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CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DIARY
GERMAN NAVAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
Part A Volume 8
April 1940
DECLA JORDS
-
WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF
(Operations Division)
PART A
April 1940
Chief, Naval Staff: Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr.h.c.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff; Vice Admiral Schniewind
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff: Rear Admiral Fricke
Volume 8
begun: 1 April 1940
closed: 30 April 1940
I,
t 'I
'I
CONFIDENTIAL
, ill
V5:
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Washington, D. C.
Foreword
1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to
translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval
Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German
Naval Staff , operations Division Part A, Volume 8 is the twenty-
fifth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow
shortly.
2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they
contain a day by day summary of the information available to the
German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof.
Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the
German Navy, 1939-1945., which have been published by this office,
the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of
naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A,
is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War
II; references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval
Records and ■ Library \^i
3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited
number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that
the copies which have been distributed are made available to other
offices which may be interested.
Washington, D. C.
1949
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Notes:
Documents, instructions, special orders and
minutes: see "Reference Pile Weseruebung" in War Diary,
Part B, Vol. V, page 120 (Special volume).
>
CONFIDENTIAL
<*
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1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway
According to repeated reports from agents, differences
of opinion are said to exist between Great Britain and France.
France is said to desire immediate action and to demand
increased pressure on neutrals, while Great Britain is more
inclined to delay. Great Britain allegedly hopes to be able
to effect an estrangement between Russia and Germany,
With regard to Norway, it is expected in London that the
Western Powers will take stronger action, at first in that
German merchantmen can no longer be permitted passage through
Norwegian territorial waters and Norway is forced to stop this
traffic by means of political pressure from the Allies.
Reuter states that Great Britain will not penetrate by
force into neutral territorial waters or take similar illegal
steps. "United Press" reports that in London it is being
semi-officially denied that Great Britain is planning to patrol
Scandinavian territorial waters, land troops in Norway or
occupy ports there.
Reports from Norway and Great Britain express opinions
on the subject of ore shipments via Narvik and come to the
conclusion that exports of Swedish iron ore to Germany via
Narvik have sunk to a fraction of what they were in peacetime,
while ore shipments to Great Britain show a marked upward trend.
The Swiss Ambassador in Stockholm reports to his Government:
German and British landings on the Norwegian coast
are directly imminent. (See also Foreign Press
and Foreign Press (Naval news)).
2. The German publication of documents is still being
discussed with unusual excitement in the U.S.A. Roosevelt
and Hull have described the documents as unauthenticated and
as a transparent German propaganda maneuver. The general
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CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
opinion in neutral countries is that Germany has abandoned
hope of improving her relations with the U.S., A., and wishes
to prevent Roosevelt's re-election through the publication
of the documents.
3. The Norwegian Government has protested to Berlin about
the torpedoing of the steamer STEINSTAD off the Irish coast
on 15 Feb. while en route from Turkey to Norway. The ship
was sailing between two neutral countries with freight for a
Norwegian firm. There was a Government guarantee that the
cargo would not be re-exported from Norway.
(For further particulars see War Diary, Part C, VIII.)
r
Afternoon:
The Commander of the LUETZOW, Captain Thiele, reported to
Commander in Chief, Navy to give notice of departure and for
final conferences with Naval Staff. The ship will be ready
to sail for the Atlantic in a few days after the period in
dock necessary for completion of remaining work.
During numerous conferences held lately complete agreement
has been established between Naval Staff and the Captain - who
has adapted himself and his ideas to his cruiser warfare
assignment in an excellent manner - on all questions of
operations in the Atlantic, on interpretation of the operational
order and on all individual military and political questions
and those of International Law.
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CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Great Britain:
According to radio monitoring, the old battleship RODNEY is to
go into dock. The agent's report about damage to the RODNEY
by a bomb hit on 16 March is thus confirmed to a certain degree.
France:
According to an agent's report a British convoy is said to
have left Dunkirk today, destination unknown.
No items about naval forces.
North Sea:
No alterations of note in the movements of the Home Fleet.
A report from Great Britain mentions the rumor that the
battleship NELSON was also damaged by a bomb hit on 16 March.
Intelligence Center, Belgium reports that in the air attack
on the convoy east of the Shetlands on 28 March one ship
(EARL CASTLE) was sunk, five damaged and one escort cruiser
("D11 class) likewise damaged.
A convoy seems to have l.eft the Norwegian coast on 31 March.
Own Situation
Order from High Command, Navy:
Summer time from 1 April.
1. Summer time is to be used in home waters in orders and
reports, also in communications for the duration of
summer time.
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CONFIDENTIAL
1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
2. G.M.T. still applies in foreign waters.
3. Submarines are all to use German summer time in
foreign and home waters.
4. If other times are used in exceptional cases, these
are to be explained by a footnote, e.g. 1400 "C.E.T. ".
Atlantic:
Nothing to report.
North Sea :
No reports from Ship "16n and Ship "11", so that operstions
may be presumed to be proceeding according to plan. The
air reconnaissance scheduled for Ship "16 as far as the
Shetlands-Norway channel had to be recalled because fog came
down in the central North Sea.
The 11th Patrol Boat Flotilla was unsuccessfully attacked by sis
Wellington bombers on route "Blau".
One Blenheim was shot down by a fighter over the North Sea,
According to observations made on 31 March, the Air Force
reports that we must count on the possibility of the enemy
using camouflaged planes with an Iron Cross (He 111) for
reconnaissance over the Heligoland Bight and to provoke
incidents over neutral territory. (They are possibly planes
which the enemy has purchased from Turkey. )
Baltic Sea;
Shipping possible from Kiel-Swinemuende-Pillau except for
local hindrance from drift ice; conditions good off Pillau.
Ice difficulties between Sassnitz and Trelleborg. Route
through the Sound blocked by heavy pack ice. Passage through
the Great Belt only slightly impeded by ice.
2 submarine chasers in the Skagen area,
2 on return passage.
Investigation of the barrage situation in the Great Belt and
repair work in the Gjedser Channel continue. Group Baltic
reports that there is no longer any objection to passage
through the Great Belt.
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1 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
A plane on air reconnaissance accidentally flew over
Danish territory in bad visibility and was fired on.
The survey vessel METEOR was commissioned as command ship
for Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic in "Weseruebung"
Submarine Situation
Atlantic/Northern Waters;
Off Narvik:
Off Trondheim:
Proceeding as Ship "16M,s
escort:
North Sea:
Peterhead area:
East of the Orkneys:
?:
On passage:
U "46".
U "51".
U "37".
U "22".
U "38", "43", "52"
U "44".
U "13", "58", "59"
Merchant Shipping
Disposition of German merchant shipping on 1 April:
1. In home waters:
(Ships over 1,600 GRT) 578 ships =
Of these -
On Scandinavian run:
7.5 ships, totaling 250,603 GRT.
(16 under 1,600 GRT)
of which 51 ships in Norway.
68,
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CONFIDENTIAL
1 April* 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
On Holland run: m
3 ships, totaling 4,504 GRT.
2. In neutral ports; 218 ships a 25.6$
of these anchored: 26.
The following cannot return:
a) Because of unfavorable
situation of their
anchorages, (Mediterranean,
Black Sea, Red Sea,
Persian Gulf)
73 ships
(f 5 without radio).
b) Scheduled for special duties:
40 ships.
3. At sea, homeward bound:
Returned home to date:
115 ships = 13.5$
4. Lost: 53 ships - 6.2$
(+ 2 without radio and
1 trawler)
849 ships • 100$
A review of German ships which have put out, homeward bound,
from ports overseas and have arrived during the war shows
the position to be as follows:
Sailed in January 1940:
5 ships, of which lost: 1 ship = 20$
returned successfully 4 ships = 80%
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1 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Sailed in February 1940:
11 ships, of which lost:
returned successfully
Sailed in March 1940:
4 ships, of which lost:
returned successfully
8 ships • 72.7$
3 ships ■ 27.3$
3 ships
1 ship
75$
25$.
The motor vess-el SEATTLE, coming from Curacao, arrived
in Tromsoe with a valuable cargo.
The Ministry of Transportation has informed us that following
elimination of the ships held In the Dutch East Indies, the
ships in Japan will now also not be sent through the north-
eastern route this year, since no cargo can be obtained for
these ships.
It would be extremely re
cargoes at all were to s
eastern route from East
the necessary cargoes fo
to sail could have been
planning. According to
the cargoes so far avail
oil are so small and the
transported by the safe
grettable if no ships and valuable
ucceed in reaching home by the north-
Asia this year. In Naval Staff's opinion
r the ships lying in Japan in readiness
obtained by prompt and large-scale
the Ministry of Economics1 statement,
able of soya beans (40,000 tons) and
refore so valuable that they are to be
railroad route.
1330 - 1800:
At 1330, after breakfasting in the Chancellery of the Reich
with the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
the commanders of the individual landing groups and Commander,
31st Corps also the Commanding Admirals and commanders of the
individual naval task forces and the Air Force commanders
reported on the arrangement and execution of their operations
during "Weseruebung".
The Fuehrer demanded most exhaustive reports from all the
officers and asked many questions. In conclusion he stated
his complete agreement with the preparations made ana expressea
his thanks for and recognition of the work performed during the
preparations •
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CONFILENTIAL
1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
(For minutes of the Fuehrer' 3 address then given to the
officers present see reference file "Weseruebung" , War
Diary, Part B, V, 120.)
See also individual questions, 2 April.
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway
Reuter announces: The possibility of a significant
intensification of the blockade cannot be denied, but the
Allied Cabinets and the Supreme War Council have so far
announced nothing.
The British press goes into detail on the problem of Norway
and on the subject of the imminent intensification of warfare.
Although 8ny out of the ordinary or illegal action by the
Western Powers against the neutrality of a neutral country is
denied, "the Allies would take such action that neutral
territories are no longer used by the Germans in order to
break the blockade."
The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, states in an interview
with the press:
"Norway protests with the same energy against the German as
against the British violations of Norwegian neutrality.
The material harm caused to Norway by Germany is deeply
regrettable; Britain's violations of neutrality are, however,
different and often did not affect Norwegian material interests
so much as her honor and independence."
Norwegian political circles appear to be expecting Great
Britain to send a note to the Norwegian Government within a
short time, demanding that Norway forbid ore shipments from
Narvik to Germany.
2. The German publication of documents is still dominating
the entire U.S. press. In the House of Representatives,
Republican Fish demanded the appointment of a committee of
five within 30 days to examine the documents.
It cannot yet be foreseen how the publication of the White
Paper, which has caused noticeable unrest among the American
people and has undoubtedly rendered Roosevelt's position more
difficult, will affect the presidential elections and the
U.S.A. 's attitude to Germany in the weeks ahead.
-9-
CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
3.
According to a communication from Copenhagen, the
Danish Government has established that the steamer EDMUND
HUGO STINNES was definitely inside territorial waters when
she was sunk. It is intended to protest to London, demanding
the release of the Captain and compensation.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items;
1. "Weseruebung":
During yesterday's conference with the individual
commanders of the task forces, the Fuehrer reconsidered whether
it was possible to send the destroyers alone to "Nlenburg"
and to refrain from using the battleships in the northern area,
since it is feared that the British Fleet will be prematurely
alerted by them.
The question of holding the battleships back was also discussed
by individual group commanders on the basis that it might possibly
be better that the battleships should first advance with the
"Bremen" Group, and should appear rather in the central North
Sea, i.e. south of the operational area, in order to avoid a
general advance alarm in a northerly direction already two days
before "Woserday", and in order to concentrate the enemy's main
attention on the battleship group in the south for the purpose
of relieving the northern groups.
Naval Staff thinks otherwise and is of opinion that the
previous plan of operations must be adhered to under all
circumstances.
The aim of the first operation for the success of "Weseruebung"
is to bring the destroyers safely through to "Nienburg" and
the 2nd Group to "Detmold". In order to carry out this
movement it may be necessary for the northern groups to fight
their way through the light forces and perhaps also heavy
cruisers in this area. The destroyers, limited in freedom
of movement and readiness for action by the numerous troops
on board, are as good as delivered defenseless into the hands
of a superior enemy if they come up against light forces.
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Naval Staff therefore regards the advance by the battleships
into the northern area as a necessary condition for successful
operations by Groups "Nienburg" and "Detmold" • If the battle-
ships are retained in the south and the enemy is therefore
forced to concentrate on the southern area, Naval Staff
considers that the prospects of a battle with a superior enemy
are increased. This, however, is just what is to be avoided.
There are, on the other hand, good chances of gaining effective
successes if the battleships clash with light forces or heavy
cruisers in the northern North Sea and the northern area. Even
the destruction of one enemy cruiser might have consequences
which would decisively influence the course of "Weseruebung".
There is undoubtedly the possibility - and Naval Staff must
take it into consideration - that the enemy will detect the
battleships' departure with the 1st and 2nd operational groups
on "Weserday" - 2 and that enemy forces will be given the
alert. It may, however, be expected that the enemy will not
draw any conclusions as to such a significant and comprehensive
operation as "Weseruebung". On the contrary there is the
possibility, if further air reconnaissance takes place on our
movements towards the northern area, that the enemy will
conclude it to be a break-through by Atlantic merchant raiders
and will concentrate his countermeasures in the area Iceland-
Shetlands, with a special view to the area north of the
Shetlands. The focal point of countermeasures may thus possibly
be diverted from an area in which Naval Staff considers danger
to the light German forces operating there specially undesirable,
i.e. in the Bergen/Southern Norway area, where the "Bremen"
Group would be particularly exposed to enemy measures.
Naval Staff adheres to its previous operational considerations
for the reasons given above: The battleships will protect the
advance of Group "Nienburg" and Group "Detmold" as per directives
already issued.
2. The Fuehrer has ordered that the question of a surprise
operation to secure the bridge near Vordingborg over the
Storstroem be examined, since the maintenance of the bridge is
of great importance for Army transport.
Naval Staff objects strongly to such an operation from the sea.
It is not possible to approach the bridge from the east because
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
of the Danish Groensund barrage. Motor fishing vessels
could approach from the west and transport roughly one
reinforced company. The main difficulty, however, lies
in the necessary very premature use of the inner Danish
channels which are normally closed to any foreign traffic
by the Danes. Advance warning by several hours (8bout five)
is hereby unavoidable. Naval Staff therefore urgently
advises Armed Forces High Command against the execution of
such an operation.
3. The Fuehrer has also ordered an examination into the
question of despatching an old battleship to "Kassel". (For
list of cover-names see reference file "Weseruebung"), to attain
an expressly demonstrative effect and to prevent the departure
of forces lying in the harbor and also the Government's
escape.
Naval Staff must reject such an operation for military and
navigational reasons. Putting-in of an old battleship drawing
8 m. would involve great difficulties; the ship would be
within range of the strong coastal fortifications both during
and after putting-in. If, however, she remained outside the
range of these guns, the desired political and demonstrative
effect would not be achieved. Further, the premature alarm -
which would be given at latest during passage through the
Helsingborg/Helslngoer Channel - is also of decisive importance
in this question.
On Naval Staff's advice, Armed Forces High Command will refrain
from despatching an old battleship. The HANSESTADT DANZIG
transport operation previously planned will, therefore, be
adhered to.
4. Group West's request that a torpedo boat flotilla be
withdrawn from "Weseruebung" for use in Operation "Gelb" is
refused, since "Weseruebung" requires the use of all available
combat forces.
5. In view of the Fuehrer's decision, Naval Staff has given
Group West permission to use aerial mines, effective immediately.
6. The Swedish Foreign Minister, in a confidential
conversation with the German Ambassador, requested that the
German Naval Attache, Rear Admiral Steffan, be recalled speedily,
as he considers him seriously compromized in connection with
various Swedish investigations into cases of trade espionage.
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The German Ambassador expressly repudiated the accusation
of espionage.
Commander in Chief, Navy orders the recall of Rear Admiral
Steffan in order to avoid further undesirable discussions.
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic :
Great Britain:
The following are at present suspected to be in the Northern
Patrol: BERWICK, GLASGOW and SOUTHAMPTON. The YORK seems
to have been relieved and to have put in to port.
Daventry produces a report according to which the crew of the
British tanker EL CIERVO, which has arrived in Halifax,
believe they sank a German submarine by gunfire on 4 March
off Trinidad. This must be regarded as a political report
for the purpose of influencing the South American States by
propaganda.
France:
Nothing special to report.
North Sea:
The cruisers GALATEA, SHEFFIELD, CAIRO, CALCUTTA and a number
of TRIBAL class destroyers are at sea on convoy duty. (The
GALATEA was 50 miles east of Pentland Firth in the morning.)
British preparations for troop transports to Norway?:
For result of investigations regarding a number of ships
lying in readiness in Glasgow, apparently to transport troops,
see Appendix to War Diary, B, Vol.V, 128.
Own Situation
Atlantic:
Nothing to report.
3" CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
North Sea:
In order to protect Ship "16"Ts break-through one Do 26 of the
Transocean squadron took off from Travemuende on special
reconnaissance. The flight lasted more than 18 hours, as
far as roughly 65° N, but no vessels were sighted apart from
some neutral merchantmen at about 62° oOf N. No reports
from Ship "16" so it can be assumed that she is proceeding as
planned.
One of the special trawlers disposed for reconnaissance off
Iceland transmitted a weather report; strong east wind and
showers •
Ship "11" has carried out her assignment (mlnelaying east of
Smith's Knoll lightship). Not possible to penetrate to
convoy route because of patrols. Mines (90 EMC's and 84
explosive floats, type C) were laid as planned in the alternative
area east of Smith's Knoll. (See brief report on Ship "11" 's
operation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. V., page 127.)
Commander, Naval Air's reconnaissance sighted destroyers east
of Lowestoft and had a brush with enemy fighters. One damaged
He 115 was sunk after a forced landing. The crew was picked
up by another He 115.
The 10th Air Corps sent out during the afternoon 10 planes of
the 30th Bomber Wing to Scapa and 11 planes of the 100th
Bomber Wing against convoy traffic east of the Orkneys/Snetlands.
Three light cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels were
observed in Scapa. The presence of a balloon barrage at 200 m.
was detected for the first time.
Bomb hits in the immediate vicinity of the sides of two
destroyers were scored in attacks. Success doubtful, especially
since several planes experienced technical trouble with their
bomb-release gear. Light and heavy anti-aircraft defense.
Own Losses:
1 plane shot down, 1 missing over Germany.
The planes of the 100th Bomber V/ing encountered several convoys
east of the Orkneys. Attacks unsuccessful.
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Baltic Sea:
Ice Situation;
Shipping unimpeded from Kiel to Pllleu; southern part of
the route through the Sound still very difficult, Great Belt
passable • Passage possible through the Little Belt.
After new barrage markings are laid It is expected that the
difficulties in the barrage gaps will be eliminated in the
next few days.
The 1st Patrol Boat Flotilla has taken over barrage patrol
in the Little Belt.
Submarine Situation
Atlantic:
Unchanged.
North Sea:
U u43", "38", "52", "44" (?) received orders to return.
U "13" is proceeding Into the operational area east of
Pentland Firth. U "22" is south of the latitude of the
Pentland Skerries. U "58", "59" are on passage west of
the Orkneys.
Merchant Shipping
Losses :
According to a British announcement, the MIMI HORN was
stopped last week by a British warship in northern waters,
set on fire and scuttled by her own crew, all of whom were
saved. (Ship sailed from Curacao on 4 Mffrch.)
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The steamer LUISE LEONHARDT reports from Oslo that on 20 March
she was attacked by British bombers west of Esbjerg, outside
Danish territorial waters. No hits*
Mediterranean;
Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Affairs/intelligence
Division has received a report that British control ships
have put into the Adriatic in order to capture the German
steamer ANKARA (put in to Dubrovnik at the end of last week)
when she leaves Jugoslavian waters. The report sounds
untrustworthy, even though we must expect the ANKARA to be
under constant observation in view of the enemy's excellent
agent network. The report is being investigated.
Afternoon
Decision of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces :
The execution of wWeseruebungM is ordered. The special
importance of keeping the coming measures secret is pointed
out. "Weserday": 9 April. *Wesertimew: 0515.
(For Fuehrer's order see "Weseruebung" file.)
On the basis of this order Naval Staff issues the following
instructions on the evening of 2 April:
1. To Group West, Group Baltic, Commanding Admiral,
Submarines and Fleet Command:
Subject: "Weseruebung"
1. "Weserday" is 9 April.
2. When issuing further orders and taking other
measures avoid unusual volume in the interests
of secrecy.
(Ski. I op. 616/40.)
-16-
CONFIDENTIAL
*
*
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
2. Naval Staff, Service Division, Transport Branch has
been ordered to send off the first steamers of the
"export" unit as scheduled. These are, to begin
with, the steamers for "Nienburg"?
BAERENFELS
RAUENFELS
ALSTER and the tanker
KATTEGAT .
3. The Naval Attache in Moscow is Instructed to
despatch the tanker JAN WELLEM from Base North to
"Nienburg".
4. Instructions to Group West, Group Baltic and Fleet,
based on a directive from Armed Forces High Command:
Swastika flag to be painted on the foredeck and
after upper deck in addition to markings already
ordered.
5. With regard to the cruiser LUETZOW, Chief, Naval
Staff reports to the Fuehrer on Naval Staff's pl8n
to despatch her into the Atlantic in the course of
"Weseruebung" and requests permission for this.
At tbe request of Armed Forces High Command, the
Fuehrer decides that the LUETZOW ia to embark a
contingent of 400 men for "Detmold" and be incorporated
in the 2nd Group. After the troops have disembarked
at "Detmold" she is to put out into the Atlantic.
Orders to this effect are issued to the sections
concerned. Embarkation of the troops is ordered
in Wilhelmshaven. The Commander of the "Detmold"
Group will still be the Commander of the "HIPPER",
as previously scheduled. The supply ship NORDMARK
is to be sent out within the Bergen Group.
"Weseruebung" has begun with the Fuehrer's order snd Nav8l
Staff's executive orders. Thus commences an operation
ranking as one of the boldest in the history of modern
warfare. Its execution proved to be necessary to protect
-17-
CONFIDENTIAL
2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
vital German interests and to ward off attempts by enemy
powers to exclude Germany from sources of raw material.
The fulfillment of the task entrusted to the Armed Forces
in the execution of "We se rue bung" North and South is of
decisive importance in the war.
Within the whole operation demands involving great
responsibility are made especially on the Navy. The
success of the whole operation will depend on the efficiency
and readiness of all naval forces participating and also on
the determination of each individual naval officer entrusted
with command. Execution and protection of the landing
operation by the Navy will take place nrinclpally in an area
where not Germany, but Great Britain is in a position to
exercise naval supremacy with superior forces.
It is of decisive importance for the successful execution of
the whole operation that the enemy and the countries to be
occupied be taken by surprise.
The success of the operation will therefore depend on the
degree to which secrecy has been and will be maintained
during the next few days until "Wesertime" • Naval Staff
has constantly expressed objections and endeavored to have
the first transport operation limited to naval forces and
not to have "export" units and sea transport units operate if
possible before "Wesertime". Despite this, the number of
merchant transport steamers with material, personnel, horses,
vehicles, etc., which have been assembled and in readiness
for a long time and are to be sent out before "Weserday", has
reached such a proportion that the slightest incidents may
cause previous warning and endanger the surprise execution
of the operation.
With regard to naval measures, thanks to the careful
preparations made by all the naval offices concerned for
"Weseruebung", Naval Staff awaits the operation with
confidence. The fulfillment of our operational task will
and must succeed if every commander is determined to reach
the goal set him. Chief, Naval Staff again summarizes the
importance of the operation and the necessary factors for
success in a directive to all Commanding Admirals, Commanders
and Flotilla Commanders and expresses his reliance on the
resolute will to fight 8nd win of all naval units taking
part.
(For directive see reference file "Weseruebung".)
-18-
CONFIDENTIAL
3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Change in the British Cabinet (according to Reuter,
to coordinate more closely the work of the different
Ministries). Lord Chatfield, the Minister for Coordination
and Defense has resigned. Churchill becomes Senior Minister
for the three Armed Services. Air Minister Kingsley Wood
has been replaced by Sir Samuel Hoare.
These slight alterations in the British Cabinet are on the
whole unimportant* The resignation of Lord Chatfield,
acknowledged to be a particularly sound man, indicates
differences of opinion within the Government.
2. For Chamberlain's speech about the intensification
of economic warfare and increased pressure on neutrals, see
Foreign Press. Great attention and anxiety among the neutrals.
It is assumed that very soon Great Britain will ration severely
or stop altogether all imports of raw materials from overseas
to neutrals, unless they pledge themselves to cease trading
with Germany. Special mention is made in this connection of
the cutting-off of ore and oil imports and the suppression of
Russian transit traffic.
Shortly before the speech "Havas" reports that Great Britain
and France will probably give the neutral countries a final
warning before taking draconic steps towards protecting
Norwegian territorial waters. Great Britain would allegedly
first exhaust all diplomatic means of pressure before she
undertook naval action to cripple Norwegian iron ore shipments
to Germany. Appropriate British notes to Norway and Sweden
are said to be in course of preparation.
3. Report from the German Embassy in Oslo regarding the
Norwegian Government's diplomatic step on 2 April against
the Western Powers. Protest against continuance of the
threat to Norwegian territorial waters by France and Great
Britain. For extract from the interview between Norwegian
Foreign Minister, Koht, and Reuter' s representative see
War Diary, Part B, V, 129.
4. An agent in Denmark reports being informed by a
Danish officer that in case of a German attack resistance
will be offered under all circumstances; military measures
have been taken for this purpose on the southern frontier.
Contrary to their views of some months ago, military circles
are now of the opinion that Germany is in a more favorable
military position than Great Britain.
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3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
5. The German Embassy reports that Roosevelt, by-passing
the War Minister, has accomplished deliveries of planes for
the Western Powers. In spite of the exasperation of public
opinion over Great Britain's blockade measures, Roosevelt is
determined to extend the U.S.A. 's war economy efforts on
behalf of the Western Powers in such a way that an Interest
for Allied victory arises in the U.S.A. for economic reasons.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the state of
"Weseruebung" :
a) For readiness of forces see reference file
"Weseruebung".
b) The first three steamers of the camouflaged
"export" unit and the tanker KATTEGAT for
Narvik sailed during the night of 2 April.
Chief, Operations Division again points out
the fact that the use of steamers of the
"export" and 1st Sea Transport Units represents
an extremely undesirable risk (for the execution
of the whole operation), since the enemy and the
Norwegians will be given previous warning in case
of the slightest incidents. Naval Staff's great
objections to the use of these steamers, which
will make their appearance several days before
"Weserday", have already been pointed out several
times to Armed Forces High Command, Group 21.
In spite of this, Armed Forces High Command, Group
21 Insists on its demand for these steamers.
c) Boehm's Staff (Commanding Admiral, Norway) has
set out its proposals for subsequent defense of the
coastal route, (see "Weseruebung" file). Chief,
Naval Staff agrees in principle to the requests
made for provision of defense forces (4 patrol
boat flotillas, 2 PT boat flotillas, 2 torpedo
boat flotillas, 8 small submarines). The date when
they will be provided however, cannot be promised,
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i'
\
3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
as It will depend on the situation.
d) Naval Staff consents to Group West's proposal
to extend the Skagerrak barrage by further
sections. (See letter in "Weseruebung" file.)
2. Report on request from Group West (North Sea Station)
regarding different measures in Operation "Gelb".
(Occupation of Rot turn, shock attack on Delfzyl by motor
minesweepers and PT boats. Penetration into the canals.
For particulars see Group West's letter.) Naval Staff is
of the opinion that special naval warfare in this area can
on no account be considered. The available units of small
boats must moreover be used in "?/ese rue bung". Only the
occupation of Rottum Is therefore agreed to.
Special Reports on the Enemy;
Atlantic;
Great Britain;
Disposition of forces;
The battle cruiser HOOD appeared in the Gibraltar area on
28 March. The ARK ROYAL Is in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The cruiser CALEDON stopped an Italian tanker west of Cephalonia
on 1 April.
It may be concluded from the fact that Port "A" (Loch Ewe)
has, for some time been appearing repeatedly in radio traffic
that the heavy forces are staying in this base more frequently.
France;
Nothing special to report, apart from some convoys detected.
North/Sea Channel;
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet and the WARSPITE, also the
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3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
BIRMINGHAM, appear to be at sea, apart from the vessels at
sea on convoy duties or in the Northern Patrol named several
times.
"Weseruebunjft
According to reports from Kirkenes and Aalesund, enemy naval
vessels have not appeared there for the past few days*
A report from Narvik states that the two armed coastal vessels
EIDVOLD and NORGA have put in to defend Narvik and that two
submarines are still expected.
Opera tion "Gelb":
A merchant captain reports from Delfzyl that a steamer loaded
with sand is lying there in readiness to block the harbor
entrance.
Own Situation;
Atlantic:
Nothing to report.
North Sea;
No surface force activities. Air reconnaissance as far as
61° was carried out as planned; it spotted a convoy north
of Viking Bank.
(Escorted by 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers.)
The 10th Air Corps sent out 15 planes of the 100th Bomber Wing
and the 50th Bomber Wing against the convoy reported; 17
planes of the 26th Bomber Wing also took off for an offensive
sortie in the direction of the Orkneys. According to the
Air Force report, the following successes were scored:
Severely damaged or sunk:
2 patrol boats off the east coast of Britain.
2 patrol boats northeast of the Shetlands.
2 steamers from the convoy.
1 destroyer (1 hit on the deck, 2 hits directly
beside the ship).
3 more steamers and 1 patrol b'oat were damaged.
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3 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Own Losses:
2 Ju 88, 1 He 111 (forced landing).
Air reconnaissance by the 4th Squadron of the 122nd Group
over Le Havre end Cherbourg produced valuable information;
the following were detected in Cherbourg hsrbor:
4 destroyers of the BGURRASQUE class,
2 large destroyers,
4 submarine -chasers and several submarines, etc.
Anti-submarine net barrage in the western entrance
of the outer mole, one passage open.
Baltic Sea;
Shipping unimpeded in the entire Baltic.
After 4 April the pilot service through the Great Belt will
be operating again. Traffic through the gap in the Sound
barrage will be resumed within the next few days J southern
entrance to the Little Belt still impassable because of
uncertain mine situation. 100 per cent searching sweep
of the passege through the Gre8t Belt is being continued.
Submarine Situation
Atlantic:
Unchanged.
North Sea:
U "7", "10", "19", "25", "30", "47", "48" and "49" are
on passage to their positions for "Weseruebung".
U "22", "46", "51" are in the operational area.
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3 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Disposition as per orders of Commanding Admiral, Submarines
for "Weseruebung". (See "Weseruebung" file.)
Merchant Shipping;
After 3 April shipping to Scandinavia will be routed through
the Baltic. Orders to this effect have been issued.
Review of quantity of ore shipped via Narvik in
1939 and comparison with ore shipments to Great
(see War Diary, Part B, V, 130.).
1938 and
Britain
r
(
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4 April 1940
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Items of Political Importance
1. Chamberlain before the Conservative party;
"This is a war of will power, and the will to
win must place us in a position to resist
intensified warfare or even to hold out against
a long and exhausting war."
2.
is being
fresh demarche
is expected to
be
)
Norway:
a) The British assurance that the planned
intensification of the blockade in the north
will in no way lead to direct action in
Norwegian territorial waters,
discussed in Sweden. Here a
by the Western Powers in Oslo
directly imminent. It is stated that Great
Britain has no right to exercise any pressure
whatsoever on Norway and Sweden on account of
ore transports, especially since these transports
were expressly recognized in the British-Swedish
trade agreement.
b) Great Britain's strikingly worded statements and
assurances that no military action in Scandinavian
territorial waters and no landing of troops in
Norway are planned, strengthen Naval Staff's
conviction that in reality just such a British
action against Scandinavia is directly imminent.
The previous handing of notes to Norway, and perhaps
also to Sweden, can be expected. "Weseruebung
Nord" is beginning to develop into a "race" between
Great Britain and Germany for Scandinavia.
3. According to the B.B.C., Great Britain is engaged
in forming a trading company with the aim of buying up raw
materials in neutral countries. The chief problem is first
to draw In the Balkans 8nd Turkey.
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4 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff
Special Items;
1. Weseruebung;
a) Conference between Col. Piekenbrock of the
General Staff and Minister of State Quisling
in Copenhagen provides nothing new for the
Navy's operations, but some valuable data for
the Army and Air Force about troop strength,
position of airfields, ground readiness, etc.
With regard to the defensive readiness of the
coastal fortifications, Quisling believes that
the coastal batteries would hardly fire without
previously asking permission from the Government
again.
Six divisions are considered necessary for a
total occupation.
Quisling generally gave evasive answers to
precise questions.
b) Group West requests that an order be issued that
any soldier engaged in "We se rue bung" who is
captured before "Wesertime" is to state when
questioned that the formation is proceeding
to Iceland.
c) An order is issued at the direction of Armed
Forces High Command, Group 21, that prisoners
taken before "Wesertime" are to refuse to make
a statement. If pressure is exercised Ireland
(not Iceland) is to be given as the target of the
operation.
d) Group West is instructed that the BREMSE is to be
used in Bergen for transport assignments in the
skerries between Stavanger and Bergen. Requests
for troops to be transferred from Stavanger to
Bergen will be arranged by the Commander of the
troops landed at Trondheim with Admiral, West
Norwegian Coast. (See directive in reference
file "Weseruebung".)
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4 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Special Reports on the Rnem%
For disposition of enemy forces and activities of the main
units during the last week of March according to radio
intelligence, see Radio Monitoring Report 13/40.
Atlantic;
Supplementary to the observations reported on 3 April, air
reconnaissance in the Channel also spotted several columns
as well as troops and vehicles at the quays in Cherbourg*,
(Could not be ascertained whether disembarking or embarking.)
Otherwise nothing special to report*
North Sea:
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet who was reported at sea,
might also be in Loch Ewe according to radio intelligence
observations. Commanders, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons
and the cruisers SHEFFIELD, PENELOPE, AURORA and CAIRO,
also destroyers of the 2nd and 3rd Flotillas, are at sea*
Radio traffic generally very quiet (almost strikingly so),
so that there is an extraordinarily
messages available for deciphering,
to gain an insight into the enemy's
and with difficulty, a circumstance
very disadvantageous in view of the
Own Situation:
small quantity of radio
We are thus only able
measures very slowly
which is felt to be
imminence of "Weseruebung".
Atlantic:
The KOENIGSBERG (Buenos Aires), scheduled as supply ship for
the cruiser LUETZOW, received a preliminary order about routes
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4 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
and code words via the Navsl Attache in Buenos Aires.
Sailing order to the KOENIGSBERG is to be issued from
Trondheim after the LUETZOW sails.
(The KOENIGSBERG is proceeding at 9 knots and has 600
tons of heavy Diesel oil.)
(For order see War Diary, Part C, Vol.1 Atlantic.)
North Sea:
No reports from Ship "16".
U "37" is directed to report Ship "16"' s last position
24 hours after she is dismissed. Ship "16" is directed by
Group West to dismiss U "37" by 6 April, if the situation
permits •
Ship "36" fs sailing had to be postponed for another day
because of the weather, which promised unfavorable visibility.
No air reconnaissance by us.
Enemy bomber flights as far as the estuaries in the morning
and afternoon. Bombs were dropped off Brunsbuettel and in
the Jade, but fell in the water and did not explode, so that
possibly mines or drift mines were dropped.
We must count on the possibility of the transport
preparations in Hamburg and Stettin not having remained secret
from the British and that the air reconnaissance and bombing
attacks on Brunsbuettel were also directed against these
preparations.
With regard to the provision of the steamers of the 1st
Sea Transport Tfait (see "Weseruebung" file), Naval Staff
learns that some of these steamers in Stettin are just lying
at the Hakenterrasse (Quay on the Oder, Tr.N.)*and are
exposed here to the unimpeded view of interested spectators.
The Swedish consulate lies in the immediate vicinity. Some
of the steamers are flying the State Service Flag. The cargo
is unmistakably Army gear. Place and circumstances of
loading must be regarded as most unfavorable for the secrecy
of the whole operation. High Command, Navy/Naval Staff,
Service Division instigates suitable changes at Naval Staff's
request.
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4 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
i
Trondheim "export" unit (steamers SAO PAULO, LEV ANTE,
MAIN and the tanker SKAGERRAK) sailed from Brunsbuettel
on 4 April,
Group West instructs Commander, Naval Air, West about
aerial minelaying operations over the Thames, Humber,
Dover and Tyne estuary, as soon as the situation
permits.
Baltic Sea:
Nothing to report
Ice Situation:
Shipping along the German coast unimpeded everywhere.
At present only possible to leave the Baltic by day
through the Great Belt. Still heavy drift ice in the
southern part of the Sound. Heavy breaking up and
floating of the ice to the north in the Little Belt.
Submarine Situation
Number of submarines on 3 April I
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4 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
2.
U "56", "57", "58", "59f ,
"61", "62", "19"
Submarine School:
U "1", "2", "3", "4", "5",
"6", "7", "10", "13", "20",
"22", "23" =
Submarine mralning Flotilla, Warnemuende ;
TT »IO" »»1/l" fMr7ft »MqN »»Oyltt
>rch
23 boats.
8 boats.
12 boats.
5 boats.
U "9", "14", "17", "18", "24
Anti-Submarine School and Resea
Purposes:
U "8", "11"
Total number of submarines
The following are to be used in
a) All submarines under Commanding Admiral,
Submarines and Commander, Submarines which
are ready.
b) All submarines of the Submarine School and
Submarine Training Flotilla, Warnemuende.
(17 boats. )
n 2 boats.
s 50 boats.
"fo'eseruebuna;" :
Atlantic:
Unchanged,
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CONPIDENTIAL
4 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Worth Sea:
Pour submarines east of the Orkneys/Peterhead;
19 on passage to positions for "Weseruebung".
\ )
Merchant Shipping
The steamer ANTONIO DELFINO put into Gothenburg on 3 April.
"Weseruebung? transports:
See "Weseruebung" file.
The following order is issued in addition to those previously
given to the supercargoes of transports which have not yet
sailed:
"Neither enemy nor neutral may gain an insight
into the camouflaged cargo.
If the Norwegians should take a special interest
in the steamer and insist on examining the holds,
the Captain of the ship is first to protest strongly
and demand that the German representative (the
nearest consulate (German citizen) and the Embassy
in Oslo) be acquainted. Also communicate with them
independently. Presume upon the fact that papers
are in order.
Do everything possible to gain time.
If, however, the deck cargo should have to be
unloaded, any offer of help is to be declined and
not until the last minute, when investigation of
the holds is directly imminent, is the German
representative to inform the Norwegians that the
cargo is bound for Russia within German agreed
deliveries. Since Leningrad is ice-bound at
present the cargo must, however, go to Murmansk.
It was camouflaged so as not to violate Norwegian
neutrality. Clearance to Norwegian ports was
effected since the development of British attacks
in Norwegian waters might have had to be awaited
here."
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CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway
a) It Is reported from Norway that British and
French officers of the General Staff have been
engaged for a long time in investigating the
possibility of landing an expeditionary corps
in Norway.
b) Intensified British propaganda - obviously to
prepare the way for British designs on the
Scandinavian area - has begun in neutral
countries in order to work on the attitude to
the Norwegian problem. Strong emphasis Is
laid on the necessity for an alteration in the
situation regarding respect for Norwegian
territorial waters.
A comparison drawn between the British and
German actions states that the Norwegian
Government's attitude "in its helplessness
regarding the ruthless sinking of Norwegian
ships and the brutal murder of Norwegian
seamen is in extraordinary contrast to its
vigorous protests against technical violations
of the three-mile zone by British warships,
which caused neither loss of life nor property
to Norway."
c) The following is said to be the Dutch Admiralty's
opinion about the British action in Scandinavian
waters :
The movement of British destroyers in
Scandinavian waters is aimed at provoking
Germany to take counter-measures. Great
Britain expects that Germany will then occupy
Norwegian ports, which could effect the desired
extension of the front at one blow. The
British press would then lay the breach of
neutrality at Germany's door.
The headlines of the Swedish press are mostly
concerned with an article in the "Dally Telegraph"
In which it is maintained that Germany has stopped
all ore transports via Narvik. She is concentrating
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CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
a fleet in her Baltic ports with 400,000 men
in readiness to be shipped to the Baltic zone
Immediately.
It is assumed in the North that at the- same
moment as Great Britain changes her plans
for cessation of the Swedish ore supplies in-
to action, Germany would land in southern
Norway.
A Swedish statement on the subject of an
immediate German counterblow if Great Britain
violates Norwegian territorial waters is worthy
of note and perhaps significant as regards the
Swedish attitude to coming events.
The present -slight operational possibilities
for the German Navy and Air Force would be
materially improved by an occupation of
southern Norway, Germany would be in a
position to carry out such an operation speedily.
The reason for it would obviously lie in the
violation of Norway's neutrality by Britain and
Norway's complete inability to repulse this
violation.
rn
e) A most important and credible report has been
received from Intelligence Center, Belgium:
British submarine blockade lines from the
Lofotens to the Norwegian coast are said to
have been formed or to be in process of
formation. Blockade duties will be performed
by five British and two French submarines.
The island of Varoe will be cut off in Norwegian
waters by mines. The Norwegian island of
Vigten will be cut off by mines and submarines.
Sule will likewise be cut off from Vigten.
Constant patrol by seven destroyers will be
instituted in the Skagerrak. Measures are to
be carried out on 5 April.
Definite confirmation of this report is not possible
at present. Naval Staff, hov.rever, considers it
likely that Great Britain is planning such a measure
within a very short time. This view is strengthened
by a report from radio intelligence about the despatch
or disposition of 15-20 British submarines (see
North Sea) .
CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items;
1. Letter from Armed Forces High Command (WFA 22131
Gkdos Chefs) ;
a) The Fuehrer has ordered that the cruiser LUETZOW
is to be drown in to transport about one battalion
to Trondheim, independent of her further assignment.
b) The Navy is responsible for the protection of the
landing parties carried on warships, even after
their disembarkation, against Norwegian and Danish
forces. It may be necessary for this purpose to
leave single naval vessels, not scheduled to
remain permanently, in Norwegian ports until the
Army troops landed can no longer be impeded in the
fulfillment of their assignment by Norwegian
naval forces.
2. Fuehrer's directive about operational cooperation
with Italy;
Discussions with Italy on strategic and operational
subjects are to be resumed. Conducted by Armed
Forces High Command. The High Commands of the
Services are not to commence discussions until the
result of Armed Forces High Command's investigation
is available.
3. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division on an
Armed Forces High Command political and military memorandum
on the situation in southeastern Europe.
4. The Naval Attache in Moscow reports that the Russians
are raising difficulties with regard to departure of the
JAN WELLEM and do not desire the supply ship to return to the
base again.
The Russian attitude cannot be understood. Since Naval Staff,
however, attaches the greatest importance to the immediate
despatch of the JAN WELLEM, the Attache' is instructed to give
the Russians suitable assurances.
(The Naval Attache reports on 6 April "that the Russian attitude
is apparently motivated by political considerations and by a
high degree of nervousness about the future Franco-British
-34-
CONFIDENTIAL
)
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
attitude to the U.S.S.R. They are therefore 8t pains to
avoid any action in the slightest degree non-neutral, -which
the enemy could use as a pretext for action. It appears
that the Russians have therefore become over-anxious on
account of Base North, and this means that its usefulness
is decreased at present. This does not imply complete and
final uselessness. As soon as the political situation is
clarified for the Russians the Base can again be used to the
full" ) .
5. The Field Marshal of the Air Force has ordered that
Scapa is to be attacked by one group each of bombers and
aerial minelaying planes as soon es the weather permits.
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic :
Great Britain:
Disposition of forces:
The WARSPITE was at sea on the afternoon of 4 April, probably
en route for the Clyde. The repair ship RESOURCE, escorted
by the DECOY and DEFENDER left Freetown on 4 April for
Gibraltar.
The submarine depot ship MEDWAY and a number of submarines
will be transferred from East Asia to the Mediterranean in the
near future.
France :
Various convoys observed.
A Brazilian steamer reported:
On 19 March the steamer was stopped by a British
auxiliary cruiser ("Blue Star Line") 55 miles
northeast of Gran Canariaj on 20 March she met
a French convoy escorted by a French auxiliary
cruiser (FLORIDA) 150 miles north of the island.
According to information from the ship's officers,
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CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
the convoys at present haul off far to the west
between Gibraltar and Great Britain,
Neutrals ;
According to an Italian report, the following arrived in
Istanbul on 3 April: the steamer SAGITmAIRE (7,706 tons)
coming from Marseilles with miscellaneous war material, the
U.S. steamers EXPLORER (6,700 tons) and EXKOUTH (4,979 tons)
coming from New York with planes and miscellaneous material.
North Sea:
British planes over Norderney and the Eastern Ems about noon;
flights into the Heligoland Bight at night.
The PENELOPE, CAIRO and some destroyers are at see in the
northern Scottish area.
The submarine SUNFISH, SEALION, SWORDFISH and- SHARK are
operating in the North Sea.
Radio intelligence intercepts a British radiogram containing
the order for submarine operation. Because of our inability
to decipher much, only the position of one boat, the TRITON,
at 57°. • . .10°. • . ,E can be partially deduced. In the opinion
of the Radio Monitoring Service it may be concluded from the
length of the radiogram (188 groups) that it deals with
operations by 15-20 boats. Some boats were possibly allocated
special assignments.
Operations by so many boats and the length of this radiogram
are In striking contrast to previous British submarine measures
and lead us to conclude that there are very special plans
afoot.
Following possibilities:
1. The enemy has knowledge of the German operational
plans and his submarine measures are of a purely
defensive character.
2. The enemy has his own offensive plans against Norway
and is sending out his boats in order to suppress
German ore traffic from Narvik, to lay mine barrages
in Norwegian territorial waters (see also report from
Intelligence Center, Belgium) and as protection against
German counterblows.
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CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
In both cases we must reckon on danger from submarines off
the Norwegian coast, off the ports and especially in the
Skagerrak.
Group Baltic is informed of Naval Staff's viewpoint and plans
to put submarine-chaser units into operation in the Kattegat
and Skagerrak in good time to protect the sea transport units
and to have air patrol carried out.
The trawler GORSPEN (208 tons) is admitted as sunk during the
air attack on 3 April.
Own Situation:
Atlantic:
Nothing to report.
North Sea:
"Weseruebung" :
Readiness of forces for "Weseruebung" •
All forces are ready to sail except the destroyers THIELE
and SCHOEMANN (engine repairs), FALKE (remaining work by
8 April), and two torpedo training boats (dock work).
(See list of forces in readiness dated 5 April, reference
file "Weseruebung") .
The first three steamers of the "export" unit and the
tanker KATTEGAT appeared in Norwegian waters today off the
south coast of Norway.
Nothing special to report in the North Sea. Enemy air
raids on Norderney and the Eastern Ems unsuccessful.
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CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Baltic Sea;
Great Belt navigable with day and night pilot service.
Pilot service not yet instituted in the Sound end Little
Belt,
Our air reconnaissance reports a Danish armed coastal
vessel with two torpedoboats off Frederlk s ha vn and one
Danish armed coastal vessel north of the Danish Great Eelt
barrage* Lightships have not yet been put out on the
Great Belt barrage; Instead the northern pilot position
is occupied by the Danish vessel INGOLF.
Submarine Situation
Atlantic:
Unchanged.
North Sea/Northern Waters;
In the operational area: U "13", "22", "46", "51",
"58", "59", "25", "30",
"34", "47", "48", "49".
On passage: U "2", "4", "5", "6",
"7", "9", "10", "14",
"19", "56", "57", "60",
"62".
Supporting Ship "16": U "37".
On return passage: U "43".
Boats disposed as per orders for " We se rue bung" .
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CONFIDENTIAL
5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
U "52M,s brief report shows no successes but produces
much reconnaissance data regarding air and sea patrol
in the Orkneys-Faroes area and off the Norwegian coast.
(See War Diary, Part B, IV.)
Merchant Shipping;
Returning home from overseas:
According to a report from the Consulate 8t Trondheim the
motor vessel SEATTLE (left Curacao on 5 March, reached
Tromsoe on 31 March) passed north of Iceland, apparently
without any difficulty.
Norwegian run:
A German Captain of a steamer coming from Bergen reports as
a striking fact that considerably more Norwegian patrol boats
have lately been encountered along the Norwegian coast.
These escort the German ships.
Adriatic:
The B.B.C. reports from Ragusa that the German steamer ANKARA
has postponed her departure to ^rieste because British
warships are cruising in the Adriatic.
The information is correct. The supply shio ANKARA has
postponed her passage for the present on account of reports
of enemy forces. The ship is instructed via the Naval
Attache" in Rome to continue on her way. The Attache' is to
endeavor to obtain confirmation of the report that there are
enemy forces in the Adriatic, since it seems untrustworthy.
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CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway:
British and French notes handed to Norway and Sweden.
Contents not yet known; probably on the subject of the
Intensification of the blockade.
In Swedish opinion the notes give no cause to suppose that
the Western Powers are contemplating direct measures,
particularly against Norwegian ore shipments. Sweden
and Norway are not required to reply immediately. The
notes did not contain an ultimatum.
Speech by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, before the
Storthing, in which he emphasizes that "the maintenance of
complete neutrality is the aim of Norwegian policy".
(For particulars see Foreign Press (Naval News)No. 83.)
Increased tension in all countries about further developments
regarding Norway; according to press statements at home and
abroad, this will be settled in the immediate future.
Although it cannot be expected that the enemy is completely
in the dark about "Weseruebung", there are all the same no
definite indications that the Western Powers have recognized
Germany's strategic plans. At least they are unaware of the
great extent of the whole operation. Naval Staff's judgment
of the enemy's actions is that he is just about to take
steps himself in Norwegian waters or on Norwegian territory.
Since, undoubtedly aware of German preparatory measures, he
must expect immediate counter blows in any operations, his
measure will take defense against German counter-operations
into account. It cannot be ascertained how far advanced the
enemy operations are or whether they are already in process
of execution. Naval Staff, hov/ever, is of opinion that the
greatest haste is necessary for the execution of "Weseruebung".
9 April appears to be the latest possible date. It would be
desirable to advance this date, but that is no longer possible.
With regard to the present state of general political unrest
in Scandinavia we must reckon on the possibility of the
Western Powers and Norway being warned in advance when the
naval forces commence their operations today.
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CONFIDENTIAL
6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items:
1. State of "V/eserubimg" :
For readiness see review in reference file "Weseruebung"
Fifteen destroyers in operational readiness (the SCHOEMANN
is not ready) .
For state of "export" and sea transport units see sketch
of 6 April: The Narvik Group (the ALSTER, RAUENFELS,
BAERENFELS, tanker KATTEGAT) is assumed to he between
Trondheim and Bergen, the Trondheim Group (the MAIN,
LEV ANTE, SAO PAULO, tanker SKAGERRAK) off the south coast
of Norway. The 1st Sea Transport Unit for Bergen (the
steamers" MARIE LEONHARDT, KURITYBA and RIO DE JANEIRO) is
in the central Baltic. The Stavanger Unit sails from
Swinemuende today (the TUEBINGEN, TIJUCA, MENDOZA).
The Bergen Sea Transport Unit comprises roughly 650 men,
1B4 horses, vehicles, etc, the Stavanger Unit roughly 750
men, 125 horses, also vehicles. The Kristiansand Unit
follows this evening with 4 steamers (the V/IEGAND, WESTSEE,
KRETA, AUGUST LEONHARDT) and, tomorrow morning, the Oslo
Unit with 5 steamers (the ANTARES, IONIA, MUANSA, ITAURI,
NEIDENFELS ) .
The 1st Sea Transport Unit thus comprises a total of 15
steamers carrying roughly 3,900 men, 742 horses, 942
vehicles and 4 tanks.
The starting up of this whole transport operation cannot
be kept secret. It will be an extraordinary stroke of
luck if the immense transport set-up reaches its ports of
destination without disturbance and incidents via the
narrow passages of the entrances to the Baltic and the
Kattegat and Skagerrak, and without the enemy receiving
previous warning.
2. Group West proposes that minelaying operation
"Skagerrak" should be carried out during the night of
"Weserday" minus 1, and sees the following advantages in
this connection:
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6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
a) Danger from the enemy, alarmed by the
appearance of the Narvik and Trondheim
Groups, is eliminated.
b) All Groups proceeding northwards will
be able to withdraw if necessary.
c) Possible to lay further barrage sections
earlier.
The Group regards the disadvantage of isolated merchant
ships striking the barrage as negligible.
Naval Staff declines Group West's proposal for the
following reasons:
I. Execution is scheduled for the night before
"Weserday".
a) Possible detection of the mine laying
unit in the Skagerrak on the evening
of wW-2" endangers the Bergen and
Kristiansand Groups on outward passage
if the enemy attacks. The risk to the
minelaying unit must take second place to
this.
b) As long as the barrage is not known, its
deterrent effect is doubtful.
II. Any alteration in operations already fixed is
if possible to be avoided.
3. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the projected
ruling about the subordination of the naval, air and
submarine forces remaining or operating off the Norwegian
coast.
The principle that there should be only one independent
operational headquarters in one theater of war is adhered
to .
a) Admirals, West and South Norwegian Coasts are
subordinate to Commanding Admiral, Norway
regarding defense in ports and coastal waters.
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6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
b) Destroyers and supply ships in Trondheim
come under Group West.
c) The BREMSE, CARL PETERS, PT boats in Bergen
under Admiral, West Norwegian Coast..
d) Torpedo and PT boats in Kristiansand at
first under Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic; later, after the Skagerrak has been
secured against surface forces, operationally
under Group West. Subordination to Admiral,
West Norwegian Coast may be considered.
e) No naval forces subordinate to Admiral, South
Norwegian Coast. Assignments in this coastal
area will be taken over by Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic.
f) Commanding Admiral, Submarines will control
all submarine assignments. Commanding
Admirals to make requests to Group West.
g) Commander, Naval Air's units at first under
the 10th Air Corps, later control of all
reconnaissance by Commander, Naval Air, West.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees. For directive to Commanding
Admirals and Commanders (1. Ski. I op 715/40) see
reference file "Weseruebung".
4. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on Naval Staff's
directive on the conduct of submarine warfare after the
conclusion of "Weseruebung". (1. Ski. I op 713/40) see
reference file "We se rue bung" .
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic :
Nothing special to report.
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6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
North Sea:
According to radio intelligence: apart from Commander in Chief,
Home Fleet and destroyers, Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron
(probably aboard the REPULSE) was in the outer Scapa area and
the battle cruiser RENOWN in the inner Scapa area.
The old battleship WARSPITE is going into dock (possible bomb
damage?)
The cruiser GALATEA is on escort duty with destroyers. Commander,
1st Destroyer Flotilla is ordered to return to Scapa with a convoy.
Reason unknown. This step appears extraordinary but may not
necessarily be connected with any operations.
Own Situation
Atlantic: Nothing special to report.
North Sea:
Command : On his return from convalescent leave Admiral
Saalwaechter resumes command of Group West on 6 April. Admiral
Carls returns to his post as Commanding Admiral, Group Baltic.
Ship "36" (Lieut. Cdr. Weyher) sails according to plan as the
second auxiliary cruiser.
For operational order see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I. The supply
ship NORDMARK leaves for the Atlantic and proceeds via Route II.
"Weseruebung" :
6 April, "Weserday" minus 5:
Naval operations commence as planned. Groups I and II (Narvik
and Trondheim) sail at £300 on 6 April under the comma nd of
Commanding Admiral, Fleet.
The cruiser LUETZOW dropped out of the Trondheim Group at the
last moment.
In the afternoon the report is received from the LUETZOW about
breakdowns caused by cracks in the auxiliary engine casings.
Complete repairs will take several days. Provisional repair
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6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Is being carried out. Sailing for operations in the Atlantic
is out of the question until full repairs are completed. The
ship must therefore be restored as quickly as possible, since
Naval Staff attaches the greatest importance to operations in
the Atlantic in order to effect a strong diversion as soon as
possible after " We se rue bung".
It is agreed with the 21st Army Group that the LUETZOW is not
to operate to Trondhelm because of her breakdown, but is assigned
to the Oslo Group. The LUETZOW is ordered to proceed through
the Kiel Canal and join the Oslo Group.
Composition of the units sailing today:
Commanding Admiral, Fleet: Vice Admiral Luetjens
Battleship GNEISENAU
Battleship SCHARNHORST
Group I: (Narvik)
Commander: Commodore Bonte
Destroyers:
WILHELM HEIDKAMP DIETER VON ROEDER
GEORGE THIELE WOLFGANG ZENKER
HANS LUEDEMANN ERICH GIESE
ANTON SCHMIDT ERICH KOELLNER
HERMAN KUENNE BERND VON ARNIM
»
Embarked on the destroyers :
2,000 men of the 3rd Mountain Division. (1 regiment).
Group II: (Trondheim)
Commander: The Commander of the HIPPER, Captain Heye.
Cruiser:
HIPPER
Destroyers:
FRIEDRICH ECKOLDT BRUNO HEINEMANN
THEODOR RIEDEL PAUL JACOBI
Embarked on the HIPPER: 900 men;
On the destroyers: 800 men of the 3rd Mountain Division.
(1 regiment). (For operational orders see "Weseruebung" file.)
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GONFIPENTIAL
6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Weather prospects;
Northern North Sea: wind south to southwest, 5-7,
freshening to 8 off the Norwegian coast, mostly cloudy
with frequent rain, ceiling 400-600 m, visibility 3-5
miles, about 10 miles on the south coast of Norway,
deterioration in visibility setting in from the northwest.
The prevailing winds will permit the advance as planned,
even for the destroyers. With following wind and sea the
advance will, however, probably just be possible still off
the Norwegian coast. Action, however, will be greatly
restricted, especially for the destroyers. We must expect
enemy reconnaissance with the present good visibility.
The dull weather setting in from the west, with visibility
dropping to two miles, will be in favor of the Groups1
unmolested advance.
It is possible that the advance will be impeded in northern
waters by a further freshening of the wind.
Naval Staff views with great confidence the operations of
the units putting to sea. The readiness of the destroyers
has reached the required standard by thorough overhauls
of the engines and boilers. The thorough preparations made
for the operation and the excellent spirit of the destroyer
crews give assurance of a resolute and successful execution
of the particularly difficult Narvik operation.
The Groups are led by excellent Commanders.
Baltic Sea:
Shipping:
The Great Belt is the only navigable entrance to the Baltic.
No pilot service has yet been instituted in the Sound and
Little Belt, but the Sound can be navigated by all ships with aid
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6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
from mine- exploding vessels.
Check sweeping in the Great and Little Belts proceeded
as planned. Check sweeping of the gap in the Sound
barrage is scheduled for 7 April. The pilot service in
the Great Belt is carried out in both directions during
the day, at night only from south to north at present.
The Danes have placed a torpedo boat at the southern entrance
of the barrage as a pilot boat.
Submarine Situation;
Atlantic:
Unchanged.
North Sea;
After her return, U "38" reports heavy patrol in the
Shetlands-Hebrides area and in Pair Passage. The boat
sank about 19,000 tons on her return passage. U "43"
suffered greatly from bad weather in the North Minch area
and west of Fair Passage. No successes.
For brief reports see Part B, Vol. IV.
22 submarines are in position as per operational orders
for " We se rue bung".
Also on passage: U "1", "50", "25", "57".
U "37" is with Ship "16".
Merchant Shipping
On 6 April there were altogether 579 ships over 1,600 GRT,
» 68.3%, in home waters, of which 100 ships totaling
301,372 GRT are on the Scandinavian run; 57 of these
ships are in Norway.
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CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1940 C0NFID5NTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway:
Reuter states that the notes to Norway and Sweden
contain no Intimidating clauses, but that Great Britain
reserves the right to take action against German attempts
to use Scandinavian waters as a protected route in order to
avoid the blockade*
The German Military Attache' wires from Finland that
Swedish and Finnish circles are greatly perturbed about the
ships concentrated in Pomeranian ports. It is concluded
that Germany has hostile intentions against Sweden.
Telephone tapping intercepts telephone conversations .-
between the Danish Naval Attache and the Danish and Norwegian
Ambassadors, in which he requests an immediate audience since
he has communications to make of the highest political
importance and bearing.
The Danish Naval Attache has possibly gained some knowledge
of the coming "Weseruebung" operation.
For further information see Foreign Press Report.
2. According to reports from German Consulates, a
large number of reservists (all reservists according to some
reports) have been called up to the Italian Navy for 1
April.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items;
1. Letter from the Naval Attache' in Oslo stating that
60$ of all Norwegian shipping has been chartered to Great
Britain since November 1939.
The Attache reports that this statement can be taken as a
fact.
a. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the progress of
AJrK
CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
"Weseruebung" and movements to date.
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Great Britain:
Disposition of forces: The WARSPITE is suspected to be
proceeding to Portsmouth (?) because of damage, the NELSON
and BARHAM to be still in southern England.
The RENOWN, REPULSE, VALIANT and RODNEY can be assumed to be
in Scottish waters.
On 7 April the cruiser SHROPSHIRE is to proceed to Capetown;
the GLOUCESTER is to proceed to Simonstown.
Task Force "H" and the auxiliary cruiser ALCANZARA put in to
Freetown on 6 April.
Radio monitoring also intercepts convoy movements.
Convoy"HS 25", comprising 23 steamers, is proceeding north
from Gibraltar, 150 miles from the coast.
France:
A French destroyer or flotilla leader (large destroyer)
has been drifting about 300 miles west of St .Vincent since
6 April.
Otherwise nothing special to report.
North Sea:
At 0948 (German Summer Time) enemy air reconnaissance reported
1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 8 planes on bearing 90° 3 miles from
55° 30'N, 6° 37'E, course 350° (cruiser HIPPER). On the
basis of this report the cruisers GALATEA and ARETHUSA with
destroyers were sent out in an unknown direction. Further
afternoon reconnaissance resulted in priority radiograms
from 1630 from the Admiralty to Commander in Chief, Home Fleet
-49-
CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
and other Commanders (1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and
2nd Cruiser Squadrons) as well as to the submarines at sea.
It can be seen from the Admiralty's radiograms that at least
1 battleship of the SCHARNHORST type, d cruisers - one
possibly a pocket battleship - and 10 destroyers are assumed.
The enemy has thus identified the operation directed north-
ward and has ordered corresponding operational measures.
It may be assumed that the Admiralty has not yet drawn
conclusions about a large-scale German action within
"Weseruebung" from the air reconnaissance information, but
rather expects a break-through to the Atlantic by a pocket
battleship. In any case, as Naval Staff expected, the
German movement has warned the enemy.
c
The cruisers SHEFFIELD, PENELOPE and CAIRO put in to Scapa
on 6 April.
Enemy submarines are detected in the eastern Skagerrak and
Kattegat, also near Utsire. Further submarine positions
cannot yet be ascertained.
Own Situation:
North Sea:
The movements of the battleships and Narvik and Trondheim Groups
continue as planned. Deterioration in weather and visibility
in the area of advance. The destroyers can still just advance
in the prevailing weather. The south to southwest winds are
still blowing strength 7-8 in the northern North Sea. Action
will be severely restricted in this weather. Rainfall and bad
visibility will greatly hinder enemy air reconnaissance
according to the weather forecast; southwest winds, strength
6-8 can oe expected in the southern part of northern waters,
decreasing to strength 4 to the north, so that conditions during
the northern part of the advance will be more favorable.
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CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
i
In connection with the battleship movements 24 Wellington
bombers had an engagement with heavy German fighters at
1500 northeast of our declared area. Two British bombers
were shot down in aerial combat in between two cloud covers
at 2,000 ra. altitude.
At noon a plane of Commander, Naval Air attacked an enemy
submarine of the GRAMPUS class with two 250 kg. bombs,
apparently successfully, 30 miles north of the northeastern
corner of the declared area.
Air reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast detected nothing
special.
The movements of the "Weseruebung" "export" units seem
to have proceeded according to plan so far. According to
Naval Staff's calculations the Narvik "export" Unit must
already be in the area off Trondheim, the Trondheim Unit
a little to the north of Bergen. Since the ships- appear to
have passed the Haugesund "cliff" without Incident, it may
be assumed that the Norwegians are so far unsuspecting.
Today the sea transport units are in the following areas:
Bergen Unit
Stavanger Unit
(3 steamers)
(3 steamers)
Krlstlansand Unit (4 steamers)
Oslo Unit (5 steamers)
(See also Situation, Baltic.)
) north of the Great
) Belt.
) in the central
) Baltic.
The tanker JAN WELLEM, which is particularly important
for Narvik1 s supplies, left Base North on 6 April. She is
expected to arrive promptly in Narvik.
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CONFIDENTIAL
7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Atlantic:
Nothing special to report.
Baltic Sea/Kattegat:
Shipping;
Unimpeded in the Baltic. Great Belt passable by day and
night. Still ice difficulties north of the German barrage
when passing through the Sound.
"We se rue bung
it .
The 17th Submarine Chaser Flotilla left for an operation in
the area east of Skagen.
The Oslo Group, which embarkea forces on the evening of
6 April, sailed as planned from Swinemuende on the evening
of 7 April.
Composition:
Commander: Rear Admiral Kummetz
Cruisers:
BLUECHER
LUETZOW
EMDEN
Torpedo boats:
(
KOHDOR
MOEWE
FALKE
2,000 men embarked, parts of the 163rd Division.
During the night of 7 April there also put to sea as
planned (at present in waiting positions):
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7 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
a) Schleswlg Holstein Group
with Training Flotilla of Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic (with 1,840 men for the
operation against Korsoer).
b) Rugard Group
with submarine chasers (with 400 men for the
operation against the bridge over the Belt at
Middelfahrt).
c) HAKSESTABT DANZIG
■ ■ 1 1 1
(with 1 reinforced battalion for Copenhagen).
Air reconnaissance was flown over the Kattegat as far
as the line Ska gen-Paternoster. No enemy forces or
submarines were sighted.
The steamer KURITYBA, belonging to the 1st Sea Transport
Unit (Bergen Group) ran aground four miles north of
Helsingborg and requires help from tugs. The 17th
Submarine Chaser Flotilla and the tugs PREUSSEN and WOTAN
have been sent out to help her.
The fact that the steamer ran aground at the border of
Swedish territorial waters gives rise to the danger of the
enemy being warned in advance if the camouflage of the
vessel carrying material, horses and men is not maintained
successfully. Naval Staff's objections to the sea transp.ort
units appearing before "Wesertime" have already been
confirmed. It can also be stated that the steamers of the
1st Transport Unit should have been better camouflaged and
that the soldiers and men in charge of the horses on board
should have worn civilian clothes.
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CONFIDETCTIAL
7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Submarine Situation:
Atlantic:
U "37" reports, time of origin 1950:
"Left Ship "16M in grid square AD 2957
(Denmark Strait) in northeasterly storm.
Hove to. Cannot reach post "Nero"
(Narvik) in time."
The break-through of the first auxiliary cruiser (Ship "16",
Captain Rogge) can thus be regarded as successful.
North Sea/Northern Waters:
Unchanged; 26 submarines in position or on passage, also
U "37" in the Denmark Strait. U "64" with Ship "36" as escort
Merchant Shipping
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, reports:
Minesweeping started in the Sound barrsge gap. Will
probably be finished by noon on 8 April; barrage gap
ice-free. Great Belt: Danish barrage gaps - lightships
North and South in position.
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CONFIDENTIAL
8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
"Weserday" minus 1
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway:
Statements from the British and French Governments
to Norway about Allied minelaying in Norwegian territorial
waters.
"The Allied Governments have decided to exclude
their enemy from the unimpeded use of parts of
Norwegian territorial waters which are obviously
of the greatest use to him. They have thus
resolved to prevent the unhinderea passage of
ships carrying contraband through Norwegian
territorial waters. They therefore announce:
"Some parts of Norwegian territorial waters
have become unnavigable because of mines.
Ships which traverse these areas do so at their
own risk. It is quite clear from the list
already published that the free approach of
Norwegian ships to their own ports and villages
is in no way impeded by minelaying. In order
to avoid the slightest possibility of Norwegian
and other ships unintentionally traversing the
areas before it is possible to warn them against
mines, arrangements have been made that the limits
of these areas are patrolled by British ships until
48 hours after the first mines have been laid in
the areas concerned* The safety of shipping is
guaranteed by this measure, together with the
warning given on the radio*" (For position of
barrages see under "North Sea").
The Western Powers have now flagrantly violated Norwegian
neutrality officially by laying mines inside Norwegian
waters. The Fuehrer is of the opinion that these measures
are only the first step in the Allies' strategic plan to
gain a footing in the Scandinavian area, suppress supplies
of ore from Norway, exercise pressure on Sweden to stop
deliveries of ore to Germany, dominate the Shetlands-Norway
passage and extend the war to Scandinavia.
The necessity of carrying out the German "Weseruebung"
operation is confirmed by the Franco-British measures*
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CONFIDENTIAL
8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Today1 s statement by the Western Powers is politically
welcome since it gives excellent grounds to the outside
world for German action as a counter-blow to the British
violation of neutrality.
On the afternoon of 8 April the Norwegian Government lodged
a protest, referring to the Norwegian-British agreement of
11 March 1940, which permits exports to Germany even of
contraband, and demanded the removal of the mine barrages
and the withdrawal of Allied forces from Norwegian waters.
In spite of .the protest, which is not very vigorous, it is
quite possible that far-reaching secret verbal agreements
have been reached between the Norwegian and British Governments
The U.S. Naval Attache (Commander Schrader) visited High
Command, Navy (Naval Attache') in the afternoon and informed
us that he listened to the British announcement about mine-
laying in Norwegian waters at noon today. He considers this
an extraordinarily serious incident and asked for High Command,
Navy's comments.
He was informed that no statements can be made yet but that
the events are regarded in a most serious light.
2. Reuter report;
The Allied offensive is divided into three parts?
1* The notes to Norway and Sweden about intensification
of the blockade j
2. the conferences between Ministers Monnet (Blockade
Minister) and Cross on the same subject;
3. the conferences beginning on 8 April between Lord
Halifax and the British Ambassadors in the Balkans,
probably with reference to the Norwegian and Swedish
answers to the British note.
3. The "General Netherlands Import Center" has started
work officially. It is a Government control, standing
surety to the Western Powers that certain export and import
goods will be for Dutch use only and will not reach other
countries. Great Britain requested this and gave assurances
in return that Dutch ships would be less strictly searched.
-56-
CONFIDENTIAL
!
8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
4. The German Ambassador in Tokio reports:
Japanese naval spokesman gave notice of suitable
severe counte measures if Great Britain undertakes
blockade measures in the Sea of Japan. On the
other hand the Naval Staff let it be known most
confidentially that the Navy would greatly welcome
the appearence of German naval forces, especially
submarines, in Japanese waters, would suffer
operations by them from Russian ports and would
afford them every possible support (ports in the
South Sea), The people would be most enthusiastic
about any successes,
(The Naval Staff1 s opinion, but hardly that of the Admiralty.)
1100
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Stsff
Special Items
1« Report on the movements of the individual groups and
on the situation in Norwegian waters after the declaration
of the British mined areas.
Naval Staff is not yet assured of the fact that mines have
actually been laid. It is considered possible that this is
a bluff to scare away German merchant shipping. On the other
hand, it is quite certain that British forces, (destroyers
and submarines) - as per the British declaration - are at the
positions indicated within or at Norwegian territorial limits
in order to capture or sink passing German steamers, thus
violating Norwegian waters. German steamers proceeding on
the former route will, therefore, undoubtedly run into the arms
of the British patrols even if mines have not yet been laid.
From a military point of view, therefore, this anticipatory
step by the Western Powers creates very unfavorable and
difficult conditions for the execution of the operation, which
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CONFIDENTIAL
8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
primarily involve severe risk for the "export" unit steamers
carrying guns, material, supplies, anti-aircraft guns,
ammunition and food supplies which are urgently required in
the northern bases of Narvik and Tronaheim.
Immediate re-routing of the "export" steamers therefore
appears desirable. Retention in southern ports or fjords,
the only safe step at present, is not possible since every
endeavor must be made to get the steamers to their ports of
destination to time. Putting into port later, after "Weserday",
would be hopeless because enemy countermeasures would then
definitely be in force off the ports.
Naval Staff therefore orders the "export" steamers and
tankers to avoid the areas endangered by mines but otherwise
still to make for their ports of destination. m
00
For orders to other shipping see under "Merchant Shipping".
2. Question of flag to be set when entering Norwegian
ports:
Naval Staff decides that the German flag should
be flown or none, according to the situation.
The previous order is canceled; the British
ensign is not to be flown since the advantages
of flying the British flag are not seen and
are at least doubtful.
Order to this effect is issued.
3. The Naval Attache in Oslo has suggested that if
Norwegian patrols delay passage, the following Morse signal
in Norwegian should be transmitted:
"Am putting in with permission of the Norwegian
Government, have an escort officer on board."
The proposal is agreed to. Order is issued to Groups for
further transmission.
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CONFIDBNTIAL
8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation 8 April
Weather
Northern North Sea/Northern Waters:
The south to southwesterly winds, strength 6-8, which
rise to 9 in places along the Norwegian coast, will gradually
decrease to strength 5-6, as the wind veers northwest, beginning
gradually from the west so that the advance of the units as
planned down to torpedo boats will be possible. Advance of
PT boat flotillas is doubtful. Visibility of only 3 miles
at present is having a prejudicial effect on air reconnaissance
by both sides. An improvement in visibility up to 10 miles
can be expected when the wind veers.
North of 65° the wind will drop to strength 3-4 ana will
no longer be an obstacle.
In the Baltic Sea, southerly winds 3-4, apparently freshening
to 5; advance as planned can therefore be expected.
Enemy Situation
Reports on the enemy received during the course of the day
show the following picture as a whole in the evening:
Light British forces off West Fjord (including
1 heavy cruiser), south of Trondheim and near Stadlandet
in order to carry out the minelaying operations announced
and in order to control shipping off the Norwegian coast.
Various merchantmen have already been stopped ana had to
turn about.
The reports about mine barrages laid are confirmed in the
afternoon by telephone calls from Norway. The mines are
said to have been laid during the night of 7 April at the
places indicated, possibly also near Karmoey (south of
Haugesund) ana near Halten (entrance to Trondheim). (Near
Halten seems improbable.)
Part of an enemy main force, consisting of 2 battleships,
1 heavy cruiser and several destroyers, on northerly course
about noon off Romsdals.
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CONFIDMTIAL
8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Battle cruiser squadron and other cruisers at sea
protecting light enemy forces. Position unknown. Light
forces between Shetlands and Norway.
Strong submarine disposition in the Skagerrak and Kattegat
and off the coasts of southern Norway and Denmark.
French forces (minelaying cruiser EMILE BERTIN and two
large destroyers) detected in the North Sea in the Scapa
area.
(For details see special appendix, radiogram file of
8 April.)
Own Situation
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Groups Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kristlansand and Oslo
proceeding to their operational targets as planned.
The enemy is aware that the battleships are included
in the Narvik and Trondheim Groups. Our own plans are not
yet revealed, but it is possible that increased steamer
traffic through the entrances to the Baltic may appear a
most striking measure both to neutral Scandinavian countries
and to the enemy in connection with the known concentration of
transports in Hamburg, Stettin and Gdynia which took place
some time ago. It cannot be ascertained how far the enemy
has actually been warned or is acting on supposition.
Destroyers were reported west of Trondheim this morning
by the enemy. Engagement between the destroyer BERNDT v.
ARNIM and the British destroyer GLOWWORM. Result still
unknown.
The enemy possibly concludes German operations against
his measures in Norwegian waters. He may expect a pocket
battleship sortie.
We fear that the British minelaying operations will affect
our military operation unfavorably.
Naval Staff forsees danger in bringing the "export" unit
and the tankers through. Re-routing to avoid encounters
with British patrols has been ordered, but is made difficult
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as the actual positions of the steamers are not known.
The operations by our forces in the northern area run
great risks from the superior enemy who, in pursuance of his
own plans, is now in our operational areas at the same time to
our disadvantage. The necessity of despatching battleships
to protect our destroyers is fully confirmed by the enemy
situation.
The 1st Sea Transport Unit is at sea comprising 15 steamers as
planned; at noon the Bergen and Stavanger Groups were in the
Skagerrak off the Norwegian coast, the Kristiansand Group
roughly off Skagen, the Oslo Group in the Kattegat near the
Danis"h coast. The steamer KURITYBA is still aground north
of Helsingborg.
Great danger from submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak.
The steamers are sailing alone, as merchant steamers, along
the border of territorial waters.
During the afternoon the first news was received of steamers
torpedoed in the Skagerrak. At 1815 the German Ambassador
in Oslo reported that the steamer RIO DE JANEIRO of the
1st Sea Transport Unit (Bergen) was torpedoed and sank at
1420 near Lillesand between Grimstad and Risoer. Shortly
afterwards the torpedoing of the steamer KRETA (of the
Kristiansand Group) was asserted. She sent an SOS at noon.
(Report is not confirmed later. The steamer was not
torpedoed, but apparently managed to evade the enemy submarine
in time. )
At 1815 the torpedoing of the tanker POSIDOUIA (present name
STEDINGEN, naval supply ship) off Stave rne by the submarine
TRIDENT was reported.
The enemy submarines were apparently directed today to
proceed without warning against all German merchantmen In
and outside neutral territorial waters. Under these
circumstances it would have been better to camouflage the
steamers of the 1st Sea Transport Unit as neutrals (Swedes,
Norwegians, Esthonians).
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Naval Staff's objections to a premature appearance of
the Sea Transport Unit In Norwegian waters are thus
confirmed. The torpedoing of the RIO DE JANEIRO, the
landing of the survivors and the dead in German uniforms
must of necessity lead to a complete revelation of the
German operation and to an advance warning of the Norwegians,
precluding the lement of surprise.
At 2030 Rueter was already reporting from Oslo:
"German troopship RIO DE JANEIRO with 300
men on board torpedoed in the vicinity of
Kristiansand.n
The movements of the naval forces have, however, also become
known now and are leading to swiftly increasing unrest and
tension in the Scandinavian and enemy countries in connection
with the German transport movements. It is reported from
Stockholm at 1400 that the Swedish Foreign Minister has
information that a strong German fleet and transport unit
passed northwards through the entrances to the Baltic. A
Danish lightship reports isolated German forces. At 1800
Reuter gave out that 80-100 German naval vessels were
proceeding through the Great Belt and Kattegat, escorted by
auxiliary vessels and trawlers.
Operation "Weseruebung" has left the stage of secrecy
and camouflage according to the Impression prevalent in the
evening. Our enemies have been warned. Since the element
of surprise is lost we must now expect engagements at all
points,
Attack by the 10th Air Division on Scapa on the evening
of 8 April.
Results as follows according to the Air Force report:
Hits:
1 battleship from 1,300 nw altitude,
1 hit SC 250 amidships, 1 SC 250 close to the bow.
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1 cruiser from 5,000 m. altitude,
1 hit SC 250 on the stern, 2 SC 500
between 2 cruisers lying only a slight
distance apart.
1 battle cruiser, 1 SC 500 10-20 m. from
the ship's side.
1 single-engined plane shot down.
Forces identified:
1 aircraft carrier with superstructure,
5 or more heavy and light cruisers,
also destroyers and auxiliary vessels.
Own losses:
2 planes shot down.
Baltic Sea:
Advance by naval forces according to plan to their
operational objectives in "V/eseruebung" •
Atlantic :
Naval Staff assumes command of Ship "16" at 2400 on 8 April,
(9) The NORDMARK is assigned a rendezvous within the scope of
the North Sea operation. U "37" is to relieve U "64" with
Ship "36" and then proceed as was ordered for Ship "16".
Submarine Situation
The defensive disposition of the submarines for "Weseruebung"
has been taken up as per operational order of Commanding
Admiral, Submarines; codeword "Hartmuth":
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8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The disposition of submarine groups is as follows:
I. Submarine group in the Narvik area:
U "25", "46", "51"; U "37" is approaching
from Iceland as the fourth boat.
II. Submarine group in the area off Trondheim:
U "30", "34".
III. Submarine group in the area off Bergen:
U "9", "14% "56", "60", "62".
IV. Submarine group in the Stavanger area:
U "1", "4".
V. Submarine group in attacking disposition
north and northeast of the Shetlands:
U "47", "48", "49" and "50". U "52" and
"38" are to continue operations in this
area.
VI. Submarine group attacking disposition east
and west of Pentland Firth:
U "13", "57", "58" and "59".
VII. Submarine group: Disposition in the
southern North Sea only in case of need.
VIII. Submarine group: Protective disposition
west of Lindesnes: U "2", "5", "6".
IX. Submarine group attacking disposition east
of the Shetlands: U "7", "10", "19".
Merchant Shipping
The following directive is issued to the steamers off the
Norwegian coast not engaged in "We se rue bung" :
"British mine barrages off Norway probably
misleading. Probable however that positions
concerned are patrolled. Therefore remain
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8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
north of Haugesund in fjords and ports*
Signed Naval Control."
The following is also wired to the Embassy in Oslo via
the Foreign Office for all German Consulates (German
citizens) in Norway for immediate transmission to all
German merchantmen:
"Merchantmen to remain north of Stadlandet in
fjords or ports "because of British mine barrages
in Norwegian territorial waters and probable patrols
there. Merchantmen between Stadlandet and
Kristiansand to return home on the former route."
The Ministry of Transportation has ordered that the
merchantmen under its control which are bound for Norway
west of Kristiansand may no longer sail from German ports.
The announcement by the French and British Governments of
the mined areas in Norway was broadcast as a warning to mariners
by the Deutschlandsender, coastal radio stations and by
Plan A distribution. The following was announced towards
the evening by radio message in clear:
"The possibility of British mines near Halten must
be reckoned with."
(Ha It en/Norway, near Trondheim.)
The following further orders were radioed to shios in Norway
(in code) :
"Ships off the south coast of Norway keep a
safe distance from the coast, since the enemy
is attacking ships in territorial waters.
Signed Naval Control."
"Ships outside the skerries are to be camouflaged
if possible immediately."
Regarding steamers of the "export" unit see under Situation
8 April.
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The steamers MAIN and BAERENFELS which, according to the
Consul at Haugesund are still lying in Koppervik owing
to lack of pilots, are ordered to proceed on to Bergen
at once. The steamer SAO PAULO is likewise to put in to
Bergen.
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
"WESERDAY"
Items of Political Importance
0500:
The German Ambassador in Oslo informed the Norwegian
Government in writing and verbally that Germany requests
Norway to place herself under German military protection.
A similar note was handed to Denmark at the same time.
Assurances were given that the political independence and
territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark would be
respected now and in future.
After thorough deliberation the Norwegian Government refused
the German demand, since it signifies an attempt on her
sovereign rights. The Danish Government decided to accept
German military protection under protest.
At 0515:
German naval forces arrived in Norwegian and Danish bases,
forces disembarked, the Danish frontiers were crossed.
Denmark prohibited firing. The Norwegian Government,
which ordered increased alert for Air Force flying and
maintenance personnel and coastal defenses yesterday,
states that Norway will offer resolute resistance.
According to a Reuter report, at 1300 the (British) Foreign
Office stated officially that the British and French Governments
have decided to give Norway full help at once with land, sea
and air forces; the necessary steps are being taken.
During the day a second Government was formed in Norway under
Vidkum Quisling (former secretary to Nansen, then leader of
the Norwegian National Unity Party and from 1931-32 Minister
for Defense) .
The old Nyggardsvold Government has not resigned, however,
but is issuing orders for mobilization and calling for
utmost resistance and sabotage.
At 0800 the German Government handed a note to Sweden
containing Armed, Forces High Command's definite demands
(see "V/eseruebung" file). A verbal assurance was given
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
that Germany's measures were in no way directed against
Sweden. The Swedish Government has accepted the German
proposals.
Chamberlain has attempted to prove in the House of Commons
that the German action against Norway and Denmark cannot
be regarded a s an answer to the laying of the British mine
barrages, since the German forces must have sailed much earlier.
He emphasized that a state of war exists between Norway and
Germany and that Great Britain regards herself as Norway's
ally.
(For further particulars and impression made abroad by the
German action, see Foreign Press and Political Review.)
Situation 9 April
Special Reports on the Enemy
forth Sea/Northern Waters:
IN
At 0500 there was an engagement between heavy British forces
and our battleships west of the Lofotens. No information as
to type and composition of the enemy task force; probably a
battle cruiser of the REPULSE class with other heavy vessels
and destroyers.
In the Shetlsnds/Norway area and off the Norwegian coast
4-5 heavy ships (possibly including heavy French forces),
about 8 cruisers and several destroyer flotillas are operating
on varying, latterly northerly courses. £r
The aircraft carrier FURIOUS left Scapa during the day,
obviously to join Commander in Chief, Home Fleet.
A submarine reported enemy destroyers on southwesterly course
in West Fjord in the afternoon.
A foreign submarine was sighted in Trondheim Fjord.
During the night of 9 April enemy cruisers and destroyers
were 40-50 miles west of Bergen on southerly courses.
(For particulars see list in radiogram file of 9 April.)
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation
Naval Staff reviews the situation as follows on the evening
of 9 April:
I. Norway:
The Norwegian Admiralty ordered increased readiness
during the night of 8 April and the extinguishing of all
radio and coastal beacons on the Norwegian coast from
Lister to Narvik. In spite of this our forces advanced
as planned.
Battleship Group:
At 0530 Commanding Admiral, Fleet reported an engagement
with heavy enemy forces west of the Lofotens (67" 40'N,
9° 50'E). He apparently succeeded in shaking off the
superior enemy after a short action.
The enemy was probably one REPULSE class and another
battleship. Commanding Admiral, Fleet reported at 2017:
"Can only proceed at 25 knots, two heavy gun
turrets out of action."
Naval Staff suspects that the damage resulted from heavy
seaway. No action report has been received from Commanding
Admiral, Fleet. A Reuter report on a great naval battle
and the sinking of the GNEISENAU appears very unreliable.
Narvik Group:
Put in as planned except for the destroyer GIESE which
did not arrive until some hours later. Landing accomplished
without difficulty, resistance slight. The Commodore's
action in sinking the armored coastal ships NORGE and
EIDSVOLD is fully approved in view of the general Norwegian
resistance. The JAN WELLEM is in harbor. The "export"
unit and the tanker KATTEGAT, however, have not arrived.
This has caused a difficult situation as regards supplies;
ammunition is scarce.
Fuel supplies for the destroyers are assured by the JAN WELLEM.
Refuelling will take until the evening of 10 April according
to Commander, Destroyers' report, since the second tanker is
not available.
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Enemy destroyers sighted in West Fjord; the Narvik
Group must sail as soon as possible. Assumed that
Commander, Destroyers will himself make every effort to
hasten departure.
Enquiry to Group West about number of destroyers ready to
sail today has not been answered yet.
Narvik submarines are assumed to be in inner positions.
Trondheim Group:
Put in as planned; slight resistance offered by coastal
batteries. Disembarkation carried out. Situation
regarding coastal defense guns not yet clarified, so that
stronger submarine protection is requested. The Norwegians
attempted to reinforce the crew of the battery at Hysnes
by landing troops. "Export" unit has not yet arrived
in Trondheim, causing difficult supply situation. The
HIPPER1 s stock of fuel is only enough for her return without
any detours. Two destroyers will not be ready to sail
until tomorrow. Naval air squadron which has arrived is still
without fuel. Airfield is heavily iced-over and probably
unserviceable.
The HIPPER reports sinking the destroyer GLOWWORM by gunfire
and ramming on the morning of 8 April while on passage.
Submarines are assumed to be in position.
Bergen Group:
Entry and disembarkation as planned; resistance slight.
The KOENIGSBERG and BREMSE sustained damage in action.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that troops are
concentrating in the hinterland, situation therefore still
not clear. Attacks from the sea feared. Population
passive.
The KOENIGSBERG, BREMSE, CARL PETERS and PT boats will
remain in Bergen. The KOELN and two torpedo boats will
try to put out tonight.
Submarines at inner positions.
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Egersund Group:
Assignment carried out as planned; forces then put out to
join the KARLSRUHE. Bicycle troops ashore.
Kri3tiansand Group:
Operation made difficult by fog. Strong resistance from
coastal defenses was broken by ships' guns and bombing attacks.
At 1130 the KARLSRUHE put in and disembarked the troops.
When putting out at 2245 the KARLSRUHE was hit by a torpedo
and severely damaged. Endeavors made to tow her in. The
TSINGTAU ana PT boat flotilla remained in Kristiansand.
Arendal assignment:
Delayed by fog; carried out as planned about noon.
Bicycle troops ashore; destroyed the cable to Great Britain.
Oslo Group:
Strong resistance from coastal batteries near Horten and
in the Droebak Channel. Impossible to force the Channel.
One motor minesweeper sank near Horten. Severe hits on
the BLUECHER caused both engines to break down. The
BLUECHER unable to move, sank near Askholmen north of the
Droebak Channel at 1530 because of explosion inside or hits
from mines or torpedoes. Troops disembarked in wioss end
Sonsbugden. Resistance of coastal fortifications broken by
bombing attack. At 1920 Droebak Channel was surrendered
without a fight.
The LUETZOW and EMDEN have not yet put in because the mine
situation is not clarified.
II. Denmark:
plan.
No resistance. Operations proceeded smoothly to
Troops landed in Copenhagen by the HANSESTADT DANZIG.
Ship sailed for V/arnemuenae.
Group "Rugard" landed troops near Middelfahrt to protect
the bridge over the Little Belt.
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Gjedser, Nyborg and Korsoer assignments carried out as
planned • The SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN ran aground near Vengeance
Gruns but was refloated in the afternoon. The Nyborg Group
was disembarked as planned.
(See also evening report from Group Baltic, radiogram file
of 9 April, 1800.)
"Export" unit;
So far no ships have arrived at their ports of destination.
Positions unknown. Motor vessel RODA sunk by a Norwegian
torpedo boat.
1st Sea Transport Unit:
Complete reports still outstanding. So "far the steamer
RIO DE JANEIRO of the Bergen Group has been lost. The steamer
MARIE LEONHARD was stopped by a Norwegian torpedo boat. No
report yet about the Oslo Group.
2nd Sea Transport Unit;
In the Great Belt on the evening of 9 April. Escort
increased #as planned. Scheduled to advance from Anholt
close to the Swedish coast.
Air Situation;
See Air Force report on the day!s events. (Radiogram file
of 9 April, 2200.)
On the basis of reconnaissance and shadower reports, strong
forces of the 30th and 26th Bomber Wings (Ju 88 and He 111)
were sent out against forces of Commander in Chief, Home
Fleet sighted. According to an Air Force report the following
definite hits can be assumed;
1 battleship 3 x 500 kg.
1 battleship 3 x 250 kg.
1 battle cruiser 1 x 500 kg.
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9 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
1 heavy cruiser
1 troopship
1 troopship
1 cruiser or
large destroyer
1 cruiser
1 x 250 kg.
1 x 500 kg.
1 x 50 kg.
2 x 500 kg.) stopped, dense smoke, list
1 x 500 kg.)
In conclusion it can be stated: The passage of the naval
forces into their target areas and the troop landing operations
in Norwegian and Danish ports have succeeded in a bold break
through the fortifications, thanks to the resolute action of
the forces participating and favored by luck. Taking the
enemy by surprise could not be guaranteed as the result of
various advance warnings, in conjunction with a noticeable
stiffening of Norway's attitude for some days. The losses
which have been incurred, especially that of the newest heavy
cruiser BLUECHER, are grievous; they are, however, in
proportion to the risk run and anticipated and cannot be called
excessively high.
The situation for the operations so far and for the most
difficult part of the whole naval operation which is now
beginning, the return passage, has been rendered much more
difficult by the enemy's operations (minelaying in Norwegian
waters and planned partial occupation of Norwegian bases)
coinciding with the German operation. It must be concluded
from the presence of enemy troopships with the battleship
formation attacked by the Air Force that the enemy's
preparations for a landing in Norway were already under way
and that the enemy is resolved even now to land troops in
Norway to combat the German occupation forces. A large
number of strong and superior British and French naval forces
is engaged in the northern North Sea up to the Lofotens and
off all Norwegian ports in carrying out the enemy operations.
Danger from the air in the occupied bases must be regarded as
extremely high in view of weak anti-aircraft defenses and
the enemy's probable use of aircraft-carriers. The great
danger from submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak is
acknowledged. It will render the task of protecting the
transport and supply routes to Oslo extremely difficult.
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Naval Staff now regards the following assignments as
urgent :
1. Break-through to home waters by the battleships
and all operational forces in Norwegian ports
as soon as possible.
2. Reinforcement of the Skagerrak mine barrage
in order to protect the Skagerrak against
enemy surface forces.
3. Concentration of submarine disposition off
Narvik and Trondheim.
4. Submarine chase with all available means in
the Kattegat and Skagerrak to protect the
supply route to Oslo. ^
5. Protection of the sea transport units.
6. Request to the Fuehrer that supplies should be
brought up via Swedish and Norwegian railroads,
since they are impossible via the west
Norwegian ports and naval supremacy in the
Skagerrak and Kattegat cannot always be
guaranteed owing to danger from enemy submarines.
Individual Items;
1. Disposition of submarines to protect the area off
Oslo is examined and rejected, since operations by our
submarines in an area where enemy submarines are suspected
prevent any planned submarine chase.
2. The question as to whether it is necessary to free t
Commanding Admiral, Fleet from obligation regarding the
destroyers, which will not be ready to sail until tomorrow,
and to advise him to have the battleships return as soon as
possible is decided in the negative. After consultation with
Group West there is no doubt - because of the exhaustive
discussions which took place before the operation - that
Commanding Admiral, Fleet, who Is in receipt of all informatlor
about our own and enemy forces, will take the right action In
accordance with the situation.
3. The request of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast to leave
the cruisers already in Bergen there, with regard to the
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
still uncertain land situation, is refused. The damaged
KOENIGSBERG must of necessity remain in Bergen for the
present. The KOELN, however, must return home as soon
as possible.
4. The appearance of the French minelaying cruiser
EMILE BERTIN and other French vessels makes it necessary to
devote increased attention to danger from mines in the
North Sea. The importance of the minelaying cruiser is
specially pointed out to the Air Force.
5. According to Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark,
the first discussions with the Danish Navy progressed very
satisfactorily.
Result:
* a) The German Navy takes over patrol also on
the north side of the Belt mine barrages.
Technical maintenance of the barrages is
still a Danish task.
Naval Staff is expected to issue instructions later
about laying deep barrages in the barrage gaps.
b) The Danish barrages remain switched on.
c) Danish naval vessels are withdrawn from the
neutrality patrol, inclusive of the west
coast of Jutland. German naval forces
take over the assignment.
The Danish Government will presumably publish a
demobilization law. The Danish Navy intends
to send most of its personnel home. Consent
is given to this.
Most Danish warships will be moved to the
Arsenal in Copenhagen for this purpose.
d) Dimming lights as a part of the total
blackout ordered has not been carried out
yet. The Danes have been requested to
submit a plan for switching off the lights
by areas.
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9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
e) The Danes have made the following urgent
requests:
1. Resumption of traffic with Bornholm.
(Granted) .
2. Permission for Danish packet steamers
to proceed between Copenhagen and
Aarhus. (Granted).
3. Permission for fishing vessels to
put out. (Granted with limitations.)
Submarine Situation
Submarines in position for "Vveseruebung" • The boats
in the Shetlands Passage and off Pentland Firth have
been ordered into attack groups in the vicinity of the
positions of the heavy enemy forces reported several
times •
Merchant Shipping
Lo s s e s :
The motor vessel SEATTLE was set on fire and destroyed
by our own bombs while breaking down resistance in
Kristiansand. The following Information Report No. 109/40
has been sent to all representatives abroad concerned,
except in Russia, Japan, U.S.A. and Italy, for immediate
transmission to all merchantmen ;
1. Danger of enemy attacking German ships
in neutral ports. *
2. Be prepared for destruction.
3. Be ready to sail on call.
Signed Navy.
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway;
Political situation in Oslo still obscure. Quisling
Government has no response from the Norwegian people.
The old Government has not resigned* Hamar, seat of
the fleeing Government, occupied by German troops.
Further flight by the Government. Discussion between
the King of Norway and German Ambassador Brauer fruitless.
King not prepared to yield. Nyggardsvold, the head of
the Government, declared before the Storthing that Norway
is resolved to continue the struggle for her integrity.
Hambro, the President of the Storthing, gave a speech over
the radio in Sweden, calling foi- action, and is recruiting
volunteers.
The Norwegian people's resistance has been stiffened by
British propaganda and assurances. Young men fit for
military service are apparently prepared to offer the
most stubborn resistance and to commence sniping activities.
The population is everywhere passive, negative.
Denmark;
No resistance, effort to comprehend the German action.
Statement by Prime Minister Stauning ••••
"The King and his Ministers have resolved,
relying on Germany's assurance that she does not
plan to infringe Denmark's integrity and political
independence by the steps taken, to attempt to
order conditions and the occupation. This course
has been selected In order to spare land and people
the consequences of war.w
Survey of the Situation
Special reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
The Naval Attache reports on a communication from the
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Japanese Admiralty that British naval forces from Hongkong
and Singapore appear to be concentrating in the Dutch East
Indies.
France :
The priority radio traffic, mostly concerning orders to
return etc., continues. A fairly large vessel, probably
a cruiser, is to be escorted from an African port to
Brest by a large destroyer.
In the Mediterranean an unidentified vessel was hastily
sent out on guard duty in the Strait of Bonifacio.
Twelve planes took off from Berre (Rhone) for Mentone
(Riviera); further transfer to Corsica is possible.
It is not out of the question that Italy's present attitude is
occasioning doubts and making security measures by Franco-
British forces necessary.
North Sea/Northern Waters:
During the day very little could be ascertained about the
exact enemy situation.
The battle cruiser REPULSE and the zna Destroyer Flotilla
are suspected to be in the Lofoten area and the battle
cruiser RENOWn on her way there.
The southern Task Force reported several times yesterday
between the Shetlands and Norway was not intercepted again
today. It remains to be seen whether the heavy ships
moved off westward or northwestward as the result of hits in
yesterday's bombing attacks. It was not until the late
afternoon, at 1700, that a battleship with two heavy and two
light cruisers was sighted east of Fair Passage on southwesterly *
course. Radio intelligence intercepted the arrival reports
of the cruisers MANCHESTER, SOUTHAMPTON and GLASGOW in Scapa.
The cruisers are possibly putting in to refuel, if damage from
yesterday's air attacks does not render any repairs necessary.
Damage to the SOUTHAMPTON and GLASGOW can be assumed according
to the Radio Monitoring Service. The cruiser BIRMINGHAM was
north of the Orkneys in the afternoon.
The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and one heavy cruiser participated
in the destroyer actions with German forces of Commander,
Destroyers in West Fjord. The Admiralty reported the
sinking of the destroyers HARDY and HUNTER, also severe
damage to the HOTSPUR and another destroyer. At noon the
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
RENOWN was in radio comnunica tion with the 2nd Destroyer
Flotilla. The aircraft-carrier FURIOUS is still at sea.
The dive-bombers which successfully attacked the forces
lying in -Bergen at 0800 probably took off from her. Only
destroyers on westerly courses were reported in the Shetlands
Passage during the forenoon.
Very great danger from submarines is still to be reckoned with
in the Skagerrak and Kattegat.
Own Situation
Norway:
Military situation outwardly quiet on the west coast.
The mobilization ordered by the old Government is arousing
resistance •
Railroad communications to Bergen and Trondheim destroyed,
telephone lines interrupted. Norwegian naval forces hostile
and prepared for actions. Groups and Commanding Admiral,
Submarines therefore ordered to destroy Norwegian forces not
in our hands or laid up in port. Further, it is pointed out
to Commanding Admiral, Norway (Admiral Boehm) that it is
urgently necessary for the new Government at once to recall
the Norwegian forces at sea. Appropriate safety measures in
view of our submarine positions are to be arranged with the
Norwegian Government.
The directive is issued - because of an inquiry from the
Group - that all captured Norwegian naval vessels are to be
commissioned with German crews.
Situation in Narvik:
At 0651 a corrupt "Most Immediate" radio message in clear was
received from Narvik about an attack made by British destroyers
on Narvik.
Later reports, still incomplete at first, show that in the
early hours of the morning, in fog and drifting snow, enemy
destroyers protected by a heavy cruiser carried out a surprise
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attack on our destroyers lying in Narvik. The attack was
warded off; three enemy destroyers were sunk or destroyed
(HUNTER, HARDY, HOTSPUR).
Our losses the HEIDKAaIP and SCHMITT. Commander, Destroyers,
Commodore Bonte, was killed. The ROEDER sustained severe
damage, LUEDEMANN, KUENNE and THIELE are able to proceed with
limitations, the ARNIM has slight breakdowns. Return passage
for the ZENKER, GIESE, KOELLNER and ARNIk appears possible.
Enemy destroyers withdrew after heavy losses. Narvik is
firmly in our hands.
As a result of damage sustained during the British attack and
difficulties in oiling, only the destroyers GIESE and ZENKER
are completely ready to proceed and put out.
A
Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla attempted to put to sea
during the night of 10 April, but had to turn back since the
five destroyers reported by U n51" in Brenes Fjord, reinforced
by cruisers in the rear, are watching the fjord entrance and
a break-through appeared hopeless because of the bright night.
Situation in Trondheim:
Military situation outwardly quiet. Every aspect of the supply
question difficult. Transport by rail from Oslo not possible.
Fuel situation critical for the 1st Naval Air Squadron of the
506th Group. Seaward defense by coastal guns not yet settled.
Port Commander therefore requests reinforcement of the submarine
disposition off Trondheim. Airfield still unserviceable as the
result of icing.
The cruiser HIPPER and the destroyer ECKHOLDT are in readiness
to sail. The RIEDPJL is not ready to proceed and is being
used as a barrage battery. The HIPPER sailed in the evening;
the ECKHOLDT had to turn about for en unknown cause.
Assessment and Steps taken:
We owe it to the strong defensive action of the Narvik
destroyers, which obviously used all their resources and
whose regrettable losses can probably be ascribed to the
enemy's taking them by surprise in bad visibility, that an
enemy landing in Narvik could be repulsed with very heavy
losses to him. The death of Commodore Bonte, who had always
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
proved himself an excellent Commander, and especially so as
Commander, Destroyers, is a heavy loss for Naval Staff and
the entire Navy, especially the destroyers.
The destroyer attack on Narvik confirms what dangers are
entailed for our forces detained in the ports because of
delayed refuelling or waiting for the arrival of tankers.
The order is therefore issued to all forces lying in readiness
to proceed in Narvik, Trondheim and Bergen to commence return
passage as soon as possible and regardless of vessels remaining
behind. If necessary they may call at intermediate ports.
The Narvik destroyers under Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla
are, as per operational order, to join the fleet which is
presumed to be west of the Lofotens (radio silence being
maintained).
Independent return passage is left to the discretion of the
cruiser HIPPER with her force.
The situation of the destroyers in Narvik is judged to be
very serious in view of further expected attacks by superior
forces. It is to be hoped that the break-through from
Narvik with the destroyers which are ready to proceed will
take place as soon as possible. Commander, 4th Destroyer
Flotilla is undoubtedly endeavoring to carry this out with
all the means in his power.
Further speedy protection of important positions in Narvik
and Trondheim is necessary. An attempt must be made to
relieve the destroyers. Naval Staff has therefore ordered
Commanding Admiral, Submarines to reinforce the submarine
disposition off these ports and to increase the number of
large boats off Narvik to 8, off Trondheim to 4. The boats
may be expected to arrive in 2-3 days.
Since the steamers of the "export" unit have not arrived in
Narvik and Trondheim, the troops landed are facing a very
difficult situation as regards equipment with guns and supplies
of ammunition. The Fuehrer has therefore ordered investigation
into the possibility of supplies by submarines , in addition to
the immediate supply service by the Air Force.
The result of the investigation is:
The following will be ready to carry out this assignment
within a short period:
U "43" from the evening of 11 April,
U "26" on 13 April,
U "29" on 15 April.
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The weight of the supplies is allowed for by the boats only
carrying the torpedoes in the tubes . They can then carry:
u
"43"
18-20
tons
u
"26"
12
tons
u
ti29«
9
tons*
Naval Staff has sent a directive to this effect to Group 21,
Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group West.
The question of the use of the large boats U "A",
U "101% U ,,122ft, which will be ready for operations in the
immediate future and the possibility of converting the boats
suitable for transport ("103", "104", "105", "106", "123",
"124") to carry mixed dargoes and aviation gasoline is under
review.
Naval Staff also proposed to Armed Forces High Command and
Commander in Chief, Air Force the immediate use of a Zeppelin,
as a further means of supply. Investigation revealed,
however, that the Zeppelin is not in readiness.
'
Because of the importance
Group has been ordered to
available meens.
of air transports, the Trondheim
make ready the airfield with all
Commanding Admiral, Fleet has reported position west of 6° E
north of 68° N; he plans to break through near the Shetlands
from the northwest and requests that the HIPPER may operate
to the east. Heavy guns will be ready for action again on
11 April, except for "A" turret on the GNEISENAU.
Commanding Admiral, Fleet* s plans are approved. The speedy
return of the ships Is desirable. Operations against light
enemy forces in order to gain taotical and strategic successes
are not possible as the enemy situation at present shows no
chances of operations against such enemy forces. The question
of battleship operations in West Fjord in order to bring the
destroyers out of Narvik is rejected, since such an operation
offers no prospects of success in view of the presence of
superior enemy forces, including the aircraft carrier, and in
view of the danger from submarines and torpedoes in the fjords;
'
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jeopardizing the battleships without prospects of strategic
success is not justified.
The maintenance of the battleships is of the greatest strategic
importance just now.
Situation in Bergen:
Bergen firmly in our hands. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast
reports the laying of the planned mine barrages in both entrances
to Bergen. Dive-bomber attack by enemy planes at 0800. The
cruiser KOENIGSBERG was set on fire by two bombs and had to be
abandoned. Ship capsized at 1100. Crew incorporated in
coastal defense.
Urgent need for supplies of anti-aircraft guns and light anti-
aircraft ammunition is reported. Admiral, West Norwegian
Coast has been given the assignment of seizing and reporting
all oil stocks ashore and in tankers.
Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force is scheduled to sail tonight
with the KOELN and two torpedo boats.
Situation in Stavanger:
Torpedo boat SKARV seized.
Stavanger airfield and seaplane base attacked by British
bombers in the evening. No particular damage done.
Situation in Eristiansand:
The torpedoed cruiser KARLSRUHE could not be saved. The ship
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
was sunk by torpedo on the night of 9 April. Nothing special to
report in Kristiansand.
Two 21 cm, six 15 cm. guns ready for use with very simple fire
control.
Situation in Oslo:
The island of Bolerne, which was still firing in the forenoon,
fell into German hands in the afternoon. The last resistance
in Oslo Fjord has thus been broken.
The LUETZOW and EMDEN put in to Oslo. The LUETZOW is to
return to Kiel tonight to be made ready for operations in the
Atlantic as soon as possible.
The torpedo boat ALEATROS ran aground at the entrance to
Oslo Fjord and is probably lost.
Such losses must be expected in the waters off the Norwegian
coast, to which we are unaccustomed and which are difficult
to navigate.
Commanding Admiral, Norway, Admiral Eoehm, flew to Oslo on
the afternoon of 10 April, and took up his duties.
The 2nd Sea Transport Unit (troops ana material) crossed to
Oslo in convoy. In spite of strong submarine protection and
sir patrol the steamers FRIEDENAU, WIGBERT and patrol boat
"1507" were torpedoed west of Gothenburg. Casualties appear
to be high.
The steamer ANTARES of the 1st Sea Transport Unit was
torpedoed (west of Uddevalla Fjord).
Unsuccessful submarine chase.
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
It is necessary to concentrate anti-submarine defenses in the
Kattegat and eastern Skagerrak because of the acute submarine
situation in these areas. At the request of Group Baltic,
the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla and Ships "35", "40", "37",
"26" and "47" have been placed at its disposal. Group West
is at present considering the transfer of a further submarine
chaser flotilla.
Denmark:
Nothing special to report in Denmark. (Coastal Defense
Commander, Denmark, Vice Admiral Mewis, in Copenhagen.)
Occupation proceeds according to plan. Good understanding
with Danish authorities.
According to the order of Armed Forces High Command (Operations
Division), command of the forces of Staff, 31st Special Duties
Corps (General Kaupisch) operating in Denmark will pass to Commander
in Chief, Army on conclusion of military operations in Denmark.
The 21st Group, Oslo will remain directly subordinate to Armed
Forces High Command.
Staff, 31st Special Duties Corps will remain in Denmark.
The Commanding Officer is the Commander and representative of
the German Armed Forces in Denmark. He is authorized to issue
orders to all German forces in Denmark in order to avert dangers.
Great Belt:
We have occupied the control positions of the Danish mine
barrages in the Great Belt.
Bornholm:
The HANSESTADT DANZIG landed a battalion at Roenne on Bornholm
in the afternoon.
— 85—
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10 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
(S©e also situation report of Group Baltic, radiogram
file 1945.)
Air Situation:
See Air Force report on day's events.
Air Force Operations Staff asked Naval Staff in the evening
whether, on the basis of the survey of the situation in Narvik,
a fresh British attack there to wipe out the destroyers and
capture the town is considered probable, so that all-out use
of a bomber group on 11 April appears to be justified.
(Planes would land at Narvik after the attack but could not
fly back because of fuel shortage.)
Naval Staff considers a British attempt to force Narvik
early on the morning of 11 April possible, perhaps even
probable. All-out use of a whole bomber group to attack,
however, appears too much to Naval Staff.
A bomber squadron is
such an attac:..
considered sufficient to repulse
Naval Staff, however, considers the use of a few long-range
bombers (5-6), which can return, to be a better solution.
Air Force General Staff (Naval Liaison Officer) was informed
to this effect by telephone.
Naval Staff, in agreement with Commander in Chief, Air Force,
has issued regulations to prevent losses to ourselves caused
by our own actions. (See War Diary, Part B, Vol. V, page 131.)
Submarine Situation
Nothing special to report.
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Disposition as per. operational order "Hartmuth". At 0800
a directive was sent to Commanding Admiral, Submarines and
Group West based on the survey of the situation in Trondheim
"Increase number of submarines off Trondheim to 4."
The order was amplified later by the following:
"Increase number of large submarines off Narvik to 8,
off Trondheim to 4, at once because of the decisive
importance of these two ports for the whole operation."
Commanding Admiral, Submarines has dispersed Submarine Group
V north of the Shetlands and assigned the boats as follows:
To Narvik: U "47", "48", "49", "38".
To Trondheim: U "50", "52".
Merchant Shipping
Own Shipping:
Stavanger Sea Transport Unit (3 steamers) put in; Krlstiansand
Unit (3 steamers) put in; steamer KRETA still missing. No
news to date from Bergen.
Armed Forces High Command orders with reference to the "export"
units :
1. Transport steamers which have passed Bergen to the
north are to proceed to Trondheim for unloading.
2. If Trondheim has been passed to the north, let
them proceed.
3. Transport steamers in Bergen or south of it to
unload at the nearest port, regardless of destination
of cargo.
Losses:
The steamer RODA of the "export" unit was sunk off Stavanger
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10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
by a Norwegian torpedo boat. According to a statement by
Chamberlain, the steamer RAUENFELS and five other German
merchant steamers were sunk in West Fjord during the attack
on Narvik.
Foreign Merchant Shipping:
With reference to a radio monitoring report that the British
Commanding Admiral, Mediterranean has instructed all Danish
and Norwegian ships in his area to put into British Mediterranean
ports, since the ships are under British protection, the
Foreign Office was requested to have the Norwegian and Danish
Governments issue counter-orders. The Foreign Office then
made arrangements in Copenhagen and Oslo for Norwegian and
Danish ships to receive instructions through the radio to put
in to neutral ports in the Mediterranean, preferably Spanish
or Italian ones, or to endeavor, as the situation permits,
otherwise to escape seizure by the British and to return home.
Simultaneously the Embassies in Rome and Madrid were instructed
to endeavor - by means of our Consulates and by pressure on
Norwegian and Danish Consulates - to hold Norwegian and Danish
ships which may be in ports there for the present. The
Italian and Spanish Governments are to be informed of these
measures. A communication has also been sent to the Ministry
of Propaganda to be broadcast by the German foreign radio
service.
At noon on 10 April Commander in Chief, Navy was in the
Chancellery to report to the Fuehrer. Conference on the
situation.
(For memorandum of Commander in Chief, Navy see War Diary,
Part C, Vol. V.)
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway:
Still difficult to assess the political situation. The King
firmly rejects the new Quisling Government. General impression:
population indifferent around Oslo, resolved to resist in the
interior because of orders from the old Government and propaganda
calling for action.
Foreign Minister Koht declared:
"We are at war with Germany and consequently allied
to all countries which are at war with Germany."
2. Denmark:
Situation continues quiet. An audience granted by the King
to the Ambassador and military leaders has confirmed the
impression that the King and Government are striving to stress
their wish for friendly and correct relations.
3. Lord Halifax states that any readiness by Norway to
negotiate with Germany would have no effect on the Allies'
decision to oppose the German penetration into Norway.
Great Britain could not possibly suffer an extension of the
German strategic position into the North Sea and Atlantic.
4. Sweden:
Is resolved to maintain her neutrality and is determined to
keep out of the conflict.
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
5. Russia, Italy, Spain and Finland declare their attitude
of strict neutrality towards the German advance against Norway
and Denmark.
6. Roosevelt has issued a proclamation forbidding U.S.
ships to enter all Scandinavian waters. The war zone laid
down in the Neutrality Law is extended by the decree.
According to it, U.S. ships may not traverse Scandinavian
territorial waters from Bergen along the west coast of Norway
up to the point 44° E, 77° N. Archangel and Murmansk are
also included in this zone.
(For individual reports on Norway and speeches by Churchill
and Reynaud on 11 April, see Foreign Press and Political
Review. )
Survey of the Situation
Political and military situation in Norway still unchanged.
Our forces are assembling for action against Norwegian troops.
Supply situation very strained, especially for the equipping of
air bases. No enemy troops have landed in Norway so far,
but landings are assumed to be imminent.
(See situation report, 21st Group of 11 April. Radiogram
file 2225.)
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Great Britain;
Disposition of forces; Aircraft carriers GLORIOUS and ARK ROYAL,
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
also 1 "C" class cruiser and <J destroyers, left Alexandria
on 9 April, in all probability to proceed to home waters.
The RESOLUTION has been detected in the area to the west of
the Channel, the REVENGE and DISPATCH in the Canada area.
The HAWKINS is in Montevideo, the HERMES in the Freetown area,
the RAMILLIES still in Australia.
France :
Hasty assembly of naval forces in Brest continues. Three
large vessels (cruisers or old battleships) from Toulon to
Casablanca on 11 April. The battleship formation DUNKERQUE,
STRASSEOURG proceeding into the North Sea? (See below).
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Luring the course of the day, U "48" several times reported an
enemy task force west of Trondheim, consisting of '6 battleships,
several heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 5 destroyers.
At 2200 U "48" reported a heavy cruiser out of control for some
time 60 miles northwest of Trondheim Fjord. This could be
the cruiser reported by the Air Force as twice hit with 50 kg.
bombs.
Radio intelligence detects at sea Commander in Chief, Home Fleet,
Commanders, Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st and 2nd Cruiser
Squadrons, also the 3rd, 4th and 6th Destroyer Flotillas.
The presence of the aircraft carrier FURIOUS v/ith the main
force led by Commanaer in Chief, Home Fleet west ana northwest
of ''•nrondheim was confirmed by our air report and by the Radio
Monitoring Service. Planes attacked Trondheim harbor during
the morning.
The former Polish steamers CHOERI (11,500 tons) and BATORY
(14,500 tons), now being used as troopships, have arrived in
Scapa .
An agent's report from Intelligence Center, Belgium, states
that there was a French squadron consisting of the battleships
STRASSEOURG and DUNXERQJJE and the aircraft carrier BEARM,
escorted by two destroyer flotillas and one submarine flotilla
(DAUPHIN class), in the entrance to the Channel early on 10 April
en route for the North Sea. Time and position are considered
improbable according to our radio monitoring. In spite of this,
the presence of the French forces in the North Sea or northern
waters must be reckoned with.
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Radio Intelligence intercepted a British radio message from
which it appears that an operation against the Norwegian
coast between 58° and 59° (area Lindesnes to Skudesnes P'jord)
is planned on 12 April, probably in the afternoon because of
the weather.
All offices concerned have been informed.
A landing at the points indicated is not considered probable.
In Naval Staff's opinion, this is probably a minelaying
operation off the south coast of Norway or a large air raid on
St a vange r/Be r gen .
Survev of our own Situation
Battleships and HIPPER;
The PTIPPER sailed from Trondheim during the night of 10 April.
Movements so far as planned. No reports. Forces should be
roughly off Egersund tomorrow morning.
Situation in Narvik:
P'our destroyers are in complete readiness to proceed,
3 in limited readiness. The DIETER von ROEDER is not ready.
(ROEDER' s radio station has been set up ashore as Narvik Naval
Radio Station, guns are being dismantled for use as a barrage
battery.) Commander, 4th Destroyer P'lotilla reports that Pie
does not consider a break-through out of West Fjord possible
as long as there are superior enemy light forces (cruisers and
destroyers) lying in West P'jord. He considers return passage
close to the coast to be unfavorable because of the joint
British and Norwegian patrol activity.
The tanker KATTEGAT was destroyed in Ofot Fjord by British
forces. Torpedoes were fired on two Eritish destroyers by
U "k25" near Baroy. Effect not observed.
Further steps taken on land to protect Narvik.
Elvenes on Gratanger Fjord was occupied. The greater part
of the population lias left Narvik. Business is at a standstill.
Narvik's primary requirements from Germany are supplies of
heavy armament (mountain guns, machine-guns, mortars) and
ammunition. Armed Forces High Command and Commander in Chief,
Air Force have issued orders accordingly.
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Long-range reconnaissance planes, type Do 26, are to operate
as transport planes for all goods which cannot be dropped.
They are therefore not available for long-range sea
reconnaissance.
Situation in Trondheim:
Attacked in the morning by land planes (aircraft carrier) with
bombs and torpedoes. No success. Scouting raid by British
destroyers repulsed by Hysnes Battery.
British landing suspected south of Storfosna and in Namsos
Fjord. Air reconnaissance is planned. The sighting report
on the British battleship and cruiser formation west and
northwest of Trondheim assumes greater importance in connection
with possible British plans for a landing.
Situation in Bergen:
Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force, sailed from Bergen on the
evening of 10 April with the KOELN, LEOPARD and WOLF.
Situation otherwise unchanged. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast,
reports that the British dive-bombers carrying out the air
raids on 10 April had German markings.
The railroad line from Bergen to Voss and trunk cable connections
have been destroyed..
The Norwegian torpedo boat BRAND was commissioned.
Group West requests the destruction of Aalesund radio
transmitter as it is in constant radio communication with Wick
radio.
Situation in Krlstiansand:
Unchanged; two Norwegian submarines seized.
Situation in Oslo:
Unchanged. The King declines to give the German Ambassador
another audience. No success yet in arresting the former
Government* Lines -of communication and railroad lines in
the hinterland interrupted.
Oslo troops further reinforced with two battalions by air and
by the main body of the 2nd Sea Transport Unit, 10 steamers of
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
which arrived in Oslo in the forenoon. Two steamers
(FRIEDENAU and WIG-BERT) were torpedoed and lost. The
steamer IONIA (1st Sea Transport Unit) carrying horses
and ammunition was torpedoed off Oslo Fjord. Attempts are
being made to tow her in.
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, has put submarine-
chasers into action to combat the great danger from submarines
in the entrance to Oslo Fjord. At 1800 a submarine-chaser
reported the alleged destruction by depth charges of a submarine
at the southern entrance to Oslo Fjord.. (No definite 'proof
available. )
One Norwegian submarine seized in Horten.
The cruiser LUETZOW, which had been recalled from Oslo to be
prepared for the Atlantic, was torpedoed and severely damaged
east of Skagen during the night of 10 April. She is unable
to move and is being picked up by forces of Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic and towed off by tugs.
The fact that the LUETZOW, although unable to move, did not
receive a second torpedo hit, makes it possible that she struck
a mine. Against this there is the fact that the ship was hit
aft . (Later investigations detected no mines in the area
in question. )
The torpedoing of the LUETZOW is the most severe lose the Navy
could suffer at the present moment. The ship's elimination
for some time results in the abandonment of pocket battleship
warfare in the Atlantic at the very moment when a strong
diversion would have been most useful. The ship's incor-
poration 'in "Weseruebung" and her despatch to Oslo have therefore
turned out to be definite strategic errors. Naval Staff feels
this all the more because it always recognized the despatch of
the pocket battleship to the Atlantic as a strategic necessity
and indicated it as such. The original plan of sending the
ship into the Atlantic from Trondheim after executing her
transport assignment could not be carried out since at the last
moment she was reported not to be ready for the Atlantic because
of trouble with her auxiliary engines. Armed Forces High
Command's request that the troops already en route be brought
to Oslo had to be fulfilled by Naval Staff, although v/ith great
misgivings • The fulfillment of this demand has proved a
mistake strategically, from the point of view of naval warfare.
It must be admitted, with regard to the execution of the
Norwegian operation, that the presence of the troops embarked
on the LUETZOW was of the greatest value for the Oslo operation
in view of the BLUECHEH's breakdown.
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
It can be stated in retrospect tha*t both the use of the
LUETZOW and of the latest cruiser BLUECHER in Oslo have led
to extremely severe losses in naval fighting strength.
It might also have been possible to carry out the landing
in Oslo with a large number of small vessels (torpedo boats,
escort boats, etc.) without great losses. A very large
number of such vessels would, however, have been necessary
for the troops to be transported. In Naval Staff 's opinion
the incorporation of powerful ships in the Oslo operation can
on no account be judged as an operational error. The use of
heavy ships1 guns was considered a basic requirement to break
down resistance in Oslo and to cover the landing. Naval Staff
also previously considered the use of the old battleships in
Oslo. Apart from the fact that one of these ships was limited
regarding maneuverability and ability to proceed and the other
was operating on the Korsoer assignment, their fighting qualities
as opposed to the coastal batteries were estimated as very slight.
(Pencilled marginal note by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: But
surely greater than BLUECHER and LUETZOW?) Finally, the
question of the possibility of intimidation by a modern
representative ship played a part in the decision to send the
BLUECHER.
Losses had to be expected in any case. They had to be taken
into account in the interests of the magnitude of the assignment
to be carried out.
Special Questions
1. In order to increase the safety of troop transports to
Norway and to avoid further losses of personnel, Group Baltic
suggests that large torpedo boats make the crossing together
with fast steamers. The boats are to act as anti-submarine
protection for the fast steamers which, for their part, will
only cross in favorable weather. It is proposed that these
load in Hamburg as before. Croup Baltic also considers
mine-exploding vessels well suited for carrying out transport
and requests an allocation.
Naval Staff has consented to the separate transportation
of men and material. Because of trie length of the route to
be protected, Hamburg is considered unsuitable as a point of
departure.
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The question of further transport has been thoroughly
discussed with Armed Forces High Command, whose attention was
drawn to the difficulties of protecting transports in view of
the great danger from submarines and mines in the Kattegat
and Skagerrak and to the necessity of transporting troops by
air as far as possible. Armed Forces High Command is well
aware of the difficulties but cannot forego speedy continuation
of transports by sea in view of the urgency of carrying out
transport assignments. Losses must be accepted.
The following is therefore ordered in agreement with Armed
Forces High Command:
a) Troops to be transported from Frederikshavn on
fast naval vessels and small, fast ships
TaTOENSBURG, ANGELBURG from the Submarine '^
School, free minelayers).
b) Material to be transported as before, plus
additional ammunition, material and provisions
from Skagen on drifters and fishing smacks.
The immediate seizure is ordered of such vessels in German and
Danish ports.
The more the transports of material can be switched over to the
greatest possible number of such vessels, the safer they will be.
The Fuehrer at present absolutely declines to carry out transport
of troops by Swedish railroads, in order to place no burden on
Sweden's neutrality. Only transports of. clothing, provisions
and medical supplies to Narvik come into question for the present.
(For Naval Staff1 s preliminary order see radiogram file of /
11 April, 1800; for executive order of Group Baltic see under
2301.)
2. The Fuehrer's order, which was received in the evening,
on the urgent assignments for the branches of the Armed Forces
(see "We s e rue bung" file) states, regarding the Navy:
a) Most important task is protection of the
Kattegat and Skagerrak against submarines.
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
b) Do 26' s of the Navy are at once placed
under the 10th Corps to carry supplies to
Narvik.
c) Narvik to be supplied by submarines.
d) Transports of material via the Trelleborg-
Sweden railroad to Narvik can be expected
within a few days.
e) Troops to cross from east Jutland to Oslo
with light naval forces.
f) Single guns etc., to be transported on
trawlers and other small vessels to
Oslo.
Groups receive this order with instruction to take the
necessary steps, if necessary in agreement with Group 21.
3. Group Baltic has been ordered to carry out at once its
proposed protection with nets of the southern outlet of the
Flint Channel, including Danish territorial waters, up to the
border of Swedish territorial waters. The Group is also to
submit suggestions for the protection of the northern outlets
of the Great Belt end the Sound north of the Nyborg-Korsoer
and Helsingoer-Helsingborg ferries.
4. In view of the appearance of the battleships and the
HIPPER in the Air Force operational area, the Fuehrer and Field
Marshal are very anxious about the danger to our own ships
during attscks by the 10th Air Corps on British naval forces.
The attention of the Navy and Air Force is again particularly
drawn to the question of identification and exchange of
recognition signals.
Group West was instructed by telephone to ensure that the 10th
Air Corps is clearly informed of the positions and movements of
the battleships and the HIPPER. Ships are also to be familiar
with German Air Force formations and the necessity is again to
be pointed out to them that the markings ordered can be clearly
made out and that recognition signals are also to be fired at
latest with "Open fire" (if not definitely identified as enemy).
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11 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Air Situation
Special Items
Armed reconnaissance in the direction of Narvik by ten planes
of the 3rd Group of the 26th Bomber Wing. Action against
enemy battleship formation (3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier,
2 cruisers, 14 destroyers, northeasterly course) about 1700
in the area off Trondheim.
Result :
1 cruiser
1 aircraft carrier
? x so kg.) bomb hits#
1 x 50 kg. )
Transfer of the 1st Coastal Patrol Squadron of the 106th Group
from Trondheim to Narvik as ordered could not be carried out
because of lack of fuel supplies.
(For particulars see Air Situation and results of reconnaissance
over Narvik in Air Force General Staff report; radiogram file
of 11 April, 2330.)
{Submarine Situation
Positions on the evening of 11 April:
1. Off ,Narvik and in West Fjord:
On passage:
2.
3.
Off Trondheim:
On passage:
Area off Bergen:
In Kors Fjord:
U "46", "25", "64", "51".
U "38", "47", "48", "49",
"65". (Roughly north of
Trondheim).
U "30", "34".
U "50", "52".
U
u
"Off
9", "14", "60", "62".
J
Ttrrt!
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11 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
4.
5.
Stavanger area: U "1", "4".
Proceeding to the following positions:
U "59" to grid square 7870
U "58"
U "57"
U "13"
U "37"
U "19"
U "10"
U "56"
7810
7850
7890
7830
7940
7980
7920
(Grid squares lie north to northeast of the Shetlands.)
6. Proceeding to the Skagerrak: U "5", "6" to position
south of Lister, U "2" south of Lindesnes.
(For order to Narvik submarines see radiogram file 11 April,
2315.)
Special Reports from Submarines
U "25" reports two destroyers torpedoed in West Fjord near
Baroy. Effect not observed. (May have been prematures).
At 1230, U "48" reported a spread of three which missed or
failed on the cruiser CUMBERLAND; at 2115, a spread of three
which missed and failed (through non-firing) on another cruiser,
U "51" had two misses, (one a safety range detonator) when
firing on a large destroyer.
Merchant Shipping
The following have arrived in Bergen:
The steamer BAERENFELS of the "export" unit.
Narvik. )
(Was bound for
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11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The steamer &1ARIE LEONHARD of the 1st Sea Transport Unit,
The transport steamers for "Wese rue bung" can now be reviewed
as follows:
1. "Export" Unit:
Narvik: No steamers arrived. 2 steamers
with material and 1 t8nker lost, 1 steamer with
material put in to Bergen.
Trondheim: No steamers arrived. 3 steamers
and 1 tanker probably lost, 1 steamer still
en route.
2. 1st Sea Transport Unit:
Bergen: 1 steamer lost, 1 arrived, 1 in Oslo.
Stavanger : All 3 steamers arrived.
Kristiansand: All 4 steamers arrived.
Oslo : 3 steamers and 1 Bergen steamer arrived,
2 lost.
3. 2nd Sea Transport Unit to Oslo:
9 steamers arrived, 2 lost.
(For particulars see review in reference file "Weseruebung". )
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Situation in Oslo not yet clarified. The Quisling Government
is endeavoring to govern but probably cannot last since support
from the people and Armed Forces is too slight. Position
rendered very difficult by the first Government's continuous
counter-orders and orders to resist.
For world opinion's reactions to the German offensive in
Norway, see Political Review No. 84 and Foreign Press.
The German action has undoubtedly evoked the greatest consternation
in Holland and Belgium, where anxiety about a German invasion
has again come to the fore. In spite of this there is no
inclination to accept the requests of the 'Western Powers to put
themselves under their protection.
It is reported from the U.S.A. that the news of the German action
was received calmly. Special importance was undoubtedly attached
here to the fact that the 3ritish breach of neutrality by mine-
laying in Norwegian waters preceded the German operation.
The publication of the German White Paper from the Polish
documents is also contributing to lessen the Government's
inclination to be biased against Germany. It is confirmed
that the European situation cannot lead America to deviate
from the maintenance of her neutrality.
In a broadcast speech the Swedish Foreign Minister emphasized
that Sweden was still firmly resolved to pursue a course of
strict neutrality. Demands from a belligerent to utilize
Swedish territory for its operations would have to be refused.
Extension of defensive readiness was necessary for the purpose
of defending Swedish neutrality.
The Danish Government has granted Iceland complete independence
for the duration of the present emergency. The Faroes have
been occupied by Britain.
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Great Britain:
It has now been established that the WARSPITE was to proceed to
the Mediterranean at the beginning of April as a reinforcement
and was apparently on her way there, but was recalled again on
6 April. Priority radio traffic predominates in the Mediterranean
and indicates that naval forces are being redeployed.
France;
The Attache in Madrid states that according to a report from
Intelligence Center, Spain, a French squadron of eight large
ships passed Gibraltar westwards during the night of 11 April.
Increased patrol activity by light forces and patrol vessels
in cooperation with planes was detected in the Dunkirk area.
i
North Sea/Northern Waters;
The area off the Norwegian coast as far as 60 N, 4° E and
the entire Skagerrak and Kattegat are declared to be a
mined area. A passage to Gothenburg has been left roughly
in the middle of the channel. 4
Narvik area;
The blockade position off Narvik Is being extended; searchlight
barrages were reported at the entrance to West Fjord; the
bringing up of supply ships (tankers) under destroyer escort
was detected. The WARSPITE, REPULSE and one aircraft carrier,
which sent her planes to attack Narvik, a^e obviously In the
area off Narvik.
The vessels mentioned, plus a number of destroyers, were
assembled into a Force "B" and sent to carry out an operation
"Attack against defenses".
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
According to a report intercepted by radio intelligence,
the attack on Narvik will probably take place on the afternoon
of 13 April.
Commander, 2nd Cruiser Squadron detailed two destroyers as
escort for the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON, which is sailing from Scapa
Flow at noon today for Vaags Fjord (north of Narvik).
This information, in conjunction with the sailing of the
troopships BATORY and CHOBRI on 12 April from Scapa, indicates
that troops will be landed in Vaags Fjord. According to a
further report the landing is planned there for 15 April.
Trondhelm area;
First British troops obviously landed in the neighborhood of
Indre Foliar (about 64° 50' Nj in the afternoon. Commander,
1st Cruiser Squadron reported operation carried out and the
suitability of Namsos and Mosjoen for further landings according
to reconnaissance by one destroyer.
Stavanger-Bergen area:
A destroyer flotilla was given a minelaying assignment in the
area of Skudesnes Fjord at about 59° N, 5° E. Execution not
yet detected.
No fresh reports of the British battleship formation.
It follows from the steps so far taken by the enemy that he is
at present ignoring ports occupied by us from the point of view
of landings and is limiting himself to alternative points and
accepting strategic disadvantages on land. From his almost
undisturbed landing places the enemy obviously plans to out-
flank the German strategically important points of Narvik and
Trondheim and to attack them after preliminary raids by planes
from the carrier. He plans to destroy in advance the naval
forces still lying in the harbors. Troops are being carried
on large, strongly escorted transports.
Simultaneously with the landing, the blockade of supply and
approach routes for our naval forces will be commenced on a
large scale by the combined Franco-British naval forces.
Own Situation
Battleships and HIPPER:
In the morning the returning ships were at approximately 59° N
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
and from 0645-1040 were continually reported by British
reconnaissance planes. Reports were passed on to nine
British bomber squadrons, which were, however, unable to
attack because of deterioration of visibility. The
battleships and HIPPER put in to Wilhelmshaven in the evening.
For brief report from the forces see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V,
page 132.
Situation in Narvik:
Three destroyers in complete readiness to proceed, two
destroyers in limited readiness. The ZENKER and KOELLNER
damaged through touching ground; tne KOELLNER is to be used as
a barrage battery. West Fjord is still blocked.
Situation on land unchanged. The ore railroad has been
slightly disrupted by the Norwegians. The troops request
infantry guns and mortars since they are opposing an enemy
with artillery.
Some of the submarines off Narvik were assigned dispositions
in Vaags Fjord in view of a possible enemy landing there.
They received permission to attack all ships encountered.
Situation in Trondheim:
The destroyers ECKHOLDT and EEINEMANN are ready to proceed.
The JACOBI and RIEDEL have damaged turbines. Questionable
whether the RIEDEL can be repaired. Destroyers ready to
proceed are to commence return passage from 13 April.
Blocking of the harbor entrance near Agdenes has been commenced.
The Norwegian torpedo boat LAKfc> has been commissioned to guard
the harbor entrance.
Vernes airfield is again serviceable because of the frosty
weather. The steamer LEVANTE alone of the "export" unit
put in to Trondheim on 12 April.
Situation in Bergen:
Further harbor barrages laid. Bergen coastal radio station
put into service. Dive-bomber attack on Bergen in the afternoon.
Result still unknown.
The absence of labor is causing great difficulty in unloading
the transports lying in Bergen.
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation In Stavanger )
) Nothing special to report.
Situation in Xristiansand)
Situation in Oslo;
Nothing special to report. Coastal fortifications comprising
Battery Rauoe (4 x 15cm.) and Battery Droebak (2 x 21 cm.)
are ready for action. Horten dockyard still out of action.
Oslo radio station working.
Anti-submarine patrol by motor minesweepers started in Oslo
Fjord.
Transport situation:
Still great danger from submarines in the Kattegat, Skagerrak
and Oslo Fjord, forcing the use of all available forces on
defense assignments. No submarine- chase successes reported
so far in spite of numerous depth charge attacks.
Losses by torpedoing:
Tanker MOONSUND sank. Ship "40" damaged. The steamer
AUGUST LEONHARDT sank on 11 April while returning from
Kristiansand. Crew saved.
Group Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic are making
the necessary preparations for the planned transports of troops
from Frederikshavn. At present transport is planned on old
torpedo boats, motor minesweepers, escort boats, the SAAR and
the steamers ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG. Group Baltic requests
allocation of the small Norwegian torpedo boats (KJELL, LOM,
HAUK, KVIK, BLINK, LYN ) as the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla and
requests the immediate seizure of Norwegian trawlers for a
patrol flotilla. Group Baltic also requests immediate expansion
of air defense. (See radiogram file, 1545.)
The cruiser LUETZOW, proceeding in tow through the Kattegat,
was in the Great Belt on the morning of 13 April. She is
being taken to Kiel.
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the situation with Chief , Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the situation:
a) Every endeavor must be made to have the
destroyers return. The necessity for this
is again pointed out to Group West by telephone.
(Group West issued the following order in the
afternoon to the destroyer commanders in
Narvik and Trondheim:
"Destroyers in complete readiness to proceed
to utilize any favorable opportunity,
especially misty nights. Sub-division
the smallest unit. The NORDMARK and
SKAGERRAK are at known positions".)
b) Battleships:
Chief, Naval Staff has issued an order
that the operational readiness of the
battleships is to be restored at top speed,
since at present favorable possibilities for
operation are foreseen from southern Norway
to Stadtlandet. Operations Division is at
once to consider operational use in view of
the enemy situation.
2. Chief, Naval Staff has drawn attention to the
necessity for altering and speeding-up the destroyer
construction program in view of destroyer losses.
Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Naval Staff, Service
Division are to undertake the necessary investigations.
3. Since the units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic are not sufficient to carry out their assignments,
the Fuehrer is to be asked whether Danish naval vessels
may be taken over and used by us to protect Danish neutrality.
4. Group Baltic has received instruction, based on the
Fuehrer's order, immediately to render the cable from L'arstrand
to Great Britain unserviceable outside territorial waters by
means of Special Group vessels. (Assignment will be carried out
by Ships "26" and "37".)
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation In the Atlantic;
No reports from Ships "16" and "36". It is assumed that
both auxiliary cruisers have succeeded in breaking through
to the Atlantic.
The tanker WINNETOU sailed from Las Palmas on 10 April as
supply ship for auxiliary cruisers.
Enemy forces were informed of the sailing by the French
intelligence service, with an exact description of the ship.
The auxiliary cruisers and the tanker WINNETOU have been
informed that Great Britain claims the protection of Danish
and Norwegian shipping, probably also later of Swedish end
Baltic shipping, so that camouflage as Scandinavians is therefore
impracticable. The WINNETOU was also instructed to avoid any
encounter with vessels so as not to be reported.
Submarine Situation
The disquieting fact of numerous torpedo failures in the past few
days has caused Commanding Admiral, Submarines to issue the
following order:
1. In zone zero and further north hold ready 3 torpedoes
with switch-setting A, one torpedo with magnetic-
firing setting.
2. Fire at ships only with setting A, depth - draught of
target minus 2 m.
3. Always fire a double shot at destroyers at first
setting A depth 3m., then magnetic-firing setting,
depth-draught plus 1 m. - interval if possible 8
seconds.
Based on its assessment of the enemy situation, Naval Staff
has ordered Commanding Admiral, Submarines immediately to
dispose one boat each:
1. In Namsen Fjord (railroad line Namsos - Trondheim).
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
2. In Romsdals Fjord (railroad line Aandalsnes-Oslo)
to prevent enemy landings,
3. Number of boats according to the situation in
Asta Fjord, north of Narvik, off Gratangen and
Lavangen Fjord*
4. Leave the Trondheim boats where they are.
Commanding Admiral, Submarines has disposed the boats
as follows:
U "52" Romsdals Fjord at 7° 20 » E.
U "65" Namsen Fjord at 11° 8» E.
U "38" "Taags Fjord northeast of the island
of Aakeroey.
U "47" Vaags Fjord south of Kjoetta.
U ,J49" Vaags Fjord northeast of the island
of Sandsoey.
Eoats in Vaags Fjord are ordered to make quite sure that
their appearance is a surprise. Attack only warships,
transports and supply ships.
U "64" reports putting in to Narvik and on the situation in
West Fjord. (See radiogram file, 2000.)
Merchant Shipping
Commanding Admiral, Norway has received orders to take over
and prepare for speedy departure all ships in Oslo suitable
for purposes of transport. High Command, Navy will 8lso
charter suitable shipping in Copenhagen and other Darish ports*
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12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The following directives regarding neutral merchant shipping
are issued:
Offices are directed to prevent neutral shipping leaving
German waters (i.e. east of the Skagerrak barrage and ports
in the Heligoland Eight). Excepted are the U.S.A., Japan,
Italy, Russia and Spain.
Danish shipping east of this limit, i.e. inner Danish
traffic with German ports and other Baltic States, is
permitted. (Group Baltic orders, in agreement with Naval
Staff, that Danish ships may only leave German Baltic ports
if their destination lies south of the line Aarhus Bay-
Sletterhage-Eesseloe-Kullen. They may call at Aarhus.)
Permission for cut-bound Swedish ships to use the shipping
channel left by Great Britain for Swedish shipping in the
Skagerrak inside the new British declared area will not be
given until it is established that the British will also
permit Swedish ships from overseas to go In to Sweden by
this route.
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CONFTDENTIAL
13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway;
Political situation unchanged. It can be stated that the
manner in which the new political order in Oslo has been
handled diplomatically and the early proclamation of the
Quisling Government have made the situation very much more
difficult. Quisling is regarded as the leader of the
Norwegian Fascists. His appeal to the people to cease all
resistance against the German troops and not to follow the
instructions of the old Nygaardsvold Government is so far
finding very little response. Hopes set on Quisling and
his influence in Norway, based on his own statements in the
conferences with Commander in Chief, Navy, (see memoranda,
Commander in Chief, Navy, War Diary, Part C, VII) have so
far not been fulfilled. It cannot yet be seen how far this
can be ascribed to the unfavorable development of political
conditions in Oslo, to a lack of skill by our diplomatic and
military offices in Norway or to Quisling's unsuitability.
(See Foreign Press for message from King George VI to King
Haakon of Norway.)
The Dutch Government has issued a statement in which it repudiates
expectations expressed abroad that Holland would be ready to
enter into agreements with the Western Powers about possible
assistance in the event of a German attack, and describes them
as completely unfounded.
Sweden:
The Embassy in Stockholm reports:
Military Attaches report that Sweden has ordered no
mobilization measures or strategic concentrations. Military
measures in progress are to increase air and coastal defense,
defensive readiness of present fortifications, safety of
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CONFIDENTIAL
13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
bridges and other installations* The Attaches are convinced
that Sweden will try to keep out of the Norwegian conflict*
Vigorous armed defense against any violation of neutrality
from either side must be expected.
(For British radio propaganda calling for the organization of
Norwegian resistance see radiogram file of 13 April, 2330.)
Survey of the Situation
Situation on land assured in southern Norway* Sea transport
and supply situation not yet certain in view of great danger
from submarines and insufficient number of efficient locating
vessels. Trondheim-Narvik area threatened with imminent
large-scale enemy landings. Skagerrak mine barrage reinforced*
Situation in Denmark still calm and quite secure.
Particulars
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic:
Great Britain;
The Naval Attache' reports: During the visit of the cruiser
HAWKINS to Montevideo it was ascertained that the British
South Atlantic Squadron at present consists of the HAWKINS,
FROBISHER, DORSETSHIRE, CUMBERLAND and two "D" class.
Contrary to details known to us, the HAWKINS is armed with
20.3 cm. guns.
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
France;
Intelligence Center, Belgium learns from a trusty agent:
The 1st French Squadron consisting of the 3rd Light Cruiser
Division, the 5th and 7th Destroyer Divisions, the 3rd Torpedo
Boat Division, 7 submarines, the carrier TESTE or BEARN and
4 troopships with parts of two infantry regiments (65th and
137th Infantry Regiirents) and two artillery regiments (35th
and 355th Artillery Regiments) sailed from Brest during the
night of 11 April. Further troopships and destroyers are
said to have left Cherbourg and Dunkirk on the same day.
Confirmation of these statements is impossible. Naval Staff,
however, expects operations in the Allied Norwegian campaign
by a strong battleship and transport formation.
Intelligence Center, Spain reports convoy movements near
Gibraltar and San Sebastian.
North Sea/Northern Waters:
Narvik area:
The attack on Narvik, detected beforehand by radio intelligence,
took place at 1300. According to radio monitoring, Commander,
Battle Cruiser Squadron is in command aboard the REPULSE.
Forces have been assembled into "Force B" and consist of:
the FURIOUS, WARSPITE, PENELOPE and nine destroyers of the
3rd and 6th Destroyer Flotillas (including the COSSACK, BEDOUIN,
PUNJABI, FOXHOUND, FORESTER, HERO). Minesweeping gear will
be used when putting into Narvik.
British reports in the evening mention the destruction of all
German destroyers in Ofot Fjord, off Narvik and in Rombakken
Fjord; 3 British destroyers are said to be damaged.
Trondheim area:
A Swedish report mentions the appearance of British destroyers
in Folda Fjord north of Trondheim.
Increased enemy activity is to be seen in Romsdals Fjord south
of Trondheim. In the afternoon a plane west of Aandalsnes
reported off Romsdals Fjord 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer flotilla and
probably 1 battleship standing on and off on varying courses.
Evening reconnaissance revealed 7 British destroyers in
Romsdals Fjord, one of them at Andalsnes quay.
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CONFTDENTIAL
IS April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Scapa area;
The netlayer PROTECTOR, two Polish troopships and escort
destroyers have sailed from Scapa,
Cooperation between the Norwegian radio stations at Aalesund
and the enemy coastal radio station Wick Radio wa3 again
detected several times.
The enemy situation now shows clearly the three directions
of thrust by the enemy:
Narvik - Folda Fjord (Namsos) -
Romsdals Fjord (Andalsnes),
of which the enemy's landing north and south of Trondheim
must be regarded as specially dangerous from a strategic
point of view, since we have still only a small number of
troops in Trondheim and reinforcements and supplies can
only be brought by air, as long as the Oslo-Dombas-Trondheim
railroad is not in German hands. Since we do not possess
naval supremacy in the whole area off the west coast of
Norway, the landings by the Western Powers can be made
without any interference from German surface forces.
Since also the enemy's landing places are not occupied by
German troops, defense against attempts to land rests alone
on the shoulders of the submarines and the Air Force.
Submarine torpedoes, however, have so far not come up to
expectation because of technical failures. Armed Forces
High Command, Operations Staff if therefore doing its utmost
to move Air Force bomber formations, fuel and bombs to the
air bases available in Norway and to ensure supplies by air
for them. Bad weather, unfavorable airfield conditions,
lack of anti-aircraft defense and the extraordinary difficulties
in supply resulting from the lack of any railroad end sea
communications are delaying operations by the offensive
Air Force and creating fighting conditions which can only be
overcome by the greatest exertion on the part of all forces,
by strain on personnel and material to the limits of their
capacity and by strict organization.
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation
Battleships and HIPPER:
Wllhelmshaven dockyard reports the result of the investigations
into the damage suffered by the ships, (See radiogram file of
13 April, 1625.) The battleships will be ready for operations
again in a short time; the HIPPER has a 40 m.-long crack on
the starboard bow caused by ramming the British destroyer
GLOWWORM. Repairs necessary; will probably last three weeks.
The complete occupation of Norway and the holding of the area
gained against enemy attacks still requires operations by the
entire Navy. The situation in the Norwegian theater cannot
yet be regarded as safe. It may therefore be necessary at any
time for the heavy ships to go into action at short notice in ^
order to weaken enemy pressure from the sea.
Naval Staff has therefore directed that the battleships are to
be repaired with the greatest possible speed without total
interruption of war readiness and are to be kept at 12 hours1
notice. Naval Staff considers speedy use of the battleships
as a most urgent operational necessity.
(For brief reports from Commanding Admiral, Fleet and Commanding
Admiral, Scouting Force, see radiogram file of 13 April, 1750
and 2330.)
i
With regard to the proposed new operations by the battleships,
the supply ship NORDMARK has been ordered to remain at the
ordered position line in northern waters. The tanker
SKAGERRAK is still at a position line 200 miles westnorthwest
of Trondheim as a fuel reserve for destroyers.
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation in Narvik:
Narvik, Elvegaardsmoen, Elvenes (on Gratangen Fjord) occupied
by the German division. Norwegians bar the way east of
Elvenes. The ore railroad between Hundalen and the Swedish
frontier has been interrupted by Norwegians.
Message from the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander to the Narvik
Group, Major General Dietl, in the forenoon:
"Defend the Narvik area against attack under all circumstances.
Ensure landing facilities on the Hartvig See. Aid the Air Force,
weather permitting. If necessary effectively destroy the
ore railroad in the mountains."
Adolf Hitler.
An advance to Narvik, planned and under way by 22 bombers
of the 10th Air Division (26th Bomber Wing) under Colonel
Fuchs, unfortunately had to be broken off because of the
weather. One FW 200 long-range reconnaissance plane succeeded
in penetrating as far as Narvik and dropped supplies just at
the commencement of the British attack there.
Reports received in the evening provide the following picture
of the British large-scale attack, about the proposed execution
of which it was possible to inform the Narvik Group in good
time owing to the results of radio intelligence:
About noon nine British destroyers and one heavy ship (WARSPITE?)
penetrated in to Ofot and Rombaken Fjords. Heavy destroyer
engagement, the enemy using all his forces, until the destroyers -
defending themselves and attacking to the last - were put out of
action. Simultaneously air raids by carrier-borne planes from
the aircraft carrier lying off West Fjord.
Enemy landing was prevented. The destroyer COSSACK was set
on fire and beached. The destroyer ESKIMO severely damaged
(forecastle torn off as far as the second gun by a torpedo),
one other destroyer damaged. Details of our losses not yet
known. The destroyer GIESE aground off Narvik. Commander
requests she may be sunk by bombs or torpedo. According to
available reports we must, however, expect the loss of all the
destrovers still lving in Narvik. U "64" was sunk in Herjaenger
Fjord by bombs. All the crew but eight ashore in Narvik.
The JAN WELLEM scuttled herself in harbor; not yet reported
whether cargo was saved or is still accessible. (At 2000 U "46"
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
reported departure from Ofot Fjord of the enemy battleship
and six destroyers.)
Our submarines in Ofot and West Fjords have obviously been
unable to score any successes in consequence of very heavy
defense from destroyers using hydrophones, and air patrol.
The 1st Squadron of the 106th Group, en route from Stavanger
to Narvik with four planes, took part in the action in the
evening despite unfavorable weather conditions and then landed
in Narvik.
Narvik Group reported in the evening:
"Attack so far warded off. No landing. Mountain battery
landed. Hundalen occupied. Enemy destroyers off Narvik. *m
Urgent request from Group Narvik for submarines to attack
destroyers near Tranoy and Rombaken."
(For Admiralty announcement see radiogram file, 2345 and
2400.)
This evening a serious and depressed mood marks Naval Staff's
impression of events. Ten of our modern destroyers, half of
our powerful and most urgently required destroyer arm, lie
shot to pieces, damaged or sunk in Ofot and Rombaken Fjords.
Narvik has proved a "mousetrap" for our forces. The tragic
factors which have brought our destroyers to this fateful
situation are: the unfavorable supply position caused by the
absence of the second tanker and the delay in sailing caused
thereby; the bad, unfavorable weather conditions; the fact
that at the date of our "Wese rue bung" the enemy's own operational
plans caused him to be already in the Lofoten area. Further
reports on the course of the action and losses in material and
personnel are to be awaited.
Naval Staff does not doubt for a moment that the Narvik
destroyers, with the superb spirit of their commanders, officers
and crews, showed themselves worthy of their tradition and
offered the most stubborn resistance to the enemy to their last
shell and torpedo.
It is to be hoped that the action in the narrow fjords enabled
the greater part of the crews to be saved after the battle and
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
to be Incorporated in the defense of the occupied area
despite probably great difficulty regarding armament,
equipment and supply. This sets the Air Force supply
service new tasks, which are to be carried out with all
possible means.
Situation in Trondheim:
The readiness of almost all batteries, also of some searchlights,
is reported. All planes can land and take off from the airport
north of the town (Jonsvatny).
The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN will not sail before 1100
on 14 April. Trondheim suspects British landings near Andalsnes.
The minelayer FROEYA, beached off Trondheim, was blown up by
U "43".
Situation in Bergen:
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the northwestern
entrances are closed by a double-row mine barrage. Ship "111"
was damaged by touching ground and is out of action. Allocation
of a motor minesweeper flotilla, Ships "37", "47", "7", two
PT boats and one submarine is requested.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has been assigned the task of
preparing submarine supplies and of instituting a pilot service
for putting into port.
Situation in Stavanger and Kristiansand:
Unchanged.
Situation in Oslo;
Unchanged.
Commanding Admiral, Norway reports;
Batteries ready to fire:
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CONFIDENTIAL
Oslo:
Rauoe :
Horten:
Droebak:
Kahol:
Kristiansand:
Stavanger:
Aeger
Trondheim:
Bettinges:
Hejwes:
4 x 15 cm.
2 x 7,5 cm.
3 x 15 cm.
1 x 28 cm.
2 a 21 cm., 6 x 15 cm.
2 x 10.5 cm.
2 x 21 cm., 3 x 15 cm.
2 x 21 cm., 2 x 15 cm.
r
Transport Situation and Situation Skagerrak/Kattegat ;
Numerous submarine warning and location reports indicate no
lessening of danger from submarines. No success in submarine-
chase.
In connection with the expansion of anti-submarine defense in
the Kattegat, Group Baltic has ordered the laying of UMA barrages
near Ealskor Rev lightship and in the deep channel east of
Friedericia. Patrol is being instituted on either side of
Sprogoe and north of Friedericia.
f<
3rd
Sea
On the evening of 13 April the
from Frederikshavn with torpedo boats,
ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG, transporting roughly 2,000 men
Transport Unit set out
the SAAR and the steamers
Group Baltic has requested the allocation of two destroyers to
transport personnel from Frederikshavn to Oslo. Naval Staff
had to refuse the request, since it is necessary to keep the
few destroyers in readiness for immediate action. On the
other hand, the Norwegian torpedo boats were allocated for
defense assignments as requested and the seizure of Norwegian
trawlers as patrol vessels approved.
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The cable from Mars t rand to England was cut by Ships "47" and
"26".
The 1st Group of the 1st Dive-Bomber Wing and the 100th Bomber
Wing each report the probable sinking of a submarine in the
Kattegat. (No proof).
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the situation
in Norway.
The British landing operations make necessary the definite and
immediate concentration of submarine operations in the Romsdals
Fjord and Vaags Fjord areas and in the Orkneys -Pent land Firth
area which is much traversed by convoys, transports and naval
forces. For directives see Submarine Situation.
2. In view of the Fuehrer's order of 12 April that the
Norwegian Armed Forces are now to be treated altogether as
hostile, the commissioning of all serviceable Norwegian naval
vessels - so far on^y seized - has been ordered with German
crews. Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Naval Ordnance
Division and Naval Staff, Service Division have received
instructions accordingly. Attention is drawn to the necessity
for and the possibility of seizing materiel and Installations
belonging to the Norwegian Navy.
3. Report on the possibility of supplying Narvik and
Trondheim by submarines. (See letter from Naval Staff,
Submarine Division (Technical) dated 13 April in reference
file "We se rue bung".) Chief, Naval Staff is definitely resolved
to fulfill the wishes of Armed Forces High Command, Operations
Staff regarding supply operations. Boats must be withdrawn
from operations for the duration of this activity. U "43" and
U "26" are to carry out assignments according to schedule,
U "29", "32", "122" and "A" are to be converted as quickly as
possible.
4. The Fuehrer is to be asked to consent to a request
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
to Sweden to put the extinguished outer lights on the Swedish
coast into operation again immediately and to have the radio
beacons work again in suitable weather if requested. (Fuehrer
agreed) .
5. The Foreign Office is to be requested to make possible
the use of Danish naval vessels by the German Navy.
6. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has reported that,
according to reports from the Commanders of escort vessels,
enemy submarine attacks on German transports several times took
place from Swedish territorial waters. Suitable steps are
being taken with the Swedish Government to ensure respect for
their rights as neutrals.
7. Groups Baltic and West have received the following order (^
regarding defense of the Skagerrak and Kattegat:
After laying the anti-submarine barrage at Skagen:
a) The Skagerrak declared area is to be reinforced
to a certain extent.
b) The southern barrage gap is to be protected
by a deep (- 15 m.) anti-submarine barrage.
8. For distribution to date of military forces in the
Norwegian and Danish area see reference file "Weseruebung",
13 April. According to a new Armed Forces High Command order,
units of the troops stationed in Denmark are put under Group 21
for operations in Norway.
r
P.M.
Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Fuehrer
(Conference took place before receipt of the first combat
reports from Narvik.)
Points discussed:
1. Supplies of aviation gasoline, coastal anti-aircraft
guns, mountain guns and ammunition for Narvik and Trondheim
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
carried by submarines. Special stress is to be laid on
supplies of aviation gasoline. Conversion of boats U "29"
"32", "A" and "122" is ordered.
2. Battleship operation and Battle of the Lofotens.
Commander in Chief, Navy is in complete agreement with the
action taken by Commanding Admiral, Fleet. In Naval Staff's
opinion it would have been incorrect to commit the battleships
fully against a superior enemy in the unfavorable strategic
and tactical situation at the time.
3. Steps taken by the Navy to defend Norwegian positions.
(Submarine dispositions, mine barrages, protection of transports.)
4. Political questions.
5. Recognition signal service between ships and planes.
6. Individual questions concerning the operation.
(See Commander in Chief, Navy's memorandum of 13 April.)
Submarine Situation
The following order, based on an assessment of the situation,
has been issued to Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines?
1. Effective immediately, submarine operations to concentrate
on the area Romsdals Fjord to Vaags Fjord and the area
from the Orkneys to Pentland Firth,
2. All large boats to be put into operation in Vaags Fjord
and West Fjord-Narvik at once.
Exceptions: A large boat is to remain in Nernsen Fjord
until at least two small boats are there.
3. Allocate small boats as follows:
2 Romsdals Fjord,
3 Trondheim,
4 Folia and Namsen Fjord,
4 Orkneys-Pent land Firth.
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13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
4. Resort to stores on the BREMSE and CARL PETERS
in Stavanger arid Kristiansand for supplies and
replenishment.
Load the remainder of the small boats and keep
them in readiness, including the boats set aside
for Operation "Gelb", in Norwegian ports and in
home waters at Group West's disposal,
6. Defer reliefs and Submarine School needs for the
present because of the concentration of assignments
in the north Norwegian area.
Commanding Admiral, Submarines then ordered U "65", "30", "34",
"52" for the present also into the Lofoten area, U "50" has
been assigned a waiting position in Folia Fjord, U "61" a
patrol area in Namsen Fjord. {
Special Events:
U "37" attacked a cruiser of the GLASGOW class north of the
Shetlands, Destruction probable as explosion was seen and
wreckage and oil patch observed.
Boats in Ofot Fjord and West Fjord report difficulty in attacking
and remaining in the Fjord, because of constant destroyer patrol,
planes and submarine-chase and nights almost as bright ss day,
(See also radiogram file of 13 April, 2349.) U "64" sunk by
a bomb in Herjaenger Fjord, Officers and 36 men saved.
War against Merchant Shipping
Naval forces are ordered to regard Norwegian naval end merchant
vessels as enemy.
Merchant Shipping
Transports to Norwayi
Between 1400 and 1700 11 ships of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit
sailed from Holtenau as planned for Oslo.
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Fresh appeal "by Oslo radio to all Norwegian ships to make
for neutral ports and on no account to put in to French
or British ports.
In spite of the countermeasures introduced by us against
the present Eritish statements that Norwegian and Danish
ships are placed under the Allies' protection, we must expect
most of the Norwegian tonnage and a great part of the Danish
to join the Allies.
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Political Situation
Situation in Norway;
Political situation unchanged.
Inclination only to acts of sabotage in the occupied area,
passive resistance here and there from the population. Sniping
in Bergen.
For proclamation by Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway,
General von Falkenhorst, see Foreign Press Report No. 156/40.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Report on the situation.
The situation in Narvik is regarded as very difficult.
Armed Forces High Command is considering whether it might be
necessary to give up Narvik because of the difficulty of
bringing up supplies and great British superiority. It has
been decided that for the present a delaying defense action
is to be fought in Narvik. However, concentration of defense
against British landings and attacks is now being transferred
to the area around Trondhelm, which must be held. It will
be necessary to bring up further forces into the Trondheim area.
An extract from Armed Forces High Command's directive of 14 f
April states:
"British forces penetrated into Narvik. No landing reported
so far. British landings in Andalsnes. Landings to be
expected in Namsos Fjord."
Most important task is the defense of Trondheim and the
destruction of the troops which have landed near Andalsnes.
Fuehrer's order:
a) Group 21. Reinforce Trondheim garrison.
Destroy the railroad line from Dombas to
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
3. So that our own naval forces may be guarded
against confusion with those of the enemy by the German
Air Force, the Fuehrer has ordered:
a) Every German warship is immediately to regard
any approaching plane as enemy and to attack
without waiting to see whether recognition is
possible.
b) Every German warship is to make itself known to
any approaching plane by searchlight signals
and also by firing light signals (in addition to
the permanent Identification marking),even if
the plane is suspected to be enemy. Light
signal regulations are to be amplified accordingly*
4. Commander in Chief, Navy expressed his full appreciation
of the success of the "Weseruebung" landing operation and
of the readiness for action shown to Commanding Admiral, Fleet,
Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force, Commander, Oslo Group
(Rear Admiral Kummetz), the Commander of the HIPPER (Trondheim
Group) 8nd the Commander of the KARLSRUHE (Kristiansand Group),
also to all ships and formations under their command.
(For teletype see radiogram file, 1424.)
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic
Great Britain:
On the evening of 13 April, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean
Fleet gave the order for half-hour readiness, and the order
for ships at sea to get up steam for maximum speed.
Light Eritlsh forces on a northeasterly course, moderate
speed, are west of Casablanca.
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Andalsnes far to the west.
b) Navy t Concentrate submarine defense in
the area off and on either side of Trondheira
and Aalesund-Vikma Island, even though it
means weakening the reinforcement previously
scheduled for Narvik.
c) Air Force: Destroy the British troops which
have landed near Andalsnes, prevent further
landings. Attack enemy forces north of
Aalesund. Occupy Dombas with parachute
troops and take steps to protect it. Use
every endeavor to bring reinforcements to
Trondheim by air.
Group 21 to use every means to seize the Oslo-
Hamar-Dombas railroad as far as Andalsnes.
The 181st Division to be brought up at top
speed, also the mobile troops to be furnished
by Group 31.
Because of this directive a concentration in submarine
disposition is also effected towards Trondheim. The boats
already in the Narvik area remain there. Boats proceeding
to the Lofotens are to go on if they are already close to
their objective. Boats whose positions are nearer to
Trondheim, however, are to be disposed in the area Romsdals
Fjord-Trondheim-Indre Folia.
(For Naval Staff's order, see Submarine Situation.)
2. The small number of our forces in comparison to the ^
enemy's much greater superiority at sea demands operations
of the highest efficiency and the avoidance of all unnecessary
losses of time through approach and departure or delays
during taking on supplies. The greatest importance is
therefore attached to the organization of supply facilities.
The Groups, Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Commanding
General, Armed Forces, Norway are directed to promote the
expansion of supply facilities and defense in the area
Trondheim-Bergen-Kristiansand-Oslo with all means in their
power. Trondheim and Bergen are the most important supply
points. Steps are to be taken first to ensure supplies of
fuel and provisions for submarines, also repair facilities
for minor damage. Supplies of torpedoes are to be arranged.
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
France ;
Nothing special to report.
North Sea/Northern Waters:
The Admiralty announces that mines have been Is id in the
Baltic and its entrances in the following area:
57°
N, 10°
26'
E
57°
N, 12°
24'
E
55°
30' N,
14°
20' E
55°
30' N,
21°
6.5' E.
This declaration Includes practically the whole area of
the entrances to the Baltic, the southern Kattegat and
the southern Baltic to the latitude of Memel. It must
be regarded for the present as a deterrent measure for the
neutrals. Practical considerations exclude an effective
and quick mining of the whole area. On the other hand,
the increasing use of mines by submarines in the Kattegat
must be expected. According to a radiogram intercepted
by radio intelligence, there will be 12 submarines in the
Kattegat/Skagerrak this morning according to plan, one a
minelaying submarine PORPOISE (120 mines), which is to
carry out her assignment in the area near Lasoe.
The use of aerial mines by the enemy has not been detected.
In connection with the British announcement of a declared
area in the Baltic, the possibility of the first use of
aerial mines must, however, be taken into account.
The following were detected at sea: Commander in Chief,
Home Fleet, Commanders, Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd
Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 3rd and 6th Destroyer Flotillas,
also the carrier FURIOUS, the cruisers GLASGOW, AURORA,
SOUTHAMPTON, PENELOPE, CAIRO and the net layer PROTECTOR.
At midnight Commander in Chief, Home Fleet was about 60 miles
west of the Lofotens on northeasterly course, speed 15 knots.
Reconnaissance by the 506th Group from Trondheim detected
tsix destroyers on northerly course, high speed, southwest
of Kristiansa'nd at 0500. A large tanker lay at anchor in
the skerries north of Kristiansand.
Destroyers putting in were reported in Namsen Fjord in the
evening.
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
During the evening radio intelligence added to the information
gained. The FURIOUS was despatched to Tromsoe, the destroyers
HOSTILE and IVANHOE ordered to Narvik in the evening. The
destroyers BEDOUIN and ESKIMO (the latter severely damaged
in Rombaken Fjord on 13 April) plan to arrive in Skjel Fjord
(Lofotens) on the morning of 15 April.
The anti-aircraft cruiser CURLEW was brought up to reinforce
the Lofoten squadron.
U "47" reports cruisers and destroyers in Vaags Fjord.
Submarine -chase and location by fishing vessels and steamers.
U "38" reports light cruisers and destroyers north of Vaags
Fjord.
The battle cruiser REPULSE and the cruiser PENELOPE plan
to put Into Scapa on 14 April.
The destroyers NUBIAN and FORTUNE left Scapa on 12 April
in the direction of the Lofotens.
Commands
Lord Chatfield is flying his flag in the cruiser AURORA.
It may be assumed that he is in supreme command of the
entire north Norwegian operation.
Appreciation of the enemy situation:
Main drive of the enemy landing into the- area north of
Narvik (Vaags Fjord). Landings under way in Namsen Fjord
and Romsdals Fjord. Preparatory operations and landings
by light forces here. Fairly large troopships not yet
detected but are expected.
C
■j
Own Situation
Situation in Narvik;
According to information now available, there is no longer
any doubt that all the eight destroyers still in Narvik
(GIESE, ZENKER, KUENNE, LUEDEMANN, ROEDER, KOELLNER, ARNIM,
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
THIELE) were destroyed or scuttled in the heavy fighting
on 12 April. About 1,000 men from the destroyer crews
are in Rundalen. Enemy destroyers off the port and in
Rombaken Fjord are blocking communication between the
different separated groups; reinforcements and supplies
for the battalion in Elvegardsmoen especially cannot be
brought up at present.
Now that the destroyers are lost, coastal defense comprises
only infantry weapons, so that defense against the blockading
destroyers is impossible.
The Commander of the GIESE reports that British destroyers
fired machine-guns on survivors in the water, causing further
loss of life.
The ore railroad north of Hundalen is still occupied by
the Norwegians.
Norwegian planes several times attacked the landing field
on the Hartvig See.
Steps have been taken to supply Group Narvik, including
the rescued destroyer crews, by air and railroad. (Undertaken
by High Command Navy, Naval Staff, Service Division, (Organi-
zation Branch) ) •
Group Narvik requests transfer of guns and bombers and asks
for air reconnaissance.
Situation in Trondhelm:
Port Commanders are instructed to seize quantities of fuel
of all kinds and to report them, together with the available
quantities of dry provisions.
The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN sailed from Trondheim
in the evening to return to Wilhelmshaven.
Situation in Bergen:
Another dive-bombing attack in the morning. The steamer
BAERENFELS set on fire and sunk. Two enemy planes shot
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1.4 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
down. Foui* submarines put in to Bergen to refuel.
PT boats S "23" and S "25" from Wilhe lms haven put in to
Bergen at the disposal of Admiral, V/est Norwegian Coast.
Situation in Stavangerj Kristiansand and Oslo:
Nothing special to report.
Battleships and HIPPER:
The periods of readiness for the battleships are now fixed
at: GNEISENAU: 12 hours, SCHARNHORST: 72 hours and HIPPER:
8 hours (with regard to engine construction).
(For HIPPER' s brief report on the Trondheim operation see
radiogram file, 14 April, 2045.)
Situation in the Skagerrak and Kattegat:
Still great danger from submarines. Only one definite
success (Torpedo Training Flotilla, 10 April) and two
probable successes (11th Submarine Chaser Flotilla, 10 April,
sub-chaser "J" 13 April) have been scored in attacks on
submarines by defense forces. Since so far only very
occasional»use of periscopes has been detected, it is possible
that the British submarines are firing only according to
hydrophone, without periscope. (The Italian Navy also uses
such procedure.)
In the afternoon the steamer FLORIDA, carrying ammunition
and material, was torpedoed and later sank west of Maseskaer
at the same spot where the attack took place on 10 April
on the 2nd Sea Transport Unit. (The shot came from territorial
waters.) Ship "35" was hit by a torpedo and lost east of
Skagen. Submarine warnings were given at several other
places In the Skagerrak.
Transport Situation:
The 1st Troop Transport on fast vessels put in to Oslo Fjord
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
at noon; 11 loaded fishing smacks, escorted by 2 submarine-
chasers, are proceeding from Aarhus to Oslo via Frederikshavn
with material.
The 2nd Troop Transport aboard the BRIMMER and escort boats
(812 men) sailed from Frederikshavn in the evening. Parts
of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit off Oslo in fog; one group
went aground in the skerries off Oslo Fjord,
Since it is impossible to show the lights in Oslo Fjord,
the convoys must be picked up off Bolaerne and Rauoey by
the 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and escorted on to Oslo.
Situation in Denmark:
Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark reports that the majority
of Danish naval vessels are at present in Copenhagen, the
remainder in various other ports. Inability to proceed
is ensured by removing vital parts of the engines. The
work necessary to transfer them to the final harbors where
they are to be laid up is to be carried out as soon as the
submarine and mine situation indicates no further danger
for Danish ships.
Submarine Situation
Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have received
the following new order based on the Fuehrer's directive
regarding concentration in the area Trondheim-Namsen Fjord-
Romsdals Fjord:
1. At once increase defense of Namsen Fjord-
Roms da ]s Fjord by means of submarines.
2. U "65" to proceed. Other boats to operate,
in conjunction with small boats already
provided, off Namsen Fjord, Trondheim,
Romsdals Fjord.
3. Prepare supplies for submarines in Trondheim.
4. Boats with supplies for the Army to proceed
to Trondheim, not Narvik, for the present.
In view of this order Commanding Admiral, Submarines
has disposed the boats withdrawn from the Romsdals-
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Andalsnes-Trondheim-Namsos area as follows:
Namsen Fjord: U "34", "61".
Romsdals Fjord: U "30", "52".
Folia Fjord: U "50".
U "65" Is proceeding on to Vaags Fjord as ordered. As
reinforcement: U "38", "47", "49". In West Fjord:
U "25", "46", "51", "48". U "43", "26" proceeding to
Trondheim with supplies for the Army.
In Bergen area: U "9", "14", "7", "60", "62".
In Stavanger area:
In Lister-Lindesnes area
North of the Shetlands:
On passage:
On return passage:
u
"9",
"14",
"7",
"60"
u
"1",
"4".
u
"5",
"6".
u
"10",
"13",
"19",
"37",
"56",
"57",
"58",
"59",
"61".
u
"17",
"23",
"24".
u
"2".
Merchant Shipping
Own Shipping:
The tanker SKAGERRAK, which was still at the rendezvous
for the Trondheim Group destroyers, sent an S.O.S. at 1026.
A British cruiser was in the vicinity. The ship must be
assumed lost.
The supplv ship NORDMARK was moved away farther north to
700 N, longitude 0° .
The steamers LETJNA and BUENOS AIRES sailed from Stettin
to Copenhagen at 2000 with a cargo for the Air Force. The
steamers CORDOBA and CAMPINAS will sail from Swinemuende
tomorrow morning to carry out further Air Force transports
from Aalborg to Oslo. The transport groups will proceed
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14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
according to the instructions of Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic.
The following reply was given to the enquiry from Group
Ealtic about the use of Swedish territorial waters for the
trip to Oslo:
1. Passage of transports through Swedish territorial
waters, even carrying war material and men,
permissible without Swedish consent.
2. Naval Staff is requesting mine-free routes
inside Swedish territorial waters, also lights
and escort.
(For Air Force events of the day see radiogram file of
14 April, report 2400.)
On 12 April Commander in Chief, Air Force set up the 5th
Air Force Command to conduct all air operations in Norway
and Denmark. General Milch is Commander 5th Air Force,
and Commander, North. Subordinate to him are:
a) The 10th Air Corps with all present subordinate
units, including transport units and transport
units (seaplanes).
b) Local Air Force Commanders in Norway.
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15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway;
In a radio address King Haakon exhorted the Norwegians to
dD their utmost to defend Norway's freedom and independence.
Since Quisling's Government in its present form is not
regarded as suitable, it resigned in the evening at the
instigation of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norv/ay.
Administration was taken over in the German-occupied areas
by an administrative committee directed by the head of the
Oslo Town Council, Christensen.
Since the formation of this committee if the rightful
Government collapses is laid down in the constitution, it
is hoped that this arrangement will effect pacification of
the Norwegian people and hasten appeasement with the prospect
still of bringing about an agreement with the King, v/ho still
rejects the Quisling Government.
In a radio address the Norwegian Ambassador in London
exhorted his fellow countrymen to hold out and pointed
out that French and British help was on the way.
In an official announcement Holland again stated her desire
for neutrality and her readiness to defend herself against
attack from any quarter. A state of siege was declared
in Holland on 13 April owing to fear of action by Germany i
or the V/estern Powers. Coastal batteries have orders to
open fire independently in case of any attack. Four
German steamers were directed to put out from Delfzyl by
the Dutch Government. (Order was later rescinded
:r
Great Britain denies rumors about British landings.
Internal unrest caused by the Fascist Mussert movement is
feared.
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15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Belgium is also experiencing great anxiety about action
by the Western Powers. Transfer of three divisions of
troops to the southwest front is confirmed. There are
therefore only 13 divisions on the northeast front at
present.
Italy's attitude supports the German action in Norway
by appropriate statements in the press and on the radio.
Rumors speak of an Italian plan to penetrate to Salonica
and of an imminent occupation of Corfu.
For reactions to the Norwegian campaign in the U.S.A.
see Political Review No. 86 and Foreign Press. Roosevelt
condemns the German invasion in a radio statement.
It is not considered out of the question that in the course
of further developments the U.S.A. will endeavor to place
Greenland under their protection. Germany has declared
that she has no interest in the administration of Greenland,
Iceland and the Faroes.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
1. The critical situation in Narvik has caused the
Fuehrer to review the question of abandoning our Narvik
position in order to avoid further waste of forces -
especially of the Air Force - for a doubtful success, and
of undertaking a concentration of force in the Trondheim
area. A determining factor in further considerations is
the state of supplies and equipment for the rescued destroyer
crews. If the members of the crews, more than 2,000
according to available reports, can be equipped with the
necessary items of clothing, hand and automatic weapons as
well as food, this addition represents such considerable
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15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
reinforcement of the fighting strength of the Narvik
Group that the Narvik Division can be expected to hold out
for a long time, considering the difficult terrain which
favors defense. The more heavily and the longer the enemy
is tied-down in the northern area, however, the greater
must be the effect of the resultant relief on the situation
in the endangered Trondheim area. Naval Staff therefore
takes up the attitude - conditional on further news and
deliberations - that it is correct to hold the Narvik position
as long as possible and to fight a delaying defense. The
Navy has the additional conviction that the great sacrifice
of ten modern destroyers demands that the Narvik position
hold out as long as supplies permit.
2. The assignments now falling to the Navy can be
summarized as follows: 0
a) Defense of sea communications with Oslo by
obviating the great danger from submarines.
Increased defense against mines in the
Skagerrak/Kattegat.
Sealing the Skagerrak off against penetration
by surface forces.
Building up a strong air defense against
bombing and aerial, mine attacks.
Speedy expansion of Denmark's coastal and
anti-aircraft defenses.
b) Expansion and reinforcement of coastal defense
at Trondheim and Bergen.
c) Equipment of Trondheim and Bergen with
vessels with minesweeping gear for the
purpose of keeping the entrances clear. £.
d) Defense of the Baltic against danger from
enemy submarines and mines in order to
maintain the vital Baltic Sea trade communications.
e) Submarines to attack enemy supply lines to
Norway, make war on merchant shipping in the
Atlantic, disrupt enemy supplies and attain
considerable diversionary effect.
f) Demand for increased use of serisl mines on
the southeast coast of England, in Scapa Flow
and Kirkwall Bay and in the Clyde (Glasgow) to
hamper the enemy's Norwegian campaign.
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g) Thrusts by the battleships against light
forces in the triangle Shetlands-Stadlandet-
Skagerrak in order to disturb the enemy;
prevention of enemy thrusts into the Skagerrak
and relief of the central and north Norwegian
area.
3. The Fuehrer has ordered an investigation into the
possibilities of protecting the entrances to Trondheim,
Bergen and into some important fjords (Sogne Fjord,
Hardanger Fjord) by the speedy establishment of torpedo
batteries. The intention is sealing off at those points
which coastal batteries cannot reach or at which they
are not available, and where it is not possible to dispose
naval forces all the time.
The best torpedo batteries, ready for immediate action,
for the intended purpose would undoubtedly be the PT boats;
these are, however, urgently required for other assignments
in the south Norwegian area, for defense and escort purposes
and for operational use end there are not nearly enough of
them available.
Three torpedo tubes each have already been dismantled in
Trondheim from the THEODOR RIEDEL and PAUL JACOB! and these
are to be used as a torpedo barrage battery. The setting-
up of further shore torpedo batteries at favorable, well
camouflaged and easily defended spots in the fjords is to
be investigated speedily by the Torpedo Branch in cooperation
with Commanding Admiral Norway. Naval Ordnance Division
sees possibilities of setting-up such makeshift batteries
with the simplest facilities in a very short time by making
launching ramps out of wood.
4. The Embassy in Stockholm states that the Swedish
Government plans to lay a mine barrage with passage gap
inside the three mile zone in Swedish territorial waters
near Falsterboe. Passage by surfaced submarines will be
forbidden and will be quite impossible for submerged
submarines. The measure is directed against British submarines
slipping into the Baltic,
Naval Staff welcomes the Swedish plan. It is, however,
suggested to the Swedish Government that the barrage should
be laid not at Falsterboe but at the southern entrance to
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15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
the Kogrund Channel. The Swedish barrage would then ^e
Incorporated in our barrage system. The proposal by Group
Baltic that our own barrage be moved to a location north of
Helsingborg-Helsingoer and SwedenTs assistance be requested
in mlnelaying is rejected for the present.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic:
Great Britain;
The two aircraft carriers ARK ROYAL and GLORIOUS put in to
Gibraltar on 13 April. The ARK ROYAL is definitely still
there on 15 April and the GLORIOUS is probably still there.
France :
Nothing special detected apart from some warship movements.
The usual convoy activity seems to have been resumed off the
west coast and in the eastern Atlantic.
North Sea/Northern Waters
West Fjord/Vaags Fjord area;
Air reconnaissance and submarine reports reveal the commencement
of the landing by enemy troops in Vaags Fjord near Harstad.
So far only cruisers and destroyers sighted in West Fjord. On
the other hand, U "65" reported from Andoye Fjord, time of origin
0829, the arrival of 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 troopships
and destroyer escort. Planes of the 4th Bomber Wing also
reported 1 cruiser, 16 merchant ships and 5 troopships off Harstad.
The old battleship WARSPITE is still said to be in the area off
Narvik.
As early as 14 April the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON reported the carrying
out of landings in Salangen to the Flag Officer aboard the cruiser
AURORA (Lord Chatfield). A Norwegian Division is obviously
in communication with these troops.
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The AURORA and SOUTHAMPTON were to meet at 2000 on 14 April
In Skel Fjord (Lofotens).
Tromsoe-Kirkenes area:
Reconnaissance is being carried out in the Tromsoe area.
No landings so far detected.
It appears from a report by the destroyer IMOGEN that a
Norwegian liaison officer will arrive in Kirkenes, whence
the heavy cruisers DEVONSHIRE and BERWICK are bound.
Area around Trondheim:
Namsos;
It appears from radiograms that the transports CHOBRY and
BATORY are obviously bound for Namsos and are escorted by the
cruiser GLASGOW and destroyers of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla*
Andalsnes:
Molde Fjord and Andalsnes were covered by air reconnaissance.
No enemy forces or troopships were sighted.
Submarines report cruisers and destroyers on varying courses
in the Shetlands Passage. U "13n sighted a heavy cruiser on
southerly course north of the Shetlends (possibly the cruiser
damaged by bomb hits on 13 April west of Trondheim).
Enemy submarines off the southwest corner of Norway, in the
Kattegat and Skagerrak.
Three French submarines east of Orfordnes at noon on 14 April.
Own Situation
Situation in Narvik:
On the evening of 14 April British destroyers also in Gratangs-
botten west of Elvenes. The destroyers in Rombaken Fjord
broke off communication with the unit in Elvegaardsmoen. Deep
new snow hinders movements by the unit and reconnaissance of
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15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
landing fields for planes* Air reconnaissance detected 16
merchantmen, 5 transports and 1 cruiser near Harstad.
Apparently large-scale troop disembarkations. The Mountain
Division expects an attack by Anglo -Norwegian forces on Narvik
and Elvegaardsmoen.
Possible for the enemy to operate undisturbed from Rombaken
on the ore railroad. British destroyers put to sea at noon
and returned in the evening for a fresh bombardment. About
2,100 members of our destroyer crews - so far scantily armed
and supplied - are engaged in defense on land. According to
this a considerable part of the destroyer crews was saved.
So far no news about the crews of the KUENNE and KOELLNER.
Enemy carrier-borne planes and Norwegian planes from Bardufoss
airfield carried out bombing attacks on Narvik and the Hartvig
See. No success.
For disposition of forces in the Narvik area see radiogram
file of 15 April - radiogram 1725. Group Narvik requests:
Air support.
Closing of Rombaken Fjord by submarines.
Mining of the channel in Rombaken Fjord
near Stroemen.
Air Force bombers could not carry out the supporting night
operation as scheduled because of the weather* Army supplies
were successfully transported and ammunition and clothing
dropped.
The use of submarines in West Fjord and Ofot Fjord is proving
more and more to be a complete failure. Very severe depth
charging, air patrol and unfavorable light conditions, combined f
with numerous torpedo failures, prevent the boats having any
chance of success. (See also Submarine Situation.)
Closing of Rombaken by a mine laying submarine must also be
rejected because of the difficult tactical conditions. The
possibility of planes operating with mines is under review.
Group Narvik received the following directive from Armed
Forces High Command in the evening:
"If the situation forces you to abandon present
positions, set up a base in the mountains, near the
ore railroad if possible, and defend yourselves with
supplies dropped by plane. Thoroughly destroy ore
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15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
railroad forward of own base*"
Situation in Trondheim:
Naval Commander, Trondheim (Commander v. Pufendorf) reports
his plan for a surprise raid on Oerlandet with the aid of the
patrol vessels commissioned.
Conditions at the airfield near Trondheim still leave much to
be desired. Intermediate landing on the Jonsvatnet See
airfield possible.
Situation in Bergen:
Patrol and pilot service has been instituted. Outer light
extinguished. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that
the weak forces in Bergen urgently require the prevention of
outflanking enemy landings in Samnanger and Soer Fjords, also
in Hardanger and Sogne Fjords. Since minel8ying is not
possible for the present, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests
that three submarines should patrol the entrances. Commanding
Admiral, Submarines has detailed submarines accordingly (U "17",
"23", "24").
Planes and PT boats are on their way from Stavanger to Bergen
with an Army battalion.
Situation in Kristlansand;
The situation on land is cleared up by breaking the resistance
of a Norwegian regiment.
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Naval and Transport Situation In the Kattegat/Skagerrak:
Group Baltic still regards the submarine situation in the
Kattegat and eastern Skagerrak as extremely serious. Submarine
sighting reports have come in from off Oslo Fjord, north and
east of Skagen and at the northern entrance to the Little Belt.
Submarine -chase and depth charging unsuccessful. The BRTJMMER
was torpedoed southwest of Oslo Fjord during the night. Success
of attempt to tow her in is questionable.
In Naval Staff's opinion the failure to date of anti-submarine
defense and location is due to the lack of practice in look-out
duties and servicing the location gear and to the apparently great
liability of the sets to break down, according to reports to hand.
From time to time so many sets are out of order that in individual
flotillas only 1-2 hydrophone or echo-ranging sets are available. *
In addition to this, it has so far only been possible to equip
a limited number of defense vessels with echo-ranging sets.
The efficiency of the sets in the shallow water of the Kattegat
must also be regarded as limited.
It can be stated that German anti-submarine defense does not
take into account the demands made on At and In the long run
this gives rise to great anxiety for the future.
Defense of the sea route to Oslo, one of the Navy's most vital
tasks, stands or falls by the success in .combatting the great
danger from submarines and mines. The experiences of the last
few days have shown that the enemy's submarine training is of a
high standard, that enemy submarines have very good hydrophone
and sighting1 gear at their disposal and know how to score hits
with their torpedoes. It is the duty of all responsible offices
to bring anti-submarine defense and training, which right from
the beginning of the war has always been a special anxiety for f
Naval Staff, to the necessary zenith with the greatest speed
and maximum effort , and to ensure that all submarine-chasers
and defense vessels are quickly equipped with efficient location
gear.
Danger from mines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak demands the
most careful consideration, even though there is no proof at
present that mines have been employed on a large scale. The
ferry between Nyborg and Korsoer was damaged on 14 April following
an explosion. While Group Baltic suspects that it ran on one
of our own UMA's, laid shortly before as a deep mine, Commanding
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic points out the possibility that this
vas a British aerial mine, since a bomber was previously sighted.
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The possibility that aerial mines are being dropped by
British planes cannot be dismissed. It is known that large
British flying boats can lay up to eight mines while taxi-ing
over the surface of the water. Further observations in this
direction are necessary. Operational offices have been
notified of these discoveries.
Another mine warning report has come from mine-exploaing vessel
"11", which struck a mine when anchoring near Sprogoe. It is
also a question here as to whether it was a mine in our own
deep barrage or one laid by the enemy.
It is necessary that Naval Staff should prepare itself for the
worst and from now on expect the use of mines by enemy planes,
with or without magnetic firing. Even though large-scale
use of aerial mines is at present improbable, the appearance
of single mines in the practice areas for surface forces and
submarines and at most widely separated traffic centers of
North Sea and Baltic shipping sets Operations Division most
difficult tasks - in view of the small number of mine sweeping
units - which force speedy review of all possible and necessary
defense measures.
Transports to Oslo are still proceeding as planned. A great
part of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit put in to Oslo during the
day. The last group had to call at Frederikshavn because of
the weather and will arrive in Oslo l8ter. The 3rd Troop
Transport Unit has been delayed in Frederikshavn because of the
weather. The planned mine laying near Skagen also had to be
postponed in view of the weather,
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commanding Admiral,
Norway are at present investigating the possibility of calling
at Larvik, Frederlkstad, Arendal and other places near Oslo,
also pilot service, emergency lights and unloading facilities
there, because of the great danger from submarines in the
entrance to Oslo Fjord.
According to Swedish press reports, Swedish territorial waters
on the west coast from Halloe to Yttre TIstlarne have been mined
and the approach buoys and entrance lights extinguished until
further notice.
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15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Submarine Situation
Because of reports from submarines about extremely difficult
operational conditions in Vaags Fjord and inside West Fjord,
Naval Staff has ordered the boats off Narvik and in Vaags
Fjord to withdraw out of the narrow fjords to positions where
there is less danger and where chances of attack still exist.
U "48" reports a vain attempt to break through to Narvik.
Misses and failures at destroyers. For U "46" fs report,
see radiogram 2100. U "14" had a miss or failure on the
cruiser ENTERPRISE.
Submarine disposition otherwise unchanged*
Air Situation;
See radiogram file of 15 April, radiograms 1200, 2200, 2400.
Merchant Shipping
1. Norwegian and Danish ships overseas;
No tonnage In the Black Sea at present.
The sailing of Danish and Norwegian ships from Italy
is being prevented or delayed by technical difficulties as
far as possible. Italy, however, declines to hold the ships
If the captains protest, for fear of British reprisals against
her own ships.
No Norwegian and Danish tonnage In Soviet ports.
It is reported from Washington that neither the official
representatives of Denmark and Norway nor their shipping
representatives have received instructions from home, and they
are therefore mostly undecided as to how to act regarding
merchant ships.
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As the Embassy in Oslo reported on 14 April, the Norwegian
Association of Shipowners has issued the following call to
all ships under the Norwegian flag, which was broadcast by
various means:
"The Norwegian Association of Shipowners hereby
calls on all Norwegian ships to put in to the
nearest neutral port immediately and to remain
there until receipt of further instructions or to
make for a Norwegian port if this is nearer.
All ships proceeding to Norway or which are in other
north European waters are to procure the best
possible information about new mine barrages for
themselves."
2, Murmansk run:
Negotiations are planned about the transportation of
phosphates from Kandalaschka to Leningrad or German ports via
the Stalin Canal on German lighters; reciprocal traffic-coal
transports for Murmansk.
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16- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway;
Situation unchanged. A radio appeal by the old Norwegian
Government definitely shows that it has thrown in its lot
with the Allies. Narvik and vicinity is said to have been
recaptured; Norwegian pilots and officers are aiding the
Western Powers' expeditionary corps; the people are asked
to accept British and French money. It is the duty of all
citizens to help the authorities and to report treachery and
espionage.
The fact that the old Norwegian Government is still in a
position to exercise certain functions, to influence the
people and incite them to resistance, must be regarded as
extremely regrettable. It was a definite mistake in the
operation that we did not succeed by suitable preparatory steps
in ensuring that the Norwegian Government was captured promptly
and that a new and capable Government was set up right on the
first day of the occupation.
Propaganda in the Swedish press is creating an anti-German
atmosphere. The Government's desire to maintain strict
neutrality is, however, shared by the people and the Government
is not criticized.
The editor Ansaldo, who acts as a spokesman for Mussolini in
certain affairs, gave a radio address to the Italian Army:
"Events show that no nation can remain outside
the conflict. War could come to Italy as it
came to Norway. Italy is preparing herself
for this and will choose the most favorable
moment, which is perhaps nearer than is believed."
Russia has handed to Roumania an aide memo'ire on various
frontier incidents. Tension between Russia and Roumania
continues. The Russians are making military preparations
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16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
and assembling troops.
The German Ambassador considers the situation threatening,
a point of view which the Army General Staff does not share
to the same extent.
The British Ambassador informed the Japanese Government
on 13 April that in case of necessity Great Britain would
take the Dutch East Indies under her control. If Japan
consented to this, Japanese tr8de would not suffer. Japan
has reserved comment.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items:
1. Conference on the situation: The great danger from
submarines and mines on the sea route to Oslo forces us to
consider asking Swe*den to permit transport of material overland
to Oslo. The subject is to be discussed with the Fuehrer*
If such a proposal is not possible at present, designation
and buoying of a skerries route along the coast of Sweden for
material transports must be requested.
2. Brigadier General Bodenschatz has informed Commander
in Chief, Navy about a conference between a Swedish delegation
under Admiral Tamm and Field Marshal Goering. By personal
order of the King, Sweden ha3 stated that she will repulse
any attack on her territory with armed force and is specially
resolved to defend the northern Swedish frontier and the ore
region with all the means in her power. The Field Marshal
stated that the German operations were in no way directed
against Sweden and that Germany desired a peaceful Scandinavia.
Swedish wishes would be taken into consideration as far as
possible .
"Everything to a^ friendly Sweden, nothing to a
hesitant Sweden."
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16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
3. With reference to our submarines • lack of success
in northern waters and fjords, Chief, Naval Staff is desirous
of speedily returning the boats to waters offering greater
prospects of success and especially of using some boats in the
Atlantic for the resumption of war" against merchant shipping.
4. With regard to the despatch of the next auxiliary
cruisers in operational readiness for operations against
merchant shipping, it has been decided that the ships are to
remain in the home operational area for the time being, since
the present enemy situation practically excludes the possibility
of a successful break-through into the Atlantic. Naval Staff
has their use overseas constantly in mind and if the situation
develops favorably this is still intended at a later date.
P.M.
Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Swedish
Naval Chief, Admiral Tamm
Points discussed:
Swedish wishes:
1. Continuation of Swedish merchant shipping, return
of Swedish ships from Denmark and Norway to Sweden c
2. Transfer from Italy to Sweden of 4 torpedo boats
bought from the Italians.
3. Safety of Swedish shipping in the Baltic, anxiety
about British minelaying in the declared area in
the Baltic. German Navy requested to inform
Sweden at once of any mines detected in the Baltic.
4. Request for help in Sweden's armament, which will
also benefit German interests. (Delivery of 2 cm.
anti-aircraft guns especially requested.)
Admiral Tamm confirmed the great anxiety about German operational
plans which existed in Sweden before 9 April. These were
regarded as definitely directed against Sweden. He prbmised
Sweden's strict legality of action and her readiness to conform
with German wishes as far £.s compatible with neutrality.
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German wishes:
1. Creation of a route for German merchant shipping,
which is as safe against submarines as possible,
in the skerries along the west coast of Sweden,
with pilot service or buoys.
2. The extinguished outer lights on the west coast of
Sweden to be put on and radio beacons operated, when
requested.
3. Prevention of enemy submarines using Swedish territorial
waters; according to German observations, these have
fired from territorial waters, disregarding Swedish
neutrality.
4. Mining of the southern entrance to the Kogrund Channel
by Sweden.
Admiral Tamm was also informed of Naval Staff's suspicion
that several Norwegian torpedo boats have sought refuge in
Swedish waters.
Survey of the Situation
i
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic:
Great Eritaln:
Of the cruisers operating earlier in the North Atlantic, the
EFFINGHAM and ENTERPRISE which were probably in dock lately,
appear in the North Sea. The ORION in the West Indies area
was ordered at noon on 13 April to proceed to Gibraltar as
quickly as possible after taking on fuel and provisions in
Trinidad.
Apart from the net layer GUARDIAN, some destroyers and the
survey vessel FRANKLIN are patrolling the Faroes. They are
supplied with food and ammunition by trawlers.
The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS has arrived in the Channel area
from the Mediterranean.
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According to a report from Intelligence Center, Spain,
the ARK ROYAL is said to have left Gibraltar, east bound.
(Last report requires investigation.)
France;
Intelligence Center, Spain, reports:
Aircraft carrier BEARU and one destroyer passed Gibraltar on
easterly course at 0930 on 16 April.
Vessels in the Bizerta and Algiers area received several
priority radiograms containing movement orders which are to
be carried out with the greatest speed.
North Sea/Northern Waters
Narvik-North Cape area:
The aircraft carrier FURIOUS and three destroyers put in to
Tromsoe.
In the West F.jord-Vaags Fjord area:
The battleship WARSPITE, probably another battleship, several
cruisers, including the cruiser AURORA with the Admiral of the
Fleet (Chatfield), and several destroyers.
Troops appear to have been landed in Harstad and Saalangen.
Particulars regarding this have not been received.
Area around Trondhelm:
Two cruisers and five destroyers reported near the island of
Vega (entrance to Mosjoen).
The cruiser GLASGOW with destroyers of the 4th Destroyer
Flotilla and the transport CHOBRY in Namsos Fjord. General
Wiart in command of the troops ashore.
Enemy destroyers are also still detected in Folda Fjord.
Three cruisers and four destroyers were reported by a submarine in
Romsdals Fjord. Enemy forces are moving in the area Romsdals Fjord/
Andalsnes. Strength of transport units not ascertained.
Landings expected. Wick Radio sent very urgent radiograms via
Aalesund to a cover address in Andalsnes. Destruction of the
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16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Aalesund redio station is urgently necessary.
Destroyers and two large transports were reported in the
Shetlands area.
For development of the enemy situation from 7-14 April,
disposition of enemy navel forces and their movements, based
on the results of radio intelligence, see Radio Monitoring
Report No. 15/40.
Own Situation
Atlantic:
The situation in the North Sea and the strong concentration of
forces along the Norwegian coast make the speedy appearance of
the two auxiliary cruisers, Ships "16" and "36", appear necessary
to effect a diversion. Naval Staff hopes that the appearance
of the auxiliary cruisers will cause the enemy forces, at present
very extensively ordered into home v/aters, to be re-disposed.
The use especially of further aircraft carriers in the northern
area for the purpose of constantly threatening our bases in
Norway from the air must be regarded as highly undesirable.
The auxiliary cruisers received the following orders with
radiograms 1814 and 1849:
1. Speedy appearance desired to relieve situation in
North Sea.
2. Ship "36" to operate in the North Atlantic for the
time being. Expect delay of up to 14 days.
Choice of operational area left to your discretion.
If situation permits, simulate presence of pocket
battleship by means of deceptive radio message to
merchant shipping. Example: "Gunned pocket
battleship" with corrupt position and name of a
steamer sunk if possible.
3. Ship "16" speed up passage to South Atlantic.
Appear as soon as possible on the Cape-Freetown
route.
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4. Both ships to carry on as per operational order
after their first success or as soon as the enemy is
aware of their presence.
North Sea/Northern Waters
Naval Forces :
After 17 April the battleships will be in 12 hours' readiness
for operations. The HIPPER' s repairs can be expected to last
at least 14 days.
The tanker NORDMARK has been instructed to stand on and off,
away from the enemy, in northern waters at her own discretion
and to await further orders.
The destroyers ECKKOLDT and HEINEMANN coming from Trondheim
put in to home ports. For brief reports see radiogram file of
16 April, 1735.
In order to prevent losses from our own action, the following
procedure is to be adopted, according to the Fuehrer's order,
the regulations previously issued being amended:
a) Any German warship is to regard any approaching
plane as enemy and to attack it at once without
waiting to see whether recognition is possible.
b) Any German warship is to identify itself to
any approaching plane by day - apart from the
permanent markings or those ordered from time
to time (painting of turret covers and gun
shields, painting on of Swastika flags, etc) -
by long fleshes from the searchlight and the
firing of recognition signal cartridges, even
if enemy planes are suspected; at night, by firing
recognition signal cartridges, at latest when
opening fire. Even after opening fire, flashes
from the searchlight depend on the tactical
situation.
Situation in Narvik;
Successful operation on land from Hundalen to the Swedish
frontier has given us possession of the entire ore railroad.
One Norwegian battalion taken prisoner, 200 Norwegians escaped
over the frontier to Sweden. Bombing raids by French bi-planes
unsuccessful. Supplies of heavy machine-guns and anti-aircraft
guns for Narvik continue to be brought by air.
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16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
In the evening two British destroyers were again patrolling
off Narvik.
The supply submarines U "43" and U "26" were ordered to make
for Narvik since Commanding Admiral, Submarines still considered
it possible for the boats to break through to Narvik in spite
of the known difficulties. Narvik Port Commander, however,
reported in the evening that he had severe misgivings about
submarines putting in to the defenseless harbor considering
the close destroyer patrol and danger of espionage. The question
of re-routing the submarines is again being investigated- with
Group 21.
Situation in Trondheim:
Situation on land still assured. Successful sortie along the
railroad to Sweden as far as the Swedish frontier.
Seaplane base and airdrome are serviceable. The operational
readiness of the planes so far brought up, however, is very
slight owing to lack of ground staff and the great demands made
on personnel and material. The seaplane base was unsuccessfully
attacked by planes with German markings at noon. Trondheim
Port Commander reports that Commander, Trondheim has taken over
patrol duties and anti-submarine and mine defense. No mines
detected to date. Two torpedo batteries, each with a triple
tube (dismantled from the destroyers in Narvik) are ready for
action near the batteries at Selven and Hysnes.
Situation in Bergen:
Hasty reinforcement of anti-aircraft defense has been ordered
in the Bergen sector. The Navy and Air Force are to exploit
every possibility for this. An 8.8 cm anti-aircraft battery
is to be brought by submarines as the first step. Preliminary
work is in progress by Admiral, West Norwegian Coast for the
erection of torpedo batteries.
The submarines took on supplies in Bergen according to plan.
Since it has been detected that Norwegian pilots are working
with the British, the seizure of the main pilot station at
Koppervik has been ordered. The operation is to be carried
out by Army troops from Stavenger. These are to be brought
up by seaplanes and naval forces.
Situation in Stavanger;
The airfield at Stavanger is at present completely obstructed
by overcrowding, the effects of enemy bombing raids and numerous
unserviceable planes. Not open for landings or supplies.
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Situation In Kristiansand:
Nothing special to report.
Situation in Oslo:
Submarine warning in Oslo Fjord near Horten. Further progress
was made in taking over and establishing readiness of coastal
batteries. Torpedo battery South Kaholm ready to fire and
manned. (The BLUECHER received two hits from this battery.)
Submarine and torpedo dockyard in Toensbjerg has been taken
over and is in operation.
Situation in Skagerrak/Kattegat :
For further defense of sea communications with Oslo against
submarines, Naval Staff has ordered:
1. Reinforcement of the Skagerrak barrage by adapted
EMC mines with a long mooring rope and upper antenna
(40 m.). Antenna buoy setting minus 15 m. Contact
setting switched on. (400 probably ready for delivery
on 20 April, 600 more being prepared.)
2. Taking over of submarine-chase in the Kattegat and
Skagerrak by Commander Naval Air, Baltic under whom
the 606th Group is placed for this purpose immediately.
It is planned to bring up another squadron of He. 59' s
for anti-submarine operations.
t
3. Group Baltic received submarine-chasers "A - F"
from Group West on request.
Sea Transport Situation:
Following the torpedoing of the BRUMMER, Group Baltic considers
the limit of the justifiable use of naval forces so farfbr
transport assignments to be reached and requests urgently a
lull of several days to devote exclusively to submarine -chase
and the laying of mine barrages. It proposes that collective
transports be carried out by air in the meantime and that
Sweden be pressed to allow material transports with pilots
and warship escort to proceed through territorial waters.
Group Baltic also considers that transports of personnel on
tbrpedo boats in pairs proceeding at high speed to varying ports
such as Langesund, Arendal, Krageron, Larvik, Toensbjerg and
Sande Fjord can be advocated if necessary, provided there are
unloading facilities and lights.
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16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Naval Staff agrees with Group Baltic in its appreciation of
transport possibilities and the great strain put on naval
forces. (See letter to Group 21, Transport Chief, dated
16. April, Reference file "Weseruebung" • )
The priority of these transports was, however, so highly-
emphasized when examining the transport question with Armed
Forces High Command and Transport Chief, Group 'dl, that Naval
Staff is forced to order transport of material and personnel
to continue as before. Group Baltic has been instructed
accordingly.
Losses are to be avoided as far as possible by using all
available escort forces.
Personnel to be carried from Frederikshavn on the fast
vessels scheduled for this if the readiness of the vessels
permits.
Transports of material as previously planned. Ships will
also be utilized to a slight extent to transport personnel.
Urgent assignments are the transfer of the 13th Machine-Gun
Battalion, the 40 Armored Battalion and transport columns.
In Oslo, Group 'dl cleared up the subject of alternative ports.
According to Commanding Admiral, Norway's report, only ports
near Oslo can be considered because of the difficulties of
transportation in Norway. Troops are now scheduled to be
transported to Larvik for the present.
For assignments and positions of the forces of Commanding
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic see radiogram file of 16 April, 1200.
The extraordinarily great strain on all the forces of
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is apparent from this
report. Rests, relief and overhaul periods are limited to
the utmost.
Special difficulties arise from the lack of and liability to
break down of the location sets on submarine chaser forces.
Of 24 echo-ranging sets available 10 are at present out of
order. It is urgently necessary to obviate these deficiencies
and to do this as quickly as possible.
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16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Submarine Situation
Vaags Fjord:
U "47" reports use of hydrophones and heavy depth charging
by the enemy. One G 7a failure, three electric torpedo non-
detonators. Boat is leaving Vaags Fjord. U "65" also
reports most difficult operational conditions.
It is learned from radio monitoring that the destroyer
FEARLESS has apparently sunk one submarine.
West Fjord:
U "46" and "51" have been assigned new positions in the area
north of Trondheim. U "25" is to search the bays in West Fjord
for enemy forces.
Romsdals Fjord:
Reconnaissance by U "52" without result. No enemy sightings.
U "13" sank a TRIBAL class destroyer north of the Shetlands.
Otherwise no special changes in disposition.
Air Situation
See events of the day, radiogram file, 2400,
Merchant Shipping
Group Oslo has requested permission for single transports
returning from Oslo to return through Swedish territorial
waters with the aid of pilots. The steamers would have to
anchor at night because of the extinguishing of the lights.
Permission has been given. Group Baltic was already informed
some days ago that there was no objection even to the passage
of troopships through Swedish territorial waters.
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C CONFIDENTIAL
16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
German Shipping in the Baltic :
The Ministry of Transportation permits shipping south of
the line Cape Kullen-Hesseloe-Aarhus • Permission from
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is necessary north of
this,
German Merchant Shipping Losses since 9 April :
32 ships totaling 166,411 GRT. Further, 7 ships totaling
26,634 GRT cannot be used at present as they lie' north of
Stadtlandet.
Danish and Norwegian ships in German ports:
9 Danish totaling 11,339 GRT, 7 Norwegian totaling 13,060 GRT.
Danish Shipping:
The Danish short wave transmitter again broadcast:
"Danish ships are again called on to make for
neutral ports, ships in the Mediterranean if
possible Italian or Spanish ports. If occasion
arises, attempt to reach home ports,"
The Danish Foreign Ministry has despatched a coded circular
telegram to this effect to Danish representatives abroad.
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17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norwegian campaign:
Reynaud spoke In the Senate about the Allies •
successes:
1. The first success lies in a severe and
irremediable weakening of German sea power;
2. Germany is cut off from Swedish ore.
Minefields lie all over the Baltic,
cutting off also this shipping route to the
ore;
3. Germany is forced to fight on a new front.
She is squandering troops, guns, planes
and fuel;
4. The fourth result is a colossal moral defeat.
King Haakon was taken for another Eerr Hacha
from Czechoslovakia. Quisling's sham Government
has collapsed.
2. The Swedish Government has banned a speech by Hambro,
the Norwegian President of the Storthing. It has also
prohibited recruiting of volunteers for Norway. The Swedish
Foreign Minister solemnly assured the German Ambassador on
15 April that all military measures taken by Sweden were
directed exclusively to the defense of her neutrality. Units
had to be reinforced to protect the lengthy Swedish-No rue gian
frontier. It was the most earnest desire of the Swedish
Government to meet Germany1 s political and economic wishes as
far as possible; the deliveries of ore according to contract
would be carried out to the extent agreed on.
3. The British Ambassador in Washington stated that
neither Great Britain' nor Canada planned to occupy Greenland
or Iceland unless Germany planned to do so.
4. Halifax assured the Dutch Ambassador that Great
Britain would respect the neutrality of the Netherlands.
5. According to a letter from Mussolini to the Fuehrer,
the Italian Navy is mobilized and at full war strength. It
could not be established to date whether considerable parts
of the Italian Fleet have gone to the Dodecanese.
The Italian press states:
"The moment has come to review the situation
in the Mediterranean with regard to the relations
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17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
between Great Britain, France and Italy."
6. Lively discussions in the U.S.A., Great Britain and
Japan about the possible protection of the Dutch East Indies
Holland states angrily that she is strong enough alone to
protect the Dutch East Indies with her own forces. In the
U.S.A. it is declared that any Japanese action against the
Dutch East Indies would come up against very strong U.S.
resistance and might perhaps lead to the U.S.A. 's entry into
the war.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Report on future submarine operations. For result see
under Submarine Situation.
2. For report from Lieut. Cdr. Gerlach, 2nd Staff Officer
of Commander, Destroyers about the destroyer operation against
Narvik and the actions on 10 and 13 April, see War Diary, Part B,
Vol. V. page 133
j<-> .
The report fills Naval Staff with pride. It shows that the
majority of the destroyers were not annihilated by the enemy
but, after a heroic fight against overwhelming odds under the
most unfavorable tactical conditions, scuttled themselves or
ran on the rocks, after the last shell and torpedo had been
fired. The crews' behavior during and after the action was
excellent and in accordance with the spirit and famous tradition
of the German torpedo arm.
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17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Survey of the Situation
Speciel Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Great Britain;
The Admiralty announces the laying of mine barrages to protect
the Clyde estuary in the following area, according to Rugby
radio;
Between the lines connecting Dunningham Point
(55° 19.5'N, 5° 33'W) and Scraigans Point
(55° 3.5 'N, 5° 3»W) and Rhuad Point (55° 21.5'N,
5° 31 »W) and Bennan Head (55° 8.5'N, 4° 59,5 »W).
Patrol vessels are stationed at the southern ^
end. Shipping is instructed to procure ana
follow directions from the Royal Navy and/or
consular authorities.
France ;
Four French submarines arrived in Harwich on 17 April.
According to bearings, the large destroyer MOGADOR and
another vessel were detected northeast of the Firth of Moray
in the afternoon.
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Intelligence Center, Belgium transmits an agent's report,
according to which the Home Fleet operating in the Norwegian
campaign is to be regrouped by withdrawing six large British
vessels and replacing them by six lighter French vessels.
Admiral Forbes commands the French Fleet units. A new large-
scale landing is to be attempted near Namsos. According to
further agents' reports, Frer i, Scottish and Canadian mountain
troops are on their way to Norway.
Narvik-Tromsoe area;
Only incomplete information on the movements of enemy forces in
the north Norwegian theater could be gained since our air activity
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17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
had to be limited to the despatch of one FW £00.
One heavy cruiser wag spotted off Harstad and one battleship
(WARSPITE) and several destroyers in the fjord southwest of
Andorja Island.
Radio intelligence detected the cruiser EFFINGHAM in the area
off Tromsoe.
In the morning U "46" reported three troopships, probably
returning, on southwesterly course northwest of Mosjoen.
According to radio monitoring, the transfer of the aircraft
carrier GLORIOUS into the operational area along the Norwegian
coast is to be expected.
Area around Trondheim:
In the morning air reconnaissance detected 'd cruisers and
5 destroyers southwest of Folda Fjord and another cruiser northwest
of it. Reconnaissance of Ram Fjord and the road to the south
showed no transports, naval forces or troops.
She t lands -Norway area:
In the forenoon Stavanger was shelled by cruisers and a
destroyer. The formation was detected 60 miles west of Haugesund
at noon on westerly course proceeding at high speed. In the
afternoon the cruiser SUFFOLK, damaged by air attack, urgently
requested aid from tugs. The enemy succeeded in bringing her
in. The battle cruiser REPULSE was 50 miles east of Fair
Passage towards evening, probably to pick up the cruiser formation.
Own Situation
Situation in Narvik;
Destroyer patrol in Rombaken Fjord continues; this is apparently
interrupted always for a short time only. A British attempt
to land by means of cutters in Herjaengs Fjord was repulsed.
British destroyers shelled German positions and batteries in
the afternoon. Bardufoss airfield is occupied by Norwegians
and there are some light planes there. About 5 cm. of snow
until the end of Kay, then unserviceable for three weeks, there-
fore no possibility of bomber operations at present from here.
Supplies by plane for the destroyer crews have commenced.
Attempts are being made to fly urgently required officers and
experts home.
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17 April 1940
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Situation in Trondheim:
Port Commander, Trondheim (Captain Thiele) requests that men
from destroyers, some of whom are manning the batteries, be
relieved by coastal specialists. The coastal battery at
Bettinges with %d x 21 cm. and 3 x 15 era. guns and the battery
at Heysnes with 2 x 21 cm. and 2 x 15 cm. guns are ready for
action.
Plans :
To
restore readiness to proceed of the destroyers JACOEI snd
RIEDEL and to send them home. It is hoped to get the JACOEI
up to a speed of 30 knots despite the stoppage of part of a
turbine •
Situation in Bergen:
Reconnaissance of the seaplane base at Flatoey shows that it
is suitable for use. The base was still occupied by Norwegians.
Four runways. Use not possible until anti-aircraft defense
is available.
Submarines supplied as planned.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the town and country
authorities will obey the orders of the Oslo Administrative
Committee.
Situation in Stavanger:
Enemy cruisers and destroyers shelled the seaplane base in the
morning. Buildings, material, ammunition and four seaplanes
destroyed. Airfield not hit. All Stavanger' s light and
power installations out of action.
Strong forces of the 26th Bomber Wing and the 30th Bomber Wing
contacted the enemy formation west of Haugesund.
Several hit° were scored:
Stern of 1 heavy cruiser
1 x 500 kg.
1 x 250 kg.
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17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
1 destroyer 1 x 250 kg.
Amidships ,1 cruiser 1 x 1,000^, kg.
1 cruiser 1 x 500 kg.
1 cruiser 1 x 500 kg.
1 x 500 kg. just by the ship's side.
Radio traffic indicates severe damage to the cruiser SUFFOLK,
which urgently requested aid from tugs and was able to reach
her base. (After engine room and steering compartment under
water. )
The need for the erection of a coastal battery in Stavanger is
urgent, as shown by today's shelling.
Orders will be given accordingly.
Because of the shelling of Stavanger, Group West requests the
transfer of available Army batteries to protect Tyboroen until
the naval battery is set up.
Situation in Kristlansand and Oslo:
Nothing special to report. 2 x 21 cm., 6 x 15 cm. guns ready
for action in Kristlansand.
Situation in the North Sea;
Ten planes of the 3rd Coastal Patrol Squadron of the 506th
Group and eight planes of the 1st Group of the 126th Bomber
Wing laid aerial mines In the area of the Downs and Edinburgh
Channel; 24 LMB mines dropped.
In order to increase the enemy's impression of the effectiveness
of the Skagerrak mine barrages It is suggested to Group West
that a suitable vessel should pretend to have struck a mine in
the deep channel through transmission of an S.O.S. on the steamer
wave.
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Situation In the Skagerrak/Kattegat :
Danger from submarines as great as ever as far as the entrances
to the Baltic. Two submarines sighted north of Schultz Grund.
Submarine warning in Friedericla in the afternoon. Submarine
chase unsuccessful. Another underwater explosion on the Nyborg-
Korsoer ferry off the entrance to Korsoer while following a
mine- exploding vessel. Minesweeper "12" checked the route on
17 April without any result. Possibly our own UMA barrage is
faulty. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has therefore
ordered the immediate sweeping of our deep barrages in the Great
and Little Belts, 100 per cent searching sweep of the ferry
route from Nyborg to Korsoer and laying of buoys.
In Naval Staff's opinion, the possibility of enemy aerial
minelaylng here must be taken into account.
Transport situation;
Fast troop transport and first fishing smack transport arrived
in Larvik and Oslo. Other transports delayed by the weather.
Denmark:
Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark reports that 3 x 21 cm. guns
are manned on the island of Flakfort east of Copenhagen.
Submarine Situation
It is necessary to fix present and future assignments for further
submarine operations according to plan. The continuous
fulfillment of tasks arising must be accomplished by a corre-
spondingly smaller number of submarines on operation.
Naval Staff at present foresees the following assignments for
submarines :
1. Occupation of the area Vaags Fjord-West Fjord in
attack dispositions.
2. Occupation of the area from the Orkneys to the Minch.
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17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
3. Defense of the Trondheim and Bergen areas.
4. Transport of supplies to Narvik and Trondheim.
5. War against merchant shipping in the Atlantic
with boats still available.
6. Use of boats for Operation "Gelb." if necessary.
7. Withdrawal of boats for submarine training.
Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have received
an order to endeavor to fulfill these assignments by the
use of the following numbers of submarines:
1. In the Lofoten area at present the large boats
already there.
2. In the Orkneys-Minch area, always 3-4 small boats. .
3. Defend the Trondheim area with 3 medium-sized and 3
small boats.
4. Defend the Bergen-Stavanger area with 2 small boats.
5. The 6 large boats scheduled are to be used for
transport assignments and for temporary defense assignments
in Norway.
6. The »large boats still available to operate in the
Atlantic.
7. For Operation "Gelb" boats to be taken from Bergen or
from those resting.
8. Eight small boats to be made available immediately
for training purposes, 9 more boats from May;
Norwegian and Danish boats to be brought up for this
if possible.
In view of Armed Forces High Command's appreciation of the
situation that it is necessary to concentrate supplies on the
Trondheim area, supply boats U "43" and "26" have now finally
been diverted to Trondheim.
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17 April 1940
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IT "29" sailed for Bergen and Trondheim as an additional
supply boat, carrying 5 tons of 2 cm. ammunition, alkali
cartridges and distilled water.
Positions on 17 April:
Outer Vaags Fjord:
Outer West Fjord:
Returning from the Lofotens:
Northwest of Trondheim:
Namsen Fjord-Folda Fjord:
Off Trondheim:
Romsdals Fjord:
Bergen- Lister area:
Area around the Shetlands:
On passage: Supply boats:
On return passage:
"38", "65",
"49" (?)
"51"
"48", "46",
"25"
"61", "34",
"50" (?)
14"
"52"
"24",
"17",
"58",
"19",
"43",
n
"9"
"30* ,
"23",
"62",
"59",
"13",
"26",
"37"
and U
»»«
»47»
"7",
IMII
"57",
"60",
"5", "6"
"56",
"10", "3"
"29"
21", freed from internment*
Great anxiety is felt regarding the fate of U
and U "50" (Bauer). U "22" (Jenisch)
from 17 April.
"47" (v. Gossler)
is posted missing as
Air Situation
See Air Force Events of the Day, 17 April in Volume "Air
Situation".
Merchant Shipping:
After further enquiry from Naval Staff, the Ministry of
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17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Transportation has issued instructions that German ships are
to sail from Baltic ports as planned in spite of the British
announcement of a declared area.
"Export" Unit:
There is now information about the steamer MAIN from the
Admiralty, according to which the ship was sunk by a Norwegian
destroyer. Of the 7 ships of the "export" unit only 1
(LEVANTE) has therefore arrived as planned; the greater part
of the cargo of another (BAERENFELS; was unloaded in Bergen
before her destruction by a bomb-hit. One steamer (ALSTER)
has unfortunately fallen into enemy hands with her valuable
cargo.
Norwegian Shipping;
The legitimate Norwegian Government has requested the British
Government to broadcast the following telegram to all Norwegian
ships :
"All Norwegian ships are warned that telegrams
they receive from Norway, signed by the shipowner,
are transmitted by the Germans. The only authentic
orders are those of a Norwegian Embassy or statements
by the 3.B.C. Captains of all Norwegian ships are
to get in touch with the nearest French or British
naval office and to avoid putting in to neutral ports,
except in the case of an authentic request. "
P.M.
Lt. Cdr. Gerlach, from Commander, destroyers, reported to the
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17 April 1940
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Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in the
presence of Commander in Chief, Navy.
The Fuehrer asked for a full report on the Narvik operation,
the situation at present and future prospects of defense, and
then expressed his special satisfaction with the report and
his recognition of the achievements of our destroyers.
(«
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18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway:
The announcement that the new Administrative Committee
under Christensen is entrusted with looking after the interests
of the Norwegian people with the German occupation authorities
has apparently been accepted peacefully and with satisfaction
among large sections of the Norwegian population. The
population of Oslo is slowly returning to the city. Shops
are being opened, business is being resumed. However, the old
Norwegian Government, which has fled and the whereabouts of
which are not known, still possesses great influence in the
areas not occupied by us, and is continually exhorting the
people to resistance, pointing out the aid already being given
by the Western Powers. This is making the execution of our
operations much more difficult.
2. The British Ministry of Information is said to have
given the press the following instructions with reference to
the excitement in Great Britain about the German Norwegian
campaign:
1. False report of the capture of Narvik is not
to be withdrawn;
2. It is to be stressed that Narvik is the only
important harbor in Norway in view of the ore
exports;
>
3. It is to be emphasized that Germany has
committed a great strategic, economic and
political blunder by the Scandinavian
action;
4. Losses to the German F,leet must be celebrated
as a great victory for Great Britain;
5. Legality of action has now completely gone
over to Great Britain.
The British press states that Italy's future attitude will be
decided in the Norwegian fjords. Italy is at present bluffing
in order to draw as many British ships as possible into the
Mediterranean to relieve Germany.
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18 April 1940
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3. The situation J.s still not clear about the transfer
of Italian Fleet units to the Dodecanese. The Consul at
Palermo reports that 4 light cruisers and 4 destroyers sailed
from Palermo on 14 April, destination unknown.
The Western Powers and the U.S.A. are at present specially
interested in Italy's attitude. Far reaching ^decisions are
expected shortly in the Balkans or in the Mediterranean.
4. The Western Powers are attempting to influence Sweden
against Germany by increased press and radio propaganda and
speeches by various ministers. It is stated that Germany's
next blow will be at Sweden in order to ensure supplies of ore
for Germany. Great Britain is ready to help Sweden if attacked
by Germany, but must insist that Sweden herself do everything
for her own defense.
5. Reports from Sweden speak of the great disquiet at
present felt by the Swedish public because of various flights
over Swedish territory by German air formations. Captains
of steamers report great expansion of Swedish coastal defense,
control of steamer crews and harbor barrages.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Report on Armed Forces High Command directive:
The Fuehrer has ordered:
a) Group Narvik has the task of defending itself
along the ore railroad, of tying down the enemy
and of preparing thorough destruction of the
ore railroad. It is being supplied with ammunition
and food. Fresh forces will not be brought up.
b) Trondheim is of decisive importance as a naval
and air base. Occupying forces, as well as
blocking the way northwards against landings,
are to defend the railroad to the Swedish border
and open up communications to the south. The
Group cannot be made too strong for this.
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18 April 1940 .CONFIDENTIAL
c) Commander in Chief, Air Force will provide
increased air transports as far as possible.
d) Commander in Chief, Navy, in conjunction
with Group 21, is to take over the bringing
up by sea of heavy weapons and ammunition
required and carry this out even at the risk
of losses.
e) Severe steps are to be taken against passive
resistance from the population.
(See under Situation in Trondheira.)
2. Operations by our battleships:
Naval Staff considers that a sudden appearance by the
battleship formation in the Lister-Utsire-Krakenaes area is
urgently necessary in order to relieve the west coast of Norway,
where troop and supply transports of the Western Powers are
constantly arriving under the protection of numerous British
naval forces. The enemy disposition of forces, at present
still showing a concentration in the Lofoten area, provides
favorable conditions for such an operation. Prospects of
success are expected from pushing through the Shetlands line
into the area west of Stadlandet-Frohavet, according to reports
on the enemy to date (primarily light forces in this area).
The dangers of such sorties, the possibilities of which in
Naval Staff's opinion should not be exhausted in isolated
operations but must form a constant threat to the enemy, lie
in danger from the air, submarines and mines, especially on the
approach routes. These dangers can be reduced to a tolerable
degree with suitable anti-mine and air escort (the effectiveness
of air patrol and air escort has been materially increased by the
newly acquired bases at Aalborg and Stavanger). It is necessary
to use all destroyers in readiness for anti-submarine escort.
However, the severe, loss which the German Fleet has suffered from
the ten destroyers out of action in Narvik makes itself particularly
felt here. The number of destroyers still available in home
waters is at present only eight, four of which are still being
overhauled or urgently require repairs. Establishment of
readiness of the remaining four still requires several days.
The minimum number of destroyers considered necessary for the
thrusts by the battleships is three.
Refuelling of the forces presents no difficulties. If
necessary, the supply ship NORDMARK, in northern waters, is at
the battleships' disposal. The destroyers can, if necessary,
re-oil in Stavanger and Bergen.
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18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Navai Staff is quite aware of the dangers of battleship
sorties in coastal waters. These, however, can on no account
be regarded as so decisive that important operations cannot
be carried out because of them. The battleships are no
"fleet in being", exercising their strategic and operational
effect alone by their presence in home bases.
Effective diversions can only be attained by their actual
appearance in the enemy's operational area. Frequent
operations in the area central North Sea-She tlands-Krakenaes
will also represent a very effective defense for the Skagerrak
and the vital sea route to Oslo.
The supreme importance of a speedy and successful conclusion
of the Norwegian operation necessitates battleship operations
as soon as possible in accordance with Naval Staff's considerations.
Group West was informed by telephone of Naval Staff's views on
this matter. f*
3. It no longer appears necessary now for the cruiser
EMDEN to remain in Olso. Group Baltic has therefore been given
permission to withdraw her. Group Baltic is to arrange with
Commanding Admiral, Norway the possibility of release and the
date of withdrawal, taking into consideration the enemy
situation, submarines and mines. (The EMDEN will remain in
Oslo for the present according to this arrangement. She is
not scheduled to return until the situation changes or if Oslo
is too dangerous and if anti-submarine escort is available.)
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Further transfer of forces is to be seen from the Atlantic and
Mediterranean to the North Sea and northern waters. Nine
destroyers were transferred from Dover to Scape. The former
Polish destroyers THUNDERBOLT and LIGHTNING, operating in the
Atlantic, are likewise in the northern North Sea. The aircraft
carrier ARK ROYAL left Gibraltar during the night of 16 April
and is in radio communication with Great Britain. The battle-
cruiser HOOD is no longer detected in the Gibraltar areaj her
transfer northward can be assumed.
The French Mediterranean Fleet has been decreased by the
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allocation of vessels to the Atlantic Fleet. In the North
Sea there are probably about ten French submarines, the mine-
laying cruiser EMILE BERTIN, a few torpedo cruisers, including
the MOGADOR, and possibly also the two DUNKERQUE class.
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Radio intelligence reveals the following disposition of enemy
naval, forces:
Are North Cape-Kirkenes :
Tromsoe to West Fjord:
The cruisers DEVONSHIRE and BERWICK.
The old battleships WARSPITE,
VALIANT, the aircraft carrier
FURIOUS and the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON.
Area Orkney s -She t lands-
coast of Norway:
In the Scapa area:
Trondheim area or nortn The 2nd and 18th Cruiser Squadrons
and south of it: with the 4th and 6th Flotillas; the
cruisers YORK, SHEFFIELD, GLASGOW
and EFFINGHAM were detected
individually.
The RENOWN and the cruisers
EDINBURGH, AURORA and CAIRO as well
as destroyers of the 5th and 7th
Flotillas.
The REPULSE and the cruisers
BIRMINGHAM, ENTERPRISE, PENELOPE,
CALCUTTA and CARLISLE as well as
destroyers of the 8th Flotilla and
the damaged cruiser SUFFOLK.
Positions of French forces are unknown. The vessels are
fully incorporated in the British Fleet's radio service.
Towards noon air reconnaissance intercepted a British battle
cruiser with semi-remote cruiser escort. This may have been
the battle cruiser HOOD.
Submarines sighted various cruisers and destroyers in the
Shetlands area without firing.
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18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Cruisers and destroyers were detected in West Fjord and
And Fjord* There was a battleship off Harstad*
North of Trondheim:
At noon Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron passed on to Admiralty
General de Wiart's report that the landing had been carried
out (probably in the vicinity of Namsos). Daventry radio
announces news of a British landing in the Namsos area*
It appears from another radiogram that a convoy plans to enter
the Mosjoen area on the evening of 18 April*
South of Trondheim:
Nq nQw results from reconnaissance of Andalsnes and Romsdals
r
iq new
Fjord.
Area off Bergen:
Submarine warning reports*
Survey of the Situation
Own Situation
Situation in the North Sea:
In order to protect shipping movements in the area off the
Norwegian coast against air attacks, an increasing number of
which must be expected as the season advances, Group West
requests the speedy transfer of fighter and heavy fighter
formations to Stavanger and Bergen as far as this is possible*
Commander, Minesweepers, West reports that after giving up all
new minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas, Minesweeper
n12n and almost all mine-exploding vessels he has now only four
auxiliary minesweeper flotillas and one flotilla of old mine-
sweepers available for mine patrol in the North Sea coastal
waters* Concentration on route nBlauw and the coastal route as
far as Hanstholm* The expansion of the bases of Esbjerg and
Tyboroen is being pushed on* The final aim of Commander,
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Minesweepers, West is to advance mine patrol up to the
Norwegian coast and Bergen as soon as the release of new
minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas and the general
situation permit.
The difficulties of mine control in the North Sea with the
small number of flotillas available will have to be endured for
the present, since the Navy's chief assignment, the safeguarding
of the transports to Oslo, can only be fulfilled by definite
concentration of anti-mine and anti-submarine defense in the
'Kattegat and Skagerrak.
Situation in Narvik:
Group Narvik reports that the day passed quietly* Dropping
place for supplies was unsuccessfully bombed by planes, apparently
French ones* After the merchant ships have been unloaded,
food in Narvik will still be sufficient for 40 days.
The Group reports enemy landings in Salangen.
Our own armed reconnaissance successfully attacked town and
harbor installations in Harstad. Attacks on a battleship on
the roads off Harstad were apparently unsuccessful. Damage
caused by heavy bombs exploding in the direct vicinity of the
ship's side is possible.
Tromsoe power station was destroyed by a bomb.
Situation in Trondhelm;
Railroad to Sweden in German hands. All forces urgently
request supplies by rail via Sweden.
Facilities for this are dependent on the Fuehrer's decision.
For the present, arms and ammunition can only be brought up
by air or sea.
The urgency of transports of every type of gun to Norway,
especially to Trondheim and Bergen, is apparent from the
Fuehrer's directive today (see above). The prospects of getting
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supplies safely to Trondheim by sea are certainly slight*
Every endeavor must, however, be made to get guns through to
Trondheim because of the still very confused situation on land
and of the severe threat to our important Trondheim position
which is to be expected from the British landings in Namsos and
Romsdals Fjord. Naval Staff thinks this might be possible
by .using Special Group vessels (camouflaged trawlers), which
are in a position to score successes against naval vessels
while carrying out the transport assignment, because of their
torpedo armament. Group West was therefore instructed by tele-
type to despatch two of the Special Group ships to Trondheim as
an experiment. Cargo of light field howitzers and first
ammunition equipment. Their main assignment is safe transportation,
the secondary one destruction of enemy naval vessels. Ships
"26" and "37" were then ordered by Group West to carry out the
transport assignment. Two guns plus ammunition can be safely
loaded on each vessel.
Situation in Bergen:
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports the destruction of a
Norwegian torpedo boat after an engagement with PT TDoats S "21"
and S "23" in Hardanger Fjord.
In Bergen harbor there are 183 steamers which are not German.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has requisitioned 27 steamers,
16 of which are ready to sail. Owing to lack of personnel
it is only possible to transfer very few steamers to Germany.
Unloading of the "export" steamer BAERENFELS was stopped because
of the danger of overturning.
Only 3 x 10.5 m. anti-aircraft guns without ammunition have
so far been set up. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast urgently
requests ammunition and also allocation of a motor minesweeper
flotilla because of danger from mines in the entrances.
The necessity for such an allocation is recognized. In spite
of this Naval Staff finds it impossible to grant the request,
since motor minesweepers are not at present available on account
of urgent requirements elsewhere. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast
must therefore make do with the means available in Bergen. Later
allocation of a motor minesweeper flotilla will be reviewed.
c
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Group West has been instructed to this effect*
Situation In the Skagerrak/Kattegat:
Numerous submarine sighting and warning reports show that there
is still very great danger from submarines* Submarine- chase
is being carried out south of Oslo, in the Skagerrak north of
Skagen, west of Maeseskaer, near Hisholm, south of Anholt, south
of Samsoe and near Schultz Grund. Several reports mention
"submarine probably destroyed"; there are, however, no proofs
of actual sinkings. One ship reports twelve submarine sightings
within four days and expresses the supposition, based on
observation, that submarines are operating in pairs. Submarines
have been identified several times by their periscopes about
1-g m. above the surface.
Examination of mine-exploding vessel "11", which struck a mine,
by the Chemical and Physical Experimental Station in Kiel reveals
possible detonation of a small mine with long-range effect and
magnetic type firing.
The first part of the Skagen anti-submarine barrage was laid
according to plan with deep UMA mines by the HANSESTADT DANZIG
group during the night of 17 April.
Transport Situation;
Transports of troops and material proceed according to plan.
950 men arrived in Larvik on torpedo bosts and the steamer
ANGELBURG; 1,000 men arrived in Oslo on two steamers.
Close escort by planes has turned out very well. Ammunition
and material are en route in drifters.
The steamer HAMM was torpedoed and badly damaged north of
Skagen out of a convoy of empty steamers returning from Oslo.
The hospital ship STUTTGART, escorted by Swedish warships, is
proceeding through Swedish territorial waters to Oslo.
Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that he cannot defend the
50-mile long Oslo Fjord with only the 1st Motor Minesweeper
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Flotilla placed at his disposal and the inadequate newly-
commissioned Norwegian vessels. He requests immediate
allocation of one submarine-chaser and one patrol flotilla,
each of at least eight boats. He also requests basic orders
on command and that the limits of the defense areas between
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commanding Admiral,
Norway be fixed (see 1943).
It is at present impossible to allocate further forces of
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic or Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, North to Commanding Admiral, Norway. Defense in
the outer Oslo Fjord is also not Commanding Admiral, Norway's
affair, but is part of the duties of Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic, who is responsible for the protection of the entire sea
route to Oslo and assumes protection of transports against
submarines and mines right into the inner Oslo Fjord.
Splitting up the few submarine-chaser and defense forces must
lead to an impossible weakening of defense as a whole and cannot
therefore be carried out at present. Commanding Admiral,"
Defenses, Baltic alone must remain responsible for commitment
of and operations by the defense formations and he will in so
doing take into consideration the wishes of Commanding Admiral,
Norway or Admiral, South Norwegian Coast as far as possible.
Various applications regarding the use of the Norwegian naval
vessels captured or commissioned have been received. Both
Group Commands request the allocation of the minelayer OLAV
TRYGVASON and of the Norwegian destroyers BALDER, ODIN, GYLLER.
Group Baltic further requests the seizure of guard vessels, ^
customs boats and trawlers for the protection of Oslo Fjord snd
of the ports in southern Norway, the allocation of the armed
coastal vessels lying in Horten as floating batteries to
Commanding Admiral, Norway and the assembly of the old second
class Norwegian torpedo boats as harbor defense flotillas.
(See radiogram file of 18 April, 1148.)
The whole affair is at present under review by High Command,
Navy/Naval Staff.
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Submarine Situation;
1. Vaags Fjord:
U "65" reports from And Fjord that the positions In
the fiords can only be occupied for hours at a time since It
Is only possible to charge the batteries far out to sea,
U "47", coming from the Lofotens, has been assigned a waiting
position from the North Minch to the northern tip of the
Shetlands.
2. Trondheim area!
U "26", "43", put in to Trondheim with supplies.
3. Bergen:
U "14" is disposed off Bergen, U "13", "61" are
replenishing their stocks in Bergen.
The following boats have been ordered to return:
By the direct route to Kiel: U. "9", "46", '"51".
Via the Orkneys area: U "10", "19", "56", "60", "62".
Via a point west of the
Shetlands to Wilhe 1ms haven: U "52".
Submarine Successes:
The British steamer SWAINBY (4,935 tons) was torpedoed off the
north coast of Scotland.
Commanding Admiral, Submarines summarizes the results of shots
fired during the past week in teletype 1725 (see radiogram file)
and thus gives a shattering summary of the numerous torpedo
failures, because of which imst of the attacks carried out
despite heavy defense on 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser,
5 destroyers and several transports were not successful. The
Navy was thus deprived of material successes in decisive action.
Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that, if the newly ordered
ruling (percussion firing inside fjords, magnetic firing in the
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open sea) results in further failures, the German Navy does
not possess any weapon for the submarines in northern waters.
Merchant Shipping
The following orders have been issued about control of neutral
shipping:
1. Apart from Russian, Dutch and Belgian ships, only
such neutral ships as are bound for German North Sea
ports are to be allowed to pass westward through the
Kiel Canal. Other neutral vessels are to be prevented
by means of pretexts.
2. Over and above para. 1., ships of the three Baltic
States are to be allowed to pass westward through the
Kiel Canal if they have a convoy certificate for
destination Delfzyl.
3. Ensure that neutral shipping neither leaves the
Skagerrak westbound nor is able to turn off to the
west from German and Danish North Sea ports, as well
as from Delfzyl.
The German Ambassador in Copenhagen reports that direct
instructions from Danish shipowners to captains do not come into
question since Danish ships are not equipped for coded broadcasts
and secrecy of position would not therefore be guaranteed. In
any case, notification of ships by means of repeated radio
instructions from the Board of Trade has attained the desired
purpose, as is apparent from reports made by several captains.
Group Baltic has been instructed that Swedish ships are permitted
to sail from ports east of the Skagerrak mine barrage if they
are bound for a destination in our sphere of Influence.
Such ships are to be prevented from making off westwards under
pretext of another port.
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The Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reports:
Danish ships are making for Brazilian ports as emergency
ports and are lying there for the present, obviously on
instructions from the Danish Embassy. Norwegian steamers
are mostly adhering to their schedule. When a ship sails,
her name and painted nationality marking are painted over.
According to the newspapers, the Ambassador here has stated
that the Government has given instructions to continue shipping
traffic.
D
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Items of Political Importance
Norway:
Political situation unchanged*
Italy:
The Italian press treats events in Norway in a definitely
pro-German manner. According to reports from trustworthy
agents, Mussolini and his closest adherents are 100 per cent
on our side* The Old Guard of the Fascist party demands that
Mussolini fight against the enemies of the Italian people.
In northern Italy, especially in the upper classes, there is,
however, no true sympathy with Germany, but with racially akin
France* "Popular opinion in large parts of Italy is greatly
averse to entry into the war; propaganda disseminated by the
Roman Catholic Church plays a great part in this*
(See under report from Naval Attache in Rome.)
The Netherlands Government has informed Japan that it has no
intention of asking a foreign power for protection for the Dutch
East Indies if Holland becomes involved in the war; the
Netherlands Government would be just as little inclined to
accept such help if it were offered.
Conference on the Situation with Chief a Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Group West!s proposal for a battleship sortie and
other operational plans:
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19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Group West regards as necessary conditions for battleship
operations:
a) Complete operational readiness of 3 destroyers,
of which the SCHOEMANN and BEITZEN will be
ready on 19 April. Date not yet definite for
the HEINEMANN.
b) Mine check on at least two routes out of the
Heligoland Bight* This cannot be carried
out until Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North
again has a fast minesweeper flotilla.
The Group's plan is for a sortie into the Shetlands-Norway
passage and beyond, either as a counter- thrust against enemy
measures detected by radio intelligence or as a sortie not
based on intelligence data. In both cases favorable weather
when sailing, which as far as possible prevents enemy air
reconnaissance, is desirable but not a prerequisite.
The Group reports further operational plans for the immediate
future :
a) Reinforcement of the Skagerrak mine barrage.
b) Use of aerial mines on the east coast of Great
Britain.
c) PT boat minelaying operations on the east coast
of England. (Group requests speedy return of
four new PT boats of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla
for this purpose.)
d) Minelaying operation by Ship "11".
Chief, Naval Staff is in complete agreement with the plans
reported by Group West. The date of the battleship operation
is to be advanced as much as possible by pressing for the
restoration of the destroyers1 war readiness, if necessary also
of the LODY and STEINBRINK, and by all-out operations by the
minesweeper flotillas left. The return of the formations
handed over to Group Baltic to the North Sea cannot be expected
for the present. The request for PT boats is acknowledged
but no decision can be taken until the situation in the
Skagerrak permits.
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19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
2. With regard to the possibility that the British
are using aerial mines with magnetic firing, Chief, Naval
Staff has ordered speeding up of provision with degaussing
equipment and manufacture of magnetic minesweeping gear.
3, It was originally decided that the battleships1
dockyard period should begin on 1 May and run concurrently
for both ships*
With the war situation at the time, this decision was based
on the view that a simultaneous dockyard period was practical
because operations with only one battleship unfavorably
increased the margin of the ratio of strength to the enemy
even in a tactical relation, and - provided both heavy cruisers
were in war readiness - the battleships' elimination for three
months in the summer, when the Air Force has decisive opportunities
of action, was quite justifiable.
(«
There was then no strategic compulsion for battleship operations.
Since then the situation has been altered fundamentally by the
Norway operation and the losses incurred as well as by the
enemy* s strong reaction.
Protection of the territory gained against the enemy pressing
in by sea requires the use of any forces available.
The BLUECHER's breakdown also makes impossible a replacement
of the battleships during their dockyard period by two heavy
cruisers.
It does not therefore seem feasible to give up at present tne
possibility of operations by the most powerful vessels of our
Fleet through the commencement of their dockyard period, and
also to immobilize them in the dockyards shortly before the
beginning of an expected intensification of warfare (air war) .
A dockyard period for one ship at a time or an overlapping
dockyard period can also not be proposed, since under present
conditions in the North Sea and adjacent portions of northern
waters, one single battleship can hardly be effective, while
the two battleships together, thanks to their qualities and the
possibility of tactical cooperation, can be conceded considerable
prospects of success.
At Naval Staff's suggestion, Chief, Naval Staff has therefore
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19' April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
decided that the commencement of both ships' dockyard period
is to be postponed indefinitely for the present and made
dependent on further developments in the situation in the North
Sea - northern waters area.
1200;
Report from the Naval Attache* in Rome (Captain Loewisch) to
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on Italy's present attitude:
Events which have lately exerted marked influence
on Italy's attitude, are:
1. Ribbentrop's visit to Rome.
2. Brenner meeting between the Fuehrer and the Duce.
3. Norway action.
The effect of these factors on Italy's attitude should not be
overestimated. Their main result lies in the increase of
mutual trust, lessening of the Italian inferiority complex,
open and more pronounced exposition of common policy and
peace aims. Speeding-up of active Italian policy.
i
In the Attache's opinion, Italy's present more positive
attitude does not permit us to conclude that Italy will enter
the war on our side within a short time. Great reluctance is
still discernible on Italy's part, especially with regard to
possible participation in an offensive against the west.
Graziani's. attitude is very cautious (statements that it will
still be 1-2 years before Italy is equipped ready for a war.
Sommigli's attitude the same).
The Fuehrer apparently made a concrete proposal for Italy's
participation in a possible western offensive at the Brenner
meeting. The Duce himself is 100 per cent pro-German, but
is greatly influenced by the attitude of the Italian Naval
Staff and General Staff. The Duce ' s answer to the German
Ambassador was, it is true, basically positive, but in practice
dilatory and hesitant.
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19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The Naval Attache believes that at best Italy will enter
the war actively when the Western Powers are so hampered
that there is no longer any danger for Italy. The Attache'
considers Imminent intervention by Italy out of the question.
In spite of this, great preparations are being made for war. -
New Defense Council created, naval mobilization complete,
different necessities rationed, Red Cross measures. Numerous
wishes are constantly being submitted to Germany regarding
help with heavy guns, anti-aircraft guns, etc.
General attitude to Germany:
The Duce and his adherents are in favor of support for Germany^
dissolution of all dependence on Great Britain, seizure of the
most favorable moment to enter the war; they see the fulfillment
of vital Italian Interests only on Germany's side.
According to a statement by Prince von Hessen, the King and
Crown Prince are now said to support Mussolini's attitude
strongly and to be convinced of the necessity for cooperation
with Germany.
Press: follows this attitude very strongly since the Brenner
meeting and emphasizes Axis policy.
The people are constantly being Influenced towards Germany
by propaganda in spite of British counter-propaganda. Far-
reaching conclusions should not be drawn from this. No
enthusiasm for war.
General Staff: has constant objections; forsees many
difficulties. Threat to Lybia is considered very sericus.
The loss of Lybia would mean a severe setback. Its defense C
is by no means adequate.
Naval Staff: very cautious. Cavagnari is apparently seriously
ill, his successor, Sommigli, follows Mussolini's lead but is
very skeptical. Commencement of Italian operations would mean
no great gain for German naval warfare, apart from the diversionary
effect of the Italian FleeTT
In the Attache's opinion there Is no question of the 12C
Italian submarines being thrown into the scales on Germany1 s
side. Clear definition of mutual spheres of interest end
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19 April 1940
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operations is always mentioned.
The Attache' ascribes the very objective and officially very
cautious manner of the Italians to the Naval Attache^ to
unsatisfactory reports from Peccori, the Italian Naval Attache*
in Berlin, Peccori is apparently embittered, unsympathetic
and without the necessary interest in his post. He is probably
reporting unfavorably on the German Navy and has no idea of the
effect of his reports on the attitude of his Naval Staff and
its general disposition towards Germany.
In spite of the Naval Attache1 s report, Naval Staff considers
it quite possible that when a favorable time to strike comes,
Mussolini will enter the war on Germany's side much earlier
than his General Staff or Naval Staff consider desirable. Not
in the form of participation in a general large-scale offensive
in the west, but in the shape of a partial war to create a
favorable basis for the attainment of later Italian goals in
the Mediterranean. Naval Staff sees a sign that Italy does
not intend to wait another one or two years before taking action
in the strength of the present mobilization, which she can on
no account keep up without results for any length of time.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic:
The battleship RESOLUTION left Portsmouth at noon on 11 April
and arrived in the Clyde on the afternoon of 12 April.
Intelligence Center, Spain confirms that the ARK ROYAL sailed
from Gibraltar during the night of 16 April, course unknown.
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At 1400 on 19 April the ORION was 360 miles west of the
Canary Islands on her way to Gibraltar.
Intelligence Station, Vienna reports:
2 British destroyers south of Salonica. At present
2 destroyers and 3 auxiliary vessels stationed in
Corfu to control traffic in the Adriatic Sea,
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Narvik-Tromsoe area ;
1 heavy ship and 3 destroyers are reported off Narvik, in
Ofotf jord. Lively boat traffic to Bogen Fjord is observed.
North of Tromsoe, at about 70° N, 19° 20' E, 1 aircraft
carrier and 2 battleships were spotted by air reconnaissance on
18 April.
Area north of Trondheim:
1 cruiser, several destroyers, 5 transports attacked by the
Air Force in Folda Fjord. U "34" reports 2 battleships, 3
transports and light cruisers off Folda Fjord on southerly
zig-zag course. The vessels reported may be a French formation,
since French vessels were ordered to assemble northwest of
Folda Fjord in the evening.
(Apparently to proceed to the Shetlands.)
About noon U "46" sighted a battleship and later a troopship W
with destroyer escort (southwesterly course, zig-zagging)
about 100 miles northwest of Trondheim.
South of Trondheim:
One heavy cruiser with destroyers was detected west of Molde Fjord.
Light cruisers near Andalsnes. Two destroyers at anchor and
some merchant steamers in Andalsnes harbor. No landings by
troops or unloadings identified.
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The enemy situation is amplified by various submarine reports
(U "51", "14"). According to these, there were two cruisers,
apparently the GALATEA and ARETHUSA, 80 miles northwest of
Aalesund at about 1500 (proceeding to Rosyth). U "14" reported
two light cruisers at noon 30 miles northwest of Stadlandet on
westerly course.
Today1 s enemy situation confirms the impression previously
gained: enemy operations, using battleships, are concentrated
north of Trondheim, i.e. in the Narvik area and in Namsen
Fjord. Lively traffic with light forces In Molde Fjord and
near Andalsnes. Troop disembarkations here, south of Trondheim,
do not , however, seem to be on a large scale so far.
According to an agent's reports the Franco-Polish expeditionary
army is said to be 15,000-20,000 strong and to have started
out for Norway during the last few days from Cherbourg and
other Channel ports via Scotland.
Own Situation
The Fuehrer has ordered:
Place.s on the coast, except for points occupied
by us J which are occupied by the British or are
reported as occupied by British announcements,
are to be destroyed regardless of the civilian
population. The order Applies first to Namsos
and Andalsnes. The railroads and roads are also
to be cut effectively here.
Narvik:
Night of 18 April passed quietly. No enemy destroyers in
the fjord. Group Narvik again urgently requests minelaying
near Stroeroen in Rombaken Fjord and in the entrance to Beis
Fjord.
The Group wishes hereby to prevent enemy forces penetrating
into the inner fjords, to render shelling of the ore railroad
more difficult and to increase the safety of the transport
planes1 landing place and of communications with the Individual
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19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
defense units. Closing of the narrows between Rombaken and
Rombaken Bodden by means of block- ships is indicated as
impracticable. Proposal for closing by mines is submitted.
Group West considers minelaying by submarines or planes
impossible at present.
In the afternoon a landing and lively boat traffic from a
heavy ship snd three destroyers near Bogen, northwest of
Narvik, were observed from Narvik.
According to an American reporter who arrived in Luba from
Bjoernf jell, it seems that the British and Canadians have
landed with ski troops and artillery north of Harstad in a
fjord with relatively good shore communications (Salangen?)
and are planning to attack Nstrvik from the landward side.
Because of the detailed verbal report made by Lt.Cdr. Gerlach,
2nd Staff Officer of Commander, Destroyers, Commander in Chief,
Navy has sent the following telegram to the Commander of the
Narvik destroyer formation, Captain Bey:
"2nd Staff Officer1 s report about the destroyer
actions at Narvik has given me the greatest satisfaction.
The destroyers* deeds are worthy to rank in our history.
I am proud of my destroyers, which have fulfilled my
expectations to the full, and I express my greatest
appreciation to the Commanders and crews. I know
that you will continue to do your dutv.
Commander in Chief."
Trondheim:
Commander, Trondheim requests despatch of motor pinnace gear
and mine sweeping gear for fishing smacks and also hydrophones
and depth charges. Equipment with these, is specially urgent
in view of the danger from submarines and mines in the entrances.
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Three stern tubes and one anti-aircraft gun C/30 each have
been dismantled from the destroyers JACOBI and RIEDEL.
Parts of the crews are allocated to guns ashore, communications
posts and patrol boats, minesweeping and barrage vessels.
Group West and Fleet have been instructed to provide as soon as
possible for the destroyers' return trip in favorable weather
after readiness to proceed has been established as far as
possible. Weapons dismantled are to be left behind.
Bergen;
The 1st PT Boat Flotilla with one company of Army troops has
arrived in Bergen from Stavanger. A combined operation witl
the Army against a light Norwegian battery in Hardanger Fjord
is planned for 20 April.
The setting up of torpedo batteries is now planned and
reconnoitered in Sogne and Hardanger Fjords.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has given permission for small
shipping to use the fjords and skerries again.
Stavanger, Krlstlansand and Oslo:
Nothing special to report.
Coastal batteries at present ready for action in Norway:
Oslo:
Rauoe
Horten
Droebak
Kaholm
4.x 15 cm.
2 x 7.5 cm.
3 x 15 cm.
1 x 28 cm.
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19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Krlstlansand:
2 x 21 cm.
6 x 15 cm.
2 x 10.5 cm.
St avenger;
Trondheim;
Bettinges: 2 x 21 cm.
3 x 15 cm.
Heysnes: 2 x 21 cm.
2 x 15 cm.
Situation in the Skagerrak/Kattegat and Transport
Situation;
Minelaying near Skagen (anti-submarine barrage) was continued
as planned by the PREUSSEN minelaying group.
Enemy submarine situation; shows a certain relaxation.
At three places submarines were sighted and attacked with depth
charges without visible success.
The mine situation is not yet adequately cleared up.
Our own anti-submarine barrage near Skagen shows some mines
on the surface. A fishing smack struck a mine yesterday
east of Skagen and is sinking.
Minesweeping and clearing off Korsoer and on the Kallundborg-
Samsoe route without result.
Troop transports had to be canceled because of bad weather.
Transports with material and empty steamers returning proceeded
as planned. Sixty large drifters have now been seized for
transports of material.
Because of discoveries made in our own submarine war against
merchant shipping and experiences gained to date, the attention
of Group Baltic and the offices responsible for carrying out
transports and their defense has been drawn to the following
points;
Line abreast, zig-zag courses frequently up to
40°. Troops on deck in area of special danger.
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<:
• 19 April 1940
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Life jackets on. All life saving apparatus
ready. Change routes in the open sea. Do not
stop the whole convoy if there is a torpedo hit.
Air Situation:
See ,&ir Force events of the day".
Operations were severely hampered by the weather.
During attacks on enemy forces in Folda Fjord a cruiser
received a 500 kg. hit on the starboard deck, level with the
after mast. Dense smoke. Two transports were damaged in
Namsen Fjord and Nord Fjord.
Air Force formations for operations in Norway and Denmark
are stationed as follows on 19 April: (see radiogram file,
0800).
Trondheim:
Stavanger:
2 squadrons of the 506th Coastal Patrol
Group.
1st Coastal Reconnaissance Squadron of the
106th Group, 1 reconnaissance squadron of
the Air Force, 1 dive-bomber squadron,
1 heavy fighter group.
Kristiansand: 1 fighter group.
Aalborg:
Westerland:
Luebeck:
Lueneburg :
1 heavy fighter group, 1 long-range
squadron, 1 bomber squadron of the 30th
Bomber Wing, 2 bomber groups of the
26th Bomber Wing.
1 bomber squadron of the 30th Bomber
Wing, 1 long-range reconnaissance
squadron (Commander in Chief, Air Force).
1 reconnaissance squadron.
1 bomber group of the 4th Bomber Wing,
1 bomber group of the 100th Bomber Wing.
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19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Submarine Situation
Again numerous reports of misses and failures. U "51"
fired a double miss at the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON, U "47" two
torpedoes which did not detonate at the WARsPITE, U "65" an
unsuccessful spread of three at the cruiser EMERALD, center
shot a premature. An unforeseen series of failures.
The continual failure of the torpedoes resulting from
catastrophic technical deficiencies must be regarded as a
calamity. The British would never have succeeded in landing
troops in the north and central Norwegian area, with all our
submarines which were in readiness sent out round them, if the
submarine torpedo arm had had at its disposal a torpedo ready
and operating perfectly. We cannot in the near future expect
the rare occasion to repeat itself when radio intelligence
is in a position to detect the enemy1 s movements promptly and
it is possible to exploit the knowledge thus gained by sending
out such a large number of submarines. The numerous sighting
reports of heavy and light enemy naval forces and transports
and the many firing reports show the extraordinarily favorable
prospects of success which the German submarines continually
miss by the complete failure of their torpedoes. The severity
of this represents an operational failure of historical significance
in German naval warfare at a time which is of decisive importance
for the successful execution of the Norway action and possibly
for the entire future course of the war.
The fundamental deficiencies in our torpedoes are known and
every endeavor is being made to overcome them. The result of
this work will not, however, unfortunately take effect for some
time. New reasons for failures, which must be feared on the
basis of recent experience, are at present the subject of
thorough and speedy Investigation.
For U "48"' s brief report see War Diary, Part B, IV.
Merchant Shipping
Baltic Merchant Shipping;
Group Baltic to the Ministry of Transportation:
"Now no objection to German steamers north of the
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19 April 1940
line Kullen-Aarhus Bay returning home, if Swedish
territorial waters are used with the aid of Swedish
pilots. Submarine attacks are to be expected even
in Swedish territorial waters. No protection or
escort can be furnished."
Preventing neutral shipping making off;
Group West has sent Admiral, West Norwegian Coast the following
directive:
"Prevent any attempt by neutral shipping to leave
the German sphere westwards* Only traffic to
German ports and Danish coastal traffic permitted in
the* North Sea, Seize Norwegian ships, use them
if occasion arises. U.S., Russian, Japanese, Italian,
Spanish, Dutch and Belgian ships remain unconstrained.
Permission for neutral steamers to sail to Danish North
Sea ports and all Baltic ports not to be given until
escort detachments can be provided as far as port of
destination or as far as east of the Skagerrak
declared area."
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The Birthday of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces
Commander in Chief, Navy Issued the following order of
the day:
"Men of the Navy, today on the birthday of our
Fuehrer and Supreme Commander we renew the oath
of unconditional loyalty and obedience we swore
to him.
True to this oath we will pursue the fight
forced upon us with unshakable courage, firm
resolve and unbounded will to win and add new
successes to those unexampled ones gained by
the Navy in combat against overwhelming odds.
With unshakable confidence we look to the man
who is leading our people upwards to new
greatness. We follow on the way he shows us
in the proud consciousness that the goal set
will be attained and final victory be ours.
So let it be. Long live the Fuehrer I
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway:
An address by the King of Norway contains the
following passage:
"The Administrative Council appointed In Oslo
for the German-occupied territories is an
emergency measure and is not a substitute for
the Norwegian Government. It therefore does not
represent the will of the people and has no legal
basis according to Norwegian law. It goes without
saying that the Council must relinquish its authority
in areas where the Royal Norwegian Government
regains its power."
In conclusion he stated:
nBy our united efforts we shall win back
our Fatherland and make the Norwegian people
masters of their own country again."
2. Sweden:
The German Military Attache reports:
"The best Swedish troops, highly trained and
familiar with the terrain, have been in the
Swedish ore region near Klruna for eight months.
An attack against Klruna via Norway would
present great difficulty. - Almost unoccupied,
roadless terrain with high mountains. No road
beside the ore railroad. Ore railroad track can
easily be destroyed at the many bridges, etc.
Ore region^ air defense adequate against
restricted air attacks. Sweden will fir6 upon
violation of her neutrality, primarily against
Great Britain as far as the officers are concerned,
if necessary also - though reluctantly - against
Germany. "
Netherlands:
Prime Minister de Ger Stated in a speech:
"The Government refuses any help from a third party,
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
whether In actual fact or promised. This
also applies to our possessions overseas.
The Government has decided to extend the state
of siege to the whole country."
4. Italy;
The Turkish Embassy reports from Rome:
"Count Ciano is said to have stated that Corfu
Is no longer of any great importance for the
defense of the Adriatic after Italy1 s occupation
of Albania. There Is therefore no point in
Italy1 s seeking adventure by an action to occupy
Corfu."
5. Jugoslavia:
The Jugoslavian Foreign Minister to the Embassy
in Berlin:
"The British Minister for Economic Warfare has
stated in London that Great Britain does not desire
a war in the southeast. The opinion in Great
Britain is that Germany desires this just as little."
The German Embassy reports that Jugoslavia Is resolved to
normalize hitherto non-existent relations with Russia by
stages, and first by the conclusion of a trade pact.
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Chief, Naval Staff has decided regarding the various
requests for allocation of the Norwegian naval vessels
commissioned as follows:
a) It is necessary to reinforce Group Westfs
coastal forces, since a large number of
experienced units were handed over to Group
Baltic and since coastal waters have been
extended.
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20- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
b) The OLAV TRYGVASON at Group West's disposal.
To be transferred in agreement with Group
Baltic.
c) The BALDER, ODIN and GYLLER at Group West's
disposal after commissioning.
d) Submarines at the disposal of Commanding
Admiral, Submarines.
e) Armed coastal vessels at the disposal
of Commanding Admiral, Norway.
f ) Other vessels in the area of the south
coast of Norway not at disposal of Group
Baltic until relieved by harbor defense
flotillas.
g) Other vessels in the area of Admiral, ?/est
Norwegian Coast at Commanding Admiral, Norway's
disposal.
h) High Command, Navy (Naval Staff, Service
Division, Organization Branch) will arrange
commissioning at the earliest possible date.
2. The Fuehrer has ordered immediate investigation of
quick, large-scale troop transports to Stavanger and Trondheim,
Transports planned on fast passenger and freight ships.
Under consideration: POTSDAM, GNEISENAU, HANS A, BREMEN,
EUROPA.
Naval Staff's attitude to the operational aspect of the
transport is as follows:
I. Crossing to Stavanger:
Transports can expect great danger from submarines
and mines and from the air.
a) Danger from submarines will exist throughout
the entire crossing, which it will be practical
to commence from a North Sea port; it will
have to be met by anti-submarine escort
consisting of destroyers and torpedoboats, and
also close escort by planes. The risk of a
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
torpedo hit cannot, however, be completely
excluded because of the close disposition
of enemy submarines in the area to be
traversed, especially off Stavanger (Skudesnes
Fjord).
b) Danger from mines can be partly obviated by
previous exikloratory sweeping of the outward
route. Under certain circumstances it will
be possible for a fast flotilla to go ahead
with minesweeping gear, but this will depend
on the number of light forces available as a
whole.
c) Threat from the air: Exclusion of this is the
Air Force's affair. It is, however, to be
borne in mind that according to wartime
experience so far, British bombers have carried
out their offensive assignments with dash and
skill in the very weather that is unsuitable for
fighters. Danger to the ships from dive-bombers
while unloading in Stavanger deserves special
consideration.
Accepting the considerable risks under a) - c),
the assignment seems possible. Transport will best
be carried out so that the last part of the outward
trip (after about* 58° N) and putting in to port
and unloading will take place in darkness.
Protection by the battleships is necessary. Departure
as quickly as possible after unloading.
II. Crossing to Trondheim:
The long sea route (800 miles) cand the passage
through the Shetlands Channel, controlled by the
enemy, offer no prospect of a successful break-
through to Trondheim. German naval forces are
not in a position to force the break-through to
Trondheim against the much superior enemy. The
success of the break-through to Trondheim and
Narvik on 7/8 April was largely due to surprise,
which can now no longer be counted upon since the
area is strongly patrolled by the enemy.
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Such an operation would mean the certain loss of
the transports and possibly of all the escorting
fleet. However, after the loss of these powerful
vessels, defense of the Skagerrak and Kattegat and
of the decisively important sea communications to
Oslo will also no longer be possible.
Naval Staff therefore sees no possibility of
sending troops to Trondheim by sea.
3. Report by Chief, Torpedo Branch and Professor Cornelius
on the torpedo problem, the speedy solution *of which is regarded
by Chief, Naval Staff as "the Navy's most urgent problem.
Investigation into the causes of failure has been ordered and
a committee of investigation including a representative of
Commanding Admiral, Submarines has commenced work. The previous
impression was that magnetic firing failures were partly caused
by the very inconstant magnetic conditions in the fjords and
along the Norwegian coast. The known fact that the G 7e has
a greater undersetting than assumed is not actually regarded as
the cause of failure but a final verdict is not yet possible.
(According to Professor Cornelius1 statement, experiences
regarding the G 7e!s depth-keeping are based on only 14
experimental shots at the Torpedo Experimental StationT*
Undersetting of the target can be regarded as the chief cause
or percussion firing failures. An increased number or
experiments is being made at present. Long periods of ice greatly
prejudiced experiments and systematic research before and made
practical trial shots impossible.
Chief, Naval Staff again pointed out the decisive urgency of
a solution of the torpedo problem and described the complete
failure of the torpedo as a catastrophe for German naval
operations in this decisively important part of the war.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic:
Great Britain;
The aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL is proceeding to the Clyde.
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
France :
The minelaylng cruiser EMILE BERTIN is likewise proceeding
to the Clyde, possibly as the result of damage sustained in
air attacks.
North Sea/Northern Waters
Narvik area;
In the afternoon there were light enemy forces off Narvik,
including the cruiser PENELOPE which bombarded the harbor
and railroad station.
North of Trondheim; (
Two convoys with strong escort were detected from reports of
submarines proceeding out of the Lofoten area towards the
Shetlands. One convoy, escorted by a battleship and destroyers,
was moving approximately 60 miles northwest of the Lofotens in
the forenoon on northeasterly course (repoi ted by U "65" and
"38"); the other convoy was detected by U "47H about 120 miles
northwest of Krlstiansand, consisting of 10 steamers and numerous
destroyers. One battleship and further destroyers are in the
vicinity. U "47" is shadowing. The convoy is proceeding
on course 60°.
A number of light forces and transports was reported by the
Air Force and U "26w in the Namsos area. Further light forces
and transports were sighted by the Air Force near Andalsnes and
west of Aalesund. In the afternoon there were light enemy
forces off Narvik, including the cruiser PENELOPE which bombarded f
the harbor and railroad station.
The Air Force's successes in the Namsos area were set out in
radiograms from the Commander there, who described the situation
at 1830 as "desperate" and requested help urgently. Namsos in
flames. Forces were being continuously bombed by planes from
1100. Escort vessels seem to be very short of anti-aircraft
ammunition. Heavy commitment of "C" class anti-aircraft
cruisers during landings. The cruiser CARLISLE seems to have
been off Andalsnes.
Home area;
The battle cruiser RENOWN probably put in to Rosyth early on
20 April.
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The cruiser YORK is in Scapa. The cruisers GLASGOW and
SHEFFIEID sailed from Scapa in the afternoon. The cruiser
CURLEW put in there.
The submarines SUNFISH and URSULA put in to their bases,
Rosyth and Harwich.
Losses:
An unidentified vessel SKID struck a mine near Sunk lightship.
Eow torn off, vessel sank during attempt to tow her off.
British steamers HAWNBY (5,380 tons) and KERSEY (1,037 tons)
sank off the southeast coast of England.
Own Situation
Narvik:
At noon enemy forces, including the cruiser PENELOPE,
penetrated into the Rombaken area and fired on the railroad
station. The forces departed again about 1500.
Rombaken ferry, important for communication with Army units
near Elvegardsmoen, and the ore railroad bridge near Forsneset
were destroyed by the bombardment. It may be possible to .
repair the bridge.
Troop landing in Bo gen Fjord to reinforce Norwegians is suspected.
Group Narvik has seized 8,000 rifles, 300 light machine-guns,
15 heavy machine-guns, 800,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun
ammunition and 50,000 rounds of heavy machine-gun ammunition
from Norwegian stocks, so that the arming of the destroyer crews
with hand weapons is assured for the time being.
Trondhelm:
Army troops received reinforcements by air. Port Commander
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
reports 7,000 kg. of lubricating oil available for submarines.
Air Commander, Trondheim reports that on 19 April 1 light
and 1 heavy cruiser as well as 2 transports were damaged by
dive-bombers from Trondheim.
Bergen;
Unsuccessful bombing attack on the BREMSE in the morning.
She is proceeding to Stavanger with four PT boats to take on
troops.
The Army carried out operation "Uskadel1*. Ship n18n (Lieut
(j»g.) Feldt), supporting the Army, brought in the Norwegian
minelayer TYR as a prize after action with her and shore
batteries. (1885, 260 tons, 10 knots, 1 x 12 cm, 1* x 7.6 cm,
2 x 3.7 cm guns).
Minesweeper M Mlw operating on transfer of troops from Stavanger
to Bergen.
North Sea;
With regard to the extension northward of the naval theater of
operations and the necessity for improving the operational
conditions of naval air forces, Group West requests the transfer
of one long-range squadron each to Stavanger and Bergen. It
regards ensuring of supplies and reinforcements and maintenance
of tactical subordination to Group West as necessary conditions
for this.
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20- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
During the night of 20 April;
Of the 9th Air Division the 3rd Squadron of the 506th Group
and the 1st Squadron of the 106th Group carried out aerial
minelaylng operations In the Downs, in the Ramsgate-North
Foreland area and Kings Channel. 26 LMB's dropped. Light
anti-aircraft defense. Barrage balloons. (3 near Dover,
8 in Kings Channel in Irregular formation at a height of 300-
400 m.).
Skagerrak/Kattegat :
Submarine alarm reports near Skagen, in the southern entrance
to Oslo Fjord and at the northern entrance to the Little Belt.
In the evening minesweeper M w7n reported the probable destruction
of a submarine northeast of Skagen.
The mine situation is not yet cleared up. In the morning the
first enemy mines were detected east of Aalbaeck Bay; one mine
cut. A British mine with a brass caa was shot up east of
Frederlkshavn. The area is declared t.o be suspected of mines.
In the evening the Nyborg-Korsoer ferry, which was escorted
by a mine-exploding vessel ahead, was damaged by an explosion
and caught firej apparently an enemy mine. Possibility of
sabotage. »
In the morning the WESER struck a mine north of Frederlcia and
was beached. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic suspects a
wrongly placed mine of our own in the deep mine barrage there.
Naval Staff inclines to the assumption that it was an enemy
aerial mine.
Since the first British mine has now been discovered, Group
Baltic considers further postponement of the equipment of all
auxiliary ships and boats with efficient bow protection gear
to be insupportable, since otherwise execution of transport
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
assignments is endangered. Further, equipment with bow
protection gear of all steamers used on transport duties as
well as tugs is requested* The Group's request is to be
granted in full and speedy equipment as allowed by the
facilities available will be started.
Transport Situation;
Fast troop transports carrying 2,500 men arrived in Larvik in
the afternoon. (Steamers ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG escorted
by torpedo-boats, PT boats and motor minesweepers). Further
troops and material transported on steamers and drifters
arrived in Oslo or are on the way. Close air escort with
the transport groups and anti-submarine patrol day and night
by naval air squadrons of Commander, Naval Air, Baltic.
Two torpedo boats have been temporarily put at Group West's
disposal as escorts for minelayers.
Situation in Denmark:
Group Baltic reports:
1. Danish Navy agrees in principle to its own naval
vessels taking over minesweeplng duties in waters
important to Danish economic traffic.
2. The Danish Navy will at once begin overhaul of the
Great Belt barrage. Relations with the Danish Navy
are developing satisfactorily with a very favorable
tendency. Chief, Naval Staff is anxious to spare
as far as possible the national pride of the Danish
Navy whose Commander in Chief has always shown the
greatest loyalty to the German Navy's desires and
demands, and to persuade the Danes themselves to
cooperate in protecting and defending their own waters.
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Air Situation:
In accordance with the directive issued to it, the 5th Air
Force concentrated on 20 April on attacking troop disembarkations
near Namsos and Andalsnes. By the Fuehrers order, the towns
and railraod termini of Namsos and Andalsnes were to be
destroyed without regard to the civilian population and rail-
roads and roads effectively cut. Armed reconnaissance therefore
also concentrated in the area Molde-Namsos Fjord. Attacks were
made everywhere under the worst weather conditions. (Cloud
only 200 m. high in the fjords). Considerable fires and hits
in Namsos. 1,000 kg. hit on a cruiser off Andalsnes (heavy
smoke), 2 x 500 kg. hits on a 15,000 ton transport, causing
fire to break out. (For particulars see Air Force Events of
£ the Day.)
Submarine Situation
Successes:
U "9" reports sinking a former Polish destroyer of the
THUNDERBOLT class northeast of the Shet lands.
Disposition:
U "30", "34", "50" have been assigned positions northwest of
of the Shetlands. U "25", "65", "38" were sent out against
the convoy reported by U "47" •
U "52"' s position is between the Shetlands and the Hebrides.
U "57" and "59" may move their operational area by 70 miles to
the northeast at their own discretion, since they were detected
at their former positions by enemy radio direction finding.
Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have been given
orders that supplies for Trondheim have top priority and
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CONFIDENTIAL
transport submarines are therefore only to be used for supply
assignments*
The previous order has been canceled and Commanding Admiral,
Submarines himself entrusted with the loading of the submarines
provided for transport. Order of priority is?
1* Aviation gasoline.
3. 8*8 cm. anti-aircraft guns with accessories
and ammunition.
3. Ammunition for the Army if space still
available.
With regard to fresh torpedo failures (U "47", w65ff),
which can be ascribed to* failure of the magnetic firing.
Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that, in spite of
these results, even after advice from the Torpedo Inspectorate,
he cannot go over to percussion firing. According to the
latest experimental results the 0 7e definitely keeps a
depth up to 2*7 m. under that set, so that even with a
torpedo depth-setting of only 2 m. (in good weather), normally,
however, 3 m., targets of less than 5 or 6 m. can no longer
be torpedoed. Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore states
(see radiogram file, 0530; that the Navy has no torpedo for
use in the area north of the Shetlands.
Merohant Shipping
In reply to a query, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast was informed
that there is no objection to Swedish and Danish ships sailing
from Norwegian ports to German waters, if steps have been
taken to prevent these ships making off westwards. Swedish
ships are to be prevented from sailing to the U.S.A. on various
pretexts.
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20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
For summary of instructions to date on the treatment of
German, neutral and Norwegian ships in the Baltic, see radiogram
file of 20 April, 1540,
*
Group Baltic gave orders as follows on 20 April for merchant
shipping in the Kattegat :
The northern limit for traffic Aarhus Bay-Sletteshage«
Hesseloe-Kullen must be maintained for military
reasons. Traffic in Swedish waters, north of this
line, with Swedish pilots is, however, permitted*
Danish cattle and food transports may proceed from
and to the east coast of Jutland. Passages are to
take place close to the Danish coast at their own
risk.
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21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway:
According to announcements by the King of Norway, there is
no doubt that the whole of Norway is at war with Germany.
Administrative Council in Oslo without influence. The
Fuehrer has now therefore assigned General von Falkenhorst,
Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway executive power.
The latter will pass on to the base Commanders all powers
in their area which are suitable and necessary to force the
speediest subjection and pacification of the country.
France:
Reynaud spoke on France's foreign policy in southeast Europe
before the Foreign Committee of the Senate. The aim of the
policy was to maintain peace in the Balkans in loyal cooperation
with Turkey. Italy had unfortunately not concurred with
France's earlier proposals; France was trying to come to an
agreement in the Mediterranean with Italy and Spain.
The Fuehrer awarded the Knight's Cross to Chief of Staff,
Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Schniewind and to Commanding Admiral,
Submarines, Rear Admiral Doenitz.
1200:
Report from the Naval Attache in Oslo, Lieut. Cdr. Schrelber
to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:
The Attache', now on the Staff of Commanding Admiral,
Norway, gives a review of developments in Oslo
from 8-11 April and of the present situation* (For
?eriod from 8-11 April see Naval Attaches report
n reference file w We se rue bung" .)
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21- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The Attache^ Is still of the opinion that almost
unopposed occupation would have been possible
given surprise. The stiffening of readiness
to resist caused by the end of the Finnish conflict
was correctly diagnozed beforehand. However, it
was possible to keep the extensive agreements
reached between the Norwegian and British Governments
a secret from the Attache'. The Attache' states that
he was surprised by the undoubtedly great bravery
and fighting readiness of the Norwegian soldiers,
which he had not expected. (A proof that the Attaches,
since they of course only come into contact with
certain circles of the people, can only receive a
partial impression.) The Attache7 is convinced that
no revelation of the German operation actually took
place up to the day before "Weserday". Norway's
defensive readiness, even after the British violation
of neutrality by minelaying, was still slight. The
torpedoing of the steamers of the 1st Sea Transport
Unit on 8 April, with the subsequent coming ashore
of shipwrecked soldiers, was alone decisive for further
developments. This alone made the Norwegian Government
conscious of the presence of acute danger and led to
the fateful order for defense and firing on the
evening of 8 April.
The very slow penetration of meager German troop units
to Oslo, which was delayed by fog (airborne troops),
the resistance of coastal batteries and the loss of
the BLUECHER, gave the Government time to escape and
resulted in complete confusion amongst the population
and authorities.
The Attache* considers the present political situation
in Norway to be entirely confused. He has had violent
disagreements with the Army and the Commanding General,
General von Falkenhorst, on the subject of the treatment
of the civilian population. The Armed Forces Command
wishes to proceed as rigorously as possible and to carry
out very severe measures such as taking hostages, in
order to counter attempts at sabotage. The Attache*
considers such draconic treatment to be incorrect from
his knowledge of the mentality of the Norwegians as
an old Germanic race. Commanding Admiral, Norway is
also of the opinion that reprisals against hostages
will not prevent acts of sabotage, but must lead to a
general passive resistance and hereby injury to our
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21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
German interests. The Attache has so far carried
his point but fears, following General von Falkenhorst* s
assumption of executive power, the severest measures
which he considers unsuitable for the treatment of
the Norwegians •
In his opinion Norway will only be pacified if the
Fuehrer directs that the "we come as friends to
protect Norway" attitude and not the "Poland Scheme"
is adopted.
The Attache* considers Quisling to be a prominent
Norwegian national, inspired with good will; he
would have been in an excellent position to take
over the reins of Government if events had turned
out favorably* His plan was to make it clear to
the people immediately after the German troops moved
in that the Germans came as friends, that the British
had had plans to occupy the country and that the old
Government had failed. As events have now turned
out, Quisling could score no successes against the King,
against the Norwegian army and against tne German
Armed Forces, which from the beginning put difficulties
in his way.
The Attache warns against too severe and rigorous
action in Norway against the population of the occupied
areas, since a general national rising would lead to
incalculable difficulties for the German pacification.
His proposal therefore runs: Clear order to occupying
troops to act as peacefully, kindly and mildly as
possible in the occupied areas, in the combat zone
on the contrary to proceed as vigorously and ruthlessly
as possible.
Survey of the Situation
Special Report 8 on the Enemy
Atlantic:
Disposition of forces: the destroyer BULIDOG, escort destroyer
of the carrier GLORIOUS, and another destroyer arrived in
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31 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Devonport at 1300 on 19 April. According to this the
aircraft carrier GLORIOUS has arrived in the home area.
Various alarm reports about the movements of Allied warships
and transports in the eastern Mediterranean in the direction
of the Dardanelles are considered untrustworthy rumors.
North Sea/lNiorthern Waters
A Area around Narvik;
Air reconnaissance sighted cruisers and transports off Harstad,
1 battleship, 5 destroyers in And Fjord, 1 cruiser, several
destroyers off Narvik (see Own Situation).
Namsos/Mosjoen;
No clear picture of the situation on land in the Namsos area.
According to Swedish reports, the strength of the troops landed
near Namsos amounts to 2 British and 1 French division. On
the other hand, Reuter gives the total strength of the expedi-
tionary troops landed in the whole of Norway as 2 British and
1 French Division, with 50/000 men. The troops landed in the
Namsos area are said to be in communication with Norwegian
troops near Steinkjaer. Namsos harbor, bombed yesterday by
the Air Force, is burnt out. Destroyers and merchant steamers
were detected in the fjord. The trawler INDIAN STAR was
A despatched to Mosjoen by Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron, in
order to Investigate conditions with the landing troops regarding
supplies and communications with Namsos.
Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron seems to be aboard the
destroyer NUBIAN.
Anti-submarine units are proceeding to Namsos and into the
Lofoten area,
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21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
U "47" and "65" shadowed the convoy reported yesterday, which
was last sighted about 120 miles northwest of Mosjoen on north-
easterly course, speed 7 knots and is apparently steering for
West Fjord or the Lofotens. Another convoy on southerly course
was reported by U "30" at noon 40 miles north of the Shetlands.
Molde Fjord-Andalsnes area:
2 cruisers, 2 destroyers and several merchant steamers in
Romsdals Fjord. The railroad line Andalsnes-Dombas has been
cut by the Air Force.
Scapa area:
Radio intelligence showed that the cruisers DEVONSHIRE and
BERWICK, also the French cruiser EMILE BERTIN, put in to Scapa.
The cruiser BIRMINGHAM put in to Scapa on the morning of 20 April.
Southeast coast:
A British minesweeper reports discovery of mines near the South
Brake Buoy. This lies between the Goodwin Sands and the coast
in the Downs (aerial mines?).
According to radio intelligence, eight enemy submarines are at
present operating in thr Skagerrak/Kattegat, two of which are to
commence return passage to Harwich on the afternoon of 21 April.
Five more boats west of the Skagerrak as far as Marsten.
Positions north of Norderney and north of Texel were again
occupied.
Own Situation
Situation in the Atlantic:
Atlantic Ships "16" and "36" are being kept constantly informed
about the situation and news of foreign merchant shipping. Enemy
papers seized In Norway about the management of the convoy service,
routing, points of departure, etc., make it possible to equip
the ships with excellent data for the conduct of war against
merchant shipping.
Narvik:
Commander, Armed Forces has assumed executive power. Local
authorities have submitted under pressure.
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21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
British crulssro end destroyers bombarded the town and
destroyed the ore railroad bridge near Forsneset by gunfire.
Lively boat traffic from warships and trawlers to Bogen Fjord
indicates further enemy landings on the north bank of Ofot
Fjord.
Group Narvik requests air reconnaissance and air support.
Four anti-tank guns with crews and ammunition are requested*
The evacuation of wounded via Sweden is requested.
Attempt to evacuate survivors from ships and neutrals via
Sweden has so far failed, since Sweden refuses to permit trains
to enter Norwegian territory again.
Negotiations on this have been commenced via the Foreign Office.
Group West has informed Group Narvik that minelaying by
submarines is scheduled in about ten days.
Trondhelm:
As opposed to Commander, Armed Forces, who considers Trondhelm1 s
land situation assured, the Port Commander considers the situation
difficult becau.se of the disembarkation of British troops in
Namsos Fjord and Andalsnes. (According to prisoner of war
statement, one British battalion is now in Steinkjaer). Sea
and fjord reconnaissance still inadequate owing to lack of
facilities; the Port Commander therefore requests allocation
of two submarines.
Blocking of the Important Steinkjaer Channel north of Trondhelm
by a combined Army/Navy operation has commenced.
Bergen:
Commander, Armed Forces has assumed executive power. Authorities
are willing to cooperate.
-215-
CONFIDENTIAL .
21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The BREMSE ran aground in the Parmsund on a transport
assignment and is stuck fast. Troops on board were landed in
Haugesund by PT boats.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests that minesweeper M wln
may be left for special assignments (protection against mines,
supplies for troops, bringing in merchantmen). He also reports
that to an increasing degree the tasks arising can no longer
be fulfilled without motor minesweepers. The PT boats are
at present indispensable because of constant defense and
transport assignments, also pilot duties.
The allocation of two minesweepers is requested for the operation
against Voss, for which it is necessary to give up the Army
battalion in Hardanger Fjord. This allocation is not possible,
however. On the other hand minesweeper M "1" is left with
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast until further notice.
Elimination of Boemen airfield is demanded, since enemy planes
are suspected to be attacking from there.
Stavanger-Krlstlanaand;
Nothing to report.
Oslo;
No defense possible in Oslo Fjord because of the lack of units.
The Norwegian submarines A "3W and M4M were detected in
Melsonvik at 10 m. depth by a diver. It may be possible to
salvage them.
In a letter to Commander in Chief, Navy dated 19 April,
Commanding Admiral, Norway reports on the present situation in
Norway and especially in Oslo and reports his plans. In
addition to looking after the Oslo area and all coastal defenses
along the Norwegian coast, the Admiral also feels himself
responsible for seaward defenses, insofar as they concern the
skerries and fjord area.
Here he considers artillery defense ashore, patrol, reporting
service and defense by suitable naval forces, as well as mine
defense, an inseparable whole and summarizes his renewed request
for:
1. Clear definition of spheres of responsibility.
2. Leaving Norwegians naval vessels In general for
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•
21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Norwegian coastal waters. Single ones to be
given up only when requirements are met along
the Norwegian coast. (For letter see reference
file "Weseruebung" • )
Naval Staff's attitude to the question of definition of spheres
of responsibility and allocation of units is as follows:
1« The area east of the Skagerrak declared area is a
complete operational area in itself, in which only
one office can control and command.
2. This area is closely connected with the adjoining
entrances to the Baltic to the south, in which
Group Baltic is responsible. Responsibility for
the whole area and operations by units in this
area for the various assignments which arise here
is therefore entirely that of Group Baltic.
3. There will probably always be a certain concentration
of enemy submarine operations off the south coast
of Norway. The danger is directed against the
stream of traffic constantly putting in and out of
the ports, that is, not against stationary coastal
defense installations but against flowing traffic at
sea, which therefore also requires not only stationary
but constant escorting defense.
4. On account of its importance Oslo Fjord will always
remain a dangerous area for supply traffic. It
therefore seems advisable to institute permanent
local defense here. Similarly to the way in which
harbor defense flotillas exist at other places,
everything is to be done here too - and at other
spots along the Norwegian coast - to institute an
effective, purely local patrol and defense under
the command of the Port Commander in question.
Seagoing units will on no account be considered for
these duties.
5. The abundance of the assignments and the relatively
small number of units demand their use by one office
in order to guarantee equal strain and the greatest
economy.
This does not exclude a temporary allocation for
certain vital assignments. But this must also be
-217-
CONFIDENTIAL -
21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
done by one office, i.e. Group Baltic.
Naval Staff's decision on the subject of definition of the
areas of defense and responsibility therefore runs:
1. Group Baltic is responsible for the entire
sea area east of the Skagerraf declared area,
concentrating on anti-submarine measures.
2. Defense of ports on the south coast of Norway
and of the inner Oslo Fjord north of Horten is
the task of the Port Commanders and is therefore
in Commanding Admiral, Norway's sphere as soon
as harbor defense units are available.
The open sea area of the outer Oslo Fjord belongs
to the sphere of Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic and therefore of Group Baltic.
3. Since there are at present no harbor defense
flotillas in operational readiness for southern
Norway and there is only a relatively small number
of units available for the many tasks in the
Baltic area, forces will still be allocated by
Group Baltic for the present, taking into considerat
vital tasks. Efforts are to be made to make
available efficient harbor defense flotillas from
the Baltic to Commanding Admiral, Norway as soon
as possible or provision by Commanding Admiral,
Norway of Norwegian vessels for these tasks.
4. Group Baltic will take into consideration as far
as possible Commanding Admiral, Norway's request
for the allocation of units. Group Baltic and
Commanding Admiral, Norway will arrange the time
when Port Commanders take over harbor defense
assignments for the individual ports.
—218—
CONFIDENTIAL
21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Situation In the North Sea:
Because of a still unexplained explosion astern of the steamer
FRANZ OHLROGGE, a mine warning report has been given for the
Elbe between peacetime position Elbe I and buoy 17.
It is possible that the enemy is using aerial mines in the
Elbe, Investigations by mine-exploding vessels and a harbor
defense flotilla are in progress,
Skagerrak/Kattegat :
Submarine alarm reports north of Kullen and south of Samsoe.
According to the Radio Monitoring Service, eight enemy submarines
are operating in the Skagerrak/Kattegat at present. Anti-
submarine patrol and air escort &s planned.
Mine Situation:
The steamer TOGO was drmaged by striking a mine off Frederikshavn.
100 per cent searching sweep of the suspicious area is being
continued.
Mines of the deep mine barrage at the northern entrance to
the Little Belt were again swept.
The location of the WESER's accident was investigated. No
discoveries.
The Danish steamer ANNE sent "S.O.S. Ship must be abandoned",
in the Skagerrak.
Naval Staff's instructions to Group West to confirm the
effectiveness of the Skagerrak mine barrage by a deceptive
radio message have thus been carried out. The S.O.S. was
picked up and repeated by British transmitters.
Transport Situation:
Transports of personnel and material proceed as planned.
-219-
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21 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Submarine Situation
Commanding Admiral, Submarines has issued the following
instructions for firing torpedoes with percussion firing:
With percussion firing depth = draught-1 m., against
destroyers, submarines and steamers under 4,000
tons 3m., in good weather 2 <m.
Depth-setting 2 m. not permitted for G 7a.
Set depth at 5 m. for battleships.
Distribution of submarines
North of Trondheim:
Northwest of Mosjoen:
Bergen and area off Bergen:
East of the Shetlands:
West of the Shetlands:
North of the Hebrides:
West of the Orkneys:
East of the Orkneys:
Pentland Firth:
Return passage:
Proceeding to Trondheim:
Missing:
In home waters:
TJ
U
TJ
U
u
u
u
TJ
U
U
U
u
u
•25"
'38"
'61"
'23"
'34"
'52"
•30"
•59"
•13"
'46"
»62"
»43"
'29"
'49"
'10"
T4",
'7",
"47", "65".
"24", "17", "14". •
"57", "58".
"51", "9", "60",
"19", "56", "26",
"50", "1".
"28", "32", "37",
"2", "3", "5", "6",
"18", "20", "21", "42".
Air Situation
Concentration on supporting Army operations and on reconnaissance
and combat tasks in the Aalesund-Andalsnes-Namsos area. For
particulars see "Air Force Events of the Day" (radiogram 2400
and "Air Situation").
-220-
CONFIDENTIAL
21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Merchant Shipping
The steamer AFRIKA sailed from Bergen to Stavanger without
escort on 16 April, contrary to orders; she has been overdue
since then*
•
•
-221-
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22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway:
For General Falkenhorst T s appeal for an amnesty, on the
occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday, for Norwegians who have
incurred a death sentence according to martial law see
Foreign Press Report.
Sweden;
The King of Sweden has sent a letter to the Fuehrer expressing
his desire for absolute neutrality. During his conferences in
Berlin Admiral Tamm gained the impression that German authorities
thought Sweden would not defend her neutrality with all possible
means. The King stresses in his letter that Sweden will do
everything to defend her neutrality by armed force.
(For appreciation of the situation in Sweden, see Political
Review. )
Italy:
On National Labor Day the Duce made a short? speech to the
workers from the Palazzo Venecia. He said:
"Today's celebrations have an especially solemn character as
a result of events. It can be summarized by the words:
♦Work and Weapons'
I am certain that this is the watchword of the entire Italian
nation from the Alps to the shores of Africa."
Russia:
It is revealed from a reliable source:
1. The Baltic States will be swallowed up by Russia
in the summer, in August at the latest;
2. The internal political effect of the Finnish
war has, by means of skillful propaganda by him,
led to a great strengthening of Stalin's position
inside Russia;
3. The Russian Army is at present divided into
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CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
three main groups:
a) in the Baltic States
b) in front of Bessarabia
c) around Murmansk (as a front against
surprise attacks from the Norwegian theater).
d) substantial reinforcements have not gone to
the Caucasus*
4. Russia does not wish to quarrel with Great Britain
and Prance. (Courier service through Russia
permitted' after cessation of other communications.)
A severe blow has been struck to Great Britain'
intelligence service from the whole Baltic area
by the Norway operation.
»
Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff
Special Items
1. For Quisling's memorandum on the development of the
situation in Norway see reference file "Weseruebung".
2. The Fuehrer ordered on 21 April that, with regard to
the tense situation in Trondheim, the destroyers PAUL JACOEI
and THEODOR RIEDEL should remain in Trondheim temporarily to
strengthen the naval front.
Naval Staff has complied with this special wish of the Fuehrer
since the present enemy situation and state of readiness of
the destroyers make a return offer little prospect of success
at the present time. It is, however, fundamentally of the
opinion that the destroyers are most unsuited to the task
intended for them by Armed Forces High Command and that they
run the risk in Trondheim of being hemmed in or falling victim
to dive-bombing from the enemy aircraft carriers.
It therefore adheres to its plan to propose to the Fuehrer
the return of the destroyers when the enemy situation is more
favorable.
-223-
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
3. The various, still unexplained mine explosions and
hits on mines in the Kattegat and on the Elbe now most probably
indicate the first use of aerial mines by the British. It
cannot yet be stated whether these are ground mines or moored
mines and whether they were parachuted or laid from planes
landing on the water. Speedy salvage of such a mine is of
decisive importance in combatting them.
4. Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark and Group Baltic
consider the present time politically most unsuitable for a
possible taking-over of the Danish Fleet by Germany, which was
being considered for carrying out defense assignments. Among
Danish officers and in other circles of the Danish population
there are those who regret the King of Denmark's decision for
a peaceful solution, with reference to the Norwegian Army's
defensive action. It is to be feared that a demand for the
handing-over of the Danish Navy to Germany, which would strongly
affect Danish honor, would greatly disturb pacification in
Denmark. It is therefore proposed that such a measure be
abandoned for the present.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the proposal. Taking-over of
Danish naval vessels by Germany is to be entirely avoided if
possible and instead the Danish Navy is to be requested to
carry out defense and protective measures with its own personnel
5. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff judges tin
situation in Trondheim to be very strained in view of the
extensive landings by the Western Powers in the Namsos area
and in Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes. Army troops and supplies are
constantly being brought up by means of transport planes, but
this cannot be done by air ifco the necessary extent, especially
with heavy arms and guns. The Fuehrer therefore plans to
bring up stronger forces by sea and has ordered that the fast
steamers EUROPA and BREMEN and the East Asia steamers GNEISENAU
and POTSDAM be made ready to sail at once. Naval Staff is to
submit to immediate investigation the operational practicabilit
of such a single supply operation to Trondheim.
For survey of the situation see reference file "Weseruebung".
The following conclusion is arrived at:
1. The operation would lead through an area which
the enemy dominates with much superior forces
and which is exposed to very severe danger from
the air.
•y24-
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
2. Escort of the transport formation by the
battleships and all available destroyers and
torpedo boats would be necessary.
3. The length of the route would make unobserved
advance impossible and allow the enemy plenty
of time to concentrate such superior forces that
even before they reached their goal there would
be nothing left for the vessels of the German
Fleet but to fight to the last. The operation
would therefore mean, for the second time, an
all-out operation by the entire Fleet still in
war readiness, with very slight prospects of
successfully carrying out the transport operation,
4. The large transports would be very greatly
exposed to danger from the air. Enemy bombing
and dive-bombing attacks would endanger the
ships, troops on board and material most severely
even after the ships put in to Trondheim.
>
5. The loss of the transports and the battleships in
action against a superior enemy would mean the
most severe loss of prestige and thus a definite
setback in the whole Norway action. After the
loss of the battleships there would be very serious
danger to the safety of sea communications in the
Skagerrak because of the weakness of German forces.
Naval Staff is therefore forced to advise Armed
Rorces High Command, Operations Staff decidedly
against the execution of such a transport under-
taking?
1500:
Commander in Chief, Navy in conference with the Fuehrer.
pommander in Chief, Navy submitted Naval Staff* s objections
to the Trondheim transport operation and proposed that in
case of necessity the crossing could be made to Stavanger
with the GNEISENAU and POTSDAM.
-225-
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April* 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The Fuehrer agreed with Naval Staff's objections and ordered
the preparation of the East Asia steamers. If possible,
transport as far as Bergen is to be undertaken.
Further points discussed with the Fuehrer:
Submarine transports
Transport of coastal batteries to Stavanger
Transports for Oslo
Use of naval forces for defense assignments
Use of aerial mines by enemy planes
Postponement of use of Danish naval vessels
for the German Navy
Report on failure of submarine torpedoes.
Commander in Chief, Navy also pointed out the urgent operational
need for the use of aerial mines in Scapa and the Clyde by the
operational Air Force. The Fuehrer stated that Commander in
Chief, Air Force considers the formations not yet sufficiently
trained to lay mines in Scapa.
Naval Staff cannot acknowledge this Air Force argument. The 9th
Air Division has already carried out aerial minelaying operations
and proved their practicability. It is now of decisive
importance, regarding the British operations in Norway, if ground
mines are laid in the main supply port, Scapa, and the main
port of embarkation, Glasgow on the Clyde, so that the greatest
difficulties are thus put in the way of the British. Naval
Staff considers the request extremely urgent.
(For particulars see Commander in Chief, Navy's memorandum
of conference with the Fuehrer, War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.)
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Nothing special to report.
North Sea/Northern Waters;
1 battleship, 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers were detected in the
-226-
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
And Fjord/Harstad area. Off Narvik the cruisers PENELOPE,
ENTERPRISE and four destroyers bombarded Narvik1 s harbor and
defense installations.
In the Namsoa area;
Several enemy destroyers were attacked by the Air Force. The
transport CHOBRY, which disembarked troops in Namsos, put in to
the Clyde on 21 April.
Namsos harbor h*as been burnt out as the result of air attacks.
Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes ;
Lively traffic consisting of Eritish transports and naval
forces indicates that enemy action is at present concentrated
here. Five transports put in to Molde Fjord and two cruisers
were sighted putting out. The cruiser ARETHUSA and several
destroyers off Andalsnes. Destroyers and steamers were reported
putting in and out of Romsdals Fjord.
Home area;
Air reconnaissance reported three battleships and five cruisers
in a bay on the west side of the Shetlands, also numerous large
merchantmen in Kirkwall Bay. Scapa was not covered because
of clouds. In the evening U "57" reported a large cruiser and
destroyers on northeasterly course east of the Shetlands.
The battleship RESOLUTION and a second battleship are operating
on convc*y duties between the Shetlands and Lofotens.
During the last few days there has been no indication of the
presence of heavy French vessels in the northern area.
-227-
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation:
Atlantic:
Auxiliary cruisers were informed about the movements of
enemy forces and merchant shipping. (See radiograms
1501, 1514.)
North Sea area:
Sailing and action readiness of the battleships has been re-
established except for a slight restriction of fire control on
the GNEISENAU and for maximum continuous speed of 28.5 knots in
the case of the SCHARNHORST. The urgently desired activity
by the battleships through operations in the Shetlands-
Stadtlandet area must for the present be abandoned on account
of the deeply regrettable state of readiness of the destroyers
(at present only two in full operational readiness) and with
regard to the final decision of Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff, still awaited, on the transport operation
to Bergen.
With reference to the extension northwards of the theater of
naval operations, Group West requests the transfer of the
806th Coast Patrol Group (He 111) to more favorably situated
operational bases. -Westerland is suggested, if necessary
at least as a jump-off base for formations of Commander, Naval
Air, West.
The question is being reviewed by the Air F,orce General
attached to Commander in Chief, Navy.
The Elbe is again opened by Group West after an unsuccessful
check sweep for mines.
Twelve planes of the 3rd Squadron of the 506th Group and twelve
further planes of the 1st and 2nd Groups of the 126th Bomber
Wing carried out aerial minelaying operations in the area off
Harwich and in the Downs. The planes were spotted and reported
by enemy patrol vessels and minesweepers when dropping the mines.
—228—
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
(Mines are said to have been laid in the vicinity of Goodwin
Knoll Buoy.)
Because of the aerial minelaying operation carried out in the
Downs on 21 April, a directive was issued to all British air
forces that all planes, whether with navigation lights on or
off, would be attacked by night fighters if they approached the
coast under 4,000 feet altitude within a 40 mile radius around
Northumberland.
Narvik;
Tromsoe transmitter advised the civilian population to leave the
town as a British bombardment was imminent. At 1200 Group
Narvik reported bombardment of railroad lines and defense
installations by an ENTERPRISE class cruiser and a PENELOPE
<»lass cruiser and four destroyers. Further destroyers are
obviously covering troop disembarkations in Bogen Fjord.
Major General Dletl reports that Narvik will be held at all
costs.. At night British destroyers are patrolling in the
immediate vicinity of Narvik and in Rombaken Fjord.
Trondhelm:
Army operation against Steinkjaer and Verdalsoeren, supported
by one destroyer and one torpedo boat.
Bergen;
Unit advanced as far as Vaksdal in Soer Fjord with the support
of Ship "18". Ship "18" destroyed a Norwegian patrol vessel.
The BREMSE was refloated and is to go into dock in Stavanger.
At the request of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast, the 1st PT Boat
Flotilla has been put at his disposal to help the Army operation
against Voss. Group West must therefore relinquish operational
control of the PT boats for this period.
-229-
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22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
For defense of the sea route between Skudesnes and Kristiansand,
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast proposes a flanking barrage
outside the 3 mile line from Utsire as far as the enemy barrage
system off Lister Fjord. Since there are at present no mines
with long mooring ropes available for laying the requested
flanking barrages, with which Naval Staff is in fundamental
agreement, they must be postponed for the present.
Stavanger;
Unsuccessful air raids on the evening of 21 April ended in
two enemy bombers being shot down*
The steamers PALIME and PELIKAN have put in to Stavanger with
the first two 15 cm. guns for the coastal battery.
South coast of Norway;
Commanding Admiral, Norway considers that the situation on the
south coast. is now so far clarified that Norwegian naval vessels
need no longer be expected in this area. Defense therefore
now only necessary by patrol units.
Commanding Admiral/ Norway now has at his disposal for defense
of the inner Oslo Fiord the 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla,
consisting of 8 boats, whale catchers RAU M7" and n8n , 2
Norwegian whale boats and the Norwegian boats of the 9th
Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which are constantly being added and
cannot be used outside the fjords.
Group Baltic thus takes over defense of Oslo Fjord only from
59° 25 f N, southwards. Defense, fcpwever, only as allfbwed by
available forces, i.e. mostly only in the course of protection
for transports to Oslo. Further, Group Baltic Is equipping 10
motor drifters each for Oslo and Kristiansand as emergency
harbor defense boats, with depth charges and minesweeping gear.
Arming with captured Norwegian guns is planned (see radiograms
1356 and 2315).
-230-
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940 ^CONFIDENTIAL
Skagerrak/Kattegat :
According to radio intelligence there were five enemy submarines
in the Skagerrak area on the morning of 22 April. Two
submarines left Harwich for the Skagerrak in the forenoon.
Some of them are French.
Various submarine chases and depth charging had no visible
result.
The western portion of the net barrage has been laid from the
coast of Jutland near Ebeltoft via the island of Hjelm to
Seelands Rev.
Mine Situation;
Minesweeping near Hirsholm and off Frederikshavn continues.
Five brass-cap mines swept. Check sweeping of the Skagerrak
barrage and sweeping in Sprogoe Channel and the Little Belt is
in progress.
Transport Situation:
Fast troop transport unit with 530 men put in to Larvik. t Further
troops and material on nine steamers in three groups are on their
way to Oslo as planned.
Armed Forces High Command has ordered the immediate transfer
of the 11th Rifle Brigade from Aalborg to Oslo. Five steamers
have been nastily sent rrom Oslo to Aalborg for this purpose.
Situation In Sweden I
The Swedish Government has taken the following new legal steps
for the purpose of ensuring defense of the country.
It is forbidden to put in to ports and enter port areas
at all important places on the east and west coast of Sweden
until permission has been obtained from the shipping control
offices In Stockholm and Gothenburg.
—231—
CONFIDENTIAL
22 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Submarine Situation
U "51" put In to port. TJ rt52", "38", "47" commenceo; return
passage. U "26" sank a 6,000 ton supply steamer from a
convoy north of Stadlandet.
U "61" sailed for the Shetlands after taking on supplies In
Bergen.
U "62" reports a suspected mined area 100 miles east of Fair
Passage.
Otherwise nothing special to report.
Air Situation
The operational Air Force concentrated on supporting the Army
in operations on land and in the adjoining sea area of Andalsnes-
Namsos (see Air Force Events of the Day, Volume Air Situation).
Successes against naval forces;
1 destroyer hit by 1 x 250 kg. bomb north of Andalsnes;
severely damaged.
1 destroyer hit by 2 x 250 kg. bombs west of Molde Fjord;
stern cut off, unable to move;
2 steamers (supply?)
2 steamers
Sunk.
Severely damaged.
Merchant Shipping
The Naval Attache in Stockholm reports that there is not a
sufficient number of pilots available at present for Swedish
territorial waters on the west coast. Sweden therefore asks
us to send only groups of three or four ships at present.
Provision of a sufficient number of pilots is again requested.
-232-
CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway;
Pacification is making progress in southern Norway. Results
of radio and leaflet propaganda discernible. Normal life and
activities in Oslo. So far no acts of sabotage in the Oslo
municipal area.
A Norwegian White Paper published in London makes the
following statements:
1. The German Government undertook no demarche with
regard to the Norwegian Government before the
first units of the expeditionary corps had already
arrived in Norwegian waters and were in action
against Norwegian forces.
2. The German Ambassador in» Norway, who knew before
8 April that a German expedition had left German
ports, did not try to justify the German action
as a counte measure against the British minelaying.
3. The Norwegian Government tried to negotiate as long
as possible. The Fuehrer, however, refused to
conduct further negotiations with Norway and demanded
the appointment of Quisling as Prime Minister; a
demand that he himself had to relinquish later.
This shows that Germany is incapable of making the
slightest concessions even to a country which has
always yielded to a great extent to her wishes.
Russia;
1. A reliable source states that as the result of skillful
propaganda the Finnish war has led to a strengthening of Stalin's
internal political position.
2. The Russian Armor's main forces are, in the Baltic States,
around Murmansk and at the Bessarabian frontier. No substantial
reinforcements have gone to the Caucasus.
Ireland;
The Embassy in Dublin reports that strong representations by
the Irish Government have succeeded in freeing the Irish
citizens living in Great Britain from conscription. About
25,000 Irishmen are exempted from conscription by this important
step.
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CONFIDBNTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Near East:
Weygand's efforts to reinforce the Orient Army and to attain
greater freedom of action are said to have been frustrated
finally by Gamelin's resistance. Considerable differences
of opinion are mentioned between Great Britain and Prance
regarding the supreme command of the Orient Army and its.
operations. Weygand's demand for supreme command of all
Allied forces has been nullified by a British counter-move,
as General Wave 11 has been appointed Supreme Commander of all
British forces in the East.
Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff
Special Items
Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has relinquished its
demand for a transport operation to Trondheim because of Naval
Staff's rejection. Instead, transport to Bergen is to be
reviewed.
Naval Staff considers the operation practicable, even though
with certain misgivings. Crossing should be carried out so
that at dawn the transports are off Skudesnes, where strong
anti-submarine escort and precautionary anti-submarine measures
will await the transports.
At a speed of advance of 20 knots in the open sea, the ships would
then have to leave the estuaries about 0600 on the day before
and cross the latitude of Hanstholm (57° N) at about 2100.
Defense:
From the Heligoland Bight to Skudesnes close escort by the Fleet,
strong anti-submarine escort, own bow protection gear, own
anti-aircraft weapons, air escort by Air Force fighter and heavy
fighter formations.
Picked up by PT boats from Skudesnes; the Fleet forces will
be out to sea and will protect the transports advancing in the
skerries against penetration by enemy surface forces and partly
also against surprise attacks by enemy bombers from the west.
—234-
CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
It Is necessary for the operation that very strong air escort
of the transports by fighter and heavy fighter formations be
provided until the troops and material have been disembarked
in Bergen.
Group West has very strong objections to the despatch of the
POTSDAM and GNEISENAU because of the great danger from the air,
and proposes that the troops should be given fast transport on
destroyers and torpedo boats (possible to take over about 1,200
men at one time).
The question is being re-considered by Naval Staff.
Since the whole transfer, following the Group1 s proposal, would
however be protracted and danger from mines and from the air
would remain about the same, Naval Staff considers that the
Group's executive plan offers no material advantages but, on
the contrary, considerable disadvantages. (See also 24 April.)
>
1200:
Report by the Assistant Naval Attache at the Hague, Lt. Cdr.
Besthorn, to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:
The Dutch Government Is firmly resolved to defend
its neutrality against both sides with all the means
in its power. While earlier only an Operation
"East" was expected, Operation "West" Is now also
regarded as very threatening. Extensive security
measures taken in Holland on 9 April. All men on
leave recalled. Pear of British lending. Great
alarm on 13/14 April because of alleged British
Fleet demonstration off the Dutch coast. Assumed
in Holland that If Germany attacks Holland the U.S.A.
will enter the war on the side of the Allies.
Opinion on the Norway action is that the German landing
was only possible as a result of the treachery of
Norwegian offices.
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CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic:
Great Britain;
The HOOD probably off the west coast of Great Britain. Radio
intelligence detected transports sailing from and putting in to
the Clyde with convoy escort.
Barrages in the Clyde have been extended to the North Channel
off the Clyde and Kilbrennan Sound. The area was announced
to be a declared area. Passing ships are individually
informed of the gaps in the barrage.
In the Gibraltar area there is a strong concentration of forces
previously operating in the Atlantic: the ROYAL SOVEREIGN,
previously in Canada, appeared in that area. The MALAYA
proceeded from Great Britain to Gibraltar on 21 April. The
ORION, coming from the West Indies, put in to Gibraltar on 22
April, the NEPTUNE and the destroyers DECOY and DEFENDER, coming
from Freetown, on 2'6 April. The two destroyers DIAMOND and
DAINTY, so far also in Freetown, escorted the repair ship
RESOURCE to Gibraltar and put in to Malta on 21 April.
The submarines OTUS and ORPHEUS, coming from the East, passed
Port Said on 20 April; the British transport LANCASHIRE (9,557
tons) with 700 troops aboard, the French transport DESIRAD
(9,645 tons) with 1,500 colored troops aboard passed Port Said
towards the Mediterranean on 20 April.
The CORNWALL, formerly in the South Africa area, is at present g
in the Freetown area. The CUMBERLAND, also formerly in South
Africa, has probably been moved there too. Quite possible
that these two ships will go on to Great Britain.
France:
A number of the forces previously stationed off the west coast
of Africa has been withdrawn during the past two weeks. Even
if details cannot be ascertained, it can be assumed that only
single destroyers, submarines, and perhaps one or two cruisers
are still stationed in Dakar and Casablanca. The cruiser
JEANNE D'ARC and several -submarines are still suspected to be
in Fort de France.
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CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic (Ships "16" and "36")
were informed by radiogram of intelligence on the enemy
situation.
North Sea/Northern Waters
Area around Narvik;
Cruisers and destroyers in Ofot and Rombaken Fjords bombarded
ore railroad installations. The cruiser VINDICTIVE appears
to be controlling net laying in the Lofoten area.
Namsos area;
The anti-aircraft cruiser CALCUTTA and another cruiser off
Namsos. Nothing new regarding troop disembarkations.
Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes ;
The cruiser ARETHUSA left Andalsnes to proceed to Rosyth.
The cruiser CURACAO is off Andalsnes as anti-aircraft defense.
Air reconnaissance spotted and attacked destroyers and supply
steamers at the entrance to Molde Fjord. Njo Important landings
could be seen.
Several destroyers and single steamers, some putting in and
some out, were sighted in the fjords between Sogne Fjord and
Kristiansund.
Home area;
Air reconnaissance by the operational Air Force sighted 2
aircraft carriers, cruisers and 15 destroyers in Scapa Flow
on 22 April. U "65" reports a battle 6ruiser with destroyer
escort 200 miles north-northeast of the Shetlands on southerly
course.
The cruiser BIRMINGHAM put in to Scapa. According to subsequent
radio evaluation, the GLASGOW and SHEFFIELD left Scapa on 20
April.
Lively minesweeping activity, primarily against magnetic mines*
in the Downs is to be seen from radio traffic. The magnetic
sweeps are said to extend specially to the channel between the
Humber lightship and Spurn Point •
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CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The British steamer LOLWORTH (1.970 tons) and the Italian
steamer ITALO BALBO (5,100 tons) struck mines off the
southeast coast.
Own Situation
Atlantic:
Disposition of enemy forces was passed on to the auxiliary-
cruisers. Tendency at present to move heavy enemy forces to
the North Sea, certain concentration in the Gibraltar area,
weakening of Atlantic forces.
North Sea/Northern Waters
Situation in the North Sea:
Group West requests the allocation of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla,
because of the complete lacl# of vessels suitable for escorting
supply steamers on the Heligoland' Bight-Stavanger-Bergen route.
Group Baltic has great cl jections to handing over the flotilla,
thus completely depriving Kristiansand of naval forces and
removing any sort of defense for the entrance to the Skagerrak,
since Group Baltic has no available substitute.
In spite of this Naval Staff feels obliged to put the 2nd
PT Boat Flotilla at Group Westfs disposal, having regard to
the new North Sea assignments (Bergen transports, defense
assignments off the southwest coast of Norway, battleship sorties).
The TSINGTAU is, however, to remain in Kristiansand, which will
still be the main base of the PT Boat Flotilla until further
notice.
Group West is to allocate assignments to the Flotilla so that if
necessary it is still possible to use it for defense of the
entrance to the Skagerrak.
-238-
CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Narvik;
Close enemy destroyer patrol off the port and in Rombaken.
Cruisers and destroyers bombarded the ore railroad installations
from Rombaken in the forenoon. The Group is constantly
requesting air support, since there are no defensive weapons
available against naval forces. Commander, Armed Forces
expects a large-scale enemy attack soon. Ore railroad was
effectively cut by the enemy. (See radiogram 1803.)
Trondhelm;
Because of the lack of communications between Bergen and
Trondhelm, Commanding Admiral, Norway has for the present
assumed direct authority over Port Commander, Trondhelm.
Supply submarine U "29" has put in to Trondhelm.
Commanding Admiral, Norway was informed by Naval Staff that
the return of both Trondhelm destroyers is planned after the
establishment of maximum possible readiness to proceed. Further
armament is therfore not to be removed. A favorable opportunity
for the return passage must be awaited.
Bergen:
Nothing special to report. Land operations against Voss were
continued successfully. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests
the allocation of armed trawlers, especially since Ship "18"
urgently requires a 14 day overhaul after operations off Voss.
Skagerrak/Kattegat ;
Naval Staff has issued the following directive regarding
definition of the areas of responsibility of Groups Baltic and
West:
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CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
1. The line dividing Group Baltic and Group West
Is the eastern limit of the Skagerrak declared
area,
2* Petrol of the southern barrage gap Is the affair
of Group West.
Patrol of the northern passage is the affsir of
Group Baltic.
3. Limit of responsibility for coastal defense is
the point of Intersection of the eastern limit
of the declared area with the coastlines.
According to this, Hanstholm is under Coastal
Defense Commander, North Priesland.
4. Military and administrative subordination as
per military line of demarcation as under 3.
5. Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark will handle
general economic questions for the whole Danish
area.
Enemy submarines are appearing in greater strength in the
Skagerrak and Kattegat. Submarine alarm reports south of
Oslo Fjord, north of Skagen, north of Kullen, near Schultz
Grund. Submarine-chaser "B" was torpedoed and destroyed
north of Skagen. Torpedoboat T "153" and the 17th Submarine-
Chaser Flotilla report probable destruction of three enemy
submarines in all (two to be assumed as definite).
Mine Situation:
According to a Danish report, the dredger PROGRESS struck a
mine and sank in the Drogden in the morning. At 1817 mine-
sweeper M "1302" was lost off Frederikshavn after striking
a mine.
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CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The 17th Submarine- Chaser Flotilla reports that at 2040
on 23 April it sighted three planes at a great distance
dropping large parachutes, apparently mines, about 1 mile
east of the Storamiddel Grund southeast of Anholt.
The flight of numerous enemy planes is reported via Schleswig
Holstein into the Western Baltic as far as Warnemuende.
Check sweeping of the ferry route Nyborg-Korsoer with special
gear was without result.
Transport Situation and Escort Services
Transport assignments carried out as planned. Fast transport
of 420 men has arrived in Larvik* Mixed material and troop
transports arrived in Oslo.
Since no trawlers and drifters can be seized in the area of the
south coast of Norway, Group Baltic requests the speedy seizure
of 39-40 trawlers and the same number of drifters and quick
transfer to the Baltic. Group Baltic also requests the quickest
possible provision of guns for those units of Commanding Admiral,
Defenses, Baltic not yet equipped with them. (See teletype
1348.)
Naval Staff must refuse the Group's request for the allocation
of the 4th and 6th Minesweeper Flotillas from the North Sea
because of urgent assignments in that area.
Sweden;
For Swedish demarche because Swedish territory has in numerous
cases been flown over, see radiogram file, 1815.
For reports about defense measures in Swedish ports and
airports see radiogram 2330.
■241-
CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 COITFIDENTIAL
Submarine Situation
U "29" put in to Trondheim and was ordered to take up position
in the area north of the Shetlands after refuelling. U "61"
was allocated the North Minch and the area off Loch Ewe as
operational area.
U "30" was allocated the area due north of the Minch and
northwest of the Hebrides, U "34" northwest of the Orkneys,
U "65" west of the Shetlands and U "25" north of the Shetlands.
U "13" is west of Pentland Firth.
Otherwise unchanged.
Air Situation
Numerous Air Force operations to reconno5ter and combat the
enemy landings. pne destroyer off Molde Fjord damaged by
bombs, also several t,ranspo-,tst The operational Air Force
concentrated on supDOPti^rj 3 my oper&.tions.
For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day of 23 April,
Merchant Shipping;
A rough estimate of the Scandinavian shipping which fell into
the hands of the Western Powers because of the Norway and
Denmark action shows, after subtraction of the shipping space
already chartered by the Western* Powers, an addition of about
2.4 million GRT, so that tonnage lost to date is thereby
compensated. (Marginal note by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:
estimated somewhat too high. Some were anyway always sailing
for Great Brit? in.)
According to a report from the Naval Attache' in Lisbon, the
Norwegians have painted over the neutrality markings on their
ships, also the national markings, names and country of origin,
■242-
CONFIDENTIAL
23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
so that they are no longer recognizable as Norwegian ships.
The Soviet Government has given permission for German
trawlers to put in to Murmansk and instructed the competent
authorities in Murmansk' to this effect*
It appears from a report from Santander that a Finnish steamer
which put in there was equipped with a cable device against magnetic
mines. It must therefore now be assumed that neutral steamers
are also already provided with "anti-magnetic girdles".
-243-
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
No rway :
Nothing to report.
Sweden:
The German Ambassador reports that Foreign Minister Guenther
has made a very serious prbtest against violations of neutrality
by German planes. (40-50 flights on 21 April alone.) He
asked whether the German attitude to Swedish neutrality had
altered; the Swedish public was greatly disturbed by the
German violations *f neutrality.
The Military Attache reports that the Swedish Government has
expressly repudiated the German Naval Staff's assertions that
Swedish territorial waters have repeatedly been utilized by
Norwegian or British naval forces.
The Swedish Government denies rumors according to which the
Swedish authorities have permitted German reinforcements for
Norway passage through Sweden. It is of course correct that
35 railroad wagons passed through Sweden, but these transported
GexTnan Red Cross personnel and equipment and were thoroughly
searched by the Swedish authorities.
France ;
The Supreme War Council met in Paris on 2<2 and 23 April. A
general communique* included the statement:
"There was a general exchange of. opinions on all
political and military problems. New decisions
were taken for effective Allied cooperation. The
Polish Prime Minister emphasized the resolution with
which the Polish Government, Army and people would
continue the struggle. Thanks for and admiration
of the Norwegian Government's heroic resistance were
expressed. The Norwegian Ambassador thanked the
Allies for their swift and effective aid."
It is reported from Paris that the French General Staff Is
very disturbed by the extent of military operations in Norway.
Russian intervention is feared. The Allies might be forced to
use larger forces. Serious differences of opinion are said
to have arisen between the French and British General Staffs on
the Norwegian question.
-244-
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Russia r
For Russia's attitude to Germany and Russian foreign policy-
see Political Review No. 94.
Conference on the Situation with Chief. Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Report on the Fuehrer's directive of 21 April
(uKW/WFA 106/40 Gkdos. dated 21 April, see "We se rue bung w file).
In it the Fuehrer expresses his unbounded appreciation to the
troops in Norway and sets the goals for the next operations.
The most important assignments of Group 21 are establishment of
communications between Trondheim and Oslo, sealing-oiif the
enemy forces landed on the northwest coast and defense of
Trondheim to the north.
2. Report on Armed Forces High Command's directive
(WFA/Abt L 868/40 Gkdos. dated 23 April, see "Weseruebung"
file):
According to this directive, another mountain
division is to be brought up for Group 21 by the
quickest route, for the coming action in mountain
country.
Transfer of the 11th Rifle Brigade (Mechanized) is abandoned.
Fast special transport steamers are to take such units and
replacements as ensure complete mobility and fighting strength
by sea to the 69th Division in Bergen. High Command, Navy
has made available for this purpose five special ships (ILLER
class) for a first transport which Is to be carried out as
soon as possible. The second transport will follow on two
East Asia steamers, as soon as these have been fitted up for
this special purpose. H^igh Command, Navy, in conjunction with
Commander in Chief, Air Force, will take over protection of
these transports.
For Group Trondheim all possibilities of reinforcement by
heavy weapons are to be exploited. High Command, Navy and
Commander in Chief, Air Force are to carry out the transports
planned for Group Trondheim1 s reinforcement as a priority
matter. High Command, Navy is to make preparations to increase
as much as possible the shipping available for the transport
operations to Norway.
-245-
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Commanding Admiral, Group West again asserted by telephone
his objections to the mixed transports of troops and material
to Bergen en the steamers indicated and considers that the
transport operation can only be carried out if personnel and
material are carried separately because of the great danger
from the air, submarines and mines. The battleships would
not then act as escorts.
Naval Staff takes a different view an"' sees some considerable
disadvantages in the execution of Group West!s transport plans:
a) The first transport (1,800 men) would require
several operations by the light forces, causing
increased total risk and ciaim for some time
on the units which could not be used for
important Oslo transports.
b) The total transfer would be greatly prolonged
by several operations and separation of personnel
and material. Transports of material require
the same light forces to escort them as the
personnel transports themselves.
c) Because of its duration the enemy would gain
time to instigate countermeasures.
d) Danger from the mines and from the air is
almost the same for destroyer transports as
for steamer transports.
e) The appearance of light enemy forces off the
southwest coast and in the Skagerrak has been
detected and may occur again at any time. There
would thus be great danger for the destroyers
and torpedo boats used for purposes of personnel
transport and hampered in their fighting strength,
unless they had strong support.
Group West was again informed by telephone of Naval Staff1 s
opinion and instructed to abandon its proposal.
-846*-
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The following order was therefore issued to Group West:
1. The speedy transport of troops and equipment of
the 69th Division to Bergen has been ordered for
the reinforcement of our forces in the Bergen area,
2. The steamers EIDER, ILLER, SAAR, MEMEL (15 knots),
MOLKEFELS (16 knots) will load in Stettin. Will
probably arrive in the Elbe ready to sail, on 28 April.
3. Battleship, destroyer and torpedo boat escort
necessary for the transports. Previously planned
battleship operation must therefore be abandoned.
4. Further transports can be expected to follow.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic:
Convoy HX 41 will leave Halifax at 0515 on 12 May and will
proceed via 43° 30» N, 40° W, - 49° 45' N, 20° W, - 49° 55* N,
13° W, - 48° N, 80 W.
It will be met by home forces at the last but one position.
North Sea/Northern Waters
Disposition of forces on 24 April:
West Fjord/Tromsoe area:
The WARSPITE, FURIOUS, PENELOPE, AURORA, VINDICTIVE.
The FURIOUS was instructed to return to Scapa.
Namsos area:
The cruiser CALCUTTA and destroyers. Air reconnaissance
discovered nothing new about position and strength of enemy
troop disembarkations.
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CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Romadals Fjord-Andalsnes area;
Two cruisers and destroyers, one anti-aircraft cruiser.
According to radio Intelligence, the carrier GLORIOUS has also
moved to the area off Andalsnes. She received data about
the position of the British troops in the area southeast of
Dombas from the cruiser CURACAO. It is apparent from a
radiogram from General de Wiart to the War Office that he
believes he can hold the position (apparently near Otta) if
planes are sent from the carrier to his aid.
The following are on escort and patrol duty;
VAJLIANT RESOLUTION RODNEY (?) REPULSE
GLASGOW SHEFFIELD ENTERPRISE EFFINGHAM
SOUTHAMPTON CARLISLE.
In Scapa;
Air reconnaissance detected 1 battleship, 1 carrier, 8 cruisers
and many destroyers. These may be the vessels concerned,
amongst others;
ARK ROYAL YORK DEVONSHIRE BERWICK
MANCHESTER CURLEW CAIRO ARETHUSA
BIRMINGHAM.
The following are assumed to be in Rosyth or the mouth of
the Tyne;
RENOWN BELFAST EDINBURGH NEWCASTLE
GALATEA..
In the west coast area;
HOOD.
Supply service;
It is apparent from course instructions to the steamer FRANCONIA
(20,000 tons) that the route for valuable transports runs at a
distance of about 200 miles from the line Shetlands-Stadtlandet.
-248-
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Special Events; •
For sortie by large French destroyers into the Skagerrak
see Own Situation*
It seems from a delayed agent's report that the Allies
originally planned a landing of about 100,000 men (?} In
the Norwegian theater in Stavanger, Haugesund, Bergen, Molde,
Trondheim and Narvik.
Own Situation
Northern area:
Narvik;
In the morning the town and ore railroad were bombarded by
2 battleships, 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers. No vital damage.
Non-combatant units of troops and prisoners were evacuated along
the ore railroad. Group Narvik blew up the ore'pier and set
it on fire. Coming from the north, the enemy attacked north
of positions near Elvenes and on the Oalgge Pass.
(For report by Port Commander, Narvik, dated 18 April,
see reference file " We se rue bung" • )
Trondheim:
After visiting Trondheim, Commanding Admiral, Norway reports
that the withdrawal of the destroyers without replacement of
the personnel engaged ashore would very greatly prejudice
Trondheim* s defense and is therefore impossible.
(See radiogram file, 1450.)
In reply to a request made by Quartermaster General of Commander
in Chief, Air Force, he was informed that six submarines at most
-249-
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
could be mad© available for transport of aviation gasoline to
Trondhelm. The Quartermaster General had made a request
which would have necessitated the withdrawal of 24 submarines
for transport purposes alone.
Bergen:
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has ordered the immediate
seizure of all Norwegian trawlers and drifters to bring units
of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic up to strength.
Reconnaissance of Sogne Fjord with reference to the setting-up
of torpedo batteries has been carried out.
Naval Staff is forced to refuse Group West • s *request for the
allocation of defense vessels from the Baltic area to Admiral,
West Norwegian Coast, since It is not possible to remove vessels
at present from the Baltic area because of losses incurred and
great claims on all vessels. Group West has been instructed
to investigate the question of handing over two patrol vessels
from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and to hand
over Ship "7".
Southern North Sea:
The ore steamer SAYN struck a mine and sank in the Hubert Gatt.
An aerial mine is assumed. A second explosion which did not
take place until some hours later in the wreckage of the steamer
also makes sabotage appear possible.
It appears from enemy radio traffic that minesweepers have
exploded a magnetic mine lit cables from Chequers Shoals Buoy.
This is the first definite information that the enemy possesses
a ready minesweeping gear or "magnet gear" to sweep magnetic
mines.
-250-
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Skagerrak/Kattegat :
Enemy destroyers broke through into the Skagerrak in the
morning. Engagement with the enemy at 0420 southeast of
Krlstlansanfl by boats of the 7th Patrol Boat Flotilla. Forty
salvoes fired by the enemy at a patrol boat without special
success. About 0500 the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla sighted the
enemy on southwesterly course, making ?>ff at high speed, without
managing' to attack. Description of enemy: clipper bow,
two squat, widely spaced funnels.
Reconnaissance by Commander, Naval Air sighted the enemy
forces leaving the Skagerrak about 1000, roughly 120 miles
west-southwest of Lindesnes. Formation probably consisted
of a French torpedo cruiser of the FANTAS^UE class and two
destroyers.
It can be assumed that the enemy carried out a minelaying
operation, in the eastern Skagerrak.
Enemy report led to temporary stoppage of transport movements
to Oslo»
Because of the enemy break-through into the Skagerrak, Group
Baltic requests the speeding up of improvized readiness for
action of the guns of the outer fort at the southern entrance
to Oslo Fjord.
Various submarine alarm reports in the Kattegat and Skagerrak.
Mine Situation?
Mine barrage detected east of Frederikshavn (laid by submarines);
21 mines swept. Whole area declared suspected of mines.
Area southeast of Anholt likewise suspected of mines because
of observed minelaying. Latvian steamer struck a mine and
sank south of Drogden lighthouse (aerial mine).
At noon Ship "20" w%s damaged by striking a mine at the Luebeck
buoy off Travemuende and was beached. Priwall anti-aircraft
observation post reports observing a low-flying plane, not
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CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
notified, over Travemuende during the night of 23 April,
Area of Commanding Admiral, Norway:
Batteries "von der Groeben", "Koester" and South Memel are on
the way to Hamburg to be sent on to Norway as coastal batteries
for the Norwegian theater. Distribution of batteries and
transport on to Norway as Commanding Admiral, Norway thinks
fit.
(For High Command, Navy's order see teletype 1400.)
I
Commanding Admiral, Norway reports stoppage of work at the
State Dockyard at Horten owing to difficulty of payment by
the Norwegian Government and the Norwegian Trade Unions1
objection to work for Germany. The necessary countermeasures
are being instigated.
Group Baltic requests the provision of harbor defense units
for the south coast of Norway. (See radiogram file, teletype
1025.)
Three harbor defense groups, each with six motor fishing
vessels, are on their way to Copenhagen, Helsingoer and
Frederikshavn.
r
For report by Commanding 'Admiral, Norway on the state of
coastal defense, see reference file Norway.
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CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Transport Situation:
Further transports of troops and material as planned (900 men
arrived in Oslo)*
Submarine Situation
U "43" returned from Trondheim; U "19", "9", put in to port.
On return passage: TJ "38", "47", "56", "60", "62", "26".
In the operational area: 16 submarines.
Air Situation
(See radiogram 2400 Air Force Events of the Day.)
Bomber operations against the enemy forces reported in the
Skagerrak were unsuccessful.
During armed air reconnaissance in the Norwegian coastal area
an anti-aircraft cruiser in Romsdals Fjord received a 250 kg.
direct hit forward and was severely damaged.
Merchant Shipping
The fact that a steamer (the SAYN) with a valuable cargo was
ordered from the Baltic to Emden and struck a mine in the
approaches to the Ents has made it advisable to point out the
risk of such routing to the Ministry of Transportation and to
suggest that steamers with specially valuable cargoes coming
from the Baltic should, if possible, discharge their cargo in
Baltic ports and that the inconveniences of transporting it
by land should be accepted.
The following teletype was received from Group West on the
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24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
afternoon of 24 April:
"Present lack of patrol forces and the danger from
mines laid in the North Sea and estuaries make
necessary course instructions to all merchant
ships for the shortest sea route to the nearest
port of discharge. Therefore direct steamers
only to Baltic ports, if possible not to North
Sea ports except Hamburg. Attention is drawn
to the case of the steamer SAYN from Helsingborg
to Emden."
The Ministry of Transportation has taken suitable steps .
The effects on the inland transport situation will be
considerable if the Ems is closed for a fairly long period.
The Ministry of Transportation believes that It must accept the
disadvantages, since it definitely desires to avoid further
losses in view of the present lack of shipping space.
In the present case it is only a matter of closing the Ems
for a short time; after a mine-check of the channel it
will be opened again.
Appreciation of the Situation
The sortie made by the large French destroyers into the
Skagerrak shows the possibilities of lively enemy activity
to disrupt the vital sea communications to Oslo. Naval
Staff expected such raids by light enemy forces and knows
quite well that the Skagerrak mine barrage - In which the
positions of the mines are uncertain because of the current's
underflow - is not in a position to prevent such sorties.
On the other hand, it is convinced that no penetration by
large or heavy enemy units is to be feared" into the Skagerrak
because of the existing danger from the air and mines.
Light enemy forces make sorties into the Skagerrak for the
purpose of laying mines on the transport route from Skagen
to Oslo, attacking defense forces in the Skagerrak and trying
if possible to intercept and destroy Oslo convoys. Naval
Staff has at its disposal only a limited number of light
forces for defense against such raids, consisting of the
PT boats and later of the destroyers and torpedo boats at
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24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
present still on escort and transport duty or not available.
The deterrent effect of the Skagerrak area therefore lies -
in addition to the ever present defensive effect of the
Skagerrak declared area - in the verv great threat from the
air (bomb and aerial torpedo attacks;. It is intensified
by the presence of our battleships, whose readiness for
action, however, must be shown by activity in the form of
sorties into the northern North Sea,
In today's sortie by the French the enemy was able to ascertain
a certain defensive readiness on Germany's part in his engagement
with patrol boats and PT boats, as well as in an encounter with
air forces, even if it was not possible to frustrate his plan
to break through. It can be expected that our Air Force's
great successes on the Norwegian coast will make the risk of
frequent raids into the Skagerrak seem very high, so that
Naval Staff does not expect frequent repetition of these sorties.
■* In spite of this, every effort must be made to prevent a
recurrence of such penetrations into the Skagerrak. Attempts
must be made, by means of comprehensive evening air reconnaissance,
to make out enemy plans in good time in order to enable withdrawal
of the important transport traffic from the enemy's grasp.
The safety of the Skagerrak will be guaranteed to the necessary
extent by stationing as many PT boats as possible at the
entrance to the Skagerrak (Kristiansand) , by setting up radar
gear to intercept enemy movements in good time and by the
constant readiness for action of Air Force bombers, in
conjunction with the Skagerrak mine barrage.
„
The last few days have confirmed Naval Staff's supposition
that:
1. The enemy has begun aerial minelaying
operations in the North Sea estuaries, tn
the Kattegat, in the entrances to the Baltic
and in the western Baltic and that
2. he is in a position to sweep the magnetic
mines laid by us with a certainty not yet
fully determined.
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The fact that the enemy is using aerial mines makes necessary
the immediate introduction of all possible defensive measures.
Geographical conditions of German waters with their shallow
depth, well suited for the use of ground mines, favor mining
operations by planes and show the considerable dangers involved
for all German and neutral shipping, the transport services, as
well as the exercise and training of naval forces in the
western Baltic, the Kattegat, the entrances to the Baltic, the
Kiel Canal and the North Sea estuaries*
Commencement of defense measures against the type of aerial
mine used by the enemy depends on this mine's type of firing.
Speedy salvaging of a mine is necessary in order to discover
the firing procedure. It can be safely assumed for the
present that it is a ground mine.
The immediate formation of a comprehensive observer system
in all important channels, harbor entrances and in the Kiel
Canal is of extreme importance in order to ascertain the places
where the mines are laid for the purpose of subsequent salvaging
or closing of the area. Provision of a large number of motor
launches and motor boats in all ports is to be undertaken at
once. High Command, Navy/Naval Staff, Service Division will
have to undertake this speedily on a large scale. New
distribution and setting-up of barrage balloon batteries is
to be investigated.
Defense of the submarine exercise area and of the Kiel Canal
merits the most careful consideration.
In view of the enemy use of aerial mines, Commander in Chief,
Air Force has ordered, as an immediate measure, the shifting
of concentration for light anti-aircraft batteries to the
principal points in danger.
The Navy's most important task, apart from eliminating the
danger from mines, is in the immediate future the further
safe transportation of troops and material to Norway. The
danger from submarines, severe at first, has decreased noticeably
through large-scale use of defense and submarine-chaser forces
and through the adaptation of the inexperienced escort service
to its duties.
The accomplishment as planned of the transports to Norway,
with relatively small losses, and of the comprehensive supply
service must be judged as a great achievement by the units
participating. These have so far successfully fulfilled the
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24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
tasks set them in all-out operations, facing most difficult
demands and without sufficient rest and relief facilities.
The following tasks have now been set for further German
naval warfare in the near future:
Offensive assignments;
1. Conduct of war against merchant0 shipping by
auxiliary cruisers in foreign waters.
2. War against merchant shipping by submarines
in the Atlantic. The solution of the
torpedo problem is of decisive importance
for successful submarine attacks.
3. Aerial minelaying operations on a large
scale in cooperation with the operational
Air Force; in the forefront of the demands
of naval warfare are the complete blocking'
of the vital port of London, the mining of
Scapa Flow, of the Clyde and of Liverpool
Bay.
Defensive assignments:
4. Defense of Baltic shipping and of ore Imports
from Sweden as a necessity for a fairly long
war; elimination of danger from mines,
especially from ground mines, is a primary
necessity for this.
5. Further assurance of troop and material
transports to Norway.
6. Defense of the occupied Norwegian and Danish
bases through the speedy reinforcement of their
defensive power by all available means.
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25 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway;
According to
Informed the
a Stockholm Radio report, the King of Norway has
Oslo Administrative Committee that the Norwegian
Government will not negotiate with the Germans on any other
basis than that of complete withdrawal of their troops from
Norway,
said to
(The King's present whereabouts are unknown, he is
have withdrawn to Northern Norway.)
"The Times" and Reuter report heavy fighting northeast of
Trondheim, The presence of vessels of the German Fleet is
a great advantage for the Germans, since they could bring
strong combat units to any threatened point, German bombers
constitute a serious danger. So far it has twice been
necessary to move the position of the Operations Division of
the British forces in Norway, Speedy execution of Allied
operational plans is only probable if great efforts are made.
Sweden;
The German Ambassador wires;
"As today1 s radio has just reported, fishing boats
were allegedly fired on by German planes inside
Swedish territorial waters near Stroemstad. One
fisherman was wounded, I should be grateful for
immediate investigation and correction, for since
yesterday suspicion of German intentions has grown
to such an extent that I consider German-Swedish
relations seriously endangered.
If we increase our pres
patience even further,
will be serious. I see
with the agreed deliver
conflict would definite
ceasing for a fairly lo
act against us if drive
according to my knowled
character, I feel that
soon arise."
sure and test Sweden's
I fear that the consequences
this primarily in connection
ies of ore, since armed
ly mean these deliveries
ng time.* Sweden will only
n to despair. However,
ge of the Scandinavian
this state of affairs might
(See also Political Review No. 95, para, 6.)
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Italy;
Mussolini Is said to have told the Fascist leaders two days
ago that it was only a question of weeks until Italy entered
the war on Germany's side.
Sharp speech on foreign policy in the Chamber by Deputy
Giunta,in the presence of the Duce, against Great Britain and
France •
It is known that the Western Powers have lately been at pains
to avoid everything which could increase tension with Italy.
With reference to the meeting some days ago of the Foreign
Committee of the French Senate, the following statement by
the Prime Minister has only just become known:
"Before and after 1 Sept. the French Government
Informed Italy that it was ready to seek a
solution, acceptable to both powers, of out-
standing questions by means of a friendly
exchange of opinions. Italy has not replied
to date. This in no way alters the French
Government's intention and it is still endeavoring
to effect a Mediterranean entente uninfluenced
by ideological considerations •"
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Commander in Chief, Air Force states that upon the
Fuehrer's instructions regarding defense of the Skagerrak
against raids by enemy forces, an Air Force bomber formation
is to be kept in constant readiness for operations in the
Skagerrak. According to Commander in Chief, Air Force a
torpedo squadron is to be kept ready for the same purpose by
the Naval Air Arm. This measure cannot be carried out, since
this squadron must definitely operate offensively against
Great Britain as an aerial mlnelaying squadron. Chief,
Naval Staff will inform the Fuehrer of this.
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
2. The following torpedo batteries are ready for
action in Norway:
Trondheim: 2 triple tubes.
Bergen: 1 battery with 3 tubes.
Oslo: 2 batteries with 6 tubes.
Further batteries are planned to block the
following entrances:
Kristiansund Andalsnes Nord Fjord.
Sogne Fjord Hardanger Fjord
Erection of the last two batteries is planned first.
Reconnaissance has been carried out.
3. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered speedy establishment
of the new torpedoboats1 operational readiness. Four or
five boats are to be ready for simple assignments in the
middle of May (remaining boats June - 2, July - 2, August - 2,
October - 1).
4. Chief, Naval Staff* s decision:
"Until her repairs are completed (probably about
9 months) the LUETZOW is to be kept in commission
with a diminished crew (25% of complement)."
5. Chief, Naval Staff points out the extraordinary
urgency of the following measures and has ordered the use of
all available means to attain the reauired objective:
a) Expansion of our anti-submarine defense and
speeding-up of supplies of echo-ranging sets.
b) Defense against enemy use of aerial mines.
c) Equipment of all patrol and defense vessels
with protection against mines and with guns.
d) Ensuring adequate numbers of new motor
minesweepers and PT boats.
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
At lant ic/Medl te rranean ;
Great Britain:
Shipping movements; The cruiser EMERALD, formerly on the
Atlantic route or in Canada, put in to the Clyde at noon on
25 April. The aircraft carrier HERMES was at sea in the
South Atlantic on the afternoon of 24 April. Exact position
unknown, base Freetown. The CORNWALL plans to put in to
Freetown on 28 April from South Africa; the SHROPSHIRE
sailed from Freetown on the evening of 24 April.
The cruiser LIVERPOOL with Commander, 4th Cruiser Squadron
on board, formerly stationed in the East Indies, is at present
proceeding to Aden, where she will arrive on 29 April.
Inquiries in Italy and Istanbul gave no confirmation of
reports emanating from Vienna during the past few days about
movements of British warships or troopships in the direction
of the Black Sea.
France;
Several French vessels returning to Brest were located in
the Irish Sea in the evening. A vessel detected west of
Trondhelm on 19 April was off Brest.
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Narvik area;
1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser and small vessels detected off
Harstad. Several destroyers off Narvik. Harbor bombarded.
Namsos area;
Commander, 20th Cruiser Squadron, on board the cruiser
CARLISLE, is proceeding into the Namsos area to relieve
the CALCUTTA. Air reconnaissance sighted 1 heavy and
1 light cruiser off Namsos. No new reports about troop
disembarkations or large transports.
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Area 3outh of Trondhelm;
It Is apparent from a radiogram from the Otta area that
the carrier GLORIOUS is off the coast in the Krist.iansund-
Trondheim area*
Disembarkations of troops and material in Andalsnes are
completed according to a radiogram from the Commander there;
two cruisers and destroyers sailed after completing their
assignment. Destroyers, freighters and steam tankers were
detected in Romsda Is Fjord, Nordal Fjord and Sjflrungs Fjord
and successfully attacked by the Air Force.
Air reconnaissance sighted enemy forces in the afternoon
60 miles northeast of Molde Fjord, consisting of 4 heavy
ships (including 1 RENOWN) and 4 cruisers on course 150°.
Plans not identifiable.
Home area;
The battle cruiser HOOD was spotted 30 miles northeast of
the Shetlands by air reconnaissance. The cruisers GLASGOW
and GALATEA in the Shetlands-Scapa area.
The enemy submarine disposition was detected to a great
extent. About 7 boats are thought to be in the Skagerrak
and Kattegat, 5 on return passage, 5 outward bound, 3 of
the latter into the southern North Sea.
Shipping Losses:
1 minesweeper destroyed by a bomb hit in Romsdals Fjord,
1 torpedoboat damaged, 1 freighter (2,000 tons) beached
in Nordal Fjord after a bomb hit, 1 steam tanker severely
damaged by a hit. The British steamer CREE (4,800 tons)
struck a mine near Smithes Knoll.
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CQNFIDENTIAL
25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation
Atlantic:
Auxiliary cruisers were informed about the situation in
Norway, the enemy situation and routing of enemy shipping.
(See radiogram 1300.)
North Sea/Northern Waters:
Narvik:
Close patrol by enemy destroyers. In the morning
bombardment of positions at the eastern entrance to Narvik,
with the support' of the cruiser ENTERPRISE. Group Narvik
requests air cover and dropping of snowshoes. Unit east
of Elvenes carried out a successful attack on a Norwegian
unit.
Trondhelm:
Air raid on Verres airfield and seaplane base in the forenoon.
Considerable damage. Hangar and 4 Ju 87fs destroyed, 2 He
115 fs overturned, 3 He 115 fs damaged.
Port Commander reports that it is not possible to requisition
Norwegian ships at present because of lack of personnel.
Bergen:
When searching steamers the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and
minesweeper M Hl" were subjected to heavy machine-gunfire
near the TJLVUC. M nlH slightly damaged. One ammunition
steamer was captured. The ULVIK was set on fire.
Army operation against Voss with help from minesweeper M wl"
as planned.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast also requests about 400 naval
personnel and 300 merchant marine personnel for manning of
Norwegian ships in rapid succession, since otherwise
sabotage and losses can be expected.
Stavanger:
Nothing special to report.
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Southern North Sea:
Mine Situations
Elbe channel again open after unsuccessful check sweep.
Group West sums up the situation in the estuaries as
follows:
"Three unexplained explosions in all, two in the
Elbe near vessels • Another in the Ems. In the
latter case a second explosion followed eight
hours later* Sweeping of the points in question
with remote clearance gear with linked sweeps and
on the Elbe also with a mine-exploding vessel
with magnet gear produced no results. We must
therefore expect that single enemy aerial mines
with an unknown firing principle were laid or
dropped (magnetic or acoustic firing). Group
West plans a daily sweep of the estuaries with
remote clearance gear and linked sweeps. Hew
buoying of the secondary channel to Emden.
Endangered areas will be swept systematically
and divers sent down so that a mine may be
recovered as quickly as possible. n
During the night of 25 April there was a fresh mine
explosion off the Western Ems near patrol boat n802n.
In view of the intensified enemy mine warfare, Station North
Sea requests the provision of two sets of remote clearance
gear and cable remote clearance gear each for the Elbe,
Weser, Jade and Ems and the provision of further mine-
exploding vessel's, also equipment of all important naval and
merchant vessels with degaussing*
With reference to Group West's coming transport operations
to Bergen, concentration of suitable defense forces under
Group West is indispensable. Naval Staff has therefore put
the remaining boats of the 5th and 6th Torpedoboat Flotillas
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
at Group West's disposal for these assignments. Transfer
or time when they go into operation at Group West*s discretion.
While the boats are withdrawn transport and escort assignments
of Group Baltic must suffer some delay*
With reference to the latest bombing attack on Sylt, Group
West reports that bombs were dropped in sticks, which
comprised simultaneously 1 large high explosive bomb, 1 bomb
with time fuse (5-8 hours), 1 bomb with an even longer time
fuse, 1 incendiary bomb and, in advance, mostly an aircraft
parachute flare.
The dropping of time fuse bombs has already been observed
elsewhere and their handling requires special care, since they
are at first thought to be duds. It is necessary to fence
off the area and watch the bomb until it is exploded or
explodes »
The time fuse bomb must be regarded as a new, very effective
weapon, defense against which will offer considerable
difficulty. When dropped at important places (in dockyards,
factories, traffic junctions), the time fuse bomb necessitates
long isolation and thereby stoppage of the part of the factory
affected, which may lead to considerable interruptions.
Speedy investigation into possibilities of defense and
protection is necessary.
Skagerrak/Kattegat :
In order to simplify instruction about movements of our naval
forces during operations, the following definitions of sea
areas are fixed by Group Baltic:
Eastern limit of Skagerrak declared
area up to the line Hirtshals-Risoer.
From this line around Skagen up to
the line Aalbeck-Vinga.
South of this line up to the northern
entrance to the Baltic Sea entrances.
Area
A:
Area
B:
Area
C:
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The first deep mine barrage in the Skagerrak declared area
was laid as planned by Commander, PT Boats.
In reply to a query from Group Baltic, Naval Staff has again
Issued instructions that defense of the northern passage
through the Skagerrak declared area is a matter for Group
Baltic. Mine control as far as the western limit of our
declared area along the coast is also included. The
allocation of duties ordered seems practical because of the
nearness of the base of Kristiansand which comes under Group
Baltic (as opposed to Thyboroen or Esbjerg).
Submarine Situation
Submarines were detected east of «Skagen and east of Lasfl.
Attacks on submarines without visible result. No interruption
to transports.
Mine Situation
The 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla succeeded in recovering a
British aerial mine west of Samsfl. A most significant and
gratifying success, which within the shortest possible time
after the first enemy use of aerial mines has eliminated the
element of uncertainty in the problem of combatting the aerial
mine and thus represents the first step towards effective
defense against it. According to the first statements, it
is a ground mine with about 500 kg. of explosive, apparently
magnetic firing. The Minelaying Experimental Command has
commenced further investigations.
Numerous flights by enemy planes during the night of 25 April
over Kiel Bay, North Schleswig Into the Fehmarn-Eutin area
and Lubeck Bay. Minelaying suspected. Several impacts by
bombs or mines in the water are reported from the Elbe and
Kiel Canal.
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25 April 194q CONFIDENTIAL
Locations indicating mines were obtained by echo-ranging
sets south of Anholt. Check sweeping is in progress*
Transport Situation
Transports of troops and personnel continue as planned.
2,500 men taken to Larvlk, 900 to Oslo. Further transports
en route with 2,100 men.
Commanding Admiral, Norway reports regarding the Norwegian
naval vessels commissioned for German use and on vessels
seized*
Commissioned with German crews:
2 destroyers
1 minelayer
6 torpedo boat 8, 2nd class
1 old minelayer
2 minesweepers
6 whalers
2 auxiliary vessels.
Submarine Situation
Nothing special to report.
Returned from operations: U "26", "62n.
North of tfce Shetlands: U n25" .
Allocated positions northeast
of the Shetlands: U "14", "17", ,,24!,.
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25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
(For brief reports from U "26", "64", "9", "46", "51",
see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.)
Air Situation
Concentration:
Armed reconnaissance off the west coast of Norway and
support for Army operations.
Successes against naval forces:
1 minesweeper Destroyed in RomsdaQs Fjord.
1 torpedoboat Hit by SD 50. (Heavy smoke.)
1 battleship Off Molde Fjord in the morning,
probably 1 hit SC 250.
(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)
Merchant Shipping
Group Baltic has replied to a query from the Ministry of
Transportation that there is no objection to German ships
returning via Swedish territorial waters and for the present
through the Kogrund Channel or north of Seeland and the
Belts. Shipping companies must request the necessary
Swedish pilots themselves.
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CONFIDENTIAL
r
26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
No rway :
During the Army*s successful battles near Lillehammer,
most important documents were found on British officers
in the form of operational orders for the British Norway
operation, from which it is clear that a British landing
in Norway had been scheduled for about the same date as
the German one. Orders bore the dates 2 April, 6 April
and 7 April, Operation had cover name "Stratford Plan".
Forces participating were described as Stratforces.
Landings were planned in Stavanger, to occupy Sola airfield,
in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. The German action preceded
the British plans bf a few* hours. After the German landing
in Norway British forces were re-routed in that Stavanger
troops were disembarked in Andalsnes and Bergen troops In
Namsos. After all details have been submitted, the Fuhrer
intends to make known the documents discovered to the
Diplomatic Corps.
According to a report from Kirkenes, a kind of interim
Government has been set up in Northern Norway, which is
organizing resistance there in agreement with the old
Norwegian Government. The attitude of the mostly "Marxist"
population Is absolutely anti-German. Officers are
fundamentally pro-German but outwardly adhere to the King
and definitely reject the Quisling Government because it
holds the confidence of no class of the people.
The British Air Ministry announces that German assertions
that Britain has commenced unrestricted aerial warfare are
unfounded. The attack on Sylt was directed against
Westerland airfield, one of the most heavily fortified
spots in Germany. No attack was made on the town of Heide.
The civilian population also suffered from the German air
raids on the Orkneys.
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Sweden:
The Naval Attache in Stockholm reports that there are
15,000 men in the Swedish ore region near Kiruna in a
very heavily fortified position with strong anti-aircraft
defense • Preparations have been made for the effective
blowing-up of the railroad line.
Swedish Trade Unions have issued a resolution according to
which they are determined on the utmost defensive readiness
Denmark;
The department of the British Ministry of Shipping in
New York stated that all Danish ships on the high seas
which had not transferred to the Allied flag would be
seized as prizes since they technically represented enemy
tonnage. Transfer to other neutrals would not be
acknowledged. The Allies are, however, ready to make
agreements on the chartering of such ships*
On the other hand, the Danish Shipping Committee in New
York stated that Denmark had opposed the German invasion.
Germany has therefore no legal rights over Danish ships.
The British assertion that these ships are prizes according
to International Law cannot therefore be acknowledged.
Endeavors to come to an agreement with the Allies about the
routes outside the European war zone have unfortunately
failed.
France :
Reynaud spoke before the Foreign Committee of the Chamber.
Investigation of the German threat to Sweden and possible
eventualities. The Turkish Governments loyalty was
recognized. France wishes an exchange of opinion in her
relations with Italy and is not responsible for its previous
failure to take place.
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Chief, Naval Staff again ordered the speedy
commencement of all measures to combat the danger of
aerial mines.
According to fresh reports from Group Baltic it is possible
that the British ground mine does not work with magnetic
but with acoustic firing. If this assumption is confirmed,
we must also expect that the British torpedo possesses an
acoustic control. (This explains various torpedo hits on
the stern as e.g. the steamer PRIEDENAU, the cruiser
LUETZOW. )
2. Chief, Naval Staff considers that further use of
submarines off the Norwegian coast and for attacks on enemy
naval vessels offers little prospect of success,, in view of
the torpedo difficulties and the slight chances of hitting
fast-moving warships, and considers that the resumption of
war against merchant shipping In the Atlantic as soon as
possible is necessary and alone promises success.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic;
Further reinforcement of Mediterranean forces: The cruisers
ORION, NEPTUNE, the destroyers DEFENDER, DECOY and the
repair ship RESOURCE have gone on eastward from Gibraltar-.
The submarine depot ship MEDWAY and three submarines left
Colombo on 17 April for the Mediterranean.
Three boats of the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla, previously
stationed in Singapore, passed Port Said on 23 April
proceeding towards the Mediterranean.
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
North Sea/Northern Waters t
Enemy landings in the Narvik area continue. Off HarstacL
a battle cruiser, a heavy cruiser, other cruisers, destroyers
and troopships as well as a large number of armed vessels
were sighted.
Lively activity by light enemy forces and transports in the
Namsos-Andalsnes area. Various cruisers and numerous
destroyers were detected in Romsdals Fjord, off Andalsnes,
in Molde Fjord and in fjords adjoining Trondheim Fjord.
Britis-h destroyers are in the Frohavet and south of the
island of Hitra in order to guard the entrance to Trondheim.
Convoys were sighted northwest and northeast of the Frohavet
and west of Molde Fjord in the forenoon.
A cruiser or destroyer in Sogne Fjord.
Own Situation
Atlantic:
Ships "16" and ,f36,f received further reports on the enemy
and data for the conduct of war against merchant shipping.
(See radiogram 2143.)
Narvik;
Renewed bombardment of port and defense installations, also
of Elvegaardsmoen by light enemy naval forces.
A Norwegian regiment was destroyed by a German counter-
attack in the Elvenes area, with severe enemy losses.
Group Narvik requests effective increase of supplies by air
for Elvegaardsmoen, especially food and snowshoes.
If later developments render it necessary for Group Narvik
to take to the mountains, it is planned to evacuate the bulk
of the destroyer crews, wounded and prisoners to Sweden.
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CONFIDENTIAL
26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
The first train from Sweden has arrived at the frontier.
Supplies, however, are extremely difficult, since the ore
railroad is partly destroyed and without current. Supplies
for Narvik are therefore not assured for any length of time.
Trondheim:
Because of the enemy situation off Trondheim, Ships M26w
and tt37", carrying howitzers and ammunition, were ordered to
postpone putting in for 24 hours.
Commander, 2nd Destroyer Flotilla reports that the JACOBI
will be repaired about two months after the gear parts arrive,
He does not consider return passage possible until the sea
and air situation has altered fundamentally. Armament is to
be dismantled, as far as necessary, and can be re-installed
later.
Bergen:
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports stubborn enemy
resistance near Voss. The enemy was overcome during the
day; Voss was taken. Reconnaissance of Hardanger Fjord
with regard to torpedo batteries has been carried out.
Forces passing through the skerries are still being fired
on with hand arms and also with guns. Because of numerous
assignments (pilot service, transport) he again requests
another minesweeper, motor minesweepers and armed patrol
boats.
Three PT boats are being sent out against the British cruiser
reported in Sogne Fjord. Air support is requested.
Commanding Admiral, Norway proposes closing of Sogne Fjord
by mlnelaylng to stop supplies for British landing troops.
Southern North Seat
Because of enemy mine laying in the estuaries, Station North
Sea requests the inclusion in the system of wartime lights
and buoys of secondary channels not so far included and
considerable reinforcement of the harbor defense flotillas
for the Jade/Weser, Elbe and Ems.
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Vessels are also requested for remote clearance gear and
cable remote clearance gear* (See radiogram file, 1835
and 1825.)
Commanding Admiral , Norway has been ordered by High Command,
Navy to set up harbor defense units in every base, subdivided
into A and B groups with the same duties as in home waters.
(See radiogram 0800.)
Skagerrak /Kattegat :
Decrease in danger from submarines discernible at the moment.
Only one submarine alarm northeast of Anholt.
Mine Situation;
Three mine barrages were located 30-40 miles north of Skagen
with echo-ranging sets; they were probably laid by the
French destroyers which penetrated into the Skagerrak.
The area endangered by mines lies in the 20 mile-wide strip
declared free of mines by Great Britain for traffic to
Sweden •
Group Baltic reports, in view of yesterday1 s order, that mine
control of the northern passage through the Skagerrak declared
area as far as the western limit is not possible with the
forces at present available. Exploratory sweeps will be
carried out after the units now being assembled are in
operational readiness.
Ground mines;
At noon a mine exploded on the west side of the channel in
the outer Kiel Estuary 20 m. away from IT "99", which sustained
only slight damage. Aerial mine. (Numerous enemy flights
over Schleswig-Holsteln, the (Kiel) Canal and western Baltic
tonight • )
Group Baltic has, ordered valuable steamers to be stopped,
100# searching sweep in the Kiel Canal, fixing of routes*
check sweeping of routes, cessation of training and trials.
(See radiogram file, teletype 1150.)
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Effective immediately, Commanding Admiral, Submarines forbids
any submarine training in Kiel and Mecklenburg Bays from
Kiel, Neustadt, Travemunde and Warnemunde. Submarine
navigation and firing training is to be transferred to Gdynia
as quickly as possible. Shore training remains in Neustadt.
/
The Swedish Naval Attache, Forshell, informs us that foreign
submarines have not been detected in Swedish territorial
waters. Merchant traffic In the channels along the west
coast of Sweden involves difficulties, Including lack of
pilots.
Transport Situation:
Transports of troops and material continue as planned.
About 2,000 men have arrived in Oslo and Larvik. Empty
steamers on return trip undisturbed.
Submarine Situation
Returned from operations
and put In to port: U "47", "56", "60".
In the operational area:
North Minoh area:
North of the Shetlands:
West of the Shetlands:
Northeast of the Shetlands: U "14", "17", "23", "24".
In the Orkneys area: U "13", "57", "58", "59";
u
"61",
"30".
TJ
"25".
U
"65".
U
"14",
"17",
TJ
"13",
"57",
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
submarines are instructed to
take up their old operational
areas again directly off
Pentland Firth according to
density of traffic and
defenses.
On return passage: U "38", "34", "52".
In Trondheim: U "29",
The crew of U "64" has returned home from Narvik via Sweden
(disguised as survivors from German steamers).
The brief reports from U "64", "46" and "51" from West Fjord
give a picture of the extraordinary difficulties in West
Fjord and Ofot Fjord arising from the length of the days,
strong defenses and calm, clear water. (See Part B, Vol. IV.)
U "23" reports a double miss on a heavy cruiser 20 miles
east of the Shetlands.
U "34" reports a double miss on the 20,000 ton supply
steamer FRANCONIA north of the Hebrides.
Air Situation
For disposition of Air Force units for operations in Norway
see radiogram file, 0800.
Air Force operations in the Narvik-Harstad area, Namsos
Fjord and Andalsnes.
Special forces have been provided for 27 April against the
aircraft carrier suspected to be in the Namsos -Andalsnes
area. It can be expected that at daybreak the carrier
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
will be near the coast to start Its planes and will then
move off Into the open sea.
(For particulars see Air Force fivents of the Day.)
Merchant Shipping
Of the altogether 185 vessels (totaling about 242,000 GRT)
lying in Bergen which are not German, contraband goods have
been discovered so far on 27 ships which are not Norwegian.
After the operation against Voss is over, transfer is to be
begun, since there are no escort detachments available at
present.
The Italian Government has released three (five according
to other sources) Norwegian tankers and a freighter, which
had at first been held, since the captains raised notarial
protest against the refusal of harbor certificates.
The Italian steamer AMECIZIA, which had been held south of
Bergen with a cargo of wood for Great Britain, has been
brought Into Stavanger. The ship is to be released after
the cargo is discharged.
1500: Conference between Chief, Naval Staff and the
Fuhrer.
Points discussed:
1. Sortie by French destroyers into the
Skagerrak on 23/24 April. Possibilities
of defense against such raids.
2. Naval Staff1 s deliberations on further
submarine warfare, withdrawal of small
submarines for the schools, submarine war
against merchant shipping in the Atlantic.
3. Defense of bases In Norway.
4. Combatting danger of aerial mines.
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26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
5. German lack of freighters •
6. Land situation in the south Norwegian area
has been cleared up.
The projected transport operation to Bergen, protected by
a battleship sortie, can therefore be canceled. The Fuhrer
has ordered the transports to be re-routed to Oslo.
(For particulars see Commander in Chief, Navy*s memorandum
of conference dated 26 April, War Diary, Part C, Vol* VII.)
The following directive has been issued to Groups West,
Baltic and Fleet, in view of the Fuhrer 's decision to abandon
the transport operation to Bergen:
1. Group West's transport assignment is canceled
as the result of the speedy clearing up of the
land situation in southern Norway.
2. Transport is to be carried out to Oslo as soon
as possible. Steamers are lying in Stettin.
Group Baltic will report plans.
3. Battleship operation is abandoned for the
present because of the necessity of
maintaining destroyers and five torpedoboats
in readiness.
4. Further torpedoboats again at the disposal
of Group Baltic.
5. Group West to report promptly plans for any
destroyer and torpedoboat operations.
Naval Staff I op 790/40.
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
Norway;
At noon in the Reich Chancellery Foreign Minister von
Rlbbentrop, before the Diplomatic Corps and the German
and foreign press, gave a statement on the political
situation and made public White Paper No. 4 containing
the diplomatic and military documents captured in Norway,
from which the Western Powers' plans to extend the war to
Scandinavia and the old Norwegian Government's guilt in
this development are obvious.
Naval Staff's information from the enemy situation and
reports from the Radio Monitoring Service, the press and
agents for the beginning and middle of March (see War
Diary) about the Allies' plans are confirmed.
The Supreme Commander of the Norwegian Army issu«d an
order of the day:
"You did everything In your power to stop the
enemy. You were often forced back and thus
had to leave your positions. That is
disheartening but the main thing was to gain
time. You honorably discharged your duty,
for which I thank you. This withdrawal
movement is now at an end and I exhort you
anew: Be of good courage and we shall be
victorious."
Sweden:
The Foreign Office is at present trying to obtain the
Swedish Government's consent to the carrying of survivors,
wounded and prisoners on the return journey of the trains
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
running to Group Narvik. This measure is justified as an
act of humanity. Even the question of possible internment
"by the Swedish Government will be no obstacle.
Denmark:
In reply to the blocking of Danish assets in the U.S.A.,
the Danes have blocked U.S. assets in Denmark.
(
Italy:
According to foreign press reports, Ciano is said to have
stated in reply to the French Ambassador, Franco ls-Poncet,
that the time was unpropltlous for discussing the
differences of opinion between *;he two countries.
Portugal:
The Embassy reports:
nSalaz*ir continues to resist Allied encroachments.
He told the British Ambassador that by their
high-handed treatment of Portugal the Allies were
doing everything to destroy sympathy for them."
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•
27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Greece;
The British Ambassador is said to have submitted four
demands to Metaxas:
1. Cessation of deliveries of products of
military importance to Germany*
2. Granting of the right to establish naval
and air bases in Greek territory.
3. Unrestricted entry for personnel of the
R.A.F. and Royal Navy.
4. Adoption of a pro-entente tone by the
Government and removal of pro-German
persons from leading positions.
Metaxas expressed himself sharply against this and stated
that he would not permit the Western Powers to intervene
in Greece a second time.
U.S.A. ;
The iEmb assy in Washington reports:
"The effect of Grand Admiral Raeder's statements
to the press, which refuted exaggerated Allied
victory propaganda in the U.S. press during the
past few days, is said to be all the greater
because the press is very struck by the swift
advance of German troops in Norway and is now
giving prominence to German military reports."
(See also appendix to Foreign Press (Naval News No. 100).)
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items;
1. The situation on land In the central Norwegian area
is judged confidently despite certain difficulties. The
Army is advancing northwards in spite of very difficult
terrain. Very speedy relief of Trondheim is hoped for.
Strong enemy forces suspected near Andalsnes and Dombas.
The Trondheim Group is advancing southwards on Stflren, in
order to cut the enemy off from the north. Situation
cleared up in Bergen; enemy beaten near Voss.
In view of the efforts of Armed Forces High Command,
Operations Staff to clear up the land situation speedily.
Chief, Naval Staff considers it specially important that,
with regard to the great strain on defense and transport
units, overhasty execution of transport be avoided and that
safety of the transports be the primary consideration.
The danger from submarines and mines necessitates observance
of all necessary defense measures.
2. British use of aerial mines; The opinion for a
while that the British aerial mine might have acoustic or
vibration firing is contradicted by a new report that the
firing principle is based on induction. Discoveries to
date show that our magnetic sweeping gear is probably fully
effective. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered tne strictest
secrecy about the fact that a mine was recovered.
The question of the greatest possible speeding-up of the
effectiveness of our anti-mine measures was again discussed.
A large-scale patrol organization for the detection of places
where mines are dropped is already being set up; requisitioning
of large numbers of motor boats and patrol vessels has been
started; the entire Kiel Canal is covered by visual
observation. The Danes are to be induced to patrol their
coastal areas and channels; similar measures are likewise
to be suggested to the Swedes.
There are at present only 11 balloon barrage batteries
In all, of which 9 are on the coast (3 in Hamburg, 6 in
Group West»s area in Wilhelmshaven, the Jade, Emden, Borkum).
Further supplies of barrage balloons cannot be expected
until August. Naval Staff, Operations Division proposes,
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
with reference to the urgency of combatting aerial mines,
that two batteries be withdrawn from Group West and placed
at the disposal of Group Baltic for the defense of the
Kiel Canal and other important points.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees. Orders to this effect have
been given.
3. Group West proposes dispensing with minelaying
measures by surface forces in Operation "Gelb".
Reason; The larger number of planes holds out prospects
of effective aerial minelaying. The enemy1 s greater
preparedness and short, bright nights make unobtrusive
execution improbable. Moreover, very undesirable losses
are now more probably in view of the slight strength of
our destroyer and torpedoboat forces.
Aerial minelaying in Operation "Gelb" is planned within the
scope of the scheduled measures HL, IL, 6*L, WL, OL and also
measure "Dunkirk'* • In all about 30 planes are scheduled
to drop about 50 aerial mines with the first wave.
Chief, Naval Staff agrees fully with Group West»s proposal.
Because of the delay in Operation "Gelb" the necessary
conditions for operations by surface forces have altered
fundamentally. The shortness and brightness of the nights
forbid any surface force operations in the area constantly
covered by the enemy, since on no account is any preliminary
warning to be given by naval measures. In the enemy's
state of readiness we must expect immediate, heavy attacks,
especially by the enemy Air Force, in the event of the
slightest suspicion. If the element of surprise is lost
the whole operation would unavoidably be greatly endangered.
The small number of our light forces - urgently required
for defense assignments - also makes it necessary that the
available destroyers and torpedoboats should not be used
for assignments in which losses seem probable from the
start, as far as these same assignments, as in the present
case, can also be fulfilled very effectively by the aerial
minelaying formations of the 9th Air Division meanwhile
set up.
4. Report by Captain Bey (Commander, 4th Destroyer
Flotill^, who flew back from Narvik on High Command, Navy*s
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
order, on the actions off Narvik on 10 and 13 April and
the present situation.
Fresh confirmation is given of the great readiness for
action of the destroyers and the excellent behavior of the
crews, who knew how to fight and die in the traditional
destroyer spirit.
Captain Bey was appointed Commander, Destroyers as well
as Commander, 6th Destroyer Flotilla.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Since the enemy again partially changed his code on 26 April,
there is much less possibility of decoding enemy radio traffic
at present.
Atlantic;
Portishead coastal radio station broadcast the following
QQQQ report:
38°41»N, 39°22»W (about 500 miles west of the
Azores) the tanker DONNAX (8,036 tons) is being
chased. Time 0948.
At 1238 the same radio station sent four times:
"QQQQ DONNAX canceled." Time 1034.
It is possible that Ship "36" was the originator of this
alarm report.
The possibility arises from additional data that there are
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
three battleships (possibly the QUEEN ELIZABETH, MALAYA
and ROYAL SOVEREIGN) in the Mediterranean.
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Narvik area;
Air reconnaissance sighted one cruiser and several destroyers
off Harstad, a cruiser and destroyers off 'Narvik, ? battle-
ship and destroyers in the fjords north of Narvik*
Trondhelm area;
Eight transports and 2 cruisers were sighted in the morning
northwest of the Frohavet on northeasterly course. One
French and 2 other cruisers on course 350° and 2 aircraft
carriers with 1 heavy cruiser and destroyers on course 30°
were detected west and northwest of the island of Fr8ya at
a distance of 30-100 miles. At noon there were 2 destroyers
in Trondheim-Leden.
A cruiser and several merchantmen off Molde and Andalsnes.
From the home areas
Nothing special to report.
Evaluation of aerial photographs on 24 April shows that the
following forces were lying in Scapa Flow on that day;
1 battleship each of the NELSON, RENOWN and REVENGE class,
1 cruiser of the LONDON class, 1 ENTERPRISE class, 1 ship
of the D class; aircraft carrier HERMES, several destroyers,
tankers, auxiliary vessels.
At 2000 on 26 April Commander in Chief, Home Fleet informed
an unidentified vessel that two German trawlers were flying
the Dutch flag. Further text of the message could not be
made out.
This obviously concerns Ships n2Sn and w37w, trawlers
camouflaged as neutrals, which were then Instructed to abandon
Dutch camouflage, move off northward and separate.
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
There is -no immediate fear that the two vessels have been
intercepted and sunk by the enemy* They were probably
sighted by enemy air reconnaissance*
Shipping Losses:
The 7,000 ton tanker SCOTTISH AMERICAN was torpedoed near
Cape Wrath, (northern entrance to the Minch), the British
steamer PIZARRO (1,367 tons) "collision" at the eastern
side of the North Minch* Ship had to be abandoned*
10,000 ton ship and 1,500 ton ship damaged by bomb hits
off Molde Fjord.
Own Situation
Narvik:
Cruisers and destroyers bombarded defense Installations
and quarters near Bjerkvik, Laverget and Elvegaardsmoen*
Great material damage* Norwegian planes attacked our
troops near Elvenes* Air Force intervention is requested.
Great difficulty in bringing supplies to the town of Narvik
and to Elvegaardsmoen because of the destruction of the
ore railroad on Rombaken Fjord and the ferry, as well as
completely snowed-up supply routes.
Trondheim:
Landing parties from British destroyers reconnoitered the
islands in Kraagsvaags Fjord and the Oerlandet Peninsula.
Destroyers were unsuccessfully attacked by the 506th
Coastal Patrol Group.
Vernes airfield is reported clear for landings and take-offs*
Bergen:
Voss and Boemoen taken by the Army; enemy withdrew to
Gudvanger-Frethe im.
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According to a communication from Group West, the proposal
to mine Sogne Fjord by surface forces cannot be carried out
from home waters and is technically impossible with submarines
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast therefore plans to carry out
minelaying after about 1 May if suitable vessels are
available by then.
PT boat attacks on the enemy cruiser (or large destroyer)
reported in Sogne Fjord unsuccessful, since the ship had
already been attacked and destroyed by the Air Force
beforehand.
Troopships from Stavanger arrived* in Bergen as planned.
Southern North Sea:
In reply to yesterday's query about Group West's readiness
for action - destroyers and torpedoboats - the Group reports:
Plan to use available destroyers and torpedoboats
as defense for minelaying operation by four
minelayers north of the declared area. Will
probably sail early on 29 April.
Naval Staff agrees to Group West's plans. The Group was
informed accordingly.
Esbjerg was examined by the Wilhelmshaven Dockyard Staff as
to suitability as a Fleet base. In view of the water-
depth and the great strain on Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
North, the harbor is considered suitable only for
destroyers and for these only to a certain extent.
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27 April 194^ CONFIDENTIAL
Enemy Mine Situation:
The pilot steamer BODENWINKEL struck a mine and sank in
the Hubert Gatt.
Crew saved. The Hubert Gatt is closed to traffic.
According to statements by the captain of the steamer HANS
SCHULTE and the captain of the pilot vessel EMDEN, at about
0400 on 21 April two planes with lights landed on the
Hubert Gatt, near the spot where the steamer SAYN later
came to grief, and afterwards took off again.
The steamer SAYN struck a mine on 23 April. It is possible
that mines were laid here by a plane which landed on the
surface.
Skagerrak/Kattegat;
Submarine alarm south of Oslo Fjord, near MaseskBr and off
Prederikshavn. Anti-submarine action unsuccessful.
Mine Situation;
The Danish steamer LUISE struck a mine 600 m. northwest of
Drogden light. The German steamer OTTO KORDS was beached
off Koldlng Fjord (probably struck a mine).
Near Korsflr mine-exploding vessel n4w swept a ground mine
80 m. away, bearing 330°, with magnet gear. The 2nd Motor
Minesweeper Flotilla detected the east wing of the enemy
mine barrage off Prederikshavn. Our Fredericia barrage
has been cleared.
A formation of Commander, Minesweepers carried out a check
sweep of the routes in Mecklenburg and Kiel Bays. Routes
proceed over the greatest depths of water possible.
Routes are not announced. Traversed at present only by
warships and valuable steamers.
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAI
Group Baltic requests speedy provision of Commander,
Minesweeper's units with gear to sweep the induction mines,
and of all naval vessels and important -merchantmen with
degaussing equipment. The Group suggests that recourse
be had to copper distance high tension conduits in Norway,
if they are not required there for military purposes, in
order to relieve the raw material situation in the
construction of cables.
Preparations are being made for the transfer of training
and trials by the Schools and Inspectorates to the central
Baltic east of Rugen because of danger of aerial mines.
Torpedo and Submarine branches will concentrate in
Gdynia-Pillau.
Group Baltic plans to withdraw the cruiser EMDEN from Oslo
to the eastern Baltic under close escort, utilizing fast
steamer groups. Will probably be carried out on 30 April
at dawn. The Group requests agreement.
Transport Situation
Transports as planned; 950 men arrived in Oslo both in the
forenoon and afternoon, also material carried on 14 drifters
and 2 tugs.
Empty transports as planned.
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27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Air reconnaissance reports lively steamer traffic along the
Swedish coast northward and southward bound; Swedish
traffic partly in the form of convoys.
Air Situation
Armed reconnaissance concentrated on the Narvik area, attack
on transport movements and disembarkations in the Andalsnes-
Trondheim area. Various supply steamers damaged by bombs.
One cruiser damaged off Andalsnes and one north of Narvik
(latter 1,000 kg. direct hit).
(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)
Submarine Situation
Since possibilities of success off the Norwegian coast are
estimated as slight because of strong patrols in the fjords,
difficulties with torpedoes and few prospects of hitting
fast-moving targets, Commanding Admiral, Submarines has been
allocated the following assignments for submarines,
constituting a change in the previous order:
1. Constant occupation of Orkneys-Minch area.
2. As strong operations as possible in the
Atlantic.
3. Further transport of supplies to Trondheim
for the time being.
4. If occasion arises, use of submarines for
Operation "Gelb".
5. Submarine training.
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27 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Defense assignments in the Norwegian coastal area lapse
for the present*
In the operational area
on 27 April:
On return passage:
Returned from operation:
Sailed with supplies
for Trondheim:
TJ "13", "14", "23", "24",
"25", "30", "57", "58",
"59", "61", "65".
U "17", "29", "34", "52".
U "38".
U "A", "32".
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CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
For first reaction abroad to Ribbentrop1 s speech and the
publication of the Anglo-Norwegian documents, see Foreign
Press Report,
Denmark;
Negotiations are in progress at present between Coastal
Defense Commander, Copenhagen and the Danish Navy about the
use of Danish naval vessels to relieve our forces. The aim
is to use Danish vessels under Danish command on minesweeping
duties, for patrol and observation duties as well as for
repairs to and inspection of Danish Mine barrages. If
necessary extra German signals personnel can be drafted to
Danish ships. Group Baltic will control all operations by
the Danish Navy.
Sweden:
According to a report from the Naval Attache* in Stockholm,
the Swedes attach particular importance to the continued
existence of their mine barrages in the Sdder-Kvarken Strait.
Naval Staff has no fundamental objection to this and only
requests that safe passage at any time be guaranteed by
clear marking of the channel and adequate, speedy provision
of pilots. The possibility of ships going aground inside
the marked channel must also be excluded. The Foreign
Office was informed of this and requested to desist from
Naval Staff1 s earlier request to have Sweden remove the
mine barrage.
U.S.S.R. :
The Soviet Government has
new Base North.
suggested Yokanya Bay as the
Italy:
Ansaldo
address
(director of the ^elegrafd1) states in a radio
to the Italian Armed Forces:
"It Is not possible for a country such as Italy
to remain outside a conflict like the present
one for the duration. This was established
today with the greatest authority in the Fascist
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28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Chamber and the Corporations by the most
important statements of Grandi and Buffarini.
Only one thing remains to be done: to be ready
for the order which will come. The words
Tbe ready' comprehend the fate of Italy and
the fate of us all."
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
1. Combatting British aerial mines; All offices have
been informed of the great difficulties arising from the
British use of aerial mines and of the urgency of solving
the problem of effective defense and they are working
towards this end with all the means in their power.
The attention of subordinate offices will be drawn to the
necessity of maintaining special secrecy with regard to all
reports about actual or possible further recovery of enemy
aerial mines as well as hits on mines, especially also by
merchant ships, and to all sweeping results. All information
must be transmitted so that the enemy radio monitoring
service can gain no insight.
For an appreciation of enemy and of our own minelaying
operations it is necessary to ascertain soon how far the aerial
mine as such is finished in construction by the enemy and
scheduled for large-scale use. It Is essential to discover
particularly whether our own use of aerial mines decided the
development of the present British aerial mine or whether it
was developed independently by the British. It must be
stated already that the British have shown themselves to be
masters of improvisation in the use of aerial mines and
defense against them and have with simple means, probably
without very exact scientific investigations, quite obviously
developed both a most useful offensive weapon in their aerial
mine and a useful self-defense and sweeping gear. We must
acknowledge that their success in doing this within a very
short space of time is a very remarkable achievement.
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It is now to be seen that the highly skilled Royal Air Force
brings the aerial mines to our waters in darkness and in
almost every kind of weather, and that it has so far
succeeded in carrying the mines almost unmolested over
Schleswig Holstein to the Baltic ports, while our own aerial
mine formations - thanks to the enemy defenses and their own
lack of training - have so far not been in a position to drop
the aerial mines in Scapa, in the Clyde or over Liverpool Bay.
This discovery forces us, on the one hand, to make every
endeavor to build up our anti-mine defense organization and,
on the other hand, to make an urgent request to the operational
Air Force that it should now speedily make widespread attacks
by carrying the aerial mine to London, to Scapa and over the
British mainland to Liverpool and the Clyde.
Group West objects greatly to the withdrawal of two barrage
balloon batteries from the North Sea area for defense of the
Kiel Canal and western Baltic, since it considers any weakening
of the Wilhe Iras haven and Jade defenses insupportable. In
Naval Staff's opinion, however, the danger to the Kiel Canal and
Kiel Bay is judged to be just as grave.
The main effect of the balloon barrages is psychological.
The withdrawal of some balloons from the North Sea defense
areas will not diminish the deterrent effect of the batteries
still remaining, but will considerably increase defense for
the Kiel Canal and Kiel Bay.
Naval Staff's order therefore remains in force.
2. Further Construction of the Aircraft Carrier GRAF
ZEPPELIN : Naval Staff denies the necessity of continuing
construction, particularly since there will not be the
necessary military and armament prerequisites for the use of
the ship in the near future. The whole anti-aircraft
armament is at present being used for urgent military tasks
at other points. It is not possible to provide it for the
carrier again without severe military disadvantages.
Complete armament cannot be installed until about one year
after completion, i.e. the end of 1941. The problem of
skilled workers offers very great difficulty. Naval Staff
is therefore abandoning further construction work on the
carrier.
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Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
North Sea/Northern Waters:
Troopship movements: According to an intelligence report,
five battalions of French Chasseurs Alpins, the 43rd Colonial
Infantry Regiment and one battalion of the Foreign Legion
passed through the Channel on 26 April on the way to Norway.
An agent reported from Paris on 20 April that intensive work
was being carried out on the formation of a new Expeditionary
Corps, to consist of special troops. Ports of departure Le
Havre, Boulogne, for material Rouen. Transports are to
leave for Norway about the end of April/beginning of May.
Narvik area:
Air reconnaissance reported 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, several
destroyers off Harstad, several transports and destroyers in
Ofot Fjord, 3 destroyers off Narvik. Landings near Bogen.
Namsos area:
Two light cruisers, several destroyers, transports and
auxiliary vessels were detected in Folda Fjord and Namsos
Fjord; 1 battleship and 1 cruiser in the area off Namsos.
No large-scale troop movements observed ashore.
Andalsnes area:
Enemy reports further successful landings in Andalsnes by radio.
Air reconnaissance spotted a cruiser, destroyers and several
transports in Romsda Is Fjord, further cruisers and destroyers
off Trondhelm Fjord, a large number of freighters and transports
in the fjords to the south. In the afternoon a plane contacted
an enemy formation, with which there were probably 1 or 2
aircraft carriers, 70 miles northwest of Molde Fjord. Strong
fighter defense.
Reconnaissance and attacks by our bomber units is reflected
in enemy radio traffic.
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28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Reconnaissance reports give the Impression that enemy landings
are mostly completed for the present. Imminent attacks by
the troops landed north and south of Trondheim against
Trondheim, with support from the enemy carrier-borne planes,
must be expected. Destruction of the enemy aircraft
carriers therefore assumes decisive importance and is being
striven after by the 5th Air Force with all the means in
its power.
Reconnaissance activity off Trondheim by enemy destroyers
leads us to expect landings and a footing on the islands
off Trondheim Fjord.
Severe blows were struck against today's enemy operations by
our Air Force attacks, which scored several hits on cruisers
as well as great successes against enemy merchant ships and
transports. (See own Air Situation.) (~f
Own Situation
Narvik:
At 0430 the Uroup reported heavy bombardment of Elvegaardsmoen
by warships. Lively scouting activity indicates offensive
action soon by the superior enemy.
The Naval Communications Officer reports very difficult
conditions, both technical and regarding personnel, in the
development of radio traffic since all communication between
units of Group Narvik is possible only in Code M (machine
code) with naval radio operators and the radio station, in
an exposed position, suffers daily bombardment. Very great
strain on personnel.
Supplies of food for the civilian population of Narvik and
the hinterland will be seriously endangered after Norwegian
stocks are exhausted. Commander requests help via Sweden.
Trondhe im ;
Commander, 2nd Destroyer Flotilla has been instructed to
endeavor to restore his destroyers1 readiness to proceed,
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28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
both regarding personnel and engines, with all the means
in his power.
Enemy carrier-borne planes attacked Trondheim at dawn.
Hits on transmitter, village and airfield.
Because of Armed Forces High Command's information that
Trondheim is adequately supplied with Army guns through
those captured, Ships "26" and "37" (carrying field howitzers
to Trondheim) have been diverted and ordered to pvt in to
Bergen separately in favorable weather.
No news from either ship.
Bergen;
Operation to set up torpedo batteries in Hardanger Fjord
has commenced.
Stavanger:
Stavanger 15 cm. battery will probably be ready for action
with two guns on 1 May. Two more guns have arrived on the
steamers ALSTERUFER and ALSTERTOR.
Because of the importance of Stavanger, Admiral, West
Norwegian Coast requests that a regular Captain, with Staff,
be appointed Port Commander, Stavanger. Previous Port
Commander to Haugesund. High Command, Navy agrees to the
proposal. Captain Fricke (Otto) has been appointed Port
Commander.
Skagerrak /Kattegat ;
Several submarine sighting and location reports .point to
fresh intensification of the danger from submarines. •
Attacks on submarines without visible result.
No further mines detected. Minesweeping to detect and mark
the British barrages off Frederikshavn continues. Check
sweeping of various areas in the Kattegat fruitless.
The 17 cm. batteries "Schill" and "Raule" in Tyboroen and
Hanstholm are temporarily ready for action with four guns.
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28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Transport Situation;
Transport of troops and material proceeded according to plan
under escort by units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses,
Baltic and constant air cover by Commander, Naval Air,
Baltic. Fast troopships took 780 men to Larvik. Further
transports arrived in Oslo with men and material. The first
party of the 2nd Mountain Division was transported.
Material carried on drifters, so far unmolested. Empty
steamers in the area as planned.
Submarine Situation
Unchanged. (For TJ n47,?,s bri-ef report see War Diary,
Part B, Vol. IV. )
Air Situation
Very successful Air Force attacks on naval forces and
transports (merchantmen) in the area Namsos-Molde-Andalsnes;
against harbor installations in Namsos, Kristiansand, Molde
and Andalsnes, and in support of the Army's advance.
4 transports or freighters sunk
1 steamer destroyed, 3 beached
3 transports or supply steamers severely damaged.
1 light cruiser - 250 kg. bomb on stern
1 light cruiser - 250 kg. bomb on forecastle
(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.)
The 5th Air Force has been directed to transfer a dive-
bomber group to Trondheim as soon as possible.
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28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Merchant Shipping
War againgt Merchant Shipping: Since the Fuhrer's decree
of 24 April 1940 established the .existence of a state of
war with Norway, Norwegian merchantmen and their cargoes
will he fundament ally treated as enemy in accordance with
Prize Regulations, Article 10 onwards.
After consultation with Reich Commissar Gauleiter Terboven,
who reserves rights regarding treatment of Norwegian
shipping in Norwegian ports for the purpose of centralized
control of the whole economic area, Commanding Admiral,
NoBway has issued the following directive to offices in
Norway:
"Treat neutral ships carrying contraband,
according to Prize Law» For Norwegian ships
I shall issue, in agreement with the Reich
Commissar, individual instructions in every
case. Former ruling stands for use as
auxiliary vessels."
Naval Staff explains the order in that requests by the Navy
for shipping, including tankers, for military purposes are
fulfilled in every case and that in these cases an agreement
with Reich Commissar Terboven is only necessary on whether
they are to be confiscated according to Prize Law without
compensation or merely requisitioned while remaining the
property of the shipping company.
Commanding Admiral, Norway was informed to this effect.
It is also necessary to clarify with the Commissar how far
Norwegian cargoes on Norwegian ships are to be rejected by
Prize Law. This always seems advisable if the cargo was
destined for enemy powers. Commanding Admiral, Norway has
been instructed to inform Oslo Naval Office in good time,
as the representative of the Reich Commissar at the Prize
Court in Hamburg, of all seizures under Prize Law.
The treatment of foreign shipping and cargoes in Denmark has
not yet been cleared up. Negotiations are in progress with
the Foreign Office.
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29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political^ Importance
1. Norway:
Reports from Norway give the following picture of the
situation in the entourage of the King of Norway:
(dated 19 April)
King Haakon, completely broken, in Northern
Norway. His entourage split in two directions.
Foreign Minister Koht and General Ruge,
commanding the central Norwegian forces, are
said to be ready to come to an agreement with
Germany (?)• Prime Minister Nygaardsvold and
General Laaka are sharply opposed to any
agreement. Great despondency in the Norwegian
High Command. The troops themselves are still
resolved to resist outside the battle zone as
the result of British propaganda.
2. For reaction abroad to the Foreign Minister's
statement, especially the official counter statement by the
British Government, see Political Review No. 98.
3. Sweden :
The Swedish Military Attache' in Berlin again stated Sweden's
unconditional desire to remain neutral and to be as
benevolent towards Germany as possible. Swedish measures
have rendered surprise landings in ports or on airfields
impossible. Violations of the frontier near Kiruna would
bring about the demolitions prepared, so that any despatch
of ore would be impossible for at least two years.
4. U.S.A. :
The German Charge df Affaires in Washington reports as follows
on the attitude taken up by U.S. public opinion towards the
Norway operation:
1. The operation has proved that widespread and
willingly believed reports about a state of
exhaustion in Germany were false.
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29 April 1940
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2.
3.
4.
5.
Geamany was forced to take counter
measures "by the British violation of
neutrality.
Great Britain has been forced to use
strong troop formations in Norv/ay for
strategic and propaganda reasons.
If Great Britain does not succeed in doing
away with the German occupation of Norway
she runs the risk of losing ftae war.
All other neutrals, including Turkey, have
received a lesson and a warning.
There are many negative reactions opposed to the positive
ones:
1.
Feeling towards Germany has
extraordinarily, especially
West, which Is settled to a
by Scandinavians.
deteriorated
in the Middle
great extent
2.
The American people have reached a state
of excitement in which the interventionists
have an easy game. The U.S.A. could
influence the result of the war decisively
without using their own troops, by increased
deliveries and by the removal of the credit
blockade.
In conclusion, the Charge d' Affaires states:
"While the election campaign is on, important
decisions regarding foreign policy can only be
expected under exceptional circumstances. Such
circumstances would arise if Sweden or Holland
were attacked. The situation in the Pacific
would preclude full U.S. support for the Allies.
The U.S.A.'s entry Into the war would necessitate
complete military and economic mobilization, for
which the organizational and financial basis is
at present still lacking. The prospects of
Roosevelt's re-election have increased
considerably.
it
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29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
!• The supply ship NORDMARK reports her position as
79°N, 2.5°E and requests permission for privateer warfare
in northern waters. Group West has granted the request
and suggests that the ship operate first in northern waters
and then in the Atlantic on cruiser warfare, since there
are no other assignments for her at present.
Naval Staff thinks otherwise and cannot agree to the Group's
proposal. Use in cruiser warfare for which the ship, as a
tanker and supply ship, is in no way specially suitable,
does not correspond to the main assignments scheduled for
her. She should only be considered for cruiser warfare
when she has fulfilled her task as a supply ship or is C\£
released from it. Naval Staff is making every endeavor to
send the battleships on sorties into the northern North Sea
as soon as possible. If this plan has so far not been
practicable, the reason is the deficient readiness of the
destroyers, a minimum number of which must assume protection
of the battleships. As long as we are still considering
operations in northern waters in the immediate future the
readiness of the NORDMARK in the northern area may be of
great importance. Group West has been informed of Naval
Staff's viewpoint and instructed that the NORDMARK is to
be held in readiness away from all traffic. The ship's
subsequent transfer to Base North is planned.
2. The Fuhrer has learned of Naval Staff's plan to
withdraw the cruiser EMDEN from Oslo. Because of the
slight anti-aircraft defenses of Oslo harbor, the Fuhrer
has decreed that the EMDEN is to remain in Oslo until
sufficient anti-aircraft defense has been ensured.
The Fuhrer also fears an undesirable withdrawal of defense
forces from present, very urgent transport operations.
Naval Staff sees a specially favorable opportunity for the
return of the EMDEN at present, since there are still
sufficient fast defense vessels available for anti-submarine
escort in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. The EMDEN 's return
would not cause any delay to transports.
In accordance with the Fuhrer' s wishes, Chief, Naval Staff
has ordered that the EMDEN remain in Oslo for the present.
He will discuss the matter with the Fuhrer.
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29 April. 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
3. The Submarine School units (torpedo recovery
vessels, anti-submarine unit) should return to the School
on 1 May, since their presence there is urgently necessary
for the training of officers and crews. Naval Staff does
not fail to appreciate the difficulties of training, but
does not feel in a position to withdraw the vessels now In
view of the great urgency of transport, especially of the
2nd Mountain Division. Group Baltic hes therefore been
ordered to retain the units temporarily and keep them on
transport duty.
4. The Commander of the cruiser LUETZOW has suggested
that, for the speedy re-establishment of the shlp^ war
readiness after repairs are completed, the officers and crew
should not now be completely separated or should anyway be
re-assembled In good time so that the experiences gained
during the first months of the war msy on no account be lost.
With regard to the availability of two pocket battleships at
the end of 1940, the Commander of the LUETZOW also suggests
investigation of the question whether combined operations by
the two ships in close tactical conjunction V'ould not be a
better guarantee for the greatest possible success than
separate operations. He Is thinking of combined appearance
in the North and South Atlantic, then simultaneous appearance
singly In the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Bengal and Arabian Sea.
Naval Staff completely agrees on the subject of maintaining
or ensuring the personnel of the crew.
According to previous Information from Naval (Ship)
Construction Division, repairs to the ship will require about
nine months. We can therefore expect readiness to proceed
and commissioning again about the end of December 1940/
beginning of January 1941.
So that the LUETZOW can be in operational readiness as soon
as possible after commissioning but at latest by a date which
still offers favorable conditions for the break-through into
the Atlantic In the winter months 1940/1941 (i.e. end of
February to end of March 1941 at the latest), also so that
the experiences gained during the first Atlantic operation
and during the period of preparation for the second (planned)
operation should not be lost, the ship must be re commissioned
by the personnel of the old crew. Prompt readiness for
action for long-range operations cannot be expected otherwise.
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29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Instructions to this effect have been sent to Naval Staff,
Service Division, Bureau of Naval Administration and
Officer Personnel Department,
The combined use of both pocket battleships in the Atlantic,
proposed by the LUETZOVl^, can only be considered if both ships
are ready for operations at the same time. As far as can
be seen, the ADMIRAL SCHEER will be ready for operations
about October 1940, the LUETZOW about the end of February
to March 1941, so that the possibility of combined use cannot
be counted upon.
If, however, through unforeseen circumstances the ships should
become ready at the same time, the question of combined or
separate action, in accordance with the strategic situation,
and of the objective to be achieved by use of the pocket
battleships in the Atlantic will have to be reviewed.
Since the pocket battleships' assignment is not action,
but attainment of a strong diversionary effect, it is true
that close tactical connection would force the enemy to
appear in greater strength; he would, however, have only
one area and one task force to take into account.
In principle it therefore seems practical to separate the
two pocket battleships, but to have Naval Staff bring them
together for a combined operation on occasion.
Naval Staff is keeping in mind the question of operations
against the British-Norwegian whaling fleets during the
winter of 1940/41. The pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER
and the auxiliary cruisers then in readiness would come
into question for such an operation.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic/Mediterranean:
Great Britain;
Scheveningen radio announces:
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29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
"It Is forbidden to anchor in the Straits of
Dover north of the line connecting Dungeness
and Cap d'Alprech, with the exception of the
Downs."
Forces in the Mediterranean;
The MALAYA and ROYAL SOVEREIGN in the western Mediterranean,
apparently en route for Malta. A "C" class cruiser is in
the Rhodes area, single auxiliary cruisers in the Lemnos area.
The submarines already In the Mediterranean, USIRIS, ORPHEUS,
OTUS and OTWAY, and the submarines proceeding from East Asia
to the Mediterranean, PROTHEUS, PARTHIAN, PHOENIX, OLYMPUS
and ODI, which were in the Red Sea on 27 April, are to form
the 1st Submarine Flotilla in the Mediterranean.
France:
Patrol service in the eastern Channel and merchant control
off the Scheldt estuary.
Mediterranean :
The BRETAGNE, LORAINE, and PROVENCE, also two destroyers,
put in to Algiers on 28 April. The ships were last detected
on 18 April in Oran.
North , Sea/Northern Waters;
Admiralty announcement:
"Mines laid in West Fjord as far as north of the
line stretching towards 12°E, i.e. from Vaer8v
Island light, 67°39'N, 12°45»E as far as the
mainland. Mines likewise laid in the channels
northeast and south of Steinvaer Island, SQQIO'N,
16035'E. Ships traversing these areas without
obtaining instructions from the local British
or the Norwegian authorities, do so at their
own risk."
Narvik area:
Customary warship activity off Narvik. Air reconnaissance
reported six destroyers off Narvik and cruisers, destroyers
and transports off Harstad.
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29 April 19,40 CONFIDENTIAL
Namso3 area;
Two cruisers, several destroyers and transports, also three
auxiliary vessels off Namsos and in Namsen Fjord. The town,
railroad station and harbor installations of Namsos were
destroyed in an air raid.
Molde Fjord-Andalsnes:
One cruiser, several transports sighted by air reconnaissance.
Successful air attacks on transports and supply steamers,
three of which were sunk and several damaged. No unloading
was observed.
Home area:
The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS, with destroyer escort, and the
cruiser ARETHUSA planned to put in to Scapa on 28 April.
Losses :
The Admiralty announces the loss of two trawlers through bomb
hits. It appears from radio deciphering that the anti-
aircraft cruiser CURACAO was damaged on 24 April by a bomb
hit in the engine and boiler room.
The Admiralty denies the sinking or damaging* of 5 steamers
and 13 transports reported by Germany.
Own Situation (
Situation on lan^.:
Group Narvik reports reinforcement of the enemy who attacked
our defenses near Elvenes with superior forces. Defenses
had to be withdrawn. Own situation is judged to be serious
if the Air Force does not succeed in bringing considerable
relief. Narvik reports successful intervention of planes
so far in action; apparently great effect on enemy.
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29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Trondheim Group advanced as far as Stflren from the north.
The most forward units of the 196th Division, coming from
the south, are near Ullsberg 45 km. before StBren.
Greatest difficulty in advancing, since all the bridges
are blown up and the enemy is firmly entrenched. The
east group encountered strong resistance near Rflros.
Situation completely cleared up in south Norwegian area;
Bergen unit advancing quickly.
With regard to the situation in the Trondheim area, Armed
Forces High Command, Operations Staff requests that the
2nd Mountain Division be brought over very quickly. It
is hoped that transportation will be completed by 8 May.
(16,000 men, 4,000 horses.)
Situation at Sea:
Narvik:
No defense from land possible against the constant warship
activity off Narvik.
Trondheim:
Nothing special to report.
Bergen:
Unsuccessful bombing attacks were made on a STINNES steamer
off Eide and on the tank installations near Grimstad Fjord.
Sixty men from the crews of the steamer AFRIKA and a STINNES
steamer were freed in Voss. Discharging of the "export"
steamer BAERENFELS continues.
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the Hardanger
Fjord torpedo battery is ready for action.
The torpedo battery in Sogne Fjord will probably be in
readiness by the end of the week.
The #4 cm. battery at Sandvigen has had firing trials and
is ready for action.
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29 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast plans to mine Sogne Fjord
with captured Norwegian mines during the night of 30 April,
In view of,
Submarines
Monitoring
points out
Bergen.
instructions from the British Commanding Admiral,
to a boat in Bjorne Fjord, picked up by the Radio
Service, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast again
the danger from submarines in the fjords off
Southern North Sea:
A minelaying formation of Commander, PT Boats sailed as
planned to reinforce the Skagerrak mine barrage against
submarines by mines with antenna firing.
Mine Situation:
Entrance to the Ems still endangered by mines. North Sea
Station requests the immediate provision of the vessels
requested for use of cable remote clearance gear, since
remote clearance gear can only be streamed up to wind
strength 3.
Transport traffic from and to Stavanger has so far proceeded
as planned. According to course instructions from Group
West, the steamers proceed, according to their speed, west
of the Skagerrak or along the coast to cross the Skagerrak
by the shortest route. Escort is provided by PT boats
and the Naval Air Arm.
Skagerrak/Kattegat :
Attacks on submarines north of Skagen, south of Oslo Fjord,
east of LHs8. Submarine-chase probably successful in two
cases (5th Submarine-Chaser Group and 17th Submarine-Chaser
Flotilla), one submarine very probably being destroyed
east of Lflsfl.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Mine situation unchanged. Planned minesweeping and clearing
delayed by the weather. Laying of net barrage near
Seelands Rev continues.
Transport Situation:
Transport movements continue as planned under the protection
of units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander,
Naval Air, Baltic. Fast troopships to Oslo (2,100 men) and
Larvik (780 men). Transport of material on drifters and
return voyage of empty steamers unmolested.
Situation in Denmark:
Group Baltic has been ordered to commence negotiations
through Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark with the Danish
Navy about the use of Danish naval vessels for tasks In
Danish waters.
The aim of the agreement ia the Inclusion of Danish forces
in the execution of assignments concerning both Navies.
Danish sovereignty will be fully maintained. Tasks for
the Danish formations to be used are to be assigned by the
Danish Navy; we control and supervise activity In agreement
with the Danish Naval Staff.
The following tasks are planned:
1, Minesweeping in Danish waters and also,
according to Group Baltic, in areas of the
entrances to the Baltic, along the Danish
coast and on certain shipping routes.
2. Patrol in Danish waters and in areas
allocated by Group Baltic. Harbor defense
tasks, patrol of Danish mine barrages, anti-
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29 April 1940
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mine and anti-aircraft escort service
for merchant traffic are concerned.
3. Observation service against enemy
minelaying planes.
4. Repair and maintenance of Danish mine
barrages.
Group Baltic has been instructed to reach agreement about
the vessels to be used and kept in commission for these
tasks and if necessary also the seizure of mine-exploding
vessels by the Danish Navy
communications personnel,
be left to the Danish Navy
vessels with sweeping gear
be mentioned to the Danes
and possible drafting of German
The question of flags is to
The equipment of Danish
against ground mines is not to
at present.
Situation in the Atlantic:
Ship "36" has been ordered to appear again in the North
Atlantic, in case the QQQQ report from the tanker DONNAa
originated from her. If necessary she is to change her
operational area, since Naval Staff has the Impression
that the enemy has not yet recognized the presence of a
merchant raider in the North Atlantic.
Submarine Situation
Returned from operation:
On return passage:
In the operational area:
Proceeding to Trondheim:
u
"52".
u
"29",
"34", "17",
"23".
u
"25",
"65", "61",
"30",
"13",
"57", "58",
"59",
"14",
"24".
u
"32",
U "A".
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>
29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Air Situation
Air Force operations concentrated on aid for Narvik and
armed reconnaissance in the Andalsnes-Namsos area.
Two transports damaged off Andalsnes. Six transports
and freighters sunk or destroyed in Molde Fjord and
Trondheim Fjord. Two steamers damaged in Namsos Fjord.
Air reconnaissance gained the impression that the enemy
is evacuating Namsos.
(For particulars see Air Situation 2400.)
Merchant Shipping
Scandinavian Shipping;
The Spanish Government has made a proposal to the Norwegian
Government to take over the Norwegian ships now in Spanish
ports, together with cargo.
Reports come from the U.S.A. of representations made by
U.S. trade circles to the State Department for unimpeded •
traffic by Danish and Norwegian ships lying in neutral ports
or transfer of their cargo.
According to a communication from the head of the transport
department of the people fs commissariat for foreign trade,
there are no Danish and Norwegian ships in U.S.S.R. waters.
It is reported from Chile that the Danish ships are
remaining, while the Norwegians are putting out.
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29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Supplement to 29 April
1530: Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy
and the Fuhrer.
Points discussed;
1. Further construction on the aircraft
carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN.
Fuhrer agrees to construction being
stopped.
2. The EMDEN is to remain a further two
weeks or so in Oslo, until anti-
aircraft defense of the port is
sufficiently assured.
3. Carrying out troop transports to
Norway.
(For particulars see Commander in Chief's memorandum,
War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.)
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30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Items of Political Importance
1. Norway:
The Norwegian Government has issued en official statement
from its unknown headquarters. It says:
"The Norwegian Government has learnt from the
radio of the German Government » a statement on
26 April that it was at war with Norway. It
must confirm that it has had knowledge of a
state of war already since the night of
8 April."
Otherwise "the statement is directed against German
operations and ends with the words:
"The fight for freedom and independence goes on."
Foreign Minister Koht gave his opinion on Ribbentrop's
declarations and maintained that they represented a
complete distortion of the facts.
2. Italy:
According to the report of an authoritative Italian, a
change of mood has actually taken place in wide circles of
the population since the Brenner conference and Ribbentrop's
visit. There has been a return to the Axis, even though a
section of the population is still not convinced of the
necessity for Italian participation in the war. It is
still important, however, he states, that the Church also
should not conduct itself in an inactive or reluctant
manner in such an event but take up some definite attitude
\ to the question.
3. Tangier:
Diplomatic circles wish to ascertain whether Tangier will
immediately be occupied by the Western Powers if there is
conflict in the Mediterranean.
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30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
4. U.S.A. ;
The B.B.C. announces that the U.S.A. have released the
latest models in tanks and guns for sale abroad.
Survey of the Situation
Special Reports on the Enemy
Atlantic/Mediterranean;
Great Britain: ,
Intelligence Center, Spain confirms that the MALAYA ana
RESOLUTION sailed to the east from Gibraltar on 28 April.
At 1100 on the same day, Admiral, Gibraltar ordered all
warships and merchant ships lying in the harbor to be
ready to sail at four hours' notice.
France:
French radio traffic in the Mediterranean indicates greater
activity by the forces there. The Admiralty was informed
of the sailing at noon of four vessels from Blzerta,
including at least one cruiser. The formation is probably
proceeding into the western Mediterranean.
Neutrals:
An intelligence report from Constanta dated 25 April:
"Crews of Italian ships are said to have stated
that their ships have orders to return to Italy
by the quickest route."
North Sea/Northern Norway:
Intelligence Center, Belgium reports departure of a French
Expeditionary Corps, in the strength of a division, from
Rouen and Le Havre. The Expeditionary Corps is said to
consist of mountain artillery, a battalion of Chasseurs
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30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Alpins, four batteries of field artillery, engineers and
one infantry regiment. British troops are also said to
have left the port of Falmouth in the direction of Namsos
on 29 April (steamers HIGHLAND CASTLE, EMPRESS OF BRITAIN,
MOORLAND ) .
Northern Norway;
Several naval vessels and transports in Gratangen Fjord
north of Narvik. Further troop disembarkations. Group
Narvik expects enemy attacks by greatly superior forces.
Central Norway;
Enemy vessels in the area of Namsos, Molde and Kristiansund.
One cruiser end destroyers in Namsos Fjord. Successful
attacks by our Air Force. Air reconnaissance reported 2
cruisers with 2 destroyers on northeasterly course 70 miles
west-northwest of Stadtlandet and 2 cruisers on southwesterly
course 30 miles north of this group.
Southern Norway;
The submarine TRITON received a radio message in which she
was informed of the appearance of mines south of Skudesnes
inside the 100 fathom line and in which the entrance to
Skudesnes Fjord west of Hvidings6*y was described as mine-free.
Home area;
The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS put in to Scapa on 28 April
with six destroyers. The anti-aircraft cruiser CURLEW at
Scapa on 30 April. The anti-aircraft cruiser CURACAO,
which was damaged by a bomb hit near Aalesund, plans to
proceed to the Nore base. The cruiser PENELOPE in the
area Shetlands-Norway.
The Admiralty announces the loss of the submarines TARPON
(1,090 tons) and STARLET (690 tons), also of the trawlers
BRADMAN and CAPE SIERETKO.
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CONFIDENTIAL
30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Own Situation
Atlantic :
Nothing to report. Enemy shipping routes passed on to
the auxiliary cruisers (see radiogram 1100). The supply
ship NORDMARK was instructed not to conduct cruiser warfare
but to stand on and off in northern waters.
North Sea/Northern Waters;
Narvik;
Light enemy forces bombarded roads on Herjfings Fjord,
Enemy attack is expected on Elvenes with simultaneous advance
from the southwest from Bogen. Air Force support urgently
requested.
The Staff of Group Narvik is in Sildvlk.
Nav8l and Air Force radio station in Narvik.
Trondheim;
Nothing special to report.
Bergen;
Minelaying operation in Sogne Fjord commenced by minelayers
ULLER and TYR. The 15 cm. Army guns which were salvaged
from the steamer BAERENFELS have been put at the disposal
of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast by the Army for the
purpose of coastal defense. Army personnel is being sent
from Germany.
Single prize steamers were despatched to home waters from
Bergen via Stavanger.
Southern North Sea;
Since the remote clearance gear is only capable of limited
use in wide North Sea estuaries because of the prevailing
weather, Group West requests an increased allocation of
cable remote clearance gear with addition for shallow
water. Increase in production is considered urgently
necessary in view of losses of gear. Allocation of
further mine-exploding vessels is requested.
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CONFIDENTIAL
(
30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Everything is being done by High Command, Navy (Naval Staff,
Service Division and Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater
Obstacles Branch) speedily to bring the Groups' equipment of
clearance gear against magnetic mines to a satisfactory
status.
Ship "40" confirms the destruction of an enemy submarine
west of Tyboroen on the morning of 10 April by subsequent
appearance of pieces of wreckage and other objects.
Skagerrak/Kattegat ;
The minelaying operation by Commander, PT Boats, West to
extend the North Sea West Wall went as planned. Because
controls broke down on the LEOPARD the boat was rammed by
the minelayer PRET7SSEN and sank. The crew was saved
except for one officer.
The barrage lies; from 57020. 5»N, 5°3.5'E
to 57°38.3'N, 4°54» E.
482 EMD mines without contact setting,
depth-setting 3m.,
1,119 explosive floats, type D,
depth-setting 6 m.
Submarine warning northeast and east of Lasc*. Results of
attack questionable. Air attack on submarine west of
Skagen on 29 April was very probably successful according
to observations subsequently reported.
-317-
CONFIDENTIAL
30 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Mine Situation:
Unchanged,
Group Baltic suggests closing the northern entrance to the
Sound "by a double net barrage. Gap in barrage off the
coast of Seeland at 10 nw depth in order to mske possible
Swedish traffic from Malmfl to Gothenburg even for the
largest steamers. No pilot service, gap in barrage well
marked, barrage patrol.
Transport Situation:
Transports of troops and material as planned.
Mine Defense in the Baltic:
Group West requests the setting up of new harbor defense
groups in all important ports on the Baltic and Danish coast
because of increasing threat from mines. (See radiogram 2017.
Submarine Situation
Put in to port:
In the operational area
Proceeding to Trondheim;
U "A" is carrying:
U "101" is carrying;
On return passage:
U "34".
U "25", "65", "61", "30",
"13", "57", "58", "59",
"14" "24"
U "A",'"32"/"101".
185 cbm. aviation gasoline.
15 tons lubricating oil.
2 x 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns.
16 x 250 kg. bombs.
60 cbm. aviation gasoline.
1 x 8.8 cm. gun.
8 x 250 kg. bombs.
U "29", "17", "23".
-318-
CONFIDENTIAL
30 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
Air Situation
See Air Force Events of the Day.
During the attacks in the Namsos-Andalsnes area a cruiser
(flotilla leader) was severely damaged by two 250 kg. hits
and sank. Another cruiser damaged by a 250 kg. hit.
Several transports and freighters damaged, one steamer sunk.
The 9th Air Division carried out an aerial minelaying
operation on the east coast of Britain; 23 aerial mines were
laid. Attack from Dunkirk to Blyth. Fighter and anti-
aircraft defense in Dunkirk. Barrage balloons on barges
500 m. south of the southern mole on the Tyne estuary.
Enemy air raid on Oslo during the night of 29 April.
Attacks in waves on Stavanger in the afternoon; 8 British
planes shot down so far; 4 of our fighters lost.
Merchant Shipping
The following ships are reported as under construction in
Danish yards for foreign or Danish account:
a)
Launched:
British motor
ve s s e 1
9,100 GRT
rt tt
rt
11,000 GRT
Norwegian "
tt
3,100 GRT
(Refrigerating
chambers)
Danish "
ft
1,836 GRT
•
(Passenger ship)
n ft
tt
9,900 GRT
also
British "
tt
9,100 GRT
(Steam tanker)
43,936 GRT
(Roughly completed).
-319-
CONFIDENTIAL
30 April 1940
CONFIDENTIAL
b)
Keel laid down:
For France
n U.S.A.
" Chile
" Norway
" Denmark
1 ship 10,700 GRT
1 " 9,400 GRT
1 w 3,300 GRT
5 ships about 38,000 GRT
7 ships about 46,000 GRT
107,400 GfcV
Conference on the Situation
with Chief, Naval Staff
Special Items
i
1. Fleet Command requests (in gkdos 764 A3) a longer
period of training for the battleships, HIPPER and also the
destroyers in the Baltic, since the present state of training
is judged to be quite insufficient.
For operational reasons Group West adopts a negative
attitude to the request.
Naval Staff agrees with the Group Command's opinion and
has come to the following decision:
"The special situation which has arisen from the
Norwegian assignment and can still be regarded
as by no means settled and the new tasks for
the Navy expected to arise from Operation
"Gelb" require that a special standard be applied
to the points raised by Commanding Admiral,
Fleet. rt
It is known that training in the sense of a systematic
peacetime training cannot be carried out to the desired
extent; on the other hand the forces in action have so far
done full justice to the demands made on them. A certain
amount of training in operations themselves must be taken
into account.
The operational situation does not at the present time
permit us to dispense with the battleships. Widespread
use of the ships is still to be one of our endeavors.
-320-
CONFIDENTIAL
30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Operations which take place must, however, make allowance
for the material state of readiness of the ships. A 14-day
training period in the Baltic Sea, i.e. away from the
operational base line of the Heligoland Bight, also cannot
be granted at present; its possibility will depend on the
development of the situation.
A decision to commence a 10-week dockyard period is
likewise still impossible^.
When listing the necessary work all possibilities must be
exhausted and* only the essentials worked out, in an attempt
to shorten the dockyard period.
Destroyers; A dockyard overhaul of the destroyers SCHOEMANN,
BEITZEN and HEINEMANN, at present still able to proceed,
seems unavoidable. It is to be commenced when the
destroyers at present In dock have attained full readiness
for action. The latter are to commence a training period
of 14 calendar days at most in the North Sea, if necessary
also in the Baltic, after completion of the dockyard period.
It must be possible to have recourse to them for operational
use at any time.
It remains to be seen whether the operational situation will
permit the full execution of such training (especially in
the Baltic).
The new torpedoboats are not to be included in calculations
of light forces ready for use. Their final readiness for
action is still a matter of complete uncertainty.
The fundamental evil with regard to the complaints about
lack of training is the constant change of personnel.
Every endeavor must be made, in certain circumstances even
accepting disadvantages for the individual or abandoning
certain conditions of promotion, to limit drafting to a
minimum.
2. The Fuhrer has decreed Investigation of the question
as to whether transport of the 2nd Mountain Division to Norway
can be speeded up by the use of the East Asia steamers
GNEISENAU and POTSDAM. The investigation has shown that in
practice there would be no speeding-up but rather a delay as
against normal transport in view of the four or five days
required to fit up the ships and their poor facilities f6r
carrying horses and gear.
-321-
CONFIDENTIAL
30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL
Chief, Naval Staff has therefore decided:
2nd Mountain Division is not to be carried on
the GNEISENAU/POTSDAM but by previous transport
facilities. The GNEISENAU and POTSDAM are,
however, in any case to be fitted up as troop-
ships in case fast transports are necessary-
later on.
3. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered the formation of
numerous motor boat flotillas for use on defense and
reconnaissance tasks in the Norwegian fjords. Consideration
is to be paid to defense of the bases, especially Bergen and
Trondheim, against attacks by enemy PT boats. (Creation of
boom defenses, if necessary quick-firing barrage batteries,
advance defense and patrol positions.)
G
4. Report on the Situation on Land;
The unit in the Gudbrand Valley advancing in pursuit of the
retreating enemy reached the railroad and road junction of
Dombaas. Land communication with Trondheim via Ullsberg-
Stflren was established. The main railroad line from Oslo
to Trondheim also fell into our hands through the occupation
of Opdal. Strong Norwegian units surrendered.
The Western Powers' attempt to oppose Germany's occupation
of southern Norway and to encircle Trondheim can thus be
regarded as a failure. Southern Norway as far as north of
Trondheim is now safely in German hands. The situation of
the Allied troops landed south of Trondheim can be described
as hopeless. We can expect speedy and complete pacification
of the occupied area.
-322-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
GLOSSARY
"Bremen"
Cover name for Bergen.
"Detmold"
Cover name for Trondheim.
EMC
Standard mine, type C; a contact mine against
surface vessels.
EMD
Plummet sinker mine with contact firing (old model).
"Gelb"
Cover name for planned invasion of the Low Countries
"Kassel"
Cover name for Copenhagen.
"Nienburg"
Cover name for Narvik.
SC (250,500)
Thin-shell high-explosive bombs.
SD (50)
Thick-shell high-explosive bombs.
" We s e rue bung"
Cover name for planned invasion of Norway.
"Weseruebung Sued"
Cover name for planned invasion of Denmark.
-323-
CONFIDENTIAL
Q
»
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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