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FOR E. B. MILLER
■ S. MARIN
F.'. LEAVENWORTH, KANS.
DEC 9 1921
U. 5. War- depf. breneval -fa£
THE
WAR WITH GERMANY
A STATISTICAL SUMMARY
LEONARD P. AYRES
Colonel, General Staff
CHIEF OF THE STATISTICS BRANCH OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Second Edition with data revised to August 1, 1919
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1919
IP REPLACE LOE^ CttRF-
f]
DEC \ 0 1958
"p
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION.
War Department,
Washington, May 10, 1919.
Sir : Now that the negotiations of the peace commission are draw-
ing to a close there is general desire for a stock-taking of the efforts
made and the results achieved by the United States in the war. In
addition to the other reports being prepared by the different divisions
of the War Department there is need for a statement which shall
set forth the significant facts and figures with respect to those major
steps in our military preparation and action which, taken together,
constitute the record of our participation in the war.
These main steps are not difficult to distinguish from the innumer-
able details connected with them. They include such major enter-
prises as raising the men, training them, transporting them overseas,
furnishing small arms, artillery, and airplanes, conducting battle
operations, and caring for the sick and wounded. It is important
that there should be available at an early date an authoritative ac-
count giving the important facts about these consecutive operations
of the war so that the more detailed reports that are beginning to
appear may be judged in their proper setting and perspective.
For these reasons I wish you would have prepared as promptly as
possible a brief and simple statistical report showing what was ac-
complished by the department and the cooperating agencies during
the war.
Very truly, yours,
Newton D. Baker,
Secretary of War.
Col. Leonard P. Atres,
Chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff.
3
LETTER OF TRANSMISSION.
War Department,
Washington, May 31, 1919.
Sir: In accordance with your instructions there is transmitted
herewith a statistical summary of the larger steps in the military
preparation and action of the United States in the late war. The
data presented have been compiled by the several sections of the
Statistics Branch of the General Staff. In the main they set forth
facts taken from the reports made by the Branch each week during
the war to the President, to yourself, and to the Chief of Staff.
These have been supplemented by facts and figures secured from the
offices of the Statistics Branch maintained during the war at General
Headquarters and at the headquarters of the Services of Supply in
France. Some of the data have also been secured from the office of
the Statistics Branch maintained at the headquarters of the American
Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. Other data have been
taken from the reports of the Interallied Bureau of Statistics, of
which the Statistics Branch has been the American agency, and from
the files of the Supreme War Council at Versailles with which the
Branch has maintained close contact.
While it is still impossible to secure final figures on some points
or entirely reliable ones on others, care has been taken to insure such
degree of reliability in the data presented as is reasonably feasible.
Since most of the data have been taken from compilations which
have been currently maintained for many months, and which have
been subjected to repeated checking and revision, it is believed that
they are in the main fairly trustworthy.
Very truly, yours,
Leonard P. Afres,
Colonel, General Staff, Chief of /Statistics Branch.
Hon. Newton D. Baker,
Secretary of War.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page.
Letter of instruction 4
Letter of transmission ~~ " g
List of diagrams 9
List of tables _______ 10
List of maps : -^
Figures of American participation in the war
Chapter I. Four million men : 13
The men who served ^T~T~T~n
The American Expeditionary Forces and the British Lx- ^
peditionary Forces
Army at home and in France—
The selective service Q^
Rejections for physical reasons
200,000 officers—- 22
The share of each State ^
Summary :
II. Six months of training: 9g
The average man 25
The divisions 2g
Camps and cantonments
Instructors for training 4,000,000 men ^
French and British instructors
Length of training
Summary
III. Transporting 10,000 men a day : ^
Sending the troops overseas o§
Growth of the transport fleet °
Where the ships came from ^
Embarkation and debarkation
Help from the Allies 44
Cargo movement ;
Losses at sea
Return of troops 4g
Summary
IV. Food, clothing, and equipment : ^
The problem of purchase
Machinery of distribution "
Narrow-gauge railways and motor trucks
47,000 telegrams a day 5?
Construction in the United States
Construction in the A. E. F ^
Food and clothing at the front
Summary "."
b TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Chapter V. Springflelds, Enfields, and Brownings : page.
Rifles ( g3
Machine guns 65
Rifles and machine guns used in Prance 68
Pistols and revolvers 69
Small-arms ammunition 69
Arms and the men 69
Preparing for the campaign of 1919 71
Summary ; 72
VI. Two thousand guns on the firing line :
Artillery 73
Artillery ammunition 75
British and American artillery production 77
Smokeless powder and high explosives 77
Toxic gases 78
Tractors and tanks SO
Our artillery in France SO
Guns needed v. guns available S2
Summary 83
VII. Airplanes, motors, and balloons :
Prewar equipment 85
Training S5
Training planes and engines 87
Service planes 88
Service engines 90
Raw materials 91
Accessories 92
Balloons 93
Forty-five squadrons in action «_i 94
Important operations 96
Chateau-Thierry 96
St. Mihiel 97
Meuse-Argonne 97
The test of battle ^ 9S
Summary 99
VIII. Two hundred days of battle :
Two out of three 101
Tipping the balance of power 103
Thirteen battles 105
German offensives 106
Allied offensives 107
Battle of St. Mihiel 10D
Battle of Meuse-Argonne 111
Records of 29 combat divisions 113
Summary 118
IX. Health and casualties :
The deadliest war 119
Battle deaths by services 121
Wounded, prisoners, and missing 122
Battle and disease losses 123
The control of disease 125
Venereal disease 127
Hospitalization 128
Summary 129
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Chapter X. A million dollars an hour : Page.
Total war expenditures 131
Army expenditures 133
Where the dollar went 134
Permanent assets 134
War expenditures of all nations 134
Summary 135
Some international comparisons :
Duration of war 137
Cost of war 138
Battle deaths 139
Per cent of front held by each army 140
Ration strength 141
Guns organized in batteries 142
Airplanes in each army 143
Airplanes per 100,000 men 144
Production of ordnance 145
Merchant shipping lost 146
Merchant shipping before and after the war 147
National debts 14S
Comparative strength of armies 149
Index 151
DIAGRAMS, TABLES, AND MAPS.
LIST OF DIAGRAMS.
Page.
Diagram 1. British and American forces on western front 1-1
2. Thousands of soldiers in Army each month 15
3. Sources of the Army 16
4. Male population registered and not registered 18
5. Thousands of men drafted each month 19
6. Sources of the commissioned personnel 22
7. Soldiers furnished by each State 23
8. Composition of National Guard divisions 27
9. Officers commissioned from training camps, by ranks 30
10. Officers commissioned from training camps, by services 30
11. French instruction officers 31
12. British instruction officers 31
13. Time from organization of divisions to entering line 33
14. Monthly sailings to France and home 37
15. Growth of the trans-Atlantic fleet 39
16. Growth of the cross-Channel fleet 40
17. American troops carried by ships of each nation 43
18. Turnarounds of transports 44
19. Cargo shipped by months 45
20. Cargo carried by corps 46
21. Time for converting cargo ships to troop transports 47
22. American production and Army purchases 50
23. Motor trucks needed and available 55
24. Costs of construction 58
25. Stocks of food in France 60
26. Springflelds and Enfields 64
27. Machine guns made in America 67
28. Small arms available 70
29. Artillery made in America 75
30. Artillery ammunition made in America 76
31. British and American artillery production 77
32. Gas 79
33. Artillery available " 82
34. Flying officers S6
35. Training planes and engines 88
36. Service planes 89
37. Service engines 91
38. Observation balloons 93
DIAGRAMS, TABLES, AND MAPS. 9
Page.
95
Diagram 39. Battle squadrons 96
40. Planes sent to zone of advance og
41. Hours of flying ~ 09
42. Airplanes and balloons brought down in action.— — ^
43. Divisions in France 1Q3
44. Front line held by each army ^
45. Rifle strength 114
46. Divisions in quiet and active sectors
47. Kilometers advanced against the enemy ^
48. German prisoners captured
49. Casualties by divisions 19Q
50. Battle deaths each week
51. Death rates of officers and men ^
52. Men missing in action ^
53. Total deaths— ^
54. Disease and battle deaths
55. Deaths by kinds of disease -
56. Deaths from disease, weekly rates ^
57. Venereal diseases ~g
132
58. Hospital beds in France
59. Cost of war per day ^~~
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
60. Where the dollar went
61. Cost of the war by nations—
62. Battle deaths by nations
63. Per cent of front held by each army
64*. Ration strengths of each nation. —
65. Artillery of each nation
66. Airplanes of each nation
67. Airplanes per each 100,000 men
68. Production of munitions "~
69. Shipping lost 147
70. Merchant fleets of the nations ^
71. National debts 14q
72. Comparative strengths of the armies
68
68
81
LIST OF TABLES.
Page.
Table 1. Men registered and inducted OQ
2. Organization and sources of divisions ^
3. Clothing produced for the Army
4. Machine guns produced
5. American machine guns used in France ---
6. American artillery in France ^
7. Thirteen American battles
8. Data of the Meuse-Argonne battle ^
9. Battle deaths of the nations i22
10. American battle casualties 12g
11. Hospital construction 133
12. Army expenditures 135
13. War expenditures of the nations ^
14. Duration of the war
10 DIAGRAMS, TABLES. AND MAPS.
LIST OF MAPS.
Page.
Map 1. Results of physical examinations, by States 20
2. Camps and. cantonments 28
3. Where the ships came from 41
4. Embarkation and debarkation 42
5. American supply lines in France 53
6. American telegraph and telephone lines in France 56
7. Construction projects in the United States 57
8. Construction projects in France 59
9. German offensives 106
10. Allied offensives - 108
11. Battle of St. Mihiel - 110
12. Battle of the Meuse-Argonne 112
FIGURES OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR.
Total armed forces, including Army, Navy, Marine Corps, etc._ 4, 800, 000
Total men in the Army 4,000,000
Men who went overseas 2, 086, 000
Men who fought in France 1, 390, 000
Greatest number sent in one month 306, 000
Greatest number returning in one month 333, 000
Tons of supplies shipped from America to France 7, 500, 000
Total registered in draft 24,234,021
Total draft inductions 2, 810, 296
Greatest number inducted in one month 400, 000
Graduates of Line Officers' Training Schools SO, 568
Cost of war to April 30, 1919 $21, 850, 000, 000
Cost of Army to April 30, 1919 $13,930,000,000
Battles fought by American troops 13
Months of American participation in the war 19
Days of battle 200
Days of duration of Meuse-Argonne battle 47
Americans in Meuse-Argonne battle 1,200,000
American casualties in Meuse-Argonne battle 120, 000
American battle deaths in war 50, 000
American wounded in war 206, 000
American deaths from disease 57, 500
Total deaths in the Army 115, 500
11
Chapter I.
FOUR MILLION MEN.
THE MEN WHO SERVED.
About 4,000,000 men served in the Army of the United States dur-
ing the war (Apr. 6, 1917 to Nov. 11, 1918) . The total number of
men serving in the armed forces of the country, including the Army,
the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the other services, amounted to
4,800,000. It was almost true that among each 100 American citizens
5 took up arms in defense of the country.
During the Civil War 2,400,000 men served in the northern armies
or in the Navy. In that struggle 10 in each 100 inhabitants of the
Northern States served as soldiers or sailors. The American effort
in the war with Germany may be compared with that of the Northern
States in the Civil War by noting that in the present war we raised
twice as many men in actual numbers, but that in proportion to the
population we raised only half as many.
It would be interesting and instructive to make comparisons be-
tween the numbers in the American armies during the present war
and those of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, but unfor-
tunately this is most difficult to do fairly and truly. The reason for
the difficulty lies in the diverse military policies of the nations.
It was the policy of France, for example, to mobilize and put into
uniform most of the able-bodied men in the population who were
not beyond middle age. Some of these were sent into the combatant
forces and services of supply of the active armies. Thousands of
others were put at work in munitions factories. Others worked on
railroads or cultivated their farms. In general, it was the policy of
the Government to put its available man power into uniform and then
assign these soldiers to the work that had to be done, whether it was
directly military in nature or not.
In the United States it was the policy to take into the Army only
those men who were physically fit to fight and to assign them, save in
exceptional cases, only to work directly related to the ordinary duties
of a soldier. The work of making munitions, running railroads,
and building ships was done by men not enrolled in the armed forces
of the Nation.
13
14
THE WAR WITH GERMANY
The policies of the other Governments were all different from the
two just described. These are the reasons why accurate international
comparisons of armies will not be possible until figures are available
showing the numbers and lengths of service of the men in the com-
batant forces of the different nations rather than the figures now at
hand showing the total numbers called to the colors and placed on
the rolls.
THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY
FORCES.
There is, however, one comparison which may fairly be made.
This is the comparison between the American Expeditionary Forces
Troops
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
/
/
/
. —
7
f
1
• 8
/
/
/
/
1
/
r
1915 1916 1917 1918
Diagram 1. — British and American Expeditionary Forces
front.
on tlie western
and the British Expeditionary Forces. Both countries devoted their
major efforts to building up and maintaining their armies in France.
The results are set forth in diagram 1, which shows the strength of
the two forces at different dates.
The British curve mounts rapidly at first and falls off in the latter
part of the period. The American starts slowly and then shoots up
very rapidly. The British curve is in general convex in shape and
the American is concave.
The British sent to France many more men in their first year in
the war than we did in our first year. On the other hand, it took
FOUR MILLION MEN.
15
England three years to reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France
and the United States accomplished it in one-half of that time.
It must, however, be borne in mind that the British had to use
men from the beginning to fill gaps caused by casualties, while the
American forces were for many months built up in strength by all
the new arrivals.
1060
1149
883
996
646
516
icsa
ltrs
4W
1990
in
UNITED 5TATE5
AND
POSSESSIONS
Him
EXPEDITIONARY
FORCES I
578
572
(30
200 290 390 500 551 691 949 JlOO
APR. ttAV JUfl JUL AUS SEPT OCT MOV. DEC JAM. TEB MAR APR NAY JUM JUL AUG SEPT OCT fto'V DEC. JAM FEB WR APR rw j'u'fi Jul Aug
Diagram 2. — Thousands of soldiers in the American Army on the first of
eaeh month.
ARMY AT HOME AND IN FRANCE.
The most difficult feature of the American undertaking is to be
found in the concentration of the major part of the effort into the
few months of the spring and summer of 1918. When the country
entered the war it was not anticipated in America, or suggested by
France and England, that the forces to be shipped overseas should
even approximate in numbers those that were actually sent.
16
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
It was not until the German drive was under way in March, 1918,
that the allies called upon America for the supreme effort that car-
ried a million and a half soldiers to France in six months. Diagram
2 shows the number of soldiers in the American Army each month
from the beginning of the war and the number of them who were
overseas.
When war was declared there were only 200,000 in the Army. Two-
thirds of these were Kegulars and one-third National Guardsmen who
had been called to Federal service for duty along the Mexican border.
When the war ended this force had been increased to 20 times its size
and 4,000,000 men had served.
£?;>,
APRIL 19ir
TOTAL FOR WAR
Diagram 3. — Sources of the Army.
After the signing of the armistice, demobilization of troops was
begun immediately. As diagram 2 indicates, more than 600,000 were
discharged during December. Forces in this country were at once
cut to the lowest point consistent with carrying on the storage of
equipment and settlement of contracts, and the discharge of men
returning from overseas. In spite of the time necessary for return
of overseas forces, demobilization was carried forward more rapidly
in proportion to the number under arms than in any previous Ameri-
can war.
Diagram 3 shows the three sources from which the Army came.
More than half a million came in through the Kegular Army.
Almost 400,000 more, or nearly 10 per cent, entered through the
National Guard. More than three-quarters of all came in through
the selective service or National Army enlistments. Of every 100
FOUR MILLION MEN.
17
men 10 were National Guardsmen, 13 were Regulars, and 77 be-
longed to the National Army, or would have if the services had
not been consolidated and the distinctions wiped out on August 7,
1918.
THE SELECTIVE SERVICE.
The willingness with which the American people accepted the
universal draft was the most remarkable feature in the history of
our preparation for war.
It is a noteworthy evidence of the enthusiastic support given by
the country to the war program that, despite previous hostility to
the principle of universal liability for military service, a few months
after the selective service law was passed, the standing of the drafted
soldier was fully as honorable in the estimation of his companions
and of the country in general as was that of the man who enlisted
voluntarily. Moreover, the record of -desertions from the Army
shows that the total was smaller than in previous wars and a smaller
percentage occurred among drafted men than among those who
volunteered. The selective service law was passed on May 19, 1917,
and as subsequently amended it mobilized all the man power of
the Nation from the ages of 18 to 45, inclusive. Under this act,
24,234,021 men were registered and slightly more than 2,800,000 were
inducted into the military service. All this was accomplished in a
manner that was fair to the men, supplied the Army with soldiers as
rapidly as they could be equipped and trained, and resulted in a
minimum of disturbance to the industrial and economic life of the
Nation.
The first registration, June 5, 1917, covered the ages from 21 to 31.
The second registration, one year later (June 5, 1918 and Aug. 24,
1918), included those who had become 21 years old since the first reg-
istration. The third registration (Sept. 12, 1918), extended the age
limits downward to 18 and upward to 45. The total number regis-
tered with the proportion who were actually inducted into the service
is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. — Men registered and inducted.
Registration.
Age limits.
Registered.
Inducted.
Per cent
inducted.
21 to 31
/ 18 to 20
\ 32 to 45
18 to 45
10, 679, 814
1 13,228,702
325, 445
2,666,867
120, 157
23, 272
25
Third
1
7
Total
18 to 45
24, 234, 021
2, 810, 296
12
132966°— 19-
18
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
At the outbreak of the war, the total male population of the coun-
try was about 54,000,000. During the war some 26,000,000 of them,
or nearly half of all, were either registered under the selective-service
act or were serving in the Army or Navy without being registered.
Diagram 4 shows the percentages of the male population who were
included in each of the registrations and the proportion who were
not registered.
The experience of the Civil War furnishes a basis for comparing
the methods used and the results obtained in the two great struggles.
This comparison is strikingly in favor of the methods used in the
present war. During the Civil War large sums were paid in bounties
48%
op
.%
1* .REGISTRATION
\
REGISTERED
3^ REGISTRATION
g
&
J>
^ooo'
ooo
aft
Diagram 4. — Male population registered and not registered.
in the hope that by this means recourse to the draft might be made
umiecessary. This hope was frustrated and the draft was carried
through by methods which were expensive and inefficient. This may
be summed up by noting that during the War with Germany we
raised twice as many men as we raised during the Civil War, and at
one-twentieth of the cost. This does not mean one-twentieth of the
cost per man, but that 20 times as much money was actually spent by
the Northern States in the Civil War in recruiting their armies as was
spent for the same purpose by the United States in the War with
Germany. In this war 60 per cent of all armed forces were secured
FOUR MILLION MEN.
19
by the draft as compared with 2 per cent in the case of the Civil
War. Diagram 5 shows the number of men inducted through the
draft each month.
The columns and the figures of the diagram illustrate the manner in
which the men came into the service. In the fall of 1917 the first
half million came in rapidly. During the winter the accessions were
relatively few, and those that did come in were largely used as
401
249
Sap Pot Hot Deo Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jon Jul Aug Sep Pot Hoy
1917 1918
Diagram 5. — Thousands of men drafted each month.
replacements and for special services. In the spring of 1918 came
the German drive and with it urgent calls from France for unlimited
numbers of men. Then over a period of several months the num-
bers of new men brought into the service mounted into the hundreds
of thousands, and reached their highest point in July, when 400,000
were inducted. During the succeeding months the numbers fell off
considerably on account of the epidemic of influenza, and with
November the inductions ceased entirely due to the unexpected ending
of the war.
20
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
REJECTIONS FOR PHYSICAL REASONS.
Under the operation of the draft, registrants were given physical
examinations by the local boards in order that those men who were
not of sufficient physical soundness and vigor for military life might
be sorted out. After those who were found to be qualified for serv-
ice had been sent to camp, they were given another examination by
the Army surgeons, and additional men were rejected because of
defects which had not been discovered in the first examination.
An attempt has been made to compute from the records of these
two sets of physical examinations data which will show how the
men from the different States compared in their physical qualifica-
70 TO 80
^B 65 TO 69
V77A 60 70 64
■■ SO TO 59
Map 1. — Per cent of drafted men passing physical examination, toy States.
tions. Eesults are presented in map 1 on this page which shows four
classifications of the States.
First come those States which are indicated in outline. These are
the States which sent men of so high an order of physical condition
that from 70 to 80 per cent of them survived the two examinations
and were accepted into the military service. It is noteworthy that
these States constitute about one-quarter of all and are mostly
located in the Middle West. Next come the States from which 65 to
69 per cent of the applicants were accepted, and these are indicated
by light cross hatching. This group is about equal in numbers with
the first, and most of them are contiguous to the first group either
FOUK MILLION MEN. 21
on the east or west. The third group makes still poorer records.
Here from 60 to 64 per cent of the young men passed the tests. The
States are indicated by heavy diagonal bars. Most of them were in
the South and far West. Finally, there is a group of States, includ-
ing, like each of the other groups, about one-quarter of all, and indi-
cated on the map in solid black. Here are the States from which 50
to 59 per cent of the candidates were accepted. They are found in
the Northeast and the far West, especially in those portions of the
West which have in recent years become popular as health resorts
and so have attracted large numbers of physically subnormal people.
In general, it is noteworthy that the best records are made by those
States that are agricultural rather than industrial and where the
numbers of recently arrived immigrants are not large. Conversely,
most of the States making low records are preeminently manufac-
turing States and also have in their populations large numbers of
recently arrived immigrants.
Further analysis of the records of physical examinations shows
that the country boys made better records than those from the cities ;
the white registrants better than the colored ; and native-born better
records than those of alien birth. These differences are so consider-
able that 100,000 country boys would furnish for the military service
4,790 more soldiers than would an equal number of city boys. Simi-
larly, 100,000 whites would furnish 1,240 more soldiers than would
an equal number of colored. Finally, 100,000 native-born would
yield 3,500 more soldiers than would a like number of foreign-born.
The importance of these differences may be appreciated by noting
that 3,500 men is equivalent to an infantry regiment at full war
strength.
2 0 0,000 OFFICERS.
About 200,000 commissioned officers were required for the Army.
Of this number, less than 9,000 were in the Federal service at the
beginning of the war. Of these, 5,791 were Regulars and 3,199 were
officers of the National Guard in the Federal service. Diagram 6
shows with approximate accuracy the sources of the commissioned
strength of the Army.
The figures show that of every six officers one had had previous
military training in the Eegular Army, the National Guard, or the
ranks. Three received the training for their commissions in the
officers' training camps. The other two went from civilian life into
the Army with little or no military training. In this last group the
majority were physicians, a few of them were ministers, and most
of the rest were men of special business or technical equipment, who
were taken into the supply services or staff corps.
22
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
THE SHARE OF EACH STATE.
A summary of the results attained is shown in diagram 7 on page
23, which gives the number of soldiers (not including officers) fur-
nished by each State. The bars are proportionate in length to the
total number of men furnished, whether by volunteering in the Eegu-
lar Army, coming in through the National Guard, or being inducted
through the draft.
SUMMARY.
1. The number of men serving in the armed forces of the Nation
during the war was 4,800,000, of whom 4,000,000 served in the Army.
2. In the War with Germany the United States raised twice as
many men as did the Northern States in the Civil War, but only
half as many in proportion to the population.
3. The British sent more men to France in their first year of war
than we did in our first year, but it took England three years to
Diagram 6. — Sources of the commissioned personnel.
reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France, and the United States
accomplished it in one-half of that time.
4. Of every 100 men who served, 10 were National Guardsmen, 13
were Eegulars, and 77 were in the National Army (or would have
been if the services had not been consolidated).
5. Of the 54,000,000 males in the population, 26,000,000 were
registered in the draft or were already in service.
6. In the physical examinations the States of the Middle West
made the best showing. Country boys did better than city boys;
whites better than colored ; and native born better than foreign born.
7. In this war twice as many men were recruited as in the Civil
War and at one-twentieth of the recruiting cost.
8. There were 200,000 Army officers. Of every six officers, one had
previous military training with troops, three were graduates of
officers' training camps, and two came directly from civil life.
FOUK MILLION MEN. 23
Men Per cen*
New York 367,864 Mg" ^ EMMESMBMM 9.79
Pennsylvania 297.891 ■""B"Ba^^^;^?*^J^!^y f,9°
Illinois 251,074 — ^^— ^^^""P 6'68
Ohio 200,293 Mg^MMff, 5 . 33
Texas 161,065
Michigan 135,485
Massachusetts 132,610
Missouri 128,544
California 112,514
Indiana 106,581
Hew Jersey 105,207
Minnesota 99,116
Iowa 98,781
Wisconsin 98,211
Georgia 85.506
Oklahoma 80,169
Tennessee 75,825
Kentucky Z5»9£5
Alabama 74,678
Virginia 73,062
N. Carolina 73,003
Louisiana 6§,988
Kansas 63 ,428
Arkansas 61,027
fl. Virginia 55,777
Mississippi 54,295
S. Carolina 53,482
Connecticut 50,069
Nebraska 47,805
Maryland 47,054
Washington 45,154
Montana 36,293
Colorado 34,393
Florida 33,331
Oregon 30,116
S. Dakota 29,686
N. Dakota 25,803
Maine £4,252
Idaho }-!.2i6
Utah 17,361
Rhode Island 16,861
Porto Bico 16,538
Dist. of Col. 15,930
B. Hampshire 14,374
Hew Mexico 12,439
Wyoming Ht39?
Arizona 10,492
Vermont 9,338
Delaware 7,484
Hawaii
Nevada
Alaska
A.E.F.
Not allocated
Philippines
Total 3,757,624
Diagram 7.— Soldiers furnished toy each State.
Chapter II.
SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING.
THE AVERAGE MAN.
The average American soldier who went to France received six
months of training in this country before he sailed. After he landed
overseas he had two months of training before entering the battle
line. The part of the battle line that he entered was in a quiet
sector and here he remained one month before going into an active
sector and taking part in hard fighting.
The experiences of thousands of soldiers differ widely from the
typical figures just presented, but a careful study of the training
data of nearly 1,400,000 men who actually fought in France gives
the average results shown above. In summary they are that the
average American soldier who fought in France had six months
of training here, two months overseas before entering the line, and
one month in a quiet sector before going into battle.
THE DIVISIONS.
The Infantry soldier was trained in the division, which was our
typical combat unit. In the American Army it was composed of
about 1,000 officers and 27,000 men. Training and sorting organiza-
tions of about 10,000 men, known as depot brigades, were also
utilized, but as far as possible the new recruits were put almost im-
mediately into the divisions which were the organizations in which
they would go into action.
Before the signing of the armistice there were trained and sent
overseas 42 American divisions. The training of 12 more was well
advanced, and there were 4 others that were being organized. The
plans on which the Army was acting called for 80 divisions overseas
before July, 1919, and 100 divisions by the end of that year.
Table 2 lists the divisions that were organized and trained before
the signing of the armistice. The different columns show the num-
ber by which each division was designated, the camp where it was
trained, and the States from which its members came at the time of
organization. In many cases the original composition was after-
wards greatly changed by bringing in replacements to make up for
losses.
25
26 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
Table 2. — Place of organization of divisions and sources by States.
Division.
Cam p.
States from which drawn.
Regulars:
1st
Regulars.
Regulars.
2nd
3rd
4th
Regulars.
Regulars.
Regulars.
Regulars.
Regulars.
5th
6th
McClellan, Ala
7th
8th
9th
10th
Regulars.
11th
12th
13th
Regulars.
14th
15th
Regulars.
Regulars.
16th
17th..
18th
Regulars.
19th
20th .
Sevier, S. C .
Regulars.
National Guard:
26th
27th
Wadsworth, S. C
New York.
29th
New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, District of Columbia
30th
Sevier, S. C
Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina.
31st...
Georgia, Alabama, Florida.
32nd
Michigan, Wisconsin.
33rd
Illinois.
34th
Cody,N. Mex
Nebraska, Iowa, S. Dakota, Minnesota, N. Dakota.
35th
36th
Texas, Oklahoma.
37th
Sheridan, Ohio
Ohio.
38th
Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia.
39th
Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana.
40th
Kearny, Calif
Fremont, Calif
Mills, N. Y
California, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico.
41st
Various States.
42nd
Various States.
National Army :
■ 76th
Devens, Mass
New England, New York.
77th...
Upton, N. Y
New York City.
78th..
Dix, N.J
Western New York, New Jersey, Delaware.
79th...
Northeastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, District of Co-
80th
Lee, Va
lumbia.
Virginia, West Virginia, Western Pennsylvania.
81st
North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Porto Rico.
82nd
Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee.
83rd
Ohio, Western Pennsylvania.
84th
Zachary Taylor, Kv
Kentucky, Indiana, Southern Illinois.
85th
Michigan, Eastern Wisconsin.
86th. . .
Grant, 111
Chicago, Northern Illinois.
87th
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Southern Alabama.
88th.
North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Western Illinois.
89th
Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Nebraska.
90th
Texas, Oklahoma.
91st
Lewis, Wash
Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho,
92nd
Nebraska, Montana, Wyoming, Utah.
93rd
Stuart, Va
Colored, various States.
The divisions are in three groups. The Regular Army divisions,
numbered from 1 to 20, were originally made up from Regular
Army units plus voluntary enlistments and selective-service men.
The National Guard divisions, numbered from 26 to 42, came in
largely from the militia of the several States. The National Army
divisions, numbered from 76 to 92, were made up almost wholly of
men called in by the selective-service law. As an aid to memory
it may be helpful to note that the Regular Army divisions were
SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING.
27
numbered below 25, the National Guard divisions from 25 to 50,
and the National Army divisions between 50 and 100.
All the divisions shown in the table reached France except the
12 Regular Army divisions numbered from 9 to 20. The divisions
being organized at the time of the signing of the armistice were num-
bered 95, 96, 97, and 100.
ntCA
O.fct
22"*
35™
42*d AVERAGE
Diagram 8.— Composition of National Guard divisions.
The sources of the National Guard divisions are shown in diagram
8. The black portion of each circle shows the part of each division
drawn from the National Guard; the shaded portion represents
troops drawn from the National Army and other sources; and the
unfilled gap in each circle represents the number of troops that the
division was short of its authorized strength when it sailed.
28
THE WAK WITH GERMANY.
Reference to the lower right-hand circle in the diagram shows that
the average composition of these National Guard divisions was one
made up of about two-thirds State troops and one-third other troops.
This illustrates the noteworthy fact that one tendency of the methods
of divisional organization was to produce composite divisions made
up of men from most varied sources.
The Forty-second Division, called because of its composite char-
acter the " Rainbow Division," was made up of selected groups from
over the entire country and sent to France early. The Forty-first,
called the " Sunset Division," was a composite of troops from many
Map 2 — Camps and cantonments.
Western States. Four divisions were made up from one State each :
the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third, and Thirty-
seventh.
CAMPS AND CANTONMENTS.
To carry forward the training program, shelter was constructed
in a few months for 1,800,000 men. For the National Guard and
National Army divisions, 16 camps and 16 cantonments were built.
National Guard units being organized rapidly during the summer
of 1917 were put under canvas in camps throughout the South; The
cantonments were largely in the North for the National Army
called in the fall of 1917. The location of these 32 training areas is
shown in map^on this page.
SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. * 29
One National Guard division, the Eainbow, required no training
field, for it was assembled directly at Camp Mills for early trans-
portation to France. Two National Army divisions, the Ninety-
second (colored) and the Ninety-third (colored), were trained in
separate units at various camps. The headquarters of the Ninety-
second were at Camp Funston and those of the Ninety-third at Camp
Stuart. The remaining 16 National Guard and 16 National Army
divisions began their training in the camps and cantonments in the
summer and fall of 1917.
The building of the cantonments was authorized in May, 1917 ; the
last site was secured on July 6, and on September 4 accommodations
were ready for 430,000 men. This capacity was shortly increased to
770,000, an average capacity per cantonment of 48,000. Construction
of the camps went forward at the same rapid pace. Although tents
were provided for housing the soldiers, a considerable number of
wooden buildings were necessary, as well as water supply, sewerage,
electric light, and roadway construction. The capacity of the camps
reached 684,000, giving a total camp and cantonment capacity of
nearly a million and a half.
The Regular Army divisions were trained in part at one or another
of these 32 centers, in part as separate units at various Army posts.
Troops had to be accommodated at many other points besides the
32 camps and cantonments. There were schools for training men for
special services, such as the Artillery, Aviation, Engineer Corps,
Chemical Warfare, Tank Corps, Quartermaster Corps. There were
proving grounds and testing fields. There were also large embarka-
tion camps at New York and Newport News. For these purposes
housing was constructed with a capacity for more than 300,000 men.
INSTRUCTORS FOR TRAINING 4,000,000 MEN.
In the American Army there is one officer for each 20 men. This
means that 200,000 officers were required for the army of 4,000,000
men. But when war was declared there were only 6,000 officers in
the Regular Army. The National Guard divisions were fortunately
able to furnish most of their own officers. After this source of sup-
ply had been exhausted, however, it was still necessary to secure some
180,000 officers elsewhere.
The officers' training camp was the instrumentality that really
solved the problem of securing the commissioned personnel of the
American Army. The successful precedents of the Flattsburg camps
were followed. Candidates for the camps were selected after rigid
tests as to physical and mental qualifications, many Reserve Corps
officers being included. Three months of inter. Qive training put the
prospective officers through all the tasks required of the enlisted man
30 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
and the duties of the platoon and company commander. This type
of training camp furnished the Army with nearly half its total
number of officers and more than two-thirds of those for line service.
Diagrams 9 and 10 show some details about the graduates of these
training camps.
Diagram 9 shows the ranks of the commissions granted. By far
the largest number of graduates were given the grade of second lieu-
Zfanber
Rank commissioned Par cent
Colonels
Lieutenant Colonels
Majors
Captains
First Lieutenants 12,397 L'^aiSaS 15.4
Second Lieutenants 62,445 ■■■■■■^■■■■1 77.5
Total 80,568
Diagram 9. — Officers commissioned from training camps, by ranks.
tenant, but exceptional ability, coupled with previous military train-
ing, was singled out in the first series of camps for more advanced
commissions.
Diagram 10 shows the numbers of officers commissioned in each
branch of the service. Infantry and Artillery absorbed seven-eighths
of the graduates with the Infantry taking more than twice as many as
the Artillery. The total of 80,568 is not the grand total of gradu-
Branch TTumber
of Service commissioned rer osn*
Infantry
48,968 ■Bgia^ l^^l 60.7
Field Artillery 20,291 ■■■^^■125.2
Quartermaster 3,067 H 3.8
Coast Artillery 2,063 ■ 2.6
Cavalry. 2,032 ■ 2.5
Engineer 1,966 ■ 2.4
Signal 1,262 I 1.6
Ordnance 767 I 1.0
Statistical 152 1.2
Total 80,568
Diagram 10.— Officers commissioned from training camps, by services.
ates of officers' training schools but only of schools training officers
for line duty. After the close of the second series of schools in
November, 1917, it was found desirable for various staff corps and
departments to conduct separate specialized schools for training their
officers and many commissions were granted in these staff schools in
addition to those shown in the diagram. The Quartermaster, Engi-
neer, Signal, Ordnance, and Statistical officers shown in diagram 10
were all graduated from the first two series of schools.
SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 31
FRENCH AND BRITISH INSTRUCTORS.
Shortly after the first of the new camps were established France
and England sent to the United States some of their ablest officers
who had seen service on the western front to bring to our training
approved methods developed in the war. These instructors were not
Subject of Instruction
Somber of
instructors
Per cent
Artillery
Liaison
43 BMHI
15.0
rs.
minor tactics
3i HBBBHB
■ 10.8
110.1
1 10.1
1 10.1
9.5
9.5
officei
Fortifications
29 mmaamm
Automatic rifles
29 ■■■■■
Hand grenades
29 mmnmm
Field and staff officers' course 27 l£E||33£B£Ji
Miscellaneous 27 BHHBBBB
Total 286
Diagram 11. — French instruction
numerous but the aid they rendered was of the first importance.
Diagrams 11 and 12 show how the subjects of instruction were
divided among them.
Diagram 11 gives the information for the French officers, who
were 286 in number. Their major specialties were Artillery and
staff work. Corresponding details for the English officers are shown
Somber of
Subject of instruction instructors Per cent
Gas
Physical training and bayonet
Machine gun
Sniping
Trench mortar
Company commanders * course
Miscellaneous
Artillery
Total 261
Diagram 12. — British instrnction officers.
in diagram 12. These military specialists were 261 in number and
much of their effort was devoted to instruction in gas and physical
training.
In addition to the officers shown, the British also detailed 226 non-
commissioned officers as instructors, who were assigned to different
subjects in about the same ratio as the officers. These groups of
foreign instructors attached to training schools, divisions, and other
units, rendered service out of all proportion to their number. They
were a significant contribution to our training program.
32 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
LENGTH OF TRAINING.
Of the 42 American divisions which reached France, 36 were organ-
ized in the summer and early autumn of 1917. The other 6 were or-
ganized as divisions by January, 1918, but had been in training as
separate units months before that time.
Although the average American soldier who fought in France had
been under training only six months before sailing, the figure for the
training of the divisions is greater than that. The main reason for
the difference is that gaps in the divisions were filled by men who had
received much less training than the original troops of the organiza-
tion.
The average division had been organized eight months before sail-
ing for France and its period of training was further lengthened by
a two months interim between the time the division landed in France
and the time it entered the line. Diagram 13 shows these periods for
each of the 42 divisions. Each division is represented by a horizontal
bar. The hollow part shows the period from organization to arrival
of headquarters in France; the lightly hatched part, the time in
France before entering line; the heavily hatched part, the time be-
tween entering the line for the first time and engaging in combat in
an active sector; and the solid portion the length of service as an
active battle organization.
The First and Second Divisions left this country as separate units
and were organized in France. The troops of which they were com-
posed were mostly thoroughly trained men of the Regular Army.
The Second Division also included two regiments of Marines. The
next three, while their stay in this country as organized divisions
was short, were composed of selected units of the National Guard,
most of which had seen service on the Mexican border and could be
counted as well-trained bodies of troops. All the other divisions
show extended periods of training in this country. The Regular
Army divisions show the shortest periods, but were made up of the
most experienced soldiers.
It is noticeable that all but two of the National Guard and Na-
tional Army divisions were organized in August and September,
1917. The two exceptions to the rule were the Twenty-ninth, whose
records show that it started the process of reorganization a few days
ahead of schedule, and the Ninety-second (colored) Division which
for a number of months trained in separte units at a number of
different camps.
The conclusion to be drawn from the diagram would seem to be
that the average American division entered battle only after 10 or
SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING.
33
Divi
eion
Jan J Feb [Mar | Apr JMay |jtm |jul [Aug |sep |Oct g
1917
1918
1 I Organization to arrival in Prance
X7Z%\ Arrival in France to entering line
H~3 Entering line to active battle service
SB Service as active combat division
Diagram 13.— Time from organization of divisions to entering line.
132966°— 19 3
34 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
11 months of thorough training. This is true of the skeletons of
divisions, but it is not true of all the men who made up their strength.
There are two reason for this. In the first place, some weeks or even
months usually elapsed from the time a division was organized to the
time when it reached full strength. In the second place, troops were
frequently taken from one division to bring up to strength another
which was sailing, or to be sent overseas to replace losses. The train-
ing of individual enlisted men was therefore less than for the divi-
sions as organizations.
The length of training of the men can be got at in another way.
By September, 1917, we had 500,000 men in this country training
for overseas duty. We did not have 500,000 men in France until
May, 1918, or eight months later. It is probable that the millionth
man who went overseas began training in December, 1917. He did
not reach France until July, 1918, after seven months of training.
Evidence of this character goes to show that for our first million men
the standard of seven months' training was consistently maintained
as an average figure.
In June with the German drives in full swing, the Allies called on
us to continue the extraordinary transportation of troops begun in
April. The early movement had been met by filling up the divisions
that sailed with the best trained men wherever they could be found.
Divisions embarked after July 1 had to meet shortages with men
called to the colors in the spring. By November the average period
of training in the United States had been shortened to close to four
months, and the average for the period July 1 to November 11 was
probably five months.
Seven months may then be taken as the average training figure for
the first million men, five months for the second million, an average
of six months before reaching France. After reaching France an
average of two months' training before going into front-line trenches
was maintained, although the experience of divisions used as replace-
ments in the last months was under this figure.
There were of course many cases in which the training was under
these averages. To make these cases as few as possible a number of
safeguards were set up. In this country a careful system of reporting
on training was arranged so that only the better trained divisions
might be sent forward. At the replacement centers in France the
men who had slipped through without sufficient training were singled
out and put through a 10 days' course in handling the rifle.
In the last months of the war, the induction of men was carried
forward at top speed and every device was used for hastening train-
ing. The result fully justified the effort. Into the great Meuse-
Argonne offensive we were able to throw a force of 1,200,000 men
SIX MONTHS OF TRAINING. 35
while we had many thousands of troops engaged in other parts of
the line. Our training-camp officers stood up to the test; our men,
with their intensive drilling in open-order fighting, which has charac-
terized American training, routed the best of the German divisions
from the Argonne Forest and the valley of the Meuse.
SUMMARY.
1. The average American soldier who fought in France had six
months of training here, two months overseas before entering the line,
and one month in a quiet sector before going into battle.
2. Most soldiers received their training in infantry divisions which
are our typical combat units and consist of about 1,000 officers and
27,000 men.
3. Forty-two divisions were sent to France.
4. More than two-thirds of our line officers were graduates of the
officers' training camps.
5. France and England sent to the United States nearly 800 spe-
cially skilled officers and noncommissioned officers who rendered most
important aid as instructors in our training camps.
Chapter III.
TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY.
SENDING THE TROOPS OVERSEAS.
During the 19 months of our participation in the war more than
2,000,000 American soldiers were carried to France. Half a million
of them went over in the first 13 months and a million and a half
in the last 6 months. Within a few weeks of our entrance into the
war we began, at the earnest request of our cobelligerents, to ship
To France
n-ri
MAY JUN JUL AUS SHTOCr MOV DEC JAtl FEB MARAPfi MAY JUM JUL AUS SOT OCT hOV DEC JAM FEB MAR APR HAY JUD
1917 1918 1919
Diagram 14.— Men sailing each month to France and home.
troops overseas. At first the movement was not rapid. We had only
a few American and British troop ships chartered directly ' from
their owners. During the early winter, as the former German liners
came into service, embarkations increased to a rate of nearly 50,000
per month, and by the end of 1917 had reached a total of 194,000.
The facts as to the transportation of troops to France and back to
the United States are presented in diagram 14, in which the upright
columns show the number carried each month.
37
38 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
Early in 1918 negotiations were entered into with the British Gov-
ernment by which three of its big liners and four of its smaller troop
ships were definitely assigned to the service of the Army. The results
of this are shown in the increased troop movement for March. It
was in this month that the great German spring drive took place in
Picardy, with a success that threatened to result in German victory.
Every ship that could be secured was pressed into service. The aid
furnished by the British was greatly increased. It was in May and
the four following months that the transport miracle took place. The
number of men carried in May was more than twice as great as the
number for April. The June record was greater than that of May,
and before the 1st of July 1,000,000 men had been embarked.
The record for July exceeded all previous monthly totals, the num-
ber of troops carried being more than 306,000. Before the end of
October the second million men had sailed from our shores. During
many weeks in the summer the number carried was more than 10,000
men a day, and in July the total landed averaged more than 10,000
for every day of the month.
No such troop movement as that of the last summer had ever been
contemplated, and no movement of any such number of persons by
water for such a distance and such a time had ever previously oc-
curred. The record has been excelled only by the achievement in
bringing the same men back to the shores of the United States. The
monthly records of this return are shown by the black columns of the
same diagram, which indicate the even more rapid increase of totals
from month to month and the attainment of higher monthly accom-
plishments. The total number of soldiers brought home in June was
nearly 360,000. If we add to this the sailors and marines, the total is
more than 364,000.
GROWTH OF THE TRANSPORT FLEET.
The necessity for creating a great transport fleet came just at the
time when the world was experiencing its most acute shortage of ton-
nage. The start was made by chartering a few American merchant
steamers and by the 1st of July there were in service seven troop
ships and six cargo ships with a total dead-weight capacity of 94,000
tons.
Diagram 15 shows how there was developed from these small be-
ginnings a great transport fleet which aggregated by the end of
1918 three and one-quarter million dead-weight tons of shipping.
The size of the fleet each month is shown by the figures in the bars
of the diagram. It will be noted that each bar is divided in two
parts, the portion on the left showing the dead-weight tonnage of the
troop ships and that on the right the tonnage of the cargo ships.
TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY.
39
During these same months another great American transport fleet,
of which little has been said in the public press, was created with
an almost equally striking rapidity. This was our cross-Channel
fleet, which carried cargo and men from England to France. Its
growth is pictured in the bars of diagram 16, in which the figures
also represent the number of dead-weight tons from month to month.
Beginning with 7,000 tons in October, 1917, this fleet consisted of
more than a third of a million tons by the end of 1918. About one-
fourth of the vessels were Swedish or Norwegian, while the rest
were American. This service utilized large numbers of small wood
1917 Jul.
1 1
|94
Aug.
1 1
■ 131
Sep*
1 I
■ 177
Oct.
1 1
(EH 268
ROV.
i i
BHE3I -
Dec.
i 0
1918 Jan.
l 1
Feb.
l |
%SUM£
Mar.
l 1
f^i*MM
Apr*
l 1
May
i 1
June 1 1
July 1 1
EEMSM
Aug.
l 1
Sep.
l 1
Oct.
l I
U07.
i 1
HHjB
Deo.
l 1
1919 Jan.
l 1
■ELSH
Feb.
i 1
liar.
l 1
■EH
Apr.
l 1
May
l 1
EJMSJS&
465
1200
2330
2700
2844
2591
2126
1839
Troop Cargo
Diagram 15. — The trans-Atlantic fleet in thousands of deadweight tons.
and steel vessels built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation at the
yards of the Great Lakes and along the coast.
WHERE THE SHIPS CAME EROM.
In building up our trans- Atlantic and Channel fleets every possible
source of tonnage had to be called on for every ship that could be se-
cured. The first great increment was the seized German vessels, which
40 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
came into service during the fall of 1917. The taking over of Dutch
steamers in the spring of 1918 and the chartering of Scandinavian
and Japanese tonnage accounted for great increases in the cargo fleet.
Map 3, on page 41, shows the amounts of tonnage that were secured
for our Army fleet from the different countries of the world.
The most ample credit must be given to the Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration, which turned over nearly a million tons of new ships, and
to the Shipping Control Committee, which stripped bare of all suit-
able vessels our import and export trades and turned over for Army
130
.taerican ' Swedish Norwegian
Diagram 16. — The cross-Channel fleet, in thousands of deadweight tons.
use nearly a million and a half tons of ships. The Army vessels also
came from 12 other nations well scattered over the globe and shown
in the figures of the map already referred to.
EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION.
Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York.
Half of them landed in England and the other half landed in
France. Most of those who landed in England went directly to
Liverpool and most of those who landed in France went to Brest.
While these statements are valid generalizations, they fall short in
showing what happened in detail. The principal facts of the east-
ward troop movement are shown in map 4, on page 42.
TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY.
41
Troops left America from 10 ports, as shown in the little table in
the left of the map. In this table the several ports of Hoboken,
New York, and Brooklyn have all been included in one, and the
same thing is true of the different ports at Hampton Roads, which
have been shown under the heading of Newport News.
While 10 American ports were used, including 4 in Canada, more
than three-quarters of all the men went from New York. The ports
of arrival are given in the tables on the right of the map, which
show that the ports of debarkation in Europe were even more nu-
merous than those of embarkation in America.
HELP FROM THE ALLIES.
Credit for the troop movement must be shared with the Allies, and
with the British in particular, since approximately half of the
Map 3. — Deadweight tons of American Army shipping secured from different
countries.
troops were carried in their ships. This is shown by the figures of
diagram 17.
Among every hundred men who went over, 49 went in British
ships, 45 in American ships, 3 in those of Italy, 2 in French, and 1 in
Russian shipping under English control. Part of the explanation
for the large numbers of troops carried in American ships is to be
found from the fact that under the pressure of the critical situation
on the western front, ways were found to increase the loading of our
own transports by as much as 50 per cent. In addition, our trans-
ports exceeded those of the Allies in the speed of their turnarounds.
The facts as to the average number of days taken by the ships
42
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
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■H tO ^- IO f> 03 83
v0 . 61 O
TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY.
43
to go to Europe, discharge their cargo and troops, come back, take
on another load, and start for France once more, are shown in
Diagram 18.
The cycle of operations is termed "a turnaround," and it is
not complete until the vessel has taken its load over, discharged it,
returned, reloaded, and actually started on another trip. When our
ships began operations in the spring of 1917 the average turn-
around for the troop ships was 52 days, and that for the cargo
ships 66 days. These performances were improved during the
summer months, but became very much longer during the excep-
tionally cold winter of 1917. During the spring, summer, and fall
of 1918 the performances of both cargo and troop ships became
Russian (British control) - 20,000 - 1%
French - 47,000 - 2$-\ \V
Italian - 65,000 - 3%-^ \\_
Total - 2,086,000
Diagram 17. — American troops carried by ships of each nation.
standardized at about 70 days for cargo ships and 35 days for troop
ships.
In noting these facts, as presented in the figures of the diagram,
it is to be borne in mind that the figures refer to the lengths of
the turnarounds of all the ships sailing from American ports in
one month. Thus the high figure of 109 days for the cargo ships
means that 109 days was the average time required for all the
cargo ships leaving American ports in November to complete their
turnarounds and start on their next trips. These vessels made
their trips in the exceptionally cold months of December, January,
and February.
44 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
The fastest ships have averaged under 30 days. During the spring
and summer of 1918 the Leviathan, the former Vaterland, has aver-
aged less than 27 days, as has the Mowrut Vernon, the former
Kronprinzessen Cecelie. These turnarounds, made under the em-
barrassment of convoy, are much quicker than anything attained
in commercial operation. During the summer the Leviathan has
transported troops at the rate of over 400 a day, and so has landed
J J A S 0 IT D JFMAMJJASOKD J F M
1917 1918 1919
Diagram IS. — Average turnarounds of troop and cargo transports in
days.
the equivalent of a German division in France each month. Two
American ships, the Great Northern and Northern Pacific, have
averaged 25 and 26 days, respectively, and have each made turn-
arounds in 19 days.
CARGO MOVEMENT.
The first shipment of cargo to support the forces abroad was made
in June, 1917, and amounted to 16,000 tons. After the first two
TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY.
45
months the shipments grew rapidly and steadily until they were in
excess of 800,000 tons in the last month of the war. These facts are
shown in diagram 19.
The shipment of cargo differs from that of troops in that it was
done almost entirely by American ships. Less than 5 per cent of the
cargo carried was transported in allied bottoms. The great bulk of
the cargo was carried in the cargo ships shown in diagram 15 on
page 39. Kelatively small amounts were carried in the troop ships.
629
536
Figures in
Thousands of Short Tons
•450
363
Jim Jul
Diagram 19.— Tons of Army cargo shipped to France each month.
Sep Oct Mot Pec Jan Feb Bar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb liar Apr
1917 1918 1919
After the signing of the armistice every ship was withdrawn from
the service as soon as it could be spared and put back into trades or
the carrying of food for relief work in Europe. By April the total
cargo fleet was only a third as large as it had been five months before.
The cargo carried for the American Army consisted of thousands
of different articles of the most varied sort. Something of this
variety is revealed by diagram 20, which shows the number of short
tons carried for each of the Army supply services and for the special
46 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
agencies. Nearly one-half of all consisted of quartermaster material,
largely composed of food and clothing. The next largest elements
were engineering and ordnance supplies. All together, from our en-
trance into the war through April, 1919, the Army shipped from
this side of the Atlantic nearly seven and a half million tons of cargo.
Included in the cargo shipment were 1,791 consolidation loco-
motives of the 100-ton type. Of these, 650 were shipped set up on
their own wheels, so that they could be unloaded on the tracks in
France and run off in a few hours under their own steam. Ship-
ment of set-up locomotives of this size had never been made before.
Special ships with large hatches were withdrawn from the Cuban
ore trade for the purpose and the hatches of other ships were spe-
Short tons
Quartermaster 3,606,000
Engineer 1,506,000
Ordnance 1,189,000
Pood relief 285,000
Motor Transport 214,000
French material 208,000
Signal Corps 121,000 | 1.62
Medical 111,000 | 1,49
Aviation 61,000 | .82
Red Cross 60,000 | ,81
Y.M.O.A. 45,000 |.60
Miscellaneous 35,000 | ,47
Chemical Warfare 11,000 | .15
Total 7,452,000
Diagram 20. — Tons of cargo shipped for each. Army supply service to
April 30, 1919.
cially lengthened, so that when the armistice was signed the Army
was prepared to ship these set-up locomotives at the rate of 200 a
month.
The Army also shipped 26,994 standard-gauge freight cars, and
at the termination of hostilities was preparing to ship flat cars set
up and ready to run. Motor trucks to the number of 47,018 went
forward, and when fighting ceased were being shipped at the rate
of 10,000 a month. Eails and fittings for the reinforcing of French
railways and for the construction of our own lines of communica-
tions aggregated 423,000 tons. In addition to the tons of cargo men-
tioned above the Army shipped 68,694 horses and mules, and at
the cessation of hostilities was shipping them at the rate of 20,000
a month. The increase in the shipment of cargo from the United
States was consistently maintained from the start of the war, and at
its cessation was undergoing marked acceleration.
TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY. 47
Aside from the cargo shipped across the Atlantic, Gen. Pershing
imported large amounts from European sources, the chief item being
coal from England. In October he brought into France by means
of his cross-Channel fleet a total of 275,000 tons of coal and other
commodities.
LOSSES AT SEA.
During the whole period of active hostilities the Army lost at sea
only 200,000 deadweight tons of transports. Of this total 142,000
tons were sunk by torpedoes. No American troop transport was
1918 1919
Diagram 21.— Average days required to convert cargo ships to troop
transports.
lost on its eastward voyage. For this splendid record the Navy,
which armed, manned, and convoyed the troop transports, deserves
the highest commendation. .
RETURN OF TROOPS.
In diagram 14, on page 37, figures are presented showing the num-
ber of troops brought back to the United States from France each
month since the signing of the armistice. The figures mount even
more rapidly and reach higher totals than those of the eastward
journeys.
As soon as the armistice was signed preparations were made for
returning the troops to the United States in the shortest possible time.
This was rendered difficult by the fact that for the eastward move-
48 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
ment we had relied largely on the British, who carried approximately
half of all the troops. After the signing of the armistice the British
needed these ships for the return of their own colonial troops, to
Canada, Australia, and South Africa.
This situation was met by the Army Transport Service, which
immediately began the conversion of our large cargo ships into troop-
carrying vessels. Diagram 21 shows the number of days that were
required to convert cargo ships into troop-carrying transports. The
upright columns of the diagram are proportional to the number of
days required. The ships upon which work was begun in December
were not ready for the first trips as troop carriers until 55 days later.
During the following months the work went forward more and more
rapidly, as is shown by the shortening lengths of the columns in the
diagram. By April the time required for converting cargo ships to
troop carriers had been almost cut in two and was approximately one
month. By means of these converted cargo ships, by the assignment
of German liners, and also by the great aid rendered by the Navy,
which put at the Army's disposal cruisers and battleships, the Army
is being brought back home even more rapidly than it was taken to
France.
SUMMARY.
1. During our 19 months of war more than 2,000,000 American
soldiers were carried to France. Half a million of these went over
in the first 13 months and a million and a half in the last 6 months.
2. The highest troop-carrying records are those of July, 1918, when
306,000 soldiers were carried to Europe, and June, 1919, when 364,000
were brought home to America.
3. Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York.
Half of them landed in England and the other half landed in France.
4. Among every 100 Americans who went over 49 went in British
ships, 45 in American ships, 3 in Italian, 2 in French, and 1 in
Russian shipping under English control.
5. Our cargo ships averaged one complete trip every TO days and
our troop ships one complete trip every 35 days.
6. The cargo fleet was almost exclusively American. It reached
the size of 2,700,000 deadweight tons and carried to Europe about
7,500,000 ions of cargo.
7. The greatest troop-carrier among all the ships has been the
Leviathan, which landed 12,000 men, or the equivalent of a German
division, in France every month.
8. The fastest transports have been the Great Northern and the
Northern Pacific, which have made complete turnarounds, taken on
new troops, and started back again in 19 days,
Chapter IV.
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT.
THE PROBLEM OF PURCHASE.
In the spring of 1917 there were in the United States some 4,000,-
000 young men who were about to become soldiers, although they
little suspected the fact. Before they entered the Army, as well as
after they were in it, these men consumed such ordinary necessities
of life as food, coats, trousers, socks, shoes, and blankets.
These simple facts lead directly to the mistaken conclusion that the
problem of supplying the necessities of life for the soldiers in the
Army was the comparatively simple one of diverting into the camps
substantially the same amounts of food and clothing as these young
men would have used in their homes if there had been no war.
These men constituted about one twenty-fifth of the population
of the country and undoubtedly consumed before the war more than
one twenty-fifth of the food and clothing used in the United States.
But after every possible allowance has been made for the require-
ments of youth and the wastefulness of war, the figures of Army
purchases still present surprising contrasts with those of civilian
use in normal times.
Some of these contrasts are shown in diagram 22, which compares
total American production of blankets, wool gloves, wool socks, and
men's shoes in 1914, as given in the census of manufactures, with
Army purchases of the same articles in 1918.
The first two columns of the diagram relate to blankets. They
show that the Army purchases in 1918 were two and one-quarter
times as great as the entire American production in 1914. To put it
another way, the figures mean that the blankets bought in one year
for the use of 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 soldiers would have been sufficient
to make good the actual normal consumption of blankets by 100,000,-
000 American civilians for two and a quarter years. From the data
of the other columns of the same diagram similar, if not equally sur-
prising, comparisons may be made.
The reasons for the enormous figures of Army purchases are not far
to seek. In the first place, men who went to camp received complete
equipment of new articles, whereas ordinary production in peace time
132966°— 19 4 49
50
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
goes mainly to replace articles that have been worn out. In the sec-
ond place, the supplies required for an army increase in proportion
to the distance that separates the army from its home base. In the
third place, the consumption in action is three or four times the peace
rate.
The stream of supplies going forward to an army may be likened
to the water delivered against a fire by an old-fashioned bucket bri-
gade. For every pailful thrown on the fire there must be many that
have been taken from the source of supply and are on the way. As
total ]
'MADE
y 1914 ;
9/
Figures in millions
8
18
TOTAL'.
;made-
J. 1914/
13
19
Blankets
Wool gloves
Wool socles
Shoes
Diagram 22.— Total American production of four articles compared
with Army purchases.
the distance from the source increases this supply in transit con-
stantly grows. When an army is 3,000 or 4,000 miles from its sources
of supply the amounts of supplies in reserve and in transit are enor-
mous as compared with the quantities actually consumed each month.
The rule generally followed for clothing was that there should be
for each man at the front a three months' reserve in France, another
two or three months' reserve in the United States, and a third three
months' supply continuously in transit. Wool coats, for example,
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT.
51
last about three months in active service. Hence for every coat on a
man's back at the front there had to be a coat in reserve in France,
a coat in transit, and a coat in reserve in the United States. For
every man at the front four coats were needed, and needed as soon as
he went overseas. Two million men overseas required something
like 8,000,000' coats, and required them immediately.
The same thing was true for other supplies and munitions. The
need for reserves and the time required for transportation called for
the supply of enormous quantities and called for it at once. The im-
mediate needs for each man sent forward were in fact far in excess
of the later requirements. For munitions difficult to manufacture,
such as artillery and ammunition, the problem presented by this
necessity for reserves and large amounts in transit, in addition to
the actual equipment of troops, was almost insuperable. The
initial need is so great in a situation of this character that it can
only be met in one of two ways; either by having the initial equip-
ment available at the outbreak of war, or by immediately securing
such an enormous productive capacity that it is larger than is
required for maintaining the establishment later.
In supplying food and clothing and other articles which are mat-
ters of common commercial production, the problem was not as
difficult as with ordnance, but the large needs for initial equipment
did put an enormous strain upon the industries concerned. A list
of the total deliveries during the war of some of the common articles
of clothing shows the size of the task. They are given in Table 3.
The cost of the articles listed was more than $1,000,000,000.
Table 3.- — Clothing
delivered to the .
Arm if April 6, 1917,
to May 31, 1918.
Articles.
Total
delivered.
Articles.
Total
delivered.
131, 800, 000
85,000,000
83,600,000
30,700,000
26, 500, 000
13'900'000
8,300,000
.pairs..
All these garments could be made in ordinary commercial fac-
tories, but their quantity was so enormous that at a number of times
during the war it was feared that the demand would run ahead
of the supply. When the troop movement was speeded up in the
spring of 1918 the margin on woolen clothing was dangerously
narrow. To secure these and other articles in sufficient quantity
it was found necessary in many cases for the Army to take control
of all stages of the manufacturing process, from assembling the
raw material to inspecting the finished product. For many months
52 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
preceding the armistice the War Department was owner of all the
wool in the country. From September, 1918, to June, 1919, if the
troop movement had continued, Army needs were estimated at
246,000,000 pounds of clean wool, while the amount allotted to
civilian needs was only 15,000,000 pounds. The British Army had
in a similar way some years before taken control of the English
wool supply in order to meet army and navy needs. Their require-
ments were, however, less than ours, to the extent that they did not
need such a large reserve in France and practically none in transit.
Their requirements per man for equipment were for this reason
about two-thirds as great as ours.
Something the same story might be told for about 30,000 kinds
of commercial articles which the Army purchased. Purchases
included food, forage, hardware, coal, furniture, wagons, motor
trucks, lumber, locomotives, cars, machinery, medical instruments,
hand tools, machine tools. In one way or another the Army at
war drew upon almost every one of the 344 industries recognized
by the United States Census. In some cases readjustments of
machinery for a slightly modified product were necessary. In many
an improved product was demanded. In practically all an enor-
mous production was required. In the cases of some articles all
the difficulties of quantity production were combined with the prob-
lems of making something not before manufactured. Typical in-
stances are the 5,400,000 gas masks and the 2,728,000 steel helmets
produced before the end of November, 1918.
MACHINERY OF DISTRIBUTION.
For those supplies that were to a certain degree articles of com-
mercial manufacture, the problem of distribution was fully as diffi-
cult as procurement. For production, machinery already in existence
could be utilized ; for distribution, a new organization was necessary.
In this country the problem was not hard for there were ample rail-
way facilities; an abundance of motor transportation could be
requisitioned if necessary ; and the troops were near the sources. In
France, a complete new organization was necessary whose main duty
it was to distribute munitions and supplies. It was called the
Services of Supply, the S. O. S., and had its headquarters at Tours.
It was an army behind the Army. On the day the armistice was
signed, there were reporting to the commanding general of the
Services of Supply, 386,000 soldiers besides 31,000 German prisoners,
and thousands of civilian laborers furnished by the Allies. At the
same time there were in the zone of the armies 160,000 noncombatant
troops, the majority of whom were keeping in operation the lines of
distribution of supplies to the troops at the front, The proportion
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT.
53
of noncombatants in the American Army never fell below 28 per
cent. In the British Army it often ran higher. Even when there
was the greatest pressure for men at the front, the work back of the
lines took roughly one man out of every three.
Distributing supplies to the American forces in France was in the
first place a problem of ports, second a problem of railroads, third
A PORTS
• GENERAL STORAGE DEPOTS
PRINCIPAL RAILWAYS USED BY A.E.f
Map 5. — Seaports, storage points, and supply lines of the American Army
in Franee.
a problem of motor and norse-drawn transportaion, and fourth a
problem of storage.
The ports and railroads of France were crowded with war traffic
and fallen into disrepair. It was not necessary to build new ports,
but American engineers added 17 new berths, together with ware-
houses and dock equipment. It was not necessary to build new rail-
roads, for France already had a railway net denser per square mile
than that of the United States, but it was desirable to increase the
carrying capacity by nearly 1,000 miles of new trackage, and by
switching facilities at crucial points, by new repair shops and round-
54 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
houses, and by new rolling stock. These things were done by the
Engineers. The problems were not wholly solved. There were never
enough docks to prevent some loss of time by vessels waiting to dock,
but the capacity for handling American cargo was tripled from
10,000 tons per day in the spring of 1918 to 30,000 tons by November
11 and the waiting time of ships was shorter than in commercial prac-
tice. There were never wholly adequate railway facilities, but with
the help of locomotives and freight cars shipped from this side
freight was carried inland about as fast as it was landed. Map 5
shows the main railway lines used by the overseas forces. They con-
nect the principal ports at which the Army fleet docked with the
headquarters of the Services of Supply at Tours and with the Toul-
Verclun sector, where the American armies operated. The dots rep-
resent the principal storage depots of the transportation service.
NARROW-GAUGE RAILWAYS AND MOTOR TRUCKS.
Railroads carried American supplies from the ports in France to
intermediate or advance depots. As map 5 shows, railroad lines
roughly paralleled the front. Spurs led up to the front, but beyond
a certain distance the standard-gauge railroad did not go. Where
the danger of shelling began or where the needs changed rapidly
as the battle activity shifted from this front to that, the place of the
heavy railway was taken by other means of distributing supplies.
First came the narrow-gauge railroad, with rails about 2 feet apart,
much narrower than the usual narrow-gauge road in this country.
American engineers built 125 miles of these roads, for which 406
narrow-gauge locomotives and 2,385 narrow-gauge cars were shipped
from this country, in addition to the standard-gauge equipment.
Beyond the range of the narrow-gauge railway came the motor
truck. The truck could go over roads that were under shell fire. It
could retire with the Army or push forward with advancing troops.
Trucks were used on a larger scale in this war than was ever before
thought possible. The American Infantry division on the march
with the trucks, wagons, and ambulances of its supply, ammunition,
and sanitary trains stretches for a distance of 30 miles along the road.
The 650 trucks which the tables of organization of the division pro-
vide are a large factor in this train. The need for trucks increased
moreover during the latter months of the war as trench warfare gave
place to a war of movement. As the forces moved forward on the
offensive away from their railway bases, more and more trucks were
demanded.
The Army overseas never had all the trucks it needed during the
period of hostilities. Diagram 23 shows how the supply, month by
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT.
55
month, measured up to the numbers called for in the tables of organi-
zation. The dash line shows the truck tonnage needed and the heavy
line the amount available.
The supply was least adequate during the last four months of the
war, when the shipment of trucks fell behind the accelerated troop
movement. The difficulty was almost entirely a shortage of ships.
At practically all times there were quantities of trucks at the ports
of embarkation, but trucks take enormous amounts of cargo space
on ships. It is slow and difficult work to load them, and time after
time embarkation officials were forced to leave the trucks standing
Tons
75000
50000
25000
1918 1919
Diagram 23.— Motor-track tonnage needed and available in the Amer-
ican Expeditionary Forces.
at the ports and load their ships rapidly with supplies needed still
more urgently overseas. In October and November more ships were
pulled out of the trades and the trucks were shipped even at the
expense of other essential supplies. The shipment kept pace with
the troop movement, but the initial shortage could not be overcome
until February. The number of trucks sent overseas prior to the
armistice was 40,000 and of these 33,000 had been received in France.
The trucks ranged in size from three-quarters of a ton to 5 tons.
56
THE WAB WITH GERMANY.
Beyond the range of the motor truck the horse and wagon were
the means of supply distribution. Here again the American armies
made an inadequate equipment do the work that was required. The
shipment of animals overseas was discontinued early in 1918 on the
information that horses could be purchased overseas. Then in the
fall when every ton of shipping was precious, the supply of foreign
horses proved inadequate and 23 of the best of the Army's cargo
JO LIVERPOOL
LEASED FROM ALLIES OR TAKEN {^
OVER FROM GERMANS *V,
U.S WIRES — . "N*»..<
Map 6.'
■American telephone and telegraph lines in France, England, and
Germany.
vessels had to be converted to animal transports. About 500 horses
and mules were embarked in September and 17,000 in October. The
shipments could not, however, be started soon enough to prevent a
shortage. A horse uses as much ship space as 10 tons of cargo, but
in the latter months the need for animals was so great that this
sacrifice was made.
In general, it may be said that the Army overseas never had
enough means of transportation. It may also be said that they
had very large quantities and that they produced remarkable results
with the supply they had.
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT.
4 7,000 TELEGRAMS A DAY.
57
In order to operate the transportation of supplies in France, a new
system of communication had to be set up; so the Signal Corps
strung its wires over nearly every part of France. This is shown
in map 6.
The heavy lines indicate telephone and telegraph lines wholly con-
structed by Americans or wires strung on French poles. The light
lines are wires leased from the French or taken over from the Ger-
mans. Trunk lines led from all the principal ports to Paris, to
Tours, and to general headquarters (G. H. Q.) back of the Ameri-
can battle areas. The lines running to Coblenz for the army of
Map 7. — Construction projects of the Army in the United States.
occupation were taken over from the Germans. At the time of the
signing of the armistice the Signal Corps was operating 282 tele-
phone exchanges and 133 complete telegraph stations. The tele-
phone lines numbered 14,956, reaching 8,959 stations. More than
100,000 miles of wire had been strung. The peak load of operation
reached was 47,555 telegrams a day, averaging 60 words each.
CONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES.
To build factories and storage warehouses for supplies, as well as
housing for troops, 200,000 workmen in the United States were
kept continuously occupied for the period of the war. The force of
workers on this single activity was larger than the total strength of
58 THE WAE WITH GEKMANY.
both southern and northern armies in the Battle of Gettysburg. The
types of construction included cement piers and warehouses, equip-
ment for proving grounds, plants for making powder and explo-
sives, repair shops, power plants, roads, and housing for troops.
Building was required in every State of the Union, as shown in
map 7. Each dot represents a construction project.
The region of greatest activity was the Northeast, at once the most
densely populated section and the center of munitions production.
Housing constructed had a capacity of 1,800,000 men, or more
than the entire population of Philadelphia. The operations of the
Millions Por cent
of dollars of total
National Amy ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
cantonments 199 B SHHBbB SZSSaB&SS&BBSEaSB&ttM 24
Ordnance Dept. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^™
projects 163 iiGBEBHJSBBBaHnBHBHH 20
Miscel. camps and ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^™ ■
cantonments 139 I IBbhEBT . 5H* Bfl 17
Quartermaster Corps ^_^_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_
projects 137 IHbBBBH \: _ H 16
Rational Guard
camps 74
Hospitals 23 | JJ
Regular Amy ^m^m
posts 22 HBB
Coast artillery ^—
posts 13 HB 2
Aviation & Signal
Corps projects
8 ■ 1
Other construction - 40
v
Total 818
Diagram 24 Costs of construction projects in the United States.
Construction Division constituted what was probably the largest con-
tracting business ever handled in one office.
The total expenditures in this enterprise to November 11, 1918,
were, in round numbers, $800,000,000, or about twice the cost of the
Panama Canal. The per cent of the total which was allotted to
various purposes is shown in diagram 24. The largest single item
is the cost of National Army cantonments which was nearly one-
quarter of the total. Ordnance Department projects, including the
building of enormous powder, high-explosive, and loading plants,
come second.
The costs of construction were probably higher than they would
have been for slower work. The outstanding feature of the accom-
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 59
plishment was its rapidity. Each of the cantonments was completed
in substantially 90 days. It was this speed that made it possible to
get the draft army under training before the winter of 1917 set
in and made it available just in time for the critical action of the
summer of 1918.
CONSTRUCTION IN THE A. E. F.
The conduct of the war in France necessitated a construction pro-
gram comparable in magnitude and number of projects with that in
the United States. Less new building was required for shelter and
\ & *->
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CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS OF
THE A.E.F.
Map 8. — Construction projects of the Army in Prance.
for the manufacture of munitions, but more for the development of
port and railroad facilities and for the repair and operation of the
complicated equipment of a modern army.
The storage space constructed in France was more than nine-
tenths as large as the amount built at home. Hospital capacity con-
structed in France was twice the new capacity at home.
All construction work in France was performed by the Corps of
Engineers under the Services of Supply. The labor force consisted
largely of American soldiers and German prisoners, although French
60
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
and English civilians and Chinese coolies were used wherever avail-
able. To economize tonnage materials were obtained in Europe as
far as possible, sometimes at high prices. The Engineer Corps ran
its own quarries and its own logging camps and sawmills. Only such
materials as could not be obtained abroad — chiefly machinery and
steel products — were purchased in the United States.
Up to the signing of the armistice construction projects had been
undertaken by the Corps of Engineers to the number of 831. Their
45 DAYS SUPPLY
23
S3
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jim Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1916
Diagram 25.— Days supply of Army rations on hand in the American
Expeditionary Forces eaeh month.
distribution over France is shown in map 8, in which every dot
represents a place at which one or sometimes several projects were
undertaken. The A. E. F. left its trail in the shape of more or less-
permanent improvements over the greater part of France. The proj-
ects cluster most thickly around the ports used by American forces
and the American area on the southern end of the battle line.
FOOD AND CLOTHING AT THE FRONT.
The real test of the efficiency of the supply service comes when an
army engages in battle. Measured by that test the work of feeding,
clothing, and equipping the American Army was well done for, in
FOOD, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT. 61
the main, the expeditionary forces received what they needed.
Within the limits of this report no account can be given in detail
of how fully the supplies received overseas met the needs of the
troops. A few typical and fundamentally important items only can
be selected. Food and clothing are the most essential.
At no time was there a shortage of food in the expeditionary forces.
Soldiers sometimes went hungry in this as in all other wars, but the
condition was local and temporary. It occurred because of trans-
portation difficulties during periods of active righting or rapid move-
ment when the units outran their rolling kitchens. The stocks of
food on hand in depots in France were always adequate. This is
illustrated in diagram 25. The columns show the stocks of food in
depots on the first of each month in terms of how many days they
would last the American forces then in France.
During the winter and spring of 1918 the amounts on hand rose
steadily. On May 1, about the time when American troops were en-
tering active fighting for the first time, they were well over the 45-
day line, which was considered the required reserve during the latter
months of the war. For a time efforts were made to build up a 90-
day supply in order that the overseas forces might continue to oper-
ate for some months, even if the lines of supply across the ocean were
cut. As the menace of the submarine becomes less acute, and as the
need of ship tonnage for other supplies became more pressing, the
required reserve was cut to 45 days. It will be seen from the dia-
gram that at no time during the period of active operations did the
reserve fall below this line.
In the matter of clothing also, the supply services rose to the emer-
gency of combat.
There were periods in the history of many individual units when
needed supplies could not be immediately obtained but, as in the
case of food, the difficulty was one of local transportation.
The records of the Quartermaster show that during the six months
of hard fighting, from June to November, the enlisted man in the
A. E. F. received on the average :
Slicker and overcoat, every 5 months.
Blanket, flannel shirt, and breeches, every 2 months.
Coat, every 79 days.
Shoes and puttees, every 51 days.
Drawers and undershirt, every 34 days.
Woolen socks, every 23 days.
SUMMARY.
1. The problems of feeding and clothing the Army were difficult
because of the immense quantities involved rather than because of
the difficulty of manufacturing the articles needed.
62 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
2. Requirements for some kinds of clothing for the Army were
more than twice as great as the prewar total American production
of the same articles.
3. To secure the articles needed for the Army the Government
had to commandeer all the wool and some other staple articles in
the United States and control production through all its stages.
4. The distribution of supplies in the expeditionary forces re-
quired the creation of an organization called the Services of Supply,
to which one-fourth of all the troops who went overseas were as-
signed.
5. American Engineers built in France 17 new ship berths, 1,000
miles of standard-gauge track, and 125 miles of narrow-gauge track.
6. The Signal Corps strung in France 100,000 miles of telephone
and telegraph wire.
7. Prior to the armistice 40,000 trucks were shipped to the forces
in France.
8. Construction projects in the United States cost twice as much
as the Panama Canal, and construction overseas was on nearly as
large a scale.
9. The Army in France always had enough food and clothing.
Chapter V.
SPRINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS.
RIFLES.
During the years immediately preceding our entrance into the war
there was much discussion within the War Department, as well as in
the country at large, of the need for increased military preparedness.
Reference to the department reports for 1914, 1915, and 1916 shows
that what was then considered as the best military and civilian
opinion was agreed that the army that would have to be called into
the field in any large emergency was one of 500,000 men.
In these reports attention was called to the fact that while our
available resources in trained men, in airplanes, and in machine guns
were entirely inadequate, our reserve stocks of rifles and small-arms
ammunition were sufficient for even a larger Army than the half
million suggested.
On the outbreak of hostilities there were on hand nearly 600,000
Springfield rifles of the model of 1903. This arm is probably the
best Infantry rifle in use in any army, and the number on hand was
sufficient for the initial equipment of an army of about 1,000,000 men.
What no one foresaw was that we should be called upon to equip
an army of nearly 4,000,000 men in addition to furnishing rifles
for the use of the Navy.
The emergency was met in several different ways. The available
Springfields were used to equip the Regular Army and National
Guard divisions that were first organized. In addition to these rifles
we also had in stock some 200,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles that had
been stored for an emergency and were in sufficiently good condition
to be used for training purposes. In addition, efforts were made to
speed up the manufacture of new Springfields.
It was soon found, however, that manufacturing difficulties would
make it impossible to increase the output of Springfields to much be-
yond 1,000 per day, which was clearly insufficient. At this juncture
decision was reached to undertake the manufacture of an entirely
new rifle to meet the deficiency.
Fortunately, there were in this country several plants which were
just completing large orders for the Enfield rifle for the British
Government. A new rifle — the model 1917 — was accordingly de-
63
64
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
signed. This rifle resembled the British Enfield sufficiently so that
the plants equipped for Enfield production could be rapidly con-
verted to its manufacture, but it was chambered to use the same am-
munition as is used in the Springfield and in the machine guns and
automatic rifles of American manufacture.
Diagram 26 shows the number of Springfields and Enfields ac-
cepted to the end of each month from the beginning of the war up
3490
3524 *»? 3550
PRE^AUSSCFTOCT MOV DEC JAM FEB MAR APR MAY JUH JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAM FEB MAH APR.
R 1917 1918 1919
Diagram 26 — Thousands of Springfields and Enfields accepted to the
end of each month.
to the end of April, 1919. The figures include the prewar stock of
Springfields.
Beginning with slightly less than 600,000 Springfields at the out-
break of the war, the total at the end of the war had increased to
nearly 900,000. The Enfields first came into production in August,
1917. After their manufacture had actually begun the output in-
creased rapidly until it totaled at the end of the war, in November,
1918, nearly 2,300,000,
SPKINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 65
During the entire period the production of spare parts for the
Springfield rifles was continued at an increased rate. The first di-
visions sent to France were equipped with this rifle. It is a fact that
about half the rifle ammunition used against the enemy by United
States troops was shot from Springfield rifles. The test of battle
use has upheld the high reputation of the Springfield, and has dem-
onstrated that the American Enfield is also a weapon of superior
quality. The American troops were armed with rifles that were
superior in accuracy and rapidity of fire to those used by either
their enemies or the Allies.
MACHINE GUNS.
The use of machine guns on a large scale is a development of the
European war. This is demonstrated by the records of every army.
In the case of the American forces the figures are particularly im-
pressive. In 1912 Congress sanctioned the allowance of the War De-
partment of four machine guns per regiment. In 1919, as a result of
the experience of the war, the new Army plans provide for an equip-
ment of 336 machine guns per regiment. The second allowance is 84
times as great as the one made seven years earlier.
In the annual report of the Secretary of War for 1916, transmitted
in the fall of that year, attention was called to the efforts then being
made to place our Army on a satisfactory footing with respect to
machine guns. The report says :
Perhaps no invention has more profoundly modified the art of war than the
machine gun. In the European War this arm has been brought into very great
prominence. * * * When the Congress at the last session appropriated $12,-
000,000 for the procurement of machine guns, it seemed important, for obvious
reasons, to free the air of the various controversies and to set at rest in as final
a fashion as possible the conflicting claims of makers and inventors. A board
was therefore created. * * * A preliminary report has been made by this
board, selecting the Vickers-Maxim type for heavy machine guns, recommending
the purchase of a large supply of them, and fixing a date in May at which time
exhaustive tests to determine the relative excellence of various types of light
machine guns are to be made.
In accordance with these recommendations, 4,000 Vickers machine
guns were ordered in December, 1916. By the end of the next year
2,031 of them had been delivered. In further accord with the recom-
mendations of the board, careful tests were held in May, 1917, of
various types of heavy machine guns, and also of light machine guns,
which have come to be known as automatic rifles. Rapidity of fire,
freedom from stoppage and breakage, accuracy, weight, ease of manu-
facture, and other factors were all carefully examined.
The Vickers gun justified the good opinion previously formed of it,
but it was clear that it could not be put on a quantity-pro^ction
132966°-^L9 5 ;,,1i !u!'Ut!< 'i&OlXi
66 THE WAK WITH GERMANY.
basis because of technical difficulties in manufacture. Fortunately,
a new gun well adapted to quantity production was presented for
trial. This gun, the heavy Browning, performed satisfactorily in all
respects and was adopted as the ultimate standard heavy machine
gun. The light Browning, designed by the same expert, was easily
in the lead as an automatic rifle, weighing only 15 pounds. The
Lewis gun, too heavy for satisfactory use as an automatic rifle and not
capable of the long-sustained fire necessary in a heavy gun, was very
well suited, with slight modification, for use as a so-called flexible gun
on aircraft. A small number (2,500) of these guns were ordered for
training purposes for ground use, but the bulk of the possible produc-
tion of this gun was assigned to aircraft purposes. In addition to
the flexible type, airplanes require also a synchronized gun; that is,
a gun whose time of firing is so adjusted that the shots pass between
the propeller blades. The Vickers gun had been used successfully for
this purpose in Europe and the call was insistent for their diversion
to this use, both for our own planes and for those of the French.
After many trials and adjustments, however, the Marlin gun, a de-
velopment of the old Colt, was adapted to this purpose, releasing
part of the early production of Vickers guns for ground use. A sub-
sequent development was the design of a modified form of the heavy
Browning for aircraft use as a synchronized gun.
Production of all the types mentioned was pressed and the advan-
tages of preparedness illustrated. The placing of the order for 4,000
Vickers in 1916 enabled 12 of our early divisions to receive that
weapon as their heavy machine gun. The thorough trial given in
May, much earlier than would have been possible except for previous
plans, made possible a selection of suitable types for every purpose
and the completion of the first light Brownings in February, 1918,
and the first heavy Brownings in April of the same year.
The remarkable rise in the rate of production is shown by months
in diagram 27. The rise was broken only in September, the month of
the influenza epidemic.
The earliest needs of our troops in France were met by French
Hotchkiss machine guns and Chauchat automatic rifles. A little
later, divisions going over were provided with Vickers heavy guns
and Chauchat automatic rifles. After July 1, divisions embarking
were equipped with light and heavy Brownings. Both Browning
guns met with immediate success and with the approval of foreign
officers as well as with that of our own.
Although the light and the heavy Browning guns were brought
into production in February and April of 1918, they were not used
in battle until September. This was not because of any shortage of
supply in the later summer months but because of a deliberate and
most significant judgment on the part of Gen. Pershing. After
SPRINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS.
67
careful tests of the new weapons had been made in Europe the
American commander in chief decided that the two new Brownings
were so greatly superior to any machine guns in use by any of the
armies on either side that the wisest course would be to wait until
several divisions could be equipped with them and a plentiful future
supply assured before using them in battle at all.
What he feared was that if the first of the guns to reach the expe-
ditionary forces were used in battle there would always be some
227
201
178
TOTAL ACCEPTED 227,000
I^J Accepted to date (whole column)
ff§f| Accepted during month
FIGCBBS 15 THOUSABDS
143
121
86
61
4a
35
26
O
13
□
19 , ,
1 1
1 1
HI
Jtm Jul Aug Sep Oct Hot Bee
To Jan Feb Vsr Apr 1
Dec 31 '
1917 1918
Diagram 27.— Thousands of American machine guns produced to the
end of each month.
chance that one might be captured by the Germans. If this should
happen it was possible that with their quick recognition of the im-
portance of any military improvement and the demonstrated German
industrial capacity for quantity production, they might begin the
immediate manufacture of German Brownings. In this event the
advantage of the possession of large numbers of greatly improved
types of machine guns and automatic rifles would be partly lost to
the American forces.
68
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
For these reasons the Brownings were not used in combat until
they were used in large numbers in the Meuse-Argonne battle. There
they amply justified the faith of the American commander and the
Ordnance Department in their superior qualities.
The total number of machine guns of American manufacture pro-
duced to the end of 1918 is shown in Table 4. In addition there were
secured from the French and British 5,300 heavy machine guns, of
which nearly all 'were French Hotchkiss guns, and 34,000 French
Chauchat automatic rifles.
Tabxe 4. — Machine guns produced to the end of 1918.
Heavy Browning field 56,612
Vickers field 12,125
Other field 6,366
Lewis aircraft 39,200
Browning aircraft 580
Marlin aircraft 38,000
Vickers aircraft 3, 714
Light Browning 69,960
Total 226,557
i
RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS USED IN FRANCE.
When troops embarked for France they carried with them their
rifles, and sometimes their machine guns and automatic rifles. If
appropriate allowance is made for such troop property in addition
to what was shipped in bulk for replacement and reserves, it is
found that about 1,775,000 rifles, 29,000 light Brownings, and 27,000
heavy Brownings, and 1,500,000,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun
ammunition were shipped to France from this country before No-
vember 1. These supplies were supplemented by smaller amounts re-
ceived from the French 'and British, as already mentioned. The
actual use of American-made machine guns and automatic rifles in
France is summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. — Use of American-made automatic arms in France.
Total,
including
training.
Light Browning
Heavy Browning . . .
Vickers ground gun
Lewis aircraft
Marlin aircraft
Vickers aircraft —
SPEINGFIELDS, ENFIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 69
PISTOLS AND REVOLVERS.
From the beginning of the war the call for pistols was insistent.
In this case the American Army was fortunate in having in the
Browning-Colt a weapon already in production and more effective
than the corresponding weapon used by any other army. But while
there never was any question as to the quality of the pistol, there was
much trouble in securing them in numbers adequate to meet the de-
mands. To help meet the situation a revolver was designed using
the same ammunition, and placed in production in October, 1917. As
a result the troops in France who were likely to require them for
close combat were supplied with one or the other of these weapons
so far as possible, but full equipment was never secured.
SMALL-ARMS AMMUNITION.
A sufficient supply of small-arms ammunition has always been
available to provide for troops in service. The complication due to
the use of machine guns and automatic rifles of French caliber has
been successfully met. To meet the special needs of the Air Service
and of antiaircraft defense, new types of ammunition have been de-
signed and produced, the purposes of which are indicated by their
names — armor piercing, tracer, and incendiary. Before the end of
the war American production of small arms ammunition amounted to
approximately 3,500,000,000 rounds, of which 1,800,000,000 were ship-
ped overseas. In addition, 200,000,000 rounds were secured from the
French and British.
ARMS AND THE MEN.
Diagram 28 is an attempt to answer in graphic form the question
"To what degree did the different elements of our troop program
and our small-arms program move forward in company front?"
The upper heavy black line represents the number of men in the
American Army from month to month. The lower black line repre-
sents similarly the strength of the Army in France.
On the same scale are drawn four other lines indicating widely
fluctuating quantities for the different months. The lowest of these
represents the size of army that could have been equipped, accord-
ing to the tables of organization, with the number of pistols and
revolvers actually on hand each month. The diagram shows that we
never had nearly enough of these weapons to equip fully our entire
Army, and only during part of the months of the war were there
enough for the full equipment of the troops in France even if all
the pistols and revolvers had been there and issued.
10
THE WAR wl?H GEEMAtf¥.
The line for automatic rifles shows an adequate supply for all
troops only in the last two months of the war. That for machine
guns shows inadequate supplies up to July and then so enormous a
MILLIONS
OF MEN
N
"7
6
5
4
3
2,
1
AftM"^^
WaXjS^lm
0
sjmsssw^ --
APR MAY JUN JUL AU6 SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG- SEP OCT NOV
1917 1918
Diagram 28. — Small arms available each month.
production as to be sufficient before the end of the war for an army
of nearly 8,000,000 men. The line for rifles shows relatively close
agreement during the entire period. There was an initial surplus,
then a deficit for six months, and after that a consistent surplus.
In the cases of automatic rifles, machine guns, and rifles there was
always a supply on hand in excess of what would have been required
for the equipment of the expeditionary forces alone.
SPRINGFIELDS, ENEIELDS, AND BROWNINGS. 71
In making the computations for all these comparisons an appro-
priate allowance has been made in every case for reserves, wastage,
and time lost in transit. The curves represent as nearly as it has
been possible to make them the actual balance each month between
the number of men and the total equipment available. They can not,
of course, take into account any shortages that may have resulted in
specific localities through failures in distribution.
Only the Springfield and Enfield rifles are included in the compu-
tation of available rifles, although hundreds of thousands of Krag-
Jorgensen and Russian rifles and some Canadian Ross rifles were
used for training purposes.
The rapid rise of the lines representing the men that could have
been equipped with machine guns and automatic rifles in the later
months is due to the heavy production of Brownings. In fact, this
production was one of the striking features of our war effort. It
would have resulted, if the fighting had been prolonged, in a greatly
increased volume of fire on the part of the American troops.
PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1919.
At this point it is appropriate to comment on the fact that there
are many articles of munitions in which American production reached
great amounts by the fall of 1918 but which were not used in large
quantities at the front because the armistice was signed before big
supplies of them reached France. In the main, these munitions are
articles of ordnance and aviation equipment, involving such tech-
nical difficulties of manufacture that their production could not be
improvised or even greatly abbreviated in time.
As the production figures are scrutinized in retrospect, and it is
realized that many millions of dollars were spent on army equip-
ment that was never used at the front, it seems fair to question
whether prudent foresight could not have avoided some of this
expense.
Perhaps the best answer to the question is to be found in the record
of a conference that took place in the little French town of Trois
Fontaines on October 4, 1918, between Marshal Foch and the Ameri-
can Secretary of War.
In that conference the allied commander in chief made final ar-
rangements with the American Secretary as to the shipment of
American troops and munitions in great numbers during the fall and
winter preparatory for the campaign of 1919.
This was one day before the first German peace note and 38 days
before the end of the war, but Marshal Foch was then calling upon
America to make her great shipments of munitions and her supreme
contribution of man power for the campaign of the following year.
72 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
SUMMARY.
1. When war was declared the Army had on hand nearly 600,000
Springfield rifles. Their manufacture was continued, and the Ameri-
can Enfield rifle designed and put into production.
2. The total production of Springfield and Enfield rifles up to
the signing of the armistice was over 2,500,000.
3. The use of machine guns on a large scale is a development of the
European war. In the American Army the allowance in 1912 was
four machine guns per regiment. In 1919 the new Army plans provide
for an equipment of 336 guns per regiment, or eighty- four times as
many.
4. The entire number of American machine guns produced to the
end of 1918 was 227,000.
5. During the war the Browning automatic rifle and the Browning
machine gun were developed, put into quantity production, and used
in large numbers in the final battles in France.
6. The Browning machine guns are believed to be more effective
than the corresponding weapons used in any other army.
7. American production of small arms ammunition amounted to
approximately 3,500,000,000 rounds, of which 1,800,000,000 were
shipped overseas.
8. Attention is directed to diagram 28, on page 70, comparing
numbers of men under arms each month with numbers for which
equipment of pistols, rifles, automatic rifles, and machine guns were
available.
Chapter VI.
TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE.
ARTILLERY.
It was true of light artillery as it was of rifles, that the United
States had, when war was declared, a supply on hand sufficient to
equip the Army of 500,000 men that proponents of preparedness
had agreed might have to take the field in the event of a large emer-
gency. There were 900 pieces of field artillery then available. The
gun on hand in largest quantities was the 3-inch fieldpiece, of which
we had 544. As 50 of these are required for 1 division, this was a
sufficient number to equip 11 divisions. When the emergency ar-
rived, however, it was far larger than had been foreseen even by
those who had been arguing that we needed an army several times
as large as the one we then had. The initial plans called for the
formation of 42 divisions, which would require 2,100 3-inch field-
pieces almost at once. In addition, these divisions would require
for active operations in France a repair shop reserve, a replacement
reserve, and a stream of guns in transit which would increase their
initial requirements to about 3,200. To keep this army going would
only require a production of about 100 guns per month, but to get
it going within a reasonable length of time would have required a
productive capacity of 300 or 400 guns per month, depending on
how soon it was imperative for the army to be in action. The great
difference between the manufacturing output necessary to get an
army going quickly and that required to keep it going after it has
been equipped, explains the enormous industrial disadvantage suf-
fered by a nation which enters a war without its stocks of military
supplies for initial equipment already on hand.
To meet the situation the decision was made in June, 1917, to
allot our own guns to training purposes and to equip our forces
in France with artillery conforming to the French and British
standard calibers. The arrangement was that we should purchase
from the French and British the artillery needed for our first divi-
sions and ship to them in return equivalent amounts of steel, copper,
and other raw materials so that they could either manufacture guns
for us in their own factories or give us guns out of their stocks and
proceed to replace them by new ones made from our materials.
73
*74 the war With germane.
The plans then formulated further provided that, with our initial
requirements taken care of in this way, we should at once prepare
to manufacture in our own plants artillery of these same cali-
bers for the equipment of later divisions. In general, it may be
truly said that these plans were carried through successfully along
the lines originally laid down. With no serious exceptions, the
guns from British and French sources were secured as needed, but
our own plants were slower in producing complete units ready for
use than had been hoped and planned.
In our factories the 3-inch guns of improved model which had
been ordered in September, 1916, were changed in caliber to use
standard French ammunition, and became known as 75 mm. guns,
model 1916. The British 18-pounder then being produced in this
country was similarly redesigned, and became known as the 75 mm.
gun, model 1917. Work was immediately begun also on the plans
for the French 75 mm. gun so as to make it possible to produce it
in American factories. For this gun, however, it was necessary to
develop new manufacturing capacity.
In the case of other calibers of artillery, the same means in gen-
eral were taken to secure a supply. Material previously on order
was adapted to meet the new conditions ; capacity actually engaged
on production for the French and British was utilized to as great
an extent as possible, and foreign plans were adapted to American
practice and new plants erected to push production. It was neces-
sary, of course, in all this work not to interfere with American pro-
duction for the Allies. Of the enormous amount of equipment made
necessary by the expansion of the Army from its first strength to
the contemplated force of 5,000,000 men, the artillery and artillery
ammunition could be improvised with the least facility, for the
necessary processes of its manufacture involved irreducible periods
of time. In spite of all these handicaps, the record of actual pro-
duction on United States Army orders only, is 1,642 complete units
of artillery before the armistice was signed. The total production
of complete units of artillery in American plants is shown by the
figures of diagram 29. The data are exclusive of production for
the Navy and for the Allies.
In point of fact the figures showing the number of complete units
produced are somewhat unfair to the American record. The diffi-
cult problem of planning the production of the different component
parts was not satisfactorily solved until about the end of the war.
The result was that by the production of a single component, after
the armistice was signed, hundreds of units were completed, and the
totals for the months after the armistice are as large as those before
October, although the work actually done in those months was very
TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE PIKING LINE.
T5
much less. These facts are revealed by the monthly and total figures
of the diagram. Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of com-
plete artillery units produced in American plants was more than
3,000, or equal to all those purchased abroad from the French and
British up to the signing of the armistice.
3077
Diagram 29.— Complete units of artillery made in America.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.
In the magnitude of the quantities involved the Artillery ammuni-
tion program was the biggest of all. Copper, steel, high explosives,
and smokeless powder were all required by the hundreds of millions
of pounds. As no firms were prepared to manufacture complete
rounds, it was necessary for the Ordnance Department to make con-
tracts for each component and to assume the burden of directing the
distribution of these components between manufacturers. For the
shrapnel it was possible to use the design substantially as had previ-
76
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
ously been used in this country, but the high explosive and gas shell
proved more troublesome. A large supply of American shell was
produced, however, before the signing of the armistice, and shipment
to Europe in quantity had begun. The ammunition actually used
against the enemy at the front was nearly all of French manufacture,
20326
18294
15702
12630
TOTAL ACCEPTED 20,326,000
£■■ Accepted to date (whole column)
"■'>' Accepted during month
FIGUBES EJ THOUSAHDS
10072
7981
6896
S55S
4361
3231
2389
1427
1803
UUhHIH
To Jan. Feb. liar. Apr. Hay June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Hot. Dec.
Dec. 31
i 191? 1918
Diagram 30.— Thousands of complete rounds of American artillery am-
munition produced.
but the approaching supply from America made possible a more free
use of the French and British reserves. As shown in diagram 30,
our monthly production of artillery ammunition rose to over
2.000,000 complete rounds in August and over 3,000,000 rounds in
October if we include United States calibers. By the end of 1918
the number of rounds of complete artillery ammunition produced
in American plants was in excess of 20,000,000, as compared with
10,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British.
TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 77
BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARTILLERY PRODUCTION.
One mode of measuring our accomplishments in the way of artil-
lery production is to compare what we succeeded in producing in our
own plants in the first 20 months after the declaration of war with
what Great Britain produced in the first 20 months after her entry
into the war. This comparison is made in diagram 31, which com-
pares for that period of time American and British production of
complete units of light and heavy artillery and rounds of light and
heavy shells. Antiaircraft artillery (a small item) is not included
Light artillery
British | 3.599 I
American
Heavy artillery
British 1
379_J
Light artillery shells
British Q
23.328.0001
American SMHRSHflHHi
2B,?74,Q0Q |
Heary artillery shells
British H. 153.0001
American hHHHhBI
Diagram 31.— British and American production of artillery and am-
munition in the first 20 months of war.
in either class. Canadian production of machined shell for Great
Britain and the United States is included in each case.
In each of the comparisons of diagram 31 the bar in outline repre-
sents British production over the first 20 months, and the one in
solid black the American output over the first 20 months. The fig-
ures show that the British did better than we did in the production
of light artillery, but that we excelled their record in heavy artillery
and in both sorts of shell production.
SMOKELESS POWDER AND HIGH EXPLOSIVES.
One of the striking contributions of the United States to the cause
of the Allies was the enormous quantity of smokeless powder and
78 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
high explosives produced. From April 1, 1917, to November 11, 1918,
the production of smokeless powder in the United States was 632,-
000,000 pounds, which was almost exactly equal to the combined pro-
duction of France and Great Britain. This was not all for our own
use. About half the British supply in 1917 was drawn from this
country, and in 1918 over a third of the French supply was Ameri-
can made. This large supply was made possible in part by plants
erected for the British in this country, but the American Ordnance
Department also added new plants. As a result, the established rate
of production in this country by the close of the war was 45 per
cent greater than the combined French and British rate.
The American production of high explosives — T. N. T., ammonium
nitrate, picric acid, and others — was not established, when we de-
clared war, on so large a scale as that of smokeless powder. It was
necessary therefore to erect new plants. This need, by the way, was
the main reason for the restrictions on the sale of platinum, which
is necessary at one point in the process of manufacture. As a result
of the efforts that were made, our established rate of production of
high explosives at the close of the war was over 40 per cent larger
than Great Britain's, and nearly double that of France. The aver-
ages for August, September, and October for the three countries
were :
Pounds.
Great Britain 30, 957, 000
France ._ 22, 802, 000
United States 43, 888, 000
The result of the high rate of production of both smokeless powder
and high explosives was that the artillery ammunition program was
never held up for lack of either the powder which hurls the bullet
or shell from the gun or the high explosive which makes the shell
effective when it reaches its destination.
.. TOXIC GASES.
When the clouds of chlorine suddenly enveloped the British and
French lines in the Ypres salient, early in 1915, a new weapon was
introduced into the war. That it was a powerful weapon is evidenced
by the fact that during the year 1918 from 20 to 30 per cent of all
Our battle casualties were due to gas.
' At the time we entered the war we had had practically no experi-
ence in manufacturing toxic gases, and no existing facilities which
could be readily converted to such use. At the signing of the armis-
tice, we were equipped to produce gas at a more rapid rate than
France, England, or Germany.
TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE.
79
In the early days of our participation in the war it was hoped that
concerns engaged in chemical manufacture could be put into this new
field. There were many valid objections, however, to such a plan.
Many of these concerns were already crowded with war work. En-
tirely new equipment would have to be installed, which, in all likeli-
hood, would be practically worthless at the close of the war. Ex-
haustive investigation and experimentation would mean delay in
securing quantity production. The element of danger would mean
10817
9907
TOTAL ACCEPTED 10,817
BBH Accepted to date (v*.ole column)
iS&i Accepted during month
FIGURES IK SHOES TOKS
10 ?!
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nor
1918
Diagram 32. — Tons of toxic gases manufactured each month.
difficulty in securing and retaining adequate labor forces. For these
reasons the Government found it necessary to build its own chemical
plants and to finance certain private firms. The majority of these
producing plants, together with plants for filling shells with gas,
were built on a tract of land in the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.,
which came to be known as the Edgewood Arsenal. The auxiliary
plants were also known as Edgewood Arsenal. The columns of dia-
gram 32 show the number of short tons of toxic gases produced in
American plants each month, The increase in production was rapid
80 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
and steady during 1918 and, before the armistice, more than 10,000
tons had been manufactured.
Production of gas and the capacity for filling were at all times well
ahead of the supply of shell containers to be filled. In June, 1918,
considerable quantities of mustard gas, chlorpicrin, and phosgene
were shipped overseas for filling gas shells produced by the French.
By the end of July no more French shells were available for this pur-
pose and the surplus gas was sold to the French and British.
TRACTORS AND TANKS.
An innovation in this war, development of which in the future
promises to be even more important, was the increased use of motor
transportation. As applied to the artillery, this meant the use of
caterpillar tractors to haul the big guns, especially over rough ground.
When we entered the war no suitable designs existed for caterpillar
tractors of size appropriate for the medium heavy artillery. But
new 5-ton and 10-ton types were perfected in this country, put into
production, and 1,100 shipped overseas before November 1. About
300 larger tractors were also shipped and 350 more secured from the
French and British.
The tank was an even more important application of the caterpillar
tractor to war uses. In the case of the small 6-ton tanks, the efforts
of this country were largely concentrated on improvement of design
and on development of large scale production for the 1919 campaign.
Up to the time of the armistice 64 had been produced in this country,
and the rate at which production was getting under way is shown by
the fact that in spite of the armistice the total completed to March 31,
1919, was 799. The burden of active service in France was borne by
227 of these tanks received from the French.
The efforts of this country in the case of heavy 30-ton tanks were
concentrated on a cooperative plan, by which this country was to fur-
nish Liberty motors and the rest of the driving mechanism, and the
British the armor plate for 1,500 tanks for the 1919 campaign. It
has been estimated that about one-half the work on the American
components for this project had been completed before November 11,
and the work of assembly of the initial units was well under way.
For immediate use in France, this country received 64 heavy tanks
from the British.
OUR ARTILLERY IN FRANCE.
The most important single fact about our artillery in France is
that we always had a sufficient supply of light artillery for the
combat divisions that were ready for front-line service. This does
not mean that when the divisions went into the battle line they
TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 81
always had their artillery with them, for in a number of cases they
did not.
The statement does mean, however, that when divisions went into
line without their artillery this was not because of lack of guns but
rather because it takes much longer to train artillery troops than it
does infantry and so, under the pressure of battle needs in the sum-
mer and fall of 1918, American divisions were put into line a num-
ber of times supported by French and British artillery or without
artillery.
When the armistice came in November the American forces not
only had a sufficient number of 75's for the 29 combat divisions, but
in addition enough more for 12 other divisions.
A careful study of the battle records of all the divisions shows
that if all the days in the line of all the combat divisions are added
together, the total is 2,234. The records further show the number
of days that each division was in line with its own artillery, with
British artillery, with French, or without any.
The result of the compilation is to show that in every 100 days
that our combat divisions were in line they were supported by their
own artillery for 75 days, by British artillery for 5 days, by French
for IJdays, and were without artillery for 18^ days out of the 100.
Of these 18^ days, however, 18 days were in quiet sectors and only
one-half of one day in active sectors. There are only three records of
American divisions being in an active sector without artillery sup-
port. The total of these three cases amounts to one-half of 1 per
cent, or about 14 hours out of the typical 100 days just analyzed.
The most significant facts about our artillery in France are pre-
sented in summary in table 6, which takes into account only light and
heavy field artillery and does not include either the small 37-mm.
guns or the trench mortars.
Table 6. — American artillery in France — Summary.
Total pieces of artillery received to Nov. 11 3,499
Number of American manufacture 477
American-made pieces used in battle 130
Artillery on firing line 2,251
Rounds of artillery ammunition expended 8, 850, 000
Rounds of ammunition of American manufacture expended 208, 327
Rounds of American-made ammunition expended in battle 8, 400
The facts of the table can be summarized in round numbers with
approximate accuracy by saying that we had in France 3,500 pieces
of artillery, of which nearly 500 were made in America, and we used
on the firing line 2,250 pieces, of which over 100 were made in
America.
132966°— 19 6
82
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
GUNS NEEDED V. GUNS AVAILABIiE.
Diagram 33 shows the degree of balance which existed each month
throughout the war between the men under arms and the artillery
that was available for them. The number of men in the entire Ameri-
can Army is shown by the upper black line and the number of these
who were in France is shown by the lower black line.
The upper hollow line shows the size of army that could have been
fully equipped each month with the pieces of light artillery, con-
APR MAY JUN JUL AU& SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR (W JUN JUL AU& SEP OCT NOV
1917 1918
Diagram 33.— Artillery available each month.
sisting of 75 mm. and 3-inch field guns, that were then actually avail-
able. If the supply had been fully ample this line would run some-
what above the upper black line, to allow for an adequate reserve
and for the retirement of the less satisfactory types of guns. Ac-
tually the hollow line runs below the black one from September, 1917,
to September, 1918, and indicates a slight deficiency in training equip-
ment, which was relieved in the fall of 1918 by large deliveries of
the 1917 model.
In a similar way the lower black line shows for each month the
size of army that could have been equipped with the proper number
of pieces of heavy artillery of calibers greater than 3 inches. The
TWO THOUSAND GUNS ON THE FIRING LINE. 83
measure of full equipment is based on the tables of organization
adopted early in the war. These tables call for more heavy artillery
for a given number of men than the French, British, or Germans
actually used, and much more than had ever been thought advisable
before this war.
If all our heavy field artillery had been of types suitable for use
in France, we should have had enough, even on this high standard,
to meet the needs of the expeditonary forces. However, as we had
some types that were considered suitable only for training the short-
age indicated by the diagram was a real one. The rapid rise in the
latter months of the war shows that the great difficulties of manu-
facture of this type of material were being overcome toward the end
of the war. In considering the facts presented by this diagram it
is to be borne in mind that all suitable pieces of artillery are taken
into account from the date they were produced or secured whether
they were then located in America or in France. The comparison is
between the men that we had and the guns that we had each month.
SUMMARY.
1. When war was declared the United States had sufficient light
artillery to equip an army of 500,000 men, and shortly found itself
confronted with the problem of preparing to equip 5,000,000 men.
2. To meet the situation it was decided in June, 1917, to allot our
guns to training purposes and to equip our forces in France with
artillery conforming to the French and British standard calibers.
3. It was arranged that we should purchase from the French and
British the artillery needed for our first divisions and ship them in
return equivalent amounts of steel, copper, and other raw materials
so that they could either manufacture guns for us in their own fac-
tories or give us guns out of their stocks and replace them by new
ones made from our materials.
4. Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of complete artillery
units produced in American plants was more than 3,000, or equal to
all those purchased from the French and British during the war.
5. The number of rounds of complete artillery ammunition pro-
duced in American plants was in excess of 20,000,000, as compared
with 10,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British.
" 6. In the first 20 months after the declaration of war by each
country the British did better than we did in the production of light
artillery, and we excelled them in producing heavy artillery and both
light and heavy shells.
7. So far as the Allies were concerned, the European war was in
large measure fought with American powder and high explosives.
84 THE WAE WITH GEKMANY.
8. At the end of the war American production of smokeless pow-
der was 45 per cent greater than the French and British production
combined.
9. At the end of the war the American production of high explo-
sives was 40 per cent greater than Great Britain's and nearly double
that of France.
10. During the war America produced 10,000 tons of gas, much
of which was sold to the French and British.
11. Out of every hundred days that our combat divisions were in
line in France they were supported by their own artillery for 75
days, by British artillery for 5 days, and by French for 1^ days.
Of the remaining 18-J clays that they were in line without artillery, 18
days were in quiet sectors, and only one-half of 1 one day in each hun-
dred was in active sectors.
12. In round numbers, we had in France 3,500 pieces of artillery,
of which nearly 500 were made in America, and we used on the
firing line 2,250 pieces, of which over 100 were made in America.
Chapter VII.
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS.
PREWAR EQUIPMENT.
When war was declared, in April, 1917, the United States had two
aviation fields and 55 serviceable airplanes. The National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics, which had been conducting a scientific
study of the problems of flight, advised that 51 of these airplanes
were obsolete and the other 4 obsolescent.
This judgment was based on the operations in Mexico, which had
demonstrated serious defects in the designs of American planes used
there. It was well known that improved types had been developed in
the European conflict, but the details of their design were carefully
guarded and withheld from neutrals.
Immediately following the declaration of war, the Allied Gov-
ernments, particularly the French, urged the necessity of sending
5,000 American aviators to France during the first year, if supe-
riority in the air were to be insured. This request emphasized the
need of speed. The European instructors who came over later to
assist in the training work made no pretense that the 5,000 schedule
was practicable. The problem was to approximate it as nearly as
possible. Public expectation was greatly exaggerated, due to the
general ignorance, shared by even the best informed American
authorities on aviation, as to the requirements, other than simple
flying ability, which this service exacts.
There were three primary requisites for bringing into existence an
elementary aviation service. These were training planes, aviators,
and service planes. All of them had to be created.
TRAINING.
For the task of training, as well as that of securing the necessary
planes and motors, there existed in our Army no adequate organiza-
tion of qualified personnel. Before the war our air service had been
small, struggling, and unpopular. Aviation was restricted to un-
married officers under 30 years of age, and offered no assured future
as a reward for success. It had made its greatest appeal to the
younger and more daring types of line officers, and was not an or-
ganization on which a great industrial expansion could be built,
85
86 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
or from which any large numbers of qualified instructors could be
drawn.
Training for aviation divides itself into three stages — elementary,
advanced, and final. Elementary training, given to all candidates
alike, includes physical training, hygiene, various practical and
theoretical military subjects, the study of the structure and mecha-
nism of airplanes and engines, signaling, observation, ground gun-
11425
A.E.7.
U.S.A*
■EEEM
Apr UayJutt Jul lug Sep Oct Nov Deo JanFepHar Apr Bay Jon Jul Aug Sep Oct New
1917 1918
Diagram 34. — Plying officers in the Army each nionth.
nery, and elementary flying to the point of doing simple flying
alone.
Advanced training consisted in the specialized work necessary to
qualify the student as a well-prepared all-around pilot or observer, as
the case might be, ready to take up and master quickly any type of
machine or any kind of observation or bombing duty which the exi-
gencies of the service might necessitate.
Final training, given in Europe, was a short intensive specializa-
tion on the particular type of machine, or the particular military
problem to which the pilot or observer was finally assigned.
AIRPLANES,, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 87
The initial shortage of instructors and the opening of new fields
made it necessary to retain a considerable proportion of the early-
graduating classes as instructors. At the date of the armistice there
were 27 fields in operation, with 1,063 instructors; 8,602 men had
been graduated from elementary training, and 4,028 from advanced
training. There were then actually in training 6,528 men, of whom
59 per cent were in elementary, and 41 per cent in advanced train-
ing schools.
There had been sent to the expeditionary forces more than 5,000
pilots and observers of whom, at the date of armistice, 2,226 were
still in training, and 1,238 were on flying duty at the front.
Diagram 34 shows the number of flying officers in the Army from
month to month.
The columns show the whole number in service each month and
the upper portions the numbers of those who were in service over-
seas. The total personnel of our Air Service, including flying and
nonflying officers, students, and enlisted men, increased from about
1,200 at the outbreak of the war to nearly 200,000 at the close.
TRAINING PLANES AND ENGINES.
With 5,000 aviators demanded and only 55 training planes on
hand, the production of training planes was the problem of greatest
immediate concern. A few planes provided for in the 1917 fiscal
appropriation were on order. Other orders were rapidly placed.
Deliveries of primary training planes were begun in June, 1917.
To the date of the armistice over 5,300 had been produced, including
1,600 of a type which was abandoned on account of unsatisfactory
engines.
Advanced training planes reached quantity production early in
1918; up to the armistice about 2,500 were delivered. Approxi-
mately the same number were purchased overseas for training the
units with the expeditionary force. Diagram 35 shows the pro-
duction of training planes and engines by months.
European experience had demonstrated that the maintenance of a
squadron, whether, in training or in service, requires more engines
than planes for replacements. Pending the results of American ex-
perience, British figures, requiring an average production of two
engines per plane, were adopted as standard for American computa-
tions. Extensive orders were placed for two types of elementary
and three types of advanced training engines.
The upper line in the diagram shows that quantity production of
training engines was reached in 1917, and that by the end of Novem-
ber, 1918, a total of nearly 18,000 training engines and more than 9,500
training planes had been delivered. Of the engines, all but 1,346
88
THE WAK WITH GEEMANY.
were built in the United States; and of the 9,500 training planes,
more than 8,000 were of American manufacture.
SERVICE PLANES.
As soon as war was declared it became possible for American offi-
cers and engineers to learn the secrets of the great improvements that
had been developed during the war in the design of airplanes used
in battle service. A commission was immediately sent abroad to
2,000
1,600
1,200
eoo
400
6
<*
V
f
4
/
#
A<
7
y/
1
^:
j>
V
j£
&
**y
>
'P
17,673
9,503'!
May Jtm Jv£L Aug Sep Oct Nor Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jra Jul Aug Sep Oct Hot
1917 ~~ 1918
Diagram 35. — Production of training planes and engines to the end of
each month.
select types of foreign service planes for production in the United
States.
A controlling factor in their selections was the necessity of rede-
signing the models so as to take American-made motors, as foreign
engine production was insufficient to meet even the needs of the Allies.
Because of this and because of the rapidity with which the designs
of the smaller planes were changing, the best allied authorities urged
the concentration of American production on the more stable obser-
vation and bombing machines, leaving the production of pursuit
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS.
89
planes to the European factories, which were in closer contact with
the front. In the case of any plane selected only an estimate could
be made as to its probable adaptability to a new type of motor, this
engineering risk being less in the more conservative types of design.
This consideration, together with the imperative need for quick large-
scale production, led to the selection of four types for this experi-
ment: The De Havilland-4 (British) observation and day-bombing
7889
Fran
foreign
sources
258 ^fe6 3(H
Sep Oct Hot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jnn Jnl Aug Sep Oct Hot
1917 1918
Diagram 36.— Production of service planes to the end of each month.
machine, the Handley-Page (British) night bomber, the Caproni
(Italian) night bomber, and the Bristol (British) two-seater fighter.
This selection was approved by the French and British authorities.
The redesigned De Havilland-4 proved to be a good, all-round
plane of rather poor visibility, with a tank design which increased
the danger in case of a crash, but with these defects more than com-
pensated by unusually good maneuver ability, and great speed. The
De Havillands were acknowledged to be the fastest observation and
bombing planes on the western front. At the time of the armistice
this plane was being produced at a rate of over 1,100 per month. A
90 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
total of 3,227 had been completed, 1,885 had been shipped to France,
and 667 to the zone of the advance. The Handley-Page was rede-
signed to take two high-powered American motors, passed its tests,
and on the date of the armistice, parts for 100 had been shipped abroad
for assembly.
Delay in the receipt of plans for the Caproni greatly retarded the
redesign of this machine. Successful tests of the new model were,
however, completed previous to the armistice. The Bristol fighter
was a failure. The changes necessary to accommodate the American
engine so increased the total weight as to render the machine unsafe.
Diagram 36 shows the production of service planes from American
and foreign sources. The total at the end of November, 1918, was
nearly 7,900, of which nearly 4,100 were of American manufacture,
and remaining 3,800 were of foreign manufacture. In other words,
of every 100 battle planes which we received up to the end of Novem-
ber, 1918, 52 were of American manufacture and 48 were made in
foreign factories.
Two new models — the Le Pere two-seater fighter, and the Martin
bomber — were designed around the standard American motor, and
in tests prior to the armistice each showed a performance superior
to that of any known machine of its class. Neither, however, was
completed in time for use in actual service.
SERVICE ENGINES.
The rapid development of the heavier types of airplane, together
with the pressing need for large scale production, made necessary the
development of a high-powered motor adaptable to American
methods of standardized quantity production. This need was met
in the Liberty 12-cylinder motor which was America's chief contribu-
tion to aviation. After this standardized motor had passed the ex-
perimental stage production increased with rapidity, the October
output being over 3,850'. The total production of Liberty engines to
the date of the armistice was 13,574. Of this production 4,435 were
shipped overseas to the expeditionary forces and 1,025 were delivered
to the British, French, and Italian air services. It is noteworthy
that at the present time the British are requesting the delivery of
Liberty motors to them in accordance with arrangements made dur-
ing the war.
Other types of service engines, including the Hispano-Suiza 300
horsepower, the Bugatti, and the Liberty eight-cylinder, were under
development when hostilities ceased. The Hispano-Suiza 180 horse-
power had reached quantity production ; 469 of this type were pro-
duced, of which about one-half were shipped overseas for use in for-
eign-built pursuit planes.
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOON'S.
91
The columns of diagram 37 indicate the total number of service
engines produced for the Army to the end of each month, and show
how many of them came from American factories and how many
from foreign ones.
Up to the end of November, 1918, the total number of service en-
gines secured was in excess of 22,000. Of this number more than
16,000, or 73 per cent, were from American sources and less than
6,000 from foreign sources.
2Z104
36o 405 483
670
Prom
foreign.
sources
g 75 gaaiEEMBiBlEEMl
Sep Oct. Hot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nor
1917 1918
Diagram 37.— Production of service engines to the end of each month.
RAW MATERIALS.
The American and allied airplane programs called for quantities
of certain raw materials, which threatened to exhaust the supply.
This was true of spruce and fir, lubricating oils, linen, dopes, and
mahogany.
In order to meet the spruce and fir shortage labor battalions were
organized and placed in the forests of the west coast, loyal organiza-
tions of civilian labor were fostered, new kiln processes were devel-
oped which seasoned the lumber rapidly, without loss of strength and
92 THE WAS WITH GERMANY.
resiliency. These methods solved the problem. Approximately
174,000,000 feet of spruce and fir were delivered, of which more than
two-thirds went to the Allies.
Castor oil was at first the only satisfactory lubricant for airplane
motors. The limited supply was far short of the prospective demand,
but the situation was met by planting a large acreage of castor beans
and the development of a mineral oil substitute.
To meet an acute shortage of linen for the wings of planes a
fabric of long fiber cotton was developed which proved superior to
linen.
The standard " dope " used by the Allies to cover the wings of their
planes, making them air and water tight, was limited in supply and
highly inflammable. A substitute dope, far less inflammable and of
more plentiful basic materials, was produced.
Mahogany for propellers was partially replaced by walnut, oak,
cherry, and ash, and by improved seasoning processes excellent results
were secured.
ACCESSORIES.
Few facilities and little experience existed at the beginning of the
war for the development of many of the delicate instruments and
intricate mechanisms required in the equipment of service planes.
Intensive research brought some notable results, of which several de-
serve especial mention. These are:
The oxygen mask, equipped with telephone connections which en-
abled the flyer to endure the rarified air at any altitude which his
plane could reach without losing speaking contact with his com-
panions.
The military parachute, which was developed to unprecedented
safety. This was used principally for escape from burning balloons,
and was improved so that it would bring down safely the entire
balloon basket with its load. During the entire war there was not an
American casualty due to parachute failure.
The electric-heated clothing for aviators on high altitude work.
The electric suit, developed in the latter months of the war and used
at the front, was lined with insulated coils through which current was
driven by means of a small dynamo actuated by a miniature propeller
driven by the rush of the plane through the air.
Long-focus, light-filtration cameras by which good photographs
could be taken through haze from altitudes of 3 miles or more. Pri-
mary credit for this belongs to Europe, but America improved the
mechanism and standardized the design for quantity production.
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS.
93
The wireless telephone, by which the aviator is enabled to converse
easily with other planes and with ground stations. This development
came too late to be of any substantial use at the front, but its value
for peace as well as for any future war is obvious.
BALLOONS.
Diagram 38 shows the total number of observation balloons manu-
factured and the number that were shipped overseas.
800
600
400
200
642
<&
X
369
^
SR-
•
•
4
°/
•
•
•
•
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jan Jnl Aug Sep Oct Nov
1918
Diagram 38.— Observation balloons produced and shipped overseas
each month.
In no field did American manufacturing capacity achieve a greater
relative success. Before the armistice we had produced 642 observa-
tion balloons and had received 20 from the French. Forty-three of
our balloons had been destroyed and 35 given to the French and
British.
This left us with 574 balloons at the end of the war. On the same
date the Belgian Army had 6, the British 43, the French 72, and the
Germans 170 on the western front. These figures mean that at the
end of the war we had nearly twice as many observation balloons as
the enemy and the Allies combined had at the front,
94 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
FORTY-FIVE SQUADRONS AT THE FRONT.)
The American pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille were transferred
from the French to the American service December 26, 1917, flying as
civilians until formally commissioned in late January, 1918. They
were then attached to and served with the French Fourth Army,
operating over Rheims.
In addition to the purely American operations, two full squadrons
were attached to the British Royal Air Force in March and June
respectively, of 1918, remaining with the British throughout the
war, and participated in the following engagements: The Picardy
drive, Ypres, Noyon-Montdidier, Viellers, Bray-Rosieres-Roye, Ar-
ras, Bapaume, Canal du Nord, and Cambrai.
The strictly American aviation operations started in the middle
of March, 1918, with the patrolling of the front from Villeneuve-
les-Vertus by an American pursuit squadron using planes of the
French-built Nieuport-28 type. These operations were in the nature
of a tryout of the American trained aviators, and their complete
success was followed by an immediate increase of the aerial forces at
the front, with enlargement of their duties and field of action. By the
middle of May squadrons of all types — pursuit, observation, and
bombing — as well as balloon companies were in operation over a
wide front. These squadrons were equipped with the best available
types of British and French-built service planes.
The rapid increase in American air forces is shown in diagram 39.
The height of the columns shows the number of squadrons in action
each month. The squadrons were of four types : Observation squad-
rons, whose business it is to make observations, take photographs,
and direct artillery fire; pursuit squadrons, using light fighting
planes to protect the observation planes at their work, to drive the
enemy from the air, or to " strafe " marching columns by machine-
gun fire; the day bombers, whose work was the dropping of bombs
on railways or roads ; and the night bombers, carrying heavier bomb
loads for the destruction of strategic enemy works.
In April the American forces just going into active sectors had
three squadrons, two for observation and one for pursuit. Their
strength totaled 35 planes. In May, as the diagram shows, the squad-
rons were increased to nine. The most rapid growth occurred after
July, when American De Havilland planes were becoming available
in quantity for observation and day bombing service, and by Novem-
ber the number of squadrons increased to 45, with a total of 740
planes in action.
The equipment of American squadrons was in the early months
entirely of French and British manufacture. American De Hav-
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS.
95
illand-4 planes were first used at the front on August 7, and the
number in service increased rapidly from that time on.
The total number of service planes that had been sent to the zone of
advance by the end of each month for the use of American airmen
with our armies is shown in diagram 40. The upper portion of the
columns represents planes of American make, and the lower portion
planes of foreign make. Of the total 2,698 planes sent to the zone
of advance, 667, or one-quarter, were of American make and the pro-
portion was rapidly increasing at the time of the signing of the
armistice.
-NI6HT B0MBIH6
-DAY BOMBING
Apr May Jan. Jul Aug Sep Oct Hoy
1918
Diagram 39.— American air squadrons in action each month.
Of the 2,031 planes from foreign sources sent forward about nine-
tenths were French. The planes sent to the zone of advance are ap-
proximately one-half of the service planes received by the A. E. F.,
the other half being in back areas.
The rapid rate of destruction of planes at the front is illustrated by
the fact that out of the 2,698 planes dispatched to the zone of advance
about 1,100 remained at the time of the signing of the armistice.
96
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
IMPORTANT OPERATIONS.
Three major operations, marking the critical points in American
participation in the war, also furnish a comparison indicating the
growth of American air forces in action. These are: The Second
Battle of the Marne, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne.
CHATEAU-THIERRY JULY.
On the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons front the Germans had at the
start a pronounced superiority in the air. The American Air Serv-
2698
Pot Hot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jtm Jul Aug Sep Oct Har
lil7 1918
Diagram 40. — Service planes sent to zone of advance by end of each
month.
ice succeeded, however, in establishing the lines of contact with enemy
airmen from 3 to 10 miles within the enemy's lines, photographed the
entire front and the terrain deep behind the lines, and played an
important part in putting German air forces on the defensive. The
German concentration for the attack of July 15 was reported in
detail and the location of the German reserves established, while the
secrecy of the allied mobilization for the counterattack was main-
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS. 97
tained and the Germans surprised. The American force employed
consisted of four pursuit squadrons, three observation squadrons and
three balloon companies.
ST. MIHIEL SEPTEMBER.
In capturing the St. Mihiel salient the American first army was
aided and protected by the largest concentration of air force ever
made, of which approximately one-third were American and the
other two-thirds were French, British, and Italian squadrons oper-
ating under American command. Throughout this operation the
German back areas were kept under bombardment day and night;
their reserves and ammunition dumps were located for the American
long-range artillery; propaganda designed to disaffect enemy per-
sonnel was dropped ; record was made by photograph of every move-
ment of the enemy's lines and reserves, such information being fre-
quently delivered to headquarters in finished photographs within
half an hour of its occurrence ; and fast pursuit planes armed with
machine guns flew low over the German lines, firing directly into his
infantry.
Day bombers and corps and artillery observers were forced to fly
low on account of the fog which hampered all the day operations,
greatly reduced the visibility, and made infantry liaison especially
difficult. This accounts for the fact that some trouble was experi-
enced by the Infantry with German " strafing " planes.
The American air force employed consisted of 12 pursuit squad-
rons, 11 observation squadrons, 3 bombing squadrons, and 14 balloon
companies. This large force performed an amount of flying ap-
proximately three times as great as was done during the Chateau-
Thierry operations. Diagram 41 shows the number of hours spent
in the air each week by American service planes at the front. Dur-
ing the last two weeks of July the flying time was more than 1,000
hours per week. The week of the St. Mihiel offensive it rose to
nearly 4,000 hours.
MEUSE-ARGONNE SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER.
Because the Meuse-Argonne engagement covered a wider front and
a more extended period of time, against an enemy who had improved
his distribution of air force along the entire southern section of the
front, no such heavy instantaneous concentration of planes as was
made at St. Mihiel was possible. In this operation, moreover, less
assistance was rendered by French and British flyers. The American
force used during the engagement was considerably larger than at
St. Mihiel.
132966°— 19 7
98
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
During the six weeks' struggle, the losses were heavy, but re-
placements were brought forward so rapidly that at the last stage
of the action the available American strength was greater than at the
start. As shown by diagram 41, American air activities continued
during the Argonne fighting on the same scale as during the St.
Mihiel offensive.
Hoars
5T
MiHin
1 1
MtUSE
ii i
AREOflflf
t;
r
a
<
2,000
c
HATEAIH
HIER
RY
0 1
24
8 B»29
S 1219 26
1 10
rata
' M
la
. U1B2
rrr
SBSoe
1320
1 11
IS 2!
1
5 1
Z2
35
11
J
i i
APR MAY
jun jul
AUS 5EPT OCT
nov DEC JAM
FEB MAR APR
1918 1919
Diagram 41.— Hours spent in the air eacb week by American service
planes at the front.
STRENGTH AT ARMISTICE.
At the signing of the armistice, there were on the front 20 pursuit
squadrons, 18 observation squadrons, and 7 squadrons of bombers;
with 1,238 flying officers and 740 service planes. There were also 23
balloon companies.
THE TEST OF BATTLE.
The final test of the American Air Service is the test of battle.
The final record is the record of the results of combat. Casualty
AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS.
99
figures are an important part of the record. American aviators
brought down in the course of their few months of active service 755
enemy planes. Our losses in combat were 357 planes. This is illus-
trated in diagram 42. The record of our balloon companies shows
a somewhat less favorable comparison between our own and enemy
AIRPLANES
755
357
Enemy l>y American Enemy by American
American lfy enemy American "by enemy
Diagram 42.— Airplanes and balloons brought down in action.
losses, the figures being 43 American and 71 German balloons de-
stroyed.
SUMMARY.
1. On the declaration of war the United States had 55 training
airplanes, of which 51 were classified as obsolete and the other 4 as
obsolescent.
100 THE WAK WITH GERMANY.
2. When we entered the war the Allies made the designs of their
planes available to us and before the end of hostilities furnished us
from their own manufacture 3,800 service planes.
3. Aviation training schools in the United States graduated 8,602
men from elementary courses and 4,028 from advanced courses.
More than 5,000 pilots and observers were sent overseas.
4. The total personnel of the Air Service, officers, students, and
enlisted men, increased from 1,200 at the outbreak of the war to
nearly 200,000 at its close.
5. There were produced in the United States to November 30,
1918, more than 8,000 training planes and more than 16,000 training
engines.
6. The De Havilland-4 observation and day bombing plane was
the only plane the United States put into quantity production. Be-
fore the signing of the armistice 3,227 had been completed and 1,885
shipped overseas. The plane was successfully used at the front for
three months.
7. The production of the 12-cylinder Liberty engine was America's
chief contribution to aviation. Before the armistice 13,574 had been
completed, 4,435 shipped to the expeditionary forces, and 1,025 de-
livered to the Allies.
8. The first flyers in action wearing the American uniform were
members of the Lafayette Escadrille, who were transferred to the
American service in December, 1917.
9. The American air force at the front grew .from 3 squad-
rons in April to 45 in November, 1918. On November 11 the 45
squadrons had an equipment of 740 planes.
10. Of 2,698 planes sent to the zone of the advance for American
aviators 667, or nearly one-fourth, were of American manufacture.
11. American air squadrons played important roles in the battles
of Chateau-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. They
brought down in combat 755 enemy planes, while their own losses
of planes numbered only 357.
Chapter VIII.
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE.
TWO OUT OF THEEE.
Two out of every three American soldiers who reached France
took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,084,000,
and of these 1,390,000 saw active service in the front line.
American combat forces were organized into divisions, which, as
has been noted, consisted of some 28,000 officers and men. These
divisions were the largest on the western front, since the British
division numbered about 15,000 and those of the French and Ger-
mans about 12,000 each. There were sent overseas 42 American
divisions and several hundred thousand supplementary artillery and
service of supply troops. Diagram 43 shows the numerical designa-
tions of the American divisions that were in France each month.
The numbers in the columns are the numbers of the divisions in
France each month, and in every case the numbers of those arriving
during the month are placed at the top of the column, while those
designating the divisions already there are shown below.
Of the 42 divisions that reached France 29 took part in active
combat service, while the others were used for replacements or were
just arriving during the last month of hostilities. The battle record
of the United States Army in this war is largely the history of these
29 combat divisions. Seven of them were Eegular Army divisions,
11 were organized from the National Guard, and 11 were made up
of National Army troops.
American combat divisions were in battle for 200 days, from the
25th of April, 1918, when the first Regular division after long train-
ing in quiet sectors, entered an active sector on the Picardy front,
until the signing of the armistice. During these 200 days they were
engaged in 13 major operations, of which 11 were joint enterprises
with the French, British, and Italians, and 2 were distinctively
American.
At the time of their greatest activity in the second week of October
all 29 American divisions were in action. They then held 101 miles
of front, or 23 per cent of the entire allied battle line. From the
middle of August until the end of the war they held, during the
101
102 THE WAR WITH GEKMANY.
greater part of the time, a front longer than that held by the British.
Their strength tipped the balance, of man power in favor of the
Allies, so that from the middle of June, 1918, to the end of the war
the allied forces were superior in number to those of the enemy.
8
38
31
34 34
86 86
84 84
87 87
40 40 40
39 39 39
88 88 88
81 81 81
7 7 7
85 85 85
36 36 36 36
91 91 91 91
79 79 79 79
76 76 76 76
29 29 29 29 29
37 37 37 37 37
90 90 90 90 90
92 92 92 92 92
89 89 89 69 89
83 83 83 83 83
78 78 78 78 78
80 80 80 80 80 80
30 30 30 30 30 30
33 33 33 33 33 33
6 6 6 6 6 6
27 27 27 27 27 27
4 4 4 4 4 4
28 28 28 28 28 28
35 35 35 35 35 35
82 82 82 82 82 82
77 77 77 77 77 77 77
33333333
55555555
32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
222222222222222
1111 1-1111 111 -11111
Jim Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Deo | Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
1917 1918
Diagram 43. — Numerical designations of American divisions in France
each month.
The total battle advances of all the American divisions amount to
782 kilometers, or 485 miles, an average advance for each division of
17 miles, nearly all of it against desperate enemy resistance. They
captured 63,000 prisoners, 1,378 pieces of artillery, 708 trench mor-
tars, and 9,650 machine guns. In June and July they helped to
shatter the enemy advance toward Paris and to turn retreat into a
triumphant offensive. At St. Mihiel they pinched off in a day an
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OP BATTLE.
103
enemy salient which had been a constant menace to the French line
for four years. In the Argonne and on the Meuse they carried lines
which the enemy was determined to hold at any cost, and cut the
enemy lines of communication and supply for half the western
battle front.
The maps and diagrams in this chapter show in more detail the
part American troops played in the allied endeavor, something of
654 854
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June
31 28 21 10 10 10
Diagram 44.— Kilometers of front line held by armies of each, nation.
July
10
Sept. Oct.
10 10
Hot.
11
the scale and character of their operations, and several comparative
records of the 29 combat divisions.
TIPPING THE BALANCE OF POWER.
The place American troops took in the allied undertaking is
illustrated in diagram 44, which shows in kilometers the length of
front line held by the armies of each nation on the allied side
during the year 1918. In January American troops were holding
10 kilometers, or 6£ miles, of front in quiet sectors. In April their
line had lengthened to 50 kilometers. In July this figure was
104
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
doubled and in September tripled. The high point was reached
in October, with 29 divisions in line, extending over a front of 162
kilometers, or 101 miles, nearly one-quarter of the entire western
front. These changes are shown on the diagram in the upper
portions of the columns in solid black.
The length of front shown as occupied by the French includes
the lines held by the Italian Second Army Corps. On November 11,
1918, the Italians held 11 kilometers, or 2^ per cent, of the western
front.
The fluctuations in the heights of the columns show how the
allied lines gradually lengthened as the five German offensives bel-
2,000,000
GERMAN.
J.600000. _ ,_
UiS.OOO
t^E6,000
1.672.000
1,684,000 »u_
ED
1.694,000
1,500,000
ALLIED
1.846,000
1,343,000
^496,000 "*X
^412,000
1,395,000
1239,000
GERMAN >•
1,223,000
\
1,000,000
\
500,000
0
866,000
Apr.l
Diagram
May 1 June 1 July 1 Aug.l Sept.l Oot.l Not.1
45.— Rifle strength of allied and German armies on the
western front.
lowed them out in big salients and rapidly shortened as the German
retreats began.
Another measure of American participation is the effect caused by
the rapid arrivals of American troops on the rifle strength of the
allied armies. One of the best indexes of effective man power is
the number of riflemen ready for front-line service. For example,
there are 12,250 rifles in an American division and smaller num-
bers in those of other armies.
Diagram 45 shows the rifle strength of the allied and German
armies on the western front from April 1 to November 1, 1918.
The dotted line shows the German rifle strength at the beginning
of each month and the solid line the allied strength. On the 1st of
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 105
April the Germans had an actual superiority of 324,000 riflemen
on the western front. Their strength increased during the next two
months but began to drop during June. At the same time the
allied strength, with the constantly growing American forces, was
showing a steady increase, so that the two lines crossed during June.
From that time on allied strength was always in the ascendency
and since the French and British forces were weaker in October and
November than they were in April and May, this growing ascendency
of the Allies was due entirely to the Americans. By November 1 the
allied rifle strength had a superiority over the German of more than
600,000 rifles.
THIRTEEN BATTLES.
American troops saw service on practically every stretch of the
western front from British lines in Belgium to inactive sectors in the
Vosges. On October 21, 1917, Americans entered the line in the quiet
Toul sector. From that date to the armistice American units were
somewhere in line almost continuously.
It is difficult to cut up the year and 22 days which intervened into
well-defined battles, for in a sense the entire war on the western front
was a single battle. It is possible, however, to distinguish certain
major operations or phases of the greater struggle. Thirteen such
operations have been recognized in which American units were en-
gaged, of which 12 took place on the western front and 1 in Italy.
Battle clasps will be awarded to the officers and men who participated
in these engagements. These battles are named and the number of
Americans engaged is shown in table 7, on this page.
Table 7. — Thirteen major operations in which Americans participated.
Operation.
Approximate
number of
Americans
West front — Campaign of 1917:
Cambrai, Nov. 20 to Dec. 4
West front — Campaign of 1918:
German offensives, Mar. 21 to July 18 —
Somme, Mar. 21 to Apr. 6
Lys, Apr. 9 to 27
Aisne, May 27 to June 5
Noyon-Montdidier, June 9 to 15
Champagne-Marne, July 15 to 18 —
Allied offensives, July 18 to Nov. 11 —
Aisne-Marne, July 18 to Aug. 6
Somme, Aug. 8 to Nov. 11
Oise-Aisne, Aug. 18 to Nov. 11
Ypres-Lys, Aug. 19 to Nov. 11
St. Mihiel, Sept. 12 to 16
Meuse-Argonne, Sept. 20 to Nov. 11.
Italian front— Campaign of 1918:
Vittorio-Veneto, Oct. 24 to Nov. 4
2,500
2,200
500
27, 500
27,000
85,000
270, 000
54, 000
85,000
103,000
550, 000
1,200,000
1,200
106
THE WAK WITH GERMANY.
The first major operation in which American troops were en-
gaged was the Cambrai battle at the end of the campaign of 1917.
Scattering medical and engineering detachments, serving with the
British, were present during the action but sustained no serious
casualties.
GERMAN OFFENSIVES.
The campaign of 1918 opened with the Germans in possession of
the offensive. In a series of five drives of unprecedented violence the
Map 9. — The five great German offensives of 1918.
imperial Great General Staff sought to break the allied line and end
the war. These five drives took place in five successive months, begin-
ning in March. Each drive was so timed as to take advantage of
the light of the moon for that month. Map 9, on this page, shows
the ground won by the Germans in each of the offensives. The arrows
indicate the points at which American troops went into the battle,
and the small numbers are the numerical designations of the Ameri-
can divisions taking part.
The first drive opened on March 21, on a 50-mile front across the
old battle field of the Somme. In 17 days of fighting the Germans
advanced their lines beyond Noyon and Montdidier and were within
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OP BATTLE. 107
12 miles of the important railroad center of Amiens with its great
stores of British supplies. In this battle, also known as the Picardy
offensive, approximately 2,200 American troops, serving with the
British and French, were engaged.
The attack upon Amiens had been but partially checked when the
enemy struck again to the north in the Armentieres sector and ad-
vanced for 17 miles up the valley of the Lys. A small number of
Americans, serving with the British, participated in the Lys de-
fensive.
For their next attack (May 27) the Germans selected the French
front along the Chemin des Dames north of the Aisne. The line
from Rheims to a little east of Noyon was forced back. Soissons
fell, and on May 31 the enemy had reached the Marne Valley, down
which he was advancing in the direction of Paris. At this critical
moment our Second Division, together with elements of the Third
and Twenty-eighth Divisions were thrown into the line. By block-
ing the German advance at -Chateau-Thierry, they rendered great
assistance in stopping perhaps the most dangerous of the German
drives. The Second Division not only halted the enemy on its front
but also recaptured from him the strong tactical positions of Bou-
resches, Belleau Wood, and Vaux.
The enemy had by his offensives established two salients threaten-
ing Paris. He now sought to convert them into one by a fourth
terrific blow delivered on a front of 22 miles between Montdidier
and Noyon. The reinforced French Army resisted firmly and the
attack was halted after an initial advance of about 6 miles. Through-
out this operation (June 9-15) the extreme left line of the salient
was defended by our (First Division. Even before the drive began
the division had demonstrated the fighting qualities of our troops by
capturing and holding the town of Cantigny (May 28).
There followed a month of comparative quiet, during which the
enemy reassembled his forces for his fifth onslaught. On July 15
he attacked simultaneously on both sides of Rheims, the eastern
corner of the salient he had created in the Aisne drive. To the
east of the city he gained little. On the west he crossed the Marne,
but made slight progress. His path was everywhere blocked. In
this battle 85,000 American troops were engaged — the Forty-second
division to the extreme east in Champagne, and the Third and
Twenty-eighth to the west, near Chateau-Thierry,
ALLIED OFFENSIVES.
The turning point of the war had come. The great German of-
fensives had been stopped. The initiative now passed from Luden-
dorff to Marshal Foch, and a series of allied offensives began, des-
108
THE WAK WITH GERMANY.
tined to roll back the German armies beyond the French frontier.
In this continuous allied offensive there may be distinguished six
phases or major operations in which the American Expeditionary
Forces took part.
These six operations are shown on map 10, on this page, in which
the solid arrows indicate points where American divisions entered
the line, and the broken arrows the distances over which they drove
forward. In four of the six operations the American troops en-
gaged were acting in support of allied divisions and under the com-
mand of the generals of the Allies.
Map 10.— American participation in the allied offensives of 1918.
The moment chosen by Marshal Foch for launching the first
counteroffensive was July 18, when it was clear that the German
Champagne-Marne drive had spent its force. The place chosen was
the uncovered west flank of the German salient from the Aisne to
the Marne. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-
eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second American Divisions, to-
gether with selected French troops, were employed. When the oper-
ation was completed (August 6) the salient had been flattened out
and the allied line ran from Soissons to Rheims along the Vesle.
Two days later the British struck at the Somme salient, initiating
an offensive which, with occasional breathing spells, lasted to the
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 109
date of the armistice. American participation in this operation was
intermittent. From August 8 to 20 elements of the Thirty-third
Division, which had been brigaded for training with the Austra-
lians, were in the line and took part in the capture of Chipilly Eidge.
Later the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, who served
throughout with the British, were brought over from the Ypres
sector and used in company with Australian troops to break the
Hindenburg line at the tunnel of the St. Quentin Canal (Sept. 20-
Oct. 20).
In the meantime simultaneous assaults were in progress at other
points on the front. On August 18 Gen. Mangin began the Oise-
Aisne phase of the great allied offensive. Starting from the Soissons-
Rheims line, along which they had come to rest August 6, the French
armies advanced by successive stages to the Aisne, to Laon, and on
November 11 were close to the frontier. In the first stages of this
advance they were assisted by the Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and
Seventh-seventh American Divisions, but by September 15 all of
these were withdrawn for the coming Meuse-Argonne offensive of the
American Army.
The day after the opening of the Oise- Aisne offensive the British
launched the first of a series of attacks in the Ypres sector which
continued with some interruptions to the time of the armistice and
may be termed the " Ypres-Lys offensive." Four American divisions
at different times participated in this operation. The Twenty-
seventh and Thirtieth were engaged in the recapture of Mount Kem-
mel August 31 to September 2. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first
were withdrawn from the Meuse-Argonne battle and dispatched to
Belgium, where they took part in the last stages of the Ypres-Lys
offensive (Oct. 31 to Nov. 11).
With the organization of the American First Army on August 10,
under the personal command of Gen. Pershing, the history of the
American Expeditionary Forces entered upon a new stage. The
St, Mihiel (Sept. 12-16) and Meuse-Argonne (Sept. 26-Nov. 11)
offensives were major operation planned and executed by American
generals and American troops. The ground won in each is shown by
the shaded areas in map 10.
In addition to the 12 operations above mentioned, American troops
participated in the Battle of Vittorio-Veneto (Oct. 24 to Nov. 4),
which ended in the rout of the Austrian Army.
THE BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL.
The first distinctly American offensive was the reduction of the St.
Mihiel salient carried through from September 12 to September 15,
largely by American troops and wholly under the orders of the Amer-
110
THE WAR, WITH GERMANY.
ican commander in chief. The positions of the various American
divisions at the beginning of the offensive and on each succeeding
day are shown on map 11 on this page. The arrows indicate the ad-
vance of each division. In the attack the American troops were
aided by French colonial troops, who held the portion of the front
line shown in dashes on the left of the map. The Americans were
also aided by French and British air squadrons.
The attack began at 5 a. m., after four hours of artillery prepara-
tion of great severity, and met with immediate success. Before noon
about half the distance between the bases of the salient had been
FORTIFIED
AREA OF ME.TZ
Map 11 The Battle of St. Mihiel.
covered and the next morning troops of the First and Twenty-sixth
Divisions met at Vigneulles, cutting off the salient within 24 hours
from the beginning of the movement.
Two comparisons between this operation and the Battle of Gettys-
burg emphasize the magnitude of the action. About 550,000 Ameri-
cans were engaged at St. Mihiel; the Union forces at Gettysburg
numbered approximately 100,000. St. Mihiel set a record for con-
centration of artillery fire by a four-hour artillery preparation, con-
suming more than 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. In three days
at Gettysburg Union artillery fired 33,000 rounds.
The St. Mihiel offensive cost only about 7,000 casualties, less than
one-third the Union losses at Gettysburg. There were captured
16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. A dangerous enemy salient was re-
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. Ill
duced, and American commanders and troops demonstrated their
ability to plan and execute a big American operation.
THE BATTLE OF THE MEUSE- ARGON NE.
The object of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, said Gen. Pershing in
his report of November 20, 1918, was " to draw the best German divi-
sions to our front and to consume them." This sentence expresses
better than any long description not only the object but also the out-
come of the battle. Every available American division was thrown
against the enemy. Every available German division was thrown
in to meet them. At the end of 47 days of continuous battle our
divisions had consumed the German divisions.
The goal of the American attack was the Sedan-Mezieres railroad,
the main line of supply for the German forces on the major part of
the western front. If this line were cut, a retirement on the whole
front would be forced. This retirement would include, moreover,
evacuation of the Briey iron fields, which the Germans had been
using to great advantage to supplement their iron supply. The de-
fense of the positions threatened was therefore of such importance as
to warrant the most desperate measures for resistance. When the
engagement was evidently impending the commander of the German
Fifth Army sent word to his forces, calling on them for unyielding
resistance and pointing out that defeat in this engagement might
mean disaster for the fatherland.
Map 12 shows the progress of the American action, giving the lines
held by divisions on different days. On the first day, the 26th of
September, and the next day or two after that, the lines were con-
siderably advanced. Then the resistance became more stubborn.
Each side threw in more and more of its man power until there were
no more reserves. Many German divisions went into action twice,
and not a few three times, until, through losses, they were far under
strength. All through the month of October the attrition went on.
Foot by foot American troops pushed back the best of the German
divisions. On November 1 the last stage of the offensive began. The
enemy power began to break. American troops forced their way to
the east bank of the Meuse. Toward the north they made even more
rapid progress, and in seven days reached the outskirts of Sedan and
cut the Sedan-Mezieres railroad, making the German line untenable.
In the meantime (Oct. 2 to 28) our Second and Thirty-sixth Divi-
sions had been sent west to assist the French who were advancing in
Champagne beside our drive in the Argonne. The liaison detachment
between the two armies was for a time furnished by the Ninety-
second Division.
112
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
In some ways the Meuse-Argonne offers an interesting resemblance
to the Battle of the Wilderness, fought from May 5 to 12, 1864, in
the Civil War. Both were fought over a terrain covered with tangled
woods and underbrush. The Wilderness was regarded as a long bat-
tle, marked by slow progress, against obstinate resistance, with very
heavy casualties. Here the similarity ends. The Meuse-Argonne
Map 12.— The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne.
lasted six times as long as the Battle of the Wilderness. Twelve
times as many American troops were engaged as were on the Union
side. They used in the action ten times as many guns and fired
about one hundred times as many rounds of artillery ammunition.
The actual weight of the ammunition fired was greater than that used
by the Union forces during the entire Civil War. Casualties were
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE. 113
perhaps four times as heavy as among the Northern troops in the
Battle of the Wilderness.
The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne was beyond compare the greatest
ever fought by American troops, and there have been few, if any,
greater battles in the history of the world. Some of the more im-
portant statistics of the engagement are presented in Table 8.
Table 8. — American data for the Meuse-Argonne Battle.
Days of battle 47
American troops engaged 1, 200, 000
Guns employed in attack 2, 417
Rounds of artillery ammunition fired 4,214,000
Airplanes used 840
Tons of explosives dropped by planes on enemy lines 100
Tanks used 324
Miles of penetration of enemy line, maximum 34
Square kilometers of territory taken 1, 550
Villages and towns liberated 150
Prisoners captured 16, 059
Artillery pieces captured 468
Machine guns captured 2, 864
Trench mortars captured 177
American casualties 120, 000
RECORD OF 29 COMBAT DIVISIONS.
Twenty-nine combat divisions achieved the successes and bore the
losses of active operations. The story of their achievements can not
be told within the limits of this account. There are, however, certain
fundamental records which give us a picture of the accomplishments
of these divisions. They tell us how long each division served in the
front line; how far each advanced against the enemy; how many
prisoners each captured ; and how heavily each suffered.
The length of service of each division in quiet and in active sectors
of the line is shown in diagram 46. The First Division was the first
in line and the first to enter an active sector. It reached France in
June, 1917, went into line in October and into an active sector in
April, 1918. The next three divisions in order of length of service
all reached France in 1917.
Three of the 29 divisions were still serving their apprenticeship
and had not seen much severe battle service at the time of the signing
of the armistice. They were the Sixth, the Eighty-first, and the
Eighty-eighth. It is interesting that of the total of 2,234 days which
American divisions spent in line, four-tenths were in active sectors.
Diagram 47 pictures the accomplishments of different divisions by
showing the number of kilometers each advanced against the enemy,
132966°— 19 8
114
THE WAR WITH GEKMATTY.
and in graphic form the percentage of the total kilometers advanced
which was carried through by each division. The length of the ad-
vance depends in each case on the length of service of the division,
the duty assigned to it (whether offensive or defensive), the nature
of the terrain to be covered, the strength and effectiveness of oppos-
ing enemy forces, artillery support, etc. Hence, conclusions as to the
relative efficiency of divisions can not be drawn from these figures
alone.
Divl-
sion
Quiet
Active
1st
127
93
26th
148
45
42nd
125
39
2nd
71
66
77th
47
66
5th
71
32
82nd
70
27
35th
92
5
32nd
60
35
3rd
0
86
89th
55
28
29th
59
23
28th
31
49
90th
42
26
37th
50
11
33rd
32
27
27th
0
57
30th
0
56
92nd
51
2
79th
28
17
4th
7
38
6th
40
0
78th
17
21
7th
31
2
81st
31
0
91st
15
14
88th
28
0
36th
0
23
80th
1
17
Total
1,329
905
Quiet
Active
220
J 164
193
J 137
113
103
186
Diagram 46.— Days spent by each, division in quiet and active sectors.
The Seventy-seventh National Army Division, composed largely
of troops from New York City, made the greatest advance — a total
of 71J kilometers, or nearly 45 miles. This was more than 9 per
cent of the ground gained by the divisions. If the advances are
turned into miles the total advance is 485 miles, and the average gain
for each division IT miles.
Diagram 48 on the number of German prisoners captured is sub-
ject to the same qualifications as the preceding diagram. The figures
for number of prisoners taken are from the official records of the
different divisions. The total is somewhat higher than the rolls of
American prisoner stockades have shown, but the difference is prob-
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE.
115
ably in prisoners turned over to the French or British. The total
number of Americans taken prisoner by Germans was 4,480.
The price paid for these achievements was 256,000 battle casualties;
a heavy price when counted in terms of the individuals who gave
their lives or suffered from wounds; a small price when compared
with the enormous price paid by the nations at whose sides we fought.
Diagram 49 gives the roll of honor of the divisions for battle casual-
ties.
Divi-
Kilo-
Per
sion
77th
2nd
42nd
1st
89th
meter*
7li
60
55
51
48
l
cent
3rd
80th
26th
32nd
33rd
9llt
37th
41
38
37
36
36
34
30
^BBHBEBB 3.83
30th
29£
MBWMHWWTIilffglffff! 3.77
5th
29
BMtu""WBlTW*gl,Ba 3.vi
90th
28§-
24§
MiLmammaaaaimmm 3.&4
4th
BS^l iS&H 3.13
78th
21
■ ^ ^ - -■■ 2.68
36th
21
■kfiAiJ^-^.JBl 2.68
79th
19£
am:.BSBB8SH 2.49
82nd
17
HttHHEHHS 2.17
35th
l*k
UUMBM) 1.60
27th
11
BBBBi i.4i
28th
10
■BBS 1.28
92nd
8
ESS 1.02
29th
7
SBB .89
81st
5k
nso .70
7th
1
1 .13
6th
0
88th
0
Total 782§-
Diagram 47. — Kilometers advanced against the enemy by each, division.
The figures given were corrected to June 3 and constitute the final
record of the office of the adjutant general of the expeditionary forces.
Battle deaths include both killed in action and died of wounds. Under
wounded are included many slightly injured. Artillery brigade losses
are included in the figures of the divisions to which they were origi-
nally assigned.
Under "others" are grouped the casualties of several different
kinds of units. These are the following.
116
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
Others.
Troops not in divisions
Ninety -third Division
Replacement and depot divisions
Divisional deaths not distributed
Total
Killed.
1,019
584
690
782
Wounded.
3,496
2,582
1,556
Total.
4,515
3,166
2,246
782
3,075
7,634
10,709
The troops not in divisions were largely artillery, headquarters,
train, and other special services attached to groups of divisions
operating together in corps and armies.
Divi
sion
Per cent,
19.0?
Total 63,079
Diagram 48.— German prisoners eaptured by each division*
The Ninety-third Division is worthy of special comment. It has
not been listed among the combat divisions because it was always
incomplete as a division. It was without its artillery and some
other units, and was brigaded with the French from the time of
its arrival in France in the spring of 1918 until the signing of the
armistice. Its service in the line was fully as long as that of many
of the so-called combat divisions. This is indicated by a compari-
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE.
117
son of its casualties with those in the other divisions. The division
was made up of colored soldiers from National Guard units of
various States.
Casualties in replacement and depot divisions are partly accounted
for in two ways. In the first place the artillery of a number of
these divisions went into action separately. Secondly, some re-
placement units joining combat divisions suffered casualties before
Divi-
sion
Battle
deaths
Wounded
.Killed
Total casualties
Wounded
4,478
4,411
3,177
2,551
2,644
2,135
2,915
2,511
1,992
1,785
1,629
1,976
1,298
1,433
1,067
1,392
989
1,384
1,419
1,132
1,414
977
951
600
296
176
251
93
29
17-752
17,201
12,940
11,429
11,275
11,325
10,477
9,893
8,505
7,201
7,325
6,864
6,248
5,858
6,216
5,685
6,266
5,861
5,331
5,000
4,364
4,266
4,268
1,928
1,397
1,466
973
453
89
2nd
1st
"H 22,230
J 21,612
3rd
■HH
"1 16,117
28 th
■BH
1 13,980
42nd
26th
zS=
1 ±8,919
113.460
32nd
ami
113.392
4th
nan
1 12.b04
77 th
kna
' 1 10,497
27 th
H3i
— 1 8,986
30th
5th
Sm
ZD 8,954
I 8,840
82nd
89 th
35th
■==
17, 546
17,291
17,283
90th
33rd
78 th
H
17,277
17,255
17,245
79 th
80th
g
16,750
1 6,132
15,778
1 5,243
1 5,219
!8
91st
■i
37 th
■
29th
■
36th
7 th
92nd
61st
6th
88th
MZZI2,5J
01,693
□1,642
□ 1,224
0 546
0118
Total
Others
47,205
3,075
198,056
7,634
Grand total
50,280
205,690
Diagram 49.— Casualties suffered by each division.
the papers involved in their transfer had been completed. Hence
they were reported in their original organizations.
Among the 10,709 " other " casualties there is one most interest-
ing and not inconsiderable group, some of the members of which
-are included in " troops not in divisions," and the rest among the
casualties of replacement and depot divisions. These are the men
who deserted to the front. They went A. W. O. L. (absent without
leave) from their organizations in the zone of supplies or in the
training areas, and found their way up to the battle line, where many
of them took part in the fighting and some of them were killed or
118 THE WAE WITH GEEMANY.
wounded. These cases were so numerous that Gen. Pershing made
special arrangements by which trained men who had rendered good
service behind the lines could, as a reward, secure opportunity to go
to the front and take part in the fighting.
In the next chapter a more careful analysis is made of American
casualties, and the battle and disease deaths in this war are com-
pared with the records of the United States and other nations in
previous wars.
SUMMARY.
1. Two out of every three American soldiers who reached France
took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,084,000,
and of these 1,390,000 saw active service at the front.
2. Of the 42 divisions that reached France 29 took part in active
combat service. Seven of them were Regular Army divisions, 11
were organized from the National Guard, and 11 were made up of
National Army troops.
3. American divisions were in battle for 200 days and engaged in
13 major operations.
4. From the middle of August until the end of the war the Ameri-
can divisions held during the greater part of the time a front longer
than that held by the British.
5. In October the American divisions held 101 miles of line, or
23 per cent of the entire western front.
6. On the 1st of April the Germans had a superiority of 324,000 in
rifle strength. Due to American arrivals the allied strength exceeded
that of the Germans in June and was more than 600,000 above
it in November.
7. In the Battle of St. Mihiel 550,000 Americans were engaged, as
compared with about 100,000 on the Northern side in the Battle of
Gettysburg. The artillery fired more than 1,000,000 shells in four
hours, which is the most intense concentration of artillery fire re-
corded in history.
8. The Meuse-Argonne Battle lasted for 47 days, during which
1,200,000 American troops were engaged.
9. The American battle losses of the war were 50,000 killed and
206,000 wounded. They are heavy when counted in terms of lives
and suffering, but light compared with the enormous price paid by
the nations at whose sides we fought.
Chapter IX.
HEALTH AND CASUALTIES.
THE DEADLIEST WAR.
Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors who took part in the
war with Germany, 2 were killed or died of disease during the
period of hostilities. In the Northern Army during the Civil War
the number was about 10. Among the other great nations in this
war, between 20 and 25 in each 100 called to the colors were killed
or died. To carry the comparison still further, American losses
in this war were relatively one-fifth as large as during the Civil
War and less than one-tenth as large as in the ranks of the enemy
or among the nations associated with us.
The war was undoubtedly the bloodiest which has ever been
fought. One possible competitor might be the Crimean War, in
which the casualty rate per 100 men was equally heavy. The Brit-
ish forces in the Crimean War lost 22 of every 100 men, the
French 31, the Turkish 27, and the Russian 43. More than four-
fifths of the losses were, however, deaths from disease, while in the
recent war with Germany disease deaths were inconsiderable as
compared with battle deaths. The forces engaged in the Crimean
War were, moreover, much smaller.
Table 9. — Battle deaths in armies engaged in present war, 1914-1918.
Russia 1. 700' °°°
Germany *■ 600' 00°
France *> 385' 300
Great Britain 900' °°°
Austria — 800' 00°
Italy . 364'000
m , 250, 000
Turkey '
Serbia and Montenegro 125> °00
Belgium - 102>^
Roumania _— 100> °00
Bulgaria 100> j™
United States _—,——— 50' 3^
Greece ___ L-L — _ '
r> 4. i 2,000
Portugal . '
7,485,600
Total ,
119
120
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
The total battle deaths in the recent war were greater than all
the deaths in all wars for more than 100 years previous. From
1793 to 1914 total deaths in war may safely be estimated at some-
thing under 6,000,000. Battle deaths alone from 1914 to 1918 totaled
about 7.500,000. An estimate of the losses of the principal nations
engaged is shown in Table 9. As the final records are not yet wholly
complete, these figures are approximate in some cases. Only deaths
meuse-argomne
CHATEAU-THIERRY
CANTIGMY
JAM
FEB MAR APR hW JUH JUL AUG SEPT OCT MOV DEC
1918
Diagram 50.— Battle deaths each week.
resulting directly from action are included. The total deaths from
all causes is very much larger, as some of the armies lost more
heavily from diseases and privation than from battle.
The table shows that Kussia had the heaviest losses, in spite of the
fact that she withdrew from the war after the fall of 1917. Amer-
ican losses are third from the bottom of the list. German losses
were thirty-two times as great as the losses of the United States,
the French twenty-eight times, and the British eighteen times as
large.
HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 121
That American losses were not more severe is due to the fact that
our armies were only in heavy fighting for 200 days. Diagram 50
shows the number of battle deaths occurring each week through 1918.
The first rise in the columns, the last part of May, reflects the battle
of Cantigny. The second rise, in July, indicates the heavy losses
which took place when American divisions were thrown in along
the Marne salient at the beginning of the allied offensive. The
heaviest losses were in the Meuse-Argonne drive from the last week
of September until November 11. The weekly deaths during a part
of that period were around the 6,000 mark.
Infantry & Maoh.Gun O*"09™ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^S
Air Service
Officers VSM//////////J7777A 33.3
lien I .6
Engineer Corps
Officers
Uen
W7777K 11.5
Officers
Uen
V/////A 11.5
Officers
Uen
y77m e.i
BB 5*6
Officers
Uen
£23.8
Officers
Uen
0 1.7
■ 1.9
Officers
Uen
0 1.7
1 .3
Officers
Uen
a
11.4
Officers
Uen
0
1 .1
Tank Corps
Artillery
Signal Corps
Medical Department
Quartermaster
Cavalry
Ordnance
Diagram 51.— Battle deaths among each thousand officers and men who
reached France.
BATTLE DEATHS BY SERVICES.
The chances of death are much heavier in the Infantry than in
any other branch of the service. Diagram 51 compares the various
services in respect to the chances of death in each. The bars show
how many battle deaths there were among each 1,000 men in the
various services who reached France. Of each 1,000 enlisted men in
the Infantry 52 were killed in action or died of wounds. The officers
show a higher rate. The most striking difference between the death
rates of officers and men appears in the Air Service. Here the
casualties among officers are much higher than among men because
in our service all aviators are officers.
122 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
WOUNDED, PRISONERS, AND MISSING.
For every man who was killled in battle, six others were wounded,
taken prisoner, or reported missing. The total battle casualties in the
expeditionary forces are shown in Table 10. The number who died
of wounds was only 7 per cent as large as the number who were
wounded. The hospital records show that about 85 per cent of the
men sent to hospitals on account of injuries have been returned to
duty. About half the wounded were reported as slightly wounded
and many of them would not have been recorded as casualties in pre-
vious wars. Except for 373 who died, all the prisoners shown in
the table have now been returned.
Table 10. — Battle casualties in the American Expeditionary Forces.
Killed in action 35, 560
Died of wounds 14, 720
Total dead 50, 280
Wounded severely 90, 830
Wounded slightly 80,480
Wounded, degree undetermined 34, 380
Total wounded 205, 690
Missing in action (Aug. 1, 1919) 46
Taken prisoner + 4, 480
Grand total 260, 496
The number of men reported as missing has been steadily reduced
from a total of 78,000 to the figure 46 shown in the table. This reduc-
tion has gone on without clearing any case as dead except on evidence
establishing the fact of death. The total number of cases cleared as
presumed dead will be about 1,550. The results of clearing up the
records of more than 21,000 cases, exclusive of prisoners, which were
reported in the casualty cables to this country, are shown in diagram
52. The largest number have been found in hospitals, while a con-
siderable number have returned to duty after being lost from their
units.
The work -of the Central Kecords Office of the American Expedi-
tionary Forces in clearing up the cases of men listed as missing has
been more successful than that done in any of the other armies or in
any previous great war. The missing lists of the other nations still
run into the hundreds of thousands. The most recent figures for
France and Great Britain are 264,000 and 121,000, respectively.
HEALTH AND CASUALTIES.
BATTLE AND DISEASE LOSSES.
123
The total number of lives lost in both Army and Navy from the
declaration of war to July 1, 1919, is 125,500. Deaths in the Army,
including marines attached to it, were 115,660. About two-thirds
Diagram 52.— Final disposition of cases of men reported missing In
6 action.
of these deaths occurred overseas. Diagram £3 shows the propor-
tion which occurred in the United States and overseas, and also the
proportion which disease deaths bore to battle deaths. Under
TOTAL 115,660
TOTAL 115,660
Diagram 53.— Total deaths.
" Other " are included deaths from accident. There were 768 lost
at sea, of whom 381 are included under battle deaths, since their
loss was the direct result of submarine activity. Almost exactly
half the losses were from disease. If the comparison between dis-
124
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
ease and battle losses is limited to the expeditionary forces, battle
losses appear more than twice as large as deaths from disease.
This is the first war in which the United States has been engaged
that showed a lower death rate from disease than from battle. In
previous wars insanitary conditions at camps and the ravages of
epidemic diseases have resulted in disease deaths far in excess of
the number killed on the battle field. The facts are shown in dia-
gram 54. In order to make a fair comparison the figures used are
the numbers of deaths each year among each 1,000 troops. Since
disease:
DISEASE
BATTLE
BATTLE
BATTLE
15
33
Mexican War
1846-48
Civil War
(North)
1661-65
DISEASE
BATTLE
m
Spanish War
1898
DISEASE
I
53
PBESSHT WAS
to Hot 11
1918
Diagram 54. — Disease and battle deaths.
the time of the Mexican War a steady improvement has been made
in the health of troops in war operations. The death rate from dis-
ease in the Mexican War was 110 per year in each 1,000 men; in
the Civil War this was reduced to 65 ; and in the Spanish War to
26 ; while the rate in the expeditionary forces in this war was 19.
The battle rate of 53 for the overseas forces is higher than in any
previous war. It is higher than in the Civil War because all of the
fighting was concentrated in one year, while in the Civil War it
stretched over four years. The rates in this war for the total forces
HEALTH AND CASUALTIES. 125
under arms both in the United States and France from the beginning
of the war to May 1, 1919, were 13 for battle and 15 for disease.
THE CONTROL OF DISEASE.
Some of the outstanding causes of the remarkably low disease
death rate in the war against Germany are: (1) A highly trained
medical personnel, (2) compulsory vaccination of the entire Army
against typhoid fever, (3) thorough camp sanitation and control of
drinking water, and (4) adequate provision of hospital facilities.
There were at the beginning of the war 2,089 commissioned medi-
cal officers, including the Reserves. During the war 31,251 physicians
from civil life were commissioned in the Medical Corps. This num-
ber included leaders of medical science who have not only made pos-
sible the application of the most recent advances of medicine in the
prevention and cure of disease, but have themselves made new dis-
coveries during the course of the war, resulting in great saving of life
in our own and other armies.
The intestinal diseases such as dysentery, the typhoids, bubonic
plague, cholera, and typhus, have ravaged and even obliterated
armies in the past. During the Spanish- American War typhoid
fever alone caused 85 per cent of the total number of deaths. In the
War with Germany these diseases have been practically eliminated
as causes of death. Diagram 55 shows the relative proportion of
deaths caused by principal diseases. During the entire war up to
May 1, 1919, a total of only 2,328 cases of typhoid fever have been
reported and only 227 deaths from this cause. The result is due to
the compulsory vaccination of every man who entered the Army
and to excellent sanitary conditions. The other intestinal diseases
are similarly of little effect as causes of death or have not occurred
at all.
It was to be expected that with careful control exercised, epi-
demics of these diseases would be avoided in the United States ; but
in the Expeditionary Forces, where troops were quartered in tem-
porary camps, billeted with civilians, or actively engaged in pro-
longed battle, the reduction of these diseases is a notable achievement
in sanitary control.
It is evident from the diagram that pneumonia has been the great-
est cause of death. More than 40,000 died of the disease. Of these,
probably 25,000 resulted from the influenza-pneumonia pandemic
which swept through every camp and cantonment in this country
and caused thousands of deaths in the expeditionary forces. Up to
September 14, 1918, only 9,840 deaths from disease had occurred in
the Army, and the death rate for the period of the war up to that
time was only 5 per year for each 1,000 men. During the eight weeks
126
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
from September 14 to the 8th of November 316,089 cases of influenza
and 53,449 of pneumonia were reported among troops in this country.
The explosive character of the epidemic is shown in diagram 56.
The curve in the diagram shows the weekly death rate for each 1,000
troops in this country during the year 1918. The curve starts to rise
sharply during the third week in September. It reached its high
point the second week in October, when 4 out of each 1,000 troops
under arms in this country died. The rate subsided at the end of
October, but during the succeeding months remained somewhat higher
than it had been previous to the epidemic.
-Z%
—.3%
MEA5LE5
SCARLET FEVER -
ORGANIC HEART DISEA5EV4%
APPEMDICITI5 A%
PERITONITIS .5
TYPHOID .5%
BRJGHT*5 DISEASE
5EPTCEMIA-
EMPYEMIA
Diagram 55.— Deaths by principal diseases.
Two other diseases which offered difficult problems for the medical
force were measles and spinal meningitis. Measles was prevalent
during the first year of the war and was particularly dangerous as
the predecessor of pneumonia. After vigorous efforts to control it,
the number of cases was greatly reduced. Meningitis has caused
nearly 2,000 deaths, ranking next to pneumonia as shown in diagram
55. Both of these contagious diseases were largely the result of
bringing numbers of men together in the confinement of camps and
cantonments where the control of contagion is difficult. In the case
of measles, men from rural communities who had not been im-
munized by previous exposure were particularly susceptible.
HEALTH AND CASUALTIES.
VENEREAL DISEASE.
127
Great, success has also been experienced in the control of the
venereal diseases. A comprehensive program of education, to-
gether with medical prophylaxis, has produced unusual results.
While these diseases have continued to be the most frequent cause
of admissions to the sick report, and the greatest source of nonef-
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR
1918 1919
Diagram 56.— Deaths per 1,000 soldiers each week in the United States,
showing effect of influenza epidemic.
fectiveness in the Army, a large proportion of the cases were con-
tracted before entering the Army. A special study of all new cases
of venereal diseases reported at five large cantonments, Lee, Va. ;
Dix, N. J. ; Upton, N. Y. ; Meade, Md. ; and Pike, Ark., during the
year ended May 21, 1919, shows that of 48,167 cases treated, 96 per
cent were contracted before entering the Army and only i per cent
after.
128
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
The record for the forces overseas has been particularly note-
worthy. There, few fresh recruits entered the Army from civil
life, and hence the conditions more accurately show the effects of
the Army control exercised.
Up to September, 1918, there was steady reduction of noneffective-
ness from venereal diseases in the Army overseas. At the begin-
ning of that month there was less than one venereal patient in hos-
pitals among each 1,000 men. Diagram 57 shows the number of
90
75
60
45
30
15
Boy Deo Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jim Jul Aag Sep Oct Mot Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr Mag
1917 1918 1919
Diagram 57.— Venereal cases in hospitals among each. 10,000 men in the
American Expeditionary Forces.
venereal patients in hospitals at the beginning of each month per
10,000 troops in the expeditionary forces. While the relative num-
ber of patients has increased since hostilities stopped, the record is
still excellent. Eegular weekly inspections, covering about 85 per
cent of the total number of troops overseas, have disclosed during
six months since the armistice less than one new case in each thousand
men examined weekly. The actual average was one new case each
week among each 2,630 men examined.
HOSPITALIZATION.
At the beginning of the war what was then considered an extrava-
gant program of hospital construction was entered upon, with the
MAJOR E. B. MILLER
U. S. MARINES
FT. LEAVENWORTH, KANS.
I7*
i55
33
,30
40
_ 39
24^
21
^0
16
16^«
"^
2Bj
!?*■
J3
2*^*
ii
13
I
HEALTH AND CASUALTIES.
129
intent that in no case should the Army lack facilities for the care of
its sick. Table 11 summarizes the hospital construction in the United
States.
Table 11. — Army hospital construction in the United States.
New hospitals -
Leased buildings and converted Army posts
Post hospitals remodeled
Total
149
Normal
bed
capacity.
88,468
29,383
6,056
123,907
The figures are exclusive of very numerous small hospitals already
in Army use. In addition more than 200 hospitals were put in oper-
BedB /"^-L
250,000 f
200,000 y j;^ t^
150,000 -J Jf SSjC- S_
100,000 j *- /■ -J V
60,000 -?r
1918 1913
Diagram 58.— Beds available and occupied in the American Expedi-
tionary Forces.
ation overseas. On December 1, 1918, there were available in Army
hospitals 399,510 beds, or 1 bed to every 9 men in the Army. Of
these, 287,290 were overseas and 112,220 were in this country.
Diagram 58 shows the number of patients at the end of each week
in the American Expeditionary Forces compared with the beds avail-
able. The hospital capacity was exceeded in this country only dur-
132966°— 19 9
130 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
ing the influenza epidemic, when it became necessary to take over
barracks for hospital purposes. The overseas record was even bet-
ter. Except during two weeks in October, at the height of the at-
tack on the Hindenburg line, the number of patients did not exceed
the normal bed capacity of the hospitals, and at that time there were
approximately 60,000 unused emergency beds.
Over 130,000 patients have been evacuated from the expeditionary
forces to hospitals in this country. They have been distributed to
hospitals in this country in accordance with a twofold plan permit-
ting the specialization of hospitals for the most efficient treatment
of the various kinds of cases and placing the convalescents near their
homes.
SUMMARY.
1. Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors, who served in the
war with Germany, two were killed or died of disease during the
period of hositilties.
2. The total battle deaths of all nations in this war were greater*
than all the deaths in all the wars in the previous 100 years.
3. Russian battle deaths were 34 times as heavy as those of the
United States, those of Germany 32 times as great, the French 28
times, and the British 18 times as large.
4. The number of American lives lost was 125,500, of which about
10,000 were in the Navy, and the rest in the Army and the marines
attached to it.
5. In the American Army the casualty rate in the Infantry was
higher than in any other service, and that for officers was higher
than for men.
6. For every man killed in battle six were wounded.
7. Five out of every six men sent to hospitals on account of
wounds were cured and returned to duty.
8. In the expeditionary forces battle losses were twice as large as
deaths from disease.
9. In this war the death rate from disease was lower, and the death
rate from battle was higher than in any other previous American war.
10. Inoculation, clean camps, and safe drinking water, practically
eliminated typhoid fever among our troops in this war.
11. Pneumonia killed more soldiers than were killed in battle.
Meningitis was the next most serious disease.
12. Of each 100 cases of venereal disease recorded in the United
States, 96 were contracted before entering the Army and only 4
afterwards.
13. During the entire war available hospital facilities in the Amer-
ican Expeditionary Forces have been in excess of the needs.
Chapter X.
A MILLION DOLLARS AN HOUR.
TOTAL WAR EXPENDITURES.
For a period of 25 months, from April, 1917, through April, 1919,
the war cost the United States considerably more than $1,000,000 an
hour. Treasury disbursements during the period reached a total of
$23,500,000,000, of which $1,650,000,000 may be charged to the normal
expenses which would have occurred in time of peace. The balance
may be counted as the direct money cost of the war to the end of
April, 1919, a sum of $21,850,000,000. The figure is 20 times the
prewar national debt. It is nearly large enough -to pay the entire
costs of our Government from 1791 up to the outbreak of the Euro-
pean war. Our expenditure in this war was sufficient to have carried
on the Eevolutionary War continuously for more than a thousand
years at the rate of expenditure which that war actually involved.
In addition to this huge expenditure loans were advanced to the
Allies at the rate of nearly half a million dollars an hour. Congress
authorized for this purpose $10,000,000,000, and there was actually
paid to various Governments the sum of $8,850,000,000.
Of the United States Government war costs, the Army was respon-
sible for the expenditure of 64 per cent, or just short of two-thirds of
the entire amount. Through April 30, 1919, there had been with-
drawn from the Treasury on the Army account $14,244,061,000. If
there is deducted from this figure what would be the normal expedi-
ture for a peace-time Army for a similar period there remains a total
of $13,930,000,000 directly chargeable to the war.
The rate of expenditure for the Army and for the entire Govern-
ment increased rapidly as the war progressed. This is illustrated
in diagram 59, which compares the daily rates of expenditure for
the first three months of the war, the fiscal year entirely included
in the war, and the first 10 months of the current fiscal year. The
total height of the columns shows the daily rate of expenditure for
the whole Government and the solid portion of the column the rate
for the Army.
During the first three months war expenditures were at the rate
of $2,000,000 per day. During the next year they averaged more
than $22,000,000 a day. For the final 10 months of the period the
131
132
THE WAK WITH GERMANY.
daily total reached the enormous sum of over $44,000,000. The
very high daily average in the last period, most of which is in the
months after the termination of hostilities, is surprising until we
consider that the building of ships for the Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration, the construction and operation of naval vessels, the food,
$44,700,000
#22,500,000
2,000,000
ARMY
April 6,1917 July 1,1917 July 1,1918
to to to
June 30,1917 June 30,1918 Apr 30,1919
Diagram 59.— Cost per day of the Government and of the Army.
clothing, pay, and land and ocean transportation of the Army have
had to go forward at about the same rate as during the war. The
great flow of munitions and supplies for the Army and Navy could
not, out of regard for the industrial balance of the country, be
stopped with too great abruptness. A considerable number of war-
time activities and purchases had still to be paid for as well.
A MILLION" DOLLARS AN" HOUR.
133
ARMY EXPENDITURES.
Table 12 shows the amounts expended by each important Army
bureau. The Quartermaster Corps, which paid the soldiers and
furnished them with food, clothing, equipment, and miscellaneous
supplies, spent the most. The Ordnance Department was next in
order, with over $4,000,000,000 for munitions, more than half of its
expenditure being for artillery ammunition.
Table 12. — Expenditures by Army bureaus.
Quartermaster Corps:
Pay of the Army, etc
Other Quartermaster Corps appropriations .
Ordnance Department
Air Service
Engineer Corps
Medical Department
Signal Corps
Chemical Warfare Service
Provost Marshal General
Secretary's office and miscellaneous
Expended to
Apr. 30, 1919.
$1,831,
6, 242,
4,087,
859,
638,
314,
128,
83,
124,
133,
273,000
745,000
347,000
291,000
974,000
544,000
920,000
299,000
301,000
367, 000
Total i 14,244,061,000
Per cent.
12.9
43.8
28.7
6.0
4.5
2.2
.9
.6
.17
.23
100.00
1 Figures are for Dec. 31, 1918. Expenditures since that date for these purposes have been small compared
with other items in table. y
Diagram 60 — "Where the Army dollar went.
The total of our Army expenditures shown in Table 12 about
equals the value of all the gold produced in the whole world from
the discovery of America up to the outbreak of the European war.
The single item of pay for the Army is larger than the combined
salaries of all the public-school principals and teachers in the United
States for the five years from 1912 to 1916.
134 THE WAR WITH GERMANS.
WHERE THE DOLLAR WENT.
Diagram 60 shows the relative amount of the Army expenditures
spent for different purposes. It does this by dividing the typical
dollar into sectors, showing the number of cents of each dollar that
went for each purpose.
PERMANENT ASSETS.
As a result of the war efforts large quantities of munitions, sup-
plies, and equipment have been secured which will be of value for
many years to come. The Army now owns some of the finest docks
in the world. The 16 National Army cantonments and 3 of the
National Guard camps will be retained permanently as training
camps. A number of first-class aviation fields and depots and bal-
loon schools will be a permanent asset. We have stocks of most
articles of clothing sufficient to last our Army for a number of years.
There is a large supply of standardized trucks.
As to rifles and machine guns and their ammunition, light and
heavy artillery and ammunition, tanks and tractors, of these we have
a supply more than sufficient to equip fully an army of a million
men and maintain them in active combat for six months. These
munitions are of the best quality and latest design — Springfield and
Enfield rifles; Browning machine guns and automatic rifles; field
guns and howitzers of tried French design. Articles of miscellaneous
equipment are available in like quantity and quality.
Thousands of Liberty motors and service planes are immediately
available for any emergency. Engineer, signal, and medical equip-
ment is on hand to the value of millions of dollars.
All these are lasting assets which we have as a result of war ex-
penditures. They give us a most valuable equipment for prepared-
ness in the Military Establishment.
WAR EXPENDITURES OF ALL NATIONS.
Table 13 gives the figures showing the war expenditures of all
nations up to May, 1919. It is as yet too soon to present figures that
are entirely accurate, but these data have been carefully compiled
and are believed to be substantially reliable.
A MILLION DOLLARS AN HOUR. 135
^able 13. — Estimated total war expenditures of principal nations to Apr. 30,
1919.
[All figures in billions of dollars and excluding normal expenses and loans to allies.]
Country.
Great Britain and Dominions
France
United States
Russia
Italy
Belgium, Roumania, Portugal, Jugo-Slavia.
Japan and Greece
Total allies and United States
Germany
Austria-Hungary
Turkey and Bulgaria
Total Teutonic allies
Grand total
Billions of
dollars.
123
63
The total direct war costs amount to about $186,000,000,000, and
of this sum the enemy countries spent about one-third and those on
the allied side about two-thirds. Germany spent more than any
other nation, and was closely followed by Great Britain, whose ex-
penditures include those of her colonies. The figure for France is
$12,000,000,000 less than that for Great Britain, and our own figure
is below that for France. The Austrian expenditure was almost
equal to that of the United States. It is noteworthy that the United
States spent about one-eighth of the entire cost of the war and
something less than one-fifth of the expenditures on the allied side.
SUMMARY.
1. The war cost the United States considerably more than $1,000,000
an hour for over two years.
2. The direct cost was about $22,000,000,000, or nearly enough to
pay the entire cost of running the United States Government from
1791 up to the outbreak of the European war.
3. Our expenditures in this war were sufficient to have carried on
the Revolutionary War continuously for more than 1,000 years at the
rate of expenditure which that war actually involved.
4. In addition to this huge expenditure nearly $10,000,000,000 have
been loaned by the United States to the Allies.
5. The Army expenditures have been over $14,000,000,000, or nearly
two-thirds of our total war costs.
6. During the first three months our war expenditures were at the
rate of $2,000,000 per day. During the next year they averaged more
136 THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
than $22,000,000 a day. For the final 10 months of the period, from
April, 1917, to April, 1919, the daily average was over $44,000,000.
7. Although the Army expenditures are less than two-thirds of
our total war costs, they are nearly equal to the value of all the gold
produced in the whole world from the discovery of America up to the
outbreak of the European war.
8. The pay of the Army during the war cost more than the com-
bined salaries of all the public-school principals and teachers in the
United States for the five years from 1912 to 1916.
9. The total war costs of all nations were about $186,000,000,000,
of which the Allies and the United States spent two-thirds and the
enemy one-third.
10. The three nations spending the greatest amounts were Ger-
many, Great Britain, and France, in that order. After them come
the United States and Austria-Hungary, with substantially equal ex-
penditures.
11. The United States spent about one-eighth of the entire cost of
the war, and something less than one-fifth of the expenditures of the
allied side.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS.
Table 14. — Duration of the war.
Allied and associated nations.
Serbia
Russia1
France
Belgium
Great Britain.
Montenegro...
Japan
Portugal
Italy.
San Marino
Roumanian Aug. 29,1916
Greece.
War declared
by Central
Powers.
July 28,1914
Aug. 1,1914
Aug. 3,1914
Aug. 4,1914
Nov. 23, 1914
Aug. 9,1914
Aug. 27,1914
Mar. 9, 1916
United States.
Panama
Cuba
Siam
Liberia
China
Brazil
Guatemala . . .
Nicaragua
Haiti
Honduras
"War declared
against Cen-
tral Powers.
Aug.
Nov.
Aug.
Apr.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Nov.
May
June
Aug.
Nov.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
July
Aug.
Aug.
Oct.
Apr.
May
July
July
9, 1914
3, 1914
3, 1914
7,1917
4, 1914
6. 1914
23, 1914
23. 1914
23. 1915
6. 1915
27. 1916
23. 1916
6, 1917
7, 1917
7, 1917
22. 1917
4. 1917
14, 1917
26. 1917
21. 1918
6. 1918
12, 1918
19, 1918
Duration of war.
Years. Months. Days
14
3
8
7
7
5
19
19
19
4
10
18
5
4
4
20
i Treaty Mar. 3, 1918.
2 Treaty Mar. 6, 1918.
137
138
the War With germane.
38
26
8/LUOA/S OrDOLMfiS SP£A/T
18
M
<jpA
/ /
^
/277^Z £XP£A/D/rffl£S 4/86,000,000,000
Diagram 61.— Billions of dollars spent by each nation for direct war
expenses to the spring of 1919.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS.
130
iroo
'X
f/G(//?£S
//v r/foas/iA/os
/
*
or*
*/// *
b
y///
mam v •> •»
/M77Z5 /X/IT/tS OF/)/?M/£S £A/6/IG£0 M P/?£S£A/r MR 7*485,000
Diagram 62.-Tnousands of men killed in action and died of wounds.
140
the War with Germany.
BFLGIAN
Jen.
31
Feb.
28
liar.
21
liar.
30
Apr.
10
Apr.
20
Apr.
30
May
10
May
20
May
30
Jane
10
June
20
June
30
July
10
July
20
July
30
Aug.
10
Aug.
20
Aug.
30
Sept.
10
Sept.
20
Sept.
30
Oot.
10
Oct.
20
Oct.
30
Nov.
11
FBEhCH
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyAyy^ e9 yy/yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy*
BRITISH AMCRlCATf
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s yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyn yyyyyyyyyyyyzzzx
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» yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy,& yyy/y/yyyyyyyyyyyyyA
6 ^^^..55 WMMs/M
3
Si
21
ID
Diagram 63.— Per cent of Western front held toy each army during 1918. The
Italian troops are included with the French and the Portuguese with the
British.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS.
141
6.427 f 100
AMERICAN
1950,100
BWTI5H
AND
PORTUGUESE
i.yiB,ooo
3,562,180
BELGIAN AMD'
ITALIAN
200,000
FRENCH
£,559,000
ALLIED
GEEMA5
Diagram 64.— Ration strength of the allied and enemy forces on the
Western front at the time of the armistice.
142
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
11*638
wm
7,709
3,008
FRENCH ITALIAN BRITISH AMERICAN
Diagram 65.— Guns organized in batteries at the date of the armistice.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS.
143
3,321
2,730
1,756
812
740
FRENCH GERMAN BRITISH ITALIAN AMERICAN AUSTRIAN BELGIAN
Diagram 66.— Number of battle airplanes in each army at tlie date of
the armistice.
144
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
130
102
77
38
FRENCH BRITISH GERMAN AMERICAN
Diagram 67.— Number of battle airplanes per each 100,000 men in each,
army at the date of the armistice.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS. 145
Rifles
Great Britain: 1,963,514
France 1,396,938
United States 2,505,910
Machine Guns and Automatic Rlfle3
Great Britain 179,127 ■
France 223,317 ■
United States 181,662 ■
Rifle and Machine Gun Amnunition
Great Britain 3,428,195,000 I
France 2,959,285,000 I
United States 2,879,148,000 I
Smokeless Powder - Pounds
Great Britain 291,706,000 I
France 342,155,000 I
United States 632,504,000 I
High Explosives - Pounds
Great Britain 765,110,000 I
France 702,964,000 I
United States 375,656,000
Diagram 68.— Production of articles of ordnance by Great Britain, France,
and the United States during the 19 months of American participation
from Apr. 6, 1917, to IVov. 11, 1918.
132966°— 19 10
146 THE WAR WITH GERMANY,
Great Britain
Norway
| 1,177
France
| 889
Italy
| 846
United States
■ 395
Greece
| 346
Denmark
1 241
Holland
| 203
Sweden
(201
Germany
| 187
Russia
1 183
Spain
I 166
Japan
1 120
Portugal
| 93
Belgium
| 84
Brazil
U
Austria
lis
7,757
Others | 16
Diagram 69.— Thousands of gross tons of merchant shipping Jost
through acts of war.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS.
TOTAL —"42,615.000
147
TiEOTRALl
MATI0N5
6,640,000
EMEMY
NATIONS
OTHER
ALUES
OW1TED
STATES
7,67 5,000
5,719,000
0N1TEP
KINGDOM
20,100,000
1914 1918
Diagram 70.— Seagoing merchant shipping of the world measured in
gross tons on July 1, 1914, and Dec. 31, 1918.
148
THE WAR WITH GERMANY.
HAIIOHAL WEALTH, PRB-WAK DEBT, AND P03T-WAB DKBT
■ i mzzzzzzzzzzzm
In Billions of Dollars
16
11
Italy
78
67
6.6
27
I
39
_k±B
France
85
£20
3.5
gga
34
I
24
1.3
Germany united Kingdom United States
Diagram 71. — Estimated prewar national wealth, prewar national
debts, and postwar national debts of five nations in billions of
dollars.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPAEISONS.
149
Vest Front, Hoy. 11, 1918
Ration strength
Length of front held
Artillery In batteries
Airplane strength
Per cent of total for three nations
French British American
All Fronts, Year 1918
Artillery ammunition
fired, including training
Small arms, ammunition
fired, including training
S§
^
%£
43
46
Diagram 72.— Comparative strength of French, British, and American
Armies at the signing of the armistice and comparative expenditures
of ammunition during 1918.
INDEX.
Page.
Airplanes
Airplane strength — 143, 144, 149
Ammunition :
Artillery 75' 149
Small arms 69> 145> 149
34
Argonne battle
. * 73, 149
Artillery '
75 149
Artillery ammunition ,tJ> iTO
149 14Q
Artillery in batteries x^' x^
Atlantic fleet 39
Balloons 9B
Battle deaths 120,121,123,124,139
t,, , .„ 50, 51
Blankets '
Breeches
89
Bristol planes
British expeditionary forces
British instructors
Browning machine guns
90
Bugatti motors
28
Camps and cantonments
„ ,. 107
Cantigny 2g
Cantonments and camps
Caproni planes
44
Cargo movement
115 r>2 123
Casualties ii0' ^ ' *
Channel fleet
Chateau-Thierry 96' X^
Chauchat automatic rifles
Civil War 13, IS, 19, 110, 112, 119 124
™ ... 60, ol
Clothing
Clothing consumed
„ , 50, 51
Coats
Colt machine guns
Commissioned personnel
*S7 *^S ^9
Construction projects ""' °°' °ao
47 4o
Conversion of cargo ships '
Crimean War
40
Cross-Channel fleet
132
Daily cost of war
De Havilland planes
Deaths :
Battle 120, 121, 123, 124, 139
Disease I23' 124
151
152 INDEX.
Debarkation, ports of 42
Depot brigades 25
Disease 125,126
Deaths 123, 124
Venereal 127, 128
Divisions : 25
Composition 26
In France 102
National Guard 27
Training of 32
Draft : 17
Duration of war 137
Dutch ships 40, 41
Embarkation, ports of 42
Enfield rifles 63
Engineer Corps 60
Expenditures 131. 138
Explosives, high 77, 145
Field artillery 73
Flying officers 86
Food 60
France, military policy 13
Freight cars 46
French instructors 31
Front line held 103,104,149
Gas 78
Gas masks 52
German ships 37
Gettysburg H°
Gloves 50
Great Northern 44
Handley-Page planes 89
Helmets 52
High explosives 77, 145
Hispano-Suiza motors 90
Horses and mules 46,56
Hospitals r 128
Induction I8' I9
Influenza 125, 127
Instructors 29
Italian Army 104
Japanese ships 40, 41
Kilometers advanced 11°
Krag-Jorgensen rifles 63
Le Pere planes 90
Lewis machine guns 66
INDEX. 153
Page.
Leviathan 44
Liberty motors 90
Locomotives 46
Losses at sea 47
Machine guns 65, 145
Marines 32
Marlin machine guns 66
Martin planes 90
Meuse-Argonne 34, 97, 103, 111, 113
Mexican War 124
Missing 122,123
Motor trucks 46, 54
Mount Vernon _ 44
Mules and horses 46, 56
National Army 16, 26, 28
National debts 148
National Guard 16, 26,28
Divisions 27
Officers 21
National wealth 148
Northern Pacific ' 44
Offensives, allied 107,108, 109
Offensives, German 106
Officers 21
Physical examinations 20
Pistols 69
Ports of embarkation and debarkation 42
Prisoners 122
Railroads in France 53
Railways, narrow gauge 54
Rainbow Division 28
Rations 60
Ration strength 141, 149
Registration 17, 18
Regular Army 16, 26, 29
Reserve Corps 29, 125
Return of troops 47
Revolutionary War 131
Revolvers 69
Rifles 63,145
Rifle strength 104
Ross rifles 71
Seaports in France 53
Selective service 17
Service planes 88
Services of Supply 52
Shipping lost 146
Shipping of the world 147
154 INDEX.
Page.
Ships, source of S9, 41
Shirts 51
Shoes _ 50,51
Small-arms ammunition 69
Smokeless powder 77, 145
Socks 50(, 51
Spanish War 124
Springfield, rifles 63
Squadrons, air 94
St. Mihiel 97, 102, 109
States :
Physical examinations 20
Soldiers furnished 22
Storage in France 53
Strength :
Of Army 13
Ration 141,149
Rifle 104
Sunset Division _ 28
Supply, Services of 52
Swedish ships 41
Tanks _— 80
Telegraph and telephone lines 56, 57
Tonnage of fleet 38
Torpedoing of ships 47
Tractors . 80
Training, air 85
Training camps, officers from 21
Training engines - 87
Training, length of 32
Training planes 87
Trans-Atlantic fleet _ 39
Transportation of troops 37
Transport fleet : : 38
Trucks, motor 46, 54
Turnarounds 43
Venereal disease 127, 128
Vickers machine guns 65
Wilderness 112
Wool 52
Wounded 122
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