, as a result of that, you went out in
the early part of 1968?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And you have been on this job ever since?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
lessons learned in VIETNAM
Senator Symington. In your statement, you say —
The lessons we have learned in Vietnam can increase Vietnam's ability to
defend itself.
Would you enlarge on your thinking on that?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
I think the lesson we have learned is that we must involve the
people in a war and that they will not support or assist an effort unless
it is something that they believe in, that they have a part of. This
lesson — that it must trust its people — is one which, I believe, the
Vietnamese Government has learned also. The best example of that,
I think, was the distribution of weapons to the Self Defense forces
which are composed of ordinary citizens in local communities.
It is also represented by the Vietnamese Government's decision to
make the Phung Hoang or Phoenix program a public i)rogram, to
expose it so that the whole public could know about it, and particiijate
in it to protect themselves against terrorists. The foundation of the
effort has to be a mass, popular effort.
Senator Symington. With great respect, when I was out there in
early 1967 and late 1967 there was the same amount of optimism
about the program, but it did not work out that way, and I imagine
that is one of the reasons they sent you.
Mr. Colby. I would not say that. Senator, by any means. But I
think the point that my statement makes is that we have not found
any solution at the end of the trail. We have been gradually learning
more and more about this.
regional and popular forces
Senator Symington. In your statement you say:
Both of these forces are made up of full-time soldiers —
Et cetera, et cetera, and then you say —
both have been substantially increased since 1968.
Mr. Colby. Since early 1968, that is.
Senator Symington. So they now total approximately 475,000 men".
What (lid they total before then?
Mr. Colby. They were about 30,000, a little over. They have been
increased about 150,000 in the past couple of years.
Senator Symington. Then you say the Communists have identified
it clearly as a major threat, a start toward a true people's army.
Mr. Colby. This is a people's self-defense force. In their resolution
No. 9 of the central office. South Vietnam, for instance, the Commu-
29
nists singled this out as a very dangerous program that could be a
threat to them in the future.
Senator Symington. Inasmuch as the Ky government, now the
Thieu-Ky government, was fighting for its life all during these years,
why do you think it took them so long to understand that this should
be done in order to handle the problem?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think it began to be learned in 1967, Senator.
Some of the programs began to be put together in 1968. Prior to 1967,
of course, things were pretty confused out there, with the changes in
governments and that sort of thing.
POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator Symington. During my visit out there in 1966, there were
three people who were highly talked about by our people. One was a
general, one was a village chief south of Danang, and the other was
a Major Mai. Did you know him?
Mr. Colby. I did; yes.
Senator Symington. I went back there a year later and the general
and Major Mai had been removed for political purposes, and the
village chief had been killed. Has that type and character of opposition
stopped?
Mr. Colby. I think we have not had similar problems of that
nature in recent times. I am not saying that political difference might
not arise in tlie future between some of them. It could happen.
Senator Symington. As I remember. Major Mai was in charge, in
eft'ect, of Vung Tau.
Mr. Colby. He was; yes.
Senator Symington. And he was removed by General Ky and
ended up as an interpreter with us for the Korean Army.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Symington. Is he still there?
Mr. Colby. He is still there.
Senator Symington. If a man has that obvious ability, why don't
they use him, instead of keeping liim, in effect, in exile?
Mr. Colby. I don't know the basis for it, but I think they thought
that he was developing a political apparatus of his own with the
cadre there. His successor. Lieutenant Colonel Be, has been there since.
He has been a very forceful speaker against corruption and against many
other things in the national government. He has been the leader of
a very strong policy for those people.
He is trusted by the Government despite the kinds of remarks he
makes, which do not sound like just praise for the Government, by
any means. He has been fully supported in the position by the Presi-
dent and by the Prime Minister. He was given full authority to run the
training program of village chiefs.
Senator Symington. Did he replace Mai?
Mr. Colby. He replaced Mai.
Senator Symington. And is Colonel Be still there?
Mr. Colby. He is still there.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
30
SELECTIVE ASSASSINATION, 1967 AND 1968
You say in your statement that during 1969, for example, over 6,000
were killed in terrorist incidents, and over 1,200 in selective assassina-
tion. What were the figures in 1968 and 1967 of selective assassina-
tions?
Mr. Colby. I cannot answer the questions right offhand. I think I
might be able to find it for you.
Senator Symington. Will you please supply it for the record.
(The information referred to follows.)
Selective assassinations for 1967 are only available from 1 Oct. to 31 Dee. The
total for this three-month period is 624. For 1968 there were 1,743; however, no
figures were available during February.
Air. Colby. The 1968 figures are incomplete because we do not
include the period of Tet, the February figure. There is 1 month for
which the figure was just not obtainable.
Senator Symington. Are those the times when they went into a
village, and picked people and killed them? Is that what selective
assassination means?
Mr. Colby. Yes, a directed assassination against a specific official
rather than a grenade going off in a marketplace.
ability to defeat guerrilla warfare
Senator Symington. In the fall of 1966, General Dayan went out
to Vietnam for some weeks, and then wrote several articles, one of
which I read in the paper here. In it he said if the North Vietnamese
and Vietcong turned to guerrilla warfare it would not be possible for
us to defeat them — this from one of the most experienced and able
guerrilla fighters in the world today, based on the record.
Why do you think he felt that way about it?
Mr. Colby. I think he was referring at that time to the fact that jj
most of our eftorts were in the conventional warfare field, and he was
making the usual criticism that a guerrilla force is very difficult for
regular forces to stop.
I tliink that is one of the real changes in the situation. The govern-
ment is developing its own guerrilla force with mass popular participa- i
tion in the effort by the self-defense and other groups in the country I
and strong advocacy of local government, letting people elect their
own leadership.
tran ngoc chau .
Senator Symington. Didn't Tran Ngoc Chau replace Mai? J
Mr. Colby. Tran Ngoc Chau replaced Mai. He did for a time, jes.
He had the overall charge of the cadre program.
Senator Symington. You mentioned that Be did.
Mr. Colby. Be is now the chief. He came in very shortly thereafter.
Senator Symington. Where is Chau now?
Mr. Colby. He is somewhere in Saigon, I believe. I do not know.
He, as you know, was elected to the National Assembly; he was
removed from his other position. He was not only the leader of the
Vung Tau Center, Senator, he was head of the RD Cadre Directorate
in the Ministry of RD.
31
CAN SOUTH VIETNAMESE WIN WAR WITHOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE?
Senator Symington. The American taxpayer has put over $100
billion into South Vietnam, and in the beginning we laid down rules
which apparently have made it impossible to achieve a military victory,
if that ever was possible. In addition, according to an article I read
in the press not too long ago, we have had around 700,000 Americans —
that would, of course, count the top figure we had in Vietnam, plus
the Seventh Fleet, plus Thailand.
Then if you added to that number the people we have in Japan
directly connected with the war, the people in the Philippines at such
bases as Subic Bay and Clark, the people we have in Okinawa and
Guam directlv connected with the war in Southeast Asia, the total
is well over 700,000, closer to 800,000.
Wliat this article asks is, if the United States cannot do it with
800,000 of its best youth, backed by our industrial capacity, how can
we expect the South Vietnamese to do it when American military
personnel are withdrawn?
That disturbs me a great deal. Could you comment?
Mr. Colby. Well, part of the lessons we have learned, Senator, is
that it is very difficult indeed to do it mth Americans, that it can
only really be done with Vietnamese, and not only with Vietnamese
officials but with the Vietnamese people.
It is only by engaging the active participation of the population
itself that they can retain their own freedom, that they can continue
an effort of this nature. Therefore, some of the critical aspects of the
war lie in the formation of the political base for the Government, a
base formed on local governments locally elected.
WHEN CAN SOUTH VIETNAMESE HANDLE VC AND NORTH VIETNAMESE
ALONE?
Senator Symington. How soon do you think it wiU be before the
South Vietnamese can handle the Vietcong by themselves and the
North Vietnamese also, if the North Vietnamese continue hostilities?
Mr. Colby. Those are two slightly different questions, Senator.
Senator Symington. Well, you develop the answer any way you
like.
Mr. Colby. How soon they can handle the Vietcong by themselves?
I think that if you removed the North Vietnamese entirely from the
picture they would be very close to that today. But if you continue
the infusion of North Vietnamese units, then it is a gradual process,
and I do not know. I cannot give you a precise figure.
I am confident that the 17 million Vietnamese in South Vietnam
can be strengthened and developed into a national cohesion to pro-
tect themselves against the North Vietnamese.
Senator Symington. Mr. Colby, I have great respect for your opin-
ion, and I would like to ask you to help us out in tliis situation. There
are a lot of issues involved, and one is the economic issue. As you know,
we have real problems now wdth respect to our economy.
If the U.S. troops and support left, after giving all that is needed,
in your opinion do you believe that the Thieu-Ky government, pro-
vided the North Vietnamese retreated, could control the country as
32
against the Vietcong and tlie National Liberation Front without any
Americans there?
Mr. Colby. I beheve so.
Senator Symington. You do believe that?
Mr. Colby. Without the North Vietnamese, I believe so.
Senator Symington. And if the North Vietnamese stayed interested
after all of this training that you are doing and all the material that
we have given them, how long do you think it will be before we can get
out?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think this has to be a gradual process. Senator,
and I frankly cannot give you a date on it. Our first priority is to get
our combat forces out of there and we certainly are in the process of
doing that.
Senator Symington. I realize that. I have not set any timetable
about it, and I am not one of those who says we must get them all out
this year. I am asking because you are out there and I respect your
thinking.
Would you say in 5 years we could get out entirely?
Mr. Colby. I really don't have a number that I could give you,
Senator. It depends on a lot of things that can develop during those
5 years. But I think that the basic thrust of the policy — that they
will be able to take care of their own affairs — is valid. Just when
that is going to happen, I really cannot say.
Senator Symington. How about 10 years?
Do you think we can get out in 10 years?
Mr. Colby I think certainly
Senator Symington. It is not an unfair question.
Mr. Colby. No, it is a fair ciuestion.
Senator Symington. When I was in the executive branch, they
promised us the troops in Germany would stay a maximum of 18
months, and they have been there for a quarter of a century.
Moreover our troops have been in Korea 20 years next June, so
I am not being facetious, but very sincere.
Mr. Colby. I know.
Senator Symington. If you don't think they can get out in 5 years
entirely, do you think they can get out in 10 years?
Mr. Colby. I think they could if nothing else arose during those
10 years that caused a revision of that estimate, if no new situation
arose.
Senator Symington. Like what?
Mr. Colby. Like a change in the overall situation in the Far East.
I could not think of anything in particular, but new factors come to
bear on things that seem to be set in one direction and change does
occur.
Senator Symington. You were not sure about 5, but you are pretty
sure about 10. How about 7?
Mr. Colby. I don't think I can really fix a time for you, Senator.
I think that the thrust is a staged reduction of our forces, taking
our combat forces out of the front lines first, taking our support forces
out second, and leaving economic support and advisory support as
the last item going out.
33
COMPAEISON OF 1968 AND 1969 SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOSSES
Senator Symington. Mr. Colby, weren't there more Vietnamese
killed, wounded, and abducted by the North Vietnamese in 1969
than in 1968?
Mr. Colby. There were, if you leave out February, Senator, yes.
The total is higher in 1969 than 1968, if you leave out February. But
February, of course, was the time of the Tet attack, and a lot of people
w^ere killed and wounded and abducted during that period.
Senator Symington. But that was 1968.
Mr. Colby. That was 1968; that is what I mean. If you leave
February out of 1968, and we just don't have figures for 1968 for that
month
Senator Symington. When you say leave out, do you mean the fact
that there was the Tet offensive is the reason that the 1968 figures
exceed the 1969?
Mr. Colby. No, sir. The 1968 figures we have do not include those
killed, wounded, and abducted during February and, therefore, they
are very short of what really happened during 1968.
Senator Symington. Why aren't those included?
Mr. Colby. We just don't know what they are, Senator. Things
were a little confused and we don't have figures.
Senator Symington. Then your supposition
Mr. Colby. My supposition is there were more killed in 1968 than
in 1969.
SIZE OF VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE
Senator Symington. What is the size of the Vietcong infrastructure
now?
Mr. Colby. Our current estimate is about 75,000, but that is a
very fuzzy figure. Senator. We are doing some fairly good homework
trying to harden that up. I am not at all confident of that figure.
Senator Symington. What was it 2 years ago?
Mr. Colby. Two years ago, I don't think we even had a good
estimate. One year ago it was about 80,000.
But that is not a good estimate either.
POSSIBILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SUCCESS WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT
Senator Symington. There are more c[uestions I would like to ask,
but I want to yield to my colleagues. But I would put the question
to you again.
We have, counting everybody, prettj^ close to 800,000 people
working every day to win whatever our objective is in Vietnam.
That counts Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Guam, and other
places that I am sure you know.
These Americans are backed over here by tens upon tens of thou-
sands of people who are producing items for the Vietnamization
program — the idea being that we are going to give them so maii}^
billions of dollars of equipment in the belief that at a certain point
they will be able to handle this problem by themselves.
Would you supply for the record a statement as to why you believe
that without these 800,000 Americans they can be successful, which
34
means we can be successful, when we haven't been able to be so after
many years and great expenditure of lives and treasure.
Mr. Colby. All right, sir.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(The information referred to follows.)
During the period 1965 to 1968, Communist military strength in Viet-Nam
was at a high level; its regular troops rested upon active guerrilla forces and a
politically organized base. The Communist regular forces were set back bj^ U.S.
regular forces. The Vietnamese Government, with U.S. support, then strength-
ened its Regional and Popular Forces, the People's Self Defense, Phoenix and
police operations, and developed a more actively engaged population. By 1970,
the nature of the war thus changed; what was formerly a Communist war con-
ducted on three levels became a government-led people's war facing an increas-
ingly^ North Vietnamese military- force. The territorial forces, the police, and the
People's Self Defense make the enemy mihtary forces much less effective since
they pre-empt the caches, the recruits, and the information. In this circumstance,
the enemy regular military force becomes less difficult to handle than the earlier
combined guerrilla and regular enemy forces and infrastructure. A weaker enemy
thus faces a GVN stronger in the political as well as the military field. This process
has already begun in the Delta where smaller total military forces are handling
a situation which formerlj^ required the assistance of regular U.S. forces.
The Chairman. Senator Case.
Senator Case. Would you ask Senator Cooper?
The Chairman. Senator Cooper.
Senator Cooper. Thank you. Senator Case.
Ambassador Colby, I would like to congratulate you on a very
comprehensive statement, which is a record of your able service and
the ser"vices of those associated with you, both on the military and
civilian side.
IS CORDS program PART OF VIETNAMIZATION?
The chairman asked you a question which, I think, was directed
toward your view of what the objective of your program was.
Would you say it is an auxiliary or is it a part of the total Viet-
namization program which has been announced as the policy of the
Administration?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think the program we are putting through
here is very much a part of the total Vietnamization effort; yes,
Senator,
IS ADMINISTRATION WITHDRAWAL POLICY IRREVERSIBLE?
Senator Cooper. Secretary Rogers said in several speeches and
statements that the policy of the United States, of this Administra-
tion, was irreversible which, I believe means that our forces will be
continuously withdrawn. Do you believe that?
Mr. Colby. I think that is our intention. Senator. As I said to
Senator Symington, new things might certainly come up in the future,
but, as we see things today, it is certainly our intention to reduce
our participation in Vietnam.
35
ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDS PROGRAM
Senator Cooper. There has been a pacification of some sort since
1959. When would you say that the present program, the one that
vou have outhned, came into effect?
Mr. Colby. It has been a gradual thing. Some of it was developed
in 1967, some in 1968, and some in 1969, Senator. Each point was added
to it as it went along.
Senator Cooper. You described your organization. Was that orga-
nization established after the new administration came in or was it
established under the preceding administration?
Mr. Colby. It was established in May of 1967, Senator,
effect of U.S. troop withdrawals on cords program
Senator Cooper. Assuming troop withdrawals continue, would you
say that the success of your program would be diminished in any way
by the withdrawal of the troops? Can it be sustained in the way that
you have described it if the troops are withdrawn?
Mr. Colby. Assuming that the troop ^nthdrawals go according to
the ideas outlined by our President and by the Secretary in relation-
ship to the three criteria, I think this program should continue,
Senator.
I think that a precipitate withdrawal of a large number might set it
back, but with a steady reduction of American forces in response to
the situation, this program will continue in about its current state.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY
Senator Cooper. We expect to hear members of your group who
deal with the Vietnamese people directly. I assume you do and the
group here that will be testifying. What is the attitude of the people
of South Vietnam toward the overall policy of this Administration and
particularly the withdrawal of troo])s?
Mr. Colby. PubUc opinion polling in Vietnam is not a very advanced
art, Senator. But, nonetheless, when this first came out I think there
was a little concern that Americans might be withdrawing i)ro('ipi-
tously. But there was great reassurance when our President indicated
that we would apply the Vietnamizalion policy in a sober and steady
manner. There is also a certain sense of pride and self-reliance that is
developing in many of the Vietnamese military units, and among the
people there, a feeling that "We can do this ourselves." I believe that
this has been a positive result of our reduction.
INVOLVEMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
Senator Cooper. The Washhigton Post, I believe, in Sunday's
issue, had a statement by a Mr. Gerald C. Hickey who, among other
observations about Vietnam made this statement. I will cpiote from
the article.
In the struggle between the Saigon Government and the Vietcong, Hickey saj^s,
most of the population had not identified with either side. "They have learned
through experience that noninvolvement is their best means for survival."
Is that a correct statement?
36
Mr. Colby. I think" that was a correct statement, Senator. I beUeve
that is one of the things that is changing. I think it is one of the most
critical things that is changing.
Over the years there is very httle doubt that the great mass of
Vietnamese peojole just did not engage on either side.
It is, I must confess, a source of some bafflement to me why the
Communists did not apply their Marxism-Leninism a little bit better
in trying to engage the people on their side. The only explanation that
has come to my mind is that maybe the leadership of the Communist
movement there were Mandarins, too.
On the other hand, on the Government's side over the years there
was a similar disdain for full participation by the population. The
French Colonial rulers ran the people; authority was centered in the
palace. This continued during the authoritarian governments and
the military governments. It is really only in the past 2 or 3 years that
a new theme has come to bear, that the people do have a participa-
tion in the war. The war cannot be won unless the people do partici])ate.
This has been brought about by local elections, by the self-defense
program, by bringing the local leaders in and assuring them that they
have authority over what is happening in their localities, by sharing
power with the people. This is a new situation, because the people are
responding to this in a considerable degree.
Therefore, I think, Mr. Hickey's comment that the Vietnamese
peasant will not engage is, perhaps, a little out of date in that respect.
I think the peasant is beginning to participate in the national effort.
Now, it isn't all there yet. Senator. There is more to do, but I think
a beginning has been made.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOCAL ELECTIONS
Senator Cooper. You spoke about recent elections in a number of
villages.
Do you have any estimates or any figures or totals of the participa-
tion of the South Vietnamese in these village elections?
Mr. Colby. I don't have numbers for you. Senator.
Senator Cooper. Percentages. Do you have any idea about what
the proportions would be?
Mr. Colby. Our newsmen and others went out to see these elec-
tions as they took place. They saw them as a general participation
by the citizens. There is a fairly high percentage of the people who
actually do go to the polls and participate in the votes in those local
affairs.
Senator Cooper. How were the elections carried out? Were there
any prohibitions against certain groups or individuals voting, or any
one faction? Were these local elections dominated by the national
administration? What kind of freedcmi was there in the election of
the local officials?
Mr. Colby. Well, there is no question but that an announced
Communist was not allowed to be a candidate nor to participate in
the voting. The elections were not held in what were called insecure
areas. That is why only something less than half of the villages and
hamlets had their local elections in 1967, the year when they should
have taken place.
37
The expansion of security during 1969 permitted the holding of
these elections in additional areas. ^ _
This is an automatic elimination of the Communists from partici-
pating in it or running it.
However, families with members who are with the Viet Cong do
participate in the elections. As I say, the general reaction of our press
who looked at these elections, including some good, critical press
members, was that they were reasonable elections in that kind of
a structure.
Senator Cooper. Are they dominated, ordered, or directed by the
national administration?
Mr. Colby. The national administration directed the elections,
but the candidates were local candidates, local people from that
neighborhood. Candidates were generally local farmers, local leaders,
varied people.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Senator Cooper. Now, I would like to turn to the question of
local security. I'm not going into the larger military questions. To
what extent have the local security forces been enlarged during the
last 2 years?
Mr. Colby. In early 1968, the local security forces, the regional
and Popular Forces were in the neighborhood of 300,000 men. Today
they are about 475,000 men. So that is about 150,000 or 175,000 men
that have been added.
Senator Cooper. Have you had many defectors from the local
security forces?
Mr. "^CoLBY. I am sure there are some defections to the enemy's
side, but it is not a major problem. There is a problem of desertion in
some of the forces. A man is categorized as a deserter when he has been
15 days AWOL. In our army we do not call him a deserter at that
time; he has to be away for 30 days. But desertion is a problem in the
forces; primarily in the regular forces, to some extent in the regional
forces, and to a very little degree in the popular forces. As they become
closer to their localities, the problem becomes less.
Senator Cooper. What about the defectors
Mr. Colby. In very few cases do these deserters go over to the other
side. Senator. These people go home. Sometimes they join another
unit, this sort of thing. We are going to stop that shortly because we
now have a fingerprint situation so that we can follow a fellow when
he quits one unit and tries to join another.
VIETCONG DEFECTORS
Senator Cooper. What about defectors from the Vietcong. Do you.
have figures on that?
Mr. Colby. Defectors from the Vietcong?
Senator Cooper. Yes.
Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator, we have a very active program. I expect
to testify on that fully later in the week. This program of inviting
people to come back to the government's side has been in progress
since 1963, and about 140,000 people since that time have come back.
38
Forty-seven thousand of them came back during 1969. This does
not mean that all of these fellows were the world's greatest fighters on
the enemy side. A lot of them were local people who were quite content
to join the government's side when the government's side came into
some of the villages and hamlets that they had been excluded from.
ASSASSINATIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE, 1968 AND 1969
Senator Cooper. Perhaps you have answered this question, but is
there a record of the assassinations of local South Vietnamese officials
or people for 1969 and 1968?
Mr. Colby. Yes. For 1969 there were a little over 6,000 people who
were killed, of those about 1,200 were selective assassinations. There
were about 15,000 wounded, and about 6,000 abducted, as I recall.
Senator Cooper. Are you including in those figures people killed
in the war — in actual fighting — or are you giving those figures as
persons killed by the Vietcong in their progi'am of terrorism?
Mr. Colby. These are the results of a terrorism. Senator. These are
not people killed or wounded in the course of military action by the
enemy or by our side. They do not include those at all.
Senator Case. You asked for 1968, I think.
Senator Cooper. Well, those figures were for 1968 or 1969?
Mr. Colby. Those were 1969, Senator. I have it here for 1968,
Senator. The number killed was 6,338. But that is only 11 months
of 1968, because the month of February we do not have any figures on.
There were about 15,918 wounded and about 10,000 abducted
during 1968.
Senator Cooper. What were the figures for 1969?
Mr. Colby. Killed, 6,086; wounded, 15,052; and abducted, 6,095.
That is the entire 12 months; that is the whole year.
Senator Cooper. I will pass on quickly.
Senator Case. Would the Senator yield for just one question on
that point? Do you have a figure for 1968 comparable to the 1,200
killed in 1969 in selective assassinations?
Mr. Colby. I do not have that. Senator.
Senator Case. Do you have any figure at all?
Mr. Colby. I would have to get one.
Senator Case. Would you get one?
Mr, Colby. I will try to get one and present it for the record.
(The information referred to appears on p. 30.)
Senator Cooper. You would say these casualties are the result
of a planned program of terrorism by the Viet Cong?
Mr. Colby. They come from all sorts of things, Senator. They
come from a mortaring of a refugee camp; they come from an explo-
sion in the marketplace. I stood in a schoolhouse about 3 weeks ago
not far from Danang. A couple of Marines had come over to this
schoolhouse and were handing out some candy to the kids, when
a couple of people threw a couple of grenades into the schoolhouse.
Five of the children were killed. Luckily one of the grenades, which
fell in a schoolroom where there were 20 children, didn't go off.
That is the kind of thing that these figures come from.
39
RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, 1969
Senator Cooper. What about the refugees? How many refugees
have been brought back from refugee camps to villages, say, in 1969?
Mr. Colby. During this past year. Senator, about 488,000 people
went back to their home villages with some government support.
There are others who went back who were not registered or soruehow
we didn't get a record of. We estimate them as something in the
neighborhood of 100,000.
Senator Cooper. What is the population in the refugee camps,
say, as of 1969 as compared to the beginning of 1969? Do you have
some figures?
Mr, Colby. The population of the camps at the end of 1969 was
about 150,000. At the beginning of 1969 there were 699,645. That is
in the camps.
effect of cords program on agriculture
Senator Cooper. Was there any bettemient of the agricultural
programs in Vietnam under the program that you have been heading
up?
Mr. Colby. Mr. MacDonald, our Director of USAID, will testify
fully, Senator, but there are several things.
The new rice that was developed in the Philippines was brought
over to Vietnam in 1967. They set a goal of planting 44,000 hectares
of this particular rice in Vietnam during 1968. Of course, when the
Tet attacks came they thought, 'T guess we won't be able to do it."
They actually did it.
They then set a goal of 200,000 hectares for the year 1969. We have
estimated that about 240,000 hectares were planted in the year of
1969.
Tliis rice is really quite fantastic; it increases your average yield
per hectare from about two tons to about 6 to 8 tons, so that the farmer
gets a considerably greater return from it.
The total amount of rice production for the whole country for 1968
was 4,300,000 odd tons. For 1969 they forecast a million-ton rise.
They did not reach that goal. They reached only 5,094,000, which is
very close and very good.
In rice production, the main crop of the nation, they are looking
forward to actually being self-sufficient by the end of this year or next
year.
During the war years rice has been imported in Vietnam.
social and economic progress in VIETNAM
Senator Cooper. I will not take more time from my colleagues, but
would you place in the record a statement showing what has been done
in all of these fields: agriculture, building, construction of roads,
building of schoolhouses, enrollment of schoolchildren, the number of
villages which have held political elections, and facts like that?
Mr. Colby. We will, indeed, Senator, both in my own testimony
and some of the papers that I hope, with the chairman's permission,
to incorporate in the record. And also Mr. MacDonald, when he comes
will testify fully on those programs for which he is responsible.
40
Senator Cooper. From your experience in Vietnam over many
years, do you say now, do you believe that in the last 2 or 3 years there
has been a marked betterment of the people, opportunity in agricul-
ture, in the social field, than there was before? Is that your belief?
Mr. Colby. I think I can testify that the normal farmer lives a lot
better than he did.
Now, there are very serious economic problems in Vietnam which
stem from the degree of American presence there, the large amount of
money that we brought in, the large efforts that we are undertaking
there. This is creating an inflationary problem and danger of some
magnitude.
Steps are being taken to control this. I think the normal citizen is
better off than he used to be in the years 1965-66 by a considerable
degree.
Senator Cooper. You were going to give figures which, in your view
would provide a favorable description of the progress of the program.
IMPACT of war on SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN POPULATION
Would you also supply to the committee, if the information is
available: One, the number of refugees generated because of the war.
Mr. Colby. During the past year about 11 4,000, Senator, have been
generated.
Senator Cooper. Two, civilians killed and wounded. I do not mean
from acts of terrorism, but because of the war.
Mr. Colby. Yes, civilian war casualties; yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows :)
Statistics are not available which would permit an estimate to be made of
civilian casualties in Viet-Nam caused by US/ARVN/FWMAF/VC/NVA in the
course of military operations.
Senator Cooper. The number of orphans, homes destroyed, and the
cropland taken out of cultivation.
I think you would have to agree that the impact of the war in its
total sense has been adverse to the civilian population.
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir; certainly.
Senator Cooper. Would you say the attitude of the civilians is
that they would just like to see the war ended?
Mr. Colby. A substantial portion of the population in Vietnam
would like peace without any further definition. There is no question
about that.
There is a substantial portion of the population which would like
peace with security, and there is a very small portion of the population
which would like Communist control and Communist peace.
south VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENT AFTER U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL
Senator Cooper. Could you answer this question? Assuming that
the United States does withdraw its combat troops within 1 year, 2
years, 3 years, do you believe that the impetus which your program
and other programs have given to the development or reconstruction
of South Vietnam would be sustained — could be sustained — by the
people of Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. I think that you are in the course of seeing a nation
develop another basis for its existence than it had before.
41
The decentralization, of authority to the local authorities and the
gradual building of a national political base in the local communities
will be matched this year by an effort to develop provincial communi-
ties. They are having some elections later this year for the provincial
councils, and the provincial councils will be given some authority so
that these become attractive jobs. The government is trying to make
this a meaningful level of government structure. I think that building
the country from the bottom up can develop a totally new popular
approach toward their responsibilities, toward their participation in
the life of their nation in the future.
U.S. POSTWAR ASSISTANCE
Senator Cooper. Do you know whether any planning is being done
about U.S. assistance on postwar relief or resettlement problems?
Mr. Colby. There has been some thinking done about that; yes,
Senator. There have been some general studies made, projecting on
into the future. Of course, there are longer term development plans
for Asia that contemplate this kind of thing. I don't think they are in
very formal or fixed form.
Senator Cooper. Are you qualified to speak of those plans or does
that come
Mr. Colby. I really think that is more Mr. MacDonald's subject to
discuss. I have a fairly short focus for my program. Senator.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES FOR VC PRISONERS
Senator Cooper. I have one other question now. I have a number,
but I think I will submit them to be answered for the record so that
my colleagues may question the witnesses.
There has been a great deal of comment in the newspapers about
the arrest and confinement of political leaders. Perhaps this might be a
subject for another day in these hearhigs, but is there any kind of
judicial process — and I am not talking about our judicial process —
but a judicial process for the Vietcong adherents who are captured
or arrested; or are they summarily confined?
Mr, Colby. There are several different procedures here, Senator. If
the Vietcong is captured with a gun in hand, as a member of a military
unit, he is considered as a prisoner of war, and is held as a prisoner
of war.
There are a number of South Vietnamese who have been captured,
and there are a number of North Vietnamese who have been captured
who are held as prisoners of war.
If a Vietcong is captured he can be tried under normal judicial
procedures. There is a military court for crimes against the state.
They hold hearings, they investigate witnesses, and so forth.
It is not our legal system; it is a different style of legal system, as
you know. It stems from the civil code more than from ours.
There is a third possible legal action — administrative detention.
The Government can detain them under emergency powers which are
somewhat similar to those of other countries during an insurrection.
There are a substantial number of people detained under this program.
The Government is in the course of improving some of these
procedures which have not been totally satisfactory in the past.
44-706—70 4
42
Senator Cooper. I am sure you will say more about that later.
Mr. Colby. There is more to do on that, too, Senator.
Senator Cooper. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
U.S. PROCEDURES CONCERNING PRISONERS
The Chairman. Would you allow me to inquire concerning that
last question whether the Americans turn over their prisoners to
the Vietnamese for disposition or do the Americans themselves tiy
these prisoners?
Mr. Colby. The American forces turn over the prisoner of war for
detention by the Vietnamese. We have advisers who watch to see what
has happened, to make sure
The Chairman. What does the Phoenix program do with their
prisoners? Do they turn them over to the Vietnamese?
Mr. Colby. Americans do not capture people under that program,
Mr. Chairman,
The Chairman. Oh.
The Senator from Wyoming.
commendation of THE WITNESS
Senator McGee. I want to commend the Ambassador for his
forthright testimony this morning.
Did I hear you say, in response to Senator Symington's question,
that you have been in Vietnam since 1959?
Mr. Colby. I have been associated with the country since 1959.
Senator McGee. But in various capacities?
Mr. Colby. I was horo for about 6 years during that period.
Senator McGee. It seems to me that the very nature of your
assignments has endowed you with a little bit of the sense of continuity
about where we have come from in this very tortuous participation in
Vietnam. From the testimony that you have submitted, you seem to
have acquired a real sense of perspective about it too. You have a
tendency to relate to what happened yesterday, not just what is
happening today. I think this has enriched your testimony on other
occasions when I have had the opportunity to examine you.
UNIQUENESS OF SITUATION IN VIETNAM
I wanted to pursue a line of questioning here in regard to the
uniqueness of the situation in Vietnam, the elements of difference
there that would seem to legitimatize that phrase. It is, indeed, a
unique setting.
Was there a Vietnam before the French?
Mr. Colby. There has been a Vietnam for well over 2,000 years,
Senator.
Senator McGee. Vietnam has also been separated mto different
pieces during separate portions of those two millenniums. They have
had their civil wars; they have had then- foreign occupations. Would
a nationalistic concept of a Vietnam be definable from the history,
such as you might associate with France, Britain or, in a very young
sense, our own country?
43
Mr. Colby. I would say less nationalist than ethnic. There is a
very strong ethnic sense among the Vietnamese. They are very proud
of their Vietnamese identity. They have a very strong sense of it.
They also have a nation in that sense, but nation as a political
state is a later experience. '
Senator McGee. You differentiate between the ethnic sense and, let
us say, the political sense?
Mr. Colby. Yes; yes.
Senator McGee. Does this factor in itself complicate in any way
the problems of witnessing an emerging independence?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think it makes it essential that the entire effort
be a Vietnamese effort. The Communists, of course, for years have
attacked the government as a puppet government, and the govern-
ment, in contrast, for a number of years, has insisted upon its own
status as a Vietnamese National Government, a national movement.
There are a number of Vietnamese in high places, as ministers of
government actually, who were participants in the Viet Minh revolt
against the French. This Viet Minh revolt went through some of the
sad experience of the Spanish Republican effort where the Commu-
nists gradually took it over and ate it up; and this is what happened
to a gTeat extent in North Vietnam.
Senator McGee. Would it be fair to say if there was any uni-
fying, if this is the right word, political consciousness at all, it might
have been anti-French at the time of the colonial break?
Mr. Colby. Very much so. This was a very popular i)rogram at
that time.
Senator McGee. Once the French were out, was that binding
factor strong enough to hold these various groui)s together?
Mr. Colby. Well, even before the French left, Senator, the Com-
munists managed to turn in the names of a few of the prominent
non-Communist nationalist leaders to be arrested and killed by the
colonial government. There are a number of jjersons well-known in
Vietnamese history to whom this has happened.
Second, the Communists immediately upon the departure of the
French began to call the new Government a puppet of the Americans,
as distinct from the French. The phrase during the Diem |)eriod was
the My Diem government, the American Diem government. They
always used that phrase, and they always today try to portray the
Government as nothing but a puppet of the United States.
So, it becomes very important to the entire effort for the Govern-
ment to stand on its own and to make its own decisions, and for us,
correspondingly, to take an advisory position, but not a command
position. That is a tricky job sometimes.
1954 DIVISION of VIETNAM
Senator McGee. At the time two Vietnams became a diplomatic
or political fact of life as a result of the Geneva Conferences of 1954,
did that division in any way reflect the difl'erences that were emerging
after the French left, or was an arbitrary division imposed?
Mr. Colby. This was a division of the country. It happens to be
very close to a previous division of the country between two royal
houses which were fighting for control during a period of Vietnamese
history. But the difference was very much a political difference which
44
arose in the 1954 period. It Avas best exemplified, of course, by the
movement of some 900,000 people from North Vietman down to South
Vietnam. Most of those were Catholics. Many of them were simple
farm people, who now live in village communities in South Vietnam.
But a substantial number of them were also people who had been
educated under the French regime in French-led schools.
Part of the ])roblem of finding a national soul, if you will, was the
impact of the French on the society for 100 years. They took the elite
and trained them away from their own philosophical bases. This has
created a problem that they are still suffering with, they are still
wrestling with.
I think they are in the course of discovering again this national
consciousness through this program of reaching out to their own
village bases to establish a true South Vietnamese base for their
political future.
Senator McGee. Didn't the Geneva agreements permit that to be
a two-way street? Wasn't the option open for those in the south to go
north if they so chose?
Mr. Colby. It was, and about 70,000 — the figure is a little open — ■
about 70,000 to 80,000 people went north. It is our information that
most of those who went north were male members of the Viet Minh
military units.
We do know a number of them went up north, remained in military
units, were trained for reinsertion back into South Vietnam, and actu-
ally did that during the late 1950's, starting in about 1957. They
began to infiltrate back to establish the guerrilla bases, networks, and
so forth.
Senator McGee. Would the direction of the flow both ways and the
dimensions of the flow reflect in any kind of direct ratio the acuteness
of the differences with the French?
Mr. Colby. That was why I compared it with the Spanish situation.
The movement south included almost all the non-Communist members
of the Viet Minh who looked ahead to a future under Communist
control of North Vietnam as being hopeless. That is why there are a
number of ex-Viet Minh who are now in positions of importance in
South Vietnam.
They are still nationalists; they still wish to support their own
country, but they realized they could not do it under a Communist
regime.
Senator McGee. This would suggest at least some measure of the
quest for political definition of two Vietnams, as we know it at the
present time. Would that not be correct, generally speaking?
Mr. Colby. There is a regionalism to Vietnam, but it actually di-
vides into three, rather than two parts. Those who live in the southern
portion of Vietnam, in central Vietnam and in North Vietnam have
very strong regional differences — different accents, different customs,
and so forth.
RIVALRIES DURING POST-COLONIAL PERIOD
Senator McGee. How sharp were the rivalries in this formative,
post-colonial period among the traditional military types who, as I
understand it, had had their own areas?
45
Mr. Colby. The immediate post-1954 situation was a period of war-
lords, entirely separate states almost, in different portions of South
Vietnam.
Senator McGee. This was not unique to South Vietnam, necessarily?
Mr. Colby. No, it happened to other countries, too. The then
government, the Diem government, in its first two years actually did
quite a fantastic job of pulhng the country together and making one
national state out of it.
There was only one major failing that it had at that time. That was a
refusal to build a real political base in the people. They were accus-
tomed to using power and buying power rather than sharing power.
This proved later to be one of then- great Achilles' heels.
Senator McGee. Their own experience and their own history tradi-
tionally had been along that Hne anyway, had it not? The French
didn't help it.
Mr. Colby. Yes. The country had been run on Mandarinal prin-
ciples for many years, of course, under the various emperors and under
the French. It was not a great change.
Senator McGee. At the very least, then, it would seem to me from
what you have said, any new independent undertaking would be a
very delicate, fragile and tender operation.
Mr. Colby. Except that it is not totally an imposed change. There
are other changes going on that are similar to what is happening
elsewhere in the world.
The transistor radio, the TV, the Honda, the public press, the
magazines, the education of the chikh'en, are all creating a changed
society. The political structure must change to reflect this very real
change that is occurring.
comparison of guerrilla wars
Senator McGee. In connection with an earher line of questioning,
drawing parallels between South Vietnam and the guerrilla activities
in Yugoslavia and in France at another time, would the fact that,
particularly in the case of France, there was a long-running tradition
of governmental institutions, experience, and participation alter the
parallel in any significant way?
Mr. Colby. The resistance effort was a national effort against a
foreign enemy. The Petain government had been pretty well dis-
credited by the time the resistance really became active. There w^as
very little appreciation of that.
In Yugoslavia you had a fairly energetic and \dgorous leadership of
a national movement against a foreign invader, the Germans, with no
pretention of imposing anything other than complete serfdom in the
future.
I think the problem in Vietnam is dift'erent. Wliile the Communists
may claim to be the heirs of the national revolution, there are people
with equally good credentials on the government's side who can assert
the cause of nationalism and of a change to a modern society as well.
This makes it by no means as clear cut as it was in the European
situation.
Senator McGee. Isn't that a critically important point in our
attempt
Mr. Colby. It is a big difference.
46
Senator McGee (contmiiing) to be realistic about the Vietnam
question?
Mr. Colby. It is a big difference between Vietnam and the other
ones. This is a group of people who reallj- do want to have an
independent Vietnam.
One of the things that they have been encouraged by is our own
assurance that Vietnam will be independent, not an American colony.
They do not want to see the troops move away too fast, of course,
but, on the other hand, they do look forward to the troops leaving.
This is a big difference from previous situations.
The Communists, of course, are endeavoring to picture it as the
same situation, claiming that the Americans are just Frenchmen in
new clothes. It is up to us, I believe, to reallj^ show there is a difference.
Senator McGee. Would it be fair to say that the Vietnamese in
their own expressions have at least exhibited their belief that it makes
a difference?
Mr. Colby. Yes. In general, I think the reaction in the countryside,
among the population, to some of the programs of this government in
the past year or two, and even to some extent before that, is real pride
in having a little blue patch of the self-defense force on one's sleeve.
This is quite a feeling of exhilaration when that old M-1 carbine is
handed to the fellow to keep in his house. Just to take it home and
keep it there with the ammunition, gives him a lot of power. It shows
he is trusted by his government; it is really his government that is
doing it.
VULNERABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO GUERRILLA TECHNIQUE
Senator McGee. The burden of my next inquiry derives from the
guerrilla technique itself, its impact on any new governing endeavor
in an independency.
Does the lack of experience, deep traditions or national identity
make the South Vietnamese more vulnerable to the guerrilla technique
than otherwise might be the casej
Mr. Colby. In two respects, I think, Senator. First there are the'
10,500-odd hamlets in the country.
Now, any one of those hamlets can be attacked any night. There-
fore, you have to have a unit in each one of those hamlets every night
ready to fend off an attack. If you have an effective government, one
whicli is very efficient, you can perhaps do that from a central place.
If you have a weak government that is just struggling to assert itself
and get itself going, it is hard for it to react, to emplo}^ the additional
fire support, to send some hel]), and to get the communications and
so forth to work that well. So tliat the guerrilla has a very substantial
advantage. Out of those 10,000 targets he can say, "Well, I will attack
these three tonight and another three tomorrow night and another
three the following night." It is his option, and the only defense is to
build up the defense of all of those hamlets, to develop a local self-
defense force and information services that tell you what is going on.
I think the second sense in which it is difficult is that when a
country has not developed a strong national identity, someone who
comes around singing a song of a sHghtly different national identity
can attract the people to his cause. He can recruit the guerrilla or the
terrorists more easily.
47
It is certainly true that a lot of the guerrillas and a lot of the mem-
bers of the enemy forces have shown great dedication and great
commitment. There is no question about it. Some of these are doing
it in order to prevent the American colonialists from taking over the
country.
As long as your situation is a little ambiguous and it is not clear
that you are 100 percent nationalist, it is easier to recruit people to
participate in that kind of a program.
IMMEDIATE GOAL OF GUERRILLA
Senator McGee. What is the immediate goal of the guerriUa? Is it
to destroy or bring down a regime to move in and set up a new regime.
Mr. Colby. No, the role of the guerrilla is to erode the presence of
the government in the countryside.
Senator McGee. It is to seize the total initiative to the guerrilla.
Where and what time to attack are his to choose?
Mr. Colby. He can make his attack where he wishes to.
manpower requirements of guerrillas and SAIGON government
Senator McGee. Does this have any relevance to the amount of
manpower required in both circumstances?
Mr. Colby. The degree to which the government can recruit the
people into self-defense programs and the degree of success of the
program of inviting the guerrilla to return to the national cause by
giving him good treatment have great relevance. This becomes a
manpower problem for the enemy, it becomes a question of "Well, I
don't really have the forces to attack more than one hamlet a night
and I don't have enough to gather together a company strength, only
a couple of platoons." This has happened, especially in the Delta,
about which Mr. Vann will tell you tomorrow. They have had a very
serious problem of maintaining their forces and, as a result, they are
beginning to send some North Vietnamese down to participate in
that guerrilla role. This is a very difficult role for an outsider to fill.
Senator McGee. What about the manpower requirements of the
Saigon government to cope with the guerrilla tactic? W^ould they be in
any measurable proportion that you could describe for us? I remember
in the days of the Malaysian difficulties there used to be talk of about
11 or 12 to 1. Is there any relevant comparison that you could make
about our experience in Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. I don't think I have any sharp rules of thumb m that
sense. I think you have to have enough regular forces to meet the
enemy regular forces. You have to have enough local defense forces to
meet the enemy guerrilla forces, and j^ou have to have enough popular
support and popular participation to eliminate the enemy's subversive
terrorist and guerrilla effort. You have to have different levels of
participation on the government side just as the enemy has the dif-
ferent styles of operations that he runs, the terrorist or the guerrilla or
the main force unit. The government has to have a mix of the thi^ee to
participate.
Now, they currently have, as I say, about almost 500,000 ten-itorial
forces whose major function is to stop the guerrilla. They have 400,000
armed people's self-defense supported by another milhon or so (The
48
figures are very fuzzy on the total membership of the self-defense
forces, but a large number of people are certainly involved). They
support this effort for security in the hamlets and they participate
in the identification of the enemy apparatus in the hamlets. You also
need a regular army to face the North Vietnamese units that come
down. What is being tried today is to develop this proper mix of
forces to meet the kind of threat it presents.
I don't have any neat formula on that, Senator, I am sorry.
Senator McGee. Would it be fair enough as a generalization to say
it is greatly disproportionate?
Mr. Colby. In total numbers.
Senator McGee. It takes a great many more men to run the estab-
lishment that is trying to stay there and build, than it does to knock it
apart by hit-and-run attack.
Mr. Colby. Right.
Well, in the defense of those 10,000 hamlets, each one requires a
platoon or so, a platoon or a company.
Senator McGee. Those platoons are not available to be moved
north or south?
Mr. Colby. They are tied up doing that. They can't be used to
fight a ])latoon or company.
The Government has in its program this coming year the strengthen-
ing of special self-defense units, which could be called tougher, harder
units. This will include additional training to teach them to use their
arms and so forth. These special units will replace a few of the Popular
Forces ; these in turn will replace some Regional Forces ; these in turn
can replace regular forces. For instance, in a large number of provinces,
the President wants to get into a situation where there are no more
regular forces, but the whole security problem is handled by these
territorial forces, so that his regular forces can go over to the border
and replace the Americans who are going to leave.
UNIQUENESS OF VIETNAM WAR
Senator McGee. Would it be fair to say that this comes now as
one of the lessons that we learned along the way? Our concept pre-
dominantly was contending for the deployment of regular forces in
the old military context.
Mr. Colby. Very much so, Senator. In 1960-61, the problem was
to increase the Vietnamese army from, I believe, 150,000 to 200,000.
The local forces at that time were a total of around 100,000 only. Now
when you are thinking in terms of the self-defense plus the local
forces you are talking of almost a million armed men supporting a
regular establishment of about a half million. So you have got a very
much different proportion.
Senator McGee. All of that endeavor might have worked if the
other side had played fair.
Mr. Colby. You have got to assume he isn't going to play fair.
That is what I was trying to get at when talking with the chairman,
that the enemy did develop a new technique of war here, to use
Senator McGee. That is what is unique about this situation?
49
Mr. Colby. To use different levels in order to go around
Senator McGee. We are imprisoned a bit by our experience in
Korea. We had a penchant to practice our next test of crisis bj^ the
last one and that was embarrassing.
Mr. Colby. I am afraid that is a burden that peaceful people have
to take, Senator. When the democratic powers entered World War I
they entered with cavalry and plumed helmets and sabres. They had
to learn about dirty gray uniforms and machine guns and things like
that during the war.
In World War II we had to learn during the war about blitzkrieg
and close air support and even strategic bombing. The Germans had
developed all these before the war started, and they did very well for
a while.
To return to Vietnam again, the enemy did develop a new technicpie,
which he was quite successful with for quite a few years. I think the
burden of my story is that I think we have learned some of these
lessons, not all of them. We haven't applied them all yet either. We are
in the course of applying them, but I think we will be able to apply
them and meet this new challenge that the enemy has developed for
us.
Senator McGee. That becomes really the guts of pacification?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
Senator McGee. That is what we are talking about in a pacification
program?
Mr. Colby. Yes, su*.
Senator McGee. It is an attempt to fill this gap, which is the change
and the unique attribute of the war in Vietnam in contrast to the
conventional experiences of the past?
Mr. Colby. That is right. It all must be founded on an actively
participating people. That is the real key to it. These people must be
supported and assisted by a variety of forces and a variety of programs.
These must all be integrated into one overall national effort or na-
tional planning. The key to it is the active involvement and participa-
tion of the people.
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF WAR TO GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT
Senator McGee. In terms of resources and the availability of re-
sources, is it possible to keep a guerrilla tactical group in the field at
far lower cost than to try to preserve order from the establishment's
point of view?
Mr. Colby. Well, I couldn't give you an absolutely clear answer
on that. Senator. It is obviously cheaper to maintain that single
guerrilla unit, which can attack any one of 10 or 15 hamlets than it
is to provide the security in all those 10 or 15 hamlets. But by a real
national effort you can provide the security for most of those hamlets
on an unpaid basis by providing the weapons to the people who live
in them, training them to take care of their own defense in great part,
and then reinforcing them by a mobile reaction force which can come
to their help if they get into more trouble than they can handle. In
that way you can work out a way in which you don't have to put
your entire national effort into defense expenditures but can do a
few things other than just defending yourself.
50
This, I think, is more a matter of sustaining a security situation
than achieving it.
Achieving security will requhe considerable investment initially.
But once achieved it can be sustained by these other ways.
TURNING POINT OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM WAR
Senator McGee. It turns out in hindsight that we arrived at a
very wise decision.
I remember one of the trips I made over there in about 1966. We
had some of our Marine units out in Da Nang with General Walt who
were doing a really impressive job with pacification. They were
undertaking it on their own initiative, and it was extremely effective.
The judgment about which we raised questions at the time was
whether this could last? Did we have the kind of manpower that ought
to be doing that sort of thing or whether the Vietnamese should be
doing it, allowing us in that transitional process to assume the more
conventional burdens of security.
Would that be a fair turning point year or did it come a little later
than that?
Mr. Colby. I think 1966-1967 is about when we really began to
work on the business of developing local security in the Vietnamese
side. The American effort became one of training and assisting them
to do this job, not merely doing the big force war alone.
EFFECT OF TET OFFENSIVE ON PACIFICATION EFFORT
Senator McGee. Did your task become any easier or any more
difficult after Tet?
Mr. Colby. Of 1968?
Senator McGee. February, 1968.
Mr. Colby. Well, of course, I arrived after Tet so I don't have that
in mind.
Senator McGee. You succeeded Robert Komer?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
I think obviously there were several very difficult months there in
which there was a tendency on the part of many of the forces to
huddle in around the towns, and be very defensive.
But I think as you look back on it, the Tet attacks did generate a
considerable national eft'ort, a national will, a national resolution to
have done with that sort of nonsense, and to i)articipate in the
program.
I think it also galvanized the Government to develop some newer
programs. It was not a government which was all that old, so I am not
saying that they had been sitting doing nothing. They had only been
inaugurated in the fall of 1967. But thoy did launch a number of new
programs, general mobilization, self-defense, the Phung Hoang or
Phoenix program and some others. As you look back on Tet you see
that, despite the real disaster, in a psychological sense it did have a
certain impact on the national effort, the national will.
effect of terrorism ON pacified rural AREAS
Senator McGee. The task of holding a remote rural area together,
a pacified area as you might call it in some circumstances, multiplies
51
as the incidence of assassination increases. As that incidence goes
down it decreases. Wonld that be a fair
Air. Colby. It is a tricky figure, Senator, because if the enemy has
full control of the area then you don't have much terrorism. In essence
they would be running the place so there would be no need to sneak
in and throw a bomb and so forth.
On the other hand, generally, as you get better security, the ter-
rorism and so forth will reduce, but, like most of our statistics out
there, it is not an absolute.
IMPATIENCE OVER PROGRESS IN VIETNAM QUESTIONED
Senator McGee. I mentioned this before, and it seems rather
relevant here. At one time I crossed a river up north at Da Nang on
a raft because the local bridge was lying in the water. It had been
blown up earlier that week. The young fellow who was pushing us
across made the point that there was the real illustration of the
problem in South Vietnam. He said it took somebody a half hour or
an hour to train a man to blow up a bridge, but it took us two, tliree
or four years to educate a man to build a bridge. Doesn't this frame
rather sharpl}^ the contrast between the guerrillas' opportunities and
the government's responsibilities?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
It obviously takes a considerable greater investment of time and
energy to produce a decent society than it does to tear it down.
Senator McGee. That is why it seems to me we are often very
guilt}" of being unwisely impatient about the course of events in
Vietnam. I personally think that the headway is measurable. It is
painfully slow and we wish it A\ould go as fast as we might be able
to do it here with our own kind or as fast as it went in France once
it was under way
I think the circumstancos and the history and almost the contradic-
tions of events give us no other choice than to expc'ct a much slower
evolution of this new process that seems to be genuinely underway in
very large sections at least of South Vietnam. I am one of those Avho
applauds those of you who have to sit through all of our bombast from
time to time and our impatieiu;c and wondering why you didn't do it
last Tuesday instead of a year from Tuesday.
Mr. Colby. Sometimes, Senator, we wonder why we didn't think of
it last Tuesday, too.
Senator McGee. It is a thankless responsibility that you have. I
think it is one that has some lasting, sustaining qualities to it that will
be there long after a lot of the other jazzy things that Mr. Cronkite
or anyone else runs on the 6:00 o'clock news. It doesn't get very much
play, but I think this is the real muscle and sustaining fiber of any new
social, economic or political grouping. That is why it is so urgent and
so important.
Mr. Chairman, that is all the time I want to take for questions.
I do think it ought to give us all pause as members of the Senate in
trying to pin timetables on either you, Mr. Colby, or the President or
the Saigon Government or anj^-one else. Surely we have learned 20
times over that in that part of the world the convenience of a
Republican and Democratic calendar doesn't carry any weight.
52
Mr. Colby. I think my timetable, Senator, is to do it as fast as it
can be done.
Senator McGee. I think onr concern rightfully is one of making
sure there is no reckless or needless lagging, just because people might
become tired or a little frustrated. It has to be pressed with all
responsible haste.
Mr. Colby. Right.
Senator McGee. I would not think beyond the tempo of respon-
sibility.
COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESSES
I want to commend you and those who work with you for what I
think is a real selfless undertaking in this enterprise.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator.
I hope that nothing has been said by me which would in any way
criticize the job that the director of this program is doing. He is, if I
understood him correctly, following orders. He didn't make the policy,
nor did he originate the idea of going into Vietnam. He formerly, as he
testified to the Senator from Missouri, w^as an agent with the CIA.
Is that correct?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I assume he is now under the orders of the present
Administration, as he was of the previous one.
Mr. Colby. I am a member of the Department of State now, Mr.
Chairman. And my immediate superior is General Abrams.
The Chairman. I certainly commend the Ambassador because I
think he has an extremely difficult job. I would commend him and
all his associates.
OBJECT OF pacification PROGRAM
It is such a difficult job that I am prompted again by the Senator
from Wyoming's remarks to ask a question which is perhaps very
unnecessary to others but still bothers me. I think you said, and it
has been said before, that this is an interesting experiment in nation-
building. You are building a new kind of nation in South Vietnam and
that is the object of the pacification program. Is that an unfair or
accurate statement?
Air. Colby. It is a contribution to the building of a nation now,
Mr. Chairman. It doesn't do it all by itself.
The Chairman. Yes, granted that. I didn't mean to imply you
were doing it all by yourself or that your organization was. But it
bears the major part of the financial cost, technical direction and
knowledge. You are building a new nation, different from that which
was historically there, with different ideas about how it should be
run, if I understand it correctly. You are not recreating a feudal
system that was characteristic, as you mentioned, in the ancient days
of either Annam or Cochin China.
As I understood what you said before, the present South Vietnam
includes most of old Vietnam other than Tonkin. Is that correct?
Mr. Colby. Mostly, yes.
The Chairman. The tAvo southern provinces?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
53
QUESTION IS ONE OF U.S. PRIORITIES
The Chairman. The question keeps coming back to me. Granted
that you are doing an effective job and accepting your testimony, it
would appear to be quite effective, the question still returns as it does
when I see the magnificent things we have done in space. It comes
back to the question that recurs on the floor of the Senate: Fine, it
was successful, but is it as necessary and essential to the security and
safety of the country as pacifying the internal dissension in this
country that results in riots, civil disturbances, in some cases the
virtual breakdown of our judicial system, as recently exhibited in some
of our big cities or the necessity for building schools to educate our
populace, the necessity for clean air to breathe and clear water? This
comes back to the same continually recumng question.
Granted it is an interesting experiment to go abroad, to take the
remnants of a feudal colonial community and to build a nice, shining
democratic community. It is an interesting thing to do, as I am sure
it was to Mr. Teller when he solved the problem of hydrogen explosion.
That is fascinating to a physicist.
I have to raise the question again, not for you, because you are
not the policy maker, but really for the Senate and the Committee
and the country. Is this of the highest priority that we must defer
doing all of the things that we continually admit should be done and
need to be done in the United States now in order to cure what I call
the very serious social and political afflictions of our own communities.
It all comes back to that question.
I am not at all sure it is a proper question to ask you because you are
doing the job you are asked to do. If I drifted into that question a
moment ago, 1 will say I probably was improper in doing it simply
because of my constant pre-occupation with this problem for four or
five years. I think [)crhaps it is wrong to ask you to make a j udgment
on that question because you are not a policy maker. You are doing
the best job you can do. Everyone says, given your assignment, you
are doing as good a job as one could possibly expect. I have heard no
criticism of the way you discharge your responsibilities. So I don't
want to pursue it.
I was trying to make my own position clear. There is no need
of my pressing you to make a decision upon a highest policy, which
is the matter of what kind of a country does this country want to
be. Do we think it is most important to use our major efforts to create
or help create a new society in an Asian country. I often think when
I see people like you with obvious talents, energy and intelligence,
how much wo could benefit by ha^dng some of your talents applied
to the problems here at home, in my State or in Chicago, Watts or
Harlem. There are lots of places A\'here we have a use for j^our talents.
That is the question and I don't think I mil ask you to answer it.
I was really only trying to state my own position correctly.
civilian casualties of U.S. BOMBING, ARTILLERY AND GUN SHIPS
Certain questions of fact that need to be explored occur to me. You
have given the numbers of victims of Vietcong terrorism. Could you
give the number of civilians who have been killed by American
bombing, artillery and gun ships? Do you have such figures?
54
Mr. Colby. I don't think I have them right here. I do hare them
available and can get them.
The Chairman. Were those figures kept by anyone during the past
several years?
Mr. Colby. They were imperfectly kept, I believe. It is a very
difficult figure to get.
The Chairman. I thmk I recall having asked questions before and
being told th.' Pentagon did not keep such figures.
Mr. Colby. They do not have a precise figure. We do have a figure
of the civilian casualties admitted to province hospitals. That is the
only kind of a figure we have.
The Chairman. Can you supply whatever figures you have available?
Mr. Colby. I certainly will. I don't have them available here, but
we will supply them.
(The information referred to follows.)
The number of civilian war casualties admitted to province and military hospi-
tals during the period of Jan. 1967 to Dec. 1969 totals 200,950.
The Chairman. Have we killed substantial numbers of civilians with
bombing, artillery or gun sliips?
Mr. Colby. It is not kept in that fashion, Senator. What it sho\ys is
the number of admissions of people with war wounds into province
hospitals. There is no showing as to just where those wounds came
from. It isn't ascribed to either a Vietcong or a Government bomb.
The Chairman. Are there figures on those who die who don't appear
in the hospital?
Mr. Colby. They probably do not appear.
The Chairman. They just disappear into the
Mr. Colby. They are buried.
The Chairman. And they disappear. So there really are no figures
about that?
south VIETNAMESE DESIRE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND PEACE
You were speaking of the national cause. Do you tliink that a
searching for a national identity exists as a major motive or is there
just a wish for peace in South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. I think there is a very strong desire for nationhood in
the South, Mr. Chairman — there is a wish for peace as well — particu-
larly with your leadership elements, and by that I mean the leadership
in the villages as well as the others. Each village, you see, has a little
temple in it. This is not necessarily a religious temple, it is the temple
of the village and there is a very strong community sense in that way.
The ChAjIrman. I realize that the life centered around the village
is traditional. Has this grown to a point where they have a feeling of
nationhood of all of the villages that now constitute the old Annam
and old Cochin China?
Mr. Colby. During the past six months. Senator, most of the village
chiefs and most of the hamlet chiefs have attended this course at
Vung Tau. At Vung Tau they went through this five-week course
during which they studied the program of the government and the
effort of the government to form a new country and so forth. During
each one of these courses the president came down and spent the
afternoon or the evening with them and talked with them.
55
If yon go up to that village chief or that hamlet chief in the far north
or the far south of the country and ask him about his experience at
Vung Tau, he recalls it. He may still be wearing the black pajamas he
was issued there.
He may recall the fact that the president spoke to them and what
he said to them. So that in that sense I think there is a development
of a sense of national identity among these village chiefs and hamlet
chiefs, who were elected by the people in their villages and hamlets.
They are part of something bigger than themselves.
The Chairman. This is new.
Mr. Colby. This is in the last 6 months. This program has gone on,
and I think it has had a substantial effect in these hamlets.
The Chairman. Not onl}^ is it new in your activity, it is new in the
experience of Vietnam because they didn't have much of a feeling,
as I think you have already testified, of a political nationhood.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. There was some degree of ethnic pride with regard
to what I guess you would call their culture. I think that was true
to a great extent in China too in some of its periods.
Mr. Colby-. Oh, yes, very much so.
The Chairman. They were proud of being Chinese, but didn't
think much of the central government.
Mr. Colby. That is right.
There are a lot of Chinese living elsewhere in Southeast Asia who
have a feeling of being Chinese.
The Chairman. I was thinking of the idea that they really have a
hankering for a nation in the sense that the nationalists have had in
Europe and in other areas during the last 100 years. Nationalism
really is a rather modern growth.
Mr. Colby. The Viet Minh movement was a strong movement.
It was a desire for an independent Vietnamese nation.
The Chairman. But you had already testified, I thought quite
correctly, that this was motivated by their hatred of the French
domination.
Mr. Colby. Yes, and a desire to have their own nation, their own
Vietnamese nation.
The Chairman. I thought most importantly to get rid of the
French, and secondarily — I don't know about that. That is an aca-
demic question that we can't do anything about now.
SIZE of vietcong infrastructure
You said in the beginning, I believe, the estimated infrastructure
of the Vietcong was 70,000. We have a letter from the Army, which
I will put in the record. All I am trying to do is clarify this as best
I can. It says:
With regard to paragraph 6 of fact sheet, a better perspective of the operation
can be gained when consideration is given to the current militarj^ intelligence
estimate that Vietcong Infrastructure strength apiDroximates 80,000.
Have there been any changes in that? The letter is from William
Becker, Major General, Chief of Legislative Liaison of the Depart-
ment of the Army.
56
(The information referred to follows.)
Department of the Army,
Office of the Secretary of the Army,
Washington, D.C., January 9, 1970.
Hon. J. W. FuLBRiGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign TteJaiionSf
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Secretary of the Army has asked me to respond to
j^our letter concerning the Phoenix Program.
Attached you will find an unclassified fact sheet, originally prepared at the
request of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which discusses in some detail
the essential elements of this Government of Vietnam Program and U.S. assistance
to the program.
With regard to paragraph 6 of the fact sheet, a better perspective of the opera-
tion can be gained when consideration is given to the current military intelligence
estimate that Viet Cong Infrastructure strength approximates 80,000.
I trust this information will be helpful.
Sincerel}^,
William A. Becker,
Major General, GS,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.
Fact Sheet
Subject: Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program In Vietnam.
Purpose: To provide information on the above subject for the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
1. Phung Hoang is a Government of Vietnam (GVN) Plan with the objective
of centralizing and coordinating the. efforts of all military and civilian agencies
engaged in the neutrahzation of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Open an-
nouncement of the heretofore classified program was made by President Thieu on
1 October 1969. This announcement pointed out to the people that Phung Hoang
is a policy aimed at protection of the people against terrorism. For example, during
1968 Viet Cong terrorism wounded some 12,000 and killed 5,400 South Viet-
namese; so far during 1969 there have been some 14,000 wounded and .5,-500
killed. The VCI is defined as that political organization by which the Viet Cong
control or seek to control the people of South Vietnam. A more detailed explana-
tion is at inclosure 1. The basic essence of the program is a fully coordinated
intelligence effort of all existing GVN and United States agencies targeted spe-
cifically on the VCI with the express purpose of neutralizing its effectiveness and
control over the people. The word Phung Hoang is derived from the Vietnamese
word meaning coordination.
2. To coordinate and manage United States assistance and support to the
GVN Phung Hoang Program, the Commander, United States Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) has developed an advisory structure
known as the Phoenix Program. This advisory and assistance program is under
the staff supervision of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), Ambassador Colby. There are
some 450 United States military advisory personnel involved in the Phoenix
Program. Of this number, 262 serve at district and city levels, which are the key
operational elements, with the remainder of the personnel serving at the national,
regional, and provincial levels.
3. The coordinated intelligence effort against the VCI had its beginning in
July 1967, when COMUSMACV established a joint civilian/military advisory
activity entitled "Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX)" with the
specific mission of assisting and supporting the GVN in a coordinated attack on
the VCI. Initially this program received Httle official GVN attention and support.
However, in December 1987, recognizing the need for a coordinated intelligence
effort against the VCI, the GVN initiated the Phung Hoang Program with the
mission of neutralizing the VCI. Accordingly, COMUSMACV changed the name
of its advisory activity from ICEX to its current name, Phoenix. With the
issuance of a "Presidential decree in July 1968, which established formal GVN
functions and organizations to implement the Phung Hoang Program, the GVN
officially committed itself to the program.
4. To control the overall program and ensure the eoordination and cooperation
among all elements capable of contributing, the GVN has established a structure
of committees from national to province levels. The Chairman of the Central
Committee is the Minister of Interior; the Vice-Chairman is the Director General
of the National Police.
5. It is at the district level that the concerted intelligence effort against the
VCI becomes most concentrated. At this level, the GVN have organized District
InteUigence and Operating Coordination Centers (DIOCCs). The DIOCC is
the facility where representatives of existing units and agencies are brought
together for a coordinated effort of intelligence collection, processing, dissemi-
nation, and timely, positive exploitation operations specifically targeted against
the \'CI. The Vietnamese District Chief is the DIOCC Chief; however, he nor-
mally delegates responsibility for daily operations of the DIOCC to his deputy
or Chief of Police. The District Senior Advisor (usually a United States Army
Major) is the District Phoenix Coordinator. Also assigned to the advisory team
is an intelligence trained officer who serves as the full time Phoenix advisor to
the DIOCC. This officer advises and assists the District Chief on DIOCC opera-
tions primarily in the area of organizational and management techniques and
procedures of intelligence collection and files (i.e.. Name Index Files, Dossiers,
Area Files), first-level analysis and dissemination of intelligence.
6. Ways in which the G\'N attempts to neutralize and exploit intelligence on
the VCI within the concept of the Phung Hoang Program are, in order of priority,
defection, capture and exploitation, and discreditation or compromise. It must
be recognized that some VCI are killed unavoidably during the normal course
of combative reaction operations; however, the overall percentage is quite low.
For example during 1968 when some 15,000 VCI were neutralized, 72 percent
were captured, 13 percent defected and only 1.5 percent were killed. Defection
and capture are the preferred methods of neutralization as the individuals often
provide highly useful information which leads to additional neutralizations and
to locating of arms and supply caches.
7. The Phung Hoang Program has evolved from many regional programs, some
initiated as early as 1962. In July 1968 these programs were pulled together into
a single, integrated national program which was indorsed by the GVN leadership
and given a high priority in the overall pacification effort. Basic organizational
and operational techniques are constantly being refined to improve the overall
effectiveness of the program.
Mr. Colby. That is a recent letter?
The Chairman. It is fairl}^ recent. The date is January 9.
Mr. Colby. There has been no recent change. We have been holding
it at about 75,000, as I said, Mr. Chairman, but we have very little
confidence in that overall figure.
The Chairman. They seem to think it is 80,000. Is it in that
neighborhood?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
I think that that figure was around earlier and that we have updated
that a bit. I can't testify as to why he sent that particular letter.
ACTIVITIES OF OPERATION PHOENIX
The Chairman. I have another sheet here. Did your j^rogram or the
CIA supervisee the organization of Operation Phoenix?
Mr. Colby. In the earliest origins of it, CIA was associated with it.
In its earliest stages it preceded my organization.
The Chairman. That was before you
Mr. Colby. Before the CORDS. '
The Chairman. This pamphlet is from the Department of State
Media Services of last 5^ear and it says as follows:
Nobody knows yet exactly how many VCI arc running this shadow government
behind the bamboo curtain but in December 1967 when Operation Phoenix was
launched it was estimated by inteUigence sources that about 80,000 were in VCI
jobs. In its first year despite the Communist offensive in February and May 1968
Phoenix resulted in nearly 16,000 of these cadres being rooted out of their under-
ground position.
44-706—70-
((
58
That uses the word "cadres" which has a certain mihtary impli-
cation. I thought this })rogram v/as directed i)rimarily at civihans.
Mr. Colby. I think they mean pohtical cadres, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Pohtical, not mihtary?
Mr. Colby. No.
The infrastructure are the pohtical cadre; the Vietnamese word is
can bo" which is a cadre man, political leader.
The Chairman. I am glad to clear that up because the use of that
word in other reports I have seen left the impression it was military
whereas as a matter of fact it is civilian.
Mr. Colby. This is the political control structure under the Com-
munist movement.
The Chairman. Is there a quota each year under the Phoenix
program?
Mr. Colby. There is a quota system for the national goal. There is
a certain amount of this that is subdivided into various other areas.
The Chairman. Could you tell us what the quota was for last year?
Mr. Colby. The quota for last year was 1,800 a month. This can be
filed by individuals who are captured, individuals who ralXy or indi-
viduals who are killed in the course of operations.
THE CHIEU hoi PROGRAM
The Chairman. Are the Chieu Hoi people those you call ralliers?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. Exactly what does rally mean, simply surrender?
Mr. Colby. Returnee is another word, Mr. Chairman. It is a sur-
render. It is coming to the government side saying 'T was on the enemy
side. I want to join your side." I expect to testify a little more fully
on that program a little later, Mr. Chairman, but
The Chairman. Whatever you wish. Do you feel you shouldn't
now?
Mr. Colby. I would be glad to comment.
The Chairman. Most of the material I am using is in published
accounts.
Mr. Colby. There is nothing confidential about the Chieu Hoi
program, but I do have a more extensive presentation on it later for
you. I might just add that this program to invite people to come over
from the other side has been going on since 1963.
The Chairman. That is the Chieu Hoi?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
origin of the phoenix program
The Chairman. As distinguished from the Phoenix?
Mr. Colby. The Phoenix program had a few precursors which
were launched by CIA to try to get the different intelligence services
there to work together to identify the political apparatus or infra-
structure and begin to see who they were. This was formalized in
December of 1967, in a decree by the Prime Minister. It was then
made more official in June of 1968 by a decree by the President.
This set up the structure of coordination and collation of infor-
mation about the Vietcong infrastructure.
59
FIGURES ON SIZE OF VCI AND PHOENIX PROGRAM QUOTAS
The Chairman. One curious question arises from these figures.
As you mentioned there have been quotas. One article in the Army-
paper, I think, says the quota in 1968 was 15,000. A story in The
Washington Evening Star, cited 19,534 in 1969, making a total of
34,534. Yet the estimated number in the Vietcong infrastructure
at present is approximately the same as it was in the beginning.
This leaves a very interesting question. Do they regenerate the
Viet Cong infrastructure as fast as you eliminate it?
Mr. Colby. Well, again I prefaced my remarks, Mr. Chairman,
by saying that it has been very difficult to get any kind of statistics
that are worth anything on the size of the Vietcong infrastructure.
We started with some estimates saying, a typical village would have
a certain number in its structure and then multiplying that by the
number of villages. We then refined it slightly by saying that hamlets
of different levels of security would probably have bigger or smaller
numbers. During the past year we have gone out and asked for
identified VCI. We have made the thrust of it one of local collection
of specific information on individuals who are members of the VCI
in different areas.
This whole process has improved oiu- figures somewhat, but we are
still concerned that some of these numbers have in them people who
are really followers rather than leaders, and that the total number,
which would include the followers, is a bit higher than it should be.
Now, this is being clarified. The Government has issued several
decrees tlefining very carefully what kind of people are VCI and at
what levels antl what sentences they can receive depending on their
level of im])ortance.
There has been a general improvement of tlio performance, but,
as Mr. Kaiser said in that article you noted we still have quite a way
to go, Mr. Chairman. We are working at it.
The Chairman. Are the statistics in this area any more difficult
than in the other areas of the war?
Mr. Colby. They are a little worse in this area, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. A little worse?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Some of the other statistics I think are very good. For instance,
I mentioned the statistics in the people's self-defense. I find the
membership figures a little soft. On the other hand, I am veiy con-
fident of the accuracy of the 400,000 weapons which have been
distrubuted because we have gone around and looked and counted.
So some statistics are good and some statistics aren't so good. We try
to use them with that in mind.
incentives to fill phoenix program quotas
The Chairman. In the quota S3'stem of the Phoenix program, are
any cash incentives offered to the Vietnamese who operate that pro-
gram for filling their quota?
Mr. Colby. ISTot to the Vietnamese who operate it. There are certain
rewards offered in public statements that certain individuals are
wanted. There have been posters and leaflets put out that a certain
man is wanted because he is a member of the infrastructure and par-
60
ticipated in a certain terrorist act and that if he is produced or infor-
mation is produced which will lead to his arrest than a certain reward
will be paid.
The Chairman. It is like putting a price on Jesse James.
Mr. Colby. Yes, except I would say that the Vietnamese Govern-
ment has made a considerable effort to indoctrinate all the way down
the line that a live captive is better than a dead one, because the live
one carries information in his head, which can do you a great deal of
good for future efforts. It has, I think, become generally accepted that
what we want is either ralliers or captives, and we are really not so
anxious to get the others.
INTERROGATION METHODS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM
The Chairman. Do they have effective ways of eliciting information
from the captives?
Mr. Colby. Well, I used to be in the intelligence business, Mr.
Chairman, and, if you want bad intelligence, use bad interrogation
methods. If you want good intelligence, use good intelligence inter-
rogation methods, because you will get bad intehigence if you use
the wrong methods. And that again is a message that we put out.
We endeavor to train people in i)roper and useful and sensible methods
of interrogation because they are just more productive than others.
TRAINING OF PHOENIX PROGRAM ADVISERS AT FORT HOLABIRD
The Chairman. I don't remember whether the Uvo men in Hola-
bird — Is Holabird the place where they train people to be advisers
and supervisors or whatever they call it?
Mr. Colby. Holabird is a miUtary intelligence school. Air.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Colby. They do train some of the officers who come over and
join our Phoenix program as advisers there. All I can say about the
allegations of these two gentlemen that you referred to as to what
they were trained for is that they were not in Vietnam and we have
some rather direct instructions to our people as to their behavior in
Vietnam.
Some of our younger officers were somewhat concerned about their
role in the Phoenix after the Green Beret case came up and so we
sent them an explanation of what their role was. We clarified very
clearly to them that they are under the same rules of war that they
would be if they were a member of a regular unit. If they see anything
that does not meet these standards, they are not only not to associate
with it, they are to positively protest against it and are to report
to us.
The Chairman. That is what you tell them in Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. That is what we tell them in Vietnam, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Does that mean that you question what they allege
they were taught at Holabird?
Mr. Colby. I am not ciualified to discuss that.
The Chairman. I just want to make it clear. You are not saying
that what they said they were taught in Holabird is not true?
Mr. Colby. Yes, I just don't know that, sir.
61
The Chairman. That is all I wanted for the record, to be clear as to
how far your testimony goes because, as you know, there has been a
great deal in the press about this matter.
Mr. Colby. Yes, certainly.
The Chairman. I think it is a very proper thing to at least get
what you know about it.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
INSTRUCTIONS TO PHOENIX ADVISERS
The Chairman. I think you made a very proper statement with
regard to what you tell them. Since this has come up in this fashion,
would it be appropriate for you to provide for the record the explana-
tion that you have given in detail to the Phoenix advisers?
Mr. Colby. I would be delighted to do so.
The Chairman. I think it would be a healthy and proper thing to do.
Mr. Colby. We have it right here, I think.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Colby. No, we will bring it in.
The Chairman. All right.
You can provide examples of a critical report of U.S. advisers.
I think this would be a very useful thing to do for the record.
(The information referred to folloMs.)
Instkuctions to U.S. Peesonnel Concerning Phoenix Activities
The PHOENIX program is one of advice, support and assistance to the GVN
Phung Hoang program, aimed at reducing the influence and effectiveness of the
Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Viet-Nam. The Viet Cong Infrastructure is an
inherent part of the war effort being waged against the GVN by the Viet Cong
and their North Vietnamese Alhes. The unlawful status of members of the Viet
Cong Infrastructure (as defined in the Green Book and in GVN official decrees) is
well established in GVN law and is in full accord with the laws of land warfare
followed by the United States Army.
Operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure include the collection of in-
telligence identifying these members, inducing them to abandon their allegiance
to the Viet Cong and rally to the government, capturing or arresting them in order
to bring them before Province Security Committees for lawful sentencing, and, as
a final resort, the use of military or police force against tliem if no other way of
preventing them from carrying on their unlawful activities is possible. Our training
emphasizes the desirability of obtaining these target individuals alive and of
using intelligent and lawful methods of interrogation to obtain the truth of what
they know about other aspects of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. U.S. personnel
are under the same legal and moral constraints with respect to operations of a
Phoenix character as they are with respect to regular military operations against
enemj^ units in the field. Thus, they are specifically not authorized to engage in
assassinations or other violations of the rules of land warfare, but they are entitled
to use such reasonable military force, as is necessary to obtain the goals of rallying,
capturing, or eliminating the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the Republic of Viet-Nam.
If U.S. personnel come in contact with activities conducted by Vietnamese
which do not meet the standards of the rules of land warfare, they are certainly
not to participate further in the activity. They are also expected to make their
objections to this kind of behavior known to the Vietnamese conducting them
and they are expected to report the circumstances to next higher U.S. authority
for decision as to action to be taken with the GVN.
There are individuals who find normal police or even military operations re-
pugnant to them personally, despite the overall legality and morality of these
activities. Arrangements exist whereby individuals having this feeling about
military affairs can, according to law, receive specialized assignments or even
exemptions from military service. There is no similar legislation with respect to
police type activities of the U.S. military, but if an individual finds the police
62
type activities of the PHOENIX program repugnant to him, on his appUcation,
he can be reassigned from the prograni without prejudice.
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, I promised the distmguished
Senator from New Jersey
Senator Case. No hurry, Mr. Chairman. You follow along those
lines because I have finished with my obligation on the floor.
The Chairman. I am willing to yield.
I don't wish to exaggerate the significance of this matter. In itself
it is not ])erhai)s nearly as dramatic as the Mylai incidents or the
Daniel Lang story in the New Yorker or others, but being related to
it, it is very healthy and very wise for you or your colleagues to clarify
this as far as you possibly can.
CONVICTION AND RELEASE OF VCI
How many of these VCI, identified and apprehended, are actually
convicted and how many are released of those who are tried?
Mr. Colby. Our information on that is not all that accurate yet.
There is a considerable improvement in the past two or three months
in the information on that, but I can't give you a statistic, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Have you no estimate?
Mr. Colby. But we do know that the province security committees
have actually been tightening up on the handling of these people over
the past six months.
EFFECT of repeated ARREST AND QUESTIONING ON VILLAGERS
The Chairman. What do you think is the psychological effect upon
villagers who are arrested and questioned and then released and then
arrested and questioned again about their allegiance? Does this have
any effect upon them?
Mr. Colby. I think so. One of the provisions of the pacification
plan of the government for 1970 is that the village chief will be
informed when any man is arrested within his village, so that he can
come up and make representations to the appropriate authorities
about that individual if it is a man known in the community for his
probity or something else. This just opens it up, to try again to make
more of this program public so that people can understand it and
participate in it and have greater confidence in it.
PHOENIX program QUOTAS! CAPTURED AND KILLED
The Chairman. You say the quota was 1,800 men a month?
Mr. Colby. 1,800 i)eople.
The Chairman. What percentage of that quota was captured and
how many were killed?
Mr. Colby. Over the year 1969, the number captured was 8,515,
rallied 4,832 and killed 6,187, to a total of 19,534. About 30 percent
were killed.
That killed figure also includes a number of peoj^le who were dis-
covered to be VCI after they were killed. For instance, various people
may be killed in an ambush outside the village at night when some
armed men come along and a firefight takes place, or in an attack on
63
an enemy 2:ueiTilla \niit. By looking at the papers that the}^ carried
and their identification it can be discovered that those killed were
actually members of the VCI. Thus, even though that particular
operation was not aimed to get them, it may develop later they were
members of the VC infrastructure and they consequently do count
against that quota.
PURPOSE OF PHOENIX PROGRAM
The Chairman. Has this i)rogram any precedent that you know
of in our history? Have we done this before?
Mr. CoLB^ . The identification and arrest of subversives?
The Chairman. No, a program for the assassination of civilian
leaders.
Mr. Colby. I question whether that is an appropriate title for it,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You rephrase it. I was trying to shorten it.
Mr. Colby. I don't think that is the appropriate title. I think it is
an internal security program.
The Chairman. Neutralization is the word. I couldn't think of it
for a moment — neutralization of civilian leaders.
Mr. Colby. No, sir; my title for it and actually the Vietnamese
government's title for this*^ program this year is a program to protect
the ])oople against terrorism. Now, I think you could call it an internal
security program, one aimed at identifying the members of the enemy
infrastructure, to get them either to rally or to capture them. In cases
of firefights they do get killed.
The Chairm.\n. What do you call a firefight? I didn't get the sig-
nificance of that.
Mr. Colby. A firefight is when two units run into each other out
in the country and shoot.
The Chairman. They are military people, aren't they?
Mr. Colby. Or jjolice.
The Chairman. I wasn't thinking of them.
Mr. Colby. Or self-defense, Senator. That is what happens in Viet-
nam. In each of these hamlets in Vietnam at night there is a curfew,
and there is a small defense unit outside the hamlet. They lay am-
bushes to stop enemy guerrilla imits from coming into the hamlet.
When the,y see some armed men coming along they shoot at them.
The Chairman. I am familiar with that. I thought that would be
classified as part of the military operation. I didn't know that was
considered part of the Phoenix operation.
Mr. Colby. I say that certain of those peoi)le who are killed in that
kind of an incident are later revealed as members of the enemy
infrastructure.
PROCEDURES CONCERNING PHOENIX PROGRAM PRISONERS
The Chairman. Is it your information that those who are captured
under the Phoenix program are not executed but put in prison? Are
they ever executed?
Mr. Colby. Well, let me say they are not legally executed, no.
What is done to them is that they are detained under this emergency
64
detention procedure. Now, I would not want to say here that none
has ever actually been executed, but certainly the program, the
government's policy and its directives are that these people when
captured are placed in detention centers and held for the appropriate
period, and the government has taken steps to insure that. But you
have not had convictions of membership in the enemy apparatus
followed by an execution. That has not happened in the past several
years.
The Chairman. In most of the newspaper stories the implication,
if not the direct assertion, is that those who are neutralized or taken
into custody are usually disposed of physically. Whether you want
to use the word executed, assassinated or electrocuted, the implication
is that they are killed.
Mr. Colby. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That is what you read.
Mr. Colby. That is a very unfortunate term. It came from the
difficulty of developing a term which would generalize the number
captured, rallied and killed. Various terms were tried to explain what
the combination of those three meant. I myself have alwaj^s gone back
to using the terms captured, rallied or killed as the only possible way
to do it.
The Chairman. Let me finish one thought. This is a Vietnamese
program. We only advise them and teach them how. Is that correct?
Mr. Colby. We advise them and support them to some extent.
The Chairman. We support them. We have an adviser with every
how many men, 20 men?
Mr. Colby. Oh, no.
We have an adviser, a young officer, who sits in each district office
of this organization.
The Chairman. In other words, our statistics are fairly accurate
on how many are in a quota, but we do not follow up, I take it, about
what is done with them. Is that why there are no statistics on what
happens to them?
Mr. Colby. No, we are beginning to follow up on that, Mr. Chair-
man. We did not follow up in the past to a great degree, but the
government wishes to follow it up more closely, and they have begun
to share certain of their information with us. However, I don't have
enough of an experience factor here to give you any statistics with
any degree of reliability.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, pardon me; I don't want to interru])t.
Mr. Colby. I just wanted to add one ])oint, if I may. The VCI
we are talking about, Mr. Chairman, are members of this enemy
apparatus. It is not at all unusual that these people operate in a
guerrilla base and participate in guerrilla operations and carry weapons
and so forth, and frequently, in the course of those fights that take
place as a result, these peojile arc killed.
Now, there is one problem area that Mr. Kaiser mentions in his
article which is a real problem that we are worried about. It is that
there is too little of the careful casework which identifies an indi^adual
and then goes out to capture him. Rather too often the quotas may be
met by individuals who are actually caught in an ambush by chance.
So that really it wasn't the result of good intelligence and good police
work but rather just by chance.
Excuse me.
65
PHOENIX PROGRAM IS NOT A COUNTER-TERROR OPERATION
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, the reason that I asked that I might
mtervene momentarily is again because we are after facts; we are not
taking positions at all.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Case. This is not properly then defined in fact as a counter-
terror operation?
Mr. Colby. No, it is not. Senator.
Senator Case. You swear to that by everything holy. You have
already taken your oath?
Mr. Colby. I have taken my oath. There was a period. Senator,
some years ago when an organization was called a counter terror
organization.
Senator Case. I am not arguing we shouldn't have one. I am iust
trying to find out what this is.
Mr. Colby. That was some time ago. There was an organization
formed there which was given the words counter terror. There were
a certain amount of fairy stories about what it actually did but it
has long ago been discarded as a concept, as any kind of an organization.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby. The organization itself later became what are called
the provincial reconnaissance units. These are small units of Viet-
namese who work on the infrastructure program. They work under
the government, under the province chiefs' control. They are supported
by the United States. We support this like we support a lot of other
things. They do operate under the same kinds of rules as to who
they are going out to capture and what their rules are as the normal
police services.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND REPUTABLE
REPORTERS
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, this is what puzzles us so much
I have before me an article by Mr. Peter Kami. Are you familiar
with him? He is a reporter.
Mr. Colby. I met him.
The Chairman. This is from a staff reporter of the Wall Street
Journal, which is generally considered a reasonably conservative
newspaper. I mean it isn't given to flights of fancy.
Mr. Colby. He is a very good reporter, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It is not given to flights of fancy particularly
m social or political affairs. This is less than a year ago. It was last
spring and he makes some very positive statements. If it were the
only case it wouldn't disturb me very much. But every time we see
the discrepancy between the more reputable newspaper reporters
and the government's position it always reminds us of the early days
of the war when the government was denouncing people like Halber-
stam for being either ignorant or prejudiced. But events proved
that he told the truth and the government lied about it. This bothers
us. I certainly am not suggesting you are misrepresenting.
Mr. Colby. I remember that article, Mr. Chairman.
66
The Chairman. There were a number of articles.
Mr. Colby. This one
The Chairman. Is it wrong, in your opinion?
Mr. Colby. No, I have full confidence Mr. Kann told the right
story. That is why I stated that, while the policy of the government
is definite, I would not want to testify that nobody was killed wrongly
or executed in this kind of a program. I think it has probably happened,
unfortunately. But I also point out that Mr. Kaiser in the article in
this morning's paper stated that after a considerable effort to identify
cases of abuse of this nature he had been unable to find one. Maybe
it is a difference in time. We have put considerable emphasis on trying
to tighten this up and make sure that it does follow a disciplined
approach. But the fact is that in Vietnam various unfortunate things
have happened in the past. The question is what is our policy, and
what are we doing to make sure that our policy is followed. And I
can assure you our policy is very clear on this and we are going to
enforce it.
REPORTED INCIDENTS UNDER U.S. POLICIES
The Chairman. Yes. It is the latter question that bothers me. I
am not and have never been bothered that the policy is to go out
and assassinate civilians or that the policy is to do what happened,
or is alleged to have happened, or was apparently proved to have
happened in Mylai by Mr. Lang. His article was based upon the
official courts-martial. I can't imagine there is any doubt whatever
that that incident took place. That is the thing that bothers us. This
is no reflection upon the intentions or purposes of the government
officials or their policy. There is a great question that arises under the
circumstances in Vietnam \\dth the greatest exertion and the best of
will to carry out those policies in a reasonably humane manner, that
I think is a serious question. This article which, I think, must be in
the record along with the other one bears directly on it. The reason
it is so important is that I don't believe the American people wish
to be a party to such inhumanity no matter what the objective, even
to build a new society in Vietnam. I don't believe they would agree
that the objective, the end, justifies the means used. I don't, and I
don't believe they do.
Mr. Colby. I agree with you, ]Mr. Chairman, and I think the
officers with me agree with me.
The Chairman. I don't mean for a minute to suggest that you or
anyone else, certainly not you, has declared a policy of the kind of
things that have been reported. Yet they keep being reported, and I
think this can well have gone beyond our capacity to control. This
is a very chaotic situation in Vietnam, I think, and I don't think
the responsibility lies with anyone like yourself or even the soldiers —
and I don't mind saying it here, and I have said before that I personally
have the greatest sympathy for Lieutenant Calley who has been
charged. I think he was put under conditions and circumstances
that were intolerable and it w^asn't his fault that he got there. He
got there because he was ordered by his government. If I am going
to blame anybody, it is the people who do make the i)olicy at the
highest levels, not you or for that matter Lt. Calley either. There are
certain personal things that perhaps could be used and if that was the
only incident I knew about and I thought he was in some way person-
67
ally unique in this, it would be a different story. But it has become such
a common occurrence, at least as reported, that there is something
beyond just the individual. That bothers me about it.
I am not really trying to criticize you or say you are not doing a
good job or you didn't give them the right instructions. It just doesn't
turn out that way.
Mr. Colby. Well, I think so, Mr. Chairman. We could say that not
only is the policy not to go in this direction but there is considerable
effort being made to insure that the policy is followed. There are
aberrations which do occur once in a while. There is no question about
that. But it is our experience from running the program that these
are few and far between. They are not a common occurrence. We are
taking steps to reduce and eliminate those that do occur.
(The articles referred to follow.)
IFrom the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 25, 1969]
The Hidden War: Elite Phoenix Forces Hunt Vietcong Chiefs in an
Isolated Village — Raid Prompted by Informers Finds Most of Foe
Gone and Natives Tight-Lipped — Demolishing a VC Monument
(By Peter R. Kann)
Don Nhon, South Vietnam. — Was it a trap? There was reason for suspicion.
But the risk had to be taken. An unsolicited bit of information offered an
opportunity to strike at a local unit of the Metcong "infrastructure" (VCI), the
clandestine political and administrative apparatus through which the enemy lays
claim to control much of the Vietnamese coimtryside.
The affair began like this:
Two ragged Vietnamese, one short and squat, the other tall and thin, recently
walked into Don Nhon, a village about 50 miles southwest of Saigon that is the
capital of Don Nhon District. The pair told American officials that they wanted
to talk about the VCI in their home village of \'inh Hoa, a nearby community of
about 2,000 persons nestled deep in Vietcong territorj- along a Mekong River
tributary. A Vietcong-sponsored "Liberation Committee" had been elected to
govern Vinh Hoa five months previously, the informers said.
The U.S. advisers were dubious about taking military action on the basis of
this intelligence. An ambush might be in the offing. Vinh Hoa was dangerous
territory, several miles from the nearest government-controlled village. And the
informers said they were refugees, rather than Vietcong defectors, who normally
could be expected to be more eager to talk. But the two stuck to their story of overt
Vietcong control in their village, and their information checked out with that in
allied files.
HIGH PRIORITY
Vinh Hoa clearly was a target for "Operation Phoenix," the high-priority
aUied effort to root out the VCI across South Vietnam. The year-old Phoenix
campaign obviously is related to the Paris negotiations. When peace comes,
South Vietnam's claims to control the coimtrj'side will be strongest where the
VCI cadre are fewest.
The Vietcong claim that about 1,800 governing bodies have been freely elected
in "hberated areas" of South Vietnam. The U.S. dismisses most of the committees
as fictions existing only on paper and claims VCI cadre are being wiped out at a
rate of better than 2,300 a month. Total VCI strength is estimated at about 70,000.
Although conceived largely by CIA men and other American planners, Oper-
ation Phoenix is executed primaril^^ by Vietnamese troops. Its methods range
from after-dark assassination strikes by small killer squads to battalion-sized
cordon and search efforts. A small strike clearly wasn't indicated for Vinh Hoa.
The village might be heavily defended. U.S. officials finally settled on a plan for
a daylight assault with helicopter transportation. The U.S. 9th Division would
provide support.
68
HUNTING THE ENEMY
Phoenix operations are reputed to be highly sophisticated and productive
affairs. The Vinh Hoa effort proved to be neither. It involved intricate — and
apparently flawed — planning, largely fruitless interrogation of fearful, tight-lipped
villagers, calculated brutality applied to suspected Vietcong, the execution of one
suspect, looting of homes by Vietnamese troops, systematic destruction of village
installations and a largel.y unproductive hunt for Vietcong officials who apparently
had fled by sampan long before the allies arrived.
The operation highlighted agonizing questions about Phoenix and the allied
methods for waging war in Vietnam. Because the Vietcong torture and assassinate,
should the allies? Is there value to an operation that "sweeps" a Vietcong area
and then departs, leaving no permanent allied presence? Who should be considered
Vietcong? Does the VC include a farmer who happens to own ancestral rice land
in a Vietcong-controUed village and paj^s taxes to the enemy?
The counter-infrastructure experts are the Provincial Reconnaissance Units,
called "PRUs." Along with the Vietnamese, they include Cambodian and Chinese
Nung mercenaries. All are recruited, trained and paid by the CIA. In two days of
planning the Vinh Hoa force grew to include about 49 PRUs, about 30 Vietnamese
special combat pohce and a handful of interrogators from the Police Special
Branch, Census-Grievance men and psychological warfare cadre. The Americans
taking part in the operation were two civilian PRU advisers, two civilian advisers
to the special police, two young Army officers working in Don Nhon District
and several radio operators. Two companies of the 9th Division, about 110 men,
were to form a cordon around the village to prevent Vietcong escapes.
THE L.\ST MEETING
Final plans were coordinated at the Tactical Operations Center of Kien Hoa
province (which includes Don Nhon) the night before the strike, with more than
a dozen Americans and Vietnamese attending or within earshot. The size of the
meeting troubled CIA men. They worried, justifiably as it turned out, that
confusion and intelligence leaks would follow.
At 7 a.m. the next morning, the operation force is waiting for its helicopter
transport at the airfield at Ben Tre, the Kien Hoa provincial capital. And waiting.
It turns out that the 9th Division is having difficulty arranging its "air assets."
An outpost under siege in a neighboring province has to be aided.
The civilian U.S. advisers begin to get restless and irritable; "The U.S. Army
is more trouble than it's worth ... all their maps and charts and crap . . .
goddamned army must have schools that teach delay and confusion . . . never
seen a 9th Division operation go off on time. . . ."
One adviser spots a plane to the west circling roughly over the area of the
target village. Fluttering from it are thousands of propaganda leaflets. He explodes:
"Great. Just great. The army is really good at this crap. Pick up a paper and read
all about it. Read about the operation that's coming in to get you."
The PRUs and Vietnamese special combat police are wearing a wild variety of
jungle fatigues, flak jackets, bush hats, berets, combat boots, tennis shoes and
sandals. Some are barefoot. Initially they are sitting in orderly rows along the
runway. Soon they begin dispersing about the airfield.
The PRU invent a game. As a big C130 cargo plane comes in to land, they sit
on the runway, then duck their heads as the plane's wings whip past just above
them. "They're the toughest men in this war," says one adviser. "They join this
outfit because they want action."
The American points to a small Vietnamese half-dozing on the grass. "That
man used to be a VC. He got disillusioned with them, so they killed his family.
He lit out for the bush. Spent two years out there alone, conducting a private
vendetta against Charlie. God knows how many VC he killed. Finally he came
in and joined up with PRUs. He wants to kill more VCs."
HOVERING CLOSE
Shortly after 9 a.m., two hours late, 10 helicopters arrive. The Phoenix force
piles aboard and is flown for 1.5 minutes across flat rice land and coconut groves to
the landing zone, a rice paddj^ less than a mile from the center of Vinh Hoa. The
helicopters hover close to the ground, and the troops leap out, wading cautiously
through thigh-deep mud and water toward a treeline from which they expect
enemv fire.
69
There is no firing. At the treeline the troops are joined by the Don Nhon District
U.S. advisers and the two Vietnamese informants who prompted the operation.
They have been separately heUcoptered to the scene. The informers, garbed in
baggy U.S. Army fatigues, are to remain mystery men, for their own protection.
Their heads are covered with brown cloth bags with eye and mouth holes. The two
present a part comic, part frightening spectacle.
The local advisers have bad news. They say the 9th Division cordon along the
southern fringe of the village didn't get into place until about 9 a.m., two hours
late, leaving the Vietcong an escape route. (The 9th Division later denies any
delaJ^) Now the informers claim not to recognize the approach being taken to the
village. One American sharply questions them. Another is cursing the Vietnamese
"psywar" operatives tramping along with the troops: "All we need are these
goddamned guys with their leaflets. And they're wearing black pajamas. Beautiful.
Now the army (the 9th Divi.sion troops) will zap 'em as VC."
LOOKING AROUND
Several of the Vietnamese special police have found an empty farmhouse,
recently deserted judging by damp betel-nut stains on the floor. They are passing
the tinie knocking holes in a water barrel. In another farmhouse, the occupant, an
old lady, stares at a wall while two carefree PRUs boil eggs on her wood stove.
A lone PRU wanders along the treeline shaking his head and muttering, "VC di
di, VC di di . . . (VC gone, VC gone)." The troops presently advance toward a
cluster of houses nearer the village center. Spaced along the mud trails at intervals
of about 10 j^ards are thick mud bunkers, each large enough for several men. The
houses also have bunkers, inside or out Vinh Hoa, being within an allied "free
strike zone," is subject to air and artillei-y pounding.
No booby traps materialize. The troops arrive at a substantial farmhouse with
flower beds in the front yard, a manicured hedge and pillars flanking the front
entrance. It is one of many prosperous homes in Vinh Hoa — surprising, since
Vietcong villages usually are poorer than government-controlled towns. Isolation
from major markets, high Vietcong taxes and allied bombing are among the
reasons.
Behind the house some leaf wrappings are found. "The VC must have been
here," an American says. "That's what they wrap field rations in." (Leaves are
used by most rural Vietnamese, VC or not, to wrap food.) The occupant of the
house an old man who stares at the interlopers through wire-rim spectacles, is
shaking, through age, or fear, or both.
The aged Vietnamese is questioned briefly. "Bring him along," an American
sa.ys sharply. "Let's move." Another adviser saj's. "That old man could be the
top dog VC in this village. You never know." The old man totters along with the
troops. He is released in mid-afternoon when one of the two informers claims him
as an uncle.
INTERROGATION
At about 1 1 a.m., an American adviser and two special police turn up with three
captives. "Found them hiding in a house," the American says. The informers in-
spect the captives and whisper, through an interpreter, that one is a Vietcong
village guerrilla, the second a Vietcong "security section chief" and the third a
non-Vietcong, perhaps a deserter from the South Vietnamese army.
The two identili( d as Vietcong arc bound, and one of them, a narrow-shouldered
bent young man with protruding te((th, is leaned against a tree trunk. Several
police interrogators and PRUs gather around him and fire questions. They want
to know where Vietcong weapons and ammunition are hidden.
The suspect doesn't know or won't say. Soon the questions are interspersed
with yanks at his hair and sharp kicks to his head, face and groin. The prisoner
sags against the tree, face bloodied.
"Americans don't want to be here for any more of this," saj's one U.S. adviser,
moving away. "It's a nasty goddamned business." He adds, "You know, it's
a whole cycle of this stuff. Last week in another village near Don Nhon the VC
marched five government sj'mpathizers into the marketplace and beat their
head in with hammers. So we return it on this guy. It goes on and on."
By now the informers have gotten their bearings. They lead most of the troops
along a trail to a hospital building behind a hedge of blue flowers. It is a straw-
thatch structure containing eight wide plank beds separated by white plastic
curtains. In one corner is a mud bunker, in another a crude case of glassware
and medicine bottles, some with French and American labels. There are no patients
or traces of them.
70
The Americans decide it is a Vietcong hospital for wounded enemy troops.
"Burn it," an American adviser directs. Ignited with cigaret lighters, the hut
biu'ns readily.
In single file, the troops wind along a trail toward the center of Vinh Hoa. Since
there hasn't been any firing, the possibihty of an ambush is discounted. Some of the
PRUs and special police are carrying food and household articles taken from the
outlying farmhouses. The "psy warriors" are strewing the trail with propaganda
leaflets carried in plastic bags. Some of the PRUs have ringed their helmets with
garlands of flowers. The procession takes on a festive air.
Ten minutes later the column reaches the center of the village, a small cluster of
houses and shops facing a square that previously contained a covered marketplace.
The marketplace has been bombed out. In the center of the square is a concrete
obelisk about 10 feet high — a Vietcong memorial, say the Americans, dedicated
to the enemy dead. It is one target of the Phoenix strike.
The PRUs and Vietnamese special police begin searching — and sacking — the
homes. They are bored, and restless, because there has been no "action." The
psywarriors' plastic bags, emptied of propaganda, are commandeered for loot
ranging from clothing to chickens. "Trick or treat," says an American, not really
amused. In one house, some of the Vietnamese troops are having a small celebration.
They have unearthed a bottle of rice wine.
A few village residents, women, children and old men, are assembled along one
side of the square. They squat on their haunches in the dust. Several male captives
are bound a few yards away. Against a wall, the narrow-shouldered prisoner is
rocking back and forth, a trickle of blood running down his head.
Amid whirling dust, a 9th Division helicopter lands in the square. A lean U.S.
lieutenant colonel in polished boots and trim uniform steps out with aides in tow.
Displaying a map marked with red grease pencil, he reports the kill totals of the
support troops: "Charlie Company got three KIAs (Killed in Action), Delta
Company two, we got one from my chopper. . . ." All the fatalities, he says,
were armed Vietcong, carrying packs. They were shot trying to flee through the
cordon. "They had low-level documents on them," the colonel reports. Presently
the chopper leaves.
In the middle of the square, two Americans are strapping demolition charges
around the Vietcong monument. A one-minute warning is sounded. Everyone
takes cover. As the charge explodes, the monument disintegrates into chunks
of brick and concrete. It is exactly noon.
THE VILLAGE CHURCH
The explosion seems to galvanize the foraging troops into action. "Don't they
have anything to do but loot those houses?" an American PRU adviser shouts to
a Vietnamese lieutenant. "Get the men out combing the rest of this village."
Two search parties move out. A third group, mostly Americans, crosses a narrow
footbridge spanning a canal to investigate a church.
Crossing the bridge, the Americans spot fresh footprints on both sides of the
river connected with the canal. For the moment, they pose a mystery.
The church, a Roman Catholic structure, is bolted shut at front and rear.
Just as two Americans warily advance to smash a lock, the front door opens and
an elderly man in white pajamas appears, smiling as though to welcome parish-
ioners to services. The inside of the little church is newly painted and neatly
ficrubbed. A row of angled bullet holes along the metal-sheet roof attests to a
visit from a helicopter gunship.
In the rear are a large drum and a brass gong. An American points to them and
questions the elderlv church attendant.
"What are thev for?"
"To call the faithful to worship."
"Did you see any people leaving the village this morning?"
"No. ■. . ."
"We have information on how much this church pays to the VC in taxes. How
much do vou sav it pays?"
"Maybe the people pay 100 or 200 piasters (80 cents to $1.60)."
"The church, how much does it pay?"
"The church does not pa.y taxes. The church never pays taxes."
"The hell it doesn't pay," the American .says. "This may be a Catholic church,
Jbut it's Charlie's Catholic church."
71
A TACITURN LADY
The Americans follow a path past the church to a cluster of solidly built homes.
Most are emptv. In one, two candles burn before a postcard picture of Christ. In
another, a picture of Pope Paul sits on a small altar beside a mud bunker. One
house is occupied by a woman with six children. She is interrogated.
"Did you .see people crossing the river this morning?"
"No, I was in my bunker."
"Where is vour husband?"
"He went to the market at Cai Mang."
"Why?"
"He always goes when the soldiers come here. . . ."
"Do vou know who are the VC in this village?"
"No." We don't know VC. We are Catholic. Cathohcs don't know VC."
"We know that a Liberation Committee was elected here. When?"
"I just heard about it recently."
"Who is the Vietcong village chief here?"
"I don't know. . . ."
"How much tax do you pay to the VC?"
"More than 1,000 piasters." (About $8.) .
"How often do Vietcong song and dance (propaganda) teams come and visit?
"Not often."
"What do they say?"
"Thev sav the Americans will go home soon."
"How often does your husband stand guard for the VC?"
"Everv five or six days."
"How" often do the women here have to make punji stakes (poisoned stakes)
for the VC?"
"Once or twice a vear."
"That's pretty typical," says the American, heading back across the foot-
bridge to the village square.
DISAPPEARING ENEMY
An American adviser has figured out the footprints on both sides of the river.
There are no sampans around the village. Adult males, except for old men, seem
almost nonexistent. The village population is estimated at 2,000, but no more
than 200 persons have been seen on this day.
The American finds a youngster hiding in a farmhouse. He poses a few per-
functory questions, then "suddenly demands: "At what time this morning did
all the "people leave here by boat?" Perhaps startled by the suddenness of the
query, the boy replies, "At four o'clock."
The conclusion: Most of the village's Vietcong guerrillas, VCI cadre and Libera-
tion Committee members have eluded the Phoenix troops. "They just had to have
that big meeting last night," fumes an American adviser, nscalling the last planning
session for the operation. "F.veryone had to get in on this goddamned operation.
The VC must have known all about it by midnight last night. 8o they blew the
place. Just sailed down the river on their .sampans."
But there may be something to salvage from the operation. In the square, the
the group of squatting villagers has grown to 50 or 60. Census-Grievance operatives
examine their identification cards. Few have them; in Vietcong controlled areas,
the enemy forbids the people to carry government ID cards and often punishes
those who do.
The two informers, still with bags on their heads, stand behind a nearby wall,
peering at the villagers. Occasionally they point to a resident and whisper to a
PRU. Those put under suspicion are pulled to their feet, bound and taken aside
to the prisoner group. The others remain on their haunches staring silently into
the dust.
THE MOVING FINGER
One villager "fingered" by the informers is a bowlegged woman clutching a
baby. She is identified as a liiember of the village "women-farmer association," a
Vietcong citizen-involvement organization not normally considered important
enough to classify as Vietcong cadre. ("No point picking them up," a U.S. official
savs "later in Saigon. "They're more trouble than they're worth to process and
hold.")
But the woman is moved to the prisoner group, clutching the baby. Her two
other children, a boy about six and a girl about 10 years old, begin to cry loudly.
72
A PRU raises a rifle butt over their heads menacingly, and the wails subside into
muffled sobs.
From behind a nearby house two shots are heard. The narrow-shouldered
prisoner has been executed. His body is dumped into a bunker.
One of the psywar operatives lectures the villagers on the perils of supporting
the Vietcong and outlines the benefits of backing the Saigon government. Propa-
ganda sheets bearing a smiling portrait of President Nguyen Van Thieu are
handed out.
At one side of the square an American adviser muses about the operation and
what it has to do with the war: "There are 30 people sitting around a table in
Paris, and they just aren't going to hack it. How can they solve this thing? The
people in this village have been VC for 10 years, maybe 20. How are you going
to change that? We come here on an operation, and what does it prove? We've
got some crook sitting in Don Nhon picking up a salary every month because
he claims to be the government village chief here. He hasn't dared to visit this
village for seven years. The district chief was too chicken to come on this operation.
So we come in, pick up a few Charlies and leave. The VC will be back in control
here tonight. ..."
HEADING BACK
At 3 p.m., with five prisoners in tow, the troops start hiking back to the landing
zone in the rice paddy for transportation home. Near the paddy they meet two
U.S. soldiers from the 9th Division cordon, leading two prisoners. Each of the
captives wears a neatly printed "Detainee Card."
The taller and more talkative of the two informers is brought forward to exam-
ine the new prisoners. One is identified as a deputy Vietcong village chief, the
other as a non-Vietcong. Both are i^laced with the other prisoners.
A deputy Vietcong village chief would be the most important captive of the
day by far, the others being low-level cadre at best. "Hey, we got us a big one,"
says an elated American adviser, who then cautions nearby PRUs: "You keep
this one alive, you hear. We want him alive."
Half an hour later the troops have been helicoptered back to their compound
in Ben Tre, and the prisoners are on their way to the Police Special Branch
interrogation center. Results of the operation: Eight kills, one after torture. Seven
prisoners taken for interrogation. One war memorial dynamited. One hospital
burned. No friendly casualties.
[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1968]
The Invisible Foe: New Intelligence Push Attempts To Wipe Out Vietcong
Underground — Elite Forces Work To Break the Enemy "Infrastructure"
BY Eliminating Leaders — Night Raids Set Up by CIA
(By Peter R. Kann)
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
Saigon. — An American official boasts that he duped' a rural Vietcong group into
assassinating one of its own key agents by elaborately sowing rumors in VC circles
that the man was a double agent working for the allies.
In a province near the Cambodian border, allied intelligence discloses the plan-
ned time and location of a VC district finance committee meeting. Sweeping into
the gathering, a special combat police unit captures six VC tax officials.
In a Mekong Delta province, U.S. officials learn that funeral rites are planned for
a senior VC official. An allied "counter-terror" team raids the funeral and kills
many of the VC agents present.
Can the visible and legal government of South Vietnam root out the "invisible"
government, the clandestine, 80,000-member Vietcong "infrastructure"? A new
effort is under way to do so. There is general agreement here that the outcome of
the struggle will be crucial to the future of the nation.
WORKING quietly
Officially described bj^ U.S. authorities as the "political and administrative
organization through which the Vietcong control or seek control over the South
Vietnamese people," the infrastructure, or VCI, is an efficient, largely covert
organization with decades of experience in moving among the people. Taking
73
advantage of family relationships and the weak grip of the established government
in remote areas, it conducts espionage, wields terror, infiltrates allied organizations,
collects taxes, disseminates propaganda and recruits natives for its cause.
For years aUied agencies and programs have sought to root out the VCI, with
meager success. Now the U.S. and the Vietnamese government are mounting
another high-prioritv program to coordinate their agencies and accomplish that
task. Called Phung Hoang (All-Seeing Bird) in Vietnamese, the program is known
to Americans as Phoenix.
After an abortive beginning. Phoenix is beginning to register some successes,
despite disinterest among some Vietnamese officials, political infighting and skepti-
cism among U.S. aides. "It's a good program," says one informed source, "but we
should have started it six years ago." One observer compares the program to
"trying to root the Republican partj^ out of Kansas."
The effort is imperative, however. If the Paris peace talks produce a cease-fire, it
is unlikely that VCI activities could be turned off with the same ease as conven-
tional military action. The VCI might continue as a covert political apparatus,
even if the Vietcong won a role in a new government.
GETTING TOGETHER
U.S. inteUigence oflScials define Phoenix as "a systematic effort at intelligence
coordination and exploitation." Before Phoenix, they found that in one district
11 networks of allied intelligence agents were operating independently. Some
observers suggested that the district contained more paid informers and agents
for the allied side than there were VC regulars to spy on.
The Vietnamese government's three major inteUigence agencies — PoHce
Special Branch, Military Security Service and Army Intelligence — all were at
work in the district, and not productively. Competing agencies regularly arrested
one another's agents, accidentally or because of political rivalries.
Phoenix works to pool the resources and information of the various agencies,
with joint intelligence committees at the province level and also down at the
district level. American advisers, including Central Intelligence Agency men,
participate in the effort to sift information from agents, informers, prisoners
and other sources. "Exploitation" is accomplished by military or paramilitary
units that make secret, small-unit missions into contested or Vietcong-controlled
areas, usually at night.
These units prefer to capture an identified VCI agent, since he may yield
further information, but if that is impractical, the target is assassinated, some-
times brutally as an object lesson to others. "It's a systematic, sophisticated
application of force," says one American adviser in the field. In big cities and
other government-controlled areas, however, the program may involve a simple
arrest rather than a kidnapping or assassination.
What happened to previous "counter-infrastructure" programs? Combined
with various "pacification" efforts, they were pushed into the background as the
overt military conflict escalated and the "other war" effort languished. Moreover,
pacification is a catchall program; the complex task of tracking down VCI cadre
didn't mesh well with agricultural aid and school-building.
A U.S. field official (who belatedly discovered that his cook was a VC agent)
points out a perennial problem. "Face it," he says, "we really can't tell who is
VCI and who isn't. The GVN (Government of A'ietnam) has to do this job." Some
U.S. officials beheve that Vietnamese leaders still don't realize the importance of
coming to grips with the VCI — or that they despair of destroying it.
THE Y.'iNKS ARE FOR IT
The Phoenix program seems to have stirred much less enthusiasm among the
Vietnamese than the Americans. It apparently has had top priority with U.S.
aides since last fall, but only two months ago did the Vietnamese government
give it similar priority. "For months we were sending plans, advisers, filing cabinets,
safes — -you name it^out to the provinces and districts," recalls one U.S. field
source. "It was an American program, not a GVN effort."
Even with top-level Vietnamese backing, the program still faces political,
tactical and technical problems. But some successes are being reported. In one
province near Saigon, pooling of inteUigence in the past two months has produced
the capture or assassination of six members of the VC province committee, three
VC district chiefs, nine other VC district officials and 31 viUage or hamlet cadre.
Trained cadre, particularly senior ones at the province level, are difficult for the
VC to replace.
44-706—70 0
74
In a province north of Saigon, Phoenix is credited with 145 VCI captives and
casualties in June. Earlier this year, when the program hadn't gained momentum,
the usual toll was about 20 a month.
In one province near the Demilitarized Zone, Phoenix is reported to have been
so successful that the enemy has had to replace local VCI cadre with North Viet-
namese; the agents from tlie North necessarily would have less rapport with the
natives than their native-born predecessors. In another northern province of
South A'ietnam, the VC are said to have formed a special committee to tr.y to
rebuild their shattered apparatus.
Nationally, some 6,000 VCI cadre have been captured or killed since the Tet
holiday in February, according to allied sources. Still, says one informed source,
"We're kidding ourselves if we think we've hurt them much yet."
Indeed, in many provinces Phoenix remains largely a paper project. In one
central highlands province, there are two provincial intelligence committees,
neither one of them functioning. The program is paralyzed by competition be-
tween the province chief, and the province police chief.
At the district level in the same province, the situation is no better. "We have
three DIOCs (District Intelligence and Operations Centers) in the province,"
says one source. "One shows signs of promise. One is headed by an incompetent.
The third is headed by a suspected VC."
jNIutual distrust among inteUigence agencies remains a problem. "Partly it's
endemic among inteUigence agencies in any country," says one American source.
"Intelligence agencies are by nature exclusive. They don't want to reveal their sources.
We have the problem, too." In Vietnam, the problem is compounded by personal,
political rivalries and the conspiratorial nature of Vietnamese.
KEEPING IT FROM THE ENEMY
Also, the Vietcong have been skillful at permeating many of the government's
intelligence agencies. Thus, while American agencies seek to have the government
share its secrets, it is questionable if the Americans share their own best informa-
tion.
Another difficulty: Vietnamese intelligence agencies traditionally have been
instruments of internal military and political intrigue, particularly in the days
when the late President Diem's brother-in-law, Ngo Dinh Nhu, headed the
police apparatus. But Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan, chief of the national poUce until
he was wounded a few months ago, also was a master intriguer. Political involve-
ments don't make for efficient intelligence work.
Because of incompetence or indifference among many regular Vietnamese mili-
tary units in carrying out "exploitation" missions, U.S. advisers recently have been
relying on "PRUs" (Provincial Reconnaissance Units) of 18 men each to make
strikes on VCI targets.
The PRUs are more American than Vietnamese. Chosen, trained, paid and
operated by the CIA, they are highly trained mercenaries, often selected from
Metnam's minority groups, such as Chinese Nungs and Cambodians, or from Viet-
cong agents who have defected. Their operations often are led by elite U.S. Navy
"Seal" commandos assigned to the CIA.
The PRUs have been an effective strike force, but the most logical exploitation
force would be native units such as Popular Force troops — platoon-sized groups
recruited and employed at the village level. These troops know their localities and
often know the identities of ^'CI agents. But the PF troops long have been the
most poorly trained, equipped and led Vietnamese units. And many district offi-
cials, envisaging harsh VC reprisals to exploitation strikes, would just as soon have
the strikes made by outside forces like the PRUs.
Indeed, some veteran U.S. officals fault the American effort for naively failing
to take local complexities into account. Many U.S. advisers are youthful Army
lieutenants or captains, and others also lack experience. One arriving colonel,
having received a long briefing on the "counter-infrastructure program," is said
to have asked, "Where is this structure, anyway?"
Some officials in the field complain of demands from Saigon for numerical results
("How many VCI did you kill this month?"). They argue that the pressure for
"results" leads to strikes against low-level VCI rather than the key, ehisive officials
in the enemy apparatus. However, a senior official in Saigon says, "We are inter-
ested in quality, not quantity. We want the hard-core cadre."
A few veteran officials complain that the counter-infrastructure effort isn't being
pursued with enough subtlety. Rather than capturing or killing VCI cadre, they
say, Phoenix should focus oii the use of secret agents to infiltrate VCI cells and
turn them against one another. Some success has been reported in such enterprises.
/o
Another source suggests that to root out the VCI the aUies will have to develop
their own clandestine "counter-infrastructure" — a permanent presence rivaling
and eventuall}' overcoming that of the VC in contested and VC-controlled areas.
EFFECT OF CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM ON SOLDIERS
The Chairman. I won't pursue it. I am going to have to yield now.
But there was an extremely interesting case the other day of a young
man, very obviously a very fine soldier and a highly regarded psy-
chiatrist, discussing this in a completely different context, which was:
What can be done for the soldiers who go through these experiences,
who are exposed to these indescribable conditions of provocation?
What can be done to help them? The discussion occurred before a
veterans committee and in a different context, but it was very impres-
sive. It raises extremely serious questions about our being able to cope
with the conditions, our being able to buihl a good society using these
means because I don't beUeve you can build a good society and an
exemplary one using means such as have been described in article
after article.
Mr. Colby. I hasten to say, ^Ir. Chairman, that I am referring to
the Phoenix program. I am not extending my comments to all the
other programs that exist out there.
The Chairman. I see.
It is just part of it?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Case, I have other questions but I have to
yiehl to you. I feel ashamed to delay you so long because you paid a
compHment to the committee and the witness to come back especially
to ask some questions.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are most generous
and I feel that I should let you go on indefinitely because of your
infinite superiority in interrogation in this matter.
The Chairman. No, I was not invited to do that.
education in south VIETNAM
Senator Case. There are two or three things I would like to ask
you about. I too apologize for keeping you so late.
On the overall question of our objective, of how we are getting
along, what is the situation in education, which I take it is part of
your interest?
Mr. Colby. It is only a small degree. That really is Mr. MacDonald's
primary responsibility, Senator.
Senator Case. All right.
Then I will not press you too hard here.
Mr. Colby. I can give you a few general answers.
Senator Case. I would like to have perhaps your general overview
of what a young Vietnamese, a peasant or a city boy, or girl, can
expect? Will he get a grade school education as a matter of course?
Is he likely to get in fact, as opposed to what the official program may
be, a high school education? What are his chances of getting into a
imiversity, if he comes from humble parents? How much is class
rigidity still existmg? Can he get into the Army as an officer, as an
officer candidate?
76
Mr. Colby. I can give you a few general answers to that, Senator.
In the first place, the Vietnamese have a high respect for education
and a high desire to benefit from it. This comes in part perhaps from
their Confucian tradition. As a result there are a vast number of
elementary schools in this country. Some of them were built under
our programs and some built by local people. There is a considerable
effort made to produce teachers for those elementary schools. In
addition there are many cases in which local military or the R.D cadre,
the political organizers, actually teach in the schools.
As a result, 1 believe the current statistic, and Mr. MacDonald can
confirm this, I believe, is that something like 90 percent of the young
people go to elementary schools, the first few years of school. Then it
gets a little harder.
Senator Case. When you say first few years, you mean up to the
fourth grade?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Case. Eighty percent of all people.
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, of the children.
Senator Case. Eighty percent in the country or in the city?
Mr. Colby. Well, a lot of them are in the city actually, where
things are crowded and they don't have adequate schools. Saigon for
instance, has a lower ratio than some of the other areas. On
the secondary level it gets a little harder.
Now, the current program is to put a secondary school in each
district. Ten, 15 years ago there was probably a secondary school
only in the province capital. This has been increasmgly developed in
many areas. Many of the local areas used their local funds in this
development program this past year to develop secondary schools. So
that you have a fairly significant percentage, I don't know the specifics
of it.
Senator Case. Secondary schools would be anything over the third
grade?
Mr. Colby. Yes. Over the fifth grade.
Senator Case. Up to where?
Mr. Colby. The first 5 years is primary, but you don't get the 80
percent through all 5 of the years.
Senator Case. All 5 of the first years?
Mr. Colby. Just 80 percent of the first 2 or 3.
Senator Case. Some drop out?
Mr. Colby. It is a little country school, a one room school, just
teaching a little reading, \^^:•iting, arithmetic.
Senator Case. Do the first 5 years give them reading, writing
and
Mr. Colby. Yes, there is a very high degree of literacy in the
country.
There are an additional number of secondary schools being built
and staffed in many of the districts. As a matter of fact, a very sub-
stantial number of the secondary schools in existence are private
schools. Some of these are religous oriented, some of them are ethnic
oriented. The Chinese, for instance, will frequently have secondary
schools. There are five universities in the country. Two new ones
have been established in the past few years: Can Tho and the Buddhist
University in Saigon.
77
CLASS ORIGIN IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE UNIVERSITIES
There are about 25,000 to 30,000 students in the University of Saigon.
Here it is true, I think. Senator, that the class origin is still with us.
It is only on very rare occasions that a country boy unless he is a
member of the notables of the community, ^^dll go on to the University.
Senator Case. Who decides that? _
Mr. Colby. He won't be able to maintain the educational effort.
This is a problem. The new Minister of Education is particularly
concerned about making some reforms in the structure so that it
works.
Senator Case. This has been a long while now. We have been at
this for 12, 15 years and there hasn't been any change yet.
Mr. Colby. Well, there has been some change made but not enough.
It is still a problem, let's face it.
Senator Case. Why hasn't it been changed?
Mr. Colby. Your schools fill up with qualified students who come
from other areas, and hi competition the fellow from the country
school doesn't get in.
Senator Case. But it isn't just because he is not qualified.
Mr. Colby. Or trained. 1 think I had better not go any further.
Senator Case. I really want facts.
CLASS STRUCTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY
Mr. Colby. I know it. I really should not go any further in this,
Senator, because I am really not your best mtness. One thing I would
like to add though, is that the military — you spoke about the officers
in the army
Senator Case. Yes.
Mr. Colby. The major requirement for an officer is that he have
what is called a second' "bac," that he be a graduate from a junior
college.
Senator Case. That is
Mr. Colby. That is what it amounts to in our country.
Senator Case. And that limits it?
Mr. Colby. It effectively limits it, except that there are provisions
for the promotion of people from the ranks. There is a pro^dsion for
the possible promotion of a qualified NCO to oflSccr status even if he
does not pass the literacy test, the educational test.
Senator Case. Have we any statistics as to how often those provi-
sions have been exercised?
Mr. Colby. I think there were something like 300 last year, as I re-
member it.
(The following information was later supplied.)
There were 293 NCOs promoted to officers last year in the Regular Forces.
However, if Regional Forces are added in, the figure is increased by 156 to a
total of 449.
Senator Case. 300 who in effect became officers, NCO's who
otherwise would not?
Mr. Colby. That is right.
Senator Case. Is that a change over the pre^nous situation?
Mr. Colby. It is some change, not a great change.
78
Senator Case. Actually, their need for officers in the military
establishments totaling some million is what?
Mr. Colby. It is a very great need. They have been sending a great
number through the officer candidate school but with the educational
qualifications.
Senator Case. With the educational qualifications, so that by and
large it is still very stronglj' a very rigid class structure.
Mr. Colby. Yes; it is still a great problem. It is opening up a bit
but not wide.
Senator Case. How- about NCO's?
Mr. Colby. NCO's, no. They are pretty open as to who becomes
an NCO. That is a quality situation.
Senator Case. What about job opportunities?
Mr. Colby. Pardon me.
south VIETNAMESE POPULATION
Senator Case. Perhaps before we get into the question of job
opportunities you might give me a little i)icture of what Vietnam
consists of. There are how many people, 18 million?
Mr. Colby. 17 million people, Senator. Almost 40 percent live in
cities now. That is a 100 percent change. There were about 20 percent
10 years ago.
Senator Case. Let's take the 60 percent first.
]\Ir. Colby. Sixty percent are ])rimarily rice growing. There are
a total of six million people living in the Delta, for instance.
Senator Case. That is men, women and children?
Mr. Colby. Men, women and children. Your average age is quite
low, I can't give you the number.
Senator Case. You mean the death rate, you mean death occurs
earlier?
Mr. Colby. Yes, there are diseases and various things.
Senator Case. What is the average. I have seen some very old
people but they are undoubtedly the exception.
Mr. Colby. Not very many. You are respected for you age m your
50s.
Senator Case. Sixty percent of the people are rural?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Case. And this means really rural, doesn't it?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Case. They are farmers?
Mt. Colby. Farmers and fishermen.
Senator Case. Workers in the field, farmers, fishermen. Timber?
Mr. Colby. Some, not very much nowadays, because the forests
are pretty dangerous. There used to be rubber plantations to some
extent.
south VIETNAMESE AGRICULTURE
Senator Case. Most of these people in agriculture work for
themselves?
Mr. Colby. Yes, the ownership of land over the years has gone
through some changes. Under the French times there were some big
plantations. These were eliminated at the end of the French time and
the land was divided up. During the war years it was further divided
79
up. A lot of the rural land today is still deserted. Some of it is being
reentered as people go back out into the countryside.
Some of the peojile in the countryside are turning to new kinds of
crops. Vegetable crops, proteins, ])igs, chickens, that sort of thing are
coming up very substantially in the past few years.
Senator Case. But for the most part, the Vietnamese farmer or
peasant
Mr. Colby. Is a rice farmer.
Senator Case. Is an entrepreneur, he works for himself?
Mr. Colby. Or he is a tenant of someone who owns the land who
may live in the village.
Senator Case. Even as a tenant, though, he works for himself
still and j)ays, either divides his produce or pays a money rent of
some sort?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Case. How does he get his stuff to market?
Mr. Colby. There are rice merchants and rice mills in many
villages. Most villages in the Delta have a rice mill or two. Frequently
this rice mill is owned by a gentleman of Chinese extraction and he
operates as the local bank and credit source. He buys the crop and
mills it and arranges to have it shipped to a center where it is gathered
and then it all goes up to Saigon. This goes up to Saigon either by
road, by trucks or by
Senator Case. Does he take the loss then when taxes are levied
by the Vietcong? Does he take the loss or the farmer?
Mr. Colby. Well, the farmer takes the loss and the merchant takes
a loss, both, and the consumer. Of course the price goes up.
Senator Case. Because the prices are higher?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
progress toward self-sufficiency in agriculture
Senator Case. Is Vietnam sufficiently self-sufficient in basic
agricultural requirements?
Mr. Colby. It should be. It isn't now, Senator. It used to be a
net exporter.
Senator Case. What is it now?
Mr. Colby. It used to be a substantial net exporter. This year
they expect to be 150,000 or 200,000 tons short.
Senator Case. Of what?
Mr. Colby. Of self-sufficiency.
Senator Case. Of what requirements?
Mr. Colby. Of a little over 5 million tons.
Senator Case. You mean about 25 percent short?
Mr. Colby. They expect to reach self-sufficiency by the end of
this calendar year in rice.
Senator Case. In rice. Is there aii}^ other basic or staple that is
a measure of self-sufficiency?
Mr. Colby. Not i)articularly. Rubber used to be one of their
major exports.
Senator Case. That is an export? I am talking about things they
consume themselves.
Mr. Colby. W^ell, there is considerable fishing. There are local
proteins like ducks and chickens and pigs.
80
Senator Case. They don't have to import; at least your expecta-
tion at the end of this year that they will not be importing a sub-
stantial amount of food.
Mr. Colby. They will be importing some food, but they will be
self-sufficient in rice.
Senator Case. Wliat foods will they have to import?
Mr. Colby. Well, milk. Condensed milk is a great import. We
actually export a considerable amount of milk over there.
Senator Case. Is this different from the old days? Did they always
import milk?
Mr. Colby. They always imported milk, but they used to do it
from France.
Senator Case. This is not a change, I am sorry.
Mr. Colby. They used to do it from France. Now, they import
from the United States.
Senator Case. So that the country is getting to be self-sufficient so
far as its agriculture is concerned?
offshore fishing
Mr. Colby. Yes, there is a great drive on for it. The new potential
is in fishing. There is apparently a considerable potential in fishing
offshore, sea fishing. It is warm water and the fish
Senator Case. Is this something new?
Mr. Colby. It has been there for years but the normal fishing has
been very limited in the first place because the boats have been very
small — it is just sort of offshore fishing — and, secondly, during the war
years they have been restricted from going out. The Government has
been opening up the fishing restrictions to allow people to fish in
areas where this hadn't been allowed. But the next stage is to develop
enough refrigeration and similar preservation capabilities so that the
fishing boats can go out further, stay longer, get a bigger catch and
come back in. They are beginning to do this.
military service of south VIETNAMESE FARMERS
Senator Case. Now, a lot of the people who are in your 60 percent
in agriculture are in the military or paramilitary forces, aren't they?
Mr. Colby. Their families certainly are, it has to be. As a matter
of fact, driving around the Delta the other day I really did notice
there are not very many men in the fields. The women are doing most
of the reaping of rice this fall.
Senator Case. And the men are just
Air. Colby. The men are out in the service some place.
Senator Case. Standing around or sitting around?
Mr. Colby. Well, they are off some place.
Senator Case. Is this different from old days?
Mr. Colby. In the military.
Senator Case. Did the men used to work?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
When you had a smaller army they lived on the farms. Then-
families still live there.
Senator Case. Yes. But did the men do the work or the women?
Mr. Colby. Well, both, the men did work also.
81
Senator Case. Not only the women?
Mr. Colby. In other words, it isn't a change of custom. The men
are off in the services.
Senator Case. Yes.
Mr. Colby. And consequently the women are doing the reaping,
not entirely but some.
Senator Case. Do the men like this?
Mr. Colby. No, the men would like to go home.
Senator Case. How much do they get paid in the popular forces?
Mr. Colby. In the popular forces they get about $40 a month.
EARNINGS of SOUTH VIETNAMESE FARMER
Senator Case. That is ten times more than they ever made on the
farm, isn't it?
Mr. Colby. Oh, no, some of these farms do pretty well, Senator.
Senator Case. Give me some figures.
Mr. Colby. A Vietnamese farm, is quite productive down in the
Delta. This is not true of the northern part of South Vietnam. It
is very crowded and it is a little tough there.
Senator Case. You don't mean crowded.
Mr. Colby. Yes, crowded, in the four or five provinces along the
sea — Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam and so forth — you can get
fairly high population densities.
Senator Case. Living in very poor soil relatively?
Mr. Colby. Not very good soil, that is right.
Senator Case. But still in agriculture?
Mr. Colby. Still in agriculture, yes, and now going back to agricul-
ture.
There are a lot of those areas where there was heavy fighting and
now the people are going back to resume life in their old fields.
Senator Case. You will give me a figure of how much the farmer did
make?
Mr. Colby. Pay and allowance for a year for a popular forces soldier
is $480; it is $40 a month more or less.
Senator Case. What would he make as a farmer?
Mr. Colby. It depends, of course, but a bare-footed farmer down in
Mr. Vann's area can sometimes pull out of his back pocket a big roll
and buy a new tractor or a new rototiller, a new gadget for the farm.
Senator Case. Which would cost several thousand dollars?
Mr. Colby. Well, at least several hundred dollars. Let's say several
hundreds of dollars.
The Delta is quite a rich area and, as they get irrigation under con-
trol, get their fertilizer moving, they are beginning to get two crops in
some areas. This doubles the income.
REDUCTION IN PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO FARM
Senator Case. Now, 60 percent of the people still farm. This is
changing, I take it.
Mr. Colby. This has been a change. It used to be 80 percent.
Senator Case. This necessarily might not have changed if we had not
been there. But is it changing to a smaller percentage of the people?
82
Mr. Colby. Yes, that has been the change. It used to be 80 per-
cent. Now it is 60 percent and it probably wih go down. It won't go
down as fast in the future, but it will go down. Recently you have had
these 480,000 people move back to their villages, back into areas that
were empty.
Senator Case. But mechanization and things like that have
happened?
Mr. Colby. Yes, the natural urban trend.
Senator Case. The same things that have happened everywhere
are reducing the number of percentage of people on the farms?
Mr. Colby. Right.
The Chairman. Defoliation reduced the number too; didn't it?
Senator Case. Perhaps he can answer.
Mr. Colby. No, not effectively, Mr. Chairman. The defoliation is
fairly carefully utilized and I don't think the defoliation has reduced
the population in the farms ])articularly. It is given some problems
here and there put in terms of net impact on population I would say
no.
Senator Case. Now, so they come to the cities, and
Mr. Colby. This is a problem. Senator.
Senator Case. It is a problem, of course. It would be a problem
whether we were there or not or whether there was a war there or not.
Mr. Colby. But even a greater problem because we are there.
Senator Case. But an even greater problem because there is a war.
Mr. Colby. Right.
Senator Case. I suppose many of the things tliat have happened
over there have made irreversible changes in Vietnam, customs and
aspirations, family life?
Mr. Colby. Sure.
Senator Case. And society and everything.
Mr. Colby. Well, some of them we haven't caused; they have just
happened. I mean the Honda, for instance. The farmer used to live in
his x'illage and never went anywhere else. Now his son — not the farmer
but his son — goes up to the province capital on the Honda. Maybe he
goes to high school up there, that sort of thing. There are a lot of
changes ha])peuing in that sense.
Ho has a television set in a little village out in the Delta.
occupation of city populations in south VIETNAM
Senator Case. They come to the city and then how many people in
the cities, of the 40 percent, how are they occupied?
Mr. Colby. Mostly commerce of some sort: buying and selling,
exchanging things. There is very little basic industry or heavy industry.
It is services and that sort of thing.
Senator Case. What percentage are in private employment and what
percentage are not, roughly?
Mr. Colby. I don't think I can give you an answer to that offhand.
Senator. Wait a minute, I do have it. Three and a half milUon out of
14 million are laborers in trade, manufacturing or service industries.
Senator Case. Three and a half million out of 14 million are in labor
or services?
Mr. Colby. I am not sure of this figure because it says miUtary
service 248,000; I know that is wrong.
83
Senator Case. That isn't meant to include those in the miUtary, I
suppose. Is it, or is it just people in the service industries for the
military?
Mr. Colby. I would rather not use this.
Senator Case. What I am trying to get at really is just a very
general picture of what
SOUTH VIETNAMESE EMPLOYED BY GOVERNMENT
Mr. Colby. Well, a certain number of your people work for the
government. You have your million in the armed forces, call it.
Senator Case. How many others are on the civil list?
Mr. Colby. There are a couple of hundred thousand. If you add up
the bureaucrats, the teachers and that sort of thing you have a couple
of hundred thousand.
Senator Case. That is in the whole country?
Mr. Colby. Whole country.
Senator Case. And local level?
Mr. Colby. Local elected officials would be in addition to that but
I am talking about the jieople who work in the bureaucracy.
Senator Case. But civil service.
Mr. Colby. Something of that nature.
Senator Case. A couple of hundred thousand.
Mr. Colby. I think so, yes, sir. It is a figure that we have been
using. . .
Senator Case. And most of the rest who are not m agriculture are
in one or another form of service job, is that a fair statement?
Mr. Colby. Service jobs, yes. We are dealing with a total popu-
lation of 18 million. You have within that those under 18 that would
not be included. Almost half of the population are under 18 —maybe
not quite that.
Senator Case. Yes, and tiu> figure 200,000 in the government, 1
su Impose, represents families in which there may be five times that
number of people who are dependents.
Mr. Colby. Yes, they have large families.
Senator Case. So that maybe a million of the 40 percent are
involved or supported by the government in civil jobs.
Mr. Colby. Right.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN SERVICE INDUSTRIES
Senator Case. Now, the service industries, I suppose, take in both
those of white collar and those of blue collar? You have banks and
insurance; you have a government lottery, I suppose?
Mr. Colby. You have a lot of markets. There is a government
lottery. You have markets; you have market places; you have small
commerce. There is a great entrepreneurial sense among the Viet-
namese.
Senator Case. They are not really making anything.
Mr. Colby. They are not making very much.
Senator Case. They are not making anything; they are not pro-
ducing anvthing.
Mr. Colby. They are not making very much. It is just service.
84
Senator Case. They are just passing the money around among
the city people. It is a fair statement.
Mr. Colby. There are light industries, light businesses.
Senator Case. Yes, but not large.
Mr. Colby. There are some, but they are not producing for export.
Senator Case. And not making much that raises the standard
of living to any substantial degree?
Mr. Colby. Not a great deal, no.
Senator Case. Now, we are getting to the point
The Chairman. If the Senator yields, unfortunately I didn't
realize how long we would go on. I wouldn't mind his going ahead if
he would excuse me. We are going to have these gentlemen back all
this week. This isn't the only meeting.
Senator Case. I agree completely and I think I ought to stop.
It is just when you have people who are altogether
The Chairman. They will be here tomorrow. You can go ahead.
I didn't anticipate we would run so late. I have to leave.
Senator Case. I think I should like not to, I certainly don't want
to keep you hungry any longer.
The Chairman. You can go ahead.
Senator Case. Would it be fair enough in 5 minutes I will knock
it off?
The Chairman. I was just going to make a short announcement
before I leave. I have to leave at 2 o'clock.
Senator Case. I just want to lead into this question, Mr. Chairman,
and then maybe I can pick it up at whatever time is appropriate.
The Chairman. As you know, they will be here tomorrow and the
next day and we go into the matter of aid and those programs there
are different; they will be coming up, too.
SOCIETY DEVELOPING IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator Case. What I am trying to get at is a kind of a picture
of the society that is developing there and the extent to which any-
thing useful is being done by the Vietnamese Government in educa-
tion and in training for jobs, in improving the standard of living over
there and the rest of it which can give any kind of affirmative appeal
to this or any other government that thej^ might have to the people
as a whole. That is all I wanted.
Mr. Colby. There is a considerable increase in skills coming out of
this war, Senator, in terms of what the people learn in the military
services, what they learn from our contractors, what they learn from
various services that they have been involved in.
For instance the returnees are offered a chance to learn a trade.
This kind of thing does exist. There is considerable increase of this
kind of skill that is developing.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, I think it is only proper that my
part of this should be put over until tomorrow.
The Chairman. You may pursue anything you would like.
Mr. Colby. I would be glad to answer your questions.
Senator Case. I understand.
Mr. Colby. I would like to note this is really mostly in Mr. Mac-
Donald's field of expertise rather than in my own; in our USAID
director's field rather than in mine.
85
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Colby; you have been
very patient.
WITNESS SCHEDULE FOR NEXT HEARING
The committee will meet again at 10 o'clock tomorrow to hear
testimony from CORDS representatives of the CORDS province
and district level. It is anticipated that Mr. John Vann who is the
deputy for CORDS, who has been there for a very long time, with
whom the staff is well acquainted and who is spoken of very highly,
Mr. Hawthorne Mills, and Major James Arthur will be the principal
witnesses. Of course, questions may arise involving others, but that
is the plan for tomorrow.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I am sorry to have imposed on you for so long.
(Whereupon at 2 p.m., the hearing was adjoiu-ned to reconvene,
Wednesday, February 18, 1970, at 10 a.m.)
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington^ D.C.
The committee met, pm*siiaiit to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chair-
man) presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Aiken, Case, Cooper, and Javits.
opening statement
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The Committee on Foreign Relations is continuing today its
hearings on the CORDS ])rogram. Oiu' first witness scheduled today
was Mr. John Paul Vann, Deputy for CORDS to the Commanding
General of the Delta Military Assistance Command, but Wv. Colby,
who was our main witness yesterday, would like to say a few prelim-
inary words, so we actually will start with him. Then, following Mr.
Vann, we will hear testimony by Mr. Hawthorne Mills, a Foreign
Service officer now serving as a province senior adviser in Vietnam,
and by Maj. James F. Arthur of the U.S. Army now serving as a
district senior adviser.
Mr. Colby, I believe you wish to make some preliminary remarks.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY. DEPUTY TO GENERAL ABRAMS,
COMMANDER OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIET-
NAM, FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUP-
PORT (CORDS)— Resumed
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to point out to the
committee, if I may, sir, the locations of the three gentlemen who will
be speaking today. Mr. John Vann will speak for the whole delta
area of the country, IV Corps. Mr. Hawthorne Mills will be speaking
for the Province of Tuyen Due, a mountain province in the center of
South Vietnam; and Maj. James Arthur will be speaking for Binh
Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province.
Mr. Chairman, I thought I would show you an organizational chart
showing how the Vietnamese Government and American advisory
group work together at the various levels since this will be the focus
of today's discussions.
I have a statement for the record on the organizational aspects of
the CORDvS program, which has been provided to your staff,
(87)
88
Mr. Chairman. I also have another statement for the record on the
development aspect of pacification and development which has been
provided to your staff.
(The statements appear at pp. 701 and 708.)
STAFF STRUCTURE OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The Central Pacification and Development Council of the Viet-
namese Government is the central national staff and program. The
chairman of it is the President. Its membership includes all of the
ministers and the chiefs of a number of the services — the Chairman of
the Joint General Staff, the Director General of Police, and so forth.
The Central Council has a staft' of its own.
On the American side you have the Military Assistance Command
of which CORDS is a part. The red lines here show^ the contact made
at different levels with the Vietnamese Government.
The various other ministries also have contact with our American
staff.
If you go down the Vietnamese chain of command, you go through
the Joint General Staff to the corps level for the military. For the
pacification ])rogram there is a regional pacification and develo])ment
council, which constitutes the regional representatives of all the
different ministries which are members of the national council.
At the corps level we have a single command structure. The com-
mander is the senior American military officer on the American side.
He has a deputy for pacification called a deputy for CORDS, who is in
all cases a civilian. Mr. Vann is the representative from the corps level
here today.
Below the field force commander, who is at the same time the senior
adviser to that corps area, there are three subdivisions of responsi-
bilities: The direct command of American units, the advisory rela-
tionship with the Vietnamese regular armed forces and the CORDS
])acification advisory structure, which exists in the various provinces.
At the province level down below the corps there is a senior adviser.
As I indicated yesterday, about half of these are civilians and about
half of them are military.
Mr. Mills is our representative of this level today.
On the Vietnamese side the province chief wears two hats: the
chief of his province in a civil sense and also the commander of that
section in the military sense.
At the next level down, the district, we have a district senior adviser
who works with the district chief and subsector commander on the
Vietnamese side. Maj. James Arthur is the representative on that
level.
I think, Mr. Chairman, you would be most interested in listening
to Mr. Vann describe the activities of the program at the corps level.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Colby. It would appear to be a
very thorough organization. I can't see any level you have left out.
Mr. Colby. Well, it does go a little bit below the district. We will
get into that another day, sir, when we discuss our mobile advisory
teams. They work dow^n to the village in some cases.
The Chairman. You prompt me to comment that I had the idea
this was a very j^rimitive country made up of villages and Buddhist
monks who went about doing good. It seems to have become very
89
complicated. You wouldn't say that we are Americanizing it, would
you?
Mr. Colby. No, sir; most of this structure existed under the French.
They have some ability to create bureaucratic structures also.
The Chairman. I see. We are not the only one.
Mr. Vann, we are very pleased to have you. I believe you have been
in Vietnam a very long time and I have been told by members of the
staff that you probably are the best known American official in the
country.
For the record, would you mind verifying that and saying a little
bit about yourself and your experience before you testify?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN PAUL VANN, DEPUTY FOR CORDS, IV CORPS
(DELTA REGION)
Mr. Vann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BACKGROUND OF MR. VANN
With the exception of 1964, I have been in Vietnam since 1962
working as an adviser in the field.
I was over there as a military senior adviser at the corps level
and then as a militar}^ senior adviser for more than a year to the
ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Seventh Division. In
that capacity I had the responsibility for about half of the same area
I now have pacification re.si)onsibility for in the adA'isorj^ sense.
I returned there in 1965 as a civilian. I have been there since that
time as a member of the Agency for International Development,
working in the field of civilian advisory effort until 1967 and then in
the combined military-civilian effort from that date until now.
The Chairman. Where did you come from, Mr. Vann? Where
were you born?
Mr. Vann. Sic, my home is Vu-ginia, but after I retired from the
Army in 1963, I settled in Colorado.
The Chairman. Did you attend the Academy?
Mr. Vann. No, sir; I was an enlisted man in the Army. I went
through flight training in the Army Aii- Corps and became commis-
sioned, and stayed in the Army from then until I retu'ed.
The Chairman. Do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. Vann. Yes, I do have one, sir.
The Chairman. Will you proceed with that, please.
Mr. Vann. Would you like for me to read, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes, please.
Mr. Vann. I am John Paul Vann, the Deputy for CORDS to the
Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command, a sub-
ordinate organization of the Military Assistance Command/Vietnam
(MACV), and one with responsibility for the U.S. ad\dsory eft'ort in
the IV Corp Tactical Zone (CTZ).
DESCRIPTION OF IV CORP TACTICAL ZONE (dELTA)
The IV Corp Tactical Zone, also known as the delta, encompasses
an area of 14,240 square miles extending south and west of Saigon, a
44-706—70-
90
distance of approximately 180 miles to the Camau Peninsula, and
being approximately 185 miles at its widest point on the east-west
axis. The 16 provinces are politically subdivided into 96 districts and
these districts in turn into 725 villages and 4,205 hamlets. The major
industry is farming and the delta produces about 80 percent of all rice
grown in South Vietnam. Additionally, it is the major producer of
fresh water fish, exporting over 30,000 tons to Saigon annually, and
pork, the principal meat consumed in Vietnam. To a large extent, the
3 million people living in the Saigon/Cholon area are dependent on the
delta for then- food.
Although the road network in the delta is not extensive, it is one
that has secure roads to all 16 of the provincial capitals and to the
majority of the district capitals. I might add that since July 1969,
for the first time since 1961, all provincial capitals can be reached by
road with unescorted single vehicle traffic during daylight hours.
The principal routes of communication in the delta, however, are
the canals and waterways. There are over 2,400 miles of major water-
ways in the delta with the majority being secure during daylight
hours.
In addition, there are approximately 23,000 miles of minor water-
ways.
MOST OF DELTA CIVILIAN POPULATION LIVE IN PEACE
An interesting fact about the delta is that although the GVN has a
lower percentage of control of the population than in the other three
corps, most of the civilian population in the delta lives in peace. I
recently had an opportunity to demonstrate this to Senator Javits
when he accompanied Ambassador Colby and me on a visit to refugee
returnee areas, which only 6 months ago had been under Vietcong
control and devoid of population. For the past 4 months there had not
been a single Vietcong initiated incident in the several hamlets we
visited. When looking at the delta in its entirety, Ave have an average
of 25 enemy initiated attacks during each 24-hour period against the
more than 4,000 hamlets, 3,000 outposts, and 5,000 Government
installations. This means that the average target for VC activity within
the delta will be hit only once in a year and a half and I might add that
the majority of these attacks are just harassing in nature. Actually, of
course, there are many places which have never been attacked and
there are a few which may be attacked four or five times a week. An
example of the latter is the Tri Ton District area of Chau Doc Prov-
ince. This is an area known as the Seven Mountains area.
SECURITY SITUATION IN THE DELTA
With the move into this area last spring of two of the five North
Vietnamese regiments which have been deployed south to the delta,
the security has deteriorated in over 30 of the hamlets around the
mountains now occupied by these North Vietnamese units. Overall,
however, there has been a rather tremendous improvement in security
in the delta during 1969. Well over a million additional people have
been brought under Government protection during this period with
progress being made in all provinces. Of interest, I believe, is the fact
that pacification progress continued in Dinli Tuong, Kien Hoa and
91
Go Cong Provinces, even after the departure of the U.S. 9th Division
in August 1969, although the rate of progress was slower than when
the U.S. division was present. Of really great significance regarding
our operations in the delta is the fact that all the ground fighting
there is now being done by Vietnamese forces and they have generally
proved able to meet and defeat the enemy. It is to be noted, of course,
that even after the departure of the U.S. ground forces, the Viet-
namese forces in the delta have continued to have U.S. air, naval and
advisory support. With that background on the delta, let me describe
to you the CORDS mission in the CTZ level.
CORDS MISSION AT CTZ LEVEL
It is very similar to that at the MACV level from the standpoint
of the functional responsibilities. At the CTZ level we have personnel
providing advisory assistance to the Government of Vietnam in the
fields of territorial security forces (RF/PF), People's Self Defense
Forces, National Police and National PoUce Field Forces, the Open
Arms or Chieu Hoi program, the Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) program,
public health, i)ublic works, refugees, economic and social development
(to include agriculture and education), public administration (to
include advising on the training of ^dllage and hamlet officials), and
Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre.
I directly supervise the 16 province senior advisers and prepare
their efficiency reports. Within the IV CTZ, nine of my 16 province
advisory teams are headed up by U.S. Army colonels or lieutenant
colonels with civilian Foreign Service Officers assigned as their depu-
ties. In the remaining seven provinces, the pro\dnce senior advisor is a
senior Foreign Service Officer with, a colonel or lieutenant colonel
serving as his deputy.
At the CTZ level, ni}^ counterjjart is the Vietnamese corps com-
mander when functioning in his role as chairman of the Corps Pacifica-
tion and Development Council. As a practical matter, the majority
of my advisory responsibilities are involved with advising the deputy
for territorial security, a Vietnamese brigadier general who represents
the commanding general, IV CTZ, on all matters involving provincial
military forces and who also functions as the de facto chairman of the
Corps Pacification and Development Council. This officer. Brig.
Gen. Nguyen Huu Planh, and I and our respective staffs meet formally
each Monday morning for a 3-hour review of the previous week's
activities and a projection of the forthcoming week. In attendance
at these meetings are approxmiately 20 Vietnamese military and
civilian officials and 10 U.S. military and civilian officials. The
officials on the Vietnamese side are the regional representatives of
the central ministries in Saigon and the principal staff officers in the
IV CTZ military headquarters. The Americans represented are the
senior advisers to these officials. The meeting is used as a problem-
solving session wherein all of the briefings and most of the discussions
are by and among the Vietnamese officials — with simultaneous
translation for the U.S. personnel. Prior to the meeting U.S. advisers
have pro\'ided their recommendations as to discussion topics and
each adviser, operating under my direction, has recommended to his
Vietnamese counterpart the problem areas that should be brought
92
up and solutions that should be proposed. I might add here that the
Vietnamese naturally do not adopt all of these.
In addition to this formal 3-hour session, I meet with General Hanh
approximately 10 or 12 times a week and also correspond with him
frequently, often reducing to writing the subjects that we have dis-
cussed orally. We frequently travel together to areas where there
are problems to be solved and we usually see each other at one or
two social functions a week. These social functions usually involve a
dinner in honor of a departing adviser or a visitor to the corps, either
Vietnamese or American. Although General Hanh is fluent in the
English language, most of my correspondence to him is prepared in
both English and Vietnamese so as to insure the maximum compre-
hension.
MILITARY ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITY OF CORDS
I have noticed that most visitors in Vietnam are surprised to learn
that CORDS has military as well as civilian advisory responsibilities.
Actually, CORDS has a considerable military advisory responsibility.
For example, in the Delta ^Military Assistance Command, IV CTZ, the
regular MACV military advisory organization numbers less than
1,000 and has advisorv responsibility for 78,000 ARVN soldiers. The
IV CTZ MACCORDS organization— with 234 civilian and 2,123
military advisers — has advisory responsibility for 184,000 members of
the regional and popular forces, 19,000 national and combat police,
and 16,000 armed RD cadre. In addition to advising these full-time
military and paramihtar}^ personnel, CORDS has advisory responsi-
bility for a people's self defense force armed with 104,000 rifles. Ihus,
you can see that the total rifle strength advised by CORDS in IV
CTZ is well over 300,000 compared to the regular force strength of
78, 000. The significance of this, of course, is the overwhelming import-
ance of providing security to the population. Without security, it is
doubtful that the remaining pacification objectives can be achieved.
PROGRESS IN SECURITY AND OTHER OBJECTIVE AREAS
As I indicated earlier, we have been making progress in security,
and also in our other objective areas. In 1969, over 1,260,000 of the
6 million population were added to the secure category — leaving less
than 800,000 in a contested or VC-controlled status. The GVN held
elections in 275 villages and in 1,700 hamlets, thus resulting in about
90 percent of all population centers having elected governments.
Approximately 30,000 people came over to the government side under
the Chieu Hoi program, nearly three times as many as the previous
record year. We reduced the number of people in refugee status from
over 220,000 to less than 35,000. Significantly, not only for the Delta
but for all Vietnam, the production of rice went up nearly 25 percent,
from 3.2 million metric tons to 4 million metric tons. Finally, the
Government of Vietnam increased the armed strength of the people's
self defense force from 23,000 to nearly 105,000.
GVN PACIFICATION PROCESS IN THE DELTA
I would like to describe the pacification process now followed by the j
GVN in the delta. Determination is made approximately 6 months
93
in advance as to the location and extent that pacification efforts will
be made. This is normally done on the basis of population density,
lines of communications, economic attractiveness, availability of
friendly resources, and size and strength of the enemy forces. Initially^
the regular forces of ARVN operate in the area, breaking up the mam
forces of the enemv and scattering them. Next, still under a regular
force shield, an KF company will come in and build a platoon-size
outpost; in a really tough, long-held area, it might be a company-
sized outpost. Eventually the regular force departs, usually a company
at a time. Meanwhile, operating under an appointed hamlet or village
government, attempts are made to recruit and send for 13 weeks of
training a 35-man PF platoon.
I would like to depart from my statement for a moment to say this
is an attempt to recruit locally people who already live in the hamlet,
who become members of this Popular Force platoon.
Concurrently, National Police Field Forces are brought in and
efforts are made to neutralize the infrastructure — the so-called hidden
government of the enemy. I'd like to emphasize here that w^e stress
neutralization of the enemy mfrastructure through capture or induce-
ment to rally under the Chieu Hoi program. A five VCI (Viet Cong
Infrastructure) is of infinitely greater value than a dead one, since
his capture or defection imperils the entire enemy organization in
the area.
When adequate security exists, an election is held. This may or
may not be before the recruited PF have retm-ned. Some elections
are quite good, some quite bad. Even a bad one — that is, not enough
candidates to really make it a contest — is worthwhile, since it is a
learning process and usually assures that the next one \^'ill be more
valid — and that the elected official will be more responsive to the
voters.
All during this time — depending both on the resources available
and the real securit}^— efforts are being made to encourage economic
progress through group endeavors with some GVN assistance. Part
of the organization effort is also diverted toward security, with
significant numbers of the population becoming members of the
People's Self Defense Forces. This program, as you know, is not
entirely voluntary, but a real attempt is made to make it popular
through demonstration of the fact that improved security is nearly
always followed by economic improvement.
Eventually, as these various objectives are achieved at the village
or hamlet level, and as adjacent areas are brought under government
control, law and order becomes a function of uniformed police with
assistance from the PSDF. Some areas, such as those having a con-
tiguous boundary with Cambodia, cannot improve their security to
this extent since enemy forces lurk nearby in the safe haven afforded
and always pose a threat. For example, there are approximately three
North Vietnamese regiments just across the border from our IV zone
now.
This process I have just decribed occurred in over a thousand ham-
lets in the delta in 1969. Most hamlets targeted achieved their mini-
mum objectives; some surpassed them; others are still trying.
Gentlemen, I will attempt to answer any questions you may have
that deal with my area of responsibility.
The Chairman. Thank, you Mr. Vann.
94
Senator Aiken, do you have any questions?
Senator Aiken. No, Mr. Chairman, not of this witness, but I
know Ambassador Colby is here. I was involved in meetings here on
the Hill and doAvntown yesterday and I could not spend much time
with this committee. I wonder if I might ask him two or three questions
which I would have asked him yesterday had I been attending strictly
to the business of this committee. Is that all right with you?
The Chairman. Certainly it is all right with me.
EFFECT OF ARMING SOUTH VIETNAMESE VILLAGERS ON PRESIDENT
THIEU'S STRENGTH
Senator Aiken. We waited quite a long time to arm the villagers in
South Vietnam. Do you think that President Thieu is stronger for
our having taken this step or does it constitute possibly a threat to
him because of his political opposition there?
Air. Colby. I think he is considerably stronger for having taken it,
Senator. There was some question, not so much m his mind as in the
minds of some of the subordinate officials, that it might be a dangerous
thing to arm the people in this fashion, but the President and Prime
Alinister have particularly supported this idea verj^ strongh^ and have
even forced it on some of the middle level officials, insisting that
they go ahead and do it.
Senator Aiken. They don't think that it weakens their position
at all?
Mr. Colby. I think the result has been that it strengthens it.
POLITICAL attitudes IN SAIGON AND COUNTRYSIDE
Senator Aiken. Going over 3'our remarks yesterday, I noticed you
spoke of the new attitudes in the countiyside, which the witness this
morning has also covered. What about the political atmosphere in
Saigon? Do the politicians there reflect a similar will to take responsi-
bility for theu' own future that you indicated that the countryside
people would take?
Mr. Colby. This has not yet happened. Senator. The fact of the
matter is the political picture in Vietnam has to be looked at in two
different levels. One level is the elite, more or less French educated,
traditional liigher class. These people for the hundred years of French
occupation were educated away from their own national basis. They
were taught French ideas, French philosophies, French thoughts, and
so forth, and in the course of it they also picked up some of the concepts
of French democratic government structure and political activity.
The governments, however, over that time were authoritarian.
Therefore, the only form of political life for many, many years was
conspiratorial. There was a premium on small groups gathering to-
gether and dividing up into very small elements the political pie that
was available.
The countryside had been pretty well left out of that process. The
countryside was the other class level of Vietnam which had continued
on its rural ways and was pretty well left alone. It was not a substan-
tial political factor until the more recent years when it became obvious
that the people were a major element of the whole war effort that is
being waged there.
95
I believe the effect of President Thieu's policies, of the policies that
the government is conducting today, is to reach around that upper
class at the Saigon political level to try to establish a pohtical base
out in the countryside and to build up from that political base a new
foundation for the state and for the constitutional government. This is
consistent with what the constitution says and it is also a very definite
program that the President has started. He started with the village
level tliis past year. During this coming year they have planned to
have some provincial council elections, to step from the village level
to the province level in this building of the structure from the base.
The Saigon pohtical scene is not all that different from what it has
been over the years though. Senator.
Senator Aiken. In applying the progressive program to the whole
country, he is facing more or less the same situation that we are here
"with the legislation now before the Senate where some people think
the law applying to integration of schools ought to cover all the
country instead of part of the country. You don't mind that; do you?
The Chairman. No.
LAND REFORM
Senator Aiken. Has the South Vietnamese legislative body taken
any action yet on land reform, which has been promised and postponed
from time to time? I believe the last promise was that action would
be taken this month, about the first of February.
Mr. Colby. The legislature has passed a version of land reform
through one of the Houses. It is still in the Senate today. I don't
believe they have actually passed it. The Government has urged a
certain land reform which would be a very advanced one.
There are some questions as to the degree to which the legislature
will accept the Government's law.
Senator Aiken. Do you mean whether the Senate will accept it?
Mr. Colby. Yes. Well, there were some modifications made by
the lower House as well, Senator.
Senator Aiken. I see.
Mr. Colby. This is a matter for the calendar. I would not want
to venture a prediction as to exactly when they will pass it, but I
believe that there is an intention to do it in the reasonably near
future, this spring.
policy control in WASHINGTON
Senator Aiken. You explained why it was necessary to centralize
control of the pacification program under the military in Saigon and
you did a very good job. Do you think that here in Washington policy
control should also be centralized and if so, where? If you don't want
to answer that question you don't have to.
Mr. Colby. I think that is a little out of my line, Senator. I have
a problem of puttmg together out there the different sources of
finance, the different som'ces of personnel and so forth, but it is a
normal kind of a bureaucratic problem, and I can adjust to the way
Washington decides to do its business.
96
PHASING OUT OF U.S. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
Senator Aiken. We have armed the villagers and they are now in
a position to have some say over their own future. Will the time come
when we should begin to phase out our civilian personnel as well as
our military personnel in South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. That time will come. It has already begun, Senator.
Senator Aiken. It has begun.
Mr. Colby. We have cut our civilian staff somewhat during this
past year. We have in mind to reduce gradually the civilian partici-
pation as well as the military participation in the advisory effort.
But frankly, the advisory effort I consider less of a priority for reduc-
tion than I do the combat forces. Any way in which we can assist the
early relief of combat forces by a little more advisory effort I think
is well worth it.
Senator Aiken. As I say, I went over the statement of yesterday,
I thought the statement was good as was the manner in wdiich you
answered questions from the dais. I have no more questions at this
time, Mr. Chairman.
I was glad to get the questioning in because I have two other
committee meetings going on now, but I am going to stay awhile.
COST of pacification effort
The Chairman. Mr. Colby, while we are on that, I believe we
requested yesterday that you be prepared to put into the record the
cost of the program for which you are responsible in Vietnam.
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir. I have some general figures. I am prepared to
fiU these out for the record if you wish. But, as I said in my opening
statement, the appropriation from the Department of Defense
consitututes $729 milUon for 1970.
The Chairman. 1970.
Mr. Colby. The appropriation to the Agency for International
Development, which includes both the direct dollar contributions and
the financing of counterpart, amounts to a total of $162 million for
1970. Thus there is a total U.S. contribution to this program of $891
million.
On the Government of Vietnam side of tliis progTam, the progi^ams
associated with the pacification effort cost the Piaster equivalent of
$627 milHon.
Most of that total on both the Vietnamese and on the American
side are military expenditures, sir. These constitute the arms for the
popular and regional forces and also the salaries of the American
advisers on the military side. They also constitute on the Vietnamese
side the salaries for the Vietnamese Regional and Popular forces.
The Chairman. Does the Department of Defense figure of $729
million include all then- civic action programs in Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. No, I do not tliink so.
The Chairman. It does not.
Mr. Colby. No, sir.
The Chairman. There are some others under the Marines and other
divisions.
97
Mr. Colby. It is not that so much, su*. It is programs conducted
by a unit in some area. It might be supported by some local funds or
it might be supported from central level funds.
The Chairman. I remember Secretary McNamara told the com-
mittee once that on their off hours most of the soldiers built Sunday
schools.
Mr. Colby. Well, they do lots of things.
The Chairman. That is what he said. That would cost a lot of
money, of course. That would cost some money that is not included
in this.
Mr. Colby. A considerable amount of it is included, Senator. I
wouldn't say it was all Sunday schools, but they do a certain amount
of civic action work around the bases, the akbase areas and so forth.
The Chairman. I have not only an interest in knowing about this
program, but by coincidence I have four constituents here in the room
this morning who are architects and engineers. Having you and Mr.
Vann describe the program there, gives them a much more persuasive
reason as to why they can't get any money for building in Arkansas
than I can give them. I was very pleased to have you prepared to give
it this morning so I won't have to burden them now with my own
story as to why there is so little money for construction of houses or
for Government operations or for anythmg else, for that matter,
because here in 1 year there is $891 million, almost $900 million. It is a
very dramatic figiu^e if you could translate it into what thej^ do in these
smaller communities of this country.
purpose of cords
Coming back to you, Mr. Vann, I can see you have a very great
interest in this work. You have been there since 1962.
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I take it you like this work.
Mr. Vann. I consider the work very important, sir.
The Chairman. It is very interesting to you; isn't it?
Mr. Vann. I also find it very interesting; yes, sir.
The Chairman. I think I detected that from your manner and the
way you spoke. I would assume that you have requested a continued
tour of duty in Vietnam. Is that correct?
j\lr. Vann. I am scheduled to stay there until February of next year,
sir.
The Chairman. By that I mean you do it willingly and voluntarily.
Mr. Vann. All civilians in Vietnam are there voluntarily, sir.
The Chairman. Do you feel that you are creating a bastion of
strength for our country in Southeast Asia?
Mr. Vann. A bastion of what, sir?
The Chairman. Strength.
Mr. Vann. I don't look upon it in that manner, sir.
The Chairman. How do you look upon it?
Mr. Vann. I look upon it as one of helping, as an agent of my
Government, to fulfill an obligation that my Government considers
important.
The Chairman. Would you clarify that a bit. Of what obligation
are you speaking?
98
Mr. Vann. I believe, sir, that based upon previous decisions made
by several administrations the United States has deemed that it
has an interest in that area of the world, an interest in preventing
that area of the world from being involuntarily absorbed by other
political ideologies.
The Chairman. What other political ideologies?
Mr. Vann. Specifically communism.
The Chairman. Do you feel that most of the people in the delta
are very strongly motivated by ideological considerations?
Mr. Vann. I do not, sir. But I feel that the leaders of the enemy
are very strongly motivated by Communist ideology.
The Chairman. What is the attitude of the people who are under
your charge?
Mr. Vann. Sir, the only people who are under my charge are the
American advisers and I think most of them share my views as to our
commitment there.
MR. VANN's attitude TOWARD VIETNAM WAR
The Chairman. There was a recent article in the Chicago Tribune
that said that you were once quite pessimistic — I believe it uses the
words "a confirmed pessiinist" — but that you are now an optimist.
Is that correct? Were you ever a pessimist about this area?
Mr. Vann. I prefer to think, sir, that I have been realistic about
Vietnam, that I was not pessimistic from 1962 until 1968 and that I
have not been optimistic from 1968 until now. Up until 1968 I was
highly dissatisfied with the manner in which the war was being con-
ducted in Vietnam, and I did not anticipate that it was going to be
successful.
Since 1968 I have become increasingly convinced that, with the
changes that have been made not only by our side but by the enemy
side, our objectives in Vietnam and, coincidcntally, the objectives of
the majority of the Vietnamese people, will be achieved.
U.S. OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. You come back again to the objectives. I don't
like to belabor this matter, but you bring it up. What are these
objectives that are going to he achieved?
Mr. Vann. The objectives, as I understand them, sir, exist first of
all because of our past involvement in not only our SEATO organi-
zation there in Southeast Asia, but all over the world. In many parts
of the world we have to some extent been committed to assist people
who are now free to remain free from Communist aggression or
aggression of any other sort that is externally imposed on their country.
I realize that these commitments may have been made at a time
when the environment of the world was much different than it is
now.
I am quite aware that as time goes on the justification that once
may have existed may have to some extent evaporated.
I consider that we did go to Vietnam for two purposes: First, to
help the people there in response to their plea not to be overrun by
communism. And, secondly — and this is my own interpretation,
99
nothing I have been told — to prevent further Communist expansion
into Southeast Asia.
CHANGES CONTRIBUTING TO SUCCESS OF PRESENT PROGRAM
The Chairman. And the way to prevent that is the program that
you are now following, and it is successful.
Mr. Vann. I think, sir, that the program we have been following
for the last 18 months has been the most successful that we have had
in Vietnam. I think it has been successful through a combination of a
change on our part and, quite possibly more significantly, a change
in the nature of the war and in the nature of the enemy.
This was a war, sn, which at one time, in my judgment, was an
insurgency, a civil war. That has largely gone by the board. It is
largely now a war of invasion. It was originally a very difficult war
for us to become involved in or to assist because at one time, certainly
in 1965, a goodly percentage, possibly even a majority, of the rural
population was supporting the National Liberation Front.
Today, not only in my "judgment but in the judgment of peoplel
have often reUed upon — missionaries and long-term residents in
Vietnam, Vietnamese, ex-Vie tminh, people not now in the Govern-
ment—the National Liberation Front enjoys the support of less than
10 percent of the population of South Vietnam.
This doesn't mean that 30 to 40 percent switched sides. It merely
means that 30 to 40 percent that did support the other side no longer
support them. It means that they are much more susceptible to the
Government's approach than they had been in the past.
However, I don't think we deceive ourselves into thinking that
there is going to be any enthusiastic follomng of the Government,
just as there never was really an enthusiastic follomng of the NLF.
People want a better government. That is why the majority of them
joined the other side. It is not that they believed in communism.
They wanted better government.
Since 1965, through a series of steps, they have been gradually
getting better government from the Government of Vietnam and
less of a basis for thinking they would get it from the NLF. From Tet
of 1968 on — because Tet was very definitely a turning point in this
war — it became very obvious to the majority of the population that
they had no opportunity at all to get the type of things that they
wanted — which, as I understand them, are peace and prosperity —
from the Communists. They did in large numbers, from Tet of 1968,
reject the enemy. They rejected him because of something that had
been changing since 1965, when he decided to escalate the war. They
rejected him because he had changed from being a South Vietnamese
ofttimes a relative, to being a North Vietnamese invader. That
happened in I, II and III Corps, like a red flag coming down the
peninsula. I could watch the change because I was there.
It started happening in 1969 in IV Corps. It has made our job
infinitely easier. It is just so much easier now to fight a North
Vietnamese enemy who doesn't have support of the population, who
is totally relying upon a line of supply and communications, who is
an alien in the area, who does not have intelligence penetrations and
who fights in a conventional manner. This is infinitely easier than it
100
is to fight a population supporting a soldier who is a farmer by day and
an enemy by night.
That part of the war is largely behind us. We are now involved
primarily in a conventional war on the other side and conversely we
have essentially stolen the enemy's thunder by engaging in a people's
war on our side. This is what has made such a difference in Vietnam.
That is why for the last 18 months I have been called an optimist in
Washington.
RESULTS OF TET ATTACK
I came back here in July of 1968 and said I recognized that a lot of
bad things happened as a result of Tet. I know the tremendous
psychological defeat, the traumatic shock it was to the American
people. But a lot of good has come out of it. It has made the war much
more black and white. It has caused the Government of Vietnam to
consider much more seriously that its very survival is at stake. It has
caused them to have mobilization. It has gotten them to take the
programs and the actions and the steps that we have been advocating
for years. Suddenly I began to see the prospect of a reallj^ tremendous
break tlu'ough.
I might say, sir that officials in our Government were almost
incredulous that between December of 1967, when I was back here
and was considered quite pessimistic, and July of 1968, after the Tet
attack, I had suddenly changed and said there was an oj:)portunity to
achieve our objectives. But it was quite sincerely the first time that I
saw that opportunity during the more than 7 years I have been in-
volved in it.
NEWSPAPER ARTICLE CONCERNING MR. VANN's VIEWS
The Chairman. I think that is very encouraging.
Do you think it woidd be useful to insert in the record an article
about you in the Chicago Tribune of November 10, by Samuel
Jameson, simply enlargmg upon your ^^dews as to why you are more
optimistic? Are you familiar with that article?
Mr. Vann. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have read it, bnt I don't
remember the details; I am certainly agreeable if the chairnuin says
it is all right, sir.
The Chairman. It really, I think, confirms and enlarges upon what
you said; so we will insert it. The basis for my questions was that you
had changed your views, which you confirmed in a very eloquent
manner.
(The article referred to follows:)
[From the Chicago Tribune, Nov. 10, 1969]
Pacification Head in Viet Sees Hope
Samuel Jameson, chief of the Tokyo bureau of The Tribune, has traveled to
South Viet Nam to assess the situation there at a time when momentous steps
affecting that country's future are being discussed and taken. Here he reports
on the pacification program in the Mekong delta.
(By Samuel Jameson)
Can Tho, Viet Nam, Nov. 9 — John Paul Vann, who heads the 3,400-man
pacification advisory team in the Mekong delta, once was a confirmed pessimist
concerning the progress of the war in Met Nam.
101
In 1963, Vann, then a lieutenant colonel serving as chief adviser to Vietnamese
troops in the delta, resigned from the army to criticize the late President Ngo Dinh
Diem's conduct of the war.
In 1965, Vann, who returned to Viet Nam as an American aid adviser in Hau
Nghia province west of Saigon, told this reporter that the Metnamese government's
efforts to extend its control and promote economic progress in the countryside were
a total failure. He estimated at the time that less than 5 per cent of Hau Nghia
province had been pacified.
"There is such a credibility gap that many of us are gun shy about saymg
anything optimistic," he said in an interview here. "Nonetheless, there has been
quite a change."
Vann's title is deputy director of the fourth corps Civil Operations and Revolu-
tionary Development Support [C. O. R. D. S.] team, which is headed by an army
major general. Vann bears primary responsibility for directing 94 American
pacification advisory teams, while the general devotes most of his time to advising
Vietnamese armj^ troops. No American combat troops are stationed in the delta.
"In 1965 it was a safe bet that as many people supported the Communists
as supported the government," Vann said.
"If an election had been held at that time, the Viet Cong probably could have
won more than 35 per cent of the votes and become the dominant group in South
Viet Nam."
Tells of Change
In an election today, the Communists would not get more than 15 per cent of
the vote, he asserted.
Vann qualified his optimism by saying that the change represented only a
marginal upturn for the government after j-ears of sliding downhill. The big
difference came from a drastic decline in the popularity of the Communists, he
said.
"Despite the obvious international propaganda victory the Communists won
with their 1968 Tet offensive, they suffered a defeat in South Viet Nam," he said.
Not only did they violate a religious holiday, thus alienating a majority of the
population, but they also lost about half of their combat leadership, he said.
"All of the critics who yell 'doomsday' talk about the government abandoning
the countryside to defend itself in the cities. That is true," Vann said. "But the
enemy also abandoned the countryside to attack the cities."
Vann said he wanted to see the government move its forces back into the coun-
tryside as early as the summer of 1968. Even tho Saigon failed to act until Novem-
ber, 1968, it found communist forces far below expectations. As a result, govern-
ment control of the countryside was shot up in unprecedented way," he said.
The pacification expert admitted the claim that the government controlled 90.5
per cent of the population was misleading.
"It is absolutely wrong to look at the statistics in that way," he said, Favorable
biases built into the American conducted hamlet evaluation survey make it im-
possible to look at the statistical findings as absolutes, he said.
"In the delta, you can say accurately that the government now controls 2 mil-
lion more people, or 38 per cent more of the population, than it did in February,
1968."
Nationwide, control has gone up 20 per cent in the last year, he added.
Vann said he relied on the accuracy of the trends shown in the evaluation system
because "for the first time the Vietnamese can't write their own report card."
"In all of the other programs since 1961, it was possible for the Vietnamese
province chief to certify that he had completed his objectives by just going thru
the motions. Nothing really substantial had to be done," he said.
Vann said the upswing in the delta — where 5 miUion people, or 35 per cent of
South Viet Nam's population, live — has produced these results:
1. For the first time in this decade road travel to every provincial capital is
possible without a military escort.
2. A still classified action, which will be announced eventually, has set a mile-
stone in terms of nation-wide defense.
3. The Vietnamese 21st division is now engaging the Commamists in the U
Minh forest in the southernmost portion of the delta, which has been a communist
stronghold for 25 year*^.
4. The numbers of pf^ople from whose ranks the Viet Cong can recruit guerrillas
and seek support has diminished by about thrf^e-fourths, from 2}^ million to
700,000. "Sinco May the Communists have been importing North Vietnamese into
the delta, whereas they u«ed to be able to export guerrillas from the delta to other
areas of South Viet Nam," Vann said.
102
5. A villogc development program, unknown in previous j^ears, has trained
17,000 village officials in the delta i=ince the beginning of 1969 — more than all
village level training ever conducted thruout South Viet Nam in all previous
years.
As an example of the increased security, Vann pointed to a trip made on Nov.
2 — by Am.bassador William Colbj^, director of the nation-wide C.O.R.D.S. pro-
gram. The ambassador drove from Saigon, then joined Vann in a road canal river
trip to My Tho, and returned to Saigon by automobile. The trip lasted five hours,
Vann said.
Vann's opinions on the efficiency of the Vietnamese bureaucracy have changed
less drastically than his outlook on the progress of the war in general.
"All of the things thej;- do are still going wrong, but they are going wrong by
American standards," he said.
Vann said the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu has proved itself
more capable than any of its predecessors since at least 19.59. It has survived.
REASONS FOR PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. Then the objective of preventmg the NLF or the
Communists from prevaihng is being achieved and you attribute it
largely I assume, to the pacification program and the change in our
strategy. Did you mean the stopping of the bombing in the north or
what did you mean by the change we went through that was
significant?
Mr. Vann. Two things, sir; if I might refer to the first part of your
question. One of the reasons that we have had the opportunity to
achieve progress is because the bulk of the NLF, although headed by
Communists and serving Communist purposes, by very great good
fortune are not Communists. They are followers. In other words, the
NLF Communist leadership enlisted in the countryside for their
Soldiers a large number of people who were simply unhappy with the
government and used this as a way to express it. So right there was
the base which we could always tap. About 95 percent of the people
in South Vietnam we have recognized since 1962 were potentially
our friends and allies if they could get what they were fighting for,
which was better government.
CHANGE IN STRATEGY
If I may, I will address myself to the second portion of your question
as to change in our strategy. The change essentially has come about
by the recognition that to provide security for a population you have
to do it 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and 31 days a month.
In all pacification programs in which I participated from 1962 up
until Tet of 1968, we would start off every year with about 4,500
hamlets under government control. Each year we would program,
depending on how optimistic we were, a thousand to 2,000 additional
hamlets to be brought under governm.ent control. Each year we
would go out and would achieve 59 to 75 percent of that objective,
but amazingly at the end of each year we would still have only 4,500
hamlets. The reason for that was quite ob-\aous. The reason for it can
be compared to the air in the balloon. If you expand a balloon in one
direction you do it only at the cost of contracting it in another. The
reason that we were not being successful on ])acification is that we
were going out and occupying a hamlet for 2 or 3 months, going
through the routine of pacifying it, but then moving on to another
hamlet and leaving the first one empty.
103
In 1968 that fact was brought home very startlingly by Tet. From
that time on as we began om* pacification, we did so with the recog-
nition that you had to leave permanent security in the hamlet.
For example, in the Delta in 1969 we pacified 1,000 additional
hamlets in a 12-months period. Coincidentally, we recruited and
trained 1,000 additional RF and PF platoons and put them in those
hamlets. They are still there. That also, sir, is why, unlike any other
pacification program, this one cannot be rolled back by sudden
political reversal. This is one in which the enemy, if and when he begins
to react to it — I don't really think he can, but if and when he does —
can't come in and overrun two or three hamlets and then have the
whole province or whole series of provinces collapse. He is going to
have to eat those hamlets up platoon by platoon and this is going to
be awfully costly to him.
This is the great difference now. We occupy those hamlets; the
government has control there. We are there 24 hours a day. We are
staying there and we intend to stay there.
On all other pacification programs, sir, we went in there for 3
months and then we left it, of ttimes with nothing more than a string
of barbed wire around it.
Senator Case. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me to
ask the Colonel to say whom he meant by, "we."
Mr. Vann. Sir, I apologize.
Senator Case. This is not
Mr. Vann. I have been an adviser to the Government of Vietnam
so long that when I say, we, I am talking about the Government of
Vietnam with American advice.
Senator Case. Thank you.
The Chairman. I don't wish to take too long. There is one line of
questioning I would like to get into and then I will yield to you.
Senator Case. Please go on.
TIME REQUIRED UNTIL GVN CAN TAKE COMPLETE CONTROL
The Chairman. In your capacity as adviser how long do you think
we will have to stay before they can be allowed to take complete
control of the situation? Do you have any estimate of it?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I am sure that all of us have our private estimates.
As you are well aware, our Government's official policy is to stay
in accordance with the situation in Vietnam and the United States.
I would answer your question in this way, sir. There is definitely
some tim^ limit on our involvement. If you make the assumption that
progress continues as it has been, I can see in the next several y^ars
tliis Government of Vietnam largely gaining enough strength to go it
alone. However, when we are talking, say, over the next 5-year time
period — and I just use that for lack of anything more definite — the
quicker you go out the less the chance that they are going to be
successful. The longer you stay the greater the chance they will be
successful and that they will remain non-Communist.
I would say that if we went out on a very accelerated basis, there is
still better than a 50-60 chance that the Government would make it.
If we go out on a gradual basis under the criteria that the President
of the United States has laid down, I would consider it a very high
104
probability, a three sigma probability, that the objectives in Vietnam
will be achieved.
MR. VANN's contact WITH TRAN NGOC CHAU
The Chairman. Mr. Vann, did you read an article in this morning's
Washington Post by Mr. Robert Kaiser about Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau?
Mr. Vann. I did, sir.
The Chairman. He quotes Mr. Chau as saying you were among the
first Americans whom Mr. Chau told about contacts with his brother,
who was a North Vietnamese intelligence agent. He also quotes Chau
as saying you went to see either Ambassador Lodge or Ambassador
Locke about Chau's contacts with his brother and then told Chau
to continue those contacts and that throughout 1968 Chau continued
to keep Americans and especially you informed of his talks with his
brother.
I don't know whether you have seen the statement on the story of
Mr. Chau, which I made on February 5.
Mr. Vann. I have seen it, Mr. Chairman.
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND
TRAN NGOC CHAU
The Chairman. Have you?
Since then I have received a letter from Mr. Chau, which I have
before me, saying that he had heard press reports which said that I
had called him a CIA agent in my statement.
I am writing Mr. Chau to point out that I said in my statement that
he had been nominated by the CIA to be head of a cadre retraining
program in 1966 and has worked closely with the CIA in that capacity.
I also said in that statement that I knew that he had reported his con-
tacts with his brother to a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, includ-
ing CIA officers with whom he had daily contact. I will put Mr. Chau's
letter and my reply in the record just for clarification, together with
Mr. Kaiser's article.
(The letters and article referred to follow:)
[Telegram]
To: H. E. U.S. Senator Fulbright, Washington, D.C.
From: Congressman Tran Ngoc Chau, Member of Special Court, Vietnam.
Text: Please accept my thankful regards for your most valuable statement
on my case as of a political persecution in Vietnam. I would rectify only one
point in your statement as released by UPI here. Which makes very harmful
to my nationalist reiDutation. For a CIA agent has been considered in Vietnam
as the most detested enemy much more than a Communist or any type of criminals.
It is true that I had cooperated with CIA for many years in developing founda-
tion of present Pacification and Rcv^olutionary Development in capacity' of
Province Chief and Director RD cadres. But I have never been a CIA agent..
I strongly ask your consideration for a U.S. Senate Investigation on American
officials and CIA operations in Vietnam which have been dcvstroj'ing both Viet-
namese Nationalist Ideology and Patriots and American image.
Present political persecution on me is consequence of combined action taken by
US officials and CIA and Vietnames(! officials. In an attempt to sabotage Viet-
nam(;s(! and Communist direct talks for Peace Settlement. I did have contacts
with my communist brother with agreement of U.S. Ambassador through Mr..
John Paul Vann. Compkito dossier on my case on the wa.v to your office. Many
notable Vietnamese has expressed their conmKuit on my case. Witnesses and
persons to testify my accusation are Ambassadors Bunker, Locke, Colby, Misters
105
John Vann, Baumgartuer, O'Donnell, Robert Moellen, Jacobson, State Depart-
ment. Georgesen, Thomas Donahue, Stuart Methven, O'Reillj', CIA; General
Wj^and, Lt. Col. Scoles, Major Sauvage of Defense Department. Drs. EUsberg,
Hickey, Rank, and others I would name later if you agree. My highest consider-
ation.
Tran Ngoc Chaxt.
February 17, 1970.
Congressman Tran Ngoc Chau,
The National Assembly,
Saigon, Vietnam.
Dear Mr. Chau: Thank you for your letter which I received through the good
offices of a third party.
I am sorry that UPI has reported that I called you a CIA agent. I am enclosing
a copy of the statement I made on February 5 at a hearing of the Committee which
I later that day inserted in the Congressional Record. I think that you will see from
reading the statement that I never alleged that you had been a CIA agent. I simply
stated that you had worked closely with the CIA in connection with the cadre
training program and that you had reported your contacts with your brother to
a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers, with whom you had
daily contact.
I found your letter most interesting and appreciated your taking the trouble to
write.
I assure you that I will continue to follow your case with sympathetic interest.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FuLBRiGHT, Chairman.
Enclosure.
Statement by J. W. Fulbright
THE story of tran NGOC CHAU
In this morning's Washington Post, Joseph Kraft tells us the story of Tran
Ngoc Chau. It is a story that does not reflect credit on the United States or on
the South Vietnamese regime of President NgU3'en \an Thieu. I have known
about the story for several months, and I know that the facts that Mr. Kraft
recites are accurate. There are, of course, many other facts that have not been
reported in the press.
To set the story in context, as Mr. Kraft writes Chau is an old friend of Presi-
dent Thieu and once shared quarters with him when both were junior officers.
From 1960 to 1966 he was Province Chief in Kien Hoa and Mayor of Danang.
In both positions, he had an outstanding record. In 1966 he was nominated by
CIA to be head of the cadre training program at the A'ungtau Training Center
where he obvioush^ worked closely with the CIA as that agency had the respon-
sibility for the Center. In the 1967 National Assembly elections, he was elected
a deputy from Kien Hoa with the second highest plurality in the country. He
then became head of the opposition bloc and was elected Secretary- General of
the Assembly.
In 1965, Chau contacted by his brother, Tran Ngoc Hien, a North Vietnamese
intelligence agent. By Chau's own admission, he did not report these contacts to
the South Vietnamese government. Kraft says that whether he reported these
contacts to the CIA is in dispute. Chau says that he did, as Keyes Beech reported
in the Washington Evening Star on February 2. I know for a fact, from private
sources, that he did report his contacts with his brother to a number of U.S.
officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers with whom he had dail.y contact.
I should add that I also know for a fact that he had, and still has, many close
friends in the American official community.
At any rate, to return to the story told by Mr. Kraft, Chau began last year to
advocate a cease-fire and direct negotiations between the South Vietnamese
government and the NLF. He also began to attack Nguyen Cno Thang, a rich
Saigon pharmacist and member of President Thieu inner clique, who is described
by Kraft as President Thieu's "political bag man."
Chau's brother was arrested in April and interrogated in Jul3^ No charges
were lodged against Chau at the time of his brother's arrest and interrogation.
I am told, in fact, that relations between Chau and Thieu were not broken until
some weeks or months thereafter. It appears that Thieu's open attacks on Chau
began only after Chau denounced the pharmacist Thang.
Thus it appears that the real reason for Thieu's attack on Chau was not his
contact with the communists but rather Chau's growing power as an opposition
44-706 — 70 8
106
figure and as a critic of Thieu's attempts to pressure and corrupt the Assembly
as evidenced by the activities of Thang.
Thieu began his campaign against Chau by denouncing him publicly on a
number of occasions. According to the Saigon press, in a speech on December 10
at the Vungtau Training Center, Thieu said that if the Assembly wovild not see
justice done to Chau, and to two other accused deputies, "the people in the armed
forces will cut off the heads of these deputies" and he added: "Our duty is to
beat such dogs to death." Thieu organized demonstrations, including a march
on Parliament, in connection with his efforts to lift Chau's parliamentary im-
munity. Failing to secure the votes of three-quarters of the members of the Assem-
bly necessarj^ to lift Chau's immunitj^, Thieu resorted to the legally questionably
tactic of having a petition lifting Chau's immunitj^ circulated among Assembly
members. According to a report in this morning's Washington Post by Robert
Kaiser from Saigon, the 102 necessary signatures on the petition have now been
obtained, and President Thieu is free to prosecute Chau.
I know that the U.S. Mission in Saigon did not expect Thieu to obtain the
necessary number of votes to lift Chau's immunity. But they obviously under-
estimated Thieu's determination and his ability to obtain the result he desires
through threats and bribery. I have very persuasive evidence on this point.
Mr. Kraft tells us that Ambassador Bunker was directed to intervene with Presi-
dent Thieu on Chau's behalf but that "the Embassy has not bestirred itself."
Given the attitude of certain high Mission officials toward Chau, and their un-
willingness to incur President Thieu's displeasure, I am not surprised. Nor am I
surprised that Chau is disenchanted with Americans because of their refusal to
intervene, as Keyes Beach reported after his interview with Chau.
Chau is now in hiding. I hope for his sake that he will be able to escape Thieu's
persecution. But even if he does, the story of Tran Ngoc Chau will not have a
happy ending. The South Vietnamese Assembly has been intimidated, while the
U.S. Government has shrugged its shoulders. And those in Vietnam who favor
negotiation and compromise, or who dispute President Thieu, will speak at their
peril from now on. Perhaps the story of Tran Ngoc Chau will prove to be the last
chapter in the history of representative government in Vietnam.
I
[From The Washington Post, Feb. 18, 1970]
Accused Saigon Deputy Blames U.S.
(By Robert G. Kaiser)
Saigon, Feb. 17 — Tran Ngoc Chau, the outspoken House deputy, today blamed
American pressure for President Thieu's decision to prosecute him for "activities
helpful to the Communists."
Chau claimed the United States feared that Thieu would use him to initiate di-
rect talks with the Communists and bypass the Americans. Now, he charged, Thieu
is prosecuting him in order to impress the Americans that this was never Thieu's
intention.
Chau has long been a favorite of U.S. officials in Vietnam, and has many
American friends. In an interview in his Saigon "hideout" today, however, Chau
spoke bitterly of the U.S. government, which he said was trying to "clean their
hands" of him.
Chau, whose American friends have been unable to protect him from the wrath
of Thieu, said that he has "lost all faith" in U.S. policy. He warned other Viet-
namese who have cooperated with the Americans to prepare for betrayal like the
one he claims to have suffered.
The Chau case is the main attraction in Saigon's center ring these days. It com-
bines— in one unruly package — three of the issues that concern this capital most:
the American role in Vietnam, Thieu's feuds with his opponents and the status of
Vietnamese democracy. This case may have important and lasting effects on the
last two issues.
And the Chau case is resplendant with the little touches of Vietnam that
boggle the Western mind. For example, the political gossips have been saying
that Chau is sleeping in a different house every night, stealthily dodging Thieu's
police. In fact, as this reporter discovered when he visited Chau this morning,
he is living quite opcnlj' in a house that is elaborately staked out by some quite
unsubtle plainclothesmen.
Very briefly, this is the storj^ of Tran Ngoc Chau:
107
Now 46, lie fought for the Vietminh until 1949, when he left the revolutionary
movement to join the forces of the Emperor Bao Dai. He became an officer, rose
quickly through the ranks and was soon immersed in a distinguished career.
He went to infantry school at Ft. Benning, Ga., in 1955-56, where he learned
English, and also American ways. Thereafter Chau seemed always to get along
well with Americans in Vietnam. His success as chief of Kienhoa Province in the
early 1960s brought him to the attention of high American officials, who saw to it
that he was promoted to important administrative jobs.
In 1967 he ran for the National Assembly from Kienhoa, and won an impressive
victorj^ He was elected an officer of the House of Representatives, and began to
establish a name for himself.
MEETS WITH BROTHER
From 1965 onward, Chau was also leading a secret life — a life he shared only with
a few Americans. In 1965 his brother and former Vietminh comrade, Tran Ngoc
Hien, came secretly to Chau and announced he was a high-ranking North Viet-
namese agent.
From then until early 1969, Chau and Hien met quite regularly. According
to the testimony of both, each tried to convert the other. At the same time, they
discussed possible approaches to a settlement of the war. According to Chau,
he was trying to arrange talks among the warring Vietnamese factions, excluding
the Americans, that might lead to a political settlement. He admits he pursued
this idea without informing the Vietnamese government.
Hien was arrested last April. He confessed his intelligence activities in the
South, and gave a detailed account of his talks with Chau. (The Washington
Post published excerpts from Hien's confession on Jan. 5.)
Chau, meanwhile, began to speak critically of the Thieu government's policies.
He called publicly for direct negotiations with the Viet-cong before Thieu had
accepted that idea. He also proposed a form of coalition government that would
have given the Communists a share of power in the provinces and the National
Assembly, but not in the executive branch.
Last July, Thieu told a group of legislators that Chau had had illegal contacts
with the enemy. That began a complicated series of events — dominated by an
emotional anti-Chau campaign conducted by Thieu himself — that has now ended
with Chau formally accused of "activities helpful to the Communists."
He was protected by the Vietnamese equivalent of congressional immunity, but
the government overcame this obstacle by promoting a petition in the House to
withdraw the immunity in this case. The petition was allegedly signed by 102
members — exactly the three-fourths required by law — and a trial is expected soon.
CALLS CHARGES RIDICULOUS
Today the accused man contended that the charges against him were ridiculous.
Chau admitted that he talked to his brother, showed him some courtesies and
failed to betray him to the government. But he denied giving him any signifi-
cant help, and insisted that his contacts with Hien were intended only to try to
convert his brother, and to bring an end to the war.
Chau admits that he did not inform any Vietnamese officials that he was talking
secretely with his brother, a Communist spy. He defended this today on the
ground that when his talks with Hien began, the South Vietnamese government
was chaotic, run by generals whose "war sentiment was very strong." In recent
times, Chau said, he thought he had the right to conduct independent talks as a
member of the National Assembh^
But, he added, he did think he should tell some Americans about his brother.
Chau gave these details of his dealings with U.S. officials:
"Among those I informed after this first contact with Hien [in late 1965] were
John Vann [an adviser in Vietnam since the earh^ 1960s, now in charge of paci-
fication in the Mekong Delta], Stuart Methven [descrilaed by Chau as a CIA
employe], Thomas Donohue [another CIA man, Chau said], and . . . the CIA
station chief at the time."
U.S. OFFICIALS INFORMED
According to all the rules of diplomatic or military practice, contacts of this sort
would have to be reported by such men to higher authoritj^ If men as prominent
as John Vann and a CIA station chief were involved, it seems certain all top U.S.
108
officials in Vietnam must have been informed. Chau said as much in today''s inter-
view:
"Methven and Donohue told me they would inform the appropriate Vietnamese
officials; Vann went to see the U.S. ambassador — I don't know which, [Eugene]
Locke or [Henry Cabot] Lodge — and the ambassador said it was okay for me to
continue my contacts" with Hien, Locke was then deputy U.S. ambassador.
Chau said two U.S. officials — Col. Mike Dunn, now a White House military
aide who worked for Lodge, and a Mr. Adam, described by Chau as a CIA man —
came to see him to find out what he was hearing from his brother.
During mid-1967, Chau related, his conversations with Hien and other factors
persuaded him that the Vietcong would try to create uprisings in populated areas.
In August 1967, he said, he gave a three-hour briefing on his theory to Ambassadors
Ellsworth Bunker and Locke and several military officials, including Lt. Gen.
Frederick Weyand.
Five months later the Communists launched the Tet offensive.
Throughout 1968, Chau said, he continued to keep Americans — -especially Vann —
informed of his talks with Hien. The Americans "seemed pleased just to get
more of the Communist assessment," Chau said today.
VANN INTERVENES
After Hien was arrested last April, Chau said, he went to see Vann at his
headquarters in Cantho, the largest city in the Delta. According to Chau, "At the
time. Ambassador [William] Colby [currently head of the U.S. pacification
program] was in Sadec Province. Vann called him and got approval on the phone
to see [Minister of the Interior Tran Thien] Khiem. The next day Vann saw
Khiem." Vann's intervention on Chau's behalf, he added, "seemed to delay the
whole affair for some time."
According to Chau, this was the last overt cooperation he got from his American
friends. Ambassador Bunker refused to meet him, Chau claimed. Then, he added,
the ambassador ordered all American officials to cease dealing with Chau.
"Bunker and the CIA believed Thieu would use me and my brother to make a
secret arrangement for direct talks between the Vietnamese, without letting the
Americans know about it," Chau claimed.
He noted that he and Thieu had been friends since the time both were young
lieutenants. But now, Chau said, Thieu responds primarily to Bunker. Chau
said he believes he is being prosecuted to demonstrate to Bunker that Thieu has no
plans for a secret deal.
NEW AMERICAN POLICY
Chau charged that there is a new American policy in Vietnam, intended to
impose a minority government on the country that will be utterly dependent on
U.S. aid, and therefore vmable to negotiate its own end to the war.
The U.S. mission here is familiar with most of Chau's claims that he was betrayed
by the American government and abandoned in time of need. But the embassy
has made no comment on Chau's accusations, the first of which were published ten
days ago. This unusual silence suggests orders from Washington not to talk.
Well before Chau's accusations began, however, many embassy officials pri-
vately expressed displeasure with Thieu's attempt to prosecute Chau and two
other members of the House. The degree of displeasure these Americans have
expressed has been unprecedented in the friendly American relationship with
Thieu.
It was learned today that Bunker has told Thieu that the U.S. expects a variety
of vmfavorable consequences if Chau is sentenced to prision. Some of Bunker's
staff believe much damage has already been done by Thieu's public campaign
against the House.
If the Chau case opened a door on interesting aspects of the U.S. role in Vietnam,
it has also provided an intriguing glimpse of Vietnamese democracy under pressure.
The legal issues in the case are complicated, though the basic facts of the
alleged crime are simple and apparently agreed by all parties: It is against the
law to give any help to Communists, and by Chau's own admission he gave his
brother some assistance — though he claims it was insignificant. For this reason,
hawks among Saigon's politicians are prepared to condemn Chau.
SYMBOLIC CASE
But there is some question as to whether this technical violation of the law is
the real issue. An authoritative source in the presidential palace, for instance,
109
said today that although Chan's transgressions were not seinous, the case against
him would be pressed because "it symbolizes the anti-Communist spirit of the
government."
Phan Thong, a House member who chaired a committee that investigated the
charges against Chau and found them justified, said in an interview today that
he too saw more than legal issues behind the prosecution. Thong said the chief
of the Special (intelligence) Police told his investigating committee that Chau
was "too ambitious in politics." Thong suggested that Chau would have been
left alone if he had not made his proposal for a coalition government.
Another complication involves the petition that the government says stripped
Chau of his immiuiity. Manj- lawyers and legislators have challenged the theory
that the House can substitute a petition for actual floor action. It is widely
assumed that the government could not win a three-fourths vote on the floor, if
only because attendance at the House is so poor.
Some pohticians think Thieu's petition ploy will do permanent damage to the
procedures of the Assembly.
Deputy Thong said he thought the petition might not have been completely
fair. But then, he added, Chau had ignored one article of the constitution by
helping a Communist, so how could he expect protection from other articles of
the constitution that stii)ulate proper parliauicntary procedures?
It is hard to find a Vietnamese who really expects the government to follow
strictly any prearranged set of laws and regulations. That is a Western notion.
TALK OF POLITICS
So the talk among politicians about the Chau case tends to center more on poli-
tics and personalities than legalities. Some, including Chau himself, think Thieu is
trying to intimidate all his opposition by his crackdown on Chau and the other
two House deputies.
Those who subscribe to this theory deplore the president's high-handedness and
warn of more repression of the opposition, but the theory is hardly universal.
Many of the most outspoken opponents of Thieu don't accept it.
Another school theorizes that Thieu is damaging himself more than Chau or any
other opponent by making such a big issue out of a small incident.
"It is like with Sen. Tran Van Don," said an articulate member of the House,
referring to another Thieu critic who has lately incurred presidential ire. "Thieu is
building up Chau and other opponents by attacking them fiercely."
Chau himself is the issue with some politicians. His critics call him vain, a self-
promoter with an exaggerated sense of his own importance. Others say he just isn't
worth all the fuss.
Chau's connection with the CIA has become an issue — several papers have
attacked him as an American lackery. "Many Vietnamese think if Chau is so
dose to the CIA, he deserves some punishment," a thoughtful editor said tonight.
The Chairman. You are not the only pubhc official Mr. Chau has
pubhcly identified as a contact. The Washington Post article has many
other names and so does Mr. Chan's letter to me, but since you happen
to be testifying here today, I did want to ask 3"ou a few questions
relating to this^ rather complicated and apparently now a significant
case according to the papers.
RELATION OF CIA TO CHAU's NOMINATION AND VUNG TAU CENTER
Did Mr. Chau develop many of the concepts of the current pacifi-
cation program?
I^lr. Vann. Sir, let me go back for a moment just in the interest of
the letter that you are sending to Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau. I would in-
terpret that your statement saying that the CIA nominated him is
where he got the impression that you were callmg him an employee of
the CIA. Actually, sir, the CIA has not been in a position in Vietnam
to nominate a GVN official from one job to another.
The job that Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau was nominated to take
was Director of the KD Cadre Directorate. That was a nomination by
the Government of Vietnam and approved by the Minister of RD.
110
That would be the one area m which he might have interpreted your
having suggested he was in the CIA employ.
Mr. Chairman. Then it was an error to say that the CIA had any-
thing to do with that Vung Tau center.
Mr. Vann. It would be an error, sir, to say that they nominated
Colonel Chau for the position as the Director of the RD cadre program.
The Chairman. Did the CIA have anything to do with that center?
Mr. Vann. The CIA, sir, was in an advisory capacity to the Vung
Tau training center.
Mr. Colby. And it also supported it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vann. It also supported it financially.
The Chairman. But, of course, it had no authority to pass upon
any of the personnel.
Mr. Vann. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Colby. The job that Colonel Chau was nominated to was not
just of that center, Mr. Chairman. It was also that of overall re-
sponsibility for the cadre effort of that particular ministry throughout
the nation.
The Chairman. Is it the usual practice of the CIA when they pay
the expenses and organize the advisers not to have anything to do
with the personnel problems of their activity? Is this a common
occurrence?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I am not qualified to answer that because I have
never worked for that agency.
The Chairman. I had heard that the CIA has on occasion taken a
hand in some of these matters. I don't know about that. I was relying
upon my staff's advice as to that statement and they believed that
to be correct at the time. "Nominated" is perhaps an unfortunate
word. Would "approved" or "confirmed" be abetter or more accurate
word or would you say they had nothing whatsoever to do with them?
Mr. Colby. I think they worked with him.
The Chairman. Wliat's that?
Mr. Colby. I think they worked Avith him on that job. This was a
job in the Vietnamese Government. The Vietnamese Government ac-
cepted and named this officer as the director of this directorate.
They worked mth him.
The Chairman. Was the CIA given an opportunity to disapprove
an appointment of this kind?
Mr. Vann. I don't believe so, sir. I would certainly say from the
standpoint of the way things happened in Vietnam that of times the
Government of Vietnam discusses appointments with the advisory
officials for any program in which we are heavily involved financially.
I frequently had a Vietnamese official discuss with me whether or not
a district chief should be continued in office because he knows I have
an adviser there who observes him on a daily basis and they would
like to have our opinion on it.
Mr. Colby. I think if the CIA had real objection to him in that
job, that could have been made very clear and would have had the
effect of having him not take that job.
is tran ngoc chau regarded as nationalist or communist?
Mr. Chairman. Mr. Vann, is Mr. Chau regarded by his colleagues
in the National Assembly and by knowledgeable American officials as
Ill
a Nationalist or as a Communist? How would you characterize him?
Mr. Vann. Sir, first of all, he has so many acquaintances with whom
I have not had personal contact that I wouldn't be qualified to answer
that.
I would say, sir, that it is quite probable, in satisfying what I detect
to be your desire for information on Tran Ngoc Chau, that we will
get into some areas which could possibly prejudice one way or the
other the outcome of a court case that is currently being planned in
Saigon by the Government of Vietnam involving Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau.
On the basis, sir, I would be happy to provide all the information
that I have on this subject to the committee, but I would much prefer
to do it in an executive session so as not to jeopardize either pro or con
the judicial action that is underway in Saigon.
Mr. Chairman. I would certainly respect that. Although this story
goes very far in discussing the matter, you simply don't wish yourself
to confirm or not to confu-m. Is that correct?
Mr. Vann. That is correct, sh". As I interpreted it, that story
represents Mr. Kaiser's interview with Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau, and
The Chairman. Mr. Chau seems to be in no way reluctant to
talk to the press about this matter. Of course, I would gather that
he believes he is about to be, in the parlance of the old days, railroaded
[laughterl because his immunity has been lifted, not by a vote in the
assembly, but by a petition with 102 names. It is a very odd situation,
but if you do not wish to discuss it in open session, I will not pursue
the matter.
The Senator from New Jersey.
Senator Case. It is nice to see you again.
Mr. Vann. Thank you, sir.
Senator Case. It is also very pleasant to see the change in the
attitude you now have from that which I saw in 1967 in May and
June.
Mr. Vann. The situation has changed, sir.
Senator Case. Well, it is very clear that you feel this strongly.
reasons for change in attitude of average south VIETNAMESE
You mentioned, I think, as one of the chief reasons for the change,
the change in the attitude of the average South Vietnamese toward
the Government, and you said that his willingness to join the Libera-
tion Front or follow its leadership was based upon his dissatisfaction
with his Government.
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. Could you elaborate a little bit on that and also
upon the change? Specifically, for example, when you say "govern-
ment," is he thinking about who is sitting in power in Saigon or is he
thinking about his province chief or commander or his district or his
village government or just what? In what respect has this improved?
Would you develop this a little?
Mr. Vann. I think, sh', that the peasant about whom we are
talking, the man who either is or is not in revolt, considers the govern-
ment to be the village and hamlet officials with whom he must have
contact in his daily work. It might extend on occasion to the district
chief. Although he seldom has contact with the district chief, he
would become aware as to whether there is a good district chief or a
112
bad district chief, good and bad in terms of his o^vn future, and his
own opportunity to pursue what he mshes to in his Hfe.
As you may be aware, I was convinced in 1962 and 1963 that there
was no way for the Government of Vietnam, mth Ngo Dinh Diem
pursing the course he was following, to win the war. I felt it was
inevitable that the National Liberation Front was going to win. I
felt strongly enough about that to retire from the Army so as to be
able to publicly express my disagreement mth the policies we were
then following by supporting President Diem.
Over the years a series of different governments came in. I think
that between November 1 of 1963 and the beginning of constitutional
government in 1967, we had approximately 14 different heads of
government in "Vietnam. There w^as a game of real musical chairs.
And there was so much instability that there was little impact down
in the countryside, little change in the life of the average peasant
other than a great deal more unpleasantness than he had ever had
before.
In 1967, when a Constituent Assembly was held, when an election
was conducted to elect, not by a majority, but by the most votes in a
field of 10 candidates, a president and a vice president, when an
assembly, upper and low^er house, were elected, there began what has
been since then a stability of government at the upper level. This
stability was severely shaken by the Tet attack, an attack which was
obviously well-designed and wliich was very nearh^ successful.
Some of the assumptions the enemy made proved to be erroneous
and fortunately he was not successful. But once the elected Govern-
ment of Vietnam, wliich was then a very new government overcame
this, they could address their time and attention to the long-standing
and long-ignored needs of the peasant. Nineteen hundred and sixty-
eight became first a year of recovering from Tet, getting the enemy
back from the cities, and then addressing the problem of how do you
respond to the peasant.
Nineteen hundred and sixty-nine became a year of execution. We
conducted a large number of elections, with the number going from
less than 50 percent to well over 90 percent of the villages and
hamlets in the country haAdng elected government.
We conducted training for these village and hamlet officials. Lit-
erally for the first time in the history of Vietnam we gave a budget to
the village and a procedure wherein the people participated on how
that budget was spent. This was something very novel to these people.
In 1969 there w^as more participation by peasants in the govern-
ment that most affected them, the \dllage and hamlet government,
than, to my knowledge, at any time in the last 100 years history in
Vietnam.
CHANGE IN ENEMY FORCE STRUCTURE AND TET
We have gotten a tremendous response. We were aided and abetted
during this period by the enemy changing the nature of his force
structure from being primarily South Vietnamese to being primarily
North Vietnamese. We were also aided by the fact that in the military
attacks at Tet, which were largely by South Vietnamese units, the
casualties were absolutely enormous. These casualties were not very
meaningful from the standpoint of the numbers of bodies involved
because the enemj^ has long shown an ability to remove bodies out of a
il3
rice paddy with no regard to whether he was killed or not. But there
was the matter of the leadership that was lost. In my judgment, more
than half, possibly two-thuds of the leadership, particularly the field
combat leadership, that the enemy had developed for his South Viet-
namese forces over a period of two decades was lost in 1968.
You can't produce leaders m a year or even 5 years. It takes a
long time to produce this kind of leadership.
This provided the enemy with a difficulty of continuing conibat
actions from which he has not yet recovered. I am not only a civihan
there. I was for 21 years a professional soldier, with a total of 14 years
in combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. "Sly hobby is analyz-
ing military operations. As an analyst, I have become acutely aware
that the leadership of the enemy today is a far cry from, far less
qualified than the leadership that he had prior to Tet of 1968.
A combination of this drop in leadership, the change of the enemy
from being a South Vietnamese to being a North Vietnamese, the
beginnings of village and hamlet government, the participation of the
population, the stability at the central level, getting enough Americans
with long-term experience in Vietnam not to go down any more
dead end alleys
Senator Case. Excuse me, I didn't hear what you said, to not go
down
CHANGE IN EXPERIENCE OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
Mr. Vann. Not to go down one-way streets that end in a deadend.
In other words, one of our big problems in Vietnam up until people
like Ambassador Colby, who had had long-term experience, or Clay
McManaway who has been there 5 years, were assigned and a lot of
people got into positions of determining advisory poficy in Vietnam
who knew something about Vietnam, has been people who have had
just 1 year in Vietnam. When this changed, we were able to prevent
the pitfalls. Year after year I had known programs were going to fail,
because I knew we had tried that sort of thing before and I knew the
deficiencies that existed.
Finally when enough people with that type of experience got into
positions of leadershi]), then the advisory assistance too became very
constructive. Up to that time it sometimes was counterproductive.
Senator Case. Thank you very much.
It is impressive, and I think the most impressive thing is the change
in your vie\v, if I may put it in that fashion and not overstate the
matter.
PRESENT POSSIBILITY OF REASONABLE SOLUTION IN VIETNAM
Our concern here, for the most part, has been with a situation that
seemed constantly to deteriorate while we didn't have the firsthand
evidence that you did because of your daily contact with it and vour
long knowledge of what was really going on. All of us sensed that things
were gomg constantly from bad to worse and that unless there was a
change there would be no end to a bad situation except a disastrous
one, and to many people this more and more indicated that the quicker
we put an end to the whole thing, the better.
114
Your own judgment, I take it now, and you have already said this,
is that as things are going now they are on the upgrade and a reasonable
solution is possible and the one that we ought to continue to try to
pursue.
A'Ir. Vann. Su", I have become so confident that we are going in the
right direction now that since July of 1968, I have within my own
organization been advocating a unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in
Vietnam consistent exactly with the three criteria which the President
enunciated in July of 1969 as official U.S. policy. In other words, for
a year prior to the time it became our official policy I had the utmost
confidence that that was the right direction to go in Vietnam.
Senator Case. Mr. Chamnan, I think most of the rest of the ques-
tions I have would better be asked in executive session and I shall
defer for the moment.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper.
Senator Cooper. Thank you.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESS
Mr. Vann, I certainly appreciate your very forthright and, I think,
precise statement. I respect you too for your statement of your views
of our objectives there. Some may disagree, but as I recall at least
until about 1966 that was the generally accepted view of what our
objectives in Vietnam had been since our first intervention there.
You brought a side of testimony to the committee we don't often
hear and I think whatever the views of anyone as to whatever the
Avar may be that it is good to have testimony like that. I must say
I haven't heard that side since I have been on this committee.
MR. VANN's commanding GENERAL AND PRIOR SERVICE
Who is the commanding general under whom you serve?
Mr. Vann. Maj. Gen. Hal McCown, sir, who formerly served as
the II Corps adviser in Vietnam 1962 and 1963.
Senator Cooper. You have stated that your prior service had
been with the military. Is that correct?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir; I was a military officer and enlisted man for
21 years.
Senator Cooper. You were in World War II?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir; I flew B-29's in World War II in the Army
Air Corps and I went back to the infantry as a paratrooper after
World War II.
Senator Cooper. As you said, your experience has made you very
interested in the military policy in South Vietnam.
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir; I served in that type of warfare. I was com-
mander of a Ranger unit in Korea in 1950 and 1951. Then of course in
1962 and 1963 I served as a senior adviser to AE.VN 7th Division with
advisory responsibility for the area from Saigon to Can Tho.
Senator Cooper. Where did you serve in World War II?
Mr. Vann. In the Southwest Pacific in World War II, sir, with the
485 Bomb Group on Guam.
115
CORDS AND WORLD WAR II MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
Senator Cooper. Listening to your explanation of the organization
and also to this chart, it would seem to me it is quite similar to the
military government organization that the United States had along
with its armies in World War II. Is that correct?
Mr. Vann. Not exactly, sir.
The thing that makes this
Senator Cooper. Similar, I said.
Mr. Vann (continuing). The thing that makes this so different is the
tremendous involvement we have in things such as social and economic
development, whereas the military government organizations were
largely related to control of the population.
Senator Cooper. And to gradually transfer responsibility to the
civilian government.
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES
Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield to me for
30 seconds. I must go to the floor because the morning hour is over.
I didn't want to ask any questions. I wanted to express my pleasure
at seeing Colonel Vann here and Ambassador Colby, both of whom
were so generous and cooperative at that time in Vietnam. As Senator
Cooper said, many of us may think about the overall nature of
American policy, but one can only be glad the United States has
such servants as yourself in such a difficult atmosphere and such a
difficult problem abroad.
Thank you.
Senator Cooper. I certainly join in what you said. Senator Javits.
factors influencing INCREASED SECURITY
You have testified about the development of the local forces. In
your statement you say this: "The significance of this, of course, is
the overwhelming importance of providing security of the population.
Without security, it is doubtful that the remaining pacification objec-
tives can be achieved."
How would you compare the security which has been improved
because of the strengthening of the local forces by arms? How would
you relate that to the fact that the Vietcong and the North \'ietna-
mese have withdrawn from the area? Which is the greatest influence
on the providing of security?
Mr. Vann. The Government's having a physical presence. I would
like to point out, sir, that the withdrawing only refers to North
Vietnamese units. Most of the North Vietnamese units are now along
the Cambodian or Laotian boundaries or in these adjacent countries.
The Vietcong, the South Vietnamese enemy forces, have not with-
drawn per se from the general area. However, there is a significant
difference in the guerriUa operations of today as compared to, say,
pre-Tet 1968. The great difference is this: Most of the guerrillas,
prior to Tet of 1968,lived in the hamlet and did their farming during
the daytime. Most of the guerrillas today must five in a base area
outside of the hamlet. They have no traffic with the hamlet except
116
on those very rare occasions when they run the risk of coming in
chmdestinely, quite possiblj^ at night, particuhirly if it is in an area
where the Government forces are not really alert. There is a vast
difference in the way guerrillas operate today from the way guerrillas
operated before.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AS UNITED STATE&
WITHDRAW^S
Senator Cooper. As you said, major North Vietnamese forces are
along the Cambodian border. Now assume that the program, which
you have described so well, continues in a successful manner and the
United States gradually withdraws its forces. What would you say
then about the possibility of the North Vietnamese coming in from
the Cambodian border and renewed activity on the part of the
Vietcong? Would the South Vietnamese apparatus which you have
described be able to maintain the security which you say is imperative
for pacification?
Mr. Vann. First of all, sir, let me disqualify myself from answering
as Deputy CORDS IV Corp and just go to a role in Vietnam as a
military analyst.
I consider that the North Vietnamese represent far less of a threat
and one which is far more easily handled than the threat we had before
from the National Liberation Front which was primarily a political
guerrilla type tlireat.
The reason I believe this is that in nearly every given set battle that
I have reviewed in Vietnam wherein a conventional ARVN force met a
conventional North Vietnamese force or a conventional U.S. force
met a conventional North Vietnamese force, the winner was always our
side. The reason was that our side had an* and artillery and the other
side did not.
These are the most decisive factors in a conventional battle.
It is expected that the Vietnamese regular forces will continue to
have air and artillery support. They now provide all their artillery
support and they are increasing the amount of air support that they"
are providing. On this basis, I look forward to the day when all of the
fighting can be done by South Vietnamese even if there continues to b&
a North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam.
Senator Cooper. Well, your answer is directed chiefly, I think, to
military aspects of Vietnamization. You consider the jiacification
program as a necessary element of the Vietnamization program,
don't you?
Mr. Vann. I do, sir. I see a very low probability of the enemy
being able to substantially roll back the pacification i)rogram that
has been achieved. The reason is that, although on any given night
at any given area he masses forces and has a local success, to do it on
a widespread basis would mean he would have to pay at least a
hundred men dead for every hamlet that he wants to reestablish
control. He docs not have anywhere near the men to even make a
dent in pacification.
Senator Cooper. I will pose this question: If the Administration's
plan for withdrawal continues, and I believe it will, and U.S. forces
are withdrawn from Vietnam in 2 or 3 years, will the Vietnamese be
117
able to maintain the security which you say is essential for the
pacification program in the absence of U.S. military forces?
Mr. Vann. Sir, that again depends upon factors such as the political
stability within the country. If things continue as they have gone
for the last 18 months, the answer quite clearly is "Yes." If for some
reason there gets to be some internal fighting among our friendly
Vietnamese, if the political struggle within Vietnam goes in such a
way as to affect the stability of the government and all of the attention
of the Vietnamese gets diverted toward a struggle among themselves,
that coiild put an entirely different light on the situation 2 or 3 years
hence. Right now all expectations are that the current stability will
continue.
NECESSITY OF U.S. PRESENCE FOR SUCCESS OF VIETNAMIZATION
Senator Cooper. Well, in your view is the American presence neces-
sary for the success of the Vietnamization program?
]\lr. Vann. The American presence today is necessary. How long
it will be necessary is obviously the question that the Administration
debates on a continuing basis. On a continuing basis we are examining
it ourselves. As one example, I have 95 district advisory teams in the
Delta. I have determined that pacification has proceeded so well in
18 of these districts that I have reduced the advisory effort to less
than 30 percent of what it was. In one i)rovince we have achieved such
a high level of security that the military ad\'isory efforts have been
reduced to about 25 percent of what it was just about a year ago. I
would see no reason for that trend not to continue, assuming that
progress continues the way it has been going.
change in attitude of south VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
Senator Cooper. There have been a number of these pacification
programs, as you know so weU, and bearing a number of dift'erent
names — revolutionary program, national building program. But
I gather from what you say that you beUeve there has been a change
in the attitude of the people of South Vietnam, that the present
program marks a distinct success in its objectives, compared to the
prior programs.
Mr. Vann. I think the biggest difference, the biggest asset we have
is the changed attitude of the population of South Vietnam. But
certainly complementing that is what, is, in my judgment, the first
well-organized pacification effort that we have had in Vietnam.
popular support for south VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
Senator Cooper. I will go to the political side for just a moment.
You said just a moment ago that you thought the success was condi-
tioned also on stability of the government. I assume you mean to be
successful a government must have the support, general support, of
the people. Is that correct?
Mr. Vann. Yes, Senator, I believe so.
Senator Cooper. In your wide range of activities in South Vietnam
do you consider that the present government has the support or the
118
acceptance — any way you want to put it — of the people of South
Vietnam?
Mr. Vann. I consider, sir, that the present government is the most
efficient government that I have seen in Vietnam since 1962, has more
real de facto support today than any government since 1961 and, thii'd,
is taking the steps through the village development program and
through the people's self-defense force organization to achieve a much
wider popular following and popular base than any other government
has either achieved or even sought to achieve.
Senator Cooper. It has been said many times that, both in North
Vietnam and South Vietnam, Ho Chi Mmh was considered the
leader because of his long record of opposition to the intervention and
colonialism of other countries. I don't know whether that is correct
or not, but assuming it is, is there any leader in North Vietnam or the
Vietcong who attracts the people of South Vietnam, in yoiu: judgement?
Mr. Vann. Sir, we certainly have reviewed that, those of us who
are students of that history. There appears not to be one now. As I
think all members of this committee are aware, the previous leader,
Mr. Ho Chi Minh, did represent a father image to a large number of
South Vietnamese as well as North Vietnamese. To some extent his
death indirectly facilitated the government of Vietnam winning more
support among the peasant population than before, because Mr. Ho
Chi Minh's image there in Vietnam was primarily as a nationalist, as
opposed to being primarily as a Communist.
I go back a little bit. Even though I personally felt that the Ngo
Dinh Diem government was not on a road that could lead to success,
I personally deplored the passing of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem himself
because he represented another father image, a man whose image was
as a nationalist and as a longtime fighter for freedom in his country.
Now that both of those gentlemen have passed from the scene it is
a kind of an open field as to who can achieve that sort of an image in
the future on both sides.
WHAT TYPE ORGANIZATION IS PHOENIX?
Senator Cooper. I will ask two questions in another field. I left
yesterday just before the hearing ended, but I read in the newspapers
questions about the organization called Phoenix. With your wide range
of activity there, you must be familiar with this organization. Ai'en't
you?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I am responsible for supervising the advisory support
of the Phung-Hoang operation, in IV Corps tactical zone and those
16 provinces.
Senator Cooper. Yesterday in response to my questions to Ambas-
sador Colby, I placed in the record a statement of the assassination,
wounding, and the abductions or kidnapings of South Vietnamese
people by the Vietcong. Is the Phoenix organization a counterterrorist
organization or is it an organization designed for use in a war for war
action against enemies. What is it?
Mr. Vann. I would like to comment on this, sir, because I have been
quite familiar with the organization of Phoenix and the various types
of organizations that preceded Phoenix, none of which were anywhere
near as extensive and none of which had the overall central corps,
119
province, and district support that the Phiing Hoang or Phoenix pro-
gram has.
First of all, there was at one time in Vietnam an organization, very-
small, that was called a counterterrorist organization. As Ambassador
Colby mentioned, any time you have a secret type organization you
get a lot of fairy tales.
Now, all of my service in Vietnam, with the exception of 9 months,
has been spent outside of Saigon essentially as a field adviser.
First of all, regrettably from my standpoint, the counterterrorist
organization was never as effective as people thought it was or as the
fairy tales about it said it was.
Secondly, it bore and bears no resemblance at all to the organization
that we began in 1967, which now bears the name of Phung Hoang or
Phoenix.
FORMATION OF PHOENIX ORGANIZATION
In 1967, on an experimental basis, first of all we brought all of the
civilian advisory agencies together. At that time we had in each
Province two American organizations, a civilian advisory organiza-
tion and a military one. When we got these organizations together,
and began comparing all of our notes and — this doesn't mean that some
people did not do this before, but originally it wasn't done — we became
somewhat distressed at the redundancy, at the overla])ping responsi-
bilities, and the very groat gaps of coverage on the part of the various
intelligence organizations.
On that basis we started on an experimental basis in III Corps five
centers called District Intelligence and Operations Coordination
Centers. We took all agencies responsible for intelligence, put them
in one location, that is, had their input come to one location, and had
representatives for those agencies there. At the same location we had
an array of responsive units that could go out and react to the
intelligence. , • •^
Now, our civilian side of this civilian-military mix was primarily
concerned with the infrastructure, the enemy's governmental mem-
bers. We were concerned that most of the inteUigencc before had
related only to tactical intelligence, that is, the enemy's combat units.
So when we formed these five DIOCC's, we emi)hasized the im-
portant role of getting the intelligence on the enemy's governmental
or secret governmental api)aratus which was actually controlling and
calling the shots for the enemy's tactical units.
Wlion we put these people together it worked so well on the experi-
mental basis that we began expanding it. Starting at the district
level we began expanding it and doing the same thing at several
other levels, at corps, province, and central. Formally, then, an
organization called Phung Hoang came into being by government
decree in 1968.
ESTABLISHMENT OF QUOTAS
Now, this whole question of quotas is one we have been in on from
the very start. One of the problems in Vietnam has been motivation
of various governmental forces to do things. We debated the wisdom
of having quotas and the value of not having quotas. This was largely
a Vietnamese determination in which we advisers were responding to
120
their knowledge of their own people to the effect that if we don't
establish a quota we don't get a real push against the infrastructure.
IS UNITED STATES INVOLVED IN "TERRORIST" ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM?
Senator Cooper. Excuse me a minute. I don't want to interrupt
you, but I know at a later date this subject will be examined. The
question I direct to you, because it is fair and should be answered, is
the following: Is the United States involved in any way in carrying
out what can be called a ''terrorist" activity? Is this a normal intelli-
gence operation of the kind which has been carried on in the past in
wartime?
Mr. Vann. Well, the answer very shortly, sir, is no, we do not. We
specifically prohibit it. Ever since I have been aware of it it has been
prohibited. Ambassador Colby said so yesterday under oath and I
say so today under oath.
NEUTRALIZATION OF ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE
I did want to set a background so I could get to one point, and that
is the point wherein people misinterpret that there are people targeted
for killing. This is not done. The reason that approximately 31 percent
of the enemy infrastructure which is reported as neutralized is shown
as people who are killed is not because we have gone out searching
for them and then killed them on the spot. The bulk of them, the
ovenvhelming majority of them, are people who in the course of the
normal conduct of the war become killed and after being killed, they
are identified as having been a member of the enemy's government
apparatus.
Senator Gore. What do you call normal?
Mr. Vann. A normal operation, sir, might be a regional force
company, a popular force platoon, going in response to an agent
report that there is a VC platoon in a certain hamlet. When they get
there, they find a VC armed force , they become involved in a fire-
fight; the enemy possibly will attempt to escape; they will be chased
down. They may be killed by an aircraft or they may be killed by
ground fire.
The Vietnamese officer in charge goes through the docunients on
a body. There is an ammunition belt around his waist; there is a rifle
in his hands and he turns to you with a triumphant smile
and says, "This man was head of the tax collection unit of the district
committee."
Now, in many cases I personally feel that oiu* Vietnamese friends
may be in error as to what the man's job was. He may just be a
guerilla soldier and they may well be saying something else simply
to meet their quota.
Now, I wanted to get this on the record because, as they are iden-
tified as having been killed, there is the supposition on the part of
many people that we go out and deliberately assassinate them. This
is not the object of the program.
It is much preferable to capture a member of the enemy structiu-e.
When you capture him the entire structure will crumble because you
can then inteiTogate him and find out what the structiu-e is. The
121
moment he is captm"ed every member of his organization becomes
apprehensive as to his future security.
COMBAT AREA AND FREE FIRE ZONES
Senator Cooper. Is all of South Vietnam considered "a terror
area," as we designated areas in World War II as "a combat zone?"
Mr. Vann. No, sir. In most i)laces in the Delta the helicopter gun
ships that are flown by the Americans are instructed that, if they are
fired at from a jiopulated area, they are not allowed to return the
fire. They are to fly away and report it.
Senator Cooper. My question is— — -
Mr. Vann. There are other areas that are designated as free jBre
zones.
Senator Cooper. Does the Army designate specific areas as com-
bat areas as they did in World War II?
Mr. Vann. No, sir, because the enemy does have a capability to
go everywhere.
Senator Cooper. All of Vietnam is a combat area.
Mr. Vann. All of South Vietnam is a combat area, sir, and at times
the streets of Saigon have been.
Senator Cooper. I have not asked these questions to approve
actions of United States or South Vietnamese forces which would not
be in accordance with tlie accei)ted rules of warfare. I recall that in
the United States duriug World War 11 tlie whole Japanese population
was moved from the west coast and it was a doubtful operation.
\Ir. Vann. There are some areas desiguated as free fire zones. These
are areas which we feel are totally inhabited by enemy soldiers and
void of civilian population.
pacification program if U.S. withdraws forces
Senator Cooper. I will ask this question. You are not able to say
whether the pacification program and the success you attribute to it
is such a program that it could be sustained if the United States
shoidd withdraw its forces, say, in 2 years, by the South Vietnamese
})eople?
Mr. Vann. Sir, with my area of responsibility being the TV Corps
and with no U.S. combat forces now in the IV Corps, it would not be
wise of me to speculate as to how long for the rest of the country.
Senator Cooper. Thank you.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Do you want to ask questions?
POLITICAL stability OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
Senator Case. I just have one question that was suggested by the
Senator from Kentucky and developed somewhat and that is on the
question of your statement that success of this program depends,
among other things, upon continued stability, political stability, in
South Vietnam. And I again will go further into this on my own time
on the next round of questioning, but this is terribly important, it
seems to me. We have been getting from many ])eople the suggestion
that Thieu's government becomes more and more narrowly' based and
44-706—70 9
122
unrepresentative and the inference or the imphcation of this to many
people is that it is becoming more fragile and less acceptable.
I gather from you a feeling that you have somewhat a different view
about the strength and stability of this regime in the minds of the
great mass of the people, as opposed to various political factions that
exist in the capital city. Am I correct in sensing this?
Mr. Vann. I wholeheartedly subscribe to the answer that Ambas-
sador Colby gave on that, sir. You look at it on two levels : one is the
level of the intellectuals and urban oriented French trained group
that makes up most of these political parties in the Saigon area and
the other is the peasant in the countryside.
I am well qualified on the second one. On the second one the base is
broadening, and broadening rapidly. On the first one I will have to
defer to someone who has responsibilities for the political acti\'ity in
the Saigon area.
Senator Case. Then I take it you regard the important level, from
the standpoint of the kind of stability you regard as essential to our
success there, as the support of the countryside.
Mr. Vann. That, sir, plus continuation of constitutional govern-
ment in Saigon. I don't think that whether President Thieu is re-
elected or not bears upon political stability. The fact is that an
election will take place in 1971, and that someone representing a
majority of the vote will then be elected because a change in pro-
cedures, a runoff between the two leading groups will assure that.
This is what I interpret as being political stability at that level.
Sentor Case. That isn't quite my question and you know it isn't.
Mr. Vann. I consider it
Senator Case. I don't want to press you beyond
Mr. Vann. I consider the countryside to be far more significant,
yes, than the Saigon area.
Senator Case. Thank you.
The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee.
U.S. advisers' recommendations to VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS
Senator Gore. I find interesting the part of your statement where
you describe a meeting with so-called Vietnamese leaders. You say
that this kind of a meeting is held once a week and that there are
usually in attendance approximately 20 Vietnamese and about 10
U.S. senior advisers to these Vietnamese.
Then I find these two very interesting sentences which describe an
unusual type of democracy or an unusual type of self-government or
an unusual type of guided performance. Let me read the sentences to
you:
The meeting is iised as a problem-solving session wherein all of the briefings
and most of the discussions are bj^ and among the Vietnamese officials. . . . Prior
to the meeting, U.S. advisers have provided their recommendations as to discus-
sion topics and each adviser, operating under my direction, has recommended to
his ^^ietnamese counterpart the problem areas that should be brought up and
solutions that should be proposed.
Mr. Vann. I think I might clarify for you. Senator, by adding that
these are by no means always accepted nor do they always govern.
But the reason we go through that jjrocedure is this — I am a firm
believer when there is a U.S. community that they sing from the same
123
song sheet. I want to be sure that the advisory effort is doing things
that are consistent with the U.S. poHcy in Vietnam, and that we are
trying to influence the Vietnamese to do things that we feel are impor-
tant.
Now, please keep this in mind. The recommendations are made by
the adviser to his counterpart. The counterpart makes a decision to
accept or reject. I don't think that it is relevant to have an ad\dser
who does not advise.
Senator Case. So, the picture here, as I see it, I mean as you de-
scribed it, is that you have these kinds of meetings once a week and
prior to the meetings the U.S. advisers have told them what subjects
to talk about and the solutions they should suggest, and then the U.S.
advisers stay in the meeting and listen most of the time, I believe you
indicate.
Well, this seems a pretty strong hand of the United States. It
reminds me of an observation that a member of our staff recently
made after a trip to Vietnam, and that is that the United States is
far more involved in the life of the Vietnamese now than the French
ever were.
Mr. Vann. The only way I could agree with that is to say we are
far more favorably involved from the standpoint of a better future
of the Vietnamese.
The Chairman. From what standpoint?
Mr. Vann. From the standpoint of the future of the Vietnamese.
Our involvement is one that is positive as opposed to exploitation.
Senator Gore. Do you tlnnk tliey have liked it since we have been
there?
Mr. Vann. I think they would prefer that to what would have
happened to them if we had not been there.
Senator Gore. Do you think those who are gone have any regrets?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I am afraid I could not answer that question.
Senator Gore. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
breakdown of activities of U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE DELTA
The Chairman. I have one or two catch-up questions. It has been
stated that there are 23,000 Americans in the Delta. There are no
U.S. combat forces in the IV Corps and there are 2,357 people in the
CORDS organization. What are the others doing in the Delta?
Mr. Vann. First of all, sir, there are approximately 6,000 who fly
helicopters and maintain them. There are approximately^ 400 heli-
copters and, as you know, helicopters require an awful lot of mainte-
nance, so the helicoi)ter grouj:) there numbers 6,000 men.
We do ])rovide about 90 percent of the helicopter support to the
Government of Vietnam in the Delta.
The Chairman. That is 6,000 out of 20,000. What are the other
14,000?
Mr. Vann. We have 5,400 engineers there.
The Chairman. What are they doing?
Mr. Vann. They are building roads, sir. They are working on
National Highway 4. They are doing it because all of the Vietnamese
engineering and public works capacity is utilized as much as it can
and still is not enough.
The Chairman. That is 11,000. What are the other 9,000?
124
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
We have approximately 5,000 U.S. Navy personnel.
The Chairman. What are they doing?
Mr. Vann. U.S. Navy personnel have a combination of several
operations screening the coasts. This includes the forces off the coast
of South Vietnam, the maritime operation, the patrolling of water-
ways. They also have the mission of advising the Vietnamese. I think
more than possibly any other program in Vietnam, because it lends it-
self to it, they are ra|)idly turning over to the Vietnamese.
They have a very interesting way of doing it. When a Swift boat,
for example, with a crew of 7 Americans, initially goes there, they
add one Vietnamese to the crew. They train him to replace one Ameri-
can. The American leaves and they add a second Vietnamese to the
crew.
The Chairman. Maybe we had better reserve that for secret
session.
Mr. Vann. All right, sir.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE METHODS OF MEETING PHOENIX QUOTAS
The Chairman. I have a few other questions. There is an article
this morning in the New York Times, I believe, by Mr. Sterba,
relating to the Phoenix program it says and I quote, " 'One thing
about the Vietnamese — they will meet every quota that's established
for them,' said one critic of the program. 'That's what makes the
head count so deceptive. How do j^ou know they ore not assigning
names and titles to dead bodies?' "
Would you comment on that statement?
Mr. Vann. I believe I actually did, sir, possibly while you were
out.
The Chairman. Did you?
Mr. Vann. I feel that that does take place at some levels, at some
times, and I think that the purpose of doing it is to introduce a sludge
factor to come up to their quota.
DESTRUCTION BY PRIMITIVE AND SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS
The Chairman. Last in discussing the terrorists, you said there
was once a small ineffectiv^e counterterrorist program, which had been
discontinued. Then in discussion with the Senator from Kentucky, a
good deal was said about the fact that we do not assassinate people.
You raise a question: In your mind is there any significant differ-
ence between wiping out a village with B-52 bombs and napalm and
wiping it out with M-16's and hand grenades?
Mr. Vann. I would say from my experience, if such things have
occurred — and I am aware that hamlets have been wiped out in both
fashions — in the case of B-52's it is always an accident so that I
would say there would be a difference.
I know of no time that a B-52 has ever been directed against a
])opulated target, and I was the senior civilian adviser for 4 years in
the III Corps area that had over 90 percent of the B-52 strikes.
The Chairman. I didn't mean to cast any reflections upon B-52's
as such. May I correct it to say helicopters or any other kind of modern
sophisticated weapons. Is there any distinction in your mind? I
125
don't wish to raise anv questions about the efficiency of the bombers
or the B-52's. Is there^i difference in your mind between kilhng people
with a primitive weapon and a sophisticated weapon? .,.,,.
Mr. Vann. First of all, sir; let me say that I don't beheve m kilhng
civilians under any circumstances. For that reason, I have instituted
procedures in the IV Corps wherein if our helicopters are fired at
from a civiUan occupied area they don't even return fire. This is a
significant change in the rules of engagement.
The Chairman. Are you saying that we have not killed any
civilians or verv few civilians in Vietnam? i -n i
Mr. Vann. IvTo, sir; what I am saying is that we have killed very
few deliberately. I am sure that too many — and it would be too many
if it was one — have been killed accidentally.
The Chairman. Then you don't subscribe to these reports ot
incidents or engagements such as Mylai?
Mr. Vann. Sir, Myhii is outside of the area which I am tamiliar
witli But I would again say I was the senior civilian official from 1966
to 1969 in the III Corps area of South Vietnam, which had the largest
contingents of U.S. Forces. I am personally aware that no such
incident ^^•as ever reported in that Corps area during the time I was
there. 1 would be the official most likely to receive such a report.
I also had a mechanism using Vietnamese reporters who were trained
to go out and survev the civilian populat'on in the enemy controlled
and the contested areas to find out what they were saymg about the
war I have compiled over 600 indepth reports of that nature. I have
never had a complaint of the sort of thing that is alleged at Song Mai
and Mylai.
CIVILIANS KILLED
The Chairman. Do 3^011 have any idea how many civihans in South
Vietnam have been killed in the last 5 years?
Mr. Vann. Sii-; there have been a large number of wliat could only
be estimates made as to how many civilians have been killed.
The Chairman. Can you say why the army keeps statistics on
body counts, which \\e have had daily, and why they do not keep
any statistics upon civilian deaths? _
\Ir. Vann. First of all some statistics are kept, but most civilian
deaths would i)robably occur in an area where there was conflict
going on and one in which we might or might not occupy the ground
aftcrtho conflict was over. If we did not occupy it, we would have no
wa}' of knowing how many were dead.
solatium payments
The Chairman. How much do you pay in compensation to the
survivor of a civilian who is killed by accident?
Mr. Vann. Sir, when it is determined that someone was responsible,
the Government of Vietman or United States aircraft, there is a
solatium payment made.
Mr. Chairman. How much is it?
Mr. Vann. Most recently it was 8,000 piasters if it was an adult
who was killed.
The Chairman. How much is that in dollars?
Mr. Vann. That is approximately $70, sir.
126
The Chairman. $70.
Mr. Vann. That is not in payment for the act, but to assist the
family in burying the dead. There are other claims that they can then
make against the Government of Vietnam for loss of livelihood and
et cetera.
The Chairman. Do you know how many such payments were
made?
Mr. Vann. I would not have the figures for all of Vietnam.
The Chairman. Does anybody have it?
Mr. Vann. I believe they could be compiled with respect to U.S.
units.
Mr. Colby. I think I can get a figure for you, Mr. Chairman. I
don't have it right here.
(The information referred to follows:)
The solatium payment for those over 15 years of age that are killed is 4,000
piasters. Those under 15 years old is 2,000 piasters. They do not keep figures on
the number of payments that have been made. However, the total payments made
last year amounted to 114,713,440 piasters or $972,000.
U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE DELTA
The Chairman. Didn't you account for all those 23,000 people? I
thought you did. The staff says you did not. Was there any other item?
Mr. Vann. Yes, there were, sir. The chairman changed the subject.
The Chairman. I didn't particularly want to have you reveal how
you changed the staff of each boat. All I wanted to know was the
number of people.
Mr. Vann. Right, sir. I gave you 6,000 who were helicopters, the
5,400 engineers, and approximately 5,000 who are Navy. Now in
addition to that we have a large number of support forces who provide
signal communication, ordnance and transportation maintenance
capability to back up some of the equipment that the Vietnamese have,
and then the total advisory organization in the Delta, military and
civilian, numbers approximately 3,800.
Now in addition to these Americans, sir, there is also an Air Force
Advisory organization that exists down in the Delta.
FRENCH AND U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. That seems to be even more than the 23,000. I
didn't quite understand your answer to the question of the Senator
from Tennessee about the French. It seems to me you are more
involved than the French ever were. I understood from the paper the
other day that the French only had about 27,000 civil servants in all
of Vietnam in the Colonial days administering the entire country, and
you have 23,000 in your Corps alone.
Mr. Vann. Sir, the French were there in the role of province chiefs
and deputy province chiefs and commanders of the military forces, not
as advisers.
The Chairman. Wliy should there be so many more advisers than
there are commanders?
Mr. Vann. I don't know that there should be or that there are, sir.
The Chairman. I am sure I read within the last week that in Laos,
Vietnam and Cambodia, all of Indo-China, the French had approxi-
127
mately 27,000 civil servants to administer that quite sizable colony.
We have now 23,000 in the Delta.
JMr. Vann. Sir, we are comparing two different things.
The Chairman. I know we are. It seems to me extraordinary.
Mr. Vann. You are speaking of civil servants and you are comparing
them with military personnel. The French also had a rather large
French contingent and a rather large Algerian contingent and a
rather large
The Chairman. I understood you to say all combat troops are
out and these are not soldiers?
Mr. Vann. That is combat support, sir.
The Chairman. Wliat is that?
Mr. Vann. The 6,000 helicopter people are combat support. The
engineers are support personnel. They are not combat personnel.
The Chairman. Do you know how many advisers then who are
not running either a machine or filing a gun?
Mr. Vann. Sir, in all of Vietnam we have less than 10,000 advisers.
The Chairman. All of Vietnam?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is approximately what I assume the French
had, if these other figures are right. How many enemies in the delta do
you consider you have?
Mr. Vann. We have an enemy order of battle, this is armed units
and guerilla strength, of 35,600. That is backed up by a considerable
support force, and it is also backed up by estimates that go as high as
35,000 infrastructure members.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.
PHOENIX program AND GVN POLITICS
The Chairman. Let me ask the reporter to put in the record here
the article I referred to by ]Mr. Sterba and the article by Mr. Arthur
Dommen on the same subject.
(The information referred to follows:)
[From the New York Times, Feb. 18, 1970]
The Controversial Operation Phoenix: How It Roots Out Vietcong
Suspects
(By James P. Sterba)
Saigon, South Vietnam, February 17. — As a controversial operation known as
Phoenix moves into its third year and to center stage today at Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings in Washington, American officials here privately
continue to call it one of the most important and least successful programs in
South Vietnam.
Designed bj^ the United States Central Intelligence Agency to weed out an
estimated 75,000 Vietcong political leaders and agents from the civilian population,
the program is not the sinister, cloak-and-dagger, terror operation that some
critics, including the Vietcong, have portrayed it to be, these officials insist.
"That's nonsense," one of them said. "Phoenix is just not a killing organization.
The kinds of things they [Foreign Relations Committee members] are probably
looking for are not happening that much — ^which is not to say they are not
happening at all."
sentence without trial
Briefij^, Phoenix works this way: When local officials feel the.y have enough
evidence against a person suspected of being connected with the Viet-cong, they
128
arrest him. If he is not released quickly — suspects often vanish out the back
doors of police station within two hours of their arrest — he is taken to a
province interrogation center.
A dossier on the suspect is then given to the Provincial Security Council,
whose powers are those of a ruling body, not a judicial one. The council may,
however, free the suspect or order him jailed for as long as two years without
trial.
Once the suspect has served a term in jail he is considered to have been
rehabilitated.
Some officials concede that many abuses have occurred under Phoenix and that
the program has potential for serious harm if it were used, for example, to harass
legitimate political opposition. Yet in the over-all portrait of Phoenix painted
here, the program appears more notorious for inefficiency, corruption and bungling
than for terror.
Like many other programs in Vietnam, Phoenix looks best on paper. Officials
here argue that its controversial reputation has been built more on its secrecy
than on its actions.
If someone decided to make a movie about Phoenix, one critic joked, the lead
would be more a Gomer Pyle than a John Wayne.
DIFFERING VIEWS
While both American and South Vietnamese officials in Saigon believe the
program to be vital, some local officials are less than enthusiastic. Saigon officials
contend that unless the Vietcong's highly skilled political apparatus is destroyed,
the Communist movement will continue to prosper regardless of how many
guerrillas and enemy soldiers are killed. In man3- contested areas, however, the
local people appear hesitant to upset an}' informal accommodations made for
the sake of survival.
"The local officials are perfectly capable of carrying out this program if they
thought they were winning," one American said.
The Phoenix program, called Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, was established
with the money and organizational talents of the C.I. A. in late 1967. It was
officially sanctioned by President Nguyen \'an Thieu July 1, 1968.
Under the Ministry' of the Interior, administrative conmiittees and intelligence-
gathering centers were set up in the 44 province capitals and most of the country's
242 districts.
About 4.30 Americans were sprinkled among these groups to serve as advisers and
paymasters. A large number were C.I. A. agents or military- intelligence officers
borrowed by the agency.
MILITARY NOW IN CHARGE
Gradually, the C.I.A.'s role was taken over by United States military men so
that at this moment according to officials, of the 441 Americans involved in
Phoenix, all six are military men. Last July 1, overall authorit}^ for American
adsorbed by U.S. military headquarters here.
The program was set up to operate at the local level, where the problems
begin.
At each "district intelligence coordinating and operations center," as thej' are
called, teams usually consisting of a South \'ietnamese military intelligence officer,
an American intelligence adviser — usually a lieutenant — special police agents
and local pacification officials are supposed to pool intelligence data and compile
dossiers on suspected Vietcong agents within the surrounding communities.
When thej^ feel they have enough evidence, they attempt to find and arrest the
suspect.
"The trouble is that in many cases, there is a complete lack of dossiers," said
one civilian official. "You might have a single sentence in a dossier saving that so
and so heard the suspect talking about such and such."
FINDING THE SLiSPECTS
Sometimes the arrest may involve a single local policeman. Other times, it ma}^
take a combined police-military operation to go into a hamlet and find a suspect.
In the cours(! of normal military operations, some suspected Metcong agents
ma.y defect, or be killed or cajjtured. When reports of these operations filter back
to the Phoenix district headquarters, officials simply call out the numbers and add
them to their scores. This helps them meet quotas set by higher headquarters.
"One thing about the Vietnamese— they will meet every (luota that's established
for them," said one critic of the program. "That's what makes the head count so
129
deceptive. How do j^ou know they are not assigning names and titles to dead
bodies?"
In 1969, according to official figures, 19,534 Vietcong were neutralized.
That number included 8,515 reportedly captured, 6,187 killed and 4,832 who
defected.
Once a suspect is captured, he automatically becomes a "neutralized" Vietcong
and part of the official tallies for the year. This is true despite the fact that many
suspects are released an hour or two later through the back doors of local police
stations. Starting this year, officials say, suspects will have to be sentenced before
thev will be counted as "neutralized."
- If the suspect is not released at the local level, he is taken to a province interro-
gation center for questioning and then conlined until his dossier comes before the
Province Security Cotmcil, composed of the province chief, his deputy for intel-
ligence, the top national policemen in the province, and usually two or three other
provincial officials. This may take months.
The provincial council is a ruling body, not a judicial body. The evidence is
examined, and the suspect is either released or sentenced. Of the suspects who
make it this far, an estimated 30 percent are released for lack of evidence.
"I've never heard of anyone having a defense," said an official famihar with the
procedure. "Generally these guys are pretty good and if the district people
haven't turned tip enough evidence, the suspect will be released."
20 PER CENT JAILED
If the council determines that the suspect is a Vietcong agent, he can be "de-
tained" without trial for up to two j^ears. But he usually isn't.
The program's American advisers estimated recently that about 20 per cent of
the suspects in 1969 were sentenced, and that only a fraction of those were im-
prisoned for the maximum two years. Most sentences were from three to six
months.
Theoretically, those given the maximum sentence are to be sent to federal
prisons, such as the one on Conson Island. Some provincial officials are reluctant
to do this, how(!V('r, b(>ca\iso by imprisoning a man in their own jails they receive
a prisoner-food allotment from the Saigon (Jovernment.
After having served a jail sentence, the suspect is given a Government identi-
fication card and released on parole. He is supposed to chock in from time to
time with local police officials.
Having to arrest or capture the same suspect two or three times is frustrating,
according to some local advisers in th(! program, and may have some effect on
the statistics in the column relating to slain suspects.
Probably the most controversial arm of the Phoenix program in each province
is a group called the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit. It consists of a dozen or more
South Vietnamese mercenaries, originally recruited and paid handsomely by the
C.I. A. to serve under the province chief as the major "action arm" of the program.
The members of these units, usually an assortment of local hoodhtms, soldiers
of fortune, and draft-dodgers, receive 15,000 piasters a month. An ordinary soldier
gets 4,000 piasters.
Some Saigon officials concede that these units have been employed in extortion
and terror. But the officials insist that the units' foul reptitations have been
exaggerated.
In October, after second thoughts about the program's secrecy, Premier Tran
Thien Khiem appealed in a speech to the people for aid in identifying Communist
agents among them. In many areas, "wanted" posters were distributed.
In one Mekong Delta town, an American official said. Phoenix operatives had
worked for months trying to find a Vietcong agent. Within an hour after his
"wanted" poster was displayed, a woman appeared at the police station and
said the agent lived next door.
[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, Jan 4, 1970]
Gloomy, if Familiar, Picture — Infighting Could Destroy South Viet-
namese Democracy
(By Arthur J. Dommen)
Saigon. — Hardly anyone is joking about the long, bruising fight between Pres-
ident Nguyen Vaii Thieu and the South Vietnamese National Assembly which
conceivably could destroy the present democratic regime.
130
Essentially, it is a power struggle between Thieu and the assembly, with the
president attempting to force the ouster of three members of the lower hovise who
are accused of being pro-Communist.
One of the accused, Rep. Tran Ngoc Chau, even hinted he would commit
suicide if found guilty.
Thus far, the struggle has been a draw. Thieu's efforts to have the three House
of Representatives members ousted began last November. It dragged on imtil
Wednesday, when the house voted to support Thieu's accusations against the
three legislators, but refused to expel them.
The president's chief agent in the assembly declared immediately after the vote
that Thieu still intends to nail the deputies to the wall. In turn, the accused
deputies threaten to create considerable chaos if thej' are arrested unconstitu-
tionally.
No one knows how the president actually feels. Since his Dec. 10 outburst
comparing the three allegedly pro-Communist deputies to barking dogs, he has
said nothing. That may change this week, when he has promised to hold a press
conference.
But the fact remains that he has chosen a bad moment for the fight.
The Viet Cong have been telling the people in their midnight propaganda lec-
tures that they are going to announce a broadening of their clandestine Provisional
Revolutionary Government. It is generally expected that they will make a deliber-
ately dramatic move in their campaign for a coalition government at about the
time of Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, which occurs at the beginning of February.
In this context, the drawn-out fight with the National Assembly, with its over-
tones of illegal mob action and resort to unconstitutional means to achieve his end,
has not done anything to improve Thieu's political image.
The Saigon government's argument is that everything is negotiable except the
right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people. The Viet Cong's ar-
gument is that the Saigon government is stifling that right.
But the lower house of the National Assembly, thovigh far from being perfectly
representative, is the closest thing in the country today to being the voice of the
people. Its members are elected by a highest vote count by individual
constituencies.
The fact that Thieu — with all the machinery of coercion, enticement and
outright vote-buying available to his government — could barelj- get a majority
to support his position against the three dejDuties has demonstrated once again
that he is a minority president.
Furthermore, when one might have expected him to wish to demonstrate the
fact that constitutionally he is the president of all the people, whether they agree
with him or not, he has instead deliberately embarked on an opposite course.
He has proceeded to arrest a number of student leaders and opposition politicians
and to close down some of the more intelligently edited of Saigon's vocal and
nationalist newspapers.
Lastly, although Thieu suggested Dec. 10 that the "army and people" might
have to take matters into their own hands unless the house acted to expel Chau
and the others, it seems now that not all the army agreed with him.
Reliable sources say at least 10 army officers, mostly of lower rank but one a
lieutenant colonel, have been placed under arrest in recent days simultaneously
with the crackdown on students and politicians.
For Americans, all this makes for a gloomy picture, but a familiar one, unfortu-
nately. Plotting against the exerciser of power is an age-old tradition of the
Vietnamese. It is a phenomenon intimately bound up with their concept of the
mandate of heaven, which implies public acceptance of abrupt changes of power
rather than Western-style evolution and transition.
Doubly unfortunately, the slow but steady progress that the Saigon government
has made in the last year with American support in undercutting the Viet Cong
power base in the countryside — uncontestably real and genuine progress — counts
for little in the event the regime lands itself in a first-rate internal political crisis.
The issue Thieu has chosen as the cause celebre in the assembly fight is the
alleged existence of secret dealings with the other side. In doing so, Thieu has
compelled Chau and others to publicly defend the legitimacy of contacts between
relatives separated by the war.
Some of Thieu's closest advisers are ex-Viet Minh, or have relatives currently
working for either Hanoi or the Viet Cong. This is a fact of fife in Vietnam. Further-
more, many South Vietnamese officers have relatives on the other side.
Therefore, involving the army in a political campaign to persecute men who
have publicly admitted having contacts with the other side holds a certain amount
of danger.
131
So far, there is no firm evidence that this is Thieu's intention, although the
illegal invasion of the lower house premises on Dec. 20 by Thieu supporters
searching for the three accused legislators was an ominous sign.
There is nothing the leaders in Hanoi would like to see more than the American
forces in South Vietnam becoming embroiled in a highly political confrontation
leading to a state of total anarch.y. The danger at the moment is that the United
States appears to be more bound to the maintenance of a constitutional regime
in Saigon than do the leaders of that regime themselves.
DEATH PAYMENTS IN DELTA
Senator Gore. You asked the ^\^.tness a moment ago about tlie
number of death payments. He said he did not have the statistics for
all of Vietnam. I wonder if you have it for the area for which you have
been responsible?
Mr. Vann. No, sir; because mine is an advisory responsibility. U.S.
units wdthin the area would keep their own and report it through their
own command channel, su', which does not involve my advisory
organization. However, I can secure for you both the Government of
Vietnam solatium payments made wdthin my area of responsibility
and the U.S. unit solatium payment made within my area of responsi-
bility. I just don't happen to have it with me.
civilian casualties in delta
Senator Gore. Would you also give an estimate of the civilian
casualties in your area?
Mr. Vann. I can give you, sir; the only thing that can be docu-
mented, which is the ci^^llian war casualty admissions into the 16 pro-
vince hospitals in the Delta. That was approximately 28,000 in 1968,
and 23,000 in 1969.
Senator Gore. A person who was killed in the village
Mr. Vann. He would not be admitted, sir, but this would be the only
basis we would have for giving any firm figure on civilian casualties.
Senator Gore. I didn't ask for any firm figure. I asked for your
estimate.
Air. Vann. Sir, I am really not qualified to go into that in detail, but
I will give you my judgment. My judgment is that for every person
who is admitted to a hospital there is probably a person killed and
there are j)robably two other people who arc wounded, but for one
reason or another did not get to a hospital. That is a judgment that I
have made in the past based upon the information available to me.
Senator Gore. This would mean more than 100,000 ci\nlian
casualties in your area?
Mr. Vann. That would mean approximately that figure, sir. But
keep this in mind, too: That is casualties from all forms of action.
That involves the mortaring of our district and province capitals
that is done b}^ the enemy. It involves the number of buses blown
up on the highway by the enemy with mines that are not discriminate.
It involves firing into a village and a hamlet.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I have one other question?
The Chairman. Yes.
combat and combat support troops
Senator Gore. You draw a distinction between combat troops and
combat support troops which raises an interesting question of termi-
132
nology. It is said that a Vietnamization goal is the withdrawal of all
ground combat troops from South Vietnam, but when I inquired
into that I found that the so-called support forces would still include
infantry, still include artillery, still include bazooka units and mortar
units. I couldn't find any elements of a U.S. Army that wouldn't be
included in the so-called supi)ort troops.
I wonder what is the real difference between a helicopter crew that
is in combat and a helicopter crew that is not in combat? Can j^ou
explain the difference between combat support and combat helicopter
troops?
Mr. Vann. First of all, sir, specifically in answer to your question
on the difference between these two type crews: a large amoimt of
helicopter operations in the delta involve the transporting of troops
from one area to another. It involves the hauling of Vietnamese and
U.S. officials from one area to another and the hauling of supplies
from ouQ area to another.
A much lesser {)art of the helicopter effort in the delta is devoted
to the gun ship support that is provided. So there is a distinct dif-
ference, just in answer to that specific question.
Senator Gore. Do the men in the helicopter crews engage in
combat?
Mr. Vann. Those who fly gun ships do, but that is called combat
support.
Senator Gore. So when I read in the paper that we have no
combat troops in the delta
Mr. Vann. Ground combat troops.
Senator Gore. Ground combat troops.
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. But we do have helicopter gun ships?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. With American soldiers fighting and shooting and
killing and dying?
Mr. Vann. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Colby. If I might. Senator, the difference, I believe, is largely
a question of command and control.
Senator Gore. A difference of what?
Mr. Colby. Of command and control. When you are talking about
a ground
Senator Gore. I think it is also a problem of military terminology
and words of military art that give one impression to a military man
and something else to the American people who read them.
Mr. Colby. Well, there is a distinction between them as used in
the military art.
Senator Gore. Quite a distinction.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Gore. I don't know exactly how the American people
draw the distinction between a helicoi)ter guncrew that is engaged
in combat in battle, killing and being killed, but yet they read there
are no combat troops in the Delta.
Mr. Colby. No ground combat troops.
Senator Gore. Ground combat troops.
133
U.S. ENGINEERS IN VIETNAM
What about tlie engineers?
Mr. Colby. They are not a combat force in that sense.
Senator Gore. Do they do any fighting?
Mr. Colby. They do not do any fighting. They do not seek out
the enemy to attack them.
Senator Gore. Are they all engineers?
Mr. Colby. They are members of engineer units. They are not
all graduate engineers, sir.
Senator Gore. Are they soldiers?
Mr. Colby. They are soldiers and they carry weapons to protect
themselves.
Senator Gore. They carry weapons. Are they organized into
military units?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, they are.
Senator Gore. What kind of units?
Mr. Colby. Comi)anies.
Mr. Vann. Construction battalions.
Mr. Colby. Construction battalions.
Mr. Vann. It is the 34th Engineer Construction group. Its prin-
cipal mission is to construct roads and also some vertical construction.
It is primarily involved on roads, however, in the delta.
Senator Gore. To what extent do they engage in combat?
Mr. Vann. Practically none. On occasion, very rare occasion, one of
the engineer crews working on the road will be ambushed or attacketl.
They v.ill then defend themselves. They do not go out as part of a
combat operation. And they normally work on roads that are con-
sidered secure.
TOTAL COST OF ADVISORY PROGRAMS IN THE DELTA
The Chairman. In that connection what is your budget for this
year, Mr. Vann?
j\lr. Vann. Sir, we don't have a budget, as so many people furnish
us support. However, I have com|)iled an estimate of the total cost of
the programs for which we have advisory responsibilities in the delta.
That is at best only an estimate in which v,e have to make a lot of
judgments. I would not submit it to aii}^ auditor at all.
The Chairman. What is it?
Mr. Vann. It comes to $.3.39 million, sir. That includes the pay of the
RF and PF soldiers, which is the largest element of it.
The Chairman. Does it include the cost of building the roads?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that roadbuilding in the pacification?
Mr. Vann. It includes, su-, every single bit of U.S. resource that
we could put a dollar sign on, including the pay of the soldiers, the pay
of the advisers, the cost of the cement, the cost of the rock, the cost of
the Public Law 480 commodities, everything that I could compile
that in any way was a U.S. cost.
134
CASUALTIES IN DELTA SINCE REMOVAL OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS
Senator Gore. Wliat casualties have these combat support forces
in the delta suffered since the ground combat troops have been
withdrawn?
Mr. Vann. Sir, over the last 5 months we average, including ad-
visers and members of these various support elements, an average of 15
Americans a month being killed in the delta.
CIVILIAN POPULATION OF DELTA
Senator Gore. What is the civilian population of the delta?
Mr. Vann. 5 million, 5.9 million. It represents over a third of the
jDopulation of South Vietnam.
PERCENTAGE OF ENEMY DEATHS DUE TO U.S. COMBAT SUPPORT
Senator Gore. When we read the number of enemy troops killed
by the South Vietnamese Army in a given engagement in the delta, for
instance, should we assume that many of these were killed by U.S.
gun ships and air support or combat support troops? Wliat percentage
of the enemy killed is the result of U.S. combat support troops?
Mr. Vann. We have inquired into that ourselves, sir; and for the
last 3 months our estimate is that something less than 30 percent are
killed as a result of airpower, that is the akcraft strikes and the heli-
copter gun ships and the Navy support. We have naval gunfu-e support.
VICE president's visit TO FRONT
Senator Gore. I was interested to read that our distinguished Vice
President was a visitor in Saigon. He took the helicopter trip to visit
with U.S. troops at the front. Were you in Saigon at the time?
Mr. Vann. No, sir; I was not.
Mr. Colby. I was, Senator.
Senator Gore. Do you know how great a distance he traveled?
Mr. Colby. I would estimate that he went about 50 miles roughly
west of Saigon to a couple of firebases up near the Cambodian border.
Senator Gore. So the front is not very far from Saigon?
Mr. Colby. The front is not very far. The Cambodian border at its
nearest point is 35 miles from Saigon, Senator,
Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The next gentleman we were to have this morning
is Mr. Mills
bombing and force reduction
Senator Cooper. May I ask just one question? You have answered
in great detail many of these questions. Some of them go to the opera-
tion of the military side of Vietnam. You have been to war, and un-
happy as these chcumstances are, they occur in war; don't they?
Civilians are killed. That is correct; is it not? You know that in
World War II the allies bombed populations of Germany.
You say we are now trying not to bomb population centers; so
there has been a change.
Let me ask you this: You served there during a period when you
saw the continued buildup of our forces in Vietnam; did you?
135
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
Senator Cooper. Would you say that you know there is a reduction
in forces now?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
Senator Cooper. Do you consider that a change in policy?
Mr. Vann. I consider it to be a very distinct change in our national
policy in Vietnam, sh.
Senator Cooper. That is all I wanted to ask.
The Chairman. Mr. Mills, do you have a statement to make?
Mr. Mills. Yes; I have, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Will you proceed?
STATEMENT OF HAWTHORNE MILLS, PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISER,
TUYEN DUG PROVINCE
Mr. Mills. Mr. Chairman, I am Hawthorne Mills from California.
I am a Foreign Service officer, class 3, on loan to AID for the past
2}^ years and now ser"sdng as Province Senior Adviser in Tuyen Due
Province in the south central highlands, almost exactly in the geo-
grai)hic center of South Vietnam. My assignment also includes
advisory responsibility for the autonomous city of Dalat, the former
French summer capital of Indochina, which is now the provincial
capital.
tuyen duc province, dalat and inhabitants
In area, the province is about 1,815 square miles, a little smaller
than the State of Delaware, consisting mainly of rugged, hea\dly
forested mountains with a few broad river vallej^s and high plateaus.
Until the early 1950's most of the inhabitants were ^lontagnard
tribesmen. After the Geneva agreement in 1954, however, Vietnamese
and ethnic minority refugees from North and Central Vietnam were
resettled in fairly homogeneous communities in the arable valleys and
along the highways of the province. Today the total population, not
counting Dalat Citj, is about 111,000, of whom roughly 34 percent
are indigenous Montagnards, 12 percent refugee minority peoples
from the north, and 54 i:)ercent are ethnic Vietnamese. Most of Dalat's
82,000 people have also mo\ed there from other parts of the country
in the ])ast 20 years, because until 1950 the French kept the city off
limits to all Vietnamese except those working for them.
Today Dalat is an important intelloctual, cultural, and economic
center which contains a luiivcrsity, the Vietnamese National Military
Academy, the Command and General Staff College, and numerous
other academic and technical institutions. In addition to its lu^ban
center, Dalat's 2 7-squ are-mile area contains dozens of rural hamlets
and the chief source of livelihood for the city's inhabitants is vegetable
growing. In the rest of the province, as well, most of the people make
their living farming, logging, or raising livestock, although there is
some light industry in some of the larger towns.
communist activity in dalat and tuyen dug
Until 1967, Dalat and Tuyen Duc Province had been relatively
untroubled by the war; some observers considered the area to be the
136
rest and recuperation area for both sides. In December 1967, however,
the Communists sent several battalions of troops into the two southern
districts, south of Dalat City overran several hamlets and outposts,
forced thousands of mountain people to take refuge in more secure
areas, interrupted the flow of traflfic along the highways, and during
Tet of 1968, actually occupied portions of Dalat for more than 2
weeks. Since that time, the Vietcong have continued to make night
raids from their base camps in the mountains into the populated
areas to get supplies, impress recruits, set up ambushes along the roads,
and disrupt the programs of the Vietnamese Government by assas-
sinating officials, blowing up rural health stations, schools and ad-
ministrative offices, and in general intimidating the people.
GVN EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY
The resources of the Government of Vietnam in the province have
been stretched to the limit in trying to provide adequate security to
the people while at the same time bringing them improved public and
social services and helping them to attain a higher living standard.
There is only a small number of regular ARVN troops in the province
and there are no United States or other free world combat forces,
although w^e do have U.S. engineering, signal, and artillery support
units. Therefore, the burden of providing security has fallen upon the
regional and popular forces and, to an increasing extent, upon the
police and ])eople's self defense units. In the past 2 years the GVN has
succeeded in bringing conditions of relative security to more than
100,000 people of this province who for a time lived under heavy Viet-
cong influence.
In command of the regional and popular forces, as weU as all other
Government personnel and activities in the province and city, is a
Vietnamese Army lieutenant colonel who serves as both province
chief and mayor. His staff at the province, city and district levels is
composed of both military and civilian officials. All village and hamlet
leaders throughout the province, however, are elected civilians.
COMPOSITION OF U.S. ADVISORY TEAM
Like the province chief's staff, the advisory team I head is composed
of both military and civilian members, each of whom has an advisory
relationship with the appropriate official on the Vietnamese side. My
deputy is a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and throughout the rest of the
team we have civilians and military personnel working side by side,
sometimes with an army man in charge, sometimes with a civilian.
At present, the team is composed of nine U.S. civilians, 85 Ai'my
officers and senior noncommissioned officers, and seven Filipino and
Korean and Australian technicians, as well as a number of Vietnamese
development specialists and clerical personnel. Most of the team
members are serving outside of Dalat on district advisory teams at
each of the district capitals or on mobile advisory teams attached to
and living wdth regional and popular force units in the field.
At the province level, the team has advisers working with Viet-
namese counterparts in the following fields: development operations
which include agriculture, public health, education, refugees and
social welfare, village self-development, public administration and
137
many of the other traditional AID areas; pubhc safety, including
the national police and the police field forces or gendarmerie; regional
and popular forces; engineering; supply and administration; psycho-
logical operations and Chieu Hoi; rural development and Montagnard
cadre teams which assist villagers in development activities and
defense; and traditional mihtary staff sections of S-1 (personnel),
S-2 (intelligence), S-3 (operations), S-4 (logistics), and S-5 (civil
affairs) .
The Chairman. That is more complicated than the poverty pro-
gram; isn't it? How do you keep track of all of it?
Mr. MiLLH. Very capable staff.
The Chairman. It must be. Go ahead.
ACTIVITIES OF ADVISERS AND COUNTERPARTS
Mr. Mills. In addition to advising our Vietnamese counterparts, we
on the province level team provide support services and guidance to
those serving on our district and mobile ad\dsory teams in the field.
Our offices are located as close as ])ossible to those of our counterparts ;
several of our advisers share offices with the Vietnamese they advise.
My office is, for instance, just across the hall from the province chief's
so we can discuss our problems and programs whenever necessary,
usually several times a day. I also accompany the province cliief to
meetings with other pacification officials, on inspection trips to approve
completed projects where U.S. commodities have been used, and on
his frequent field tri])s to give guidance to vilhige and hamlet officials
and military units throughout tlie province. About once a week we go
with his technical service chiefs to spend the night in an outlying
hamlet. On these visits he talks with the people in the marketplace,
distributes relief commodities, settles problems on the spot, usually
sleeps on an air mattress in tlie local schoolhouse or administrative
office, and generally tries to make the national government seem real
and important to the population.
The relationshi])s which have been established between the advisers
on our team and their counter]Mirts are, in almost all cases, friendly,
frank and productive. Our main eini)hasis is on helping the Vietnamese
to make their own system work more efficiently, not substituting our
system for theirs. In the 14 months I have been in Dalat, I have seen
very real im])rovements in security, in economic and social conditions,
in the willingness of the people to"^ defend themselves, and in the com-
petence and effectiveness of Vietnamese Government officials. Now
I would be glad to answer any questions you have.
The Chairman. In that last paragraph you said our main emphasis
is to make their system work. You mean theii' system involved all
those different bureaus to which you referred?
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It sounds more like our system to me.
Mr. Mills. Sir, that is an inheritance from the French as the am-
bassador mentioned. While we don't have an individual adviser for
every technical agency or every operational outfit that they have, we
do have someone who follows those affairs on our staff. In many cases
it is one individual following eight or 12 different functions.
The Chairman. Did you state how many people in
44-706—70 10
138
Mr. Mills. Yes, I did; sir. We have roughly 85 military people
and about nine U.S. civilians.
APPOINTMENT AND AUTHORITY OF PROVINCE CHIEF
The Chairman. You said a Vietnamese Army Lieutenant colonel,
who serves as both province chief and mayor, is in command of the
regional and popular forces as well as all other government personnel
and activities of the province. He is not elected; he is appointed.
Mr. Mills. He is appointed ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is true of all provinces.
Mr. Mills. Yes, it is.
Mr. Colby. The Vietnamese constitution, Mr. Chairman, states
that the province chiefs will be elected, but during the President's
first term of office they may be appointed.
The Chairman. Since he is in command of all of the personnel and
activities, what is all this talk about elections? What difference does
it make if there are elections if they don't have any authority? j
Mr. Mills. But they do have, sir. *
The elections are at the local level at the hamlet and village level.
The rural population has elected its own representatives who in turn
go to the district officials and the province officials with suggestions
for development of the village and with the problems of the people.
The Chairman. But the final word is the province chief's; isn't it.
Perhaps I am reading something into tliis. You say he is in command
of all Government personnel. Does Government personnel include
the local officials?
Mr. Mills. In a sense, but not in the sense I meant it in this state-
ment, sir. I was speaking of his staff, both military and civilian. I
was trying to indicate he was both the military commander and the
province chief on the civil side as well. The local officials, the elected
officials at the village and hamlet level are responsible to the people
who elect them and not to the province chief, although, of course,
they must follow the guidelines and the rules laid down for them.
The Chairman. You say he is in control of all Government person-
nel and activities in the province and the city? That is very all-
inclusive language and what I was trying to determine is how extensive
is his responsibility. He would seem to have very extensive powers.
Mr. Mills. He does.
The Chairman. And you are his adviser?
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISER AND PROVINCE
CHIEF
The Chairman. How does that particular relationship work? Does
he ask your advice, or do you volunteer it? How does this operate?
Do you have an office across the hall? Wliat happens? Describe it as
best you can to the uninitiated.
Mv. Mills. I think it would be easier if we talk about a specific case.
The Chairman. All right, do it any way you like.
Mr. Mills. Right.
In our development operations section, for instance, his staff will
be working on the public works program for the coming year. People
139
on my staff who follow the engiDeering and the public works section
will get together with his staff and discuss how much money will
be available, and what the priorities ought to be in using this money.
My staff will discuss it with me, and the province chief's staff will
discuss it with the province chief. Before we have our weekly pacifi-
cation and development council meetings, the province chief and I
will talk about it. We will bring our best judgment to bear on what
the best way would be of using the resources available. This happens
in all other areas. I am advised by the people on my staff who handle
the technical aspects. I also am his adviser in the military sense as
well, but, of course, I rely very heavily on the military officers on
my staff for that kind of advice. It is a very informal relationship.
He doesn't come to me and say, "I would like to have your ad^dce
on this particular subject," but in the course of our inspection trips,
in our planning for new projects, in a manner of conversational
discussion of the issues, my ideas on what ought to be done are brought
out. He may or may not decide that this is the advice he wants to
take. It would make my job much easier, of course, if he would take
all the American advice that we think would contribute to the devel-
opment of his ]irovince. This is in no case true. He is his own man.
The Chairman. Has he ever declined to take your advice?
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What is an example of that?
Mr. Mills. Well, in one case, to continue the example that I
started of the pacification plan for 1970, we felt that too much of the
rather limited amount of money which he had available for develop-
ment purposes was going into roads and that there ought to be a
higher proportion devoted to secondary schools, which is a large need.
We have pretty much completed the requirements for primary schools
in our area, but there still is not an adequate secondary school plan.
We advised that more schoolrooms be built at the secondary level
and that more secondary teachers be trained. Partly because he had
more capability for doing a roadbuilding project, he elected to spend
a larger proportion on roads and bridges than we thought was a good
balance.
FUNDING OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN
The Chairman. Who supplied the money?
Mr. Mills. It comes from the national Government. A group
from the central pacification and development council came down
later after the province chief's plan was submitted, discussed the
various elements of the plan, and approved these projects on the
spot.
The Chairman. So it wasn't American money?
Mr. Mills. It is not American money directly.
Mr. Colby. There is American counterpart money in it, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Lets not get confused over language. There is no
difference between counterpart. We agreed on that yesterday.
Mr. Colby. Yes, as far as Mr. Mills is concerned he feels that it is
part of the Vietnamese Government budget, but at the national level
we realize that there is American counterpart money involved which
comes from American taxpayers' dollars.
140
BUDGET FOR TUYEN DUG PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
The Chairman. How much is the budget for your operation in
your area?
Mr. Mills. Do you mean to run the advisory effort or for the
Vietnamese development scheme?
The Chairman. I mean the operation which you advise.
Mr. Mills. This is a Httle difficult.
The Chairman. What is the budget of the operation to which you
give advice? I don't know how to describe it, but similar to Mr. Vann
having the whole delta area. He described that in some detail. He has
$330 million or $339. What do you have— $200 million or $100 or
what?
Mr. Mills. No, sir, not by any means.
The Chairman. What do you have?
Mr. Vann. Let me qualify that; that is not a budget control; that is
just my estimate of the total involved.
The Chairman. I understand you estimated it. I am not going to
hold you to the dollar. You gave us some idea of the magnitude.
This is very significant, Mr. Vann. I am not saying it critically of
you, but it is interesting that very few Americans have the slightest
idea what this operation costs. It is usually presented in terms of
statistics, which mean nothing to them. Even that amount is so
large that it leaves most of them without any j^articular impression.
If it can be translated into something about which they know, why
it means more. All I am trying to do is to find out the magnitude of
the operation in your area. You don't have to be ])recise. I know
you don't know to the penny. Is it quite large or what is it?
Mr. Mills. Yes, there is quite a bit of money being spent for
development activities in my province.
The Chairman. That is what I meant. How much?
Mr. Mills. I have to do it bit by bit because we don't have any
overall allocation. These come from different parts of the Vietnamese
Government. To take an example of the self-development funds for
next year, we have been allocated 17 million piasters, when I say we,
the Vietnamese Government, in carrying on its public works. Its
education and health programs amount to roughly 17 million piasters
for the province and another 14 million for developmental programs
in the city of Dalat, for a total of 31 million, which is roughly $270,000.
In addition to that, of course, there are very large amounts of
money spent for the payment of RF and PF soldiers. We have roughly
5,000 of those in the province. They draw approximately, well, I
would average it out 5,000 or 6,000 piasters per month per man. This
runs up to a considerable amount of money.
Payment to the province chief's staff costs money. We are now
engaged in a program of improving the electrical facilities of the city
of Dalat. Some of the normal urban problems have been laid aside
because of the war, and now we are in a position to go ahead and do
some of those. Those will cost a good deal of money.
road building ACTIVITIES
The Chairman. Did you say building roads?
Mr. Mills, Yes, sir, most of the roads in the province have been
141
built. We have a U.S. engineering unit which has been upgrading
these.
The Chairman. Did you pa}^ for those or did they come out of the
Department of Defense?
Mr. Mills. No, sir, we don't have any control over the U.S.
engineering unit at all, and we don't include their expenses in our
l)r()\'incial accounts at all.
The Chairman. The Department of Defense pays that?
Mr. Mills. I can't really say.
The Chairman. Or AID, one or the other.
Mr. Colby. The Department of Defense would pay those.
The Chairman. They are the ones who have the money. They are
tlie ones who ought to pay for it.
DECISIONMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT FUNDS
When it comes to a question of whether you spend the money for
roads or for schools, the province chief makes the decision?
Mr. Mills. Not entirely, sir. The province chief is more and more
looking to the villages, for instance. They have, in 1969, for the first
time, a great deal of decisionmaking responsibility as to how these
local funds are spent. The village people get together in council and
decide. They know a certain amount of money based upon their pop-
ulation will be allocated for a development project. The people them-
selves can decide whether they want to improve the marketplace in the
town, whether they want to set up a profitmaking organization such
as a Lambretta service to take people to the nearest district town, or
whether they want to build a social or community center for the young
l)eople. They make the decisions. They have the final decisions on
projects up to a certain amount of money. Beyond a certain point
their projects must be approved by the province chief but in general
he follows the recommendations of the people at the village level who
themselves have decided.
U.S. ADVISERS AT VILLAGE LEVEL
The Chairman. Do the village authorities have advisers, too?
Mr. Mills. No, sir, we have no CORDS advisers to the village
authorities. The village chiefs now have authority over the PF platoons
and the PSDF Peoples Self-Defense Units, Security. We do have advi-
sory teams which operate sometimes at the village levels in advising
these elements. We have no direct advisers to the village level civil
officials.
The Chairman. Not permanently, but there are mobile ones.
Mr. Mills. Well, these are strictly advising on military and security
tactics and the pacification aspects of military affairs.
PROVINCE CHIEFS AND DISTRICT CHIEFS
The Chairman. Does the province chief dominate the district
chiefs?
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir; well, actually these are nominated by the
President, I believe.
The Chairman. On the recommendation of the province chiefs.
142
Mr. Mills. I am not sure whether he even recommends.
Mr. Colby. No, the Prime Minister appoints district chiefs, Mr.
Chairman. The President appoints province chiefs.
The recommendations come from a variety of places, and frequently
they are new people to that province.
The Chairman. How long does a province chief serve?
Mr. Mills. At the pleasure of the President.
The Chairman. At the pleasure of the President.
Mr. Mills. Some of them have been there for a number of years.
Some of them have had fairly short tours.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper.
PROGRESS OF PACIFICATION
Senator Cooper. I am sorry. I am going to have to go. But I
would like to ask this general question. Do you share the optimism
of Colonel Vann about the pacification progress and do you believe
that the local people will be able to carry on this program successfully
without American presence?
Mr. Mills. Of course, I don't have the perspective that Mr. Vann
has. I have been dealing with Vietnamese affairs only since the
summer of 1967. But certainly in the time I have been there I have
seen a number of changes which lead me to believe that we are working
our way out of a job in Vietnam and that is, of course, what we are
trying to do.
On my team, for instance, since I have been there, we have felt it
was no longer necessary to have an adviser to the Vietnamese supply
system. The Vietnamese have achieved such good standards of war
housing and supply control that we could pull out our logistics
adviser.
Since I have been there we have pulled out the refugee and social
welfare adviser because the Vietnamese on their side are doing a
much better job of supervising the welfare setup that they have. We
have removed one of our police advisers from the province because
the police are beginning to do the kind of things we have been ad\asing
them for some time to do. Based on this experience, I really believe
that there will come a time when the Vietnamese will be perfectly
capable of doing this by themselves.
I believe with Mr. Vann and Mr. Colby and others that as we with-
draw Americans troops to be rej^laced by Vietnamese, this may create
a bigger burden on the Vietnamese in the sort of peacetime activities
that we in the CORDS program are concerned with to some extent.
So I am not sure that the CORDS ad^dsers or the traditional Agency
for International Development advisers will be in a position to leave
quite as soon as the combat units. But eventually we will certainly
come to that point.
Senator Cooper. Thank you. I have no further questions.
decrease IN NUMBER OF U.S. ADVISERS
The Chairman. I have forgotten now, but you said that there
were how many, 84 in your team?
Mr. Mills. Well, roughly 100, sir.
The Chairman. A hundred?
143
Mr. Mills. Not quite.
The Chairman. You think they will be decreasing because of the
efficiency of the operation now ; is that correct?
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir. I think we have cut the team down by about
20 altogether.
The Chairman. Was it 20 more than that a year ago?
Mr. Mills. Yes. sir.
The Chairman. And a year from now you hope it will go further
down?
Mr. Mills. I hope so.
PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION
The Chairman. As I understood you, the problem of corruption
has been controlled; there is no longer any corruption.
Mr. Mills. I don't believe I said that.
The Chairman. Didn't you? Maybe it was Mr. Vann. I am sorry;
I have it mixed up.
Mr. Vann. No. sir, I did not get involved in that.
The Chairman. You didn't?
. Mr. Vann. But I will if you wish. There is still a problem of
corruption.
VIETNAMIZATION AND PACIFICATION QUESTIONED
The Chairman. I will come back to it. I wanted to read you a
comment called ''Letter from Saigon" by a rather well known observer.
This is Mr. Shaplen. Do you know Mr. Shaplen?
Mr. Mills. I know some of his books.
The Chairman. This is from the New Yorker magazine of January
31, 1970. I didn't read it all, but he says:
Technology and bureaucracy are surely not enough when Communists are
still far from defeated — when, as one veteran American economic development
worlier commented, "Two Vietcong in a hamlet can still undo most of what
we've accomplished."
That is a quote. Then he says:
The Americans, after fighting the war themselves for too long, without equipping
and training a mobile Vietnamese army are now, as they hastily try to put Amer-
ican-style social-welfare and economic-improvement programs into effect, again
doing the job themselves instead of letting the Vietnamese learn the hard way.
The Chairman. Do you think that is an accurate statement?
Mr. AIiLLS. No, sir, I don't. Certainly not at Tuyen Due Province
which is all I can speak for.
(The article follows:)
[From the New Yorker, Jan. 31, 1970]
Letter From Saigon, January 20
On Februarj^ 6th, another Tet holiday will usher in the Year of the Dog, and
while there are as many opinions about what will happen in Vietnam in 1970 as
there are breeds of dog, there is universal agreement that it will be the most critical
year since this misbegotten war begain a decade ago. If President Nixon, backed
bj' his silent majority, sticks to his tentative timetable, it will amost surely be the
last year of major American combat involvement. This does not mean that a year
from now American troops of all sorts will not be engaged in some fighting, or that
144
the American death toll of just over forty thousand could not eventuality ritc to
fiftj?^ thousand or more. Under the present withdrawal plan, between twenty and
forty thousand American military advisers and technicians will be left here as late
as the end of 1972, and the lower figure will still be about three times the number
that were in the country in 1962. Those Americans who are known here as "the
new optimists" — people who believe that the process of Vietnamization is really
l)('ginnino- to work — acclaim the Nixon program as the only sensil)le course. Others
Avho are more skeptical believe that if Vietnamization is ito have any success five
years or more u'ill be upcded. And still others are convinced that no amount of
ibime will enable our allies to master the complex weapons systems that the
Americans themselves have had only limited success in using conventionally^ in
this unconventional war.
Apart from the military arguments, even those Americans here who are most
strongh^ opposed to the war and want to get out quickly are forced to admit that
a further acceleration of the American withdrawal, in the absence of sudden con-
cessions by Hanoi, would endanger the vulnerable social and economic reconstruc-
tion programs and perhaps provoke the collapse of the present Saigon government.
However, more and more people are beginning to wonder whether another govern-
ment might not be able to end the war sooner and still preserve an independent,
non-Communist South Vietnam, and perhaps a stronger and sounder one as well.
The constitutional "legality" of the present Administration, which was elected
for a four-year term that will end in the fall of 1971, is still acknowledged, but
such legality is not held to be as sacrosanct as it was a few months ago. The
doubts that are arising about both the intentions and the political efficacy of the
Thieu regime could therefore prove to be more important than all the complicated
technical and administrative machinery of Vietnamization, and their consequences
could unhinge Nixon's whole scheme.
However justified or imjustihed the skepticism may be concerning Nixon's
silent majority in the United States, a silent majority unquestionably exists
among the seventeen million South Vietnamese, and although this majority
opposes the Communists, only a relatively small portion of it is really behind
Thieu. This much is admitted by Thieu's most enthusiastic American supporters,
who have nursed him along through imcertainty and s(4f-doubt to his current
I'uijhoric overconfidence, which bears a growing resemblance to the overweening,
self-destructive assurance shown by the late President Ngo Dinh Diem at the
end of the nineteen- fifties. Nixon and Thieu, who are alike in many ways, will most
likely do their best not to upset each other's plans, which are carefully calculated
to iDring about their respective reelections. Whatever Nixon may privately think
of Thieu — and it is hard to imagine that he could actually believe the Vietnamese
President to be, as he has called him, "one of the four or five best political leaders
in the world" — he will almost surely go to any lengths to avoid an upheaval in
Saigon that might affect his twofold aim of getting out of Vietnam as gracefully
and quickly as possible and keeping himself in the White House until 1976. Like
pilot and co-pilot on a takeoff, they have reached a point of no return, and now
they must fly on together toward their common destination. It will be ironic for
Nixon if the" flight is hijacked by some of Thieu's more fractious passengers.
Obviously, this is one of the eventualities the Communists are hoping for; in
fact, their present strategy and tactics are geared to it. Last year and the year
before, Hanoi's plan was to keep American casualties at a high enough level to
stir up strong sentiment against the war in the United States, as a way of achieving
its ultimate aim of American withdrawal and a favorable political solution through
the forced establishment of a coalition government. Their 1970 plan is apparently
designed to achieve the same aim by subtler means; namely, by attacking the
Vietnamization program on all levels through increased terrorism, and by further
denigrating and dividing the by no means popular Thieu Administration.
Naturally, the Communists' official line is that Vietnamization cannot work, but
at the same time they appear to worry that it might; at least, this would account
for what seems to be a strong difference of opinion in Hanoi about how the war
in the South should now be fought. Som- observers, citing manpower and pro-
duction problems that the North Vietnamese themselves have admitted to,
believe that a power struggle is beginning. After the death of Ho Chi Minh last
September 3rd, the triumvirate of Premier Pham Van Dong; Le Duan, the First
Secretary of the Laodong (Workers') Party; and Truong Chinh, the chairman of
the National Assembly Standing Committee, seemed to be taking over smoothly
and .swiftly. Now, however, there are some signs that Dong, who might be said
to occupy the driver's seat, is being subjected to more and more back-seat driving
from Chinh and Duan, who differ with him and each other about priorities at
145
home, especially in the vital areas of agricultural production and Party reorgani-
zation and disciphne. While Duan, as the chief Party leader, is working closely
with Dong to keep the government running properly and to maintain a balance
between Moscow and Peking, he appears to believe that Hanoi can win the war
in the South, or at least achieve a stalemate, in a relatively short time, and will
then be in a position to pay more attention to domestic difficulties. China, the
chief Party ideologist, who has recently been appearing in public almost weekly
and who follows a more pro-Peking hne, wants to shore up the North's economy
first, and accepts the inevitabihty of a protracted challenge in the South. In a
succession of statements and speeches, which have covered everything from the
effects of floods and droughts on food production to revisionist trends in art and
the need to revitalize "mass leadership," Chinh has sounded increasingly like a
scolding leader of the Cultural Revolution in China. Duan, on the other hand, ap-
pears in public only rarely, and, when he did so lat;; in October, declared prag-
maticall}-, "The collective system must be firmly maintained. It is inadvisable to
adopt the opinion of one person and force all others to follow it."
Even if the differences of opinion and of approach in North Metnam are not
yet serious enough to ansount to a power struggle, and I don't think they are,
they do convey some idea of the complicated situation in that country. The
statements being made by both sides in this long and brutal war are, in fact,
increasingly shrill and confused. The Vietnamese opponents have come to seem
like two punch-drunk prizefighters in an old-time bareknuckle brawl that has
lasted more rounds than either can remember. Both are wobbly and can hardly
stand but are kept going by their seconds, who between rounds clean them up,
fix their cuts, and give them smelling salts, then send them out again when the
bell rings. Sooner or later, one of the weary battlers may simply collapse and drop
to the canvas. Or the iight may go on and on, with the spectators heli>less. It
is easy to say that if the seconds would just pack up and go home it would all
be over, but the seconds can't; neither the American moral predicament nor
Communist revolutionary dialectics and objectives will permit it.
The most important Communist statements made recently on the nnlitary and
political direction of the war are contained in a seven-part article by General Vo
Nguyen Ciap, North N'ict iiain's i)rfen>c .Minister, that apjx-ared in two Hanoi
newspapers in mid-December, and in copies of a number of directives that were
captur(>d in South Vietnam — notably a pair called "COS\"N Resolution Nine"
and "C08NV Resolution Ten." Through the veracity of captured documents has
often been questioned, I have seen the ^"ietnames(! originals of the ones I am
referring to, and am sure that they are authentic. "COSX'N" stands for Central
Office for South X'ietnam, which is the headquarters that, under Hanoi's direction,
runs the war in the South, and which is at present situated in Cambodia, just
across the western border of Tay Ninh Province, northwest of Saigon, and has a
forward headquarters in Tay Ninh itself. There have been ten resolutions since
COSNV was established, at the end of 1961, or about a year after the creation of
the National Liberation Front in the South. These resolutions are, in effect,
orders and interpretations of orders for Party workers and followers in South
A^ietnam, and are based on prior Laodong resolutions, handed down from Hanoi.
For example. Resolution Nine, which was issued last July, was based on a Laodong
resolution issued by the Politburo in Hanoi in Ai)ril. Resolution Nine was cap-
tured here when a Communist courier was ambushed and killed by members of
an American brigade north of Saigon in October. It was the first complete resolu-
tion ever obtained, and it is considered especially significant because it contains a
lengthy and detailed analysis of the war. It was presumably written by Pham
Hung,"the fourth-ranking member of the Hanoi Politburo and the highest-ranking
Communist in the South, who directs both the military and the political war
effort, and one sign of its importance is that Party woi'kers are ordered to study it
for "fifty hours." It charts a compiic;ited, sometimes seemingly contradictory,
course for "achieving a decisive victory within a relatively short period of time"
while "firmly grasping the precept of protractedness" in order to "defeat the
enemy in case they tryto prolong the war." Hopes for rapid American deescalation
and for the failure of N'ietnamization are repeatedly expressed, as is the hojie that
the Americans will be "forced to seek an early end to the war through a political
solution that thej- cannot refuse;" namely, a cease-fire followed by the establish-
ment of a coalition government. While accepting the fact that "the Saigon area
is our major battlefield for the whole of South Metnam," Resolution Nine appears
to acknowledge the difficulty of again laying siege to Saigon and other major
cities in the manner of the 1968 Tet offensive. One phrase that is constantly
reiterated is "especially in the Delta," and it is there in particular — the rich
146
rioo rogiou south of Saigon — that Communist troops are supposed to grab the
initiative and ''liberate and control the major part of the rural area, . . . and
build the liberated areas into perfect revolutionary bases to serve as the firm,
direct rear of the resistance.'" It is in the Mekong Delta, however, where guerrilla
activity back in lO.'iO touched off the present war. that the South Metnamese
government has made the most progress in the last year. Largely on the basis of
advances in this area, President Thieu has claimed that his government now
"controls" ninety-five per cent of the total population of South Vietnam — a claim
that even optimistic Americans privately acknowledge to be exaggerated by at
lea-^t fifteen per cent.
There is no doubt that improvements have taken place. Many roads that had
beeit closed to t rathe for years are open again. Rice and other produce are moving,
a itumber of former contested areas have now been brought under either partial or
nearly complete government control, and thousands of the people who had been
living in Communist villages and hamlets have crossed over into safer zones. It is in
the Delta, too. that the biggest improvement has been made in the use of Regional
and Popular Forces — the provincial and local troops — which together now number
almost half a million men and are being supplied with more and more American
M-Ui rifles. With American help — and our air and artillery support particularly
are still vital — the South \'ietnamese have managed to set up outposts in the two
long-ostablishod A'ietcong base areas in the Delta — the U ^linh Forest and Base
Area 4711 — close to the Cambodiait border. That the Commtmist^ are now fever-
ishly coitcerned about the Delta is therefore no surprise.
Late last year, the North Metnamese '273rd Regiment moved into the area — the
first time that Hanoi elements had come that far south. With the announced with-
drawal of the American 9th Division — a tmit that established a tremeitdously
high, and quite v>ossibly exaggerated, ratio of combat losses to enemy casualties,
and left as ntaity enemies as friends among the South A'ietnamese — the North "\'iet-
nameso shifted more forces south. Today, there are elements of four additional
North Vietnamese rt^giments in the Delta, and also countless North Metnamese
seitt in as replacements to fill out depleted main-foree ^'ietcong luiits, some of
which are now eighty per cent North Vietnamese. All in all, there are probably ten
thousand North Vietnamese soldiers in the area, and, counting political workers,
main-force Vietcong. local guerrillas, and men. women, and cliildren handling sup-
plies and acting as communications and liaison personnel, a total of between fifty
and sixty thousand Communists are active there. Although the rate of infiltration
from North Vietnam at any given time is extremely difficult to determine until
moitths later, when certain elements in the Sovith may be identified, the best avail-
able intelligence indicates that four or five thousand North Vietnamese came South
during November and somewhat fewer in December. These figures, if they are
right, are in keeping with the ovemll Hanoi plan to fight the war in the South in
1970 by using higlily trained, fast-striking small units to attack larger American
ai\d South \'ietnamese uttits whenever an. opportunity arises and continuing to
attack such important targets as government administrative centers.
What the Communists have been doing in the Delta in the past few weeks
admittedly has American military and intelligence experts baffled. For example,
Haitoi has put parts of two regiments into the L" Minh Forest, where they can be
bottled up and subjected to artillery and air attack. Obviously, the Communists
are getting ready for something, but ito one knows what. The best guess is that,
in conjunction with forces that they are maintaining in the Central Highlands to
the north, and also still farther north, adjacent to Laos, they ;u-e doing two things:
slowly establishing a new system of liiiked base areas reacliing all the way from
North Vietnam to the tip of the Delta, and getting ready to sweep eastward from
these bases to attack district capitals, and perhaps some provincial capitals as
well — one of which, either in the Highlands or in a remote section of the Delta, is
likely to be proclaimed the capital of the Provisional Revolutionary Government
that COS\"N and Hanoi established last June. Such a widespread campaign, aimed
at seizing specific places and simultaneously disnipting the pacification and ^'iet-
namization prognims, could pave the way for a cease-fire and political talks. What
Hanoi may have iit mind is the consolidation of a wide belt of territory embracing
all of western Vietnam and all of eastern Laos, including, in Laos, part of the
Plane des Jam^s. which the Commtmists lost last fall. Together, these areas would
constittite a "libemted" system of interlocking zones, which, except for some of the
Delta regions, are largely, iminhabited. Wliat would follow if this happens might
lead, according to what is called by American officials the "leopard-spot theory,"
to regional ceasefires accompanied by political accommodation and followed by
local and regional elections, the end result being the division of botli Metnani and
147
Laos into Communist and non-Communist areas. Although such a partition could
bf'come a permanent or semi-permanent solution in Laos, it ])robably couldn t in
Vietnam, for political and guerrilla warfare would undoubtedly continue regardless
of ceasefires. Tht^re is no doubt that in Hanoi's eyes "ultimate victory" still means
unification of Vietnam, and Hanoi is likely to persist in this aim even if it takes five,
ten, or twenty years longer. , . -r. ^ ■ ^- i
A number of references in Resolution Nine to completmg Party organizational
work by "June, 1970." indicate both that the task is urgent and that if a decisive
victory" can be attained by that date a cease-lire may end the major fighting, at
least temporarily, and the political struggle may be stepped up. Portions of
Resolution Ten and other documents exfjloit the cease-fire theme further. There
are frequent referenc(!S to "th(! situation developing quickly." According to a
notebook taken from the body of a high-ranking ofTicer killed southeast of Saigon
in November, the Communiists in order to expedite American withdrawal and
"frustrate de-Americanization," can create "an unfavorable situation ^ for ^ the
Americans and th(! Saigon government when a cease-fire is stipulated" if we
capitalize on the opportunity bv planting our personnel in government-controlled
areas to take advantage of any changes" — i)Ossibly a reference to an anti-Thieu
coup. This notebook adds, "in the immediate future, we will accept a cease-fire.
Whenever the cease-fire is promulgated by us, our troops will continue to attack
and overrun government Armv posts. We will not make prisoners of puppet
soldiers. Rather, we will (iducate them and release- them on the spot. But we have
to capture as many [enemyl soldiers as possible in preparation for a political
settlement." Another docunient, believed to be a section of R(!solution Ten, speaks
of an increase in military proselytizing among both governmimt and allied forces
and of supporting "a fifth column in place" within allied units to erode morale,
instead of simply encouraging desc^rters.
There has been considerable discussion of whether the Communists, if they took
over South Vietnam, would kill their political enemies, as they did in North
Vietnam in 1945-46, and again in the mid-fifties, when there was a peasant rebellion
against enforced collectivization; between fifty thousand and a hundred thousand
people were kilhrd during each period. Predictions about such matters are hazard-
ous, but although the Communists have joined the rest of the world in condemning
the American massacre at My Lai— or, to give it its correct Vietnamese geo-
graphical dc^signation, Tu Cong— in March, 1968, they have also, according to
scores of documents I have just read, given orders to "kill tyrants and traitors'
throughout the country now and also when ui)risings take place just before and just
after a cease-fire is df^clared. The rate of terrorism, including tin; assassination of
village and hamlet oflicials, especially those engagcid in pacification and self-
defense, rose at the end of 1969 quit sharply, having av(!rag(;d slightly less per
month during the rest of the year than in 1968, when during the Tet offensive in
Hue the Communists appear, on the evidence of mass graves still being uncovered,
to have murdered close to five thousand people — government functionaries, anti-
Communist politicians, pro-government intellectuals, religious leaders, and so on.
The documents captured during 1969 also included orders to "annihilate" opposi-
tion elements bv categories, much as was initially done in Hue. Several of the
documents gave" orders for the "annihilation" of a specific number of people in
each of various villages in central Vietnam; for one ])rovince, the number ranged
from five to forty i)er village. Instructions issued in mid- 1969 to Party committees
of two Delta provinces ordered rosters to be prei)an>d of "wicked village delegates,
polic(;men, hamlet chiefs and assistant hamlet chiefs, intelligence agents, spies,
and betrayers who have committed a blood debt against our people." One docu-
ment advocated careful procedures, saying, "We should not take advantage of the
situation to terrorize, assassinate, and torture indiscriminately. We should fully
understand the policy of using violence and implement it correctly and democrat-
ically." Another document was more blunt. "Each comrade must kill one re-
actionary," it said.
A distinction should be made between captured enemy documents, usually sent
out for official Communist guidance, and public speeches or articles, such as the
seven-part article by General Giap. The importance of Giap's article lies in the
imi)rimatur it gives to the earlier COSVN resolutions and documents and in the
corroboration it offers of the kind of war the Communists are now preparing to
fight — one emi)hasizing "the art of using a small force to fight a big force." In
his current article, (iiai), sounding far less positive and confident than he did when
he wrote his famous guerrilla tcxtl^ook "People's War, People's Army," in the
fifties, speaks of "the great imbalance of numerical strength and population, and
also a great imbalance of technical equipment," and of the need for enough time
148
"to graduall.y exterminate and weaken the enemy's forces, to restrict their strength
and aggravate their weaknesses, to gradually strengthen and develop our forces and
overcome our deficiencies." The theme throughout is to make economical use of the
forces that the Communists have at their command, which are now estimated to
include a hundred and thirty thousand North Vietnamese fighting men in the
South (or in rest camps in Cambodia), in a total combined force — among which are
Vietcong main-force units, guerrillas, political workers, supplj^ troops, and so
on — of three hundred and thirty thousand.
A recent studj^, based partly on interviews with some of the six thousand
North Vietnamese battlefield prisoners being held in South Vietnam, reaches the
conclusion that the North Vietnamese are still deeply dedicated to their cause
of the "liberation" of the South and hold a continuing staunch behef in the
advantages of Communism in the North. This belief, which, it has been found,
is held even by sons of some former landowners who were killed in the mid-fifties'
purge, entails acceptance of the harsh regimen and strict security measures
imposed on the North by the war, and a conviction that the war in the South
has been a legitimate drive for "national salvation"- — a natural and logical
sequel to the struggle against the French that began in 1945. Anti-Americanism
is the basis of this belief — an extension of the violent anti-colonial feelings that
led to the victory over the French in 1954. Thus, although the North Vietnamese
soldiers regard their three-to-six-month trip to the South as a painful experience,
and although many of them acknowledge, with a kind of Buddhist or Taoist
fatalism, that they may never return to their homes and families again, they
tend to accept their role as a totally unavoidable commitment, a responsibility
from which there is no escape. The attitude of these North Vietnamese soldiers
is in considerable contrast to the feelings of many South Vietnamese Vietcong
hoi chanh (returnees), who have averaged twenty-five thousand a year over the
last four .years, compared to a total of less than two hundred North Vietnamese
who have defected without being forced to surrencer on the battlefield since
the war began. There are manj' dedicated Vietcong soldiers, but there are just
as many who, after joining the Commvuiists either voluntarily or by impressment —
and in the last two years the latter has been the case more and more often — have
revealed a negative attitude. A large numl;)er of the hoi chanh who volimteercd
have said that the}' did so because they were against the government for one
reason or another — lack of faith in the successive Saigon regimes, anger over
specific cruel or discriminatory actions by local officials. Those who had fought
the hardest for the Vietcong did so because they related their actions directly
to what they felt for the South Vietnamese "homeland," and they showed no
strong convictions about reunification with the North.
Until recently — and even now, to a lesser extent — they were also motivated
bj' the belief that they were fighting on the winning side. Something that is new
in the past year, according to the study, is a decline in morale, owing to physical
and economic hardship — the result, in large part, of the devastating B-.52 raids
(These raids are to be continued, at reduced strength, during the coming period
of Vietnamization.) The drop in morale has also been due in part to the diminishing
num})er of zealous and well-trained poHtical workers. Today, there is less ex-
povuiding of revolutionary ideology, less careful indoctrination, and more direct
preaching about anti-Americanism and survival, together with vague allusions
to ]3romotion and status once the war is won. The great losses that the Communists
suffered during Tet in 1968 and the decline in morale after the death of Ho Chi
Minh (on the whole, oddly, this has been greater in the South than in the North)
also have made recruitment in the South more difficult. The Communists are still
taking people on, at a rate of at least five thousand a month, but most of the new
recriuts are boys of eleven or twelve, women, and old men, and most of them have
been impressed into service. Despite all this, and despite growing friction between
the dedicated Northerners and the Southerners who dream more simply of j^eace,
interrogations indicate tliat the average Coiinnunist political worker in the South
still has stronger motivation than his coimterpart on the government side.
Because what is now South Metnam has, historically, been more often divided
than united, and because it has been subject to more divisive foreign influences
than the North, the South ^'ietnamese inevitably lack the solidarity and the
sustained revolutionary ardor of their Northern liicthrei), and are today Ix-v.il-
dered and imcertain about their own capacity to hold together and to restore their
broken nationalist roots under the harsh imperatives of time and of such essentially
artificial programs as "Vietnamization" and "pacification." To be "Vietnamized"
or "pacified" or "reconstructed" — words that Aldous Huxley or George Orwell
would have n^lishcsd — without being given time or opportunity to rediscover a
149
Southern consciousness, which exists but hes deeply submerged, is apt to be
meaningless. This is the fundamental problem in South \'ietnam toda^^, and
nothing makes this fact clearer than a trip, such as one I made last month, through
the provinces of the seething Delta. In certain respects, the journey is comparable
to a tour of New York City that includes the ugly, violent slums of Harlem and
Williamsburg, the bland middle-class sections of Queens and the Bronx, and
the insulated wealthy blocks of upper Fifth and Park Avenues. It may be no
accident that the two terms one hears used most often by the \mericans in Viet-
nam these days are "social mobility" and "decentralization." The first has to do
with the involvement of many more people in the Revolutionary Development
programs and in the complex bureaucratic social structure of the provinces. There
are now hundreds of new "experts."
Seventeen different types, including village chiefs, are being trained at Vung
Tan, on the coast near Saigon, for rural-development work of one sort or another;
district and province chiefs are being specially trained elsewhere. Ordinary villagers
are getting short courses designed to encourage building up usefid relationships
among themselves and among neighboring commimities. The Americans hope
that when elections are held for provincial councils, sometime this spring or
summer (the forty-four province chiefs will continue to be appointed), social
mobility will increase, especially if, as is anticipated, each candidate is required
to run from the district in which he lives. As for decentralization, it is a concomi-
tant of social mobility. It refers to the reestablishment of traditional local auton-
omy through the election of hamlet and village chiefs and councils. On the average,
four to six hamlets make up a village, and, according to the latest American
figures, there are 2,157 villages and 10,731 hamlets in South Vietnam. Ninety-two
per cent of the villages have chiefs, assistant chiefs, and councils, most of them
locally elected, and the fact of their having been elected entitles them to govern-
ment funds of a million i)iastres (about eight thousaiid dollars at the official rate,
but less than three thousand at the current l)lack-market rate) for development
projects of their own choosing; villages whose officials are still appointed, because
they are not secure enough to hold elections, get only four hundred thousand
piastres. When the provincial councils are set up, they will also have their own
d(\ (lopuuMit funds, and it is lioped that these councils will encourage social
mobility further by dealing directly with their village counterparts in promoting
development projects.
It might work, but, given the subtle, often intractable ways of the Orient, it is
too pat, too "Western" a concept. There has always been a tendency among the
statistics-minded, reform-minded Americans here to play numbers games, and
by now th(> \'ietnaniese have caught the habit. Thus, when President Theiu
claims to have ninety-five per cent of the population of the country under control,
he is taking cognizance of the fact that about forty per cent of the people now live
in or around cities, in contrast to just fifteen per cent before the war. In the Delta
resiion, which has more than half the country's total population, the number
of hamlets under \'ietcong control, the Americans say, has been more than halved
since a year ago — fourteen per cent of the population compared to thirty-five per
cent. There is no doubt that many people have moved out of Communist areas
in the Delta in the last year, whether because of food shortages or higher Com-
munist taxes or for such reasons as one chief in a Vietcong village gave after cross-
ing over: "It was just getting too hard to see my wife." Undoubtedly, the govern-
ment has improved its position a great deal by den.ying resources to the Communist
area through military pressure. There are five hundred thousand more guns on the
government side today than there were a year ago — about a hundred and fifty
thousand of them new M-16 rifles that have been distributed to the Regional
and Popular Forces, and the rest mostly carliines that have been giv^en out to the
Popular Self-Defense Forces — volunteer groups that patrol communities at night.
As for economic improvements in the Delta, today one can see there thousands
more Hondas, sewing machines, television and radio sets, and the like, than one
could a year or so ago, and the current rice crop, amounting to more than five
million tons, in the highest in several years.
In 1969, what was called the Accelerated Pacification Program was supposed to
get as many people as possible into as many secure villages as possible before the
Communists got there. It was an effort to trade space for time, and by and large
the government did not do badly. The 1970 program is emphasizing consolidation —
building up the new village governments and stimulating more information
campaigns and development projects (bridges, schoolhouses, pig-raising centers,
social halls, and so on). Two of the worst weak spots are the local police forces,
which have been a problem ever since the time of Diem, and the Phoenix program,
150
a provincially coordinated plan for collecting intelligence on important local Com-
munists and then arresting them. Another, over-all, weakness is a tendency to
emphasize quantity at the expense of quality, and this is something that pervades
the whole Vietnamization program, including the recruitment of paramilitary
elements. But the greatest weakness of all, as I see it, remains the lack of political
motivation from the bottom up. This is something that only the Vietnamese can
ultimately provide, but the Americans have all along failed to stimulate such
eflforts, and the new heavy emphasis on rapid Vietnamization, with its manifold
technical aspects, scarcely helps to focus attention on useful political develop-
ments. "Village democracy," beginning with the election of a chief — there often is
only one candidate, frequently a reluctant one — continuing with a group decision
whether to build a schoolhouse or a pig farm, and facilitated by an increase in
administrative efficiency, may stimulate an emerging political consciousness. But
these are all material measures, and neither such eflforts alone nor an improvement
in military security — important as that is — nor a combination of the two will save
Vietnam if more substantial political institutions are not established. Technology
and bureaucracy are surely not enough when the Communists are still far from
defeated — when, as one veteran American economic-development worker com-
mented, "two Vietcong in a hamlet can still undo most of what we've accom-
plished." The Americans, after fighting the war themselves for too long, without
equipping and training a mobile Vietnamese armj?-, are now, as the.y hastily try to
put American-style social-welfare and economic-improvement programs into effect,
again doing the job themselves instead of letting the Vietnamese learn the hard
way.
Most Americans consider Kien Hoa, a coastal province southeast of Saigon that
has traditionally been a Conimunist stronghold and major recruitment center
for the Vietcong, possibly the worst province in the country. Today, things there
are not as bad as they once were. Some roads can now be driven over by day, and
some long-closed markets and schools are open again. But more than two thousand
Communists, or about twice as many as there were a year ago, are currently
active in the province, and in the past few months the number of Vietcong incidents
has increased four or five fold— to about a hundred and fifty a month. Most of
these are acts of terrorism against and attacks on the Regional and Popular
Forces, whose members still tend to hole up in outposts, or, if they do patrol, to
take the same routes over and over — an open invitation to attack. The Vietnamese
10th Regiment, which replaced the American 9th Division, has failed to establish
good relations with provincial officials, and the result has been reduced pressure
on the Vietcong. In one recent five-day peroid, the Vietcong killed three hamlet
chiefs and seriously wounded a village chief and a schoolteacher. The new govern-
ment workers more often than not lack direction, whether because the district
chiefs, who are usually Armj^ captains, don't know how to assign them or because
the village chiefs, who are now supposed to be in charge of the incoming Revolu-
tionary Development workers and other specialists, are afraid to exercise their
new authority or are harassed by their jealous district and provincial superiors.
The situation is not made easier by the fact that some of the more experienced
technical cadremen, with academic degrees from Saigon, are paid more than
most provincial officials and twice as much as the village chiefs. Moreover, the
province chief in Kien Hoa, Colonel Tran Thien Nhien, has additional political
problems of his own, connected with profiteering scandals that reach all the way
up to the House of Representatives in Saigon, and these have further divided
political loyalties in the province. Five-man Mobile Advisory Teams of Americans,
who either work with the Regional Force companies or work on village develop-
ment schemes, put in only thirty- or forty-day stints, in which they can seldom
accomplish enough to make a lasting impression. The teams are much in demand,
however, both in Kien Hoa and elsewhere — one more indication of the continuing
overdependence on the Americans.
Neighboring "\'inh Binh Province is another Communist backwater, with between
two or three thousand main-force Vietcong and local guerrillas still active, but
there the government has established some degree of control over twice as many
hamlets as it could claim a year ago. Nevertheless, the Vietcong still hold several
important areas — most notably Cang Long District, which has been an enemy
base for many j^ears. The American senior adviser told me that the Vietnamese
Army commander in the Delta was willing to put two regular regiments into Cang
Long for one month but that it would take six months to clear out the Vietcong.
"Generally, we've ]>ut too much responsibility on little men in the villages who
can't handle it, and at the same time we've let those who should be taking over
make excuses for not doing their job," the adviser said. Police work there is poor.
151
too, and there is a lack of coordination within the local Phoenix program. Though
some roads are now passable even at night, the Communists are still able to move
between Vinh Binh and the neighboring provinces almost at will after dark, using
an intricate system of canals and rivers as well as manj^ of the roads. In Ba Xuyen
Province, south of Vinh Binh, the situation has improved more substantially, with
the estimated total of armed Vietcong and guerrillas having dropped in the past
year from nearly four thousand to slightl}^ more than two thousand. The Regional
and Popular Forces there have done particularly well, the local senior adviser said.
The province has a population of three hundred and eight}' thousand, and of this
number fifty-six thousand are still considered to be under Vietcong control; on
the other hand, all but sixty thousand of two hundred and eighty thousand hec-
tares of riceland are imder government cultivation. As I moved in south to Thoi
Binh District, in An Xyuen Province, at the far end of the Delta, which is another
contender for the designation of the worst area in the country, I was given the
latest evaluations on its hamlets, which, according to the Hamlet Evaluation
Systems — an American system of rating hamlets from A down to E on the basis
of their security and development, with V used to designate a hamlet still com-
pletely in Vietcong hands — had no A's four B's, four C's five D's, and seven Vs.
Here, the American advisers agreed, the Communists, if thej' choose to, can hit
hard in the coming months.
I had now been in four bad provinces in a row. The next two were a sharp
contrast. In Kien Giang, on the southwest coast, eighty-eight per cent of the
population is living in hamlets rated A, B, or C, and territory that was abandoned
to the Communists is being rapidlj^ reoccupied. The people of Kien Giang are
not yet altogether pro-government, but they are becoming more openly anti-
Communist; though they still retain their fear of reprisals, they are now willing
to give information about Vietcong agents, possibl}^ because they get paid for
it. In Chau Thanh District of An Giang Province, just to the north, the situation
is even better. A majorit}^ of the district's population are members of the Hoa
Hao, one of the two major religious sects in the South, and its leaders in this
region for years maintained a successful truce with the Commiuiists.
in the Delta, as elsewhere in South Vietnam, many of the improvements are
bound to prove transitory if the}' do not keejj pace with the ability of the Com-
munists to retaliate — and Hanoi still has the ability to do so. One high-ranking
American civilian official with many j^ears of experience here told me, "The
Vietnamese are never going to be able to live happilj' ever after. A lot depends
on their sticking to what they're doing right now. There are three curves — the
curve of increasing Vietnamization, the curve of our declining direct support,
and the curve of Communist action. If we can keep the first two curves ahead of
the last, we'll be all right." Many Americans complain i)rivately about the "thin
veneer" of ability among Vietnamese officers, though they praise some individuals
highly. More are now being trained in the United States and elsewhere abroad,
and the training period in Vietnam is longer, too, but the question of quantity
versus quality remains a vital one. Another problem is improving officers' chances
for promotion — an area in which the Vietnamese, having been caught up so long-
in French traditionalism, have lagged. A forthcoming reorganization of the four
military corps areas into six or seven more realistically divided regions should help
increase promotional niobility and jjerhaps galvanize some of the atrophied ad-
ministrative apparatus.
There remain all sorts of other military difficulties, having to do with logistics
and with strategy and tactics. For example, the job of training helicopter pilots
and mechanics, which takes three years and should have been started long ago,
was only recentlj' begun. The tasks of running depot and maintenance facilities
and of keeping proper inventories were carried on almost exclusively by the
Americans for jears, and when the Vietnamese — along with some Koreans — took
parts of them over, pervasive laxity led to corruption. One lucrative source of
corruption among Vietnamese officials today is scrap metal — steel, copper, and
brass — which is secretly being shipped to Singapore and other places for high
profits: I was shown a copy of a contract involving the wife of a Vietnamese
general, who had received official permission to ship more than half a million
dollars' worth of scrap, including shell casings, to Singapore. Corruption and
inflation go together, and Vietnam today, despite recently introduced austerity
taxes — or, rather, partly because of them, since the}' caused immediate price
increases — is undergoing a new period of inflation so severe that it may ultimately
force devaluation of the piastre. An Army private with five children makes seven
thousand piastres a month, but he cannot possiljly get along on less than twice
that amount. Officers and civil servants are similarly situated, and the obvious
result is moonlighting, or corruption, or both.
152
There is also the tripartite question of mihtary equipment — what the ^"iet-
namese want, what they can use, and what the United States feels they should
have. One Vietnamese general told me, "We're really three years behind now,
because .you've always been afraid of moving faster. Things would have been a
lot different if you had started sooner, not only with your M-16 rifles but with
other equipment, including jet fighters. INIaybe we didn't know how to use all
these things, and maybe we'd have had trouble learning quickly, but the effort
at least should have been made. Suppose we lost a hundred thousand M-16s to
the enemy in battle, or through smuggling or corruption. Look at the Russians
and the way they supply the Egyptians. They don't like to see materiel and planes
being lost to the Israelis, but that hasn't stopped them from giving more, has it?"
It rnay be true, as General William C. Westmoreland, the former commander-
in-chief in Vietnam, is known to believe, that if the North had been more thor-
oughly bombed, or if we had invaded Laos and Cambodia to hit at the Communist
sanctuaries, the war could have been "won." Such actions might have turned the
tide significantly, yet it is doubtful whether the war would have been won per-
manently that way; in any case, it wouldn't have affected the complaint of the
Vietnamese about why it took us so long to help them defend themselves ade-
quately, which is what every President from Eisenhower through Nixon has
professed our policy to be. The truth is that we were always more interested in
doing the job for the Vietnamese. Whatever the initial opposition of the mihtary
to our getting involved in a major war on the Asian mainland, once we were in,
the American military-industrial complex wanted to run the show, and it did.
That shortsighted" policy also helps explain our poor political performance
in Metnam, which may yet undo Vietnamization and all that it seeks to accom-
plish. For four years aher the Americans helped engineer the overthrow of Presi-
dent Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in 1963, we did little or nothing to
create new political institutions in Vietnam, and when we did interfere in Viet-
namese politics it was with remarkable maladroitness. Having fostered the new
constitutional government of the Second Republic, which led to the elections in
the fall of 1967, we devoted inordinate care and attention to building up President
Thieu as a national figure capable of leading the South Vietnamese from war to
peace and of instituting a form of guided democracy that would combine a degree
of benevolent authoritarianism with a system of decentralized government gradu-
ally established. The theory was a plausible one, but it hasn't worked. Thieu has
turned out to be a military mandarin, and though decentralization has begun to
take place, and could in time become poHtically productive, it was administra-
tively imposed from the top, and has therefore become a factor in a possibly
dangerous new polarization of political forces. This polarization is largely the
result of the other Vietnamese leaders' mistrust of Thieu, owing to his deviovis
methods, his mixture of pride, caution, and suspicion, his growing isolation, and
his essential lack of popular appeal, and also owing to the natural tendency of
Vietnamese pohticians to mistrust each other and to pursue selfish ambitions, and
to the general confusion and fear over what sort of compromise will ultimately
be made with the Communists and who will then survive and who will fall.
It would be virtually impossible to take a public-opinion poll in Vietnam
today, but if one could be taken I think it would show something like the follow-
ing results: twenty per cent pro-Communist, twenty per cent pro-Thieu, twenty
per cent anti-Thieu and anti-Communist and aligned with one of the dozen-odd
political or religious parties or groups of some significance, and forty per cent
undecided and confused but deeply desirous of peace and some form of new,
preferably more locally representative self-expression. No American correspond-
ent can visit the Communist areas in South Vietnam, so it is impossible to obtain
a clear picture of what the popular feeling there is. But then it is also impossible
to ascertain how many of the people hving in government or contested areas
are privately willing or prepared to go along with the Communists if a coalition
is created. As for Thieu, he continues to rule the country from Independence
Palace with an entourage that is small and tight but, even so, divided into several
factions. Its two most important members are Nguyen Cao Thang, a wealthy
businessman, who dispenses funds and patronage for Thieu among members of
the National Assembly and has made some trips abroad in Thieu's behalf, during
which he is said to have established exploratory contacts with the Communists,
and Lieutenant General Dang Van Quang, a former commander in the Delta,
who once made accommodations there with the Vietcong and who now holds a
tight rein on all security matters.
Thieu has continued to give formal support to the group known as the National
Social Democratic Front— now a five-party rather than a six-party group, since
153
one of its original component parties, representing the Hoa Hao element, quit.
He created this group last year, but it has gained little popular prestige or support.
While its more opportunistic members vie for his attention and patronage, Thieu,
in turn, uses them for his own protection and as a convenient sounding board,
and that is about all. However, he has privately drawn closer to two of the parties
in the Front — the Dai Doan-Ket, or Greater Solidarity Force, composed chiefly
of Northern Catholic refugees, and the Nhan Xa, or Revolutionary Social
Humanist Party, which is primarily a central-Vietnamese Catholic organization.
Thieu, himself a Catholic, has also encouraged the reestablishment of the Can
Lao, a quasi-secret Catholic party from the Diem period, of which NguiJ-en Cao
Thang, for one, was a member, but so far it has gained little vitality. More
important, Thieu is trying to create a national organization of his own based on
his continuing control of the Army and the whole military bureaucracy, and of
the national network of civilian workers involved in pacification and other adminis-
trative duties. It is upon this still loose and amorphous group, unofficially called
the Cadre-Khaki Party, that he is basing his hopes for reelection in 1971, and
some people believe that if his hopes are realized he ma^- try to make some sort
of accommodation with the Communists, despite his present disclaimers about
ever accepting a coalition government. A number of experienced Vietnamese
politicians, including some whom Thieu fears or mistrusts deeply but who are
willing to help him now in order to strengthen the still fragile Second Republic,
are convinced that if he wins the Presidency in 1971 by a minoritj- vote, as he did
last time, it will mean that he has failed to create a strong enough organization to
withstand the Communists and their potential allies among the opposition groups
in the country.
These opposition groups are now compartmented, quarrelsome, and ineffectual.
Thieu has helped keep them this waj' through divide-and-conquer tactics, at which
he is adept, but this has not slowed the growing polarization of forces — pro-Thieu
and anti-Thieu. His own increasing Diemist tendencies came to general notice last
November 3rd, when he permitted the Catholic Nhan Xa members of his Cabinet—
who control the Information Ministry and its eighty thousand workers, on whom
he is depending to build up the Cadn^Khaki Party — to commemorate the murders
of Diem and Nhu. A ceremony at their unmarked graves in Saigon — the first to
take place since their deaths — was attended by three thousand people, including
Mme. Thieu and several members of the Administration. That same week, two
of the former generals who were leaders of the coup against Diem — Duong Van
Minh and Tran Van Don — gave parties at their homes, and each of these gather-
ings, in typical Vietnamese fashion, began at a significant hour, Don's shortly
after noon on October 30th, when, in 1963, the junta that plotted the coup held
its final secret meeting, and Minh's at 1 :30 p.m. on November 1st, the exact
time the coup began six years before. The avowed purpose of these two gatherings
was to "reinstill the spirit of the revolution of 1963," in which Thieu took part,
somewhat reluctantly, as a division commander outranked by both Minh and
Don. Resentment against Thieu had already been mounting, because harsh
austerity taxes had been imposed a week before, and also because Thieu had
pushed the taxes through by decree instead of obtaining a two-thirds vote in the
House of Representatives, as the constitution prescribes. For several weeks after
the tax decree was issued, a flurry of coup rumors circulated in Saigon. President
Nixon's speech of November 3rd helped ({uiet them, but the opposition to Thieu
has continued to grow.
Don, following a trip to the United States, during which he was impressed
by the anti-war sentiment, made an effort to start a Third Force Movement,
and, having failed to do this, he last week formally placed himself in opposition
to Thieu l\v creating a new People's Bloc. Publicly, Don has taken a strong stand
against Thieu on numerous issues, including that of the American massacre at
Tu Cong, which he and some of his fellow-senators investigated on their own
after the government had hastily declared that there had been no massacre. The
Don group concluded that a massacre had indeed taken place, in which at least
eighty persons, mostly women and children, were murdered in cold blood — -a
conclusion that the investigators arrived at after speaking with a number of
survivors and with two Vietnamese interpreters who had accompanied the Amer-
ican platoon charged with the massacre. The Don investigation also uncovered
evidence that other massacres have taken place around the country, mostly in
the northern section but also in the Delta, and have involved Korean troops as
well as Americans, and that at least four or five hundred Vietnamese lost their
lives in these "incidents," which mostly grew out of abuses of the so-called "free-
fire-zone" regulations, which permit allied attacks on Communist areas by air,
44-706 — 70 11
154
artillery, or direct assault without svifficient prior clearance from the Vietnamese,
or without the government's knowledge. Though the Tu Cong massacre has
aroused far less emotion here in Vietnam than in the United States and else-
where, it has added to both the growing anti-Americanism and to the mounting
anti-war sentiment.
Don, who is one of twent}'-nine senators who have to run for reelection next
September, will undoubtedly take his case to the people and speak out even inore
strongly against Thieu. Unfortunately, though he is popular, he lacks political
experience and astuteness, and tries to go off in several directions at once. As for
former General Minh, who was Chief of State after the fall of Diem, he has
reverted to silence after issuing a call early in November for a national referendum,
which he never clearly defined, but which was designed to obtain approval or
disapproval of the govei-nment's policies. Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky, who is
supposed to be still "supervising" the dormant Paris talks but hasn't attended
them in many months, is in the position of an astronaut between space flights,
waiting for the next countdown. He is curi'ently testing his political strength by
taking private surveys to see whether he has a chance to win the Presidencj- in
1971 as a staunch anti-Communist hawk. Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, who
gets along with Tliieu on the surface but has his own designs on the Presidencj^,
might, if a showdown occurred, side with Don and Minh, and perhaps with Ky.
The ''loyal opposition" is represented by two parties of some potential strength.
One is the Progressive National Movement, headed jointl^y by Nguyen Van Bong,
of the National Institute of Administration, and Nguyen Ngoc Huy, a member
of the Paris delegation and a leader of the old Dai Viet nationalist party. The
other is the new Farmers- Workers Party headed by Tran Quoc Buu, the nation's
top labor leader, who has had a lifelong tendencj- to hover in the background as
a political mastermind but may now finally be ready to come out into the open
and lead a party personally. If he does so, it could be an important development ,
for he controls several hundred worker and peasant groups around the countr}^.
Various other parties are still trying to pull themselves together, and a number o f
senators are once more attempting to form blocs — an activity that up to now has
been futile.
As for the religious factions, the militant Buddhists, headed by the An Quang
Pagoda group, of which Thich Tri Quang remains the dominant leader, are speak-
ing out more loudly for peace, and are also taking soundings to determine if they
should start a formal political party. Tri Quang himself is more moderate and less
virulently anti-American than he once was, and has expressed himself in favor of
a neutral South Vietnam that would be independent and apart from the North
indefinitely. The Catholics remain strongly anti-Communist, but they are more
sharply divided than thej^ once were. One faction is willing to accept anything
Thieu wants, a Northern refugee element is in favor of peace but against Thieu on
personal grounds, and a basically conservative Southern element is beginning to
think in terms of accommodation with both sides. The Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects
have recently made some efforts to heal internal factionalism, but both remain
divided.
And so it goes — a kind of compulsive mutual-vivisection society, in which ever.v-
one wants to cut everyone else up to determine the cause of the national disease,
which may be incurable. Vietnamization may prove unworkable because the weak
body politic may not be able to withstand the treatment. Nevertheless, in due time
Vietnamization will get the United States out of this desperate war, though I doubt
if it will happen as smoothly as President Nixon hopes. In all likelihood, the war
will go on indefinitely between the Vietnamese themselves. It will end sometime,
of course, as all wars do, and by then most of the Americans will have gone home,
leaving behind what we started with — a handful of advisers assisting in an enter-
prise that very few of them will ever understand.
CAUSE OF SKEPTICISM OVER PROGRESS OF WAR
The Chairman. This is what troubles many of us. Over the years
reporters of the character of Mr. Shaplen beginning in 1962 or 1963,
have almost consistently made statements, we will say, of this char-
acter, which are rather critical of the operations. They are always
denied at the time by the Government officials and almost invariably
the reporters have been proved to be correct. I don't wish to be skep-
tical of you specifically or any of you specifically. We are made
155
skeptical by past events not by any of you gentlemen, by any means.
It isn't because of any suspicion of your motiA^es or anything else.
I think you are familiar with incidents I am speaking of. It is simply
that in the past some of the more notable ones were Secretaries of
State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and ex-Chau'-
man of Joint Chiefs, who would go out and look the situation over,
and come back and tell this committee almost the same thing we have
been told this morning. Each year we are very hopeful that we are
getting the truth this time. I am very hopeful that we are this time.
We are very hopeful that you and Mr. Vann and Mr. Colby are more
accurate observers than your predecessors were, but this prompts
me to ask these questions to give you an opportunity to further sup-
port your much more optimistic views. Goodness knows I hope jou.
are correct about it, all of you for that matter.
No one wants this horrible bloodletting to continue. It is so com-
pletely contrary to what I think are the traditional values of this
society, of which I happen to be a member, that it is reahy very
repulsive to have to even ask you to contemplate it.
It has been my lot to think about this war much more than many
other chairmen, some of us can talk about roads and schools and so
on, and not about the war, but unfortunately I have to talk about
the war, so I hope you will forgive me if I exhibit a certain degree of
skepticism.
SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF U.S. OFFICERS TODAY SPEAK VIETNAMESE
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, there is one factor that you might be
interested in.
The Chairman. I would like any factor that fortifies, Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby. And that is that a very substantial number of our
oflScers today speak Vietnamese, which was not true 5 and 10 years ago.
Mr. Mills, for instance, speaks Vietnamese, and several of our other
officers here speak Vietnamese. This enables them not just to talk to
the few officials through an interpreter, but it does allow them to go
out to the villagers and get a feel of what they are saying. Mr. Mills
may want to talk to you about it.
The Chairman. I welcome anything that will make more per-
suasive the conclusions which you have given.
Tell us a httle more, Mr. Mills. I didn't reaUze you were so ac-
complished in this particular area.
VC ABILITY TO DESTROY GVN EFFORTS
Mr. Mills. I would like to comment a Uttle about the quote that
you gave a moment ago about two VC being able to upset and destroy
what the Government spends a lot of time and effort doing. I thmk
in some ways we are being hit from both sides. The Government of
Vietnam is being charged with not meeting the needs of the people,,
with not haAdng the kinds of social welfare programs that people
have been led to expect of their government. And it is, of course, very
much easier for the VC to come in and blow up an administrative
house or school house, which has taken a long time and a lot of or-
ganization and a lot of money to build. So to that extent I think I
would agree with that article.
156
EXTENT AND PURPOSE OF U.S. ADVISORY EFFORT
Where I disagreed was the impHcatioii that we were imposing a
social welfare system that the Vietnamese didn't want or weren't
capable of doing and that we were doing the work ourselves. When
I said I did not agi'ee with the article, this is what I meant.
The Chairman. Considering the extent of our personnel there, of
course, how effective or how far you go in advising your counterpart
is a matter of judgment. I mean we have heard many stories in the
past about the Americans and knowing Americans even in Washing-
ton, there is a tendency for some American bureaucrats to be a little
bossy you know. Haven't you ever observed that? [Laughter. 1
We are taking Americans out to a rather underdeveloped country,
although it has an ancient culture. In other instances we have seen
this same thing hajipen, where Americans do impose their will upon
other countries, other peoples. That is said without any i)articular
invidious comparisons. I think the British were accused of doing that
when they were running China, weren't they? Do you remember some
of the stories about China?
Mr. Mills. I think that what was true of the French in Vietnam
and perhaps the British in China is not true of us. We are not com-
manding. We are not in a position of authority. We are in ad^^sory
positions, and I think the basis of a good ad\dsory relationship in
what we are trying to achieve in Tuyen Due is a kind of friendly
confidence between the adviser and his Vietnamese counterpart, so
that the Vietnamese realize that we are working toward the same
independence and that our purpose in offering the advice is not to
run the country, but to help them to achieve something that is in
their own interest.
PURPOSE OF questioning
The Chairman. I most certainly hope that you are correct and I
am not on my own authority saying that you are not. I am rather
trying to give you an opportunity to express from every angle that
you can from your experience every item that would supi)ort it so
that we can ha\^e as sound a judgment as ])ossible about what to do
about this situation, which apparently will be with us for quite a
while.
The significance of it, it seems to me, is that the country has to
make a decision. At the present time the President's view about
Vietnamization have been accepted and that is that. Even the Presi-
dent, I would think, would want his assumptions tested by the best
people we have and among them are you gentlemen. That is why we
are trying to ask you these questions. I would hope you don't think
I am trying to question your veracity at all. I am only trying to
approach it from different ways to enable you to support it or not as
best you can.
"cautious optimism" of sir ROBERT THOMPSON CONCERNING
STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
Recently we have had an example that interested me. The Presi-
dent has recently sought the advice of Sir Robert Thompson. His
157
record on Vietnam and this recent report by Sii* Kobert, after he
was given a special mission to look into the thing in the President's
words, was cautiously optimistic. But Sir Robert has had a back-
ground on this and I would read for your information, in case you
do not know it, to illustrate a bit the point I am making. In the
book 'To Move a Nation" on page 461 there was this passage of
quotation from that book written by Mr. Hilsman :
Thompson, who a 5'ear earher when I had seen him had been rather gloomy, was
not the most optimistic of them all. What he told us and what he showed us in a
tour of the Delta — hopping from one little airfield to another and flj'ing low over
roads and hamlets — offered the most solid basis we had yet seen for believing that
at least a beginning was being made. I had expected Thompson to be worried over
too rapid proliferation of strategic hamlets. He was. Manj^ were being established
in exposed areas, in violation of the "oil blot" principle, and many more were nothing
but a shell, a strand of barbed wire with nothing inside — no poHce work to elimi-
nate Viet Cong agents, no defenses worthy of the name, no positive benefits to win
the allegiance of the people. But he showed us a nucleus of hamlets that were good,
and he felt that if our luck held this nucleus could be expanded to cover the bulk
of the population in the delta. There w^ere a lot of "ifs" in this judgment — if the
Viet Cong reaction to the strategic hamlets did not get any more violent than it
was, if the military would keep the Viet Cong off balance by "clear and hold" opera-
tions that would permit the nucleus area to be expanded, and if nothing else
happened to put the program off stride. But in spite of the "ifs" Thompson's
judgment was optimistic.
I suspect it is the nature of all militarj^ leaders and nearly everyone
else to be optimistic. I suppose they would have to be optimistic or
they wouldn't he there. So I don't wish to downgrade it at all. I only
raise the question.
Mr. Vann. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment upon the
reading of Sir Robert Thompson?
The Chairm.\n. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Vann. Sir, during 1962 and 1963 I discussed the strategic
hamlet program on numerous occasions with Sir Robert Thompson
and, as Sir Robert pointed out then and as I think he would point
out in discussion now, the plan as devised by him working as an
adviser to the Government of Vietnam envisaged an implementation
over a period of 5 to 7 years. The decision as made by Mr. Nguyen,
the brother of President Diem, was to implement the 5 to 7 year
program in a period of 1 year. It was clearly foreseeable that it could
not be successfully implemented in that period of time. I think Sir
Robert Thompson himself saw that, but he like many of us at that
time was trying to make the best of a bad situation.
The Chairman. But you don't think he was overly optimistic at
that time? Do you think his judgment was accurate?
Mr. Vann. Su-, his judgment was that it was not going to work
unless done over the period of time that had been programed. His
nature and his enthusiasm was such that once a decision had been
made to try to do it he was going to try to do all he could to get it
accomplished.
The Chairman. Yes.
general Navarre's optimism about Vietnam war in 1950
I think it is reaUy a much happier personality though that is always
optimistic. People who are pessimistic must be an awful bore to their
colleagues. I remember the first meeting when a Frenchman came to
loS
this committee. I was a freshman Senator or maybe I was still in the
House. I forget what his name was. One of the leading French generals
came over, Navarre, and he thought in 6 months it would all be over.
He thought that they had everj^thing under control. There was a
Navarre plan; wasn't there? Do j^ou know about that, Mr. Colby?
Mr. Colby. Yes, it was General Navarre. I did not happen to meet
him.
The Chairman. I think he was the one who came. He was a very
imposing looking, big Frenchman and he said that if we sent another
hundred shiploads of something over it would be over in 6 months. I am
not stretching it very much. He came over and visited with us. That
was in 1943.
Mr. Colby. 1948.
The Chairman. 1948 I guess.
Mr. Colby. 1950.
The Chairman. 1950. So it is a long history. It is not just General
Tajdor, General this and that; it is even the French generals. It is a
long story. So I hope you wdll forgive me for being a tiny bit skeptical.
Mr. Mills. My optimism, if it is optimism, is not based on any
long perspective or this kind of thing.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Mills. But it seems to me it is based on seeing changes which
I think are necessarily more and more taking place on the ground.
The Chairman. I hope they are.
amount of money spent on war and humane activities
I will ask you one last question. I must ask Major Arthur some
questions.
Mr. Vann, you spent $339 million roughly. I am not holding
you to it precisely. In the context of Vietnam where we have spent
an estimated $100 billion in the war, this is a relatively small amount.
But what always impresses those of us who are from the other side
of the table is that this is a very substantial amount. That is approxi-
mately the total U.S. military assistance budget for 1969. That is
three times as much as the Peace Corps for worldwide operations. It
is 10 times as much as the budget for the international exchange pro-
gram, which some people believe is significant or could be significant
for a more civilized world.
I mean there are people who still do have an interest in humane
activities, rather than the killing of people, and in the money that is
spent in those activities, which is tiny. This is approximately 10 times
as much as this Government mil spend worldwide this year on the
AID jH'ogram. In academic ckcles and even in religious circles — we will
call them biophilic circles — that is very much money. Yet in one prov-
ince here we think nothing of spending $339 million.
Mr. Mills. That was not the province.
Mr. Vann. That is one-third of the country's population.
The Chairman. One region.
Mr. Vann. Let me also qualify, sir, that the largest bulk of that,
$198 million, is the pay of the RF and PF. Now, let me also qualify
that this is my estimate of the cost of converting piasters into dollars,
of all of the programs for which we have advisory responsibility, all
of the support costs, and all of the contract costs. The source of all
159
these funds gets very jumbled up. For example, quite clearly included
in the RF and PF funds are funds that are provided by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam. The reason we can't straighten them out down at
our level is that commercial import program funds, counterpart funds,
and taxes at the top level get juggled around to where we down_ at
the corps level are not aware as to exactly which agency is funding
which program, and whether it is GVN or U.S. But $339 million is
our best estimate of thr cost of the programs that we advise.
The Chairman. I certainly didn't by any means wish to question
the figiu-e. What I am trying to raise is an entirely different point,
which is one of perspective, accepting the amount. By the way is that
amount conversion at the official rate or black market rate?
Mr. Vann. Official rate, sh".
BLACK MARKET CONVERSION RATE ON DOLLARS
The Chairman. What would it be at the black market rate? Do
you know?
Mr. Vann. Su-
The Chairman. There is some difference.
]\lr. Vann. The last figure we had before I left, and this is not
applicable to our costs at all, was that the black market rate on
dollars was running between VN $260 and VN $330. That was the
conversion rate over a month's period of time of piasters to a dollar.
SENSE OF PERSPECTIVE DURING W^ARTIME
The Chairman. In any case, I wasn't trying to make the point
about whether you are extravagant or not. That was beside the point.
It was the sense of perspective that arises during wartime and that
we can look at this with equanimity apparently and contemplate it
as going on for many years, even though it is so outrageously excessive
compared to many activities. I shouldn't say many because we are
not engaged in many, but a few activities designed to improve the
quality of life here at home or our relations with some of our allies.
Again that may not be your responsibility.
Major Arthur," do you have some contribution to make to this
discussion?
Major Arthur. I have a prepared statement, Mr. Chah-man.
The Chairman. Will you proceed, please, sir.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. JAMES F. ARTHUR. U.S. ARMY DISTRICT
SENIOR ADVISER, BINH CHANH DISTRICT, GIA DINH PROVINCE
Alajor Arthur. Mr. Chairman, I am Maj. James F. Arthur from
North Carolina. I am currently the District Senior Adviser of Binh
Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province, Republic of South Vietnam.
major Arthur's mission and district team
My mission is to advise and assist LTC Nguyen Ba Di, the District
Chief and concurrently the Binh Chanh Special Zone Commander
on both mihtary and civil aspects of the counterinsurgency program.
To accomphsh this mission, I am assisted by my district team, key
160
members of which are as follows: A Deputy Senior Adviser, who is
a Foreign Service officer from the State Department; an Operations
Section com])osed of a captain, first lieutenant, and three noncom-
missioned officers; a military police first lieutenant who is the People's
Self Defense Force Adviser; a military intelligence first lieutenant who
advises the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center
and a Community Development Ad\dser. This team is slightly larger
than the normal district team due to the location of the district in
relation to Saigon and the active civil development program under way.
In addition, I have operational control of five mobile ad^dsory teams
which are assigned to advise Regional Force Companies.
BINH CHANH DISTRICT
Binh Chanh is one of the six major districts surrounding Saigon
and borders the city on the south and southwest. It has an area of
20,177 hectares (77.9 square miles) and includes 15 villages and 60
hamlets with a po]3ulation of 59,863. Binh Chanh is a lowland area
consisting of rich rice fields, swampy areas in the extreme eastern and
northwestern portion of the district and niunerous streams and canals
most of which are densely vegetated with nipa palm. Since the district
is a delta area, most of the population live along the three principal
hard surface roads and the larger canals. Approximately 75 percent
of the population makes its living by farming. Rice is the principal
crop with 14,700 hectares under cultivation. Cattle, ]:)oultry and swine
are raised also, but only for the needs of the individual farmers. The
remainder of the population is engaged in either cottage industry and
small businesses or military ser^ace.
The major religions of Vietnam are represented in the district with
54 percent of the population being Buddhist, 24 percent Cao Dai and
18 percent Catholic. Religious political parties are not particularly
active in the district, however, the religious leaders do play an impor-
tant role in an opinion forming function among their parishioners.
The district has one high school which is located in Binh Chanh
village and 45 primary and elementary schools operating throughout
the district. In addition there are 10 maternity dispensaries located
within the district.
VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOCAL GUERRILLAS
Binh Chanh sits astride the major routes of infiltration into the city
of Saigon from the south and was used as a staging area during the
1968 Tet offensive. The primary targets of the District's Territorial
Forces are the Vietcong hifrastructure and the local guerrillas which
ideally would number approximately 30 per village and 12 per hamlet.
These Vietcong are prime targets because they are the ones who have
the mission of terrorism, assassination, tax collection, propaganda,
and ]:)rovi(ling intelligence and guides for the main force units. At the
present time the Vietcong infrastructure and local guerrillas have
been reduced to squad and half squad size units per village and
there is very little organization left at hamlet level. However, there
are three under strength main force battalions whose areas of opera-
tion include Binh (vhanh District. These units are normally based
outside the district boundaries and send in small units to assist the
local guerrillas in accom})lishing their mission.
161
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. FORCES
The District Chief has 17 Reoioiial Force Companies and 25
Popiihir Force Platoons under his "command and in addition, there
are three Ranger Battahons operatino- in the district. In the past,
the 199th Light Infantry Brigade was based in the district. However,
there are no U.S. combat forces ui the district now and the defense
of Binh Chanh rests solely on the Vietnamese. The primary mission
of the territorial forces is that of providing security for the population
\\hile the Ranger Battalions have the mission of eliminating the
Vietcong main "force units. The 1970 plan calls for the Regional
Forces to assume the mission of offensive operation and Popular
Forces, assisted by the People's Self Defense Force, to assume the
responsibility for protecting the population, thereby enablmg the
Rangers to be released for duty elsewhere. At the present there_ are
eidit Regional Force Companies ready to assume offensive operations
missions "and the changeover shouUrbeghi in March or April. The
Regional Forces are rapidly improving and a number of the com-
jjanies are able to handle sophisticated airmobile, cordon and search,
and raid ojjerations. Since September the territorial forces have
captured 36 Vietcong and killed 23, including two district level party
committee members. During the past month, the territorial forces
made contact with the Vietcong 11 times with only two of those
contacts being Vietcong initiated.
Peoi:)le's Self Defense Forces continue to be a jn'obleni area. Accord-
ing to Vietnamese figures they have organized 20,700, trained 5,800
and armed 1,782. As" yet the PSDF adviser has been unable to get a
physical coiuit of the members; however, he has been able to monitor
some of the training which is marginal at best. The only firm figure is
the number of weapons issued and the adviser has been able to verify
that the persons issued these weapons are actually performing security
duties at night in the hamlets.
SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS
The Chairman. Major, 1 apologize, but they have rung a vote. You
heard that bell. I have been informed this is one of those controversial
votes that we have on the floor involving civil rights. I am going to
have to leave you. I wonder if you would mind taking this up in the
morning? Since it is so late and there are others who are not here, I
think it would be more satisfactory if we take this up in the morning.
I have to go. I can't afi'ord to miss this vote. I hope you understand
that.
Major Arthur. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Coming from North Carolina, you understand it,
even if the others don't." We will adjourn until 10 o'clock in the
morning. I >\ ill ask that the staff confer with you on some questions
l)erhaps to shorten these procedures. I a]x>logize for the time we seem
to take and there is a good deal of repetition that we can't seem to
avoid.
Tomorrow at the beginning, Senator McCarthy has requested an
oi)i)ortunity to be heard. Following that we will take up where we left
off with you, Major, if that is all right.
Alajor Arthur. Yes, sir.
162
The Chairman. I am sorry we liave to adjourn at this time, but we
are going to be faced with this. We are very hicky that we got through
this part.
Thank you. . , ^
(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearmg was recessed to reconvene,
Thursday, February 19, 1970, at 10 a.m.)
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Gore, Church, Symington,
Case, Cooper, and Williams.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
opening statement
The committee is meeting this morning to hear Senator McCarthy,
who was unable to testify during the recent hearings on the Vietnam
policy proposals which we started last week. Following his testimony
we will resume the hearings on the operation of the CORDS program
in Vietnam. The witnesses this morning will be Maj. James F. Arthur,
who will testify on the CORDS program at the district level; Mr.
William K. Hitchcock, who will testify on the refugee program, and
again Ambassador William E. Colby, who will testify on the Chieu
Hoi program and be available for general ciuestions on CORDS
operations.
Senator McCarthy, we are very pleased you could find the time to
meet with us this morning. Having been a former member of this
committee, you know how useful it is for us to have information from
a man who has been as thoughtful as you on this subject over many
years. We are very pleased indeed to have you this morning.
STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE J. McCARTHY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MINNESOTA
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before this committee and speak to you about what I
consider the possibility of negotiated settlement of the war in Vietnam.
In defending his Vietnam policies, the President has attempted to
confine the discussion to two possible courses of action: One, the
immediate withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam, in what
he describes as a precipitate action, and his pohcy of Vietnamization,
which contemplates a reduction of U.S. presence and a building up of
(163)
164
the military strength of South Vietnam under t]ie control of the
present government.
The immediate and total withdrawal of American forces is not the
only alternative to the Administration's program. The choice has
never been as limited as the Administration statements indicate and
is not so limited today. A third very real possibiUty is a negotiated
political settlement, followed or accompanied by withdrawal of
American military power.
COST OF VIETNAM WAR
The massive American intervention in Vietnam in 1965 and in the
years following created difficult military, political, and moral prob-
lems for us. They will not be easily solved. As chairman of this com-
mittee, you have heard testimony and know what the war has cost,
so many million dead, aj^proximately a million and a half refugees,
increased corru])iion of the cities and of the population of Vietnam,
desolation of the countryside, so well described in the Vietnamese
training pamphlet which was quoted in this committee's recent staff
report
I woidd ask that the section of this be included in my remarks,
(The information referred to follows.)
Rural Vietnam today is desolate, bleak and in many areas deserted. Gardens
are plowed by either bombs and shells or by men digging not furrows for seed
but shelters and trenches. Houses appear in irregular patterns, some curiously
unscathed by the ravages of war, but many are destroyed or knocked askew and
lean drunkenly, adding to the mournful loneliness which is the hallmark of aban-
doned areas. Previously lush rice fields are overgrown with weeds, the silence
unbroken by the peasant's songs from generation to generation, the abandoned
land devoid of even the herds of cattle and buffalo that formerly roamed. ]\Iany
villages have become ghost towns, their inhabitants having fled to the cities as
war refugees or to the mountains or forests to escape ever-impending death.
To these losses in Vietnam we must add the more than 40,000
American dead and quarter of a million wounded, many of whom
survive more heavily impaired than the survivors of previous wars
because of advanced medical and siu'gical techniques and improved
field evacuation procediu'es. And remember also that the heaviest
toll of American dead and wounded is among those of 19 to 21 years
of age. The cost of the war, so far as we can discover, is something
between 20 and 30 billion dollars a year.
We must ask what have we achieved. The only clear answer is
the continuation of a government in Vietnam of cpiestionable integrity
and little real stability.
WHAT WILL BE GAINED FROM CONTINUING VIETNAM WAR?
The President speaks often of the necessity for an "honorable
settlement" or a "just peace;" he does not define either. One must,
therefore, ask what, if any, honor has been gained by the death and
destruction and social chaos that has gone along with om* over-
whelming military power and our massive physical presence in Viet-
nam over the past 5 years, and ask ^^■hat will be gained from the
continuation of the war.
It is unlikely that the Vietnamese will be able to take over the
fighting effectively and to control the country. Rather, the course
165
tlie Administration is pursuing is likely to require an indefinite con-
tinuation of American involvement in Vietnam, although at a re-
duced level. We still have over 50,000 men in Korea 17 years after
the end of the fighting there.
Some of the claims made by the Administration must recall to the
committee the optimistic statements issued by spokesmen for the last
Administration, particularly by the Secretary of Defense, Mr.JMcNa-
mara at that time, on his return from his numerous visits to Vietnam.
The record of the past suggests that Vietnamization will not work. It
has been tried repeatedly over the past 20 years — first by the French
and later by us. It was, after all, the inability of the South Vietnamese
Army to fight effectively even after more than 10 years of training
and ecjuipment by the United States that prompted the dispatch of
American combat troops to that country in 1965.
Even if through a resurgence of morale and reduction of corruption,
the South Vietnamese Army could be made into an effective military
force, there would still be the cjuestion of whether Vietnamization is
itself desirable.
Asians would be killing Asians with American arms. Defoliation
and destruction of crops would continue; villages be destroyed; refu-
gees be "generated;" casualties be continued.
The United States would still have a great share of moral rcsj)on-
sibility for the war, for continuing it and sustaining it. We will have
made of the Vietnamese Army, if the Nixon jjolicy is "successful,"
essentially' a nKTconary army fighting its own peo|)le for an unr('])re-
sentative governmcnl, and beyond that, if we are to accept the state-
ments of Dean Rusk and President Nixon, to attempt to protect the
interests of the free world.
PUBLIC HAS BEEN DISTRACTED FROM JUDGING VIETNAM POLICY
Mr. Chairman, I believe the American people were prepared to
make a ])ublic judgment on American policy in 1908, but they were
distracted.
They were distracted first by the withdrawal of President Johnson
from the campaign of 1968.
Second, thev wer(> distractetl by the meeting of negotiators in Paris
on May 13, 1968.
More recently, they have been distracted by limited troop with-
drawals, which have demonstrated so far only that ther<» were too
many troops in Vietnam in the first place. These troop withdrawals
do not at this point indicate any change of policy.
And fourth, they have been distracted by the talk of Vietnamization.
Public examination or reexamination of our involvement in Vietnam
is essential.
I believe that the Nation is being misled over the issues at stake in
Vietnam now as it was in 1966 and 1967 when your committee took
upon itself the n^sponsibility of educating and informing the people
and called the Johnson administration to a public accounting.
POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
Mr. Chairman, I believe that a negotiated settlement of the war
is possible and that the time to seek such a settlement is now.
166
The first reason for this opinion is an immediate and practical one,
which is that I am not convinced that — leaving out the U.S. presence —
there has been any major shift in the basically unfavorable balance
of political and military power in Vietnam or that such a shift is likely
to take place. It is in order, therefore, to ask what will happen if the
level of our involvement becomes insufficient to avoid defeat. Will we
escalate our efforts or will we then negotiate from weakness?
The second point arises from my belief that there have been no
serious negotiations since the first meeting in Paris in May of 1968
or since the joint meetings began in Paris in January 1969.
We are today proposing, principally, free elections. This proposal
has very little to offer to the other side. In 1956, we supported the
Diem government in its refusal to hold the elections called for in the
Geneva Accords. As former Ambassador Harriman has stated, it has
never been envisaged that the political settlement could be brought
about by a ''winner take all" election in the Western tradition. The
Avar has not been fought for free elections. I am not aware of any case
in recent history where divisions and disagreements strong enough
to have led to 25 years of civil war were settled immediately by
elections — ^free or unfree.
There is no good reason to believe that we can bring about serious
negotiations in Paris until the United States is willing to make a
basic change in policy. Serious negotiations cannot proceed unless we
are willing to support a coalition or a fusion or a new government to
control the process of transition, at least. The task of the interim
government would be to arrange a cease-fire and to assure the orderly
withdrawal of foreign forces. It would prepare the way for the eventual
selection of a permanent government. We should be prepared to sup-
port mth other nations such a hope and, I would hope with the con-
currence of the United Nations, such a negotiated settlement could be
sustained.
There are risks and dangers in such a policy. I do not believe they
are as great as some have declared them to be.
My conversations with the National Liberation Front and the North
Vietnamese delegation in Paris lead me to believe that a political settle-
ment of this kind is possible and lead me also to these conclusions.
NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES
First, that the North Vietnamese are not counting on winning the
war in Washington, as some advocates of the war in this country say.
They point out that the war with the French, for example, was not
won in Paris and that they were involved in this war long before the
United States became involved.
Second, they point out that historical evidence does not support a
presumption that massive executions would follow a negotiated settle-
ment and they say that such executions would not occur.
Third, they anticipate that North Vietnam would not take over
South Vietnam and that for a long period of time — meaning years —
some division would exist between North and South Vietnam.
Fourth, they feel very strongly about our having bombed North
Vietnam — their country — a feeling which is reflected in their attitude
toward captured fliers.
167
Fifth, they do not beheve that Vietnamization will work.
Sixth, they seek a commitment on troop withdrawal, a commitment
which would be accompanied by an agreement on a provisional govern-
ment and along with this there could be immediate negotiations with
reference to prisoners of war and the manner in which South Vietnam
might be governed until a permanent and settled government could be
established there.
Mr. Chairman, those are the conclusions I have come to, not just
from the conversations in Paris, but in my years on this committee
and through the thought and reflection and study I have given to this
problem over the last 5 years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
WHAT IS TO BE GAINED BY CONTINUING VIETNAM WAR?
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator McCarthy. I think it is quite
obvious that you have thought very deeply about the war. You
have raised questions in which I find myself very interested and with
which I am deeply sympathetic. I am very deeply sympathetic to
your point of view. It comes back to this question of what is to be
gained by a continuation of the war.
I have asked this of some of the witnesses who have been telling us
about the actual conditions as they see them in Vietnam. Usually
they answer that they are not policymakers and that whether or not
we should be there is someone else's business. All they are concerned
with is the best possible administration of their immediate duty.
You raised what I consider the fundamental question of what
is to be gained by a continuation of the war. If I understand you
properly, you can see nothing to be gained of any great value, of
any great importance or significance to this country, by a continua-
tion of the war, nothing that could not be obtained as well or better
by a negotiated peace. Is that correct?
Senator McCarthy. Yes, that is my position, Mr. Chairman.
I think we have known all along that we could somehow mn a
victory in Vietnam if we were prepared to put enough power into it
and enough men and enough equipment, enough force.
The question is: What comes with that kind of victory? Do we
wish to establish a puppet state of some kind in Vietnam and sustain
it as a kind of miUtary government for 10 or 15 or 20 years? Is this
what's meant by a just settlement and an honorable peace in South
Vietnam? Or do we Avish to work out some other kind of political life
for the people of that country?
If we take into account the fact that we have roughly a half million
military and police personnel there, and we don't know just what the
number is in the South Vietnamese Army, but they are roughly a
million, that is a million and a half military personnel^ to control a
population of approximately 15 million people or one military person
for every 10 nonmilitary people. And add to that the force that we
have there, artillery "and airplanes, helicopters and firepower, you
would have to say at some point we could dominate the country.
But the question is what comes of domination and that has never
been satisfactorily answered by any spokesman for this Administration
or the last one.
168
MEANING OF ADMINISTRATION'S "HONORABLE PEACE"
The Chairman. What do you feel the Admmistratioii means by an
"honorable peace"? What are the conditions of an honorable peace?
Senator McCarthy. Mv. Chairman, I don't know. When President
Johnson spoke, at least in his conversation from the Cronkite report,
his first telecast, it became a Uttle bit, at least I thought, clearer to
me when he said that in his judgment and in the judgment of the
Secretary of State that the Tet offensive was a great military failure
for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. I think we acknowledge
that it didn't accomplish their objectives and that that was a turning
point. If this was his judgment, it became a little clearer to me why
the negotiations in Paris never did go any place, because it seemed
that we went there not to negotiate but really to accept some kind of
surrender. So you had two i)arties there, the spokesmen for North
Vietnam and the enemy, believing that we were going to negotiate
some kind of settlement and, so far as I can see, our people were there
to accept surrender. So there was nothing that was negotiable. I say
this becomes clear in light of ^^•hat President Johnson says his inter-
pretation of the Tet offensive was in early 1968, that we really have
not gone there to negotiate. So I don't know what settlement the
Administration would accept other than the acceptance of the Ky-
Thieu e-overnment of South Vietnam and whatever ^^'ould follow from
that.
PRESENT PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM WAR
The Chairman. Senator McCarthy, do you not detect, however,
that the mood of this country is that the war is for all practical
purposes over? The shift in emphasis has been dramatic, it seems to
me, in the iniblic discussions, in the press, and in the television.
There is a shift from discussion of the war, its significance and after-
math to interest rates, to revival of interest in segregation, racial
matters. The war has taken very much of a backseat, so to s])eak. Do
3^ou see it that way, and that the iHiblic generally is not really inter-
ested in the war on the assumption that it is about over or is on its
way to being liquidated?
Senator McCarthy. I think part of it is an expression of a kind of
hope that the war is going to end. I think also it is a kind of desperate
feeling there is not much that can be done about it in this particular
period of time.
COST OF VIETNAM WAR
The Chairman. I would gather from what you say you don't
think it is about to end.
Senator McCarthy. I don't, no.
The Chairman. It is going on at a very high cost. Thursday being
the reporting day, I heard on the radio coming in this morning that
there were, I think, 96 dead and about 350 wounded this past week,
which is a very substantial number. The cost in dollars is still very
great. The effect of the drain of the war on oiu" resources, not only
material but mental resources in the sense that it preoccupies the
minds of some of our most important leaders, seems to me to indicate
that we are not dealing and coming to grips with the fundamental
169
causes of the social and economic disruption here at home. Do you
agree '^
Senator McCarthy. Yes; I agree.
The Chairman. It worries me very much, but I don't know what
to do about it.
Senator jNIcCarthy. I hope your hearings may again stir interest.
As I said, it was the hearings this committee held back in 1965 and
1966 that called the attention of the country to what was happening
by way of escalation of the war and I know of no better way than
the way you are following now of again trying to stir the country to
a concern over the war and of trying to lay before the Senate and the
Congress the facts. Not just the facts of the situation but what we
seem to be accepting as a kind of way of life for America, continuation
of the war, a military jjosition in Southeastern Asia, despite the fact
that spokesmen for this Administration and the last repeatedly said
we don't intend to maintain any bases there.
what prevents united states from negotiating?
The Secretary of State some time ago said that the decision to
withdraw troops was irreversible. It is difficult for me to understand
why we can't negotiate a withdrawal of troops if what lias been said
reflects their real position. If they were going to take the troops out,
why not negotiate? But we can't negotiate that because that would
give away our position, they say. But it seems to me if they believe
what they said and are sincere about the troop withdrawal, they have
already given away their position, and that the better part of wisdom
would be to talk about the conditions under which tlie withdrawal
would take place and see what could be negotiated by way of a re-
sponse to that withdrawal.
The Chairman. I want the other members to have an opportunity
to discuss this with you. I am not sure this is really a question that
can easily be answered, but is there any one single consideration, as you
see it, in the minds of the Administration that stands in the way of a
negotiated peace such as you suggest? Can you isolate it? Can you
identify a single consideration that people can understand and that
this committee can understand as to why we do not do whatever it
takes to get a negotiated peace? The Vice President, if I may say so,
has accused me of saying tiiat all we want to do is to surrender and
to turn everytiiing over to the Comnninists. This is, of course, a very
pejorative statement on the part of the Vice President. It is not the way
to characterize either what you said or what I said. That is; one of the
obstacles of course to giving rational consideration to this kind of
problem.
In view of your long thought about it. what it is that stands in the
way of a negotiated settlement to conclude this war, which seems to
me to be so eminently in our national interest.
All kinds of i)rograms of a domestic nature in which the Congress and
the peoi)lc are interested, all the way from pollution to inflation con-
trols, are very much influenced by this enormous military exi:)enditure..
If that is true and if it is standing in the way, what do you think pre-
vents us from negotiating?
Senator McCarthy. I think that the practical decision that has to
be made is one of a willingness to accept a new government in Southi
44-706 — 70 12
170
Vietnam and there never really has been any indication of a wilHng-
ness to accept that.
CONTINUING THRUST OF PAST POLICIES
The action in Vietnam is not very different from what was urged
upon President Truman at the end of Workl War II when tliere were
those who said we had to go into China. And that poHcy was turned
down. A simihir j^ohcy was urged upon President Eisenhower at the
time the French failed, but he said "no" to it. But the thrust was
there and the pressure for it, I think, is built into the State Depart-
ment and built into the Defense Department and built, in a way, into
the thinking of this country. It is not rational any more to accept
China as a great threat to the United States or to have an idea of
putting Chiang Kai-shek in power on the mainland. But we are stUl
carr^ang on a program which is unrelated to any basic belief or policy
of Asia; it is a kind of madness. There ought to be some relation be-
tween a program and what we believe and what our objectives are.
But in this case we have a program which reaUy has become a policy
and it ought to be the other way — the policy determining the program.
The ideological base, if we can call it that, or the historical judg-
ments that were made and accepted, I thuik, m the State Department
by John Foster Dulles, in World War II and at the end of it — these
are no longer accepted, but the momentum of the State Department
and of the Defense Department is such that we are carrying on a
program which is unrelated to a policy or which relates to a policy
which we no longer accept.
The Chairman. I thank you very much. You know you have a
way of being very provocative in the way you put things. You
immediately raise, intentionally or otherwise, a re\dval of the concept
of Manifest Destiny as Breckenridge and others used to talk about it
at the turn of the century. I don't want to go into it right now, but I
refer to what jon say about this continuing thrust. Even though a
policy is turned down, still it comes back again.
Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCarthy has given
a very full statement and you have certainly quizzed him at such
point that there is not much left for me. But I will ask one or two
things.
cease-fire and TROOP WITHDRAWALS
For instance, in your statement you say the task of the interim
government would be to arrange a cease-fu"e and to assure the orderly
withdrawal of foreign forces. Haven't the North Vietnamease repeat-
edly stated that they would not negotiate for a cease-fire or anything
else until all of the American trooi)s were gone?
Senator McCarthy. I don't think that is their position, as I gather.
They would want an agreement about withdrawal of troops, but they
are })repared to negotiate, I am quite satisfied, follo\A4ng such an
agreement but before they are withdrawn.
Senator Sparkman. Why should not the cease-fire be negotiated
at the conference table before the setting up of an interim government?
Senator McCarthy. Well, you get into a question of military
tactics at that point. Senator Sparkman, and the question is not very
171
different from what happened in Korea. There was fighting going on
even while they were negotiating. I think that rather than talk about
an incidental thing like stopping the bombing, for example, that you
have to go beyond that and I think the first step should be a significant
one rather than one that is incidental.
I don't mind, I think, if we can get an agreement on a cease-fire
first, but I think an agreement on a cease-fire is much less important
than an agreement on troop withdrawals and the establishment of
a new government.
STEPS UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE
Senator Sparkman. I wonder if you could state in a sentence or
two what steps you advocate the United States should take.
I believe actually you enumerated them in your statement.
Senator McCarthy. Yes, pretty much those two points, I think.
Senator Sparkman. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. One, as Administration spokesmen — both
President Johnson and spokesmen in his Administration and spokes-
men in this Administration — have said, we don't want a permanent
base in Southeast Asia and Secretary Rogers has said that the de-
cision to ^^^thdraw troops is irreversible, that we could be prepared
to negotiate conditions under which we would \nthdraw troops. We
could be prepared to talk about them. But I don't believe we are.
We have to talk at the same time, I think, about a new government
in South Vietnam which would be reasonably representative of the
factions that were there before Ky and Thieu came in and which I
think are still there.
COALITION GOVERNMENT
Senator Sparkman. I am not completely clear on this because it
seems to me there have been several statements made on both sides
that indicate to me a kind of indecision. It seems to me that the
suggestion has been made, whether at the conference table or else-
where, that an agreement could be made on some kind of coalition
government and that from time to time President Thieu has indicated
that he would be willing to see such a coalition government. It may
be that the difference was that he felt that that coalition government
should come about as a result of free elections. Is that right?
Senator McCarthy. AVell, I don't know that he has ever — I am
sure he has never made any serious proposition about a government
to replace him. I think early in this Administration someone did use
the word "coalition," but only once and they never have come back
to it again. There is no indication in Paris that coalition is being very
seriously talked about or proi)osed at the discussions there. At present,
elections are the big offer that we are making and that offer is entirely
unacceptable.
EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION IX VIETNAM
Senator Sparkman. In your paper you quote a part of the report
from the staff of this committee, from which you point out that
"Rural Vietnam today * * *" — "Gardens are plowed hj either
bombs * * *" I don't believe you read this.
172
Senator McCarthy. I didn't read it into the record. I assumed the
committee had heard it in other testimony.
Senator Sparkman. I wanted to ask you a question about it.
"Gardens are jDlowed by either bombs and shells or by men digging
not furrows for seed but shelters and trenches. Houses appear in
irregular i^atterns, some curiously unscathed by the ravages of war,
but many are destroyed or knocked askew and lean drunkenly, adding
to the mournful loneliness which is the hallmark of abandoned areas.
Previously lush rice fields are overgrown with weeds, the silence
unbroken by the peasant's songs passed from generation to genera-
tion, the abandoned land devoid of even the herds of cattle and
buffalo that formerly roamed. Many villages have become ghost towns,
their inhabitants having fled to the cities as war refugees or to the
mountains or forests to escape ever-impending death."
In the testimony by Ambassador Colby, he stated: "Except in one
or two areas, the large enemy battalions, regiments, and divisions are
in the border sanctuaries. The roads are oj^en to many markets and,
from the air, tin roofs sparkle throughout the countryside \vhere fami-
lies are once again tilling their long-abandoned farms."
Can you explain the difference between the two statements?
Senator McCarthy. I think the report of the committee said there
were some areas tliat were not devastated. This was not a total descrip-
tion of Vietnam but a description of some part of Vietnam and I took
it on the authority of the committee staff who made that re|)ort to
include it in mine, not saying it was my observation at all, but I think
it is generally agreed there are areas that have been devastated seriously
and there are others which people say appear to be unmarked. But
you have to believe that if we have dropped as many bombs with such
destructive weight on the coinitry as we are reported to have, it has
to have some effect.
Senator Sparkman. I am sorry that in neither statement do I find
any estimate as to how much of the country may be subject to the
conditions described in each statement.
That is all, ]\Ir. Chairman.
EXTENT OF DEFOLIATION
The Chairman. I have seen recently figures about the extent, but I
don't recall them. For example, the defoliation is many thousands of
acres. I have forgotten just how many, whether it was 10 percent of
the arable land or not.
Let me read it. I knew I had seen it somewhere. Since you have
brought it up, I think the record should be complete. This is from a
rei)orter-at-large on defoliation. It is written by a reporter for the
New Yorker, Thomas Whiteside. He says:
In 1968, 1,267,110 acres were sprayed, and in 1969, perhaps a million acres.
Since 1962, the defoliation operations have covered almost 5 million acres, an
area equivalent to about 12 percent of the entire territory of South Metnam, and
about the size of the State of Massachusetts.
I thought Massachusetts was larger than that. It seems to loom
larger.
Senator McCarthy. It is a rather small State.
The Chairman. It seems to loom larger. That is a very substantial
area and would be, I am sure, much of the land where people live.
I think that would be interesting to include in the record.
173
PRESIDENT THIEU'S CONDITIONS FOR ENDING VIETNAM WAR
If the Senator ^nll allow me on another question, the s;;aff has handed
me an article from the Star of last September, and I quote the pertinent
language to the question that the Senator just raised.
The President of South Vietnam took indirect issue with President Nixon today
over conditions for ending the war and for withdrawing American troops. President
Thieu said his country will not stop short of victory no matter what happens
in Washington. He defined victory as "no Communist "domination and no coalition
with the Comnuinists.'" Nixcn told a news conference yesterday that the United
States favors internationally supervised elections in South A'ietnam. "We will
accept the result of those elections and the South Metnamese will as well even if it
is a Communist government," Nixon said.
I think the whole article ought to go in. But here President Thieu
directly contradicts the idea.
Senator Sparkman. I said it has been an on-and-off proposition.
He also has been quoted at times, I believe, sayuig he woidd accept it.
I don't think there is anything on which we can rely. I am not urging
that.
Senator McCarthy. I think iiis condition is pretty consistent. He
may have slii)])e(l once, but that is what he said.
(The information referred to follows:)
(Fioni the Washington Evening Star, Sept. 27, 1969]
Thieu Co.\tuadicts Nixon's Statement On Viet Elections
The president of South Vietnam took indirect issue with President Nixon today
over conditions for ending the war and for withdrawing American troops.
President Nguyen Van Thieu said his country "will not stop short of victory, no
matter what happens in Washington." He defined victory as "no Conmiunist
domination and no coalition with the Communists."
Nixon told a news conference yesterday that the United States favors inter-
nationally supervis(^d elections in" South Vietnam. "We will accept the result of
those elections and the South Vietnamese will as well, even if it is a Communist
government," Nixon said.
Thieu's apijarenr denial of this was quoted by United Press International
from a news conference he held at Vung Tau, a coastal resort where he spoke to
village official trainees.
WITHDRAWAL PLANS
Thieu said he was "promoting national reconciliation (with the Communists)
through free elections." But his remarks indicated that he was not prepared to
accept a pre-election coalition with the Communists or an election result favoring
them.
The South Vietnamese president also outlined what he expects from the United
States as it withdraws troops.
If \\'ashington tells him how many troops it wants to withdraw in 1970, he will
submit a plan saying what he needs to cover that, Thieu said.
"It's very reasonable to replace the bulk of your infantry if you provide us
equipment, enough funds, and material to achieve the strengthening and moderni-
zation of Vietnamese troops, at the same rate and same speed," he went on.
"If you help me adequately, all right," he added.
The discussion involves only U.S. infantrymen. Both Thieu and the Nixon
administration seem to assume that American soldiers will remain in \'ietnam to
pro\ide logistical, artillery and air power support for South Vietnamese foot
soldiers.
In Washington yesterday, high South Vietnamese sources said that Saigon
planning i< based on the assumjjtion that these U.S. support forces will remain at
least through the end of 1972, should the war last that long.
At his news conference todav, Thieu did not sj^ecify figures. His vice president,
Nguyen Cao Ky, said last week that 150,000 to 200,000 American troops could be
withdrawn by the end of 1970.
174
After the currently planned reduction of 35,000 men V^y Dec. 15, there will be
484,000 American troops authorized for Vietnam. Ky's figures suggested some
300,000 miglit still be there at the end of next year, and Thieu's comments
seemed to support this.
Thieu said he "has no wish" to replace all American forces in 1970. "What
we're asking for is a reasonable tiine for us to provide training and leadership,"
he said.
Nixon's hope
Nixon has said he hopes to beat the timetable set by former Defense Secretary
Clark M. Clifford, who has urged that all American ground combat troops be
pulled out of Vietnam by the end of 1970.
Defense Secretary [Nlelvin R. Laird has said that an all-volunteer force to serve
in Vietnam would not be possible until the American troop level had dropped to
no more than 250,000. He has denied, however, that the administration plans to
create such a force and to go on fighting indefinitely.
South Vietnamese sources here echoed Nixon's belief that the only way now to
end the war is to convince Hanoi that it has nothing to gain bj' waiting for further
concessions from the allied side.
The South Vietnamese now have a military force of about 863,000 men. This
includes army, navy, marine, air force and airborne units as well as regional and
popular forces. It does not include about 182,500 in the national police and other
paramilitary units nor more than a million villagers organized in self-defense
units.
Present plans call for raising the 863,000 figure by 90,000— to 953,000— by the
end of 1972, the sources said.
SIGNIFICANCE OF TIN ROOFS
The Chairman. I have one other comment. Whenever you see a
tm roof there, that is an indication that the house had been destroyed,
because most of them didn't have tin roofs. These are roofs the
Americans have come along and replaced. I think that is the signifi-
cance of the tin roof. We had a big argument, you remember, by the
Senator from Indiana, whether Indiana or Korea should supply the
tin roofs and at what price, in our discussion of the aid bill.
SOURCE OF EXCERPT FROM COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, may I add this. Regarding the
excerpt from 3^our statement, Senator McCarthy, which is from this
committee's staff report, my attention has been called to the fact
that it was not their own observation that the staff members were
giving.
Senator McCarthy, That is right.
Senator Sparkman. It is a quote from a pamphlet that had been
previously published there. I see nothing that w^ould show to what
time it relates.
Senator McCarthy. I say that in my paper. It was out of a
handbook or guide.
Senator Sparkman. I am told a pamphlet was published in 1969.
The Chairman. By whom?
Senator Sparkman. It was used at the Vietnamese training center.
Senator McCarthy. That is right.
The Chairman. At Vuug Tau?
Senator McCarthy. That is right.
The Chairman. Whore Revolutionary Development Cadre, village
and hamlet officials, People's Self Defense Force personnel and others
are trained.
175
Senator McCarthy. It was supposed to be reasonably official from
our point of view, I understand.
The Chairman. Senator Case.
Senator Case. Thank 3^ou, Mr. Chairman.
COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS
I, on this side of the table, welcome you back to the committee.
We have missed you, but you have been engaged in important work
elsewhere. I think the contribution that you have made in this regard
in 1968 was a tremendous one.
Senator McCarthy. I think the committee has done well without
me.
Senator Case. The committee has limped along under the disabiUty
that it suffered at that time, but seriously, the committee and you
were engaged in the same general process, and the role which you
assumed at that time, I think, was i)eculiarly adapted to your
qualifications.
MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE AND U.S. ROLE
I wonder if I may, leaving aside the innnediate suggestion that
you make here — and I hope your optimism is right; I have not,
myself, seen any signs of negotiation as likely to produce anything
better than we have now — ask you to give me for our general guidance
your conce])tion of the role of the Lnited States broadly in hiter-
national affairs now? I was very much struck by the article that
foreign affairs carried a few months ago by John Patton Davies, the
• thrust of which was we had gotten away from the only real possible
principle on which peace can bo based on this world — the balance ot
power. Is this a conception on which broadly you agree? What is
the basic thrust of your view as to the way peace can be maintained
in the world and the role of the Lnited States in it?
Senator McCarthy. Senator, I am not pessimistic about the over-
all possibiUtv of some order in the world among the great powers. I
think there is a kind of balanced power relationship now as between
the United States and Russia, with the Chinese not really a power but
simply a force or a presence, and that the war in Vietnam is really not
part of any great power struggle. If it were, one might say in some
kind of gi-eat historical judgment you could justify what we were
doing. But I don't think that is the case.
Therefore, it is unrelated and you have to judge it really in itself.
And, in that case, I don't think it is defensible on any grounds, and
certainly to the extent that it might cause some kind of confrontation
with the gi-eat powers. It is dangerous even apart from whatever
judgment vou might pass on it as a separate problem.
It is my opinion that we can maintain this relationship between
Russia and the United States if we are reasonably careful. The Uvo
nations, I see as probably being the most positive force for order in
what they do and how they develop are the Japanese in the Far East
and Germany in Europe. They seem to have accepted their responsi-
bility to be restrained and to avoid military buildups and to avoid
confrontation. If that relationship, if this status, can be maintained
in Europe and the Japanese develop as they are developing in Asia,
176
then the only uncertainty would become that of China and I don't
think anyone can make a judgment as to how that nation will go.
You asked me a rash question and it is a rash judgment, more or less.
Senator Case. You have generally accepted the idea of a balance
of power in being?
Senator McCarthy. I think it does exist.
Senator Case. And what is your view as to the relevance of Viet-
nam?
Senator McCarthy. It is a different kind of balance, a different
kind of power and a different kind of politics from the day of the
Austro-Hungarian Emiiire. It would seem to be the language in which
some people talk about the language of power today.
Senator Case. The world is different, of course. There are two
powers now of great consequence and the others have various sub-
sidiary roles, and more minor ones. But the general concept is one
which you accept as perhaps the only, so far as" there can be a ration-
ale, the_ only basic rationale, for international relations, and our role
in this is an important one, I take it, and has to be in some degree
an active one; is that correct?
Senator McCarthy. Yes, I quite agree. I am not an isolationist.
Senator Case. I think this is terribly important because your views
on these matters are followed with avidity by a large number of
people.
RUSSIAN views
Have you any revelations to bring us from Moscow; you have been
there as well as Paris?
Senator McCarthy. No, I don't think that I really learned any-
thing particularly there that hasn't been said publicly. They ex-
pressed deep concern over developments in the Middle East^ but
they have said more since I left than they said at the time that I
was there. They had nothing in particular to say about Vietnam,
the particular problem that we are dealing with here today.
Senator Case. Mr. Chakman, I think that is all that I would
like to say now\ Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Church.
commendation of the witness
Senator Church. Senator McCarthy, I want to say that no one
man in American politics had more to do with changing our war
pohcy in Southeast Asia than you by your activities in 1968. I think
you rendered the Nation a great service.
difference in negotiating positions at PARIS peace talks
You have just recently returned from Paris where you had discus-
sions with representatives of the North Vietnam and the National
Liberation Front. What fundamental difference between the two
sides would you ascribe as the basic reason for the stalemate at
the conference table.
Senator McCarthy. Senator Church, our position there, so far
as our spokesman, Mr. Habib, presents one, is that we are for elections.
And this is totally unacceptable to the other side. Their position is.
177
it gets a little bit confused, but the two points are, as I understood
their position: an agreement about withdrawal of troops, which
should be acceptable, because, as I said earlier in response to a ques-
tion by another Senator, both the Johnson and the Nixon administra-
tion (spokesmen for them) said they had in mind to withdraw troops
and not to establish any permanent bases. So it would seem to me
that the proposition should be open. And the other point is a new
government in South Vietnam. In my opinion, both of these should
be subject and are subject to negotiation. But we don't respond to
either of these.
Generally, we reject their 10-point program saying this is all or
nothing and it is not all or nothing. I am sure that these two proposi-
tions are subject to very serious negotiations if we are really prepared
to begin to talk about them.
U.S. PROPOSAL OF ELECTIONS AS BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT
Senator Church. Isn't it curious at this late stage that we now
stress elections as the basis for a settlement, even though there is
little evidence that either Saigon or Hanoi want elections? The present
laws and constitution of South Vietnam prevent free elections, as we
Americans would define them, and there is no indication that Hanoi
is interested in free elections. Is it not the case that we have put
forward a proposition that has little appeal to either side?
Senator McCarthy. I think ])ractically no appeal.
Senator Church. Then why have we pursued that course?
Senator McCarthy. Well, I don't — I can give a general judgment
that we more or less believe in free elections in this country and it
sounds like a fair proposition. Most people would say that is a good
offer.
It was difficult to hold free elections in some places in this country,
to say nothing of what might happen in South Vietnam, but it is just
not a viable proposition for negotiation. After a war has been going on
for 25 years to say: "Look, we have been fighting for 25 years for free
elections." Tliey don't respond very actively to that proposal.
north VIETNAMESE AND VIETCONG VIEW OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICIES
Senator Church. Based upon your conversations with the North
Vietiuimese and the Vietcong's representatives in Paris, how does,
in their eyes, the policy of the Nixon administration differ from the
policy of the closing days of the Jolnison administration?
Senator McCarthy. They didn't talk about it, particularly in
terms of that kind of contrast, but it was obvious that they thought
it was a continuation of the same policy.
Senator Church. Basically the same polic3^
Senator McCarthy. Basically the same policy. Nothing new had
been offered for negotiation with the change of Administration, and if
anything they felt, I think, that the failure to replace Ambassador
Lodge was a further indication that possibilities of these negotiations
were very slight.
Senator Church. Do they view their own situation as growing
stronger, growing weaker, or simply stalemating?
178
Senator McCarthy. I couldn't speculate as to what they really
think in terms of the trends. The only indication I received was that
they were not on the verge of surrender certainly, and that they were
not moved to believe that Vietnamization was going to be a significant
success.
Senator Church. Do they view Vietnamization mth alarm?
Senator McCarthy. I didn't get that impression; no.
U.S. NEGOTIATION FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT
Senator Church. I visualize the withdrawal of American troops
creating a situation whereby it becomes necessary for all Vietnamese
factions to begin to negotiate a Vietnamese settlement. How would
you envision the United States undertaking to negotiate directly for
this coalition government in Paris? In regard to your position of a
coalition government, how can we proceed to negotiate on any basis
that would of necessity dispose of or replace the present government in
Saigon?
Senator McCarthy. Well, I think it is a difficult test of statesman-
ship, but I think we must acknowledge that, unless things have changed
significantly, we have a great deal of control in South Vietnam at
the present time and control over the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment. Certainly, before the Ky-Thieu administration was established,
we were efi^ective in changing governments reasonably often in South
Vietnam. In my judgment that is still an open possibility and it
ought to be tried. We really haven't tried it. You say it is difficult
and I think it is difficult. If you suggest it could not take place,
I think that must be taken to be on the side of pessimism. The alter-
native is simply just pull our troops out and see what happens or
else the only way to settle any kind of international disagreement
is by the application of more force. I hope we would not reach the
point where we would accept those as the only two possibilities in
Vietnam or any other part of the world.
ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL SUGGESTED
Senator Church. I deeply believe we lack the capacity to be the
principal architect for a new political structure in South Vietnam.
We have given the present government everything that can be given
them in the way of military and material support. The only sensible
course now is to proceed with an orderly withdrawal. This may very
well result in the formation, ironically, of a much more broadly based
South Vietnam Government, due to the negotiations among the
Vietnamese themselves. The end of the road would, thus, be the same
as the start.
Senator McCarthy. I would be prepared to accept that as an
alternative to the war in any case, take a chance on what might
happen.
Senator Church. Thank you. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. The Senator from Kentucky.
Senator Cooper. I wish to join with all the members in saying we
are glad to welcome you. You have been complimented, and correctly,
for your leadership in the past, but I would say, too, I do not assume
that denies your leadership in the future.
Senator McCarthy. Thank you.
179
LACK OF PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING
Senator Cooper. I would be hai:)py, too, if we could find some way
10 quickly end this war and stop the killing and the wounding. You
know we have sought negotiations and I agree with you that it would
be much better if the war could be settled by negotiation, and the
future of the entu-e area could be settled at least for a time by
negotiation.
You remember that you and many of us advocated the cessation of
bombing in the belief that it would lead to negotiations. I know you
will recall it was intimated by Mr. Kosygin and other leaders of the
Soviet Union that it would bring negotiations. I thinlv j^ou will agree
with me that there have been no substantive negotiations to settle
anv of the issues in Paris. Is that your view?
Senator McCarthy. Yes, of course, that is right. The proposition,
at the time the bombing halt was under consideration, is the}' said
they wouldn't even sit down and talk unless we stopped bombing
North Vietnam. It was a precondition really to their even coming to
the negotiating table.
Senator Cooper. Don't j^ou agree, we thought, you thought, every
one of us thought, if there could be a cessation of bombing, the results
would be more than sitting down and talking, but substantive
negotiations.
Senator McCarthy. Yes, I certainly hoped for it.
Senator Cooper. I have talked with Ambassador Harrunan and
Ambassador Lodge, as I am sure you have.
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Senator Cooper. And they told that nothing of substance was ever
discussed.
Senator McCarthy. No.
vietnamization and troop withdrawals
Senator Cooper. I believe this lack of substantive progress in
negotiations is one of the reasons that led the Administration to try
this policy of Vietnamization. Some have stated that they do not think
it is a change in policy, that it is essentially the same policy that was
followed under the administration of President Johnson. I disagree,
and I must challenge this viewpoint. All of us remember that for years
the United States had become more and more involved in Vietnam:
economically and militarily. You will remember that in 4 or 5 years
our forces were increased "from 17,000 to about 550,000. Would you
consider that the withdrawal of troops and the promised withdrawal of
an additional hundred thousand is a change?
Senator McCarthy. Well, Senator, I think if the numbers with-
drawn reach a point where it necessarily sets in motion a policy of
change in government in South Vietnam, a shifting of degree of re-
sponsibility for that goverimient to South Vietnam itself, at that
]joint the quantitative change would result in a policy change. I don't
think we have reached that point yet and I don't think the withdrawal
of another hundred thousand troops is necessarily gohig to do it.
First, because there are more troops there than we need even now;
and secondly, as you will recall when we were criticizing the escalation,
the protest against sending in troops arose long before there were
180
300,000 American troops in South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, when
it got to 50,000 and 60,000 and it looked as though it was going to
a hunch-ed thousand, it was protested. At that time General Gavin
talked about the enclave theorj^, which he was never really allowed to
explain, and I think we have come back to something closer to that if
it is not necessary to control the whole countryside. But I don't see a
policy change yet reflected in the prospective and the present and
past withdrawals of troops. The basic policy is still military domina-
tion and continued support of the military government of South
Vietnam.
Senator Cooper. Many have talked about the government in
Saigon, and it is correct that anything the United States does in
Vietnam is in a sense in support of the govermxient. As in this coun-
try, if good is done under a Democratic or Kepublican administra-
tion, it supports that administration.
SEARCH AND DESTROY STRATEGY AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS
But I go back to my point of a change in policy. On the military
side there has been a change in the search and destroy strategy.
Second, the President is withdrawing troops, and Secretary of
State Rogers has said this is irreversible. I assume it means a con-
tinuing removal of troops. I think it is irreversible because once you
start on a program of withdrawal there would be no way to secure
the su]>port of the Congress and the American people to increase
troops in Vietnam. Do you think I am correct?
Senator McCarthy. Well, you describe what has happened. I just
say it is a question of how far it goes. I mean there are not as many
search and destroy missions as there were, and we are not bombing
in quite the same places, but they are bombing Laos, so that it is
more at this point, as I see it, a question of some changes in tactics
rather than a change of policy.
PRESIDENT NIXON's STATEMENT AT GUAM
Senator Cooper. You have said you thought our programs dictated
policy rather than having the programs applicable to a policy.
Do you not think the statement of President Nixon at Guam that,
as I consider its substance, we would not become involved again in
the land mass of Asia, but leave the burden of protection to those
countries, a policy?
Senator McCarthy. There are hardly any countries for us to get
into except China.
Senator Cooper. The United States is in Southeast Asia.
Senator McCarthy. Laos.
Senator Cooper. We are in Southeast Asia, and I believe that the
President's policy is a change. It means getting our forces out of
Southeast Asia.
Senator McCarthy. Well, President Johnson said that, too.
Senator Cooper. I know, but President Johnson was hicreasing
troops all the time, and bombing North Vietnam. It seems so long ago,
but I remember the bombing of Hanoi, and when we went to the White
House and heard the President describe it in great detail. Our policy
is changing. I would agree if we could negotiate with the North Viet-
181
namese it would be a better means, but I assume our present course
is taken because we haven't been able to negotiate.
NEGOTIATION AND TROOP WITHDRAWAL
Senator McCarthy. I would say all the changes you have de-
scribed have not encouraged negotiations. It would seem to me it
would make it easier to negotiate, because we are doing this thing or
the Administration is, they should not negotiate. It seems to me that
that doesn't follow. That they could negotiate and continue, in fact;
the fact that withdrawals were taking place it would seem to me would
make it easy to negotiate.
Senator Cooper. I think you said that the North Vietnamese
always insisted on the withdrawal of our troops before any substan-
tive
Senator McCarthy. On an agreement. I don't think they were
insistent upon withdrawals of troops before there was a settlement.
That would be j^reposterous.
U.S. alternatives
Senator Cooper. You have said, and many of us have said, that
if we can negotiate a cease-fire and orderly withdrawal of troops it
would be best. I assume that the substance of j^our statement, and it
is a good statement, is that we should make a choice between the
present pohcy of Vietnamization or an immediate withdrawal of
troops. Would you say that is its substance?
Senator McCarthy. I didn't hear you.
Senator Cooper. I would assume that the substance of 3^our pro-
posal is we should make a choice between the present policy of Viet-
namization or immediate withdrawal of troops.
Senator McCarthy. No, I say that is not the choice. That is what
is proposed to us. But I thuik there is a jilace between that for a
negotiated settlement now; that the alternatives are not simply Viet-
namization as described by the Administration or the withdrawal of
troops. We can negotiate.
coalition government and troop withdrawal
Senator Cooper. You couple with it, then, the installation of a
coalition government?
Senator McCarthy. I think that is the critical point of difference
between my position and the Administration's.
Senator Cooper. Senator Church asked this: Do j^ou think the
United jStates should force or coerce the South Vietnamese to estab-
lish a coalition government?
Senator McCarthy. Well, I think Senator Church indicated if we
continued to withdraw troops it will have the same effect. It will
create a vacuum in which they will have to work out something. May-
be that is the only way we can do it, but I think we ought to try to do
it in any kind of a rational or orderly way to see if we can arrange it.
If we can't, then to let the policy — let it hapjjen.
It seems to me I am somewhat more optimistic that reasonable
order could be agreed upon than simply create conditions out of
chaos in the hope that some good may come.
182
Senator Cooper. Withdrawal of troops, then, m your view is the
essential element to achieve a coalition government.
Senator McCarthy. Agreement upon withdrawal of troops, not
necessarily the withdrawal, is the beginning of negotiation. I think the
two come together — an effort to set up a new government and an
agreement on withdrawal of troops. I think they can be worked out
almost simultaneously.
COULD COALITION GOVERNMENT RESULT IN MINORITY TAKEOVER?
Senator Cooper. We have talked about self-determination and free
elections and all that, but practically, it seems to me, the people of
South Vietnam have, the majority have not wanted to be under the
domination of a minority. Do you believe that a coalition government
would result in a minority in South Vietnam taking over against the
will, whatever that will is, of the majority? This has happened in
many coalition governments.
Senator McCarthy. I know. I don't think you are going to be able
to determine quite what the majority wants. The cult of the silent
majority is taking over in this country, so I don't know as I could read
it in South Vietnam. I haven't been able to read it here. But I think
you deal with the forces that you can identify in South Vietnam
without trjdng to claim for them either majority support or lack of
that support, as we have attempted to do before we supported the
Thieu-Ky government.
DESIRABILITY OF REAL NEGOTIATIONS
Senator Cooper. I certainly am glad to hear you. I agree if there is
any possible way of getting real negotiations, we should try. But I
must say that I do disagree with you that there has been no change in
policy.
Senator McCarthy. It would be almost better to break oft' nego-
tiations than to pretend we are negotiating as we have been for nearly
2 years.
Senator Cooper. Thank you.
The Chairman. Is the Senator through?
Senator Cooper. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Williams?
Senator Williams. Just a brief question first. I want to join my
colleagues in welcoming you back to the committee.
FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT
I notice that you do not believe that free elections are the answer.
You are suggesting that we abandon that recommendation. Assmiiing
that we withdraw our support for free elections today and express a
willingness to enter into an agreement for withdrawal of the troops
as you recommend, how would you form this coaUtion govermnent?
That is who would make the appointments for the respective sides?
I ask that question because I know here in this country w^e have many
coalition commissions between the Repubhcan and Democratic
Parties, but usually the man who makes the appointments makes all
the appointments that would coincide with his view^s.
183
In the forming of a coalition government, if we enforce snch a
proposal today, how would we form that coaUtion? Who would make
the designations of the respective positions and where would the
balance of power lay and how w^ould it be worded?
Senator McCarthy. I don't know how that could be worked out.
That is what we should determine in Paris. We are supposed to have
people there who are supposed to be talking about the four principal
parties involved in the war and it would be a discussion among them
out of which an agreement on a new government could come.
Senator Williams. What would be your views if you were a nego-
tiator and making the recommendation? What recommendation would
you make as to the forming a coalition government? Just how would
we go about it? I asked you for your views because you have given it
a lot of study.
Senator McCarthy. I think everyone has thought about it a great
deal and there is no set formula. You are not going to pull them out
of a hat, but sit down as they have done before in setting up coalition
governments and done in other cases where we negotiated. We did
something like this in Laos where we settled. So it is a cj[uestion of reas-
onable i^eople sitting down saying, "We will take a chance on this kind
of government as an alternative to a continuation of the war." And
you pick your people and name them and it is generally agreed that
there are people in South Vietnam, some of them in the Ky-Thieu
government, who ^^■ould be acceptable. But there is no magic formula
for it. It is like working out the leadership of the Democratic Part3^
Senator Williams. As you state, there are some in the present
government that would be acceptable. Acceptable to whom — the
present government? Or would you let each one of the various op-
posing forces select their own representatives?
Senator McCarthy. It would be negotiated. You know how these
things are done, John. It is not a formula. You are not going to
take 2 percent proportionate representation. We are not going to
take that. We know what the forces are running in South Vietnam.
At least we should know by now. We have been there roughly 10
years. And I hope we would be expert enough to know what the various
gi'oups are and forces and how some kind of reconciliation could be
worked out. The alternative is just to withdraw troops, either do
it themselves or continue support of a kind of military dictatorship;
these are the choices we have.
Senator Williajnis. This is one solution and I was wondering what
your views are as to how we should form such a coalition government.
That is all.
excerpts from vung tau training center pamphlet: condi-
tions IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. Previously there was reference made to the ex-
cerpt from the document which was cited by you. Senator Sparkman
read the part which you cited. I have been handed the document.
It is entitled "Revolutionary Development Cadre Program, Contri-
bution to the Vietnamese People's Struggle or Solution to the Vietnam
War." It is apparently used in Vung Tau Training Center which was
set up by American funds and advisers, but, as I understand it, is
actually run by Vietnamese now with the advice of Americans. There
184
has been called to my attention the following language, following
the part that you cited, which seems to me to be interesting enough
to read into the record. It is very short. The very next sentence
following your excerpt reads:
* * * Of course there are those villages which are fortunate enough to lie
within those areas under government control. But, cruel irony, in these areas
we run into man's inhumanity to man in other forms. We find the exploitation of
the people by the petty tyrants, the shakedown-artists and the con men. In short,
the corrupt officials who look upon the people as being so many vegetables, so
much garbage, with whom they can do as they please, indulge their capricious
whims no matter how perverted. Is it any wonder that life in these areas is full of
ompltiints springing from an outraged sense of justice.
This then is life in N'iotnam as it really is. On the one hand, the cities are troubled
with moral and material crises. On the other hand, the countryside is destitute,
deserted, racked with disease and hunger and the people feel that life has cheated
them. With the cauldron boiling as it is, dissension rampant, the ranks of the
nationalists divided and scattered, all who care about their countrj^'s future must
feel heartbroken. * * *
We must not hide from the facts, or camouflage the wretched conditions in
our homeland under a screen of hypocrisy.
It was such a colorful statement, that I asked the staff why they
didn't put it all in their report. They said they thought it would be
so extreme it might be offensive to members of the committee and to
the public; so they stopped just short of ptitting that in.
U.S. PURPOSE IN VIETNAM
I want to ask one last question of you if I may. In the hearings that
have been going on and in pre^^ous hearings, it seems to me, if there
is any recurring reason given as the purpose of this war, it is to prevent
the spread of the Communist social and political system. This goes
back to the days of Secretaiy Rusk. Is that your impression? Would
you agree that, although other reasons have been given, this is the
recurring and most central one?
Senator McCarthy. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, a^ the
American commitment for troojis and power increased there was a
kind of escalation of the stated objectives as it went along, simply
protecting the South Vietnamese from Communist domination, then
the larger question of the national honor and the credibility of the
American commitment, and Secretary Rusk finally began to talk
about the potential danger of a billion Chinese in the year 2000. So
the rather limited objective which I think was first set has been greatly
exi)anded as time has passed and as the American presence has in-
creased in South Vietnam.
You sec, with reference to the re]iorted description of conditions in
Vietnam, in the manner in which you did, I don't know as you really
can look at it from outside and make a very positive judgment. If you
tried to judge it simj^ly within the terms of the policies that have been
announrod and the re]iorts that have come out from those making
the ])olicics at least since 1965, the members of this committee know
that it won't stand the test of internal criticism. We could hope that
what's being said now will turn out to be the right judgment and
things may work out as the Administration s])okesmen say they are
working out. But the record of the past is such that I think wc have
to be most skeptical. There is the further consideration that there is
very little said about what things are going to be like after victory,
185
and it seems to me that should always be the first question that one
should raise and attempt to answer before he becomes involved in
military action.
The Chairman. I am not sure that I gathered your answer to this.
I realize that in the days of Secretary Rusk there did occur this
escalation. However within the last 2 days one of the witnesses of the
present Administration, who is working in Vietnam, in response to the
question of what we really expect to achieve and what is the purpose,
if I understood it correctly, said it was to prevent the spread of the
Communist system by force. I have found no other central theme from
the beginning, although there have been variations, as you pointed out.
Occasionally, it is said our purpose is to give them the right to free
elections, but when I ask why we are so interested in free elections in
Vietnam as opposed to free elections in Panama or Spain or Greece or
Brazil, 1 find no answer. We don't seem to be the least concernecl about
the fact that there are no elections in Greece. We give them assistance
and encouragement; we give it to many others and I have never
understood. So it seems to come back to this matter of containing
communism.
CEXTRAL MOTIVATING FORCE FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
I wondered if you would agree that that has been the central
motivating force unless you assume the manifest destiny urge that,
somewhat" like the lemmings, forces us on regardless of what our
reason tells us.
Senator McCarthy. Yes, I think that was the primary motivation
of those who first advocated our becoming involved in South Vietnam.
The Chairman. Aren't they still recurring to that if they are
pressed?
Senator McCarthy. We have two points, I think: One, President
Nixon has said if you have free elections and it turned out to elect
Communists that we would accept that. So the question then that
must be asked is: Are we there because we object to the process, the
spreading of communism by force, and not to communism itself? It
\\ ould seem to me that this is the position that they hold. If it is then
the question you raised, if it is the process, then we ought to be opposed
to the establishment of military dictatorships or military democracies
by force also. If it is the process that is our concern and not the con-
sequence, that should be our general concern in Greece and in Latin
American countries too.
But as you know, Mr. Chairman, contradictions are present in so
man}- areas that it would be better to just try to work on negotiating
a settlement in South Vietnam today.
effect of conduct of war on U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM
The Chairman. Of course, what interests me as the result of this
question is the last question which grows out of this. Is the war, the
way we have conducted it, actually promoting the strength of the
democratic system as we conceive of it, either political or the private
enterprise system in the economic sense, or is it weakening it? In other
words, is this pohcy and what we have done actually strengthening
those concepts in which we say we beheve and undertake to put into
44-706—70 13
186
effect here or does it weaken them? In view of the attitude of so many
people around the world in many advanced societies who so thoroughly
disagree with this policy, I have the terrible feeling that we are
undoing our own house, you see, by this misguided policy. It simply
is not strengthening those very things we think we are strengthening
by this enormous extravagance in a monetary way and loss of lives.
There is a rather haunting feeling that we are our own undoing in this
kind of policy, that the objective is not at all being accomplished.
Senator McCarthy. Well, I think we are weaker at home because
of the war and I think we have less influence in the world because of
the involvement in Vietnam than we would have if we were not
involved.
The Chairman. Today we have the declining interest rates, the
decline in business, the layoff of workers in the automobile and con-
struction business. What is this doing to the economy and to the
system which we say we support? The continuation of a military
influence far greater than any other influence always leads to the
decline of the democratic processes in any country; doesn't it? Hasn't
that been so? You are a great student of history.
Senator McCarthy. Generally so.
The Chairman. Generally so.
Thank you very much. Do you have anything further to say?
Senator McCarthy. No, I think not; thank you.
Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, may I say one thing?
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
BASIS OF present ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY
Senator Cooper. It is obvious that conditions which you described
in Vietnam are the result of the war. We wouldn't have the material,
human situation there if we hadn't had a war. It seems to me that
the inquiry we are making is to see how we get out of the war the best
possible way. Whatever these policies, purposes were in the past, and
we have used all kinds of words, such as "defense against Commu-
nism," "self-determination," and other such terms, but whatever
those reasons were, I do not believe the policy of this Administration
is based on the policies of the past. I think it is saying it is getting
out, and that is the basis of their policy. I think the process of with-
drawal is irreversible.
Senator McCarthy. All right, we will let that judgment stand.
Senator Cooper. And we will talk later.
Senator McCarthy. We will talk later.
question of urgency and influences on presidential POLICIES
The Chairman. I would say to the Senator I agree with that. The
question is one of urgency and also the influence of some who have a
more powerful Messianic spirit than others. When I read a speech by
Admiral Sharp or General Ciccolella, it gives me the impression they
have no idea of getting out at all. Their idea is to Christianize and civil-
ize. Their speeches read almost like ^McKinlej^'s when he took on
Aguinaldo in the Philippines. That is what it sounds like. I will leave
it up to you to read the speeches. I grant it is not the Administration.
These are important military leaders and these are influences in our
187
system. I am very pleased that the President has made no such speech.
I personally only would like to urge him to carry on, as the Senator
from Kentucky has so well said on many occasions, to the irreversible
conclusion of complete withdrawal. But there is always a little bit of
reservation. I have never heard him say complete withdrawal; nor
have I heard the Secretary of Defense, say complete withdrawal. It is
^^dthdrawal of combat ground troops and in yesterday's hearing the
witnesses went into some detail, explaining that a gunship, a heli-
copter with powerful weapons, is not combat ground troops. There is a
question whether there is any intention of withdrawing in this sense at
all. These are the questions I raise simply in an effort to try to create,
insofar as I can, a feehng of urgency that it is against the interests of
the people of the United States to continue this war and simply to
urge the President to follow what he has announced as his policy and
not to allow other influences to divert him.
When we read about the previous Administration, it is quite obvious
that that President followed what I think was a disastrous policy.
There were elements, influences, some pushing him one way and
some another, and he finally, in my view, took the wrong turn because
of the })ower of persuasion of certain of his ad\nsers. There were
others, such as yourself and others, who gave him different advice,
but he didn't follow that.
All Presidents are human beings. These two both happen to have
been Members of the Senate. We know how we are pushed and ])ulled
on all kinds of issues from day to day and 1 think that is the way this is.
QUESTION OF IMPLEMENTING POLICY STILL REMAINS
I agree with the Senator from Kentucky. I am not trying to say
that the President has not said any of the things he has said. There
still remains the question of imi)lementing the policy of getting the
job done, of getting the war over and then getting down to trying to
attack the problems that are threatening to undermine the stability
of our own country. That is all this is about.
QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, leaving out all questions of
pnncij)le, i)urely in self-interest, I think one can argue that we should
get out.
The Chairman. 1 am not leav-ing it out — only in the sense that it
doesn't seem to have much a])peal to many people. The}' respond more
to the practical effects than principle. The principal argument has
been made by you and others very persuasively and I haven't seen
much effect.
Senator Case. May I say just a word on this question of prin-
cii)le. I am not sure just what you mean, because if you mean a course
of action, and I don't think you do, which because of some divine
revelation requires us to get out of there and leave to thek fate millions
of people, then I don't think that principle is worth following, and I
don't think there is any such principle that guides us or should guide
us. It is a practical problem of getting out with the least damage and
the best chance for this country and for that part of the world to
rehabilitate itself, and that is what we are all for.
188
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
That hist statement brings up a very interesting subject. I had
thought this country was based upon certain principles beginning
with the Dechiration of Independence and the Constitution, but I
think that goes too far. I personally think we have far departed from
our basic principles, as eiumciated in certain of those basic documents.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, we are in a different age and this is
a different country. A little struggling 2 or 3 million people on the
fringe of a wilderness outside the main world is a different country,
with different responsibilities, from a country which is the most
powerful Nation in the world.
The Chairman. Are you suggesting, then, that the Declaration of
Independence is obsolete as Mr. Katzeiibach did with the Constitution?
Senator Case. I don't think I want to
The Chairman. I don't think you are. I don't Avant to argue with
my colleague here or get into this at this time. Maybe we ought to do
that on the floor of the Senate.
Senator Case. I agree with you.
The Chairman. I don't think the principles there are obsolete at
all. The basic principle, I would say, in Southeast Asia is that those
people have a right to work out their own destiny without the intrusion
of the United States with arms. That is what I am saying in eft'ect.
I don't think we have any mission there.
Senator Case. We are not engaged de novo with a situation and, of
course, we would agree with this. We are where we are and we have to
work out of it; that is the i)oint we are talking about.
Senator McCarthy. That is right.
The Chairman. I think the Senator has given us some good sugges-
tions this morning.
Senator McCarthy. Thank you.
The Chairman. Major Arthur. Will you come forward, please, sir.
You didn't get to finish your statement yesterday. Please carry on.
May we have order please.
Major Arthur, will you continue please.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN
VANN, HAWTHORNE MILLS, AND CLAYTON E. McMANAWAY—
Kesumed
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible for me, perhaps, to
offer a little clarification of one matter that came up during Senator
McCarthy's testimony.
The Chairman. Yes, Ambassador Colby is recognized, certainly.
excerpt from vung tau training center pamphlet: conditions
in south VIETNAM
Mr. Colby. The quotation from the Vietnamese document that
was read during the past session also caught my eye when it was first
put in the report of your staff" members. When I found this in Saigon
I looked around for the origin of that statement and I discovered it.
I believe it was in the same book you were looking at and which you
extended.
189
I think, if you will look about two or three {Jages, or four or five
pages ahead of that quotation you will see the date of October 1967
on that statement. I think that is the point. My reference to the tin
roofs, and my statement about the extension of the security throughout
the countryside do indicate that there has been a change in Vietnam
in the ])ast 2 years.
I think that this is obvious to most observers who have been
there. It is obvious to the gentlemen who have come here with me.
I think Senator Javits can indicate that he has seen it. Senator
Harrison Williams was out there and I think he may report some-
thing about this. I suggest that the key difference here between our
two reports really lies in the dates of the two reports.
The Chairman. I will have the staff check that and insert this as
a footnote or an explanation. The date on the outside of the overall
document is 1969.
Mr. Colby. Right, sir.
The Chairman. I did not read the part about which you are
speaking, but that can be checked and will be corrected to reflect that.
Mr. Colby. The author of that particuhir document, Mr. Chairman,
is an old friend of mine. He gave me a copy of that particular document
earlier. He is the gentleman who is today running the Vung Tau
Training Center. He is the gentlemen who, on one occasion, criticized
publicly to our then Vice President Humphrey the corruption in the
elite structure of Vietnam.
He is also the gentleman whom President Thieu has publicly
endorsed and emphasized that he \\'ished to continue this kind ()f
teaching in that camp to all village and hamlet chiefs to try to inspire
in them this now spirit to change tlu> situation in Vietnam. I think
this has been the thrust of the pacification program over the past
year or so.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
appointment of district chiefs
Since we started this, I have one (question with regard to 3'esterday's
testimony in order to keej) the record straight. I believe you said that
the district chiefs are not nominated by province chiefs. The back-
ground paper jMit out by the Embassy in Saigon and entitled, "Back-
ground Data on South Vietnam" states on |)age 4 as follows, and I
quote:
"Directly below the province, districts are headed by a Chief
ai)i)oint('(l by the Minister of Interior upon the nomination of the
province chief."
Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Colby. I think that may be somewhat mistaken, Mr. Chairman.
I have talked to a class of about 100 i)rospective district chiefs who
were selected by the national Government and sent to a special course
in their new duties before they were appointed, and certainl}' before
they were even known to the province chiefs involved.
Thi'j then were assigned as district chiefs out around the country.
I think that may be a slight mistake as to the formal way in which
these i^eople become tlistrict chiefs. They are finally appointed, in
any case, by the Prime Minister.
The Chairman. Not by the Minister of Interior?
190
Mr. Colby. By the Prime Minister today. He is the same man
now.
The Chairman. When you go back, you can have them correct
their bulletin.
Mr. Colby. We will do so, sir.
The Chairman. Major Arthur, will you proceed.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JAMES F. ARTHUR, DISTRICT SENIOR AD-
VISER, BINH CHANH DISTRICT, GIA DINK PROVINCE, SOUTH
VIETNAM— Resumed
Major Arthur. Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of the other Senators,
I would like to introduce myself and tell what I do and then continue
approximately where I left off with the statement yesterday.
The Chairman. All right.
Major Arthur. I am Maj. James F. Arthur from North Carolina.
I am currently the district senior adviser from Binh Chanh District,
Gia Dinli Province, Vietnam.
Senator Case. Which corps area is that in?
Major Arthur. That is in III Corps.
Senator Case. Thank you.
Major Arthur. I continue approximately where I left off yesterday.
SCHOOLS AND MATERNITY DISPENSARIES
The district has one high school which is located in Binh Chanh
Village and 45 primary and elementary schools operating throughout
the district. In addition, there are 10 maternity dispensaries located
within the district.
VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOCAL GUERRILLAS
Binh Chanh sits astride the major routes of infiltration into the
city of Saigon from the south and was used as a staging area during
the 1968 Tet offensive. The primary targets of the district's territorial
forces are the Vietcong infrastructure and the local guerrillas which
ideally would number approximately 30 per \dllage and 12 per hamlet.
These Vietcong are prime targets because they are the ones who
have the mission of terrorism, assassination, tax collection, propaganda
and providing intelligence and guides for the main force units.
At the present time, the Vietcong infrastructure and local guerrillas
have been reduced to squad and half squad size units per village and
there is very little organization left at hamlet level. However, there
are three under strength main force battalions whose areas of opera-
tion include Binh Chanh district. These units are normally based
outside the district boundaries and send in small luiits to assist the
local guerrillas in accomplishing their mission.
U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
The district chief has 17 regional force companies and 25 popular
force platoons under his command and in addition, there are three
191
ranger battalions, ARVN type, operating in the district. In the past,
the 199th hght infantry brigade was based in the district. However,
there are no U.S. combat forces in the district now and the defense
of Binh Chanh rests solely on the Vietnamese.
The primary mission of the territorial forces is that of providing
security for the population while the ranger battalions have the mission
of eliniinating the Vietcong main force units. The 1970 plan calls
for the regional forces to assume the mission of offensive operations
and popular forces, assisted by the people's self-defense force to
assume the responsibility for protecting the population, thereby en-
abling the rangers to be released for duty elsewhere.
At the present there are eight regional force companies ready to
assume offensive operations missions and the changeover should begin
in March or April. The regional forces are rapidly improving and a
number of the companies are able to handle sophisticated airmobile,
cordon and search and raid operations.
Since September, the territorial forces have captured 36 Vietcong
and killed 23, including two district level party committee members.
During the past month, the territorial forces made contact with the
Vietcong 11 times with only two of those contacts being Vietcong
initiated.
People's self-defense forces continue to be a problem area. According
to Vietnamese figures they have organized 20,700, trained 5,800 and
armed 1,782. As yet the PSDF advisor has been unable to get a physi-
cal count of the members; however, he has been able to monitor some
of the training which is marginal at best. The only firm figure is the
number of weapons issued and the adviser has been able to verify
that the persons issued these weapons are actually performing secu-
rity duties at night in the hamlets. I plan to place increased emphasis
on this ])rogram during 1970 since a success in this area will increase
identity with the Government and also free regional force companies
for offensive operations.
VILLAGE AND HAMLET PROGRAMS
The program to improve village and hamlet government got off to a
slow start, but by the close of 1969 all the staff positions at both village
and hamlet level had been filled and the personnel trained by either the
National Training Center at Vung Tau or the Gia Dinh Province
Training Committee.
Village self development programs were slow starting due to the lack
of trained xdllage officials to handle them. However, once the program
started it was well received by the rural populace. Small projects, 193,
each costing 50,000 piastres ($423) or less, were approved by the village
councils and 142 were completed.
Seven of ten projects in the 50,000 piastre to 150,000 piastre price
range were completed. Four projects, each costing over 150,000
piastres, were approved by the Province Chief, but none were com-
pleted because the cost of materials rose before the projects could be
started. The remaining projects w\\\ be completed during the first
quarter of 1970, and the pa[)erwork for the 1970 program \vi\\ be
initiated concurrently.
192
CHIEU HOI AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS
The Chieu Hoi and Information programs did not do well during
1969 and special emphasis will be placed in these areas during 1970.
INTRODUCTION OF IR-8 RICE
IR-8 rice, which is a new miracle rice, was introduced into the
district in June 1969 and lesults were outstanding. The program
was well publicized and all indications are that the people have
accepted the new rice and will plant more of it next season,
PROGRESS AGAINST VIETCONG
Progress has been made. When Lieutenant Colonel Di assumed
command of the Binh Chanh Special Zone on May 8, 1968, there
were 15 Vietcong hamlets and the majority of the rest were in the
"D" and "E" category as reflected by the hamlet evaluation system
(survey) .
Today there are four "D" hamlets, 38 "C" hamlets and 18 "B"
hamlets in Binh Chanh district. This is not an inflation of a rating
system, but reflects the untiring efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Di, his
staff and the advisers assigned to his district.
The Vietcong main force units have been reduced to one-quarter
strength and local guen'illas are seriously under strength. The security
situation has improved remarkably and eveiy effort will be made
to continue to improve it and give additional emphasis to rural
development in 1970.
The Chairman. Thank you, Major Arthur.
CONDUCT OF hamlet EVALUATION SYSTEM
You mentioned the hamlet evaluation system. Hovr much of your
time do you spend on the hamlet evaluation system?
Major Arthur. I spend about 60 percent of my time during the
month in conducting the hamlet evaluation system survej^. This is
part of my job. I have to get out and visit every hamlet that I possibly
can, and I manage to make most of them every month, and in doing so
I look for the factors that are included on the HES worksheet to see
what progress or what the actual situation in the village or hamlet is,
at that time.
The Chairman. How many hamlets are there in your district?
Major Arthur. There are 60, sir.
The Chairman. Did you say you visit each one each month?
Major Arthur. I trv to make it every month, sir. Sometimes I
don't.
The Chairman. It seems like an awful lot of hamlets to visit in 30
days. That is an average of two a day.
^lajor Arthur. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How soon after you became a district adviser did
you begin filing the HES reports?
Major Arthur. I filed it the first month after I became the district
adviser, sir.
The Chairman. How long do you spend in each hamlet?
193
Major Arthur. Sometimes as little as 15 or 20 mimites, sir; some-
times as much as a couple of hours.
The ChairmAxV. How much lower would the percentage of A, B, and
C hamlets be if the hamlets were surveyed ai, night?
Major Arthur. The HES report includes activities that happen 24
hours a (lay. In preparing the hamlet evaluation I have a report of all
the contacts that occurred during the month, where they occurred,
what the results were, both night and day, both for operational con-
tacts and ambushes.
Also included in the report are all the VC i)ropaganda attempts and
attempts at taxation or completion of propaganda missions and
taxation. This includes nighttime figures also.
I think the HES as it stands now, sir, is a valid system which is
correct in my district. I cannot speak for any of the other districts.
The Chairman. How do you know what goes on in the C hamlets
at night?
Major Arthur. We have popular force platoons, some revolu-
tioiuiry development cadre, village and hamlet officials that are staying
there who can give the reports to the tlistrict chief.
Also they bring up matters for my people who visit the hamlets to
talk to them.
The Chairman. Have you ever downgraded any hamlets in your
tlistrict?
Major Arthur. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How many?
Major Arthur. I have downgraded three since I have been there,
sir; and I have made numerous downgrade changes per month. Some
go up, some go down, depending on the level of VC activity.
The Chairman. What kind of reports do you have to submit when
a hamlet is downgi-aded?
Major Arthur. On the HES report, sir, is a section for comment
of why it is being downgraded. I downgi'aded Da Phouc 4 for excessive
taxation. I had" five reported incidents occurring somewhere in the
neighborhood of that hamlet during the month and this is a specific
instance.
hamlet evaluation system report
The Chairman. I don't know how to put it in the record, but I
think this sheet I hold in my hand indicating the type of information
that you report on each hamlet each month, ought to be put in.
Major Arthur. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are you familiar w ith it?
I will ask the reporter to do the best he can to put it in, but it is
an enormous thing. There nuist be 50 or 60 questions. This seems
like an impossible job.
(The information referred to is in the Committee files.)
PREPARATION OF HES MONTHLY REPORT
Do you speak Vietnamese?
Major Arthur. I speak a little Vietnamese, sir. My deputy'speaks
fluent Vietnamese, and he is responsible for handling questions 4, 5
and 6 on this report, which deal with the civil development and
administration.
194
The Chairman. Does he go along with you on these visits?
Major Arthur. He conducts his visits independently most of the
time, sir. Sometimes we do go together.
The Chairman. Is he an American or Vietnamese?
A4ajor Arthur. He is an American, sir — a Foreign Service officer,
FSO-6.
The Chairman. I was wondering what you could do with this kind
of a i)rogram with a form to be filled in in 15 minutes in any kind of a
village, no matter what language you spoke, because you can see it is
enormously complicated.
Major Arthur. I have a district team of 14 members that assist me,
and I task them with various points to assist in preparing the HES.
The Chairman. When you go into a village for 15 minutes, do you
take them with you?
Major Arthur. No, sir, they operate on their own during the day
going around on the various programs that they work with, and they
are looking at this also.
The Chairman. Are all these questions given equal importance and
then averaged out or how do you accomplish this?
Major Arthur. There are letter grades assigned to it, sir, and I
assume they are all of cqiuil importance.
The Chairman. All are of equal importance? After you fill them all
do you average it up?
Major Arthur. I fill it all in and send it to Province. They send it
to III Corps and it is put into a computer and it comes back with a
rating.
The Chairman. Some of these questions would be very difficult to
answer. They are matters of opinion about what hapi)ens to whoever
you talked to, such as "No reason to doubt whole party apparatus
eliminated or neutralized."
phoenix program
The Chairman. Do you have anything to do with the Phoenix
program?
Major Arthur. Yes, sir, I do.
The Chairman. What do you do about that?
Major Arthur. The district chief is concurrently the head of the
Phoenix program and as his adviser I head the Phoenix program. I
have a military intelligence first lieutenant who is the adviser. District
Operations and Coordinating Center (DIOCC). He does the day-to-
day nuts and bolts work there in the DIOCC.
The Chairman. Are you familiar with the incident that occurred
in Baltimore not too long ago involving the two men who had been
trained at Fort Holabird? Was that brought to your attention?
Major Arthur. Only what I heard about it in this committee a
couple of days ago.
The Chairman. You do not know anthing about it?
Major Arthur. I don't know anything else about it, sir.
USE OF HES statistics IN CLAIM OF POPULATION CONTROL
The Chairman. It was called to my attention that the Chicago
Tribune article of Mr. Samuel Jameson, to which I referred yesterday,
195
quoted yon, Mr. Vann, claiming that the statement that the Govern-
mient controlled 94 or 95 percent of the po])ulation was misleading.
Could you explain that or why were the HES statistics misleading?
Mr. Vann. It is misleading when it is used in that fashion, sir.
The Chairman. What fashion?
Mr. Vann. Trying to measure absolute values. We use it as a man-
agement tool to indicate trends and to reflect changes in control of
the population.
We feel that when you are asking questions of the nature of the
HES questions there is a limit as to how much information you can
get and as to the accuracy of the answers of each one. For this reason
I personally, since I am a graduate statistician and helped origiiuilly
to develop this report in 1967, feel that there are certain built-in biases
in this rei^ort ancl that they are favorable.
But I also feel that the biases are constant. I have long deplored
using this to claim that we controlled an absolute percentage of popu-
lation, and instead have long used it to reflect that we controlled x
percentage more of ])opulation now than at some other given period.
SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. Could you, before you sit down, tell us what you
think is tlu; real security situation in the country, understanding as
you do this bias?
Mr. Vann. I think generally, sir, that, first of all, in terms of rele-
vancy, it is a much imjn-oved situation over what it has been at any
time since I have been there in 1962.
Secondly, the trend line, which was going down in early 1968,
has since March of 1968 been up. It has not been completely steady —
sometimes it has been slightly erratic — but the trend has been generally
up in security. The reason the trend has been up in security is that
there lias been a large increase in the number of Vietnamese troops;
and, secondly, these troops have moved out from Province and
district towns and into hamlets that previously were not occupied.
HES as a management TOOL
I am quite satisfied that as a management tool the HES is very
worthwhile.
I would point out that before Ave had the HES, when you wanted
to know what the status was in a hamlet you had to rely upon the
judgment of whatever American oi Vietnamese had been around
in the local area the longest. It was a very subjective judgment at
that time.
The Chairman. It is an attempt to make it much more statistical
and objective than formerly is I guess what you said?
Mr. Vann. I think, su-, any management system has to work on
certain basic data. I would point out that that HES report is not
used just to measure security; it also provided for the first time in
Vietnam a data bank on which hamlets had schools, which had Avells,
which had a hamlet chief who Avas sleeping in his hamlet at night,
and many other factors that before we could only speculate about.
The Chairman. Yes.
196
U.S. CIVILIANS AND MILITARY IN BIENH CHANH DISTRICT
Major Arthur, did you say how many Americans are in your dis-
trict, civilian and military?
Major Arthur. I said 14.
The Chairman. Fourteen civilians.
Major Arthur. No, 14 people on my district team.
The Chairman. Fourteen military; how many civilians?
Major Arthur. The whole team is a combined organization. We
have 14 people on the district team. In addition, I have five mobile
advisory teams operating in the district which are under my opera-
tional control. They have five men each.
operation of phoenix program at district level
The Chairman. Is there anything further you could add with
regard to the way the Phoenix program operates at the district level
that has not been covered?
Major Arthur. I sup])ort Mr. Vann's point that the Phoenix
program is a coordinated intelligence support. We have a wide variety
of responses to take toward Vietcong units. Phoenix is not, as has
been brought out before, an assassination tool. It is not used that way
in any district that I know of, and certainly not in mine. It has a
message section, a situation section, and an operations section, like
any other military organization that I know of.
what happens to vietcong picked up by south VIETNAMESE?
The Chairman. Do you know what happens to a Vietcong who
is picked up and turned over to the Vietnamese?
Major Arthur. Well, in our district they are picked up by the
Vietnamese, so they are not turned over to the Vietnamese. They are
doing all the picking up. Wo accompany some operations.
The Chairman. All right.
Do you know what hap])ens to them after they are picked n\)?
Major Arthur. He is interrogated normally at district from any-
M'hore u]) to 24 hours, held there, and then sent to the S-2 at province
level.
The Chairman. Do you have any means of knowing what happens
to him?
Major Arthur. Yes, sir. We get a rej)ort back down through in-
telligence channels of what the readout was on his interrogation,
whether he was released at that level, whether he was held for further
interrogation and what information was obtained.
METHODS of EXTRACTING INFORMATION FROM CAPTURED VIETCONG
The Chairman. I am not sure that you can answer this. If you
cannot I will understand. Do you have any reason to know, one way or
the other, about the stories which have been reported from time to
time about the methods used in extracting information from a cap-
tured Vietcong? Are you familiar with any methods that are used in
that connection?
Major Arthur. I have seen some interrogations. I have seen one
instance in which there was some force used and I mentioned it to my
197
counterpart. I have not seen it since and 1 have been around in in-
terrogations. There has not been any more of this type of activity.
The Chairman. You have never seen them utilize hehcopters in
that connection?
Major Arthur. No, sir.
IS PHOENIX PROGRAM MISUSED?
The Chairman. Have jou ever heard of any cases of Phoenix being-
misused for purposes of extortion or intimidation by Vietnamese or
district officials?
Major Arthur. I have no knowledge of it and liave never hoard of
it.
The Chairman. Senator Gore.
NEUTRALIZATION UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Gore. I wish you would give me a definition of neutralized.
As I understand from what 1 have heard and read, the purpose of
the Phoenix program is to neutralize the ])ohtical infrastructure of the
NLF; is this correct?
Major Arthur. To answer your first question, the word "neutral-
ize" means to me to capture, rally or to kill the Vietcong infra-
structure of the Vietcong units. Phoenix oi)erates both against the
Vietcong infrastnicture and against conv(Mitional and local guerrilla
forces.
Senator Gore. I wanted to leave out of my question military
operations. I am referring to the counter terror phase of the Phoenix
l)rogram, as it has been described to me.
I understand it has been testified here that it is no longer a counter
terror program. You say then that the definition of neutralize is to
capture, rally or kill.
Major Arthur. That is my impression of the definition of neu-
tralize, yes, su'.
Senator Gore. Do you give to the Phoenix director a goal within
your district for neutralization of the political infrastructure?
Major Arthur. Well, there is a goal established by province. This
is entirely a Vietnamese show. U.S. people are involved in an advisory
capacity.
I might note for just a moment, sir, that Phoenix and the DIOCC
is only one of the many programs I have going at all times in the
district.
Senator Gore. Do you have any more programs going with the
goal of capturing, rallying or killing civilians?
Major Arthur. No, sir.
Senator Gore. This is the total program of neutralization then?
Major Arthur. I think civilians is a bad word there. These Viet-
cong infrastructure are civilian members of the Vietcong, the
political leaders and the brains, if you will, behind the organization.
They often, more often than not, have been found to carry weapons
and are armed. There is a goal established, sir, and it comes down from
the province level by the Vietnamese to the district. It is established
for neutralization.
198
Senator Gore. I think if I were in Vietnam, from what I know about
it, I would want to carry a weapon of some sort, but I do not know
that that is a test of whether a man is a member of the mihtary or
whether he is a member of the pohtical infrastructure. PoHcemen
carry weapons even in Washington, sometimes even in our high
schools.
Major Arthur. These people are classified as guerrillas, sir.
Senator Gore. Who classifies them?
Major Arthur. I would have to defer just a monent, if I may, to
Ambassador Colby. There is a green book.
Mr. Colby. I think. Senator, we are talking about one of the com-
plications of this war, that it goes all the way from a North Vietnamese
uniformed soldier down to a local member of a political association.
Now, all of those are part of the enemy structure, and in between
there are various levels of armaments, various kinds of organizations.
This whole thing is part of the fight that is going on in Vietnam.
Senator Gore. True, it is a part of a civil war and we have taken
sides. We have organized a counter terror program which we call
Phoenix and the purpose of it is to neutralize either by captur-
ing, rallying or killing the political infrastructure of the opposition to
the Thieu regime.
Mr. Colby. I think. Senator, if I may, I would have to take some
issue with certain of the ways you express this.
Senator Gore. I wish you would.
ENEMY FIGHTS ON A SERIES OF LEVELS
Ad!r. Colby. I think that one of the things we have learned out in
Vietnam is that the war has been fought by the enemy on a series of
levels : on a level of organizational effort, on a level of guerrilla effort,
on a level of military effort, on a level of South Vietnamese effort,
and on a level of North Vietnamese effort.
Now, for a long time we concentrated on assisting the Government
of Vietnam to fight on the last two of those levels, the regular force
actions.
Over the past
Senator Gore. Of both the North Vietnamese
Mr. Colby. North Vietnamese.
Senator Gore (continuing). And the Vietcong.
Mr. Colby. And the southern main force units; yes, sir, Senator.
NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERCENTAGE OF ENEMY
COMBAT STRENGTH
Senator Gore. And the southern main force units were the larger
of the two?
Mr. Colby. It was; it is no longer, sir. In 1965, the balance of
combat forces was something like a little less than 25 ])ercent North
Vietnamese, and about 75 i)ercent South Vietnamese. Our intelligence
analysis of the combat strength that we are facing today, and by this
I mean the main and local forces — the full-time soldiers on the other
side — now indicates through interrogations and through what we have
learned of their organization, that the total enemy combat strength
today is something like 72 percent North Vietnamese and only about
26 or 28 percent South Vietnamese.
199
NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator Gore. The largest estimate which has been given to this
committee throughout the war of the number of organized North
Vietnamese miUtary in South Vietnam has been 85,000. Can you
give us an estimate of what it is now?
Mr. Colby. I am not at Hberty to give it in the open, the exact
figure, but it is higher than that today, sir.
Senator Gore. When you say higher, are you taking into your
estimate the North Vietnamese troops that are stationed outside the
borders of South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. I am taking into account the ones who are in the im-
mediate vicinity of the South Vietnamese border.
Senator Gore. That was not the question I asked you. I said within
South Vietnam the highest estimates ever given to this committee
were 85,000.
Mr. Colby. Yes, su\
Frankly, we do not separate them out in that fashion because these
troojjs are very mobile in the border area. In the area of the Cambodian
border or the Lao border, the presence of units 1 or 2 kilometers one
side or the other does not change tlie military situation that our
peoi)le are faced with. They have to face that total force. For intelli-
gence j)urposes, they consider it as one total force.
Senator Gore. Of course, they have to be
Mr. Colby. This does not include the units which are quite a ways
away, however, and are not an immediate military i)roblem. It does
not include the ones who are far uj) into the panhandle of North
Vietnam or the logistic elements in the Lao corridor.
SeiuUor Gore. 1 realize this is a question that will need to be
examined in executive session, but this is the first evidence I have
yet heard from anyone that the North Vietnamese forces in South
Vietnam exceeded the Vietcong units in South Vietnam.
Mr. Colby. They exceed the combat strength, Senator. It is impor-
tant, unfortunately, to deal in these terms of art and I would not
want to mislead you. I am talking about the combat units, the main
and local forces. This does not include the guerrilla force. The guerrilla
is another figure, and it is not in that i)r()portion. But the full-time
soldiers that you are dealing with are included in what I said.
Senator Gore. These terms of military art frequently remind me
of Alice in Wonderland. I believe there was a character there who
was going to declare her own terms and choose words with her own
meaning.
The Communists have done that for a long time and we seemed to
have learned the trick.
Mr. Colby. No, sir, it is not a trick. Senator.
Senator Gore. The formula then.
Mr. Colby. It is a formula we use because this is the way we use
the information. You must, in order to fight the war, have in cate-
gories the different t3'pes of forces you are fighting so that you can
identif}^ clearly how much of your effort to put against the different
forces. Therefore, you must break them down into these different
elements.
200
EXTENSION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM
TO FIGHT NLF
Senatoi Gore. You were saying- before we got into this question
of the size of forces that the United States had long assisted the wSouth
Vietnamese Government in resisting and fighting people from North
Vietnam and also the indigenous opposition called the Vietcong.
In the Phoenix program, as I understand you to say and you correct
me if I am misstating your position, we moved to assist the South
Vietnamese Government in fighting the political infrastructure of the
indigenous political opposition in South Vietnam, which has been
identified as the National Liberation Front.
Do I correctly state j^our position?
Mr. Colby. You are correct. Senator. We have extended our
assistance over the past 2 or 3 years, from assistance merely on the
purely military contest to assistance to the South Vietnamese to
strengthen their local territorial forces which protect the hamlets
and villages against the guerrillas. We have also extended our assist-
ance and our advisory effort to include the police and internal security
effort against the enemy terrorists, against the enemy's command and
control structure for the entire effort. It is the political structure that
is the command element which gives the direction to the terroiists,
to the gueriillas, and to the main force elements and, therefore, they
are a verj^^ definite part of the total war eflPort.
COUNTER TERROR PROGRAM
Senator Gore. Would you mind explaining the difference between
the Vietcong terror efforts against the political infrastructure of the
Saigon Government, on the one hand, and the counter terror program
of the South Vietnamese Government against the political infrastruc-
ture of their opposition, the NLF.
Mr. Colby. As I testified the other day, Senator, there is no longer
a counterterror effort. Several j^ears ago there was a short period in
which that kind of an idea got loose.
Senator Gore. How short a period?
Mr. Colby. I would saj a maximum of 6 months, between 6 months
to a year.
Senator Gore. What was the goal of the counter terror program?
Mr. Colby. This was a period at which very little effort was being
made against the political apparatus, the control structure, the
terrorist structure of the enemy. It was determined at that time, with
the Vietnamese Government, to organize some special groups to try
to begin to work on this side of the total problem.
Now, they were given a very unfortunate name, and they also did
some unfortunate things.
This was stopped, and I might confess that I had something to do
with stopping it, because I just do not believe that this is going to be
productive. There has been a change— : —
Senator Gore. You had no other reason, no conscience against
organized assassination?
Mr. Colby. Sir, I have a conscience. Senator.
Senator Gore. Was that part of your reason is what I am asking?
201
Mr. Colby. That was i)art of my reasoning, but it is also unproduc-
tive in the larger sense. It is not productive to do unconscionable
things, I do not believe.
Senator Gore. Of course, I do not know how a^ou would measure an
estimate of productivity of a program and your reluctance conscien-
tiously to engage in it. Do you have a measurement?
OBJECT OF TOTAL OPERATION IN VIETNAM
Mr. Colby. Senator, the object of this total operation in Vietnam
was to strengthen the Vietnamese people and government against the
challenge being made to it.
Senator Gore. By neutralizing their opposition?
Mr. Colby. No, sir. First, by strengthening their own cohesion and
their own engagement and commitment in the effort, to change it from
an effort conducted by officials and by soldiers to an effort which in-
cludes such organizations as the People's Self-Defense, in which the
ordinary citizen is given a weapon to help defend his home; and also by
including in the effort a ])rogram of identifying clearly who are the key
members of the enemy a])paratus as distinct from the individual who is
merely a member of a local farmer's association.
PAST AND PRESENT GOALS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Gore. This brings us back to the question I asked you some
moments ago, to which I did not receive an answer. What were the
goals of the Phoenix program when it was, by your terms, a counter-
terror i^rogram?
Mr. Colby. The goals at that time were to begin to capture, rally,
or kill members of the enemy a]:)paratus.
Senator Gohe. Those are still the goals p.ow except you liave begun.
You are well into it now.
Mr. Colby. The difference today is that this is more integrated
into the normal government and i)olice and judicial structure of the
Vietnamese Government.
At that time there was not a constitutional government. There was
military rule. Since that time a constitution has been ado])ted, a
government has been established, and a beginning has been made to
establishing the kind of law and order that you would expect a govern-
ment to produce.
Senator Gore. As I understand your answer, the goals are the same.
You used identically the same words — capture, rally, or kill. I do not
quite get either a distinction or a difference in what it was when you
called it and described it as a counter terror progi'am and the Phoenix
]:)rogram now with the same goals.
Would you mind enlightening me?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
I think the difference. Senator, as I indicated, was that at that time
there were these special grou]:)s which were not included in the normal
government structure. They were essentially guerrilla forces on the
government side, organized to help conduct the fight against this
aspect of the enemy.
Since that time, this has been more and more integrated into
the normal government structure, and correspondingly conducted
under the government's rules of behavior.
44-706—70 14
202
Senator Gore. What particular vii-tiie does interrogation contribute
to murder?
Mr. Colby. Senator, this is not murder. We are not talking of
that.
Senator Gore. Or killing. I will use your terms.
Mr. Colby. We are talking of a fire fight that develops when a team
of police, a group of soldiers, or a group of self-defenders goes out to
attack and to capture, if possible, a leading member of the enemy
command structure.
Now, they realize
Senator Gore. When you say command structure, is this a word
of art? Is this a village chief in an area in which the NLF has the
predominant influence?
Mr. Colby. This is the chairman of the People's Revolutionary
Party for that village, for example.
Senator Gore. In other words, this is the community or village
political leadership.
Mr. Colby. He has not been elected. There is another village chief
in that village, Senator.
Senator Gore. I did not inquire about how he became a leader,
whether he was elected under the constitution or othenvise. He is the
local village political leader and the purpose of the Phoenix program
is to neutralize him either by capture, rally, or kill.
Mr. Colby. He is an individual contending for power in that village.
On his side. He is contending for power from the Communist side.
Senator Gore. Thank you very much, but I have overtrespassed my
time.
Senator Cooper. I was not leaving because you asked questions.
I have to go to the floor, but I will be brief.
IS united states involved in assassination or terror program?
I have seen the newspaper article and the implication of the articles
and also our questioning may suggest and wrongfully that the United
States may be a part of, either by act or by advice, a program of assas-
sination, the same type of program that the Vietcong directed against
the South Vietnamese.
Now, does the United States, through your operations, have any
program or one which is supported by our country, or a U.S. supported
program of the South Vietnamese which directs assassination or acts
of terrorism?
Mr. Colby. No, Senator, I do not.
If I might continue a bit with the same point, the Vietnamese
Government has developed this program first of all to identify the
members of the enemy political structure, to get their names clearly,
to go through these seven or eight aliases, and then to try to capture
them or to try to get them to rally.
Now, in the course of those actions, just as happened to John
Dillinger, he may shoot back and he may end up dead.
The second area in which these figures show people being killed is
that in the normal hamlet or village of Vietnam there are several
ambushes around the outside of the village at night to keep marauding
guerrilla bands away.
203
When an armed band approaches that particidar area, the am-
biishers do not stop to inqidre too deeply as to who is there. They
know that no one should be moving in that area, and they are aware
of any friendly troops that are moving in that area.
At that point, a fire fight begins, and in the morning it is clear that
several people have been killed.
By looking at the documents on the bodies, it can be discovered
frequently that an individual was the head of a district committee
or the local security officer for the village committee, or whatever.
In that fashion, he is reported as killed.
But in direct answer to your question, Senator, the United States
is not a party to a program to assassinate people in Vietnam.
Senator Cooper. I wanted the answer and I appreciate it very
much.
U.S. ACTIONS IN EVENT OF ASSASSINATIONS BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE
We are all aware that in war situations things occur that do not
occur in peacetime. Assume that you know or find out that there are
assassinations by the South Vietnamese. Do you take any position?
Do you advise against it, or is the United States just neutral about it?
Mr. Colby. No, sir, we have issued a directive to all members
of the American community there, the members of the CORDS, the
military, and the civilian advisers, that if they see a situation which
does not meet the rules of land warfare, they are not only to refuse
any participation, they are to make their objections known, and they
are to report the fact that this happened to higher authority.
Major Arthur just mentioned the fact that there was an unfortunate
interrogation that took i)lace in his area, and that he objected to it,
and it has since ceased. I think those are very clear directives to our
forces and to our civilian advisers in Vietnam. I have a copy of that
directive.
PROSECUTION, SENTENCING AND DETENTION OF VIETCONG
Senator Cooper. In the United States in time of war, in a combat
zone, a writ of habeas corpus is not a\aila})le. That is the law in our
country, and also militaiy trial is aj^plicable in a combat zone in the
United" States. The Supreme Court decided that in the case of the
Germans who were captured on the eastern seacoast.
But when the leaders of the Vietcong are apprehended and taken
into custody and are held in detention, is there any kind of legal
process — I do not mean due process as we would expect in our coun-
try— but is there any kind of a process to determine whether or not
those detained are in the command or political structure, whether or
not they have been engaged in acts of terrorism or acts of assassina-
tion?
Mr. Colby. A Vietcong member who is captured. Senator, after
being interrogated at the district level, as the major mentioned, is
then sent to the province.
At the province level it is decided whether there is a case against
him for criminal prosecution under security legislation. If so, he is
sent to a military tribunal where be can be con^^cted of this particular
crime.
204
This tribunal is authorized to give a variety of sentences which are
convictions.
There is a separate proceeding which he might be subjected to. This
is called administrative detention. The Vietnamese word is An Tri.
If under the circumstances there is evidence to satisfy the executive
that this man should be held because he is a danger to the State, then
he may be held in detention for a period up to 2 j^ears. This would then
be extended thereafter by a review of his case.
Over the past year the Government has defined very clearly the
different levels of participation in the Vietcong political effort. They
have issued a detailed description of this which, I believe, we have
provided to the committee staff. This identifies three levels of par-
ticipation, called A, B, and C.
(The information referred to follows:)
Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)
1. Definition: The A'iet Cong infrastructure is defined as the political organiza-
tion through which the ^'iet Cong control or seek to control the South \ietnaniese
people. It consists of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) structure (which
includes a command/control and administrative apparatus — Central Office for
South Vietnam (COSVN). — at the national level), and the leadership and admin-
istration of a parallel front organization, The National Front for the Liberation
of SVN (NFLSVN), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet
level. The PRP is the southern arm of the Lao Dong or worker's party the official
Communist Party of North ^■ietnam. Several high ranking personnel in key
positions at the COSVN level hold jjositions on the Lao Dong Central Committee
which interlocks leaders of the PRP and Hanoi.
2. Not considered to be in the VCI category: (a) Rank and file guerrillas; (6) Rank
and file members of front organizations; (c) Soldiers and members of organized
VC/NVA military units; (d) Persons who pay taxes to the VC; (e) Persons who
perform miscellaneous tasks for the VC; and (/) ]\Iembers of the populace in VC-
controlled areas.
The A level receives a 2-year sentence. The B level receives a
minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 2, because that is all that is
authorized. The C level, or general follower, cannot receive more than
a 1-year sentence.
Now, in actual fact, most of the C level are let go veiy quickly.
The quotas, for instance, that we were discussing apply only to A
and B levels. They do not apply to C levels.
U.S. IS NOT INVOLVED IN SYSTEM OF ASSASSINATION OF VIETCONG
Senator Cooper. In substance, you do say that the United States
has not initiated, does not participate in, does not advise or condone
a system of assassination of the Vietcong.
Mr. Colby. I do say that. Senator. I do submit that unfortunate
things happen on occasion in Vietnam, and I would not pretend to
say that no one has been wrongfully killed there; that I would not
pretend to say.
But I think I frankly was quite heartened in the past few days by
the appearance of two articles in the Washington Post and the New
York Times. These articles were written by very serious reporters
who were obviously told to go out and look carefully into this Phoenix
program in preparation for these hearings.
They have come up with some well-stated criticisms of the prograni.
We are aware of these weaknesses in the program and the difficulties
205
of getting this program done. This is not novel in Vietnam,
unfortunately.
But in the course of their stories they do not mention any of the
kinds of abuses that have been suggested here. In fact, I beheve the
Washington Post story by Mr. Kaiser states that he was unable to
find any evidence of that kind of an incident.
Now, several years ago I think he would have been able to find
that kind of evidence. I am very pleased to indicate that apparently
his researches have not proved that to be occurring now.
Senator Cooper. Thank you very much.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, I guess you signified that you wanted
mo to i)roceed.
The Chairman. Yes, you may proceed. We may have a vote pretty
soon, I am told. I wonder if we can come back this afternoon. We
have two more witnesses. Can you come back for a while this
afternoon?
Senator Case. I can come back.
The Chairman. Go ahead until the bell rings, but we are expecting
a vote on the Mondale amendment.
POSSIBILITY OF CORRUPT USES OF PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Case. On this new program, Colonel, why don't you come
up here and sit here because 1 have a couple of questions that I would
like to address to you on your statements yesterday. But for the
moment, I would like to i)ursue this Phoenix thing a little further,
and you have already introduced it, Mr. Ambassador, and the line of
([uestioning I wanted to bring out is based largely on Robert Kaiser's
story in the Post.
He does say, I do not think quite as flatly as, perhaps, you sug-
gested, that there was no present evidence of assassination, but that
he had not been able to find any direct evidence of it, and, in general,
plays down the Phoenix as an assassination or counter terror operation.
But he does make criticism of it, as you suggest, too.
One of them is its potential for use by ambitious politicians against
thoir political opponents, not the Vietcong at all. And I take it you
are conscious of this possibility.
Would you comment on it?
Mr. Colby. This is a possibility, Senator, and this jjossibiUty has
beim raised in the Vietnamese Legislature.
The Vietnamese Legislature called the government to account on a
series of stories that they had heard in various provinces about this.
They interrogated the government and indicated that they were
concerned about it.
Any program can be abused, of course, if the parties in power wish
to do so. This is true of the armed forces or the Administration or any
other. But to date it is our impression that this is not being used
substantially for internal political purposes, if you except the Com-
munists from the area called internal.
Senator Case. So Mr. Kaiser states. He talks about this as a
l)otential, and certainly it is a potential because it involves roving
bands of government agents with, in effect, kangaroo court powers
if they are exercised.
206
Air. Colby. Yes, it is. They are not really roving bands, Senator.
They are members of the police and military apparatus. They are
under the command of the appropriate level of authority, the province
chief and the district chief. They are part of the government structure.
Senator Case. But this possibility does exist.
The article says, ' 'Phoenix contributes substantially to corruption.
Some local officials demand payoffs with threats of arrest under the
Phoenix iirogram, or release genuine Vietcong for cash."
What about that?
Mr. Colby. I would say that occasionally that happens, yes. I
could not give you a percentage of how often this haj^jjens. It is a
l^roblem not only in the Phoenix program; it is a problem in other
programs.
The shakedown is a problem in a variety of nations around the
world. All I can say is that I have heard the President and the Prime
Minister on many occasions give very strong directions that the
focus of the effort is on the Vietcong, that this is the object of the
operation, and that it is not to be used for other purposes.
INCONSISTENCY IN GVN ACTION AGAINST MR. DZU
The Chairman. Will the Senator allow me to ask a question? Can
you tell us, where is Mr. Dzu, the man who ran second in the last
election? Is he still in jail?
Mr. Colby. Mr. Dzu is in Chi Hoa jail in Saigon.
The Chairman. How do you reconcile that with your statement of
the very objective view of the Prime Minister? I do not see how you
do reconcile it.
Mr. Colby. He was not arrested under the Phoenix program, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. I know. I realize that. I mean this estimate of
yours of their high-mindedness in this matter. This has always
puzzled me. How you can defend an administration that did that to
Mr. Dzu and apparently are going to give it to Mr. Chau, too. That
is all.
It does seem to me quite inconsistent with what you said about it.
Mr. Colby. I believe I was discussing the Phoenix program, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. I understand that. But you say they are giving
instructions to be so careful not to use the program for political
purposes, wdien Thieu himself has put a man in prison for no other
crime that we know of than that he ran second to him in the election.
Senator Case. I think that just, perhaps, suggests this is a privilege
reserved for the higher officials. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. I see.
phoenix program's focus on low-level operators
Senator Case. A third specific suggestion about this program is
that it is hel})ing the Vietcong more than hurting them, by thro\\ing
peoi)le into prison who are just low-level operators even under duress,
and not really enemies of the regime, and alienating a substantial
number of people in a ])opulation who ought to be persuaded to come
on tlie side of the Saigon Government.
207
Is this also true?
Mr. Colby. Well, of course, Senator, as I will bring out in later
testimony, there is an active program to invite members of the
enemy to join the government's side, a very energetic program.
Senator Case. I understand that.
Mr. Colby. So if they would join the government's side they
would be welcomed.
Senator Case. I understand
Mr. Colby. As for your point, however, this has been a problem.
The government adopted the A, B, C classifications of the members
of the apparatus so that the lower levels Avould not count as part of
this program, and so that they would not be the object of the effort.
It was an effort to downgrade that kind of targeting and to focus
on the key members of the enemy api)aratus, and I believe they have
had some success.
Senator Case. That is the general objective, but how about the
quotas? Are the quotas met by anybody?
Mr. Colby. No, sir; the quotas are only met by A's and B's not
by C's.
a's, b's, and c's
Senator Case. Tell us roughly who is an A, who is a B, and who
is a C.
Mr. Colby. There is a detailed breakout in this green book, which
is in Vietnamese.
Senator Case. Just tell me.
Mr. Colby. The A levels are People's Revolutionary Party Mem-
bers, party members who are obviously fellows who have gone through
the candidate stage and become convinced members of the enemy
api)aratus.
The B level are leaders of the various front groups, the leading
elements of the so-called farmers association in an area, the other
senior peoi)le who are trying to give actual leadershii), although they
may not be party members yet. The C level are generally the rest of
the people who participate in the actions.
effectiveness of phoentx progr.^m
Senator Case. Now, Mr. Kaiser sort of switches it around and says
this model bears small resemblance to actuality. He says the thing
has hardly worked at all, and the main reason is that the Government,
Saigon jjeople, military antl whatnot, the military officials supposedly
on the Government side, are not interested in prosecuting it.
They do not want to disturb things. They would rather take their
chance with things as they are, not upset people. They do not want
to go after the Vietcong.
Mr. Colby. Senator, I used to be quoted to the effect that I did not
feel that the operation had begun to hurt the enemy at all. I have
changed my evaluation in the ])ast, I would say, 2 to 3 months.
I do not think it is being all that effective yet, but I do believe it is
beginning to bite.
The normal VCI now goes with a bodyguard. He does not live in
the village any more. He lives out in the forest, in the safe area. This
is beginning to put some pressure on this apparatus.
208
There are many things to be clone to improve it. Beside the ones
mentioned here, I know a few of my own. We will try to improve
these and make it work the way it should.
It is having some impact now, though I think it is increasingly
having an overall positive impact as distinct from the possibility of
counterproductive impact which it may have had some time ago.
VIETNAMIZATION OF PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Case. Kaiser concludes his piece by saying '' 'Vietnamiza-
tion' of Phoenix has, in a sense, already been completed," so far as
the Americans involved. As you said, they were advisers, and he says
that some officials think most of them should be ^^-ithdrawn. " 'We
have done all we can,' one official said. 'If they want to get the VCI
they can do it. We can't do anything more.' "
Mr. Colby. As for the wanting to eliminate this, Senator, I believe
that there are
Senator Case. Our participation in it.
Mr. Colby. Yes, but both the national leadership and the local
leadership have a considerable interest in eliminating this Vietcong
terrorist effort.
As I brought out yesterday, over 6,000 people were killed last year
in the course of these terrorist incidents. Fifteen thousand were
wounded. This is a very serious business to the local village chief, to the
local district chief, to the local province chief. They know who is
organizing this kind of a program. It is this apparatus. So they are
anxious to do it.
Now, the Government made a further step on October 1 when they
changed the program from being a private government effort to a
public program. They publicized it; they made it the subject of leaflets
and banners, and so forth, with the theme that this program protects
the population against terrorisnu
Since that time they have published leaflets with the pictures of
people who have been wanted. Some of these people have come in;
some of them have been captured; some of them have been reported on
by their neighbors as a result of being identified through this program.
The People's Self-Defense Force has been assisting in carrying out
this program of identifying and picking up members of the other side.
Senator Case. I take it, in general, you operating gentlemen, you.
Colonel, Major, certainly would not disagree — I would assume you
would not disagree — with the Ambassador?
Mr. Colby. If they wish to, sir, they are qiute at liberty. They are
under oath to tell the truth.
IS phoenix program best way to do the job?
Senator Case. Is this the best way to do the job? Is Phoenix all that
imi)ortant or are the negative sides equal to the positive value in your
ex})erience?
Mr. Mills. Senator, I would say it is a job that has to be done one
way or the other in the same way that the FBI
Senator Case. Would you identify yourself?
Mr. Mills. Yes, sii*.
209
I am Hawthorne Mills, Province Senior Adviser in Tuyen Due. I
testified yesterday in your absence.
I would say this job has to be done. There are some questions
about the Phoenix organization, as a manmade mechanism to go
about rooting out the underground organization, is the best way to
do it.
Senator Case. That is what we are talking about. Nobody, at
least this Senator, is in any way criticizing the idea of a successful effort
in South Vietnam.
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. But this Senator is questioning this particular thing
and its effectiveness and the dangers involved in it, whether it is
counterproductive.
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.
I think the Phoenix program was designed to overcome some of the
weaknesses in the counterintelhgence organization of the Vietnamese
Government. This may be a further step toward the situation in most
countries of the world, wherein the police or the national equivalent of
the FBI handle this type of program. The Vietnamese pohce are play-
ing the effective i)art in this.
It may be that some of the weaknesses which have been i)()inted out
are weaknesses in the operation of this thing, but not in the concept.
I think there has been a misunderstanding which has come out today
that somehow or other the Phoenix program is o])erating against
innocent civilians who are working under the normal political rules.
This is not the case, as the Ambassador ])ointed out.
These are organizers of the terrorist activities that the Vietcong are
conducting. I would say that in Tuyen Due Province the Phoenix
program is a great advance over what was being done in the past.
But, perha])s, as security conditions allow, the normal })olice can
take over this operation, and this will be, ])erhai)s, a better way of
handling it.
TRIAL AND DETENTION UPON EVIDENCE OF VC CONNECTION
Senator Case. It says here that if there is some evidence of a Viet-
cong coimection, the people apjirehended are brought to trial before
a ])rovincial security team. That is before the Phoenix team. I take it?
Mr. Colby. No, sir; that is the jn'ovincial security committee.
That is made up of the province chief, the deputy for admhiistration,
the chairman of the provincial council, the province judge, the chief
of police, and a few other officials on the ])rovince level.
Senator Case. Is that the way normal criminal justice is admin-
istered?
Mr. Colby. No; it is not. That is the second system. That is the
administrative detention proceeding.
The other system is a military tribunal that can give a real con-
viction after a full trial.
Senator Case. Then people are not, so far as you know, at least
the rule is that they are not, punished bevond detention without such
a trial?
Mr. Colby. No, Two-year detention is the rule. It can be extended.
Senator Case. So it is indefinite detention, which is possible by
these terms?
210
Mr. Colby. But normally they are released, Senator.
Senator Case. Is there anything you want to say, either of your
colleagues?
Mr. McManaway. The detention is not decided by the team, sir;
it is by the security committee.
Senator Case. Which has just been described.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Case. Major?
EFFECTIVENESS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM IN BINH CHANH
Major Arthur. Yes, sir. In reference to j^our question as to how
it is working and whether it is the most effective tool to accomplish
the mission, it is not working all that well in Binh Chanh district.
During the months of June through December, with a quota of 80,
they got 46 VCT. However, it is better than what they had before. It
is an honest effort to collate all the intelligence that comes into the
district to get it in one central place and get it together so they can
identify the people who are causing problems.
Let me give you an example. In An Lac Village, about the first
week in November, a Vietcong terror team came in and assassinated
an old man by taking him out and bayoneting him. They left his
body on the road with a message. He was a distant relative of the
district chief.
District forces, regional and popular forces had conducted an armed
raid from An Lac 1 to An Lac 4. They had a fire fight and killed one
terrorist. The other one never was seen again.
Approximately a week later, the Vietcong went into An Lac 4 and
went to the home of a woman whom they suspected of telling where
they were hiding. They bayoneted her. Thej^ came back the next
night and killed her son and nephew.
We put everything we could together — revolutionary forces, de-
velopment cadre, the district intelligence squad, the PF platoons
normally assigned to the village, the PSDF, the whole thing, every-
thing. This went on for about a month, but didn't get anything really
at all.
Then we got some intelligence that they were going to be coming
back into the village, and we increased the security, particularly in
the area they thought they would come in.
A fire fight did ensue that night, and when the bodies were identi-
fied, one was Le Cong Dong who was the An Lac Village chief for
security. He was the head guy who had been sponsoring all this as-
sassination by the Vietcong.
So it does work. This was not specific targeting. We just knew they
were going to come back into the village at some time, and we thought
it was going to be a certain night, and increased the security of that
village.
Senator Case. This village chief
Major Arthur. He is still in business.
Senator Case. He was ostensibly a representative of the Saigon
government, their village chief, but turned traitor.
Major Arthur. No, sir. He was on the Vietcong side as the Vietcong
security chief for the shadow government of An Lac Village.
211
Senator Case. Was he discovered in the village or was his identifi-
cation, his identity, discovered later?
Major Arthur. We knew who he was. We knew the leader. He
was identified once he was killed. Documents on the body identified
him as such. We were not sure whether he woidd be coming back with
that three-man or four-man guerrilla squad at night.
Senator Case. Is there anything further, Colonel, that you would
like to say about this program?
PROBLEMS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM IN THE DELTA
Mr. Vann. I would just like to add a comment or two. Senator Case.
I have some 2,500 American ad\dsers in the Delta. By and large,
their standard of morals and ethics are about the same as that of the
normal American. Thej^ are normal Americans.
We, on a continuing^ basis, do have problems in all programs, and
certainly in the Phung Hoang program, because we have in many
cases i)eople who are given responsibilities who have either not had
adequate training or projier training or have not had adequate experi-
ence in the discharge of the responsibilities on the Vietnamese side.
In many cases leaders develop who have motivations that are not
for the effort but are ]:)ersonal, and so you do have aberrations that take
place on the part of these people.
You have people who are abusing this program or any other.
You can have a good program such as simply building a school become
a tool for corruption when instead of the man building a school he will
sell the cement or will sell half the cement, and you end up with walls
which might fall down on the children.
Visitors to Vietnam, and particularly rei)orters, when they go out
into the Delta, and we have 725 villages
delta villages and hamlets
Senator Case. Excuse me. By villages you mean what we call small
towns?
Mr. Vann. No, sir, these are groups of towns. We go to what we
call
Senator Case. You mean a collection of villages?
Mr. Vann. A village is a collection of hamlets. A hamlet is what we
would call a small town. A hamlet may be as little as 50 people, or
it may be as many as 15,000 or 20,000. We have 4,205 of these hamlets.
Seiiator Case. The average, just to give a httle more of the picture,
the average po})ulation of that hamlet is about what?
Mr. Vann. The average population of a Government-controlled
hamlet in the Delta is 1,000. The average population of a Vietcong-
controUed hamlet in the Delta is about 850. This just reflects the fact
that where there is better security and better economic opportunity
there will b6 a greater cluster of population.
TENDENCY TO REPORT EXTREMES IN PHOENIX PROGRAM
What I wanted to say was that, as a reporter or a visitor or an
analyst goes through he "looks for the unusual. When you are looking
212
into the Phoenix program the normal coiu'se of operations does not
make news, and it is not worthy of separate analysis.
Therefore, there is always a tendenc}^ to report the extremes, and
so, even thongh in 725 villages we may have village administrations
that are fimctioning well in the main, when you find one that has a
corrupt village chief or one who has taken the police and the popular
forces who have been assigned to him and who is using them to collect
rentals for absentee landlords or using them to bully the people, that
becomes kind of a cause celebre. When it does we try to focus attention
on it and try to correct it.
But I must say as a citizen that I to some extent resent the implica-
tion that we Americans would be over there aiding, abetting, assisting,
or directing a ])rogram which was designed to assassinate civilians,
particularly civilians that may or may not be members of the opposi-
tion. We don't. In my instructions, I have often said to the advisers:
You are the conscience not only of the American effort but, because this is a
very young country, and because it has been subject to revolution, you are also
the conscience of the Vietnamese effort. You must at all times be aware of your
responsibility to see that standards of human decency applJ^
This is just standard practice on our part over there. But when
these exceptions get reported, and particularlj^ when they are used
by people who are in basic disagreement with the ijolicy in Vietnam
as a means of criticizing the effort, they are taken out of context.
They in no way reflect anything that is normal.
Senator Case. I think your latter point is the kind of evidence that
we want. I do not believe there are many people who suggest that
Americans do this for the fun of it. I am sure this is true. There are
many who have questioned whether it may not inevitably, may not
inherently, be so susceptible to bad use and to corruption in an area
like this for a thousand reasons that the question is whether or not it
is desirable overall. That question, I take it, you have constantly under
re\dew yourself.
I assume that this is so.
Mr. Vann. We do, sir. I might even add that
The Chairman. I wonder if the Senator will allow me to interrupt.
There is a vote going on. The bell rang a moment ago. I think we
ought to make it.
Can you gentlemen come back at 2:30? Would that be all right,
or a quarter of 3.
\h\ Colby. At your convenience, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, it is 1 o'clock now. ^Slake it a quarter of 3
to give you time for lunch.
Senator Case. I will let the colonel finish.
(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 2:45 p.m., this same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
The Chairman. Mv. Ambassador, before we let Major Arthur go,
there is one more question I would like to ask.
Is Major Arthur there?
213
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JAMES F. ARTHUR— Resumed
Major Arthur. Yes. .
The Chairman. It is not a very complicated question; it was lett
dangling.
DOES DEFENSE OF BINH CHANH REST SOLELY ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE?
Yon said in your statement that there are no U.S. combat forces
in the district now and the defense of Binh Chanh rests solely on the
Vietnamese.
That seems to be such a positive flat statement, 1 wondered il
you would elaborate. What support does the United States con-
tribute?
For example, in engagements with the enemy, are American
helicopter gunships called in? Is there American artillery support
or what kind of air support does the United States provide, if any?
Major Arthur. Sir, the Vietnamese i)rovide their own artillery sup-
port. We do have helicopter gunships support on call. Maybe on an
average of once a week a fire team of two gunships will be in the area
and operate for 15 to 20 minutes. This is the extent of the U.S. combat
support we are getting. We do not have any tactical air and no tactical
air has been called siiue I have been in that district. It is available but
we have not called it. .
The Chairman. Then would you say it is accurate to say that it
rests solelv on the Vietnamese? That is a Uttle bit of an overstatement;
is it not? Or do you think the gunships are of no significance? Are they
de minimis?
Major Arthur. Pardon me, sir?
The Chairman. Do you think the supi)ort of gunships is of no signifi-
cance, so that they are unworthy of notice?
Major Arthur. Well, they do contribute some added firei)ower.
The Chairman. All I am "arguing about is the statement when you
say, "solelv on the Vietnamese." If you have gunships, the way we have
had these gunships described, they are quite useful histruments in the
slaughtenng of ])eople. Are they not?
Major Arthur. Well, not in the slaughtering of [)eople, sir.
The Chairman. KiUing thorn, whatever you like to call it. They
have very powerful fire power; do they not?
Major Arthur. Yes, sir; they do.
The Chairman. What do you call it? Do you prefer to say killing
or slaughtering?
Major Arthur. I would prefer to say killing or dehvenng sup-
pri^ssive fire so the infantry can close in with the enemy.
The Chairman. That sounds nicer.
Major Arthur. Or force them out of the water so they will sur-
render.
The Chairman. It sounds nicer. I thought in discussing the war
there is no point in trying to make it sound like a ten party. I mean
their ])urpose is to kill people; is it not?
Major Arthur. Yes, su*.
The Chairman. That is the whole purpose of the operation in the
military sense; is it not?
Major Arthur. No, su-.
214
The Chairman. What is the purpose?
Major Arthur. The purpose, of course, would be to get them to
surrender or to capture them, if possible.
The Chairman. If they don't, kill them; isn't that right?
Major Arthur. Yes, sir.
DEFENSE OF BINH CHANH DOES NOT REST SOLELY ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE
The Chairman. I am a little slow in semantics I guess. I have not
had the training you have had out there in how to describe these
activities. But the point I was making is that I did not realize, and I
do not believe it is accurate to say, that it rests solely on the Viet-
namese. What are all these troops doing out there if it rests solely on
the Vietnamese? That is the only point of the question.
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. Do you insist that "solely" is an accurate descrip-
tion?
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, I believe the major was probably
thinking in terms of those forces in the district rather than those that
are available from outside. I think your point is well taken.
The Chairman. It does not rest solely on them.
Mr. Colby. That is right.
The Chairman. That is the whole point. We are trying to make
this as accurate as we can. I am not trying
Major Arthur. Are there any further questions, sir?
The Chairman. No, that is all.
Now, we have Mr. William K. Hitchcock, who is the director of the
refugee program.
Air. Hitchcock, do you have a statement?
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Do you msh to proceed at this time, please, sir?
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK, DIRECTOE, REFUGEE
DIEECTORATE, COEDS
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the committee knows, the United States is providing substantial
assistance to the Government of Vietnam to help mitigate the distress
of Vietnamese people dislocated by the war. This effort. Ambassador
Colby has explained, is part of the pacification program. The problems
of assisting these ])eople, however, present special challenges, and the
Government of Vietnam has set up an integrated organization to
deal with them at the central, regional, and provincial levels of
government.
I am happy to have this opportunity to give you a report on this
program and our efforts to help move it forward. My statement con-
tains information on the background of tlie present situation, develop-
ments in 1969, problems we continue to confront, and our estimation
of future prospects.
215
DISPLACEMENT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE RESULTING FROM 1954 GENEVA
AGREEMENT
Although other large-scale displacements of people have occurred
before in Vietnam's history, two of them can be directly related to
events in Vietnam since World War II. The first occurred as a result of
the Geneva Agreement of 1954 which gave all Vietnamese people 300
days to choose whether they wanted to live in the North or the South.
Estimates vary, but to the best of our knowledge, approximatel}^
900,000 civilians moved south and about 75,000 went north. Almost
all of those who went south were absorbed into the community in about
3 years' time and they constitute an important element of South
Vietnamese society today.
The Chairman. Would you mind an interruption at that point?
NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND ASSISTANCE IN MOVING SOUTH
There was a piece in the paper the other day about the 900,000
that moved south. President Nixon in his November 3 speech, which
was, as you know, widely noted in this country, said, and I quote:
a* * * ^j^g million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South
Vietnam when the Communists took over in the north."
How do you reconcile those figures? I noticed that in your statement.
Mr. Hitchcock. I had not noticed that figure, sir, and I do not know
that I have ever seen the source that has quoted a million and a half; a
million is closer.
The Chairman. I have not either. I thought perhaps they had called
upon you or in someway or other had checked it with you.
How did these people get to the South? Did the United States take
them in American ships primarily?
Air. Hitchcock. The United States was involved; so, also, were the
French. I am not quite sure. Perhaps, Ambassador Colby may remem-
ber the story.
Mr. Colby. Thej' went south in ships, Mr. Chairman; they went
south in aircraft; they went south by walking — a variety of ways. But
they were assisted by the United States very distinctly.
The Chairman. That is what I mean ; I read that.
Mr. Hitchcock. There was very definitely assistance.
The Chairman. OK. Will you, however, check on that figure and see
what the background is for the record? It seems to me there is such a
discrepancy between 900,000 and a million and a half. Not now; you
do not have to do it now, but later.
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, we will.
(The information referred to appears on p. 748.)
DISPLACEMENT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DURING INTENSIFICATION
OF WAR
jNIr. Hitchcock. The second large-scale displacement of people
developed with the intensification of the war in the mid-1960's. The
refugees of this jieriod are defined as people who have had to leave
their homes and their means of livelihood to escape from Communist
pressures, from artillery or bombardment, or fron,i the crossfire of war.
216
Over 3 million people, almost 20 percent of Sonth Vietnam's total
population, have sought refuge during the past 6 years. Unlike
World War II European refugees who moved from counlry to country,
South Vietnam's clisplaced people have remained within its own
borders. They moved in large or small groups from Vietcong-controlled
areas or from combat zones to some place nearby ^\'hich offered them
relative security. Virtually no one has voluntarily left places con-
trolled by the Republic of Vietnam either for Vietcong-controlled
areas or for North Vietnam. Most of them have been at least temjjo-
rarily resettled in new locations or returned home as improved security
conditions permitted.
In March 1969, 1,450,000 were still on the government's refugee
rolls; by the end of December the payment of allowance had reduced
this number to 270,000. An individual is removed from the active
refugee caseload when he receives the payments he has been promised;
a refugee site, on the other hand, continues to receive assistance until
it is physically and economically up to Vietnamese standards. The
completion of most individual payments in 1969 permits efforts in
1970 to be concentrated on establishing normal living conditions and
a basis for achieving economic self sufficiency at each inadequate site.
Aside from regular refugees, well over a million other people have
seen their homes destroyed or have had their lives otherwise disrupted
by the w^ar. They receive special assistance as war \'ictims. What
distinguishes this group from refugees is that the war -related distress
they suffer does not drive them away from their homes or their
established means of livelihood for more than transient periods of
time. And, finally, there are numerous war widows, orphans, and
physically disabled men, women, and children who require more and
better organized help.
The Chairman. Before you leave that page, what is the payment
of allowances to which you referred?
Mr. Hitchcock. That, sir, comes a few pages later in my statement.
The Chairman. Does it? OK.
Mr. Hitchcock. I take it up in detail.
The Chairman. OK. I did not know. That is all right. Proceed.
Mr. Hitchcock. These are the groups of people that have been
the concern of this program since it began. They represent the prin-
cipal problems of human distress among the civilian population. The
scope and even the nature of the problems fluctuate with developments
in the conflict. Whenever military activity is intense, the number of
peoi)le displaced increases. Conversely, whenever the level of combat
subsides and the armed forces have restored territorial security,
refugees return home, or, if they prefer, resettle themselves and their
families in new locations. In either case, they are helped by then-
government. Encouraging progress has been made during the past
year, but the fact remains that fully satisfactory solutions to some of
these problems will not be possible until the fighting stops.
background of present situation
Now let me be more explicit about the background of the present
situation. As the conflict intensified from 1965 through 1967, there was
a tremendous increase in the number of people who had to flee their
217
homes in search of safety. Much has been said about the heavy con-
centration of this refugee movement in the northern part of the
country (or I Corps) where the fighting; was the heaviest. It was
substantial there, but the pervasive character of the conflict created
refugees all over the country, and it did so in ways that varied a great
deal in each of the four regions. For example, in the delta (or IV
Corps) area, many peo]jle fled theii- homes, but, given the relative
ease of subsisting there, they were quickly assimilated and they never
became the obvious ])roblem represented by people in northern
refugee camps. In fact, many of the refugees in the delta never sought
government assistance of any kind at the time they became refugees,
and their number only began to become apparent as security in the
countryside improved and they started returning home in 1969.
Saigon also presents a special kind of situation. ]Much of the influx
of [)eople into the city undoubtedly was motivated by a search for
greater physical security, but they were al)le to find jobs quickly and
they have become an almost indistinguishable pai't of their new envi-
ronment. This is not to say that their adjustment, or the adjustment
of the large numbers of people who came to Saigon for other reasons,
has been satisfactory. Both groups pose a continuing problem, but it is
being tackled as an urban rather than a refugee one.
Tliroughout the country, but particularly in tlic camps in the north,
the continuous stream of people who sought refuge between 1965 and
1967 created widespread confusion and uncertainty about how to deal
with the situation. The challenge of taking care of so many people in
the difficult conditions of the war was enormous; and. hi^kiiig .'i ade-
(juate program or even the resources for one, the Government of Viet-
nam's response to the problem was understandably slow and hesitant.
The extended family system, which constitutes the basis of Viet-
namese life, consists of large tightly knit groupings of se\eral gen-
erations of relatives. It is the extended familv which traditionally has
cared for individual members afflicted by misfortune; the concept of
government responsibility for the welfare of individuals used to be
virtually unknown. Tlie war, however, severely disrupted this system
and created burdens which far exceeded the remaining capacity of the
family structure. This required a fundamental change in the custom-
ary role of Vietnamese Government and the assumption of new re-
sponsibilities.
BEGINNING OF GVN REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND U.S. ASSISTANCE
Against this background the Government's refugee assistance pro-
gram got underway ; but for some time it was an inadequate response
to the problem, and the refugees often had to fend for themselves.
In the United States momiting concern — including the constructive
interest of the Senate — focused attention on the plight of these un-
fortunate people, and the tempo of American efforts to assist in-
creased significantly. I should emphasize that, from the outset, the
problem was recognized as basically a Vietnamese one requiring ^'iet-
namese solutions. But we accepted the responsibility of doing e^i^ry-
thing we could to help. In 1966 the combined efforts of both govern-
ments were concentrated on developing an organization, recruiting
and training people, locating financial resources, and identifying the
44-706—70 15
218
kinds of assistance required in varying refugee situations. Logistics
support also was a prime requirement and building it up was a time-
consuming process. As these organizing efforts proceeded throughout
1966 and 1967, Vietnamese Government officials were gradually learn-
ing how to take care of displaced people. The program that began to
emerge incorporated a number of political and strategic considera-
tions, but basically it was, and is, a humanitarian undertaking.
1968 COMMTJNIST OFFENSR^S
By the end of 1967 the stage was set for an organized all-out attack
on the pi'oblem of the large number of persons who remained in i-efu-
gee status. Then the Communists launched their Tet offensive in Jan-
uary 1968, followed by offensives in May and August. These enemy
attacks, mostly on cities, resulted in over 1 million war victims —
people who were injured or whose homes and property had been dam-
aged or lost, but who did not have to move away from their means of
livelihood. Throughout 1968, assisting these people took almost all the
resources of the Government organization that had been built u}) to
deal with the refugee problem, but, by the end of the year, virtually
all of the million-plus war victims were back under roof and on their
jobs. This was a substantial achievement, given the chaotic circum-
stances existing at that time. It also contributed greatly to the confi-
dence of the Vietnamese Government in its ability to meet this kind of
crisis and to the confidence of the people in their government.
19 6 0 FAVOPvABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN REFUGEE PROGRAM
You have heard Ambassador Colby describe the accelerated pacifica-
tion campaign which was initiated at the end of 1968. The results of
that effort, particularly the extension of security over a large part of
the countryside, plus the increase in GVN self-assurance, were the
main reasons for the favorable developments in the refugee program
in 1969, in wliich it was possible to give largely undiverted atteiition to
the overarching refugee ]:>roblem. Adequate financial resources also
were available, and ti'ained American and Vietnamese personnel were
located throughout the country. So were the logistic supplies such as
roofing, cement, blankets, mosquito netting, and foodstuffs. By this
time the Ministry of Social Welfare had also issued detailed instruc-
tions on what to do and how to do it.
GVN REFUGEE PROGRAMS
The GVN refugee programs do not involve extensive assistance to
any single individual or family, simply because the number of needy
people is so large and the amount of available resources to help them
is limited. This is generally what happens : soon after refugee families
reach secure areas those who seek assistance are housed in Government-
l)rovided temporary camps. Each newly-arrived family gets emer-
gency food commodities for 7 days, followed by a 30-day temporary
allowance, which includes more than food, which is normally extended
until the family can return home or begin to settle elsewhere. The
amount of assistance given to families being resettled or to those re-
turning home is the same : 10 sheets of aluminum roofing and 7,500
219
piasters for each family and 6 months' rice ration or its piaster equiva-
lent for each family member. I might say this averaged for a family
of five about $180. The out-of-camp refugees— those who do not seek
shelter in Govermiient-provided sites — are usually largely self-re-
settled, but they are given 1 months' rice ration and are eligible for
the standard amount of assistance when, and if, they return home.
You will find details of the amounts of these ditlerent refugee allow-
ances and of the payments made to war victims in two charts which
have been attached to my statement.
(The information referred to appeal's on pp. 224 and 225.)
The Ministry of Social Welfare also provides refugee resettlement
camps with wells, latrines, classrooms, simple health facilities and
services, vocational training, and where land is available, vegetable
seeds and other agricultural assistance. The most important and the
most difficult problem is to give the refugees the opportunity to re-
build their lives — to give them some hope for the future. I will discuss
this later in my statement.
Before leaving the subject of allowances I should add that the gen-
eral adequacy of food supplies in Vietnam and the existence of almost
full employment in the cities are important factors which lessen the
amount of government assistance these displaced people require. With-
out tlieso factors the condition of Vietnamese refugees, which often
still is unsatisfactory, would be immeasurably worse.
19 09 ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES
As I indicated earlier, last year over 1 million of the lio million
refugees on the rolls in March 19t)0, received the individual resettle-
ment allowances thej had long been promised. Some 100,000 new refu-
gees and about 22r),()()() wai' \ictinis also were assisted during the year.
Moreover, ap[)roximately 4ss,000 lefugees weie gixcn liel]) by the
Government in returning to their homes as security improved in their
native hamlets and villages. This number of returnees included all
categories of people who had })reviously fled fi"om their liomes — those
in-camp and those out-of-camp, thosi' [)re\ ioiisly resettled, and those
never previously recorded. We estimate that approximately another
100,000 refujxees have returned home and have not vet received Go\-
eminent assistance. Having retunuMl on their own, they are now in
the process of being registeivd and \alidated. 1 belie\e this movement
home was the most significant step forward last year, representing as it
does the reoccupation of many parts of the countryside formerly aban-
doned to the Connnunists. In this sense it adds a new dimension to the
pacification program.
EXAMPLE OF KIEX lMIOX(J PROVIXCE
One exami)le of this development in 1969, one of many, can be seen
in Kien Phong Province in the Delta where 18,936 refugees, many of
them previously unrecorded, returned to their original homes. Four-
teen thousand of them returned along the Thap Muoi Canal, a major
supply route fi'om the Delta to the metropolitan Saigon area, which
had been closed since 1966. Almost as soon as territorial security forces
established new outposts along the canal in 1969, the po[)iilation began
220
to move back. The area is now 75 percent popnlated by former refugees
who have rebuilt their liomes and rephmted their fields, and the canal
is crowded with commerce. As new outposts are consti'ucted, refugees
do not wait for an announcement that the pacification has been com-
pleted. Instead they return while it is in process, convinced by the ex-
[)erience of others that they will be able to resume the lives tliey once
knew.
PROGRESS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
The demands of resettling themselves have encouraged the inven-
tiveness, ingenuity, and self-reliance of the refugees throughout the
country. For example, one group from Binh Dinh Province in II
Corps resettled on a sandy area in Ninh Thuan Province, also in II
Corps, where they have been able to develop a prosperous livelihood
raising onions, garlic, watermelons, and a number of other crops on
small plots of sand. They have built an irrigation system which not
only supplies water for themselves and their crops, but for two neigh-
boring hamlets as well. Then, too, a number of refugee farmers who
returned to their homes in Thua Thien Province, which is in I Corps,
pooled half their rice allowance to buy 232 rototiller tractors, which
enabled them to cultivate their land rapidly and thereby become self-
supporting much more quickly. Incidentally, in Thua Thien Province
alone approximately 130,000 refugees have returned to their native vil-
lages, rebuilt their homes, and reopened their land.
Most of the refugees in II, III, and IV Corps who were resettled
away from their native homes are now satisfactorily situated in eco-
nomic and social circumstances comparable to those of other citizens
in the Vietnamese village hamlet political system. Arable land is gen-
erally available for refugees in these regions, and many of them who
are not farmers have been able to reestablish themselves as fishermen,
craftsmen, laborers, and other self-supporting members of their
communities.
A statistical view of the number of refugees on the rolls and prog-
ress in return to village and payment of resettlement allowances is
given in tables and graphs attached to this statement.
(The information referred to appears on pp. 224 — 227.)
PLIGHT OF REFUGEES IN I CORPS CAMPS
Pi'oblems remain, but the one that is particularly difficult is the
plight of a large number of people, mainly in I Corps, who have not
l3een able to return home and who are living in crowded, far from
satisfactory, camps. Most of these camps are in the three southern
provinces of I Corps — Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.
Rehabilitation of refugees is more difficult there for several reasons.
Arable land was scarce in these provinces long before the refugees
began to concentrate in the areas that were relatively secure. Securitj'^
is not as good as it is in other ])rovinces with large numbers of refu-
gees. Big enemy units operate in the area and the frequency of mili-
tary action creates a great deal of disiuption in the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment's efforts to im]3rove the living conditions of refugees there.
In contrast to other areas, most of the refugees in these provinces
are in camps and most of these camps are economically unviable ones.
221
Some camps are located in islands of relatii^e security in areas which
are otherwise insecure. Access to them often may be possible only
by lielicopter. They are subject to fairly frequent Vietcong or North
Vietnamese Army attacks.
In Quang Nam, for example, on December 23 last year at Thanh
Quang Hamlet in Duy Xuyen District, a plastic device exploded
among a group of Catholic refugees watching a Christmas play. Re-
sulting casualties were five killed and 65 woimded, 20 still in serious
condition. Most were women and children. On January 4, NVA-VC
units shelled the refugee camp at Go Chua in Due Due District, in the
same pro^dnce, with 12 rounds of 82-millimeter mortar fire. Fourteen
were killed, 55 were wounded, and 15 houses were destroyed. At the
same time, two were killed, 15 wounded, and five houses destroyed in
Log Qu}^, a nearby hamlet in the same district.
Almost all of these I Cor[)s refugees want to go back to their homes,
but most of them will not be able to do so in the near future. The pay-
ment of resettlement allowances in 1969, to all but about 150,000 of
them, has set the stage for a concerted effort in 1970, to improve the
economic and physical conditions of life at each of the sites.
Several projects are already underway. For example, the refugees
are being introduced to techniques for improving yields of crops, par-
ticularly of vegetables, grown on marginal land. Plandicraft projects
have l)een organized. Small industries, and I mean small, such as pep-
permaking, responsive to the needs of the area are being developed.
In those cases where untilled. secure land exists in reasonable prox-
imity to a refugee camp, the ]\riuistrv of Social Welfare is working
with the Minisliy of AgriciiUurc and the Ministry of Finance to make
it available. Public Law 4S0, title II, food is being distributed to the
needy people in these campsites, and some food-for-work projects are
taking shajX'. But these efforts ai'e not yet adequate solutions for the
stubborn, com])lex problems confronted. More needs to be done. And,
even if presently-planned projects are successfully executed, the con-
dition of some of these refugees will remain less than satisfactory
until they can return to their homes.
PROBLEM OF CONTINUIXO INFI.UX OF NEW REFUGEES
Another problem is the continuing, though substantially reduced,
influx of new refugees generated by military actions. For a brief pe-
riod in the mid-1960*s, forcing people to leave outlying areas was seen
as a way of denying the Vietcong nuin]iower they could exploit. Many,
of course, sought refuge on their own as a way of escaping such ex-
ploitation. However, most refugees over time have probably been
created by the intensified fighting and its accompanying destruction.
Instructions issued in 1967, and expanded in 1969, require military
operations to be conducted in such a manner as to minimize property
destruction and the generation of refugees. These instructions, along
with the geographical shift of heavy fighting out of populated areas
toward the western frontier, the extension of territorial securitv, and
the general decline in the level of military activity, have been major
factors in reducing the number of new refugees.
AVhen an operation is planned which is likely tx) result in a sub-
stantial displacement of people, prior permission must be obtained
222
from the Central Pacification and Development Conncil and arrange-
ments mnst be made in advance by the military for takinp; care of
them until the Ministry of Social Welfare can bring organized assist-
ance to them. The basic principle of this policy is that security should
be brought to the people, not the people to security. One exception has
been the temporary removal of people from an area in which military
clearing activities are underway. People so moved are the responsibility
of the allied armed forces and they are returned home immediately
after the military operation is concluded, usually within a week or
two. If their homes have been damaged, the Vietnamese Government
assists them as war victims, not as refugees.
In recent months there have been a few cases in which military
forces have moved people for more than temporary periods without
obtaining the required approval in advance. This means that the ]Min-
istry of Social Welfare is not always aware of the problem soon enough
to avoid delays in providing assistance in an organized way. As these
cases arise, we have taken steps to remedy them as quickly as possible.
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF REFFGEE PROGRAM
The refugee program has important political objectives, although
the techniques used to achieve them are more social and economic than
])olitical. The Government of Vietnam's hope is to normalize the
lives of refugees as soon as possible and to do this in ways which
introduce an element of confidence on which they can rebuild their
lives. This usually means giving them an economic base they can
exploit. Almost invariably they prefer farming or fishing. Elections
are held as soon as possible in the resettled or revived villages. Once
the village administi-ative machinery is set up, refugees are able to
take part in local self-government as full Vietnamese citizens. They
also gain access to such other sources of assistance as the village and
provincial development funds. The availability of these normal gov-
ernment resources is important, but additional help for these people
also is usuallv i-equired. Eefugees being I'esettled in new locations
are involved in building a hamlet from the very ground up. Those
returning home face a similar problem because their hamlets usually
are entirely, or at least partially, destroyed. The goal of all these
efforts is to make the refugee once again a regular citizen, living in
conditions not noticeably different from those of other citizens, hope-
ful for the future but well aware of the fact that it will depend
largely on his own efforts.
IMPACT OF REFUGEE PROGRAiNrS
The impact of these programs is difficult to assess. The recipient's
appreciation usually is obvious, and there is little doubt that the
Government benefits from this attitude, even in cases where benefit pay-
ments may have been delayed for a long time. Understandably, few
refugees enjoy their lives. Almost all of them want to return home as
soon as possible, but they usually wait until they are convinced the
area is reasonably safe. Virtually no one wants to i'eex|:)Ose himself to
the insecurity or exploitation which caused him to seek refuge in the
first place.
223
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS
Financial assistance for these programs comes largely from the
United States. The Government of Vietnam budget defrays the cost
of persomiel, space, supplies, some war damage claims, and other mis-
cellaneous Vietnamese expenditures. The budgeted costs of the United
States and the GVN and an estimate of private voluntary agency con-
tributions are given for the last 3 years in an exhibit attached to this
statement. This exhibit shows that U.S. support, both in dollars and
piasters (AID-generated) and in Public Law 480 title II commodi-
ties, was equivalent to $65.4 million in fiscal year 1968 and $70.2 million
in fiscal year 1969; $59.3 million is estiniated for fiscal year 1970.
These costs should drop considerably beginning in calendar year 1971,
if the favorable trends of 1969 persist and security conditions through-
out the country continue to improve.
( The information referred to appears on p. 228.)
Thirty-two private voluntary agencies, mostly from the United
States, are actively engaged in refugee and social welfare programs,
and their reported annual budgets total approximately $25 million
a year. This is a major contrilmtion and much of it comes from indi-
vidual Americans. The programs of these organizations are effec-
tively carried out and they are deeply appreciated by the Vietnamese
people and their Government.
Finally, the military forces of the United States, Vietnam, and
others engage in numerous civic action projects which, though difficult
to assess in terms of cost, have become a valuable part of the total
effort. In addition, military units, operational military units, provide
substantial lielp to new refugees from the moment they first arrive
in secure areas until they ai-e turned over to the GVX refugee program.
TEOPI.E WORKING ON REFUGEE PROGRAMS
Apart fi-om the budget it is im])ortant to make a few observations
alwut the number of people woi-king in Vietnam on these programs.
The GVN Ministi-y of Social Welfare has by far tlie largest number,
ha\ing built its staff' up to an authorized strength of 1,900 from about
125 in January 1966.
I might digress to say that until March 1966 they had no organized
governmental agency to co[)e with this kind of problem at all.
At the pi-esent time, 1,536 of these positions are filled, 637 in Saigon
and 899 in the field. American and third countiy voluntary agencies
have 431 specialists from abroad and 741 Vietnamese employees. From
a high of 116 positions authorized and 109 on board in early 1969 — up
from 18 in January 1966 — the T'.S. official advisory group at present
consists of 79 people in the country against an authorized strength of
97. This reduction in the number of U.S. advisers has been possible
largely because of the increasing competence of the Ministry of Social
Welfare staff'. Further reductions will be made by the end of 1970 if
present trends continue and if the program remains unchanged. I am
attaching a table which shows the breakdown of both GVN and
CORDS staffing.
(The infoi-mation referred to appears on p. 228.)
224
American refugee advisers ai'e stationed in all provinces wliere
there is a substantial problem. If the numbers of displaced persons
are small and we do not require a full-time adviser in the province,
we draw on other members of the provincial adAdsory team, or, in
emergencies, we send specialists from the regional offices or Saigon.
ACTIVITIES PLANNED FOR 19 7 0
This year the Vietnamese Government, with our help, will
concentrate on the following activities:
1. Assisting people to return home wherever security conditions are
adequate.
2. Improving the viability of life in refugee sites whenever it is not
possible for i-efugees to return home in the foreseeable future.
3. Concludmg benefit payments to the remaining 270,000 refugees
on the rolls.
4. Taking care of any new refugees who may be generated, and
5. Augmenting presently inadequate programs of help to other
types of war victims such as widows, orx^hans, the disabled and the
aged needy people.
SUMMATION
To sum up : Although Vietnam has had a long history of population
movements, the problem which concerns us now arises out of large-
scale displacements of people and other hardships they have suffered
during the past 6 years.
It took a considerable amount of time to develop and staff an orga-
nization capable of dealing with a crisis situation of this kind. By
the end of 1967, the Vietnamese Government was pro^ading emergency
assistance to the refugees, helping some of them to resettle themselves
or return home, and preparing for large-scale rehabilitation pro-
grams. This effort was disrapted during most of 1968 by the Com-
munist Tet offensive and their offensives in subsequent months.
From November 1968 to date considerable progress has been made
in paying refugees the allowances due them, in returning almost
600,000 to their homes, in resettling many of the remaining refugees,
and in starting out on a program to assist war widows, orphans, and
other disabled jjeople.
The three soutliern provinces of I Corps remain a special problem.
Our primary tasks in 1970 will be to continue our efforts to help
those i^eople who still are refugees — or who become refugees — to re-
turn to their homes or to effectively resettle elsewhere.
(The attachments referred to follow :)
REFUGEE BENEFITS
House
Rice allowance or Salt for construction
Duration money equivalent Montagnards Commodities allowance
Immediate relief 7 days limit 50C grams per person 20 grams per 3 cans of con-
assistance, per day. person per densed milk
day. per family.
Temporary assistance.- 1 month (can Either VN $15 or 500
be extended grams+VN $5 per
If necessary). person per day.
Resettlement or 6 months Either 15 kilograms or 20 grams per VN$7,500and
return-to-village VN $300 per person person per 10 sheets of
assistance per month. day. roofing.
225
WAR VICTIM BENEFITS
Rice allowance Commodities
House construc-
tion allowance
Solatium
To families whose house
500 grams per
2 meters cloth per
VN $3.000
was damaged 20 to 50
person per
person. 1 blanket and
percent.
day for 15
days.
1 mosquito net per
family of 2 to 4
persons; 2 blankets
and 2 mosquito nets
for each family with 5
or more members.
To families whose house
500 grams per
Same as above.
VN $7,500 and
was damaged over 50
person per
10 sheets of
percent.
day for 30
days.
roofing.
For deaths
VN $4,000 if deceased
was 15 years old or
more; VN $2,000 if
deceased was less than
15 years.
For injuries requiring medi-
. VN $2,000.
cal treatment for at least
7 days.
NUMBERS OF REFUGEES BY CATEGORIES-1969
End 1st
quarter
End 2d
quarter
End 3d
quarter
EndUli
quarter
135,894
1,477
6,425
6,809
Temporary refugees:
I CTZ. 289,985 323,899 242,285
IICTZ 73,810 44,447 11,500
IIICTZ 8,285 6,090 2,283
IVCTZ 64,743 61,278 37,074
Total 436, 823 435, 714 293, 142 150,605
Refugees in resettlement process:
I CTZ 95,966 37,363 13,919 17,183
IICTZ 85,511 80,514 70,679 36,568
IIICTZ.. 67,187 40,540 22,841 1,779
IVCTZ. 26,204 12,938 15,593 10,399
Total 274,868 171,355 123,032 65,929
Out of camp refugees;
I CTZ.. 300,525 151,516 133,084 16,026
IICTZ 270,824 235,999 110,860 18,265
IIICTZ 7,402 23,123 22,382 1,335
IVCTZ 156,188 179,436 107,626 16,092
Total 734,939 590,074 373,952 51,718
Total refugee population:
I CTZ.. 686,476 512,778 389,288
IICTZ 430,145 360,960 193,039
IIICTZ 82,874 69,753 47,506
IVCTZ 247,135 253,652 160,293
Total. 1,446,630 1,197,143 790.126 268,252
169, 103
56,310
9,539
33, 300
226
REFUGEE POPULATIOM
1969
1,000
.900
.800
,700
.600
.500
.400
.300
.200
,100
TN THOUSANDS
Out Of Cijip
MAM
0 N
227
LUMBERS OF REFUGEES RETURNED TO VILLAGE OR PAID RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES, 1969 1
Total, 1st
quarter
Total, 2d Total, 3d Total, 4th _
quarter quarter quarter Year s total
RETURNED TO VILLAGE
I CTZ
II CTZ
III CTZ -
IV CTZ
Total.-
PAID RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES
I CTZ
II CTZ
III CTZ
IV CTZ
Total ---
17, 283
1,087
0
9,639
26,231
32, 694
75
36, 284
19,510
85,319
6,293
38, 313
73,093
40, 031
2,524
99, 844
136,117
159, 131
8,892
184, 080
28, 009
95, 284
149, 435
215, 492
488, 220
1,056
13, 123
12, 757
12, 620
4,529
42, 103
32,794
12, 899
76. 285
29,433
28, 254
13,991
95,181
143, 098
25, 227
43, 029
177,051
227,766
99, 032
82, 539
39, 565
92, 325
147,963
306, 535
586. 388
The payment of resettlement and return-to-village allowances represents only ^^e GVN's responsibim
igee farriilies. In addition, the GVN accepts responsibility for assistance to the resettlement or return-to-village com-
rcfUSBB luiiMii'-j. >>> «««.<■.«■■, *■•- — ••• , — — ■--
munity to foster its economic viability and a normal life for all its members.
NUMBERS OF REFUGEES RETURNED ID VILLAGE
OR PAID RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES*
1969
(Cumolative in Thousands)
Paid
Resettlement
Allowances
586, 3Ba
. Returned
to Village
488,220
*The payment of resettlement and return-to-viUage allowances represents
only the GVN' s responsibility to individual refugee families. In addition, ,
the GVN accepts responsibility for assistance to the resettlement or return-
to-village community to foster its economic viability and a normal life for
all its members.
228
SUPPORT FOR REFUGEE AND SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAM
(Dollars sliown in thousands]
Fiscal year-
1968
1969
1970
1
I. Refugee dollar budget-..
I. Refugee piaster budget'.
$18, 724
30,254
$16,400
32,119
$10,452
34,430
Subtotal
III. Food for Freedom, Public Law 480 (Ref. and Soc. Wei.).
Total U.S. contribution
48, 978
16,380
48, 519
21,638
44,882
14, 399
65, 358
70,157
59,281
Calendar year—
1968 1969
1970
GVN National Budget (VN$ and $US equivalent in thousands)
(
511,223 429,600
($4,332) ($3,641)
510,000
($4,322)
Fiscal year—
1968 1969
1970
Estimated Voluntary Agency and Free World Assistance contribution..
--
$25,500 $28,995
$25, 500
1 Calendar year counterpart piasters generated by AID Commodity Import Program and title I, Public Law 480 sales.
The use of these funds is subject to joint U.S.-GVN agreement. They are administered by the GVN through its budget
procedures.
CORDS, MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE, VOLUNTARY AGENCIES-PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO REFUGEE PROGRAM
AS OF JANUARY 1970
On
board CORDS
On board
ministry,
social -
welfare U
On board vol
jntary agencies
U.S.
civilian
U.S.
military
Local
nationals
nited States
TCN
VN
Saigon
27
3
6
33
18
637
899
84
193
44
110
?1,^
Field....
52
528
Total...
79
9
51
1,536
277
154
741
Authorized CORDS
Authorized
ministry,
social —
welfare U
Authorized voluntary agencies
lited States TCN
U.S.
civilian
U.S.
military
Local
nationals
VN
Saigon..
Field.
26
71
4
10
38
26
680
1,220 ..
0)
(')
0)
Total
97
14
64
1,900 ..
> Not applicable.
The CiiAiRMAX. Thank you very much, INIr. Hitchcock.
Mr. Hitchcock. Thank yon.
The Chairmax. That is a very thorough description, I think, of the
program.
OTHER LAR(}E MIGRATIONS OF PEOPLE IN VIETNAM
You mentioned one thing that caught my attention. You said that
there have been other large migrations of people in Vietnam.
To what did you have reference prior to tliis war?
229
]\Ir. Hitchcock. My understanding of Vietnamese liistory is not
deep, Mr. Chairman, but even at tlie beginning, before around 200 B.C.,
it began as a nomadic movement of people to escape out of China.
Throughout history there have been a number of Chinese invasions and
some internal insurrections and movements of the people.
Many people characterize the history of the count it as a recurring
mo\ement of the people of this kind — possibly not of this magnitude.
The Chairman. Has anything like this occurred since the French
took the country about a hundred years ago ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Xot to the best of my knowledge.
The Chairman. Did the French displace manj^ peoi)le when they
moved in? I am just curious.
Mr. Hitchcock. Xot to the best of my knowledge.
The Chairman. I had not heard about it.
Mr. Colby. There was one additional movement, ^Ir. Chairman, in
the period of about 1958 to 1962, when the Diem government was mov-
ing substantial numbers of refugees up into the highland areas who had
formerly been in the lowlands. There was a certain excess of popula-
tion in the lowland areas, but also there were some refugees from
North Vietnam. They went up into the highland areas and established
new communities in that part of the countr}'.
Vietnam has spread over two millenia from its source in the Red
River Valley around Hanoi. It began moving south about 1450, reach-
ing the area around Saigon only in 1750.
In the course of that, they essentially pushed out of the way a whole
civilization called the Chams, and they also i)rcssed the Khmers, Cam-
bodia's ancestoi-s, back out of the way.
You have also had a substantial movement of Chinese down into
South Vietnam in the period around the turn of this century.
The Chairman. A\niat percentage are the Cliinese now? Do you
know ?
Mr. Colby. It is pure guesswork ; but I mean that it is not only mine,
but it is basically guesswork. It is in the neighborhood of a million,
we would estimate.
The Chairman. Out of the IT million ?
Mr. Colby. Out of the 17 million.
REFUGEES GENERATED BY RELOCATION
Tlie Chairman. You said in your statement that for a brief period
in the sixties, forcing people to leave outlying areas was seen as a
w^ay of denying the Vietcong manpower they could exploit.
You do not haA'e any refugees created by this program ?
'Sh: Hitchcock. Sir, the subject of refugees created in those years
is extremely vague. The rei)orting of iigui'es was done hardly at all
in many cases, and very impei-feetly in the rest.
This becomes a part of the total figure that I estimated of something
over 3 million in the last 6 years, but in the last 4 years there have
been something approaching 2 million — a couple of hundred thou-
sand less than 2 million — so, possibly in the period of 1965 and late
1964 there may have been a million. I am not sure of how long this
particular approach of relocating people persisted, but it was in the
1965-66 period.
230
In 1966, there were about a million refugees generated, but I cannot
say that they are all attributable to that, by any means.
EFFECT OF WAR OX VIETXAMESE EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEM
The Chairman. You said previously, I believe, that the extended
family system looked to the family for taking care of people in this
unfortunate circumstance. They had never looked to the government
before. Is that right ?
Mr. Hitchcock. That is, by and large, true, as I understand it. That
is, as you undoubtedly know, a common part of the societal structure
in Asia — the extended or joint family structure, in which they each
take care of themselves basically. During the war large numbers of
people have been killed or displaced, and many people have fled from
one area to another; in this process there has been a dismembering
effect on the family unity to the point where that which remains of
the extended family structure is no longer capable of doing that which
it did traditionally. One other manifestation of it is that sometimes
a family gets so dismembered that a man may be in the service, the wife
has had to become the breadwinner, and she has had on frequent oc-
casions to put their children in orphanages.
You frequently find orphans in Vietnam who are, in fact, literally
not orphans. One or possibly both parents may be alive. But this is
a manifestation of this breakdown of the family structure.
EFFECT OF WARS OX UNITED STATES
The Chairman. There was a time in this country not too long ago
in which this was more or less the custom ; wasn't it ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. We have not always had social security and Gov-
ernment intei'vention ; have we ?
]Mr. Hitchcock. "Wliat, sir ?
The Chairman. We have not always had social security and gov-
ernment intervention in America ; have we ?
]Mr. Hitchcock. No.
The Chairman. This is rather recent development in this country ; is
it not?
Mr. Hitchcock. It certainly is.
Tlie Chairman. When do you think it started in this country?
Mr. Hitchc OCK. Well, it began in a rather meaningful way, I think,
in the early thirties — 19o2.
The Chairman. Subsequent to World War I ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Subsequent to World War I.
'I'he Chairman. Do you think that there is any association at all
between war and tlie development of these things ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Well, war obviously creates basic social dislocations.
The Chairman. It certainly does.
Mr. Hitchcock. And problems which society feels it has to deal with,
I jH-esume consciously, in the circumstances which are created.
The Chairman. It is rather ironic that war seems to be the principal
enemy of what we used to think of as the self-reliant free enterprise
system : isn't it ?
]Mr. Hitchcock. Yes.
231
The Chaikjman. There is no greater force that leads to socialization
of a country than war ; is there ? Wouldn't you agree ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes, and also, unfortunately or fortunately a great
deal of technological advance is usually stimulated by wars.
The Chairman. "Wliat do you mean by that ? To what do you have
reference ?
Mr. Hitchcock- I mean, in World II many of the advanced tech-
niques which have now widespread ability and application — radar may
be a case in point — were a consequence of the kind of money that was
made available.
The CHAiRMAiSr. Do you think those are very significant counterbal-
ances to the misfortunes which are brought about ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Xo : I would not argue that for a second.
The Chairmax. I thought you were suggesting that.
Mr. Hitchcock. No.
The Chairmax. Just think; we could even point to going to the
moon. We have had two wars, and we can now go to the moon. Doesn't
that malve you feel good ?
Mr. Hitchcock. I do not know quite how I feel about that sir.
{Laughter.]
The Chairmax. You are very wise not to say anything.
My greatest misfortune is that I have a tendency to say what I think
about these things. One should not do tliat in Washington.
criteria for classificatiox'^ Of refugees as resettled
In your figures about the refugees in March of 1969, you state there
were 1,450,000 still on the Government's refu|2;ee rolls and it had been
reduced to 270,000 in December. A Mr. David Holi'man, writing in
the Washington Post, which is a rather well-known local journal of
which you probably have heard
Mr. HiTcifcocK. Yes, I know the article.
The Chairman (continuing) . Says :
American advisers report from the countryside, however, that tens of thousands
of refugees are being erased from the rolls and reclassified as resettled citizens
without being productively resettled.
This raises tlie question : Has there been any change in the last year
in the policy of who was considered to be a refugee and what consti-
tutes resettlement?
Mr. Hitchcock. I welcome ^Ir. Hoffman's article, but there was a
failure in the article to point out that the rehabilitation of refugees
has been a two-part process. Some of the difficulty of achieving it I
liave already described for the I Corps area. Part of the process, and
an essential part of the process, is to pay the people the allowances
which they have been promised. These are allowances which are essen-
tial for rehabilitation ; the second part is to upgrade, to improve situa-
tions in whicli they find themselves, whether it be a camp or whether
it be their former home, to which they have returned.
Now there has been a lot of confusion about this. I think it is
important to make it clear that in 1969 the Government of Vietnam
decided that it would give first priority attention to maldng the
payments to refugees, payments which were long delayed in many
'Cases, and that to the extent they had resources, they would simul-
232
taneoiisly do this upgrading of the sites on which the refugees were
located.
They did do that with some measure of success in II, III and IV
Corps areas.
In I Corps — and in I Corps I am talking only of the southern three
Provinces of I Corps — they did not have the same measure of success
for the i-easons I stated.
In the northern two Provinces of I Corps, the one next to the DMZ,
Quang Tri, and the next one down, Thua Thien, it was impressively
done, with a couple of exceptions in each case.
The Chaikman. Do I take it that the answer to the question is that
you have not changed the criteria by which you determine whether
a ]3erson is resettled or not ?
Mr, Hitchcock. No, we have not, sir.
PRESENT NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN SOUTH \TETNAM
Senator Symington. How many people are considered refugees in
South Vietnam now ?
Mr. Hitchcock. This is a rather complicated question, sir, but on
the active case rolls at the moment are 270,000 who have yet not re-
ceived their benefits. Their allowances for resettlement have not been
received. This does not mean that those who have received all their
allowances have been satisfactorily resettled, as we were discussing
just before you arrived
Senator Symington. How many of these are there ?
Mr. Hitchcock. This gets into the highly estimative field, but I
would guess about 520,000 have received their allowances and are not
satisfactorilv resettled.
Senator Symington. You would add 270,000 to those ?
Mr. Hitchcock. No, I would include those 270,000.
Senator Symington. So, 520,000.
;Mr. Hitchcock. These are in camps which still need attention. Many
of the people in those camps have already received their allowances.
RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES AND SITES
Senator Syiviington. Wliat do you mean by allowances exactly ?
Mr. Hitchcock. It is a resettlement allowance given.
Senator Symington. How much ?
Mr. Hitchcock. It amounts to about $180 a family.
Senator Symington. Wlio pays for it ?
Mr. Hitchcock. It is paid by the Government of Vietnam with
money provided by the United States.
ISeriator Syimington. Wliat do they do with that money when they
get it?
Mr. Hitchcock. Well, this is a kind of grubstake that eases the
building of their homes, the development of some means of livelihood,
whether it be farming or fishing or trade, and provides a cushion of
6 or more months.
Senator Symington. Six or more months ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes.
Senator Symington. Where do they go with it ?
233
xMr. HiTCTK^ocK. AYell, most of these people are in camps which are
beiiio- resettled. We call them resettlement sites.
Senator Symingtox. Is that where they are gomg to live
permanently? • T»r • • • •
Mr. Hitchcock. Possibly not permanently, sir. My opinion, sir, is
that there are a great number of people being resettled now because
there is no alternative. They say, "We want to return home when the
war ends." They want to return to the homes that they left, but we do
not resettle people if the chances of their returning home are imminent.
REFUGEES IN CAMPS AND RESETTLED
Senator Symington. You have 520,000 now ? _
Mr. Hitchcock. In camps which still need assistance.
Senator Symington. How many were here, say, last year ? .
Mr. Hitchcock. Well, we had at that time 1,450,000 people in March
on the active case rolls, of which
Senator Symington. Does that mean that 900,000-plus have gone
Mr Hitchcock. No. I sort of hesitate to get involved in the problem
of numbers, because they sometimes do not add up to the total. During
the year 1969 about 600,000 people have returned home. Now, they
are people who came from out-of-camp situations, from m-camp situa-
tions from camps previouslv resettled completely, and camps that were
in the process of being resettled. So, it is not a deductive figure. Never-
theless around 600.000 went home.
Senator Symington. Are they back where they came from {
Mr HncHCOCK. By and large, they did when security was extended.
Senator Symington. How many did you add to the number ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Add to the number ?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Hitchcock. For what ? • ^ ^i
Senator Symington. How many people came mto the camps ^
600,000 went out^how many came in ? . ^^ . • . i
Mr Hitchcock. 114,000 new refugees came m. This compares with
about 300,000 the previous year, 400,000 the year before that, and
upward of a million the year before that.
cost of refugee program
Senator Symington. How much did your program cost the United
States, all told, last year?
Islx. Hitchcock. The total last year was S.O.lo* million. The pro-
gram for fiscal vear 1970 is anticipated at S59.2 million.
^ Senator Symington. What was it in 1968 ?
:Mr. Hitchcock. $65.8 million.
Senator Symington. In 1967? . ,.,.,-
Mr. Hitchcock. $70 million; 1969 was the year m which the impact
of a lot of the special 1969 Tet assistance fell.
Senator Symington. They have pretty heavy inflation over there ;
haven't thev ?
:Mr Hitchcock. Thev have substantial inflation. ,
Senator Symington.' Then, if $180 was right 2 years ago, why is it
still right today ?
44-706—70 16
234
Air. Hitchcock. The basic reason is that tlie Vietnamese are increas-
ing their capability of doing this tj'pe of vrork. We have reduced quite,
a bit the amount of doHars. The piaster input has increased, but the|
net has definitely decreased, and I would anticipate
Senator Symington. When you say "increased capacity of doing
this work," what do you mean by that ?
Mr. Hitchcock. The problem of handling this kind of displaced
people, people who have lost homes, whose homes have been destroyed.
Senator Symington. What amount has the Vietnamese Government
put in ?
Air. Hitchcock. The Vietnamese Government provides personnel;
it pays for some war damage claims and other miscellaneous Vietnam-
ese services. Their contribution to this program is small.
Senator Symington. How much would you say per person?
Mr. Hitchcock. Per person, I do not know, sir, but their total has
run about $4 million, its equivalent or a little more, each of the last
3 years.
Senator Symington. Then, you divide that into the number of
refugees. You could ; couldn't you ?
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes ; but that is such a fluctuating number that it
is hard to do the mathematics.
Senator Symington. You could get a rough amount.
Air. Hitchcock. The amount that each family receives in allowances,
whether they are resettling in a new location o"r returning home is the
equivalent of about $180, which is paid in piasters or in aluminum
roofing.
NUMBER AND SIZE OF REFUGEE SITES
Senator Symington. How many places have you where you put
these refugees?
Air. Hitchcock. At the moment, we have 646 refugee sites. There
were 841 at the beginning of 1969.
Senator Symington. How many of those are in the I Corps, for
example ?
Air. Hitchcock. I do not have that figure offhand.
Senator Symington. Will you supply that for the record?
Air. Hitchcock. I can certainly get it.
(The information referred to follows :)
There are 162 sites in I Corps.
Senator Symington. The II, III Corj>s, and then in the delta.
Air. Hitchcock. There are practically no formal sites in the delta,
although for administ]-ati\e con\'enience' we have counted some clusters
of people as a site. They are included in this number of 646.
Senatoi- Symington. What is the average size of a refugee camp ?
Air. Hitchcock. It varies tremendously. In I Corps the average size
is 1,902 ; II Corps 986 ; III Corps 776 ; and in IV Corps the average is
very close to zero because most are out of camp. There is one very large
site m the northern part of I Corps of 20,000 which is considerably the
largest.
Senator Symington. 20,000.
Air. Hitchcock. 20,000
Senator Symington. Acres ?
235
Mr. HrmicorK. 20,000 people. It is right near the DMZ.
Senator Symixgtox. I meant in size, in area.
Mr. Hitchcock. I cannot tell you, sir.
It is on a sand spit. It is not a irood location, and we have had major
problems.
Senator Symixgtox. It must be a pi-etty sizable spit if you have
20,000 there.
Mr. Hitchcock. True, but it is sand, nonetheless. We have had a diffi-
cult time making land available in I Corps, but we recently have had
land opened up by extension of security in the immediate area.
REASONS REFUGEES LEFT HOMES
Senator Symixgtox. Has any analysis been made of the break-
down between the number of refugees who left their homes because
of harassment from the VC and those who left because of allied
military operations?
]\Ir. Hitchcock. Attempts, but none of them succeeded. It is very
difficult to determine the reason why an individual or a collection
of refugees leave their homes. I did say in my statement, sir, that
in general it appears that the majority of refugees have left home to
escape the crossfire of war.
Senator Symixgtox. I had better go vote. We will be right back.
(Short recess.)
possibility of CORRUPTIOX' IX' REFUGEE PROGRAMS
The Chairman, INIr. Hitchcock, how much of the aid furnished by
the I mited States and destined for the refugee programs is lost in the
pipeline to the refugees.
Mr. Hitchcock. I do not know, sir. I have been very conscious of
the possibility of diversions. There have been occasions when it has
been alleged that not all got to the refugees. Those cases are all investi-
gated and in one instant case I can recall since I have been there, a
service chief was jailed; a service chief is the social welfare ministry
representative in the province.
There probably are greater chances for misrepresentation (not di-
version) in the assessment of damage to villages and hamlets that are
attacked.
I have noticed that the number of occasions when the percent of
houses destroyed is given as 20 to 50 percent is relatively small com-
)>ared to the times when it is given as 50 to 100 jiercent. There are
different amounts of allowances paid for these differing amounts of
damage. But I have seen no evidence and have heard of no evidence
of alleged widespread or significant corruption in the program.
The Chairman. You have not ?
Mr. Hitchcock. I have not.
The CiiAiRMAX'. No more than is normal ?
Mr. Hitchcock. No more than you might say normal.
The Chairmax^. We hear stories. I have not heard any, as a matter
of fact, of any significance about refugees. jNIost of them have been
with regard simply to the regular aid program, the import program
of commodities. There has been a lot of that in the past. I do not
recall having heard too much about corruption in the refugee program
236
itself. Can you add anything? Do you have anything different from
that, Mr. Colby?
Mr. Colby. I think the only thing we were concerned about a year
or so ago was the tendency for some of the refugees to resell the ma-
terial instead of using it. I do not really call this corruption in that
sense, but it is use of it for another purpose. In other words, they
receive certain commodities and instead of using them, they sell them.
We did take the step, for instance, in the refugee program this past
year of terminating the issuance of cement to refugees because we
found that there was a certain leakage and resale of it. Instead the
refugees receive a certain sum of money which is given to them to
use as they wish to help rebuild their houses.
Mr. Hitchcock. I think the basic reason for doing away with cement
distribution was a desire to utilize the private sector for the distribu-
tion of that commodity.
PAST POLICY OF OENERATIXG REFUGEES
The Chairman. In the staff report. Mr. Hitchcock, there occurs
this statement. I want vour comment on it if it is true. It savs:
Incidentally, we were told that while it had once been considered desirable
to genei'ate refugees — because they would presumably become sympathetic to
the government or would at least be under government control — it was no
longer regarded as advantageous and the military were being told not to do so
purposely.
Mr. Hitchcock. That is true, sir.
The Chatrmax. Is that a true statement ?
Ml-. HiTciK ocK. Yos. I sj)ecifically addressed that in my statement.
This has not been the case for the last several years. The basic policy
of pacification in general is to bring security to the people rather than
bring the people out of insecure areas to secure areas.
The Chairmax. '\Yliat was the experience with those whom you
deliberately made refugees and then helped resettle? Were they grate-
ful and did they turn out to be sympathetic to and supporters of the
Government ?
Mr. Hitchcock. I cannot reliably answer that question, sir.
Mr. Colby. I think our assessment, Mr. Chairman, was that it was
not a very successful technique, which is the reason the Government
turned against it with our full support.
The Chairman. Without knowing anything, just as a political
observer, it does not appeal to me.
iVIr. Colby. It does not sound very practical.
The Chairmax. Without knowincr anvthing about what vour ex-
perience was, it does not appear a very likely program. I am not at
all of the feeling that people are likely to be that grateful.
Mr. Hitchcock, in your statement you indicate procedures which
have been instituted to minimize the effect of military operations in
generating refugees. Then you aclmowledge this does not always work,
which we have discussed several times in these hearings. We have
called attention to questionable practices and the answer has been.
"Maybe that used to happen, but the order has now been changed."
I wonder what things are going on now that we do not know about,
but which later will be corrected.
237
REFUGEES GENERATED BY OPERATIOX RUSSELL BEACH
In this particular case, let me ask you about an incident reported by
the Washington Post in another article by Mr. David Hoffman on
December 24. He writes as follows :
For example: Navy landing craft and his troop-carryinsi- helkopteris dis-
charged many thousands of soldiers on Quangngai's Batangan Peninsula in
early January. p]lements of the 2d ARVN division, the Americal Division and
the Marine 26th Regimental Landing Team cordoned off the whole peninsula,
transplanted 11,000 peasants and razed their Vietcong-infested hamlets. The
operation, code-named Russell Beach, was one of the largest hard cordons of the
war.
A giant helicopter airlift was organized to tnan-sport the peasants, en masse,
to a "combined holding and interrogation center" some ~>0 miles from their home-
sites. The refugees lived there, in a tent colony, for almost 3 months while Russell
Beach spent itself.
Advisory Team 17 at Quangngai was given approximately 20 days notice that
an openation contemplated by the military could be expected to generate 5,000
refugees, no more. It was Team 17's responsibility, along with Colonel Khien, to
care for the disi>laced persons — when and if they materialized.
"That one oi>eration cost the Province 6 monthis work," said a Team 17 adviser
recently. "We thought Russell Beach was a gigantic mi.stake, and few of us have
changed our minds since it ended." But the advice of advisers is not always
solicited.
This raises several question including the effectiveness of the coor-
dination between the CORDS and the operational military elements.
Do you have any comment to make on that ?
]Mr. Hitchcock. Well, I have some familiarity with that from the
point of ^dew of the refugees generated. Most of the basic facts there
are true. Over 11,000 people were removed in advance of the military
sweeps through the Batangan Peninsula area. They were not held, I
believe, as long as 3 months. I believe it was closer to 2 months.
They were screened, and they were returned. The- were returned
to places which were not in all cases the precise home that they had
left. This is an area which had been for many, manv years a Viotcong
stronghold. WlictluM- oi- not tlie military operation was wortli the
effoT't put forth, I cannot judge. I have heard it contended that it
was in militaiy terms.
These people wore returned to five different places on the peninsula.
Tliey were assisted as refugees. They were assisted also while they
were in the reception center. Conditions in the reception center were
overcrowded, but they did not lack in the way of food or sanitation.
It was not obviously a desirable kind of thing if you can avoid it,
l)ut the alternati\e might have been a lot of deaths of these people in
the military opeiation that was undertaken.
So I would not care to balance all this out in terms of pros and
cons.
Most of the people who were returned to the five locations on the
peninsula subsequently have dispersed throughout the peninsula to
the immediate home areas that they originally left.
The CiTAiRMAX. It is a very difficult and heart-rendering kind of
operation concei-ning these people.
I do not know that I have any other questions. Do you have any-
thing further you would like to say before we move on to the next
subject?
238
TECHNIQUES ARE BEING REVIEWED
Mr. Colby. On that question you raised, Mr. Chairman, as to whether
there are other things that we will find out later that we would just as
soon that we were not doing now, I think the answer is yes, that there
will be a number of things. Things like this are under study.
We are, I think, improving some of our techniques by studying
them, reviewing them, and determining whether the net value was
really worth the energy and effort involved. This applies to a variety
of programs.
The Chairman. Of course, I do not think anyone in this committee
or anywhere else has any doubt but that given the war, we have to do
the best we can with it. Other than these questions which have been
given to me, I have personally heard of nothing seriously wrong with
your program.
jNIr. Hitchcock. It is not perfect, sir.
The Chairman. I do not feel good about having to have it, but
nevertheless
Mr. Hitchcock. It is not perfect, but it is improving,
priority or refugee program
The Chairman. Do you think that relative to the other activities
it has as high a priority as it ought to have ? I mean is it treated fairly
within the distribution of funds ?
Mr. Hitchcock. It does not suffer for lack of priority.
The Chairman. Lack of funds.
Mr. HiTCHCorK. I think Ambassador Colby's attitude, for example,
is quite apparent. He lias been a strong supporter of it.
The Chairman. Then thank you very much, JMr. Hitchcock.
Mr. Hitchcock. Thank you. It has been a pleasure.
The Chairman. I believe, ]Mr. Colby, you are now going to tell us
about the Chieu Hoi program; is that correct? Do you have a state-
ment ?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, I have a small statement.
Mr. Chairman, in previous parts of this testimony, we have discus-
sed programs by which tlie Vietnamese people are increasing their par-
ticipation in a national effort to build as well as protect their country.
Some Vietnamese, even South Vietnamese, have been in the hostile
camp. I would like to describe now the program of the A^ietnamese
Government which seeks to inchide them as well in this national effort.
CIIIEU HOT PROGRAM
Since '1963, the Government of Vietnam has waged a battle to win
the allegiance of those who actively oppose it. In this battle, the Viet-
namese Gover-mnent has appealed to the enemy to retui-n to the na-
tional cause and assisted those who returned to establish useful and
meaningful lives in Vietnamese society. This program is called Chieu
Hoi, or, in English, Open Arms. To the Vietnamese, it means "a call
to return home.""'
When the returnees join the Government side, the Government
reinstates their citizenship and rights, and makes every effort to fully
reintegrate them into the political, social and economic life of the
239
Nation. They are not treated as prisoners of war, enemies of the
people, or otherwise castigated for their past activities that may well
have inclnded acts of terror and violence.
The response to this appeal, especially during the past year has
been impressive. Since 1968, over 142,000 Vietnamese supporting the
Vietcong have come over to the Government of Vietnam. Almost a
third of these, 47,000, rallied during the past year. In addition, some
NVA, far fewer than Vietcong, to a total over the years of less than
1,000, have rallied. The appeal to return home is not the same of
course for the NVA soldier in the South.
A variety of methods are used to encourage the Vietcong to rally.
The Vietnamese Ministry of Chieu Hoi, the 5linistry of Information,
the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and MACV, cooperate in produc-
ing radio broadcasts, making tapes of appeals by former Vietcong
which are broadcast from aircraft or ground stations, and disseminat-
ing printed material. The most effective operations, however, are con-
ducted by the armed propaganda teams, which are made up exclu-
sively of returnees. The primary purpose of the team is to conduct
fact-to-face operations in less secure areas to encourage VC and
their sujjporters to return to the government side. On January 1, 1970,
the Ministry of Chieu Hoi authorized an increase from 75 to 90 such
teams. The current strength of these armed propaganda teams of 74
men each is 5,200 men.
RECEPnOX AND TREATMENT OF RETURNEES
Once encouraged to return by the APT, armed propaganda team, or
otlier means, the returnee begins his journey back to normal life. The
first step is taken at a Chieu Hoi reception center.
Keception activities encompass all activities required to receive,
process, care for, and release returnees. These activities are managed
by the Chieu Hoi cadre. The manner in which the retuniee is received
and treated is critical for if ill-treated he will probably become incor-
rigible and never support the Govermnent. Kece]:)tion centers are
located in 74 districts, all Provinces, and four autonomous cities. In
addition, for higher ranking returnees, there are four regional centers
and one national center. Upon arrival, the returnee is welcomed by the
Chieu Hoi chief and then interviewed to obtain biographical data and
establish a basis for classification. The returnee is interrogated by the
nation police. Province S-2 and S-5, and, when available, a member
of the Phung Hoang Committee, to develop information of immediate
tactical value or personnel data on known V(T. The infoimation
brought in by returnees results in many successful operations against
the enemy, the capture of important documents, a decrease in mine and
booby trap casualties due to operations guided by Hoi Chanh and the
location and capture of rice and weapons caches.
The returnee, whether rice bearei- or high-ranking officer, has knowl-
edge about the enemy, his movements, strengths, locations, and tactics.
In most cases, the returnee readily volunteers this information. Also,
during the interrogation process, many bogus returnees, ARVN
deserters, and enemy infiltration agents are detected.
The returnee is required to remain in the Chieu Hoi center for a 60-
day period to fulfill the program, although he is not physically
240
restrained or gnai-ded to prevent liis leavinjr. During that time
he is supported by the Government with a small amount of money
(about 50$VN or U.S. 40 cents) per day for food for himself, his wife,
and any dependents over 15 years of age. Dependents under 15 years
of age receive 25$VN (T^.S. 20 cents) per dav for food. He also receives
two sets of clothes or a 1,500$VX (U.S. $lo) clothing allowance. Each
returnee is given oOO^VX (T'.S. $2.50 per month for si)ending money
for liimself and 150$VN (U.S. $1.25) for each of his dependents. In
addition, when the returnee is resettled he receives a 1,200$VN (U.S.
$10) resettlement allowance to get him a small start.
During his stay in the center, the returnee receives at least 72 hours
of political training. The topics include : democratic processes of
government ; rights and duties of a citizen in a democracy ; success of
the (tVN as contrasted to the failures of the Viet Cong; policies and
programs for combating the enemy ; and inconsistencies in Communist
policies.
Training opportunities are offered in 17 skill areas. The most popu-
lar are mechanics, tailoring, masonry, carpentry, driving, and barber-
ing. From the beginning of the vocational training program in 1964
luitil December 1969, 11,112 returnees have completed some form of
vocational training. Of these 5,359 returnees, or about half of the over-
all total, were trained in 1969. This is not a large percentage of the
total, but this training is voluntary, the program has had its problems
and most returnees ])refer to return to their home villages as soon as
the required 2-month stay at the center is over.
Currently, two regional centers and 35 provincial centers offer some
form of vocational training. By July 1970, all regional and provincial
centers will offer vocational training. In addition, courses are spon-
sored by U.S. Navy Seabees, USAID/General Support Office, and the
Ministries of Labor and Agriculture.
RESETTLEIMENT OF RETUENEES
The four objectives of resettlement are :
A. To fulfill GVN promises to the ralliers.
B. To provide the means for the ralliers to reintegrate themselves
into the normal flow of Vietnamese society and life.
C. To enable the ralliers to become economically self-sufficient.
D. To develop the ralliers' capability for contributing to societv.
If the security situation ])ermits, the returnee usually elects to
return to his former place of residence. If not, he may establish his
residence in an urban area or build a new home in a Chieu Hoi hamlet.
Chieu Hoi hamlets are normally exclusively for ralliers. They are a
last i-esort method of resettling ralliers. Currently, there are 28 opera-
tional hamlets providing homes for 4,000 families, with an additional
12 hamlets nearing completion. Each family receives a small plot of
land, suitable for some gard(Miing, from the Government. The Gov-
ernment also i^rovides building materials for a home and a rice allow-
ance for 6 months.
MIETTART SERVICE OF RETURNEES
Approximately 50 percent of all ralliers desire to return to farming
upon leaving the center and do so. All ablebodied male ralliers, how-
241
ever, are eligible for the draft 6 months after thev leave the center..
Many voluntarily join paramilitary? units like the APT (Armed Prop-
aganda Team). Reg'ional and popular forces also attract some return-
ees. One of the most successful utilizations of ralliers is the Kit Carson
scout program. Founded in October 1966, the KCS are Hoi Chanh,
ralliers, employed by U.S. and other free world military units to pro-
vide geographical expertise and tactical knowledge of the enemy's
method of operation. ITtilization of the scouts has been credited with
saving numerous American and allied forces lives. Since the inception
of the program, 230 scouts have been killed and 716 wounded.
Curi-ently, there are 2,245 scouts. They receive a salary ranging from
5,000$VN to 10,000$VN per month, paid from the military assistance
for pacification fund (ATK). In addition, the scouts receive the same
medical attention as i)ersonnel in the unit to which assigned.
In total, about 25 ])ercent of all returnees have joined some type of
force actively fighting against their old associates.
EFFECTS OF CHIET' HOI I'lIOORAM
Another very positive indicator of the effect this program is having
on the enemy is the fact that the XVA and VC have taken specific ac-
tion to counteract the pi'ogram. Central Office of South Vietnam Pes-
olution No. 9, issued last fall, dii'ectly addresses the problem, and units
have been oi-dered to carry out intensive indocti-ination against the
program. Special schools have been set up to train cadres to infiltrate
the Chieu Hoi centers to foment discord. Chieu Hoi hamlets and pro-
vincial rece[)tion centers are prioiity tai-gets for enemy attacks. Pi^l-
liers are very high on the enemy selecti\-e assassination list. All this
shows that the enemy has \erv deep concern about the deleterious effect
the r'hieu Hoi progi-am is having on their ranks.
As I said at the outset, the benefits of this progi-am ai-e measurable.
And, Avhile there was opposition to this program in the past — mainly
fi-om GVX officials and high-ranking military — at the present, this
opposition has dwindled to almost zero due, among other things, to
President Thieu's strong direction to Government officials to utilize
the i-eturnees actively. Since most VC have family roots in GVX-held
teri'itoiT, their reintegration into society has not b(HMi difficMilt.
It is ti"ue that a substantial proportion of the retui-nees are low-level
guerrillas, lessei- infi-astructure members, and part-time workers or
porters for the enemy. Nevertheless, these ralliei-s represent serious
mani^ower losses to the enemy, and, without them, it is more difficult
for the enemy to carry out his operations. Furthei-, ralliei-s have proved
an invaluable source of intelligence to GVX and Free World Forces.
In addition to providing information on enemy strengths, dispositions,
and ])ersonalities, ralliers have guided many successful operations
against the enemy insulting in the capture of documents, decrease in
mine and booby trap casualties, and location and capture of caches. In
1969, 190 operations resulting in discovery of weapons and food caches
were led by ralliers. During the year, 8.82S Aveapons were captured in
this fashion. It is also true that the rate of returnees has decreased in
the past several weeks. This is a drop from the exceptional figures dur-
ing late 1969. AVe ascribe this drop to the annual pre-Tet dip, to
increased precautions against the program by the enemy and to the
fact that expansion of pacification into new areas, which produces
242
many returnees from those happy to rejoin the Government side and
remain home, has gone so far that there is less of this sort of
population to absorb.
Future returnees may thus be fewer, but the program of oifering
reconciliation even to the members of the hard-core enemy will con-
tinue, and I might add in the number last week ; the number that came
in last week was 622, Mr. Chairman, which is a reversion to the some-
what higher figures that we had during December and some of the
earlier periods. It is not the high thousands-a-week le^'el that we used
to have, that we were liaving duiing the fall, but it is very substantially
over the low of 200-odd that it dipped to just before Tet.
Beyond the manpower and intelligence gains accruing to the Gov-
ernment corresponding to debits on the VC side of the ledger, the polit-
ical benefits are really the most significant. The act of rallying is an act
of political commitment to the GVN and away from the Communists.
Apart from the initial act, the commitment is strengthened by good
treatment and indoctrination at the Chieu Hoi Center. Further, the
political posture taken by the Government in welcoming all to the
national effort is a unifying force acting not only on those in the enemy
camp, l>ut those already in the GVN fold.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
TYPE OF RALLIERS UNDER CHIEU HOI
A journalist named Harvey ]Meyerson has written a book about
Vietnam entitled "Vinh Long," which is due to be released later this
month. Mr. Meyerson's book tells a story of what happened in Vinh
Long Province in 1967 and 1968. He makes several observations about
the Chieu Hoi program in this book. He writes that most defectors
who rally under the program had been in the Vietcong for less than 11
months so that the Chieu Hoi program "had scarcely touched the Viet-
cong hard core" but was affecting only "fresh recruits'"; that many
who rallied were doing so in order to get new clothes, a daily food
allowance, a welcome package and other benefits ; and that still others
had been brought in by others under "the third party inducement
program.-'
Would you comment on his observations, or do you happen to know
Mr. Meyerson?
Mr. Colby. I do not offhand, Mv. Chairman. I think his comments
are roughly similar to the ones I made here. I think that the great
mass of the ralliers are low-level people, not any great contribution.
There have been, of course, some very notable exceptions, some very
important ralliers who have given us very important intelligence, but
that is a fairly small percentage of the total number. The main effect
of the program over the past year has been to bite into the enemy's
total manpower base, not to get at its key people.
THIRD PARTY INDUCEMENT PROGRAM
The Chairman. What does he mean by the third party inducement
program ?
Mr. Colby. There was a program that began at the time of the ac-
celerated pacification pi-ogram, Mr. Chairman, in which various sums
243
were OiTeied to tliii'd parties wlio would induce named or ranking Hoi
Chanh (ralliers) to come in. In other words, if a lieutenant was in-
duced by someone else to come in, this person received a reward, in a
sense.
This program, we believe, had something to do with increasing the
number of people coming in. We also began to have increasing doubts
as to the validity of the inducement and whether there was not some
an-angement in many cases so that the man who was coming in anyway
was ci-edited to some fi'iend: and as a result the i)rogi-am was termi-
nated at the end of li)()9.
The Chairman. Ir was terminated (
Mr. Colby. It has been terminated ; yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. This article that I have by Mr. Beech was printed
last year. It indicated just what yon said you suspected. I would expect
that that would be a very difficult program to administer.
Mr. Colby. I think it had a certain stimulating effect, but then some
fellows inevitably figure out how to exploit it.
The CiiAiioiAx. It is sort of haid to get a program where they can-
not do that. That is true here too.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. You have seen in the paper recently that in our own
poverty program there seem to be some difliculties of a similar nature.
It is very difficult indeed and especially in a foreign country where
there are circumstances that are very unsettled.
COMPARATIVE COST OF KILLING AND RALLYING ^^ETCONG
Maybe this question is iri-elevant to your i)roblem. You were talking
about the allowances and also Mi'S. Hitclicock was talking about the
allow^ances to refugees. Some time ago I saw an article in which some
statistician had calculated how much it cost us — I believe it was the
ammunition, just the wai', the military aspect — to kill a VC.
Do you remember seeing such a figure ?
Mr.' Colby. I do not recall it, but it is generally an astronomical
figure, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It was something like $200,000 to $300,000; was it
not?
Mr. Colby. It generally — I do not know what the figure is, but I am
sure it is very high.
The Chairiman. When you were talking there about gi\'ing them
$1.25 a month or something, I thought perhaps we could strike a bar-
gain and give them half as nuich as it cost to kill them and they would
all quit.
Mr. Colby. Well, I think ]Mr. Chairman, this is even cheaper. This
particular pi-ogram in 1970 cost in the neighborhood of $1-1 million. If
you divide it roughly by the 40,000-odd people who came in, we come
to a per returnee cost of $368, which is really pretty cheap. Now all of
them are not the greatest accomplishment in terms of being high level
Vietcong, but, on the other hand, that is a considerably smaller cost
than the cost of killing them.
The Chairman. I take it you did not mention tlie third party pro-
grsim in youi- statement simply because it had been abandoned.
^Ir. Colby. That is right, yes, sir.
244
The Chairman. I do not know that there is any use in puisning: that
subject since it has been abandoned. There were several aiticles with
which I assume you are familiar.
IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT OF RALLIED VIETCOXG
Could you give any impression about the Vietcong who do come in
in this Chieu Hoi program ^ Do they give the impression they are really
committed or ever were committed to communism as an ideology?
Mr. Colby. Again, I think this relates, Mr. Chairman, to their level.
The great mass of them, the larger number were not. These were in
great part people who were living in their local village, and in their
local village they participated in the local guerrilla group, perhaps
because it was the only guerrilla group around to participate in. "Wlien
the Government appeared in the area and established itself and tlie
Government programs began to work in the area, they were quite con-
tent to shift over and join the Government side. They were not deeply
committed.
Now there are Vietcong who are deeply committed individuals, there
is no question about that^ — the higher level ones. Some of these have
gone through the intellectual agonies of a real defection before they
have come over.
The Chairman. This question is always arising. I remember in the
early days in De Gasperi's regime in Italy, we were greatly disturbed
about the large Communist vote. Wlien I was there we discussed it
and it usually came down that in the opinion of many of our own
people, as well as the Italians, they really were not Communists. Thoy
were against the Government. They did not like what the estab-
lishment represented and the only really eifective organized opposi-
tion was the Communist Party. I think subsequent events to a great
extent have su]:)ported that thesis.
Mr. C^oLBY. ^ remember a story about a ]5easant, Mr. Chairman. I
believe in Thaiiand one time who was asked why he joined the Com-
munist Party, and his reply in all ingenuousness was that this was the
first thne anyone had ever asked him to join anything. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. I think that is probably true. It is very likely to be
true.
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED WARS
I do not want to raise it again with you, but this does raise the ques-
tion of whether these ideologically motivated wars in which we become
engaged are justifiable in our national interests.
The other criteria we at one time used to try to apply was that it was
a real threat to the security of our country regardless of what their
ideology may be or is alleged to be. To my way of thinking, it has been
a great tragedy that we departed from that principle, but that is
another matter.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR PACIFICATION FTTND
Wliat is this military assistance for pacification fund to which you
referred as AIK in your statement ?
245
Mr, Colby. Yes, sir, right. This is one of those counterpart funds,
Mr. Chairman. It was generated by counterpart, and it is a fund made
available by the arrangements between ourselves and the Vietnamese
(iovemment for our direct dispensing. There has to be agreement on
how most counterpart is to be spent and it is spent in joint programs.
But this particular fund is a sum of money which is tinned over to our
province and district teams. They may spend it without consultation
with the Government in that area.
AVe frankly used this very heavily right after the Tet period espe-
cially to get tilings moving very fast. It was more flexible and it was
a fund which could be utilized \ery rapidly.
In calendar 11)70 we are cutting this back A-ery substantially because
we have found that these other [)rograms that have been developed
which are in the Vietnamesa structure, like the village self-develoi>-
nient progiam, and the province self -development program, can have
the necessary flexibility and, therefore, you do not need an American
liniidled fund of that natui-e so much.
The source of the fund is still American dolhii-s, Mr. Chaiiinan, but
it is an efl'ort to de\ clop the Vietnamese channels to handle these things
jatlier than handling them through American funds.
The CiiAii{:srAX. How much does it consist of in 1970 or 19C9?
Mr, McMaxaway. 19()9 it was 1.5 billion piasters or about-
Mr. CoLr.Y. IS> lullion piasters for 1969. In 1970 it will be reduced to
one-half billion piasters.
The CiiAiKMAN. Do you lune difliculty with those ciphers like I do?
yiv. Coi.i'.v, I do, ^Ir. Chairman, I am not a mathematician.
The CiiAiKMAX. So do I. I tend to get lost with these figures in calcu-
llation. That is the great advantage the military has over the civilians.
Tlieii- cipheis are so numerous that no one understands what they come
out with and the othei" pi'ogi-ams people understand them.
If you get it down to half a billion, people will know what you are
s[)ending and you will have problems.
FUNCTION, SIZE, AND PAY OF ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAM
"What is the function, size, and pay of an armed propaganda team?
^Ir. Colby. The armed propaganda team has 74 men in it. A team
of 74 former Vietcong who are recruited to work for you. They are
paid between 5,000 and 10,000 piasters a month. They are armed
usually, with M-2 carbines. They are uniformed, and they operate
generally in smaller elements than 74. They generally operate in pla-
toon size or e\en in squad size. Their fimction is to go aromid into
the countryside and indicate to the people that they used to be Viet-
cong and that the government has received them and taken them in
and that the Chieu Hoi program does exist as a way of Vietcong cur-
rently on the other side to rally. They contact people like the families
of known Vietcong. They have, for instance, invited and provided
the transportation to take such families for a look at the local Chieu
Hoi center, to see what it is, and then return them to their homes after
that one-half day visit just so the next time they see their relative
they can attest to the fact that this program really is what it is. Some
of them are also used as guards on the Chieu Hoi hamlets or even the
Chieu Hoi centers to help protect them against possible Vietcong
attack.
246
As I indicated, tlie fellow in the Cliieu Hoi reception center is free
to leave if he wishes.
ADVISERS TO ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS
The Chairmax. Do these teams liave American advisers I
Mr. Colby. They ha\e American advisers, sir, Australian advisers
and some Filipino advisers. Eacli team miglit not necessarily have an
adviser, but there will probably be an advisei' in the Province to advise
the total proo;ram, the reception of new Hoi Chanh and the use of the
armed propaganda teams.
The Chairman. I thought the Filipinos had been withdrawn.
Mr. Colby. These are contract people, individuals who are hired by
us. They are paid by the Americans but are not Americans.
The Chairman. AVhy do you hire Filipinos?
Mr. Colby. The Filipinos had a very interesting history of a pro-
gram of inviting the Huks to rally, and they had the same kind of a
pi'ogram of resettling them and inviting them to rejoin the government
side.
A number of these people who were woi'king in the Philippines under
President Magsaysay did come over and help set this program up and
helped on the advisory aspects of it.
The Chairman. Is General Lansdale out there ?
Mr. Colby. He is not in Vietnam now. He is here in the United
States.
The Chairman. Did he have anything to do with setting up this
program because he worked in the Philii)pines before: did he not?
Mr. Colby. Yes. I think he had something to do with setting it up
in the Philippines ; I could not say for sure. I think it was set up before
he returned to Vietnam this time.
The Chairman. These teams have either American or, as you say,
contract advisers ?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
The Chairman. The teams report to them, I take it ?
Mr. Colby. No, they rejDort to the Chieu Hoi chief.
The Chairman. Chieu Hoi chief ?
Mr. Colby. Yes. They are part of the Vietnamese Government, and
their command structure is to the Chieu Hoi chief of that particular
Province.
The adviser is an adviser to the Chieu Hoi chief. They do not com-
mand these teams.
chieu hoi interrogation procedtjres
The Chairman. In your statement you discuss the interrogation
procedure. Are these advisers present during the interrogation?
Mr. Colby. Generally not, Mr. Chairman. The interrogation is done
in the Chieu Hoi center by the national police, by the military intelli-
gence or whoever, and it would be very rare that an American would
be involved in the actual interrogation.
Once in a while that probably happens . I believe for the very im-
portant ones who come over, like some of the higher officers who have
247
come over, the Americans have directly intei-rogated them. But the rule
is tliat a man who comes over and says he is a Hoi Chanh must be
reported to the Chieu Hoi service and center and must be physically
brought there within 24 hours. He then, with his consent, may be re-
turned to an interrogation center for further discussion and elucidation
of what he knows, but he must first be brought into the Chieu Hoi
meclianism.
ARE HOI CHANH COUNTED UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM ?
The Chairman. Are those who come in under the Chieu Hoi pro-
gram also counted as defectors under the Phoenix program ?
Mr. Colby. Yes, yes. They are included in that total. Xot all of them,
of course, because all of them do not meet the standards of the Phoenix
program, the A, B category.
IMPORTANT OFFICIALS RALLIED
The Chairman. You gave the figures; 1 will not repeat them. Can
you indicate the percentage who are what you would call important
officials or of that rank who might be called Communists in an ideo-
logical sense ?
Mr. Colby. I think the sum last year, the total mnnb-^r last year
brought in were 47,000 of which 28,000 were military. Now, they would
not be included in the category of important officials because they are
not in the political apparatus; l^.AOO-odd aie called political. I think
in our Phoenix figures that 5,000-odd rallied, something of that nature,
and those 5,000 out of the 47,000 would be a figiu-e for the more im-
portant ones,
CHIEU hoi program QUOTAS
The Chairman. Arc there quotas assigned under the Chieu Hoi
program ?
Mr. Colby. Yes, there have been goals set, I would call them goals
rather than quotas — goals to get that many brought in ; 4,800 ralliers
were included in the Phoenix total last year.
The Chairman. They would be considered of some consequence
rather than
Mr. Colby. Yes, not enonnous consequence in that an A, B level
could be a front leader at the village level. I mean that does not really
make him a member of the central committee in Hanoi.
The Chairman, Last year you said, I believe, 47,000 rallied ; is that
correct ?
Mr, Colby. Yes.
ARVN DESERTERS
The Chairman. How many deserters or defectors did the AKVX
have last year ? Do you know that ?
Mr. Colby. I do not know the answer, sir. I can get it for you. It
may be a matter we should give you in executive session. I will have
the figure for vou tomorrow.
248
I would add that the ARVN deserter is carried as a deserter after
15 days absence from his unit as distinct from our practice of calling
him a deserter only after 30 days.
It is our experience that a number of the people who are classified as
deserters actually show up again or show up in another unit sometimes.
There is a certain shifting among the different units. This should be
reduced in the future by reason of a fingerprint system which is well
on its way toward being implemented today, so that I think we will
be able to find out when that recruit was a member of some other unit.
The Chaikman. I am told that figure, as you say, is classified. It
was very substantially greater than the number of Chieu Hoi. We will
talk further about that tomorrow.
]\Ir. Colby. I will have that figure for you tomorrow.
CLASSIFICATION OF ARVN DESERTION FIGURES QUESTIONED
The Chairman. I am not quite sure why these figures should be
classified if the country is supposed to understand what we are doing
and what goes on. The reason I object to this classification of things of
this eharartei- is )io\v do they expect people to make a reasonably well-
informed judgment if they do not know some of the critical questions?
If you let the Chieu Hoi stand alone without any reference at all
to what is happening on the other side, it creates an impression that
the thing is collapsing. I mean it is just about to collapse and, of
course, if you hang on another year it will be over.
But if there are more desertions from the ARVN than there are
desertions from the other side, that puts a little different light on the
situation ; does it not ?
Mr. Colby. Well, Mr. Chairman, these figures are not that com-
parable, because the 'Chieu Hoi figures are people who were on the
other side who joined the government side.
Now, there are some who were on the other side and who just drift
back into their homes and never go through the Chieu Hoi center.
Secondly, it is our fairly firm opmion that very few of the deserters
from the GVN forces actually go to the other side.
Again, as I say, a number of these shift to other imits. Some of
them drift oft' and go home and plant rice and that sort of thing, so
it is not an exactly comparable figure.
The Chairman. Let us assmne you are correct. I still do not see why
they say this is a classified figure if there is an explanation. It creates
then a false impression that it is perhaps more serious than it is. What
I do not like is always classifying some aspect of it. I think it may
well create an impression that the Government is hiding something
that is bad. This contributes to a degree to this so-called credibility
gap, that we do not believe what we are told. I have already gone over
it. You know, we have been misled so much in the past. I thmk it is
to your benefit not to classify these things, but to put it on the table and i
then if there is an explanation, such as you have given, give it.
It is much healthier and much more persuasive to say, "Yes," there
were so many thousands of these deserters, but this is what happened
to them. They did not go to the YC; they went home and did so and
so — just what you said.
I
249
It is iniich healthier than your saying, "Well, that figure is
ol*is*^iriGcl '
Mr. Colby. Let me examine the question, Mr. Chairman, and if it is
possible to declassify it tomorrow, we will hand it to you on an
unclassified basis.
The Chaikmax. It is very irritating you see. This keeps cropping up.
It is the same as this terrible controversy we are having over the Lao-
tian situation, with which you have nothing to do. But it is very irritat-
ing in trying to operate a' democratic government, if it is still maybe
called that, to be always confronted with this tendency to cover up
some kind of a figure or some activity. I do not see anything wrong
with your explanation of it and I am not rejecting it at all. If that is
the fact, well, then, so what? Then it does not mean what it might
otherwise mean if you merely make the explanation and say, ''Well,
the figure is classified."'
Mr. Colby. I do not want to indicate that desertion is not a problem.
It is a problem : I agree with vou there.
The CiiAiitMAX. It is a problem. There is a considerable problem
within our own forces ; is there not ?
Mr. Colby. I do not know, ^Mr. Chairman.
The Ciiair:hax. You have read alK)ut it. I mean there is a consider-
able problem about the ciuestion of the draft. This has been in the
paper. This has been a pretty difficult war; has it not? Do you not
agree to that ?
Mr. Colby. It has indeed.
The Chairman. Or have vou been too far away from us to know it^
Mr. Colby. It is a difficult war on both sides of the ocean, I believe.
The Chairman. It sure is.
There is a sort of closing note, putting together a few odds and ends.
POPULATION CONTROL MARKING SYSTEM
Are you familiar with an Army project called the population con-
trol marking system, which was described in an October 1969 Army
intelligence information bulletin as one which will "enable U.S. Forces
to rapidly and invisibly mark mass elements of a given population with
a permanent coated agent that cannot be reasonably reproduced or
forged. In this manner it will be possible through a special read-out
device to rapidly and accurately ascertain to what hamlet, city, or
region an individual belonged, thus identifying him as a suspect should
he be detected in other than his designated area" '?
^h\ Colby. I am not familiar with that program, ^Mr. Chairman.
I am familiar with the program of giving new identification cards to
Vietnamese which will be backed up by fingerprints and photographs.
These will be given to all Vietnamese. We are supporting that program.
It is normal identification card type thing.
The Chairman. You think this is not this program though ?
Mr. Colby. That does not sound like it to me. But I do not know
anything about that program, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. This I am told is an invisible tatooing program.
You do not laiow anything about it ?
Mr. Colby. I am afraid vou are bevond me, Mr. Chairman. We have
lots of bright ideas out there, Mr. Chairman.
44-706 — 70 17
250
The Chairman. Maybe you as well as we can learn something out of
this hearing. As a matter of fact, it has just been called to my atten-
tion. I do not know about it either. We have lots of new developments
going on in this country.
EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE CORRUPTION IN VIETNAM
This morning I think there was a description of corruption in South
Vietnam written in 19G7 by a Vietnamese, and it was suggested the
document was out of date. I have now been handed a more current
observation, an up-to-date statement written less than a year ago, writ-
ten in the spring of 1969, also by a Vietnamese. Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau.
It relates to the success of eliminating corruption. There are a few
excerpts that I thought I might read into the record and maybe you
would care to comment on them as to the success. It says :
The present countermeasures used in abolisliing corruption can only solve the
problem partially. Due to the following reasons, we have not yet been able to
determine the main reasons that cause and nourish corruption. A campaign is
directed mainly for political propaganda and for the satisfaction of criticism by
American opinion. The measures taken are somewhat partial because they are
only aimed at low ranking, isolated and out of power local oflBcials. The above
mentioned measures are so inefficient and erroneous that they can cause corrup-
tion to be more severe, formation of factions to be stronger and honest officials
to become agitated and to have a crime obsession and an inferiority complex thus
making our regime internally as well as internationally more scattered and
weaker.
Do you have any comment to make on that ?
Mr. Colby. Well, my difference wdth the earlier statement was
mainly pointed at the question of the situation in the country side, the
physical condition in the countryside, Mr. Chairman. Corruption is
still a problem. It has been for many years in most of Asia and I
presume will be with us for a while.
There are still problems that have to be dealt with. There are some
steps being taken on this. It is a matter of discussion from time to time.
AVe take particular pains, of course, in our own programs and in the
use of our own resources to minimize, to the degree possible, any
corruption.
I would suggest that you would be interested in a little story. One
of our people in a district in Saigon had an idea which was adopted,
and as a result in this office in Saigon today there are big painted
signs on the walls describing the different forms, the different docu-
ments that are available at that office, and next to each the name of
each form or each license that you need. It tells the cost of the licenses
and the number of days or how long it should take to be available.
The purpose of publicizing this is to make it obvious that it is not
necessary to give the extra money, the "tea" money, and so forth, to
get the document through in any shorter time. It also fixes the sum
for the license fee.
Now, this is not everywhere in Vietnam, but it is the kind of sug-
gestion that comes up from some of our people from time to time which
a local official will adopt to try to bring some of the problems out into
the open so that the normal control of the population's interest in
eliminating this kind of nuisance can begin to bear on it.
251
FRENCH STATEMENTS ON INDOCHINA WAE IN 195 3
The Chairman. There is one passage in this book of ]Mr. Meyerson's
which I thought was rather interesting. It bears upon this recurrent
question of whether or not we are actually judging the situation prop-
erly. This is in his appendix and I thought it would be interesting for
the record. It is very short. ,
This gentleman, I majr say, spent quite a long tune, m two diiierent
periods, altogether, I think, the equivalent of a year or a year and a
half, studying this one small problem. He said :
On fi visit to Saisron one day in May lOoT. jnst nfter the much heralded nation-
wide village elections, I came upon a bundle of back issues of the French maga-
zine "Indochina Sud Est Asiatique." They were published in 1953. Here are
"The transport squadrons of the Army Air Force in Indochina have, since
October 1952, flown 8 million kilometers. They have registered 25,261 sorties,
carried 24,400 tons of Ciirgo and 143,000 passenger, and they have dropped
75,000 paratroopers.
"I was struck by the high morale of the Vietnamese soldiers, the intelligence
of the officers who command them, and above all the new fact that the popula-
tion is joining in the struggle against the terrorists."
This was attributed to a statement of French President Paul Rey-
naud in summing up his inspection trip in Saigon.
On the next page it says :
"Each year sees a refinement of military tactics in Indo-China. Since the fall
of Nghia-Lo, isolated outposts have been downgraded. The late.st tactic involves
hedge-hopping air mobile units.
"Vietnam has now successfully completed an extraordinary undertaking : In the
midst of a violent civil war, the government has conducted village elections
employing every guarantee of liberty and independence of choice that can be
imagined for any modern State. . . . One need only recall the old Vietnamese
saying. 'The authority of the King stops at the gates of the village,' to appreciate
the full significance of these elections. . . .
"Nevertheless, certain observers have tended to write off the elections as
being . . . without political significance. This interpretation vastly under-
estimates the importance of the event It should be emphasized that, in the
weeks preceding the elections, the Viet Minh announced a two-pronged anti-
election campaign : On the one band, terrorism and sabotage would be stepped
up; on the other hand, voters would be pressured into abstaining. Yet, despite
these threats, not only did 80.21 iiercent of eligible voters participate in the elec-
tion, but, equally significant, 15,000 candidates presented themselves for the
7,000 seats at stake."
These reports going back for 20 years sound so familiar: do they
not ? Sometimes at least it raises a slight question about our judgment ;
does it not ?
Mr. Colby. I think we tried to express our judgment with
api^ropriate caution and awareness of difficulties ahead, Mr, Chairman.
Tlie Chairman. I am sure you do. I am quite sure President Reynaud
was not trying to deceive anyone. I liave no reason to doubt that. Tliey
went through a very painful experience because of it. I hope I never
suggested that I think any of you are trying to deceive this committee
or in any way misrepresent it as you see it. The problem is how do we
see it. That is true not only of that problem, but of a lot of them here at
home. There is nothing peculiar about it; only it is extraordinarily
difficult. I do think it is very difficult.
Anything else today?
I want to make this sliort announcement.
252
SECURITY ASPECTS OF PACIFICATION
JNIr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, I have a document here on the security
aspects of pacification that I thought we might insert in the record.
The Chaieman. It would be very helpful.
Mr. Colby. It just summarizes some of the programs that aflect
security. I think v^ e Imve discussed most of them in the course of the
past few days.
The CTTAiR:\iAi>r. I think it would be very helpful to do that.
(The information referred to ai^pears on p. 716.)
expression of APPRECIATIOlSr BY WITNESS
Mr. Colby. I would like, since this would be the closing part of the
public session, I understand, Mr. Chairman, to express on behalf of the
various officers and men who have come here from Saigon our appreci-
ation for your courtesy and your patience, I might add, and also your
concerned curiosity about what is happening there.
Sergeant Wallace will go back to central Vietnam to rejoin his CAP
platoon in the hamlet out there. Captain Geek will go down to the
delta to resume life there in the village along the canals to try to help
that village get established. Captain Murphy will go back to advising
an RF operation in Long Aii Province where there is still a good fight
going on. Major Arthur who spoke here is going back to his quarters
in Binh Chanh District in which he lives in a double bed which has
sandbags at the top underneath a sandbagged roof because the enemy
rather frequently manages to mortar the place. Mr. ]\Iills will go back
to his highlanders and try to work the relationship between the Viet-
namese and the highlanders in order to create some cohesion there. Mr.
Vann will return to his rather intense programs of visiting all of the
areas of the delta, every last corner of it. Mr. IMclNIanaway and I will
return to the somewhat less arduous physical surroundings of Saigon.
I think we all have been very much educated and very much impressed
by this example of interest on your part, jNIr. Chainnan, and on the
]Dart of the other members of the committee in what we are trying to
do out there.
We think we are trying to do something useful. I am sure we are.
On some occasions our perspective may be a little narrow, but I
think that we are going to continue to try to do the best job we can
for our Government, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CRiTicisar IS not of witnesses but of high-lemsl decisions
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
You promjit me to respond by saying that I hope that all of these
gentlemen understand that this committee, and certainly the chairman
of this committee, do not now nor ever have intended to criticize you
gentlemen who are carrying out the orders of your Government in the
best way you can, whether you are fighting on the front, whether you
are exposed to the enemy, or whether you are directing from Saigon.
This criticism has been misrepresented inevitably by people who dif-
fer with us as a criticism directed at the people carrying on the war.
Of course, that is utterly without foundation.
253
The criticism that I and others on this committee have is confined to
the decisions beintr made at the highest level, goinor back to 19Gi-Go,
We are not talking about what any of the people m the held have done
but to be precise^ about the decisions made by the President, taken
ui)on the advice of his Cabinet and advisers. Tliere is a difterence ot
opinion as to where the interests of the United States lie. It is a polit-
ical question, and I have nothing but admiration for you m your
position and all the gentlemen you have mentioned. It is even more
difficult in my opinion, to carry on a conflict such as this about wlucli
certainly there is greater doubt and greater criticism than any m our
history, I believe. . . ^ • i j; ^,„,
Of course the Ci\^l War was unique, but m any other outside ot oui
own Civil War, where we really did fall to fighting among ourselves,
there was nothing like this. To my knowledge there was nothing like
this in World War I, World War II, the Korean war, nor any other
war
There was something like this long after the event m the Philippine
war There was quite a fuss raised, but due to lack of communications
at that time no one knew anything about it until after it was long oxer.
Unfortunately this one has gone on. You give me the occasion to
sav I have not now nor have I ever intended to criticize what you gen-
tlemen are doing or soldiers are doing in the field. You are doing what
you conceive is vour duty and your order. I have never suggested in
any way that any man has anv choice about this matter.
i have had many people, st^udents and others, because of my well-
known opposition to the war itself, ask my advice about the draft nnd
so on. I have alwavs and always shall advise tliem, "This is your Gov-
ernment and you inust follow the laws of your Government."
DUTY OF SENATORS TO EXPRESS DISAGREEMENT W^TII POLICY
I have tried to follow the laws of the Government. I figure it is my
duty, as it is other Senators' duties if they disagree with a policy, not
to meekly fall in line but to express that disagreeinent. That is the
only wav a democratic country can properly function and there is a
tendency always in wartime to' stifle any criticism or opposition. Gen-
erally, that is no probU^m or not a serious one, but in this case it has
been! It is a very unfortunnte pait and a very unhappy role to play to
disagree with your Government's policy at any time, but esi)ecially
when it involves the lives of so many ]^eople and the costs.
I can well understand how you gentlemen in the fiekh having a job
to do, are very impatient of those who back here in Washino:t()ii do
rritirize the operation overall, even thou.q-h the critirism is not directed
at you, because vou are bound to feel that you are doing something of
importance to the country. Given the assumption that the decision was
coi-rect. vou most certainly are. The question of whether or no<- we
should be there, whether or not it is consistent with the vital national
interest and securitv of the country, is anothpr question. It is a legiti-
mate question to ask not only the' past Administration, but also this
Administration.
It was a very important question. I think, in tlie last Administration's
decision not to run. At least we thought it was. I think that is generally
accepted. The country, I think, thought there would be a very signifi-
254
cant change, and there may be. That is the question we are all interested
in today.
The President, as you know, published a statement yesterday on
general overall policy. It is so long that due to these hearings I have
not had a chance to read it yet. I hope to read it over the weekend.
QUESTION IS OXE OF JUDGMENT, NOT WITNESS' CANDOR
I want to thank you and all of you for your cooperation in coming
here and giving us your advice. I hope you will not go away think-
ing I am suspicious or have reservations about your frankness and
candor when I call attention to the fact that in the past statements
about this war have not proved to have been true.
There again I did not suggest that tlieso other witnesses were telling
the committee anything that they did not believe at the time. I am
suggesting these are very difficult things to judge. In our fallibility
in the pasr wo liave not been correct in our judgment of how things were
going and we must take every precaution possible not to fall again
into this same trap. That is about the sum and substance of it.
I certainly do not wish to impugn anybody's honesty and integrity
in their testimony.
iMr. Colby. I had no suggestion of that in my statement.
senate's belief in value of open DISCUSSION
The Chairman. We raised these questions for examination. There
is still in the Sennte, especially among some Members, perhaps a
naivete that there is some value in open discussion by a number of
people. Tliere is still the idea thnt among a hundred men, if thev are
first made aware of the facts and then have an opportunity to discuss
them, the ultimate decision may be a little wiser than that taken by
one man or two or three men in secret session, if I may call it that.
This is part and parcel of this argument about what should be made
public. I mean what should we be allowed to know and and to discuss,
such as the controversy over Laos. All it is really is the feeling among
a great many Members of the Senate that there is still value in open
discussion of public matters of the greatest importance.
That does not mean we arrogate to ourselves any superior wisdom.
We assume we are all average, but the discussion develops the truth,
we will say, or more nearly the truth.
I appreciate your statement. Ambassador Colby.
announcement of next hearing
Tomorrow we will hear testimony in executive session in room S-116
in the Capitol from Capt. Armand Murphy, Regional Forces and
Popular Forces Adviser in Long An Province; Capt. Richard T.
Geek, Commander, Mobile Advisory Team, Kien Giang Province, and
U.S. Marino Cor]3s Sgt. Richnrd Wallace. He is Combined Action
Platoon Team Leader in Quang Nam Province.
I might point out that according to the staff the Department of
Defense was prepared to have these witnesses testify in public session,
but in this instance, much to my surprise, they were overruled by the
255
State Department. This is a salutary sign of a new relationship
between the Departments of State and Defense in any case. But it is a
disturbing indicator of the Department of State's unwillingness to
open up all aspects of our involvement in Vietnam to public discussion.
We will also discuss the case of Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau further. The
staff of this committee has looked into this case in some depth. The
case of Mr. Chau seems to raise a number of important questions con-
cerning the operations of U.S. agencies in Vietnam, the relationship
of the American mission to the Thieu regime, and the prospect of
representative government in South Vietnam. We will be very
interested in the comments of you gentlemen tomorrow.
I also will end by apologizing for keeping you so late and for being
unable to make these hearings a little shorter, but that is a very difficult
thing to do.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Mr. Colby. Thank you very much.
( Whereupon, at 5 : 05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
Friday, February 20, 1970, at 10 a.m.)
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
United States 3Iilitaiy Advisory Program in Vietnam
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., iu room S-116,
the Ca])ito], the Honorable J. W. Fulbrio:h( (chau-man) presidino;.
Present: Senators Fulbri<2:ht, Gore, Church, Symington, Pell,
Aiken, Case, Cooper, and Javits.
Also i)resent: William E. Colbv, Deputy to General Abrams;
John Vann, Deputy for CORDS, IV Corps; Hawthorne Mills. Prov-
ince Senior Adviser, Tuycn Due; Maj. James F. Arthur, District
Senior Adviser, Binh Cluinh District, Gia Dinh Province; and
Clayton E. McManaway, assistant.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
opening statement
The committee is meeting this morning in executive session at the
insistence of the State Department to hear testimony from Captain
Armand Muri)hy, Adviser to Regional and Popular Forces in Long
An Province, Capt. Richard T. Geek, Mobile Advisory Team Com-
nuinder in Kien Gian Province, and Sgt. Richard D. Wallace, Com-
bined Action Platoon sergeant in Quang Nam Province. The com-
mittee will be interested in learning more about these assistance
programs, the capacities of the Vietnamese forces involved, and the
prospects for the Vietnamese to assume these responsibilities.
Following their teslimon}^ we will examine with Ambassador
Colby additional details of the Phoenix program, the case of Tran
Ngoc Chan and other matters.
Befor(> Cajjtain Murjihy, Cai^tain Geek, and Sergeant Wallace read
their prepared statements, 1 would like to ask each of them one
question. Do you have any objections to discussing in public session
what you are doing in Vietnam?
Captain Murphy. No, sir.
Captain Geck. No, sir.
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir.
The Chairman. You did not suggest that this be in executive
session ?
Cai)tain Murphy. No, sir; Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Who wishes to begin?
(257)
258
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARMAND MURPHY, ADVISER TO REGIONAL
AND POPULAR FORCES IN LONG AN PROVINCE
Captain Murphy. I will begin, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Proceed, please, sii*.
Captain Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Army Capt. Armand Jordan Murphy from Florida. I have
served in the Republic of Vietnam for the last 24 consecutive months,
serving with the 9th U.S. Infantry Division and the last 12 months
with the Military Assistance Command Vietnam. During the last
7 months I have held the position of senior Regional and Popular
Forces adviser for Long An Province.
LONG AN PROVINCE
Long An Province lies to the south and west of Saigon at a distance
of approximately 10 miles at its closest boundary. It is the southern-
most province in III Corps tactical zone but possesses no international
borders. The Province has seven districts, 81 ^^llages, and 387 hamlets.
The primary occupation of the 365,000 inhabitants is rice farming.
By the latest statistics, over 85 percent of the population is under
Government of Vietnam security. Militarily, Long An has 52 Regional
Force companies and 163 Popular Force platoons. There are two regi-
ments of the Army of the Rejjublic of Vietnam forces totaling five
battalions operating in the Province. The Third Brigade of the 9th
U.S. Infantry Division mth four infantry battalions operates almost
exclusively in Long An. Vietnamese forces in both combat and combat
support functions total approximately 16,000 personnel. U.S. forces
total in excess of 5,500 personnel. Two Regional Force companies
and 50 Popular Force platoons are to be added in 1970.
DUTIES AND ACTIVITIES OF CAPTAIN MURPHY
As the senior Regional and Popular Forces adviser, my primary
function is that of principal U.S. adviser to Maj. Nguyen Van Thanh,
commander of Pro\dnce Regional and Popular Foices. My duties
consist of rendering advice and assistance to Major Thanh on all
facets of Regional and Popular Force functions. My acti\aties include
assisting in the planning, preparation, and execution of tactical opera-
tions, accompanying on inspections of Regional and Popular Force
units, and advising on administrative and logistical support functions.
REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES IN LONG AN PROVINCE
The Regional and Popular Forces play a key role in the pacifica-
tion effort in my Province through provision of territorial security.
Currently in Long An, pacification expansion is being supported by
14 Regional Force companies, four independent Regional Force
platoons, and eight Popular Force platoons. Other missions under-
taken by Long An Regional and Popular Forces include security
for villages and bridges throughout the Province.
The proficiency of Regional and Popular Forces in Long An Prov-
ince has improved measurably. This improvement is largely attrib-
utable to the efforts of the 20 mobile advisory teams operating in the
259
Province. These teams, consisting of two officers and three noncom-
missioned officers, live and operate with Regional and Popular Force
units and have the mission to upgrade the overall operational effec-
tiveness of the units they advise.
The Chairman. Ai-e those Americans?
Captain Murphy. That is correct, Mr. Chau-man; they are
Americans
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Captain Murphy. Another contributing factor to the improvement
in territorial security force proficiency has been the equipment
conversion program. Equipping these forces with modern weapons,
vehicles, and communications equipment has not only given our allies
sujDerior firepower, communications, and transportation capabilities
over the enemy, but has also resulted in a psychological effect on
the individual soldier making him more self-confident and aggressive.
Presence and availability of support from helicopter gunships, tactical
air fighters, and medical evacuation aircraft have also greatly en-
hanced the combat capabilities of Regional and Popular Forces.
The Chairman. Thank you. Captain Murphy.
AGGRESSIVENESS OF VIETNAMESE
You were referring to making them aggressive. Were j^ou referring
to the Vietnamese?
Captain Murphy. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Are they not naturally very aggressive?
Captain Murphy. It varies, sir, with the individual.
The Chairman. Do you have to inspire them with aggression?
Captain Muprhy. It varies with the individual, and I would say
with the leadership.
The Chairman. Do you think by the time we com[)lete our job they
will be aggressive enough to hold their own in this modern world?
Captain Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, that we have seen
considerable improvement in the aggressiveness of the units through
U.S. assistance, and I would hope that through our continued efforts
in this direction that we will eventually achieve a very high degree of
aggressiveness and combat capability on the part of the individual
Vietnamese soldier.
background of captain murphy
The Chairman. Are you a Regular Army captain?
Captain Murphy. No, Mr. Chairman. I am Army Reserve.
The Chairman. You did not attend the Academy?
Captain Murphy. No, Mr. Chairman, I did not.
The Chairman. Where are you from in Florida?
Captain Murphy. I call St. Petersburg my hometown, on the west
coast of the peninsula.
The Chairman. Is that where they have this oil slick?
Captain Murphy. I do not know about that.
The Chairman. Have you been reading about the oil slick?
Captain Murphy. No, I have not, Mr. Chainnan.
The Chairman. It is near Tampa, I believe.
Captain Murphy. Tampa is just north of St. Petersburg.
260
The Chairman. They have a magnificent oil sUck, killing all the
wildlife and ruining all the beaches. I was recently down there for a
couple of days, not at Tampa but at Fort Lauderdale. It is nice
weather down there.
Captain Murphy. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. I am anxious to get
back.
The Chairman. How old are you?
Captain Murphy. I am 27, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. What were you doing before you were ordered to
Vietnam?
Captain Murphy. I attended the Infantry Officer Candidate School.
The Chairman. What were you doing before that? Had you gone to
college or had you finished school?
Captain Murphy. Yes, sir, I attended school at Georgia Institute
of Technology in Atlanta.
The Chairman. What did you study?
Captain Murphy. I studied mechanical engineering.
The Chairman. Are you going to be an engineer?
Captain Murphy. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Do you do anything in the engineering field in
Vietnam?
Captain Murphy. No, Mr. Chairman. I am involved almost en-
tirely in military affairs.
The Chairman. Pacification is kind of a mixture. It is not only
military but political too. Is it not social?
Captain Murphy. Yes, it is, ^Ir. Chairman. It definitely has a
political aspect.
The Chairman. Do you have many reasons to call upon your train-
ing as an engineer in your present position?
Captain Murphy No, I do not
ADVISORY DUTIES OF CAPTAIN MURPHY
The Chairman. You do not, but you are becoming a politician.
What exactly do you do when you advise these people? You are the
senior regional adviser; is that right?
Captain Murphy. Senior Regional and Popular Forces adviser.
The Chairman. Whom do you advise directly?
Captain Murphy. I am principal U.S. adviser to Maj. Nguj^en
Van Thanh. Major Thanh is the deputy province chief for security
in Long An.
The Chairman. What do you tell him? Give us a picture. About
what do you advise him?
Captain Murphy. Well, let me, if I may — ■ —
The Chairman. Do you speak Vietnamese?
Captain Murphy. Yes, I do.
The Chairman. Does he speak English?
Captain Murphy. He speaks excellent English. We carry out all
our conversations in English.
The Chairman. About wliat do you ail vise him?
Ca})tain Murphy. Let me cite, if I may, a typical day.
The Chairman. That is what I would like.
261
JOINT UNITED STATES AND VIETNAMESE MORNING BRIEFING
Captain Murphy. In the morning at approximately 8 o'clock we
have a joint United States and Vietnamese briefing, which is conducted
in English because the province officials are all fluent in English.
The Chairman. Who attends that meeting?
Captain Murphy. It is attended by the province chief, Col. Le
Van Tu; my counterpart, Maj. Tan An, anrl the Vietnamese staff;
Col. Alfred Sanderson, the province senior adviser, myself, and the
members of the U.S. staft".
After this briefing, Maj. Tan An and I discuss our activities
The Chairman. Who does the briefing?
Captain Murphy. The briefing is given by both United States and
Vietnamese.
The Chairman. Are you one of those who does the briefing?
Captain Murphy. No, I do not brief.
The Chairman. Wlio does it?
Captain ]\1urphy. The S-2 intelligence officers will brief on the
enemy situation.
The Chairman. Are they the DOD intelUgence of CIA? Whose in-
telligence officers are they?
Captain Murphy. Well, the Vietnamese intelligence officer.
The Chairman. The}^ brief you about what? Describe it as best
you can.
Cai)tain Murphy. They will go briefly into the events of the
night.
The Chairman. What happened the day before?
Captain Murphy. Yes.
The Chairman. The significance of the night before?
Captain Murphy. The significant incidents. They will brief us on
intelligence reports which we may have received.
The Chairman. They are bringing you up to date on developments;
is that right?
Captain Murphy. That is correct, more or less, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. How many are at this briefing?
Captain Murphy. About eight.
The Chairman. Eight.
Captain Murphy. Eight Vietnamese personnel and about the same
number of Americans.
The Chairman. In effect you gather around the table and they
tell you what haj)pened as far as they know. Then what happens?
Cai)tain Murphy. Then the U.S. counterpart will brief immediately
after the Vietnamese. He will go into detail on any reports which we may
have received through our advisory channels, from our advisers in the
districts or on down to the mobile advisory team.
The Chairman. Yes.
Captain Murphy. Following that, the Vietnamese operations
officers, what we refer to as S-3 officers, will brief on operations for the
day.
The Chairman. Y"ou mean what they are going to do in the coming
day, not on what has happened.
Captain Murphy. On this particular day of the briefing.
The Chairman. Is it plans for the day?
Captain Murphy. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
262
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Captain Murphy. Then artillery personnel will give briefings on
significant radar sightings and rounds of artillery expended during the
preceding night.
That is about the extent of the briefing.
The Chairman. How long does that take?
Captain Murphy. It usually runs about 25 or 30 minutes in the
morning.
ARTILLERY FIRE DURING NIGHT
The Chairman. What is a typical rejjort? How many artillery
rounds, would you say are normal? Is it 100, 200, or a thousand?
Captain Murphy. We have both Vietnamese and U.S. artillery
located within a province.
The Chairman. In an average niglit do they expend many artillery
shells?
Captain Murphy. Generally the United States and Vietnamese will
fire a total of about 300 rounds of artillery.
The Chairman. During a night?
Captain Murphy. Yes.
The Chairman. At what do they fire?
Captain Murphy. Primarily, Mr. Chairman, on radar sightings.
We have an antipersonnel or personnel detecting radar which is
designed to pick up movements of personnel.
The Chairman. Can that radar tell whether it is a Vietnamese or an
American or a North Vietnamese or a South Vietnamese?
Captain Murphy. No, it cannot, Mr. Chairman. There is in all
areas in Vietnam a curfew of which the local inhabitants are aware.
They are informed through their government channel, and it can be
assumed that after a set time i
The Chairman. It picks up anything that moves.
Captain Murphy. Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Then the artillery shoots at it.
Captain Murphy. Yes, it does, after the target is cleared.
The Chairman. What does that mean?
RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. ARTILLERY FIRE
Captain Murphy. The target must be approved by Vietnamese
Government officials. I think I should point out here that U.S. artillery
is very restricted in the areas into which it can fire, both by us and
by Vietnamese restrictions which are imposed upon it. For example,
the U.S. artillery units have what they call a population overlay,
Mr. Chamnan. This is an overlay which has been drawn up through
both visual reconnaissance of the areas and through coordination
with Government of Vietnam officials. It shows where the population
is centered, and these targets can under no circumstances be engaged
by U.S. artillery. Some of these areas can be engaged by Vietnamese
artillery because they do not have the visual reconnaissance factor
or their overlays do not include the A'isual reconnaissance.
The Chairman. Why not? If there is a justification for one, why
is there not for the other?
Captain Murphy. I think the U.S. artillery units are extremely
aware of it.
The Chairman. What?
263
Captain Murphy. Of the possibility of injuring ci\'ilians; innocent
civilians.
The Chairman. The South Vietnamese do not care; is that it?
Captain Murphy. I would not say they do not care.
The Chairman. What does it mean then? Why do they make the
distinction, if they do?
Captain Murphy. Frankly I do not know why the Vietnamese
can fire in the areas that the United States cannot.
U.S. ARTILLERY ADVISERS
The Chairman. If you advise them not to fire over there, do they
follow your advice?
Captain Murphy. I do not advise on artillery engagements gen-
erally.
The Chairman. You do not. Who does advise on artillery?
Captain Murphy. We have an artillery ad\nsory detachment which
advises the Vietnamese artillery which is from the 25th ARVN
Division. It is not Regional or Popular Force artillery, so I do not
get involved with the artillery.
The Chairman. Do Americans advise on this?
Captain Murphy. The}^ have acU-isers, yes.
The CvHAirman. Americans. You do not happen to advise them?
Captain Murphy. No, I do not. Not on artillery matters, no.
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE NIGHTLY ARTILLERY FIRE
The Chairman. Do the Americans, you say, normally expend
about 300 rounds a nio-ht?
Captain Murphy. That is combined. To give you a breakdown,
Mr. Chairman, I would say the United States probably will fire about
two rounds for every one Vietnamese round.
The Chairman. It is about 200 to about 100?
Captain Murphy. Yes.
The Chairman. What size artillery is this?
Captain Murphy. These are 105mm and 155mm.
The Chairman. ^^Hiat range do they have?
Captain Murphy. 105 can engage targets at about — let me consult
with an artillery ex])ert.
The Chairman. You can advise with him if you like.
Captain Murphy. About 11 kilometers.
The Chairman. Ai-e you the artillery expert?
Captain Murphy. He is an artillery officer.
The Chairman. You are the one who advises them?
Captain Murphy. That just happened to be his basic branch, Mr.
Chairman. He is an artillery officer. I am an infantry officer.
DIFFERENCE IN RESTRICTIONS ON UNITED STATES AND SOUTH
VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY FIRE
The Chairman. We will come to him in a minute. This is greatly
interesting on how it operates. The Americans are restricted in certain
areas out of a delicate feeling for the ci\dlians I take it.
Captain Murphy. I think they are extremely aware of the possibility
of injuring civilians.
264
The Chairman. The ARVN is not. Is that a proper distinction?
Captain Murphy. I would not say they are not concerned for the
population. Certainly they have their restrictions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I am not trying to put words in your mouth. I am
only trying to get you to say it the way you see it. What is the differ-
ence, if any?
Mr. Vann. My. Chairman, may I help out on this?
The Chairman. I would like these young men who are not quite
as sophisticated as you are to answer, Mr. Vann. We will come back
to you later.
Mr. Vann. I am at the level that prepares the rules of engagement
under which they operate, and I do know the answer to your question.
The Chairman. I understand. You will have your opportunity,
but at the moment I am very interested in Captain Murphy's observa-
tions.
Senator Cooper. May I intervene at this point?
The Chairman. Most certainly you can.
Senator Cooper. Is the difference based at least in part upon the
fact that we do not command the Vietnam artillery? Do we?
Captain Murphy. No, Senator, we do not command Vietnamese
artillery.
Senator Cooper. You command your own troops, but you cannot
command theirs. You might advise them, but you cannot command
them.
Captain Murphy. That is right. Senator.
The Chairman. I did not mean to lead the witness at all. I was
only trying to get him to say whatever he believes to be the facts. I
do not have any viewpoint.
Senator Cooper. It is a proper inquiry.
The Chairman. I am not trying to lead the witness. Whatever the
situation is, I would like him to describe it. It is not often we get a
witness of your particular qualifications. Captain Murphy. Most of
our witnesses are diplomats and people highly trained in the art of
evasion. [Laughter.] I like the way you answer questions. Obviously^
you have not been trained.
This is no laughing matter. It is a fact. Any of you who have been
around know that. What is the principal achievement of a professional
ambassador? I would c^ualify that. That does not apply to a CIA
ambassador. [Laughter.] Of course it is. It is to avoid saying what
their government does not want them to say.
Captain Murphy, I am serious about it. I am very interested in
seeing how^ this operates because we have a principal responsibility
for it. We have plenty of advisers in your area. You have given the
number there as 5,500 Americans; is that right?
Captain Murphy. That is approximately correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. How many of those are advisers? How many are
active, we will say, troops?
Captain Murphy. We have about 250.
The Chairman. Advisers?
Captain Murphy. Advisers.
The Chairman. You do not happen yourself to advise the Viet-
namese on their program for the use of artillery, but some American
does; does he not?
Captain Murphy Yes, the artillery advisory elements.
265
The Chairman. Do you know who that is?
Captam Murphy. The advisory element that advises the 25th
ARVN Division is involved in the advice of ARVN artillery units.
The Chairman. Your idea is that even though we advise them not
to be indiscriminate in their use of artillery, they do not have to take
that advice. Is that the distinction you make?
Captain Murphy. They certainly do not have to take the advice.
The Chairman. As a practice, in your experience, do your counter-
parts take your advice?
Captain Murphy. Generally, Mr. Chairman, yes, they do. If my
counterpart chooses not to take my advice, he has always afforded me
the courtesy of an explanation as to why.
captain murphy's counterpart
The Chairman. How old is your counterpart?
Captain Murphy. He is 37 years old, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Is he a professional soldier?
Captain Murphy. Yes, he has been in the Army for 17 years and
he holds the rank of major.
The Chairman. Infantry?
Captain Murphy. He has served in the infantry.
The Chairman. He outranks you?
Captain Murphy. Yes, he does.
The Chairman. Do you have to salute him every time you come in
his presence?
Captahi Murphy. I afl'ord him the courtesy of a salute in the
morning.
The Chairman. In the morning, once a day?
Chptain Murphy. Yes.
Tae Chairman. Are yom- relations good?
Chptain Murphy. Quite good, Mr. Chairman.
Toe Chairman. Has he been implicated in any form of corruption
to your knowledge?
Captain Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I can truthfully say that I have
never known my counterpart to be involved in any type of corrup-
tion or graft.
The Chairman. Did he fight with the French before he fought with
the ARVN?
Captain Murphy. No, he did not.
The Chairman. He was not a member of the French forces?
Captain Murphy. No, he was not.
The Chairman. The French have been out 17 years. He did not
fight at all then until after the Geneva accords?
Captain Murphy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. What did he do before that?
Captain Murphy. He was in the north. He came south in 1954.
The Chairman. Is he Catholic?
Captain Murphy. No, he is not. He is a Buddhist.
The Chairman. You mean he lived around Hanoi. He lived in
North Vietnam, and he came south?
Captain Murphy. Yes.
44-706—70 18
266
U.S. MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS IN LONG AN PROVINCE
The Chairman. You say 20 mobile advisory teams operate in the
Province. These are all Americans?
Captain Murphy. They are American advisory.
The Chairman. Consisting of two officers and three noncommis-
sioned officers?
Captain Murphy. That is right.
The Chairman. They go about advising whom?
Captain Murphy. They advise the Regional and Popular Force
units.
The Chairman. About what?
Captain Murphy. They render tactical, administrative, and logisti-
cal advice. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that Captain Geek is in a better
position to testify on this since he is the leader of one of these mobile
units.
The Chairman. Have you anything further? I was trying to
develop your own statement as best I could to get a feeling about
what you do.
Is Captain Geek with one of the 20 mobile advisory teams?
Captain Murphy. He is a team leader of one such team, yes, Mr.
Chairman,
CAPTAIN murphy's VIEWS ON HIS WORK
The Chairman. Is there anything further of significance that you
should tell us? You have been there 24 months, you say?
Captain Murphy. That is correct.
The Chairman. Did you ask for an extended stay?
Captain ^Iurphy. Yes, I did.
The Chairman. Do you enjoy this work?
Captain Murphy. I find it most rewarding.
The Chairman. You do? Wliy? What do you feel you are
accomplishing?
Captain Murphy. Sir, I think I can best answer that question by
relating the situation as it was when I arrived in Long An Province
in January of 1968. At that time there were many areas which were
under strong enemy influence and control. As a member of the 9th
U.S. Army Infantry Division I operated in these areas. Many of these
areas in which we engaged company and battalion size enemy forces
are today prosperous centers of government support. I think a very
good indicator of the progress that we have made is the open road
network which now extends throughout the province.
ATTITUDE OF LOCAL PEOPLE
The Chairman. Are the people in your area reasonably happy and
contented with their lot?
Captain Murphy. On every occasion that my counterpart and I
have visited these new areas which have come under Government of
Vietnam security through pacification expansion, the people have been
extremely receptive to the GVN, to the Regional and Popular Force
units which now occupy those areas.
The Chairman. Have you become very friendly with many of the
natives?
Captain Murphy. Well
267
The Chairman. Are the ordinary people easy to know?
Captain Murphy. Yes. They are quite willing to talk to you.
The Chairman. Are they? Are they friendly to you?
Captain Murphy. Yes, they are, particularly in the new areas.
The Chairman. In the new areas. Do you have anything further to
say?
Captain ]\Iurphy. I have nothing else.
The Chairman. Do you have anything else? We have the three
officers.
Senator Cooper. I have some questions.
EXTENT OF ENEMY CONTACT IN LONG AN PROVINCE
You have been in the area 7 months?
Captain Murphy. I have been in the area for 24 months, Senator.
I have been in my current capacity for 7 months.
Senator Cooper. But you have been in this area more than the 7
months you have been adviser there. How long have you been in this
province?
Captain Murphy. In the province for 24 months, Senator.
Senator Cooper. Twenty-four months. Has there been much fight-
ing in this Province during that time?
Captain Murphy. There has been considerable contact with the
enemy, yes, Senator.
Senator Cooper. Is this continuous contact? Has it been one of
tho major areas of fighting?
Captain Murphy. Let me relate back to my statement and then
elaborate on it if I may. I think I can best answer your question in this
manner. When I first Arrived in Long An Pro\'ince, I served with the
9th Infantry Division. At that tirne contact Avith the enemy was
frequent, and generally the size of the enemy unit engaged was a com-
pany size unit or better.
Today contact with, the enemy is far less frequent, and generally
the size of the unit engaged is normally not larger than a squad.
STRENGTH OF ARVN AND U.S. BATTALIONS
Senator Cooper. What is the strength of an ARVN battalion?
You say there are five battalions?
Captain Murphy. An Army of the Republic of Vietnam bat-
talion has approximately 500 to 600 men.
Senator Cooper. What is the strength of a U.S. battalion, say of
the four operating there?
Captain Murphy. A U.S. battahon would have approximately
the same strength, about 500 soldiers.
VIETCONG and north VIETNAMESE WEAPONS
Senator Cooper. I see. What is the range and what kind of weapons
other than small arms, are the Vietcong or North Vietnamese
equipped with? Do they have any artillery?
Captain Murphy. The enemy, Senator?
Senator Cooper. Yes.
Captain Murphy. Mortar is about the heaviest artillery they have,
mortars and rockets.
268
I
Senator Cooper. "VMiat is the range? "
Captain Murphy. Of long-range rockets?
Senator Cooper. What is the range of a mortar?
Captain Murphy. A mortar can accurately engage the target up to
about 6 kilometers.
Senator Cooper. Six what?
Captain Murphy. Kilometers.
MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS BY ENEMY
Senator Cooper. Have there been many mortar or rocket attacks
by the enemy upon U.S. forces or ARVN forces?
Captain Murphy. Yes, indirect mortar and rocket attacks make up
the majority of the enemy-initiated actions.
Senator Cooper. Do they fire upon villages?
Captain Murphy. They do mortar villages, particularly the villages
which are undergoing pacification.
Senator Cooper. What is your headquarters, what town?
Captain Murphy. W^e are located in Tan An.
Senator Cooper. Have there been any mortar attacks on your
headquarters?
Captain Murphy. Not for over a year, Senator, and we attribute
this largely to the fact that through the pacification expansion we have
been able to provide security throughout the periphery of the province
capital.
RF AND PF FORCES IN HAMLETS
Senator Cooper. How many of the 387 hamlets are there that have
Regional or Popular Forces? Please give a rough percentage.
Captain Murphy. I would say well over 300.
Senator Cooper. How many?
Captain Murphy. W>11 over 300 are under GVN security.
Mr. Colby. You have said the size of your forces is 52 companies,
163 PF platoons. They are present in a certain number of those
hamlets.
Captain Murphy. Yes.
weapons, vehicles, AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO SOUTH
VIETNAMESE
Senator Cooper. You have given quite a comprehensive list of
weapons, vehicles, equipment that has been supplied to the Viet-
namese. Have the South Vietnamese been completely equipped now
or is there more equipment which is intended for them?
Captain Murphy. The M-16 rifle conversion program, which is
probably the most important and receives more emphasis than any
others, has been completed for all the forces which now operate in
Long An Province.
Senator Cooper. You say vehicles, communications equipment. Has
that been completed?
Captain Murphy. We have completed approximately 60 to 75 per-
cent of the conversion in these two categories.
Senator Cooper. Do you have any idea what the cost of this equip-
ment— what is the cost of this ecpupment that has been furnished?
Captain Murphy. No, Senator, I do not have.
269
UjSTITED states and south VIETNAMESE COMBAT SUPPORT
Senator Cooper. You say:
Presence and availability of support from helicopter gunships, tactical air
fighters, and medical evacuation aircraft have also greatly enhanced the combat
capabilities of Regional and Popular Forces.
Is that support American support?
Captain Murphy. Yes
Senator Cooper. The hehcopter gunships
Captain Murphy. The hehcopter assault battahons, the troop
carrying, and the hehcopter gunships are flown exchisively by Amer-
ican pilots. The Vietnamese do have their own medical evacuation
helicopters.
Senator Cooper. The support of gunships, fighters, tactical air
fighters, medical evacuation support: is this in support of the Ameri-
can forces?
Captain Murphy. They do also support the U.S. Forces.
Senator Cooper. What I am asking is do the Vietnamese operate
any helicopter gunships, air fighters?
Captain Murphy. No, not in Long An Province. They do have
tactical aircraft.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN
VANN, HAWTHORNE MILLS, AND CLAYTON E. McMANAWAY—
Resumed
Mr. Colby. E.xcuse me. I think the .Senator asked do the Vietnamese
operate any one of these three things that are mentioncil here; the
gunships, no.
Captain Murphy. No.
Mr. Colby. Tactical air fighters?
Captain Murphy. Tactical air fighters, yes. The Vietnamese Air
Force does have both forward air controllers and tactical aircraft
pilots.
Mr. C^oLBY. And nuHJical evacuation?
CajHain Murphy. No, medical evacuation is supported by the
United States.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT CAPABILITY WITHOUT U.S. COMBAT SUPPORT
Senator Cooper. The reason 1 ask you this is this: Suppose this
su|)i)ort were withdrawn, say a year from now, what would be the
combat ca})abilities — what would 3'ou estimate the combat capabili-
ties for Regional and Popular Forces to be?
Ca[)tain Murphy. I think, Senator, that it certainly would have an
effect on their ca])ability in a negative manner, but I think they could
continue in an effective manner.
Senator Cooper. You have been there 24 months and I know you
have had great e.Kperience there. Do you believe that if American
forces are withdrawn, that South Vietnam forces would be able to
match, be a match or could they defend themselves against the
North Vietnamese and the Vietcong? Do you believe they could sus-
tain the combat capability without the presence of American forces?
Captain Murphy. Senator, 1 can only answer within the scope of
my perspective. In Long An Province, yes, they could. This is evi-
denced by the fact that recently the U.S. unit there, the 3d Brigade
270
of the 9th Infantry Division, has, in fact, had difficulty finding suit-
able areas in which to operate.
Senator Cooper. The 9th Infantry Division?
Captain Murphy. That is right.
Senator Cooper. Because of what?
Captain Murphy. Because of the pacification expansion, and the
expanded area in which Regional and Popular Forces now are oper-
ating.
ATTITUDE OF LONG AN POPULACE TOWARD GVN
Senator Cooper. I notice at one point this province is only 10 miles
from Saigon; is that correct?
Captain Murphy. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cooper. It seems to me the people there must have some
knowledge of the government in Saigon. Wliat do they say about it?
Do they support it or are they against the government there in Saigon
or do they have any attitude at all?
Captain Murphy. It is interesting to see the change in attitude in
the areas under pacification from the time when the territorial security
forces are first deployed to these areas as opposed to the attitude
after they have been there for a while, and after the various agencies
of the GVN have performed specific tasks in conveying to the people
the position of the GVN. They become very much progovernment.
Senator Cooper. You hear that? Do people say that to you?
Captain Murphy. Yes, they do. Yes, they do. In many cases it is
the first time that any government has displayed a desire to help the
people at that level.
Senator Cooper. I am through.
The Chairman. Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Captain, I am interested in your testimony.
MILITARY BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN MURPHY
Wlien did you enter the Army?
Captain Murphy. 1966, Senator.
Senator Symington. Where did you enlist?
Captain Murphy. In Texas.
Senator Symington. What is your training, your background?
Captain Murphy. I took the normal basic training. I then attended I
the Infantry Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Ga., and re-j
ceived my commission in the infantry. I was sent to Vietnam in Janu-
ary of 1968.
Senator Symington. Did you have any ROTC training before]
that?
Captain Murphy. Yes, sir, I did. I had 2 years of ROTC.
Senator Symington. I see. How old are you now?
Captain AIurphy. Twenty-seven.
Senator Symington. When you got out of Benning where did you go?]
Captain Murphy. I served a short time at Fort Benning. Then I
went to Vietnam in January 1968 and served 1 year with the 9th j
Infantry Division. During the last 5 months I commanded the U.S.
portion of what was then known as the combined reconnaissance and!
intelligence platoon. This was a platoon consisting of 20 American and j
20 Vietnamese from the regional force province intelligence platoon.
We accompanied them on many combined operations. This is when Ij
first became involved with the Regional Forces.
271
COLLAPSE IN THE DELTA
Senator Symington. I have been out there a good deal myself —
believe I have made six trips, went all over the country. In the fall of
1965, things in the delta were quite quiet. I went to Vung Tau, and
then on down to Can Tho. We had no guards. We just walked around,
and there did not seem to be any problem. I went back again in 1966,
twice in 1967. I went down and watched that riverine operation south
of where you were. You are pretty close to Saigon; are you not, just a
few miles?
Captain Murphy. I am located about 25 miles from Saigon.
Senator Symington. What is the reason for the collapse in the delta?
The delta was the peaceful part of the situation in 1965 and 1966,
1967. Did it coUapse all of a sudden? What is the story?
Captain Murphy. Senator, I can only answer your question as
far as I have knowledge on it.
Senator Symington. Of course.
Captain Murphy. Because I was confined in Long An Province.
1 do not think we have seen a collapse there.
Senator Symington. Now things are much better than last year
but they were pretty good when 1 was there in 1967.
I am just wondering what was the problem in betAveen times.
We did not have any troops to speak of at all in the delta when
I was there. The South Vietnamese seemed to be handling it pretty
well.
Captain Murphy. As far as the entire delta is concerned, I am
sure Mr. Vann will be in a better position to speak than I would be.
Senator.
Senator Symington. The problems, as I remember them, were
mainlv near the DMZ and Danang, Chu Lai, and uj) in there, and a
great deal of fighting west of Plciku. But I thought the delta
The Chairman. He is not in the delta.
Senator Symington. Yes, he is.
Captain Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the portion generally referred
to as the delta is the area to the south of Saigon.
Senator Symington. Tliat is right.
The Chairman. I thought Mr. Vann was responsible for the delta.
Captain Murphy. He is, further down in the delta.
Senator Symington. Mekong Delta.
Captain Murphy. That is right.
Mr. Colby. Long An is kind of a delta. But it is not part of the
Mekong Delta.
Senator Symington. The only point is I have been in the delta
a lot and it seems peaceful down there.
The Chairman. What delta are we talking about so that I can
follow that?
Senator Symington. You are farther down.
The Chairman. Will somebody show it?
Mr. Mills. Here is Saigon and here is Long An. The Province
stretches to the south of Saigon, but the so-called delta provinces
that Mr. Vann is responsible for begin with the south.
The Chairman. South of Long An was what I understood.
Mr. Vann. That is correct. Long An and parts of Hau Nghia are
geographically in what is called the delta.
272
Senator Symington. The onl}' point I am trying to make is this
witness I did not think purported to be as competent to speak for the
delta as Mr. Vann is; is that correct?
Mr. Vann. He is speaking of Long An, sir, which is his competence.
Long An is geographical!}^ part of the delta.
The Chairman. Okay, proceed.
BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN GECK
Senator Symington. Captain Geek, what is your background?
Captain Geck. I came in the Army in 1967 also. I went through OCS.
Senator Symington. How old are 3'ou?
Captain Geck. Twenty- three.
Senator Symington. Twenty-three?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. What college did 3'ou go to?
Captain Geck. I do not have a college degree. I attended Seton
Hall Uniyersity in Ne\y Jerse}'.
Senator Symington. And did you enlist as a priyate?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir, I did.
The Chairman. I wonder if the Senator would mind. We are
trying to take these men in order. I announced that when we finished
with Cai)tain Murphy we would go down the line. Each one will tell
his own experiences and we haye not come to either of them. What I
was suggesting in the beginning was if anyone wishes to ask Captain
Murplty anything. Then we will take them in order.
Senator Symington. I understand.
The Chairman. Is there anything further from Captain Murphj'?
Senator Case. We will come back to that.
The Chairman. There are one or two small questions. I did not
wish to cut you off.
Senator Symington. I was late because of another hearing.
The Chairman. He already explained he went to school. I think
you will find the record is quite good on that. I do not wish to cut
anyone off, but to proceed in as orderly a manner as we can.
Do you not wish to ask him anything?
Senator Case. No, not at the moment.
enemy killed attributable to U.S. SUPPORTING FIRE
The Chairman. I haye one or two questions because of your
intimate knowledge on the local basis. You did not quite complete
your statement to Senator Cooper, I belieye. Can you estimate
what percentage of the enemy killed in engagements with Regional
and Popular Forces are actually killed by helicojiter gunships and
aircraft and artillery fire as opposed to the ARVN? Do you haye any
way of estimating that?
Captain Murphy. Yes, I do, \h\ Chairman.
I conducted a study on this last year, and it was determined at that
time that 35 percent of enemy killed in action could be attributed to
U.S. su})])orting fire. That includes helicopter gunships, artillery,
and tactical air strikes.
The Chairman. That is about one-third.
273
QUALITY OF RF AND PF FORCES
The CORDS handbook, entitled 'The Vietnamese Village," states
that, and I quote, "Studies indicate that RF and PF are often margin-
al men drawn from the poorest elemients of village society."
Would you agi'ee with that statement?
Captain Murphy. That they are only marginal men, Air.
Chairman?
The Chairman. This is from the CORDS handbook. Does that
reflect your views about it too from your experience?
Captain Murphy. I think that
The Chairman. I will repeat it. "Studies indicate that RF and
PF are often marginal men drawn from the poorest elements of
village society."
Captain Murphy. They are drawn from village society, certainly.
I am not sure I understand marginal. In what respect? Do they refer
to proficiency as soldiers?
The Chairman. That is what I think.
Senator Symington. What is RF and PF?
Captain Murphy. Regional Forces and Popular Forces.
The Chairman. That is what I take it to mean. They are not
extremely capable or efficient operators.
Cai)tain Murphy. Well, here, Mr. Chairman, I think w^e have to
determine what we are comparing them to before we can say they are
marginal
The Chairman. I only asked you to make your own observations
about that statement.
Captain Murphy. I can honestly say, Mr. Chairman, that I have
seen, and I have accompanied Regional Force companies on tactical
operations which are as good or better than U.S. companies which
I have also observed.
The Chairman. Is that right?
Captain Murphy. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
MOTIVATION OF RF AND PF FORCES
The Chairman. What do you think motivated the average RF
and PF member to join the force ami for what does he think he is
fighting?
Captain Murphy. The Regional and Popular Forces have a great
appeal to the 3^oung man of draft age because they enable him to
live in his home communit3^ The Regional Forces operate exclusively
within the pro^ance in which they enlist. The Popular Forces remain
within the district in which they are recruited.
The Chairman. Vv'hat does he conA'ey to you that he is fighting for?
Captain Murphy. Well, there is no doubt he is defending his own
home, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right.
caliber OF regional FORCES IN OTHER AREAS
Do you think that the Regional Forces you advise are representa-
tive of Regional Forces in other parts of Vietnam?
274
Captain Murphy. I am really not prepared to answer that because
riiave not observed Regional Forces in other parts of the country.
The Chairman. Have you never talked with any of your colleagues
from other parts of Vietnam?
Captain Murphy. Yes. They encounter the same problems we
encounter. Yes, Mr. Chairman. But I just do not know about RF
and PF proficiency.
The Chairman. I mean do they report to you the high caliber of
people, as you have described your own counterpart? Do you see
any reason to say that your particular province is better or worse or
different from other provinces in Vietnam? That was the question.
Captain Murphy. Nc, I do not see any reason not to say that.
The Chairman. I am prompted to ask this because of the com-
ments a soldier also instructing Regional Forces made in a letter to
his professor, which I have here in my hand. The soldier, who has a
comparable responsibility to yours, \\Tote to his professor, and I
quote part of it, "We're out in the field South of Hue." Of course
this is the northern part and less prosperous, I take it, than your
area.
Captain Murphy. Yes.
The Chairman. He says:
We're out in the field South of Hue giving on the job training to Regional
Force Vietnamese. They are stubborn and lazy and unpredictable and we dislike
having them in combined operations. I suspect they have even less incentive
than we do, and all we care about is getting out of this place and going home.
So you can imagine.
You can also imagine the language problems involved for no one speaks Viet-
namese and vice versa. It creates some very hairy situations, for instance how do
you explain the firing procedure of the M72 LAW —
Which is a light antitank weapon, I am told —
which has a number of safeties and deployment procedures plus an even more
elaborate mis-fire procedure? What you do is hand the thing, fuU.v armed, to the
smiling little man who keeps nodding his head in supreme confidence, and then you
run. He is then a qualified ARVN soldier. Bang — he staggers toward you, stunned
by the tremendous blast, still smiling and still nodding. I can imagine the stories
he'll tell when he gets back to his village.
The sad part about the whole thing is that we are told not to give any criticism
of the RF's to the brass when it comes out for inspections. Just the opposite
happens. We give glowing reports of progress; the brass smiles, gets back on the
choppers and flies away.
The sooner the brass thinks the Vietnamese can fight for himself, the sooner
we'll get out of the fighting. As far as I'm concerned, I think it's a dirty damn
trick, to give a man the superficial training we do, and worst of all give him
confidence based on that training and then send him out to find the enemy is a
cruel joke; that man is dead.
Adding to the irony is the fact that the U.S. gives the RF's nothing but brand
new weapons and equipment; believe it or not we are jealous of their goods! Again
however there is a rotten motive, the government wants to avoid any blame for
the failure of these forces because of lousy equipment. It will all cost a lot of
people their lives.
OVERALL discipline AND ORDER OF REGIONAL FORCES
That prompts one to raise a question as to whether all of them are as
well disciplined and as well ordered as is your particular responsibility.
Wovdd you have any comment on that letter?
Captain Murphy. May I ask again, Mr. Chairman, who wrote that
letter?
275
The Chairman. The letter is from a professor at the college in
Sacramento, Calif. This is his old student. I will read the professor's
letter. He says:
I am enclosing copies of two letters from one of my former students who is
now an infantryman in Vietnam. He is a graduate of Sacramento State College
where I am a professor of art and have been a member of the faculty since 1950.
I think you will be particularly interested in the second letter with its com-
ments about the Vietnamization of the war from the point of view of one very
perceptive American G.I. If it can help you in your long-range efforts to bring
about a just and reasonable settlement of this tragic war, I hope you will make
use of it. Despite his stated willingness to allow publication, I have removed his
name, organization, and station.
Obviously he was fearful of retaliation from the authorities if the
name were known, which was a very sensible precaution.
Captain Murphy. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that the individual who
wrote the letter was not an ad\aser, but rather was in a U.S. unit since
he refers to combined operations.
The Chairman. He says he is the soldier instructing regional
forces. This is a Thermofax of the actual letter that the boy A\Tote.
We are out in the field south of Hue giving on the job training to Regional
Force Vietnamese.
Captain Murphy. Mr. Chairman, this training that he was giving
them was not part of the basic training included in any of the formal
training which is given to the Regional Force soldier. The Regional
Force soklier undergoes a basic training course which is comparable to
our own basic traiiung course. Then the entire Regional Force unit to
which he is assigned is periodically recycled to a training center for
specific training on new weapons or developments. Teaching a soldier
to fire a weai)on without an interju'eter is not part of the Government
of Vietnam's training i)rogram. This particular weapon that he de-
scribes, the M-72, is a weai)on which is currently being funneled into
the Vietnamese suppl}^ system. Going along with it will be courses
taught to Vietnamese by Vietnamese in their own language on proper
firing techniques.
The Chairman. Americans do not instruct the Vietnamese?
Captain Murphy. We do give some instruction through interpret-
ers; yes, Mr. Cliahman. Our mobile advisory teams do give instruction.
The Chairman. One last question.
ADEQUACY OF PAYMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND
CIVIL SERVANTS
Mr. Robert Shaplen, who has Amtten a great many articles and I
think a book on Vietnam, has spent a great deal of time there. He
writes in the New Yorker on January si of this year as follows:
An Army private with five children makes 7,000 piasters a month, but he cannot
possibly get along on less than twice that amount. Officers and civil servants are
similarly situated, and the obvious result is moonlighting, or corruption, or both.
Is that correct about what an Army private makes in the ARVN?
Do you know?
Chaptain Murphy. In Vietnamese currency?
The Chairman. Yes.
Captain Murphy. That is approximately correct.
The Chairman. What comment would you make on that statement?
276
Captain Murphy. I would say that the pay grades are based upon
the economic situation of the area in which they hve. They have high
cost of hving areas and low cost of living areas. I can speak for Long
An, and certainl}^ with the various allowances that they receive they
can exist on their income.
The Chairman. You can. Then would you say this was inaccurate?
They do not have to moonlight?
Captain Murphy. I would say it does not pertain to Long An
Province.
The Chairman. It does not. In other words, they do not have to
moonlight or to obtain
Captain Murphy. They are not in jiosition to moonlight, Mr. Chair-
man. These people have commitments which require their services
both day and night.
The Chairman. And they do not
Senator Case. Regional and Popular Forces, I want to know what
he is talking about.
The Chairman. An Army private is the way he describes it.
Senator Case. That is different; that is the ARVN.
Captain Murphy. He may be referring to the Army of the Republic
of Vietnrmi.
The Chairman. He says that officers and civil service are similarly
situated.
Senator Javits. Air. Chairman, would the Chair jneld at that i)oint?
I was very imjiressed with the feeling of both the President and Vice
President in Vietnam about this particular matter of which they are
extremely conscious and make a very big point. They simply have to
raise the salaries because they are having terrible morale trouble. It is
a matter of information.
The Chairman. Then your experience would confirm Mr. Shaplen's
observation?
Senator Javits. I am going at a somewhat higher level than that, Mr.
Chairman. The President of the country himself is very, very deeply
involved and concerned in actions to improve this situation. Perhaps
Ambassador Colby would comment.
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, there has been considerable inflation,
as you know, an increase in prices over the past few months.
The Chairman. Do you mean there or here? About which are you
talking?
Mr. Colby. There.
The Chairman. Is it more there than here?
Mr. Colby. I believe it is more there than here, but I am really not
all that qualified.
Senator Javits. I can tell you it is more there than here.
Mr. Colby. The Government has set up a commissaiy system for
the miliatry personnel to tr}'' to save them some money. And they are
currently discussing the possibility of some kind of direct support
through provision of rice and other staple foods. The President, Vice
President and Prime Minister are very much interested in this matter.
The Chairman. I think we had better move to Captain Geek.
Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question or two of
Captain Murphy?
The Chairman. Yes.
277
ATTITUDES OF U.S. ADVISERS AND COUNTERPARTS
Senator Javits. Captain, I have just been in Vietnam and I am
no expert at all, but I did want to ask you a couple of questions.
Mind you please feel very free to tell me I am wrong about this
because I am only testing out a very superficial impression with a
man who has been there and lived with the problem. It would be
helpful if I am right or just as helpful if I am wrong. We ought to
know so I am gi^'ing a hypothesis rather than a conclusion. I had the
distinct impression that our ad^dsers, like you, were much more
enthusiastic about the ideological cause than the Vietnamese of the
same rank, station, and parallel responsibility. For example, you
spe k of a major in your statement. Talking with him and talking
with you or your prototype was like day and night. Our fellows were
enthusiastic, excited, missionary in their zeal, and these fellows were
still rather cynical and rather pragmatic about the corruption and the
problems and the murder with which they lived. Do 5^0 u have any
reaction to that?
Captain Murphy. I think one of the greatest forms of assistance
we can give them is through our attitude toward problems which
confront them and their Government. Certainly when we express
zeal, enthusiasm, and confidence in them and their government, I
think we do them a great ser\'ice. We must realize they have been
up against these problems for quite some time, and I know it is only
human nature perhaps to let these problems run you down. So when
we are enthusiastic, I think this is good.
Senator Javits. Do you feel that there is corruption at that level
of any appreciable character?
Captain Murphy. I have not seen any corruption. I don't have
any firsthand knowledge of any corruption, Senator. I, of course,
have heard rumors, but I don't have any firsthand knowledge on
corruption.
Senator Javits. Do j^ou think at that level there is any playing
ball, as a little bit of insurance, with the Vietcong and the Communists?
Captain IMurphy. Certainly not that I have an}^ knowledge of.
Senator Javits. In othcn- words, on the Asian theory that you
never lose all your options. You understand precisely what I mean
by that?
Captain Murphy. Yes, I do. Again, I have no knowledge of it.
Senator Javits. You have not seen it.
comparative quality of vc and rf and pf
Have 3^ou had any operational contact with the Vietcong?
Captain Murphy. I am not sure I understand your question.
Senator Javits. Have 3'ou been in any operations which brought
you face to face with the Vietcong?
Captain Murphy. Right; yes, I have, Senator.
Senator Javits. Do you think they are superior in any way to
the Vietnamese troops whom you are advising. If so, tell us in what
way.
Captain Murphy. As I stated earlier, Senator, I think the degree
of proficiency of the units vary. But by and large I think the Regional
Forces and the Popular Forces are superior to the enemy forces.
278
Senator Javits. They are. Are they superior m firepower and num-
ber and morale? Give us a little qualitative analysis on that.
Captain jMuephy. Well, again, the degree of morale, the degree of
agressiveness varies from unit to unit and depends upon a great many
factors. We have some units which are less proficient probably than
comparable enemy units within the province.
Senator Javits. But on the whole?
Captain Murphy. By and large I feel that we have superior forces.
NECESSITY OF U.S. SUPPORT TO RF AND PF SUPERIORITY
Senator Javits. To what extent does this rely upon the American
input, to vdt, logistical support? Give it to us separately, if you can,
as au' support, artillery support, advisory support. There are four
quantities there — logistical, air, artillery, advice.
Captain Murphy. How does each of these affect it? Is that your
question, Senator?
Senator Javits. Eight. You are an adviser. You say j^ou have supe-
rior forces over the Vietcong and whatever North Vietnamese there
are around. Now give us the input of these four aspects of American
support and as they affect j^our qualitative judgment that the troop
strength you are advising is better than the enemy.
Captain Murphy. The logistical support is entirely Vietnamese,
Senator. Vfe advise on techniques, but the system itself is run by
Vietnamese.
Senator Javits. The supplies are ours.
Captain Murphy. The materials are funneled into the system at a
high level.
Senator Javits. That is what I am asking.
Captain Murphy. But the distribution is by the Vietnamese.
Senator Javits. I understand, but how important is the actual
materiel?
Captain Murphy. It is quite important.
Senator Javits. Indispensable, isn't it?
Senator Case. They haven't anything else.
Captain Murphy. Nothing that compares with the weapons of
the enemy.
Senator Javits. OK. The enemy's weapons would be very much
superior to theirs, Avere it not for our input.
Captain Murphy. Yes, I would say that.
Senator Javits. Second, how vital is air support to the superiority
of the Regional and Popular Forces?
Captain Murphy. It is definitel3'' a contributing factor. Senator.
Senator Javits. Is that as indispensable as the supph'?
Captam Murphy. I would have to say no, I don't believe so.
Senator Javits. What about artillery support?
Captam Murphy. U.S. artillery support is not that important
because the Vietnamese have access to artillery in Long An Province.
Senator Javits. And ability to use it?
Captain Murphy. And they can utilize it effectively.
Senator Javits. What about adviser backing? How mdispensable
is that?
Captain Murphy. This would be related directly to the proficiency
of the individual unit. What we aim to do is concentrate our field
advisory effort on the units which are less effective than some other
279
units. This is the criteria we use for deployment of our mobile advisory
teams. I think at this point the field advisor}^ effort is indispensable,
but not as indispensable as it was a year ago and not as indispensable
as it was 2 years ago. Next year it will be less indispensable.
MOTIVATION OF VIETCONG AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
Senator Javits. The popular idea in the United States is that for
some reason or other the Vietcong are more inspired, are better soldiers,
are more patriotic believers in their cause than the South Vietnamese in
theirs. To what extent do you think this has any real validity?
Captain Murphy, Senator, 4 or 5 years ago, this might have been a
valid conviction. Certainly the degree of motivation of an indi\adual
soldier greatly influences his performance in the field. This is one of
the factors which now influence the degree of proficiency of the indi-
vidual soldier.
Going into an area which 2 months ago was under enemy control,
providing securit}^ which has enabled the Government of Vietnam to
perform its other functions, workmg with the people; building a road,
being there providing security and seeing this progress has had a
tremendous effect on the morale and the motivation of the individual
soldier.
Senator Javits. So you think that motivation on the part of the
South Vietnamese themselves is becoming liigher?
Captain Murphy. Yes, it is. It definitel}' is.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND A;IETCONG
Senator Javits. My last question, Mr. Chairman, is this: Again I
would like to give you a hypothesis. I was there in 1965, and I was
there again the other week and saw Ambassador Colby. I was not in
your Corps; I was in the IV Corps area when I was there a few weeks
ago. In 1966 I spent most of the time in I Corp up around Hue, but I
would hke to give you this hypothesis. In 1966 I had the impression
that the South Vietnamese were anxious to get rid of their government
because the}^ felt their government was just another way of keeping
them at war, where they had been for 20 years, that it was just that
they hated it and they wanted peace at any price with anj-one.
They couldn't have cared less whether it was Communitsts or Zoro-
astrians, just so there was an end to the war.
This is my hypothesis and I want you to say I am ^^Tong or right
even from 3'our little frame. I had the impression they had the same
feelmg with the Vietcong, "Go away and let us alone. You are the
fellows who are now^ keeping tliis whole place m turmoil and killing us."
Captain Murphy. Certamly, I don't think the Vietnamese
people, like people anywhere, enjoy the rigors of war. I think that they
are now^ for the first time identifying themselves mth one side, and
that side is the Government of Vietnam.
Senator Javits. Thank you, ]Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Do you want to ask any questions?
SIZE, POPULATION, AND MILITARY FORCES OF LONG AN PROVINCE
Senator Case. I would like to put in terms of numbers some of these
figures in your statement, if you will. You are advising in a Province,
280
It has roughly what, 15 by 35 miles, somethmg like that in its dimen-
sions roughly. You know in a rough way.
Mr. Colby. It is bigger than that. Speaking in kilometers from north
to south and east to west roughly. How many grid squares?
Captain Murphy. From north to south I would say 20 miles, and
from east to west probably twice that.
Senator Case. I was roughly right then, and 365,000 people.
Captain Murphy. That is correct. Senator.
Senator Case. You have 52 Regional Force companies. How many
personnel?
Captain Murphy. That represents approximately 7,000.
Senator Case. And 163 Popular Force platoons. How many are
those?
Captain ^SIurphy. About 5,500 personnel.
Senator Case. Now two regiments of the ARVN, five battalions.
Captain Murphy. Each battalion having about 600 personnel, 500
to 600 personnel.
Senator Case. Roughl}^ 3,000 people.
Captain Murphy. That would be another 3,000.
Senator Case. Then you say our 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry,
four infantry battalions almost exclusively oi)erating there. How
much is that? About 5,500?
Captain Murphy. The United States is there with the 9th Division
of about 5,500 of which about 200 or 250, Senator, are the advisory
team.
Senator Case. So you have over 20,000 troops in this area.
Captain Murphy. Yes, Senator.
Senator Case. In your province.
Captain Murphy. Yes, we do.
Senator Case. And that is fairly static and has been that way for
some time.
Captain Murphy. Since the end of 1967, we have more than
doubled our Regional and Popular Force strength. At the end of 1967
we had 21 Regional and 74 Popular Force platoons as compared with
the figure I gave in my statement.
Senator Case. This is not an active military operation so far as
large-scale military operations. This is more or less a permanent
garrison of, I take it
Captain Murphy. All these forces operate within the province,
yes.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LONG AN PROVINCE
Senator Case. When you say "operate" this isn't large-scale military
operation ; is it?
Captain Murphy. Well, we frequently have operations in excess
of two companies. Three and four company-size operations are a
daily operation now.
Senator Case. Now these are conducted largely by the ARVN,
I take it.
Captain Murphy. Under the command and control of the province
officials.
Senator Case. Is it American operation?
Captain Murphy. No, I am speaking of Vietnamese operations.
Senator Case. What does our 3d Brigade do?
281
Captain Murphy. They generally engage in company-size operations
for the most part, sometimes even smaller.
Mr. Colby. If I may, Senator, I believe it was an area of fau"ly
active operations up until fah^y recently. I think the Captain made
that point a while ago. There was some rather major fighting tliat
went on there.
Captain Murphy. On a typical day, Senator, we have each of our
seven districts conducting one and possibly two company-size opera-
tions. U.S. forces operate generally in the unpopulated ai-eas in
company size, utilizing, I would say, about 75 percent of theh opera-
tional forces. In addition, one province-controlled operation may take
place within the province center. It is generally of thi'ee to four
company size.
Mr. Vann. Senator Case, if I can interject here. Long An Province
has for a period of 8 years been ])robabiy the most hotly contested
province in all of Vietnam. In 1962 through 1965, it hadf more Viet-
cong incidents and contacts by a multiple of 3 than any other
province in Vietnam. Only in the last year has the level of activity there
diminished substantially.
Senator Case. Has the level of American activity changed?
Captain Murphy. It has diminished; yes, it has,*^ Senator.
Senator Case. Would you describe tliis, just in a very quick way.
I don't mean to go over it again.
Captain Murphy. During my experience with the 9th Division
operating in Long An, my company averaged generally two contacts
with tlie enemy per week. On most occasions the size of the force
engaged would be a company or larger. This is not the situation which
exists now. The situation now is that the U.S. forces, as I said earlier,
are having difficulty finding suitable areas in which to operate. This
has occurred because of the pacification expansion, because of the
fact th(>re are Vietnamese forces already in these areas and operating
within these forces.
P Senator Case. Have American forces been reduced then?
Captain Murphy. The U.S. forces have not been reduced, Senator.
In fact with the dei)arture of the division headcjuarters from Dong
Tarn, which is just south of Long An, some of the support forces
formerly in Dong Tam moved uj) to the Tan An area; the brigade
headquarters are colocated with an advisory team in Tan An.
results if U.S. support were eliminated
Senator Case. Just one other question. Suppose American support
was completely eliminated now, what would happen?
Captain Murphy. All combat support?
Senator Case. All combat support. All the four categories that
Senator Javits spoke of before
Captain Murphy. It would slow down the progress and. Senator
Senator Case. Is that an euphemism? What would happen actu-
ally? Who would run the show?
► Mr. Colby. The Senator also included the weapons?
Senator Case. Talking about weapons, the weapons, I don't mean
to say
The Chairman. You mean take away their weapons and ammuni-
tion and give them bows and arrows?
44-706 — 70 19
282
Senator Case. I don't mean that. Let's take it
Mr. Colby. Support is the word of art.
EESULT IF U.S. AIR SUPPORT WERE ELIMINATED
Senator Case. Let's take the air, no air.
Captain Murphy. The Vietnamese could contend with the current
level of enemy activity.
Senator Case. Look, you kids get educated early in the language.
The current level of anj^ activity — what would happen in your judg-
ment? We are not antagonistic; we are trying to get answers. You
have been given a terrible job to do, all of you, the Ambassador, the
Colonel, and everybody, and we are sympathetic as the devil. But
we want to get the facts. We don't want to be getting a lot of stuff
that we get from the Admiral in Hawaii and from other people which
is just a bunch of baloney. We want to know in plain language what
would happen in your judgment if we pulled out all air support. You
can talk to us, we are Americans, just the same as you would talk to
your commanding officers and to the people in the military, to Colonel
Vann or anybody else. He is going to talk to us this way soon. That is
why we are having an executive session.
Captain Murphy. Senator, I hesitate because I am not sure that I
know what would happen. Certainly the enemy would capitalize on
this and they would take advantage of the fact we didn't have air
support. I i^resume you are asking me if they could hold the fort.
Senator Case. Sure. Would they collapse?
Captain Murphy. No, I don't think they would collapse.
Senator Case. Well, they would have in 1965; wouldn't they?
Captain Murphy. I think they would have; yes, Senator.
USE OF AIR SUPPORT
Senator Case. How often is the air support called in and for what
purposes?
Captain Murphy. We only use tactical air support
Mr. Colby. I think the Senator means to include helicopters.
Senator Case. Sure, helicopters, ambulance, or whatever you call
them, you know supply, troops.
Captain Murphy. Whenever we engage an enemy which we think
are of squad size or larger we employ this supporting fire on just about
every contact.
Mr. Colby. How often do you have a contact, every day?
Captain Murphy. No, I would say four times a week: significant
contacts, outside of ambush being sprung.
captain murphy's counterpart
Senator Case. You have a counterpart in the Vietnamese force?
Captain Murphy. Yes, Senator.
Senator Case. What is his grade?
Captain Murphy. He is an ARVN major. He is the deputy province
chief.
The Chairman. Senator, we really did cover every word of this.
Senator Case. But they didn't cover it for me.
The Chairman. Okay.
283
Senator Case. I am sorry. I mean the chairman didn't mean to
interrupt you.
The Chairman. No, go right ahead.
Captain Murphy. He is an ARVN major. He has been in the Army
for 17 years. He is 37 years old. He is the deputy province chief and
RE/PF commander.
Senator Case. He is a well trained, well educated man.
Captain Murphy. He is well experienced.
Senator Case. He is a well educated man.
Captain Murphy. He has the equivalent of 2 years of college by
our standards.
Senator Case. What was his background in civilian life?
Captain Murphy. He came south in 1954, and as I said he holds
an equivalent of 2 years of college. He has been in the Army since he
was 20 years old.
Senator Case. Did he come from a well-to-do family?
Captain Murphy. No, he didn't. He came south with just the clothes
on his back and not much more.
Senator Case. I mean before that. How did he get to be a soldier,
down there?
Ca])tain Murphy. I get the impression from talking to him that he
did came from a well-to-do family.
vSenator Case. He did; yes.
Captain Murphy. Yes. Certainly if he has the education that
lie has
eligibility for education and admission to officer corps
Senator Case. The reason I ask, of course, is that it has been our
understanding that only people of the upper classes and a rather small
grouj) are eligible for, one, education and, two, admission to the officer
classes, is that correct still?
Cai)tain Murphy. Of course, there are educational requirements,
and they are dependent on attaining the education to achieve his
requirements. He has to be able to afford it and to be able to afford
it
Senator Case. And in general whether j^urposely intended or de
facto, as a word that has been used in considerable length around
these premises lately, very few people are still eligible for the educa-
tion that admits them to the officer corp, is that true?
Captain Murphy. Yes, Senator, with the exception of the infantry
field commander's commission which is available to anyone who
exhibits leadership in the field. The educational requirement is waived
for this type of commission. The individual who receives it can reach
the grade of captain as a field commander.
CAPTAIN murphy's COUNTERPART
Senator Case. Is this guy corruptible?
Captain Murphy. I don't beheve he is, Senator. I have never seen
any evidence of it.
Senator Case. Has he a family down there?
Captain Murphy. Ho has a wife and seven children. They live in
Bien Hoa, which is to the north.
284
Senator Case. Yoii mean another province?
Captain Murphy. Yes.
•Sciuitor Case. I was up there myself.
Go ahead, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. How much does he make? Go ahead and finish it.
Senator Case. I think an impressionistic picture of this kind is the
most we can get.
Tlie Chairman. I agree with you. I think it is very important. All I
was suggesting ^^■as that we had asked him most of those questions in
■the beginning before you came in.
Senator Case. These many other questions somehow don't
The Chairman. What is his pay?
Captain Murphy. He makes the Vietnamese equivalent of approxi-
mately $150 a month.
The Chairman. Do you wish to ask any questions?
Senator Pell. No questions.
The Chairman. Captain Geek, will you give your statement, please.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. RICHARD T. GECK, U.S. ARMY, ADVISER,
MOBILE ADVISORY TEAM, KIEN GIANG PROVINCE
Captain Geck. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
I am C^apt. Richard Geck of New Jersey.
Senator Case. May I ask what town do you come from?
Captain Geck. Right now, Toms River.
Senator Case. You have always lived in that area?
Captain Geck. No, su", I lived in Newark, N.J.
The Chairman. I was afraid we wouldn't get to the New Jersey
part.
Senator Case. There was never any doubt if we had to sit here all
week.
The Chairman. I never knew he was from New Jersey.
Senator Case. When he raised the Seton Hall flag I knew he was a
New Jersey boy.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Captain Geck. I am currently the commander of a mobile advisory
team in Kien Giang Province. I would like to take a few minutes to
describe, in brief, the type of work being done by the mobile advisory
team in Vietnam and to give you a general idea of how the work is
progressing in my area.
SOC SON VILLAGE
My experience comes from the delta region of Vietnam, specifically,
Kien Giang Province, located 140 miles southwest of Saigon on the
Gulf of Thailand. I will refer specifically to one village; the village of
Soc Son. Soc Son is centered in the main stream of enemy infiltration
into the delta, and from time-to-time large enemy units inhabit two
large mountins to the west. During the month of July 1969, Soc Son
was the scene of heavy fighting between the government forces and
infiltrating NVA units.
OPERATION OF MOBILE ADVISORY TEAM IN SOC SON VILLAGE
From Julv 1969 until November 1969, I commanded a five-man
mobile advisoiy team located in Soc Son village. The team consisted
285
of two officers of the combat arms and tlii'ee noncommissioned
officers, who speciafized in fight weapons, heav}' weapons, and medical
training, respectively. Our primary mission in Soc Son was to assist
the village chief in the upgrading of the level of securitv within his
vifiage with, the emphasis on impro\'ing the performance of his existing
forces, and the formulation and training of a strong Popular Self
Defense Force group in each hamlet. In addition, we accepted the
secondary mission of rendering assistance where possible in the field
of village administration.
Soc Son, a village of 11,000 people, was notoriously ifi run. The
village chief, who had fived in Rach Gia City, about 8 miles away,
since Tet of 1968, for fear of assassination, was ineffective and little
was expected from his staff. The VC assassinated two of the four
hamlet chiefs in the vifiage center in late June 1968, and the terrorists
had \drtually a free hand within the vfilage.
My team began with the work of training the Popular Force
platoons in the village. We also began to work^with the vifiage staff
in forming a People's Self Defense Force and set about the task of
initiating coordination between the various elements on hand. Through
constant observation of the Popular Forces, we were able to see where-
in their weaknesses lay and suggest methods of improvement. We
accompanied the Poi)uhir Forces on their operations, rendering advice
where needed, and providing liaison with supporting units. In short
order, through an increased level of confidence, the results of the PF
operations began to imjjrove. Night operations became quite eft'ective
and seriously hanijjered enemy movement in our area. At the same
tune, elements of our team were busy with the vifiage People's Self-
Defense Force leaders, providing them with written material to better
explain their jobs, organizing a training program and assisting in the
dissenunation of information on the People's Self Defense Forces. As
the Popular Self Defense Forces developed, the village was able to
release the PF ])latoons from their roles of static defense and allow
them to operate offensively in the outer reaches of the vfilage, targeting
both VC military units and the infrastructure. A method of coordinating
the operations of these various forces was needed. With the guidance
of the advisers a village security plan was begun. This plan on com-
pletion provided each unit leader involved in the security of Soc Son
with specific requirements as to bis mission and responsibfiities as
well as the methods and requirement for coordination of operations
between units. The resultant increase in security was staggering. Inci-
dents of VC terrorism virtually came to a halt. The VC infrastructure
was forced into exile and rendered ineffective. The village chief re-
turned to the village. The Government of Vietnam gained a free hand
to operate within the village and was able to turn its attention to
improved adininistration and economic development in the area. As
the people gained confidence in the Government, more information
became available on enemy activities and VC operations were even
further hampered.
Many of the things accomplished were made much easier through
the help of the American adviser. The vfilage chief, whfie in fact a
good administrator, did not have the background to effectively
coordinates the operations of the units within his vfilage. Many of the
staff members were new in their positions and did not know what
286
could or could not be done. The unit commanders, in many cases,
had become too set in their methods. The alternative solutions to
problems as offered by the advisers helped them to vastly imi:)rove
their operations.
Presently Soc Son continues to grow. Many of the programs begun
during and after the tenure of the advisory team have become exami^les
used throughout the Province. The security plan developed in Soc
Son is now used corpswide as a planning guide to village security.
In November our team moved to another village within Kien
Giang Province and met with similar problems to those encountered
upon our arrival in Soc Son. Progress in the new location is quite
encouraging and many of the improvements witnessed in Soc Son are
being seen in the new area.
The Chairman. In view of what has gone on before, I wonder if
it ^^"ould not be better if we let tlie sergeant make his statement and
then you can ask questions of either one of them because time is
running out. Is that agreeable to you?
Senator Symington., All right.
The Chairman. Sergeant, make your statement now and then the
members can ask questions of all three witnesses.
TESTIMONY OF SGT. EICHARD D. WALLACE, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
SQUAD LEADER, COMBINED ACTION PLATOON, QUANG NAM
PROVINCE
Sergeant Wallace. Air. Chairman and gentlemen, my name is
Sgt. Richard D. WalUice, U.S. Marine Corps, from Torrance, Calif.
I am assigned as the squad leader of the U.S. Marine element of
combined action platoon 2-1-5 in Quang Nam Province, Vietnam.
COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
A combined action platoon, or "CAP" as we call it, is a unit
composed of U.S. Marines teamed up with Vietnamese Popular Forces
soldiers. The Popular Forces, or "PF" as we call them, are a form of
local militia who have the responsibility of i^roviding security to their
own ^•illage. By working closely together with the PF, the Marines
help them to provide this security.
DESCRIPTION OF CAP 215
In my CAP at the jiresent time, there are 13 marines, one U.S.
Navy corpsman, and 25 PF soldiers. Being residents of the local
village, the PF have excellent knowledge of the area and, of course,
they also know the people. The marines are strangers from a different
culture, but by working with the PF every day and sharing their
dangers and hardshij)s. the marines and PF develoji close ties. Aided
by close ties with the PF, the marines are able to understand and to
be understood by the people in the hamlets. In fact, most of the
marines come to feel as if they are part of t!ie ^illage community
themselves.
My CAP area is located in Hoa Luong Village, located about 5 miles
southwest of the Danang airfield, in the area shown in yellow on this
ma]). This village has four hamlets named La Chau, Goc Kha, Duyen
287
Son, and Huong Son. The principal occupation of the people in this
area is farming.
CAP ACTIVITY AGAINST VC
My CAP was established in its present area in July 1967. Before
that time, the VC guerrillas had a free hand in the area, and they
were able to depend on the people for food, other supi^lies, shelter,
and information about the movements of U.S. and ARVN forces. The
reasons for our staying in this area for this length of time is due to
the close proximity of large NVA units just west of Danang. The
average stay of a CAP is 1 year.
At the present time, the VC are no longer safe in my CAP area.
They no longer receive moral or material sujiport from the people.
Nearly all of the hard core VC supporters have been driven out or
ca])tured, and the people are supporting their legitimate Government
with a minimum of fear that the VC will get back at them.
When I took over the Marine squad in the CAP in July 1969, the
hamlet of Huong Son was being rei)eatedly terrorized by VC guerrillas.
Since that time we have concentrated our operations in and around
that hamlet, and have reduced the terrorist activities. With the help
of the Vietnamese rural development cadre in the village, we have
been able to rebuild this hamlet and bring it to a normal life, and we
are now in the process of building a school for the children there.
As I said earher, the CAP's mission is to protect the people. We
accomplish this by |)atroling the area during the day and setting up
two or more ambushes in different i)laces around the luimlets at
night. Because the ambushes are never in the same ])lace from night
to night, the VC never know where we will be, so they do not feel
safe anywhere in our CAP area. Besides that, because they can't
predict our j)ositions, they are not able to catch us by surprise with
a larger force.
A CAP marine does not live inside of a fort. He lives among the
people, with the PF, often staying in I heir homes. With no fixed
position to defend, the CAP has a closer relationship with the jx^ople
and can devote full time to the people's security.
TRAINING OF POPULAR FORCES
While helping to provide security, the Marines are assigned the
further task of training the PF so as to make them a more effective
fighting unit. We teach them how to nuike better use of their wea])ons
and we help them to develop better tactics with which to fight the VC.
Eventually, the PF will be strong enough to take care of the area
without Marines assistance.
DAILY ROUTINE OF CAP 215
At this ]X)int, I would like to briefly describe the daily routine of
my CAP. Just before tla^'break each day, we will secure from our night
ambush ])ositions and return to our ilaytime position. Our daytime
position will normally consist of two houses farily close together, with
half of the Marine squad in each one. Some members of the CAP
will be detailed as sentries around the day position to guard against
288
surprise attack. The PF leader will normally leave six to 10 PF to
stay with the Marines during the day. The remainder of the PF's will
return to their homes to spend the day working.
At some time during the day, the CAP will run a patrol through the
CAP area. A typical daytime patrol will consist of five marines and
five PF. Also at some time during the day the Navy corpsman along
with his Vietnamese assistants and a security element will go to
Goc Kha hamlet, where we have set up a sim])le dispensary in order
to offer daily medical attention to the ])eople in the area.
The Marines in the CAP eat three meals a day. Two meals will
consist of canned military "C" rations and the third meal, usually in
the evening, will consist of hot prepared food delivered by truck to our
position. Any other supplies we need will be delivered at the same
time. At about 6 p.m., the PF leader and I will get together and com-
plete our plans for the night's patrols and ambushes. After that, we
each brief our men. Sometime after dark, the CAP splits up into two
or more patrols, each of which goes out to set up ambushes under the
cover of darkness. These ambushes remain in position all night, alert
for the approach of the enemy.
This concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to answer
your questions.
witnesses' age, experience and language facility
The Chairman. Sergeant Wallace, how old are you?
Sergeant Wallace. Twenty-two years old, sir.
The Chairman. How long have you been in Vietnam?
Sergeant Wallace. 1 have been there 8 months, sir.
The Chairman. Do you speak Vietnamese?
Sergeant Wallace. ISFo, sir; I don't.
The Chairman. Captain Geek, how old are you?
Captain Geck. 23, sir.
The Chairman. Do you speak Vietnamese?
Captain Geck. Yes, I do.
The Chairman. How long have you been in Vietnam?
Captain Geck. 18 months, sir.
PREPARATION OF WITNESSES' STATEMENTS
The Chairman. Did you write your statement. Captain Geck?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir; I did.
The Chairman. Has it been cleared by anyone else?
Captain Geck. Sir, my statement was checked for punctuation,
spelling, for things like that, but it was not checked for its content.
The Chairman. Was your statement checked?
Sergeant Wallace. It went through my CAP director, and the
content of the statement was checked for punctuation.
The Chairman. Your statements were checked only for punctu-
ation?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
289
BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN GECK
When did you join the Army?
Captain Geck. Sir, I came into the Army in March of 1967.
Senator Symington. 1967.
Captain Geck. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. What was your schooling before you came in?
Captain Geck. Prior to coming into the Army, sir, I attended
Seton Hall Prep, and then Seton Hall University for 2 years.
Senator Symington. Where did you enlist?
Captain Geck. I enlisted in Newark, N.J.
Senator Symington. Did you have an}' ROTC before?
Captain Geck. No, sir, I did not. I was omitted from the program.
Seton Hall has a ROTC program; I did not participate.
Senator Symington. You enlisted as a private?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Symington. When were you promoted to corporal?
Captain Geck. Sir, I went through the basic training program at
Camp Polk, La. Then I went to Camp Wolters, Tex., to the Army's
flight training program. After that I was relieved from that course of
instruction and went to the Arnn^'s artillery OCS at Fort Sill, Okla.,
so I was never promoted through the ranks. I went to OCS.
Senator Symington. You went right from a private. You were
commissioned when?
Captain Geck. June of 1967.
Senator Symington. When did you go to Vietnam?
Captain Geck. Sir, I went to Vietnam in March of 1968.
Senator Symington. Nine months after vou were commissioned
then?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Were you commissioned a first or second
lieutenant?
Captain Geck. Second lieutenant, sir, in the Army Reserve.
Senator Symington. When were you promoted to first lieutenant?
Captain Geck. A year thereafter, sir, and then a year thereafter
to captain.
Senator Symington. And you told the Chairman that you spoke
Vietnamese?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir. I can handle about 70 percent of my
business in Vietnamese.
Senator Symington. Did you study that before you went to
Vietnam?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir. I volunteered for Vietnam in March, went
to Fort Bragg, to the military assistant's training adviser's course,
and then on to the Defense Language Institute where I was trained
33^' months in Vietnamese.
Senator Symington. Where is that school?
Captain Geck. That is Fort Bliss, El Paso, Tex.
Senator Symington. You took Vietnamese there?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. When did you go into the Pro\dnce you are
m now?
Captain Geck. I worked in two Provinces, Chau Due, which we
spoke about earlier and Kien Giang. I arrived in Chau Due in August
290
of 1968. Approximately 2 months later I went to Kien Giang, and
I have been there ever since.
Senator Symington. When you arrived there was your Vietnamese
pretty good?
Captain Geck. No, sir, it was fair. I could at that time conduct
only about 40 percent of m3^ business. It has progressed since that time.
CONDITIONS IN KIEN GIANG PROVINCE
Senator Symington. Since you have been there you think conditions
have improved; is that correct?
Captain Geck. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Symington. What was the situation when you arrived?
Captain Geck. When I first arrived in Kien Giang Pro\dnce the
Army was able to operate in fairly large units in most of the area.
The conditions \^ithin the villages were fairly poor. The village govern-
ments were not organized.
Right now all of the villages in Kien Giang have elected govern-
ments. Most of the hamlets have elected governments. The people now
are participating in the government. I think this is quite an imi)rove-
ment.
The Regional and Popular Forces have never had any outside as-
sistance from the U.S. forces in our area except for air power. We
have only had assistance from the regular Army of Vietnam forces.
RIVERINE
Senator Symington. Wliat is your relationship with the Riverine?
Captain Geck. Sir, I have no relationship with the Riverine.
We have used the Riverine elements to insert units from time to time,
but I have no relationship with them.
U.S. TROOPS in delta
Senator Symington. When you first came there what U.S. troops
were in the delta?
Captain Geck. Sir, I am not sure of any besides the 9th U.S.
Infantry Division, but we had no contact with them at all.
Senator Symington. Mr. Ambassador, I do not beheve there
were any American troops in the delta in 1965 in any quantity.
Mr. Colby. No, sir.
Senator Symington. When did we send troops into the delta in
quantity?
Mr. Colby. We never sent troops to that part of the delta, Senator.
The troops were sent to the upper delta only, I believe in early 1967.
Mr. Vann. They arrived in July of 1966 in Long An Pro^dnce
and in September 1966 in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa and Go Cong
Provinces. U.S. trooi)s have never been stationed in the other 13
provinces of the delta, only in three provinces.
Mr. Colby. You do have the river forces, the Navy forces though.
Some of those are in Kien Giang, so in a sense there are U.S. forces.
Senator Symington. When you say they arrived, who arrived?
Mr. Vann. The U.S. 9th Infantry^ Division was assigned to Dinh
Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Go Cong in September 1967.
291
Senator Symington. That was the first time a division of U.S.
troops went into the delta?
Mr. Vann. In any part of the delta?
Senator Symington. In anv part of the delta.
Mr. Vann. No, sii-. In July of 1967 a brigade of the U.S. 25th
Division went into Long An, which is geogra])hically the northern
part of the delta.
Senator Symington. Just below Saigon?
Mr. Vann. Just below Saigon.
Senator Symington. Let us talk about the delta. The first troops
that went into the delta, as we consider the delta, 50 miles or what-
ever the distance would be, south of Saigon was when the 9th In-
fantrv Division went in in Julv 1967?
Mr. Vann. The U.S. 25th' Division's 23d Brigade in July 1967.
effect of introduction of U.S. TROOPS ON CONDITIONS IN DELTA
Senator Symington. Well, the thrust of my question is if we put
troops into the delta for the first time as late as Juh^ 1967, and then
increased the number of those troops in September 1967, that would
automatically improve conditions, would it not?
Mr. Vann. If I might say, and in that connection, in connection
with your earlier comments about 1965
Seiuitor Symington. First answer the (pieslion.
Mr. Vann. It would not autonuitically improve conditions, sir. It
would (lei)end ui)on how nniny enemy may have been introduced at
the same time.
Senator Symington. All right. Now take it from there.
1965 ASSESSMENT OF DELTA SITUATION
Mr. Vann. May I now address your earlier (piestions about 1965.
Sir, in 1965 General Westmoreland sent me to survey the delta and the
reports that the delta was being |)acified.
Senator Symington. Were you in uniform at that time?
Mr. Vann. No, sir, I was a civilian.
The reason General Westmoreland sent me to do that w^as
because
Senator Symington. What w as your position at that time?
Mr. Vann. I was the provincial adviser for USAID for Hau Nghia
Province, which is the very northernmost part of the delta. However,
1 had been the senior militarv adviser for the Mekong Delta in 1962
and 1963.
Senator Symington. At that time were you in uniform?
Mr. Vann. I was in uniform as a lieutenant colonel.
Senator Symington. Of the Army?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
'Slv. Vann. General W^'stmoreland wanted me to assess the change
in the situation in the area in which I had been the senior military
adviser between 1963 and 1965. He asked me also to go beyond that
area farther south into the delta. I had not p^e^'iously been the
adviser there, but I did have responsibility for the area when I operated
as a staff adviser at the corps advisory level.
292
Senator Symington. When you were in the military did you have
any relationship with the pacification program?
Mr. Vann. At that time, sir, we did not have a pacification program
as it is now known. We did have the strategic hamlet program in 1962
and 1963.
SCHOOL AT VUNG TAU
Senator Symington. Did you have any relationship yourself with
the school at Vung Tau?
Mr. Vann. I had relationship with the school at Vung Tau from 1965
through the middle of 1966.
Senator Symington. What was your relationship at that time?
Mr. Vann. I was the USAID adviser on the RD cadre program to
the RD cadre director.
Senator Symington. What was your relationship at that time with
the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. Vann. I have never had any relationship other than one of
cooperation as a representative of either the U.S. Army or of the
Agency for International Development.
Senator Symington. At that time wasn't the CIA running the Vung
Tau operation?
Mr. Vann. They were the agency with operational responsibility.
Senator Symington. What is the difference between running it and
being the agency with operational responsibility?
Mr. Vann. At that time, sir, it was being officially run by the
Government of Vietnam, financed by the Central Intelligence Agency,
and advised by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator Symington. And your relationships with the agency were
always of the best?
Mr. Vann. We have had differences of opinion, sir, but I have never
had a relationship of alienation with them.
I would like to address your
Senator Symington. I want to follow this a little bit, colonel, because
I am remembering a few things as you talk.
Mr. Vann. All right, sir.
Senator Symington. In 1965 you had a relationship at Vung Tau and
there was some disagreement about how the i)lace should be run; was
there not?
Mr. Vann. There were differences of opinion among Vietnamese as to
how it should be run, and there were some differences of opinion among
Americans.
Senator Symington. Would you describe those a bit?
Mr. Vann. The princii)al
Senator Symington. Your own position I understood was different
from some of the thinking of the American authorities.
Mr. Vann. I would be happy to, sir. I would like to answer your
previous question first.
Senator Symington. We will get back to that.
Mr. Vann. All right, sir.
Senator Symington. If we can.
Mr. Vann. I would say the principal difference, first of all, con-
cerned the size of the teams that should be employed.
A second difference concerned the manner of advising on the RD
cadre program. I would say a third difference concerned how overt or
how covert the U.S. role in the RD cadre program, should be.
293
Senior Symington. Who did you differ with on these questions?
Mr. Vann. Some Vietnamese ofl&cials, sir, and some U.S. officials.
Senator Symington. What U.S. officials did you differ with on that?
Mr. Vann. I would say in one degree or another I differed with the
MACV representative and the USIS representative.
Senator Symington. That is what I heard when I was out there,
colonel.
Now, we will get back to the other question.
Mr. Vann. Thank you, su\
Senator Symington. Right.
1965 ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN DELTA
Mr. Vann. I went to the delta in a series of trips, going each weekend
to 10 different provinces over a period of about tliree and a half
months to do this assessment for General Westmoreland.
On July 3, of 1965 I briefed General Westmoreland on ni}- findings.
I essentially told General Westmoreland that the situation in the
delta had deteriorated considerably since 1963, that the Vietcong
were firmly in control of the countryside in the delta, that contrary
to tlu; opinion of many advisers in the delta, the reduction of incidents
was not because of pacification being successful but because the Viet-
cong had gained such control there was no need to have incidents.
I told him that the VC had, in my judgment, made a decision to use
the d(^lta as a recruiting and food base, and that they had come to
some form of an accommodation wherein thsy were leaving the pro-
vincial and district cai)itals and the road network alone so as not to
get people excited and not to interfere with their operations in the
countryside.
I also indicated that at that })eriod of time up to 50 percent of the
Regional Forces and Popular Forces had reached some form of accom-
modation with the enemy, a form of accommodation that went the
gamut}
Senator Symington. Up to what period of time?
Mr. Vann. This was in July of 1965, sir. This was an accommodation
that ran the gamut from a simjih^ "I will let j'ou live, you let me live"
arrangement which would result in local cease-fires to an arrangement
wherein some imits were serving for the government in the daytime
and operating as Vietcong at night. The latter wovdd certainly
represent i\w minoritv, the formc^r the majority of the accommoda-
tions. I concluded by saying if the delta is pacified it is unfortunately
pacified by the wrong side.
General Westmoreland listened to my arguments. He subsequently
had me return to Saigon from my field post to brief his new deputy,
General Throckmorton. He subsequently had me come in and brief
General Rosson, the Chief of Staff when he was assigned.
Api)roximately a year later, when General Westmoreland decided
to request troops to go into the delta, he advanced as the reasons for
it some of the conclusions that I had given to him in 1965, such as
that it had become a food and recruiting base for the Vietcong.
It has always been my contention
Senator Symington. Excuse me. It was known that it was a food
base for everybody; was it not? I can remember a general in the
Army telling me that the tax of the South Vietnamese on rice coming
294
out of the delta into Saigon was greater than the tax that the Viet-
cong hiid down for rice coming into Saigon. So I think we have
known for some time, certainly in 1965, that it was a food base.
Mr. Vann. It is a food base for the entire country without question
sir.
Senator Symington. Right.
CIA OPERATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR VUNG TAU
Did you recommend that the CIA operation responsibihty be
returned to the Ai-my?
Mr. Vann. Responsibihty in what area, sir?
Senator Symington. In operating Vung Tau.
Mr. Vann. Sh, it had never been with the Army, and I did never
recommend that it be returned to the Aimy.
I did at one point in time, suggest that it might be more acceptable
to the Vietnamese Government to have either the MiUtary Assistance
Command or the Agency for International Development have the
principal responsibility and the financial responsibihty for the program
because of a tendency of Vietnamese to, in this case wi-ongfully,
assume the motives of the CIA in running the progi-am. It was my
observation at that time, sir, that
Senator Symington. You could not be talking about the villagers
because they did not know what CIA meant.
Mr. Vann. I was talking about the hierarchy, the district and
Province chiefs.
I would further like to qualify, sh, that the program as run by the
CIA was totally overt, and that there were no subterranean or hidden
motives behind it. But the basis for the recommendation was the
fact that the Vietnamese are naturally suspicious and that they
would have a tendency to ascribe hidden motives to the RD cadre
program being financed by the CIA.
REMOVAL OF MAJOR MAI
Senator Symington. Did you know Major Mai?
Mr. Vann. I know him quite well, sir.
Senator Symington. What did you think of him?
Mr. Vann. I thought he was an extremely capable officer and one
who was highly dedicated to his work.
Senator Symington. Do you know why he was removed?
Mr. Vann. Yes, I do know why he was removed, sir.
Senator Symington. Why?
Mr. Vann. There was some indication, sir, that Major Mai had
started his own internal political organization within the cadre program
and had established cells of the Duy Dan sect of the Tan Dai Viets
political party, and had them reporting to him. The objectives of that
party were contrary to the objectives of the Government of Vietnam.
Senator Symington. Do you agree with that? Did you know
enough about it to think that was justified criticism?
Mr. Vann. Well
Senator Symington. Did you know enough about it to think that
was justified criticism of him?
Mr. Vann. Of Major Mai, sir?
Senator Symington. Yes.
i
295
Mr. Vann. I did, sir. That does not moan I do not greatly admii'e
and respect Major Mai.
Senator Symington. What were the objectives of Major Mai that
were different from General Ky or General Thieu?
Mr. Vann. I don't know whether these were Major Mai's personal
objectives, but the objectives ascribed to his party were a third force
concept which was both antigovernment and anti-Vietcong.
Senator Symington. This is really quite fascinating. I was very
impressed with Major Mai and so were all the people who went out
there. The next time I went back he was completely obliterated from
the scene and I heard that that was done because the Government did
not approve of the fact that he was more interested in the people than
he was in the way that the Government was being handled, including
the corruption. I tried to see him but could not; I finally talked to him
on the phone. I think he was an interpreter with the Korean Ai'iny in
Vietnam.
Mr. Vann. It was my understanding he went to such an assign-
ment, sir. I considered Major Mai to be a dedicated nationalist, a
man who was against corruption, a man who was for a people's
])r()gram, a man who had been very effective as head of the institute.
I recommended strongly at that time that ho be brought to the United
States — he was extremely fluent in English — and lecture at our service
schools and explain the nature of the war.
Now, I do agree that the Government of Vietnam at that time could
not afford to have as the commandant a man who was believed by
them, with some foundation, to be essentially advocating their over-
throw.
The Chairman. Would the Senator yield?
Is there any connection between this and the Tran Ngoc Chau case?
It sounds a little like the Chau case.
Senator Symington. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I siiddenh'
realized what we \ven\ getting into down there. Some people in 19(35
described Major Mai as being the most outstanding young person in
Vietnam, that he was not a Communist in any wnj, but he did not
approve of the way that the Government of South Vietnam was
liandling U.S. money, especially as they were personally profiting
lu^avily from it.
major mai's removal
Senator Case. Would the Senator pursue this? What has happened
to the major now? Is he still alive and working? What is he doing?
wSenator Symington. Those are very good questions. I am interested
in Colonel Vann's recommendation that he come back here and tell
about the cause in this country.
Senator Case. This was 4 years ago. What has happened since?
Senator Symington. I would be interested in it.
The Chairman. Also does it relate to the Chau case?
I understand the Americans had great difficulty in preventing
President Ky from imprisoning him. Do you know anything about
that?
Mr. Vann. I don't know that, sir. I was not involved in it.
Senator Symington. What did you hear about it?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I knew he was removed because the Government of
Vietnam believed that the political party, that it had evidence he was
a member of, was anti-GVN.
296
Senator Symington. But it was in no way a pro-Communist
Party, was it?
Mr. Vann. Absolutely not. I make no suggestion that it was pro-
communist.
Senator Symington. That is the point I wanted to bring out,
Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Vann.
Mr. Vann. I will say, sir, just in cooperation
The Chairman. Go ahead and say what happened to him.
Mr. Vann. Sir, I don't really know. I am aware he is alive, and I
am aware he does have an official Government job and the rank of
major in the Government of Vietnam service. That is the limit of
my knowledge. I have not seen A^Eajor Mai since he left Vung Tan in
1966.
Senator Symington. Do you believe in the government of Thieu
and Ky today as it has been conducted?
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.] I feel that, in view of the difficulties that
they face, they quite possibly are doing about as much as we can ex-
pect any group of Vietnamese to do under the circumstances.
Senator Symington. Well, the thrust of my question is you recom-
mended that Major Mai come over here and lecture to the American
people, you must have had great confidence in him, and agreed with
his thinking, at least to some extent, about the need for reform of the
present Vietnam Government.
Air. Vann. Sir, I felt that the man was exceptionally well qualified,
particularly with regard to the village and hamlet govermnent. I
did not necessarily endorse everything he did. Certainly I could not
in good conscience endorse at that level an action designed to over-
throw the Government of Vietnam when I was working for a govern-
ment wdiose official i)olicy was to support the Government of Vietnam.
Senator Symington. Did you have any proof that he was trying
to overthrow the Government?
Air. Vann. It was the announced purpose of the ]3arty, sir, to
radically change the hierarchy that existed in Saigon.
The Chairman. By force or by an election? Is it any different from
the Democrats' attitude toward the Republicans?
Senator Symington. That is what I was thinking about.
Air. Vann. Sir, there were members of the party who suggested
that the way to change it was by assassinating 52 top leaders in the
Government. That would be force.
major mai's replacement: major be
Let me say, sir, that the man who came to succeed him at Vung
Tan at that time, Alajor Be, who was the Deputy Province Chief
at Binh Dinh, was equally outs])okon against corruption, equally
outspoken against abuses of government and, in my judgment, is
equally qualified as the officer to be in charge of training RD cadre
programs.
Senator Symington. He belonged to the right party.
Mr. Vann. No, sir, he did not.
Senator Symington. What is the difference?
Air. Vann. Colonel Be has come in for almost as much criticism
from Government leaders as did Alajor Alai.
297
Senator Symington. Are they both members of the same party?
Mr. Vann. I don't know what party Major Be, or Colonel Be, may
be a member of.
Senator Symington. How can you assert he was not a member of
Major Mai's party?
Mr. Vann. I have no evidence that he was so; I do not know.
Senator Symington. I see.
Mr. Vann. However, there are many political parties who have the
same general lines.
U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD REPLACEMENT OF MAJOR MAI
Mr. Colby. Senator, I might add on this, since I was partly in-
volved at the time, as you know, that one of the factors which caused
us not to really raise very much objection to the replacement of Major
Mai officially was that we were supporting a very large cadre opera-
tion, and that if this became the personal political tool of one particular
party the CIA would be directly in the position of doing what Colonel
Vann says that many people suspected the CIA was doing, and v. Inch
we do not wish to do.
REPLACEMENT AND ASSASSINATION OF HIGH
CALIBER SOUTH VIETNAMESE
Senator Symington. I understand that. But Major Mai is just one
case.
General Walt inlroduccd mo to a village chief and said he was one
of the finest village chiefs around there. He was assassinated.
He then told me General Thi was a brave a man as he ever knew.
He was kicked out. It is indeed difficult to understand what is going
on out there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TRAN NGOC CHAU
The Chairman. I want to pursue this, Colonel Vann. How does
Chau fit into this transition between Mai and Colonel Be? He has
been in the news recently. We started to ])ursue this the other day
and you said you would rather do it now. Can you fit it in now with-
out my having to stumble around and ask a number of questions?
Just tell us.
Mr. Vann. In December of 1965, then Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau,
Province chief of Kien Hoa Province, was appointed by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam and the Minister of Revolutionary Development to
be the director of the RD cadre directorate with offices in Saigon and
resi)onsibility for the RD cadre program throughout Vietnam.
A part of Colonel Chau's responsibility was the supervision of the
RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau, which had as its assigned
commandant at that time Captain Mai, later Major Mai. Colonel
Chau continued in this capacity until September or October of 1966.
During part of his tenure. Captain ]\Iai, now Major Mai, was
relieved of his responsibilities as the commandant. I believe this
occurred in July of 1966.
44-706—70 20
298
He was replaced initially by a Colonel Thinli, and then Colonel Chau
himself left his jjost in Saigon and went to the Vung Tan Training-
Center to directly supervise it.
He left there when Major Be was assigned as the commandant.
Major Be was assigned as the commandant, based upon the ai)proval
of Gen. Nguyen Due Thang, who was the Minister for Revolutionary
Development.
Major Be operated under the supervision of Col. Tran Ngoc Chau.
In about September or October of 1966, Colonel Chau went into a
hos])ital with a reported illness. Essentially he was removed from the
RD catlre program at his own request.
He subsequently continued working in the Ministry of RD and
became an inspector of revolutionary development operations in I
Corps until the summer of 1967. He had attempted to resign his com-
mission in the army so as to be free to run for the constituent assembly
in mid- 1966. He was denied permission to resign.
However, at a later date, when they were having the elections for
the assembly, the election laws provided that active duty army
officers could run for the position of deputy.
Colonel Chau ran for the position of de})uty from Kien Ho a Prov-
ince, was elected as a dei)uty in the national assembly, and was subse-
quently elected by the national assembly to be its ^Secretary General.
The Chairman. What does Secretary General mean?
Mr. Vann. Secretary General, sir, I would ascribe as about the
third ranking position in the assembly operating under the president
of the assembly as his kind of chief of staff.
That is the situation. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau, as you know, is still a
member of the assembly and is currently embroiled in a dispute
brought about by the Government's charges that he was dealing with
his brother, a known Communist, without having reported this
incident to the Government.
EVALUATION OF TRAN NGOC CHAU
The Chairman. You have evaluated Major Mai. What about
Chau? The way you and the Senator from Missoini described Mai
fitted what I have been told about Chau. He is also a nationalist, a
great patriot, but he does not approve of the present Government and
he is regarded by the present Government as a rival. Is that true or
not?
Mr. Vann. I don't know how the present Government regards
Colonel Chau, sii-, but with my regards to how I evaluate Colonel
Chau, I think it is one of the continuing surprises and paradoxes of
this conflict there and of that Vietnamese society that Colonel Chau
who in my judgment is a nationalist, an honest man, against corrup-
tion, for the people, a man with a great deal of charisma, one whose
motives I have always found to be of the highest order and Major
Mai were bitter enemies. Colonel Chau had a great deal to do with
getting Major Mai removed as the commandant because they hap-
pened to have different political ideologies, despite the fact that they
were both for the same basic things.
I considered all three men. Major Be, now Colonel Be, the present
commandant; Major Mai; and Colonel Tran Ngoc Chau to be people
who were i)otentially going to do great things for their country from
299
the standpoint of giving better government, giving government that
is more responsive to the neetls of the peasants. I considered them
people who were famihar with the village and hamlet structure, the
needs of the population. Two of these gentlemen fought with the
Viet Minh against the French.
The Chairman. Which two?
Mr. Vann. Colonel Be and Colonel Chau. I don't believe Major
Mai had because I believe he was too young to have done so. I feel
had he been older, he would have.
The Chairman. However, Thieu and K3- both fought with the
French against the Viet Minh; didn't they?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I am not totally familiar with that. I know General
Ky did fly with the French Air Force. He was trained by them.
Senator Symington. Mr. Colby would know.
Mr. Colby. He was, yes. He fought mth the French.
The Chairman. Go ahead, this is very interesting.
Mr. Vann. That was my answer to your question, sir.
The Chairman. I am not trying to ]Kit words in your mouth. I
am only clarifying it. You think that although Chau was, I take it
you say, a political enemy of Mai, they both were high class, superior
men interested in their country.
Mr. Vann. All of my contact with them, sir, would indicate that
to me.
TRAN NGOC CHAU'S relationship with CIA
The Chairman. I read to you the other day about these allega-
tions. There is notliing secret about it. This story is in the paper. I am
trying to clarify Chan's relationshij) with the CIA.
Did he ever re])ort to the CIA \\hen he was there?
Mr. Vann. To my knowledge, sir, he has never been employed by
th(> CIA and never reported to the CIA.
Mr. Colby. Since he was in charge of a ]irogram that was being
linanced by the CIA, he certainly reported to them in that sense.
The Chairman. He reported to the CIA. Were you then in the
CIA before you were ambassador?
Mr. Colby. I was, sir.
The Chairman. So you know this of 3'our own knowledge.
Maybe you ought to comment about this aspect. I should have
asked you about it. Go ahead.
Mr. Colby. The way this program ran, Mr. Chairman, was that
the CIA financed the Government of Vietnam program. The program
was part of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, and Colonel
Chau was the responsible officer in that ministry for that program. So
that the financing of the program was conchicted to some extent under
his own overall supervision. In that respect he kept the CIA people
informed of what they were doing with the program.
This does not mean, however, in proi)er CIA parlance, that he was
an agent. He was not i)aid at all by the CIA. He was paid by the
Government of Vietnam.
DID chau report HIS MEETINGS WITH HIS BROTHER?
The Chairman. I believe that is consistent with what he has said,
but I believe that one of the stories, at least, was that he had reported
300
voluntarily his meetings with his brother or other activities of this
kind. This wasn't any secret. Can you say whether he did or not?
Did you know he had a brother who was a Communist?
Mr. Colby. Frankly, Senator, it has been 2 years since I have
been associated with it, and one's memory gets a little fuzzy. I would
prefer to look at the records which I do not have access to [deleted]
before I gave you a direct answer.
I do seem to remember that there was a story that he had a brother
in the North, and that there was some possibility of a contact. I am
a little fuzzy on the details.
The Chairman. Colonel Vann, have you any knowledge of this?
Mr. Vann. Well
The Chairman. Why don't you sit over here. There is plenty of
room. There is a chair right there. I don't know whether I ask questions
of exactly the right one every time.
Do you know anything about this? Did he report? In your view was
he frank and open with the Americans? 1 am not saying he was an
agent, but to your knowledge did he report?
Mr. Vann. Sir, he was a man who was very fluent in the English
language, and had U.S. advisers since 1961. He was a man who
was known to many Americans, admired by many Americans, and he,
in turn, appeared to be an admirer of Americans and things that
we were doing and programs that we were suggesting.
He was a province chief in Kien Hoa Province in 1962 and 1963,
while I was the senior adviser to the zone commander, a zone that
included seven Pro\nnces of which Kien Hoa was one.
He and I became very close friends during this period of 1962 and
1963. I was in contact with him on a fairly continuing basis up until
July of 1969.
Because we were close friends, he often confided to me many things
that I knew he probably would not confide to other people.
In the latter part of 1965, then Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau, iii his role
as Province chief, while I was visiting him in his Province in Kien Hoa,
after giving me a very long and mysterious buildup, walked me out
into his provincial palace garden at about midnight and confided to me
that a very important person from Hanoi had recently visited him in
his Province. He said this was a person who was a nationalist and \yho
was interested in seeing if there was some way of getting nationalists
in the north and nationalists in the south together. Colonel Chau
sought my advice as to what he should do.
I asked him as to what his relationships were with his adviser, who
was from the Central Intelligence Agenc}^ assigned to the Province. He
said he had very good relationships.
I suggested to him that that w^ould be a much more appropriate
channel through which to report and to get advice than through me,
because I was not involved at that time in things dealing with the
Government of Vietnam. I was at that time assigned as an adviser to
the U.S. 1st Infantry Division.
We had then tried the experiment of putting someone who had been
in Vietnam with each incoming U.S. unit to help them get oriented
and acclimated to the Vietnamese and to the Vietnamese officials.
We dropped the subject, and I did not report it to any of my higher
headquarters, and one of the reasons I did not was that dunng that
particular period of time I had a great many confidences given to me
301
by Vietnamese, which, had I reported would have resulted in their
heads being chopped off careerwise because things were extremely un-
settled in Vietnam. There were a series of changing governments.
There was a game of musical chairs going on, and the future was
pretty indefinite.
Also, the enemy was at almost the high point of his control in the
countrj'side, and that did have many Vietnamese officials standing
with one foot in both camps.
DID CHAU REPORT HIS BROTHER'S VTSITS ?
During a subsequent period in the summer of 1966, when Chau and
I were working closely together, Chau again raised the subject with
me. He told me he had had another visit from that same person, and
then after a great deal of cautions and explaining how dangerous it
would be to him, he confided to me that it was his brother. He then
gave me the background on his brother. He gave me a picture of what
I assume now to be Tran Ngoc Hien, but a picture which had several
inconsistencies compared to what I now know about Tran Ngoc Hien.
At that time, Colonel Chau — he was still in the army — asked me if I
would report this conversation to ni}^ higher authority, and to find
out if my higher authority would like to meet with his brother, Tran
Ngoc Hien. He did not identif}^ his brother by name.
He told me at the time that his brother was coming in and out of
the country on a Jai)an('s(' passport and that if a meeting was to be
arranged it would require 3 weeks' notice because he had to contact
liis brother by an advertisement in a Saigon newsjjaj^er.
T renorted"^ this to mv hi«:her authoritv, and went throusrh that
channel to the then Dej)uty Ambassador.
The Deputy Ambassador listened to the story, plus the background
on Tran Ngoc Chau, informed me that they were continualh^ getting
requests for meetings of this sort from various peo])le. [Deleted.] The
bona fides of this man realh' ha<l not been established, and he would
let me know later what, if anything, would be done.
He subsequently called me in and said that neither the Ambassador
nor he would agree to a meeting with Chan's brother but that if it
was particularly desired, if Chan's brother particularh^ desired and
thought he had something that was worthwhile that I would be
authorized to represent the Ambassador at a meeting.
I gave this information to Colonel Chau, and he then said he
would contact his brother. He subsequently told me approximately a
month later that he had contacted his brother and that his brother
was not interested in meeting with me because I was not of sufficient
importance. That essentially terminated my role in the matter
iiu'olving his brother.
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO REMOVE CHAu's IMMUNITY
The Chairman. Why do you think that presently the Thieu
government goes to such lengths to remove the immunity of Chau?
Mr. Vann. I really do not know, sir, because you must understantl
that my contacts with Chau have been very limited since this thing
became a hot issue last Julv.
302
The Chairman. You have not seen him smce that time?
Mr. Vann. I have seen him, but not for the purposes of
discussion.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Vann. He has attempted to see me and has made it a point,
since he knows places where I g-o to, and I have had to excuse myself
as quickly as possible after arriving.
MR. VANn's present INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING CHAU
The Chairman. Has the Ambassador or any one of your superiors
ordered you not to see him and to discuss things?
Mr. Vann. Ambassador Bunker, sir, and Ambassador Colby have
told me since July that it is advisable not to become involved in this
matter since it is a matter between the Government of Vietnam and
one of its officials; [deletedl.
Mr. Colby. Any contacts on the subject would be made by Am-
bassador Bunker, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vann. That is correct.
IS CHAU a communist?
The Chairman. Do you personally have any doubt in your mind
about Chan's being a Communist or not being a Communist?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I have to have some reservation because Ambas-
sador Bunker has informed me that there are things about the case
of which I am not aware. I do not know what these things are.
However, since I do not have access to the dossier, either of the
Government of Vietnam or of such files as the political section of the
Embassy may have — it is cpiite obvious that I don't have the total
picture.
Nothing in my personal relationships with Colonel Chau and my
knowledge of him since 1962 would lead me to doubt that he is other
than a dedicated nationalist anti-Communist person.
The Chairman. That is all I can speak to.
Mr. Vann. Right, Senator.
discrepancies in information supplied by CHAU
Senator Case. You said you were concerned about the discrepancies
between what he had told you about his brother and what the facts
about his brother were. Was this a distrubing thing to you?
Mr. Vann. It has become. It is my knowledge, sir, that Colonel
Chau has lied to me on several matters that involved this case, for
what purpose I don't know. There are several matters in which he
deliberately lied.
Senator Case. Were these significant? Were these deliberate?
Mr. Vann. The information he gave me is different from informa-
tion I now know to be true. It does not concern whether he is a Com-
munist. It concerns details about his brother and details about
statements that he has ascribed to other Vietnamese officials that they
have subsequently told me that they did not say.
Senator Case. Have you any feeling that this was an intentional
deception and, if so, what the intent was or what its purpose was?
303
Mr. Vann. I feel that a portion of this may well have been to
protect the identity and location of his brother.
Senator Case. I see.
ASSISTANCE SOUGHT BY CHAU CONCERNING CHARGES
The Chairman. Has Mr. Chan indirectly or directly sought your
assistance at any point in connection with charges brought by Presi-
dent Thieu?
Mr. Vann. He has sought my assistance on a continuing basis, su'.
The Chairman. What cUd he ask you to do?
Mr. Vann. He has, first of all, asked me if there was some way that
I could arrange for him to go to the United States. That has been an
approach over the period of the last year.
He has, second, asked if I could get the U.S. Government to
intervene with President Thieu in his behalf and inform them of the
fact that we were aware of his brother's presence.
He has asked me to go to the Prime Minister, Prime Minster Khiem,
in his behalf. He has also asked for advice as to Avhat he should do.
I have on a continuing basis advised him that he should use the same
rules that he is asking the Government to use in his opposition to the
Government. I have told him that at this period of time I consider
his outspoken opposition — and this is ])articularly true in the first
6 months of 1969 — was hurting the Government's efforts against the
foe.
The Chairman. Against whom?
Mr. Vann. Against the foe, against the enemy. I have told him
that, even though I knew his motivations were good, now was the
time for all Vietnamese to get toegther and ]Hit their shoulder to the
wheel, and that if he really wanted to have a different government, he
should work for the 1971 Vlections as opposed to suggesting anything
that would either aid or abet the Communist cause at the moment,
even though it may not have that purpose.
U.S. position on asylum for chau
The Chairman. Did our Government refuse or decline to grant him
asylum?
"Mr. Vann. Sir, I have not asked our Government to grant him
asylum. But my superiors have told me that we will not seek to get
him to the United States, which is what he had requested be done.
We do not interpose an objection to his government letting him go.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Colby. I don't think it was a question of asylum, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Wliat was it?
Mr. Colby. I think it was a question of would we actively help get
him out of there.
The Chairman. W^hat is our position? Would we allow him to come
if he could come surreptitiously?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think that is a question you really have to
address to the Department and to Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Cliair-
man. I am not qualified to answer it.
The Chairman. You don't know?
304
Mr. Vann. He has asked me whether we would do such a thing, sir,
and I have said I did not believe we would, but that was my operating
assumption.
The Chairman. Did you ever ask Ambassador Bunker what he
would recommend?
Mr. Vann. I have discussed Tran Ngoc Chau with Ambassador
Bunker on a number of occasions, sir.
The Chairman. What is Ambassador Bunker's attitude?
Mr. Vann. Ambassador Bunker's attitude, and his instructions to
me, sir, were that 1 should tend to pacification in the delta and he
would tend to the political situation in Vietnam. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. That is a very clear answer.
CIA chief's knowledge about tran ngoc chatj
Mr. Colby, since you were so closely identified previously with the
CIA, did the CIA Chief there know about these meetings of Chau
with his brother?
Mr. Colby. As I said, Mr. Chairman, my memory frankly is a little
dim, and I am not that close to the situation today. I don't have
access to the files. I really would have to defer that to the CIA.
I do recall some consideration, should we say, to the fact that he
had a brother. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Do you know whether the present CIA Chief
believes Chau is a Communist or not?
Mr. Colby. I do not know the answer to that, Mr. Chairman. I
have never really
The Chairman. This is what bothers me. I had not known about
this Major Mai story. I was told that with the Senator from Missouri.
Now you have Chau and, of course, this immediately suggests the
treatment given Mr. Dzu, who is still in jail; isn't he? As far as I know
his only crime was that he ran against Thieu and came out second.
charges against MR. DZU
Do you know of anything else wrong with Dzu?
Mr. Vann. I don't know Mr. Dzu at all, but I know from the papers
at that time that is not the reason that ostensibly he went to jail.
The Chairman. What is the reason?
Mr. Vann. As I understand, it dealt with some matter of fraud that
was part of the charges, and
The Chairman. What kind of fraud?
Mr. Vann. Advocating against the laws of the Government of
Vietnam.
The Chairman. Which was to make peace.
Mr. Vann. Well, advocating some arrangements with the coalition
government which is against the law.
The Chairman. That is right. The papers that I read indicated that
he did advocate that they should seek to make a negotiated peace
rather than a military victory. That is about what was reported in
the press, which is not unlike what apparently was in the mind of Chau
when he was, at least, conferring with j^ou with regard to the possi-
bility of meeting with representatives of Hanoi. Is that not a correct
analvsis?
305
Mr. Vann. Chau did have in his mind, sir, an eventual poHtical
settlement of the war.
The Chairman. Settlement of the war is what both of them had
in mind; is that not coiTect?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I cannot comment on JMr. Dzu because I have never
dealt with him personally.
The Chairman. Of course I have not either, but all the reports were
that that was his crime.
Mr. Vann. That is right, sir.
gvn pressure to lift chau's immunity
The Chairman. Do you have any knowledge of any irregular activi-
ties or pressure brought to bear on the Vietnamese National Assembly
by the Thieu regime in connection with lifting the immunity of Chau?
Do you have any knowledge of that?
Air. Vann. Sir, I have on a continuing basis talked to deputies in
the assembly, particularly those from the delta.
The Chairman. Yes. What do you know?
Mr. Vann. The deputies have suggested to me that there is a good
deal of pressure being brought by the Government, no specific person
in the Government, but by the Government, on individual members
of the assembly to support the Government's position.
The Chairman. To sign a petition?
Mr. Vann. I think, sir, in this country, it is called lobbying.
The Chairman. Yes, that is one. Is it to sign the petition removing
immunity?
Mr. Vann. There has been some specific reported lobbying for this
purpose; that is right.
The Chairman. Do vou know anything about that, Ambassador
Colby?
Mr. Colby. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not. I don't deal with the depu-
ties normally.
The Chairman. You only deal with the diplomats and generals.
Mr. Colby. No, sir. I deal mostly with province chiefs and govern-
ment officials.
The Chairman. I was kidding j^ou.
Mr. Colby. I know it.
The Chairman. Politics is a difficult game.
VISIT from MR. DZU'S SON
Colonel Vann, I think this is very interesting.
This, I must very frankly confess, bothers me a great deal. I do
not know Mr. Dzu personalh', but his son came to see me personally,
as he did a number of members of this committee, in a humanitarian
venture. He said his father was quite ill, with a heart attack or some-
thing, and he is in prison and he thinks he will be allowed to die there.
His attitude is that the only real crime of his father was that he would
like to settle this war with a political settlement. That is the wa}" he
described it.
The son is quite attractive. Isn't he here now or do you know?
Mr. Vann. I don't know him, su\
The Chairman. He is a j^oung man and he came to see me, but I
do not know. I have read all his reports.
306
Senator, do you wish to interrogate?
Mr. Vann. Sii', could I add one thing?
The Chairman. I wish you would add anything that is significant.
Mr. Vann. This is significant to the question earher this morning,
but it does not concern the Chau case.
CRITERIA FOR U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY FIRE
In the discussion, sir, about the control of artillery and the fact that
there ai-e different criteria for U.S. artillery firing from Vietnamese
artillery firing, just to clear the record, I would like to explain that
U.S. units are not permitted to fire artillery shells within a thousand
yards of a Vietnamese population center unless there are U.S. units
under active attack.
Vietnamese units are allowed to fire at a closer distance because they
can communicate directl}^ with outposts and Vietnamese commanders
who are in the population center, and the population center may be
under attack. That is the reason that Vietnamese can fire into areas
that U.S. troops cannot.
Secondly, if most of the firing described in Long An Province, an
average of 300 rounds per day, is like that which I have observed on a
continuing basis in Vietnam in some 27 other provinces, it is primarily
firing of what they call an H and I, harassing and interdiction. This is
fired on known commiuiication routes, usually in unpopulated areas,
and in areas where it is felt that Vietcong units may be traversing as a
way of both making it more dangerous to them and of inhibiting them
not to come to those areas.
That is all, sir.
CHAU'S TROUBLE WITH CIA OVER RD CADRE PROGRAM
The Chairman. One last question I overlooked there on the Chau
case.
Did Chau have any trouble with the CIA over the RD cadre pro-
gram; do you know?
Mr. Colby. Yes, he did.
The Chairman. What was it?
Mr. Colby. It was a question of the degree of control. I think Mr.
Vann ap]H"oved of that.
The Chairman. With which official of the CIA did he have the
trouble?
Mr. Colby. I don't remember, Mr. Chairman. I think it was the
station as a whole.
The Chairman. Was it Mr. [deleted].
Mr. Colby. I don't remember.
The Chairman. Do you know, Mr. Vann?
Mr. Vann. Mr. Chan's relationships with Mr. [deleted] were quite
close, sir, and there was no personal disagreement between the two
of them. However, Colonel Chau had a basic disagreement as to t:he
role of the CIA representative in each province from the standpoint
of handling the funds and making decisions relative to supporting or
nonsui)porting the progi'am.
He felt these should be Vietnamese actions and Vietnamese
decisions.
307
I might also add that Colon '1 Chan had a difference of opinion
with his own superior, General Thinh, over this same matter in that
Colonel Chan was much more sensitive to the CIA involvement in the
RD cadre program and its possible effects than was General Thinh.
The Chairman. What do you mean by sensitive?
Mr. Vann. Apprehensive as to possible repercussions from what
he would consider to be their too overt role.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Colby. The CIA's position on that, Mr. Chairman, was that
they needed that degree of control over the funds they were disbursing.
They did not want to give the funds at a central level and let it be
handled by the Vietnamese.
The Chairman. The difference of opinion was over close supervision
of expenditures?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE U.S. TROOP AVITHDRAWAL
The Chairman. The last question is a little different, but Colonel
Vann, you have been there so long and had such a long experience and
are so thoroughly acquainted with it, could you answer two general
questions? Do you think we can take all of our troops out of Vietnam
and, if so, when would you estimate this can be done? Or, will we have
to keep 75,000 men, more or less there as we do in Korea? This is the
thrust of the question.
Coukl you comment on that?
Mr. Vann. I can comment on it, sir, but I am undoubtedly going to
get into trouble with both j'ou and ni}^ boss.
The Chairman. You are not going to get into trouble. I prefaced
this with "because of your long experience" and you shouldn't get into
any trouble. I don't believe that you will with your boss.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, I wouhl like to sa}' I share with you
the fact that in asking these cpiestions, that we ask the colonel to be
quite specific, quite detailed, and to break it down into various kinds
of assistance.
The Chairman. That 1;^ right. You won't get into any trouble,
colonel. You have been there too long. Go ahead.
Mr. Colby. He has been in trouble before.
The Chairman. He is used to trouble.
Senator Case. He is a Rutgers man, so he cannot be fazed.
The Chairman. Tell us your prognosis of this situation.
Mr. Vann. Sir, first of all, any prognosis is based upon a set of
assumptions, any one of which may jirove to be false, and I have no
more clairvoyance about how Hanoi is going to react or not react
than anyone else.
In my judgment, we are i)roceeding on a course of action that
quite clearly will get the U.S. role in Vietnam greatly diminished and
greatly reduce the cost both in lives and in money.
REDUCTION TIMETABLE PROPOSED IN 1968
Now, I did at one time in 1968 propose that a time table for the
reduction, based upon mv judgment as to what the situation was,
[deleted].
Senator Case. Is this you in 1968 or a^ou now?
t5
308
Mr. Vann. It was me in 1968, and I made certain assumptions
which have thus far held correct, and my judgment continues to be
at that level, that that is about as rapidly as we can do it without
unnecessarily jeopardizing the continuation of the non-Communist
government in Vietnam.
Senator Case. [Deleted.]
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Will you break that down.
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. At what point did you say under 100,000?
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Only to 200,000 by then.
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Would you say it would take 5 years to get it down
below 100,000?
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Three years?
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. It is too far to foresee beyond that?
Mr. Vann. [Deleted.] It is unpredictable as to whether Hanoi will
scale up the fighting or scale down the fighting.
Hanoi's activity during predicted u.s. reduction
Senator Case. This is the thing that I think is kind of important.
Those predictions of yours are based upon the assumption that Hanoi
will be nice people.
Mr. Vann. No, rather that they will continue as they now are.
Senator Case. Well, what is that?
Mr. Vann. Maintaining their current level of strength in South
Vietnam.
Senator Case. Suppose they decide to do more. One, will they be
able to do more?
Mr. Vann. I personally, sir, don't think that they can substantially
increase their effort in South Vietnam. I see several reasons as to why
they may want to scale it down and go back more toward a political
guerilla-type effort, and to modify their expectations for perhaps a
decade or even a decade and a half.
Senator Case. You think that they will not do more because they
Avill not find it feasible to do more?
jMr. Vann. I think, sir, that they must be having a great number of
internal problems. They are certainly having a great problem of morale
among their troops at the moment, even at this level of action. They
are having an extremely difficult logistical problem supporting this
number of forces.
Senator Case. This is a very important factor, it seems to me, and
this is the kind of information we don't have much of.
Mr. Vann. Sir, keep in mind it is a personal opinion. It is not factual
information.
Senator Case. You haven't pulled it out of the air?
Air. Vann. No, sir.
Senator Case. This is based upon your observations and upon what
5''ou have heard.
309
Mr. Colby. I think it is fair to say also based primarily upon Mr.
Vann's position in the southern part of the country.
Senator Case. Yes.
Well, would you, Mr. Ambassador, express a view contrary to that?
Mr. Colby. I would say, in addition to the factors that he comes up
with; you do have the problem of the DMZ and the potential for
action in that area.
Senator Case. Yes. I think there is no doubt about that.
Mr. Colby. There is a shorter geographical distance involved and
they are engaged in a logistical effort there, and so forth.
Senator Case. You do not exclude their abiUty to
Mr. Vann. Sir, I have information, of course less information,
about these corps areas, but I did try to take into consideration this
type of thing, too, in amving at this overall judgment from whatever —
the information that I have had available, and once a month I do get
a briefing on the situation in the entire country and outside my area.
Senator Case. Is your feeling based largely not on what Hanoi is
about to do, but upon increasing strength among the South Viet-
namese?
Mr. Vann. I believe there is every reason to expect that the
Government's control will improve over a period of time. I see time as
an element on our side and one that is hurting the enemy.
difference in appraisals
Senator Case. This was a different appraisal from the one you
were giving in 1967.
Mr. Vann. In 1967, sir, we had a very different situation. We had a
tremendous problem in the pacification area because of the lack of
the continuing close-in security for the population.
Keep in mind that in 1967 we were winning a lot of battles. That
meat-grinding action may very well have caused the enemy to try the
change of tactics that the Tet offensive represented.
loss of U.S. LIVES INVOLVED IN PREDICTED REDUCTIONS
Senator Case. Now, looking at your own prediction as to what you
think is likely, what does this involve in 1970, 1971, 1972, in the loss
of American lives?
Mr. Vann. I believe, sir, that it should be an ever-diminishing rate.
Senator Case. Well, would you give us some order of magnitude.
Mr. Vann. Sir, I would really submit that you could get much
better estimates from someone directly involved in the U.S. tactical
military effort.
Senator Case. I don't mind trying that, of course, but I would
like to have your own.
Mr. Vann. Well, sir, when we think of an ever-duninishing rate,
one of the factors involved in casualties is that a great number of the
casualties (less now than before — at one time it was over 50 percent
of U.S. casualties) are from mines and boobytraps.
Now, the fewer U.S. troops you have in Vietnam, the fewer mines
and boobytraps they are going to stumble over. So there has been
quite a correlation between the size of our force structure and the
number of casualties. If we get down to half of the present force
310
structure I would imagine the casualties would be half of what they
are now.
Senator Case. Are you suggesting, your belief is, that the most
likely result is [tleleted].
The Chairman. Could I ask, Mr. Colb}', if you have any different
view about this estimate?
Mr. Colby. Well, I have great respect for John Vann's attitudes
and views. I think that as the nature of the American particiijation
changes from combat units to primarily su])iwrt structure, you will
have the same kind of impact on American casualties. You ^\■il]
have a very substantial reduction, more than proportionate.
I think an example is the delta today without U.S. ground combat
forces, although still with air combat forces — to refer to the Senator's
statements the other day. Nonetheless, the fact is that you have very
few American casualties at this time in the delta area each week and
month. I think as you reduce the American participation in the
ground combat work in the other parts of the country, you will get a
very sharp decline in the total number of American casualties.
PROJECTION OF HANOl's ATTITUDE
As for the projection of Hanoi's attitude and what they are think-
ing— if they are determined to carry on and achieve a Communist
victory in South Vietnam at some appropriate time, they have a very
difficult problem on their hands. They made kind of a truce on the
assumption that the place would fall into their hands in 1954. They
were badly deceived because the country picked itself up and put
itself together and actually began to run, and I think
The Chairman. Do you mean under Diem?
Mr. Colby. Yes, in the first couple of years in the Diem period,
there was a very distinct revival of that nation or formation of a nation
if you will. It deteriorated later for other reasons.
But they face the prospect of turning oft' the gas on this effort with
the very dangerous potential for them that their forces in the south
will disintegrate, that their own drive and sense of purpose will
reduce, and that they would be sort of confessing to having failed. It
is very dangerous politically to the heirs of Ho Chi Minh to come up
and say that they failed in what their leader told them to do.
I think they will continue to keep some pressure on, with whatever
they are able to use. I think that the potential for winding up and
giving kind of a special effort is always there. They do have divisions
in the area north of the DMZ. Their supply lines are shorter up in that
area. I think there is a chance that at some time they could make a
decision that their situation in the south was deteriorating to such a
degree that they had to do something dramatic and sharp to shake it
up, the way they obviously felt in early 1968.
Senator Case. Is there a possibility that, rather than being able
to do this, they are reducing their response in response to ours and
the evidence of this may be their increased activity in the plain of
Jarres?
Mr. Colby. It is, of course, possible. Senator. I don't read their
mind.
Senator Case. I know.
311
Mr. Colby. I frankly do not think so. I frankly believe their
directives to their forces, their speeches to their people, show a
continued determination to keep the heat on in South Vietnam.
The Lao situation is more or less as it has been all along, except
that they have put some extra forces into it in the past 6 months or
year.
Senator Case. Indeed they have.
Mr. Colby. But it is not anywhere near the magnitude of extra
forces that they have in South Vietnam.
Senator Case. Of course not. But it is a substantial increase which
suggests they are not under pressure. That is all I am trying to get
at.
Mr. Colby. Well, it suggests they are able to put those forces
which are in North Vietnam into an area very close to their own
homeland as distinct from sending them all the way down to the
South, which is a very large logistics problem.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to barge in in this
way, but you and I are directly interested in the same approach.
The Chairman. Could you come back at a quarter of three as you
did yesterday?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, at your disposal, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I have two constituents I i)roinised to take to
lunch.
Senator Case. That would be a humanitarian thing to do anyway.
The Chairman. We will come back then at a quarter of three.
Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 2:45 p.m., this same day.)
afternoon session
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Sergeant Wallace, as I said, I didn't get to ask you any questions
at all.
language facility of cap team
Do you speak Vietnamese?
TESTIMONY OF SGT. RICHARD D. WALLACE— Resumed
Sergeant W^allace. No, sir, I don't. I have two marines that sjjeak
fairly'good Vietnamese, and also my counterparts speak excellent
English. We have a big brother program in which we select children
within the hamlets to work for the Marines. The majority of these
kids who work for us speak fluent English, and also write English.
The Chairman. Did you say two of those in your CAP team? Your
CAP team consists of five?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir, there are 13 marines.
The Chairman. Two of them speak Vietnamese?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir, not fluently but they get a point
across.
The Chairman. How do you communicate with the PF soldiers and
with residents in the village in which you are stationed?
312
Sero(>ant Wallace. Again, part of the PF's, a good percentage,
speak English, and the marines who speak Vietnamese are with me.
The Chairman. What percentage of your PF's speak EngHsh?
Sergeant Wallace. I would say 25 percent.
The Chairman. Where are they learning?
Sergeant Wallace. School, sir, and from the marines and from the
children.
The Chairman. How do you ascertain that the marines are under-
stood by the people in the hamlets?
Sergeant Wallace. Well, sir, when we first arrived there, the hamlets
were having c^uite a bit of trouble. We were primarily working within
that area, operating in and around the hamlet there. The people are
accepting the marines. They are more friendly with them. I am invited
to all the hamlet meetings.
HAMLET MEETINGS
The Chairman. What kind of hamlet meetings?
Sergeant Wallace. This is just the hamlet meetings where they get
the older people
The Chairman. Are the}^ social meetings?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What is the nature of the social meetings?
Senator Wallace. I just discuss things which improve the A^illage
or hamlet, and problems which have arisen and try to work these out.
normal day of cap
The Chairman. Describe in the way that your predecessor,
Captain Murphy did, a normal day. Give us a feeling of what you do
and what is said.
Sergeant Wallace. Fine, sir.
I start off in the evening, usually around 6 :30 or a half hour or an
hour after dark. We run two patrols which go out and set up their
ambushes. These ambushes stay out all night. They come back the
next morning at approximately 6:30, depending upon what time of
the year it is.
Then we send out a security guard to guard the hamlet in the day-
time. We work \vith the rural development cadre. We get supplies
for them and help them to rebuild the hamlet.
The people need wood, cement, tin, et cetera. The Marines during
this time have opportunities to sleep.
selection, background, and training of cap
The Chairman. How is your 13-man CAP team chosen?
Sergeant Wallace. Sir, they are selected from the United States.
At one time the CAP were all from within South Vietnam, but the
program has been expanded and they are accepting them from the
States. They are sent over with orders for the CAP program. They are
screened and the better ciualified Marines are taken for this program.
Senator Aiken. Are they from rural areas?
Sergeant Wallace. Pardon me, sir?
Senator Aiken. Are the Marines from the rural areas largely?
Sergeant Wallace. I don't know what you mean by rural area.
313
Mr. Colby. American farm areas. They are not.
Sergeant Wallace. They are not.
The Chairman. Is there any special training the squad leaders
receive?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir. We go to a CAP school, which is located
in Danang. The school lasts 2 weeks. They just talk about the people,
how the people live, the customs, et cetera.
The Chairman. Have the Marines under your command been
given any special training?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. They also attend this 2-week course.
The Chairman. They do too?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. All Marines going through the CAP
program attended this school.
The Chairman. Do you think the Marines today are trained as well
as they were in the past?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir. Present day demands for Marines are
quite large. They are rushed through most of the training. They don't
have as much time to grasp all the infantry aspects which they need,
and are not trained as well as I was when I went through training.
The Chairman. You say this is because tliey are in too big a hurry?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. The demand for Marines is such that
they rush them through classes.
great demand for marines
The Chairman. Why is the demand so great?
Sergeant Wallace. We need Marines. People are rotating and to
jBll their positions they must get the replacements over to Vietnam.
The Chairman. But we are reducing the numbers. Ai'en't we
reducing the number of Marines along with the Ai-my?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir, correct. But when they rotate a man,
they still have to send replacements for the remaining units.
The Chairman. Where does the reduction come about if you replace
them or is this a fiction?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir, it is not a fiction. They are reducing
the Marines.
The Chairman. If they are reducing, then you don't send a replace-
ment every time you bring one home; do you?
Sergeant Wallace. I guess that is correct, sir.
The Chairman. I am trying to get it straight in my own mind.
Why is there a greater demand for Marines now than there was when
you were in training?
Sergeant Wallace. The CAP program has enlarged quite a bit.
It is expanding.
The Chairman. The CAP program is expanding, not the Marines
generally?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. In my area you will find we have two
infantry units which I will show you on the map here. Charlie Com-
pany from the l-26th, and also India Company from the 3-lst. They
also have started using tlie CAP program. They are sending men down
to work with the Popular Force soldiers.
India Company has CAP units located just north of my area. The
26th Marines have a CAP which is just south of my area. They operate
44-706—70 21
314
primarily in Huong Son area. The CAP program has been quite
effective.
The Chairman. For what purpose?
Sergeant Wallace. Providing security for the hamlets.
The Chairman. I see.
IS SECURITY SITUATION IN CAP 215 AREA TYPICAL OF PROVINCE?
Would you say that the area you cover is typical of the province in
teiTus of the security situation, lack of support for the Vietcong?
Sergeant Wallace. Would you rephrase that, sir.
The Chairman. Is the area that you cover typical of the province
as a whole \\dth regard to the security of the people and the lack -of
support for the Vietcong?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It is typical?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It is not unusual.
TERMINOLOGY USED TO REFER TO VIETNAMESE
We have often read in the papers that American soldiers, including
marines, refer to the Vietnamese as Dinks, Gooks, or Slants. Is the
terminology generally used?
Sergeant Wallace. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Which is the more fashionable?
Sergeant Wallace. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Could you give us any enlightenment as to why
these terms are used by the marines?
Sergeant Wallace. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Is this a word of affection?
Sergeant Wallace. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Is it respect? What is it?
Sergeant Wallace. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. Your counterparts?
Sergeant Wallace. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. You are an adviser?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir; I am not an adviser.
The Chairman. You are a leader of the CAP's?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir; a squad.
The Chairman. Do you have any questions. Senator Aiken?
WEARING OF uniforms BY MARINES AND POPULAR FORCES
Senator Aiken. Are the Marines always in uniform?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
Senator Aiken. Do the Popular Forces have a uniform too?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir; they have.
Senator Aiken. I don't want to ask any questions. Any I would
ask have probably been asked twice abeady, so I will get it from the
record.
315
SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IN HAMLETS
The Chairman. Do you think that most of the people in the ham-
lets in which you have been stationed support the present Govern-
ment of South Vietnam?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir, I do.
kill ratios of cap's
The Chairman. What is the kill ratio of the CAP platoons?
Sergeant Wallace. Just a second, sir, I have the statistics. Sir,
these are statistics from January 1 to November 30, 1969. Total enemy
killed in this period of time was 4,735; the enemy killed by CAP's
was 1,862. The ratio is 6.4 to 1.
The Chairman. 6.4 enemy to 1?
Sergeant Wallace. Friendly.
KILL RATIO OF PF PLATOONS OPERATING ALONE
The Chairman. Do you know the kill ratio of Popular Force pla-
toons operating alone after CAP teams have left?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir, 3.5 to 1.
The Chairman. Just about half.
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know whether that is general or is that
only in vour area?
Sergeant Wallace. This is for the entire CAP program, sir, the
entire combined action force, 114 CAP's.
kill ratio of psdf
The Chairman. Is that the ratio of the People's Self-Defense
Forces?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir. This does not include the PSDF.
The Chairman. What is their kill ratio?
Sergeant Wallace. I don't have that.
The Chairman. Do you have that, Ambassador Colby?
Mr. Colby. We have some very poor statistics on that, Senator,
which I don't have very much reliance on. It comes out roughly one
for one on People's Self-Defense. These vary.
ownership and boundaries of farms
Senator Aiken. I would like to ask one more question. You say this
is a farming community. Do the people own the land on wliich they
work or are they tenants working as tenant farmers? Are they work-
ing for someone who owns a lot of land perhaps?
Sergeant Wallace. Sir, I don't know.
Senator Aiken. Is it their own? You might know. Is that situation
bettor over there than it was?
Mr. Colby. It varies from one part of the country to another,
Senator. Up in central Vietnam they never have had a very large
landlord problem. Most of the holdings there are faiidy small holdings.
A number of them are rented out to other people in the villages.
A family will rent out part of its land to someone else.
316
Senator Aiken. The boundaries are well defined?
Mr. Colby. Quite well defined, and they remain stable. Even when
the village leaves because of the w^ar and comes back 3 years later,
the families find their old locations. The village handles a great deal
of that.
Now, down in the delta area, where you did have larger holdings
and absentee landlordism, there has been some modification over the
past few years.
Under the Diem regime they put in a partial land reform program,
let us say, and accepted as that. It reduced the maximum holding down
to 100 hectares, plus a little for religious purposes. That is 250 acres.
This absorbed land which was formerly owned by the French or
former bigger holdings. They spent quite a time trying to distribute
this land, and by 1961-62 when the war began they had not done very
much of it. This past year they had 147,000 hectares yet to distribute.
They essentially had not distributed anything much over the past
7 years.
During this past year the Government set the goal of finishing up
that whole 147,000. They did not make it. They did distribute about
75,000. They mil clean it up in the early part of this year.
Senator Aiken. That is quite an improvement.
Mr. Colby. Yes. There was more distributed this year than the
la-st 7 years.
Senator Aiken. When a few people get control of the land it seems
almost a pure formula for rebellion in the country.
Mr. Colby. Well, the Government today has a further bill on land
reform which has been in the National Assembly.
Senator Aiken. I know.
Mr. Colby. It is not yet up before the Senate. It is in Senate com-
mittee at the moment. This would reduce the maximum holding down
quite a bit further. There is some debate as to whether it will be eight
or ten hectares, but it will be way down. The thrust of the Govern-
ment's position on the bill is that you will arrive at a situation where
you essentially cannot be a landlord. The only way to own land is to
work it. That is the thrust of their policy. That has not yet passed the
National Assembly.
Senator Aiken. Ok.
hamlet festival
The Chairman. Captain Murphy, perhaps you are as good as any-
one on this. Are you familiar with the hamlet festival?
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. AEMAND MUEPHY— Eesnmed
Captain Murphy. No, I am not, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Are you?
TESTIMONY OE CAPT. EICHAED T. GECK— Eesnmed
Captain Geck. Mr. Chairman, are you referring to a situation in
which we would bring in entertainment and bring the people to-
gether where we conducted operations?
The Chairman. This is described in a handbook for miUtary support,
pacification, but it is 2 years old.
317
Captain Geck. I believe that is what you are referring to, sir. I have
been instructed in it, but I do not use it.
The Chairman. Do you use it any more? Do either of you know?
Captain Geck. No, sir.
The Chairman. I don't know whether this calls — ■
Sergeant Wallace. Sir, we call it Psyops. Occasionally a team of
Vietnamese will come in and show a movie.
The Chairman. "The purpose of this annex is to set forth the
task organization of the RVNAF teams of the hanilet festival force
involved in a cordon and search operation; in addition, discussion of
the physical layout of the hamlet festival is presented. Task organi-
zation and functions of RVNAF teams. * * *, cultural team, agri-
cultural team, youth services teach," and so on.
Captain Murphy. Possibly, Mr. Chairman, this is a function of the
regular forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
The Chairman. I wondered whether you participated in it.
Captain Murphy. I am not familiar with it.
The Chairman. Either of you?
Cai)tain Geck. It was a technique taught to us when we ^yent
through the advisory training program. We have used it in a modified
sense.
The Chairman. It does not look as if it is a promising subject.
Mr. Vann. Mr Chairman, may I make mention of the fact that
I am very familiar with the program. It is a program largely involving
U.S. tactical forces, working in conjunction with police or provincial
forces, that Mere involved in taking an area that had been under
Vietcong control or in which there might still be members of the
Vietcong. They surround the area, seal it off, and then have the
National Police of the Government of Vietman assemble the j^eople
in the center of the town and interrogate, usually the males, and
some of the female adults.
To make this less onerous for the people, a county fair or hamlet
festival was also established wherein food, drink, and medical aid was
dispensed to the peo])le while they were assembled. They would also
sometimes show movies or even get some local Vietnamese cultural
drama teams to put on entertainment. It is a technique that was
used extensively in 1967.
It has largely been abandoned since that period of time.
The Chairman. I suspected as much.
sentencing and release under phoenix program
I believe we come back to the Phoenix program.
Ambassador Colby, I believe you said your statistical information
about what happens to the Vietcong after their ai:)prehension is not
very good. I notice an article by Mr. Terence Smith in the Xew
York Times of August 19, 1969 which says:
Officials in charge of the program acknowledge that fewer than 20 percent of
the 25,233 suspected agents and sympathizers who had been arrested have
received prison sentences of a year or more.
Do you think that is correct?
Mr. Colby. Well, Mr. Chairman, I stand by the fact that our
information is not veiy good. We did run a survey here about 8 months
318
ago in which we used what information we had available and could
collect on what happened to people. The experience at that time did
reveal that about 20 percent received a sentence of more than 6
months. Most of them were much less.
This was a one-time experiment, and I would not generalize it
completely, but it was one of the factors used to discuss with the
government the necessity for a tightening up of the regulations as to
what kind of sentences were applied to what kinds of people.
The Chairman. The same article quotes ]\Ir, John Mason, identified
as the head of the American PhoenLx Advisers, and as saying, "Many
of them just go out the back door of the jail. We know that." What
does he mean by that?
Mr. Colby. He means that a number of the people who are orig-
mally arrested are released very c[uickly because government officials
decide they do not have enough of a case to hold them.
STATEMENT ON PHOENIX PROGRAM
Mr. Chairman, if I might, I have prepared a statement on the
Phoenix progi'am, if I might submit it for the record.
The Chairman. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Colby. It is just a general roundup of the progTam and it
might help fill out the record.
(The information referred to appears on p. 723.)
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM
The Chairman. Yesterday you mentioned a system of administrative
detention of up to 2 years under the PhoenLx program. Would you
describe what happens to the typical member of the VC infrastructure
who is arrested.
Mr. Colby. The man is arrested. As I think Major Arthur said, he
would be picked up and brought into the district. He would be inter-
rogated there for about 24 hours maximum. He would then be sent to
the province.
There he would be held in a detention center at the province level.
He would be interrogated there by some more specialized teams of
interrogators, people who would try to find out both his tactical knowl-
edge and his knowledge of the enemy infrastructure.
While under interrogation a case would be prepared describing his
activity and his background, describing for what reason be should be
held.
This case would be reviewed by what is called the province security
committee. The province security committee, as I mentioned, is made
up of the province chief, the deputy province chief for administration,
the chairman of the provincial council, an elected body, the local
provincial judge. There is frequently only one judge in the province,
and he would be a member — I think a better term for it in English
is the local district attorney, frankly, because
Senator Aiken. Is he appointed or elected?
Mr. Colby. Under their system of law he is appointed. He is under
the Ministry of Justice. He is a national government official.
Senator Aiken. I see.
319
Mr. Colby. The case would be reviewed by that body. Assuming
the suspect fell within the categories and depending on what his job
was in the VC, he would receive an appropriate sentence according
to the subdivisions that I have outlined. Serious party members
would have a minimum of a 2-year sentence.
Leaders of the fronts, and that sort of thing, but not party members,
would receive a 1- to 2-year sentence. A lesser follower, someone who
had just helped at the machinery, would have a maximum of 1 year.
Upon conviction, under the current legislation, he would be moved
to a detention center or corrections center, as it is called, a prison,
and held there until the expiration of his term.
Xow I am speaking of the ideal, Mr. Chairman. I am speaking of
the way the legislation says it should work. There are weaknesh,js in
it that are being worked on. One of them, for instance, is that there is
frequently a long detention period while the case is being prepared.
Bureaucracy does not prepare it fast enough.
The other thmg, as was mentioned, is that a number of the cases
received less than the appropriate sentence for their job until re-
cently when this had begun to tighten up a little bit.
Some of the provinces have not moved the individuals from the
province detention facilities to the national corrections centers even
after tlie se;itence. Up until a few months ago the requirement was
that the case be reviewed and confirmed by the Mmistry of Justice,
which meant another 2 or 3 months' delay in the processing. That
has been changed in the past few months, so that, once the case was
approved by the province security committee, the men will be moved to
the national corrections center and begin serving theii' ternis. The
Ministry of Interior still does review the case but it re\iews it after
he has been sent to the corrections center.
PROVINCE SECURITY COMMITTEE
The Chairman. Who makes up the province security committee?
I dill not understand that.
^h\ Colby. The province chief, the deputy province chief, his
deputy for administration. The latter is a civilian.
The Chairman. These are all Vietnamese?
Mr. Colby. Oh, yes. No Americans are in this. A number of these
officers actually have American advisers. The pro\ance chiefs have
senior advisers, for instance, but no Americans sit on committee.
rights of arrested PERSON
The Chairman. Does the arrested person have a counsel and trial?
Mr. Colby. Generally, no.
The Chairman. May^he be tried by the committee while he is in
jail and in absentia?
Mr. Colby. I think what you mean is one thing that is currently
under discussion, Mr. Chairman. Does he have a right to a hearing?
The Chairman. And to be present at it?
Mr. Colby. No, he does not have a right to a hearing under the
present legislation. There is some consideration being given to modify-
ing that.
320
VCI KILLED UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM IN 1968 AND 1969
The Chairman. In 1968, out of a total of 15,776 VCI neutralized
under the Phoenix program, 2,259 were killed, which is about 13
percent of the total.
Last year 6,187 were killed out of 19,534 neutraUzed, which is
about 36 percent.
•u i^^^u^^^ according to your statements for the record, the VCI
killed about the same number of people. You said more than 6,000.
TriV^^ -fi .. explanation of the great increase in the percentage of the
VCI killed m 1969?
Mr. Colby. If I may make one correction, Mr. Chairman. You
will recall that 1968 terrorist figures do not include the month of
i^ebruary, the month of the Tet attacks, so that it is an 11-month
period.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Colby. Actually there were more people killed during 1968
than 1969, I am quite sure.
The explanation for the difference, Mr. Chairman, is, I beheve,
that during 1969 increased attention has been given to the progi-am.
Ihere has particularly been an increased discipline over the kinds of
people that were credited to the program.
During 1968 they did not have precise definitions of who was a
yCi and, consequently, pretty much everyone who was arrested was
included as a VCI in those figures.
By 1969, these sharpened up a bit, and many people who were
actually captured and arrested as VC could not be classified as VCI
tor this program.
Secondly, I think that the pressures on the program of concentrating
on the infrastructure as a target have created a greater degree of
activity and a greater degree of intensity of effort so that even though
the figures m 1969 are liarder, I think vou are getting essentially a
larger total than you had for the softer figures in 1968.
Third, as I mentioned the other day,^I think that a substantial
number of the killed were not ones that were particularly targeted
but were ones which were identified as members of the infrastructure
after hiwing been killed in some kind of an action. But since there was
a certain desire to focus on the infrastructure as a target, these people
were credited to the totals.
Mr. Vann. Could I add two things to that, sir, from my experience
m the Delta?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Vann. In 1969 many more members of the infrastructure are
living m base areas than in 1968.
In 1968, they were continuing to live in the hamlet. Because they
now five m base areas, it means they five with the mihtary unit as
opposed to hvmg among the civilian communities. That would account
on the one hand for why there would be such a high percentage killed.
Finally, and Ambassador Colby just touched "^on it, you are kind
of comparing apples and oranges because in 1968 the figures are A, B,
and C categories. In 1969, it was A, B, and C for the first 5 months
and then A and B only for the last 7 months.
321
If you were to take comparable figures for 1968 and 1969— A,B,
and, C for the total year— the percentage of VCI killed goes down
substantially.
The Chairman. Would the numbers go down?
Mr. Vann. Su-?
The Chairman. The number.
Mr. Vann. The number would go up.
Mr. Colby. The number goes up very substantially.
Mr. Vann. The numbers would go up, but the number killed goes
down. . . 1 . X- 1
The Chairman. The number 6,000 against 2,000 is substantial.
Mr. Vann. Right, sir.
The Chairman. Numbers, not percentage.
Mr. Vann. Right, sir. But total numbers also go up considerably
in 1969.
effectiveness of phoenix program
The Chairman. Do you consider this program a successful one,
Mr. Vann? i ^ u ^
Mr. Vann. Sir, I consider it an essential program that has not
become anywhere near as effective as we believe it can be. I also am
Avell aware that, like any other program in Vietnam, it has its share
of abuses, and by its very nature it is one which is extremely vulnerable
to being misused. It requires a great deal of supervision.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for one
question here?
The Chairman. Yes.
why is phoenix program essential?
Senator Symington. Why do you think it is essential?
Mr. Vann. Are you referring to me, sir, or the Ambassador?
Senator Symington. You said you thought it was essential.
Mr. Vann. I think it is essential because in any organization ot the
enemy the brains of that organization are what keep it going. In
other words, you can kill on a continuing basis followers and yet the
people who can organize things politically can get a recruiting drive
goin^ and replace 'these followers. They can continue to send them
out where they are in danger and can be, and will be, killed and have
to be replaced. The followers go out to do the missions or the dirty
work, if you will. They are the ones who are sent out to do executions
of GVN officials.
The best way of getting on top of that is to get the nerve center,
the command post,' of the enemy, and this is essentially what the
Phoenix or Phung Hoang program is designed to do.
It has not yot enjoyed the success that we feel is possible. It has
not done it prim aril vbocauso there has not been the same degree of
awareness on the part of the Government of Vietnam, speaking on
the whole, not as individuals, as there is on the part of the United
States as to the importance of this.
Please keep in mind their government is very militarily oriented.
Even on the American side for years we had difficulty getting the
322
G-2 elements at various tactical levels to recognize that it was some-
times more important to capture one key organizer in an area than
it was to kill 100 guerrillas because he was the man who could keep
up the organization, keep it flourishing and replenish the losses as they
occurred.
I had a very high level U.S. American Army G-2 officer comment to
me in 1967, ''Look, let us win this damned war by killing the enemy
and then you ci^dlians can screw around with the infrastructure after
the war is over." That reflected all too often the attitude on the part
of some U.S. personnel.
The attitude is much more prevalent on the part of the Vietnamese
personnel because they are much more militarily oriented in their
entire government structure than we are. This is why I consider it is
an essential program, sir.
Mr. Colby. I think I might add to that, Senator, that the necessity
of the program comes from the nature of the war being fought. This is a
war fought on different levels. Part of the war is a subversive war, a
terrorist war being fought by a political apparatus, one which refused
to consider operating under any kind of normal rule.
They are the ones who began the process of subversion and de-
veloping these networks, developing the attacks on the government
structure.
If you are going to fight this kind of a war, you have to fight it on
this level as well as on the regular level. You have to do a better job.
The government of Vietnam, however, as Mr. Vann said, has not
develoj^ed much expertise in this thing.
We Americans have been learning the necessity of it. The Com-
munist Party of Indo-China began in 1930 and they have been
developing their techniques and standards ever since, so they have
about a 40-year jump on us in terms of professionalism. This is a very
professional covert operation that the enemy is running. A normal
member of the VCI will have several aliases; he will have all the
paraphernalia of covert operations, cutouts and all that sort of thing.
So it is a subversive organization and it has to be met by good,
sensible, hard police methods — intelligent ones too, not brutal ones;,
don't get me wrong.
DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND MILITARY
The Chairman. This is directed at civilians rather than military;
is that correct? I am not sure.
Mr. Colby. Sir, the difference between a civilian and a military
is very fuzzy in the nature of this war.
Is the guerrilla a civilian or military? Is the political boss civilian
or military? Is the fellow who is in the local force unit civilian or miU-
tary? He probably does not have a uniform. He does have a weapon.
The infrastructure fellow has a weapon. Maybe he has a bomb that
he places someplace. Is he civilian or military? Those distinctions
are some of the things that we have learned are not that compelling.
We have learned it in our CORDS organization. We have learned
that we have to put civilian Americans and military Americans
together to make an American team to fight this kind of war. It does-
not divide into civil and military.
323
The Chairman. Does this account for the fact that you have
incidents Hke Myhii in which you cannot tell the difference, so 3^ou
resolve all doubts in favor of the fact that they are all VCI because
you cannot tell the difference?
Mr. Colby. No, sir. I think I have tried to indicate that we have
devoted quite a lot of effort to identifying precisely who is a member
of which part of the apparatus.
The Chairman. This is w^hat confuses me. I thought you said it Avas
difficult to tell the difference. I can see it would be very difficult.
Mr. Colby. I am saying there is not a difference between ciAal and
military.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Colby. But the Phoenix program is auned at identifying by
name — not by character but by name — the people who do these
different jobs so they can be identified and indi\ddually picked up.
Mr. Vann, Sir, there is no relationship at all between the incident
which is alleged to have happened at Mylai and the type of program
we arc now discussing, no relationship at all.
The Chairman. I can see there is not in that sense, but there is
the fact that you cannot tell very well the difference between a mili-
tary man and a VCI, a soldier. These people don't wear their uniforms.
They all wear pajamas; don't they?
Mr. Vann. Let's look at it from the other side, sir. Ambassador
Colby is just as legitimate a target to the other side as is General
Abrams.
When I travel in the countryside, sir, I have, not on my person, but
close to me in the back of my h(^licoi)ter and on luy person if I am
going to spend a night in an outpost, a weapon to give myself close-in
protection if someone tries to assassinate me or shoot me. That is the
kind of a war it is. Everything is fair game for either side.
Senator Symington. You say you have a weapon to protect you if
someone is about to attack you?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Where do you keep it?
Mr. Vann. If I am flying in my helicopter or in my car I have it at
mv feet or at my side, but out of sight because I don't like to have it
visible. I will have four hand grenades in a briefcase and a pistol and
100 rounds of ammunition in my briefcase.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
The Chairman. I agree this is a very peculiar war. Everythmg
indicates that, but I am trying to understand.
allegations of officers trained at fort holabird
Are you familiar Avith the allegations made in the case in Baltimore
involving a man named Reichmeyer? Are either of you familiar with
it?
Mr. Colby. Are those the two officers?
The Chairman. They were being trained at Fort Holabird.
Mr. Colby. Generally. 1 am not precisely familiar with it.
The Chairman. Could you give an explanation of your point of
view or your explanation of that incident if you are familiar with it?
324
Mr, Colby. I am not familiar with it, Mr. Chairman. All I know is
that those officers apparently had not been to Vietnam. They were
talking about what they would be told to do when they got to
Vietnam.
The Chairman. That is correct.
They were repeating what an instructor who had been to Vietnam
told them would be expected of them when they arrived there ; is that
not correct? That was the report.
Mr. Colby. Right. My only comment is that that is not expected
of them. In fact, quite the contrary, we have given very specific
directives to our officers as to their behavior, and I believe I have
submitted one of those for the record.
(The information referred to appears on p. 61).
The Chairman. Why did the Government drop the case and not
go on through with it and allow them to attempt to prove their
allegation?
Mr. Colby. I don't know.
The Chairman. This is the same sort of thing that the Senator
from Missouri and I are concerned about in the executive hearings.
In this case these two men offered to prove their allegations. The
Government backed off from it and it was quashed. It reminds me a
little of what is quashed in our hearings and it leaves these questions
in our minds.
I would much prefer for our own satisfaction if the Government had
made the explanation you are making and had been able to sustain it.
It would have cleared the air and been a lot better. These two men
made what they called a proffer and the Government after that
dropped it and didn't prosecute them. The men were allowed Avhatever
it was they asked for. It was a conscientious objection or something.
The men said they were very deeply offended by what they believed
they were expected to do if they went to Vietnam, which is what has
been explained.
I grant it is just one case.
Mr. Vann. Senator Fulbright, may I submit
The Chairman. I would like you to.
Mr. Vann. Although you have a policy, a program of instruction,
and clearly delineated orders and principles that people are to follo\y,
the Army, CORDS organization, and all of our other agencies in
Vietnam are, after all, made up of human beings. Many people deviate
from what they have been told to do because of their own personal
experience or because of their personal convictions as to what may be
right. I have on a continuing basis found subordinates of mine violating
my established policies. Depending upon the nature of the violation,
I either get it corrected or I discipline them.
But, sir, those are not the published instructions. It is not the way
these people operate. What these two young gentlemen were told, and
by what instructor, is not within my knowledge, but I do submit it is
quite possible it was someone acting outside of the scope of his estab-
lished responsibility.
The Chairman. I regret that the Government did not go ahead
and clear the matter up at the time.
325
INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLENCE
IN VIETNAM
What I said reminds me of a statement yesterday. I won't undertake
exactly to state what you said, Colonel Vann, but you expressed a
certain resentment, I think, at what you considered an implication of
some questions relating to this program.
It occurred to me afterward, when I considered how many acts of
violence take place in this city or in New York City or any other city
in America and the enormous increase in the amount of crime and
violence here in this country, that you really should not be too sur-
prised that people who hear about these things are not too skeptical
about the allegations of crime or, we will say, acts of violence in
Vietnam because we have them here at home.
We are at present a very violent people. Everything indicates that.
Mr. Vann. All I was submitting, sir, is when it happens here it is in
violation of the law.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Vann. When it happens there it is in violation of the law as we
have established it.
EFFECT OF CONDITIONS ON ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. I think you are right in a sense. I mean I don't
feel that you have deliberately ordered people, or the policy orders
them, to do many of the things which are done. The conditions are
such that it almost inevitably results in that because this is a very
nasty war. Don't you think it is?
Mr. Vann. I agree with you wholeheartedly-
Mr. Colby. I don't think it almost inevitably results in that.
Mr. Vann. I agree with you it is a n&stj war, sir.
The Chairman. I think it arises out of the fact that we intervened
in a civil war and the Americans were led to believe it was a holy war
on a different basis. This has nothing to do with the waj- you gentle-
men discharge your duties. There have been many, many misappre-
hensions about what the war is about, but that is another matter,
largely of a political nature.
Mr. Colby. I did hope, Mr. Chairman, that in the course of these
hearings we might lay to rest the belief that had gotten abroad and in
the press that the Phoenix program was a program of assassination
and murder and that sort of thing. I just don't think it is. It is not
how does phoenix program get THE PEOPLE AT THE
TOP?
Senator Symington. If the Chair will yield, the testimony recently
was that you go after the people at the top. How do you get them at
the top. Suppose they resist; what do you do then?
Mr. Colby. The purpose of the program. Senator, is to
Senator Symington. I understand what the purpose is.
Mr. Colby. To get ahold of the fellows.
326
Senator Symington. You have been over the purpose. We both
know — I have been in the Army myself, I have been a secretary in the
Pentagon, and I think I know something about the estabUshment.
Mr. Vann says he has a gun by his feet and hand grenades in his
valise, and so forth and so on.
Now, he emphasizes that it is not important to kill a blank number,
w^liich is what we do every week. We put out how many of them that
we kill, and I think that is a relatively unimportant piece of knowledge.
With our industrial complex, if we cannot kill a lot of North Viet-
namese, then I am very surprised. I wish we would have killed more
North Vietnamese before they had killed more Americans. But, in any
case, we kill a lot and we boast about it.
Mr. Vann comes up here and he says it is not important to kill the
little people; it is important to kill the big people.
Mr. Colby. No, sir.
Senator Symington. That is, in effect, what he is saying, because
you say you are going to get them. Suppose you go in and arrest a man
and ho pulls a gun on you. What do you do, run away or do you pull
a gvm on him?
]\Ir. Colby. No, sir. But the statistics for this year, as the chairman
was suggesting, show that roughly a third of these were picked up by
capture, roughly a third by themselves voluntarily coming over to
the Government, and roughly a third by being killed.
Senator Symington. Right.
Mr. Colby. Now the rest of the effort is to try to get them to come
to our side, either by invitation or by grabbing them.
Senator Symington. But you are told to get them, aren't you, just
like the Canadian Mounted Police are told to get their man. That is
what they are told, aren't they?
Mr. Colby. That is right.
Senator Symington. When you are told to get a civilian in a village
it is stretching it a little bit to say that under no circumstances should
you be considered— of comrse, the word *'get" is an important word,
you see.
Mr. Colby. Agreed.
Senator Symington. I have been on the CIA Committee in the
Senate for over a decade and I think we are beginning to get awfully
wordy about what we are doing.
ideology of major mai and than ngoc chau
Colonel Vann, you said this morning that you didn't think that Mai
was a Communist; is that correct?
Mr. Vann. That is correct, sir. I have no reason to think that he
is other than what he seems to be, which is a dedicated Nationalist.
Senator Symington. Right. And you also said the same about
Chau, didn't you?
Mr. Vann. That is correct, sir.
Senator Symington. Why do you think the Ambassador feels Chau
is a Communist?
Mr. Vann. I don't know that he does.
Senator Symington. Well, I do because he told our staff people that
he was.
327
Mr. Vann. He did not tell me that.
Senator Symington. Why do you think he told our staff people that
he was?
Mr. Vann. If he tliinks that, he has information that is not available
to me.
Senator Symington. Or to the head of the CIA out there Mr.
[deleted] who happens to be a friend of mine, and one of the best men
I know in the business. He says he is not a Communist.
Do you think Air, Bunker takes the word of Mr. Thieu or some
other official in the Saigon government over the top official in our
Government?
Mr. Vann. I really cannot answer that, sir.
Senator Symington. But you are in 3'our own mind confident that
Mr. [deleted] is right and Ambassador Bunker is wrong about his being
a Communist; is that correct?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I would not phrase it in that fashion.
Senator Symington. How would you phrase it?
Mr. Vann. I would say that I have no information at all that would
suggest to me that Tran Ngoc Chau is a Communist. The information
I do have suggests to me that he is not a Communist. It suggests to
me he is not pro-Communist.
Senator Symington. All right. You have made your point.
CHAU'S discussion OF HIS CONTACTS WITH HIS BROTHER
Did Mr. Chau ever tell you that he discussed his contacts with his
broiaer, who was a Communist?
Mr. Vann. With whom, sir?
Senator Symington With his oM^n brother.
Mr. Vann. He told me about his brother.
Senator Symington. What did he tell you about his brother?
Mr. Vann. He told me that his brother had come to see him and
wanted to establish contact with the Americans.
Senator Symington. Did he tell you that liis brother was a Commu-
nist?
Mr. Vann. He told me his brother was a Communist. However, he
qualified it, and we had an argument about it. He told me liis brother
was first a nationalist and second a Communist, and I told him I
thought that no one could be a Communist and have it as a second
priority and that his brother must be first a Communist.
priority of communism and nationalism
Senator Symington. What would you say Dubczek was, first a
Communist and second a nationalist in Czechoslvakia, or first a
nationalist and second a Communist. What would you say about that?
Mr. Vann. Fu-st of all, su-, I know nothing about the gentlemen
except for what I read in the paper.
Senator Symington. I see.
If a man is a Communist, do you think automatically he cannot be
a nationalist; is that right?
Mr. Vann. No, sir. I just think that, if he is a Communist, that
takes first priority in his thinking, and nationalism would be second.
328
Senator Symington. What do you mean by that?
How about the Czechoslovak Communists? You must get some
papers out where you are. How about the Czechoslovaks who risk
their lives protesting against communism although they are members
of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia? Do you think they are
nationalists first?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I don't consider communism to be monolithic.
Senator Symington. What are you talking about?
Mr. Vann. I am saying I would imagine their allegiance to the
Czechoslovak Communist Party would override, if it came into con-
flict with their feelings of nationalism, provided they were bona fide
Communists.
Senator Symington. Well, we are getting into a semantic square
dance.
TRAN NGOC CHAU'S contacts with CIA
Senator Symington. Let me ask you this question, Colonel Vann.
Do you know of any contacts that Mr. Chau had with the CIA?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I only know that Colonel Chau worked with the
CIA advisers in his province, the CIA advisers in the Vung Tau
Training Center, and the CIA advisers at the ministerial level.
Colonel Chau told me that he had had contacts with the CIA.
Senator Symington. What people did he have contact with?
Mr. Vann. Sir, he told me he had contacts with Mr. [deleted] and
Mr. [deleted].
Senator Symington. Did he tell you he had any contact with Mr.
[deleted]?
Mr. Vann. No, sir, he did not.
Senator Symington. Or Mr. [deleted]?
Mr. Vann. No, sir.
Senator Symington. Do you know whether the CIA reported Mr.
Chau's contacts to the Government of South Vietnam?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I have no idea of what they did or did not report.
Senator Symington. Mr. Colby, do you know about that, sir?
Mr. Colby. I really cannot answer. I wouldn't want to answer
without checking the files, Senator.
TRAN NGOC CHAU'S DIFFERENCES WITH CIA
vSenator ^Symington. Do either of you know whether Chau's dif-
ferences with the CIA over the program involved Messrs. [deleted]?
Mr. Colby. They were both there at the time, sir.
Senator Symington. Were there differences between them?
Mr. Colby. I could not say. It was a difference between our Agency
and Mr. Chau about how the thing should be run, [deleted].
Senator Symington. Colonel Vann, how about that?
Mr. Vann. I am aware that they did have differences of opinion
on how the cadre program should be run, sir.
Senator Symington. What were the dift'erences?
Mr. Vann. The differences were a matter of the degree of control
that the CIA should exercise versus the degree and the type of con-
trol the Government of Vietnam should exercise.
329
Senator Symington. Did you know that when the Ambassador
sent representatives down there that they came back and agreed with
Mr. Chau about some of these differences?
Mr. Vann. I am aware, sir, that two Foreign Service officers did go
to Vung Tau at Deputy Ambassador Porter's request.
Senator Symington. Ambassador Porter, not Ambassador Bunker.
Mr. Vann. When they came back they gave him a report on it.
They did not give me the report.
Senator Symington. You don't know how the}^ felt about it?
Mr. Vann. I gatliered from comments made afterward, I never saw
their report, that they were sympathetic to Colonel Chau.
Senator Symington. And did you talk with them?
Mr. Vann. I have talked with the two officers involved on a con-
tinuing basis for the last 4 years, sh.
Senator Symington. Do you know [deleted].
Mr. Vann. Quite well, sir.
Senator Symington. What did he tell you about this?
Mr. Vann. Sir, we discussed this on numerous occasions, and
Senator Symington. Pick the occasion that you think is most
pertinent to my question.
Mr. Vann. It would be very difficult for me, 4 years past, to
remember any exact date. But we remembered that Colonel Chau
had some points in his favor. We also agreed that Colonel Chau is a
prima donna, that he is a very ambitious man, that he had political
objectives in mind in wanting to dominate this program, and that he
also was extremely concerned about his own personal image as a
possible employee of the CIA. This concerned his personal ideals and
standards, and he became more concerned about it than his immediate
superior. General Thang.
Senator Symington. What did he say to you that you thought had
merit in it?
Mr. Vann. Colonel Chau?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Vann. I agreed with him that it ^\■ould be preferable, given
the expansion of the program and the rather deep involvement it
would have with all phases of Vietnamese life, for it to be under the
sponsorship of another agenc3^
desirability of improvement in CIA
Senator Symington. So even though he was very ambitious, and I
say with great respect that I heard the same about you when I was
out there, you do agree, and I think both of you were probably right,
there could be some improvements in the Agency.
Mr. Vann. Not in the Agency, sir, but it is a fact that the Vietnamese
tend to regard anything in connection with the CIA as ha^dng some
spy thriller type of acti\'ity associated A\-ith it.
Senator Symington. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Vann. I agree that the Vietnamese feel that way, sir. I do not
agree that that is true, because all of my knowledge of the CIA
involvement on the revolutionary cadre development program was
that it is overt and aboveboard.
44-706—70 22
330
Senator Symington. Then the stories I have heard of jour being
heavily critical of the CIA have no basis in fact.
Mr. Vann. I would not say they have no basis, sir. I was heavily
critical of individual members in the CIA, and some of their manners
of operation. I was also very complimentary of some of the members,
such as Mr. [deleted] who I thought did a masterful job when I was
out there.
Senator Symington. Where is Mr. [deleted] today, do you know?
Mr. Vann. Yes, sir. He is assigned here in Washington.
Senator Symington. Where is Mr. [deleted]?
INIr. Vann. I do not know, sir.
Senator Symington. Mr. Colby, do you know, sir?
Mr. Colby. No, sir; I do not. I am not sm'e.
Senator Symington. Do either of them have anything to do with
Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. Mr. [deleted] does. Mr. [deleted], I am not sure.
Senator Symington. What does he have to do with it?
Mr. Colby. He is in, he is a staff officer in, CIA headquarters.
reason for U.S. LACK OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM
Senator Symington. I would ask you this question, Mr. Colby, and
I would like the record to show again that I never met anybody who
seemed to know more about what he was doing than you. Why do
you think it is, with 800,000 Americans, and I count the fleet, people
in Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines, why do you think it is when
we have that number of people, backed up by this great miUtary-
industrial complex, that we have had so little success out there in what
we are trying to do?
Mr. Colby. This you asked me to submit a reply for the record, sir.
I have written out something and I would be glad to expand on it a
little bit.
Senator Symington. Go ahead.
Mr. Colby. My comment was that during the period 1965 to 1968,
Communist military strength in Vietnam was at a high level. Its
regular troops rested upon active guerrilla forces and a politically
organized base. The Communist regular forces were set back by U.S.
regular forces.
The Vietnamese Government, with U.S. support, then strengthened
its Regional and Popular Forces, the People's Self-Defense, Phoenix,
and police operations, and developed a more actively engaged
population.
By 1970 the nature of the war has thus changed. What was formerly
a Communist war conducted on three levels became a Government-
led people's war facing an increasingly North Vietnamese military
force.
The territorial forces, the police, and the People's Self-Defense make
the enemy militaiy forces much less effective since they preempt the
caches, the recruits, and the information.
Under these circumstances the enemy regular military force becomes
less difficult to handle than the earlier combined guerrilla and regular
enemy forces and infrastructure.
331
A weaker enemy thus faces a GVN which is stronger in the political
as well as in the military field. This process has already begun in the
delta where smaller total military forces are handling a situation
which formerly required the assistance of regular U.S. forces.
Now, that is just a portion of the delta that I am talking about.
Senator Symington. As I understand you say the reason we haven't
been successful out there is because the North Vietnamese and the
Vietcong regulars and guerrillas have increased their strength to meet
our competition; is that right?
Mr. Colby. No, sir. The answer was, how can the Vietnamese be
expected to assume what these 800,000 Americans have done.
Senator Symington. I didn't ask you that. At this time I asked you
why it was, with 800,000 people, backed up by $80 million a day at
one point and over $100 billion all told, we have been so unsuccessful
in whatever it is we are trying to do out there.
Mr. Colby. I think, Senator, the thing is that, unfortunately, as
has happened in pre^^ous wars, we have learned about the tactics and
technique of this war in the course of fighting it, and that we have had
a very bad few years in the course of that.
Senator Symington. You don't think that if we had unshackled
the Army, let them counterattack into Cambodia and North Vietnam
and Laos, and if we had let the air operate as it always had before in
any wars we have been in, and if we had let the Navy operate on the
same basis, we could have cleaned this matter up pretty rapidly?
Mr. Colby. No, sir, I think the nature of this war requires the active
engagement of the ])opulation, the creation of a population which is
really fully involved in the war. I think we have finally learned this
lesson and we are beginning to ap])ly this lesson.
Senator Symixgtox. Thus, even though we put these 800,000
people and all this monc}^ and ecpiipment into the war, the very fact
we went at it the wrong way is the chief reason for lack of success;
is that your opinion?
Mr. Colby, i think it had a lot to do with it. It is not the sole
reason.
prospects for vietnamization in next few years
Senator Symington. Nevertheless you feel that because South Viet-
namese now know how to do it, with the i)roper equipment, Vietnami-
zation will increase over the period of the next few years; is that
correct?
Mr. Colby. Over a period, yes. Senator. I think that having learned
the techniques and having begun to apply them, and with a program
which will carry it further it will succeed. A lot of these techniques
are in their infancy; the Phoenix program is just beginning to be
eft'ective and there are a lot of other problems in the country. But
gradually these techniques will become accepted and become imple-
mentetl. The People's Self-Defense for instance is still very untrained,
[deleted].
Senator Symington. I see. But despite the arsenals in this country.
General Westmoreland's setup, and Admiral Sharp's setup, and the
Air Force, and 800,000 young Americans, the reason ihej did not win
332
was they didn't know how to fight the war right. They are learning
how to fight it right, and after they get out, it wih be won by the
Vietnamese if we give them the equipment; is that right?
Mr. Colby. Well, a lot of those things were necessary at one period,
Senator. The war would have been lost certainly without those young
men. There is no question about that. The war would certainly have
been lost by 1965 or 1966 unless our troops had entered it.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, may I carry a few questions along
that line?
Senator Symington. I would like to turn this over to Senator
Aiken, if I may, because I have to catch a plane and Senator Fulbright
said he would be back here in 10 minutes. I would be very glad to
yield to you.
Senator Case. Well, you are so gracious.
Senator Aiken. I have one question.
REGULARS NEEDED TO COPE WITH A GUERRILLA
How many regulars does it take to cope with a guerrilla?
Mr. Colby. If you are just talking about regulars. Senator, it is a
very sticky problem because there are over 10,000 hamlets in Vietnam,
any one of which can be attacked by a guerrilla. There are two possible
ways to protect them. One is to go out and hit the guerrilla with a
regular force, if you are lucky enough to find him. The other is to
develop self-defense capabilities for all those people, all those hamlets.
The only way to find the guerrillas is to do that.
Senator Aiken. I have two definite answers. I asked General
Westmoreland how many regulars it took to deal with a guerrilla and
he said 10. I asked Admiral Sharp, who was some distance away from
the scene, and he said, oh, four or five. It seems the further away you
are
Mr. Colby. I would rather answer the question by saying that a
guerrilla can be dealt with not only by regulars but also by guerrillas
and also by policemen. But it is not a thing you can handle effectively
by only regulars alone.
Senator Aiken. The method of making war even by guerrillas,
has changed.
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
Senator Aiken. So that a smaller force can
Mr. Colby. Can tie up
Senator Aiken. Can tie up or hold off a much larger force than
would have been possible 30, 35 years ago.
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
Senator Aiken. Go ahead, Senator Case.
NECESSITY OF POPULAR SUPPORT TO DEFEAT GUERRILLAS
Senator Case. I take it, along that line, that part of the answer is
also that you cannot ever defeat guerrillas unless the population is at
least with you.
Mr. Colby. I believe so.
Senator Case. On the other hand, the guerrilla cannot be effective
unless the poj)ulation is sympathetic to him.
333
Mr. Colby. Not necessarily sympathetic, Senator.
Senator Case. Apathetic — is not antigiierrilla.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Case. You are naturally taking into account now the
matter of bringing the population actively on the side of the South
Vietnamese regime.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO FIGHT WAR
Senator Case. Again, further along the lines of the questions that
Senator Symington was asking. There has been a suggestion that
what we did was our thing — the type of warfare, highly mechanized
and supported by air and helicopters, and sophisticated equipment,
communications and other things. It is argued, therefore, that our
effort to Vietnamize the war cannot succeed because we won't be able
to turn this kind of warfare effectively over to the Vietnamese; and
yet they have been corrupted in their tactics by seeing us and wanting
to copy us and being able to do the thing in the modern 20th century
way.
I wish you would talk about this because the question of the
success of the Vietnamese themselves in this kind of war seems to me
terribly important.
I was going to ask these younger officers, too, their general views
about this. Are they going to be able to operate helicopters, communi-
cations equipment, artillery, all the mechanisms that we have taught
them is necessary?
Mr. Colby. We have a system in the services of starting with the
junior member for an answer, Senator.
Senator Case. 1 wish you would sort of help me and get this in-
formation out as you think appropriate.
Mr. Colby. I think your questions are quite apt and I think we
ought to start with them, not have them just sa}^ their boss is right.
Senator Case. Well, all right.
Senator Aiken. Let us begin at the end of the line.
Mr. Colby. The question. Sergeant, is, do you think the Vietnamese
have been corrupted into believing they have to have very fancy
equipment that they will not be able to continue to use and maintain
and employ that we have spoiled them in a way in giving them this
equipment and that consequently the implication of the Senator's
question is we will have to continue to do it.
vSergeant W^allace. No, sir. I don't feel this way because the
PSDF were given M-l's.
Senator Case. What is that, sir?
Sergeant Wallace. The People's Self-Defense Force were given
M-l's carbines and Thompson machineguns. These are obsolete
weapons that we no longer use yet they are willing to learn and
seem to be fighting effectively with these weapons.
south VIETNAMESE ABILITY WITHOUT U.S. AIR AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
Senator Case. There is another side. I mean it isn't just what they
will be willing to use, but what they will be able to use. Will they
334
be able to carry on this fight without our providing air support and
logistical support, and all the rest?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir, I think they can.
Senator Case. Will they do it because they will supply air support
or
Sergeant Wallace. We have used air support very few times in
our area.
Senator Case. In j'our particular experience.
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. That is not the general situation. Would anybody
in the whole team talk about this air support? I had always understood
air is rather unportant.
Captain Geck. Throughout the IV Corps, some of the Vietnamese
are flying some of the helicopters themselves. I guess right now it is
about 10 percent. Ho%vever, the Vietnamese have quite a few pilots;
I would not know the exact number of how many are in Fort Walters
training at this time with helicopters. Our plan is to replace our pilots
with theirs.
The Vietnamese I have flown with, and I have gone on operations,
are very competent. They will fly into the same areas that the Ameri-
can pilots will, and give you the same sort of support.
On the maintenance side, wdiich I was just prompted to mentiouj
I am not exactly sure of what they have as a capability, but there is
training program for their people at a base in IV Corps near Can Tho.
Naturally, the people of the Popular and Regional Forces units I
work with, have been slightly spoiled by the M-16 rifles they are using
now and the heavy air support they now have. They could not do
without it.
In any combat situation, once you have this asset, to do without
it is a hindrance. However, in my area, they have all had their own
artillery. I would say it has been my experience that they have 50
percent or more of their own air support and have been flying heli-
copters, so that I see there is a good chance for us to pull out in the
future.
Senator Case. And you. Captain?
Captain Murphy, t would like to attack this question from the
standpoint of comparing what they do have, Senator, to what they
don't have, where I am in Long An Province.
First of all, as you mentioned, they do have modern individual
weapons, the M-16 rifle or the M-60 machinegun, the M-79 grenade
launcher. They can utilize these weapons effectively against the enemy.
They have modern transportation and communications equipment.
They have the same radios and the same vehicles that we have in the
U.S. Army. They perform 100 percent their own maintenance.
Senator Case. They do?
Captain Murphy. On the equipment which they have, yes, they
do, sir.
Senator Case. All this?
Captain Murphy. There is one platoon or two tubes of Vietnamese
artillery operated by the 25th ARVN Division located in each of our
seven districts. They have support capabilities throughout that
district.
335
Other indirect fire weapons that they have are mortars, the same
mortars that we have in the U.S. Ai*my. What they don't have in
Long An Province are hehcopter gunships. However, training programs
are underway whereby we train hehcopter pilots, and eventually they
will be able to perform and operate in their own helicopter assault
companies and fly the gunship support as well.
ENDURANCE AND MOTIVATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE
Really, Senator, it is not very difficult to be an infantry soldier. It
takes commonsense and an aggressive attitude. Certainly, the Viet-
namese have all these capabilities. The one thing they do not have,
which we have, is a little more endm^ance. The Vietnamese people, by
and large, do not have the endurance capability that the U.S. soldier
has.
Senator Case. You mean physical stamina?
Captain Murphy. Physical.
Senator Case. That is interesting.
Captain Murphy. But they do have something we don't have,.
Senator, and that is the motivation brought about by the role that
they are performing in the defense of their own homes and ^'illages.
Senator Case. Well, you know, I will come back to you, if I may,
but you had something you wanted to say about that.
CAPABILITIES OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE
Major Arthur. It has been my observation that the Vietnamese
people, as a nation, or as a race, are quite clever mechanically. They
are able to take engines apart and put them back together again. You
can see a man taking his motorcycle apart and repairing it on any
street corner in Saigon or Binh Chanh. They are quite adept and can
handle communications very well. That is one of their fortes.
The artillery that I have observed is good, and they i)ro\'ide all the
artillery fire support in Binh Chanh.
The counterparts that I have operated with on combat missions are
capable of handling air mobile operations. The}' would be capable of
handling and controlling light fire teams, which are two helicopter
gunships when we are in contact, if those gunships were flown by
Vietnamese. I stand beside the captain or the colonel — whoever hap-
pens to be there. He tells me what he wants done in English, as broken
as it is. If it is the captam, with the little Vietnamese that I speak and
the interpreter we get the point across. I tell the pilots of the heli-
copters where we want them to hit, and they engage that area.
When the Vietnamese are trained to fly the helicopters, and the Viet-
namese commander on the ground can talk to the Vietnamese heli-
copter pilot in the air in Vietnamese, they will be able to handle their
own air support. There is a language problem now.
The}^ can also handle the medical evacuation helicopter if they were
talking to a Vietnamese pilot for the}' know the procedures, et cetera.
We speak of the modern weapons we have given them. Well, the
people on the other side are carrying AK-47's made in Red Cliina or
Russia. The}^ are modern weapons also. I feel the South Vietnamese in
336
my area have progressed and are capable of assuming their own de-
fense. They provide 100 percent of the maintenance of the equipment
in my area, also maintaining the jeeps that I have.
I hope I have been able to answer some of your questions, sir.
Senator Case. Thank you. You have, indeed.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE MOTIVATION AND AGGRESSIVENESS
Now, I would like to come back to the point you were making when
you w^ere last talking together, because it is what you said that sounds
so different from what so many people have said and written: that
the one thing that the Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, have not had is
motivation or morale or aggressiveness, another one of your words,
but rather the reverse of all those attributes, and this was the trouble,
that they wouldn't go out to fight, and they wouldn't move in to fill
gaps that we perhaps have had to leave occasionally. I wish you
would develop this a little bit more because this is almost the heart of
the point, it seems to me; isn't it?
Mr. Colby. Yes, it is.
Senator Case. Is you experience unique?
Captain Murphy. I don't believe it is unique, Senator. It is a ques-
tion of what causes this motivation or this aggressiveness to evolve.
I think it is partially because of the weapons, the equipment that they
have now. But more than anything else, sir, I think it is a result of the
individual soldier, the individual platoon leader, and the individual
company commander seeing the progress that his unit has helped to
bring about in the rural hamlets and villages.
That is, I tliink, one of the greatest factors which has contributed
to it.
Senator Case. I am sure it is, and what we are interested in is
whether it really happened, or whether it happened in a real area or
whatnot.
Captain AIurphy. I assure you it has.
Senator Case. I remember when I was over there before, up in
I Corps, one of the most important things about these mixed teams
that I guess you said, didn't you, you were involved in one of these
mixed patrols, or whatever you called them
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, six-, combined action platoon.
Senator Case. The boys did all right so long as you were with
them. And, seriously, that is a fact. I was not surprised at it or critical.
But if you weren't with them, then what happened to them?
result of U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VILLAGE OR HAMLET
I would like to ask all three of you what has happened when our
teams have moved out of a village or a hamlet, or whatnot, and left
it to the Vietnamese.
Captain Geck. Sir, if I maj^ make a comment here, this is some-
thing I tried to point out in my opening statement, after we moved
out of villages (I cited one particular village, and we have worked
quite a few) in very few cases do the units seem to return to their
old level. >
337
In most cases, I thiiik the word is confidence. It has begun to work
well. They can see they have the ability and are successful against
the enemy. They continue to operate this way. They are no longer
afraid of the enemy. He is no longer this giant who used to scare them.
Because of Tet, 1968, he is now a real individual they have met and
defeated. Also, something I have seen on the village level in both the
civilian and the military side is a confidence in, if not a stable Govern-
ment, at least a stable system developing in Vietnam, something they
can count on for the future.
On the civilian side, you can see it in rural areas not very far,
perhaps 5 kilometers from a large Vietcong base area. They are
putting up a large building. People are contributing quite an invest-
ment to the villages they live in. The Vietnamese are sensible in the
usage of their money as we are. They are not going to waste millions
of piasters in some'^cases or take a chance that these buildings that
they are erecting will be destroyed in the near future.
they have confidence that the village Avill continue to gi-ow. I
think this is the whole trick both in the military and inside the
Government.
MOTIVATION OF REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES
Major Arthur. I wanted to bring up a point about their motiva-
tion, because I am talking about the Kegional Forces and Popular
Forces as opj^osed to the ARVN. I am at the Province level. I have
17 Regional Force comi)auies and 25 Popular Force platoons in the
district.
The motivation of our troops is up over previous reports that you
might have heard. Primarily these are home troops. The Popular Forces
are" working in the district they were recruited in, and the Regional
Forces are working in the Province they were recruited in. This, to me,
is part of the drive to get good Regional Forces and Popular Forces
and upgrade them to handle the territorial security and protect their
homes in this area.
This is where the motivation comes in.
SKEPTICISM IS PRODUCT OF PAST EXPERIENCE
Senator Case. You will forgive us if we are skeptical about these
things because we have had this kind of a report 5, 6, 7 years.
Major Arthur. Yes, sir, I understand.
Senator Case. People like you have not wanted to be oflFensive to
your counterparts or make a bad record of your own accomplishments,
so you come up only with the good side, and I am not saying that
an}^ of you are doing this now. What I am saying is that you have to be
understanding with us when we have had to listen to this kind of thing
from McNamara. We have McNamara coming back and saying the
boys are going to be out of the trenches by Christmas, you will
remember, 5 or 6 years ago, and not only that, but right down the line.
Major Arthur. Sir, I didn't say it was 100 percent either. There is
an improvement, and there is room for improvement still.
338
IS REASONABLE END IN SIGHT?
Senator Case. What we are trying to get at is, must this still be
looked at as an endless thing, or is there an end in sight and is it
reasonable?
Major Arthur. Yes, sir, I think it is reasonable to assume that
mth things going the way they are going now, there is an end in sight.
I cannot realh^ put a timetable on it. It is beyond m}^ capability.
CAP PROGRAM IN HAMLETS
Sergeant Wallace. Senator, I would like to mention that the
primary purpose of the CAP program is to move into that hamlet,
provide security for the people. The hamlets are being trained and
protected b}^ the CAP's. There are 450 hamlets which presently are
protected by CAP teams; there are 350 hamlets in which the CAP's
operated previously. In all there are 800 hamlets which have been
provided security by the CAP program.
One hundred and fourteen platoons are now being trained by the
CAP's; 90 platoons were previously trained by CAP's. This is a total
of 204 platoons in 204 hamlets. Not one of these hamlets where the 90
platoons which we trained are located has been turned over to the
Vietcong nor have the Vietcong been able to move in and take over
the hamlets.
The Chairman. Is that one district or everywhere?
Sergeant Wallace. This is the entu-e CAP program.
Mr. Vann. Senator Case, could I add just one tiling?
Senator Case. Yes.
IMPROVEMENT IN RF AND PF PERFORMANCE
Mr. Vann. We are very much aware of the skepticism and feel that
there certainly has been adequate justification for it. And yet there are
some others who have looked at it over the long haul and are in a
position to compare realistically what existed today and what existed
a year ago, or 3 or 5 years ago.
These officers have been talking about RF and PF, the Regional
Forces, and Popular Forces.
We always are aware of the fact that no statistic in time of war is
accurate. To some extent they are all spurious. But let us look at the
very broad picture of how Regional Forces and Popular Forces per-
formed in the past and how they are performing now. In 1966 the
Regional Forces and Popular Forces, numbering less than 300,000, lost
as many men and as many weapons as they killed and as they captured.
In 1969, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces killed three times
as many enemy as they suffered losses themselves, and more than four
times as many weapons were captured as they lost. This involved
475,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces.
Now, su*, there are many other measures of effectiveness. Neverthe-
less, this is one that in the final analysis means how people are per-
forming in combat. There is a very substantial improvement. It is
attributable to many, many things, not the least of which is certainly
a much less hostile environment as far as the population is concerned
than they previously had.
339
Senator Case. Thank you, sii .
Mr. Ambassador, do you have anything you want to contribute?
SATISFACTORY OUTCOME CAN BE ACHIEVED
Mr. Colby. On this point, Senator, I refer back to my opening
-statement where I rather carefully say that we are not optimistic nor
pessimistic about this situation, but I do believe that a satisfactory
outcome can be achieved.
I can think of setbacks which will occur and I can think of situations
which could arise which could reverse the current trends.
I think it is important, after the experience that you referred to of
the disappointments of the past, that we be very serious about this.
It also depends in great part upon the determination of the Vietnamese
and of the Americans who are there — the determination to continue
this program of increasingly developing the ability of the Vietnamese to
carry this load themselves.
Therefore, we are trjdng not to exude optimism in our report to j^ou
here. I speak for myself certainly and I am sure for the other officers
here. But we are also convinced that this is not a thing that the
American people can feel is just sort of a hopeless thing that goes on
forever. It is one that can be achieved.
I think you make a very valid point, can the Vietnamese expect to
•carry on the same standard of effort that they have with our rather
fancy equipment. The answer is "No." But I also think that the Viet-
namese are developing the ability to fight this kind of a war that we are
faced with now with greater effectiveness, that this can make a sub-
stantial difference in the balance between them, and that conse-
quently an outcome which gives them a free choice for the future can
be achieved.
Senator Case. Thank you, sir, very much.
Captain, may I just ask you a couple of questions.
POPULAR FORCES OPERATIONS WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT
You said in your statement that you went with the Popular Forces
on their operations, gave them advice where it was necessary, and
provided liaison with supporting units. Those were your words.
You are referring to U.S. support units there, are you not?
Captain Geck. Yes, Senator. I am referring basically to helicopter
gunships in that case.
Senator Case. That is the chief kind of support?
Captain Geck. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Case. Do the Popular Forces continue to conduct Hght
operations after our advisory teams have moved on to other villages?
Captain Geck. Yes, Senator, very much so. In fact, those particular
Popular Forces that I am speaking of in that paragraph, have been
increased. Their numbers have been increased since I left. Their
operations now go further out than they ever went before, further
than they ever went with us. I think in some cases they were afraid
to take us out to some places, because they were afraid one of us would
be hurt.
Senator Case. You obviously believe what you are saying.
340
Captain Geck. Yes, sir, Senator. I am very impressed mth the
people I am working with.
Senator Case. I don't mean anything else except you have around
this table for the most part people who want to be persuaded, but also
people who have been disappointed so many times.
Captain Geck. Senator, I think, as the Ambassador said, I am
probably optimistic. But, at the same time, I can see there might be
setbacks. However, in the cases I have worked with, these people
have learned quickly and responded well, and continued to do so
after we left.
SUPERIORITY OF KIEN GIANG PROVINCE
Mr. Vann. I might say, sir. Captain Geck is working in a province
that has an unusually good province chief and one in which the amount
of progress made in the last year surpasses that of nearly any other
place I know of in Vietnam. So his assessment would naturally be more
positive than, say, someone working in Kien Hoa Province.
Kien Hoa Province, incidentally, is about the worst pro\ance in
our delta, and is the one that Mr. Robert Shaplen picked to ^mte
about in his article.
Senator Case. I figure it is not going to come up spontaneously
from the Defense Department or Department of State, and he had
better do that job. But I am glad to have that comment; it is im-
portant.
SELECTION OF CAP SQUAD LEADERS
Sergeant, how are the CAP squad leaders chosen?
Sergeant Wallace. Sir, once we report to staging, they will issue
orders to Vietnam, and I was assigned from the States to the CAP
program. We are screened by a board and issued orders.
TRAINING OF CAP MARINES
Senator Case. What special training do they get?
Sergeant Wallace. Sir, all CAP marines go to 2 weeks of school in
Danang.
Senator Case. Danang?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. What about the marines under your command,
what do they get?
Sergeant Wallace. The same schooling.
Senator Case. The same kind?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes.
Senator Case. Senator, wouldn't you like to ask a question or
two? I might want to come back before we get through, but please
go ahead.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
I have a few questions, which I will direct to Ambassador Colby.
IDENTIFICATION OF VC BY PHOENIX PROGRAM
In connection with the Phoenix program, how do you identify the
people whom you feel are active in the infrastructure? Perhaps
Colonel Vann would want to answer that?
341
Mr. Colby. I can start off. This an intelligence problem initially.
You develop card records on people in the area.
You know that the infrastructure in a certain province, in a certain
district, probably has a certain structure. It has a chairman; it has a
security man; it has a finance economy man; it has a liaison, and so
forth. It has different bodies. So you know there is somebody taking
care of those problems on the infrastructure side.
Then, through interrogation of ralliers — people who come over
from the other side — through interrogations of prisoners, through
some informants, through reports of neighbors and people of that
nature, you gradually build up a picture of who these people are.
Now, initially a number of these reports may be just a single alias,
a report that a certain job is filled hj a man named Thanh or who
calls himself Thanh. Then through the gathering of additional in-
formation, you find out that this man's name is really Nuygen Van
Thanh or something, and that he was born in a certain section and
place.
Senator Pell. Do any Vietnamese citizens have access to these
card filing systems?
Mr. Colby. This is a Vietnamese card system, not American. The
American helps the Vietnamese to set it up. The Vietnamese handle it.
Senator Pell. Is it a Vietnamese source for most of the intelli-
gence going into it?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
PURPOSE OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Pell. The statement has been made, which has concerned
me, that one of the purposes of the Phoenix program or one of the
results of it certainly is the elimination of the hard core of those who
oppose the Thieu-Ky regime.
What is your reaction to that statement or allegation?
Mr. Colby. I think if you can go to the different areas where this
program is in process you can see that the real thrust ol it is to identify
members of the Vietcong. That is what the problem is in a local area.
These are the people who are the problem — with grenades and with
contacts with the guerrillas, and so forth.
So that from the national level down to the bottom level, the whole
thing is aimed at the Vietcong infrastructure and the Vietcong ap-
paratus and terrorism.
It is possible, occasionally, that the wrong information on a man
is reported, such as that he is in the infrastructure or that he holds a
certain office in the Vietcong apparatus. Second, there may be a
shakedown kind of thing: "I will report you unless you pay me." And,
of course, you can go and say that a political jealousy in a local area
could produce a wrongful report.
This is certainly possible, and I think that the National Assembly,
in calling the Government to an interrogation on this, about 3 or 4
months ago, was conscious of this problem. They are following it.
They are concerned about it.
I certainly would not say it has never happened, but I think the
thrust of the program, the command em])hasis given to it, the inspec-
tions, and the general emphasis is pretty clearly that these are members
of the enemy apparatus. This is not just a little political discussion.
342
Unfortunately, the word "political" sometimes is difficult to trans-
late. We call the Vietcong a political apparatus and that sounds like
a political party over here.
VIETNAMESE AND AMERICANS IN PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Pell. Ai^e the people in the Phoenix program entirely
Vietnamese or are they mixed Vietnamese and Americans?
Mr. Colby. The Vietnamese. The Phoenix program is basically a
Vietnamese program. There are American advisers in it. This is a
Vietnamese structure which has information centers and operation
centers at the district, province, and national level. These are all
Vietnamese officials.
They will have an American sitting in the office with them.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN G-2 AND PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Pell. What is the relationship between our own intelligence
organization, G-2, and the Phoenix program?
]Mr. Colby. They are not technically a part of it. The Phoenix
program is a Vietnamese program. In other words, if there is an
American unit in the neighborhood, a brigade or something, our G-2
of that brigade would not be a member of the local Phoenix committee.
He would have liaison, but he would not be a member.
Senator Pell. I don't mean to take so much of your time, but I
must be phrasing my questions poorly. ...
Does any member of G-2 ever feed in information to the Phoenix
program — to the Vietnamese?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Pell. And vice versa?
ISIr. Colby. We have access to most of the Vietnamese intelligence —
I believe all of it — on this question.
NUMBER of AMERICANS INVOLVED IN PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Pell. How many Americans are involved in the Phoenix
program?
Mr. Colby. 450 Americans, almost all military being direct advisers.
There are many other Americans who are associated with the organ-
izations that work with the Phoenix: in the Phoenix program, the
police, the military, and so forth.
NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN PHOENIX PROGRAM
Senator Pell. How rasnij Vietnamese, roughly, to the nearest
thousand, are involved?
Mr. Colby. It is a hard question; it includes the Vietnamese
special branch, the entire thing. The ordinary police participate in
it on a part-time basis.
Senator Pell. How many have it as their main responsibility?
Mr. Colby. There would be roughly between 4,000 or 5,000 working
directly on it. But, as I say, there are literally tens of thousands more
who spend part time on it.
343
NERVE CENTER ON WHICH PHOENIX PROGRAM FOCUSES
Senator Pell. This question I would direct more to Colonel Vann,
if I might. I must say I have heard the most complimentary things
about you, Ambassador Colby, and you, Colonel Vann, with respect
to what you have done and the way you do it in Vietnam.
You said that part of the purpose or the purpose of the Phoenix
program was to go to the nerve center. Don't we still believe the
nerve center to be in Hanoi or do we believe the nerve center to be
in South Vietnam?
Mr. Vann. Sir, the organization that we are focusing this program
against is the South Vietnamese political infrastructure that supports
COSVN, the Central Office of South Vietnam. That would be the
regional political structure, provincial political structure, district and
village, and even down to hamlet.
The lower the level, the more indistinct it becomes, so that at the
hamlet level the Vietcong hamlet chief may also be the leader of the
local Vietcong squad.
The higher the level the more sophisticated the organization
becomes. You ^^-ill have a separate man to do liaison, another to do
tax and finance and economy, another to do women's organizations,
et cetera. It also ties in directly at all levels \\ath the military units
that they command. In other words, an infrastructure chief at any
level has at his beck and call a supporting unit; at the hamlet level
it is a squad, at the village level it is a platoon, and at the district
level it is usually a company.
Senator Pell. I would like to go up a little higher still. Isn't the
nerve center for this operation in North Vietnam? Presumably the
reason for our commitment in Vietnam is that the nerve center is
in North Vietnam. If what you are saying is correct, we shouldn't
have a single American soldier there.
Mr. Vann. COSVN, in turn, operates directly under Hanoi, sir.
Mr. Colby. Excuse me, I think if I may. Senator, the Lao Dong
Party, the central committee of the Lao Dong Party, is the nerve
center.
Senator Pell. For South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. For the Communist effort of all Vietnamese. There is
a separate party called the People's Revolutionary Party, which is the
southern branch of the Lao Dong Party. It has a central committee
and a whole structure.
As you go down, I think we really mean the nervous system rather
than nerve center. The party and its apparatus is the nervous system
of the enemy force. It calls upon the muscles of the guerrillas and the
main forces and all the rest. But it is the nervous system that runs this.
As you correctly say, the head of it is in Hanoi, but the nervous
systeru goes throughout the country through this apparatus. We are
engaged in cutting off the apparatus at various places so that the
force which is conducting this war is unable to operate.
344
PHOENIX program's EFFORTS CONCERNING ENEMY LEADERSHIP
Senator Pell. When a man gets sufficiently high up, one is pretty
sure he won't rally spontaneously and he has such a security setup
that he will not be able to be taken prisoner. Then will not an effort
be made to assassinate him?
Mr. Colby. Not to assassinate him in that sense. If you had clear
knowledge that the province committee is at a certain place, you
might well organize a very large operation of several companies or
battalions to go in and clean that area out.
Senator Pell. We don't have the same situation we have with the
Mafia in any part of this country where the poor soldiers, like the
numbers people, get taken in all the time, but not the fellows at the
top of the family. What do they call the family leaders, the dons?
Mr. Colby. The Capo.
Senator Pell. No, the Capo are soldiers. W^e know who the top
people are in this regard, but we do not go after them.
Mr. Colby. No, we go after anybody that we can get. But most of
the higher leadership is either in Cambodia or in a fairly secure base
area way out in the jungles.
Mr. Vann. Could I add one other thing to my answer?
Senator Pell. Yes.
Air. Vann. I am not aware of any successful or even any attempted
assassination of such a leader of the type that you talk about. In my
time in Vietnam I am not aware of our ever having done that, ever
trying it, or ever having been successful.
Senator Pell. I think, as a general rule of international relations,
there is a policy of no government-supported assassinations. Other-
wise many more of our chiefs of state and heads of government
would be assassinated, which is not the case. It is not done.
Mr. Colby, It is just not very feasible, either, in this kind of a
case.
wSenator Pell. Certainly around the world it would be done much
more frequently than it is. There is in your former agency, as you
know, a general agreement that you don't do it. You don't assassinate
chiefs of government as a result of government action. It never
happens in history. Do you know of an exception, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. I do not know.
Senator Pell. It is a fact because then it opens up the other way.
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
Going back to the rights of individuals, and this is what has bothered
me particularly in Vietnam, what happens to prisoners when they
are taken? Do we turn them over to the South Vietnamese and then
they are rather cruelly interrogated, which we accept? Is there any
way this practice can be discouraged more, or not?
Mr. Colby. Those people taken with arms in their hands are
handled as prisoners of war whether they are from North Vietnam or
from South Vietnam.
If the United States captures them, \\e turn them over to the
Vietnamese to be handled. We have advisers with the prison system,
Avith the POW system, and so forth.
345
I referred to our directive about the Phoenix thing. If anything
happens that does not fit the rules of war, our people are supposed to
object.
The major was telling about a case in his district where he made a
point of this. He objected strenuously, and it has not happened since.
This was in the record a little while ago.
In our instructions, in our training of the Vietnamese, we empha-
sized good systems of interrogation. Now, occasionally, people do get
a little loose, I am sure, but our thrust is in this direction, and I think
the Vietnamese are increasingly accepting that this is what we expect
about how to behave.
Now, I would add that the International Red Cross Committee
does inspect the Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camps. It regularly looks
them over and checks on them.
Senator Pell. The problem, as you know, is the same in Greece.
It is not when you get to prison, but the process when you are taken
and if you are lucky enough to be sent to jail. This is the question.
Mr. Vann. Let me add there, sir, that an American unit which
captures a Vietnamese prisoner cannot just turn him over to any
Vietnamese. They can only turn him over to that level of the Govern-
ment of Vietnam that has an official detention center. That is usually
the province level.
Senator Pell. I see. Thank you.
BETTER MOTIVATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
I would be interested in the assessment of any of you. I don't
think you covered it quite in the way I wanted it. How do you account
for the better motivation of the North Vietnamese, in general, as a
country, as opposed to that of South Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. Some of the Vietnamese discuss this in some degree.
They wonder why it is that the North Vietnamese ethnic minority
within South Vietnam has so man}^ of the important jobs.
There is a certain characteristic energy and toughness, and so
forth. The southerner spilled out onto that rich delta a few genera-
tions ago. He is less organized in the sense that the northerner has
been living in tight little ^^llage communities, and has developed a
rather strong discipline and self discipliue.
These, like most ethnic differences, are not 100 percent by any
means. But there is a difference in the characteristics of a North
Vietnamese and a South Vietnamese.
Senator Pell. More vital.
Mr. Colby. More discipline, more drive in most cases; not always
by any means.
Senator Pell. Like Italy.
Mr. Colby. This creates a certain amount of trouble in the political
scene in Saigon.
Senator Case. You know — off the record.
(Whereupon, there was a short discussion off the record.)
44 706 — 70 23
346
BLACK AMERICANS IN VIETNAM
Senator Pell. Is there any inhibition on the use of black Americans
in the Phoenix operation? Do the black American soldiers offer any
problems in dealing Avith the Vietnamese? I noticed the people the
Department sends up here are always all white. What is the reason for
that?
Mr. Colby. We have one province senior adviser who is black, a
U.S. colonel. We have a deputy province senior adviser who is a black
U.S. colonel. In your province, Captain Murphy, you have a black
district senior adviser.
Captain Murphy. Yes.
Senator Pell. How about in uniform? Do any of you have a black
commanding officer?
Major Arthur. Yes, sir, a full colonel. He is a deputy senior
adviser.
Mr. Colby. He was the one I was referring to.
Major Arthur. The senior adviser is a FSO-1, and the deputy is a
full colonel.
FRICTION BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM
Senator Pell. We hear reports about friction between black and
white. How true is that?
Major Arthur. I cannot say on that level. I have three black non-
commissioned officers on my team. We have no problem on our level
There are 14 of us.
Sergeant Wallace. No problems at all.
Captain Geck. None in my team. I have heard of very little
friction.
Senator Pell. How about you. Captain?
Captain Murphy. I was a commander of a U.S. unit, and I am
now in an advisory capacity. In neither capacity, while I was the
commander of that unit, or now, have I witnessed or heard of any
trouble of this nature. I just cannot think of a single incident.
Senator Pell. Either the press reports must have dealt with other
parts of the country or they were ill-advised.
Thank you. Those are all the questions.
Mr. Mills. I would just like to mention that we have had one
incident of racial unrest on our team. It was on a MAT team. There
were a cou])le of black fellows, and one white southerner who did not
get along. I feel that this was a matter of the leadership of the MAT
team. We transferred the officer who was a weak leader away from
there. Even though the two Negroes and the white who were involved
in this difficulty were kept at the same post, with a stronger leader in
charge there was no longer at least overt hostility.
They did their jobs together. They did not go out socially after
work was over. I think this is, ])erhaps, fairly typical of the situation
in other parts of the country. Where you have good leadershi]) which
does not tolerate antagonism based on anything other than non-
coo])eration or things of that nature, you do not have racial problems.
Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
347
PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS
The Chairman. \It. Ambassador, are you familiar with an article
about this subject by Georgie Aniie Geyer in the February 1970
True magazine? Do you know any such writer?
Senator Case. What magazine is that?
The Chairman. True magazine, T-r-u-e. Are you familiar with her?
]\Ir. Colby. She is a reporter, I believe, in Vietnam.
The Chairman. 1 thought perhaps you had met her. She apparently
was in Vietnam.
Mr. Colby. I might have met her, Mr. Chairman. I don't recall it.
The Chairman. She reports it as her own experiences in Vietnam,
and I think, for whatever it is worth, the article should be put in the
record.
(The article referred to follows:)
(True Magazine, February, 1970)
The CIA's Hired Killers
(By Georgie Anne Gejer)
As the war becomes more political and less military, targets shift from the
enemy's army to its civilian leadership. To get the job done, the U.S. has trained
an elite corps of assassins to eliminate the Viet Cong's "shadow government."
It was 3 o'clock one hot, dark Sunday morning in a small delta town near the
Vietnamese-Cambodian border. The tough, powerfully-built American we'll call
"Bill" — a paramilitary or guerrilla fighter for the Central Intelligence Agency
who had spent precious little of his career worrying about the "moral implications"
of his work — paced back and forth in the dingy front room of his house. His job,
like that of many Americans in South Viet Nam, was terror. And for the first time
in his life, this mission was bothering him. If he hadn't had eight or 10 or maj^be
15 drinks, perhaps he wouldn't have talked to ine about it. But he had, and he did.
"I've been doing this for 22 years all over the world," Bill said, sitting down and
hunching over his beer. He was very intense as he reeled off the places: Egypt
when Nasser was coming to power, the Congo when we were trying to get rid of
Tshombe — Bill's life story was a history of just about every place the United
States had intervened or tried covertly to intervene in the past two decades. "I
did it believing in it," he went on. Then he shook his head in perplexity. "But for
the first time, I feel I really don't understand a situation," he said. "When people
ask me, all I can say is * * * 'I don't know * * * I don't know * * * ' Hah!"
He pointed at me. "If you write a story and say you don't know and * * * " His
voice trailed off. There remained only the sinister silence of the tiny delta town.
"The dedication of these peoy^le is fantastic," he spoke up again. "The dedication
and the motivation. I wish I could understand it. You cai:)ture them and put a
pistol to their heads, and they say, 'Kill me.' They're so little. * * * " Bill had
shoulders like a football plaj^er — it was easy to picture the absurdity, even the
vulgarity, of his enormity next to the tiny-boned, miniature, frail Vietnamese.
"You take their necks in your hands * * * you can destroy them so easilJ^
But you can't just keep killing them. You can't ever kill them all. * * *"
Today a lot of Americans like Bill are beginning to have misgiving, as the
Viet Cong hangs doggedh^ on, about the increasing ruthlessness and cold-blooded-
ness in this already most sanguinary of wars. Many are also beginning to wonder
whether such methods reality "work" — or whether we don't destroy more than we
build in the process.
A few months ago, the mj-sterious arrest of eight Green Beret oflBcers for the
slaying of an alleged North Vietnamese double agent spotlighted some of the
"dark side of the moon" activities in which Americans are involved. Inside sources
reported at the time that Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of American
forces and a man of recognized integrity, was so personally enraged by many of
the "black intelligence" goings-on conducted by irregular outfits like the Green
Berets and the CIA that he personally ordered the arrests as a once-and-for-all
example.
348
"The Special Forces," he reportedly told subordinates, "are going to have to
show a higher regard for human life."
The CIA was careful to divorce itself from the Berets case, but man}^ other
equally brutal operations in which the Agency and other Americans are involved
are likewise coming into question. The recently disclosed massacre at Song My,
and the subsequent investigations, only served to underscore the point.
With the peace talks in Paris, the deemphasis of the military role in Viet Nam,
and the impending U.S. puUout, the political side of the war has been stepped up.
The struggle today is to control the peace — to be on top when the ceasefire finally
comes and the half-million Americans go home. The name of the game on both
sides is to get your people into places of power, to win the allegiance of the country-
side and its rice-roots leadership for the future, and, conversely, to get the enemy's
people out of corresponding positions.
The U.S. and the South Vietnamese are using various methods of doing this.
Among them are persuasion and propaganda, promises of political and economic
reform, goodwill missions and * * * the use of sheer animal terror.
At the heart of the latter phase of the campaign are Bill's troops, the little-
known Provincial Reconnaissance Units or PRU's (pronounced Prews). A
regionally-based, American-led, CIA-financed paramilitary force of 5,000 "\'iet-
namese, they were originally conceived of as a counterguerrilla organization
borrowing from Chairman Mao Tse-tung's principles of living and operating
among the peasantry' as the fish do in the sea.
They operated out of regional safe-houses or, even, Viet Cong-like, masqueraded
as peasants by day and fought as guerrillas at night. In the beginning, they
practiced all the arts of guerrilla warfare — the ambush, the night raid, the kid-
napping or the knifing in the night — and they also engaged in stand-up battles
in which they rapidly established themselves as tigerish fighters in an army where
most units resemble Snoopies looking baaefuUy over the garden fence at the cat
next door.
But of late the PRU emphasis has been on just one role of the guerrilla: to
murder, kidnap, terrorize or otherwise forcibly eliminate the civilian leadership
of the other side. Trained and directed by their American advisors, the PRU's
have set out to target and destroy what has come to be known popularly as the
"VCI" — the Viet Cong "infrastructure." These are the "shadow people" of the
VC, the complex of political cadres, tax collectors, party members, couriers and
others who do the base work which keeps the guerrillas and the main force units
going. They also serve as the de facto government in VC-held territory, and the
idea is to get as many of them out of the way as possible before a ceasefire turns
control of the country back to the Vietnamese.
Thus in one village, a VC tax collector will be assassinated in his bed in the
night. In another, "wanted" posters will be put up for a VC leader, offering a
reward to try to persuade his friends to turn him in. The PRU's may also drop
down from helicopters and terrorize whole villages, in the hope that they will be
frightened to deal with the VC in the future. Or they may bribe VC office holders
to "change sides, or kidnap (technically, the word is arrest) those who prove
unbribeable.
In 1968, according to Saigon government figures, approxmiately 15,400 of the
estimated 80,000 members of the infrastructure were "eliminated." Of these,
11,000 were captured, 2,220 killed and the rest rallied to the Saigon side.
In Go Cong province in 1968, the PRU's captured the very highest ^ C official —
the province chief. Acting on intelligence that he was hiding in a certain village,
they crept out on a small midnight raid and kidnaj^ped him from his bed. But not
all "captures" are so deliberate. In Kien Giang province, on a massive raid on a
village, one PRU suddenly noticed a Viet Cong trying to run away. The PRU
tackted the man and the two wrestled wildly for a few minutes until the PRU
stabl^ed and killed his opponent. The PRU's discovered only then that the dead
man had been the North A'ietnamese lieutenant in charge of all the movement of
materiel into the delta for the 1968 Tet offensive — the battle which changed the
■course of the war.
In Rach Gia, the South Vietnamese colonel complained to the PRU advisors
about mines on the road; so the PRU's laid an ambush that killed 40 VC who had
been laying the mines at night. In another village, a South Vietnamese woman was
sent with a 300 piastre (about $3) bribe to give to a YC guard to visit her husband
in a VC prison in Vinh Binh. Her husband passed her a message for the PPtU's
outlining the entire prison layout. The next morning the PRU's hit the prison,
liberating 28 shackled South Vietnamese.
349
The PRL types are not sentimental when one of their own turns double agent
When one group made such a discovery, it set up a field tribunal, condemned the
man to death, and beheaded him. Both the head and the bodv were Uolitdv
returned to the man's family for burial. ' P"" ei3
Indeed, the PRU.s are excellent torturers and employ beatings, electric wires
I the ears water suffocation, and anything else that seems effective, constantlv
and regularly.; Sometimes we have to kill one suspect to get another to talk " one
American advisor says cooiy. Another American advisor told me— and I have no
reason not to beheve him— that he ate supper with his PRU's on the hearts and
livers or their slam enemies.
The inission and the operation of the PRU's, of course, is still extremely hush-
V'^-fio. 1 !! ^^•^"•espondents know of their existence, but few have obtained anv
vermable details. U.S. high officialdom in Saigon talks about them oalv on rare
private occasions, and Washington doesn't acknowledge their mission at all!
bven the Berccs case didn't totalJv bring out the PRU's role
During r. recent tour of duty in ^■iet Nam, I asked, without much hope of ap-
proval to be allowed to go on a PRU mission. To mv surprise, permission was
grantea. it was not to be an assassination or kidnapping— 7^o correspondent would
ever be permitted to witness that— but a sudden-strike mission on a VC-held
yUlage. It seemed that the Americans wanted to show off a South \-ietnamese unit
thac was zealous, effective and full of fight, particularly at a time when the regular
\ i&cnamese army, the AR^ 1\ , was under severe criticism.
The American CIA chief with whom I dealt had trained guerrillas elsewhere
in Asia during World War II. Intelligent, handsome, a profc-ssional inlrrelS
warfare he was proud as punch of his PRU's. Like manv similar experts, he
b(;lieved that had the war been fought more on the counterguerrilla level in the
beginning, it would not have turned into such a mess. "Now we're fightin'- this
war the way it always should have been fought," he told me once
We started our mission by fi>-ing down to Rach Ciia, a ])icturesque little fishing
V illage on the South China Sea where the boats are gaily jxiinted with the all-seeini
J^ietnamese eyes that actually see so little. Its airport was a deserted road cut iS
half by an operating road, so that when a plane came in, trafl^c stoijped in both
directions. This morning, 160 PRU's— tough-looking, wirv, cockv, incrediblv
eager-arrived early in trucks. While they were waiting, thev sat on the runway
n~^ K for kicks— ducked to miss the wings as the planes roared in.
une boy ot 22, with a buoyancy I had never seen among the regular South
^n v>?'iS''' ^'''uF''\t'^''VI?^^.t^^''' '^"Sle most flabbergasting i^roposal I exer heard
'^.nJ T "fV 1"^?^."^^'^^' •''^" ^'^"^ ^""^ ^ '•l^^^"^^ ^" flo anvthing," he said,
and I want to fight. Here, there s opportunity. Vesterdav there wasn't room for
me in the chopper, and I was sad to l)e left behind. I like to go on American mis-
sions because the \ C like to kill Americans and then we get them. I like the Amer-
icans because they don t just advise you, they fight with vou." Then he got his
spectacular idea. "If there is a war in the United States, I would like to come and
ngnt with you, he added.
The two American "advisors" (really the leaders) of the PRU's were friendlv
and obviously competent. Twenty-nine-year-old Stanley Rodimon, of Iluntsville,
Alabama, had studied economics at the Universitv of Alal)ania. Small, darkl
haired, good-looking, he was proud of his job. "We're "just taking their guerrilla tac-
tics and turning them around and using them on them." he saidt "I've had no trou-
ble adjusting, rius IS just a job now. I'll either stay in the service or go back to
ITfcherl f'rJf't'i v^ '''"^^'", ^.'•'""' '^^' °( I^^P^'"'^^! Beach, Calif orniar had been
detached from the Navy Seals to serve with the PRU's. Blond, huskv, with a wrv
he"was doi'i™''''' "''''" '^' ""^ "" ^'°^ ""^"^ ''''''' 1'™"^ °f ^^^^ ^^■"'■'^
The object of our whirling onslaught by helicoi>ter was the small village of
Ba Ihe a group of houses strung out on both sides of one of the arrow-straight,
French-built canals that gridiron the .Mekong Delta. The PRU advisors had
special intelligence that several ranking \CJ had been hiding in the village The
inte hgence was carefully guarded. Only the adxisors and \he top Vietnamese
PRU leader knew where we were going. As we swirled down to it, the town's VC
sympatliies became obvious. A large white sign hung across the canal reading: "Be
sure and listen to wht^t Lncle says. Rise up and kill the Americans." This was
the same Uncle Ho Chi Minh who had also said, "I am not concerned with the
military successes of the government of Soutli \'iet Nam. I would onlv become
concerned when they and the U.S. began to destroy the VC political infrastruc-
350
Our choppers landed like a sinister flock of black crows coming to roost in
the swaying green rice fields, and the men jumped out swiftly into the waist-
deep water. Almost immediately, a small bare-shouldered man rose out of the
padd.y and pointed his gun at Rodimon. Rodimon killed him on the spot, and
the body slipped back beneath the unbiquitous water of the delta. "I was happy
when I got him," Rodimon exulted later.
Systematically the PRU's swept into and through the village — house by house,
bunker by bunker. From the air, the town had looked as empty of human life as
an Arizona ghost town, but one by one the PRU's nudged out young Vietnamese,
their wet, brown shoulders glistening in the sun.
Among those "killed or captured" — it was significant that the two were lumped
together — were the VCI they had sought. In all they had killed eight and captured
26 — in their terms, a successful daj-.
That evening, as we sat in one of the advisors' houses drinking beer, the two
men kept stressing, perhaps becavise such bloody methods were being questioned
on many levels, how careful they were in their work. "The men are verj- selective,"
Rodimon insisted. "They never hurt villagers. I personally checked the pagoda
in the town before we went. We're ver}- careful of religious things. We have a fund
to give money to people picked up by mistake. But the men never feel bad about
killing a VC.''
Were they certain that all the men they "got" were really VCI? Absolutely,
they said, the intelligence was that good.
Only at one point did Frank Flynn waver, reminding me a little of Bill's mis-
givings. "Sometimes," he said, very late in the evening, "I wonder. Are we really
doing anything for the people? Or is it just for ourselves?"
There are many more — both Americans and Vietnamese — who question and
question deeply the use of deliberate counterterror and assassination on "our
side." There are Americans who question not only its morality and effectiv'eness,
but also what it does to the Americans involved when they see brutality and
torture institutionalized in their military sj-stem. As one senior American officer
in Viet Nam put it, "There are no circumstances — none whatsoever— in which
murder is legal in the U.S. Army."
On one occasion, an American talked to me about the policy of shipping cap-
tured VCI to the remote Con Son island prison for the duration of the war. He
shook his head. "I ask myself," he said, "is that any different from the Gestapo?"
Another said, "We use the word 'neutralize' which is a horrible word. It means
kill or capture." Then he thought some more. "But on the other hand, if we're
going to fight this war, we should be effective. We have to fight it their way."
That was exactly how the PRU's originated and the whole counterterror phi-
losophy got started — through the idea of "fighting it their wa.v." In the absence
of an American or South Vietnamese ideology, it was said in the early days, why
not borrow the most workable tenets of the enemy's? "After aU, they stole the
atomic bomb secrets and all from us," a young American named Frank Scottoa
said one day. "Why should we be squeamish about stealing people's warfare
from them? It works better than anything we've come up with to match it, so
why not give it a try?"
Thus Scotton and a few other Americans, who were both USIS and CIA-
related, started a counterguerrilla movement in northern Quang Ngai province.
Their emulation of the Viet Cong went to such lengths that they even had "our
Vietnamese" learning the four general rules of Mao Tse-tung (respect the people,
help the people, protect the people, follow orders) .
Terror and assassination were included in tlieir bag of tricks. At one point,
USIS printed 50,000 leaflets showing sinister black eyes. These were left on
bodies after assassinations or even — "our terrorists" are playful — nailed to doors
to make people think they were marked for future efforts.
Even the American mandarinate's formidaljle representatix^e to Saigon in the,
early days. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, once acknowledged our new-
found toy with the words: "There is a brand-new type of fighting man — the ter-
rorist, who is just as distinct as the infantryman or the aviator, and he fights in
a war with no front, no rear and no flanks in which his 'base' is right among the
people."
The counterguerrilla idea quickly found supporters in all quarters. The Green
Berets, for instance, built their own private army of 40,000 mercenaries. Scotton's
movement evolved into something called the CT's or Counter- Terrorists. Finally,
351
the PRU's emerged in 1966. But whereas Scotton's original counterguerrillas
were both assassins in the night and goodwill organizers of the people, the PRU's
were almost exclusively assassins in the night. The ideological mission was taken
over by the Revolutionary Development and later the Phoenix progi'am.
From the beginning, it was no secret that the CIA sponsored, trained, paid
and led the PRU's. Or that they represented the specifically political CIA ap-
proach, as opposed to the military approach. From the beginning, the CIA
had seen the war more in political terms than did the generals. And the CIA cer-
tainly turned out to be more right than wrong.
But "our terror" was different from "their terror." To the Viet Cong, terror
was an indispensable weapon in the political and military war. They both pin-
pointed village chiefs, killing them brutally and precisely, and they used indis-
criminate terror, throwing bombs into marketplaces and killing the innocent.
Terror on "our side," on the other hand, was largely selective. Victims were
carefully targeted, generally bj^ the CIA in concert with South Vietnamese intel-
ligence. The major difference was there was no real political organization — no
political ideology — behind our terror. Their bo.vs did it for faith; our boys did it
for money.
From the beginning, the PRU's were the best killers in Viet Nam. When other
Vietnamese troops balked at going up Supersitition Mountain near the Cam-
bodian border, which they believed to be cursed and where the VC had been
dug in for years, it was the PRU's who cHmbed down into the sinuous caves.
Everywhere they fought like tigers. An estimated 30 percent were former VC
who had learned well how to fight and how to hate. Often they had become
ferociously embittered because a father or a brother or a relative was killed b^'
the VC.
"That man used to be a VC," one American officer said one daj-, pointing
to a PRU. "But they killed his family. He lit out for the bush. Spent two years
out there alone, conducting a private vendetta against Charlie. God knows how
many VC he killed. Finallv he came in and joined up with the PRU's. He wants
to kill more VC."
This fighting si)irit is encouraged at the camp at Vung Tau on the coast where
the PRU's are trained by CIA instructors in an intensive four-week course in
clandestine warfare. They learn how to sht throats in the dark, how to make the
silent capture, but get no political indoctrination. The training leads to a strong
sense of comradeship, and the PRU's are ferocious about protecting their Ameri-
can advisors. (In Kien Giang province, they worried about one 300-pound adviser
whom they would not be able to carry out if wounded.)
Their American leaders are CIA paramilitary, Navy Seals, Special Forces-
anybody the CIA could dig up who had a counterinsurgency background. And in
contrast to ARVN officers, the Americans generally treated the PRU's as equals.
They were even ])romoted according to merit, in sharp contrast to the ARVN
witli its aristocratic caste system. When I talked to the PRU's themselves, this
basic equality was the first thing every one stressed.
"I like the imit because very man's a fighting man," the Squad Leader Truong
Van Lan said. "We really don't have officers, like in the ARVN where everj^-
body's sitting in the office. The men are like brothers. We even call each other
'brother.' "
"We kill many VC," the deputy commander, Nguyen Ngoc Diep added. "We
give fame to our people."
Yet, how well are the PRU's actually doing in their assigned task of rooting
out the VC infrastructure? Are they actually as successful as Saigon makes them
out to be?
From the beginning, the problems of this assignment were enormous. Our
Soiith Vietnamese could understand shooting at a guerrilla who was shooting
at them. But a quiet little clerk they'd known from childhood who just hap-
pened to be directing the entire thing? "It's like trying to convince them to get
the Mafia leader instead of the guy in the New York subway with the switch-
blade," one American advisor put it.
Then there were the "accommodations," by which South Metnamese offi-
cials had, for years, made "deals" with their VC counterparts. A VC village chief
near Dalat once wrote an angry letter to his South Vietnamese counterpart and
demanded :
"What are j^ou trying to do? Why are you interviewing my relatives? Why are
you attacking me now?" It was hard for him to believe that his "friends" on the
"other side" could have turned against him.
352
The earh' figures of apprehended were impressive, but American officials now
admit that the victims were chiefly small fish in Mao's swarming waters: rice car-
riers, low-level VCI. Nor has that much meaningful intelligence actually been
gathered. And about 80 percent of those caught are eventually let go b}' their
South Vietnamese brothers.
Moreover, the VC appear able to regenerate cadres as fast as the Americans
knock them off. "I am constantly amazed at the tasks they level on these people,
that they don't just throw up their hands," one American says. But then, many of
the VCI are unquestionablj' the most energetic, aggressive, upward-mobile and
idealistic people in the country.
Many came out of the Viet Minh after it won the war against the French but
lost the South. About 10,000 Viet Minh stayed south after 19.54 and laid the
base for the future Viet Cong leadership. Still others "signed on" after the late
President Ngo Dinh Diem's infamous law 1059 by which any anti-Diem men,
whether they were communists, Confucianists or whatever, were purged and
often killed by the Diemists.
For these men, indoctrination by the VC was a real awakening. "Suddenly I
realized what life was all about," one related after he was captured by the
southerners. "We would sit around in a circle and the political cadres would talk
to us. The}^ never actually told us anything, they made it come out of us. How
many villagers had the Americans killed? they would ask. How many of your
women are sleeping with them? What are they doing to your comitry? Suddenly
everything became clear."
And todajr, in addition to their old roles of supply, i^olitical indoctrination and
tax collection, the VCI form the ostensibly-elected liberation committees — which
will constitute the new VC "government" in the South to fight the government
of Saigon.
Moreover, what about the whole idea of terror? Does it not destroy the loyalties
of more people than it wins over? Is it really effective on "our side"? Without
being naive about it, for this is a war, how does a supposedl}^ democratic govern-
ment rationalize the same kind of terror its excoriates "their side" for?
For one thing, despite the fact that it is generally effective, terror is not alway,
so selective as PRU leaders claim. The roundup of hordes of people in operations
like that at Ba The is bound to bring in the innocent as well as the guilty. PRU's
steal from the peasants, just as the ARVN does. Thej^ often do the same dull
stupid things as the South Vietnamese soldiers, only thej^ compound it with terror
and brutalitj'.
Not only do many Americans object to these methods, so do many South
Vietnamese. Torture has now come to be used so indiscriminately that the VC
warn their men to beware of any released prisoner if he has not been tortured.
The Vietnamese Congress, no paragon of virtue itself, recently began a series
of investigations charging Phoenix and the PRU's with corruption, clumsj' police
work and too manj" illegal arrests.
"Officials have orders to arrest a certain number of Viet Cong," charges Ho
Van Minh, deputy chairman of the House of Representatives and considered one
of the best and most honest young deputies. "But our investigations show there
have been a multitude of cases in which the.y've arrested the wrong people."
He and other officials who called for an investigation of the whole program
admitted that it had resulted in the capture of many agents. But they also
wondered whether the malj^ractices were not alienating people from the govern-
ment and thus simply creating more VC.
"There have been a number of arrests which reall.y amount to kidnapping,"
says Ho. "A man going home from work on his bicycle is seized on the wa.y. As
far as his family knows, he has simply disappeared. Perhaps a month or two later,
they find out where he is."
Another critic. Ho Ngoc Nhuan, chairman of a lower house rural-construction
committee, complained that: "In Qang Nam province, I followed one operation.
Thejr jammed the entire population of four hamlets into a four-room school and
a courtyard while they searched the villages. They ignored the village chiefs who
might have been able to help them distinguish which people were VC. They kept
the people squatting there for two whole days."
In the 1970's the PRU's will be transferred entirely to the Vietnamese Ministry
of the Interior as part of the total changeover of all units to Vietnamese direction.
However, the CIA is by no means immediately relinquishing control — not as
353
long as it pays the bills. But certainly with the Green Beret scandal and with the
cold eye of criticism looking more at such covert operations, ever5"one will be
taking a colder, harder look at PRU and other such activities.
As noted, one American officer said that there are no circumstances whatsover
in which murder is legal in the U.S. Army. Another disgruntled American civilian
official put it this v/ay: "Thej' use terror, yes, but thej- also have ideology. We
have terror without ideology, without revolution. And what is that? It's plain
murder."
VIETNAMESE CONGRESS' INVESTIGATION OF PHOENIX PROGRAM AND
PRU
There are one or two things I will ask you about. I w^on't read it all.
The hour is getting late. It says:
The Vietnamese Congress, no paragon of virtue itself, recentlj" began a series
of investigations charging Phoenix and PR Us [Provinical Reconnaissance Units]
with corruption, clums}^ police work and too many illegal arrests.
Before I go on, are you aware of the Vietnamese Congress' institut-
ing any investigation?
Mr. Colby. Yes; I referred to that in my testimony.
The Chairman. I thought I recalled it.
Mr. Colby. The legislature did call the government to explain. The
Prime Minister and several of the other ministers appeared before
them to respond to questions.
The Chairman. I won't read all of the article, but she quotes and
says:
"Officials have orders to arrest a certain number of Viet Cong," charges Ho Van
Minh, Deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives and considered one of
the best and most honest young deputies. "But our investigations show there
have been a multitude of cases in which they have arrested the \\Tong people."
That is a quote of Ho Van Minh. Do you know- Ho Van Minh?
Mr. Colby. I don't know Mm.
The Chairman. Have 3'ou ever hoard of him, Mr. Vann?
Mr. Vann. I have heard of him, sir.
The Chairman. Would 3'ou agree he is an honest young man?
Mr. Vann. I don't know his reinitation. I do know the reputation of
his associate who was involved in this, Mr. Ngo Cong Due [deleted].
The Chairman. I will try to paraphrase it. This whole thing here
is not so much about the brutality of it. The point she is really making
is that by this kind of cluins}" administration they make enemies for
the Government. She saj's:
Another critic, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, Chairman of a Lower House Rural-Construc-
tion Committee, complained that: "In Quang Nam Province, I followed one
operation. They jammed the entire po]iulatioii of four hamlets into a four-room
school and a courtyard while they searchc'd tht' villages. They ignored the village
chiefs who might have been able to help them distinguish which people were VC.
Thej' kept the people squatting there for two whole daJ^s."
Then the conclusion is that tliis makes enemies of the Government.
In other words, it is not accomplishing its purpose.
Mr. Colby. I think, if you would like my comments on that, sir
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Colby. I tliink the problem of mistaken or wTongful or even
deliberately erroneous allegations, as I mentioned before, does exist.
It is something that just has to be stomped on and stopped. I think
they are trying to do that and trjdng to put in controls to reduce it.
354
With respect to the second one, I think that that fits into the dis-
cussion we were having a Uttle while ago of the cordons and the
operations hke the Russell Beach which we are really turning away
from and doing much, much less of. There was some of that done some
time ago, particularl}^ up in central Vietnam. It has been used less
and less.
The Chairman. There were a few other questions.
USE OF FIRE POWER AND PHOENIX PROGRAM AFTER U.S.
WITHDRAWAL
Senator Case. Just one thing on that line, if I might. It would be
well to have it at this point. Both you and Colonel Vann have been
concerned about this sort of thing, I know, very much, such as the
use of helicopter gunships being used indiscriminately, et cetera, et
cetera.
What is going to happen as we pull out, and the Vietnamese them-
selves are left with responsibilities for the conduct of the war in matters
such as this, and the kind of thing that the chairman has just called
to your attention?
Air. Colby. I think, Senator, that the growth of the whole program
puts some internal controls upon the techniques. In other words, new
rules are being applied that say that you must inform a village chief
of the arrest of anybody in this village. It is a new rule that they are
just beginning to implement. That kind of a thing, once it gets started
and going becomes a matter of habit. It is followed and begins to put
a certain control on just who gets arrested in a village.
Now, with respect to the use of firepower, the Vietnamese get used
to a stricter standard. As they depend more and more upon the elected
village officials and elected province ofiicials and as their legislature
takes a more active role in protesting against things like this, that
kind of control will increasingly come to bear.
Two or 3 years ago the army was the only power in the country.
There is no question about it. Officers' words were law. That is no
longer the case. Their ]iower is being circumscribed on the Vietnamese
side, not just by American influence.
Now, there is more work to do on this, don't get me \vrong, but that,
I think, is the answer to your question. Senator.
Senator Case. Do you agree?
Mr. Vann. Sir, not only do I agree, but I went to the trouble of
comparing some statistical estimates. In 1969 with approximately 14
times as much airpower being applied from the stand])oint of strikes
against targets in South Vietnam as were applied in 1962, there were
in my judgment less civilian casualties than there were in 1962. That
reflects a tremendous im]3rovement in discrimination and the use of
these indirect fire and airborne weapons systems.
Senator Case. What do you think will be the result as we progres-
sively withdraw our advisory groups?
Mr. Vann. I wholeheartedly concur with Ambassador Colby's
assessment. I really couldn't put it better.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
355
CASE OF TRAN NGOC CHAU
The Chairman. I am told that Senator Symington had to leave and
did not quite complete some questions about the Chau case. I will try
to make these very rapid and get through with them. The hour is
getting late and everyone is getting tired.
Mr. Vann, when was Chau's brother arrested? Do you remember?
Mr. Vann. In April of 1969.
The Chairman. April 1969. Was Chau accused at that time or
when was Chau accused?
Mr. Vann. Sir, within a few days after Mr. Tran Ngoc Hien had
been arrested, the information appeared in the newspapers that he
had been in contact with his brother who was a deputy in the as-
sembly, Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau. That is not in the form of a formal
accusation.
The Chairman. ^ATien did Chau first publicly acknowledge his
contacts with his brother?
Mr. Vann. To the best of my recollection, su-, in the spring of 1969,
subsequent to April and prior to, I would say, June 30.
The Chairman. Prior to June 30?
Mr. Vann. To the best of my recollection, but I can't venWj be
certain as to the approximate time.
The Chairman. 1 am not sure, but I thought I asked you about
this. Do you believe the United States has a responsibility to intercede
in Chau's behalf at least to the extent of informing the Vietnamese
government of Chau's reporting on his contacts?
Mr. Vann. Sir, the Prime Minister of the country has been informed
as to the facts that Colonel Chau did notify Americans of his in-
volvement.
Tlie Chairman. He has been informed of it?
Mr. Vann. I informed him of it.
The Chairman. In your o])inion, did tlie CIA have a responsibihty
at an earlier point in time to inform the GVN of Ciuiu's contacts?
Mr. Vann. I am not personally aware, sir, that the CIA knew of
Chau's contact with his brother.
The Chairman. You testified you knew; you didn't know whether
an^'One else knew.
Air. Vann. That is correct, Senator.
The Chairman. When was the Prime Minister informed of these
contacts? Are you the one who informed him?
Mr. Vann. 1 informed him, sir, in early July of 1969.
The Chairman. Did you have reason to believe that Chau would
make public his contacts with official Americans regarding his
brother?
Mr. Vann. Mr. Chau informed me, sir, that when it got down to
the point of his being tried he would have no recourse but to speak
about the contacts.
The Chairman. Did you so inform the Embassy?
356
Mr. Vanx. Yes, sir, I have. I informed through my channel, which
was Mr. George Jacobson and Ambassador Colby.
The Chairman. What recommendations, if any, did you make?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I felt that although Chau had, by his own admission,
violated technically the law of his country, I did not believe that he
was either pro-Communist or was aiding or abetting communism, and
that I considered that it would be better for all concerned if the case
went no further.
EFFORT TO LIFT CHAu's IMMUNITY
The Chairman. Can you describe a little more specifically how the
Thieu government has lobbied to obtain the lifting of the immunity
of Mr. Chau?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I can only say what I got from deputies.
The Chairman. In your district?
Mr. Vann. From the Delta on the matter, [deleted].
chau's views on gvn policy
The Chairman. ^Vhat views has Mv. Chau expressed to you about
appropriate Vietnamese policy about broadening the government in
negotiations?
Mr. Vann. Su-, he has made so many recommendations over so
long a period it would be very extensive.
Colonel, now Mister Tran Ngoc Chau, [deleted] contention on a
continuing basis to me was that the non-Communist elements of the
society must have a greater voice in the government of Vietnam, a
voice that he does not feel that any other than those associated with
the current government now have. That is his opinion.
The Chairman. Did he express his view on a coalition government?
Mr. Vann. To me, su-, he has always expressed the view that there
should be somevaccommodation made at the local levels and that
would preclude an accommodation having to be made at the national
level.
My interpretation of his views is_ that he would not endorse a
coalition with Communists at the national level.
SELF DETERMINATION IN LIGHT OF MAl's AND CHAu's EXPERIENCES
The Chairman. This case is made even more significant by your
exchange with and discussion of Major Mai as to what we can find
or \vhat we can do about the political situation in South Vietnam, and
how realistic is the asserted objective of giving them a right of self-
determination. 1 1 • 1 1
Mai's and Chau's experiences and also Dzu, whom I would include
from what we know about it from the ])ress, at least assuming the
press statements are true, seem to me to make rather a farce of the
idea of self-determination. You have a very effective dictatorship, not
unlike the Greeks or any other, if an opposition man, no matter how
re))utable, puts up his head and off it goes. This comes back to a ques-
tion asked the other day. Self-determination under the circumstances
357
is illusory. If there is any objective which could make any sense at all,
it simply is the restraining of communism, which was the main objec-
tive expressed by former Secretaiy Rusk.
Mr. Vann. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, you realize there is on a con-
tinuing bases a number of people who are in op]:>osition to the Thieu
government who do speak on the matter. 1 believe Senator Tran Van
Don is one of the foremost, and certainly to some extent. General
Minh. So I would not say that it is any case of totalitarian
The Chairman. There are all kinds of opposition. We have those
distinctions too. But according to your own testimony, if I under-
stood it correctly, Mai and Chan were two of the most promising,
attractive opponents. There are other kinds of opponents. You have
tame opi)onents as well as other kinds.
Mr. Vaxn. Sir, the time period that we talked of with regard to
Major Mai was 1966, and the Thieu-Ky government per se did not
exist then.
The Chairman. It was the Ky government.
Mr. Colby. You didn't have constitutional government.
Mr. Vann. It was a directorate headed up by Ky.
ACCUSATIONS AGAINST AND VIEWS OF TRAN NGOC CHAU
The Chairman. In order to complete the record, I will put in some
of the documents dealing with accusations against Mr. Chau and his
views on a variety of subjects, and some newspaper articles dealing
with this case.
(The materials referred to follow:)
An Open Lktter of Deputy Tran Xgoc Chau
My couutryinen and comrades-in-arms in kicn hoa and throughout the country,
deputies to the national assembly,
gentlemen,
In my letter of Dec. 5, 1969, to the deputies to the national asseml)ly, I promised
to defend myself when necessary?
I still honor this decision until the lower house formally carries out articles 37
and 88 of the constitution against my person.
However, in the aftermath of the i)resident's biased accusations against my
person and the tlireats he made in Yung Tau against the national assembly, ;is
well as in the wake of radio and television broadcasts and demonstrations, etc.
I felt the need to send to you this letter to give you and public opinion food for
thought.
THI<: SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION
The constitution of Vietnam has 117 articles. To honor the constitution means
to honor all the articles and the laws emanating from these articles.
Recently, the ])resident and a small number of people have only alleged article
4 in order to condemn me and intimidate all those politicians who disagree with
the government.
Why did the president and that small numl^er of peo])le not u]:ihold article 7
of the constitution, and why did they al)use their power and exploit the nation's
facilities to slander and and denigrate me over the radio and television, in the
press and demonstrations encouraged or authorized by the go\-ernment. Article 7,
section 8, clearly states that "defendants are considered innocents until they are
definitely found guilty by a court. In case of doubt, the court will rule in favor
of the accused".
358
ARTICLE 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Thus, even though I may be affected by article 4 of the constitution, I am
still an innocent man.
Article 4 of the constitution says clearl.v that: "that repuVjlic of Vietnam opposes
communism under all forms; all activities aimed at publicising or promoting
communism are strictly forbidden."
I cannot be so cowardly as to deny my brother Tran-Ngoc-Hien's relations
and contacts with me (I did not seek to contact mj^ brother). But the contacts
were only made discreetly, between two blood brothers, and were never disclosed
or publicized in order to publicize or promote communism.
On the contrary, in my contacts with Tran-Ngoc-Hien, I never failed to try
to persuade my brother to:
a. renounce communism,
b. acknowledge the existence of the republic of Vietnam's regime, and
c. persuade north ^'ietnam to have direct negotiations with the repubhc of
Vietnam in order to end the war.
Tran-Ngoc-Hien himself testified to my anti-commimist stand at his trial on
Julv 4, 1969. Several newspapers carried this news. Let me quote thoi the dailv
of July 5, 1969:
"* * * the defendant's brother (Tran-Ngoc-Chau) proved himself useless
because he opposed communisin too strong!}-."
It could by no means be believed that the above statement was intended to
protect me because the documents used to accuse me were also based on other
statements by Tran-Ngoc-Hien.
Previously, when talking about my "case" to a number of deputies in the dan
tien (people's progress) bloc, the president had said that "Mr. Tran-Ngoc-Chau
did not act in any way for the communists but only out of his connections with
some american groups." this statement was disclosed to me by Mr. Nguj'en-cao-
Thang and Mr. Nguyen-cao-Thang, later, confirmed it to other deputies at the
dien hong conference hall.
To tell the truth, I did not act either for the communists or for any foreign group.
Even after Mr. Nguyen-cao-Thang retaliated (as I had demanded that the lower
house looked into allegations that Mr. Nguyen-cao-Thang had used his money
and influence to undermine the national assembly) by telling the press that
I had "records of connections with the communists," premier Tran-thien-khiem
denied this news and disclosed that no government agencies had such a dossier
(the hoa hinh dailj' carried this news item which was not denied by anyone) .
With the facts just mentioned, there cannot be any pretext for accusing me of
violating article 4 of the constitvition.
Meanwhile, president Nguyen-van-Thieu himself accepted to talk peace with
north Vietnam and the NLF, agreed to allow the NLF to take part in elections.
Such steps have enabled the NLF to gain prestige in the international political
arena, thereby enabling them to establish a government which was recognized by
many countries. The communists could not have achieved such things before the
republic of Vietnam agreed to sit down at the conference table with them in Paris.
If article 4 of the constitution is to be upheld, then the president's acts just men-
tioned actually helped the communists publicize and promote communism.
However, I have no intention to accuse the j^resident of violating article 4 of
the constitution because I beheve that the president's acts (if they were as sincere
as those of other Vietnamese and m_v own) were all aimed at realizing national
reconciliation, restore peace in freedom, and not at favoring communism.
THE president's ACCUSATIONS
According to the contents of the "dossier" which the president submitted to
the lower house, I was accused of the following crimes:
1. 8 times of contacts, relations and exchange of news with Hien without
notif\nng the authorities.
2. support in money, transportation facilities and legal papers for Tran-Ngoc-
Hien.
3. existence of the enemy's support for m_v candidacy to the lower house.
359
WHAT IS THE TRUTH
May I speak out the truth as follows:
1. I wrote to Hien a cai"d agreeing to see him for the first time. The other times
Hien always came to see me unexpectedly.
You may understand the situation of two blood brothers who were separated
for 16 years when one of them asked to see the other. Who could be so inhumane
as to decline the request?
Moreover, at that time, I thought that mj- brother might trj^ to see me in
order to surrender to the nationalist cause.
I never exchange news with Hien, but only tried to persuade him bj^ analyzing
the situation with a view to making Hien see that the communists could not win
victory in south Vietnam. And thus, I intended to persuade Hien to renounce
communism or make him persuade the communists to seek an accommodation
with the republic of Vietnam in order to end the war.
I wish that you will understand why I did not denounce Tran-Ngoc-Hien.
How could I ignore my feelings and traduce m3- brother to his death?
I believe that no nationalist could do this.
Moreover, every time Hien met me, I always told Hien that if he refused to heed
my advices (a,b,c), he must get back to the north and never see me again.
Apart from such human circumstances and from the fact that the contacts
between my brother and me had a family character, high government authorities
who knew our relations acknowledged my sincerity. If these authorities, for some
noble reasons, prefer to let me defend myself alone before public opinion, I would
agree to it and would not disclose their identities and ranks.
2. As a province chief (until the end of 1965), director of the RD training pro-
gram and commandant of the liD training center in A'ung-Tau (until the beginning
of 1967), I never gave Tran-Ngoc-Hien any document, news or facilities, except an
amount of 30 thousand piasters, a car ride from Kien-hoa to my tho and a card
authorizing Hien to meet me. This help was given exclusivcl,y within the frame-
work of brotherhood and only for once.
In the above-mentioned positions and with available means, I could, if I in-
tended to help the communists, have done nuich more to support Hien and the
communists, especially in 1964 and 196.'3 when the situation in Kien-hoa and many
other provinces throughout the country was critical.
On the contrary, I wrestle with the communist and people.
The result was that the day I was assigned to the RD ministry (November 1965),
the leaders of the religions in the province and the provincial council members sent
cables to the central government and corps authorities to request for m_v continued
stay. And it is i^recisely because of my anti-communist record that it, Gen.
Nguyen ^'en Thieu, national directory chairman, awarded me the fourth class
national order medal and first class order of merit medal. Both things rarely
happens to out going province chiefs.
3. In the electoral campaign for the lower house in Kien-hoa, there were only
about 90,000 people out of 500 thousand did vote. These voters were all screened
and were in the government-controlled areas.
I was elected among 19 candidates with 38 thousand votes. The majority of my
votes were gotten in the provincial capital (I got 8,000 votes while the runner up
got less than 3,000) and in the areas where catholic voters lived.
The foregoing are my clarifications about the three accusations by the president
as featured in the "dossier" which the president forwarded to the lower house.
OTHER ACCUSATIONS
Recently, the armed forces radio and a coui^le of newspapers in the capital
disclosed another accusation, namely, that Tran-Ngoc-Hien said that Hien
entrusted me with the mission of setting up a committee to work with the NLF.
In this committee, there were 2 buddhist monks, 1 politician and 1 deputy.
I strongly deny and protest this additional accusation and other accusations
which ma,y be added later. I never had such activities.
Suppose this disclosure was truthful, why did not the president "dossier"
mention it?
It should be noted that the "dossier" forwarded bj' the president did not hint
at additional evidences while the "dossier" in the hands of a fellow deput^y con-
tains this item.
360
May I caution public opinion that after he was sentenced to hfe imprisonment,
Tran-Ngoc-Hieii has been kept in solitary confinement and has not been visited
by his relatives for three months. Was this ineasure intended to force Tran-Ngoc-
Hien to tell further of m}^ crimes.
My countrj^men and comrades-in-arms,
Fellow-deputies,
The foregoing are my clarifications al:)0ut the "crimes" which the president
has charged me of.
I could not guess whether there will be other accusations. However, I believed
that the accusations bearing the signature of the president himself must be the
most serious and complete accusations.
I agree that all shows of force and display of anti-communist spirit are rightful.
But when the "secret" dossier has only been sent to the lower house for consider-
ation and decision, and when the public and even the people who wrote for the
radio and TV networks or organized the demonstrations have not been assess
the validitj" of the dossier, any condemnation and indictment before the lower
house takes a decision and the court pronounces a verdict are only acts contrary
to reason and in violation of both the constitution and existing laws (article 7,
section 8 of the constitution now in force) .
If anyone still believes that I am guilt}', my guilt should be specified as follows:
"Tran-Ngoc-Chau had the courage to take up arms to kill foreign invaders
and the communist during 23 years; but Tran-Ngoc-Chau did not have the
courage to traduce his blood brother Tran-Ngoc-Hien who was a north Viet-
namese officer".
Although there are serious pressures for accusing me, I still believe that the
common sense of the nationalists will not accept any arbitrary measure and
accusation against me which are severe than against the communists.
Respectfully,
Saigon, December 34, 1969.
Tran Ngoc Chau.
Self-Confession by Tran Ngoc Hien in Relation to Tran Ngoc Chau
past contacts with tran ngoc chau
I. — First contacts without change of attitude
After studying the importance and location of the objectives as well as assessing
the importance and competence of the individuals, the directorate of studies
decided to work on a number of people, including Tran Ngoc Chau, who might
become good news sources. Although Chau and I are blood brothers, we had not
met for nearly twenty j^ears, and I had no idea how he had changed. Therefore,
I chose the following mottoes:
(a) To persevere in winning over him regardless of the time needed.
(b) To strengthen the brotherly ties and at the same time to win over him
politically in accordance with the dictates of circumstances.
(c) To remain vigilant.
(d) To make careful preparations for the contacts. And to do this, I a.sked ]Mr.
Tran Chau Khang, my eldest brother, to contact Chau first in order to assess his
attitude in advance.
By the beginning of 1965, Mr. Khang met him and told him that I intended
to see him. Mr. Khang reported to me that Chau was willing to receive me and
that I could come to see him at any time; he sent me a card bearing this sentence:
"please let this man come and see me immediately." Besides, he sent me a query
whether I intended to surrender to the government. If I did, he would recommend
me for a trip to the United States. As it was not yet timely to make a contact,
I destroyed the card, fearing that it might cause trouble as I was using a false
I.D. card by Sej^tember 196.5, v/hen Mr. Khang went down to Kien Hoa to ask
Chau to give him legal papers so that he could apply for a job, I asked Mr. Khang
to reassess Chau's attitude and see whether his attitude had changed in any way.
Mr. Khang told me that Chau did not say auA^hing about plans to see him; I
reasoned that there was no obstacle to my plans. Therefore, in Novemb>cr 1965,
I decided to go to Kien Hoa to have the first contact with him. At about 1430
hours on a svmday in Nov. 1965, I went straight to the residence of the chief of
Kien Hoa province and told the guards that I wanted to see Chau. I wrote a
note as follows:
Dear brother: I have just arrived from central ^'ietnam, and, following your
advice, I request to see j'ou. Signed: contractor
361
We were so happ.y to see each other after so many j^ears. We talked about our
family. I tald him about our relatives in the north. He introduced his wife and
children to me. At dinner, in the presence of his wife and children, he asked me
whether I needed anj^ legal papers, thereby showing that he was a man of fair
play. I thanked him and told him that I had gotten all necessary papers. As far
as I can remember, I got the following ideas across to him during our conversation
that night:
The front ordered me to contact you and see whether you want to support the
front. Your former friends such as Buoi, Luong, Chuong, I\inh and Lien all want
you to do so. No one has anj'thing against you. We ourselves took the risk of
contacting you.
The front stands for the struggle against the americans, and for demanding
independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. There is nothing to commimism.
The revolutionaries are not against anti-communist elements who are true patriots.
The revolutionaries onl}- oppose those who, under the label of anti-communism,
suppress the people and let american inference in our sovereignth.y. On the other
hand, the revolutionaries would be guilty of ignorance if they fought against french
dominion in order to accept the rule of the russians or of the Chinese.
Your interests and mine are identical; they ai-e the interests of the people. No
theory or doctrine transcends these fundamental interests.
As you believe you are a nationalist and patriot, you should not use anj^ pre-
text, even that of opposing communism, to calmly let the americans murder the
compatriots and devastate the covmtrv.
Chau did argue with me on those ideas, but my principle was to avoid argtiments.
He said categorically: my stand is clearly to oppose the commtmist ideologj^,
but not go hate the communists as individuals. He said he did not kill anybodj'
except when he was on operations. He complained that the guerrillas had at-
tempted to kill him with a plastic charge.
Finally, I said: the main and realistic question is not to find out who is right
and who is wrong, but to work together to save south Metnam from the iiearlj^
30 years of war from the french till the Americans. We should not try to convert
each other today. Life will do the conversion.
The next morning, CHAU had to go early for an operation; he asked me whether
I could stay. I said I wanted to leave. Before departing each other, CHAU put
in ni3' pocket a bundle of 500-piaster notes (I found otit later that the sum was
nearly 30,000 piasters). His wife told a driver to take me to My-Tho in a private
car. After this contact, I made the following report to my su]3eriors:
(a) The brotherly ties are fairly good.
(6) (Chau's) ideas and political stand are not favorable; his opposition is still
strong and shows signs of becoming stronger.
(c) Contacts should be' temijorarily suspended, pending more favorable circum-
stances and changes in the situation.
(d) No more regular contacts, but brotherly relations should be maintained.
I requested that the front's committcH^ in Kien-Hoa forbid the guerrillas to
assassinate CHAU because he could be won over in the long run.
IL By May 1966, for a second contact, I went straight to Chau's office as he
had just been ai)pointed director of the R.D. training program.
At tliis time, the buddhists were waging a vigorous sti-uggle, the anti-American
movement was gathering momentum, the internal situation of sotith Vietnam
was critical. I went to see Chau this time in order to see whether the overall
situation had an}?- effect on his stand.
Diu'ing this second contact, I advance the following ideas:
"The front is quite determined to fight the Americans until the end. The most
ajipropriate jiolitical cotirse for South Vietnam to take wotild be real neutralism.
The Sotith would not go connnunist btit would not be dei:)endent on the Ameri-
cans. Yoti have many friends among the generals, field grade officers, politicians,
intellecttials. You should contact patriotic elements and form a grotip which
would work hand in hand with the front when the opportunity arrives. This
means that you can contintie to opjiose comnumism, btit you shotUd do something
to oppose the Americans and defend the interests of the people. The front's
polic.v is to seek the widest tmity possible. The front does not demand that people
support its platform entirel}-, but only wants to stipport people who oppose the
Americans.
Here is what Chau replied to me: this is very difficult. There are here people
who oppose the Americans or who do not like the government, but this does not
mean that they are willing to cooperate with the communists.
44-706—70 24
362
He boasted that the Americans respected him, that American newspapers
praised him, and that he knew man}^ American personahties to whom he could
introduce me if I wanted. But I rephed: what should I see Americans for? I onlj-
want to see patriotic nationalists. We were in the midst of our conversation when
an American came in, so I left.
Chau's ideas had not undergone any change. On the contrary, he appeared to
be closely associated with the Americans. Therefore, I decided not to continue
to work on him politically for some time, and to wait for a more favorable occasion.
//. — Apparent cJiange of attitude, hut actual intentions to profit
For a long period, I did not come to see CHAU because Mr. KHANG told me
that CHAU was having close relations with the Americans.
(Ill) By the end of 1967, CHAU asked KHANG to tell me to come to his
private house on Ngo-Tung-Chau street in Gia-dinh so that he could say some-
thing to me. The contents of the third meeting between the two brothers are as
follows:
He told me he had gone to Hue. Many relatives knew that I was in Saigon.
So the secret was revealed and security agents might know about vaj whereabouts.
He advised me to take to the bush and not to go around to contact people; he
said I might be arrested and bring trouble to him. I answered: don't worry, I
will drop in here only occasionally and will go out immediately.
After that, he told me he would run for the elections in Kien-Hoa for the
reason that he would lose his initiative if he continued to stay in the army, and
that a political career would be more lasting and promising. CHAU added: can
you see any way to help me? I do not need more votes because I know manj'
people and enjoy prestige * * * among people in Kien Hoa province; moreover,
I don't have important opponents; but could you tell "the other side" not to
"sadden" the election daj- such as by preventing people from going to the polls,
indulging in terrorism, shellings, etc. I asked: do you have a new policy to propose
in running for the elections? He answered: I have alwaj-s opposed the communist
ideology but not in a blind manner; I do anj^ thing beneficial to the people and
the cause of peace.
I considered Chau to be a "potential target" who deserved to be won over in
a long process. Therefore, within the framework of strategic intelligence, I intended
to lead him into the path of activities useful to my purpose whereas I knew that
the lower house would be a corrupt and puppet body which would not play any
important role or influence anybody. I indirectly asked him why he did not
staj^ with the army and be a province chief or work in some ministry, which give
him more actual power whereas a deputy in south Vietnam could by on means
deal with Mr. Loan or a gun-carrying general.
But I realized that Chau had decided to do politics at all costs. I tried to win
his S}^mpathy by saying:
The front intends to induce the people to oppose and boycot this election. But I
personally am ready to support you and I will report j-our desire to m.j superiors.
If they agree, orders would be promptly given to the Kien Hoa people.
Here are the contents of the cable I sent to brother Toan after I met with Chau:
"I don't know why Chau asked me to come and told me that my relatives knew
about my where abouts and advised me to take to the jungles. Do you, brother
Toan, have anj" ideas to give me?
Chau also told me that he would run for the lower house in Kien Hoa con-
stituencj'- and requested me to ask the front to give him a hand by limiting the
sabotage of the elections there.
Since we haven't had Chau, this is a good occasion to win his sympathy and
create an favorable atmosphere for to continue to work on him.
Please contact the front to see whether our Chau might be harmful to the overall
policy of the front. If possible, we would propose that our forces intensify our
offensive in other areas while we would scale our military action against the capital
and district towns of Kien Hoa province".
About one month later, brother Toan sent me a letter: "Chau used the pretext
that sy's whereabouts had been disclosed in order to force him {sv) to take to the
jungles and clear the way for his entry into the political area. Sy's presence would
be embarassing and inhibit Chau's freedom of action.
However, be vigilant in your goings and comings. It is possible that the CIA
might have known and set up a trap".
Brother Toan did not say a word about my proposal. And until now, my superiors
have not said a word about it.
363
During the election period, I closelj- follow the electoral process in Kien Hoa
by reading newspapers. It appeared to be relatively smooth. Besides, I was told
by ^Ir. Khang that during the election campaign, Chau used suzuki motorbike
to move around in Kien Hoa.
There were only 3 candidates in Kien Hoa: Chau, 1 male nurse and 1 teacher.
Chau believed he did not have serious opposition. The result was that Chau got
30.000 votes from 80.000 voters out of the population of 500.000.
In my opinion, the success of Chau was a matter of course and should not
surprise or mystify anyone.
HI.— Since the Mau Than Tet, signs of change of attitude
After the first wave of the Mau Than Tet offensive, after the second wave,
after the general situation had evolved and after I had received instructions from
above, I had the following intentions regarding Chau:
1. — To persevere in working on him over a long period, using thi-ee assets:
brotherlv sentiments, influence of the situation, political action consisting of:
(a) advising and criticizing Chau with a view to limit obnoxious effects of the
political gimmicks that he liked to do at the national assembly;
(b) graduallv arousing his patriotic, anti-american feelings, and at the same
time making him understand and sympathize with the policies and programs of
the front.
(c) increasing his awareness about the need for political probity.
2. to exploit all counter-intelligence information.
3. to be extremely vigilant and cautious as chau might be a tool of the CIA.
since the middle of 1968, there have been signs of:
(a) progress along the lines specified above.
(b) influence of the situation (on chau).
(c) Chan's change as the situation changed.
(d) the CIA's activities falling in line with the U.S. policy.
Little by little, the man showed more signs of change in his ideas and attitudes
in subsequent contacts.
IV. — The June, 1968, contact had two objectives
(a) To find out whether chau could potentially participate in the Trinh diuh
Thao alliance.
(b) To assess whether he had undergone further change after the two offensives
and his trip abroad.
He raised his voice to berate and condemn Mr. Trinh-dinh-Thao. Therefore I
gave up the idea to sound him out.
During this contact, although he still pretended to stick to his anti-communist
stand, he did show signs of concern and display some changes in his thinking such
as: • , , ,
From believing that the Americans would defeat the communists he had come
to admit that the Americans could not win victory because they had a wrong
policv but that they could not lose either. He said: why didn't you go and fight
anvwhere instead of fighting in the cities thus bringing death to the people. I
answered half jokingly: the countryside was all liberated, if we did not carry the
fighting here where could we do it then? We did not shoot at the people. The
peo]3le and their houses were destroyed because of American airplanes. As a
deinity, why haven't you raised your voice to protest against American bombings
of civilians?
He showed first signs of wanting to put an end to the war. He disclosed that
public opinion in almost all the countries he had just visited (Japan, United
States, England, Italy, France) wants:
a. Contradiction and dissention between the Americans and the authorities
in Saigon.
b. The ideas, viewpoints and peace formulas of every personality and group
on the Saigon or American side.
I asked Chau: are the reactions of the national assembly and of Thieu to the
unilateral cessation of the bombing of the north real or not? I have heard that it
was all a farce triggered by Bunker.
Chau smiled: those were real reactions. Please don't believe that the Americans
can do anj-thing they want here; we do not abide by all the decisions of the
Americans.
I said: it is distressing indeed. As an outsider, I could not even put up with
this. The Americans are unacceptable. They override you so crudely. This is a
good occasion for the \ietnamese to find a way to shake off the American yoke.
364
Chan asked: i^lease find out if the north is willins^ to receive a soutneru ijar-
liamentary delegation in order to discuss about tlie yossiljility of solving vhe war
in the south.
I asked him: do you really intend to seek a settlement among all the Vietnamese?
is this your own personal idea or is it someone else's? Chau replied: it is not appro-
priate to say at this time, but roughly Tran-chanh-Thanh shares this idea.
I tried to work on him: this idea is not realistic. Why go to the north while the
front is the direct opponent and is the people's ligitimate representative w'hich has
full rights to make decisions? since the north still refuses to recognize, the southern
regime, how couxd it receive a southern parliamentary delegation? this w^ould only
be beneficial to the americans because the americans can use it to soothe public
opinion. The only rightful solution is to deal sincerely with the front of national
liberation. However, I will report to my su])eriors and will give you an answer.
I did report Chau's ideas and suggestions to mv superiors and askes brother
Toan to:
(a) Find out what was behind Chau's proposals.
(b) Suggest to me how to answer Chau in such a way as to preserve the front's
policies and at the same not to contradict Chau too sharply.
After that, Tu Hiep ordered me to answer along the lines expounded on the
Hanoi and liberation radios.
(VII). — The contact after the election of nixon, by the end of dec. 68:
Chau appeared to be gratified by the election of Nixon and said: during this
transition period, the position of Mr. Thieu will be rather delicate but will be better
and better defined.
Following the advice of my sviperiors, I answered Chau that it was not timely
yet to send a southern parliamentar}^ delegation to the north. He flew into an
anger and said: "so you believe your are certain of success and only want to settle
with the Americans. You must not force us into the position of either siding en-
tirely with the other side or leaning competely on the Americans. We are those who
neither accept the front nor side wilh the ultra-rightists. We are only middle-of-
the-road people (litterally: we are only people who stand in the middle).
I w^aited to Chau to cool down, then advanced some ideas.
The policies and platform of the north and of the front are always identical.
The front's policy is that the southern problem must be settled among the Viet-
namese without foreign interference.
If you or your group w^ant to put an end to the people's 30 years of sufferings,
you s^hould deal directly with the southern front of liberation. This is inevitable,
sooner or later.
The americans are presently squeezed from all sides. This is a good occasion
to break away from american bondage; and the only solution is still to seek an
accommodation among the Vietnamese.
(VIII). — The contact after the ky dau tet, by the end of february, 1969, at Chau's
invitation through Mr. Khang:
Upon seeing me, he told me immediately: a number of deputies and possibly
representatives of some religions want to set up a delegation to paris or to some-
where else in order to contact the north and the front with a view to assess the
possibility of ending the war. This group's intention is to gain some political
stature which would enable it to tell other circles and groups that it has the capa-
bility of promoting understanding and reaching an settlement with the other side.
It does not matter for it to meet with north Vietnam first and the front second
or simultaneously.
I asked: What are the group's views on a solution? He replied: to seek a settle-
ment with the front without having to amend the constitution forbids communism
while the front has never admitted that it is a communist organization. The front
can in the long run be considered a political party, a minorit^^ group, and adjust-
ments can be made for it to have deputies (to the national assembly). President
Thieu has about the same ideas. There must be a settlement with the front, sooner
or later, but it is too dangerous to declare so at this time. He asked me to find out
whether the front and the north w^ould agree to receive the group. If the answer
was positive, he would go to paris in april or may 1969.
I asked for further information about the comi^osition of the delegation. He
roughly said he had contacts with the buddhists, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, etc.
I tried to work on him:
365
Is this your sincere idea or only a political gimmick or a CIA scheme; does
this group have any strength or prestige? If not, after the meetings, all its members
would be jailed and would not be able to achieve anything.
What is Mr. Thieu really stand for?
If you want to give your group strength, you must enroll the support of the
major rehgions such as the catholics, the An Quang buddhists, as well as of
personalities both here and abroad. It would be useless to have a group of people
whose names scare off people. There must be a political platform that is in line
with independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, if a settlement is to be reached.
In politics, you must know the strength of the parties. On what grounds could
you consider the front as a minority group?
Finally, I promised: although I have no concrete ideas yet, I will report to my
superiors and will give .you an early answer.
After I left Chau, I wrote a report to my superiors dealing with Chau's formula
of seeking a settlement with the front within the framework of the constitution.
In another letter, addressed to Tu Hiep, I wrote: "It is to be wondered what
happen in paris in * * * april and may which would make CHAU decide to go
there to contact us".
After that, I went to see Ba Can and talked briefly about CHAU's ideas, and
I said that we should study the situation more fuUv in order to make suggestions
to the higherups.
I intended to come and see CHAU by the beginning of april, 1969, for two
purposes :
(a) to assess the strength, policies and platform of the CHAU group.
(b) If favorable, to ask to contact some of the group's members in order to
have clearer ideas and to expand my sources who might be useful to my strategic
intelligence activities.
I had 1-ot come to see CHAU when I was arrested on April 6, 1969.
Views of Tr.\n Ngoc Chau on GVN/NLF Talks
(Submitted by Daniel Ellsberg)
The several items following were recently sent me by Tran Ngoc Chau, formerly
lieutenant colonel in AIIVN, now a Deputy from Kiin Hoa (when he was twice
the Province Chic^f), and Secretary General of the National Assr-nbly, House of
Deputies. Formerly a battalion commander in the Viet Minh, rallying to the
Bao Dai Government in 1950, Chau was perhajjs the leading innovator and
analyst of pacification techniques in X'ietnam and was first head of the Revolu-
tionary Development Cadre Program. I know Chau as a close friend and, as do
many other Americans, r(»spect him as a patriot.
Among the items sent by Chau (not rejiroduced below) is a hand drawn diagram
headed: "This is how the G^'N and NVN are competing in winning over the
support of the people in South Vietnam." With the "people in South Vietanm"
as a box in the center, Chau shows them as appealed to, on the one side, by
successive boxes representing various vehicles ranging from the DRV (attracting
"communists of the first degrees"), the NLF (attracting "communists of the
second degree"), Trinh Dinh Thao's alliance (for "communists of the third
degree") and the proposal of coalition government (appealing to "communists of
the fourth degree"); whereas on the other side, non-communists vehicles en-
couraged by the GVN (and U.S.) are represented by the GVN alone, appealing
to "anti-communists of the first degree": "Everyone dse is accused or condemned
as pro-communist."
Chau is now regarded as a leader of the nationalist oijposition to the present
G^'N, within the National Assembly. He has for several vears favored ceasefire
and direct talks between the GVN and the NLF in Vietnamese politics. Were it
not for the immunity granted by his membership in the National Assembly, he
would undoubtedly be arrested "by the current GVN leadership for his recent
expressions of these long-held views (as represented in the accomjjanying trans-
lations). That immunity is probably not absolute. His vulnerabilitv has un-
doubtedly been increased by his recent public disclosure that a Viet Cong captain
now in poHce custody is his brother (another brother is a North Vietnamese
official), even though these family relationships have been known to the govern-
nient for some time and represent, as he put it, a "familiar drama" in the conflict
in South Vietnam.
366
Why Must We Talk With North Vietnam and the National Liberation
Front
(By Deputjr Tran-Ngoc-Chau)
On January 15, 1969, the Quyet-Tien Daily published an interview
with me about attitudes towards the NLF. To make the matter
clearer, I would like to add the following statement. — Deputy
Tran-Ngoc-Chau
not gone with the wind
From the beginning of 1945 to the end of 1949, I had the privilege of wearing
torn clothes, walking bare-footed, living from hand to mouth, working without
pay and living in straitened circumstances along the Truong Son Mountains to
participate in the resistance, taking up arms to oppose foreign invasion.
In 1950, I changed ranks and rallied to the Nationalist camp. Since then, I have
worn French uniforms and American shoes, lived in plenty and received high
salaries, enjoyed comforts from Hai Phong and Hung Yen to the Ben Hai and
Ca Mau, participating in the resistance against the Communists.
The time I have spent on this side is threefold or fourfold the time spent on the
other side; feats of arms I have accomplished on this side also outnumber those on
the other side. My authority and privileges on this side are also superior to those
on the other side." My way of life and my thoughts are also more at ease on this
side than on the other side. I have also more friends and relatives here than there.
Thus, there is no reason whv I should support a victory of the other camp
(NVN and the NLF) whether on the battlefield or at the conference table.
But we must also sincerely admit that if the great majority of our people could
enjoy their basic rights under a good regime, they themselves would have long ago
been determined to defend themselves against any form of Communist propaganda
and terrorism. Thus, the Communists would never have been able to use minority
rule to swav us and to make it necessary for us to cope with them for so many years.
In view of the above, I believe that "the Communists are guilty of provoking the
war, but that we ourselves, non-Communist leaders, have been incapable of im-
proving society, of bringing confidence to the people, and of fully utilizing our
capabilities to destrov the Communists.
And it is because of the above-mentioned inalMlity that the Communists have
been able to expand and attract a great part of the population to them, while
we ourselves must depend on our ally, the United States, to fight the Communists.
Until the day comes when the United States changes its methods, we must face
our enemy in the front and our ally in the back.
We cannot prolong this war under such conditions.
An earlv end must be put to the war so as to save the great majority of the
poi^ulation from death, from infirmity, and from bankruptcy caused by the war.
Both sides — we and the Communists — must put an end to the war for the sake
of humanity.
realistic reason
There are only three ways of achieving peace in this war:
1. Surrender to the Communists.
2. Defeat the Communists.
3. INIake mutual concessions.
Of course, we cannot, nor is there any reason for us, to surrender to the Com-
munists in anv form. At anv rate, we remain stronger than they.
Defeat the "Communists? We have been defeating them successfully day after day.
Whoever opens the daily news bulletins and statistical reports froni 1959 to the
present would certainly see that the total number of Viet Cong killed stands at
millions bv body count, and that the population that we control comes up to
twenty or'thirty million. Therefore, if we choose to defeat the Communists with the
old strategy, it would mean that' the war would go on indefinitely-endlessly. Such a
situation' would be tantamount to continuing the present war with promises but
without anv end in sight.
A number of anti-Communist elements whose incomes increase and whose rela-
tives and friends dodge military service have chosen this self-deceiving formula.
Therefore, if the two above formulas are not chosen, we must make mutual concessions
to put an end to the war and bring peace to our country.
367
CONDITIONS TO END THE "WAR
But on what basis must concessions be made? This is quite a problem which we
must anah'ze.
As everj'one of us knows:
In the past — in spite of statements and promises of peace — our government
has advocated that the war must be ended on the basis that "NVN must withdraw
its invasion troops", the Viet Cong must "chieu hoi" and surrender to the govern-
ment, and that, even if they would do so, only elements recognized as "good" can
participate in political as "individuals" in the "national community".
The above conditions require that NVN and the Viet Cong must lay down their
arms and surrender — no more, no less.
In ni}' heart and that of all non-Communist people, we hope that NVN and the
Met Cong will act that way.
Our attitude in resiging ourselves to sit down at the conference table in Paris on
January 18, 1969, with a delegation equal in number to that of the United States
delegation, with the presence (known to the entire world) of the National Libera-
tion Front indicated that our government had given up the above unrealistic
policy of restoring peace.
What a shame!
When the other camp consists of 8 Vietnamese facing our camp which consists
of 4 A'ietnamese and 4 Americans.
But let's look into the reality, into the bones and blood of the people and into
the scenes of destruction of the coimtry, and thus continue to seek peace.
The most loud-talking anti-Communist elements should raise their voices and
tell people what we should do in the face of this tragic and shameful situation.
Should we accept the Communists and thus maintain Vietnamese personalit}'^
(because we all still are Vietnamese) or accept dependence on the United States
not necessarily to be anti-Communist, but rather to depend on the United States
to lead us anywhere it wants?
Is there anyone who forgets that:
In 1963 the United States accused President Ngo-Dinh-Diem (who had been
elected by the people in accordance with the Constitution) of repressing the
Buddhists and attempting to come to agreement with NVN in order to come to
the November 1, 1963 couj)?
And that in 1966 the United States supported the most terrible repressions of
the Buddhists by tanks and planes, and today (the U.S.) compels the Republic
of Viet Nam to sit at the conference table, not only with North Viet Nam, but
also with the National Liberation Front?
But reality, however shameful, still does not necessarily require us to choose
between "dependence on the United States" and "acceptance of the
Communists".
Reality still gives us a chance to choose another road, different from slavery
(Communist or foreign).
RESPONSimLITIES OF THE N.VTIONALISTS
That road is one of nationalism, pure nationalism, which can overcome all
temptations, influences and controls by both the Communists and the foreigners.
Those \'ietnamese who sincerely love their compatriots and their countiy will
unite to build that new road.
If there arc ^'ietnamese who sided with the French, or follow the Americans or
the Nationalist camp out of horror and hatred of the dictatorial nature and the
brutal actions of the Communists, why can't there be other Vietnamese who sided
with the Communists out of horror and hatred toward the arbitaiy and despotic
nature and the selfish and cruel actions of some of us?
In the most cruel and corrupt regimes there still must be generous and honest
elements.
The road to save the Metnamese nation now and in the future in South Viet
Nam, in North Met Nam, and all over the Vietnamese territory, will not be built
by the Vietnamese who follow the American, follow the Russians or follow the
Chinese, but rather will be built by the Nationalistic A'iotnamese.
In the face of that new reality and those new requirements, the Republic of Viet
Nam should bravely talk peace directly with North Viet Nam and the National
Liberation Front.
36S
Talk with North Viet Nam in order to reach agreement on a common framework
for the future of both the South and the North, and talk with the National
Liberation Front in order to end the war on the territorj' which lies South of the
17th parallel.
Met Nam peace cannot be settled completely between the Repu]:)lic of Viet
Nam and the National Liberation Front because on the other side of the parallel
North Yiet Nam is still ready to stu- up trouble and support the war.
Nor can Viet Nam peace be settled completely between the Republic of Viet
Nam and North Met Nam because the National Liberation Front, which North
Viet Nam will never abandon, is still on this side of the parallel.
We have the right to call the National Liberation Front by a hundred terms
which are bad, vile and most servile, but we must admit that this organization
exists in reality, and that there could never be anjr peace talks which could bring
an end to the war if we did not agree to make some conces'-ions to this organization
and thus to satisfy some of its minimum demands.
We have done this before with regard to some armed opposition groups. Why
can't we do it again with regard to the National Liberation Front? Is it because
this Front is Communist or dependent on the Communists?
That is the truth.
But at present; both we and the U.S. have realized that our army and the armj^,
technical ability and resources of the most advanced modern power in the world
can't exterminate them and because of that, we are forced to talk with them at
the conference table.
Whether we like it or not, we are compelled to discuss the methods of ending
the war in order to restore peace.
But peace is never restored b^' means of a combat of wits and open discussions
at the conference table.
Peace can be restored only by means of acceptance by the concerned parties.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONCERNED PARTIES
Let us ask ourselves who are the concerned parties and what understanding
and concessions are possible?
The United States
First, let us speak about the United States. We must speak about the United
States first because in the past the United States has proven its power through the
evolution and shifts of power among the patriots and scoundrels among the leader-
ship of the Vietnamese nation, and at present the United States is still the most
influential power from our local level to the central government and from the
companies and battalions to higher echelons.
If the United States had withdrawn some assistance items or some supply
items, certainly what happened to President Diem, to the regime prior to 1963,
would have happened to President Thieu, to the present regime.
With its available open and secret power, the United States is the main obstacle
which blocks Viet Nam on the road to war or peace. If the Lhiited States does
not agree with the RVN.
Therefore, let us demand that the United States reconsider its attitude at the
Paris peace negotiation and at other peace talks to come.
It is precisely the presence of the United States at the conference table which
has:
(a) encouraged North Viet Nam and the NLF to refuse to talk with the
RVN;
(b) pushed the RVN back into a subordinate position;
(c) escalated its role in the war, that the Communists always make propa-
ganda about;
(d) and consequentl.y, caused the majority of the people in the world and
the American people to oppose the war in Viet Nam;
(e) made the most pro- American nationalists feel ashamed and hate the
United States;
(/) made the North Vietnamese feel more proud and enthusiastic because
thej^ can sit at the same level as the United States; and
(g) made the Southeast Asian nations friendly to the United States doubt
the goodwill of the United States.
The presence of the U.S. not only entails the above consequences, but moreover
the whole world knows that it is the U.S. that took the helm and forced the
RVN to sit at the conference table with North Viet Nam and the NLF.
369
In view of the past disastrous consequences, and the obstacles that can be
forecast, the U.S. must put an end to its absurd role in Paris and in other peace
talks, the U.S. cannot use the fact that it has troops fighting in Viet Nam to
maintain this negotiating role, because the American troops came to Viet Nam at
the request of the GVN in order to meet a political need.
Peace talks are a way of solving problems on the political level. Only the
RVN — a sovereign nation — has the unique competence to solve (its) political
problems.
If one pretends that the U.S. needs to be present in order to solve the military
problems, it will be all the more absurd.
Because militarj' decisions must always depend on the political ones.
Assuming that we accept this reasoning, the U.S. only has the right to designate
military representatives who participate within the RVN's delegation. It does not
have the right (to have) an equal or separate delegation.
The righteous cause of both the U.S. and the RVN lies in these details.
The Pk,VN is ready to conclude separate agreements with the U.S. regarding the
guarantees concerning the safety and the interests of the U.S. in Viet Nam. With
these guarantees, the U.S. should let the RVN negotiate direct!}^ with North
Viet Nam and the NLF.
(I don't know whether the American negotiatoi's in Paris feel ashamed v\'hen
they face, not the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, but the delegates of a segment
of a little country. I personally feel very ashamed over the situation of the V.N.
negotiators who must sit together with the American delegation in order to talk
with Vietnamese even though they are Communists.)
The Republic of Viet Nam
As for the RVN, we must be determined to put an end to the military war.
But we can't surrender to the Communists.
We will accept in sequence:
(a) a total cease-fire;
(b) a number of representatives designated (chi dinh) by the NLF in the
village councils, the provincial councils and in the National Assembly. The
ratio of these representatives must be that of a minority.
(c) the incorporation of the NLF armed forces into the RVNAF.
(d) rejiresentatives of the NLF may stand for election to the organs pro-
vided for in the Constitution;
(e) a general election for the reunification of the two regions within 10
years ;
(/) an international police organization will supervise and arbitrate the
implementation of the above clauses.
Of course, such a plan must be approved by the National Assembly which will
amend 1 or 2 articles of the Constitution concerning election ])rocedures.
Once again I must stress that if we want peace, we must be realistic and make
concessions.
In Italy, the Communist i^arty is the strongest party. However, the Italian
nation is still not controlled by the Connnunists.
In Viet Nam the Communists have not and will not triumjih over us by force of
arms. But they have come to the conference table with political ])restige.
Why don't we accept replacing this militarj^ struggle with a political one? We
will win.
Because only when faced with a direct Commiuiist threat will the Nationalist
parties unite. The South Vietnamese people don't like Communism and will choose
the Nationalist parties immediately after terrorism and danger have ceased.
NORTH VIET NAM AND THE NLF
We must acknowledge that they have scored some success when they forced
the U.S. to stop the bombing and come to the conference table as their equal.
But results are only a possibility.
We hope that North Met Nam and the NLF must realize that they can never
conquer South Viet Nam:
(a) by force of arms. Despite the fact they have initiated the most violent
attacks ;
(b) by a coup d'etat. Despite the fact that manj' similar attempts have
occurred.
370
Even though the RVN has not yet defeated North ^'iet Nam and the NLF
this year, nor next year, certainly the RVN can still continue to exterminate the
Communists and prevent them from winning.
If North Viet Nam and the NLF see this reality clearlj-, we hope they will thrust
the U.S. aside in order to sincerely seek with us a peace solution among Vietnamese,
ev^en though they are of diflferent political views.
IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED
Assuming that peace is restored based on concessions made by the RVN,
what will happen?
The NLF will become an open political party, but it must observe the Con-
stitution, especially Article 4.
Faced with this direct and present threat, non-Communist parties will be
forced to come to an agreement, make mutual concessions and form an alliance
to cope with it.
The population will have the free opportunity, without fear of terrorism or
danger, of choosing the side that will secure for it the greatest material welfare
and spiritual guarantees.
In this environment there will certainly occur a tense competition between the
non-Communist side and the NLF.
Precisely this competition will help our society- progress quickly, and our fellow
countrj^men easilv find the righteous cause.
And because of this, all open or latent conflict due to religious and regional
differences among the non-Communist people will be erased. And onlj^ because
the.y do not have a serious adversary to cope with.
In the new political struggle, the Army will no longer play the main role, but
the political parties, religions and the people will have to directly and totally
resist the Communists.
IS THE CONSTITUTION VIOLATED?
Many persons deem that it is unconstitutional to express the view of accepting
the NLF since this Front is a tool of the NA'N Communists.
The Constitution clearly forbids in Article 4 as follows:
The Republic of Viet Nam opposes Communism in any form. Every ac-
tivity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited.
So, when discussing the reasons why we must talk peace with the NLF or with
North Viet Nam does not mean making propaganda or carrying out Communism.
Provided that the above discussions only bring up realistic data and do not praise
or encourage people to follow the Communists.
We ask ourselves, when the National Assembly authorizes the government to
talk peace directly vv-ith North Viet Nam (authentic Communists) can this deci-
sion be interpreted as an action aimed at making propaganda or carrying out
Communism or not?
Of course not.
So the proposal (and not the decision) to talk with the NLF (which is only a
Communist tool) cannot be considered unconstitutional. Especially when rep-
resentatives of our government are actually talking with the representatives of
North Met Nam and the NLF in Paris (despite the fact that both parties still
declare they do not recognize each other).
In summary, it is unconstitutional only when the promoters of the idea re-
nounce the RVN regime in order to demand the recognition of the NLF as a true
government, but it cannot be unconstitutional only to propose the acceptance of
the NLF as a political party that must observe the RVN Constitution and its
incorporation into the whole RVN structure as a minoritj' element.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I must define clearly once again my position concerning peace
talks with North Viet Nam and the NLF as follows:
1. The concerned parties must be determined to put an end to this savage
war.
2. The United States must withdraw from all peace talks with North Viet
Nam and the NLF. Only when this has been done will North Viet Nam and
the NLF accept direct peace talks with the RVN.
371
3. The RVN will resolve with North Viet Nam the future regime of a
Free and Unified Nation of Met Nam.
4. The RVN will accept the NLF as a political party provided that it
honors the Constitution. There maj^ be some amendments to the Constitution
with regard to election procedures.
5. The armed forces of the NLF must be integrated into the Armed Forces
of the RepubUc of Viet Nam.
6. The Nationalist political parties must automatical!}^ ally to form a
majority capable of checking the NLF.
7. An international force will supervise and arbitrate the implementation
of the above clauses.
With the concept presented in this document, I still maintain the position of
a Nationalist who puts the integrity of the body and the mind of the Vietnamese
above all other ideologies or interests.
I never accept Communism, but I also never accept our subordination to a
foreign country. Because subordination to either side brings the nation war and
destruction as the past and the present have proven.
(Submitted By Daniel EUsberg)
Part I. Colonel Chau's Remarks
PERSONAL BACKGROUND
In addition to the positions that Dan EUsberg has mentioned, I want to say a
few more things about mv background. I was from a very conservative reUgious
familv in the Imi^erial City of Hue. As a young Boy Scout in 1942 I was recruited
into the Vietminh by a very outstanding leader of the International Boy Scout
movement named Professor Bo. Beginning in 1942 Professor Bo organized clan-
destine Communist units among selected \'ietnamese youth. In 1944 hand-picked
vouths from each province were sent to a special course in North Metnam called
The First Political Militarv Course. This course lasted three months and at its
conclusion I was made one of the first platoon leaders in the \'ietminh Liberation
Army which, in 1947, was renamed the Army for the Protection of the Country.
In 194.5 to 1950 I served at various levels in the Liberation Army and moved up
to Ihe level of Political Commissar for the 5th \ietminh Inter-zone, which consist-
ed of the areas from Duong Nang to the 3rd Corp in South \i"tnam.
I left the Vietminh for several reasons. ^My conservative background made me
very attached to the Roval Family and when Bao Dai returned to Vietnam, we
felt we had a national patriot. Besides that, the Vietminh increasingly began to
discriminate against all elements they considered unreliable, such as "bovu-geoise,"
Catholics and the hke. A number of persons from religious backgrounds like
mvself left the Vietminh at that time. This was one of the major mistakes of the
Vietminh— that they were unwiUing to trust the inside cadre only on the basis of
social origin. Another mistake was the 194G assassination of all non-communist
elements within the Nationalist movement.
First altempts at pacification
The first use of the term pacification was in 1952 when the French attempted
three types of programs to clear the Vietminh from the countryside. One was in
the Delta region of North \'ietnam, a predominately CathoUc area; the second
tvpe of French program occurred in the central coastal area, provinces such as
Binh Dinh. Th(> third took place in the Mekong Deha area. Each program was
different and yet there were similar aspects: first, the launching of a mihtary
operation to clear Vietminh units from the area; secondly, the improvement and
expansion of a French-tvpe police system; thirdly, the reorganization of a village
committee to take direct control of the village area. The basic failures of the
French program are obvious from the outcome of the war against the Vietminh —
the French defeat in 1954.
Pacification in 1961
Pacification was tried again in 1961 but this time much more fully under
Vietnamese control. There was, however, substantial support from the U.S. and
from advisors such as Thompson. The main element consisted in the effort of
"combining a military spirit with the technical organization sj'stem." The youth
brigades organized by the South \'ietnamese government were to undertake
economic development activities, but also possess military combat qualities.
372
There were two main failures in tins 1961 program: first, an effort to do "too
much too rapidly"; secondly, many of the local commanders were "intellectually
hypnotized" by' the instructions issued to them by Nhu's central committee.
Cioin^ too fast meant that the province chiefs were too eager for success and
therefore moved on to more advanced steps in the pacification process before
adequately completing the necessary preliminaries. They failed to screen the \C
infrastructure out of the villages before undertaking pacification activities. There
were not enough economic development activities and, thirdly, the province
officials, in their haste, were not willing to persuade people to undertake the
actions the government desired, but instead forced them to do various things,
such as the construction of combat hamlets and the like.
During this time I was one of the province chiefs y,-ho refused to make haste
merely for the sake of appearing successful to my superiors. My province, Kien
Hoa at that time, also continually appeared as 36th or 37th among the provinces
in the monthly progress reports that we had to file. Nevertheless, I believe the
1961 pacification program would have been a success "had it not been for the
1963 Buddhist crisis." This crisis undermined the government at the center and
made any progress in the field impossible.
In the"aftermath of the November 1963 coup against Diem, the mihtary regime
declared there would be no more strategic hamlet programs and disbanded the
combat youth that the Nhus had set up. Nevertheless within a short time the
value of the program was seen and under a new name a new pacification effort
was begun.
The 1963 ■pacification program
In setting up the new pacification program under the military regime, a major
obstacle to be overcome was the fact that "many of those participating in the
former pacification program had been physically or psychologically condemned."
They were looked upon as "Nhu people," and felt defensive. The military said
that they had collaborated with the Nhus, that they had cooperated with the
Diem government and, therefore, were not reliable; yet these people such as
myself and many others were the ones who had experience in pacification. Due
to this psychological defensiveness, a number of the people who "joined the new
pacification program did so without enthusiasm."
Current pacification program — December 1965 to present
In discussing the current pacification program I must refer to my participation
and my ideas. I do this without any sense of pride and Dan Ellsberg can verify
the facts that I shall relate.
General Thang became Minister of Rural Development in December 196o and
this marked the beginning of the present pacification program. He appointed me
as First Director of the Cadre Training Program because, as province chief in
Kien Hoa, I had begun to work on pacification in my own way with some genuine
SllCCGSS.
The "ideas that I initiated in the first part of 1964 and found extremely useful
was the census grievance program, and I shall now describe it and my reasons for
initiating it. . -r. ,■
I realized that the most important reasons for lack of success m pacification
was because of the non-participatio n of people. This non-participation was not
because the people supported the Viet Cong, because if the people had supported
the Viet Cong, I would not have had the courage to continue in my activities
at all. Rather they were threatened by the Viet Cong in a kind of imminent way.
The Viet Cong were not there in the villages I dealt with; they were relatively
secure; there were few incidents. But the people had a mental fear of the Viet
Qong — an obsession. They felt the Viet Cong might always come back or could
be anywhere at any time.
I set up the census grievance program because I wanted to release the people
from their mental fear of the Viet Cong. The people did not have psychological
confidence in our forces and the army and the PF. They always suspected that one
or two people in these or any other government agencies might have secret
connections with the Viet Cong, and, therefore, were afraid to give any informa-
tion to the government.
The census grievance program was begun in 1963. The essential idea was that
one cadre would be assigned by a province chief with a closed office in each village.
Then on a regular basis this census grievance official would see all the people from
373
the village for an equal length of time, usually about three minutes and then he
would walk out the door. So it l)ecame impossible to know who had said something
to the official and who hadn't — only the official knew.
The census grievance official would talk to the person and first lK>gin to ask him
about his family, how they were, who were his relations in the village, and what
were the various members of his family doing. Secondly, he would begin to ask
about whether the individual had any problems with government officials or with
the soldiers, and whether he wanted anything done about these problems, or if he
wanted more services, government aid of one kind or another. Thirdly, the official
would ask the villager whether he had seen any suspicious activity lately, such as
strangers near the village, change in the number of persons living in homes nearby
or movement of supplies or goods in the area.
Once the census grievance program had begun operating for a little while, the
people in the hamlet began to be supicious but this time in a reverse sense. They no
longer merely worried about whether someone was an informer for the Viet Cong
or whether they were Viet Cong agents who watched and knew what their activities
were. Rather they now began to wonder whether and if some of the people were
informing to the government about them. No one knew whether anyone was giving
any information; no one knew what kind of information might be given. But the
whole procedure and the fact that nothing could be known about what went on
began to have an effect on those people who were secret!}^ members of what we
called the "on-the-spot Viet Cong." Within one month after the program began
operating, seven poeple voluntarily left the village. These were the Viet Cong agents
in the village.
In 1964 this program was so successful in my province that almost every prov-
ince installed this system toward the end of 1964.
Colonel Chan's -procedures for dealing with the people's grievances
A problem with the census grievance program was that the established authori-
ties of the village, the police chief and the hamlet chief, etc., of course began to
worry also about whether the people were informing on their activities. For that
reason they were not cooperative at first and quite suspicious of the program. A
problem Ifaced then was, "if I created jealousy between the census grievance
cadre and the village chief, I would destroy the basis of the village chief's au-
thorit3^" My procedu.re then for dealing with complaints and grievances against
the village chief was the following: (1) the census grievance cadre would put this
information to the district office; (2) the district office would pass the information
on to my personal staff of inspectors who would then go out and verify the fact
that the grievance cited actually was occurring; (3) the insj^ector would report to
a special committee of the province chiefs and would recommend action; (4)
finally, I myself would have a talk with the village chief, explain the inforn^>ation
and attempt to persuade him to change his ways. .My ))urpose "was not to ])uuish
but to educate the village chiefs and to change their behavior.'"
I also kept two afternoons open a week at the province caiiital where anyone
could come and personally tell me about any prol)lems he was having in the prov-
ince. This audience with me was open to anyone, first come, first served. Another
technique we used was to broadcast on a radio ijrogram. We had discussion of a
problem that had occurred (Mth(»r in a named village or a village that was described
in general. The problem would be described, then the way the case was solved, the
solutions that were proposed by the province chief or adopted by the village
chief as the case may be. This broadcasting of real probhuBS and real solutions,
together with the; afternoon audi(!nce possibiliti(\s brought many people to see me in
my office, and gave many people hope that some things could be changed.
The way I handled these fears and suspicions of the other government officials
was mainly to try to talk with them, listen to their problems, listen to the concerns
they had about the census grievance program. I tried to make myself available to
them and help them understand that as long as they performed properly, there was
nothing they need worry al)out. In fact, with time, many police chiefs told me
that they found me far from being a threat, a valuable province chief, because at
least I was accessible to them and they could talk to me about the problems they
were having.
Daniel Ellsberg's comments on the census grievance system
This entire discussion brings out a number of very interesting points. One is that
information flow is felt to be very important by the Communists and Colonel
Chau is one of those rare people in the GVN or American establishment who like-
374
wise is very concerned with promoting the accumulation of accurate information
on the people whom government programs, pacification, military programs and
the like are supposedly aimed at.
In Vietnam within the administrative agencies of the GVN there is generalh- a
very high rate of personnel turnover, so there are very few people within the GVN
who know anything about "their areas." As a resvilt of the census grievance pro-
gram in Kien Huo province, however, an enormous amount of very important
data had been collected and could be passed on from one hamlet village or district
or province official to the next. For example, in a very simple hamlet of the prov-
ince— a hamlet would consist of a number of houses with some coconut and
banana trees and the like — there would be a simple thatched hut like all the others
on the outside which would contain the data collected by the census grievance
system. Inside this hut would be a very accurately, in fact, even artistically
drawn map of the hamlet showing the property owned by each person, exactly
where it was, its extent, and what was produced on that property. In addition,
there would be file cards which clearly indicated the pattern of relations among
people within the hamlet and among the various hamlets in the village. Further,
there would be very complete listings of all relatives presumed working with the
the Viet Cong, or with the GVN administrative apparatus. In addition to that,
the census grievance data cards also had breakdowns of age groups, the amount
of education received by various people, land holdings, and other such socio-
economic information. Colonel Chau has not mentioned this purely informational
aspect of the census grie\'ance program, but as it worked out, it provided Kien
Hao province with one of the few incidences of worthwhile information on the
people in a local area.
One organization in Vietnam is known for backing new ideas. It backed the
census grievance program in Kien Hoa province as a pilot project. Once it began
working so well, it was immediately tried on a nation-wide scale. There it could
not work so well for three main reasons: (1) not all province chiefs are anjrwhere
near as good as Colonel Chau; (2) the cadre must be instructed to collect grievances
and complaints about the government rather than merely to elicit information
about the Viet Cong. The cadre cannot be motivated if they are to be nothing
more than spies for the government; (3) there came to be an emphasis on the
third part of the census grievance program — the collection of information on the
Viet Cong. As a result of this, the cadre were neither as motivated nor as effective
as they had been in the initial program.
But the "effectiveness of Colonel Chau's census grievance program was not
dependent on who was running it"; it did provide information. In fact, there never
had been as much information as was obtained bj^ this system. The system was
by no means as good as it had been in its pilot province, but it still was effective
for some purposes when extended to a national scale.
The reasons why Kien Hoa is not more secure today
Despite the success mentioned in 1964, it is correct to say that Kien Hoa
province is not much more secure today than any other province in Vietnam. The
reasons for this might be better understood if I describe mj- operations at the time
a bit more.
I used the census grievance information as an input to several counterterrorist
groups which I ran. These counterterrorist groups usually operated in small units
of three men and were very effective in assassinating VC cadre in the area of my
control. In addition to this I attempted to contact the families of jjersons who
were working with the VC and used them as a means to bring people back to the
government side.
The way I would do this was the following: once census grievance information
gave us lists of people who were working with the VC, I would make a public
announcement within each hamlet of the families which had a member working
with the VC either in the village or elsewhere. When these families saw their
names published in an open list like this, their feelings were hurt and they felt
that their prestige in the community had been lessened. The whole purpose of the
public announcement was to cause them some psychological shock and prepare
them for visits from selected Chieu Hoi cadre who then came in and spoke with
the family. These Chieu Hoi tried to convince the famil,y that they should make
an effort to get their VC members back. Usually the families then tried to get the
VC members back. Thej^ would either talk to them when the VC members visited
them, or they would communicate by writing or in some other way. Whether the
375
family was successful or not, the net effect of this was demoralizing for the Yiet
Cong members because the}- saw their families' loyalty disappear and felt them-
selves more alone in the movement.
Furthermore, the family's position and its unity before had been quite secure.
They had a member working with the Viet Cong but no one really knew for sure,
and they did not feel they had to hide anything. But with the publication of the
list, the family began to feel insecure. That was the reason for their emotional
shock — that was the reason they felt sorry they had a VC member in the family.
And once the family felt insecure like this, they didn't want the VC members to
come back as often, so the whole arrangement of membership in the Viet Cong
became a much less comfortable affair for the Viet Cong member. He couldn't
simply return to his familj^ and be equally comfortable in the government side as
well as the Viet Cong side of the Vietnamese scene.
Now to return to the reasons for the deterioration of the security of Kien Hoa
province. First, the census grievance no longer worked after I left. Secondly, the
counter-terrorist groups did not work because my successor decided to consolidate
the small 3-man units, first into platoon and then even into company size. Thirdly,
I had had support from eminent peojale in my province from the Catholics from the
Hoa Hoa, from the Cao Dai, and so forth, but my successor could not obtain their
support.
The reason for that is because I went around the province a lot by jeep and
bicycle. I kept in constant touch with the villages and hamlets and with the
officials, and I tried to be very sure to visit the hospital, both civil as well as
militar}^ patients, and the prisons, at least once a week. My successor did not do
this — the people made an unfavorable comparison and he did not receive their
support as I have. "The failure of pacification is not due to militarj^ arrangements."
Siv steps to pacification — Chau's program
When I ask people, Vietnamese or American, what is the end object of pacifica-
tion, the answer always is something like, winning the hearts and minds of the
]jeople so that they will support the government. To me this is no objective at all.
It merely permits all commanders on all levels of government to do what they
wish.
When I hear an objective like this, I say that there is no pacification program.
It's too vague.
The objective of pacification should be people's self-defense. By this I mean that:
Ideologically as well as militarih', people must be convinced that they cannot
stand as neutrals. They must either go with the Comnumists or with the gov-
ernment.
I will never consider a hamlet as pacified as long as the people are willing to
protect themselves. No place in Vietnam can be considered as pacified in this
sense at the present. There are onlj' secure places which are secure because of the
presence of military forces.
Now what will make people willing to defend themselves? That will occur onlj-
when people arc running their own aff"airs. And how can this be obtained? This can
be obtained when elections are really desired by the people, rather than merely
imposed on them as it has happened so often in the past.
Local people's organizations
Elections will be desired by the people only when they have their roots in the
understanding that government can do something for them. People's organizations
exist in Vietnam as elsewhere in the world. "These organizations train people to
respond to community spirit."
Farmers realize farmers belong to a farmers' association because it helps them
with their crops. They then learn about representation and government when they
realize that they can't devote their own time to running the farmers' organization,
so they must appoint a representative to run the organization for them.
Improve living standard of people
To make local people's organizations really important, they must do something
tangible for the people. What I mean by improving the living standard is an
improvement in economic conditions and also an improvement in their dignity.
The people are most concerned with things like justice, fairness, protection, and
the like. The city and town i)eople care the most about dignity and justice. People
in the countrj- are most concerned with economic development and, in fact,
376
wouldn't really understand any system that was supposed to guarantee them
justice. They would see justice not in any set of procedures but merely in the
way things are run.
This is where AID programs should come in — -the.v should be brought in at
this level — at the village hamlet level — to improve the economic conditions of
the people.
Why have so many AID programs failed to work? Because most of the people
working were technicians and they were only technicians — they did not use
economic aid for political purposes in the villages and hamlets. Also, they did not
really understand the local political situation and so often were taken in by the
people who used economic aid for their self-interest.
Investigation into local natural leaders
For that reason it is important to know who are the most influential people
in the community, that is, who are the people who can really have an impact on
the people and get them to use new economic and agricultural techniques. For the
most part, AID technicians don't know tliis and neither do Vietnamese. This
must be found out by doing a thorough investigation of this before putting in
economic aid.
Confidence of the people
By confidence of the people I mean two things: first, security from the Viet
Cong and, secondly, proper behavior of the GVN. These things are necessary
before anything can be done in the community.
Now in Vietnam all of these six things have been done, but they have never
been done together in one place at one time and they haven't been done in the
proper sequence. The sequence of events is all-important if the end result is to
be the people's self-defense as I have outlined it. The sequence must be as follows:
1) confidence; 2) investigation of leaders; 3) improvement of living standards;
4) local people's organizations; 5) local elections; and 6) people's self-defense.
Pacification
You have asked me to talk about the good and bad aspects of pacification in
1966 and 1967. The good aspects were the following two: first, there was a definite
pacification program; secondly, we made strenuous efforts to implement the pacifi-
cation program, and finally, we made some efforts to evaluate its success and
failures. It was only toward the end of 1966 that we in the Ministry of Rural
Development were able to convince the Vietnamese military of the need for
pacification.
Question. What lessons did you learn about pacification in 1966?
The most important failure was "the improper selection of areas to be pacified."
Our failure was that we tried to make too rapid progress and we neglected the
district towns and other areas that were marked as secure. The point was that
only in a few pacified areas that had been considered insecure before 1966 could
district and local officials show any real progress in pacification. So we neglected
the central towns and district capitals, etc., and other such secure areas, and con-
centrated our pacification efforts on the areas just outside the secure areas.
The bureaucratic process of selecting areas to be pacified
In theory, suggestions of areas to be pacified was by the suggestion of the
district chief, but in fact the province chief told the district chiefs which hamlets
to select. Andt he province chief was. told by the corps commander or division
commander which area to pacify and his main purpose was to extend the secure
areas.
But this description of the actual process by which areas were selected is not
quite accurate.
In practice pacifications areas were selected sometimes by the district chief,
sometimes by the province chief, and sometimes by the divisional corp com-
mander.
Impact of bureaucratic, economic and other interests on the selection of areas to be
pacified
Actually the selection of areas to be pacified did not depend so much on the
matter of tangible interests, but rather was more related to the "concept the
various people had of pacification."
377
The province chief usually selected areas on a political l)asis. I selected iny areas
on the basis of these factors: (1) Whether there was enough security. This is the
most important factor — security enough for the pacification teams to work. (2)
The manpower factor, meaning the number of people living there. I used this as a
guideline to how important the area was. (3) The existence of notable people who
could mobilize people to participate in pacification programs. (4) My estimate
of the sympathy of people in the area to be pacified and if it would be possible to
win them over.
Manj' Vietnamese government institutions talk about the criteria of selection
for pacification but say nothing about the final objectives for pacification.
It is impossible to select areas or to establish criteria for selection without a
clear idea of the real objectives for pacification.
The ABC area concept
Consider three concentric rectangles with the inside one the first one, the A
area; the second one the B area, and third one the C area. Assume that the A
area marks the immediate location of hamlets and villages around a major district
or province town. According to my ideas, the A area is the place where one should
begin working on pacification, that is, it is secure enough for the pacification
forces to work in, and now with additional effort, one tries to get the people to
organize their own self-defense — the end objective of pacification as I have
mentioned earlier.
Under those circumstances one deploys pacification personnel in the A area;
the B area we will call the contested area, and in that, military deployment is
needed to keep the Viet Cong out of the A area. And, in the C area we'll call that
the Viet Cong-controlled, the Viet Cong may have large forces, bases, and hideouts.
(Comment by Ellsberg: The current situation is that people in A areas haven't
taken sides, and an area is secure only when it is saturated with troops. The
people in these "secure" areas are passive; thej^ don't cooperate with the govern-
ment in their defense; they haven't been forced to take sides in the manner that
Chau envisions. A major reason the government doesn't want to work in the A
aieas is because this will not permit statistical displaj" of progress since the areas
are already called "secure.")
My overall strategy is to move out from a number of relatively secure areas
within a province, deploying pacification cadre first in the A areas, then to the
B areas, and so forth, hoj^ng to link up several foci so that the net area that might
be called truly pacified grows and becomes connected together.
The strategy called for spreading out from many centers of security. It is not
possible to begin with one area and then continually enlarge the sphere of security
because that would mean in effect abandoning many districts and province towns
that are now relatively secure. If people are abandoned who already have, in
effect, sided with the government, the effect may be disastrous. To do that and
concentrate all efforts in one area and then spread out would be giving up nuich
too much. The Viet Cong would take over all the areas that had been left, of
course.
(Comment by Pauker: Whether a single c(Miter or manv- overall strategies are
adopted probably depends on popular attitudes. If areas are secure only because
there are lots of troops there, but the people really havx'u't made any commitment
of any kind to the government or might even be leaning toward the VC, then
theoretically not much is lost by withdrawing to a single area and concentrating
resources in order to begin spreading out from there. If, on the other hand, people
in the other centers of pacification activity, have in a sense come to depend on
the government or trust it, or what not, then withdrawing could be catastrophic.)
Area Current deployment Chau's preferred deployment
A. ARVN base._ __ A popular self-defense force plus (presumably) RD cadre.
B Some ARVN, some U.S. troops, some PF A uniform police force— field police which had absorbed the
R F and PF, and the urban police force.
C None— or popular force; regional force ARVN operations in the "C" area.
In effect, my concept of military operations reverses the current situation.
Right now the popular forces in the C area in effect protect ARVN which huddles
in the district and province towns of the A area. I would make the deployment as
44-706 — 70 25
378
indicated (see page 25) and give political control of the A and B areas to the prov-
ince chief, while leaving ARVN in control of the C area. The C area, then, would
be the primary field of ARVN operations with the uniform police handling police
and security functions in the A and B areas.
(Comment by Menges: Has Chau or anyone else made any prelinunary esti-
mates of the extent to which the ABC area concept in reality reflects the security
sitimtion in South Vietnam? Might it not be that there are corridors or patches
of B and C areas within a larger A area, or vise versa? Or, put another way I
might ask whether the A, B, and C areas are mere constructs or whether they are
meant to reflect geographically contiguous regions. Does geography here really
matter.'' Partially 1 11 answer my own question by sajing that since force deploy-
ment and pohtical authority is involved, territorial units are basic to Chau's
scheme. The notion of ARVN operating in a C area which crosses through A or B
areas or of having uniform police operate in a defined A area while one-half mile
away the C area is left to ARVN, and so forth, seems completely absurd. In
other words, since the concept does depend in broad measure on the security
situation in South \ietnam, being divisible into more or less contiguous if not
necessarily concentric A-, B-, or C-type areas, the first question that needs to be
answered is whether this, in fact, is the case in South Vietnam. It also seems
logical to ask whether Chau or anyone else has tried any variant of this scheme.)
Organization of youth as a strategy
Question Might it not now be time and in fact essential to begin the organization
of sermtotahtarian youth groups similar to the young cmnmunists or Hitler Youth
as a way of building an antt-Communist cadre?
It is not possible in Vietnam to extract one group from the society and deal with
it alone as was done in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union or 'in Communist
Cuba. Programs of this type have failed in the past because the indoctrination
did not include the parents, relatives and other elements of the society that are
essential since the youth will not simply follow an organization alone. Also in
order to have indoctrination it is necessary to have a doctrine. '
Question. But for the very young children, eight, nine, and ten years old, the doctrine
can be relatively simple anti-communist, and youth and sport associations can be
the means by which subtly a gradual measure of indoctrination occurs.
Well, the French tried to do exactly this in the mid- 1940s. They formed many
sport organizations and the like in order to get youth to use up energy and not
think about nationalism and other such ideas. But in fact it had precisely the
reverse effect; I was in the Boy Scouts as I mentioned before and other youth
and sport associations, but when we went out to the countryside bicycling and
other such things, we enjoyed it but this did not leave us satisfied. We, in a sense
became more energetic because of these organizations, became more disciplined'
more concerned about the society and, in fact, ultimately we became more
nationalistic.
In Vietnam many youth organizations have been tried since 1954. Many were
formed and many have been disbanded. Diem's approach was the Republican
youth and this ended in 1963. As I mentioned, Vietnamese will join if they are
told to join something, but that isn't the same thing as being truly committed.
Comments on A RVN
Responding to the question of the quality of the officer corps of ARVN, I
would make the following breakdown: NCOs, 90 percent are good; company
commanders, that is, lieutenants and second lieutenants about SO percent-
captains, 70 percent good; majors, about 60 to 50 percent; then colonels and gen-
erals from 20 to 15 percent good. In other words, the higher the rank, the lower the
political morale and military quality of the persons who hold them.
Reasons for the GVN's neglect of the people
The major reason the people are neglected by the GVN is what I shall call
facilities and resources aspect of the situation. On the government's side all facili-
ties and resources come from the state— they come from outside the people, it
seems, while on the VC side, it is necessary to get all these facilities and resources
directly from the people, so they are not able to ignore the people.
This is a fundamental difference — one side is directly and clearly tied to the
people. It understands this — the Communists know that unless they are able to
extract and coerce and voluntarily get resources from people, they will have
nothing. On the government side, though, it seems that the people's 'cooperation
IS not directly necessary for anything.
379
The Vietminh did not steal from the people, not because of communist ideology
and other high-blown reasons, but due to "practical necessity." They knew that
they would have to get supplies from the people tomorrow, so, if they were to
steal one time, they understood that the people would immediately begin to hide
all the supplies from them, and they would not have a second, third, or fourth
opportunity to steal frona the people. The Vietminh knew this even though they
might have been willing to use force. If they stole or were too rough with the
people, they would simply not be able to find the supplies they needed. They
wouldn't even be able to buy the supplies they needed.
Main problems at the top echelons of the South Vietnamese government
After the fall of Diem in 1963, there were in reality three powers in South
Vietnam: ARVN, United States, and the Viet Cong.
That means for the South Vietnamese government there were in effect two
two powers, and the dramatic situation is that no one seems to be the real leader.
Americans expect initiative and performance from the Vietnamese; they wait for
the Vietnamese to act. At the same time the Vietnamese expect ideas, initiative,
and leadership from the United States.
Many of the natural leaders in South A'ietnam expected various things from
the United States while the U.S. people did not want to take over the real leader-
ship for obvious reasons. As the situation now is, no one acts as a leader.
The Americans interfere but not enough to get anything really done; and the
Vietnamese initiate but they don't follow through in doing anything.
Question. Perhaps you could take the 1966 pacification program and give us
a case study description of the way these problems work at the top.
The situation in the rural development ministry was the following: General
Thang was in charge of the program. Colonel Lok was his deputy and he was in
charge of what I would call "routine' operations, that is, getting the supplies
there on time, taking care of running the day-to-day things. Colonel Quang had
to handle the budget; his role was to decide how much went into each of the
various programs, and I was in charge of the rural operations and the rural
development cadre program. In effect it meant that there were two people who
had a planning role; these wert; myself and CJeneal Thang.
Question. For example, how did the Ministry of Rural Development go about
getting budget support — what bureaucratic allies did it have; who were the
opponents of the Rural Development Ministry?
Here the United States' role was very important. The Americans felt that
this was a very good idea and they were willing to give almost the complete
budget of 3 billion piasters.
Comnient by Meiiges: Despite varioii.s efforts, it was difficult to get Colonel Chau to talk about elite
politics even within the tangible context of the pacilication program. Another effort was made later by
Ellsberg in the discussion, and this did not meet with greater success in getting Colonel Chau to trace out
the full play of elite politics.
Question. What is wrong with ARVN leadership in your opinion?
First, there is too much difference in the treatment among different ranks from
General to Colonel to ]Major and down in the officer corps. The salaries are not
too different, but the Generals and Colonels have government houses, cars,
drivers, and all sorts of special funds. Captains, Lieutenants, Majors don't have
government housing, don't have cars, and the like. Secondly, the promotion
system is not terribly fair.
We have a Board of Promotion and everything, but despite that every General
has to deal with other Generals to survive, so promotions are actually handled
in the following way — if you want your men to be promoted, you have to promote
those the other Generals suggest.
So when the promotion list comes around, tradition is that two-thirds of those
suggested by each General actually get promoted. And all the Generals cooperate
with each other on this. "So officers realize that they have to make a choice to
staj' with one General or another." If his career goes up, they go up; if he goes
down, they go down.
This was the situation until 196o, but since then the system has gotten better.
Promotion, in other words, has been mainly based on political concerns, not
ability. Every officer realizes that he must have "an influential affiliation" if he
is going to get ahead.
Comment by Menges: There wasi no chance to askJChau how/why the system had gotten better in the
last two years. This might be worth exploring.
380
Comments on GVN elite politics
Question. As a case study of the political process in South Vietnam, could you
describe to us how one might attempt to go about changing the promotion system
at the upper levels of ARVX? What might the role of the National Assemblj- be
of the United States, etc.?
The Americans didn't like Diem so they withdrew support from him and gave
it to Khanh and then to one general after another. It seems that the Americans
keep looking for people. They try to impose leaders who fit their conception of
leadership. Sometimes one feels that the Americans look on Vietnam as a very
primitive countiy and they think that if they impose a suitable leader, all would
be well.
There are three choices for Vietnam: a communist system, a mixed democracy-
dictatorial system, or a real democratic system. We have already tried choices
one and two. The communist system has failed in the North and it would have the
same bad effects in the South. The mixed system under Diem was clearly unsuc-
cessful, therefore, it is now time that w'e tried a genuine democratic system.
In South Vietnam at the present time neither the government nor the
legislature is all-powerful. There is some sort of balance held by the United States.
The legislature represents the sympathy of the people but cannot in any way
mobilize their active support. While the government represents the desperate
choice of the people but does not have their active support in any sense.
So the United States has to support the democratic system in Vietnam. It has
to make clear to the generals and to the government of South Vietnam that it will
support the principle and practice of the current constitution of South Vietnam.
Right now there is some degree of danger in being a member of the legislature as
I am and attempting to bring about reforms and changes in the central govern-
ment. You will recall the assassination of one leading figure in the constituent
assembly. I will continue to try but I won't try too hard because I realize that if
arrested' I'm not doing anyi)ody any good, least of all myself. For me it is very
important that I know that the United States will defend, not me personally,
but the principle of legislative government if anything should happen to me.
There are other people like me who are more likely to be willing to take chances
in attempting to reform the system if they believe that the United States govern-
ment will support the constitutional system.
Comment from Menges; There was then an approximately one hour discussion on the military aspects of
local operations. This is not recorded here.
Reformist elements in ARVN
The captains and the majors are most important and reformist oriented. There
are two types of captains and majors. There are the youth who have just become
captains and majors, and then there is another large group of officers who had been
passed over at promotion several times.
Main changes desired in the GVN
One, a better balance between executive and legislature. Two, the encourage-
ment of a loyal opposition. Three, integration of Buddhists with the government.
Since their defeat in 1966, the GVN has done nothing to win over Buddhist
leadership and bring about greater cooperation with the organized Buddhist
community.
This is an important element that is not at all understood by the current South
Vietnamese leadership. Although one of the Buddhist leaders such as Tri Quang
may have only 5 percent of his followers who would really obey his orders and
become active' politically at his distinct request, the other 95 percent would, if
Tri Quang were persecuted, immediately move against the government. They
would withdraw all support and collaboration with the government; that is,
though they probably would fight against it, the government would have lost
their support. This is what the government does not understand, that by failing
to make efforts at symbolic unity with more of the factions and groups in South
Vietnam, it is losing any chance of bringing the various followers of the move-
ments and people and groups into any kind of active collaboration with it. This
doesn't mean, of course, that these same people would collaborate with the Viet
Cong. But in any case they are lost to the government.
Question. Why is there no effort to organize these other political elements in
South Vietnam by the generals?
Two reasons: first, the government people feel that these various opposition
leaders have no real following. They think there's no reason to take the trouble
381
to win them over politically because thej' can neither help them nor hurt them.
Secondl}', it is a matter of interest.
It is not possible to bring people in unless you give them something. I am not
even speaking of economic interests in this case. If the generals want to bring
leaders of other groups into Vietnamese politics, they have to share power and
authority. They are afraid to share an}- power.
Question. Could 3'ou, without naming specific names, describe some of the
elements of the circles of the power that surround the generals ^-ou mentioned?
These might be of man.y kinds, for example, there might be a general who
has five province chiefs who are essentially his. Another general might have three
ministries.
General Thang's resignation
Question. Could you tell us something about some of the obstacles to the reform
program that General Thang attempted and the reason he resigned?
A very complex story with many sides. The generals could probably accept the
reform plan of General Thang, but they did not want to accept it from him. The
reason for this is that they believed that this whole reform scheme was essentially
an American plan and that they gave it to General Thang. The South Vietnamese
generals believed this was an American plan to let General Thang be successful
as a reformer in order to have him take over as the Premier in South Vietnam.
In other words, the Americans were getting ready to switch leaders again and for
that reason the current group wanted to make sure that General Thang would
not be successful. But I think that the reform plan will be adopted by the generals.
Comment by Menges: Chau was very reluctant to go into this in any greater detail on this day. Nor did
he the next day when I tried to get him to speak further on these topics. Partly I believe thLs is a matter of
ignorance on exactly how the generals operate. Partly it seems to be a matter of discretion, or desire to limit
the information he gives us. EUsberg would have a better sense of which it might be. Chau had mentioned
earlier that there is a classmate circle of people wlio hud graduated from the same military academy at the
same time; these include Ky, Loan, and about four others. All graduated from Nahm Binh Academy in tlie
early 1950s.
The Library of Congress,
Washington, B.C., February 11, 1970.
TRANSLATION (French)
[From Le Mvnde, July 7, 1%9, pp. 1 and 2]
Revelations in Saigon on the Occasion of a Trial
(By Jean-Claude Pomonti)
Saigon, July 5. — Does President Thieu's regime, in spite of intentions aired
and numerous concessions on fundamentals made in the course of the last eight
months, sincerely consider a compromise with the NLF; i.e., as a first step, a
living together under the same roof with his adversaries? A growing number of
Saigon politicians doubt it and have for some time been accusing the regime
more and more openly of opposing any peace initiative not originating from
the government, and especially, of trying to .silence the liberal groups rather than
to make them i)artners in its enterprises. This is the impre.ssion at least that
prevailed again Friday night, when the proceedings brought against some twenty
persons accused of treason or corresponding with the enemy ended in service
punishment in the form of imprisonment and hard labor.
This case began with a scenario that the \'ietnamese have known only too well
from a quarter century of war and dissension. Captain Tran Ngoc Ilien, a Viet
Cong officer and an old hand at intelligence — 22 years of service, as he said him-
self, not without pride, in the course of the trial — went back to Saigon in 1964,
probably on a mission. He contacted his family and friends: his wife and his three
children who live in Ainh Long, in the Delta; his brother, Tran Ngoc Chau,
Deputy and Secrt^tary General of the National Assembly; a cousin, Mr. A'o Dinh
Cuong, one of the Buddhist Youth leaders of the An-Quang Pagoda; as well as
iMr. Nguyen Lau, the well-known publisher of the moderately anti-Communist
Saigon Daily News.
Last April, Captain Hien, Mr. Xo Dinh Cuong, and Mr. Nguyen Lau, were
arrested and accused of "treason", as were some twenty confederates. Did he
know about Captain Hien's activities? Did the latter use his kin and his childhood
382
friends without their knowledge? Mr. Nguyen admitted in April that he suspected
something, that he should have reported Captain Hien instead of sending him a
letter from his paper, but that he could not make up his mind to do so, as Mr.
Hien was both a childhood pal and a comrade from the anti-French Resistance of
1946-1947. On Friday he pleaded not guilty and denied having known about
Captain Hien's activities, stating that his previous testimony was worthless.
A LONG STRING OF CONTACTS
"I was isolated in a cell, I heard people cry, I finally gave up", he said before the
military tribunal. Captain Hien's testimony was to the same effect: an old officer
like myself, he said in substance, is not going to entrust his secrets to just any-
body, even if he is a friend. In short, the very type of case in which evidence is
lacking and from which the most contradictory conclusions may be drawn ac-
cording to whether one looks at it from the viewpoint of state of war or of peace.
The military tribunal then settled it: hard labor for life for Captain Hien, 25 years
of hard labor for another NLF agent (Mrs. Paulette Quoi), five years in prison for
Messrs. Nguyen Lau and \'o Dinh Cuong, various penalties for the other
defendants.
The case became complicated because Captain Hien's brother. Deputy Tran
Ngoc Chau, published during the trial, on Fridaj^ afternoon a statement implying
that the contacts he had with his brother had a highly political bent. "In April
1968, I suggested to Hien", he said to us Saturday morning, "that I go to Hanoi
with a parliamentary delegation to set up discussions between Hanoi and Saigon.
''Hien came back to see me in June 1968, to tell me that the North Vietnam
leaders were ready to meet with us at Hanoi or in Laos, but as visitors and not
as officials. Shortly thereafter, in August, I submitted a petition to the Assembly
carrying 74 signatures (or, the majority of the deputies) in favor of direct nego-
tiations between the two Vietnams. As the Assembly showed itself hesitant, but
did not reject this proposal, I asked Hien, who knew the principal leaders of the
North ver}^ well, again whether Hanoi would accept receiving a joint delegation —
of deputies accompanied by high-ranking persons — by stressing the necessity of
receiving us as representatives of the South Vietnamese people. He answered that
this would be difficult and, after an absence of 20 hours, he came back to see me
to tell me that the North was maintaining its position: visitors but not officials.
He added that if we would make new proposals we would perhaps be received in
an official capacity. In January, I then presented a peace plan (see the statement
made to Le Monde on January 18, 1969), but it got such an unfavorable reception
in Saigon that I did nothing more until my brother's arrest."
LOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
Were President Thieu and the Americans aware of these leads? On this point,
Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau refused to answer: "It is a question of honor", he said to
us simpljr, to justify this refusal. These revelations, if they are comfirmed —
Mr. Chau is expecting a categoric denial from North Vietnam — are a rather good
illustration of the difficulties encountered by those who try to facilitate talks in
Saigon between the different partners, thus drawing the most logical conclusions
from the opening of negotiations in Paris.
It seems that the Saigon government hardly appreciates this attitude, as thej-
are intentions, suggestions, or, especially, initiatives of which it itself is not the
originator. Bej^ond a process that shows to what point the Vietnamese can be
torn, after 20 years of war, between their convictions, their constraints, their
aspirations, their past, and their friendships, another process is beginning: Do
the Saigon leaders hope to convince anyone of their willingness to negotiate a
compromise solution if they continue to persecute the proponents of such a
solution, and those who, because of circumstances, do nothing to prevent its
materialization?
Another Deputy, Mr. Ly Qui Chung, whose paper was closed down three
weeks ago, issued a "warning" in other words. He stated to a group of jovu'nalists:
"Only one voice is accepted, that of the diehards. The politicians are threatened,
the newspapers are closed down. If the government persists in this attitude, it
will gather strength in its isolation, and the opposition will be pushed more and
more toward the NLF. That is what happened last year: non-Communists,
students in particular, came over from the other side because they had no other
383
way of participating in the national cause. We do not want the overthrow of the
government. We only ask for the right to express a different point of view for
the sake of true opposition, and not solely for the sake of the false opposition of
those who do not dare tackle the real problems."
Back from Midway on June 9, President Thieu declared that there would be
"neither a cabinet of peace nor a government of coalition or reconcihation". Can
the regime maintain, without reflecting upon the "good will" to which it lays
claim, such an intransigence at home as the first American troops are leaving
Vietnam, when the United States is inviting it publicly, as Mr. Rogers again
did on Fridav, unambiguously, to make new peace overtures; when the war has
been falling off for two weeks' almost to the point of ex-extinction; in short, when
the diplomatic and military requirements for the beginning of serious negotiations
are satisfied perhaps for the first time?
In eight months of negotiations, the contradiction has only become accentuated,
and it is now the crux of the dispute.
J. C. POMONTI.
Translated by Elizabeth Hanunian.
[From the Los Angeles Times, Sunday, Dec. 28, 1969]
Thieu Stakes Prestige on Vote to Condemn 3 House Members
(By Arthur J. Dommen)
Saigon. — One of South Vietnam's worst political crises in recent years heads
for a showdown Tuesday and the outcome could have a critical impact on the
political future of President Nguyen Van Thieu.
At that time the lower house of the National Assembly is scheduled to vote on
a resolution to condemn three of its members for pro-Communist activities. The
vote could pave the way for stripping the members of their constitutional immunity
from prosecution.
Thieu was the prime mover in bringing the charges against the deputies. He has
virtually staked his prestige on the outcome of the vote. The issue has resulted in
a confrontation between a president zealous in stifling Conununist and neutralist
sympathies and a legislative body jealous of its constitutional prerogatives.
' It has even raised the possibility of impeachment proceedings against Thieu
a move that coiild elevate a super warhawk, vice president Nguyen Cao Ky, to
the nation's highest office.
The latest development was the disclosure Saturday that a nine-member
assembly committee completed a tlu-ee-week study of the case and supported — by
a single" vote — Theiu's allegations against the three deputies. The vote was four
to three with two abstentions. It is the committee's resolution condemning the
deputies that will be submitted to the assembly Tuesday.
The closeness of the vote, according to observers here, make it doubtful that
Thieu will be able to muster the required three-fourths vote in the house needed
to lift the three members' immunity.
The investigation into the accusations turned into a Thieu-assembly confronta-
tion last Dec. 10 when Thieu hinted that if the house did not act to purge itself
of elements suspected of Conununist connections the "army and people" might
take matters into their own hands.
This remark apparently spurred the demonstration Dec. 20 in which several
hundred youths and old women invaded the house to demand action against the
three deputies.
The lower house has been strongly supported by the upper house in denouncing
the incident as an illegal act. President Thieu was forced to promise a house
delegation that there would be no repetition of the demonstration.
Meanwhile, in other developments:
Thieu's presidential adviser, Nguyen Cao Thang, a millionaire pharmacist who
has played an active role in Thieu's relations with the National Assembly and
who made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the South Vietnam National Lib-
eration Front in Paris last March on behalf of Thieu, reportedly met with the
3.5-member pro-government Dan Tien bloc in the 136-member lower house. Thang
was apparently trying to line up support for passage of the resolution Tuesday.
384
The chairman of the house information and press committee charged that the
accusations against the three deputies was part of a plot aimed at diverting pub-
lic attention from a Presidential Palace spy scandal.
NEWSPAPER SUSPENDED
The Information Ministry suspended the newspaper Chanh Dao, a daily closely
identified with the Buddhist church and one of the three accused deputies, on the
eve of publication of a lengthy article on the case.
In the resolution considered by the lower house commission, one of the three
deputies, Pham The True, 29, was condemned on five counts.
He accused the Saigon government of dictatorship, militarism, repression and
exploitation of the people at a press conference in Tokyo last summer. He proposed
a settlement of the war along the lines of Communist proposals and demanded that
the United States withdraw all its troops from South Vietnam and cease it ssupport
of the Saigon government, as demanded by the Communists.
True was charged with supporting the Communist-backed Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government of South Vietnam. He advocated the formation of a coalition
government with the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, and demanded
the overthrow of the Thieu regime.
Tht resolution stated that True was guilty of violating Article 25 of the 1967
constitution, which says "ever.y citizen has the duty to defend the fatherland and
the republic."
CONVICTED SPY RING
The resolution charged deput.y Hoang Hoa Ho, 43, with being in "close rela-
tions" with Le Hull Thuy and Vii Ngoc Nha, convicted members of a Communist
spy ring that extended into the Presidential Palace.
The third deputy, former province chief and Revolutionary Development
program director Tran Ngoc Chau, 45, was condemned for having contacts with
his brother while the latter was working as an agent for North Vietnam.
It also condemns Chau for givdng financial and other assistance to his brother.
Chau has publicly admitted the contacts with his brother and defended them
on the grounds he could not have refused to meet his brother again after a separa-
tion of 16 years. He has denied being a double agent, and has said the small acts of
assistance he performed on his brother's behalf did nothing to harm national
security.
At his press conference Friday, house press chief Ngo Cong Due defended
Chau, saying "the majority of the deputies believe Chau is a nationalist who
opposes this government."
Chau was once close to Thieu. However, after his election to the house, Chau
consistently criticized Thieu's policies and made several proposals for the opening
of negotiations to end the war. He also accused Thang of using presidential funds
to bribe the National Assembly.
COMMUNIST CADRE
In an interview with the government-controlled Vietnam Press Agencj' last
Oct. 27, Thang described Chau as "a left-behind communist cadre in the National
Assembly" and said he thought Chau should be tried for treason.
In a possiblv related move, the senate Friday voted to cut bv 50 million piasters
($423,700) the 400 million piasters ($3,389,600) in South Vietnam's national
budget earmarked as the president's special fund for which he does not have to
account.
The National Assembly has been divided up to now on most issues and Thieu
has had to handle the two chambers delicately to get them to pass his legislation,
even in the most favorable conditions.
He has usually succeeded in having his way. But this time Thieu appears to
have united a majority of the lower house on an issue that involves the self-preser-
vation of the house itself.
If Thieu fails to obt-ain satisfaction on the score of the three deputies, he can
fall back on Article 4 of the constitution, which states "every activity designed to
publicize or carry out communism is prohibited."
But if he accuses the three deputies of being in violation of Article 4, he leaves
himself open to a similar accusation himself by the National Assembly, and there
is growing talk in the assembh' of impeaching him.
385
This is because it is now known that Thieu sent Thang to Paris last March in
a secret attempt to enter into contact with the NLF delegation there. Presum-
ably, the aim was to set up private talks to discuss a political settlement beyond
the propaganda blasts exchanged between the Saigon delegation and the NLF
delegation across the conference table at the weekh- meetings at the Hotel
Majestic.
Thang's attempt, made through French Foreign Minister Michel Debre, is
known to have failed.
Now, argue some of the deputies, Thieu's secret effort to open contacts with
the NLF did much more to harm national security than the occasional friendlj^
contacts between one of his province chiefs with his brother on the other side, a
situation common in ^'ietnam's civil war.
The attempt to make contact in Paris put the communists on notice that their
principal antagonist, the leader they had vowed to overthrow, was anxious to
talk, about a settlement of the war.
Some deputies even go so far as to say, in private, that Thieu may have been
intent on seeking to make a private deal with the communists that would have
preserved his position, although there exists no evidence of such an effort.
SPECIAL COTTBT
This is why there has been talk of impeachment, particular!}- if Chan survives
the vote Tuesday.
Chau is a meniber of an 11-member special court that has the power to im]:)each
the president for treasonable activities. Ten of the 11 members of the special court
are members of the two chambers of the National Assembly.
Chau has maintained that if he were found guilty of violating the constitution
because of his meetings with his brother, then there would be even more reason to
consider Thieu guilty because of the president's attempts to meet the NLF
represenatives in Paris.
Chau, True and Ho are all protected bj^ parliamentarj- immunity under Articles
37 and 38 of the constitution.
Thieu can declare martial law and susj^end the constitution. But this would
seriously undercut the Saigon government's negotiating position at the Paris
conference, since it is based on the premise the Saigon government is the legal
product of free elections and a freelj^ chosen constitution. The provisional revolu-
tionary government proclaimed by the NLF is considered illegal and has no
constitution.
Suspension of the constitution would also automatically undercut the U.S.
negotiating position in Paris, which is that the only nonnegotiable issue in South
Vietnam is the right of the South Metnamese people to self-determination.
Thus, it appears Thieu is rapidlj- heading for an impasse on the legal and con-
stitutional aspects of the current crisis.
The political effect of Thieu's confrontation with the National Assembly
seems to be splitting the entire country at a time when national unit.y would
appear to be the overriding necessity.
The accused deputies are Buddhists, and thej' aie being placed on trial in a
forum in which the country's Catholic minority has a disproportionate share of
power. The National Assembly is heavily weighted in favor of the Catholics
because the militant Buddhists virtually boycotted the 1967 elections.
Thieu, because he i^- a Catholic, is vulnerable to the old susincion that the South
Vietnamese had of his predecessor. President Ngo Dinh Diem — he is favoring the
better organized Catholic minority over the poorly organized Buddhist majority.
The current case is likely to deepen that suspicion and risks splitting the country.
The persons who demonstrated against the three deputies in Saigon and other
cities, at a time when all demonstrations are forbidden by the government, were
mainly Catholics.
Three of the four deputies who voted in favor of be commission resolution
condemning the accused are northern Catholics, who have made a political slogan
of their anticommunism.
Now a Buddhist newspaper has been closed by an information minister who is
widely known to have been a member of Diem's secret Can Lao Party and is
sympathetic to the anticommvmist line in the Catholic sense of the word.
This is why, politically, Thieu risks provoking the Buddhists into a new up-
heaval on the scale of the 1963 rebellion against Diem which led directly to Diem's
downfall.
386
[From the Washington Evening Star, Feb. 2, 1970]
Viet Fugitive Criticizes CIA, Cites Offer on Political Party
(By Keyes Beech)
SAIGON — A South Vietnamese legislator accused of pro-Communist sym-
pathies said today the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency offered him money to
finance a politicalparty but the deal fell through because the CIA wanted him to
support President Nguyen Van Thieu.
Tran Ngoc Chau, 46-year-old national assemblyman, said two CIA men ap-
proached him more than a year ago and told him they would supply the funds if
he would launch his own party.
Chau, who formerly had close ties with the CIA, said he considered the proposal
but failed to reach agreement because of his stand that the Saigon government
should open negotiations with the National Liberation Front, the political arm of
the Viet Cong.
Officiallv at least, Thieu is bitterly opposed to negotiations with the NLF. He
has accused Chau of being a "tool of communism" because the latter did not de-
nounce his brother, a convicted Communist spy. Chau and Thieu were once close
friends and as newly married voung officers shared a house.
Chau declined to name the two CIA men who came to see him "because they
were mv friends and I don't want to hurt anybodj^"
But Chau is disenchanted with the Americans, especially the CIA, because, he
says, they have refused to intervene in his behalf to clear him of Thieu' s charges
that he is a Communist. Chau swears he told CIA friends about his meetings with
his brother in the mid-1960s. U.S. intelligence sources denied this. ^
"If this is a sample of the wav the Americans treat their Vietnamese friends,'
Chau said, "I wonder about the future of thousands of other Vietnamese who have
co-operated with the Americans."
Chau, who has been on the run for several weeks out of fear of arrest or assas-
sination, was interviewed in a secret hideout outside Saigon.
No formal charges have been brought against Chau. However, he has been under
heavy pressure since Thieu's forces sought a three-fourths vote in the assembly to
striphim and two other legislators of their parliamentary immunity so they can
be tried for alleged Communist leanings.
Chau is a former province chief and once was in charge of all revolutionary
development cadres in South Vietnam. The revolutionary development program
was backed by CIA. , r^ -r,
After first adopting a "hands off" attitude,!Ambassador Ellsworth C. Bunker
reportedly asked Thieu to soften his campaign against.Chau because it was hurting
the president's political image in the United States.
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1970]
Thieu Authorized To Try 2 Deputies for Links to Reds
(By Robert G. Kaiser)
Saigon. Feb. 4— South Vietnam's House of Representatives has authorized
President Thieu to prosecute two legislators whom he has accused of consorting
illegally with Communists. . .
One hundred and two of the House's 135 members have signed a petition em-
powering the government to prosecute their two colleagues, who would normally
have a Vietnamese version of congressional immunity. There is some dispute
about the legality of the petition, but it seems virtually certain that the govern-
ment will use it to bring the legislators to trial. .
The Vietnamese constitution stipulates that no member of the National
Assembly can be prosecuted unless three-fourths of his peers approve. One
hundred two is exactly three fourths of the House membership.
The number was reached on Sunday, according to Phan Thong, chairrnan of
the special House committee that had investigated and upheld an accusation by
Thieu that three legislators were guilty of helping the Communists. Ihong
held a press conference today to announce successful completion of his petition
campaign.
387
Thong's committee — and later the House membership, but only by a simple
majority — already had found that all three men accused by Thieu were guilty.
But today's petition only applies to two of them.
The third, Pham The True, escaped because four of the 102 petition signers
refused to include him. The point is of marginal significance, however, because
True is voluntarily exiled in Paris, while the other two are in Vietnam and now
subject to prosecution and, possibly, arrest before their trial.
They are Tran Ngoc Chau, a well-known figure whose brother recently con-
fessed to being a Communist spy in South Vietnam, and Hoang Ho, an obscure
legislator whose name came up in a recent espionage trial here.
Chau could not be located today, and there were unconfirmed rumors that he
had been arrested. Reached at her home by telephone, Mrs. Ho said her husband
had not been arrested, and was 'Svandering around the city."
There is likely to be a controversy over the use of a petition to get three-fourths
of the House to approve prosecution of Chau and Ho.
Today, the president of the Senate, the other house of the National Assembly,
said he "thought a petition was illegal. He said the House should rneet, debate and
vote on the question. Several lawyers have taken the same position.
One, Tran Van Tuyen, a well known man in political circles, said that if this
petition is allowed to stand. House members in future may as well stay home,
sending in their votes on important matters in writing.
The constitution is not explicit on this question, however, and it is a rule of
thumb in Vietnam that when there is any doubt about a constitutional question
the presidential view will prevail.
And President Thieu has made a major issue of the legislators he accused of
helping the enemy. He apparently ordered several "spontaneous rallies" around
the country to try to pressure the House to strip the three of their immunity.
The army 'radio s'tation controlled by the government, also campaigned vigor-
ously for House action.
Manv House members believed Thieu was conducting a campaign against them.
When the House debated the guilt or innocence of the three accused five weeks ago,
many members refused to vote that the\ were guilty because they objected to
Thieu's tactics.
But, in a displav of Vietnamese flexibihty, many of those who complained the
loudest turned up "on the list of signatoiies of the new petition that was released
todaj-.
[From the New York Times, Saturday, Feb. 7, 1970]
Thieu Opponknt in Saigon Feels Betrayed by U.S.
(By Terrence Smith)
Saigon, South A'ietnam, Saturday, Feb. 7— Tran Ngoc chau, an Opposition
deputv accused bv President Nguyen Van Thieu of Communist aflihalions, says
he feels he has been betrayed by the America mission here despite a long and close
working relationship.
Mr. Chau, whose situation was described in Washington yesterday by Senator
J. W. Fulbright, said in an interview that he had repeatedly advised the United
States Embassv and the Central Intelligence Agency of s(!veral meetings he had
had between 196."i and 1969 with his older brother, Tran Ngoc Jlien. The brother,
was convicted last July as a Communist spy and sentenced to life in prison. Mr.
Chau is now being accused of pro-Communist activities because of those meetings.
U.S. knew about it
"Americans knew about it all along," Mr. Chau said, "They even wanted me
to put them in touch with my brother, so they could find out what the Com-
munists were doing. As far as" I was concerned, their knowledge and encourage-
ment of the meetings was tantamount to their approval.
"Now they refuse to admit this," he said. "This raises an important question:
Is this the way the Americans treat their friends, people who have worked with
them in the past? If so, it's a sad fact."
388
Mr. Chan is a 45-.year-old political maverick who is one of three Lower House
representatives that President Thieu has accused of serving as "tools of the
Communists." Mr. Thieu has demanded that the House strip the three of their
parliamentary immiuiity from prosecution so they may be tried b}' a militar}'
court.
During the course of a two-hour interview, Mr. Chau charged that an aide of the
President had bribed a majority of his Lower House colleagues to get them to
sign a petition lifting his immunity.
He said the aide, Nguyen Cao Thang, had paid bribes of as much as 400,000
piasters (about $3,400) for some of the signatures on the petition.
In Washington yesterday. Senator Fulbright made a similar charge. The
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he had "very persuasive
evidence" that Mr. Thieu had used bribery and threats to obtain the signatures
of the three-quarters majority of the House members required to lift the deputies'
immunity.
A petition bearing the necessary 102 signatures was forwarded to President
Thieu earlier this week by the speaker of the lower house. Official sources con-
firmed today that President Theiu had ordered the Defense Ministry to initiate
prosecution of i\Ir. Chau and a second deputy, Hoang Ho, a former journalist,
who is also accused of having aided the Communists.
The two men are expected to be tried shortly b}^ a three-man militarj' tribunal,
probabl}' on charges of compromising national securitj^
"shrugged his shoulders"
In his remarks in Washington, Senator Fulbright also said that the United
States Embassy had ''shrugged its shoulders" over the Chau incident despite
instructions from Washington to intervene on the deputy's behalf.
A spokesman for the embassy declined to comment on this charge today. But
a high-level American source confirmed that the embassy had had communication
from Washington on the Chavi case and said that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
had recently discussed the matter with President Thieu.
Concerning Mr. Chan's charges, the source insisted that senior officials at the
embassj- had neither initiated nor encouraged the deputy's contacts with his
brother. He conceded, however, that it was possible that Mr. Chau had acted
with the knowledge and approval of lower level officials working for the C.I. A.
or other agencies.
CLOSE RELATIONS CONCEDED
No one in the mission disputes the fact that Mr. Chau maintained close working
relations with officials in the C.I. A. and embassy during his j-ears as a province
chief in the Mekong Delta, and as mayor of Danang. In 1966, he was a key official
in the so-called revolutionary development program, which was devised and
operated by the C.I. A. As one of the administrators of the program he worked
on a day-to-day basis with C.I. A. agents.
Mr. Chau is currently hiding because he is afraid that the Government will
arrest him at any time; he has slept each night for the last several weeks in a
different house. He has remained in touch with his friends, however, and has
seen a few foreign correspondents.
Mr. Chau acknowledges that he saw his brother, who is 46, eight times between
1965 and Mr. Hien's arrest last April.
[From the the New York Times, Feb. 11 , 1970]
Saigon Court Bids Two Deputies Appear
SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 10 (Reuters) — A military court has ordered
two members of the lower house to face questioning on alleged pro-Communist
activities.
The wives of the two legislators, Tran Ngac Chau and Hoang Ho, said sum-
monses were delivered to their homes yesterday by military policemen.
The two women said neither of their husbands had been at home for some
time and their whereabouts were not known.
Mrs. Chau told reporters that her husband, a 46-3rear-old member who repre-
sents Kienhoa Province in the Mekong Delta, was "now staying in a quiet place
writing his memoirs."
389
A petition signed bj^ 102 members of the House of Representatives was sent
to President Nguyen \au Thieu last week asking the Government to take action
against the two men under the countr.y's anti-Communist laws.
Under the Constitution 102 votes — a three-quarters majority — are required to
strip deputies of legislative immunity.
Mr. Chau has admitted that he met eight times with his brother, Tran Ngoc
Hien, a North Aietnamese intelligence agent, before the latter's arrest. Air. Hien
was sentenced last July to 20 years at hard labor for spying.
In an interview with reporters last week, Mr. Chau said he had kept the United
States Embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency informed of his meetings
with his brother. He accused the Americans of letting him down in not backing
him against President Thieu's accusations.
Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has
accused President Thieu of persecuting Air. Chau because the deputy had criti-
cized Nguyen Cao Thang, a Saigon pharmacist who is a member of the President's
inner circle, and because of Mr. Chau's growing power as an opposition leader.
CLASSIFICATION OF PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. A report released last June b}^ a study team of
distinguished Americans quoted the Vietnamese Director of Correc-
tion Institutions, Col. Nuyen Phu Sanh, as stating that there were
35,000 prisoners in 41 correctional centers and that of these 64.25
percent were classified as Communists. The report stated that Mr.
Don Bordenkercher, the senior American adviser to Colonel Sanh,
said there \\ere 10,000 more prisoners held in interrogation centers.
This raises a number of questions:
How do the South Vietnamese authorities define the word "Com-
munist" for purposes of putting someone in jail?
Mr. Colby. Under the Phoenix program, sir, anyone who is as-
sociated in a certain job with the National Liberation Front or the
People's Revolutionaiy Party.
The Chairman. I am not sure this was only the Plioenix program.
These questions
Mr. Colby. These are the peoi)le held in jail. This is the object
of the Phoenix program.
The Chairman. Are there 35.000 prisoners? Is that statement,
taken from this report, correct? Are you familiar with the report of
tlie U.S. study team?
Mr. Colby. Yes there are 34,372 prisoners in 41 correctional centers,
1 talked to these groui)s.
The Chairman. You talked to them?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I guess that is correct.
Mr. Colby. I think that is close enough, Mr. ChaiiTiian, for our
purposes today. There are about that many.
vSenator Case. These are all prisoners?
(The report referred to follows.)
(U.S. Study Team on Religious and Political Freedom In ^'ietnam)
Report on Findings of U.S. Study Team Trip to Viet Nam, May 25-June 10,
1969
I. LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM IN SOUTH VIETNAM
An eight-member U.S. Study Team, joined by a British observer, was in
South Vietnam, May 29 to June 5, studying religious and political freedom, prison
conditions and the classification, detention and treatment of political prisoners.
390
The Team met with President Thieu, Minister of Interior Tran Thien Khiem
and members of his staff, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and members of his
staff, national religious leaders, lawmakers, intellectuals, attorneys, students, a
varietj- of persons of different political persuasions and talked with scores of
political prisoners. It visited prisons at Thu Due, Chi Hao, and on Con Son Island,
as well as the National Police Headquarters. The Government of South Vietnam
was helpful in providing data, in permitting Team members to visit prisons, and in
making accessible certain prisoners.
In the original press release announcing the Team's departure for Saigon (May
25, 1969), it was stated that the Team would meet with persons "not connected
with the N.L.F. or the Thieu-Ky Government." It prov^ed both necessary and
helpful to meet with many government officials. To our knowledge the Team had
no conversations with representatives of the National Liberation Front while in
Vietnam. It should be noted that many authorities on Vietnam doubt the possi-
bility of a trul.y representative government without the inclusion of the N.L.F.
Three things are readily apparent in South Vietnam: (1) As state of war exists
and any meaningful study of freedom must be done against that background;
(2) South Vietnam is miserably poor and is unable to provide from its own re-
sources institutional facilities and forms of care which are taken for granted in
the Western world; and, (3) whereas the United States of America has lived vmder
the guarantee of its present Constitution for nearly two hundred years. South
^'ietnam does not have a tradition of political liberty and its Constitution is only
two years old. Notwithstanding this, in a message cabled directly to President
Nixon from Saigon, the Study Team said:
"Speaking for peace or in any other waj^ opposing the government (in South
Vietnam) easily brings the charge of communist sj'mpathy and subsequent
arrest. . . . There must be no illusion tliat this climate of religious and political
suppression is compatible with either a representative or a stable government."
Many persons interviewed argued that President Thieu's government is less
repressive than the ten years of brutal intimidation under Ngo Dinh Diem.
Others, while agreeing that repression is not as obvious and violent, argued that it is
equally pervasive though more subtle today. (Some of the following documenta-
tion will indicate that there is still unsubtle, violent intimidation.)
Three celebrated cases of political arrest have claimed international attention
in recent months. They are the cases of Thich Thien Minh, one of the most in-
fluential Buddhist monks in South Metnani; Truong Dinh Dzu, runner-up in the
Presidential Election of 1967; and Nguyen Lau, wealthy publisher of the Saigon
Daily A^ews.
Thich Thien Minh was arrested on Fabruary 23, 1969, at the Buddhist Youth
Center and charged with "harboring rebels, concealing weapons and illegal
documents . . . harboring deserters and supporting draft dodgers". After appear-
ing before a military field tribimal, he was sentenced to serve terms of ten and
five years at hard labor, the sentences to run concurrently. Last month, his sen-
tence was reduced to three years.
It is ass\uned by many that Thich Thien Minh was arrested not because of the
specific crimes with which he was charged but for his public criticism of the
Thieu-Kj' government and his strong advocacy of peace.
In February he was summoned to the Ministry of the Interior and warned to
tone down his sermons which were said to be disrespectfid to the government of
President Thieu. He had earlier said that the people of South Vietnam could
accept neither the "terrorist regime" of North Vietnam nor the "corrupt govern-
ment" in Saigon. Repl.ving to Thien Minh, President Thieu said, "Mj- govern-
ment can die because of those pacifists, but before we die, they will have to die
first."
The Study Team visited both Thich Thien Minh and Quang Due Buddhist
Youth Center. The Youth Center, closed at the time of Thich Thien Minh's arrest
(20 other Buddhists were arrested at the same time), was handed back by the
Government and re-opened during the Team's stay in Saigon. Team members
saw Thich Thien Minh's room, as well as the many hallways, rooms and stairways
that separated him from the tiny room and wooden closet with the false back that
were said to be the hiding place of the V.C. agent and a cache of small arms.
Seeing the distances and buildings involved, it is not difficult to believe the monk's
assertion that he had no personal knowledge of a V.C. agent's presence in that
hidden room.
391
The Team talked with Thich Thien Minh, who has been held in military
custody. They interviewed him in a small house, a part of a larger complex of
carefully guarded government buildings. The Team observed the office of a U.S.
Advisor two doors removed. At one point, three government officials pointedly
left the room that the discussion might be private. However, it had been deter-
mined during the conversations that there was a government agent only four feet
from the Venerable, behind a thin wall. Thus, the interview was necessarily
inhibited. Thich Thien Minh had been moved four times since his arrest and was
kept under the strictest security. Though badl.y injured b.y a hand grenade, said
to have been thrown by a V.C. in 1966, he said his health was good. He added,
"My only offense is that I believe in peace."
On May 1, 1968, Truong Dinh Dzu was arrested "on charges of urging the
formation of a coalition government as a step toward peace." In August, he was
sentenced to five years of forced labor. Although the N.L.F. is now participating
in the Paris peace talks and a coalition government is being widely discussed by
responsible government officials in the United States, Mr. Dzu has not yet been
released.
In a national election that denied certain candidates the right to run ^ because
they were peace advocates, and that heavily favored the Thieu-Ky regime be-
cause of its domination of the military and political structures of South Vietnam
and because of the well-known support of the American 'presence' in Vietnam,
Mr. Dzu ran second, polling 18 percent of the vote. He wisely did not announce
his "white dove" platform until after his candidacy had been approved. (It is
interesting to note that in the election, the Thieu-Ky ticket gained onlj^ 35 per-
cent of the vote. In March 1968, Vice-President K}'- told an Italian journalist,
"Our last elections were a loss of time and money, a mockery.") Dzu has never
been accused of being pro-communist and is, as President Thieu openly acknowl-
edged, a "political prisoner." The fact that, running as a peace candidate and
freeh^ talking of a coalition government, he ran second onh' to the President,
accounts inore than anything else for his imprisonment. Mr. Dzu was moved
from Con Son Prison Island to Chi Hoa Prison in Saigon during the last week
in May, 1969. U.S. Study Team members saw him in his cell in Chi Hoa. Suf-
fering from a heart condition, he looked well and various kinds of medicines were
in evidence. He said he wanted to serve his country as a nationalist. On June 5,
President Thieu told the Team that support for a coalition government cannot
be tolerated.
On April 16, 1969, Ng-uj'en Lau, publisher and owner of the Saigon Daily News
was arrested for "having maintained private contacts with a Vietcong political
agent." The agent, a boyhood friend of Lau, returned to Saigon in 1964 from
North Vietnam. He talked with Lau many times during the past five years and
had, at one time, asked him to supplj' information for the V.C. According to both
Lau and Tran Ngoc Hiem, the agent, Lau had refused to supply the information.
In discussing Lau's case with a member of the Team, one of Saigon's most
highly regarded foreign correspondents exi^lained its background. In Vietnam, a
culture influenced immeasurablj- by Confucianism, family ties and friendship are
revered. Mr. Lau, in a press conference held by government officials at National
Police Headquarters, made no attempt to deny his associations with Hiem. He said
that Communism was poisoning the minds of many, but that Vietnam would
surely survive Connnunism. He added, "Even today, sitting before j'ou, I keep
wondering if as a publisher and as a Vietnamese intellectual, I should denounce
a friend who I have known since boj'hood."
Mr. Lau was educated at Oxford and the Sorbonne. As a member of an old and
important familj- of wealth he has no respect for war profiteers and little sj'mpathy
for corruption in government. As a respected journalist and an avowed anti-
Communist, he considered it part of his responsibilitj- to be open to every facet
of Vietnamese life. He once said, "If people are free to walk the streets, they are
free to talk to me."
He insisted upon his right to criticize. On March 24, 1969, the New York Times
quoted him as saying, "Diem said bluntly that he was not going to tolerate freedom
of the press. There were no illusions then. We are living a lie now. People saj^ they
are giving you freedom and someone without experience in journalism may be
' General "Big" Minh was kept in exile in Bangkok and Au Truong Thanh, the other leading contender
was refused candidate status because of his alleged "neutralism". The Study Team talked with Au Truong
Thanh in exile in Paris.
392
innocent enough to believe that this is paradise. Now you may be carried away by
your iUusions and land in trouble." Less than a month later Nguyen Lau was
arrested.
Members of the Study Team visited the National Police Headquarters. There,
Lt. Col. Nguyen Man, Chief of Special Branch, told them about the government's
case against the publisher. The only "evidence" he produced was the photostat
of a press card, allegedly issued by Mr. Lau to one Tan That Dong, the alleged
V.C. alias of Tran Ngoc H iem. Such "evidence", however, raises serious questions.
Two daj's following Lau's arrest, police brought a "so-called Vietcong" to the
Lau home. In Mrs. Lau's absence, they proceeded to take pictures of him in various
positions around the house. When her two sons (aged 10 and 14) protested, they
were handcuffed while the i)ictiu"e-taking continued. When told of the incident,
Mrs. Lau courageously went to the authorities. A senior police official did admit
that police had visited the house with a V.C. agent and camera to gather "evi-
dence".
IVIembers of the Study Team were not permitted to see Mr. Lau, still being held
without sentence. Nor were they permitted to see thirteen other i^risoners they
had made specific requests to visit.
These three cases have not been isolated because they are more important than
others, but because they are more well known. They are symptomatic of a climate
of intellectual, religious and political repression that has led to the imprisonment,
exile or silencing of thousands of loyal Vietnamese nationalists, persons who are
not pro-Communist, but who are critical of the Thieu-Ky government and who
insist upon the right to think for themselves.
The government's sensitivity at this point is revealed in its attitudes toward
dissidents, so-called "militant Buddhists", students and intellectuals, sti-enuous
political opposition and the press.
The religious picture in South Vietnam is confused. About one-tenth of the
nation's population is Roman Catholic. Yet, from the time of Diem and the
Nhu's on, Catholicism has played a dominant role in Vietnamese political life.
(Actually, this goes back to the 18th Century French missionary-priest, Pigneau
de Behaine, and the continuing influence of French Catholicism during colonial
days.) President Thieu reminded the Study Team that, though he had trouble
with Buddhists, Catholics had supported his administration. The former editor
of a Catholic magazine, a friend and confidante of Archbishop Nguj'en Van Binh,
agrees that fewer than 10 percent of the Catholics in South Metnam are critical
of the war and of Thieu's government. It must be remembered that about 1,000,000
of South Vietnam's Catholics were born in what is now North Vietnam and came
south following 1954. They are, for the most part, vigorous anti-Communists.
However, there are Catholics who want a closer tie with Buddhists and who are
.seeking what some call, a "third solution". They are trying to find answers between
Communism and corrupt militarism. Father Hoang Quynh, an active leader of
the All-Religion Citizen's Front, has worked with Buddhists in trying to prevent
further friction between the Buddhist and Catholic communities. He has said,
"Catholic faithful must learn to live a responsible political life." Other Catholics,
like Father Lan and attorney Nguyen A'an Huyen seem close to the Pope's views
on meaningful negotiations and peace. They have won the confidence of Buddhist
leaders.
When, in January 1968, all of the bishops of South \'ietnam released a four-page
statement supporting Pope Paul's message on Vietnam and calling for a bombing
halt in North Vietnam, it seemed that there had been a breakthrough. However,
and without exception, those with whom Study Team members spoke indicated
that the hierarchj^ in South Vietnam had confined themselves to what the Pope
had said with no desire or inclination to supplement or further interpret the
Vatican's plea concerning peace. There continues to be sharp feeling between
Buddhists and Catholics. As one Buddhist complained, "When Catholics talk about
peace, the Thieu government hears it one way. When we use the word, it is sup-
posed to mean something else." Many Buddhists feel, and justifiably so, that they
have been discriminated against b.y a succession of governments in Saigon.
There are two major Buddhist factions in South Vietnam; the "moderate"
government-authorized faction of Thich Tarn Chau, and the "activist" ^- faction
- The term "militant" is usually applied to tlie An Quang Pagoda faction. However, Buddhists are com-
mitted to non-violence. In French, "militant" means an "active supporter or worker In a political group".
393
of Thich Tri Quang and the An Quang Pagoda. However, the Unified Buddhist
Church of the An Quang Pagoda is made up of both ^lahayana (northern) and
Therevada (southern) Buddhists. Early in 1967, the government sought to frag-
ment the Buddhists, withdrawing its charter from the Unified Church and recog-
nizing the "moderate" wing of Thich Tam Chau. However, the An Quang Pagoda
continues to be a major factor in the reUgious and pohtical life of the country. On
the Buddha's 2513th ])irthday, celebrated May 30, at the An Quang Pagoda,
former Chief of State, Phan Khac Suu, Tran Ngoc Chau, General Secretary of the
House of ReiDresentatives, other deputies and senators, Father Quynh, as well as
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders were present, indicating a broad base of pojaular
support among disparate groups.
During the ceremonies, white doves of peace were released as a crowd of more
than 3,000 i^eople looked on, and Thich Tinh Khiet, Supreme Patriarch of the
Unified Buddhist Congregation said, "Every hostile tendency of the world has
jostled its way into the Vietnam war in order to exploit it and seek for victory,
whereas all the Vietnamese people — either on this side or on the other side of the
17th Parallel — are mere victims of this atrocious war. Our nation is thus forced to
accept ready-made decisions without having any right to make our own choice."
President Thieu and pro-government supporters may insist that such peace talk is
"political". If so, it is an obvious expression of that freedom essential so an emerg-
ing democi'acy. And it is no more political than the forms of protection and sup-
port offered innumeral)le Catholic priests and parishes; no more political than a
sleek caravan of govi^rnment-owned cars driving Thich Tam Chau to the Saigon
Airport on Jvme 5, to meet the Nepalese delegation to a World Buddhist Confer-
ence on Social Welfare; no more political than the imprisonment of hundreds of
Buddhist monks.
Often the Buddhists who i)rotest government jjolicy are students. Following
the government-controlled elections of 1967, Buddhist students joined by some of
their professors were promptly singled out b}- the government for retaliatorj' acts.
A professor of law said, "\'an "llanh University (Buddhist) was the chief target for
attack . . . . If students go to meetings, the police follow them and they can be
arrested any time. Many times, they are drafted before the legal age or before
their deferments as students expire."
As a result of a peace meeting held in September, 1968, in Saigon University-,
the Student Union was closed by police. Students, professors, deputies from the
Lower Housi; and some Buddhist monks had jjarticipated in the meeting. Thirty
persons, mostly students, were arrested. More arrests followed.
At about the same time, a student in the ^ledical School was murdered. He had
been kidnapped by the N.L.F. and later rescued b}- American troops. He was
accused of having "leftist tendencies". He was found dead with his hands tied
behind his back, having been pushed from a third floor window. The police called
it "probable suicide" and made no investigation.
Student resistance continued. On Christmas Eve, responding to the Pope's plea
for peace, 2,000 students, many of them Catholic, held a peace procession. In tho
aftc^rmath, hundreds were arrested.
In spit(! of set-back and discouragement, the spirit of the student peace movf-
ment remains unbroken. A Buddhist student stepped out of a sullen mass r'
prisoners at Camp No. 7 on Con Son Island and addressed members of the Team.
The government translator said, "He is here because he refuses to be drafted
He says he doesn't want to serve the United States. As a Vietnamese citizen b'-
will go into the Army only when we have independence." A student, recen*^'
released from Con Son, reacting to the devastation visited on his covmtry b'^
modern instruments of war, said nuieh the same thing: "I will not serve a count'-'
that has done so much to my own."
Students, intellectuals and Buddhist monks do not comprise the only opponen*^"
who threaten Presidiuit Thieu's government.
There is a growing mood of independence in the Lower House. It is only found
in a few deputies, but they are voicing increasing opposition to the policies and
practices of the Thieu-Ky government. There have been criticisms of Operation
Phoenix in the National Assembly. Two members of the Lower House raised
serious cjuestions about prison policies early in May. The president's tax program
has been challenged. Constitutional questions challenging the prerogatives of the
executive branch are frequently raised.
President Thieu proudly points to the "new alliance" of political parties in
South Vietnam as an indication of the breadth of his support. This alliance
44-706—70 26
394
includes the Greater Union Force, the political arm of mihtant Roman Catholic
refugees, the Social Humanist Party, a rebirth of Ngo Dinh Nhu's Cam Lao
party, the Dai Vet, an erstwhile grouping of anti-French nationalists, a faction
of the Hoa Hao sect based in the Delta and the Met Kuomintang, a pro-govern-
ment bloc formed after the Tet offensive in 1968. All of these parties together,
combined with the Thieu-Ky vote, failed to capture half of the popular vote in
the 1967 elections.*
While there is genuine political opposition, most of it has been driven under-
ground. Members of the Study Team met with leaders of five old-line political
parties no longer permitted to function as recognized entitie.'^. These men had all
been active in the resistance movement against the French and were ardent nation-
alists. Their parties have been outlawed, their requests to publish a newspaper
have gone unanswered and their voices have been muted. These men, and they
reflect a vast middle-position in South Vietnam, struggled against the French
and consider the Americans their new colonial masteis. Over the past twenty-five
years, they have known imprisonment and .sacrifice. (A retired general present
had been in prison eleven times.) They are opposed to Communism. But, they
argue that unity and independence cannot be achieved under present circum-
stances. One of them said, "We know the American government is anti-Commu-
nist and they help us fight Communism. But when they look at Viet Communists,
they think of them as western Communists. That is a bad mistake." It is the con-
viction of the Study Team that there will be no trulj' representative government
in South Vietnam until voices such as these can be legitimatized and i^articipate
in the democratic processes of the republic.
One further evidence of political oppression is the government's attitude toward
the press. Although it seems reasonably- tolerant of foreign correspondents, and
thej' are permitted to function without too many instances of censorship, the
government's relationship to the Vietnamese piess is far more direct and inhibiting.
Twelve months ago, censorship was officiallj^ eliminated in South Vietnam. Since
then, at least twentj^-five newspapers and two magazines have been suspended.
Mr. Lau's Daily Neivs has been suspended for thirty days for hinting that Thich
Thien Minh's trial might have been vmfair. Tin Sang was closed when it suggested
that Prime INIinister Huong (one of the most highly regarded members of the
Thieu government and a former political prisoner himself) once yielded to pressure
irr a cabinet appointment.^ Nguyen Thanh Tai a UPI combat photographer, was
arrested in Maj', 1968, for taking pictures "detrimental" to South Vietnam.
One of the most credible and influential anti-government nationalist leaders
with whom we talked prepared a three-page position paper for the Team. The
English translation was his own. In part, he said:
"The range of political expression as legally exists here is narrow indeed . . .
"Let us imagine for a moment that those people are given a chance. What
would they do?
"Thej^ would firstly negotiate with the Government of the United States an
agreement on the Allied Forces Establishment in Viet Nam which would provide
for progressive withdrawals when the situation warrants it. Of course, they would
bear in mind the securitj^ and the honor of the Allied troops who came here to
protect ourselves and prevent a Communist domination.
"They would secondly invite the Vietnamese people to actively participate
in national aff"airs and take their share of responsibilitj'. Democratic freedom
would be enforced without restrictions, how adventurous this might first look.
Live forces such as students, intellectuals, religious leaders and workers' unions
would be given an authorized say. Unjust treatment would be redeemed. One
cannot fight for freedom without ensuring freedom at home . . ."
Although many of the nationalist leaders with whom the Study Team talked
believed that a continuing American presence in South Vietnam is an unfortunate
necessitj^ until the political situation can be stabilized and made nrore representa-
tive, one student leader who had been imi)risoned twice bj- the Thieu government
for his activities on behalf of peace argued that no truly representative democracy
can come into being as long as U.S. troops are present and U.S. policj- is being
enforced. He said, "Bj- now, we should have learned the ironj- of having any
Vietnamese government that is embraced bj^ U.S. power. The Americans must
3 The United States sent election "observers" to Vietnam to report on election procedures. As one cynical
Vietnamese put it: ''We are planning to send twenty-two Vietnamese observers who don't speak English to
the United States . . . for four davs to see if your elections are fair."
* See: New York Times, March 24, 1969.
395
dej^art leaving us to decide our own future." He spoke those words with anguish,
obviously knowing the problems that Vietnamese nationalism and manj^ of its
long-suffering advocates would face in dealing with the N.L.F. in the wake of
an American withdrawal. Yet, he bitterl,y insisted that after many years of
American military presence and American good intentions, there was no other
way.
At the luncheon given the Team by members of the Lower House, Deputy
Duong Minh Kinh talked about the vast expenditures poured into North Vietnam
by the Soviet Union and China, and into South Vietnam bj' America. He said,
''We are beggars from all of the people in the world in order to destroy ourselves.
That is the greatest tragedy of all."
II. DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT
The large majority of those imprisoned in South Vietnam are held because they
oppose the government; thej' are "poHtical prisoners." "Undoubtedly a great
many of these are, as the government classifies them, "Viet Cong." Legally
speaking, they are properly prisoners of war — though they are kept in a separate
category from military prisoners. Undoubtedly, a number are "civilians related
to Communist activities;" i.e. V.C. agents, and accurately classified as such. Yet
it is clear that a great manj^ people, many of them detained without hearing or
trial, should be seen in two other categories. Some have been picked up in a sweep
and are innocent of anything save being present in an area of military operations.
Others are pohtical prisoners. They are nationalists and not Communists —
though seen by the government as inimical to its continuing control. In the
official statistics, these categories are kept vcrj' low and thus their existence is all
but denied. As the following examples of official estimates show, the practice is
to classify almost everyone held as either "Communist" or "criminal" (though
this division omits the large numbers of "detainees" held without hearing or
trial.)
The classification of prisoners in 41 Correctional Centers as given by Col.
Nguj^en Psu San, Director of Correctional Institutions, is:
16.98% Criminals
64.25% Communists
4.16% Civilians related to Communist activities
11.91% Mihtary
.21% Political activities harmful to national interest
2.49% War prisoners temporaril}- in correctional centers
Warden Pham Van Lien of Chi Hoa prison reported to Team members on
June 3, 1969, a classification in Chi Iloa as follows:
45% Criminals
40% Communists
4% Civilians condemned by military court
10% Military
.6% Political — non-Communist
Prison Governor Minh, of Thu Doc prison, classified the 1,126 prisoners held
by him on June 3, 1969 as follows:
265 Criminal offenders
843 Communists
15 Civilians condemned b}' militarj' courts
3 Military prisoners
0 Political prisoners
0 Prisoners of war
The Warden of Con Son Island prison reported that there were 7,021 men and
boys in Con Sou, of whom:
984 were soldiers who committed political offenses (helped or sympathized
with the V.C.)
2,700 were civilians who had worked directly with the V.C,
769 were soldiers who committed criminal offenses,
252 were civilians who committed criminal offenses, and
2,316 were detainees, never tried or sentenced.
(Note that only the Warden of Con Son Island prison separately identified
unsentenced detainees in his statistics. The rest of the breakdowns presumabl.y
distribute the detainees among the classifications according to file, or dossier,
information.)
396
There are no figures available on the religious affiliation of prisoners. Warden
Lien reported that there were abovit 120 Buddhist monks in Chi Hoa prison on
June 3 when Team members visited.
Colonel Sanh said that there are 35,000 prisoners in 41 Correctional Centers. The
senior American advisor to Col. Sanh, Mr. Don Bordenkerclier, estimated that, in
addition, there are 10,000 hold in interrogation centers. He reported that the
number had gone up gradually since the Tet offensive of 1968 when the jump was
precipitate. Ambassador Colby, General Abrams' Deputy for Pacification, said
that the number of prisoners had gone up and will continue to go up as the pacifica-
cation program (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support)
develops.
The national police in Saigon and in the provinces are the official organ for
making arrests. In addition, there appear to be many other arrest and detention
agencies.' It is clear that those arrested are taken to a variety of detention centers
for interrogation and that many are held in these centers for considerable periods
of time. According to the U.S. Mission, American advisors are involved only with
cases of Viet Cong or suspected Viet Cong sympathizers and with persons appre-
hended driring military operations (e.g., "Operation Phoenix" — the 18 month-old
program which pools information from half a dozen U.S. and South Vietnamese
intelligence and security agencies with the purpose of identifying and capturing
Viet Cong political agents.)
Of course, estimates of the total number of political prisoners in South Viet-
nam— including those held as prisoners of war, by intelligence agencies and in
military prisons, as well as in the correctional institutions and by the various
arresting agencies to which we have referred — run much higher than the official
statistics and estimates we have recited. The methods of reporting and keeping
such statistics are such that we doubt any one knows whether any of such esti-
mates approach accuracJ^ That the number exceeds the official statistics, and
that it is rising, are the only conclusions that can be accepted as reliable.
In addition to the 37 (officially listed) provincial Correctional Centers, there
are four large prisons for essentially civilian prisoners. These are Chi Hoa in
Saigon, Thu Due in Gia Dinh (for female prisoners). Tan Hiep near Bien Hoa,
and Con Son on an island off the southeastern coast. Team members were enabled
by the Ministry of the Interior to visit Chi Hoa, Thu Due, and Con Son Island
Prison. They were also shown through the interrogation center at National
Police Headquarters.
Thu Due (Women's Prison)
Members of the Study Team spent several hours at the Women's Prison, where
the staff, headed by Prison Governor Minh, gave full explanations of the prison's
operation and enabled members to see everything they requested. The administra-
tion of the prison is evidently efficient in most respects, and the large compound
contains many elements normally found in such establishments.
There was overcrowding of the cells. This was especially hard on nursing
mothers and those with small children. In the cell where babies were shown to the
Team, it was confirmed that fifty people lived in a room 40' by 30'. Primitive
sanitation was severely inadequate. The medical provisions of the camp, if used
as it was claimed, could ameliorate the situation, but there was evidence that some
prisoners had not had recent medical attention, and skin ailments among little
children pointed to low standards. Of particular concern are: the length of sen-
tences; the youth of some classified as Commimists; the large numbers of un-
convicted prisoners; and the looseness and generality of charges and classifications.
Governor Minh told us that there were 50 children from birth to 14 years in the
prison; 40 were classified as young offenders (13-17 years); presumably the re-
mainder were in ])rison solely because one or both parents were theie.
The Team members found reason to conclude that recent adjustments in
classification had taken place. To judge from both interviews and official ex-
planations, the circumstances of many classified as "communist" did not justify
this classification. Governor Minh asserted that "hard-core communists" served
life imprisonment, though those whose "comnumist" activities had resulted from
coercion would be released on record of good behavior and "repentance." Two
students who were so classified were found by the Team members to be unsen-
• A future thorough investigation should check carefully into the number and types of arrest and detention
agencies; this was impossible for the present team with limited time and staff.
397
tenced detainees. On examination of the dossiers, it was found that they were
being held simply because they had exhibited "leftist tendencies". On inquiry
put to all of the prisoners in another cell block, twenty percent responded that
they had not been tried or sentenced. The Team members concluded that the
"evidence" against those classified "communist" was often weak and that many
deserved the designation "political" prisoners.
Chi Hoa
Chi Hoa is often referred to as the "showcase" prison. Since 1963 American
funds have been available for the improvement of facilities, and American advisors
have helped set up rehabilitation programs. The Team was given an attractive
brochure with pictures of prisoners in classes; at worship; enjoying recreational
activities. The brochure states that "the present Vietnamese systeni of corrections
is * * * basedon the principles of humanity, charity and equality."
The Warden said that there were about 5,500 men and boys now in the prison
of whom 40% were Commvuiist and only .6% were non-Communist political
prisoners. Each prisoner wore a colored badge indicating his classification. The
Warden estimated that 40% of the inmates had not yet been tried or sentenced.
He said someone from the Ministry checked the lists every month and an effort
was made to have those prisoners who had been in longer than six months brought
to trial and sentenced.
The Team members were taken on a tour of the prison. Wherever the group
went, they found the halls and cells clean. They were shown the vocational classes
in which about 300 prisoners were enrolled and met daily over a six-month period.
Team members saw the Catholic Chapel, a Buddhist shrine and a Buddhist
pagoda. In the pagoda, they talked with several monks who are in prison for
resisting the draft. These monks were the only prisoners in any of the institiitions
who did not stand at rigid attention. Sometimes prisoners shouted ear-splitting
anti-Communist slogans when Team members stopped to see them.
The Warden estimated that there were 200 children from 10 to 14 years of age
and 200 from 14 to IS in the prison not yet sentenced. All children, he said, were in
a separate section and given education. Team members asked to see the children's
section and were shown two cells. In one room, about 40 feet by 25, there were 47
children ^lncler 8 years of age. One child, 4 years old, said he was in prison because
he had been caught stealing a necklace, the children were squatting in one end
of the room ealiiig when the Team members entered. They live in a bare room,
with sanitarv facilities at one end. No materials for play or study were in evidence.
The food was rice with vegetables and fish. It looked adequate. The children
seemed to be well phvsically. Immediately when the Team members entered
they left their bowls of food "and assembled in lines without any order from the
adult in the room or from the Warden. They all, even the 4 year old, stood at
attention and did not move or speak; only their eyes followed the visitors moves.
In the next cell, similar in size, there weie 67 children slightly older but under 10
years. The situation was the same in all respects.
The Team members saw three cells in the men's section. They were about the
same size as the cells for children. There were about 50 men in each of the rooms
viewed. Some of the men were preparing over tiny burners various kinds of focd
which had been brought by friends or relatives. None of the men in these thiee
cells had been sentenced.
Upon asking to see the disciplinary cells, the Team members were shown a room
with iron rings for shackling prisoners, which, we were told, were seldom used.
The iron looked rusty. Team members did not get to see any of the 100 prisoners
who the Warden said were in solitary.
The prihon is in the form of a hexagon, four stories high facing inside. The
wedge-shajjed area in front of each of the six sections contains water tanks for
bathing ond washing clothes and an open space. The Warden said that after
5 p.m. the inmates are allowed here for sports and bathing. Since there is an
average of about 1000 inmates in each section, it is obvious that only a very
small proportion of the inmates could play soccer, volley ball, bathe or wash
clothes at one time.
Con Son Island Prison
Con Son Island Prison, an escape-proof prison about 50 miles oflf the southeast
coast is said bv officials to contain 7021 prisoners, most of them "political." In
many of the baVracks, the majoritv of the prisoners were "poHtical" prisoners who
hod been "tried" before a Militarv Field Court, usually without legal representa-
398
lion. They wore red tags which identified them as either V.C. or V.C. sympa-
thizers. Those with yellow badges (detainees) presented another kind of problem.
A show of hands, taken in a number of barracks, revealed that manj' detainees had
been imprisoned as long as a year and a half with little hope of being released
unless, conceivably, space was required for new prisoners. It was explained that
frequently the means or records necessary to determine whether charges should be
brought were unavailable. The failure to observe even a minimum amount of due
process in the overwhelming majority of cases is a fair conclusion since the same
circumstances were repeatedly recited by the prisoners; namely, they were either
being held on charges of sympathizing with or aiding the enemy, or they had been
rounded up after a military confrontation with the Viet Cong int heir village
and were simply held from that point on. Others were students who had indicated
their support for peace.
The tour had been carefully arranged. The only time the Team members de-
viated from the prepared pattern, successfully demanding to see Camp No. 4
instead of the camp that the prison authorities had scheduled, they saw something
of significance. There were large dark dormitory cells (three out of about ten such
cells were inspected) in which there were from 70 to 90 prisoners each, all of whom
(as determined by a show of hands) were condemned to life in prison. None had
had lawyers or any trial other than a judgment by a military tribunal.
The prison authorities denied the existence of "tiger cages", reputed small
barred cells in which prisoners being disciplined were chained to the floor in a prone
position. Although recently released prisoners referred to this practice from actual
experience, the Team members were unable to elicit any more from the prison
officials than that the "tiger cages" were no longer in existence. (At first any
knowledge of sucn things was denied). One prisoner, however, speaking surrepti-
tiously to the Team members said, in answer to a question, "Yes, the 'tiger cages'
are here, behind Camp No. 2 and Camp No. 3. You looked in the wrong place."
The Team members had looked behind Camp No. 4.
Taking into consideration the conditions under which such a prison had to
operate, it seemed that an attempt was being made by the prison officials to con-
duct as clean and sanitary an operation as they could. There was a 1.3 million
dollar expansion underway, which would provide 72 additional barracks.
Pursuing further the question of how prisoners were disciplined, the Team
members were told that only ten out of the 7,021 prisoners were under discipline.
On request, the visitors were shown two of these ten. Thej^ had been in solitarj^
for six months because of their refusal to salute the flag. One said he would never
salute it. His legs were deeply marked, the Colonel in charge explaining this was the
result of a past disease. Questioned directly, the prisoner said it was the result of
a long period in leg irons.
Although Team members observed no brutality, they felt that to have no
disciplinary barracks other than a small number of maximum security cells was
highly unusual. The Team members noted the fearful reaction of the inmates
whenever prison officials appeared, surmising that there must exist a high degree
punitive regimentation.
The most disturbing aspect of the prison situation in Vietnam is torture. Its
existence, though minimized by many, is widely admitted by most of those out-
side the Vietnamese government itself who are knowledgeable about the arrest and
detention system. U.S. officials, advisory to the Vietnamese prison system agree
that there is torture, but insist that is does not take place in the correctional
centers themselves but in the interrogation and detention centers where the
prisoners are taken first. They point out that brutality could not exist in the
correctional centers because the ratio of prisoners to staff (58 to 1) is so great. In
at least one instance, however, the Team was advised that "trustees" were used
to administer brutal punishment and such an explanation would be consistent
with the high degree of fear and regimentation seen in the response of the prisoners.
Many nongovernment Vietnamese interviewed, including a number of ex-prisoners,
supported the conclusion that there was relatively little torture in the correctional
centers.
Accoimts by ex-prisoners, many of them persons of integrity, agree that most
prisoners in the detention and interrogation centers are tortured. This is done to
extract information — the most obvious kind being the names of companions,
friends and acquantances. (It appeared that sometimes innocent persons were
named in order to seem to cooperate with the interrogator.) It is also done as a
matter of general procedure, being rationalized as necessary for interrogation of
V.C. and their sympathizers.
399
One of the difficulties in appraising first-hand accounts of torture is that intel-
lectuals, those who by definition are the ones who can most readily speak about it
to outsiders, are seldom tortured except in what is called mild forms (usually
simplj^ beatings) Of course they are oppressed by conditions of overcrowding, with
many prisoners stuffed into small cells which do not allow for lying down or,
sometimes, even for sitting; and this, when it is steaming hot, when excrement
accmnulates, and when the prisoners are seldom released for exercise, is torture
indeed. But as "favored" people, they do not appear to receive the normative
interrogation treatment.
Beating is the most common form of abuse. It is done with wooden sticks and
clubs. ("Metal" was mentioned by one observer.) The blows are applied to the
back and to the bony parts of the legs, to the hands, and, in a particularly painful
form, to the elevated soles of the feet when the body is in a prone position^ Beating
of the genitals also occurs. A number of commentators also described the immer-
sion of prisoners into tanks of water which are then beaten with a stick on the
outside. The pain is said to be particularly intense and the resultant injuries are
internal.
Another type of water torture in which a soaked cloth is placed over the nose
and mouth of a prisoner tied back-down to a bench is said to be very common.
The cloth is removed at the last moment before the victim chokes to death, and
then is reapplied. In a related form, water is pumped into the nose.
Frequently, the interrogation center at the National Police Headquarters in
Saigon was mentioned as a scene of torture. The most common procedure is said
to be the elevation of the victim on a rope bound to his hands which are cro.ssed
behind his back. One witness described a "bicycle torture" used in this center.
For about a week the prisoner is forced to maintain a squat position with an iron
bar locking his wrists to his ankles; "afterwards he cannot walk or even straighten
up", it was said.
An intellectual who was arrested in 1966 and spent the first six months of his
two and one-half years term in an interrogation center described what he called
the "typical case" of a woman law student in a nearby cell. (Not "t3'picar' in
one respect because she was an intellectual). She had been in the interrogation
center for six months when he arrived and stayed for the next six months during
his own imprisonment there. Throughout this }('ar, she was tortured, mostly by
beating. When she was finally called before a tribunal to hear the charges, she
had to be carried by two fellow prisoners. The tribunal, apparently because of
her status, heard her case carefullj- and determined that it was a case of mis-
identification. Someone in Zone D had reported a \.C. returnee or spy who looked
like her.
The same informant said, as a number of others did, that sexual torture was
common. Though apparently it was not used on this woman student, it is used
on many women. Frequentlj' coke and beer bottles were prodded into the vagina.
Also, there were a number of accounts of electrical wires applied to the genitals
of males and females, as well as to other sensitive parts of the body. Another
informant told of the torture by electricity of an eight-year old girl for the pur-
pose of finding her father: "She said her father was dead and they just kept
torturing her . . . They tortured her mother too." This was said to have oc-
curred in the National Police Interrogation Center (Saigon) during 1968. Several
ex-prisoners testified that it is not unusual to torture family members, including
children, before the eyes of the prisoner. "Then," explained a woman teacher
who had been imprisoned twice, "the prisoner will teU anythinir '"
Although Team members were allowed to visit the National Police Headquarters
in Saigon, it was an arranged visit. There was no evidence of the forms of torture
here described. Col. Mau said that modern interrogation techniques ruled out
the need for physical violence. Team members saw the interrogation rooms but
no prisoners were being questioned. The Team's evidence for the tortures de-
scribed come from interviews with ex-prisoners testifying to what they had en-
dured and seen, together with the statements of doctors and others who had
treated the victims. While the testimony of prison officials and the appearances
of the National Police Headquarters cannot be lightly dismissed, the sheer weight
of witnesses' statements seemed overwhelming and conclusive to Team members.
All informants agreed that the types and extent of torture administered in
many of the detention centers in the provinces were far worse than in the Na-
tional Police Interrogation Center in Saigon.
400
III. LEGAL STANDARDS AND PEOCEDURES
{1 ) Standards and Procedures
The heart of the problem of assessmg the conditions of political imprisonment
in South Vietnam lies in the matters of standards and procedures. The key ques-
tions are: who is subject to arrest and imprisonment; and, how in each case is
this determination made? If either the standards for determining who is subject
to arrest, or the procedures for making the determination is loose, then enormous
potential for official capriciousness exists and the freedoms of those subject to
such caprice are ephemeral.
The Study Team found both the standards and the procedures to be loose by
any measure — even by the most generous measure of allowance for the exigencies
of civil and guerrilla warfare. The evidence is more than adequate to sustain the
conviction of the Studj^ Team that this looseness is used deliberately to suppress
political dissent and to oppress some religious groups. In particular, loyal na-
tionalists who are in basic disagreement with the government fear retaliation for
expressing their views and do so with good reason.
Naturally, the exigencies of the particular kind of war being waged in South
Vietnam bear upon the judgments of the Team. Government of Vietnam officials
quite properly see an analogy between the civilians arrested for guerrilla war
activities — sabotage, espionage and organization and support of National Libera-
tion Front military cadres — and soldiers taken as prisoners in more conventional
war. The validity of the analogy should be granted; we cannot class as suppression
of political freedoms the imprisonment of those actively engaged in conducting
war against the government. Moreover, we must concede the need for procedures
sufficiently expeditious to permit such imprisonments to take place speedily and
without exposure of the government to the risk of further war-like activity by the
arrested person — either by release on bail pending determination or by early
termination of the period of imprisonment.
It is humbling for Americans to be reminded that their own history is replete
with invasions of individual rights made in the name of wartime emergency — the
susi:)ension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War in the United States,
for instance, and the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast during World War II. An American cannot presume to sit with wholly clean
hands in judgment upon the Government of South Vietnam. But both the princi-
ples of justice to which their constitutions commit the United States and the
Republic of Vietnam, and the pragmatic concern for winning popular support for
democratic principles compels this Team to confine the restrictions on freedom
made in the name of wartime exigency to those actually necessitated bj' war.
But the loose standards and procedures above cited do not represent concessions
to those wartime exigencies. Minimization of risk of war-like activities against the
government is not achieved by the imprisonment, for instance, of loyal nationalists
for advocacy of reconstituting the government by forming a coalition with N.L.F.
representatives. Nor does minimization of such risks require imprisonment of
powerless people who scurry to avoid exposure to the demands of both N.L.F. and
government forces, in so-called "insecure" areas, and are arrested on suspicion
with the expectation that brutal interrogation may yield a confession of some
conduct which will warrant detention.^
In fact, imprisonments of this kind create unnecessary risks of alienating
lo.yalties — a hazard made doubly severe by the highly political character of the
war in Vietnam. The seriousness of this hazard is underscored by the statement
to the Team by one yoinig man, a resident of a rural province, that probably a
majority of the men his age who reside in "secure" areas (under Government of
So. Vietnam control) of that province have experienced arrest and detention at
least once during their lives. The evidence available to the Team, moreover, all
suggests that the numbers of such arrests is steadily and continuously increasing.
The limits of the "war exigencies" justification are well illustrated by Article 29
of the Repubhc of Vietnam Constitution which clearly contemplates the existence
of exceptional circumstances such as war. It provides:
"Any restriction upon the basic rights of the citizens must be prescribed bj'
law and the time and place within which such a restriction is in force must be
clearly specified. In any event the essence of all basic freedoms cannot be violated."
1 Credible testimony of instances of arrests fitting both these examples was. given the Study Team from
many sources.
401
A. Standards
Authority for imprisonment of non-conventional criminals is found in the
State of War Law, Law No. 10/68, adopted b}- the National Assembly and pro-
mulgated by the President on November o, 196S. It amends the State of War
Decree promulgated prior to the present Constitution, on June 24, 1965, and as
amended authorizes, among other things:
* * * * *
"The search of private houses, both by daj' and night;
"Fixing the place of residence of those elements judged dangerous to
national security;
H: 4: 4: 4: ^
"Prohibition of all demonstrations or gatherings harmful to public secvu'ity
and order;
"Prohibition of the distribution of all printed matter harmful to national
security;
* « * * «
"Control and restriction of communications and travel, consonant with
security requirements; . . . "
In particular, the euphemistic language of the second paragraph quoted requires
elaboration. Under it, numbers of persons are "assigned residence" in one or
another of the provincial or national prisons by action of a Provincial Security
Committee for specified but renewable terms, not exceeding two years, because
they are "judged" to be "elements . . . dangerous to national security". Such a
standard patently abdicates to the judging body the determination of who is to
be subject to such imprisonments, almost totally without guidance from the
legislature. In fact, it was determined that students with nothing more than the
notation in their files that they exhibited "left-wing tendencies" were being in-
carcerated in national prisons whose administrator classified them in his census as
"communists"; i.e., in the same category with individuals found to have assumed
leadership roles in organizing war-like activity for the N.L.F. Others claimed to
the Team that they had been detained for no other reason than that local officials
responsible for their arrest expected to extort a bribe as a condition for their
relea.se.
Under the heading of "prohibition of . . . gatherings", the Team learned of
a Saigon political leader who was sentenced by a military field court to imprison-
ment for one year because he called a press conference without proper advance
clearance from Republic of Vietnam authorities. (In this man's case, a known re-
quirement appeared to have l)een deliberatelj' violated, but the sentence suggests
that the State of War Law is being u.sed for more than minimization of militarj^
risks to national secin'ity.)
The standards just quoted should be read in conjunction with Article 4 of the
Constitution which provides:
"Article 4. (1) The Republic of Vietnam opposes Communism in any form.
(2) Every activity de.signed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited."
The looseness of the prohibition against activ'ity designed to "i)ublicize or carry
out" Communism parallels that inherent in the other standards we have discussed.
Under it. President Thicu, in an inter\iew he generously afforded the members
of the Team, justified the detention of Truong Dinh Dzu as a "political prisoner"
on the ground that he had allegedly advocated the formation of a coalition
government in which the N.L.F. would participate. This would violate Article 4,
President Thieu reasoned, since such advocacy is ipso facto prohibited by that
article. If may be unnecessar.y to point out, in response to this reasoning, that the
Constitution also provides machinery for its own amendment, a process hardly
likely to be completed without someone having first advocated a result barred by
the language of the provisions being amended.
B. Procedure
1. Arrest, detention and interrogation. — Because of the long periods for which
individuals are often held and interrogated prior to any disposition, often for six
months or more — the procedures for determining who is to be arrested and for
how long he is to be detained and interrogated take on a special importance;.
Moreover, the frequent and serious physical abuses about which the Team
402
heard occur during this period. Although they seem to be employed as "aids" to
interrogation, they are forms of cruel and barbarous punishment against which
the citizen needs every conceivable procedural protection.
In fact, procedural protections are essentially non-existent at the arrest and
interrogation stage. Arrests are made by a wide variety" of local and national
officials — by district police, special securit.y forces, militarj- forces and intelligence
units — each exercising a relatively unfettered discretion. The arrest maj' occur
for no other reason than that the arrestee was found near the scene of a guerrilla
raid. Unless the arrested personis of exceptional importance, he will usually be
detained b}' the arresting unit or by the district or security police in the district
or province where arrested, and subjected to whatever interrogation methods
authorities in that unit choose to apply. As we have stated, such detention for
interrogation frequentl}' continues for many months and it is at this state that
the bestial brutality we have encountered occurs.
Despite the constitutional provision that:
"(6) A defendant has the right to a defense lawyer for counsel in every
phase of interrogation, including the preliminary investigation."
the Team was unequivocallj- assured by Lt. Col. Mau, Chief of the Special
Branch of the National Police Forces, that no one within his knowledge ever saw
a lawyer at this stage — certainly never when detained at the Interrogation Center
of the National Directorate of Police in Saigon. All of the Team's information
tended to coniirm that this generalization applied to other places of interrogation,
both in Saigon and in the provinces.
Not only is the arrestee denied a right to counsel at this stage, he is freciuently
denied all contact with outsiders, including members of his family. Often families
are not notified of the arrest, and they may go for days or months in ignorance of
any fact save that their loved-one has disappeared. In one instance,when occasional
visits were permitted to an eighteen year old arrestee, the visits were stopped after
several weeks on the ground that they interfered with the interrogation. Isolation
itself maj^ be used as an interrogation "aid" or technique.
2. "Assigned residence" by Provincial Security Councils. — An unknoicn proportion
of the persons held in the correctional system — the four national and thirty-seven
provincial prisons of the system — are assigned there by action of Provincial Security
Councils rather than by the judgment and sentence of any court. An official of one
province reported that 50 percent of the 1,400 occupants of the local provincial
prison were assigned there by the action of the Provincial Security Council.
When Prime Minister Huong took office in May, 1968, the Team was told he
made a major effort to improve the functioning of these bodies, enlarging them
to include an elected official (in the provinces where elections have been held)
and causing them to pare their backlogs of undisposed of business. As a result,
it may be assumed that dispositions in some provinces show a greater sensitivity
to local opinion and that the periods of preliminary detentions — to the extent
they exceed the length of interrogation desired — have been reduced.
One of the Prime Minister Huong's first acts was to initiate a spectacular
admission of wrongdoing on the part of the Thieu government in the release and
commutation of the sentences of a number of political prisoners whose total has
been variously estimated from 2,000 to 6,000.
On another occasion Deputy Prime Minister Khiem commendably acknowl-
edged in response to questions raised in the National Assembly the arbitrary
nature of the arrest and interrogation procedures and the official fear of reper-
cussions which could result from the conditions of brutality.
But these steps only sweeten a system that is intolerable beyond capacity for
amelioration. No society can pretend to be free that permits "administrative"
detentions of the kind handled by Provincial Security Councils. One Team member
was privileged to visit the members of one such Council as its regular weekly
session was being concluded. Members of the Council each possessed a type-
written list of the names of the inviduals whose cases were being considered;
approximately 100 names were on the list for a single afternoon's consideration.
He was told that on heavj^ business days the Council sometimes continued to
meet into the evening. An officer brought the relevant files to the meeting and
read to the Council the information required for consideration. Without notice
to the arrested person, without his presence or that of witnesses to the facts
relevant for determination, without confrontation or opportunity for rebuttal, to
say nothing of rights of counsel or to appeal, the liberty of each of the 100 persons
listed was summarily determined in this manner and detentions in prison were
ordered for periods — renewable by like procedure — of up to two years. No war-
403
time exigency, nor any other justification, can be oCFered to reconcile such
precedure with the democracy which is claimed to be the object of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Vietnam. Undoubtedly, the system succeeds in detaining
some people for whom a real connection with the activities of the N.L.F. has been
shown, although the Team was told that all serious wartime offenses are referred
to a Military Field Court for disposition. But no other purpose than convenience
to the interests of local or national officials which are adverse to those of the
detainees — whether to suppress political opposition or otherwise — can really be
served by this mechanism.
(£) Military Field Tribunals
The Study Team has reached the conclusion that the Thieu-Ky Government
has, through the extensive and increasing use of the extra-constitutional Military
Field Courts, imprisoned thousands of persons without the most fundamental
elements of a fair hearing and, in a shocking number of instances, without even
apprising the imprisoned persons of the charges against them. This extraordinary
development has had such a devastating eflfect on the people of South ^'ietnam
and such a chilling impact on all political activities that it seems important to
chronicle in some detail the process by which the present Saigon Government, in
the name of a wartime emergency, can deny persons arrested for political "offenses"
all of the guarantees which Vietnamese constitutional and statutory law gives to
persons accused of crime.
The Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, promulgated on April 1, 1967,
confers in Article 7 a series of guarantees upon those accused of crime which are
among the most generous and progressive of any democracy in the world. Because
these rights have been denied to probably 65 to 75 percent of all of the persons
committed to prisons in South Vietnam, it is important to set them forth in some
detail. Article 7 reads as follows: — -
"(1) The State respects and protects the security of each individual and
the right of evcr}^ citizen to plead his case before a court of law.
"(2) No one can be arrested or detained without a legal order issued by an
agency with judicial powers conferred upon it by law, except in case of
flagrant violation of the law.
"(3) The accused and his next of kin must be informed of the accusation
against him within the time limit prescribed bj' law. Detentions must be
controlled by an agency of the judiciary.
"(4) No citizen can be tortured, threatened or forced to confess. A con-
fession obtained bj- torture, threat or coercion will not be considered as
valid evidence.
"(5) A defendant is entitled to a speedy and public trial.
"(6) A defendant has the right to a defense lawyer for counsel in every
phase of the interrogation, including the preliminary investigation.
"(7) Any person accused of a minor offense who does not have a record of
more than three months' imprisonment for an intentional crime may be
released pending trial, provided that he or she is employed and has a fixed
residence. Women pregnant more than three months accused of minor of-
fenses who are employed and have fixed residence can be released pending
trial.
"(8) Accused persons will be considered innocent until sentence recognizing
guilt is handed down.
"In event of doubt, the court will rule in favor of the accused.
"(9) If unjustly detained, a person has the right to demand compensation
for damages from the State after he has been pronounced innocent, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of law."
All of these carefully spelled-out guarantees were nullified for political oflfehders
by Law No. 10/68 of November 5, 1968, which we have earlier described. This law
amends and revitalizes a pre-constitutuional decree issued June 24, 1965. By its
legitimation of the Military Field Courts, this law, in effect, amended the Con-
stitution although none of the Articles of the Constitution related to amending
the document (Nos. 103-108) were complied with.
The November 5, 1968 law, in addition to authorizing the invasions of individ-
ual rights previously recited, authorizes local proclamations of martial law and
in its Article 2 declares that
"AH violations of the law related to national security fall within the Military
Field Courts which will try them in accordance with emergency procedures."
The creation of these "Military Field Courts" is nowhere authorized in Article
76 through Article 87 of the Constitution, which provide in detail for the structure
404
of Vietnam's judiciary. Nor is the "Military Field Court" related to military
tribunals which exist in the armed forces of South Vietnam for the prosecution of
offenses committed by militarj- personnel. The "Military Field Coiirts" are not
really courts at all.
The Study Team is convinced that the number of arrests and imprisonments
continues to grow larger under the law of November 5, 1968. Moreover, it is clear
that the 1968 law, unlike the 1965 decree, abrogates and amends the 1967 Consti-
tution of South Vietnam in an illegal way. Indeed, the 1968 law eviscerates that
Constitution and suggests that the President and the National Assembly disre-
garded the Constitution in several respects and, relying on "a state of war",
undertook to legitimize the Military Field Courts which imprison persons in
proceedings having few if any of the features of a real trial. No matter how favor-
ably they are viewed, these courts serve as the instrument by which the Thieu
gov^ernment imprisons and thereby silences its critics.
The inadequacies of the Military Field Courts are many. Among their more
glaring defects are the following:
(1) These courts violate Article 77 of the Constitution which stipulates that
every court should be composed of "an element that judges and an element that
prosecutes, both of which are professionally qualified." In the Military Field
Court, the judge is a military official not necessarily trained in law.
(2) The offenses triable by the Military Field Courts are non-bailable and
convictions in these courts are non-appealable. The denial of these basic rights
violates the Vietnam Constitution as well as the practices which have become
customary in most of the judicial processes in the civilized world.
(3) The Military Field Courts also violate Article 9 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights which states that, "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention." This statement is now incorporated in the draft Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and is broadened to read as follows:
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established
by law."
These provisions are being violated in South Vietnam. Their violation is thus a
violation of the Constitution of South Vietnam which states in Article .5 that
"the Republic of Vietnam will comply with the provisions of international law
which are not contrary to its national sovereignty and the principle of equality
between nations."
(Signed) James Armstrong,
Bishop, United Methodist Church.
Anne M. Bennett (Mrs. John C),
Allan Brick,
Director of National Program, Fellowship of Reconciliation.
John Conyers, Jr.,
Member of Congress.
Robert Drinan, S. J.,
Dean, Boston College Law School.
Peter W. Jenkins,
Pastor, Congregational Church, Wimbledon, England.
John de J. Pemberton, Jr.,
Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union.
Seymour Siegel, Rabbi,
Professor of Theology, Jewish Theological Seminary.
Arnold E. True,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (retired).
Organizational associations listed for purposes of identification only.
June 9, 1969.
CALLING PEOPLE COMMUNISTS
Tlie Chairman. It is a very interesting subject even here, because
there are many people in this country, in this community, in this city,
^vho have a habit of designating as Communists anyone with whom
they happen to disagree on any particular controversy^ or subject.
This is very common. Certainly this was very common in the days of
the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. It is still common.
405
Today the insinuation is often a little more subtle than in the days
of Senator Joe McCarthy, but I have had a recent exjicrience. There
is a man named Fred Schwartz who has made a great fortune in scaring
l)eople to death about communism and asking for contributions. He
picked up a statement in an Austrialian paper that I said I didn't care
if all the countries of Southeast Asia went Communist, which is
wholly untrue and absolutely without foundation.
Senator Case. As you got off the plane you said that. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. He is using this in a letter for soliciting funds. I
suppose today you can put them out on computers for as little as 3 or
4 cents apiece. He sends out a half milUon letters and he receives a
half million dollars or something like that. He gets a lot of money
anyway. There are a number of peoj^le like this in this country
who make a good living out ot frightening our people about the threat
of communism and calling anyone who happens to be controversial as
of the moment a Communist.
This is very interesting. I wondered if the South Vietnamese are
much more discriminating and careful in the use of that word than
we are.
Mr. Colby. I think the South Vietnamese in the Phoenix program,
Mr. Chairman, are indeed trying to be very discriminating about
identifying very clearly who the members are.
The Chairman. Do you think they are more careful than we are?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think we are very careful in our Government,
Mr. Chairman. Those gentlemen that you may be referring to may be
less careful.
The Chairman. They have a purpose for it.
PERCENTAGE OF VC "WHO ARE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS
We have already asked you what i)ercent of the VC are really
Communist members of the People's Revolutionary Party.
Mr. Colby. The People's Revolutionaiy Party is the Communist
Party of South Vietnam.
The Chairman. What percentage of the VC are members of that
party? We had this the other day, but I have forgotten what you said.
Do you remember?
Mr. Colby. I don't recall that precise question. I don't think so.
I don't believe you asked me.
The Chairman. Did I ask j'ou that, Colonel?
Mr. Vann. We touched upon it, sir.
The Chairman. I thought we did.
Mr. Vann. We had a very extensive study done by a U.S. Informa-
tion Agency officer. It is now about 3K years old. The story was done
by Mr. Doughis Pike. He came up with an estimate that 3 percent of
the Viet Cong were card-carrying Communist Party members.
The Chairman. Only 3 percent?
Mr. Vann. That was his estimate at that time, and I think I possibly
brought it out in context that
The Chairman. I thought we asked you about it.
Mr. Vann. For a long period of time we have recognized that cer-
tainly a very small minority of the South Vietnamese enemy force is
Communist. However, that minority is the leadership, and they are
directing the activities of the rest for Communist purposes.
406
CLASSIFICATION OF PRISONERS AS COMMUNIST OFFENDERS
The Chairman. That is consistent with other experiences, but it is
not consistent with this figure that out of 35,000 prisoners they called
64 percent of them Communists. That seems outrageously high as a
percentage of Communists.
Mr. Colby. They are called Communist offenders, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Case. You mean in the jail?
The Chairman. These are in the jail.
Mr. Colby. These are what are called Communist offenders by
the Vietnamese.
The Chairman. I wondered whether this means they are unsym-
pathetic to the government. Does it?
Mr. Colby. No, sir. What it means is that those people are some-
how associated w4th the Viet Cong struggle against the government
and have, consequently, run across the laws and done something im-
proper. That is distinct from pure party membership, which is an
elite status.
The Chairman. This is a very difficult question.
The Pentagon takes a colonel, I believe, or a Captain Rowe and he
tells a story, of which one of the burdens is that people like myself,
who disapprove of this war, are the principal aiders and abettors to
the enemy and, in effect, if it were not for people like myself who dis-
approve of this war as not being in the interests of this Government,
the war would have been over long ago and, therefore, most of the
deaths of the GI's are attributable to me. This is the story Captain
Rowe takes throughout the country under the auspices of our
Government.
It seems to me it is not unusual to think that perhaps the Viet-
namese Government may be doing the same thing.
Mr. Colby. I think the distinction here, Mr. Chairman, is that the
party membership is a fah'ly small percentage of the total number of
people who are engaged somehow in this war on the enemy side. This
is somewhat similar to the difference between the members of one of
our political parties and the number of voters in the election.
neutralists in south VIETNAM
The Chairman. Is it against the law in Vietnam to be a neutralist?
Mr. Colby. I think it is against the law and you would get in
trouble to advocate neutralism at the moment — no, that is not so,
because Senator Don, for instance, has advocated that South Viet-
nam really ought to be neutral between the Communist and non-
Communist camps.
Senator Case. Can he run for office or vote?
Mr. Colby. There is a provision of the election law that states that
candidates could not be "those who have directly or indirectly
worked for communism and pro-Communist neutralism or worked in
the interest of communism." Those were the words used in the most
recent election law in effect."
The Chairman. As the Senator says, a neutralist cannot run for
office nor vote.
Mr. Colby. A pro-Communist neutralist was the specific language.
407
Senator Case. By definition you are pro-Communist if you are a
neutralist or almost.
Mr. Colby. There are some who have advocated that South Viet-
nam should eventually be a neutral state, so it is not as if you auto-
matically go to jail if you say that. It is not so.
Senator Case. Not go to jail necessarily.
The Chairman. He is not saying they will not go to jail, but that
they cannot vote or run for office.
Mr. Colby. I don't think there has been a clear-cut determination
of that fact.
Senator Case. I wonder what the general understanding is. If you
are a neutralist you had better not vote; is that right?
Mr. Colby. Well, in the middle of a war it is hard
Senator Case. Isn't that the general situation? That is what I
thought.
POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. How many of these people w^ould you think are
classified as political prisoners in a Western sense?
Mr. Colby. In a Western sense, it depends on whether you include
the Communist offenders in that category or not. [Deleted.]
U.S. ADVISERS working WITH CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM
The Chairman. How many advisers are there working in connection
with the civilian prison system in Vietnam?
Mr. Colby. We have four full-time civilians at the Saigon level
and one full-time military officer at each corps level. That is four
additional.
In addition, the Public Safety Officer in almost every province
spends some time working with this i)roblem.
number of PEOPLE IN PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMPS
The Chairman. How many people are there in prisoner-of-war
camps?
Mr. Colby. About 32,000 more or less.
The Chairman. That is in addition to what we have been discussing?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN PRISONER INTERROGATION
The Chairman. Do U.S. advisors ever participate in interrogations
of prisoners?
Mr. Colby. I think, yes. I would assume so.
RURAL VIETNAMESE CONCEPT OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY CONCERNING VC
The Chairman. Docs the average rural Vietnamese consider he is
engaging in an illegal activity when he helps a friend or relative who
is a Viet Cong, such as giving him food, shelter or information?
Mr. Colby. That is a very difficult question to answer. Senator. I
think I woidd guess that, with the amount of publicity that the
government has put out about the Phung Hoang program to protect
408
the people against terrorism and the general realization this is a war
going on, the normal member of the government side knows that help
to a member of the enemy camp is an nnlawfnl act.
The Chairman. I don't know. There is a war going on, but it is
not a traditional war. It is certainly not the kind of war in which we
have been traditionally involved.
Mr. Colby. Yes, but at night the guns go off and the flares are in
the air, and the grenades go off in the marketplaces. It is a war at
night.
COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND COMMUNIST OFFENDERS
The Chairman. This puzzles me, and I come back to this. When
you say 3 i)ercent of the VC
Mr. Vann. That was the figure, sir, about 1965, when this re-
search was done.
The Chairman. Have you any reason to believe it has changed?
Mr. Vann. I would think there probably has been a change in the
number of VC, and that it occurs largely in the number of guerrillas
and the nonparty chiefs. It might be a little bit higher than it was,
but I think it is definitely a very small minority.
The Chairman. It is hard for me to understand. We started out
the other day with an estimated 80,000 VC; wasn't it?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Three percent of that are only about 2,400, and
yet we find nearly 65 ])ercent of those in jail, which the staff says is 22,750,
are called Communist offeiiflers.
Mr. Colby. These are apples and oranges, ]Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Are the^^?
Mr. Colby. What we are talking about is the difference between
on the one hand full-party members, (the small percentage Mr. Vann
mentioned) a status which can only be achieved after a candidate
period and then admission to the party, which in a Communist society
is a very high status indeed, and, on the other hand, those who have
been arrested for assistance to the Communist cause, which are in-
cluded in the figures for those in ])risons.
The Chairman. But the}^ all call them Communists.
Mr. Colby. They call them Communist offenders.
The Chairman. On that basis then I suppose in this country all of
the SDS and the Black Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan and all
Members of Congress who object to the war could be put in jail as
associates, as aiding and abetting the Communists. All those who voted
against the ABM might be considered that.
Senator Case. Don't stretch it too far. I have agreed with you up
to that.
Mr. Colby. Well, I think, sir, the difference is between a country
which is at war and a country not at war. South Vietnam is at war, is
at war for its life, and, consequentlv, the line is drawn very sharply
between peoj^le who are helping the enemy and people who are helping
the government side.
Senator Case. It is a difference in transition, too. Free speech has
never been encouraged there; is that right?
4C9
Mr. Colby. I think so. I think that certainly is true. I think it is
gro\nng, but it has a long way to go.
BASIS OF NEED FOR U.S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM
Senator Case. Just a couple of questions. I will ask you and anybody
else who would like to speak on this. You feel, having had a good
deal of experience in that part of the world, that the need for American
troops ought to be considered just in the context of Vietnam or do
you think we ought to keep troops there as part of our general strategic
role in the area?
Mr. Colby. I was responsible for the Far East in my job in CIA. I
think it depends upon the overall situation in that part of the world,
the degree of threat by the other side, the degree of cohesion which
has developed in that part of the world, the degree to which those
countries grow and gradually pick up and assume the responsibilities
for their own defenses. These are all very large-scale considerations,
and I don't think we can give a very straight answer.
I would not say that we should keep troops in Vietnam in order to
be available for use in that part of the world.
Senator Case. Do you have any comment?
Mr. Vann. No, I have no comment.
south VIETNAMESE RESPONSE TO U.S. ADVICE
Senator Case. On quite another matter, I would just like to bring
this up to each one of you at the table, if 3'ou will, offer a very brief
response.
What response are we getting generally from the Vietnamese to our
advice at all levels, particularly where we have been told, by writers
and others, that in many cases the South Vietnamese tell us to go to
the devil and there is nothing we can do if they don't do what we tell
them or advise them they should do. We are involved, our prestige is
so deeply sucked in there, we just cannot do anything about pulling
out anyway, and so no matter wluit we do we are hooked and we just
have to take it.
Would you comment briefly on this and especially those who are
down the line. First, have they ever sent an imfavorable report to their
superiors about what the South Vietnamese to whom they have given
advice have done and, if so, what happened?
Mr, Colby. Would you like to start that at the bottom, too, sir?
Senator Case. Sure. Have you ever had any South Vietnamese who
dichi't do what you wanted him to do?
Sergeant Wallace. Sir, in one instance, yes.
Senator Case. What did you do?
Sergeant Wallace. My counterpart and I occasionally disagree on
some matter. To resolve these differences, once a week, all of the
CAP squad leaders report to the company office, with their counter-
parts, and discuss the problems with the Marine CAP commander
and his counterpart. At these meetings we will discuss our difference
and try to resolve our problems. This method has been very effective.
Senator Case. Have you ever had to report to your superiors
failure on your part to persuade the South Vietnamese, your counter-
part?
44-706 — 70 27
410
Sergeant Wallace, What exactly do you mean "persuade," sir?
Senator Case. Have you ever suggested something which you
thought was important that they should do which they would not do,
and have you had to report that to your superior?
Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir, I have. Occassionally we will run a
killer team and my counterpart will disagree with this. He will say,
"No," and I will call district. We will discuss it over the radio and
come to an agreement,
killer team
The Chairman, What is the killer team?
Sergeant Wallace. A killer team is a small unit, sir, designed to
make contact and then return.
The Chairman, Is it not to kill anyone? Why do you call it a killer
team?
Sergeant Wallace. The teams are designed to make contact and
to mflict casualties on the enemy and then return to their base camp.
response of south VIETNAMESE TO U.S. ADVICE
Senator Case. What response did you get, when you had to report
that you had not succeeded in your effort to persuade a response from
your own people. What did your superior do?
Sergeant Wallace, We are usually able to resolve our differences.
Senator Case. In other words, you have not had the experience of
reporting an important matter of failure on your part?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sh.
Senator Case. To your superiors?
Sergeant Wallace. No, sir.
Senator Case. How about you, Captain?
Captain Geck. Sir, having had a series of counterparts I cannot
think of one who has always agreed with me. Most of them have had
differing views than mine as much as half of the time. In some instances
I have gone to a counterpart and suggested little changes either in
tactics to be used on an ambush or some village project and have
received a flat no. If I am adamant about the program, I will report to
my immediate superior who ^vill go to his counterpart and try to get
the program instituted from above. This method usually will bring
some sort of success.
Senator Case. Is it true that there has been any substantial amount
of stubbornness on the part of the people or refusal to take reasonable
advice?
Captain Geck. Sir, in many cases there is.
Senator Case. Go ahead.
Captain Geck. For instance, it used to be a common occurrence
for me to go to a military man and say 'T think in such case you
should do this," and he would turn around and say, "I have been here
for 8 years now and I know what needs to be done." But after awhile
he gains confidence in your advice. As he learns you do know what
you are talking about, he will start to be more receptive. I am lucky
for being down at the bottom I can send the question higher. I have
no idea how the man at the top
Senator Case. We will try that later. Has this failure that you
have run into on occasion related to direct refusals to go into fights?
Captain Geck. In one or two cases; yes, sir.
411
Senator Case. What happened?
Captain Geck, [Deleted.]
Senator Case. In that case you may report to your chain up the
hne?
Captain Geck. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. And this is your experience; that this has not been a
common thing.
Captain Geck. No, sir, it has not been common.
response to south VIETNAMESE REFUSAL OF U.S. ADVICE
Senator Case. It has not made you disgusted?
Captain Geck. On occasion it has, but not on the whole program.
Senator Case. Not on the whole program?
Captain Geck. No.
Senator Case. You haven't felt we were doing a job for people who
were not worth fighting for?
Captain Geck. No, sir, not at all.
Senator Case. How about j'ou, Captain?
Captain Murphy. From my own personal experience there have
been occasions whore ni}' counterpart has elected not to take or not
to utiUze the advice that I have given him. The course of action I
then take is determined by how strongly I feel about the advice,
exactly how the advice is to be utilized, what the advice was that 1
offered, and how strongly I feel about my recommendations. Whore I
foci very strongly about his not taking my advice, I report it to my
superior, the Province Senior Adviser and recommend that he discuss
the problem with the the proxince chief, to see if he couldn't influence
ni}' counterpart to do it the way I recommended. I am sure you under-
stand that two people ma}' not share the same opinion. This does not
necessarily mean that one is entireh^ wrong.
Senator Case. I know.
Captain Murphy. But different individuals have different ways of
doing things.
Senator Case. You understand what I am trying to get at?
Captain Murphy. Yes, sir, I do. On Captain Geek's level, the
MAT team in the field sometimes comes up against a situation where
the Regional Force company commander or Popular Force platoon
leader will not accept their advice. What we do then is determine how
effectivel}^ that unit is operating, how effectively the commander is
accomplishing the mission.
Senator Case. Overall.
Captain Murphy. Perhaps he is not in a position where he needs
the advice. If he is doing a satisfactory- job, if he is accomplishing
his mission, perhaps the SlAT team should not be with him or coidd
be utilized better in some other location with another unit.
In cases where we suspect that the commander is in violation of
certain Vietnamese directives we, of course, report it through our
channels to a higher headquarters. The corps commander will assign
an inspection team to come down and investigate the matter based
upon our report.
Senator Case. This is the South Vietnamese corps commander?
Captain Murphy. That is correct. Generally we get good response
to our advice and oiu" reports, to the effect that proper measures are
being taken or with respect to the performance.
412
Senator Case. Have you had any experience of your own of your
reports of this sort to our own forces, to our own people, being just
put away in the drawer and ignored?
Captain Murphy. No, sir. I can't recall of any. You mean our
rejiort to our higher headquarters?
Senator Case. Yes.
Captain Murphy. No.
Senator Case. They don't tell you to forget it?
Captain Murphy. No, never. If we feel strongly about it, they will
take measures to correct the problem.
Senator Case. Is this the general feeling among our officers?
Captain Murphy. Yes, it is.
vSenator Case. You concur in that?
Captain Geck. Yes.
Senator Case. You are satisfied? i
Captain Geck. Yes. *
MAJOR Arthur's advising of counterpart
Major Arthur. First, I would like to say that my counterpart is '
a lieutenant colonel ARVN officer. He has 19 years of service. Some-
times he wonders about what advice I as a major can give. I have
had two tours in Vietnam, so I have some authority to give some
advice. [Deleted.]
Sent* tor Case. How long ago did you make that report?
Major Arthur. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. How long have you been back here?
Major Arthur. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. How long have you been back home?
Major Arthur. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. So there was no response within a month anyway?
Major Arthur. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Roughly.
experience with counterparts at district senior adviser level
What is the generality of the experiences of the people at your
level?
Major Arthur. The generality of experience with my counterpart
is that I have an excellent working relationship with him and my
advice is generally taken. Again, I emphasize he is a mighty capable
officer, well thought of, well respected, and a capable soldier. The
advice that I render comes on new techniques or the use of new
equipment. The advice of my subordinate officers who work with
his staff officers in staff procedure is normally accepted.
Senator Case. The troubles you have had have not been related
to motivation on his part or willingness to fight?
Major Arthur. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Or this kind of things?
Major Arthur. [Deleted.]
I might add I was a battalion advisor to a ARNV infantiy battalion
in 1966. I did, in fact, have some bad times after a couple of fights
in pursuing the enemy. We took our licks; we gave them their licks.
We policed the battlefield, but we went back or stayed there for the
night, and they lived to fight another day.
413
In some cases it might not have been wise to pursue pellmell after
them and track them down and kill them all. My other counterpart
had a lot of combat savvy, too, but I felt at that time they should
have pressed on and followed up on the enemy. This is 1966 now I
am talking about, sir.
There is no lack of desire on the part of my present counterpart
or his subordinates to mix it up that I have run into yet. They are
out there looking for and actively searching to engage the enemy.
Senator Case. Thank you very much.
EESPONSE TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE REFUSAL OF ADVICE IN TUYEN DUG
Mr. Mills. Sh, I can testify on the basis of my experience in Tuyen
Due on the question of what happens when a Vietnamese official does
not take our advice or seems to us to be incapable of doing a job that
is demanded of him [deleted].
Senator Case. [Deleted.]
Mr. Mills. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Just cancel that one.
Mr. Mills. [Deleted.]
RESOLUTION OF INCOMPATIBILITY ON ADVICE
Air. Vann. We have to realize that all advisers do not always give
good advice, so there is a legitimate basis for a good experienced
Vietnamese rejecting the advice. There is a formal system for going up
the ladder to let the next advisory level know when there is incoin-
patibiUty down below. When Ave reach this at my corps, I look into
the situation. I may resolve it by telling the ])rovince senior adviser I
don't think it is important enough to make an issue of.
I may resolve it by going into the province chief with him or I may
resolve it by going to the corps commander and presenting the argu-
ment to him. Usuall}^, having ascertained what he wants, I accept his
decision even though it may not be what we want.
Occasionally, on a real gut issue that I cannot get resolved at my
level, I will go to Ambassador Colby and ask for his assistance, but
it is an ever-diminishing number of these as you go up the line.
SOAKING UP AND BURYING COMPLAINTS
Senator Case. This used to be rather prevalent, this matter of
soaking up and burying com]ilaints and what not.
Mr. Vann. I would say we are much better organized, sir, in many
respects on both the Vietnamese and the U.S. side. We have much
less of a problem now because there are many more formally established
plans. There is more detailed guidance as to what we are going to
do and how we are going to do it, and when we are going to do it.
This tends to minimize conflict.
BUREAUCRATIC STODGINESS AND INEFFECTIVNESS
Senator Case. How about this general question of bureaucratic
stodginess and ineffectiveness and what not that is in our establish-
ment?
414
Mr. Vann. I would rather think they have about as much or more
than we have.
Senator Case. There are people who have begun to make a career
ol life in Vietnam. You are one, but you are not the kind of person I
am talking about, but what about the typical bureaucrat who shuffles ^
papers around and sticks them in his desk?
Mr. Vann. Sir, I have no
Senator Case. You know we have heard about them.
Mr. Vann. We know about these people. We tend to get them
weeded out reasonably fast.
evaluation of operation as a whole
Senator Case. Are you satisfied with the operation as a whole?
Mr. Vann. What I am participating in I am delighted with organi-
zationally on the American and Vietnamese side.
Mr. McManaway. I think at times of John Vann's remarks several
days ago about the change as it relates to Tet in 1968. I have been
working at the national level for almost 5 years, and there has been a
marked change in the attitude of the Vietnamese that I worked with
since Tet in terms of their receptivity and their willingness to reach
out for advice. This is reflective of a change m attitude toward the
war, and in trying to get the job done.
I think most of them are interested in getting a job done and are
reaching out for advice and actmg on advice — more so than they
were before Tet.
effectiveness of U.S. OPERATING STRUCTURE
Senator Case. What about our own operating structure? What
about the comments that have been made that for one reason or
another — frustration, people are getting old, scared of losing their
jobs, and not willing to take the trouble, and what not, comments
that this has been very, very common in the past so far as complaints
go — things aren't getting done.
Mr. McManaway. I think one of the problems we have that did
reflect some of this was the big buildup both on the civilian side as
well as the military side. There was a very rapid buildup from 1965
tlirough 1967. During that same period, in the course of 10 months
two massive reorganizations took place within the U.S. community,
one where part of the civilian effort was put together so you had only
one civilian chain of command, and one military chain of command,
and then another reorganization bringing together the civilian and
military into the CORDS organization. There was turbulence at that
time. People didn't have enough to do because of changes being made,
and so forth. I think we have come tlu-ough that period. For my
money the CORDS organization is one of the most dynamic I have
been privileged to be associated ^vith.
I think that is reflective even here today.
Mr. Vann. I think. Senator, you have got to understand there are
many Americans who come there and can see something that is clearly
^^^:•ong and report it. Then if something isn't done about it immedi-
ately, they tend to think it is being ignored. That comes from not
recognizing that the Vietnamese Government is a sovereign govern-
ment and there is a limit as to how much we can make them do and
how fast we can make them react.
415
Now, a lot of the younger people, particularly in the field, don't
accept this. They feel that they are getting less support than they
should have, because when they report a case of corruption, we don't
immediately come down and throw the fellow in jail [deleted].
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROVINCE CHIEFS AND MILITARY CLIQUES
Senator Case. On this broad question of corruption and of ineffec-
tiveness, the general conception was, I think, at the time that most
of these province chiefs, the military clique and whatnot were a
bunch of robbers.
Mr. Vann. That was much more of a basis to that at one time than
now.
Senator Case. And brigands and grafters and just hung together
and scratched each others' backs and no head of a government in
Saigon could touch them because they were so powerful and this kind
of thing. Has this improved?
Mr. Vann. Enormously.
Mr. Colby. That era has pretty well gone, sir, really.
Senator Case. Well, I am very much obliged. I am not going to ask
you whether you have got a good show or not. Ob\'iously it would be
embarrassing, and I am not making any suggestions that you have not.
I am just going over some of the many things that partly have been
told to us over many years, partly have been wTitten about and partly
things that I think we have a little experience firsthand about, and I
myself am very grateful to all of you. I don't know what our chairman
wants. Would you tell the chairman so far as I am concerned I have
finished my questioning?
The Chairman. I have nothing more to ask. In fact, I apologize for
this going on so long. I have had a little help, you will notice.
additional questions for THE RECORD
The staff has a few questions which I am not going to ask you.
These are more or less routine questions, but to complete the record we
will submit them to the Department and your staff can supply the
answers so that we can fill in the public record.
Mr. Colby. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You don't mind doing that?
(The information referred to follows:)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Vietnam Hearings, Answers to
Questions for the Hearing Record on the CORDS Program
questions for ambassador COLBY
General
Question 1(a). Does the amount given as the total spending for CORDS activities
include all military spending for pacification activities? For example, does it include
spending for the Marine Combined Action Platoons and for civic action activities
conducted by the military?
Answer. No, it does not include all. There are many military actions which
directly or indirectly support pacification, the costs of which cannot be segregated.
The amounts given to the Committee include those direct pacification programs
and projects run by CORDS. It does not, however, include the Marine Combined
Action Platoon cost as budget data for these are not available in the field. Civic
action activities using the so-called "assistance in kind" (AIK) funds are included
in the totals, although there are manj-- individual civic action efforts conducted by
individual units that cannot be costed.
416
(6) Do the U.S. budget figures include the pay and allowances for the military
personnel who work in CORDS programs.^ If not, what is the estimated cost for
these items in 1969 and 1970?
Answer. Yes, the U.S. budget figures do include the pay and allowances for
the military personnel assigned to CORDS.
Question 2. How many different reports are received in CORDS headquarters
each tnonth from the field? How many reports are sent by CORDS to Washington
each month?
Answer. Reports are received in CORDS from the 250-odd districts, 44 prov-
inces and six autonomous cities and four Corps. These reports could be counted
as one report, e.g., the HES, or as 250-odd reports, e.g., each district's sub-
mission counted separately. In terms of overall reports, e.g., HES counted as
one. CORDS headquarters receives 11 manual and 15 ADP reports from the
field each month, based on information collected from the districts, provinces
and corps. CORDS sends to Washington each month approximately 10 overall
summaries of pacification or specfic programs therein (e.g., refugees). Public
Safety, in addition, reports directlj^ to its Washington home office. There are
15 raw tapes from the machine reporting systems, e.g., HES, TFES, etc. sent
in consolidated form to the Department of Defense.
Question 3. What kind of training does the average U.S. district advisor receive?
Do military and civilian advisors receive the same training?
Answer. Civilian District Senior Advisors and Deputy District Senior Advisors
receive a basic orientation course of 18 weeks at the Viet-Nam Training Center
in Washington, D.C., and may receive additional training up to a total of 42 weeks.
The 18-week basic course includes:
— Viet-Nam area studies (history, culture, attitudes, politics, etc.)
— Counter-insurgency
— U.S. Role in Viet-Nam
- — Personal affairs and survival
— Exercises in POLWAR, etc.
— Off-site military training
— District operations (e.g., HES)
— 275 hours of language training
The 42-week course is the basic 18-week course plus 1,125 hours of \'ietnamese
language study.
Military District Senior Advisors receive the 18-week basic course.
In Viet-Nam some but not all military and civilian DSA and DDSA personnel
are programmed into the JNI ACCORDS District Advisors Course which is con-
ducted monthly for five days and includes a current and comprehensive briefing
on CORDS Pacification Programs. They are also programmed into the PHOENIX
Orientation Course at \'vmg Tau when feasible.
Question 4- Do CORDS personnel at the Province level report to MACV through
military channels \exclusively? Can they report through civilian channels to the
Embassy? What is (he chain of command for submission of CORDS reports to
Washington? Describe the Washington organization for supporting and directing the
CORDS effort. Where is overall authority vested?
Answer. The chain of command for all CORDS personnel at province level is
through the Province Senior Advisor to the Corps Senior Advisor. In practice, the
DEPCORDS at the Corps generally supervises the activities of the province
teams. From the Corps Senior Advisor the chain of command goes to General
Abrams, although the four DEPCORDS generally maintain a close association
with Ambassador Colby. The formal channel is through the command at each
level, however. This is supplemented b^^ a wide variety of "technical" contacts.
Various staff levels at CORDS headquarters and various staffs of USAID and
others maintain direct contacts with CORDS personnel in the field on their
technical specialities, subject to the overriding authority of the command channel.
In addition, there are a number of hiformal contacts with the Embassy political
reporters in the field who report directly to the Embassy. CORDS personnel are
encouraged to discuss matters with the Embassj" political reporters, but do not
"report" formally to them. The chain of command for submission of CORDS
rei^orts to Washington is through CINCPAC to JCS, as it is an element of MACV.
Information copies are genei'ally sent to the Department of State, AID/ Washing-
ton, White House and other Washington addressees. At the Washington level,
overall authority stems from the National Security Council, although the com-
ponent elements of CORDS report to their parent agencies.
Question 5. When was the name of the CORDS program changed from "Revolution-
ary" development to "Rural" development — and why?
Answer. This change was made on 1 January 1970 to reflect the GVN's change
of its title for the Pacification and Development Program from Binh Dinh Xay
417
Dung (Pacification and Construction) to Binh Dinh Phat Trien (Pacification and
Development) and the change of the ^Ministry of Revohitionary Development
from Xay Dung Nong Thon to Phat Trien Nong Thon. The word "Revolution-
ary" did not exist in either version of the Vietnamese. "Rural Development"
reflected the thrust of the 1970 Plan with its focus on development but maintained
the CORDS acronym.
Question 6. To what extent is the increase in popii.hijion eonl rolled by the Govern-
ment of South Viet-Nam clue to success of the mititari/ and pacification proejrams and
to what extent is it due to a change in strategy by the Viet Cong and the Morth Viet-
namese. To what extent does it reflect the movement of population to urban areasf _
Answer. The increase in population in relatively secure or better status since
1968 can be attributed to the effectiveness of the military and pacification cani-
paigns and the comparative absence of enemy resistance, caused in part by their
military losses during 1968 and in part by their concentration in 1969 on attacks
on U.S. forces. It was not until later in 1969 that the enemy began to focus on
the need to resist the pacification campaign. The movement of population to
urban areas during earlier periods also contributed to increasing the population
within GVN protection. During the past year the major movement has been back
to the countryside rather than to the urban areas.
Question 7. How would you assess public attitudes in Viet-Nam today in terms of
support for the Government of South Viet-Nam, for the Viet Cong, and those who favor
neither?
Answer. There is no fully reliable system for assessing overall public atti-
tudes in Viet-Nam so most judgments are only estimates. However, there is a
general consensus among many Americans and "\'ietnamese that the earlier degree
of active support for the \'iet Cong has been substantially reduced over the past
year, that the degree of active support for the government has been increased over
the past year, and that there is still a substantial portion of the total population
which have no very strong identification with either. The government's current
programs, of course, are aimed at securing their active participation in such pro-
grams as People's Self Defense, A'iJlage Self Development, etc. Even among the
non-committed there is a substantial group who believes that the government
will piobab'.y win und that this is an acceptaljlc outcome, a further difference
from several years ago.
Question 8. Has there been a change in the last year in the emphasis placed on the
RD cadre programf
Answer. Several years ago, the RD Cadre were looked upon as the main force
for |)acification. Over the past two years they have been considered only one of
the forces participating in pacification, together with the RF, PF, National Po-
lice, local officials, etc. Their total strength has remained relatively constant, but
their function has changed to put more emphasis on their political and organiza-
tional work and less on t leir paramilitary contribution.
Question 9. What is the pay of the average member of an RD team, compared with
pay for a member of ARVN, the Regional or Popular Forces, a Census Grievance
Team, a Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, and an Armed Propaganda Team?
Answer. The unmarried RD Cadre team member makes about the same as
his ARVN private counterpart. He makes more than the average RF and PF
private. Because of the additional allowances available tlu-ough the military for
married personnel at the same levels, the RD Cadre with three children makes
more than only the PF in the same status but less than both the ARVN andRF
privates.
(In Vietnamese piastres]
RDC PF RF ARVi^
Month— single man:
Base pay
Special allowance
Rice allowance
Hazard pay
Additional allowances 800 1,044
3,250
2,500
2,480
2,480
1.000
1,000
1,000
1,000
200
200
200
200
300 __
Total 4,750 3,700 4,480 4,724
Month— married with 3 children:
Base pay
Special allowance
Rice allowance
Hazard pay
Additional allowances
Total 5,550 4,500 6,680 7,399
3,250
2,500
2,480
2,480
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
300
2,200
2,919
418
Question 10. Do Province and District Advisors report on corruption? To whom?
What action is then taken?
Answer. Province and District Advisois report on corruption in a variety of
forms. The HES carries a question on it. In addition, individual reports are
submitted through channels. Action is decided at various command levels and the
matter is taken up at the appropriate level with Vietnamese officials who can
take action on it.
Question 11. Is it possible that Vietnamese officials involved in local development,
the RD cadres and so on, are now being organized as the nucleus of a political organi-
zation?
Answer. It is of course possible. We have not seen signs of organization outside
the government structure except in certain limited areas (I Corps).
Question 12. What is the Viet Cong recruiting rate now, compared with a year ago?
Answer. The estimated average recruitment rate for the period January to
August 1969 was over half again as high as it was during the period Septembei 1969
to January 1970.
Question 13. What has been the performance thus far of the Popular Self Defense
Force in terms of the ratio of Viet Cong to PSDF killed in action?
Answer. During 1969 the ratio was 1.21 enemj'- killed to 1 friendly.
Question 14- Is the District Advisor supposed to visit each hamlet in his district
every month in connection with the Hamlet Evaluation System? How many hamlets
must the average District Advisor visit in a week to cover every hamlet each month?
What percentage of the "A," "fi," and "C" hamlets are not visited by a District
Advisor in an average month?
Answer. The District Senior Advisor must evaluate each hamlet within his
district each month, visiting as many as he can, but using other sources of informa-
tion such as the district staff, his own staff, contacts with local officials, MAT
teams, etc. The average district in Viet-Nam contains about 50 hamlets so if he
were to visit every hamlet, he would have to visit about 12 each week. Data from
January HES indicates that 8.7 percent of the ABC hamlets in the nation were not
visited by any U.S. advisory personnel during that month.
Question 15. What percentage of the District Advisors can speak and understand
Vietnamese xvcll enough to evaluate a hamlet without an interpreter — let us say at the
three level or above? How well do interpreters speak English?
Answer, (a) Military:
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISERS AND ASSISTANT DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISERS
[In percent)
DSA ADSA
Rl/Sl
R2/S2...
R3/S3
R4/S4
R5/S5 --- - -
Total percentage. --
(b) Civilian: From a total of 80 DSAs and DDSAs, 23 are able to speak and
understand Vietnamese at the S3 level or better. This represents 28 percent of
the total civilian advisor force.
Question 16. How long does an average District Senior Advisor serve in his district?
How long is the overlap with his predecessor? How soon after he arrives does he begin
filing HES reports?
Answer. The average District Senior Advisor serves 10 months in his district.
The average overlap with his predecessor is less than one week. The DSA is re-
sponsible for the HES report as soon as he takes command of the district team.
In most cases, he relies heavily upon his deputy and team personnel during the
first month or two.
Question 17. Does the Government of South Viet-Nam rely on U.S. collected data
for its pacification and security measurements? Hoio do their statistics of the percentage
of population under South Viet-Nam Government control differ from the U.S. figures?
Answer. The GVN uses information from the HES to set goals and evaluate
pacification programs. GVN references to pacification status use HES as their
basic information. At various times both the GVN and U.S. sides will use different
terminology but the underlying statistics are the same.
Question 18. If the Viet Cong used the HES system, is it not likely that they would
count the "C" hamlets as under their control?
36.4
18.7
6.6
5.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
42.9
23.7
419
Answer. Since the NLF claims 80 percent of the population and territory under
its control, it would necessarily claim many C hamlets. The VC might actually
consider many C hamlets contested, but hardly under VC control.
Question 19. In addition to administering CORDS operations in their areas, are
District Advisers also charged with evaluating the success of the activities in which
they are engaged? Do xjou believe that this is a sound managerial principle?
Answer. District Advisors are primarily advisors, not administrators. The
administration of the Pacification Program is a Vietnamese responsibility. The
District Advisors evaluate their performance in addition to advising them. The
District Advisor is the closest resident American to the situation on the ground
and thus is the most likely to be able to follow the details of local activities. The
District Senior Advisor evaluation is supplemented by inspectors and evaluators
from the MAGV, Corps and Province level, so that there is independent evaluation
in this respect. This is the best managerial principle workable in Viet-Nam.
Question 20. (a) Does the South Vietnamese constitution provide for an inspectorate
to police corruption?
(b) How long after the constitution was adopted was it organizedf
(c) Has it submitted reports?
id) How many convictions resulted?
(e) What was the average sentence?
Answer. The Vietnamese Constitution, adopted 1 April 1967, provided for an
Inspectorate to be established no later than two years from the date the first
National Assemblv was established. The members of the Inspectorate were sworn
into office on 30 October 1968.
According to the Chairman of the Inspectorate, in the first year of operation of
the Inspectorate, 2,000 cases were sent to the Inspectorate for action, all of which
were resolved. Twelve were prosecuted in court, 10 dismissed from office, and 20
demoted or transferred. The Inspectorate recommended punishment of 38 mili-
tary officers. The additional detail is not available.
Question 21. How many Province or District Chiefs were removed for cause last
year? How many were accused and convicted of corruption?
Answer. Twenty-three Province Chiefs were relieved for all causes with one of
them for corruption, during the period 1 January 1969 to 28 February 1970.
This officer was convicted by the GVN and is in prison. During the same peiiod,
149 District Chiefs were reheved for all causes, two of them for corruption. It is
not known whether the Inspectorate recommended their trial or was content only
with their removal.
Question 22. How many South Vietnamese officials, in total, were convicted of
corruption last year?
Answer. The answer in meaningful terms is not available as no composite
records are being kept by the GVN.
Refugees and other Social Aspects of the War
Question 1. Were any South Vietnamese officials arrested and convicted in the last
year for corrupt activities in connection with the refugee program? How many, and
what was the average sentence?
Answer. During the past year four Ministry of Social Welfare Provincial Service
Chiefs were arrested, three for misappropriation of commodities and one for "intent
to defraud." Court decisions in these cases are still pending.
Question 2. How many refugee camps are now in operation? What proportion of the
population in these camps is housed in temporary shelters? What percent of the refugees
are sympathetic to the Viet Cong?
Answer. In the Refugee Program a distinction is made between temporary
and resettlement camps, or sites. In temporary sites, refugees are housed in shelters
of varying quality ranging from schoolrooms and tents to semi-permanent houses,
built by the GVN. Refugees normally remain in temporary status only for a
short time and then either return to their original homes or are given the oppor-
tunity to build permanent-type homes in resettlement sites. At resettlement sites,
the houses, built with GVN assistance, compare with the average houses of the
locaUty. As of December 1969, there were 646 refugee camps in operation, with
a total population of 518,000. Of these, approximately 145,000 or 28% are living
in temporary shelters. The percent of refugees sympathetic to the Viet Cong is
obviously unknown, although a number of the refugees have family members
with the Viet Cong.
Question 3. Why is there such a great disparity between conditions m different
refugee camps?
Answer. Disparity depends on factors such as security, effectiveness of local
officials, leadership among the refugees, logistics problems, etc.
420
Question If. How many Vietnamese doctors and other health personnel are attached
to these camps? How many U.S. civilian or military doctors or other health personnel
are available to treat refugees?
Answer. Forty-three Vietnamese midwives and 39 trained health workers are
attached directly to refugee camps, but no doctors. Vietnamese provincial medical
personnel serve refugees as well as the general population. One third country
national doctor is assigned to the CORDS Refugee Division in I Corps to inspect
and arrange solutions to acute niedienl and sanitation problems within the
camps in that area. On the U.S. side, military and civilian doctors working with
the Provincial Medical Services give attention to refugees as well as the general
population. Military medical personnel participate in the Medical Civil Assistance
Program (MEDCAP), conducting frequent medical assistance missions to villages
and refugee camps. A number of voluntary agency representatives and voluntary
agency medical teams from Korea, Germany, Switzerland, New Zealand, England,
Spain, Iran, Nationalist China, The Philippines, and Australia also assist. These
teams usually work in provincial or urban hospitals or medical centers but do
provide services to refugees as well.
Question 5. How many Vietnamese have been uprooted from their homes in some
way since the war began.? Hoiv many people in what used to be the rural population
have moved to the vrlan areas since the war began? What does this mean in terms of
post-war adjustmeyit problems?
Answer. About 3, r)n(), 000 i^eople have been uprooted during the past six years.
The urban population of Viet-Nam is now almost 40 percent of the total, an in-
crease of 10 to 20 percent in the past 10 years. As security has expanded a sub-
stantial number of people have moved back to the rural areas from refugee
centers and other concentrated population areas. During 1969, 488,000 people
received government assistance to return to their home villages. The remaining
urban concentration, however, is substantial and is a substantial problem for the
Government of Viet-Nam. The Pacification and Development Plan for 1970
includes a section dealing with urban problems.
Question 6. How much docs the Government of South Viet-Nam spend per capita
on public health programs? How much docs the United States contribute?
Answer. In the 196'.) GVN National Budget, 3,88-),400,00n .S^"N was aj^pro-
priated for Pul>lic Health programs of all types. With a rounding of population
figures to 17 million persons this amounts to 229 $VN per capita. This program
has received increasing attention from the G^'N as com])arative figures show that
this part of the budget was onl^^ 1.85 billion piasters in 1966, 2.5 billion in 1967,
and 3.6 billion in 1968. U.S. Government assistance to public health programs in
FY 69 total $41,867,000. This does not include sizable contributions by Free
World Assistance and voluntary agencies.
Question 7. How much in compensation is paid by the Government of South Viet-
Nam and by the United States to survivors of a civilian accidentally killed in military
operations? How much is paid for a house destroyed?
Answer. In a solatiiun program, conducted by the Ministry of Social Welfare
suiDported by American Aid Chapter Fimds, the survivors of a civilian accidentally
killed in military operations receive VN $4,000 if the deceased was 15 years or
older and VN $2,000 if the deceased was younger. When a house is destroyed
between 20 and 50 percent, the head of the family receives VN $3,000 for its
reconstruction and a 15-da.y rice supply. If the house was damaged over 50 per-
cent, the family receives VN $7,500, plus 10 sheets of roofing and a 30-day rice
supply. Moreover, needy war widows, orphans, and disabled persons may receive
PL-4S0 food. These payments are not intended as compensation, but as assist-
ance from the government in time of need.
Question 8. What is the average time taken to settle a claim — from damage to
payment? How many claims against the South Vietnamese Government and the United
States for damage to persons and property are now pending? How many claims have
been paid thus far for death, injury, or property damage by both governments?
Answer. In Viet-Nam, there are two war-damage claim programs: one involving
claims against the U.S. Government; and one involving claims against the Viet-
namese Government.
a. Against the United States Government:
Since December 1965, the U.S. Government has adjudicated 21,207 claims,
approving 14,058, denying 6,937, and forwarding 212 to higher authority.
A total of $4,732,750 lias been paid as of 28 February 1970.
As of 28 February 1970, there were 1,518 claims pending against the U.S.
Government.
421
b. Against the Vietnamese Government:
Under the current rehef system put into effect during 1969, the emergency
reserve fund at the province level is used to pay war victim claims, usually
within 30 days. However, under an older system which was in effect during
1968 and earlV 1969, the average time taken to settle a claim was much longer.
In 1968-1969, the Ministry of Social Welfare, which is supported by the
American Aid Chapter, paid 435,766 claims. In the same period, the Ministry
of Defense paid 17,118 claims (excluding those of defoliation).
As of 14 March 1970, there were 3.5,000 claims pending at the Ministry of
Social Welfare, which is supported by the American Aid Chapter, and 294
cases pending at the ^linistry of Defense.
Question 9. (a). Is compensation paid by the United States or the government of
South Viet-Naynfor defoliation damage to crops or other growing things?
Answer. Compensation for defoliation damages are paid by the U.S. Gov-
ernment with funds administered under the MILCAP Program. A total of 207,-
380,183 $VN has been paid during the peiiod January 1968 to December 1969.
These funds are paid out by the Government of Viet-Nam.
Part (b) of question 9. How many acres have been taken out of cultivation by
defoliation? How many acres have been sprayed in all thus far?
Answer. No acreage has been taken out of cultivation. The herbicides used do
not prevent future recultivation. Acres subjected to herbicide operations (1962-
1969) :
Acres
(1) Crop destruction 385,073
(2) Defoliation (e.g., LOCs, Tactical ops areas) 4,129,840
Total area sprayed thus far (1962-69) 4,514,913
Part (c) of question 9. How much has been paid out in compensation?
Answer. Amount of compensation paid Jan. 1968 to Dec. 1969: $VN 207,380,-
183.
Part (d) of question 9. Is thr United States supplying defoliants to the South
Vietnamese armed forces?
Ansv\-er. United States provides herbicides to the GVN.
Chieu Hoi Program
Question 1. Among those who "rallied" last year, what percentage had been in the
Viet Cong for a year or less? What level was the average "rallier" who came in last
year? How many defectors last year were members of Vict Cong or Xorth Vietnamese
fighting units?
Answer. Although statistics are unavailable on all Hoi Chauh as to what per-
centage had been in the Aiet Cong for less than a year, a random survey c(jnducted
by the Systems Development Corporation in 1969 indicates that:
a. 17.9 percent served for 1-5 mouths i)nor to ralljing;
b. 17.2 percent served for 6-10 months;
c. 24.8 percent served for 11-15 months;
d. 38.7 percent served 15 months or longer;
e. 1.4 percent of the sample did not give information on length of service.
57.2 percent of all ralliers are hamlet or village guerrillas or cadre. Returnees
from district level or above constitute 10.6 percent. The; rcnuiiuder are ^■C civilian
personnel including \'CI.
28,045 returnees in 1969 were classified as military \C or NVA, meaning they
belonged to some military unit (60 percent of the total).
Question 2. How do tve know that a "rallier" is truly a defector? Do we rely on the
Vietnamese to tell us that a "rallier" was a Viet Cong and that he has changed his
allegiance? Are there any repeats under the program?
Answer. All ralliers are interrogated by the police and a cross-check is made on
their story to the extent feasible. This is handled by Metnamese, although Ameri-
cans have access to the inteiTOgations and occasionally interrogate the ralliers.
There are some repeats in the program, but rarely.
Question S. What is to prevent a "rallier" from going back to the Viet Cong? How
many do?
Answer. Nothing prevents him from returning to the Viet Cong, as he is free to
leave the Chieu Hoi Center and, of course, free after he is released from it. Survej'-s
of returnees by Rand Cori)oration and others iiulicate that less than one percent
may have gone back to the \'iet Cong.
Question 4- Do Armed Propaganda Teams ever go on operations to capture members
of the Viet Cong? Do they ever work with Provincial Reconnaissance Units?
422
Answer. APTs do not go on missions to capture VC nor work with the PRU.
They do accompany military units on occasion on cordon and search operations
etc.,' to make contact with VC and their families.
Question 5. Do Armed Propaganda Teams have American Advisors? If so, how
many in total and to whom do they report? How is the effectiveness of a team measured?
Answer. APTs have American Advisors assigned from the province teams.
Twenty-eight provinces have such advisors, who report to the Province Chieu Hoi
Advisor who in turn reports to the Province Senior Advisor. APT effectiveness is
determined by their activities and the numbers of Hoi Chanh who report having
been induced by the APT.
Question 6. the prepared statement on the Chieu Hoi program referred to bogus
returnees, ARVN deserters and enemy agents. How many of these were there last year?
Are they included in the 47,000 total for last year?
Answer. No figures are kept on the number of bogus returnees or ARVN
deserters who try to enter the program. These are weeded out in the interrogation
process before they are classified as returnees and therefore are not counted in the
total figures. During 1969, 59 enemy agents were arrested trying to infiltrate the
Chieu Hoi program.
Question 7. On page 3 of the statement it was said that returnees receive 72 hours of
political training at the center. How is the effectiveness of the training measured?
Answer. The effectiveness of pohtical training is measured by evaluation forms
filled in by Ministry of Chieu Hoi personnel and U.S. Advisors. This includes
attitude of instructor, use of training materials, class participation, etc.
Question 8. Is there any estimate of how many Viet Cong who come in through the
Chieu Hoi program were ever believers in Communism as an ideology?
Answer. Most returnees probably do not beheve in Communism as an ideology.
However, a 1968 survey indicated that 6 percent were party organization cadre and
another 7.8 percent party rank and file. During 1969, 4,832 Hoi Chanh were
credited under the Phung Hoang Program, meeting its standards as members of
the infrastructure. A substantial number of these were presumably behevers in
Communism.
Phoenix Program
Question 1. What is the average length of sentence and of time served in jail by a
person captured under the Phoenix Program? How many members of the Viet Cong
Infrastructure have been arrested more than once?
Answer. Of the VCI captured, 5 to 10 percent are tried by military court and
receive an average sentence of five to six years. Of those sentenced under the
administrative detention procedure, the average sentence has been 9 to 12 months.
We do not have a reliable estimate of the number of VCI arrested more than once,
but a record system is being established which will provide this in the future.
Question 2. What was the rank of the average person neutralized" under the
Phoenix Program — high, middle, or low? Approximately what percentage of those
"neutralized" were not bona fide members of the infrastructure?
Answer. See Statement for Record on Phung Hoang Program, Pages 12 and 13
for priorities and levels of those affected by Phoenix Program. During 1969,
some were probably included as captured who were later released for lack of
evidence. In 1970, these will be included only after sentencing so that this error
should be removed. While some abuses or other errors may have taken place,
these fi^gures are believed essentially accurate as to the ' bona fide members of the
infrastructure" affected by the Phoenix Program. rr ■, ^ o. , , *i.
Question 3. Have there every been any studies made by the United btates at the
village or hamlet level to try to measure the effectiveness of the Phoenix Program? If
so, what have those studies shoivn? Has the abolition of the Phoenix Program, or the
termination of United States participation in it, ever been proposed?
Answer. Studies have been made. These have indicated that the size and
activities of the VCI have been reduced considerably in many areas, although the
essential leadership structure was relatively intact, could carry on many of its
earlier activities and serve as a base for future expansion. Many of the posts
had been filled on paper and internal document and Hoi Chanh reported difficulty
in maintaining earlier levels of activity. While informal suggestions have been
made to abolish the Phoenix Program or terminate U.S. participation, a formal
proposal and decision pro or con, have not taken place. Changes in organization
and structure and tactics, etc., are constantly under study in an efifort to improve
the program. , ,, ^ ,•
Question 4. Do you think that the Phoenix Program has destroyed the effectiveness
of the Viet Cong Infrastructure? Is it still capable of carrying on the pohtical and
administrative side of the war for the Viet Cong?
423
Answer. The Phoenix Program has not destroyed but has diminished the effec-
tiveness of the VC Infrastructure. See Statement for Record on Phung Hoang
Program, Pages 15-16. The VCI is still capable of conducting poUtical and
administrative activities, but at a reduced level. The Phoenix Program has con-
tributed to this reduction of V C capability which has also been produced by other
aspects of the overall pacification program.
Question 5. Does the operation of the Phoenix Program interfere with the efforts
of hamlet and village officials to maintain their own local sources of information?
Should village officials have more control over the -program, rather than Army or police
officials who are unresponsive to local sentiment? Does the Phoenix Program run
counter to the announced policy of developing village government?
Answer. The operation of the Phoenix Program does not work against hamlet
and village officials, but has incorporated them as an essential element of the
program. Village operations centers are being established which involve the
Village Chiefs and other significant village leaders, plus the National Policeman
who is under the Village Chief's authority. These collect information on the
VCI in the neighborhood and integrate this information into the Phoenix Pro-
gram. They do not interfere with the local officials' sources of information. Thus
the Phoenix Program is consistent with the policy of strengthening village govern-
ment in that it relies upon the village government for contributions to the pro-
gram. Direction has been given (but is not adequately executed yet) that Village
Chiefs must be informed of all arrests within the village, preciselj^ in order to
reinforce the Village Chief's authority and to ensure consideration of matters
known to him as the responsible local official.
Question 6. How much U.S. money was involved in the operation of the Phoenix
Program last year?
Answer. During 1969, approximately $US 350,000 was expended in direct
support of U.S. civilian personnel and for necessary supplies and equipment for
U.S. Phoenix advisorj^ staff officers. This sum does not include the pay and al-
lowances for 441 U.S. military personnel assigned to the Phoenix Program. Ap-
proximately 230 million piasters (equivalent to $US 2 million) of U.S. funds were
expended in support of the Vietnamese Phonenix Program, to provide logistic
support, construction, payment of local employees, and training. These costs do
not include U.S. supi>ort of other programs such as the RF/PF, National Police,
intelligence services, information services, etc., which participate in the Phoenix
effort. It is not possible to segregate the portion of those costs devoted to Phoenix.
Question 7. Are rewards offered for information on members of the Viet Cong
Infrastructure? How much and how is the money paid?
Answer. Rewards are offered for information on members of the VCI. Normally
these rewards do not exceed 10,000 piasters ($84.75), although exceptions are
occasionally made. The rewards are normally paid to the recipient by a Vietnamese
official, who has been provided the funds and is sometimes accompanied by a U.S.
advisor.
Question 8. What was the cost to the United States last year of the Provincial
Reconnaissance Unit program? What is the estimated cost for 1970? Are there any
ex-Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in Provincial Reconnaissance Units? If so, how
many? Do U.S. advisors ever go on Provincial Reconnaissance Unit operations?
Answer. PRU budget 1909, $5,553,600; 1970, $6,159,500. There are screened
ex-VC and NVA in PRU units; total estimated not over 200. Since September 1969,
U.S. advisors are not authorized to participate in PRU operations.
Question 9. Why are members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure who are arrested and
convicted not jailed for the duration of the confliclf W hat is the justification for re-
leasing known members of the VCI while the war is still going on?
Answer. The administrative detention procedure (An Tri), is limited to a two-
year maximum sentence, although this is renewable on reconsideration at the end
of the two-year period. Military courts could sentence oft'enders to am- period of
time, including death. Sentences are for a determined period of years. The justifi-
cation for release while the war is still going on is found in the government's pro-
gram of rehabilitation. The government has sought to rehabilitate its prisoners
and detainees and release those it believes rehabilitated.
Question 10. What is the current estimate of the strength of the Viet Cong Infra-
structure in Saigon and the other principal urban areas?
Answer. The Viet Cong Infrastructure in Saigon and other principal urban
areas is strong enough to conduct limited terrorist activity but not to exert
continuing authority over the area.
424
QUESTIONS FOR MR. VANN
Question 1. How long do you think American support forces will be required in
the Delta? How many members of these forces do you think will be required by the end
of 1972f
Answer. Any answer to this question requires an assumption as to objectives
and missions for both the Vietnamese and the United States. For example, I have
no waj' of knowing to what extent we will continue to assist the GVN in a road
building program, hence cannot estimate the length of time that engineer support
forces will be required in the Delta. Based on current trends and assuming no
major change in enem}!" strengths or techniques, I would estimate that a substan-
tial reduction of support forces would take place in the Delta by the end of 1972.
Question 2. What plans are there for the future as far as the size and functions of
your staff are concerned? How large do you expect your staff to be in one year? In
three years? In five years? How long ivill it be necessary to keep United States Ad-
visors in the Delta?
Answer. Again, an answer to this question requires speculation as to the policy
and objectives of the U.S. Government and its subordinate agencies in Viet-Nam.
My staflf has been reduced in the past j'ear and I expect additional reductions in
the forthcoming year. These reductions are largeh' related to management im-
provement or to the completion of certain assistance (such as attaining a satis-
factory level of handling education) to the GVN.
Question 3. What is enemy strength in the Delta now compared with a year ago?
What is the Viet Cong recruiting rate now compared with a year ago?
Answer. Total enemy strength in the Delta is virtually unchanged as compared
with a year ago, but the proportion of NVA personnel has gone up substantially,
while VC guerrilla strength is down. ^'C recruitment is well down from a year ago.
Question 4- Is the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the Delta still functioning? How
large is it now compared with a year ago? If there has been a reduction in size, how
much is from the top echelon?
Answer. The Met Cong Infrastructure is still functioning in the Delta, but
overt VC and ^'CI activity has been decreasing steadily over the past six months.
This phenomenon aijpears to be due primarily To the accelerating ]jace of terri-
torial security. Particularly related to decreasing VC activity is improved and
increased activity on the part of the paramilitary PSDF and the militia (RF/PF).
Also involved in the reduction of VC activity is an apparent change in VCI
tactics. The armed \C forces and the N\'A have tended lately to remain in the
major VC bases areas, remote and inaccessible. According to captured documents
and Hoi Chanh interrogation reports, the VCI have "gone underground" to
begin operations on a more covert basis. The.y do this by obtaining legal GVN
documentation through the Chieu Hoi or refugee programs. Once the VCI be-
come legal cadre, they return to their native villages to await further instructions
for action at a more propitious time. Indisputable proof of "directed" rallying by
the VCI is difficult to obtain^ but it is relativeh^ easy to do and the VCI have
made their intent clear. Thus the only safe assumption is that this type of activity
is occurring. It is reportedly widespread.
Those VCI who are still functioning overtly have modified their priorities
substantially. Captured ^'C documents stress the need for more emphasis on
mihtary proselytizing within the GVN ranks, increased farmer's association activi-
ties, and widespread general propaganda. Many Village People's Revolutionary
Councils or Committees were chosen through some type of 'N'C-controlled elections.
Many of these organizations function merely on paper with little actual impact
on the village, but the extent of this type of activity indicates that the VCI view
basic political organizing with some sense of urgency.
Any analysis of the size of the VCI is difficvdt to make because estimates vary
greatly. It seems probable that the actual figure may be in the vicinity of 20,000
significant VCI cadre with about one-third of the figure operating at district or
higher level.
Phung Hoang reported that 6,960 VCI cadre were neutralized in 1969. This in-
cluded 1,742 cadre from district and higher level — a rate of 25 percent. Since there
was no directed attempt to conduct operations in order to cause maximum damage
to the ^'CI as an organization, the individuals who were neutralized were replaced
with relative ease. Captured documents do indicate that the replacements are
not as well-trained or as thoroughly indoctrinated as the older, more experienced
cadre.
Undoubtedly'-, a year and a half of Phung Hoang activity has had an effect on
the VCI as an organization. It should be reiterated, however, that the major
factor inhibiting the activity of the VCI is the adverse trend — from a VC point
of view — of pacification as a whole. It is this trend which has forced the VCI to
adopt a low profile policy of seeking to establish legal, semi-covert cadre and
build up new bases for i)oiitical action at the village and hamlet level.
Question 5. Do the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese have the ceipacity to upset
the recent progress in pacification in the Deltaf What clo you think they intend to clot
Answer. AI_v assessment is that the enemy's strategy is to oppose and attempt
to roll back pacification. It is my opinion that the 5^ will be unable to do this given
their current strength levels and capabilities. This assessment would obviously
change if the enemy were to bring in additional NVA luiits and apply additional
resources to this objective. Even assuming the latter, there would be no di-amatic
roll-back of pacification since the pacification expansion is based on the physical
presence of over 1,000 additional RF and PF units that did not exist a year ago.
Question 6. What is the official pay of the average Vietnamese province and district
chieff How much does it cost them to live in the style expected of persons in their
position? What has been your experience in seeking to have corrupt GVN officials
removed?
Answer. The average province chief has the military rank of lieutenant colonel.
Assuming a wife and three children a lieutenant colonel province chief would
have pay and allowances totalling 28,000 VN$ (US$ 237) each month plus a house,
car and servants. Additionallv, he would have an expense and entertainment
allowance of from 8,500 VN$ to 25,000 VN$ (US$ 72 to 212) a month. For the
purpose of this answer, the average province chief would be assumed to have an
expense/entertainment allowance of 17,000 \'N$ (US$ 144). This net income of
45,000 VN$ (US$ 381) vv^ould be approximately half of what I estimate to be his
average expenses each month: 90,000 VNS (US$ 762). With the same assumptions
for a district chief, the average district cliief is deemed to be a major with a wife
and three children. His income would approximate 16,250 VNS (US$ 137.75)
plus a house, car and servants. He does not receive an expense or entertainment
allowance. His average expenditures per month are estimated by me to be 49,000
VNS (USS 415.54), or approximately three times liis legal income.
In IV CTZ, during the past thi'ce years, there has been a 160 per cent turnover
in the district chief positions and a 175 percent turnover in the province chi(-f
positions. About 40 per cent of these changes were due to normal duty rotation.
The remainder were due to charges of corruption, malfeasance, and incompetence.
Question 7. If the South Vietnamese armed forces are not able to withstand massive
enemy attacks at some point in the future, the 23,000 Americans there will be in a very
vulnerable position. Are we not taking a big chance by not protecting them with
American forces? And after all United States ground combat forces are withdrawn
from South Viet-Nam, won't the problem of protecting hundreds of thousands become
even more serious?
Answer. The question implies assumptions which, in my judgment, are not
warranted. In all the time I have been in Viet-Nam, I have never been aware of
an instance wherein adequate protection was not provided to American Advisors
or support personnel b}^ Vietnamese armed forces or police. If anything, U.S.
personnel in such roles are provided a disproportionately high level of security
sometimes to the extent of the securitj' arrangements interfering with their work
performance requirements. I do not see the Hkelihood that the security of U.S.
personnel will be unduly jeopardized if the.y are not protected by U.S. combat
forces. Throughout Viet-Nam, there are thousands of advisors in all Corps
Tactical Zones whose security is now and has been the full responsibiUty of the
GVN.
Question 8. How many hamlets in IV Corps have been doivngraded in the HES
ratings since the Uth US Infantry was withdrawn from the Delta?
Answer. The 9th US Division was physically present in only two of the 16
provinces within the Delta. Pacification progress has continued both throughout
the Delta and specifically in the two provinces where the US 9th Division was
located. Specifically, on i30 June 1969, there were 2,861 hamlets in the Delta in
HES category ratings of A, B and C. On 31 December 1969, there were 3,319
hamlets in these categories. Within the specific area occupied b}'' the US 9th
Division (Kieu Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces), on 30 June 1969, these two prov-
inces had a total of 593 hamlets in the HES categories A, B and C and on 31 De-
cember, they had a total of 691 hamlets in these categories or an increase of 10.4
per cent since the departuie of the LS 9th Division.
Question 9. It has been reported in the press that the South Vietnamese Government
has recently moved additional forces into certain Delta areas where Viet Cong forces
had been strengthened. You said in your prepared statement that progress in those
areas is now "slower." Have any HES ratings been lowered? If not, why?
44-706—70 28
426
Answer. The VNA invasion of the Delta has had little impact on pacification
since most of the NVA forces have moved into unpopulated areas or have been
located along remote sections of the Cambodian border. An exception to this is
Tri Ton District of Chau Doc Province where the proximity of the 18-B NVA
Regiment to the hamlets of Tii Ton District has resulted in 31 of these hamlets
being reduced from HES categories A and B to HES category C and 19 HES
category C hamlets to contested (D and E) status. Overall, however, progress
has been made in pacification since and during the introduction of NVA units into
the Delta.
Question 10. When were all United States combat forces withdrawn from the
Fourth Corps area? Did the number of U.S. military advisors increase when U.S.
combat forces were withdrawn?
Answer. A reduction of U.S. combat forces in the Delta began in June 1969
and was completed on 31 August 1969. Because of the requirement for processing
these forces for out-shipment, the effective removal of U.S. ground combat forces
is considered by me to have been July of 1969. The number of U.S. military
advisors has not increased since the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This is true not
only for the Delta in its entirety, but specifically for the two provinces where the
U.S. 9th Division was located. There are no plans to increase the number of U S
advisors within IV CTZ.
Question 11. Ho7v many reports do you file weekly, monthly, annually?
Answer. The following count is of reports submitted to various agencies by
province advisory teams in IV CTZ on a recurring basis. The reports include
administrative, logistical, intelligence and operational reports as well as pacifi-
cation progress reporting.
Annual i
Semiannual 1
Quarterly 10
Bimonthly 2
Monthly 3q
Weekly g
Daily """" 3
As required 26
Total ^
The following count is of reports submitted by CORDS headquarters and
includes only those dealing with pacification progress reportmg.
Quarterly __ _ _ _ 2
Monthly ll"...~ll."_l".ll 7
Weekly ' 2
As required 4
Total 15
Equating the above listed report counts to a monthly requirement basis, the
following count arises. As Required reports are not included in this computation.
Province 158
CORDS Headquarters 16
Total 174
QUESTIONS FOR MR. MILLS
Question 1. What plans are therefor the future relating to the size and functions of
your staff?
Answer. As I mentioned in my testimony, we constantly look for ways to work
ourselves out of our jobs as Vietnamese officials gain the necessary experience and
competence. In my 15 months in Dalat we have eliminated a refugee and social
welfare advisor, a logistics advisor, a nursing advisor, a public information advisor,
an assistant police advisor, and three military advisors at various levels. We are
now working on a reorganization of the team to eliminate a separate advisory
section for Dalat City, incorporating the work of one U.S. Army captain, one
Vietnamese area specialist and one secretary in our existing development and mili-
tary_ operations sections. Before the end of this year we expect to be able to
eliminate an agricultural advisor, a non-commissioned advisor to the Revolution-
ary and Montagnard Cadre teams, an assistant advisor to the RF and PF (a cap-
tain's position), two civihan advisors to the police special branch, and several
427
Vietnamese administrative and clerical employees. In addition, we will share our
Chieu Hoi advisor with two other provinces, replace a Filipino radio operator with
a Vietnamese who is now in training, and possibly transfer a five-man mobile
advisory team and a three-man RF battalion advisory team working in the Da
Nhim Special Zone to the Ninh Thuan Province team whose location enables it
to support and control the teams more effectively than we can. It is difficult to
rapidly reduce the size of district and mobile advisory team because, operating
independently in remote and frequently dangerous locations, they must be large
enough so that there will always be: (a) an officer present in spite of leaves, illness,
and required trips out of the area; (b) adequate personnel to handle 24-hour radio
watches; (c) a medic present; and (d) sufficient personnel for team defense. Never-
theless, as our role becomes more and more that of monitoring Vietnamese pro-
grams rather than advising, we expect to be able to reduce the number of mobile
advisory teams as well as the size of the province-level team.
Qestion 2. You saij that there are no United States combat forces in your province.
How many U.S. support forces are there? How many U.S. advisors in all — both
civilian and military — are there in the province? What is the strength of the ARVN,
RF, and PFf What is enemy strength in your province?
Answer. The total strength of U.S. support forces in the province is a little over
1,000. There are the following U.S. advisors: CORDS, 30 military officers, 55
NCOS, 11 civilians; MiUtary Academv, 12 officers, 4 enhsted; Command and
General Staff College, 2 Officers, 1 enlisted; Political Warfare College, 1 officer,
1 enlisted; National Police Field Force training center, 4 civihan, 6 miUtary;
regional highway advisory detachment, 2 civiUans. The Vietnamese military (RF,
PF, and ARVN) total some 6,000. Estimated enemy strength is around 2,000.
Question 3. Do you report on corruption? Were any Vietnamese officials in your
province removed for corruption last year? Were any of them prosecuted?
Answer. As incidents or rumors of corruption come to our attention we report
them. For instance, the former National Police chief and his deputy w^ere both
removed for corruption and put in jail in Saigon. Prosecution in such cases is
diffcult because of lack of evidence and the unwillingness of others involved to
testify. As the next best alternative, suspected officials are transferred out of their
former areas to new jobs where they know the American advisor is watching them
closely. They frequently perform satisfactorily and honestly.
Question 4. How mariy member of the Viet Cong Infrastructure are in your province
now compared with a year ago?
Answer. We estimate that roughly 10% of VCI strength in Tuj'en Due and
Dalat was neutralized in the past year.
Question 5. Would you describe the function and method of operation of the Prov-
ince Security Committee? What percentage of the apprehended Viet Cong Infra-
structure are tried by these Committees? What is the average sentence and the average
length of lime served?
Answer. The Province Security Committee (PSC) functions as a quasijudicial
tribunal which determines the sufficiency of evidence against suspected "communist
offenders." It is directed by the Province Chief and is composed of the chiefs of
the National Police, police special branch, sector S-2, miUtary security service,
and the judge of the provincial court acting as legal advisor. A dossier is prepared
on the arrested person by the special police liefore his hearing. It includes bio
data, family history, criniinal record, personal statements during interrogation,
and intelligence reports indicating his involvement with the communists. The
special pohce chief will tentatively classify the individual in accordance with
Ministry of Interior guidelines as category A (leaders of NLF and People's
Revolutionary Party organizations, heads of assassination teams, espionage units,
armed propaganda units, front organizations, etc.) ; category B (members of the
above organizations); or category C (suppliers and other low-level supporters).
If the PSC determines that the evidence supports this classification, it sentences
the person as follows: category A, two years; category B, one year to 18 months;
category C, three to six months. A and B offenders are imprisoned in national
detention centers, while category C are sent to the province rehabilitation center.
The sentences of A and B offenders are open ended and their cases can be heard
again by the PCS at the end of their sentences.
There is no U.S. involvement after a suspect's apprehension, making it difficult
to follow up to determine final dispo.sition of the case. The PSC in Tuj-en Due has
consistently applied strict rules of evidence in cases brought before it. Unless the
suspect has admitted hi? involvement in communist activities, the PCS almost
never classifies him higher than C category, with the result that most apprehended
suspects serve less than six months or are released outright after investigation.
428
Question 6. How soon do you think the Vietnamese in your province will be capable
of doing for themselves all the things in which United States personnel are now
involved?
Answer. In many areas of our team's activity, the Vietnamese are already fully
capable of performing the work themselves but we still must have an American to
monitor the use of American commodities and prepare the required periodic
reports. As discussed in question No. 1, we are consolidating such positions as
quickly as possible and should be able to reduce the team to about half its present
size within the next 18 months. I would hope that within about three years all
CORDS advisors could be removed from this province, although I believe that
peacetime programs of economic and social development such as we have supported
in other developing countries may require the presence of one or two American
civilians after that. As for American support troops in this province, the engineers
probably will be removed after they have finished work on National Highway 11
later this year; the communications units, which chiefh' provide relaj' services for
American forces outside the province, can be reduced as U.S. forces are replaced by
Vietnamese troops; and the U.S. artillery can be removed as soon as the Vietnamese
receive comparable equipment and adequate experience, perhaps in as little as 18
months. Logistical and air support units will also be unnecessary when other U.S.
troops have gone.
Question 7. Is the Province Chief in your province from the province originally?
Answer. The Province Chief of Tuyen Due is from Go Cong Province in the
Delta. Before coming here in jNIarch 1969, he served for four years as Province
Chief in Binh Long, III Corps.
Question 8. On page 2 of your prepared statement, you mentioned that Dalat
has a universitii, the Vietnamese National Military Academy, the Command and
General Staff College and numerous other institutions. Are American advisors at-
tached to the university, the military academy, and the Command and General Staff
College? What assistance has the United States given to these inslitutions? Do you
know the cost involved in each case?
Answer. There are no American advisors at Dalat University, although one
Fulbright instructor of English teaches there full time and a USIA officer teaciies
part time. The university is supported by the Catholic Church and the Met-
namese Government. As far as I know, the U.S. Government has never given
any money to it directly but has contributed some used furniture and some
construction and roofing materials for repairs, and through a grant to the Asia
Foundation assisted in the development of library facilities through the provision
of books and training. Of the total grant, about $60-80 thousand is attributable
to Dalat. Data on U.S. assistance to the Military Academy and Command and
General Staff College is given below:
Command and general staff
Military academy college
Authorized. 16 (12 officers) 5 (4 officers).
Assigned 13 (10 officers) 4(3 officers).
U.S. assistance . Vietnamese dollars, 300,000,000 (1968)_.. U.S. dollars, 6,400 (1970).
Facilities Vietnamese dollars, 281,000,000 (1969)...
Question 9. At the top of Page 3, you stated that since Tet "the Viet Cong have
continued to make night raids from their base camps in the mountains into the popu-
lated areas to get supplies, impress recruits, set up ambushes, and disrupt programs
of the Vietnamese Government by assassinating officials, blowing up rural health
stations, schools and administrative offices, and intimidating the people." How does
Viet Cong strength noio compare with two years ago? Have HES ratings of hamlets
been lowered as a result of this enemy activity?
Answer. Two years ago VC military forces in the province were about the same
strength as todav but at that time they had free run of many populated areas
from which they have since been driven by the GVN. HES ratings reflect the
presence and activities of VC force in populated areas. As the GVN has extended
its control to virtually all settled communities in the province and pushed the
VC back into mountain base areas, the HES ratings have moved upward. In
periods of heavy VC activity, however, as in the fall of 1989 and in January
1970, HES ratings have been lowered to show the decreased security.
Question 10. You must have many opportunities in your vjork to observe political
developments in your province. Does the Embassy take advantage of the presence of
Foreign Service Officers to inform itself of events of the countryside? Can you com-
429
municate directly with the Embassy about such matters? Does MACV prohibit your
communicating with the Embassy if you do not go through the MACV chain
of command f
Answer. The Embass\- has selected one CORDS employee in each province,
usually a Foreign Service Officer, to report on significant political and economic
developments in his area. Because we work for MAC\' and not the Embassy,
we submit our reports through the MAC\" chain of command rather than directly.
Delays which sometimes used to occur in forwarding the reports seem to have
been eliminated and I know of no case v.here reports to the Eiub.issy have been
stopped or altered. In addition to this formal channel, we frequently discuss
our observations ^ath the officer from the Embassy's political section who is
assigned to the Corps area.
Question 11. How many reports do you file weekly? Monthly? Annually?
Answer. Our team submits the following regular periodic reports: 3 daily,
9 weekly, 48 monthly, 6 quarterly, 1 semi-annually and 4 annually. In addition,
we submit perhaps 50 to 80 one-time spot reports each month.
QUESTIONS FOR MAJOR ARTHUR
Question 1 . What plans are there for the future as far as the size and functions
of your staff are concerned?
Answer. We plan to reduce the size of the district team in Binh Chanh District
from fourteen to six members through normal rotation liy 30 Jime 1970. Advisory
positions in the reduced team are as follows: District Senior Advisor, Deputy
District Senior Advisor (civilian). District Intelligence and Operations Coordinat-
ing Center Advisor, People's Self Defense Force Advisor and two Radio Operators.
Question 2. How would you estimate public opinion in your district in terms of
support for the Government of South Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong, and those not aligned
with either side?
Answer. Approximately 40 per cent of the people of Binh Chanh District
su|>port the Government of South Viet-Nam, 10 per cent of the peoi)le support
the Viet Cong and M) per cent have not conunitted themselves to either side.
Question 3. Is the district chief a native of the district? The province?
Answer. LTC Nguyen Ba Di, the District Chief, was born in Can Giouc
District, Long An Proviiu*e. 11 is l)irthplace is approximately ten miles from the
Binh Chanh District Ileadqiuxrters and while he is not technically a native of
the District or Province lie is a native of the same geograj^hic ;iiid ethnic area.
Question 4- How many reports do you file weekly? Monthly? Annually?
Answer. The District submits 8 weekly, 14 monthly and 1 annual reports.
These are standard r(>oecurring reports and do not include spot reports and
reports submitted on "as required" basis.
Question 5. Qn page S of your statement, you stated that "the Viet Cong Infra-
structure and the local guerrillas have been reduced to squad and half squad size units
per village and there is very little organization left at hamUt level." Docs the Viet Cong
still have the capability of disrupting the pacification program in your district? How
many Vietnamese were killed, wounded or abducted by the Viet Cong last year and
how many the year before?
Answer. The Viet Cong still possess the capalnlity to disrupt the Pacification
Program for short nonsustained periods. In most cases the local village guerrillas
have been unal)le to cause any disruption to the Program without assistance from
members of the X'u^i Cong Main Force units which are based outside the District
boundaries. Viet Cong actions directed against civilians dvu'ing 1968, excluding
the Tet Offensive, resulted in 46 killed, 101 wounded and 49 abducted. In 1969
there were 27 killed, 53 wounded and 9 abducted. To date in 1970 there have been
2 civilians killed and 2 wounded by the Viet Cong. These figures are approximate.
Question 6. On the bottom of Page 4 of your statement, you stated that you plan to
place increased emphasis on the People's Self Defense Forces Program during 1970
"since a success in this area will increase identity with the government . . ." What
do youmean by "increase identity with the government?"
Answer. When a person joins the People's Self Defense Force he identifies
himself as a supporter of the Government of South Viet-Nam. In addition, he is
showing his fellow villagers and the Viet Cong as well that he is willing to become
involved in the affairs of his village. He accepts the fact that he must donate his
time and energy in order to defend and develop his village. He does this knowing
qtiite well that he is now a "marked man." He is no longer considered "uncom-
mitted" by the Viet Cong. They recognize that as the people are organized into
the People's Self Defense Force they will lose the passive support they have
enjoyed in the past. Therefore, the Viet Cong are directing a campaign of propa-
430
ganda and terrorism against the members of the People's Self Defense Force to
prevent the people from casting their lot with their Village, Province and Na-
tional Government.
Question 7. On Page 5 of your statement, you stated that the Chieu Hoi program
did not do well during 1969. Why not?
Answer. There were a number of problems in the administration of the pro-
gram and training of Chieu Hoi cadres. In addition, the Viet Cong remaining in
Binh Chanh District are hard-core apparently highly motivated individuals wha
know how to avoid allied operations, know their area of operations well and
seemingly have no confidence in the Chieu Hoi Program.
STATEMENTS CONCERNING PROGRESS OR LACK OF
PROGRESS IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. Then I want to put in the record, Mr. Reporter,
some statements that have been compiled by the Library of Congress,
and a simihir compilation from the Washington Post, relative to the
progress or lack of progress made in Vietnam over the years to give
a sense of perspective to the judgment of our present people on the
same situation.
(The material referred to follows :)
[From the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, June 6, 1967]
To: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
From: Foreign Affairs Division.
Subject: Selected statements by members of the executive branch on victory
in Vietnam and removal of U.S. troops.
Statements by President Kennedy and his leading advisers in 1963 indicated
they did not believe that large-scale introduction of U.S. troops into South
Vietnam would be necessary. Statements by President Kennedy, by Secretary
of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated that the South
Vietnamese would be able to handle the situation themselves, that U.S. troops
would not be needed in more than an advisory and training role, and that even
those in a training role could begin returning home in late 1963 and in 1964.
Several statements by Secretary McNamara were optimistic about the termi-
nation of the U.S. military mission. A White House statement on October 2,
1963 included the following: "Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported
their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed
by the end of 1965." Several statements were made by President Kennedy and by
Secretary McNamara dealing with the removal of a certain number of U.S.
troops by the end of 1963. Some troops were removed, a large number of whom
had completed their task of training South Vietnamese policemen. The impression
remained, however, that this signified the beginning of the end of the U.S. training
mission.
Secretary McNamara in 1963 and 1964 made other statements that could be
classified as optimistic. On February 19, 1963, he indicated he thought it would
take "maybe 3 or 4 years" to defeat the V'iet Cong. In February 1964 he said
that "I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. I don't believe
we can take on that combat task for them." By 1965, Secretary McNamara was
more cautious in his statements on the duration of the war. In November 1965,
he did say after returning from a trip to South Vietnam that "the most vital
impression I'm bringing back is that we have stopped losing the war."
A statement by President Johnson in March 1964, made clear that a large
portion of those militarj^ advisers who returned had been training guards and
policemen in South Vietnam. President Johnson stated that others might return
when their task was completed, but that additional men would be sent as required.
Some early statements by President Johnson indicated that the Administration
was still hopeful about the war's coming to an end: On January 1, 1964, in a New
Year's message to the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South
Vietnam, he wrote: "As the forces of your government become increasingly capable
of dealing with this aggression, Amei'ican military personnel in South Vietnam can
be progressively withdrawn." The statement he made in March indicated a
gradually changing assessment of the situation. However, in September 1964,
during the election campaign, President Jolmson did not give the impression that
U.S. troops would be used in combat. He said: "We don't want our American
431
boys to do the fighting for Asian boys, we don't want to get tied down in a land
war in Asia." Other statements by administrative officials in 1964, in 1965, 1966
and 1967 indicated a cautious assessment of how soon the war might be over.
However, the Administration did make an arbitrary assumption in drawing up
the fiscal 1967 budget ''that the conflict would end by June 1967."
Statements by President Johnson during the past year indicate uncertainty
about how long the war might continue. In December 1966, he said: "Just how
long they will be required to do so, I am not able to predict. If I did predict it,
I would have no doubt but what I would live to regret it." In March 1967, he
said, "I think we have a difficult, serious, long, drawn-out, agonizing problem
that we do not yet have the answer for."
Though Secretary Rusk apparently has not made any specific references, with
dates, as to when the U.S. might withdraw from South Vietnam, he did in 1963
show some optimism over developments there. On February 13, he said that
"the momentum of the Communist drive has been stopped . . . The guerrillas
are losing ground . . . government forces have the initiative and are using it
with growing effect." In April he said, "The Vietnamese are on their way to
success" but "we cannot promise, or expect, a quick victory there." In February
1964, he said that the Vietnamese "can handle this problem primarily with their
own effort."
On January 1, 1967 he noted that the Viet Cong "must surely now understand
that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Vietnam bj- force ... If I
am pessimistic, it is simply because we have not yet seen any indication from the
other side that they are prepared to give up their idea of seizing South Vietnam
by force." On April 16, 1967 Secretary Rusk stated that "I think we have seen
some very favorable signs that we are making headways on the military side, but
that does not "mean that the war is just about over."
SELECTED EXECUTIVE STATEMENTS ON VICTORY IN VIETNAM AND WITHDRAWAL
OF U.S. TROOPS
John F. Kennedy
May 22, 1963: "I hope we could — we could withdraw the troops, any number of
troops, any time the government of South "\'ietnam would suggest it. The day after
it was suggested, we would have some troops on their way home. We are hopeful
that the situation in South Viet Nam would permit some withdrawals in any case
by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgment at the present
time. There is stilla long, hard struggle to go ... I couldn't say that today the
situation is such that we could look for a brightening in the skies that would permit
us to withdraw troops or begin to l)y the end of the year ... As of today, we
would hope we could begin to perhaps to do it at the end of the year, but we
couldn't make any final judgment at all until we see the course of the struggle the
next few months."
September 2, 1963: "I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the
Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the
final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We
can help them, we can give theni equipment, we can send our men out there as
advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet Nam, against the Com-
munists."
October 31, 1963: "When Secretary McNamara and General Taylor came back
from Viet Nam, they announced that we would expect to withdraw a thousand
men from South Vietnam before the end of the year and there has been some refer-
ence to that by General Harkins. If we are able to do that, that would be our
schedule. I think the first unit or first contingent would be 250 men who are not
involved in what might be called front-line operations. It would be our hope to
lessen the number of Americans there by 1,000, as the training intensifies and is
carried on in South Vietnam. As far as other units, we will have to make our judg-
ment bed ason what the militar}- correlation of forces may be."
November 14, 1963: "We are going to bring back several hundred (troops from
South Vietnam) before the end of the 3^ear."
Lyndon B. Johnson
January 1, 1964. New Year's message to chairman of the Militar_y Revolutionarj"
Council in South Vietnam: "As the forces of your government become increasingly
capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South
Vietnam can be progressively withdrawn. The U.S. Government shares the view
of your government that 'neutralization' of South Vietnam is unacceptable. As
long as the Communist regime in North A'ietnam persists in its aggressive policj'-.
neutralization of South Vietnam would only be another name for a Communist
takeover."
March 7, 1964: "I don't think that the American public has fully understood
the reason for our withdrawing saiy advisers from South Vietnam, and I think
the.v should. We have called back approximately 1000 people. A good many of
those people, several hundred, were training guards, policemen . . . From time
to time, as our training mis-^ion is completed, other people will be withdrawn.
From time to time, a-< additional advisers are needed, or as people to train addi-
tional Vietnamese are needed, we will send them out there. But we see no reason
to keep the companies of MP's out there, after they have already trained the
Vietnamese who can perform the duty equally as well. I think that a good deal
will depend on what Secretary IVIcNamara advises concerning who is withdrawn,
when they are withdrawn, and who is sent out, and when the^- are sent out . . .
When his report is in, we will carefully evaluate it, and if additional men are
needed, we will send them. If others have completed their mission, we will with-
draw them."
March 17, 1964, on McNamara and Taylor report on trip to South Vietnam:
"The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their
roles can be assvuned by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they
are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance
and support to South Viet Nam for as long as it is required to bring Commvmist
aggression and terrorism under control."
September 25, 1964: "There are those that say you ought to go north and drop
bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the
war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't
want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a
land war in Asia. There are some that say we ought to go south and get out and
come home, but we don't like to break our treaties and we don't like to walk off
and leave people who are searching for freedom, and suffering to obtain it, and
walk out on them."
December 31, 1966, reply to news conference question on war strategy: "I
think that we are making tlie plans that we believe are in the best interest of this
country. I don't think anyone can say with any precision when the peace con-
ference will come. We are preparing our people to protect our national interest
and our agreements and commitments. Just how long they will be required to do
so, I am not able to predict. If I did predict it, I would have no doubt but what I
would live to regret it."
March 21, 1967, on how things look in Vietnam: "I think we have a difficult,
serious, long, drawn-out, agonizing problem that we do not yet have the answer
for."
Robert S. McNamara
Februar}^ 19, 1963: "I hope for a gradual strengthening of the control of the
Government over the activities of that nation, and a gradual weakening of the
influence of the Viet Cong. I think this will go on for a substantial period in the
future. I can't really put a number on the years involved, but I think it would be
mavbe 3 or 4 vears."
October 2, 1963, White House statement: "Secretary McNamara and General
Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can
be "completed by the end of 196o, although there may be a continuing requirement
for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that b}- the end of
this .year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the
point where 1000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Metnam can he
withdrawn."
November 19, 1963: "It is our objective to provide the training and logistical
assistance which the South Vietnamese Government has requested of us, and upon
completion of certain facets of that training, small numbers of the U.S. personnel
will be able to return l)v the end of this year."
Februarv 3, 1964: "Last fall I wa< not as optimistic perhaps about the course of
the war as' I was about being able to bring back our personnel in certain numbers
bv the end of last year and also in increments. I still am hopeful of doing that. We
did, of course, bring back a thousand men toward the latter part of last year. I am
hopeful we can bring back additional numljers of men. I say this because I per-
sonally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight ... I don't believe we
can take on that combat task for them. I do believe we can carry out training . . .
The training, by the verv nature of the work, comes to an end at a certain point."
May 14, 1964: "I firmly believe that the persistent execution of the political-
military plans which the Government of Vietnam has developed to carry out that
war with our assistance will lead to success."
433
Answer to question on number of LS training personnel needed in Vietnam ;
"I tS on balance the number is not likely to increase -bstai^^^^^^^^
M'lrch 2 1965, reply to question on length of war. i reallj can t ^a\ • J. xmiiK
the neriod of time required to counter effectively a substantially guerrilla effort
of the kind that currently exists in South Vietnam is great and whether it is 1
vear -^ vears or more I really can't say, but a long period of time is required to
JSr;|S?;^t.^el, W and stjU^ih^ into a nation th^J^iS^-^^^art
Z^ ^Z^Z^:^:^ I w J^irepeat what I -id amoment a^ a. effec
tive opposition to a guerrilla campaign requires ^n extended leriodo^
the resilts to be clear. I don't beheve that ^^e ^^n be eifective m South Vietnam
in n short neriod of time. We expanded our efforts at the end ot lyoi. vve nave
beenfhe^Vnowlplus years on L expanded basis We ^-^\^^^^:j^'^l
these objectives— the same objectives we have todaA— for 10 or 11 jear^, ana
think that it will be more before we achieA'e them. situation
ATav 9 1965- "Let me sav that I think it is perfectly clear that tne s tuanon
in Vietnam has deteriorated during the past year on a year and a half, both politi-
'iul?":^;l965f!n Saigon: "In ^many aspects there has been deterioration since
I was here last— 15 months ago." t +v,,-,.i' in ^PVPrnl resnect^ It
Julv 21 1965: "The situation is serious today, I think, m several respect, ij^
has deteriorated over the past 12 months. Vietcong strength has mci-eased dia-
mttituv dudng Tat peri!>d, primarily as a result ^^ tVf?om"N"JftitSam
of lar^^e "numbers of soldiers— now regular army personnel fiom jNorth \ietriain.
That^'increased strength has allowed the Vietcong to expand and mteiisifj then
Ittacks onthe poffticll structure of South Vietnam and in particular to increase
their oamDaisn of terror against the civilian population. • • • .
''""[ ca.??prldi?t the futuf e with accuracy. I ^o want to mention one tMng^^^^^^^
the future, however, that I think is very interesting. ^^^ ) "\fj^.^^^:^^ °\y fl^^^^
Ho Chi Minh looked into the future, and he said it might take 20 veais tor tnem
^^Tctober 26, 1965, interview question: One of the generals in the fi^M is quoted
as saving that h<- once thought it was going to be a 10 year war, but now he i^
optimistic and leaning toward 93- 'i years. +„ +1,0 H„rntinn nf thf^
Secretarv McN \m vr.v. "I wouldn't make a prediction as to the duratioii ot tne
waifl'mrik it is important to recognize that progress has been made during the
''"Nol^m'ber 30, 1965, planeside interview at Andrews AFB, returning fio^^South
Vietnam : ''The most vital impression I'm bringing back is that we have stopped
losing the war."
Dean Rusk ^ -ni, .-^
February 1, 1963: "There are some definitely encouraging elements. The rat o
of cisualtJes between Government and Viet Cong forces, the ratio of arnis cap-
tured ^^iSt between the two sides, the steady extension «/ ^he strategic-^^^^^^^^^
program, the increasingly effective work of the "!«"^^8"^^tth nk^lit ii such
kreas-al those indicate some turmiig in the situation . . ^ ^^^mk that in Mich
a situation as we have in Viet Nam at any one time there are going to be both
pluses and minuses in the situation." . ^ j • v, u ^„ ..+rv.>,->oH
February 13 1963: "The momentum of the Commumst drive has been stopped.
ConS^vic orj for South \wi Nam is not just around the corner, but the g.ier-
riUaia?e losing ground and the number of guerrilla attacks has declined signifi-
cantly. Major deficiencies in training, intelligence and mol,ility have been repaired.
Government forces have the initiative and are using it with growing effect.
April IS, 1963: "The South \ietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle,
'^Anrif 22 1963" "The Government forces are able to maintain the initiative and,
incrSisinglV, to achieve the advantage of surprise. The strategic h^"; f^ P^«^:';;:;j
is producing excellent results. ... The strategic hamlet provides strength ag<iin>t
ihe Communists in the countryside. . . . The villagers are figiiting when attacked.
. . . Rice production is up Defections from the Viet Cong have risen. . .
The Viet Cong is losing more weapons than are the Government f 01 ces. \iet
Cong attacks are running at less than half the rate of January 1962 .1 he
Viet Cong has been unable to carry out its plan to escalate to largei milit.ai>
units and to more conventional warfare We cannot promise, or expect a
quick victory there It took 8 years to wipe out the Commumst terrorists
in Malaya— and they were far from a major Communist base. But there is a
good basis for encouragement. The Vietnamese are on their way to success and
434
need our help; not just our material help — they need that — but our sympathetic
understanding and comradeship."
November 8, 1963: "We were also concerned in May and June and July of this
5'-ear when developments in South Viet Nam indicated that there was a growing
gap between the government and people of that country, and there was some
danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be
undermined by differences within the country. . . . We beheve that the present
regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able
to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be
a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf
of the total eflfort."
February 24, 1964: "I think the resources and the capabilities are there to get
this job done on the present basis of assistance to the Vietnamese so that they
themselves can handle this problem primarily with their own effort."
July 1, 1964: "I think they (the Viet Cong) have very serious problems — not
only in fact, in terms of losses, disruptions, but in terms of morale. So I am not
pessimistic about the situation. It is difficult, it is going to take some time, it is
going to take more of the heroic job being done by South Vietnamese and
Americans and others in that situation. But I don't feel any sense of despair
whatever."
June 18, 1965: "I think they (the South Vietnamese) have been encouraged by
the clear evidences of the United States support and the clear evidence that we
take our commitments seriously and that they are getting major sssistanse from
us and growing assistance from others, I think this has had a good deal to do with
strengthening their hand and sustaining their morale in what has been a very diffi-
cult and mean situation over a period of time."
August 2.5, 1966: "We are beginning to see some signs of success of this strategy.
The Viet Cong monsoon offensive, which we know from captured documents it
was their intention to carry out during the period May to October, has not ma-
terialized because of Westmoreland's tactics of carrying out spoihng operations
based on intelligence he has received as to concentrations of Viet Cong . . . The
number of defections this year has doubled compared to the past year. No doubt
this is a sign of erosion of morale."
January 1, 1967, on the prospects for peace in Vietnam in 1967: "I think there is
a possibihtJ^ The task of diplomacy is to proceed on the basis of optimism. And I
never close the door to the possibihty that this situation will change. I do believe
that one basis for optimism is that the other side must surely now understand
that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Viet Nam by force. Now,
maybe that will bring about a significant change in their political approach to
this question.
But if I am pessimistic, it is simply because we have not yet seen any indication
from the other side that they are prepared to give up their idea of seizing South
Viet Nam bv force."
April 16, 1967: "I think we have seen some very favorable signs that we are
making headway on the military side, but that does not mean that the war is
just about over ... I am reluctant to put dates on (winning conventional
warfare phase of the war), but I would think we made very, very substantial
headway during 1966 on the conventional tj^pe of warfare. Now, the pacification
eflfort against the guerrillas is almost by nature a slower task . . . But that is
beginning to move now, and I think that behind the cover of the military success
against the large units can come an increased pace against the guerrillas. I must
say that I have been impressed by the doubling of the rate of defectors from the
other side."
M. T. Haggard,
Analyst in Asian Affairs,
The Library of Congress,
Washington, B.C.
Statements By Executive Officials in 1967 and 1968 on Progress in
Vietnam (Excerpts)
(Prepared According to the Instructions of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee)
The attached has been prepared for the personal use of the Mem-
ber requesting it in conformance with his directions and is not
intended to represent the opinion of the author or the Legislative
Reference Service.
435
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
1967
February 2. — "We felt that it [the bombing of the North] would make the
North Vietnamese pay a much heavier price for what they were doing. And we
felt that it would make the iBfiltration more difficult. We think it has achieved
all of those expressed purposes." (Press Conference, The White House)
March 15. — "Despite continuing increases in North Vietnam's infiltration, this
strengthening of aUied forces in 1966, under the brilUant leadership of General
Westmoreland, was instrumental in reversing the whole course of this war."
*******
"What we do know is that General Westmoreland's strategy is producing
results, that our military situation has substantially improved, that our military
success has permitted the groundwork to be laid for a pacification program
which is the longrun key to an independent South Vietnam." (Address to a joint
session of the Tennessee Legislature, Nashville.)
March 20. — "There are many signs that we are at a favorable turning point.
Your [South Vietnamese] fighting men, aided by your allies, now hold the initiative
and are striking heavy blows against the strongholds and refuges of the Viet Cong
and their North Vietnamese masters." (Remarks opening the Guam conference.)
August 18. — "Our activity in the South is determined a great deal by what the
enemy there is willing to do. More and more here of late — we think that because
of the losses he has suffered, because of the position in which he finds himself — he is
less anxious to engage our troops in combat."
*******
(Question: ". . . have we reached a stalemate in the Vietnam war?")
The President. "No. I think there are those who are taking a pretty tough
drubbing out there, who would like for our folks to believe there is a stalemate.
But I haven't been there. I can't personally say that I have observed all the action
that has taken place. ... All of these men [Generals Westmoreland, Wheeler,
Johnson, and Larson] think that the stalemate charge is nothing more than propa-
ganda." (News Conference, The White House.)
September 1. — (Question: "Mr. President, do you concur with General Johnson's
prediction that the troops will be brought home in 18 months from Viet Nam?")
The President: "That is General Johnson's opinion. I have mande no predic-
tion and wouldn't care to at this time." (News Conference, The White House.)
September 29. — "There is progress in the war itself, steady progress considering
the war that we are fighting; rather dramatic progress considering the situation
that actually prevailed when we sent our troops in there in 1965; when we inter-
vened to prevent the dismemberment of the country bj^ the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese. The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many
of their interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp in 1965
has now been denied them. The grip of the Viet Cong on the people is being
broken." (Remarks in San Antonio, Texas.)
November 1. — (Question: "Are you optimistic, sir?")
The President. "Ycs. I believe that we are making progress. I believe that
we are doing what Ave ought to do. I think we are going to continue doing what
we ought to do." (News Conference, The White House.)
November 17. — "But overall, we are inaking progress. We are satisfied with that
progress. Our allies are pleased with that progress."
*******
(Question: "Do you think that at this point our force levels in Vietnam will
begin to level off in authorized strength, or do you think more troops may be
needed in the future?)
The President: "We have previously considered and approved the recommen-
dations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the force level.
"General Westmoreland discussed this at some length with me last night and
this morning. He anticipates no increase in that level." (News Conference, The
White House.)
1968
January 1. — "We are very hopeful that we can make advances toward peace.
We are pursuing every possible objective. We feel that the enemy knows that he
can no longer win a military victory in South Vietnam. But when he will reach the
point where he is willing togive us evidence that would justify my predicting peace
this j-ear — I am unable to do so — that is largely up to him. (News Conference
Johnson City, Texas.)
February 2. — (Question: ". . . are we still winning the war?")
436
The President: "I think I see nothing in the developments that would indi-
cate that the evaluation that I have had of this situation throughout the month
should be changed. ... I don't want to prophesj^ on what is going to happen,
or why. We feel reasonably sure of our strength." (News Conference, The White
House.)
SECRETARY RUSK
1967
January 1. — ''I do believe that one basis for optimism is that the other side
must surelv now understand that they are not going to succeed in seizing South
Vietnam bv force. Now, maybe that will bring about a significant change in their
political approach to this question." ("Face the Nation" interview.)
January 31. — ". . . and I have no doubt at all that the bombing has made it
much more difficult for them to lay on their effort and sustain it and certainly
more difficult for them to increase it."
*******
"Well, in the first place, the effort of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese
forces to cut the country in two has been frustrated. They have not been able to
move this war to the third stage of the guerrilla tactics; that is, to the conventional
stage; organized forces of battalion and regimental size are not the pattern of
their action at the present time in general, because in those engagements the
firepower and the force that are present there inflict very severe casualties upon
them and they have therefore been pulling away from that. The problem is still
the tactical problem of the guerrilla situation.
*******
"So we think we are making headway, but the typical guerrilla problem is still
there — that is a mean and difficult kind of thing to deal with." (Interview for
British television.)
March 28. — "If they [authorities in Hanoi] have supposed that they would be
able to obtain a military victory in the South, they must surely now put that hope
aside. If they had any hope that there would be a political collapse in South
Viet-Nam, surely ihey must now know that all of the groups in South Viet-Nam,
who have some differences among themselves, are resolved to bring into being a
constitutional government in which these various groups can work together on a
basis of the free choice of the South Vietnamease people with respect to their
future and that one point on which they are generally agreed in South Viet-Nam
is that they do not wish the program of Hanoi or the Liberation Front." (News
Conference statenient.)
April 16. — "W 11, we have a good deal of evidence, from prisoners and from
documents and from what we know of their deployments, that the other side is
having considerable difficulty ia maintaining their forces, in giving them supply,
keeping up their morale. . ". . No. I think we have seen some very favorable
signs that we are making headway on the military side, but that does not mean
that the war is just about over."
*******
"Well, I am reluctant to put dates on [a conclusion of the conflict], but I would
think we made very, very substantial headway during 1966 on the conventional
type of warfare." ("Meet the Press" interview.)
Jxdy 1. — "Although no one foresees any United States troop Avithdrawals
within the next six months, the United States is confident that the efforts by
South Viet-Nam and its allies will continue to bring improvements, although
there may be ups and downs. The important thing to bear in mind is that the inili-
tary and non-military developments are inextricably intertwined in South Viet-
Nam, even more than elsewhere, so chat the most significant indicators of military
success may be found not in battle reports and casualty statistics but in the evi-
dence that the country is moving forward, creating political institutions, holding
village and hamlet elections, improving communications and stabilizing the
economy."
*******
"The remarkable progress Ix'ing made in the direction of a constituti'-inal
government augurs well for the future if security can be maintained." (Slate
Department press release of an interview with a Swedish newsman.)
August 29. — "Those who visit Viet-Nam and talk to our men in the field don't
get a feeling of stalemate, Vjut a sense of steady progress toward the ultimate
objective of seen ring South \'iet-Nam against this terror and this aggression,
from the North." (Address to the American Legion National Convention.)
437
October 12. — "I cannot tell 30U when peace will come. I am encouraged by
progress toward peace in South Viet-Nam, but I cannot name a date. But we
shall continue our effort both by resisting those who would impose their solutions
by Ijrute force and by an imremitting exploration of every path which could
lead to peace."
*******
"I know that some reporter in Saigon invented the wor i 'stalemate.' Our
military authorities do not believe there is a stalemate. * * * There are many
indicators that the government and allied forces are getting on with the job on
the military side."
*******
"The economic situation has been improving. In other words the Viet Cong
have not achieved their objective. The country is moving ahead. And I see no
reason for us to be gloomv simply because it is not over yet. We have had our
combat forces there for approximately 2 years, and other allies have put forces
in there, and the situation is moving."
*******
"When vou look at the total situation, it's moving; and I have no reason
myself whatever to subscribe to this notion of a stalemate. It is not a stalemate
at all." (News conference.)
October 16. — "I said in my press conference the other day that I know of no
significant opinion in this countrv supporting a withdrawal and an abandonment
of \'iet-Nam and Southease Asia." (Interview with the foreign press, USIA
transcription.)
October ."^O.— "What sustains Hanoi? At first and until recently, the hope of
military victorv in the South. That possibility is now beyond their reach. Perhaps
they had some hope of a political collapse in South Viet-Nam. But in the midst
of the war, the South \'ietnamcse have adopted a new constitution and elected a
President and a Vice President and a Senate and a House, as well as village and
hamlet leaders. Perhaps Hanoi has hoped to build up international pressures to
cause us to alter our course. That is not occurring. I have just completed meeting
with about 90 foreign ministers in the opening stages of the current meeting of
the U.N. General Asseml:>ly. I can tell vou that we are not under pressure from
other governments to pull out of Viet-Kam." (Address at Columbus, Indiana.)
December 6. — ". . . major progress since the siunmer of 1965 — dramatic on
the military side, and politically in adopting a Constitution and holding free
elections. Also signilicant gains for nuich of the civilian population in education,
health, roads, agriculture, and curbs on inflation."
*******
"If anyone doubts that our stand in Viet-Nam has been a major contribution
to these highly favorable developments over a vast area (the Pacific and East
Asia), let him" go there and talk with responsible government officials. I cannot
tell vou how much longer it niaj- take to achieve peace in Viet-Nam. . . . Mean-
while, the situation in South Viet-Nam is not a stalemate." (Address before
the National Association of Manufacturers.)
1968
January 4. — ". . . and a clear, I think, turn of events on the ground, as far as
Viet-Nam is concerned."
*******
"I cannot tell vou today whether there's been a change or not. . . . We know
that they [Hanoi] have issued orders for an intensified offensive during the winter
season. (Press Conference.)
January 22. — "In partnership with our Vietnamese allies and the other nations
assisting in South Viet-Nam's defense, we have made significant progress. Repeated
enemv assaults have been thrown back, at heavy loss to the other side. Pro-
tection against Viet Cong terror has been steadily extended to wider segments
of the poi>ulation. Five elections have been held in the past 18 months for local
officials, the Presidency, and the two legislative chambers, and institutions
for representative government have thus been established in the midst of a cruel
war. I expect further steady progress over the coming months." (Interview
with "MacLeans" magazine of Canada.)
February 4. — "We have not seen evidence around the countryside of what the
Viet Cong might call a popular uprising. Now, we have known for some months
they were going to launch a winter-spring offensive, they call it, which they
anticipated would trigger off such a popular uprising.
438
". . . and I might say also that we know there is going to be some hard fighting
ahead. We are not over this period at all. As a matter of fact, the major fighting
up in the northern part of South Viet-Nam has not yet occurred, so there are some
hard battles ahead."
(Interview on "Meet the Press.")
SECRETARY m'naMARA
1967
January ^5.— "These trends bear out the assumption we made last year that
the number of North Vietnamese would increase substantially while the supply of
indigenous military manpower would be further limited.
"It is not clear [however] that the limit that results is below that the North
Vietnamese planned on, and, in any event, it is not below the level necessary to
support the force in the South at present."
*******
"Although we still have no way of knowing when the conflict will end it is per-
fectly clear that we must take whatever measures are necessary to ensure our
ability to support our forces in the event the conflict does continue beyond June
30, 1967." (Statement before a joint session of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations.)
February 15. — "I don't believe the bombing of the North, by itself, will cause
the political leaders of North Vietnam to end their activities in the South. However,
the impact of the bombing can be judged in part by the great efforts of North
Vietnam to force us to stop bombing." (News Conference.)
March 1. — "And the magnitude of this price [air campaign against the North]
to the North, I think, is recognized by them and it has been translated into their
worldwide campaign to force us to stop this." (News Conference.)
J^dy 9. — "Our casualties are high but we also have inflicted very high casualties
on North Vietnamese army units. I anticipate the enemy will receive a very heavy
pounding." (Statement following visit to the DMZ.)
July 12.— "The political scene has changed substantially since my last visit to
South Vietnam last September and early October.
"The Constituent Assembly, as you know, has completed its work during that
period. The nation now has a constitution. Preparations for the elections are
advancing rapidly.
"As you are well aware, the election for the Chief Executive, the Vice President
will be held within about 4.5 days and that will be followed very shortly there-
after— within the next 45 to 60 days — by the completion of elections for the
legislative branch of the government.
"This is tremendous progress when one looks back at the situation that existed
9 months ago."
*******
"So there has been a very substantial improvement in the economy and a much
more stable basis for future development of that economy."
****** 4:
"On the military field, let me say to start with, the military commanders I
met with — and I met with all of the senior military commanders in the field, all
of the senior Vietnamese commanders, many of the Allied commanders, Korean
and New Zealanders, for example, and many of the middle ranking and junior
U.S. officers — all of the military commanders stated that the reports that they
read in the press of military stalemate were — to use their words— the 'most redic-
ulous statements that they had ever heard.'
"In their view, military progress had occured and was continuing."
• **•***
"However, having said that, I should state to you that to be candid I must
report the progress in pacification has been very slow. I think that the momentum
will increase as the new organization gains in experience, but what we are really
trying to do here is engage in nation building. It is an extraordinarily complex
process. I would anticipate progress in what is really a very significant field would
continue to be slow." (Press Conference.)
July 22. — "I do not consider it optimistic to cite the progress which has been
made; I do not consider it pessimistic to cite the problems which remain." (State-
ment to the Press.)
August 25. — ". . . I would like to restate my view that the present objectives
of our bombing in the north were soundly conceived and are being effectively
439
pursued. They are consistent with our overall purposes in Vietnam and with our
efforts to confine the conflict. We are constantly exploring ways of improving our
efforts to insulate South Vietnam from outside attack and support. Further
refinements in our air campaign may help. I am convinced, however, that the
final decision in this conflict will not come until we and our allies prove to North
Vietnam she cannot win in the south. The tragic and long-drawn-out character of
that conflict in the south makes very tempting the prospect of replacing it with
some new kind of air campaign against the north. But however tempting, such
an alternative seems to me completely illusory. To pursue this objective would
not only be futile but would involve risks to our personnel and to our Nation
that I am unable to recommend.
"I don't believe that the testimony to date does support the conclusion that
there is a direct relationship between the level of bombing of the north and the
U.S. forces required in the south.
"... Now on the other side of the equation, would a reduction in the air
campaign in the north lead to an increase in the forces required in the south, I
frankly don't know. I think it would depend on what the North Vietnamese did
under these circumstances.
"Undoubtedly they would take advantage of the reduction to move material
with a lesser cost to them in terms of numbers of people engaged, and this would
be an advantage to them. Whether it would result in the movement of more men
and material to the south I think is questionable. I don't know the answer."
(Hearings before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services.)
1968
February 4- — -"Just four days ago I remember reading in our press that I had
presented a gloomy, pessimistic picture of activities in South Vietnam. I do not
think it was gloomy or pessimistic; it was realistic. It said while they had
suffered severe penalties they continued to have the strength to carry out the
attacks which we have seen in the last two or three days."
*******
"The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have not accomplished either one of
their major objectives, either to ignite a general uprising or to force a diversion of
the troops which the South Vietnamese and the United States have moved into
the northern areas of South Vietnam, anticipating a major Vietcong and North
Vietnamese offensive in that area. And beyond that, the North Vietnamese have
suffered verj^ heavy penalties in terms of losses of weapons and losses of men in
the past several days. They have of course dealt a very heavj^ blow to many of
the cities of South Vietnam."
*******
"The balance has definitely moved toward the South Vietnamese. I think,
however, you are putting undue emphasis on the military aspects of this war.
This is a complicated question. There isn't a simple military solution to it. It's
a political-economic-military problem. Each of these facets intertwine. And we
should not only examine the militarj^ operations when we're talking about rela-
tive balance of progress." (Interview on "Meet the Press.")
VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY
1967
November 10. — "We are on the offensive; territory is being gained. We are
making steady progress. . . ." (Television Interview.)
November IS. — ". . . I am heartened by the progress I saw."
*******
"But there is progress — not marked from day-to-day or week-to-week, but
clearly measurable over the course of months. The greatest and most obvious
progress of all is in the military effort."
*******
"So that is the picture I bring back from Vietnam. Political, economic and
social progress; steady but slow. Military progress: steady and gaining momen-
tum. National security and national development: both proceeding. (Address to
the Grocery Manufacturers of America, New York.)
440
CLARK CLIFFORD
1967
August 5. — "The consensus expressed in each instance, without any exception,
was that the Allies are headed on the right track. They believe that the progress
made on the ground in South Viet-Nam has been appreciable. They believe that
pressure should be built up in South Viet-Nam.
"In each instance, without exception, the Allies agreed on the necessity and the
value of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. It is through North Viet-Nam that
the forces of the Viet Cong and North Viet-Nam are being supplied in South
Viet-Nam. The Allies feel strongly that those lines of supply should be interdicted
to the best of our ability.
"So it is the general feeling, as I attempt to synthesize their attitude, that we
are headed in the right direction. The maintenance of force and the possibility of
increased force and pressure should bring the Allies out at the point where we
hope to come out." (Press Conference, The White House.)
AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER
1967
September 10. — "Yes, I think we are making steady progress — not spectacular
progress — it is not that kind of situation. I think we are making steady progress.
This is a situation which cannot be solved overnight. It takes time. It takes
patience. It takes steady application of pressure. As I say, it is not a situation
where you have spectacular things happening. It is a question of keeping on the
pressure, gradually moving ahead." (Television Interview, ''Face the Nation,"
CBS.)
Novernher 13. — "I don't think you can put this situation in a time frame. I
think it is a great mistake to try to do it. INIy view is very definite and that is that
we are making steady progress. I think there is every prospect, too, that the
progress will accelerate, because I think that man^^ factors point to it."
"I described to the President my views of the situation now in Viet-Nam. I
said to him, as I have said before, too, that in iwy view we are making steady
progress in Viet-Nam, not only militarily but in other ways as well: in the evolu-
tion of the constitutional process, in the pacification program, which is, in my
view, equally as important as the military situation." (News Conference, The
White House.)
(News Conference, The White House.)
November 17. — "In a war with as many faces as that in Viet-Nam, one of the
best indications of how things are progressing is the degree of security in the"
countryside.
"The Vietnamese Armed Forces are carrying the major burden in providing such
security, so vital to the success of the many pacification programs designed to
improve the well-being of the people and to enable them to manage their own
affairs free from Viet Cong terrorism.
"Obtaining a definitive assessment of the extent of securit3^ is an extremeh^
complex task. It is our judgment that the proportion of the population under the
reasonably secure protection of the Gov^ernment of Viet-Nam has increased to
more than two-thirds of the 17 million people in South Viet-Nam. Just over 2 j-ears
ago, it is estimated the projjortion was about one-half. Of the one-third not under
Government protection toda}-, about half are under \'iet Cong control and half in
contested areas.
*******
"This, then, is the picture in Viet-Nam as I see it. Steady but not spectacular
progress is being made militarily and in nation-ljuilding. The development of
representative institutions and vigorous political life is encouraging. But, quite
frankly, I can't answer the big question that I know is on your minds: How long
will it take?"
(Address to the Overseas Press Club, New York.)
GENERAL AVILLIAM WKSTMORELAND
1967
April 24. — "Although the military picture is favorable, I emphasize the fact
that we have no evidence to indicate that the enemy is slowing his invasion from
the North, or that he is breaking up his major units and scattering them about,
or that he is giving up his plans to try to inflict major defeat upon us.
441
"HP is takincr great casualties and he does have logistics problems, but his
comoletefv unrealistic During the past year tremendous progress has been made.
fthuktlJe Secretary [McNamara] noted this during his recent trip
''The SecrSywi there about 9 months ago and I am sure that the progress
was evident to hLr I live it from day to day and it is not as evident to me as it
" m ifuk" ;a?chrg'vrr"hS"grow up. The grandmother comes and sees
s-ii^Ai^^iS^tt:?^/?^tJSe ^s^^ "^ -"^'
* *
* * * * *
"During the past year tremendous progress has been made ^ We ^ave jush^,^
the enemy farther and farther back into the jungles . •^•J^^^^^XeV of defectors
Si;- SJ^lIrlo^SeS^lJ^lJtSf^^ncr.^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^^SS
doubled dunng the^P-^t Jear ^^^.^ significant victory during the past
winnTnt t^davTe is Srtath 'Sg.^TSre are indications that the Viet Cong and
'""H?^;"vt^th"e?emv mav be operating from the delusion the political pressure
^^-^iri:3^^?^eio^t^S^^^^^
in his continuing the war in its present pattern.
"With 1968, a new phase is now starting. We have reached an ""PO^^^nt point
when the end begins to come into view." (Address to the National Press Club,
Washington, D.C.)
^%lbruarv 25.-"li is too early to assess the impact the recent o^f f^^e by the
onomv has had on the pacification program. However, it is reasonable to assume
Jhau'n manrareas the p^rogram has been set back. On the other hand, m some areas
"■''In'thJlrSt whe'reto was a setback, certainly it will take months in some
instanced to rt^tore the effort to its former level, although the exact time in-
volved depends on a number of imponderables.
*
"In sum I do not believe Hanoi can hold up under a long war. The present
enemy offensive attitude may indicate that Hanoi reahzes this, also. ^Press
Conference, Saigon.) ^^^^_^^ ...Washington Post, July 23, 1969]
A Selection From Vietnam Familiar Quotations
(By Philip Geyelin)
Defense Seeretarv Laird's recent progress report on the Vietnam War has conie
uiXr a certain ainount of criticism from people who apparently ha^e no sense of
tradition. Even when allowance is made for the P^'^tagon s eff^cn^ to tidj p h^
Secretary's intended meaning the next day, h.s declaration that we have ^e ^^ } .^^
turned the corner in the war" is a worthy addition to any compilation of 1 anuliar
"^^S^plll^SJant Defense Secretary for Piiblic Affairs Jerry Fned^j- --^^^
D'lins the following dav to sav that the corner Laird was referring to had to do only
Xthe Temendous progress" being made in the "Vietnamization" of the war,
it he mighrarwell hive saved his breath-as Robert McNamara would be he
fi Nt to testify Who now recalls, or even knows, that his celebrated. 1963 projection
of the war's end was not originated by him, that it grew out of a joint mission with
44-706—70 29
442
Gen. Maxwell Tajdor, that it was polished and put out by a large group of White
House advisers with the approval of President Kennedy, and that it presupjaosed
no enlargement of the enemy war effort?
That is one rule — that it is the first impression that counts — in these matters.
The second rule is more important, and it is that predictions or appraisals having
to do with the course of this war, for whatever purpose thej?^ niay be made, do not
have are cord of standing up verj^ well. One can always hope. But the record, which
is rich, argues otherv/ise — argues in fact, for public officials either making the most
carefully measured estimates or making none at all and letting the facts, such as
they are, speak for themselves.
Mr. Laird's assessment, for example, follows hot on the heels of his boss's
much-discussed, much-amended, expression of a "hope" that he could outdo
Clark Clifford's timetable for removing all of our ground combat forces by the end
of our ground combat forces by the end of 1970. Mr. Clifford was dealing, inci-
dentally, not in hopes but in the terms of a proposed line of action. But if Mr.
Nixon was violating his own injunction, expressed in his first press conference
("I do not think it is helpful to make overly optimistic statements which, in
effect, may impede and perhaps make very difficult our negotiations in Paris"), he
was in good company, for both his remarks and those of Mr. Laird were of a piece
in this respect with an appraisal offered in January 1969 by a close Presidential
confidant. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, that "(the enemy's) . . . situtation is
deteriorating rather rapidlj'." And this, in turn, was merely the best news we
had received since an assessment in September 1968 by Gen. William West-
moreland, now the Army Chief of Staff and formerly the field commander in
Vietnam, that "the enemy is deteriorating."
This world "deteriorating" is much favored among appraisers of the Vietnam
War. "Turning the corner" is also a stock item, if that is any comfort to Mr.
Laird. In fact, whether the official in question is a general or a President or a
Cabinet member, there are patterns here, certain forms to be observed. And
so, for the convenience of those officials who cannot resist the impulse, as well
as for the edification of those who might see some purpose in trying to fight
it— given the past record — what follows are some selected quotations from the
last 15 years:
". . . We have never been in a better relative position." General Westmoreland,
April 10, 1968.
". . . We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into
view . . . The enemy has many problems: He is losing control of the scattered
population under his influence . . . He sees the strength of his forces steadily
declining . . . His monsoon offensives have been failures. He was dealt a mortal
blow by the installation of a freely elected representative government . . . the
enem,y's hopes are bankrupt." General Westmoreland, Nov. 21, 1.967.
". . . We aie generally pleased ... we are very sure we are on the right track."
President Johnson, July 13, 1967.
". . . Progress has been made We have pushed the enemy farther and
farther into the jungles. . . . We have succeeded in attaining our objectives."
General Westmoreland, July 13, 1967.
"1 except the . . . war to achieve very sensational results in 1967." Ambassador
Lodge, Jan. 9, 1967.
"We are beginning to see some signs of success," and "There is an erosion of
[enemy] morale." Secretary of State Rusk, Avg. 25, 1966.
"We have stopped losing the war." Secretary of Defense McNamara, October,
1965.
". . . We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousands miles from
home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." President Johnson,
Oct. 21, 1964.
"The war in Vietnam is on the right track." Ambassador Lodge, June 30, 1964.
"I think the number [of U.S. personnel] in Vietnam is not likely to increase
substantially." Secretary of Defense McNamara, May 14, 1964-
". . . The Vietnamese . . . themselves can handle this problem primarily with
their own effort." Secretary of State Rusk, Feb. 24, 1964.
"The United States still hopes to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam by
the end of 1965." Secretary of Defense McNamara. Feb. 19, 1964.
"I am hopeful we can bring back additional . . . men . . . because I personally
believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. I don't believe we can take on that
combat task for them." Secretary of Defense McNamara, Feb. 3, 1964-
"Victory ... is just months away, and the reduction of American advisors can
begin any time now. ... I can safely saj^ the end of the war is in sight." Gen.
Paul D. Harkins, Commander of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon, Oct,
SI, 1963.
I
443
"Secretary IMcNamara and General [Maxwell] Taylor reported their judgment
that the major part of the U.S. militarj- task can be completed by the end of
1965. . . ." White House statement, Oct. 3^ 1963.
"I feel we shall achieve victory in 1964." Tram Van Dong, South Vietnamese
general, Oct. 1, 1963.
". . . South Vietnam is on its way to victory . . ." Frederick E. Nolting, U.S.
Ambassador to South Vietnam, June 12, 1963.
"The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well."'
Secretary of State Rusk, April 1963.
"[The struggle] is turning an important corner." Secretary of State Rusk, March
8, 1963.
". . . The corner has definitely been turned toward victory in South Vietnam."
Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense, March 8, 1963.
"There are definitely encouraging elements . . . the ratio of casualties . . .
indicates some turning in the situation." Secretary of State Rusk, Feb. 1, 1963.
"The war in Vietnam is going well and will succeed." Secretary McNamara,
Jan. 31, 1963.
"... The South Vietnamese should achieve victory in three years. ... I am
confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war. [The Vietcong] face inevitable
defeat." Adrn. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, Jan. 12,.
1963.
"Every quantitative measurement shows we're winning the war. . . ." U.S.
aid to Vietnam has reached a peak and will start to level oflf." Secretary of Defense
McNamara, 1962.
"The Communists now realize they can never conquer free Vietnam." Gen.
J. W. 0' Daniel, Official Military Aide'to Vietnam, Jan. 8, 1961.
"... The American aid program in Vietnam has proved an enormous success,
one of the major victories of American policy. . . ." Gen. J. W. O'Daniel, Official
Military Aide to Vietnam, Sept. 7, 1959.
' "With a little more training the Metnamese Army will be the equal of any other
army. . ." Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker, Dec. 18, 1955.
"I fully expect (only) six more months of hard fighting." General Navarre,,
French Commander-in-Chief, Jan. 2, 1954-
COMMENDATION OF \VITNESSES
The Chairman. I tliink that is about all I have to say. I can only
say again that you all have been most cooperative and it has been
educational. I am afraid we have exhausted ourselves as well as you
with the length of these hearings. We normally don't go this long,
but we tried to cov^er this as fast as we could sim])ly because you are
away from Vietnam and are here and want to go back. At least the
Government wants you to go back. Normally we would not subject
you to such long hours.
T have neglected my own work and my ovm constituents to a!i
outrageous extent in the last 2 weeks, but 1 hope the^^ will understand
that. I think these hearings will be useful to the other members of the
committee and the Senate.
It did come at a busy time, and the same goes for you young men.
You have made veiy good w itnesses, I must say.
COMMENTS ON RF AND PF IN DRAFT HANDBOOK
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing. You quoted from a
draft handbook on the village some remarks about the RF and PF
and what kind of ])eoi)le they were.
1 would just like the record to show that this was a draft. I have
not yet approved that particidar book and, frankly, I don't think I
would have approved that particular statement. IDeleted.l
444
I think I speak for all the members of this group that were invited
to testify before you, sir, in expressing our appreciation for your
courtesy and patience and your interest in what we are trying to do.
INTEREST IS IN U.S. DOMESTIC LIFE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We are interested. We are
not only interested in what you are doing there, but we represent
constituents in this country and they are very upset at the moment.
They feel that the conditions here at home are very unsatisfactory in
many ways, so that we have to try to balance that off with your job
and with what you are doing. This is not easy to do in a country as
big as this is and with the trouble and many dislocations we have at
home.
There was an incident yesterday, which while it did not kill any-
body, is very embarrassing in Washington. It is one of the minor
incidents, but they are going on all over the country.
All we can hope is that we can in some way bring these things
back into a more normal status and in which we can allow the country
to resume a more normal procedure in its domestic life as well as in
international relations.
Thank you all very much. I wish you well. The committee is
adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 5:30 o'clock p.m., the committee was adjourned.)
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
U.S. Military Advisory Program
TUESDAY, MABCH 3, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on Fokeigx Kelations,
Washington, B.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New
Senate Office Building, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present : Senators Fulbright, Gore, Aiken, Case, and Williams.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
OPENING statement
The committee is meeting this morning to begin the second phase of
a series of hearings to study the nature and extent of U.S. advisory
and assistance programs in Vietnam. Two weeks ago the committee
considered the pacification program and the advisory program for the
regional and jwpular forces. Today the committee begins consideration
of the overall U.S. military advisory program in Vietnam.
President Nixon, in discussing the prospects for Vietnamization in
his recent foreign policy message to the Congress, stated, and I quote:
We are now attemptins to determine the depth and durability of the progress
whioli has been made in Vietnam. AVe are studying the extent to which it has
bt^eu dei>endent on tlie presence of American combat and support forces as well
as on expanded and improved South Vietnamese Army and territorial forces. We
are asking searching questions :
What is the enemy's capability to mount sustained operations? Could they
suceetHl in undoing our gains?
What is the actual extent of improvement in allied capabilities? In partic-
ular, are the Vietnamese developing th(» leadersliip. logistics capabilities, tactical
know-how, and sensitivity to the needs of their own people which are indisi)ensa-
l)le to continued success?
What alternative strategies are open to the enemy in the face of continued
allied success? If they choose to conduct a protracted, low-intensity war, could
they simply wait out L'.S. withdrawals and tlien. through reinvigorated efforts,
seize the initiative again and defeat the South Vietnamese Forces?
Most important, what are the attitudes of the Vietnamese people, whose free
choice we are fighting to preserve? Are they truly being disaffected from the Viet
Cong, or are they indifferent to both sides? What do their attitudes imply about
the likelihood that the pacification gains will stick?
I hope that these hearings with on-tlie-scene personnel will help to
develop the facts u]ion which informed judgments can be made — by
Administration officials, by the Congress, and by the general public —
on basic questions such as those posed by the President. After years of
frustration over the course of this tragic war, the American people can-
not be expected to support any Vietnam policy on faith alone.
(44.1)
446
HEARING SCHEDULE
The coinmittee is pleased to have as witnesses today two distinguished
Army officers who will discuss matters involving plans and prospects
for tlie Vietnamization policy. They are Brig. Gen. Wallace L. Cle-
ment, director of the training directorate of the U.S. Military Assist-
ance Command in Vietnam, and Col. Jesse L. Wlieeler, Jr., senior ad-
viser to the 1st Infantry Division of the South Vietnamese Army. The
committee will hear additional testimony from them tomorrow in ex-
ecutive session on matters of a classified or sensitive nature. I hope that
the information to be reserved for discussion in executive session will
be kept to a minimum.
SWEARING OF WITNESSES
In order to protect these witnesses from the understandable ambiv-
alence they may feel with respect to their responsibilities to the Army
and the executive branch on the one hand and to this conmiittee and
the Senate on the other, we will follow the procedure used in the recent
hearings on the pacification program and ask that they be sworn in
before giving their testimony.
Would General Clement and Colonel Wheeler please stand and raise
their right hands ?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to
give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
General Clement. I do.
Colonel Wheeler. I do.
The Chairman. You have a prepared statement, gentlemen ?
General Clement. I do.
The Chairman. Would you read it, please.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WALLACE L. CLEMENT, DIEECTOE OF
THE MACV TRAINING DIRECTORATE
General Clement. I am Brigadier General Clement, Director of the
MACV Training Directorate, It is my privilege to present to the
committee a summary of major aspects of the U.S. military advisory
effort in South Vietnam. I believe a brief history of the growth of this
effort will be of interest and will serve as useful background.
BACKGROUND OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE EFFORT
The original U.S. military assistance effort, MAAG (Military As-
sistance Advisory Group), Indochina, was established in 1951 to ad-
minister the disposition of and report on the use of equipment sent to
the French and through them to the indigenous forces. From 1951 until
1954, this MAAG Indochina was primarily a small logistics group.
In July 1954, with the signing of the Geneva accords which brought
about the ceasefire in Indochina, the French began withdrawing their
combat forces and the Government of South Vietnam took command
of its own troops. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces had a total
strength just in excess of 200,000 men, the majority being in the army.
The air force was practically nonexistent and the very small navy had
no independent administrative or operational capabilit3^
447
At this time, MAAG Indochina was replaced by MAAG Vietnam
which consisted of 342 officers and men. MAAG Vietnam's mission was
to assist the Vietnamese Government in improving the militar;^ capa-
bility of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. In agreement with the
French, a separate transitional organization, known as the training
relations and instruction mission (TEIM) was established. TRIM was
composed of French, Vietnamese, and American personnel and its
mission was to assist the Government of Vietnam in the organization
and development of sound, effective armed forces. TRIM was termi-
nated in April 1956 when the French advisers withdrew. However,
French missions for the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force were retainecl
until ]May 1957.
In May of 1961, Vice President Johnson visited South A^ietnam and
issued a"^ joint communique with President Diem announcing the
expansion of defense and economic development programs. Shortly
thereafter. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor was sent by the President on a
special mission to A^ietnam. Near the end of the year. President Ken-
nedv decided to enlarge the U.S. support for the South Vietnamese.
From a strength of less than 700 at the end of 1960, MAAG Vietnam
was increased some 2,500 persomiel so that at the end of 1961 there
were over 3,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam.
MAAG Vietnam was authorized to provide an adviser to each prov-
ince cliief and adviser teams down to battalion level for operational
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces units in the field.
South Vietnamese Armed Forces have grown from about 200,000 in
1954 to a force which will approach 1 million by the end of fiscal year
1970. The total advisory strength has grown from about 340 in 1954 to
approximately 14.000 today. Of the latter figure approximately one-
half are the military advisers of the Vietnamese Regular Armed
Forces.
The Chairman. What is the other half ?
General Clement. The other half, sir, you were briefed on by Am-
bassador Colby.
The Chairman. Oh, I see what you mean.
MISSION OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND
General Ci-ement. The advisory mission of the U.S. IMilitary Assist-
ance Command, Vietnam, is to: (a) Develop military assistance plans
and programs in cooperation with the Chief of the U.S. ^Mission and
other U.S. governmental agencies in the ]Mission, and (h) provide
appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the Republic
of Vietnam on military assistance matters.
organization of macv
The advison^ organization is tailored to the Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces structure, sir. We use the acronym RVNAF and I may
lapse back and forth.
The Chair:\tan. That is all right. We will try to interpret.
General Clement. And each U.S. military service contributes to the
MACV advisory effort. If we will turn our attention to chart No. 1, 1
will show you Avhere our advisers are.
At the top is the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and the MACV
headquarters staff, with its component advisers. On the lower line, we
448
have the A'ietnamese Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, all Vietnamese ;
separate airborne division, the artillery command, ranger command,
armor command, and special forces, each with its own advisory unit.
Next, the Corps — I, II, III, and IV Corps — with their advisors. And,
of course, under the corps, the operational units, the divisions, with
their advisers.
Finally, on the lowest line, in the center, are the Corj^s advisers ; you
were briefed on this, sir. On the left, the central lo£>-istics command
with its advisers. On the right is the Central Training Command wliich
is run by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, with its advisers,
which is really my training directorate. This gives you a very brief
outline of the advisory effort.
The Chairman. The total comprises about a million men in
Vietnam ?
General Clement. Yes, sir; the figure of approximately 1 million is
the total Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces structure, which includes
the RF and PF, on which you have previously been briefed.
The functions of the Vietnamese Army Headquarters are performed
by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff whose counterpart is ]\IACV.
Therefore, U.S. advisers to the Vietnamese Army are assigned to
MACV.
MACV discharges the army advisory task by assigning advisers to
all echelons in the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and also to the
corps areas under operational control of corps senior advisers. The
U.S. senior adviser in each corps area is also the commander of U.S.
Army and/or Marine units in that geographical area.
The Chief, Naval Advisory Group advises the Vietnamese Chief of
Naval Operations and all naval forces. The Chief of the Naval Ad-
visory Group is also the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam.
The INIarine Corps Advisory Group advises all Vietnamese Marine
Corps Forces and is under the staff cognizance of the Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV).
The Chief U.S. Air Force Advisory Group advises the Vietnamese
Chief of Air Operations and all Vietnamese Air Force units. The Chief
of the Air Force Advisory Group does not command U.S. Air Force
units in Vietnam.
BASIC FUNCTIONS OF ADVISORY GROUPS
The basic functions of the advisory groups are to provide advice and
assistance to their Vietnamese counterparts in all matters pertaining
to command, administration, training, tactical operations, logistics,
and ]5ersonnel with the objective of establishing combat ready and self-
sufficient armed forces.
I will next discuss in broad terms some of the more salient features
of the MACV advisory effort. I will exclude from my discussion the
advisory effort for territorial forces (that is, regional and popular
forces) . The committee was briefed on this effort in February by Am-
bassador Colby.
CRITERIA FOR ADVISER ASSIGNMENT
The criteria for adviser assignment in each service are generally the
same; that is, experience in the functional area to which assigned. In
addition, to work successfully with the Vietnamese the adviser must be
449
sensitive to and respect their way of doiug things, appreciating their
strengths and wealmesses ; he must be dedicated and snicere ; patient
and diplomatic; must appreciate the fact that the Vietnamese have
been brought up to the sound of guns, have been fighting for a long
time and foresee a continuing struggle. In brief, an adviser must know
his business and be able to get along with the Vietnamese.
There are outstanding examples of leadership, courage, and dedica-
tion throughout the Vietnamese military system. There is an innate
strength in the Vietnamese which has enabled them to endure combat,
strife, and destruction and yet retain their basic values. It is important
that we try to appreciate and to recognize the Vietnamese way of doing
things which is based on a very ancient culture and traditions. We try
to avoid uniquely "American" solutions, although this is often difficult.
METHOD OF OPERATIONS OF ADVISORY EFFORT
Gentlemen, I will describe how the adviser fits into the operational
day-to-day aspects of the adviser effort.
The U.S. Army advisory effort parallels the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam organization and is tailored to its present operational
needs. Advisers are assigned at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff
level downward through corps, division, regiment, and battalion in
the combat and combat support area and downward through depots,
area logistics command and subordinate support units in the adminis-
trative and logistics support area. The requirement for adviser skills
runs, on one hand, from the detailed knowledge of the M-16 rifle
through the operation of an automotive reljuild plant and, on the other
hand, from the employment of a rifle squad in combat through the ap-
plication of all types of combat power in a corps against both guerrilla
and conventional enemy forces. Many of our Army advisers are com-
mitted to the training of ARVN forces — the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam Forces — and are colocated at the many training centers and
schools throughout South Vietnam.
The Navy advisory skills run the gamut required for the conduct of
naval operations against an active and aggressive enemy in both coastal
and inland waterway operations. The U.S. Naval advisory effort ex-
tends from the senior Vietnamese Naval Headquarters downward
through task forces and river assault and interdiction division
(RAID) to an individual small craft conducting combat operations
on the many inland riA'ors and canals in South Vietnam, with tlie biilk
being in the INIekong Delta area. This includes advisers with training
and logistic support forces.
The U.S. Marine Corps Advisory Group, operating under the U.S.
Naval Advisory Group (COjMNAVFORV), is involved primarily in
advising a Marine Corps Division.
The U.S. Air Force adviser works with the highest Vietnamese Air
Force echelon downward tlirough combat wings, combat groups,
squadrons, training centers, forward air controllers, air liaison, and air
logistics commands.
A military adviser may be officer or enlisted. He works directly with
one or more Vietnamese counterparts. Advisers work alongside their
counterparts in all phases of their activities, both advising and assist-
ing them in the accomplishments of assigned missions. This involves
the advisers with combat units accompanying the units on both combat
450
and pacification operations. Staff advisers at all levels work with their
counterparts on combined studies and plans. All advisory efforts are
aimed at improving the quality of the KVNAF, improving their man-
agement at all levels and making them self -sufficient.
INCREASE IN TRAINING EFFORTS
Training constitutes a major adviser effort in all services. The im-
provement and modernization of RVNAF brought with it a pro-
nounced expansion of RVNAF personnel strength, and an attendant
increase in training requirements. The objective is to increase the level
of combat readiness and combat proficiency through individual train-
ing (m-country and off shore) and unit training. There are 42 RVXAF
traming centers and 27 RVNAF schools involved in this effort, located
throughout the whole of South Vietnam. Those being trained range
from recruits at training centers to senior officers at the Command and
Staff College in Dalat, or at the National Defense College in Saigon.
Instruction at these centers and schools is carried out by the Vietna-
mese. This chart very briefly, sir, shows the rapid buildup in the pro-
gram in the past 2 years in the projected programs.
In calendar year 1968, the training base was saturated. We go from
there to 1969, an increased effort, and from there to the 1970 projec-
tion. That was increased even more. So there is a great training effort
going on in these schools, and training centers.
In addition, to these formal training programs, there is an exten-
sive on-the-job training effort going on in all of the services, aimed
generally at the technical skills. We trained over 3,000 in the logis-
tical field alone in this manner in calendar year 1969, and currently
have over 4,000 being trained. JMore than 2,000 Vietnamese are pres-
ently being trained m U.S. Navy craft. Of course, the Vietnamese
themselves are implementing a supplementary on-the-job program.
FUTURE OF AD\^S0RY EFFORT
There is continuing improvement in the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
As the RVNAF continues to grow, the weight of the advisory effort
will be given to the most critical areas.
The RVNAF logistical organization and system are presently capa-
ble of reasonably satisfactory logistical support to operating elements.
By necessity, there is a strong advisory effort in this area which will
continue for some time.
We are advising a military force which has rapidly expanded over
the past few years, stretching to the limit the amount of experienced
talent available. It will take time for skill levels to catch up with the
force structure. This, in itself, has placed severe tasks on our advisory
effort. As the force structure increase approaches the end goal, more
emphasis will be placed on qualitative improvements of all existing
forces.
The size and composition of our present and future advisory effort
in Vietnam will be determined in light of the development of RVNAF
forces to assume a larger share of the war effort and the rate at wliich
RVNAF units can receive equipment, complete training, and attain
operational readiness.
Gentlemen, MACV is very much aware of the importance of the
advisory role in connection with improving the Vietnamese Armed
i
451
Forces. The advisory effort contributes to RYNAF's capability to
shoulder the burden of the fighting- at an accelerated rate. This allows
a progressive reduction of U.S. military presence in South Vietnam.
Sir, that concludes my statement. Do you have any questions at this
time?
PURPOSE or COMJIiTrLE IXQUIRT
The Chairman. Thank you, General. That is a very interesting
statement.
Before I proceed with any questions, General, I want to make it very
clear that, at least speaking for myself and I think for most of the
committee, criticism such as it has appeared in the press has never been
against the military activities of your people, either the officers or the
men. What we are really dealing with in this question of the difference
in view is the political policy and the objectives of the operation as a
whole. I hope that the military establisliment realizes that we are not
inquiring into these matters because of a feeling of disapproval of the
way you or j'Our men have conducted yourselves. This is not the issue
at all. This committee is concerned with the political implications of
the overall effort. It has often been misinterpreted that either this com-
mittee or the Senate or certain Members of the Senate did not support
the Armed Forces. That is not at all a true reflection of the issue. It is
not a question of supporting the Armed Forces or whether they have
supported the policy. It is a question of supporting the political policy
that results in these questions on Vietnam. I hope you imderstand.
General Clement. Yes, sir, I understand.
OBJECTIVE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTIVITY IN AIETNAjNI
The Chairman. This statement and most of these statements are
based upon the assumption that there is a legislatiA'-c objective involved
in all of tliis activity, because it is a very substantial and very exten-
sive activitv. Do you. as a military man, feel concerned about the
question of whether or not the activity as sucli has a legislative
objective? Could you say what you believe the objective is?
General Clement. Sir, I think I can address it as far as our mission,
as far as the military advisers are concerned. We certainly feel it is a
worthwhile objective. It is one that we are committed to and we cer-
tainly are intent on carrying it out and making sure that we do so to
the best of our ability.
The Chairman. Maybe I did not make myself plain. I Iniow as a
military man you are under orders and no military organization can
operate without discipline and established traditional organization.
You took it back to the begimiing in 1951, which is what inspired
thought about this. You said the original military assistance was
MAAG Indochina in 1951. Are you familiar with the circumstances of
its creation?
General Clement. Not in detail, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know why it was created or what its purpose
was?
General Clement. I believe I do, sir.
The Chairjian. T^Tiat was it ? "What is your feeling about it ?
General Clement. It was establislied to counter the Communist
threat in Southeast Asia, wliich continues to this time. I think that
basically is one of the primary reasons that we are there.
[52
The Chairman. What was the nature of the threat in 1951?
General Clement. Sir, I am sorry. It really is outside my cognizance
and I am not prepared to discuss that aspect.
The Chairman. This was really the thrust of my first question. It
seems to me that perhaps quite properly, as a military man, it is not
your responsibility to have a judgment. I do not wish to restrict you
in any way if you have a judgment. After all, you are also a citizen
of the United States. You ai'e free to express a judgment, whether or
not you concern yourself with that objective.
Senator Case. General, would you pull those microphones closer to
you.
The Chairman. They are not every sensitive. Our technological
expertise is exhausted m going to the moon. We cannot make good
microphones or trucks.
General Clement. Sir, if you are asking me whether I feel we are
performing a worthwhile task in Vietnam and whether our soldiers
are, I would say yes, we certainly are, and, personally it has been a very
challenging, very rewarding assignment.
The Chairman. If I understand you correctly, that does not involve
necessarily, at least a judgment of the political justification beginning
in 1951 and following through various stages of escalation after 1954
and after Kennedy came in, and then the major one in 1965. That
is not your responsibility. Or do you feel it is your responsibility to
have any judgment about such a matter?
General Clement. I believe, strictly speaking, sir, my responsiliility
is to carry out the orders that are given me by headquarters and which
I am trying to do to the best of my knowledge and belief.
The Chairman. That is what I suspected was the proper answer. I
am just curious.
ORIGIN OF U.S. INV0L\TE3IENT IN VIETNAM
I have a very strong feeling that it was none of our business going
in there in 195i. We went in in support of the French to retain control
of their colony ; did we not ? The French were still battling to control
Vietnam in 1951 ; were they not?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; I guess they were.
The Chairman. There is no guess about it. They were. They were
fighting their enemies ; weren't they ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The Armed Forces had a total streng+h of 200.000
men, the majority being in the Army. They were the remnants of the
Colonial Army which the Frencli had created to support their control
of Vietnam. Is that not a fact ?
General Clement. Yes, sir : I believe it prol^ably was.
The Chairman. It was or was not. That is a fact ; is it not ? You made
this statement ; did you not ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you create this statement out of your own
knowledge or did someone assist you ?
General Clement. No, sir ; I did have assistance.
The Chairman. Was this the 100,000 you mentioned here
General Clement. That was the French forces.
The Chairman. The French Colonial Army : was it not ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
453
The Chairman. Their main purpose was to maintain the control
of the French in Vietnam ; was it not ?
General Cle3iext, I am not familiar with their purpose, sir. As a
matter of fact, I was relating a general historical picture. I have not
had much tune recently to do much historical research. I really have
been concerned with this training advisory effort.
The Chair3iax. I would not have asked you about it except you men-
tioned it in your statement. I think it is important, not particularly
for you as a militarv^ man, and that is why I said that I am not critical
of you or any of your colleagues. As a matter of fact, I am not particu-
larly critical of the men who have been charged with atrocities because
they are exposed to a situation which is almost intolerable and beyond
human endurance. AVliat I am critical of, and still am, is that policy
would put them in this position, and that policy finds us in this posi-
tion. It did then and it still does. I thmk it is an intolerable position.
That is no reflection whatever upon you or any of your colleagues. That
is not the point at all, but this is significant.
You have raised the point here that this is the origin of this war.
It does have relevance as to whether or not we ha^•e any business con-
tinuing it, in my view, as a political matter, whether or not it is worth
the price that you are continuing to pay because imder your statement,
we have advisers at every level and we are for all practical purposes
running the country militarily.
You say we have 1-J:,000 advisers. Do you know how many French
advisers to the militaiy there Avere ?
General Cle:mi:xt. I do not know exactly.
The Chairmax. I doubt if they had as much as we have. As a matter
of fact, we have in effect taken OA-er the effort.
You may be more acquainted with the history of this country. To
give you a comparable view do you remember Avhen the British fought
the American Colonial power? You are familiar with the American
Revolutionary AVar; are you not '.
General Ceemext. Yes, sir ; we studied it.
The Ciiairmax". The British brought over a number of troops, of
course, to help them, but the American Colonials fought them. When
it was all over, and after the British finally gave it up, we had a rem-
nant of an Army left that George Washington had created. That is
the equiA-alent of this 200,000 that j'ou are talking about here. Is it, or
is it not %
General Clemex't. Yes, sir ; I presume it would be.
The Chatr:max'. Xo, it is not. You see, these people were fighting
for the French. Tiiis is the point I wanted to make. These 200,000 weie
not fighting for Wy^ Colonials, the Colonists such as George
Washington.
EXTEXT AX'D AD^^SA^>ILITY OF COXTIX'THX'G IX'^VOLA^MEX'^T
I think it is very important, not so much foi' you as for the country.
Because you are under orders, you do not have to know those things.
You prompted me to raise a question wliich I think is central l)ecause
this war is now escalating into Laos and we are getting into it deeper
and deeper. It simply raised the question once again. Is it in the interest
of the United States to go down this road ?
Your testimony makes quite clear to me just how extensive our in-
vohement is. You said 14,000 military advisers.
454
General Clement. I beg your pardon. There is a total of 14,000
advisers ; 7,000 is the rough number of military advisers.
The Chairman. Did I misread it?
General Clement. No, sir. If vou will recall, 14,000 was the total
effort and the CORDS people talked of the other 7,000. This is the
7,000 in the military effort, the military advisory unit, with the tactical
units, the corps and divisions, the Central Training Command, and
the logistics units.
The Chairman. They are still military or paramilitary. They are
closely similar ; aren't they ?
General Clement. For the purposes of the hearings, sir, you wanted
to break out the military advisory effort from the total advisory effort.
I was just putting it in perspective.
The Chairman. Would the 14,000, though, include legislatively all
in the paramilitary or the police units ?
General Clement. Yes, sir, that is what Ambassador Colby
mentioned in his appearance.
The Chairman. How many were there a year ago ? Is this more or
less than there were a year ago ?
General Clement. I think it is about the same, sir.
The Chairman. About the same ?
General Clement. Yes, sir, about the same number.
cost of military equipment supplied to south \t:etnam
The Chairman. Could you tell us what the total cost to the United
States is for the military equipment supplied or turned over to the
South A-^ietnamese to date ?
General Clement. Sir, I do have some figures on costs. The fiscal
year 1970 cost related to the support of the Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces, excluding paramilitary, is approximately $1.5 billion.
The Chairman. That is for fiscal year 1970 ?
General Clement. Yes, sir. The costs are broken down into different
appropriation areas: Military personnel, which is basically rations
for the Army; operations and maintenance, which includes off'-
shore training, repair parts, depot overhaul programs, maintenance
costs, and procurement, which consists primarily of equipment and
ammunition. Those are the major parts of the $1.5 billion, sir.
The Chairman. Do you have an estimate of the accelerated total we
have returned to the Vietnamese ? This is the equipment and supplies ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; this is for equipment and supplies.
The Chairman. What is that ?
General Clement. This is the current appropriation. $1.5 billion.
The Chairman. That is for 1 year ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
I do not have the accumulated total.
The Ch^mrman. An accelerated total for the past.
General Clement. I do not have that here, sir. I can try to provide
it for you.
The CHAIR3HAN. Would you get that for the record, please? I assume
it is available.
General Clement. I will get it for the record of the executive session.
The Chairman. Do you have any estimates for 1971 ?
General Clement. No, sir, I have no projections for 1971.
455
The Chairman. Does this $1.5 — and the figures I want, of course,
inchide the bases and excess equipment we turned over to the Viet-
namese? We have recently turned over some large bases, have we not?
General Clement. This would exclude the plant, sir, only equipment
and supplies turned over.
The Chairman. The plant?
General Clement. The plant, or bases, are excluded, sir.
The Chairman. Everything from rifles on up ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; all the programed supplies and equip-
ment.
percentage of south ^^ETNAMESE MILITARY BUDGET PAID BY UNITED
STATES
The Chairman. What portion of South Vietnam's military budget
is paid for, directly or indirectly, by the United States ?
General Clement. We pay directly, of their fiscal year 1970 defense
budget, which is about a billion dollars, about 11 percent, sir, as U.S.
funds.
The Chairman. Of the military budget?
General Clf^ient. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Eleven percent. Wlio pays the other 89 percent?
General Clement. This is paid by the Government of Vietnam. They
finance it through taxes and customs duties and raise other revenues.
The Chairinian. Are you sure about this ?
General Cle^ient. As it concerns their militarv^ budget, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Then we pay all of tlie civiliaii : is that right ? How
do you judge this? You know very well that the Vietnamese liave no
resources to pay for 89 percent of the fighting. How is this set up ?
General Clement. Sir, this is the way the" defense budget is broken
out and accounted for.
The Chairman. By whom ?
General Clement. It is jointly worked out by tlie Vietnamese and
our people in jNIACV.
Tlie Chairman. Those taxes which the Government collects are all
paid by the Federal Government of the United States ; are they not?
General Cle:ment. Sir, that is really beyond my area.
The Chairman. Beyond your area ?
General Clement. Of responsibility.
The Chairman. ^Yi^o would know about this? Is either of your
colleagues expert in this?
Are you, Colonel ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
The Chairman. You do not bother about budgetary matters?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
The Chairman. I sympathize with you. I would not either, if I did
not have to. I do not blame you.
But I would guess at kast 90 percent of the civilian and military
costs of the Government of South Vietnam is paid for by the American
Government.
AMiat they do, of course, is tax the imports that we send in for them.
We send in' a very large amount, $500 million of economic goods, to
support them and they levy a tax on it and then they do not call that
as being derived from the U.S. Federal Government.
456
I said directly or indirectly. What I meant is either by direct budg-
etary support or by paying taxes to them in the form of import taxes
or any other kind,
I am afraid the 11 percent is very misleading if you are saying that
that is all that the U.S, Federal Government contributes to support of
the military in Vietnam, directly or indirectly. It may be the only
direct support,
I have a number of other questions I will direct later, but I want the
other Senators to proceed if they are ready.
MEANING OF REDEPLOYMENT OF "U.S, GROUND COMBAT FORCES
Senator Gore. General, I was interested in and have become increas-
ingly interested in the last few weeks in military terminology. Now,
let me read you a statement which Chief of Staff General Wheeler
made. This is with respect to Vietnamization :
Our goal is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to improve so that in the
absence of an acceptable guaranteed political settlement, they may resume full
responsibility for the security of their country and we may redeploy all of our
ground combat forces now thei'e.
If you would be so kind, from your familiarity with military ter-
minology, I would like you to tell me precisely what is the meaning of
these words : "Redeploy all of our ground combat forces now there."
General Clement, Well, sir, I am sure General AVlieeler is referring
to the phase redeployment from Vietnam which is currently going on.
The current accent certainly is on redeployment of ground combat
forces, I am sure he is talking in this context.
Senator Gore, In testimony before this committee, I questioned
Secretary Laird with respect to this. If I correctly recall his termi-
nology, what would remain there a year hence would be support
troops, not by definition or description ground combat troops. Would
you mind explaining the difference between support forces and ground
combat forces ?
General Clement. Sir, support forces would be primarily quarter-
master, transportation, engineer, signal, aviation forces. 'Wlien you
speak of support, this is normally what is envisaged : The technical,
administrative, and logistical people, et cetera, that support the combat
effort.
Senator Gore. When I inquired of him if it included infantry, the
answer was yes. Would you say it would include infantry ?
General Clement, In the definition I gave, it did not, sir. But I am
not sure of the context in which the Secretary was replying to 3^our
question. Was there a broader context ?
Senator Gore. I am always left with this uncertainty. Just what is
meant? The other day I read in the press that Secretary Laird said
there were military advisers in Laos, but then changed it and they were
military attaches. I do not know exactly the difference. I am frequently
left with this.
General Clement. I am sure that the Secretary was talking in a
broader or different context rather than strict redeployment of combat
troops per se,
DEFINITION OF "VTLETNAMIZATION
Senator Gore. Maybe we will just leave this between you and me
and not refer to Avliat term the President or Secretary Laird has used.
"Wliat is your definition of Vietnamization as you miderstand it?
457
General Clement. Sir, because A^ietnamization lias been interpreted,
paraphrased
Senator Gore. I see you are jorepared for this one.
General Clement. I would like to read the definition.
Senator Gore. Yes, I think it is worthy. , • i , t^ .. i
General Clement. Vietnamization is the process by which the United
States assists the Government of Vietnam to assume increasing re-
sponsibility for all aspects of the war and all functions inherent m self-
government. It means building a stronger government with improved
economy and strengthening the military internal security forces suffi-
cient to permit the United States to reduce its military and civilian
presence in Vietnam without unacceptable risks to the objectives of
the United States in the security of the free world and Government of
Vietnam forces. Vietnamization refers only to the assumption by Viet-
namese of that portion of the war effort carried on by the United
States. It does not refer to the total war effort in which the South Viet-
namese themselves have carried such a large and heavy burden for
some years."
Senator Gore. Did you prepare this definition ?
General Clement. We have prepared this definition; yes, sir.
Senator Gore. I did not understand that.
General Clement. We have prepared the definition. It is not original
with my appearance here.
Senator Gore. I see.
Then this is an official definition ?
General Clement. It can be termed that, I believe ; yes, sir.
schedule for reduction of U.S. presence
Senator Gore. Can you give us some idea of when this millenium
may arrive?
General Clement. Sir, I believe that President Nixon has reserved
to himself the announcement of any further withdrawals, or, rather,
redeployments of U.S. forces and any time schedule. I am not prepared,
really, to put time limits or announce any schedules.
Senator Gore. Is there a schedule to your knowledge ?
General Clement. Sir, I laiow of no schedule and, as I say, the
President has said that he will make these announcements from time
to time.
Senator Gore. If there is a schedule, you are not aware of it?
General Clement. I know of plans, sir, but they are plans only. I
know of no schedule.
Senator Gore. Are you prepared to discuss with this committee those
military plans ?
General Clement. I believe I can discuss aspects, perhaps, in another
session.
Senator Gore. In executive session ?
General Cleivient. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. I certainly shall not press you there. Do you know if
agreements exist between the Pentagon or U.S. military forces and
the Saigon government with respect to the support from the Saigon
government's troops ?
General Clement. Sir, I really can't answer that. I really do not
know. It is beyond my ai'ea of competence here.
44-706—70 30
458
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, all I seem to be able to get is another
definition. I will turn the witness back to you.
EFFECTIVENESS OF ORIGINAL U.S. ADVISORY EFFORT
The Chairman. Senator Aiken.
Senator Aiken. I have only three or four questions.
First, the witness goes back to 1951. I think we ought to realize that
from 1951 until 1954 we were considering Indochina and not Vietnam,
and Indochina, as I recall, included Laos and Cambodia. So there was
quite a diii'erence.
At the time that Indochina was broken up, our advisory group con-
sisted of 324 officers and men who became advisers to South Vietnam.
That is correct ; is it not ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator Aiken. Then the number of advisers increased slowly until
1960 ; they reached something less than 700. In the meantime, as I re-
call, in 1954, the United States was urged to send military assistance
to the French ; is that correct ?
General Clement. Yes, I believe it is correct.
Senator Aiken. President Eisenhower at that time refused to put
our Armed Forces in there in spite of urging from some of the Joint
Chiofs. So by 1960, we had less than 700 advisers there.
Then they increased rather steadily from less than 700 at the end of
1960. The advisers for Vietnam alone increased to some 2,500 per-
sonnel. So at the end of 1961 there were over 3,000 American military
personnel in South Vietnam. Yet it appears that as our number of
advisers increased from 1961 until 1968, the effectiveness of the South
Vietnamese military establishment did not increase proportionately
or accordingly. Does that mean that they did not have the capacity to
study them or to learn or to take the advice ? Or does it mean that we
considered it our war from 1963 until 1969 ?
Our advisers certainly were not very effective as far as strengthen-
ing the South Vietnamese during those years and were not effective
until 1969, if I read correctly the reports we get. What was the trouble ?
General Clement. I am not prepared, sir, to defend the previous
advisory effort or to share your judgTnent that our advisers were in-
effective. I would prefer to tell you about our advisory effort now.
We feel it is quite efl'ective.
Senator Aiken. Would you say our advice has been more effective
during the last 12 months than it had been during the previous 6 or 7
years ?
General Clement. Sir, I would prefer not to make comparisons out
of context, because this effectiveness is a fmiction of the enemj- situa-
tion and of many other things.
Senator Aiken. Very well. I think it is so obvious you do not need
to make an estimate on that.
ADVISORY EFFORT IN LAOS
The other question I had in mind concei'us the military advisers in
Vietnam. Do they operate entirely distinct from the military, or per-
haps some would say nonmilitary, advisers in Laos who are trying to
make an effective army out of those troops? Do they operate entirely
distinct or is there collaboration ?
459
General Clement. Sir, I know nothing about the advisory ejffort in
Laos and I am not prepared to discuss it. I can certamly tell you how
our advisers operate, and specifically in the traming field, what we do.
EFFECTIVENESS OF RECENT U.S. ADVISORY EFFORTS
Senator Aiken. Do you feel that your work in South Vietnam has
been effective during the last year ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; we do.
Senator Aiken. Is the work which they are doing there in part
responsible for the fact that we are reducing the number of our own
forces in South Vietnam ?
General Clement. I would say the total effort, the work that every-
one has done there, sir, is responsible for that. This is a total war over
there.
Senator Aiken. What do you mean by everyone ?
General Clement. I mean the South Vietnamese and the U.S. troops
over there, our civilians working there — everybody working together.
Senator Aiken. You mean their morale, their spirit, has been better
during the hast year?
General Clement. I have only been there a year. I cannot make
sharp judgments. I believe there has been a tremendous increase in
spirit from what I have seen.
Senator xViken. I think we can draw our own conclusions there,
because we are getting reports, which I hope are accurate, of great
progress being made during recent months, in contrast to the reports
that we were getting, say, from 1963 to the end of 1968.
BASIS FOR decision TO TURN MORE RESPONSIBILIITT OVER TO SOUTH
\t:etnamese
You are aware that we had planned to turn over to the South Viet-
namese more responsibility for the defense of their own country. Is
that plan based on our belief that the capacity of South Vietnam to
assume the burden has increased greatly, or is it based on the theory
that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong are ^retting sick of the job ?
General (^lement. No, sir. Personally, I think it is a function of all
of those things. The South Vietnamese have demonstrated competence.
I can speak particularly of the training area, where they have cer-
tainly demonstrated a competence which, for example, would be dif-
ferent from 2 years ago — remarkal^ly different. So this is a part of it.
Of course, the enemy is also always a part of this picture when you
are at war.
Senator Aiken. As the spirit and confidence of the South Viet-
namese rises, then the spirit and the confidence of their enemy, the
Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, diminishes or subsides. That
seems a natural assumption, anyway.
I think and I hope we do not ha\e any more complications, that the
situation is ivuich better than it was 2 years ago.
Thank you.
The CiiAiRiMAN. Senator Case, do you have any questions?
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know it is embarrasing, General, but the questions that Senator
Aiken was putting are questions that concern me very much, concern
460
all of us. Secretary Laird, as I recall it, came back after his first trip
over there and. said he was appalled at the lack of traming of the
Vietnamese. Now, this, as Senator Aiken pointed out, was not really
indicating progress. Xewspaper accounts by responsible analysts who
have come back, I think some of our very best people, have made this
point.
witness' experience with training program
How long have you been associated with the training progi'am?
General Clement. Since September, sir. Formerly, I had a tour
with the Americal Division for 9 months.
Senator Case. Wliat division ?
General Clement. Americal Division, sir.
Senator Case. Woidd you say the words out ?
General Clement. I am sorry, sir. It was the U.S. 2od DiAdsion in
the north. We worked very closely with the 2d Division of the Armj^
of the Eepublic of Vietnam in the I Corps. I had opportunity daily
to work and see them.
Senator Case. How long did you work with that ?
General Clement. That was 9 months.
Senator Case. So your whole experience goes back about a year?
General Clement. A year ago December, yes, sir.
Senator Case. Before that, jou were not connected with this prob-
lem ?
General Clement. Xo, sir. I was not.
Senator Case. Are there any people here who were ?
General Clement. No, sir, I do not believe so.
Senator Case. So we cannot get from you any idea of what the
difference has been in this particular operation between the long
period Senator Aiken referred to, from 1961 to 1969, and 1969 on?
You are just not prepared to talk about this ?
General Clement. No, sir.
effectiveness of ARVN 2D DIVISION
I can talk in a general way, for example, of the division with which
I worked, and the change that did take place even in those months,
brief as they were.
Senator Case. llHien you say division, you mean the whole training
effort, the whole training program of the whole Vietnamese Army?
General Clement. That is right. The net result of the training is
operational effectiveness, which, of course, is what we are after. Tliis
2d Division, we thought, was tremendous, and still is, a very fine
division.
Senator Case. How many men is that ?
General Cle^ient. It runs about 12,000, sir.
Senator Case. That is the wliole division ?
General Clement. That is the entire division, yes, sir.
Senator Case. That is how many ?
General Clement. Regiments and battalions.
Senator Case. How large a total force ?
General Clement. This 12,000 would be within the division itself.
There would be a backup of logistical support.
Senator Case. I am sorry, one division out of how many?
461
General Clement. Twelve divisions. Ten numbered divisions, the
airborne division, and the marine division.
Senator Case. Has that division been o-ood all along ?
General Clement. I am certain that its eifectiveness has been greater
in the past year than it had been previously.
Senator Case. Was it in past years better than the rest of it ?
General Clement. I am not prepared to say, sir.
Senator Case. You do not know anything about that ?
General Clement. I do not know its effectiveness in past years in
relation to other divisions in Vietnam.
Senator Case. This didn't spring full blown from
General Clement. No, it had been a good division.
REASONS FOR E^^ECTI^^ENESS OF ARVN 2D DIVISION
Senator Case. Why had it been a good division ? Wliy has it been
all along a good division ?
General Clement. I say it had been a good division, but I believe it
has been much better, f rixnldy, in the past year based on its records.
Senator Case. Why was it better in the old days, why is it better
now than the rest ?
General Clement. A lot of it is built on success, and they have had
success in combat. There is nothing better than that to have the morale
go up.
Senator Case. That had to begin some time. How did it get gonig?
What are the qualities that make it different from other divisions?
General Clement. Leadership ; you can begin with that, sir.
Senator Case. In the South Vietnamese Division itself ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The division commander is a good leader.
Senator Case. Has he been the same commander for many years?
General Clement. He has been there 2 or 2i^ years, sir.
Senator Case. Did this division just start being good 2 years ago?
General Clement. Sir. I would like to reserve questions on the
di^•ision, if you would, for later. Colonel Wheeler is prepared to dis-
cuss the Ist'Division. He is the 1st Division senior adviser.
Senator Case. He has been for some time ?
General Clement. Since last July.
Senator Case. But he knows something of the history of this?
Colonel ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. You do know something of this
The Chairman. If the Senator will yield, since you are interested,
the colonel has a prepared statement. Then you can go on with the
questioning.
Senator Case. I do not mind a bit. I am trying to get something
specific about this, rather than this tremendous amount of generality.
The Chairman. He is the adviser. He would be able to answer you
on this.
Senator Case. I will be glad to reserve until later.
The Chairman. You can do it now.
Senator Case. I do not want to create a break here. I am trying
to get something more useful than the repetition of the many generali-
ties we have had before.
Go ahead.
462
As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, why not let the colonel go aliead.
The Chairman. All right.
Then we will come back and you can have a go at the rest of it.
TESTIMONY OF COL. JESSE L. WHEELER, JR., U.S. ARMY, SENIOR
ADVISER, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM
Colonel Wheeler. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
Colonel Wieeler, senior adviser to the 1st Infantry Division, Army
of the Eepublic of Vietnam. The 1st Infantry Division is the northern-
most Vietnamese division in South Vietnam. Its area of operations is
contiguous with the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and includes the two
northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The division head-
quarters is located on the northeast edge of Hue.
The organization of the infantry divisions in the Army of the Re-
public of Vietnam and the advisory teams are basically the same,
except the 1st Infantry Division has an additional organic regiment
to enhance its capability to cope with the strong threat in and along
the DMZ.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF ARVN 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
I will discuss briefly the organization of the 1st Infantry Division
for two reasons. First, as the senior adviser, I am most familiar with
this division and, second, to depict where the advisory effort is
employed.
The primary mission of the division is conduct of offensive opera-
tions against the enemy in order to provide security for the people in
Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces and to facilitate the pacification
effort.
The division combat miits are three regiments with four battalions
each and one regiment with five battalions for a di^'ision total of IT
infantry battalions and one armed cavalry squadron. Combat support
and service support units are very nearly the same as in other ARVN
divisions. Normally attached to the division are armored cavalry, artil-
lery, engineer, military police, and Navy units.
The commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division is also the
senior military commander of the two northern provinces, Thua Thien
and Quang Tri. There are regional force companies and popular force
platoons in these two provinces with whom the division is associated.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ADVISORY TEAM
The mission of the 1st Infantry Division advisory team, U.S. ]Mili-
tary Assistance Command, Vietnam, is to provide advice and assist-
ance in the fields of command, personnel, intelligence, operations,
training, and logistics. The 1st Infantry Division advisory team has
197 officers and enlisted men, 49 of whom are staff ad^dsers and 111
advisers with the combat units.
ROLE OF THE ADVISER
The role of the adviser has been to advise and assist the commander
and his staff concerning all aspects of military operations to include
463
coordinating combat operations and tlie employment of U.S. combat
support and combat service support assets. This advisory effort is
changed in direct proportion to the increased tactical proficiency of the
ARVN units. For example, as units become self-sufficient, the advisers
are withdrawn. In the 1st Infantry Division onlj- newly activated ar-
tillery battalions are assigned advisers. In the signal battalion and en-
gineer battalion the advisers have been deleted.
The increase in the level of military sophistication is typified by the
professional operations of the 1st Division throughout the two north-
ern i^rovinces, and particularly along the DMZ, in the A Shau Valley,
and the coastal areas during 1968 and 1969.
The 1st Infantry Division has effectively developed professional
battalion and regimental commanders and principal division staff' offi-
cers to the degree comparable to U.S. units. The majority of the bat-
talion and regimental commanders have an average of 10 years combat
command experience. To a large degree, these commanders have opei^
ated within the same general geographical areas. This background
experience has enabled these commanders to develop expertise in most
areas of tactical employment of military forces. In view of this tactical
expertise, the adviser m the 1st Infantry Division has become a con-
sultant for plans development and coordinator of available U.S. combat
support and combat service support assets. Accordmgly, the emphasis
of the advisory effort has been directed toward these ^mictions. Spe-
cifically, the adviser must possess the necessary education and experi-
ence to assist in the employment of nonorganic combat support assets
to complement the combat plan dev^eloped by his comiterpart, that is,
selection of appropriate firepower for the accomplishment of the mis-
sion and use of tactical air support, to include gunships where precise
English is a requirement.
The adviser must continue to give assistance to battalion and regi-
mental staffs. In general, these staffs lack experience and until the
junior officers and NCO's are better trained, they provide only limited
assistance to the commander. Specifically, two areas that require im-
provement are the analysis of intelligence and intrastaff' coordination.
Due to the emphasis of the advisory effort in this area, marked prog-
ress is being made in their development.
In the combat service support role, demands are made upon the
advisor to be knowledgeable of both U.S. and ARVN logistical sys-
tems. The adviser mdst be able to complement the ARVN logistical
system with any unique features of the U.S. system. Additionally,
adviser assistance is required in administration, maintenance of equip-
ment, and base management.
The adviser is expected to be knowledgeable of civilian military
relations and history of the local area in which the unit operates. He
must be able to discuss current events and the likely impact of these
events upon US/ARVN relations. He must establish personal rapport
with his counterpart, which is a most essential factor in adviser-
counterpart relations and which provides the necessarj^ foundation for
which mutual advice is exchanged and acted upon.
Mr. Chairman, this is a brief resume of the mission and role of the
adviser and organization of the 1st ARVN Division which I am senior
adviser.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Case ?
464
Senator Case. Thank yon, Mr. Cliairman. Colonel.
It is not necessary that I follow %Yhat the chairman said at the outset
of this hearing. I think all of ns are completely aware of the tremen-
dous difficulty of the job you men have had and still have. It is for us a
unique kind of operation, and questions about it are not only, as the
chairman suggested based upon questions of policy but also upon
whether this kind of thing can be successful.
REASOXS FOR EXCELLEXCE OF 1ST DIVISIOX
I would like to come back now to the question I did present to Gen-
eral Clement earlier, and address it also to you, or both of you, if you
will. What is there about this 1st Division that has set it apart over the
years ? What sets it apart now ? Besides the fact that — but you do not
have to comment upon your being the adviser of it. Undoubtedly, you
are responsible for a good deal of its recent excellence. But this is not
new. This has been always mentioned as we have one division of the
South Vietnamese Army that really is beginning to shape up. This has
been going on for years. Wliy ?
Colonel WiTEELER. KSir, tlie 1st ARVN Division enjoys its particular
prestige among all combat divisions from probal^ly two factors. One is
the leadership it has in its division commander, subordinate command-
ers, and the soldiers within the ranks. The soldiers within the ranks of
the 1st ARVN Division are 55 percent from the Thua Thien and
Quang Tri Provinces, with 45 percent of the personnel coming from
other areas in Vietnam.
Senator Case. You mean they are natives of that area ?
Colonel Wpieeler. They are natives of those two provinces, sir. It
has been my observation that the soldier of the 1st ARVN Division, be
he private, NCO, or officer, understands the value and the reason why
he is fighting. I think he understands the fact that those values are
worth fighting for and in some cases, worth dying for because the
alternatives were clearly demonstrated to him during the Tet offensive
of 1908.
Senator Case. That goes back only 2 years.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
The 1st ARVN Division, sir, was taken over by General Truong in
June of 1966 at the time that the Buddhist "struggle movements'" were
taking place. He has built the division through flawless leadership and
has made it comparable to any U.S. division.
Senator Case. Is he also the province political head ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir : the two provinces have their own province
chiefs. He is the senior military man there and as such, he is the one
who is responsible for the security of both provinces. He does not
usurp their prerogatives of direct operational command of the PF
and RF forces. However, he does include these forces in his planning
and deployment for the security of the division tactical area
components of his overall operational force.
Senator Case. Now, when he took over in 1966, what shape was the
1st Division in ?
Colonel Wheeler. The division at that particular moment, sir, was
not in the best state of morale because it was torn by the Catholic and
the Buddhist factions.
465
Senator Case. The factor that you mentioned earlier, that half of
them or more come from the two provinces in -which they are actively
operating, that was still effective then ; was it not ?
Colonel Wheeler. Would you state the question again, please sir?
Senator Case. In 1966, thoiigh they were torn between the Catholics
and the Buddhists and had other difficulties, they were still men from
those two provinces ; were they not ?
Colonel Wheeler. They were, but I do not know the percentage, sir.
Senator Case. Do you think that percentage has increased ?
Colonel Wheeler. I cannot say, sir.
Senator Case. Have you any reason to think it has increased ?
Colonel Wheeler. I would think probably that it lias increased to
some extent, sir, since the recruitment for the division is primarily
within those two provinces now.
Senator Case. Now, is this a unique factor applicable or attributable
to this division as opposed to other di\isions in which personnel do
not come from the areas in which they are operating ?
Colonel Wheeler. I do not know what percentage the other divi-
sions have of personnel from their own local areas, sir. They all receive
trainees from the nationalist training centers.
Senator Case. Including the 1st?
Colonel Wheeler. Including the 1st, sir.
UNIQUENESS OF GENERAL TRUONG
Senator Case. Now, as to the leadership, apart from the commander,,
the military commander, who is unique in your experience, is he in
leadership, is he unusually good ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir, he is.
Senator Case. Why is he unusually good ?
Colonel Wheeler! Sir, he is a very competent individual, Avith an
extraordinary amount of ability and intelligence. He has a very keen
and analytical mind. He takes his job seriously. He is on the job 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, 31 days a month.
Senator Case. Is he independent of Saigon ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir ; he is under the command of the I Corps
commander, wlio in turn answers to JCS.
Senator Case. Is he one of the group who we sometimes talk about
as the military leader, the real leadersliip of Vietnam, to which we
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir ; he does enjoy prestige from all quarters,
both from Vietnamese and nllied officials.
Senator Case. No, I am talking about is he one of the group of mili-
tary commanders who are supposed to be the boys who really run the
show ?
Colonel Wheeler. I am not sure what you are S]~>eaking of here, sir.
All I can say is that he devotes his primary effort to the war in the
lltli Division Tactical Area which is his assigned responsibility. I will
say that he assiduously avoids political involvement, although he does
enjoy equal prestige, whether they be political leaders or otherwise.
Senator Case. What I am trying to get at is does he have unique
qualities in his personality and his characteristics which give him the
qualities to give leadership? ^AHiat are the — I know you are trying to
answer, but I am trying to find out why he is unique, why we do not
have a dozen leaders of this kind thrown up in the process. How did he
get to the top ?
466
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, a brief history of General Truong — lie grad-
uated from My Tho College in 1953 and attended Officer Candidate
School at the Thu Doc Military School from which he graduated in
1954.
Senator Case. This is when the French were there ?
Colonel Wheei^er. That is correct, sir. Upon graduation he was com-
missioned a second lieutenant and assigned to the Airborne Division.
Senator Case. Was he a member of the mandarin class ?
Colonel Wheeler. Not that I know of, sir.
Senator Case. Do you happen to know what his family back-
ground is ?
Colonel Wheeler. He comes from the Kien Hoa Province, south of
Saigon.
Senator Case. He is a southerner ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. A Buddhist ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. Please go on.
Colonel Wheeler. From the date of his commissioning until 1966
he served exclusively with the airborne division in all positions from
platoon leader to deputy division commander. In June 1966, he be-
came the conmiander of the 1st ARVN Division. His demonstrated
leadership qualities were those associated with a professional of the
military art. Furthermore they were achieved through his own efforts.
Senator Case. ^YllJ do we not have more of them? You know, I
know this is part of your problem.
Colonel Wheeler. I am sure, sir, that there are others who are very
competent, too.
General Clement. There are some coming along the line. There are
good division commanders.
Senator Case. Out of 12?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. That is pretty — well, I mean not in very large pro-
portions, is it, after almost 20 3'ears of our military advisory effort?
General Clement. No, sir.
Of course, we have singled out the 1st Division. Colonel Wlieeler is
the senior adviser. This happens to be probably the outstanding com-
mander. He is well up there. There are others that are very good, very
fine commanders. The one I worked with in the 2d Division is very
jfine.
Senator Case. Where is that ?
General Clement. That division is also in I Corps, just south of the
1st Division.
Senator Case. Running clown to
General Clement. Quang Ngal and Quangtin Provinces.
estimate of 1ST DIVISION
The Chairman. I wonder if the Senator would allow me to read a
story? It is on this subject. This is a story dated December 30 in the
Christian Science Monitor. It contains an article by George Ashworth
about the 1st Division :
The Americans have obviously tried to give the 1st the best of everything, as
one would a precocious, favored son.
4g:
He says .'
The 1st not only is the best, but it is the largest South Vietnamese Division,
M-ith 19 maneuver battalions and a total strength of 21.000 ineludin- attach-
ments of armored and other units. Other divisions are about half that s*ize.
It talks about General Truong. It says, among other things that he
looks after his people. It says there is a commissary at which'solcliers
and their families can buy rice and other staples at well under the
market level. Troops whose families are near are allowed time off
generally once a month, to go see them. '
The article says :
Naturally there are flaws in the 1st. There is a lack of depth in leadership All
enlisted leaders receive si>ecial training at the division's training center, but .some
important stafe positions remain unfilled, probably for lack of anyone the General
cares to appoint. ...
Biit the question remains whether Saigon wiU have enough units as good as
the 1st when the moment of crisis approaches ... One shining example, such
as the 1st, may not be enough.
This is the Christian Science Monitor which, as you know, is a rather
reliable newspaper, if there is one according to the modern day
mat would you say about Mr. Ashworth's estimate of the 1st
Division ?
Colonel Wheeler. I would say his estimate, sir, is very accurate. I
have met Mr. Ashworth on several occasions.
The Chaieman. Then the conclusion would be that the 1st is bv no
means a typical division. It is the outstanding division of the whole
AKVX Army ; is it not ?
Colonel Wheeler. I have no way of judging the other divisions, sir.
ihe Chairmax. I see. I should not ask vou that. I withdraw the
question That is what Mr. Ashworth and other people say. Being the
senior adviser, I can see why you would not want to make a self-
serving statement like that. I am sure General Clement, being there on
the stand with you, would not want to, either, unless he wishes to
volunteer that.
General Clement. No, sir, I would not wish to comment on that.
uneveness Of performance of arvn forces
The Chairman. This is to Colonel '^^Tieeler, too. Following that up
on January 12 of this year, there was a panel discussion on national
educational television among several reporters in Vietnam In com-
menting on Vietnamization, Mr. Beach of the Chicago Daily News
who I believe has been out there longer than any and is very well
acquainted in the area, said :
Well, the performance by the ARVN forces, and I will include the regional and
popular forces in ARVN, has been very, very spotty. Thev have done very badly
in some places and they have done very well in others. You can prove anything
you want to, really, by going to a given area. You can prove that thev are doing
beautifully here and you can prove that they are doing simply horribly there
And that is that. It has always been true of this war.
Would you say that is a rather inaccurate statement, General ?
_ General Clement. Sir, I would sav there is bound to be unevenness
m i~>erformance in all units.
The Chahiman. Yes.
General Clement. And I think he mav have overdrawn the case
somewhat.
468
The Chairman. You think ho has, Colonel ? Has he overdrawn the
case ?
Colonel Wheeler. I can only speak of my area, sir, I can say that
the lowlands of the 11th Division tactical area are currently, and have
been since last summer, secui-ed by the RF and the PF units. The com-
bat units and the combat support units of the 1st ARYX Division are
employed in the Piedmont and the jungle areas where the NYA are
located.
Senator Case. How long has the 1st Division been up there, opei'ating
where it is now ?
Colonel Wheeler. The 1st ARA-^N Division, sir, has been there since
its activation in 1955.
Senator Case. So from recent history, in recent history, it has been
there all the time ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
NUIMBER OF AMERICAN TROOPS IX 1ST CORPS AREA
The Chairman. How many American troops are in that 1st Corps
area compared to the ARYN troops ?
Colonel Wheeler. I do not have a figure on the total American troops
in the I Corps area.
General Clement. I don't have a figure. We have a unit, sir; it is a
Marine division.
The Chairman. Don't j^ou know how many men and arms are in
the 1st Corps area ?
Don't you know. General ?
General Clement. I am just wondering if I should provide the exact
number or give you a ball pai-k figure, sir.
The Chairman. Do you think tliis involves security ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chaipjnian. Why don't you say so? Say you know, but don't
want to tell us in open session. That is tlie proper answer. Don't say you
don't know. You leave the impression that you came all the way from
Vietnam and don't know anything to talk about. AVe can talk about it
in executive if that is tlie way you feel. I did not assume it is any secret,
but if it is, all right. That is your privilege.
Senator Case ?
helicopter support for 1ST ARVN DIVISION
Senator Case. What percentage of the helicopter support comes
from the Vietnamese force in the 1st Corps, the 1st Vietnamese
Colonel Wheeler. The 1st ARVX Division helicopter support pro-
vided by the Vietnamese Air Force is about i^O to 25 percent, sir.
Senator Case. Of the support that that division is given in opera-
tions ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. Has that markedly increased from what it was when
you first went there ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
At that time, we did not have support for the 1st ARVX Division
provided by the Vietnamese Air Force. A helicopter unit became oper-
ational in October 1969 and that unit has provided some support to us
on a daily basis for resupply and for combat assaults.
469
Senator Case. Do they have a gunship helicopter ?
Colonel "Wheeler. No, sir, they do not.
The Chairman, I don't understand. Are you talkmg about
helicopters that first
Senator Case. I am talking about Vietnamese helicopter support by
the Vietnamese.
The Chairman. Do you mean how many they have that are not ours ?
Senator Case. Well, I want to find out what percentage they are
supplying of their own helicopter support.
The Chairman. I could not follow the answer.
Senator Case. I thought it was about 20 to 25 percent.
The Chairman. Of what ?
Colonel Wheeler. I understand the question concerns the total
amoimt of helicopter support that is employed or used by the 1st
AE.VN Division and what percentage of that is provided by the
VNAF.
Senator Case. That is right.
Colonel Wheeler. I stated 20 to 25 percent.
The Chairman. Seventy-five percent by Americans.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Oh, I didn't imderstand.
Senator Case. And none of that VXAF- furnished support is fighter
ships ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir. VNAF has no helicopter gimships at this
time.
Senator Case. What is the plan and prospect for that ?
Colonel Wheeler. I do not have the information on that, sir.
Senator Case. That comes from the Vietnamese Air Force, I take it ?
This is all a matter of central ARVN control ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir, and we do get tactical air, both United
States and VNAF.
The Chairiman. How many helicopters does the 1st have ?
Colonel Wheeler. The 1st ARVN Division does not have any
organic helicopters, sir.
The Chairman. Oh, it does not have any ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
Senator Case. So your training operation does not include any
training in helicopter, even for support?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
Senator Case. Even for support as opposed to fighting ?
Colonel Wheeler. Our training includes the utilization of
helicopters for combat assault and combat resupply missions.
Senator Case. That is furnished by 75 percent Americans or 75 or
80, and 20 to 25 supplied by the Vietnamese Army ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. How long do you think it would be before— you are
not prepared, I guess, to say how the Vietnamese Air Force is coming
along in its training, are you ? You would have to get that from some
other place ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. This kind of support objective is still central to the
operations as you conceive that they will be carried on, continue to be
carried on ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
470
NECESSITY OF HELICOPTER SUPPORT
Senator Case. You need helicopter support? It is essential, I take it?
Colonel Wheeler. It is essential to the combat operations there as
long as the situation remains as it is now, sir.
Senator Case. Will you tell me why it is essential ? The North Viet-
namese-Vietcong operations have never had this kind of support. Why
do we have to have it ?
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, the location of the enemy in the area in which
the division is employed requires that we have the necessary combat
support. Here I am speaking of the artillery, to support the infantry
units that are employed into the jungle and mountain areas. To move
artillery in where there are no roads we use the helicopters.
Senator Case. I know you do. But the North Vietnamese do not have
that. How do they get around ?
Colonel Wheeler. The North Vietnamese, sir, do not employ fire
power from the type artillery weapons that we do.
UNITED STATES INFLUENCE ON SOUTH \T:ETNAMESE WARFARE TACTICS
Senator Case. Of course, what I am getting at. Colonel, is this other
question as to whether we have corrupted the tactics of the South Viet-
namese in the war and tried to make it a war in which we fight our way
and try to make them fight it in that way. I wish more comment on
this thing. I again am not being critical, but this comment has been
made many times, that we have not only taken the war over ourselves
and fought it as I expect anybody given a job would want American
forces to do, but that we have made it impossible by disabling the South
Vietnames from the kind of warfare they would be able to carry on any
other time. What do you say about that ?
Colonel Wheeler. I would say, sir, in this case, we do not have ad-
visers in the artillery units. They are competent, fully capable, and do
employ their artillery without the assistance of advisers.
Senator Case. That is a very interesting observation, but it does not
really go to the question.
General ?
General Clement. Sir, I think we should talk of air mobility tac-
tics since this sort of personifies what we have there. One of the big-
gest reasons for the success we have had is because of the air mobility
concept. This allowed us to get to places we had never been before,
that the French had never been in before. Unfortunately, the French
did not have this amount of helicopter support. We did. We have
been able to move into the war zone C, war zone D, in and out as the
enemy evaporated. This meant we could bring pressure on the enemy
in places he had never had it before. We could make him move from
his base areas. We could operate on his supply lines. This was a tre-
mendous thing.
We first tried it out here in Fort Benning, Ga., and brought it over
under General Kinnard and it made a tremendous difference from the
very beginning.
Senator Case. I am not advocating that we have tied our men's
hands, our forces hands at all. That is not the point.
General Clement. No, sir.
Senator Case. The point is have we made it impossible for the South
Vietnamese to fight the way they have always fought and know how'
to fight?
471
General Clement, Let me come back to that and try to paint a pic-
ture of the enemy concept and the helicopter per se. It has been a
tremendous thing. You mentioned the NVA and the fact that they
do not have them. They would love to have them, I am sure.
We talk about the Vietnamese. We have trained them, yes, in the use
of helicopters. Many of these combat assaults that Colonel Wheeler
described are ARVN. These are Vietnamese soldiers out there, under-
standing how to be air mobile, understanding the use of the helicopter,
how to do things with it. Yes, I think a certain percentage of heli-
copters ought to be retained by the A'ietnamese.
Now, you come to the balance of how many should be retained. The
ARVN is not a mirror image army by any means. It is a much slmimer
army than ours. Its divisions are not as heavily armed as ours. There
would not be as many helicopters as there are in our army, obviously.
Certainly air mobility is a concept which should not be forgotten and
which they should keep. How much is a question of trade-offs.
IS UNITED STATES SUPPLYING CRUTCH TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE ?
Senator Case. Of course, I am not, again, trying to say how much
they should have. All I am trying to say is are they getting to the point
where they can take this job on themselves or are we in a sense, with
the very best purpose in the world, making it impossible for them to
do this by giving them this crutch and supplying this crutch which,
when it is taken away, whether this year, 10 years from now, will make
them unable to do the job ?
General Clement. Sir, I believe that you maybe paint the crutch a
little bit too heavily. I do not believe it is that much of a crutch. It is
another facet, another weapon to be used, a different tactical employ-
ment to be used.
These commanders we are talking about are seasoned commanders-
General Truong, for example, and most of the others — they have been
at war for a long time. They understand the use of this measure. If it
is taken away, there is another way to do it. They can always do it the
way they did it before, which would take longer, perhaps, but given
the enemy threat, this is what you are always concerned with.
Senator Case. I think I have just summed up the testimony that
General "Wheeler has given. I take it that you would pretty much agree,
you are not prepared to talk about the prospects for self-sufficiency
on the part of the Vietnamese Air Force, neither one of you.
General Clement. No, sir.
PROSPECTS FOR 1ST DIVISION OPERATION WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT
Senator Case. That is involved here. You are prepared to say that in
the north, these two northern provinces in the 1st Division area, the
South Vietnamese Army is coming along so that it will be able to
handle itself and make use of the kind of support that it is getting
now and I feel we have come to lead them to think is necessary. So
they will be able to take this on increasingly themselves and use it
tactically and operationally. You are satisfied with this, that you could
let them go fairly soon and they could run the show themselves, with
the outside support, of course, especially the air support that we are
now providing.
472
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir. The staff of the 1st ARVN Division at
the present time does plan by itself tactical operations, and the use of
any support which we can provide, to accomplish whatever tactical
plan the division conunander directs.
Senator Case. In other words, now, may I broaden this just a little
bit ? If the rest of the Vietnamese Army could do this, we could pull
out tomorrow except for support.
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, that goes beyond my purview.
Senator Case. What about you, General ?
General Clement. No, sir, and I thmk you paint the picture, a little
too strongly for the I Corps area. There are a lot of enemy up in I
Corps, and there always have been. Quang Ngai Province, I am sure
you recognize, has always been one of the most difficult provinces. It
still is. The units here have to cover these areas where the enemy may
be found. So this problem of where the enemy may be found is a very
sensitive problem.
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Case. Yes.
The Chairman. How long do you think it will be before the 1st
Division can operate completely independently without U.S. heli-
copter, artillery, and other support ? How long do you think it will be
before it can operate on its own.
Colonel Wheeler. Mr. Chairman, an answer to that particular
question would certainly consider the intentions of the enemy. I would
not at this time be in a position to state what those intentions are.
The Chairman. I assume that there has been the assumption that
their intention was not the friendliest and that there would be some
conflict. I did not mean that they could operate with no war at all. I
assumed that with the known attitude of the North Vietnamese.
If you cannot answer, that is all right.
ATTITUDE OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM
I would like to go back to a question. You said a moment ago that
one reason why the 1st Division was so good is that the soldier in the
1st understands what he is fighting for and he believes in it and that is
why he is the best soldier. Is that al^out what you said ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Can you say that about the American soldiers there
too?
Colonel Wheeler. Those that I have observed, yes, sir.
The Chairman. General, do you feel the same way about that ?
General Clement. I think generally, yes, sir.
The Chairman. I wanted to examine you a bit on that. Tliere have
been a number of news stories in recent months concerning the grow-
ing disillusionment of American servicemen in Vietnam with the war.
I will put a number of these in the record, but I would just ask you
about a few excerpts from them.
The following from an article in the Washington Evening Star
describes the problem in this way. These are Americans they are talk-
ing about and I quote :
"Soldiers do not seem to care particularly wliich 'gooks' finally win
the war— 'our gooks' or 'their gooks.' To the American slogging
through the rice paddies and jungles, under blazing sun or monsoon
473
rain, all Vietnamese are 'gooks,' whether fighting for the Communists
or tlie Saigon Government.
"The widespread use of the term 'gook', a leftover of World War II
and the Korean conflict, reflects the repugnance and aversion of most
soldiers toward the citizens of the country they are ordered to defend.
"The term, spoken with contempt, hatred,"^ or simple resignation,
simplifies a contradiction between attitude of the average 'grunt' or
infantryman and that of American officials still intent on 'winning the
hearts and minds of the populace.' "
Would you comment on that statement? This is by Donald Kirk,
Asia Correspondent of the Washington Star.
General Clement. If I could just make a brief comment, sir, from
experience serving with the American troops, in the 23d Division, I
would not say that at all.
The Chairman. You would not ?
General Clement. I think their attitude, their morale, their
dedication, was pretty outstanding.
The Chaieman. You would not agree with that at all ?
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. You think they know what they are fighting for?
General Clement. I think they do ; yes, sir.
FOR what is the UNITED STATES FIGHTING IN VIETNAM?
The Chairman. I wish you would make as clear as you can what you
tliink they think they are ^^ghting for ?
General Clement. I would rather not speak about what they think
they are fighting for. I can tell you what I think I am fighting for.
The Chairman. All right.
General Clement. I am fighting for what we first of all do recog-
nize as a Communist threat. This has been over our heads for a number
of vears.
iThe Chairman. You speak for yourself, not with "we." You go
ahead and say what you think you find.
General Clement. We have encountered Communists on the battle-
field, we have taken them under fire, and we feel that the count-
try for which we are fighting, and with whose soldiers we are fighting,
is making great strides toward becoming a nation on its own, self-
determined, and that this is why we arc doing it.
The Chairman. You say you have encountered many of these
Communists. Have you?
General Clement. I say in battles, engagements.
The Chairman. What is it about the Communists that you think
justifies the eif ort that we are making ?
General Clement. Sir, I would prefer not to get into a lengthy
political discussion about the communists.
The Chairman. The reason this question was prompted is that the
Colonel says the reason the ARVX 1st Division is so good is that they
know what they are fighting for. They understand it and they believe
in it.
It sems to me it is a legitimate question to ask an American what he
is fighting for and why he believes it and why it is so important.
There are contradictions, you see. There are Communists in Cuba,
for example, only 90 miles away from America. If it is important and
44-706—70 31
474
the only reason you are fighting there is because these are Communists
and therefore they are evil and should be eradicated, why do we not
fight in Cuba? This is the kind of question I am asked. I get letters
from constituents all the time and this question has been a recurring
one.
If I understand you, the reason we are fighting there is because we
are fighting Communists. Is that correct ?
General Clement. And another reason, sir ; and probably the biggest
one, is that our Nation has decided that that is where military forces
will be committed by the United States. I am an officer and that is
where I am going when I am sent there. I think that is where the
forces do really go, sir. When they are sent, they go and they do a
tremendous job.
The Chairman. I think that is a different kind of answer. You are
there because you are a military man and you have been ordered there
to fight for your country ; is that right ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; and I also have belief.
The Chairman. I think this is legitimate, too. I have inquired with
both of them. They are both legitimate and I do not quarrel with
them. I am just trying to elucidate it.
This article in the Washington Star is certainly not the last word.
attitude of U.S. soldiers in VIETNAM
I have another article here from South Vietnam, "Every Boy,.
U.S.A." This is apparently an interview with an American soldier. It
says, "His name is Roy Miles. He came to Vietnam last February, a
fresh-faced, rosy-cheeked kid, fully prepared to fight honorably for his
country's ideal. There have been some changes since then." He is very
disillusioned with the war. This is a quote from an interview by a man
named Arnold Abrams in Saigon, carried in the February 12, 1970^
Far Eastern Economic Review. He quotes Mr. Miles, saying, " 'I've
seen a lot of things and done a lot of thinking since I got here. * * *
I feel as if I've been used. Nothing I've seen or heard about the way
we've been doing things, and why, makes any sense.' If the United
States was supposed to save South Vietnam, he said, 'How come we
are starting to pull out now ? Everyone knows the South Vietnamese-
can't make it by themselves.' He added : And if it's not really so im-
poi'tant to save this country, why did we get involved in the first place —
and what do we say to the parents of the 40,000 guys who have been
killed?'
"This was no hippie, draft dodger, or dissenter spouting rhetorical
questions. This was, if such a thing still exists. Every Boy, U.S.A. ; a
clean-cut, right-thinking, relatively unsophisticated, Midwestern youth
who hns served and snftpred as a soldier, seen others die, and now asks
why. Nobody, he said, has supplied a satisfactory answer.
"Miles' feelin.q:s are as representative of American troop morale in
Vietnam as sentiments of the so-called Silent INIajority are of prevail-
ing public opinion in the United States. He is neither hawk nor dove;
juRt disilliisionod and dipjynstpd.''
There are other articles. I am going to put all the articles in the-
record.
(The information referred to follows :)
475
'From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1969]
"Let Them Fight It Out" — Geowinq GI Disilltjsion Casts Dotjbt on Mobalb
Claims
(By Donald Kirk)
Saigon. — The worn-out cliche of generals and master sergeants that "morale
over here is great" no longer seems to apply to men in the field.
Unlike the veterans of previous tours in Vietnam, many of those here now
say the United States should get out — as quickly as possible. "Leave it to the
gooks to fight it out between themselves" is a typical comment.
Soldiers do not seem to care particularly which "gooks" finally win the war —
"our gooks" or "their gooks." To the Americans slogging through the rice paddies
and jungles, under blazing sun or mon.soon rain, all Vietnamese are "gooks"
whether fighting for the Communists or the Saigon government.
The widespread use of the term "gook," a leftover of World "War II and the
Korean conflict, reflects the repugnance and aversion of most soldiers toward
the citizens of the country they are ordered to defend.
The term, spoken with contempt, hatred or simple resignation, symbolizes a
contradiction between the attitude of the average "grunt" or infantryman and
that of American ofiicials still intent on "winning the hearts and minds of the
populace."
SENSE OF futility
The reasons for GI opposition to the war range from lack of support at home
for what they are doing to a sense of futility in patrolling the same patch of jungle
day in and day out without any prospect of real victory.
Some soldiers express support for antiwar demonstrators at home, but many
despise the demonstrators and center their discontent on the failure of the
United States to throw all of its resources into winning a military victory.
Whatever the reasons, however, the prevalent GI attitude now goes far beyond
routine complaints against authority or per.sonal hardship.
"It's a crazy war," mused Spc. 4 Charles Rose, resting in the back of an
armored personnel carrier in between patrols from a firebase operated by the
2.')th Infantry Division .some 30 miles northwest of here. "It ain't really worth-
while."
To Rose, like many of the other soldiers interviewed at firebases around the
country, one of the most disillusioning realizations was that the Vietnamese did
not like the Americans.
"We went to a village and we asked the people some questions," said Rose, a
20-year-old former farm boy."All they said was, 'Who's VC?' They acted like they
never heard of them. The people don't give a damn for us."
GI's often are not aware that the VC will threaten and possibly kill villagers
who provide them with information, but the sense of hostiliy also is manifest in
plainly "friendly" areas.
Outside the ba.ses tiixi-drivers, .soft-drink vendors and the like wait to charge
unsuspecting soldiers five or 10 times the going prices for their .seiwices.
"These people are just out for our money," was a typical GI observation. "They
want us to liiiht for them," oh.served one soldier, "and then they'll take us for all
they can while we're here. That's all they care about."
"If they don't want us to help them, now's the time to go home," said Pfc.
Ronald Dorsey. 21. a radio operator from Atlanta, Ga. "As long as the people
don't want us here, I don't think we .should he here."
The inbred Vietnamese suspicion of foreigners, whether Americans, French,
Chinese or Japanese, does not seem to puzzle the troops so much, however, as the
opposition to the war in the United States.
DISSENT LOUD
Despite occasional efforts by Armed Forces Radio in Saigon to downplay criti-
cism of the war, the me.ssage of dissent at home gets through loud and clear to the
men in the field. They hear i-eports of anti-war statements by senators and dem-
onstrations by students.
Soldiers two, three and four years ago almost unanimously viewed such reports
with disdain and disgust. To the men who were then fighting the war, the demon-
strators "back in the world" were "draftdodgers" who were too frightened to go
to the war themselves.
476
Many Americans here still liew to this view, but many others now applaud the
antiwar dissidents. "They should keep on demonstrating," said one soldier.
"Then maybe we'll all get to go home."
"If I was there, I'd join 'em," remarked a 22-year-old sergeant, James O. Smith
of San Diego. "The demonstrations are 'No. 1.' I don't think half the iJeople here
believe in this war."
Pfc. Robert Jones, 19, countered tliat the demonstrations would not "help the
cause" even if war was pointless. "They won't get us out of here any faster," he
said, "and they might just encourage the gooks to fight harder against us."
To Jones, a native of Memphis, the central question was whether or not the
United States planned to fight to the finish or merely maintain a stalemate.
RISKS CAUSE GRIPES
"I can see the point in the war to fight to win," he said. "If the war is to stop
communism, I'd a lot rather stop it in Vietnam than somewhere else. But I can't
see any reason for just fighting it half way."
The "half-way" nature of the war ranks as easily the greatest complaint among
those soldiers who might support it as long as the United States had any inten-
tion of winning.
The most frequent gripe among infantrymen is they must risk their lives patrol-
ling rice paddies and jungles designated as "no-fire zones" by their superiors. The
reason for this designation in most cases is plain enough : artillery and bombs
might kill and wound civilians and do more to injure than help the allied cause.
To the average GI. however, this reasoning makes little sense, particularly
when some "civilians" turn out to be enemy soldiers or infonnants. And many of
the troops are even less convinced of restrictions on going into enemy base areas
along the Cambodian border.
"This war will always be just a stalemate," observed a GI in a battalion of the
1st Air Cavalry Division, responsible for covering the jungles of War Zone C
along the frontier "Either we should invade Cambodia or go back home. There's
no middle course."
The sense of puzzlement, frustration and bitterness permeates the attitudes of
young ofiicers as well as enlisted men. It is not uncommon these days to find
lieutenants and captains expressing complete agreement with the "antiwar"
views of some of the troops beneath them.
WAR BELIEF SHAKEN
A lieutenant at a 25th Division fire base singled out a visiting reporter and ad-
vised him "None of the men here believe in this war."
The lieutenant claimed only the Regular Army officers — career men — were
enthusiastic about fighting much longer.
"Don't believe what they tell you," the lieutenant remarked when his superior
officers were out of hearing. "We're just here because we have no choice and for
no other reason."
Like the enlisted men, however, officers present a wide variety of views. "Per-
sonally, I think we should nuke 'em (hit with nuclear weapons)," remarked a
second lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry Division. "We should have increased the
bombing of North Vietnam and not have stopped it. That was the worst mistake
of the war."
Amid these conflicting viewi^oints, a significant number of officers and men
also support the present policy of the administration of gradual withdrawal of
American troops and "replacement" of them by Vietnamese units.
"It's their country, their weather, their insects," remarked Pfc. Francis Mc-
Carten, 20, of New York. "They can speak to anyone they meet. Anything the VC
can do, they can do. If they thought it was their war, then they would fight it."
"Leave it to the gooks to fight for themselves," was the advice of a lieutenant
w^ho had led a platoon in War Zone C. "It's their country. They know that jungle
better than we do. We're lost there."
Despite the general decline in troop morale, virtually no soldier admitted his
personal attitude and views had alfected his performance. "It hasn't reached that
point yet," said a member of an artillery crew, "because we know we only have
so much time to do here, and we just mark off the days on our calendars .
Other factors also tend to keep soldiers from refusing orders or openly rebelling.
Helicopters fly hot food and mail out to the field. Post exchanges sell luxury goods
as well as practical necessities at all major installations. Even on small artillery
bases the troops get two cans of beer a day.
477
(i-DAY LEAVES
\nd then in the middle of his tour in Vietnam, every GI goes on a six-day
leave in one of the nightclub- and girl-filled cities of Asia and even to Honolulu
or Australia. No other country in history has offered this kind of diversion or
spent so much to please the troops. ., . , o>. . • ^v, i 4.^
GI's remark, as do students at home, that the United States is the place to
fight -the real war" against America's problems. To some of these soldiers, how-
ever the enemies when they return home will not be the generals who wanted
them to fight in Vietnam but the youth who demanded an end to hostilities.
"We're fighting the wrong enemy," said a 19-year-old foot-soldier who gradu-
ated from high school in June of last year. "I think we should go back to the
States and turn some of these weapons and helicopters against these demon-
strators. We should take care of that problem before going ahead and fighting
another war overseas."
[From the Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 12, 1970]
South Vietnam : Everybody L'SA
(By Arnold Abrams)
A year in Vietnam had left its mark on the kid's face, but had not erased the
American Midwestern wholesomeness from his features. This was his first Saigon
visit after 10 months in the field, and he was absorbing the city with wide-eyed
wonder, in no hurry to rejoin his unit.
"My god, the girls," he said. "I've never seen such girls. So beautiful — and the
clothes they wear. Never seen anything like this in my whole life." Understand-
ably. His whole life had taken up all of 19yo years, most of which were spent in
Delavan, Wisconsin, a tiny town about 45 miley from Milwaukee. Not many Dela-
van girls wear Vietnamese ao-dais.
His name is Roy Miles. He came to Vietnam last February, a fresh-faced, rosy-
cheeked kid fully prepared to fight honourably for his country's ideals. There
have been scvnie changes since then.
There were, to start, the physical things: Mile.s' nose was deeply ridged and
.spread acro.ss more of his face than before, the result of his detonating an enemy
land mine while driving an armoured peri^onnel carrier with the U.S. 1st Division
north of Saigon. Then there was his hearing. It was off, due to a cracked eardrum
caused by the boom (►f a B-40 rocket shinuuing into the rear of his carrier on
another occasion.
Still, one of his companions had been killed and 10 others cut up in those inci-
dents, so Miles really had no cause to complain about physical ailments. But more
than battle bruises were bothering him, for time and medical care would heal
those. His other anguish, however, was another matter: there is no known cure
for disillusionment.
Miles had .loined tlie anny several months after graduating from Delavan High
School in June, 1968. He had been an average student with no specific vocational
aims, and had enlisted after killing time in two meaningle.ss factory jobs.
Having resix'ct for his i)an'nts, and noting their pride in his older brother, a
military policcniiin stationed in the States, he had listened when his father spoke
about love of country and fullilment of obligations.
Miles knew nothing about Vietnam, but trusted his father, a police officer. He
came to believe a worthy national cau.se was involved here, and that he .should
make whatever contribution he could.
Miles was ordered to Vietnam after completing basic and advancetl infantry
training. There was no time to return home. He phoned the news to his parents.
"I don't think they had ever got themselves to believe I'd be sent to Vietnam." he
said. ":My motliercrietl when I told her. Still, their last words to me were that I
should be a good soldier."
He hit the mine six weeks after arriving. He was in hospital several weeks and
then went back into action even though the smashed bone structure in his nose
imiieded normal breathing. "The doctors said I"d eventually have to get an opera-
tion." he said, "but that in the meantime. I was in good enough shape to go back.
I didn't argue. I went."
It is different with Miles now. He thinks he was a sucker. "I've seen a lot of
things and done a lot of thinking since I got here," he said, "and I feel as if I've
been used. Nothing I've seen or heard about the way we've been doing things, and
why, makes any .sense."
478
If the US was supposed to save South Vietnam, he said, "how come we're start-
ing to pull out now? Everyone knows the South Vietnamese can't make it by
themselves." He added : "And if it's not really so important to save this country,
why did we get involved here in the first place — and what do we say to the parents
of the 40,000 guys who've been killed?"
This was no hippie, draft-dodger or dissenter spouting rhetorical questions.
This was, if such a thing still exists, Everyboy USA: a clean-cut, right-thinking,
relatively unsophisticated Midwestern youth who has served and suffered as a
soldier, seen others die, and now asks why. Nobody, he said, has supplied a satis-
factory answer.
Miles' feelings are as representative of American troop morale in Vietnam as
sentiments of the so-called Silent Majority are of prevailing public opinion in the
US. He is neither hawk nor dove ; just disillusioned and disgusted.
This boy's case has deep implications, for there is mounting evidence of a
malaise spreading through American troop ranks in Vietnam. Dissent here is
generally attributed to the growing number of college educated youths pulled
into service.
However, behind this articulate, protest-oriented minority, are many Roy Miles :
farm boys and factory workers who do not wear beads, smoke pot or paint peace
posters — but who are, nevertheless, increasingly intolerant of a .seemingly sense-
less situation .
AVhat will he say about Vietnam to the folks back in Delavan, particularly his
parents? "I really don't know. Maybe nothing." Then he added : "My father feels
'my country, right or wrong.' I once did too. But going through something like
this changes your mind. America is my country, yes. But when it's wrong, it's
wrong, and something should be done to correct it. People shouldn't let 40,000
guys get killed and not know why."
He doesn't sympathize with all the aims of peace demonstrators back home.
"But I think they've done some good. I think they've made the point to the Presi-
dent and the American people that the United States can be wi-ong."
What would he say now about Vietnam to a draft-age son? "I don't think I'd
say anything," he said. "I'd let him make up his own mind. He'd understand."
Miles, due home later this month, wonders if his own father will understand.
[From the New York Times, Aug. 4. 1969]
Many GI's Disillusioned on Wak
but espeit de corps appears excellent in most units
(By B. Drummond Ayres Jr.)
Saigon, South Vietnam. — It was 2 : 25 A.M. and the moon over Landing Zone
Center was high, too high for night ambushes. But the private from Phoenix had
his orders.
He slung a belt of machine,gun ammunition over each shoulder and wrapped
a third around his waist. Then he smeared his face and hands with camouflage
grease paint.
As he worked, he offered a running commentary on the war.
"If you'll look closely," he said, "you'll see some beads and a peace symbol
under all of this ammo. I may look like Pancho Villa on the outside but on the
inside I'm nothing but a peacenik.
"I fight because that's the only way to stay alive out here in the boonies. I
don't believe this war is necessary. I just work hard at surviving so I can go
home and protest all this killing."
He picked up his rifle, slid in a fresh magazine, slammed home a round and
trudged off into the moonlit paddies stretching toward nearby Danang.
There are many United States soldiers in South Vietnam today who lack an
ideological commitment to the war, though not all wear beads or threaten to
march after discharge. But even though many voice disillusion with the war —
either because they view it as unnecessary or because they feel it is not worth
fighting under the present rales and circumstances — morale remains high.
'only want to stay alive'
Why do these men continue to fight and die? What carried them to Apbia
Mountain? Or made them stick it out at Benhet?
479
Conversations with scores of infantrymen ttiroughout tbe country over the last
several months have produced a number of answers. Most are variations on the
Arizonian's theme that "I fight because that's the only way to stay alive."
To Sgt. William Simpson, a 28-year-old reconnaissance expert from Catlett,
Va., the war has not "real" meaning. After completing a recent helicopter assault
in which four enemy soldiers were killed, he said :
"I'm a volunteer but this war has become only a job to me. If we're going to
fight we ought to fight and not play around with a lot of sanctuaries and lulls and
pauses. You could believe in the war if you could really fight it.
"As it is, I just do my job as well as I can because it's death to let up. But I
don't have to like my working conditions."
Specialist 4 Kenneth McParland, a 21-year-old infantryman from Rock Valley,
Iowa, does not care about the war "except that it interrupted things and I want
to get out and go home."
During a break between patrols, he said : "I'm part of a squad. I pull my share
of the load. The other fellows don't let me goof ofE and I don't let them goof ofE.
It's the only way to stay alive."
'big PAIX IX THE XECK'
To Private First Cla.ss Edward Stich, a 20-year-old rifleman from Queens, the
vpar is "a big pain in the neck."
"Who needs it?" he asked one hot morning at the end of a long march. Without
waiting for an answer, he continued :
"I'm just putting in my days, doing what I'm told, doing a job. One morning I'll
wake up and I'll be finished and then I'll go home and tune out, forget it all."
Many .soldiers are quick to .say they fight in SouthVietnam because they believe
in the war, whatever the political and diplomatic complications. Many of these
men are career officers or sergeants.
Typical of them is Maj. James Bramlet, a 37-year-old operations oflScer with
the Fir.st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
"I believe in what we're doing here," he said over a cold beer at the end of a
Jay of fighting.
"A big fellow has got to help a little fellow." he added, "especially if the little
fellow is a nice guy who's getting kicked around. That's what America is all
about. It's not a matter of the 'yellow peril.' I don't go for that argument. It's
really just a matter of a man's commitment to his fellow man when his fellow
man needs help."
Another professional, Capt. Ernie Carrier, 23 years old, of Benton, La., sees the
war as "duty that I requested."
Chatting with several of his men, he said : "I signed up. So I go along because
that's what I'm suppo.sed to do. If I don't like it, I can always get out."
For all the divi.sion over the war here and at home, the espirit de coi'ps remains
excellent in most United States units. Even in outfits not yet scheduled to go home
a part of the new United States withdrawal plan there are no .signs of eroding
morale. In fact, the average American soldier seems to bold no hoi^e that he will
go home a single day earlier than originally sclieduletl.
"Let's face it," said Private First Class John Cuccione, 20-years old, of New
Rochelle. "Specific battalions of the Ninth Division were shipped home but most
of the men in those battalions with more than a month to serve were shifted to
some unit not scheduled to go home. They flipflopped with men with less than a
month to go."
United States commanders attribute the continuing high .spirit to a number of
factors, including good leadership, good medical care, good equipment and good
food. The most frequently mentioned factor, however, is the relative shortness of
the tour of duty in Vietnam.
••When one of my men arrives in country," said Maj. Gen. Ormond R. Simpson,
commander of the First ^larine Division, "he knows that in exactly 13 months
he'll be going home again if bad luck doesn't send him sooner.
'•For the Army boys, the tour is only 12 months. You can't beat short tours for
boosting spirit in a war like this, especially when the short tours them.selves are
broken by a five-day fi^ee vacation to some exotic place like Hawaii or Hong Kong
or Tokyo."
480
[From the Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1969]
Many GI's Dislike Viet Allies
a'letnamese retukn the animosity
(By Robert G. Kaiser)
Saigon. — Before I came to Vietnam I wanted a job working with the Viet-
namese," the young American lieutenant said, "but now I'm glad I'm in a U.S.
infantry outfit. I just don't like Gooks. Right after I got here I went out with one
of our companies, one of the first operations I went on. The company got hit —
they got mauled, really. Six Americans got killed, 18 wounded. You looked at those
guys, dead and wounded, and you had to feel different about the Gook after that."
Gooks — or Dinks, or Slopes — are major figures in the Vietnam war who don't
often get their names in the papers. They are, in GI argot, the Vietnamese people.
Gooks can be friendly or hostile, ours or theirs. The only good Gook, it is said
again and again on U.S. bases throughout Vietnam is a dead Gook.
Open expression of American contempt for Vietnamese is common. An Army
major driving a jeep in Saigon after a heavy rain deliberately drives along the
edge of the road so he can keep his outside wheel in the puddles and splash
pedestrians. A sergeant in Cantho taunts a Vietnamese girl who operates a PX
snack bar with lurid sexual insults, knowing she doesn't understand him, and
basking in the laughter his insults evoke from his buddies.
A senior diplomat sneers, "these people are incorrigible." A soldier recuperating
in an Army hospital tells a fellow patient about the old man he killed "by mis-
take," but it didn't matter, "He was just a Gook." One of the eight Green Berets
recently accused of murder, jokes about the fate of Thai Khac Chuyen : "Just
like a Gook to carry more chain than he could swim with."
The American soldier's contempt for Asians is now new. In World War II the
Indians were Wogs, the Burmese and Chinese were Slopeys. But in Vietnam
relations between Americans and "the little people" are more complicated.
Naive young U.S. soldiers are told that their enemy is Vietnamese — small,
tough, slant-eyed, wearing blaciv pajamas and lurking everywhere. They are also
told that the United States is here to allow the South Vietnamese — small, slant-
eyed, many clad in black pajamas — to determine their own destinies.
Enemy and ally don't look any different. Most GIs find it diflicult to believe that
some Gooks are their mortal enemies while others are devoted friends.
The ordinary soldier's attitude is undoubtedly colored by the Vietnamese he
most often meets. Few GIs get to know ordinary Vietnamese people during their
12 months here. In.stead the American soldier meets the riffraff of war, the camp-
following pimps and bar girls, shopkeepers and hustlers who claw at him when-
ever he leaves his base.
It would be diflicult to convince a 19-year-old American boy that these people
are not typical. The Army makes little effort to promote good relations between
Americans and Vietnamese.
There have been no polls or surveys to determine how many Americans in
Vietnam like or dislike the Vietnamese. One can only report a personal impres-
sion : Among soldiers, negative feelings about the Gooks are as common as any
openly expressed complaint. The soldier who speaks warmly of the Vietnamese,
or who makes an effort to help them in his spare time or on his job, usually makes
an impression, because he is an exception.
Soldiers working with the Vietnamese in advisory jobs seem much more likely
to like the locals than GIs in American units.
A psychiatric social worker in the Anny's 3d Field Hospital in Saigon. Maj.
Aaron Dotson, reports that in his experience black soldi.U'S are less prone to prej-
udice against Vietnamese than whites. But there are certainly blacks who will
curse the Gooks. Dotson says anti-Vietnamese feeling is widespread.
Among American civilians hostility is much more subtle, and admirers of the
Vietnamese are much more common. But candid relationships are rare.
An American cannot overhear the unguarded remarks of Vietnamese, but one
suspects that they regularly return the insults. The basic slang for Americans is
"Meo," which the Vietnamese equate with "Yanks," though they say it is a "funny
word."
Vietnames anti-Americanism seems to come in two strains. One is practical and
direct : The Americans shot up my house, dumped my vegetable stand, defiled my
daughter — I don't like them. The other is more basic: We were a simple and
peneeful society before the Americans came, now we are crass and commercial
and our values are distorted. Vietnamese life will never be the same, the Amer-
icans have created more needs than they have satisfied.
481
The undercurrent of the second strain of anti-Americanism is strong in Saigon.
It often emerges at the end of long lunches or long conversations, heavily coated
-with Oriental politeness, but forceful and sometimes bitter.
Only occasionally is anti-Americanism ov(!rt, and when it is, Vietnamese assure
their American friends that it is just an aberration.
A recent example was series of editorials in the militant Buddhist newspaper
Chanh Dao, organ of the An Quang Pagoda. The editorials were written by a
journalist named Viet Bang, a former employee of the U.S. government who was
fired from his job in Saigon.
Bang's editorials villified the United States for seeking to monopolize the Viet-
namese economy, If or importing foreign labor at the expense of local workers, for
promoting black market sales of PX goods to undermine local products, and for
many other transgressions. Bang is obviously not a representative spokesman for
Vietnamese opinion, but one wonders how widely his prejudices may be secretly
held. .
There seems to be no single psychological explanation for the hostility between
Americans and Vietnamese, but one often senses a common ingredient —
resentment.
The Americans are here, they say, to save Vietnam, and they resent the Viet-
namese for failing to be appropriately appreciative. Or they are here against
their will, because they were drafted to fight a bewildering war, and they resent
the Vietnamese for causing it. Or they are Americans who have no patience or
deliberate Oriental ways, and they resent the Vietnamese for their stubborn
unwillingness to adopt American ways.
For their part, the Vietnamese seem to have always been suspicious about why
so many Americans came to their country. Many, including some intellectuals and
politicians, are convinced that Vietnam is only a pawn in the grasp of uncaring
big powers, and only one l»ig power is available as a target for their resentment.
Some Vietnamese who are deeply grateful for the fact that the United States
apparently saved them from a Communist takeover in 1965 (and there are many)
nevertheless bitterly resent America's deep involvement in their domestic affairs.
Only once in his tenure in office has President Thieu lieen a genuinely popular
leader : wlien lie stood up to the Americans and refused to take part in the Paris
peace talks last November. Even Thieu's aides acknowledge to Americans that it
was his finest hour.
WHY IS UNITED STATES FIGHTIXG IX SOUTH VIETNxVM ?
The CiiAiRM.vx. Those are the kinds of questions that come to Sen-
ators, at least tliis Senator, What are we doino; there ? I can understand
the soldier in Hue, wlio lives in Hue and he is fiojliting; and he believes
he is fighting for his personal existence and his way of life. It is diffi-
cult for me to explain to my constituents why we are fighting in South
Vietnam. If it is just communism that you are fighting, I do not know
why there are not other places, more agreeable places, to fight them if
that is what we want to do. It is a very disagreeable place for the
ordinary soldier ; is it not ? I do not mean for you, but for the boy in
the paddy ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; quite.
The Chairman. I understand it is very uncomfortable and un-
plc^asant and it is very difficult J'or me to know why we are fighting,
continuing to fight. "\Xniat is worthwhile to the United States? What
is the United States going to gain out of it ?
If we are fighting in the traditional way to annex this area as a
colony and exploit its natural resources, at least it is a traditional
historical motive. But I cannot understand what the present motive is,
the one that induced President Johnson to become so involved.
Can Senator Case explain that and give me a better answer ? He looks
as if he is anxious to reply.
Senator Case. No, the Senator is not anxious to attempt to answer
the chairman's question at this time. I was hopeful that we would use
482
these witnesses for their technical competence as much as we could and
I was anxious to get on with a couple more things.
The Chairman. All right. I yield to you. The colonel inspired that
question.
Senator Case. This question is one that plagues us all the time. Of
course it is.
What I am really trying to get at now from you gentlemen, not in
the way of hurrays, is again I repeat, I will continue to repeat, we
have every understanding of the difficult job you have as you sit before
us and the c[uestion is whether it is possible for any human being to
accomplish it, if that is the question we are getting at here.
ENEMY CONTACTS OF 1ST ARVN DIVISION
How many contacts with the enemy did this 1st ARVN Division
have in 1969 "in the DMZ ?
Colonel Wheeleb. The exact number, sir, I do not have, but we have
had numerous contacts.
Senator Case. Major ones?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
We have had major contacts.
Senator Case. Could you make — I am not trying to dig into exact
operational details — a comparison between say, 1967, 1968, and 1969
in this regard?
Colonel Wheeler. Certainly during 1968, sir, there was much
heavier fighting in the division tactical area than in 1969. However,
the enemy presence was still great. In early 1969, through the tena-
ciousness of the division commander and the gallant troops under his
command, pressure was maintained on the enemy forces and by sum-
mer of 1969, the major portion of the NVA and the VC had been elim-
inated from the lowlands. At that time, the division's efforts were ap-
plied in tlie Piedmont region and the Ashau Valley to destroy the base
areas and sanctuaries where the enemy was located. The division com-
mander turned over the defense and security of the hamlets and the
villages to the RF and PF. At the present time, you will find the 1st
ARVN Division soldiers west of QL-1, which is the north-south main
highway. To the east, from QL-1 to the ocean, you will find the terri-
tory being secured only by RF and PF forces. The division has been in
continuous combat. Wlien you have 19 maneuver battalions, 17 in-
fantry and two armored cavalry, some units will always be in contact
with the enemy and others prepared to go into combat because of intel-
ligence derived from prisoners or documents.
We engaged in 19 major regimental -sized operations during 1969.
Senator Case. Most in the early part of the year? The majority of
them ?
Colonel Wheeler. The majority of them in the early part.
Senator Case. And that has dropped off some ?
Colonel AVheeler. That has dropped off some, sir, in the latter part
of 1969.
Senator Case. Is that a function — I forget the word you used — of
the reduced infiltration of the Vietcong forces ?
Colonel Wheeler. It was in the latter part of 1969, yes, sir.
483
TROOPS PROTECTING LAOS BORDER
Senator Case. As far as the west goes, the border of Laos, this 1st
Division has been screened always by our own troops, has it not ?
Colonel Wheeler. Has been always screened ?
Senator Case. Protected from infiltration from the west ?
Colonel Wheeler. The 1st Division has not always been screened,
sir.
Senator Case. Yes, our own American troops have been guarding the
border there, have they not ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir, the 1st AKVN Division has been out there
with them.
Senator Case. With whom ?
Colonel Wheeler. Currently, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division, sir.
Senator Case. Under the 1st ?
Colonel Wheeler. With the 1st. Prior to that time, the 1st ARVN
operated with the 1st Cavalry Division and, before they were with-
drawn, with the 3d Marine Division, sir.
prospects for withdrawal of U.S. TROOPS
Senator Case. I am just trying to get the fact that the ARYN Army
I can take this thing over tomorrow and we can get out of there. This
is what I want. You appreciate, I am sure, as well as anybody else, that
this general optimistic picture is something we have been getting for
20 years, almost, and it never realizes. So Secretary Clifford comes in
and tries to get somebody to say, well, how soon is it going to be —
5 years, 10 years ? We cannot say how long.
Do you have any estimates about it ?
Colonel Wheeler. I do not, sir. I can say when the 3d ^Marine Divi-
sion was witlidrawn from their positions adjacent to the DMZ, the area
was taken over by the 1st ARVN Division.
AMERICANS COMPRISE WHAT PORTION OF I CORPS?
The Chairman. If the Senator will yield. When I asked you, aren't
there more Americans in I Corps, you declined to answer on security
grounds. I know there are more up there. I do not think you are being
frank. You leave the impression that the 1st with all its prestige is tak-
ing over the fighting, but all the stories I have heard are that the
Americans still are bearing the brunt of it. Therefore, I think it is
misleading and deceives us to leave the impression indirectly that they
have taken over the fighting. If you leave that impression, I think then
you ought to go on and say how manv Americans are there.
Are there only 10 ]:)ercent of the fighting men in I Corps that are
Americans or what? Or are you going to leave the impression that the
South Vietnamese have taken it over? I tliink it has to be one or the
other to be frank about it.
Colonel Wheeler. I can only talk about that portion of I Corps
where I am located. That is the nortliern part of I Corps. We do have
there the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Brigade of the 5th
Mechanized Division and those elements which support them as well
as the 1st ARVN Division. They are all employed in separate areas of
operation and they are gainfully employed at the present time with the
threat that does exist.
484
IXFILTRATION ACTIVITY OF ENEMY
Senator Case. Has there not been a distinct dropping off in infiltra-
tion of enemy activity np in this area ? You have ah-eady said this. Has
it not been related to our bombing halt in some fashion ? At least in
time, we won't argue about whether it is caused by that or not, but
since that, has there not been a distinct lessening in enemy infiltration
up in this area ?
Colonel Wheeler, I think, sir, that I could say within the confines of
this discussion that there was some lessening of infiltration last fall.
However, that has not been so in recent months.
Senator Case. You mean it is stepped up again ?
Colonel Wheeler. There has been some increase in infiltration, yes,
sir.
Senator Case. Has it increased to the degree at which it existed
before the decrease?
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, I would prefer to answer that in executive
session.
Senator Case. Well, I will defer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
prospects for overall AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL
The Ctiairm.vX. Wo are, of course, really interested in, and it is
difficult for us to get at, the prospects for the overall withdrawal of
the American engagement in Vietnam. I do not know whether, judging
from what you have said, you were willing to discuss that at open
session. Is there any way you can approach it, general or colonel, to
give any light upon the probabilities of the Americans being able to
turn it over to the Vietnamese ? Can you volunteer any thoughts about
this?
General Clement. Sir, I am afraid I really can't add to what already
has been said about it. That is tlie President's stipulation that there are
three major factors — the negotiations in Paris, the enemy activities,
and the rate at which the Vietnamese take on at an accelerated pace
the equipment and training and operational aspects. It is dependent
on those things.
The Chairman. Have you noticed any effect at all upon the attitude
of the Vietnamese as a result of the increase in the activities in Laos ?
Do you have any knowledge at all about any reaction among the circles
in which you travel in Saigon ?
General Clement. Sir, I have no knowledge, really of any change
on the part of the Vietnamese with regard to this.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, maybe I can interject just one point.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Case. I know that the three-p)ronged proposition that you
have referred to has been this Administration's position. The degree of
si)eed with which we can and the completeness with which we can get
out depends upon three things — the ability of the South Vietnamese to
take over ; the results of negotiations in Paris ; and the willingness of
the North Vietnamese to let us get out without taking advantage of
that — that is a paraphrase, but that is what you had in mind just now,
was it not. General ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
485
EFFECT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE WILLINGNESS ON U.S. WITHDRAWAL
Senator Case. When you analyze it, what you said just now, I think,
was that the speed with which the Vietnamese will be able to take over
depends upon negotiations and the results in Paris and the willingness
of the North Vietnamese not to take advantage of them. Now, is this
not really saying, in both cases, that we will be able to disengage and the
South Vietnamese will be able to take over depending on just one
thing. That is the willingness of the Xorth Vietnamese to let us get out
of there. That is really what you are saying, is it not ?
General Clement. I will refer to what I did say, sir.
Senator Case. I am not trying to twist a word. I am just trying to
get to analyzing this proposition.
General Clement. Obviously, the negotiations play a big part.
Senator Case. That again depends upon the North Vietnamese does
it not?
General Clement. I would say so.
Senator Case. We are always willing to negotiate ; are we not ? And
we would make a fair settlement at any time ; would we not ? There are
two parties to this and so it depends upon the North Vietnamese here
too ; does it not ?
General Clement. Sir, the negotiations and those aspects are really
not a part of my business.
Senator Case. I understand, but we are just talking now, you know,
man to man or person to person and I'eally just trying to analyze what
we are talking about.
Mr. Chairman, do you want to go on ?
The Chairman. I would like a few minutes if the Senator does not
mind.
Senator Case. Not at all. The chairman has complete control of the
time and so on.
The Chairman. Not at all.
Senator Case. I do not mean to be interrupting, but I did interject
because it seems to me we got a clear understanding of what those three
points were, and it all comes down to one thing, the willingness of the
North Vietnamese to let us go.
The Chairman. I do not think there is any doubt that the North
Vietnamese would like to see us go. They do not wish to let us go with
an understanding that our puppets will remain in control in South
Vietnam ; they do not believe that that is our right. They are willing
for us to go. I am quite sure they would love for us to leave tomorrow.
But it is the conditions under which we go and how we can disengage.
are interests of U.S. being sacrificed for questionable objective?
AVhat I am interested in and trying to develop is that I think the
interests of the United States are being sacrificed here for a very ques-
tionable objective. The interests of the Ignited States to me are far
greater and more important to enemy constituents and the country as a
whole than as to whether or not they can preserve this government in
Vietnam. The more I read about this wonderful judicial system that
they ha\e as reported in the morning paper, the way they conduct trials
there, the less enthusiastic I am about sacrificing your time and your
efforts along with the lives of your men for any such government.
486
Do you remember the report of the trials of Mr. Chan in the morn-
ing paper, General ?
General Clement. I have read of it, sir.
The Chairman. This morning ?
General Clement. Not this morning, sir.
The Chairman. It was an interesting one. They have changed the
whole basis of the trial now. They no longer list his immunity. It is a
completely diilerent theory of the trial. But this is such a farce and
such a ridiculous and absurd way to conduct the business, the serious
judicial business involving a man's life and his freedom. Yet we say
we are there — not say, we are supporting this government and saying
self-determination.
There were one or two other questions, General, before we adjourn.
ATTITUDE OF U.S. OmClALS IN SAIGON TOWARD TROOP WITHDRAWAL
The Washington Star on February 25 — and this is the best way we
have of getting news, because it is extremely difficult to get informa-
tion from the front except through the reputable news agencies —
states :
The feeling among these officials is that reduction of American strength after
the present withdrawals would leave the South Vietnamese dangerously ex-
posed to the enemy threat. American oflScials in Saigon, in fact, have opposed
every phase of de-escalation beginning with the cessation of the bombing of
North Vietnam in 1968 and then have reluctantly expressed their approval after
they can no longer prevent the U.S. moves.
Would you say that is an accurate reflection from your
observations ?
General Clement. In my particular experience, sir, working with
the training directorate and working with my counterpart and observ-
ing over 50 schools and training centers and their commanders, which
IS a fairly good sample of their military people, I think it is an in-
accurate statement.
The Chairman. Inaccurate?
Gerenal Clement. I do not think it is right. From my experience
in talking with those people, they feel that they perhaps are a little
surprised at how well they have done. I have the general feeling, in
talking with them, that they would like to get on with the job and
just see what will happen.
The Chairman. In other words, the American officials in Saigon
with whom you associate have not opposed the withdrawal of Amer-
ican troops ?
General Clement. Sir, I am sorry. I was talking of Vietnamese
officials and I misunderstood you.
The Chairman. No, no, they are Americans. "American officials in
Saigon in fact have opposed every phase of de-escalation. * * *"
American officials.
General Clement. No, sir, I have not encountered American officials
with these views.
The Chairman. In other words, American officials in Saigon have
not opposed American withdrawal of troops? That is your view?
General Clement. I have not really had much contact in talking on
this subject with American officials. As I say, most of my time has
been spent with the Vietnamese, sir, and talking with them at times
on this
487
The Chairman. You don't associate much with American officials?
General Clement. Well, our time is pretty restricted, sir.
The Chairman. In another story on January 14, the Christian
Science Monitor quotes an American officer in Saigon as saying "We
have fought Washington on every reduction so far. And I am sure we
Avill keep fighting them."
But you would say that is not accurate in your experience ?
General Clement. I have no experience of that, no, sir.
UNITED states AND SOUTH \TrETNAMESE GENERAL/fLAG OmCERS IN
VIETNAM
The Chairman. In a news story on January 14, Christian Science
jNIonitor, it quotes the following :
The Vietnamese protocol list for Saigon names nearly 100 American oflScers of
general and flag rank. By comparison, there are fewer than 50 South Vietnamese
generals and admirals on active duty with all the Vietnamese armed forces.
Is that a true statement ?
General Clement. I am not prepared to say, sir. I do not have the
data at hand.
The Chairman. You do not know either of those, sir ?
General Clement, I do not know the figures, sir.
The Chairman. Do you. Colonel ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
The Chairivian. Who do you think would know them ?
General Clement, We can provide them, sir.
The Chairman. Oh, can you provide that ?
General Clement. I think we can provide them for the record,
(The information referred to follows.)
General Officers for South Vietnam
(Department of Defense)
As of 1 January there were approximately 90 U.S. general/flag officers in
Vietnam. Of this number, 29 were assigned in the Saigon area. As of 1 January
1970. there were 44 general/flag officers in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVNAF). RVNAF is authorized 196 general/flag officers.
ADEQUACY OF \^ETNAM FORCES
The Chairman, Prince Sihanouk wrote in an article :
The day the American Armies left, the Saigon Army would di-ssolve because
today it is composed only of mercenaries, very well equipped, I am sure, but
paralyzed by the lack of an idea.
Would you care to comment on that ?
General Clement. Sir, would you repeat that ?
The Chairman, You know who Sihanouk of Cambodia is ?
General Clement, Yes, sir.
The Chairman, This is an article that quotes the article written by
Prince Sihanouk :
The day the American Annies left, the Saigon Army would dissolve because
today it is composed only of mercenaries, very well equipped, to be sure, but
paralyzed by the lack of an idea.
General Cleinient, I would prefer not to comment, sir, on that.
The Chairman, You do not care to comment.
488
The thrust of all of this is, sir, trying to find out your views and
ideas of the inadequacies or adequacies of the Vietnamese forces with
whom you are working if the Americans withdraw. It is very difficult,
of course, to get this. I have asked in a general way would you care to
estimate when you believe the Vietnamese could sustain themselves
without American assistance. I believe you said you did not feel you
could comment on it.
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. These are statements of other people. These are
newspapermen from the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington
Star, and in particular, Mr. x^shworth of the Christian Science Moni-
tor, who has written a great many articles, as of course, have many
other people. These are their views about it and I thought maybe it
would give you a vehicle either to agree or disagree with it.
ESTIMATE OF WHEN SOUTH VIETNAMESE COULD TAKE OVER
You simply do not feel that you want to make an estimate as to when
the Vietnamese would be willing to take over. Is that right?
General Clement. Yes, sir, I believe that is correct. I really could
not make an estimate.
The CiLviRMAN. You would not want to say whether it is a year,
2 years, or 10 years ?
General Clement. No, sir, I prefer to stay away from time f raines.
The Chairman. I may say in your own statement, the implications,
and it is purely an implication that one draws from some of the lan-
guage, you seem to anticipate that we will be there for quite a while.
I would have to look it up. This is what you say :
The size and composition of our present and future advisory effort in Vietnam
will be determined in light df the development of RVNAF forces, to assume a
larger share of the war effort and the rate at which RVNAF units can receive
equipment, complete training, and attain operational readiness.
The only thing I can say is that the implication is that you do not
anticipate any withdrawal in the immediate future; do you? It does
not indicate how long you will go on.
General Clement. No, sir, I am not giving any real time-frame. I
am trymg to paint the general problem and picture which finally re-
sults in advisors and
TROGRESS BEING MADE BY SOUTH ■ST;eTNAMESE TROOPS
The Chairman. You feel, however, that the Vietnamese troops with
whom you are acquainted, and you do spend most of your efl'orts in
advising with them as I understand it, are making real progress. You
feel that they can, at least in an indeterminate time, take over and
carry the whole burden.
General Clejuent. I would say yes, sir, they certainly are making
progress. They seem to show a willingness. If you remember tlie train-
ing chart, the paragraph showing the training centers, there is a lot
of very hard work going on. A^^ien you have overloaded centers, per-
haps the quality goes down a bit because you double the student load
to get them out and get them into the operating unit, but withal, they
make tremendous strides and they are very serious about their work.,
sir.
489
VIETXAMIZATIOX AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL
The Chairman. I will put the rest of these articles in the record
as illustrations of the views of other observers. There is a letter here
from a Marine that I want to put in the record. I do not know that
it is anything other than cumulative. It is the attitude of some of the
soldiers and the comments of people interested in this matter about
the prospects of the future for us as well as the Vietnamese.
(The information referred to follows :)
[From Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 24, 1969]
Empty American Chaik— Do United States and Saigon Cooperate Enough?
Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, now completing a six-
mouth tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the
Vietnamization of the land war there. In this, the first of several
dispatches, he tells of the gulf that still exists between the American
and South Vietnamese commands.
Every Monday, the Vietnamese joint general staff holds an operational and
intelligence briefing in Saigon for high-level Vietnamese and allied officers.
The most senior Vietnamese officers are present, along with senior generals from
the Thai, Korean, Australian, and New Zealand forces.
Almost always, sources say, the front row chair marked for the senior American
representative is empty. Further back in the room, sitting with the other colonels,
can usually be found the senior American present.
This is the way it is at the most important briefing the South Vietnamese
Ai-my general staff gives each week. To the Vietnamese, the American absence
is a disagreeable snub.
Sources siiy tlie American command has indicated such presence would be "a
waste of time" in that all of the important information is available through reg-
ular American channels. So the marked American chair remains empty.
GAP RANGES DOWN THE LINE
To many observers, this separation at the top symbolizes the wide gulf remain-
ing between Vietnamese and Americans on down the line in this fifth year of
heavy United States involvement.
Many sources believe that gulf is one of the greatest obstacles to successful
transfer of the war effort from the Americans to the South Vietnamese.
The Nixon administration has substantially increased emphasis on "Vietnami-
zation" of the war effort. When Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird returned
to Washington in March, he was openly disappointed as he discussed preparations
in Vietnam for the load burdens of war to be shifted.
Other high defense officials have visited the war zone and left saying a number
of important Americans still don't believe that A'^ietnamization is the most im-
portant task now confronting the vast American hierarchy here.
As one young officer who has worked at length in liaison between the Americans
and Vietnamese put it, "The command here has fought Washington every step
of the way. Each step forward has been forced on them. And it will probably
have to stay that way."
Senior Americans argue that the Americans and Vietnamese are working ex-
tremely closely together. They point out the vast numbers of civilian and military
liaison teams.
HUGE NUMBERS IN LIAISON
There certainly are huge numbers of liaison teams. As one American put it,
"Many of them are so big and so busy that they could get along well and keep busy
even if all the Vietnamese they advise were moved away."
When the Vietnamese Army was falling apart in late 19(>4 and early 190).", the
Americans moved in with troops and supplies and took over the war. Now, in
late 1969, there are few signs of a ready willingness to give it back, no matter
what Washington wants.
Americans here still live in a society largely of their own. They generally see
little of Vietnamese other than maids and chauffeurs unless they are specifically
assigned to do so.
44-706 — 70 32
490
Even among the advisory groups, often at very low level, it is uncommon to
see Americans and Vietnamese actually living in close proximity. They vpork
together, but when the time comes to eat or sleep or have a party, they usually
go their separate ways.
In Saigon, officers in the vast Military Assistance Command headquarters freely
admit they never see Vietnamese or talk to them or work with them.
Generals and colonels get into their staff cars at the end of a working day and
are driven to quarters on or otf post. If off post, the quarters are guarded by
American military police, and the Americans often venture forth only in the
company of other Americans.
This apartness continues in the field, where corps and division officers head-
quarters are isolated from the Vietnamese. Many staff officers, who must daily
make decisions affecting the lives of hundreds of Vietnamese never have met any
in the line of work or socially. Intelligence and operations officers have been able
to spend whole tours without coming into contact with Vietnamese district and
province officers.
When Vietnamese and American companies and battalions work together, the
command points to fact proudly. And such efforts are given some symbolic name,
such as Dong Tien, for "progress together."
Sometimes, when the American and Vietnamese do work together, Americans
go to the other extreme. Aloofness is discarded, and visitors are treated to the
appalling sight of some Vietnamese officer being trotted out, much like a favored
child. Then comes the pat on the shoulder and some such praise as, "Captain
Nguyen is one heck of a fighter. A real tiger, aren't you. Captain Nguyen." And
Captain Nguyen smiles with embarrassment and offers his hand.
Too often, many experienced officers here say, the Captain Nguyens and other
Vietnamese officers ax'e most appreciated when their approach resembles closely
that of the Americans. To many Vietnamese, there is nothing more galling than
the thought that the American way is the only right way.
But that view of American correctness does permeate. At the highest levels,
the Vietnamese are urged to draw up their own plans for operations, but
Americans are always ready to change them, sometimes completely. Consequently,
many Vietnamese take the dodge of sounding out the Americans as to what plan
they want before writing anything. Then the semblance of Vietnamese suffi-
ciency is maintained — ^they do write a plan, but one perfectly suited to American
views.
Of course, there are notable exceptions. The Marine combined action platoons
and some Army units do live and work with the Vietnamese. Many advisers try
to learn Vietnamese ways and customs, try to like Vietnamese food, and try to
achieve both harmony and progress without needlessly hurting feelings.
Dozens of sources are deeply convinced that it is critically important now, as
American withdrawal continues, that the operational rift between the allies be
closed and that the Vietnamese be truly encouraged and helped to go it alone —
while that is a choice, not an absolute necessity.
In effect, sources say, the alternative to closer help and encouragement is
abandonment.
[From Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 30, 1969]
'Being No. 1 Division Can Be an Experience'
Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, now completing a six-
month tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the
Vietnamization of the land war there. In this second of several
dispatches, he discusses the 1st Division — considered outstanding
in the South Vietnamese Army.
Hue, Vietnam. — It's quite an experience to see the South Vietnamese 1st
Division.
A few years ago, it wasn't much. Now it is something of a showpiece. It is
setting an example for the rest of the country. For it proves, if nothing else
does, that the Vietnamese Army can be efficient and effective.
The development of the 1st Division has been a gradual process over the past
few years. As early as 1967, Americans would enthuse over the 1st. It was better
than the others then. And it probably still is, although there have been many
improvements in other units.
When experienced American officers are asked which Vietnamese divisions are
good, they immediately point to the 1st. Then they usually add the 2nd, also in
491
northernmost 1st Corps area, and the 21st in the delta. Then the list tapers off
to those divisions that are "'coming along well."
There are any number of reasons for a unit to be good or bad or m the mid-
dle But the usual one centers on the availability or otherwise of good leadership
from the middle level on up. Tlie 1st doesn't have any leadership problems, ac-
cording to both Vietnamese and Americans.
COMMANDER PRAISED
As one senior American put it, when speaking of Maj. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong,
the division's commander : "There probably isn't an American colonel in Vietnam
(the rank of a division senior adviser) who could advise General Truong. He
could help the general with support and coordination, but he couldn't teach him
anything." , ^, -, ^ • ,
A Vietnamese source said, "Truong is really pretty good. He does a good job,
and they leave him alone. They need him. Even his classmates at the academy
aren't jealous of him." , .^. , ,. • , ^
The 1st Division reached a low point in 1966. Its ranks were bitterly divided,
with a number of members of the division openly sympathetic to the Buddhist
struggle movement. Division troops provided protection for Buddhist leaders and
demonstrated against the government. When the movement was overthrown, the
government ordered 1st Division combat forces away from Hue so they could no
longer provide a threat.
General Truong was put in charge of the division when morale was near bot-
tom and desertions were high.
What has happened since has set an example for the rest of the country. And
in this case there has been the important difference that the example was set
by the Vietnamese themselves, not Americans.
THRUSTS BLOCKED
From almost all accounts, the 1st fought well and without faltering during
the Tet, 11(68. battle of Hue. And its men have fought well since, blocking thrusts
in force as well as smaller endeavors by North Vietnamese main-force units,
as well as Viet Cong guerrillas. . .
The 1st not only is the best, but it is the largest South Vietnamese division,
with 19 maneuver battalions and a total strength of 21,000, including attachments
of arra«r and other units. Other divisions are about half that size.
The Americans have obviously tried to give the 1st the best of everything, as
one would a precocious, favored son. And the l.st has leaped at the ready avail-
ability of American helicopters, for instance. The 1st has been fast to learn the
usefulness of helicopters for operations throughout its operating area in north-
ern 1st Corps, but particularly in the roadless, mountainous reaches away from
the coast.
Consecpiently, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), with its nearly
450 helicopters, finds itself hard pressed to meet the needs of two divisions— their
own. the 101st, and the Vietnamese 1st.
While thev use helicopters when necessary, members of the 1st are used to
walking and climbing. Members of the 2nd battalion of the Ist's 3rd Regiment
were the first soldiers to reach the top of "Hamburger Hill." They pulled back
when American forces needed more air strikes to get on up and then went back
up for the second time.
According to Col. Vu Van Giai, commander of the division forward command
post, which controls the division's 2nd Regiment and 7th Mechanized Task Force,
"The only thing to do is have chow, get a rifle, and go fight. That's what makes
you Xo. 1."
Colonel Giai attended military schools in the United States and took paratroop
training at Fort Benning, Ga. Like many other ofl3cers in the division, he seems
to have developed a liking for Americans, an affinity which is reciprocated. There
is a sense of camaraderie between Americans and Vietnamese in the 1st that is
often missing elsewhere.
ORIENTATION REQUIRED
The colonel likes to talk with Americans and he speaks excellent English. But
he is not given to overly long explanations. Asked to explain the division's suc-
cess. Colonel Giai said, "We tried to make it No. 1 division. And we made it."
Actually, the formula wasn't that simple. Many believe an important ingre-
dient has* been the special 15-day training session given all recruits or draftees
492
arriving from tlie government's training centers or, in the case of volunteers,,
from the division's own training center. During the orientation for all, new sol-
diers are given haircuts, indoctrination, and dog tags, as well as a final brush-
ing up to prepare them to go to the division.
As Colonel Giai puts it, "When they come here, all we must do is give them
food and put them in the field."
A half or a little more of the new men coming into the division are volunteers.
Each regiment has three recruiting teams that comb the villages for eligible
males between 18 and 35.
When they find a potential joiner, the pressure becomes pointed. Colonel Giai
says the recruiters put it simply : "There are two ways to go. Either you be No.
1, or you go to the draftee center."
He smiled slightly. "Most say, 'Make me No. 1.' "
Being No. 1 can be an experience. General Truong is a very capable leader,
but he also is a demanding one. Battalion commanders have been fined or jailed
for infractions that hurt the morale of the troops. He also is quite ready to get
rid of any ofiicers or enlisted men who do not measure up to the standards.
PRIVILEGES GKANTED
Concern for the troops is evident in many ways. There is a commissary where
soldiers and their families can buy rice and other staples at prices well under
the market level. Troops away from their families are allowed time off, gen-
erally once a month, to go see them. And there is some dependent housing. In
the forward area, for instance, there is dependent housing for 500 of 3,000 eligible
families with more being obtained or built.
The general spends five or six hours daily overseeing field activities. When
the weather is good, he uses u helicopter to be more far-rauging.
General Truong inspires great loyalty for his efforts. Officers tell of the time
he was waving as an assault force aboard helicopters started off. One man
thought the general was motioning for him, so he leaped about eight feet from
the hovering helicopter and ran over to report. The general waved him back,
and the man ran to a point under the hovering chopi>er. The American gunner
leaned out, whisked him aboard, and they wei^e away.
The officers and noncommissioned officers are expected to lead and to inspire.
This inevitably leads to a certain elan. Aides tell of the day Colonel Giai's head-
quarters was being rocketed from the DMZ area.
SOUVENIRS TAKEN
The colonel and a few men leaped aboard a helicopter and soared off to find
the source of the shellings. They came in on the position, turned one rocket
around, and fired it across the DMZ, then loaded the remaining two aboard to
take home as souvenirs.
Naturally, there are flaws in the 1st. There is a lack of depth in leadership.
All enlisted leaders receive special training at the division's training center, but
some important staff positions remain unfilled, probably for lack of anyone tlie
general cares to appoint. Although the division is nearly up to strength, some
officers are below the grades those positions would warrant. And because officers
tend to stay in their jobs for years, there is a lack of broad experience among
many.
iSome of these problems are doubtless due to the general's desire to build
slowly. From every indication, what has been built has been built well. As a
result, none of the problems is really serious.
By conventional measures the 1st Division stacks up well in loss rates and
weapons-loss comparisons. Eleven enemy are killed for every member of the
1st. So far this year, 32 weapons have been lost to 2,441 captured.
But the question remains whether Saigon will have enough units as good as
the 1st when the moment of crisis approaches. Progress has been, and remains,,
slow. And one shining example, such as the 1st, may not be enough.
[From Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 5, 1970]
Some Glaring Weaknesses in Saigon Military
Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, having jiTst completed
a six-month tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment
of the Vietnamization of the land war.
493
Lai Khe, Vietnam. — When the Vietnamese battalion commander at Fire Base
Mahone was killed in action, his battalion was quickly pulled off the line.
In the American Army, the battalion would have fought on. But the loss of a
key man was a major blow to the Vietnamese battalion and raised real questions
as to whether the battalion could continue in combat.
In almcst any Vietnamese Army division, the loss of a senior officer in an
important position has impact. This is particularly true in tlie Vietnamese 5th,
which now is .iust venturing out into difficult action after years as a garrison-
huffging "coup division."
Pi-esident Thieu formei-ly commanded the 5th, and it was his power base as
he began his rise to sovereignty. Under later commanders, the 5th, stationed
near Lam Son north of Saigon, was available should there be a need to save
the palace from insurrection.
It was not until this fall that the disgruntled American command was able to
prevail upon the Vietnamese to remove the politically safe and militarily cautious
commander of the 5th and replace him with another Vietnamese offi.cer,
Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Hieu. While not considered brilliant, General Hieu is
thought of as moderately diligent by both Vietnamese and American officers.
Now the general is trying to lead his division to some higher level of com-
petence. Most observers " agree that if the 5th do?s become good it will bode
well for the Vietnamese Army, for the 5th now is just about the worst of the
10 Vietnamese divisions.
At one time, not so long ago, there was something of a running competition
among American advisers as to who could claim to be with the absolute worst
divisions. The 5th, the ISth, and the 25th were all in the running, as horror
stories were swapi)ed.
It was not until 1969 that the desire for real, measurable improvement m these
divisions became more than a matter of hope. In March, Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird told the command here in no uncertain terms that it had to
get much more serious than ever before in preparing Vietnamese units — even
the worst— to assume the burdens of war. Galvanized into action, the command
beaan looking around for ways to step up progress.
Last summer, the American and Vietnamese units began working much more
closelv together in combined operations. Units of the 5th have been working
with elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry, in particular, as well as the U.S. 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
Since the 1st I'.S. and the Vietnamese 5th began working together under the
program called "dong tien," which translates as "progress together," there have
been substantial increases in enemy killed, captives. Hoi Chanhs (ralliers to the
government side), and weapons captured. In terms of these conventional meas-
ures, the Sth Regiment of the Vietnamese 5th is doing about three times as well
as before.
The Vietnamese in general are compiling better records than the Americans.
During one month, for instance, the Vietnamese Sth elements and territorial
forces garnered all but eight of the 61 ralliers in the U.S. 1st Infantry's area
of operations.
The 5th Division's kill rates are high, particularly in the cases of the better
battalions. But American officers agree that the various tallies are an imper-
fect measure of a division's jierformance and capabilities. So far, however, noth-
ing better has been devised.
The tallies that look so promising are somewhat a product of the special en-
vironment of the Dong Tien program, in which vast quantities of U.S. helicopter
transport and gunship support, as well as massive artillery and air support, are
available. Under such circumstances, high kill rates can be expected.
AVhen one battalion of the 5th completed a cycle of working with the Ameri-
cans and then worked for a similar i>eriod away from the Americans, there were
few signs of continued progress. As one adviser put it, the batallion "had about
held its own."
While there are doubtless advantages to be gained in working with Americans,
exposure to the relative plenty of the American war machine can lead to prob-
lems, many military sources Itelieve. The Vietnamese quickly learn that going
by helicopter is easier than going by truck, that trucks are better than walking,
that supplies can be quite plentiful, and that the fallen will be quickly evacuated.
But. when the Americans are gone, the supplies won't be so plentiful. There
will not be so many helicopters. Medical evacuation may not be so swift. Many
things will only work if the Vietnamese make them work. American help won't
be so readily available.
494
American officers agree that the 5th Division is being given a great deal —
perhaps too much — ^now. But, they say, this does improve Vietnamese effective-
ness. At the best, sources say, this plenty may be a sort of '"pump priming" that
will lead to a much higher level of performance when the Americans leave. In
the meantime, one American said, a "hot-house environment" is needed for
improvement.
Another officer was worined over the enormous problems that continue to
plague the 5th. He asked: "Are we showing them things that aren't germain?"
At present the division's three regiments are rated good, acceptable, and weak.
In terms of battalions, most U.S. officers who have worked with the 5th say that
about one-fourth are very good, another fourth rather marginal, and the rest
somewhere in the middle.
There are excellent battalions. One is the 1st of the 8th Regiment, which re-
covered after the loss of its commander and is now doing well in the field. The
Americans thought so highly of the slain commander, Lt. Col. Chau Miuh Kien,
that they renamed Fire Support Bas Mahone in his honor.
The 1st was replaced at Kien by the 3rd Regiment of the 8th, which has also
done well, racking up better scores on the inevitable charts than other American
battalions, including the U.S. battalion based with the Vietnamese battalion at
Kien.
When a Vietnamese unit is good, it has a marked advantage over a similar
American unit in terms of its ability to gather intelligence and to find out what
is happening in its area. When Vietnamese units behave themselves and don't
steal or destroy, they are in a better position to be accepted by the people and to
work with them.
When a unit is bad, the situation can be disastrous. For instance, one battalion
of the 5th is so bad, Vietnamese commanders won't let it out of training camp.
The 5th remains beset by shortages of officers, noncommissioned officers, and
enlisted men. Officers of appropriate rank are often unavailable to command
units. Some battalion commanders are captains. One commander, a captain,
told me he had officers to head the administrative, logistical or civil-affairs sec-
tions of his headquarters.
When an officer is lost, there is often no one qualified to reph^ce lihn. Promo-
tions are slow, and a Vietnamese unwillingness to move officers around denies
many the broad base of experience they would need to fill a new post adequately.
This officer problem is compounded by the fact that in war many of the l)est
officers get killed. The casualty rate is far higher among the courageous and the
capable.
Desertions remain a constant source of trouble for the 5th. Unlike the ISth
Division nearby, which is now exempted from taking habitual or likely deserters
into its ranks, the 5th takes all who are sent. And they can be a mixed bag. An
estimated half of all new men sent to the 5th are rated as desertion-prone for one
reason or another.
The 5th's location within easy hiking distance of Saigon doesn't help, for
deserters often find it easy to lose themselves from the authorities in Saigon.
General Hieu has taken some steps to improve the situation. There are signs
of greater interest at headquarters now in the concerns of the troops. And the
general has tried to get the internal squabbling that has always plagued the
division within manageable levels. But pay remains very low. There isn't much
dependent housing and what there is is not very good. Also food is scarce and
costly.
As one Vietnamese source put it, "General Hieu has very many problems."
Within the area the 5th shares with the U.S. 1st, the enemy strength is rather
low. Including Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, strength totals perhaps 5,-500.
There are almost no concentrations. Thus the enemy can be found usually at
squad strength or less.
Since the effort to improve the 5fh went into full force in mid-19C)0. many ele-
ments of the division have moved away from the populated areas, leaving secu-
rity to territorial forces and civilian defense groups. Those working with the
U.S. 1st are largely in upper Binh Duong province north of Saigon. Other units
are working with the T\S. 1st Cavalry closer to the border.
There are 55 hamlets rated as Viet Cong-controlled in III Corps, which sur-
rounds Saigon and includes the populous center of the country. All but two are in
Long An Province, leaving the 5th with only two to cope with in Binh Duong.
If the Americans were to leave Binh Duong now, with the Vietnamese 5th left
responsible, the 5th would succeed, most sources say. If the enemy situation were
to be stronger, the 5th might encounter difficulties, they add, while agreeing
that the 5th will have troubles enough as it is.
i
495
A concerted drive is now under way to overcome some of tlie Stli's most serious
problems, and senior Americans hope for marked improvement by April. By then,
they say, strength should be generally higher, and there will have been time to
gain experience where it is most sorely needed.
This will not remove concerns. One senior American said he was convinced the
5th could fight the big, conventional sort of battles, but such battles appear as a
thing of the past. Now, he said, there is a need for the Vietnamese to learn how
to fight well in small units, in decentralized operations, with an emphasis upon
stealth, endurance, and a willingness to persevere.
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. S, 1970]
Thieu's Move Next — South Vietnamese President Faces Quandey in Choosing
Between Military Politics and Upper-Echelon Profiency
Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, now completing a six-
month tour of South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the land
war there. In this, the fourth of several dispatches, he cites pres-
sures for President Nguyen Van Thieu to take decisive action.
Saigon. — The next move in the quest for better South Vietnamese armed
forces is up to President Nguyen Van Thieu.
There is general agreement among Vietnamese and Americans familiar with
the development of the Vietnamese armed forces that the most alarming remain-
ing problem is the caliber of the senior leadership.
That caliber remains startlingly low at this critical point in the Vietnamization
process. And President Thieu has yet to do anything major to remedy the
problem.
One senior American official estimated recently that of the senior generals in
the Vietnamese hierarchy only one is fully competent to the job assigned him.
Others, more generous, might put the competence level at 2 or 3 of the senior 14
or 15.
That is not high, and many say that continued unwillingness by the President
to clean out the upper ranks could mean the ultimate failure of Vietnam's
fighting forces.
In late 1964 and early 1965, the South Vietname.se Army was, one senior
American put it "shattering in the face of the enemy." Losses were running at
roughly a battalion a week.
response described
Recalling the situation, one Vietnamese source said. "When the Army was
not being attacked it would retreat. When it was attacked, it would run or
surrender."
Generally speaking, the generals in charge then are in charge now.
To be sure, there have been changes. But most of those have been politically
motivated. To remove a man for sheer military incompetence and nothing else
is a rarity — and when it does happen it is a long and laborious process.
The American command has been able to get a couple of the very worst South
Vietnamese generals moved, but only after the application of great pressure.
It was significant that the most recent modest reshuffling came last fall after
Presidents Thieu and Nixon met at Midway and later at Saigon.
This quest for better generals is not only an American dream. Many Viet-
namese, particularly younger officers, feel very strongly on the point. In Saigon,,
too numerous politicians accept the present state of the military hierarchy as
the single most important problem facing the military — if not the nation.
military base cited
Unlike the United States, with its civilian-controlled military, South Vietnam
is a miltary government. The military provide the corps commanders, the
province chiefs, and the district chiefs. And all three men at the top of the
government are military men.
Thus, inept or corrupt military men can greatly hann both the war and the
endeavors of the government to gain that all-important support and backing
of the people.
During the past two years. President Thieu has replaced most of the district
chiefs. That is viewed in some quarters as a major step toward bringing cor-^
ruption within bounds. But even with absolutely fine people coming into district-
496
chief positions — of itself a farfetched notion — corruption would not be halted.
The Vietnamese expect a certain amount of corruption, and a district chief
with modest demands can win the support of his people. But given a relatively-
honest district chief, there remain the monetary demands of his superiors — the
province chiefs and the corps commanders.
INSPECTORATE EMBARRASSED
Often, there is the show of honesty, at least for American consumption. Viet-
namese sources report that one corps commander recently gave an excellent talk
to his province chiefs on the merits of honest government, being true to the
peasants, and that kind of thing. Afterward, he reportedly drew two of the
province chiefs off into a side room and berated them heatedly for being behind
in their payments to him.
There is a government inspectorate designed to expose and deal with such
corruption. But it does not have the backing of President Thieu. Once, when a
general was exposed, the inspectorate was roundly criticized for bringing public
disgrace upon the ranks of the Army. Nothing happened to the general, although
the inspectorate was shamed.
COMPETENCY QUESTIONED
From time to time, however, a colonel or two, or someone lower, will be ex-
posed and punished. Punishment usually does not mean jail or anything like
that. At worst, it usually means a less desirable post. It is, of course, easier to
catch a colonel than a general because the generals are always carefvil to make
sure that there is a patsy or two around to take the blame if something goes
awry.
Incompetence is as great a problem as corruption. Only 2 or 3 of the 10 South
Vietnamese regular-division commanders are considered competent by Americans
who have worked in the developmental process. And it is a sure commentary on
the caliber of the available general officers that Americans, when asked whether
a competent commander could be found for every division, start naming Viet-
namese colonels — not generals — ^who they believe could lead divisions well.
The South Vietnamese Army is much more tightly controlled than is the U.S.
Army, which allows unit commanders a fair degree of latitude. In the South
Vietnamese Army, regimental commanders maintain tight controls over the bat-
talions, and commanders are allowed very little room for initiative. Divisions
similarly control their regiments.
TEES TRACED
Aiiove that, the control begins to break down. Corps commanders theoretically
are nble to give orders to divisions, but often political influences are such that the
division commander is allowed to go his own way to a great extent. However, the
division commander is aware that his continued prosperity depends largely upon
President Thieu, who appointed him and can remove him.
The result is a system of military control tied in closely with national politics.
And at the higher levels political acumen becomes more important than military
skill.
Thus, there are many things to stymie young officers who would like to improve
the Army. Often they have commanders they cannot respect who give them orders,
based on political considerations, they cannot appreciate. Promotions are slow.
Rewards are often sparse, and things these young officers believe should be
done are not done.
According to South Vietnamese sources, province and district chiefs are afraid
to mention many of their problems to President Thieu or to his Prime Minister,
Tran Thien Khiem. They fear the complaints would get back to their superiors
who, themselves unpunished, would punish the complainers.
AWARENESS NOTED
Thus much that goes on probably is unknown to President Thieu. The President
takes tours through the countryside to make sure that governmental monev is
being spent generally where it should be spent and that affairs are approximately
in order.
However, Vietnamese sources say, although the President might not know all
that IS wrong with his military hierarchy, he does know enough to know that
something should be done.
497
One veteran Vietnamese politician summed up Mr. Thieu's dilemma this way :
"The issue now is whether Thieu has the courage to clean out the Army and the
Joint General Staff. He must decide whether to resolve the problem in the
national interests or in his own. He will act if he sees the national interests as
his own."
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 14, 1970]
How TO Cushion GI Withdrawal
WOULD MORE U.S. ADVISERS HELP SAIGON?
(By George W. Ash worth)
Saigon. — In the midst of American withdrawals from Vietnam, the United
States command in Saigon is endeavoring to convince Washington to allow still
more advisers to the South Vietnamese.
On the surface, it would appear that advice to the Vietnamese is already
plentiful. As an example, the Vietnamese protocol list for Saigon names nearly
100 American officers of general and flag rank. By comparison, there are fewer
than 50 South Vietnamese generals and admirals on active duty with all of the
Vietnamese armed forces.
The hope for more advisers is not generally held in the field.
In interviews throughout Vietnam, numerous Army officers and civilians act-
ing in advisory capacities expressed the view that they could get by with fewer —
not more.
But as the American involvement in combat has waned and the emphasis
upon development of the South A^ietnamese forces has constantly grown, the
militai-y and civilian advisory effort has been looked upon in many quarters as
the new way to grow.
This desire for expansion marks what many American sources see as a major
continuing problem in Vietnam : the unwillingness of the Americans to let go.
One American officer put it this way : "We have fought Washington on every
reduction so far. And I am sure we will keep fighting them."
Despite withdrawals, American strength remains quite high in many areas
of South Vietnam. In northernmost I Corps, for instance, there are nearly three
times as many American fighting men as there are Vietnamese, despite the with-
drawal in early fall of the 3d Marine Division. As of early December, there were
still 55,589 American marines and 67,810 Army officers and enlisted men in I
Corps. Vietnamese Army forces totaled 41,010.
In Saigon, the headquarters of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam
(MACV) now contains about 2,400. A senior officer thought for a moment before
guessing that the headquarters could be cut by about 1,000 without great
difficulty.
The latest withdrawal announcement, made Jan. 12, included orders for a 10
percent cut in many headquarters staffs. It is the first major reduction in head-
quarters staffs, and there is general agreement tliat nuuh of the American staff
in Saigon, both civilian and military, is far too large.
One officer new to the field from an assignment at the Saigon MACV head-
quarters tei'med his departure an escape.
"There were seven colonels in our office," he said, "and we had almost nothing
to do. Sometimes, one or the other of us would skip lunch in hopes something
would come along to do while the others were out."
In some provinces, the advisory staffs number several hundred.
The abundance of Americans at the top levels — and down the chain of com-
mand— has produced what many in the field see as a major hindrance to the
development of the Vietnamese.
Withdrawals so far have left the various headquarters and advisory efforts
relatively untouched. Some staffs even have grown.
As the American withdrawal continues, and still more combat troops leave,
the size of the so-called "tail" will become still more disproportionate, if current
trends continue.
Aware of the problem, Washington ordered the military command at one point
in recent withdrawals to increase the share of headquarters personnel leaving.
Even then, it was but a tiny fraction of the whole.
One senior official in Saigon suggested that the overall effort could be substan-
tially enliancetl if a careful study were made to see precisely which departments
could be abolished and which moved back to the United States.
498
One officei' suggested facetiously, "we could let those in the United States put
wp some barbed wire around their headquarters and wear jungle boots if they
would be happier."
GRAVITY SUMMED UP
While many sources who have followed the war effort closely joke about the
vast continuing American presence, they carefully agree that it is most serious
problem for several reasons :
The sheer size of the bureaucracy leads to a lot of waste motion as well as
dreadful slowness from time to time in matters of great urgency. And many
officers, particularly yoimger ones, complain that mediocrity is often forthcom-
ing when brillance is needed.
Because there are so many Americans, the Vietnamese simply are not afforded
the challenges they desperately need at this stage in their development. There are
so many Americans that they often must do more than they should simply to
stay busy.
And there is the continuing problem of the American belief that only the Amer-
ican way is best acceptable. Too often, many sources here maintain, Vietnamese
ideas are shunted aside needlessly and unthinkingly.
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 24, 1970]
ViETNAMIZATION AND WITHDRAWAL — "WHAT Is NEEDED ArE PRECISE TIMETABLES"
Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth has recently returned
from a six-month tour of duty in South Vietnam for this paper.
From the comparative quiet of his Washington desk he reports on
the Vietnamization program.
Washington. — One leaves South Vietnam with a firm conviction that so-called
^'Vietnamization" can work.
Even then, it is very difficult to be convinced that it will work.
But that it can is one of the few things that can be considered reasonably
certain in a period and a place of rampant uncertainty.
The other day one respected reporter in Saigon said : "When I go back to
the States, people will want to know what I know. And the problem is that
there is nothing to know in Vietnam."
There are myriad statistics and indicators, and scores of "trends," but there
remains the continuing question whether the statistics are accurate, and if they
are, what they say. And if there is a trend, where does it lead?
If President Thieu is trying to do something, there are a hundred answers to
the questions why and what. And, while one answer may be true to a degree,
it almost certainly is not complete. Nothing in Vietnam ever is.
When they admit one into the windowless briefing room at the MACV (Military
Assistance Command in Vietnam) headquarters, all of the figures on pacification
are neatly packaged into multicolored slides. They tell all without telling very
much. A visitor wants to know, "What does it all mean?" The answer isn't in
the slides.
WHYS ARE missing
Intelligence is such that it is not too hard to find out what the enemy is doing
in a physical sense ; whether he is hungry ; whether he has come into the moun-
tains overlooking Tri Ton in Chau Doc Province ; or whether he is massing. But
again the whys are missing.
There are a number of people who have been in Vietnam for a long while, almost
all of them civilians. The best of them admit that all one can do is conjecture. If
enough factors are considered, tliese Americans can come up with quite acceptable
and surprisingly accurate predictions.
But these are people who have watched the North Vietnamese and the Viet
Cong for years, who understand the political-military approaches of the enemy.
They know when a captured document is just so much propaganda, or when it
tells something. But they are rare, and they are getting rarer as the war goes on
and other places and duties beckon.
As a result, Vietnam is jammed with Americans manifesting what seems from
time to time to be a vast corporate ignorance. Few can be well informed in their
jobs— particularly in the military with its fast rotation policies. By the time
they have learned much they are gone. By the time an adviser has gained the
499
trust and confidence of his Vietnamese counterpart, if he is able, he is ready for
another assignment.
In Saigon, there is a sense of unworldliness in the bunkered and fenced MACV
compound, from whence few emerge to see the war in the field. Sometimes officers
driven by a desire to know what is going on get away to other assignments.
Then they see part of it. Few can see the whole.
Compounding the lack of the sort of knowledge that only experience can give
is the reluctance of military intelligence analysts to delve into the political im-
plications of enemy activities.
Thus political-military endeavors are frequently analyzed strictly in military
tei-ms. And a question as to why the Viet Cong are doing something elicits the
response that they have been "ground down" and are only able to do that. The
further question, "Why, then, if they have been hurt, did they choose this precise
approach?" thus eludes answer.
The complex is reduced forcibly to the simple, with frequent and inevitable
inadequacy.
This problem becomes particularly clear at the pre.sent .iuncture. with the
American command diligently trying to predict what the enemy will do in the
spring after the Tet holidays. The rice harvest is nearly over now, and with the
peasants freed from the fields, more guerrillas and helpers will be available for
what is to come.
Analysts have decided that there will be no offensive .similar to that of Tet
1968. This is based largely, apparently, on the analysis that the enemy is not
capable of trying the same thing again. Some officers, however, give greater
weight to the fact that such an approach is no longer allowed by enemy strategic
doctrine.
But analysis becomes hazier when the question arises. "\^Tiat then is likely
in light of current doctrine?" This is much harder, because the new enemy
strategy was evolved last year after the fourth and final phase of the massive
offensive approach following Tet last year. Thus there is no experience with a
spring campaign under the new approaches.
These uncertainties, as tliey affect the war, are added to by the continual lack
of a precise, positive plan for the coiitiimcd witlulrawal of American forces.
The command continues to adhere to the belief that something might happen,
such as some big enemy endeavor, to slow American withdrawals. That belief
has been bolstered by continued warnings by Washington that the enemy would
be foolhanly to do anything to take advantage of American withdrawals.
li^nemy doctrine is to do preci-sely that by tmiphasizing attacks upon South
Vietnamese units assuming responsibilities from departing American units. Of
cour,<;e, that they are taking such advantage will not slow American withdrawal.s,
but a sense lingers that perhaps they will go one step too far. and things will
slow down.
OFFICERS POORLY ATTUNED
Soui-ces in Washington realize that it would be almost impossible for the
enemy to do anything to slow down the inexorable American departures. But
that point has not been brought home finally to Americans in the civilian and
military hierarchies in Saigon.
As a consequence, the American command in Saigon is less attuned to the
immediacy of the American withdrawal program than is Washington. Those in
the field are even less attuned.
Despite the clear fact of continued American departures, sources, say, plans
for corps level on down in Vietnam are ba.sed on the assumption tjiat the
American involvement will continue indefinitely at the present level.
This can lead to an air of almost unreality. I spoke with one general in charge
of several Unitefl States divisions and major units late last year and asked him
what he could afford to send home during 1970. He replied that he could lose
one of his several major units late in the year, and the later the better. Yet in
Washington plans now being studied would relieve him of virtually all of his
combat forces by the end of this year.
If Washington cannot get the point driven home of what it must and will do,
this sort of thing will go on. It will have very harmful effects, most sources
believe. If those in the field do not plan for the assumption of tasks by the
Vietname.se on a time table attuned to that of Washington, each withdrawal
will come as a surprise, and the cry will go up, "We are not ready." That will,
of course, be true, but sources believe it need not be.
What is needed, they say, are precise timetables, understood in Washington
and in the field, that will allow and force careful planning and preparation in
the field for the inevitable shifting of the burden.
500
There is a somewhat understandable reluctance among the military to accept
the inevitability of U.S. departures, perhaps with the job not accomplished. It
has been a long, sad and divisive war, and there remains in many the wistful
hope that if the U.S. holds on long enough it will all turn out all right.
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Washington, with its political urgencies and its high budgets for preparing
the Vietnamese to shoulder the burden, wants fast, efficient withdrawal. If the
command had its way, withdrawals would be a mere trickle, with additional
forces withdrawn only when it was doubly certain that the troops could be
spared. Such certainties are very elusive in this war.
Numbers of sources in Vietnam believe that continued troop departure^; at the
present speed, or even somewhat faster, have much to commend them. Only
under such a program, they say, can several urgent things occur :
The command will be forced to continue the developmental process of the
Vietnamese as well as possible, and many activities that should be turned over
will be turned over out of necessity. Then, too, with fewer Americans around to
play "big brother," the Vietnamese will be forced to take the initiative or fail.
The Thieu government will be moved still further toward a sense of urgency
that has not yet materialized. There are encouraging signs, however, and many
sources believe that the challenge of continued withdrawal is about the best way
to keep the government moving in productive directions.
As American troops leave, the civilian bureaucracy also will be dwindling.
This should open the way for far greater efficiency and force the Americans to
reevaluate many programs to see what could be cut out or reduced, what can
be turned over to the Vietnamese, and what coxdd be done with fewer Americans
and done better.
In the final aiaalysis, there are many reasons to believe that the Thieu govern-
ment can bring itself and its armed forces through the trials of American with-
drawal.
FOTJNTAINHEAD OF COERXJPTION
Certainly many problems remain. Corruption seems almost boundless, but
South Vietnam is run by its Army, and that Army is the fountainhead of cor-
ruption. As long as the Army remains in absolute control of the provinces and
the districts, with military men heading the government, corruption will con-
tinue. Of course, if it weren't the Army running corruption, it would be someone
else.
In their common travails, the Vietnamese have yet to pull togetlier.
The militant An Qunag Buddhists, although now sifting around for new posi-
tions, have made it clear that they would rather head for the hills than support
either the government or the Communists.
There are many Vietnamese with plans for the salvation of South Vietnam,
but not many with a willingness to work with what they have to help the gov-
ernment improve. To many who see change as urgent, nights are calm, and
conversation is pleasant, and "if the Americans would only get rid of Thieu. . . ."
On the other hand. President Thieu has not approached with open arms those
who would support him.
He used the legitimacy of the Assembly to argue against the formation of the
advisory council the Americans wanted. Now. with that problem out of tlie way,
he has been busy attacking the Assembly. The government reportedly has paid
demonstrators — members of the civilian irregular defense forces — to demonstrate
before the lower house.
Mr. Thieu has used the Army's propoganda machine to denounce Sen. Trau
Van Don and Gen. Duong Van ("Big") Minh for their advocacy of a "third
force." General Minh is a likely candidate for president in 1971 against Mr.
Thieu, who is doing all he can now to scotch the general's chances.
TIME OF EECKONING
As many Americans and Vietnamese see it, the only thing that can temper
this infighting and maneuvering, and all the other things of less urgency in this
time of need, is the constant reminder that tlie time of reckoning is coming with
the departure of the Americans.
As the Americans go. it will, hopefully, become abundantly clear to many Viet-
namese that there are more important things at stake than getting reelected or
making money.
501
If this realization does not come, sources agree, then nothing the Americans,
could do will make it come, and without it, there can not be much hope no matter
how long the Americans stay. -,. a. . 4.
To be sure, there is reason now to be encouraged. As an example, a district
chief who recently fled in the face of the enemy was relieved the next day by
telephone. Sources took this as a major step forward for the government In
achieving speed, as well as a good omen for the phone service.
But, in more important areas, the government has moved, although in an
inept fashion, to institute some austerity, taxes. There is a growing feeling of
dedication among many South Vietnamese military men and civilians in the field.
There are signs of improvement as the government gets better organized through-
out the country.
Thus there is hope.
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 12, 1970]
Major Tests Ahead for Saigon- Forces
U.S. withdrawals soon to put BXnSDEN ox south VIETNAMESE
staff correspondent George W. Ashworth. now completing a six-
month tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the
VietnamizatiOn of the land war there. In this, the last of five dis-
patches, he lists some of the strengths and weaknesses of South
Vietnam's forces as it prepares to assume a larger role in the war.
(By George W. Ashworth)
Saigon. — Continued American withdrawals will soon open the way for the first
broad-scale testing of the South Vietnamese fighting forces.
The United States presence is still so great in the South that there have been
no opportunities for conclusive assessments of what the Vietnamese can do.
Yet there have been some indications, both good and bad :
On the encouraging side, a major part of the 23rd Division was partially
responsible for fending off three North Vietnamese regiments in recent fighting
around Du Prang and Due Lap along the Cambodian border in II Corps central
highlands.
It would be wrong, however, to tout this as a major victory for, as a senior
colonel in Saigon put it. "We threw in so much air and artillery the ARVN
[South Vietnamese Array] couldn't lose." Also involved were the U.S. si>ecial
forces and their Cambodian civilian mercenary irregulars who proved, as they
have before, quite valiant in the eight-week campaign.
Vietnamese excellence was more apparent in the fighting for the infamous
Hamburger Hill last .Tune, when elements of the 1st Vietnamese Division were
the first allied force up the slopes.
In battling around Ben Hat late last spring. Vietnamc^se forces fought ex-
ceedingly valorously until they lost a high numl)er of officers. Then they showed
signs, as one American put it, "of coming un.glued."
When the U.S. Ninth Division was pulled out of the Mekong Delta last sum-
mer, v.ith two-thirds of the division leaving for the states, an opportunity was
presented for the Vietnamese 7th to take over and prove itself.
BASES SOMETIMES STRIPPED
When American bases were turned over to the Vietnamese, there were several
instances of widespread stripping. Much that was taken never showed up again.
Vietnamese engineer units were called upon to oversee .some future transfers but
the damage had been done.
And in the ensuing bitterness, members of the press were persona non grata
for a while with the 7th, and no pictures of stripped facilities were allowed.
Later, the military picture in the 7th began to deteriorate. On Nov. 18. in Dinh
Tuomg Province. Vietnamese sources report, about 15 enemy were killed when
thev ambushed a battalion of the 7th.
But the ARVN lost an estimated .5.5 killed, more than SO wounded, and about
70 missing. The battalion commander was killed, along with other key officers,
sources report. Specifics were not ofiieially reported.
Units of the Vietnamese 9th had been sent to help the marines in the U Minh
forest, but they were rushed back to bolster the sagging 7th. Now authorities
here in Saigon consider the 7th a decided problem.
502
PERFORMANCE EXTREME
To paraphrase the rhyme which might still be applied to the Vietnamese Army,.
"When it is good it is very, very good, and when it is bad, it is horrid."
The 1st in the exti-eme north of the country is very, very good. And there are
others, such as the 2nd and the 21st, the marines and the Airborne.
But there are units like the 7th, with problems, and the 5th and the 18th,
which are coming along slowly but, hopefully, consistently.
Improving the ARVN is a .slow process under any circumstances. Even though
priorities have shifted away from the former almost complete emphasis upon
the American war machine, there remains much to be done. Many sources argue
that Vietnamization was not being taken seriously here until an appalled Secre-
tary of Defense Melvin R. Laird ordered it so last March.
It is still not clear what kind of army the Vietnamese will have when it is all
done. There is little doubt that they will have neither the vast quantities of
equipment nor the technical expertise to be a duplicate or even a passable
imitation of the Americans.
That, of course, is not necessarily bad, for many sources agree that the Viet-
namese will have to devise the approaches and solutions best suited to their
skills, not try to emulate the Americans.
But they cannot have the oppo.site of what the Americans have, or a pure
guerrilla-fighting army, because it is not that kind of war anymore and because,
with American guidance, the South Vietnamese have more than a 10-year expe-
rience gap at fighting a guerrilla-type war.
Certainly what some sources see as the "excessive firepower" of the Americans
will not be available to the South Vietnamese. Discussing the American approach,
one general in Saigon said, "If we see one little VG running around, we call in
the B-52's on him."
The general was being a bit facetious, of course, but the enormity of American
firepower has only been diminished slightly as tight budget problems have led
to some cut-backs in B-.52's and other armaments. The Americans plan to support
the Vietnamese with ai'tillery and airpower for several years to come, but there
is little doubt that the new approach, with the Vietnamese leading and the
Americans supporting, will be somewhat less potent.
For one thing, the Americans cannot afford to leave everything behind in Viet-
nam. The Army is aware of probable budget strictures in the years to come, and
it is realized that much military hardware must be saved from the war in
Vietnam if it is to be repossessed at all.
Training is a problem, particularly that of such people as helicopter and
fighter pilots and mechanics. It takes about 18 to 20 months to train a pilot, and
about one-half that time is purely training in English. Thus it goes slowly.
Now the Vietnamese have about 1.50 helicopters. Eventually they will have 400
or so as the American combat forces leave and Vietnamese crews are trained.
Still, to show the enormous differences in mobility and firepower that can
be envisioned, the Vietnamese armed forces will have fewer helicopters under
present programs than the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division does now.
SIMPLER JETS BETTER?
In the case of fighters and bombers, the Vietnamese are getting relatively
unsophisticated A-37 and F-5 jets, while the United States Air Force is taking
home its more potent planes, such as the F-4 Phantom. And all of the new, large
cargo planes are going back to the U.S.
Of course, it is probable that the Vietnamese can get by with far-less sophisti-
cated equipment than can the Americans. This is argued particularly in the
case of Jets. Any such planes, no matter how unsophisticated, will put the South
Vietnamese that much ahead of the enemy, with no aircraft.
And it can even be argued that the smaller, less-sophisticated aircraft are
better for use in fighting in the South, where there is no antiaircraft fire to
wori-y about.
But all of these differences do mean that the South Vietnamese will have fight-
ing forces much different in capabilities than the combination now in the field.
The Americans plan to use their own forces to bolster in problem ai-eas. But
it will certainly be a different war — and a war the Vietnamese have yet to prove
themselves capable of fighting.
The Vietnamese are planning some reorganization to make the new war more-
manageable, but these needed changes are very slow in coming.
503
TARGETS CAREFULLY PICKED
The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have decided to concentrate upon Viet-
namese forces that have replaced Americans in an attempt to show any in-
adequacies of the Vietnamese — ^thus shaking the confidence of the Americans
and the South Vietnamese Governments.
There is little doubt here that the Communists will have some measure of
success against the Vietnamese forces. At best, sources say, the Vietnamese will
have to give up areas along borders and in enemy-infested or endangered sec-
tions where the South's forces are overextended. At worst, enough of the South's
forces could begin falling apart to raise again enemy hopes that a military vic-
tory in the South is possible.
Almost all sources are inclined to the view that the South Vietnamese armed
forces can achieve what is necessary, given a few setbacks. But there is general
agreement that the question 6f whether what is necessary will be done is largely
contingent upon the willingness of the Vietnamese to do so.
At present, there is an air of confidence in the South Vietnamese hierarchy.
But that confidence may prove to be a delusion, many sources say, unless they
can develop a sense of urgency and do what must be done.
Still needed is a reorganization of the military, with the elimination of the
incompetent and the burdensomely corrupt. Then there must be a far greater con-
cern for those who serve in the services and a willingness to punish those in
positions of authority who do not do well. These things have yet to come.
In essence, the Thieu government should be able to survive the American with-
drawal and assume the military burden. But without a vastly greater urgency
and dedication than is now manifest, the future covild indeed be grim.
[From the Washington Evening Star, Feb. 25, 1970]
Intelligence Geopes for Clues — What Are Reds Up To? U.S. Aides Ask
Saigon. — For the first time since the 1968 Tet ofiffensive, American officials
admit they are deeply puzzled concerning enemy plans.
Now, however, Americans convey the impression they are groping through
a complex array of indicators to discern enemy aims and finding only hints and
threats but nothing conclusive on what to expect.
"Through most of 1968 and all of 1969 we really thought we had a pretty good
handle on what the enemy was considering," explained one American official.
"Now all we can say is we don't know. We have lots of ideas and theories but are
more puzzled than we have been for more than a year."
The main reason for tlie puzzlement of senior Americans here is the peculiar
position in which the United States finds itself in relation to its own — and the
enemy's — troop strengths.
While Americans are gradually scaling down their commitment, the North Viet-
namese are building up for what may eventually prove the final, decisive cam-
paigns of the war.
Americans are desperately attempting to shore up South Vietnam's defense
capabilities against this threat but are as anxious now as they ever were
for "time" — time to hold off the enemy while South Vietnamese divisions, sup-
ported by Regional and Popular Forces, reach a level deemed necessary for de-
feating the enemy on their own.
less hopeful than laird
Officials here indicate they are more pessimistic than Defense Secretary
Melvin R. Laird, who praised the success of the "Vietnamization" program while
warning of inevitable problems and setbacks.
The feeling among these officials is that reduction of American strength after
the present withdrawals would leave the South Vietnamese dangerously exposed
to the enemy threat.
American officials in Saigon, in fact, have opposed every phase of de-escalation
beginning with the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968, and then
have reluctantly expressed their approval after they could no longer prevent
504
the U.S. moves. Observers here expect a similar pattern surrounding tlie next
troop withdrawals this summer.
The pattern may he somewhat different this time, however, in that officials
appear less inclined to speak of the capabilities and potential of the Vietnamese
forces in quite such optimistic terms as they did six months — or even two
months — ago.
While claiming vast "improvements," as they did all during 1969, they give
the impression they still are far from certain the South Vietnamese will be able
to bear the brunt of a full-fledged North Vietnamese attack after the Americans
have withdrawn.
RED BUILDUPS REPORTED
The sense of pessimism seems based largely on reports of unprecedented enemy
buildups from the Mekong Delta to southern Lais, where officials report the most
enemy vehicle traffic in the history of the war.
Most of the troops and equipment remain uncommitted, but officials say that
obviously the North Vietnamese would not have sent them so far from staging
areas in the North without intending to use them.
The influx of North Vietnamese troops and equipment into the war zone-
including base areas across the borders as well in South Vietnam — has enabled
the enemy to keep up its troop strength of approximately 240,000 men despite
heavv losses in 19GS and the first half of 1969.
American officials believe more than 600,000 enemy troops have died in the war
but admit relative ignorance of how many more troops Hanoi could send in for
a showdown.
One of the greatest "unknowns" in the Tiddle of determining the enemy's aims
is the method by which North Vietnam has governed itself since President Ho
Chi ]Minh's death last year.
Officials here have the feeling North Vietnam is "ruled by committee," as one
of them put it, although Party Secretary Le Duan seems to have emerged as
the chief policy spokesman.
Le Duan's emergence bodes ill for the chnnces of a settlement of the war in
the foreseeable future, for he has always been regarded as one of the "hardliners"
in North Vietnamese ruling circles.
He has warned his countrymen of a long war requiring heavy sacrifices — an
indication that North Vietnam is willing to suffer heavy losses in its effort to
humiliate So-uth Vietnamese forces and weaken the position of the government
of President Nguyen Van Thieu.
FALL OFFENSn^E SEEN
Indicative of the puzzlement of American officials, however, is speculation the
enemy will attempt to mount a major offensive next fall, in the period of the
South Vietnamese senatorial elections and the American congressional campaign.
"These theories all sound vei-y logical," said one American official, "but so far
we don't have a shred of evidence to support them. We're in a position now in
which we can't quite tell what they're thinking or planning."
"We're still in the midst of a 'lull' in the fighting," the official went on. "but a
lot of important things conld be hapi>ening. It's kind of a deceiving, intermediate
period, and it's harder now than it ever was to figure out what's going on be-
neath the surface."
EFFECT OF TT.S. COISIBAT FORCE WITHDRAWAL ON ADVISER STRENGTH
The Chairman. Do you think as the combat forces of the ITnited
States are withdrawn from Vietnam, the number of military advisers
will have to increase to compensate for that ?
General Clement. No, sir ; I think— let me in a o-eneral way speak in
these terms. We look forward to a decrease in adviser strength, with-
out a time schedule now. Lookino- at tlie nature of things advisers do,
with respect to the combat forces of the Vietnamese, we would say that
perhaps you can begin to pull advisers out, say from battalion levejs.
They have alreadv iDcen pulled out of some of our engineer and artil-
lerv'battalions in Vietnam and we are looking at where further reduc-
tioiis may be made. In the training centers, we are doing the same
505
thing. This is apart from U.S. deployment. This is looking hard at
what the Vietnamese can do. We perhaps will not need as many ad-
^•isers in training centers at some time in the future.
We do see in some other areas, because of the nature of the buildup,
that there will be a need to increase logistical and teclmical advisers
so there will probably be mutual offsets.
A%'ERAGE DIVISION STAFF AND U.S. AD\T:SERS
The Chairman. General, how large is the average Vietnamese divi-
sion staff? .
General Clement. It would probably be about 150 to 200, sir. The
1st ARVN Division runs about 200.
The Chairman. Of course, that division is larger. This article I
read says it is twice as large as the average.
Is that right, Colonel ?
Colonel Wheeler. I don't know whether it is twice as large, sir,
but the division does have responsibilities that are not normally as-
signed to other divisions such as the DMZ and that requires an addi-
tional intelligence effort.
The Chairman. How large is your division ?
Colonel Wheeler. Our division's staff approximates 200, sir. That
inchides all the staff elements.
The Chairman. How large is the U.S. advisory staff attached to
that division ?
Colonel Wheeler. My advisory team has a total of 197, of whom
49 are advisers at staff level and 111 at combat unit level, sir. The re-
mainder are support personnel.
The Chairman. It is approximately the same size as the Vietnamese.
You said 200 against 197 ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that about average for the average Vietnamese
division? ,
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir ; they are smaller and so is adviser staff.
The Chairman. I don't mean in numbers, actually, I mean in
percentage.
To put it another way, in the a\erage division, regardless of how
large the staff is, is there approximately the same number of Americans
as there are Vietnamese ? That is what I mean.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that right?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir ; total adviser effort.
Sir, there is one thing I would like to add to that. W\.\en we are
speaking of advisers, all are not located at division staff level. The
total figure includes advisers down to the battalion level.
The Chairman. Yes ; I understand you said that.
ATTITUDE OF SOUTH M:ETNAMESE OFFICERS TO U.S. WITHDRAWAL OF
COMBAT FORCES
"Wliat is the attitude of most senior South Vietnamese military
officers with regard to the rate of withdrawal of the American com-
bat forces? Can you give us an estimate of that, either one of you?
44-706 — 70 33
506
General Clement. The few that I have spoken to, sir, have really
felt that they could certainly live with this. I think that again, they
feel that there is a momentum. I am trying to paint a picture of the
feeling within the country — these are people I talk to, my counter-
parts and others — that they can certainly give it a go. I haven't en-
countered any particular pessimism on their part.
The Chieman. Do they expect that most U.S. combat forces will
be withdrawn by the end of 1970 ?
General Clement. I have no judgment on that, sir.
The Chairman. What percentage of enemy casualties in 1969
credited to the South Vietnamese Army was due to U.S. air and artil-
lery ? Do you Imow that ?
General Clement. I don't have that data, sir.
COMBINED COMBAT OPERATIONS
The Chairman. What percentage of combat operations last year
were combined United States- Vietnamese operations? Do you have
that ?
General Clement. I do not have that information, sir.
Senator Case. I wonder if Colonel Wheeler can tell us about his
own division ?
Colonel Wheeler. In my division, sir, in the 1st AKVN Division,
approximately 30 to 40 percent of the large scale operations, regi-
mental sized, in 1969, were combined operations.
The Chairman. Did the combined operations prove advantageous ?
Did they x^roduce a higher kill ratio ?
Colonel Wheeler. No necessarily, sir. It was just the fact that the
enemy situation at the time and the suspected target was of such size
that it required a preponderance of force, considering other troop re-
quirements, the forces were combined in order to best accomplish all
tasks.
During our combined operations, the target area was further broken
down into individual unit areas of operations. Each battalion sized
force operated independently in its own area.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY BEING TRAINED IN UNITED STATES
The Chairman. How many South Vietnamese military personnel
are being trained in the United States ? Do you know that, general ?
General Clement. At the present time, sir, we have in the neigh-
borhood of 1,500 or 2,000, somewhere in that area.
The Chairman. Do you know how it is broken down in Army,
Navy, and Air Force ?
General Clement. I can provide the specific for tlie record, sir.
The Chairman. Good.
(The information referred to follows :)
Breakout of kSouth Vietnamese Military Being Trained In United States
(Department of Defense)
Six thousand three hundred twenty-two Vietnamese were prosrrammed for
training in the United States during FY 70. The br^ilv out by Service was: 735
Army, 1,906 Navy/Marine, and 3,(i81 Air Force. As of 1 January 1970, 460 (212
Army, 14 Navy/Marine, and 234 Air Force) had completed training and 1967
were training (321 Army, 290 Navy /Marine, and 1,356 Air Force) .
507
The Chairman-. Do you know liow much the training given the
Vietnamese in the United States costs the United States ? Can you give
us the cost of that ?
General Clemext. I can give it for the record. I do not have it
broken out specifically here, but we do have the figure.
The Chairman. Do you know how much it costs to train an average
jet pilot ?
General Clement. No, sir ; I do not.
The Chairman. Have you any idea ?
General Clement. No.
The Chairman. Could you find that out ? Are such figures available ?
General Clement. We can certahily look into it. There probably
are figures available.
(The information referred to follows :)
Cost to U.S. for F.Y. 1970 Off-iShore Training of ARVNAF
(Department of Defense)
Estimated costs to US for FY 70 off-shore training for ARVNAF is $41.8
million.
196 9 SOUTH Vietnamese changes in command
The Chairman. Do you know how many Vietnamese commandei-s
were relieved of their commands last year ?
General Clement. Sir, I am not saying relieved, but I Imow there
were changes in conunand since last August in five divisions.
The Chairman. Five divisions since last August ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Cii.vir:man. Do you Imow tlie reasons ?
General Clement, I don't. I know specifically in two cases; the rea-
son probably would be relief. I am not sure of the others.
The Chairman. Do you know whether or not the American ad-
visers objected to these remo\als ?
General Clement. That I do not know, sir.
DESERTION RATE IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE AR:MY
The Chairman. Do you Imow, general, what is the current deser-
tion rate in the South Vietnamese Army ?
General Clement. I would like to discuss that, sir, if we could, in
an executi\e session.
The Chairman. It is not public property, right ?
General Clement. I don't believe it is.
AD\ ISOKV ASSIGNMENTS VERSUS COMBAT ASSIGNMENTS
The CirAiRZMAN. Do most U.S. military advasers seek advisory as-
signments or do they prefer combat assignments I
General Cle:ment. I think for a professional man, sir, the combat
assignment, when we are in combat, is the one that is generally sought.
But I must say that the advisory etfort certainly has been emphasized
in the i)ast several months, particularly the idea of getting better
quality advisers. The adxisory effort per se is undergoing a tremendous
examination right now, sir, as far as upgrading.
508
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND
VIETNAMIZATION
The Chairman. Colonel, I do not know the difference in the inti-
macy each of you has with your counterparts. This is a matter, I sup-
pose, of personal relationships. But do you and your opposite number
in the 1st Division ever talk about such things as the withdrawal of
American troops and the so-called Vietnamization program ?
Colonel Wheeler. We do, sir.
The Chairman. What does your counterpart think about it? Does
he think it is a wise thing to do ?
Colonel Wheeler. The 1st ARVN division commander and his com-
manders and their troops with whom I have been in daily contact are
willing to shoulder the load. There has been no hesitation on their part
to assume their responsibilities at every opportunity and their conduct
on the field of battle and the results, I think, prove it.
The Chairman. Has he ever indicated to you what he thinks would
he a reasonable timetable ?
Colonel Wheeler. He has not said, sir. He has only made one state-
ment in this regard and that was he would hope that the combat sup-
port and combat service support to best deal with the NVA threat cur-
rently within his area is sufficient for him to remove the threat from
the confines of the South Vietnam borders.
The Chairman. Would you have anything to say, General, about the
same question as to your counterpart?
General Clement. No, sir.
I thmk I had indicated earlier that I have talked to my counterpart
in general terms and to many of the training center commanders about
the general problem. I have had neither negative reaction nor negative
attitude; they feel they can get along, can get on with the job.
The Chairman. Do you have anything further today ? There are a
number of these things I think you prefer to talk about in executive
session.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. We will adjourn mitil tomorrow then.
(Whereupon at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene,
Wednesday, March 4, 1970, at 10 a.m.)
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
U.S. 31ilitary Advisory Program in Vietnam
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.O.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 : 07 a.m., in room S-116,
U.S. Capitol Building, the Honorable J. "W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present : Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington, McGee, Aiken,
Case, Cooper, and Williams.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
opening stateinient
The committee is meeting in executive session today to continue re-
ceiving testimony from Brig. Gen. Wallace L. Clement, director of the
Training Directorate in the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-
nam, and Col. Jesse L. T\nieeler, Jr., senior adviser to the 1st Infan-
try Division of the South Vietnamese Army.
As high ranking officers, with the on-the-ground responsibility for
training Vietnamese forces to take over the burden of the war. you
gentlemen are in a far better position to appraise the problems of
Vietnamization than are policymakers in the Pentagon — or legislators
in the Congress, who must vote on bills to finance the war.
It might interest you that one reason I was late this morning was that
I had a delegation of contractors call upon me crying the blues about
why their business has gone to pot. I told them it was primarily because
of the war in Vietnam, which I think is true. It was a very interesting
situation. Contractors are beginning to feel they arc going broke. That
is why I was late. They Averc from Arkansas. Otherwise, I would haA^e
been here on time.
Policies can be no better than the factual information on which they
are founded. That is why it is essential that this committee receive the
most accurate, impartial, and detailed information available concern-
ing the plans and prospects for disengaging American forces in Viet-
nam. And 1 hope that today you can and will provide the committee
with the best factual information upon which we may judge the merits
of the current policy.
It is curious, I may say. I do not think this will be on record.
(Discussion off the record.)
(509)
510
STATEMENT OF BKIG. GEN. WALLACE L. CLEMENT, DIRECTOR OF
THE TRAINING DIRECTORATE IN THE U.S. MILITARY ASSIST-
ANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM; ACCOMPANIED BY COL. JESSE L.
WHEELER, JR., SENIOR ADVISER, FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION,
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM; AND MR. PETER R.
KNAUR, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
The Chairman. Do you want to say anything initially before we go
into specific questions ?
General Clement. No ; I have no opening statement.
COST OF OFFSHORE AND PILOT TRAINING FOR FISCAL TEAR 19 70
The Chairman. One question occurred to me. Did you get the figures
on cost of the training of pilots and other activities I asked for
yesterda}^ ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you have those for the record ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The estimated cost of offshore training for fiscal year 1970 is
[deleted] and I can give you the specifics on the pilot training.
The Chairman. By offshore, do you mean the United States?
General Clement. That is what I mean, yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is for all categories.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. [Deleted.] How many personnel does that con-
template ?
General Clement. The plan for the total year will be
The Chairman. Fiscal year ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; fiscal year 1970. That plan encompasses
[deleted] people in the fiscal year 1970 offshore program.
The Chairman. Are they all categories ?
General Clement. Yes, sir. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force.
The Chairman. '^Vllat do you estimate it costs to train one pilot ?
General Clement. I have the costs. For a UH-l, helicopter pilot,
[deleted] . For a jet pilot, [deleted] .
The Chairman. Why is that ? Wliy is there such a tremendous dif-
ference ? Is it time or what is it ?
General Clement. It would be the time differential, the type of in-
struction they undergo, and the more expensive materials they use.
The Chairman. "^Vliy are pilot training costs confidential ? Is there
any reason why these figures should be classified or secret ? Does this
tell the enemy anything it should not know ?
General Clement. Sir, these are confidential figures.
The Chairman. '\^^iy are they confidential ? This is what interests
me. Is this simply to keep the American people ignorant of how much
the war costs them ?
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you afraid the American people would become
disillusioned with the war if they knew how expensive it is ?
General Clement. No, sir.
511
The Chairman. Then what is the reason ? Just give us a good reason.
General Clement. I am sure the training costs as a part of our total
resources is a security matter.
The Chairman. AVliat is it? We have a feeling, frankly, that the
reasons for security are far less to prevent the enemy from knowing
about it than to prevent the American people and Congress from
knowing about it. I wish you would disabuse my mind of this.
General Clement. Sir, I really do not know the exact reason why
these figures are confidential, but I do understand the general matter —
and I am sure you do — of the security aspects.
The Chairman. Maybe you want to speak for yourself and tell us the
reason. Why is the cost of jet pilot training confidential ? You do not
have to do it secondarily. We are quite willing to refer your
Mr. Knaur. Actually, I do not think it is in the general's or my
purview to know why." I mean, it is a decision that was made by the
responsible officials.
The Chairman. Wlio ?
Mr. Knaur. This, sir, would fall within the Security Eeview Branch
of the Pentagon.
The Chairman. This is so vague and indefinite. Cannot you say ? Is
this the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense ?
Mr. Knaur. In the last analj^sis, yes, sir. I mean
The Chairman. Can you put it in the record? Will you procure for
the record a very positive statement of why the costs of training a jet
pilot must be confidential ?
Mr. Knaur. Yes, sir; I will.
The Chairman. And possibly be understandable and direct and
simple ?
Mr. Knaur. I will try on the latter.
(The information referred to follows :)
Classification of Cost op Training Republic of Vietnam Jet Pilot
The individual cost attributed to the trainins; of a Republic of Vietnam Air
Force jet pilot is not considered classified information. However, the identifica-
tion of the total program with costs and strengths would be considered sensitive
information.
The Chairman. Why is it that the cost of training a Vietnamese to
fly a jet is confidential? I cannot imagine why it should be, other than
the fact that you are afraid it might disillusion the Congress and the
American people with the war.
Mr. Knaur. I am sure that is not the motivation.
The Chairman. Why are you sure it is not? I cannot think of a
better one. Can you think of a better one ?
basis for security rules
INIr. Knaur. Because I have never heard of any security rule being
based on trying to deceive the American public or the Congress.
The Chairman. Say that over, ^^^lat is this now ? I did not get the
thrust of that.
]\Ir. Knaur. Just, sir, that I have never heard of a security rule that
has been made for the prime purpose of keex^ing information from the
American public or from the Congress.
General Clement. Sir, if I may, there is another aspect.
512
The CHATRMAisr. All right. Go to it. AVhat is it?
General Clement. If the cost of training a jet pilot is known in the
budget there is an overall cost, then we are telling the other side that
we are training 200 pilots this year. So this, you see, is a way these
figures can be used.
The Chairman. What difference does it make ?
General Clement. This is a factor involved.
The Chairman. What difference does it make ?
General Clement. I think we should keep the enemy in as much
doubt about what we are doing at all levels, and I know you share the
belief with me. It is hard to get information on the battlefield, sir, and
we do not like to have the enemy given it free, as you well know.
The Chairman. On that theory we should not publish budgets and
we should not have debates in the' Congress and should pretend the war
is not going on.
General Clement. No, sir.
^ The Chairman. Every time a speech is made about the war up here it
gives some information.
General Clement. Yes, and I think as I know you are well aware,
this is a matter of judgment. Obviously, the American public must J
know and should know just as much as possible. We share that with ^
you.
VIEWS OF ADMIRAL MCCAIN AND GENER.\L CICCOLELLA
The Chairman. It is nice of you to say that, but you know yourself
that some of your principal officers, such as Admiral McCain and Gen-
eral Ciccolella and others have denounced the Congress roundly, not
only the Congress in general but me in particular, for criticizing the j
war or raising any question that this is not in our interest. You know ,
that as a fact.
General Clement. I cannot speak of what General Ciccolella has]
said. I really have no knowledge.
The Chairman. You do not know anything about it. How is it that I
you can be in this war and know so little ? You do not know what your]
counterpart thinks ? You never heard of General Ciccolella ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You do not know anything about what he thinks of I
it? . .
General Clement. Sir, your question was did I know what he had
said about you and I do not know.
The Chairman. I mean about the war and those who disapprove of !
it. You ought to have a copy of his famous speech to the chamber of j
commerce at Taiwan about the war and the Congress generally and all
of those who do not think it is the Lord's work.
General Clement. May I pick up on another point ? You said I do I
not know what my counterpart was thinking. I must say I work closely i
with my counterpart and I thought I indicated that yesterday. I do try !
to get into these aspects.
The Chairman. Did I not ask you what he thought about the Chau ;
case and you said you did not know ?
General Clement. This is a specific case. Yes.
The Chairman. There may be other things but, I thought if you
worked that closely — ^the Chau case is famous. You know about it ; do
you not?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
513
The Chairman. I am sure your counterpart would know about
Mr. Chau.
General Clement. We have not actually discussed it. In general, I
discuss training matters with him.
The Chairman. It is amazing to me you do not know what Admiral
McCain said. He has been publicized and he had a lead article in the
Reader's Digest saying the enemy was defeated. That was a year ago,
in January.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you read that ?
General Clement. In general terms
The Chairman. Did you read the article ?
General Clement. I cannot recall specifically, but I have read these
articles.
The Chairman. Do you think the events proved he was correct in
his statement?
General Clement. Well, if this is the statement he made, then the
events obviously did not b^ir him out.
The Chairman. Did you not read it ? This was a question and an-
swer interview with him.
General Clement. I am sorry, sir, I do not recall.
The Chairman. It was a lead article. I think it was the first article in
the Reader's Digest of a year ago January. I think I am paraphrasing
accurately. He said the enemy is defeated." He just does not know it yet.
General Clement. Well, a year ago January, sir, we were pretty
busy in the sector I was in and I do not believe I was doing a lot of
reading at that time.
The Chairman. I was busy, too, but we read these things because
they are of such major interest here.
classification of information on jet pilot training
I think it is the Pentagon's responsibility and not yours really. I
would like them to give reasons for classifying this type of
information.
Mr. Knaur. Yes, sir.
The Chairmen. I guess a good example is AA'liy the costs to train a
jet pilot should be classified specifically.
Mr. Knaur. I will, Mv. Chairman.
The Chairman. If the best you can do is that the reason is that the
other side might know how many jet pilots you are training. I feel
very sorry for you. I do not think that is a justifiable reason.
19 7 0 TJ.S. artillery AND AIR SUPPORT EXPECTED BY SOUTH 'STETNA:m:ESE
General, we come back to something more specific. What types of
American military support, for example, artillery and air support, are
South Vietnamese Army commanders expecting in 1970 ?
General Clement. Sir, let me give a general statement and then we
can get some specifics in it. Under the RVNAF improvement and mod-
ernization program, which is what we are talking about [deleted]
percent of all ARVX authorized units had deployed by January 31,
1970. [Many ARVN units have been activated earlier than planned as
a result of men and equipment being available. This includes artillery
514
units, an additional Marine battalion, some logistics units, and other
units of this type. We have specifics which are in some detail.
COST OF TRAINING U.S. PILOT
The Chaieman. General, pardon me. I apologize. I meant to ask
while you are doing this to give me what it costs to train an American
pilot and if that is secret. Include that in the memorandum.
Mr. Knauk. Eight, sir.
(The information referred to follows :)
Training Cost
The United States spends approximately $82,000 to train one jet pilot for the
U.S. Air Force. This cost includes equipment, training facilities, and personnel to
support the training base. The individual costs are unclassified, but the entire jet
pilot training program is considered sensitive information.
The Chairman. Proceed.
19 70 U.S. military SUPPORT EXPECTED BY SOUTH "VTCETNAMESE
General Clement. As an example, we will indicate here how some of
these things were completed ahead of schedule. An artillery battalion,
105 millimeter, was activated in November 1969 rather than the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 1970. A light truck company was activated Feb-
ruary 1, 1970, versus the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1970. In the Viet-
namese Air Force [deleted] percent of all the authorized squadrons
had been declared operational as of January 31, 1970. Many of these
units have become operationally ready prior to the planned operational
ready date. For example, a gunship squadron. In addition, a [deleted].
[I)eleted] percent of all the authorized small combat craft have been
turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. The Navy program has been
accelerated to complete a turnover of all small craft. That would be
river patrol boats principally.
These are specific examples, sir, of the kind of thing that is going on
as far as our improvement and modernization program.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE BEING TRAINED IN UNITED STATES
Senator JVIansfield. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question there ?
The Chairman. You certainly may.
Senator Mansfield. General, following up one of the questions
raised by the chairman which you indicated if answered at least in the
financial sense might be of value to the enemy by giving him an idea of
how many people are being trained as jet pilots and the like. I note here
in the February 22 issue^of the Washington Post a story under the
byline of Mr. Eichard Homan, which indicates that the number of
Vietnamese over here being trained in various capacities will inci-ease
within this year from 1,600 to 6,000. The story itself is from Mineral
Wells, Tex.
There are breakdowns as to the number of South Vietnamese being
trained at Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi and what they are
doing, at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas and what they are doing,
at Fort Wolters outside Mineral Wells, Tex. and in what they are being
trained, and at Newport, R.I., where it is anticipated a 60-man class of
South Vietnamese naval officer cadets will be forthcoming.
I
515
It looks as if while the costs may not be available, the numbers are
available for those who want to read the U.S. newspapers. I would
hazard a giTess that Mr. Homan obtained this information from official
sources. Otherwise, he could not write so authoritatively. I cite it and
I ask that this be made a part of the record at this point only to indi-
cate that there is too much secrecy and not enough publicity as far as
our involvement in Vietnam is concerned. This is true also in the case
of our involvement in Laos, which I think is pretty well known but for
some reason officially is an interlude war, a nonwar, a secret war or
something else.
(The information referred to follows :)
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1970]
Rate in U.S. Quadkupled — Vietnamization Training Up
(By Richard Homan)
Mineral Wells, Tex— One after another, 30 Orange and white helicopters
dropped from the brilliant Texas sky, broke their fall inches above the hardpacked
clay, and settled — some smoothly and some awkwardly — onto the makeshift land-
Inside one of the bubble cockpits, the student, Warrant Officer Le Tan Minh,
said, "It was pretty good." His instructor, Warrant Officer William R. Wells, said,
"Except—" and Minh admitted, "Except for air speed— some trouble there."
W^arrant Officer Minh is a 22-year-old Buddhist Vietnamese, a high-school
graduate from Hue. He and his American instructor are assigned to Ft. Wolters,
60 miles west of Dallas. They are part of the Vietnamization of the war in South-
' The Pentagon considers the training of Vietnamese in the United States the
kev to eventual withdrawal of American fighting men.
This year the training of Vietnamese in the United States has quadrui)l('d. from
1,600 to 6,000 men a year, forming the nucleus of the future Vietnamese lighting
forces
In a recent week, at Ft. Eustis. Va., 250 Vietnamese were studying to be heli-
copter mechanics. At Randolph AFB in Texas, 200 were receiving their first flying
lessons in fixed-wing aircraft.
At Keesler Air Force Base on the Mississippi Gulf coast, 160 were m the second
phase of pilot training, studying navigation, airborne electronics, or learning to
be air traffic controllers. .
At Lackland Air Force Base on the edge of San Antonio, Tex., 5o0 were taking
specialized English courses, learning the technical jargon of their future mditary
At Ft. Wolters, outside Mineral Wells, Tex., 350 were learning to fly helicopters,
and the first class of 35 moved into the final month of its 21-week course, prepar-
ing to transfer after graduation to Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah, Ga., for
16 weeks of advanced lielicopter training.
At Newport, R.I., the Navy was preparing for the arrival in March of a 60-man
class of South Vietnamese naval officer candidates.
At each of these installations, and at the Pentagon, where the program is
monitored, officials are enthusiastic and describe the results so far as unexpectedly
Talks with students and instructors at several installations indicate that the
South Vietnamese, most in their early 20s, are generally shy at the start, but have
impressed instructors with the grasp of complex U.S. military machinery. In
many instances, they have performed better than comparable classes of U.S.
draftees.
PAINSTAKING PROCESS
But the specialties being taught the Vietnamese and the scope of the program
to train Vietnamese instructors indicates that Vietnamization of the support
role will be gradual and painstaking.
For example, all of the flight training at Randolph and Keesler is in single-
engine, propeller-driven planes. Only a small number of Vietnamese are sched-
ided for advanced instruction that will enable them to fly multi-engine cargo
planes or jets.
516
Helicopter training at Ft. Wolters and Hunter is in single-rotor, observation-
type aircraft. Few South Vietnamese will learn to fly the large troop-carrying
or gunship helicopters.
Because the immediate emphasis is on boosting the number of Vietnamese
flying personnel, there is little effort now to develop a sizable cadre of South
Vietnamese qualified to expand that country's present small pilot training facility.
Limited though it is. Pentagon officials say the training is consistent with
South Vietnam's immediate needs and weaponry.
South Vietnam's Air Force has few jets or other advanced aircraft. It has
three squadrons of A-1 Skyraiders, single-seat attack bombers ; three squadrons
of A-37S, subsonic attack jets ; several C-47 cargo planes and gunships and one
squadron of F-5's, simplified supersonic fighters produced primarily for recipients
of U.S. military assistance.
Training is done within the framework of the Military Assistance Program,
under which the U.S. annually trains several thousand men from the armed forces
of 50 allied nations. Because of the sudden increase of Vietnamese students —
which is expected to last at least another year — a separate taks force has been
created in the Pentagon to oversee their instruction.
The emphasis is on aircraft skills, with the immediate goal, according to Air
Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans Jr., the doubling in size of the South Viet-
namese Air Force by the end of 1971. Seamans said recently, "This is a program
that will run for another year and three-quarters or so."
Through the program, the Pentagon hopes to upgrade the South Vietnamese
capability to operate and repair helicopters, needed to allow the Vietnamese to
carry on the mobile type of combat that the U.S. has pioneered there.
According to Pentagon planners, the expectation is that a solid grounding in the
basic aircraft will allow South Vietnam to conduct more than half of the total
combat sorties flown in the country — about twice as many as they now fly.
The sudden increase in Vietnamese students has forced a rapid readjustment of
teaching methods.
By lengthening courses and concentrating on problem areas, U.S. instructors
have been able to produce graduates who, they say, meet the same standards set
for American GIs,
IS FLABBERGASTED
"I'm flabbergasted at the success, really I am," said Maj. A. Robert Cyr, a
helicopter maintenance instruction supervisor at Ft. Eustis. "Let's face it. They've
got a grave, grave problem with language and technical background. You can
simply say 'carburetor' to an American GI and he knows what you mean. But
back home in Quang Ngai province, maybe the most complicated thing the '\'iet-
namese boy has seen is the bus going by or his uncle's bicycle."
iMaj. James W. Johnson, a director of helicopter pilot training at Ft. Wolters,
said, "We insist that the VNAF student is just as good as the American when he
graduates, and by the same standards." At Keesler, Col. Stanley R. Lovell, director
of Vietnamese pilot training, said, "We're proud of our product and we couldn't
be if they put pressure on us, or a quota system."
The Vietnamese students are young, most between 20 and 23. All are high
school graduates, many hav^e attended two years of college and all have studied
English before leaving Vietnam.
To be eligible for technical training in the U.'S., the Vietnamese must score 65
per cent on the standard English Comprehensive Level test given all potential
students from abroad.
Most however, come to the United States with a 40 per cent score and go to
Lackland for English courses— eight weeks of general English and seven weeks of
specialized instruction in technical terminology related to their military job.
"Technical language, even if you already speak English, is really a language all
its own," John P. Devine, head of a special language unit at Lackland, .said.
A few doors from Devine's office, 12 Vietnamese sitting in a circle in a tiny
classroom shouted the new jargon in a strange mechanistic chant led by their
civilian American teacher : "Laterally, laterally, he's vibi-atlng laterally '. Verti-
cally, vertically, he's vibrating vertically ! He vibrates vertically because he's out
of track. He's vibrating vertically ! The machine is out of balance. The machine !
The machine ! The machine is out of balance !
The influx of Vietnamese has been absorbed easily at most U.S. bases becau.se
the American de-escalation has resulted in a reduction of American GI's being
trained.
517
At Ft. Wolters, a peak of 575 helicopter pilot graduates a month was reached
in 1968. Now, even with the Vietnamese, the total is well below 500. At Ft. Eustis,
where helicopter mechanics were taught in three shifts around the clock in recent
years, only two shifts are needed now.
Where their numbers are large enough, the Vietname.se fomi separate classes.
This permits the teachers to pace the instruction to their language capabilities
and reduces problems of shyness and embarras.sment.
The training, conducted by U.'S. military personnel and civilian contract firms,
is aided by staffs of four or five Vietnamese cadre, most of them captains and
majors, at each base, The cadre are proficient in the specialty being taught at
the base and fluent in EnglLsh. Many have taught at the Vietname,se air training
center in Nhatrang.
COUNSELED BY VETERAN
At Randolph Air Force Base, Capt. Nguyen Minh Due, 31, a U.S.-trained pilot
with 6000 flying hours, most of it in combat where he was shot down twice,
counsels and tutors Vietnamese nervously preparing for their first solo flight.
Minh, who says he is anxious to get back to combat, talked of the students'
problems.
"Mo.st of them can't drive a car," he .said. '"They have just graduated from
high school, maybe they can drive a scooter, and that's all. Their skill with
machinery was very limited. I think they have the skill now to fly airplanes, but
the main problem has been the language."
At Fort Wolters, a Vietname:-e captain went up in a helicopter with a student
who was in danger of being eliminated because of extreme nervousness. The
student flew flawlessly with his countryman, and the captain learned during the
flight that the student was simply frightened at the hand gestures of his demon-
strative American instructor. He thought the flrst instructor would hit him.
Different customs and language make it clear why the United States is pressing
to develop a training capal>ility within the Vietname.se military.
"The eventual objective," a I'entagon planner of Vietnamization said, "is to
train them in their own country with tlieir own instructors. What we're really
doing now is handling the surge created by the expansion of their militaiT-
When the expansion of the Vietnamese military has been completed, the
United States expects South Vietnam to be able to train its own pilots, techni-
cians and specialists to fill the vacancies that result from normal American attri-
tion and rotation.
In one effort to build tluit capability, at Keesler Air Force Base a 12-man team
of enlisted instructors, headed by a master sergeant with 15 years' background
in electronics, is preparing to go to Nhatrang in August to spend a year helping
South Vietnam establish courses similar to those at Keesler.
PILOT CLASS GRADUATED
Keesler also graduated a 15-man "transitional pilot" class last month, made up
of Vietnamese with years of practical flying experience but little formal training
in instrumentation or navigation. The course upgrades the pilots and sends them
back to Vietnam as potential instructors.
At each training center, the U.S. military men speak glowingly of the en-
thusiasm and dedication of the Vietnamese.
Hanoi-born Capt. Ly Ngoc An, who lost his right arm in a bombing mission
and has returned to the U.S. for psychological warfare training at Fort Bragg,
explained, "Some people here think that because we are a country at war, the
students probably would rather stay over here — not go home. But they seem
very anxious to go home and serve."
When a visitor asks the students what sort of aircraft they hope eventually to
fly, some talk excitedly of jets — which are flown only by their Air Force's elite.
One student pilot, asked how long he expected to serve in the Armed Forces,
responded solemnly, "Until I die."
Another, Warrant Officer Bui Viet Thac, 22, from Saigon, admitted to some
apprehension about flying as he waited in a hangar at San Antonio's Stinson
Field for his first hour of instruction. "But I think I must enjoy it if I'm going to
be a pilot," he said.
Two factors contribute to the high motivation exhibited by the Vietnamese
students ; they are handpicked for their intelligence and attitude and the training
is a volunteer program that requires an 8-year minimum military commitment.
"They see it as an opportunity to get in on the ground floor of the expansion
of their military," one U.S. instructor said.
518
In most courses, the elimination rate for Vietnamese actually runs lower than
that for Americans — because of the less rigid screening of U.S. students and the
lower motivation of some U.S. draftees. At Fort Wolters, the elimination rate in
the first three Vietnamese helicopter pilot classes w-as 6 percent. American
classes run about 18 percent.
One course allows the Vietnamese up to 30 hours of helicopter flying time be-
fore they are required to solo, though most are ready to solo after about 20.
U.S. students are required to solo after 16 hours of dual instruction.
To add long-term benefits for the United States and to influence the men they
expect to be the South Vietnamese colonels and generals of the next generation,
the Defense Department has encouraged and financed a broad travel and orien-
tation program for the students.
One is at Fort Eustis, where Maj. William J. Blair, the post's foreign liaison
oflScer, has si;pervised an ambitious program that includes visits to Colonial
Williamsburg, Jamestown and Yorktown ; the Newport News Maritime Museum ;
the Federal Reserve Bank in Richmond ; cigarette factories ( "to show them
methods of mass production, with a product they can readily relate to") and
Washington.
NOTHING HIDDEN
'•I have them eat in automats and Hot Shoppes," Blair said. "I want to show
them how to mass feed. I do not pull any punches at all about our country's
problems and I try not to hide any minority problems. I let them see what the
problems are and what we're trying to do about them. I show them the middle-
class homes and the slums— so they realize we aren't all rich."
The students fly to Fort Eustis from Vietnam, but they can go back to Travis,
Calif., AFB by commercial bus, if they want a longer and closer look at the
United States.
At one training center, a Vietnamese liaison officer talked frankly of how the
visit to the United iStates can erase 'the ugly American impression that young
Vietnamese may have foi*med.
"In Vietnam," he said, "your Gl's, they can throw a beer can wherever they
want ; here they put it in a trash can. It's a little thing, but it gives us a different
view of Americans. And here, at a traflic light, you must stop. There, the Amer-
ican military can drive however they please."
Pentagon planners expect the Vietnamese student load at U.S. bases to remain
at its present level for the next year or more, then drop ofl' as the expanded Viet-
namese Armed Forces fill their manpower requirements and attain the capability
to train their own replacements.
The Vietnamese Air Force, for example, has a backlog of about 500 qualified
cadets waiting for flight training and about 30 percent of the flight training is
now being done in the United States. As the backlog is reduced and more Viet-
namese instructors become available, UjS. bases will get out of the business of
mass training of South Vietnamese pilots.
Until then, the attitude of many of the U.S. instructors is that Chief Warrant
lOfficer Bob Watts. At Fort Wolters last week. Watts, who admits to being "skep-
tical about this self-help program at first," said, "I'd rather spend my time train-
ing an individual than standing in for him."
ACTIVITIES IN LAOS AND THAILAND
Senator Mansfield. Incidentally, General, are your activities con-
fined to South Vietnam or do you have anything to do with events in
Laos and Thailand ?
General Clement. I have nothing at all to do with those activities,
sir.
Senator Mansfield. Who would be your counterpart in Thailand, if
there is a counterpart ? There is a different situation there. There may
be none.
General Clement. Sir, I do not have a counterpart in Thailand.
COST or VIETNAM WAR TO UNITED STATES
Senator Mansfield. I understand that you said yesterday that the
cost of the effort in Vietnam during this year
General Clement. Fiscal year 1970.
519
Senator Mansfield (continuing). This fiscal year is now down to
$1.5 billion a month 'l
General Clement. No ; the total support for the RVNAF, Republic
of Vietnam Armed Forces, is $1.5 billion for the fiscal year.
The Chairman. That is only equipment ; is it not ?
General Clement. That is the equipment and supplies, sir.
Senator Mansfield. It will be $1.5 billion for this fiscal year.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator ]\L\nsfield. What is the overall cost to us to date — applica-
ble to the Vietnamization program ?
The South Koreans and the Thais. Do you have any figures as to
the total overall cost of our participation in this venture in Vietnam?
General Clement. Sir, I do not.
Senator Mansfield. You have no indication as to what the cost of
the military advisory effort is to date. Do any of your colleagues?
General Cle3Ient, I have cumulative costs here, sir, for supporting
the RVNAF up to date. Beginning in fiscal year 1965 and forward.
Senator Mansfield, "\^^lat is the total ?
General Clement. Up through fiscal year 1969, a total of $3.7 billion
is the investment and operating costs.
Senator Mansfield. That would be in addition to the $1.5 billion for
this fiscal year ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator Mansfield. I would assume for the next fiscal year the
figure will be on the increase ?
General Clement. I do not know about fiscal year 1971, sir ; I have
no figures on that at all.
Senator Mansfield. Do you have any figures as to the total overall
cost to this Government and its people of the Vietnamese war?
General Clement. No, sir ; I do not.
Senator jNIansfield. Not even an estimate?
General Clement. No, sir ; I do not have that.
Senator ISIansfield. Do any of your colleagues, either civilian or
military, have a thouglit on that ?
The Chairman. Does the Pentagon have any figures?
Mr. Knatjr. I am sure they do, sir; but I do not know them.
The Chairman. Can you get them for the record? What is their
estimate of the cumulative cost of the Vietnam war?
Mr. Knatjr. Cumulative
The Chairisian. Cumulative including fiscal year 1970.
Mr. Knatjr. All right, we will try to ascertain that.
The CiiAiR^rAN. The New York Times had an estimate the other
day. I would like to compare it and see whether they are accurate or
not.
(The information referred to follows :)
Estimated Department of Defense outlays in support of Southeast Asia operations
(Dollars in millions)
Fiscal year :
1965 103
1966 5, 812
1967 20, 133
1968 26, 547
1969 28, 804
1970 23, 204
Total 104, 603
520
Senator Mansfield. It is ray understanding that the cost has been in
the vicinity of $28 to $30 billion a year and that Secretary Laird indi-
cated earlier this year or late last year that he thought the figure could
be reduced to about $1.5 billion a month, which would make it a total
of $18 billion a year. That is a decided drop, but still a lot of money.
To that $18 billion I would assume perhaps the $1.5, wliich you have
indicated is going for the Vietnamization of the Kepublic's forces,
would be added. I do not know.
That is all the questions I have at this time, Mr, Chairman.
ESTIMATE OF COST OF WAR IN VIETNAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 19 71
The Chairman. Mr. Knaur, while we are talking about it, can you
give US what the Pentagon estimates the cost will be in fiscal year 1971,
in Vietnam ?
Mr. Knaur. If that is possible, sir ; yes.
Estimates foe Fiscal Year 1971 iSoutheast Asia Costs
Estimates for FY 1971 Southeast Asia costs are not available for public release,
because of the need to preserve flexibility in determining the scope of operations
in Southeast Asia and to avoid disclosure of our intentions to the enemy. All
relative information regarding FY 1971 'Southeast Asia operations and costs have
been provided to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the
House and the Senate.
Senator Mansfield. I would like to ask one more question. What is
the U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam at the present time, roughly,
if you do not have the exact figure ?
General Clement. We do have the figure, sir. The total at this time
is [deleted] men.
Senator Mansfield. Does that include the personnel of the Tth Fleet ?
General Clement. This includes the Navy force of [deleted] sir : the
Naval Forces, Vietnam — who are engaged in small boat and river
operations in Vietnam.
Senator Mansfield. That would be exclusive of the 7th Fleet then.
(The information referred to follows.)
present U.S. TROOP STRENGTH IN \T:ETNAM
General Clement. Well, these are not a part of the 7th Fleet.
Senator Mansfield. But what you have are these forces in Vietnam.
They have been mostly concentrated, as I understand, in the Delta
region.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator Mansfield. They are manning small boats. I think they call
them riverine forces. Is tliis 29,000 separate from the 7th Fleet as an
entity detached?
General Clement. Yes, sir; this is specifically attributable to the
Vietnam effort. In other words, these forces come under General
Abram's purview, his operational control.
Senator Mansfield. The 7th Fleet comes under whose authority ?
General Clement. Under Admiral McCain.
Senator Mansfield. What would you estimate would be the number
of man attached to the 7th Fleet ?
521
General Clement. Sir, of the 78,900 assigned to the 7th Fleet, 23,900
are committed offshore to direct support of the Southeast Asia
operation.
GREATER U.S. CONCENTRATION IN VIETNAM THAN IS GENERALLY KNOWN
Senator Mansfield. What I am trying to indicate is that there is a
greater concentration in Vietnam than is generally known because not
only do you have the forces in Vietnam proper. Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine, and Coast Guard, but you have the backup installations
at Clark Base in the Philippines. You have backup installations in
Japan where we have a number of hospitals which take care of our
people who are wounded in Vietnam. You have some sort of a connec-
tion between Okinawa and Vietnam as well. I would hazard a guess
that those who are in contact, directly or indirectly, with the venture
in Vietnam would very likely number somewhere in the vicinity of
600,000 or even a little more with this drawdown strength which has
come into effect since this administration took office.
Mr. Knaur. Well, Mr. Chairman, can I just comment that the 7th
Fleet and the other bases that you have mentioned, have a responsi-
bility beyond Vietnam. I mean, they are not there solely for Vietnam.
The 7th Fleet
Senator Mansfield. They still are now.
Mr. Knaur. Not the 7th Fleet.
Senator Mansfield. Yes ; they are. I will challenge that statement. I
will tell you why. T^Hien I was out there last year I found that we had
only two' ships, destroyers, in the Gulf of Taiwan, which is the original
base for the 7th Fleet concentration. This does not take in the facilities
where they go for repairs like Yokosuka and the like. [Deleted.]
The straits have been relatively undefended as far as the 7tli Fleet
is concerned because of Vietnam and, therefore, its chief concentration
is in that area and part of the installations at Clark Air Force Base in
the Philippines are tied to the Vietnam venture. Okinawa is too and so
are in some respects the Philippines and so was, imless the B-52's have
been removed, Guam itself. All of these factors veer in one direction,
one objective, and for one purpose. We are in a situation which is not
normal which would back up your statement, I believe, as to disposi-
tions. Everything now is pointed in one direction and that is Vietnam.
I think the record will show that.
That is all.
The Chairman. I would only venture this observation. I think I
heard the Senator from Missouri give on the floor yesterday his esti-
mate including all of our forces in the Far East. He did not say
directly Vietnam, but directly and indirectly it was 800,000. He was
including those in Korea, in Thailand, Japan, Okinawa, Laos, and
all that. His estimate, I think, also included civilians.
I do not know whether he made a calculation or was estimating it
roughly.
CONNECTION BETWEEN VIETNAM WAR AND U.S. FORCES IN FAR EAST
Senator INIansfield. I think, Mr. Chairman, it would be a good thing^
to direct the staff to make a calculation of the situation in that area
so we can have as a part of the record what the connection is between
44-706—70 34
522
the war in Vietnam, the 7th Fleet, the installations in Japan, Guam,
Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, Laos and Thailand, and many other
areas.
The Chairman. I agree with that. It seems to me the Pentagon would
have this. Could you arrange for this, Mr. Knaur ? Are you represent-
ing the Pentagon or AID or what are you representing this morning ?
Mr. Knaur. I am Department of Defense.
The Chairman. Then you ought to have this available. I mean it
ought to be very easy for you to obtain a total compilation of all the
personnel.
]Mr. Knaur. We can submit that for the record; yes, sir.
CLASSIFICATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL FIGURES IN FAR EAST
The Chairman. May I ask you if this is confidential and secret ?
Mr. Knaur. I do not know, sir.
Senator Mansfield. I thmk we can do it from both ends, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Knaur. I am sure a detailed listmg of our strengths would be a
classified figure.
The Chairman. It would ?
Mr. Knaur. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Take a figure like Korea. Every day we read it is
around 60.000, but this is still classified. You see it 'in the paper all the
time, but that still is a classified figure.
Senator Mansfield. I think I can show stories out of the U.S. News
& World Keport.
The Chairman. I know you can. I read them all the time. I want to
know if it is still classified.
Mr. Knaur. The fact that a figure exists in the paper does not
declassify it.
The Chairman. I understand.
Mr. Knaur. And the other thing I would like to say is that a rank
figure is not necessarily classified.
Senator Mansfield. A what kind ?
Mr. Knaur. A rank figure. If you say around 60,000 where the actual
figure, and this is hypothetical, is 52,000, then the around 60,000 would
not be classified where the 52,000 would be.
Senator Mansfield. We w^ould like to have round figiu'es.
Mr. Knaur. Well, we will see if we can do that, sir.
The Chairman. Can you give it for all these categories that he men-
tioned in the whole Far East? It is not restricted to Vietnam. I mean
the total manpower and their location. By that I mean I would like to
know whether or not you are including Guam or Okinawa. We can
draw the conclusions as to whether or not they are related to Vietnam.
You do not have to draw that. We want the disposition of personnel
in the Far Eastern theater. I think you could supply that ; could you
not?
Mr. Knaur. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I am sure the Secretary has that at his fingertips.
Mr. Knaur. I am sure he does.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)
The Chairman. We would like what degree of classification you have
applied to it. Since you arc going to do that, if it is classified we would
523
like to know why. We have to get to the bottom of why you classify so
much of the information reLating to our military activities.
(The information referred to follows.)
Reasox fob Security Classification
The disposition of United States troops in the various countries of the Far East
is considered cbissifled infonnation, at the level of iSECRET. The only purpose of
any security classification is to deny access, by the enemy, or possible enemy, to
information tliat may be of some aid or benefit to him and could therefore be
inimical to the security of the United States.
Specific numbers of troops, especially by service, in specific locations could
quite easily lead an enemy into deducing our capabilities and intentions in those
specific areas and could over a pei-iod of time indicate trends.
I wonder, General, do you have any information on when the 486,000
you mentioned would be reduced to 250,000? Do you have any
projection when it will be?
General Clement. Sir, I have no Imowledge, I have no projections
at all of what end strengths are going to be at any time in the future.
PROJECTION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TRAINING SCHEDULES
The Chairman. How do you organize training schedules if you have
no idea of what the level of people is going to be and when it will be
reduced ? On what basis do you organize a training schedule ?
General Clement. If you are talking of Vietnamese training sched-
ules, we do have knowledge of how they are increasing and what their
forces are going to be.
The Chairman. What is it ?
General Clement. These forces are considered in our training
projections and this is
The Chairman. What is it ? Will you give us that ?
General Clement. In fiscal year 1971, sir, under the acceleration
program, Vietnamization, we are heading toward an end strength of
[deleted.] That is the total Kepublic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
RVNAF is building up toward tliis total. This is the agreed figure
with them, [deleted] and with this
The Chairman. [Deleted.]
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That is the fiscal year 1971.
General Clement. Fiscal year 1971, sir.
The Chairman. How do you project what that is going to be in the
next few years? "\Miat is 1972? Have you a projection?
General Clement. I do not have that. We have the fiscal year 1971
figure firm right now. And we have, of course, fiscal year 1970.
The Chairman. What is 1970 ?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. [Deleted.] So they are increasing [deleted] between
1970 and 1971.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would you venture an opinion that that is sort of
the rate of increase that you anticipate in their armed forces ? Is that
the overall ?
General Clement. Sir, I would not because this is subject to again
the enemy situation and other things that are happening. We are firm
on the [deleted] for fiscal year 1971. This is part of the plan I was
524
talking of yesterday. The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force
break out in there
The Chairman. How is that broken down ?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
VIETNAMESE SAILORS AND PILOTS TRAINED IN UNITED STATES
The Chairman. Do you train sailors over here as well as air and jet
pilots?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; there is a training program.
The Chairman. For what ?
General Clement. For the Vietnamese Navy.
The Chairman. Vietnamese Navy ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; this is generally in the skilled areas, tn
other words, maintenance and that sort of thing.
The Chairman. What do you estimate it costs to train a boat main-
tenance man ?
General Clement. I will have to provide it for the record. I cannot
supply it now.
(The information referred to follows:)
'Costs To Train a Boat Maintenance Man
Cost of training a boat maintenance man vai-ies according to tlie location and
sicill level desired. This training (Deisel Maintenance) is accomplislied at one of
three places and the costs for each are as follows : CONUiS (including transporta-
tion) $1320.00 per individual, Guam (on the job training) $500.00 per individual.
Danang (U.S. Contractor Schuol) $600.00 per individual. The duration of the
courses are : 18 weeks OONUS, 8 weeks Guam, and 12 weeks Danang.
The Chairman. You do have a list of
General Clement. I had the overall cost for you, sir, of
The Chairman. [Deleted.]
General Clement. [Deleted] would include all of those being trained
in the States.
The Chairman, That is all of them, but there is a vast difference..
[Deleted]. How long does it take to train that jet pilot? That [deleted]
is a year or is it total ?
General Clement. That is the total cost.
The Chairman. Spread over how long ?
General Clement. Thirty weeks of language training in Vietnam,
sir, plus an additional 6 or 8 weeks at Lackland Air Force Base, plus
the pilot training itself which would amount to about 16 to 18 months.
The Chairman. That seems very expensive. Say 18 months at the
outside it costs [deleted]. Does that not strike you as very expensive?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; I do think that training is expensive in
general.
The Chairman. What is that $4,000 a month to train a pilot ? Why
is that ? Does that include the cost of the plane or something ?
General Clement. It would be the operational costs to include the
maintenance on the aircraft he is using, cost of the instructor who is
used, and things of that nature.
RATE or replacement or U.S. forces by itetnamese
The Chairman. When does your counterpart in the Vietnamese
Army expect the American forces to be reduced to 250,000? Has he-
525
ever indicated what he has in mind as to what he expects in this
regard ?
General Clement. Sir, we have discussed no specific strengths and
have not discussed this aspect at all.
The Chairman. One thing surprised me. You say the increase in
South Vietnamese forces between fiscal 1970 and 1971 is only 6,000. At
that rate, that is one for one; how many years would it take for us
to withdraw 300,000? What is 6,000 into 300,000? Six into 300. That is
50. So, at that rate they would supplant our withdrawal of 300,000 in
50 years; would they not?
(jeneral Clement. Sir, I am not sure of the figures you are using
now.
The Chairman. The actual figures are that they have increased their
armed forces from [deleted] . Is that not the figure you gave me ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Assuming they continue at this rate of increasing
their figures 6,000 a 3-ear and they are to take up the place of 300,000
of our troops, it will take them 50 years to do it; will it not?
General Cleiment. Sir, I do not believe we have really
The Chairman. What is wrong with that reasoning?
General Clement. I do not think we have agreed on just how many
they are replacing of ours.
The Chairman. I know you have not agreed, but this is one little
fact into which we have got our teeth. You said this is what the fact is.
Til is is what we are going to do.
I am projecting that in the absence of any estimate. You say neither
you nor your counterpart can give any estimate. If you have to reduce
to extrapolating that figure, it would look like you are contemplating
around 50 years to make a transfer. Wliat is wrong with that reasoning ?
General Clement. Well, sir; we are not speaking of any transfer. I
am speaking of training the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
The Chairman. The Administration's policy is to witlidraw Ameri-
cans and ATvVX take their place. Is that not the polic y of the Viet-
naniization?
General Clement. In very general terms, yes.
The Chairimax. In general terms we are going to withdraw and they
take our i^laco. You doscril)e it better then. I throw this out as a
thought. What is wrong with that?
General Clement. In general terms I am sure it is true.
The Ciiatr:max. That is the Vietnamization program. Insofar as you
are willing or able to give us information, what is happening is they
are increasing at the rate of 6,000 a year. I say that looks like it is
going to be a very long time to bring about this withdrawal of 300,000
troops.
factors other than vietnamization invol%"ed in it.s. withdraw ai
General Clement. But, sir, it is going to depend, as you well know,
on other factors besides Vietnamization.
The Chairman. I am only inviting you to explain the other factors.
I am giving you an opportunity to enlighten us now. I am not trying
to persuade you to say any particular thing. Tell us the other factors.
General (^leiment. Sir, t think the Paris negotiation is obviously one
big factor which is overriding. The enemy activity is another big
factor that is overriding.
526
In other -words, the activity of the North Vietnamese themselves.
No. 2 would be the Paris negotiations and how that culminates, and
Vietnamization, in other words, their taking on more and more of the
burden. These are the three broad variables, I guess you would call
them, on which the whole program is based. You have to take them
all into account when we are talking strengths, speeds, and transfer of
responsibilities.
The Chairman. I wish I could draw the conclusion, and maybe with
your support I might, that this very slow increase m their personnel
indicates the administration expects to have a negotiation in Paris.
Would I be correct if I draw that conclusion ?
General Clement. Sir, that is beyond my purview.
NUMBER OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN FAR EAST THEATER
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, there is another hearing I left
and I have to get back. May I ask a couple of questions ?
The Chairman. Certainly. I would welcome it. Before you came in
I took your name in vain by saying I thought I remembered your
saying yesterday that you estimated 800,000 American personnel in the
Far East theater. Was I right or wrong?
Senator Symington. That is about right.
The Chairman. Did you not say sometliing: like that ?
Senator Syimington. 540,000 in Vietnam. Right.
The Chairman. As of today, I thought you meant.
Senator Syimington. At one point we had about 545,000 in Vietnam^
didn't we ?
General Clement. We did earlier. Right now we have [deleted].
Senator Symington. And you had 50,000 in Thailand at one point,
right?
General Clement. I do not loiow about that.
Senator Symington. I do. So, that would be 59'5,000. Then, you
have the fleet which is estimated at about 60,000 all told. That adds up
to 655,000. You also have all the ancilliaries, such as Japan. The Guam
setup incident to B-52's, Okinawa incident to refueling of B-52'Sj
and Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines.
What I said therefore, and the chairman is right, at the peak period
we had around 800,000 people in the Far East working on the problem
to the best of my analysis. Would you have any cause to dispute that ?
General Clement. No, sir ; I would really have no comment.
ability of south VIETNAMESE TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE AVITHOUT U.S.
SUPPORT
Senator Symington. If the United States of America having that
number of people working to accomplish whatever it is that we want
to accompish out there could not do the job with the Vietnamese,
regardless of the degree of training and the amount of equipment that
we give to the South Vietnamese, how can we expect them to do it
without those 800,000 people ? That is my concern about the question
on the Vietnamization program.
General Clement. Well, I would like to offer some comments in gen-
eral terms, sir. I think when we discuss these matters and go back in
history over time and we talk of a people at a certain point in time and
how they are doing, these are, by themselves, variables.
527
Tet 1968. 2 years ago-
Senator Symington, I imderstand all that. I have been to Vietnam
numerous times. One of the reasons I asked that question is I asked in
another committee ^Yhether the rules which have restricted our Air
Force, Navy, and Army Avould also apply to the South Vietnamese. I
was told yes, that they would apply so lono; as we put up the money.
Does tliis mean in effect that a o-ood deal less number of people with
the same rules can do a better job than we could do with the U.S. forces
that were there ? Now we are leaving ; and I am for that. Personally I
do not think there is anything left out there to win, but if we have
failed as against what President Johnson wanted, and I support Presi-
dent Nixon's program, and we get out, how can they win without us
under the same rules ?
To me it is mathematical, but I would like to get your comments on it.
General Clement. If I undei-stood it, I Avould like to bring it down to
Vietnam itself, our present deployment there, and wliat we are doing
there. I think you broadened it to include all of Southeast Asia and I
would rather stay
Senator Symington. No ; I am only talking about South Vietnam
and the rules that apply to the fighting there.
General Cle3ient. Again, sir ; I am saying, as you analyze the prob-
lem, you are analyzing the forces you are dealing with, our own and
the Vietnamese. We feel the Vietnamese have come a long way — that
is why I went back to Tet of 1968 — there has been a tremendous change.
I think if you were there at that time and there now you would see a
tremendous difference.
This change in an Army is a factor that is taken into account — it is
a big thing, as a matter of fact.
Senator Sy:mington. How do you mean a big thing? I was there just
a few weeks before Tet.
General Clement. I think it is a big thing that we have the feel for
their effectiveness. The way they have operated has been effective and
we have seen this demonstrated in the past.
Senator Symington. You mean an improvement in the forces of
South Vietnam ?
General Clement. Right.
Senator Symington. Do you think those forces are improving to a
point wliere they can handle the situation without us in the not too
distant future?
General Clement. No, sir: I would not estimate when we would be
able to leave or in what form. I think that it is a function of the forces
we are working with and Vietnamization. This is why I believe there is
such, well guarded optimism about this particular subject. "We believe
that the Soutli Vietnamese forces are responding.
I think another
Senator Symington. I am sure they are responding. The figure you
have I think, is $11/2 billion for the annual cost of equipment. Does
that include training?
General Clement. Yes, sir : that includes training and equipment ;
$1.5 billion is what we are talking about for fiscal year 1970.
U.S. helicopters in VIETNAM
Senator Symington. And how many helicopters are we giving
them? Do jon know roughly?
528
General Clement. Yes, sir ; under the program they will have in the
area of [deleted.]
Senator Symington. And in rough figures how much is that worth ?
General Clement. About $250,000 per helicopter.
Senator Symington, Are you saying the average cost of these
helicopters is $250,000 apiece? Is that right?
General Clement. About $250,000, sir.
Senator Sybiington. How many helicopters have we lost in
Vietnam ?
General Clement. I believe you mentioned a figure of 1,500, sir.
Senator Symington. I did not mention it, I do not think but
General Clement. It was mentioned in an article and I do not have
the total at hand, but it is probably in that area.
training of south VIETNAMESE HELICOPTER PILOTS
Senator Symington. Do you find helicopters pretty tricky to run?
Are the South Vietnamese learning how to handle them well ?
General Clement. Yes sir ; I think you will find that they are. As a
matter of fact, they are pretty good pilots and I think this is another
reason for guarded optimism. They have demonstrated an ability to
fly helicopters and jet aircraft and have performed well. They seem
to be quite eager. They take English language training. It would be
very stimulating the next time you are over there to visit the English
language training program to see these young Vietnamese getting
trained by our young airmen. These young airmen are given a course
of instruction in English language training by the Defense Language
Institute in Vietnam, and then these young men go on to teach the
Vietamese. It is quite gratifying to see them perform.
Senator Symington, The airmen speak Vietnamese?
General Clement. No, sir. They are teaching English. The course
Tuns roughly 30 weeks, I have talked to some of these VNTAF airmen
and asked how they are doing. They are very proud to speak the
English they can speak after a few weeks. They say they like this
training. We ask are you all ready to fly those choppers? Of course,
they have a long way to go. They have to go back to the States and
get trained at Lackland and Rucker and other places. However, they
reply, yes, sir, we are ready to fly ! We want to fly ! This is just
Senator Symington. Do they fly as well as the American pilots ?
General Clement. I would hesitate to make a judgment, sir. I have
heard judgments made that they are pretty darn good pilots and I
would think the same.
Senator Symington. Properly trained they are just about as good
as ours?
General Cleiment. Well, I think so, sir, in general terms. This kind
of thing is what heartens you a little bit about those people. You feel
a little bit stimulated about their ability to do things and their eager-
ness to do these things.
NTTMBER AND COMPOSITION OF ARVN DI^-TSIONS
Senator Syivongton. General, how many divisions do the AR^^N"
have now?
General Clement. They have 10 numbered divisions, sir; an air-
borne division, and a Marine division.
529
Senator Symington. Twelve divisions all told ?
General Clement. Yes, sir. ^ _
Senator Symington. And how many people in a division?
General Cleihent. The average strength authorized is around 12,000,
sir. The 1st Division is heavier than that. But the average is about
12,000.
Senator Symington. That would give them about 144,000, something
like that?
General Clement. In their combat divisions.
Senator Sy^ongton. Combat divisions. And how many of those are
combat soldiers? De we support those divisions with American logistic
support ?
General Clement. No, sir. They have
Senator Symington. How many of the 12,000 are combat troops?
General Clement. Well, that would get down to the ratio of combat
troops to service troops.
Senator Symington. Right. _
General Clement. I have the figure here for a typical division.
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Symington. I cannot follow you on the regiment ; please put
it in the division.
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Symington. How many combat and how many noncombat ?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Symington. Thus 9,000 out of 12,000 would be combat, and
2,000 more would be combat support and 1,000 more would be non-
combat. Is that a fair analysis ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. So, you would say out of a division, about
11,000 could l)e considered combat.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
composition of U.S. DIVTSIONS COMPARED TO ARVN
Senator Symington. Take an American Division of 15,000. How
many in that are combat ?
Colonel Wheeler. It would be much less, sir.
Senator Symington. How many roughly, out of 15,000 ? As I remem-
ber the figure, it was two noncombat to one combat, so there would be
in an American division, 9,000 noncombat and 6,000 combat. You say
in a South Vietnamese division of 12,000 there are 11,000 combat and
1,000 noncombat. Does that mean that a lot of the logistics are going
to continue to be performed by Americans ? You see the thrust of my
question.
General Clement. Yes, sir. And may I suggest that this is part of
the program. In other words, with the "buildup, the combat forces are
pretty well builtup so far as the ARVX goes.
iSTow, talking of logistical support — they do have a logistical system
of their own and a pretty good one.
VC GUERRILLA AND NVA FORCES COMPARED TO ARVN
Senator Symington. Well, the way you put it you have about 130,-
000 combat South Vietnamese troops. How many'^Viet Cong regulars,
guerrillas and North Vietnamese oppose them ?
530
General Clement. I am just trying to recall a figure. [Deleted]
troops. The rest were guerrillas, NVA, and VC.
Senator Symington. How many of those would be combat, of the
300,000?
General Clement. That is the figure I am trying to recall.
Senator Symington. OK.
General Clement. There was a total given of, I think, 300,000.
Senator Sysiington. Right.
General Clement. [Deleted.]
Well, sir, besides the infantry divisions, there is a lot of fire sup-
port— artillery and aircraft. This is a big part of the picture.
Senator Symington. I see. In other words, if we give them enough
modern equipment, you think that might turn the tide ?
General Clement. To go back to the earlier question, a part of the
buildup is really to beef u]3 their logistical force in order to give them
much greater self-sufficiency.
Senator Sy^mington. What did you say ?
General Clement. The Navy and the Air Force programs are giving
them more combat support. This is accelerated. So this means that the
combat effort, particularly groundwise, may very well be there, but the
combat support is needed. This is coming, and the total picture is a
much more balanced force in the future. This is why we feel that for a
period of time the United States will be there, but I cannot say how
long.
ability of south \^ETNAM TO WAGE WAR WITHOUT U.S. AID
Senator Symington. Now, I would like you to file for the record an
answer to my earlier question. If we plan to get out of Vietnam and
leave it to the South Vietnamese — we are certainly not going to give
them better equipment than we have given our own boys — how can
they succeed if we take the 800,000 people out of the picture that we
have had there ? Mr. Chairman, I do not want to pursue it any further.
I have been asking this question and cannot get an answer that is satis-
factory to me.
General Clement. Let us try to provide something.
Senator Symington. Thank you. I would appreciate it.
ViETNAMIZATION
In the four years (1965-69) of increasing U.S. participation in Soutli Vietnam,
there were very significant results achieved in the naain foi'ce war, in pacification,
and in the improvement and modernization of the South Vietnamese forces. This
progress malfes Vietnamization a credible option.
Indigenous Viet Cong forces have been seriously degraded. Recruiting is diflfi-
cult and becomes increasingly so as GVN presence expands into the countryside.
The brunt of the main force war must be borne by the NVA. Heavy quantitative
losses in the VC/NVA forces beginning in Tet 1968 have resulted, more impor-
tantly, in severe qualitative losses in experience soldiers and in leadership.
As' a measure of progi-ess in pacification, the increase in percent of population
under GVN control since the time the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was
initiated, is encouraging:
December
1967
June
1969
February
1970
GVN control _ --
67
86
7
7
88
Contested
16
8
VC control and not evacuated
17
4
Total
100
100
100
531
The critical military factor in Vietnamization is the improvement and moderni-
zation of the South Vietnamese forces. In quantitative terms alone, their forces
have roughly doubled in size, exclusive of the People's Self-Defense Forces.
Planned
June 1965 June 1969 June 1970 June 1973
RVNAF - 522,400 875,800 986,400 1,100,000
Total force's including pa'ramilitary 625,800 1,057.400 1,189,900 3,249,160
Qualitative improvements have been slow and laborious but have received
primary emphasis during the past year. The fruits of this effort have been amply
demonstrated in the highly professional performance of the BVNAF in recent
engagements.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator a question ? I
think he has presented this in a veiy graphic and strikmg way, this
question. I wonder if we are going to get any response. I want an
answer to the same question — a response more or less keyed to the
question of well, we can get out, if the North Vietnamese let us.
Senator Symingtox. Well, I think that is a very good observation,
if I may say so, but one of the things that has worried me
Senator Case. Maybe we should save several alternatives.
Senator Symingtox. One of the things that is worrying me is Laos.
We are getting so little out of the Paris talks and it would seem logical
if we are not pressing them in any way and assuring them we are not
going to launch an attack against Laos, it seems quite logical they will
take those divisions and put them into Laos.
Senator Case. Agam the Senator will not think I am
presumptuous
Senator Symixgtox. No. I appreciate this.
Senator Case. In response to his question he might ask that it be
responded to on the basis of an alternative ; 1, the North Vietnamese
do not come back and exercise a strong stand and, (2) if they do. That
is all I want.
Senator Symixgtox'. I think that is very well put.
May I ask this question. General. Do you premise your opinion of
success if we leave on the basis of less interest on the part of the North
Vietnamese in taking over South Vietnam ?
General Clemext. Sir, I am sure the whole question will be ad-
dressed in the context of the three propositions, the North Vietnamese
actions, the Paris negotiations, and the rate of Vietnamization.
Senator Symixgtox^. If that is done, will that satisfy
Senator Case. I think so. Unless we are going to get the same old
answer we have gotten since the November 3d speech and before that
which is, we will come out of this fine if A, B, and C and nobody can
say what will happen if A, but not B or O.
Senator Symix-^gtox. We are getting down to this point on it. If I
were in the executive branch, which I am not, or if I were running a
company, which I am not, and somebody came to the board of directors,
which is in effect what the Congress is because it puts up the money as
the board does for the president of a company, and ask for blank bil-
lions of dollars to run a program, it is logical to ask what the company
and the stockholders will get out of that jji-ogram.
Thus for this additional $71/4 billion, I would like to know what we
think we are going to get and why.
Thank you, ]Mr. Chairman.
532
DESERTION RATE IN ARVN
The Chairman, General, I have a few questions here that are sort
of basic to the operation over there. I will try to make them short and
maybe we can get some answers.
Of the [deleted] presently in the armed forces, what is the present
desertion rate in the ARVN forces ?
General Clement. Yes, sir,
(The information referred to follows :)
Desertion Rate
The desertion rate for the RVNAF is as follows :
Calendar year :
1967 Rl, 79T
1968 139. 670
1969 123, 311
1970 (March) 27, 851
General Clement. Sir, I can show you a chart of the gross desertion
rate for 1968 and 1969. I also have a table which may be more helpful
and I will supply it for the record.
The Chairman. You will have to put it in the record. The record
cannot show that chart. You can read from it if you like. It does not
have to be precise.
General Clement, Currently it is running at about [deleted].
The Chairman. [Deleted.]
General Clement. Yes, sir, we have a table which is worked out on it.
The Chairman. All right.
General Clement. This is less, we would like to point out, than it was
in 1968. It runs perhaps an average of two per thousand under that.
comparison of draft and desertion rates
The Chairman. What is the draft rate in comparison to the desertion
rate ?
General Clement. They have met their recruiting quotas, sir.
The Chairman, How do they compare with the desertion rate ?
General Clement. We will have to work that figure up, sir.
The Chairman. Will you work it up and put it in the record, please ?
General Clement. Certainly we will.
The Chairman. What percent of the sorties are flown by South
Vietnamese aircraft ?
General Clement. We will have to do some research,
(The information referred to follows :)
Percentage of Sorties Flown by South Vietnamese Aircraft
The following tahle is a comparison of the total Sonth Vietnamese who were
conscripted into the RVNAF and the total number of RVXAF personnel who
deserted during the years 1967 and 1969.
Year
Conscripts
Desertions
1967
48,545
81,797
1968
99,145
139,670
1969
80,423
123,311
533
(The information referred to follows.)
Bombs Dropped and Abtillekt Fiked
The Republic of "Vietnam Air Force flew 18 percent of the total strike sorties
flown during February 1970 in South Vietnam.
The Chaieman. Do you have the bombs dropped and helicopter
flights? Surely you have that. We are trying to show their relative
effort presently this year.
General Clement.
The Chairman. And the artillery fire by the South Vietnamese and
do you have any projections what they will be next year ?
(The information referred to follows.)
Total U.S. & GVN Artillery Fiee and Aie Sorties, 1st Quarter 1970
During the first quarter of 1970 a total of over 230,000 tons of bombs and over
220,000 tons of artillery ammunition was expended in South Vietnam.
Also, during the same period, U.S. and Vietnamese airforce flew over 1,000,000
armed helicopter and combat support sorties.
U.S. HELICOPTERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Do you have how many U.S. helicopters were in Vietnam a year ago
and how many are there today ?
General Clement. I do now know a year ago, sir, but I believe
roughly it is [deleted] that are there today.
The Chairman. U.S. helicopters?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Does that include helicopters that the Vietnamese
have ?
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. What do
General Clement. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. [Deleted.]
General Clement. Yes, sir.
U.S. and south VIETNAMESE FIGHTER-BOMBERS
The Chairman. How many U.S. fighter-bombers are there in
Vietnam today?
General Clement. That, I will have to get. I have it here.
The Chairman. Do you have approximately what it is ?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. How many were there a year ago? Is this an
increase or decrease?
General Clement. I think it is probably maybe a little bit less than
it was a year ago because there has been some redeployment.
The Chairman. How many South Vietnamese fighter-bombers are
there?
General Cle:mext. As now planned they will have [deleted].
The Chairman. When? That is not today?
General Clement. No, sir ; that will be — completely operational in
fiscal year 1971.
The Chairman. 1971. Do you have the figure there for what they are
today ?
General Clement. I do not have it right now, sir. I can get that.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)
534
SOUTH \t:etnamese artillery battalions
The Chairman. How many South Vietnamese artillery battalions
are there?
General Clement. We do have that. And again, I can give it to
you for the record, if you wish.
The Chairman. Can you give what your estimate is they will be
next year?
General Clement. Yes, sir; we can show you what the projected
buildup is.
(The information is classified and in the committee files.)
ARVN, NVA, and VC MANEUVER BATTALIONS
The Chairman. How many maneuver battalions does ARVN have
now compared to the number the North Vietnam and Vietcong have
committed in South Vietnam ?
General Clement. We will have to, again, do some more research
on that. We can dig out the maneuver battalions but the enemy side
will have to
(The information is classified and in the committee files.)
MEDICAL EVACUATION SUPPORT
The Chaieman. Does the United States presently provide all of the
South Vietnamese Armies' medical evacuation support?
General Clement. No, sir ; it does not.
The Chairman. About what percentage ?
General Clement. I can give you the numbers. We do have it broken
out and let me provide it for the record. I believe that something that
has not been widely known is that the Vietnamese have flown their
own dust-off, as we call them. There have been VNAF medical evacua-
tion sorties.
(The information referred to follows.)
Medical Evacuation
RVNAF is currently proYiding approximately 15% of the total helicopter medi-
cal evacuation effort in support of Vietnamese forces.
maintenance of electronic equipment
The Chairman. How many U.S. personnel are now involved in the
maintenance of electronic equipment being used by the Vietnamese
Armed Forces?
General Cle^ient. We have none, sir. They are maintaining their
own equipment. In other words, they have their own system.
The Chairman. They maintain their own electronic equipment ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How many fully-trained Vietnamese are there in
the field of electronics equipment? i)o you know how many there are?
General Clement. I am sure we can get it for you, sir. I do not have
the figure on hand right now.
The Chairman. You have it available ?
General Clement. We can get it ; yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows :)
535
Training
iDetermining the number of full-trained Vietnamese in tbe field of electronics
equipment maintenance has consistently been one of the major obstacles in
attempting to determine not only RVXAF but also civil requirements in this field.
The Vietnamese do i>erform their own communications-electronics maintenance
on the equipment currently in their inventory, however, most of this equipment
is relatively unsophisticated compared with US systems equipment in Vietnam.
The skills required for maintenance of this equipment are predominately lower
level skills, although maintenance up to third echelon is performed by the
RVNAF. Approximately 65 to 70 percent of the RVNAF personnel requirements
in the communications operations and maintenance field are now filled.
As US turnover of communications and electronics (C-E) sytsems to the
RVNAF is made, concurrent training programs will be conducted. Training in
wide-band communications equipment is scheduled to begin in July 1970 with
the ultimate goal of providing approximately 1,500 trained personnel over a
5-year period.
The military services do not maintain statisical data regarding local national
civilians trained in these fields. Specific figures regarding trained RVNAF C-E
personnel must be obtained from MACV.
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. FORCES
The Chairman. Are there any specific measures of the overall effec-
tiveness of ARVN and other South Vietnamese forces compared to
U.S. forces ? Is there any way to measure that ?
General Clement. No, sir ; I do not think so. We are talking of two
different forces.
The Chairman. I thought perhaps you had estimated that they are
10 percent or 50 percent as effective and, therefore, you draw a con-
clusion as to how many people they will need to take the place of some
of the Americans. Have studies like that ever been made ?
General Clement. Sir, I know of none.
The Chairman. Let us take one specific indication. Colonel, can you
say if any such study has been made with regard to your division,
which is a very special one and the best as I understand it ? Has any-
one ever made a comparison that it is as good or about as good or better
than an American division ?
Colonel Wheeler. Tliere has been no published study that I know of,
sir. I think tlie observations and the record of their combat actions
will indicate that they are comparable to any U.S. unit considering
the fact that they are on the lean side with combat support and service
support. The majority of their forces arc combat forces. We maintain
about 85 percent combat unit strength in the 1st ARVX Division.
The Chairman. Are the ARVN divisions evaluated individually as
ours are or is yours the only one ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, they are all evaluated.
The Chairman. They are all evaluated individually ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Can you say how they are evaluated today relative
to a year acfo ? You can deal with vours and then all of them ?
General Clement. Yes, sir. I think we can show there has been an
improvement.
The Chairman. This would bear upon the question of if the ARVN
forces take over the full burden of the war and the activity of the
enemy continues at the level of last year, then you should be able to
project how large a force it would take to handle the situation. Do
you know if that has been done ?
General Clement. No, sir. I do not know that that has been done.
536
COST TO UNITED STATES IF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TAKE OVER FULL BURDEN
OF WAR
The Chairman. If the Vietnamese take over the full burden, is there
any estimate that has been made of how much of the cost would have
to be paid by the United States ?
General Clement. No, sir. I know of no studies on this line.
The Chairman. I would think they would make such a study in
contemplation of the implementation of the President's program.
General Clement. I know of none, sir.
ARVN CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY
The Chairman. Wliat was the total number of ARVN contacts with
the enemy ui 1969 compared with 1967 and 1968? Do you have that?
General Clement. I am sure we can compile sometliing along this
line, sir, which will show the comparisons.
The Chairman. Do you have any idea yourself as to whether they
were greater or less ?
General Clement. I will have to check, but 1968 had the Tet Offen-
sive in it and, for that period, there is going to be a difference. So,
1968 and 1969 may be equal, but I would have to wait and put it mto
the record.
(The information referred to follows :)
Ground Operations Conducted by RVNAF
The total number of battalion-size or larger unit ground operations which were
conducted by RVNAF are as follows :
Current year: RVNAF
1966 3, 942
1967 3, 874
1968 6, 973
1969 11, 403
1970 (March) 2, 701
ATTITUDE OF SERVICEMEN TOWARD ARVN UNITS
The Chairman. Can you tell us how do American officers and NCO's
feel about combined operations ? Are they, for example, willing to rely
on ARVN units in situations in which the ARVN performance is
critical to their own security ?
General Clement. Sir, this would just be a very general statement
on my part. I do not want it to be definitive, but I think when a new
man comes in, there is a need for him to get to know them. I think after
you get to know them and after you work with them, there is a feeling
of quite mutual respect and confidence depending on where you are
in the unit.
I know specifically in my own unit we had quite a bit of confidence
in the ARVN division working with us.
The Chairman. Which division was that ?
General Clement. Second ARVN Division.
Colonel Wheeler. The U.S. miits will call for 1st ARVN Division
artillery support just as quickly as they will call for the U.S. artillery
support, and likewise in our combined operations they may be some
cases in which we have a small portion of U.S. forces and they work
very well and with complete confidence.
537
The Chairman. In the ARVN.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
ARVX AND U.S. GENERALS AND JUNIOR OFFICERS KILLED OR WOUNDED
The Chairman. How many ARVN generals have been killed or
wounded in action compared to the number of U.S. generals killed or
wounded?
Colonel Wheeler. I do not know, sir. I do know General Triiong
has been wounded twice. He has received 25 decorations for valor, two
of which are U.S. Silver Stars.
General Clement. This, I do not know.
The Chairman. These are compiled ; are they not ? These are avail-
able ?
General Clement. We would have to do research.
The Chairman. There are so few of them that would not be very
many.
General Clement. No. We would have to dig that out.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)
The Chairman. In the same way could you supply the casualty rate
last year for junior officers of the ARVN and those of U.S. forces
comparable in grade or rank? If those studies had been made
General Clement. I am not familiar with the data, but I think we
can get
The Chairman. I think I have seen some of these comparisons made
hi the papers.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee
files.)
COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNITED STATES AND SOUTH
VIETNAMESE FORCES
Have any new American forces ever been put under Vietnamese
command ?
General Clement. No, sir. We never had that where I was. I do not
know about you. Colonel.
Colonel Wheeler. We have had operational control, but not
command.
General Clement. We have operational control. We work closely.
Colonel Wheeler. Operations control but not command.
The Chairman. Could you define for the record briefly the difference
between command and operational control ?
General Clement. It is defined operational control wliich controls
the maneuver of the units, the general fighting plan, while full com-
mand involves all the administrative aspects, discipline and the rest
of it.
(The following information was subsequently submitted by the
Department of Defense.)
Command and Operational Control
The following is the definition for Command and Operational Control :
(a) Command — The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for
the direction, coordination and control of militai-y forces.
(6) Operational control — The authority granted to a commander to direct
forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks
which are usually limited to function, time, or location ; to deploy units con-
44-706 — 70 35
538
cerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include
administrative or logistic control (these functions are the responsibility of
individuals who exercise command over the assigned units.)
The Chairman. Have the Vietnamese been put under the command
of American officers ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir. It has been one of operational control and
it has worked very satisfactorily without any question with regard to
who was specifically in command.
General Clement. I think the same thing as previously stated, oper-
ational control.
COMMISSIONING OF SOUTH VIETNAM NCO's AND ENLISTED MEN
The Chairman. Can you give us how many noncommissioned officers
or other enlisted men in the South Vietnamese Army became commis-
sioned officers last year ?
General Clement. I can give you an estimate on it, sir. There is now
a program called the special reserve officer candidate school pro-
gram. In 1967 they had no such program. In this program they take
people from the ranks and into the officer corps.
The results have been they feel, most gratifying. I think we do, too.
Out of^I will speak in round numbers— about 10,000 OCS students
who went through their infantry school at Thu Due, near Saigon, in
the neighborhood of 1,000 came out of the special program for XCO's.
This has been a very gratifying thing.
Obviously, it is a good thing to have men who have been in battle
several years and recognize the fact that they can lead, and they do.
In fiscal year 1970, they anticipate 30 percent of the 9,000 or 10,000
OCS candidates will come from the ranks. So, it is a program that is
not well known, but it is going well.
ARVN OFFICERS RELIEVED OF COMMAND FOR CORRUPTION
The Chairman. Can you give us how many AEVN officers were re-
lieved of their command for corruption last year ?
General Clement. No, sir, I do not believe I can.
The Chairman. How many were convicted or sentenced ?
General Clement. I do not know.
The Chairman. You do not have that ?
General Clement. Nothing on that, sir.
ADEQUACY OF ARVN PAY SCALE
" The Chairman. Do you think the pay of the ARVN officers and
soldiers is adequate ?
General Clement. Sir, they have a very low pay scale.
The Chairman. Wliat is it ?
General Clement. A private, for example, gets about $40 a month.
A major gets about twice that. If you would like the entire pay scale for
the record, we can provide it.
The Chairman. All right. Put it in.
(The information referred to follows :)
539
MONTHLY PAY RANGES FOR ARVN REGULAR FORCES PERSONNEL
[U.S. dollar equivalent]
Grade
Mjmimum
Maximum
General 185 437
Lieutenant general 169 392
Major general . 159 371
Brigadier general 151 399
Colonel 116 392
Lieutenant colonel... 110 311
Major... 103 287
Captain 86 265
1st lieutenant 76 229
2d lieutenant 70 211
Grade
Minimum
Maximum
ASP.. - -.. 58 174
Master sergeant 1st class 53 16&
Master sergeant 50 165
Sergeant 1st class. 47 161
Sergeant 44 157
Corporal 1st class 43 151
Corporal 40 123
Private 1st class 39 119
Private. 38 118
The Chairman. Have you estimated how much it would cost to raise
the pay to what you would call an adequate level ?
General Clement. I do not have it, sir. There are studies imderway
ill this general area. There are joint studies going on in the area of
morale, pay, housing, rations, social welfare, family problems, and
leave. All these things bear on a soldier's attitude.
COST TO UNITED STATES OF ARVN PAY INCREASE
The Chairman. Could you put in with that information how
much of the cost of any increase would have to be paid by the United
States?
General Clement. Sir, before I can say, let me see what we can give
you on this, and if possible, we certainly will.
(The information referred to follows :)
Effect on U.S. Supporting Assistance of ABVN Pay Increase
If the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) are granted a 20 percent
pay increase, the cost to the GVN is estimated to be over 24 billion piasters.
A pay increase for RVNAF would not necessarily require an increase in U.S.
supporting assistance. The level of supporting assistance reflects the difference
between the resources necessary to support GVN military activity and the ability
of the GVN to provide such resources from the domestic economy of South Viet-
nam. A military pay increase would require increased supporting assistance only
to the extent that the GVN was unable to transfer sufficient resources to cover the
increase from other sectors of the domestic economy. The ability of the GVN to
effect such transfers in any given instance depends upon a variety of factors, in-
cluding security, levels of domestic production, administrative capabilities, and
legislative authority, to note the most obvious.
PUBLIC RELATIONS ADATISORY FUNCTIONS OF U.S. FORCES
The Chairman. Do the U.S. forces advise the South Vietnamese-
forces on public relations matters?
General Clement. We do have an information advisory element
working with Vietnamese counterparts in the Joint General Staff. We-
also have advisory functions with some units.
The Chairman. You do have advisory functions.
General Clement. We do have an advisory function, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are U.S. reporters allowed to accompany the South-
Vietnamese on combat operations ?
Colonel Wheeler. In the 1st ARVN Division they are permitted
to go as they so desire. I believe when Mr. Moose and Mr. Lowensteiit
were there in December, the same courtesies were extended to them.
540
The Chairman. Are tliey allowed to do so in other divisions or just
the First?
General Clement. I am sure it is a general policy throughout
Vietnam.
The Chairman. In all of these?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman, Do U.S. advisers insist on preparing press
information concerning battle actions involving South Vietnamese
troops ?
General Clement. No, sir, I would say they do not.
The Chairman. If they advise on public relations matters, why do
they not advise on those releases ?
General Clement. Sir, I do not have the detailed infonnation but,
in general, the advice is on the mechanics of handling and doing and
I am certain the substance of releases is under Vietnamese control.
U.S. advisers to SOTJTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY UNITS, 19 71
The Chairman. Can you estimate how many U.S. advisers to
Vietnamese military units will be in Vietnam a year from now ?
General Clement. I cannot give you a precise number, sir; but I
think it will be slightly larger than the 7,000 military advisers that I
have spoken of previously. This is because of the buildup that we have
shown, particularly in the Navy and the Air Force. There may be
some more.
The Chairman. You would not venture a guess or was that de-
pendent upon how many more people are put in their armed forces?
General Clement. No', sir. It is dependent on the buildup of the units
themselves. Principally Navy and the Air Force.
It will be in the area of perhaps another 300 or 400, sir. Again, I
think I can check this more specifically.
U.S. military aid to south VIETNAM
The Chairman. Did I ask you the estimate for the cost to the
United States of the military equipment, supplies, and bases to be
turned over to the Vietnamese in 1971 ?
General Clement. I believe you did. I do not believe we have that
cost for 1971 estimated.
The Chairman. Could you not have that for 1971 ?
General Clement. We do not have it, sir.
The Chairman. You make such projections; do you not? You are
contemplating next year's operations now, are you not?
General Clement. Sir this is beyond my cognizance. I have fiscal
year 1970 costs which I have given you.
The Chairman. Have you given it for 1970 ?
General Clement. I gave you the $1.5 billion, sir.
The Chairman. Do you expect U.S. support for the Vietnamese
military budget to increase in the future ?
General Clement. Sir, I would hesitate to make a guess on these
budgetary matters which are beyond my purview.
The Chairman. Is there specific agreement concerning the amount
of budget support that will be provided for various military purposes ?
General Clement. I really do not know that there is such an agree-
ment, sir.
541
Tke Chairman. From what sources and under what authorization
does the equipment, supplies, and other aid to the Vietnamese armed
forces come?
General Clement. This is under the Military Assistance Service
funded program, sir.
The Chairman. Is that all of it ; or how much of it is provided under
the Department of Defense budget ?
General Clement. I am not sure. The fig^ure that I gave you of 1.5 is
part of Department of Defense budget.
The Chairman. That is Department of Defense. The military aid is,
I thought, part of the AID program.
Mr. Knaur. No, sir; the military assistance for Vietnam was
transferred totally to the regular
The Chairman, All of it ?
Mr. Knaur. Totally in 1966, yes, sir, for the regular Defense budget.
The Chairman. Tlien the whole billion and a half is DOD.
Mr. Knaur. Yes, sir.
U.S. economic aid to south VIETNAM
The Chairman. Only the economic now comes out of the AID.
Mr. Knaur. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How much is that ?
Mr. Knaur. The economic, I do not know.
The Chairman. It is around $500 million ; is that correct ?
Mr. Knaur. I am not aware of that.
assignments of U.S. advisers in \t:etnam
The Chairman. How many advisers are attached to the Vietnamese
Joint General Staff?
General Clement. We have approximately 400 advisers
The Chairman. You have 400 attached to the Joint General Staff.
How many to the South Vietnamese corps commanders?
Generar Clement. The total is just over 3,000. 1 have precise figures.
[Deleted.]
The Chairman. How many are attached to the ARVN division
commanders ?
General Clement. The corps figure of 3,000 actually encompasses
the divisions.
The Chairman. That is corps and divisions ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How many are attached to smaller units than
divisions? How is that broken down?
General Clement. The total figure includes all regimental and
battalion advisers.
The Chairman. How many are in that category ?
General Clement. Well,"^ for example, the 1st ARVN Division
Advisory Team has a total of [deleted] officers and men. That includes
advisers' to the division headquarters and to the regiments, battalions,
and subordinate units. We can give you some figures on division
advisory team strength.
The Chairman. Yes. give us a feeling of how it is divided.
General Clement. Well — and we have the corps figures also.
The Chairman, All right.
542
(The information referred to follows :)
DIVISION ADVISORY TEAM-A TYPICAL DIVISION ADVISORY TEAM ORGANIZATION
Officer
Enlisted men
22
23
9
9
24
24
4
4
1
1
1
1
4
4
Total
Division command and staff advisers .-
Regimental headquarters advisers (3 regiments) _
Infantry battalion advisers (12 battalions)
Armored cavalry squadron advisers (1 squadron) —
Artillery advisory team \
Division recon company team..
Direct support battalion team
Team support branch (administrative, logistical, and security personnel
for support of the advisers)
Total
20
45
18
48
8
2
2
8
21
66
86
152
Colonel Wheeler. In the 1st ARVN Division there are [deleted]
officers and NCO's advising at regimental and battalion level.
The Chairman. Out of about 200 ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Of these advisers, how many are with the Navy ?
General Clement. The Navy has roughly 900, sir.
The Chairman. And how many with the Air Force ?
General Clement. [Deleted].
The Chairman. How many are attached to military academies and
service groups ?
General Clement. That total, sir, is in the Training Directorate and
it runs in the area of 250.
The Chairman. Are there any other advisory positions that
Americans occupy?
General Clement. The logistics advisory positions, sir.
The Chairman. What are they ?
General Clement. It is in the area of 500 and I have the specifics on
it. They are advisers to the area logistics commands and the technical
services, for example.
The Chairman. I believe that one press report we have seen reported
that after the U.S. combat supported logistical troops are withdrawn
from South Vietnam, about 50,000 or more U.S. advisers will be left in
Vietnam indefinitely.
U.S. AD^^SERS left in VIETNAM AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF LOGISTICAL TROOPS
Would you say that is a possibility ?
General Clement. No, sir ; I would prefer to make no comment at all
on what might be left at any time in the future.
U.S. PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO MACV HEADQUARTERS
The Chairman. How many officers, enlisted men, and U.S. civilians
are attached to MACV headquarters at present?
(xeneral Clement. Sir, I will have to get that exact figure.
The Chairman. You have it ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Could you say approximately and then supply the
figure ?
General Clement. I believe MACV headquarters is authorized
about 2,000 military personnel. The civilian strength, I am not sure
about.
The Chairman. Including civilians?
543
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. You can supply the figure. I just wanted to have an
idea of the general size.
General Clement. All right, sir.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)
The Chairman. Do you gentlemen want to question? These are
questions prepared by the staff.
Senator Cooper. I was not able to be at the hearing yesterday. I am
sorrj' I missed being here.
vietnamization
The Chairman. Do you think that Vietnamization has been put to a
test yet ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; in this way. In the territorial forces last
fall and last summer there was an acceleration of the Popular Forces
training efforts by approximately 6 months. This was, what might be
considered a jump on the part of the Government to move these Popu-
lar Forces platoons through these training centers and out into their
hamlets vei7 quickly and much ahead of what initially had been
planned.
This has been done and I believe the general results have been rather
gratifying as far as the Popular Forces platoons are concerned.
This effort is continuing right now.
Another increment is being trained, ahead of schedule again, to go
on out into the hamlets. Of course, sir ; when we talk of Vietnamization,
we are talking of the whole effort which begins with the villages and
hamlets, as Ambassador Colby has covered, and continues up to the
corps level. We try to think of it in the total context— the people's Self-
Defense Force, and the Popular and Regional Forces, and the regular
units.
The Chairman. You think of Vietnamization as far more than just
the military effort.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You think of it as the total concept of building a
nation ?
General Clement. It is a total concept, sir.
lack of combined command in VIETNAM
The Chairman. Why has there never been a unified command for
combat forces in Vietnam ?
General Clement. Sir, MACV is a unified command under Admiral
McCain.
The Chairman. I guess this question means we are talking about the
previous one. Are there any plans for putting U.S. units under Viet-
namese conmiand in the future ? I thought you said they were not under
United States-Vietnamese command.
General Clement. You are talking of a combined command.
The Chairman. Why has there never been a unified command for
combat forces in Vietnam ?
General Clement. I think what was misleading was the term unified
command, that we recognize as such, which means all of the U.S. forces
under one command. No, sir; I know of no plan that envisages a com-
bined command.
544
The Chair:max. "Why has there not been a nnified command for all
combat forces ? "What is the reason there Avas not i
General Clement. Sir ; I really have not gone into that problem in
any detail at all. I could not say.
U.S. CASUALTIES DURING WITHDRAWAL
The Chairman. During the time the United States is in the process
of withdrawing combat forces, will the enemy attack in force, in your
opinion ? We have already really discussed that, have we not 'I
General Clement. I think we have.
The Chairman. You said you did not know. I do not see how you
could know.
General Clement. I think that is a real crystal ball question.
The Chairman. Yes, have you made any estimate of the number of
casualties the United States is likely to suffer under the current with-
drawal schedule ^ Is there any estimate of that ^
General Clement. No ; I know of none, sir.
ENEMY recruitment AND INFILTRATION. 19G0
The Chairman. I think I liave asked you this. What is' the total
enemy recruitments and infiltrations in 1969 ? Do you have any figures
on that ?
General Clement. I do not have any total on this, sir.
morale and tpw\ining of enemy forces
The Chairman. Do you have any comment to make on the morale
and training of the enemy forces? How do they strike either one of
you i
General Clement. Again, it would have to be in general terms.
The Chairman. Sure; give me your impression from your own
experience and from talking to your counterpart.
General Clement. We find, I believe, as with any force, that it is
spotty. For example. North Vietnamese Army units will vary. Up in
the sector where I was in the Americal Division they had NVA regi-
ments there that on several occasions did not do very well. It was very
surprising. We thought they were supposed to be crack troops. On
other occasions, they stayed around for a while and did quite well.
On balance, though, we felt the quality was deteriorating and this is
another aspect of why I think you find the South Vietnamese forces
feel a little bit more confident. NVA leadership in several instances
that I can think of was certainly not the greatest. For example, one
sapper attack on a fire support base last August, near the Hiep Due
region, was really an abort i\e attempt. Here they came in, tipped oft'
their hand. Theii* own supporting fires dropped on tlieir own troops,
which is unusual. They got to the wire and were just alwut decimated.
In fact, there were over 50 killed on the wire and they never did pene-
trate the fire base. That was an example. We had other experiences with
them earlier whei'e they ne\er did such a thing.
The Chairman. Was this attril)utable to tiaining or morale?
General Clement. Tliat is a training aspect.
The Chairman. They were poorly trained.
545
General Clement. I do not make a general statement. I am trying
to give you examples of training where we feel their leadership must
liave been hurt. It has been hurt, we feel. I think another example of
this is that we know, in their infantry battalions, they have ordered
one company now to take sapper training. The sappers, of course, are
the units that try to get into the fire bases. The sapper has been in elite
units in the past and specifically trained for this mission of getting
thi'ough the wire with just a pair of shorts on, a few grenades, cutting
the wire, getting in, getting out on the other side after throwing their
grenades and satchel charges. Eifle companies go out and become
sappers now. We feel they are desperated. Sure it is a training problem.
It is not the way he would have done it earlier. Now, I do not want to
make general statements about it, but we do feel in instances and
perhaps Colonel Wheeler can talk of some, too, that the training is
not up to what it had been before.
The Chairman". That is your estimate. It is not nearly up to what
it was?
General Clement. And I think you are going to find examples of
low morale as we have found, definitely where the Hoi Chanhs come
in through the Chieu Hoi program. In Quang Tin, the province I was
in, I understand 3 months ago they had almost a whole company de-
fect. This is very unusual.
ENEMT training and 3I0RALE
The Chairman. From your experience, would not these two go
together? If they are not trained, then I tliink their morale is bound
to be pretty bad if they do not know wliat they are doing.
General Clement. Again, I think you have to look at the unit and I
would hate to say the enemy morale is low and their ti-aining is no
good. I want to say selectively we have seen examples of it where we
were working against these units and certainly it has surprised us.
The Chairman. I am sure there will be that variation in it. We
ha^-e already discussed the variation in the ARA'^ divisions, but I
guess that the thrust of this is compared to a year ago or 2 years ago,
how it is now. Is it deteriorating or is it as good or is it better?
Colonel Wheeler. I can elaborate in the area which I am familiar
since we have both examples. First of all, the local forces and guer-
rillas. In their case we find their morale is much lower than it was
last year because of the beating they ha\e taken by the AEVX and
the U.S. forces. On the contrary, those forces that come across the
DMZ are normally well trained, well fed, well supplied and they
present a more formidable force. And likewise, the forces that in-
filtrate from Laos. They are normally rei)lacements and in some cases
they are entire units. The morale of the prisoners depends upon the
age and length of service. The younger ones obviously are surprised
and disillusioned at what they find in South Vietnam whereas the
older ones, the more seasoned soldier, has probably made that trip
before and has come back again, hoping this time to achieve success.
Each time they meet with a stronger resistance. I think that we find
the reason that the Chieu Hois are willing to talk and lead us to the
locations of the enemy forces is because they, too, have lost a great
deal of the previous spirit that they had.
546
The Chairman. Is it fair to say from that that the morale and train-
ing of the VC, the guerrilla forces has deteriorated markedly but the
North Vietnamese are about the same ? Is that about a fair summary ?
ACHIEVEMENT OF VIETNAMIZATIOX IX IITH DTA
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir, I would like to give a brief explanation
from the map, if I may, sir, with regard to Vietnamization and how
it is being achieved in our area.
Generally speaking, the ARVN responsibility for the 11th Division
Tactical Area (DTA) which extends north of the Hai Van Pass to the
DMZ, is assigned to the 1st ARVN Division. Major operations con-
ducted by the U.S. XXIV Corps and the 1st ARVN Division destroyed
most of the NVA forces in the lowlands by the end of 1968. The suc-
cess of continued operations conducted by the 1st ARVN Division, the
101st Airborne Division, the 3d Marine Division, and the 1st Brigade,
6th Mechanized Division in the Piedmont region, the A Shau Valley,
south of Khe Sanh and along the DMZ while maintaining pressure on
the VC and the local guerrilla forces in the lowlands resulted in the
enemy forces being well mauled by July 1969. At that time General
Truong made the decision to turn over the internal security of the
lowlands where 90 percent of the people live, to the RF and PF units.
He then concentrated the efforts of the division with the support of
U.S. forces west of QLl, the north-south main highway. Combined
operations with the 101st Airborne Division in the A Shau Valley and
ARVN independent operations in the Piedmont region destroyed the
principal enemy communication/logistical complexes in base areas 101
and 114. This was accomplished prior to the withdrawal of the 3d
Marine Division and the Marine combat support and combat service
support forces in the fall of 196S.
The 1st ARVN Division assumed responsibility for most of the
area previously occupied by the 3d INIarine Division along the DJNIZ in
accordance with a plan agreed to by CG, XXIV Corps, and CG, 1st
ARVN Division. Accordingly, U.S. and ARVN forces were disposed
to insure maximum security to the population. Cognizance was taken
of the forthcoming monsoon season — October to IVIarch — and the
enemy-announced winter/spring offensive. Chieu Hoi's prisoners and
captured documents have since verified the enemy had been denied the
capability of redeploying large tactical forces and resupplying exist-
ing units in the 11th DTA with sufficient food supplies, primarily rice,
from the people in the lowlands. At the same time the NVA has been
unable to rebuild the VC infrastructure which he considers para-
mount to the conduct of a successful major offensive. It is reported
til at the people are enjoying security in this area to a degree never
before experienced. The fact that the RF, PF, and PSDF have pro-
vided most of the internal security while the combat forces were em-
ployed against the NVA is a significant factor in the people's increase
support of the Government of Vietnam.
EXTENT OF PHOENIX PROGRAm's CONTRIBUTION TO DETERIORATION OF
VC OR VCI
The Chairman. Could you say to what extent the deterioration of
the VCI or VC is due to the Phoenix program ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir ; I cannot.
547
The Chairivian. Are you familiar with the Phoenix program?
Colonel Wheeler. I know there is a Phoenix program, sir, but I do.
not deal with it.
The Chairman. You have nothing to do with it ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
The Chacrman. You are aware of its results ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
The Chahiman. Thank you very much, Colonel.
south KOREAN AND THAI FORCES IN VIETNAM
What are the plans, if any, for withdrawal of the South Korean
and Thai forces in Vietnam, General ?
General Clement. Sir, I do not know of any plans. I really do not
know of any plans for withdrawal or their disposition in any way.
The Chairman. Do you know what the total cost of all support pro-
^•ided their forces in Vietnam was last year ?
General Clement Of all support ?
The Chairman. Provided the forces of the Koreans and Thais.
General Clement. No, sir ; I do not.
The Chairman. Do you or does anyone advise with the Thai and
tlie Korean forces the same way they do with the Vietnamese?
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. They have no advisers ?
General Clement. Not in Vietnam.
The Chairman. Do the Vietnamese have advisers with them or are
they entirely on their own ?
General Clement. They have interpreters with them.
The Chairman. They have only interpreters ?
General Clement. We liavc liaison with tliem, but not an advisory
force.
The Chairman. Why would we not have advisers with them if we
have them with the Vietnamese? I wonder what is the rationale for
that.
General Clement. I think it is due to the fact that the ROK's are
well-trained forces.
The Chairman. They are in a strange country, and so on. I would
think they would benefit by advisers. I did not realize thnt. They have
no American advisers?
General Clement. AVe have no advisers with them that I know of.
The Chairman. T am snr]:>rised. I rather assumed
General Clement. I would like to enlarge on that a bit. The liOK's
undertake quite a tremendous training program of their own for the
Popular Forces. Avhich they coridncted last year and arc continuing it.
It is quite a good coiu-se. They train popular forces ])latoon leaders and
XCO's as well as units.
The Chairiman. They train Vietnamese.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The CHAii;:NrAX. T)o the Thais do the same ?
General Clement. I do not believe the Thais do, sir. I do not know
of their program.
The Chairman. Are the Thais combat troops or not? I have forgot-
ten. Do yon know ?
General Clement. Yes, sir, they have combat troops.
548
The Chairman. The Philippines were not combat.
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever had any contact with the Thai forces ?
General Clement. I have not, sir.
The Chairman. Have you with the Koreans ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; with the Korean marine bi'igade U]) in
the north in the sector I was in, Quang Tin.
The Chairman, What was your impression ?
General Clement. We feel the Koreans are pretty o:oocl soldiers.
COMBAT TROOPS REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION OF LOGISTICS FORCES
The Chairman. What is the normal ratio between logistics forces
and combat troops required for their protection ?
General Clement. Sir, this gets back to, I think, an earlier question
of the breakout which we are providing of the ratio of combat to com-
bat support and combat service support. I think this is the question.
The Chairman. This is a further question. If 200,000 U.S. forces are
required for logistics, air and artillery service to the Vietnamese forces,
how many U.S. combat troops wdll be needed to protect them? That is
the thrust of the question. Did we ask that ?
General Clement, No, sir ; you are asking that now. Sir, I really do
not have that figure.
The Chairman. That surely has been considered in the development
of the program of Vietnamization though ; has it not ?
General Clement, Sir, I am certain that there have been many pro-
posals and discussions but there is nothing firm and no decision has
been made. It would be premature to say anything about it.
The Chairman, I would think this would be a matter that has been
discussed and some estimate made as to how many combat troops will
be needed. I have heard the Secretary of Defense himself say, that
of course, there would be a certain number. He did not say how many
of the combat troops would be necessary for the protection of the
logistics people. I wondered if you have such figures.
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. If there is any such study, will you make it avail-
able ? I do not know whether there is or not.
General Clement, If we have it.
The Chairman. At some point I assume you will have to do that.
If you have not done it yet, you will do it I reckon.
Senator Case. I wonder if at that point. I have one or two questions.
The Chairman. I am almost through. These are the stafi' questions.
u,s. SUPPORT after avithdrawal of combat troops
Senator Case. I know they are. I was just thinking about elaborat-
ing on an answer, getting some added impressions to the picture. How
many bases we would have to support with our 200,000 support forces,
how they would be located? Just give us some idea what the whole
country would look like. General, if you have some idea. I do not mean
to interrupt the chairman now, but you might be thinking about this
because I would like to get some idea of what this theater is going to
look like when we get our combat troops out and what kind of a war
it is going to be.
549
General Clement. Sir, I do believe in this general vein, that the
policy has been to stay away right now from figures and projections
nntil the President deems what will be done, at which time the force
that would remain would obviously have to be determined.
Senator Case. We would like to ask some questions later.
The Chairman. I am almost through.
Senator Case. I am not rushing you.
selection and training of U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS
The Chairman. I have only a few more. How are American mili-
tary advisers selected 'i Is there any particular process by which mili-
tary advisers are selected ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; through the career management system
within each service.
The Chairman. Do they have any special training when they are
selected ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; they do. There is a course, for example,
in the Army at Fort Bragg which trains a percentage of these advisers.
The Chairman. Do they receive language training ?
General Clement. Yes, sir ; it varies from 8 to 12 weeks, something
of that nature.
The Chairman. In language ?
General Clement. Yes; there is a percentage of these people who
receive language training.
The Chairman. Do you mean not all of them ?
General Clement. No, sir; it is a percentage that are earmarked
specifically for these advisory positions. Now, for example
The Chairman. Are all of those selected for advisory positions given
language training?
General Clement. No, sir.
The Chairman. AYliat percentage are ?
General Clement. Probably in the area of I'o percent, sir, within the
Army.
The Chairman. Are advisory assignments ever offered to draftees
instead of combat assignments if they would reenlist?
General Clement. Not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. I would assume this is at lower level. I do not mean
at the general level but lower level.
General Clement. No, sir ; at whatever level, sir.
Colonel Wheeler. Normally you will find that your adviser person-
nel arc skilled and more experienced. They are personnel in the NCO
grades. The normal draftee assigned is in a clerical status or some
other nonadvisory capacity.
assignment or U.S. forces withdrawn from VIETNAM
The Chairman. Yes. To what extent are the — I do not know
whether you call them surplus or not — U.S. military forces in Vietnam
being redistributed to other countries in the Far East such as Thai-
land, Formosa, Korea? In other words, are they being brought back
to the United States or being redistributed in other countries?
General Clement. No. sir ; this is the general policy of career man-
agement. In other words, the man's tour overseas is so long and he then
moves to his next station. I know of no specific program that allocates
him to other countries.
550
I
DISTRIBUTION' OF EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN FROINI VIETNAM
The Chairman. I think the thrust of the question is if they are
pulled out of Vietnam will they be brought to the mainland, United
States or put in Formosa, Korea, or Thailand ? I am told this refers to
equipment and arms rather than personnel.
General Clement. I beg your pardon ?
The Chairman. I am told this refers to equipment and arms rather
than personnel. I thought it meant personnel. The equipment is there.
Is it left in Vietnam or is it redistributed in some other Far Eastern
base?
General Clement. It depends on the program itself. Obviously, if
there are shortages in country and the equipment is needed, some
would be earmarked to remain there. Then the total disposition is
made depending on where shortages are and where the equipment is
needed.
The Chairman. But the equi]3ment of these divisions that are with-
drawn is not left in Vietnam ; is it ?
General Clement. No, sir. The divisions, I believe to date have re-
deployed with equipment. Neither the 1st Division nor the 1st Brigade,
4th Division, but the Marines, for example, went out with it and
The Chairman. Do you mean they bring it home with them?
General Clement. Or wherever they are stationed.
The Chairman. Wherever they go they take the equipment with
them.
General Clement. That has been the case. Now, there are examples
also, and this is because of the reequipment program, where the equip-
ment is left in place, t-o save shipping back and forth.
The Chairman. It is left there for the Vietnamese to use.
General Clement. Yes, turned over to them if they are authorized it.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
The Chairman. How many U.S. advisers arc in the field of psy-
chological warfare?
General Clement. I will have to get that figure for you, sir. It is not
a great figure but we do have 27 military personnel authorized in
MACV headquarters as psychological operations advisers.
The Chairman. You do have some.
General Clement. We do have some, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do U.S. units engage in this activity also? In the
U.S. Forces do you have psychological warfare ?
General Clement. Yes. It is called the G-5 section or S-5 section in
a battalion.
The Chairman. What do they do ?
General Clement. Sir, for example from an operational point of
view, there may be a combat action in which the battalion commander
on the other side has been captured or is a casualty. Psychological
operations personnel would develop a program to utilize leaflets or loud
speakers to reach the rest of his unit stating your battalion commander
has been captured. We suggest you come in, turn o^-er your arms and
whatnot. Cliieu Hoi, for example, is this kind of thing. Chieu Hoi
pamphlets are disseminated and this pamphlet is a safe conduct pass
for the man to bring in and he is accepted as a Hoi Chan.
551
The Chairman. Not only our people do this, but you try to get the
ARVN people to do the same thing.
General Clement. Yes, sir, and it is a valuable thing, more particu-
larly with them, because they are talking with their own people, in
their own hamlets and villages,
COST or U.S. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. Do you have the cost to the United States of con-
struction work on American bases last year ?
General Clement. I will have to see what we have.
The Chairman. That is available, I guess.
General Clement. We will have to see.
The Chairman. Do vou have what is planned for this coming vear,
fiscal 1971?
General Clement. We will see what we have, sir, on that.
The Chairman. How much money is being kept aside for the
planned and scheduled construction ? One of the things that interests
us very much is the cost of this operation now and the projected cost
because, as the Senator from Missouri emphasized, money is very tight
in this country.
T[ow much will be spent on construction of South Vietnamese bases
as opposed to our own this year ? Do you have that ?
General Clement. Let us see if we have something.
The Chairman. AVill you supply that? And I would like in that
connection to know how much of it the United States will pay. "Wliat
is the total cost of all U.S. bases in Vietnam and will all of these be
turned over to the Vietnamese ? Can you answer that for the record ?
General Clement. I cannot, sir, at this time. I will have to get
something.
The Chairman. You can give the total cost. You cannot give whether
it will be turned over.
You do know the total cost of all the bases in Vietnam? This is a
matter of record in the Pentagon, I think.
General Clement. I was going to say we will have to dig out
The Chairman. I imagine you have that available. I assume that is
a cumulative total they have to present to the Appropriations Com-
mittee every year. I do not think that will be any surprise to them. Do
you think they have that, Mr. Knaur?
Mr. Knaur. I wall see if we do have it.
Tlie Chairman. What do you do when you go to the Appropriations
Committee and they ask you what you spend ? They know what you
spend. They try to keej) up wath it anyway. They ask you at least. I
will be interested in this connection in what we spend.
(The information referred to follows:)
Military Construction in South Vietnam
During the first nine months of Fiscal Year 1970, Military Construction funds
totalin:; $74.4 million had been obligated to meet South Vietnamese construction
re(iuirements. Projections for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1970 indicate that
an additional $21.3 million will be obligated for this purpose.
In regard to the total cost of all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, military con-
struction in-place totaled $1.53 billion as of March 1, 1970. Of this total. $135.4
niillion n-presented Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces work-in-place. The $1.53
billion represents the total military construction investment in Vietnam, includ-
ing bases, ports, airfields, roads and operational facilities. Working in collabora-
tion with the Vietname.se Joint General Staff, we are making every effort to
552
assure that maximum Vietnamese utilization is made of existing U.S. facilities
which become excess to U.S. requirements. However, we do not anticipate that
all UjS. facilities will he turned over, as there are facilities which are probably
in excess of Vietnamese military reciuirements. These facilities are in locations
which cannot be used by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, in some
cases, U.S. facilities have exceeded their original life exi>ectancy.
SOUTH ^TETNAMESE PLANS TO OFFSET U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL
I think this is the last question I have. I wonder, General, if you
could give this, or perhaps the colonel could as some of these questions
perhaps cannot be answered generally for the whole country as they
can for the I Corps. In your relations with your counterparts, how do
the Vietnamese plan to take up the slack, for example, Colonel
[deleted] ? AVhat are their plans to take up the slack? How are they
going to go about it ?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
[Deleted.]
The Chairman. What is an AO?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
The Chaieman. I understand they are sharing it. We had this ques-
tion yesterday, I think, and I had been informed that there were ap-
proximately [deleted] troops in the I Corps and [deleted] Vietnamese
of which yours is [deleted] I believe.
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. [Deleted.] Wiat I think we are trying to get at is
that you are already deployed, presumably in significant areas. ^Yha.t
do they have in mind doing when these [deleted] leave ? What are they
going to do about that ?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. What percentage do you think of the Americans
who are withdrawn can be replaced with Vietnamese who are now in
training ?
Colonel Wheeler. I know of no figure, sir, that would give you a
percentage. Again, we would, take into consideration that the RF and
the PF are growing in stature. They are undertaking the surveillance
and the security of their hamlets' and villages which releases the
AR VN combat units to go after the NVA forces.
The Chairman. That relates certainly to the question. If I under-
stand what you are saying, the PF and RF are going to take up much
of the slack.' That is what you are saying.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir ; they are now, and that is why the 1st
ARVN Division is in the jungle and along the DMZ making it diffi-
cult for the NVA to infiltrate and terrorize the people.
General Clement. Sir, as a matter of fact, in the delta when our
9th Division came out, this is exactly what happened. The 7th ARVN
Division operates in that general area now.
The Chairman. How do you rate the 7th ?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
The Chairman. New commander?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is he a good one ?
General Ci^.ment. He is very good, sir.
The Chairman. Is he an improvement ?
General Clement. They think highly of him ; yes, sir.
553
The Chairman. Senator Cooper ?
Senator Cooper. Senator Case will be back in a few minutes. He has
some questions. I am very sorry I was not able to come to the meeting
yesterday.
The Chairman. Well, we missed you. I am sorry, too.
Senator Cooper. Thank you. I had other committees I had to go to.
Senator Fulbright asked very comprehensive questions. Perhaps
what I ask has been gone over before. If they have been asked you can
tell me.
SUPPLY rate from NORTH TO SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE BOMBING CESSATION
Since the cessation of bombing of Xorth Vietnam, has there been an
increased flow of supplies from Xorth Vietnam into South Vietnam t
General Clement. Sir, I really cannot give you the data on that as
to what kind of a buildup and what the rates are. I do not have these
figures at hand. We want to be sure we are precise.
"Senator Coopek. Perhaps though your military command observa-
tions you have some precise evidence that Xorth Vietnam has either
diminished supplies or enlarged supplies to its forces in the south. Just
general observations.
General Clement. In the business of intelligence estimates, I would
rather stay on —
(The following information was subsequently submitted.)
Supply Flow From North Vietis'am to South Vietnam
Yes, evidence does indicate that Nortli Vietnam has increased its materiel
support for its war effort in South Vietnam since the bombing halt.
north VIETNAMESE STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA
Senator Cooper. Have the Xorth Vietnamese forces been enlarged
either in South Vietnam or in Laos? Cambodia? Cambodia
particularly ?
General Ci-j:ment. Let me again dig this out. This is in the intelli-
gence business, and we want to be precise in whatever figures we give
you.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)
improved U.S. equipment supplied to south VIETNAM
Senator Cooper. I assume that the L^nited States is now in the
course of providing to the South Vietnamese more effective, better
equipment^
General Clement. Yes, sir.
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMS
Senator Cooper. I am sure that is correct. "WTiat would you say about
the comparison of the arms of the U.S. forces in comparison to Xorth
Vietnam forces ?
General Clement. Sir, I think we have much superior fire power
available.
Senator Cooper. Are our rifles as good ?
General Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator Cooper. Artillery ?
44-70&— 70 36
554
General Clement. Yes, sir. They use mostly rockets. A rocket by its
very nature is a very imprecise weapon, but makes a big explosion and
if it hits near, it causes concern. An artillery piece is much more
accurate and we have a lot of artillery. Our air support again
Senator Cooper. They use mortar ?
General Clement. Some mortar fire, but our artillery will generally
outdistance them all and is more accurate.
Senator Cooper. Have you noticed in the last year or two more
sophisticated items of equipment given to the North Vietnamese
forces ? We have read about their rocket capabilities, and their surface-
to-air missiles.
General Clement. No, sir ; I think a weapon like the AK-40, is a
good one. They have an antitank rocket, the B-40, which is a pretty
good antitank weapon.
Senator Cooper. Surface-to-air. I remember reading Eussia
provided them with this.
General Clement. I really have no knowledge of that kind of
equipment, sir.
TR.\INING of U.S. military advisers and south VIETNAMESE
Senator Cooper. Before the United States became involved, in com-
bat I recall one instance when Senator Stennis in his position on the
Armed Services Committee was managing the defense authorization
bill and appropriations bill. Questions were asked, and in fact he
raised these questions himself, that the type of training that had been
given to the South Vietnamese soldier was not the kind of training
that was needed for guerrilla warfare. It was in 1962 or 1963 that
these questions were raised in the debate on the Senate floor.
I recall I asked him about it and after a year or so, he said that
the proper kind of training had been provided.
Was it correct that at the beginning of your mission that there was
inadequate training in guerrilla type of warfare ?
General Clement. I would like to answer generally, sir, because that
is really before my time in Vietnam, but in general terms
Senator Cooper. I am talking about the training of military ad-
visers ?
General Clement. "Wlien you bring your force into a new environ-
ment you obviously start learning on the ground. Your doctrine covers
so much and as you know, the doctrine of the plan bumps up against
reality and then you start flexibly moving with what is actually hap-
pening. I know that there was a learning curve, if you want to call it
that, as we went into Vietnam.
I assure you we started a lessons learned program which for ex-
ample captures the experience of the First Cavalry Division when
they went in. The lesson learned is used in our doctrine back home.
Vietnamese training includes the same thing. They have a lessons
learned program.
Eemember, sir, they are training themselves in their schools and
training centers. When you go to a Popular Force platoon, these men
come from that hamlet. This is their own hamlet and they have lived
there all their lives. Maybe a young man has been a platoon leader
for 4 years in his hamlet and you query him. You say, platoon leader,
how cio you dispose — this is through an interpreter — how do you dis-
555
pose your platoon? First of all, schematically draw your hamlet. He
will draw the stream, the hamlet, and the street. 'W^iere do you put
your strong point ? Here, here, here, I have one here.
Senator Cooper. Now, if the NVA or VC come from this direction,
who do you communicate with and where do you get your supporting
fire ? Do you sweep afterwards ?
General Clement. Yes, we sweep this way. So through bitter ex-
perience and through long hard experience they have been exposed to
VC and they try to get that right back into their training programs.
Of course, a lot of training takes place. You have the formal pro-
gram and then when you get back in the hamlet it is an on-the-job
program.
So I would say, yes, lessons learned, certainly
DIRECTIOX OF ATTACKS BY NORTH VIETNAMESE
Senator Cooper. I just have two more questions. Is there any pattern
in your direct experience there and your knowledge of the experience
of "our forces there of attacks by the North Vietnamese being directed
preferably at South Vietnamese forces rather than at U.S. forces or
the contrary ?
General Clement. No, sir. Again I will have to speak in general
terms. There was an offensive last summer, I believe it was in August,
or earlier, which was specifically aimed at U.S. fire bases to inflict U.S.
casualties and at the same time attack the hamlets. In other words,
where popular force platoons are. Based on documents captured later,
they were going to hit the pacification program, and inflict U.S. cas-
ualties and, as a matter of fact, it seemed in our sector, ARVN units
were avoided at that time. They had so much ammunition to expend,
and recognize that they do not have a great supply to haul down those
trails. They were hitting U.S. bases, so a part of their policy was to
single out at that time the U.S. forces.
Senator Case. This was last summer ?
General Clement. Yes. Now, more recently I Imow the pacification
[)rogram is a fair target because they recognize, and I believe Ambas-
sador Colby covered this, that the accelerated pacification program of
President Thieu, seems to huve stolen a march on the enemy. In other
words, they got these platoons out into the hamlets before — and this
man on the other side is very meticulous and studies hard — before
lie could crank up a campaign on his side to counter it. But now, yes,
I think you will find that they seem to be going after the pacification
eft'ort. ARVN units selectively have been hit. For example, at Bien
Het and Bu Prang, ARVN uiiits were specifically hit and the fighting
was successfully handled by the ARVN themselves. There were some
casualties there but ARVN inflicted more casualties than they suffered.
This was strictly ARVN. As a matter of fact, up in Bien Het it seemed
to be a test of Vietnamization. Bien Het is in Kontiim Province. Ele-
ments of the 4th Division had been operating up in that area and this
area had been turned over to the ARVN and it seemed the NVA de-
cided to test them.
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield? I need to go to the floor. I
wonder if Senator Case will carry on as long as you care to and ask
all the questions.
Senator Case. When we are finished
556
The Chairman. Just adjourn. Gentlemen, I appreciate very much
your coming here. I have been unable to go to the floor all week, so I
need to go up there now. I have a very important statement I want to
make.
TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Senator Cooper. We heard the U.S. forces had quite an elaborate
commimications and intelligence system in Vietnam for application
of force wherever it is needed ; air power, supplies, evacuation — a very
sophisticated communications network. Is there any training of this
kind being done for the South Vietnamese ? Would they be able to
handle such sophisticated advance commmiications systems?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
Some of these students will go offshore ; by that I mean to Fort ]Mon-
moiith, for example, in the United States. Not many. [Deleted.] They
have a signal school already. It is a big problem. It is being addressed,
and they are being trained right now.
morale of north and south ^aETNAMESE FORCES
Senator Cooper. Are you able to make any conmients to compare the
morale of South Vietnamese forces and 'North Vietnamese forces,
describing their will to fight ?
General Clement. Sir, I think, generally speaking, we feel that the
South Vietnamese morale is pretty good. One example is, I believe,
that they have been able to get out Into these hamlets where they have
not been before. They have been able to accelerate their training. They
have been able to pick up the equipment, the accelerated Vietnamiza-
tion program we have been talking about, and go. They have had some
successes. The two battles that I mentioned are examples. Yes; they
have been in it, did it the hard way, but they did finally come out all
right. In the delta, the 9th Didsion, ARVN, has operated with more
mobility and more rapidly and covered more ground than any division
has done for some time. This is not only in the area where they used
to operate, but also down in the U Minli Forest area, up to the north
and back. So, I say as a general statement, yes.
Now, you are going to find examples where morale is low and you are
going to find that everywhere. However, I do feel that in general they
seem to be getting with it and getting on with it and certainly — one
big thing I think that is evident is the pacification effort with the Pop-
ular Force platoons and regional force companies who are out where
they have not been before.
Senator Cooper. Thank you.
location of U.S. support personnel after vietnamization
Senator Case (now presiding). Please do not hesitate to involve
yourself in this part either. I would like to pick up a little bit, just for
my own benefit, a picture of what we are really talking about here.
"Earlier we discussed the hypothesis that when the period of Viet-
namization was over we would still leave about 200,000 American per-
sonnel in various supporting capacities. I do not ask you to say yes or
no about that figure. But at the time I was wondering if I could get
some idea — assuming that that were true or something like it.
557
Would they all be in Saigon and Danang, a few other places, or the
big harbor we have there or would there be smaller, a number of
snialler units around ? I would like to get some idea of youre and you
particularly. Colonel, in regard to your two pro^dnces up there in the
north, j ust what you envisage.
First of all, let us say how is this support coming in now, and from
where ? And how much from that, if you could extrapolate maybe, just
to get some idea what this picture is again.
General Clemext. Sir, in general I would rather not even project or
talk about force dispositions or locations because again we are getting
into the future where forces might be, how they might be deployed,
things of that nature.
Frankly, I have no specific knowledge of these things and
Senator Case. Well, I know you do not. Let us talk about the pres-
ent, then, in your operations and in the operations of our forces up
there, support troops.
LOGISTIC AXD COMBAT SUPPORT SUPPLIES
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, at the present time I might clarify one point
regarding logistical support. Xormal supplies for the division are
requisitioned through the ARVN channel. This means that their
ammunition, clothing, equipment, rations, et cetera, all come through
the ARVN Army Logistical Command just the same as the U.S.
supplies come through its own logistical system.
Now, for that combat support such as the helicopters
Senator Case. Where is this material? How does it get into the
country and where does it go?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
The helicopter support
Senator Case. That particular operation is conducted by the
Vietnamese Army?
Colonel Wheeler. By the Vietnamese Army. sir.
Senator Case. Under the protection, including
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. What is in that ?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. This is the Vietnamese ?
Colonel AV heeler. Vietnamese helicopter squadron; yes, sir.
Senator Case. And what kind of helicopters? What kind-
Colonel Wheeler. Hueys, UH-IH's, sir. They are used for resupply
and for combat assaults, as required.
Senator Case. Combat assaults. You do not mean that they are fire
ships, do you?
Colonel Wheeler. Xo, sir.
Senator Case. Are there any helicopter fire ships?
Colonel Wheeler. They doliave some gim ships.
General Clement. But they have not been introduced operationally
as yet.
Senator Case. Would you describe one just in a rough general way?
I did not realize we had any helicopter fire ships. I mean fighters.
General Clement. Not fighters as such. They are gim ships and they
have machine cnns mounted on each side of them for protection. They
do not have the Cobras of which you speak. This unit does not have
them.
558
Senator Case. But they do have
General Clemext. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. "Wliich are used in support of ground troops.
General Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. How many of the [deleted].
General Clement. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. That supplies, if I remember, the testimony from yes-
terday about 20 percent of the helicojDter requirement for the South
Vietnamese 1st Division.
Colonel Wheeler. Twenty percent in my division area.
Senator Case. Yes.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. So that means we are now providing 80 percent
roughly.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. Where is that located and what is it and how does it
get in ?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Is that the only supply ?
Colonel Wheeler. There is a requirement for Medevac helicopters.
They are located near the surgical hospitals; the 18th surgical at
Quang Tri and the 85th surgical hospital at Phu Bai.
HELICOPTER SUPPORT
Senator Case. Now, what kind of protection do you have for those,
the helicopter
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. So that as long as we have helicopter support we are
going to be in combat, are we not ? As long as we are providing heli-
copter support we are going to be in combat, I take it, leaving aside —
3^ou do not have lines in this
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir ; we do not normally have front lines.
Senator Care. I mean, it is like the Middle Ages. This is the thing
that I am trying to get at, a picture of what kind of operation this
would be when the so-called ground troops are gone. We are still going
to have to have fighters, fighting men in protection of these various
support operations. Is not that true ?
General Clement. Sir, I think this has been the general thrust of
the announcements to date, the balanced force. In other words, the rate
of Vietnamization is a function of the level of activity and of how
many gim ships are needed for how long. This would be one way of
interpreting that, and if I follow your questioning, again the Paris
talks, the enemy, his activity and what he is doing, so that is why we
cannot really talk too much in the future about the balance or how
many ships are going to be devoted to combat a year from now. These
figures will be — we just do not have them and I believe
Senator Case. But as far as you can envisage in the future and
project from what we are doing now, so long as we have American
helicopter support we are going to have Americans in action. Is that
not true ?
Colonel Wheeler. I would say given that
Senator Case. I am just trying to figure out — we had Americans in
World War 1. 1 remember as a small boy ambulance drivers, and tliey
were not regarded as in action in a sense. But is it not true that the
559
ambulance driver in World War I was a good deal more respected as
a noncombatant than the operations of ambulance helicopters in this
war?
Colonel Wheeler. He is very highly respected.
Senator Case. By the enemy as well ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir. To the extent they know that they are
the ones who get in there and get out the wounded.
Senator Case. And they lay off, in other words.
Colonel Wheeler. I am not certain, sir, as to what the directions are
with regard to the enemy.
Senator Case. What is your experience ?
Colonel Wheeler. We have not experienced any helicopter Medevacs
being shot down.
Senator Case. By the enemy ?
Colonel Wheeler. By the enemy. We know they do come under fire.
Senator Case. They do come\mder fire? By mistake, in your
judgment or deliberately?
Colonel Wheeler. That I could not answer, whether it is deliberately
or not.
Senator Case. You leave me a little confused.
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
effect of U.S. SUPPORT FORCES LEFT IX VIETNAM
Senator Case. My point, though, really is to get an honest and fair
picture of what the American public is going to be looking at as we
move down the line here and — would it be a fair statement? — that so
long as we are in there in any support capacity, or as advisers, whether
in communications support, even medical, certainly as far as transport
and gun ships, there are going to be Americans in combat either
directly with the enemy or indirectly or following their presence there
to protect their own forces? It is not possible to think of us as a non-
combatant so long as we are providing support, is that not true? I am
not saying we should or should not do it. I have not any solution to this
thing. My general impression is if you want my own view just as one
Senator, I am not a dove or a hawk. I have a belief that Hanoi will give
up or do anything that is in its interest. If it is going to get a better
deal now than it will at the end and that is the way this is going to
come up, and what we are talking about is to try and i3ring this to some
situation which will make them realize or believe that they are l-)etter
off now to make a negotiation than later on a basis that is acceptable to
us. Therefore, what we are talking about is some kind of a credible pic-
ture of America — this country supporting this effort for such time as is
necessary to bring Xorth Vietnam to that frame of mind.
That is, I think, what we are really talking about and that is why
I am trying to find out what it is likely to be.
General Clement. Yes, sir. I would have to agree with you that it
depends on time and we are not saying how many or when or what the
nature of the forces and the environment there! ^Whatever forces are
left in Vietnam, including just pure Vietnamese, are going to be ex-
posed to a hostile environment as long as the enemy is there.
Senator Case. I appreciate that and I am sure the committee will
be sure never in any way to misuse it or to prove more than you said
by what you have said or anything else, and if you ever see any of
us doing this, tell us privately, I really mean this because the Lord
knows we are only
560
General Clement. I am just painting a picture
Senator Case. We are only after the true picture and the true
prospect.
CAN DEFICIENCIES IN VIETNAMIZATION STRATEGY BE OVERCOME?
General Wlieeler last month said on this Vietnamization strategy
several things, I would not like to comment, but I base my question on
it, so I will quote :
The question remains, tlien, wliat of tlie leadership, tlie motivation and the
confidence, for these are the ingredients of military success which the United
States cannot provide and they are the ingredients on which victory or defeat
can turn.
Lack of adequate leadership and experience has been a problem at all levels of
command from squad leader to the Division Commander.
He went on :
Rapid mobilization of both the regular forces and the paramilitary forces
greatly depleted the supply of talent, education, and leadership capability. The
numbers of those with potential for advancement is limited.
I should not ask you if you agree with the statement of your superior
officer. Of course, you do. The second one I really want to ask is the
second one here. Can these basic deficiencies be overcome within a
period of 2 or 3 years and if not, how long is it going to take ?
General Clement. This is a very general question. It is impos-
sible
Senator Case. Very general.
General Clement (continuing). Impossible to get the time— —
Senator Case. Another phase of the question, how long.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TRAINING
General Clement (continuing) . To solve these problems. Let me say
this, sir, from the point of view of leadership, one aspect of it is train-
ing and I think I have already mentioned that the training program
is going on. That is good. For example, the Vietnamese military acad-
emy graduated its first class last December. This is a 4:-year course.
Senator Case. How many ?
General Clement. This class was 92 officers at that time.
Senator Case. Graduated ?
General Cle^ient. Yes, sir ; and they are out
Senator Case. Is this across the board, military, naval, air, and
General Clement. Yes. There is an allotment for each service given.
This is one example of growth. Please do not multiply 92 times the
four services. An enrollment of 250 is what they are looking for.
These are regular officers. Lieutenants. I am just giving you an example
of how leadership is coming on.
The Navy and Air Force have their own schools. Thej^ are of short
duration and much more applied to Air Force problems and Navy
problems. Tliey are not the 4-year coui'se. In addition, for senior officer
leadersliip training there is the National Defense College; this is at a
higher leveL
Senator Case. You mean like staff ?
General CLE:\rENT. Like our National War College here, sir, the next
class at the Defense College in Saigon, and they will be coming in very
soon, will be 40. They are selected senior officers, colonel rank, part of
the future leadership. This is part of the program.
I
561
Tu Due, the infantry school, turned out just about 10,000 officer
candidates last year and they anticipate the same kind of a turnout in
fiscal year 1970. These are the young officers.
The NOO courses. There is an NCO academy up at Nha Trang for
Vietnamese noncommissioned officers. This school and all of the other
schools are run by the Vietnamese. This NCO academy, I think, turned
out somewhere in the area of 16,000 noncommissioned officers.
Senator Case. How long is the course for them ?
General Clemext. The NCO course runs about, I think, 16 weeks,
tlirougli that academy. This has been one of the finest academies. We
really want to be sure the quality is there and that putting too many
through too fast does not degrade the quality. This is, of course, a con-
stant problem. This is a trade off.
Senator Case. Have we had a heavy advisory operation in that ?
General Clement. Yes, sir. We have advisers at all of these schools.
Now, for example, I believe at the NCO academy it is probably a total
of 10, eight or 10 men. That would be about five officers and five enlisted
men.
Senator Case, They do not really do much instruction.
General Clement. No, sir ; they certainly do not. The instruction is
given by the Vietnamese. What we do is check on the quality, assist
the counterparts at these schools and advise in the management of it.
Senator Case. Do these Americans have the language?
General Clement, No, sir. You will find very, very few. On the
other hand, you will find that most Vietnamese in responsible ])Ositions
speak English. I myself do not speak Vietnamese. My counterpart
speaks perfect English. This goes on in the combat units as well. In a
few weeks you can learn something about the language, a few of the
general expressions. I would say hello or goodbye, perhaps, but gen-
erally the English language is used and this is not a bar. The program
goes on.
So, these are examples of leadership training and the training cen-
ters themselves. Quang Trung is a nig one right near Saigon, for
example. They train 12,000 or 15,000 men at a time in their training
center and some of these are S})ecific leadership courses that are gi\en.
So, it is being addressed and not taken for granted.
Senator Case. Just a couple of questions that have been suggested by
the staff, if I may. How many ARVN generals have been killed or
wounded ?
General Clement. Sir, that was
Senator Case. This was
General Clement. This has l)een asked and we are going to ha\e to
do some research.
Senator Case. This would be in comparison with the number of our
general officers.
General Clement. That was the context, yes.
SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF 1ST ARVN DI^^SI0N
Senator Case. Is there any plan to make the 1st Division ARVN,
completely self-sufficient so they will not need any American sujiport?
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, the 1st ARVN Division as it is ]^resently con-
stituted, can operate on its own without U.S. support. The U.S. sup-
port is made available so that we may take better advantage of the
562
tactical situation in moving the ARVN combat troops to where they
can decisively and quickly engage the enemy. This is a matter of being
able to use the tactical mobility which U.^. forces have but which is
not organic to the ARVN division.
Senator Case. Again, I suppose this has been covered many, many
times in many different ways but each time we go into it I learn a little
bit. In other words, the 1st Division could subsist indefinitely.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir. The 1st Division as presently organized
can
Senator Case. Can protect itself ; is that what you are talking about ?
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Of that division.
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. This is a very interesting point because it leads to-
ward the question of whether in using other tactics, other strategj- , we
can pull out entirely.
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, they use not only the U.S. tactics, they use
their own. They are quick to adopt any new ideas or means that take
better advantage of the enemy. We have units that use sapper tactics,
the same as the NVA.
Senator Case. Wlien you say we
Colonel Wheeler. Sir, 1st ARVN Division.
You asked me about their contacts with the NVA yesterday. The
most recent contacts prior to my departure, ranged from small squads
to platoon to company size. In all of these the ARVN troops acquitted
themselves admirably and inflicted many casualties on the enemy with-
out suffering any appreciable wounded themselves.
I think this is significant because they plan and they execute very
appropriately, in a limited amount of time, those things which nor-
mally could not be accomplished by a unit that has been recently
activated.
combat system in northern two pro^tcnces
General Clement. Sir, I do not believe you can speak of divisions
uniquely or pull them out and say, therefore, they are self-sufficient.
They are a piece of the whole problem up there in, say, those northern
two provinces and there is a system up there, a combat system which
in^'olves both U.S. and Vietnamese forces at this time. So, I do not
believe we can address it out of context and divorce the whole — the
PF and the RF, and it is going to vary as you look at other locales.
You go to the south and go through the country, you must examine
the problem in the province, in the area, from the point of view of
what the enemy is doing. You must examine the context in which
these operations are taking place. In the delta situation, an analysis
of the enemy actions, of the forces themselves and their combat effec-
tiveness, would undoubtedly be quite different. The environment is
different in the delta from the north. You cannot answer without con-
sidering the whole package of forces that are committed, enemy, Viet-
namese, American, and others, and the kind of sup^Dort given these
forces.
Yes; the 1st Division does a tremendous job. I just want to point
out it is a part of an overall complex, an overall combat system up
there in those northern two provinces.
563
Colonel Wheeler. I would summarize, sir. In my area the United
States and ARVN have not only concentrated their combat forces on
enemy units in the Piedmont and A Shau Valley, [deleted].
But simultaneously, have worked hard on building roads, pacifica-
tion and resettling the refugees. Wlien you combine these areas
together, it builds the total picture and also builds the people's
confidence in their government's ability to defeat the enemy.
SELF-STJETICIENCY OF TWO NORTHERN PR0^'INCES
Senator Case. I have the general impression that those two provinces
may be self-sufficient as far as food goes under normal circumstances.
Whether it is now true or not I would like to have you comment on.
But there is not very much for that they have got there, is that right ?
That is
Colonel Wheeler. They do not have very much industry.
Senator Case. Or no extractive industi-y particularly.
Colonel Wheeler. Not at the present time. They do have a capa-
bility whenever the area becomes secure to go into lumbering and
fishing.
Senator Case. Mining ?
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
Senator Case. There are mines down in — below that, I guess.
General Clement. There are mines.
Colonel Wheeler. South of Da Nang.
General Clement. And sugar cane down in the south, too.
Senator Case. Right now it is not really supporting the operations
going on up there, is it ? /
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.
united states and south VIETNAMESE TROOP STRENGTH IN I CORPS
Senator Case. I suppose in a sense there are — the question is if suffi-
cient U.S. forces were taken out of I Corps to equalize the number of
ARVN and U.S. troops, do you think the situation could be held if the
North Vietnamese decided to make a hard push? That is, could we
equalize enough troops to make our combined force with South Viet-
nam hold against North Vietnamese? Do you have a judgment about
that?
General Clement. I would not want to make a judgment, sir.
Senator Case. In other words, how many troops have we got there
now?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. That is in the I Corps ?
Genei-al Clement. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. And I suppose that — well, while certainly they are
not all in your two provinces, they are available for relief in some
measure and this is an important factor, I suppose, is it not? The
availability — they form a kind of reserve in a sense for operations in
your province, is that not true ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. And now, the South Vietnamese forces there come
to what, something under [deleted].
Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]
564
Senator Case. In your division. What else is there in, say — well,
in the whole I Corps ?
General Clemext. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. We have roughly three times as many now as the
South Vietnamese in that I Corps area.
Colonel Wpieeler. The total figure which the general has given in-
cludes all the service, support and everything Ignited States. We have
not included the AR VN service, and support elements
Senator Case. In our own figures. So the ratio would be even larger
of American troops now.
General Clement. Xo, sir. We have them included in the [deleted].
I would hesitate to add up all the Vietnamese support forces. I have
maneuver battalions here which is again what we were talking about.
Senator Case. I want to be sure I understand. You gave me a figure
of [deleted] that was the total United States.
General Clement. Total U.S. forces but I did not give you the total
AEVN force because I was using combat forces. So, it would be, per-
haps double the AR VN force I gave you.
Senator Case. In I Corps, actually located there.
General Clement. I believe something in that area. We can
provide
Senator Case. So, we have then not three times as many personnel
but something over 50 percent.
General Clement. One and a half. Given those figures. And I may
have to check that.
(The following information was subsequently submitted:)
Teoop Steets^gths in I Corps
The following is the troop strength of I Corps as of January 1970.
U.S. 152. 600
ARVN 80, 800
Senator Case. Now, can you tell us what would be the figure com-
parable in American active forces to the figure you fii'st gave me for the
South Vietnamese combat forces ?
General Clement. That is the 101st Division, the 23d Division, and
the First Marine Di^dsion, and the 1st Brigade, oth Mechanized Di-
vision. This is a rough estimate again, sir. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Does that include the support, that is
General Clement. No, sir. Well, no, this is a division. I am talking
now about combat divisions.
Senator Case. So, in addition we have actually in combat sup-
port
General Clement. Yes ; which would come up to the total of [de-
leted].
Senator Case. That is everything. I am talking about the people
who actually get in there and fly missions.
General Clement. I am measuring combat divisions, so I have taken
the 101st Division, a separate brigade which is up there, and the 23d
Division and Marine division.
Senator Case. We actually have at least twice the combat troops in
this area that the South Vietnamese do ?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
Senator Case. Equal strength in combat effort ?
General Clement. [Deleted.]
565
SIZE OF ENEMY FORCE
Senator Case. So the question, my question then would not be based
on an accurate assumption if I assumed that there was a difference.
Now, that total force has been against, opposed to, roughly over the
last year, what size enemy ?
General Clement. Sir, I would rather — these forces vary, these esti-
mates of enemy strengths. I really cannot
Senator Case. Maybe you can perhaps give a high and a low or
something of that sort for the record.
General Clement. All right, sir.
treatment of prisoners of war
Senator Case. AVliat does the ARVN 1st Division do with prisoners
of war?
Colonel Wheeler. The prisoners of war, sir, are evacuated to their
combined interrogation center and after they are interrogated there,
they are processed.
Senator Case. MHiich is countrywide ?
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.
Senator Case. Have you any observation to make about the manner
in which they are interrogated ?
Colonel Wheeler. Sir
Senator Case. Are we present at these regularly or sometimes or
Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir. At the combined interrogation center
there are some members — Americans there and they are inspected and
the facilities are quite adequate. We liave been — General Truong and
I have been in the field when we have captured prisoners and the U.S.
press has been there. There has been no indication, no observation of
my own to indicate that they have been other than treated with the
utmost care and I would say this is one of the reasons why the 1st
ARVN Division enjoys success, is because most times the prisoners will
lead them back into the areas, and I have a good example of that just
recently.
Senator Case. Is that a matter of policy on their part? Do they
understand
Colonel Wheeler. I believe that is now a policy throughout the
ARVN Army, because your best intelligence comes from the POW and
he knows the area which he left ])rior to being captured.
Senator Case. In other words, they do not feel — the enemy does not
feel it has to fight to the death in order to avoid a worse fate.
Colonel Wheeler. No, sir; and the Chieu Hoi program, I think, has
been coming along nicely.
attitude of U.S. SOLDIERS
Senator Case. Have you any general comments. General, about the
attitude of the American soldier toward the war?
General Clement. Just from my own experience in the 2od Division,
I think the American soldier has been pretty well described by many
of our leaders in this country. He is a pretty well motivated man when
he is given a job and he gets on with it. And I must say it is very inspir-
ing to see the young men come in, put up at a new base in some un-
pronounceable hamlet and see him go about his job, get out, go on
patrol, come back and stay with it.
566
You have examples, I know, that can be publicized but I do not
believe the fact has been equally publicized that these American sol-
diers are very professional and the American is a good fighting man.
By professional attitude I mean the conscript, if you want to call him
that, is a professional and his outlook very quickly gets to be to get on
with the job. You know, in group identification the first thing he thinks
of is his squad, his platoon, his battalion. And this is a function of
leadership.
So, my general observation of the soldier over a period of many
years, they are some of the finest young men we have seen.
Senator Case. I wonder if I could ask you for the record later, or
now if you wish, to answer a list of questions that are jotted down on
this note to me.
ATTITUDE OF U.S. Gl's TOWARD \T:ETNAM WAR
How would you describe the attitude of American Gl's toward the
war?
(The information referred to follows :)
Attitude of the GI Toward the War
The Army has never polled its personnel as to whether or not they approve of
the Army's assigned mission in Vietnam. As in previous periods of armed conflict
the natural instinct for survival is high in the minds of all Army combat per-
sonnel ; the surest aid to survival being teamwork, from the squad level to the
highest command level. Such teamwork inherently encompasses obedience to
lawful orders of duly appointed leaders.
Objectively viewed, it seems safe to assume that any individual — soldier or
civilian — who is faced with possible death has a feeling of antipathy toward the
causative agent, whether it be an active war or a careless driver on the highway.
There is no reason to doubt, however, that the overwhelming majority of soldiers
believe in the necessity of the Army retaining a responsive, apolitical body in
implementing national policy which emanates from the Commander in Chief.
Are draftees offered less dangerous assignments if they will reenlist ?
(The information referred to follows :)
Reenlistment Options, Draftees
It is neither Army policy nor intent to unduly influence soldiers into reenlisting.
It is, however. Army policy to retain on a long-term basis those qualified soldiers
necessary to maintain a trained, experienced force. To achieve this goal a num-
ber of options advantageous to the soldier and the Army are offered as incentives
for reenlistment.
Current reenlistment policy permits personnel serving on their initial term
of service to reenlist any time after completion of eight months service for any
option for which they qualify. There are two options for which such personnel
serving in short tour areas, including Vietnam, may reenlist regardless of the
length of time in the command.
The Present Duty Assignment Reenlistment Option permits an individual in
grade E-6 and below to reenlist and be reassigned to any unit within the com-
mand. However, the unit must have a vacancy for his particular military
occupational specialty.
The second option is the Army Career Group Reenlistment Option. This option
permits personnel in grade E-4 and below to reenlist for training in a new mili-
tary specialty. This is provided the command has the training capability and
a valid requirement for the specialty. In conjunction with this option, the indi-
vidual may request a transfer to another unit. Again, the unit requested must
have the training capability and the vacancy to fulfill the option.
567
statistical data on reenlistment which resulted in transfers from divisions or
brigades to combat support or combat service support units have not been main-
tained in Vietnam. A recent one-time analysis of Vietnam reenlistments indicated
that the majority of personnel exercising these options selected door gunner and
aviation maintenance fields. It should be pointed out that these soldiers, by
reenlisting for reassignment to door gunner duties, have voluntarily continued
themselves in positions with a high combat exposure factor.
RACIAL INCIDENTS
Are there incidents between white and black soldiers ?
Have any of these incidents resulted in a loss of lives ?
(The information referred to follows :)
Incidents Between White and Black Soldiers
Yes, there have been some incidents. The initial racial climate that manifested
itself immediately after the buildup of American forces in SEA and SVN was
characterized by congenial intergroup relations in both the combat areas and the
rear support activities areas. The character of racial relations that developed at
this time was unique in that it incorporated a kind of pervasive intergroup rap-
port and social fraternization which had not been previously demonstrated on
former expeditions of American forces to foreign countries. Following the out-
breaks of racial disturbance in the continental United States in the summers of
1966 and 1967, letters from servicemen and the reports of news men in the area
of SEA and SVN indicated a serious deterioration in relations between the races.
A field visit in October 1968 to SEA by elements of the ODASD (Civil Rights)
revealed that racial tensions were dangerously increasing. In 1969 we witnessed
an increase in overt racial violence. The spate of racial disturbances of serious
magnitude that occurred in July and August of 1969 and earlier in October of
1968 appear to have peaked and at present are in a process of winding down.
Minor disturbances, intolerable though they may be, have persisted to some
extent.
Loss OF Lives From Racial Incidents
We have been unable to identify an instance of a death directly attril)utable
to a racial incident.
I am going to have to go upstairs and vote and we will adjourn the
liearing at this point. I want to thank you both for your patience and
endurance, too.
(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)
j
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
U.S. Economic Assistance Program in Vietnam
TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) pre-
siding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Symington, and Aiken.
The Chairman. Tlie committee will come to order.
opening statement
The committee is meeting this morning to continue its study of
the operations of the U.S. ])rograms in Vietnam.
Thus far in this series, the committee has heard testimony from
U.S. officials in Vietnam responsible for the pacification and the mil-
itary advisory programs. Today the committee will hear testimony
concerning the economic assistance program.
By the end of this fiscal year the United States will have provided
some $4.8 billion in economic aid to South Vietnam, including food-
for-peace shipments.
I would like to emphasize that this does not include the military
assistance or military expenditures; this is economic aid.
Aid to Vietnam in fiscal 1970 will absorb more than one-fourth of
the total ai)j)ropriation for economic assistance. The purpose of
this hearing is to examine how these vast sums are being spent, the
])lans for further U.S. aid to Vietnam, and the assumptions on which
those plans are based, including the prospective imi)act of the Viet-
uamization policy and the withdrawal of U.S. forces on Vietnam's
economy.
The witness today is Mr. Donald G. MacDonald, Director of the
U.S. AID mission in South Vietnam, who is accompanied b}' a number
of his associates. In keeping with the procedure followed in the previ-
ous hearings involving personnel brought back from Vietnam, I will
ask Mr. AlacDonald, and his associates to be sworn at this point.
swearing of witnesses
Would you please stand and raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about
to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
(569)
44-70G — 70 37
570
Mr. MacDonald. I do.
Mr. Sharpe. I do.
Mr. Farwell. I do.
Mr. Ellis. I do.
Mr. Herr. I do.
The Chairman. Mr. MacDoNALD, I notice that your prepared
statement is some 25 pages in length. Do you think it woukl be
feasible for you to put the entire statement in the record for reference,
but summarize it now, because I know you and members of the com-
mittee have limited time and much of this is not news. If you would
pick out those points which you would like to stress, I think it would
be more agreeable, if you are willing to do that.
TESTIMONY OF DONALD G. MacDONALD, DIRECTOR, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, VIETNAM ; ACCOMPANIED
BY WILLARD D. SHARPE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ECO-
NOMIC POLICY, VIETNAM BUREAU, AID, WASHINGTON; A. E.
FARWELL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT,
U.S. AID, VIETNAM ; A. H. ELLIS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR PRO-
GRAMS, U.S. AID, VIETNAM ; AND RICHARD H. HERR, ASSISTANT
PROGRAM OFFICER, U.S. AID, VIETNAM
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, of course, if that is the Chak's pleasure*
I had hoped to be able to
The Chairman. It will take an hour to read it; will it not?
Mr. MacDonald. No, sir; I think I can skim it off in 29 or 30 min-
utes. It is triple spaced.
The Chairman. Go ahead, if that is what you prefer.
Mr. MacDonald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I am
very glad to have this chance to tell you about the economic and
technical assistance programs which my agency conducts in South
Vietnam. I think they have been essential to the overall effort in the
past, and are certainly important to the process you are now examin-
ing— as you indicated, Mr. Chairman — the process of Vietnamization.
Earlier witnesses have said that the j^roblem in Vietnam is not ex-
clusively a military one. It is a situation requiring a whole spectrum
of activity^ — economic and social, political and psychological, as well as
military. It is an uni)recedented struggle and the nature and diversity
of our efforts to deal with it have been, I think, unprecedented, too.
requirement for nonmilitary aid
Substantial nonmilitary aid has been required, just to cope with
the consequences of the military conflict — to sustain the logistics
api)aratus of roads, ports, and harbors necessitated by the war; to
enable a small economy to support a huge defense budget; to ease the
burdens of a civilian population already living within very narrow
means; to give special help to the refugee, the injured, and the other
civilian casualties.
Substantial aid has also been required to help the GVN master
problems of economic and social development. This has entailed an
effort not just to moderate the hardships but to improve the
circumstances of ordinary South Vietnamese despite the conflict and
571
despite the attempts of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese to^
worsen their economic lot. It has also entailed the growing effort of
the South Vietnamese to achieve rapid social change in the midst of
war; to build theh nation as a better place in which to live, not at
some distant time, but today and tomorrow. Finally, it entails putting
down economic foundations now for independence and self-sustaining
growth of Vietnam in the years ahead.
I would like to talk first about the economic problems of
stabilization and Vietnamization.
THREAT OF INFLATION
Most of the assistance AID has provided South Vietnam has been
given to prevent runaway inflation. Without external aid to support
the necessary expansion of South Vietnam's national budget, its
economy would have succumbed to a destructive inflation. The threat
of such an inflation emerged in 1965 as defense spending rose, as U.S.
base building began to put strains on manpower and as Vietcong;
interdiction of transport curtailed the distribution system.
Domestic production fell as farmers were drafted for military
service, were driven from their land, or sought the security of the
cities. Those who remained on their farms produced less, as their
access to markets was cut. In all, over )^ million Vietnamese in the
private sector who had been engaged in economic pursuits were
mobilized to the public payroll and service in the nation's defense.
The most costly declines in production were those in rubber, the
nation's leading export, and in rice, the foundation of the rural
economy. By the end of the 1966-67 crop season, rice production had
fallen by more than one-fifth, requiring South Vietnam to import
more than twice as much rice that year as she had exported only
3 years earlier.
In addition to falling production, there were dangerous increases
in money supply as Vietnam's defense budget and spending by United
States and other free world forces grew.
These three trends — falling production, the mobilization of man-
power to the public sector, and rising expenditures — created a classic
inflationary situation in which too much money competed for too few
goods.
It was necessary to contain this inflationary^ threat, not just to
avoid the kind of economic chaos which has stricken other countries
in similar circumstances, but to preclude the human suffering, despair,
and political instability which would have ensued. To have failed
in this would probably have meant to have failed in the total effort,
just as allied troops were arri^^ng to help South Vietnam avert a
military defeat.
STABILIZATION EFFORT: THE IMPORT PROGRAM
A major feature of the stabilization effort which was begun in
1965 has been a combination of United States and Vietnamese Gov-
ernment (GVN) financed import programs which eased the infla-
tionary ])ressure of the growing money supply by making goods less
scarce. At the beginning of the period, the volume of U.S. imports — ■
that is. Public Law 480 food for peace and food for freedom, and
572
AID imports — was greater than that of GVN imports. These U.S.
imports were substitutes for goods, such as rice, which could no
longer be produced in sufficient quantities, and they met new and
essential demands within the economy created by the war. They
also generated revenues to finance the national budget.
United States financed commercial imports peaked in 1966 when
AID and the Department of Agriculture provided $335 million in
commodities. In succeeding years South Vietnam's foreign exchange
receipts rose with an increase in spending by free world forces. This
was largely dollar spending by the U.S. Department of Defense for
its piaster needs. As this occurred, AID import financing was cut
back to shift more of the import bill to the Vietnamese to avoid
unwarranted buildup of their foreign exchange reserves.
Total commercial imports financed under both j^rograms rose
from $282 million in 1965 to $659 million in 1969. During the same
time, Mr. Chairman, government revenues derived from these im-
ports which were needed to finance the wartime budget shot up
eightfold, from about 6 billion piasters in 1965 to about 52 billion in
1969, the latter amounting to some 36 percent of the national budget.
STABILIZATION EFFORT: MONETARY REFORM
A second major feature of the early stabilization effort was de-
valuation of South Vietnam's currency in June 1966, to a new rate
of 118 piasters to one U.S. dollar, roughly one-half of its previous
worth. This increased the price Vietnamese importers were required
to pay in piasters for the same amount of goods, lowered demand for
imi)orts, and reduced the need for foreign aid to finance them.
The Chairman. What is the black market rate?
Mr. MacDonald. Pardon, sir?
The Chairman. What is the black market rate?
Mr. MacDonald. The last quotation when I left last week was, I
believe, 356 last week. I do not know what it is today. We can supply
that sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
Black Market Rate for U.S. Dollars (AID)
The black market rate as of Mar. 9, 1969, was 362 piastres to the dollar.
STABILIZATION EFFORT: INTERNAL TAXATION
A third feature of the overall stabilization effort has been a con-
tinuing im]H-ovement in the administration of internal taxes, as
distinct from revenues from imports. There have been improvements
in collections and revenues have increased substantially from 11 to
37 billion piastres in the last 4 years, but most of this increase is
attributable to inflation. Much obviously still remains to be done.
The Ministry of Finance is introducing improvements and striving
for better performance. A 35-percent increase of 13 biUion in revenues
from internal taxes is expected in 1970.
STABILIZATION EFFORT: DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
A final feature of the overall stabilization effort has been the series
of measures which the South Vietnamese have undertaken with our
573
help to encourage domestic production, to restrain imports, and check
their rehance on foreign aid. Imports financed under AID's commercial
import program include, in addition to essential consumer goods,
basic raw materials and selected ca})ital equipment to maintain and
increase domestic production. Among the most important of these,
as an example, has been fertilizer. It has been subsidized to induce
farmers to use it, and during the last 3 years its importation and
distribution have been transferri*d from less efficient bureaucratic
hands to the private sector. The use has doubled in that time.
But Vietnamese policy actions have also been required to achieve
domestic production increases. In 1967 and again in 1968 the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam raised the price of rice, a politically difficult
move, in order to provide incentiA^es to farmers to grow more of it.
These price incentives and — for the first time in history — the ready
availability in markets throughout South Vietnam of agricultural
inputs of all kinds, of fertilizer, pesticides, and ])umps — combined to
make })ossible in late 1967 a dramatic new program to increase rice
])roduction through the introduction of the now well-known miracle
rice seeds from the Philip])ines. The ambitious goals the Vietnamese
set for the raj)id introduction of these miracle seeds, despite the sub-
stantially complicated cultivation jjrocedures they requke, are being
met. Production of all kinds of rice for the current crop year is ex-
|)ected to be 5.1 million metric tons, the best since 1964, and the
Vietnamese foresee self-sufficiency beginning in 1971.
RESULT OF STABILIZATION MEASURES
What has been the result of these stabilization measures?
The basic result has been to avoid the runaway inflation that was
threatened and to slow the rate of ])rice increases. From July 1966 to
January 1970, a jieriod of 3% years, the average annual rate of increase
in the cost of living in Saigon was held to 27 percent. That is a lot of
inflation, but it is strikingly less than the 150 i)ercent annual rate of
increase \\hi('h occurred in Korea in the com])arable period from
1950 to 1953, bringing with it in that country and at that time not
just austerity, but \\i(lespread suifering.
In contrast, there has been no hardship from purely economic
causes for most South Vietnamese families since 1965. If anj'thing,
price inflation has probably been exceeded by an increase in average
family real income, as the old economy of traditional underemploy-
ment— which was further depressed by heavy migration to the cities
at the beginning of this ])eriod — to one of full emi)loyment with jobs
for all employable members of a family. I cannot j^retend that good
statistics are ke])t on all these things, but it is clear, I think, that more
South Vietnamese are gainfully employed than ever before; they
have a more varied and nutritious diet, and the}^ have access to a
range of ])roducer and consumer goods which have ex})anded their
social and economic horizons.
From the foregoing you might conclude, Mr. Chairman, that we
are overly content that efiorts we made to maintain relative stability
in Vietnam's economy have been successful. We are not. There have
never beeji grounds for com])lacency in my time, at least, nor are there
in the time ahead. Fighting inflation in wartime is hke running a
high-hurdles race; there is always a new obstacle just ahead. The
economic impact of Vietnamization is the next hurdle.
574
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF VIETNAMIZATION
Decisions taken in June 1969, setting higher South Vietnam force
levels, made possible the beginning of the reduction of U.S. troop
levels. But they called for a projected increase in the GVN defense
budget of almost 40 billion piasters, nearly a doubhng of the defense
budget, and this immediately intensified inflationary pressures. As a
corrective measure, in October 1969 the Government decreed heavy
increases in import taxes on less essential goods. In 1970 these austerity
taxes will nearly double revenues derived from imports by raising an
additional 30 to 35 bilhon piasters, and in so doing will be a major
factor in financing the initial costs of Vietnamization. But, they will
not be enough. As^ American servicemen leave. South Vietnam's troop
levels and its defense spending will necessarily continue to go up.
The defense budget will grow further still as U.S. mihtary base facil-
ities, naval vessels, aircraft, and artillery are transferred to Vietnam-
ese forces, introducing heavy new maintenance and operation costs
to the budget.
We believe it is essential that the Vietnamese prepare to do as
much as they can themselves to meet these rising costs of Vietnarni-
zation. They have been doing a great deal to cut least essential
activities from their budget and to increase their tax collections; they
can be expected to continue these efforts. And their success in reversing
the decline in domestic production triggered by the war has already
been remarkable, I think. But there should be renewed emphasis,
despite the war, on the development of domestic production to begin
to reduce the need for imports and for foreign aid in the time ahead.
There are several opportunities to increase domestic output and some
export potential as well, even in the relatively short run. Naturally,
however, with 1.1 million men out of a population of some 17 million
soon to be under arms — and I would interpose here, Mr. Chairman,
that this is a defense force in the magnitude of 13 to 14 million people
in American population terms — with such a force soon to be under
arms and with the economy ah-eady in the condition of over-full
employment, increases in domestic output and export expansion will
come slowly.
A hidi level of U.S. economic assistance will be needed in the next
few years to help finance the cost of Vietnamization. We have not yet
determined the levels of assistance which will be required. When the
conflict will end, how it will end, the rate at which U.S. forces will be
withdrawn, the level of Vietnamese forces that need to be retained
after the war, are all questions which have a bearing on these require-
ments and which we do not have answers to today.
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE
Let me turn now to another facet of the AID program, our assist-
ance to the South Vietnamese and their efforts to achieve rapid social
change.
Colonialism established economic and social patterns inadequate
to the needs of an independent Vietnam. The French left a limited
range of social services, established to support and perpetuate their
position as the occupying power. They left a French-orient^ed school
system providing French education to children of the Vietnamese
elite; health services largely Umited to the capital and province towns,
575
administered by French or by French-trained Vietnamese; a system
of government administration geared to a colonial society, staffed by
Vietnamese trained more to control than to serve. These Government
functions had three things in common: They were highly centralized,
preserving authority in a few hands; they were static, drawing on the
experience of the occupying power, without the potential for self-
evaluation or constructive change, and they were intended to per-
petuate the privileged position of the elite.
With independence. South Vietnam was hard-pressed to maintain
even these limited kinds and levels of administration. Partition had
denied it most of the nation's industrial base and much of its ability
to school and train its manpower. Moreover, South Vietnam's leader-
shi]) came to the task of nation-building with a sense of aspiration,
perhaps, but with few clear goals, and it tended to think in terms of
continued centralization, autocracy and privilege.
Yet, that leadership sought foreign technical assistance to help begin
a process of evolutionary change. And in 1965, even as the war intensi-
fied, the nation's leaders consciously converted that process of evolu-
tionary change to an attempt at social revolution. During a time of
war, when government services are traditionally curtailed, the Gov-
ernment sought to create a system of universal free education. During
a period when it was swamped by the problem of caring for refugees
and the war injured, it nonetheless embarked on programs to develop
a capacity to deliver health services to all Vietnamese. During a
period of widespread insurgency when, on the evidence of history,
the Government might have been expected further to centralize
power, there was a restoration of constitutional authority and the
delegation of governmental power to newly elected — not appointed —
village officials.
During a period of budgetary deficit, the central Government
chose to share with people in local communities control over national
resources and the means to modify the envii'onment in which they
lived. All these efforts were undertaken as invasion and externally
stimulated insurrection threatened the very existence of the nation.
I cannot, Mr. Chairman, in my opening statement, cover the full
array of government services bemg developed in South Vietnam, so
I will limit my comments to two key areas — education and land re-
form— and attempt to deal ^^ith other areas as you may ^\-ish later.
EDUCATION
Vietnam has adopted education as a vehicle of economic and social
change, as a visible evidence of government responsiveness to public
demand, and as a force for national unity. The full effort encompasses
the training of teachers and the creation of a normal school system
to accomplish that, the preparation and printing of Vietnamese
textbooks, the revision of an old French curriculum to one based on
the needs of today, and the construction of classrooms and schools.
As a result, the number of children enrolled in primary school has
risen since independence from about 400,000 to 2.3 million today —
or nearly 82 ])ercent of the primary school age population of the
country. These are obviously not only the children of the elite.
This revolution in education lias received the support and active
participation of the population at large. Since 1966, some 2,000
576
Student-Parent Associations have been formed, with one-half miUion
members. People in local communities are contributing their own
resources — their money and labor — to the construction of additional
classrooms. A threefold effort has been launched to further decentralize
this national education. This effort is encompassed in a decision taken
by the Ministry of Education last year to delegate to local communities
administration of primary and secondary education, in efforts of the
Government to revitalize the collection of local taxes by local com-
munities, and in a delegation of authority for them to spend the
revenues they collect, and finally, in the installation of a nationwide
community school program involving participation by the school in
the life of the community.
We realize that numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The
system is numerically strong, but still qualitatively weak, inade-
quately staffed and struggling to handle its swelling tide of students.
But it is also a system possessing a leadership capable of distinguishing
between planning and dreaming, which has made a breakthrough in
mass education that many countries at peace in the world are yet to
begin. And it is a system already working on the next generation of
problems — the problem of keei)ing children in school longer, of evolving
a pattern of secondary education which matches the nation's needs for
skills; of modifying the university system further to produce the
engineers, agricultural scientists, and business administrators who
still largely seek their training abroad.
The Vietnamese have, of course, received a great deal of help from
us in realizing these accomplishments, but I would stress very much
that the end product is wholly Vietnamese. The primary school
system is now a matter of some 40,000 Vietnamese teachers instructing
2.3 million Vietnamese children in 32,000 Vietnamese classrooms,
using 16 million Vietnamese textbooks.
AID once had 20 primary school advisers working with the Ministry
of Education. Now there are two.
LAND REFORM
Another matter of great economic, social and political importance is
land reform. The Government of Vietnam has given increasing atten-
tion in the last 2 years to long-standing programs intended to transfer
the ownership of more of the nation's rice lands to those who till it. Of
more recent vintage is President Thieu's revolutionary land-to-the-
tiller bill, which would abolish tenancy conij^letely in Vietnam. This
bill has been passed by the Senate and will soon be sent to the Presi-
dent for confirmation and promulgation.
The current emphasis on land reform is a logical extension of
policies which have been carried out — sometimes vigorously, some-
times not — over the past 17 years. Prior to independence, most of the
land in agricultural production was owned by the French or the
Vietnamese elite. The first significant reforms were taken by decrees
in 1953 and 1955 to protect the security of tenants under rental
contracts and to limit rents to 25 ])ercent of the value of the crop.
These regulations were difficult to administer and were not uniformly
a])]5lied. But they had a good effect, strengthening the tenant in his
rehxtions with his landlord and generally lowering rents, which had been
577
in the range of 45 to 55 percent of crop values, to an average of about 35
percent.
Next, in 1956, the Government, by expropriation, reduced to 250
acres the amount of rice hind wliich any individual could retain, and
in 1958 it acquired the rice land holdings of French citizens. In total,
the Government took ownership of about 1.7 million acres. By 1961,
the program of redistributing the cultivable portion of these lands —
which had gotten off to a reasonably good start in the fifties — fell
prey to maladministration, deteriorating security, and the preoccupa-
tion of successive national leaders ^ith pohtical survival. The distri-
bution of these lands became painfully slow; only 6,000 acres were
distributed annually from 1962 to 1967.
Then, as security improved in 1968, the Government gave renewed
priority to land reform. With some technical and financial assistance
from AID, it revamped its administrative machinery. Procedures
were simplified; purchase payments by cultivators were waived, and
a nationwide freeze on occupancy and rents was decreed by the
President. In the ensuing 2 years," a quarter of a million acres were
distributed. Distribution of the approximately 185,000 remaining cul-
tivable acres held by the Government is ])lanned to be completed this
vear. These programs will have reduced the percentage of rice lands
tilled by tenants from 77 percent in the mid-1950's to 58 percent at
the end of this year.
However, the land-to-the-tiller bill just passed by the National
Assembly calls for the redistribution of 3.2 million acres to at least
600,000 farm families comprising about 4 miUion of South Vietnam's
17 million people. When enacted into law and if successfully carried
out, it may eliminate tenancy in South Vietnam within 5 years.
The foregoing is not to say that a social revolution, American-style,
has been accomplished or even that the end result can be fully dis-
cerned. But the leadership of South Vietnam has begun and is pursuing
a process of enlightened social change.
PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN POSTWAR PERIOD
Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment briefly, last of all, about
South Vietnam's longer-range i)rospects for development in the j)ost-
war period. Whatever the uncertainties about when the conflict will
end and what kind of peace will follow, there are several constants
in this longer-range equation.
The first constant is the constant of faciUties. Vietnam will need
to reconstruct damaged facilities and repau- others which have
deteriorated from lack of maintenance. Secondary roads and bridges,
irrigation canals, and salt water intrusion barriers will need early
attention.
The problems of inadequate public utilities and housing in urban
centers whose poi)ulations have doubled since 1965 are becoming
urgent and will be diflacult. Difficult, also, will be the traditional dis-
locations in the transition to peace, particularly the problem of
unemployment.
On the other hand, South Vietnam is generously endowed with
natural resources. The fertility of the rich delta soil is unsurpassed in
Southeast Asia. Double cropping and extensive crop diversification
practices are already under way and can be steadily extended when
578
peace comes. The forests in the highlands are largely iinexploited and
offer excellent prospects for timber and processed wood production.
Rubber, once Vietnam's leading export, could rather quickly, we
believe, regain a position of importance. Fisheries offer another area
of a known but as yet virtually untapped resource. I have already
mentioned rice, which is approaching self-sufficiency in 1971 and may
again become a significant export. These are only a few. The whole
gamut of potential Vietnamese exports in the 1970's is really very
favorable. A study completed for AID just last December by David
Lilienthal's Development & Resources Corp. suggests potential export
earnings in 1980 could be as high as $425 million compared to the
meager $15 million in 1969, or prewar peak earnings of $84 million
in 1961. And exports should be just the "top of the development
iceberg/' supported by more extensive domestic production substi-
tuting for many of today's imports and answering domestic con-
sumption needs.
Moreover, South Vietnam will possess many excellent infrastructure
assets for a country of her size and at her stage of development.
First-class seaports, airports, warehousing facilities, and excellent
major road arteries will be in place and in use.
And South Vietnam will inherit from the war years, also, a large
reservoir of literate manpower, trained to comparatively high levels
in diverse military-civilian technical and management skills.
Finally, the GVN is trying to put its planning house in order. The
President of South Vietnam last fall appointed a Special Assistant
for National Planning, who is now working up relatively short-term
development projects. And the Vietnamese and we have already
looked further ahead to a period when it will be possible to engage in
projects of broader economic development. The committee has been
furnished copies of the three-volume study of March 1969, entitled
"The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam: Policies
and Programs," prepared jointly by a grouj) of Vietnamese Govern-
ment and private American experts, which I would be pleased to
discuss later, if the Committee wishes.
FOREIGN AID REQUIRED FOR POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT EFFORT
Foreign aid mil be requu'ed by the Vietnamese in their longer range
development effort.
I must not give you the impression, however, that only American
help should or will be sought. The Vietnamese and we are in frequent
consultation with the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank,
the several technical assistance agencies of the United Nations, the
Japanese and other governments about development and investment
opportunities. We are very much encouraged by the interest others
have shown recently in playing a role in the development of Vietnam
when peace comes.
From a purely economic point of view, this should be an exciting
decade for South Vietnam. Given a chance at peace, it could, I believe,
be the transitional decade in which South Vietnam could attain a
state of self-sustaining growth without the need for continuing, con-
sessional aid thereafter.
579
PRESENT U.S. ECONOMIC ROLE IN VIETNAM
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I conceive of the U.S. economic role in
Vietnam today not only as one of assistance to Vietnam to carry the
burdens of a costly military conflict, but, simultaneously, to help
Vietnam plan for economic s(>lf--5iifr:( ieiH-^r.
Mr. Chaiiman, there are many things about om' aid to South Viet-
nam I have not mentioned. I have tried to spare you a too-long recital
of facts and figures and confine myself to the main purposes and
elements of the Vietnamese efforts we assist, in the expectation that
members of the committee will have manj' specific questions, and I the
opportunity to respond to them.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I am very apprecia-
tive for having had the opportunity to make it.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.
BACKGROUND OF WITNESS
Tell me, Mr. MacDonald, how long have you been in the AID
organization?
Mr. MacDonald. I joined it in 1952, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. How long have you been in Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. 1966, the late summer of 1966.
The Chairman. Where were you prior to that?
Mr. MacDonald. I served a very short tour in Nigeria, where I
had been assigned, expecting to stay for several years, and then was
asked to come to Vietnam.
Prior to that time, sir, I served as the AID Chief in Pakistan. I w^as
in Pakistan about 4 years.
The Chairman. You have been approximately 4 years in Vietnam.
Where are you from in the United States, Mr. MacDonald?
Mr. MacDonald. I am a resident of the State of Vermont.
The Chairman. That is a coincidence. [Laughter.]
Senator Aiken. Now be careful.
The Chairman. I did not know you had been so successful in
staffing the agency. [Laughter.]
U.S. OBJECTIVE in VIETNAM
Mr. MacDonald, since you have been there 4 years, I wonder if you
could tell me what do you think is the purjjose of the U.S. efforts in
Vietnam? What is the ultimate objective? Why are we there?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, in pursuit, Mr. Chahman, of national
interests.
The Chairman. Whose national interests?
Mr. MacDonald. In pursuit of what the Administration conceives
to be American national interest.
A shorter and more direct answer to your question is that in 1965,
the beginning of the period that I am discussing, our gi^eat effort
was to attempt to help the South Vietnamese avert defeat which
seemed
The Chairman. To do what?
Mr. MacDonald. To avert defeat in 1965 and 1966.
The Chairman. Defeat by whom?
580
^fr. MacDonald. By their enemies, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairmax. Who are their enemies?
Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, the North Vietnamese and those
within South Vietnam externally stimulated by the North Vietnamese
are their enemies.
The Chairman. I did not anticipate your going back to 1955, but
were there substantial numbers of North Vietnamese in South Vietnam
in 1955?
Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, my reference was not 1955.
The Chairman. You said 1955.
Mr. MacDonald. No, sir; I said 1965. I am sorry.
The Chairman. You do not have to lean over. Pull the microphones
closer to you and it will be much easier to hear you. Both of them are
movable and it will make it much easier for you to speak into the
microphone.
This story you give of what you are doing there is, of course, a very
a])i:»ealing one. I still do not quite understand why my constituents
ha\e a vital interest in ^\-hat happens in Vietnam. I wondered if you
could enlighten me a little because they ask me all the time in letters
and I find it very difficult to justify the taxes that they pay to support
the Vietnam AID program. I wondered if you could give me an idea
of what you would say to a farmer in the Ozarks as to his great interest
in what takes place in Saigon.
Would you help me on that?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I
would recall that I am the Director of the U.S. economic and
technical assistance program in Vietnam.
The Chairman. Correct.
Mr. MacDonald. This is my responsibility. It is also my compe-
tence and I am prepared to i^rovide you all the information that I
possibly can on that.
I would respectfully suggest, sir, that the questions that you are
addressing to me are of a political nature that are not in my field of
competence or responsibility.
The Chairman. That is a perfectly valid answer and I accept it.
I do not think it is in my competence either. I do not know of anyone
who has been here who could explain it satisfactorily to me, but I
thought you might give it a try. You have been there 4 years. You
have observed it and you are better prei)ared than most of them.
amount of fiscal year 1970 AID PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Coming to your statement, you say this statement is to give us what
was within your competence. I do not believe you gave in your state-
ment the amounts involved in the current fiscal 3*ear in the AID pro-
gram in Vietnam. Is it in your statement?
It seems to me you carefully, or at least inadvertently, avoided
giving any figures about our current amounts.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes. As I said in my conclusion, I said I had
hoped to spare you too full a recital of facts and figures. I have these
figures.
The Chairman. I wish you would give them. You might suspect
that we would be interested in the amounts. Nearly all legislators are.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir.
I have come fully prepared.
581
The Chairman. I wondered why you avoided that in any of youi'
statements. There are no amounts about the current or ]nist year.
Would you read them now?
Mr, MacDonald. Yes.
The amounts that we estimate for the cm-rent fiscal year of 1970
broken down by
The Chairman. What is the total?
Mr. MacDonald. The total is $498.5 million, excluding an alloca-
tion to my mission of about $1 million from agency- wide administra-
tive appropriations.
The Chairman. $498 million in economic assistance. That has
nothing to do with military assistance?
Mr. MacDonald. That is correct.
The Chairman. Does that include Pulbic Law 480?
]\Ir. MacDonald. That includes Public Law 480.
The Chairman. Then if you wish to break it down, into what is it
broken down?
Mr. MacDonald. The AID portion of that total figure is $352
mihion. I can break that further, Mr. Chahman. There is $132 million
devoted to project activities of the sort that I referred to in my dis-
cussion of technical assistance in such fields as education and hmd
reform, and an additional $220 million to finance the commercial
imi)ort program that I cited in my statement as a major tool in the
anti-inflation and budget revenue generation effort, for a total of
$352 million under AID.
Under Public Law 480, there is $107.1 million for tiile I commodi-
ties which, as j^ou know, are sold within the connnercial community
of the country, and another $39.4 million of title II commodities
which are not sold but granted to needy people in South Vietnam.
It is a grand total of $498.5 million.
spending by united states and other free world forces
The Chairman. You sny in y(nu- statement that the "spending Iw
United States and other free world forces grew," but you do not give
the levels.
What was the level of siKUiding by United States and other free
world forces? What are the free world forces you are thinking of?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, I do not have every year at my fingertips,
but this year our expectation is that U.S. spending will be $354
million, and if my memory is clear, about $45 million of these pur-
chases will go for personal i^iaster purchases, and the remaining $309
million will go for official requirements to service American-based
facilities, and thhigs of that sort, $354 million this year.
The Chairman. Who are the other free world forces? T did not
follow that.
Mr. MacDonald. The allied countries who have forces fighting.
The Chairman. Do you mean the Koreans?
Mr. MacDonald. I mean the Australians and the
The Chairman. There are very few Australians. The Koreans are
the only substantial force in numbers; are the}^ not?
Mr. MacDonald. They are the largest.
The Chairman. Is that whom vou mean?
582
Mr. AIacDonald. I mean all the allied forces who are there, the
Koreans and the Australians and others.
The Chairman. You are counting this as the money they are spend-
ing, but all the money they are spending we are furnishing them; are
we not?
Mr. MacDonald. Not all, Mr. Chairman, not all. Not the
Australians.
The Chairman. No, not the Australians. Are we not furnishing the
Koreans their expenses?
Mr. MacDonald. I have no competence in that.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. MacDonald. I think that is a military question. I do not know
the arrangements.
U.S. agreement concerning KOREAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. We have had evidence. I thought I would like to
put it in here. We made an agreement with the Koreans to transport
them to Vietnam, feed them and pay them.
I thought you knew that. The famous Brown letter has been widely
publicized, but it is not directly your responsibility.
EXCHANGE RATE OF PIASTER
With regard to monetary reform you say in your statement that the
piaster was devalued in 1966 to a rate of 118, and today the black
market rate you said is 386.
Mr. MacDonald. I said 356 last week.
The Chairman. 356. Do you think there should be a further
devaluation?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, the exchange rate is not a terribly com-
plicated thing, but it is not quite that simple.
As a practical matter, the Government of South Vietnam has what
can only be described as a multiple exchange rate system. There is
not a single exchange rate against which all imports come into the
country.
For instance, in my opening statement I made mention of the
emphasis that we gave to the importation of fertilizer, and I think I
added that it was subsidized to induce farmers to use it. Fertilizer
enters the economy at the very, very low rate of 80 piasters to 1 dollar.
That is even lower than the 118 which is legally the official rate.
I might as an aside say that the 80-to-l rate is probably a Uttle too
low.
The other end of the spectrum, Mr. Chairman, will take you all the
way to, for a car for instance, something on the order of 1,005 to 1,010
piasters to 1 dollar. They have a series of customs and austerity taxes
which are applied over and above the basic 118 rate, so there is in
effect a multiple system.
FISCAL YEAR 1970 ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM IS A GRANT
The Chairman. Before I move away from it, the $498 million is
not loans; that is a grant?
583
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, all these figures, sir, that I have given so
far are grants.
In an earlier time there were a few dollar loans made.
PAYMENT FOR IMPORTS
The Chairman. Is the United States paid in piasters for the
unports at all?
Mr. MacDonald. Not for AID; but PubKc Law 480 title I foods are
sold by the United ^States to South Vietnam for piasters, 20 percent
of which are returned for U.S. uses.
The Chairman. When you ship in televisions, are you paid for
them or are they given to the people or the recipients?
Mr. MacDonald. AID does not finance TV sets in its commercial
import program. All of the goods which enter Vietnam under import
programs enter through normal commercial channels under business-
like procedures.
The Chairman. Do they pay at the official rate?
Mr. MacDonald. They pay at whatever the effective rate is for the
article. As I have indicated to you the farmer will pay but 80 piasters
for
The Chairman. It is a variable rate; there is no definite rate.
Mr. MacDonald. There is an official basic rate of 118 per dollar.
The Chairman. What is the significance of that if it is not used in
imports?
Mr. MacDonald. It is a base from which one can dei^art to sub-
sidize a particular commodity which it is imi)ortant to make available
for widespread use, or to restrict the importation of other goods by
putting on very high austerity taxes.
1971 BUDGET REQUEST
The ChXirman. What is the estimate of next year's budget? What
is next vear's budget request?
Mr. XIacDonald. 1971 has not yet been finally determined, Mr.
Chairman. I believe that my superior, Dr. Haimah, is scheduled to
make an appearance, if not tomorrow, early next week before the
Subcommittee of the House Approjjriations Committee. Decisions
have not yet been made as to the levels that will be sought.
U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO HELP FINANCE VIETNAMIZATION
The Chairman. You say in your statement that "a high level ofU.S.
economic assistance will be needed in the next feN\- years to help finance
the cost of Vietnamization." What is your estimate of that?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, as I indicated, Mr. Chairman, it is not
really possible to provide a single estimate. I need a whole series of
givens in the first instance. I need to know the rate of U.S. force with-
drawal to calculate the effect that that will have on foreign exchange
earnings of South Vietnam. I would need to know the intentions of the
enemy and what that implies for the size of South Vietnamese force
levels in the years ahead.
These are unanswerable questions, Mr. Chairman. I am not avoiding
yom- question. If I were given a series of hypothetical assumptions, I
and my staff could come up with estimates.
584
The Chairman. I based the question on only your own statement.
I thought you had some idea of which that high level would be. It is
quite all right if you haven't made such an estimate.
AMOUNT OF U.S. AID TO EDUCATION
You talk about the help to education. You say the Vietnamese have
received educational help. What amount have they received for
education?
Mr. MacDonald. The dollar amount of our assistance, Mr.
Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. MacDonald. If you will give us a moment I think we can
probably supj)ly that or would 3^011 prefer that we supply it for the
record?
The Chairman. Yes, supply it for the record if you don't have it.
(The information referred to follows:)
A.I.D. EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM
The total AID dollar obligations for assistance to South Vietnam in the field of
education from fiscal year 1954 through fiscal year 1970 are $62.2 million.
financing of south VIETNAMESE BUDGET
The Chairman. Can you give an estimate of the percentage of the
Vietnamese national budget derived directly or indirectly from U.S.
assistance or U.S. military spending?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes. Let's see, it is something in excess of 50
percent. 53.4 or 53.6 percent of the total piaster budget of the Govern-
ment of Vietnam is supported by American aid, whether that be
defined as direct economic aid or as indhect economic aid, about 53
percent, sir.
If you would like a discussion on this point, I would be pleased to
carry it further. I even have a chart.
Let me answer you by giving you the figures in this way : The way
in which the 1969 budget was financed, if you will permit me to deal
with 1969 rather than 1970 — I was reading the Wall Street Journal
a couple of weeks ago with an editorial to the effect that projections
of U.S. inflationary estimates are like snowflakes, they melt before
they hit the ground — I would be more comfortable with the firmer
1969 figures.
There are five sources of funding of the South Vietnamese budget.
The first is counterpart with which you are familier, I know, and
also local currency
The Chairman. Describe it. Counterpart are the funds generated
by our imports; is that right?
Mr. MacDonald. In part. It is only in part the piaster gener-
ated
The Chairman. As a ])ractical matter it is no different fromX^
direct gi'ant; is it? They are not going to repay any of it. %4
Mr. MacDonald. This is very clearly an American contribution
to the budget. ^
The Chairman. That is all I wanted to say.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes. Counterpart.
585
The Chairman. Counterpart is a word oenerated years ago and it
has a kind of a mystical feehng. It has a disguise so that people won't
understand how much we are throwing away.
Mr. MacDonald. Let me explain it. When a dollar's worth of
AID-financed commodities are imported into South Vietnam, counter-
l^art to the extent of IIS piasters to a dollar are generated and put
into a special counterpart account of the Government of Vietnam for
their use with the concurrence of the United States. That is the first
category of sources of budgetary funds.
The Chairman. That is" about one-third of the going black market
rate; isn't it?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
The Chairman. About one-third.
^h\ MacDonald. Yes. I will come to the austerity taxes which
will get the proceeds up to a level commensurate with the so-called
black market rate.
In addition to counterpart there is also, Mr. Chairman, the local
currency sales proceeds of Public Law 480 commodities, which come
in at the same rate of 118 piasters to the dollar.
The second category of funds available for financing the Vietnamese
budget are customs duties on commercial imports financed by U.S.
aid, duties over and above the 118 piasters which are extracted and
put into the counterpart fund.
The Chairman. Who pays the customs duty?
Mr. MacDonald. The importer who imports the goods. As I have
said, in the case of a car, which we do not finance under the AID
program, the customs duties would bring the rate to 1,000 piasters or
something in that magnitude.
The third source of financing for the budget is customs on GVN
financed imports, imports which they bring in with dollars from their
own treasury.
The fourth is the generation of tax revenues from income taxes,
direct taxes, excise taxes, the receipts of government agencies, such as
the post office, these sorts of things.
The fifth, Mr. Chairman, is deficit financing to finance budget
activities. This is in a very real sense a direct taxation of the people
of Vietnam because it redeplo3-s resources within the economy; it
reduces their consumption of resources.
I would like, if you are interested, to show you a chart which lays
this all out, I think it does it
The Chairman. I think that is enough. I don't believe Ave need a
chart.
AID PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM: PERSONNEL AND PAYMENT
I Avonder, Mr. MacDonald, how many ])eople are employed in the
aid ])rograms in Vietnam, direct hire, contract, and foreign nationals.
Don't you have that available?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, yes, sir.
The Chairman. I have it here, but there are so many pages I
can't count them u]). There are 10 pages in this booklet. I have
not counted the numbers.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, let me give you the total at the outset
and remind you in doing so that I am not talking just of Americans
but of Vietnamese and other nationals as well.
44-706 — 70 38
586
Our employment peaked last June at 10,272, including all categories.
Now, of those
The Chairman. Are they all on your own payroll? Those are not
contract or do they include contract?
Mr. MacDonald. This is the universe: Vietnamese, American,
third country nationals, direct hire, contract employees, personal
service contracts, and employees of contractors whom we engage.
We had at that time 2,183 direct hire Americans of that" 10,000
total.
The Chairman. In South Vietnam.
Mr. MacDonald. In South Vietnam. Plus 787 contract employees.
In addition to that the Americans
The Chairman. Could I clarify one point? Is the upkeep of these
people included in the figure of $498 million or is that in addition
to that as a cost of the Vietnam program?
Mr. MacDonald. The $498 million figure that I gave you, sir, is
a dollar figure, and it includes all of the dollar expenditures which
we make.
The Chairman. Including the pay and support of all these
people.
Mr. MacDonald. Including the dollar portion of pay for these
people.
The Chairman. For example, is your salary paid out of that
Mr. MacDonald. Yes; if you include the administrative allotment
I referred to at the outset.
The Chairman. Out of that aid?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes; the only salaries not paid out of those
dollars are the salaries of ]:)eople who receive piasters, the Viet-
namese. We have arrangements with the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment under which we use counterpart funds to pay our local
staff.
The Chairman. That is in addition to the $498 million.
Mr. MacDonald. No. It is this year's manifestation of last year's
dollar input which generated those piasters. It is not additive, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. What do you expect to have a year from now?
Do you have an estimate of that in personnel?
Mr. MacDonald. Let's see, now, we are going down and we will
be down in June of this year, a year since the high of 10,272, to
about 9,410. I would expect, Mr. Chairman, that it would continue
to drift down over the next 2 or 3 years.
The Chairman. The pacification program is quite apart from the
aid ])rogram; isn't it?
Mr. AIacDonald. No, sir. One of my responsibilities is to jjrovide
the dollar, piaster, and staff resources that Ambassador Colby re-
quires to conduct his several programs in the pacification field. These
are gross figures for AID including the support we give Ambassador
Colby's program.
The Chairman. How much is that?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, let's see, I have a breakdown. Do you want
personnel figures?
587
BREAKDOWN OF CORDS/aID PERSONNEL AND FUNDING
The Chairman. I want the personnel figures and the amounts m
doUars to see how it breaks down between your and iVmbassador
Colby's operations.
Mr. MacDonald. Somewhat less than half of the American
personnel are provided to Ambassador Colby.
The Chairman. About a thousand?
Mr. MacDonald. About that, sir. Also roughly 90 percent of the
counterpart budget that we Americans support in our project opera-
tions is turned over to pacification ]:)rograms under Ambassador
Colby's purview. On a dollar basis a relatively small amount goes to
CORDS. The great bulk of the dollar amount, of course, goes into
our commercial unport program, the Public Law 480 ])rogram and
other nonpacification ])rojects. Mr. Chairman, I can submit this for
the record in full detail.
The Chairman. Could you indicate roughly without the details?
I mean there is a substantial part of it and I thought you could
indicate in round numbers about what it is.
Mr. MacDonald. I would like to submit the exact figures.
The Chairman. Yes, you can do both. That is right. Indicate
roughly what this is and then correct it for the record so we will have
it exactly.
The Chairman. What is the cost of what 3'ou contribute to the
CORDS program?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, you will recall my saying that within the
$352 million that AID ])roi)oses to spend in*^ 1970, $132 million of it
would be spent on j^rojects. Of that $132 million, roughly $46 million
will be administered by agencies to A\hich Ambassador Colby is ac-
credited. The remainder will be spent by other agencies of the Vietnam
Government to which I am accredited.
(The information referred to follows:)
1. Personnel. — As of January 31,
American personnel was as follows:
USAID/CORDS Brkakdown
1970, the breakdown
of A.I. D. -funded
Direct hire
Contract
Total
USAID. in Vietnam
CORDS, in Vietnam
In training and processing (USAID and CORDS).
Total
943
799
170
1,912
413
332
745
1,355
1,131
170
2,657
2. Funding. — Estimated A.I.D. dollar obligations for the FY 1970 project
program are broken down as follows:
Millions
USAID $85.9
CORDS 46. 1
Total 132. 0
The Chairman. Do you su])])ly any cover or mone}^ to the CIA?
Mr, MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, I have been instructed to say
that all comment on such questions must be made in executive session
and by other a])]n'o])riate officials than myself, sir.
The Chairman.
All right.
588
AID PAYROLL AND ALLOWANCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
What is the total cost of AID's payroh, mchiding- allowances, m
Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. I can supply that for the record, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Could you indicate it roughly? Is it in the neigh-
borhood of a hundred million or 50 million?
Mr. MacDoxald. I can't at the moment, but I can supply it. We
believe it is in the range of $50 million in 1970.
The Chairman. $50 million. The Senator from Tennessee wishes to
ask questions and I yield.
(The information referred to follows:)
A.I.D. fiscal year 1970 direct hire personnel costs for USAID/Vietnam and
CORDS are estimated at $56.9 million.
U.S. AID TO education IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator Gore. Since I have another committee to which I must go,
I found considerable interest in your statement with respect to the aid
to education. How much money has the United States contributed to
aid education in Vietnam in the past decade?
Mr. MacDonald. I can furnish that information for the record,
Senator Gore.
Senator Gore. What w^ere the expenditures last year for education?
Mr. MacDonald. Let me describe to you the componentry of
expenditures by AID in such a field as education. Primarily we are
talking of technical assistance which we provide to the Vietnamese in
their efforts to modernize their educational system. This entails the
recruitment of professionally qualified Americans to work with the
Ministry of Education.
Senator Gore. I know what it is. I am trying to find out.
Mr. MacDonald. And at our peak, we had about 29. The total cost
of aid for education from 1954 to 1970 was $62.2 million. Senator.
Senator Gore. Aid to education.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
Senator Gore. Is this an inclusive figure?
Mr. MacDonald. Is this what, sir?
Senator Gore. Is this an inclusive figure?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, it is a gross figure of all costs to AID.
Senator Gore. That provides classroom aid, supplement to teach-
ers' salaries, textbooks.
Mr. MacDonald. This is the dollar figure. Senator Gore. The
salaries of our advisers who have worked with the Ministry of Educa-
tion, the cost of certain imports such as cement and reinforcing steel
with which schools are built, the costs of contractors' services who
work with the Vietnamese in the develojiment of a modern instruc-
tional materials center — things of this sort. These are dollar costs,
Senator Gore.
quality of south VIETNAMESE EDUCATION
Senator Gore. Do you have an evaluation of the quality of educa-
tion of the Saigon schools?
Mr. MacDonald. As I mentioneil in my opening statement, we
know that numbers don't tell the full story. The quality of primary
5S9
education in South Vietnam is not good by modern standards. It is
steadily improving.
Senator Gore. How does it compare with the District of Cohunbia
standards?
Mr. MacDonald. I am not currently familiar with the District of
Columbia standards, Senator, but in rough comparison I suggest to
you that in level and quality, primary education in Vietnam today is
something on a par with standards of 1890 to 1910 in our country
where, typically, there was a small one-room schoolhouse, filled
mostly by chikh-en in the primary grades, and taught by a young
girl who iSer]uii)s the previous September had been a student at that
school and tlien had been given brief training to become a teacher.
There is a ^'cry aggressive ijrogram being carried out by the Viet-
namese, now that they have met their quantitative goals, to improve
the quality of education.
I mentioned there were some 40,000 elementary school teachers.
About 26,000 of these are 90-day wonders, to use the parlance of
World War IT military training in our country, or others who are
less than fully quahfied teachers. The remainder are graduates of
2-year normal school courses. Over the next 7 years, I think it is,
Vietnam will be producing a sufficient number of graduates from the
normal schools to place a fully qualified elementary school teacher
in every classroom in the country.
Senator Gore. Some member of our audience sent me up a note
that he lived in the District of Columbia and had to spend 15 percent
of his annual income to send his chikh-en to a private school because
of the inadc^quacy of the pubhc schools in the District of Columbia,
which suffer a lack of funds. I draw no parallel. I merely say we need
funds for education everywhere.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PERCENTAGE OF AID PERSONNEL ABROAD IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. Mr. MacDonald, what percentage of the total
AID personnel abroad are in Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. I will hav(> to confirm the estimates I will give
you for the record later but 1 believe it is on the order of 40 percent.
I am speakhig, sir, of direct hire professional people.
The Chairman. Are you now talking of the Americans or everyone?
Mr. MacDonald. Americans.
The Chairman. You don't incluck' in other words the 10,272.
You are only talking about the 2,183.
Mr. MacDonald^ That is correct; yes, sir. I liave no knowledge
off hand
The Chairman. You think tluit 2,183 is approximately one-third
of all Americans abroad in the AID organization?
Mr. MacDonald. Direct-hire Americans abroad, yes. This is my
estimate and I must have the oi)])ortunity to correct it.
(The information rof erred to follows:)
Percentage of AID Personnel Abroad in Vietnam
The exact figure is 40.3 percent as of June 30, 1969.
590
IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT
IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. You see this is the sort of thing, Mr. MacDonald,
that prompted my question. I respect your right to say that it is not
your concern and you have no competence to give a reason why we
are in Vietnam but when we have to be concerned not only with
Vietnam, as you are, but with Arkansas and Tennessee and the
United States, and Latin America and other phices, whether or not
what we are doing there is justified is a very important question. You
take a third of the total AID personnel in the whole world in this
little country of 16, 18 million people. This is why the question recurs,
even though you don't wish to comment on it, as to whether or not
this effort is justified at all. You are very fortunate in not having to
bother about that. If you can accept it and go along and do the best
you can, it is all right. I don't criticize you for it because obviously
you didn't make the decision to go in there, but you can see how it
is a very important question to those of us who do have a responsibility
for other areas than Vietnam, and especially our own areas in our own
country.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What is bothering me and a number of others is
that we are destroying our own country in order to go off after this
will-o-the-wisp 10,000 miles away and it has no real relevance to our
own country, our children, or our own lives. It is very difficult to find
anyone, you see, who will take this responsibility other than the
President of the United States. The military people have no responsi-
bility because they only have military responsibilities. Yet I suspect
very strongly that the military reports, your reports, Mr. Colby's
reports, all of them, converge to influence the President's view because
all of these reports, just as yours is, are quite optimistic about the
success of your individual operations. This is not any criticism of
you. I am quite sure you believe what you have said about the success
of your program. We have heard for, I guess, at least 6 or 8 years how
remarkably successful the land program is. It always is about to come
to fruition and everyone is going to have his own garden. It never
quite reaches that point, but it is about to and it's been about to do
that for 10 or 12 years. I don't criticize you. I am quite sure you believe
it will, but his does raise very serious problems. The i)urpose of these
hearings is simply to emphasize just how deeply bogged down we are
in Vietnam and whether or not it is in the national interest to continue
it.
PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF DIRECT-HIRE EMPLOYEE
How much does the average direct-hire employee receive in pay
and allowances in Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. We have that, sir.
Mr. Chairman. In order to save time your aides may interject. It
isn't so formal that you have to answer it all. Your assistants are
quite free to give answers in order to save time.
Mr. MacDonald. The average wage would be somewhere within
the range of $28,000 to $34,000 total average cost.
The Chairman. What is the highest?
Mr. MacDonald. $67,000 at the highest and $16,000 a the lowest.
The Chairman. Do you get $67,000 dollars a year?
591
Mr. MacDonald. No, sir; I suspect that perhaps the Government
spends that much maintaining me there, but that is not my salary.
The Chairman. What is your salary?
Mr. MacDonald. $38,000.
The Chairman. And the difference between that and $67,000
what — your perquisites?
Mr. MacDonald. Perquisites are housing and transportation of the
few sticks of furniture I took with me.
The Chairman. Do they furnish you with a house?
Mr. MacDonald. I have a house; yes.
The Chairman. They pay the rent on it?
Mr. MacDonald. My house happens to be owned by U.S. AID.
The Chairman. They bought it?
Mr. MacDonald. It is one of the few cases in which that is so.
We bought it back, I think, in 1953.
early U.S. aid presence in south VIETNAM
The Chairman. I didn't know w^e had a presence there in 1953.
Mr. MacDonald. There was an AID mission to
The Chairman. In 1953?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir; in 1953, there was an AID presence. I
believe it started in 1952, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The aid to the French?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
The Chairman. Under the Truman regime, there was an aid pro-
gram. I think we gave them about $2 bilhon in trying to retain con-
trol of Vietnam.
former allegiances of witness' south VIETNAMESE
associates
As a matter of fact, most of these government people that you asso-
ciate with fought for the French; didn't they?
Mr. MacDonald. I do not know that to be the case.
The Chairman. You don't know that?
Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. You don't know Mr. Ky was an aviator for the
French?
Mr. MacDonald. You said most of the people with whom I deal,
Mr. Chairman. I am not sure that is the case. I know many who were
on the other side during the earUer years. One of my counterparts,
a man with whom I deal perhaps more than any other, the Minister
of Economy, was a Viet Minh in those early years. He is a man of
great courage and competence.
south VIETNAMESE REACTION TO CASE OF TRAN NGOC CHAU
The Chairman. Did you ever meet Mr. Chau who has recently
been imprisoned?
Mr. MacDonald. I have never met Mr. Chau.
The Chairman. Do you know about him?
Mr. MacDonald. I know of the case; yes.
The Chairman. Did that case attract any interest in Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, it did.
592
The Chairman. It did?
Mr. MacDonald. It did, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Was it favorable to the regime?
Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, I am not able, I am afraid
The Chairman. You don't wish to answer that. That is the safest
answer.
Mr. MacDonald (continuing). To improve your knowledge or
understanding of the case.
The Chairman. That is the safest answer, all right. I think you are
quite wise in not commenting. I wanted to see what you thought.
SALARY differential OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM
How much salary differential do U.S. personnel get for serving in
Vietnam as against another country?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, let's see, the same as they do for serving in
Nepal and half a dozen other places, a 25-percent differential.
The Chairman. As opposed to Washington — over Washington.
Mr. MacDonald. Pardon?
The Chairman. Over Washington or over, say
Mr. MacDonald. Over the basic salary, 25 percent of one's basic
salary.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE INCOME TAXES
The Chairman. You mentioned income taxes. Do they have an
effective income tax system? Do they have an income tax system?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, the income tax
rates imposed under the Vietnamese system are in some cases stiffer
than those called for in the United States. They don't have as good a
record of collections obviously as we do here. I think you will recall,
Senator, that Vietnam after all is a country in a relatively under-
developed stage and it faces all sorts of difficulties in the collection
of its taxes.
In the first place the pattern of business there is markedly different
from what it is in the United States. Private businesses are very small
businesses there. For the most part they are family owned. Most of
the transactions in the commercial community are made in cash.
Many businesses literally do not keep books, not so much to avoid the
payment of taxes as that they haven't traditionally required them.
Vietnam has had additional difficulties in the administration of its
tax system during the war. Mobilization has taken many of the staff
of the Director of Taxation in Saigon and the ])rovincial tax agencies.
The fighting in the countryside has made it difficult and in some cases
literally impossible to collect taxes in the less secure areas.
The Chairman. How much of the budget comes from income taxes?
Mr. MacDonald. Well
The Chairman. Ten or 20 percent?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, let's see. Mr. Sharpe would have it. About
20 percent of all domestic tax revenues are income tax revenues.
The Chairman. Twenty ])ercent of domestic tax revenues. Does
that include 20 percent of the revenues derived from customs, import
taxes?
Mr. MacDonald. No, no, purely domestic. Only those that can be
reasonably attributed to Vietnamese resources.
The Chairman. That is less than 50 percent of the budget.
593
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
The Chairman. It would be in the neighborhood of 10 percent, I
suess, of the total budget; would it not?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, let's see, only 4 percent, actually, of the
total budget comes from income taxes. The remaining 44 percent,
roughly, of the total budget borne by the Vietnamese is made up of
other revenue — indirect taxes, government receipts for services, and
deficit financing, which is a form of taxation.
The Chairman. Four percent. You said it is much higher than m
America. What would a man with a $50,000 income pay in income
tax, assuming he paid his tax?
Mr. MacDonald. We have a schedule on this, a comparative
schedule, Mr. Chairman. Here I have it. A single individual who is
earning 50,000 U.S. dollars in the U.S. system would pay, what,
$23,700. A Vietnamese would pay $23,200. But a married man with
two children would pav $22,650 in Vietnam; in the United States he
would pay $16,900.
The Chairman. Wliat percentage of those earning $50,000 pay any
income taxes?
Mr. MacDonald. Pay; what percentage?
The Chairman. Yes; do you have any way of knowing that?
Mr. MacDonald. No, we do not really know that. We can furnish
3'ou the numbers of people actually pajjing income taxes.
The Chairman. It would be interesting. ^^VHiat is that number?
Mr. MacDonald. I don't have it here.
The Chairman. Can you furnish it?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, I can for the record.
The Chairman. It would be very interesting.
(The information referred to follows:)
1969 Payment of Income Taxe.s in South Vietnam
In 1969 a total of 169,000 corporations, businesses, and individuals filed income
tax returns or had income taxes withheld from their salaries.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. ECONOMIC AID BUDGET
The Chairman. Did I ask you what percentage of the total economic
aid budget goes to Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. The worldwide aid?
The Chairman. Yes, the economic aid budget.
Mr. MacDonald. No, you tlid not. I don't have that figure but I
can have it furnished for the record.
The Chairman. If one of your assistants knows that, what is it?
jNIr. Ellis. We do not, sir.
The Chairman. It isn't difficult. You said it is $498 milhon and all
you need to know is your total for 1970. The $49S million is what
percentage of your total? Is it a billion, a billion and a half?
Mr. MacDonald. I think it is $1,600 million worldwide when you
deduct militarj^ assistance, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I meant economic. It is not too hard to figure that
out. I have forgotten what your aid figure was.
(The information referred to follows:)
594
AID PROGRAM IN VIETNAM: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL,
The AID-funded program in Vietnam of $352 million in fiscal j-ear 1970
reiDresents 19 percent of total AID programs worldwide. The worldwide total,
$1,878 million, includes use of estimated carryover and recoveries from prior
years in addition to new fiscal year 1970 appropriations.
PUBLICATION OF '^VIETNAM, THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"
The Chairman. Here is a booklet. It is a rather unusual way of
publishino; it^ but it is an AID booklet. Are you familiar with "Viet-
nam, the View Beyond the Battle"?
Mr. MacDonald. That is a booklet of 1966 vintage, I think.
The Chairman. The staff says 1967. Why do you print it without
any attribution or any date? Is that deliberate?
Mr. MacDonald. I could not tell you that. I believe I saw that
when I first came on the job, Mr. Chairman. I haven't seen it since.
The Chairman. You haven't seen it since. It is a slick paper job,
a very good looking job.
Mr. MacDonald. Not produced by my mission. It is a pamphlet
put out in Washington here.
The Chairman. A staff member who was recently in Vietnam
brought this back. He told me it was an AID publication and he thinks
it was published in 1967. It is rather strange that there is no attribution
and no indication of when it was published.
Mr. MacDonald. To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, it was not
published by the AID mission in Vietnam. I can ascertain for you
when it was and where it was published. It might be an AID publica-
tion; I assume it is an AID publication.
The Chairman. It is all about AID. I can't imagine anyone else
publishing it.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, the U.S. Information Agency does have
certain responsibilities for publicizing these programs abroad. I am
not suggesting that that is a USIA document, but it may be. It is
only that I do not know.
The Chairman. For some reason the staff member thinks it was
put out in 1967 although there is nothing to indicate that.
Mr. MacDonald. I am at a disadvantage, sir. I don't have the
document and there seems to be some question of how to identify it.
(The follomng information was subsequently supplied by AID:)
Publication of Brochupe, "Vietnam, The View Beyond The Battle"
The Brochure: Vietnam, the View Beyond the Battle was published at USIA
Regional Service Center, Manila, in March 1967 at the request of USAID/
Vietnam. It was funded from JUSPAO Vietnam impression account. In total,
some 100,000 copies were published in ^'ietnamese and 68,500 copies were
published in English.
The Chairman. It says, "More men were coming and more Ameri-
can expenditures." It doesn't even have a page number; I didn't
know that but anyway
Mr. MacDonald. I also provided your staff member, I think, a
copy of the report I put out about the AID operation in Vietnam.
I think it bears a date.
595
PROPORTION OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED BY SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. This doesn't; I don't know why. It says, "Durmg
1966, Vietnam had passed India as the foremost recipient among 82
nations receiving U.S. economic aid." Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. MacDonald. I do not have in mind the AID figures for
India, Mr. Chairman. May I go back for a moment? You asked me
to estimate the proportion of total U.S. economic aid around the world
with reference to the $498 million in Vietnam.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. MacDonald. I cited to you my recollection about the total
amount being available as would be $1.6 billion. I would recall that
the $498 million that we were earlier talking about includes Public
Law 480 in it; $1.6 billion does not include Public Law 480 and
there are a series of other items.
The Chairman. Leaving out the Public Law 480, how does it break
down?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, $352 million is the AID portion against
$1.6 billion.
The Chairman. That is the figure I wanted in the record.
Mr. MacDonald. There are, I believe^ however, other addons to
the $1.6 and I will ascertain what they are and supply them for the
record. I believe the Congress in the last session, I\Ir. Chairman,
authorized the President to return payments on principal and interest,
if my recollection is correct, on loans made in prior years for use in the
AID program. So I think it is a higher total figure and, therefore, a
lesser percentage that Vietnam commands,
PROPORTION OF U.S. AID RECEIVED BY SOUTH VIETNAM AND INDIA
The Chairman. I thought this was a very interesting statement. I
wish you would comment on this if you will, not now but for the
record, because I have never seen before that Vietnam passed India
in 1966 as the foremost recipient among 82 nations, when you consider
India has some 500 million i)eople.
The Senator from Missouri is not here and I hesitate to speak in his
absence, but he and others have been under the impression that India
got the big end of our aid. I had never seen this statement before.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, could I put that into some context, Mr.
Chairman, by recalling that there is a conflict taking place in Vietnam?
I would like for the committee to understand that the people of Viet-
nam are producing at all time record highs despite the war; 1969 was
a record year for agricultural production.
Second, the Government of Vietnam, through its various programs,
is able to support from wholly and genuinely Vietnamese resources a
civilian budget adequate to a country of her size at her stage of de-
velopment were she not at war. The extraordinary assistance that we
give Vietnam both on the military side and indeed on the economic
side is occasioned by the fact of the conflict, by the fact that the South
Vietnamese have found it necessary to have an army of 1.1 million
people, the equivalent of a 13 or 14 million man force in U.S. terms,
I can assure you, sir, that the job of development which is my
agency's traditional job, could be accomplished in Vietnam at much
less cost were there not these nondevelopmental problems that
afflict the country.
596
The Chairman. I am quite sure the war does add to the difficulty
and the cost.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUDGET IN PIASTERS
Mr. Reporter, ] will put in the record a table here with regard to the
Vietnam budget in piasters just for our consideration here.
(The information referred to follows:)
In regard to the actual and estimated customs and austerity taxes for C Y 1967,
1968, and 1969 on commercial imports, .34, 3.3, and 35 percent respectively are a
result of duties on A. I. D. -financed imports. Total revenues derived from A.I.D.
and Public Law 480 programs (import duties plus counterpart) were for CY 1967
and 1968, VN$28.12 and VN$21.77 billion, or 59 and 47 percent, respectively of
budget revenues. For CY 1969, total revenues derived from U.S. sources are estimated
at VN$44-3 billion or 50 percent of budget revenues.
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM BUDGET
[In billions of piastres, U.S. $1 = VN118 at import rate)
Estimated
Calendar year Calendar year calendar year
1967 1 1968 1969
Line item
1. Expenditures 86.19 105.19 147.8
2. National revenues
a. Domestic revenue.. .,
Direct taxes
indirect taxes
Excise taxes
Registration and other
Preequation and equalization taxess
b. Custom duties and austerity tax
GVN imports
U.S. -financed imports
3. AID (counterpart)
Commodity improvement program
Public Law 480, title I
Netdeficit -15.59 -41.63 -34.6
1 Includes only expenditures for the 1st 13 months chargeable to the budget for the fiscal year. Budgeted expenditures
may be incurred up to 6 months after the end of the fiscal year. The influence of the remaining 5 months upon the magni-
tude of the deficit will be slight.
-' In calendar year 1969, the revenue from these taxes are inlcuded within item b (customs and austerity taxes).
Budgetary financing by the Government of South Vietnam for the deficit after
foreign aid, by source, for CY 1967, 1968 and 1969 (est.), is pre.-^ented below:
(VN BILLION PIASTRES)
Estimated,
Calendar year Calendar year calendar year
Line item 1957 1968 1969
A. Netdeficit.-.- __ -15.59 -41.63 -34.6
B. Sources of financing:
Advances from national bank 14.92 35.45 30.0
Change in Treasury bonds outstanding .67 6.18 4.6
47.57
46.35
88.9
32.40
32.64
36.9
(2.97)
(4. 17)
(5.14)
(6.51)
(7.48)
(9.34) ...
(5.4)
(4.94)
(6.25)
(7.4)
(8.3)
(9. 38)
(8.86)
(15.8)
15. 17
13.71
52.0
(10. 08)
(5. 09)
(9.15)
(4. 56)
32.0
20.0
23. 03
17.21
24.3
(13.23)
(4.11)
(13.1)
(15.6)
(9.8)
(8.7)
Total 15.59 41.63 34.6
The Chairman. Senator Aiken, do you want to ask any questions?
597
EFFECT OF INFLATION ON AID COSTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator Aiken. Have you any idea to what extent the increasmo-
amount of sahiries, retirement and inflationary costs have increased
the AID costs in South Vietnam? Has that been a major contribution
to increased costs?
Mr. MacDonald. No, sir. On the contrary, inflation hits those one
can least aft'ord to have it hit. Inflation is quickly overcome by the
private sector that has the opportunity to raise prices, raise salaries,
and to whatever levels are necessary to command personnel.
Senator Aiken. I am referring to the $220 milUon worth of com-
mercial imports. Don't they cost more now than they did 2 or 3 years
ago?
Mr. MacDonald. Within the country?
Senator Aiken. Yes.
Mr. MacDonald. I am sorry, Senator Aiken. Yes; oh, yes. Four
years ago, those goods were sold at 60, 70, 80, 90 piasters for each
dollar's worth. Today they are being sold to the i)eople of South
Vietnam at something between 250 and 300 piasters per dollar for the
same goods.
Senator Aiken. We also have increased costs of material and goods
in the United States.
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, yes; there has been a distinct inflationary
factor over the last several years, which averaged 4, 5, 6 percent.
Senator Aiken. I think at least that.
1969 SOUTH VIETNAMESE INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
I understand that last year there were South Vietnamese themselves
who invested some $40 "million in [)rivate enterprise. Is that figure
about accurate?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, I believe it was $39 million, nearly $40
million of various industrial investments in 1969 alone which is, I
think, an indication of a measure of confidence.
Senator Aiken. I asked a witness yesterday if that indicated that
some, if not many, of the South Vietnamese investors found the war
rather profitable?
Mr. MacDonald. Senator Aiken, obviously intense business activ-
ity, whatever its cause, provides the opportunity. I can assure you the
management methods we have ap|)lied and the policies we have nego-
tiated with the South Vietnamese have controlled the situation as far
as it aft'ects United States aid. Years ago there was an essentially
monopolistic condition that existed in the import community of South
Vietnam. There was a relativ^e handful of importers. There was no
competition. They could decide how much to bring in and how fast
to sell it and how long to hold it antl thereby realized very large
markups.
As I recall the markup average prior to 1966 for imported goods
was on the order of 70, 75-or-greater percent, and obviously that
was exorbitant. We were able at the time that we were designing the
present import i^rogram and negotiating with the Vietnamese whether
there would be one or not to persuade the Vietnamese to introduce
improved })rocedures and a liberalized imi)ort policy.
Today the American taxpayers' goods go into Vietnam and there
is a markui) on the order of 15 percent, which is a legitimate business
598
markup. No one is becoming a millionaire, out of AID's business,
Senator.
Senator Aiken. Then this investment of $40 million in private
enterprise in Vietnam would be made from normal earnings.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
Senator Aiken, Of the investors, we will say.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
EFFORTS TO CONTROL BLACK MARKET PROBLEM
Senator Aiken. Is the black market problem being brought under
control at all?
Mr. MacDonald. There is no doubt that there is a black market
in Vietnam in money. The chairman has cited the black market
rate for the dollar. A great deal of attention has been given to the
problem both on the "American side and on the Vietnamese side.
In 1967 I recommended to Ambassador Bunker — and he accepted
my recommendation — that there be a U.S. missionwide coinniittee
called the Irregular Practices Committee in order to maintain a
continuing surveillance over our operations to see if there were
loopholes in our regulations or our practices or procedures that
enabled people to circumvent them. Over the past 3 years we have ha_d
great success, I think, within the U.S. mission to tighten up, to limit
the amounts of PX goods made available in the commissaries and the
post exchanges to proper levels, a variety of things of this sort,
including currency control procedures within the military banking
system.
More importantly, I think, Senator Aiken, are tlie efforts of the
Vietnamese themselves. It is sometimes little noticed that the constitu-
tion of South Vietnam calls not only for the traditional three branches
of government, but for what in effect amounts to a fourth branch of
government, the Censorate, which is somewhat akin to our General
Accounting Office but has wider responsibilities. The Censorate is not
fully organized or fully operative, but it does have the responsibility
to develop controls to minimize and preclude corru])tion and irregular
practice within the South Vietnamese Government itself.
Also, the South Vietnamese executive has recently set up an
Irregular Practices Committee of its own chaired by the Minister of
Finance. Its membership includes the Minister of Economy, the
governor of the national bank, the national director of ])olice, and
two or three other positions. The two American and Vietnamese
Irregular Practices Committees meet regularly to see what can be
done to tighten up.
EFFECTIVENESS OF LAND REFORM BILL
Senator Aiken. I notice in this morning's paper that the South
Vietnamese Senate has passed the land reform bill. Are you familiar
with the kind of bill they passed?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
Senator Aiken. Will it work?
Mr. MacDonald. I believe so, Senator Aiken. I was very pleased
to see the ])aper today. As I indicated in my opening statement this-
is a truly revolutionary piece of legislation, it is a sweeping bill that
599
will abolish tenancy in its entirety. This means there will be no
absentee landlords in Vietnam. Only people who till land can own it.
I think it is an unprecedented bill in my somewhat limited knowledge
of other situations in the world.
Senator Aiken. You are glad we don't have that law in Vermont;
aren't you?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir.
Senator Aikex. Or woidd you like to go home and start tilling?
[Laughter.]
FINANCING OF LAND REFORM PROGRAM
You may recall that some time ago a suggestion was made in the
Senate here in Washington that the United States finance the land
reform program. Do you think we are expected to contribute rather
heavily to that?
Mr. MacDonald. The Vietnamese and we both regard the problem
of financing this program internally in South Vietnam as a Vietnamese
problem. That is what it is and how it should be handled. The Govern-
ment will pay landlords for the land it will take. However, Senator
Aiken, to be quite clear, the injection into an already very large
money supply of over 50 billion achlitional j^iasters — and that was
the tentative price tag of the President's bill, the mhiimum price
tag — is going to generate additional inflationary pressure, which will
have to be met in part by an increase in imports to generate additional
piasters as customs and other payments are paid when they come in.
The United States has given every indication to the South Viet-
namese that it realizes there is this exchange problem and that we
will study in the j^ears ahead what foreign exchange requirements
the program will generate.
borrowing credit of south VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
Senator Aiken. Does the South Vietnam Government have borrow-
ing credit?
Mr. MacDonald. What?
Senator Atken. Does it have borrowing credit from the banks?
Mr. MacDonald. In the world market, sir?
Senator Aiken. In the local market, any market.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, it has; yes. It can borrow from its national
bank as it does each year. This year we are expecting it to borrow
something on the order of 28.6 billion piasters.
U.S. investment BANKERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator Aiken. Three or four 5^ears ago I notice there was some
competition among our investment bankers here in the United States
to see who covdd get over there and get located first. Have they done
a ])retty good business?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, yes. The Bank of America and Chase
]\Ianhattan are doing rather nicely, I think, sir.
Senator Aiken. I don't think I have any more. There isn't much
use in asking questions if you already have the answers to them,
although 1 find it is a [iretty good idea to know the answer yourself
before you ask a question in this town.
600
SOURCE OF COMPENSATION FOR LAND OWNERS UNDER LAND REFORM
PROGRAM
The Chairman. You were speaking of land reform. How are the
owners of the lands to be compensated? Are we going to pay them?
Mr. MacDonald. No, sir, that was my i)oint. This is a Vietnamese
problem. It would not be a])propriate, we feel, for the United States
to enter directl}^ into that kind of a transaction between a tenant and
a landlord.
The Chairman. How can we avoid it when we are paying 52
percent of their budget? It seems to me an illusion. If we are paying
or supplying, as you have already testified, over 50 percent. I think
it is 52 percent.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said
The Chairman. How in the world can it be done without our
having helped?
Mrr MacDonald. We start with the plain fact that something
more than 50 percent of the national budget is financed from U.S.
sources.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. MacDonald. There is no question about that, sir. I suppose
it is possible from that point to proceed to attribute, in ])art, the U.S.
contribution to the total budget to each expenditure of the Govern-
ment. I didn't mean to negate my having acknowledged the heavy
share of financing that the United States puts into the budget. I
merely meant to say, sir, that the Vietnamese Government ^vill deal
with the ])roblem of paying landlords. The United States is not going
to interfere in that process.
The Chairman. I didn't phrase my question properly. I didn't ex-
pect that you would give the check for the money directly to the land-
lord. I am sure some agency of the Vietnamese Government Avill be
the paying agent, but the source of the funds will almost inevitably
be the United States up to 50 percent.
Mr. MacDonald. There have been those who suggest a much
more energetic American involvement in the land reform process.
There have been those who suggested that we take the counterpart
funds, funds which have already accrued to the Government of Viet-
nam accounts which cannot be spent without our apiH'oyal, and use
that to pay landlords. We are not certain that is approi)riate.
section 620(G) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
The Chairman. Do you recall section 620(g) of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act? I will read it. I think the record ought to show it. It says:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no monetary assistance shall be
made available under" this Act to any government or political subdivision or
agency of such government which will be used to compensate owners for expro-
priated or nationalized property and, upon finding by the President that such
assistance has been used by any government for such purpose, no further assist-
ance under this Act shall be "furnished to such government until appropriate
reimbursement is made to the United States for sums so diverted.
I wonder if that \vould create an obstacle to your continued opera-
tions in Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. Two comments, Mr. Chairman: First, as I recall
the legislative history of that particular provision it had to do with
1
601
the protection of American investments in countries abroad. Perhaps
its application is broader and does pertain also to expropriation of non-
American assets or indigenous assets. I don't recall at the moment.
The second comment is that I am not, as I sit here, entirely clear
as to whether the bill on President Thieu's desk today does in fact
entail expropriation. I honestly do not know this. As I understand
it, the Senate in voting last week altered the provision having to do
with the methodology of taking land from the landlord. It is quite
possible that the procedure will be one where the landlord turns his
land over to the tenant and the Government comes in and finances it.
I don't know whether legally and technically it constitutes expro-
priation in terms of the meaning of section 802.
The Chairman. 620.
.Mr. MacDonald. 620.
The Chairman. The method of doing it would have something of
course to do with it. I don't think there is anything in the law to
indicate it was intended for Americans. I rather thought that this
was a prohibition against our paying foreign investors in a company.
Sujjposing a government expropriates a telephone company of
which the Americans own 60 percent and someone owns 40. I thought
one of the principal objectives of this was that we were not going to
pay the foreign national, for his expropriated property even though
under our guarantee program which is designed to protect American
investors.
Mr. MacDonald. I am quite sure, sir, there is a sufficienc}^ of
])iasters in the national budget which come from non-U.S. sources to
cover the costs of the hind reform bill.
LOSSES OF and ENEMY ACTIVITY AGAINST AID PERSONNEL
Senator Aike\. I omitted one question I was going to ask j'ou. We
have in the neighborhood of 10,000 Americans and native people
engaged in the AID ])rogram in South Vietnam at this time.
Mr. MacDonald. That was the high last June. We are going down
to something over 9,000 this year, sir.
Senator Aiken. What are the personnel losses, killed, wounded,
and missing, and are they subject to continuous harassment? What is
the situation? I think if we have that information we can tell whether
the program is making progress in this field.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, since 1968 we have been very fortunate.
We have not, to my recollection, had losses of AID peoi)le. I know
we haven't in 1969 as a result of conflict. We have other losses. Senator
Aiken, lots of them.
Senator Aiken. Accidents?
Mr. MacDonald. My deputy, a young man of 46, suffered a heart
attack 5 weeks ago. We have losses of this sort given the demands and
strains put on peojile who work 7 days a week 12, 14, 16 hours a day.
But we have not had losses to the enemy since the year of 1968
of Tet.
Senator Aiken. What I meant was is what we call the enemy, the
Vietcong, engaged in violence against our AID workers?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, yes, yes, we have been targets. The year
before last, as I was entering the building a grenade went off, for-
44-70e— 70 39
602
tiinately for me, just around the corner. It injured 11, killed two,
maimed three, and hurt the remaining six. Yes we are targeted.
Senator Aiken. Is it a premeditated attack on the AID workers?
Mr. MacDonald. Occasionally premeditated on the AID program,
yes.
Senator Aiken. Is it as prevalent as it was 2 years ago?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, security has much improved, but there is
no ultimate protection. There is no idtimate way to preclude terrorists
coming at you from out of a crowd. We know that not only in South
Vietnam, sir, but unfortunately in cities in our own country.
Senator Aiken. Is it as bad as New York, Washington, or Chicago?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, I had the very good fortune of having Airs.
MacDonald join me in Saigon for the last 8 or 9 months after 3 years
alone. She is able to walk freely in Saigon. Security is, I think, much
better, if I may make the invidious contrast, than it is in many of the
American metropolitan areas, yes.
Senator Aiken. I see. Don't let her walk too freely in Washington.
That is enough, I guess.
1969 AID funds EARMARKED FOR LAND REFORM
The Chairman. I was handed a note, Mr. MacDonald, that the
Agency earmarked $10 million for land reform in 1969 fiscal year
funds, but it was conditioned upon their passage of the legislation and
satisfactory progress. I assume this passage comes too late for the $10
million this year, or does it?
Mr. MacDonald. No, it is a valid obligation. It is on the books,
and assuming the law is signed and brought into being and put into
operation, Mr. Chairman, these funds can be, and I believe certainly
should be
The Chairman. How would they be made available for this purpose?
Mr. MacDonald. As I was saying, tlie injection of large amounts
of piasters into the economy through the process of the government
saying the landlords for the land they are about to give up would
increase inflation.
The Chairman. Yes, I heard that.
What would you do with the $10 million is what I meant.
Mr. MacDonald. We would make the $10 million available.
The Chairman. To the government?
Mr. MacDonald. To American suppliers to send American products
through commercial channels, as ordered by Vietnamese importers, to
the Vietnamese economy, and as they come through the Port of Saigon
and go over the customs
The Chairman. What is the significance of saying it is earmarked
for that purpose? We give them more aid in the usual fashion. This
is one of our own outlets. Why do you say it is earmarked if you are
going to follow the same jirocedure?
Mr. MacDonald. Because it is earmarked, Mr. Chairman. On June
28, 1968, the date we executed the project agreement obligating those
$10 million, we sought to estimate the foreign exchange requirements
that we foresaw during 1969.
Now, we were very poor projectors. We had anticipated that the
bill would pass in the late summer, in August or September, and it did
not.
603
The Chairman. I do not want to belabor the matter, but I do not
see any difference whatever. You increase the amount of aid in the
usual way — more imports. You did not allocate it and give it to some-
one to go buy land, if I understand you correctly.
Mr. MacDonald. It is a cost, it is a cost, Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. It is one of the items on which you estimate what
the level of the aid Avill be ; is it not?
Mr. MacDoxald. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. That is all I meant. I guess I am confused by the
semantics. Earmarking has a different significance with us than it
does with you, I would think. When we earmark something in a bill
it can be used only for that purpose.
Mr. MacDonald. I do not know the language, Mr. Chairman, but
we identify, Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. That is all right. I did not want to belabor a
particular point. I was not trying to make a point of it. The only point
I was trying to make of it was in relation to this legal recpirement that
you certainly could not do it du-ectly. I suppose they could do it
indirectly.
variety and extent of U.S. involvement in south vietnaaiese
ECONOMY
I want to ask you a couple of ciuestions about the variety or the
extent of your involvement in the economy and the life of Vietnam.
This is the Foreign Service list which has a number of pages. It is about
four and a half pages of names and what they do and some of them to
me are rather surprising. These are your people in AID and this is the
list in Vietnam.
You have Mr. Henry R. Anderson, geologist, for example. What
would a geologist be doing for you?
Mr. MacDonald. He is working on the national water program to
identify sources of fresh water for municipal, provmce, and to\vTi
requirements.
The Chairman. Then you have Miss Barbara J. Baden, nurse,
administrative hospital nursing service. Is she setting up a nursing
school or somethmg?
Mr. MacDonald. She is working in a nurse teaching school in
Saigon, helping the Vietnamese establish a capability of their own to
run a nursing school, train nurses, and meet then- own needs.
At the height of the crisis in 1965 and 1966, it was necessary, we
felt, and there was much congressional interest, to meet this need for
nurses. We brought in well over 100 American nurses to work in
province hospitals throughout Vietnam.
But at the same time we have been providing a few people to furnish
technical assistance to train Vietnamese nurses so that the American
nurses can go home.
The Chairman. What would you pay a nurse to go out to Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. I do not know, but I can get that for the record,
I am sure.
The Chairman. Would you supply it for the record?
(The information refeiTed to follows:)
604
Payment op A.I.D. Nurses in South Vietnam
Most nurses in Vietnam serve in positions rated FSR-5, with a base annual
salary of $14,132. This is augmented bj' the past differential of 25 percent, bringing
, total compensation to $17,665.
Mr. MacDonald. Most of our nurses come from the Public Health
Service, so I imagine their salary scales are probably exactly the same
as those serving here for the Public Health Service.
The Chairman. As you know, there is a great shortage of nurses
in this coimtry.
Air. jMacDonald. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I did not realize this was one of the reasons.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, I think it no longer is, Mr. Chairman.
We have only a handful of nurses.
The Chairman. You have Mr. John Byrnes, air traffic center spe-
cialist. What does that mean?
Mr. MacDonald. We have a team from the Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) under contract to us working with its counterpart
agency in South Vietnam in the operation of the country's airports.
The Chairman. Air Force?
Mr. MacDonald. Airports.
The Chair]\ian. I thought all airports were luider the military. Is
Tan Son Nhut operated as a civil airport?
Mr. MacDonald. It is a civilian airport.
The Chairman. I thought it was military.
Mr. MacDonald. It has its military base operations.
The Chairman. It is primarily military; is it not?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, yes, but Pan-American goes in and out, and
there are international
The Chairman. I see. You supply men to run the civilian side.
Mr. MacDonald. Not run it. We have advisers there. We used to
have, as I recall, some 51 or 52. We have fewer than that now because
some Vietnamese have been trained and they are taking over.
All our work, Mr. Chairman, is work of an advisory sort. We do
not do things. We do not run things. We are helping the Vietnamese
develop their own capabilities.
extent and variety of U.S. economic involvement in south
VIETNAM
The Chairman. Here is another one: Willis W. F. Christine, traffic
management adviser. Is that some other kind of traffic? Is that
automobile traffic?
Mr. MacDonald. No. I think you are still on the FAA list.
The Chairman. It does not have that
Mr. MacDonald. I know the man. I believe that
The Chairman. It does not say air like the other one does.
Mr. MacDonald. In any case, he would be an adviser to the air
traffic manager in the Vietnamese directorate for civil airport
operations.
The Chairman. They forgot to mention air. I thought it was
automobile traffic.
Don't you have someone rumiing the traffic? I hear Saigon has a
terrible traffic problem.
Mr. MacDonald. Does it have a traffic problem?
605
The Chairman. Yes. I have seen pictures of it which said it had a
traffic problem. You would help them out with that if they had one;
wouldn't you?
Mr. MacDonald. We do not try to deal mth every problem in
sight, Mr. Chairman. We couldn't begin to attempt to do that.
The Chairman. It is hard for me to think of one that you haven't
dealt with from this list.
You have here "agron adv seed inp." Wliat does that mean?
Mr. MacDonald. Would you give me those again?
The Chairman. Mr. Donald M. Coe, and it says "agron adv seed
inp."
Mr. ]\IacDonald. He is an agronomist. He is an adviser of some
sort. I do not recognize him.
The Chairman. I notice you have livestock and nutrition, equip-
ment specialist, livestock again, assistant public health, rehabilitation
and development, soils and something, medical supplies, highway
training schools specialist, educational, elementary, vocational educa-
tion, engineering materials.
Mr. MacDonald. If I may interject, Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. Arcliitects, engineers. I don't know anything you
have left out.
Mr. MacDonald. If I may interject, you are posing a USAID
director's classic dilemma, how much to do and how much not to
attempt to do.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. MacDonald. We are much put upon from various sources to
do more than we do. The Congress has not been slow on occasion to
suggest the need that much more be done in South Vietnam, for the
South Vietnamese people in their need, than we have felt it either
possible or appropriate that the United States attempt to do. It is
possible for you or anyone to run through that list and identify a
range of skills that encompasses the entire spectrum.
The Chairman. That is right. That is the only point I was making.
Mr. MacDonald. We are in the business of attempting to enable
countries to develop their own capacities so that they will not have
continuing reliance on foreign aid or dependence upon the United
States, and as quickly as we achieve our objectives, goal by goal, we
back out.
I think the primary school program that I meiitioned in my opening
statement is, perhaps, the best illustration I can offer of that procedure
of finishing a job, and leaving as quickly as possible.
impact of U.S. defoliation operations in VIETNAM
The Chairman. I know there has been considerable emphasis upon
agriculture. What would you say has been the impact on Vietnamese
agriculture of the American defoliation operations which, I have read
in the paper, have covered an area in Vietnam as large as the State of
Massachusetts. That has been published in the paper. In the first
place, is that accurate? Has an area as large as Massachusetts been
defoliated?
^Ir. MacDonald. Well, sir, there are as many estimates of things
of this sort as there are those who turn theii- muids to them.
The Chairman. Surely there is a better criteria than that. Don't
you have an estimate?
606
Mr. MacDonald. I do not have at my fingertips the area of Mas-
sacliusetts nor tlie range of estimates of destro^^ed tree and otlier
negetative areas in South Vietnam. But let me talk to the problem.
There have been economic losses due to the war, due to the deliberate
defoliation of some parts of the forests, due to the deliberate cutting
and destruction of trees 100 meters on each side of a lane that goes
through a rubber plantation, so that American and Vietnamese soldiers
won't be shot from ambush.
The Chairman. Let me come back. I did not mean to entice you
into that. I should not have used ^Massachusetts anyway. I do not
know why I did. How many acres have been defoliated?
Mr. MacDonald. That is beyond my purview.
The Chairman. It is? You mean you would not know? Who would
know how much is defoliated?
Mr. MacDonald. The Department of Defense.
The Chairman. And they would not tell you?
Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the estimates of as
much as 10 to 12 percent of the country's surface having been sub-
jected to defoliation are probably a fairly accurate estimate, 10 to 12
percent
The Chairman. That is what I wanted — 10 to 12 percent of the
total acreage.
Mr. MacDonald (continuing). With varying degrees of economic
loss as a consequence of that.
The Chairman. How much of that 10 percent is agricultural land
and how much forests?
Mr. MacDonald. Do you have that, Mr. Sharpe?
Mr. Sharpe. Nearly all the defoliation in Vietnam has been carried
on over the forested areas and very little of it deliberately, at least,
over cultivated areas.
The Chairman. I do not care what their motive was. What is the
actual result, whether it is deliberate or not?
RESULTS OF U.S. DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. MacDonald. Let me speak to the results. The 10 to 12 percent
is essentially denuded forests or forests that have been partly
damaged, trees that will come back 2 or 3 years hence. I suppose it is
possible to do some calculations and figure out there are 600 million
metric tons of timber which could potentially be cut up into wood and
sold and put to productive use. But it is a hypothetical exercise, I
believe, Mr. Chairman, because the fact of the matter is that the
stands of timber in South Vietnam are essentially virgin stands of
timber. It is unexploited, so although there has been a real physical
loss, there has not been an appreciable economic loss from the
defolitation of the trees.
Now, turning to another area where there has been real economic
loss, the rubber trees; rubber used to be the principal export of
South Vietnam. As I recall back in 1960, over half of South
Vietnam's $84 million worth of exports came from her sale of
rubber.
Now she has lost some. I do not have an estimate of how much
has been lost by defoliation, plus how much has been lost by
deliberate cutting of the trees to preclude ambushes. I can tell you
607
that the $48 milUon of exports has declined until last year only $9
million worth of rubber was exported. This is economic loss partly
from damage, partly also from the fact that laborers have been
drafted and taken off the plantations and cannot work, and partly
from the fact that there are still inadequate aspects of the exchange
system for exports. There is a disincentive to export, given the ex-
change rate system as it works.
The point I am trying to make here is that the permanent
economic loss, the real economic loss is not great, and that recovery,
particularly in the rubber field, can be quite quick. And I will con-
clude with the recollection, sir, that this last year, 1969, set all-time
highs for South Vietnamese agricultural production including com-
mercial crops and timber.
The Chairman. You said a moment ago that these forests that
have been defoliated will be back in 2 or 3 years. On what do you
base that? I have read conflicting stories about the effect of poisons,
chemical poisons in particular, and the persistence of some things in
this area has been considerable. Some of our conservationists are very
worried about what is used in this country. I mean the use of the
poisons in the cotton fields and in our own agriculture. It accumulates
in the irrigation ditches and the next thing you know it kills fish. I
have been reading in several stories in connection with this pollution
l^roblem and conservation that they are very dubious now about the
use of pesticides and also herbicides for crop control. Many of our
])cople are dubious here. How do j^ou know over there that if you go
out and defoliate a forest that it is going to come back in 2 or 3 years?
Mr. MacDonald. I didn't say that.
The Chairman. I thought you did.
Mr. MacDonald. A dead tree is a dead tree, and it needs to be
replaced.
The Chairman. I thought you said it would come back in 2 or 3
years.
Mr. MacDonald. I said the Vietnamese rubber industry can come
back very quickly. Most of the losses in rubber production in Vietnam
are not attributable to the (k'foliation or the destruction of trees. Most
of the loss is due to other considerations, lack of security, lack of labor.
The Chairman. I think you miss[)oke, because I think you first
said the forests would come back 2 or 3 years. That is quite all right.
We are going along pretty fast.
percentage of south Vietnam's income derived from u.s.
presence
Tell me what i)ercentage of South Vietnam's income is derived
directly or indirectly from the U.S. presence. I am shifting, from the
AID program alone. I will restate the question. What is the percentage
of South Vietnam's overall income, direct or indirect, from all of the
U.wS. presence, including the presence of the Military Establishment
with their expenditures and everything. What is your estimate of the
percentage of the total income that is derived from that presence?
Mr. AIacDonald. Well, I gather that you are not talking about
the budget of Vietnam.
The Chairman. Not AID, not just AID.
Mr. MacDonald. My discussion of the budget
608
The Chairman. Not just the budget; that is correct. I wondered if
you could estimate what the overall amount was.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, the gross national product of a country at
war receiving military assistance and receiving also large numbers of
foreign troops is very difficult to compute. I think I should ask Mr.
Sharpe to take this question, but before I turn to him, my recollection
is that the gross national product, as best w^e can calculate it, is on
the order of $5.5 billion in dollar equivalent, and that something more
nearly on the order of $4.25 billion of that is a truly Vietnamese
product. I stand to be corrected by Mr. Sharpe.
Ad^r. Sharpe. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Sharpe?
Mr. Sharpe. To give a short-cut answer, we estimate that the
Vietnamese GNP per capita in real terms, and kind of brushing past
the problem of exchange rate, is on the order of $150 to $175. The
direct cost of U.S. aid this year per capita is about $30. I would guess,
adding up all of the indirect types of U.S. aid, that you could say
there is another $20 or $25.
The Chairman. Did you say aid? I didn't want you to confine it
to aid. All expenses, using everything.
Mr. Sharpe. Well, indirect types of assistance or indirect effects of
the U.S. presence.
The Chairman. Your saying "assistance" is what put me off.
I did not want you to confine it to what I call assistance. I don't
know that a GI going into a nightclub is assisting them in that sense.
He is spending his money, and I wanted to include everything for
which they spend it. All I want is to understand you.
Mr. Sharpe. Adding up all those types of U.S. expenditures, not
assistance, I would say you would get up another $20 or $25 per capita,
so that perhaps in grand total the American presence is amounting to
something like $50 or $55 per capita.
The Chairman. About a third.
Mr. Sharpe. Well, nearly a third.
The Chairman. You said $150 per capita.
Mr. Sharpe. $150 to $175.
The Chairman. I see.
EFFECT OF U.S. TROOP REDUCTION ON SOUTH VIETNAM'S ECONOMY
The next question in this series would be if the American forces
are reduced to 200,000, for example, and U.S. economic aid remains
the same, what effect will the troop reduction have on Vietnam's
economy?
Mr. MacDonald. One of the sources of Vietnam's dollar receipts,
of course, is the American military presence.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. MacDonald. The great bulk of the dollars received from that
presence are used to purchase piasters for the financing and the main-
tenance and operation of the facilities — an estimated $309 million of
$354 million of piaster purchases in 1970. Only a very small portion
is earned from piasters for personal uses, particularly those of combat
troops, the man who is up on Razorback Hill in an artillery position
who does not get to town.
609
I think the average monthly piaster expenditure for the G.I. is
about $6 or $7.50 a month. Many years ago it used to be much higher
than that, but it is now that low.
We are talking about the reduction of American combat troops in
the first instance. As combat troops leave the dollar effect of their
departure will be relatively minimal.
Is that a responsive answer?
The Chairman. Yes; that is. You think the effect of their reduction
to 200,000 would not be very great. If we cut down to 50,000, wliich
would go far beyond the combat troops, would there be a substantial
and serious impact on their economy?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes; it would. There is no question but what
it would, assuming the necessity of maintaining the defense effort at
the present level.
The Chairman. From the South Vietnamese point of view it is
not so bad to lose the combat troops, economically speaking, but it
would be bad to lose the other troops, the supporting or logistics
troops. They spend their money more, being free.
NUMBER OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE WORKING FOR THE UNITED STATES
Could you tell how many Vietnamese work on U.S. bases, for U.S.
contractors or for U.S. personnel directly?
Mr. MacDonald. I believe last month total Vietnamese employ-
ment by U.S. agencies of all sorts, plus their major contractors was
142,000.
The Chairman. 142,000.
Do you have any estimate of how many others hold jobs which are
dependent upon Americans for their patronage and
Mr. MacDonald. Of what sort, Mr. Chairman, the taxi driver?
The Chairman. I mean all sorts of things, personal service, cooks,
and maids, all sorts of things.
Mr. MacDonald. I would not hazard a guess.
The Chairman. There is no calculation which has been made.
I will put in the record here a story by Mr. George Ashworth of the
Christian Science Monitor from Saigon in September of 1969. It dis-
cusses this subject. If you wish you may comment on it; you do not
have to. Here is one thing he says:
According to unofficial estimates, as manj' as two million Vietnamese may be
directly dependent upon wages paid by the Americans.
Would you quarrel with that statement?
Mr. MacDonald. I think it is a grossly exaggerated statement.
The Chairman. He says:
In effect, the war has created a terribly artificial situation in which many depend
upon emplo3'ment that can't last, a black market that must some day wane and
thievery that will some day have fewer available victims.
This is a sample of the article. Do you know Mr. Ashworth?
Mr. MacDonald. No; I have not known him, but I knew his
predecessors.
The Chairman. The Christian Science Monitor is a very reputable
paper, if any papers are reputable any more. It certainly has a good
reputation in my belief.
(The article referred to follows :)
610
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 26, 1969]
Economy Fragile — U.S. Exit May Add Saigon Woes
(By George W. Ashworth)
Saigon. — If a South Vietnamese Army captain with a family saved 10 percent
of his salary, he covild afford a Honda auto with the savings in about 30 years.
The sharp disparity between income and outgo for things Americans take for
granted illustrates the plight of the Vietnamese wage-earner in a time of rampant
inflation.
Actually, South A'ietnam's inflationary spiral isn't so bad, considering the war,
as it has been kept to about 30 i^ercent a j-ear.
But the inflation and the shaky state of the Vietnamese economy pose problems
both for the government and the citizens under it. American withdrawal will
intensify some of those difficulties. Officials here realize that some careful planning
and strong action will be necessary if the econom.y and those dependent upon it
are to avoid disaster.
If wages had kept up with inflation, of course, the problem would not be so
severe for the typical A'ietnamese. But income has not kept pace, particularly in
the cases of Vietnamese civil servants and members of the military. Soldiers are
so poor that stealing is common. Civil servants are so badly off that small bribes
known as "tea money" are accepted as an economic necessity.
POLICE ACCEPT 'tOKENS'
Police at roadblocks "accept" a small token of appreciation for letting trucks
with perishable produce through with dispatch. Sometimes they demand more
than a small token, which can be disastrous to truck drivers who must pay their
own money.
But if the driver is an employee of someone who can afford the bribe, such as an
American contractor, or some private concern, Vietnamese or foreign, he doesn't
mind so much. He can report the demand at double what was given and pocket
the difference, which means a great deal to a poor man.
Desperation, of course, leads to dishonesty and thievery. Many poor Vietnamese
adhere to the view that the Americans can afford to lose things now and then.
So theft rings are organized and Americans lose traveler's checks, cameras, and
cash. Bank managers sigh as they report another check theft. And American
insurance companies think darkly of Saigon. The black market thrives.
The American Government and armed forces now employ perhaps 150,000
Vietnamese. Other American firms employ about 50,000 more. Despite efforts to
keep pay scales in line with prevailing rates, it hasn't really worked out.
For one thing, Americans pay a lot of overtime. Neither the A'ietnamese Gov-
ernment nor Vietnamese private employers do that. And to get good help, gov-
ernmental agencies and contractors often get around the guidelines by giving
unjustifiedly high job grades. Thus a simple guard becomes a well-paid guard/
interpreter. He may never interpret. Indeed, he may not know how. But he draws
the pay.
INCOMES WILL DROP
According to unofficial estimates, as many as 2,000,000 Vietnamese may be
directly dependent upon wages paid by the Americans. Officials believe that the
shortage of skilled labor will mean that most wage earners will easily find jobs
after the Americans go. Of course, officials admit these Vietnamese will be some-
what saddened at their sharply reduced incomes.
In effect, the war has created a terribly artificial situation in which many depend
upon employment that can't last, a black market that must someday wane, and
thievery that will someda,y have fewer available victims. There are landlords now
doing very well, indeed, with renting apartments and villas and buildings to
Americans. Someday, there won't be people around to pay those high rents.
Some knowledgeable sources here believe that the beginnings of troop with-
drawal will not greatly affect the AMetnamese economy. Employment will remain
fairly steady for a while. Major drops will only begin v/hen major bases are
closed or turned over to the Vietnamese.
Combat troops leaving do not present a great drain upon revenues. It is esti-
mated officially that the typical American soldier s]:)ends about $5 a month on
the Vietnamese economy. Unofficial estimates put his black market dealings at
another $5.
611
Of course, as the American puUouts become more extensive, Vietnamese em-
ployment will begin to drop. But officials believe that the economy can absorb
many of these losers of jobs easily. Economic impact programs will further
alleviate the problem.
But no one denies that there will be problems, many of them severe ui the
period ahead. Continuing inflation would complicate them.
But the typical Vietnamese cannot worry now about the future. He must occupy
himself with the desperate fight for survival now. If he is fortunate enough to make
an income of 10,000 piastres a month, and he has a family, he faces the prospect
of spending a quarter of his income on rice alone. Then he must buy the things
to go with the rice.
And those things are still going up. jNIedium-quality rice is up two thudt> over
prices last year, and refined sugar is up US percent over a year ago. Condensed
milk prices have risen 30 percent since December, and stick beans have almost
doubled.
There is solace, of course, in the fact that some few things, such as pork beihes,
have staved level in price or declined sUghtly. But, overall, the retail price index
has risen from a January, lS6.i, base of 100 to the present level of 472.
Officials are, of course, trying to keep jH-ices down. And some, such as rice,
seem to have leveled off. But it is a great tight.
The Thieu government is talking now of austerity and the need to keep the
government solvent and the economy from disaster. ^
This will mean belt-tightening for both government and people. It won t be
easy, particularly with so little precedent. But officials have made clear their
intentions. Hard though it may be, many Vietnamese believe there is no other
alternative.
EFFECT OF U.S. PRESENCE IX VIETNAM ON U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The Chairman. Mr. MacDoiiakl, what \vill be the adverse effect
this year on the U.S. balance of payments from the U.S. presence m
Vietnam? Do yovi know that?
Mr. MacDoxald. Yes, 1 have some information on that.
The Chairman. Wonkl yon give it?
Mr. MacDonald. Tlie AID program here and elsewhere has really
very little effect on the U.S. balance-()r-i)ayments problem. Yon will
recall my saying that onr program is divided into two parts.
The Chairman. I did not say the AID program. I don't blame you
for getting confused. I am speaking now of the overall presence as
distinguished from AID alone.
Mrr MacDonald. Well, let me do as best I can.
The Chairman. You can do both if you would like, but I wanted
it to be clear. I did not ask about AID alone; I asked about presence.
EFFECT OF AID PROGRAM OX U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Mr. MacDonald. As far as the AID program, first, Mr. Chairman,
is concerned, virtually all our commercial im]3ort dollars cause no
balance-of-payments effect.
The Chairman. Because you buy the materials here.
Mr. MacDonald. Either buy them here or from PD 31 countries
where the dollars in the next go-around come back to the United
States; for our ])roject i)rogTam last year, we were required to spend
only about $2,000 in other \'ountries where there would have been an
adverse balance-of-iiaymenls effect, for instance, a French part for a
French machine, which was critical to a particular operation. It is
l)ractically nonexistent, on the AID side.
612
GVN SPENDING OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS
The $354 million that we estimate the Vietnamese will receive this
year from the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense, are
dollars that they freely use to purchase goods wherever they choose
to. I believe that we have in the last year seen them spend a propor-
tionately higher amount of those free dollars in the United States than
in the previous year, but the bulk is still spent outside the United
States.
The Chairman. How many are there?
Mr. MacDonald. I can get you the figure.
The Chairman. I thought you said a figure.
yir. MacDonald. No. I said the great bulk is spent outside the
United States. The amount coming back to the United States is going
up. I will have to su})ply that for the record.
( The information referred to follows :)
GVN-FINANCED IMPORT LICENSING BY SOURCE COUNTRY, CALENDAR YEARS 1965 THROUGH 1969
[Values In thousands of dollars!
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Per-
Per-
Per-
Per-
Per-
Source
cent of
cent of
cent of
cent of
cent of
country
Value
total
Value
total
Value
total
Value
total
Value
tota
Total
_ $114,848
100.0
$225,419
100.0
$291,845
100.0
$392, 695
100.0
$425 149
100.0
Belgium
4, 368
3.8
5,456
2.4
3,754
1.3
6,895
1.8
6,898
1.6
England
4,352
3.8
7,116
3.1
6,835
2.3
6,562
1.6
8,746
2.1
France
7,141
6.2
15,359
6.8
10,789
3.7
18,468
4.7
23,723
5.6
West Germany. _
. 9, 855
8.5
16,400
7.3
10,746
3.7
19, 847
5.1
18,958
4.4
Hong Kong
4, 147
3.6
8,549
3.8
11,604
4.0
19,391
4.9
16, 531
3.9
Italy
. 9, 805
8.5
27.222
12.1
18,325
6.3
16, 329
4.2
16, 848
4.0
Japan
. 43, 162
37.9
112.394
49.9
102,349
35.0
173,015
44.0
153,233
36.0
Singapore
853
.7
3,115
1.4
24, 249
8.3
14,422
3.7
34, 703
8.2
Switzerland
707
.6
2,599
1.1
6,372
2.2
14, 857
3.8
14,870
3.5
Taiwan
. 15,338
13.3
12, 396
5.5
28, 535
9.8
18,786
4.8
26, 346
6.2
United States...
4,102
3.6
6,205
2.8
24,011
8.2
157,731
14.7
58, 359
13.7
Other
.. 11,018
9.5
8,608
3.8
44, 276
15.2
26, 492
6.7
45,934
10.8
« Includes unlicensed value of $13,100,000 for 2 Boeing-727 aircraft.
AID FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES
The Chairman. Also how much are we spending in foreign ex-
changes in countries other than the United States? You do not have
that?
Mr. MacDonald. I am sorry, I could not hear that.
The Chairman. The amount of your foreign exchange expenditures
to countries other than the United States. Do you have that figure or
will you supply it?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes. In 1969 we spent $128 milhon in the
United States. We spent $37 million in Taiwan; we spent $4 million
in Korea, and these, as you will recall, are countries where dollar
expenditures do not result in an adverse U.S. balance of payments.
The Chairman. Are you talking about AID's expenditures?
Mr. MacDonald. At the moment I am.
613
IMPACT ON U.S. BALANCE OF PAYiMENTS OF U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. Yes. I asked about South Vietnam, overall. I am
still tryirio- to get these figures about the total impact of our presence,
not only AID. Where do they spend their foreign exchange?
Mr. JNIacDonald. I can supply that for the record.
The Chairman. You do not have it?
Mr. MacDonald. I do not have it, but ] can assure you that the
great bulk of their free foreign exchange is spent in other countries
than the United States.
The Chairman. Other than the United States?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
The Chairman. That is what 1 meant.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
The Chairman. Can you estimate the volume of that?
Mr. MacDonald. Last year the Vietnamese purchases from the
United States were approaching the magnitude of $40 million, $50
million. This year it may go somewhat higher than that, but $40 to
$60 million from $350 million still leaves the great majority of free
foreign exchange being spent in other countries.
The Chairman. Do they have $353 million in foreign exchange?
Mr. MacDonald. The $354 million we estimate will be realized by
Vietnam this calendar year of 1970 frorn piaster purchases by the
Department of Defense. They have additional
The Chairman. By the Department of Defense. Then that will be
free. There are no strings on it; is that correct?
Mr. MacDonald. That is correct. There are additional
The Chairman. This is Avhat I first asked you about the impact on
our balance of payments. If the major part of that money is spent
somewhere else, why isn't that an impact upon our balance of
payments?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, I have said
The Chairman. Not yours.
Mr. MacDonald. I said the AID program has a miniscule effect.
The Chairman. That is what I was getting at a moment ago. It is
the presence and not AID. I was trying to distinguish between them.
Mr. MacDonald. The remainder of their foreign exchange expendi-
tures do constitute a serious balance-of-payments effect.
The Chairman. Would it be fan- to say that you think it is as much
as at least $300 million adverse eft'ect on the balance of payments?
Mr. MacDonald. Something in that order of magnitude I would
estimate.
The Chairman. You cannot be precise on these matters. They are
too big.
economic aid from countries other than united states
Do you know how much economic aid South Vietnam received this
last year from countries other than the United States?
Mr. MacDonald. About $25 million from all sources, including
multilateral agencies as well as individual countries.
It is $25 million in 1969. We see it moving up, we think, appreci-
ably in 1970, Mr. Chairman, and, as I indicated in my opening
remarks, there is a rather extensive display of interest by a number of
614
countries about getting involved in financing the postwar reconstruc-
tion and development effort that lies ahead.
1969 VALUE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE BLACK MARKET CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS
The Chairman. A report of the Senate Government Operations
Subcommittee estimated the value of Vietnamese black market
currency transactions at $250 million last year. In your view is this a
reasonably accurate estimate?
Mr. MacDonald. I think it is exaggerated, Mr. Chairman. I think
it is very greatly exaggerated. Again I will ask Mr. Sharpe to comment
on the difficulties of making estimations of capital flight, capital loss,
in the situation that obtains there. I have heard estimates ranging
from $50 million to much higher than the one which you cited.
Mr. Sharpe. I am afraid that the problem of estimating how much
money is going into the black market is one of the most difficult of all
that we have. My own estimate would be certainly much smaller than
$250 million.
The Chairman. What would yours be?
Mr. Sharpe. $100 million to $150 million.
CURRENCY BLACK MARKET IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. I will put in the record the article I have here from
the New York Times of November 19, 1969, entitled ''U.S. Diplomat
Testifies in Capital that Currency Black Marketeers are Undermining
War Effort."
The article reads:
A United States diplomat formerly stationed in Saigon testified today that the
Vietnam war effort was being undermined by a $150 million a year currency black
market run by money manipulators from India.
Did you ever run into any Indian manipulators?
Mr. MacDonald. We don't deal with them, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I did not expect you dealt with them, but I thought
if they were that prominent you would run into them.
Mr. MacDonald. I think I know the gentleman. It was Robert
Parker, who was my special assistant for several years.
The Chairman. Do you know Mr. Parker?
Mr. MacDonald. Oh, yes. He was my special assistant. Because
of the range and intensity of problems in this whole area of irregular
practice in Vietnam I have a separate office, a si)ecial office, to help
me see that our administration of the AID program is done well, and
that the public's resources are protected.
Bob Parker's reference to $150 million was not a loss figure. It was
his estimate of the total volume of monetary transactions taking place
within the black market.
The Chairman. That is what I said. The question was the amount
of money. It says black market currency transactions. It did not say
a loss. These transactions indicate the volume of the business. The
article says that Mr. Parker "told the Senate Permanent Investigating
Subcommittee that U.S. banks, Americans in Vietnam, and deserters
hiding in Saigon participated in the racket, which has been described
by some as abillion-dollar operation." It goes on and says:
615
Mr. Parker said Moslems from India run the black market. The black marke-
teers are so well organized, he added, that they have a "legal services" department
that promptly pays the fine of any money changer caught and sets him back up
in business.
Mr. jMacDonald. Reminiscent of the Mafia organization, Bob
told me.
The Chairman. It says:
'' 'The government's official rate is 118 piasters to a dollar,' Mr.
Parker said. 'But on the black market, a dollar is worth at least 200
piasters.' " You said 328 or something like that It has gone up since
he was there, since last fall?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
The Chairman. This is a very interesting article. It says:
A subcommittee spokesman said black-market currency transactions in Vietnam
worked two wavs, both based on the difference between the official exchange rate
of 118 piasters "to the dollar and the black market rate of 170 to 200 piasters a
dollar. , . , , . .
In one, a check drawn for United States dollars on an American bank is given
to a black market money changer in \'ietnam, who pays the higher, illegal, ex-
change rate, then cashes the check himself for the dollars.
The second svstem, called a 'lateral transfer,' involves coded messages. An
American in Vietnam sends a message to his bank at home, instructing it to
transfer a certain amount of United States money to another account, also in the
United States. , . , , , , , ^
T^nknown to the first bank, the second account is linked with a black marketeer
in \'ietnam.
Do you know about this sort of thing?
Mr.^lAcDoNALu. Oh, yes, I have read the transcript of the hearings
of Senator Ribicoff's committee.
The Chairman. Have you?
Mv. MacDonald. It was of natiu'al interest to me.
(The article referred to follows:)
[From the New York Times, Nov. 19, 1969]
U.S. Diplomat Testifies in Capital That Currency Black Marketeers
Are Undermining War Effort
Washington. — A United States diplomat formerly stationed in Saigon testified
todav that the Vietnam war effort was being undermined by a $150-million-a-year
curroncv black market run by moiiev manipulators from India.
The diplomat, Robert R. Parker, told the Senate Permanent Investigating
Subcommittee that United States banks, Americans in ^ ietnam and deserters
hiding in Saigon participated in the racket, which has been described by some as
a billion-dollar operation. . c^ x
Mr. Parker was an embassv attache and assistant director of the United States
aid program in Vietnam until last month. He also worked under Ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker on a special investigation of black-market currency manipu-
lation. 1 • 1 u
"Black marketeers and illicit money changers have built a racket which has
been estimated over-all as running over $150 million a year in \ ietnam," Mr.
Parker testified. . . ,,
"They create an atmosphere of illegality and fraud, immorality and cynicism,
he said," and "give aid and comfort to the enemy. They undermine what we are
trving to achieve in Vietnam."
"Mr. Parker said Moslems from India run the black market. The black mar-
keteers are so well organized, he added, that they have a "legal services" depart-
ment that promptly pays the fine of any money changer caught and sets him back
up in business. re u
Mr. Parker was the first witness at the hearings, which come after a five-month
subcommittee investigation.
616
According to Mr. Parker, the black marketeers use code-named bank accounts
^n the United States and Hong Kong, in addition to currency investors in Saigon,
to reap profits from the difference between the official and black-market rates of
exchange for United States dollars and Vietnamese piasters.
"The Government's official rate is 118 piasters to a dollar," Mr. Parker said.
"But on the black market, a dollar is worth at least 200 piasters."
An aide to the subcommittee said its investigators had been in Vietnam for five
months looking into the black-market situation.
Senator Abraham RibicofT, Democrat of Connecticut, is chairman of the sub-
committee. He said federal officials, economists, banking experts, businessmen and
others would provide evidence of black market currency transactions through
banks in the United States and Hong Kong totahng about $360 million during the
last five years.
Senator Ribicoff said that the transactions were alleged to run much higher —
over the billion-dollar mark. The black market "seriously harms the American
economic effort in South A'ietnam, severely damages the Vietnamese economy and
hinders the struggle against inflation, and reduces the effect of the American
aid program," he said.
METHODS DESCRIBED
A subcommittee spokesman said black-market currency transactions in Vietnam
worked two ways, both based on the. difference between the official exchange rate
of 118 piasters to the dollar and the black-market rate of 170 to 200 piasters a
dollar.
In one, a check drawn for United States dollars on an American bank is given
to a black-market money changer in Vietnam, who pays the higher, illegal, ex-
change rate, then cashes the check himself for the dollars.
The second system, called a "lateral transfer," involves coded messages. An
American in Vietnam sends a message to his bank at home, instructing it to
transfer a certain amount of United States money to another account, also in
the United States.
Unknow^n to the first bank, the second account is linked with a black marketeer
in Vietnam. The contact administering the second account sends a coded message
to the money changer, advising him the money has arrived, and the money changer
pays the American in piasters under the black-market rate.
[From the New York Times, Nov. 21, 1969]
Black Marketing in War Is Traced
senate inquiry tells of flow of dollars into gold
(By Peter Grose)
Washington, Nov. 20 — Senate subcommittee investigators today described
the operations of international syndicates said to be engaged in black-market
currency transactions and w^ar profiteering in Vietnam, starting with the dollars
of American personnel and ending up as gold acquired in a Persian Gulf
Sheikdom.
Through a fabric of trading companies existing mainly on paper and New
York bank accounts under false names, traffic in the Vietnam black market in
currency was estimated at $250 million last year alone. Repeatedly expressing
astonishment through two hours of detailed testimony. Senator Abraham A.
Ribicoff, acting chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations, called for
tighter auditing bj^ civilian and militarj^ government agencies and closer
scrutiny by American banks over accounts with funds originating in Saigon.
"After examining these bank statements," the Connecticut Democrat said,
"I can't conceive how any prudent banker could draw anj^ conclusion other than
that they were being used as conduits for black market funds by an inter-
national sj^ndicate, to the detriment of the United States."
The report on black market and profiteering operations was presented, after
nearly a year's investigation, by Carmine S. Bellino, an accountant who is a
consultant to the subcommittee, part of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations.
617
BANK ACCOUNTS EXAMINED
Mr. Belliiio's report included an examination, with photocopy exhibits, of 13
bank accounts with total deposits averaging about $75-million yearly. These
represented, he said, "only a few of the many throughout the world which are
used to siphon currency from Vietnam."
From these records, the Senate investigators identified American civilians
holding Government contracts as suppliers to military installations. These sup-
pliers, they said, engaged in illegal currency exchanges, gave and accepted kick-
backs and charged excessive prices for goods sold to the Government and to
military personnel at post exchanges.
"The 13 bank accounts he examined include four large accounts controlled by a
group of Indian nationals in Hong Kong who have a syndicate for Vietnamese
currency manipulation," Mr. BeUino said. "The group is headed by B. S. A.
Rahman, who is also a motion picture producer and a manufacturer of wire and
rope. Rahman was born in 1928 in Madras, India. Four male relatives assist him
in his variovis enterprises."
The largest of these accounts was in the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
of New York, Mr. BeUino said, under the code title "Prysumeen." He reported
that the authorized signatures for the account were those of two persons with a
Hong Kong j^ost office box address, whom the subcommittee investigators later
identified as employes of some of Mr. Rahman's companies.
$51-MILLI0N DEPOSITED
During the account's existence, from February 196-5, until early this year when
it was closed, $51-million were deposited to Prysumeen — over half from Vietnam,
Hong Kong and Singapore according to the investigators. The bulk^$42-milIion —
was withdrawn and transferred to the credit of three banks in the city of Dubai a
seaport on the Persian Gulf in the Trucial states of Oman, they added.
Some of these funds were transferred directly from Manufacturers Hanover and
some went through the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Mr.
BeUino reported.
"The banks in Dubai do business in gold," he explained. "Gold smuggling is
prevalent in the states of the Persian Gulf and gold hoarders will pay $70 an ounce
and sometimes as much as $85." The United States Treasury's price for gold is
$35 an ounce.
Since one of the Dubai banks receiving the Prysumeen fluids was reported to
be a branch of New York's First National City Bank, the subcommittee served a
subpoena on that bank in New York to get the branch records.
"Attorneys for the bank, however, advised us that the ruler of Dubai had
forbidden the production of records and had issued a general prohibition on such
matters to all banks operating in Dubai," Mr. Bellino said.
PROTECTION OF AID RESOURCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I would like to sa}^, Mr. Chairman, that these matters, while they
are serious and of very specific interest to us, don't relate to the AID
])rogram per se. Perhaps, it would be appro]iriate for me to mention
the extent to which in oiu- administration of AID resources we have
been able to assure that there has been a maximum de2;ree of immunity
and ])rotection from the vicissitudes of that kind of behavior.
It is frequently suggested in the press and elsewhere that oiu- loss
rates of American commodities paid for by the taxpayers are enormous.
1 still hear occasionally estimates that we are losing 20, 30, and 40
percent of our commodities in our CIP program.
In point of fact, sir, we lose less than one-half of 1 percent from
every conceivable loss, includhig short shipments, inadvertent as
they may be, by American supjiliers, losses en route from Bayonne,
N.J., perhaps, to the Port of Saigon, losses on spoilage, breakage,
l)ilferage, thievery — less than one-half of 1 percent in our commercial
import program.
44-706—70 40
618
Our record is not quite that good in the commodity programs having
to do with our projects — the goods we bring into the country on behalf
of the Ministry of Education for construction of chissrooms and
equipment and supplies and other things for the Ministry of Health
and their operation of provincial hospitals. I estimate we are losing,
from causes, perhaps 2 percent of the commodities in our project
program. I do not say this smugly, Mr. Chairman, as the amounts are
still quite large if one multiplies one-half of 1 percent against an
import program of some $200 million, but I can assure you, and this
is my only point, that our AID program is run very carefully and,
I believe, sir, particularly in this area very well. We do not lose in this
area.
BLACK MARKET OPERATION IN COMMODITIES
The Chairman. How much of the black market operation in
commodities do you estimate is due to the United States and other
foreign military forces or from civilian employees acquiring PX goods
and then selling them on the Vietnamese economy to get a more
realistic rate of exchange?
Mr. ^NIacDonald. Well, first, let me say vu-tually none from the
U.S. AID programs; virtually none. There are some exceptions
which would prove the rule.
Let me give you an exception to prove the rule. Bulgur is brought
in under Public Law 480, title II, for needy people — given, not sold
to them — given to people who are accustomed to rice and have no
taste for Bulgur. Some trade it for rice. That is the kind of exception
on the AID side.
The black market does traffic to a certain extent in commodities
that come in unrelated to the U.S. AID program or the Department
of Agriculture program — the post exchanges and the commissaries,
for instance — one can see PX articles in the stalls on the black market
in the streets. There are fewer and fewer cases of this, given the con-
trols that General Abrams has instituted in the PX system, and given
the increasing concern of the Vietnamese Government and its instruc-
tions to the police to clean this up.
Magnitudes I cannot estimate for you, Mr. Chairman. I do not
know that anybody can.
The Chairman. Have any studies been made of the extent to
w^hich the PX and commissary goods end up in the black market?
Mr. MacDonald. I do not know how many studies of that kind
have been made.
The Chairman. Do you know how many tons of PX articles are
brought in each month?
Mr. MacDonald. These are things I don't know, but the Depart-
ment of Defense does.
The Chairman. It has been in the paper that about 36,000 tons
a month are imported to the PX commissaries. Does that sound
about right?
Mr. MacDonald. I really don't have any idea, Mr. Chairman.
It is not an AID matter.
The Chairman. You are really not (•(nn}ieteut to comment on
the PX's.
Mr. MacDonald. Not at all.
619
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFECTS OF U.S. AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. There is another article here from the January 29,
1970, Christian Science Monitor. I hope you don't thhik I read nothing
but the Christian Science Monitor, but it is a newspaper that is gen-
erally considered above politics and it is a paper that is a favorite of
people who are trying to lean over backwards not to be biased and,
hopefully, not to come within the purview of some of our leading
officials \\'ho do not think well of other newspapers that report on these
matters. That is one of the reasons why we are partial to the Christian
Science Monitor. It has not been denounced as an effete snob or some-
thing of that kind.
On January 29, 1970, it quotes a report commissioned by the World
Council of Churches as concluding that :
More aid is coming into Vietnam now than can be effectively absorbed.
What would be your comment on that?
Mr. MacDonald. I do not agree with that statement. I think that
good use is being made of the aid that comes in under the AID and
Public Law 480 program, sir.
The Chairman. Further in the article it says:
This massive infusion of aid "has also encouraged dependence on foreign aid
to such an extent that many South Vietnamese have ceased to believe that the
Vietnamese can solve their own problems.
What would be youi' comment on that?
Mr. MacDoxald. I would say there is dependence upon the outside
world for help occasioned by the fact that they are under attack from
an enemy also from the outside. Without that need, sir, they would
certainly not have as much dependence upon us.
The Chairman. Lastly on this:
The general effect of the aid to Vietnam has been to widen the gap between
rich and poor.
Mr. MacDonald. 1 would take immediate and emphatic exception
to that; immediate and emi)hatic exception to that.
The Chairman. You don't agree with this?
Mr. MacDonald. Not at all, sir; not at all.
The diet, the ordinary economic circumstances of life for the
average Vietnamese, tend to be somewhat better today than it was
before. I think if one is going to put jn-ice tags on these things, one
has to remember that there are 82 or 83 percent of the j^rimary school-
age kids in school. That is income, sir; that is income. I think, if
anything, the gulf, such as it was, between a handful of the elite and
the great mass of people today has narrowed very much.
(The article referred to follows:)
[From The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 29, 1970]
World Council of Churches Report — U.S. Aid to Saigon Widens Gap
Between Rich and Poor?
(By Daniel Southerland)
Saigon. — A report commissioned by the World Council of Churches says that
more foreign aid is currently coming into South Vietnam than dan be effectively
absorbed.
The report was prepared bj- two secretaries of the council, Don Luce and Nguyen
Tang Canh, who were appointed to spend three months preparing a survey of the
620
needs of the people of South Vietnam. Their report is described as an "interim"^
report, with a final assessment yet to be made.
The 57-page document says that much of the $408 million in United States aid
provided to South Vietnam in 1969 "has been caught in administrative bureauc-
racy and absorbed by corruption."
This massive infusion of aid "has also encouraged dependence on foreign aid to
such an extent that many South Vietnamese have ceased to believe that the
Vietnamese can solve their own problems."
"The general effect of the aid to Vietnam has been to widen the gap between
rich and poor," the survey says.
The report warns that pumping in large amounts of voluntary aid at this time
in addition to the already existing United States Government aid covdd merely
"complicate the situation."
"More aid is coming into Vietnam now than can be effectively absorbed," it
says.
Don Luce, an agricultural specialist from East Calais, Vt., has spent more than
10 years working in Vietnam, most of them with the International Voluntary
Service (IVS), a kind of private peace corps that works with the Vietnamese
people, training refugees, working on agricultural projects, and teaching English
among other things, Mr. Luce speaks Vietnamese.
In late 1967, Mr. Luce, then IVS director for Vietnam, and three other IVS
executives in Vietnam, resigned in protest against U.S. policies in Vietnam. They
sent an open letter to President Johnson calling the war "an overwhelming atroc-
ity" and appealing for deescalation, an end to crop defoliation, an end to the
bombing in both North and South Vietnam, and recognition of the Viet Cong's
National Liberation Front.
PEOPLE BEHIND REPORT
Mr. Luce was coauthor last year of a book called "Vietnam — the Unheard
Voices," published by the Cornell University Press. The foreword was written bj'
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D) of Massachusetts.
Nguyen Tang Canh is an "economist who did graduate work at the University
of Lausanne in Switzerland.
The Luce-Canh report contrasts sharply with an optimistic year-end report
recently released here by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID).
It maintains that "American economic aid has changed and is changing for the
better the ever.yday living of the people of Vietnam."
The AID report says that over a period of 18 years the United States has spent
or committed something less than $4 billion in economic aid to South Vietnam. It
says this aid reached a high of $646 million in the fiscal j^ear of 1967, dropped to
$548 million in 1968, and to $408 million in 1969. It projects a jump back up to
more than $514 million in 1970.
This has long been the largest American aid program in the world, the largest
anywhere, in fact, since the Marshall Plan of more than 20 years ago. The greatest
portion of the aid to Vietnam has been devoted to a commercial-import program
aimed at curbing inflation.
The Luce-Canh report says the Vietnamese "have been overrun with foreign
and technical experts, feasibility studies, relief goods, orphanages. . . . Social
order has broken down."
"Too manj^ Vietnamese have become dependent on handouts," it says. "Televi-
sion, motorbikes, air-conditioning have been showered upon Vietnam without
concern for the social and economic effects.
"Moreover, many Vietnamese feel that many of these things were imposed on a
(Saigon) government too weak to resist," the report continues. "The overwhelming
foreign presence has become a threat to Vietnamese manhood and nationhood."
The report calls for the "Vietnamization" of economic programs in South
Vietnam and a fenewal of the traditional village commvuiity life which has been
disrupted by the war.
The survey is not only critical of U.S. Government aid but also of foreign
voluntary agencies: "The country has been oversaturated with foreign voluntary
agencies," it says. "Develo]«nent of local groups has been at a minimum, partly
because foreigners have allocated the resources to their own organizations rather
than Vietnamese ones."
Emphasizing community development and cooperation with private Viet-
namese organizations, the Luce-Canh report takes a different approach from the
lengthy economic report submitted to President Nixon last year by David E.
621
Lilieuthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, and Vu Quoc Thuc, an economics professor and
minister of state in the Saigon government.
DEVELOPMENT PLAN HIT
The Thuc-Lilienthal document, which took two .years to prepare, amounts to
the onljr major postwar development plan for South Vietnam.
It concludes that with a total of at least $2.5 biUion in foreign aid, most of it
presumably to be provided by the United States, South Vietnam could attain
complete economic self-reliance — meaning freedom from dependence on foreign
aid — within 10 years.
The Luce-Canh i*eport does not directly criticize the Thuc-Lilienthal study
except to say that it has been financed by the U.S. and Saigon governments and
thus "reflects the Washington and Saigon political points of view."
But when questioned in an interview, Mr. Luce said he felt the Thuc-Lilienthal
plan was "too westernized."
"Many Vietnamese feel the plan puts too much emphasis on projects that will
require a large amount of capital from the West and that it is attempting to set
up a Vietnamese economy modeled after the U.S. one," .said Mr. Luce.
Mr. Luce is convinced that South Vietnam will eventually have a government
much less tightly linked with the United States than the present one and that
economic planners should take this into consideration.
PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S IMPORTS FINANCED BY
UNITED STATES
The Chairman. Do you have any estimate there of the percentage
of South Vietnam's imports that are being directly or indirectlj^
financed by the United States?
Mr. MacDonali). Oli, virtually all. There is no question about that,
if you use tiie word "iiulireclly." They imported roughly three-quarters
of $1 billion in 1969. AID and Public Law 480 constituted something
slightly more than one-third of that three-quarters of $1 billion. The
slightly less than two-thirds remaining amount was financed by
dollars of their own. But, as you suggest in yoiu' question, those
dollars of their own came predominantly from the Department of
Defense which i)urchased piasters with them.
But let us ]iot give the Vietiuimese no credit for export earnings.
Their earnhigs have gone down precipitously in the years of war, but
they still do earn some $15 to $17 million of their own. But the great
bulk uiuiuestionably is from U.S. taxpayer source. There is no question
about that, sir.
comparative EFFECTIVENESS OF AID PROGRAMS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AND PAKISTAN
The Chairman. How do you compare j'our present and your ex-
jierience in the last 4 years with your experience in Pakistan as to the
effect of the i)rogram on the local conmumity? How effective has it
been and what is the reaction of the peoi)le to it? You were 4 years in
Pakistan?
Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
The Chairman. Before these 4 years in South Vietnam?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, almost"^ immediately before. I had a brief
interlude in another country before being asked to go to Vietnam.
The Chairman. Could you compare it and give us any lessons you
learned?
622
Mr. AIacDonald. They are rather hicomp arable.
The Chairman. Are they? They may not be the same.
Mr. MacDonald. They are rather incomparable situations. Viet-
nam is a country at war. Pakistan Vv-as not.
The Chairman. They didn't have the war with India when you
were there?
Mr. MacDonald. It happened 2 days after I left, but it was not a
war of a quarter of a century's duration, Mr. Chairman. They are
hardly comparable.
The Chairman. You left just in time.
Mr. MacDonald. I would like very much to respond to your ques-
tion. I am not certain how I can approach it, however. The Pakistanis
in those years, and 1 gather since, have been doing a very creditable
job in developing their resources and their economy.
In the early 1960's they were pretty much out in front among the
develoi)ing countries of the world. They had a sense of discipline. They
had a realization of the limited worth of external aid, an understand-
ing that development entailed in the first })lace an enormous amount
of self-help and a willingness to leaven their own self-help with aid,
but not to depend entirely upon it.
I would say that the Vietnamese have no less an luiderstanding
that their future is dependent upon their own efforts across the
board, not just in the economic sphere, but in the military area as n\ ell.
From an economic point of view I find them enormously attractive
people, with great potential, great skill, great learning abihty, with
the determination, when they make up their mind to undertake a
certain objective, to see it through.
They have had one success after another, if I may use that word to
describe some of the things they have done in these last 4 years.
The Chairman. Would you say that our experience in Pakistan
was a quite successful one and that AID made a real contribution to
that country?
Mr. MacDonald. I think there is no question but that AID
resources, the financial resources provided by Americans to Pakistan
were important.
impact of aid on undeveloped countries
The Chairman. I ask you this because as you know, it was not too
long ago that Mr. Ayub Khan was, in a sense, deposed by General
Yahya Khan. There have been stories since that time that there was
a very undue concentration of economic activity and wealth in the
hands of a very few ]")eople. It is sort of that old story of the 20 fam-
ilies, perhaps 50 families, but anyway a very high concentration.
The implication of the story I read did not really lay it to AID's
activities, but it prompts this thought. I wonder if the infusion of
aid through a foreign government's aa-encv could not be subject to
C? OCT? i_«- ,.-1
the criticism that it may distort the orderly — because it is so much
easier and almost inevitable that you do business with those who
speak English and know how to do business with the West. They
know how to import; they know how to do business. The story I
read described how those very rich families did i)ractically all the
importing of modern equipment all the way from automobiles to
computers. They represented all of the major corporations in the
West and they, of course, reaped all the benefits of import programs.
623
They were also closely allied with Mr. Ayub Khan's political
organization and the article gave this as one of the ]jrincipal reasons
why there was in a sense this revolution in Pakistan.
It only raises again the question whether a foreign country, espe-
cially a very rich, big Western country, can go into a small or a large,
for that matter, undeveloped country and do a job that is really to
the benefit of the local people. I know you don't feel competent to
answer these questions.
Mr. MacDonald. I do feel competent to answer that one, sir.
The Chairman. Do you? I thought this fell in line with my first
question as to why we were in Vietnam. You didn't want to answer
that one.
Mr. MacDonald. I think it is a difierent question.
The Chairman. I would like to have you have a go at it.
Mr. MacDonald. I think that traditional societies have generally
been characterized as you just have, as societies with a small elite at
the top enjoying a monopolistic position, certainly in economic terms
and in many other ways. That has been the pattern of traditional
culture and societies around the world.
But the whole idea of development and the effect of aid, is to alter
that. It may very well be true that a country has 14 or 40 or 67 pre-
dominant families in a ])osition to benefit by an increase in economic
activity, but the net effect of the entire effort is to raise the living
standards of the mass of people, not through aid alone. Aid is only a
catalyst to enable a nation to meet its own needs, to increase output,
the better to share national wealth with all its ]^eople.
I think there is no question but that the develojnnent efforts and
the AID efforts in Vietnam have accomplished these things, and I
believe in Pakistan also. There is a middle class in being that never
used to be there.
The Chairman. It is very interesting and I am glad j^ou gave your
views about it.
QUESTION IS ONE OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT
As I am sure you recognize, there is a difference of opinion because
the people in Pakistan didn't like what was developing there. What-
ever influence you had, j^ou were there. I don't mean you, personally,
but the AID ])rogram was there for quite a while and we put quite
substantial amounts of money in there. This raises a very serious
question in my mind of whether a country, like ours can do what we
think we are doing. I certainly don't question the motives. I think
our motives in AID were about as good as we could have. I don't
question that at all.
It is our judgment as to human nature and human i^ychology that
is in question. It is like what is in question in Vietnam are not the
motives of anyone past or present. It is the political judgment.
Was it wise and is it in, the interests of the country? That is still the
question.
These are always legitimate questions in political circles. You are
not responsible for our being there, so I certainly don't hold you re-
sponsible. You are doing a job.
624
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Taking the old saw that no news is good news, I am bound to say
that during the last couple of years there has been far less scandalous
news out of Vietnam than any preceding 2 years I can remember. It
used to be chronic. About every 6 weeks there would be a new scandal
about speculation of one kind or another, and corruption and goods.
There were even stories that most of the Vietcong supplies really
came through our AID import program.
Whether you have improved it or have at least stifled the reporting,
one or the other, I have not heard bad news like that very much in
recent months.
4'fAssuming that it is warranted, I will congratulate you on at least
the appearances of having controlled what used to be a flagrant case
of corruption. I do not know whether I would say bad management,
but a situation which could not be controlled.
I will end by saying you apparently have done a good job, and I
know of no reason to say you have not. I do not criticize you or mean
to leave any implication or criticism for Vietnam on your being there.
You are there to do a job and you think that apparently you have
done a good job.
SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
It is getting late. I have a few more questions here but I have to go.
I have another engagement. I w^onder if the staff could submit the
few other questions I have to you and your staff. They are really
material for use in our consideration. I don't want to detain you. I
will just say thank you very much for coming here. I think you have
been very informative and it is very useful indeed.
SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS
I want to announce that the committee will continue this series of
hearings on Thursday, at 10 a.m., when we will have the testimony
of the Director of the USIA program in Vietnam. Prior to the testi-
mony from the USIA witness, we will hear Congressman McCloskey.
Thank you very much, Mr. MacDonald.
(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
on Thursday, March 19, 1970, at 10 a.m.)
(The following are answers by the Agency for International Devel-
opment to additional committee questions:)
AID Replies to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Questions of
April 1, 1970
1. (a) What percentage of South Vietnam'' s imports last year were financed directly
or indirectly by the United States? What ivill the percentage he this yearf Next year?
Answer. Earlier, I noted that virtuallj'- all of the three-quarters of $1 billion
in imports into Vietnam in 1969 was financed "directly or indirectly" by the
United States. The level of imports referred to was the value of commercial
import licenses and PL 480 Title I purchase authorizations issued, which totalled
$740 million in 1969. Besides this commonly used measure of import activity, a
more detailed analysis can be made on the basis of actual payments on import
625
transactions, rather than licensing. Commercial imports on a payments basis
totalled $686 million in 1969, and were financed as follows: Millions
AID commercial import program (CIP) $177. 2
Public Law 480 title I sales 87. 8
GVN-financcd freight and insurance (on above) 18. 5
GVN-financed imports 402. 4
Total commercial imports GIF- value 685. 9
A.I.D. CIP and PL 480 imports represents direct U.S. financing b^- the Agency
for International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, respec-
tively. Of GVN-financed transactions, about $15 million-worth were covered by
South Vietnam's foreign exchange earnings from visible exports. The remaining
amount of $406 milUon was financed with dollars, also of the Government of South
Vietnam, which it earned in 1969 and prior years from its invisible exports, vir-
tually all in the form of dollars accrued in the sale of piasters to the United States
for use by the Department of Defense in purchasing goods and services in South
Vietnam "necessary to the United States presence. Considering the latter amount
as "indirect" financing by the U.S., the total percentage of commercial imports
financed directly or indirectly by the United States was 98 percent.
In addition to commercial imports, the value of non-commercial imports in 1969
was approximately as follows :
' ' *^ Millions
AID project commodities $85. 0
Pubhc Law 480 title II grants 28. 5
Non-U. S. foreign assistance grant commodities 10. 0
Total noncommercial imports 123. 5
Total commercial and non-commercial imports are thus estimated at $809.4
million on a payments basis, and the percentage financed directly or indirectly by
the U.S. at 97 percent.
We expect this percentage will continue at well over 90 percent in 1970 and
1971.
(b) What was the cost to the United States of the import program for each of the last
three years?
Answer. On a payments basis, the A.I.D. Commercial Import Program totalled
$104.3 million in 1968, $177.2 million in 1969, and is estimated at about $200.0
million in 1970. (On a gross obligation basis bv fiscal A^ear, the amounts are $160
million in FY 1968, $130 million in FY 1969, and are estimated at $220 million
in FY 1970.)
(c) When do you think U.S. aid for commodity imports can be ended if the war
continues at the present level?
Answer. As long as the war continues at the present level and South Vietnam
must divert over one million men from economically productive pursuits to its
armed forces, there will be a need for some substantial level of commodity import
assistance.
£. Has the Government of Vietnam asked the United States for additional aid to
help feed the South Vietnamese Army?
Answer. A.I.D. itself has received no such request. However, the Government
of Vietnam has made a proposal along these lines which is being considered by the
Department of Defense.
S. Has the United States made any commitmenls to the Government of South Vietnam
regarding the future level of U.S. aid? If so, would you provide the Committee with a
copy of that agreement?
Answer. The U.S. has made no such commitment.
4. How much economic assistance did South Vietnam receive last year from other
nations? What nations and what amounts from each? How much is expected for 1.970?
Answer. Economic and social assistance extended to Vietnam in 1969 from covui-
tries other than the U.S. totalled $25.8 million, as follows:
626
Millions
Germanj' $6. 1
Japan 4. 9
France 4. 8
Korea 3. 4
Australia 2. 2
Canada 1. 9
United Kingdom 1. 0
New Zealand . 6
Switzerland . 4
Thailand . 2
Others . 3
Total 25. 8
A slightly higher total is expected in 1970 unless there is a significant diminution
of hostilities, in which case we would expect other countries to plan for substan-
tiall}^ increasing their aid.
5. Is AID financing any organized programs of study concerning Vietnam at
U.S. colleges or universities? If so, please describe the scope and objectives of the
assistance.
Answer. An institutional development grant of one million dollars was made
to Southern Illinois University on June 30, 1969, for a five-j^ear period. The
purpose of the grant was to increase the University competence for establishing
studies and programs geared to postwar economic and social development of
Vietnam. Such competence will become available to A.I.D., other agencies of
the U.S. Government and for program planning, personnel training, and other
related needs.
The grant was made under the provisions of Section 211(d) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1966 as amended, which authorizes such grants ". . . to
research and educational institutions in the United States for the purpose of
strengthening their capacity to develop and carry out programs concerned with the
economic and social dev^elopment of less developed countries." The 211(d) grants
are for strengthening on-campus capabilities; they do not provide for direct
services to A.I.D. (such as overseas technical assistance contracts) which, if any,
would be carried out under separately financed contracts.
Under the terms of the grant, the objectives and scope of the studies and
programs of the Center include:
1. The Universit5^ will expand its permanent, full-time professional core
staff, of Vietnamese and U.vS. scholars under a Director of the Center for
Vietnamese Studies and Programs. Activities will include organizing interdis-
ciplinarj^ courses of study about Vietnam in the related disciplines at the graduate,
undergraduate and special short-course levels for both U.S. and foreign graduate
and special students. This will involve the development of new courses and the
restructuring of some existing courses.
2. The University will expand its library and public information services on all
aspects of Vietnam.
3. The University will expand its research into economic and social development
technology as related to the purpose of this grant.
The expanded full-time Vietnamese-American professional core staff, courses of
study, library and information program will enable the University to respond
more adecjuately to requests for assistance on economic and social development
problems in Vietnam from A.I.D., other U.S. universities, Vietnamese govern-
mental agencies and imiversities, international and regional agencies, various
private businesses and interested private citizens.
In addition, A.I.D. is also financing programs of study concerning Vietnam
through a contract with The Asia Society, New York, N.Y. While The Asia
Society is not itself a college or university, luider the terms of the contract, it has
organized the South East Asia Development Advisory Group — a group of pro-
fessors from various academic disciplines and from different universities who are
interested in development assistance to the South East Asia countries — including
Vietnam. In 1969 research grants were provided to six scholars for the following
studies on Vietnam:
The Changing Composition of the Political Elite in South Vietnam as
Reflected in Persons Holding National Office since 1954. ($11,400) (Wesley
R. Fishel, Michigan State University) ;
627
The Current and Future Role of the 1967 Lower House as an Emergmg
Political Institution and its Membership as an Emerging Elite. ($9,803)
(Allan E. Goodman, Harvard University) ;
The Effects of Long Term Viet Cong/Viet Minh Control on Rural Viet-
namese Social Structure and Attitude and Value Orientations of the Delta
Peasantry. ($19,820) (Neil Jamison and A. Terry Rambo, University of
Hawaii) ;
The Relationship between Economic Change and Peasant Organizations
in Vietnamese Villages. ($22,670) (Samuel L. Popkin, Harvard L^niversity) ;
and
Planning Study on Research on Village Development in Vietnam. ($18,426)
(Ithiel de Sola Pool, M.I.T.).
6. How much has South Vietnam's population increased in the last ten years? What
is the current birth rate? Does the United States provide family planning assistance to
South Vietnam? If not, why not?
Answer. The GVN National Institute of Statistics estimates that South Viet-
nam's population has increased by approximately 4.1 million in the last ten years,
to a 1969 total of 17,867,000. The annual estimated population growth rate during
those years has varied between 2.6 and 3.0 percent. The annual crude birth rate is
estimated at 4.4 percent (live births surviving 24 hours).
Because of a 1933 Vietnamese law prohibiting the practice of contraceptive
techniques and dissemination of family planning information, U.S. assistance in
family planning has been limited to a Ministry of Health research project. In this
research project the U.S. has provided medical equipment, vehicles, audio visual
training equipment and contraceptive supplies for the establishment of Family
Planning Clinics within the Ministry's Maternal and Child Health system. At
present there are nine of these clinics and one family planning training center for
national midwives in operation. The U.S. has also provided training opportunities
for 47 community health and population studies workers.
The limited direct U.S. assistance has been coordinated with the work of the
following international family planning organizations:
(a) The International Planned Parenthood Federation, which has provided
in-country training for national midwives, training at the IPPF regional center in
Singapore for doctors and nurses, and financial support for the establishment of a
private Vietnamese family planning organization.
(b) The Population Council's observational tours for GVN officials have
acquainted them with successful Asian family planning programs.
(c) The Pathfinder Fund has provided assistance for G^'N participation in
international family planning conferences, salaries for family planning clinic
clerical personnel, and contraceptive supplies.
7. (a) What is the outlook for future U.S. private investment in Vietnam?
Answer. The GVN, the Aletnamese private sector and AID are cooperating in
identifying potential postwar private investment opportunities in Vietnam. While
results of this work arc tentative, areas of greatest attraction for investors will
probably be the following: fisheries, wood products, sugar refining, fertilizer,
chemicals, textiles, machinery and metal products. The extent to which U.S.
private capital takes advantage of these opportunities will depend largely on the
availability of investment guaranties, and the existence of an efficiently imple-
mented, attractive Metnamese investment incentive law. The security situation,
of course, must show steady improvement over a period of time before any sub-
stantial increase in U.S. or other foreign investment can be expected.
(b) Is AID devising any special incentives to attract potential investors to South
Vietnam in the postwar period?
Answer. AID Advisors are working closely with the GVN in drafting a new
investment incentive law that will be competitive with those of other countries
in the area. It is anticipated that such a law will be put into effect during 1970.
In cooperation with the Asian Development Bank, AID is also advising the GVN
Industrial Development Center on restructuring itself to become more attractive
to foreign lenders. The AID investment guaranty program will be an essential
element in fostering postwar U.S. investment.
8. What is the estimated total for foreign investment in Vietnam at present? How
much is the U.S. investment and how much of that is covered lender the investment
guaranty program?
Answer. As of the end of 1969, foreign private industrial investment was
estimated at US$108 million, of which U.S. investment was approximately
$8.8 million. The balance was principally French investment.
AID political risk insurance coverage in effect is as follows:
628
American Trading Investment Corp $135, 354
Intl. Dairv Eng. Co. (Foremost) 395, 293
Caltex (storage tanks) 294, 000
Subtotal 824, 647
Chase Manhattan Bank 30, 000, 000
Bank of America 30, 000, 000
Total 60, 824, 647
It is most unlikely that the two American banks would ever have claims for the
insured amounts.
9. (b) What portion of Vietnam's spending of foreign exchange is in the United
States? What other countries get sizable shares of GVN spending?
(The information referred to appears on p. 612)
10. The Lilienthal report on post-war reconstruction stated that in the next 10
years, South Vietnam's economy will require an investment of $5 billion to achieve a
satisfactory growth rate and that half of this will have to come from external sources.
How much of that do you expect to come from U.S. private resources? How m.uch from
U.S. foreign aid?
Answer. The Lilienthal report postulated not just the possibility of South
Vietnam attaining a ". . . satisfactory growth rate . . ." following a decade of
development, but rather that she could in that time attain a state of self-sustaining
growth in which she would have no need for further concessional aid. That achieve-
ment would require satisfactory growth rates during the decade of development.
Given the uncertainty of future events, it is difficult to establish meaningful
investment requirements for the next ten years. If the Lilienthal report's prospectus
and figures are correct, and assuming a U.S. share in financing the 2.5 billion dollar
investment which the report says may be derived from external sources over the
next ten years, it is probable that most U.S. assistance would come from public
sources. U.S. private business has only recently expressed interest in investing in
Vietnam. The prospects for increased aid, both public and private, from other
nations (notably Japan) are brighter, and should materialize quickly as hostilities
diminish.
11. The General Accounting Office recently reported, that the United States Gov-
ernment had paid directly or indirectly between $28 million and $34 million in rental
taxes on leased facilities in Viet-Nam between 1966 and 1968 and the GAO recom-
mended that steps be taken by the U.S. Government to obtain relief. Is anything being
done to correct this situation?
Answer. Since receiving the GAO report, the U.S. Mission in Viet-Nam has
determined to seek an exemption from the rental taxes on facilities leased to the
U.S. Government, and steps to obtain this relief are now being discussed with
the Ministry of Finance.
Since this question was put to the Director USAID/Viet-Nam, it should be
noted that this problem has virtually no applicability to A.I.D. operations as
virtually all piaster financing in support of them is derived from the GVN counter-
part account and not from U.S. -purchased piasters as in other areas.
12. What proportion of the total cost of the land reform piogram will be paid by
the United States — directly or indirectly? What will be the total cost to the United
States?
Answer. Cost of the new "Land-to-the-Tiller" Law to the GVN is estimated
at VN$75-$110 billion (LTS$64a-960 million equivalent),' depending on land val-
uation. This amount would cover landlord compensation at 20 percent cash down-
payment with the balance in bonds redeemable over an eight-year period. The
U.S. does not contemplate making any direct financial contribution to these
payments, which are a local currency cost. In recognition of the inflationary
impact on the economy of these payments, however, we intend to assist the
GVN to meet the resulting increased import demand, as we do with respect to
total import requirements. Our financial assistance would be applied through the
A.I.D. Commercial Import Program. We have been planning to earmark ITS$40
million for this purpose over the first three years of the program, through specific
project agreements tied to progress in land transfers. US$10 million of this amount
has already been obligated. Additional support over the life of the program will
be considered as part of our overall economic stabilization assistance.
Since the level of this subsequent support will depend on a great number of
economic factors besides land reform payments, an estimate of that portion of
the total cost of the program which the U.S. might bear cannot be predicted now.
1 Converted at 118 :1.
629
13. (a) What is the total for all U.S. spending in Viet- Nam — government and
private?
Answer. U.S. spending affecting the Vietnamese economy is estimated at
approximately $730 million in 1969. This includes all A.I. D. -financed and PL 4S0
commodities, and official and troop spending. Other private spending is negligible.
(b) How much of South Viet-Nain's national income is derived, directly or indirectly,
from the United States presence, including the U.S. aid program?
Answer. The computation of the Vietnamese GNP is complicated by the war
situation and the exchange rate problem. At a realistic exchange rate, GNP per
capita is estimated at roughh' US$150-175, of which US$.30-55, or about one-
third, is the direct and indirect contribution of the American presence, including
American aid.
(c) What effect will the continued reduction of U.S. forces and spending have on
South Viet-Nam's economy and on the level of U.S. aid?
Answer. The reduction of the number of combat troops will have little direct
effect on the economy, though certain dislocations in urban economies may
attend the reduction of the number of support troops. Indirectly, the reduction
of forces will decrease the amount of dollars available to the GVN to finance
imports. A compensating increase in economic aid will probablj^ be required to
mitigate the effect of economic dislocations caused by personnel withdrawals, to
help finance the increased burden shouldered by the GVN, and to supply invest-
ment capital.
14. (a) Has the United States encouraged the Government of Vietnam to devalue
the piaster? If not, why notf
Answer. The United States has strongly encouraged the GVN to take a series
of stabilization measures of which monetary reform is one important element.
(6) What magnitude of devaluation would be required to stem the present capital
flight and reduce black market activities to insignificance?
Answer. It is difficult to say what magnitude of devaluation would stem
capital flight and reduce black market activities. An\' arrangement short of a
freely fluctuating rate would involve limiting access to the exchange and thus
insure a continued Vjlack market demand. The short-run consequences of a free
rate would be too disruptive to contemplate. Of much greater importance in
stemming capital flight is the matter of basic confidence in the economy, which
goes bej'ond adjustment of the exchange rate.
15. (a) What percentage of South Vietnam revenues last year was derived from
taxes? How much from income taxes?
Answer. The composition of GVN revenues in 1969 was as follows, in billion
of piasters:
Customs duties and related collections VN$52. 0
Domestic taxes 26. 0
Receipts for services, lottery proceeds, etc 110. 9
Counterpart releases 24. 8
Deficit financing 29. 6
Total revenues 142. 8
Customs and domestic taxes represent 55 percent of the total. Income taxes
represent a relatively small proportion of domestic taxes, the bulk being derived
from indirect, excise, and registration taxes. Income taxes amount to about 4
percent of total revenues. Domestic taxes and receipts as a whole account for
26 percent of the total; and if domestic borrowing (deficit financing) is added,
the percentage of the budget financed solely by the GVN and unrelated to external
assistance amounts to 46.6 percent. It is important to note that this self-financed
level, the equivalent of US$o62 million, suljstantially exceeds expenditures for
the civilian portion of the budget for such areas as education, health, agriculture
and public services, which totalled US$317 million equivalent in 1969. A chart
giving additional detail on budget receipts and expenditures follows.
(6) Have United States officials recommended in the past that South Vietnam
reform its tax structure, especially with regard to income taxes?
Answer. The U.S. has stressed the need to increase domestic revenues, including
receipts from income taxes, as a necessary part of an effective economic stabiliza-
tion program. Specific tax policy advice is provided by a resident United Nations
advisor. The USAID/IRS tax advisory team is concerned with improving tax
administration and has made man.y recommendations for administrative reform,
including the administration of income taxes.
630
GVN BUDGET
.. 1969
BILLIONS- OF FiASTERS
150
TOO
50
142.8
MINISTRY
OF DEFEMSE
92.0 (US$760 million)
DEFENSE-RELATED
yi CIVIL PROGRAMS
13.3 (US$112 million)
OTHER CIVIL
PROGRAMS
37.5 (US$317 million)
A. I. D. COUNTERPART
&P.L. 480 PROCEEDS
FOR GVN BUDGET USE
24.3 (US$206 million)
CUSTOMS ON US.
FINANCED IMPORTS
12 0 (US.$102 million)
CUSTOMS ON GVN
FINANCED IMPORTS
40.0 (US$338 million)
DOMESTIC TA>
RECEIPTS
36.9 (US$312 million)
SALE OF TREASURY BILLS
1.0 (US$6.5 million)
DEFICIT FINANCING
28.6 (US$2U2 million)
EXPEIIDITURES
RECEIPTS
16. (a) How much were South Vietnam's exports last year compared with imports?
What is expected for 1970f
Answer. In 1969 South Vietnam exported an estimated $15 million worth of
goods. This may be compared with commercial imports of $686 million, or with
total commercial and non-commercial imports of $809 million. (See tabular
material, Question 1 a.). In 1970, exports should remain about $15 miUion and
total imports are estimated in the range of $750 million.
(6) How much potential is there for export expansion, ass^iming that the war con-
tinues? To what extent can the South Vietnamese reduce their level of imports?
Answer. As long as the war continues at its present level, prospects for sub-
stantial export expansion are relatively slight. Increases in domestic production
despite the war and a significant reduction of imports are possible and are being
sought.
(c) Do you think the gap can ever be closed as long as the war goes on?
Answer. The gap between imports and exports is not at all likely to be closed as
long as the war continues at its present level.
17. (a) When will South Vietnam regain self-sufficiency in rice production?
Answer. South Vietnam will regain self-sufficiency in rice i^roduction by the end
of 1971, assuming there is a continued economic incentive for farmers to raise rice.
Rice import and marketing policies must be such as to sustain this incentive.
There is every expectation of self-sufficiency in 1971.
(6) What has happened to South Vietnam's traditional rice markets since the war
began? What are prospects for her regaining these markets?
Answer. Vietnam's traditional rice exports consisted first of relatively small
quantities shipped to Hong Kong and Singapore. Vietnam can probably recapture
some of these markets bv exporting her very high quality rice as she did when last
an exporter, and by adjusting her monetary rate of exchange to encourage export
sales. Additional small amounts moved to France and other European countries,
but Vietnam's command of these markets was primarily the result of cheap
backhaul freight rates. Finally, the majority of South Vietnam's rice exports m the
past went to North Vietnam.
(c) Are the new "miracle rice" varieties of adequate quality to compete in the world
Answer. The original "miracle" rice strains, IR-8 and IR-5, are meeting the
quantitative needs for rice in Vietnam, but they are not considered suitable for
631
export by Vietnam or other surplus producing countries. New improved varieties,
however, such as IR-20 and IR-22, have milling and table qualities suitable for
international trade. IR-20 has been distributed to all the primary rice-growing
provinces in small amounts to begin the build-up of seed stocks. IR-22 is being
tested and will be released in the near future if it continues to prove to be satis-
factory for Vietnam's conditions. Other promising varieties are in the develop-
ment stage. These improved strains are, of course, available to other rice produc-
ing countries as well as Vietnam.
18. Given the prospects for continued fighting under the Vietnamization policy,
what are the prospects for reducing the imbalance between GVN spending for militanj
purposes and for economic and social purposes?
Answer. As long as the country is under military attack by North Vietnam and
subjected to harassment by local insurgents externally stimulated by the North
Vietnamese, and through the North Vietnamese equipped by other foreign
Powers, the present priority given military spending should and must continue.
Nonetheless, GVN spending for economic and social purposes which has been
large and growing the last three years will probably continue to increase absolutely
in the next several years despite the war. This should bring a continuation of
the rapid and unprecedented growth of public and social services being provided
the South Vietnamese people by their government, in marked contrast to the
situation in North Vietnam.
Given a cessation of the external aggression by North Vietnam and their aid
to the Viet Cong, but a continuation of Viet Cong insurgency, a substantial re-
duction in the "imbalance" could be effected.
19. What is the state of South Vietnam's foreign exchange holdings now, compared
with a year ago? Two years ago? What do you expect them to be a year from now?
What will happen to her foreign exchange holdings as U.S. forces are withdrawn,
assuming that U.S. economic aid is not increased?
Answer. Vietnam's foreign exchange holdings in millions of U.S. dollars are as
follows:
As of yearend
1967 1968 1969
Official GVN holdings 325 319 260
Commercial bank holdings 13 26 jU
Total... 338 345 290
Total foreign exchange reserves as of the end of 1970 should be about US$255
million. Future foreign exchange earnings would decline more or less sharply,
depending on the pace of U.S. force withdrawal, and holdings would probably
be reduced. The level of reserves, however, will be determined by a combination
of GVN import, fiscal, and domestic production policies and by the magnitude
of direct and indirect foreign aid, which cannot be forseen precisely now.
20. Approximately 100,000 to 300,000 South Vietnamese women are living as
prostitutes, bar girls, and "temporary wives" of American servicemen, according to
a report put out in October 1969 by the World Council of Churches. What, if any,
steps are being taken to integrate these women into productive economic activities as
American forces are withdrawn?
Answer. The figures in the referenced report were oflFcred without substantia-
tion. Since statistics on this subject are not kept, one could do no more than
speculate whether the wide-range "guesstimate" made in the report is high, low
or reasonably accurate. The American military, in a major effort to lessen the
incidence of "this kind of problem began over two years ago to place cities off
linuts to servicemen and this has doubtless had a pronounced effect.
The Ministry of Social Welfare is attempting to deal with the problem of
prostitution in Vietnam through programs of vocational training and education
at a few rehabilitation and detention centers, and has plans to expand this work.
But the imjxict of these programs has been limited and it seems unlikely that the
problem will t)e eliminated here much more quickly than it has in comparable
situations in other nations suffering from war-time conditions.
21. (a) What has been the inflation in South Vietnam since 1965? What is expected
for 1970?
Answer. From 1965 through 1969, the cost of living as measured by costs for the
Saigon working class rose about 35 percent a year. If taken from June 1966, the
632
annual rate of increase through 1969 is in the order of 27 percent. Something less
than that is being attempted for 1970.
(6) Have any steps been taken tovmrd easing the impact of inflation on the poor
through stateowned stores selling rice and other essentials, subsidizing the price of
rice, or similar measures f
Answer. Imported U.S. rice is sold at prices below the price of domestic rice,
and below the free market price for U.S. rice, to groups of people hard-hit by
inflation, such as refugees, soldiers and theii- families, civil servants and a variety
of needy persons.
22. (o) How many Vietnamese work at U.S. government installations, for U.S.
Government contractors, or for U.S. personnel in a private capacity?
(b) How many Vietnamese jobs are dependent, directly or indirectly, on the United
States presence?
Answer. In early 1970, some 142,000 Vietnamese were employed by all U.S.
agencies and major contractors. There is no way to estiiuate reliably the number
of Vietnamese who may be privately employed by Americans, nor how many jobs
may be indirectly dependent on the U.S. presence in Vietnam.
23. Why were "austerity" taxes on imports of luxuries not imposed long before last
Answer. The "austerity" tax had its origin in 1961, and so was mdeed imposed
long before last Fall. As to the last two years, however, the political and economic
disruptions of Tet 1968 effectively postponed additional economic austerity
measures until 1969. Some were introduced in the spring, and more far-reaching
measures in the fall of 1969. The result of the measures taken at that time was to
increase by 65 percent the average effective cost of those imports on which addi-
tional taxes were imposed. (Twenty-seven percent of imports, considered essential,
were exempted from the austerity tax increases).
24. (a) How much of the black market operation in commodities do you estimate to
be due to U.S. military forces, foreign military forces, or civilian employees acquiring
PX goods and then selling them on the Vietnamese economy in order to get a more
realistic rate of exchange?
(b) Have any studies been made of the extent that PX and commissary goods end up
in the black market? If so, what do they show as to the total value of the goods so diverted?
(c) What was the total value of all goods imported into Viet-Nam last year for use in
PX or commissary operations? How much does this come to per soldier?
(d) Are any reports kept, or have any studies been made, of the amount of PX sales
made to persons other than U.S. military personnel? What do they show?
[These questions asked at Hearings, pp. 617-618 of transcript, Mr. MacDonald
indicating this is a DOD matter in which he has no competence.]
25. Can the United States give a more realistic rale of exchange to its employees or
servicemen with the piasters it owns, if it chooses to do so?
Answer. Yes, but doing so would entail the diversion of U.S.-owned piasters
which the U.S. presently uses to finance essential activities.
26. How does the GVN select the importers who will be permitted to bring m goods
financed by the United States under the commodity import program? How many
people were arrested and convicted last year of fraud or other corrupt activities in
connection with the import program? , ,. , j
Answer. The GVN has an "Open General Licensing Systein", with established
pre-qualification criteria against which commercial importing firms, dealers, and
industrial enterprises apply for registration or authorization to act as importers.
A large number of importers are qualified under the system and substantial com-
petition results. During a recent 14-month period, 837 importers were issued one
or more AID-financed import licenses. There were no arrests or convictions last
year dhectly connected with the AID-financed import program. A.I.D. controls
and procedures have succeeded in keeping the loss rate low on A.I.D.-financed
commodities— less than one-half of one percent in the commercial import pro-
gram. This includes losses from all causes including theft, breakage, spoilage, and
short shipments.
Considering GVN Customs operations as a whole, there are of course many
arrests for avoidance or attempted avoidance of GVN regulations by smuggling
or other iUicit practices. In 1969 the GVN Customs Service collected fines and
penalties totalling US$ 1.8 million equivalent for violations of customs and import
regulations. Over 3500 customs cases were instituted, and 2807 cases settled
through administrative proceedings. Court convictions resulted in 192 of these
cases.
633
27. Is pay adequate for GVN civil servants and is there a relationship between low
pay and corruption in the ministries?
Answer. Pay increases for GVN civil servants have not kept pace with rises in
the cost of living, and civil service salaries are generall.v lower than those in the
]irivate sector. The inadequacy of GVN civil service salaries is partialh^ alleviated
by fringe benefits such as family allowances, a rice allowance and inedical benefits.
Low pay is a contributing factor to corruption. Petty officials often require
"speed" money of a nominal amount as their price for processing a document, for
example, a practice which some say has come to be tolerated in Vietnamese society
as an unavoidable evil, a form of enforced tipping for service. Major instances of
corrupt practices probably occur most often among officials, irrespective of their
salary, in positions in which they can control large amovmts of money. Control of
the problem of corruption is being attempted through the institution of tighter
audit controls, wider publicity on contract awards and similar transactions, and
heavy penalties imposed for those caught in malpractices. Higher salaries would
probably have a helpful effect on reducing corrupt practice.
44-706 -7(f 41
VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970
U.S. Assistance on Information 3Iatters and U.S. Psychological
or Propaganda Operations
THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1970
United States Senate,
Committee on I oreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room
4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright (chairman), Church, and Gore.
Senator Church. The hearing will come to order.
opening statement
The principal purpose of this morning's meeting is to continue the
committee's consideration of the operation of various U.S. programs
in Vietnam.
First, the committee will hear testimony from Congressman Paul
N. McCloskey, Jr., of California, who was in Vietnam only a few
weeks ago. I am sure that his observations will be of interest and
assistance to the committee.
Following Congressman McCloskey's testimony, the committee
will hear testimony concerning U.S. activities to assist the Vietnamese
Government on information matters and the scope of U.S. psycho-
logical or propaganda operations generally.
The United States is engaged in a broad-scale program to assist
and promote the Government of Vietnam through the use of the
entire spectrum of the communications media, from leaflet drops to
television. I hope that this hearing ^^-ill develop the full facts con-
cerning the nature and extent of these activities. But of far greater
significance than the sjjecifics of what is being done in Vietnam is the
underlying policy which presumes that it is proper and in the national
interest for the U.S. Government to engage in propaganda acti\'ities
in behalf of a foreign government.
There is also the cpiestion of whether the Congress in passing the
Smith-Mundt Act, the USIA's basic statutoiw authority contem-
plated such a role for the Government's official overseas information
agency.
However, the witness here to discuss U.S. programs in Vietnam,
Mr. Edward J. Nickel, a career officer of the USIA, who is Director
of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, is not responsible
(635)
636
for the policy which thrust the USIA into that role. His job is only
to implement that policy.
We will now hear from Congressman McCloskey.
STATEMENT OP HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JE., EEPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGEESS FEOM THE IITH CONGEESSIONAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. McCloskey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In testifying before you today, I would like you to know first of the
limitations on the accuracy of any opinions I may give.
EXPERIENCE OF WITNESS
As a Marine Corps Reserve officer, I have been a student of counter-
insurgency warfare since the late 1950's and was privileged to par-
ticipate in the last large-scale combat exercise in this field prior to our
landing of combat troops in Vietnam in the spring of 1965. I applied
for an active duty Marine Corps assignment to Vietnam in the fall of
1965, which was rejected; in the following year, I was offered the
opportunity to serve as an AID provincial adviser in Vietnam but
declined. Since being elected to the Congress in 1967, I have been
able to visit Vietnam only twice, once for a period of 11 days just
prior to the Tet offensive of January-February 1968, and more
recently, for a period of 6 days in February of this year.
T tried to visit the same areas last month which I had seen 2 years
earlier in order to appraise the progress of pacification, and more
particularly the so-called Vietnamization program. Aside from head-
quarters briefings and the study of captured enemy documents and
prisoner interrogations, I spent the bulk of my time in the hamlets
and villages where the pacification program is being conducted, and
with the infantrymen and advisers engaged in field operations.
My most recent observations and inquiries were limited to four of
Vietnam's 44 Provinces, but I believe the northerly two Provinces,
Binh Dinh and Quang Nam, to be fairly representative of the coastal
portions of the I and II Corps areas, and the southerly Provinces,
Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, to reflect the range of i)roblems faced in
the delta and the territory surrounding Saigon. Since all four of these
Provinces are rated fairly near the bottom for security purposes under
the hamlet evaluation system (2Sth, 37th, 34th, and 35th, respec-
tively, as of January), it is possible that my conclusions will be a
little more pessimistic than the overall situation justifies. These con-
clusions are certainly susceptible of a considerable range of error in
any event, but they represent my best judgment and I have no
hesitancy in presenting them for your evaluation and comparison with
those of our military and State Department personnel.
ORDINARY LIVING CONDITIONS IN I AND II CORPS AREAS
About 6 million people, roughly one-third of the poi)ulation, reside
in the I and II Corps areas. Ninety i)ercent of thorn five within a few
miles of the coast in fertile valleys which are bordered by rugged and
heavily forested mountains.
637
The ordinary manner of living in the rural areas of Vietnam is in
hamlets of a few hundred people. The Vietnamese rural hamlet is
ordinarily a very pleasant j)lace. The people are courteous, affectionate
toward then* families, respectful toward their elders and reverent
about their ancestry. A family can grow its own food in the equivalent
of 2 or 3 acres of land. The clim ile is lii'i I and the soil fertile. There
is no need, and I could observe little inclination, for leaving the area
of one's home. I doubt that there are many places in the world where
people can live in closer harmony with their land and envhonment
than in the coastal provinces of the I and II Corps areas.
EFFECT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR IN I AND II CORPS AREAS-
In waging counterinsurgency war in this area over the past several
years, I was advised that we have destroyed 307 of the original 555
hamlets of Quang Nam Province.
I flew over miles and miles of area south and southwest of Danang^
where nearly every hamlet had been destroyed that was not within
a mile of the main highway or larger settlements. Tree lines, hedge-
rows, and gravesites are all that remain.
The purpose for this destruction was to deny rice, cover, and support
to the Vietcong, as well as to the North Vietnamese units operating
in the adjacent mountainous areas.
In one interior valley of pleasant hamlets and productive soil which
was pointed out to me 2 years ago, some 20,000 people have been
forcibly evacuated to refugee camps along the coastal highway and
theu" hamlets destroyed by either bombing, artillery fire or the action
of individual soldiers.
The result has been predictable. One high-ranking CORDS officer
told me that he estimated at least one-third of the Vietnamese people in
Quang Nam Province to be hostile to the American military presence.
In the 5th ^Marine regimental tactical area of responsibility (TAOR)
southwest of Danang, for example, the bulk of the casualties in 1969
came from booby traps. Infantrymen from the regiment discovered
over 1,200 booby traps during the year, of which about half were
detonated causing 95 KIA's (killed in action) and 1,195 WIA's
(wounded for action), many of them amputees. Thus in 1 year's time
the odds of being killed or Avounded by a booby trap in this particular
regimental area were about 1 in 2 for the 2,400-odd marine riflemen in
the regiment.
Under these cu'cumstances, I do not think enough can be said for
the courage, morale, and patriotic service of American troops and the
officers who lead them,
EFFECTIVENESS OF RESETTLEMENT AND TRAINING EFFORTS
In both Quang Nam and Binli Dinh Provinces, I visited hamlets
which had originally been destroyed and defoliated, but which were
in the process of resettlement. In Quang Nam Province thus far, some
G3 of the 307 hamlets destroyed are being reoccupied as the Govern-
ment seeks to expand the areas under Government control.
The protection of these hamlets is being assigned to PF and PSDF
forces as the American forces are -withdrawn, but I observed no
evidence that the people were learning any great sense of commitment
638
to the Saigon government as they returned to their lands and com-
menced rebuilding homes and restoring land to production.
From a military standpoint, if U.S. troop withdrawals continue, I
Avould predict that the entire coastal area from Binh Dinh north to
to the DMZ (demilitarized zone) wUl fall to the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese within 90 days after the last American troops withdraw.
There seems little hope that the fragile institutions of hamlet and
village o;overnment wUl survive increasing North Vietnamese and VC
pressures once American troops are withdrawn.
Withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division last year and the pending
withdrawal of additional brigades from the coastal areas has already
caused an increase in enemy activities; remaining American units are
required to expand their tactical areas of responsibility to the breaking
point.
In both Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces, for example,
battalions of the 1st Marine Division and 173d Airborne Brigades,
respectively, have been required to cover over 100 square mUes each
by breaking down into platoons and small units located at considerable
distances from one another. It is presently requiring the full abilities
and efforts of these units to maintain a status quo with small units of
local VC and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) units operating in the
adjacent mountainous areas.
Of the rural hamlets I visited in both provinces, it was apparent that
local RF/PF (Regional Forces/Popular Forces) and PSDF (Peoples'
Self -Defense Forces) forces would be unable to protect any individual
hamlet in the event that U.S. Main unit forces were withdrawn. While
the ARVN divisions in I Corps are deemed excellent by U.S. troop
commanders M^ho have been working with them, no American officer
was willing to predict that such units alone could withstand a deter-
mined assault by NVA units presently operating in I Corps or located
just across the DMZ or Laotian frontier.
There appears to be no reasonable expectation that an additional
18 months of resettlement and training of local forces would be suffi-
cient to withstand the historic attitudes of a large percentage of the
populace, exacerbated by our clear and destroy and defoliation policies
of years past.
SITUATION IN THE DELTA
A different situation exists in the delta in my judgment. There, on
flat terrain, with an absence of jungle and mountain cover except in the
areas close to the Cambodian border and the U Minh forest pacifica-
tion has progressed far more rapidly. The province chiefs and adviser
teams in the two provinces I visited, Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, had
achieved a far greater cohesion at the hamlet and village level, and
prosperity and security have been materially advanced in the past 2
years. American combat troops have not operated in the delta since
the 9th Infantry Division vacated the area in late 1969.
The number of VC-controlled hamlets has been substantially re-
duced and VC local forces and guerrillas have been prevented from
any major interference with commerce and communications.
Perhaps the best indication of Government success in the area has
been the progress in arming the PSDF. A decision to issue arms to
large numbers of civilians 2 years ago would have been unthinkable;
most such weapons would have ended up in the hands of the VC.
639
In the hamlets I visited in Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong Provinces,
however, the large number of RF/PF available plus arms issued to
the PSDF had caused the hamlet chief to feel relatively secure against
anj^thing but a major N^'^A or VC attack.
A qualification should be noted here, however. It is not entirely
certain that the loyalty of either the RF/PF or PSDF is so assured as
to guarantee against infiltration by the VC. One instance was cited
to me where one individual had caused an entire PSDF squad to
defect to the VC.
Also, a hard-core Communist prisoner told me, in an hour-long
interviewing that Americans w^ere getting a distorted view of the true
views of the rural South Vietnamese, since we only talked to them in
the presence of armed forces. This prisoner, a deceptively sweet-
appearing lady who had been the VC mayor of My Tho, the Pro^dnce
capital for Dinh Tuong Province, indicated that "resolve, not num-
bers, will determine the final issue."
I would tend to agree.
The military and pacification progress in III and IV Corps, coupled
with the terrain there, could permit a maintenance of the status quo,
solely by South Vietnamese troops, barring a major NVA invasion
from the Cambodian border. Should such an invasion occur, the issue
will be squarely up to the abilities and resolve of the ARVN (Army
of the Republic of Vietnam) divisions presently stationed in the
southerly half of Vietnam. From hearsay only, I gather that most
American military officers have grave doubts of the abilities of most
of the ARVN units involved, and that the issue would be significantly
in doubt.
ULTIMATE RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL
From what I could determine, nearly all Vietnamese, both North
and South, desire reunification. If the NVA and VC resolve and
willingness to undergo hardship remains firm, it would be my judg-
ment that upon our withdrawal that they will ultimately succeed in
forcing, first, a coalition government on the South and ultimately a
reunification of their country.
I can see no reason why a U.S. presence of over 18 months will
affect the ultimate result any differently than if we continue to with-
draw, having all of our troops, both combat and support, home by
the end of June 1971.
We have tended to equate "progress" mth a guarantee of ultimate
success. There has indeed been progress, but to obtain it, we have
been required to militarize South Vietnam and to create a political
structure which far outweighs the South Vietnamese economy's
capacity to fund.
To cite an example, one hamlet I visited, with a population of less
than 1,000, had local PF protection costing over 1.5 million piasters
per year, and a civil administration costing another 1.5 million piasters
per year. The total tax revenues from this hamlet were less than one-
quarter million piasters per year, about a 12-to-l ratio. These figures do
not include the cost of the central government or American military
and economic assistance. Repeated for some 10,500 existing hamlets
in Vietnam, it is apparent that the operating expenses of the Saigon
government, merely to maintain the status quo, are staggering.
640
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO CONCLUDE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN
VIETNAM
In conclusion, I would like to say a word in support of the Mathias
resolution to terminate the Gulf of Tonkin authority, as well as
comment on the responsibility of Congress, as opposed to the
executive branch, in bringing American involvement in Vietnam to
an early conclusion.
I had occasion to refer recently, Mr. Chairman, to the Federalist
papers of Alexander Hamilton, particularly Nos. 24 and 26, where he
was urging adoption of the Federal Constitution. It seems to me that
the following statements of Mr. Hamilton are worthy of consideration
by both Houses of Congress today:
The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at
least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military
force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of
the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. Thej' are not at
liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of
an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so
improper a confidence.
I think that puts the burden on the Congress of the United States to
determine how long we fund this conflict, and if we face that issue
between now and November.
PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF PACIFICATION
I would be pleased to answer any questions. I think the summation
of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is this : Pacification in the northern
half is not successful and cannot be successful. In the south half of the
country it is succeeding, but its continued success will depend on the
ability in the- — —
Senator Gore. I did not understand you after the conjunction
"but."
Mr. McCloskey. I said in the north.
Senator Gore. I understood that part of it.
Mr. McCloskey. In the south half of the country, in my judgment,
pacification is proceeding successfully and can be successful, but only
if the ARVN, South Vietnamese army units, are capable of withstand-
ing a determined assault from across the Cambodian border in the
future and that issue would be very much in doubt both on the quality
of the ARVN troops in the south and on their resolve to fight.
Senator Gore. What dividing line do you choose between the north-
ern part of the country and the southern part of the country?
Mr. McCloskey. Well, it is not precisely between the four corps
areas, Mr. Senator. It is the nature of the terrain in the north half of
the country, the mountainous jungle, heavily covered terrain where the
rice paddies go right up against the areas of cover and concealment,
these are the areas, in my judgment, where pacification cannot succeed.
As you get down into the delta where the terrain is flat, where there is
no heavily jungled cover, where there is no way in which troops can
conceal themselves to come back into the villages and get their rice,
in those areas ])acification has been successful and is succeeding, in my
judgement. But its continued success requires the prevention from
intrusion of major NVA units. Every time major NVA units have come
641
into the area, the guerrilla incidents have increased and the loyalties
of the people have become far more tenuous.
Senator Gore. Alay I continue with a question or two, Mr. Chair-
man?
The Chairman (presiding). Certainly.
LOYALTY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO HANOI ANp SAIGON
Senator Gore. Is there any loyalty, if that is the right term, on
either side? Is it a matter of fear? This has been difficult for me to
comprehend.
Mr. ]\IcCloskey. This is an impression, Senator, because I share
your committee staff's feeling that it is very difficult for an American
to understand what a Vietnamese thinks from what he says. But I
would appraise the situation that there is very little loyalty to the
Saigon government and there is verj^ little love for the Hanoi govern-
ment amongst the rural peasantry of South Vietnam; that the over-
whelming bulk of the people, over 80 percent of them, would prefer
peace at any price regardless of who happened to govern them; and
that loyalty to a central government located in a city far away is a
term that is not appropriate to apply to the rural countryside in
Vietnam.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
Senator Gore. What is your assessment of their attitude toward
American military presence?
Mr. McCloskey. Again that would be an impression that I could
not guarantee as to its accuiacy, but I see no reason for them not to
accept the presence of anyone who is giving them a million piasters a
year, to any village that would elect a village chief.
I can understand why a Adllage might happily welcome the Ameri-
cans who bring them the million piasters. But I do not think there is
any long-range love for Americans.
Senator Gore. Did you mean to imply that the measure of the
bounty was the election of a chief who was friendly to us or what do
you mean to suggest?
Mr. McCloskey. I do not detect any bitter hatred of Americans
amongst the villagers who seem to bear our artillery fire and our
aircraft bombardment, but whom we pay a million piasters a year to
any village that will elect a village chief. But I do not detect any love
on then- part for us either, and I suspect, and this is only an impression
and not testimony under oath, but I suspect everyone in Vietnam
would welcome the day when the last American has left Vietnam.
USE of booby TRAPS
Senator Gore. I notice you described the effective use of booby-
traps. Can such traps be effective without at least the tacit approval
and cooperation of the natives?
Mr. McCloskey. No, sir. Those areas south of — southwest of
Danang where tremendous boobytrap casualties are occurring in the
very areas that our troops go into day after day after day and in
which the populace on the surface of things is at least passive if not
642
friendly to us, but obviously in those areas a large percentage of the
people are willing to support the Vietcong that operate amongst them.
Senator Gore. I am asking you not out of information, but out of
interest. If American GI's in small numbers are stationed in isolated
villages, are they particularly vulnerable because of differences in
physical appearance?
Mr. McCloskey. I do not know that, sir. The booby trap casualties
that the young men are suffering occur when they go out on patrol
either day or night into areas in which they can operate in the daytime
without too much fear of receiving sniper fire. We have been able to
hold VC and NVA units at bay by our power. If they mass three men
at one time, we liifc them with artillery or bombing or we land a
helicopter full of troops and go after them, but the troops are still
there. The enemy are still there. They are not showing themselves.
They have adjusted their tactics to match our firepower, but they
are out there sowing boobytraps every night and those boobytraps
are causing casualties to us in an overwhelming percentage. The fact
they are able to sow these boobytraps night after night so that when
our troops go out on a path they might hit a tripwire with a detona-
tion which nipy cause 2.3 casualties every time the booby trap is
detonated means they are getting the support of the local populace
in the countryside or they would not be able to do that.
When I say support, I do not mean that the local populace are
loving the VC more than they love Saigon, but they are not willing
to commit themselves.
Senator Gore. If the natives are to avoid the boobytraps, they
must at least know where they are or have some knowledge of them.
Mr. McCloskey. The greatest advance by the Marine units that I
observed was their growing sophistication in discovering boobytraps
by locating the means by which the Vietnamese signal their location,
perhaps two bamboo sticks left pointing to a "V" in a certain trail
junction and apparently any Vietnamese in the area knows that
means there is a boobytrap some distance away.
The American troops are gaining greater knowledge to deal with
this situation.
Senator Gore. At least we are not slow to catch on.
Mr. McCloskey. We are not slow, but the penalty of failure can
be that you lose both legs, sir.
Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Church. I think. Congressman McCloskey, your state-
ment was excellent.
LIKELY RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM
Is it your judgment that, after we have left Vietnam, two things are
likely to happen; the present Government is likely to be replaced in
Saigon by some form of coalition government and the two halves of
Vietnam are likely to be reunited?
Mr. McCloskey. That is correct. Just by way of example, in the
village capital, in the village hut that goes for a city hall in the
pro\dnces in the north, there is a plaque on the wall that says "The
Nation Overall" in Vietnamese; and the map is of all of Vietnam,
North and South, not just South Vietnam. I could find no indication
643
on the part of anyone that South Vietnam was considered a perma-
nent and inde])endent nation as we would have it.
Senator Church. In your judgment, then, the overwhehning senti-
ment in both North and South Vietnam is to reunify the country.
Mr. McCloskey. I think I can say honestly — I have never been
to North Vietnam — the resolve that keeps them commg 800 miles
south to try to unify the country would so indicate.
Senator Church. Yes.
American policy for years has been to keep Vietnam divided, as
well as to support and sustain an anti-Communist government in
Saigon that would be closely allied Mith our country. From your
testimony I understand there is no evidence whatever that that
objective has been abandoned by the present Administration >
Mr. McCloskey. I would have to agree.
Senator Church (continuing). And that that objective A^dll not be
achieved once American forces leave.
Mr. McCloskey. Senator, let me make a qualification to my prior
answer. I did detect in the President's speech early after his election
the mention of a peace based on the Geneva accords of 1954, and such
a peace would presuppose the reunification of Vietnam within 2 years
because tliat was the understanding under the Geneva accords of
1954. Unfortunatelj^ I have seen no other mention by this Administra-
tion of a concurrence that they would accept a peace based on the
Geneva accords which involved a unification of Vietnam.
Senator Church. The ])olicy by which we fought this war has
hardly been directed at a reunified Vietnam. Yet this vnW very likely
occur b}'^ the forces that we have been opposing.
Mr. McCloskey. Correct.
U.S. perception of and policy in southeast ASIA questioned
Senator Church. I think the inability of the U.S. Government
to know how the people of Vietnam really feel, what their political
values are, and what their national objectives may be, has been
evident throughout the whole course of oiu involvement in that
country. It is also reflected in what has just happened in Cambodia.
From the contacts that I have had with the State Department
and from the briefings that this committee has been given, it was
unanticipated that Prince Sihanouk would be displaced in Cambodia.
In fact, official ojiinion plus informed expert opinion here had it that
if anyone was secure in Southeast Asia, it was Sihanouk.
This clearly demonstrates the fragility of any policy on our part
which seeks objectives that are intimately indigenous, and the
futility of atternjiting to win a civil war in a country such as Vietnam
with a foreign army.
In the face of that experience, why are we not disengaging
American military forces from Southeast Asia generally, especially
from Laos antl Thailand, before we find ourselves confronted with
questions of honor, commitment, and the other political consequences
that flow from such a predicament?
Did you have an opportunity in your trip to visit Thailand or Laos?
Mr. 'McCloskey. No, sir. I have not had the privilege of visiting
the other countries.
644
I think that the great lesson of Vietnam is that in a land where
people are wedded to their soil, and their tradition, and their history,
that to try to say to a country of 17.5 million people, "We will impose
afgovernment of our type, of our choice," in a country which has no
real reason to have any cohesion with any government — these people
live very happily in their own villages and are unwilling to make a
commitment to any kind of government — that in that kind of a
country, the use of American firepower is almost immoral.
P Senator Church. Immoral. Immoral is perhaps not strong enough
aTterm. After all, you mentioned that 307 villages out of 555 had been
destroyed in one province alone by American firepower.
Mr. McCloskey. I would say this, Senator. That where we seek to
lead the world to a peace through law and the only legal precedents
we look to are the Hague Convention and perhaps the Nuremberg
agreement where we said wanton destruction of villages was a war
crhne, there is no way we could state that our policy of destroying
Vietnamese villages to deny rice and support to the VC that operate
in the vicinity and in some respects out of those villages is not of the
same level to be condemned as we did in Nuremberg when we executed
German officers for pursuing a policy of wanton destruction of villages,
and if a war has to be fought by destroj^ng people's homes because so
many of the people who live in an area are sympathetic to the enemy,
then I do not think America should ever again fight such a war with
our weapons in such a country.
Senator Church. I concur wholeheartedly in what you said. If we
liad just left those people alone, if we had just staj^ed oirt of their
affairs, none of this terrible agony, none of this wanton destruction,
none of this mass killing would have occurred on the scale that has
taken place. And, u'onically, the security interests of the United States
would not have been affected one iota.
Our Vietnam policy has been touched with madness; this foreign
adventure is undoubtedly the greatest catastrophe that has ever
occurred in the history of our country overseas.
I appreciate very much your testimony. I think it has been very
helpful.
The Chairman. Mr. Congressman, I am sorry I was a bit late. I
read your statement, and I know something of your views. I expect
anything I ask you may be repetitive and yet I do not think it hurts
to go over one or two points.
U.S. OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM
You have made very clear your views about the destruction of the
villages. The Senator from Idaho mentioned our objective of creating
a government there that was friendly to us. How do you see the
objective of our policy and activity in Vietnam? What does it strike
you that we seek to achieve there?
Air. McCloskey. Well, I think, quite honestly, that the North
Vietnamese have characterized it properly, and that is to permanently
divide that country preventing Communist domination of the entire
country, that our policy has been to divide it and to furnish such
military and economic assistance as is necessary to preserve its
division.
The Chairman. Does that strike you as being a valid objective?
645
Mr. McCloskey. No, sir; I think that in the long run you can
trace most trouble spots in the world to countries that were divided —
Germany, Korea, the Israelis
The Chairman. In other words, if they did achieve their announced
objective, it would not be in the interests of this country. Is that
what you are saying?
Mr. McCloskey. My feeling is that any divided country is a-
potential source of world war III and that it should be our national,
policy to seek a reunification of Vietnam and Korea.
The Chairman. I suppose our people would say we are perfectly
willing to reunify it provided it is on our terms and if they will accept
our views as to what kind of government they will have; will thej-^ not?
Our people will not object to Vietnam's reunification providing they
accept our terms.
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO END U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAlVf
Mr. McCloskey. I think if this issue is fairly debated, Senator,,
that the people will decide it at the polls in November. This was the
reason for my quote from Alexander Hamilton because the Congress
of the United States has it within its power to stop our involvement
in Vietnam just as much as the President does.
The Chairman. How would you propose that that be done?
Mr. McCloskey. I would propose a continuing withdrawal over a
period not to exceed 18 months offering sanctuary to any Vietnamese
who chose to leave the countr\^ because he felt imperiled by our with-
drawal.
The Chairman. Maj'be I did not understand. You said the Congress
had the power to stop the war. What did you have in mind about the
Congress — cutting off the mone}'?
Mr. McCloskey. Two ways, sir; I thought that the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution, under \vhich President Johnson indicated he felt he had
this power, should be terminated ofi'ective December 31, 1970. I
think I would extend that now to 1971. Also under the Constitution
where w(^ are given the sole power to provide for a standing army for
a ])eriod not to exceed 2 years, I think that means exactly what it
says and perhaps we should attach to ap])ropi-iations measures this
year the qualification that the Congress will vote only such funds as
are sufficient to jiermit our continuing and steady withdrawal with
all American troops to be out at the end of fiscal 1971.
The Chairman. We have the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution
under consideration and will actively consider it on Friday, I think,
in the Mathias resolution, but I understand from the letter they gave
us that the Administration's position is that repeal of the Tonkin
Gulf would not affect the President's right to continue the war. He is
not relying on it. This President says he is not relying on the Tonkin
Gulf resolution for his right to carrv on the war. So I do not think
that would do it. ^
The money business I think would do it. Do you think there is a
majority ot tlie Congress that would vote that?
Mr. McCloskey. Not right now. Senator, but I think as this matter
is debated between now and November and congressional candidates,
all of whom run for office in November, are forced to a yes or no answer
on the question, "Will you or will you not fund money to continu&
646
our indefinite involvement in Vietnam?" that that issue may be
determined by the American people, and I think exactly that is what
the framers of the American Constitution had in mind when they
said one body will face election every 2 years.
I have heard different figures from the Pentagon but if our
strength — we had the equivalent of 12 combat infantry divisions in
Vietnam, 108 maneuver battalions. Every time one division is brought
home, I have heard the Pentagon say it saves this country $1.5 billion
in the defense budget, so it is merely a matter of multiplying that sum
of money by bringing our troops home and attaching a rider in the
appropriation bills when they come before the House and Senate.
The Chairman. It takes the votes. I have been under the impression
that a very strong majority of the House supports the war.
Mr. McCloskey. Yes, sir. When I was elected to the Congress in
1967, I think I was the only Republican opposed to the war. Perhaps
there were two or three others. But I noticed in October last year 64
Repubhcans signed a resolution drafted by Paul Findley of lUinois.
They supported the President in his expressed determination to with-
draw all American troops at the earliest practicable date, and I suspect
by next November a majority even in the House of Representatives
W'ill support the Administration on this as troops are beginning to be
withdrawn on a steady, continued rate.
The Chairman. Of course, if your judgment as to their sentiment
is true, then it is very hopeful that something can be done.
POSSIBILITY or congress's ending U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
This is a drastic step. I am incHned to favor it; do not misunderstand
that. I think this war is the greatest tragedy that this country has
ever encountered, but our people are not conditioned to the policy
of directly challenging a President of the United States.
Have you seen George Reedy's book about our Presidency? There
was a portion of it in "Look magazine which was entitled, "Do We
Need a Kick?" Did you see that?
Mr. McCloskey. I have not seen that.
The Chairman. It is a very interesting book. I mean it is a very
good one. As you remember, Mr. Reedy had considerable experience
in the White House and the sort of royal attitude and regal attitude
that developed in recent years about it.
I do not know whether we can do it or not. I think it is something
to consider. Your views that it might come about ought to be encourag-
ing to the President to give him backing to move out of this place
quickly. i j-
Mr. McCloskey. I have supported what he has done thus lar,
Senator. I think that the studied and orderly withdrawal have taken
out almost a thhd of the American combat troops in the first 9 months
since he commenced the withdrawal and that this is consistent with
the views I express today. I am concerned with whether or not that
withdrawal will continue. Within the next 3 to 9 months I suspect
that the status quo will change in Vietnam as American troops con-
tinue to be withdrawn because it is a very tenuous situation there m
the north, and if those American troops continue to be withdrawn
over the next year, I suspect that the balance of power will change
between the conflicting elements.
647
NECESSITY OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
The Chairman. The Senate may be too interested in precedents.
It has been accused of being precedent ridden, but take this case: I
cannot think offhand of a war of any consequence having been stopped
by one side graduahy withdrawing without any negotiated agreement
with regard to the ending of the war.
If I thought this could take place, as you described it, I certainly
would be for it if it would happen in a reasonable period of a year or
2 years. I know of no precedent, and therefore it, among other reasons,
makes me very skeptical that this is going to happen. What I antici-
pate as much more likely to happen is that a number of troops will be
withdrawn but a very large contingent will be left with the most
sophisticated weapons which will give logistics support to the best
troops of the Vietnamese goverimient and they kind of stay there in a
kind of a stalemate in a modification of the enclave theory. This
could go on for 5 or 10 years without a negotiated settlement.
This is the only reason. It is a practical matter. The most similar
war to this is the war of the French in the same country after being
there 100 years. How did they end their war? They did not just walk
off. They went to Geneva and had a cease-fire and had a negotiated
and agreed upon settlement called the Geneva Accord.
It is hard for me to believe that if we are really serious about ending
the war with a clean-cut end to it, if that is not the procedure most
likely to bring that about.
U.S. WITHDRAWAL COULD RESULT IN VIETNAMESE ACCOMMODATION
Mr. McCloskey. Senator, this is speculation, of course, but as
American troops continue to withdraw, and assuming that the Vietna-
mese who have become quite adept with our artillery, gain an increas-
ing sophistication in the use of heUcopters and communication and
logistics in which they have a particularly grave problem, and assum-
ing that they are able to build a South Vietnamese army that can hold
its own, the very nature of Vietnam, as an 800 mile long country with
roughly 15 ARVN divisions matched against an equal nuniber of
North Vietnamese and Victcong, in my judgment will require the
South Vietnamese forces to retire into a modified enclave giving up
much of the northern coasts, some of the central highlands, some of
the III Corps area, and concentrating around Saigon. If tliis happens,
bearing in mind there will be over a million men in South Vietnam
under arms and there never have been over 200,000 North Vietnamese
and Vietcong opposed to them, the South Vietnamese retiring and
becoming stronger as their lines grow less, the North Vietnamese
grow weaker as they fight a longer distance from home, you would
have the Vietnamese people, a very pragmatic people, not desirous
of continuing the execution of each other.
For example, I think of the four province chiefs where I had visited,
two of them were from the north. Three-eighths of the Saigon govern-
ment, then- house of delegates, are from the north; tln-ee-eighths of the
North Vietnamese leadership is from the south.
I think as a i)ragmatic people faced mth the destruction of their
country by foreign forces over all these years, they wih reach some
accommodation between themselves which will bring their war to an
648
end, and I do not see that the continuing American mihtary presence
will contribute to that settlement. I think it is counterproductive
when we destroy villages, kill people, arm increasing numbers of the
peasantry. We are prolonging the conflict by our presence there.
The Chairman. I think so too.
Mr. McCloskey. We could not train these people from 1960 to
1970, Senator. I doubt 3 years instead of 18 months remaining there
will change the balance.
U.S. RESPONSE TO VC PROVOCATION DURING WITHDRAWAL
The Chairman. What do you anticipate will happen if we get down
to 300,000 men and the Vietcong become impatient and attack a city
or do something provocative? Do we continue to deescalate? The
President was implicit in his statement that if they did not sort of
cooperate and make it easier for us to get out, he would retaliate.
Mr. McCloskey. I think it is very noteworthy in the President's
two speeches that when he spoke of the possibility of retaliation he
referred only to the danger to U.S. forces. He made it clear in both of
those speeches, one of which was very carefully worked out by him
personally, that a threat to the South Vietnamese need not provoke
our retaliation, but only a threat to U.S. forces would do so. I do not
think we need fear a Dunkirk. I do not know of any U.S. unit in
Vietnam which would be left there without sufficient firepower and
air support to defend itself in the process of withdrawal.
QUESTION IS ONE OF MOST FEASIBLE WAY TO END WAR
The Chairman. Do not misunderstand me. I am for ending the
war in any way we can do it, but which is the most feasible and likely
way to do it and which could come the soonest? It seems to me that
the traditional political settlement by which nearly every war I can
think of has been ended is the one that has the most promise, but if
the other will work, I am for that too.
I do not criticize doing it. It is a question of how much time we
allow. This Administration has been in nearly a year and 3 months.
That is becoming a very substantial time period to look for results.
There has been a decrease in the casualties, it is true, but they are
still quite substantial.
EXTENT OF DEFOLIATION
I have a few more specific questions. While you were there did you
notice any signs of defoliation of the countryside?
Mr. McCloskey. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Was it extensive?
Mr. McCloskey. Well, let me put it this way: In the coastal plains
of the north they have had to move the people into within a mile or so
of the main roads in the cities and they have moved them out of their
villages and destroyed then- villages in the interior valleys that go
back from the coast because of the desire to deny rice to the Vietcong.
Several officers pointed out to me that in the interior valleys when-
ever there was the indication of someone growing a crop back there,
whether it was civilians left behind or people who had gone back to
their homes or Vietcong, the planes were instructed to go in and imme-
649
diately defoliate any crops that were being grown in the interior
valleys.
In the two hamlets that I visited which are being revisited, that is
close to 550 in Quang Nam, 307 were destroyed, some 63 have now
been resettled or they are in the process of resettlement. When I spoke
with the villagers in those towns being resettled, they spoke of the
fact they could not grow coconuts as they had and they pointed out
the coconut trees which had been destroyed or defoUated with chem-
icals at the time the village had been destroyed back in 1966 or 1967,
whenever it had occurred. So in the resettlement process while they
can restore the rice paddies and gi*ow some younger trees for repro-
duction, it is going to be a long time before they restore some of those
trees that have been hurt by the defoliation.
The Chairman. We realh^ do not know enough about the ultimate
effect of defoliants to know how long it will be or how permanent is
the destruction by the chemical; do we?
Mr. McCloskey. I can only say what I have observed. Senator, I
do not know. But 1 did see people tilling ricefields in areas which they
told me had been defoliated in the last 2 or 3 years. What the crops
will be and who will suffer from them I do not know, but thej^ were
actually tilUng the soil.
The CvHAiR!^iAN. There was one article in the paper which said we
had defoliated an amount of territory approximately equal to the
State of Massachusetts.
Mr. McCloskey. I could believe that from what I saw, sir, be-
cause these interior valleys that stretcli away from the coast are con-
sidered free lire zones and a|)parei\tly we defoliate anything growing
there as part of (his rice denial program, but they are substantial
areas. I would say there are hundreds of square miles of areas where
every village had been razed to the ground.
witness' SERVICB in MARINE CORPS
The Chairman. How long has it been since you have been in the
Marines? When did you get out?
Mr. McCloskey. I served in the Marine Corps in Korea as a
platoon leader in 1951. I was released to inactive duty in 1952. I
stayed in the Reserve until 1065. I was on active duty in Operation
Silver Lance at the time the 1st Marine Brigade was sent to the Gulf
of Tonkin in March of 19()5. I triel to remain as an infantry officer
when I was a civilian between 1952 and 1967 when 1 went to Congress.
CIVILIAN knowledge OF FREE FIRE ZONES
The Chairman. I had a letter this morning from a former marine
in my hometo\\m, Fayetteville, dated March 12. It says:
This past week saw five marines charged with murder. There are elements
suiToundin.ti this that I do not miderstand. Civilians in this instance were supposed
to be in a free lire zone. I don't know what a free fire zone is. The term wasn't
in currency when I was a Marine. However, I take it to mean a zone where any-
thing that moves is a candidate for sudden death. I am very concerned about how
such information on a zone of this sort is disseminated to the civilians in the area,
especially in light of the fact that the :irea was an enemv-held territory. Did these
unfortuiiate souls know that this part of their land was otf limits to them? Who
told them and how?
44-706 — TO 42
650
Do you know the answer to that?
Mr. McCloskey. I do not, sn\
The areas that we flew over and the hamlets which I visited in
Quang Nam and Binh Dinh in the north, there were obviously free
fire zones where nothing stood ; but there were people walking around
down in those areas, and this is what I spoke of in my testimony.
The greatest single attachment that the Vietnamese has, in my judg-
ment, is to his lands and they are not going to be easily moved off the
lands even at the cost of the risk if they remain. They risk remaining
in the zone, even with signs showing the limits of the village and the
limits of the free fire zone.
The Chairman. How did we propose to tell the people they were
in a free fu"e zone ai>d to get out? Did we go through any motions?
Did USIA tell them or nof?
Mr. McCloskey. Well, I only know this by hearsay. I have not
seen the operations, but I understand that in a cordon and search
operation, or search and destroy, they will attempt to have people in
aircraft with megaphones telling people where to go and why and what
is going to be the free fire zone and what isn't and scatter thousands
and thousands of leaflets. But I do not think we are ever going to be
sure with that kind of information that there are 10 percent who will
not get the word. And the result has been in that particular country
a lot of innocent people have been killed.
The Chairman. It is very risky to go about talking from a heli-
copter. They could shoot it down ; could they not? We have been losing
on the average about one and one-tenth helicopters per day in recent
months. Did I see that in the paper recently?
Mr. McCloskey. The figures seem very staggering. I could not
verify the precise figures.
SITUATION OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. I would like your comment on the next paragraph
of this letter. He says:
No matter how yovi look at it, you cannot escape the fact that it would not have
happened if we had not been there in the first place. We have put our young men
in an impossible situation. They are damned if they do and they are dead if they
don't.
I thought that was a rather striking way to put it. I am speaking
of our own young men who are now being accused of murder.
Mr. McCloskey. I think they are the finest young men in the
country.
The Chairman. I say if they did not do what they did, they are
very likely to be dead; are they not? They think they would in any
case. They are being put into an intolerable situation.
Mr. McCloskey. The reaction time of a marine rifleman to a
situation which may or may not cause his death very seldom permits
judicious decision. I think Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "Sober
reflection is not required in the presence of an uplifted knife." And to
that rifleman walking in a rice paddy, the question of whether he is a
civilian or enemy certainly does not give him much time or opportunity
and certainly not the inclination to take the chance.
The Chairman. The next sentence says:
651
The onlj^ possible answer to me is to remove them from this situation. If we
don't, we can expect more of the same, and we will have to bear our share of the
blame.
He goes on for several pages. It is quite an interesting letter. He
says the time is far past when we should have stopped and asked
ourselves where it is that we are going. It is a very interesting letter
from a marine.
CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD ENDING VIETNAMESE WAR
I appreciate very much your taking the time to come here. You are
very optimistic, I think. I hope you are correct about the attitude of
the Congress. I am not nearly in as close touch with the House, as you
are and, therefore, I certainly do not wish to challenge 3^0 ur judgment.
All I can say is I hope. When I look at some of the actions recently
taken on military affaks, the urgency with which they wish to give jets
to Taiwan and more money to Korea with which to fight, it does not
seem to me they have become very pacific in their attitude. They seem
to be much more eager to heat up the war than they are to calm it
down, but I certainly hope you are correct in your judgment that they
would not do it. I feel the Senate has moved very strongly in that
direction.
Mr. McCloskey. I would not suggest that we have anywhere near a
majority which would do as I say. Senator, with respect to cutting off
the money or indeed stopping the Gulf of Tonkin authority, but I
suspect with those November elections looming that perhaps the 92d
Congress may be of a little different persuasion.
The Chairman. That is encouraging. After all, the final justification
for our system of government is that the people do have an opportunity
to make such a change this fall if they wish to take it. If they do not
wish to take it, if they do not wish to make this a major issue, of course,
they do not have to and we can continue. But you are quite right and I
have confidence and faith in the efficiency and workability" of oiu* sys-
tem. So many of us have been here too long jierhaps or at least very
long and we become impatient, I guess, too impatient, with the slow-
ness wdth which these decisions are finally reached, especially when you
are concerned with such a tragic situation as this war.
COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS
Speaking for myself, I am very happy to see you there who can
interpret what the war is about and give and bring to it an estimate and
a judgment which not many people have had and which will be very
important to the Congress.
Mr. McCloskey, Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I think it has been very helpful to have your
testimony this morning and such testimony is one of the main reasons
that maybe what you say about the judgment of the people in the
coming election will come about.
Thank you very much.
witnesses' views on VIETNAM WAR
Mr. Reporter, I want to put in the record an interview with the
Congressman.
652
Mr, Congressman, do yoii know the interview by Lou Cannon? It
does not have a date on it. Was it in February? Put it in the record.
(The information referred to follows :)
[February, 1970J
Marine Veteean Tours Vietnam — GOP Congressman Says War "Immoral"
(Bj^ Lou Cannon)
Washington. — A Republican congressman and former Marine officer has re-
turned from an inspection tour of Vietnam convinced that the United States must
speed its withdrawal from "this immoral war."
Rep. Paul N. INIcCloskey of California, the man who came to Congress in 1967
by defeating Shirley Temple Black and others in a special election, inspected
Vietnam on a weeklong trip sponsored by Members of Congress for Peace Through
Law.
This 90-member group of essentially anti-Pentagon congressmen from both
parties paid for McCloskey's $968 round trip fare to \'ietnam in an effort to assess
military strategy and withdrawal progress there.
McCloskey, a decorated Marine combat officer in the Korean war and a counter-
intelligence reserve officer who later helped participate in guerilla war planning,
emerged from his second inspection of Vietnam more critical of the U.S. role than
ever before.
The California congressman believes that President Nixon, "while preserving
his options," is actually embarked on a polic\' that wiU leave between 200,000 and
250,000 American support troops in Vietnam and frustrate the opportunity for a
coalition settlement ending the war.
McCloskey also came away convinced that news reports of battles showing
many Communists are killed in ])roportion to the American casualties are seriously
misleading. He says the casualty figures of his own Marine regiment, the 5th,
show that the L^nited States is taking the majority of its casualties from booby
traps in situations where the enemy takes no casualties at all.
But McCloskey's strongest-held perceptions appeared to involve neither
military strategy nor political timetables but the U.S. participation in the war
itself.
"I fleto ovei- miles and miles of areas where the hamlets and villages had been totally
destroyed.'^ McCloskey said. "7 have real reservations that this policy is anything hut
a war crime. If you look back to Ahire7nberg and our policy in 1946, we insisted that
it ivas a war crime to wantonly destroy villages."
]McCloskey visited Metnam two years ago shortly after his election to Congress.
While he was sharply critical then of the policy the United States was pursuing,
he tended to view the war from the perspective of an essentially military man who
was convinced the country was caught up in a war it covdd not win.
"When I was there two years ago it was not apparent to me that we were
pursuing a scorched earth policy," McCloskey said. "No one told me and I
didn't ob.serve it. This time the difference was immediately apparent."
McCloskey said that the policy of destroying villages in the north and coastal
areas has now been largely abandoned because it has been "counterproductive."
But in these areas, up to one-third of the people may be living in refugee centers
and McCloskey says he is convinced that the areas, now occupied by I Corps
and II Corps, would quickly go Communist when the American forces withdraw.
It is the "scorched earth" policy that clearlj" concerns McCloskey the most.
"This bothers me more than My Lai," he says.
He does not want to comment on the guilt or innocence of anyone accused of
the purported My Lai murders, but he says that 'the "underlying facts" are the
orders to destroy villages.
"The only purpose of destroying villages was that they gave occasional shelter to
the VC that came into them or provided rice for the UC," McCloskey believes. "It's
exactly what we executed Germans for doing."
The situation, he found, was different in the delta area south and west of
Saigon than in the I Corps and II Corps area.
Here, McCloskey discovered some "real progress" in helping villages to es-
tablish a modicum of local democracy and defense. He thinks it conceivable that
the South Vietnamese forces in the delta might be able to survive on their own
after American withdrawal.
But even in the delta, McCloskey is sharply critical of American policy.
653
He says that the villages have been defended by an uneconomic policy that
expends 20 or more times on them what is taken out in taxes and that places
virtually every citizen under arms.
In McCloskey's view this policy will stiffen the determination of South Viet-
namese generals to resist the pressures for a coalition government and a unified
Vietnam.
"We've destroyed a good part of the country and what we're doing now in the
delta is almost equally indefensible," McCloskey said. "We're militarizing the
country and creating seeds of warfare for the next generation."
AlcCloskey, who in Korea earned the Silver Star and a Purple Heart, has
analyzed the casualties of his old unit during the last j'ear.
He said the unit encountered 1,277 booby traps and detonated 604 of them.
This caused, he said, the death of 99 American servicemen and the wounding
of 1,135 many of whom suffered amputation. In other words, one-third of this
unit's troops were killed or wounded b}^ booby traps irrespective of battle
casualties.
In the first 13 days of February this same luiit lost eight killed and 31 wounded
from all causes. Of this total five of the men killed and 25 of those wounded were
booby trap victims.
I^For this reason McCloskey contended, the reports of battles which show a
disproportionate Communist loss are misleading.
"We're causing casualties by massing our fire," he said. "They're causing them
in situations where no enemy is even encountered or any battle fought."
McCloskey is concerned that the ratio of support to combat troops in the
Nixon Administration withdrawal is only 2-1 compared to a 4-1 ratio in Vietnam.
If this continues, McCloskey said, the U.S. would wind up with four divisions
in Vietnam to back np South Vietnamese forces there.
McCloskey said all forces should be withdrawn within 18 months, a goal the
President still is capable of reaching.
"But I suspect that Mr. Nixon's policy is that we should get out at such a
rate that the American people's concern is quieted while leaving behind enough
troops that the South Vietnamese military establishment is strengthened," he
added. »
Other McCloskey views expressed in an interview here soon after conclusion
of his trip:
— Vietnam will become an issue in the election this year vmless troop with-
drawals continue." The great silent majority support the President (on this
issue) only because of the withdrawals."
— Nearly everyone in Vietnam desires unification and many are "hedging their
commitments" in expectation of ultimate Communist victory.
— Anyone who wants sanctuary should be given the means of leaving South
Vietnam, although a "blood bath" of any except the very wealthy, the province
chiefs and the military commanders is unlikely.
— "There is nothing about the government in the north that is so harsh and
repressive that it is worth the continued loss of life . . . The great bulk of the
people want peace at any price and are denied it because of American assistance."
The Chairman. The next witness is Mr. Edward J. Nickel.
SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES
Mr. Nickel, in keeping with the procedure followed in the previous
hearings involving: ]iersoniiel broiio-ht back from Vietnam, in order
that I show no partiality in this matter, I will ask jou and j^onr asso-
ciates who may be called upon to testify to be sworn at this point.
Would you please stand and raise yoiu' rio;ht hand.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to
give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Nickel. I do.
Mr. Osborne. I do.
Mr. Hays. I do.
The Chairman. You have a prepared statement, I believe, Mr.
Nickel?
654
Mr. Nickel. 1 do, sir.
The Chairman. Would you proceed, please, sir.
TESTIMONY OP EDWARD J. NICKEL, DIEECTOE, JOINT U.S. PUBLIC
APPAIES OPPICE, SAIGON, AND OTIS E. HAYS, OPPICE OP USIA
ASSISTANT DIEECTOE FOE EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
Mr. Nickel. Mr. Chairman, I would like fost to describe briefly
the office in Saigon which 1 head. It is called the Joint U.S. Public
Affahs Office or JUSPAO. This Office, which was established in 1965,
includes American military and civilian personnel and its functions
are:
To provide policy guidance for all U.S. psychological operations in
Vietnam.
To provide media materials in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam to
the U.S. Information Agency for use in third countries.
To perform the normal USIS cultural and information mission.
To provide assistance to the Government of the Republic of Viet-
nam (GVN) to improve its ]3ublic information programs.
ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY JUSPAO
I will confine my statement to a description of this last function.
JUSPAO's efforts in this regard can be grouped in four categories:
First, assistance in the construction and operation of mass media
communication facilities including the national radio network and
the national television network.
Second, assistance in the improvement of personnel, training, or-
ganization, methodology, and the equij^ping of the INlhiistry of In-
formation's field organization called the Vietnamese Information
Service (VIS).
Third, assistance in the production of information materials by
the Government's mass media and by the Vietnamese Information
Service.
Fourth, assistance through joint planning and joint production of
information materials by JUSPAO and the Ministry of Information
to support the Government's pacification and develoimient programs.
Additionally, ^Ir. Chairman, JUSPAO indirectly influences the
psychological warfare activities of the Vietnamese Armed Forces
because we provide poHcy guidance for psychological operations to
the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) which assists the
Vietnamese Armed Forces in this field.
These categories of assistance cover a wide range of cooperative
efforts to which the U.S. Government and the GVN contribute
staff, funds, and equipment. The number of personnel and the amounts
of money contributed by each side have varied from year to year.
However, in the last year and a half we in JUSPAO have begun to
establish terminal dates for several assistance operations and to trans-
fer greater responsibility for others to the Government of Vietnam.
This process is related to the overall effort to replace the U.S. (-on-
tribution to the war effort with an increased Vietnamese contribution.
655
REDUCTION OF JUSPAO CONTRIBUTIONS
JUSPAO is presently in the process of defining specific reductions
in its contributions of personnel, money, and equipment. By the
end of the current fiscal year American civilian positions will be
reduced by 31 (from 132 to 101); American military positions by 11
(from 118 to 107); Vietnamese positions by 42 (from 385 to 343);
thu-d-country nationals by eight (from 12 to 4). As the GVN absorbs
more of our currently joint operations, more American positions will
be eliminated.
Our support in the information field should be completely terminated
by the middle of 1972. Some projects will be completed earlier. For
instance, the terminal date for the television project is June 1971.
Radio construction will be completed in the spring of 1971. However,
technical training needed to o])erate the ncAV radio network will
requhe an additional year.
Our role increasingly will become more and more an advisoiy one
as our financial support and our production of media materials is
reduced. But, in the category of printed material, the GVN in the
near future will not be able to take over all of our present production.
We believe this situation will be partially offset when the radio and
television networks are completed and when more Vietnamese In-
formation Service personnel have been trained in face-to-face com-
munication techniques. We are planning now to increase this type
of training.
For some time the GVN has lacked trained and experienced per-
sonnel needed to sustain effective information programs. Our training
programs and support have helped alleviate this problem to some
degree. However, many of those trained have been drafted for military
serA^ce. Mass communications skills will continue to be in short supply
in South Vietnam for some time.
1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Lately the GVN has manifested an increasing understanding of the
im]-)ortance of developing better lines of communication Avith the
people, especially those in rural areas. The 1970 pacification and
development program expresses this awareness by making the goal of
establishing an effective information system one of its eight national
objectives. The realization of that goal could make an important
contribution to successful communication between the Government
and the governed.
Other objectives of the 1970 plan are designed to encourage increased
participation by citizens in the governmental process and to encourage
local initiative.
Among the substantive programs of the plan are land reform;
elections at the local, provincial, and national levels; recruitment of
citizens in local militia forces with arms provided by the Government;
and Government grants of village self-help funds to be used for
development projects the villagers themselves desire. A large part of
the GVN information effort iii 1970 and U.S. support for it is being
devoted to publicizing these programs and encouraging the South
Vietnamese citizens to participate in them.
656
I would like to describe some of OLir assistance projects and to
indicate our plans for reducing them as the GVN assumes increasing
responsibilit}" for them.
U.S. ASSISTANCE IN RADIO
Between the jeaTS 1952 and 1964, the U.S. financed the purchase
of low- and medium-povrer radio transmitters to help the GVN to
set up stations in various parts of the country or to increase the signal
strength of existing stations. The cost to the United States of this
equipment was about $1.1 million. Australia contributed a high-
powered station through the Colombo plan.
However, the collection of stations v. as never quite a network and
its range was still inadequate. As the pace of the war stepped up 5
3^ears ago, the United States began a project aimed at providing the
GVN with an integrated radio network capable of reaching 95 percent
of Vietnam's population, rather than the 65 percent possibly reachable
with varying quahty signals and programing through the then existing
group of stations. Feasibility studies were followed by preconstruction
architectural and engineering studies. These were almost completed
when the 1968 Tet attacks took place. In those attacks transniitters
at Hue and Ban Me Thuot were badly damaged as were studios and
other installations in Saigon and Qui Nhon.
As a result of those attacks, the United States and GVN decided
against constructing a 12-station network in favor of a network of
fom- stations of higher power. This change was dictated by security
and manpower considerations. It was felt it would be easier to protect
four installations than 12, and also to staff them. The coverage of the
population would be the same in either case — ^more than 95 percent.
That four-station network is now being built and will be complete
about 1 year from now at a cost of approximately $6.8 million in U.S.
funds. Technical training for operation and maintenance of the new
network will continue for 1 year after construction is completed.
An additional sum equivalent to about $1 milhon in GVN-owned
but jointly controlled counterpart funds is being used in the project.
The rest of the GVN contribution to this project is an indirect one,
largely in the form of its budget for radio operations, including the
salaries of a staff of 464 personnel. In 1965, that budget was the equiva-
lent of about $750,000. This figure has increased steadily in the past
5 years. This year the budget is the equivalent of about $1.7 million.
We believe the quality of programing has improved during that
period. More and more the GVN officials concerned with radio have
become aware of the concept of providing a service to the people.
This has resulted in increased use of radio broadcasting to engender
participation by tlie peo]:)le in Government programs ranging from
land reform and improved agriculture to self-defense.
U.S. ASSISTANCE IN TELEVISION
In 1966 the United States agreed to install a four-station television
network in Vietnam. The GVN was committed to furnishing land,
buildings, staff and an operating budget.
Telecasting initially was for 1 hour nightly to the Saigon area from
an airborne transmitter. Now ground stations in Saigon, Hue and
Can The are on the ah- an average of 4 hours nightly. Between Saigon
657
and Hue an airborne transmitter provides coverage for the coastal
area. By early 1971, a fourth ground station — at Qui Nhon— -will
have replaced the air operation.
The U.S. cost will total about $8.2 million when we phase out of
the operation by July 1, 1971. GVN counterpart funds amounting to
the equivalent of about $2 million paid for land and building costs.
In addition, the annual operating budget of GVN television has risen
from the equivalent of about $400,000 including salaries of 17 em-
ployees in 1966 to more than double that amount including salaries
of 139 employees in the current year.
The Chairman. Could I ask for a point of information? Do the
GVN counterpart funds arise from American imports?
Mr. Nickel. In the original instance; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is there any real distinction in their impact upon
American costs between GVN counterpart funds and $1 million?
Mr. Nickel. The difference, of course, sir, would be that they are
not directly appropriated funds.
The Chairman. No; but the total cost really is American; is it not?
It is not GVN. It is American costs expressed in two different ways.
Mr. Nickel. It would be derived from the commercial import
program.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Nickel. A rigorous program of training in the difficult TV
skills is being carried out under contract by the National Broadcasting
Co., International. Most of the training is on site in Vietnam. However,
six engineers who will constitute the GVN supervisor engineering staff
are being trained in the RCA Institute in New York.
We estimate there are now 300,000 TV receivers in Vietnam, with
a viewing audience of about 2 million. Many sets are outside the cities
in the heavily populated flat delta region where the signal is particu-
larly good.
Of the programs presented b}^ the GVN's TV network, less than 10
percent are imported. Ninety percent of the programing is locally
produced, either Hve or on film or tape. As with radio, the television
medium is used extensively to exi)lain GVN programs to the people.
Last September the GVN began a weekly program called "The
People Want to Know," during which officials and other leaders are
interviewed by journalists in the format of "Meet the Press."
U.S. assistance to VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE
A major part of our assistance is directed to the operation of the
Vietnamese Information Service. This is the field arm of the Ministry
of Information, with officer staffs at corps headquarters cities and in
all provinces and districts of the country. Starting this year, the
Ministry began an intensive training program for additional personnel
at the village and hamlet levels. As these new lower level personnel
are trained, they are now being placed under the operational control
of the village and hamlet chiefs with program support coming from
district and provincial VIS offices.
The job of the VIS is to use a wide range of information and psy-
chological techniques to support GVN programs as prescribed in
guidances from the Ministry in Saigon. The techniques include the
publication of district newsletters and province newspapers, leaflets
658
and posters; the relaying of news and commentaries and the playing
of prerecorded tapes over loudspeaker systems in village and hamlet
centers; the showing of motion pictures; visits to families in villages
and hamlets to discuss GVN programs affecting them; the distribution
of national magazines and other materials received from the Ministry
and JUSPAO; and the sponsoring with other local officials of
campaigns, public meetings, exhibits and artistic and cultural
presentations.
From fiscal year 1955 through 1967, the United States contributed
an average of $497,000 in dollar funds annually to equip the VIS with
audiovisual equipment, the vehicles, the office machines, and other
materials necessary to carry out these programs. In the succeeding 3
years the dollar expenditure for this program has been $187,000 in
1968, $85,000 in 1969, and $60,000 in the current year. In the last 2
years we have gradually transferred to the GVN full responsibility for
maintenance and replacement costs for this equipment as well as for
the operation of repair centers.
During the same period, an average of the equivalent of $200,000
annually was used for the VIS from GVN counterpart funds. We do
not have adequate figures for the GVN's budget for the VIS prior to
1964. However, from that year to the present the budget has averaged
about the equivalent of $6.4 million annually through 1970. The 1970
budget is about the equivalent of $15 million, a substantial increase
over previous years.
The Chairman. TVliat caused that ?
Mr. Nickel, To a large extent, sir, an increase in personnel, but
there was also a real increase in operations. There was a large increase
in local personnel with the improvement of hamlet and village infor-
mation programs.
U.S. CONTACT WITH VIS
Contact with the VIS is maintained both in the field and in Saigon.
In the capital it is the fimction of several elements of JUSPAO. In
the field it is carried out by 81 American civilian and military advisers
located in 34 of the 44 Provinces. These advisers are detailed to the
U.S. Military Assistance Command CORDS program and are under
the operational control of the Province senior advisers at the Province
level and the U.S. Command elements at the various corps head-
quarters. Just as the VIS chief is required to participate with the
province chief and other GVN officials in planning and operating
GVN programs, so our CORDS psychological operations staff perform
a similar function within the U.S. province team. The providing of
advice and support to the provincial VIS operation is the principal
duty of these American psychological operations personnel.
Thus, the American structure for information operations parallels
in broad outline that of the GVN, permitting a degree of coordination
at all levels.
EFFOETS TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF VIS
The efficiency of the VIS varies from place to place. Where key
officials are dedicated and competent, operations are generally effec-
tive. And there are a number of these. Where they are not well moti-
vated and energetic, the programs suffer. And there are some of these
659
also. In the past year, two new approaches have been undertaken by
the Ministry of Information with our cooperation to try to improve
the efficiency of the VIS. These are the phinning of a comprehensive
series of training courses for various levels of VIS personnel and the
regular holding of joint meetings of Saigon and field personnel,
usually on a corps area basis. We believe these two measures have
had and will continue to have a good effect on the VIS operation.
During the current year, we will use the equivalent in counterpart
funds of about $63,000 to support the training program. We are also
providing the assistance of one American adviser to help develop
course materials.
JUSPAO'S LIAISON WITH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
JUSPAO's liaison with the Ministry itself takes many forms. At
the top, I meet frequently with the Minister and his senior staff. At
the planning level, JUSPAO policy ofl&cers meet daily with Ministry
officials to plan joint campaigns, instructions, and guidances to media
producers and to field personnel. On the media production side, our
writers and editors work together in the publication of magazines,
pamphlets, posters, loudspeaker tapes, and radio programs.
I have tried, Mr. Chairman, to describe here the evolution of some
of the current major programs we are conducting to assist the GVN
in the information and psychological fields. In the expansion of these
])rograms over the years, the American contribution has been sub-
stantial. So has the Vietnamese contribution. In the past 2 years, a
considerable portion of the load the United States was carrying has
been shifted to the GVN. We plan to continue moving in that direction.
Thank you, sir; that is the end of my statement.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Nickel.
How long have you been in charge of this program, Mr. Nickel?
Mr. Nickel. Two years, su'.
The Chairman. Do you live in Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. I do, sir.
magnitude of USIA effort in SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. I believe you said there were 132 Americans under
your immediate direction; is that correct?
Mr. Nickel. We are reducing this year, sir, by 31 positions from
132 American positions to 101 American positions.
The Chairman, Is that in the office in Saigon or how extensive is
this?
Mr. Nickel. Those are civilian USIA officers, some serving in
Saigon and some in the Provinces. I should add that we also have
American military ])ersonnel serving with JUSPAO, sir.
The Chairman. You mentioned that in the Provinces you have
military advisers who are Americans. Is tluit right?
Mr. Nickel. We have some civifian advisers in the provinces but
the bulk of them are militarj^, sir.
The Chairman. To get some idea of the magnitude of the effort,
take the present fiscal year of 1970. Is it correct to say that the
civilian positions are 132 or 101?
Mr, Nickel. 101 civiUan positions, su*.
660 .
The Chairman. That is in the current year,
Mr. Nickel. Fiscal year 1970.
The Chairman. How many of these mihtary advisers are assigned
to this work?
Mr. Nickel. We have 107 mihtary spaces in JUSPAO, sir.
The Chairman. 208 is the total American personnel?
Mr, Nickel. 208 is the figure, sir.
The Chairman. What is the size of the budget for the USIA
operation in Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. The USIA budget for Vietnam, sir, is $6.4 million.
The Chairman, Is that for the year of 1970?
Mr, Nickel, For fiscal year 1970; yes, sir.
The Chairman, Does that include construction or is that only
support of the personnel?
Mr, Nickel, That is the USIA component of the budget, sir.
Construction would be funded by an AID component of our budget.
I will give you these add-ons. We also have $2.4 million funded by AID
and $2.1 million funded by the Department of Defense, to make a total
budget available to me for JUSPAO's operations of $10.9 million.
The Chairman. Would that include the pay of the military men to
whom you referred?
Mr. Nickel. It does not include military salaries. However, it
does include USIA civilian salaries.
The Chairman, The military salaries would be in addition then?
Mr, Nickel, They would be in addition, sk.
The Chairman, Do you have any estimate of what that would
cost?
Mr, Nickel, I have no estimate, but I could furnish it for the
record.
(The information referred to follow^s:)
Pay and Allowances of Military in JUSPAO
(The military pay and allowances, as reported by the four Military Services
whose personnel are involved, amount to $1.2 million.)
The Chairman, What I am trying to get and what we are interested
in is the total cost of this overall operation. It is the usual basic mate-
rial that we would like to have,
Mr, Nickel. I could furnish the information about military pay,
sir.
military personnel working in propaganda field
The Chairman, Do these personnel figures include the personnel in
the military units not associated with USIA who work in the field of
propaganda?
Mr, Nickel, They do not, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know how many people there are in that?
Mr. Nickel, May I furnish that, sir. I have it, but I cannot put my
hands on it.
The Chairman, Yes; you can furnish it. Could you give a rough
estimate that you can correct later?
Mr. Nickel. Sir, I now have the information. In 1970 there are 761
U.S. military psyops field personnel and 50 serving on staft* or as
advisers to the Vietnamese, for a total of 811.
661
The Chairman. That is very much larger than your own operation;
is it not?
Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.
MISSION OF JUSPAO
The Chairman. This brings up a further question. What do you
consider to be the mission of your operation? Wliat are you trying to
accomphsh?
Mr. Nickel. My principal mission, sir, is to assist the Vietnamese
Government in developing and conducting an effective program of
communications.
The Chairman. Your mission is to assist the Vietnamese Govern-
ment to create a system of communications. Is that it?
Mr. Nickel. To assist the Vietnamese Government in developing a
means of communicating with the electorate and to pro^^de technical
and professional advice.
The Chairman. What leads you to believe that the purpose of our
Government in establishing the USIA was to create an agency to
create a means of communication for a foreign government?
Mr. Nickel. I would answer that, Mr. Chairman, by stating that
m}' operations are responsive to the instructions and directions I
receive from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and from
the American Ambassador in Saigon.
The Chairman. Then you would characterize your mission to be to
carry out orders. Is that the right wa}^ to put it?
^Ir. Nickel. In my position; yes, sir.
The Chairman. You have no idea what the real mission of this
operation is other than to carry out orders?
Mr. Nickel. I know what my instructions are.
AUTHORIZATION OF JOINT U.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE MISSION
QUESTIONED
The Chairman. This is a matter, I think, of considerable interest.
Let me refer to section 2 of the basic legislation creating this operation:
The Congress hereby dechires that the objectives of this Act are to enable the
Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United
States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the
people of the United States and the people of other countries.
Do you think that language authorizes USIA to create for another
coimtry a system of conmuiuications for that government and its
l)eoi)le?
Mr. Nickel. My organization, the Joint U.S. Public Affau-s Office,
Mr. Chairman, was established in 1965 by order of the President. I
would suggest that any justification of the suitability of the mission
we are performing is something that should be addressed to the people
to whom I report. I would be very hapi)y to address this problem to
them.
The Chairman. I think it would be very interesting if you would.
You sa}" it was created by Executive order. It was not created by
statute. There is no statute law authorizing you to do what you are
doing; is there?
Mr. Nickel. I said that the U.S. Public Affairs Office was created
as a result of Presidential directive.
662
The Chairman. Yes. Aiid in pursuance of that action you have
been directed by your superiors to do what you are doing. So you
would not wish to undertake to say what this whole operation is
intended to accomplish for the people of the United iStates; would
you?
Mr. Nickel. I believe I said earlier, sir, that my mission in Vietnam
was in large measure to assist the Vietnamese Government in develop-
ing and improving its means of communicating with its people.
ESTABLISHMENT OF MINISTRY OF INFORMATTON QUESTIONED
The Chairman. It occurs to me that in this country there has
always been not only a great reluctance, but aversion, to the creation
of a ministry of information in our Government to inform our own
people. Is that not so?
Mr. Nickel. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Does the law not specifically forbid the USIA to
indoctrinate or brainwash, or whatever you want to call it, the
American people? Is that not so?
Mr. Nickel. Clearly, sir.
The Chairman. Are you not creating in Vietnam just such an in-
formation agency? The way you describe here what you have done
and are in the process of doing, it is to create in Vietnam an agency
to enable that Government to control its people through this device
which we ourselves abhor in this country? How does this seem to
you to be consistent with our own views?
Mr. Nickel. I would suggest, Mr. Chan-man, that Vietnam is not
unique in possessing a ministry of information. I would also suggest
that in Vietnam, as in many other developing societies, there do not
exist any strong commercial or nongovernmental media.
The Chairman. Mr. Nickel, I am quite aware that it is not unique.
In every dictatorsliip I know of they have a ministry of information
just like this. But we are told, on the one hand, that we are seeking to
establish the government of self-determination and this leaves the
impression we are seeking to establish a democratic system there.
I quite agree with you that information agencies are typical. They
were typical of Hitler's Germany and typical of nearly every dictator-
ship and authoritarian government I know of, but I would not have
thought we would be a party to helping construct such a governmental
apparatus.
Mr. Nickel. Are there not also some regimes we regard as being
democratic that have ministries of information?
The Chairman. What, for example, would be one from your point
of view?
Mr. Nickel. If I am not mistaken, is there not a French Ministry
of Information?
The Chairman. I would not know. Is there one in Sweden, which
is a country that I think has achieved a high degree of democracy or
self-determination if you like, or England? I do not recall that in
England they have a minister of information whose job it is to sell
the people of England upon the merits and virtues of that Govern-
ment. I do not recall ever having heard of it. France has recently
gone through a rather unusual evolutionary period, almost revolution-
ary under De Gaulle, of course, and France may be an example. I
would not want to say for sure. I do not know that.
663
GVN CLOSING OF PRIVATE NEWSPAPERS
How many private newspapers have been closed by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam cUiring the past year?
yir. Nickel. I could not give you the number, sir.
The Chairman. There have been several.
Mr. Nickel. There have been several closings.
The Chairman. You say there is not a heavily developed private
sector. It is largely because that Government is so sensitive to criticism
that they close the private newspapers whenever they criticize the
Government. Is that not a fact?
Mr. Nickel. There have been some closings; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you ever feel a bit uncomfortable in being ahned
with a government which is so clearly an authoritarian government
or do you feel perfectly comfortable in your relationship with that
government?
Mr. Nickel. I have no problems in performing my job.
The Chairman. You have no problems. You feel perfectly at home?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
USIA PAY AND ALLOWANCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Chairman. Coming back to a more pedestrian subject of the
costs, could you tell me what is the average pay of the American
employees of USIA in Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. The average pay of a USIA employee with JUSPAO,
SU-, including allowances, minus houshig, would be about $28,900.
The Chairman. What is the total cost to the Government of the
United States for those employees, including everything? Do they
furnish housing?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, housing is furnished, sii". I am unable to break out
that figure for an individual. Do you want the total cost?
The Chairman. Perhaps if you could tell me your own. What is
your pay and what do your allowances amount to? You are the
Director?
Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. What is your total? What is the total cost to the
Federal Government?
Mr. Nickel. The combination of my salary and allowances, again
makhig no provision for my housing, is $45,473.
TheCn airman. Plus housing?
Mr. Nickel. Housing?
The Chairman. Do they furnish you ^^ith a house?
Mr. Nickel. I am furnished with housing.
The Chairman. What would be the reasonable cost of the house
that is paid for by the Federal Government?
Mr. Nickel. That is right, the house is paid for by the Federal
Government.
The Chairman. How much is that? You ought to know that.
Mr. Nickel. Let me see if I have that, sk.
The Chairman. You have been there for 2 years. You have no idea
what that would be?
Mr. Nickel. My house, sii-, is a U.S. Government house.
The Chairman. Is it a good house?
664
Mr. Nickel. It is comfortable, sir.
The Chairman. Was it one that the Government built or is it an old
villa?
Mr. Nickel. It was there. It is a U.S. Government-owned house.
The Chairman. How many houses does the U.S. Government own
in Saigon? Do you know?
Mr. Nickel. I do not know that answer, sir.
The Chairman. Is it several?
Mr. Nickel. It is more than several.
The Chairman. It is more than several.
Then I would estimate your total cost would be somewhat in the
neighborhood of at least $50,000.
Mr. Nickel. That would seem right, sir.
The Chairman. Are you furnished an automobile?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are USIA officials in Saigon given special pay
equivalent to combat pay for military people?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir. We receive a differential.
The Chairman. What does it amount to? Is it 25 percent?
Mr. Nickel. Twenty-five percent.
U.S. COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES
The Chairman. If our Government decides that it is proper to
furnish assistance in the building of a propaganda operation for
Vietnam, how does it decide in which country to do tliis? Is this the
only country in which we have done this?
Mr. Nickel. Specifically have done what, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Have we created a communications system which
enables the government to, as you say, communicate with its citizens?
Have we done it in Thailand? Are we doing it or have we done it
in Thailand? Does the USIA have a comparable operation in Thailand,
may be not on as large a scale but a lesser scale?
Mr. Nickel. Certainly, as you say, not comparable in order of
magnitude.
The Chairman. Do we have a similar operation?
Mr. Nickel. I am not — I personally am not aware that
The Chairman. Are any of your associates?
Mr. Nickel. I am not aware and I do not think my associates
are aware that we are doing any such thing as building a TV network
or building a radio network. I cannot speak more directly to the
specific programs, sir.
newspapers closed by gvn
The Chairman. Before I leave that, you said you did not know
how many newspapers. Do either of your associates know how many
newspapers the government of Saigon has closed in the last few
years?
Mr. Hays. No, sir.
The Chairman. Is that information not available?
Mr. Osborne. It can be made available. I do not have it available.
The Chairman. Would you supply it for the record?
Mr. Osborne. Yes, sir.
665
(The information referred to follows:)
Newspapers Suspended by GVN From 1968 Through March 23, 1970
During 1968 the Government of Viet-Nam indefinitely suspended six news-
papers. Sixteen others were temporarily suspended, for an average of 35 days per
suspension. , , ,rv
During 1969 through March 23, 1970, the GVN indefinitely suspended 12
newspapers. An additional 14 received temporary suspensions ranging from a
few days to almost 11 months, for an average of 46 days per suspension.
The Chairman. I notice in the paper every now and then there is
a notice that X paper has been closed by the government. I simply
have not made a counting of it, but I ani under the impression there
have been several.
Mr. Nickel. I will supply it, su'.
The Chairman. Of course the government controls the supply of
newsprint and it is no problem for them simply to cut off the news-
l)rint if they wish to close a newspaper. Is that so?
Mr. Nickel. Yes.
USIA analysis of south VIETNAMESE PUBLIC ATTITUDES
The Chairman. Does the USIA, Mr. Nickel, or any other agency
attempt to analyze Vietnamese public attitudes periodically?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Have polls been taken?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir; polls have been taken.
The Chairman. How is this done? Is it done by you directly or by
contract?
Mr. Nickel. By contract, sir.
The Chairman. Wliat organization has done it?
Mr. Nickel. May I answer that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that
I have been informed that you have ^\Titten the Director of the U.S.
Information Agency asking for information about our polling in Viet-
nam, that this is now under consideration, and that I would prefer
to have the information come to you through that channel.
The Chairman. I wrote that letter partly to give you notice that
this is a matter in which we are interested. I hoped that you would
bo prepared to answer it this morning. Are you saying that this is a
mutter that affects our security and that you do not wish to testify
in open session on it?
Mr. Nickel. I prefer not to go beyond stating, sir, that we do
engage in polling in Vietnam, as in some other countries.
witness' instructions concerning testimony about polling
The Chairmen. Have you been instructed to state to the committee
that you will not testify in open session on this matter?
Mr. Nickel. I am not able to discuss the polling in open hearing,
sir.
The Chairman. Have you been instructed not to respond to
questions about ])olling?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Who instructed you, sir? Did Mr. Shakespeare tell
you not to answer such questions? If not, who did?
44-706—70 13
666
Mr. Nickel. I have been instructed by my principal.
May I have just one moment, sir?
The Chairman. Certainly. You confer with your lawyer if you
like.
Mr. Nickel. In answer to your question, sir, I have been instructed
by the director of my agency.
The Chairman. Mr. Shakespeare has instructed on this?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What grounds did he give you for instructing you
not to reply to this question?
Mr. Nickel. This question is under consideration as to the possible
security elements involved.
The Chairman. Possible security involved.
You heard the previous witness, Congressman McCloskey; did you
not?
Mr. Nickel. I did, sir.
The Chairman. You realize that this committee has some au-
thority in the authorization of the funds for you agency; do you not?
Mr. Nickel. I am very well aware of that.
The Chairman. We normally expect people in USIA to respond to
questions about their operations if they expect this committee to au-
thorize any funds for the agency. You realize that; do you not?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Does Mr. Shakesj^eare realize that?
Mr. Nickel. I cannot speak for Mr. Shakespeare, sir.
The Chairman. I want to make it clear that I do not accept your
reason for refusing to answer. It is a perfectly legitimate question.
You are engaged in an activity which is very dubious in its authority
under an executive order, in any case, and I think that you should be
very careful in refusing to answer questions about these operations.
I would like to know how much you paid, for example, for a contract
to take a poll in Vietnam and see how it compares to polls in this
country. Would you be willing to say how much you paid for the poll?
Mr. Nickel. I do not believe I am able to, sir.
The Chairman. Wlio was the gentleman who advised you not to
answer? Was he sworn also?
Mr. Nickel. The gentleman with whom I just talked did not
advise me not to answer.
The Chairman. He did not?
Mr. Nickel. I wanted to check something with him. He is the
General Counsel of the U.S. Information Agency.
The Chairman. He did not advise you as to your instructions.
It is very unusual. I did not expect you to refuse to answer these
questions. One reason why I sent that letter inquiring about these
matters was, as I say, to alert the Agency that we are interested in
the poll.
When was the latest poll taken? Will you refuse to answer that?
Mr. Nickel. I find myself unable to answer it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You mean by saying "unable" that 3'-ou do not
know?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. Do either of your associates know when the latest
poll was taken?
Mr. Nickel. I believe, sir, that they are bound by the same instruc-
tions.
667
witness' instructions concerning subject of polling
The Chairman. I asked you if you were instructed to tell it. There
is a difference between your answer if you know, and are instructed
not to tell and if you do not know. I want to make the answer clear.
On what grounds are you refusing to say when the latest poll was
taken?
Mr. Nickel. I am under instructions, sir, not to discuss this
subject.
The Chairman. Then you do know when it was, but you are under
instructions not to discuss the subject. You are in effect taking the
equivalent of the Fifth Amendment; is that correct?
Mr. Nickel. No.
The Chairman. Why is that not correct? You do not consider that
the USIA is a sensitive undertaking similar to the CIA; do you?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. Usually your activities are open and above board;
are they not?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You are not authoiized to engage in covert opera-
tions; are you?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. Would you be willing to answer this kind of ques-
tion? What was the poll about? Did it ask about the attitude of the
local citizens toward Americans?
Mr. Nickel. I find, sir, in line with my instructions, that I am un-
able to discuss the subject of polhng.
The Chairman. You would not discuss as to whether or not the
1)()11 involved the question of the extent of the support of the Vietnam-
ese people for the Thieu government?
Mr. Nickel. I do not believe, sir, in line with my instructions, that
I am able to respond.
The Chairman. I may say before I leave this subject, this is very
unsatisfactory. I regret very much, and 1 hope you will tell your
superior, Mr. Shakesi)eare, that, si)eaking for myself, I very much
regret this attitude. This committee is entitletl to know what the poll
cost, what it asked, and what the results were.
This is not a document, it seems to me, that comes under executive
privilege. It has nothing whatever to do with the President directly.
I mean it is not a confidential document. It is a matter that is paid for
by the public funds of the Government, and the committee is entitled
to actually have the poll, in my opinion, and we shall ask for it. I
regret he gave you such instructions.
U.S. ADVISORY work IN TV, RADIO, AND PRINTED MATERIALS
Do the U.S. advisers work with the Vietnamese on matters in-
volving TV and radio program content and makeup?
Mr. Nickel. Our advisers work with both radio and TV. They
occasionally are involved in the format of a program.
The Chairman. Do they work with them in the preparation of
printed information materials?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
668
GVN media's treatment OF TRAN NGOC CHAU CASE
The Chairman. Was the case of Tran Ngoc Chau reported over
the Vietnamese radio and television stations?
Mr. Nickel. I can only assume it was. I would have to retire to
an assumption because I was not in vSaigon at that particular time,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Are you familiar with the Chau case?
Mr. Nickel. I have read about it; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know Mr. Chau?
Mr. Nickel. I do not, sir.
The Chairman. Do either of your associates know whether or not
the radio and television stations of Vietnam carried any news about
Mr. Chau?
Mr. Hays. No, sir.
The Chairman. You do not know?
Mr. Hays. No, sir.
The Chairman. You do not know?
Mr. Osborne. No, sir; I do not.
The Chairman. Were any printed materials put out by the South
Vietnamese Government on this case?
Mr. Nickel. I do not know, sir. I can find out.
The Chairman. In your statement you say "JUSPAO's liaison with
the Ministry itself takes many forms." That is the Ministry of In-
formation.
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You say:
At the top, I meet frequently w'th the Minister and his senior staff. At the
planning level, JUSPAO policy officers meet daily with Ministry officials to plan
joint campaigns, instructions and guidances to media producers and to field
personnel. On the media production side, our writers and editors work together
in the publication of magazines, pamphlets, posters, loudspeaker tapes, and radio
programs.
Ill doing all of that, do you still say you do not know whether
anything was put out on the Chau case?
Mr. Nickel. If I may offer a brief explanation, sir, our relationship
with the Ministry would deal with things like support of the pacifica-
tion program, but would not consist of liaison in terms of tactical
matters. We have never had occasion to discuss the Chau case with
anyone in the Ministry.
The Chairman. Did our advisers or did you advise against the
public attacks on Chau by the Government media?
Mr. Nickel. I have never personally been involved in the Chau
case in any way, sir.
The Chairman. Did any of your employees under your direction
give any advice whatever about the Chau case?
Mr. Nickel. I do not believe so, sir. Again, I wish to state that I
myself was absent from Saigon during most of this period, but I
believe that they did not.
KINDS OF ADVICE GIVEN TO GVN BY JUSPAO
The Chairman. Does the Minister of Information in Saigon ever
ask your advice about the formulation of his Government's public
position on major issues?
669
Mr. Nickel. My discussions with the Minister in line with my own
responsibiUties, sir, are concerned more with the oi)erations of the
Vietnamese Information Service program than with substance.
The Chairman. Then are you saying you do not give him advice
about substantive measures; is that right?
Mr. Nickel. My advice is primarily operational.
The Chairman. Is it exclusively?
Mr. Nickel. No. We might, for example, Mr. Chairman, discuss
how best to promote or to conduct information campaigns in support
of the People's Self-Defense Force, and matters like that which fall
within the pacification and development program.
I think I should point out that I am not responsible, Mr. Chairman,
for our press operation in Vietnam. That responsibility falls to a
colleague of mine who is the special assistant for press affairs to the
Ambassador.
As the dhector of JUSPAO I do not speak for the Embassy on press
affairs.
The Chairman. What is his name?
Mr. Nickel. Mr. Newman.
The Chairman. Is he in Saigon now?
Mr. Nickel. He is in Saigon, sir.
The Chairman. Have you discussed with the Information Minister
the South Vietnamese refusal to attend the opening of the expanded
Paris talks?
Mr. Nickel. I did not, sir.
The Chairman. Did you discuss with him what the official reaction
to the death of Ho Chi Minh would be?
Mr. Nickel. We had some discussion with the Ministry of Informa-
tion about this matter; yes, sir.
The Chairman. What was your advice to them with regard to how
to treat the death of Ho Cld Alinh?
Mr. Nickel. We agreed, sir, that a maximum effort should be made
to inform the enemy forces in Vietnam of Ho's death. We also agreed
that our treatment should be straight information, and that there
should not be any exultation in our output to the enemy forces.
advice concerning impact of gvn policy on united states
The Chairman. Do you or any of your officials ever advise President
Thieu or other GVN officials on the potntial impact in other countries
of ])olicy matters, particularly about the potential impact in the
United States of GVN i)olicies?
Mr. Nickel. I do not advise Vietnamese officials about the impact
on the United States or the impact on American i3ublic opinion, sir.
The Chairman. Does anyone?
Mr. Nickel. I presume this is discussed, but not by me, sir.
The Chairman. You do not know of it. You are not aware of any
such advice?
Mr. Nickel. Not specifically; no, sir.
The Chairman. You are not aware of any advice that was given to
Mr. Thieu or anyone else in the higher echelons of the Government
as to the possible reaction in this country of the imprisonment of Mr,
Chau?
Mr, Nickel, As I said earlier, I was not involved in the Chau case.
I do not know.
670
The Chairman. It would not be a deep involvement.
Has there ever been any discussion with them about the impact in
this country of his imprisonment of Mr. Dzu? Do you know about
Mr. Dzu?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You are aware of who he is?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know what happened to him?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you ever advise them as to what the reaction
in this country is to his imprisonment?
Mr. Nickel. I have never advised the ]\Iinister of Information
about impact on U.S. public opinion.
The Chairman. Do any U.S. personnel ever assist Vietnamese
officials in the writing of speeches?
Mr. Nickel. Certainly no one in my organization, to the best of
my knowledge.
The Chairman. Are U.S. officials consulted by Vietnamese officials
in the handling of statements that relate to U.S. policy?
Mr. Nickel. I presume so, sir, but not within my cognizance so
far as my organization is concerned.
The Chairman. You do not know anything about it anyway?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
U.S. personnel located at ministry of information
The Chairman. Are any Americans attached directly to the
Minister of Information's office?
Mr. Nickel. We have one or two Americans, Mr. Chairman, who
are physically located in the Ministry of Information headquarters
building for liaison purposes. They are not attached directly to the
office of the Minister.
The Chairman. What is their function?
Mr. Nickel. They perform liaison in terms of our overall advisory
efforts. I believe the thrust of your question was whether any of my
officers are attached directly to the office of the Minister. No one
serves directly on the Minister's staff, sir.
The Chairman. There is no such thing as an adviser to the Minister
of Information?
Mr. Nickel. We have advisers to various elements of the Ministry.
There is no adviser to the Minister, sir.
U.S. advisers to elements of ministry of information
The Chairman. I do not know enough about it to make a distinc-
tion. Could you tell us the distinction? I mean advisers to an element.
What is an element? It is a person; is it not? You advise people; do
you not?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What do you mean by that?
Mr. Nickel. We have advisers who work with the radio network.
We have advisers who work with the TV network.
The Chairman. Wliat do they do?
Mr. Nickel. We have advisers who work with the Vietnamese
Information Service.
671
The Chairman. About what do they advise them? Do they not
advise them about U.S. pohcy?
Mr. Nickel. Most of their advice, sir, is concerned with improving
operational efficiency of the various elements of the Information
Ministry.
The Chairman. How do you improve the efficiency ^vlthout any
attention to the substance which they are using? Do you mean to
say they are concerned only with the technical operation of the broad-
cast system?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir. With respect to the Vietnamese Information
Service, for example, our advisers would be concerned ^^ith discussing
with their Ministry counterparts how best, for example, to support
and promote the various objectives of the pacification and development
program.
HANDLING OF MYLAI MASSACRE
The Chairman. How has your Agency handled the Mylai massa-
cre theme during the past several months?
Mr. Nickel. JUSPAO, sir, has handled the Mylai incident by
taking the position that a serious investigation is underway by the
U.S. Government and that if a crime has been committed, the U.S.
Government will try the personnel concerned. In other words, we have
not in any way attempted to be evasive. We take the position it is
under investigation and we have to wait and see what the mvestigation
reveals.
The Chairman. What has been the position of the Vietnamese
Information Service regarding these incidents?
Mr. Nickel. I think the Vietnamese Information Service position
has been very similar to ours, sir.
The Chairman. Did the USIA or other American advisers offer
advice to the Government of South Vietnam about the handling of
this matter?
Mr. Nickel. Our policy i^eople in JUSPAO discussed it with the
l)olicy ])eople in the MinisUy of Information with respect to the guid-
ance" that should be given to the psyop media.
The Chairman. Did the Vietnamese Government i)lay down the
incident as being of little importance?
Mr. Nickel. It has been treated in the Vietnamese press. I am
unable to say m^^self whether the Vietnamese Government played it
down, sir. It certainly has been mentioned in the Vietnamese media.
The Chairman. Would you say that it had been emj^hasized or
was it deeini)hasize(l as a matter of great significance?
Mr. Nickel. It certainly has not been emphasized, sir.
treatment of communist massacres at hue
The Chairman. How has the USIA treated the Communist mas-
sacres at Hue in the program aimed at the Vietnamese people through
leaflets, newspapers, or television?
Mr. Nickel. We have done our best to assist the Vietnamese in
telling the story of the massacres at Hue, sir.
The Chairman. Has the USIA itself in its own pamphlets, news-
])apers and programs emphasized the massacre at Hue?
Mr. Nickel.^ We in JUSPAO have provided material to USIA for
use by USIA posts in other countries, sir.
672
NORTH VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS DIVISION OF JUSPAO
The Chairman. What is the function of the North Vietnamese
Affairs Division of JUSPAO?
Mr. Nickel. The North Vietnamese Affairs Division of JUSPAO,
sir, is a staff office which seeks to keep abreast of the propaganda de-
velopments involving the North. It is concerned with release to the
media of certain enemy documents. It also releases material of a more
general nature about certain enemy attitudes, activities, and practices.
psychological operations against north VIETNAMESE
The Chairman. Are any psychological operations being carried out
against North Vietnam at the present time?
Mr. Nickel. With respect to the operation that I am responsible
for, sir, 1 know of nothing but radio broadcasting.
The Chairman. There are no aerial drops being made of printed
material?
Mr. Nickel. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Have there ever been any made in the past?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Could you give a brief description of their magni-
tude and purpose?
Mr. Nickel. I could supply that for the record, sir. I cannot describe
the magnitude of them since they were discontinued some time ago.
The Chairman. When were these air drops terminated?
Mr. Nickel. At the time of the bombing halt, sir.
The Chairman. They ran coincidentally with the bombing in the
north; that right?
Mr. Nickel. They took place at the same time. They were not
operationally
The Chairman. No, I mean they went on at the same time.
Mr. Nickel. And they were discontinued at the same time.
(The information referred to follows:)
Beginning in 1965, propaganda leaflets were released from aircraft operating
over North Viet-Nam, or were dropped over waters outside the boundaries of
North Viet-Nam and wind-drifted into the country. Until March 31, 1968, this
program was designed generally to convince North "\let-Nam — both people and
regime — that North Vietnamese aggression in South Viet-Nam would fail, to
motivate North Viet-Nam to seek peaceful settlement of the conflict, and to
warn the people to stay away from military targets because they were subject to
air strike. At its peak, the program involved some 25 million leaflets per month.
Following the partial bombing halt announced on March 31, 1968, leaflet
targets were restricted to those south of 20 degrees North Latitude. The primary
objective of these leaflets was that of keeping the people in the area aware of
efforts by the Government of Viet-Nam and the United States to bring about a
negotiated settlement of the conflict.
After the total bombing halt of November 1, 1968, the leaflet program over
North Viet-Nam was terminated.
COST OF U.S. PROPAGANDA OPERATION IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. I am not sure this question has been qviite clarified.
Is it fair to say your operation in all phases of the information, psycho-
logical warfare program in Vietnam costs approximately $10 million?
Did you say it cost about $10 million?
Mr. Nickel. I said that the money that fell within my area of re-
sponsibility was $10.9 million.
673
The Chairman. It does not include the military?
Mr. Nickel. It does not include the military.
The Chairman. The military I remember now you said had 800
people against your 81?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I guess if yours is $10 million, theks is $80 million,
Is it fair to say we spend $80 million or $100 million on propaganda?
Mr. Nickel. I would hesitate to answer that.
The Chairman. What?
Mr. Nickel. I would hesitate to even speculate on what the cost
is, sir.
The Chairman. Would you venture a guess?
Mr. Nickel. I just have no base on which to make such a judgment.
The Chairman. We would like very much to have an idea of the
total cost. Of course, I realize the Pentagon has an enormous propa-
ganda operation in many places far greater than yom's, I wondered
whether you could give an estimate.
radio broadcasting beamed to the north
Did I understand you to say that radio broadcasting is not beamed
to the North?
Mr. Nickel. I did not say. Some of it is, sir.
The Chairman. Some of it is, presently.
Mr. Nickel. Yes.
radio free ASIA
The Chairman. Do you have anything whatever to do with Radio
Free Asia?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you ever hear of it?
Mr. Nickel. I think I have. I am not sure of the title.
The Chairman. Do you know what it is? Do you know where the
broadcasts come from?
Mr. Nickel. No, I do not.
The Chairman. Do they not come from Korea?
Mr. Nickel. I personally am not familiar with that.
Mr. Chairman. To your" knowledge, can you hear them in Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. I am not aware of that.
The Chairman. If you can, you do not know it.
Mr. Nickel. I do not.
The Chairman. I do not either, but we have seen these letters
soUciting donations to Radio Free Asia. They state that they beam
radio programs all over Asia. I do not know that they say specifically
Vietnam. I do not know whether they do either. It came to my
attention a few weeks ago. You do not know whether you make any
contribution to that operation or not.
Mr. Nickel. We make no contribution, sir.
GVN spending on PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
The Chairman. Do you know how much the Vietnamese Govern-
ment spent on their psychological warfare in the current year and
last year, either one or both?
674
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Ministry of Information, sir, in its current fiscal year budget
is spending $19.7 million.
The Chairman. $19.7 million?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that budget this current year, 1970?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that up or down? What was it compared to last
year; do you know it?
Mr. Nickel. That is up, sir. Last year it was $9.6 million, sir.
The Chairman. From $9 to $19 million in 1 year?
Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. How do you account for such a large increase?
Mr. Nickel. I believe I mentioned earlier, sir, that there was a
sizable increase in personnel which accounted for a good part of this
increase from $9 to $19 million, but not all of it. There was also a
substantial increase in program money.
The Chairman. How much of that do we furnish, directly or
i ndirectly?
Mr. Nickel. The $19 million which I cited, sir, is from the GVN's
regular budget. There are no counterpart funds in that.
The Chairman. Do you know how much is planned for next year?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
JUSPAO BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1971
The Chairman. Do you know how much you have or are planning
for fiscal year 1971 for yoin* operations?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir. We plan to have a budget figure of $8.4
million, sir.
The Chairman. For next year?
Air. Nickel. Next year.
The Chairman. That again does not include the militarv or any
alhed?
Mr. Nickel. It does not include the militarv, although it does in-
clude, as I believe vou are aware, the AID and DOD funds that are
available to JUSPAO.
distribution of film, ''the silent majority" in VIETNAM
The Chairman. Has the film, ''The Silent Majority" been dis-
tributed in Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. It has, sir.
The Chairman. By you? By the USIA?
Mr. Nickel. We made it available to Vietnamese television and
to the National Motion Picture Center of Vietnam. It was shown on the
GVN television network and in commercial theaters.
The Chairman. Would you estimate how many Vietnamese have
seen it?
Mr. Nickel. I will sui)ply an estimate, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
675
Number of South Vietnamese Who Have Seen "The Silent Majority"
In South Vietnam, the GVN's Ministry of Information (MOD was the sole
distributor of the fihii "The Silent Majority." MOI estimated that 1.2 million
persons saw the showings of the film on the national television network, and that
an additional 300,000 tirban viewers saw the film in theaters in six major cities,
for an overall total of 1..5 million.
The Chairman. It would be apparently a very substantial amount.
Have yon any measiu'e of public reaction to that firm?
Mr. Nickel. We did not undertake any specific evaluation.
The Chairman. Has anyone that you know?
Mr. Nickel. I am not aware that anyone did.
USIA POLLS concerning ATTITUDES TOWARD UNITED STATES
The Chairman. Coming back for a moment, it inspires me to ask a
further question about the polls. Have you been instructed to decline
to discuss the polling in Vietnam or all jjolls — any poll in any other
country?
Mr. Nickel. Well, the only polling that would come within my
])urview would be that in Vietnam, sir.
The Chairman. The USIA takes polls in other countries; does it not?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. They are about public attitudes toward the United
States and its policies? That has been a jiractice for a long time; has
it not?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You do not know about them and cannot testify
about them; is that right?
Mr. Nickel. When I say 1 do not know abt)ut them, I mean that I
just do not know in detail anything about them and obviously could
not speak to what they were about, sir.
The Chairman. Were you in the USIA b(>fore you went to Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Where did you serve before that?
Mr. Nickel. In Japan, sir.
The Chairman. In Japan?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
Th(> C^hairman. While you were in Japan, did you take i)olls there?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Ai'e you at liberty to discuss the \w\h you took in
Japan?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. You are instructed not to discuss them; is that it?
Mr. Nickel. 1 am instructed not to discuss ])olls.
The Chairman. It is very unusual. Where did you serve besides
Ja])an?
Mr. Nickel. I have served in Burma, and I have served in Wash-
ington, sir.
The Chairman. Did you take polls in Burma?
Mr. Nickel. To the best of my recollection, I do not believe we did,
but that was some years ago.
The Chairman. You do not believe you did?
Mr. Nickel. I just cannot give you a definitive answer.
676
IS USIA TAPING PROCEEDINGS?
The Chairman. Is the USIA taking a tape of these proceedings?
Mr. Nickel. I am unaware if they are taping these proceedings.
The Chairman. You would know if they are; would you not?
Mr. Nickel. Let us just say that I am unaware if they are.
The Chairman. I wondered how efficient they were in reporting
all these matters.
publication of 'Vietnam today"
How many newspapers, magazines or other periodicals does the
United States publish or print that are aimed at Vietnamese audiences?
Mr. Nickel. We publish, Mr. Chairman, or I should say we assist
the Vietnamese in publishing, a pacification newsheet, a weekly called
"Vietnam Today," in 600,000 copies per issue.
The Chairman. 600,000?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is that a newspaper type of publication?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. 600,000 copies are published weekly?
Mr. Nickel. 600,000 copies.
The Chairman. Is that given away? What happens to it? I was
interested.
Mr. Nickel. It is given away, sir. It is distributed through the
Vietnamese information ser\dce and it is more or less a vehicle for
the Central Pacification and Development Council. In other A\^ords,
it concentrates on developments in the pacification field.
The Chairman. It is printed in Vietnamese?
Mr. Nickel. Printed in Vietnamese, sir.
The Chairman. Is the cost of printing that a part of your budget?
Mr. Nickel. The printing cost is part of my budget.
The Chairman. What would it cost a week to put out 600,000
copies of that?
Mr. Nickel. $2,400.
The Chairman. Where is it printed?
Mr. Nickel. Printed in Saigon, sir. Part of it— I might say that
half of the printing now is handled by the Ministry of Information
and half is handled by the USIA.
The Chairman. Does the USIA have a printing plant in Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. JUSPAO has a small printing plant.
The Chairman. JUSPAO. Is it large enough to print this?
Mr. Nickel. This is not printed entirely by JUSPAO. Half of the
circulation— in other words, 300,000, sir— is printed by the Ministry
of Information printing plant, and the other half by JUSPAO.
The Chairman. Who determines the material that goes into this
publication?
Mr. Nickel. Most of the editorial work on this newspaper now is
done by the Ministry of Information, sir.
publication of "free south"
The Chairman. There is another newspaper called "Free South."
Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.
The^CHAiRMAN. Is it published biweekly?
677
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How many of those are published?
Mr. Nickel. This is published in an edition of 1.3 million copies.
It is a small 8 by 10 sized newspaper. It is air dropped into contested
areas.
The Chairman. Being published twice a week that is 2.6 million a
week; is that correct?
Mr. Nickel. I am sorry, sir; it is published every 2 weeks, not
two a week.
The Chairman. Every 2 weeks?
Mr. Nickel. Every 2 weeks, sir.
publication of "rural spirit"
The Chairman. I notice here another one called "Rural Spirit."
Are you familiar with that?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What is that? Describe it. Is it a magazine?
Mr. Nickel. The Vietnamese name for Rural Spirit is Huong
Que. It is a magazine designed largely for rural audiences, and it is
to a great extent agricultural in its approach. It has a monthly cir-
culation of 565,000, su".
The Chairman. How many pages is a typical issue of that magazine?
Mr. Nickel. Thirty-six pages.
The Chairman. Thirty-six pages. Is it slick paper or what?
Mr. Nickel. No; it is not slick.
The Chairman. Is it a jHcture magazine?
Mr. Nickel. It has some illustrations, but it is not basically a
picture magazine.
The Chairman. Where is it printed?
Mr. Nickel. It is printed in Manila at our regional service center.
The Chairman. Printed in Manila?
Mr. Nickel. At the U.S. Information Agency Regional Service
Center. We have a large printing plant there.
USIA printing plant in MANILA
The Chairman. Do we have a large printing plant there?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What countries does it service?
Mr. Nickel. It serves for the most part, sir, USIA posts in tlie
East Asia and Pacific area.
SIZE OF circulation OF "FREE SOUTH" AND "RURAL SPIRIT"
The Chairman. Would you say that the Free South newspaper has
the largest circulation of any newspaper in Asia outside of Japan and
mainland China?
Mr. Nickel. Well, it is a magazine. I just would not be able to
make that judgment. It has a very high circulation, if you discount
Free South which — are we talking about Huong Que?
The Chairman. Take both of them. One is a newspaper and one
is a magazine?
678
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would you say they have the largest cbculation
of their kind, both magazine and newspaper, in Asia outside of Japan
and mainland China?
Mr. Nickel. I could not make that judgment. They certainly are
the largest in Vietnam.
The Chairman. You do not know of any that is larger; do you?
Mr. Nickel. I do not know, sir.
USIA printing plant in MANILA
The Chairman. Did you answer the question of what countries
the printing office in Manila serves? Does it serve all countries in
Asia? Could you tell us how large that operation is?
Mr. Nickel. It exists to provide backstopping for our USIS posts
in Asia, Mr. Chairman. If you would like specific information on the
plant, I shall see that the appropriate parties in my agency furnish it.
(The information referred to follows:)
USIA's Regional Service Center In Manila
USIA's Regional Service Center in Manila has three main functions: (1) pro-
ducing publications originated by USIA in Washington for distribution to USIS
posts in Asia; (2) producing publications originated by USIS posts in Asia for
their own use; and (3) editing and producing regional pubhcations. Products
include magazines, photo newspaper inserts, leaflets, posters and "fast pamphlets."
The latter, frequently full texts of Presidential statements, are keyed to major
foreign policy events in which the time element is important.
Among the 11 American and 231 Filipino employees currently at the Regional
Service Center are editors, artists, photo specialists and skilled printing tech-
nicians. The estimated operating budget for FY 1971 is $2,566,000, which includes
printing service performed for other U.S. Government agencies on a reimburse-
ment basis.
MAGAZINE ENTITLED, "tHB FACE OF ANGUISH, VIETNAM"
The Chairman. Is this magazine I have here, The Face of Anguish,
Vietnam, an issue of the Rural Spirit?
Mr. Nickel. No, su\
The Chairman. This is not its name; is it? What is this issue? It
is a picture magazine; I think it came from you.
Mr. Nickel. I do not — I cannot recognize it.
The Chairman. No; this comes from Free Asia Press, Manila, I
am sorry. Is that part of our operation?
Mr. Nickel. I do not recognize the magazine, su'.
The Chairman. Since you are in the business, maybe I will give it
to you and ask you to see if you can identify it for us. It does not seem
to be identified. I do not know what the Free Asia Press is. It is a very
elaborate magazine and beautifully done. Who would you say is the
sponsor of that?
Mr. Nickel. I would just say that — I have never seen it, and it
does not appear to me to be one of our products.
The Chairman. Who would publish such a magazine except us?
Mr. Nickel. I do not know.
679
PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF, 'SvHO ARE THE VIETCONG?"
The Chairman. Here is another one. It has no identification what-
soever. It is called, "Who Are the Vietcong?" Have you ever seen
that pamphlet?
Mr. Nickel. That is ours.
The Chairman. It is not identified. There is nothing in it, I am told
by the staff, that would identify it as being your publication. Is that
the normal way we operate? We do not identify our publications?
Mr. Nickel. No; I would not say that is normal.
The Chairman. What proportion would you say are attributed to us
and are identifiable as our publications and what proportion are not?
Mr. Nickel. It would be very hard to give a percentage. It is an
English language publication, I believe, Senator. I would feel com-
fortable in saying that most of our English language publications are
attributed.
The Chairman. Do you know where this was distributed? Was it
distributed in South Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. Since it is an English language version, sir, I would
assume that some numbers were used in South Vietnam, but I would
also assume that the English language version was prepared for use
|)rimarily outside of Vietnam.
The Chairman. In the United States?
Mr. Nickel. No; not in the United States.
The Chairman. Where outside of Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. For use by posts other than Vietnam.
The Chairman. By the USIA?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You prei)ared it in wSaigon?
Mr. Nickel. It was — may I inquire?
The Chairman. Do you want to look at it or are you familiar with it?
Mr. Nickel. May we see it, sir? The reason I am pausing is be-
cause I am not sure whether it was a JUSPAO publication or a USIA
publication.
I can find out for you, sir, and supply the information.
The Chairman. But it is a pamphlet which you prepared and
l)ublished?
Mr. Nickel. We are sure it is a i)amphlet in which we were in-
volved. But whether JUSPAO prepared it or USIA prepared it, I do
not know.
The Chairman. Would that kind of magazine be printed in Manila
rather than in Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. Yes; it would be.
The Chairman. Where would it be distributed? It would not be
distributed in Japan; would it?
Mr. Nickel. That would depend on what jiosts ordered it, sir.
Japan certainly would not use large numbers in English.
The Chairman. Will you be able to find out where that was
printed and for whom and where it was distributed?
Mr. Nickel. I will see that that information is developed.
The Chairman. Will you supply it for the record, please?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows :)
680
Printing and Distribution of "Who Are the Viet Cong?"
The pamphlet "Who Are the Met Cong?" was initially prepared in English by
USIA in Washington for overseas distribution as part of USIA's worldwide infor-
mation program. Texts and photos were initially sent to USIA's Regional Service
Center (RSC) in Manila, where 10,250 pilot copies were printed in August 1966.
Some 10,000 of these were printed for USIA, for distribution to USIS posts
ordering them. There were additional printings at RSC Manila for USIS posts in
Saigon, Canberra and Tel Aviv in 1967.
JUSPAO prepared a Vietnamese language version which was printed at RSC
Manila in several press runs from December 1966 to ]\Iarch 1967, in a total of
300,000 copies. This version was distributed in South Viet-Nam.
IS ANY UNIDENTIFIED MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED IN UNITED STATES?
The Chairman. Is any material of this kind ^vithout identification
ever distributed in the United States?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. You are sure about that?
Mr. Nickel. I am sure to the extent that I am very well a\vare
of the need to keep it out of the United States, and we are always
cognizant of this restriction.
The Chairman. If it is not identified, how would you keep it out?
What is to prevent someone from distributing it here when there is
no way of telling who printed it and where it came from except to the
initiated?
Mr. Nickel. In terms of USIS use of materials of this sort, all
USIS posts, and all USIS personnel would be aware of the necessity
to avoid its introduction into the United States.
BOOKLET ENTITLED "VIETNAM : THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"
The Chairman. On a recent visit to Saigon, two members of the
staff of this committee were given this booklet called, "Vietnam, the
View Beyond the Battle." Are you familiar with it?
Mr. Nickel. I have seen it.
The Chairman. This was part of the materials in a welcoming kit.
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. When you say you have seen it, who published it?
Did you publish it? It also does not have a date on it.
Mr. Nickel. I believe it was printed at our regional service center
in Manila.
The Chairman. It is a very elaborate magazine with extremely fine
workmanship in its maps and ])hotographs. There is a magnificent
photograph of Thieu and Ky and President Lyndon B. Johnson taken
in February of 1966. It does not say itself when it was printed. Can
you tell us when this was printed?
Mr. Nickel. I beheve, sir, that that was printed at our regional
service center in Manila. I beheve it was a USAID project, and the
cost of printing
The Chairman. Was it prepared at your request for distribution in
Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. I beheve it was prepared by a contract \\Titer for
AID and I believe printing was at AID expense. However, I make
that statement subject to check.
The Chairman. I asked the AID Director the day before yesterday
if he had ever seen it. I thought perhaps it was his, but he had no
681
knowledge of it. He said he had never seen it and knew nothing about
it.
Mr. Nickel. I beheve, sir, it was printed 2 or 3 years ago.
The Chairman. He said he knew nothing about it, and he left the
impression that he did not think it was an AID project. Again I
raise the same question because it is such a fine piece of work. What
is the purpose of publishing in English such a fine magazine and what
is the distribution of it? Could you find that out on this one too?
Mr. Nickel. I will find out on that, su\
(The information referred to follows:)
Printing and Distribution of "Vietnam: The \ iew Beyond the Battle"
In 1967, because the Government of Met-Nam wanted to tell to its citi2ens
the story of developing nationhood in South Viet-Nam and because USAID
especially was providing advice and assistance in the development, JUSPAO was
requested to prepare a one-time publication, "Viet-Nam: The View Beyond the
Battle." Information and photos were furnished by the GVN and USAID, with
JUSPAO assuming coordinating responsibility for text, editing, layout and
printing. The Vietnamese language publication was printed in 100,000 copies
at USIA's Regional Service Center (RSC), at JUSPAO's request, for distribution
in Viet-Nam.
An English language version was also printed in 68,500 copies. They were
ordered by and shipped to JUSPAO and to USIS posts, at INIanila, Djakarta,,
Bonn, Wellington, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur, Lusaka, Lagos, Stockholm, Taipei,
Georgetown, Quito, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Rangoon, Suva, Copenhagen, Bern,
Kabul, Brussels and Reykjavik.
From the JUSPAO su})plv, some .i,000 copies were provided to USAID for use
in a briefing kit for distribution to visitors, journalists, incoming USAID officers
and other persons inquiring about USAID 's activities. Until early 1968 the U.S.
Mission Press Center in Saigon, which operates under American Embassy super-
vision, distributed copies to newsmen.
WHY ARE MAGAZINES UNIDENTIFIED AS TO SOURCE?
The Chairman. I do not quite understand why magazines of this
kind arc not identified as to source. It obviously raises a very interest-
ing question.
Mr. Nickel. I will furnish the information to the committee.
(The information referred to follows :)
Explanation of Lack of Attribution of Publications
As was pointed out in Mr. Nickel's opening statement, one of the roles per-
formed by JUSPAO is assistance in the production of information materials by
the GVN. In 1967, when "Viet-Nam: The View Beyond the Battle" was first
printed, the GVN did not have the capacitv to produce magazines of this type.
In developing this particular project with and for the GVN, JUSPAO decided
that this and similar publications might also have an audience in third countries
as well. If attribution were given rightfully to the GVN, such attribution could
limit USIS use overseas. On the other hand, if attribution were given to USAID
or JUSPAO, it could limit or embarrass the GVN's use of the publication in
Viet-Nam. As has been noted .earlier, JUSPAO assisted the GVN by providing
100,000 copies of the publication in the \'ietnamese language. Accordingly, a
decision was made not to positivelv identify this type publication with either th(!
GVN or U.S. agencies, thereby permitting all interested parties to distribute it,
through their own outlets.
PUBLICATION OF ATTRIBUTED AND UNATTRIBUTED MAGAZINES
The Chairman. Do you know who w^ould make the contracts for
the publication of such magazines? Put it this way: Has USIA ever
made a contract for a similar magazine even though it is not this one?
44-706 — 70 14
682
Have you ever asked the regional office to publish for your purposes
an unidentified magazine?
Mr. Nickel. Let nie answer that by saying we would occasionally
use contract personnel to prepare products for us, but the use of a
contract writer would not in any way be related to the decision as to
Avhether the product would be attributed or unattributed. I do not
myself know why this publication is not an attributed product.
The Chairman. Does j^our office ever ask for magazines similar to
this from the regional office in Manila?
Mr. Nickel. "We occasionally order publications from the regional
office in Manila.
The Chairman. When you do, do you specify whether they are to
be attributed to you or not? Is that decision left up to the regional
office?
j\Ir. Nickel. If they are in English, sir, and they already exist,
the}^ already are either attributed or unattributed, so we would not
get involved in the attribution. I think I am correct in assuming that
most are attributed. If we are doing Vietnamese versions of basic
English language publications that originate at the Manila plant, then
it would be up to JUSPAO to decide whether we wanted them
attributed.
The Chairman. On what basis do you decide whether it is attributed
to you or not attributed to you? What is the criteria?
Mr. Nickel. Well, speaking for myself alone
The Chairman. You ought to speak for the Agency. I do not
want you to speak only for yourself, but you can do both.
Mr. Nickel. If you will allow me to speak
The Chairman. Speak for yourself and then speak for the agency.
That is right.
Mr. Nickel. In making the decision as to whether something is to
be attributed or not, I gerierally follow the policy that anything that
is explaining some aspect of U.S. policy or U.S. society, should have
attribution "to the United States. In fact, attribution adds to the
credibility of it.
The Chairman. How do you decide when not to attsribute it?
What is your objective?
Mr. Nickel. Let me put it this way. I have another area of opera-
tions in Vietnam where I am engaged in helping the Vietnamese
publish materials. Obviously, I do not attribute such materials to
my own organization.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PUBLICATION OF MATERIALS IN ENGLISH
The Chairman. They would not publish materials in English;
would they?
Mr. Nickel. They publish some materials in English.
The Chairman. Do they?
Mr. Nickel. A few, for use abroad.
The Chairman. For use where?
Mr. Nickel. Well, for use abroad.
The Chairman. In the United States?
Mr. Nickel. Yes.
The Chairman. Really?
Mr. Nickel. But these are not materials I am involved in.
683
The Chairman. But they do pubUsh materials in EngHsh that are
then distributed in the United States?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, occasionally, sir.
The Chairman. I did not know that. Of how many do you know?
Mr. Nickel. I would have to determine that.
The Chairman. Have you any examples of it?
Mr. Nickel. I have no examples with me, sir.
The Chairman. What would be the objective of such publications?
To what are they directed?
Mr. Nickel. Well, when I say for use in the United States, they
publish on their own behalf without assistance from us some materials
for use overseas. They publish these in French and in English, and I
can only assume that some of the material they publish in English,
unilaterally, is made available to then- Embassy in Washington.
Now, I w^ant to make it very clear, Mr. Chairman, these are aspects
of their operation that I am not officiallj^ involved in; I provide neither
support for, nor assistance in any way.
The Chairman. And no ad\nce?
Mr. Nickel. And no advice.
The Chairman. They do it all on their own?
Mr. Nickel. That is right, sii-.
The Chairman. Could you sui)i)ly for the record some recent
examples of publications that the Vietnamese Government has made
in Enghsh?
Mr. Nickel. I will, sir.
The Chair.vian. Give us a few examples during the last year to see
what they are doing.
(The information referred to follows:)
GVN Publications in English
Sample materials provided through the Embassy of Viet-Nam include
"Fighters for Peace," "Communist Atrocities During the Latest Offensives,"
aad"Vict-Nam Bulletin."
OTHER publications
The Chairman. With regard to these otlier |)ublications, we
mentioned three, I believe, the Rural Si)irit, which has 565,000, and
the Vietnam Today, wilh 600.000, and the P'ree South with 1.3
million per edition.
Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. There are nine otlier publications which 1 will not
take the time to go into at length. I will name them and I think these
are correct. This is material which we obtained in Saigon.
A magazine called Mother Heart. Long Me is the way you pronounce
it in Vietnamese. It is published bimonthly in 200,000 copies per
issue.
There is a magazine called Culture-Drama published bimonthly,
12,000 per issue. '
magazine ENTITLED "MOTHER HEART"
What is "Mother Heart"?
Mr. Nickel. Long Me, sir, is a publication of the Ministry of
Chieu Hoi. We provide considerable assistance to the publication.
684
We print it. It is designed to explain and promote the Chieu Hoi
program largely in the sense of informing families of prospective
Chieu Hoi ralliers.
The Chairman. This is intended for the Vietcong whom yon want
to come over; is that right?
Mr. Nickel. No; it is intended for families on the South Viet-
namese side who may have relatives serving with the enemy. It
provides these families with better information about the program.
Also, one of its secondary objectives is to supply more information
about the program to the Vietnamese officials who themselves are
concerned with Chieu Hoi.
MAGAZINE ENTITLED "cULTURE-DRAMA"
The Chairman. What is the magazine Cidture-Drama about?
Mr. Nickel. It is known as the Van Tac Vu magazine, Mr. Chair-
man. It is a magazine designed to provide program material — songs,
skits, and general raw material — for a great number of culture-drama
teams which exist in Vietnam. The culture-drama form is a very
attractive one.
The Chairman. Cultm'e-drama has nothing to do with the theater,
I guess.
Mr. Nickel. It is folk theater touring
The Chairman. Is there a theater in Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. There is opera, renovated opera, classical.
The Chairman. Do they have a local opera company?
Mr. Nickel. There are performances.
The Chairman. Are they traveling people that we bring in?
Mr. Nickel. No; this would be more on the order of classical
Vietnamese drama. When I say opera, I mean classical Vietnamese
opera which is not unrelated to Chinese opera.
The Chairman. Do we determine the subject matter of a magazine
of that kind?
Mr. Nickel. This particular magazine is directed at culture-drama
teams which perform in the provinces, and in general perform almost
like vaudevillians, if I might use the term, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. What is the objective of our sponsoring such a
magazine? What do we seek to accomplish in publishing such a
magazine?
Mr. Nickel. We seek to provide program material that is national-
ist in its direction because these culture-drama teams play a role in
support of the Government.
The Chairman. Do you think this kind of a role would agree with
Vice President Agnew's idea of what a magazine or a publication
ought to do? He would not criticize the kind of publications we put
out in Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. I prefer not to comment on the Vice President.
The Chairman. If I understood his views, they were that maga-
zines and newspapers ought to support the Government and, there-
fore, he would approve of this type of publication. It seems to me it
is perfectly obvious he would.
I am not quite sure myself though what justifies the spending of
American money on the cultural and drama magazine. Not that I
have any aversion to culture and drama, but I did not know that we
685
were competent to tell the Vietnamese about culture and drama in
Vietnam.
Mr. Nickel. Well, of course
The Chairman. We have a hard time knowing what is culture and
drama in Washington.
Mr. Nickel. Of coiu-se, Mr. Chairman, the JUSPAO staff that
works on this magazine is predommantly Vietnamese.
The Chairman. I see. You think it is so constructed and edited
that it would appeal to the effete, intellectual snobs of Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. I would say that it appeals to the performers and cul-
ture-drama teams m the provinces of Vietnam.
POSTERS, PAMPHLETS AND SONG SHEETS
The Chairman. Of what are posters IR-8 and IE,-5 on rice ex-
amples? This is about the mhacle rice.
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir. Those would be posters.
The Chairman. Is that a one-shot proposition, one poster?
Mr. Nickel. One poster.
The Chairman. 50,000 copies?
Mr. Nickel. It is not a fixed periodical.
The Chairman. It is not a recurring poster or is it?
Mr. Nickel. It is not recurring, but obviously our interest in
IR-8 is such that over a period of time we could do many posters on
IR-8.
The Chairman. We have another poster entitled, "Our Project
Has Been Completed." Is that a recurring poster or a single shot?
Mr. Nickel. I would assume that is a single shot.
The Chairman. It is 50,000 copies?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Then you have a poster called, "The Government
of the RepubUc of Vietnam Helps Refugees Return Home." That
again is just another poster?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Then there is a pamphlet, "Security Laws
Protect the Citizens."
Mr. Nickel. Yes, su-.
The Chairman. That is 50,000 copies. Is that only for that purpose?
Mr. Nickel. That would be a one shot pamphlet, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Then we have song sheets. One is called "Spring of
Hope" and one is called "Native Spring." What is our objective in
printing song sheets?
Mr. Nickel. That song sheet was probablj^ a product that was
issued by the Ministry of Information in connection with the Tet
observation. As you know, Tot is quite a festive holiday in Vietnam,
and the songs were probably connected with the celebration of that
holiday.
number of posters produced in fiscal year 1969
The Chairman. Could you tell us how many different posters were
put out last year?
Mr. Nickel. I can only give you an overall figure on posters, Mr.
Chairman— a total of 1.73 million copies in fiscal year 1969. That
would be for individual units.
686
The Chairman. Individual units of posters.
Mr. Nickel. 1.73 million pieces of paper, every one of which was
a poster. I cannot give you the circulation or the production per
poster. I cannot say' 50,000 of this or 70,000 of that.
The Chairman. To illustrate the point, you ])ut out 15 posters
consistino; of 1.7 million issues. Is that about right?
Mr. Nickel. Those are not the figures, but that is the logic.
The Chairman. I know they are not the figures.
Mr. Nickel. That is the logic.
The Chairman. That is what I meant. You could not estimate how
many posters there were, not individual ])ieces but how many different
posters there were?
Mr. Nickel. I find that veiy difficult.
publications of all kinds put out in a year
The Chairman. Would you estimate how many publications of
all kinds you put out in a year? Would it be 10 million or 50 million
|)ublications of all dift'erent kinds, including all these magazines and
posters and newsi)apers? The newsi)apers alone run into several
million weekly; do they not?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I wondered if you had au estimate to give us some
idea of the volume of our activity.
Mr. Nickel. 24 million ])lus, sir. That would be magazines, news-
papers, posters, and jjamphlets.
leaflets dropped by the military
The Chairman. Would the j^amj^hlets inchule the leaflets dropped
by the military?
Mr. Nickel. That does not, sir.
The Chairman. Do you have any estimate how many there are?
Mr. Nickel. That would be somewhere in the vicinity of 1.5 billion,
sir.
The Chairman. Billion?
Mr. Nickel. Billion.
The Chairman. My goodness; 1.5 billion by the mihtary?
Mr. Nickel. Yes.
The Chairman. Who prints those? Where can they get so many
printed? That seems incredible.
Mr. Nickel. They would be primarily distributed by the military.
The Chairman. Are these printed in that regional office in Manila?
Mr. Nickel. No, sk.
The Chairman. Does the military have its own printing plant?
Mr. Nickel. I was a bit hasty. Let me be more precise. Some
might be printed in Manila. Many might be printed by the military
on Okinawa.
The Chairman. Do they have a big printing plant on Okinawa?
Mr. Nickel. They have a printing plant that provides support for
the psychological program in Vietnam.
The Chairman. Is it comparable to the size of yours in Manila?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. It is not as large?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
687
The Chairman. Is the USIA plant in ManUa a very large one?
Mr. Nickel. It is a substantial modern plant.
The Chairman. Is it capable of printing a magazine as large as,
say, Time magazine or Fortune or Newsweek?
Mr. Nickel. It is difficult for me to answer. I am not aware of what
capacity it would have for volume. I would think that technically it
could do the job.
OTHER PRINTING BY THE MILITARY
The Chairman. Does the military, in addition to the 1.5 billion
leaflets, also ])rint magazines and i)ublications similar to this? Does
it i)rint anything similar to this anywhere?
Mr. Nickel. It would be very unlikely to |)rint a pamphelt like
that. I believe they do print an employee relations magazine for the
Vietnamese emjiloyees for the military in Vietnam. But to the best
of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, that is the only publication of that
tyi)e that the military i)Hblishes.
lack of ATTRIBUTION OF "VIETNAM! THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"
The Chairman. 1 do not know who did tliis, ijut that is one of the
finest pictures of its kind I ever saw of the ])eoi)le in the rice |)a(l(lies.
As a technical matter, regardless of its content, you could well take
credit for it because it is a very fiue pi-oduction. I think it is a \ery
attractive thing. Did I show it to you to see if you coukl identify it,
or did you? T do not remember. Do you want to look at it and perhai)s
you can tell me?
Mr. Nickel. I am familiar with it. I have seen it.
The Chairman. ^Ou have seen it.
I have so many publications here I cannot keep them all straight.
I am told by the staff that the USIS press said this morning, after
(hey checked it, that it was printed in March 1967. I still am i^uzzlcd
about this question of attribution. A magazine of this kind is such an
imposing i)roducti()n that it is rather a shock to find there is no way
of telling who printed it and where and when it was printed. Yet it is
on a subject which a|)paren(ly either we or the Government of Vietnam
would be the only ones really interested in doing it. So I can see now
that it was. I would suggest, for whatever it is worth, that it helps our
credibility to identify and to claim it as our own when it is. I do not
think that the world as it is today is going to be very impressed by
our trying to avoid responsibilit}' for the publication.
PRESS CREDENTIALS GRANTED TO FOUR SECURITY AGENTS IN SAIGON
Did your office have anything to do with the recent granthig of
l)ress credentials in Saigon to four security agents?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. It is not your responsibility. Do j^ou know anything
about that episode?
Mr. Nickel. T am familiar with the general newspaper accounts of
that.
The Chairman. Then I suppose you have friends who were aware
of that in Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
688
The Chairman. Could you tell me in what mission these people
were engaged for which they wanted such credentials?
Mr. Nickel. I have no knowledge of that, sir.
The Chairman. You have no knowledge ot tnai.
ARE CIA PERSONNEL USING USIA AS COVER?
Could you say whether any CIA personnel are using the USIA
as cover?
Mr. Nickel. Comment on such a question must JDe made in execu-
tive session by other appropriate officials, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right.
LANGUAGE FACILITY OF USIA PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
Could you tell me what percentage of USIA personnel in Vietnam
speak Vietnamese?
Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. At three level or better. I am not talking about
Vietnamese employees.
Mr. Nickel. Six percent.
The Chairman. How many speak French at the three level or
better?
Mr. Nickel. I am sorry, sir. I gave you a percentage figure. I
did not mean it to be a percentage. Six employees speak Vietnamese
at the three level or better.
The Chairman. That is approximately 6 percent; is it not?
Mr. Nickel. It also works out to approximately 6 percent, but it
is not a percentage figure. The figure for French would be 24.
The Chairman. That is at the three level or better?
Mr. Nickel. Y^es, sir.
language facility of juspao personnel
The Chairman. What about all JUSPAO personnel?
Mr. Nickel. All JUSPAO personnel in terms of three or better
or what, sir?
The Chairman. Y^es.
Mr. Nickel. Well, I am addressing the ci\dhan component of
JUSPAO. There are six people who speak Vietnamese and 24 who
The Chairman. What about the 800 military you mentioned? Do
you know anything about them?
Mr. Nickel. I do not.
The Chairman. You do not have the figures on them.
journalists' trips to VIETNAM SPONSORED BY USIA
Does the USIA finance or sponsor in any way trips to Vietnam by
journalists from the United States?
Mr. Nickel. The U.S. Information Agency, sir, does have a third
country journalist program.
The 'Chairman. Could you indicate the magnitude of that? How
many journalists in the course of a year?
689
Mr. Nickel. I would be very happy to supply that for the record.
It is a program administered out of the headquarters in Washington,
and I cannot speak to the details, su*.
(The following information referred to follows:)
USIA Third Country Journalist Program, Fiscal Year 1969
For the record, the program involved 15 foreign journalists during Fiscal Year
1969, and an anticipated equal number during the current fiscal year.
The Chairman. I want it both ways. I want trips from the United
States to Vietnam of American journalists and also from other coun-
tries to Vietnam.
Mr. Nickel. I believe, sir, that this program is only concerned
with third country journalists to Vietnam.
The Chairman. You mean not United States?
Mr. Nickel. Not American journalists.
The Chairman. Then the answer to my first question is no. They
do not sponsor U.S. journalists to Vietnam; is that correct?
Mr. Nickel. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. They do sponsor foreign journalists to Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. That is right, su-.
The Chairman. Could you say what is the purpose of this pro-
gram? Why do you sponsor foreign journalists to Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. To enable them, sir, to come and see for themselves
the developments in that country. This is done in many instances for
journalists from publications which could not afford to or would not
send their correspondents to Vietnam.
The Chairman. When they arrive in South Vietnam, does your
agency take care of them, meet them and make arrangements for
their visit?
Mr. Nickel. They are accredited, and they receive the same fa-
cilitation from the Mission Press Center, Mr. Chairman, as any
accredited journalist would receive.
The Chairman. I realize that, but in addition there is the fact that
you sponsored them and paid for their passage. Do 3^ou also take
care of them and give them any special treatment or are they just
allowed like any other journalist?
Mr. Nickel. We give them special treatment when they ask for it,
special treatment of the same kind that we would give any journalist
in Vietnam who so requested it.
To really get to the thrust of your question, Mr. Chairman, it is up
to them. They come out; they are accredited; they are there like other
journalists and their programs are theirs to arrange.
The Chairman. If they are not familiar Avith the place, I would
assume in the normal course of events you would take them around
and show them the places ol interest. I would have thought the answer
was yes. It would seem to me a rather dubious investment to bring
a journalist from Europe or Africa and then let him go on his own.
Mr. Nickel. The answer is yes. I just wanted to make it clear
that what is offered them is what is available for all the journalists
in Vietnam.
690
JUSTIFICATION FOR USIA THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALIST PROGRAM
QUESTIONED
The Chairman. I have some difRciihy, I may say, in reconciling
this activity with the mission of your agency that you describe. I
cannot quite fit this in as to how we are justified as a government
and as a people to support this activity. I wish you would enlighten
me a little as to the reasoning justifying this activity of bringing
foreign journalists to Vietnam to view the
Mr. Nickel. I think this is another matter, Mr. Chairman, which
I will have to refer to my sui)eriors and I am sure they will furnish a
justification for it. I say that because it is a program that is not within
my purview in terms of responsibility.
(The information referred to follows.)
Third Country Journalist Program
This activity, known within USIA as the third country journalist program, was
begun in 1965 and is currently active. The records of this Committee will reflect
that, in hearings on news policies in Vietnam on August 17, 1966, the Agency
provided a legal memorandum justifj'ing this program. That record also indicates
that the Committee obtained an opinion from the Comptroller General of the
United States on the program that found the expenditure of funds for this program
to be proper.
The Chairman. I see. In other words, this is carried on, but you
have no responsibility for doing it. The decisions are all made here.
You would have to ask iMr. Shakespeare about that; is that what
you said?
Mr. Nickel. I am not sure that it would be Mr. Shakespeare, but
certainly one of my principals in Washington.
The Chairman. I just use him. He is the nominal head of the
Agency. It is qiute right he might not know about it, but someone at
that level w^ould know. But you would not be willing to share with
me your views about the justification for such a program.
third country journalists' briefing and interviews
When these people arrive there, are they normally given briefings
by the American officials?
Mr. Nickel. If they so request.
The Chairman. Is it normal that they do request such a briefing?
Mr. Nickel. I w^oidd say not necessarily, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No?
Mr. Nickel. It is very hard to categorize journalists in that regard.
The Chair:man. Do they normally expect to see military officials
or the people in the Embassy? What would you say ^^'as the norm?
Mr. Nickel. Many of them, Mr. Chairman, would like to interview
senior officials in Vietnam. I would say, by and large, they are no
more successful or no more unsuccessful in arranging interviews than
the average journalist who is accredited in Vietnam.
691
witness' instructions concerning policy questions
The Chairman. In this matter, do your instructions with regard
to the polls also include policy questions? Were you instructed not to
discuss policy questions with the committee?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
POLLING BY OLIVER QUAYLE
The Chairman. Have you ever heard of Mr. Oliver Quayle? Does
that name mean anything to you?
Mr. Nickel. The name does not sound completely strange, but
frankly I cannot associate it with anything.
The Chairman. You associate Mr. Quayle with something else; do
you? That word used to be common, but 1 have not heard it in that
connection for a long time. They have developed new words. He is a
well-known figure in U.S. circles and has often done work testing
jniblic oi)iniom ]n fact there is an article in this morning's paper. One
of the well-known columnists apparently has been down in Alabama
with him this week. 1 happened to see it this morning.
I wondered if you knew whether he had ever visited Vietnam while
you were there. Apparently not. You are not acquainted with his work?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. He has done considerable work in this country on
the testing of attitudes and opinions, and I think one of the columnists
sometime back mentioned that he thought Mr. Quayle had made a
poll in Vietnam. Whether he made it at the USIA's request is another
matter. We will try to find that out from your superiors.
(The information referred to follows.)
Polling by Olivrii Quaylk
U.S. Information Agency records indicate that USIA has never commissioned
Mr. Oliver Quayle to conduct a public opinion poll in Melnam.
orientation of usia officers from countries other than
VIETNAM
Are USIA officers assigned in countries other than Vietnam ever
sent to Vietnam for brief visits at Government expense?
Mr. Nickel. USIA officers?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Nickel. Yes; we bring some USIA officers to Vietnam for
orientation.
The Chairman. Could you indicate about how many during the
course of a year are brought to Vietnam for this purpose?
Mr. Nickel. I do not'bave specific figures but, during the period
I have been there, we have brought groups of five officers, I would say,
to Vietnam two or three times a year for orientation.
The Chairman. That means 15 or 20 officers altogether?
Mr. Nickel. That is right.
The Chairman. What countries did they come from while you
were there?
692
Mr. Nickel. They came from a variety of countries.
The Chairman. Europe?
Mr. Nickel. Europe, South America, and East Asia.
The Chairman. The purpose of this orientation is for them to go
back and do what?
Mr. Nickel. Its purpose is to give them a firsthand appreciation
of the situation in Vietnam.
The Chairman. Is it in order to aid them in spreading the word
when they get back to their posts?
Mr. Nickel. In order to enable them to better speak to tlie situa-
tion.
EFFECT OF USIA THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALIST PROGRAM
The Chairman. With regard to the newspapermen, what has
been the eiTect and the result of this program? Even though you did
not inspire it nor originate it, do you know whether when they return
to their respective countries they report and wTite their articles in a
very sympathetic way to our purposes in Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. I do not know enough about it, sir, to be able to
characterize it.
The Chairman. If they do not, it does not seem justified to carry
on the program. Is there no followup to find out how they react?
Mr. Nickel. There is.
The Chairman. There is a followup?
Mr. Nickel. There is, sir, but the followup does not fall into my
area of responsibility.
The Chairman. I see. You do not know, but clearly they could want
to check to see if these people reacted in the proper way and if they
appreciate the courtesies you have extended them. Would they not?
Mr. Nickel. I am sure that our people are well aware of what was
written by newspapermen who have participated in this program.
program of bringing government officials to VIETNAM
The Chairman. Were you there when Mr. Moshe Dayan came to
Vietnam?
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. Was that before your tour of duty?
Mr. Nickel. That was before my time.
The Chairman. Do you know anything about the program of bring-
ing government officials there? You do not know about that?
-r •
Mr. Nickel. No, sir.
The Chairman. It is not your responsibiUty.
Mr. Nickel. It is not mine, and I am not aware of any.
The Chairman. You do not know about it.
western influence on south VIETNAMESE CULTURE
There was a recent publication in the Vietnam Embassy here in
Washington which contains an article on what is happening to
Vietnamese culture. This is from a statement of the Minister of Culture
on which I would like to have you comment. It says and I quote :
693
"Few of these young city people know much about their own culture except for
the well-known festival such as Tet or the Mid- Autumn Festival," says the scholar
versed in eastern and western cultures. "It is not that they don't care. But access
to western ways is easier than access to traditional Vietnamese culture. * * *"
Radio and television are the media mainly responsible for the changes. As a
Saigon University coed says, "Probably 80 percent or even more of the young
people in Saigon prefer western music and art. We like the music especially. Few of
us understand our own culture, mainl.y because we have never had the opportunitj-
to study its features. But the western forms can be seen and heard daily on the
American forces radio and television stations. And now even Vietnamese radio and
television have program ;> devoted to western music."
Would you say that is an accurate description of what has taken
place in Saigon?
Mr. Nickel. Certainly access to Western culture is there. The
communications explosion, I would say, Mr. Chairman, has had its
effect in Vietnam as elsewhere. The youth of Vietnam like the youth
of other countries have been attracted by Western forms. On the
other hand, in the countryside of Vietnam, the Vietnamese cultural
imi)act is very ]ironounced and very visible. I would say from my
own view that the cultural problem, the problem of cultural identity
in Vietnam, is probably not much different from the problem of
cultural identity that you find in most develoi^ino; nations today.
The Chairman. Do you mean most developing nations or only
those in which we have a large presence?
Mr. Nickel. Perhaps I will amend that to say many developing
nations. It is largely a ])roblem of what I call the communications
explosion.
The Chairman. Is there any indigenous competition in Saigon to
the television and radio systems which we have established?
Mr. Nickel. Well, Mr. Chairman, on Vietnamese television, I
believe that juobably the most popular program offered during a
week's schedule is a"^ night devoted to Vietnamese opera, which is
distinctly Vietnamese in form and a very inherent ])art of their own
cultural ])attern. You find youngsters as well as elderly Vietnamese
clustered around the sets watchhig it.
IMPACT OF U.S. PRESENCE ON VIETNAMESE CULTURE
The Chairman. Do you think that the impact of the I .S. presence
in Vietnam on the Vietnamese culture has been a favc»»ble one?
Mr. Nickel. I would ans\v(>r that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that
whenever you introduce a half million foreigners into a country of a
population of 17 million, there are going to be dislocation's and some
of the dislocations are going to be cultural.
The Chairman. Are you saying that the presence of a half million
soldiers is a greater influence than the presence of the USIA with its
great publications, its newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and posters?
Wliich do you think is the greater influence on the Vietnamese culture?
Mr. Nickel. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that the presence
of a half million foreigners in a nation of 17 million people is bound
to have some impact, some cultural impact.
The Chairman. Supposing you did not have any USIA, do you
think there would be a great impact if the foreigners were engaged
primarily in fighting out in the rice paddies? All I mean is that it
694
seems to me you probably are responsible for a greater part of the
impact than the soldiers.
Mr. Nickel. I would not discount the effect of the presence of a
half million people.
The Chairman. I am not discounting it.
I do not suppose thare are any easy criteria by which we can measure
that.
Mr. Nickel, it is getting late. I must say, outside of those areas in
which you have been instructed not to answer my questions, you have
been very forthcoming and I think it has been a very interesting hearing.
It seems to me that you have demonstiated beyond a doubt that the
presence of the Americans is overwhelming. It has almost submerged
the indigenous traditions and culture, at least in Saigon, although not
in some of the remote areas where I suppose it is different. But I
hardly know how they could resist it and maybe that is a good thing.
I do not know. I guess that is for history to determine.
I appreciate very much you and your colleagues coming here to the
committee.
QUESTIONS ON U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY POLLS
We will take up with your superiors the question of whether or not
we are entitled to the information about polls. I must say it is hard for
me to find a justification for secrets in an agency for information created
and paid for by the American people. I thought it was to instruct every-
one. When we ask you what you are doing, it seems to me it is a little
incongruous for you to say, "We can't tell you about that." We expect
that from something like the CIA, but I was a little surprised to have it
coming from an information agency. I had not thought of it in that
connection, but I realize you are not the policymaker nor the highest
responsible official and I do not criticize you for it. If you have been
told to do that, I do not want you to cut your own throat out in the
open here before the committee. We will talk to Mr. Shakespeare about
it or someone else in his agency.
Thank you very much, Mr. Nickel.
Mr. Nickel. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon^ at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the
call of the Chair.)
(The following are answers by the U.S. Information Agency to
additional committee questions:)
USIA Replies to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Questions
1. What is the current USIA policy with regard to having in its libraries in Viet-
Nam books that are critical of U.S. policy in Viet-Namf Would you name some of
the books currenly stocked that are critical of U.S. policy?
The U.S. Information Agency's policy with regard to critical books in ^'ietnamese
libraries is one of presenting the issues, both pro and con, to interested readers.
Some typical titles on this subject include the following: J. W. Fulbright, The
Arrogance of Power (English and French editions) ; and Robert Shaplen, The Lost
Revolution. In addition the libraries have balanced collections of periodicals,
many of which regularly have contents critical of U.S. policy, including New
Repiiblic, Nation, Harpers, Look, Life, Foreign Affairs, Newsweek, Time, Saturday
Review, Asian Survey, New York Times Magazine, and the New Yorker.
2. Have any films produced by the Vietnamese Government been brought to the
United States for showing? If, so, provide the details.
695
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following GVN-produced 16 mm
films to the G\ N's Elmbassy in Washington and to the GVN's permanent observer
to the United Nations since Janviarv 1969:
Ti*io ■ Observer
'"'^ Language GVN Embassy to U.N.
il^a^age at Hue" ■...._. English 1 print 1 print.
Viet-Nam News Magazine" do 2 prints. 2 prints
Love and Hatred do Sprints None '
■;Viet-NamFigtits and Builds" Vietnamese 1 print None'
Back to the Fatherland do._.. None 1 print
1 In addition, aporoximately 28 prints of "Massacre at Hue," w(hich is the same as "Carnage at Hue " were sent bv the
GVN to various U.S. civilian groups at the latter's request.
3. fa) Have there been any studies made of the relative effectiveness of GVN and
Viet Cong -political -propaganda? (b) If so, what do they show as to the effectiveness
of the various methods of propaganda used by each?
There is no record of any comparative studies. Typical Viet Cong propaganda
studies report themes but no comparative evaluation.
4. Hoiv many TV sets are there in Viet-Nam — in Vietnamese hands? How many
are oivned by the Vietnamese Government? How many were paid for by the United
States?
The GVN estimates that there are 300,000 television sets in use by the Viet-
namese. The GVN owns 4,832 sets, of which 4,.5S2 were USG-funded— 1,082
for the Republic of Viet-Nam's Armed Forces (RVNAF), and 3,500 for the
Ministry of Information's community viewing program.
o. How many TV crews does the USIA operate in Viet-Nam? What use is made
of their production?
USIA does not have any TV crews in Viet-Nam. JUSPAO, however, does have
six motion ]Mcture cameramen on its payroll, and thev are available to produce
materials for a T\' clip service. Since January 1, 1969, JUSPAO has produced
108 TV clips for distribution to USIS posts in 36 countries. When clips are con-
sidered to have application to Vietnamese audiences, they are offered to Viet-
namese TV.
6. (a) How does the number of personnel now attached to the (1) USIA, (2)
JUSPAO, and (3) in military psychological operations compare with a year ago?
How many will there be a year from now?
Estimate,
1969 1970 1971
(1) Personnel— USIA element:
American civilians
Local and 3d country nationals
Total..
(2) Personnel— JUSPAO:
American civilians
Local and 3d country nationals '
American military personnel
Total
(3) Personnel— Military psychological operations.
I 130
= 99
5 347
3 88
5 347
«397
527
446
435
« 132
6 101
347
107
ego
397
347
118
107
647
555
811
544
996
(8)
> Includes 30 AID-funded, 6 DOD-funded, and 2 VOA-attached officers
2 Includes 24 AID-funded, 2 DOD-funded, and 1 VOA-attached officers.
3 Includes 14 AID-funded and 2 DOD-funded officers.
< Includes 133 AID-funded personnel.
5 Includes 117 AID-funded personnel.
6 Includes USIA element and 2 MACV civilians.
• USIA element
8 1971 personnel level is still in the planning stage where some reduction is being considered.
6. (6) What percentage of all USIA personnel overseas are in Viet-Nam?
5.04 percent of all USIA American and local overseas personnel are in Viet-Nam.
6. (c) Hoiv many JUSPAO employees are in Saigon and how inany are in the
field?
696
Of the total of 555 personnel, 389 are in Saigon and 166 in the field:
Saigon Field
78 23
American civilians --- - ,j 73
American military personnel --- - - 277 70
Local and 3d country nationals - - 2_
Total -- - --- - -- 389 166
7 Is the USIA consulted regularly concerning future military operations, with a
view to obtaining its assessment of the effect of such operations onVietnamese attitudes^
In Saigon, the Director of JUSPAO as a member of the Mi.ssion Comicil has
the opportunity to advise the Ambassador and fellow Mission Council members
of possible effects on Vietnamese attitudes of planned general and specific military
^""T^The information bookld entitled ''JUSPAO Viet-Nam" states that "H (JUS-
PAO) also produces for field use leaflets, pamphlets, newspaper articles and photo-
araphs, posters, magazines, loudspeaker tapes, motion pictures, and radio and television
vroqrams These items are variously distributed by hand, disseminated from airplanes
or broadcast by the GVN, the U.S., and other free world nations.
8 (a) What was the total number of pieces printed or produced last year }or each
of these categories? What is planned for this year? Next year?
(.gj 1969 Estimate, 1970 Estimate, 1971
, „ , 36,000,000 10,000,000 5,000,000
Leaflets , 3 500,000 3,000,000 1,500,000
Pamphlets..... --- -- g Oqq 3000 3,000
Newspaper articles - -- --- gg' qqq gg qoo 36,000
Photographs ---- , 7 ggo'ooo 8,000,000 6,000,000
Posters - - ---- , 9'9oo'ooo 9,600,000 7,800,000
Magazines... U g^g 7 310 None
Loudspeaker tapes. j'^j^ g55 600
Motion picture prints - - ^'27^ i_048 450
Radio programs - '27 '72 None
Television programs 2...
1 The estimates provided in the Mar. 19, 1970, testimony were based on volume of U.S. support for the GVN printed
'"2*JUs''pAO^p"rovided scripts and culture-drama team support to GVN television.
8 (b) Do these totals include the propaganda materials put out by the U.S. military
forces? If not, how much did the military produce last year? Where are these materials
^'mifLvy production, for which JUSPAO is not responsible, last year included:
Category
Quantity ^^^^^ produced
, _, 78billloni --- 7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Leaflets.-.. - 2 4bi on' ---- 4th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
P3its ::::: 0:5 minion.v.:::::::::::: 7th psyop Group, Okinawa.
Newspaperarticles Not applicable.... --
Photographs is'g m°illi8n V..- 4th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Posters - 9 mTl ion " 7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Magazines \%JV""°^ -"-- 4th psyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Loudspeaker tapes 11 7 \"h\ ""
Motion picture prints Not appiicaoie - ^^^ PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Radio programs.. foo . . -
Television programs - Not applicable - -
.The estimate provided in the Mar. 19, 1970, testimony was based on GVN, not United States military publication
programs.
8 (c) Does JUSPAO print materials for the Vietnamese government? How much
of the GVN printed propaganda is printed in its own plants? TTTt^PAO'^
^ It is estimated that during FY 1970, approximately 70 percent of JUSPAO s
printing output provides information support to GVN programs. Of the GVIN b
total support requirements, JUSPAO estimates that the GVN produces about 46
percent of the materials.
697
8. (d) Does JUSPAO produce materials for use by the Korean and Thai forces in
Viet-Nam? Has it ever produced any materials relating to allegations of Korean
atrocities against civilians?
JUSPAO does not regularly produce materials for use bj^ Korean and Thai
forces. However, records list the following printed products:
Category Date Quantity How used
Two posters in Vietnamese 1968 30,000 By Koreans troops.
Paper flags. ROK.GVN, and United States---. 1968 12.090 Do.
Booklet, in Korean 1969 15,000 By Korean troops involved in the Chieu Hoi pro-
gram.
Poster in Vietnamese 1968 50,000 By Vietnamese Information Service to reveal Thai
assistance to Vietnam.
JUSPAO has not produced any materials relating to allegations of Korean
atrocities.
8. ie) How many publications, in English, concerning Viet-Nam have been pro-
duced by USIA and arc currently in stock? Phase provide copies of these publications,
information on the distribution and the cost of each.
'USIA has one such publication in stock, "Vietnamizing the Search for Peace,"
printed in 20,000
East and South As
JUSPAO has one __- „ ^ ^ . . ^ ,, .,
printed for the GVN in 20,000 copies by the Regional Production Center, Manila.
Distribution was made to the GVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 29 G^'N
diplomatic posts (excluding Washington), 11,800; GVN Ministry of Information,
6 r-,00- 29 USIS posts where there are GVN diplomatic posts, 47.i for information;
RSC reserve stock, 1,000; JUSPAO reserve stock, 22.5.
Cost of "Vietnamizing the Search for Peace" is .7 cents per copy, and "Viet-Nam
1970" is 20 cents per copy.
8. (/) Hotv mam/ of these publications do not bear the USIA imprint? Why?
"Viet-Nam 1970" does not bear the USIA imprint but rather that of the GVN
Ministry of Information. The i^ubhcation was originally published in Vietnamese
(100,000 copies) at the GVN's request for GVN u.se; the subsequent English
language version was likewise printed for GVN use.
9. (a) What facilities does the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network maintain
in Viet-Nam?
[In kilowattsl
Radio,' Radio/ Television/
Location AWI power FM power ER power
ag"'::::::::::::::::::;:::::::::::::::::::::;::::::::::::::: i? ""25- S
^l:ik^^:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::":: 1 f I
QuiNhon. - 10 25 40
Tuy Hoa - - - - »i- Vi
^ilU"^::::::::;:::::::::::::;::::::::::::::::::::::::;:;::::: I' lo^
Can The ----- '■
1 UHF translator.
9. {b) How many hours is the Armed Forces TV station in operation daily com-
pared with the operating hours for the GVN station?
Armed Forces TV stations average 12 hours of daily operations. Three of the
GA'N TV stations average four hours daily; the fourth station (Saigon) averages
five hours. _^^ , , . .
9. (c) How many Vietnamese watch the Armed Forces TV network compared with,
the number who watch the GVN station?
A comparison has not been established.
10. (a) How much has been spent, or is planned to be spent, by the USIA and other
U.S. agencies, to help build the physical plants for the GVN radio and television, film,
printing and other information programs? ^,t-tvt ■ ^ tt a
Since 1965 and projected to the completion of the current G\ N projects, U.b.
agencies have spent or plan to spend the following amounts: 4-station radio net-
work, $6.8 million; television network, $8.2 million; motion picture center, $2.5
million; information printing house, $234,000; other physical plants, none.
44-706 — 70— — 45
698
10. (b) How much has the GVN put up for each of these categories?
Actual amounts earmarked for physical plants for GVN media facilities are not
identified per se in the GVN budget. However, for the period since 1965, the fol-
lowing monies, including those for any physical plants, have been spent or ear-
marked for: radio, $8.3 million; television, $4.2 million; motion picture center,
$2.7 million; information printing house, $1.8 million; and Ministry of Informa-
tion General Directories and the Vietnamese Information Service, $47.6 million.
11. (a) What was the total amount spent last year by the United States on all
phases of the information and psychological warfare program in Vietnam, including
the costs for all aspects of military psychological operations? How much will be spent
this year? Next year?
[In millions of dollars]
Estimate, Estimate
Category 1969 1970 1971
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office controlled programs _.- 13.3 12.1 9.7
U.S. military programs - 14.6 10.7 0)
Total - — 27.9 22.8 -
'1971 funding level is still in the planning stage where some reduction is being considered.
11. (b) Hoio much did the Vietnamese government spend on these programs last
year? How much is planned for this year?
[In millions]
Estimate
Category 1969 1970
Ministry of Information $9-6 $19.7
RVNAF Psy War activities - --- '4.9 4.9
Total...- — - 14^5 24T6
1 No detailed breakout of GVN funds expended for 1969 is available. However, officials estimate that the amount is
approximately the same as programed for the current year.
12. (a) How many U.S. personnel work directly in or with GVN agencies con-
cerned with propaganda or information matters?
U.S. civilians U.S. military
JUSPAO... '67 107
USIVIACV... - - 167
Total 67 274
I This total includes 16 NBC/I contractual personnel.
12. (6) How many Americans work in the GVN radio network?
Three JUSPAO advisors. In addition, there is one technical advisor assigned to
the RVNAF radio branch.
How many Americans work in the GVN television activities?
Sixteen contractual advisors (National Broadcasting Company, Inc.) and three
other JUSPAO advisors. In addition, there is one technical advisor assigned to the
RVNAF television branch.
How many Americans in GVN films?
Two JUSPAO advisors.
13. What is the purpose and scope of operation of "psychological operations officers'
attached to U.S. advisory teams in the provinces? How many are there?
They advise Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and Vietnamese Army
political warfare (PolWar) units in the provinces on effective coordinated infor-
mation/psychological operations in support of national and local Pacification and
Development goals. There are 34 civilian and military "psychological operations
officers" attached to U.S. advisory teams in the provinces to concentrate on the
f mictions of the GVN civilian information services; an additional 43 military
officers serve as advisors to the GVN military political warfare cadre.
699
14. What control, if any, does the USIA have over the activities of the five Army
television camera crews operating in Viet-Nam that -produce malerials aimed at U.S.
television audiences?
None.
15. Have the Viet-Nam Information Services and other Viet-Nam agencies dealing
with propaganda matters been receptive to USIA advice?
They have been generally receptive to advice in program, training and engineer-
ing matters. Advice in administrative matters has been less effective.
16. (a) How many members of Viet-Nam' s National Assembly haie come to the
United States in (he last two years? How many have had all or part of their expenses
paid for by the United States?
During the past two .years, 33 Vietnamese senators and 42 deputies visited the
United States. Ten senators and 10 deputies traveled in whole or in part at U.S.
Government expense. Of these 20, six senators and five deputies were provided
domestic travel expenses and per diem from the Department of State in response
to invitations issued by members of the U.S. Congress.
16. (6) Does the USIA sponsor any Vietnamese to come to the United States on
speaking tours? If so, give details.
None.
17. (a) How many Vietnamese have been brought to the United States for study or
training {non-military) in the last five years under government auspices?
Program 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Tota
Fulbright-Hays scholarships
Cleveland International program
East-West center scholarships
American field service scholarships.
USAID grants ---
9
6
0
0
U
16
2
2
3
2
2
11
2
5
7
5
2
21
15
14
48
33
23
133
107
92
412
433
186
1,230
Total..- -- --- 135 119 470 473 , 214 1.411
1 Partial grant.
17. (b) How many are here now?
Program :
Fulbright-Hays scholarship 1
East- West Center scholarships 13
American field service scholarships 30
Television engineers to RCA Institute 5
USAID grants 526
Total 575
17. (c) How many are programmed to come this year? Next year?
Program
1970 1971
Cleveland international program
East-West Center scholarships
American Field Service scholarships.
USAID grants (new)...-
USAID grants (renewals)..
Total.
2
2
5
&
20
20
»331
411
384
448
742
886
1 Although new participants have been selected and funds obligated, they are authorized to depart Vietnam up to 9
months after the obligation date.
Appendix I
Statement for the Record on the Administrative Aspects of Pacification
AND Development
(By Ambassador W. E. ColbjO
Mr. Chairman: In this statement I will cover the organization, personnel, and
costs of the Civil Operations and Rm^al Development Support (CORDS) effort.
I will also describe briefi.v how it works and how it relates to the Metnamese
organization for Pacification and Development. In my opening statement I
touched on the background of the orgrnization and briefly traced the concept
and evolution of its e.stablishment. As I indicated, CORDS is a combined civil/
military organization within the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV)
headed by General Creighton Abrams. I am General Abrams' Deputy for Civil
Operations and Rural Development Support.
I. U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Exhibit A shows the organization of MACV. As 3 ou can see, CORDS is an
integral part of MACV. Its headquarters component, headed by an Assistant
Chief of Staff, operates luider the Chief of Staff like other headquarters staff
elements and through the Chief of Staff to field commands. As General Abrams'
Deputy for CORDS i have access through the Chief of Staff to the Field Com-
mands and to all the .staff agencies, including CORDS. This same arrangement
is repeated at the Corps level where each U.S. Field Force Commander has a
Deputy for CORDS and a staff agency for CORDS. The Commander's respon-
sibilities fall into three categories, connnand of any U.S. troops units in the area,
the Vietnamese Army advisory effort, and the pacification and development ad-
visory effort or CORDS. At Province level, the Province Senior Advisor, who
may be niilitarj^ or civilian depending on the security situation commands a
unified CORDS organization. Twenty-five (25) Provinces currently have military
Province Senior Advisors and nineteen (19) phis four autonomous cities have
civilians.
B. Exhibit B shows the relationship between CORDS and other Mission ele-
ments. While I am a member of the Mission Council, the CORDS organization
itself relates to other U.S. Agency headquarters through the MACV structure.
At the Saigon level. National Securitv Council Action Memorandum #362 of
May 9, 1967, directed the establishment of MACCORDS and dealt with its rela-
tionship to other U.S. agencies. The Embassy, AID and JUSPAO all have inde-
pendent headquarters staffs reporting directly to Ambassador Bunker. However,
their field activities and personnel operate through the MACV chain of command.
Thus, all field activities are under a single manager: MACV. This arrangement is
an unprecedented approach, melding civil and military responsibilities and
personnel into one organization.
C. Within CORDS there are staffs for each element of the Pacification and De-
velopment program. The Refugee, Chieu Hoi, Public Safety, and Community
Development Directorates are concerned with civil oriented programs and there-
fore are staffed mainly by civilians. The Territorial Secvirity Directorate staff is
mainly military. The other Directorates, like Plans, Policy and Programs, Reports
and Analysis, "and Management Support are more fully combined civil/military
staffs. The primary mission of the Directors is to advise their counterpart GVN
agencies. In addition, they have internal MACV staff responsibilities.
II. GVN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Exhibit C shows how the Vietnam Central Pacification and Development
Covmcil is organized. As you can see there are similar councils down through the
GVN chain of command"; at corps and province. I have weekly meetings with
Major General Hon who is Chief of the Pacification Coordination Center, in effect
the principal staff manager of Pacification and Development. Mr. McManaway,
Director of Plans, Policy and Programs of CORDS, meets with General Hon
more frequently, at times daily. I also meet frequently with the Prime Minister,
(701)
702
but these meetings are not on a regularly scheduled basis. At these meetings, we
discuss a wide variety of problems and proposals dealing with Pacification and
Development.
B. I will not describe here what the advisors at corps, province, and district
do on a day-to-day basis since there are representatives from each level available
here today who will be discussing that with you, but in general the relationship
with the Vietnamese follows the pattern at the central level, growing closer at
province and district level.
III. PERSONNEL
A. CORDS has 7,627 authorized U.S. personnel spaces. The actual on-board
figure varies, of course, but as of the end of January the fill was 7,368 personnel
or about 96%. Exhibit D brealvs out the authorized figures. The great majority
of total personnel are assigned in the field.
B. The largest single advisory element is the one most closely related to Viet-
namization and U.S. troop redeployment. This element is the 353, 5-man Mobile
Advisor.y Teams (MAT) who rotate among the Vietnamese Regional and Popular
Forces with the mission of assisting them in upgrading their effectiveness.
C. A similar approach toward the same objective is the Combined Action
Platoon (CAP) concept employed b.y the Marines in I Corps. There are 114 CAP
Teams who report through the I Corps Marine chain of command rather than the
CORDS structure so they are not included in Exhibit D figures. Coordination
takes place at the CTZ and province levels. We have with us todaj^ representatives
of both the MATs and CAPs who will be describing what they do in more detail.
D. The total number of military personnel in CORDS is 6,437: 2,427 officers
and 4,010 enlisted men. The majority are at Province and District levels and are
involved in advising their Metnamese counterparts on programs, as well as
general management and advisory support.
E. We have 883 civilian officers, from AID and the Department of State
assigned to CORDS. These personnel work in those areas of activity for which
CORDS has full responsibility, such as Refugees, Chieu Hoi, and Community
Development. This category does not include USAID technicians working in the
areas of education, health, and agriculture, nor certain State Department per-
sonnel who are assigned by the Embassy to the field and thus come under the
operational control of, rather than assignment to, MACV. The latter category
totals some 242 positions.
F. Tlie last category of U.S. personnel is DOD-funded civilians assigned to
CORDS. There are 65 people in this category. These people work mainly in the
Rural Development (RD) Cadre and Phoenix programs both at headquarters and
in the field.
IV. SELECTION AND TRAINING
A. These, then, are the Americans involved. I will now describe how they are
selected, trained and how they are assigned.
B. Military advisors, particularly those serving as Province Senior Advisors
(PSA) or Deputy Province Senior Advisors (DPS A) are carefully screened and
selected through a special process set up for this purpose by the Department of
the Army (DA). The Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, personally notifies
each individual selected and obtains his acceptance of the assignment in writing.
DSAs are also selected by special, but less elaborate, procedure by the Career
Branch, Department of the Army.
C. Senior civilian officers, including those in PSA and DPSA positions, are
initially selected by nomination by their parent agency, AID or Department of
State. The nominations are sent to USAID/Saigon which, in coordination with
ACofS, CORDS and myself, reviews and accepts or rejects the nomination.
D. The military PSA/DPSA serves an IS-uionth tour and the DSA at least
12 months with options for extending. Civilian tours are at least IS months. Some
45-50% of all civilian advisors return at their request for a second tour and in a
number of key positions, particularly at the Saigon and Corps levels, we have
officers with long and extensive experience in Vietnam and Southeast Asia
generally.
E. All civilian advisors receive at least seven weeks training at the Foreign
Service Institute. The majority of junior officers, both AID and Department of
State, receive up to forty-two weeks of language training in Washington depending
on the individual's language ajititude determined through special tests.
F. For Province Senior Advisors and their dei)uties, both military and civilian,
there is a s]3ecial course at the Vietnam Training Center in Washington. The
course includes language training and may extend as long as forty-two weeks
703
depending on the individual's needs. Once in country, there are orientation
briefings in Saigon, phis orientations when they report in at Corps and Province.
The District Senior Advisors and their deputies receive 18 weeks training at the
Vietnam Training Center.
G. In addition to the above there is a 5-day CORDS Advisor Orientation
Course for all newly arrived personnel which provides a comprehensive review of
all aspects of pacification. There is also an in-country Vietnamese language
training program run by CORDS available to all CORDS personnel.
H. The MAT Team members have a special course at the Di An Training
Center which runs 18 days covering all facets of their role in training and upgrading
the RF and PF.
I. In terms of quality, I would say that overall we probably have had and con-
tinue to have some of the best and most dedicated officers in the U.S. Government
serving in Vietnam. The.y are for the most part hand picked. Where an officer
cannot or will not perform satisfactorily he is removed at once and either assigned
to another job where he can perform or sent home. Precise figures are not available,
but the CORDS military advisors do receive a high percentage of the total awards
and decorations presented to MACV advisors. The CORDS civilians also have a
record of dedication and achievement. Over the past year and a half there have
been 24 killed, 45 wounded and 12 captured. Of the latter, one was released, one
escaped, and four to the best of our knowledge have died in captivity. Since the
estabhshment of CORDS, its civilians have been awarded the U.S. Secretary's
Award twice, the Award for Heroism 18 times, the Distinguished Honor Award
five times and the Superior Honor Award 11 times. More than 60 have received
the Meritorious Honor Award and about 400 have received awards from the
Vietnamese Government.
v. REPORTING
A. At this point I would like to discuss the reporting S3-stems used by both the
Americans and the Vietnamese in managing pacification and judging its trends.
There are a number of systems now in use. These include systems reporting on
terrorist incidents, Territorial Forces Evaluation, People's Self Defense Forces,
National Police evaluation, the refugee situation, and others. The most important,
especially in terms of overall trends in security, is the Hamlet Evaluation System.
I will discuss this system in some detail and some recent changes that have been
worked into it.
B. The HES was started in January 1967 to provide a way to measure trends
in pacification progress countrywide. The system was developed to provide auto-
mated data processing of comprehensive evaluations of the situation in each
hamlet level prepared by District Senior Advisors.
C. Each rater evaluates the hamlets in his district in terms of 18 separate indi-
cators. Nine of the indicators are related to hamlet security and nine to socio-
economic development. Each of the 18 indicators can be rated on a scale of five
points running from A through E. Enemy controlled hamlets are simply rated as
Category V. Scores are averages of these ratings.
D. In' addition to the IS indicator ratings, evaluators are also required to report
estimates of hamlet population, map coordinates, and whether or not the hamlet
was visited bv GVN or U.S. officials during the month.
E. The Hamlet Evaluation System has been an effective tool for planning and
managing pacification and related programs in Vietnam since 1967. The ratings are
certainly not absolute measurements of security or development but they have
been valuable comparative indicators of the pacification situation at different
times and in different places. Weaknesses in the system have been relatively con-
stant, thus the figures are useful trend indicators. They have served as a basis for
allocating new resources, identifying weak areas, planning expansion of pacifica-
tion, setting of goals and monitoring performance.
F. To improve HES and make it more useful, a revision has been in process
since June 1968. This has involved a three-month trial period, November and
December 1968, and January 1969, plus extensive revision and discussion there-
after. In July 1969, the new system called HES 70 was implemented in all districts
of Vietnam and has been completed regidarly in parallel with the regular HES.
Since the GVN pacification and development plan for 1969 utilized HES exten-
sively, it was believed essential to continue HES trends and measurements through
the completion of the 1969 plan. This also gave us some solid experience with HES
70.
G. HES 70 differs from the current HES in the following respects:
(1) More objective questions which separately determine answers to specific
conditions rather than the use of a grading scale.
704
(2) HES 70 uses a centralized mathematical scoring technique for question
replies, rather than a subjective grading by the District Senior advisor.
Questions are combined into categories, these then combined to achieve
security, political and socio/economic ratings, and these then combined to
provide an overall pacification rating for each hamlet and village in Vietnam.
(3) More data will be available centrally because of additional specific
questions on hamlets and villages throughout the country.
(4) In HES 70 there are separate questions on both hamlet and village level,
and separate questions monthly and quarterly. The questions cover additional
subjects not covered by the current HES, but because some are answered
only quarterly, fewer questions per month are completed by the District
Senior advisor.
VI. COSTS
A. The last part of my statement will cover pacification funding, how much the
programs I described in other statements, and the organization and advisory
support I have just discussed, costs and how the GVN and the U.S. Government
share the burden.
B. The total financial resources going into pacification have risen over the past
five years as you can see on Exhibit E. As significant as the magnitude of the
increase is the composition. The upward trend reflects the result of the GA'N itself
applying more of its own revenue and resources to pacification, a strong indication
of the priority the GVN now places on the program, particularly in light of current
budgetary constraints.
While it is true that the U.S. is still providing about half of the costs, this is
largely the result of new equipment and material requirements to support increased
numbers of Regional and Popular Forces. As these new U.S. dollar procm-ement
requirements are met and the U.S. share is reduced to replacement requirements,
the GVN will be carrying the greater share of pacification costs.
VII. CONCLUSION
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any
questions you or the committee members may have.
705
EXHIBIT A
MiLlTARV ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VISTlNAfv)
COtVfUSMACV
DEPUTY
CORDS
jm
ACo-<S ACofS
i_— 1
lADVlSORj ADVISOR
1 CTZ
CG
It GTE
CG I
CHIEF OF STAFF
ACofS
AC oi S
CORDS
I SR I SR
■ADVISOR ADVISOR
3 MAF i -FFORCEY
l(t CTE
CG II !
ifforcevi
IV CT2L
CG
ACoES;
lOGISTICsi
ACofS
PUNS
SIVPIES
C 2 G f K
f.ROUF
iri
ACofSJ
COHP i
COMPTR
ACotS
MitlTARY
ASSIST
CONST?
9IR6CT
EXHIBIT B
JUGPAO
nSASSY
ACofS
CORDS
A"BASSADOR
Dl^PL'TY A"PASSAD'1R
'JSAID
ACofS
Jl, J?, J3, gtc.
=Tl ADVnORS
I, II, III, IV OTZ
DEPUTY FOR CORDS
I, II, III, IV CTTZ
RELATIONSiflP OF CORDS TO U.S. MISSION
706
GVN PACIFICATION ORGANIZATION
National
Central Pacification and Development
Council
Chairman
Sec. Gen.
Members
- President
Prime Minister
- Ministers
Coordinating
Center
Regional
Regional Pacification and Development
Council
Chairman - Corps Commander
Secretary - Chief, RPDCC
Members - Representatives of
Ministries
Coordinating
Center
Provincial Pacification and Development
Council
Provincial
Chairman
Secretary -
Members
Province Chief
Chief. PDCC
Deputy Province Chief
Commander, PSDF
Chiefs, Provincial
Services
All District Chiefs
Chief, PDCC
?:XHIBIT C
Coordinating
Center
707
EXHIBIT D
CORDS US GQVEeNf.^ENT PERSONNEL
AUTHORIZED
SOURCE OF PERSONNEL WiUTARY CIVILIAN TOTAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 6361
MILITARY
ARMY 162941
NAVY 123]
AIR FORCE, !81
MARINiE !35|
COASTGUARU 111
TOTAL 16351]
CIVILIAN 65 :;426
AiD FOREIGN -SERVICE
ASSIGNED TO MACV '33
MACV OPN CONTROL 211 944
STATE FOREIGN-SERVICE
ASSIGNED TO MACV 150
MACV OPN CONTROL 11 161
J'JSPAO
MACV OPN CONTROL 76 20 96
JSIA I20i
ARMY (451
NAVY !101
AIR rORCE '151
fv'iARIN{ JliL.
70S
T;.r.;;DS jn i'Acii-T.c/.TX.:; r.;:;Di;:G
: '^.'.£-197 'I
EX!iTi;iT t
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1970 !:■■
1 "
; ;
Statement for the Record on the Development Aspects of P.vcification
.\ND Development
(By Ambassador W. E. Colby)
Mr. Chairman: In my opening statement I noted that one of the major lessons
learned over the years about the people's war is that military security is not
enough alone. The people want a voice in their destiny, an opportunity to earn a
living, and something to live for. For this reason, the Government of Vietnam has
made the political, economic, and social development of its people an integral part
of their Pacification program. It is endeavoring to build a political base among
the people by sharing power with them through a program of decentralization,
of authority, resources, and opportunity. This process is by no means complete,
but it has begun and it has produced the beginnings of a new spirit in the country-
side.
709
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. The central thrust of the Government of Vietnam's development strategy
over the past year and a half has been building effective, representative, and
viable local government. The main focus has been on the village level which
traditionally is the link between the central power and the people. It keeps im-
portant records, collects taxes, intercedes with higher officials, provides the
necessary papers and channels government services to the people. In its recent
history, however, the village has been merely an extension of the Palace; a vehicle
to execute Saigon's decrees and taxes. There has been a considerable reversal of
this relationship as a result of various recent steps taken by the ^'ietnamese
Government.
B. First, the village and hamlet election process, initiated in 1967, was com-
pleted. Exhibit A shows the status of elected government as of the present. As
you can see, about 95% of the villages and 94% of the hamlets are now in the
hands of the elected representatives of the people. The remaining elections could
not be held because of security. At the outset of 1969, less than half of the villages
and hamlets had elected governments.
C. The elective process will continue and expand in 1970. In the spring the
Government is scheduling elections for those areas that held elections in 1967,
and for those areas not j^et having had elections because of securit}'. Both village
and hamlet officials have three-year terms. The Government also plans to have
elections at the province level for the first time since 1965. Province Councils
which now exist mainly as ceremonial posts, will be revitalized. The National
Assembly has passed a bill that has been forwarded to the President for signature,
calling for expanded authority for the Province Councils and elections in the
spring.
D. An integral part of building local government is training those who run it.
Last year, the Government began a major training program for local officials
and their staffs at the National Training Center at Vung Tau. In 1969, the Center
trained more than 31,000 officials and cadre operating at the village level. Exhibit
B shows the number of people trained bv category from the opening of the Center
in 1966.
E. From 1966 to 1968 the Center was used only for training Rural Develop-
ment Cadre. In 1969 it was broadened to include local officials. Popular Forces
Platoon leaders, Armed Propaganda Teams, and People's Self Defense (PSDF)
organizers. In 1970, the (iovcrnment i)lans to train more than 50,000.
F. The courses for local officials, partly technical, parth- motivational, aim to
develop a greater sense of leadership and professionalism. Senior officials of the
Government address each class to emphasize the importance of the village officials
in the total effort. The President himself addressed each graduating class of village
and hamlet chiefs and gave them his personal assurance that they have real
authority over local affairs.
G. Another element of the i^ffort to develop local government involved strength-
ening its authority. Decree # 045 on April 1, 1969 revolutionized not only the
village's relationship to Saigon and interim bureaucratic levels but, most impor-
tanth", its relationship to the people. Decision-making powers were jjlaced in the
hands of the Village Council headed by the X'illage Chief. As shown on Exhibit C,
two Deputy village Chiefs, one for security and the other for administration, were
established together with several conmiissioners (the number varies according to
the population) for agriculture and land affairs, education and social welfare,
finance, taxation, and civil status. Within the village structure there are also
hamlet governments, headed by elected Hamlet Management Boards. The Hamlet
Chief also has two deputies as at village plus several assistants.
H. Significantly, as reflected on the organization chart, the Village Chief for
the first time in history was given control over the Popular Force Platoon (s), the
National Police, People's Self Defense Forces, and the 30-man Rural Develoi^ment
Cadre Team(s) operating in the village. This has not j'et been effectively imple-
mented in all villages, but it has started.
I. There are also various budgetary- reforms underway to permit the villages to
retain a greater share of their revenues, and subsidies for those running a deficit
are being improved. Village officials have been given a pay raise so thej- would not
have to work at other jobs to support themselves and their families and to add to
the prestige of office. In effect, the Village Chief is being made a manager of
government at that level. Province and District Chiefs who formerly would
by-pass the Village Chief now must work through him on many matters and will
increasingly do so as further reforms are implemented.
710
ir. SELF DEVELOPMENT
A. In addition to being able to vote and handle their own affairs, the people
want a better life. This is a critical part of the political equation in a people's
war. It means a lot of national programs like land reform, miracle rice seeds,
schools, health units and roads that USAID Director MacDonald will be dis-
cussing later in these hearings.
B. At the local level, in 1969 the Government for the first time granted each
village with an elected government a development fund under a new program
called Village Self-Development. The funds, one million piasters per village in
1969, were placed under control of the village council after a public vote of the
people. In addition to enhancing the prestige of the councils, the program stimu-
lated the active participation of the people. The government allocated nearly
two billion piasters or about $17 million to the villages in this way last year, an
average of $8,100 per village. In 1970 the allocations are made on the basis of
population and amount to about two and a half billion piasters (over $20 million),
A provision in the use of the funds is that the people must contribute to the
projects they select either in the form of labor or money. Thus, the amount of
activity generated is actually much greater than the amount of money budgeted.
Moreover, the people are encovu-aged to select revenue generating projects, for
example, small hand or motorized tractors.
C. The Village Self Development process has been modified and improved since
its inception in 1969 as a result of experimentation with different local develop-
ment techniques conducted in five pilot provinces over a two year period. The
GVN completed this pilot program in the latter half of last year and incorporated
many of its techniques into the 1970 Milage Self Development program.
D. While the projects themselves are important, the principal result is the
political cohesion that takes shape in a community from the interchange in public
meetings about common problems and goals. The dialogue that takes place is
one of hope: they have the means to do something about their problems themselves
and they participate in the decisions.
E. Along lines similar to the A'illage Self Development program, the GVN is
planning to establish a one billion piaster Province Council Development program
following the election of new councils in 1970. The funds will be apportioned
according to population and the decision-making authority will be vested in the
councils themselves. Council members will solicit proposals from among their
constituents and hold open public meetings during which the decisions will be
made. Once selected, projects will be turned over to the Province Pacification and
Development Councils for implementation. The primary significance of this pro-
gram is that it will .strengthen the power of these newly elected councils and
enhance their prestige among the people as well as other elements of the province
administration. Furthermore, it is hoped that the increased power will also attract
more capable candidates to run for council seats. This is all part of the total
development effort.
III. URBAN DEVELOPMENT
A. In addition to the development effort in rural areas, the Vietnamese Govern-
ment is beginning to turn more of its attention to the urban masses that make up
more than 40% of the total population.
B. Following the 1968 TET and May attacks, the first urban area, vmder-
standablj', to receive increased Central Government's attention was Saigon itself.
The City of Saigon, encompassing over two million people in extremely high
density, had been subjected to an almost continuous series of political, economic
and military emergencies during the past 15 years. Shortages of financial resources
and other bureaucratic problems had made it difficult for the Prefecture to provide
even minimal services. In July of that year the GVN began developing a special
program to generate political support among the Saigonese, especially in the
poorer areas on the fringes of the Citj'.
C. Building in large part on a successful commmiitj* development program that
was already operating in the City's District 8, a program was designed to
ameliorate some of the worst conditions, improve communications between the
Prefecture and the local groups, and maintain minimum essential municipal
services. The inadequate level of services in many places, povert.v, and the
absence of a meaningful GVN presence, made many areas susceptible to Viet
Cong subversion and intimidation. It was necessary to develop not only an
effective administrative structure, but also to involve the citizen in improving
and protecting his neighborhood community. Thus, some of the early activities
711
included organizing neighborhood People's Self Defense Forces and encouraging
small self-help efforts toward community development. A Self-Help Housing
Program was initiated to provide relief from the critical housing shortage brought
on by the TET Offensive of 196S and the influx of refugees. The program involves
the establishment of local building councils, the pooling of land, labor, and
capital. The principal thrust of the Saigon eifort has been to get the people
involved in working toward their mutual benefit. There are also larger
improvements in health, sanitation, roads and education.
D. Since its inception, the Saigon effort has made significant headway. 276,000
PSDF members have been organized in the citj^ 43,000 of whom are armed. The
self-help program, which provides small amounts of funds to permit the people
themselves to improve their neighborhoods, has resulted in the completion of
some 37.5 separate projects. The Self-Help Housing Program already mentioned
has re.sulted in the construction of over 1,100 low cost hovises. Another 2,400
houses are scheduled for completion in 1970. During 1969, the school-aged
population enrolled in full-time classes increased from 69% to 73%, primarily
the result of 67 new classrooms that were constructed. 19 of the city's 28
health dis])ensaries have an annual caseload of 2. .5 million out-patients. A
program to build and repair 28 kilometers of small roads and pathways in the
poorer areas of the city is also underway.
E. For this year, the GVN has promulgated an urban campaign annex to its
basic Pacification and Development plan. Essentially the plan calls for extending
those programs enjoying success in the rural areas to the urban areas. Specificallj',
the \'illage Self Development Program that last year was applied only in rural
areas will be applied in cites as well. The Province Development Program that in
1969 channelled its resources into expansion of securitj' in rural areas, now is
available as well to the cities for infrastructural projects, such as street repair and
building markets, The Rural Development Cadre in 1970 will have urban counter-
parts. The five autonomous cities will also have elections for Municipal Citizen's
Councils and these Councils will be eligible like the Province Councils for devel-
opment funds.
F. The GVN Directorate of Reconstruction and Urban Planning has issued
guidance to the Provincial and Municipal Reconstruction Services on how to
approach urban development. Some activity is already evident. A land use survej'
is being conducted in Saigon and five such surveys have been completed in other
urban areas.
IV. PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT
A. Another part of the government's effort aims at tackling development
problems beyond the means of the people to solve themselves. A program called
Province Development provides funds to carry out small-scale infrastructure
projects in support of province pacification plans. For example, a province road
that might be needed to facilitate access to remote villapcs. The objective is still
essentially a political one in that the criteria used to determine fund allocations is
the number of people benefited. Further, the program promotes political cohesion
in a larger sense by opening roads and waterways to facilitate economic resurgence
as well as the extension of government services.
Exhibit D is a, breakout of the 1969 and 1970 Province Development allocations
by area of activity. As can be seen, the bulk of the funds go into roads and bridges
in both j-ears. In 1969 this was the case because roads were needed to reach out
into contested or newly secured areas. In 1970 roads are needed to consolidate
the newly opened areas and to link up local communities with economic centers
and the national community.
Exhibit E shows the breakouts for the same j^ears by Corps. The Delta got the
lion's share in both vears reflecting the priority attached to that heavily populated
area by the GVN. '
B. This program operates under a set of streamlined planning and implemen-
tation procedures. This is briefly the way it works: the Province Pacification and
Development Council sends a request to the Central Pacification and Develop-
ment Council for funds to implement a certain project, e.g., a province road.
The Central Council sends a team down to the province to look at the proposed
project, see how it fits into the province's plan and determine whether or not the
province has the capability to implement the project. On approval the funds are
sent to the province and the province implements the project directly.
712
V. MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION
A. The major lines of communication are the Hfehnes of a government engaged
in a people's war; without them the urban areas would be isolated pockets of
control facing economic and political strangulation. The 1970 Combined (Military)
Campaign Plan, AB-145, specifically charges niilitar.y commanders in each of the
area security- zones to conduct operations to provide adequate security to open
and protect roads and bridges, rail and waterways throughout the country.
B. Since 1969, the GVN has emphasized reopening or construction of economi-
cally important secondarj' roads, especially market roads in the rural areas. Since
the farmer is reluctant to raise more produce than he can get to the market, the
provision of safe, dependable routes from the countrj^side to town encourages
him to increase production, thus stimulating the economy by providing more
goods for sale and curtailing inflationary consumer competition for essential food
items.
VI. RURAL DEVELOPMENT CADRE
A. One of the tools vised by the government in implementing its development
strategy at the village level is the Rural Development Cadre. There are presently
47,000 cadres assigned in 30-man teams throughout the country. Some 7,200 of
these are Highlander Cadre working among their people in the Central Highlands.
B. The Cadre Teams are armed, politically motivated government represent-
atives who work and live directly with the people. As mentioned earlier, they
operate under the direction and control of the Village Chief. The Cadre are
political catalj'sts. They help the people oi'ganize self-defense and self-development
activities.
C. Dependent upon needs in a particular community and the judgment of the
Village Chief, they may assist in a variety of ways, such as agriculture, land
reform teachers, public information, and health workers. Their paramilitary role
is defensive rather than offensive in nature. In addition to providing a measure of
defense for the villagers by virtue of their presence, they help organize and train
People's Self Defense Forces so that the people can protect themselves.
D. The Cadre and the People's Self Defense Force they have helped organize
and train are an increasingly significant element. The People's Self Defense pro-
gram is discussed in detail in the statement on security. Their contribution to
local security is not the sole value; the political commitment is equallj'' significant.
The People's Self Defense Force interest to protect family and property coincides
with the government's own interest in obtaining support from the people against
those who would tax and terrorize in the dark of night.
VII. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
A. Mr. Edward J. Nickel will discuss the GVN's information program fully
later in these hearings. The information program is an essential element of Pacifi-
cation and Development, informing and stimulating all citizens to participate in
a national effort. To do so, the usual media techniques of radio, TV, leaflets, etc.,
are being supplemented by a new program to utilize all government workers,
military personnel and others such as People's Self Defense Force to carry the
word orally to the people and their families and to report back their reactions.
This program is just starting, and has not yet shown results.
Vin. CONCLUSION
The Vietnamese have moved impressively on political, economic, and social
development at the local levels as well as the national. The process continues. As
more and more responsibility and power are shifted from the Palace into the hands
of the people, as the people learn more about how to handle their own affairs,
more decentralization will be possible and desirable. What I have described is the
beginning, but it clearly points up the strategy of mobilizing and relying on the
people to participate in an independent and self-sufficient Vietnam.
713
IS O
a\
31 ;pEc e3
44-706—70-
-46
714
NTC TRAI^miG CHART
1968
1969
31,000
2i,000
20,000
15,000
10,000^.
5,000
c
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ae
e
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u
H
s
6
«
3
u
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-H
4
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H
715
VILLAGE GOVERKMENT UNDER DEGREE#198 (1966)
AS AMENDED BY 0ECREEff45 (1 April 19691
VIL1A8E
COUNCl
VILLAGE CHIEF
mt^^^m^m
DEPliH VILLAGE CHIEF
m. ADMINISTRATION
T ~
r
COMMISSIONERS
• AGRICULTURE AND
LAND AFFAIRS
« [ODCATICN AND
SOCIAL XfL.rARt
• FINANCt
• TAXATKW
• CIVl STATUS
1
VILLAGE OFFICE
CHIEF StCRETARr
ASST. SECRETARK
B,FORKftT!CN CAORL
2 TECHNILIANS
SPECIAL ASST
FOR PACIFICATION
I
R.D. CADRE
130 MAN GROUPS
jrz
PEOPLES
SELF-DEFENSE
GROUPS
—I
HAMLET CHIEFS
T
■c
■c
h
I
DEPUTY VILLAGE CHIEF
FOR SECURITY
J
COMMISSIONER
FOR MILITARY
AFFAIRS
Tm.
' NATIONAL
POLICE
:suboistrict;
-| r
POPULAR
FORCES
T _ . _■
=1j
PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT ALLOCATIONS BY FUNCTIONAL ARtA
Percent of
1969 amount' total amount 1970 amount '
Publicworks — $647.6 68.0 $1,422.6
Irrigation 152.6 16.0 363.9
Education - 43.0 4.6 137.7
Publichealth 68.8 7.3 118.1
Agriculture..-- 11-9 1-3 6.6
Fisheries 51 -5 17.2
Animal husbandry - 16.5 1.7 2.5
Total - - 945.5 100.0 2,068.3
1 In millions of Vietnamese dollars.
PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT ALLOCATIONS BY CORPS TACTICAL ZONE
(Amounts in thousands of Vietnamese dollars]
1969 1970
Percentage of
Amount total allocation Amount
ICTZ 124.7 13 280.9
II CTZ" - 139.5 15 397.3
IIICTZ - - --- 190.5 20 438.7
IVCTZ - - 490.9 52 951.4
Total 945.6 100 2,068.3
Percent of
total amount
63.8
17.6
6.7
5.7
.3
.8
.1
100.0
Percentage of
total amount
14
19
21
46
100
716
Statement for the Record on the Security Aspects oi Pacification and
Development
(By Ambassador W. E. Colby)
I. introduction
A. Importance
1. Security is an essential element of Pacification and Development. It has
been repeatedly demonstrated in Vietnam that sustained, credible security must
be the first step in the pacification and development process. While security is
only one of the major concerns facing the average ^'ietnamese citizen, it is undoubt-
edly his primary concern. It is too much to ask the average citizen to make a
sustained commitment to programs of social, economic or political improvement
until he is confident that he can reasonably insure the safet.y of his family.
2. The Communists have consistently attempted to demonstrate to the Vietna-
mese people that their government is incapable of providing its citizens with
personal security, even with foreign assistance. This policy forms a key part m
the Communists' effort to achieve their ultimate objective — the political control
of South Vietnam. At various times the Communists have tried to occupy the
rural areas with their own military forces, to cause death and destruction by
directly attacking populated areas protected by government forces, or by pro-
voking exceptionally destructive responses by government forces to Viet Cong
or North Vietnamese Army actions. This combination of tactics was calculated
to discredit the South Vietnamese Government both at home and abroad; it
has always been a keystone in the overall Communist military political strategy.
B. Three Levels
In the People's War in Metnam, security must be maintained on three levels:
Militarj', Territorial, and Internal, each dealing with a specific element of the
Communist threat.
1. Military security. — Militarj^ security, or the task of shielding the populated
areas from Communist main forces, and at the same time seeking to eliminate
them permanently as a threat to national security, is the task of the Vietnamese
regular forces. These forces are advised and assisted by the Military Advisory
element of the Military Assistance Command, Metnam, and are supplemented
by U.S. and other Free World combat units. Dealing with the Communist main
force units is not a part of Pacification, but is a necessary prerequisite to it. In
many situations, when enemy main forces are not an immediate threat, these
U.S. allied and ARVN regular units actively engage in local security and pacifica-
tion operations, but their principal mission remains protection against enemy
main forces.
2. Territorial security. — Territorial security, or the task of providing the popu-
lated areas with security from Communist local forces and guerrilla units is
assigned to the Vietnamese Territorial Security Forces, assisted by the People's
Self Defense Forces. The citizen must be permanently protected in his neighbor-
hood, which requires a broad dispersal of these forces in small units so that the
guerrilla meets opposition wherever he attacks. This is an integral element of
pacification and provides an environment in which other Pacification and Develop-
ment Programs can be safely and successfully implemented.
3. Internal Security. — Internal security, or the task of protecting the people
from the Viet Cong Infrastructure, terrorists, and other harassment is assigned
to the Na^tional Police, assisted bv the People's Self Defense Forces and supported
by all military and civilian agencies through the PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX
Program.
//. Territorial security forces
The Territorial Security Forces of the Republic of Mctnam are the Regional
Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF). The RF and PF are advised by military
personnel on the CORDS Province and District Advisory Teams, and iDy special
US Army or Marine units such as the Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) and the
Combined Action Platoons (CAPs). These teams also assist in the provision of
fire support, air support and medical evacuation by US forces when necessary.
A. Regional forces (RF)
1. Mission. — (a) The mission of the Regional Forces is to protect the people
in the pacification areas from enemy local forces and guerrilla units by conducting
operations in the areas between the villages. They provide an outer security shield
for the village defense forces, and maintain ready reaction forces to reinforce the
717
Popular Forces and People's Self Defense Forces in the event thej' are attacked
by superior enemy forces. The RF also assist the National Police in establishing
and maintaining internal security by participating in the PHUNG HOANG
program, and assist the Poi^ular JForces and Rural Development Cadre to train
the People's Self Defense Force. They are, in the present emergency, full-time,
uniformed soldiers fully integrated into the national armed forces. They are
under the control of and are paid and supported by the Ministry of National
Defense.
b. As part of the Government of Vietnam taking over a greater share of the
prosecution of the war, the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan calls for
priority relief by Regional Force units of Vietnamese Regular Army units assigned
to territorial security missions in the populated areas so that the latter can be
redeployed to combat enemy main forces in the sparsely populated areas. This in
turn is designed to reduce the requirement for US and other Free World c&mbat
units presently required for this purpose.
2. Strength.— (a) Growth: The Regional Forces have expanded from about
1.50,000 in 1967 to about 260,000 men in December 1969. The basic unit of organi-
zation is the rifle company consisting of 123 officers and men. Additional RF will
l)e activated in the first six months of 1970, some newly recruited and some by
converting Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, a border defense force advised by
the US Army Special Forces, into RF Companies.
1 6) Recruitment and deployment: RF Companies are recruited from specific
provinces, and are assigned for service in those provinces following basic training.
The Regional Forces serve any place within the province, as assigned by the
Province Chief. Thev mav be deployed as individual companies under the direct
command of the Province Chief/Sector Commander or the District Chief/Subsector
Commander, or they may be deployed in multi-company groups under command
of a group headquarters,' which in turn answers to the District Chief or Province
Chief, depending on local requirements. Thirteen Regional Force Battalions have
been formed for performance of special missions assigned by the Corps Com-
manders, such as the defense of vital installations and airfields.
3. Equipment. — For the past year, the Regional Forces have been benefitmg
from the improvement and modernization program implemented by the Govern-
ment of Vietnam with US support. This program aims at improving the effective-
ness of the RF not onlv bv increasing its authorized strength to a level commen-
surate with the requirements of the tasks assigned it, but by improving training,
leadership and equii)ment. During 1969, substantial gains were made in RF equip-
ment By end-December, 94 percent of 200,000 M-16 rifles authorized had been
issued, plus all of the 11,000 AN-PRC-2.") radios scheduled: 99 percent of 3,300
60mm mortars; 78 percent of the M60 machine guns: 76 percent of the 23,563 M79
grenade launchers, and 69 percent of the one-ton trucks.
4. Training. — The Regional Forces soldier receives the same individual training
as ARVN personnel. Each recruit receives five weeks of basic training and four
weeks of advanced individual training. Individual RF soldiers are ehgible to
attend all leadershi]) and si)ecialist courses. In addition to individual training
Regional Force rifle companies receive five weeks of Companv Basic Unit training,
and five weeks of refresher training every three years. Each Regional Force,
Company is supposed to conduct at least six hours of in-place training each week.
5. Operations.— (a) Tactical: (1) Regional Force Companies conduct operations
against VC local forces and guerrilla units in and around the pacification area,
particularly in the uninhabited areas between the villages, with the following
objectives:
(a) To strike enemy forces in the territory surrounding the pacification
areas. , . ^,
(b) To prevent the incursion of enemy forces into the secure areas and the
areas undergoing pacification, either by day or night.
(c) To rehiforce the Popular Forces and People's Self Defense Forces in the
event of enemv attack.
(d) To protect important installations and LOCs throughout their assigned
area of operations.
(2) Regional Force operations vary in size from small ambushes and patrols to
multi-companv operations lasting several days or longer. They may be conducted
by the RF alone, or in conjunction with ARVN or US main force units, or Popular
Forces and People's Self Defense Force. Since the enemy frequently uses darkness
to cloak his movement, night operations, particularly patrols and ambushes pro-
tecting the approaches to the populated areas are constantly emphasized by all
718
command echelons. In 1969, Regional Force operations resulted in about 23,000
enemy killed and 9,600 weapons captured, at a cost of 5,647 RF killed, 23,06o
wounded, and 2,040 RF weapons lost.
(b) Internal security: The Regional Forces participate in PHUNG HOANG
operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure. These operations are planned and
coordinated by the local PHUNG HOANG organizations, principally the District
Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCCs) and the Province
Centers (PIOCCs). They may involve Regional Forces alone, or operating in con-
junction with Popular, People's Self Defense, or Regular Forces in support of the
National Police.
(c) Civic action: Regional Force vmits are required to conduct civic action op-
erations, particularly to improve the social and economic situation of people in
newly opened or resettled communities.
B. Popular forces (PF)
1. Mission. — (a) The mission of the Popular Forces is to provide close-in pro-
tection to the people in the villages undergoing pacification, to maintain security
in the areas already pacified, and to assist the National Police in maintaining
law and order in the secure areas. They provide an inner security shield for the
hamlet population, in conjimction with the village combat Self Defense Forces.
The Popular Forces also assist the National Police in establishing and maintaining
internal security by participating in the PHUNG HOANG Program. They assist
the Rural Development Cadre in training the People's Self Defense Forces,
assuming primary responsil)ility for this mission in villages and hamlets which
have no Cadre assigned. The Popular Forces are, like the Regional Forces, full-
time, uniformed soldiers who have been fully integrated into the Armed Forces
for the duration of the present emergency. They are under the control of and are
paid and supported by the Ministry of National Defense.
(b) The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan calls for Popular Forces to
take over maintenance of securit.v from Regional Force Companies to the extent
possible. By taking over the maximum possible share of the territorial security
role, Popular Forces release Regional Forces for service in less secure areas, in
turn releasing regular ARVN units for combat in the sparsely populated areas,
presently being undertaken by US or Free World combat units.
2. Strength. — (a) Growth: Since 1967, the Popular Forces have expanded from
about 150,000 to 215,000 men in December 1969. The unit of organization is the
rifle platoon of 35 men and PF do not have larger units. During 1969, the number
of activated Popular Force Rifle Platoons increased by 1,000. Additional platoons
will be activated in the first six months of this year.
(6) Recruitment and deployment: PF Platoons are recruited from specific
areas within the province and generally serve in their home villages following
basic training. The Popular Forces have in 1969 been placed under the operational
control of the Village Chief to deploy them throughout the village in accordance
with the Village Defense Plan. In many areas. District Chiefs still maintain direct
control of PF Platoons, however.
3. Equipment. — The Popular Forces participate with the Regional Forces in
the Government's Improvement and Modernization Program. 98 percent of
almost 200,000 M16 rifles authorized for the Popular Forces have been issued.
PF Platoons are also being issued M79 grenade launchers and AN/PRC-25
radios to replace obsolete equipment presently in use.
4. Training. — Popular Force training is conducted at 14 PF Training Centers
throughout the country. PF recruit training consists of five weeks basic combat
training and four weeks advanced individual training. Individual PF soldiers are
eligible to attend special PF leadership and specialist training courses conducted
at the PF Training Centers. Newly activated PF Platoons receive a three-week
Platoon Basic Unit Training Com-se prior to deployment. Selected PF platoons
receive refresher courses at PF Training Centers. Each PF Platoon is supposed
to conduct a minimum of six hours in-place training each week.
5. Operations. — (o) Tactical: (1) Popular Force Platoons conduct operations to
defend the hamlets from VC Local Force and Guerrilla luiits, particularly by
patrolling and ambushing in the outskirts during the hours of darkness:
(a) To intercept enemy forces or terrorists and prevent their incursion into
the residential areas.
(b) To reinforce the People's Self Defense Force in the event of enemy
attack.
(c) To secure important installations and LOCs within the hamlets.
(2) Popular Force operations vary in size from patrols and ambushes of squad
size or less up to participation by one or several platoons in joint operations with
719
Regional or Regular units. In 1969, Popular Force operations resulted in over
14,000 enemy killed and 5,400 weapons captured, at a cost of 4,233 PF killed,
8,942 wounded, and 1,797 PF weapons lost.
(b) Internal security:
The Popular Forces participate in PHUNG HOANG operations agauist the
Met Cong Infrastructure which are planned and coordinated by the District
InteUigence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). The PF also assist
the National Police to maintain law and order in the community. The Popular
Forces play a kev part in protecting the people from terrorism by detecting and
intercepting terrorists attempting to infiltrate the hamlet, and by immediately
reacting alone or with the PSDF to VC terrorist incidents.
in. people's self defense force (psdf)
A. Miss-ion
The mission of the People's Self Defense Forces is to defend their communities
against infiltration by small armed enemy units; to detect and deter enemy
terrorists and saboteurs ; and to promote community improvement by full partici-
pation in local self-development programs. The members serve without pay on a
part-time basis. Thev are organized on a community basis and take their orders
from their Village Chief. As the PSDF becomes capable of defending their com-
munity with less and less assistance from the Regional and Popular Forces
particiilarly in the more secure areas, more and more Regional Force Companies
and Popular Force Platoons can be redeployed to strengthen pacification efforts
in the less secure areas, and to extend pacification to less populated areas presently
defended by regular combat units.
B. Strength
The People's Self Defense Force owes its origin to the 196S Tet offensive, when
thousands of people petitioned the government for arms to help defend their
lives and property from \'iet Cong attack. In response, the government estab-
lished the PSDF "under provisions of the 1968 Mobihzation Law. At end-1969,
the PSDF was divided into "combat" members, trained to use weapons, and
"support" members, providing first aid, runners, etc. The Mobilization Law
required that all men between the ages of 16 and .50 participate in the defense of
their country. Under this law, any man in that age bracket who is not a member of
the armed forces, is required to belong to the combat PSDF in his community.
To these are added volunteers from the elderly, young people from 12 to 15, and
women, who are the "support" forces. "Membership" in PSDF is somewhat
imprecise, so the 3,000,000 members are not a firm statistic, but the issuance of
some 400,000 weapons to the combat PSDF is rehable and confirmed by spot
checks in the countryside. 1970 plans include issuing an additional 300,000
weapons, and expanding the "combat" PSDF to 1.5 milhon members.
C. Training
1. Zn^erieams.— During 1970, about 500,000 combat PSDF are planned to be
organized into about 15,000 35-man units, at least one for every secure hamlet.
Each member of these units will be armed, and will receive special training from
Vietnamese Mobile Training Teams. About 60,000 PSDF leaders will receive spe-
cial training at Popular Force Training Centers. As these units complete then-
training, they will systematically take over assignments presently tasked to the
Pojiular Forces — primarily maintaining the most secure areas, and defensive
duties within their capabilities, such as the defense of bridges, pubUc facilities,
and intra-village roads. The remaining combat PSDF will continue to receive
training from the Rural Development Cadre and Popular Force Platoons assigned
to their villages and will share the weapons issued to them.
2. Nonmilitary training. — The PSDF will continue to receive training from the
Rural Development Cadre, and from the village technical cadre on the practical
aspects of their involvement in political and economic development programs.
D. Operations
1. Local security.— PSDF security operations primarily involve helping to
guard the immediate approaches to the hamlet in order to intercept and engage
enemy ground forces, or terrorists seeking to enter the hamlet at night. As m-
dicated above, PSDF will also replace PF Platoons in certain defensive activities
within the more secure areas. ^^^ ^^^ . ^^^
2. Internal security .—The PSDF assist in the PHUNG HOANG program by
identifying members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and by detecting and pre-
venting attempted acts of terrorism or sabotage within the community
720
S. Development. — (a) Social and economic: In addition to their contribution to
community defense, the PSDF form the backbone of the community self develop-
ment in their villages and hamlets. Thej' participate in local efforts to improve the
social and economic status of their communities. The political significance of
this involvement in the life of the community is considered by the Viet Cong to
be a greater threat to their objectives than the military threat posed by the arms
they hold.
E. Political significance
1. The People's Self Defense Force provides an outlet for the growing spirit
of nationalism among the Vietnamese people. It has a common insignia, simple
objectives which are both practical and popular, and a program which allows
all ages, sexes, religions and ethnic groups to participate, stinuilating community
spirit, and contributing to the common defense. At the same time it is a locally-
based organization, without hierarchy or superstructure. It is by its ver3^ nature
almost exclusively Vietnamese, with very little US advisory participation.
2. The decision to arm the people was initially questioned by some Vietnamese
officials. The President and Prime Minister, however, took the position that it
was only by showing this kind of confidence in the people that the People's War
could be effectively fought. The act of giving and receiving a w^eapon constitutes
a double act of faith on the parts of the Government and the citizen. Each makes
a public commitment to the other. This commitment has been recognized and is
feared by the \'iet Cong. Instances have been recorded in which the Viet Cong
urged the people, not to surrender their weapons to the \'C, nor to destroy them,
but to openly return them to the Government, thus rupturing the bond and re-
voking the commitment. The Communists have identified the PSDF as a major
threat, the beginnings of a true people's army and a locally based political force
for the future. As a result, they have repeatedly attacked it and tried to destroy
it, but the PSDF have generally (not always) stood their ground, fully validating
the Government's confidence.
IV. NATION.\L POLICE
A. Components and missions
1. General. — The primarj' responsibility' of the National Police is to maintain
law and order throughout the populated areas of Vietnam. In addition, the
National Police is the agenc.y charged with the primarj' responsibility for pro-
tecting the people from the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The National Police are
advised by CORDS Public Safety Advisors at the national, Corps and province
levels.
2. Uniformed police. — Uniformed Police perform functions similar to their
American town or city counterparts. They represent the law in the neighborhoods
to which they are assigned. In addition to maintaining general order, they direct
traffic, participate in the control of resources, assist in preparing judicial cases
against criminal suspects, and provide personnel for customs and immigration
duty, operating communications networks, implementing the National Identitj^
Registration Program, securing [jublic installations, and similar duties.
3. Special police. — The Special Police are responsible for collecting, collating and
evaluating intelligence pertaining to the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and coordi-
nating available information with PHUNG HOANG Centers at various levels.
The Special Police also react to intelligence collection requirements levied by the
PHUNG HOANG Centers.
4. National police field forces (NPFF). — The National Police Field Forces are
the paramilitary action arm of the National Police. Thej^ are responsible for pro-
tecting the people from terrorism by cortducting police operations against the
Viet Cong Infrastructure. The NPFF participate in anti-infrastructure operations
generated by Province PHUNG HOANG Centers (PIOCCs) and by District
Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCCs). They may operate
alone or in conjunction with military units. Once the Viet Cong Infrastructure had
been driven from an area, the NPFF has the primary responsibility of preventing
a resurgence. The final mission of the NPFF is to safeguard the extension of the
uniformed National Police presence into the rural areas.
5. Provincial reconnaissance units {PRU). — Provincial Reconnaissance Units
are small platoon and company sized units operating under the control of Province
Chiefs against the VC Infrastructure as a part of the PHUNG HOANG (PHOE-
NIX) operation. They are funded by the United States but in 1969 were placed
under the national control of the Director General of National Police, and a
Vietnamese Army oflficer was designated as national commander. The mission of
the PRU is to collect intelligence on and conduct operations against the VC
Infrastructure as directed bv Province Chiefs.
721
6. Marine police. — The Marine Police are charged with maintaining securit.y
and law and order, and controlling resources on the inland waterwaj-s and in
the ports and harbors of Vietnam.
B. Strength
1. Police forces. — During 1969, the number of National Police rose from a low
of 76,330 to 85,218. Of these 45,5.58 are assigned to duty as uniformed police
(inchiding 1,762 Marine Police); 15,454 as Special Police; 15,113 as Field Force
Police. Some 9,229 are transferees from the Armed Forces, who are in training
status and have not vet received their assignments. Plans call for the expansion
of the National Police to 122,000 in 1970, including the transfer of an additional
3,771 military personnel.
2. Provincial reconnaissance units. — The current strenght of the PRU is 4,454
men. The PRU are organized into 18-man units made up of three 6-man teams.
The number of 18-man units assigned to a province varies according to the status
of pacification, the size of the population, and the strength and concentration of
the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The size of Provincial Units thus varies at present
from 18 to 220 men.
C. Training
A nuijor problem facing the National Police is expansion of its training capa-
bilities to meet the requirements of recent and planned expansion. To solve this,
the capacity of the Basic Training Facility at Vung Tau has been increased from
2,000 to 5,000 students bv construction of 66 additional buildings during the last
four months of 1969. In addition to the normal 12-week course, a shorter 8-week
course has been adopted to train recruits with prior military service. 3,093 of the
13,000 transferees from the armed forces conijileted the course in late December
1969. An additional 4,643 is currently in training. To meet the demand for more
qualified leadership, the National Police Academy provides professional and
supervisory training. The first classes completed their six-month courses in De-
cember 1969. Courses will also be initiated for command level officials (Com-
missioners). Plans also call for increased emphasis on the Advanced Training
Program for lower level supervisory personnel which graduated 1,661 students
in 1969, and the specialized programs for training National Police Field Forces
and Marine Police, which graduated 7,815 and 572, respectively, last year.
D. Operations
1. Village police. — A nuxjor effort was made to establish a police presence in the
rural villag(!s during 1969. Prior to November 1968, there were only 140 Sub-
District Police Stations scattered throughout the country. By the end of 1969,
6,000 National Police had been assigned to 1,600 villages. The 1970 Pacification
and Development Plan calls for the assignment of from 6 to 18 police in each secure
village, according to population, by the end of the year. National Police assigned
to a village are under the operational control of the \'illage Chief.
2. Resources com^/o/.— National Police resources control efforts resulted in nearly
100,000 arrests during the year, including more than 10,000 VC and VC suspects,
4,000 ARVN deserters, and 35,000 draft evaders. Confiscations included over
1,000 land mines, grenades, plastic explosives and other ordnance, along with
50,000 units of medicines/drugs and 6,000 tons of contraband foodstuffs.
J. National identity registration program. — The National Identity Registration
Program involves issuing tamper-proof identification cards to all citizens 15 years
of age and over. :More than 3,000,000 persons were registered during 1969. In
the process, the Identification and Record Service was able to identify, through
fingerprint checks, 8,414 wanted ijersons, including 6,820 military deserters, 928
wanted on a variety of criminal charges, 609 draft dodgers and 57 \'iet Cong
suspects. 1970 plans call for registration of an additional six million individuals.
4. Combined telecommunications directorate (CTD).— The National Police have
the primary responsibility for the Combined Telecommunication Directorate
which operates a fast effective telecom system to all provinces, cities and districts
within South Vietnam. The system now passes over 2.5 million messages annually
for the police, other civil security agencies and most other civil administrative and
technical agencies on a common user basis. It is also responsible for maintaining
and servicing the 47,000 radios in the Village/Hamlet Radio System, which pro-
vides communications between the villages and hamlets and higher administrative
headquarters. The CTD also supports the 12,000 radios in the National Police
Radio Telephone System. The new CTD fixed station, multichannel \ HF system
provides teletype and dial telephone service for official communication between
Saigon and Mv Tho and Can Tho in the South and to Bien Hoa in the North. A
total of 343 students were graduated from the CTD Training School at Thu Due.
722
Training of an additional 500 Regional and Popular Force personnel for service
throughout the system was initiated in January 1970.
5. Marine operations. — Operating from 15 bases, Marine Police now patrol 700
kilometers of waterways. During 1969, they searched over 400,000 craft and
examined nearlj- three million people. As a result, 32 craft were impounded;
2,371 people were arrested and their contraband cargoes confiscated.
E. Corrections and detentions
The National Police and Directorate of Corrections receive advisory support
and commodity assistance for the improvement and better security of detention
and correction centers. In FY 1970 the total cost to the US of this effort, includ-
ing salaries, training and commodities is $253,000.
V. PHUNG H0.4NG (PHOENIX)
A. Purpose
The PHUN G HOANG or PHOENIX program is designed to protect the people
from Communist terrorism by securing information about the Viet Cong Infra-
structure, identifying the individuals that make it up, and conducting operations
against them. In order to insure complete restoration of security in the Republic,
it is the Government's stated policy " . . .to completelj* eliminate the Viet
Cong Infrastructure by capturing as many as possible, while the lenient rehabili-
tation policy aims at releasing as many as possible." (Ministry of Interior Decree
757, 21 March 1969)
B. Organization
All elements of the government participate in the PHUNG HOANG program
through a series of PHUNG HOANG Committees whose function is to direct
the program at their respective levels from central to district. It is the responsi-
bility of the PHUNG HOANG Committee, or the District Intelligence and
Operation Coordinating Center (DIOCC), as it is called at district level, to coor-
dinate the activities of the various military and civil agencies involved. It super-
vises the orderly collection, collation and distribution of information on individual
members of the VCI and plans operations against identified Viet Cong operatives,
using the appropriate police, militar.y or paramilitary forces. These centers are
advised by US personnel.
C. Popular participation
■ To give the people a clear understanding of the program, its methods and
objectives, and to enlist their support for the program, the President ordered, in
the fall of 1969, a public information campaign to explain to the people what
PHUNG HOANG was, why it was necessary, at whom the program aimed, and
how the people could participate. This campaign is still in its early stages. In
some areas it has produced encouraging results. Private citizens have identified
local communist leaders wanted by the Government. In other cases, local citizens
have induced relatives or acquaintances in the Viet Cong to seek reconciliation
through the Chieu Hoi program.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Interaction
These programs interact to provide security for pacification at the various levels
on which the enemy fights this People's War. The Regular Forces fight on the
military level, the Regional and Popular Forces on the territorial level, and the
police and PHUNG HOANG on the internal security level. Underlying all and
providing the necessary injection of the people into the effort is the People's Self
Defense Force. These forces are integrated and pursue common plans worked out
at the village, district, province and national levels. Forces are allocated, supporting
fires are arranged, and plans for emploj^ment are developed. Great improvements
have been made in coordinated ])lanning and allocation of resources through the
operations of the Pacification and Development Council, and each province and
sub-division has a specific ijlan for the extension and improvement of securit}'
during the coming year.
B. Obstacles
There are of course many obstacles ahead. North Vietnamese in units and as
individual fillers are infiltrating into the country and must be fought off. On
occasion the Popular Force Platoon takes refuge in its outpost rather than actively
patrols in the night. Knowledge of the complicated apparatus of the VC Infra-
structure is still imperfect and important VC leaders slip through the fingers of the
police and PHUNG HOANG forces. There are individual problems of leadership
723
at various levels and there are cases in which doctrine and directives are not
followed on the ground. There is dependence on US support and reliance upon a
US shield in many areas. All these are real problems which must be faced and over-
come bj' the Vietnamese in order that the Pacification and Development program
may provide security to the population.
C. The Future
Over the past two years, there has been a substantial strengthening of all the
tools with which the Government and the people of Vietnam are fighting this war,
and at the same time there has been a weakening on the Communist side. The war
is not over; it will involve much hard work and some setbacks, but the structure is
there. The Vietnamese at the low, as well as the high level, are in good part en-
deavoring to make it work so that they maj^ take on more of the burden of holding
off the enemy.
Statement for the Record on the Phung Hoang Program (Phoenix)
(By Ambassador W. E. ColbjO
Mr. Chairman: The PHUNG HOANG ("PHOENIX") program of the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam is designed to protect the Vietnamese people from ter-
rorism, and political, paramilitar.y, economic and subversive pressure from the
Communist clandestine organization in South Vietnam. This organization, known
as the Viet Cong Infrastructure, or VCI, is the leadership and control core of the
Communist campaign. The Communists try to keep it intact to deliver a political
victory, if they are defeated militarily or choose as a tactic to sue for peace.
I. the VIEiT CONG INFRASTRUCTURE
A. History
At the end of the 194.5-o4 war, the Communists took about 75,000 native
.southerners north for training in organizing, propaganda and subversion. During
the late 1950's these cadre returned to their southern provinces and districts.
There they revived the networks they had left in 19.54, organized the population
into farmers' groups, women's organizations and youth groups and began to
recruit and train and establish bases for guerrilla groups.
By 1960 this process was sufficiently advanced so that the Vietnamese Com-
munists proceeded to establish formal political structures. Thus the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam was founded in 1960, to be followed in 1962
by the People's Revolutionary Party, a separate southern branch of the Lao Dong
(Comnnuiist) Party of North Vietnam, in 1968 by the Alliance of National Demo-
cratic and Peace Forces, in 1968 by the establishment of Revolutionary or Libera-
tion Committees as pretended local governments rather than simply political
bodies, and finally in 1969 by the pretended Provisional Government of South
Vietnam. Together all of these organizations and their local manifestations make
up the VC Infrastructure.
B. Function
The VCI is an essential and integral element of the effort to overthrow and re-
place the Government of Vietnam. In the Communist doctrine of the People's War,
the \'CI is the leadership structure of the Communist insurgency. It constitutes its
political, administrative, supi)ly and recruitment apparatus. The VCI supports
military operations of VC and North \ietnamese Army Units by providing guides,
caches of food, clothing, weapons, medical supplies and other war materials,
logistics support, and by directing and implementing a systematic campaign of
terrorism, extortion, subversion, sabotage, abduction and murder to achieve
Communist objectives. ,
C. Strength
The estimated strength of the YCl at the end of 1969 was approximately 74,000.
(This estimate is very rough and is derived from the numbers of known ^'CI and
interpolation of data on the organizational pattern of the People's Revolutionary
Party and the cadre structure of the VCI.)
D. Methods
During the period when the Vietnamese government was unable to successfully
oppose the Communist insurgency in the countryside, the VC were able to extort
support with a mininuun of overt terrorist activity, directed at local representa-
tives of the government, or private citizens who were, for one reason or another,
724
unpopular with the local population. The rural people had little alternative but to
acquiesce to the demands of local \C cadre. In the.-^e circunistance.s, the implica-
tion or latent threat of force alone was sufficient to insure that the people would
comply with Communist demands. The local farmer could see the armed guer-
rillas, the local forces and the North Vietnamese Army units. He could not see a
counterbalance to that force representing the national government. The neces-
sarily slow process of political fencemending, called pacification, only gradually
began to re-establish the government presence and to introduce that long absent
counterbalance.
With the defeat of the Communist main force units in the 1968 offensive, the
subsequent growth of seciu-ity in the countryside, the expansion of the Regional
and Popular Forces and their continually widening deployment, and the arming
of the people through the People's Self Defense program, the people were provided
with an alternative. It became more and more difficult for the VCI to extort the
food, clothing, money, recruits and services required to sustain their insurgency
from a rapidly decreasing population base. VC "recruiting" agents who had
formerly been able to fill the ranks under the guise of giving the head of the
family an opportunity to "volunteer" a son or daughter to fight for "freedom"
now had to resort to outright Ividnapping of adolescent children. \'C tax collectors
had to resort to methods amounting to armed robbery to fill their coffers. VC
terrorists who had formerly "tried and executed" local administrators appointed
by the government were now publicly murdering hamlet and village officials
elected by their neighbors.
E. Terrorism
In 1969 alone, the Viet Cong infrastructure murdered more than 6,000 officials
and ordinary citizens in South Vietnam, including 23 village chiefs, 126 hamlet
chiefs, 229 refugees and 4,350 private citizens. In the same period the VCI wounded
over 15,000 and kidnapped more than 6,000 people from among the civilian
population. The purpose of the Phung Hoang program is to protect the people of
South Vietnam from this terror.
II. THE PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIx) PROGRAM
A. Legal basis of the program
The Phung Hoang program was formally established by Presidential Decree on
1 July 1968 which defined the VCI target and established Phung Hoang com-
mittees from central down to district level.
From a legal standpoint, members of the VCI are subject to two legal procedures:
1. Prosecution for crimes against national security. These involve full judicial
proceedings in military courts, and result in criminal convictions to sentences in
accordance with law.
2. Administrative detention imder emergency powers. These are siniilar to
emergency measures used by other countries such as Malaya, Kenva and the
Philippines during period of insurgency or national emergency. (See also U.S.
Code Title 50, Section 812 et seq.) Detention is determined by a Province Se-
curity Committee, comprising the Province Chief, the Province Judge, the
Chairman of the Provisional Council and other officials.
Ministry of Interior Decree 757 of 21 March 1969 provided specific definitions
of classes of Cvunmunist offenders and outlined the appropriate periods of de-
tention, depending upon their party status and responsibilities. The preamble to
this decree stated "the government policy is to completely eliminate the ^'CI by
capturing as many as possible, while tlie lenient i-ehabilitation policy aims at
releasing as mam^ as possible."
B. Forces
The Phung Hoang program has national, corps, provincial and district com-
mittee levels. The national chairman is the Minister of Interior and Secretary
General is the Director General of the National Police. Its membership contains
representatives from the Defense Ministry, the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Ministry,
the Rural Development Ministry, the Military Security Service of the Army,
the Special Police Branch, the Police Field Forces and the Joint General Staff.
The composition at each of the lesser committee levels is essentially the same.
While all elements of the government participate in the Phung Hoang program,
a leading role is played by the National Police with the support of the Special
Police, National Police Field Force (NPFF) and the Provincial Reconnaissance
Units (PRUs). The military participates in the Phung Hoang program through
its intelligence and seciu-ity services and through the operations of its Regular,
725
Regional and Popular Forces. The People's Self Defense Force, the RD cadre,
the Information Services, local officials and all other elements of the government
further contribute to the effort.
The Provincial Reconnaissance Units were developed and funded by the United
States to conduct operations against the YCl. Thev first fimctioned under the
Authority of the GXN Joint General Staff. On 31 March 1969, by Decree 044-
SL/NV, the PRU was designated a police program controlled by the Director
General of National Police, and an ARVN officer was assigned as National Com-
mander. While the PRU is still funded by the United States, plans are in progress
for the transition of the PPtU to full G\'N funding and support. In each province
the PRU is controlled by the province chief, with a subordinate province PRU
commander who is in most instances an ARVN officer.
C. U.S. role
The U.S. role with respect to Phung Hoang is one of advice and assistance. This
relationship is maintained by CORDS under COMUS^IAC\'. American Phung
Hoang officers are present in most District Operations Centers and U.S. staffs are
present at province and at the national level, to work with the appropriate GVN
Phvmg Hoang committees at those levels. These officers work closely with their
Vietnamese counterparts in the Province Operations Centers/District Operation
Centers, which operate on a 24-hour basis, receiving, collating verifying and co-
ordinating intelligence on the VCI from all sources on the one hand, ana on the
other hand facilitating the exploitation of the intelligence b}' the various action
arms of the Phoenix program.
The U.S. officers also obtain and coordinate U.S. technical, material and fire
support for the Province and District Operations Centers and its action arms.
Most of the American personnel are military. In addition to those American per-
sonnel working directly with Phung Hoang committees and DIOCCs, other
American personnel are clo.sely involved with many of the G\'N services par-
ticipating in the program, such as the military, the police and others.
On 15 October 1969, a memorandum (copy attached) was distributed to mem-
bers of the Phung Hoang U.S. staff and forwarded for inclusion in the training of
Phung Hoang advisors in \'ietnam and at Fort Holabird, Maryland. It pointed out
that the Phvmg Hoang program against the ^'CI is an inherent part of the war
effort in Vietnam and that U.S. personnel are under the same legal and ifioral
constraints with respect to operations under this program as with respect to mili-
tary operations against enemy units in the field.
D. Procedures
The key element of the Phung Hoang program is the District Intelligence and
Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). This is a center established at each of
the 2.o0-odd districts of \'ietnam to serve as a central point of information and
coordination of operations against the VCI. Its chairman is the district chief, and
its membership consists of all the services which have information on the VCI or
conduct operations against them. Thus, the National Polic(>, the militarj-, the
Chieu Hoi service. Rural Development cadre and others provide to this center
such information as they have on the VCI. The center collates this material and
develops from it lists of VCI in the neighborhood, organizational charts and
operational plans and targets. There are similar Phung Hoang committees at
province, regional and national levels, and some village officials are beginning to
collate information on the VCI in their village.
To reduce the threat of the VCI, the GVN has established \'CI operational
goals for the Phung Hoang agencies in each geographic area of South Vietnam.
These goals are based on the estimated strength of the VCI, local security situa-
tions and the capabilities of the various G\'N agencies. These goals can be met by
counting VCI who rally or are ind.iced to rally, those who are captured and
sentenced and those who are killed in the course of security operations. The
desirabilit_y of capturing \'C\ is stressed, for the intelligence and other values they
can offer. Hoi Chanh frequently provide important intelligence and their in-
formation serves as the basis of many operations.
In order to single out key personnel for primary attention, Phimg Hoang
guidance for both 1969 and 1970 has designated certain VCI elements for priority
attention. These include, in addition to all personnel operating at district level or
above, specialists assigned to these four kej- components of the Viet Cong
organization:
Revolutionary Committees
Current Affairs Committees
726
Security Sections, and
Finance and Economy Sections
In addition, the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, the goals have been
made more sophisticated, requiring a percentage of the goal of those \'CI neu-
trahzed to consist of previously identified VCI, rather than those whose status
is only revealed during interrogation or search after capture or death. Also VCI
captured can only be credited toward the goal after thev have actuallv' been
sentenced to the appropriate administrative detention or criminal conviction and
specific goals will be stated for higher level ^'CI, rather than permitting the entire
goal to be met with lower level VCI. The effect of these changes is to place empha-
sis on the arrest and detention of higher level, previously identified VCI.
E. Popular Participation
The government took an important step in October 1969, when it decided to
mobilize the people in the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Under the
slogan of protection of the people against terrorism," the GVN has publicized
the program, the enemy against which it is aimed, and the assistance the avera^^e
citizen can give it. In addition to general explanations, local Phung Hoang activ-
ities have been explained in more specific terms, in leaflets and posters featuring
photographs of the neighborhood VCI. In a number of cases this has resulted in
capture of a wanted person through information provided by the public, or in
the individual turning himself in as a Hoi Chanh because of the pressure gener-
ated against him. ^
F. Justice
The government has also taken positive steps to insure justice in the imple-
mentation of the program. In Ministry of Interior Decree 2212 of 20 August 1969,
a detailed procedure was established by which information would be assembled
and recorded to warrant the arrest of the individual VCI. The 1970 Pacification
and Development Plan, Annex II on Protection Against Terrorism, states the
importance of treating the population and detainees in a fair, current and humane
manner and sets out requirements for the implementation of the program Prime
Mmister's Directive No. 1293-Th. T/PCI/M dated 27 November 1968 outlines a
set of regulations for rapid screening of their cases. The government is engaged in
a program of improving and upgrading its detention facilities for detainees. Higher
ranking VCI are sent to maximum security detention facilities on Con Son Island
Other specialized national correction centers have been designated for women
While the Geneva Convention does not require it, the GVN has permitted the
International Red Cross to inspect facilities where VCI detainees and convicted
V CI are kept.
G. Results
•^■^i'^ ooQ^^' ^^^^ year it originated, Phung Hoang operations resulted
9 nln' captures, 2,229 raUiers and 2,259 VCI killed, for a total 15,776 VCI
AU50, or about 13% of these were personnel functioning at District level or
higher.
In 1969, operating under much stricter classification criteria, the results were
8,ol5 captiired, 4,832 ralliers and 6,187 killed for a total of 19,534, of whom 21%
were from District level or above. The higher echelon personnel included:
From district level 3 qqj
From province level '___'_ _____ ' 770
From city level ' _ 9yc)
From region level _ _. ' _ " Toe
From COSVN level ""~"~~m"ll""lllllllll"l" 23
Total 4,229
About 48% of the VCI captured, rallied or killed in 1969 were specialists
from the four key components singled out for priority action:
Security section personnel _ 4 007
From finance and economy sections I l_ _ '" ' 3*670
Revolutionary committee members _" "_ " ' '" i' 108
Members of current affairs committee " -111.111" .lllll ' 609
Total 9 394
Allowing for the 1,948 specialists who were from District level or higher, the
tota priority VCI targets were 11,675, or about 60% of the 19,534 overall 1969
727
The total fell about 10% short of the 1969 goal of 21,600, largely due to poor
results in the first six months of the year. Performance in the last six months
averaged slightly better than the 1,800 monthly goal, but not well enough to
balance the first semester short fall. There has been some decline in the figures
during the past three months, which is partly a reflection of stricter GVN stand-
ards, partly increased discipline and security by the VCI and partly an end of
year slump. GVN has put much stress on the, program for 1970, and it should
gain in effectiveness against the enemy in coming months. It needs improvement
in a number of its aspects, but the direction is set to bring this about. At the
same time, it is making substantial contribution to the national effort todaj'.
In one province, for example, Partj^ members are being assigned two or more
functions in villages, due to lack of personnel to fill existing vacancies. By No-
vember, VC Infrastructure who were unable to cope with the GVN pacification
campaign had fled to sparsely jDopulated areas, and even into Cambodia, where
they were able to exert little influence over the areas to which they were assigned.
Reports received in late November indicated that Cadre of District level and
below had been ordered to return to their villages from their Cambodian sanc-
tuaries. There has been a complete turnover of personnel in this district in 1969,
some positions two or more times ; most positions remain double slotted or vacant
for lack of personnel.
The most notable successes against COSVN and Regional level Viet Cong have
occurred in the large urban areas around Saigon, Danang and Hue. During 1969,
the Police effectively neutralized a COSVN level intelligence net directed against
the office of the President and GVN Ministries in Saigon.
A member of the Political Struggle Section of VC Sub-Region .5, immediately
Northwest of Saigon, expressed his concern over the situation, following his
arrest on November 7. He stated that the recent period of VC inactivity in both
the military and political fields was not a sign of willingness for peace, but rather
a period needed by the VC to reorganize their military and political strategies.
He said that COSVN Revolution 9, which places a greater degree of emphasis
on political activities, was an example of this new planning. He said that the
Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) Program has been given top priority for destruction
by the VC.
III. CONCLUSION
The Viet Cong Infrastructure has not been severely hurt, but the Communists
are having problems, and the problems are becoming more difficult to solve. The
Government of Vietnam is increasing the efi'ectiveness of the Phung Hoang Pro-
gram in 1970. By continuing the publicity campaign to enlist popular support for
Phung Hoang, and by emphasizing and practicing justice, the government is
involving the people in the effort to end Communist terrorism. The Government
is also improving the work of its agencies against this level of the enemy's activity.
In short, the VC Infrastructure is still there. The Vietnamese Government and
people are determined to end this threat to internal security in Vietnam.
Appendix II
Statement of Former U.S. Senator Joseph S. Clark
I am Joseph S. Clark and it is a great personal privilege for me to present my
views before this Committee and its distinguished Chairman, the Senator from
Arkansas, Bill Fulbright. This Committee, on which I had the honor to serve for
four years, is the one that I believe can play, and it has played, a crucial role in
changing the tenor and tone of our foreign policy. The distinguished Chairman
has often spoken of the historic role of this Committee, and to him and my former
colleagues I can only wish God speed in their deliberations during what I believe
will be the most crucial decade of our existence: the decade of the 1970's. It will
be, I believe, in the next ten years that we will have to face the hard decisions
about our role in the world and our prospects for enduring peace.
This Committee can be a countervailing power against those forces in the U.S.
that would commit our country to military intervention in difficult and perilous
danger spots around the world where our presence is neither necessary, desired
nor justified. At its very best, the Senate under the guidance of this Committee
can be that countervailing balance for peace and sanity, as it was during the
recent secret sessions to discuss our involvement in Laos and Thailand. The
resulting bipartisan amendment called on the Executive Branch not to commit
ground troops to Laos or Thailand without Congressional consent. This was
clearly in line with constitutional authority granted to Congress to give advice
728
and consent on foreign policy matters. We have too often seen in recent years
the strong arm of the White House making its case, and implying ver}- strongly
that opposition amounted to a lack of patriotism.
The classic case of excessive Executive authority is the continuing war in
Vietnam. Since leaving the Senate (involuntarily, I might sa}') I have been
President of World Federalists, USA, a voluntary, non-partisan political action
organization with headcjuarters iu Washington, D.C. and over 100 chapters
throughout the country dedicated to the goal of world peace through enforceable
world law. At our last General Assembly in July, we adopted a whole host of
short and intermediate range goals. On the matter of Metnam, our policy state-
ment reads as follows:
"No single nation should have either the right or the responsibilitj'" to intervene
by military action in the affairs of another people.
The Vietnam war is glaring evidence of the urgent need for an effective world
agency to keep the peace and promote justice, and of the futility of national armed
force as a means for resolving political conflict. While the peace talks in Paris
creep on, the killing of both soldiers and civilians continues.
The killing in Vietnam must end. We call upon all parties to the struggle to agree
upon an immediate cease-fire, instead of continuing to use armed force to maneuver
for some hoped-for advantage.
We welcome President Nixon's announced intention of gradually withdrawing
American forces from Metnam. We insist that the withdrawal of American forces
must be complete, and must be carried out as speedily as possible.
The United States must, however, accept responsibility for the consequences
of its past policy. We must provide refuge and asylum for those Vietnamese who
may need it, and we must provide, under international supervision, for the recon-
struction and rehabilitation of Vietnam."
In view of this concern of the World Federalists, USA, I felt it would be of some
value to share our evaluations of the several resolutions on Metnam pending be-
fore this Committee.
Many of these resolutions have the support of the World Federalists, USA.
Some we strongly support, and feel that their enactment may still stave off
additional tragedies in that Ijattered country.
On the whole matter of our continuing presence in Vietnam, we strongly endorse
S3000 of Senator Goodell, which would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
and which is appropriately entitled the "Vietnam Disengagement Act" for it
states that Congress finds that the "broad foreign policy interests of the United
States reciuire that the American military presence in \'ietnam be removed at the
earliest possible time" and that "such action will promote the social and political
well-being of the people of South Vietnam."
S3000 also states, and this is its essential thrust, that we must establish a clear
time table for ending U.S. combat operations by withdrawing troop commitments
in the near future. It signifies that the responsibility for ending the American
involvement in Vietnam is "not the President's alone, but must be shared by the
Congress under its constitutional authority to "raise and support armies" and
to "declare war."
In expressing the clear intent of Congress that all military personnel be with-
drawn from Vietnam on or before December 1, 1970, S3000 would give clear notice
to the government of South Vietnam that it would have to assume the principal
burden, which we have been led to believe is possible by countless statements by
our military. On behalf of the World Federalists, USA, I strongly urge the adop-
tion of legislation similar to S3000. We should remember that there are 1,000,000
South Vietnam under army confronting no more than 240,000 of the troops of
the Vietcong and Hanoi combined. If they cannot prevent an enemy victory with
a 4-1 superiority and vastly superior armament, I can see no advantage to
American continuing to support them.
There are other bills and resolutions before the Committee, which we believe
deserve support: I refer particularly to S. Res. 270 (Church D-Idaho), and Hat-
field (R-Ore.) which states in effect that continued presence of U.S. troops in
Vietnam postpones necessary political accommodations, and is therefore very
much related to the Goodell Proposal in its philosophical outlines. To be sure, this
goal of the Church-Hatfield proposal can only be attained by a more rapid with-
drawal of U.S. troops and a comtnitnient to fully disengage pending an orderly
transition. We strongly support S. Res. 270.
If ever there was a time for the people of South Vietnam to take charge of their
own destiny, it is now, and this view underlines S. Con. Res. 40 (Javits, Metcalf
& Pell) which also asks that the President withdjaw all combat troops by end of
729
1970, and terminate the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by that period. This legislation
would get the rest of the U.S. troops out of Vietnam in a reasonable time thereafter,
and provide through the U.N. and other international organizations asj'luni for
those whose lives would be endangered by such actions. We also endorse S. Con.
Res. 42 (Young D-Ohio). The World Federahsts, USA, endorses S. Con. Res. 40,
as we do S. Con. Res. 39 (Mc Govern and others) which really gets to the heart of
the matter in its very tough, but accurate preamble. The concurrent resolution
lays bare the terrible haunting tragedy of this senseless war —
The loss of more than 47,000 American lives;
Over 250,000 American casualties;
The depletion of U.S. resources to the extent of over $100,000,000,000; and
The incredible destruction of Vietnamese life and propertj^.
S. Con. Res. 39 also appropriately emphasizes the terrible state of our national
priorities in characterizing the war as "the greatest single obstacle to efforts to
focus the country's financial, human, and spiritual resources upon urgent domestic
needs."
We also strongly support S. Res. 268 (Hughes D-Iov,^a and others) urging South
Vietnam to give liberty and amnesty to political prisoners, to lift censorship, and
to permit political parties to organize and present a plan for a transitional provi-
sional government representative of all groups. The legislation goes on to state
that if this is not done, the United States should declare that its commitment to
the present Thieu-Ky regime is ended "with all responsible haste" and our military
and political and economic assistance is terminated.
We also endorse S. Con. Res. 43 which relates to the Hughes Resolution regard-
ing amnesty but places the matter under the jurisdiction of the 31st International
Conference of the Red Cross. This legislation recognises that the international
community has consistently demanded humane treatment for prisoners of war.
The legislation calls upon all parties to abide by the obligations set forth in the
convention and upon all authorities involved iii armed conflicts to assume this
humane treatment.
Another most interesting proposal before this Committee, which we believe
deserves wide discussion, is S. J. Res. 166, sponsored by Senators Mathias and
Mansfield. Discussion of this resolution would constitute a most needed dialogue
on the direction of our foreign policy in the past with a view to strengthening our
position in the future. It would repeal the Formosa and Pescadores Security
Resolution of January 1955, Section 2 of Public Law 85-7 relating to the use of
the armed forces of the United States under certain circimistances to maintain
peace in the Middle East, a joint resolution on Cuba in 1962 (PL 87-733) and
the South East Asian Resolution (Tonkin Bay) relative to the maintenance of
international peace and security in South East Asia. All of these resolutions
would be repealed effectivelj' with the sine die adjournment of this Congress.
It would create a temporary joint committee of 12 to studj' terminating the
National Emergency proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950
with a report due before adjournment.
We also endorse Senator Magnuson's S. Res. 290 relating to land reform in
South Vietnam and the implementation by the government of a broad based and
equitable land reform ])rogram. We believe there should be a discussion of S. Res.
275 of Senators Scott, Hatfield and Mansfield which abhors — as I do — the attempt
of Phan Van Dong to associate Americans who demonstrate for peace with the
cause of North Vietnam and S. Res. 271 of Senator Dole which has as its funda-
mental goal peace and self determination.
We do not think anything would be gained by a discussion of S. J. Res. 63 of
Senator Thurmond, which does not even mention Vietnam and therefore is ir-
revelant to the major issues at hand. Its thinking is too obsolete to justify serious
consideration. *
In closing let me say that this Committee deserves great credit for the wide
ranging quality of its discussions. I agree with a recent article in Foreign Affairs
by Senator Javits (R-N Y) which warns of a "crisis in constitutional relationships"
and asks Congress to reassert itself in foreign pohcy. He asks the Executive
Branch to readjust itself "psychologically and procedurallj^ to a new reahty— the
reality that the Senate will not again shrink from its responsibihties or yield its
constitutional power with respect to national security issues and the solemn
undertaking of national commitments." I feel that this development is already
under waythrough the various phases of deliberation being conducted by this
Committee, and I greatly appreciate the opportunity to present my views.
Thank you very much.
44-706—70 47
730
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Friends House,
Sandy Spring, Md., October 16, 1969.
Dear Senator Fulbright: I don't care about testifying, all I want to do is to
help in any way to have the United States withdraw its troops in Vietnam and
observe the Geneva Agreement of 1954.
However, you can file this statement. Two years ago I took a group of some 35
professors and teachers around the world. In every country we visited the leaders
we saw were opposed to United States policy in Metnam. We met in London with
the leaders of the Labor Party. They were all opposed to United States policy in
Vietnam. In Japan everj^ single Pres. of a University we met with signed a state-
ment urging the United States to withdraw its troops from Vietnam. They stated
that all of Vietnam should be united as provided for in the Geneva Agreement of
1954.
We are grateful to you for all you are doing.
Sincerely j^ours,
Jerome Davis, D.D., LL. D., Litt. D.
Statement of Axel, B. Gravem
I am grateful for permission to file a statement with your Committee. I represent
no one and am a person of no importance, but feel that my views may represent
those of others in the same category whose voice should be heard.
I suggest that our foreign policj', for a great many years has been inhuman in the
course of human events, and that its course should now be dictated by our mottoes
of "In God We Trust" and "One Nation Under God" to which our leadership
gives but lip-service.
Winston Churchill has said that "The history of civilization is War; the greatest
talents of mankind have been and are being spent for destruction, but the time will
come when they will be spent for construction."
The Roman Emperor, Triboniam, said: "So use your own things as not to hurt
others."
The scientist Steinmetz said: "The time will come when you will scrap your
physical laboratories and create laboratories of the mind."
Jesus said: "If your enemy hungers feed him; if he thirsts, give him to drink;
then you will be heaping coals of fire on his head."
Ralph Waldo Emerson said: "The dice of God are always loaded in His favor."
Histoiy records that the American people have made the greatest strides in
technological development and that we, beyond all others, have applied the
results for destructive purposes in the implementing of our foreign policy. We
invented and used the atomic bomb; we have developed the hydrogen bomb;
we are developing lethal gases — -all for destruction! We, in fact, are the modern
"Merchants of Death", selling and giving our destructive wares to both sides in
conflict and using our weapons to impel our will on others in an arrogance of
command and power.
In Viet Nam this has been all too fruitless, with enormous destruction of human
life and incalculable waste of wealth, resulting in a collision course in our domestic
social, economic and political life which could end in revolution.
Our President speaks of pragmatism and our industrial-military complex, fol-
lowing in a pragmatic course which has never worked, should now take heed of
the moratorium in our national and international mortuary and, actualh^, put
the God of our untrustfulness in the driver's seat and leave the driving to Him.
Obviouslj', this suggestion maj- seem to emanate from Polly Anna and the
Sunday School, but, since all others efforts have so conspicuously failed, whj^ not
give constructive heed to our j^urported national mottoes?
The President is a Quaker, believing in tenets devoted to peace, whj- does he
not give the order "Cease Firing" and be content to leave the aftermath to his
God and to His care that the suggested blood-bath of the South ^^ietnamese will
not occur, and that the dominoes will not fall.
If he does not do so, I suggest that your Committee cause a bill to be put in
Congress demanding that the President give this order forthwith. It would
appear that the entire country will rise in support of this measure. The logical
person to do this is your Chairman, Senator Fulbright, who was man enough to
admit his mistake in voting for the Tonkin Bay Resolution, showing more
manhood than others in higli office. The bald fact is that we made the most
catastrophic mistake in our histoiy. Our countiy is "big enough" to admit its
731
error and by so doing will deserve the "decent respect for the opinions of
mankind" which it does not now have.
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,
Washington, B.C., October 10, 1969.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, B.C.
Dear Senator Fulbrigiit: Enclosed are two statements which we ask be
included in the record of the upcoming hearings on Vietnam policy. Our union,
representing members in Alaska, Hawaii, California, Oregon, Washington, and
Canada, believes that the war is a "disastrous mistake" and that the United
States must "stop trying to be a world cop." We believe, along with important
and growing sections of the labor movement, that workers and trade union people
are not warmongers, and that they want peace.
Our international Convention adopted, in April of this j^ear, the enclosed
resolution "End the Vietnam War." That position was recently reaffirmed by the
ILWU State Convention in Hawaii. Enclosed also is an editorial from the official
union newspaper. The Dispatcher, of September 9, 1969, pointing out the costs of
the war to working people.
We wish j^ou every success in your deliberations and hope that they will assist
in bringing an end to the tragic confict.
Sincerely,
Albert Lannon,
Washington Representative.
Enclosure.
Resolution on: End the Vietnam War
Whereas It appears that a majority of our fellow Americans now agree that
intervention in Vietnam was a disastrous mistake, harmful to our nation's welfare;
and
Whereas ILWU members can take patriotic pride in the fact that their union
spoke out against this mistaken policy from the beginning. They can be proud
that ILWU, along with leaders of a number of AFL unions, gave support tothe
courageous and farsighted early minority which strove to arouse the American
people to the ways in which the war was damaging and endangering our nation ; and
Whereas The 1967 ILWU Convention called for our union to persuade the rest
of the labor movement to get into the fight for peace. We took part in a noteworthy
effort bv manv leading AFL-CIO and independent union officials to establish a
Labor Leadership Asse^nbly for Peace to show that the war program did not have
solid labor support; and
Whereas Worthwhile as these efforts were, it is only fan- to say that the leader-
ship in the peace movement has not come from labor. It has come primarily froin
the young people whose lives and values are directly threatened by war and mili-
tarism, and from their natural friends and sympathizers — women, teachers and
clergvmen. The peace movement has been powerfully assisted too by the upsurge
of Black resentment against the waste of national treasure and energy on foreign
war to the neglect of poverty and injustice in our own backyard; and
Whereas Labor has every reason to take a leading, active part in the peace
movement. American workers pay for the immense cost of the war. Their paj^-
checks are cut by inflation, taxes and surtaxes. At the same time the conditions of
life deteriorate because the war prC.-ents government attention to the problems of
transportation, pollution, crime, inadequate schools and community facilities ; and
Whereas Our union must help reinforce the peace movement. A year ago LBJ s
dramatic announcement of a halt in the bombing of the North diffused that
movement — and thereby made it possible to continue a war which had become
politically unacceptable — by deluding the American people that the war was
being ended; and
Whereas Far from scaling down the fighting, the aggressive search-and-destroy
actions and the instant-pacification program ordered in the last months of LBJ s
term escalated the level of combat and produced more American casualties ; and
Whereas The atrociousness of the war was escalated for civilians as well. Our
bombers were shifted away from their wasteful and ineffective missions in the
North to the "protective" "destruction of the southern countryside; andw -^ »»
Whereas Then, as so often before, Americans were asked by Dean Rusk to be
atient and support one more effort which would bring the "honorable" settlement
732
we had been fighting for all along: a permanentlj^ divided Vietnam with an anti-
communist government in the South. This is the unrealistic objective for which
the Eisenhower administration and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles first
started American interference in Vietnam affairs ; and
Whereas Up to now the Nixon administration has gone along with this program,
while the military commanders repeat the same old bunk which has kept casualties
mounting for the last six futile years: "We are winning, give us a little more time
and we can bring the boys home and let the Saigon troops take over"; and
Whereas The war will continue indefinitely — both the killing and draining of
money we urgently need at home — unless a national decision is made to abandon
the foolhardy objectives set by Dulles, Rusk and the military hawks, and negotiate
a political settlement; and
Whereas To bring about such a decision will apparently require a massive new
popular anti-war protest, of which Labor must be a part^ Our union must take a
leading role in such a drive, doing all it can to encourage new allies from other
unions, but moving ahead nevertheless. We must seek out and develop every
natural alliance with other elements — youth, Blacks, and other minorities, the
poor and exploited, and the growing number of clergymen, scientists and intel-
lectuals who are concerned for peace and social progress. We need them and thev
need us to win our common objectives;
Therefore be it resolved. We want and will work for these objectives:
1. Stop the killing — ceasefire.
2. Negotiate a political settlement with the people who are doing the fighting.
3. Withdraw all support from the present Saigon government if it does not
cooperate in the peace negotiations.
4. Cut back on military spending and use the money for urgent domestic needs.
5. Eliminate the 10% surtax.
6. No more Vietnam! Stop pouring money down the drain all over the world.
Stop trjdng to be a world cop. Let us straighten out our own house and show
how democracy can be made to work at home before we trv to tell the rest of
the world how to live.
7. Reassert Congressional control over the military-industrial complex. Inves-
tigate the extent to which unwarranted military secrecy has been used to hide
the squandering of pubHc funds and manipulation of public opinion for the
advantage of private profits and personal careers.
8. Srrengthen the United Nations.
9. End the Cold War. Seek peaceful co-existence between nations with different
social sj^stems; and
Be it further resolved. That we demand that the Nixon Administration begin
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and that the negotiators in Paris be
given instructions to move the peace talks ahead with the proposal for the with-
drawal of all and any foreign troops and to leave the Vietnamese to decide their
own affairs;
And be it further resolved. That we make this resolution public by sending it
to all news media, our Congressmen, Senators, Secretary of State Rodgers and
President Nixon.
Be it finally resolved. That we urge the officers and members of this union to
take all appropriate action to these ends and to develop understanding and
support for these policies in our communities and among our elected represent-
atives.
[From the Dispatcher, September 9, 1969]
(By Sidney Roger, editor)
The time is now — and there is no time to lose — to stop the tragic Vietnam war,
and get our men out of there as fast as possible. There is so much to do: Save our
cities, restore our nation's health, rebuild our people's homes, clean the waters,
purify the air, end unemployment and inferior education. We must reform our
tax system so that the rich do not get richer, while the poor get poorer. We must
concentrate our energies into making this the kind of country we keep saying
it ought to be; and in a world that still has one slim hope for survival — providing
there is peace.
That's a big job, an enormous challenge. But it must be done. It's getting
late. Some scientists say it may even be later than we think, as the worldslowly
strangles in its own garbage, while populations soar and sources of food are
disappearing at an alarming rate.
733
In recent weeks the American people have been treated to tension-creating
contradictions which make people want to climb walls. On one day some top
echelon administration mouthpiece hints that large numbers of troops will be
removed from Vietnam soon; the next daj^ some other brass hat says no, we
may even have to send more men.
One day some expert is saying, sorry, but even if the Vietnam war ends it will
be impossible to divert any of those "earmarked" military funds to domestic needs;
that the Pentagon's demands are greater than ever in our quest for "defense.'?
The next day another expert says, no, that was wrong, we can divert a few bucks
over to domestic needs, but not too much.
The fact remains, and it is a fact, that $80 billion budget for death can be cut
back by more than .$50 billion according to some experts, and our defense wouldn't
suffer one iota. The rate of spending in Vietnam is now $500 million a week.
Hardly a week goes by that doesn't reveal another example of cozy, sweetheart
relationships between defense contractors and Pentagon purchasers. Those
billions come primarily from the pockets of working people.
As Minnesota's Senator Walter Mondale puts it so well: "In a very real sense,
what we have in this country is not a pollution problem, or a farm problem, or an
educational problem, but rather a war problem. And until we can bring this war
problem under control . . . there is little hope for providing the funds for the ex-
plosive domestic problems which plague every state and everj- city in the nation."
Many people have sadly noted that what was called th« "peace movement"
has disintegrated — for many reasons. Then to whom can the nation look for
leadership in the quest for peace?
Only one organized group in this country has the capacitj' to make peace work
for the benefit of the people — and that's the labor movement. Working people
have the least to gain, the most to lose. The labor movement is the group most
concerned with planning for the future well-being of the people.
The labor movement, despite its many internal differences, understands that it
takes planning to eliminate poverty; realizes there must be some kind of guaranteed
annual income; that there must be training for jobs and work for those who are
trained; that there must be a gigantic housing program, and a national health
program, and much, much more.
Above all else, we want to see an end to the war, with no ifs, ands, or buts. What
about those who say working people fear an end to war would mean unemployment
and a depression?
Well, we believe the majority of working people would be willing to take their
chances. That's why we have unions. The trade union movement developed out of
poverty and crisis^pooling the muscle, minds and resources of the working people
to bring about political and economic changes to make the system work for the
working people.
Workers and trade union people are not warmongers. They know who does the
dying and who pays the bills. To say working people won't give up a few extra
dollars in overtime, and some of the frills of a war-born affluence, is an insult to the
working class.
We believe workers want peace. We believe the working people in this country
are ready to say to the military machine: "Stand aside, we've got work to do?"
Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam,
New York, N.Y., February S, 1970.
Hon. J. W. Fulbrigiit,
Chairman. Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
My Dear Senator Fulbright: We note that the Committee is planning to
open hearings on Vietnam. We shall greatly appreciate an opportunity to have
representatives of our Committee testify at such hearings.
We wish to submit, and enclose "herewith, a program evolved by our
Consultative Council and our Committee for the ending of the war in Vietnam.
We respectfully request that this program be inserted in the record of the
hearings.
Your Committee has performed a notable service in alerting the American
people into the realities of American involvement in Vietnam and to the hazards
and perils it poses. On behalf of the Committee, we wish to commend the
Committee for its resolute efforts.
Faithfully yours,
Joseph H. Crown, Sevielaiij.
734
Five-Point Program To End the War in Vietnam
The advent of a new Administration provides an occasion for the reassessment
of our policy toward the war in Vietnam and the negotiations that are presently-
proceeding in Paris.
The Number-One task facing our nation is the rapid termination of the war in
Vietnam. This is essential for the peace of the world; it would brighten the pros-
pects of international order. No solution in Vietnam is possible, however, unless
we face up to the realities in Vietnam. In the sections which follow, we set out the
guidelines for a solution — a o-point program to end the war.
1. ACCEPTANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
Chief among these realities is the imperative need for the United States to
discard the notion that the National Liberation Front is an appendage of Hanoi
and to accept the fact that the NLF is a political entity in South Vietnam entitled
to share governmental responsibility and a force which inevitably will play a role
in the post-war government. The acceptance of this actuality may be anathema
to the Saigon regime, but imtil the United States acknowledges the inevitability
of a coalition government in South Vietnam — and impresses that point upon the
Saigon regime — the Paris talks are unlikely to register any real progress. Only
recently the Laotian Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, repeated that "a
coalition government is a necessity for South Vietnam [because] the NLF cannot
be ignored."
Professors George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, two of America's
foi-emost scholars in Asian affairs, in their illuminating and documented analysis
of the war in The United States in Vietnam, have written (pages 119-120):
Contrary to U.S. policj^ assumptions, all available evidence shows that the
revival of the civil war in the South in 19.58 was undertaken by Southerners
at their own — not Hanoi's — initiative. There is no evidence to assert, as does
the U.S. "White Paper" of 196.5, that "the Liberation Front for South
Vietnam . . . was formed at Hanoi's order." This assertion is merely a con-
venient assumption and is quite as devoid of actual foundation as is Secretary
Rusk's dependent assumption that the civil war "could end literally in 24
hours ... if these people in Hanoi should come to the conclusion that they
are not going to try to seize Vietnam and Laos by force."
The most knowledgeable noncommunist French specialists have long known
all this, but their views have been studiously ignored in Washington. And
one does not have to rely on their writings to reach the inescapable conclusion
that the Liberation Front is not "Hanoi's creation"; it has manifested inde-
pendence and it is Southern. Insurrectionary activity against Saigon govern-
ment began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of
any dictate from Hanoi, but contrary to Hanoi's injunctions. Abundant data
have been available to Washington to invalidate any argument that revival
of the war in the South was precipitated by "aggression from the North."
The Administration's admission of this would, however, undercut the very
cornerstone of its justification of American military involvement in the South
and escalation of the war against the North.
2. FORMATION OP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Another reality we must face vip to is the recognition that the main obstacle to
a settlement is the present regime in Saigon. The Saigon regime obviously has
more to gain by continuing the war than hj ending it — and the conduct of the
Thieu-Ky regime to date indicates a keen perception of that interest. Hans J.
Morgenthau, a member of our Consultative Council, recenth^ observed in a letter
to The New York Times that the Saigon regime "is capable of making peace
because its leading members have literally a vital interest in the continuation of
the war; their political and perhaps even their physical lives depend on it."
The rulers in Saigon are not a government in the sense that they can be con-
sidered to represent the interests or the desires of the people of vSouth Vietnam.
They constitute a small group of military officers installed, in effect, by the prior
Administration to curb the political convulsions that were interfering with our
military activities. Despite the manipulated elections boycotted by the Buddhists
and characterized by the dragooning of the electorate, only one-third of the votes
were counted for General Thieu. The Thieu-Ky regime has suppressed democratic
freedom of expression and has indeed imprisoned the runner-up Presidential candi-
date, Truang Dinh Dzu, simply because he advocated peace talks.
735
Despite the vast sums appropriated to the Saigon regime, no serious social
reform has been achieved in South Vietnam. The Saigon military officers are
conscious of then- participation in the displacement and destruction of South
Vietnamese rural villages. There are, it is estimated, about 2,000,000 refugees — as
if 26,000,000 Americans were homeless or interned in special camps. No coherent
or representative political structure can evolve under these tragic circumstances.
If we continue to support the Thieu-Ky regime, we are, in substance, asking these
generals to negotiate their own abdication.
The situation calls for the formation of a provisional government which would be
representative of the principal political, social-economic, religious and ethnic
groups of South Vietnam, including the National Liberation Front. The existence
of the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces formed (after the Tet
Offensive) in April 1968 and consisting of respected and widely-known non-
Communist personalities, drawn mainly from Saigon and Hue, can greatlv facilitate
the formation of the provisional government.
We believe that a negotiated rather than an elected provisional government is
called for at the outset in South Vietnam. There has never been a truly free elec-
tion in Vietnam and the negotiation and implementation of an electoral procedure
might imperil what would otherwise be a mutually acceptable settlement of the
war. Such a negotiation would obviously require great delicacy and moderation
on the part of the negotiating parties, and might be assisted by private and secret
negotiating sessions.
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Subsequent to the formation of the provisional government, at a fixed date in
the future — perhaps one year later — and probablj^ subject to the supervision of a
neutral international observation group (possibly drawn from a reconstituted
International Control Commission) free elections could be held. The object of
such elections might be a Constitutional Assembly or an actual permanent govern-
ment. In the interim, elections might be scheduled for district and provincial
governments. These are the most meaningful units of political control for most
Vietnamese. To proceed in this way would build into the peace settlement some
assurance that the population of South Vietnam would recover control over its
own political destinj^ at the earliest practical time.
International supervisory forces should be brought into South Vietnam under
the aegis of the negotiating conference. A natural starting point is the International
Control Commission (ICC) set up by the Geneva Conference of 1954. Both sides
have indicated a willingness to use the ICC as a point of departure. Insofar as the
provisional government establishes stable authority, the functions of the inter-
national forces could be reduced, and yet thej^ might be needed to restrain certain
militant elements on either side. Such a presence might also be of help in guarantee-
ing against reprisals.
4. TERMINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN
TROOPS
t
There should be an immediate halt to all offensive operations. "Search-and-
sweep," "sweep-and-hold" missions should forthwith cease; the raids b_y B-52
bomber planes of villages and towns of South Vietnam should be terminated
now; the bombing of Laotian territorj^ should be promptly ended. Military action
should be confined to passive defense. We view with grave concern the intelligence/
extermination program now operative which aims to locate and eliminate the
political and administrative leadership of the NLF to pave the way for Saigon's
control of the NLF hamlets prior to a political settlement.
Independent of the negotiations, the United States should without delay begin
moving troops out, without awaiting prior agreement on machinery to monitor
withdrawal of all American and North Vietnamese troops. Senator McGovern's
proposal for immediate large-scale evacuation of American troops (and his con-
demnation of the Saigon military dictatorship) are eminently sound.
The proposal of the American delegation; ''withdrawal of all military and sub-
versive forces of North Vietnam" back to the North — with "subversive forces"
apparently referring to diverse forces of the NLF — is not only unrealistic; it
carries forward to the negotiating table the untenable position advanced by earlier
administrations — that the NLF is a mere agent and creature of Hanoi.
The restoration of the demilitarized zone, proposed by our delegation, is aimed
manifestlj^ at sealing off the North from the South. This proposal seeks to imple-
ment only one point of the 1954 Geneva agreements but ignores the prohibitions
736
prescribed in the Geneva Accords against the introduction of foreign troops and
armaments into Vietnam and the protdbition against the estabUshment of bases —
prohibitions grossly violated by the United States. It was these violations and
South Vietnam's refusal, aided and encouraged by the U.S., to hold elections in
1956 which lie at the roots of the origin of the war. And the origins of the war
must necessarily be considered in evolving a just and reasonable settlement.
The ]3rovisional government whose establishment we regard as essential, would
direct the demobilization of all South Vietnamese armed forces on both sides,
along with the withdrawal from South Vietman of all outside forces, both North
Vietnamese and the American and allied troops, under the surveillance of the
international presence.
Successful negotiations may still leave some elements in South Vietnam in
danger of reprisals. On the side of optimism is the remarkablj^ favorable experience
of the amnesty and exchange of persons between the two zones after the first
Geneva Conference. On the pessimistic side is the cruel nature of the current
war. The United States owes an obligation to assist persons who felt they might
be in jeopardy because of the U.S. military withdrawal. The presence of the
international supervisory force and the functioning of the provisional government
should help mitigate against reprisals.
5. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT GUARANTEEING VIETNAM'S NEUTRALITY) THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS; THE NEED OP MASSIVE ECONOMIC AID
To promote an enduring peace in Vietnam, there should be an international agree-
ment guaranteeing Vietnam's neutrality and its freedom from any outside inter-
ference. Major questions such as reunification should be left to the Vietnamese
after the establishment of responsible government in South Vietnam and the
achievement of relative stability. It should be made clear that nothing in such an
agreement precludes eventual reunification of North and South should the
Vietnamese so decide. Provisions for commercial and cultural exchange, freedom
of movement, and postal service between the North and South might well be
included.
The United Nations could aid in promoting the long-range goal of stability in
Southeast Asia if mainland China and North Vietnam become participants in
the world community of nations. This would require that the issue of Chinese
representation in the U.N. be solved. North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, could
become an Observer at the U.N. with full opportunities to take part in the eco-
nomic and social programs of the U.N. sj^stem and with opportunities for diplo-
matic consultation at Headquarters. With Peking representation and with
agreement reached for self-determination in the whole area of Vietnam, steps
could be taken for some type of U.N. guarantee of the neutrality of Cambodia,
Vietnam and Laos. Underlying the immediate steps would be the broader ob-
jectives: the achievement of universality of membership in the U.N. and the
development of orderly processes for the attainment of security through peaceful
settlement, peaceful change, and the promotion of human rights and the rule
of law.
The achievement of a settlement of the Vietnamese war would open the way
to fulfill the long-delayed promise of massive economic aid to the people of Viet-
nam. To the indigenous problem of povertj^ has now been added the appalling
destruction of the war. The American people have a responsibility to assist in the
repair of the damage wrought to both South and North Vietnam by the war. It
is imperative that we do so if we are to prevent this area from becoming an
explosive center for bitter anti-Americanism in tlie future.
Aid must be openl}^ extended without strings attached. This is easier to do if
it comes under the auspices of an international body. Full advantage should be
taken of the machinery already existing vuider the United Nations Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East. Under its auspices plans for the INIekong
River development have been laid, projecting a technological revolution affecting
the lives of over 30 million people. And following the example of the United
Nations' response to the Congo crisis, a special emergency reconstruction fund
could be established under United Nations auspices which would mobilize the
skill and experience available through other international agencies. The Asian
Development Bank could be given a larger role and the Asian Institute for Eco-
nomic Development and Planning could greatl.y expand its efforts to train gov-
ernment officials.
These, then, are the guidelines for a solution to the Vietnam dilemma. The
past years of devastation and deadlock have shown the self-defeating nature of
737
military solutions to political and economic problems. A new approach must be
adopted.
The experience of Metnam has shown the need for American understanding of
the social forces impelling change in various areas of the world. The tragedy of
Metnam shows that revolutionary forces can turn to civil war, and civil war can
lead to outside intervention, and intervention can lead to an ever-widening arena
of conflict.
American understanding must become aware of the dangerous assumption that
the United States can determine the course of the whole world, either through
military power or economic power. It is important that the American people be
clear that our involvement in Vietnam always rested on unfounded myths. Chief
of the myths propagated by the prior Administration was (a) that the NLF was
an appendage of Hanoi (see Point 1) ; and (b) that our involvement was a response
to "aggression" by North Metnam (dealt with in the Appendix of this statement).
It is imperative to dispel these myths which sought to confuse and obfuscate
American public opinion and to rationalize our involvement in Vietnam. The
dissipation of these myths can clear the record and thus expedite a resolution of
this tragic war. We earnestly believe the implementation of the 5-point program
here advanced will assure an ecjuitable and honorable solution to the crisis in
Metnam.
We do well to recall Pierre Mendes Frances' promise in 1954 that he would
achieve a settlement of the Franco-Indochinese war in 30 days — a deadline he did
indeed meet. That is the sense of urgency that should invest the new Administra-
tion— toward the end of restoring our national prestige and paving the way for the
reconciliation and unity of our people.
It is fitting to recall, too, the great honor visited iipon President Eisenhower for
bringing the Korean war to an end. The early end of the Vietnam war would earn
for this Administration the gratitude of America and of all mankind.
Appendix
Myth Vis-a-Vis "Aggression" by North Vietnam
This proposition was advanced by former Secretary of State Rusk who, in his
testimonv before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January-February
1966, testified that the 325th Division (perhaps 8,000-15,000 men) of the North
Metnamese Army had moved into South Metnam at the close of 1964. However,
that testimony was belied by Secretary McNamara's statement on April 27, 1965
that evidence accumulated in March-Ai)ril 1965 (after we had begun combat
operations) confirmed merel>' the ijreseiice of a battalion "on the order of 400 to
500 men." Moreover, the Mansfield Report makes plain that significant armed
]iersonnel were introduced from the North only after the United States had inter-
vened at a ])oint in the war when "total collaj)se of Saigon Government's authority
appeared imminent in the early months of 1965."
Professor Quincy Wright, formerly President of the American Society of Inter-
national Law and a member of our Consultative Council, has noted, in his article,
"Legal Aspects of the \'iet-Nam Situation," which appeared in the October 1966
issue of the American Journal of International Law:
There seems to l)e no evidence that organized contingents of the North
Metnamese army crossed the cease-fire line until after the L'nited States
bombing attacks began in February, 1965. . . .
Ho Chi Minh's action in support of the Met-Cong did not constitute
aggression or armed attack in international relations but civil strife within
the domestic jurisdiction of \'iet-Nam, similar to the action of the North
against the South in the American Civil War. Whether called "intervention,"
"reprisals," or "collective defense," the United States' response by bombings
in North Viet-Nam, which began in February, 1965, violated international
law, the United Nations Charter, and the Geneva Agreement, if the latter
were in effect.
Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
which had conducted intensive hearings on the war in Metnam, noted in his book,
''The. Arrogance of Power" (page 107):
It is said that we are fighting against North Metnam's aggression rather
than its ideology and that the "other side" has only to "stop doing what it
is doing" in order to restore peace. But what are the North Vietnamese doing
except participating in a civil war, not in a foreign country, but on the
other side of a demarcation line between two sectors of the same country, a
civil war in which Americans from ten thousand miles across the ocean are
44-706—70 48
738
also participating? What are they doing that is different from what the
American North did to the American South a hundred j-ears ago, with results
that few of my fellow southerners now regret?
The falsity of the myth is extensively documented in Vietnam and International
Law, a volume prepared by the Consultative Council of the Lawyers Committee
on American Policy Towards Vietnam.
Statement by Mr. Klaus Loewald, Assistant Professor, Department of
Political Studies, Adelphi University
Given the prospect that the outcome of the war in Viet-Nam is a government
dominated bv Hanoi, and given the significance of United States involvement in
that war, it is reasonable and proper for the United States to consider its
responsibilities towards that country after the cessation of hostilities. This paper
attempts to deal with responsibilities to individual Vietnamese citizens.
There are in Met-Nam many citizens who would not wish to live under a
government dominated by Hanoi. There are the Vietnamese who fled from that
type of government once before. There are many who, selflessly or selfishly, worked
with the United States and its allies these past many years. There are others,
perhaps a large number, who cherish concepts of freedom and individualism in its
best sense, many of whom, partly for that reason, we do not as yet know. Such
people can expect little understanding or forbearance from a Hanoi-dominated
government.
It is the obligation of the United States and its allies to facilitate the
emigration of such Vietnamese as do not wish to live under a Hanoi-dominated
government. Together we have kept them fighting to avoid that fate, and this
statement is presented on the assumption that we shall not be successful.
I submit, therefore, that it is necessary for a nation claiming leadership among
free peoples to declare its readiness to take responsible action. The United States
ought to announce that it is prepared to oiDen its doors to ^'ietnamese refugees,
and it must ask its friends in the family of nations to do likewise.
While the activities of private organizations are necessary and laudable, the
size of the proposed task appears to require governmental action. So does its com-
plexity. The ordinary Vietnamese citizen today finds his efforts to obtain a valid
passport severely hindered by administrative action even if another country is
ready to offer him refuge. Nor must I necessarily condemn an administration for
its reluctance to assist in the wholesale emigration of its citizens. To obtain its
cooperation, I believe, allied governmental action is appropriate. In this connec-
tion, I am gratified by relevant statements by Senator McGovern. I urge the
Congress to take requisite action.
My impulse to submit this statement to the Committee stems from expressions
of an apparent popular desire to have done with Viet-Nam and to devote our
energies to the solution of domestic problems. This recurrence of a national desire
for a "return to normalcy" is disturbing, for even its earlier manifestation, after a
victorious war, was no long-term success nor, judging with the benefit of hind-
sight, could it have been. Today, it is neither realistic nor moral for the United
States to wash its hands of a turbulent international problem created largely by
its own actions.
I am aware of possible objections to my proposal. Cynics may say that Viet-JNam
ought to be left to its own devices as long as our domestic misery fares no better.
Learned argument may be advanced pertaining to differing cultural concepts in
Asia concerning the sanctity, if any, of life and choice. But I submit that American
moral and ethical standards, even if not shared by others, must govern our acts
toward them. It would be shameful that, approaching a situation which the
United States has led the costly fight to avoid— costly primarily to the Vietnamese
— this nation should now refrain from shouldering responsibilities pertaining to
the aftermath of that fight.
Statement by D. Gareth Porter, Ph. D. Candid.\te, Southeast Asia
Program, Cornell University
self-determination and the legitimacy of the SAIGON government: an
HISTORICAL analysis
The primary obstacle to progress in the Paris talks has been the status of the
Saigon regime led bv President Nguven Van Thieu. The North Metnamese and
the National Liberaliion Front, have insisted that no negotiated solution is possible
739
until the Thiou-Ky regime is replaced by a more representative government which
is willing to discuss seriously with them the establishment of an interim coalition
government, to administer national elections. The U.S. official position has long
been that we cannot abandon a government which was chosen through free
elections under a national Constitution promulgated in 1967.
It is thus on the alleged legitimacy of the present Saigon leadership that the
U.S. bases its refusal to agree to an interim coalition. It is argued that only by
honoring the 1967 Constitution and Presidential election can the U.S. uphold the
principle of self-determination in South Vietnam. Because the Saigon Constitution
and the Presidential election which it fostered have become the primary props of
the present U.S. negotiating stance, it is well to examine both of them carefidly
in light of the principle of popular self-determination which the}- are supposed to
represent.
On the basis of the following examination, the author has concluded that the
Thieu regime has no claim to legitimacy in the eyes of the South \'ietnamese
people, and that the political process cannot be said to have brought them self-
determination.
I. The Constitution: January 1966-April 1967
Premier Nguyen Cao Ky promised in January, 1966, that a "Council for a
Building of Democracy" would be established sometime after January 20th to
propose a draft constitution and that the constitution would be finished by
October and national elections held sometime in 1967. There was little enthusiasm
in Saigon for these plans, since it seemed clear that the military would keep the
entire processs carefully under control and the ultimate shift in authority to
civilians would be put off indefinitely. Moreover, even this tentative timetable
disappeared from view after the meeting in Honolulu between President Johnson
and Premier Ky in February, 1966. The final communique promised to "build
true democracy" and to write a Constitution "in the months ahead", but failed
to repeat the pledge for assembly elections in 1967.' The U.S. declaration gave its
support to the "purpose of free elections proclaimed by the Government of South
A'ietnam", indicating the low priorit}' which a freely elected government held in
American policy .^
In March, 1966, the first real pressure for a popularly elected National Assembly
came from the militant Buddhists. For several weeks, the Buddhists and their
allies effectively controlled Hue and Danang, the two major Central \'ietnamese
cities, as they demanded elections for a Constitutional Assembly and real legi.s-
lative powers for the Assembly once the Constitution was written. Ky and his
fellow generals were determined, however, to appoint the committee which would
draft the constitution and keep all legislative powers in their own hands until a
new government took office.^
A political congress in April, whose members had been appointed bj' the military
junta supported the demands of the Buddhists rather than the position of the
Generals and further asked that the rebellious Central Vietnamese cities be paci-
fied by political rather than by military means.'' Although Thieu and Ky signed
an order establishing Assembly elections within three to five months, the other
recommendations of the political congress were ignored when Ky's troops were
sent in American planes to Danang and then Hue to occupy them and arrest all
those who had defied the government and carried on demonstrations.
Then Ky proceeded to issue an electoral decree which brushed aside the recom-
mendations of both the political congress and a later electoral law conmiission
appointed by himself, which had called for an assembly which woiild have legis-
lative powers beyond the drafting of a constitution. Kj''s electoral decree pre-
scribed a second election in 1967 for a legislative assembly, leaving the junta in
power until after that assemblj^ was elected. ' Moreover, the Buddhists, who
under the electoral commission's plan would have been able to use their religious
symbol, the red lotus, which had been verj^ successful in 1965 local elections, were
denied the right to use it in Ky's decree. And the junta's complete control over
the screening process would allow it to keep out any undesirable candidates on
the grounds that they worked "directly or indirectly for Comnumism or
neutralism." ^
1 New York Times, January 16, 1966.
2 Text in George McT. Kahin and John \V. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: Dial Press,
1967). pp. 442-5.
3 New YoTk Times, March 29, 1966.
* Ibid.. Apr. 14, 1966.
5 See Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., p. 258.
nbid., pp. 258-9.
740
One da\' after issuing the election law, Kj- ordered a Ranger battalion to raid
the Buddhist headquarters in Saigon, and all the monks, nuns and laymen were
removed and between thirty and forty leaders were arrested.^ In Central Vietnam,
several thousand soldiers, five or six hvmdred officers (including all the regimental
commanders and six of twelve battalion commanders of thi' first division, who
had given their allegiance to the Buddhist struggle Movement) were arrested
along with 200 students from Hue and Danang, 400 monks and several members
of the Hue University faculty.* Thus the organizational structure which had
sustained the Buddhist movement's political campaign was shattered.
Even with the only coherent opposition group eliminated from competition,
the jiuita did not refrain from using its power over the military machinery to
insure a favorable result in the September, 1966 As.sembh" election. As Bernard
Fall noted, a "seemingly innocuous provision" in the electoral decree permitting
soldiers to vote wherever they happened to be stationed at the moment, rather
than by absentee ballot, could be used to insure victory for a mmiber of candi-
dates." Since the constituencies were provinces, a division of troops could give a
lagging candidate a big boost. Naturally, since there were not enough divisions
to distribute among the candidates, some promises were not kept. The fifth divi-
sion had reportedly been promised to a candidate in the fifth district of Saigon
but was rerouted to the Delta to vote when it was learned that the chairman of
the People's Armed Forces Council (the enlarged Armed Forces Council), Tran
Van Van, was in danger of losing. "^
The major U.S. public relations effort on the Assembly election was focused
not on the meaningful choice which was presented to the electorate — an absurd
theme under the circumstances — but on the high rate of voter tiu-nout, which
demonstrated, it was said, both the weakness of the Met Cong and the high
interest and support of the \'ietnamese for their government. According to Saigon's
figures, 80 percent of the registered voters, or 4.2 million, went to the polls, an
impressive display of political participation. ^^
This exceptionally high rate of voter turnout was certainly an important
characteristic of electoral politics under the military junta. But it was nothing
new to South Vietnam; as one anti-Communist political organization noted
during the summer, the Vietnamese people had learned what rigged elections were
through one referendum, three national assembly elections and one President
election under the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem.^- In all of these votes, the percentage
of eligible voters who went to the polls was over 80 percent. (The average for the
legislative elections was 85 percent, the figure for the Presidential election was
93 percent) .^3 xhe method of insuring such turnouts was described succinctlj'
by the U.S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam as follows: "Officially, there is no
fine or penalty attached to non-voting. The authorities, however, tend to regard
voter participation as a criterion of loyalty, and the citizen may find his motives
questioned if his identity card does not show that he has voted." '^
This tradition was continued by the military junta in 1966. The police and civil
servants distributed voting cards to these who did not pick them up, and few
voters believed that it was a matter of choice for them.'^ The government's attitude
toward voting was further underlined by its i^olicy toward those who tried to
organize a boycott of the vote as a protest against unfair electoral arrangements.
In the II Corps area, the Corps Commander, Vinh Loc, told local government
officials, police and army officers to arrest all those who opposed the election. '^
South Vietnamese police were given special powers to shoot on sight anyone found
agitating against the election, and on August 31, a man discovered ripping down
a government election poster in Saigon was shot and killed when he tried to flee."
When the results of the election were announced it was clear that the members
of the Constituent Assembly were highly conservative representatives of the well-
educated middle and upper class and that the assembly would be "safe" from the
jimta's standpoint. In fact. Article 20 of the electoral decree had provided that
' New York Times, June 21. 1066.
8 Robert Shaplen, "Lettpr from Saigon," The New Yorker, August 20, 1966, p. 124; New York Times, Feb-
ruary 2, 1967; tin tunng (Paris), September, lOfifi. p. 13.
" Bernard Fall, "Vietnam: The Search for Stability", Current History, January, 1967, p. 11.
>" Denis Warner, "South Vietnam's Political Awakening", The Reporter, November 17, 1966, p. 42.
<i Fall, loc. cit.
'2 .Joint Coinnmnique of the Front nf Citi:ens of all Relieiions and Political Organizations, July 9, 1966. The
Front is an interfaith group led l)y the strongly anti-Coniniiinist Catholic priest Father Quynh.
'3 Robert Scipliano, South Metiiaiir. Nation Under Stress (Boston: IIoughton-Mifflin, 1963), p. 96.
'< Quoted in Marshall Windmiller, "Thi> Vietnam Elections" Ramparts, November, 1966, p. 4.
15 Washington Post, September 11, 1966.
■6 III id.
I" //Md., August 31, 1966.
741
the head of the junta could modify legislation at will unless two-thirds of the
legislature overruled him.^** And as one deputy said after polling the membership
on Article 20, "It is impossible to get a two-thirds vote of the Constituent As-
sembly in favor of anvthing that goes against the government's wishes". '^ The
leader of a major bloc in the Assembly, Saigon publisher Dang 'Wan Sung, made
no secret of his willingness to help the junta write a constitution through which a
general wearing civilian clothes could govern South Vietnam.^"
The intention of the jiuita to maintain an iron grip on the creation of the new
Constitution was indicated once again when in the first week in December, 1966,
the government signed a letter rejecting any effort to modify Article 20 or limit
its power to overrule the Assembly.^^ At the same time officials from Thieu's office
suggested that a compromise might be worked out, meaning that the Assembly
would accei)t the government's revisions before passing important Constitutional
provisions, in return for a pledge not to use the veto.^^ A series of meetings between
the junta and assemblymen began for the purpose of incorporating military
demands into the draft document. Thus the assembly would avoid humiliation,
while the junta maintained control over the final produce.^^
The two major issues on which the Assembly changed its position under the
junta's pressure were the power of the legislature to dissolve the cabinet and
the election of province chiefs. Originally, the Assembly had favored a provision
which would have given the legislature power to dissolve the cabinet by a vote
of two-thirds of both houses. The junta was adamantly opposed to any such
power in the hands of a legislative body, so a compromise was adopted which
made anv overturning of the government highly improbable. A vote of three-
fourths of l)oth houses was required in the final draft. Similarly, on the question
of electing |jrovince chiefs, the junta flatly opposed it and the final draft gave the
President the power to delay such elections for four years.2<
When the assemblv insisted on claiming sul:)stantial legislative powers for itself
during the transition stage after the adoption of the constitution, the junta went
to great lengths to force a retreat. Long after the above-mentioned compromises
had been hanmiered out behind the scenes, Lt.-Gen. Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary
General of the National Leadership Council, went before the Assembly to demand
that there be no provision for electing j^rovincial chiefs and that the President
should have the right to dissolve the legislature. General Thieu himself threatened,
in effect, to nuUifv the bodv's efforts by veto or, if necessary, by dissolving it,
unless it agreed to modify seven articles, including the one concerning legislative
powers during the transition. In the end, the Assembly satisfied itself with the
power to write an electoral law, ratify treaties and other minor legislation.-^
Thus the Constitution was the offspring of a strong military junta and a weak
Assemblv, a large minoritv of which had already agreed to cooperate with the
junta in return for being elected with military help. The junta had used its power
to suppress or intimidate any opposition and had maintained tight control over
the entire political process leading up to the creation of the new Constitution.
The way was then open for the use of the new formal structure to insure continued
rule bva military man bevond the 1967 Presidential election.
Premier Nguven Cao Kv lost little time in making clear his intention of running
for the Presideiicv in 1967! Early in Fet>ruary, 1967, he began to refer to a military
ticket in the Presidential election, which all military men would be expected to
suijport. Kv's plan to head that military ticket became clear when posters began
appearing around Saigon extolling "the Government of Nguyen Cao Ky" as "the
government of the poor" well ahead of the time when the campaign was to begin.
The U.S. could have made it clear that it preferred an election in which the
administrators of the balloting were not at the same time identified with a ma]or
candidate. But instead American policy was to remain aloof while the election
was svstematicallv rigged to insure military victory. Most American officials,
from the White House to the Embassy in Saigon, believed that government by
military men insured "stability", which was the primary U.S. concern while the
U.S. military buildup went forward.
'* Kaliin and Lewis, oyj. cit., p. 260.
•9 Christian Science Monitor, November 10, 1966.
2" London Olwrver, September 18, 1966.
21 New York Times, December 3, 1966.
22 Ibid, December 15, 1906.
23 London Obserrer, Januarv 25, 1967.
■» A'eto York Times, March 15, 1967.
25 Ibid.
%
742
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: MAY 1967-SEPTEMBER 1967
When the issue of a runoff election arose in the Assembly, followers of civilian
candidates wanted the U.S. to take a stand in favor of the runoff, since without
it, a united military ticket would have an easy job of winning against several
civilian candidates. But U.S. officials made no attempt to influence the outcome.
The pro-jimta bloc in the assembl.v supjjorted a single election, while nearly a
third of the meml)ership stayed away from the voting. The runoff was thus
defeated 44 to 36.-'' The U.S." did use its influence, however, to make sure that
the rivalry between General Ky and General Nguyen ^'an Thieu was resolved
and that a single ticket represented the military. The result was a slate in which
Ky accepted second place to General Thieu.-'
Of the thirteen candidates who filed for candidacv, two were ruled off the
l)allot bj^ the junta. Ky's own former economics Minister, Au Truong Thanh, a
yoiuig, able and respected Southerner, entered the campaign to draw support for
an end to the war, and adopted the slogan "Ceasefire" and the campaign symbol
of a bomb with an ''X" over it. A few davs after the filing deadline, one of Ky's
agents in the assembly filed a petition with the electoral committee urging Thanh's
elimination from the ballot, charging that he was a communist. At a press con-
ference, the National Police accused Thanh of having been active in a Communist
"intellectual proselytizing committee" in Saigon, but the two documents sup-
ported no such accusation. One was a "self-confession", written bv Thanh after
being arrested by Diem's secret police in 1959, in which he admitted only to
having a "left-leaning political credo". The other, purporting to be a report by
a captured Viet Cong agent, charged him with making one pro-communist state-
ment in a conversation.^^
When the Assembly met to pass judgment on the eligibility of Presidential
candidates one-third of the membership stayed away, and Thanh's candidacy
was soundly defeated.^^ At the same meeting, the Assembly voted 54 to 14 to
rule out the candidacy of General Duong Van Minh. The pretext was that Tran
Ngoc Lieng, had at one time held dual French-\'ietnamese citizenship and was
therefore not a ^'ietnamese citizen — an unique interpretation of citizenship. ^'^
Premier Ky had earlier announced the decision of the junta that General Minh
would not be allowed to return from exile in Thailand, regardless of the election
results.^'
Vietnamese were convinced by this time that the elections would be fraudulent.
The respected Catholic leader Father Hoang Quynh, who maintained close con-
tacts with rvu-al Catholic priests, told an interviewer that his "intelligence sources"
had reported that a province chief had already received orders that a "certain"
ticket was to win the election. He denounced the election as "window dressing." ^2
The general feeling was that the administrative, police, and military networks
were Ijeing used by Thieu and Ky to insure victory.''^
Early in the campaign civilian candidate Tran Van Huong, a former Mayor
of Saigon, charged at a news conference that in six Mekong Delta provinces
soldiers had been issued two voting cards, province chiefs had ordered their sub-
ordinates to i:)roduce votes for the generals, and his own campaign workers had
been threatened. Huong added that he expected "voting frauds in faraway
places where the foreign press does not go." ^* The representative to the Constituent
Assembly from Go Cong province in the delta immediately added that the
Province Chief there was actively sui)])orting the military ticket, urging civil
servants and military personnel to do likewise and trying to intimidate Huong's
campaign staff.^^
Shortly after Huong's charges, President Johnson said that these charges were
no different from campaign charges in the U.S. He noted that American cam-
paigners allowed themselves the "luxury of a great many rash statements and
criticisms" and i)redicted there would be more of such statements in South
-'6 Washinqton. Post, May 8, 1967.
2' Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1007.
28 New York Times. July 9, 1967.
2» Ibid. Julv 10, 1067.
30 Francos 11. Craiphill and C. Robert Zelnick. "Ballots or Bullets; What the 1967 Klections could mean,
Vietnam: Matters far the Acienda. A Center Occasional Paper (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Demo-
cratic Institutions, 1967). p. 21.
31 Dan Tien (Saigon), July 7, 1987.
3-' Christian Science Monitor. .July 9, 1967. .
33 Robert S. Browne, "Memorandum on the Current Political Situation in Vietnam": Congressional,
Record. .July 24, 1967. p. A3708; Washinqton Post, July 24, 1967. ^
34 New Yorii Times, August 16, 1967.
35 Tin Song (Saigon), August 17-18, 1967; Thanh Cliung (Saigon), August 17, 1967.
743
Vietnam as the elections approached.^'^ But while the charges were being flip-
pantly dismissed, the U.S. embassy received from its own reporter in Go Cong
province confirmation of those charges. The Province Chief, it was reported, had
implied his suppoi't for Thieu and Ky at a meeting of government officials on
election procedures, while Huong's local representatives had been warned to
terminate their campaign activities. The report also disclosed that the pacifica-
tion program cadre in the province's priority district had played an active cam-
paign role on behalf of the militarj^ ticket, tearing down all civilian candidate's
posters and replacing them with those of Thieu and Ky, among other activities.^^
The Johnson Administration, intent on assuring the U.S. public that the
Vietnamese elections would be fair, invited senators, governors, mayors and other
selected political and academic figures to go to \ietnam to observe the election for
four days. 3* The move appeared to civilian candidates as part of a sj'stematic
effort to legitimize the election of Thieu and Ky, which they considered a foregone
conclusion.*" "The foreigners will never understand the subtleties of government
manipulation", Huong said, admitting that bringing them in was a shrewd move
by Thieu and Ky.^"
N'ice-Prosidential candidate Dr. Phan Quang Dan meanwhile declared that the
government had issued duplicate voting cards and carried villages on the electoral
roles which had long been depopulated. ''^ In part to remind American observers
that there was more to rigging elections than might be observed in a four-day visit
accompanied b}- government interpreters, the committee supporting one of the
candidates issued an extensive guide to election-rigging practices based on both
previous elections and current practices. ■'^ Nevertheless, none of the American ob-
servers appeared to grasp the potentialities for both fraud and intimidation by the
Saigon government. The naivete of these observers was epitomized in the remark
by New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes, who said, "If peasants are pressured or
intimidated, they can call their policeman." "
On election day, the atmosphere in Saigon was charged with fiu'ther accusa-
tions of fraud. A' group of highly respected political figures not connected with
any candidate circulated the results of a survey which named 54 districts, or
one in evt^ry six, in which officials were reported to have been ordered to insure
a Thieu-Ky victory .^^ The following day, seven of the ten civilian candidates
lodged protests with the Assembly concerning voting fraud. ^^ A spokesman for
Huong pointed out that he had been badly defeated in his native city, Vinhlong,
while Phan Khac Smi, a former Chief of State, had run a miserable fourth in
his hometown, Cantho.'"' Suu's running mate. Dr. Phan Quang Dan, complained
of the "absurd vote" which Thieu and Ky had gotten in Gia Dinh Province,
where he had maintained a free medical clinic for years and had won impressive
electoral victories in the past, but this time had finished fourth."
Gia ]3inh province appears to be one of the many cas(is of election fraud at
the district level or above. As David Wurfel has pointed out, Gia Dinh, where the
Province Chief was a relative of National Police Chief Nguyen Ngoc Loan, was
the province with the most spectacular rise in registered voters between June
and August — over 80,000 — and it provided a margin of more than 100,000 votes
for the military ticket, the largest in the countrj-.-'^
Not the least of the cases of fraud, it appears, was in Saigon itself where
Huong was the announced winner by a slim 2,000 votes. Weeks later, civil servants
who had participated in the counting disclosed to an American reporter that Gen-
eral Loan had ordered a narrow victorv for Thieu, but that Huong actually won
the city by some 20,000 votes."
A significant survey carried otit by a New York Times reporter in twenty
villages revealed that in many villages, the clerks and poll-watchers had been
38 AVw York Times, August 17, l'.)67.
37 Interview with Carl D. Robiasou. former Chief Research and Programs, CORDS, Go Cong Province,
Saigon, Jnlv, 19fi8.
3- New Y'ork Times, August 24, 1967.
3« IVnshington Post, Soptomher ti. 1067.
40 2Vi?j/, York Times, September 1, li)ti7.
" Ibid.
'- Snigon Post, September 2. 1967.
" nail Strtcl Journal, September C, 1967.
" Neie York Times. September 3, 1967.
" Ibid, September 5, 1967.
«« Ibid, September 6, 1967.
17 Ibid.
<« David Wurfel, Preliminary Report on Vietnamese Election, unpublished manuscript, September 21,
1967, p. 6. According to Shaplen. 22,000 votes were said to have been added to the Thieu-Ky ticket's total
at a late hour. New Yorker, October 7, 1967, p. 154.
*« Critchfield, op. cit., p. 356.
744
brought in from outside the village by the district chief and that regulations
requiring that election results be posted for each polling place were ignored.*"
When the poll-watcher was from the same village, stories of voting fraud some-
times got out. One American told the author of a poll-keeper in Dinh tuong
Province in the Mekong Delta who showed him an official tally sheet giving
Huong 80 per cent of the vote and the militarj- ticket only 20 per cent. Yet the
district chief had reported the results as 80 per cent for Thieu and 20 per cent for
Huong.5'
The voting system in Vietnam also lent itself to fraud at the polling place,
although it is likely that it was much less significant than district or province
level fraud. The only way of checking to see that ballots were not added by
officials was to compare voting card corners clipped with the number of ballots
cast. Extra voting cards issued to military personnel and their families, the
addition of voting card corners, and proxy voting by village officials were all
possible. Wurfel reported that the percentage of invalid ballots was much lower in
rural than in url)an areas, despite the prevalence of illiteracy in the former,
raising the probability that proxy voting was quite widespread where no election
ol)servers were present. ^^
Outright fraud was only a part of the whole picture of electoral manipulation.
It woidd appear that the informal pre-election pressures on voters also played an
important role in the 1.6 million total vote for Thieu and Ky. One indication of
this strategy was the removal of the Deputy Province Chief for Security in Long
An Province in August, because, according to U.S. officials, he was not supporting
the military ticket.^^ An American official in one Delta province reported to the
Embassy that "strong and inordinate pressure" appeared to have been exercised
by higher GVN officials, most notably the Province Chief, to support the Thieu-Ky
slate. The Deputy Province Chief, a Huong sup])orter, said he thought Huong
would win in the province capital, but the outcome in the countryside was
"questionable" because of pressure from District Chiefs and outpost commanders.
Village and hamlet officials were told by the Province Chief that if they did not
vote for Thieu and Ky, "they would be kicked out."*"*
As always at election time, A'ietnamese felt obliged to go to the polling booth.
People were threatened with the loss of their identification card if it was not clipped
as evidence of having voted.** Moreover, there was a widespread belief among
Vietnamese peasants that if they discarded the three-striped national flag (the
symbol on the military ticket's ballot), they would be considered disloyal.*'' And
since in many villages, only Thieu-Ky posters could be found, the sense of obliga-
tion to vote for them was heightened.
There were some provinces where manipulation by the military was either very
limited or nonexistent. Tay Ninh province, for example, the home of the Cao
Dai "Holy See", with a high percentage of Cao Dai followers, had a more honest
election, according to U.S. and Metnamese officials there, than most other prov-
inces, due to the Cao Dai province Chief, a former Viet Minh, Colonel Ho Due
Trung.*7 Thieu and Ky were defeated there by Truong Dinh Dzu, 40,000 to 30,000
primarilj' because of Dzu's strong stand on ending the war.
There is no way of knowing what percentage of the military ticket's total \'ote
was produced by fraud or pressure. The important point is, however, that Thieu
and Ky felt obliged to resort to such techniques to insure victory despite the fact
that they had already ruled out their most popular competitors and despite the
fact that it would have been difficult for any military ticket to lose against a
large field of mostly imknown candidates — unless it was intensely unpopular.
Thus the evidence of electoral imjiropriety is also evidence that the military ticket
was highly sensitive to its own lack of popular supiiort.
Despite the fact that both the South Vietnamese military and the U.S. govern-
ment viewed the Presidential election as a means of legitimizing rule bj^ the mili-
tar}^ elite, there is much evidence that it had precisely the opposite effect. Student
disgust at another rigged election provided the impetus for post-election protests
which brought participation from the universities at Can Tho as well as from the
50 New York Times. September 26, 1067.
51 Interview with Dennis Rothaar, formerly IVS refugee aide in Dinli Tuong province, July, 1968.
5- Wurfel, op. cit.. p. 10.
53 New York Times. August 31, 1967.
5< Interview with Robinson.
55 Interview with Rothaar.
sij Francois Sullv, "The Elections in Luong Hoa," unpublished report in files of N'eivsweek Bureau, Saigon ,
September 5, 1967.
5" Interviews in Tay Ninh Province, July, 1968. One year later. Col. Trung was removed on the pretext
of corruption, despite his apparent effectiveness and popularity, Wasliington Post, September 14, 1967.
745
Buddhist Van Hanh University. At a news conference after the elections, the
Saigon Student Union's Executive Committee expressed its disapproval of a con-
gratulatory message sent by President Johnson to General Thieu before the
results had been officially validated.'^ Police raided the Student Union's head-
quarters and removed posters calling for strikes to protest the rigging of elections.**
Eight of ten civilian candiates meanwhile formed a "Militant Democratic
Opposition Front" to demand that the Assembly invalidate the election results.
On September 21, the "Democratic Front" demanded the annulment of the
elections and a caretaker government to organize new ones. It also sent a letter to
Ambassador Bunker demanding an end to U.S. political intervention in \"ietnam
and warning specifically against U.S. intervention to have the elections validated
by the Assembly.**"
Confronted with a government which had been elected by fraudulent means,
University student leaders were driven for the first time to oppose the continuation
of the war itself. On September 23, the Presidents of the Executive Committees
of the Student organizations at Saigon, Van Hanh and Can Tho Universities,
addressed an open letter to President Johnson and the American people which
began by noting that U.S. intervention in Vietnamese politics had "led the Vietnam-
ese People to believe that the Americans are replacing the French Colonialists." "
On September 30, .oOO students protested in front of the Assembly Hall against the
rigged elections and, after they were informed that the Assembly's election com-
mittee had voted 16 to 2 to throw out the results, stormed the government's huge
election scoreboard and began tearing it down.^^ -pwo days later, when students
tried to move toward the Assembly to demonstrate, they were cut off by police and
beaten. Many students were arrested and drafted immediately into the army,
including the Chairman of the Student Union, Ho Hun Nhut, and two other
student leaders, who tried to hold a press conference in the Student Union com-
pound to protest "terroristic and oppressive police measures". ''^ Rather than fight
for the Saigon government, Nhut and several others defected to the N.L.F. at
the onset of the 1968 Tet offensive and emerged the following May as Chairman
of the "Saigon Students Committee for Peace", which was explicitly aligned with
the National Liberation Front. *^*
It is signilicant that it was only after the 1967 Presidential elections that the
Front was able to attract the first significant group from Saigon's inteUigentsia
to leave the city and joii\ them since the Front was founded in 1960. One
member of the "Allianc(! of National Democratic and Peace Forces" which
emerg(>d after the Tet Offensive had been on the "Council of Notal)les" api)ointed
by the first post-Diem military junta; another had Ik-cu Saigon's superintendent
of primary schools for two years; a third was a well-known woman doctor. And
two other former officers of the Saigon Student Union (one of whom had worked
closely with Americans on social service projects) ulso joined the Alliance.*"'
The bitterness felt among Buddhists, students, and intellectuals over the
rigged election was certainly a major contributing factor to the narrowing base
of political support for the "military regime in the following two years. Far from
increasing its h'gitimacy in the eyes of the population, the Presidential election
merely debased the electoral process itself and incn>ased the cynicism of
Vietnamese toward their government and toward the war itself. As the opinion
surveys conducted by the U.S. mission indicated, by the end of 1967, most
Vietnamese did not believe that the power to make war and peace lay with the
Saigon regime. They bc^lieved that the Americans were prolonging the war, either
to test military techniques and weapons or for economic reasons.**^
Given this ijackground, the policy of maintaining the present Saigon regime in
power can hardly be viewed as consistent with self-determination. The invocation
of that principle on behalf of the present U.S. negotiating position is bound to be
viewed bv most Vietnamese as merelv a signal of bad faith.
■''' Tieiig \'ano (Saipon), September 14, 1967.
59 Dan Chunq (Saigon). September 14. 1967.
60 Dan Tien (Saigon), September 23, 1967; Song (Saigon) September 22, 1967.
61 English translation of the original text.
«-■ Tieno ^'ang, October 2, 1967.
63 Saigon Post. October 8, 1967: H'ashington Post, October 7. 1967.
«< Xa'y Dung (Saigon), Mav 31, 1968; Washington Post. June 26, 1968.
65 IVashingion Star. Mav 12, 1968; Christian Science Monitor. May 8, 1967; Robert Shaplen, "Letter From
Saigon," The New Yorker. Jmie 29, 1968.
66 JVew York Times. December 6, 1967.
746
Memorandum on the Justification of Our Vietnam Policy
(By Charles A. Weil)
I am a retired business man, student of, and writer on geostrategy, which
I define as relating foreign policy to strategic capabilities as affected by geography.
I am author of the first and only book published to defend American military
presence in Vietnam exclusively from the geostrategic, national security, aspect.
This statement is a synopsis of that book, "Curtains Over A'ietnam", the basic
conclusions of which no top level military professional could criticize, not even
General Shoup; that military access to South \'ietnam is absolutely indispensable
to the U.S., global balance of power policy and American security.
It would not be surprising if its members, along with so many intellectuals,
were predisposed against my views, since there is not, I believe, a single book
other than my "Curtains Over Vietnam" that presents the geostrategic, national
security stake of this country in Southeast Asia as it does.
I can't know whether its considerations were ever presented in closed hearings
to this committee. I am certain they have never been elicited in ojjen hearings to
educate the public and break through the "paper curtain", the conspiracy of silence
of our academic media complex. No wonder the war is unpopular. It has never
been convincingly explained.
My conclusions stand or fall on whether or not a forced landing is, and always
he, feasible on a shore defended by a power with nuclear capabilities; whether or
not such a forced landing would be deterred.
Every other consideration is sham, immaterial, irrelevant or transcended.
President Johnson declared the kej' to Vietnam was really our own securitj-.
President Nixon said the same. But neither gave reasons for their bare allegations,
reasons I am about to propound that not a single top level military expert con-
sulted disagrees with. And only the military are qualified to judge.
The main thrust and novelty of my testimonj^ is the disclosure of a suppressed
geostrategic reason for Vietnam's importance to security, to a power equilibrium ;
the indispensability of an independent South Vietnam, access to which cannot be
denied in a contingencj^, by conventional or tactical nuclear capabilities of a
potential enemy such as China and/or Russia.
Splitting the atom also split the global equilibrium into two interlocking parts
with two different strategies; the conventional traditional balance of power and
strategy, and the nuclear balance and strategy, super-imposed on the former, and
a public opinion split from stem to stern.
There is no experience at all with the latter. It is therefore doubtful whether
we can successfully relate Viemam directly to the atomic balance (or balance of
terror or mutual deterrence).
But we still can, and have to, relate the conventional equilibrium to the nuclear;
to preserve the former, so as not to involve ineluctable resort to the latter in
extremis, or siu-render if the conventional balance be irretrievaloly upset in favor
of the bloc, as Chou en Lai said it would have been by what he though was the
effect of the 1954 Geneva parlej-. For to such conventional equilibrium. Southeast
Asia was, and continues to be, an integral and vital geostrategic element.
The conceptual confusion as to global equilibrium and failure to distinguish
between its two parts and strategies brought confusion of strategic terms that has
rent our public opinion as involved misapplications of the untried a priori methods
of nuclear strategy to conventional warfare; such as flexible response, escalation,
and graduated deteri-ence; that simply don't apply to conventional war and
strategy. It produced the misapprehensions as to Vietnam's importance and the
strategy indispensable to its preservation that split the country.
For mobility, outflanking, which necessarily involves escalation, are indis-
pensable to conventional strategy, especiallj^ of seapower.
The Vietnam conflict is a global power balance, preventive war according to
high administration statements. They are confirmed by geography and the "real
politik" that involved us in three prior overseas wars since we became, what
Theodore Roosevelt said in 1910, "the balancer of the whole world." It is to
preserve the "precarious balance" between the maritime, or insvdar world and
the continental heartland of Eurasia.
The conventional strategy of such a world balancer, or insular linchpin as
successfully proved by Great Britain was, has been, and is for us, today as Liddell
Hart described it,
"Seaborne expeditions against the enemy's vulnerable extremities."
And as Gneisenau advised England against Napoleon, on many fronts to
747
"Force him to have his armies run from one end of his empire to the other"
However, such multiple fronts, exploiting the mobility of seapower requires the
capability of landing expeditionary forces on such extremities that have been,
and are generally, peninsulas for many reasons, logistical and tactical, defensive
and offensive, as in World War II.
That necessitated, therefore, the independence of many widely dispersed
nations with parallel vital interests, on continental littorals with peninsulas, for
allies and contingency beachheads in depth. Such prerequisites are all the more
urgent if the potentially continental coercer has nuclear capabilities it could not
resist using against the concentrated, vulnerable target of a seaborne landing
force, like Eisenhower's 4,000 vessels in Normandy; especially when it lacks con-
ventional and logistic capabilities, as is the case with China.
There are twenty-three peninsulas in Europe available to seapower to preserve
the balance or contain a continental coercer there as, France was under Louis XIV
and Napoleon; Germany under William II and Hitler; and now Russia. But
against Russia and/or China in East Asia there are only five peninsulas: Korea,
Liaotung, Shantung in the North, and Luichow and Southeast Asia in the South.
The three first are all too near each other and our Korean beachhead, to China's
Manchurian arsenal, and to the terminus of Russia's Trans Siberian railroad.
By law of supply and demand, each Asian peninsula is strategically worth more
than any of the twentv-three European salients into the laws of seapower, such
as France, Spain, Italy or Denmark, attack on any one of which would bring us
into instant war.
Tlie independence of peninsula beachheads for a maritime linchpin is a con-
sideration I have never seen in print, in all the verbiage on Vietnam, except as
attributed to foreign statesmen and military men, and my own books, significantly
not reviewed in a single newspaper or mass circulation periodical.
The Russians and Chinese are not only aware of the above U.S. grand strategy
but have repeatedly avowed objectives to thwart it by driving American forces
off the Eurasian landmass.
So, our lack of candor fools no one l)ut our own public and that of nations with
parallel vital interests, and only handicaps effective implementation of our con-
ventional strategy to forestall concpiest eventually or strategic nuclear warfare as
only alternatives.
South Vietnam is not only on a peninsula with potential access to China, but a
position from which the strjitegic straits of Malacca can be attacked or defended.
It is far from Kor<>a, China's Manchurian arsenal, the terminus of Russia's Trans-
Siberian railroad and has excellent harbors for landing personnel and materiel. It
is peninsular in character, logistically, with good roads miming North-South but
few widely separated East-West connnunications through mountainous defiles,
vulnerable and easily blocked.
\'ietnam could well i)e our last clear chance if the domino theory proves right.
Better safe than sorrv; better hedge our bets.
Offshore islands; Japan, Taiwan and Indonesia; won't do if only because not on
the mainland, necessitating forced landings, perhaps impossible against Chnia's
growing nuclear capabilities.
Thailand is an inadequate springboard since it does not jjrovide access to China
because of mountains and lack of roads to China and the South China Sea. Alone,
it is difficult to defend from Laos.
Malaya is too far from China, and can easily be defended from the North, not
from the South.
However, Laos is the key to A'ietnam, according to President Kennedy an
General Westmoreland. It touches all countries of the peninsula and has no value
at all except strategic, providing the only means of access for materiel and per-
sonnel from China and North \'ietnam to the South via the Ho Chi Minh trails.
The 1962 treaty made it a buffer state. Instead, the enemy is using it as com-
munications zonein violation of that treaty. If such violations cannot be stopped
by diplomacy, they have to be stopped hy military action. Since bombing can't do
it, only ground action can save ^'ietnam. If \ietnam is a key to our security, Laos
is Ihe key to Vietnam.
The flow of personnel and materiel through Laos must therefore be stopped at
all costs, short of strategic nuclear war. No peninsular campaign has been waged
and won in modern warfare without a defended line and protected flanks to bar
communications and supplies. No guerrilla war has ever been lost where the guer-
748
rillas have been effectively cut off from replacement of men and supplies by a
defended line or sea blockade.
Such 120 mile Laotian line is well within the capabilities of South Vietnam and
allies and would compel the enemy to fight the kind of war we can fight and support
and the kind they can't. They are too far away, too poor industrially, and have
inadequate access roads though the.y are starting to build some.
Many objections have been raised, none of which have an iota of merit, that
within the restricted compass of this expose can be dealt with, if raised on cross
examination, I am prepared for. Each and every such objection can however be
demolished. Most are sham, immaterial and irrelevant or transcended by the prior-
ity of national survival over any and ever.y other consideration.
Now we are threatened by avowed enemies with control of an indispensable piece
of real estate, with the reasons for preventing it, having been suppressed by our
academic media-complex whose paper curtain would have the iron and/or bamboo
descend over it.
No general circulation newspaper would publish such reasons even in letters to
editors. No trade book publisher would publish my book setting them forth. No
general circulation periodical would publish such an article. No one would even
publish a review of my book. No TV or radio station would allow such reasons to be
broadcast or of the existence of such a book with such reasons.
No wonder the war is unpopular. No wonder intellectuals, who only know what
they can read, protest against it. No wonder the campus unrest. No wonder Mr.
Nixon ignores a public opinion deliberately kept in ignorance by that paper
curtain.
I also deeply deplore not having been accorded a personal appearance and sub-
jected to cross examination, as I also wrote Senator Fulbright with copy to Senator
Javits. For this statement is only a synopsis of a 155 page book in which I may well
have overlooked or ineptly expressed some point on which some committee member
might well have sought clarification.
Secondly it is most probable that in the sciu-ry it will only be filed and forgotten,
not even read b}^ all members of this committee whose opinion it might have served
to influence.
Finally it raises the presumption that such cross examination would not have
impaired the validity of its thesis. '
Difference in Figures on Refugees Moving South
The Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of July 20,
1954, provided in article 14(d) for the movement of civilians from either "zone"
(i.e., North \'iet-Nam or South Met-Nam) to the other during the period author-
ized for the regroupment of military forces (specified elsewhere as 300 days).
During this period, which lasted from Julv, 1954 through Mav, 1955, an esti-
mated 850,000 to 900,000 residents of North" Viet-Nam moved to the South. (An
unknown iDut much smaller number of persons moved from South to North.)
The historian Joseph W. Buttinger, who himself uses the estimate of "nearly
900,000 persons", states that a principal reason for the lack of any precise number
of refugees is that the files of the South ^'ietnamese Refugee Commissariat were
burned in a fire during fighting in Saigon in the spring of 1955.'
There is a substantial and well-organized Northern Catholic community in
South Met-Nam todai/, which by most estimates — taking into account the large
Catholic component of the original refugee group and their descendants, who share
many of the same political and ideological points of view — numbers well over a
million persons, perhaps as many as a million and a half. The total Roman Catho-
lic population of South Viet-Nam today — ethnic Northerners and ethnic Southern-
ers alike — is believed to number about two million persons.
' Buttinger, Viet-Nam: A Dragon Kiiiliattled (New York: Praeeer 1067), Volume II, pp. itOO and 1116-
1117.
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Aiken, Senator George D.: p^^^
Examination of witnesses:
Clement, Brig. Gen. Wallace L oroi^-^V- t^fi'-'-^Q
Colbv, William E 94-96, 31o-316, o32
McCarthy, Senator Eugene E -a^'-nn'an^ aoo
MacDon^ld, Donald G tl~f,^A't^r~fd
Wallace, Sgt. Richard D 312,314-315,333
Case, Senator CHftord P.:
Examination of witnesses:
Arthur, Maj. James F 190, 210-211, 335, 337-338, 412
Clement Brig. Gen. Wallace L 460-461
(element, ciig 470-471, 484-485, 548, 558, 560-565
Colby, WiUmmE^^. .^.^_^. -;^^^^ '280-2827309-31 1," 333; 336; 339, 354!
406-407 409 415
Geek, Capt. Richai'd T 334,336,339-340,410-412
McCarthy, Senator Eugene E ~ ' li a
mSp'S^LS"''" ::::::"208:209,ll3
MurphyrCapt. Arniand::::::::::"276:27§, 280-284, 334-336, 4 n-4 12
Vann, John i22;2li-2i2,'28i,l02,"308-309,l38,'346r3M, 413-415
Wallace, Sgt. Richard D 333-334,336,340,409-410
Wheeler. Col. Jesse L., ^^-'^^^:,,^-^^^^^^i-,s:omJd
Church, Senator Frank
Examination of witnesses:
McCarthy, Senator Eugene E «!•.
McCloskcy, Congressman Paul N., Jr o4o
Cooper, Senator John Sherman:
Examination of witnesses: ,
Clement Brie Gen. Wallace L oo^-ooo
Colbv, William e' 18, 34-42, 203-204, 268-269
McCarthy, Senator Eugene E..-. 178-182, 186
Mills, Hawthorne 04 «" oat ovn
Murphy, Capt. Armand ?! ^' t5I"7?^-
Vann, John 114-121, loo
Fulbright, Senator J. W.:
'''^" A'rth;;"'M»r j";;:r^ 100-162, 190, 192-194, 196-197 213-^214
^'™™^,^^l/40t«r4?2h74r4-8l\-4¥47«:i8Sr50i-.m^^^^^^
513, 519, 523-526, 532-545, 547-552
Colby, Winiam_E^^.-------^--------------;^------:^^,^-- 3 .^^
Geek, Cap"t^ Richard T 257, 272, 284, 288, 316-317
IT , /^-Ji- Tp OOO
3^c^ci^wuuamK::::::::::::::::::::ii4-2J6,2^^^^
Knaur, Peter R 511, 513, ol4, ol9-o20, .o22, o41, 551
'^^^''°"^^''"^"l7:ft77:579:595:600:609:6ni615:618-619:621-623
McCarty, Senator Eugene E 163-170, 172, 174-175, 183-188
McCloskey, Congressman Paul N. Jr 636, 644-6ol
McManawav, Clayton ::;;-; ^o" ;-;"; -^" ; co ov?
Mills, Hawthorne 135-143, lo5-li>6, 158,271
(749)
750
Fulbrisht, Senator J. W — Continued
Examination of witnesses — Continued Page
Murphv, Capt. Armand 2o7-267, 271-276, 284, 316-137
Nickel.' Edward J 654, 659-694
Osborne, Mr 664.668
Sharpe, WiUard D . 608
Vann, John 89-93,
97-111, 123-127, 133, 140, 143, 157-159, 195, 264, 271,
29t>-308, 317, 320-321, 323-325, 353-357, 405-408
Wallace, Sgt. Richard D 257,286-288,311-315,338,410
Wheeler, Col. Jesse L., Jr 44.5-448,
460, 469, 472, 483, 487, 505-506, 508, 514, 535-538, 542, 546-
547, 552
Gore, Senator Albert:
Examination of witnesses:
Arthur, Maj. James F 197-198
Clement, Brig. Gen. Wallace L 456-458
Colby, William E 132-134, 198-202
Macbonald. Donald G 588
McCloskev, Congressman Paul N., Jr 640-642
Vann, John 120, 122-123, 131-134
Sparkman, Senator John:
Examination of witnesses:
McCarthy, Senator Eugene E 170, 172-174
Javits, Senator Jacob K.:
Examination of witnesses:
Colbv, William E 276
Murphy, Capt. Armand 276-279
Vann, John 115
Mansfield, Senator Mike:
Examination of witnesses:
Patrick J. McCrone —
Clement, Brig. Gen. WaUace L 518-521,526-531
Knaur, Peter R 521-522
Wheeler, Col. Jesse L. Jr 529
McGee, Senator Gale W.:
Examination of witnesses:
Colby, WiUiam E 42-52
Symington, Senator Stuart:
Examination of witnesses:
Colbv, WiUiam E 27-34, 271, 290. 299, 322, 32.5-326, 328, 330-331
Geek, Capt. Richard T 272, 289, 290
Hitchcock, WiUiam K 232-235
Murphv, Capt. Armand 270-271,273
Vann, John 272, 290-297, 321, 326-330
PeU, Senator Claiborne:
Examination of witnesses:
Arthur, Maj. James F 346
Colbv, WiUiam E 340-342, 344-346
Geek, Capt. Richard T 346
Murphv, Capt. Armand 346
Vann, John 343-345
WaUace, Sgt. Richard D 346
WiUiams, Senator John J.:
Examination of witnesses:
McCarthy, Senator Eugene E 182-183
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