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Part A Volume 8 

April 1940 



(Operations Division) 

April 1940 

Chief, Naval Staff: Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr.h.c. 

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff; Vice Admiral Schniewind 

Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff: Rear Admiral Fricke 

Volume 8 

begun: 1 April 1940 
closed: 30 April 1940 


t 'I 



, ill 

V5 : 


Washington, D. C. 


1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to 
translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval 
Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German 
Naval Staff , operations Division Part A, Volume 8 is the twenty- 
fifth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow 

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they 
contain a day by day summary of the information available to the 
German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. 
Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the 
German Navy, 1939-1945 ., which have been published by this office, 
the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of 
naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, 

is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War 
II; references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval 
Records and ■ Library \^i 

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited 
number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that 
the copies which have been distributed are made available to other 
offices which may be interested. 

Washington, D. C. 




Documents, instructions, special orders and 
minutes: see "Reference Pile Weseruebung" in War Diary, 
Part B, Vol. V, page 120 (Special volume). 





1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway 

According to repeated reports from agents, differences 
of opinion are said to exist between Great Britain and France. 
France is said to desire immediate action and to demand 
increased pressure on neutrals, while Great Britain is more 
inclined to delay. Great Britain allegedly hopes to be able 
to effect an estrangement between Russia and Germany, 

With regard to Norway, it is expected in London that the 
Western Powers will take stronger action, at first in that 
German merchantmen can no longer be permitted passage through 
Norwegian territorial waters and Norway is forced to stop this 
traffic by means of political pressure from the Allies. 

Reuter states that Great Britain will not penetrate by 
force into neutral territorial waters or take similar illegal 
steps. "United Press" reports that in London it is being 
semi-officially denied that Great Britain is planning to patrol 
Scandinavian territorial waters, land troops in Norway or 
occupy ports there. 

Reports from Norway and Great Britain express opinions 
on the subject of ore shipments via Narvik and come to the 
conclusion that exports of Swedish iron ore to Germany via 
Narvik have sunk to a fraction of what they were in peacetime, 
while ore shipments to Great Britain show a marked upward trend. 

The Swiss Ambassador in Stockholm reports to his Government: 

German and British landings on the Norwegian coast 
are directly imminent. (See also Foreign Press 
and Foreign Press (Naval news)). 

2. The German publication of documents is still being 
discussed with unusual excitement in the U.S.A. Roosevelt 
and Hull have described the documents as unauthenticated and 
as a transparent German propaganda maneuver. The general 



1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

opinion in neutral countries is that Germany has abandoned 
hope of improving her relations with the U.S., A., and wishes 
to prevent Roosevelt's re-election through the publication 
of the documents. 

3. The Norwegian Government has protested to Berlin about 
the torpedoing of the steamer STEINSTAD off the Irish coast 
on 15 Feb. while en route from Turkey to Norway. The ship 
was sailing between two neutral countries with freight for a 
Norwegian firm. There was a Government guarantee that the 
cargo would not be re-exported from Norway. 

(For further particulars see War Diary, Part C, VIII.) 


Afternoon : 

The Commander of the LUETZOW, Captain Thiele, reported to 
Commander in Chief, Navy to give notice of departure and for 
final conferences with Naval Staff. The ship will be ready 
to sail for the Atlantic in a few days after the period in 
dock necessary for completion of remaining work. 

During numerous conferences held lately complete agreement 
has been established between Naval Staff and the Captain - who 
has adapted himself and his ideas to his cruiser warfare 
assignment in an excellent manner - on all questions of 
operations in the Atlantic, on interpretation of the operational 
order and on all individual military and political questions 
and those of International Law. 



1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Great Britain : 

According to radio monitoring, the old battleship RODNEY is to 
go into dock. The agent's report about damage to the RODNEY 
by a bomb hit on 16 March is thus confirmed to a certain degree. 

France : 

According to an agent's report a British convoy is said to 
have left Dunkirk today, destination unknown. 

No items about naval forces. 

North Sea : 

No alterations of note in the movements of the Home Fleet. 

A report from Great Britain mentions the rumor that the 
battleship NELSON was also damaged by a bomb hit on 16 March. 

Intelligence Center, Belgium reports that in the air attack 
on the convoy east of the Shetlands on 28 March one ship 
(EARL CASTLE) was sunk, five damaged and one escort cruiser 
("D 11 class) likewise damaged. 

A convoy seems to have l.eft the Norwegian coast on 31 March. 

Own Situation 

Order from High Command, Navy: 

Summer time from 1 April. 

1. Summer time is to be used in home waters in orders and 
reports, also in communications for the duration of 
summer time. 



1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

2. G.M.T. still applies in foreign waters. 

3. Submarines are all to use German summer time in 
foreign and home waters. 

4. If other times are used in exceptional cases, these 
are to be explained by a footnote, e.g. 1400 "C.E.T. ". 

Atlantic : 

Nothing to report. 

North Sea : 

No reports from Ship "16 n and Ship "11", so that operstions 
may be presumed to be proceeding according to plan. The 
air reconnaissance scheduled for Ship "16 as far as the 
Shetlands-Norway channel had to be recalled because fog came 
down in the central North Sea. 

The 11th Patrol Boat Flotilla was unsuccessfully attacked by sis 
Wellington bombers on route "Blau". 

One Blenheim was shot down by a fighter over the North Sea, 

According to observations made on 31 March, the Air Force 
reports that we must count on the possibility of the enemy 
using camouflaged planes with an Iron Cross (He 111) for 
reconnaissance over the Heligoland Bight and to provoke 
incidents over neutral territory. (They are possibly planes 
which the enemy has purchased from Turkey. ) 

Baltic Sea ; 

Shipping possible from Kiel-Swinemuende-Pillau except for 
local hindrance from drift ice; conditions good off Pillau. 
Ice difficulties between Sassnitz and Trelleborg. Route 
through the Sound blocked by heavy pack ice. Passage through 
the Great Belt only slightly impeded by ice. 

2 submarine chasers in the Skagen area, 
2 on return passage. 

Investigation of the barrage situation in the Great Belt and 
repair work in the Gjedser Channel continue. Group Baltic 
reports that there is no longer any objection to passage 
through the Great Belt. 



1 April 1940 


A plane on air reconnaissance accidentally flew over 
Danish territory in bad visibility and was fired on. 

The survey vessel METEOR was commissioned as command ship 
for Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic in "Weseruebung" 

Submarine Situation 

Atlantic/Northern Waters ; 

Off Narvik: 
Off Trondheim: 
Proceeding as Ship "16 M, s 

North Sea : 

Peterhead area: 

East of the Orkneys: 


On passage: 

U "46". 

U "51". 

U "37". 

U "22". 

U "38", "43", "52" 

U "44". 

U "13", "58", "59" 

Merchant Shipping 

Disposition of German merchant shipping on 1 April: 

1. In home waters : 

(Ships over 1,600 GRT) 578 ships = 

Of these - 

On Scandinavian run: 

7.5 ships, totaling 250,603 GRT. 

(16 under 1,600 GRT) 

of which 51 ships in Norway. 




1 April* 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

On Holland run: m 

3 ships, totaling 4,504 GRT. 

2. In neutral ports ; 218 ships a 25.6$ 
of these anchored: 26. 

The following cannot return: 

a) Because of unfavorable 
situation of their 
anchorages, (Mediterranean, 
Black Sea, Red Sea, 
Persian Gulf) 

73 ships 
(f 5 without radio). 

b) Scheduled for special duties: 

40 ships. 

3. At sea, homeward bound : 
Returned home to date: 

115 ships = 13.5$ 

4. Lost : 53 ships - 6.2$ 

(+ 2 without radio and 
1 trawler) 

849 ships • 100$ 

A review of German ships which have put out, homeward bound, 
from ports overseas and have arrived during the war shows 
the position to be as follows: 

Sailed in January 1940 : 

5 ships, of which lost: 1 ship = 20$ 
returned successfully 4 ships = 80% 



1 April 1940 


Sailed in February 1940 : 

11 ships, of which lost: 

returned successfully 

Sailed in March 1940 : 

4 ships, of which lost: 

returned successfully 

8 ships • 72.7$ 
3 ships ■ 27.3$ 

3 ships 
1 ship 


The motor vess-el SEATTLE, coming from Curacao, arrived 
in Tromsoe with a valuable cargo. 

The Ministry of Transportation has informed us that following 
elimination of the ships held In the Dutch East Indies, the 
ships in Japan will now also not be sent through the north- 
eastern route this year, since no cargo can be obtained for 
these ships. 

It would be extremely re 
cargoes at all were to s 
eastern route from East 
the necessary cargoes fo 
to sail could have been 
planning. According to 
the cargoes so far avail 
oil are so small and the 
transported by the safe 

grettable if no ships and valuable 
ucceed in reaching home by the north- 
Asia this year. In Naval Staff's opinion 
r the ships lying in Japan in readiness 
obtained by prompt and large-scale 

the Ministry of Economics 1 statement, 
able of soya beans (40,000 tons) and 
refore so valuable that they are to be 
railroad route. 

1330 - 1800 : 

At 1330, after breakfasting in the Chancellery of the Reich 
with the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, 
the commanders of the individual landing groups and Commander, 
31st Corps also the Commanding Admirals and commanders of the 
individual naval task forces and the Air Force commanders 
reported on the arrangement and execution of their operations 
during "Weseruebung" . 

The Fuehrer demanded most exhaustive reports from all the 
officers and asked many questions. In conclusion he stated 
his complete agreement with the preparations made ana expressea 
his thanks for and recognition of the work performed during the 
preparations • 



1 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

(For minutes of the Fuehrer' 3 address then given to the 
officers present see reference file "Weseruebung" , War 
Diary, Part B, V, 120.) 

See also individual questions, 2 April. 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway 

Reuter announces: The possibility of a significant 
intensification of the blockade cannot be denied, but the 
Allied Cabinets and the Supreme War Council have so far 
announced nothing. 

The British press goes into detail on the problem of Norway 
and on the subject of the imminent intensification of warfare. 
Although 8ny out of the ordinary or illegal action by the 
Western Powers against the neutrality of a neutral country is 
denied, "the Allies would take such action that neutral 
territories are no longer used by the Germans in order to 
break the blockade." 

The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, states in an interview 
with the press: 

"Norway protests with the same energy against the German as 
against the British violations of Norwegian neutrality. 
The material harm caused to Norway by Germany is deeply 
regrettable; Britain's violations of neutrality are, however, 
different and often did not affect Norwegian material interests 
so much as her honor and independence." 

Norwegian political circles appear to be expecting Great 
Britain to send a note to the Norwegian Government within a 
short time, demanding that Norway forbid ore shipments from 
Narvik to Germany. 

2. The German publication of documents is still dominating 
the entire U.S. press. In the House of Representatives, 
Republican Fish demanded the appointment of a committee of 
five within 30 days to examine the documents. 

It cannot yet be foreseen how the publication of the White 
Paper, which has caused noticeable unrest among the American 
people and has undoubtedly rendered Roosevelt's position more 
difficult, will affect the presidential elections and the 
U.S.A. 's attitude to Germany in the weeks ahead. 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 


According to a communication from Copenhagen, the 
Danish Government has established that the steamer EDMUND 
HUGO STINNES was definitely inside territorial waters when 
she was sunk. It is intended to protest to London, demanding 
the release of the Captain and compensation. 

Conference on the Situation w i th C hief, Naval Staff 

Special Items ; 

1. "Weseruebung" : 

During yesterday's conference with the individual 
commanders of the task forces, the Fuehrer reconsidered whether 
it was possible to send the destroyers alone to "Nlenburg" 
and to refrain from using the battleships in the northern area, 
since it is feared that the British Fleet will be prematurely 
alerted by them. 

The question of holding the battleships back was also discussed 
by individual group commanders on the basis that it might possibly 
be better that the battleships should first advance with the 
"Bremen" Group, and should appear rather in the central North 
Sea, i.e. south of the operational area, in order to avoid a 
general advance alarm in a northerly direction already two days 
before "Woserday", and in order to concentrate the enemy's main 
attention on the battleship group in the south for the purpose 
of relieving the northern groups. 

Naval Staff thinks otherwise and is of opinion that the 
previous plan of operations must be adhered to under all 

The aim of the first operation for the success of "Weseruebung" 
is to bring the destroyers safely through to "Nienburg" and 
the 2nd Group to "Detmold". In order to carry out this 
movement it may be necessary for the northern groups to fight 
their way through the light forces and perhaps also heavy 
cruisers in this area. The destroyers, limited in freedom 
of movement and readiness for action by the numerous troops 
on board, are as good as delivered defenseless into the hands 
of a superior enemy if they come up against light forces. 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Naval Staff therefore regards the advance by the battleships 
into the northern area as a necessary condition for successful 
operations by Groups "Nienburg" and "Detmold" • If the battle- 
ships are retained in the south and the enemy is therefore 
forced to concentrate on the southern area, Naval Staff 
considers that the prospects of a battle with a superior enemy 
are increased . This, however, is just what is to be avoided. 
There are, on the other hand, good chances of gaining effective 
successes if the battleships clash with light forces or heavy 
cruisers in the northern North Sea and the northern area. Even 
the destruction of one enemy cruiser might have consequences 
which would decisively influence the course of "Weseruebung". 

There is undoubtedly the possibility - and Naval Staff must 
take it into consideration - that the enemy will detect the 
battleships' departure with the 1st and 2nd operational groups 
on "Weserday" - 2 and that enemy forces will be given the 
alert. It may, however, be expected that the enemy will not 
draw any conclusions as to such a significant and comprehensive 
operation as "Weseruebung". On the contrary there is the 
possibility, if further air reconnaissance takes place on our 
movements towards the northern area, that the enemy will 
conclude it to be a break-through by Atlantic merchant raiders 
and will concentrate his countermeasures in the area Iceland- 
Shetlands, with a special view to the area north of the 
Shetlands. The focal point of countermeasures may thus possibly 
be diverted from an area in which Naval Staff considers danger 
to the light German forces operating there specially undesirable, 
i.e. in the Bergen/Southern Norway area, where the "Bremen" 
Group would be particularly exposed to enemy measures. 

Naval Staff adheres to its previous operational considerations 
for the reasons given above: The battleships will protect the 
advance of Group "Nienburg" and Group "Detmold" as per directives 
already issued. 

2. The Fuehrer has ordered that the question of a surprise 
operation to secure the bridge near Vordingborg over the 
Storstroem be examined, since the maintenance of the bridge is 
of great importance for Army transport. 

Naval Staff objects strongly to such an operation from the sea . 
It is not possible to approach the bridge from the east because 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

of the Danish Groensund barrage. Motor fishing vessels 
could approach from the west and transport roughly one 
reinforced company. The main difficulty, however, lies 
in the necessary very premature use of the inner Danish 
channels which are normally closed to any foreign traffic 
by the Danes. Advance warning by several hours (8bout five) 
is hereby unavoidable. Naval Staff therefore urgently 
advises Armed Forces High Command against the execution of 
such an operation. 

3. The Fuehrer has also ordered an examination into the 
question of despatching an old battleship to "Kassel". (For 
list of cover-names see reference file "Weseruebung"), to attain 
an expressly demonstrative effect and to prevent the departure 
of forces lying in the harbor and also the Government's 

Naval Staff must reject such an operation for military and 
navigational reasons. Putting-in of an old battleship drawing 
8 m. would involve great difficulties; the ship would be 
within range of the strong coastal fortifications both during 
and after putting-in. If, however, she remained outside the 
range of these guns, the desired political and demonstrative 
effect would not be achieved. Further, the premature alarm - 
which would be given at latest during passage through the 
Helsingborg/Helslngoer Channel - is also of decisive importance 
in this question. 

On Naval Staff's advice, Armed Forces High Command will refrain 
from despatching an old battleship. The HANSESTADT DANZIG 
transport operation previously planned will, therefore, be 
adhered to. 

4. Group West's request that a torpedo boat flotilla be 
withdrawn from "Weseruebung" for use in Operation "Gelb" is 
refused , since "Weseruebung" requires the use of all available 
combat forces. 

5. In view of the Fuehrer's decision, Naval Staff has given 
Group West permission to use aerial mines, effective immediately. 

6. The Swedish Foreign Minister, in a confidential 
conversation with the German Ambassador, requested that the 
German Naval Attache, Rear Admiral Steffan, be recalled speedily, 
as he considers him seriously compromized in connection with 
various Swedish investigations into cases of trade espionage. 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The German Ambassador expressly repudiated the accusation 
of espionage. 

Commander in Chief, Navy orders the recall of Rear Admiral 
Steffan in order to avoid further undesirable discussions. 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Great Britain : 

The following are at present suspected to be in the Northern 
to have been relieved and to have put in to port. 

Daventry produces a report according to which the crew of the 
British tanker EL CIERVO, which has arrived in Halifax, 
believe they sank a German submarine by gunfire on 4 March 
off Trinidad. This must be regarded as a political report 
for the purpose of influencing the South American States by 

France : 

Nothing special to report. 

North Sea : 

The cruisers GALATEA, SHEFFIELD, CAIRO, CALCUTTA and a number 
of TRIBAL class destroyers are at sea on convoy duty. (The 
GALATEA was 50 miles east of Pentland Firth in the morning.) 

British preparations for troop transports to Norway?: 

For result of investigations regarding a number of ships 
lying in readiness in Glasgow, apparently to transport troops, 
see Appendix to War Diary, B, Vol.V, 128. 

Own Situation 


Nothing to report. 


2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

North Sea: 

In order to protect Ship "16" T s break-through one Do 26 of the 
Transocean squadron took off from Travemuende on special 
reconnaissance. The flight lasted more than 18 hours, as 
far as roughly 65° N, but no vessels were sighted apart from 
some neutral merchantmen at about 62° oO f N. No reports 
from Ship "16" so it can be assumed that she is proceeding as 

One of the special trawlers disposed for reconnaissance off 
Iceland transmitted a weather report; strong east wind and 
showers • 

Ship "11" has carried out her assignment (mlnelaying east of 
Smith's Knoll lightship). Not possible to penetrate to 
convoy route because of patrols. Mines (90 EMC's and 84 
explosive floats, type C) were laid as planned in the alternative 
area east of Smith's Knoll. (See brief report on Ship "11" 's 
operation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. V., page 127.) 

Commander, Naval Air's reconnaissance sighted destroyers east 
of Lowestoft and had a brush with enemy fighters. One damaged 
He 115 was sunk after a forced landing. The crew was picked 
up by another He 115. 

The 10th Air Corps sent out during the afternoon 10 planes of 

the 30th Bomber Wing to Scapa and 11 planes of the 100th 

Bomber Wing against convoy traffic east of the Orkneys/Snetlands. 

Three light cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels were 
observed in Scapa. The presence of a balloon barrage at 200 m. 
was detected for the first time. 

Bomb hits in the immediate vicinity of the sides of two 
destroyers were scored in attacks. Success doubtful, especially 
since several planes experienced technical trouble with their 
bomb-release gear. Light and heavy anti-aircraft defense. 

Own Losses : 

1 plane shot down, 1 missing over Germany. 

The planes of the 100th Bomber V/ing encountered several convoys 
east of the Orkneys. Attacks unsuccessful. 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Baltic Sea : 

Ice Situation ; 

Shipping unimpeded from Kiel to Pllleu; southern part of 
the route through the Sound still very difficult, Great Belt 
passable • Passage possible through the Little Belt. 
After new barrage markings are laid It is expected that the 
difficulties in the barrage gaps will be eliminated in the 
next few days. 

The 1st Patrol Boat Flotilla has taken over barrage patrol 
in the Little Belt. 

Submarine Situation 



North Sea : 

U u 43", "38", "52", "44" (?) received orders to return. 

U "13" is proceeding Into the operational area east of 
Pentland Firth. U "22" is south of the latitude of the 
Pentland Skerries. U "58", "59" are on passage west of 
the Orkneys. 

Merchant Shipping 

Losses : 

According to a British announcement, the MIMI HORN was 
stopped last week by a British warship in northern waters, 
set on fire and scuttled by her own crew, all of whom were 
saved. (Ship sailed from Curacao on 4 Mffrch.) 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The steamer LUISE LEONHARDT reports from Oslo that on 20 March 
she was attacked by British bombers west of Esbjerg, outside 
Danish territorial waters. No hits* 

Mediterranean ; 

Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Affairs/intelligence 
Division has received a report that British control ships 
have put into the Adriatic in order to capture the German 
steamer ANKARA (put in to Dubrovnik at the end of last week) 
when she leaves Jugoslavian waters. The report sounds 
untrustworthy, even though we must expect the ANKARA to be 
under constant observation in view of the enemy's excellent 
agent network. The report is being investigated. 


Decision of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces : 

The execution of w Weseruebung M is ordered. The special 
importance of keeping the coming measures secret is pointed 
out. "Weserday": 9 April. *Wesertime w : 0515. 

(For Fuehrer's order see "Weseruebung" file.) 

On the basis of this order Naval Staff issues the following 
instructions on the evening of 2 April: 

1. To Group West, Group Baltic, Commanding Admiral, 
Submarines and Fleet Command: 

Subject: "Weseruebung" 

1. "Weserday" is 9 April. 

2. When issuing further orders and taking other 
measures avoid unusual volume in the interests 
of secrecy. 

(Ski. I op. 616/40.) 





2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

2. Naval Staff, Service Division, Transport Branch has 
been ordered to send off the first steamers of the 
"export" unit as scheduled. These are, to begin 
with, the steamers for "Nienburg"? 



ALSTER and the tanker 


3. The Naval Attache in Moscow is Instructed to 
despatch the tanker JAN WELLEM from Base North to 

4. Instructions to Group West, Group Baltic and Fleet, 
based on a directive from Armed Forces High Command: 
Swastika flag to be painted on the foredeck and 
after upper deck in addition to markings already 

5. With regard to the cruiser LUETZOW, Chief, Naval 
Staff reports to the Fuehrer on Naval Staff's pl8n 
to despatch her into the Atlantic in the course of 
"Weseruebung" and requests permission for this. 

At tbe request of Armed Forces High Command, the 
Fuehrer decides that the LUETZOW ia to embark a 
contingent of 400 men for "Detmold" and be incorporated 
in the 2nd Group. After the troops have disembarked 
at "Detmold" she is to put out into the Atlantic. 

Orders to this effect are issued to the sections 
concerned. Embarkation of the troops is ordered 
in Wilhelmshaven. The Commander of the "Detmold" 
Group will still be the Commander of the "HIPPER", 
as previously scheduled. The supply ship NORDMARK 
is to be sent out within the Bergen Group. 

"Weseruebung" has begun with the Fuehrer's order snd Nav8l 
Staff's executive orders. Thus commences an operation 
ranking as one of the boldest in the history of modern 
warfare. Its execution proved to be necessary to protect 



2 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

vital German interests and to ward off attempts by enemy 
powers to exclude Germany from sources of raw material. 
The fulfillment of the task entrusted to the Armed Forces 
in the execution of "We se rue bung" North and South is of 
decisive importance in the war. 

Within the whole operation demands involving great 
responsibility are made especially on the Navy. The 
success of the whole operation will depend on the efficiency 
and readiness of all naval forces participating and also on 
the determination of each individual naval officer entrusted 
with command. Execution and protection of the landing 
operation by the Navy will take place nrinclpally in an area 
where not Germany, but Great Britain is in a position to 
exercise naval supremacy with superior forces. 

It is of decisive importance for the successful execution of 
the whole operation that the enemy and the countries to be 
occupied be taken by surprise. 

The success of the operation will therefore depend on the 
degree to which secrecy has been and will be maintained 
during the next few days until "Wesertime" • Naval Staff 
has constantly expressed objections and endeavored to have 
the first transport operation limited to naval forces and 
not to have "export" units and sea transport units operate if 
possible before "Wesertime". Despite this, the number of 
merchant transport steamers with material, personnel, horses, 
vehicles, etc., which have been assembled and in readiness 
for a long time and are to be sent out before "Weserday", has 
reached such a proportion that the slightest incidents may 
cause previous warning and endanger the surprise execution 
of the operation. 

With regard to naval measures, thanks to the careful 
preparations made by all the naval offices concerned for 
"Weseruebung", Naval Staff awaits the operation with 
confidence. The fulfillment of our operational task will 
and must succeed if every commander is determined to reach 
the goal set him. Chief, Naval Staff again summarizes the 
importance of the operation and the necessary factors for 
success in a directive to all Commanding Admirals, Commanders 
and Flotilla Commanders and expresses his reliance on the 
resolute will to fight 8nd win of all naval units taking 

(For directive see reference file "Weseruebung".) 



3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Change in the British Cabinet (according to Reuter, 
to coordinate more closely the work of the different 
Ministries). Lord Chatfield, the Minister for Coordination 
and Defense has resigned. Churchill becomes Senior Minister 
for the three Armed Services. Air Minister Kingsley Wood 
has been replaced by Sir Samuel Hoare. 

These slight alterations in the British Cabinet are on the 
whole unimportant* The resignation of Lord Chatfield, 
acknowledged to be a particularly sound man, indicates 
differences of opinion within the Government. 

2. For Chamberlain's speech about the intensification 
of economic warfare and increased pressure on neutrals, see 
Foreign Press. Great attention and anxiety among the neutrals. 
It is assumed that very soon Great Britain will ration severely 
or stop altogether all imports of raw materials from overseas 

to neutrals, unless they pledge themselves to cease trading 
with Germany. Special mention is made in this connection of 
the cutting-off of ore and oil imports and the suppression of 
Russian transit traffic. 

Shortly before the speech "Havas" reports that Great Britain 
and France will probably give the neutral countries a final 
warning before taking draconic steps towards protecting 
Norwegian territorial waters. Great Britain would allegedly 
first exhaust all diplomatic means of pressure before she 
undertook naval action to cripple Norwegian iron ore shipments 
to Germany. Appropriate British notes to Norway and Sweden 
are said to be in course of preparation. 

3. Report from the German Embassy in Oslo regarding the 
Norwegian Government's diplomatic step on 2 April against 
the Western Powers. Protest against continuance of the 
threat to Norwegian territorial waters by France and Great 
Britain. For extract from the interview between Norwegian 
Foreign Minister, Koht, and Reuter' s representative see 
War Diary, Part B, V, 129. 

4. An agent in Denmark reports being informed by a 
Danish officer that in case of a German attack resistance 
will be offered under all circumstances; military measures 
have been taken for this purpose on the southern frontier. 
Contrary to their views of some months ago, military circles 
are now of the opinion that Germany is in a more favorable 
military position than Great Britain. 



3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

5. The German Embassy reports that Roosevelt, by-passing 
the War Minister, has accomplished deliveries of planes for 
the Western Powers. In spite of the exasperation of public 
opinion over Great Britain's blockade measures, Roosevelt is 
determined to extend the U.S.A. 's war economy efforts on 
behalf of the Western Powers in such a way that an Interest 
for Allied victory arises in the U.S.A. for economic reasons. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the state of 
"Weseruebung" : 

a) For readiness of forces see reference file 

b) The first three steamers of the camouflaged 
"export" unit and the tanker KATTEGAT for 
Narvik sailed during the night of 2 April. 
Chief, Operations Division again points out 
the fact that the use of steamers of the 
"export" and 1st Sea Transport Units represents 
an extremely undesirable risk (for the execution 
of the whole operation), since the enemy and the 
Norwegians will be given previous warning in case 
of the slightest incidents. Naval Staff's great 
objections to the use of these steamers, which 
will make their appearance several days before 
"Weserday", have already been pointed out several 
times to Armed Forces High Command, Group 21. 

In spite of this, Armed Forces High Command, Group 
21 Insists on its demand for these steamers. 

c) Boehm's Staff (Commanding Admiral, Norway) has 

set out its proposals for subsequent defense of the 
coastal route, (see "Weseruebung" file). Chief, 
Naval Staff agrees in principle to the requests 
made for provision of defense forces (4 patrol 
boat flotillas, 2 PT boat flotillas, 2 torpedo 
boat flotillas, 8 small submarines). The date when 
they will be provided however, cannot be promised, 





3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

as It will depend on the situation. 

d) Naval Staff consents to Group West's proposal 
to extend the Skagerrak barrage by further 
sections. (See letter in "Weseruebung" file.) 

2. Report on request from Group West (North Sea Station) 
regarding different measures in Operation "Gelb". 

(Occupation of Rot turn, shock attack on Delfzyl by motor 
minesweepers and PT boats. Penetration into the canals. 
For particulars see Group West's letter.) Naval Staff is 
of the opinion that special naval warfare in this area can 
on no account be considered. The available units of small 
boats must moreover be used in "?/ese rue bung". Only the 
occupation of Rottum Is therefore agreed to. 

Special Reports on the Enemy ; 

Atlantic ; 

Great Britain ; 

Disposition of forces ; 

The battle cruiser HOOD appeared in the Gibraltar area on 
28 March. The ARK ROYAL Is in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The cruiser CALEDON stopped an Italian tanker west of Cephalonia 
on 1 April. 

It may be concluded from the fact that Port "A" (Loch Ewe) 
has, for some time been appearing repeatedly in radio traffic 
that the heavy forces are staying in this base more frequently. 

France ; 

Nothing special to report, apart from some convoys detected. 

North/Sea Channel ; 

Commander in Chief, Home Fleet and the WARSPITE, also the 



3 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

BIRMINGHAM, appear to be at sea, apart from the vessels at 
sea on convoy duties or in the Northern Patrol named several 


According to reports from Kirkenes and Aalesund, enemy naval 
vessels have not appeared there for the past few days* 

A report from Narvik states that the two armed coastal vessels 
EIDVOLD and NORGA have put in to defend Narvik and that two 
submarines are still expected. 

Opera tion "Gelb" : 

A merchant captain reports from Delfzyl that a steamer loaded 
with sand is lying there in readiness to block the harbor 

Own Situation ; 

Atlantic : 

Nothing to report. 

North Sea ; 

No surface force activities. Air reconnaissance as far as 
61° was carried out as planned; it spotted a convoy north 
of Viking Bank. 

(Escorted by 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers.) 

The 10th Air Corps sent out 15 planes of the 100th Bomber Wing 
and the 50th Bomber Wing against the convoy reported; 17 
planes of the 26th Bomber Wing also took off for an offensive 
sortie in the direction of the Orkneys. According to the 
Air Force report, the following successes were scored: 

Severely damaged or sunk: 

2 patrol boats off the east coast of Britain. 
2 patrol boats northeast of the Shetlands. 

2 steamers from the convoy. 

1 destroyer (1 hit on the deck, 2 hits directly 
beside the ship). 

3 more steamers and 1 patrol b'oat were damaged. 



3 April 1940 


Own Losses : 

2 Ju 88, 1 He 111 (forced landing). 

Air reconnaissance by the 4th Squadron of the 122nd Group 
over Le Havre end Cherbourg produced valuable information; 
the following were detected in Cherbourg hsrbor: 

4 destroyers of the BGURRASQUE class, 

2 large destroyers, 

4 submarine -chasers and several submarines, etc. 

Anti-submarine net barrage in the western entrance 
of the outer mole, one passage open. 

Baltic Sea ; 

Shipping unimpeded in the entire Baltic. 

After 4 April the pilot service through the Great Belt will 
be operating again. Traffic through the gap in the Sound 
barrage will be resumed within the next few days J southern 
entrance to the Little Belt still impassable because of 
uncertain mine situation. 100 per cent searching sweep 
of the passege through the Gre8t Belt is being continued. 

Submarine Situation 


North Sea : 

U "7", "10", "19", "25", "30", "47", "48" and "49" are 
on passage to their positions for "Weseruebung". 
U "22", "46", "51" are in the operational area. 



3 April 1940 


Disposition as per orders of Commanding Admiral, Submarines 
for "Weseruebung". (See "Weseruebung" file.) 

Merchant Shipping ; 

After 3 April shipping to Scandinavia will be routed through 
the Baltic . Orders to this effect have been issued. 
Review of quantity of ore shipped via Narvik in 
1939 and comparison with ore shipments to Great 
(see War Diary, Part B, V, 130.). 

1938 and 






4 April 1940 


Items of Political Importance 

1. Chamberlain before the Conservative party; 

"This is a war of will power, and the will to 
win must place us in a position to resist 
intensified warfare or even to hold out against 
a long and exhausting war." 


is being 
fresh demarche 
is expected to 



Norway : 

a) The British assurance that the planned 
intensification of the blockade in the north 
will in no way lead to direct action in 
Norwegian territorial waters, 
discussed in Sweden. Here a 
by the Western Powers in Oslo 
directly imminent. It is stated that Great 
Britain has no right to exercise any pressure 
whatsoever on Norway and Sweden on account of 
ore transports, especially since these transports 
were expressly recognized in the British-Swedish 
trade agreement. 

b) Great Britain's strikingly worded statements and 
assurances that no military action in Scandinavian 
territorial waters and no landing of troops in 
Norway are planned, strengthen Naval Staff's 
conviction that in reality just such a British 
action against Scandinavia is directly imminent. 
The previous handing of notes to Norway , and perhaps 
also to Sweden, can be expected. "Weseruebung 
Nord" is beginning to develop into a "race" between 
Great Britain and Germany for Scandinavia. 

3. According to the B.B.C., Great Britain is engaged 
in forming a trading company with the aim of buying up raw 
materials in neutral countries. The chief problem is first 
to draw In the Balkans 8nd Turkey. 



4 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff 

Special Items ; 

1. Weseruebung ; 

a) Conference between Col. Piekenbrock of the 
General Staff and Minister of State Quisling 
in Copenhagen provides nothing new for the 
Navy's operations, but some valuable data for 
the Army and Air Force about troop strength, 
position of airfields, ground readiness, etc. 
With regard to the defensive readiness of the 
coastal fortifications, Quisling believes that 
the coastal batteries would hardly fire without 
previously asking permission from the Government 

Six divisions are considered necessary for a 
total occupation. 

Quisling generally gave evasive answers to 
precise questions. 

b) Group West requests that an order be issued that 
any soldier engaged in "We se rue bung" who is 
captured before "Wesertime" is to state when 
questioned that the formation is proceeding 

to Iceland. 

c) An order is issued at the direction of Armed 
Forces High Command, Group 21, that prisoners 
taken before "Wesertime" are to refuse to make 
a statement. If pressure is exercised Ireland 
(not Iceland) is to be given as the target of the 

d) Group West is instructed that the BREMSE is to be 
used in Bergen for transport assignments in the 
skerries between Stavanger and Bergen. Requests 
for troops to be transferred from Stavanger to 
Bergen will be arranged by the Commander of the 
troops landed at Trondheim with Admiral, West 
Norwegian Coast. (See directive in reference 
file "Weseruebung".) 



4 April 1940 


Special Reports on the Rnem% 

For disposition of enemy forces and activities of the main 
units during the last week of March according to radio 
intelligence, see Radio Monitoring Report 13/40. 

Atlantic ; 

Supplementary to the observations reported on 3 April, air 
reconnaissance in the Channel also spotted several columns 
as well as troops and vehicles at the quays in Cherbourg*, 
(Could not be ascertained whether disembarking or embarking.) 

Otherwise nothing special to report* 

North Sea : 

Commander in Chief, Home Fleet who was reported at sea, 
might also be in Loch Ewe according to radio intelligence 
observations. Commanders, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons 
and the cruisers SHEFFIELD, PENELOPE, AURORA and CAIRO, 
also destroyers of the 2nd and 3rd Flotillas, are at sea* 

Radio traffic generally very quiet (almost strikingly so), 

so that there is an extraordinarily 
messages available for deciphering, 
to gain an insight into the enemy's 
and with difficulty, a circumstance 
very disadvantageous in view of the 

Own Situation: 

small quantity of radio 
We are thus only able 
measures very slowly 
which is felt to be 
imminence of "Weseruebung". 

Atlantic : 

The KOENIGSBERG (Buenos Aires), scheduled as supply ship for 
the cruiser LUETZOW, received a preliminary order about routes 



4 April 1940 


and code words via the Navsl Attache in Buenos Aires. 
Sailing order to the KOENIGSBERG is to be issued from 
Trondheim after the LUETZOW sails. 

(The KOENIGSBERG is proceeding at 9 knots and has 600 
tons of heavy Diesel oil.) 

(For order see War Diary, Part C, Vol.1 Atlantic.) 
North Sea: 

No reports from Ship "16". 

U "37" is directed to report Ship "16"' s last position 

24 hours after she is dismissed. Ship "16" is directed by 

Group West to dismiss U "37" by 6 April, if the situation 

permits • 

Ship "36" f s sailing had to be postponed for another day 
because of the weather, which promised unfavorable visibility. 

No air reconnaissance by us. 

Enemy bomber flights as far as the estuaries in the morning 
and afternoon. Bombs were dropped off Brunsbuettel and in 
the Jade, but fell in the water and did not explode, so that 
possibly mines or drift mines were dropped. 

We must count on the possibility of the transport 
preparations in Hamburg and Stettin not having remained secret 
from the British and that the air reconnaissance and bombing 
attacks on Brunsbuettel were also directed against these 

With regard to the provision of the steamers of the 1st 
Sea Transport Tfait (see "Weseruebung" file), Naval Staff 
learns that some of these steamers in Stettin are just lying 
at the Hakenterrasse (Quay on the Oder, Tr.N.)*and are 
exposed here to the unimpeded view of interested spectators. 
The Swedish consulate lies in the immediate vicinity. Some 
of the steamers are flying the State Service Flag. The cargo 
is unmistakably Army gear. Place and circumstances of 
loading must be regarded as most unfavorable for the secrecy 
of the whole operation. High Command, Navy/Naval Staff, 
Service Division instigates suitable changes at Naval Staff's 



4 April 1940 



Trondheim "export" unit (steamers SAO PAULO, LEV ANTE, 
MAIN and the tanker SKAGERRAK) sailed from Brunsbuettel 
on 4 April, 

Group West instructs Commander, Naval Air, West about 
aerial minelaying operations over the Thames, Humber, 
Dover and Tyne estuary, as soon as the situation 

Baltic Sea: 

Nothing to report 

Ice Situation : 

Shipping along the German coast unimpeded everywhere. 
At present only possible to leave the Baltic by day 
through the Great Belt. Still heavy drift ice in the 
southern part of the Sound. Heavy breaking up and 
floating of the ice to the north in the Little Belt. 

Submarine Situation 

Number of submarines on 3 April I 



4 April 1940 








U "56", "57", "58", "59 f , 
"61", "62", "19" 

Submarine School : 

U "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", 
"6", "7", "10", "13", "20", 
"22", "23" = 

Submarine m ralning Flotilla, Warnemuende ; 

TT »IO" »»1/l" fMr 7 ft »MqN »»Oyltt 


23 boats. 

8 boats. 

12 boats. 
5 boats. 

U "9", "14", "17", "18", "24 

Anti-Submarine School and Resea 
Purposes : 

U "8", "11" 

Total number of submarines 

The following are to be used in 

a) All submarines under Commanding Admiral, 
Submarines and Commander, Submarines which 
are ready. 

b) All submarines of the Submarine School and 
Submarine Training Flotilla, Warnemuende. 
(17 boats. ) 

n 2 boats. 

s 50 boats. 
"fo'eseruebuna;" : 





4 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Worth Sea : 

Pour submarines east of the Orkneys/Peterhead; 
19 on passage to positions for "Weseruebung". 

\ ) 

Merchant Shipping 

The steamer ANTONIO DELFINO put into Gothenburg on 3 April. 

" Weseruebung? transports : 

See "Weseruebung" file. 

The following order is issued in addition to those previously 
given to the supercargoes of transports which have not yet 

"Neither enemy nor neutral may gain an insight 
into the camouflaged cargo. 

If the Norwegians should take a special interest 
in the steamer and insist on examining the holds, 
the Captain of the ship is first to protest strongly 
and demand that the German representative (the 
nearest consulate ( German citizen ) and the Embassy 
in Oslo) be acquainted. Also communicate with them 
independently. Presume upon the fact that papers 
are in order. 

Do everything possible to gain time . 
If, however, the deck cargo should have to be 
unloaded, any offer of help is to be declined and 
not until the last minute, when investigation of 
the holds is directly imminent, is the German 
representative to inform the Norwegians that the 
cargo is bound for Russia within German agreed 
deliveries. Since Leningrad is ice-bound at 
present the cargo must, however, go to Murmansk. 
It was camouflaged so as not to violate Norwegian 
neutrality. Clearance to Norwegian ports was 
effected since the development of British attacks 
in Norwegian waters might have had to be awaited 



5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 
1. Norway 

a) It Is reported from Norway that British and 
French officers of the General Staff have been 
engaged for a long time in investigating the 
possibility of landing an expeditionary corps 
in Norway. 

b) Intensified British propaganda - obviously to 
prepare the way for British designs on the 
Scandinavian area - has begun in neutral 
countries in order to work on the attitude to 
the Norwegian problem. Strong emphasis Is 
laid on the necessity for an alteration in the 
situation regarding respect for Norwegian 
territorial waters. 

A comparison drawn between the British and 
German actions states that the Norwegian 
Government's attitude "in its helplessness 
regarding the ruthless sinking of Norwegian 
ships and the brutal murder of Norwegian 
seamen is in extraordinary contrast to its 
vigorous protests against technical violations 
of the three-mile zone by British warships, 
which caused neither loss of life nor property 
to Norway." 

c) The following is said to be the Dutch Admiralty's 
opinion about the British action in Scandinavian 
waters : 

The movement of British destroyers in 
Scandinavian waters is aimed at provoking 
Germany to take counter-measures. Great 
Britain expects that Germany will then occupy 
Norwegian ports, which could effect the desired 
extension of the front at one blow. The 
British press would then lay the breach of 
neutrality at Germany's door. 

The headlines of the Swedish press are mostly 
concerned with an article in the " Dally Telegraph " 
In which it is maintained that Germany has stopped 
all ore transports via Narvik. She is concentrating 



5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

a fleet in her Baltic ports with 400,000 men 
in readiness to be shipped to the Baltic zone 
Immediately . 

It is assumed in the North that at the- same 
moment as Great Britain changes her plans 
for cessation of the Swedish ore supplies in- 
to action, Germany would land in southern 
Norway . 

A Swedish statement on the subject of an 
immediate German counterblow if Great Britain 
violates Norwegian territorial waters is worthy 
of note and perhaps significant as regards the 
Swedish attitude to coming events. 

The present -slight operational possibilities 
for the German Navy and Air Force would be 
materially improved by an occupation of 
southern Norway, Germany would be in a 
position to carry out such an operation speedily. 
The reason for it would obviously lie in the 
violation of Norway's neutrality by Britain and 
Norway's complete inability to repulse this 


e) A most important and credible report has been 
received from Intelligence Center, Belgium: 

British submarine blockade lines from the 
Lofotens to the Norwegian coast are said to 
have been formed or to be in process of 
formation. Blockade duties will be performed 
by five British and two French submarines. 
The island of Varoe will be cut off in Norwegian 
waters by mines. The Norwegian island of 
Vigten will be cut off by mines and submarines. 
Sule will likewise be cut off from Vigten. 
Constant patrol by seven destroyers will be 
instituted in the Skagerrak. Measures are to 
be carried out on 5 April. 

Definite confirmation of this report is not possible 
at present. Naval Staff, hov. r ever, considers it 
likely that Great Britain is planning such a measure 
within a very short time. This view is strengthened 
by a report from radio intelligence about the despatch 
or disposition of 15-20 British submarines (see 
North Sea) . 


5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items ; 

1. Letter from Armed Forces High Command (WFA 22131 
Gkdos Chefs) ; 

a) The Fuehrer has ordered that the cruiser LUETZOW 
is to be drown in to transport about one battalion 
to Trondheim, independent of her further assignment. 

b) The Navy is responsible for the protection of the 
landing parties carried on warships, even after 
their disembarkation, against Norwegian and Danish 
forces. It may be necessary for this purpose to 
leave single naval vessels, not scheduled to 
remain permanently, in Norwegian ports until the 
Army troops landed can no longer be impeded in the 
fulfillment of their assignment by Norwegian 
naval forces. 

2. Fuehrer's directive about operational cooperation 
with Italy; 

Discussions with Italy on strategic and operational 
subjects are to be resumed. Conducted by Armed 
Forces High Command. The High Commands of the 
Services are not to commence discussions until the 
result of Armed Forces High Command's investigation 
is available. 

3. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division on an 
Armed Forces High Command political and military memorandum 
on the situation in southeastern Europe. 

4. The Naval Attache in Moscow reports that the Russians 
are raising difficulties with regard to departure of the 

JAN WELLEM and do not desire the supply ship to return to the 
base again. 

The Russian attitude cannot be understood. Since Naval Staff, 
however, attaches the greatest importance to the immediate 
despatch of the JAN WELLEM, the Attache' is instructed to give 
the Russians suitable assurances. 

(The Naval Attache reports on 6 April "that the Russian attitude 
is apparently motivated by political considerations and by a 
high degree of nervousness about the future Franco-British 




5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

attitude to the U.S.S.R. They are therefore 8t pains to 
avoid any action in the slightest degree non-neutral, -which 
the enemy could use as a pretext for action. It appears 
that the Russians have therefore become over-anxious on 
account of Base North, and this means that its usefulness 
is decreased at present. This does not imply complete and 
final uselessness. As soon as the political situation is 
clarified for the Russians the Base can again be used to the 
full" ) . 

5. The Field Marshal of the Air Force has ordered that 
Scapa is to be attacked by one group each of bombers and 
aerial minelaying planes as soon es the weather permits. 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Great Britain : 

Disposition of forces : 

The WARSPITE was at sea on the afternoon of 4 April, probably 
en route for the Clyde. The repair ship RESOURCE, escorted 
by the DECOY and DEFENDER left Freetown on 4 April for 

The submarine depot ship MEDWAY and a number of submarines 
will be transferred from East Asia to the Mediterranean in the 
near future. 

France : 

Various convoys observed. 

A Brazilian steamer reported: 

On 19 March the steamer was stopped by a British 
auxiliary cruiser ("Blue Star Line") 55 miles 
northeast of Gran Canariaj on 20 March she met 
a French convoy escorted by a French auxiliary 
cruiser (FLORIDA) 150 miles north of the island. 
According to information from the ship's officers, 



5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

the convoys at present haul off far to the west 
between Gibraltar and Great Britain, 

Neutrals ; 

According to an Italian report, the following arrived in 
Istanbul on 3 April: the steamer SAGIT m AIRE (7,706 tons) 
coming from Marseilles with miscellaneous war material, the 
U.S. steamers EXPLORER (6,700 tons) and EXKOUTH (4,979 tons) 
coming from New York with planes and miscellaneous material. 

North Sea : 

British planes over Norderney and the Eastern Ems about noon; 
flights into the Heligoland Bight at night. 

The PENELOPE, CAIRO and some destroyers are at see in the 
northern Scottish area. 

operating in the North Sea. 

Radio intelligence intercepts a British radiogram containing 
the order for submarine operation. Because of our inability 
to decipher much, only the position of one boat, the TRITON, 
at 57°. • . .10°. • . ,E can be partially deduced. In the opinion 
of the Radio Monitoring Service it may be concluded from the 
length of the radiogram (188 groups) that it deals with 
operations by 15-20 boats. Some boats were possibly allocated 
special assignments. 

Operations by so many boats and the length of this radiogram 
are In striking contrast to previous British submarine measures 
and lead us to conclude that there are very special plans 

Following possibilities: 

1. The enemy has knowledge of the German operational 
plans and his submarine measures are of a purely 
defensive character. 

2. The enemy has his own offensive plans against Norway 
and is sending out his boats in order to suppress 
German ore traffic from Narvik, to lay mine barrages 
in Norwegian territorial waters (see also report from 
Intelligence Center, Belgium) and as protection against 
German counterblows. 



5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

In both cases we must reckon on danger from submarines off 
the Norwegian coast, off the ports and especially in the 

Group Baltic is informed of Naval Staff's viewpoint and plans 
to put submarine-chaser units into operation in the Kattegat 
and Skagerrak in good time to protect the sea transport units 
and to have air patrol carried out. 

The trawler GORSPEN (208 tons) is admitted as sunk during the 
air attack on 3 April. 

Own Situation : 

Atlantic : 

Nothing to report. 

North Sea : 

"Weseruebung" : 

Readiness of forces for "Weseruebung" • 

All forces are ready to sail except the destroyers THIELE 
and SCHOEMANN (engine repairs), FALKE (remaining work by 
8 April), and two torpedo training boats (dock work). 

(See list of forces in readiness dated 5 April, reference 
file "Weseruebung") . 

The first three steamers of the "export" unit and the 
tanker KATTEGAT appeared in Norwegian waters today off the 
south coast of Norway. 

Nothing special to report in the North Sea. Enemy air 
raids on Norderney and the Eastern Ems unsuccessful. 



5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Baltic Sea ; 

Great Belt navigable with day and night pilot service. 
Pilot service not yet instituted in the Sound end Little 

Our air reconnaissance reports a Danish armed coastal 
vessel with two torpedoboats off Frederlk s ha vn and one 
Danish armed coastal vessel north of the Danish Great Eelt 
barrage* Lightships have not yet been put out on the 
Great Belt barrage; Instead the northern pilot position 
is occupied by the Danish vessel INGOLF. 

Submarine Situation 

Atlantic : 


North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

In the operational area: U "13", "22", "46", "51", 

"58", "59", "25", "30", 
"34", "47", "48", "49". 

On passage: U "2", "4", "5", "6", 

"7", "9", "10", "14", 

"19", "56", "57", "60", 

Supporting Ship "16": U "37". 

On return passage: U "43". 

Boats disposed as per orders for " We se rue bung" . 



5 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

U "52 M, s brief report shows no successes but produces 
much reconnaissance data regarding air and sea patrol 
in the Orkneys-Faroes area and off the Norwegian coast. 

(See War Diary, Part B, IV.) 

Merchant Shipping ; 

Returning home from overseas : 

According to a report from the Consulate 8t Trondheim the 
motor vessel SEATTLE (left Curacao on 5 March, reached 
Tromsoe on 31 March) passed north of Iceland, apparently 
without any difficulty. 

Norwegian run : 

A German Captain of a steamer coming from Bergen reports as 
a striking fact that considerably more Norwegian patrol boats 
have lately been encountered along the Norwegian coast. 
These escort the German ships. 

Adriatic : 

The B.B.C. reports from Ragusa that the German steamer ANKARA 
has postponed her departure to ^rieste because British 
warships are cruising in the Adriatic. 

The information is correct. The supply shio ANKARA has 
postponed her passage for the present on account of reports 
of enemy forces. The ship is instructed via the Naval 
Attache" in Rome to continue on her way. The Attache' is to 
endeavor to obtain confirmation of the report that there are 
enemy forces in the Adriatic, since it seems untrustworthy. 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway : 

British and French notes handed to Norway and Sweden. 
Contents not yet known; probably on the subject of the 
Intensification of the blockade. 

In Swedish opinion the notes give no cause to suppose that 
the Western Powers are contemplating direct measures, 
particularly against Norwegian ore shipments. Sweden 
and Norway are not required to reply immediately. The 
notes did not contain an ultimatum. 

Speech by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Koht, before the 
Storthing, in which he emphasizes that "the maintenance of 
complete neutrality is the aim of Norwegian policy". 
(For particulars see Foreign Press (Naval News)No. 83.) 

Increased tension in all countries about further developments 
regarding Norway; according to press statements at home and 
abroad, this will be settled in the immediate future. 

Although it cannot be expected that the enemy is completely 
in the dark about "Weseruebung", there are all the same no 
definite indications that the Western Powers have recognized 
Germany's strategic plans. At least they are unaware of the 
great extent of the whole operation. Naval Staff's judgment 
of the enemy's actions is that he is just about to take 
steps himself in Norwegian waters or on Norwegian territory. 
Since, undoubtedly aware of German preparatory measures, he 
must expect immediate counter blows in any operations, his 
measure will take defense against German counter-operations 
into account. It cannot be ascertained how far advanced the 
enemy operations are or whether they are already in process 
of execution. Naval Staff, hov/ever, is of opinion that the 
greatest haste is necessary for the execution of "Weseruebung". 

9 April appears to be the latest possible date. It would be 
desirable to advance this date, but that is no longer possible. 

With regard to the present state of general political unrest 
in Scandinavia we must reckon on the possibility of the 
Western Powers and Norway being warned in advance when the 
naval forces commence their operations today. 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items : 

1. State of "V/eserubimg" : 

For readiness see review in reference file "Weseruebung" 

Fifteen destroyers in operational readiness (the SCHOEMANN 
is not ready) . 

For state of "export" and sea transport units see sketch 
of 6 April: The Narvik Group (the ALSTER, RAUENFELS, 
BAERENFELS, tanker KATTEGAT) is assumed to he between 
Trondheim and Bergen, the Trondheim Group (the MAIN, 
LEV ANTE, SAO PAULO, tanker SKAGERRAK) off the south coast 
of Norway. The 1 st Sea Transport Unit for Bergen (the 
in the central Baltic. The Stavanger Unit sails from 
Swinemuende today (the TUEBINGEN, TIJUCA, MENDOZA). 

The Bergen Sea Transport Unit comprises roughly 650 men, 
1B4 horses, vehicles, etc, the Stavanger Unit roughly 750 
men, 125 horses, also vehicles. The Kristiansand Unit 
follows this evening with 4 steamers (the V/IEGAND, WESTSEE, 
KRETA, AUGUST LEONHARDT) and, tomorrow morning, the Oslo 
Unit with 5 steamers (the ANTARES, IONIA, MUANSA, ITAURI, 

The 1st Sea Transport Unit thus comprises a total of 15 
steamers carrying roughly 3,900 men, 742 horses, 942 
vehicles and 4 tanks. 

The starting up of this whole transport operation cannot 
be kept secret . It will be an extraordinary stroke of 
luck if the immense transport set-up reaches its ports of 
destination without disturbance and incidents via the 
narrow passages of the entrances to the Baltic and the 
Kattegat and Skagerrak, and without the enemy receiving 
previous warning. 

2. Group West proposes that minelaying operation 
"Skagerrak" should be carried out during the night of 
"Weserday" minus 1, and sees the following advantages in 
this connection: 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

a) Danger from the enemy, alarmed by the 
appearance of the Narvik and Trondheim 
Groups, is eliminated. 

b) All Groups proceeding northwards will 
be able to withdraw if necessary. 

c) Possible to lay further barrage sections 

The Group regards the disadvantage of isolated merchant 
ships striking the barrage as negligible. 

Naval Staff declines Group West's proposal for the 
following reasons: 

I. Execution is scheduled for the night before 

a) Possible detection of the mine laying 
unit in the Skagerrak on the evening 
of w W-2" endangers the Bergen and 
Kristiansand Groups on outward passage 
if the enemy attacks. The risk to the 
minelaying unit must take second place to 

b) As long as the barrage is not known, its 
deterrent effect is doubtful. 

II. Any alteration in operations already fixed is 
if possible to be avoided. 

3. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the projected 
ruling about the subordination of the naval, air and 
submarine forces remaining or operating off the Norwegian 

The principle that there should be only one independent 
operational headquarters in one theater of war is adhered 
to . 

a) Admirals, West and South Norwegian Coasts are 
subordinate to Commanding Admiral, Norway 
regarding defense in ports and coastal waters. 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

b) Destroyers and supply ships in Trondheim 
come under Group West. 

c) The BREMSE, CARL PETERS, PT boats in Bergen 
under Admiral, West Norwegian Coast.. 

d) Torpedo and PT boats in Kristiansand at 
first under Commanding Admiral, Defenses, 
Baltic; later, after the Skagerrak has been 
secured against surface forces, operationally 
under Group West. Subordination to Admiral, 
West Norwegian Coast may be considered. 

e) No naval forces subordinate to Admiral, South 
Norwegian Coast. Assignments in this coastal 
area will be taken over by Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, Baltic. 

f) Commanding Admiral, Submarines will control 
all submarine assignments. Commanding 
Admirals to make requests to Group West. 

g) Commander, Naval Air's units at first under 
the 10th Air Corps, later control of all 
reconnaissance by Commander, Naval Air, West. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees. For directive to Commanding 
Admirals and Commanders (1. Ski. I op 715/40) see 
reference file "Weseruebung". 

4. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on Naval Staff's 
directive on the conduct of submarine warfare after the 
conclusion of "Weseruebung". (1. Ski. I op 713/40) see 
reference file "We se rue bung" . 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Nothing special to report. 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

North Sea : 

According to radio intelligence: apart from Commander in Chief, 
Home Fleet and destroyers, Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron 
(probably aboard the REPULSE) was in the outer Scapa area and 
the battle cruiser RENOWN in the inner Scapa area. 

The old battleship WARSPITE is going into dock (possible bomb 

The cruiser GALATEA is on escort duty with destroyers. Commander, 
1st Destroyer Flotilla is ordered to return to Scapa with a convoy. 

Reason unknown. This step appears extraordinary but may not 
necessarily be connected with any operations. 

Own Situation 

Atlantic : Nothing special to report. 

North Sea : 

Command : On his return from convalescent leave Admiral 
Saalwaechter resumes command of Group West on 6 April. Admiral 
Carls returns to his post as Commanding Admiral, Group Baltic. 

Ship "36" (Lieut. Cdr. Weyher) sails according to plan as the 
second auxiliary cruiser. 

For operational order see War Diary, Part C, Vol. I. The supply 
ship NORDMARK leaves for the Atlantic and proceeds via Route II. 

"Weseruebung" : 

6 April, "Weserday" minus 5 : 

Naval operations commence as planned. Groups I and II (Narvik 
and Trondheim) sail at £300 on 6 April under the comma nd of 
Commanding Admiral, Fleet. 

The cruiser LUETZOW dropped out of the Trondheim Group at the 
last moment. 

In the afternoon the report is received from the LUETZOW about 
breakdowns caused by cracks in the auxiliary engine casings. 
Complete repairs will take several days. Provisional repair 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Is being carried out. Sailing for operations in the Atlantic 
is out of the question until full repairs are completed. The 
ship must therefore be restored as quickly as possible, since 
Naval Staff attaches the greatest importance to operations in 
the Atlantic in order to effect a strong diversion as soon as 
possible after " We se rue bung". 

It is agreed with the 21st Army Group that the LUETZOW is not 
to operate to Trondhelm because of her breakdown, but is assigned 
to the Oslo Group. The LUETZOW is ordered to proceed through 
the Kiel Canal and join the Oslo Group. 

Composition of the units sailing today : 

Commanding Admiral, Fleet: Vice Admiral Luetjens 

Battleship GNEISENAU 

Group I : (Narvik) 

Commander: Commodore Bonte 

Destroyers : 







E mbark e d on the destroyers : 

2,000 men of the 3rd Mountain Division. (1 regiment). 

Group II : (Trondheim) 

Commander: The Commander of the HIPPER, Captain Heye. 

Cruiser : 


Destroyers : 


Embarked on the HIPPER : 900 men; 

On the destroyers: 800 men of the 3rd Mountain Division. 

(1 regiment). (For operational orders see "Weseruebung" file.) 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Weather prospects ; 

Northern North Sea: wind south to southwest, 5-7, 
freshening to 8 off the Norwegian coast, mostly cloudy 
with frequent rain, ceiling 400-600 m, visibility 3-5 
miles, about 10 miles on the south coast of Norway, 
deterioration in visibility setting in from the northwest. 

The prevailing winds will permit the advance as planned, 
even for the destroyers. With following wind and sea the 
advance will, however, probably just be possible still off 
the Norwegian coast. Action, however, will be greatly 
restricted, especially for the destroyers. We must expect 
enemy reconnaissance with the present good visibility. 
The dull weather setting in from the west, with visibility 
dropping to two miles, will be in favor of the Groups 1 
unmolested advance. 

It is possible that the advance will be impeded in northern 
waters by a further freshening of the wind. 

Naval Staff views with great confidence the operations of 
the units putting to sea. The readiness of the destroyers 
has reached the required standard by thorough overhauls 
of the engines and boilers. The thorough preparations made 
for the operation and the excellent spirit of the destroyer 
crews give assurance of a resolute and successful execution 
of the particularly difficult Narvik operation. 

The Groups are led by excellent Commanders. 

Baltic Sea: 

Shipping : 

The Great Belt is the only navigable entrance to the Baltic. 

No pilot service has yet been instituted in the Sound and 

Little Belt, but the Sound can be navigated by all ships with aid 



6 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

from mine- exploding vessels. 

Check sweeping in the Great and Little Belts proceeded 

as planned. Check sweeping of the gap in the Sound 

barrage is scheduled for 7 April. The pilot service in 

the Great Belt is carried out in both directions during 

the day, at night only from south to north at present. 

The Danes have placed a torpedo boat at the southern entrance 

of the barrage as a pilot boat. 

Submarine Situation ; 

Atlantic : 


North Sea ; 

After her return, U "38" reports heavy patrol in the 
Shetlands-Hebrides area and in Pair Passage. The boat 
sank about 19,000 tons on her return passage. U "43" 
suffered greatly from bad weather in the North Minch area 
and west of Fair Passage. No successes. 

For brief reports see Part B, Vol. IV. 

22 submarines are in position as per operational orders 
for " We se rue bung". 

Also on passage: U "1", "50", "25", "57". 

U "37" is with Ship "16". 

Merchant Shipping 

On 6 April there were altogether 579 ships over 1,600 GRT, 
» 68.3%, in home waters, of which 100 ships totaling 
301,372 GRT are on the Scandinavian run; 57 of these 
ships are in Norway. 



7 April 1940 C0NFID5N TIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway : 

Reuter states that the notes to Norway and Sweden 
contain no Intimidating clauses, but that Great Britain 
reserves the right to take action against German attempts 
to use Scandinavian waters as a protected route in order to 
avoid the blockade* 

The German Military Attache' wires from Finland that 
Swedish and Finnish circles are greatly perturbed about the 
ships concentrated in Pomeranian ports. It is concluded 
that Germany has hostile intentions against Sweden. 

Telephone tapping intercepts telephone conversations .- 

between the Danish Naval Attache and the Danish and Norwegian 
Ambassadors, in which he requests an immediate audience since 
he has communications to make of the highest political 
importance and bearing. 

The Danish Naval Attache has possibly gained some knowledge 
of the coming "Weseruebung" operation. 

For further information see Foreign Press Report. 

2. According to reports from German Consulates, a 
large number of reservists (all reservists according to some 
reports) have been called up to the Italian Navy for 1 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

Special Items ; 

1. Letter from the Naval Attache' in Oslo stating that 
60$ of all Norwegian shipping has been chartered to Great 
Britain since November 1939. 

The Attache reports that this statement can be taken as a 

a. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the progress of 



7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

"Weseruebung" and movements to date. 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Great Britain : 

Disposition of forces: The WARSPITE is suspected to be 
proceeding to Portsmouth (?) because of damage, the NELSON 
and BARHAM to be still in southern England. 

The RENOWN, REPULSE, VALIANT and RODNEY can be assumed to be 
in Scottish waters. 

On 7 April the cruiser SHROPSHIRE is to proceed to Capetown; 
the GLOUCESTER is to proceed to Simonstown. 

Task Force "H" and the auxiliary cruiser ALCANZARA put in to 
Freetown on 6 April. 

Radio monitoring also intercepts convoy movements. 
Convoy"HS 25", comprising 23 steamers, is proceeding north 
from Gibraltar, 150 miles from the coast. 

France : 

A French destroyer or flotilla leader (large destroyer) 
has been drifting about 300 miles west of St .Vincent since 
6 April. 

Otherwise nothing special to report. 

North Sea : 

At 0948 (German Summer Time) enemy air reconnaissance reported 
1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 8 planes on bearing 90° 3 miles from 
55° 30'N, 6° 37'E, course 350° (cruiser HIPPER). On the 
basis of this report the cruisers GALATEA and ARETHUSA with 
destroyers were sent out in an unknown direction. Further 
afternoon reconnaissance resulted in priority radiograms 
from 1630 from the Admiralty to Commander in Chief, Home Fleet 



7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

and other Commanders (1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 
2nd Cruiser Squadrons) as well as to the submarines at sea. 

It can be seen from the Admiralty's radiograms that at least 
1 battleship of the SCHARNHORST type, d cruisers - one 
possibly a pocket battleship - and 10 destroyers are assumed. 

The enemy has thus identified the operation directed north- 
ward and has ordered corresponding operational measures. 

It may be assumed that the Admiralty has not yet drawn 
conclusions about a large-scale German action within 
"Weseruebung" from the air reconnaissance information, but 
rather expects a break-through to the Atlantic by a pocket 
battleship. In any case, as Naval Staff expected, the 
German movement has warned the enemy. 


The cruisers SHEFFIELD, PENELOPE and CAIRO put in to Scapa 
on 6 April. 

Enemy submarines are detected in the eastern Skagerrak and 
Kattegat, also near Utsire. Further submarine positions 
cannot yet be ascertained. 

Own Situation: 

North Sea: 

The movements of the battleships and Narvik and Trondheim Groups 
continue as planned. Deterioration in weather and visibility 
in the area of advance. The destroyers can still just advance 
in the prevailing weather. The south to southwest winds are 
still blowing strength 7-8 in the northern North Sea. Action 
will be severely restricted in this weather. Rainfall and bad 
visibility will greatly hinder enemy air reconnaissance 
according to the weather forecast; southwest winds, strength 
6-8 can oe expected in the southern part of northern waters, 
decreasing to strength 4 to the north, so that conditions during 
the northern part of the advance will be more favorable. 



7 April 1940 



In connection with the battleship movements 24 Wellington 
bombers had an engagement with heavy German fighters at 
1500 northeast of our declared area. Two British bombers 
were shot down in aerial combat in between two cloud covers 
at 2,000 ra. altitude. 

At noon a plane of Commander, Naval Air attacked an enemy 

submarine of the GRAMPUS class with two 250 kg. bombs, 

apparently successfully, 30 miles north of the northeastern 
corner of the declared area. 

Air reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast detected nothing 

The movements of the "Weseruebung" "export" units seem 

to have proceeded according to plan so far. According to 

Naval Staff's calculations the Narvik "export" Unit must 

already be in the area off Trondheim, the Trondheim Unit 

a little to the north of Bergen. Since the ships- appear to 

have passed the Haugesund "cliff" without Incident, it may 

be assumed that the Norwegians are so far unsuspecting. 

Today the sea transport units are in the following areas: 

Bergen Unit 
Stavanger Unit 

(3 steamers) 
(3 steamers) 

Krlstlansand Unit (4 steamers) 
Oslo Unit (5 steamers) 

(See also Situation, Baltic.) 

) north of the Great 
) Belt. 

) in the central 
) Baltic. 

The tanker JAN WELLEM, which is particularly important 
for Narvik 1 s supplies, left Base North on 6 April. She is 
expected to arrive promptly in Narvik. 



7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Atlantic : 

Nothing special to report. 

Baltic Sea/Kattegat : 

Shipping ; 

Unimpeded in the Baltic. Great Belt passable by day and 
night. Still ice difficulties north of the German barrage 
when passing through the Sound. 

"We se rue bung 

it . 

The 17th Submarine Chaser Flotilla left for an operation in 
the area east of Skagen. 

The Oslo Group, which embarkea forces on the evening of 
6 April, sailed as planned from Swinemuende on the evening 
of 7 April. 

Composition : 

Commander: Rear Admiral Kummetz 

Cruisers : 




Torpedo boats : 





2,000 men embarked, parts of the 163rd Division. 

During the night of 7 April there also put to sea as 
planned (at present in waiting positions): 



7 April 1940 


a) Schleswlg Holstein Group 

with Training Flotilla of Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, Baltic (with 1,840 men for the 
operation against Korsoer). 

b) Rugard Group 

with submarine chasers (with 400 men for the 
operation against the bridge over the Belt at 


■ ■ 1 1 1 

(with 1 reinforced battalion for Copenhagen). 

Air reconnaissance was flown over the Kattegat as far 
as the line Ska gen-Paternoster. No enemy forces or 
submarines were sighted. 

The steamer KURITYBA, belonging to the 1st Sea Transport 
Unit (Bergen Group) ran aground four miles north of 
Helsingborg and requires help from tugs. The 17th 
Submarine Chaser Flotilla and the tugs PREUSSEN and WOTAN 
have been sent out to help her. 

The fact that the steamer ran aground at the border of 
Swedish territorial waters gives rise to the danger of the 
enemy being warned in advance if the camouflage of the 
vessel carrying material, horses and men is not maintained 
successfully. Naval Staff's objections to the sea transp.ort 
units appearing before "Wesertime" have already been 
confirmed. It can also be stated that the steamers of the 
1st Transport Unit should have been better camouflaged and 
that the soldiers and men in charge of the horses on board 
should have worn civilian clothes. 



7 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Submarine Situation : 

Atlantic : 

U "37" reports, time of origin 1950: 

"Left Ship "16 M in grid square AD 2957 
(Denmark Strait) in northeasterly storm. 
Hove to. Cannot reach post "Nero" 
(Narvik) in time." 

The break-through of the first auxiliary cruiser (Ship "16", 
Captain Rogge) can thus be regarded as successful. 

North Sea/Northern Waters : 

Unchanged; 26 submarines in position or on passage, also 

U "37" in the Denmark Strait. U "64" with Ship "36" as escort 

Merchant Shipping 

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, reports: 
Minesweeping started in the Sound barrsge gap. Will 
probably be finished by noon on 8 April; barrage gap 
ice-free. Great Belt: Danish barrage gaps - lightships 
North and South in position. 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

"Weserday" minus 1 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway : 

Statements from the British and French Governments 
to Norway about Allied minelaying in Norwegian territorial 

"The Allied Governments have decided to exclude 
their enemy from the unimpeded use of parts of 
Norwegian territorial waters which are obviously 
of the greatest use to him. They have thus 
resolved to prevent the unhinderea passage of 
ships carrying contraband through Norwegian 
territorial waters. They therefore announce: 

"Some parts of Norwegian territorial waters 
have become unnavigable because of mines . 
Ships which traverse these areas do so at their 
own risk. It is quite clear from the list 
already published that the free approach of 
Norwegian ships to their own ports and villages 
is in no way impeded by minelaying. In order 
to avoid the slightest possibility of Norwegian 
and other ships unintentionally traversing the 
areas before it is possible to warn them against 
mines, arrangements have been made that the limits 
of these areas are patrolled by British ships until 
48 hours after the first mines have been laid in 
the areas concerned* The safety of shipping is 
guaranteed by this measure, together with the 
warning given on the radio*" (For position of 
barrages see under "North Sea"). 

The Western Powers have now flagrantly violated Norwegian 
neutrality officially by laying mines inside Norwegian 
waters. The Fuehrer is of the opinion that these measures 
are only the first step in the Allies' strategic plan to 
gain a footing in the Scandinavian area, suppress supplies 
of ore from Norway, exercise pressure on Sweden to stop 
deliveries of ore to Germany, dominate the Shetlands-Norway 
passage and extend the war to Scandinavia. 

The necessity of carrying out the German "Weseruebung" 
operation is confirmed by the Franco-British measures* 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Today 1 s statement by the Western Powers is politically 
welcome since it gives excellent grounds to the outside 
world for German action as a counter-blow to the British 
violation of neutrality. 

On the afternoon of 8 April the Norwegian Government lodged 
a protest, referring to the Norwegian-British agreement of 
11 March 1940, which permits exports to Germany even of 
contraband, and demanded the removal of the mine barrages 
and the withdrawal of Allied forces from Norwegian waters. 
In spite of .the protest, which is not very vigorous, it is 
quite possible that far-reaching secret verbal agreements 
have been reached between the Norwegian and British Governments 

The U.S. Naval Attache (Commander Schrader) visited High 
Command, Navy (Naval Attache') in the afternoon and informed 
us that he listened to the British announcement about mine- 
laying in Norwegian waters at noon today. He considers this 
an extraordinarily serious incident and asked for High Command, 
Navy's comments. 

He was informed that no statements can be made yet but that 
the events are regarded in a most serious light. 

2. Reuter report ; 

The Allied offensive is divided into three parts? 

1* The notes to Norway and Sweden about intensification 
of the blockade j 

2. the conferences between Ministers Monnet (Blockade 
Minister) and Cross on the same subject; 

3. the conferences beginning on 8 April between Lord 
Halifax and the British Ambassadors in the Balkans, 
probably with reference to the Norwegian and Swedish 
answers to the British note. 

3. The "General Netherlands Import Center" has started 
work officially. It is a Government control, standing 
surety to the Western Powers that certain export and import 
goods will be for Dutch use only and will not reach other 
countries. Great Britain requested this and gave assurances 
in return that Dutch ships would be less strictly searched. 




8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

4. The German Ambassador in Tokio reports: 

Japanese naval spokesman gave notice of suitable 
severe counte measures if Great Britain undertakes 
blockade measures in the Sea of Japan. On the 
other hand the Naval Staff let it be known most 
confidentially that the Navy would greatly welcome 
the appearence of German naval forces, especially 
submarines, in Japanese waters, would suffer 
operations by them from Russian ports and would 
afford them every possible support (ports in the 
South Sea), The people would be most enthusiastic 
about any successes, 

(The Naval Staff 1 s opinion, but hardly that of the Admiralty.) 


Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Stsff 

Special Items 

1« Report on the movements of the individual groups and 
on the situation in Norwegian waters after the declaration 
of the British mined areas. 

Naval Staff is not yet assured of the fact that mines have 
actually been laid. It is considered possible that this is 
a bluff to scare away German merchant shipping. On the other 
hand, it is quite certain that British forces, (destroyers 
and submarines) - as per the British declaration - are at the 
positions indicated within or at Norwegian territorial limits 
in order to capture or sink passing German steamers, thus 
violating Norwegian waters. German steamers proceeding on 
the former route will, therefore, undoubtedly run into the arms 
of the British patrols even if mines have not yet been laid. 

From a military point of view , therefore, this anticipatory 
step by the Western Powers creates very unfavorable and 
difficult conditions for the execution of the operation, which 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

primarily involve severe risk for the "export" unit steamers 
carrying guns, material, supplies, anti-aircraft guns, 
ammunition and food supplies which are urgently required in 
the northern bases of Narvik and Tronaheim. 

Immediate re-routing of the "export" steamers therefore 
appears desirable. Retention in southern ports or fjords, 
the only safe step at present, is not possible since every 
endeavor must be made to get the steamers to their ports of 
destination to time. Putting into port later, after "Weserday", 
would be hopeless because enemy countermeasures would then 
definitely be in force off the ports. 

Naval Staff therefore orders the "export" steamers and 

tankers to avoid the areas endangered by mines but otherwise 

still to make for their ports of destination. m 


For orders to other shipping see under "Merchant Shipping". 

2. Question of flag to be set when entering Norwegian 

Naval Staff decides that the German flag should 
be flown or none , according to the situation. 
The previous order is canceled; the British 
ensign is not to be flown since the advantages 
of flying the British flag are not seen and 
are at least doubtful. 

Order to this effect is issued. 

3. The Naval Attache in Oslo has suggested that if 
Norwegian patrols delay passage, the following Morse signal 
in Norwegian should be transmitted: 

"Am putting in with permission of the Norwegian 
Government, have an escort officer on board." 

The proposal is agreed to. Order is issued to Groups for 
further transmission. 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation 8 April 


Northern North Sea/Northern Waters : 

The south to southwesterly winds, strength 6-8, which 
rise to 9 in places along the Norwegian coast, will gradually 
decrease to strength 5-6, as the wind veers northwest, beginning 
gradually from the west so that the advance of the units as 
planned down to torpedo boats will be possible. Advance of 
PT boat flotillas is doubtful. Visibility of only 3 miles 
at present is having a prejudicial effect on air reconnaissance 
by both sides. An improvement in visibility up to 10 miles 
can be expected when the wind veers. 

North of 65° the wind will drop to strength 3-4 ana will 
no longer be an obstacle. 

In the Baltic Sea, southerly winds 3-4, apparently freshening 
to 5; advance as planned can therefore be expected. 

Enemy Situation 

Reports on the enemy received during the course of the day 
show the following picture as a whole in the evening: 

Light British forces off West Fjord (including 
1 heavy cruiser), south of Trondheim and near Stadlandet 
in order to carry out the minelaying operations announced 
and in order to control shipping off the Norwegian coast. 
Various merchantmen have already been stopped ana had to 
turn about. 

The reports about mine barrages laid are confirmed in the 
afternoon by telephone calls from Norway. The mines are 
said to have been laid during the night of 7 April at the 
places indicated, possibly also near Karmoey (south of 
Haugesund) ana near Halten (entrance to Trondheim). (Near 
Halten seems improbable.) 

Part of an enemy main force, consisting of 2 battleships, 
1 heavy cruiser and several destroyers, on northerly course 
about noon off Romsdals. 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Battle cruiser squadron and other cruisers at sea 
protecting light enemy forces. Position unknown. Light 
forces between Shetlands and Norway. 

Strong submarine disposition in the Skagerrak and Kattegat 
and off the coasts of southern Norway and Denmark. 

French forces (minelaying cruiser EMILE BERTIN and two 
large destroyers) detected in the North Sea in the Scapa 

(For details see special appendix, radiogram file of 
8 April.) 

Own Situation 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Groups Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kristlansand and Oslo 
proceeding to their operational targets as planned. 

The enemy is aware that the battleships are included 
in the Narvik and Trondheim Groups. Our own plans are not 
yet revealed, but it is possible that increased steamer 
traffic through the entrances to the Baltic may appear a 
most striking measure both to neutral Scandinavian countries 
and to the enemy in connection with the known concentration of 
transports in Hamburg, Stettin and Gdynia which took place 
some time ago. It cannot be ascertained how far the enemy 
has actually been warned or is acting on supposition. 

Destroyers were reported west of Trondheim this morning 
by the enemy. Engagement between the destroyer BERNDT v. 
ARNIM and the British destroyer GLOWWORM. Result still 

The enemy possibly concludes German operations against 
his measures in Norwegian waters. He may expect a pocket 
battleship sortie. 

We fear that the British minelaying operations will affect 
our military operation unfavorably. 

Naval Staff forsees danger in bringing the "export" unit 
and the tankers through. Re-routing to avoid encounters 
with British patrols has been ordered, but is made difficult 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

as the actual positions of the steamers are not known. 

The operations by our forces in the northern area run 

great risks from the superior enemy who, in pursuance of his 

own plans, is now in our operational areas at the same time to 

our disadvantage. The necessity of despatching battleships 

to protect our destroyers is fully confirmed by the enemy 


The 1st Sea Transport Unit is at sea comprising 15 steamers as 
planned; at noon the Bergen and Stavanger Groups were in the 
Skagerrak off the Norwegian coast, the Kristiansand Group 
roughly off Skagen, the Oslo Group in the Kattegat near the 
Danis"h coast. The steamer KURITYBA is still aground north 
of Helsingborg. 

Great danger from submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak. 
The steamers are sailing alone , as merchant steamers, along 
the border of territorial waters. 

During the afternoon the first news was received of steamers 
torpedoed in the Skagerrak. At 1815 the German Ambassador 
in Oslo reported that the steamer RIO DE JANEIRO of the 
1st Sea Transport Unit (Bergen) was torpedoed and sank at 
1420 near Lillesand between Grimstad and Risoer. Shortly 
afterwards the torpedoing of the steamer KRETA (of the 
Kristiansand Group) was asserted. She sent an SOS at noon. 
(Report is not confirmed later. The steamer was not 
torpedoed, but apparently managed to evade the enemy submarine 
in time. ) 

At 1815 the torpedoing of the tanker POSIDOUIA (present name 
STEDINGEN, naval supply ship) off Stave rne by the submarine 
TRIDENT was reported. 

The enemy submarines were apparently directed today to 
proceed without warning against all German merchantmen In 
and outside neutral territorial waters. Under these 
circumstances it would have been better to camouflage the 
steamers of the 1st Sea Transport Unit as neutrals (Swedes, 
Norwegians, Esthonians). 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Naval Staff's objections to a premature appearance of 
the Sea Transport Unit In Norwegian waters are thus 
confirmed. The torpedoing of the RIO DE JANEIRO, the 
landing of the survivors and the dead in German uniforms 
must of necessity lead to a complete revelation of the 
German operation and to an advance warning of the Norwegians, 
precluding the lement of surprise. 

At 2030 Rueter was already reporting from Oslo: 

"German troopship RIO DE JANEIRO with 300 
men on board torpedoed in the vicinity of 
Kristiansand. n 

The movements of the naval forces have, however, also become 
known now and are leading to swiftly increasing unrest and 
tension in the Scandinavian and enemy countries in connection 
with the German transport movements. It is reported from 
Stockholm at 1400 that the Swedish Foreign Minister has 
information that a strong German fleet and transport unit 
passed northwards through the entrances to the Baltic. A 
Danish lightship reports isolated German forces. At 1800 
Reuter gave out that 80-100 German naval vessels were 
proceeding through the Great Belt and Kattegat, escorted by 
auxiliary vessels and trawlers. 

Operation "Weseruebung" has left the stage of secrecy 

and camouflage according to the Impression prevalent in the 

evening. Our enemies have been warned. Since the element 

of surprise is lost we must now expect engagements at all 


Attack by the 10th Air Division on Scapa on the evening 
of 8 April. 

Results as follows according to the Air Force report: 

Hits : 

1 battleship from 1,300 nw altitude, 

1 hit SC 250 amidships, 1 SC 250 close to the bow. 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

1 cruiser from 5,000 m. altitude, 
1 hit SC 250 on the stern, 2 SC 500 
between 2 cruisers lying only a slight 
distance apart. 

1 battle cruiser, 1 SC 500 10-20 m. from 
the ship's side. 

1 single-engined plane shot down. 

Forces identified : 

1 aircraft carrier with superstructure, 
5 or more heavy and light cruisers, 
also destroyers and auxiliary vessels. 

Own losses: 

2 planes shot down. 

Baltic Sea: 

Advance by naval forces according to plan to their 
operational objectives in "V/eseruebung" • 

Atlantic : 

Naval Staff assumes command of Ship "16" at 2400 on 8 April, 
(9) The NORDMARK is assigned a rendezvous within the scope of 

the North Sea operation. U "37" is to relieve U "64" with 
Ship "36" and then proceed as was ordered for Ship "16". 

Submarine Situation 

The defensive disposition of the submarines for "Weseruebung" 
has been taken up as per operational order of Commanding 
Admiral, Submarines; codeword "Hartmuth": 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The disposition of submarine groups is as follows: 

I. Submarine group in the Narvik area: 

U "25", "46", "51"; U "37" is approaching 
from Iceland as the fourth boat. 

II. Submarine group in the area off Trondheim: 
U "30", "34". 

III. Submarine group in the area off Bergen: 
U "9", "14% "56", "60", "62". 

IV. Submarine group in the Stavanger area: 
U "1", "4". 

V. Submarine group in attacking disposition 
north and northeast of the Shetlands: 

U "47", "48", "49" and "50". U "52" and 
"38" are to continue operations in this 

VI. Submarine group attacking disposition east 
and west of Pentland Firth: 

U "13", "57", "58" and "59". 

VII. Submarine group: Disposition in the 
southern North Sea only in case of need. 

VIII. Submarine group: Protective disposition 
west of Lindesnes: U "2", "5", "6". 

IX. Submarine group attacking disposition east 
of the Shetlands: U "7", "10", "19". 

Merchant Shipping 

The following directive is issued to the steamers off the 
Norwegian coast not engaged in "We se rue bung" : 

"British mine barrages off Norway probably 
misleading. Probable however that positions 
concerned are patrolled. Therefore remain 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

north of Haugesund in fjords and ports* 

Signed Naval Control." 

The following is also wired to the Embassy in Oslo via 
the Foreign Office for all German Consulates (German 
citizens) in Norway for immediate transmission to all 
German merchantmen: 

"Merchantmen to remain north of Stadlandet in 
fjords or ports "because of British mine barrages 
in Norwegian territorial waters and probable patrols 
there. Merchantmen between Stadlandet and 
Kristiansand to return home on the former route." 

The Ministry of Transportation has ordered that the 
merchantmen under its control which are bound for Norway 
west of Kristiansand may no longer sail from German ports. 

The announcement by the French and British Governments of 

the mined areas in Norway was broadcast as a warning to mariners 

by the Deutschlandsender, coastal radio stations and by 

Plan A distribution. The following was announced towards 

the evening by radio message in clear: 

"The possibility of British mines near Halten must 

be reckoned with." 

(Ha It en/Norway, near Trondheim.) 

The following further orders were radioed to shios in Norway 
(in code) : 

"Ships off the south coast of Norway keep a 
safe distance from the coast, since the enemy 
is attacking ships in territorial waters. 

Signed Naval Control." 

"Ships outside the skerries are to be camouflaged 
if possible immediately." 

Regarding steamers of the "export" unit see under Situation 
8 April. 



8 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The steamers MAIN and BAERENFELS which, according to the 
Consul at Haugesund are still lying in Koppervik owing 
to lack of pilots, are ordered to proceed on to Bergen 
at once. The steamer SAO PAULO is likewise to put in to 




9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 


Items of Political Importance 

0500 : 

The German Ambassador in Oslo informed the Norwegian 
Government in writing and verbally that Germany requests 
Norway to place herself under German military protection. 
A similar note was handed to Denmark at the same time. 
Assurances were given that the political independence and 
territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark would be 
respected now and in future. 

After thorough deliberation the Norwegian Government refused 
the German demand, since it signifies an attempt on her 
sovereign rights. The Danish Government decided to accept 
German military protection under protest. 

At 0515 : 

German naval forces arrived in Norwegian and Danish bases, 
forces disembarked, the Danish frontiers were crossed. 
Denmark prohibited firing. The Norwegian Government, 
which ordered increased alert for Air Force flying and 
maintenance personnel and coastal defenses yesterday, 
states that Norway will offer resolute resistance. 

According to a Reuter report, at 1300 the (British) Foreign 
Office stated officially that the British and French Governments 
have decided to give Norway full help at once with land, sea 
and air forces; the necessary steps are being taken. 

During the day a second Government was formed in Norway under 
Vidkum Quisling (former secretary to Nansen, then leader of 
the Norwegian National Unity Party and from 1931-32 Minister 
for Defense) . 

The old Nyggardsvold Government has not resigned, however, 
but is issuing orders for mobilization and calling for 
utmost resistance and sabotage. 

At 0800 the German Government handed a note to Sweden 
containing Armed, Forces High Command's definite demands 
(see "V/eseruebung" file). A verbal assurance was given 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

that Germany's measures were in no way directed against 
Sweden. The Swedish Government has accepted the German 

Chamberlain has attempted to prove in the House of Commons 
that the German action against Norway and Denmark cannot 
be regarded a s an answer to the laying of the British mine 
barrages, since the German forces must have sailed much earlier. 
He emphasized that a state of war exists between Norway and 
Germany and that Great Britain regards herself as Norway's 

(For further particulars and impression made abroad by the 
German action, see Foreign Press and Political Review.) 

Situation 9 April 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

forth Sea/Northern Waters : 


At 0500 there was an engagement between heavy British forces 
and our battleships west of the Lofotens. No information as 
to type and composition of the enemy task force; probably a 
battle cruiser of the REPULSE class with other heavy vessels 
and destroyers. 

In the Shetlsnds/Norway area and off the Norwegian coast 

4-5 heavy ships (possibly including heavy French forces), 

about 8 cruisers and several destroyer flotillas are operating 

on varying, latterly northerly courses. £r 

The aircraft carrier FURIOUS left Scapa during the day, 
obviously to join Commander in Chief, Home Fleet. 

A submarine reported enemy destroyers on southwesterly course 
in West Fjord in the afternoon. 

A foreign submarine was sighted in Trondheim Fjord. 

During the night of 9 April enemy cruisers and destroyers 
were 40-50 miles west of Bergen on southerly courses. 

(For particulars see list in radiogram file of 9 April.) 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation 

Naval Staff reviews the situation as follows on the evening 
of 9 April: 

I. Norway : 

The Norwegian Admiralty ordered increased readiness 
during the night of 8 April and the extinguishing of all 
radio and coastal beacons on the Norwegian coast from 
Lister to Narvik. In spite of this our forces advanced 
as planned. 

Battleship Group : 

At 0530 Commanding Admiral, Fleet reported an engagement 
with heavy enemy forces west of the Lofotens (67" 40'N, 
9° 50'E). He apparently succeeded in shaking off the 
superior enemy after a short action. 

The enemy was probably one REPULSE class and another 
battleship. Commanding Admiral, Fleet reported at 2017: 

"Can only proceed at 25 knots, two heavy gun 
turrets out of action." 

Naval Staff suspects that the damage resulted from heavy 
seaway. No action report has been received from Commanding 
Admiral, Fleet. A Reuter report on a great naval battle 
and the sinking of the GNEISENAU appears very unreliable. 

Narvik Group : 

Put in as planned except for the destroyer GIESE which 
did not arrive until some hours later. Landing accomplished 
without difficulty, resistance slight. The Commodore's 
action in sinking the armored coastal ships NORGE and 
EIDSVOLD is fully approved in view of the general Norwegian 
resistance. The JAN WELLEM is in harbor. The "export" 
unit and the tanker KATTEGAT, however, have not arrived. 
This has caused a difficult situation as regards supplies; 
ammunition is scarce. 

Fuel supplies for the destroyers are assured by the JAN WELLEM. 
Refuelling will take until the evening of 10 April according 
to Commander, Destroyers' report, since the second tanker is 
not available. 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Enemy destroyers sighted in West Fjord; the Narvik 
Group must sail as soon as possible. Assumed that 
Commander, Destroyers will himself make every effort to 
hasten departure. 

Enquiry to Group West about number of destroyers ready to 
sail today has not been answered yet. 

Narvik submarines are assumed to be in inner positions. 

Trondheim Group : 

Put in as planned; slight resistance offered by coastal 
batteries. Disembarkation carried out. Situation 
regarding coastal defense guns not yet clarified, so that 
stronger submarine protection is requested. The Norwegians 
attempted to reinforce the crew of the battery at Hysnes 
by landing troops. "Export" unit has not yet arrived 
in Trondheim, causing difficult supply situation. The 
HIPPER 1 s stock of fuel is only enough for her return without 
any detours. Two destroyers will not be ready to sail 
until tomorrow. Naval air squadron which has arrived is still 
without fuel. Airfield is heavily iced-over and probably 

The HIPPER reports sinking the destroyer GLOWWORM by gunfire 
and ramming on the morning of 8 April while on passage. 

Submarines are assumed to be in position. 

Bergen Group : 

Entry and disembarkation as planned; resistance slight. 
The KOENIGSBERG and BREMSE sustained damage in action. 
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that troops are 
concentrating in the hinterland, situation therefore still 
not clear. Attacks from the sea feared. Population 

remain in Bergen. The KOELN and two torpedo boats will 
try to put out tonight. 

Submarines at inner positions. 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Egersund Group : 

Assignment carried out as planned; forces then put out to 
join the KARLSRUHE. Bicycle troops ashore. 

Kri3tiansand Group : 

Operation made difficult by fog. Strong resistance from 
coastal defenses was broken by ships' guns and bombing attacks. 
At 1130 the KARLSRUHE put in and disembarked the troops. 
When putting out at 2245 the KARLSRUHE was hit by a torpedo 
and severely damaged. Endeavors made to tow her in. The 
TSINGTAU ana PT boat flotilla remained in Kristiansand. 

Arendal assignment : 

Delayed by fog; carried out as planned about noon. 

Bicycle troops ashore; destroyed the cable to Great Britain. 

Oslo Group : 

Strong resistance from coastal batteries near Horten and 
in the Droebak Channel. Impossible to force the Channel. 
One motor minesweeper sank near Horten. Severe hits on 
the BLUECHER caused both engines to break down. The 
BLUECHER unable to move, sank near Askholmen north of the 
Droebak Channel at 1530 because of explosion inside or hits 
from mines or torpedoes. Troops disembarked in wioss end 
Sonsbugden. Resistance of coastal fortifications broken by 
bombing attack. At 1920 Droebak Channel was surrendered 
without a fight. 

The LUETZOW and EMDEN have not yet put in because the mine 
situation is not clarified. 

II. Denmark: 


No resistance. Operations proceeded smoothly to 

Troops landed in Copenhagen by the HANSESTADT DANZIG. 
Ship sailed for V/arnemuenae. 

Group "Rugard" landed troops near Middelfahrt to protect 
the bridge over the Little Belt. 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Gjedser, Nyborg and Korsoer assignments carried out as 
planned • The SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN ran aground near Vengeance 
Gruns but was refloated in the afternoon. The Nyborg Group 
was disembarked as planned. 

(See also evening report from Group Baltic, radiogram file 
of 9 April, 1800.) 

"Export" unit ; 

So far no ships have arrived at their ports of destination. 
Positions unknown. Motor vessel RODA sunk by a Norwegian 
torpedo boat. 

1st Sea Transport Unit : 

Complete reports still outstanding. So "far the steamer 
RIO DE JANEIRO of the Bergen Group has been lost. The steamer 
MARIE LEONHARD was stopped by a Norwegian torpedo boat. No 
report yet about the Oslo Group. 

2nd Sea Transport Unit ; 

In the Great Belt on the evening of 9 April. Escort 
increased # as planned. Scheduled to advance from Anholt 
close to the Swedish coast. 

Air Situation ; 

See Air Force report on the day ! s events. (Radiogram file 
of 9 April, 2200.) 

On the basis of reconnaissance and shadower reports, strong 
forces of the 30th and 26th Bomber Wings (Ju 88 and He 111) 
were sent out against forces of Commander in Chief, Home 
Fleet sighted. According to an Air Force report the following 
definite hits can be assumed; 

1 battleship 3 x 500 kg. 
1 battleship 3 x 250 kg. 
1 battle cruiser 1 x 500 kg. 



9 April 1940 


1 heavy cruiser 
1 troopship 
1 troopship 
1 cruiser or 

large destroyer 
1 cruiser 

1 x 250 kg. 
1 x 500 kg. 

1 x 50 kg. 

2 x 500 kg.) stopped, dense smoke, list 
1 x 500 kg.) 

In conclusion it can be stated: The passage of the naval 
forces into their target areas and the troop landing operations 
in Norwegian and Danish ports have succeeded in a bold break 
through the fortifications, thanks to the resolute action of 
the forces participating and favored by luck. Taking the 
enemy by surprise could not be guaranteed as the result of 
various advance warnings, in conjunction with a noticeable 
stiffening of Norway's attitude for some days. The losses 
which have been incurred, especially that of the newest heavy 
cruiser BLUECHER, are grievous; they are, however, in 
proportion to the risk run and anticipated and cannot be called 
excessively high. 

The situation for the operations so far and for the most 
difficult part of the whole naval operation which is now 
beginning, the return passage, has been rendered much more 
difficult by the enemy's operations (minelaying in Norwegian 
waters and planned partial occupation of Norwegian bases) 
coinciding with the German operation. It must be concluded 
from the presence of enemy troopships with the battleship 
formation attacked by the Air Force that the enemy's 
preparations for a landing in Norway were already under way 
and that the enemy is resolved even now to land troops in 
Norway to combat the German occupation forces. A large 
number of strong and superior British and French naval forces 
is engaged in the northern North Sea up to the Lofotens and 
off all Norwegian ports in carrying out the enemy operations. 
Danger from the air in the occupied bases must be regarded as 
extremely high in view of weak anti-aircraft defenses and 
the enemy's probable use of aircraft-carriers. The great 
danger from submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak is 
acknowledged. It will render the task of protecting the 
transport and supply routes to Oslo extremely difficult. 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Naval Staff now regards the following assignments as 
urgent : 

1. Break-through to home waters by the battleships 
and all operational forces in Norwegian ports 
as soon as possible. 

2. Reinforcement of the Skagerrak mine barrage 
in order to protect the Skagerrak against 
enemy surface forces. 

3. Concentration of submarine disposition off 
Narvik and Trondheim. 

4. Submarine chase with all available means in 
the Kattegat and Skagerrak to protect the 

supply route to Oslo. ^ 

5. Protection of the sea transport units. 

6. Request to the Fuehrer that supplies should be 
brought up via Swedish and Norwegian railroads, 
since they are impossible via the west 
Norwegian ports and naval supremacy in the 
Skagerrak and Kattegat cannot always be 
guaranteed owing to danger from enemy submarines. 

Individual Items ; 

1. Disposition of submarines to protect the area off 
Oslo is examined and rejected, since operations by our 
submarines in an area where enemy submarines are suspected 
prevent any planned submarine chase. 

2. The question as to whether it is necessary to free t 
Commanding Admiral, Fleet from obligation regarding the 
destroyers, which will not be ready to sail until tomorrow, 

and to advise him to have the battleships return as soon as 
possible is decided in the negative. After consultation with 
Group West there is no doubt - because of the exhaustive 
discussions which took place before the operation - that 
Commanding Admiral, Fleet, who Is in receipt of all informatlor 
about our own and enemy forces, will take the right action In 
accordance with the situation. 

3. The request of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast to leave 
the cruisers already in Bergen there, with regard to the 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

still uncertain land situation, is refused. The damaged 
KOENIGSBERG must of necessity remain in Bergen for the 
present. The KOELN, however, must return home as soon 
as possible. 

4. The appearance of the French minelaying cruiser 
EMILE BERTIN and other French vessels makes it necessary to 
devote increased attention to danger from mines in the 
North Sea. The importance of the minelaying cruiser is 
specially pointed out to the Air Force. 

5. According to Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark, 
the first discussions with the Danish Navy progressed very 


* a) The German Navy takes over patrol also on 

the north side of the Belt mine barrages. 

Technical maintenance of the barrages is 
still a Danish task. 

Naval Staff is expected to issue instructions later 
about laying deep barrages in the barrage gaps. 

b) The Danish barrages remain switched on. 

c) Danish naval vessels are withdrawn from the 
neutrality patrol, inclusive of the west 
coast of Jutland. German naval forces 
take over the assignment. 

The Danish Government will presumably publish a 
demobilization law. The Danish Navy intends 
to send most of its personnel home. Consent 
is given to this. 

Most Danish warships will be moved to the 
Arsenal in Copenhagen for this purpose. 

d) Dimming lights as a part of the total 
blackout ordered has not been carried out 
yet. The Danes have been requested to 
submit a plan for switching off the lights 
by areas. 



9 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

e) The Danes have made the following urgent 

1. Resumption of traffic with Bornholm. 
(Granted) . 

2. Permission for Danish packet steamers 
to proceed between Copenhagen and 
Aarhus. (Granted). 

3. Permission for fishing vessels to 

put out. (Granted with limitations.) 

Submarine Situation 

Submarines in position for "Vveseruebung" • The boats 
in the Shetlands Passage and off Pentland Firth have 
been ordered into attack groups in the vicinity of the 
positions of the heavy enemy forces reported several 
times • 

Merchant Shipping 

Lo s s e s : 

The motor vessel SEATTLE was set on fire and destroyed 
by our own bombs while breaking down resistance in 
Kristiansand. The following Information Report No. 109/40 
has been sent to all representatives abroad concerned, 
except in Russia, Japan, U.S.A. and Italy, for immediate 
transmission to all merchantmen ; 

1. Danger of enemy attacking German ships 
in neutral ports. * 

2. Be prepared for destruction. 

3. Be ready to sail on call. 

Signed Navy. 

-7 6- 


10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway ; 

Political situation in Oslo still obscure. Quisling 
Government has no response from the Norwegian people. 
The old Government has not resigned* Hamar, seat of 
the fleeing Government, occupied by German troops. 
Further flight by the Government. Discussion between 
the King of Norway and German Ambassador Brauer fruitless. 
King not prepared to yield. Nyggardsvold, the head of 
the Government, declared before the Storthing that Norway 
is resolved to continue the struggle for her integrity. 
Hambro, the President of the Storthing, gave a speech over 
the radio in Sweden, calling foi- action, and is recruiting 

The Norwegian people's resistance has been stiffened by 
British propaganda and assurances. Young men fit for 
military service are apparently prepared to offer the 
most stubborn resistance and to commence sniping activities. 
The population is everywhere passive, negative. 

Denmark ; 

No resistance, effort to comprehend the German action. 
Statement by Prime Minister Stauning •••• 

"The King and his Ministers have resolved, 
relying on Germany's assurance that she does not 
plan to infringe Denmark's integrity and political 
independence by the steps taken, to attempt to 
order conditions and the occupation. This course 
has been selected In order to spare land and people 
the consequences of war. w 

Survey of the Situation 

Special reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

The Naval Attache reports on a communication from the 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Japanese Admiralty that British naval forces from Hongkong 
and Singapore appear to be concentrating in the Dutch East 

France : 

The priority radio traffic, mostly concerning orders to 
return etc., continues. A fairly large vessel, probably 
a cruiser, is to be escorted from an African port to 
Brest by a large destroyer. 

In the Mediterranean an unidentified vessel was hastily 
sent out on guard duty in the Strait of Bonifacio. 
Twelve planes took off from Berre (Rhone) for Mentone 
(Riviera); further transfer to Corsica is possible. 

It is not out of the question that Italy's present attitude is 
occasioning doubts and making security measures by Franco- 
British forces necessary. 

North Sea/Northern Waters : 

During the day very little could be ascertained about the 
exact enemy situation. 

The battle cruiser REPULSE and the zna Destroyer Flotilla 
are suspected to be in the Lofoten area and the battle 
cruiser RENOWn on her way there. 

The southern Task Force reported several times yesterday 

between the Shetlands and Norway was not intercepted again 

today. It remains to be seen whether the heavy ships 

moved off westward or northwestward as the result of hits in 

yesterday's bombing attacks. It was not until the late 

afternoon, at 1700, that a battleship with two heavy and two 

light cruisers was sighted east of Fair Passage on southwesterly * 

course. Radio intelligence intercepted the arrival reports 

of the cruisers MANCHESTER, SOUTHAMPTON and GLASGOW in Scapa. 

The cruisers are possibly putting in to refuel, if damage from 

yesterday's air attacks does not render any repairs necessary. 

Damage to the SOUTHAMPTON and GLASGOW can be assumed according 

to the Radio Monitoring Service. The cruiser BIRMINGHAM was 

north of the Orkneys in the afternoon. 

The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and one heavy cruiser participated 
in the destroyer actions with German forces of Commander, 
Destroyers in West Fjord. The Admiralty reported the 
sinking of the destroyers HARDY and HUNTER, also severe 
damage to the HOTSPUR and another destroyer. At noon the 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

RENOWN was in radio comnunica tion with the 2nd Destroyer 
Flotilla. The aircraft-carrier FURIOUS is still at sea. 
The dive-bombers which successfully attacked the forces 
lying in -Bergen at 0800 probably took off from her. Only 
destroyers on westerly courses were reported in the Shetlands 
Passage during the forenoon. 

Very great danger from submarines is still to be reckoned with 
in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. 

Own Situation 


Military situation outwardly quiet on the west coast. 

The mobilization ordered by the old Government is arousing 

resistance • 

Railroad communications to Bergen and Trondheim destroyed, 
telephone lines interrupted. Norwegian naval forces hostile 
and prepared for actions. Groups and Commanding Admiral, 
Submarines therefore ordered to destroy Norwegian forces not 
in our hands or laid up in port. Further, it is pointed out 
to Commanding Admiral, Norway (Admiral Boehm) that it is 
urgently necessary for the new Government at once to recall 
the Norwegian forces at sea. Appropriate safety measures in 
view of our submarine positions are to be arranged with the 
Norwegian Government. 

The directive is issued - because of an inquiry from the 
Group - that all captured Norwegian naval vessels are to be 
commissioned with German crews. 

Situation in Narvik : 

At 0651 a corrupt "Most Immediate" radio message in clear was 
received from Narvik about an attack made by British destroyers 
on Narvik. 

Later reports, still incomplete at first, show that in the 
early hours of the morning, in fog and drifting snow, enemy 
destroyers protected by a heavy cruiser carried out a surprise 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

attack on our destroyers lying in Narvik. The attack was 
warded off; three enemy destroyers were sunk or destroyed 

Our losses the HEIDKAaIP and SCHMITT. Commander, Destroyers, 
Commodore Bonte, was killed. The ROEDER sustained severe 
damage, LUEDEMANN, KUENNE and THIELE are able to proceed with 
limitations, the ARNIM has slight breakdowns. Return passage 
for the ZENKER, GIESE, KOELLNER and ARNIk appears possible. 

Enemy destroyers withdrew after heavy losses. Narvik is 
firmly in our hands. 

As a result of damage sustained during the British attack and 
difficulties in oiling, only the destroyers GIESE and ZENKER 
are completely ready to proceed and put out. 


Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla attempted to put to sea 
during the night of 10 April, but had to turn back since the 
five destroyers reported by U n 51" in Brenes Fjord, reinforced 
by cruisers in the rear, are watching the fjord entrance and 
a break-through appeared hopeless because of the bright night. 

Situation in Trondheim : 

Military situation outwardly quiet. Every aspect of the supply 
question difficult. Transport by rail from Oslo not possible. 
Fuel situation critical for the 1st Naval Air Squadron of the 
506th Group. Seaward defense by coastal guns not yet settled. 
Port Commander therefore requests reinforcement of the submarine 
disposition off Trondheim. Airfield still unserviceable as the 
result of icing. 

The cruiser HIPPER and the destroyer ECKHOLDT are in readiness 
to sail. The RIEDPJL is not ready to proceed and is being 
used as a barrage battery. The HIPPER sailed in the evening; 
the ECKHOLDT had to turn about for en unknown cause. 

Assessment and Steps taken : 

We owe it to the strong defensive action of the Narvik 
destroyers, which obviously used all their resources and 
whose regrettable losses can probably be ascribed to the 
enemy's taking them by surprise in bad visibility, that an 
enemy landing in Narvik could be repulsed with very heavy 
losses to him. The death of Commodore Bonte, who had always 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

proved himself an excellent Commander, and especially so as 
Commander, Destroyers, is a heavy loss for Naval Staff and 
the entire Navy, especially the destroyers. 

The destroyer attack on Narvik confirms what dangers are 
entailed for our forces detained in the ports because of 
delayed refuelling or waiting for the arrival of tankers. 
The order is therefore issued to all forces lying in readiness 
to proceed in Narvik, Trondheim and Bergen to commence return 
passage as soon as possible and regardless of vessels remaining 
behind. If necessary they may call at intermediate ports. 
The Narvik destroyers under Commander, 4th Destroyer Flotilla 
are, as per operational order, to join the fleet which is 
presumed to be west of the Lofotens (radio silence being 

Independent return passage is left to the discretion of the 
cruiser HIPPER with her force. 

The situation of the destroyers in Narvik is judged to be 
very serious in view of further expected attacks by superior 
forces. It is to be hoped that the break-through from 
Narvik with the destroyers which are ready to proceed will 
take place as soon as possible. Commander, 4th Destroyer 
Flotilla is undoubtedly endeavoring to carry this out with 
all the means in his power. 

Further speedy protection of important positions in Narvik 
and Trondheim is necessary. An attempt must be made to 
relieve the destroyers. Naval Staff has therefore ordered 
Commanding Admiral, Submarines to reinforce the submarine 
disposition off these ports and to increase the number of 
large boats off Narvik to 8, off Trondheim to 4. The boats 
may be expected to arrive in 2-3 days. 

Since the steamers of the "export" unit have not arrived in 
Narvik and Trondheim, the troops landed are facing a very 
difficult situation as regards equipment with guns and supplies 
of ammunition. The Fuehrer has therefore ordered investigation 
into the possibility of supplies by submarines , in addition to 
the immediate supply service by the Air Force. 

The result of the investigation is: 

The following will be ready to carry out this assignment 
within a short period: 

U "43" from the evening of 11 April, 
U "26" on 13 April, 
U "29" on 15 April. 



10 April 1940 


The weight of the supplies is allowed for by the boats only 
carrying the torpedoes in the tubes . They can then carry: 










ti 29 « 



Naval Staff has sent a directive to this effect to Group 21, 
Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group West. 

The question of the use of the large boats U "A", 

U "101% U ,, 122 ft , which will be ready for operations in the 

immediate future and the possibility of converting the boats 

suitable for transport ("103", "104", "105", "106", "123", 

"124") to carry mixed dargoes and aviation gasoline is under 


Naval Staff also proposed to Armed Forces High Command and 
Commander in Chief, Air Force the immediate use of a Zeppelin, 
as a further means of supply. Investigation revealed, 
however, that the Zeppelin is not in readiness. 


Because of the importance 
Group has been ordered to 
available meens. 

of air transports, the Trondheim 
make ready the airfield with all 

Commanding Admiral, Fleet has reported position west of 6° E 
north of 68° N; he plans to break through near the Shetlands 
from the northwest and requests that the HIPPER may operate 
to the east. Heavy guns will be ready for action again on 
11 April, except for "A" turret on the GNEISENAU. 

Commanding Admiral, Fleet* s plans are approved. The speedy 
return of the ships Is desirable. Operations against light 
enemy forces in order to gain taotical and strategic successes 
are not possible as the enemy situation at present shows no 
chances of operations against such enemy forces. The question 
of battleship operations in West Fjord in order to bring the 
destroyers out of Narvik is rejected, since such an operation 
offers no prospects of success in view of the presence of 
superior enemy forces, including the aircraft carrier, and in 
view of the danger from submarines and torpedoes in the fjords; 




10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

jeopardizing the battleships without prospects of strategic 
success is not justified. 

The maintenance of the battleships is of the greatest strategic 
importance just now. 

Situation in Bergen : 

Bergen firmly in our hands. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast 
reports the laying of the planned mine barrages in both entrances 
to Bergen. Dive-bomber attack by enemy planes at 0800. The 
cruiser KOENIGSBERG was set on fire by two bombs and had to be 
abandoned. Ship capsized at 1100. Crew incorporated in 
coastal defense. 

Urgent need for supplies of anti-aircraft guns and light anti- 
aircraft ammunition is reported. Admiral, West Norwegian 
Coast has been given the assignment of seizing and reporting 
all oil stocks ashore and in tankers. 

Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force is scheduled to sail tonight 
with the KOELN and two torpedo boats. 

Situation in Stavanger : 

Torpedo boat SKARV seized. 

Stavanger airfield and seaplane base attacked by British 
bombers in the evening. No particular damage done. 

Situation in Eristiansand : 

The torpedoed cruiser KARLSRUHE could not be saved. The ship 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

was sunk by torpedo on the night of 9 April. Nothing special to 
report in Kristiansand. 

Two 21 cm, six 15 cm. guns ready for use with very simple fire 

Situation in Oslo : 

The island of Bolerne, which was still firing in the forenoon, 
fell into German hands in the afternoon. The last resistance 
in Oslo Fjord has thus been broken. 

The LUETZOW and EMDEN put in to Oslo. The LUETZOW is to 
return to Kiel tonight to be made ready for operations in the 
Atlantic as soon as possible. 

The torpedo boat ALEATROS ran aground at the entrance to 
Oslo Fjord and is probably lost. 

Such losses must be expected in the waters off the Norwegian 
coast, to which we are unaccustomed and which are difficult 
to navigate. 

Commanding Admiral, Norway, Admiral Eoehm, flew to Oslo on 
the afternoon of 10 April, and took up his duties. 

The 2nd Sea Transport Unit (troops ana material) crossed to 
Oslo in convoy. In spite of strong submarine protection and 
sir patrol the steamers FRIEDENAU, WIGBERT and patrol boat 
"1507" were torpedoed west of Gothenburg. Casualties appear 
to be high. 

The steamer ANTARES of the 1st Sea Transport Unit was 
torpedoed (west of Uddevalla Fjord). 

Unsuccessful submarine chase. 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

It is necessary to concentrate anti-submarine defenses in the 
Kattegat and eastern Skagerrak because of the acute submarine 
situation in these areas. At the request of Group Baltic, 
the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla and Ships "35", "40", "37", 
"26" and "47" have been placed at its disposal. Group West 
is at present considering the transfer of a further submarine 
chaser flotilla. 

Denmark : 

Nothing special to report in Denmark. (Coastal Defense 

Commander, Denmark, Vice Admiral Mewis, in Copenhagen.) 

Occupation proceeds according to plan. Good understanding 
with Danish authorities. 

According to the order of Armed Forces High Command (Operations 
Division), command of the forces of Staff, 31st Special Duties 
Corps (General Kaupisch) operating in Denmark will pass to Commander 
in Chief, Army on conclusion of military operations in Denmark. 
The 21st Group, Oslo will remain directly subordinate to Armed 
Forces High Command. 

Staff, 31st Special Duties Corps will remain in Denmark. 
The Commanding Officer is the Commander and representative of 
the German Armed Forces in Denmark. He is authorized to issue 
orders to all German forces in Denmark in order to avert dangers. 

Great Belt : 

We have occupied the control positions of the Danish mine 
barrages in the Great Belt. 

Bornholm : 

The HANSESTADT DANZIG landed a battalion at Roenne on Bornholm 
in the afternoon. 

— 85— 


10 April 1940 


(S©e also situation report of Group Baltic, radiogram 
file 1945.) 

Air Situation : 

See Air Force report on day's events. 

Air Force Operations Staff asked Naval Staff in the evening 
whether, on the basis of the survey of the situation in Narvik, 
a fresh British attack there to wipe out the destroyers and 
capture the town is considered probable, so that all-out use 
of a bomber group on 11 April appears to be justified. 
(Planes would land at Narvik after the attack but could not 
fly back because of fuel shortage.) 

Naval Staff considers a British attempt to force Narvik 
early on the morning of 11 April possible, perhaps even 
probable. All-out use of a whole bomber group to attack, 
however, appears too much to Naval Staff. 

A bomber squadron is 
such an attac:.. 

considered sufficient to repulse 

Naval Staff, however, considers the use of a few long-range 
bombers (5-6), which can return , to be a better solution. 

Air Force General Staff (Naval Liaison Officer) was informed 
to this effect by telephone. 

Naval Staff, in agreement with Commander in Chief, Air Force, 

has issued regulations to prevent losses to ourselves caused 

by our own actions . (See War Diary, Part B, Vol. V, page 131.) 

Submarine Situation 
Nothing special to report. 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Disposition as per. operational order "Hartmuth". At 0800 
a directive was sent to Commanding Admiral, Submarines and 
Group West based on the survey of the situation in Trondheim 

"Increase number of submarines off Trondheim to 4." 

The order was amplified later by the following: 

"Increase number of large submarines off Narvik to 8, 
off Trondheim to 4, at once because of the decisive 
importance of these two ports for the whole operation." 

Commanding Admiral, Submarines has dispersed Submarine Group 
V north of the Shetlands and assigned the boats as follows: 

To Narvik: U "47", "48", "49", "38". 
To Trondheim: U "50", "52". 

Merchant Shipping 

Own Shipping : 

Stavanger Sea Transport Unit (3 steamers) put in; Krlstiansand 
Unit (3 steamers) put in; steamer KRETA still missing. No 
news to date from Bergen. 

Armed Forces High Command orders with reference to the "export" 
units : 

1. Transport steamers which have passed Bergen to the 
north are to proceed to Trondheim for unloading. 

2. If Trondheim has been passed to the north, let 
them proceed. 

3. Transport steamers in Bergen or south of it to 
unload at the nearest port, regardless of destination 
of cargo. 

Losses : 

The steamer RODA of the "export" unit was sunk off Stavanger 



10 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

by a Norwegian torpedo boat. According to a statement by 
Chamberlain, the steamer RAUENFELS and five other German 
merchant steamers were sunk in West Fjord during the attack 
on Narvik. 

Foreign Merchant Shipping : 

With reference to a radio monitoring report that the British 
Commanding Admiral, Mediterranean has instructed all Danish 
and Norwegian ships in his area to put into British Mediterranean 
ports, since the ships are under British protection, the 
Foreign Office was requested to have the Norwegian and Danish 
Governments issue counter-orders. The Foreign Office then 
made arrangements in Copenhagen and Oslo for Norwegian and 
Danish ships to receive instructions through the radio to put 
in to neutral ports in the Mediterranean, preferably Spanish 
or Italian ones, or to endeavor, as the situation permits, 
otherwise to escape seizure by the British and to return home. 
Simultaneously the Embassies in Rome and Madrid were instructed 
to endeavor - by means of our Consulates and by pressure on 
Norwegian and Danish Consulates - to hold Norwegian and Danish 
ships which may be in ports there for the present. The 
Italian and Spanish Governments are to be informed of these 
measures. A communication has also been sent to the Ministry 
of Propaganda to be broadcast by the German foreign radio 

At noon on 10 April Commander in Chief, Navy was in the 
Chancellery to report to the Fuehrer. Conference on the 

(For memorandum of Commander in Chief, Navy see War Diary, 
Part C, Vol. V.) 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway : 

Still difficult to assess the political situation. The King 
firmly rejects the new Quisling Government. General impression: 
population indifferent around Oslo, resolved to resist in the 
interior because of orders from the old Government and propaganda 
calling for action. 

Foreign Minister Koht declared: 

"We are at war with Germany and consequently allied 
to all countries which are at war with Germany." 

2. Denmark: 

Situation continues quiet. An audience granted by the King 
to the Ambassador and military leaders has confirmed the 
impression that the King and Government are striving to stress 
their wish for friendly and correct relations. 

3. Lord Halifax states that any readiness by Norway to 
negotiate with Germany would have no effect on the Allies' 
decision to oppose the German penetration into Norway. 
Great Britain could not possibly suffer an extension of the 
German strategic position into the North Sea and Atlantic. 

4. Sweden : 

Is resolved to maintain her neutrality and is determined to 
keep out of the conflict. 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

5. Russia, Italy, Spain and Finland declare their attitude 
of strict neutrality towards the German advance against Norway 
and Denmark. 

6. Roosevelt has issued a proclamation forbidding U.S. 
ships to enter all Scandinavian waters. The war zone laid 
down in the Neutrality Law is extended by the decree. 
According to it, U.S. ships may not traverse Scandinavian 
territorial waters from Bergen along the west coast of Norway 
up to the point 44° E, 77° N. Archangel and Murmansk are 
also included in this zone. 

(For individual reports on Norway and speeches by Churchill 
and Reynaud on 11 April, see Foreign Press and Political 
Review. ) 

Survey of the Situation 

Political and military situation in Norway still unchanged. 
Our forces are assembling for action against Norwegian troops. 
Supply situation very strained, especially for the equipping of 
air bases. No enemy troops have landed in Norway so far, 
but landings are assumed to be imminent. 

(See situation report, 21st Group of 11 April. Radiogram 
file 2225.) 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Great Britain ; 

Disposition of forces; Aircraft carriers GLORIOUS and ARK ROYAL, 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

also 1 "C" class cruiser and <J destroyers, left Alexandria 
on 9 April, in all probability to proceed to home waters. 

The RESOLUTION has been detected in the area to the west of 
the Channel, the REVENGE and DISPATCH in the Canada area. 
The HAWKINS is in Montevideo, the HERMES in the Freetown area, 
the RAMILLIES still in Australia. 

France : 

Hasty assembly of naval forces in Brest continues. Three 
large vessels (cruisers or old battleships) from Toulon to 
Casablanca on 11 April. The battleship formation DUNKERQUE, 
STRASSEOURG proceeding into the North Sea? (See below). 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Luring the course of the day, U "48" several times reported an 

enemy task force west of Trondheim, consisting of '6 battleships, 

several heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 5 destroyers. 

At 2200 U "48" reported a heavy cruiser out of control for some 

time 60 miles northwest of Trondheim Fjord. This could be 

the cruiser reported by the Air Force as twice hit with 50 kg. 


Radio intelligence detects at sea Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, 
Commanders, Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st and 2nd Cruiser 
Squadrons, also the 3rd, 4th and 6th Destroyer Flotillas. 

The presence of the aircraft carrier FURIOUS v/ith the main 
force led by Commanaer in Chief, Home Fleet west ana northwest 
of ''• n rondheim was confirmed by our air report and by the Radio 
Monitoring Service. Planes attacked Trondheim harbor during 

the morning. 

The former Polish steamers CHOERI (11,500 tons) and BATORY 
(14,500 tons), now being used as troopships, have arrived in 
Scapa . 

An agent's report from Intelligence Center, Belgium, states 
that there was a French squadron consisting of the battleships 
STRASSEOURG and DUNXERQJJE and the aircraft carrier BEARM, 
escorted by two destroyer flotillas and one submarine flotilla 
(DAUPHIN class), in the entrance to the Channel early on 10 April 
en route for the North Sea. Time and position are considered 
improbable according to our radio monitoring. In spite of this, 
the presence of the French forces in the North Sea or northern 
waters must be reckoned with. 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Radio Intelligence intercepted a British radio message from 
which it appears that an operation against the Norwegian 
coast between 58° and 59° (area Lindesnes to Skudesnes P'jord) 
is planned on 12 April, probably in the afternoon because of 
the weather. 

All offices concerned have been informed. 

A landing at the points indicated is not considered probable. 
In Naval Staff's opinion, this is probably a minelaying 
operation off the south coast of Norway or a large air raid on 
St a vange r/Be r gen . 

Survev of our own Situation 

Battleships and HIPPER ; 

The P T IPPER sailed from Trondheim during the night of 10 April. 
Movements so far as planned. No reports. Forces should be 
roughly off Egersund tomorrow morning. 

Situation in Na r vik : 

P'our destroyers are in complete readiness to proceed, 
3 in limited readiness. The DIETER von ROEDER is not ready. 
(ROEDER' s radio station has been set up ashore as Narvik Naval 
Radio Station, guns are being dismantled for use as a barrage 
battery.) Commander, 4th Destroyer P'lotilla reports that Pie 
does not consider a break-through out of West Fjord possible 
as long as there are superior enemy light forces (cruisers and 
destroyers) lying in West P'jord. He considers return passage 
close to the coast to be unfavorable because of the joint 
British and Norwegian patrol activity. 

The tanker KATTEGAT was destroyed in Ofot Fjord by British 
forces. Torpedoes were fired on two Eritish destroyers by 
U "k25" near Baroy. Effect not observed. 

Further steps taken on land to protect Narvik. 

Elvenes on Gratanger Fjord was occupied. The greater part 

of the population lias left Narvik. Business is at a standstill. 

Narvik's primary requirements from Germany are supplies of 
heavy armament (mountain guns, machine-guns, mortars) and 
ammunition. Armed Forces High Command and Commander in Chief, 
Air Force have issued orders accordingly. 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Long-range reconnaissance planes, type Do 26, are to operate 
as transport planes for all goods which cannot be dropped. 
They are therefore not available for long-range sea 

Situation in Trondheim : 

Attacked in the morning by land planes (aircraft carrier) with 
bombs and torpedoes. No success. Scouting raid by British 
destroyers repulsed by Hysnes Battery. 

British landing suspected south of Storfosna and in Namsos 
Fjord. Air reconnaissance is planned. The sighting report 
on the British battleship and cruiser formation west and 
northwest of Trondheim assumes greater importance in connection 
with possible British plans for a landing. 

Situation in Bergen : 

Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force, sailed from Bergen on the 
evening of 10 April with the KOELN, LEOPARD and WOLF. 

Situation otherwise unchanged. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast, 
reports that the British dive-bombers carrying out the air 
raids on 10 April had German markings . 

The railroad line from Bergen to Voss and trunk cable connections 
have been destroyed.. 

The Norwegian torpedo boat BRAND was commissioned. 

Group West requests the destruction of Aalesund radio 
transmitter as it is in constant radio communication with Wick 

Situation in Krlstiansand : 

Unchanged; two Norwegian submarines seized. 

Situation in Oslo : 

Unchanged. The King declines to give the German Ambassador 
another audience. No success yet in arresting the former 
Government* Lines -of communication and railroad lines in 
the hinterland interrupted. 

Oslo troops further reinforced with two battalions by air and 
by the main body of the 2nd Sea Transport Unit, 10 steamers of 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

which arrived in Oslo in the forenoon. Two steamers 
(FRIEDENAU and WIG-BERT) were torpedoed and lost. The 
steamer IONIA (1st Sea Transport Unit) carrying horses 
and ammunition was torpedoed off Oslo Fjord. Attempts are 
being made to tow her in. 

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, has put submarine- 
chasers into action to combat the great danger from submarines 
in the entrance to Oslo Fjord. At 1800 a submarine-chaser 
reported the alleged destruction by depth charges of a submarine 
at the southern entrance to Oslo Fjord.. (No definite 'proof 
available. ) 

One Norwegian submarine seized in Horten. 

The cruiser LUETZOW, which had been recalled from Oslo to be 
prepared for the Atlantic, was torpedoed and severely damaged 
east of Skagen during the night of 10 April. She is unable 
to move and is being picked up by forces of Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, Baltic and towed off by tugs. 

The fact that the LUETZOW, although unable to move, did not 
receive a second torpedo hit, makes it possible that she struck 
a mine. Against this there is the fact that the ship was hit 
aft . (Later investigations detected no mines in the area 
in question. ) 

The torpedoing of the LUETZOW is the most severe lose the Navy 
could suffer at the present moment. The ship's elimination 
for some time results in the abandonment of pocket battleship 
warfare in the Atlantic at the very moment when a strong 
diversion would have been most useful. The ship's incor- 
poration 'in "Weseruebung" and her despatch to Oslo have therefore 
turned out to be definite strategic errors . Naval Staff feels 
this all the more because it always recognized the despatch of 
the pocket battleship to the Atlantic as a strategic necessity 
and indicated it as such. The original plan of sending the 
ship into the Atlantic from Trondheim after executing her 
transport assignment could not be carried out since at the last 
moment she was reported not to be ready for the Atlantic because 
of trouble with her auxiliary engines. Armed Forces High 
Command's request that the troops already en route be brought 
to Oslo had to be fulfilled by Naval Staff, although v/ith great 
misgivings • The fulfillment of this demand has proved a 
mistake strategically, from the point of view of naval warfare. 
It must be admitted, with regard to the execution of the 
Norwegian operation, that the presence of the troops embarked 
on the LUETZOW was of the greatest value for the Oslo operation 
in view of the BLUECHEH's breakdown. 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

It can be stated in retrospect tha*t both the use of the 
LUETZOW and of the latest cruiser BLUECHER in Oslo have led 
to extremely severe losses in naval fighting strength. 
It might also have been possible to carry out the landing 
in Oslo with a large number of small vessels (torpedo boats, 
escort boats, etc.) without great losses. A very large 
number of such vessels would, however, have been necessary 
for the troops to be transported. In Naval Staff 's opinion 
the incorporation of powerful ships in the Oslo operation can 
on no account be judged as an operational error. The use of 
heavy ships 1 guns was considered a basic requirement to break 
down resistance in Oslo and to cover the landing. Naval Staff 
also previously considered the use of the old battleships in 
Oslo. Apart from the fact that one of these ships was limited 
regarding maneuverability and ability to proceed and the other 
was operating on the Korsoer assignment, their fighting qualities 
as opposed to the coastal batteries were estimated as very slight. 
(Pencilled marginal note by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: But 
surely greater than BLUECHER and LUETZOW?) Finally, the 
question of the possibility of intimidation by a modern 
representative ship played a part in the decision to send the 

Losses had to be expected in any case. They had to be taken 
into account in the interests of the magnitude of the assignment 
to be carried out. 

Special Questions 

1. In order to increase the safety of troop transports to 
Norway and to avoid further losses of personnel, Group Baltic 
suggests that large torpedo boats make the crossing together 
with fast steamers. The boats are to act as anti-submarine 
protection for the fast steamers which, for their part, will 
only cross in favorable weather. It is proposed that these 
load in Hamburg as before. Croup Baltic also considers 
mine-exploding vessels well suited for carrying out transport 
and requests an allocation. 

Naval Staff has consented to the separate transportation 
of men and material. Because of trie length of the route to 
be protected, Hamburg is considered unsuitable as a point of 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The question of further transport has been thoroughly 
discussed with Armed Forces High Command, whose attention was 
drawn to the difficulties of protecting transports in view of 
the great danger from submarines and mines in the Kattegat 
and Skagerrak and to the necessity of transporting troops by 
air as far as possible. Armed Forces High Command is well 
aware of the difficulties but cannot forego speedy continuation 
of transports by sea in view of the urgency of carrying out 
transport assignments. Losses must be accepted. 

The following is therefore ordered in agreement with Armed 
Forces High Command: 

a) Troops to be transported from Frederikshavn on 
fast naval vessels and small, fast ships 

TaTOENSBURG, ANGELBURG from the Submarine '^ 

School, free minelayers). 

b) Material to be transported as before, plus 
additional ammunition, material and provisions 
from Skagen on drifters and fishing smacks. 

The immediate seizure is ordered of such vessels in German and 
Danish ports. 

The more the transports of material can be switched over to the 
greatest possible number of such vessels, the safer they will be. 

The Fuehrer at present absolutely declines to carry out transport 
of troops by Swedish railroads, in order to place no burden on 
Sweden's neutrality. Only transports of. clothing, provisions 
and medical supplies to Narvik come into question for the present. 

(For Naval Staff 1 s preliminary order see radiogram file of / 

11 April, 1800; for executive order of Group Baltic see under 

2. The Fuehrer's order, which was received in the evening, 
on the urgent assignments for the branches of the Armed Forces 
(see "We s e rue bung" file) states, regarding the Navy: 

a) Most important task is protection of the 
Kattegat and Skagerrak against submarines. 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

b) Do 26' s of the Navy are at once placed 
under the 10th Corps to carry supplies to 

c) Narvik to be supplied by submarines. 

d) Transports of material via the Trelleborg- 
Sweden railroad to Narvik can be expected 
within a few days. 

e) Troops to cross from east Jutland to Oslo 
with light naval forces. 

f) Single guns etc., to be transported on 
trawlers and other small vessels to 

Groups receive this order with instruction to take the 
necessary steps, if necessary in agreement with Group 21. 

3. Group Baltic has been ordered to carry out at once its 
proposed protection with nets of the southern outlet of the 
Flint Channel, including Danish territorial waters, up to the 
border of Swedish territorial waters. The Group is also to 
submit suggestions for the protection of the northern outlets 
of the Great Belt end the Sound north of the Nyborg-Korsoer 
and Helsingoer-Helsingborg ferries. 

4. In view of the appearance of the battleships and the 
HIPPER in the Air Force operational area, the Fuehrer and Field 
Marshal are very anxious about the danger to our own ships 
during attscks by the 10th Air Corps on British naval forces. 
The attention of the Navy and Air Force is again particularly 
drawn to the question of identification and exchange of 
recognition signals. 

Group West was instructed by telephone to ensure that the 10th 
Air Corps is clearly informed of the positions and movements of 
the battleships and the HIPPER. Ships are also to be familiar 
with German Air Force formations and the necessity is again to 
be pointed out to them that the markings ordered can be clearly 
made out and that recognition signals are also to be fired at 
latest with "Open fire" (if not definitely identified as enemy). 



11 April 1940 


Air Situation 

Special Items 

Armed reconnaissance in the direction of Narvik by ten planes 
of the 3rd Group of the 26th Bomber Wing. Action against 
enemy battleship formation (3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 
2 cruisers, 14 destroyers, northeasterly course) about 1700 
in the area off Trondheim. 

Result : 

1 cruiser 

1 aircraft carrier 

? x so kg.) bomb hits# 

1 x 50 kg. ) 

Transfer of the 1st Coastal Patrol Squadron of the 106th Group 
from Trondheim to Narvik as ordered could not be carried out 
because of lack of fuel supplies. 

(For particulars see Air Situation and results of reconnaissance 
over Narvik in Air Force General Staff report; radiogram file 
of 11 April, 2330.) 

{Submarine Situation 

Positions on the evening of 11 April: 
1. Off ,Narvik and in West Fjord: 
On passage: 



Off Trondheim: 
On passage: 
Area off Bergen: 
In Kors Fjord: 

U "46", "25", "64", "51". 

U "38", "47", "48", "49", 
"65". (Roughly north of 

U "30", "34". 

U "50", "52". 




9", "14", "60", "62". 





11 April 1940 



Stavanger area: U "1", "4". 
Proceeding to the following positions: 
U "59" to grid square 7870 

U "58" 
U "57" 
U "13" 
U "37" 
U "19" 
U "10" 
U "56" 


(Grid squares lie north to northeast of the Shetlands.) 

6. Proceeding to the Skagerrak: U "5", "6" to position 
south of Lister, U "2" south of Lindesnes. 

(For order to Narvik submarines see radiogram file 11 April, 

Special Reports from Submarines 

U "25" reports two destroyers torpedoed in West Fjord near 
Baroy. Effect not observed. (May have been prematures). 

At 1230, U "48" reported a spread of three which missed or 
failed on the cruiser CUMBERLAND; at 2115, a spread of three 
which missed and failed ( through non-firing ) on another cruiser, 

U "51" had two misses, (one a safety range detonator) when 
firing on a large destroyer. 

Merchant Shipping 

The following have arrived in Bergen : 

The steamer BAERENFELS of the "export" unit. 
Narvik. ) 

(Was bound for 



11 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The steamer &1ARIE LEONHARD of the 1st Sea Transport Unit, 

The transport steamers for "Wese rue bung" can now be reviewed 
as follows: 

1. "Export" Unit : 

Narvik : No steamers arrived. 2 steamers 
with material and 1 t8nker lost, 1 steamer with 
material put in to Bergen. 

Trondheim : No steamers arrived. 3 steamers 
and 1 tanker probably lost, 1 steamer still 
en route. 

2. 1st Sea Transport Unit : 

Bergen : 1 steamer lost, 1 arrived, 1 in Oslo. 

Stavanger : All 3 steamers arrived. 

Kristiansand : All 4 steamers arrived. 

Oslo : 3 steamers and 1 Bergen steamer arrived, 
2 lost. 

3. 2nd Sea Transport Unit to Oslo : 
9 steamers arrived, 2 lost. 

(For particulars see review in reference file "Weseruebung". ) 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Situation in Oslo not yet clarified. The Quisling Government 
is endeavoring to govern but probably cannot last since support 
from the people and Armed Forces is too slight. Position 
rendered very difficult by the first Government's continuous 
counter-orders and orders to resist. 

For world opinion's reactions to the German offensive in 
Norway, see Political Review No. 84 and Foreign Press. 

The German action has undoubtedly evoked the greatest consternation 
in Holland and Belgium, where anxiety about a German invasion 
has again come to the fore. In spite of this there is no 
inclination to accept the requests of the 'Western Powers to put 
themselves under their protection. 

It is reported from the U.S.A. that the news of the German action 
was received calmly . Special importance was undoubtedly attached 
here to the fact that the 3ritish breach of neutrality by mine- 
laying in Norwegian waters preceded the German operation. 

The publication of the German White Paper from the Polish 
documents is also contributing to lessen the Government's 
inclination to be biased against Germany. It is confirmed 
that the European situation cannot lead America to deviate 
from the maintenance of her neutrality. 

In a broadcast speech the Swedish Foreign Minister emphasized 
that Sweden was still firmly resolved to pursue a course of 
strict neutrality. Demands from a belligerent to utilize 
Swedish territory for its operations would have to be refused. 
Extension of defensive readiness was necessary for the purpose 
of defending Swedish neutrality. 

The Danish Government has granted Iceland complete independence 
for the duration of the present emergency. The Faroes have 
been occupied by Britain. 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Great Britain : 

It has now been established that the WARSPITE was to proceed to 
the Mediterranean at the beginning of April as a reinforcement 
and was apparently on her way there, but was recalled again on 
6 April. Priority radio traffic predominates in the Mediterranean 
and indicates that naval forces are being redeployed. 

France ; 

The Attache in Madrid states that according to a report from 
Intelligence Center, Spain, a French squadron of eight large 
ships passed Gibraltar westwards during the night of 11 April. 

Increased patrol activity by light forces and patrol vessels 
in cooperation with planes was detected in the Dunkirk area. 


North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

The area off the Norwegian coast as far as 60 N, 4° E and 

the entire Skagerrak and Kattegat are declared to be a 

mined area. A passage to Gothenburg has been left roughly 

in the middle of the channel. 4 

Narvik area ; 

The blockade position off Narvik Is being extended; searchlight 
barrages were reported at the entrance to West Fjord; the 
bringing up of supply ships (tankers) under destroyer escort 
was detected. The WARSPITE, REPULSE and one aircraft carrier, 
which sent her planes to attack Narvik, a^e obviously In the 
area off Narvik. 

The vessels mentioned, plus a number of destroyers, were 
assembled into a Force "B" and sent to carry out an operation 
"Attack against defenses". 



12 April 1940 CONF IDENTIAL 

According to a report intercepted by radio intelligence, 

the attack on Narvik will probably take place on the afternoon 

of 13 April. 

Commander, 2nd Cruiser Squadron detailed two destroyers as 
escort for the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON, which is sailing from Scapa 
Flow at noon today for Vaags Fjord ( north of Narvik). 

This information, in conjunction with the sailing of the 
troopships BATORY and CHOBRI on 12 April from Scapa, indicates 
that troops will be landed in Vaags Fjord. According to a 
further report the landing is planned there for 15 April. 

Trondhelm area ; 

First British troops obviously landed in the neighborhood of 
Indre Foliar (about 64° 50' Nj in the afternoon. Commander, 
1st Cruiser Squadron reported operation carried out and the 
suitability of Namsos and Mosjoen for further landings according 
to reconnaissance by one destroyer. 

Stavanger-Bergen area : 

A destroyer flotilla was given a minelaying assignment in the 
area of Skudesnes Fjord at about 59° N, 5° E. Execution not 
yet detected. 

No fresh reports of the British battleship formation. 

It follows from the steps so far taken by the enemy that he is 
at present ignoring ports occupied by us from the point of view 
of landings and is limiting himself to alternative points and 
accepting strategic disadvantages on land. From his almost 
undisturbed landing places the enemy obviously plans to out- 
flank the German strategically important points of Narvik and 
Trondheim and to attack them after preliminary raids by planes 
from the carrier. He plans to destroy in advance the naval 
forces still lying in the harbors. Troops are being carried 
on large, strongly escorted transports. 

Simultaneously with the landing, the blockade of supply and 
approach routes for our naval forces will be commenced on a 
large scale by the combined Franco-British naval forces. 

Own Situation 

Battleships and HIPPER : 

In the morning the returning ships were at approximately 59° N 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

and from 0645-1040 were continually reported by British 
reconnaissance planes. Reports were passed on to nine 
British bomber squadrons, which were, however, unable to 
attack because of deterioration of visibility. The 
battleships and HIPPER put in to Wilhelmshaven in the evening. 

For brief report from the forces see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V, 
page 132. 

Situation in Narvik : 

Three destroyers in complete readiness to proceed, two 
destroyers in limited readiness. The ZENKER and KOELLNER 
damaged through touching ground; tne KOELLNER is to be used as 
a barrage battery. West Fjord is still blocked. 

Situation on land unchanged. The ore railroad has been 
slightly disrupted by the Norwegians. The troops request 
infantry guns and mortars since they are opposing an enemy 
with artillery. 

Some of the submarines off Narvik were assigned dispositions 
in Vaags Fjord in view of a possible enemy landing there. 
They received permission to attack all ships encountered. 

Situation in Trondheim : 

The destroyers ECKHOLDT and EEINEMANN are ready to proceed. 
The JACOBI and RIEDEL have damaged turbines. Questionable 
whether the RIEDEL can be repaired. Destroyers ready to 
proceed are to commence return passage from 13 April. 

Blocking of the harbor entrance near Agdenes has been commenced. 
The Norwegian torpedo boat LAKfc> has been commissioned to guard 
the harbor entrance. 

Vernes airfield is again serviceable because of the frosty 
weather. The steamer LEVANTE alone of the "export" unit 
put in to Trondheim on 12 April. 

Situation in Bergen : 

Further harbor barrages laid. Bergen coastal radio station 

put into service. Dive-bomber attack on Bergen in the afternoon. 

Result still unknown. 

The absence of labor is causing great difficulty in unloading 
the transports lying in Bergen. 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation In Stavanger ) 

) Nothing special to report. 
Situation in Xristiansand ) 

Situation in Oslo ; 

Nothing special to report. Coastal fortifications comprising 
Battery Rauoe (4 x 15cm.) and Battery Droebak (2 x 21 cm.) 
are ready for action. Horten dockyard still out of action. 
Oslo radio station working. 

Anti-submarine patrol by motor minesweepers started in Oslo 

Transport situation : 

Still great danger from submarines in the Kattegat, Skagerrak 
and Oslo Fjord, forcing the use of all available forces on 
defense assignments. No submarine- chase successes reported 
so far in spite of numerous depth charge attacks. 

Losses by torpedoing: 

Tanker MOONSUND sank. Ship "40" damaged. The steamer 
AUGUST LEONHARDT sank on 11 April while returning from 
Kristiansand. Crew saved. 

Group Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic are making 
the necessary preparations for the planned transports of troops 
from Frederikshavn. At present transport is planned on old 
torpedo boats, motor minesweepers, escort boats, the SAAR and 
the steamers ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG. Group Baltic requests 
allocation of the small Norwegian torpedo boats (KJELL, LOM, 
HAUK, KVIK, BLINK, LYN ) as the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla and 
requests the immediate seizure of Norwegian trawlers for a 
patrol flotilla. Group Baltic also requests immediate expansion 
of air defense. (See radiogram file, 1545.) 

The cruiser LUETZOW, proceeding in tow through the Kattegat, 
was in the Great Belt on the morning of 13 April. She is 
being taken to Kiel. 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Conference on the situation with Chief , Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the situation: 

a) Every endeavor must be made to have the 
destroyers return. The necessity for this 

is again pointed out to Group West by telephone. 

(Group West issued the following order in the 
afternoon to the destroyer commanders in 
Narvik and Trondheim: 

"Destroyers in complete readiness to proceed 
to utilize any favorable opportunity, 
especially misty nights. Sub-division 
the smallest unit. The NORDMARK and 
SKAGERRAK are at known positions".) 

b) Battleships : 

Chief, Naval Staff has issued an order 
that the operational readiness of the 
battleships is to be restored at top speed, 
since at present favorable possibilities for 
operation are foreseen from southern Norway 
to Stadtlandet. Operations Division is at 
once to consider operational use in view of 
the enemy situation. 

2. Chief, Naval Staff has drawn attention to the 
necessity for altering and speeding-up the destroyer 
construction program in view of destroyer losses. 

Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Naval Staff, Service 
Division are to undertake the necessary investigations. 

3. Since the units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, 
Baltic are not sufficient to carry out their assignments, 
the Fuehrer is to be asked whether Danish naval vessels 

may be taken over and used by us to protect Danish neutrality. 

4. Group Baltic has received instruction, based on the 
Fuehrer's order, immediately to render the cable from L'arstrand 
to Great Britain unserviceable outside territorial waters by 
means of Special Group vessels. (Assignment will be carried out 
by Ships "26" and "37".) 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation In the Atlantic ; 

No reports from Ships "16" and "36". It is assumed that 
both auxiliary cruisers have succeeded in breaking through 
to the Atlantic. 

The tanker WINNETOU sailed from Las Palmas on 10 April as 
supply ship for auxiliary cruisers. 

Enemy forces were informed of the sailing by the French 
intelligence service, with an exact description of the ship. 

The auxiliary cruisers and the tanker WINNETOU have been 
informed that Great Britain claims the protection of Danish 
and Norwegian shipping, probably also later of Swedish end 
Baltic shipping, so that camouflage as Scandinavians is therefore 
impracticable. The WINNETOU was also instructed to avoid any 
encounter with vessels so as not to be reported. 

Submarine Situation 

The disquieting fact of numerous torpedo failures in the past few 
days has caused Commanding Admiral, Submarines to issue the 
following order: 

1. In zone zero and further north hold ready 3 torpedoes 
with switch-setting A, one torpedo with magnetic- 
firing setting. 

2. Fire at ships only with setting A, depth - draught of 
target minus 2 m. 

3. Always fire a double shot at destroyers at first 
setting A depth 3m., then magnetic-firing setting, 
depth-draught plus 1 m. - interval if possible 8 

Based on its assessment of the enemy situation, Naval Staff 
has ordered Commanding Admiral, Submarines immediately to 
dispose one boat each: 

1. In Namsen Fjord (railroad line Namsos - Trondheim). 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

2. In Romsdals Fjord (railroad line Aandalsnes-Oslo) 
to prevent enemy landings, 

3. Number of boats according to the situation in 
Asta Fjord, north of Narvik, off Gratangen and 
Lavangen Fjord* 

4. Leave the Trondheim boats where they are. 

Commanding Admiral, Submarines has disposed the boats 
as follows: 

U "52" Romsdals Fjord at 7° 20 » E. 

U "65" Namsen Fjord at 11° 8» E. 

U "38" " T aags Fjord northeast of the island 

of Aakeroey. 
U "47" Vaags Fjord south of Kjoetta. 
U ,J 49" Vaags Fjord northeast of the island 

of Sandsoey. 

Eoats in Vaags Fjord are ordered to make quite sure that 
their appearance is a surprise. Attack only warships, 
transports and supply ships. 

U "64" reports putting in to Narvik and on the situation in 
West Fjord. (See radiogram file, 2000.) 

Merchant Shipping 

Commanding Admiral, Norway has received orders to take over 
and prepare for speedy departure all ships in Oslo suitable 
for purposes of transport. High Command, Navy will 8lso 
charter suitable shipping in Copenhagen and other Darish ports* 



12 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The following directives regarding neutral merchant shipping 
are issued: 

Offices are directed to prevent neutral shipping leaving 
German waters (i.e. east of the Skagerrak barrage and ports 
in the Heligoland Eight). Excepted are the U.S.A., Japan, 
Italy, Russia and Spain. 

Danish shipping east of this limit, i.e. inner Danish 
traffic with German ports and other Baltic States, is 
permitted. (Group Baltic orders, in agreement with Naval 
Staff, that Danish ships may only leave German Baltic ports 
if their destination lies south of the line Aarhus Bay- 
Sletterhage-Eesseloe-Kullen. They may call at Aarhus.) 

Permission for cut-bound Swedish ships to use the shipping 
channel left by Great Britain for Swedish shipping in the 
Skagerrak inside the new British declared area will not be 
given until it is established that the British will also 
permit Swedish ships from overseas to go In to Sweden by 
this route. 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway ; 

Political situation unchanged. It can be stated that the 
manner in which the new political order in Oslo has been 
handled diplomatically and the early proclamation of the 
Quisling Government have made the situation very much more 
difficult. Quisling is regarded as the leader of the 
Norwegian Fascists. His appeal to the people to cease all 
resistance against the German troops and not to follow the 
instructions of the old Nygaardsvold Government is so far 
finding very little response. Hopes set on Quisling and 
his influence in Norway, based on his own statements in the 
conferences with Commander in Chief, Navy, (see memoranda, 
Commander in Chief, Navy, War Diary, Part C, VII) have so 
far not been fulfilled. It cannot yet be seen how far this 
can be ascribed to the unfavorable development of political 
conditions in Oslo, to a lack of skill by our diplomatic and 
military offices in Norway or to Quisling's unsuitability. 

(See Foreign Press for message from King George VI to King 
Haakon of Norway.) 

The Dutch Government has issued a statement in which it repudiates 
expectations expressed abroad that Holland would be ready to 
enter into agreements with the Western Powers about possible 
assistance in the event of a German attack, and describes them 
as completely unfounded. 

Sweden : 

The Embassy in Stockholm reports: 

Military Attaches report that Sweden has ordered no 
mobilization measures or strategic concentrations. Military 
measures in progress are to increase air and coastal defense, 
defensive readiness of present fortifications, safety of 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

bridges and other installations* The Attaches are convinced 
that Sweden will try to keep out of the Norwegian conflict* 
Vigorous armed defense against any violation of neutrality 
from either side must be expected. 

(For British radio propaganda calling for the organization of 
Norwegian resistance see radiogram file of 13 April, 2330.) 

Survey of the Situation 

Situation on land assured in southern Norway* Sea transport 
and supply situation not yet certain in view of great danger 
from submarines and insufficient number of efficient locating 
vessels. Trondheim-Narvik area threatened with imminent 
large-scale enemy landings. Skagerrak mine barrage reinforced* 
Situation in Denmark still calm and quite secure. 


Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Great Britain ; 

The Naval Attache' reports: During the visit of the cruiser 
HAWKINS to Montevideo it was ascertained that the British 
South Atlantic Squadron at present consists of the HAWKINS, 
Contrary to details known to us, the HAWKINS is armed with 
20.3 cm. guns. 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

France ; 

Intelligence Center, Belgium learns from a trusty agent: 
The 1st French Squadron consisting of the 3rd Light Cruiser 
Division, the 5th and 7th Destroyer Divisions, the 3rd Torpedo 
Boat Division, 7 submarines, the carrier TESTE or BEARN and 
4 troopships with parts of two infantry regiments (65th and 
137th Infantry Regiirents) and two artillery regiments (35th 
and 355th Artillery Regiments) sailed from Brest during the 
night of 11 April. Further troopships and destroyers are 
said to have left Cherbourg and Dunkirk on the same day. 

Confirmation of these statements is impossible. Naval Staff, 
however, expects operations in the Allied Norwegian campaign 
by a strong battleship and transport formation. 

Intelligence Center, Spain reports convoy movements near 
Gibraltar and San Sebastian. 

North Sea/Northern Waters : 

Narvik area : 

The attack on Narvik, detected beforehand by radio intelligence, 
took place at 1300. According to radio monitoring, Commander, 
Battle Cruiser Squadron is in command aboard the REPULSE. 

Forces have been assembled into "Force B" and consist of: 
the FURIOUS, WARSPITE, PENELOPE and nine destroyers of the 
3rd and 6th Destroyer Flotillas (including the COSSACK, BEDOUIN, 
PUNJABI, FOXHOUND, FORESTER, HERO). Minesweeping gear will 
be used when putting into Narvik. 

British reports in the evening mention the destruction of all 
German destroyers in Ofot Fjord, off Narvik and in Rombakken 
Fjord; 3 British destroyers are said to be damaged. 

Trondheim area : 

A Swedish report mentions the appearance of British destroyers 
in Folda Fjord north of Trondheim. 

Increased enemy activity is to be seen in Romsdals Fjord south 
of Trondheim. In the afternoon a plane west of Aandalsnes 
reported off Romsdals Fjord 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer flotilla and 
probably 1 battleship standing on and off on varying courses. 
Evening reconnaissance revealed 7 British destroyers in 
Romsdals Fjord, one of them at Andalsnes quay. 




Scapa area ; 

The netlayer PROTECTOR, two Polish troopships and escort 
destroyers have sailed from Scapa, 

Cooperation between the Norwegian radio stations at Aalesund 
and the enemy coastal radio station Wick Radio wa3 again 
detected several times. 

The enemy situation now shows clearly the three directions 
of thrust by the enemy: 

Narvik - Folda Fjord (Namsos) - 
Romsdals Fjord (Andalsnes), 

of which the enemy's landing north and south of Trondheim 
must be regarded as specially dangerous from a strategic 
point of view, since we have still only a small number of 
troops in Trondheim and reinforcements and supplies can 
only be brought by air , as long as the Oslo-Dombas-Trondheim 
railroad is not in German hands. Since we do not possess 
naval supremacy in the whole area off the west coast of 
Norway, the landings by the Western Powers can be made 
without any interference from German surface forces. 

Since also the enemy's landing places are not occupied by 
German troops, defense against attempts to land rests alone 
on the shoulders of the submarines and the Air Force. 
Submarine torpedoes, however, have so far not come up to 
expectation because of technical failures. Armed Forces 
High Command, Operations Staff if therefore doing its utmost 
to move Air Force bomber formations, fuel and bombs to the 
air bases available in Norway and to ensure supplies by air 
for them. Bad weather, unfavorable airfield conditions, 
lack of anti-aircraft defense and the extraordinary difficulties 
in supply resulting from the lack of any railroad end sea 
communications are delaying operations by the offensive 
Air Force and creating fighting conditions which can only be 
overcome by the greatest exertion on the part of all forces, 
by strain on personnel and material to the limits of their 
capacity and by strict organization. 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation 

Battleships and HIPPER : 

Wllhelmshaven dockyard reports the result of the investigations 
into the damage suffered by the ships, (See radiogram file of 
13 April, 1625.) The battleships will be ready for operations 
again in a short time; the HIPPER has a 40 m.-long crack on 
the starboard bow caused by ramming the British destroyer 
GLOWWORM. Repairs necessary; will probably last three weeks. 

The complete occupation of Norway and the holding of the area 

gained against enemy attacks still requires operations by the 

entire Navy. The situation in the Norwegian theater cannot 

yet be regarded as safe. It may therefore be necessary at any 

time for the heavy ships to go into action at short notice in ^ 

order to weaken enemy pressure from the sea. 

Naval Staff has therefore directed that the battleships are to 
be repaired with the greatest possible speed without total 
interruption of war readiness and are to be kept at 12 hours 1 
notice. Naval Staff considers speedy use of the battleships 
as a most urgent operational necessity. 

(For brief reports from Commanding Admiral, Fleet and Commanding 
Admiral, Scouting Force, see radiogram file of 13 April, 1750 
and 2330.) 


With regard to the proposed new operations by the battleships, 
the supply ship NORDMARK has been ordered to remain at the 
ordered position line in northern waters. The tanker 
SKAGERRAK is still at a position line 200 miles westnorthwest 
of Trondheim as a fuel reserve for destroyers. 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation in Narvik : 

Narvik, Elvegaardsmoen, Elvenes (on Gratangen Fjord) occupied 
by the German division. Norwegians bar the way east of 
Elvenes. The ore railroad between Hundalen and the Swedish 
frontier has been interrupted by Norwegians. 

Message from the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander to the Narvik 
Group, Major General Dietl, in the forenoon: 

"Defend the Narvik area against attack under all circumstances. 
Ensure landing facilities on the Hartvig See. Aid the Air Force, 
weather permitting. If necessary effectively destroy the 
ore railroad in the mountains." 

Adolf Hitler. 

An advance to Narvik, planned and under way by 22 bombers 
of the 10th Air Division (26th Bomber Wing) under Colonel 
Fuchs, unfortunately had to be broken off because of the 
weather. One FW 200 long-range reconnaissance plane succeeded 
in penetrating as far as Narvik and dropped supplies just at 
the commencement of the British attack there. 

Reports received in the evening provide the following picture 
of the British large-scale attack, about the proposed execution 
of which it was possible to inform the Narvik Group in good 
time owing to the results of radio intelligence: 

About noon nine British destroyers and one heavy ship (WARSPITE?) 
penetrated in to Ofot and Rombaken Fjords. Heavy destroyer 
engagement, the enemy using all his forces, until the destroyers - 
defending themselves and attacking to the last - were put out of 
action. Simultaneously air raids by carrier-borne planes from 
the aircraft carrier lying off West Fjord. 

Enemy landing was prevented. The destroyer COSSACK was set 
on fire and beached. The destroyer ESKIMO severely damaged 
(forecastle torn off as far as the second gun by a torpedo), 
one other destroyer damaged. Details of our losses not yet 
known. The destroyer GIESE aground off Narvik. Commander 
requests she may be sunk by bombs or torpedo. According to 
available reports we must, however, expect the loss of all the 
destrovers still lving in Narvik. U "64" was sunk in Herjaenger 
Fjord by bombs. All the crew but eight ashore in Narvik. 
The JAN WELLEM scuttled herself in harbor; not yet reported 
whether cargo was saved or is still accessible. (At 2000 U "46" 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

reported departure from Ofot Fjord of the enemy battleship 
and six destroyers.) 

Our submarines in Ofot and West Fjords have obviously been 
unable to score any successes in consequence of very heavy 
defense from destroyers using hydrophones, and air patrol. 

The 1st Squadron of the 106th Group, en route from Stavanger 
to Narvik with four planes, took part in the action in the 
evening despite unfavorable weather conditions and then landed 
in Narvik. 

Narvik Group reported in the evening: 

"Attack so far warded off. No landing. Mountain battery 

landed. Hundalen occupied. Enemy destroyers off Narvik. *m 

Urgent request from Group Narvik for submarines to attack 

destroyers near Tranoy and Rombaken." 

(For Admiralty announcement see radiogram file, 2345 and 

This evening a serious and depressed mood marks Naval Staff's 
impression of events. Ten of our modern destroyers, half of 
our powerful and most urgently required destroyer arm, lie 
shot to pieces, damaged or sunk in Ofot and Rombaken Fjords. 
Narvik has proved a "mousetrap" for our forces. The tragic 
factors which have brought our destroyers to this fateful 
situation are: the unfavorable supply position caused by the 
absence of the second tanker and the delay in sailing caused 
thereby; the bad, unfavorable weather conditions; the fact 
that at the date of our "Wese rue bung" the enemy's own operational 
plans caused him to be already in the Lofoten area. Further 
reports on the course of the action and losses in material and 
personnel are to be awaited. 

Naval Staff does not doubt for a moment that the Narvik 
destroyers, with the superb spirit of their commanders, officers 
and crews, showed themselves worthy of their tradition and 
offered the most stubborn resistance to the enemy to their last 
shell and torpedo. 

It is to be hoped that the action in the narrow fjords enabled 
the greater part of the crews to be saved after the battle and 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

to be Incorporated in the defense of the occupied area 
despite probably great difficulty regarding armament, 
equipment and supply. This sets the Air Force supply 
service new tasks, which are to be carried out with all 
possible means. 

Situation in Trondheim : 

The readiness of almost all batteries, also of some searchlights, 
is reported. All planes can land and take off from the airport 
north of the town (Jonsvatny). 

The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN will not sail before 1100 
on 14 April. Trondheim suspects British landings near Andalsnes. 
The minelayer FROEYA, beached off Trondheim, was blown up by 
U "43". 

Situation in Bergen : 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the northwestern 
entrances are closed by a double-row mine barrage. Ship "111" 
was damaged by touching ground and is out of action. Allocation 
of a motor minesweeper flotilla, Ships "37", "47", "7", two 
PT boats and one submarine is requested. 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has been assigned the task of 
preparing submarine supplies and of instituting a pilot service 
for putting into port. 

Situation in Stavanger and Kristiansand : 


Situation in Oslo ; 


Commanding Admiral, Norway reports; 

Batteries ready to fire: 



13 April 1940 



Rauoe : 

Kristiansand : 



Trondheim : 


4 x 15 cm. 

2 x 7,5 cm. 

3 x 15 cm. 

1 x 28 cm. 

2 a 21 cm., 6 x 15 cm. 

2 x 10.5 cm. 

2 x 21 cm., 3 x 15 cm. 
2 x 21 cm., 2 x 15 cm. 


Transport Situation and Situation Skagerrak/Kattegat ; 

Numerous submarine warning and location reports indicate no 
lessening of danger from submarines. No success in submarine- 

In connection with the expansion of anti-submarine defense in 
the Kattegat, Group Baltic has ordered the laying of UMA barrages 
near Ealskor Rev lightship and in the deep channel east of 
Friedericia. Patrol is being instituted on either side of 
Sprogoe and north of Friedericia. 




On the evening of 13 April the 

from Frederikshavn with torpedo boats, 

ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG, transporting roughly 2,000 men 

Transport Unit set out 
the SAAR and the steamers 

Group Baltic has requested the allocation of two destroyers to 
transport personnel from Frederikshavn to Oslo. Naval Staff 
had to refuse the request, since it is necessary to keep the 
few destroyers in readiness for immediate action. On the 
other hand, the Norwegian torpedo boats were allocated for 
defense assignments as requested and the seizure of Norwegian 
trawlers as patrol vessels approved. 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The cable from Mars t rand to England was cut by Ships "47" and 

The 1st Group of the 1st Dive-Bomber Wing and the 100th Bomber 
Wing each report the probable sinking of a submarine in the 
Kattegat. (No proof). 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the situation 
in Norway. 

The British landing operations make necessary the definite and 
immediate concentration of submarine operations in the Romsdals 
Fjord and Vaags Fjord areas and in the Orkneys -Pent land Firth 
area which is much traversed by convoys, transports and naval 
forces. For directives see Submarine Situation. 

2. In view of the Fuehrer's order of 12 April that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces are now to be treated altogether as 
hostile, the commissioning of all serviceable Norwegian naval 
vessels - so far on^y seized - has been ordered with German 
crews. Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Naval Ordnance 
Division and Naval Staff, Service Division have received 
instructions accordingly. Attention is drawn to the necessity 
for and the possibility of seizing materiel and Installations 
belonging to the Norwegian Navy. 

3. Report on the possibility of supplying Narvik and 
Trondheim by submarines. (See letter from Naval Staff, 
Submarine Division (Technical) dated 13 April in reference 

file "We se rue bung".) Chief, Naval Staff is definitely resolved 
to fulfill the wishes of Armed Forces High Command, Operations 
Staff regarding supply operations. Boats must be withdrawn 
from operations for the duration of this activity. U "43" and 
U "26" are to carry out assignments according to schedule, 
U "29", "32", "122" and "A" are to be converted as quickly as 

4. The Fuehrer is to be asked to consent to a request 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

to Sweden to put the extinguished outer lights on the Swedish 
coast into operation again immediately and to have the radio 
beacons work again in suitable weather if requested. (Fuehrer 
agreed) . 

5. The Foreign Office is to be requested to make possible 
the use of Danish naval vessels by the German Navy. 

6. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has reported that, 
according to reports from the Commanders of escort vessels, 
enemy submarine attacks on German transports several times took 
place from Swedish territorial waters. Suitable steps are 
being taken with the Swedish Government to ensure respect for 
their rights as neutrals. 

7. Groups Baltic and West have received the following order (^ 
regarding defense of the Skagerrak and Kattegat: 

After laying the anti-submarine barrage at Skagen: 

a) The Skagerrak declared area is to be reinforced 
to a certain extent. 

b) The southern barrage gap is to be protected 
by a deep (- 15 m.) anti-submarine barrage. 

8. For distribution to date of military forces in the 
Norwegian and Danish area see reference file "Weseruebung", 

13 April. According to a new Armed Forces High Command order, 
units of the troops stationed in Denmark are put under Group 21 
for operations in Norway. 


P.M . 

Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Fuehrer 

(Conference took place before receipt of the first combat 
reports from Narvik.) 

Points discussed : 

1. Supplies of aviation gasoline, coastal anti-aircraft 
guns, mountain guns and ammunition for Narvik and Trondheim 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

carried by submarines. Special stress is to be laid on 
supplies of aviation gasoline. Conversion of boats U "29" 
"32", "A" and "122" is ordered. 

2. Battleship operation and Battle of the Lofotens. 
Commander in Chief, Navy is in complete agreement with the 
action taken by Commanding Admiral, Fleet. In Naval Staff's 
opinion it would have been incorrect to commit the battleships 
fully against a superior enemy in the unfavorable strategic 
and tactical situation at the time. 

3. Steps taken by the Navy to defend Norwegian positions. 
(Submarine dispositions, mine barrages, protection of transports.) 

4. Political questions. 

5. Recognition signal service between ships and planes. 

6. Individual questions concerning the operation. 
(See Commander in Chief, Navy's memorandum of 13 April.) 

Submarine Situation 

The following order, based on an assessment of the situation, 
has been issued to Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines? 

1. Effective immediately, submarine operations to concentrate 
on the area Romsdals Fjord to Vaags Fjord and the area 
from the Orkneys to Pentland Firth, 

2. All large boats to be put into operation in Vaags Fjord 
and West Fjord-Narvik at once. 

Exceptions: A large boat is to remain in Nernsen Fjord 
until at least two small boats are there. 

3. Allocate small boats as follows: 

2 Romsdals Fjord, 

3 Trondheim, 

4 Folia and Namsen Fjord, 
4 Orkneys-Pent land Firth. 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

4. Resort to stores on the BREMSE and CARL PETERS 
in Stavanger arid Kristiansand for supplies and 

Load the remainder of the small boats and keep 
them in readiness, including the boats set aside 
for Operation "Gelb", in Norwegian ports and in 
home waters at Group West's disposal, 

6. Defer reliefs and Submarine School needs for the 

present because of the concentration of assignments 
in the north Norwegian area. 

Commanding Admiral, Submarines then ordered U "65", "30", "34", 

"52" for the present also into the Lofoten area, U "50" has 

been assigned a waiting position in Folia Fjord, U "61" a 

patrol area in Namsen Fjord. { 

Special Events : 

U "37" attacked a cruiser of the GLASGOW class north of the 
Shetlands, Destruction probable as explosion was seen and 
wreckage and oil patch observed. 

Boats in Ofot Fjord and West Fjord report difficulty in attacking 
and remaining in the Fjord, because of constant destroyer patrol, 
planes and submarine-chase and nights almost as bright ss day, 
(See also radiogram file of 13 April, 2349.) U "64" sunk by 
a bomb in Herjaenger Fjord, Officers and 36 men saved. 

War against Merchant Shipping 

Naval forces are ordered to regard Norwegian naval end merchant 
vessels as enemy . 

Merchant Shipping 

Transports to Norway i 

Between 1400 and 1700 11 ships of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit 
sailed from Holtenau as planned for Oslo. 



13 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Fresh appeal "by Oslo radio to all Norwegian ships to make 
for neutral ports and on no account to put in to French 
or British ports. 

In spite of the countermeasures introduced by us against 
the present Eritish statements that Norwegian and Danish 
ships are placed under the Allies' protection, we must expect 
most of the Norwegian tonnage and a great part of the Danish 
to join the Allies. 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Political Situation 

Situation in Norway ; 

Political situation unchanged. 

Inclination only to acts of sabotage in the occupied area, 
passive resistance here and there from the population. Sniping 

in Bergen. 

For proclamation by Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, 
General von Falkenhorst, see Foreign Press Report No. 156/40. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

Special Items 

1. Report on the situation. 

The situation in Narvik is regarded as very difficult. 
Armed Forces High Command is considering whether it might be 
necessary to give up Narvik because of the difficulty of 
bringing up supplies and great British superiority. It has 
been decided that for the present a delaying defense action 
is to be fought in Narvik. However, concentration of defense 
against British landings and attacks is now being transferred 
to the area around Trondhelm , which must be held. It will 
be necessary to bring up further forces into the Trondheim area. 

An extract from Armed Forces High Command's directive of 14 f 

April states: 

"British forces penetrated into Narvik. No landing reported 
so far. British landings in Andalsnes. Landings to be 
expected in Namsos Fjord." 

Most important task is the defense of Trondheim and the 
destruction of the troops which have landed near Andalsnes. 

Fuehrer's order : 

a) Group 21 . Reinforce Trondheim garrison. 
Destroy the railroad line from Dombas to 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

3. So that our own naval forces may be guarded 
against confusion with those of the enemy by the German 
Air Force, the Fuehrer has ordered: 

a) Every German warship is immediately to regard 
any approaching plane as enemy and to attack 
without waiting to see whether recognition is 

b) Every German warship is to make itself known to 
any approaching plane by searchlight signals 
and also by firing light signals (in addition to 
the permanent Identification marking),even if 
the plane is suspected to be enemy. Light 
signal regulations are to be amplified accordingly* 

4. Commander in Chief, Navy expressed his full appreciation 
of the success of the "Weseruebung" landing operation and 

of the readiness for action shown to Commanding Admiral, Fleet, 
Commanding Admiral, Scouting Force, Commander, Oslo Group 
(Rear Admiral Kummetz), the Commander of the HIPPER (Trondheim 
Group) 8nd the Commander of the KARLSRUHE (Kristiansand Group), 
also to all ships and formations under their command. 

(For teletype see radiogram file, 1424.) 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 


Great Britain : 

On the evening of 13 April, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean 
Fleet gave the order for half-hour readiness, and the order 
for ships at sea to get up steam for maximum speed. 

Light Eritlsh forces on a northeasterly course, moderate 
speed, are west of Casablanca. 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Andalsnes far to the west. 

b) Navy t Concentrate submarine defense in 

the area off and on either side of Trondheira 
and Aalesund-Vikma Island, even though it 
means weakening the reinforcement previously 
scheduled for Narvik. 

c) Air Force : Destroy the British troops which 
have landed near Andalsnes, prevent further 
landings. Attack enemy forces north of 
Aalesund. Occupy Dombas with parachute 
troops and take steps to protect it. Use 
every endeavor to bring reinforcements to 
Trondheim by air. 

Group 21 to use every means to seize the Oslo- 
Hamar-Dombas railroad as far as Andalsnes. 
The 181st Division to be brought up at top 
speed, also the mobile troops to be furnished 
by Group 31. 

Because of this directive a concentration in submarine 
disposition is also effected towards Trondheim. The boats 
already in the Narvik area remain there. Boats proceeding 
to the Lofotens are to go on if they are already close to 
their objective. Boats whose positions are nearer to 
Trondheim, however, are to be disposed in the area Romsdals 
Fjord-Trondheim-Indre Folia. 

(For Naval Staff's order, see Submarine Situation.) 

2. The small number of our forces in comparison to the ^ 
enemy's much greater superiority at sea demands operations 
of the highest efficiency and the avoidance of all unnecessary 
losses of time through approach and departure or delays 
during taking on supplies . The greatest importance is 
therefore attached to the organization of supply facilities. 
The Groups, Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Commanding 
General, Armed Forces, Norway are directed to promote the 
expansion of supply facilities and defense in the area 
Trondheim-Bergen-Kristiansand-Oslo with all means in their 
power. Trondheim and Bergen are the most important supply 
points. Steps are to be taken first to ensure supplies of 
fuel and provisions for submarines, also repair facilities 
for minor damage. Supplies of torpedoes are to be arranged. 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

France ; 

Nothing special to report. 

North Sea/Northern Waters : 

The Admiralty announces that mines have been Is id in the 
Baltic and its entrances in the following area: 


N, 10° 




N, 12° 




30' N, 


20' E 


30' N, 


6.5' E. 

This declaration Includes practically the whole area of 
the entrances to the Baltic, the southern Kattegat and 
the southern Baltic to the latitude of Memel. It must 
be regarded for the present as a deterrent measure for the 
neutrals. Practical considerations exclude an effective 
and quick mining of the whole area. On the other hand, 
the increasing use of mines by submarines in the Kattegat 
must be expected. According to a radiogram intercepted 
by radio intelligence, there will be 12 submarines in the 
Kattegat/Skagerrak this morning according to plan, one a 
minelaying submarine PORPOISE (120 mines), which is to 
carry out her assignment in the area near Lasoe . 

The use of aerial mines by the enemy has not been detected. 
In connection with the British announcement of a declared 
area in the Baltic, the possibility of the first use of 
aerial mines must, however, be taken into account. 

The following were detected at sea: Commander in Chief, 
Home Fleet, Commanders, Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd 
Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 3rd and 6th Destroyer Flotillas, 
also the carrier FURIOUS, the cruisers GLASGOW, AURORA, 
At midnight Commander in Chief, Home Fleet was about 60 miles 
west of the Lofotens on northeasterly course, speed 15 knots. 

Reconnaissance by the 506th Group from Trondheim detected 
t six destroyers on northerly course, high speed, southwest 
of Kristiansa'nd at 0500. A large tanker lay at anchor in 
the skerries north of Kristiansand. 

Destroyers putting in were reported in Namsen Fjord in the 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

During the evening radio intelligence added to the information 
gained. The FURIOUS was despatched to Tromsoe, the destroyers 
HOSTILE and IVANHOE ordered to Narvik in the evening. The 
destroyers BEDOUIN and ESKIMO (the latter severely damaged 
in Rombaken Fjord on 13 April) plan to arrive in Skjel Fjord 
(Lofotens) on the morning of 15 April. 

The anti-aircraft cruiser CURLEW was brought up to reinforce 
the Lofoten squadron. 

U "47" reports cruisers and destroyers in Vaags Fjord. 
Submarine -chase and location by fishing vessels and steamers. 
U "38" reports light cruisers and destroyers north of Vaags 

The battle cruiser REPULSE and the cruiser PENELOPE plan 
to put Into Scapa on 14 April. 

The destroyers NUBIAN and FORTUNE left Scapa on 12 April 
in the direction of the Lofotens. 

Command s 

Lord Chatfield is flying his flag in the cruiser AURORA. 
It may be assumed that he is in supreme command of the 
entire north Norwegian operation. 

Appreciation of the enemy situation : 

Main drive of the enemy landing into the - area north of 
Narvik (Vaags Fjord). Landings under way in Namsen Fjord 
and Romsdals Fjord. Preparatory operations and landings 
by light forces here. Fairly large troopships not yet 
detected but are expected. 



Own Situation 

Situation in Narvik ; 

According to information now available, there is no longer 
any doubt that all the eight destroyers still in Narvik 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

THIELE) were destroyed or scuttled in the heavy fighting 
on 12 April. About 1,000 men from the destroyer crews 
are in Rundalen. Enemy destroyers off the port and in 
Rombaken Fjord are blocking communication between the 
different separated groups; reinforcements and supplies 
for the battalion in Elvegardsmoen especially cannot be 
brought up at present. 

Now that the destroyers are lost, coastal defense comprises 
only infantry weapons, so that defense against the blockading 
destroyers is impossible. 

The Commander of the GIESE reports that British destroyers 
fired machine-guns on survivors in the water, causing further 
loss of life. 

The ore railroad north of Hundalen is still occupied by 
the Norwegians. 

Norwegian planes several times attacked the landing field 
on the Hartvig See. 

Steps have been taken to supply Group Narvik, including 
the rescued destroyer crews, by air and railroad. (Undertaken 
by High Command Navy, Naval Staff, Service Division, (Organi- 
zation Branch) ) • 

Group Narvik requests transfer of guns and bombers and asks 
for air reconnaissance. 

Situation in Trondhelm : 

Port Commanders are instructed to seize quantities of fuel 
of all kinds and to report them, together with the available 
quantities of dry provisions. 

The destroyers ECKHOLDT and HEINEMANN sailed from Trondheim 
in the evening to return to Wilhelmshaven. 

Situation in Bergen : 

Another dive-bombing attack in the morning. The steamer 
BAERENFELS set on fire and sunk. Two enemy planes shot 



1.4 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

down. Foui* submarines put in to Bergen to refuel. 

PT boats S "23" and S "25" from Wilhe lms haven put in to 
Bergen at the disposal of Admiral, V/est Norwegian Coast. 

Situation in Stavangerj Kristiansand and Oslo : 

Nothing special to report. 

Battleships and HIPPER : 

The periods of readiness for the battleships are now fixed 
at: GNEISENAU: 12 hours, SCHARNHORST: 72 hours and HIPPER: 
8 hours (with regard to engine construction). 

(For HIPPER' s brief report on the Trondheim operation see 
radiogram file, 14 April, 2045.) 

Situation in the Skagerrak and Kattegat : 

Still great danger from submarines. Only one definite 
success (Torpedo Training Flotilla, 10 April) and two 
probable successes (11th Submarine Chaser Flotilla, 10 April, 
sub-chaser "J" 13 April) have been scored in attacks on 
submarines by defense forces. Since so far only very 
occasional»use of periscopes has been detected, it is possible 
that the British submarines are firing only according to 
hydrophone, without periscope. (The Italian Navy also uses 
such procedure.) 

In the afternoon the steamer FLORIDA, carrying ammunition 

and material, was torpedoed and later sank west of Maseskaer 

at the same spot where the attack took place on 10 April 

on the 2nd Sea Transport Unit. (The shot came from territorial 

waters.) Ship "35" was hit by a torpedo and lost east of 

Skagen. Submarine warnings were given at several other 

places In the Skagerrak. 

Transport Situation : 

The 1st Troop Transport on fast vessels put in to Oslo Fjord 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

at noon; 11 loaded fishing smacks, escorted by 2 submarine- 
chasers, are proceeding from Aarhus to Oslo via Frederikshavn 
with material. 

The 2nd Troop Transport aboard the BRIMMER and escort boats 
(812 men) sailed from Frederikshavn in the evening. Parts 
of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit off Oslo in fog; one group 
went aground in the skerries off Oslo Fjord, 

Since it is impossible to show the lights in Oslo Fjord, 
the convoys must be picked up off Bolaerne and Rauoey by 
the 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and escorted on to Oslo. 

Situation in Denmark : 

Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark reports that the majority 
of Danish naval vessels are at present in Copenhagen, the 
remainder in various other ports. Inability to proceed 
is ensured by removing vital parts of the engines. The 
work necessary to transfer them to the final harbors where 
they are to be laid up is to be carried out as soon as the 
submarine and mine situation indicates no further danger 
for Danish ships. 

Submarine Situation 

Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have received 
the following new order based on the Fuehrer's directive 
regarding concentration in the area Trondheim-Namsen Fjord- 
Romsdals Fjord: 

1. At once increase defense of Namsen Fjord- 
Roms da ]s Fjord by means of submarines. 

2. U "65" to proceed. Other boats to operate, 
in conjunction with small boats already 
provided, off Namsen Fjord, Trondheim, 
Romsdals Fjord. 

3. Prepare supplies for submarines in Trondheim. 

4. Boats with supplies for the Army to proceed 
to Trondheim, not Narvik, for the present. 

In view of this order Commanding Admiral, Submarines 
has disposed the boats withdrawn from the Romsdals- 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Andalsnes-Trondheim-Namsos area as follows: 

Namsen Fjord: U "34", "61". 
Romsdals Fjord: U "30", "52". 
Folia Fjord: U "50". 

U "65" Is proceeding on to Vaags Fjord as ordered. As 
reinforcement: U "38", "47", "49". In West Fjord: 
U "25", "46", "51", "48". U "43", "26" proceeding to 
Trondheim with supplies for the Army. 

In Bergen area: U "9", "14", "7", "60", "62". 

In Stavanger area: 

In Lister-Lindesnes area 

North of the Shetlands: 

On passage: 

On return passage: 




























Merchant Shipping 

Own Shipping : 

The tanker SKAGERRAK, which was still at the rendezvous 
for the Trondheim Group destroyers, sent an S.O.S. at 1026. 
A British cruiser was in the vicinity. The ship must be 
assumed lost. 

The supplv ship NORDMARK was moved away farther north to 
700 N, longitude 0° . 

The steamers LETJNA and BUENOS AIRES sailed from Stettin 
to Copenhagen at 2000 with a cargo for the Air Force. The 
steamers CORDOBA and CAMPINAS will sail from Swinemuende 
tomorrow morning to carry out further Air Force transports 
from Aalborg to Oslo. The transport groups will proceed 



14 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

according to the instructions of Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, Baltic. 

The following reply was given to the enquiry from Group 
Ealtic about the use of Swedish territorial waters for the 
trip to Oslo: 

1. Passage of transports through Swedish territorial 
waters, even carrying war material and men, 
permissible without Swedish consent. 

2. Naval Staff is requesting mine-free routes 
inside Swedish territorial waters, also lights 
and escort. 

(For Air Force events of the day see radiogram file of 
14 April, report 2400 .) 

On 12 April Commander in Chief, Air Force set up the 5th 
Air Force Command to conduct all air operations in Norway 
and Denmark. General Milch is Commander 5th Air Force, 
and Commander, North. Subordinate to him are: 

a) The 10th Air Corps with all present subordinate 
units, including transport units and transport 
units (seaplanes). 

b) Local Air Force Commanders in Norway. 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway ; 

In a radio address King Haakon exhorted the Norwegians to 
dD their utmost to defend Norway's freedom and independence. 

Since Quisling's Government in its present form is not 
regarded as suitable, it resigned in the evening at the 
instigation of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norv/ay. 
Administration was taken over in the German-occupied areas 
by an administrative committee directed by the head of the 
Oslo Town Council, Christensen. 

Since the formation of this committee if the rightful 
Government collapses is laid down in the constitution, it 
is hoped that this arrangement will effect pacification of 
the Norwegian people and hasten appeasement with the prospect 
still of bringing about an agreement with the King, v/ho still 
rejects the Quisling Government. 

In a radio address the Norwegian Ambassador in London 
exhorted his fellow countrymen to hold out and pointed 
out that French and British help was on the way. 

In an official announcement Holland again stated her desire 

for neutrality and her readiness to defend herself against 

attack from any quarter. A state of siege was declared 

in Holland on 13 April owing to fear of action by Germany i 

or the V/estern Powers. Coastal batteries have orders to 

open fire independently in case of any attack. Four 

German steamers were directed to put out from Delfzyl by 

the Dutch Government. (Order was later rescinded 


Great Britain denies rumors about British landings. 
Internal unrest caused by the Fascist Mussert movement is 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Belgium is also experiencing great anxiety about action 
by the Western Powers. Transfer of three divisions of 
troops to the southwest front is confirmed. There are 
therefore only 13 divisions on the northeast front at 

Italy's attitude supports the German action in Norway 
by appropriate statements in the press and on the radio. 
Rumors speak of an Italian plan to penetrate to Salonica 
and of an imminent occupation of Corfu. 

For reactions to the Norwegian campaign in the U.S.A. 

see Political Review No. 86 and Foreign Press. Roosevelt 

condemns the German invasion in a radio statement. 

It is not considered out of the question that in the course 
of further developments the U.S.A. will endeavor to place 
Greenland under their protection. Germany has declared 
that she has no interest in the administration of Greenland, 
Iceland and the Faroes. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

1. The critical situation in Narvik has caused the 
Fuehrer to review the question of abandoning our Narvik 
position in order to avoid further waste of forces - 
especially of the Air Force - for a doubtful success, and 
of undertaking a concentration of force in the Trondheim 
area. A determining factor in further considerations is 
the state of supplies and equipment for the rescued destroyer 
crews. If the members of the crews, more than 2,000 
according to available reports, can be equipped with the 
necessary items of clothing, hand and automatic weapons as 
well as food, this addition represents such considerable 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

reinforcement of the fighting strength of the Narvik 
Group that the Narvik Division can be expected to hold out 
for a long time, considering the difficult terrain which 
favors defense. The more heavily and the longer the enemy 
is tied-down in the northern area, however, the greater 
must be the effect of the resultant relief on the situation 
in the endangered Trondheim area. Naval Staff therefore 
takes up the attitude - conditional on further news and 
deliberations - that it is correct to hold the Narvik position 
as long as possible and to fight a delaying defense. The 
Navy has the additional conviction that the great sacrifice 
of ten modern destroyers demands that the Narvik position 
hold out as long as supplies permit. 

2. The assignments now falling to the Navy can be 

summarized as follows: 

a) Defense of sea communications with Oslo by 
obviating the great danger from submarines. 
Increased defense against mines in the 

Sealing the Skagerrak off against penetration 

by surface forces. 

Building up a strong air defense against 

bombing and aerial, mine attacks. 

Speedy expansion of Denmark's coastal and 

anti-aircraft defenses. 

b) Expansion and reinforcement of coastal defense 
at Trondheim and Bergen. 

c) Equipment of Trondheim and Bergen with 
vessels with minesweeping gear for the 

purpose of keeping the entrances clear. £. 

d) Defense of the Baltic against danger from 
enemy submarines and mines in order to 

maintain the vital Baltic Sea trade communications. 

e) Submarines to attack enemy supply lines to 
Norway, make war on merchant shipping in the 
Atlantic, disrupt enemy supplies and attain 
considerable diversionary effect. 

f) Demand for increased use of serisl mines on 
the southeast coast of England, in Scapa Flow 
and Kirkwall Bay and in the Clyde (Glasgow) to 
hamper the enemy's Norwegian campaign. 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

g) Thrusts by the battleships against light 

forces in the triangle Shetlands-Stadlandet- 
Skagerrak in order to disturb the enemy; 
prevention of enemy thrusts into the Skagerrak 
and relief of the central and north Norwegian 

3. The Fuehrer has ordered an investigation into the 
possibilities of protecting the entrances to Trondheim, 
Bergen and into some important fjords (Sogne Fjord, 
Hardanger Fjord) by the speedy establishment of torpedo 
batteries. The intention is sealing off at those points 
which coastal batteries cannot reach or at which they 

are not available, and where it is not possible to dispose 
naval forces all the time. 

The best torpedo batteries, ready for immediate action, 
for the intended purpose would undoubtedly be the PT boats; 
these are, however, urgently required for other assignments 
in the south Norwegian area, for defense and escort purposes 
and for operational use end there are not nearly enough of 
them available. 

Three torpedo tubes each have already been dismantled in 
Trondheim from the THEODOR RIEDEL and PAUL JACOB! and these 
are to be used as a torpedo barrage battery. The setting- 
up of further shore torpedo batteries at favorable, well 
camouflaged and easily defended spots in the fjords is to 
be investigated speedily by the Torpedo Branch in cooperation 
with Commanding Admiral Norway. Naval Ordnance Division 
sees possibilities of setting-up such makeshift batteries 
with the simplest facilities in a very short time by making 
launching ramps out of wood. 

4. The Embassy in Stockholm states that the Swedish 
Government plans to lay a mine barrage with passage gap 
inside the three mile zone in Swedish territorial waters 
near Falsterboe. Passage by surfaced submarines will be 
forbidden and will be quite impossible for submerged 
submarines. The measure is directed against British submarines 
slipping into the Baltic, 

Naval Staff welcomes the Swedish plan. It is, however, 
suggested to the Swedish Government that the barrage should 
be laid not at Falsterboe but at the southern entrance to 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

the Kogrund Channel. The Swedish barrage would then ^e 
Incorporated in our barrage system. The proposal by Group 
Baltic that our own barrage be moved to a location north of 
Helsingborg-Helsingoer and Sweden T s assistance be requested 
in mlnelaying is rejected for the present. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Great Britain ; 

The two aircraft carriers ARK ROYAL and GLORIOUS put in to 
Gibraltar on 13 April. The ARK ROYAL is definitely still 
there on 15 April and the GLORIOUS is probably still there. 

France : 

Nothing special detected apart from some warship movements. 
The usual convoy activity seems to have been resumed off the 
west coast and in the eastern Atlantic. 

North Sea/Northern Waters 

West Fjord/Vaags Fjord area ; 

Air reconnaissance and submarine reports reveal the commencement 
of the landing by enemy troops in Vaags Fjord near Harstad. 
So far only cruisers and destroyers sighted in West Fjord. On 
the other hand, U "65" reported from Andoye Fjord, time of origin 
0829, the arrival of 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 troopships 
and destroyer escort. Planes of the 4th Bomber Wing also 
reported 1 cruiser, 16 merchant ships and 5 troopships off Harstad. 
The old battleship WARSPITE is still said to be in the area off 

As early as 14 April the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON reported the carrying 
out of landings in Salangen to the Flag Officer aboard the cruiser 
AURORA (Lord Chatfield). A Norwegian Division is obviously 
in communication with these troops. 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The AURORA and SOUTHAMPTON were to meet at 2000 on 14 April 
In Skel Fjord (Lofotens). 

Tromsoe-Kirkenes area : 

Reconnaissance is being carried out in the Tromsoe area. 
No landings so far detected. 

It appears from a report by the destroyer IMOGEN that a 
Norwegian liaison officer will arrive in Kirkenes, whence 
the heavy cruisers DEVONSHIRE and BERWICK are bound. 

Area around Trondheim : 

Namsos ; 

It appears from radiograms that the transports CHOBRY and 
BATORY are obviously bound for Namsos and are escorted by the 
cruiser GLASGOW and destroyers of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla* 

Andalsnes : 

Molde Fjord and Andalsnes were covered by air reconnaissance. 
No enemy forces or troopships were sighted. 

Submarines report cruisers and destroyers on varying courses 
in the Shetlands Passage . U "13 n sighted a heavy cruiser on 
southerly course north of the Shetlends (possibly the cruiser 
damaged by bomb hits on 13 April west of Trondheim). 

Enemy submarines off the southwest corner of Norway, in the 
Kattegat and Skagerrak. 

Three French submarines east of Orfordnes at noon on 14 April. 

Own Situation 

Situation in Narvik: 

On the evening of 14 April British destroyers also in Gratangs- 
botten west of Elvenes. The destroyers in Rombaken Fjord 
broke off communication with the unit in Elvegaardsmoen. Deep 
new snow hinders movements by the unit and reconnaissance of 


15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

landing fields for planes* Air reconnaissance detected 16 
merchantmen, 5 transports and 1 cruiser near Harstad. 
Apparently large-scale troop disembarkations. The Mountain 
Division expects an attack by Anglo -Norwegian forces on Narvik 
and Elvegaardsmoen. 

Possible for the enemy to operate undisturbed from Rombaken 
on the ore railroad. British destroyers put to sea at noon 
and returned in the evening for a fresh bombardment. About 
2,100 members of our destroyer crews - so far scantily armed 
and supplied - are engaged in defense on land. According to 
this a considerable part of the destroyer crews was saved. 
So far no news about the crews of the KUENNE and KOELLNER. 

Enemy carrier-borne planes and Norwegian planes from Bardufoss 
airfield carried out bombing attacks on Narvik and the Hartvig 
See. No success. 

For disposition of forces in the Narvik area see radiogram 
file of 15 April - radiogram 1725. Group Narvik requests : 

Air support. 

Closing of Rombaken Fjord by submarines. 
Mining of the channel in Rombaken Fjord 
near Stroemen. 

Air Force bombers could not carry out the supporting night 
operation as scheduled because of the weather* Army supplies 
were successfully transported and ammunition and clothing 

The use of submarines in West Fjord and Ofot Fjord is proving 

more and more to be a complete failure. Very severe depth 

charging, air patrol and unfavorable light conditions, combined f 

with numerous torpedo failures, prevent the boats having any 

chance of success. (See also Submarine Situation.) 

Closing of Rombaken by a mine laying submarine must also be 
rejected because of the difficult tactical conditions. The 
possibility of planes operating with mines is under review. 

Group Narvik received the following directive from Armed 
Forces High Command in the evening: 

"If the situation forces you to abandon present 
positions, set up a base in the mountains, near the 
ore railroad if possible, and defend yourselves with 
supplies dropped by plane. Thoroughly destroy ore 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

railroad forward of own base*" 

Situation in Tro n dheim : 

Naval Commander, Trondheim (Commander v. Pufendorf) reports 
his plan for a surprise raid on Oerlandet with the aid of the 
patrol vessels commissioned. 

Conditions at the airfield near Trondheim still leave much to 
be desired. Intermediate landing on the Jonsvatnet See 
airfield possible. 

Situation in Bergen : 

Patrol and pilot service has been instituted. Outer light 
extinguished. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that 
the weak forces in Bergen urgently require the prevention of 
outflanking enemy landings in Samnanger and Soer Fjords, also 
in Hardanger and Sogne Fjords. Since minel8ying is not 
possible for the present, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests 
that three submarines should patrol the entrances. Commanding 
Admiral, Submarines has detailed submarines accordingly (U "17", 
"23", "24"). 

Planes and PT boats are on their way from Stavanger to Bergen 
with an Army battalion. 

Situation in Kristlansand ; 

The situation on land is cleared up by breaking the resistance 

of a Norwegian regiment. 



15-April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Naval and Transport Situation In the Kattegat/Skagerrak : 

Group Baltic still regards the submarine situation in the 
Kattegat and eastern Skagerrak as extremely serious. Submarine 
sighting reports have come in from off Oslo Fjord, north and 
east of Skagen and at the northern entrance to the Little Belt. 
Submarine -chase and depth charging unsuccessful. The BRTJMMER 
was torpedoed southwest of Oslo Fjord during the night. Success 
of attempt to tow her in is questionable. 

In Naval Staff's opinion the failure to date of anti-submarine 
defense and location is due to the lack of practice in look-out 
duties and servicing the location gear and to the apparently great 
liability of the sets to break down, according to reports to hand. 
From time to time so many sets are out of order that in individual 
flotillas only 1-2 hydrophone or echo-ranging sets are available. * 
In addition to this, it has so far only been possible to equip 
a limited number of defense vessels with echo-ranging sets. 
The efficiency of the sets in the shallow water of the Kattegat 
must also be regarded as limited. 

It can be stated that German anti-submarine defense does not 
take into account the demands made on At and In the long run 
this gives rise to great anxiety for the future. 

Defense of the sea route to Oslo, one of the Navy's most vital 

tasks, stands or falls by the success in .combatting the great 

danger from submarines and mines. The experiences of the last 

few days have shown that the enemy's submarine training is of a 

high standard, that enemy submarines have very good hydrophone 

and sighting 1 gear at their disposal and know how to score hits 

with their torpedoes. It is the duty of all responsible offices 

to bring anti-submarine defense and training, which right from 

the beginning of the war has always been a special anxiety for f 

Naval Staff, to the necessary zenith with the greatest speed 

and maximum effort , and to ensure that all submarine-chasers 

and defense vessels are quickly equipped with efficient location 


Danger from mines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak demands the 
most careful consideration, even though there is no proof at 
present that mines have been employed on a large scale. The 
ferry between Nyborg and Korsoer was damaged on 14 April following 
an explosion. While Group Baltic suspects that it ran on one 
of our own UMA's, laid shortly before as a deep mine, Commanding 
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic points out the possibility that this 
vas a British aerial mine, since a bomber was previously sighted. 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The possibility that aerial mines are being dropped by 
British planes cannot be dismissed. It is known that large 
British flying boats can lay up to eight mines while taxi-ing 
over the surface of the water. Further observations in this 
direction are necessary. Operational offices have been 
notified of these discoveries. 

Another mine warning report has come from mine-exploaing vessel 
"11", which struck a mine when anchoring near Sprogoe. It is 
also a question here as to whether it was a mine in our own 
deep barrage or one laid by the enemy. 

It is necessary that Naval Staff should prepare itself for the 
worst and from now on expect the use of mines by enemy planes, 
with or without magnetic firing. Even though large-scale 
use of aerial mines is at present improbable, the appearance 
of single mines in the practice areas for surface forces and 
submarines and at most widely separated traffic centers of 
North Sea and Baltic shipping sets Operations Division most 
difficult tasks - in view of the small number of mine sweeping 
units - which force speedy review of all possible and necessary 
defense measures. 

Transports to Oslo are still proceeding as planned. A great 
part of the 3rd Sea Transport Unit put in to Oslo during the 
day. The last group had to call at Frederikshavn because of 
the weather and will arrive in Oslo l8ter. The 3rd Troop 
Transport Unit has been delayed in Frederikshavn because of the 
weather. The planned mine laying near Skagen also had to be 
postponed in view of the weather, 

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commanding Admiral, 
Norway are at present investigating the possibility of calling 
at Larvik, Frederlkstad, Arendal and other places near Oslo, 
also pilot service, emergency lights and unloading facilities 
there, because of the great danger from submarines in the 
entrance to Oslo Fjord. 

According to Swedish press reports, Swedish territorial waters 
on the west coast from Halloe to Yttre TIstlarne have been mined 
and the approach buoys and entrance lights extinguished until 
further notice. 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Submarine Situation 

Because of reports from submarines about extremely difficult 
operational conditions in Vaags Fjord and inside West Fjord, 
Naval Staff has ordered the boats off Narvik and in Vaags 
Fjord to withdraw out of the narrow fjords to positions where 
there is less danger and where chances of attack still exist. 

U "48" reports a vain attempt to break through to Narvik. 
Misses and failures at destroyers. For U "46" f s report, 
see radiogram 2100. U "14" had a miss or failure on the 
cruiser ENTERPRISE. 

Submarine disposition otherwise unchanged* 

Air Situation ; 

See radiogram file of 15 April, radiograms 1200, 2200, 2400. 

Merchant Shipping 

1. Norwegian and Danish ships overseas ; 

No tonnage In the Black Sea at present. 

The sailing of Danish and Norwegian ships from Italy 
is being prevented or delayed by technical difficulties as 
far as possible. Italy, however, declines to hold the ships 
If the captains protest, for fear of British reprisals against 
her own ships. 

No Norwegian and Danish tonnage In Soviet ports. 

It is reported from Washington that neither the official 
representatives of Denmark and Norway nor their shipping 
representatives have received instructions from home, and they 
are therefore mostly undecided as to how to act regarding 
merchant ships. 



15 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

As the Embassy in Oslo reported on 14 April, the Norwegian 
Association of Shipowners has issued the following call to 
all ships under the Norwegian flag, which was broadcast by 
various means: 

"The Norwegian Association of Shipowners hereby 
calls on all Norwegian ships to put in to the 
nearest neutral port immediately and to remain 
there until receipt of further instructions or to 
make for a Norwegian port if this is nearer. 
All ships proceeding to Norway or which are in other 
north European waters are to procure the best 
possible information about new mine barrages for 

2, Murmansk run : 

Negotiations are planned about the transportation of 
phosphates from Kandalaschka to Leningrad or German ports via 
the Stalin Canal on German lighters; reciprocal traffic-coal 
transports for Murmansk. 



16- April 1940 CONFIDEN TIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway ; 

Situation unchanged. A radio appeal by the old Norwegian 
Government definitely shows that it has thrown in its lot 
with the Allies. Narvik and vicinity is said to have been 
recaptured; Norwegian pilots and officers are aiding the 
Western Powers' expeditionary corps; the people are asked 
to accept British and French money. It is the duty of all 
citizens to help the authorities and to report treachery and 

The fact that the old Norwegian Government is still in a 
position to exercise certain functions, to influence the 
people and incite them to resistance, must be regarded as 
extremely regrettable. It was a definite mistake in the 
operation that we did not succeed by suitable preparatory steps 
in ensuring that the Norwegian Government was captured promptly 
and that a new and capable Government was set up right on the 
first day of the occupation. 

Propaganda in the Swedish press is creating an anti -German 
atmosphere. The Government's desire to maintain strict 
neutrality is, however, shared by the people and the Government 
is not criticized. 

The editor Ansaldo, who acts as a spokesman for Mussolini in 
certain affairs, gave a radio address to the Italian Army: 

"Events show that no nation can remain outside 
the conflict. War could come to Italy as it 
came to Norway. Italy is preparing herself 
for this and will choose the most favorable 
moment, which is perhaps nearer than is believed." 

Russia has handed to Roumania an aide memo'ire on various 
frontier incidents. Tension between Russia and Roumania 
continues. The Russians are making military preparations 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

and assembling troops. 

The German Ambassador considers the situation threatening, 
a point of view which the Army General Staff does not share 
to the same extent. 

The British Ambassador informed the Japanese Government 
on 13 April that in case of necessity Great Britain would 
take the Dutch East Indies under her control. If Japan 
consented to this, Japanese tr8de would not suffer. Japan 
has reserved comment. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items : 

1. Conference on the situation: The great danger from 
submarines and mines on the sea route to Oslo forces us to 
consider asking Swe*den to permit transport of material overland 
to Oslo. The subject is to be discussed with the Fuehrer* 

If such a proposal is not possible at present, designation 
and buoying of a skerries route along the coast of Sweden for 
material transports must be requested. 

2. Brigadier General Bodenschatz has informed Commander 
in Chief, Navy about a conference between a Swedish delegation 
under Admiral Tamm and Field Marshal Goering. By personal 
order of the King, Sweden ha3 stated that she will repulse 
any attack on her territory with armed force and is specially 
resolved to defend the northern Swedish frontier and the ore 
region with all the means in her power. The Field Marshal 
stated that the German operations were in no way directed 
against Sweden and that Germany desired a peaceful Scandinavia. 
Swedish wishes would be taken into consideration as far as 
possible . 

"Everything to a^ friendly Sweden, nothing to a 
hesitant Sweden." 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

3. With reference to our submarines • lack of success 

in northern waters and fjords, Chief, Naval Staff is desirous 
of speedily returning the boats to waters offering greater 
prospects of success and especially of using some boats in the 
Atlantic for the resumption of war" against merchant shipping. 

4. With regard to the despatch of the next auxiliary 
cruisers in operational readiness for operations against 
merchant shipping, it has been decided that the ships are to 
remain in the home operational area for the time being, since 
the present enemy situation practically excludes the possibility 
of a successful break-through into the Atlantic. Naval Staff 
has their use overseas constantly in mind and if the situation 
develops favorably this is still intended at a later date. 

P.M . 

Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Swedish 
Naval Chief, Admiral Tamm 

Points discussed : 
Swedish wishes : 

1. Continuation of Swedish merchant shipping, return 
of Swedish ships from Denmark and Norway to Sweden c 

2. Transfer from Italy to Sweden of 4 torpedo boats 
bought from the Italians. 

3. Safety of Swedish shipping in the Baltic, anxiety 
about British minelaying in the declared area in 
the Baltic. German Navy requested to inform 
Sweden at once of any mines detected in the Baltic. 

4. Request for help in Sweden's armament, which will 
also benefit German interests. (Delivery of 2 cm. 
anti-aircraft guns especially requested.) 

Admiral Tamm confirmed the great anxiety about German operational 
plans which existed in Sweden before 9 April. These were 
regarded as definitely directed against Sweden. He prbmised 
Sweden's strict legality of action and her readiness to conform 
with German wishes as far £.s compatible with neutrality. 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

German wishes : 

1. Creation of a route for German merchant shipping, 
which is as safe against submarines as possible, 
in the skerries along the west coast of Sweden, 
with pilot service or buoys. 

2. The extinguished outer lights on the west coast of 
Sweden to be put on and radio beacons operated, when 

3. Prevention of enemy submarines using Swedish territorial 
waters; according to German observations, these have 
fired from territorial waters, disregarding Swedish 

4. Mining of the southern entrance to the Kogrund Channel 
by Sweden. 

Admiral Tamm was also informed of Naval Staff's suspicion 
that several Norwegian torpedo boats have sought refuge in 
Swedish waters. 

Survey of the Situation 


Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Great Eritaln : 

Of the cruisers operating earlier in the North Atlantic, the 
EFFINGHAM and ENTERPRISE which were probably in dock lately, 
appear in the North Sea. The ORION in the West Indies area 
was ordered at noon on 13 April to proceed to Gibraltar as 
quickly as possible after taking on fuel and provisions in 

Apart from the net layer GUARDIAN, some destroyers and the 
survey vessel FRANKLIN are patrolling the Faroes. They are 
supplied with food and ammunition by trawlers. 

The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS has arrived in the Channel area 
from the Mediterranean. 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

According to a report from Intelligence Center, Spain, 
the ARK ROYAL is said to have left Gibraltar, east bound. 
(Last report requires investigation.) 

France ; 

Intelligence Center, Spain, reports: 

Aircraft carrier BEARU and one destroyer passed Gibraltar on 
easterly course at 0930 on 16 April. 

Vessels in the Bizerta and Algiers area received several 
priority radiograms containing movement orders which are to 
be carried out with the greatest speed. 

North Sea/Northern Waters 

Narvik-North Cape area : 

The aircraft carrier FURIOUS and three destroyers put in to 

In the West F.jord-Vaags Fjord area : 

The battleship WARSPITE, probably another battleship, several 
cruisers, including the cruiser AURORA with the Admiral of the 
Fleet (Chatfield), and several destroyers. 

Troops appear to have been landed in Harstad and Saalangen. 
Particulars regarding this have not been received. 

Area around Trondhelm : 

Two cruisers and five destroyers reported near the island of 
Vega (entrance to Mosjoen). 

The cruiser GLASGOW with destroyers of the 4th Destroyer 
Flotilla and the transport CHOBRY in Namsos Fjord. General 
Wiart in command of the troops ashore. 

Enemy destroyers are also still detected in Folda Fjord. 

Three cruisers and four destroyers were reported by a submarine in 
Romsdals Fjord. Enemy forces are moving in the area Romsdals Fjord/ 
Andalsnes. Strength of transport units not ascertained. 
Landings expected. Wick Radio sent very urgent radiograms via 
Aalesund to a cover address in Andalsnes. Destruction of the 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Aalesund redio station is urgently necessary. 

Destroyers and two large transports were reported in the 
Shetlands area. 

For development of the enemy situation from 7-14 April, 
disposition of enemy navel forces and their movements, based 
on the results of radio intelligence, see Radio Monitoring 
Report No. 15/40. 

Own Situation 


The situation in the North Sea and the strong concentration of 
forces along the Norwegian coast make the speedy appearance of 
the two auxiliary cruisers, Ships "16" and "36", appear necessary 
to effect a diversion. Naval Staff hopes that the appearance 
of the auxiliary cruisers will cause the enemy forces, at present 
very extensively ordered into home v/aters, to be re-disposed. 
The use especially of further aircraft carriers in the northern 
area for the purpose of constantly threatening our bases in 
Norway from the air must be regarded as highly undesirable. 
The auxiliary cruisers received the following orders with 
radiograms 1814 and 1849: 

1. Speedy appearance desired to relieve situation in 
North Sea. 

2. Ship "36" to operate in the North Atlantic for the 
time being. Expect delay of up to 14 days. 
Choice of operational area left to your discretion. 
If situation permits, simulate presence of pocket 
battleship by means of deceptive radio message to 
merchant shipping. Example: "Gunned pocket 
battleship" with corrupt position and name of a 
steamer sunk if possible. 

3. Ship "16" speed up passage to South Atlantic. 
Appear as soon as possible on the Cape-Freetown 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

4. Both ships to carry on as per operational order 

after their first success or as soon as the enemy is 
aware of their presence. 

North Sea/Northern Waters 

Naval Forces : 

After 17 April the battleships will be in 12 hours' readiness 
for operations. The HIPPER' s repairs can be expected to last 
at least 14 days. 

The tanker NORDMARK has been instructed to stand on and off, 
away from the enemy, in northern waters at her own discretion 
and to await further orders. 

The destroyers ECKKOLDT and HEINEMANN coming from Trondheim 
put in to home ports. For brief reports see radiogram file of 
16 April, 1735. 

In order to prevent losses from our own action, the following 
procedure is to be adopted, according to the Fuehrer's order, 
the regulations previously issued being amended: 

a) Any German warship is to regard any approaching 
plane as enemy and to attack it at once without 
waiting to see whether recognition is possible. 

b) Any German warship is to identify itself to 
any approaching plane by day - apart from the 
permanent markings or those ordered from time 
to time (painting of turret covers and gun 
shields, painting on of Swastika flags, etc) - 
by long fleshes from the searchlight and the 
firing of recognition signal cartridges, even 
if enemy planes are suspected; at night , by firing 
recognition signal cartridges, at latest when 
opening fire. Even after opening fire, flashes 
from the searchlight depend on the tactical 

Situation in Narvik ; 

Successful operation on land from Hundalen to the Swedish 
frontier has given us possession of the entire ore railroad. 
One Norwegian battalion taken prisoner, 200 Norwegians escaped 
over the frontier to Sweden. Bombing raids by French bi-planes 
unsuccessful. Supplies of heavy machine-guns and anti-aircraft 
guns for Narvik continue to be brought by air. 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

In the evening two British destroyers were again patrolling 
off Narvik. 

The supply submarines U "43" and U "26" were ordered to make 
for Narvik since Commanding Admiral, Submarines still considered 
it possible for the boats to break through to Narvik in spite 
of the known difficulties. Narvik Port Commander, however, 
reported in the evening that he had severe misgivings about 
submarines putting in to the defenseless harbor considering 
the close destroyer patrol and danger of espionage. The question 
of re-routing the submarines is again being investigated- with 
Group 21. 

Situation in Trondheim : 

Situation on land still assured. Successful sortie along the 
railroad to Sweden as far as the Swedish frontier. 

Seaplane base and airdrome are serviceable. The operational 
readiness of the planes so far brought up, however, is very 
slight owing to lack of ground staff and the great demands made 
on personnel and material. The seaplane base was unsuccessfully 
attacked by planes with German markings at noon. Trondheim 
Port Commander reports that Commander, Trondheim has taken over 
patrol duties and anti-submarine and mine defense. No mines 
detected to date. Two torpedo batteries, each with a triple 
tube (dismantled from the destroyers in Narvik) are ready for 
action near the batteries at Selven and Hysnes. 

Situation in Bergen : 

Hasty reinforcement of anti-aircraft defense has been ordered 
in the Bergen sector. The Navy and Air Force are to exploit 
every possibility for this. An 8.8 cm anti-aircraft battery 
is to be brought by submarines as the first step. Preliminary 
work is in progress by Admiral, West Norwegian Coast for the 
erection of torpedo batteries. 

The submarines took on supplies in Bergen according to plan. 
Since it has been detected that Norwegian pilots are working 
with the British, the seizure of the main pilot station at 
Koppervik has been ordered. The operation is to be carried 
out by Army troops from Stavenger. These are to be brought 
up by seaplanes and naval forces. 

Situation in Stavanger ; 

The airfield at Stavanger is at present completely obstructed 
by overcrowding, the effects of enemy bombing raids and numerous 
unserviceable planes. Not open for landings or supplies. 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation In Kristiansand : 

Nothing special to report. 

Situation in Oslo : 

Submarine warning in Oslo Fjord near Horten. Further progress 
was made in taking over and establishing readiness of coastal 
batteries. Torpedo battery South Kaholm ready to fire and 
manned. (The BLUECHER received two hits from this battery.) 

Submarine and torpedo dockyard in Toensbjerg has been taken 
over and is in operation. 

Situation in Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

For further defense of sea communications with Oslo against 
submarines, Naval Staff has ordered: 

1. Reinforcement of the Skagerrak barrage by adapted 
EMC mines with a long mooring rope and upper antenna 
(40 m.). Antenna buoy setting minus 15 m. Contact 
setting switched on. (400 probably ready for delivery 
on 20 April, 600 more being prepared.) 

2. Taking over of submarine-chase in the Kattegat and 
Skagerrak by Commander Naval Air, Baltic under whom 
the 606th Group is placed for this purpose immediately. 
It is planned to bring up another squadron of He. 59' s 
for anti-submarine operations. 


3. Group Baltic received submarine-chasers "A - F" 
from Group West on request. 

Sea Transport Situation : 

Following the torpedoing of the BRUMMER, Group Baltic considers 
the limit of the justifiable use of naval forces so farfbr 
transport assignments to be reached and requests urgently a 
lull of several days to devote exclusively to submarine -chase 
and the laying of mine barrages. It proposes that collective 
transports be carried out by air in the meantime and that 
Sweden be pressed to allow material transports with pilots 
and warship escort to proceed through territorial waters. 
Group Baltic also considers that transports of personnel on 
tbrpedo boats in pairs proceeding at high speed to varying ports 
such as Langesund, Arendal, Krageron, Larvik, Toensbjerg and 
Sande Fjord can be advocated if necessary, provided there are 
unloading facilities and lights. 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Naval Staff agrees with Group Baltic in its appreciation of 
transport possibilities and the great strain put on naval 
forces. (See letter to Group 21, Transport Chief, dated 
16. April, Reference file "Weseruebung" • ) 

The priority of these transports was, however, so highly- 
emphasized when examining the transport question with Armed 
Forces High Command and Transport Chief, Group 'dl, that Naval 
Staff is forced to order transport of material and personnel 
to continue as before. Group Baltic has been instructed 

Losses are to be avoided as far as possible by using all 
available escort forces. 

Personnel to be carried from Frederikshavn on the fast 
vessels scheduled for this if the readiness of the vessels 

Transports of material as previously planned. Ships will 
also be utilized to a slight extent to transport personnel. 

Urgent assignments are the transfer of the 13th Machine-Gun 
Battalion, the 40 Armored Battalion and transport columns. 

In Oslo, Group 'dl cleared up the subject of alternative ports. 
According to Commanding Admiral, Norway's report, only ports 
near Oslo can be considered because of the difficulties of 
transportation in Norway. Troops are now scheduled to be 
transported to Larvik for the present. 

For assignments and positions of the forces of Commanding 
Admiral, Defenses, Baltic see radiogram file of 16 April, 1200. 

The extraordinarily great strain on all the forces of 
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is apparent from this 
report. Rests, relief and overhaul periods are limited to 
the utmost. 

Special difficulties arise from the lack of and liability to 
break down of the location sets on submarine chaser forces. 
Of 24 echo-ranging sets available 10 are at present out of 
order . It is urgently necessary to obviate these deficiencies 
and to do this as quickly as possible. 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Submarine Situation 

Vaags Fjord : 

U "47" reports use of hydrophones and heavy depth charging 
by the enemy. One G 7a failure, three electric torpedo non- 
detonators. Boat is leaving Vaags Fjord. U "65" also 
reports most difficult operational conditions. 

It is learned from radio monitoring that the destroyer 
FEARLESS has apparently sunk one submarine. 

West Fjord : 

U "46" and "51" have been assigned new positions in the area 
north of Trondheim. U "25" is to search the bays in West Fjord 
for enemy forces. 

Romsdal s Fjord: 

Reconnaissance by U "52" without result. No enemy sightings. 

U "13" sank a TRIBAL class destroyer north of the Shetlands. 

Otherwise no special changes in disposition. 

Air Situation 

See events of the day, radiogram file, 2400, 

Merchant Shipping 

Group Oslo has requested permission for single transports 
returning from Oslo to return through Swedish territorial 
waters with the aid of pilots. The steamers would have to 
anchor at night because of the extinguishing of the lights. 
Permission has been given. Group Baltic was already informed 
some days ago that there was no objection even to the passage 
of troopships through Swedish territorial waters. 



16 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

German Shippin g in the Baltic : 

The Ministry of Transportation permits shipping south of 
the line Cape Kullen-Hesseloe-Aarhus • Permission from 
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is necessary north of 

Germa n Mercha nt Shipping Losses since 9 A pril : 

32 ships totaling 166,411 GRT. Further, 7 ships totaling 
26,634 GRT cannot be used at present as they lie' north of 

Danish and Norwegian ships in German ports : 

9 Danish totaling 11,339 GRT, 7 Norwegian totaling 13,060 GRT. 

Danish Shipping : 

The Danish short wave transmitter again broadcast: 

"Danish ships are again called on to make for 
neutral ports, ships in the Mediterranean if 
possible Italian or Spanish ports. If occasion 
arises, attempt to reach home ports," 

The Danish Foreign Ministry has despatched a coded circular 
telegram to this effect to Danish representatives abroad. 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norwegian campaign : 

Reynaud spoke In the Senate about the Allies • 

1. The first success lies in a severe and 
irremediable weakening of German sea power; 

2. Germany is cut off from Swedish ore. 
Minefields lie all over the Baltic, 
cutting off also this shipping route to the 

3. Germany is forced to fight on a new front. 
She is squandering troops, guns, planes 
and fuel; 

4. The fourth result is a colossal moral defeat. 
King Haakon was taken for another Eerr Hacha 
from Czechoslovakia. Quisling's sham Government 
has collapsed. 

2. The Swedish Government has banned a speech by Hambro, 
the Norwegian President of the Storthing. It has also 
prohibited recruiting of volunteers for Norway. The Swedish 
Foreign Minister solemnly assured the German Ambassador on 

15 April that all military measures taken by Sweden were 
directed exclusively to the defense of her neutrality. Units 
had to be reinforced to protect the lengthy Swedish-No rue gian 
frontier. It was the most earnest desire of the Swedish 
Government to meet Germany 1 s political and economic wishes as 
far as possible; the deliveries of ore according to contract 
would be carried out to the extent agreed on. 

3. The British Ambassador in Washington stated that 
neither Great Britain' nor Canada planned to occupy Greenland 
or Iceland unless Germany planned to do so. 

4. Halifax assured the Dutch Ambassador that Great 
Britain would respect the neutrality of the Netherlands. 

5. According to a letter from Mussolini to the Fuehrer, 
the Italian Navy is mobilized and at full war strength. It 
could not be established to date whether considerable parts 
of the Italian Fleet have gone to the Dodecanese. 

The Italian press states: 

"The moment has come to review the situation 

in the Mediterranean with regard to the relations 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

between Great Britain, France and Italy." 

6. Lively discussions in the U.S.A., Great Britain and 
Japan about the possible protection of the Dutch East Indies 
Holland states angrily that she is strong enough alone to 
protect the Dutch East Indies with her own forces. In the 
U.S.A. it is declared that any Japanese action against the 
Dutch East Indies would come up against very strong U.S. 
resistance and might perhaps lead to the U.S.A. 's entry into 
the war. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. Report on future submarine operations. For result see 
under Submarine Situation. 

2. For report from Lieut. Cdr. Gerlach, 2nd Staff Officer 
of Commander, Destroyers about the destroyer operation against 
Narvik and the actions on 10 and 13 April, see War Diary, Part B, 
Vol. V. page 133 

j<-> . 

The report fills Naval Staff with pride. It shows that the 
majority of the destroyers were not annihilated by the enemy 
but, after a heroic fight against overwhelming odds under the 
most unfavorable tactical conditions, scuttled themselves or 
ran on the rocks, after the last shell and torpedo had been 
fired. The crews' behavior during and after the action was 
excellent and in accordance with the spirit and famous tradition 
of the German torpedo arm. 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Survey of the Situation 

Speciel Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Great Britain ; 

The Admiralty announces the laying of mine barrages to protect 
the Clyde estuary in the following area, according to Rugby 

Between the lines connecting Dunningham Point 

(55° 19.5'N, 5° 33'W) and Scraigans Point 

(55° 3.5 'N, 5° 3»W) and Rhuad Point (55° 21.5'N, 

5° 31 »W) and Bennan Head (55° 8.5'N, 4° 59,5 »W). 

Patrol vessels are stationed at the southern ^ 

end. Shipping is instructed to procure ana 

follow directions from the Royal Navy and/or 

consular authorities. 

France ; 

Four French submarines arrived in Harwich on 17 April. 

According to bearings, the large destroyer MOGADOR and 
another vessel were detected northeast of the Firth of Moray 
in the afternoon. 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Intelligence Center, Belgium transmits an agent's report, 
according to which the Home Fleet operating in the Norwegian 
campaign is to be regrouped by withdrawing six large British 
vessels and replacing them by six lighter French vessels. 
Admiral Forbes commands the French Fleet units. A new large- 
scale landing is to be attempted near Namsos. According to 
further agents' reports, Frer i, Scottish and Canadian mountain 
troops are on their way to Norway. 

Narvik-Tromsoe area ; 

Only incomplete information on the movements of enemy forces in 
the north Norwegian theater could be gained since our air activity 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

had to be limited to the despatch of one FW £00. 

One heavy cruiser wag spotted off Harstad and one battleship 
(WARSPITE) and several destroyers in the fjord southwest of 
Andorja Island. 

Radio intelligence detected the cruiser EFFINGHAM in the area 
off Tromsoe. 

In the morning U "46" reported three troopships, probably 
returning, on southwesterly course northwest of Mosjoen. 

According to radio monitoring, the transfer of the aircraft 
carrier GLORIOUS into the operational area along the Norwegian 
coast is to be expected. 

Area around Trondheim : 

In the morning air reconnaissance detected 'd cruisers and 
5 destroyers southwest of Folda Fjord and another cruiser northwest 
of it. Reconnaissance of Ram Fjord and the road to the south 
showed no transports, naval forces or troops. 

She t lands -Norway area : 

In the forenoon Stavanger was shelled by cruisers and a 
destroyer. The formation was detected 60 miles west of Haugesund 
at noon on westerly course proceeding at high speed. In the 
afternoon the cruiser SUFFOLK, damaged by air attack, urgently 
requested aid from tugs. The enemy succeeded in bringing her 
in. The battle cruiser REPULSE was 50 miles east of Fair 
Passage towards evening, probably to pick up the cruiser formation. 

Own Situation 

Situation in Narvik ; 

Destroyer patrol in Rombaken Fjord continues; this is apparently 
interrupted always for a short time only. A British attempt 
to land by means of cutters in Herjaengs Fjord was repulsed. 
British destroyers shelled German positions and batteries in 
the afternoon. Bardufoss airfield is occupied by Norwegians 
and there are some light planes there. About 5 cm. of snow 
until the end of Kay, then unserviceable for three weeks, there- 
fore no possibility of bomber operations at present from here. 

Supplies by plane for the destroyer crews have commenced. 
Attempts are being made to fly urgently required officers and 
experts home. 



17 April 1940 


Situation in Trondheim : 

Port Commander, Trondheim (Captain Thiele) requests that men 
from destroyers, some of whom are manning the batteries, be 
relieved by coastal specialists. The coastal battery at 
Bettinges with % d x 21 cm. and 3 x 15 era. guns and the battery 
at Heysnes with 2 x 21 cm. and 2 x 15 cm. guns are ready for 

Plans : 


restore readiness to proceed of the destroyers JACOEI snd 
RIEDEL and to send them home. It is hoped to get the JACOEI 
up to a speed of 30 knots despite the stoppage of part of a 
turbine • 

Situation in Bergen : 

Reconnaissance of the seaplane base at Flatoey shows that it 
is suitable for use. The base was still occupied by Norwegians. 
Four runways. Use not possible until anti-aircraft defense 
is available. 

Submarines supplied as planned. 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the town and country 
authorities will obey the orders of the Oslo Administrative 

Situation in Stavanger : 

Enemy cruisers and destroyers shelled the seaplane base in the 
morning. Buildings, material, ammunition and four seaplanes 
destroyed. Airfield not hit. All Stavanger' s light and 
power installations out of action. 

Strong forces of the 26th Bomber Wing and the 30th Bomber Wing 
contacted the enemy formation west of Haugesund. 

Several hit° were scored: 
Stern of 1 heavy cruiser 

1 x 500 kg. 
1 x 250 kg. 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

1 destroyer 1 x 250 kg. 

Amidships ,1 cruiser 1 x 1,000^, kg. 
1 cruiser 1 x 500 kg. 

1 cruiser 1 x 500 kg. 

1 x 500 kg. just by the ship's side. 

Radio traffic indicates severe damage to the cruiser SUFFOLK, 
which urgently requested aid from tugs and was able to reach 
her base. (After engine room and steering compartment under 
water. ) 

The need for the erection of a coastal battery in Stavanger is 
urgent, as shown by today's shelling. 

Orders will be given accordingly. 

Because of the shelling of Stavanger, Group West requests the 
transfer of available Army batteries to protect Tyboroen until 
the naval battery is set up. 

Situation in Kristlansand and Oslo : 

Nothing special to report. 2 x 21 cm., 6 x 15 cm. guns ready 
for action in Kristlansand. 

Situation in the North Sea ; 

Ten planes of the 3rd Coastal Patrol Squadron of the 506th 
Group and eight planes of the 1st Group of the 126th Bomber 
Wing laid aerial mines In the area of the Downs and Edinburgh 
Channel; 24 LMB mines dropped. 

In order to increase the enemy's impression of the effectiveness 
of the Skagerrak mine barrages It is suggested to Group West 
that a suitable vessel should pretend to have struck a mine in 
the deep channel through transmission of an S.O.S. on the steamer 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation In the Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

Danger from submarines as great as ever as far as the entrances 
to the Baltic. Two submarines sighted north of Schultz Grund. 
Submarine warning in Friedericla in the afternoon. Submarine 
chase unsuccessful . Another underwater explosion on the Nyborg- 
Korsoer ferry off the entrance to Korsoer while following a 
mine- exploding vessel. Minesweeper "12" checked the route on 
17 April without any result. Possibly our own UMA barrage is 
faulty. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has therefore 
ordered the immediate sweeping of our deep barrages in the Great 
and Little Belts, 100 per cent searching sweep of the ferry 
route from Nyborg to Korsoer and laying of buoys. 

In Naval Staff's opinion, the possibility of enemy aerial 
minelaylng here must be taken into account. 

Transport situation ; 

Fast troop transport and first fishing smack transport arrived 
in Larvik and Oslo. Other transports delayed by the weather. 

Denmark : 

Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark reports that 3 x 21 cm. guns 
are manned on the island of Flakfort east of Copenhagen. 

Submarine Situation 

It is necessary to fix present and future assignments for further 
submarine operations according to plan. The continuous 
fulfillment of tasks arising must be accomplished by a corre- 
spondingly smaller number of submarines on operation. 

Naval Staff at present foresees the following assignments for 
submarines : 

1. Occupation of the area Vaags Fjord-West Fjord in 
attack dispositions. 

2. Occupation of the area from the Orkneys to the Minch. 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

3. Defense of the Trondheim and Bergen areas. 

4. Transport of supplies to Narvik and Trondheim. 

5. War against merchant shipping in the Atlantic 
with boats still available. 

6. Use of boats for Operation "Gelb." if necessary. 

7. Withdrawal of boats for submarine training. 

Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have received 
an order to endeavor to fulfill these assignments by the 
use of the following numbers of submarines: 

1. In the Lofoten area at present the large boats 
already there. 

2. In the Orkneys-Minch area, always 3-4 small boats. . 

3. Defend the Trondheim area with 3 medium-sized and 3 
small boats. 

4. Defend the Bergen-Stavanger area with 2 small boats. 

5. The 6 large boats scheduled are to be used for 
transport assignments and for temporary defense assignments 
in Norway. 

6. The »large boats still available to operate in the 

7. For Operation "Gelb" boats to be taken from Bergen or 
from those resting. 

8. Eight small boats to be made available immediately 
for training purposes, 9 more boats from May; 
Norwegian and Danish boats to be brought up for this 
if possible. 

In view of Armed Forces High Command's appreciation of the 
situation that it is necessary to concentrate supplies on the 
Trondheim area, supply boats U "43" and "26" have now finally 
been diverted to Trondheim. 



17 April 1940 


IT "29" sailed for Bergen and Trondheim as an additional 
supply boat, carrying 5 tons of 2 cm. ammunition, alkali 
cartridges and distilled water. 

Positions on 17 April : 

Outer Vaags Fjord: 

Outer West Fjord: 
Returning from the Lofotens: 
Northwest of Trondheim: 
Namsen Fjord-Folda Fjord: 

Off Trondheim: 
Romsdals Fjord: 
Bergen- Lister area: 

Area around the Shetlands: 

On passage: Supply boats: 
On return passage: 

"38", "65", 

"49" (?) 


"48", "46", 


"61", "34", 

"50" (?) 



"30* , 







and U 






"5", "6" 

"10", "3" 

21", freed from internment* 

Great anxiety is felt regarding the fate of U 
and U "50" (Bauer). U "22" (Jenisch) 
from 17 April. 

"47" (v. Gossler) 
is posted missing as 

Air Situation 

See Air Force Events of the Day, 17 April in Volume "Air 

Merchant Shipping : 

After further enquiry from Naval Staff, the Ministry of 



17 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Transportation has issued instructions that German ships are 
to sail from Baltic ports as planned in spite of the British 
announcement of a declared area. 

"Export" Unit : 

There is now information about the steamer MAIN from the 
Admiralty, according to which the ship was sunk by a Norwegian 
destroyer. Of the 7 ships of the "export" unit only 1 
(LEVANTE) has therefore arrived as planned; the greater part 
of the cargo of another (BAERENFELS; was unloaded in Bergen 
before her destruction by a bomb-hit. One steamer (ALSTER) 
has unfortunately fallen into enemy hands with her valuable 

Norwegian Shipping ; 

The legitimate Norwegian Government has requested the British 
Government to broadcast the following telegram to all Norwegian 
ships : 

"All Norwegian ships are warned that telegrams 
they receive from Norway, signed by the shipowner, 
are transmitted by the Germans. The only authentic 
orders are those of a Norwegian Embassy or statements 
by the 3.B.C. Captains of all Norwegian ships are 
to get in touch with the nearest French or British 
naval office and to avoid putting in to neutral ports, 
except in the case of an authentic request. " 

P.M . 

Lt. Cdr. Gerlach, from Commander, destroyers, reported to the 



17 April 1940 


Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in the 
presence of Commander in Chief, Navy. 

The Fuehrer asked for a full report on the Narvik operation, 
the situation at present and future prospects of defense, and 
then expressed his special satisfaction with the report and 
his recognition of the achievements of our destroyers. 




18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway : 

The announcement that the new Administrative Committee 
under Christensen is entrusted with looking after the interests 
of the Norwegian people with the German occupation authorities 
has apparently been accepted peacefully and with satisfaction 
among large sections of the Norwegian population. The 
population of Oslo is slowly returning to the city. Shops 
are being opened, business is being resumed. However, the old 
Norwegian Government, which has fled and the whereabouts of 
which are not known, still possesses great influence in the 
areas not occupied by us, and is continually exhorting the 
people to resistance, pointing out the aid already being given 
by the Western Powers. This is making the execution of our 
operations much more difficult. 

2. The British Ministry of Information is said to have 
given the press the following instructions with reference to 
the excitement in Great Britain about the German Norwegian 

1. False report of the capture of Narvik is not 
to be withdrawn; 

2. It is to be stressed that Narvik is the only 
important harbor in Norway in view of the ore 


3. It is to be emphasized that Germany has 
committed a great strategic, economic and 
political blunder by the Scandinavian 

4. Losses to the German F,leet must be celebrated 
as a great victory for Great Britain; 

5. Legality of action has now completely gone 
over to Great Britain. 

The British press states that Italy's future attitude will be 
decided in the Norwegian fjords. Italy is at present bluffing 
in order to draw as many British ships as possible into the 
Mediterranean to relieve Germany. 



18 April 1940 


3. The situation J.s still not clear about the transfer 
of Italian Fleet units to the Dodecanese. The Consul at 
Palermo reports that 4 light cruisers and 4 destroyers sailed 
from Palermo on 14 April, destination unknown. 

The Western Powers and the U.S.A. are at present specially 
interested in Italy's attitude. Far reaching ^decisions are 
expected shortly in the Balkans or in the Mediterranean. 

4. The Western Powers are attempting to influence Sweden 
against Germany by increased press and radio propaganda and 
speeches by various ministers. It is stated that Germany's 
next blow will be at Sweden in order to ensure supplies of ore 
for Germany. Great Britain is ready to help Sweden if attacked 
by Germany, but must insist that Sweden herself do everything 
for her own defense. 

5. Reports from Sweden speak of the great disquiet at 
present felt by the Swedish public because of various flights 
over Swedish territory by German air formations. Captains 
of steamers report great expansion of Swedish coastal defense, 
control of steamer crews and harbor barrages. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. Report on Armed Forces High Command directive : 
The Fuehrer has ordered: 

a) Group Narvik has the task of defending itself 
along the ore railroad, of tying down the enemy 
and of preparing thorough destruction of the 

ore railroad. It is being supplied with ammunition 
and food. Fresh forces will not be brought up. 

b) Trondheim is of decisive importance as a naval 
and air base. Occupying forces, as well as 
blocking the way northwards against landings, 
are to defend the railroad to the Swedish border 
and open up communications to the south. The 
Group cannot be made too strong for this. 



18 April 1940 .CONFIDENTIAL 

c) Commander in Chief, Air Force will provide 
increased air transports as far as possible. 

d) Commander in Chief, Navy, in conjunction 
with Group 21, is to take over the bringing 
up by sea of heavy weapons and ammunition 
required and carry this out even at the risk 
of losses. 

e) Severe steps are to be taken against passive 
resistance from the population. 

(See under Situation in Trondheira.) 

2. Operations by our battleships : 

Naval Staff considers that a sudden appearance by the 
battleship formation in the Lister-Utsire-Krakenaes area is 
urgently necessary in order to relieve the west coast of Norway, 
where troop and supply transports of the Western Powers are 
constantly arriving under the protection of numerous British 
naval forces. The enemy disposition of forces, at present 
still showing a concentration in the Lofoten area, provides 
favorable conditions for such an operation. Prospects of 
success are expected from pushing through the Shetlands line 
into the area west of Stadlandet-Frohavet, according to reports 
on the enemy to date (primarily light forces in this area). 
The dangers of such sorties, the possibilities of which in 
Naval Staff's opinion should not be exhausted in isolated 
operations but must form a constant threat to the enemy, lie 
in danger from the air, submarines and mines, especially on the 
approach routes. These dangers can be reduced to a tolerable 
degree with suitable anti-mine and air escort (the effectiveness 
of air patrol and air escort has been materially increased by the 
newly acquired bases at Aalborg and Stavanger). It is necessary 
to use all destroyers in readiness for anti-submarine escort. 
However, the severe, loss which the German Fleet has suffered from 
the ten destroyers out of action in Narvik makes itself particularly 
felt here. The number of destroyers still available in home 
waters is at present only eight, four of which are still being 
overhauled or urgently require repairs. Establishment of 
readiness of the remaining four still requires several days. 
The minimum number of destroyers considered necessary for the 
thrusts by the battleships is three. 

Refuelling of the forces presents no difficulties. If 
necessary, the supply ship NORDMARK, in northern waters, is at 
the battleships' disposal. The destroyers can, if necessary, 
re-oil in Stavanger and Bergen. 


18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Navai Staff is quite aware of the dangers of battleship 
sorties in coastal waters. These, however, can on no account 
be regarded as so decisive that important operations cannot 
be carried out because of them. The battleships are no 
"fleet in being", exercising their strategic and operational 
effect alone by their presence in home bases. 

Effective diversions can only be attained by their actual 
appearance in the enemy's operational area. Frequent 
operations in the area central North Sea-She tlands-Krakenaes 
will also represent a very effective defense for the Skagerrak 
and the vital sea route to Oslo. 

The supreme importance of a speedy and successful conclusion 

of the Norwegian operation necessitates battleship operations 

as soon as possible in accordance with Naval Staff's considerations. 

Group West was informed by telephone of Naval Staff's views on 

this matter. f* 

3. It no longer appears necessary now for the cruiser 
EMDEN to remain in Olso. Group Baltic has therefore been given 
permission to withdraw her. Group Baltic is to arrange with 
Commanding Admiral, Norway the possibility of release and the 
date of withdrawal, taking into consideration the enemy 
situation, submarines and mines. (The EMDEN will remain in 
Oslo for the present according to this arrangement. She is 
not scheduled to return until the situation changes or if Oslo 
is too dangerous and if anti-submarine escort is available.) 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Further transfer of forces is to be seen from the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean to the North Sea and northern waters. Nine 
destroyers were transferred from Dover to Scape. The former 
Polish destroyers THUNDERBOLT and LIGHTNING, operating in the 
Atlantic, are likewise in the northern North Sea. The aircraft 
carrier ARK ROYAL left Gibraltar during the night of 16 April 
and is in radio communication with Great Britain. The battle- 
cruiser HOOD is no longer detected in the Gibraltar areaj her 
transfer northward can be assumed. 

The French Mediterranean Fleet has been decreased by the 



18 April 1940 


allocation of vessels to the Atlantic Fleet. In the North 
Sea there are probably about ten French submarines, the mine- 
laying cruiser EMILE BERTIN, a few torpedo cruisers, including 
the MOGADOR, and possibly also the two DUNKERQUE class. 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Radio intelligence reveals the following disposition of enemy 
naval, forces: 

Are North Cape-Kirkenes : 
Tromsoe to West Fjord: 

The cruisers DEVONSHIRE and BERWICK. 

The old battleships WARSPITE, 
VALIANT, the aircraft carrier 
FURIOUS and the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON. 

Area Orkney s -She t lands- 
coast of Norway: 

In the Scapa area: 

Trondheim area or nortn The 2nd and 18th Cruiser Squadrons 
and south of it: with the 4th and 6th Flotillas; the 

and EFFINGHAM were detected 

The RENOWN and the cruisers 
as destroyers of the 5th and 7th 

The REPULSE and the cruisers 
CALCUTTA and CARLISLE as well as 
destroyers of the 8th Flotilla and 
the damaged cruiser SUFFOLK. 

Positions of French forces are unknown. The vessels are 
fully incorporated in the British Fleet's radio service. 

Towards noon air reconnaissance intercepted a British battle 
cruiser with semi-remote cruiser escort. This may have been 
the battle cruiser HOOD. 

Submarines sighted various cruisers and destroyers in the 
Shetlands area without firing. 



18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Cruisers and destroyers were detected in West Fjord and 
And Fjord * There was a battleship off Harstad* 

North of Trondheim : 

At noon Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron passed on to Admiralty 
General de Wiart's report that the landing had been carried 
out (probably in the vicinity of Namsos). Daventry radio 
announces news of a British landing in the Namsos area* 

It appears from another radiogram that a convoy plans to enter 
the Mosjoen area on the evening of 18 April* 

South of Trondheim: 

Nq nQw results from reconnaissance of Andalsnes and Romsdals 


iq new 

Area off Bergen : 

Submarine warning reports* 

Survey of the Situation 

Own Situation 

Situation in the North Sea : 

In order to protect shipping movements in the area off the 
Norwegian coast against air attacks, an increasing number of 
which must be expected as the season advances, Group West 
requests the speedy transfer of fighter and heavy fighter 
formations to Stavanger and Bergen as far as this is possible* 

Commander, Minesweepers, West reports that after giving up all 
new minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas, Minesweeper 
n 12 n and almost all mine-exploding vessels he has now only four 
auxiliary minesweeper flotillas and one flotilla of old mine- 
sweepers available for mine patrol in the North Sea coastal 
waters* Concentration on route n Blau w and the coastal route as 
far as Hanstholm* The expansion of the bases of Esbjerg and 
Tyboroen is being pushed on* The final aim of Commander, 



18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Minesweepers, West is to advance mine patrol up to the 
Norwegian coast and Bergen as soon as the release of new 
minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas and the general 
situation permit. 

The difficulties of mine control in the North Sea with the 
small number of flotillas available will have to be endured for 
the present, since the Navy's chief assignment, the safeguarding 
of the transports to Oslo, can only be fulfilled by definite 
concentration of anti-mine and anti-submarine defense in the 
'Kattegat and Skagerrak. 

Situation in Narvik : 

Group Narvik reports that the day passed quietly* Dropping 
place for supplies was unsuccessfully bombed by planes, apparently 
French ones* After the merchant ships have been unloaded, 
food in Narvik will still be sufficient for 40 days. 

The Group reports enemy landings in Salangen. 

Our own armed reconnaissance successfully attacked town and 
harbor installations in Harstad. Attacks on a battleship on 
the roads off Harstad were apparently unsuccessful. Damage 
caused by heavy bombs exploding in the direct vicinity of the 
ship's side is possible. 

Tromsoe power station was destroyed by a bomb. 

Situation in Trondhelm ; 

Railroad to Sweden in German hands. All forces urgently 
request supplies by rail via Sweden. 

Facilities for this are dependent on the Fuehrer's decision. 
For the present, arms and ammunition can only be brought up 
by air or sea. 

The urgency of transports of every type of gun to Norway, 
especially to Trondheim and Bergen, is apparent from the 
Fuehrer's directive today (see above). The prospects of getting 



18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

supplies safely to Trondheim by sea are certainly slight* 
Every endeavor must, however, be made to get guns through to 
Trondheim because of the still very confused situation on land 
and of the severe threat to our important Trondheim position 
which is to be expected from the British landings in Namsos and 
Romsdals Fjord. Naval Staff thinks this might be possible 
by .using Special Group vessels (camouflaged trawlers), which 
are in a position to score successes against naval vessels 
while carrying out the transport assignment, because of their 
torpedo armament. Group West was therefore instructed by tele- 
type to despatch two of the Special Group ships to Trondheim as 
an experiment. Cargo of light field howitzers and first 
ammunition equipment. Their main assignment is safe transportation, 
the secondary one destruction of enemy naval vessels. Ships 
"26" and "37" were then ordered by Group West to carry out the 
transport assignment. Two guns plus ammunition can be safely 
loaded on each vessel. 

Situation in Bergen : 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports the destruction of a 
Norwegian torpedo boat after an engagement with PT TDoats S "21" 
and S "23" in Hardanger Fjord. 

In Bergen harbor there are 183 steamers which are not German. 
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has requisitioned 27 steamers, 
16 of which are ready to sail. Owing to lack of personnel 
it is only possible to transfer very few steamers to Germany. 

Unloading of the "export" steamer BAERENFELS was stopped because 
of the danger of overturning. 

Only 3 x 10.5 m. anti-aircraft guns without ammunition have 
so far been set up. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast urgently 
requests ammunition and also allocation of a motor minesweeper 
flotilla because of danger from mines in the entrances. 

The necessity for such an allocation is recognized. In spite 
of this Naval Staff finds it impossible to grant the request, 
since motor minesweepers are not at present available on account 
of urgent requirements elsewhere. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast 
must therefore make do with the means available in Bergen. Later 
allocation of a motor minesweeper flotilla will be reviewed. 




18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Group West has been instructed to this effect* 

Situation In the Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

Numerous submarine sighting and warning reports show that there 
is still very great danger from submarines* Submarine- chase 
is being carried out south of Oslo, in the Skagerrak north of 
Skagen, west of Maeseskaer, near Hisholm, south of Anholt, south 
of Samsoe and near Schultz Grund. Several reports mention 
"submarine probably destroyed"; there are, however, no proofs 
of actual sinkings. One ship reports twelve submarine sightings 
within four days and expresses the supposition, based on 
observation, that submarines are operating in pairs . Submarines 
have been identified several times by their periscopes about 
1-g m. above the surface. 

Examination of mine-exploding vessel "11", which struck a mine, 
by the Chemical and Physical Experimental Station in Kiel reveals 
possible detonation of a small mine with long-range effect and 
magnetic type firing . 

The first part of the Skagen anti-submarine barrage was laid 
according to plan with deep UMA mines by the HANSESTADT DANZIG 
group during the night of 17 April. 

Transport Situation ; 

Transports of troops and material proceed according to plan. 
950 men arrived in Larvik on torpedo bosts and the steamer 
ANGELBURG; 1,000 men arrived in Oslo on two steamers. 

Close escort by planes has turned out very well. Ammunition 
and material are en route in drifters. 

The steamer HAMM was torpedoed and badly damaged north of 
Skagen out of a convoy of empty steamers returning from Oslo. 

The hospital ship STUTTGART, escorted by Swedish warships, is 
proceeding through Swedish territorial waters to Oslo. 

Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that he cannot defend the 
50-mile long Oslo Fjord with only the 1st Motor Minesweeper 



18- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Flotilla placed at his disposal and the inadequate newly- 
commissioned Norwegian vessels. He requests immediate 
allocation of one submarine-chaser and one patrol flotilla, 
each of at least eight boats. He also requests basic orders 
on command and that the limits of the defense areas between 
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commanding Admiral, 
Norway be fixed (see 1943). 

It is at present impossible to allocate further forces of 
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic or Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, North to Commanding Admiral, Norway. Defense in 
the outer Oslo Fjord is also not Commanding Admiral, Norway's 
affair, but is part of the duties of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, 
Baltic, who is responsible for the protection of the entire sea 
route to Oslo and assumes protection of transports against 
submarines and mines right into the inner Oslo Fjord. 

Splitting up the few submarine-chaser and defense forces must 
lead to an impossible weakening of defense as a whole and cannot 
therefore be carried out at present. Commanding Admiral," 
Defenses, Baltic alone must remain responsible for commitment 
of and operations by the defense formations and he will in so 
doing take into consideration the wishes of Commanding Admiral, 
Norway or Admiral, South Norwegian Coast as far as possible. 

Various applications regarding the use of the Norwegian naval 

vessels captured or commissioned have been received. Both 

Group Commands request the allocation of the minelayer OLAV 

TRYGVASON and of the Norwegian destroyers BALDER, ODIN, GYLLER. 

Group Baltic further requests the seizure of guard vessels, ^ 

customs boats and trawlers for the protection of Oslo Fjord snd 

of the ports in southern Norway, the allocation of the armed 

coastal vessels lying in Horten as floating batteries to 

Commanding Admiral, Norway and the assembly of the old second 

class Norwegian torpedo boats as harbor defense flotillas. 

(See radiogram file of 18 April, 1148.) 

The whole affair is at present under review by High Command, 
Navy/Naval Staff. 



18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Submarine Situation ; 

1. Vaags Fjord : 

U "65" reports from And Fjord that the positions In 
the fiords can only be occupied for hours at a time since It 
Is only possible to charge the batteries far out to sea, 

U "47", coming from the Lofotens, has been assigned a waiting 
position from the North Minch to the northern tip of the 

2. Trondheim area ! 

U "26", "43", put in to Trondheim with supplies. 

3. Bergen : 

U "14" is disposed off Bergen, U "13", "61" are 
replenishing their stocks in Bergen. 

The following boats have been ordered to return: 

By the direct route to Kiel: U. "9", "46", '"51". 

Via the Orkneys area: U "10", "19", "56", "60", "62". 

Via a point west of the 

Shetlands to Wilhe 1ms haven: U "52". 

Submarine Successes : 

The British steamer SWAINBY (4,935 tons) was torpedoed off the 
north coast of Scotland. 

Commanding Admiral, Submarines summarizes the results of shots 
fired during the past week in teletype 1725 (see radiogram file) 
and thus gives a shattering summary of the numerous torpedo 
failures, because of which imst of the attacks carried out 
despite heavy defense on 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 
5 destroyers and several transports were not successful. The 
Navy was thus deprived of material successes in decisive action. 
Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that, if the newly ordered 
ruling (percussion firing inside fjords, magnetic firing in the 



18 April 1940 


open sea) results in further failures, the German Navy does 
not possess any weapon for the submarines in northern waters. 

Merchant Shipping 

The following orders have been issued about control of neutral 

1. Apart from Russian, Dutch and Belgian ships, only 
such neutral ships as are bound for German North Sea 
ports are to be allowed to pass westward through the 
Kiel Canal. Other neutral vessels are to be prevented 
by means of pretexts. 

2. Over and above para. 1., ships of the three Baltic 
States are to be allowed to pass westward through the 
Kiel Canal if they have a convoy certificate for 
destination Delfzyl. 

3. Ensure that neutral shipping neither leaves the 
Skagerrak westbound nor is able to turn off to the 
west from German and Danish North Sea ports, as well 
as from Delfzyl. 

The German Ambassador in Copenhagen reports that direct 
instructions from Danish shipowners to captains do not come into 
question since Danish ships are not equipped for coded broadcasts 
and secrecy of position would not therefore be guaranteed. In 
any case, notification of ships by means of repeated radio 
instructions from the Board of Trade has attained the desired 
purpose, as is apparent from reports made by several captains. 

Group Baltic has been instructed that Swedish ships are permitted 
to sail from ports east of the Skagerrak mine barrage if they 
are bound for a destination in our sphere of Influence. 
Such ships are to be prevented from making off westwards under 
pretext of another port. 



18 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The Embassy in Rio de Janeiro reports: 

Danish ships are making for Brazilian ports as emergency 
ports and are lying there for the present, obviously on 
instructions from the Danish Embassy. Norwegian steamers 
are mostly adhering to their schedule. When a ship sails, 
her name and painted nationality marking are painted over. 
According to the newspapers, the Ambassador here has stated 
that the Government has given instructions to continue shipping 




19 April 1940 CONFIDENT IAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway : 

Political situation unchanged* 

Italy : 

The Italian press treats events in Norway in a definitely 
pro-German manner. According to reports from trustworthy 
agents, Mussolini and his closest adherents are 100 per cent 
on our side* The Old Guard of the Fascist party demands that 
Mussolini fight against the enemies of the Italian people. 
In northern Italy, especially in the upper classes, there is, 
however, no true sympathy with Germany, but with racially akin 
France* "Popular opinion in large parts of Italy is greatly 
averse to entry into the war; propaganda disseminated by the 
Roman Catholic Church plays a great part in this* 

(See under report from Naval Attache in Rome.) 

The Netherlands Government has informed Japan that it has no 
intention of asking a foreign power for protection for the Dutch 
East Indies if Holland becomes involved in the war; the 
Netherlands Government would be just as little inclined to 
accept such help if it were offered. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief a Naval Staff 

Special Items 

1. Group West ! s proposal for a battleship sortie and 
other operational plans: 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Group West regards as necessary conditions for battleship 

a) Complete operational readiness of 3 destroyers, 
of which the SCHOEMANN and BEITZEN will be 
ready on 19 April. Date not yet definite for 

b) Mine check on at least two routes out of the 
Heligoland Bight* This cannot be carried 
out until Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North 
again has a fast minesweeper flotilla. 

The Group's plan is for a sortie into the Shetlands-Norway 
passage and beyond, either as a counter- thrust against enemy 
measures detected by radio intelligence or as a sortie not 
based on intelligence data. In both cases favorable weather 
when sailing, which as far as possible prevents enemy air 
reconnaissance, is desirable but not a prerequisite. 

The Group reports further operational plans for the immediate 
future : 

a) Reinforcement of the Skagerrak mine barrage. 

b) Use of aerial mines on the east coast of Great 

c) PT boat minelaying operations on the east coast 
of England. (Group requests speedy return of 
four new PT boats of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla 
for this purpose.) 

d) Minelaying operation by Ship "11". 

Chief, Naval Staff is in complete agreement with the plans 
reported by Group West. The date of the battleship operation 
is to be advanced as much as possible by pressing for the 
restoration of the destroyers 1 war readiness, if necessary also 
of the LODY and STEINBRINK, and by all-out operations by the 
minesweeper flotillas left. The return of the formations 
handed over to Group Baltic to the North Sea cannot be expected 
for the present. The request for PT boats is acknowledged 
but no decision can be taken until the situation in the 
Skagerrak permits. 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

2. With regard to the possibility that the British 
are using aerial mines with magnetic firing, Chief, Naval 
Staff has ordered speeding up of provision with degaussing 
equipment and manufacture of magnetic minesweeping gear. 

3, It was originally decided that the battleships 1 
dockyard period should begin on 1 May and run concurrently 
for both ships* 

With the war situation at the time, this decision was based 
on the view that a simultaneous dockyard period was practical 
because operations with only one battleship unfavorably 
increased the margin of the ratio of strength to the enemy 
even in a tactical relation, and - provided both heavy cruisers 
were in war readiness - the battleships' elimination for three 
months in the summer, when the Air Force has decisive opportunities 
of action, was quite justifiable. 

There was then no strategic compulsion for battleship operations. 

Since then the situation has been altered fundamentally by the 
Norway operation and the losses incurred as well as by the 
enemy* s strong reaction. 

Protection of the territory gained against the enemy pressing 
in by sea requires the use of any forces available. 

The BLUECHER's breakdown also makes impossible a replacement 
of the battleships during their dockyard period by two heavy 

It does not therefore seem feasible to give up at present tne 
possibility of operations by the most powerful vessels of our 
Fleet through the commencement of their dockyard period, and 
also to immobilize them in the dockyards shortly before the 
beginning of an expected intensification of warfare (air war) . 

A dockyard period for one ship at a time or an overlapping 
dockyard period can also not be proposed, since under present 
conditions in the North Sea and adjacent portions of northern 
waters, one single battleship can hardly be effective, while 
the two battleships together, thanks to their qualities and the 
possibility of tactical cooperation, can be conceded considerable 
prospects of success. 

At Naval Staff's suggestion, Chief, Naval Staff has therefore 



19' April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

decided that the commencement of both ships' dockyard period 
is to be postponed indefinitely for the present and made 
dependent on further developments in the situation in the North 
Sea - northern waters area. 

1200 ; 

Report from the Naval Attache* in Rome (Captain Loewisch) to 
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on Italy's present attitude: 

Events which have lately exerted marked influence 
on Italy's attitude, are: 

1. Ribbentrop's visit to Rome. 

2. Brenner meeting between the Fuehrer and the Duce. 

3. Norway action. 

The effect of these factors on Italy's attitude should not be 
overestimated. Their main result lies in the increase of 
mutual trust, lessening of the Italian inferiority complex, 
open and more pronounced exposition of common policy and 
peace aims. Speeding-up of active Italian policy. 


In the Attache's opinion, Italy's present more positive 
attitude does not permit us to conclude that Italy will enter 
the war on our side within a short time. Great reluctance is 
still discernible on Italy's part, especially with regard to 
possible participation in an offensive against the west. 
Graziani's. attitude is very cautious (statements that it will 
still be 1-2 years before Italy is equipped ready for a war. 
Sommigli's attitude the same). 

The Fuehrer apparently made a concrete proposal for Italy's 
participation in a possible western offensive at the Brenner 
meeting. The Duce himself is 100 per cent pro-German, but 
is greatly influenced by the attitude of the Italian Naval 
Staff and General Staff. The Duce ' s answer to the German 
Ambassador was, it is true, basically positive, but in practice 
dilatory and hesitant. 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The Naval Attache believes that at best Italy will enter 
the war actively when the Western Powers are so hampered 
that there is no longer any danger for Italy. The Attache' 
considers Imminent intervention by Italy out of the question. 

In spite of this, great preparations are being made for war. - 
New Defense Council created, naval mobilization complete, 
different necessities rationed, Red Cross measures. Numerous 
wishes are constantly being submitted to Germany regarding 
help with heavy guns, anti-aircraft guns, etc. 

General attitude to Germany : 

The Duce and his adherents are in favor of support for Germany^ 
dissolution of all dependence on Great Britain, seizure of the 
most favorable moment to enter the war; they see the fulfillment 
of vital Italian Interests only on Germany's side. 

According to a statement by Prince von Hessen, the King and 
Crown Prince are now said to support Mussolini's attitude 
strongly and to be convinced of the necessity for cooperation 
with Germany. 

Press : follows this attitude very strongly since the Brenner 
meeting and emphasizes Axis policy. 

The people are constantly being Influenced towards Germany 
by propaganda in spite of British counter-propaganda. Far- 
reaching conclusions should not be drawn from this. No 
enthusiasm for war. 

General Staff : has constant objections; forsees many 
difficulties. Threat to Lybia is considered very sericus. 

The loss of Lybia would mean a severe setback. Its defense C 

is by no means adequate. 

Naval Staff : very cautious. Cavagnari is apparently seriously 
ill, his successor, Sommigli, follows Mussolini's lead but is 
very skeptical. Commencement of Italian operations would mean 
no great gain for German naval warfare , apart from the diversionary 
effect of the Italian FleeTT 

In the Attache's opinion there Is no question of the 12C 
Italian submarines being thrown into the scales on Germany 1 s 
side. Clear definition of mutual spheres of interest end 



19 April 1940 


operations is always mentioned. 

The Attache' ascribes the very objective and officially very 
cautious manner of the Italians to the Naval Attache^ to 
unsatisfactory reports from Peccori, the Italian Naval Attache* 
in Berlin, Peccori is apparently embittered, unsympathetic 
and without the necessary interest in his post. He is probably 
reporting unfavorably on the German Navy and has no idea of the 
effect of his reports on the attitude of his Naval Staff and 
its general disposition towards Germany. 

In spite of the Naval Attache 1 s report, Naval Staff considers 
it quite possible that when a favorable time to strike comes, 
Mussolini will enter the war on Germany's side much earlier 
than his General Staff or Naval Staff consider desirable. Not 
in the form of participation in a general large-scale offensive 
in the west, but in the shape of a partial war to create a 
favorable basis for the attainment of later Italian goals in 
the Mediterranean. Naval Staff sees a sign that Italy does 
not intend to wait another one or two years before taking action 
in the strength of the present mobilization, which she can on 
no account keep up without results for any length of time. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

The battleship RESOLUTION left Portsmouth at noon on 11 April 
and arrived in the Clyde on the afternoon of 12 April. 

Intelligence Center, Spain confirms that the ARK ROYAL sailed 
from Gibraltar during the night of 16 April, course unknown. 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

At 1400 on 19 April the ORION was 360 miles west of the 
Canary Islands on her way to Gibraltar. 

Intelligence Station, Vienna reports: 

2 British destroyers south of Salonica. At present 
2 destroyers and 3 auxiliary vessels stationed in 
Corfu to control traffic in the Adriatic Sea, 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Narvik-Tromsoe area ; 

1 heavy ship and 3 destroyers are reported off Narvik, in 
Ofotf jord. Lively boat traffic to Bogen Fjord is observed. 
North of Tromsoe, at about 70° N, 19° 20' E, 1 aircraft 
carrier and 2 battleships were spotted by air reconnaissance on 
18 April. 

Area north of Trondheim : 

1 cruiser, several destroyers, 5 transports attacked by the 
Air Force in Folda Fjord. U "34" reports 2 battleships, 3 
transports and light cruisers off Folda Fjord on southerly 
zig-zag course. The vessels reported may be a French formation, 
since French vessels were ordered to assemble northwest of 
Folda Fjord in the evening. 

(Apparently to proceed to the Shetlands.) 

About noon U "46" sighted a battleship and later a troopship W 

with destroyer escort (southwesterly course, zig-zagging) 
about 100 miles northwest of Trondheim. 

South of Trondheim : 

One heavy cruiser with destroyers was detected west of Molde Fjord. 
Light cruisers near Andalsnes. Two destroyers at anchor and 
some merchant steamers in Andalsnes harbor. No landings by 
troops or unloadings identified. 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The enemy situation is amplified by various submarine reports 
(U "51", "14"). According to these, there were two cruisers, 
apparently the GALATEA and ARETHUSA, 80 miles northwest of 
Aalesund at about 1500 (proceeding to Rosyth). U "14" reported 
two light cruisers at noon 30 miles northwest of Stadlandet on 
westerly course. 

Today 1 s enemy situation confirms the impression previously 
gained: enemy operations, using battleships, are concentrated 
north of Trondheim, i.e. in the Narvik area and in Namsen 
Fjord. Lively traffic with light forces In Molde Fjord and 
near Andalsnes. Troop disembarkations here, south of Trondheim, 
do not , however, seem to be on a large scale so far. 

According to an agent's reports the Franco-Polish expeditionary 
army is said to be 15,000-20,000 strong and to have started 
out for Norway during the last few days from Cherbourg and 
other Channel ports via Scotland. 

Own Situation 

The Fuehrer has ordered: 

Place.s on the coast, except for points occupied 
by us J which are occupied by the British or are 
reported as occupied by British announcements, 
are to be destroyed regardless of the civilian 
population. The order Applies first to Namsos 
and Andalsnes. The railroads and roads are also 
to be cut effectively here. 


Night of 18 April passed quietly. No enemy destroyers in 
the fjord. Group Narvik again urgently requests minelaying 
near Stroeroen in Rombaken Fjord and in the entrance to Beis 

The Group wishes hereby to prevent enemy forces penetrating 
into the inner fjords, to render shelling of the ore railroad 
more difficult and to increase the safety of the transport 
planes 1 landing place and of communications with the Individual 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

defense units. Closing of the narrows between Rombaken and 
Rombaken Bodden by means of block- ships is indicated as 
impracticable. Proposal for closing by mines is submitted. 

Group West considers minelaying by submarines or planes 
impossible at present. 

In the afternoon a landing and lively boat traffic from a 
heavy ship snd three destroyers near Bogen, northwest of 
Narvik, were observed from Narvik. 

According to an American reporter who arrived in Luba from 
Bjoernf jell, it seems that the British and Canadians have 
landed with ski troops and artillery north of Harstad in a 
fjord with relatively good shore communications (Salangen?) 
and are planning to attack Nstrvik from the landward side. 

Because of the detailed verbal report made by Lt.Cdr. Gerlach, 
2nd Staff Officer of Commander, Destroyers, Commander in Chief, 
Navy has sent the following telegram to the Commander of the 
Narvik destroyer formation, Captain Bey: 

"2nd Staff Officer 1 s report about the destroyer 
actions at Narvik has given me the greatest satisfaction. 
The destroyers* deeds are worthy to rank in our history. 
I am proud of my destroyers, which have fulfilled my 
expectations to the full, and I express my greatest 
appreciation to the Commanders and crews. I know 
that you will continue to do your dutv. 

Commander in Chief." 

Trondheim : 

Commander, Trondheim requests despatch of motor pinnace gear 
and mine sweeping gear for fishing smacks and also hydrophones 
and depth charges. Equipment with these, is specially urgent 
in view of the danger from submarines and mines in the entrances. 



19 April 1940 


Three stern tubes and one anti-aircraft gun C/30 each have 
been dismantled from the destroyers JACOBI and RIEDEL. 
Parts of the crews are allocated to guns ashore, communications 
posts and patrol boats, minesweeping and barrage vessels. 

Group West and Fleet have been instructed to provide as soon as 
possible for the destroyers' return trip in favorable weather 
after readiness to proceed has been established as far as 
possible. Weapons dismantled are to be left behind. 

Bergen ; 

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla with one company of Army troops has 
arrived in Bergen from Stavanger. A combined operation witl 
the Army against a light Norwegian battery in Hardanger Fjord 
is planned for 20 April. 

The setting up of torpedo batteries is now planned and 
reconnoitered in Sogne and Hardanger Fjords. 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has given permission for small 
shipping to use the fjords and skerries again. 

Stavanger, Krlstlansand and Oslo : 
Nothing special to report. 

Coastal batteries at present ready for action in Norway: 


4.x 15 cm. 

2 x 7.5 cm. 

3 x 15 cm. 
1 x 28 cm. 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 


2 x 21 cm. 

6 x 15 cm. 

2 x 10.5 cm. 

St avenger ; 

Trondheim ; 

Bettinges: 2 x 21 cm. 

3 x 15 cm. 
Heysnes: 2 x 21 cm. 

2 x 15 cm. 

Situation in the Skagerrak/Kattegat and Transport 
Situation ; 

Minelaying near Skagen (anti-submarine barrage) was continued 
as planned by the PREUSSEN minelaying group. 

Enemy submarine situation ; shows a certain relaxation. 

At three places submarines were sighted and attacked with depth 

charges without visible success. 

The mine situation is not yet adequately cleared up. 
Our own anti-submarine barrage near Skagen shows some mines 
on the surface. A fishing smack struck a mine yesterday 
east of Skagen and is sinking. 

Minesweeping and clearing off Korsoer and on the Kallundborg- 
Samsoe route without result. 

Troop transports had to be canceled because of bad weather. 
Transports with material and empty steamers returning proceeded 
as planned. Sixty large drifters have now been seized for 
transports of material. 

Because of discoveries made in our own submarine war against 
merchant shipping and experiences gained to date, the attention 
of Group Baltic and the offices responsible for carrying out 
transports and their defense has been drawn to the following 

Line abreast, zig-zag courses frequently up to 
40°. Troops on deck in area of special danger. 




• 19 April 1940 


Life jackets on. All life saving apparatus 
ready. Change routes in the open sea. Do not 
stop the whole convoy if there is a torpedo hit. 

Air Situation : 

See , &ir Force events of the day". 

Operations were severely hampered by the weather. 
During attacks on enemy forces in Folda Fjord a cruiser 
received a 500 kg. hit on the starboard deck, level with the 
after mast. Dense smoke. Two transports were damaged in 
Namsen Fjord and Nord Fjord. 

Air Force formations for operations in Norway and Denmark 
are stationed as follows on 19 April: (see radiogram file, 


Stavanger : 

2 squadrons of the 506th Coastal Patrol 

1st Coastal Reconnaissance Squadron of the 
106th Group, 1 reconnaissance squadron of 
the Air Force, 1 dive-bomber squadron, 
1 heavy fighter group. 

Kristiansand: 1 fighter group. 

Aalborg : 

Westerland : 

Luebeck : 
Lueneburg : 

1 heavy fighter group, 1 long-range 
squadron, 1 bomber squadron of the 30th 
Bomber Wing, 2 bomber groups of the 
26th Bomber Wing. 

1 bomber squadron of the 30th Bomber 
Wing, 1 long-range reconnaissance 
squadron (Commander in Chief, Air Force). 

1 reconnaissance squadron. 

1 bomber group of the 4th Bomber Wing, 
1 bomber group of the 100th Bomber Wing. 



19 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Submarine Situation 

Again numerous reports of misses and failures. U "51" 
fired a double miss at the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON, U "47" two 
torpedoes which did not detonate at the WARsPITE, U "65" an 
unsuccessful spread of three at the cruiser EMERALD, center 
shot a premature. An unforeseen series of failures. 

The continual failure of the torpedoes resulting from 
catastrophic technical deficiencies must be regarded as a 
calamity. The British would never have succeeded in landing 
troops in the north and central Norwegian area, with all our 
submarines which were in readiness sent out round them, if the 
submarine torpedo arm had had at its disposal a torpedo ready 
and operating perfectly. We cannot in the near future expect 
the rare occasion to repeat itself when radio intelligence 
is in a position to detect the enemy 1 s movements promptly and 
it is possible to exploit the knowledge thus gained by sending 
out such a large number of submarines. The numerous sighting 
reports of heavy and light enemy naval forces and transports 
and the many firing reports show the extraordinarily favorable 
prospects of success which the German submarines continually 
miss by the complete failure of their torpedoes. The severity 
of this represents an operational failure of historical significance 
in German naval warfare at a time which is of decisive importance 
for the successful execution of the Norway action and possibly 
for the entire future course of the war. 

The fundamental deficiencies in our torpedoes are known and 
every endeavor is being made to overcome them. The result of 
this work will not, however, unfortunately take effect for some 
time. New reasons for failures, which must be feared on the 
basis of recent experience, are at present the subject of 
thorough and speedy Investigation. 

For U "48"' s brief report see War Diary, Part B, IV. 

Merchant Shipping 

Baltic Merchant Shipping ; 

Group Baltic to the Ministry of Transportation: 

"Now no objection to German steamers north of the 



19 April 1940 

line Kullen-Aarhus Bay returning home, if Swedish 
territorial waters are used with the aid of Swedish 
pilots. Submarine attacks are to be expected even 
in Swedish territorial waters. No protection or 
escort can be furnished." 

Preventing neutral shipping making off ; 

Group West has sent Admiral, West Norwegian Coast the following 

"Prevent any attempt by neutral shipping to leave 
the German sphere westwards* Only traffic to 
German ports and Danish coastal traffic permitted in 
the* North Sea, Seize Norwegian ships, use them 
if occasion arises. U.S., Russian, Japanese, Italian, 
Spanish, Dutch and Belgian ships remain unconstrained. 
Permission for neutral steamers to sail to Danish North 
Sea ports and all Baltic ports not to be given until 
escort detachments can be provided as far as port of 
destination or as far as east of the Skagerrak 
declared area." 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The Birthday of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces 

Commander in Chief, Navy Issued the following order of 
the day: 

"Men of the Navy, today on the birthday of our 
Fuehrer and Supreme Commander we renew the oath 
of unconditional loyalty and obedience we swore 
to him. 

True to this oath we will pursue the fight 
forced upon us with unshakable courage, firm 
resolve and unbounded will to win and add new 
successes to those unexampled ones gained by 
the Navy in combat against overwhelming odds. 
With unshakable confidence we look to the man 
who is leading our people upwards to new 
greatness. We follow on the way he shows us 
in the proud consciousness that the goal set 
will be attained and final victory be ours. 
So let it be. Long live the Fuehrer I 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway : 

An address by the King of Norway contains the 
following passage: 

"The Administrative Council appointed In Oslo 
for the German-occupied territories is an 
emergency measure and is not a substitute for 
the Norwegian Government. It therefore does not 
represent the will of the people and has no legal 
basis according to Norwegian law. It goes without 
saying that the Council must relinquish its authority 
in areas where the Royal Norwegian Government 
regains its power." 

In conclusion he stated: 

n By our united efforts we shall win back 
our Fatherland and make the Norwegian people 
masters of their own country again." 

2. Sweden : 

The German Military Attache reports: 

"The best Swedish troops, highly trained and 
familiar with the terrain, have been in the 
Swedish ore region near Klruna for eight months. 
An attack against Klruna via Norway would 
present great difficulty. - Almost unoccupied, 
roadless terrain with high mountains. No road 
beside the ore railroad. Ore railroad track can 
easily be destroyed at the many bridges, etc. 
Ore region^ air defense adequate against 
restricted air attacks. Sweden will fir6 upon 
violation of her neutrality, primarily against 
Great Britain as far as the officers are concerned, 
if necessary also - though reluctantly - against 
Germany. " 

Netherlands : 

Prime Minister de Ger Stated in a speech: 

"The Government refuses any help from a third party, 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

whether In actual fact or promised. This 
also applies to our possessions overseas. 
The Government has decided to extend the state 
of siege to the whole country." 

4. Italy; 

The Turkish Embassy reports from Rome: 

"Count Ciano is said to have stated that Corfu 
Is no longer of any great importance for the 
defense of the Adriatic after Italy 1 s occupation 
of Albania. There Is therefore no point in 
Italy 1 s seeking adventure by an action to occupy 

5. Jugoslavia : 

The Jugoslavian Foreign Minister to the Embassy 
in Berlin: 

"The British Minister for Economic Warfare has 
stated in London that Great Britain does not desire 
a war in the southeast. The opinion in Great 
Britain is that Germany desires this just as little." 

The German Embassy reports that Jugoslavia Is resolved to 
normalize hitherto non-existent relations with Russia by 
stages, and first by the conclusion of a trade pact. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

Special Items 

1. Chief, Naval Staff has decided regarding the various 
requests for allocation of the Norwegian naval vessels 
commissioned as follows: 

a) It is necessary to reinforce Group West f s 
coastal forces, since a large number of 
experienced units were handed over to Group 
Baltic and since coastal waters have been 



20- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

b) The OLAV TRYGVASON at Group West's disposal. 
To be transferred in agreement with Group 

c) The BALDER, ODIN and GYLLER at Group West's 
disposal after commissioning. 

d) Submarines at the disposal of Commanding 
Admiral, Submarines. 

e) Armed coastal vessels at the disposal 
of Commanding Admiral, Norway. 

f ) Other vessels in the area of the south 
coast of Norway not at disposal of Group 
Baltic until relieved by harbor defense 

g) Other vessels in the area of Admiral, ?/est 
Norwegian Coast at Commanding Admiral, Norway's 

h) High Command, Navy (Naval Staff, Service 
Division, Organization Branch) will arrange 
commissioning at the earliest possible date. 

2. The Fuehrer has ordered immediate investigation of 
quick, large-scale troop transports to Stavanger and Trondheim, 
Transports planned on fast passenger and freight ships. 
Under consideration: POTSDAM, GNEISENAU, HANS A, BREMEN, 

Naval Staff's attitude to the operational aspect of the 
transport is as follows: 

I. Crossing to Stavanger : 

Transports can expect great danger from submarines 
and mines and from the air. 

a) Danger from submarines will exist throughout 
the entire crossing, which it will be practical 
to commence from a North Sea port; it will 
have to be met by anti-submarine escort 
consisting of destroyers and torpedoboats, and 
also close escort by planes. The risk of a 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

torpedo hit cannot, however, be completely 
excluded because of the close disposition 
of enemy submarines in the area to be 
traversed, especially off Stavanger (Skudesnes 

b) Danger from mines can be partly obviated by 
previous exikloratory sweeping of the outward 
route. Under certain circumstances it will 
be possible for a fast flotilla to go ahead 
with minesweeping gear, but this will depend 
on the number of light forces available as a 

c) Threat from the air : Exclusion of this is the 
Air Force's affair. It is, however, to be 
borne in mind that according to wartime 
experience so far, British bombers have carried 
out their offensive assignments with dash and 
skill in the very weather that is unsuitable for 
fighters. Danger to the ships from dive-bombers 
while unloading in Stavanger deserves special 

Accepting the considerable risks under a) - c), 

the assignment seems possible . Transport will best 

be carried out so that the last part of the outward 

trip (after about* 58° N) and putting in to port 

and unloading will take place in darkness . 

Protection by the battleships is necessary . Departure 

as quickly as possible after unloading. 

II. Crossing to Trondheim : 

The long sea route (800 miles) cand the passage 
through the Shetlands Channel, controlled by the 
enemy, offer no prospect of a successful break- 
through to Trondheim. German naval forces are 
not in a position to force the break-through to 
Trondheim against the much superior enemy. The 
success of the break-through to Trondheim and 
Narvik on 7/8 April was largely due to surprise , 
which can now no longer be counted upon since the 
area is strongly patrolled by the enemy. 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Such an operation would mean the certain loss of 
the transports and possibly of all the escorting 
fleet. However, after the loss of these powerful 
vessels, defense of the Skagerrak and Kattegat and 
of the decisively important sea communications to 
Oslo will also no longer be possible. 

Naval Staff therefore sees no possibility of 
sending troops to Trondheim by sea. 

3. Report by Chief, Torpedo Branch and Professor Cornelius 
on the torpedo problem, the speedy solution *of which is regarded 
by Chief, Naval Staff as "the Navy's most urgent problem . 

Investigation into the causes of failure has been ordered and 
a committee of investigation including a representative of 
Commanding Admiral, Submarines has commenced work. The previous 
impression was that magnetic firing failures were partly caused 
by the very inconstant magnetic conditions in the fjords and 
along the Norwegian coast. The known fact that the G 7e has 
a greater undersetting than assumed is not actually regarded as 
the cause of failure but a final verdict is not yet possible. 
(According to Professor Cornelius 1 statement, experiences 
regarding the G 7e ! s depth-keeping are based on only 14 
experimental shots at the Torpedo Experimental StationT* 

Undersetting of the target can be regarded as the chief cause 
or percussion firing failures. An increased number or 
experiments is being made at present. Long periods of ice greatly 
prejudiced experiments and systematic research before and made 
practical trial shots impossible. 

Chief, Naval Staff again pointed out the decisive urgency of 
a solution of the torpedo problem and described the complete 
failure of the torpedo as a catastrophe for German naval 
operations in this decisively important part of the war. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Great Britain ; 

The aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL is proceeding to the Clyde. 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

France : 

The minelaylng cruiser EMILE BERTIN is likewise proceeding 
to the Clyde, possibly as the result of damage sustained in 
air attacks. 

North Sea/Northern Waters 

Narvik area ; 

In the afternoon there were light enemy forces off Narvik, 
including the cruiser PENELOPE which bombarded the harbor 
and railroad station. 

North of Trondheim ; ( 

Two convoys with strong escort were detected from reports of 
submarines proceeding out of the Lofoten area towards the 
Shetlands. One convoy, escorted by a battleship and destroyers, 
was moving approximately 60 miles northwest of the Lofotens in 
the forenoon on northeasterly course (repoi ted by U "65" and 
"38"); the other convoy was detected by U "47 H about 120 miles 
northwest of Krlstiansand, consisting of 10 steamers and numerous 
destroyers. One battleship and further destroyers are in the 
vicinity. U "47" is shadowing. The convoy is proceeding 
on course 60°. 

A number of light forces and transports was reported by the 

Air Force and U "26 w in the Namsos area. Further light forces 

and transports were sighted by the Air Force near Andalsnes and 

west of Aalesund. In the afternoon there were light enemy 

forces off Narvik, including the cruiser PENELOPE which bombarded f 

the harbor and railroad station. 

The Air Force's successes in the Namsos area were set out in 
radiograms from the Commander there, who described the situation 
at 1830 as "desperate" and requested help urgently. Namsos in 
flames. Forces were being continuously bombed by planes from 
1100. Escort vessels seem to be very short of anti-aircraft 
ammunition. Heavy commitment of "C" class anti-aircraft 
cruisers during landings. The cruiser CARLISLE seems to have 
been off Andalsnes. 

Home area ; 

The battle cruiser RENOWN probably put in to Rosyth early on 
20 April. 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The cruiser YORK is in Scapa. The cruisers GLASGOW and 
SHEFFIEID sailed from Scapa in the afternoon. The cruiser 
CURLEW put in there. 

The submarines SUNFISH and URSULA put in to their bases, 
Rosyth and Harwich. 

Losses : 

An unidentified vessel SKID struck a mine near Sunk lightship. 
Eow torn off, vessel sank during attempt to tow her off. 

British steamers HAWNBY (5,380 tons) and KERSEY (1,037 tons) 
sank off the southeast coast of England. 

Own Situation 


At noon enemy forces, including the cruiser PENELOPE, 
penetrated into the Rombaken area and fired on the railroad 
station. The forces departed again about 1500. 

Rombaken ferry, important for communication with Army units 
near Elvegardsmoen, and the ore railroad bridge near Forsneset 
were destroyed by the bombardment. It may be possible to . 
repair the bridge. 

Troop landing in Bo gen Fjord to reinforce Norwegians is suspected . 

Group Narvik has seized 8,000 rifles, 300 light machine-guns, 
15 heavy machine-guns, 800,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun 
ammunition and 50,000 rounds of heavy machine-gun ammunition 
from Norwegian stocks, so that the arming of the destroyer crews 
with hand weapons is assured for the time being. 

Trondhelm : 

Army troops received reinforcements by air. Port Commander 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

reports 7,000 kg. of lubricating oil available for submarines. 

Air Commander, Trondheim reports that on 19 April 1 light 
and 1 heavy cruiser as well as 2 transports were damaged by 
dive-bombers from Trondheim. 

Bergen ; 

Unsuccessful bombing attack on the BREMSE in the morning. 
She is proceeding to Stavanger with four PT boats to take on 

The Army carried out operation "Uskadel 1 *. Ship n 18 n (Lieut 
(j»g.) Feldt), supporting the Army, brought in the Norwegian 
minelayer TYR as a prize after action with her and shore 
batteries. (1885, 260 tons, 10 knots, 1 x 12 cm, 1* x 7.6 cm, 
2 x 3.7 cm guns). 

Minesweeper M M l w operating on transfer of troops from Stavanger 
to Bergen. 

North Sea; 

With regard to the extension northward of the naval theater of 
operations and the necessity for improving the operational 
conditions of naval air forces, Group West requests the transfer 
of one long-range squadron each to Stavanger and Bergen. It 
regards ensuring of supplies and reinforcements and maintenance 
of tactical subordination to Group West as necessary conditions 
for this. 



20- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

During the night of 20 April ; 

Of the 9th Air Division the 3rd Squadron of the 506th Group 
and the 1st Squadron of the 106th Group carried out aerial 
minelaylng operations In the Downs, in the Ramsgate-North 
Foreland area and Kings Channel. 26 LMB's dropped. Light 
anti-aircraft defense. Barrage balloons. (3 near Dover, 
8 in Kings Channel in Irregular formation at a height of 300- 
400 m.). 

Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

Submarine alarm reports near Skagen, in the southern entrance 
to Oslo Fjord and at the northern entrance to the Little Belt. 
In the evening minesweeper M w 7 n reported the probable destruction 
of a submarine northeast of Skagen. 

The mine situation is not yet cleared up. In the morning the 
first enemy mines were detected east of Aalbaeck Bay; one mine 
cut. A British mine with a brass caa was shot up east of 
Frederlkshavn. The area is declared t.o be suspected of mines. 

In the evening the Nyborg-Korsoer ferry, which was escorted 
by a mine-exploding vessel ahead, was damaged by an explosion 
and caught firej apparently an enemy mine. Possibility of 
sabotage. » 

In the morning the WESER struck a mine north of Frederlcia and 
was beached. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic suspects a 
wrongly placed mine of our own in the deep mine barrage there. 
Naval Staff inclines to the assumption that it was an enemy 
aerial mine. 

Since the first British mine has now been discovered, Group 
Baltic considers further postponement of the equipment of all 
auxiliary ships and boats with efficient bow protection gear 
to be insupportable, since otherwise execution of transport 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

assignments is endangered. Further, equipment with bow 
protection gear of all steamers used on transport duties as 
well as tugs is requested* The Group's request is to be 
granted in full and speedy equipment as allowed by the 
facilities available will be started. 

Transport Situation ; 

Fast troop transports carrying 2,500 men arrived in Larvik in 
the afternoon. (Steamers ARENDSBURG and ANGELBURG escorted 
by torpedo-boats, PT boats and motor minesweepers). Further 
troops and material transported on steamers and drifters 
arrived in Oslo or are on the way. Close air escort with 
the transport groups and anti-submarine patrol day and night 
by naval air squadrons of Commander, Naval Air, Baltic. 

Two torpedo boats have been temporarily put at Group West's 
disposal as escorts for minelayers. 

Situation in Denmark : 
Group Baltic reports: 

1. Danish Navy agrees in principle to its own naval 
vessels taking over minesweeplng duties in waters 
important to Danish economic traffic. 

2. The Danish Navy will at once begin overhaul of the 
Great Belt barrage. Relations with the Danish Navy 
are developing satisfactorily with a very favorable 
tendency. Chief, Naval Staff is anxious to spare 
as far as possible the national pride of the Danish 
Navy whose Commander in Chief has always shown the 
greatest loyalty to the German Navy's desires and 
demands, and to persuade the Danes themselves to 
cooperate in protecting and defending their own waters. 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Air Situation : 

In accordance with the directive issued to it, the 5th Air 
Force concentrated on 20 April on attacking troop disembarkations 
near Namsos and Andalsnes. By the Fuehrers order, the towns 
and railraod termini of Namsos and Andalsnes were to be 
destroyed without regard to the civilian population and rail- 
roads and roads effectively cut. Armed reconnaissance therefore 
also concentrated in the area Molde-Namsos Fjord. Attacks were 
made everywhere under the worst weather conditions. (Cloud 
only 200 m. high in the fjords). Considerable fires and hits 
in Namsos. 1,000 kg. hit on a cruiser off Andalsnes (heavy 
smoke), 2 x 500 kg. hits on a 15,000 ton transport, causing 
fire to break out. (For particulars see Air Force Events of 

£ the Day.) 

Submarine Situation 


U "9" reports sinking a former Polish destroyer of the 
THUNDERBOLT class northeast of the Shet lands. 

Disposition : 

U "30", "34", "50" have been assigned positions northwest of 
of the Shetlands. U "25", "65", "38" were sent out against 
the convoy reported by U "47" • 

U "52"' s position is between the Shetlands and the Hebrides. 

U "57" and "59" may move their operational area by 70 miles to 
the northeast at their own discretion, since they were detected 
at their former positions by enemy radio direction finding. 

Group West and Commanding Admiral, Submarines have been given 
orders that supplies for Trondheim have top priority and 



20 April 1940 


transport submarines are therefore only to be used for supply 


The previous order has been canceled and Commanding Admiral, 
Submarines himself entrusted with the loading of the submarines 
provided for transport. Order of priority is? 

1* Aviation gasoline. 

3. 8*8 cm. anti-aircraft guns with accessories 

and ammunition. 
3. Ammunition for the Army if space still 


With regard to fresh torpedo failures (U "47", w 65 ff ), 
which can be ascribed to* failure of the magnetic firing . 
Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that, in spite of 
these results, even after advice from the Torpedo Inspectorate, 
he cannot go over to percussion firing. According to the 
latest experimental results the 7e definitely keeps a 
depth up to 2*7 m. under that set, so that even with a 
torpedo depth-setting of only 2 m. (in good weather), normally, 
however, 3 m., targets of less than 5 or 6 m. can no longer 
be torpedoed . Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore states 
(see radiogram file, 0530; that the Navy has no torpedo for 
use in the area north of the Shetlands. 

Merohant Shipping 

In reply to a query, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast was informed 
that there is no objection to Swedish and Danish ships sailing 
from Norwegian ports to German waters, if steps have been 
taken to prevent these ships making off westwards. Swedish 
ships are to be prevented from sailing to the U.S.A. on various 



20 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

For summary of instructions to date on the treatment of 
German, neutral and Norwegian ships in the Baltic, see radiogram 
file of 20 April, 1540, 


Group Baltic gave orders as follows on 20 April for merchant 
shipping in the Kattegat : 

The northern limit for traffic Aarhus Bay-Sletteshage« 
Hesseloe-Kullen must be maintained for military 
reasons. Traffic in Swedish waters, north of this 
line, with Swedish pilots is, however, permitted* 
Danish cattle and food transports may proceed from 
and to the east coast of Jutland. Passages are to 
take place close to the Danish coast at their own 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway : 

According to announcements by the King of Norway, there is 
no doubt that the whole of Norway is at war with Germany. 
Administrative Council in Oslo without influence. The 
Fuehrer has now therefore assigned General von Falkenhorst, 
Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway executive power . 
The latter will pass on to the base Commanders all powers 
in their area which are suitable and necessary to force the 
speediest subjection and pacification of the country. 


Reynaud spoke on France's foreign policy in southeast Europe 
before the Foreign Committee of the Senate. The aim of the 
policy was to maintain peace in the Balkans in loyal cooperation 
with Turkey. Italy had unfortunately not concurred with 
France's earlier proposals; France was trying to come to an 
agreement in the Mediterranean with Italy and Spain. 

The Fuehrer awarded the Knight's Cross to Chief of Staff, 
Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Schniewind and to Commanding Admiral, 
Submarines, Rear Admiral Doenitz. 

1200 : 

Report from the Naval Attache in Oslo, Lieut. Cdr. Schrelber 
to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: 

The Attache', now on the Staff of Commanding Admiral, 
Norway, gives a review of developments in Oslo 
from 8-11 April and of the present situation* (For 

?eriod from 8-11 April see Naval Attaches report 
n reference file w We se rue bung" .) 



21- April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The Attache^ Is still of the opinion that almost 
unopposed occupation would have been possible 
given surprise. The stiffening of readiness 
to resist caused by the end of the Finnish conflict 
was correctly diagnozed beforehand. However, it 
was possible to keep the extensive agreements 
reached between the Norwegian and British Governments 
a secret from the Attache'. The Attache' states that 
he was surprised by the undoubtedly great bravery 
and fighting readiness of the Norwegian soldiers, 
which he had not expected. (A proof that the Attaches, 
since they of course only come into contact with 
certain circles of the people, can only receive a 
partial impression.) The Attache 7 is convinced that 
no revelation of the German operation actually took 
place up to the day before " Weserday" . Norway's 
defensive readiness, even after the British violation 
of neutrality by minelaying, was still slight. The 
torpedoing of the steamers of the 1st Sea Transport 
Unit on 8 April, with the subsequent coming ashore 
of shipwrecked soldiers, was alone decisive for further 
developments. This alone made the Norwegian Government 
conscious of the presence of acute danger and led to 
the fateful order for defense and firing on the 
evening of 8 April. 

The very slow penetration of meager German troop units 
to Oslo, which was delayed by fog (airborne troops), 
the resistance of coastal batteries and the loss of 
the BLUECHER, gave the Government time to escape and 
resulted in complete confusion amongst the population 
and authorities. 

The Attache* considers the present political situation 
in Norway to be entirely confused . He has had violent 
disagreements with the Army and the Commanding General, 
General von Falkenhorst, on the subject of the treatment 
of the civilian population. The Armed Forces Command 
wishes to proceed as rigorously as possible and to carry 
out very severe measures such as taking hostages, in 
order to counter attempts at sabotage. The Attache* 
considers such draconic treatment to be incorrect from 
his knowledge of the mentality of the Norwegians as 
an old Germanic race. Commanding Admiral, Norway is 
also of the opinion that reprisals against hostages 
will not prevent acts of sabotage, but must lead to a 
general passive resistance and hereby injury to our 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

German interests. The Attache has so far carried 
his point but fears, following General von Falkenhorst* s 
assumption of executive power, the severest measures 
which he considers unsuitable for the treatment of 
the Norwegians • 

In his opinion Norway will only be pacified if the 
Fuehrer directs that the "we come as friends to 
protect Norway" attitude and not the "Poland Scheme" 
is adopted. 

The Attache* considers Quisling to be a prominent 
Norwegian national, inspired with good will; he 
would have been in an excellent position to take 
over the reins of Government if events had turned 
out favorably* His plan was to make it clear to 
the people immediately after the German troops moved 
in that the Germans came as friends, that the British 
had had plans to occupy the country and that the old 
Government had failed. As events have now turned 
out, Quisling could score no successes against the King, 
against the Norwegian army and against tne German 
Armed Forces, which from the beginning put difficulties 
in his way. 

The Attache warns against too severe and rigorous 
action in Norway against the population of the occupied 
areas, since a general national rising would lead to 
incalculable difficulties for the German pacification. 
His proposal therefore runs: Clear order to occupying 
troops to act as peacefully, kindly and mildly as 
possible in the occupied areas, in the combat zone 
on the contrary to proceed as vigorously and ruthlessly 
as possible. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Report 8 on the Enemy 


Disposition of forces: the destroyer BULIDOG, escort destroyer 
of the carrier GLORIOUS, and another destroyer arrived in 



31 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Devonport at 1300 on 19 April. According to this the 
aircraft carrier GLORIOUS has arrived in the home area. 

Various alarm reports about the movements of Allied warships 
and transports in the eastern Mediterranean in the direction 
of the Dardanelles are considered untrustworthy rumors. 

North Sea/lNiorthern Waters 

A Area around Narvik ; 

Air reconnaissance sighted cruisers and transports off Harstad, 
1 battleship, 5 destroyers in And Fjord, 1 cruiser, several 
destroyers off Narvik (see Own Situation). 

Namsos/Mosjoen ; 

No clear picture of the situation on land in the Namsos area. 
According to Swedish reports, the strength of the troops landed 
near Namsos amounts to 2 British and 1 French division. On 
the other hand, Reuter gives the total strength of the expedi- 
tionary troops landed in the whole of Norway as 2 British and 
1 French Division, with 50/000 men. The troops landed in the 
Namsos area are said to be in communication with Norwegian 
troops near Steinkjaer. Namsos harbor, bombed yesterday by 
the Air Force, is burnt out. Destroyers and merchant steamers 
were detected in the fjord. The trawler INDIAN STAR was 
A despatched to Mosjoen by Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron, in 

order to Investigate conditions with the landing troops regarding 
supplies and communications with Namsos. 

Commander, 18th Cruiser Squadron seems to be aboard the 
destroyer NUBIAN. 

Anti-submarine units are proceeding to Namsos and into the 
Lofoten area, 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

U "47" and "65" shadowed the convoy reported yesterday, which 
was last sighted about 120 miles northwest of Mosjoen on north- 
easterly course, speed 7 knots and is apparently steering for 
West Fjord or the Lofotens. Another convoy on southerly course 
was reported by U "30" at noon 40 miles north of the Shetlands. 

Molde Fjord-Andalsnes area : 

2 cruisers, 2 destroyers and several merchant steamers in 
Romsdals Fjord. The railroad line Andalsnes-Dombas has been 
cut by the Air Force. 

Scapa area : 

Radio intelligence showed that the cruisers DEVONSHIRE and 
BERWICK, also the French cruiser EMILE BERTIN, put in to Scapa. 
The cruiser BIRMINGHAM put in to Scapa on the morning of 20 April. 

Southeast coast : 

A British minesweeper reports discovery of mines near the South 
Brake Buoy. This lies between the Goodwin Sands and the coast 
in the Downs (aerial mines?). 

According to radio intelligence, eight enemy submarines are at 
present operating in thr Skagerrak/Kattegat, two of which are to 
commence return passage to Harwich on the afternoon of 21 April. 
Five more boats west of the Skagerrak as far as Marsten. 
Positions north of Norderney and north of Texel were again 

Own Situation 

Situation in the Atlantic : 

Atlantic Ships "16" and "36" are being kept constantly informed 
about the situation and news of foreign merchant shipping. Enemy 
papers seized In Norway about the management of the convoy service, 
routing, points of departure, etc., make it possible to equip 
the ships with excellent data for the conduct of war against 
merchant shipping. 

Narvik : 

Commander, Armed Forces has assumed executive power. Local 
authorities have submitted under pressure. 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

British crulssro end destroyers bombarded the town and 
destroyed the ore railroad bridge near Forsneset by gunfire. 

Lively boat traffic from warships and trawlers to Bogen Fjord 
indicates further enemy landings on the north bank of Ofot 

Group Narvik requests air reconnaissance and air support. 
Four anti-tank guns with crews and ammunition are requested* 

The evacuation of wounded via Sweden is requested. 

Attempt to evacuate survivors from ships and neutrals via 
Sweden has so far failed, since Sweden refuses to permit trains 
to enter Norwegian territory again. 

Negotiations on this have been commenced via the Foreign Office. 

Group West has informed Group Narvik that minelaying by 
submarines is scheduled in about ten days. 

Trondhelm : 

As opposed to Commander, Armed Forces, who considers Trondhelm 1 s 
land situation assured, the Port Commander considers the situation 
difficult of the disembarkation of British troops in 
Namsos Fjord and Andalsnes. (According to prisoner of war 
statement, one British battalion is now in Steinkjaer). Sea 
and fjord reconnaissance still inadequate owing to lack of 
facilities; the Port Commander therefore requests allocation 
of two submarines. 

Blocking of the Important Steinkjaer Channel north of Trondhelm 
by a combined Army/Navy operation has commenced. 


Commander, Armed Forces has assumed executive power. Authorities 
are willing to cooperate. 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The BREMSE ran aground in the Parmsund on a transport 
assignment and is stuck fast. Troops on board were landed in 
Haugesund by PT boats. 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests that minesweeper M w l n 
may be left for special assignments (protection against mines, 
supplies for troops, bringing in merchantmen). He also reports 
that to an increasing degree the tasks arising can no longer 
be fulfilled without motor minesweepers. The PT boats are 
at present indispensable because of constant defense and 
transport assignments, also pilot duties. 

The allocation of two minesweepers is requested for the operation 
against Voss, for which it is necessary to give up the Army 
battalion in Hardanger Fjord. This allocation is not possible, 
however. On the other hand minesweeper M "1" is left with 
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast until further notice. 

Elimination of Boemen airfield is demanded, since enemy planes 
are suspected to be attacking from there. 

Stavanger-Krlstlanaand ; 

Nothing to report. 

Oslo ; 

No defense possible in Oslo Fjord because of the lack of units. 

The Norwegian submarines A "3 W and M 4 M were detected in 
Melsonvik at 10 m. depth by a diver. It may be possible to 
salvage them. 

In a letter to Commander in Chief, Navy dated 19 April, 
Commanding Admiral, Norway reports on the present situation in 
Norway and especially in Oslo and reports his plans. In 
addition to looking after the Oslo area and all coastal defenses 
along the Norwegian coast, the Admiral also feels himself 
responsible for seaward defenses, insofar as they concern the 
skerries and fjord area. 

Here he considers artillery defense ashore, patrol, reporting 
service and defense by suitable naval forces, as well as mine 
defense, an inseparable whole and summarizes his renewed request 

1. Clear definition of spheres of responsibility. 

2. Leaving Norwegians naval vessels In general for 




21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Norwegian coastal waters. Single ones to be 
given up only when requirements are met along 
the Norwegian coast. (For letter see reference 
file "Weseruebung" • ) 

Naval Staff's attitude to the question of definition of spheres 
of responsibility and allocation of units is as follows: 

1« The area east of the Skagerrak declared area is a 
complete operational area in itself, in which only 
one office can control and command. 

2. This area is closely connected with the adjoining 
entrances to the Baltic to the south, in which 
Group Baltic is responsible. Responsibility for 
the whole area and operations by units in this 
area for the various assignments which arise here 
is therefore entirely that of Group Baltic. 

3. There will probably always be a certain concentration 
of enemy submarine operations off the south coast 

of Norway. The danger is directed against the 
stream of traffic constantly putting in and out of 
the ports, that is, not against stationary coastal 
defense installations but against flowing traffic at 
sea , which therefore also requires not only stationary 
but constant escorting defense. 

4. On account of its importance Oslo Fjord will always 
remain a dangerous area for supply traffic. It 
therefore seems advisable to institute permanent 
local defense here. Similarly to the way in which 
harbor defense flotillas exist at other places, 
everything is to be done here too - and at other 
spots along the Norwegian coast - to institute an 
effective, purely local patrol and defense under 
the command of the Port Commander in question. 
Seagoing units will on no account be considered for 
these duties. 

5. The abundance of the assignments and the relatively 
small number of units demand their use by one office 
in order to guarantee equal strain and the greatest 

This does not exclude a temporary allocation for 
certain vital assignments. But this must also be 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

done by one office, i.e. Group Baltic. 

Naval Staff's decision on the subject of definition of the 
areas of defense and responsibility therefore runs: 

1. Group Baltic is responsible for the entire 
sea area east of the Skagerraf declared area, 
concentrating on anti-submarine measures. 

2. Defense of ports on the south coast of Norway 
and of the inner Oslo Fjord north of Horten is 
the task of the Port Commanders and is therefore 
in Commanding Admiral, Norway's sphere as soon 
as harbor defense units are available. 

The open sea area of the outer Oslo Fjord belongs 
to the sphere of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, 
Baltic and therefore of Group Baltic. 

3. Since there are at present no harbor defense 
flotillas in operational readiness for southern 
Norway and there is only a relatively small number 
of units available for the many tasks in the 
Baltic area, forces will still be allocated by 
Group Baltic for the present, taking into considerat 
vital tasks. Efforts are to be made to make 
available efficient harbor defense flotillas from 
the Baltic to Commanding Admiral, Norway as soon 

as possible or provision by Commanding Admiral, 
Norway of Norwegian vessels for these tasks. 

4. Group Baltic will take into consideration as far 
as possible Commanding Admiral, Norway's request 
for the allocation of units. Group Baltic and 
Commanding Admiral, Norway will arrange the time 
when Port Commanders take over harbor defense 
assignments for the individual ports. 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Situation In the North Sea : 

Because of a still unexplained explosion astern of the steamer 
FRANZ OHLROGGE, a mine warning report has been given for the 
Elbe between peacetime position Elbe I and buoy 17. 

It is possible that the enemy is using aerial mines in the 
Elbe, Investigations by mine-exploding vessels and a harbor 
defense flotilla are in progress, 

Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

Submarine alarm reports north of Kullen and south of Samsoe. 
According to the Radio Monitoring Service, eight enemy submarines 
are operating in the Skagerrak/Kattegat at present. Anti- 
submarine patrol and air escort &s planned. 

Mine Situation : 

The steamer TOGO was drmaged by striking a mine off Frederikshavn. 
100 per cent searching sweep of the suspicious area is being 

Mines of the deep mine barrage at the northern entrance to 
the Little Belt were again swept. 

The location of the WESER's accident was investigated. No 

The Danish steamer ANNE sent "S.O.S. Ship must be abandoned", 
in the Skagerrak. 

Naval Staff's instructions to Group West to confirm the 
effectiveness of the Skagerrak mine barrage by a deceptive 
radio message have thus been carried out. The S.O.S. was 
picked up and repeated by British transmitters. 

Transport Situation : 

Transports of personnel and material proceed as planned. 



21 April 1940 


Submarine Situation 

Commanding Admiral, Submarines has issued the following 
instructions for firing torpedoes with percussion firing: 

With percussion firing depth = draught-1 m., against 
destroyers, submarines and steamers under 4,000 
tons 3m., in good weather 2 <m. 

Depth-setting 2 m. not permitted for G 7a. 
Set depth at 5 m. for battleships. 

Distribution of submarines 

North of Trondheim: 
Northwest of Mosjoen: 
Bergen and area off Bergen: 
East of the Shetlands: 
West of the Shetlands: 
North of the Hebrides: 
West of the Orkneys: 
East of the Orkneys: 
Pentland Firth: 
Return passage: 

Proceeding to Trondheim: 


In home waters: 








T 4", 

"47", "65". 

"24", "17", "14". • 

"57", "58". 

"51", "9", "60", 

"19", "56", "26", 

"50", "1". 

"28", "32", "37", 
"2", "3", "5", "6", 
"18", "20", "21", "42". 

Air Situation 

Concentration on supporting Army operations and on reconnaissance 
and combat tasks in the Aalesund-Andalsnes-Namsos area. For 
particulars see "Air Force Events of the Day" (radiogram 2400 
and "Air Situation"). 



21 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Merchant Shipping 

The steamer AFRIKA sailed from Bergen to Stavanger without 
escort on 16 April, contrary to orders; she has been overdue 
since then* 





22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Politic al Importanc e 

Norway : 

For General Falkenhorst T s appeal for an amnesty, on the 
occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday, for Norwegians who have 
incurred a death sentence according to martial law see 
Foreign Press Report. 

Sweden ; 

The King of Sweden has sent a letter to the Fuehrer expressing 
his desire for absolute neutrality. During his conferences in 
Berlin Admiral Tamm gained the impression that German authorities 
thought Sweden would not defend her neutrality with all possible 
means. The King stresses in his letter that Sweden will do 
everything to defend her neutrality by armed force. 

(For appreciation of the situation in Sweden, see Political 
Review. ) 

Italy : 

On National Labor Day the Duce made a short? speech to the 
workers from the Palazzo Venecia. He said: 

"Today's celebrations have an especially solemn character as 
a result of events. It can be summarized by the words: 

♦Work and Weapons' 

I am certain that this is the watchword of the entire Italian 
nation from the Alps to the shores of Africa." 

Russia : 

It is revealed from a reliable source: 

1. The Baltic States will be swallowed up by Russia 
in the summer, in August at the latest; 

2. The internal political effect of the Finnish 
war has, by means of skillful propaganda by him, 
led to a great strengthening of Stalin's position 
inside Russia; 

3. The Russian Army is at present divided into 



22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

three main groups: 

a) in the Baltic States 

b) in front of Bessarabia 

c) around Murmansk (as a front against 
surprise attacks from the Norwegian theater). 

d) substantial reinforcements have not gone to 
the Caucasus* 

4. Russia does not wish to quarrel with Great Britain 
and Prance. (Courier service through Russia 
permitted' after cessation of other communications.) 

A severe blow has been struck to Great Britain' 
intelligence service from the whole Baltic area 
by the Norway operation. 


Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. For Quisling's memorandum on the development of the 
situation in Norway see reference file "Weseruebung". 

2. The Fuehrer ordered on 21 April that, with regard to 
the tense situation in Trondheim, the destroyers PAUL JACOEI 
and THEODOR RIEDEL should remain in Trondheim temporarily to 
strengthen the naval front. 

Naval Staff has complied with this special wish of the Fuehrer 
since the present enemy situation and state of readiness of 
the destroyers make a return offer little prospect of success 
at the present time. It is, however, fundamentally of the 
opinion that the destroyers are most unsuited to the task 
intended for them by Armed Forces High Command and that they 
run the risk in Trondheim of being hemmed in or falling victim 
to dive-bombing from the enemy aircraft carriers. 

It therefore adheres to its plan to propose to the Fuehrer 
the return of the destroyers when the enemy situation is more 



22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

3. The various, still unexplained mine explosions and 
hits on mines in the Kattegat and on the Elbe now most probably 
indicate the first use of aerial mines by the British. It 
cannot yet be stated whether these are ground mines or moored 
mines and whether they were parachuted or laid from planes 
landing on the water. Speedy salvage of such a mine is of 
decisive importance in combatting them. 

4. Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark and Group Baltic 
consider the present time politically most unsuitable for a 
possible taking-over of the Danish Fleet by Germany, which was 
being considered for carrying out defense assignments. Among 
Danish officers and in other circles of the Danish population 
there are those who regret the King of Denmark's decision for 
a peaceful solution, with reference to the Norwegian Army's 
defensive action. It is to be feared that a demand for the 
handing-over of the Danish Navy to Germany, which would strongly 
affect Danish honor, would greatly disturb pacification in 
Denmark. It is therefore proposed that such a measure be 
abandoned for the present. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the proposal. Taking-over of 
Danish naval vessels by Germany is to be entirely avoided if 
possible and instead the Danish Navy is to be requested to 
carry out defense and protective measures with its own personnel 

5. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff judges tin 
situation in Trondheim to be very strained in view of the 
extensive landings by the Western Powers in the Namsos area 

and in Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes. Army troops and supplies are 
constantly being brought up by means of transport planes, but 
this cannot be done by air ifco the necessary extent, especially 
with heavy arms and guns. The Fuehrer therefore plans to 
bring up stronger forces by sea and has ordered that the fast 
steamers EUROPA and BREMEN and the East Asia steamers GNEISENAU 
and POTSDAM be made ready to sail at once. Naval Staff is to 
submit to immediate investigation the operational practicabilit 
of such a single supply operation to Trondheim. 

For survey of the situation see reference file " Weseruebung ". 

The following conclusion is arrived at: 

1. The operation would lead through an area which 
the enemy dominates with much superior forces 
and which is exposed to very severe danger from 
the air. 



22 April 1940 


2. Escort of the transport formation by the 
battleships and all available destroyers and 
torpedo boats would be necessary. 

3. The length of the route would make unobserved 
advance impossible and allow the enemy plenty 
of time to concentrate such superior forces that 
even before they reached their goal there would 
be nothing left for the vessels of the German 
Fleet but to fight to the last. The operation 
would therefore mean, for the second time, an 
all-out operation by the entire Fleet still in 
war readiness, with very slight prospects of 
successfully carrying out the transport operation, 

4. The large transports would be very greatly 
exposed to danger from the air. Enemy bombing 
and dive-bombing attacks would endanger the 
ships, troops on board and material most severely 
even after the ships put in to Trondheim. 


5. The loss of the transports and the battleships in 
action against a superior enemy would mean the 
most severe loss of prestige and thus a definite 
setback in the whole Norway action. After the 
loss of the battleships there would be very serious 
danger to the safety of sea communications in the 
Skagerrak because of the weakness of German forces. 

Naval Staff is therefore forced to advise Armed 

Rorces High Command, Operations Staff decidedly 

against the execution of such a transport under- 

1500 : 

Commander in Chief, Navy in conference with the Fuehrer. 

pommander in Chief, Navy submitted Naval Staff* s objections 
to the Trondheim transport operation and proposed that in 
case of necessity the crossing could be made to Stavanger 
with the GNEISENAU and POTSDAM. 



22 April* 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The Fuehrer agreed with Naval Staff's objections and ordered 
the preparation of the East Asia steamers. If possible, 
transport as far as Bergen is to be undertaken. 

Further points discussed with the Fuehrer: 

Submarine transports 

Transport of coastal batteries to Stavanger 

Transports for Oslo 

Use of naval forces for defense assignments 

Use of aerial mines by enemy planes 

Postponement of use of Danish naval vessels 

for the German Navy 

Report on failure of submarine torpedoes. 

Commander in Chief, Navy also pointed out the urgent operational 
need for the use of aerial mines in Scapa and the Clyde by the 
operational Air Force. The Fuehrer stated that Commander in 
Chief, Air Force considers the formations not yet sufficiently 
trained to lay mines in Scapa. 

Naval Staff cannot acknowledge this Air Force argument. The 9th 
Air Division has already carried out aerial minelaying operations 
and proved their practicability. It is now of decisive 
importance, regarding the British operations in Norway, if ground 
mines are laid in the main supply port, Scapa, and the main 
port of embarkation, Glasgow on the Clyde, so that the greatest 
difficulties are thus put in the way of the British. Naval 
Staff considers the request extremely urgent. 

(For particulars see Commander in Chief, Navy's memorandum 
of conference with the Fuehrer, War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.) 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Nothing special to report. 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

1 battleship, 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers were detected in the 



22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

And Fjord/Harstad area. Off Narvik the cruisers PENELOPE, 
ENTERPRISE and four destroyers bombarded Narvik 1 s harbor and 
defense installations. 

In the Namsoa area ; 

Several enemy destroyers were attacked by the Air Force. The 
transport CHOBRY, which disembarked troops in Namsos, put in to 
the Clyde on 21 April. 

Namsos harbor h*as been burnt out as the result of air attacks. 
Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes ; 

Lively traffic consisting of Eritish transports and naval 
forces indicates that enemy action is at present concentrated 
here. Five transports put in to Molde Fjord and two cruisers 
were sighted putting out. The cruiser ARETHUSA and several 
destroyers off Andalsnes. Destroyers and steamers were reported 
putting in and out of Romsdals Fjord. 

Home area ; 

Air reconnaissance reported three battleships and five cruisers 
in a bay on the west side of the Shetlands, also numerous large 
merchantmen in Kirkwall Bay. Scapa was not covered because 
of clouds. In the evening U "57" reported a large cruiser and 
destroyers on northeasterly course east of the Shetlands. 

The battleship RESOLUTION and a second battleship are operating 
on convc*y duties between the Shetlands and Lofotens. 

During the last few days there has been no indication of the 
presence of heavy French vessels in the northern area. 



22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation : 

Atlantic : 

Auxiliary cruisers were informed about the movements of 
enemy forces and merchant shipping. (See radiograms 
1501, 1514.) 

North Sea area : 

Sailing and action readiness of the battleships has been re- 
established except for a slight restriction of fire control on 
the GNEISENAU and for maximum continuous speed of 28.5 knots in 
the case of the SCHARNHORST. The urgently desired activity 
by the battleships through operations in the Shetlands- 
Stadtlandet area must for the present be abandoned on account 
of the deeply regrettable state of readiness of the destroyers 
(at present only two in full operational readiness) and with 
regard to the final decision of Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff, still awaited, on the transport operation 
to Bergen. 

With reference to the extension northwards of the theater of 
naval operations, Group West requests the transfer of the 
806th Coast Patrol Group (He 111) to more favorably situated 
operational bases. -Westerland is suggested, if necessary 
at least as a jump-off base for formations of Commander, Naval 
Air, West. 

The question is being reviewed by the Air F,orce General 
attached to Commander in Chief, Navy. 

The Elbe is again opened by Group West after an unsuccessful 
check sweep for mines. 

Twelve planes of the 3rd Squadron of the 506th Group and twelve 
further planes of the 1st and 2nd Groups of the 126th Bomber 
Wing carried out aerial minelaying operations in the area off 
Harwich and in the Downs. The planes were spotted and reported 
by enemy patrol vessels and minesweepers when dropping the mines. 



22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

(Mines are said to have been laid in the vicinity of Goodwin 
Knoll Buoy.) 

Because of the aerial minelaying operation carried out in the 
Downs on 21 April, a directive was issued to all British air 
forces that all planes, whether with navigation lights on or 
off, would be attacked by night fighters if they approached the 
coast under 4,000 feet altitude within a 40 mile radius around 

Narvik ; 

Tromsoe transmitter advised the civilian population to leave the 
town as a British bombardment was imminent. At 1200 Group 
Narvik reported bombardment of railroad lines and defense 
installations by an ENTERPRISE class cruiser and a PENELOPE 
<»lass cruiser and four destroyers. Further destroyers are 
obviously covering troop disembarkations in Bogen Fjord. 
Major General Dletl reports that Narvik will be held at all 
costs.. At night British destroyers are patrolling in the 
immediate vicinity of Narvik and in Rombaken Fjord. 


Army operation against Steinkjaer and Verdalsoeren, supported 
by one destroyer and one torpedo boat. 

Bergen ; 

Unit advanced as far as Vaksdal in Soer Fjord with the support 
of Ship "18". Ship "18" destroyed a Norwegian patrol vessel. 

The BREMSE was refloated and is to go into dock in Stavanger. 

At the request of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast, the 1st PT Boat 
Flotilla has been put at his disposal to help the Army operation 
against Voss. Group West must therefore relinquish operational 
control of the PT boats for this period. 



22 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

For defense of the sea route between Skudesnes and Kristiansand, 
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast proposes a flanking barrage 
outside the 3 mile line from Utsire as far as the enemy barrage 
system off Lister Fjord. Since there are at present no mines 
with long mooring ropes available for laying the requested 
flanking barrages, with which Naval Staff is in fundamental 
agreement, they must be postponed for the present. 

Stavanger ; 

Unsuccessful air raids on the evening of 21 April ended in 
two enemy bombers being shot down* 

The steamers PALIME and PELIKAN have put in to Stavanger with 
the first two 15 cm. guns for the coastal battery. 

South coast of Norway ; 

Commanding Admiral, Norway considers that the situation on the 
south coast. is now so far clarified that Norwegian naval vessels 
need no longer be expected in this area. Defense therefore 
now only necessary by patrol units. 

Commanding Admiral / Norway now has at his disposal for defense 
of the inner Oslo Fiord the 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, 
consisting of 8 boats, whale catchers RAU M 7" and n 8 n , 2 
Norwegian whale boats and the Norwegian boats of the 9th 
Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which are constantly being added and 
cannot be used outside the fjords. 

Group Baltic thus takes over defense of Oslo Fjord only from 
59° 25 f N, southwards. Defense, fcpwever, only as allfbwed by 
available forces, i.e. mostly only in the course of protection 
for transports to Oslo. Further, Group Baltic Is equipping 10 
motor drifters each for Oslo and Kristiansand as emergency 
harbor defense boats, with depth charges and minesweeping gear. 
Arming with captured Norwegian guns is planned (see radiograms 
1356 and 2315). 



22 April 1940 ^CONFIDENTIAL 

Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

According to radio intelligence there were five enemy submarines 
in the Skagerrak area on the morning of 22 April. Two 
submarines left Harwich for the Skagerrak in the forenoon. 
Some of them are French. 

Various submarine chases and depth charging had no visible 

The western portion of the net barrage has been laid from the 
coast of Jutland near Ebeltoft via the island of Hjelm to 
Seelands Rev. 

Mine Situation ; 

Minesweeping near Hirsholm and off Frederikshavn continues. 
Five brass-cap mines swept. Check sweeping of the Skagerrak 
barrage and sweeping in Sprogoe Channel and the Little Belt is 
in progress. 

Transport Situation : 

Fast troop transport unit with 530 men put in to Larvik. t Further 
troops and material on nine steamers in three groups are on their 
way to Oslo as planned. 

Armed Forces High Command has ordered the immediate transfer 
of the 11th Rifle Brigade from Aalborg to Oslo. Five steamers 
have been nastily sent rrom Oslo to Aalborg for this purpose. 

Situation In Sweden I 

The Swedish Government has taken the following new legal steps 
for the purpose of ensuring defense of the country. 

It is forbidden to put in to ports and enter port areas 
at all important places on the east and west coast of Sweden 
until permission has been obtained from the shipping control 
offices In Stockholm and Gothenburg. 



22 April 1940 


Submarine Situation 

U "51" put In to port. TJ rt 52", "38", "47" commenceo; return 
passage. U "26" sank a 6,000 ton supply steamer from a 
convoy north of Stadlandet. 

U "61" sailed for the Shetlands after taking on supplies In 

U "62" reports a suspected mined area 100 miles east of Fair 

Otherwise nothing special to report. 

Air Situation 

The operational Air Force concentrated on supporting the Army 
in operations on land and in the adjoining sea area of Andalsnes- 
Namsos (see Air Force Events of the Day, Volume Air Situation). 

Successes against naval forces ; 

1 destroyer hit by 1 x 250 kg. bomb north of Andalsnes; 

severely damaged. 

1 destroyer hit by 2 x 250 kg. bombs west of Molde Fjord; 

stern cut off, unable to move; 

2 steamers (supply?) 
2 steamers 


Severely damaged. 

Merchant Shipping 

The Naval Attache in Stockholm reports that there is not a 
sufficient number of pilots available at present for Swedish 
territorial waters on the west coast. Sweden therefore asks 
us to send only groups of three or four ships at present. 
Provision of a sufficient number of pilots is again requested. 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway ; 

Pacification is making progress in southern Norway. Results 

of radio and leaflet propaganda discernible. Normal life and 

activities in Oslo. So far no acts of sabotage in the Oslo 
municipal area. 

A Norwegian White Paper published in London makes the 
following statements: 

1. The German Government undertook no demarche with 
regard to the Norwegian Government before the 
first units of the expeditionary corps had already 
arrived in Norwegian waters and were in action 
against Norwegian forces. 

2. The German Ambassador in» Norway, who knew before 
8 April that a German expedition had left German 
ports, did not try to justify the German action 

as a counte measure against the British minelaying. 

3. The Norwegian Government tried to negotiate as long 
as possible. The Fuehrer, however, refused to 
conduct further negotiations with Norway and demanded 
the appointment of Quisling as Prime Minister; a 
demand that he himself had to relinquish later. 

This shows that Germany is incapable of making the 
slightest concessions even to a country which has 
always yielded to a great extent to her wishes. 

Russia ; 

1. A reliable source states that as the result of skillful 
propaganda the Finnish war has led to a strengthening of Stalin's 
internal political position. 

2. The Russian Armor's main forces are, in the Baltic States, 
around Murmansk and at the Bessarabian frontier. No substantial 
reinforcements have gone to the Caucasus. 

Ireland ; 

The Embassy in Dublin reports that strong representations by 
the Irish Government have succeeded in freeing the Irish 
citizens living in Great Britain from conscription. About 
25,000 Irishmen are exempted from conscription by this important 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Near East : 

Weygand's efforts to reinforce the Orient Army and to attain 
greater freedom of action are said to have been frustrated 
finally by Gamelin's resistance. Considerable differences 
of opinion are mentioned between Great Britain and Prance 
regarding the supreme command of the Orient Army and its. 
operations. Weygand's demand for supreme command of all 
Allied forces has been nullified by a British counter-move, 
as General Wave 11 has been appointed Supreme Commander of all 
British forces in the East. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff 

Special Items 

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has relinquished its 
demand for a transport operation to Trondheim because of Naval 
Staff's rejection. Instead, transport to Bergen is to be 

Naval Staff considers the operation practicable, even though 
with certain misgivings. Crossing should be carried out so 
that at dawn the transports are off Skudesnes, where strong 
anti-submarine escort and precautionary anti-submarine measures 
will await the transports. 

At a speed of advance of 20 knots in the open sea, the ships would 
then have to leave the estuaries about 0600 on the day before 
and cross the latitude of Hanstholm (57° N) at about 2100. 

Defense : 

From the Heligoland Bight to Skudesnes close escort by the Fleet, 
strong anti-submarine escort, own bow protection gear, own 
anti-aircraft weapons, air escort by Air Force fighter and heavy 
fighter formations. 

Picked up by PT boats from Skudesnes; the Fleet forces will 
be out to sea and will protect the transports advancing in the 
skerries against penetration by enemy surface forces and partly 
also against surprise attacks by enemy bombers from the west. 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

It Is necessary for the operation that very strong air escort 
of the transports by fighter and heavy fighter formations be 
provided until the troops and material have been disembarked 
in Bergen. 

Group West has very strong objections to the despatch of the 
POTSDAM and GNEISENAU because of the great danger from the air, 
and proposes that the troops should be given fast transport on 
destroyers and torpedo boats (possible to take over about 1,200 
men at one time). 

The question is being re-considered by Naval Staff. 

Since the whole transfer, following the Group 1 s proposal, would 
however be protracted and danger from mines and from the air 
would remain about the same, Naval Staff considers that the 
Group's executive plan offers no material advantages but, on 
the contrary, considerable disadvantages. (See also 24 April.) 


1200 : 

Report by the Assistant Naval Attache at the Hague, Lt. Cdr. 
Besthorn, to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: 

The Dutch Government Is firmly resolved to defend 
its neutrality against both sides with all the means 
in its power. While earlier only an Operation 
"East" was expected, Operation "West" Is now also 
regarded as very threatening. Extensive security 
measures taken in Holland on 9 April. All men on 
leave recalled. Pear of British lending. Great 
alarm on 13/14 April because of alleged British 
Fleet demonstration off the Dutch coast. Assumed 
in Holland that If Germany attacks Holland the U.S.A. 
will enter the war on the side of the Allies. 

Opinion on the Norway action is that the German landing 
was only possible as a result of the treachery of 
Norwegian offices. 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Great Britain ; 

The HOOD probably off the west coast of Great Britain. Radio 
intelligence detected transports sailing from and putting in to 
the Clyde with convoy escort. 

Barrages in the Clyde have been extended to the North Channel 
off the Clyde and Kilbrennan Sound. The area was announced 
to be a declared area. Passing ships are individually 
informed of the gaps in the barrage. 

In the Gibraltar area there is a strong concentration of forces 
previously operating in the Atlantic: the ROYAL SOVEREIGN, 
previously in Canada, appeared in that area. The MALAYA 
proceeded from Great Britain to Gibraltar on 21 April. The 
ORION, coming from the West Indies, put in to Gibraltar on 22 
April, the NEPTUNE and the destroyers DECOY and DEFENDER, coming 
from Freetown, on 2'6 April. The two destroyers DIAMOND and 
DAINTY, so far also in Freetown, escorted the repair ship 
RESOURCE to Gibraltar and put in to Malta on 21 April. 

The submarines OTUS and ORPHEUS, coming from the East, passed 
Port Said on 20 April; the British transport LANCASHIRE (9,557 
tons) with 700 troops aboard, the French transport DESIRAD 
(9,645 tons) with 1,500 colored troops aboard passed Port Said 
towards the Mediterranean on 20 April. 

The CORNWALL, formerly in the South Africa area, is at present g 
in the Freetown area. The CUMBERLAND, also formerly in South 
Africa, has probably been moved there too. Quite possible 
that these two ships will go on to Great Britain. 

France : 

A number of the forces previously stationed off the west coast 
of Africa has been withdrawn during the past two weeks. Even 
if details cannot be ascertained, it can be assumed that only 
single destroyers, submarines, and perhaps one or two cruisers 
are still stationed in Dakar and Casablanca. The cruiser 
JEANNE D'ARC and several -submarines are still suspected to be 
in Fort de France. 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic (Ships "16" and "36") 
were informed by radiogram of intelligence on the enemy 

North Sea/Northern Waters 

Area around Narvik ; 

Cruisers and destroyers in Ofot and Rombaken Fjords bombarded 
ore railroad installations. The cruiser VINDICTIVE appears 
to be controlling net laying in the Lofoten area. 

Namsos area ; 

The anti-aircraft cruiser CALCUTTA and another cruiser off 
Namsos. Nothing new regarding troop disembarkations. 

Romsdals Fjord-Andalsnes ; 

The cruiser ARETHUSA left Andalsnes to proceed to Rosyth. 
The cruiser CURACAO is off Andalsnes as anti-aircraft defense. 
Air reconnaissance spotted and attacked destroyers and supply 
steamers at the entrance to Molde Fjord. Njo Important landings 
could be seen. 

Several destroyers and single steamers, some putting in and 
some out, were sighted in the fjords between Sogne Fjord and 

Home area ; 

Air reconnaissance by the operational Air Force sighted 2 
aircraft carriers, cruisers and 15 destroyers in Scapa Flow 
on 22 April. U "65" reports a battle 6ruiser with destroyer 
escort 200 miles north-northeast of the Shetlands on southerly 

The cruiser BIRMINGHAM put in to Scapa. According to subsequent 
radio evaluation, the GLASGOW and SHEFFIELD left Scapa on 20 

Lively minesweeping activity, primarily against magnetic mines * 
in the Downs is to be seen from radio traffic. The magnetic 
sweeps are said to extend specially to the channel between the 
Humber lightship and Spurn Point • 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The British steamer LOLWORTH (1.970 tons) and the Italian 
steamer ITALO BALBO (5,100 tons) struck mines off the 
southeast coast. 

Own Situation 


Disposition of enemy forces was passed on to the auxiliary- 
cruisers. Tendency at present to move heavy enemy forces to 
the North Sea, certain concentration in the Gibraltar area, 
weakening of Atlantic forces. 

North Sea/Northern Waters 

Situation in the North Sea : 

Group West requests the allocation of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla, 
because of the complete lacl# of vessels suitable for escorting 
supply steamers on the Heligoland' Bight-Stavanger-Bergen route. 
Group Baltic has great cl jections to handing over the flotilla, 
thus completely depriving Kristiansand of naval forces and 
removing any sort of defense for the entrance to the Skagerrak, 
since Group Baltic has no available substitute. 

In spite of this Naval Staff feels obliged to put the 2nd 
PT Boat Flotilla at Group West f s disposal, having regard to 
the new North Sea assignments (Bergen transports, defense 
assignments off the southwest coast of Norway, battleship sorties). 
The TSINGTAU is, however, to remain in Kristiansand, which will 
still be the main base of the PT Boat Flotilla until further 

Group West is to allocate assignments to the Flotilla so that if 
necessary it is still possible to use it for defense of the 
entrance to the Skagerrak. 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Narvik ; 

Close enemy destroyer patrol off the port and in Rombaken. 
Cruisers and destroyers bombarded the ore railroad installations 
from Rombaken in the forenoon. The Group is constantly 
requesting air support, since there are no defensive weapons 
available against naval forces. Commander, Armed Forces 
expects a large-scale enemy attack soon. Ore railroad was 
effectively cut by the enemy. (See radiogram 1803.) 

Trondhelm ; 

Because of the lack of communications between Bergen and 
Trondhelm, Commanding Admiral, Norway has for the present 
assumed direct authority over Port Commander, Trondhelm. 

Supply submarine U "29" has put in to Trondhelm. 

Commanding Admiral, Norway was informed by Naval Staff that 
the return of both Trondhelm destroyers is planned after the 
establishment of maximum possible readiness to proceed. Further 
armament is therfore not to be removed. A favorable opportunity 
for the return passage must be awaited. 

Bergen : 

Nothing special to report. Land operations against Voss were 
continued successfully. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast requests 
the allocation of armed trawlers, especially since Ship "18" 
urgently requires a 14 day overhaul after operations off Voss. 

Skagerrak/Kattegat ; 

Naval Staff has issued the following directive regarding 
definition of the areas of responsibility of Groups Baltic and 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

1. The line dividing Group Baltic and Group West 
Is the eastern limit of the Skagerrak declared 

2* Petrol of the southern barrage gap Is the affair 
of Group West. 

Patrol of the northern passage is the affsir of 
Group Baltic. 

3. Limit of responsibility for coastal defense is 
the point of Intersection of the eastern limit 
of the declared area with the coastlines. 
According to this, Hanstholm is under Coastal 
Defense Commander, North Priesland. 

4. Military and administrative subordination as 
per military line of demarcation as under 3. 

5. Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark will handle 
general economic questions for the whole Danish 

Enemy submarines are appearing in greater strength in the 
Skagerrak and Kattegat. Submarine alarm reports south of 
Oslo Fjord, north of Skagen, north of Kullen, near Schultz 
Grund. Submarine-chaser "B" was torpedoed and destroyed 
north of Skagen. Torpedoboat T "153" and the 17th Submarine- 
Chaser Flotilla report probable destruction of three enemy 
submarines in all (two to be assumed as definite). 

Mine Situation : 

According to a Danish report, the dredger PROGRESS struck a 
mine and sank in the Drogden in the morning. At 1817 mine- 
sweeper M "1302" was lost off Frederikshavn after striking 
a mine. 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The 17th Submarine- Chaser Flotilla reports that at 2040 
on 23 April it sighted three planes at a great distance 
dropping large parachutes, apparently mines, about 1 mile 
east of the Storamiddel Grund southeast of Anholt. 

The flight of numerous enemy planes is reported via Schleswig 
Holstein into the Western Baltic as far as Warnemuende. 

Check sweeping of the ferry route Nyborg-Korsoer with special 
gear was without result. 

Transport Situation and Escort Service s 

Transport assignments carried out as planned. Fast transport 
of 420 men has arrived in Larvik* Mixed material and troop 
transports arrived in Oslo. 

Since no trawlers and drifters can be seized in the area of the 
south coast of Norway, Group Baltic requests the speedy seizure 
of 39-40 trawlers and the same number of drifters and quick 
transfer to the Baltic. Group Baltic also requests the quickest 
possible provision of guns for those units of Commanding Admiral, 
Defenses, Baltic not yet equipped with them. (See teletype 

Naval Staff must refuse the Group's request for the allocation 
of the 4th and 6th Minesweeper Flotillas from the North Sea 
because of urgent assignments in that area. 

Sweden ; 

For Swedish demarche because Swedish territory has in numerous 
cases been flown over, see radiogram file, 1815. 

For reports about defense measures in Swedish ports and 
airports see radiogram 2330. 



23 April 1940 COITFIDENTIAL 

Submarine Situation 

U "29" put in to Trondheim and was ordered to take up position 
in the area north of the Shetlands after refuelling. U "61" 
was allocated the North Minch and the area off Loch Ewe as 
operational area. 

U "30" was allocated the area due north of the Minch and 
northwest of the Hebrides, U "34" northwest of the Orkneys, 
U "65" west of the Shetlands and U "25" north of the Shetlands. 
U "13" is west of Pentland Firth. 

Otherwise unchanged. 

Air Situation 

Numerous Air Force operations to reconno5ter and combat the 
enemy landings. pne destroyer off Molde Fjord damaged by 
bombs, also several t,ranspo- , ts t The operational Air Force 
concentrated on supDOPti^rj 3 my oper&.tions. 

For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day of 23 April, 

Merchant Shipping; 

A rough estimate of the Scandinavian shipping which fell into 
the hands of the Western Powers because of the Norway and 
Denmark action shows, after subtraction of the shipping space 
already chartered by the Western* Powers, an addition of about 
2.4 million GRT, so that tonnage lost to date is thereby 
compensated. (Marginal note by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: 
estimated somewhat too high. Some were anyway always sailing 
for Great Brit? in.) 

According to a report from the Naval Attache' in Lisbon, the 
Norwegians have painted over the neutrality markings on their 
ships, also the national markings, names and country of origin, 



23 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

so that they are no longer recognizable as Norwegian ships. 

The Soviet Government has given permission for German 
trawlers to put in to Murmansk and instructed the competent 
authorities in Murmansk' to this effect* 

It appears from a report from Santander that a Finnish steamer 
which put in there was equipped with a cable device against magnetic 
mines. It must therefore now be assumed that neutral steamers 
are also already provided with "anti-magnetic girdles". 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

No rway : 

Nothing to report. 

Sweden : 

The German Ambassador reports that Foreign Minister Guenther 
has made a very serious prbtest against violations of neutrality 
by German planes. (40-50 flights on 21 April alone.) He 
asked whether the German attitude to Swedish neutrality had 
altered; the Swedish public was greatly disturbed by the 
German violations *f neutrality. 

The Military Attache reports that the Swedish Government has 
expressly repudiated the German Naval Staff's assertions that 
Swedish territorial waters have repeatedly been utilized by 
Norwegian or British naval forces. 

The Swedish Government denies rumors according to which the 
Swedish authorities have permitted German reinforcements for 
Norway passage through Sweden. It is of course correct that 
35 railroad wagons passed through Sweden, but these transported 
GexTnan Red Cross personnel and equipment and were thoroughly 
searched by the Swedish authorities. 

France ; 

The Supreme War Council met in Paris on 2<2 and 23 April. A 
general communique* included the statement: 

"There was a general exchange of. opinions on all 
political and military problems. New decisions 
were taken for effective Allied cooperation. The 
Polish Prime Minister emphasized the resolution with 
which the Polish Government, Army and people would 
continue the struggle. Thanks for and admiration 
of the Norwegian Government's heroic resistance were 
expressed. The Norwegian Ambassador thanked the 
Allies for their swift and effective aid." 

It is reported from Paris that the French General Staff Is 
very disturbed by the extent of military operations in Norway. 
Russian intervention is feared. The Allies might be forced to 
use larger forces. Serious differences of opinion are said 
to have arisen between the French and British General Staffs on 
the Norwegian question. 



24 April 1940 


Russia r 

For Russia's attitude to Germany and Russian foreign policy- 
see Political Review No. 94. 

Conference on the Situation with Chief. Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. Report on the Fuehrer's directive of 21 April 
(uKW/WFA 106/40 Gkdos. dated 21 April, see "We se rue bung w file). 

In it the Fuehrer expresses his unbounded appreciation to the 
troops in Norway and sets the goals for the next operations. 
The most important assignments of Group 21 are establishment of 
communications between Trondheim and Oslo, sealing-oiif the 
enemy forces landed on the northwest coast and defense of 
Trondheim to the north. 

2. Report on Armed Forces High Command's directive 
(WFA/Abt L 868/40 Gkdos. dated 23 April, see "Weseruebung" 

According to this directive, another mountain 
division is to be brought up for Group 21 by the 
quickest route, for the coming action in mountain 

Transfer of the 11th Rifle Brigade (Mechanized) is abandoned. 
Fast special transport steamers are to take such units and 
replacements as ensure complete mobility and fighting strength 
by sea to the 69th Division in Bergen. High Command, Navy 
has made available for this purpose five special ships (ILLER 
class) for a first transport which Is to be carried out as 
soon as possible. The second transport will follow on two 
East Asia steamers, as soon as these have been fitted up for 
this special purpose. H^igh Command, Navy, in conjunction with 
Commander in Chief, Air Force, will take over protection of 
these transports. 

For Group Trondheim all possibilities of reinforcement by 
heavy weapons are to be exploited. High Command, Navy and 
Commander in Chief, Air Force are to carry out the transports 
planned for Group Trondheim 1 s reinforcement as a priority 
matter. High Command, Navy is to make preparations to increase 
as much as possible the shipping available for the transport 
operations to Norway. 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Commanding Admiral, Group West again asserted by telephone 
his objections to the mixed transports of troops and material 
to Bergen en the steamers indicated and considers that the 
transport operation can only be carried out if personnel and 
material are carried separately because of the great danger 
from the air, submarines and mines. The battleships would 
not then act as escorts. 

Naval Staff takes a different view an"' sees some considerable 
disadvantages in the execution of Group West ! s transport plans: 

a) The first transport (1,800 men) would require 
several operations by the light forces, causing 
increased total risk and ciaim for some time 

on the units which could not be used for 
important Oslo transports. 

b) The total transfer would be greatly prolonged 

by several operations and separation of personnel 
and material. Transports of material require 
the same light forces to escort them as the 
personnel transports themselves. 

c) Because of its duration the enemy would gain 
time to instigate countermeasures. 

d) Danger from the mines and from the air is 
almost the same for destroyer transports as 
for steamer transports. 

e) The appearance of light enemy forces off the 
southwest coast and in the Skagerrak has been 
detected and may occur again at any time. There 
would thus be great danger for the destroyers 
and torpedo boats used for purposes of personnel 
transport and hampered in their fighting strength, 
unless they had strong support. 

Group West was again informed by telephone of Naval Staff 1 s 
opinion and instructed to abandon its proposal. 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The following order was therefore issued to Group West: 

1. The speedy transport of troops and equipment of 
the 69th Division to Bergen has been ordered for 
the reinforcement of our forces in the Bergen area, 

2. The steamers EIDER, ILLER, SAAR, MEMEL (15 knots), 
MOLKEFELS (16 knots) will load in Stettin. Will 
probably arrive in the Elbe ready to sail, on 28 April. 

3. Battleship, destroyer and torpedo boat escort 
necessary for the transports. Previously planned 
battleship operation must therefore be abandoned. 

4. Further transports can be expected to follow. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic : 

Convoy HX 41 will leave Halifax at 0515 on 12 May and will 
proceed via 43° 30» N, 40° W, - 49° 45' N, 20° W, - 49° 55* N, 
13° W, - 48° N, 80 W. 

It will be met by home forces at the last but one position. 

North Sea/Northern Waters 

Disposition of forces on 24 April : 

West Fjord/Tromsoe area : 


The FURIOUS was instructed to return to Scapa. 

Namsos area : 

The cruiser CALCUTTA and destroyers. Air reconnaissance 
discovered nothing new about position and strength of enemy 
troop disembarkations. 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Romadals Fjord-Andalsnes area; 

Two cruisers and destroyers, one anti-aircraft cruiser. 
According to radio Intelligence, the carrier GLORIOUS has also 
moved to the area off Andalsnes. She received data about 
the position of the British troops in the area southeast of 
Dombas from the cruiser CURACAO. It is apparent from a 
radiogram from General de Wiart to the War Office that he 
believes he can hold the position (apparently near Otta) if 
planes are sent from the carrier to his aid. 

The following are on escort and patrol duty ; 


In Scapa ; 

Air reconnaissance detected 1 battleship, 1 carrier, 8 cruisers 
and many destroyers. These may be the vessels concerned, 
amongst others; 




The following are assumed to be in Rosyth or the mouth of 
the Tyne ; 


In the west coast area ; 


Supply service ; 

It is apparent from course instructions to the steamer FRANCONIA 
(20,000 tons) that the route for valuable transports runs at a 
distance of about 200 miles from the line Shetlands-Stadtlandet. 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Special Events ; • 

For sortie by large French destroyers into the Skagerrak 
see Own Situation* 

It seems from a delayed agent's report that the Allies 
originally planned a landing of about 100,000 men (?} In 
the Norwegian theater in Stavanger, Haugesund, Bergen, Molde, 
Trondheim and Narvik. 

Own Situation 

Northern area: 

Narvik ; 

In the morning the town and ore railroad were bombarded by 
2 battleships, 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers. No vital damage. 
Non-combatant units of troops and prisoners were evacuated along 
the ore railroad. Group Narvik blew up the ore'pier and set 
it on fire. Coming from the north, the enemy attacked north 
of positions near Elvenes and on the Oalgge Pass. 

(For report by Port Commander, Narvik, dated 18 April , 
see reference file " We se rue bung" • ) 

Trondheim : 

After visiting Trondheim, Commanding Admiral, Norway reports 
that the withdrawal of the destroyers without replacement of 
the personnel engaged ashore would very greatly prejudice 
Trondheim* s defense and is therefore impossible. 

(See radiogram file, 1450.) 

In reply to a request made by Quartermaster General of Commander 
in Chief, Air Force, he was informed that six submarines at most 



24 April 1940 


could be mad© available for transport of aviation gasoline to 
Trondhelm. The Quartermaster General had made a request 
which would have necessitated the withdrawal of 24 submarines 
for transport purposes alone. 

Bergen : 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast has ordered the immediate 
seizure of all Norwegian trawlers and drifters to bring units 
of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic up to strength. 

Reconnaissance of Sogne Fjord with reference to the setting-up 
of torpedo batteries has been carried out. 

Naval Staff is forced to refuse Group West • s *request for the 
allocation of defense vessels from the Baltic area to Admiral, 
West Norwegian Coast, since It is not possible to remove vessels 
at present from the Baltic area because of losses incurred and 
great claims on all vessels. Group West has been instructed 
to investigate the question of handing over two patrol vessels 
from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and to hand 
over Ship "7". 

Southern North Sea : 

The ore steamer SAYN struck a mine and sank in the Hubert Gatt. 
An aerial mine is assumed. A second explosion which did not 
take place until some hours later in the wreckage of the steamer 
also makes sabotage appear possible. 

It appears from enemy radio traffic that minesweepers have 
exploded a magnetic mine lit cables from Chequers Shoals Buoy. 
This is the first definite information that the enemy possesses 
a ready minesweeping gear or "magnet gear" to sweep magnetic 



24 April 1940 


Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

Enemy destroyers broke through into the Skagerrak in the 
morning. Engagement with the enemy at 0420 southeast of 
Krlstlansanfl by boats of the 7th Patrol Boat Flotilla. Forty 
salvoes fired by the enemy at a patrol boat without special 
success. About 0500 the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla sighted the 
enemy on southwesterly course, making ?>ff at high speed, without 
managing' to attack. Description of enemy: clipper bow, 
two squat, widely spaced funnels. 

Reconnaissance by Commander, Naval Air sighted the enemy 
forces leaving the Skagerrak about 1000, roughly 120 miles 
west-southwest of Lindesnes. Formation probably consisted 
of a French torpedo cruiser of the FANTAS^UE class and two 

It can be assumed that the enemy carried out a minelaying 
operation, in the eastern Skagerrak. 

Enemy report led to temporary stoppage of transport movements 
to Oslo» 

Because of the enemy break-through into the Skagerrak, Group 
Baltic requests the speeding up of improvized readiness for 
action of the guns of the outer fort at the southern entrance 
to Oslo Fjord. 

Various submarine alarm reports in the Kattegat and Skagerrak. 

Mine Situation ? 

Mine barrage detected east of Frederikshavn (laid by submarines); 
21 mines swept. Whole area declared suspected of mines. 

Area southeast of Anholt likewise suspected of mines because 
of observed minelaying. Latvian steamer struck a mine and 
sank south of Drogden lighthouse (aerial mine). 

At noon Ship "20" w%s damaged by striking a mine at the Luebeck 
buoy off Travemuende and was beached. Priwall anti-aircraft 
observation post reports observing a low-flying plane, not 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

notified, over Travemuende during the night of 23 April, 

Area of Commanding Admiral, Norway : 

Batteries "von der Groeben", "Koester" and South Memel are on 
the way to Hamburg to be sent on to Norway as coastal batteries 
for the Norwegian theater. Distribution of batteries and 
transport on to Norway as Commanding Admiral, Norway thinks 

(For High Command, Navy's order see teletype 1400.) 


Commanding Admiral, Norway reports stoppage of work at the 
State Dockyard at Horten owing to difficulty of payment by 
the Norwegian Government and the Norwegian Trade Unions 1 
objection to work for Germany. The necessary countermeasures 
are being instigated. 

Group Baltic requests the provision of harbor defense units 
for the south coast of Norway. (See radiogram file, teletype 

Three harbor defense groups, each with six motor fishing 
vessels, are on their way to Copenhagen, Helsingoer and 


For report by Commanding 'Admiral, Norway on the state of 
coastal defense, see reference file Norway. 



24 April 1940 


Transport Situation : 

Further transports of troops and material as planned (900 men 
arrived in Oslo)* 

Submarine Situation 

U "43" returned from Trondheim; U "19", "9", put in to port. 

On return passage: TJ "38", "47", "56", "60", "62", "26". 
In the operational area: 16 submarines. 

Air Situation 

(See radiogram 2400 Air Force Events of the Day.) 

Bomber operations against the enemy forces reported in the 
Skagerrak were unsuccessful. 

During armed air reconnaissance in the Norwegian coastal area 
an anti-aircraft cruiser in Romsdals Fjord received a 250 kg. 
direct hit forward and was severely damaged. 

Merchant Shipping 

The fact that a steamer (the SAYN) with a valuable cargo was 
ordered from the Baltic to Emden and struck a mine in the 
approaches to the Ents has made it advisable to point out the 
risk of such routing to the Ministry of Transportation and to 
suggest that steamers with specially valuable cargoes coming 
from the Baltic should, if possible, discharge their cargo in 
Baltic ports and that the inconveniences of transporting it 
by land should be accepted. 

The following teletype was received from Group West on the 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

afternoon of 24 April: 

"Present lack of patrol forces and the danger from 
mines laid in the North Sea and estuaries make 
necessary course instructions to all merchant 
ships for the shortest sea route to the nearest 
port of discharge. Therefore direct steamers 
only to Baltic ports, if possible not to North 
Sea ports except Hamburg. Attention is drawn 
to the case of the steamer SAYN from Helsingborg 
to Emden." 

The Ministry of Transportation has taken suitable steps . 
The effects on the inland transport situation will be 
considerable if the Ems is closed for a fairly long period . 
The Ministry of Transportation believes that It must accept the 
disadvantages, since it definitely desires to avoid further 
losses in view of the present lack of shipping space. 

In the present case it is only a matter of closing the Ems 
for a short time; after a mine-check of the channel it 
will be opened again. 

Appreciation of the Situation 

The sortie made by the large French destroyers into the 
Skagerrak shows the possibilities of lively enemy activity 
to disrupt the vital sea communications to Oslo. Naval 
Staff expected such raids by light enemy forces and knows 
quite well that the Skagerrak mine barrage - In which the 
positions of the mines are uncertain because of the current's 
underflow - is not in a position to prevent such sorties. 

On the other hand, it is convinced that no penetration by 
large or heavy enemy units is to be feared" into the Skagerrak 
because of the existing danger from the air and mines. 
Light enemy forces make sorties into the Skagerrak for the 
purpose of laying mines on the transport route from Skagen 
to Oslo, attacking defense forces in the Skagerrak and trying 
if possible to intercept and destroy Oslo convoys. Naval 
Staff has at its disposal only a limited number of light 
forces for defense against such raids, consisting of the 
PT boats and later of the destroyers and torpedo boats at 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

present still on escort and transport duty or not available. 
The deterrent effect of the Skagerrak area therefore lies - 
in addition to the ever present defensive effect of the 
Skagerrak declared area - in the verv great threat from the 
air (bomb and aerial torpedo attacks;. It is intensified 
by the presence of our battleships, whose readiness for 
action, however, must be shown by activity in the form of 
sorties into the northern North Sea, 

In today's sortie by the French the enemy was able to ascertain 
a certain defensive readiness on Germany's part in his engagement 
with patrol boats and PT boats, as well as in an encounter with 
air forces, even if it was not possible to frustrate his plan 
to break through. It can be expected that our Air Force's 
great successes on the Norwegian coast will make the risk of 
frequent raids into the Skagerrak seem very high, so that 
Naval Staff does not expect frequent repetition of these sorties. 
■* In spite of this, every effort must be made to prevent a 

recurrence of such penetrations into the Skagerrak. Attempts 
must be made, by means of comprehensive evening air reconnaissance, 
to make out enemy plans in good time in order to enable withdrawal 
of the important transport traffic from the enemy's grasp. 

The safety of the Skagerrak will be guaranteed to the necessary 
extent by stationing as many PT boats as possible at the 
entrance to the Skagerrak (Kristiansand) , by setting up radar 
gear to intercept enemy movements in good time and by the 
constant readiness for action of Air Force bombers, in 
conjunction with the Skagerrak mine barrage. 


The last few days have confirmed Naval Staff's supposition 

1. The enemy has begun aerial minelaying 
operations in the North Sea estuaries, tn 
the Kattegat, in the entrances to the Baltic 
and in the western Baltic and that 

2. he is in a position to sweep the magnetic 
mines laid by us with a certainty not yet 
fully determined. 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The fact that the enemy is using aerial mines makes necessary 
the immediate introduction of all possible defensive measures. 
Geographical conditions of German waters with their shallow 
depth, well suited for the use of ground mines, favor mining 
operations by planes and show the considerable dangers involved 
for all German and neutral shipping, the transport services, as 
well as the exercise and training of naval forces in the 
western Baltic, the Kattegat, the entrances to the Baltic, the 
Kiel Canal and the North Sea estuaries* 

Commencement of defense measures against the type of aerial 
mine used by the enemy depends on this mine's type of firing. 
Speedy salvaging of a mine is necessary in order to discover 
the firing procedure. It can be safely assumed for the 
present that it is a ground mine. 

The immediate formation of a comprehensive observer system 
in all important channels, harbor entrances and in the Kiel 
Canal is of extreme importance in order to ascertain the places 
where the mines are laid for the purpose of subsequent salvaging 
or closing of the area. Provision of a large number of motor 
launches and motor boats in all ports is to be undertaken at 
once. High Command, Navy/Naval Staff, Service Division will 
have to undertake this speedily on a large scale. New 
distribution and setting-up of barrage balloon batteries is 
to be investigated. 

Defense of the submarine exercise area and of the Kiel Canal 
merits the most careful consideration. 

In view of the enemy use of aerial mines, Commander in Chief, 
Air Force has ordered, as an immediate measure, the shifting 
of concentration for light anti-aircraft batteries to the 
principal points in danger. 

The Navy's most important task, apart from eliminating the 
danger from mines, is in the immediate future the further 
safe transportation of troops and material to Norway. The 
danger from submarines, severe at first, has decreased noticeably 
through large-scale use of defense and submarine-chaser forces 
and through the adaptation of the inexperienced escort service 
to its duties. 

The accomplishment as planned of the transports to Norway, 
with relatively small losses, and of the comprehensive supply 
service must be judged as a great achievement by the units 
participating. These have so far successfully fulfilled the 



24 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

tasks set them in all-out operations, facing most difficult 
demands and without sufficient rest and relief facilities. 

The following tasks have now been set for further German 
naval warfare in the near future: 

Offensive assignments ; 

1. Conduct of war against merchant shipping by 
auxiliary cruisers in foreign waters. 

2. War against merchant shipping by submarines 
in the Atlantic. The solution of the 
torpedo problem is of decisive importance 
for successful submarine attacks. 

3. Aerial minelaying operations on a large 
scale in cooperation with the operational 
Air Force; in the forefront of the demands 
of naval warfare are the complete blocking' 
of the vital port of London, the mining of 
Scapa Flow, of the Clyde and of Liverpool 

Defensive assignments : 

4. Defense of Baltic shipping and of ore Imports 
from Sweden as a necessity for a fairly long 
war; elimination of danger from mines, 
especially from ground mines, is a primary 
necessity for this. 

5. Further assurance of troop and material 
transports to Norway. 

6. Defense of the occupied Norwegian and Danish 
bases through the speedy reinforcement of their 
defensive power by all available means. 



25 April 1940 


Items of Political Importance 
Norway ; 

According to 
Informed the 

a Stockholm Radio report, the King of Norway has 
Oslo Administrative Committee that the Norwegian 

Government will not negotiate with the Germans on any other 

basis than that of complete withdrawal of their troops from 


said to 

(The King's present whereabouts are unknown, he is 
have withdrawn to Northern Norway.) 

"The Times" and Reuter report heavy fighting northeast of 
Trondheim, The presence of vessels of the German Fleet is 
a great advantage for the Germans, since they could bring 
strong combat units to any threatened point, German bombers 
constitute a serious danger. So far it has twice been 
necessary to move the position of the Operations Division of 
the British forces in Norway, Speedy execution of Allied 
operational plans is only probable if great efforts are made. 

Sweden ; 

The German Ambassador wires; 

"As today 1 s radio has just reported, fishing boats 
were allegedly fired on by German planes inside 
Swedish territorial waters near Stroemstad. One 
fisherman was wounded, I should be grateful for 
immediate investigation and correction, for since 
yesterday suspicion of German intentions has grown 
to such an extent that I consider German-Swedish 
relations seriously endangered. 

If we increase our pres 
patience even further, 
will be serious. I see 
with the agreed deliver 
conflict would definite 
ceasing for a fairly lo 
act against us if drive 
according to my knowled 
character, I feel that 
soon arise." 

sure and test Sweden's 

I fear that the consequences 

this primarily in connection 
ies of ore, since armed 
ly mean these deliveries 
ng time.* Sweden will only 
n to despair. However, 
ge of the Scandinavian 
this state of affairs might 

(See also Political Review No. 95, para, 6.) 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Italy ; 

Mussolini Is said to have told the Fascist leaders two days 
ago that it was only a question of weeks until Italy entered 
the war on Germany's side. 

Sharp speech on foreign policy in the Chamber by Deputy 
Giunta,in the presence of the Duce, against Great Britain and 
France • 

It is known that the Western Powers have lately been at pains 
to avoid everything which could increase tension with Italy. 

With reference to the meeting some days ago of the Foreign 
Committee of the French Senate, the following statement by 
the Prime Minister has only just become known: 

"Before and after 1 Sept. the French Government 
Informed Italy that it was ready to seek a 
solution, acceptable to both powers, of out- 
standing questions by means of a friendly 
exchange of opinions. Italy has not replied 
to date. This in no way alters the French 
Government's intention and it is still endeavoring 
to effect a Mediterranean entente uninfluenced 
by ideological considerations •" 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 

Special Items 

1. Commander in Chief, Air Force states that upon the 
Fuehrer's instructions regarding defense of the Skagerrak 
against raids by enemy forces, an Air Force bomber formation 
is to be kept in constant readiness for operations in the 
Skagerrak. According to Commander in Chief, Air Force a 
torpedo squadron is to be kept ready for the same purpose by 
the Naval Air Arm . This measure cannot be carried out, since 
this squadron must definitely operate offensively against 
Great Britain as an aerial mlnelaying squadron. Chief, 
Naval Staff will inform the Fuehrer of this. 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

2. The following torpedo batteries are ready for 
action in Norway: 

Trondheim: 2 triple tubes. 
Bergen: 1 battery with 3 tubes. 
Oslo: 2 batteries with 6 tubes. 

Further batteries are planned to block the 
following entrances: 

Kristiansund Andalsnes Nord Fjord. 

Sogne Fjord Hardanger Fjord 

Erection of the last two batteries is planned first. 
Reconnaissance has been carried out. 

3. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered speedy establishment 
of the new torpedoboats 1 operational readiness. Four or 
five boats are to be ready for simple assignments in the 
middle of May (remaining boats June - 2, July - 2, August - 2, 
October - 1). 

4. Chief, Naval Staff* s decision: 

"Until her repairs are completed (probably about 
9 months) the LUETZOW is to be kept in commission 
with a diminished crew (25% of complement)." 

5. Chief, Naval Staff points out the extraordinary 
urgency of the following measures and has ordered the use of 
all available means to attain the reauired objective: 

a) Expansion of our anti-submarine defense and 
speeding-up of supplies of echo-ranging sets. 

b) Defense against enemy use of aerial mines. 

c) Equipment of all patrol and defense vessels 
with protection against mines and with guns. 

d) Ensuring adequate numbers of new motor 
minesweepers and PT boats. 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

At lant ic/Medl te rranean ; 

Great Britain : 

Shipping movements ; The cruiser EMERALD, formerly on the 
Atlantic route or in Canada, put in to the Clyde at noon on 
25 April. The aircraft carrier HERMES was at sea in the 
South Atlantic on the afternoon of 24 April. Exact position 
unknown, base Freetown. The CORNWALL plans to put in to 
Freetown on 28 April from South Africa; the SHROPSHIRE 
sailed from Freetown on the evening of 24 April. 

The cruiser LIVERPOOL with Commander, 4th Cruiser Squadron 

on board, formerly stationed in the East Indies, is at present 

proceeding to Aden, where she will arrive on 29 April. 

Inquiries in Italy and Istanbul gave no confirmation of 
reports emanating from Vienna during the past few days about 
movements of British warships or troopships in the direction 
of the Black Sea. 

France ; 

Several French vessels returning to Brest were located in 
the Irish Sea in the evening. A vessel detected west of 
Trondhelm on 19 April was off Brest. 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Narvik area ; 

1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser and small vessels detected off 
Harstad. Several destroyers off Narvik. Harbor bombarded. 

Namsos area ; 

Commander, 20th Cruiser Squadron, on board the cruiser 
CARLISLE, is proceeding into the Namsos area to relieve 
the CALCUTTA. Air reconnaissance sighted 1 heavy and 
1 light cruiser off Namsos. No new reports about troop 
disembarkations or large transports. 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Area 3outh of Trondhelm ; 

It Is apparent from a radiogram from the Otta area that 
the carrier GLORIOUS is off the coast in the Krist.iansund- 
Trondheim area* 

Disembarkations of troops and material in Andalsnes are 
completed according to a radiogram from the Commander there; 
two cruisers and destroyers sailed after completing their 
assignment. Destroyers, freighters and steam tankers were 
detected in Romsda Is Fjord, Nordal Fjord and Sjflrungs Fjord 
and successfully attacked by the Air Force. 

Air reconnaissance sighted enemy forces in the afternoon 
60 miles northeast of Molde Fjord, consisting of 4 heavy 
ships (including 1 RENOWN) and 4 cruisers on course 150°. 
Plans not identifiable. 

Home area ; 

The battle cruiser HOOD was spotted 30 miles northeast of 
the Shetlands by air reconnaissance. The cruisers GLASGOW 
and GALATEA in the Shetlands-Scapa area. 

The enemy submarine disposition was detected to a great 
extent. About 7 boats are thought to be in the Skagerrak 
and Kattegat, 5 on return passage, 5 outward bound, 3 of 
the latter into the southern North Sea. 

Shipping Losses : 

1 minesweeper destroyed by a bomb hit in Romsdals Fjord, 
1 torpedoboat damaged, 1 freighter (2,000 tons) beached 
in Nordal Fjord after a bomb hit, 1 steam tanker severely 
damaged by a hit. The British steamer CREE (4,800 tons) 
struck a mine near Smithes Knoll. 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation 

Atlantic : 

Auxiliary cruisers were informed about the situation in 
Norway, the enemy situation and routing of enemy shipping. 
(See radiogram 1300.) 

North Sea/Northern Waters : 

Narvik : 

Close patrol by enemy destroyers. In the morning 
bombardment of positions at the eastern entrance to Narvik, 
with the support' of the cruiser ENTERPRISE. Group Narvik 
requests air cover and dropping of snowshoes. Unit east 
of Elvenes carried out a successful attack on a Norwegian 

Trondhelm : 

Air raid on Verres airfield and seaplane base in the forenoon. 
Considerable damage. Hangar and 4 Ju 87 f s destroyed, 2 He 
115 f s overturned, 3 He 115 f s damaged. 

Port Commander reports that it is not possible to requisition 
Norwegian ships at present because of lack of personnel. 

Bergen : 

When searching steamers the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and 
minesweeper M H l" were subjected to heavy machine-gunfire 
near the TJLVUC. M n l H slightly damaged. One ammunition 
steamer was captured. The ULVIK was set on fire. 

Army operation against Voss with help from minesweeper M w l" 
as planned. 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast also requests about 400 naval 
personnel and 300 merchant marine personnel for manning of 
Norwegian ships in rapid succession, since otherwise 
sabotage and losses can be expected. 

Stavanger : 

Nothing special to report. 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Southern North Sea : 

Mine Situation s 

Elbe channel again open after unsuccessful check sweep. 

Group West sums up the situation in the estuaries as 

"Three unexplained explosions in all, two in the 
Elbe near vessels • Another in the Ems. In the 
latter case a second explosion followed eight 
hours later* Sweeping of the points in question 
with remote clearance gear with linked sweeps and 
on the Elbe also with a mine-exploding vessel 
with magnet gear produced no results. We must 
therefore expect that single enemy aerial mines 
with an unknown firing principle were laid or 
dropped (magnetic or acoustic firing). Group 
West plans a daily sweep of the estuaries with 
remote clearance gear and linked sweeps. Hew 
buoying of the secondary channel to Emden. 
Endangered areas will be swept systematically 
and divers sent down so that a mine may be 
recovered as quickly as possible. n 

During the night of 25 April there was a fresh mine 
explosion off the Western Ems near patrol boat n 802 n . 

In view of the intensified enemy mine warfare, Station North 
Sea requests the provision of two sets of remote clearance 
gear and cable remote clearance gear each for the Elbe, 
Weser, Jade and Ems and the provision of further mine- 
exploding vessel's, also equipment of all important naval and 
merchant vessels with degaussing* 

With reference to Group West's coming transport operations 
to Bergen, concentration of suitable defense forces under 
Group West is indispensable. Naval Staff has therefore put 
the remaining boats of the 5th and 6th Torpedoboat Flotillas 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

at Group West's disposal for these assignments. Transfer 
or time when they go into operation at Group West*s discretion. 
While the boats are withdrawn transport and escort assignments 
of Group Baltic must suffer some delay* 

With reference to the latest bombing attack on Sylt, Group 
West reports that bombs were dropped in sticks, which 
comprised simultaneously 1 large high explosive bomb, 1 bomb 
with time fuse (5-8 hours), 1 bomb with an even longer time 
fuse, 1 incendiary bomb and, in advance, mostly an aircraft 
parachute flare. 

The dropping of time fuse bombs has already been observed 
elsewhere and their handling requires special care, since they 
are at first thought to be duds. It is necessary to fence 
off the area and watch the bomb until it is exploded or 
explodes » 

The time fuse bomb must be regarded as a new, very effective 
weapon, defense against which will offer considerable 
difficulty. When dropped at important places (in dockyards, 
factories, traffic junctions), the time fuse bomb necessitates 
long isolation and thereby stoppage of the part of the factory 
affected, which may lead to considerable interruptions. 
Speedy investigation into possibilities of defense and 
protection is necessary. 

Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

In order to simplify instruction about movements of our naval 
forces during operations, the following definitions of sea 
areas are fixed by Group Baltic: 

Eastern limit of Skagerrak declared 
area up to the line Hirtshals-Risoer. 

From this line around Skagen up to 
the line Aalbeck-Vinga. 

South of this line up to the northern 
entrance to the Baltic Sea entrances. 









25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The first deep mine barrage in the Skagerrak declared area 
was laid as planned by Commander, PT Boats. 

In reply to a query from Group Baltic, Naval Staff has again 
Issued instructions that defense of the northern passage 
through the Skagerrak declared area is a matter for Group 
Baltic. Mine control as far as the western limit of our 
declared area along the coast is also included. The 
allocation of duties ordered seems practical because of the 
nearness of the base of Kristiansand which comes under Group 
Baltic (as opposed to Thyboroen or Esbjerg). 

Submarine Situation 

Submarines were detected east of «Skagen and east of Lasfl. 
Attacks on submarines without visible result. No interruption 
to transports. 

Mine Situation 

The 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla succeeded in recovering a 
British aerial mine west of Samsfl. A most significant and 
gratifying success, which within the shortest possible time 
after the first enemy use of aerial mines has eliminated the 
element of uncertainty in the problem of combatting the aerial 
mine and thus represents the first step towards effective 
defense against it. According to the first statements, it 
is a ground mine with about 500 kg. of explosive, apparently 
magnetic firing . The Minelaying Experimental Command has 
commenced further investigations. 

Numerous flights by enemy planes during the night of 25 April 
over Kiel Bay, North Schleswig Into the Fehmarn-Eutin area 
and Lubeck Bay. Minelaying suspected. Several impacts by 
bombs or mines in the water are reported from the Elbe and 
Kiel Canal. 



25 April 194q CONFIDENTIAL 

Locations indicating mines were obtained by echo-ranging 
sets south of Anholt. Check sweeping is in progress* 

Transport Situation 

Transports of troops and personnel continue as planned. 
2,500 men taken to Larvlk, 900 to Oslo. Further transports 
en route with 2,100 men. 

Commanding Admiral, Norway reports regarding the Norwegian 
naval vessels commissioned for German use and on vessels 

Commissioned with German crews: 

2 destroyers 

1 minelayer 

6 torpedo boat 8, 2nd class 

1 old minelayer 

2 minesweepers 
6 whalers 

2 auxiliary vessels. 

Submarine Situation 

Nothing special to report. 

Returned from operations: U "26", "62 n . 

North of tfce Shetlands: U n 25" . 
Allocated positions northeast 

of the Shetlands: U "14", "17", ,, 24 !, . 



25 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

(For brief reports from U "26", "64", "9", "46", "51", 
see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.) 

Air Situation 


Armed reconnaissance off the west coast of Norway and 
support for Army operations. 

Successes against naval forces : 

1 minesweeper Destroyed in RomsdaQs Fjord. 

1 torpedoboat Hit by SD 50. (Heavy smoke.) 

1 battleship Off Molde Fjord in the morning, 

probably 1 hit SC 250. 

(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.) 

Merchant Shipping 

Group Baltic has replied to a query from the Ministry of 
Transportation that there is no objection to German ships 
returning via Swedish territorial waters and for the present 
through the Kogrund Channel or north of Seeland and the 
Belts. Shipping companies must request the necessary 
Swedish pilots themselves. 




26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

No rway : 

During the Army*s successful battles near Lillehammer, 
most important documents were found on British officers 
in the form of operational orders for the British Norway 
operation, from which it is clear that a British landing 
in Norway had been scheduled for about the same date as 
the German one. Orders bore the dates 2 April, 6 April 
and 7 April, Operation had cover name "Stratford Plan". 
Forces participating were described as Stratforces . 
Landings were planned in Stavanger, to occupy Sola airfield, 
in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. The German action preceded 
the British plans bf a few* hours. After the German landing 
in Norway British forces were re-routed in that Stavanger 
troops were disembarked in Andalsnes and Bergen troops In 
Namsos. After all details have been submitted, the Fuhrer 
intends to make known the documents discovered to the 
Diplomatic Corps. 

According to a report from Kirkenes, a kind of interim 
Government has been set up in Northern Norway, which is 
organizing resistance there in agreement with the old 
Norwegian Government. The attitude of the mostly "Marxist" 
population Is absolutely anti-German. Officers are 
fundamentally pro-German but outwardly adhere to the King 
and definitely reject the Quisling Government because it 
holds the confidence of no class of the people. 

The British Air Ministry announces that German assertions 
that Britain has commenced unrestricted aerial warfare are 
unfounded. The attack on Sylt was directed against 
Westerland airfield, one of the most heavily fortified 
spots in Germany. No attack was made on the town of Heide. 
The civilian population also suffered from the German air 
raids on the Orkneys. 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Sweden : 

The Naval Attache in Stockholm reports that there are 
15,000 men in the Swedish ore region near Kiruna in a 
very heavily fortified position with strong anti-aircraft 
defense • Preparations have been made for the effective 
blowing-up of the railroad line. 

Swedish Trade Unions have issued a resolution according to 
which they are determined on the utmost defensive readiness 

Denmark ; 

The department of the British Ministry of Shipping in 
New York stated that all Danish ships on the high seas 
which had not transferred to the Allied flag would be 
seized as prizes since they technically represented enemy 
tonnage. Transfer to other neutrals would not be 
acknowledged. The Allies are, however, ready to make 
agreements on the chartering of such ships* 

On the other hand, the Danish Shipping Committee in New 
York stated that Denmark had opposed the German invasion. 
Germany has therefore no legal rights over Danish ships. 
The British assertion that these ships are prizes according 
to International Law cannot therefore be acknowledged. 
Endeavors to come to an agreement with the Allies about the 
routes outside the European war zone have unfortunately 

France : 

Reynaud spoke before the Foreign Committee of the Chamber. 
Investigation of the German threat to Sweden and possible 
eventualities. The Turkish Governments loyalty was 
recognized. France wishes an exchange of opinion in her 
relations with Italy and is not responsible for its previous 
failure to take place. 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Conference on the Situation with Chief , Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. Chief, Naval Staff again ordered the speedy 
commencement of all measures to combat the danger of 
aerial mines. 

According to fresh reports from Group Baltic it is possible 
that the British ground mine does not work with magnetic 
but with acoustic firing. If this assumption is confirmed, 
we must also expect that the British torpedo possesses an 
acoustic control . (This explains various torpedo hits on 
the stern as e.g. the steamer PRIEDENAU, the cruiser 

2. Chief, Naval Staff considers that further use of 
submarines off the Norwegian coast and for attacks on enemy 
naval vessels offers little prospect of success,, in view of 
the torpedo difficulties and the slight chances of hitting 
fast-moving warships, and considers that the resumption of 
war against merchant shipping In the Atlantic as soon as 
possible is necessary and alone promises success. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic ; 

Further reinforcement of Mediterranean forces: The cruisers 
ORION, NEPTUNE, the destroyers DEFENDER, DECOY and the 
repair ship RESOURCE have gone on eastward from Gibraltar-. 
The submarine depot ship MEDWAY and three submarines left 
Colombo on 17 April for the Mediterranean. 

Three boats of the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla, previously 
stationed in Singapore, passed Port Said on 23 April 
proceeding towards the Mediterranean. 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

North Sea/Northern Waters t 

Enemy landings in the Narvik area continue. Off HarstacL 
a battle cruiser, a heavy cruiser, other cruisers, destroyers 
and troopships as well as a large number of armed vessels 
were sighted. 

Lively activity by light enemy forces and transports in the 
Namsos-Andalsnes area. Various cruisers and numerous 
destroyers were detected in Romsdals Fjord, off Andalsnes, 
in Molde Fjord and in fjords adjoining Trondheim Fjord. 
Britis-h destroyers are in the Frohavet and south of the 
island of Hitra in order to guard the entrance to Trondheim. 

Convoys were sighted northwest and northeast of the Frohavet 
and west of Molde Fjord in the forenoon. 

A cruiser or destroyer in Sogne Fjord. 

Own Situation 


Ships "16" and ,f 36 ,f received further reports on the enemy 
and data for the conduct of war against merchant shipping. 
(See radiogram 2143.) 

Narvik ; 

Renewed bombardment of port and defense installations, also 
of Elvegaardsmoen by light enemy naval forces. 

A Norwegian regiment was destroyed by a German counter- 
attack in the Elvenes area, with severe enemy losses. 
Group Narvik requests effective increase of supplies by air 
for Elvegaardsmoen, especially food and snowshoes. 

If later developments render it necessary for Group Narvik 
to take to the mountains, it is planned to evacuate the bulk 
of the destroyer crews, wounded and prisoners to Sweden. 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

The first train from Sweden has arrived at the frontier. 
Supplies, however, are extremely difficult, since the ore 
railroad is partly destroyed and without current. Supplies 
for Narvik are therefore not assured for any length of time. 


Because of the enemy situation off Trondheim, Ships M 26 w 
and tt 37", carrying howitzers and ammunition, were ordered to 
postpone putting in for 24 hours. 

Commander, 2nd Destroyer Flotilla reports that the JACOBI 
will be repaired about two months after the gear parts arrive, 
He does not consider return passage possible until the sea 
and air situation has altered fundamentally. Armament is to 
be dismantled, as far as necessary, and can be re-installed 

Bergen : 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports stubborn enemy 
resistance near Voss. The enemy was overcome during the 
day; Voss was taken. Reconnaissance of Hardanger Fjord 
with regard to torpedo batteries has been carried out. 
Forces passing through the skerries are still being fired 
on with hand arms and also with guns. Because of numerous 
assignments (pilot service, transport) he again requests 
another minesweeper, motor minesweepers and armed patrol 

Three PT boats are being sent out against the British cruiser 
reported in Sogne Fjord. Air support is requested. 

Commanding Admiral, Norway proposes closing of Sogne Fjord 
by mlnelaylng to stop supplies for British landing troops. 

Southern North Sea t 

Because of enemy mine laying in the estuaries, Station North 
Sea requests the inclusion in the system of wartime lights 
and buoys of secondary channels not so far included and 
considerable reinforcement of the harbor defense flotillas 
for the Jade/Weser, Elbe and Ems. 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Vessels are also requested for remote clearance gear and 
cable remote clearance gear* (See radiogram file, 1835 
and 1825.) 

Commanding Admiral , Norway has been ordered by High Command, 
Navy to set up harbor defense units in every base, subdivided 
into A and B groups with the same duties as in home waters. 
(See radiogram 0800.) 

Skagerrak /Kattegat : 

Decrease in danger from submarines discernible at the moment. 
Only one submarine alarm northeast of Anholt. 

Mine Situation ; 

Three mine barrages were located 30-40 miles north of Skagen 
with echo-ranging sets; they were probably laid by the 
French destroyers which penetrated into the Skagerrak. 
The area endangered by mines lies in the 20 mile-wide strip 
declared free of mines by Great Britain for traffic to 
Sweden • 

Group Baltic reports, in view of yesterday 1 s order, that mine 
control of the northern passage through the Skagerrak declared 
area as far as the western limit is not possible with the 
forces at present available. Exploratory sweeps will be 
carried out after the units now being assembled are in 
operational readiness. 

Ground mines ; 

At noon a mine exploded on the west side of the channel in 
the outer Kiel Estuary 20 m. away from IT "99", which sustained 
only slight damage. Aerial mine. (Numerous enemy flights 
over Schleswig-Holsteln, the (Kiel) Canal and western Baltic 
tonight • ) 

Group Baltic has, ordered valuable steamers to be stopped, 
100# searching sweep in the Kiel Canal, fixing of routes* 
check sweeping of routes, cessation of training and trials. 
(See radiogram file, teletype 1150.) 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Effective immediately, Commanding Admiral, Submarines forbids 
any submarine training in Kiel and Mecklenburg Bays from 
Kiel, Neustadt, Travemunde and Warnemunde. Submarine 
navigation and firing training is to be transferred to Gdynia 
as quickly as possible. Shore training remains in Neustadt. 


The Swedish Naval Attache, Forshell, informs us that foreign 
submarines have not been detected in Swedish territorial 
waters. Merchant traffic In the channels along the west 
coast of Sweden involves difficulties, Including lack of 

Transport Situation : 

Transports of troops and material continue as planned. 
About 2,000 men have arrived in Oslo and Larvik. Empty 
steamers on return trip undisturbed. 

Submarine Situation 

Returned from operations 

and put In to port: U "47", "56", "60". 

In the operational area: 

North Minoh area: 

North of the Shetlands: 

West of the Shetlands: 

Northeast of the Shetlands: U "14", "17", "23", "24". 

In the Orkneys area: U "13", "57", "58", "59"; 
















26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

submarines are instructed to 
take up their old operational 
areas again directly off 
Pentland Firth according to 
density of traffic and 

On return passage: U "38", "34", "52". 

In Trondheim: U "29", 

The crew of U "64" has returned home from Narvik via Sweden 
(disguised as survivors from German steamers). 

The brief reports from U "64", "46" and "51" from West Fjord 
give a picture of the extraordinary difficulties in West 
Fjord and Ofot Fjord arising from the length of the days, 
strong defenses and calm, clear water. (See Part B, Vol. IV.) 

U "23" reports a double miss on a heavy cruiser 20 miles 
east of the Shetlands. 

U "34" reports a double miss on the 20,000 ton supply 
steamer FRANCONIA north of the Hebrides. 

Air Situation 

For disposition of Air Force units for operations in Norway 
see radiogram file, 0800. 

Air Force operations in the Narvik-Harstad area, Namsos 
Fjord and Andalsnes. 

Special forces have been provided for 27 April against the 
aircraft carrier suspected to be in the Namsos -Andalsnes 
area. It can be expected that at daybreak the carrier 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

will be near the coast to start Its planes and will then 
move off Into the open sea. 

(For particulars see Air Force fivents of the Day.) 

Merchant Shipping 

Of the altogether 185 vessels (totaling about 242,000 GRT) 
lying in Bergen which are not German, contraband goods have 
been discovered so far on 27 ships which are not Norwegian. 
After the operation against Voss is over, transfer is to be 
begun, since there are no escort detachments available at 

The Italian Government has released three (five according 
to other sources) Norwegian tankers and a freighter, which 
had at first been held, since the captains raised notarial 
protest against the refusal of harbor certificates. 

The Italian steamer AMECIZIA, which had been held south of 
Bergen with a cargo of wood for Great Britain, has been 
brought Into Stavanger. The ship is to be released after 
the cargo is discharged. 

1500: Conference between Chief, Naval Staff and the 

Points discussed : 

1. Sortie by French destroyers into the 
Skagerrak on 23/24 April. Possibilities 
of defense against such raids. 

2. Naval Staff 1 s deliberations on further 
submarine warfare, withdrawal of small 
submarines for the schools, submarine war 
against merchant shipping in the Atlantic. 

3. Defense of bases In Norway. 

4. Combatting danger of aerial mines. 



26 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

5. German lack of freighters • 

6. Land situation in the south Norwegian area 
has been cleared up. 

The projected transport operation to Bergen, protected by 
a battleship sortie, can therefore be canceled. The Fuhrer 
has ordered the transports to be re-routed to Oslo . 

(For particulars see Commander in Chief, Navy*s memorandum 
of conference dated 26 April, War Diary, Part C, Vol* VII.) 

The following directive has been issued to Groups West, 
Baltic and Fleet, in view of the Fuhrer 's decision to abandon 
the transport operation to Bergen: 

1. Group West's transport assignment is canceled 
as the result of the speedy clearing up of the 
land situation in southern Norway. 

2. Transport is to be carried out to Oslo as soon 
as possible. Steamers are lying in Stettin. 
Group Baltic will report plans. 

3. Battleship operation is abandoned for the 
present because of the necessity of 
maintaining destroyers and five torpedoboats 
in readiness. 

4. Further torpedoboats again at the disposal 
of Group Baltic. 

5. Group West to report promptly plans for any 
destroyer and torpedoboat operations. 

Naval Staff I op 790/40. 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

Norway ; 

At noon in the Reich Chancellery Foreign Minister von 
Rlbbentrop, before the Diplomatic Corps and the German 
and foreign press, gave a statement on the political 
situation and made public White Paper No. 4 containing 
the diplomatic and military documents captured in Norway, 
from which the Western Powers' plans to extend the war to 
Scandinavia and the old Norwegian Government's guilt in 
this development are obvious. 

Naval Staff's information from the enemy situation and 
reports from the Radio Monitoring Service, the press and 
agents for the beginning and middle of March (see War 
Diary) about the Allies' plans are confirmed. 

The Supreme Commander of the Norwegian Army issu«d an 
order of the day: 

"You did everything In your power to stop the 
enemy. You were often forced back and thus 
had to leave your positions. That is 
disheartening but the main thing was to gain 
time. You honorably discharged your duty, 
for which I thank you. This withdrawal 
movement is now at an end and I exhort you 
anew: Be of good courage and we shall be 

Sweden : 

The Foreign Office is at present trying to obtain the 
Swedish Government's consent to the carrying of survivors, 
wounded and prisoners on the return journey of the trains 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

running to Group Narvik. This measure is justified as an 
act of humanity. Even the question of possible internment 
"by the Swedish Government will be no obstacle. 

Denmark : 

In reply to the blocking of Danish assets in the U.S.A., 
the Danes have blocked U.S. assets in Denmark. 


Italy : 

According to foreign press reports, Ciano is said to have 
stated in reply to the French Ambassador, Franco ls-Poncet, 
that the time was unpropltlous for discussing the 
differences of opinion between *;he two countries. 

Portugal : 

The Embassy reports: 

n Salaz*ir continues to resist Allied encroachments. 
He told the British Ambassador that by their 
high-handed treatment of Portugal the Allies were 
doing everything to destroy sympathy for them." 




27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Greece ; 

The British Ambassador is said to have submitted four 
demands to Metaxas: 

1. Cessation of deliveries of products of 
military importance to Germany* 

2. Granting of the right to establish naval 
and air bases in Greek territory. 

3. Unrestricted entry for personnel of the 
R.A.F. and Royal Navy. 

4. Adoption of a pro-entente tone by the 
Government and removal of pro-German 
persons from leading positions. 

Metaxas expressed himself sharply against this and stated 
that he would not permit the Western Powers to intervene 
in Greece a second time. 

U.S.A. ; 

The iEmb assy in Washington reports: 

"The effect of Grand Admiral Raeder's statements 
to the press, which refuted exaggerated Allied 
victory propaganda in the U.S. press during the 
past few days, is said to be all the greater 
because the press is very struck by the swift 
advance of German troops in Norway and is now 
giving prominence to German military reports." 

(See also appendix to Foreign Press (Naval News No. 100).) 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items ; 

1. The situation on land In the central Norwegian area 
is judged confidently despite certain difficulties. The 
Army is advancing northwards in spite of very difficult 
terrain. Very speedy relief of Trondheim is hoped for. 
Strong enemy forces suspected near Andalsnes and Dombas. 

The Trondheim Group is advancing southwards on Stflren, in 
order to cut the enemy off from the north. Situation 
cleared up in Bergen; enemy beaten near Voss. 

In view of the efforts of Armed Forces High Command, 
Operations Staff to clear up the land situation speedily. 
Chief, Naval Staff considers it specially important that, 
with regard to the great strain on defense and transport 
units, overhasty execution of transport be avoided and that 
safety of the transports be the primary consideration. 
The danger from submarines and mines necessitates observance 
of all necessary defense measures. 

2. British use of aerial mines ; The opinion for a 
while that the British aerial mine might have acoustic or 
vibration firing is contradicted by a new report that the 
firing principle is based on induction . Discoveries to 
date show that our magnetic sweeping gear is probably fully 
effective. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered tne strictest 
secrecy about the fact that a mine was recovered. 

The question of the greatest possible speeding-up of the 
effectiveness of our anti-mine measures was again discussed. 
A large-scale patrol organization for the detection of places 
where mines are dropped is already being set up; requisitioning 
of large numbers of motor boats and patrol vessels has been 
started; the entire Kiel Canal is covered by visual 
observation. The Danes are to be induced to patrol their 
coastal areas and channels; similar measures are likewise 
to be suggested to the Swedes. 

There are at present only 11 balloon barrage batteries 
In all , of which 9 are on the coast (3 in Hamburg, 6 in 
Group West»s area in Wilhelmshaven, the Jade, Emden, Borkum). 
Further supplies of barrage balloons cannot be expected 
until August. Naval Staff, Operations Division proposes, 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

with reference to the urgency of combatting aerial mines, 
that two batteries be withdrawn from Group West and placed 
at the disposal of Group Baltic for the defense of the 
Kiel Canal and other important points. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees. Orders to this effect have 
been given. 

3. Group West proposes dispensing with minelaying 
measures by surface forces in Operation "Gelb". 

Reason ; The larger number of planes holds out prospects 
of effective aerial minelaying. The enemy 1 s greater 
preparedness and short, bright nights make unobtrusive 
execution improbable. Moreover, very undesirable losses 
are now more probably in view of the slight strength of 
our destroyer and torpedoboat forces. 

Aerial minelaying in Operation "Gelb" is planned within the 
scope of the scheduled measures HL, IL, 6*L, WL, OL and also 
measure "Dunkirk'* • In all about 30 planes are scheduled 
to drop about 50 aerial mines with the first wave. 

Chief, Naval Staff agrees fully with Group West»s proposal. 
Because of the delay in Operation "Gelb" the necessary 
conditions for operations by surface forces have altered 
fundamentally. The shortness and brightness of the nights 
forbid any surface force operations in the area constantly 
covered by the enemy, since on no account is any preliminary 
warning to be given by naval measures. In the enemy's 
state of readiness we must expect immediate, heavy attacks, 
especially by the enemy Air Force, in the event of the 
slightest suspicion. If the element of surprise is lost 
the whole operation would unavoidably be greatly endangered. 
The small number of our light forces - urgently required 
for defense assignments - also makes it necessary that the 
available destroyers and torpedoboats should not be used 
for assignments in which losses seem probable from the 
start, as far as these same assignments, as in the present 
case, can also be fulfilled very effectively by the aerial 
minelaying formations of the 9th Air Division meanwhile 
set up. 

4. Report by Captain Bey (Commander, 4th Destroyer 
Flotill^, who flew back from Narvik on High Command, Navy*s 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

order, on the actions off Narvik on 10 and 13 April and 
the present situation. 

Fresh confirmation is given of the great readiness for 
action of the destroyers and the excellent behavior of the 
crews, who knew how to fight and die in the traditional 
destroyer spirit. 

Captain Bey was appointed Commander, Destroyers as well 
as Commander, 6th Destroyer Flotilla. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Since the enemy again partially changed his code on 26 April, 
there is much less possibility of decoding enemy radio traffic 
at present. 

Atlantic ; 

Portishead coastal radio station broadcast the following 
QQQQ report: 

38°41»N, 39°22»W (about 500 miles west of the 
Azores) the tanker DONNAX (8,036 tons) is being 
chased. Time 0948. 

At 1238 the same radio station sent four times: 

"QQQQ DONNAX canceled." Time 1034. 

It is possible that Ship "36" was the originator of this 
alarm report. 

The possibility arises from additional data that there are 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

three battleship s (possibly the QUEEN ELIZABETH, MALAYA 
and ROYAL SOVEREIGN) in the Mediterranean. 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Narvik area ; 

Air reconnaissance sighted one cruiser and several destroyers 
off Harstad, a cruiser and destroyers off 'Narvik, ? battle- 
ship and destroyers in the fjords north of Narvik* 

Trondhelm area ; 

Eight transports and 2 cruisers were sighted in the morning 
northwest of the Frohavet on northeasterly course. One 
French and 2 other cruisers on course 350° and 2 aircraft 
carriers with 1 heavy cruiser and destroyers on course 30° 
were detected west and northwest of the island of Fr8ya at 
a distance of 30-100 miles. At noon there were 2 destroyers 
in Trondheim-Leden. 

A cruiser and several merchantmen off Molde and Andalsnes. 

From the home area s 

Nothing special to report. 

Evaluation of aerial photographs on 24 April shows that the 

following forces were lying in Scapa Flow on that day; 

1 battleship each of the NELSON, RENOWN and REVENGE class, 

1 cruiser of the LONDON class, 1 ENTERPRISE class, 1 ship 

of the D class; aircraft carrier HERMES, several destroyers, 

tankers, auxiliary vessels. 

At 2000 on 26 April Commander in Chief, Home Fleet informed 
an unidentified vessel that two German trawlers were flying 
the Dutch flag. Further text of the message could not be 
made out. 

This obviously concerns Ships n 2S n and w 37 w , trawlers 
camouflaged as neutrals, which were then Instructed to abandon 
Dutch camouflage, move off northward and separate. 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

There is -no immediate fear that the two vessels have been 
intercepted and sunk by the enemy* They were probably 
sighted by enemy air reconnaissance* 

Shipping Losses : 

The 7,000 ton tanker SCOTTISH AMERICAN was torpedoed near 
Cape Wrath, (northern entrance to the Minch), the British 
steamer PIZARRO (1,367 tons) "collision" at the eastern 
side of the North Minch* Ship had to be abandoned* 

10,000 ton ship and 1,500 ton ship damaged by bomb hits 
off Molde Fjord. 

Own Situation 

Narvik : 

Cruisers and destroyers bombarded defense Installations 
and quarters near Bjerkvik, Laverget and Elvegaardsmoen* 
Great material damage* Norwegian planes attacked our 
troops near Elvenes* Air Force intervention is requested. 
Great difficulty in bringing supplies to the town of Narvik 
and to Elvegaardsmoen because of the destruction of the 
ore railroad on Rombaken Fjord and the ferry, as well as 
completely snowed-up supply routes. 

Trondheim : 

Landing parties from British destroyers reconnoitered the 
islands in Kraagsvaags Fjord and the Oerlandet Peninsula. 
Destroyers were unsuccessfully attacked by the 506th 
Coastal Patrol Group. 

Vernes airfield is reported clear for landings and take-offs* 

Bergen : 

Voss and Boemoen taken by the Army; enemy withdrew to 
Gudvanger-Frethe im. 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

According to a communication from Group West, the proposal 
to mine Sogne Fjord by surface forces cannot be carried out 
from home waters and is technically impossible with submarines 
Admiral, West Norwegian Coast therefore plans to carry out 
minelaying after about 1 May if suitable vessels are 
available by then. 

PT boat attacks on the enemy cruiser (or large destroyer) 
reported in Sogne Fjord unsuccessful, since the ship had 
already been attacked and destroyed by the Air Force 

Troopships from Stavanger arrived* in Bergen as planned. 

Southern North Sea : 

In reply to yesterday's query about Group West's readiness 
for action - destroyers and torpedoboats - the Group reports: 

Plan to use available destroyers and torpedoboats 
as defense for minelaying operation by four 
minelayers north of the declared area. Will 
probably sail early on 29 April. 

Naval Staff agrees to Group West's plans. The Group was 
informed accordingly. 

Esbjerg was examined by the Wilhelmshaven Dockyard Staff as 
to suitability as a Fleet base. In view of the water- 
depth and the great strain on Commanding Admiral, Defenses, 
North, the harbor is considered suitable only for 
destroyers and for these only to a certain extent. 



27 April 194^ CONFIDENTIAL 

Enemy Mine Situation : 

The pilot steamer BODENWINKEL struck a mine and sank in 
the Hubert Gatt. 

Crew saved. The Hubert Gatt is closed to traffic. 

According to statements by the captain of the steamer HANS 
SCHULTE and the captain of the pilot vessel EMDEN, at about 
0400 on 21 April two planes with lights landed on the 
Hubert Gatt, near the spot where the steamer SAYN later 
came to grief, and afterwards took off again. 

The steamer SAYN struck a mine on 23 April. It is possible 
that mines were laid here by a plane which landed on the 

Skagerrak/Kattegat ; 

Submarine alarm south of Oslo Fjord, near MaseskBr and off 
Prederikshavn. Anti-submarine action unsuccessful. 

Mine Situation ; 

The Danish steamer LUISE struck a mine 600 m. northwest of 
Drogden light . The German steamer OTTO KORDS was beached 
off Koldlng Fjord (probably struck a mine). 

Near Korsflr mine-exploding vessel n 4 w swept a ground mine 
80 m. away, bearing 330°, with magnet gear. The 2nd Motor 
Minesweeper Flotilla detected the east wing of the enemy 
mine barrage off Prederikshavn. Our Fredericia barrage 
has been cleared. 

A formation of Commander, Minesweepers carried out a check 
sweep of the routes in Mecklenburg and Kiel Bays. Routes 
proceed over the greatest depths of water possible. 
Routes are not announced. Traversed at present only by 
warships and valuable steamers. 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAI 

Group Baltic requests speedy provision of Commander, 
Minesweeper's units with gear to sweep the induction mines, 
and of all naval vessels and important -merchantmen with 
degaussing equipment. The Group suggests that recourse 
be had to copper distance high tension conduits in Norway, 
if they are not required there for military purposes, in 
order to relieve the raw material situation in the 
construction of cables. 

Preparations are being made for the transfer of training 
and trials by the Schools and Inspectorates to the central 
Baltic east of Rugen because of danger of aerial mines. 
Torpedo and Submarine branches will concentrate in 

Group Baltic plans to withdraw the cruiser EMDEN from Oslo 
to the eastern Baltic under close escort, utilizing fast 
steamer groups. Will probably be carried out on 30 April 
at dawn. The Group requests agreement. 

Transport Situation 

Transports as planned; 950 men arrived in Oslo both in the 
forenoon and afternoon, also material carried on 14 drifters 
and 2 tugs. 

Empty transports as planned. 



27 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Air reconnaissance reports lively steamer traffic along the 
Swedish coast northward and southward bound; Swedish 
traffic partly in the form of convoys. 

Air Situation 

Armed reconnaissance concentrated on the Narvik area, attack 
on transport movements and disembarkations in the Andalsnes- 
Trondheim area. Various supply steamers damaged by bombs. 
One cruiser damaged off Andalsnes and one north of Narvik 
(latter 1,000 kg. direct hit). 

(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.) 

Submarine Situation 

Since possibilities of success off the Norwegian coast are 
estimated as slight because of strong patrols in the fjords, 
difficulties with torpedoes and few prospects of hitting 
fast-moving targets, Commanding Admiral, Submarines has been 
allocated the following assignments for submarines, 
constituting a change in the previous order: 

1. Constant occupation of Orkneys-Minch area. 

2. As strong operations as possible in the 

3. Further transport of supplies to Trondheim 
for the time being. 

4. If occasion arises, use of submarines for 
Operation "Gelb". 

5. Submarine training. 



27 April 1940 


Defense assignments in the Norwegian coastal area lapse 
for the present* 

In the operational area 
on 27 April: 

On return passage: 

Returned from operation: 

Sailed with supplies 
for Trondheim: 

TJ "13", "14", "23", "24", 
"25", "30", "57", "58", 
"59", "61", "65". 

U "17", "29", "34", "52". 

U "38". 

U "A", "32". 



28 April 1940 


Items of Political Importance 

For first reaction abroad to Ribbentrop 1 s speech and the 
publication of the Anglo-Norwegian documents, see Foreign 
Press Report, 

Denmark ; 

Negotiations are in progress at present between Coastal 
Defense Commander, Copenhagen and the Danish Navy about the 
use of Danish naval vessels to relieve our forces. The aim 
is to use Danish vessels under Danish command on minesweeping 
duties, for patrol and observation duties as well as for 
repairs to and inspection of Danish Mine barrages. If 
necessary extra German signals personnel can be drafted to 
Danish ships. Group Baltic will control all operations by 
the Danish Navy. 

Sweden : 

According to a report from the Naval Attache* in Stockholm, 
the Swedes attach particular importance to the continued 
existence of their mine barrages in the Sdder-Kvarken Strait. 
Naval Staff has no fundamental objection to this and only 
requests that safe passage at any time be guaranteed by 
clear marking of the channel and adequate, speedy provision 
of pilots. The possibility of ships going aground inside 
the marked channel must also be excluded. The Foreign 
Office was informed of this and requested to desist from 
Naval Staff 1 s earlier request to have Sweden remove the 
mine barrage. 

U.S.S.R. : 

The Soviet Government has 
new Base North. 

suggested Yokanya Bay as the 

Italy : 


(director of the ^elegrafd 1 ) states in a radio 
to the Italian Armed Forces: 

"It Is not possible for a country such as Italy 
to remain outside a conflict like the present 
one for the duration. This was established 
today with the greatest authority in the Fascist 



28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Chamber and the Corporations by the most 
important statements of Grandi and Buffarini. 
Only one thing remains to be done: to be ready 
for the order which will come. The words 
T be ready' comprehend the fate of Italy and 
the fate of us all." 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items 

1. Combatting British aerial mines ; All offices have 
been informed of the great difficulties arising from the 
British use of aerial mines and of the urgency of solving 
the problem of effective defense and they are working 
towards this end with all the means in their power. 

The attention of subordinate offices will be drawn to the 
necessity of maintaining special secrecy with regard to all 
reports about actual or possible further recovery of enemy 
aerial mines as well as hits on mines, especially also by 
merchant ships, and to all sweeping results. All information 
must be transmitted so that the enemy radio monitoring 
service can gain no insight. 

For an appreciation of enemy and of our own minelaying 
operations it is necessary to ascertain soon how far the aerial 
mine as such is finished in construction by the enemy and 
scheduled for large-scale use. It Is essential to discover 
particularly whether our own use of aerial mines decided the 
development of the present British aerial mine or whether it 
was developed independently by the British. It must be 
stated already that the British have shown themselves to be 
masters of improvisation in the use of aerial mines and 
defense against them and have with simple means, probably 
without very exact scientific investigations, quite obviously 
developed both a most useful offensive weapon in their aerial 
mine and a useful self-defense and sweeping gear. We must 
acknowledge that their success in doing this within a very 
short space of time is a very remarkable achievement. 



28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

It is now to be seen that the highly skilled Royal Air Force 
brings the aerial mines to our waters in darkness and in 
almost every kind of weather, and that it has so far 
succeeded in carrying the mines almost unmolested over 
Schleswig Holstein to the Baltic ports, while our own aerial 
mine formations - thanks to the enemy defenses and their own 
lack of training - have so far not been in a position to drop 
the aerial mines in Scapa, in the Clyde or over Liverpool Bay. 

This discovery forces us, on the one hand, to make every 
endeavor to build up our anti-mine defense organization and, 
on the other hand, to make an urgent request to the operational 
Air Force that it should now speedily make widespread attacks 
by carrying the aerial mine to London, to Scapa and over the 
British mainland to Liverpool and the Clyde. 

Group West objects greatly to the withdrawal of two barrage 
balloon batteries from the North Sea area for defense of the 
Kiel Canal and western Baltic, since it considers any weakening 
of the Wilhe Iras haven and Jade defenses insupportable. In 
Naval Staff's opinion, however, the danger to the Kiel Canal and 
Kiel Bay is judged to be just as grave. 

The main effect of the balloon barrages is psychological. 
The withdrawal of some balloons from the North Sea defense 
areas will not diminish the deterrent effect of the batteries 
still remaining, but will considerably increase defense for 
the Kiel Canal and Kiel Bay. 

Naval Staff's order therefore remains in force. 

2. Further Construction of the Aircraft Carrier GRAF 
ZEPPELIN : Naval Staff denies the necessity of continuing 
construction, particularly since there will not be the 
necessary military and armament prerequisites for the use of 
the ship in the near future. The whole anti-aircraft 
armament is at present being used for urgent military tasks 
at other points. It is not possible to provide it for the 
carrier again without severe military disadvantages. 
Complete armament cannot be installed until about one year 
after completion, i.e. the end of 1941. The problem of 
skilled workers offers very great difficulty. Naval Staff 
is therefore abandoning further construction work on the 



28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

North Sea/Northern Waters : 

Troopship movements: According to an intelligence report, 
five battalions of French Chasseurs Alpins, the 43rd Colonial 
Infantry Regiment and one battalion of the Foreign Legion 
passed through the Channel on 26 April on the way to Norway. 
An agent reported from Paris on 20 April that intensive work 
was being carried out on the formation of a new Expeditionary 
Corps, to consist of special troops. Ports of departure Le 
Havre, Boulogne, for material Rouen. Transports are to 
leave for Norway about the end of April/beginning of May. 

Narvik area : 

Air reconnaissance reported 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, several 
destroyers off Harstad, several transports and destroyers in 
Ofot Fjord, 3 destroyers off Narvik. Landings near Bogen. 

Namsos area : 

Two light cruisers, several destroyers, transports and 
auxiliary vessels were detected in Folda Fjord and Namsos 
Fjord; 1 battleship and 1 cruiser in the area off Namsos. 
No large-scale troop movements observed ashore. 

Andalsnes area : 

Enemy reports further successful landings in Andalsnes by radio. 

Air reconnaissance spotted a cruiser, destroyers and several 
transports in Romsda Is Fjord, further cruisers and destroyers 
off Trondhelm Fjord, a large number of freighters and transports 
in the fjords to the south. In the afternoon a plane contacted 
an enemy formation, with which there were probably 1 or 2 
aircraft carriers, 70 miles northwest of Molde Fjord. Strong 
fighter defense. 

Reconnaissance and attacks by our bomber units is reflected 
in enemy radio traffic. 



28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Reconnaissance reports give the Impression that enemy landings 
are mostly completed for the present. Imminent attacks by 
the troops landed north and south of Trondheim against 
Trondheim, with support from the enemy carrier-borne planes, 
must be expected. Destruction of the enemy aircraft 
carriers therefore assumes decisive importance and is being 
striven after by the 5th Air Force with all the means in 
its power. 

Reconnaissance activity off Trondheim by enemy destroyers 
leads us to expect landings and a footing on the islands 
off Trondheim Fjord. 

Severe blows were struck against today's enemy operations by 
our Air Force attacks, which scored several hits on cruisers 
as well as great successes against enemy merchant ships and 
transports. (See own Air Situation.) (~f 

Own Situation 


At 0430 the Uroup reported heavy bombardment of Elvegaardsmoen 
by warships. Lively scouting activity indicates offensive 
action soon by the superior enemy. 

The Naval Communications Officer reports very difficult 
conditions, both technical and regarding personnel, in the 
development of radio traffic since all communication between 
units of Group Narvik is possible only in Code M (machine 
code) with naval radio operators and the radio station, in 
an exposed position, suffers daily bombardment. Very great 
strain on personnel. 

Supplies of food for the civilian population of Narvik and 
the hinterland will be seriously endangered after Norwegian 
stocks are exhausted. Commander requests help via Sweden. 

Trondhe im ; 

Commander, 2nd Destroyer Flotilla has been instructed to 
endeavor to restore his destroyers 1 readiness to proceed, 



28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

both regarding personnel and engines, with all the means 
in his power. 

Enemy carrier-borne planes attacked Trondheim at dawn. 
Hits on transmitter, village and airfield. 

Because of Armed Forces High Command's information that 
Trondheim is adequately supplied with Army guns through 
those captured, Ships "26" and "37" (carrying field howitzers 
to Trondheim) have been diverted and ordered to pvt in to 
Bergen separately in favorable weather. 

No news from either ship. 

Bergen ; 

Operation to set up torpedo batteries in Hardanger Fjord 
has commenced. 

Stavanger : 

Stavanger 15 cm. battery will probably be ready for action 
with two guns on 1 May. Two more guns have arrived on the 

Because of the importance of Stavanger, Admiral, West 
Norwegian Coast requests that a regular Captain, with Staff, 
be appointed Port Commander, Stavanger. Previous Port 
Commander to Haugesund. High Command, Navy agrees to the 
proposal. Captain Fricke (Otto) has been appointed Port 

Skagerrak /Kattegat ; 

Several submarine sighting and location reports .point to 
fresh intensification of the danger from submarines. • 
Attacks on submarines without visible result. 

No further mines detected. Minesweeping to detect and mark 
the British barrages off Frederikshavn continues. Check 
sweeping of various areas in the Kattegat fruitless. 

The 17 cm. batteries "Schill" and "Raule" in Tyboroen and 
Hanstholm are temporarily ready for action with four guns. 



28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Transport Situation ; 

Transport of troops and material proceeded according to plan 
under escort by units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, 
Baltic and constant air cover by Commander, Naval Air, 
Baltic. Fast troopships took 780 men to Larvik. Further 
transports arrived in Oslo with men and material. The first 
party of the 2nd Mountain Division was transported. 
Material carried on drifters, so far unmolested. Empty 
steamers in the area as planned. 

Submarine Situation 

Unchanged. (For TJ n 47 ,?, s bri-ef report see War Diary, 
Part B, Vol. IV. ) 

Air Situation 

Very successful Air Force attacks on naval forces and 
transports (merchantmen) in the area Namsos-Molde-Andalsnes; 
against harbor installations in Namsos, Kristiansand, Molde 
and Andalsnes, and in support of the Army's advance. 

4 transports or freighters sunk 

1 steamer destroyed, 3 beached 

3 transports or supply steamers severely damaged. 

1 light cruiser - 250 kg. bomb on stern 

1 light cruiser - 250 kg. bomb on forecastle 

(For particulars see Air Force Events of the Day.) 

The 5th Air Force has been directed to transfer a dive- 
bomber group to Trondheim as soon as possible. 



28 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Merchant Shipping 

War againgt Merchant Shipping : Since the Fuhrer's decree 
of 24 April 1940 established the .existence of a state of 
war with Norway, Norwegian merchantmen and their cargoes 
will he fundament ally treated as enemy in accordance with 
Prize Regulations, Article 10 onwards. 

After consultation with Reich Commissar Gauleiter Terboven, 
who reserves rights regarding treatment of Norwegian 
shipping in Norwegian ports for the purpose of centralized 
control of the whole economic area, Commanding Admiral, 
NoBway has issued the following directive to offices in 

"Treat neutral ships carrying contraband, 
according to Prize Law» For Norwegian ships 
I shall issue, in agreement with the Reich 
Commissar, individual instructions in every 
case. Former ruling stands for use as 
auxiliary vessels." 

Naval Staff explains the order in that requests by the Navy 
for shipping, including tankers, for military purposes are 
fulfilled in every case and that in these cases an agreement 
with Reich Commissar Terboven is only necessary on whether 
they are to be confiscated according to Prize Law without 
compensation or merely requisitioned while remaining the 
property of the shipping company. 

Commanding Admiral, Norway was informed to this effect. 
It is also necessary to clarify with the Commissar how far 
Norwegian cargoes on Norwegian ships are to be rejected by 
Prize Law. This always seems advisable if the cargo was 
destined for enemy powers. Commanding Admiral, Norway has 
been instructed to inform Oslo Naval Office in good time, 
as the representative of the Reich Commissar at the Prize 
Court in Hamburg, of all seizures under Prize Law. 

The treatment of foreign shipping and cargoes in Denmark has 
not yet been cleared up. Negotiations are in progress with 
the Foreign Office. 



29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political^ Importance 

1. Norway : 

Reports from Norway give the following picture of the 
situation in the entourage of the King of Norway: 
(dated 19 April) 

King Haakon, completely broken, in Northern 
Norway. His entourage split in two directions. 
Foreign Minister Koht and General Ruge, 
commanding the central Norwegian forces, are 
said to be ready to come to an agreement with 
Germany (?)• Prime Minister Nygaardsvold and 
General Laaka are sharply opposed to any 
agreement. Great despondency in the Norwegian 
High Command. The troops themselves are still 
resolved to resist outside the battle zone as 
the result of British propaganda. 

2. For reaction abroad to the Foreign Minister's 
statement, especially the official counter statement by the 
British Government, see Political Review No. 98. 

3. Sweden : 

The Swedish Military Attache' in Berlin again stated Sweden's 
unconditional desire to remain neutral and to be as 
benevolent towards Germany as possible. Swedish measures 
have rendered surprise landings in ports or on airfields 
impossible. Violations of the frontier near Kiruna would 
bring about the demolitions prepared, so that any despatch 
of ore would be impossible for at least two years. 

4. U.S.A. : 

The German Charge d f Affaires in Washington reports as follows 
on the attitude taken up by U.S. public opinion towards the 
Norway operation: 

1. The operation has proved that widespread and 
willingly believed reports about a state of 
exhaustion in Germany were false. 



29 April 1940 






Geamany was forced to take counter 
measures "by the British violation of 

Great Britain has been forced to use 
strong troop formations in Norv/ay for 
strategic and propaganda reasons. 

If Great Britain does not succeed in doing 
away with the German occupation of Norway 
she runs the risk of losing ftae war. 

All other neutrals, including Turkey, have 
received a lesson and a warning. 

There are many negative reactions opposed to the positive 


Feeling towards Germany has 
extraordinarily, especially 
West, which Is settled to a 
by Scandinavians. 

in the Middle 
great extent 


The American people have reached a state 
of excitement in which the interventionists 
have an easy game. The U.S.A. could 
influence the result of the war decisively 
without using their own troops, by increased 
deliveries and by the removal of the credit 

In conclusion, the Charge d' Affaires states: 

"While the election campaign is on, important 
decisions regarding foreign policy can only be 
expected under exceptional circumstances. Such 
circumstances would arise if Sweden or Holland 
were attacked. The situation in the Pacific 
would preclude full U.S. support for the Allies. 
The U.S.A.'s entry Into the war would necessitate 
complete military and economic mobilization, for 
which the organizational and financial basis is 
at present still lacking. The prospects of 
Roosevelt's re-election have increased 





29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff 
Special Items 

!• The supply ship NORDMARK reports her position as 
79°N, 2.5°E and requests permission for privateer warfare 
in northern waters. Group West has granted the request 
and suggests that the ship operate first in northern waters 
and then in the Atlantic on cruiser warfare, since there 
are no other assignments for her at present. 

Naval Staff thinks otherwise and cannot agree to the Group's 

proposal. Use in cruiser warfare for which the ship, as a 

tanker and supply ship, is in no way specially suitable, 

does not correspond to the main assignments scheduled for 

her. She should only be considered for cruiser warfare 

when she has fulfilled her task as a supply ship or is C\£ 

released from it. Naval Staff is making every endeavor to 

send the battleships on sorties into the northern North Sea 

as soon as possible. If this plan has so far not been 

practicable, the reason is the deficient readiness of the 

destroyers, a minimum number of which must assume protection 

of the battleships. As long as we are still considering 

operations in northern waters in the immediate future the 

readiness of the NORDMARK in the northern area may be of 

great importance. Group West has been informed of Naval 

Staff's viewpoint and instructed that the NORDMARK is to 

be held in readiness away from all traffic. The ship's 

subsequent transfer to Base North is planned. 

2. The Fuhrer has learned of Naval Staff's plan to 
withdraw the cruiser EMDEN from Oslo. Because of the 
slight anti-aircraft defenses of Oslo harbor, the Fuhrer 
has decreed that the EMDEN is to remain in Oslo until 
sufficient anti-aircraft defense has been ensured. 

The Fuhrer also fears an undesirable withdrawal of defense 
forces from present, very urgent transport operations. 
Naval Staff sees a specially favorable opportunity for the 
return of the EMDEN at present, since there are still 
sufficient fast defense vessels available for anti-submarine 
escort in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. The EMDEN 's return 
would not cause any delay to transports. 

In accordance with the Fuhrer' s wishes, Chief, Naval Staff 
has ordered that the EMDEN remain in Oslo for the present. 
He will discuss the matter with the Fuhrer. 



29 April. 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

3. The Submarine School units (torpedo recovery 
vessels, anti-submarine unit) should return to the School 
on 1 May, since their presence there is urgently necessary 
for the training of officers and crews. Naval Staff does 
not fail to appreciate the difficulties of training, but 
does not feel in a position to withdraw the vessels now In 
view of the great urgency of transport, especially of the 
2nd Mountain Division. Group Baltic hes therefore been 
ordered to retain the units temporarily and keep them on 
transport duty. 

4. The Commander of the cruiser LUETZOW has suggested 
that, for the speedy re-establishment of the shlp^ war 
readiness after repairs are completed, the officers and crew 
should not now be completely separated or should anyway be 
re-assembled In good time so that the experiences gained 
during the first months of the war msy on no account be lost. 

With regard to the availability of two pocket battleships at 
the end of 1940, the Commander of the LUETZOW also suggests 
investigation of the question whether combine d operations by 
the two ships in close tactical conjunction V'ould not be a 
better guarantee for the greatest possible success than 
separate operations. He Is thinking of combined appearance 
in the North and South Atlantic, then simultaneous appearance 
singly In the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Bengal and Arabian Sea. 

Naval Staff completely agrees on the subject of maintaining 
or ensuring the personnel of the crew. 

According to previous Information from Naval (Ship) 
Construction Division, repairs to the ship will require about 
nine months. We can therefore expect readiness to proceed 
and commissioning again about the end of December 1940/ 
beginning of January 1941. 

So that the LUETZOW can be in operational readiness as soon 
as possible after commissioning but at latest by a date which 
still offers favorable conditions for the break-through into 
the Atlantic In the winter months 1940/1941 (i.e. end of 
February to end of March 1941 at the latest), also so that 
the experiences gained during the first Atlantic operation 
and during the period of preparation for the second (planned) 
operation should not be lost, the ship must be re commissioned 
by the personnel of the old crew. Prompt readiness for 
action for long-range operations cannot be expected otherwise. 



29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Instructions to this effect have been sent to Naval Staff, 
Service Division, Bureau of Naval Administration and 
Officer Personnel Department, 

The combined use of both pocket battleships in the Atlantic, 
proposed by the LUETZOVl^, can only be considered if both ships 
are ready for operations at the same time. As far as can 
be seen, the ADMIRAL SCHEER will be ready for operations 
about October 1940, the LUETZOW about the end of February 
to March 1941, so that the possibility of combined use cannot 
be counted upon. 

If, however, through unforeseen circumstances the ships should 
become ready at the same time, the question of combined or 
separate action, in accordance with the strategic situation, 
and of the objective to be achieved by use of the pocket 
battleships in the Atlantic will have to be reviewed. 

Since the pocket battleships' assignment is not action, 
but attainment of a strong diversionary effect, it is true 
that close tactical connection would force the enemy to 
appear in greater strength; he would, however, have only 
one area and one task force to take into account. 

In principle it therefore seems practical to separate the 
two pocket battleships, but to have Naval Staff bring them 
together for a combined operation on occasion. 

Naval Staff is keeping in mind the question of operations 
against the British-Norwegian whaling fleets during the 
winter of 1940/41. The pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER 
and the auxiliary cruisers then in readiness would come 
into question for such an operation. 

Survey of the Situation 
Special Reports on the Enemy 
Atlantic/Mediterranean : 
Great Britain ; 
Scheveningen radio announces: 



29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

"It Is forbidden to anchor in the Straits of 
Dover north of the line connecting Dungeness 
and Cap d'Alprech, with the exception of the 

Forces in the Mediterranean ; 

The MALAYA and ROYAL SOVEREIGN in the western Mediterranean, 
apparently en route for Malta. A "C" class cruiser is in 
the Rhodes area, single auxiliary cruisers in the Lemnos area. 

The submarines already In the Mediterranean, USIRIS, ORPHEUS, 
OTUS and OTWAY, and the submarines proceeding from East Asia 
and ODI, which were in the Red Sea on 27 April, are to form 
the 1st Submarine Flotilla in the Mediterranean. 

France : 

Patrol service in the eastern Channel and merchant control 
off the Scheldt estuary. 

Mediterranean : 

The BRETAGNE, LORAINE, and PROVENCE, also two destroyers, 
put in to Algiers on 28 April. The ships were last detected 
on 18 April in Oran. 

North , Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Admiralty announcement: 

"Mines laid in West Fjord as far as north of the 
line stretching towards 12°E, i.e. from Vaer8v 
Island light, 67°39'N, 12°45»E as far as the 
mainland. Mines likewise laid in the channels 
northeast and south of Steinvaer Island, SQQIO'N, 
16 35'E. Ships traversing these areas without 
obtaining instructions from the local British 
or the Norwegian authorities, do so at their 
own risk." 

Narvik area : 

Customary warship activity off Narvik. Air reconnaissance 
reported six destroyers off Narvik and cruisers, destroyers 
and transports off Harstad. 



29 April 19,40 CONFIDENTIAL 

Namso3 area ; 

Two cruisers, several destroyers and transports, also three 
auxiliary vessels off Namsos and in Namsen Fjord. The town, 
railroad station and harbor installations of Namsos were 
destroyed in an air raid. 

Molde Fjord-Andalsnes : 

One cruiser, several transports sighted by air reconnaissance. 
Successful air attacks on transports and supply steamers, 
three of which were sunk and several damaged. No unloading 
was observed. 

Home area : 

The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS, with destroyer escort, and the 
cruiser ARETHUSA planned to put in to Scapa on 28 April. 

Losses : 

The Admiralty announces the loss of two trawlers through bomb 
hits. It appears from radio deciphering that the anti- 
aircraft cruiser CURACAO was damaged on 24 April by a bomb 
hit in the engine and boiler room. 

The Admiralty denies the sinking or damaging* of 5 steamers 
and 13 transports reported by Germany. 

Own Situation ( 

Situation on lan^. : 

Group Narvik reports reinforcement of the enemy who attacked 
our defenses near Elvenes with superior forces. Defenses 
had to be withdrawn. Own situation is judged to be serious 
if the Air Force does not succeed in bringing considerable 
relief. Narvik reports successful intervention of planes 
so far in action; apparently great effect on enemy. 



29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Trondheim Group advanced as far as Stflren from the north. 
The most forward units of the 196th Division, coming from 
the south, are near Ullsberg 45 km. before StBren. 
Greatest difficulty in advancing, since all the bridges 
are blown up and the enemy is firmly entrenched. The 
east group encountered strong resistance near Rflros. 
Situation completely cleared up in south Norwegian area; 
Bergen unit advancing quickly. 

With regard to the situation in the Trondheim area, Armed 

Forces High Command, Operations Staff requests that the 

2nd Mountain Division be brought over very quickly. It 

is hoped that transportation will be completed by 8 May. 
(16,000 men, 4,000 horses.) 

Situation at Sea: 


No defense from land possible against the constant warship 
activity off Narvik. 

Trondheim : 

Nothing special to report. 

Bergen : 

Unsuccessful bombing attacks were made on a STINNES steamer 
off Eide and on the tank installations near Grimstad Fjord. 
Sixty men from the crews of the steamer AFRIKA and a STINNES 
steamer were freed in Voss. Discharging of the "export" 
steamer BAERENFELS continues. 

Admiral, West Norwegian Coast reports that the Hardanger 
Fjord torpedo battery is ready for action. 

The torpedo battery in Sogne Fjord will probably be in 
readiness by the end of the week. 

The #4 cm. battery at Sandvigen has had firing trials and 
is ready for action. 



29 April 1940 


Admiral, West Norwegian Coast plans to mine Sogne Fjord 
with captured Norwegian mines during the night of 30 April, 

In view of, 
points out 

instructions from the British Commanding Admiral, 
to a boat in Bjorne Fjord, picked up by the Radio 
Service, Admiral, West Norwegian Coast again 
the danger from submarines in the fjords off 

Southern North Sea: 

A minelaying formation of Commander, PT Boats sailed as 
planned to reinforce the Skagerrak mine barrage against 
submarines by mines with antenna firing. 

Mine Situation : 

Entrance to the Ems still endangered by mines. North Sea 
Station requests the immediate provision of the vessels 
requested for use of cable remote clearance gear, since 
remote clearance gear can only be streamed up to wind 
strength 3. 

Transport traffic from and to Stavanger has so far proceeded 
as planned. According to course instructions from Group 
West, the steamers proceed, according to their speed, west 
of the Skagerrak or along the coast to cross the Skagerrak 
by the shortest route. Escort is provided by PT boats 
and the Naval Air Arm. 

Skagerrak/Kattegat : 

Attacks on submarines north of Skagen, south of Oslo Fjord, 
east of LHs8. Submarine-chase probably successful in two 
cases (5th Submarine-Chaser Group and 17th Submarine-Chaser 
Flotilla), one submarine very probably being destroyed 
east of Lflsfl. 



Mine situation unchanged. Planned minesweeping and clearing 
delayed by the weather. Laying of net barrage near 
Seelands Rev continues. 

Transport Situation: 

Transport movements continue as planned under the protection 
of units of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, 
Naval Air, Baltic. Fast troopships to Oslo (2,100 men) and 
Larvik (780 men). Transport of material on drifters and 
return voyage of empty steamers unmolested. 

Situation in Denmark : 

Group Baltic has been ordered to commence negotiations 
through Coastal Defense Commander, Denmark with the Danish 
Navy about the use of Danish naval vessels for tasks In 
Danish waters. 

The aim of the agreement ia the Inclusion of Danish forces 
in the execution of assignments concerning both Navies. 
Danish sovereignty will be fully maintained . Tasks for 
the Danish formations to be used are to be assigned by the 
Danish Navy; we control and supervise activity In agreement 
with the Danish Naval Staff. 

The following tasks are planned: 

1, Minesweeping in Danish waters and also, 
according to Group Baltic, in areas of the 
entrances to the Baltic, along the Danish 
coast and on certain shipping routes. 

2. Patrol in Danish waters and in areas 
allocated by Group Baltic. Harbor defense 
tasks, patrol of Danish mine barrages, anti- 



29 April 1940 


mine and anti-aircraft escort service 
for merchant traffic are concerned. 

3. Observation service against enemy 
minelaying planes. 

4. Repair and maintenance of Danish mine 

Group Baltic has been instructed to reach agreement about 
the vessels to be used and kept in commission for these 
tasks and if necessary also the seizure of mine-exploding 
vessels by the Danish Navy 
communications personnel, 
be left to the Danish Navy 
vessels with sweeping gear 
be mentioned to the Danes 

and possible drafting of German 
The question of flags is to 
The equipment of Danish 
against ground mines is not to 
at present. 

Situation in the Atlantic : 

Ship "36" has been ordered to appear again in the North 
Atlantic, in case the QQQQ report from the tanker DONNAa 
originated from her. If necessary she is to change her 
operational area, since Naval Staff has the Impression 
that the enemy has not yet recognized the presence of a 
merchant raider in the North Atlantic. 

Submarine Situation 

Returned from operation: 

On return passage: 

In the operational area: 

Proceeding to Trondheim: 





"34", "17", 




"65", "61", 



"57", "58", 






U "A". 




29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Air Situation 

Air Force operations concentrated on aid for Narvik and 
armed reconnaissance in the Andalsnes-Namsos area. 

Two transports damaged off Andalsnes. Six transports 
and freighters sunk or destroyed in Molde Fjord and 
Trondheim Fjord. Two steamers damaged in Namsos Fjord. 
Air reconnaissance gained the impression that the enemy 
is evacuating Namsos. 

(For particulars see Air Situation 2400.) 

Merchant Shipping 

Scandinavian Shipping ; 

The Spanish Government has made a proposal to the Norwegian 
Government to take over the Norwegian ships now in Spanish 
ports, together with cargo. 

Reports come from the U.S.A. of representations made by 
U.S. trade circles to the State Department for unimpeded • 
traffic by Danish and Norwegian ships lying in neutral ports 
or transfer of their cargo. 

According to a communication from the head of the transport 
department of the people f s commissariat for foreign trade, 
there are no Danish and Norwegian ships in U.S.S.R. waters. 

It is reported from Chile that the Danish ships are 
remaining, while the Norwegians are putting out. 



29 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Supplement to 29 April 

1530 : Conference between Commander in Chief, Navy 
and the Fuhrer. 

Points discussed ; 

1. Further construction on the aircraft 


Fuhrer agrees to construction being 

2. The EMDEN is to remain a further two 
weeks or so in Oslo, until anti- 
aircraft defense of the port is 
sufficiently assured. 

3. Carrying out troop transports to 

(For particulars see Commander in Chief's memorandum, 
War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.) 



30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Items of Political Importance 

1. Norway : 

The Norwegian Government has issued en official statement 
from its unknown headquarters. It says: 

"The Norwegian Government has learnt from the 
radio of the German Government » a statement on 
26 April that it was at war with Norway. It 
must confirm that it has had knowledge of a 
state of war already since the night of 
8 April." 

Otherwise "the statement is directed against German 
operations and ends with the words: 

"The fight for freedom and independence goes on." 

Foreign Minister Koht gave his opinion on Ribbentrop's 
declarations and maintained that they represented a 
complete distortion of the facts. 

2. Italy : 

According to the report of an authoritative Italian, a 
change of mood has actually taken place in wide circles of 
the population since the Brenner conference and Ribbentrop's 
visit. There has been a return to the Axis, even though a 
section of the population is still not convinced of the 
necessity for Italian participation in the war. It is 
still important, however, he states, that the Church also 
should not conduct itself in an inactive or reluctant 
manner in such an event but take up some definite attitude 
\ to the question. 

3. Tangier : 

Diplomatic circles wish to ascertain whether Tangier will 
immediately be occupied by the Western Powers if there is 
conflict in the Mediterranean. 



30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

4. U.S.A. ; 

The B.B.C. announces that the U.S.A. have released the 
latest models in tanks and guns for sale abroad. 

Survey of the Situation 

Special Reports on the Enemy 

Atlantic/Mediterranean ; 

Great Britain: , 

Intelligence Center, Spain confirms that the MALAYA ana 
RESOLUTION sailed to the east from Gibraltar on 28 April. 
At 1100 on the same day, Admiral, Gibraltar ordered all 
warships and merchant ships lying in the harbor to be 
ready to sail at four hours' notice. 

France : 

French radio traffic in the Mediterranean indicates greater 
activity by the forces there. The Admiralty was informed 
of the sailing at noon of four vessels from Blzerta, 
including at least one cruiser. The formation is probably 
proceeding into the western Mediterranean. 

Neutrals : 

An intelligence report from Constanta dated 25 April: 

"Crews of Italian ships are said to have stated 
that their ships have orders to return to Italy 
by the quickest route." 

North Sea/Northern Norway : 

Intelligence Center, Belgium reports departure of a French 
Expeditionary Corps, in the strength of a division, from 
Rouen and Le Havre. The Expeditionary Corps is said to 
consist of mountain artillery, a battalion of Chasseurs 



30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Alpins, four batteries of field artillery, engineers and 
one infantry regiment. British troops are also said to 
have left the port of Falmouth in the direction of Namsos 

Northern Norway ; 

Several naval vessels and transports in Gratangen Fjord 
north of Narvik. Further troop disembarkations. Group 
Narvik expects enemy attacks by greatly superior forces. 

Central Norway ; 

Enemy vessels in the area of Namsos, Molde and Kristiansund. 
One cruiser end destroyers in Namsos Fjord. Successful 
attacks by our Air Force. Air reconnaissance reported 2 
cruisers with 2 destroyers on northeasterly course 70 miles 
west-northwest of Stadtlandet and 2 cruisers on southwesterly 
course 30 miles north of this group. 

Southern Norway ; 

The submarine TRITON received a radio message in which she 
was informed of the appearance of mines south of Skudesnes 
inside the 100 fathom line and in which the entrance to 
Skudesnes Fjord west of Hvidings6*y was described as mine-free. 

Home area ; 

The aircraft carrier GLORIOUS put in to Scapa on 28 April 
with six destroyers. The anti-aircraft cruiser CURLEW at 
Scapa on 30 April. The anti-aircraft cruiser CURACAO, 
which was damaged by a bomb hit near Aalesund, plans to 
proceed to the Nore base. The cruiser PENELOPE in the 
area Shetlands-Norway. 

The Admiralty announces the loss of the submarines TARPON 
(1,090 tons) and STARLET (690 tons), also of the trawlers 



30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Own Situation 

Atlantic : 

Nothing to report. Enemy shipping routes passed on to 
the auxiliary cruisers (see radiogram 1100). The supply 
ship NORDMARK was instructed not to conduct cruiser warfare 
but to stand on and off in northern waters. 

North Sea/Northern Waters ; 

Narvik ; 

Light enemy forces bombarded roads on Herjfings Fjord, 
Enemy attack is expected on Elvenes with simultaneous advance 
from the southwest from Bogen. Air Force support urgently 

The Staff of Group Narvik is in Sildvlk. 

Nav8l and Air Force radio station in Narvik. 

Trondheim ; 

Nothing special to report. 

Bergen ; 

Minelaying operation in Sogne Fjord commenced by minelayers 
ULLER and TYR. The 15 cm. Army guns which were salvaged 
from the steamer BAERENFELS have been put at the disposal 
of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast by the Army for the 
purpose of coastal defense. Army personnel is being sent 
from Germany. 

Single prize steamers were despatched to home waters from 
Bergen via Stavanger. 

Southern North Sea ; 

Since the remote clearance gear is only capable of limited 
use in wide North Sea estuaries because of the prevailing 
weather, Group West requests an increased allocation of 
cable remote clearance gear with addition for shallow 
water. Increase in production is considered urgently 
necessary in view of losses of gear. Allocation of 
further mine-exploding vessels is requested. 




30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Everything is being done by High Command, Navy (Naval Staff, 
Service Division and Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater 
Obstacles Branch) speedily to bring the Groups' equipment of 
clearance gear against magnetic mines to a satisfactory 

Ship "40" confirms the destruction of an enemy submarine 
west of Tyboroen on the morning of 10 April by subsequent 
appearance of pieces of wreckage and other objects. 

Skagerrak/Kattegat ; 

The minelaying operation by Commander, PT Boats, West to 
extend the North Sea West Wall went as planned. Because 
controls broke down on the LEOPARD the boat was rammed by 
the minelayer PRET7SSEN and sank. The crew was saved 
except for one officer. 

The barrage lies ; from 57020. 5»N, 5°3.5'E 

to 57°38.3'N, 4°54» E. 

482 EMD mines without contact setting, 
depth-setting 3m., 
1,119 explosive floats, type D, 
depth-setting 6 m. 

Submarine warning northeast and east of Lasc*. Results of 
attack questionable. Air attack on submarine west of 
Skagen on 29 April was very probably successful according 
to observations subsequently reported. 



30 April 1940 


Mine Situation: 


Group Baltic suggests closing the northern entrance to the 
Sound "by a double net barrage. Gap in barrage off the 
coast of Seeland at 10 nw depth in order to mske possible 
Swedish traffic from Malmfl to Gothenburg even for the 
largest steamers. No pilot service, gap in barrage well 
marked, barrage patrol. 

Transport Situation : 

Transports of troops and material as planned. 

Mine Defense in the Baltic : 

Group West requests the setting up of new harbor defense 
groups in all important ports on the Baltic and Danish coast 
because of increasing threat from mines. (See radiogram 2017. 

Submarine Situation 

Put in to port: 

In the operational area 

Proceeding to Trondheim; 
U "A" is carrying: 

U "101" is carrying; 

On return passage: 

U "34". 

U "25", "65", "61", "30", 
"13", "57", "58", "59", 
"14" "24" 

U "A",'"32"/"101". 

185 cbm. aviation gasoline. 

15 tons lubricating oil. 

2 x 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns. 

16 x 250 kg. bombs. 

60 cbm. aviation gasoline. 
1 x 8.8 cm. gun. 
8 x 250 kg. bombs. 

U "29", "17", "23". 



30 April 1940 


Air Situation 

See Air Force Events of the Day. 

During the attacks in the Namsos-Andalsnes area a cruiser 
(flotilla leader) was severely damaged by two 250 kg. hits 
and sank. Another cruiser damaged by a 250 kg. hit. 
Several transports and freighters damaged, one steamer sunk. 

The 9th Air Division carried out an aerial minelaying 
operation on the east coast of Britain; 23 aerial mines were 
laid. Attack from Dunkirk to Blyth. Fighter and anti- 
aircraft defense in Dunkirk. Barrage balloons on barges 
500 m. south of the southern mole on the Tyne estuary. 

Enemy air raid on Oslo during the night of 29 April. 
Attacks in waves on Stavanger in the afternoon; 8 British 
planes shot down so far; 4 of our fighters lost. 

Merchant Shipping 

The following ships are reported as under construction in 
Danish yards for foreign or Danish account: 



British motor 

ve s s e 1 

9,100 GRT 

rt tt 


11,000 GRT 

Norwegian " 


3,100 GRT 

Danish " 


1,836 GRT 


(Passenger ship) 

n ft 


9,900 GRT 


British " 


9,100 GRT 
(Steam tanker) 
43,936 GRT 
(Roughly completed). 



30 April 1940 



Keel laid down: 

For France 
n U.S.A. 
" Chile 
" Norway 
" Denmark 

1 ship 10,700 GRT 
1 " 9,400 GRT 
1 w 3,300 GRT 
5 ships about 38,000 GRT 
7 ships about 46,000 GRT 

107,400 GfcV 

Conference on the Situation 

with Chief, Naval Staff 

Special Items 


1. Fleet Command requests (in gkdos 764 A3) a longer 
period of training for the battleships, HIPPER and also the 
destroyers in the Baltic, since the present state of training 
is judged to be quite insufficient. 

For operational reasons Group West adopts a negative 
attitude to the request. 

Naval Staff agrees with the Group Command's opinion and 
has come to the following decision: 

"The special situation which has arisen from the 
Norwegian assignment and can still be regarded 
as by no means settled and the new tasks for 
the Navy expected to arise from Operation 
"Gelb" require that a special standard be applied 
to the points raised by Commanding Admiral, 
Fleet. rt 

It is known that training in the sense of a systematic 
peacetime training cannot be carried out to the desired 
extent; on the other hand the forces in action have so far 
done full justice to the demands made on them. A certain 
amount of training in operations themselves must be taken 
into account. 

The operational situation does not at the present time 
permit us to dispense with the battleships. Widespread 
use of the ships is still to be one of our endeavors. 



30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Operations which take place must, however, make allowance 
for the material state of readiness of the ships. A 14-day 
training period in the Baltic Sea, i.e. away from the 
operational base line of the Heligoland Bight, also cannot 
be granted at present; its possibility will depend on the 
development of the situation. 

A decision to commence a 10-week dockyard period is 
likewise still impossible^. 

When listing the necessary work all possibilities must be 
exhausted and* only the essentials worked out, in an attempt 
to shorten the dockyard period. 

Destroyers ; A dockyard overhaul of the destroyers SCHOEMANN, 
BEITZEN and HEINEMANN, at present still able to proceed, 
seems unavoidable. It is to be commenced when the 
destroyers at present In dock have attained full readiness 
for action. The latter are to commence a training period 
of 14 calendar days at most in the North Sea, if necessary 
also in the Baltic, after completion of the dockyard period. 
It must be possible to have recourse to them for operational 
use at any time. 

It remains to be seen whether the operational situation will 
permit the full execution of such training (especially in 
the Baltic). 

The new torpedoboats are not to be included in calculations 
of light forces ready for use. Their final readiness for 
action is still a matter of complete uncertainty. 

The fundamental evil with regard to the complaints about 
lack of training is the constant change of personnel. 
Every endeavor must be made, in certain circumstances even 
accepting disadvantages for the individual or abandoning 
certain conditions of promotion, to limit drafting to a 

2. The Fuhrer has decreed Investigation of the question 
as to whether transport of the 2nd Mountain Division to Norway 
can be speeded up by the use of the East Asia steamers 
GNEISENAU and POTSDAM. The investigation has shown that in 
practice there would be no speeding-up but rather a delay as 
against normal transport in view of the four or five days 
required to fit up the ships and their poor facilities f6r 
carrying horses and gear. 



30 April 1940 CONFIDENTIAL 

Chief, Naval Staff has therefore decided: 

2nd Mountain Division is not to be carried on 
the GNEISENAU/POTSDAM but by previous transport 
facilities. The GNEISENAU and POTSDAM are, 
however, in any case to be fitted up as troop- 
ships in case fast transports are necessary- 
later on. 

3. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered the formation of 
numerous motor boat flotillas for use on defense and 
reconnaissance tasks in the Norwegian fjords. Consideration 
is to be paid to defense of the bases, especially Bergen and 
Trondheim, against attacks by enemy PT boats. (Creation of 
boom defenses, if necessary quick-firing barrage batteries, 
advance defense and patrol positions.) 


4. Report on the Situation on Land ; 

The unit in the Gudbrand Valley advancing in pursuit of the 
retreating enemy reached the railroad and road junction of 
Dombaas. Land communication with Trondheim via Ullsberg- 
Stflren was established. The main railroad line from Oslo 
to Trondheim also fell into our hands through the occupation 
of Opdal. Strong Norwegian units surrendered. 

The Western Powers' attempt to oppose Germany's occupation 
of southern Norway and to encircle Trondheim can thus be 
regarded as a failure. Southern Norway as far as north of 
Trondheim is now safely in German hands. The situation of 
the Allied troops landed south of Trondheim can be described 
as hopeless. We can expect speedy and complete pacification 
of the occupied area. 





Cover name for Bergen. 

Cover name for Trondheim. 

Standard mine, type C; a contact mine against 
surface vessels. 


Plummet sinker mine with contact firing (old model). 

Cover name for planned invasion of the Low Countries 

Cover name for Copenhagen. 

Cover name for Narvik. 
SC (250,500) 

Thin-shell high-explosive bombs. 
SD (50) 

Thick-shell high-explosive bombs. 
" We s e rue bung" 

Cover name for planned invasion of Norway. 
"Weseruebung Sued" 

Cover name for planned invasion of Denmark.