Full text of "The war, the world and Wilson"

See other formats

THE WAR, THE WORLD,
AND WILSON

BOOKS BY
GEORGE CREEL

IRELAND'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM
HOW WE ADVERTISED AMERICA
THE WAR, THE WORLD AND WILSON

Harper y Brothers Publishers

THE ENTRY INTO PARIS

President Wilson and President Poincare

WAR, THE WORLD
AND WILSON

By
GEORGE CREEL

Author of

"IRELANDS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM"
VHOW WE ADVERTISED AMERICA'!

HARPER &. BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON

THE WAS. TBS WORLD AND WILSON

Printed in the United States of America

Published June. 1930

F-U

To My Mother

VIRQINIA CREEL

At every step in my life an incentive, an

inspiration and a standard — this book

is dedicated in love and gratitude

CONTENTS

CHAP. PACK

FOREWORD i

I. THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT .... 14

II. NEUTRALITY 39

III. "STRONG MEN" 59

IV. "THE ROOSEVELT DIVISIONS" 75

V. THE CASE OF LEONARD WOOD 87

VI. THE POWER AND THE GLORY 98

VII. AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES 119

VIII. THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL" . . 133

IX. WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS . . 148

X. PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION 164

XI. "THE BIG FOUR" 177

XII. THE OPENING BATTLE 189

XIII. THE STAB IN THE BACK 201

XIV. THE ZERO HOUR 213

XV. MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD 229

XVI. WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY? 243

XVII. THE QUESTION OF COAL 258

XVIII. SHANTUNG AND HYPOCRISY 271

XIX. THE ADRIATIC TANGLE 283

XX. WERE THE FOURTEEN POINTS IGNORED? . 299

XXI. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 310

XXII. How THE TREATY WAS KILLED .... 328

XXIII. THE GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION . . . 347
CONCLUSION. . ./ . . . _. . . . . . 359

THE WAR, THE WORLD,
AND WILSON

FOREWORD

THE people of the United States are faced to^l
day by a crisis more momentous than any
that has gone before, for it is not America only
that quivers in suspension, but the whole of that
thing we know as civilization. It is a world that
is molten — not the world of Macedon or Rome —
but a twentieth-century world in which there
are no longer the safeties of «parpT jfog 4*rrpnt
reserve of barriers, its unhappy peoples thrown
into confused collision by a shock that has
crumpled in all four corners. And by the whirl
of chance, or maybe in obedience to some inexo-
rable law working behind the great screen, the
task of molding is in the hands of no ancient
state, confident in inherited tradition, but waits
the experimental touch of a nation scarce one i
hundred and forty-four years old.

The responsibilities of the United States are
not a matter of speculation. Our material con-
tributions, great and decisive as they were, stand
dwarfed by the power and the glory that flowed
from the declaration of American aims. It was

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

our idealism, put in khaki, that made the Great
War a war for democracy. It was not that
when it began. It was hardly that when we
entered it. Military pre-eminence may occasion
dispute, but the moral leadership of America is
[ not subject to question.

On the instant that we drew the sword we told
our own people, and all the peoples of earth,
that we meant to fight a war against war, that
what we sought was the "destruction of arbitrary
power," "the rights of small nations,*' "the
reign of law based upon the consent of the gov-
erned," an end to the mad business of competitive
armaments, and the substitution of discussion for
bloodshed by the establishment of a League of
Nations to make certain "that the combined
power of free nations will check every invasion
of right, and serve to make peace and justice
the more secure by affording a definite tribunal
of opinion to which all must submit, and by which
every international readjustment that cannot be
amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly
concerned shall be sanctioned."
_» Our might struck the shackles of tyranny from
\ the body of the world, but it was our pledges
that set free the heart of the world. America,
without dissent, indorsed these great guaranties
of a new and better order, and the Allied govern-
ments accepted them and hailed them as words
of light and guidance. At home they gave
unexampled unity and indomitable resolve;
abroad they poured like wine into the war-weary
veins of the Allies, won the support of neutral
nations, and struck at the very foundations of

FOREWORD

enemy morale. The world, hopeless, despairing,
turned to us as the forlorn of Galilee turned to
Christ, not knowing, but believing; not asking,
but trusting.

It was the giving of these pledges that won
the war: it is the repudiation of these pledges
that is losing the peace. What is the use of
mincing words! The moral leadership that was
our pride is now our shame. The peoples of
earth are turning from us even as they turned to
us, and in their hearts is a vaster bitterness than
comes from any mere betrayal of the body. It
is their hope that we have deserted: it is their
dream that we have killed. "The tents have
been struck, and the great caravan of humanity
is again on the march," cried General Smuts.
To where? And how? Ravaged by war, pes-
tilence, and famine — disorganized, leaderless,
desperate — the unhappy nomadism heads back
to the same old morass in which mankind has
struggled from the beginning, but now without
the ignorances and submissiveness that made
possible the ancient way, for they have seen the
vision of a new world, the world that America
promised.

These are the problems that face us to-day!
Are we going to redeem our pledges or are we
going to indorse repudiation? Will we assume
proper responsibility for the majesties of aspira-
tion that we called into being, or will we watch
them play out as tragedies of disappointment?
Shall we regain our moral leadership, pointing
humanity's caravan to the high ground, or shall
we trail as camp-followers, coming at last to a
2 3

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

common quicksand? President Wilson spoke
truly when he said that "the forces of the world
do not threaten; they operate." Ours was the
voice that called these forces into being — ours
is the voice that must order them. Self-preser-
vation joins with self-respect in the demand, for
there are compulsions of interest as well as
compulsions of honor.

As a result of the Senate's course, the world
to-day is as much of an armed camp as before
the armistice. Germany — sullen, desperate, cha-
otic— has an active army of 300,000, also a State
Constabulary of 75,000, and a "Home Guard"
of 600,000, both organizations composed entirely
of war veterans. Against this threat, impover-
ished France is compelled to keep 480,000 men
under arms instead of releasing them for the
task of reconstruction. The fighting force of
the Bolshevists is estimated at 600,000 and
Poland faces this menace with close to 500,000
men, all of whom ought to be working, Italy,
instead of concentrating upon her peace problems,
marches to bankruptcy with an army of half a
million, and the Jugoslavs are also in battle
array. The Serbs, destitute as they are, have
250,000 men in the field, and Bulgaria plots
revenge with a force of 100,000. Greece, whose
peace army is 30,000, now has 300,000 men
under arms. The Rumanians, forced to guard
against the anger of Hungary, has an army of
300,000, and Hungary, although limited to an
army of 35,000, is copying the German "Home
Guard" plan with success. Czechoslovakia,
•eager for peace, has an army of 100,000 to guard

FOREWORD

against the Germans and the Magyars. Eng-
land has 44,000 troops in Mesopotamia, 13,000
in Palestine, 200,000 in Ireland, and about 50,000
in Egypt, not to mention her forces of iron re-
pression in India. There are 25,000 Japanese
troops in Siberia, 12,000 in Manchuria, and a
large force in Mongolia, while in Japan itself
there is an active army of 300,000 with 1,500,000
trained reserves.

Wherever one looks, democracy is hemmed in
on one side by Trade Imperialism and on the
other by Bolshevism. And America, the nation
that called the democratic aspiration into life
and passion, refuses aid and stands aloof!
Must another world war be fought to drive
home the fact that humanity's one hope is in an
international concert? What stands far more
probable than any mere renewal of European
conflict, however, is a concentration of anger
and despair against the selfish well-being of \
America.

It is a situation in which every fact has all
the obviousness of a wound. The Allies owe us
an amount well above ten billions of dollars.
Without a League of Nations, able to lift the
crushing burdens of armies and navies from the
backs of peoples, permitting national energies to
be concentrated upon the speedy restoration of
normal economic processes, there is not a chance
that the United States will ever receive a cent
of interest, much less a dollar of the principal.
Nor is that all. Debtor nations do not love
their creditor, especially when payment involves
bankruptcy, and since repudiation is an ugly

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

policy to adopt in cold blood, what more natural
than the release of those passions that make for
hot blood? And what less difficult?

For more than a year the Senate of the United
States has exhausted effort in the manufacture
of enmity. It is not alone that we have stood
aside from the great adventure in fraternity
that we ourselves proposed, but this program of
withdrawal has been companioned by a policy
of studied insult. The honor of Japan has been
questioned time and again, the faith of France
has been impugned repeatedly, and there has
been the mean insistence that self-governing
dominions like Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa shall be put lower in the scale
of countries than those small republics of the
West Indies and Central America that are our
own political and commercial dependencies.

As a matter of fact, very little sophistry
would be required to give united attack upon
America all the sincerity and fervor of a cru-
sade. A nation that preached the faith and
then betrayed it! A people that pledged and
then abandoned! In such a war there would
be not only the cancelation of external debts
without the shame of repudiation, but equally
the salvation afforded by the spoils of victory.
fFar-fetched, perhaps, but it must be remem-
bered that we are not dealing with the ordered,
cautious world of other days, but a disorganized
welter driven back upon its hopes, desperate in
its despairs, and unspeakably wretched in all
of its conditions.

Never was choice so plain. Either a League
6

FOREWORD

of Nations, a great world partnership in world
reconstruction, eager and effective in restora-
tion and stabilization, abating the passions and
despairs of humanity by the sanities of its
justice, or else a military establishment suffi-
ciently large and powerful to guard our shores
against the rising storm. There is no parallel
for the madness that strikes down the Peace
Treaty with one vote, insulting and alienating
the whole world, and with another vote reduces
naval appropriations, denies universal training,
wipes out our merchant marine, and utterly
annihilates the aircraft program.

It is the people, as always in every great
crisis, that must meet these problems and give
these answers. Poisoned by partizanship, the
bankruptcy of Congress is utter and absolute.
Government by proxy has fallen down. It is
the men and women of America who must fight
the peace even as they fought the war. Not
Republicans nor Democrats, not conservatives
nor radicals, but the people as a whole; the
countless millions who are not seen or heard,
but whose energy and hopes and devotions are ]
the strength of democracy.

/ ' *•• * ""1

History is not always a sure guide, but often-
times it is an inspiration, and in the annals of I
the Republic there are two crises that may weir
be recalled. On September 10, 1787, the Con-
stitutional Convention finished its labors and
reported back to the various states. Six years
had passed since the Treaty of Paris — barren
years full of hatreds, suspicions, and distrusts

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

that gave victory the bitter taste of ashes.
Commercial ruin and financial collapse joined
to make liberty an empty word and savage
forces of disintegration undermined the weak
foundations of union. New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, and Rhode Island were compelled to
contend against open rebellion, the Territory of
Maine discussed the advisability of setting up
an independent state, mobs closed the courts of
Connecticut, North Carolina had witnessed the
ugly attempt to form the state of Frankland,
and traitorous talk of foreign alliances bubbled
like acid in many sections. The mean prides of
local sovereignty had the malign force of open
treason; a blind selfishness dominated every
council, and tariff wars and boundary disputes
were constant invitations to conflict. Connec-
ticut and Pennsylvania, after actual battles,
were parties to a sullen truce, and New York,
Vermont, and New Hampshire, as the result of
clashing greeds, stood on the verge of war.
f~ The Constitution, providing a central govern-
ment with strength, power, and recognized
authorities, was the one visible hope, if not the
one obvious remedy, yet a campaign of nine
months was required to secure the assent of the
nine states necessary to ratification. Visionless
men, more concerned with petty privileges than
national welfare, denounced the document as a
"triple-headed monster," and declared the whole
plan "as deep and wicked a conspiracy as ever
was invented in the darkest ages against the
liberties of a free people." Washington was
branded as a "fool" and "traitor," Franklin as

FOREWORD

a "dotard," and both were burned in effigy.
Riots were actually organized to give support
to the "protest of free men against the insidious
restoration of monarchy," and mobs publicly
kindled bonfires with copies of the "accursed
proposal" that was to rob the states of their
rights.

Nor was ratification, when it did come, a
thing of released enthusiasm, but rather the
spent victim of a gantlet. In Massachusetts
there was the small majority of nineteen, in
Virginia it carried by ten votes only, and in
New Hampshire by eleven. New York, the
ninth state, remained in convention for forty
days, Governor Clinton holding two-thirds of
the delegates against the Constitution for no
larger reason than that it was the work of his
political enemies. The unanswerable arguments
of Hamilton beat down the barriers of this
malignant partizanship, and the sullen Clinton
was finally deserted by enough of his delegates
to change the minority of twenty-seven into a
majority of three.

In such manner the people of the Colonies
met the first great American crisis. Unhappy
days, time of sick fears and deep humiliation,
with narrowest of margins for success, but still
a margin wide enough for the passage of the
vision that was to save the world.

In 1864, while Lincoln sat by the side of
America as the one physician able to save, the
sick-room filled with the same passion and clamor
that sent Washington to his grave in loneliness
and disillusion. Not defeat could have spelled

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

more disastrous consequences than parley or
compromise, yet Greeley spoke for no incon-
siderable number when he wrote to Lincoln that
"our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country
longs for peace — shudders at the prospect of
fresh conscriptions, of further wholesale devasta-
tions,-and of new rivers of human blood; and a
wide-spread conviction that the government and
its supporters are not anxious for peace, and do
not improve proffered opportunities to achieve
it, is doing great harm now, and is morally
certain, unless removed, to do far greater in the
approaching elections."

The President was charged with "feebleness
and want of principle," and General Fremont
declared that "if Mr. Lincoln should be nomi-
nated, as I believe it would be fatal to the country
to indorse a policy and renew a power which has
cost us the lives of thousands of men and need-
lessly put the country on the road to bank-
ruptcy, there will be no other alternative but to
organize against him every element of conscien-
tious opposition, with the view to prevent this
misfortune of his re-election."

The forces of defeatism were rich, organized,
and powerful, yet Lincoln was re-elected in a
passion of faith that burst the bonds of party.
His policies were indorsed, the hosts of compro-
mise were scattered, and well within the year
there came the surrender at Appomattox that
forever ended the issue of human slavery and
forever lifted the indivisibility of the Union
above question or debate. Thus the people of
the United States met the second great American

10 •

FOREWORD

crisis, standing like iron in support of the principle
that fundamental truths do not permit of truce.

* . * * * * •*•!
For a third time in the history of the Republic

the people are called upon to decide organic
policies — to declare their will with respect to
democracy's future course. The issues are as
insistent as fundamental and upon the decisions
hangs the fate of the great dreams and high hopes
that gave courage to Washington and Lincoln.
National destiny is a fine mouth-filling phrase,
but to-day it has a poignancy that must pierce
veneer, striking down to those sincerities that
are the soul of America.

A first task is to get back to a war footing as
far as the national morale is concerned. En-
thusiasm, unity, and high resolve must be
regained. Just as party, creed, and color disap-
peared when we massed to fight the autocratic
pretensions of the Imperial German government,
so must these divisions disappear to-day when
the crises of reconstruction threaten our national i
life. -1

It were well indeed could Washington's Fare- >
well Address be cast in bronze and set in every
market-place, for the Father of His Country,
looking down the years, warned against the
very danger that nets us now. Solemnly, force-
fully, he pointed out the "baneful effects of the
spirit of party," and in words of high prophetic
value declared that "the alternate domination
of one faction over another, sharpened by the
spirit of revenge natural to party dissension . . .
is itself a frightful despotism . . . the common

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are
sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a
wise person to discourage and restrain it. It
serves always to distract the public councils
and enfeeble the public administration. It agi-
tates the community with ill-founded jealousies
and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one
part against another ... a fire not to be
quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to
prevent it bursting into a flame, lest, instead of
warming, it should consume."

Can it be said that these evils have not come
to pass? Through dreary, humiliating months
we have heard the great question of world
union debated as though it were a chattel mort-
gage; we have seen humanity's hopes sub-
ordinated to office hunger and the future of
America limited to the presidential election of
1920. And, crowning infamy, the sorry chaffer-
ing has been linked invariably with the names
of Washington and Lincoln — the two Americans,
of all our noble company, who most despised
the sordid chicane of partizans. These are the
things that must be swept away, even as we
swept away all ignobilities of the spirit when we
rallied to the defense of free institutions and gave
great slogans to a despairing world.

The citizen who does not do his own thinking
^to-day is no less a traitor than the man who
tried to evade the draft, and those who think in
terms of party prejudice or personal advantage
are America's enemies. In this hour when the
fate of democracy hangs in the balance, the
criminal mind is the closed mind. v

FOREWORD

It is in the interests of public information that
this book has been written. It is, frankly
enough, a whole-hearted advocacy of the League
of Nations, and yet a very honest attempt has
been' made to subject every question to such
analysis, and to make such presentation of facts,
as will permit the reader to form his independent
judgments. The consideration begins with our
very entrance into the war because imminent
issues are not intelligible unless considered in
relation to causes. It works through the per-
sonality of Woodrow Wilson, and away from it,
because he was and is, by virtue of his office, .
inevitably the source and center. — i

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

1 I"

T is the misfortune of democratic governments
1 that they tend inevitably to operate through
the emotions rather than the intellectual proc-
esses. The party organization, always the mo-
tive power in the formation of political opinion,
may have its origin in high ideals, but ultimately
it becomes a business on the success of which
hangs the employment or disemployment of
thousands. Victory becomes the chief concern,
and it follows, naturally enough, that principles
are subordinated to personalities. To feel is
instinctive; to think is laborious. To attack or
to defend a candidate is infinitely simpler and
more effective than to attack or to defend an
issue, inasmuch as the one course lends itself to
emotions and assertions, while the other calls
for intelligence and facts. As a consequence,
the present situation is not original in any de-
gree, but part and parcel of an established
routine. The League of Nations, the Peace
Treaty, questions domestic and international,
are not discussed fairly and informatively, for
the very simple reason that partizan purposes
are best served by a direct personal attack
upon the President, designed to appeal to irrita-

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

tions and prejudices. This condition, unfor-
tunate always, is rendered still more unhappy
by the fact that Woodrow Wilson is, and has
been from the very first, an easy target for
misrepresentation and misunderstanding. ^ —

As far as appearances are concerned, there is
a certain measure of justification for the repeated
charges that the President is inclined to autoc-
racy, preferring to "play a lone hand" instead
of inviting counsel; that he is cold and lacks
human warmth; that he is selfish and self-
centered; that he is without capacity for friend-
ship; and that he has worked disintegration by
his disregard of Congress. These surface indica-
tions are sufficient to the purposes of politicians,
for the Great American Public has never been
particularly in love with analysis.

Nothing is more true than that people do not
live by bread alone; catch-phrases constitute a
staple article of diet, especially in a democracy.
All citizens worthy of the name talk largely of
"constitutional rights," yet not one in a thou-
sand has ever read the Constitution. Every
four years the electorate, or such portion of it as
has had the energy to register, votes for a Presi-
dent of the United States, yet not one in a hun-
dred thousand has any definite, authoritative
conception of the office or its powers. It is
these ignorances that have played so surely into ?
the hands of partizans.

The makers of the Constitution were not
vague in their ideas of the powers or functions of
the President, nor were they less than vigorous
and explicit in defining them. The Fathers con-

, THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

ceived the office as the keystone in the federal
arch, the one seat of administration, the true
source of the central control necessary to effi-
ciency. Not only was the President constituted
one of the three great co-ordinate branches of
government, with power to veto the legislative,
but other high authorities were given him until
the cry arose that his privileges ran far beyond
those of the British Crown. Madison, Frank-
lin, Hamilton, and their associates were not
afraid of power because there was also respon-
sibility to the people; their real fear was that
the President had not been given sufficient
strength to make him what they intended him
to be — a Chief Executive in fact as well as name.
These doubts were only with respect to the
peace powers of the President, for when the
consideration of war powers was reached, even
ultra-democrats conceded the necessity of a
supreme control virtually despotic in its sweep.
It was the one possible answer to the well-
founded criticism that a democracy, with its
balance of power, could not make war, since war
was one thing that called for centralized purpose

F~and instancy of decision. A President of the
United States, in time of war, is either a dictator
or a traitor, for dictatorship in' war is the Con-

I stitution's direct intent.

Woodrow Wilson was in no wise ignorant of
the aim of the Constitutional Convention. It
is to be remembered that he did not receive his
nomination as a reward for the usual hack ser-
vice of the partizan, but in recognition of a
statesmanship evidenced in action to some

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

extent, but far more in voluminous writings
that shot light through the confusions of govern-
ment. It is only necessary to read his books to
discover that his views on the functions of the
President were at one with the thought and
purpose of the Constitution's framers.

In Congressional Government, written in 1884,
he pointed out a Chief Executive's opportunities
for service, and lamented that the "high office
has fallen from its first estate of dignity because
its power has waned; and its power has waned
because the power of Congress has become pre-
dominant." The reason, as he saw it, was a
steady usurpation on the part of Congress, its
growing habit of "investigating and managing
everything," and its effort to club the Executive
into obedience by denying appropriations or
refusing confirmations.

In 1879, when only twenty-three years of age,
his article on "Cabinet Government in the
United States" set out his belief that "there is
no one in Congress to speak for the nation.
Congress is a conglomeration of inharmonious
elements; a collection of men representing each
his neighborhood, each his local interest; an
alarmingly large proportion of its legislation is
'special'; all of it is at best only a limping
compromise between the conflicting interests of
the innumerable localities represented."

In 1900 he said: "When foreign affairs play a
prominent part in the politics and policy of a
nation, its Executive must of necessity be its
guide: must utter every initial judgment, take
every first step of action, supply the information

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

upon which it is to act, suggest and in large
measure control its conduct."

In 1911 he said: "The increasing dependence
of the country upon its executive officers is
thrusting upon them a double function. They
must undertake the business of agitation — that
is to say, the business of forming and leading
opinion, and it will not be very effectual or
serviceable for them to do that unless they take
the next step and make bold to formulate the
measures by which opinion is to be put into
effect."

«— When Woodrow Wilson took office, therefore,
» it was with a political philosophy fully formed —
a philosophy that held the true powers of the
President to be abridged at every point by the
unconstitutional encroachments of the legisla-
tive branch. Facing him was a Congress stub-
born in its resolve to retain the prerogatives
filched from a series of weak or ignorant execu-
tives. The lock of wills was instant, also funda-
mental, for on the outcome hung decision as to
whether the President should be the servant of
the people or the servant of Congress, a leader
or a follower, a spokesman or an echo.

Truce was not possible; the issues were too
clean cut. And Woodrow Wilson won. In
peace he was the Chief Executive of the nation.
In war he was the Commander-in-chief. This is
as the Constitution meant it to be. He did not
usurp; he merely regained. The price that he
paid for victory, however, cost him heavily in
popularity. Congress has ever hated and fought
the President it could not rule. It was also the

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

case that the public, out of its profound contempt
for Congress, began to feel that the President
should take over the duties of the legislative
branch. When he did not do so, discontent
developed. If a needed law was not passed,
it was Wilson that was to blame. Whatever
went wrong, whether in a city, a state, the nation,
or the world, there was a general feeling that
Wilson should have "fixed" it. Even those
most blatant in crying "Dictator!'* were pas-
sionate in their indignation when the President
refused to remedy the incompetencies of Con-
gress by some usurpation of power. Yet the
victory was worth all that it cost. Woodrow
Wilson has shown the country what a President
should be, and although people will undoubtedly
apply the tests unconsciously, the Chief Execu-
tives of the future will be measured by his
standard. Never again will we rest content
with mountebanks, mere partizans, nonentities, j
or congressional errand-boys.

This clash of diametrically opposed concep-^
tions of power, while at the bottom of the Presi-
dent's inharmonious relations with Congress,
was given intensity by personal dissimilarities no
less fundamental. Woodrow Wilson looks at
things from the standpoint of the statesman;
the average officeholder approaches government
from the standpoint of machine politics. The
politician is concerned only with votes, the
statesman with results; the one has an eye
upon the popularities of the moment, the other
upon history. One of the fixed traditions of
American political life is that the way to success
3 19,

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

is through compromise, and as a consequence
those have been most admired and most elevated
who have managed to slither their way through
opposed ideas and irreconcilable ideals without
commitment. In sharp contradiction, a funda-
mental of the Wilson philosophy is that truces
are dangerous when they are not discreditable.
Where disputes are personal he is willing to
search for the basis of concession, but when a
vital issue is at stake he does not know the
meaning of compromise. With all his soul he
^believes that principles have to be fought out.

Such a passionate conviction could not pos-
sibly be turned on or off at will, as with a spigot
attachment, and his direct contacts were in-
evitably affected. The intellectually dishonest
were loathsome to him, and not by any advan-
tage of self-interest could he be induced to meet
and confer with them. "We send men to
prison for stealing bread," he once exclaimed,
"but we send them to Congress when they steal
faith." The popular habit of confusing ability
with mere cunning, of letting "slickness" pass
for brains, was irritating to him, and his pride
as an American suffered real humiliation at see-
ing men like Reed, Watson, and Penrose sitting
in the Senate of the United States.

His partizanship, based upon a conception of
public service rather than personal profit, was
not of the ardent kind that gave any satisfaction
to the members of his own party. Years ago,
in an article on Mr. Cleveland, he defined him
as "the sort of President the makers of the
Constitution had vaguely in mind: more man

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

than partizan, with an independent will of his
own : hardly a colleague of the Houses so much
as an individual servant of the country: exer-
cising his powers like a Chief Magistrate rather
than like a party leader." With great questions
to be decided, questions that concerned the lives
and hopes of millions, the President evidenced
a growing distaste for the long-winded visiting
that had no larger object than the discussion of
a postmastership, the party outlook in a district,
or the necessity of placating this or that boss.

Had this distaste confined itself to his contacts ]
with professional politicians, the injury would not
have been irreparable, but it happened to be the
case that the President was not elected by a
party, but by a movement — a great progressivist
uprising of men and women grown sick of
"machines" and eager for escape from the old
Civil War alignment. Every appointment to
office should have been studied carefully with a
view to strengthening this movement. This was
what the President did not do. His keen dislike
of "patronage brokers" made him hold aloof
from party bosses, but he failed to accompany
this attitude by any determined search for
appointees with whom progressivism was a
religion. Anxious to get rid of an unpleasant
business, he fell more and more into the habit
of depending upon the advice of those close to
him, and as a consequence men were selected
who satisfied neither party nor movement.
Garrison, McReynolds, Gregory, Burleson, and
others like them were not "machine men," but
neither were they Wilson's kind. As a matter of

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

fact, every one of them was a Bourbon of Bour-
bons. This haphazard method of selection, due
entirely to the President's refusal to take keen
and continuous personal interest in appoint-
ments, worked a triple injury — it surrounded
him with men who did not speak his language
or think his thoughts; it alienated the leaders
of his party, and it weakened and eventually
| demoralized the progressivist movement.

There is this to say in his behalf, however:
the treadmill activities of the White House
leave its occupant little time for anything else,
that is, if he has honesty and high purpose. It is
rare indeed for any one to consider the Presidency
in the light of a job, but it is a fact that a con-
scientious Chief Executive is called upon for more
downright drudgery than any other official in the
world. The position still runs exactly along the
lines laid down in 1787, when the population of
the entire country totaled less than the census
of New York to-day, with the result that the
duties are a queer, impossible jumble of tre-
mendous problems and absurd clerical routine
calculated to break the strongest. At a mo-
ment when the President is considering some
vital domestic question or facing an interna-
tional complication, nothing is more likely than
an enforced halt while he affixes his signature
one thousand times to papers that should never
get beyond a third assistant secretary.

The difficulties of the place are added to by
the popular point of view with regard to public
servants. The head of a great corporation
would not hold his position a day were he to

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

waste his energies in time-wasting activities
designed only to advance personal popularity,
yet a President is confidently expected to leave
his office door open for all who choose to "drop
in." America is now a world power, and Amer-
ican government has become a tremendous com-
plexity that centers all the ceaseless striving of
110,000,000 people, and yet the executive head
of this huge corporation is expected to hold to
the formula of conduct laid down in the days of /
tallow dips and stage-coaches. Professional poli- i
ticians are largely to blame for this, with their
continual emphasis upon the office rather than -7*
the task, their campaign mummeries and their
buncombe about "simple, rugged Americanism."
The vulgar charlatanism of campaigns has done
much to confuse democracy with mere physical
boisterousness, and in many minds there is an
actual insistence upon hand-shaking, shoulder-
clapping, and ability to remember first names as
the real democratic tests.

Even had he been strong enough to stand the
physical strain of such a conception, it is much
to be doubted if Woodrow Wilson would have
attempted to live up to this caricature. His
temperament precludes the tricks of the pro-
fessional office-seeker, the labored lord-of-the-
manor graciousness that passes for "democracy,"
and his conscience forbids the fawning, time-
wasting activities of the professional office-seeker.
As a historian and a publicist, he had made care-
ful study of the duties of the Chief Executive,
and it was in 1908, long before he had thought
of filling the office, that he wrote this conclusion:

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

No other man's day is so full as his, so full of the responsi-
bilities which tax mind and conscience alike, and demand
an inexhaustible vitality. The mere task of making
appointments to office, which the Constitution imposes
upon the President, has come near to breaking some of our
Presidents down, because it is a never-ending task in a
civil service not yet put upon a professional footing, con-
fused with short terms of office, always forming and dis-
solving. And in proportion as the President ventures to
use his opportunity to lead opinion and to act as spokesman
of the people in affairs, the people stand ready to over-
whelm him by running to him with every question, great
and small. They are as eager to have him settle a literary
question as a political; hear him as acquiescently with
regard to matters of expert knowledge as with regard to
public affairs, and call upon him to quiet all troubles by
his personal intervention. Men of ordinary physique and
discretion cannot be Presidents and live, if the strain
be not somehow relieved. We shall be obliged always to
be picking our Chief Magistrates from among wise and
prudent athletes.

He knew, therefore, that he would have to
choose, at the very outset, between popularity
and service. Either he could consider the office
politically, disregarding duty in the interests of
personal acclaim, or he could assume it as a task
to be discharged in honor and high faith, thereby
surrendering all hope of applause. He made his
decision as an American, not as a politician.
After estimating the task in terms of routine
and national needs, and measuring the demand
against his strength, he saw plainly that the one
chance was a careful, systematic, scientific con-
servation of every ounce of energy. Taking up
the study of his problem with the cool detach-
ment of an engineer in charge of a plant, the
President and his physician worked out an iron

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

regimen, a fixed daily program that ordered
every minute of his life with machine-like
exactitude.

Certain hours for work and sleep, regular
mornings for golf and regular nights for the
theater, a scientific diet, and stern caution against
waste effort of every kind. It was not only
physical habits that were forced under rigid
discipline, but mental habits as well. Never at
any time disposed to solitude or reticence,
but one of the most companionable men that
ever lived, the President had never failed to
find a large part of his pleasure in the give-and-
take of conversation. The trouble was, as
with every eager, vivid personality, that he gave
more than he took. His talk was no mere
adventure in anecdotes, but a broad sweep
across the whole of life, illuminating everything
that it touched. Such contacts, inevitably
entailing an expenditure of nervous force, had
to be surrendered. Interviews were confined
to official importances, and personal approaches
increasingly gave way to the submission of
memoranda. In the quiet of his study every
paper received the painstaking attention of
the President, but even this larger efficiency
failed to soothe wounded vanities. As he was
permitted no excitement at meals, even eating
became a business. This deprived him of one of
Roosevelt's greatest assets, making the White
House table a quiet affair instead of the gather-
ing-place that the President would have liked.

Only his doctors knew. Not once, in all the
driving years, did he confess the fight that went

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

on in loneliness from day to day. Some one
has said that the President's greatest weakness
is an utter inability to "grand-stand." This
lack was never more apparent than in connection
with his struggle against exhaustion. A word,
a gesture, would have won him understanding
and sympathy, but he would not speak it,
would not make it. He won and continued to
win, but victory was never assured. There
was always a shadow that hung over him,
always the fear that each new day might bring
the added ounce of strain that could not be
endured. And so each hour that he wrested
from his battle was devoted to the task, not
to the man.

These conditions of the President's life should
serve to explain many of the inconsistencies
that have baffled observers, resulting in biog-
raphies that are no more than studies in con-
trast. One man sees him as a thinking-machine,
cold, remote, aloof, utterly devoid of animal
heat, while another sees him as a man of warm
impulses, intensely human, and winningly genial.
Both are true pictures, one being the man, the
other the President: one a normal person,
impulsive and companionable, the other the
creature of an iron discipline, compelled to live
within himself because it was the only way in
which he could live and discharge the duties
imposed upon him by his official oath and his
conscience.

rThe results of Woodrow Wilson's determination
to serve are written in the bronze of history.
The administrative record of the last eight years

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

is a record of accomplishment without parallel
in the annals of American government. Great
laws, dealing with the very fundamentals of
finance, industry, tariff legislation, human wel-
fare, commerce, and credit, were either con-
ceived by him or else mastered by him in the
interests of intelligent advocacy.

Confronted from the first by a press of prob-
lems handed down from the Roosevelt and Taft
administrations — faced by the necessity of end-
ing the rule of Special Privilege, in no instance
did he evade or ignore. Tariff revision, the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, the Federal Trade Commission,
rural credits, the Clayton anti-trust law, the
child-labor law, the eight-hour day, workmen's
compensation, development of natural resources,
road-building, the Seamen's Act, the shipping bill
— these were some of his measures that put
foundations under honest business, defeated
cruelty and injustice, threw the mantle of pro-
tection over the weak and helpless, and restored
the pride, the courage, and creative genius of
the American people. With it all he had to
meet one international complication after the
other, and always there was the wretched weight \
of an enormous routine.

It did not seem possible that human strength
could stand additional strain, yet when America
entered the war he seemed to find new wells of
energy on which to draw. Throughout the
struggle he did the work of ten men. While it
is true enough that no one was "close" to the
President, it is also true that he himself was
close to every man connected with government.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

He had his hand on the pulse of each department,
and his knowledge of detail was as amazing
as it was often disconcerting in the hour of re-
port. He did not seem able to divest himself
of a feeling of personal responsibility for every
soldier that he sent to France, and this virtual
obsession drove him relentlessly. What the
youth of America was doing appealed to him
as so wonderfully fine, so shot through with a
splendor of sacrifice, that he looked upon any
sparing of himself as nothing short of betrayal.
After a crowded day — for, despite alleged "aloof-
ness," he saw people in a steady stream of five,
ten, and fifteen-minute interviews — he gave his
evening to the papers that stacked his desk,
typing off comment, suggestion, or instructions
on his own battered little machine. It took six
weeks invariably to get a ruling from the State
Department, but the President replied either
at once with a dictated letter or else on the
morning of the second day there came the small
envelope with its little typewritten page, all
curiously neat, signed "W. W."

I saw him many times when his face had the
gray of ashes, but the one complaint that I ever
heard was on the score of sleepiness. "I'm
getting like Dickens's fat boy," he laughed one
day. "I could go to sleep at an angle of ninety-
five degrees." The importance of husbanding
his energies, however, made him less and less
willing to spend them upon the trivial, and the
immaterial and irrelevant became increasingly
unbearable. There was so much to do, and
always the fear of being hampered in the doing

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

by some rebellion of the body. I felt always
that any standing possessed by me! with the
President was due to the fact that at the very
outset I divined this sense of urgency. Before
an interview with him, I would prepare for it
just as a lawyer prepares a brief, putting each
subject down in its proper order, heading and
subheading, and working up the manner or
presentation in order to strip away every vestige
of the non-essential. Within ten seconds after
shaking hands I had commenced my memoran-
dum and followed it through without pause or
change. So few did this. During the war I
took scores of visitors to the White House, many
of them men of large affairs and high reputation
as executives, and it was seldom indeed that
any of them drove hard and straight at the
point. One man that I remember particularly
had twenty minutes to present a most important
matter and he did not even touch upon it until
after nineteen minutes had passed.

Thomas Garrigues Masaryk, that great states-
man now President of Czechoslovakia, once
remarked to me on the "amazing impracticality"
of America's so-called "practical men," and
whimsically commented that of all the people
he had met "your visionary, idealistic President
is by far and away the most intensely practical."
Franklin Lane had a habit of referring to him
as "an idealist in action," but the only other who
ever seemed to grasp this very obvious charac-
teristic of the President was Charles H. Grasty,
who touched on it as follows in the course of a
recent article in the Atlantic Monthly:

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

After seeing him at Paris, I would expect him to succeed
if, upon his retirement from the Presidency at sixty-four
years of age, he took the highly improbable step of entering
the field of industry. In a large executive position, say
the presidency of the Steel Corporation, I confidently
believe that he would make an unprecedented success.
He has the keenest and truest sense of what is real. Irrele-
vance cuts him to pieces. When he is at work on a thing that
engages his interest he is like a hound on the scent. Waste
of time or any kind of lost motion is like poison to him.
A member of the Big Four once said to me: "Wilson works.
The rest of us play, comparatively speaking. We Euro-
peans can't keep up with a man who travels a straight
path with such a swift stride, never looking to the right
or left. We cannot put aside our habit of rambling a bit
on the way."

The reason, perhaps, is found in the fact that
of all our misused words, practicality has been
most twisted away from its original meaning.
Owing to the general habit of measuring accom-
plishment in terms of profit, it has come to
stand for acquisitiveness, for a certain mean
shrewdness, for the successes of greed. The
man who dreams the dream of tunneling a
mountain so that locked waters may turn the
desert into orchard, and then allows himself
to be cheated of the financial reward, is "im-
practical," but the glorified pawnbroker that
does the cheating is hailed as "practical."

Watching the President's mind work was like
watching the drive of a perfectly tuned engine.
Intellectual discipline, supplementing natural
ability, has placed every faculty at his immediate
call, and there is never a hint of waste nor delay.
What often passes for "peremptoriness" with
him is really nothing more than his habit of

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

thinking straight and thinking through. Having
certainties of his own, he pays people the com-
pliment of assuming that they themselves have
equally definite conclusions, and he invites
the clash of ideas. Instead of disliking argu-
ment, there was never any one who had higher
appreciation of the value of argument. What
he does not like, to be sure, is the blithe custom
of substituting mere assertions for established
facts and placing reliance upon opinions rather
than logic. "*v

I was in Washington from the first week of
the war to the last, occupying a position that
brought me into intimate contact with the head
of every department, bureau, and committee,
and I can say truthfully that of all those assem-
bled minds the President's was the most open.
This does not mean the usual catch-basin type
of mind into which any passer-by may throw
his mental trash, but a mind receptive to sug-
gestions, one with a welcome for new ideas. He
comes to his conclusions too carefully to give
them up quickly, but once let his facts be dis-
puted successfully and he surrenders without
question. And of all the men who gathered to
direct the progress of the great war machine,
the President was the most modest and the most
courteous. No man ever heard him utter a
vainglorious word or a rude one. What was
always most impressive, however, was his re-
markable control over as hot a temper as ever./'
burned within a human being.

A habit of emphasizing the Scotch strain in
Wilson's blood has curiously obscured the fact

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

that on the paternal side his grandfather and
grandmother were both Irish. Never in any
one were two blood strains more apparent or
more evenly balanced. The result is the very
unusual combination of strength and sensi-
bility. "Strong men" are too often lacking
in the emotional necessities, while delicacies
of perception and feeling are generally compan-
ioned by a sort of wishy-washiness. The mixt-
ure is likewise responsible for a very definite
cross-pull, and no one is more aware of it than
the President himself. As he said to me one
day: "The Irish is always the first to react and
its invariable command is to go ahead. The
Scotch, however, is never more than a second
behind, and always catches me by the coattail
with the warning to wait a minute and think it
over/'

As a result, his conclusions are invariably
reached by a process of incubation, assisted at
every point by the most painstaking study and
thorough investigation. Instead of an "im-
patience of counsel and failure to subject him-
self to the corrective process of association,"
the very reverse is true. To use his own favorite
phrase, he "borrows brains" wherever he finds
them, and many important decisions are delayed
unwisely while he waits to see persons assumed
r"to have certain special knowledge. Complete
information is a passion with him, and it was in
this connection that Colonel House proved so
valuable. Soft-spoken, selfless, unassertive, but
an epitome of alertness, the colonel was a high-
class sponge, with the added beauty of being

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

easy to squeeze. Once in possession of every 1
fact in the case, the President withdraws, com-
mences the business of consideration, compari-
son, and assessment, and then emerges with a
decision.

This habit of thought is by no means a short
cut to popularity. There is a certain vanity
in all of us that makes us like to feel that our
views carry weight, that our conclusions have
the quality of convincing, and a certain chill
is bound to come when we see views and con-
clusions carted away to be sorted over with a
lot of others. Also, in the case of politicians,
advice usually means control. The charge that
the President "dislikes advice" is simply that
the President prefers to form his own conclu-
sions instead of letting others form them for
him.

If, however, the Scotch strain disposes him to
slowness in making a decision, the Irish strain
assumes command when the decision has been
reached, and he brings to his advocacies a
fighting spirit that takes no account of odds.
Slow to take fire, he burns inextinguishably
when once alight. Here again, however, the
President suffers by contrast. By comparison
with the opportunism and pliability of the
average politician, the Wilson tenacity of pur-
pose inevitably takes on the look and feel of
granite.

Mental habits have a clutch as strong as the
physical. As time went by, with increasing
necessity for husbanding hours and energy,
it was easy to see the growing dominance of the

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

intellectual factor in the President's equation.
He came more and more to view every problem
mentally, to look into the minds of men rather
than into the hearts of men. America possessed
him to the exclusion of Americans, and in
increasing degree he gave his thought to the
people as a whole rather than to individuals.
A revolt against the charlatanism of politics,
with its emphasis on palliatives, gave intensity
to his search for causes and cures. On every
side he saw politicians and papers trying to
content people with thrills, and his determina-
tion grew to make people think. With his
mastery of language, his rare ability to give
words poignancy as well as point, it would have
been easy for him to dramatize himself, but he
shrank from this usual political trick as unutter-
ably cheap, wholly unworthy. On his trip in
support of the League of Nations, for instance,
it was suggested to him that it might be well to
"warm up a bit," and his answer was an indig-
nant refusal to "capitalize the dead."
J^M. It was a course that had no other end than
9 unpopularity, for the American people prefer to
confine the business of thinking to their own
personal affairs. When they turn to politics
it is for amusement, for excitement, for indigna-
tion, but never for intellectual activity. The
President, by his continual appeals to mentality
rather than to the emotions, became a trial.
The war, with its opportunity for intense feeling,
saved him from actual disfavor for a wjiile, but
the reactions of the armistice sealed his doom.
People turned back definitely and irritatedly

THE; MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

to their own personal concerns, and the continued
insistence of the President upon national and
international affairs both bored and angered.
Couldn't he see that they were busy! Yet only
the President has lost. Every word that he
said, every appeal that he cried, has found a
lodgment in the hearts and minds of the men and
women of the United States, and while they may
dislike him for making them think, the thinking
is being done. He has been, in truth, a schooj-
master, and not all that we get from a teacher
ever softens humanity's curious resentment atj
having to be taught.

Such a type was naturally disappointing to
the newspapers, and this disappointment is
at the heart of the "aloofness" that grew up
between the President and the Washington
correspondents. They wanted drama and he
refused to furnish it. They wanted something
that would lend itself to "scareheads" and he
responded with an "exposition." In the first
years of his administration the President received
the correspondents regularly. He talked to
them with the utmost freedom, and the discon-
tinuance of the interviews was not based upon
any violation of confidence, but upon his con-
viction of their futility. In the group that would
stand before him were men of high character
and brilliant attainments, able to talk and
think on terms of equality with any statesman
or great executive. Also in the group, however,
were immature boys, ignorant of life in any of
its larger aspects and unconcerned with issues
since they were without knowledge of them.
4 35

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

These undeveloped minds played with small
things and put continual emphasis upon them.
They were more interested in the sheep ' on the
White House lawn than in any analysis of
policy, more eager to find out what the President
had for dinner than to receive the explanation
of a proposed law.

The principal distaste of the President, how-
ever, was based upon what he termed "con-
jectural journalism." He felt that the press
was not interested in what had happened, or
what would happen, but only in what might
happen. As he phrased it, their idea of news
was "the satisfaction of curiosity." Every one
will admit the folly of taking the eggs from
under a hen every five minutes in order to note
the process of incubation, yet when great ques-
tions of domestic or international import are
in process of settlement, the press insists upon
its right to examine them at every stage of the
hatching process. This claim was abhorrent
to the orderly habits of the Wilson mind, with
its regard for established facts, and it became
his battle to conceal decisions until they were
completely formed. At Paris, as in Washing-
ton, much of the complaint of press and politi-
cians was due to the President's refusal to
"guess."

Once he might have taken a chance on the
hazards of "conjecture," once he might have
endured stupidity, selfishness, low thinking, and
time-wasting, once he might have thought in
terms of personal popularity or partizan ad-
vantage, but if ever there was such a time,

THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENT

it was before he became the President of the
United States, a time before he sat face to face
with America, heard her call and saw her needs.
What happened to Woodrow Wilson was the
thing that happened to Lincoln, that happened
to Washington — the dream of a race, the spiritual
passions of a people, the necessities of menaced
liberties, joined to lift him from the homely
companionships of the average to the loneliness
of the type.

What is America, after all — not the America
that we sing when the verses are remembered —
but the America that is in the hearts of men,
that is the hope of mothers, the inheritance of
children? It is a light that has never failed
since first it rose, a dream of ideals more glorious
than armies, a vision of struggle against the
injustices of life, a working theory of spiritual
progress that shall make to-morrow finer and
better than to-day.

No people in all history were ever less con-
cerned with the material. Money is merely the
symbol of achievement; our passion is progress,
and high endeavor our happiness. At once
pacific and militant, incurably religious yet in-
cessantly questing, clamorously emotional but
hard and shrewd withal, conservative and revo-
lutionary in the same breath, curiously sophisti-
cated and unalterably naive, freedom is the one
note that brings every discord into harmony.
Controlled by a law of averages for the most
part, giving mediocrity an easy indulgence, it is
only when danger reaches down to the soul of
America that the type is demanded and evolved.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

And well for these great souls if, like Lincoln,
they pass on in the moment of supreme achieve-
ment, for there is nothing more cruel, more
savage, than a people's reaction from high
t emotionalism.

NEUTRALITY

peace tangle will not unravel unless re-
A lated to war aims, and war aims stand
unsupported and somewhat overstrained unless
related to the various emotional stages that
marked the period of our neutrality. The web
of confusion in which the nation struggles is no
simple skein, but a complicated weave of every
falsehood and prejudice evolved by the political
and spiritual upheavals of the last six years.

One has only to read the public prints of 1914
to realize how entirely the Great War took
America by surprise. Such a sudden, unpro-
voked assault on the ideals of civilization was
not only incomprehensible to us, but almost f ^^
incredible. Naturally, well-nigh instinctively, ;
the mind of the nation reacted on the instant to
old habits of thought and familiar courses of/
action.

More than any other tradition or policy, the I
gospel of democracy declared by James Monroe
has dominated the expanding Jife of America.
Flung at the monarchies of Europe in 1823 as a
grim ultimatum that their interference in the
political affairs of the New World would be
resisted to the death, it was equally our promise
not to interfere in the wars and disputes of the

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Old World. At the time no more than a simple
warning, it grew in the popular mind to be an
expression of national independence, the great
foundation stone in the wall of American safety.
It was at all times questionable whether we
could have upheld the famous Doctrine in event
of attack, but there was never a moment when
the country would not have taken arms in its
defense. The cables, the wireless, fast mails,
and the growth of foreign trade all joined to
end the isolation that was the very heart of the
policy, but changed conditions had no power to
weaken faith in its desirability and importance.
Even in the Hague Conference of 1899 the dele-
gates of the United States signed the arbitration
convention with this proviso:

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so con-
strued as to require the United States of America to depart
from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering
with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy
or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall
anything contained in the said convention be construed
to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America
of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.

We sent delegates to the Algeciras Conference
called in 1906 to adjust the affairs of Morocco,
but while approving the arrangement that re-
sulted, we disclaimed any responsibility for the
enforcement of the treaty provisions that guaran-
teed the independence and integrity of Morocco.
Five years later, when these guaranties were
ruthlessly set aside, we affirmed our traditional

Ijattitude by refusal to enter protest.

I""" Another great American tradition, second in

NEUTRALITY

our hearts only to the Monroe Doctrine, was the
advocacy of arbitration as a substitute for war.
From the day that the thirteen original states
agreed to abide by the decisions of a federal tri-
bunal, Americans have had the conviction that
similar agreements on the part of nations would
achieve similar results. It was this plan of
judicial settlements, rather than military de-
cisions, that we took to The Hague in 1899 and
again in 1907, and that we failed in our purpose
was entirely due to the resistance of the German
and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Defeated in
our purpose, as far as international concert was
concerned, our enthusiasm suffered no abate-
ment. To nation after nation we carried our
statement of aims, and by 1914 we had effected
dual arbitration treaties with thirty countries,
twenty of which had been duly ratified and ;
proclaimed.

These traditions, these aspirations, were as
much a part of American life as the breath of
the body, and the President spoke for a whole
people when he issued his proclamation of neu-
trality on August 4th, supporting it later in these
noble words :

Every man who really loves America will act and speak
in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of im-
partiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned.
. . . It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay
it. Such divisions among us ... might seriously stand
in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the
one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself
ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak
counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partizan,
but as a friend.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

This thought, springing inevitably from the

American faith in arbitration, our horror of war,

dominated all of the President's earlier speeches,

and the response of the country was sincere.

Not at the time, nor for months, was any Amer-

^Jcan right assailed, and the whole dispute seemed

\ entirely European. It was not until a full year

had passed that the full tragedy of Germany's

treatment of Belgium burned into the con-

)( sciousness of the United States, and it was an

even longer period before the full purpose of the

Imperial German government dawned upon the

I democratic mind.

It is one of the paradoxes of politics that those
partizans who attack the League of Nations
because it carries the danger of American en-
tanglement in European affairs also declare in
the same breath that America was shamed and
betrayed by the President's refusal to thrust
America into the World War at the time of Bel-
gium's invasion. It is this falsity that must be
considered at the very outset, for it is respon-
sible for much of the prejudice that clouds
judgment. v

The answer is simple and does not admit of
challenge. It is not the right of the President
of the United States to declare war, the Constitu-
tion of the United States vesting that power in
Congress absolutely and entirely. No con-
straint of any kind rested upon Senator or
Representative. It was the privilege of any
single member of Congress to introduce a war
resolution or to ask a protest. This power was
not exercised. No resolution was introduced.

NEUTRALITY

Neither at the time of the German invasion of
Belgium nor during the first year of the German
occupation was war or protest even suggested
in Congress or out of it.

Speaking on February 16, 1916, Elihu Root,
then a full-fledged presidential candidate, as-
serted that "the American people are entitled
not merely to feel, but to speak concerning the
wrong done to Belgium. The law protecting
Belgium which was violated was our law and the
law of every other civilized nation." Better
than any one else Elihu Root knew that the
United States was bound by neither law nor
treaty. The Hague Declaration that the "ter-
ritory of neutral powers is inviolable" contained
no means of enforcement, and, as far as 1914 was
concerned, nullified itself entirely by Article 20:
"The provisions of the present Convention do
not apply except as between contracting parties,
and then only if all the belligerents are parties to
the Convention." Neither Great Britain nor
Serbia ever ratified the convention. What is
even more to the point, Mr. Root was in the
Senate for one year and six months after the
invasion of Belgium and not once during that
time did he open his mouth to suggest a protest.

As for Mr. Roosevelt, who devoted the latter
part of 1915 and the first six months of 1916 to
attacking President Wilson for his failure to pro-
test in the matter of Belgium, the following
article from his pen appeared in The Outlook
under date of September 23, 1915:

A deputation of Belgians has arrived in this country to
invoke our assistance in the time of their dreadful need.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

What action our government can or will take I know not.
It has been announced that no action can be taken that will
interfere with our entire neutrality. It is certainly emi-
nently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral and
nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our

neutrality and taking sides one way or the other.

Neutrality, however, argued no surrender
whatsoever of American rights. In this con-
nection, disputes with Great Britain gave small
occasion for real alarm, as the existence of a
treaty provided means of peaceful adjustment.
Such was not the case with the Imperial German
government, which had specifically and repeat-
edly refused to enter into arbitration agreements
with us. It was apparent, therefore, that dis-
sensions arising between the United States and
Germany held promise of grave danger, for
diplomatic conversations, ineffective at best,
are hopeless unless exchanged in good faith.
The absence of this good faith was made mani-
fest at the very outset by the organized German
attempt to arouse outcry against our sale of
munitions to the Allies.

rThe contention was dishonest, for as recently
is the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 both
Germany and Austria had sold munitions to
the belligerents. Their appeals to us, therefore,
"were not to observe international law, but to
revise it in their interest." The stand taken
by the United States was consistent not only
with international law and traditional policy,
but also with obvious common sense. For, as
we pointed out, "if we had refused to sell
munitions to belligerents we could never in

NEUTRALITY

time of a war of our own obtain munitions from
neutrals, and the nation which had accumulated
the largest reserves of war-supplies in time of
peace would be assured of victory. The mili-
tarist state that invested its money in arsenals
would be at a fatal advantage over the free
people who invested their wealth in schools.
To write into international law that neutrals
should not trade in munitions would be to hand
over the world to the rule of the nation with the
largest armament factories. Such a policy the |
United States of America could not accept."1 ^

This dispute, and others like it, however, were \
merely irritating when compared to the dyna-
mite contained in another historic tradition.
Only second to the Monroe Doctrine has been
our deep and continuing interest in the "freedom
of the seas." In the early days of the Republic,
long before the West opened its rich resources
to our energies, we sought prosperity in the
ocean lanes, and America's fast clipper ships
carried our expanding commerce to every corner
of the world. As a consequence, the law of the
seas was of vital interest to us, and from the
very outset our diplomacy has had a just mari-
time code as one of its principal objectives.
At every point in history we denied the theory
that any nations possessed proprietary rights
in world waters, and entered invariable protest
against all policies of belligerents that abridged
the rights of neutrals to sail the seas in peace and
independence.

As in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, the

1 How the War Came to America.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

"freedom of the seas" was a gospel that we were
at all times ready to defend with our lives and
fortunes. The civil wars of the Barbary States
were of small interest to us, but when their
piracies limited the liberties of ocean traffic we
declared war against them. Napoleon's cam-
paigns were interesting to us only as news,
but his continental blockade struck down our
sea rights, and in 1798 we drove our navy
against the privateers of France and called
Washington from his retirement to take com-
mand of the army. England's war against
France could be viewed with indifference, but
British Orders in Council affected the lives of our
citizens instantly and disastrously, and in 1812
we took arms in defense of the freedom of the
seas.

The typical Americanism of the President
reacted to this American tradition even as to
the Monroe Doctrine, and as early as August 6,
1914, he sounded a sharp warning to the belliger-
ents, despatching an identical note to all of them
in which attention was called to the sea rights
of neutrals. Again on February 10, 1915, as a
result of Germany's proclamation of a war zone
around the British Isles, President Wilson in-
formed the German government that "if the
commanders of German vessels of war should
act upon the presumption that the flag of the
United States was not being used in good faith
and should destroy on the high seas an American
vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would
be difficult for the government of the United
States to view the act in any other light than

NEUTRALITY

as an indefensible violation of neutral rights,
. . . the government of the United States would
be constrained to hold the Imperial German
government to a strict accountability for^ such
acts of their naval authorities and to take any
steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard
American lives and property and to secure to
American citizens the full enjoyment of their
acknowledged rights on the high seas."

Also on March 30, 1915, a long note was sent
to the British government, protesting against the
Order in Council of March I5th that we held to be
"a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent
rights over neutral commerce within the whole
European area, and an almost unqualified denial
of the sovereign rights of the nations now at
peace." In note after note we laid down our
ancient claim that the high seas are common
territory to every nation.

As a matter of fact our grievances against Eng-
land were far more acute than those against
Germany when the sinking of the Lusitania
worked its tremendous revulsion in public^
feeling. Even before this tragedy, however,""|
the mind of the President had freed itself from
the shackles of tradition. Just as our interest
in the seas had forced us into every great war,
so was it a certainty that we would be drawn
into the conflict then raging. Our "isolation,"
never anything more than fancied, was finally a
proved absurdity. As for the Monro.e Doctrine,
German victory meant its surrender or else its
defense by armed force. These truths stood
plain to the President, but with vision no less

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

clear he saw also that American unity was no
longer a substance, but a shadow, and that
through the careless years great forces of disin-
tegration had been permitted to work at will.
Glib references to the "melting-pot" instead of
some sane and continuous process of assimilation;
intelligent nationalism split into parochial rival-
ries by the dangerous growth of sectionalism.

In the days of the Colonies the Atlantic sea-
board was America, but in the twentieth century
it cannot truthfully be looked upon as other than
a fringe. It is between the Alleghanies and the
Rockies that the real America lies — an America
careless of Eastern opinion when it is not con-
temptuous. New England and New York might
wax hysterical over a European war, but the
great Middle West went its way in indifference.
Added to a very intense belief that war was a
medieval madness, one found also a very definite
pro-Germanism. Great centers like Milwaukee,
St. Louis, and Chicago were, in many respects,
as Teutonic as Berlin, and from these cities
poured a steady stream of propaganda that
subtly influenced public opinion in favor of the
German cause. It is to be remembered that
Congress, the war-making body, took no action
whatsoever as a result of the Lusitania tragedy,
and that press and politicians, while condem-
natory indeed, divided sharply on the abstract
issue. The infamous German charge that the
Lusitania carried ammunition "destined for the
destruction of brave German soldiers'* found
many supporters, and from the Middle West
actually came the suggestion that Americans

NEUTRALITY

ought to keep off the sea. Slowly but surely
the President addressed himself to the discovery
of truth and the affirmation of ideals in the
interests of American unity.

The feeling that great issues were at stake
was not enough. There had to be the burning
conviction that those issues and their proper
solution were bound up with the permanent
safety of America here and now and forever.
War might come as a result of some outburst
of national feeling, but national passions and
hatred were without the necessary carrying
power. The imperative thing was such deep
understanding of national ideals as would fur-
nish unity and indomitableness throughout the
days, perhaps the years, of suffering and sacri-
fice— an understanding that would reach down
to the souls of one hundred millions, cross
sectioning race and creed and circumstance,
firing all with a common faith. One has only to
read the President's notes to follow the mighty
drive of an inflexible purpose. Fools laughed at
them, but they will stand for all time as mile-
stones in America's longest march to the heights.!

In the first Lusitania note, dated May I, 1915,
we stated plainly that "the Imperial German
government will not expect the government of
the United States to omit any word or any act"
to safeguard our rights. In the note of June
9th we said: "Whatever be the other facts
regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is
that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a
conveyance for passengers, and carrying more
than a thousand souls that had no part or lot in

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the conduct of the war, was sunk without so
much as a challenge or a warning, and that men,
women, and children were sent to their death in
circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare.
The government of the United States is con-
tending for something much greater than mere
rights of property or privileges of commerce.
It is contending for nothing less high and sacred
than the rights of humanity."

In the third note, dated July 2ist, it was as-
serted clearly that "the repetition of certain
acts must be regarded by the government pf
the United States, when they affect American
citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."

On September 1st the Imperial German govern-
ment gave assurance that its submarines would
sink no more liners without warning, seemingly
a notable victory for international law as well
as for America. The President, however, realized
that the assurance rested entirely upon the
honor of Germany, having no basis in legal
agreement. On January 18, 1916, he set forth
a declaration of principles regarding submarine
attacks and asked assent to them by the warring
nations. The German answer was a curt notice
to all neutral powers that armed merchant-
ships would be treated as war-ships and sunk
without warning. Instantly and with unparalleled
vigor the German propaganda organization
in the United States commenced a campaign
to gain popular support for the policy.

America's unreadiness for war was never more
apparent than at this moment. The old cry
against "traffic in human lives" was revived,

NEUTRALITY

and powerful political and business groups
went so far as to urge the President to advise
American citizens not to travel on armed mer-
chant-ships. Mr. Bryan and the West censured
the administration for being too militaristic,
while Mr. Roosevelt and the Atlantic seaboard
attacked on the ground of ultra-pacifism. The
President's answer was specific assertion of the
right of commercial vessels to carry arms in
self-defense, and an equally explicit refusal to
consent to the amazing theory that Americans
had no right on the sea that Germany was
bound to respect.

At every point in the proceedings there was
clear evidence of Germany's conviction that the
United States stood helpless by reason of our
high percentage of citizens of German birth or
descent. Relying upon the immunity afforded
by this presumption of disloyalty, and in abso-
lute defiance of the Lusitania pledge, a submarine
torpedoed the Sussex without warning on March
24th, killing and wounding American citizens.
The shot at Concord was no more explicit than
the ultimatum of the President that unless
Germany abandoned such methods of submarine
warfare diplomatic relations would be severed
at once. His speech before Congress was a
more terrible arraignment of Germany than had
yet been put in words, and under the scourge
of this reprobation Berlin cowered and sur-
rendered. Acknowledging their guilt in the
matter of the Sussex, the Germans gave pledges
that met the main demands of the United States.
There was nothing conclusive in such a settle-
5 51

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

ment, however. The Kaiser meant it as a
truce, and the President so recognized it. Even
as Berlin rallied its American sympathizers to
defeat his re-election, so did the President pro-
_^ceed to prepare for the grapple of principles
that he now felt to be inevitable. Speaking
before the League to Enforce Peace on May 27,
1916, he called upon the people to face facts
even as he himself had been compelled to face
them. After conclusive establishment of the
truth that America no longer enjoyed a "detached
and distant situation," that our "isolation"
was fancied, not real, he declared that the nation
must stand prepared to assume the authorities
and responsibilities of a world power, and set
forth this new article of faith :

So sincerely do we believe these things that I am sure
that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America
when I say that the United States is willing to become a
partner in any feasible association of nations formed in
order to realize these objects and make them secure against
violation.

Again speaks the typical Americanism of the
man. Though bound by tradition as firmly as
any ancient people, it is the salvation of America
that we have the courage to blaze new trails
when it is seen that the old paths are no longer
trustworthy. Prior to 1916 the address of the
President would have shocked and alienated,
but, viewed in the red light that flowed from
the battle-fields of Europe, it was recognized as
truth. The approval of the nation marked the
beginning of America's surrender of the illusion
of isolation, the dawn of America's realization

NEUTRALITY

that freedom^ of the seas could not be separated
from freedom of the land, and that the world
peace of our dreams depended on our willingness
to enter into a world partnership for the preser-
vation of that peace. From this time on the
speeches of the President were marked by
certainty. He felt that he was not merely a
leader, but a spokesman; that he was not sup-
plying impulse, but receiving it. Throughout the
whole of 1916 his words had the ring of a clarion:

We are not going to invade any nation's right, but sup-
pose, my fellow-countrymen, some nation should invade
our right? What then? ... I have come here to tell you
that the difficulties of our foreign policy . . . daily increase
in number and intricacy and in danger, and I would be
derelict to my duty to you if I did not deal with you in
these matters with the utmost candor, and tell you what it
may be necessary to use the force of the United States to do.

America up to the present time has been, as if by de-
liberate choice, confined and provincial, and it will be
impossible for her to remain confined and provincial.
Henceforth she belongs to the world and must act as part
of the world.

The United States will never be what it has been. The
United States was once in enjoyment of what we used to
call splendid isolation. . . . And now, by circumstances
which she did not choose, over which she had not control,
she has been thrust out into the great game of mankind,
on the stage of the world itself, and here she must know
what she is about, and no nation in the world must doubt
that all her forces are gathered and organized in the interest j
of just, righteous, and humane government.

The issues of the election were clean-cut.
Germany was under no delusion. Berlin knew

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

that the President had come at last to exact
appreciation of Potsdam's plan of world con-
quest and meant to array the strength of democ-
racy against it. Every force that German money
and influence could control was hurled into the
campaign against the President, but the people
were no less aroused to the issues involved and
Americanism triumphed over partizanship.

The march of events was swift and logical.
On December 18, 1916, the President addressed
a note to the belligerent nations in which he
pointed out that each side claimed to be fighting
a defensive war; each side asserted interest in
the rights of small nations; each side declared
itself to be "ready to consider the formation of a
league of nations to insure peace and justice
throughout the world." As the objects for
which both sides were fighting, "stated in
general terms . . . seem to be the same," the
President asked the belligerent powers if it
would not be possible for them to avow the
"precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy
them and their people." He justified the re-
quest by stating that America was "as vitally
and directly interested as the governments now
at war" in the "measures to be taken to secure
the future peace of the world."

The reception of this note will be recorded by
historians as a proof of how far the statesman-
ship of the modern world had fallen away from
intelligence. Partizans in America berated the
communication as a shameful confession of
ignorance, regarding it as nothing more than an
effort to "find out what the war was about."

NEUTRALITY

The British and French spokesmen, as well as
the press of the two nations, were shocked at
what seemed an exhibition of cold-blooded im-
partiality. Yet nothing was more obvious than
that the note was written directly at Ger-
many, and that under the palm branch gleamed
a naked sword. The President was not trying
to "find out what the war was about," but the
terms on which the belligerents would be willing to
end it. The terms of the Allies had been stated
repeatedly and frankly and were well known.
Germany, on the other hand, had dealt entirely
in vague generalities, sometimes threatening,
sometimes mawkishly pathetic. It was the de-
termination of the President to drive them out
into the open. As plain as words could make it,
the note denied any purpose of mediation and
demanded information that would permit us to
frame a definite, conclusive policy. America
could stay out no longer; America did not wish
to stay out longer. Our search was for worthy
comrades in a battle to the death between j
opposed ideals.

The whole of the President's supreme states-
manship had run to this tremendous moment.
Something that the bayonets of the Allies had
not been able to do his words had done: Ger-
many was at bay. Two decisions, and two only,
were presented to the Kaiser for his choice.
He could continue silent or evasive, confessing
guilt of blood and guilt of plan, thereby forcing
a united America into the war against him, or he
could have cried "Peace" in a voice great enough
to reach that Heaven against which he had

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

r*.

sinned. Not in all the annals of humanity were
a people ever given so wonderful an opportunity
\ for spiritual and physical redemption. What if
"~ Germany had said: "Let the guns be silenced.
We are sick of our struggle, sick of ambitions that
we now see to be cruel and impossible. Let us
order a new world and build it on the rock founda-
tions of justice and brotherhood. We stand
ready to pay for the damage done in France and
Belgium. We will right the wrongs of Alsace
and Lorraine and acknowledge the national
aspirations of the Poles, the Czechs, and the
Serbs. We want the burden of militarism lifted
from our backs and from the back of humanity,
and we offer our partnership in a league of
nations/'

Not in all the Central Powers, however, was
there one statesman with the vision to see the
necessity or the splendor of such an answer.
Drunk with success, confident in the power of
their tribal god, and resolute in their mad dream
of world conquest, the military masters of
Germany replied in their usual terms of vague-
ness and evasiveness. Going before the Senate
on January 22d, the President discussed the
answers to his notes, and every sentence of that
discussion was an arraignment of the German
pretensions, a recognition that the Allied gov-
ernments had come to stand for liberty and hu-
man aspiration. The people had watched; the
people understood. War was not only a ques-
tion of time and German arrogance. The
expression was not long delayed. On January
31, 1917, Berlin officially notified the linked

NEUTRALITY

States that "from February I, 1917, sea traffic
will be stopped with every available weapon
and without further notice." We were told
that American passenger-steamers could con-
tinue their sailings undisturbed only on condi-
tion of following certain lines to certain ports
and "bearing on hull and superstructure three
vertical stripes, eight meters wide, each to be
painted alternately white and red/'

With rare shamelessness, the German Chan-
cellor informed the Imperial Diet that the reason
this ruthless policy had not been employed
earlier was simply because the navy wanted
to wait until more submarines had been built.
Our action was instant. On February jd the
German ambassador was dismissed and diplo-
matic relations severed.

Slowly but surely the President had led the
people to high ground demanded by old ideals and
new needs. The filibuster of the "fourteen
wilful men" had power to kill the armed-
neutrality bill, and the McLemore resolution,
warning Americans not to travel on armed
merchant-ships, managed to muster one hundred
and fifty-two votes, but these were the last
gasps of the congressional groupTtrTat drew its
inspiration from blind pacifists and German
disloyalists. Devotion to peace had been proved
by"""afT unparalleled patience. The President's
complete unmasking of the German plan had
given us unity, and the people saw" at last that
the war was not only a war of self-defense, but
a logical continuation of the AhieTi"CaTl~§truggle *
that started in 1776.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

The popular response to the war message of
pril 2d was a fulfilment of the President's
prophecy that "There will come that day when
the world will say, 'This America that we
thought was full of a multitude of contrary
counsels now speaks with the great volume of
the heart's accord, and that great heart of
America has behind it the supreme moral force
of righteousness and hope and the liberty of
mankind.'"

Ill

"STRONG MEN'

HTHE sweep of a century leaves nothing remem-j
•*• bered but fundamentals and a few great
names. Historians, writing of events that time
has withered until only the fadeless essentials
remain, are not concerned with the living pas-
sions that colored and confused those events
in the day of their happening. A contemporary
chronicler may take no such privilege, for he
deals with the ferment rather than the solution,
and must treat of things in their present im-
portance without waiting until the years have
settled the question of relative value. History
can afford to be a concentration of the impersonal
and important, but life, as it runs along from
day to day, is made up of little things, and
public opinion of the moment is more controlled
by passing rages, clashing vanities, and the
hour's excitement than by the larger purposes
that do not reveal themselves until the winds
of time have blown away the smoke and ashes j
of the human struggle.

America's war rush and overwhelming vic-
tory, the Peace Treaty, and the League of
Nations, will stand alone before the future,
but to-day they move obscurely through clouds
of confusion, and it is idle to consider them

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

until some attempt has been made to settle
the yeasty ferment of angers and resentments.
Such matters as the failure to form a coalition
Cabinet, the refusal to permit Mr. Roosevelt
to go to France, the case of General Wood, and
the President's "partizan appeal," while tran-
sient and trivial in comparison with the great
issues of the day, nevertheless cloud these
larger questions to an extent that demands
attention.

The War Message haa not ceased to echo before
the cry for "strong men" burst upon the ears of
the President. Raised by Republican poli-
ticians as an opening wedge in the drive for a
bipartizan government, it was nevertneless a
slogan of direct appeal to the millions of Amer-
icans who were girding themselves for service,
and who wanted the assurance that civilian
leadership was to be no less expert than the mili-
tary direction itself. Because a coalition Cab-
inet was not formed, the feeling grew that the
President meant to "play a lone hand," a par-
tizan hand, and its persistence as a conviction
is at the bottom of much of the ugly anger that
imperils our unity to-day.

It was, and is, a confusion that proceeds from
the unfortunate fact that the great majority of
Americans are as little familiar with their govern-
ment as with their history. Because of this
ignorance concerning plain facts of administra-
tion it was the general opinion that the Presi-
dent's refusal to form a coalition Cabinet was
due to a dislike of "counsel," an unwillingness
to subject himself to the independences of "ad-

"STRONG MEN"

vice" that might result from the inclusion of
Republicans in his "official family." Cabinet
members are in no sense counselors or advisers
to the President, nor have they ever been. They
are the real executives of the administration,
each one the head of a department with exact
duties to discharge, and coming into regular
contact with the President only for purposes of
report, conference, and cohesion. The Presi-
dent has the responsibility, but his Cabinet
members have the power. If they fail him in
faith, in loyalty, in understanding, or even in
agreement, his reputation and regime are alike
endangered.

Because of the general ignorance concerning
history, it is the wide-spread opinion that co-
alition Cabinets are customary in times of
stress and that the idea has the indorsement
of efficiency. Both assumptions are groundless.
When urged to take Democrats into his Cabinet
in 1898, President McKinley refused flatly.
No less than Woodrow Wilson he had read his
history and knew that the first need of a war
President was a working-force trained in team-
play, a close association of trusted lieutenants,
not a sudden importation of strange captains.
Nor did Lincoln call a coalition Cabinet into
being. Yet even though all were members of
his own party, he paid a bitter penalty for having
selected them with reference to factional divi-
sions rather than in accord with his own prefer-
ences. The "strong men" of his official family
were of such abounding strength that each
imagined himself the President, and utter dis-

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

organization was averted only by Mr. Lincoln's
decision to assert his right to unquestioned
obedience.

"We pretend to no state secrets," said the
New York Evening Post in 1862, "but we have
been told, upon what we deem good authority,
that no such thing as a combined, unitary, de-
liberative administration exists; that the Presi-
dent's brave willingness to take all responsibility
has quite neutralized the idea of a joint respon-
sibility; and that orders of the highest impor-
tance are issued, and movements commanded,
which Cabinet officers learn of as other people
do, or, what is worse, which the Cabinet officers
disapprove and protest against/'

Washington, alone of all the Presidents, en-
joyed the peculiar privileges of a coalition
Cabinet, for when he assumed the direction of
the new Republic it was his feeling that all po-
litical faiths should have fair representation.
As a result, Hamilton and Jefferson, opposed in
every thought and principle, were handcuffed
together, and their pull and haul came close to
swamping the frail bark of government. Do-
mestic policies waited while the two factions
fought, and international relations fell into new
discords while Washington studied as to how he
should decide between the conflicting recom-
mendations of the two rivals. Peace came only
when Jefferson resigned to lead the party that
was to carry his beliefs to victory.

Even if government and history both be put
aside, however, a third and stronger reason is at
hand to prove the impossibility of a coalition

"STRONG MEN"

Cabinet. It must be admitted, as a matter of
course, that a prime requisite in the choice of the
new men was general agreement as to their
suitability. It would not have been enough for
the President to say, "These are strong men."
Judgment of their strength was primarily the
province of the Republican party, and second-
arily the right of the Country as a whole. The
demand for a coalition Cabinet was not the de-
mand of the President, and therefore his idea of
what constituted "strong men" was read out of
court at the start.

What figures, then, stood out so boldly from
the rank and file of the Republican party as to
make their selection a thing of unanimous
applause, a choice by acclamation ? The poverty
of America's public service was never more
apparent than when such a search began. An
interesting essay could, and should, be written
on the reasons, but for the purposes of this
consideration they may be stated briefly. Our
public life dooms itself to mediocrity because
it offers neither reward nor honor. Alexander
Hamilton, studying the results achieved by the
unpaid public service of England, grafted the
British plan upon our own governmental plant.
In England, however, there was a leisure class,
inheritors of wealth and idleness, able and
willing to serve without pay as some sort of
justification for their existence. In the New
World it was as headless a proposition as sane
men ever advanced. Lacking a leisure class,
unpaid positions and nominal salaries either
invited chicane or compelled impoverishment.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

To take a case in point, a member of Congress
receives compensation in the sum of $8,000 a
year. Out of this salary he is expected to live
and entertain and also to provide the expenses
of a never-ending campaign. Elected for two
years only, the wretched man is forced to com-
mence "running" again within a day of his
election. As an indication of expense the
campaign for the re-election of the Speaker
of the New York State Assembly — a $1,500
office — cost $29,000.

These conditions have forced the party or-
ganization into complete power. Naturally
enough, since it furnishes the funds and the
"workers," it exercises the privilege of selection,
and still more naturally its preference is for
"grateful" men. The average officeholder,
therefore, is of the type that is willing to act as
a combination errand-boy and patronage broker.
Now and then a Lincoln, a Wilson, or a Roose-
velt is able to break through the iron alignment,
but public office, for the most part, is the reward
of a tireless enthusiastic "regularity." This
theory of politics as a vast employment agency
has its logical development in the perfection of
slander and abuse as legitimate campaign weap-
ons. As a result, public life has become a
gantlet as cruel as any ever devised by savages.
An officeholder has no rights that partizanship
is bound to respect, and not even the common
decencies are permitted to stand in the way
of assault upon a candidate. Inevitably public
life holds out its invitation chiefly to the
mediocre or the rascal, the one so small as to

"STRONG MEN"

be flattered by any notice, the other too shame-
less to mind it.

Force and administrative genius, thereforeT^
by reason of the price that politics demands,
have turned to private enterprise in increasing
degree. There is no more striking characteris-
tic of American life to-day than the complete
divorcement of politics and business so far as
genuine public service is concerned. To be sure,
there are certain contacts, but the very slyness
of them, and their corrupt selfishness, has done
as much to discredit the "business man" in the
opinion of the electorate as it has done to
besmirch the politician. It is a gulf that must
and will be bridged, but it was not bridged in
1917, and selection of a "captain of industry'*
for the Cabinet would have forfeited the con-
fidence of workers even as it would have aroused ?
the distrust of the country as a whole.

These remarks, offered assertively because
briefly, may explain the poverty of public life
that made it impossible to find "practical
statesmen" without "anxious search or perilous
trial." As a matter of fact, the most careful
poll of suggestions afforded no larger number of
names than could be counted on the fingers of
two hands. Even so, not one of the list met the
primary requisite of general acceptability.

Colonel Roosevelt, while offering his services
on the instant, was specific from the first in his
insistence that he should be permitted to go
to France at the head of a volunteer division
of his own enlistment. When this request was
denied he entered straightway upon the " broom-

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

stick drill" and "coffin order'* tirades that did
so much to convince neutral nations and the
Central Powers that America would never be
able to figure in the war in a military sense.
Gen. Leonard Wood, now hailed as a great
administrator, was then putting entire emphasis
upon his military ability, and his ambition had no
other thought than to command the American
Expeditionary Force when it went to France.

Mr. Taft has experienced a curious rehabilita-
tion in the last few years, but in 1917 there was
still keen remembrance of the fact that he had
been denied re-election in 1912 because of his
proved inefficiency as an Executive. The Dol-
liver characterization of him as a "large body
surrounded by men who knew exactly what
|^they wanted" had by no means been forgotten.
The President liked Mr. Taft, admired and
trusted him, and meant to use him, as he did
later, but not in any capacity where dynamic
energy and quick decisions were necessities.

As for Charles E. Hughes, the campaign of
1916 was fresh in the minds of the people, and
the revulsion of feeling against him, particularly
in his own party, made it almost a certainty
that his selection for a high executive post would
have aroused resentment rather than enthusiasm.
This general attitude extended also to Mr.
William R. Willcox, chairman of the Republican
National Committee.

r Campaign necessities, exercising their usual
pressure, have somewhat blurred the sharp lines
of Republican division, but in 1917 Senator
Lodge was a rather unimportant figure, only

"STRONG MEN"

lifted above mediocrity by the conviction of the
Progressives that he was one of the operators of
the "steam-roller" that had crushed them in
Chicago in 1912. His selection at that time
would have been resented not only by a large
Senate group, headed by men like Kenyon, ^
Norris, and Borah, but by the rank and file of "|
Western Republicanism.

All of these various objections were freely
admitted by every person of intelligence at the
time, and the one man able to elicit any una-
nimity of approval was Elihu Root. As in the
case of Mr. Taft and Senator Lodge, however,
Mr. Root stood in the public mind as the very
high priest of stand-pattism. He was not only
an offense to all Democrats and Republicans of
progressive thought, but no man in our public
life is so absolutely distrusted by the workers of
the nation. The President recognized his values*"^
as he recognized the values of Mr. Taft, but he
knew in his heart, as every other sane man knew,
that any elevation of Mr. Root to a high place
in the war machine meant the chilling of liberal
sentiment and the planting of an ugly doubt in 1
the minds of labor.

Curiously enough, the President himself de- I
sired certain Cabinet changes, and was preparing
to make them when war forced a surrender of
the plan. Mr. Lansing, elevated to be Secretary
of State at the time of Mr. Bryan's sudden
resignation, was never anything but a disap-
pointment. His ideas were annual, and, what
was even worse, he approached every question
from the standpoint of a hidebound conser-
6 67

vatism. His slow mind, unwilling and unable
to cope with the midstream of life, clung like a
limpet to the rocks of the backwater. The
President might have endured dullness, but Mr.
Lansing's utter inability to think in terms of the
twentieth century made his elimination desir-
able. It is also probable that a change would
have been made in the office of Attorney-General,
for while the President had high regard for Mr.
Gregory's honesty and ability, he felt him to be
a legalistic type of mind lacking alike in dynamic
I values and progressivist tendencies.
••«* The other Cabinet members ranked high
' above the average. Mr. McAdoo's conduct of
the Treasury had even won the grudging admira-
tion of the country's great financiers, Secretary
of the Interior Lane was universally popular,
Secretary of Labor Wilson and Secretary of
Agriculture Houston enjoyed general confidence,
and the Postmaster-General had not yet for-
feited popularity by his advocacy of the Postal
Zone law or his enforcement of trie Espionage
Act. The President knew the attack on Secre-
tary Daniels to be malignant and unjust, and he
had complete faith in Secretary Baker's ability
to operate the War Department along lines of
democracy as well as efficiency. Conditions,
however, forced him to stand firm on the Cabinet
as a whole. Even had he been inclined to run
the grave risk of intrusting departments of
government to new men, untried men, it was
still the case that our public life contained no
figures sufficiently commanding to win unani-
mous selection. Any attempt to change would

"STRONG MEN"

have precipitated instant and bitter disputes
between parties, factions, creeds, and classes,
and at a time when unity and purpose were
imperative needs the country would have been
distracted by the pull and haul of contending
candidacies. Not only was the President wise
in avoiding this danger, but he was still more
prudent in guarding against the lost time and
waste effort that would have inevitably resulted
from the displacement of men who, whatever
their failings, were still in possession of four
years of practice and experience in the conduct
of the executive departments of government.
As a consequence, Lansing and Gregory became i
fixtures along with the rest.

History, however, will record that while the )
; President shrank from the obvious dangers of a
i coalition Cabinet, he went beyond any other
I in the formation of a coalition administration.
It was more than ill-advised, when Chair-
man Hays, Senator New, and Senator Wat- *•
son wrote this daring manifesto into the
Indiana Republican platform of 1918: "This
is the war of no political party. This is
the country's war, and we charge and de-
plore that the party in powe~ is guilty of
practising petty partizan politics to the
serious detriment of the country's cause. We
insist that this cease, and we appeal to all
patriots, whatever their politics, to aid us in
every way possible in our efforts to require
that partizan politics be taken out and kept out
of the war management."

The search for "the best man for the place"
69

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

was instituted without regard to party, faction,
blood strain, or creed, and the result was a
composite organization in which Democrats,
Republicans, and Independents worked side by
side, partizanship forgotten and service the one
consideration.

It stood recognized as a matter of course that
the soldier selected to command our forces in
France might well develop into a presidential
possibility, yet this high place was given with-
out question to Gen. John J. Pershing, a life-
long Republican and the son-in-law of Senator
Warren, one of the masters of the Republican
machine.

Admiral William S. Sims, a vociferous Re-
publican, was sent to English waters in high
command, and while Secretary Daniels was
warned at the time that Sims's partizanship was
of the kind that would not recognize the obliga-
tions of loyalty or patriotism, he waved the
objection aside out of his belief that Sims was
"the best man for the job."

For the head of the Aircraft Board, with its
task of launching America's great aviation pro-
gram, Mr. Howard E. Coffin, a Republican, was
selected, and at his right hand Mr. Coffin placed
Col. Edward A. Deeds, also a Republican of vigor
and regularity. It is to be remembered also
that when failure and corruption were charged
against the Aircraft Board, the man appointed
by the President to conduct the highly im-
portant investigation was Charles E. Hughes.

Three Assistant Secretaries of War were ap-
pointed by Mr. Baker — Mr. Benedict Crowell, a j

"STRONG MEN"

Cleveland contractor; Dr. F. E. Keppel, dean of
Columbia University, and Emmet J. Scott,
formerly Booker Washington's secretary — and
all three were Republicans. Mr. E. R. Stet-
tinius of the J. P. Morgan firm and a Republican
was made special assistant to the Secretary of
War and placed in charge of supplies, a duty
that he had been discharging for the Allies.
Maj.-Gen. George W. Goethals, after his un-
fortunate experience in ship-building, was given
a second chance and put in the War Department
as an assistant Chief of Staff. The Chief of
Staff himself, Gen. Peyton C. March, was a
Republican no less definite and regular than
General Goethals. Mr. Samuel McRoberts,
president of the National City Bank and one of
the pillars of the Republican party, was brought
to Washington as ch'ief of the procurement sec-
tion in the Ordnance Section, with the rank of
brigadier-general; Maj.-Gen. E. H. Crowder was
appointed Provost-Marshal-General, although
his Republicanism was well known, and no ob-
jection of any kind was made when General
Crowder put Charles B. Warren, the Republican
National Committeeman from Michigan, in
charge of appeal cases, a position of rare
power.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation was virtu-

/ ally turned over to Republicans under Charles
M. Schwab and Charles Piez. Mr. Vance Mc-
Cormick, chairman of the Democratic National

/ Committee, was made chairman of the War
Trade Board, but of the eight members the
following five were Republicans: Albert Strauss

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

of New York, Alonzo E. Taylor of Pennsylvania,
John Beaver White of New York, Frank C.
Munson of New York, and Clarence M. Woolley
of Chicago.

The same conditions obtained in the Red ,
Cross. A very eminent Republican, Mr. H. P.
Davison, was put in supreme authority, and on
the Red Cross War Council were placed ex-
President Taft; Mr. Charles D. Norton, Mr.
Taft's secretary while President; and Mr. Cor-
nelius N. Bliss, former treasurer of the Repub-
lican National Committee. Not only was Mr.
Taft thus honored, but upon the creation of a \
National War Labor Board the ex-President was
made its chairman and virtually empowered to /
act as the administration's representative in its [
contact with industry.

Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip,*a Republican of iron
regularity, was placed in charge of the War
Savings Stamps Campaign, and when Mr. Mc-
Adoo had occasion to name Assistant Secretaries
of the Treasury he selected Prof. L. S. Rowe of
the University of Pennsylvania and Mr. H. C.
Leffingwell of New York.

Harry A. Garfield, son of the Republican
President, was made Fuel Administrator, and Mr.
Herbert Hoover, now a candidate for President (
on a platform of unadulterated Republicanism,
was nominated as head of the Food Administra-
tion.

The Council of National Defense was an
organization of high importance and one of
tremendous influence from a partizan standpoint,
yet its executive body was divided as follows:

"STRONG MEN'*

Republicans — Howard E. Coffin, Julius Rosen-
wald, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Dr. Franklin Martin,
Walter S. Gifford, Director; Democrats — Daniel
Willard and Bernard M. Baruch; Independent —
Samuel Gompers. >

So much for a sorry subject that should never
have had to be mentioned. When judged in
accordance with the facts and the evidence,
the war record of the administration is remark-
ably free from the shame and stain of partizan-
ship. Always more concerned with party ac- (
complishment than party organization, war \
worked an even more complete forgetfulness
of party lines in President Wilson, and his spirit
communicated itself to the entire war machinery.
It was a tremendous thing that all were called
to do, and in the doing ofjthe_thing there was
thought of nothing ; save America. Men and
women of every party, race, creed, and cir- \
cumstance worked side by side in Washington
as in the trenches, fraternity in their hearts,
the glory of sacrifice in their souls, and service
the one rivalry. I came into direct contact
with every detail of the vast organization, and
my reports from the country were daily and
authoritative, and I can say truthfully that
throughout the year and a half of war partizan-
ship existed as the sole and undivided possession
of a small congressional group.

This group, however, made up in virulence
what it lacked in numbers. Every one con-
nected with the drive of America's great war
machine knew that there were two enemies to
be fought — the Germans in front, and Penrose,

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

vSmoot, New, Watson, Moses, and Longworth
from behind. From first to last these wretched
souls thought only in terms of officehblding and
office-seeking, the sordid habits of their lives
blinding them to America's terrible necessities.
They tore at public confidence with their daily
lies, hampered executive activities by their mean
obstructions, and broke many a spirit by their
unscrupulous persecutions. At a time when
every dollar was needed by the nation they com-
menced the collection of the great campaign fund
that was to restore the idyllic days of Hanna, and
in an hour when the war hung in the balance
they were sending Hays, their party chairman,
on a coast-to-coast tour for the mobilization of
the "machine." The decadence of American
public life is not a matter of any argument as
long as such men hold positions of prominence
and power.

"THE ROOSEVELT DIVISIONS

HPHE average American has no higher faith
A than fair play, and not supreme statesman-
ship nor administrative genius is permitted to
compensate for lack of generosity in the treat-
ment of a defeated rival. At the bottom of
much of the feeling against Woodrow Wilson —
a feeling that transfers itself unconsciously to his
advocacies — is a general belief that the Presi-
dent was entirely responsible for the refusal of
Mr. Roosevelt's offer to enlist a volunteer force
for service in France, and that his reasons were
personal rather than public. He is judged as
having failed in magnanimity and the resulting
prejudice has had a wide sweep. -^v

As a matter of fact, Mr. Roosevelt's offer was •
never brought to the official notice of the Presi-
dent until Mr. Roosevelt called in person, and
Mr. Roosevelt did not present his request to
the President until after it had been rejected
by the Secretary of War on the recommenda-
tions of the General Staff. Instead of being
moved by any personal ill will, the whole inclina-
tion of the President was to overrule the General
Staff in Mr. Roosevelt's favor, and even when
he realized that the iron necessities of war forbade

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

such a course he confessed a deep and sincere

I regret.

^~ It was on February 2, 1917, two months before
America entered the conflict, that Mr. Roosevelt
first wrote to the Secretary of War, requesting
permission to raise a division of infantry and a
divisional brigade of cavalry. Mr. Baker, reply-
ing under date of February 9th, and again on
March 2Oth, pointed out that the enlistment
of such divisions was expressly prohibited by
Congress unless directly sanctioned, and stated
also that "a plan for a very much larger army
than the force suggested by your telegram has
been proposed for the action of Congress when-
ever required. Militia officers of high rank will
naturally be incorporated with their commands,
but the general officers for all our forces are to
be drawn from the regular army." Mr. Roose-
velt, answering on March 23d, made the point
that he was "a retired commander-in-chief of
the United States army," and referred to General
Young, General Sumner, and Leonard Wood
for opinion as to his "fitness for the command of
troops."

i The plan referred to by the Secretary of War
was based upon the principle of compulsory
military service and every force of the adminis-
tration was committed to it. The President,
Mr. Baker, and the entire Cabinet, no less than
the General Staff, were as iron in the resolve
that the criminal wastes and inefficiencies of the
volunteer system should not be permitted to
discount America's determination. On April
yth, the day after the war declaration, Mr. Baker

"THE ROOSEVELT DIVISIONS"

informed the House Committee on Military
Affairs that the Selective Service law was abso-
lutely essential, and the President followed with
the statement that "the safety of the nation
depended upon the measure." The answer of
Congress was a stubborn demand that the
volunteer system be given a fair test before any
adoption of conscription.

Mr. Roosevelt came to Washington on April
nth to urge the acceptance of his volunteer
divisions, and telephoned the President for an
appointment that was instantly made. The two
men, strangely enough, had never met before,
and during the forty-five minutes of the inter-
view official Washington held its breath. At
the end of that time Mr. Roosevelt emerged in
high good humor, informed the waiting corre-
spondents that the President had received him
with "the utmost courtesy and consideration"
and would doubtless "come to a decision in his
own good time." Mr. Wilson himself said
nothing, and that was, and is, the trouble.

As a matter of fact, it is to his utter failure ,
to appreciate the compulsions of curiosity that
the President disappoints most deeply. He
himself is entirely lacking in the intense interest
in personal things that dominates the life of
the average man and woman. He never gossips,
and while his conversation is always brilliant
and amazingly stimulating, it has none of the
salt of the " he-said-and-I-said " chit-chat that
constitutes 90 per cent, of human talk. Much
of this is due to the forward-looking habit of
his mind, its preoccupation with things to be

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

done, rather than things that have been done,
but part of it is a very definite preference for
ideas above personalities. Happening to call
at the White House the very next day, it was
natural to expect that some mention would be
made of the famous interview, but not a word
was volunteered by the President. When I
finally took the liberty of asking about it, how-
ever, he talked freely and interestedly, giving a
very vivid picture of the meeting. My keenest
impression at the time was the President's
appreciation of Mr. Roosevelt's intense virility,
picturesque personality, and love of fighting.

One of the first remarks made by Mr. Roose-
velt was to the effect that if 'he were given per-
mission to go to France "he'd promise not to
come back." Although put forward jocularly,
the President refused to let even a hint of past
disagreements creep into the talk, and the two
approached each other finally in a spirit of abso-
lute frankness. Mr. Roosevelt made a strong,
convincing case for his plan to enlist four volun-
teer divisions, pointing out the speed with
which they could be raised, the enthusiasm that
would be aroused, and the necessity for convinc-
ing the Allies that America was in the war with
men as well as money.

[ The President, in answer, explained the pro-
/ visions of the Selective Service law, and cited
Mr. Roosevelt's own bitter attacks upon the
criminality of the volunteer system. He dwelt
on the obvious fact that the opposition of Con-
gress undoubtedly reflected the sentiment of the
country in large degree, and was of the opinion

"THE ROOSEVELT DIVISIONS"

that it would be no easy matter to wean the
people away from their most cherished tradition.
Any sign of compromise would be the signal for
defeat, and to make one exception, even for an
ex-President, was to open the gates to every
politician with an ounce of military knowledge.
His desk, he said, was piled high with requests
from war veterans, Indian-fighters, Texan
Rangers, and Southern "colonels," none of them,
as a matter of course, able to compare with Mr.
Roosevelt in position or popularity, yet each
one a volcano of courage and sincerity. He had
the conviction that the attitude of Congress
was largely due to their desire to accommodate
this spirit, but it was an accommodation that
could not end in anything but disaster. The
war in France was no "Charge of the Light
Brigade," but the grim subordination of human
valor to the cold-blooded science of killing.
Moreover, it was a "boys* war." Tragic, to be
sure, but middle age must realize that the strain
and fatigue of the trenches were for the 'twenties.
Mr. Roosevelt was willing to admit that his
volunteer divisions might not prove a material
contribution to the struggle, but he stood firm
on the proposition that their "moral effect"
would be of incalculable value. James Bryce
and General Joffre alike had advised him of the
necessity of stimulating the Allied morale, and
he challenged Mr. Wilson to point out a quicker,
surer way than the spectacle of an ex-President
of the United States entering France at the head
of a division of men of proved reputation for
courage and achievement.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

The President agreed to this, but held firmly
that the situation demanded more than a gesture.
As he saw it, Europe inclined to the belief that
America was a country of large flourishes, and
nothing would confirm this feeling more surely
than the dramatic arrival of a body whose general
unreadiness must soon become apparent. He
demurred also to the imposing list of officers
that Mr. Roosevelt requested, urging that it
deprived the new draft army of the very men
that it would most need. His principal and
unalterable objection, however, was based upon
the fact that any exception for the benefit of
Mr. Roosevelt would imperil the adoption and
operation of the Selective Service bill upon
which the administration depended. He urged
Mr. Roosevelt to put his powerful influence be-
hind the draft bill, and asked him as a personal
favor to see certain members of Congress for
purposes of conversation.

Against the decision Mr. Roosevelt hurled all
the weight of his personality, and while the
President made no promises, he was persuaded
to the point of agreeing to make the matter the
subject of discussion with the Secretary of War
and the General Staff. At every point he tried
to give Mr. Roosevelt the sense of deep sym-
pathy with his wish, his full understanding of a
very natural ambition. At the moment, I saw
for myself how all that was ardent in the Presi-
dent, the adventurousness that made him want to
be a sailor in his youth, went out to Mr. Roosevelt
and his dream of leading the first Americans across
the water to fight in the land of Lafayette and

"THE ROOSEVELT DIVISIONS"

Rochambeau. What a crown to a picturesque,
colorful, and ever strenuous career! What finer
death, if death should come! Every impulse of
the President supported Mr. Roosevelt's re-
quest, and it was the one time when his emotional
processes interfered in any degree with cool,
intellectual analysis of the values of a proposi-
tion. Not then only, but a score of times*"]
thereafter I saw him show an almost passionate
envy for the men lucky enough to spend their
strength of body and strength of patriotism in
the supreme exaltation of the battle-field, and
it was this feeling of his own that gave him i
appreciation of Theodore Roosevelt's desire.

After some discussion of the probability of
domestic disaffection and the general situation
on the western front, the two parted in genuine-
ness, and Mr. Roosevelt set to work at once
on the conversion of Congressmen to the draft
plan. He failed, however, for an informal poll
of the House Committee on Military Affairs,
taken April i6th, showed that the volunteer
system still possessed a majority. It was then
that the President sent for the House leaders
and informed them flatly that the administra-
tion would not "yield an inch of any essential
part of the program for raising an army by
conscription." He recited our own experience
in the war with Spain, and presented facts that
proved the volunteer plan to be directly respon-
sible for England's early disasters. As a con-
sequence, the House passed the Selective Service
bill on April 29th, although only after a debate
of intense bitterness.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

In the mean time Mr. Roosevelt had in no
wise abated his demand for permission to raise the
volunteer divisions, nor had the Secretary of
War and the General Staff changed their minds
in any degree. During Mr. Roosevelt's stay
in Washington Mr. Baker called upon him
personally, and, as a result of the interview,
wrote him a letter on April 1 3th that contained
this definite refusal:

Co-operation between the United States and the Entente
Allies has not yet been so far planned as that any decision
has been reached upon the subject of sending an expedi-
tionary force; but should any force be sent, I should feel
obliged to urge that it be placed under the command of the
ablest and most experienced professional military man in
our country, and that it be officered by and composed of
men selected because of their previous military training,
and, as far as possible, actual military experience. My
judgment reached this conclusion for the reason that any
such expedition will be made up of young Americans who
will be sent to expose their lives in the bloodiest war yet
fought in the world, and under conditions of warfare in-
volving applications of science to the art, of such a char-
acter that the very highest degree of skill and training
and the largest experience are needed for their guidance
and protection. I could not reconcile my mind to a recom-
mendation which deprived our soldiers of the most experi-
enced leadership available, in deference to any mere senti-
mental consideration, nor could I consent to any expedition
being sent until its members have been seasoned by most
thorough training for the hardships which they would have
to endure. I believe, too, that should any expeditionary
force be sent by the United States, it should appear from
the very aspect of it that military considerations alone
had determined its composition, and I think this appear-
ance would be given rather by the selection of the officers
from the men of the army who have devoted their lives
exclusively to the study and pursuit of military matters

"THE ROOSEVELT DIVISIONS"

and have made a professional study of the recent changes
in the art of war. I should, therefore, be obliged to with-
hold my approval from an expedition of the sort you
propose.

The entire correspondence, beginning Febru-
ary 2d and ending May nth, was printed by
Mr. Roosevelt in the Metropolitan Magazine
for August, 1917, and is available for reference
and study. While the Secretary of War assumed
full responsibility for the refusal, Mr. Roosevelt
knew well that the decision was the decision of
the General Staff, and his letter of April 22d
was a direct attack upon "well-meaning military
men of the red-tape and pipe-clay school, who
are hidebound in the pedantry of that kind of
wooden militarism which is only one degree
worse than its extreme opposite, the folly which
believes that an army can be improvised between
sunrise and sunset." With acid in every word
he commented upon the fact that the large
number of men who rise high in the army
"owe more to the possession of a sound stomach
than to the possession of the highest qualities
of head and heart," and flatly urged the Secre-
tary to regard his military advisers as unwise
counselors.

Mr. Roosevelt's point of view was that of the
civilian, and it is impossible for the civilian
not to feel sympathy with it. About the de-
cisions of every General Staff there is a certain
effect of class arrogance, a sort of contemptuous
disregard for everything except their own opin-
ions, that inevitably arouses the anger of the
layman. At the same time there must be
7 83

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

understanding of Mr. Baker's position. The
members of the General Staff were, by our law,
his duly constituted advisers in all military
matters, and to overrule them in a fundamental
policy at the very outset was to invite bitter-
ness and disorganization. Because of this con-
dition, and by reason of his own intense advocacy
of compulsory service, he stood firm in his
refusal of Mr. Roosevelt's petition.

Returning to Congress, the favorable vote of
the House on April 29th transferred the battle
to the Senate. All hope of swift action was
killed almost instantly by the adoption of an
amendment that gave Mr. Roosevelt the right
to raise four volunteer divisions. The Republi-
can leaders — Lodge, Harding, Penrose, Curtis,
and Weeks — led the fight, and the debate was
marked by a tone of ugly and disturbing parti-
zanship. The House refused to concur in the
amendment, a deadlock resulted, and for two
weeks this single question paralyzed the war
effort of an embattled nation. On May I5th,
however, a compromise was reached, the Senate
agreeing to withdraw the mandatory feature
of the amendment, making it optional with the
President to accept or request the four volunteer
divisions offered by Mr. Roosevelt.

By reason of the transfer of the dilemma
from the Congress to the White House, the
President was confronted with this situation:
to refuse Mr. Roosevelt was to give an impression
of ungenerousness, an effect of partizan narrow-
ness; on the other hand, to authorize the volun-
teer enlistment of four divisions was to upset

the whole machinery of the draft, to make a
flagrant exception that would inevitably anger
and alienate the supporters of the volunteer
system, and, worst of all, to serve notice upon
the General Staff that its recommendations
were at all times subject to personal and political
considerations. His statement of May 5th
did not attempt to evade the issue, but met it
decisively. After setting June 5th as registra-
tion-day, and announcing the choice of Gen.
John J. Pershing to head an Expeditionary
Force that would sail for France at the earliest
possible date, the President took position in
support of the General Staff and the unfaltering
execution of the Selective Service law. It
would have been his pleasure, he said —

to pay Mr. Roosevelt the compliment and the Allies
the compliment of sending to their aid one of our most
distinguished public men, an ex-President who has ren-
dered many conspicuous public services and proved his
gallantry in many striking ways. But this is not the time
or the occasion for compliment or for any action not calcu-
lated to contribute to the immediate success of the war.
The business now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of
scientific definiteness and precision. I shall act with
regard to it at every step and in every particular under
expert advice from both sides of the water. That advice
is that the men most needed are men of the ages con-
templated in the draft provision of the present bill, not
men of the age and sort contemplated in the section which
authorizes the formation of volunteer units, and that for
the preliminary training of the men who are to be drafted
we shall need all of our experienced officers. Mr. Roose-
velt told me, when I had the pleasure of seeing him a few
weeks ago, that he would wish to have associated with
him some of the most effective officers of the regular army.
He named many of these whom he would desire to hare

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

designated for the service, and they were men who can-
not possibly be spared from the too small force of officers
at our command for the much more pressing and necessary
duty of training regular troops to be put into the field
in France and Belgium as fast as they can be got ready.
The first troops to France will be taken from the present
forces of the regular army, and will be under the command
of trained soldiers only. The responsibility for the suc-
cessful conduct of our part in this great war rests upon me.
I could not escape it if I would. I am too much interested
in the cause we are fighting for to be interested in anything
but success. The issues involved are too immense for me
to take into consideration anything whatever except the
best, the most effective, and most immediate means of
military action.

THE CASE OF LEONARD WOOD

EMOTIONAL excitement causes a certain
suspension of the mental processes, and
when national feeling is at high pitch the im-
portant and unimportant almost invariably
suffer curious inversion. America sent more
than two million soldiers across the Atlantic to
engage in a struggle that meant the life or
death of free institutions, yet throughout that
trying time, when the issue hung in the bal-
ance, there were papers and people whose in-
terest had no larger manifestation than the
fortunes of Gen. Leonard Wood. At. this very
time of writing the man himself is a conspicu-
ous figure in public life by reason of the fact
that he was kept at home in a training-camp
instead of being permitted to match his military
genius against the abilities of Hindenburg and
Ludendorff.

General Wood was not sent to France for the
very good reason that Gen. John J. Pershing,
commander of the American Expeditionary
Forces, did not ask to have him sent, plain in-
dication that he was neither needed nor wanted
in France. The decision was not the decision of
the President nor the Secretary of War nor the

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Chief of Staff, but the weighed judgment of
General Pershing, the soldier selected for the
high post of field command, and given full
power even as he was held to full responsibility.
All of the generals in charge of American training-
camps were sent to France in the summer of
1917, not only that they might see for them-
selves the goal to which they were pointed, the
style of fighting, and the kind of soldiers that
would have to be made, but equally for the pur-
pose of permitting General Pershing to pass upon
their personalities, character, and abilities. The
generals returned from their pilgrimage, applied
themselves to the work of turning raw boys into fit
defenders, and in due time Pershing sent to the
Chief of Staff a list of the commanders that he
desired to accompany their divisions to France
when the stage of embarkation should be reached.
The name of Gen. Leonard Wood was not on the
list.

As chairman of the Committee on Public In-
formation, with duty to stimulate and guard the
national morale, I made it my business to inquire
into the facts in the case. At the time of General
Pershing's departure for France I knew, as did
every one else in government, that it had been
made plain to him that he would not be hampered
by home meddling. Even as he was held to full
responsibility, so was he given full power in the
selection of those men upon whom he would
have to depend. His list, therefore, was ap-
proved as a matter of course, and went into the
War Department files until further action should
be demanded. As I remember it, the whole

THE CASE OF LEONARD WOOD

trouble arose from the fact that General March
treated the circumstance as one of military
routine entirely, utterly failing to realize its
political importance. Instead of informing Gen-
eral Wood at once that he had not been chosen
to go to France, he followed the established
procedure and waited for the completion of the
training period before issuing orders to the
division commanders. General Wood, however,
left Camp Funston in advance of the division
and without waiting to receive his orders.
General March sent them to him in New York,
and in consequence there was an appearance
of eleventh-hour action, an effect of jerking
General Wood from the very deck of the trans-
port.

As a matter of course, General Wood carried
his complaint to the President and was told
plainly that the list would not be revised in the
personal interest of any soldier or politician.
When the President took office in 1913 the one
army man that he knew was Gen. Hugh L.
Scott. " Wood was then Chief of Staff, and,
owing to many and bitter complaints against
him, the President sent for Scott and asked for
information and advice with respect to the re-
tention of Wood. General Scott, a generous
and kindly man, urged the President to take no
action, and Wood was permitted to remain in the
office until his term expired in 1914. Throughout
that period the atmosphere of the War Depart-
ment was one of spite and jealousy and intrigue.
When Wood took command of the Department
of the East in 1914, there was no change in

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

strategy or tactics. At all times the President
was explicit with regard to Wood. His sense
of justice had been outraged by the political
elevation of a doctor over the heads of sol-
diers who had given laborious years to the
study and practice of their profession, and his
sense of taste was offended by the spectacle of
a soldier in uniform plying the trade of a poli-
tician. He felt that this allowance of special
privilege, this grant of immunity to insult and
insubordination, struck a blow at the discipline
of the army.

As for Mr. Baker's views, no one knew at the
time nor does any one know to-day. At the
outbreak of war there was plain evidence that
the Secretary of War had decided upon a policy
of impersonality, a sort of judicial detachment
that would lift him above the human wrangle,
permitting him to make his decisions unin-
fluenced either by likes or dislikes. This policy
worked out in his case as it works out in every
case. He went to absurdities of fairness - in
dealing with his enemies, in order to avoid the
charge of prejudice, and swung back to an ex-
treme of unfairness where his friends were
concerned in order to guard against the sus-
picion of being swayed by his preferences. As
a consequence Leonard Wood looked after his
personal interests during the war, even as he
has been allowed to make a presidential cam-
paign in the uniform of a major-general of the
army of the United States. Mr. Baker's silence,
to be sure, lends itself to a finer, nobler view,
and I have always thought that it was the

THE CASE OF LEONARD WOOD

right one. Had he spoken, telling of General
Pershing's list and the fact that Wood's name
did not appear upon it, he would have escaped
attack, but America might have suffered. It
mattered little that the Secretary of War should
be attacked and abused, but it was an entirely
different matter for the commander-in-chief of
the American forces in France, face to face with
crisis, to be dragged into a domestic political
wrangle.

All of which would not be deserving of at-
tention but for certain curious exaggerations
in the public mind that have given both the
man and the incident an importance out
of all proportion to value. It is by his un-
canny ability to create these exaggerations
that Wood rose above the average to which
he seemed doomed by his mediocrities, and
is to-day a national figure. The American
habit of dissociating public and private busi-
ness, treating political affairs as an emotional
relaxation rather than an importance, has
resulted in many incredibilities, some tragic,
some humorous, but it is doubtful if in
all history there is record of anything so
utterly incredible as the story of Leonard
Wood.

The reputation of Wood is built upon as-
sumption rather than fact, on clever suggestion
rather than provable statement. His military
genius is made a matter of general belief by
reason of constant allusion to Indian campaigns
in which he played heroic part, assuming com-
mand of an infantry battalion after it had "lost

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

its last officer," and conducting himself in such
manner as to win a medal of honor; also upon
his achievements in the war with Spain, when
he led the Rough Riders to victory at San Juan
Hill. His administrative genius rests upon his
record in Cuba from 1899 to 1902, where, ac-
cording to one of his biographers, he built so*
permanently that he left behind him "an inde-
pendent proud democracy" strong to withstand
the storms of revolution. This record, when
taken to pieces, is seen to be an absurd jumble
of baseless claims.

According to the War Department records,
Wood entered the military service as a "contract
surgeon," a civilian employee entirely without
military status. During June and July, 1886,
he was assigned to duty under Capt. H. W.
Lawton of the 4th Cavalry, at that time in the
field in pursuit of Geronimo. In addition to the
cavalry, Captain Lawton had under him a small
detachment of infantry, about eighteen or twenty
in number, that had been sent to him without
any officers.

On July 2d, when the need arose to have
this small body captained by some one,
Doctor Wood asked for the command and
was given it, and for twenty-eight days was
by way of being an officer. It was in this
period that the historic encounter took place
that gives Doctor Wood his claim to a niche
in the Hall of Fame. The following extract
from the official report of Captain Lawton sets
forth the facts as they were seen by that
officer at the time:

THE CASE OF LEONARD WOOD

EN ROUTE TO FORT MARION, FLA.,

September p, 1886.

SIR, — I have the honor to submit the following report
of operations against Geronimo's and Natchez's bands of
hostile Indians made by the command organized in com-
pliance with the following order:

On the 6th of July the command, consisting of infantry
and scouts, marched from Oposura. No officer of infantry
having been sent with the detachment, and having no
officers with the command except Second-Lieutenant
Brown, 4th Cavalry, commanding scouts, and Second-
Lieutenant Walsh, 4th Cavalry, commanding cavalry,
Assistant-Surgeon Wood was, at his own request, given
command of the infantry.

The work during June having been done by the cavalry,
they were too much exhausted to be used again without
rest, and they were left in camp at Oposura to recuperate.

On the 1 4th of July a runner was sent back by Lieutenant
Brown of the scouts, with the information that the camp
had been located and that he would attack at once with
his scouts, asking for the infantry to be sent forward to
his support. I moved forward with the infantry as rapidly
as possible, and did not reach Lieutenant Brown until
after he had entered the hostile camp. The attacking
party had been discovered and all the hostiles escaped.
Their animals and camp equipage, with a large amount of
dried beef, etc., fell into our hands, but the hostiles scat-
tered and escaped on foot.

• ••••••

H. W. LAWTON,
Captain 4th Cavalry.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA.

It will thus be seen that Captain Lawton,
writing at the time, did not look upon the
twenty infantrymen as a "battalion," but

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

merely as a detachment; that he stated clearly
that officers were not sent to him with the

. detachment, and that no attempt was made by
him to claim that Wood and the infantry were
present at the attack upon the Indian camp,
but, on the contrary, there is explicit admission
that they did not reach the place of encounter
until after its occupation by the scouts and
after the flight of every Indian.

s~ It was not until January 5, 1886, that Doctor
Wood ceased to be a civilian employee, on that
date receiving an appointment from Massachu-
setts as Assistant Surgeon in the United States
army. From this point on nothing is heard
of him until 1898, when he emerged into the
limelight as the personal physician of President
McKinley and the valued medical adviser of
Secretary of War Alger. In March, when it
was a certainty that we would go to war with
Spain, the country and the army were stunned
by the announcement that Doctor Wood had
been awarded the medal of honor "for distin-
guished conduct in campaign against the Apache
Indians in 1886 while serving as medical and
• line officer of Captain Lawton's expedition."

Russell A. Alger has much to answer for, what
with "embalmed beef," paper shoes, and fever
camps, and other peccadilloes, but it cannot be
held against him that he ever permitted the
obligations of public service to interfere with
proper rewards for true Republicanism. Not
only did his enthusiasm blaze back across the
long stretch of twelve years, but by its light
he was able to see the occurrence far more

THE CASE OF LEONARD WOOD

vividly than even Captain Lawton, on the
ground at the time. Instead of a "detachment"
of eighteen or twenty men, Secretary Alger saw
Doctor Wood's command as a "battalion";
not only had officers been sent with this detach-
ment, contrary to Captain Lawton's report,
but the noble souls had "died of exposure,"
permitting Doctor Wood to leap forward to fill
all of the vacant posts; the affair at the Indian
camp was no skirmish, but a "battle," and
Doctor Wood, instead of being miles away, was
in the very forefront of the attack.

Evidently the medal of honor also carried
with it the award of Seven League Boots, for
from this time on the strides of Doctor Wood
were many and mighty. On May 8, 1898,
scarce six weeks after receiving the magic medal,
he was made commanding colonel of the 1st
U. S. Volunteer Cavalry; on July 8th he was
made a brigadier-general for services at Las
Guasimas and San Juan Hill, and on December
7th he was made a major-general. ,.

There is not any large need for consideration )
of Wood's Cuban War record, for even his
biographers admit that it is confined to two
battles. There is public testimony to the effect
that he did not participate personally in the
battle of San Juan Hill, as it is a matter of mili-
tary record that he owed his rescue at Las
Guasimas to the courage of colored troops.
The point of importance, however, lies in these
undisputed facts: that the military record of
Leonard Wood rests upon the command of twenty
men for twenty-eight days during which but one

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

engagement was fought and in which he played
no part, and upon several months of service in
Cuba, where, even if the San Juan Hill claim
is allowed, he participated in but two battles.
On the strength of this record he was made a
major-general in the regular army of the United
States by Roosevelt in 1903, chief of staff by
President Taft in 1910, urged for commander-
in-chief of the American Expeditionary Force in
1917, and boomed for the Presidency in 1920
I on a Prussian platform.

^ The Wood reputation as a "great administra-
/ tor" rests upon foundations no less flimsy.
As a matter of course he made Cuba a better
place in which to live. Not only were conditions
at a point where improvement was the one
possible change, but he had with him the very
flower of America's sanitarians and municipal
experts.

House-cleaning, however, is not "administra-
tive genius." Street-sweeping, while important,
is scarcely the sole concern of a President of
the United States. The thing by which Wood's
governorship must be judged, in the light of his
aspirations, is the permanency of the structure
that he built. He went into Cuba when the
ground was clear and he had a free hand backed
by all the power of the United States. What
was the result? The structure that he raised
fell to pieces in exactly four years. In July,
1906, revolution rocked the island to a demorali-
zation as complete as any ever suffered before,
and in September of that year American troops
landed for a second intervention. For three

THE CASE OF LEONARD WOOD

years we kept our soldiers and administrators
in charge of Cuban affairs, and when they left
in 1909 they had builded so well that the re-
public endures to this day, a period of eleven
years as compared to the four years' life of the
former creation. And in this second interven- j
tion Leonard Wood had no part or lot.

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

A PROFOUND sense of unnecessariness is
** bound to check many post-war explanations,
even as it imparts a perfunctory quality to
those that are made, for, after all, the complete
answer to every charge of fault, failure, and mis-
conduct is given by the fact of victory as swift
as it was decisive. In the hour when the fate of
free nations hung uncertainly the organized
major force of America struck the blow that
crushed the mightiest military organization in
history. Not one pennyweight of credit is to
be taken away from the Allies, war-weary after
four terrible years, but at the time we entered
the struggle the Germans were in positions of
virtual dominance on every front — insolent, as-
sured, powerful. Twenty months from Amer-
ica's declaration of war their arrogance was
bowed, their leaders in flight, their ultimatums
changed to pleas.

It was inevitable that politicians would seek
to ignore this fact of victory, but that a whole
people should shut their eyes to splendid achieve-
ment will undoubtedly excite the puzzled atten-
tion of the historians of the future. A more
amazing, incomprehensible change has never
been suffered by a race. The day of the armis-

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

tice America stood on the hilltops of glory,
proud in her strength, invincible in her ideals,
acclaimed and loved by a world free of an an-
cient fear at last: to-day we writhe in a pit of
our own digging, despising ourselves and de-^
spised by the betrayed peoples of earth. Instead
of unity a vast disintegration, instead of enthu-
siasm an intolerable irritation, instead of fixed
purpose a strange and bewildering indecision. I
A certain reaction was natural and is perfectly """
understandable. After a year and a half of
intense emotionalism, with every life keyed to
service and sacrifice, taut nerves were bound to
go slack. With people picking up old threads
and finding them sadly tangled, a high degree of
irritability was a foregone conclusion. The
natural has long since been left behind, however,
and it is the stage of obsession that has been
reached. Criticism has changed to vile abuse,
and the shining arch of victory goes unseen while
snooping hundreds crawl around the base, hope-
fully searching for cracks and flaws. Heroes
pushed aside by camp-followers, men most
applauded whose partizanship drips like acid on
the war record of America, and statesmanship
discarded for the pull and haul of parochial
politicians. The common decencies of patriotism
call a halt before the wells of public opinion are
poisoned beyond all cleansing!

It is our pride as a people that we must re-
cover— a pride that springs from no effervescence
of conceit, but a pride bed-rocked in supreme
accomplishment. It was not alone that we did
the thing we set out to do, but in the doing we
8 99

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

established records of energy, initiative, and
determination that have no parallel in history.
The Allies had only faint hope of aid from our
man-power, while the Germans themselves were
confident that they would have ample time to
win the war before America could possibly prove
a factor in the fighting. They stimulated their
morale, civil as well as military, by repeated
assurances that "the Yankees" could not raise
an army; that even if it were raised it could not
be trained properly; that even if raised and
trained it could not be transported.

Within a month from the declaration of war
the traditional policy of the nation was reversed
by the enactment of the Selective Service Act.
A vast machinery of registration was created that
ran without a hitch, and on June 5th more than
10,000,000 men were registered quickly and
efficiently.

Thirty-two encampments — virtual cities, since
each had to house 40,000 men — were built in
ninety days from the driving of the first nail,
complete in every municipal detail, a feat de-
clared impossible, and which will stand for allj
time as a building miracle.

In June, scarcely two months after the Presi-
dent's appearance before Congress, General
Pershing and his staff reached France, and on
July 3d the last of four groups of transports
landed American fighting-men in the home of
Lafayette and Rochambeau. On October loth
our soldiers went on the firing-line.

Training-camps for officers started in June,
and in August there were graduated 27,341

100

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

successful aspirants, ready to assume the tasks
of leadership.

What was the situation in France? Every
possible port pre-empted, every mile of railroad
used to its uttermost capacity, supplies sufficient
for French forces only, and an utter lack of
proper housing facilities for the Americans who
were to come. A tidewater port was the best
that we could get, great docks had to be built,
our own railroad lines had to be constructed;
there were storage depots to build, and 13,000
foresters, equipped with the latest American
inventions in lumbering machinery, had to go
into the woodlands of France and cut down the
trees for barracks, railroad ties, and construc-
tion timber. Not in any degree was it the case
that our problem was merely to get men to
France. Not only did we have to get them
there, but we also had to build our own debarka-
tion facilities, our own transportation, our own
housing, hospitals, ordnance bases, etc., and we
had to devise the stable mechanism that would
keep supplies of every kind flowing steadily
across 3,000 miles of water. And it was done!

Shipping was an abandoned craft. It had to
be revived, workmen trained and yards built;
yet such were our ingenuities that by November
I, 1918, the transport service of the army alone
numbered 431 ships, totaling over 3,000,000
deadweight tons.

In June 12,261 troops and 2,798 marines were
embarked. In December embarkations had
reached 50,000 a month. In March the number
had grown to 84,000. Then came what Europe

101

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

called "America's transport miracle." In April
the embarkations were 1 18,637; m May, 245,950;
in June, 278,756; in July, 306,185. At the time
of the armistice the total embarkations amounted
to 2,045,169 troops and 30,665 marines.

The first shipment of supplies was about
16,000 tons in June, 1917. By October we were
shipping 750,000 tons a month. Altogether we
shipped 5,153,000 tons of supplies to our soldiers
in France, 95 per cent, of it in American bottoms.

Ships had to be altered to carry the 1,145
locomotives that we sent; there were problems
in connection with the shipping of flat-cars
"ready to run"; there was also a cross-
channel fleet that had to be assembled, but
these things were all done, not slowly, but at
top speed.

With what result? Before our aid was deemed
a possibility we were relieving French and
English divisions in quiet sectors; in May, 1918,
a year after our declaration of war, we fought
side by side with veterans at Cantigny; in June
we met the Germans hand to hand in Belleau
Wood and proved ourselves their masters; in
July, with the Germans almost at the gates of
Paris, we disdained the general retreat and won
the battle of Chateau-Thierry, a victory that was
the turning-point of the war.

In September we wiped out the St.-Mihiel
salient, held by the Germans against every attack
for four long years; in October we dealt the
Prussians that succession of terrible hammer
blows — twenty-eight American divisions in the
firing-line — that drove them back up the Meuse

102

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

until we entered the outskirts of Sedan and
definitely cut the German supply line. That was
the war's end!

Is it in the face of these glories and tremendous
achievements that we are to whine and nag and
meanly quarrel?

Our achievements on the high seas were no
less notable than those on land. The navy of
the United States, held up to derision as a junk-
pile, proved an invincible first line of defense,
not only guarding the shores of America, but
able also to send fighting-craft of every kind to
English waters, South American waters, the
Mediterranean, and the North Sea. Our navy
guarded over two million men on the way to
Prance; our navy escorted tonnage to France
with a loss of only 0.009 Per cent, and tonnage
out of France with a loss of 0.013 Per cent.

Our destroyers proved themselves in the war
zone, our mine-layers dropped the submarine bar-
rages that made the North Sea safe, our officers,
with their courage, initiative, and inventive
genius, gave new force to the fight against the
U-boats.

The greatest single constructive agency of
naval warfare, which did more to break the
German naval morale than any other one thing,
was the mine-barrage across the North Sea, a
sweep of 230 miles. In April, 1917, within a few
days after the United States entered the war,
the Bureau of Ordnance proposed such a bar-
rage, the General Board of the Navy approved,
and we drove it through against the doubt and
opposition of the British Admiralty, who, not

103

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

having thought of it during three years of war,
insisted that the idea was without merit.

In the "Summary of Activities of United
States Naval Forces Operating in European
Waters," made up and issued from Admiral
Sims's headquarters in London, it was stated
that "a total of over 256 attacks by United
States vessels occurred. In 183 of these cases
there was definite chart evidence of a submarine
in the vicinity."

^ Disregarding the numerous reports of sighting
/submarines or periscopes which were classed as
doubtful or problematical, the records of the
Armed Guard Section contain reports of 227
encounters of armed American merchant-ships
with submarines, in 193 of which the attacks
were successfully combated. Thirty-four U-boats
were reported damaged by Armed Guard gun-
fire, of which there was evidence that several
were sunk. Of the 227 encounters, 44 were
surface engagements, some of them long-con-
t tinued gun-fire contests.

One of the most notable and successful naval
actions, after this country entered the war,
was the attack on the Austrian naval base at
Durazzo, October 2, 1918. In this operation a
flotilla of American submarine-chasers, under
command of Capt. Charles P. Nelson and
Lieut.-Com. E. H. Bastedo, took a prominent
part, leading the way and clearing the path of
mines, sinking one submarine, and damaging
and apparently destroying another U-boat;
screening larger ships from torpedo attack,
going to the aid of a British cruiser which was

104

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

torpedoed, and taking under escort an enemy
hospital-ship — all this under heavy fire during
bombardment from the Austrian forts. A num-
ber of engagements with enemy submarines by
United States naval vessels operating from Gib-
raltar were also reported. Another report
compiled and issued by Admiral Sims's head-
quarters in London stated that "between the
dates of their arrival in European waters and
signing of the armistice United States battle-
ships were attacked six times by enemy sub-
marines, and on one occasion the New York
collided with a submarine." y

It is in the face of this record, in the face
of his own admissions, that Admiral Sims an-
nounces: "Our navy was not in this war in
a fighting-sense. We were acting as motor-
lorries behind the army, except that we were
on the water. There was no fighting on the
sea."

A better witness is Mr. Herbert Hoover,
who in his testimony before the Senate stated
flatly that at the time of America's entrance
into the war the German submarine campaign
had brought the Allies to "the border-line of
starvation," and that it was our vigorous and
instant co-operation that crushed the U-boat
menace. — I

Aircraft achievements, so bitterly attacked
by partizan malice throughout the war, show
no less fine and inspiring when subjected to fair
analysis. An April 6, 1917, the United States
had 3 small aviation-fields, 55 training-'planes,
only 4 of which were in use, and an air personnel

105

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

of 65 officers and 1,120 men. By the time of the
armistice we had 34 aviation-fields, and our
aviation training-schools had graduated 8,602
men from elementary courses and 4,028 from
advanced courses. More than 5,000 pilots and
observers were sent overseas.

From July 24, 1917, when the appropriation
was made, up to the time of the armistice, there
were produced in the United States more than
8,000 training-'planes and more than 16,000
training-engines.

Of De Havilland 4*8, the observation and day
bombing-'planes, 3,227 were completed and 1,885
shipped overseas for work at the front.

Of Liberty engines, 13,574 were completed,
4,435 shipped to the American Expeditionary
Forces, and 1,025 delivered to the Allies.

By orders placed in France and Italy at the
outset of the war, for all of which we paid, and
for many of which we furnished the materials,
we received from these sources 3,800 service-
'planes, in which we put American fliers.

In nineteen months we were able to display a
machine built in America, of American materials,
built by American labor, and of American
design, of each of the types used on the battle-fronts
in Europe, and each of them as good as, if not
better than, any other made anywhere else
in the world.

In our nineteen months we did more than was
done by any other belligerent nation in its first
nineteen months. Our second year of war
equaled England's record in her third.

We gave to the world its greatest airplane
106

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

engine — the Liberty. We produced typical
American machines that were acknowledged j
to be the superior of Europe's best.

The Allies, after three years of war, had
developed only one machine-gun that could be
successfully synchronized to fire through a re-
volving airplane propeller. In twelve months
we produced two, both susceptible to quantity
production.

We invented new airplane cameras, electric-
heated clothing for aviators in high -altitude
work, also the oxygen mask, equipped with tele-
phone connections that enabled the flier to endure
any altitude without losing speaking-contact
with his fellows.

We developed the military parachute to a
degree of safety undreamed of by Europeans.
During the entire war there was not a casualty
due to parachute failure.

We developed in quantity the wireless airplane
telephone that placed the flier in easy and instant
communication with his ground station and his I
commander in the air.

At the time of the armistice the American air
force on the firing-line numbered forty-five
squadrons with an equipment of 740 'planes, and
these squadrons played great parts in the battles
of Chateau-Thierry, St.-Mihiel, and the Meuse-f
Argonne. We brought down 755 enemy 'planes
in open combat.

In plain words, at the time of the armistice,
after only nineteen months of effort, we had
training-'planes, De Havilland 4*5, and Liberty
engines in quantity production, and we were

107

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

ready with the Lepere, a two-place fighting-
machine built around a Liberty engine, and held
by the greatest experts in the world to be the
last word in clean-cut perfection.

The story of our aircraft is the story of the
whole war; for not only does it take in the tre-
mendous grapple with problems as new as huge
and imperative, but it also brings into promi-
nence those impatiences and intolerances that are
the manifestations of our youth as a nation.
When we want a thing we want it, and woe to
those who commit the unforgivable crime of
disappointment. Perhaps this has figured as an
asset in our fight for success, and yet there is
something very brutal about the quality, a
certain definite unfairness that borders on cold-
blooded cruelty. Our climb to greatness is
thick with the shattered reputations of men who
dreamed splendidly and wrought hugely, yet,
failing in the time or manner of delivery, were
cast aside, while others came forward to reap the
credit of vision, struggle, and achievement.

When we entered the war and turned to the
building of aircraft it was much as though the
Babylonians had been called upon suddenly to
construct automobiles. The secrecies of belliger-
ents had kept our automotive engineers from
keeping abreast with the myriad changes and
improvements; only one or two factories had
any equipment for the new industry, few
workers were familiar with the thousand and
one delicate operations of 'plane manufacture,
and the bulk of necessary material was all in the
raw. It was not known that forty-five trained

108

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

men were necessary to keep one 'plane in the
air, that each 'plane had to have an extra engine
as well as a multitude of spare parts, that flying-
fields constituted a problem all their own, and
that the constant play of extraordinary inventive
genius made junking a daily occupation.

None of these considerations had any weight
with the American people, however. We wanted
to become the world's greatest airplane power
overnight, and that was \ all there was to it!
The Joint Army and Navy Technical Board
caught the spirit and announced that they must
have 22,000 training and battle 'planes in twelve
months, which, counting extra engines and spare
parts, meant a total of 40,000 in one year.
Twining vine leaves in its own hair, the Senate
voted $640,000,000 for aircraft production, and
the spree was on.

Let it be remembered also that even the order
for what amounted to 40,000 'planes in one year
did not appease the editorial and fireside ex-
perts. Such as these demanded that America
must have 50,000 'planes in the air at one time,
and Admiral Peary never became reconciled to
any smaller figure. Many editors refused to
admit any difference between airplanes and
"flivvers," and grew querulous at the delay in
turning out hourly batches.

Even to this day I marvel at the courage of
the men who went up against that stone wall of
expectation, and even more do I admire the
superb enthusiasm, the invincible optimism, that
never failed to illumine the darkest hours.
Never a whine out of them, never a moment's

109

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

pause to search for alibis, but always the in-
sistence, "We can do it because it's just got to
be done."

Howard Coffin was the man with vision enough
to see down to the very heart of American
genius and energy; Deeds, Waldon, and Mont-
gomery put solid foundations under the vision;
Vincent and Hall conceived and built the Liberty
motor, and to their call came others who joined
to write a record of romantic achievement that
ought to be put into school readers for the
inspiration of children. First, there was the
problem of the spruce and the fir that go into
the wingbeams and other 'plane parts. In many
cases, stands of timber had to be surveyed and
railroads built to connect them with mills.
Special saws had to be designed, and experts
trained in the selection and judging of logs.
The usual processes of seasoning were too slow,
and new kiln processes had to be developed to
dry out the lumber more quickly, and yet in
such manner as to preserve its strength.

On top of everything labor troubles developed,
and the whole production of spruce and fir was
threatened with stoppage. Col. Bruce P. Disque
was materialized, and before he got through he
had organized 75,000 lumbermen into the Loyal
Legion of Loggers, every man pledged to give his
best to the government.

Castor-oil was recognized as the one satis-
factory lubricant for airplane motors. The
supply was not sufficient, and we secured from
Asia a quantity of castor beans large enough to
seed 100,000 acres.

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

When we entered the war it was supposed
that the only possible fabric for covering the
flying surfaces of a 'plane was linen. England, '
after promising to meet all our requirements
from Ireland's supply of flax, fell down on the
job. To meet the need, the Bureau of Standards
developed a fabric of long-fiber cotton that was
even superior to linen. Over 10,000,000 yards
were woven and delivered to the government,
which, put end to end, would have stretched
from California to France.

Then there was the difficulty of "dope," a
sort of varnish with which the cotton covering
had to be filled in order to stretch it tight and
give a smooth surface. We figured that our
dope had to be made from acetone and its kin-
dred products. But the world's supply of ace-
tone was insufficient to meet the demand, and
so it was that the government had to enter into \
a partnership for the establishment of ten large
factories for the production of acetone.

All the aeronautic experts of the world were
convinced that mahogany was the one suitable
wood for propellers. Our supply was scant, so
we conducted experiments with walnut, oak,
cherry, and ash, and by improved seasoning
processes gained results as splendid as with
mahogany.

Then there was the question of the engine.
The slightest observation showed that the
European engines were being scrapped with
alarming regularity, owing to constant better-
ments. It would have been folly indeed to
equip our factories for the production of machines

that we knew would be out of date by the time
we commenced to produce in quantity.

Colonel Deeds and his associates reached the
decision that the thing for America to do was to
produce an engine of her own that would be so
far ahead of all others as to be safe from any
danger of scrapping. Jesse G. Vincent and
E. J. Hall, each in his own way, had been working
on an engine, and the two were asked to give
up their individual experiments and pool their
inventive genius for the good of America. Mr.
Hall and Mr. Vincent, with Colonel Deeds and
Colonel Waldon beside them, set to work on
May 29, 1917. As fast as the detail drawings
were made they went at top speed to the twelve
factories among which the work was divided.
The greatest engineers in the country went over
the plans in detail, practical production men were
then called in, and even builders of the machine-
tools were called for counsel. As fast as the
various parts were turned out they were rushed
to the Packard Company for assembling.

On July 14, 1917, the first 8-cylinder Liberty
engine was delivered in Washington, and on
August 25th the 12-cylinder Liberty passed its
hard fifty-hour test successfully.
| A good engine in six weeks and the best in
f the world in three months ! And delivery in series
) began in five months! It stands as an achieve-
ment absolutely without parallel. The best ever
done by any other country was a year.

Is all this miracle to be discounted because
"there was not speed enough"? All the honest
pride that should be ours to be buried in queru-

112

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

lousness because we were promised delivery on
Thursday and did not get it until Saturday?

As in the case of mobilization, building, ship-
ping, and aircraft, the provision of rifles, machine-
guns, ammunition, and ordnance presented
problems as new as stupendous. We had enough
Springfield rifles on hand to equip an army of
1,000,000, but their intricate construction made
immediate quantity production an impossibility.
Yet quantity production of ammunition for the
Springfields was possible. American initiative
met the problem by changes that not only
simplified and improved the British Enfield,
but fitted it for the use of the Springfield
cartridge. This modified Enfield came into
quantity production in August, 1917, and at the
time of the armistice the output had reached a
total of 2,300,000. Added to this was a produc-
tion of 300,000 Springfields. In the matter of
ammunition we produced 3,500,000,000 rounds
of our own as compared to 100,000,000 rounds
that we bought from the French arid British.

Congress, in 1912, sanctioned the allowance
of four machine-guns to a regiment. When
America entered the war the use of machine-
guns had developed to 336 machine-guns per
regiment. To meet initial needs we bought
Hotchkiss machine-guns and Chauchat auto-
matics from the French, but at the same time
started work on the perfection of a gun of our
own that would be "better than the best." The
answer of American inventive genius was the
"light" Browning and the "heavy" Browning,
admittedly superior to anything possessed either

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

by the Allies or the Germans. Both types were
brought into production in February and April,
1918, and at the time of the armistice 227,000
had been delivered.

With respect to artillery, it was decided at
the outset that speed and effectiveness alike
pointed to the wisdom of using guns of French
manufacture. Not only was French artillery
the best, but French production outran the
demand. Inventions of our own were perfected,
however, and manufacture pushed, with the re-
sult that the armistice found America producing
complete artillery units sufficient for every need.
Great plants had to be erected for the manu-
facture of high explosives, whole industries had
to be taken over, the production of toxic gases
called for government ownership and operation,
and each day demanded new exhibitions of in-
ventive genius and driving initiative. With what
results ?

At the time of the armistice we were pro- i
ducing gas more rapidly than England, France,
or Germany.

At the end of the war American production of
smokeless powder was 45 per cent, greater than
the French and British production combined.

At the end of the war American production
of high explosives was 40 per cent, greater than
Great Britain's and nearly double that of
France.

Out of every 100 days that our combat divi-
sions were in line in France they were supported
by their own artillery for 75 days, by British
artillery for 5 days, and by French for \% days.

114

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

Of the remaining \%]4 days that they were in
line without artillery, 18 days were in quiet
sectors, and only ^ of I day in each 100 vwas
in active sectors. ^.

Greatest source of pride, however, is the care \
that every fighting-man received. From first
to last not an "embalmed-beef" horror such
as shamed the Spanish-American War, not a
case of "paper-soled shoes," not a single duplica-
tion of the "fever camps'* that brought unneces-
sary grief into thousands of American homes in M

1898. The death-rate per 1,000 during the war
with Spain was 26. In the war just ended the
death-rate per 1,000 was 6.4 in the United
States, and 4.7 in the American Expeditionary
Force, and it must be remembered that even
these percentages were made much larger by .
the influenza epidemic that swept the country.
No soldiers of any nation ever received such
care. Among the 39,000 officers of the Medical
Corps were the best :aen of the profession —
the greatest specialists in every line — and not
even the sons of the rich in civil life were given
more painstaking attention than that bestowed j '•
upon the humblest private.

Nor was this all. The War Risk Insurance
Bureau, originated and administered by Secre-
tary McAdoo, made the government of the
United States the largest and safest insurance
company in the world, and at the same time a
"helping hand" that went out to the wives
and children of the fighting-men. In the very
first year of its operation the Bureau wrote
4,000,000 policies in an amount exceeding $40,-
9 115

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

000,000,000 and distributed $450,000,000 to the
dependent families of soldiers and sailors.

Honesty is no less a glory. In addition to
$10,000,000,000 loaned to the Allies, the govern-
ment expended more than $27,000,000,000 for,
the prosecution of the war, a sum as large as1
the total expenses of the federal government \
from 1783 to 1917. Although this huge amount !
was disbursed in the hurry and confusion of
war, the utmost zeal of congressional commit- !
tees has been unable to unearth graft or serious '
misconduct on the part of responsible officials or
of the citizens who responded to the call of the
administration. The completeness of these in-
vestigations may be judged by the fact that they
have cost the taxpayers more than $2,000,000
to date. When the scandals and shames of 1898
are remembered, a great satisfaction can be
taken in the honor and faith of 1917 and 1918.
r~ Raising $37,000,000,000 was a task faced by
6 as many new and difficult problems as were met
with in aircraft and ordnance. Billions were an
immediate necessity, and Secretary McAdoo
met the emergency by the inspiration of short-
time certificates of indebtedness, followed im-
mediately by the announcement of bond issues.
The financiers of the country naturally assumed
that these issues would be floated through the
banks on the usual commission basis, but Secre-
tary McAdoo had the courage and vision to
conceive a plan that would save money even as
it would manufacture war spirit. Coining the
name "Liberty Loan," he went straight to the
people, and although the idea was fought with

116

THE POWER AND THE GLORY

bitterness, each of five bond issues was over-
subscribed. It was likewise the genius of Mc-
Adoo that conceived the idea of War Savings and
Thrift Stamps, a plan that made the smallest
child a partner of the government in the pros- I
ecution of the war.

A wonderful achievement, whether taken as a
whole or subjected to piecemeal analysis. The
committee appointed by President McKiniey
to examine the conduct of the war with Spain
prefaced its report by asking the people to
remember that "the task of mobilizing, training,
and equipping 275,000 men was of such massive
proportions that all of the criticisms and com-
ments that were made in regard to it must be
read with regard to the size of the task." Only
nineteen years later America was called upon,
almost overnight, to mobilize, train, equip, and
maintain an army of 5,000,000 men — to send
2,000,000 of them across the Atlantic — and met
that call without one of the scandals or failures
that shamed the record of 1898. *^

Glory in the highest, and, what is best, glory *
enough for all. By no means was it the war of
an administration or the war of a party. In the
tremendous accomplishment Republicans and
Democrats stood shoulder to shoulder, partizan-
ship forgotten, nothing, remembered save that
they weje Ar^ejirans. Nor wUs it merely the
war of soldiers and sailors. Behind the trenches
and the battle-ships stretched the army of the
second lines, the men, women, and children of
the United States, serving and sacrificing with
no less devotion than the fighting-force itself. <

117 <~s

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

These are things to remember when partizanship
deals only in sneers and detraction. The future
of America is not limited to the presidential
campaign of 1920, and the hopes of that future
are linked inseparably to the prides and resolves
born of unparalleled achievement.

VII

AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES

REAT and splendid as were the military 1
achievements of the United States, they
were not more effective than the projectile force
of American ideals. No credit may be taken
from the 2,000,000 men in khaki who beat back
German might at Chateau-Thierry and St.-
Mihiel, and whose presence and courage gave
heart to the Allied armies in an hour of despair,
but there were moral victories no less far-reaching
and conclusive. Our war aims, declared in the
various state papers of the President, gave us
domestic unity, won us the friendship and sup-
port of neutral nations, and crumbled the foun-
dation of fear and lies that upheld the evil
structure of Prussian militarism. Sent by cable
and wireless to every corner of earth, translated
into every tongue, printed by the millions on
native presses, the pronouncements of the Presi-
dent had the force of armies, conquering the
mind of mankind and delivering humanity from
age-old bondages. As long as the world lasts,
these addresses, of singular power and beauty^
will stand as the ultimate exposition of human
faith in the practicability of liberty, justice, and j
fraternity. ^_

It is to be remembered that the Great War was
119

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

not a war for democracy when it commenced,
nor even at the time we entered it. Trade
imperialism ruled the world in 1914 and the
breakdown of civilization was the logical result
of theories of government that put weakness
at the mercy of greed. Ireland, India, and
Egypt struggled in the grip of the British Em-
pire; France held Morocco; Italy clutched
Tripoli; England and Russia strangled Persia;
in China and Africa the French, English, and
Germans were rival annexationists; Russia kept
the Poles, the Finns, and the Ruthenes in sub-
jection; the Austro-Hungarian Alliance enslaved
Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, and Jugo-
slavs; Japan ruled Korea and parts of Man-
churia; and Germany exercised brutal sway over
kingdoms and colonies. Wherever one looked
there was a cynical disregard of human rights,
an almost blasphemous exaltation of the privi-
leges of trade.

It was merely the case that the Imperial Ger-
man government came to disdain the slow and
undramatic processes of "peaceful penetration."
Its masters, unbalanced by the incantations
and prophecies of militarism's high priests and
drunk in contemplation of colossal power,
reverted suddenly to the savage methods of
tribalism and resolved upon one great blow
that should give them world dominion. Through
the eyes of hate and paranoia, they saw Belgium
annexed, France crushed, occupation of the
Channel ports, Serbia reduced to vassalage,
and the rest of the Balkan States instructed in
obedience; Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Italy

120

AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES

mere suzerainties; Asia and Africa left helpless
for the taking; Russia, England, and America
to be dealt with at leisure. A dream of mad-
men, perhaps, but one that had every chance of
success. gf

The disclosure of these purposes, the very/
ferocity of the sudden and unprovoked assault,
and the horror of German war practices inevi-
tably placed the Allies in the finer position of
standing for civilization, humanity, and inter-
national law. Their struggle, however, was
essentially one of self-defense and remained
just that, not a leader having the vision to grasp
the necessity of a new and better order as a
substitute for the outworn system of balanced
power, responsible not only for the present
madness, but equally certain to breed other
wars if continued. President Wilson was under
no illusions. He knew that France and Prussia
were once in alliance, that Italy was the ally
of Germany in 1914, that England had always
hated Russia and feared her, that England and
France were ready to fight over Fashoda in 1900,
and he saw at the end of the war, even in event
of Allied victory, nothing more conclusive than
realignments and new "balances of power."
Out of his soul's rebellion against the sorry
drama of despair and futility he harked back
to the innate idealism of the race and brought
forth his p7dp7>?al"T6l>~'a: "League ^oT Nations, a
world partnership of self-governing peoples in
the interests of justice, liberty, and a peace of
permanence. The idea itself was as old as
Christ, but it was not until the President's

121

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

address of May 27, 1916, that it took shape
and form in the heart of sick and hopeless
humanity.

*"L Again on December i8th, in his note to the
{ belligerent nations, Woodrow Wilson showed
that he was looking beyond the war to the peace,
and that the compelling interest of America
was in some settlement that would guard the
world against a recurrence of barbarism. The
war we entered must be a war against war, and
the whole purpose of the note was to lift the
thought of the world above the accepted and
habitual. The President knew well where Ger-
many stood; what he wanted was to force the
Allies to take higher, firmer ground. The plan
succeeded. The Imperial German government
answered in the terms and spirit of Attila; the
reply of the Allies showed grasp of the American
aspiration and full sympathy with it. Of supreme
significance was the declaration of "whole-
hearted agreement with the proposal to create
a League of Nations which shall assure peace
and justice throughout the world." The address
of the President to the Senate on January 22,
1917, transformed the war from a struggle
between dynasties to a holy war in behalf of
imperishable ideals, even as it marked the
flowering of his individual patriotism into the
genius of the race. It was to a world that the
President spoke, and it was the world that
answered this noble outline of a Peace of the
People:

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with
one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the

122

AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES

doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend
its policy over any other nation or people, but that every
people should be left free to determine its own polity,
its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened,
unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid en-
tangling alliances which would draw them into com-
petitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and
selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences
intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance
in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same
sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common
interest and are free to live their own lives under a common
protection.

Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will
be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guaran-
tor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater
than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance
hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable
combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If
the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a
peace made secure by the organized major force of man-
kind.

The War Message of April 2d had in it nothing I
of the tentative. Sure of his ground at last,
confident alike in the idealism of America and in
the aroused vision of Allied peoples, the President
declared that —

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace
must be planted upon the tested foundations of political
liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no
conquests, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for our-
selves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall
freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights
of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have
been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations
can make them.

The right is more precious than peace, and we shall ^

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

fight for the things which we have always carried nearest
our hearts — for democracy, for the right of those who
submit to authority to have a voice in their own govern-
ments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a
universal dominion of right by such a concert of free people
as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make
' the world itself at last free.

The projectile force of the President's idealism,
its full military value, may be measured by the
fact that between April 6 and December 8, 1917,
sixteen states, great and small, declared war
against Germany or severed diplomatic relations
with her. From the very first the Allies accepted
the President as their spokesman. Shrewd for
all their cynicism, they saw that the old order
was out of tune and favor, and that Mr. Wilson
spoke the language of a new order, that his was
the gift of understanding human hopes, and they
sat silent when his voice was lifted. The papal
overtures of August, 1917, were answered by
the President alone, and again the world thrilled
to the assertion of unconquerable resolve in
connection with the establishment of a peace
of justice and permanence.

The last months of 1917 marked the zero
hour for the Allied cause so far as military opera-
tions were concerned. The great German-Aus-
trian counterdrive into Italy was quickly followed
by the overthrow of Kerensky, Lenin's instant
submission to Germany, and the infamous Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk. With the flourish of the con-
queror, Count Czernin laid down a set of peace
terms in behalf of the Central Powers, and it
was the answer of the President on January 8,

124 .

AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES

1918, that shot light through the falling dark-
ness. In the declaration of America's peace
terms there was a certainty and confidence that
carried reassurance to the Allies even as it struck
mightily at the weak foundations of Austria-
Hungary. The "program of the world's peace'*
was set forth in Fourteen Points that were im-
mediately accepted by the world as great
commandments.1

Speaking on July 4th, at Mount Vernon, he
formulated the fundamental principles for which
we were fighting in four supplementary points:

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be
final. There can be no compromise. No half-way decision
would be tolerable. No half-way decision is conceivable.
These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the
world are fighting and which must be conceded them
before there can be peace:

(1) The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere
that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice dis-
turb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently
destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

(2) The settlement of every question, whether of terri-
tory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of politi-
cal relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of
that settlement by the people immediately concerned
and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage
of any other nation or people which may desire a different
settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or
mastery.

(3) The consent of all nations to be governed in their
conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor
and of respect for the common law of civilized society that
govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their
relations with one another; to the end that all promises
and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots

1 For full text see Chapter XX.
125

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with
impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the hand-
some foundation of a mutual respect for right.

(4) The establishment of an organization of peace which
shall make it certain that the combined power of free
nations will check every invasion of right and serve to
make peace and justice the more secure by affording a
definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and
by which every international readjustment that cannot be
amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned
shall be sanctioned.

In the New York address of September 27th
the President touched again upon the funda-
mentals of peace, seeking to bed-rock them in
the granite of a universal and explicit under-
standing. He said then:

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Na-
tions and the clear definition of its objects must be a part,
is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement
itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would
be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated
against a common enemy. It is not likely that it would be
formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee
the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an after-
thought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why
it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the
peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and
means must be found in connection with the peace settle-
ment itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would
be folly to leave the guaranty to the subsequent voluntary
action of the governments we have seen destroy Russia and
deceive Rumania.

These twenty-three specific points, taken
together, constituted President Wilson's peace
charter for the world, and the unqualified in-
dorsement of the Allies gave them binding

126

AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES

authority. Not until the renascence of trade
imperialism at Paris in February, 1919, was there
the slightest disposition to question either the
feasibility of a League of Nations or the con-
tractual obligation to make it a primary and
integral part of the Peace Treaty itself.

The full force of the President's "moral offen-
sives" now commenced to be felt. It was not
only that they had won the "verdict of mankind,"
but, driving into the Central Powers as well,
they disintegrated military and civilian morale,
and forced the fears that made autocratic
governments sue for peace. On October 5th,
scarcely more than a week after the President's
address of September 27th, the Germans begged
an armistice, and on October 7th the Austro-
Hungarian government presented a similar plea.
It may be stated at this point, in answer to the
charges of a "lone hand" and "bad faith," that
every detail of the correspondence that followed
was known to the Allied leaders and received
their complete approval.

The President, replying to Germany on Octo-
ber 8th, asked if he was to understand definitely
that the German government accepted the terms
laid down in the Fourteen Points and in subse-
quent addresses and "that its object in enter-
ing into discussion would be only to agree upon
the practical details of their application." He
added also that the immediate evacuation of
invaded territory was an essential to the good
faith of further discussion. On October I2th
the German government replied affirmatively,
and on October I4th the President made this

127

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

statement of decision: that the conditions of the
armistice must be left to the military advisers
of the United States and the Allies, and that no
arrangement could be accepted that did not
provide "absolutely satisfactory safeguards and
guaranties of the maintenance of the present
military supremacy of the armies of the United
States and the Allies in the field"; that an
armistice could not be considered until submarine
warfare ceased; and that further guaranties
of the representative character of the German
government would have to be given.

On October 2Oth Germany accepted the new
conditions and pointed out that she now had a
constitution and a government dependent for
its authority on the Reichstag. On October
23d the President informed Germany that,
having received the solemn and explicit assurance
of the German government that it unreservedly
accepts the terms of peace laid down in his
address to the Congress of the United States on
January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement
enunciated in his subsequent addresses, and that
it is ready to discuss the details of their applica-
tion, he had communicated the above corre-
spondence to the governments of the Allied
Powers with the suggestion that, if they were
disposed to effect the peace upon the terms and
principles indicated, they will ask their military
advisers to draw up armistice terms of such a
character as to "insure to the associated govern-
ments the unrestricted power to safeguard and
enforce the details of the peace to which the German
government has agreed."

128

AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES

Meanwhile events in other directions had
been moving rapidly. Replying to Austria-
Hungary on October i8th, the President pointed
out that a radical change had been worked in
Point Ten, which read: "The peoples of Austria-
Hungary, whose place among the nations we
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should
be accorded the freest opportunity of autono-
mous development."

"Since that sentence was written and uttered
to the Congress of the United States," he said,
"the government of the United States has recog-
nized that a state of belligerency exists between
the Czechoslovaks and the German and Austro-
Hungarian Empires, and that the Czechoslovak
National Council is a de facto belligerent govern-
ment clothed with proper authority to direct
the military and political affairs of the Czecho-
slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest
manner the justice of the nationalistic aspira-
tions of the Jugoslavs for freedom."

On October 28th the Austro-Hungarian gov-
ernment submitted to the conditions of the
President, and on November 4th accepted
armistice terms that amounted to a complete
surrender. Bulgaria had already withdrawn
on September 29th, and Turkey had capitulated
on October 3ist. On November 5th the Pres-
ident transmitted to Germany the decision of the
Allied governments. Subject to two qualifica-
tions, they declared their willingness to make
peace with the government of Germany on the
terms of peace laid down in the President's
address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and

129

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the principles of settlement enunciated in his
subsequent addresses. The qualifications were:
(i) Freedom of the seas, being open to various
interpretations, must be left to the Peace Con-
ference, and in the discussion they "reserved to
themselves complete freedom!" (2) Further,
in the conditions of peace laid down in his ad-
dress to Congress on the 8th of January, 1918,
the President declared that invaded territories
must be restored as well as evacuated and made
free. The Allied governments feel that no
doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what
this provision implies. By it they understand
that compensation will be made by Germany
for "all damage done to the civilian population of
the Allies and to their property by the aggres-
sion of Germany by land, by sea, and from the
air."

The acceptance of the German government
was given on October 27th; the armistice terms
were submitted on November 8th, and were
signed by the Germans to become effective on
November nth. At the time the Germans had
2,000,000 men under arms on the western front,
and to the east there were the armies of Macken-

/ sen and von Sanders. What happened to them
was an utter spiritual collapse, a disintegration
of morale both on the firing-line and among the
civilian population. And history will say that
this was due to the words of Wilson in even

r larger degree than to the hammer blows of Foch.

.— There is a tendency in certain quarters to-day

I to attack the Peace Treaty on the theory that the
German capitulation was in no sense a surrender,

130

AMERICA'S MORAL OFFENSIVES

but merely a cessation of hostilities on certain
fixed terms. This view, as a matter of fact, is
the very base of The Economic Consequences of
the Peace, the book in which J. M. Keynes appeals
to the world in behalf of Germany. The con-
tention entirely ignores the second stipulation
of the Allies' answer, the specific statement that
"compensation will be made by Germany for
all damage done to the civil population of the
Allies and to their property by the aggression of
Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

This all-embracing clause, agreed to by the
President, meant unconditional surrender, and
the Germans were in no doubt as to the intent.
Ludendorff, in his Memoirs, says:

On October 23d or 24th Wilson's answer arrived. It was
a strong answer to our cowardly note. This time he made
it quite clear that the armistice conditions must be such
as to make it impossible for Germany to resume hostilities
and to give the powers allied against her unlimited power
to settle themselves the details of the peace accepted by
Germany. In my view, there could no longer be doubt
in my mind that we must continue the fight.

Hindenburg held to the same view, and on
October 24th signed an order "for the informa-
tion of all troops" that made these statements:

He (Wilson) will negotiate with Germany for peace only
if she concedes all the demands of America's allies as to
the internal constitutional arrangements of Germany. . . .
Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender.
It is thus unacceptable to us soldiers.

The closing words were a passionate appeal to
"continue resistance with all our strength."
The order, however, was never promulgated.
10 131

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Hindenburg and Ludendorff were both over-
ruled, and the note of submission went forward
to the President, a note that accepted the terms
that every German fighting-man knew to be
unconditional surrender.

A second opportunity to choose between war
or surrender was afforded the Germans by the
presentation of the armistice terms. A more
definite and detailed document was never framed.
It set down provision after provision that were
the essence of unconditional surrender, and at
every point it made clear what the Peace Treaty
itself would contain. It was in the power of the
Germans to denounce the terms as being in
violation of the President's assurances of a "just
peace/' They made no such denunciation.
Instead they signed and accepted the armistice
terms, and it remained for an English economist,
writing a year later, to discover that the Germans
did not surrender and that the Allies were falce
to promises.

VIII

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL

THE congressional elections in November,
1918, merit detailed consideration by reason
of the sweep and force of their consequences.
Not only were ugly passions aroused that shat-
tered domestic unity, turning the United States
over to a very madness of pull and haul, but the
results worked an evil change in Europe as well,
giving the elder statesmen of the Allies the hope
that "practical programs" might be substituted
for "idealistic theories." Only by analysis of
the various incidents can clear understanding be
gained of an action that, on its face, bears every
appearance of aberration.

In September various Democratic members of
Congress waited upon the President and told
him frankly that if he desired to retain a party
majority in the House and Senate his one hope
was to make an open, non-partizan appeal to
the people. They were explicit in the statement
that the Democratic organization itself was in
no position to conduct a vigorous campaign, and
with a certain approach to resentment gave him
specific explanations. For more than a year
the party had been without leadership, as Vance
McCormick, chairman of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee, had devoted himself exclu-

133

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

sively to the direction of the War Trade Board.
This lack of executive authority, and the Presi-
dent's own failure to act as a party leader, had
resulted naturally in the disintegration of ma-
chinery and in a war chest too depleted to meet
even the mechanical expenses of a campaign.
On the other hand, Will H. Hays, chairman of
the Republican National Committee, was giving
entire time to travel and conference in the in-
terests of party harmony and enthusiasm, as
well as collecting funds in larger amounts than
had been known since the days of Hanna.

The President, always impatient of the me-
chanics of politics, was doubly unwilling to con-
sider them at a moment when the fate of a world
hung in the balance. Somewhat curtly, and very
decisively, he rejected the suggestion made him,
and turned to the tremendous questions that
pressed upon him. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey were trembling on the verge of sur-
render, and the notes of the President, each one
with the cutting edge of a sword, were slashing
the bonds that held these countries to continued
support of the Imperial German government.
Not only did the Allies have instant and intimate
knowledge of every detail of this correspondence,
but they indorsed it so fully as to give the Presi-
dent authority to speak for them. Far better
than any one in America they knew the exhaus-
tion of their own countries and the strength of
Germany, and both statesmen and soldiers fol-
lowed with eagerness every point in the Presi-
dent's diplomatic correspondence, seeing hope
of winning by words the victory that might

134

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL"

otherwise have to be purchased by still
greater expenditures of blood and money and
suffering.

On October I3th, at the most critical stage of
the correspondence, Mr. Roosevelt publicly de-
nounced the President for attempting to bring
about a "negotiated peace," accused ijim of
"bad faith" to the Allies, and berated him for
his "weakness." As if in response to a signal,
the Republican speakers rose in their places and
elaborated the attack. Almost instantly the
plan of campaign was broadened to take in the
Fourteen Points. To be sure, it was the case
that these specifications of the President, de-
clared in his speech of January 8th, had been
accepted unquestioningly by the people of the
United States and by the Allied governments as
well, and nothing was more obvious than that
the high justice of these pledges had been po-
tent factors in winning the approval and support
of neutral nations. Mr. Roosevelt, however,
sounded a general assault by his statement that
"When it comes to peace negotiations, we should
emphatically repudiate these famous Fourteen
Points."

The campaign, in its first stages, seemed so
entirely political, rather than popular, that .small
attention was paid to it. Certain partizan Sena-
tors had spared no effort to embarrass and harass
the administration in its prosecution of the war,
but never at any time had the people shown any
signs of being gulled. The President had the
conviction that Americans were interested but
little in the election, and he was particularly of

135

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the opinion that the reactionary Senate group
did not reflect the sentiment of the Republican
rank and file in any degree. As time went by,
however, two things became increasingly appar-
ent; first, that the so-called "Old Guard" was
in undisputed control of the Republican ma-
chinery; second, that the forces of "invisible
government" were preparing to emerge from the
j^tirement thrust upon the unities of war.

^Realizing that German defeat was only a matter
of weeks, Big Business felt that the time was
ripe for a successful attempt to regain the power
lost in 1912. What took evil and definite shape
in the shadows was no mere uprising of a partizan
clique, but a carefully planned revolt against
Wilson and his "crazy ideals." The orders that
went out from the headquarters of Privilege
were peremptory, and money in huge amounts
followed the drders. The hands of the President
were to be upheld no longer; they were to be tied.
The movement's power in men, money, and
machinery began to be appreciated, and appre-

\ hension took the place of easy confidence.

There was not a man in the whole war ma-
chinery, Republican or Democrat, who did not
react to the gravity of the situation. It was
not only that a Republican majority in the House
or Senate meant divided leadership at a moment
when the President's undisputed central control
was a necessity, but it was a certainty that
such result would be regarded by Europe as a
repudiation of the President and his war policies.
The Central Powers and the Allied governments
alike would interpret it as a weakening of our

136

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL"

war will, and while the enemy would be strength-
ened, our associates would be correspondingly
depressed. It was not a party that was at
stake, but America, and Americans, without
regard to political beliefs, urged the President
to reconsider his decision with respect to an
appeal to the people. He did so, and on October
24th issued the following statement:

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: The congressional elections
are at hand. They occur in the most critical period our
country has ever faced or is likely to face in our time.
If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to
continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs
at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will ex-
press yourself unmistakably to that effect by returning a
Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

I am your servant and will accept your judgment without
cavil, but my power to administer the great trust assigned
to me by the Constitution would be seriously impaired
should your judgment be adverse, and I must frankly tell
you so because so many critical issues depend upon your
verdict. No scruple or taste must in grim times like
these be allowed to stand in the way of speaking the
plain truth.

I have no thougnt of suggesting that any political party
is paramount in matters of patriotism. I feel too deeply
the sacrifices which have been made in this war by all our
citizens, irrespective of party affiliations, to harbor such an
idea. I mean only that the difficulties and delicacies of
our present task are of a sort that makes it imperatively
necessary that the nation should give its undivided support
to the government under a unified leadership, and that a
Republican Congress would divide the leadership.

The leaders of the minority in the present Congress hare
unquestionably been pro-war, but they have been anti-
administration. At almost every turn since we entered
the war they have sought to take the choice of policy

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

and the conduct of the war out of my hands and put it
under the control of instrumentalities of their own
choosing.

This is no time either for divided counsels or for divided
leadership. Unity of command is as necessary now in
civil action as it is upon the field of battle. If the control
of the House and the Senate should be taken away from the
party now in power, an opposing majority could assume
control of the legislation and oblige all action to be taken
amid contest and obstruction.

The return of a Republican majority to either House of
the Congress would, moreover, be interpreted on the other
side of the water as a repudiation of my leadership. Spokes-
men of the Republican party are urging you to elect a
Republican Congress in order to back up and support the
President, but, even if they should in this impose upon
some credulous voters on this side of the water, they would
impose on no one on the other side. It is well understood
there as well as here that the Republican leaders desire
not so much to support the President as to control him.

The peoples of the Allied countries with whom we are
associated against Germany are quite familiar with the sig-
nificance of the elections. They would find it very difficult
to believe that the voters of the United States had chosen
to support their President by electing to the Congress a
majority controlled by those who are not in fact in sym-
pathy with the attitude and action of the administration.

I need not tell you, my fellow-countrymen, that I am
asking your support not for my own sake or for the sake
of a political party, but for the sake of the nation itself in
order that its inward duty of purpose may be evident to
all the world. In ordinary times I would not feel at liberty
to make such an appeal to you. In ordinary times divided
counsels can be endured without permanent hurt to the
country. But these are not ordinary times.

If in these critical days it is your wish to sustain me
with undivided minds, I beg that you will say so in a way
which it will not be possible to misunderstand, either here at
home or among our associates on the other side of the sea.
I submit my difficulties and my hopes to you.

138

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL"

Such an appeal was in no sense extraordinary.
As a matter of fact, it had high warrant in
distinguished precedent. In various elections
George Washington pleaded for "united leader-
ship," and Lincoln specifically urged upon the
people the unwisdom of "swapping horses in
midstream." It was Lincoln also who made the
following election statement:

There is an important sense in which the government
is distinct from the administration. One is perpetual, the
other is temporary and changeable. A man may be loyal
to his government and yet oppose the peculiar principles and
methods of the administration. I should regret to see the
day in which the people should cease to express intelligent,
honest, generous criticism upon the policy of their rulers.
It is true, however, that, in time of great peril, the dis-
tinction ought not to be so strongly urged; for then criti-
cism may be regarded by the enemy as opposition, and may
weaken the wisest and best efforts for the public safety.
If there ever was such a time, it seems to me it is now.

In a speech delivered at Boone, Iowa, October
II, 1898, President McKinley pleaded for a
Republican Congress in these words:

This is no time for divided councils. If I would have
you remember anything I have said in these desultory
remarks, it would be to remember at this critical hour in
the nation's history we must not be divided. The triumphs
of the war are yet to be written in the articles of peace.

Theodore Roosevelt, when a candidate for
Governor of New York, appealed to the people
to give President McKinley a Republican Con-
gress, saying:

Remember that whether you will or not, your votes this
year will be viewed by the nations of Europe from one

139

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

standpoint only. They will draw no fine distinctions. A
refusal to sustain the President this year will, in their
eyes, be read as a refusal to sustain the war and to sustain
the efforts of our peace commission to secure the fruit of
war. Such a refusal may not inconceivably bring about a
rupture of the peace negotiations. It will give heart to
our defeated antagonists; it will make possible the inter-
ference of those doubtful neutral nations who in this
struggle have wished us ill.

Ex-President Benjamin Harrison, also urging
the people to "stand behind the President" by
electing a Republican Congress, said:

If the word goes forth that the people of the United
States are standing solidly behind the President, the task
of the peace commissioners will be easy, but if there is a
break in the ranks — if the Democrats score a telling victory,
if Democratic Senators, Congressmen, and governors are
elected — Spain will see in it a gleam of hope, she will take
fresh hope, and a renewal of hostilities, more war, may be
necessary to secure to us what we have already won.

Theodore Roosevelt, as President, did not
feel that such an appeal was improper even
in time of peace, for on August 18, 1906, he wrote
as follows to James E. Watson, then the Republi-
can whip :

If there were only partizan issues involved in this con-
test, I should hesitate to say anything publicly in reference
thereto. But I do not feel that such is the case. On the
contrary, I feel that all good citizens who have the welfare
of America at heart should appreciate the immense amount
that has been accomplished by the present Congress,
organized as it is, and the urgent need of keeping this
organization in power. To change the leadership and or-
ganization of the House at this time means to bring con-
fusion upon those who have been successfully engaged
in the steady working out of a great and comprehensive

140

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL"

scheme for the betterment of our social, industrial, and
civic conditions. Such a change would substitute a pur-
poseless confusion, a violent and hurtful oscillation between
the positions of the extreme radical and the extreme re-
actionary for the present orderly progress along the lines
of a carefully thought out policy.

In every war in America's history the man in
the White House at the time has asked to have
his party majority confirmed at the polls, and
common sense approves the wisdom and justice
of such a request. It is upon the President,
named in the Constitution as Commander-in-
Chief, that war responsibility rests, and fairness
and prudence join to point the necessity of
guarding him against partizan harassment.

Mr. Wilson's appeal, however, was denounced
as "unprecedented," and straightway subjected
to bitter attack. Mr. Hays, chairman of the
Republican National Committee, in the course
of an intemperate speech, charged that the Presi-
dent had impugned the loyalty of Republicans
and denied their patriotism, and said:

A more ungracious, more unjust, more wanton, more
mendacious accusation was never made by the most reck-
less stump orator, much less by the President of the United
States, for partizan purposes. It is an insult, not only to
every loyal Republican in Congress, but to every loyal
Republican in the land. It fully merits the resentment
which rightfully and surely will find expression at the polls.

Mr. Roosevelt declared that the President had
asked the people to elect a Congress made up
exclusively of Democrats, and in his Carnegie
Hall speech made this flat statement, "No man
who is a Republican, and no man, whether a Re-

141

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

publican or not, who puts loyalty to the people
ahead of loyalty to the servants of the people is
to have a voice in determining the greatest
questions ever brought before this nation."
This, of course, was nonsense. What the Presi-
dent asked for was not a unanimous vote, but
a majority vote. Had every Democrat been
elected, or had every Democrat been defeated,
neither party would have had two-thirds of the
Senate, the majority necessary to ratify a peace
treaty, for instance. Regardless of the elec-
tion's outcome, Republican votes retained im-
portance and power^

As the campaign progressed the hand of Big
Business became increasingly apparent. Mr.
Hays, carried away by his bitterness, betrayed
true objectives in these words:

But Mr. Wilson's real purpose has nothing to do with the
conduct of the war. He wants just two things. One
is full power to settle the war precisely as he and his sole,
unelected, unappointed, unconfirmed personal adviser
may determine. The other is full power as the "unem-
barrassed spokesman in affairs at home," as he actually
demands in his statement, to reconstruct in peace-times
the great industrial affairs of the nation in the same way,
in unimpeded conformity with whatever socialistic doctrines,
whatever unlimited government ownership notions, what-
ever hazy whims may happen to possess him at the time,
but first and above all with absolute commitment to free
trade with all the world, thus giving to Germany out of
hand the fruits of a victory greater than she could win by
fighting a hundred years. A Republican Congress will
never assent to that. Do you want a Congress that will?
Germany does.

Germany looks to Mr. Wilson to get it for her, as he
pledged himself to do in one of the few of his famous articles

I42

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL"

which are explicable. Germany understands that. See
the New York World, spokesman of the administration,
of last Saturday, and read the testimony of Henry C.
Emery, former head of the Tariff Commission, just returned
from seven months in Germany. "The German people,"
he says, "seemed to realize that in President Wilson lay
their only salvation. They have turned to him in the
belief that he is the one great political leader who can be
trusted to make a permanent peace which will permit
equal economic development." He is. All others demand
that the Germans shall pay the full penalty of their crimes.

To-day, when the German vote is again a
power to be soothed and wooed, the Republican
leaders are crying out against the President for
his harsh treatment of the Central Powers, but
at the time of Mr. Hays's speech the war was
still on, the German vote was cowed, and it was
good campaign strategy to denounce the Presi-
dent as the friend of Germany, the champion of
a "negotiated peace'* instead of the uncondi-
tional surrender that the warriors of the Home
Guards demanded. Under all the buncombe,
however, there coiled the selfish purposes of
reaction — protective tariffs, ship subsidies, special
privileges, private ownership, and the feudal
operation of free institutions.

The campaign of the Democrats, necessarily
weak by lack of funds, was made still more
futile by a combination of unfortunate circum-
stances. At the time when they were preparing
to take the field in earnest the sweep of the
influenza epidemic put an end to public meetings.
It is doubtful if the speech of the President had
been read carefully by one citizen in ten thou-
sand. Certainly there was no remembrance of

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the paragraph in which he said: "I have no
thought of suggesting that any political party is
paramount in matters of patriotism. I feel too
deeply the sacrifices which have been made in
this war by all our citizens, irrespective of party
affiliations, to harbor such an idea." Repub-
lican papers drove home the lie that the Presi-
dent had said that Republicans were not patriots.
Democratic speakers had no chance to answer it.
__ The fundamental mistake, however, was in
\ permitting "patriotism" to remain the issue.
In no sense was this the nature of the fight. As
in 1912, the battle-lines were drawn between
progress and reaction, between politics and
public service, between the hosts of democracy
and the forces of Special Privilege. This align-
ment was not touched upon; the real issues were
not made clear. Greatest misfortune of all,
the President did not have at his back the
inspired, unselfish fighting forces that swept
him to victory in 1912 and 1916. As has been
pointed out, his rooted distaste for the business
of appointments had blinded him to the impor-
tance of putting none but progressivists on guard,
and as a result of his neglect the movement had
fallen into discouragement and disintegration.
Bad enough prior to 1917, it was a condition
that grew into hopelessness after America's
entrance into the war. The leading reaction-
aries of the country were permitted to capture
the War Department and a majority of the newly
created civil bodies, and each man, as a matter
of course, swiftly installed his standpat following.
Not for a day nor an hour did a single one

144

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL"

of them surrender his political convictions or
domestic prejudices. Under direct partizan
inspiration reactionary organizations, such as
the National Security League and the American
Defense Society, sprang into evil being. A
chauvinistic hue and cry was raised at once,
and while "disloyalty" was the asserted object
of attack, the real purpose was to crush the
liberal movement in the United States. Men
and women of any reputation as progressivists
were excluded from war-work and even subjected
to continual harassment and attack.

It was these forces that were foremost in
crying that the President had "insulted the
patriotism" of every Republican. The Demo-
cratic organization, utterly demoralized, could
not beat back the lie. The progressivist move-
ment, that might have stemmed the tide, was
scattered and besmirched. As a consequence,
the people reverted to partizanship, and, without
thought of the war or the peace, rushed to the
polls and voted on the question as to whether
Republicans were "traitors." My feeling at^
the time, and my conviction to-day, were ex-
pressed in the following letter sent under date
of November 8th:

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, — You have indeed made
this war a war to "make the world safe for democracy."
But it was not that sort of war when it began. And it ^t

was not that sort of war when we entered it.

Before we got into it, our entrance had its chief impul-
sion from our most reactionary and least democratic ele-
ments. Consequently nearly all our most progressive
and liberal leaders had marked themselves as opposed to
it. The Republican representatives of Big Business made

145

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

a clear record of patriotic support of what was then, in
outward appearance, a reactionary trade-imperialistic war.
Many radicals, progressives, and Democrats spoke and
voted against it.

When you raised it to the level of a war for democracy,
you rallied to the support of the war all the progressive
and democratic elements. The Big Business patriots went
with you, ostensibly on your own terms, because they saw
that only on your terms could the war be won. They
came into conspicuous leadership as Red Cross executives,
as heads of State Councils of Defense, as patriotic dollar-
a-year men.

All the radical or liberal friends of your anti-imperialist
war policy were either silenced or intimidated. The Depart-
ment of Justice and the Post-office were allowed to silence
or intimidate them. There was no voice left to argue
for your sort of peace. %

When we came to this election, the reactionary Republi-
cans had a clean record of anti-Hun imperialistic patriotism.
Their opponents, your friends, were often either besmirched
or obscure. No one had been able to tell the public what
was really at issue in the elections. The reactionaries
knew, but they concealed it. They could appeal to their
patriotism against what looked like a demand for a partizan
verdict for the Democrats. The Democrats, afraid of
raising the class issue, went on making a political campaign.
Secretary Daniels and you spoke too late.

It seems to me if the defeat is to be repaired, the issue
as between the imperialists and the democracy will have
to be stated. You will have to give out your program for
peace and reconstruction and find friends for it. Other-
wise the reactionary patrioteers will defeat the whole
immediate future of reform and progress.
Respectfully,

GEORGE CREEL.

Every one of our present troubles traces back
to the election of 1918. Lodge was lifted from
mediocrity to evil power, and has been able to
translate his personal hatreds into national

146

THE PRESIDENT'S "PARTIZAN APPEAL"

policies. The war aims of the United States
have been repudiated and we have been kept
out of the League of Nations. Worst of all,
the Wilson program for reconstruction — a great
plan for the restoration of our national health —
was handed over to the mercy of such men as
Penrose, Smoot, Watson, Sherman, and Brande-
gee. Had it been the deliberate intent of the
electorate to destroy America nationally and
internationally, it could not have worked more
surely.
11

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

IT is safe to say that on the day of the armistice
Woodrow Wilson was the most loved and
admired man in all the world. In foreign lands
they burned candles before his picture, named
squares and streets in his honor, and hailed him
as an apostle of light, the invincible champion
of human rights; in the United States the sweep
of victory cleansed the popular mind of prejudice
and irritations, leaving only an intense apprecia-
tion of the man's true greatness. With courage
and devotion never surpassed, the President
threw this universal popularity upon the gaming-
board of Paris, risking himself in one tremen-
dous hazard for a peace of justice, a peace of
permanence.

As clearly as though the future mirrored itself
before him, he saw the tragedy of reaction and
intrigue that would stage itself at the Peace
Conference. Never at any time under delusions
as to the character of the statesmen of Europe,
he knew well that the lifting of war's necessities
would restore them to their old habits of thought
— habits formed through long years of tortuous
diplomacy, " practical" politics, and careful
balancing of power. What they had promised
in the hour of defeat, when American aid was

148

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

the one salvation, was bound to lose importance
in the hour when a cruel and merciless enemy
lay at their feet. Against an enforced idealism,
resented by their experience as "visionary" and
"Utopian," there would be a revolt of minds
accustomed to think in terms of victor and
vanquished, spoils and revenge.

What more natural? For close to five years
the armies of the Central Powers had ravaged
Belgium, France, Italy, and Serbia, their sub-
marines had swept the seas of Allied shipping,
and their aircraft had wrought desolation in
great cities. For close to five years, through
no fault of their own, French, English, Italians,
Belgians, and Serbians had sat face to face
with death and despair, and the future that
stretched out before them was gray with the
smoke that rose from burning homes. A League
of Nations, a peace of justice, were fine faiths
when a world shook to the sound of guns, but
with victory won, what more intelligent than
to attend first to the redress of immediate
wrongs, to the exaction of indemnities, to the
imposition of punishments that would rid them
at once and forever of the German menace?
Then the ideals!

There was no doubt in the mind of the Presi-
dent as to the sincerity of the Allied peoples.
Their passion of belief in the righteousness and
practicability of a new order came to him across
the sea, inexpressibly inspiring. He knew, how-
ever, that between citizenship and government,
especially in European countries, there yawned
a gulf not to be bridged without infinite time

149
\

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

and labor, and that so far as the Peace Confer-
ence was concerned, decision would be in the
hands of politicians, the young more plausible
than the old, but all master opportunists su-
premely skilled in the art of appealing to the
human passions of gain and revenge.

Working also to their advantage was the fact
that the surrender of Germany was in every
sense unconditional. It was not only the case
that the Allies held the written promise of Ger-
many to make compensation "for all damage
done to the civilian population of the Allies
and to their property by the aggression of
Germany by land, by sea and from the air."
There was also that grim provision in the armis-
tice itself "that any future claims and demands
of the Allies and the United States of America
remain unaffected.'* It was legitimately in the
power of the Peace Conference to present just
claims that would put the Central Powers in
bondage for generations to come, that would
destroy them forever as a free people, an inde-
pendent nationality.

The one restraint was in the Fourteen Points,
accepted by the Allied governments as the basis
of settlement. Better than any one else, how-
ever, the President knew that these terms were
far removed from being an easily enforceable
pledge in the sense that a contract is enforceable.
They were articles of faith, rather than the hard
and fast clauses of a commercial agreement, and
if they were to be dealt with in a mean, legalistic
spirit, every one of them could be denied without
loss of face.

ISO

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

This phase of the difficulty was exaggerated
by the situation in America itself. Throughout
the whole of October, during the congressional
campaign, the Republican party had indulged
in wholesale repudiation of the Fourteen Points,
denouncing them as part of a mollycoddle policy
inspired by secret concern for Germany's wel-
fare. "Blood and iron" was the prize election
compound as far as the Republicans were con-
cerned, and nothing was more abhorrent to their
thought than the idea of a "negotiated peace,"
a peace that considered Germany's future in
any degree. Mr. Hays, chairman of the Re-
publican National Committee, sounded the key-
note when he declared that America "will
uphold her allies in whatever reparation they
may exact for the frightful outrages inflicted
upon them by the accursed Huns." And the
Republicans had won the election! Already,
in every capital in Europe, statesmen were ad-
justing themselves to the new situation, secretly
rejoicing in the turn of the wheel that seemed
to lift the burdensome obligations that had been
placed upon them by the Fourteen Points.

For the President to have stayed in Wash-
ington would have been the easy way. En-
throned in the White House, high above the
jangles of Paris, it was in his power to have
placed entire responsibility upon an appointed
Peace Commission, reserving an Olympian de-
tachment for himself. But even as he knew
that this would save him his popularity, just as
surely did he know that it would lose the peace.
The one chance for the League of Nations, for

a peace of justice and permanence, was for him
to go to Paris in person, to sit at the Peace Table
himself, fighting face to face for the fulfilment
of the pledges that he had framed. To sit in
Washington was to invite defeat. With a situa-
tion that would change with every word, it was
idle to dream that intelligent communication
could be maintained by cable and wireless.
His absence would be regarded as the assumption
of a dictator's role, and the premiers would be
quick to use it to their advantage. Advice and
counsel, unless in line with their wishes, would
be construed as ultimatums and commands.

There was also the possibility that his presence
might stabilize the situation in large degree.
It would disprove the theory of "autocratic
aloofness," and, by giving direct evidence of a
willingness to share in common counsel, might
result in larger regard for the American position.
With all the passion of his soul the President
desired a Conference of friends, unchanged,
unchanging, animated in peace by the same
ideals that had thrilled in war, and had it been
necessary to achieve such result he would have
made the pilgrimage on his knees. These were
the considerations that formed his decision to go
to Paris as head of the American Commission to
Negotiate Peace — a decision made in spite of the
attack of political enemies and the implorations
of his friends. The responsibility was still his:
he would not shirk it!

rThe general ignorance of our basic law was
.lever more apparent than in the widely held
belief that the Senate is part of the treaty-making

152

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

power of government, and that the President
acted autocratically in refusing to take that
august body to Paris with him in its entirety.
The Constitution, as a matter of fact, places
the foreign relations of the nation in the hands
of the President alone. No one_elsehas power or
voice! The making of a treaty withTany foreign
natTohls the duty of the President, and responsi-
bility rests upon him and upon no other. The
sole business of the Senate is to ratify or to
reject the treaty when the President has made
it. In this, as in a score of other ways, the
Constitution is unwieldy, for it was written in a
day when we boasted of our isolation, and its
framers did not conceive of a time when foreign
relations would furnish the country its most
important and complex questions. Until the
defect is remedied by amendment, however,
it is the law, and the President was faced by a
responsibility that he could not have evaded |
had he so desired.

The selection of the personnel of the Commis-
sion came next, and, as is generally the case
in the United States, personalities dwarfed prin-
ciples. Within a week both press and people
were far more concerned with the men who
were to go to Paris than with what they were to
do in Paris. The number decided upon was
four, exclusive of the President, and two of the
places were filled from the first. The Secretary
of State, by virtue of his position, was compelled
to be chosen, although there was the exact knowl-
edge that he would contribute nothing to the
general strength. Colonel House was equally in-

153

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

evitable, owing to the President's continuous use
of his services in foreign affairs and the intimate
knowledge of European conditions thus gained.

Looking back, there is no question that much
bitterness and antagonism would have been
averted had the President selected ex-President
Taft and Mr. Root for the two remaining places.
They were logical choices, for at the time both
were more or less committed to the League of
Nations and to a peace of justice, and the ap-
pointment of these eminent Republicans would
have appealed to the country as big and broad.
After prolonged deliberation, the President de-
termined against them. He knew that the
Allied countries seethed in unrest, and that
radicalism was the ruling force in Europe, not
reaction. Mr. Root had failed with his Russian
mission by reason of his reputation as America's
foremost champion of the "capitalistic system,"
and the President feared that his presence as a
peace delegate would work prejudice at the out-
set. As for Mr. Taft, there was his indelible
record as a genial, peace-loving soul who never
let convictions stand in the way of concord.
Although the moving spirit in the League to
Enforce Peace, and an ardent champion of the
President's program throughout the war, he
commenced to wabble at the beginning of the
congressional campaign, and by the time his
Republican associates had finished their per-
suasions his performances were truly acrobatic.
As the President saw it, the prime qualification
of a commissioner was an ability to hold to
convictions for more than a day at a time.

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

With these two men eliminated, the field of
selection was left bare and sterile. Judge
Hughes might have passed muster, although this
is doubtful, but in his case the President was
explicit. The evasions of the ex-justice in the
campaign of 1916, the belief among many people
that he was angling for the German vote, his re-
fusal to take a position on any question of the day,
had disgusted the President even more than it had
chilled the Republican party. As for Mr. Roose-
velt, his antagonism to the Fourteen Points was
open and bitter, and throughout the campaign he
had stood for a "dictated peace," insisting that
America was without right to interfere in the im-
position of such terms as the Allies saw fit. When
it came to making a selection from the Senate the
case was hopeless. From Senator Lodge straight
down the line every Republican had followed
Mr. Roosevelt, and stood committed irrevocably
against the Fourteen Points that had been
accepted by the Allies as the base of settlement.

Never very patient in such matters, for the
business of appointment was always an irrita-
tion to him, the President ended his difficulties
by selecting Secretary of War Baker and Mr.
Henry White. The choice of Mr. Baker was a
wise one, for, whatever his lacks in other direc-
tions, he has a mind that is as quick as it is
tireless, as deep as it is brilliant, and he is never
more impressive than in those mental clashes
that call for the nice commingling of firmness
and adroitness. Realizing, as the President did
not, that his presence was more necessary in the
United States than in Paris, Mr. Baker declined

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the honor, an exhibition of unselfish devotion to

.duty for which he has never been given credit.

The man to have put in his place was ex-Secre-
tary McAdoo, not only by reason of his force and
genius, but because of the fact that his control of
the Treasury throughout the war had given him
an intimate familiarity with European condi-
tions and needs. There was never any chance
of this, however, for the President's horror of
i_nepotism is close akin, to mania. Gen. Tasker
H. Bliss, while a man of rare scholarship and
very real ability, stood in the public mind merely
as a soldier. The selection of Mr. Henry White
was a very honest effort to please the Republicans
as well as a very sincere attempt to strengthen
the Commission by a very necessary note. Mr.
White had been an ambassador to Italy and
France by the appointment of Republican
Presidents, had served as the head of many
American delegations to international confer-
ences, and he knew the European diplomatic
mind as a fox knows its burrow.

As a matter of fact, however, the American
Commission to Negotiate Peace was not an im-
portant body in the true sense of the word.
When one thought of France, England, and
Italy it was not in terms of commissions,
but in terms of Sonnino, Clemenceau, Lloyd
George and Orlando. Just as each of these was
the sole source of power, his nation's picked
champion, so was it a foregone conclusion that
Woodrow Wilson would have to stand out as
America's source of power, America's picked
champion. What forecast itself was no round-

156

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

table argument, shared in by scores of com-
missioners, but a grapple of four wills, a test of
strength confined to four chosen leaders. What
the President needed on the Commission, and
he knew it, was not counselors, but men who
would guard his back. — ^

The truly important body — and this the
President realized from the first — was the group
of experts that went along with the Commission,
the pick of the country's most famous specialists
in finance, history, economics, international law,
colonial questions, map-making, ethnic dis-
tinctions, and all those other matters that were
to come up at the Peace Conference. They
constituted the President's arsenal of facts, and
even on board the George Washington, in the
very first conference, he made clear his de-
pendence upon them.

"You are, in truth, my advisers," he said,
"for when I ask you for information I will have
no way of checking it up, and must act upon it
unquestioningly. We will be deluged with claims
plausibly and convincingly presented. It will be
your task to establish the truth or falsity of these
claims out of your specialized knowledges, so
that my positions may be taken fairly and
intelligently."

It was this expert advice that he depended
upon, and it was a well of information that never
failed him. At the head of the financiers and
economists were such men as Bernard Baruch,
Herbert Hoover, Norman Davis, and Vance
McCormick. As head of the War Industries
Board, in many respects the most powerful of

157

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

all the civil organizations called into being by
the war, Mr. Baruch had won the respect and
confidence of American business by his courage,
honesty, and rare ability. At his side were such
men as Frank W. Taussig, chairman of the
Tariff Commission; Alex. Legg, general man-
ager of the International Harvester Com-
pany; and Charles McDowell, manager of the
Fertilizer and Chemical Departments of Armour
& Co. — both men familiar with business con-
ditions and customs in every country in the
world; Leland Summers, an international me-
chanical engineer and an expert in manufactur-
ing, chemicals, and steel; James C. Pennie, the
international patent lawyer; Frederick Neilson
and Chandler Anderson, authorities on interna-
tional law; and various others of equal caliber.

Mr. Hoover was aided and advised by the
men who were his representatives in Europe
throughout the war, and Mr. McCormick, head
of the War Trade Board, gathered about him
in Paris all of the men who had handled trade
matters for him in the various countries of the
world.

Mr. Davis, representing the Treasury Depart-
ment, had as his associates Mr. Thomas W.
Lamont, Mr. Albert Strauss, and Jeremiah
Smith of Boston.

Dr. Sidney E. Mezes, president of the College
of the City of New York, went with the President
at the head of a brilliant group of specialists,
all of whom had been working for a year and
more on the problems that would be presented
at the Peace Conference. Among the more

158

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

important may be mentioned: Prof. Charles
H. Haskins, dean of the Graduate School of
Harvard University, specialist on Alsace-Lor-
raine and Belgium; Dr. Isaiah Bowman, di-
rector of the American Geographical Society,
general territorial specialist; Prof. Allyn A.
Young, head of the Department of Economics at
Cornell; George Louis Beer, formerly of Colum-
bia, and an authority on colonial possessions;
Prof. W. L. Westermann, head of the History
Department at the University of Wisconsin and
specialist on Turkey; R. H. Lord, professor
of history at Harvard, specialist on Russia and
Poland; Roland B. Dixon, professor of ethnog-
raphy at Harvard; Prof. Clive Day, head of the
Department of Economics at Yale, specialist
on the Balkans; W. E. Lunt, professor of his-
tory at Haverford College, specialist on northern
Italy; Charles Seymour, professor of history at
Yale, specialist on Austria-Hungary; Mark Jef-
ferson, professor of geography at Michigan
State Normal, and Prof. James T. Shotwell,
professor of history at Columbia.

These groups were the President's real coun-
selors and advisers, and there was not a day
throughout the Peace Conference that he did *
not call upon them and depend upon them.

And so the expedition sailed. As the George
Washington left its anchorage and slipped down
the Hudson to the sea, a thousand whistles
screamed, a million onlookers cheered, and a
great tity rocked to the waves of an exultant
patriotism. An old naval officer, standing on
the deck, recalled the return of Dewey in 1898,

159

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the madness of welcome that awaited the hero
of Manila, and reflected in bitterness that in
less than a year the cheers had turned to abuse.
He harked back to Washington, beloved and
honored in the day of victory, yet leaving office
in humiliation and heartsickness, followed by
jeers and imprecations. "We are people of the
hive," he said. "When the king bee has per-
formed we kill him."

Signs were not wanting to support the gloomy
prophecy. Already the signal fires of partizan-
ship were blazing from every hilltop, and Re-
publican leaders were sending the burning arrow
from state to state. On November 27th, five
days before the President's departure, Mr. Roose-
velt had cried this message to Europe, plain
intimation that the Republican majority in the
Senate would support the Allies in any repudia-
tion of the League of Nations and the Fourteen
Points:

Our allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should
all understand that Mr. Wilson has no authority whatever
to speak for the American people at this time. His leader-
ship has just been emphatically repudiated by them.
The newly elected Congress comes far nearer than Mr.
Wilson to having a right to speak the purposes of the
American people at this moment. Mr. Wilson and his
Fourteen Points and his four supplementary points and his
five complementary points and all his utterances every
which way have ceased to have any shadow of right
to be accepted as expressive of the will of the American
people.

He is President of the United States. He is a part of
the treaty-making power; but he is only part. If he acts
in good faith to the American people, he will not claim
on the other side of the water any representative capacity

160

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

in himself to speak for the American people. He will say
frankly that his personal leadership has been repudiated
and that he now has merely the divided official leadership
which he shares with the Senate.

. . . America played in the closing months of war a
gallant part, but not in any way the leading part, and she
played this part only by acting in strictest agreement
with our allies and under the joint high command. She
should take precisely the same attitude at the Peace Con-
ference. We have lost in this war about 236,000 men
killed and wounded. England and France have lost about
7,000,000. Italy and Belgium and the other Allies have
doubtless lost 3,000,000 more. Of the terrible sacrifice
which has enabled the Allies to win the victory, America
has contributed just about 2 per cent.

It is our business to act with our allies and to show an
undivided front with them against any move of our late
enemies. I am no Utopian. I understand entirely that
there can be shifting alliances.

But in the present war we have won only by standing
shoulder to shoulder with our allies and presenting an
undivided front to the enemy. It is our business to show
the same loyalty and good faith at the Peace Conference.
Let it be clearly understood that the American people
absolutely stand behind France, England, Italy, Belgium,
and the other Allies at the Peace Conference, just as she has
stood with them during the last eighteen months of the
war. Let every difference of opinion be settled among the
Allies themselves, and then let them impose their com-
mon will on the nations responsible for the hideous disaster
which has almost wrecked mankind.

What Mr. Roosevelt did, in words as plain
as his pen could marshal, was to inform the
Allies that they were at liberty to disregard the
President, the League of Nations, and the Four-
teen Points, and that the Republican party
would stand as a unit for as hard a peace] as
Foch chose to dictate. Had he signed a power

161

of attorney he could not have given any freer
hand to Lloyd George and Clemenceau.

The President was at all times aware of the
I risks that he ran, the dangers that he faced. The
joy of the armistice, that caught every one in its
tidal sweep, was, perhaps, his last experience
with unalloyed happiness. I was on the George
Washington as his guest, my errand to France
haying no other object than to wind up the
affairs of the Committee on Public Information.
The legends that associated my work with
censorship and repression made demobilization
the part of wisdom, and the same reasons forced
the conclusion that any personal connection with
the Peace Conference would be distorted and
attacked. One evening, as we walked the deck,
I spoke to the President of the tremendous help
that his addresses had been to us in our work —
of the wholehearted response of the peoples of
earth, their gladness in his words, the joyful
liberation of their thought. The one incom-
pleteness was in connection with the Central
Powers. In a score of ways we had reached the
public opinion of these countries with the mes-
sage of America, but what seemed necessary
now was to put the story of American idealism
before them in all of its splendid fullness. New
governments were forming in Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Jugoslavia and not only was it
important to impress them with the true nobility
of our purpose, but there were also the sullen-
nesses of Germany, Austria, and Hungary that
might be wiped out by an explicit relation of the
facts.

162

WHY THE PRESIDENT WENT TO PARIS

The President stood silent for quite a while, and
when he turned to me at last his face was as
bleak as the gray stretch of sunless water.

"It is a great thing that you have done," he
said, "but I am wondering if you have not un-
consciously spun a net for me from which there
is no escape. It is to America that the whole
world turns to-day, not only with its wrongs,
but with its hopes and grievances. The hungry
expect us to feed them, the roofless look to us
for shelter, the sick of heart and body depend
upon us for cure. All of these expectations
have in them the quality of terrible urgency.
There must be no delay. It has been so always.
People will endure their tyrants for years, but
they tear their deliverers to pieces if a millennium
is not created immediately. Yet you know, and
I know, that these ancient wrongs, these present
unhappinesses, are not to be remedied in a day
or with a wave of the hand. What I seem to
see — with all my heart I hope that I am wrong — I
is a tragedy^fjdisapppintment.**

PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION

BREST brimmed with flower-bearing children
— it seemed as if the jardins des enfants of
France had been poured into the streets of the
town — and on the way to Paris the train passed
through a veritable lane of women and little
ones crying: "Vive VAmerique! Five le Presi-
dent!" They crowded the stations, they lined
the fields, and their shrill pipings were the last
thing we heard at night, the first thing in the
early dawn. Paris was splendid! All that was
fine and brave and generous in the nation poured
out like wine in those first days.

Dear and heart-warming as it was, however,
the President had not come to France for his
gratification, but on a stern errand th'at brooked
no delay. He asked at once about the Con-
ference, and there began the series of delays
that were carefully and skilfully planned to
give time for the subsidence of popular emotion.
It was explained that Lloyd George was fighting
for his political life in the English elections,
that Orlando and the Italians were not ready,
that France could not bear to let him commence
serious conversations until he had received her
full tribute — and seen the devastated area; and
there were also the plans that had been arranged

164

PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION

for his visits to England, Italy, and Belgium.
The statesmen knew well that had the Con-
ference convened upon the President's arrival,
it would have been suicide to resist a single
Wilson proposition, for the peoples of the Allied
countries were still in the grip of a great joy, a
great gratitude, and a great faith. In equal
degree these wise old men knew that it would be
only a matter of weeks before these very people,
going back to their ruined homes and desolate
lives, would be thinking in terms of victory and
indemnities.

The President was bitterly disappointed at the
delay, but, since there was no other alternative,
he accepted the situation with good grace.
His one successful resistance was to the repeated
effort to have him visit the devastated area.
It was obviously the French desire to stir him
to a passion of resentment against the Germans,
and, keen as were Mr. Wilson's sympathies, he
did not mean to let himself be swayed from
high purposes by any process of harrowing. At
every point, and at every moment, there was
this organized campaign on the part of the
politicians to center thought on France's wrongs
and to keep discussion away from the League
of Nations and the Fourteen Points. All the
while the Paris papers filled their columns with
despatches from the United States, telling of
the President's repudiation by the Republican
Senate majority, and informing Europe that
the American people were behind France, not
Wilson.

In England an even more disturbing mani-
165

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

festation of intent was witnessed. To win the
election of December i8th Lloyd George was
forswearing himself and his pledges with a
shamelessness that was equaled only by that
of the English people in forcing and applauding
such a course. Speaking on November nth,
the day that the armistice was signed, Lloyd
George made this declaration of faith :

They [the conditions of peace] must lead to a settlement
which will be fundamentally just. No settlement that
contravenes the principles of eternal justice will be a per-
manent one. The peace of 1871 imposed by Germany
on France outraged all the principles of justice and fair
play. Let us be warned by that example. We must not
allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping
desire, to override the fundamental principles of righteous-
ness. Vigorous attempts will be made to hector and bully
the government in an endeavor to make them depart from
the strict principles of right, and to satisfy some base,
sordid, squalid idea of vengeance and of avarice. We must
relentlessly set our faces against that. . . .

A large number of small nations have been reborn in
Europe, and these will require a League of Nations to
protect them against the covetousness of ambitious and
grasping neighbors. In my judgment a League of Nations
is absolutely essential to permanent peace. We shall
go to the Peace Conference to guarantee that a League of
Nations is a reality.

On December nth, at a time when the Presi-
dent of the United States was on the sea, coming
to Europe to receive the fulfilment of the
pledges made him, Lloyd George was begging
votes on a platform of "Hang the Kaiser" and
"Make Germany pay the whole cost of the war."
As he said in Paris, grinning as though it were
all a joke, "Heaven only knows what I would

166

PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION

have had to promise them if the campaign had
lasted a week longer."

England cheered the President even more .
enthusiastically than Paris — the same England
that had voted to repudiate his program just
one week before — and even as the ovation rang
loudest Clemenceau was informing the Cham-
ber of Deputies that the old-fashioned system
of alliances must be maintained. Fairly shouting
his defiance to the League of Nations, he de-
clared on December 3 1st that "there is an old
system which appears condemned to-day, and
to which I do not fear to say that I remain
faithful at this moment. Countries have or-
ganized the defense of their frontiers with the
necessary elements and the balance of power."

The Italian situation also had its disquieting
features. While in Paris on December igth the
King of Italy and his advisers had sounded out
the President on the subject of annexing Fiume
and a large section of the Dalmatian, coast.
This plan did not have the full-hearted support
of either the King or Orlando, and as yet had
not been mentioned to the Italian people, but
was entirely the jingoistic conception of the
reactionary Sonnino. The President did not
attempt to conceal either his sense of shock or
his unalterable opposition. He made it clear
that he stood for every Italian claim that had
been openly advanced, and would support the
return to Italy of the Trentino, Triest, and
part of Istria, but that he saw nothing but in-
justice and new war in the original and startling
proposition to seize the only possible seaport of

167

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the Jugoslavs. The Italians seemed to ac-
quiesce, but the surrender was more apparent
than real.

On the journey to Rome Ambassador Page
boarded the President's train at Modane, and in
his party was a messenger from Mr. Hearley,
the Commissioner for Italy of the Committee
on Public Information. He told me that the
program for the President, as arranged by Or-
lando and Sonnino, had excited wide-spread
discontent by its exclusion of the people them-
selves. I looked over the sheet brought by the
ambassador and saw for myself that the plan of
entertainment considered only the royal and
official circles. Mr. Hearley 's suggestion was
that the President had an empty hour after his
luncheon with the Queen Mother, and that as he
drove back to the Quirinal the citizens of Rome
were eager to have him stop at the Piazza Vene-
zia for a meeting that would be the people's own.
I took the matter up with the President at once,
and after consultation with the ambassador,
who saw no impropriety in the arrangement, I
was given permission to telegraph the Presi-
\ dent's consent to Mr. Hearley.

At twelve o'clock of the day Admiral Grayson
brought word that the "official entertainers" had
entered a very vigorous protest against the plan
and that the President thought it wise to cancel
the engagement. I explained to the admiral
that this was impossible, as thousands were al-
ready gathered at the Piazza. Venezia and
nothing but misunderstanding and bitter dis-
appointment could result from the announcement

168

PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION

that the President had changed his mind at the
last moment. The invitation had been extended
and accepted in good faith, and, as the pledge of
the President had been given, surely the Italian
government would not wish to put him in a
position of extreme embarrassment. The mes-
sage came back that the President would keep
the appointment, but that the hour would have
to be four o'clock instead of two-thirty o'clock.
Orlando and Sonnino, working quickly, had
arranged for a number of interviews that were
not on the program.

As early as one o'clock the great square facing
the Umberto Memorial was filled with men,
women, and children, and by two there must
have been 50,000 people packed in the Piazza
and the near-by streets. Four o'clock came, and
with it a message from the President to tell the
waiting throngs that he was being delayed for
half an hour. Alpini, Arditi, and plain citizens
ran through the crowd like mad, shouting the
news. Despite the fact that all had been stand-
ing for four hours, a great and happy cheer went
up when it was learned that the President would
come eventually. Time dragged on, and it was
not until six o'clock that we heard the trumpets
and saw the outriders that marked the approach
of the King and the President. Every one
figured, as a matter of course, that a stop would
be made, but the procession swept by at full
speed on its way to the Chamber of Deputies.
A groan went up from the gathered thousands,
and with the Latin emotionalism that one finds
only in Italy women cried and men threw their

169

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

hats upon the ground and tore wildly at their
hair.

It was not until the next day that I learned
the full story of the wretched afternoon. Un-
able to change the President's plans, Orlando and
Sonnino went to work deliberately to block them.
Interview after interview was arranged in haste
and thrust forward with peremptoriness, and
^vhen the President, out of all patience, was
about to put on his coat to go out the King
himself was produced for the purpose of an offi-
cial conference on matters of state. At last
there was the understanding that the car would
be stopped at the Piazza Venezia, but this was
not done. It was told to me later, by a sym-
pathetic member of the court circle, that the
reason for it all was Sonnino's fear that the
President, speaking extemporaneously to the
people, might bring up the Fiume proposal.
This would have been fatal to the plans of the
politicians, for they had not yet commenced
their propaganda campaign, and all Italy was
thinking in terms of peace and justice, not in
terms of annexation and renewed hostilities.
Undoubtedly the President guessed at this, for
in his speech before the Chamber of Deputies
he declared that the full independence of the
Balkan States must not be interfered with by
any dream of annexation.

The planned interruptions of the afternoon,
reaching a climax in the deceit that carried him
by the Piazza Venezia without a halt, stirred
the President to a deep and bitter resentment,
and the last act of the drama added to his dis-

170

PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION

trust of Sonnino. A statement of the affair,
cautious enough to guard against offense and
yet sufficiently explicit to absolve the President
in the minds of the people, was killed by the
Italian censorship. In its stead the official
press carried the bland announcement that the
President had never had any intention of speak-
ing to the people at the Piazza Venezia, the false
report being the work of trouble-makers.

Throughout the stay in Rome it was amus-
ingly apparent that only the King and the peo-
ple believed in the President and his ideals.
The Cabinet, dominated by Sonnino, epitomized
reaction. As a matter of fact, the King himself
was the only man in the Italian government
who seemed to have any faith in democracy /at
all. A sturdy little figure, homely, but very
appealing, his simplicity went home to the
heart of the President on the occasion of their
first meeting in Paris.

"Good Lord!" the King groaned as he looked
around him at the splendors of the Hotel Murat,
"we can't give you anything like this at the
Quirinal."

The President reached Paris on the morning
of January 7th, and was dismayed to learn that
Lloyd George had not yet arrived, and that a
visit to Belgium was in process of arrangement.
As firmly as might be, the President served
notice that touring was at an end and that he
must insist upon an instant convocation of the
Peace Conference. His very evident indigna-
tion forced an end to the deliberate dawdling,
and on January I2th the first meeting of the

171

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Supreme Council was held. A primary task
was the amendment of the armistice terms,
and, this done, the President drove straight at
the fundamental point, inviting a test of strength
on the question of the League of Nations. He
won. When the discussion ended announcement
was made that the League of Nations would
be "at the head of the order of the day at the
first full meeting of the Peace Conference."

On January I5th, however, he suffered a
reverse, the Council deciding against open
sessions.

^^M. Tardieu in the course of a recent article
^attempts to prove that Clemenceau was at all
times an advocate of publicity. Nothing is
farther from the truth. The President and
Lloyd George made the fight for the admission
of the press, and were voted down by the union
of France, Italy, and Japan. It was only under
the pressure of an aroused public opinion that
Clemenceau and his two supporters yielded to
the extent of permitting the full sessions of the
Conference to be open. Frankly, the French
governments attitude toward publicity was a
source of irritation throughout the entire Con-
ference. Before leaving Washington the Presi-
dent had announced the suspension of American
censorship of every kind, and had requested
both France and England to pursue a similar
course, stating his belief that the peoples of the
world were entitled to the fullest possible in-
formation with respect to the Peace Treaty.
Both governments agreed, but on arrival in
Paris it was discovered that the British were

172

PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION

living up to their pledge only in part, while the
French were disregarding it entirely. The Presi-
dent's protests were specific and repeated, but
only England heeded them.

The cleverness of the French was never more
apparent than in their concealment of responsi-
bility for the unfortunate condition, for it was
even the case that they persuaded many to
believe that President Wilson himself was the
source of repression. So intelligent an observer
as Dr. E. J. Dillon was deceived, and has writ-
ten as follows in his Inside Story of the Peace
Conference:

It was characteristic of the system that two American
citizens were employed to read the cablegrams arriving
from the United States to French newspapers. The
object was the suppression of such messages as tended to
throw doubt on the useful belief that the people of the
great American Republic were solid behind their Presi-
dent, ready to approve his decisions and acts, and that his
cherished Covenant, sure of ratification, would serve as a
safe guaranty to all the states which the application of his
various principles might leave strategically exposed. In
this way many interesting items of intelligence from the
United States were kept out of the newspapers, while
others were mutilated and almost all were delayed. Pro-
tests were unavailing. Nor was it until several months
were gone by that the French public became aware of the
existence of a strong current of American opinion which
favored a critical attitude toward Mr. Wilson's policy and
justified misgivings as to the finality of his decisions.
It was a sorry expedient and an unsuccessful one.

Nothing could be farther from the facts.
There was no such censorship, and never at any
time were "two American citizens" employed
for any such purpose. The proof of it may be

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

found in the Paris press of December and Janu-
ary. Every paper, on its front page, carried
daily despatches from Washington informing
the French people that Wilson was not the spokes-
man of the United States, but only a repu-
diated politician. On December i8th Sena-
tor Knox made a bitter attack upon the League
of Nations, declaring that the whole question
should wait "until the Allies had imposed their
terms," and on December 2Oth Senator Lodge
delivered a lengthy address along the same lines.
Both of these speeches were "played up" in the
French and English press, and other regular
features were the assaults of Roosevelt. Also
on December 2ist Senator Lodge made a speech
in favor of Clemenceau's appeal for "secret
sessions," and this was reprinted with keen
delight. As early as January 1st such papers as
L'Echo de Paris and the London Post were
carrying editorials stating that the attitude
of the Republican Senate majority "placed full
power in the hands of the Allies," but that this
power must be used wisely, as any open humilia-
tion of Mr. Wilson might be resented.

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, attached to the
American Peace Commission at the time, has
given proof of the extent to which the campaign
was organized and directed:

A secret document showing how the French press —
a large part of which is notoriously controlled by the
government — was being marshaled against the influence
of the President and in support of French interests actually
came into the possession of one of the American commis-
sioners. It was in the form of official suggestions of

174

•

PARIS AND PROCRASTINATION

policy of French newspaper editors, and it contained three
items:

First, they were advised to emphasize the opposition to
Mr. Wilson in America, by giving all the news possible
regarding the speeches of Republican Senators and other
American critics.

Second, to emphasize the disorder and anarchy in Russia,
thereby stimulating the movement toward Allied military
intervention.

Third, to publish articles showing the ability of Germany
to pay a large indemnity.

At all times there was plain evidence of this
secret relation between__£EiIEHn3]ugovernment
and the French press. The President, induced
to regard private discussions as sacredly con-
fidential, kept his pledge to the point of an
absurd reticence. No American newspaper man
could win a word from him with reference to
any controversial matter until decisions were
reached and duly announced. On the other
hand, the French contentions, the French points
of view, were communicated secretly but regu-
larly to the French press, a pleasant practice
that continued until the President served warn-
ing that he would not submit to it a day longer.

Repudiated and assailed by the Republican
majority, every attack being reprinted with
joyousness by a French and English press, meet-
ing at every turn the stubborn antagonism of
cynical statesmen bent upon a policy of delay
until they were ready to stab, and faced by the
patent fact that the "power of the people" was
confined to the presentation of flowers and city
keys, it was only the driving force of the Presi-
dent's faith that compelled the meeting of the

175

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Supreme Council of January I2th and secured
the selection of the League of Nations as a first
order of business. And with this faith as his
sole support he turned now to the first meeting
of the Peace Conference, where the real battle
was to be fought.

"THE BIG FOUR'

NO council-chamber ever witnessed the meet- \
ing of four more widely dissimilar person-
alities than those that faced in Paris for the pur-
pose of restoring peace and order to a distracted,
war-torn world. In character, temperament,
training, culture, ideas, and ideals the President,
Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Sonnino stood
out as studies in contrast, and these differences
were rendered more acute by a conflict in aims
that was as instant as it was fundamental. Eng-
land, France, and Italy were gathered as victors
to impose terms upon a defeated enemy, their
whole intent embittered by the wretchedness
and desolation at their backs. The settlement
with Germany accomplished, and accomplished
according to the Mosaic formula, they were willing
to talk of world peace and international concert,
but not until then. Only the mind of the
President was unclouded by any passion of anger \
or self-interest.

The Allied point of view found a vigorous and
complete expression in Clemenceau, better known
as "The Tiger." Mr. Keynes, more concerned
with striking phrase than true characterization,
may call Clemenceau "dry in soul and empty

177

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

of hope,"1 but no one else gained any such impres-
sion. The whole soul of the man flamed with
a passion for France, his hopes for France were
insistent demands, and to the support of an
aggressive nationalism he brought the strength
of a bull and the direct charge of a rhinoceros.
As a youth he had writhed under the Prussian
entry into Paris; from 1871 to 1914 he had seen
his country exist as a nation by the sufferance of
Berlin, and it was the memory of these un-
happy, humiliating years that dominated him at
every stage of the Conference. Reparation was
not a determining consideration with him by
any means. What he wanted, what France de-
manded, was security. Better a prostrate Ger-
many, too weak to pay, than a Germany strong
enough to pay, and therefore srong enough to
repeat the assaults of 1870 and 1914. It was
this fear, burned into French consciousness by
a half-century of dread, that Clemenceau felt
and expressed. When he presented claims that
violated the principles of settlement it was
in no spirit of mean rapacity, but in obedience
to a very natural instinct of self-preservation.
France was sick of living under the Prussian
sword. The simplicity of Clemenceau's problem
added immeasurably to the innate strength of
the man. He stood for France, for France
alone, and the devastated area was a background
that not only robbed the stand of sordidness,
but gave it a certain heroic quality. Squat and
powerful, his long arms reaching well below his
knees, his old face gnarled into the shape of a

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
178

"THE BIG FOUR"

bludgeon, he was an embodiment of the primi-
tive, the savage, as he stood over the -bleeding,
prostrate form of France and bellowed his
challenges.

The President, on the other hand, was cast
in no such picturesque role. He fought for
principles, always less dramatic than the personal,
and neither could he point behind him to a war-
ravaged land. He had to find his foothold
among seeming abstractions, while Clemenceau
was privileged to fix his feet on the solid gran-
ite of an uncompromising demand. Clemenceau
could talk concretely, while the President was
forced to talk generally. He could appear the
man of action, while the President, in the nature
of things, had to look the man of words.

Orlando, the Italian delegate, was a plump,
cheery little man, blessed with some approach to
democratic vision as well as a very real ability,
but at his back, controlling and directing, was
always Baron Sidney Sonnino, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Son of an Italian Jew and an
English mother, Sonnino had the age and
cynicism of Clemenceau without a single one of
the Frenchman's generous passions. Hair white
as snow, his age-stooped shoulders and hawk
face joined to give him the appearance of a bird
of prey. An imperialist in every inch of his old
body, believing implicitly in secret diplomacy
and the balance of power, Sonnino foresaw the
triumphs of the Allies at the time Italy entered
the war, and dreamed a dream of divided spoils
that would restore the ancient glories of his
country. The claim to Fiume, cutting off the
is \ 179

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Slavic hinterland from any Adriatic port, was
his conception entirely, and at every point in
the Conference he stood like iron against "Uto-
pian theories" and "emotional experiments."

Working by himself, Orlando would have been
of inestimable value to his country, but Sonnino
was a millstone that dragged him down. Taci-
turn to the point of sullenness, offensive to the
point of insolence, and holding himself aloof
at all times, Sonnino was the most disliked man
in Paris. His constant pull and haul with
Orlando also had the effect of giving a weird
effect of contrariety to every Italian position.
What was said or done one day would be unsaid
and undone the next, and as a result even the
best friends of Italy were always in doubt as
to how she wished to be served.

As for Lloyd George, there is no parallel for
him in American politics, or in world politics,
for that matter. So completely does the quick-
silver quality of the man defy terse characteriza-
tion that it is, perhaps, the safest course to let
his political record define him. It was by rea-
son of his savage assault upon England's estab-
lished order and the English ruling class that
Lloyd George first rose to power. The House
of Lords was anathema to him, and not even
William D. Haywood ever inveighed so elo-
quently against the tyrannies and oppressions
of Special Privilege and Vested Interest. I was
in England in 1910 at the time when he was
driving through the Parliament act that stripped
the Lords of their veto power, and every true
Briton able to support a white collar and a top-

180

"THE BIG FOUR"

hat cried out against the Welshman as an assas-
sin who meant to "murder them in their beds,"
a form of death that, for some reason, seems to
hold a peculiar horror for Englishmen.

By his passionate championship 6f labor and
his strenuous advocacy of home rule for Ire-
land he was the idol of these groups, and Asquith,
forced to recognize his power in the Liberal
party, had to make a place for him in the Cabinet.
Growing in radicalism, in order to effect a dis-
tinction between himself and Mr. Asquith's
more conservative leadership, there is no doubt
that Lloyd George was reaching out for the reins
of power, but the sudden explosion of war com-
pelled a change in his plans. His patriotism
may not be questioned, but even the most ardent
patriotism can be made to take on the color
of one's desires. Out of his alliance with North-
cliffe came the bitter, unceasing attack upon
Asquith that eventually enabled Lloyd George
to aid in the overthrow of his party leader with
every appearance of sincere purpose. He failed,
however, to carry the bulk of the Liberal party
with him in his desertion, and this compelled
an alliance with his ancient enemies, the Tories.
No matter what the country, reactionaries are
ever hard bargainers and skilful traders, and
while Lloyd George rose to be Premier, the price
that he paid was the recantation of many of his
labor principles, complete abandonment of home
rule, and the placing of such Tories as Bonar
Law, Carson, Milner, Curzon, and Balfour at
his right hand in seats of power.

From that day to this his career has been
181

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

marked by one patent opportunism after the
other. Even while basing his December cam-
paign upon assertions that Germany would be
squeezed to the last pfennig and that the Kaiser
would be tried and hanged in the Tower of Lon-
don, he was solemnly assuring the liberal thought
of England that he would stand for the League
of Nations and a "peace of justice." In Paris
he fairly bubbled with enthusiasm over the
"rights of small peoples" and at the same time
ordered fresh troops to Ireland, Egypt, and
India to crush the rebellions of unhappy peoples.
One moment with Clemenceau and Sonnino,
the next a fine supporter of the President, he
swung like a pendulum between the compulsions
of his own decent principles and the necessity
of placating his Tory masters. To quote the
words of Doctor Dillon, an Englishman and
a former admirer of the Premier, "his conduct
appeared to careful observers to be traced mainly
by outside influences, and as these were various
and changing, the result was a zigzag. One
day he would lay down a certain proposition
as a dogma not to be modified, and before the
week was out he would advance the contrary
proposition and maintain that with equal warmth
and doubtless with equal conviction. Guided by
no sound knowledge and devoid of the ballast
of principle, he was tossed and driven hither
and thither like a wreck on the ocean."

A curious compound of drama, oratory, craft,
cynicism, vision, demagoguery, and idealism, the
perfection of the blend made Lloyd George at
once a hope and a despair. Only the brilliant

182

"THE BIG FOUR"

audacity of the man, his humor, bubbling
gaiety, and charm, enabled him to carry off
situations that would have shamed another.

At no time was the President deceived as to
the character or intent of his colleagues. One of
his most valuable possessions is an uncanny gift
of appraisement, and from the first he assessed
each man fairly and accurately. The impas-
sioned nationalism of Clemenceau, the medie-
valism of Sonnino, and the "grasshopper mind"
of Lloyd George were simple of understanding
after the first few meetings, and with every per-
sonal obstacle clear in his mind, he set to work
on the accomplishment of the purposes that
had brought him to Paris. Mr. Keynes, with
glib authoritativeness, may declare "that the
President had thought out nothing; when it came
to practice his thoughts were nebulous and
incomplete," but the facts dispute this impudent
assertion at every turn. What the President
carried to the Peace Conference was a definite,
concrete plan for a League of Nations, not as an
afterthought, but as an integral part of the
treaty, its very foundation, in fact, for he saw
plainly that the one hope of a just peace, a
world peace, was in the quick creation of an
independent, impartial machinery of adjustment
and adjudication.

In driving to his goal, however, he was arbitra-
rily limited both by internal and external re-
straints. Every warm impulse of his nature
stirred to the pathos of the desolated homesteads
of France, Belgium, Serbia, and Italy, and
even while he opposed many of the demands of

183

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

their spokesmen as calculated to continue the
very evils that had worked the wretchedness,
his sympathy was at all times with them. Com-
radeship is an instinct with him, and he could not
have forgotten, had he wished to do so, that
America had fought side by side with these
peoples. This very real understanding of their
wrongs, this sense of blood brotherhood, made
him patient of chicane, unfalteringly tolerant of
deceit and selfishness, and robbed him of weapons
that it would otherwise have been in his power
to use.

There is also this to bear in mind. When the
President, in behalf of America, served notice
upon the world that the Conference must present
a "peace of justice," he did not mean a "peace
of parole" by any means. Much of the mis-
understanding that muddles public thought
to-day is due to this confusion of justice with
such words as mercy, leniency, escape, con-
donement, etc. The President suffered from
no such confusion. What Germany had at-
tempted was an intolerable thing, and it was
right that she should be made to pay for the
attempt. The wrong that Germany had sought
to do the world and to civilization was the
greatest wrong in all history, and there must be
no weak purpose with regard to punishment.
There was to be no thought of crushing the
German people, but what had to be burned into
the consciousness of the German people was
a due sense of responsibility for the horrors
wrought by their mad ruler. Thus the President
,spoke and thus he thought.

184

"THE BIG FOUR"

Another difficulty in the path of the President
was the American situation. Each day saw
the French and English press filled with quota-
tions from the speeches of Republican Senators
and Republican politicians in which both the
President and his policies were repudiated and a
"peace of victory" urged. Particular emphasis
was placed upon Mr. Hays's declaration that
"America will uphold her allies in whatever
reparation they may exact for the frightful
outrages inflicted upon them by the accursed
Huns." x.

That no sympathy went out to the President \
is either a compliment to the strength of the
man or else a bitter commentary upon the fair
play of America, for his position was pitiable
and desperate. Instead of support from the
people whose declared ideals he championed,
there came only the steady shrilling of the Senate,
vile in its abuse, treacherous in its desertion
of war aims, enthusiastic in its encouragement
of every attack upon the President and his
principles. Facing him were men who jeered
him in their souls and whose minds were set
on his defeat. The obvious course was forbidden
to him by his conscience. If, for instance, he
appealed to the peoples of Europe against their f
rulers, what then? Granting that the iron cen-
sorship of France, England, and Italy would have
permitted his message to be printed, does any
one imagine that they would have presented it
fairly? Nothing is more certain than that a
great cry of "pro-Germanism" would have been
raised at once, and that the wild angers aroused

185

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

would have been deaf to argument or reason.
America itself, still hot with battle anger, would
have joined in the clamor no less than the Allied
countries, and the world would have surged
again to its former hates.

For him to have returned to the United States,
as a protest, would have been not merely deser-
tion, but actual betrayal. Left to themselves,
with every restraint removed, the Allies would
have harked back to the Congress of Vienna
for their inspiration, giving themselves entirely
over to their fears, hates, and rapacities, and
deciding upon a peace treaty at the last that
would have doomed the world to resume life
under the old menaces of catastrophe. Instead
of a League of Nations, with its great world
court for the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disputes, only a return to the evil balance
of power; instead of universal disarmament,
freeing the back of humanity from a crushing
burden, more millions into navies and even
larger standing armies; instead of permanent
peace, only the certainty of new and more terrible
wars. There was but one decision possible to be
made in honor, and that was to fight it out.
This decision the President made, and he brought
to its support a courage that never wavered, a
faith that beat down opportunism, a resourceful-
ness that bewildered his opponents, and a char-
acter that compelled their reluctant respect.

Mr. Keynes finds it in his conscience to write
that the President's mind was "slow and un-
adaptable," that he was somewhat "dull" and
often "bewildered"; that his hands, "while

186

"THE BIG FOUR"

capable and fairly strong, were wanting in sensi-
tiveness and finesse," that he lacked "the
dominating intellectual equipment necessary to
cope with subtle and dangerous spellbinders,"
and, crowning fault of all, "he was not only
insensitive to his surroundings in the external
sense, he was not sensitive to his environment
at all. What chance could such a man have
against Mr. Lloyd George's unerring, almost
medium-like sensibility to every one immediately
round him? To see the British Prime Minister
watching the company, with six or seven senses
not available to ordinary men, judging character,
motive, and subconscious impulse, perceiving
what each was thinking and even what each was
going to say next, and compounding with tele-
pathic instinct the argument or appeal best
suited to the vanity, weakness, or self-interest
of his immediate auditor, was to realize that the
poor President would be playing blind man's
buff in that party."

This expression of British malice, so peculiarly
revelational of the intense dislike for America
and Americans that dominates the average
Englishman, is best answered by the record.
The President met Clemenceau, Lloyd George,
and Sonnino on their own ground, fought them
with their own weapons, and won. Before many
days had passed his Tory associates were hysteri-
cal in their resentment against Lloyd George
for his weakness, contemptuously referring to
him as "Wilson's puppy dog," while the reaction-
ary French newspapers and the jingoistic group
in the Chamber of Deputies were equally bitter

187

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

against Clemenceau for permitting "the auto-
cratic Wilson" to bully him into the surrender
of French rights. The same hoarse screaming
came from Italy and Japan.

The League of Nations, urged only by the
President and resisted by every Premier, was
not only adopted, but adopted as a primary and
integral part of the Peace Treaty, the very key-
stone of the arch.

The German colonies, confidently looked upon
by England as loot, and the weak nations of the
world, about to be divided as part of the spoils,
were all withdrawn from conquest and annexa-
tion and placed under the supervision and pro-
tection of the League of Nations.

The French claim to the sovereignty of the
Saar Basin and the Rhine Valley was disputed
successfully, likewise the Italian claim to the
Jugoslavic seaport of Fiume, and Japan, instead
of holding Shantung as a prize of war, was forced
to accept the role of an economic concessionaire.

The German indemnity, instead of being fixed
at $40,000,000,000, was set at about $14,000,-
000,000, and placed under the direction of a
Reparations Commission that has the power
to accommodate payments to the needs and
abilities of the German people.

Mr. Keynes may* feel that the "old Presby-
terian" was "bamboozled," but no crow of self-
congratulation has yet escaped Lloyd George,
Clemenceau, or Sonnino, and the bitterness of
the imperialistic press of France, England, and
Italy continues unsoothed.

XII

THE OPENING BATTLE

HTHE sources of confusion and antagonism
•»• with respect to the treaty narrow down,
under analysis, to two fundamental miscon-
ceptions: the first as to the power and purpose
of the Peace Conference itself, and the second
as to its emphasis and procedure. There is a
somewhat general opinion, carefully cultivated,
that the Paris gathering had the scope and
authorities of a world court, and that it blundered
criminally and fatally in failing to realize that
its problems were not political or territorial, but
financial and economic.

The Peace Conference, as a matter of fact,
was in no sense a concert of nations, but merely
the assemblage of a group of victorious belliger-
ents for the sole business of determining matters
that concerned themselves and themselves alone.
They were joined only to re-establish their own
lives, to heal their own wounds, for any attempt
to order the affairs of the whole world, in the
absence of every neutral nation, would have been
unwarranted and resentable. The single con-
cern of the Conference was the settlement of the
war and questions arising out of the war. All
else was automatically excluded.

It was the case, to be sure, that definite bases
189

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

of settlement had been declared, and that many
solemn pledges bound the gathering to certain
great principles in connection with the estab-
lishment of a new world order with permanent
peace as its object. The application of these
principles to concrete injustices, however, was
neither the right nor province of the Conference.
The freedom of the seas, self-determination,
disarmament, arbitration — these and all other
related hopes were not in the authority of the
Conference, except as it chose to approve them,
but waited necessarily on the formation of an
inclusive, independent, and impartial body such
as was forecast by the proposed League of
Nations. Ireland, Egypt, and Morocco had no
more reason to be considered than Porto Rico,
Cuba, or the Philippines, for they were not Ger-
man possessions nor were they at stake in the
war. Their wrongs, and they were undoubted,
were for the adjudication of a world court,
not for the wrangle of a group of belligerents.
For America to have attempted to give England
orders as to Ireland would have been as futile
and absurd as for England to have issued a
mandate to America with respect to the Philip-
pines. The one result of such impudences
would have been an exaggeration of chaos, the
loss of the one hope that lighted the despairs of
oppressed peoples.

Refusing to recognize the obviousness of the
situation, Irish, Egyptian, and Hindu delega-
tions hurled themselves upon Paris and the
President, demanding instant adjustment of
their wrongs and refusing to admit that any-

190

THE OPENING BATTLE

thing else possessed larger importance. But for
the tragedy of it, there would have been laughter
in the confident assumption that the President
had only to "sign on the dotted line" in order to
give freedom to Ireland, India, and Egypt.
Their insistences rejected, the various revolu-
tionary groups joined hands with the reactionary
groups, and soon the world witnessed the amaz-
ing spectacle of imperialist and rebel, Tory and
Bolshevik, all joined in enthusiastic unity for the
defeat of the League of Nations. «._

The second contention— that the Conference I
should have refused to consider political and
territorial problems until a program of financial
and economic reconstruction had been worked
out — is the talk of ignorant specialists when it is
not the malignance of partizans. From the be-
ginning of time, the strongest force in human
nature has been the passion for liberty. Not
cold nor hunger nor wretchedness nor death has
ever hacTpower to'~subordmate the soul of man-
kind to the material considerations of life. The
words ot Wilson and the defeat of Germany
joined to give bright promise of a new order.
These forces released the aspirations of centuries,
and the Old World seethed in a spiritual tumult
that had no parallel save in the exaltations of the
Crusades. It is true enough that through the
President's windows came the cries of a suffering
world, but in no sense was it the wail of a nursing
child. It was the cry of men and women sick
of tyranny, and it came from their hearts and
souls, not from their bellies. Bread was not
their clamor, but freedom. The thing that

191

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

stirred them was not present needs, but ancient
\ wrongs.

For four hundred years the indomitable peo-
ples of Czechoslovakia had held to their national
hopes in spite of every cruelty of repression;
through bloody, terrible centuries the Poles
had dreamed their dream of nationality, and the
Jugoslavic peoples, unbowed by the Austro-
Hungarian yoke, were also standing erect at
last, pressing their faces against the stars. It
is reasonable to assume that such as these would
have put their passions to one side while be-
spectacled economists worked out the problems
of customs, exchange, fuel, and transport?
For close to half a century France had suffered
the memories of 1871, and the self-respect of the
nation was bound up in the restoration of Alsace-
Lorraine. Italy looked to the Irredenta as a
mother to her recovered child, and this spirit of
nationalism also compelled an early considera-
tion of the Adriatic tangle. Is it fair, or even
intelligent, to imagine that France and Italy
would have been content to think of Alsace-
Lorraine and the Irredenta in terms of coal and
iron and railroads?

It is true that finance and economics were
fundamental problems, but it is equally true
that the Peace Conference did not meet in an
emotional vacuum. Nothing is more unfair,
more mad, than the present smug theory that
the human equation could have been cold-
bloodedly put to one side while economists pawed
over charts and tables. The President saw the
situation in all of its pathetic hopelessness, and

192

THE OPENING BATTLE

even as he drove forward with the League of
Nations, so did he insist upon instant considera-
tion of the land titles of Europe. The League
was his safeguard against injustice, a guaranty
for the future, while a quick settlement of
European territorial claims, in his opinion, would
abate passion and stabilize mental processes,
permitting economic questions to be answered
sanely.

This order of business, however, was not in
accordance with the plans of the various Pre-
miers. While the Allies stood as a unit against
the League of Nations and the Fourteen Points,
each nation had its own secret ideas with regard
to the territorial readjustment of Europe. In
addition to the proposed annexation of the
Rhine Valley and the Saar Basin, France was
also taking a very feverish interest in the affairs
of the new Polish state, as well as giving much
thought and time to the cultivation of close
arrangements with Czechoslovakia. Italy was
rounding out her claims to Fiume and Dalmatia,
and considering new measures to check the
aspirations of the Jugoslavs. England, in full
control of the seas, could afford to look upon
Germany as a customer, rather than as a rival,
but was not yet willing to show her hand fully.
What complicated the situation still further
was the disclosure of secret treaties, made
prior to the American entry into the war, to be
sure, but never even hinted at until President
Wilson heard of them in Paris and demanded
to see them. Among the documents that he
forced to be laid on the board were the Treaty

193

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

of London, by which Italy was induced to declare
war; the agreement with Rumania in August,
1916; the various agreements in respect to
Asia Minor, and the agreements of 1917 between
France and Russia relative to the Saar Basin
and the left bank of the Rhine.

The President, as a matter of course, an-
nounced that he would refuse to be bound by
these secret and concealed arrangements, but of
all those assembled in Paris, only Venizelos
supported his stand. In a public statement,
the Greek statesman said that "A League of
Nations will do away with these treaties. As
a matter of fact, they were made before the real
purpose and significance of this was developed
and before America came into the conflict.
They no longer apply. At Versailles we all
agreed to the fourteen peace terms of President
Wilson. That agreement abrogates previous
secret treaties which are not in harmony with
it."

It is a matter of intense regret that Venizelos
could not have played a larger part in the Peace
Conference, for he had qualities of greatness
that dwarfed those of Lloyd George, Clemenceau,
and Sonnino. With his broad forehead, deep-set
thinker's eyes, and general suggestion of the
university, Venizelos gave little hint of the rev-
olutionist, yet it was his courage that drove
Prince George from Crete and sent a traitor
king into exile and disgrace. Venizelos sees as
far and sees as clear as any man in the world
to-day. As intense a nationalist as ever lived,
he holds his land and his people to ideals of

194

THE OPENING BATTLE

justice and refuses to let them be stained by a
single selfishness.

The Allies were not ready to face the issue,
partly out of a fear of the President's strength,
but principally because their own plans were
still in disarray. What seemed safe, therefore,
as a measure for gaining further time was the
disposition of the German colonies, and this
question was put to the fore. On its face, it
looked simple, for the peoples involved were
weak and helpless, and the transaction seemed no
more difficult than a book transfer from Germany
to the nations then in physical possession. All
had been arranged in advance and only signa-
tures were required. Japan was to hold the
province of Shantung in fee simple and was to
take over the Marshall and Caroline Islands;
Australia and New Zealand were to divide the
Southern Pacific possessions; South Africa was
to annex German territory; and the French were
to receive the Cameroons and Togoland.

The President, when faced with these pro-
posals, pointed to the fifth of the Fourteen
Points, which said that in colonial claims "the
interests of the populations concerned must
have equal weight with the equitable claims of
the government whose title is to be determined."
The Allies agreed enthusiastically to this prin-
ciple, but insisted that its application be delayed
until after the German colonies had been dis-
tributed. President Wilson stood like iron in
support of Point Five, insisting that the German
colonies should not be handed out like prize
packages, but must be placed under the pro-
14 195

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

tection and guidance of the League of Nations.
Mr. Hughes, the Australian Premier, was put
forward by England to make the open fight
against the President, and his bitter attack
reached the point of insult and abuse. The
French and British press, directly inspired,
joined in a hue and cry that continued until the
President informed Lloyd George and Clemen-
ceau that he would reveal the entire discussion
unless the guerrilla attack came to an end.
Neither of the Premiers dared to stand before the
world as cold-blooded annexationists, and in the
end the President scored a complete victory.
Article 22 of the Covenant accepts the mandatory
principle in its entirety. The French press gave
vent to its indignation in rather full degree, but
it was the English newspapers that voiced a
frenzy of reproach. Lloyd George was accused
of having cut the Empire into bits, attacked for
betraying the British tradition, and denounced
as a weakling who dared not stand out against
the autocracies of Wilson.

This decision was reached on January 29th.
On the 25th another success had been won by
the President, the first plenary session of the
Peace Conference adopting the project to estab-
lish a League of Nations as an integral part of
the Peace Treaty, and appointing a committee to
work out the details. The President was named
as chairman, and his associates were Lord Robert
Cecil, General Smuts, Leon Bourgeois, and
'Orlando. No lie was more assiduously circulated
at the time, or is more generally believed to-day,
than that the President's stubborn support of

196

the League of Nations was responsible for the
delay in framing the full Treaty of Peace. As
a matter of fact, the two engagements of January
1 8th and January 25th were as brief as they were
decisive, while the actual formulation of the
Covenant itself was done at night after the
President had given his day to the Peace Con-
ference. This incessant strain, forced upon
him by his sense of urgency, was what sapped
His strength, for he was compelled to depart
from the White House regimen that kept him
in health. ,_-

Much is made of the fact that when the Presi- 4
dent reached Paris he did not have a typewritten
constitution and by-laws in his pocket for im-
mediate production after the style-^of a constable
about to foreclose a chattel mortgage. Where
the President had the plan of the League was
in his mind, his heart, and his soul. The matter
was not one for thought, but one for agreement.
Every fundamental of the League's constitution
had been set down in his addresses time and
again. Its terms, as he saw them and as he had
stated them, were these: an end to the secret
treaties of secret diplomacy, disarmament, a
general council to sit continuously, arbitration
and the economic boycott as a substitute for
war, an end to private traffic in the munitions
of war, the establishment of a permanent court
of international justice, the protection of demo-
cratic nations brought into existence as the re-
sult of the Great War, and a system of manda-
tories for the upbuilding of weak peoples hitherto
handed about from power to power like so many

197

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

pawns. It was not phraseology that mattered —
any law clerk could write it out when agreed
upon — but^grinciples. In the discussions that
took place in the Hotel Murat, night after night,
Orlando was reserved, Bourgeois timid, Cecil
hesitant, and only Smuts, with the ardor and
vision of the colonial, had the courage to take
his stand side by side with the President, aiding
\ him at all times to drive forward.
j* All the while another question of tremendous
I import was pressing its demand for immediate
attention. This was the Russian situation.
Throughout the war the President, unable to
come to any positive agreement with France,
Great Britain, and Japan, and faced by the
utter impossibility of taking any single-handed
action, had more or less permitted the Russian
chaos to "take care of itself." This policy
could be persisted in no longer with safety, and
none realized it more keenly than the President.
Japan was taking advantage of every opportunity
to increase her armed force in Siberia, and French
opinion, concerned entirely with France's huge
loans to Russia, was solidly in favor of over-
throwing the Bolshevik dynasty, although some-
what uncertain as to the means. In the middle
of January Lloyd George ventured a hint that
it might be well to recognize the Lenin govern-
ment as a first step in the direction of stabiliza-
tion, but the outcry that rose instantly from
the conservatives of England and France sent
him scuttling to cover. The Republican leaders
in the Senate — -the selfsame group that later
listened with such keen sympathy to Mr. Bul-

198

THE OPENING BATTLE

litt's glowing picture of Bolshevism — joined in
the thunder of denunciation.

The next move in the confused game was the
proposal to hold a conference on Prince's Island
to which representatives of every Russian group
would be invited, the hope being that the Rus-
sians themselves might come to some agreement,
or, at least, simplify the situation so that the
Peace Conference could take a fair and definite
position. The idea was that of the President,
but it had the approval of England and France.
Lenin accepted the invitation with alacrity,
but the anti-Bolshevist groups declined with
fury and particularity. How far the French
encouraged this refusal will always be a matter
of conjecture, but there can be no doubt as to
Clemenceau's change from sullen acquiescence to
aggressive opposition. The Republican party
in the United States, and the conservative forces
of France and England, joined in bitter protest
against any "parley with assassins," and Clemen-
ceau was able to support his attitude by reference
to this opposition. Deserted by their own peo-
ple, the President and Lloyd George were unable
to go farther. Even as they debated, however,
the situation changed, forcing an action of the
very appearance that both men hated and
desired to avoid. Japan, waiting with curled
lip while the talk went on, announced that she
was sending 70,000 troops into Siberia for the
purpose of "protecting Japanese rights." It
was plain to be seen that Japan could not be
permitted to go into Russia alone. As quickly
as might be, England sent a force into northern

199

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Russia, French troops went to southern Russia,
and American troops traveled to guard the
Siberian Railway. It looked like a policy of
aggression, but, in reality, it was a policy of
protection. This, however, could not be ex-
plained, for the motives of Japan could not be
impugned, the honor of Japan could not be
questioned.

The Russian chaos exists to-day as a direct
result of the failure of the Prinkipo conference,
and it will continue to exist until democratic
nations are sufficiently in love with their practice
to make the admission that Russia is entitled
to have the kind of government that the people
want or seem to want. Whether one likes or
dislikes the rule of the proletariat is not the
question. It is what Russia likes, or, at least,
what Russia endures, that counts.

XIII

THE STAB IN THE BACK

'"THE early days of February, 1919, were
•*• bright with promise. The European press,
seeming to accept the President's leadership as
unshakable, was more amiable in its tone, the
bitterness bred by the decision as to the German
colonies had abated, Fiume and the Saar Basin
had taken discreet places in the background
with other deferred questions, and the voice of
French and English and Italian liberalism was
heard again. On February I4th the President
reported the first draft of the League con-
stitution— a draft that expressed his principles
without change — and it was confirmed amid
acclaim. It was at this moment, unfortunately,
that the President was compelled to return to
the United States to sign certain bills, and for the
information of the Senate he carried with him
the Covenant as agreed upon by the Allies. _«
We come now to a singularly shameful chapter «
in American history. At the time of the Presi-
dent's decision to go to Paris the chief point
of attack by the Republican Senators was that
such a "desertion of duty" would delay the
work of government and hold back the entire
program of reconstruction. Yet when the Presi-
dent returned for the business of consideration

201

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

and signature, the same Republican Senators
united in a filibuster that permitted Congress to
expire without the passage of a single appropria-
tion bill. This exhibition of sheer malignance,
entailing an ultimate of confusion and disaster,
was not only approved by the Republican press,

I but actually applauded.
+ The draft of the League constitution was

f denounced even before its contents were known
or explained. The bare fact that the document
had proved acceptable to the British Empire
aroused the instant antagonism of the "pro-
fessional" Irish-Americans, the "professional"
German-Americans, the "professional" Italian-
Americans, and all those others whose political
fortunes depended upon the persistence and
accentuation of racial prejudices. Where one
hyphen was scourged the year before a score

4 if hyphens was now encouraged and approved,
n Washington the President arranged a con-
ference with the Senators and Representatives
in charge of foreign relations, and laid the
Covenant frankly before them for purposes of
discussion and criticism. The attitude of the
Republican Senators was one of sullenness and
suspicion, Senator Lodge refusing to state his
objections or to make a single recommendation.
Others, however, pointed out that no express
recognition was given to the Monroe Doctrine;
that it was not expressly provided that the
League should have no authority to act or
express a judgment on matters of domestic policy;
that the right to withdraw from the League was
not expressly recognized; and that the constitu-

202

THE STAB IN THE BACK

tional right of the Congress to determine all
questions of peace and war was not sufficiently
safeguarded.

The President, in answer, gave it as his opinion
that these points were already covered satis-
factorily in the Covenant, but that he would be
glad to make the language more explicit, and
entered a promise to this effect. Mr. Root and
Mr. Taft were also furnished with copies of the
Covenant and asked for their views and criticism,
and upon receipt of them the President again
gave assurance that every proposed change and
clarification would be made upon his return to
Paris. On March 4th, immediately following
these conferences, and the day before the sailing
of the President, Senator Lodge rose in his place
and led his Republican colleagues in a bold and
open attack upon the League of Nations and
the war aims of America. The following account
of the proceedings is taken from the Congressional
Record:

MR. LODGE: Mr. President, I desire to take only a mo-
ment of the time of the Senate. I wish to offer the resolu-
tion which I hold in my hand, a very brief one:

Whereas under the Constitution it is a function of the
Senate to advise and consent to, or dissent from, the ratifica-
tion of any treaty of the United States, and no such treaty
can become operative without the consent of the Senate
expressed by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
Senators present; and

Whereas owing to the victory of the arms of the United
States and of the nations with whom it is associated, a
Peace Conference was convened and is now in session at
Paris for the purpose of settling the terms of peace; and

Whereas a committee of the Conference has proposed a
constitution for the League of Nations and the proposal

203

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

is now before the Peace Conference for its consideration;
Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the United States in the dis-
charge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to
treaties, That it is the sense of the Senate that while it
is their sincere desire that the nations of the world should
unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the
constitution of the League of Nations in the form now
proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted
by the United States; and be it

Resolved further, That it is the sense of the Senate that
the negotiations on the part of the United States should
immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the
urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany
satisfactory to the United States and the nations with
whom the United States is associated in the war against
the German government, and that the proposal for a
League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the
world should be then taken up for careful and serious
consideration.

I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration
of this resolution.

MR. SWANSON: I object to the introduction of the reso-
lution.

MR. LODGE: Objection being made, of course I recognize
the objection. I merely wish to add, by way of explanation,
the following:

The undersigned Senators of the United States, Mem-
bers and Members-elect of the Sixty-sixth Congress, hereby
declare that, if they had had the opportunity, they would
have voted for the foregoing resolution:

Henry Cabot Lodge James E. Watson

Philander C. Knox Thomas Sterling

Lawrence Y. Sherman J. S. Frelinghuysen

Harry S. New W. G. Harding

George H. Moses Frederick Hale

J. W. Wadsworth, Jr. William E. Borah

Bert M. Fernald Walter E. Edge

Albert B. Cummins Reed Smoot

F. E. Warren Asle J. Gronna
204

THE STAB IN THE BACK

Frank B. Brandegee Lawrence C. Phipps

William M. Calder Selden P. Spencer

Henry W. Keyes Hiram W. Johnson

Boies Penrose Charles E. Townsend

Carroll S. Page William P. Dillingham

George P. McLean I. L. Lenroot

Joseph Irwin France Miles Poindexter

Medill McCormick Howard Sutherland

Charles Curtis Truman H. Newberry
L. Heisler Ball

I ought to say in justice to three or four Senators who
are absent at great distances from the city that we were
not able to reach them; but we expect to hear from them
to-morrow, and if, as we expect, their answers are favorable
their names will be added to the list.

A full report of this action was cabled to
Europe, as a matter of course, and when the
President arrived in Paris on March I4th, ten
days later, he was quick to learn of the disastrous
consequences. The Allies, eagerly accepting the
orders of the Republican majority, had lost
no time in repudiating the President and the
solemn agreements that they had entered into
with him. The League of Nations was now
discarded and the plan adopted for a preliminary
peace with Germany was based upon a frank
division of the spoils, the reduction of Germany
to a slave state, and the formation of a military
alliance by the Allies for the purpose of guarantee-
ing the gains. Not only this, but an Allied
army was to march at once to Russia to put down
the Bolshevists and the treaty itself was to be
administered by the Allied high command, en-
forcing its orders by an army of occupation.
The United States, as a rare favor, was to be per-

205

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

mitted to pay the cost of the Russian expedition
and such other incidental expenses as might
arise in connection with the military dictatorship
that was to rule Europe.

While primarily the plan of Foch and the other
generals, it had the approval of statesmen, even
those who were assumed to represent the liberal
thought of England being neck-deep in the con-
spiracy. Not a single party to the cabal had
any doubt as to its success. Was it not the case
that the Republican Senators, now in the ma-
jority, spoke for America rather than the Presi-
dent? Had the Senators not stated formally
that they did not want the League of Nations,
and was the Republican party itself not on
record with the belief that the Allies must have
the right to impose peace terms of their own
choosing, and that these terms should show
no mercy to the "accursed Hun"? I was in
Paris throughout this period, and while regret
at the "passing of the President" was heard in
some quarters, the general feeling was one of great
satisfaction. There would now be an end to
this silly gabble about "ideals" and "justice."
The President allowed himself just twenty-four
hours in which to grasp the plot in all of its
details, and then he acted, ordering the issuance
of this statement :

The President said to-day that the decision made at the
Peace Conference in its Plenary Session, January 25, 1919,
to the effect that the establishment of a League of Nations
should be made an integral part of the Treaty of Peace,
is of final force and that there is no basis whatever for the
reports that a change in this decision was contemplated.

206

THE STAB IN THE BACK

This action of the President brought upon his
head the fiercest denunciation that had yet been
launched, and when he met with Clemenceau
and Lloyd George on March i8th their attitude
was one of truculence. In this crisis the Presi-
dent used no threats of any kind, for, as a matter
of fact, there were none that he could use.
Deserted by the peoples of the world, all of them
now committed to a "hurry up the peace"
policy, betrayed by the Congress of his own
country, and faced by a group of men able at
last to voice their resentment against principles
in which they had never believed, there was no
threat in his power that would not have recoiled
to his defeat and humiliation. Nor did he stoop
to appeals or persuasion. He simply talked
sense. Clearly, logically, convincingly, he ripped
the plan to pieces, showing that it was not only
unjust, but unworkable, and that instead of lead-
ing to firm ground it was committing the Allies
themselves to a quicksand from which there
was no escape. If they cast the Fourteen Points
to one side, where would it leave them ? France
would straightway seize the Saar Basin and the
Rhine Valley. Was that agreeable to England
and Italy? No! Italy would proceed at once
to make the Adriatic an "Italian lake,'* cutting
off Czechoslovakia, Austria, Jugoslavia, and
Hungary from their outlet to the sea. Putting
aside the certainty of armed resistance by the
Slavs, would France and England like that?
No! Poland, craftily directed by France, would
lay claim to East Prussia and all the territory
from the Baltic to the Black Sea? Even ignor-

207

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

ing the wars of freedom that would be waged by
Russians, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, and Ukrain-
ians, would England and Italy like that? No!
England would take over Persia, Mesopotamia,
the Hedjaz, Egypt, and the German islands in
the southern Pacific? Would France and Italy
like that? No-
Did they not have sense enough to see that
the thing they planned was no more than the
manufacture of new wars; that if it were put
into effect it would not be a year before England,
France, and Italy would not only be facing
armed revolt from within, but that each nation
would be in arms against the other, searching
eagerly for allies, and willing to make any agree-
ment, even with their former foes, that would
enable them to defeat their former friends?
They thought themselves intelligent, yet could
not discern that their greedy imperialism would
restore not only the reputation of the Central
Powers, but also their military strength? It
stood plain that they recognized the need of a
machinery to administer the terms of the Peace
Treaty. Were they fools enough to dream that
this administration could be furnished by the
Allied high command, backed by armies drawn
from the youth of America, England, Italy,
Japan, and the other associated nations? Did
they not have the vision to perceive that the
peoples of these nations were sick of militarism,
and that they would not stand for a military
dictatorship any more than would the people
of Germany? Were they so blind as not to see
that the League of Nations provided the very

208

THE STAB IN THE BACK

machinery — and a civil machinery — that was
needed? That the whole Peace Treaty would
fall to pieces without a fair, independent, civil
body to live on through the years that would
be necessary to carry out the treaty's provisions ?
What madness possessed them that they ima-
gined for one moment that the United States
would furnish the money for a Russian invasion
or for the maintenance of a military dictatorship
in Germany? „_

Under this merciless rain of logic Lloyd George \
curled up and Clemenceau writhed. There was
no answer to it, either from the gay insouciance
of the one or the insolence of the other. On
March 26th it was announced, grudgingly
enough, that there would be a League of Nations
as an integral part of the Peace Treaty. It was
now the task of the President to take up the
changes that had been suggested by his Re-
publican enemies, and this was the straw that
broke his back. There was not a single suggested
change that had honesty back of it. The League
was an association of sovereigns, and as a matter
of course any sovereign possessed the right of
withdrawal. The League, as an international
advisory body, could not possibly deal with
domestic questions under any construction of
the Covenant. No power of Congress was
abridged, and necessarily Congress would have
to act before war could be declared or a single
soldier sent out of the country. Instead r of

recognizing the Mnnrrw jQflf irrn^as. aft Arneriran

policy, the League legitimized it as a world
policy. The President, however, was bound to

209

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

propose that these plain propositions be put in
kindergarten language for the satisfaction of
his enemies, and it was this proposal that gave
Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and their associates
a new chance for resistance.

All of the suggested changes were made with-
out great demur until the question of the Monroe
Doctrine was reached, and then French and
English bitterness broke all restraints. Why
were they expected to make every concession
to American prejudice when the President would
make none to European traditions? They had
gone to the length of accepting the doctrine of
Monroe for the whole of the earth, but now,
because American pride demanded it, they must
make public confession of America's right to
give orders. No! A thousand times no! It
was high time for the President to give a
little consideration to French and English and
Italian prejudices — time for him to realize
that the lives of these governments were at
stake as well as his own, and that Lloyd
George, Clemenceau, and Sonnino had parlia-
ments to deal with that were just as unrea-
sonable as the Congress of the United States.
If the President asked he must be willing to
give.

"""As if at a given signal, France renewed her
claim for the Rhine Valley and the Saar Basin,
Italy clamored anew for Fiume and the Dalma-
tian coast, and Japan, breaking a long silence,
rushed to the fore with her demand for Shantung
in fee simple and the right of her nationals to
full equality in the United States. Lloyd George,

210

THE STAB IN THE BACK

threatened on one side by the British Labor
party and menaced on the other by his Tory
government, shifted painfully from one foot to
the other, wondering which way to jump.
Worn out in body by the terrific strain, the
President fell ill and took to his bed, but his
indomitable will would not let him quit the
struggle, and the Council of Four continued its
meetings, holding them in a room adjoining the
President's sick-room. Instead of sympathy for
his illness, there was only desperate intent to
take advantage of it. On April yth the President
struggled to his feet and faced the Council in
what every one recognized as a final test of
strength. There must be an end to this dreary,
interminable business of making agreements only
to break them. An agreement must be reached
once for all. If a peace of justice, he would
remain; if a peace of greed, then he would leave.
He had been second to none in recognizing the
wrongs of the Allies, the state of mind of their
peoples, and he stood as firmly as any for a
treaty that would bring guilt home to the Ger-
mans, but he could not, and would not, agree
to the repudiation of every war aim or to arrange-
ments that would leave the world worse off
than before. The George Washington was in
Brooklyn. By wireless the President ordered
it to come to Brest at once.

The gesture was conclusive as far as England
and France were concerned. Lloyd George
swung over instantly to the President's side, and
on the following day Le Temps carried this \
significant item:
15 211

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Contrary to the assertions spread by the German press
and taken up by other foreign newspapers, we believe that
the government has no annexationist pretensions, openly
or under cover, in regard to any territory inhabited by a
German population. This remark applies peculiarly to
the regions comprised between the frontier of 1871 and the
frontier of 1814.

Again, in the lock of wills, the President was
the victor, and the French and English press,
exhausted by now, could only gasp their con-
demnation of Clemenceau and Lloyd George.

XIV

THE ZERO HOUR

PHE week that followed was one of such prog-
•*• ress that on April I4th the Germans were
notified that they should present themselves at
Versailles on the 25th. Suddenly a new storm
broke. Angered beyond measure at the seeming
inability of their delegates to withstand the
force of the President, the House of Commons
and the Chamber of Deputies served notice
that they would not rest satisfied with less than
a "hard peace." The French radicals, of whom
so much had been expected, mustered 166 votes
against 334. From Italy came an imperative
demand for Fiume that aroused Orlando to a
frenzy of action. Day after day the President
battled along against the onslaught, for while
both Lloyd George and Clemenceau were op-
posed to the Italian claim, neither one had the
courage to come out in the open. The President
yielded to the point of agreeing to place Fiume
under genuine international control, but beyond
this he would not go. On April 23d, seeing no
end to the interminable discussion, he issued the
famous statement in which he defined and de-
fended the rights of the Jugoslavs to a seaport.
Straightway Orlando left the Conference and
set out for Rome, declaring that Italy would

213

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

neither sign the treaty nor join the League of
Nations. The President's statement had been
read and approved by Lloyd George and Cle-
menceau, but when the storm burst both hunted
cover and permitted newspaper announcement
to be made that neither of them had indorsed
the President's position.

It was at this moment that Belgium chose for
an expression of the anger that had been slowly
forming through the weeks. From the time it
became apparent that it was not in the power
of Germany to pay in full measure for the dam-
age inflicted the Belgians commenced to worry
for fear that France and England would appro-
priate the bulk of the reparations moneys, forcing
the "little fellows" to rest content with what
was left. Notice was now served on the Presi-
dent that unless the Belgian idea of justice
was met in all completeness, Belgium would
follow the example of Italy, withdrawing from
the Conference and refusing to become a signa-
tory to the treaty.

f Into this troubled situation the Japanese pro-
jected themselves with instancy and vigor.
Bluntly, stubbornly, they insisted upon the
validation of their claim to German rights in
Shantung. As far as legal title was concerned,
the Japanese contention was impregnable against
attack. Shantung had been wrested from the
Germans by force of arms, and the transfer of
German rights to Japan had been pledged by
France and England, and approved by China as
well. The President, however, looked beyond
the law and treaties to the justice of the case,

214

THE ZERO HOUR

and stood for the return of Shantung to the
Chinese as a first step in restoring the territorial
integrity of China. The Japanese were bitter
in their rejection of this theory. On April nth
the Peace Conference had denied them the racial
equality that should have been given to them.
Wounded in pride, deeply resentful of what
seemed to be a bold drawing of the color line,
Japan insisted upon her rights in Shantung
not only as a matter of honor, but as a demand
of national self-respect. They pointed to the
treaty in which France and England agreed to
support the Shantung claim. Was this now to
be regarded as "a scrap of paper"? Lloyd
George and Clemenceau answered that they still
felt themselves bound by their written agreement,
whereupon both Premiers walked out of the
room, leaving the President to make the fight
alone. Words were not wasted. If the Japanese
claim was not adjusted in fairness, Japan would
withdraw from the Conference and refuse to
sign the Peace Treaty.

The fate of the world now hung upon the
decision of the President, a man deserted by his
associates, repudiated by the parliamentary
body of his country, and unsupported by the
peoples from whose idealism so much had been
expected. Italy had already withdrawn from
the Conference, Belgium was making daily
threats of withdrawal, and now came the Japan-
ese with a similar ultimatum. It was not
merely the disruption of the Conference that
was to be feared; it was the world chaos that
impended. In Hungary the administration of

215

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Karolyi had been overthrown and Bela Kun
and his Bolshevists were in command; Austria
trembled on the edge of anarchy; Bavaria had
adopted a Bolshevist form of government; the
Poles and the Czechs were at swords' points;
red-flag parades were being held in Paris, and
wherever one looked there was hatred and fight-
ing. To delay the peace meant the turning
over of civilization to the forces of disorder.
To permit the disruption of the Conference
might give courage to Germany to enter the
field again. Above all, it would lose the League
of Nations!

Was this great fundamental, after all, not
more important than a detail or two? Was it
right to hazard the peace and security of the
world by any stubborn demand for immediate
perfection? None knew better than the Presi-
dent that if the Conference dissolved in anger
and confusion nothing but another world war
would restore the League of Nations to the
realm of practical politics. None knew better
than the President that the constitution of the
League contained every power of remedy for
the evils of the treaty, and that these powers
would be exercised wisely and effectively in
the day when the rule of reason should prevail
again. These were the considerations that
impelled the President to certain measures of
compromise. Facing the Japanese anew, he
told them that he would support their claim
to the German rights in Shantung if Japan, in
return, would agree to recognize the sovereignty
of China and rest content with the mere role

216

THE ZERO HOUR

of an economic concessionnaire. Upon this basis /
the settlement was made on April 29th.

The Italians had no such case in the matter of
Fiume, for even the Treaty of London specifi-
cally excluded this seaport. As a consequence
the President stood firm on this point. He
refused to change his position with respect to
the Polish demand for East Prussia and Dantzig,
insisting that the needs of Poland would be served
by the internationalization of the ancient city.
Neither was he shaken as to the continuance of
German sovereignty in the Rhine Valley and
over the Saar Basin, but in the last phase of this
debate he did make an important concession to
Clemenceau. This was the tripartite alliance
that pledged England and the United States to
come to the aid of France in event of any new
attack by Germany. Even had conditions been
vastly different, it is difficult to see how any
other action could have been taken in fairness or
generosity.

Clemenceau had been forced to surrender on
virtually every point in the French demand.
Punitive indemnities, the annexation of the
Rhine Valley and the Saar Basin, the League of
Nations — all of these were losing battles for
"The Tiger." What he asked at the last was
nothing more than reassurance, a gesture to
c«lm the hysteria of fear that shook his people.
The Americans and the British were returning
to their unravaged lands, leaving a desolated
France to live under the menace of an uncrushed
Germany. What stood in the way of such a
pledge? Had Mr. Roosevelt and the entire

217

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Republican party not attacked the President
savagely for his neutrality, urging France's
many claims upon America's generosity? Was
it not the case that the people and press of the
United States were a unit in admitting America's
obligations to the land of Lafayette and Rocham-
beau? Why, then, the hesitancy? It was true,
to be sure, that the League of Nations would
furnish the desired security, but the Republican
majority in the Senate had served notice that
it would not ratify the Covenant. What was
France to do in the mean time? Also was it
not a fact that the President had insisted upon
reopening a closed matter for the sake of exempt-
ing the Monroe Doctrine from the jurisdiction
of the League of Nations? What was this but
an obvious submission to the prejudices of his
people? Would he now deny Clemenceau's ap-
peal to have equal respect shown for the fears
of France? It was an argument that could not
be rejected by a just or generous man.

With the various disputes adjusted, com-
promised, or dismissed, the treaty took shape
rapidly, and on May 7th, fourth anniversary of
the Lusitania disaster, the German delegation
filed into the historic chamber at Versailles
where Bismarck had once stood in power and
arrogance, shouting the savage terms that were
assumed to work the annihilation of France.
The personnel of the delegation was unfortunate,
for instead of men expressive of a new and
democratic order, the head was Count Brock-
dorff-Rantzau, a pillar of Hohenzollernism, and
at his side grouped prominent figures of the old

218

THE ZERO HOUR

regime. Their attitude was truculent to the
point of insolence, and from the first it was
more their disposition to argue dead issues than
to deal intelligently with the presented problems.
Without attempt to play upon the passions of the
past, Clemenceau gave the text of the treaty to
Brockdorff-Rantzau, and informed him that an
answer would be required by May 2ist. Oral
discussion was barred, and this decision is the
sole ground for one of the most popular and
widely copied attacks upon the President:

Thus it was that Clemenceau brought to success what had
seemed to be, a few months before, the extraordinary and
impossible proposal that the Germans should not be heard.
If only the President had not been so conscientious, if
only he had not concealed from himself what he had been
doing, even at the last moment he was in a position to have
recovered lost ground and to have achieved some very
considerable successes. But the President was set. His
arms and legs had been spliced by the surgeons to a certain
posture, and they must be broken again before they could
be altered. To his horror, Mr. Lloyd George, desiring
at the last moment all the moderation he dared, discovered
that he could not in five days persuade the President of
error in what it had taken five months to prove to him to
be just and right. After all, it was harder to de-bam-
boozle this old Presbyterian than it had been to bamboozle
him; for the former involved his belief in and respect for
himself. Thus in the last act the President stood for
stubbornness and a refusal of conciliations.1

To charge that the Germans were not heard
is a well-nigh incredible distortion of the facts.
Oral discussion was barred for the very sound
and sensible reason that meetings would have
degenerated into unseemly wrangles, angers

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 54.
219

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

putting argument to one side, not to mention
the obvious effect of daily recrimination upon
the populations of the various countries. On
the other hand, written arguments and counter-
proposals were invited, and the Germans took
full advantage of this privilege. All in all, a
full score of objections and appeals were filed,
and these notes, with the Allied replies, were
given instant publication so that the world
might follow the negotiations. On May loth
the Germans discussed at length the clauses
relating to the repatriation of prisoners; on
May 1 2th, the question of reparations; on May
I3th, the proposed territorial changes; on May
l6th, the Saar Basin; on May 22d, the interna-
tional labor legislation; and on May 23d the
report of the German Economic Commission
was published, together with the Allied reply.
On May 2Oth an extension of time was asked
and granted, and on May 29th the complete
German counter-proposals were handed in and
straightway given to the press for the informa-
tion of all peoples. No fairer method of hearing
could have been devised. Instead of the hot
give-and-take of oral debate, confined neces-
sarily to a few principal figures, the Germans
were allowed time and opportunity for thought,
study, and consultation in order that their replies
might be full and authoritative, expressing the
deliberate opinions of their experts.

At no time did Lloyd George attempt to
persuade the President of error in this matter.
It is true that he called the whole British Cabinet
to Paris on June 1st for the purpose of consider-

220

THE ZERO HOUR

ing the advisability of modifying the peace
terms to Germany, but this is what every other
government was doing, and what the President
himself insisted upon. The Peace Treaty and
the German reply were before the world. As a
matter of common sense, it behooved the Peace
conferees to see that every German point
received full consideration, for the peoples of
earth were watching and waiting. From May
29th to June i6th the Council worked on the
German counter-proposals, weighing every word,
analyzing every claim, for it was the moral
judgment of mankind that would pass upon the
result of their labors.

It is to be wished that the two documents —
the German of May 29th and the Allied reply
of June i6th — could be printed in every language
and placed in every school and library, for they
furnish in themselves a complete and dramatic
exposition of the whole Peace Treaty, permitting
the formation of an intelligent and independent
opinion with respect to the confused question
of justice or injustice. The German note was
passionate without being strong, and even so
ardent an admirer as Mr. Keynes admits regret-
fully that it "did not succeed in exposing in
burning and prophetic words" the insincerity of
the transaction. The Allied note, on the con-
trary, had strength without passion, and even as
it made many and important concessions and
modifications, so was it at pains to explain every
rejection. -^

The principal German contentions were these: *
that the peace was one of violence, not justice;

221

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

that Germany did not commence the war; and
that the Allies had stated repeatedly that they
were not making war on the German people; it
should be taken into consideration that the
people were now in power, and that the new
government should not be held responsible for
the " faults " of the former government. To these
assertions this crushing rejoinder was made:

The protest of the German delegation shows that they
fail to understand the position in which Germany stands
to-day. They seem to think that Germany has only to
"make sacrifices in order to obtain peace," as if this were
but the end of some mere struggle for territory and power.
The Allied and Associated Powers therefore feel it neces-
sary to begin their reply by a clear statement of the judg-
ment of the world, which has been forged by practically
the whole of civilized mankind.

In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers the war
which began on the 1st of August, 1914, was the greatest
crime against humanity and the freedom of the peoples
that any nation calling itself civilized has ever consciously
committed. For many years the rulers of Germany, true
to the Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance
in Europe. They were not satisfied with that growing
prosperity and influence to which Germany was entitled,
and which all other nations were willing to accord her, or
the society of free and equal position.

They required that they should be able to dictate and
tyrannize over a subservient Europe, as they dictated and
tyrannized over a subservient Germany. In order to
attain their ends they used every channel through which
to educate their own subjects in the doctrine that might
was right in international affairs. They never ceased to
expand German armaments by land and sea, and to propa-
gate the falsehood that it was necessary because Ger-
many's neighbors were jealous of her prosperity and power.
She sought to sow hostilities and suspicion instead of
friendship between nations.

222

THE ZERO HOUR

They developed a system of espionage and intrigue
through which they were enabled to stir up international
rebellion and unrest, and even to make secret offensive
preparations within the territory of their neighbors, where-
by they might, when the moment came, strike them down
with greater certainty and ease. They kept Europe in a
ferment by threats of violence, and when they found that
their neighbors were resolved to resist their arrogant will
they determined to assert their predominance in Europe
by force.

As soon as their preparations were complete, they en-
couraged a subservient ally to declare war on Serbia at
forty-eight hours' notice, a war involving the control of the
Balkans, which they knew could not be localized and which
was bound to unchain a general war. In order to make
doubly sure, they refused every attempt at conciliation
and conference until it was too late and the World War was
inevitable for which they had plotted and for which alone
among the nations they were adequately equipped and
prepared.

Germany's responsibility, however, is not confined to
having planned and started the war. She is no less respon-
sible for the savage and inhuman manner in which it was
conducted. Though Germany was herself a guarantor of
Belgium, the rulers of Germany violated their solemn
promise to respect the neutrality of this unoffending people.
Not content with this, they deliberately carried out a
series of promiscuous shootings and burnings with the sole
object of terrifying the inhabitants into submission by the
rery frightfulness of their action.

They were the first to use poisonous gas, notwithstanding
the appalling suffering it entailed. They began the bombing
and long-distance shelling of towns for no military object,
but solely for the purpose of reducing the morale of their
opponents by striking at their women and children. They
commenced the submarine campaign, with its piratical
challenge to international law and its destruction of great
numbers of innocent passengers and sailors in midocean,
far from succor, at the mercy of the winds and waves, and
the yet more ruthless submarine crews.

223

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

They drove thousands of men ana women and children
with brutal savagery into slavery in foreign lands. They
allowed barbarities to be practised against their prisoners
of war from which the most uncivilized people would have
recoiled.

The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human
history. The terrible responsibility which lies at her doors
can be seen in the fact that not less than 7,000,000 dead
lie buried in Europe, while more than 20,000,000 others
carry upon them the evidence of wounds and suffering,
because Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny
by a resort to war.

Justice, therefore, is the only possible basis for the set-
tlement of the accounts of this terrible war. Justice is
what the German delegation asks for, and says that Ger-
many has been promised. But it must be justice for all.
There must be justice for the dead and wounded, and for
those who have been orphaned and bereaved, that Europe
might be free from Prussian despotism. There must be
justice for the peoples who now stagger under war debts
which exceed $30,000,000,000 that liberty might be saved.
There must be justice for those millions whose homes and
lands and property German savagery has spoliated and
destroyed.

This is why the Allied and Associated Powers have
insisted as a cardinal feature of the treaty that Germany
must undertake to make reparation to the very uttermost
of her power, for reparation for wrongs inflicted is of the
essence of justice. That is why they insist that those
individuals who are most clearly responsible for German
aggression and for those acts of barbarism and inhumanity
which have disgraced the German conduct of the war
must be handed over to justice, which has not been meted
out to them at home. That, too, is why Germany must
submit for a few years to certain special disabilities and
arrangements.

Germany has ruined the industries, the mines, and the
machinery of neighboring countries, not during battle, but
with the deliberate and calculated purpose of enabling her

224

THE ZERO HOUR

own industries to seize their markets before their industries
could recover from the devastation thus wantonly inflicted
upon them. Germany has despoiled her neighbors of
everything she could make use of or carry away. Germany
has destroyed the shipping of all nations on the high seas,
where there was no chance of rescue for the passengers
and crews.

It is only justice that restitution should be made, and
that these wronged peoples should be safeguarded for a
time from the competition of a nation whose industries
are intact and have even been fortified by machinery
stolen from occupied territories.

If these things are hardships for Germany, they are
hardships which Germany has brought upon herself.
Somebody must suffer for the consequences of the war.
Is it to be Germany or the peoples she has wronged ? Not
to do justice to all concerned would only leave the world
open to fresh calamities. If the German people themselves,
or any other nation, are to be deterred from following the
footsteps of Prussia; if mankind is to be lifted out of the
belief that war for selfish ends is legitimate to any state;
if the old era is to be left behind, and nations as well as
individuals are to be brought beneath the reign of law, even
if there is to be early reconciliation and appeasement — it
will be because those responsible for concluding the war
have had the courage to see that justice is not deflected for
the sake of a convenient peace.

It is said that the German revolution ought to make a
difference, and that the German people are not responsible
for the policy of the rulers whom they have thrown from
power. The Allied and Associated Powers recognize and
welcome the change. It represents great hope for peace
and a new European order in the future, but it cannot
affect the settlement of the war itself.

The German revolution was stayed until the German
armies had been defeated in the field and all hope of profiting
by a war of conquest had vanished. Throughout the war,
as before the war, the German people and their representa-
tives supported the war, voted the credits, subscribed to
the war loans, obeyed every order, however savage, of their

225

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

government. They shared the responsibility for the policy
of their government, for at any moment, had they willed
it, they could have reversed it.

Had that policy succeeded they would have acclaimed
it with the same enthusiasm with which they welcomed the
outbreak of the war. They cannot now pretend, having
changed their rulers after the war was lost, that it is justice
that they should escape the consequences of their deeds.

In conclusion, the Allied and Associated Powers must
make it clear that this letter and the memorandum attached
constitute their last word. They have examined the
German observations and counter-proposals with earnest
attention and care. They have, in consequence, made
important modifications in the draft treaty, but in its prin-
ciples they stand by it.

They believe that it is not only a just settlement of the
Great War, but that it provides the basis upon which the
peoples of Europe can live together in friendship and
equality. At the same time it creates the machinery for
the peaceful adjustment of all international problems by
discussion and consent, and whereby the settlement of
1919 itself can be modified from time to time to suit new
facts and new conditions as they arise.

Another important German demand was for
immediate admission to the League of Nations.
In answer, the Allies expressed earnest hope of
the "early entry of Germany into the League,"
but felt that it would be wise to wait until the
revolution proved itself a "permanent change."

Military terms were modified, the revision
permitting Germany to maintain temporarily
an army of 200,000 instead of 100,000, certain
demands with respect to Helgoland were granted,
and important rectifications were made as to the
Polish frontier. While explicit refusal met the
German request to retain Dantzig, instead of

226

THE ZERO HOUR

turning it over to the League of Nations, the
German contention for a plebiscite in Upper
Silesia was allowed. It was also agreed that the
historic frontier between Pomerania and West
Prussia should be established.

German objections to the Schleswig settlement
were answered by the statement that the plebis-
cite, as planned, was no more than what Prussia
had promised by treaty in 1864. It was also
explained that the award of the communal woods
of Prussian Moresnet to Belgium was not puni-
tive, but merely partial compensation for the
destruction of Belgian forests.

With respect to her colonies, Germany agreed
that they should be turned over to the League
of Nations, but claimed the right to be named as
mandatory. 'This was rejected by reason of the
abuses that invariably attended German colonial
administration, and the theory of hampered
economic development was met by the proof
that pre-war figures showed that only one-half
of I per cent, of Germany's exports and one-half
of i per cent, of her imports were with her own
colonies.

While accepting obligation to pay for all
damages sustained by the civil populations in
the occupied parts of Belgium and France,
Germany opposed reparation to other occupied
territories in Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Ru-
mania, and Poland, as no, attack in contradiction
to international law was involved. In answer
it was pointed out that the President's Fourteen
Points, explicitly accepted by Germany as a
base of settlement, made plain statement that

16 227

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the damage to these countries must be paid
for. While it was denied that liberated coun-
tries should be expected to pay any part of the
German war debt, there was admission that they
should bear their proper portion of pre-war
debts.

Questions of reparations, coal, shipping, river
control, and other economic phases of the dis-
cussion will be treated in succeeding chapters,
as they call for more than brief comment.

MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD

VARIOUS references have already been made '
to The Economic Consequences of the Peace,
the work of John Maynard Keynes, an English-
man. In considering the details of the treaty,
these references will become increasingly numer-
ous, for more exactly and comprehensively than
any other Mr. Keynes has caught up and ex-
pressed every attack, misrepresentation, dis-
tortion, and malignance. His book — jerked into
notoriety by those who hate the President,
endowed with scriptural values by every German,
Austrian, and Hungarian, copied extensively
by reactionary and radical publications, and
hailed with joy by the semi-intelligent as a
short cut to statecraft — has done more than
any other thing to poison the wells of public |
opinion.

An American wit once said that an accountant/
was merely a "bookkeeper out of a job.'* He
might have commented also that the usual
economist is a clerk risen to the importance of
carrying a leather portfolio. Another confusion
is in the matter of definition. In America
"liberal" implies a state of mind; in England
Liberal applies to a national political party.

229

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

In America liberalism is based upon ideals; in
England Liberalism is based upon partizan-
ship. These distinctions must be borne in mind
in any consideration of Mr. Keynes's book.
He does not write as a liberal, but as a Liberal,
and his book is in no sense the protest of an out-
raged conscience, but the explicit announcement
of a party program in support of a definite party
objective.- The Liberals of England have never
forgiven Lloyd George for his desertion and
betrayals, and his vagrant course at the Peace
Conference provided the opportunity for assault
that was denied them during the war. The
Welsh chameleon and his Tory associates are
now to be thrown out of office, and Liberals and
Labor are to be put in their places. This is Mr.
Keynes's primary offensive, and at the end he
states it frankly, explaining that "the replace-
ment of the existing governments " is a necessary
! preliminary to any honest readjustment.

The Premier is held up to scorn as an oppor-
tunist when he is not scourged as a charlatan, and
the consequences of his opportunism and char-
latanry are painted in terms of anarchy, disaster,
and ruin. The flings at President Wilson are
largely incidental, included, perhaps, for the
sake of the American sale, but chiefly for the
purpose of catering to that large segment of the
British population that is never so happy as in
hearing America and Americans shamed and
derided.

Having launched the drive to "kick the ras-
cals out," the next step, naturally, is a platform
based upon national and material interests.

230

MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD

Lloyd George and the Tories have done fairly
well by England in the matter of profits. It must
be shown to the electorate that Mr. Keynes and
the Liberals can do better. The result is a cold-
blooded program based upon the betrayal of
every obligation of honor and friendship. In the
first place, America is urged to cancel England's
indebtedness, and in event that we are not
generous enough to adopt the suggestion, there
is the frank threat of repudiation. This done,
America is to make a new loan.

In the second place, the program calls explicitly
for the complete rehabilitation of Germany and
the equally complete demoralization of France.
In plain words, France is to be destroyed as a
rival and Germany is to be built up as a customer.
There is no longer any German merchant marine,
there are no longer any German colonies and the
German hold on world trade has been broken
in the Levant, the Orient, Africa, and South
America. England's control of the seas is abso-
lute, and therefore England has nothing to fear
from German rehabilitation, but everything to
hope. A rich, powerful Germany — cut off from
the sea — may become a menace to the Continent,
but not to England. It is from England that
the Germans will be forced to buy — it is through
England that Germany will be forced to sell.
The weak point in the plan is German poverty;
and the remedy for this is the restoration of
Germany to her pre-war status, minus colonies,
navy, and merchant marine. Mr. Keynes works
boldly to his object, not fearing to paint this
picture of the idyllic conditions of 1914:

231

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

The interference of frontiers and of tariffs was reduced
to a minimum, and not far short of three hundred millions
of people lived within the three Empires of Russia, Ger-
many, and Austria-Hungary. The various currencies,
which were all maintained on a stable basis in relation to
gold and to one another, facilitated the easy flow of capital
and of trade to an extent the full value of which we only
realize now, when we are deprived of its advantages. Over
this great area there was an almost absolute security of
property and of person.1

At whatever cost — to the Continent — this
happy family must be brought together again.
It is "abhorrent and detestable" that France
should be permitted to recapture Alsace-Lor-
raine and exercise suzerainty over the Saar
Basin, although Mr. Keynes is able to view with
equanimity the English seizure of Germany's
African possessions. The Dantzig corridor for
Poland is part of a policy "not authorized by
religion or natural morals," but Mr. Keynes's
religion and morals approve the taking and
keeping of the German ships by England. An
"unworkable" condition is created by the action
of the Poles and Czechs in assuming control of
the Silesian coal-fields, but every interest of
efficiency is served by the action of England in
absorbing Persia, annexing Egypt, and filching
Mesopotamia and the Hedjaz. Through all the
centuries "perfide dlbion" has been a cry of hate
and reproach, but it has remained for this Eng-
lish government clerk, writing in the name of
humanity, to give new and greater force to the
ancient indictment of British faith.
(At every point, in every word, The Economic

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 15.
232

MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD

Consequences of the Peace is a brutal attack upon
England's allies — that they may not be permitted
to dispute England's program of trade imperi-
alism— and an equally indecent attempt to
restore Germany as an European autocracy,
robbed of sea-power and barred from world
trade, and therefore forced to buy and sell
through England. France is derided and re-
buked, her wrongs ignored, her sufferings min-
imized. Belgium is an object of contempt, for,
while Mr. Keynes admits a certain amount of
sacrifice in 1914, "she played a minor role'*
thereafter and sacrificed as little as possible,
thinking it sufficient to pride herself on not
having made long ago a separate peace with
Germany.

Poland, no less than Belgium and France,
excites anger by the bare presumption of na-
tional existence. "She is to be strong, Catholic,
militarist and faithful, the consort, or at least
the favorite of victorious France, prosperous
and magnificent between the ashes of Russia and
the ruin of Germany. Rumania, if only she
could be persuaded to keep up appearances a
little more, is a part of the same scatter-brained )
conception."1

Prof. Charles D. Hazen of Columbia has
characterized this as a "gift of quite gratuitous
insult" and points it out as an "excellent example
of Mr. Keynes's highly perfected art of slurring
those who helped win this war, without under-
going the labor of presenting the situation with
any fairness."

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 291.
233

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Another authority, Prof. Charles H. Haskins
of Harvard, has also passed judgment in these
words :

Throughout the book the author's economic conceptions
are curiously static. He pleads for the restoration of pre-
war conditions as far as possible, irrespective of the fact
that they gave Germany a position of peculiar advantage
in Europe, and he opposes any correction of this balance in
favor either of France or of the new states of the East.
Having adopted a Germanocentric theory of European
economic life, he follows it through. A little more imagina-
tion would show him that many readjustments are possible
with the opening up of new natural resources and lines of
trade and with the extension of the industrial revolution to
eastern Europe; and a little more sympathy with non-
German peoples would show him the injustice of re-estab-
lishing a state of affairs which Germany exploited to her
own selfish advantage. Readjustment inevitably causes
hardship in Germany, but it is necessary to prevent Ger-
man dominance over peoples whom the war has at last
set free.

Professor Haskins is mistaken, however, in
assuming that Mr. Keynes is content with any
mere "restoration of pre-war conditions." With
the Imperial German Empire restored — ex-
cepting colonies and ships, which England will
retain — the claims of Belgium, France, Serbia,
and Italy eliminated, and the absurd pretensions
of Poland and Czechoslovakia wiped out, the
next step in the program is to turn Russia over
to "German enterprise and organization" for
the restoration of Russian productivity. To
quote Mr. Keynes:

It is impossible geographically and for many other
reasons for Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Americans to un-
dertake it; we have neither the incentive nor the means for

234

MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD

doing the work on a sufficient scale. Germany, on the other
hand, Has the experience, the incentive, and to a large
extent the materials for furnishing the Russian peasant
with the goods of which he has been starved for the past
five years, for reorganizing the business of transport and
collection, and so for bringing into the world's pool, for the
common advantage, the supplies from which we are now
so disastrously cut off. It is in our interest to hasten the
day when German agents and organizers will be in a posi-
tion to set in train in every Russian village the impulses of
ordinary economic motive.1

Nor is this all. One of Mr. Keynes's important
"remedies" is the establishment of a free union
of countries "undertaking to impose no protec-
tionist tariffs whatever against the produce of other
members of the union. Germany, Poland, the
new states which formerly composed the Austro-
Hungarian and Turkish Empires, and the man-
dated states should be compelled to adhere to this
union for ten years, after which time adherence
would be voluntary. The adherence of other states
would be voluntary from the outset. But it is to
be hoped that the United Kingdom, at any rate,
would become an original member. . . . By the pro-
posed Free Trade Union some part of the loss of
organization and economic efficiency may be re-
trieved, which must otherwise result from the in-
numerable new political frontiers now created
between greedy, jealous, immature, and economically
incomplete nationalist states. Economic frontiers
were tolerable so long as an immense territory was
included in a few great empires, but they will not
be tolerable when the empires of Germany, Austria-

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, pp.
293-294.

235

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Hungary, Russia, and Turkey have been parti-
tioned between some twenty independent author-
ities."1

tin plain words, Mr. Keynes proposes to have
:he treaty give to Germany what Germany failed
to win by war. The "greedy, jealous, and im-
mature" small states, having won their freedom
from Germany by blood and sacrifice, are to be
restored to the commercial ownership of Ger-
many in the sacred name of economics. It is
the German dream of Mittel-Europa that Mr.
Keynes wants to see come true. The list of
countries that he sets down is precisely the list
that Doctor Naumann enumerated in his grandi-
ose plan for gaining for Germany the economic
mastery of central and southeastern Europe.
Compelled to enter the union and denied the
right to erect a single tariff barrier against Ger-
many, the new states would indeed be given a
splendid chance to build up their industries!
The one change in the Mittel-Europa program,
as declared by Naumann, is that the United
Kingdom will also enter, cannily directing and
sharing in the profits of this economic conquest.
These brutalities might be forgiven to Mr.
Keynes, for he is the inheritor of commercial
traditions. For centuries the British govern-
ment has made trade its god, annexation its
religion, and while there is reason to believe that
a new generation is commencing to view hypoc-
risy and rapacity with disgust, the official class
is still the creature of old habit. It is impossible,

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, pp.
265-266.

236

MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD

however, to forgive him for his inhumanity.
That is a personal quality. Nothing stands
more clear than that the military masters of
Germany precipitated the World War in cold
blood, working a horror of desolation that is ex-
pressed in millions of graves, in sad hosts of
maimed and blind, in the destruction of cities,
the devastation of great areas, the ruined lives
of whole populations, and the blight of a future
that had every promise of fairness. One searches
in vain through the pages of Mr. Keynes for a
single word of condemnation addressed to Ger-
many— for a single word of sympathy addressed
to Belgium, France, Italy, or Serbia. Almost
tearfully he quotes paragraph after paragraph
from German writers telling of the sufferings of
German children, and in one foot-note he prints
this pathetic story:

You see this child here, the physician in charge explained;
it consumed an incredible amount of bread, and yet did not
get any stronger. I found out that it hid all the bread it
received underneath its straw mattress. The fear of hunger
was so deeply rooted in the child that it collected stores
instead of eating the food: a misguided animal instinct
made the dread of hunger worse than the actual pangs. •**

No one would wish to take away a throb of
pity from the little ones of the Central Powers
and each day sees America raising vast amounts
for child relief in Germany, Austria, and Hun-
gary. But is no word to be said in behalf of
the children of France, of Belgium,, of Poland,
of Serbia, and of Italy? What of the desolated
homes in Allied countries, the tragic flights of
families, of whole communities; the tragic toll

237

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

rin human life that was taken by hunger, cold,
and hardship? Of all this there is no word from
Mr. Keynes. Human wretchedness must cry
its despair in German to reach his ears. At
one point he says:

The German commentators had little difficulty in showing
that the draft treaty constituted a breach of engagements
and of international morality comparable with their own
offense in the invasion of Belgium.

Professor Hazen has made the best comment,
saying:

This amazing statement accurately presents the tone that
pervades the book from cover to cover. From this passage,
as from many others, the reader can form his own idea of
the sobriety of judgment, the restraint of language, the
intellectual discrimination of the author. The world^put-
'• side central Europe long ago formed a very definite idea of
the morality involved in the invasion of Belgium. Mr.
Keynes places the treaty alongside as a fit and adequate
companion-piece. He is entitled to all the repute he may
get as a fair thinker from that phrase. At any rate, he gives
us a clear revelation of his critical standards.

As bearing upon the fairness of Mr. Keynes,
it is noteworthy that there is neither record nor
remembrance of any advancement of his "liberal"
views while acting as a representative of the
British Treasury at the Peace Conference. The
members of the American delegation, such as
were concerned with reparations, have the very
distinct recollection that his one effort was to
get everything possible for the British Empire,
regardless of justice, and that his only other bias
was a certain definite antagonism to France and
the French. Also, in a recent letter to Prof.

238

MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD

Allyn Young this amazing economist expressed
regret that his book should have been construed
as an attack upon the President, concluding,
naively, "Of course I recognize that President
Wilson was the noblest figure in Paris." x.

In the matter of honor Mr. Keynes is no less '
peculiar and individual, as stands proved by the
slightest consideration of what he is pleased to
call his "remedies.'* That he is valued chiefly
as a rhetorician, by the way} rather than as an
economist, is made obvious by the fact that not
one of these "remedies" has ever been given
serious attention by any of the papers or the
people who have been most vigorous in applaud-
ing his phrases. The principal "remedy" pro-
posed by Mr. Keynes is the entire cancel ation
of inter-Ally indebtedness, which, reduced to
terms, is a frank demand that the United States
shall wipe off the ten billions owed by the Allies.
Mr. Keynes assumes that when America gave
the money that "it was not in the nature of an
investment," and he also mentions casually that
"the financial sacrifices of the United States
have been, in proportion to her wealth, immensely
less than those of European states." 1

In event that these great debts are not can-
celed, thereby giving a "stimulus to the solidar-
ity and true friendliness of the nations lately
associated," Mr. Keynes blithely advances a
policy of repudiation: "On the one hand,
Europe must depend in the long run on her
own daily labor and not on the largesse of
America; but, on the other hand, she will not

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 273.
239

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

pinch herself in order that the fruit of her daily
labor may go elsewhere. In short, I do not
believe that any of these tributes will continue
to be paid, at the best, for more than a very
few years. They do not square with human
nature or agree with the spirit of the age.1 . . .
It might be an exaggeration to say that it is
impossible for the European Allies to pay the
capital and interest due from them on these
debts, but to make them do so would certainly
be to impose a crushing burden. They may be
expected, therefore, to make constant attempts
to evade or escape payment, and these attempts
will be a constant source of international friction
and ill will for many years to come. A debtor
nation does not love its creditor. . . . There
will be a great incentive to them to seek their
friends in other directions, and any future rupture
of peaceable relations will always carry with it
the enormous advantage of escaping the payment
of external debts."2

This must be regarded as the voice of England
alone, for no other country has suggested can-
celation except England. And what is that but
a direct threat, the blackmail of force? By no
means will "Europe pinch herself" in order to
pay her debts. America pinched herself to
lend, and to-day is paying burdensome taxes
to carry the loans, but England is of greater
sensitiveness, and these sordid money transac-
tions irk her proud spirit. Either America must
cancel the debt or else we may expect repudia-

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 282.

2 Ibid, p. 278.

240

MR. KEYNES'S JEREMIAD

tion and enmity. "A debtor nation does not
love its creditor" and "rupture of peaceable
relations" are ugly phrases pregnant with
warning.

Passing on, Mr. Keynes next proposes an
international loan, "a fund of one billion in the
first instance," and to be made by the United
States as a matter of course. Having repudiated
ten billions as "not squaring with the spirit of
the age," even the nai've mind of Mr. Keynes
is impressed by the necessity of reassuring the
lender with regard to the second loan, and he is
entirely willing that the additional billion "should
be borrowed with the unequivocal intention
of its being repaid in full." Of course, if America
does not care to enter into this easy arrange-
ment, there is the possibility that the indicated
"rupture of peaceable relations" may provide
a way to make us. ^^

Detailed answer to Mr. Keynes, however, >l
requires a volume all its own. Any full exposure
of the contradictions that crowd his pages would
necessitate lengthy and painstaking analysis,
particularly with respect to foot-notes, for it is
in their small type that the author huddles the
facts that he misrepresents in the bolder type
of his text. In the chapters that follow only the
fundamental misstatements of the book will be /
checked. ^

Nor is it the intent of the writer to paint I
either the treaty or the Covenant as documents
of perfection. Whatever their faults, however,
their justice cannot be questioned. Had the
Germans been stripped of every asset

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

jected to vassalage for generations to come, still
would the punishment have fallen far short of
their monstrous crime. As a matter of truth,
the actual terms are in no wise akin to enslave-
ment. If the Germans will work in peace as
they worked in war, bringing to reparation the
same passionate energy that they devoted to
destruction, the treaty will work. Life will
be hard for them, to be sure, but is it argued
that life is going to be easy in France, Belgium,
Italy, or Serbia?

Framed in an hour of passion, with emphasis
placed entirely on territorial and political issues,
and one man only standing in championship of
ideals, there are many changes that will have
to be made in a spirit of mercy, for justice,
especially when applied with literalness, has
a way of being harsh. What escapes Mr.
Keynes's notice, for the most part, and the
notice of the majority of people entirely, is that
ample provision is made for this machinery of
accommodation. When the heat of nationalism
has died down and passions have abated, and
when the necessities of the workaday world
have developed mutuality of interest, the Rep-
arations Commission may be expected to dis-
charge its high duties in such manner as to
restore the normalities of commerce, industry,
and intercourse.

In the mean time, the Treaty and the Cove-
nant, for all their faults, stand as a great and note-
worthy attempt to rebuild the world on found a-
\ tions of liberty, peace, and fraternity.

XVI

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

'"PHE principal confusion with respect to the
A treaty centers naturally around the matter
of reparations. Huge calculations are intricate
at best, and for reasons that will be explained
the Allies were at pains to avoid explicitness in
the indemnity clauses. This premeditated vague
ness, while essentially in the interest of the
Germans, nevertheless lends itself admirably
to their campaign of distortion. Mr. Keynes,
for instance, declares that Germany must pay a
total of $40,000,000,000 and insists that this
crushing burden will have the effect of reducing
a people "to servitude for a generation, of
degrading the lives of millions of human beings,
and of depriving a whole nation of happiness."
Mr. David Hunter Miller, legal adviser to the
American Peace Commission, has answered this
bold misrepresentation in detail, showing plainly
"that instead of an indemnity of $4.0,000,000,000
laid upon Germany, as claimed by Mr. Keynes,
with annual payments of nearly $4,000,000,000,
the indemnity of the treaty amounts to approxi-
mately $14,000,000,000; that this sum cannot be
added to except by a unanimous determination of
the Reparations Commission (composed of repre-
sentatives of the United Statesy Great Britain,
17 243

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

France, Italy, and Belgium), that Germany is in
equity able to pay more, and that before any such
determination, evidence and argument on behalf
of Germany must be heard."

Subjected to analysis, the indemnity clauses
of the treaty are as clear and simple as a sum
in primary arithmetic, and stand at every point
in flat contradiction to the figures of Mr. Keynes
and the German economists. Germany's first
payment is set for May I, 1921, in the sum of
20,000,000,000 marks, or, accepting the gold
mark as equal to a quarter of a dollar, $5,000,-
000,000. As credit items against this payment,
the Germans are permitted to list the expenses
of the Army of Occupation, ships, coal, securities,
machinery, cattle, and such other assets as she
may turn over to the Allies prior to May I, 1921.
There is also the provision that "such supplies
of food and raw material as may be judged by
the governments of the principal Allied and
Associated Powers to be essential to enable
Germany to meet the obligations for reparation
may also, with the approval of the said govern-
ments, be paid for out of the above sum."

In plain words, a part or the whole of this sum
may be reloaned to Germany for the recon-
struction of her economic life. As Mr. Keynes
is compelled to admit, even if sneeringly: "This
is a qualification of high importance. The
clause, as it is drafted, allows the Finance Minis-
ters of the Allied countries to hold out to their
electorates the hope of substantial payments at
an early date, while at the same time it gives to
the Reparations Commission a discretion, which

244

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

the force of facts will compel them to exercise,
to give back to Germany what is required for the
maintenance of her economic existence."

The second monetary demand upon Germany
is for $10,000,000,000 in bonds, carrying interest
at 2^ Per cent, from May 2, 1921, to 1926, and
at 5 per cent, plus I per cent, for amortization
thereafter. In event, however, of Germany's
failure to meet completely the first payment of
$5,000,000,000, any unpaid balance is to be con-
verted into interest-bearing bonds of the same
character as the $10,000,000,000 issue and added
to that issue. As an example of Mr. Keynes's
honest purpose, he makes this declaration in his
text, "Assuming, therefore, that Germany is
not able to provide any appreciable surplus
toward reparation before 1921, she will have to
find a sum of $375,000,000 annually from 1921
to 1925, and $900,000,000 annually thereafter." *

It will thus be seen that he wipes out en-
tirely any possibility of offsets, allowing noth-
ing at all for the German ships, coal, securities,
etc. In one of his coy foot-notes, however, he
says, "If, per impossible, Germany discharged
$2,500,000,000 in cash or kind by 1921, her
annual payments would be at the rate of $312,-
500,000 from 1921 to 1925 and of $750,000,000
thereafter." 2

As a matter of truth, many conservative
economists figure that these credit items will
reach a total that may discharge the entire obli-
gation, but none places them at less than $2,500,-

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 164.
2 Ibid., p. 164.

245

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

ooo,ooo.1 Assuming, then, that Germany is
able to make no cash payment on May 21, 1912,
and has nothing to offer but her offsets, there
will remain a balance of $2,500,000,000 to add
to the bond issue of $10,000,000,000, making a
total of $12,500,000,000. This is the only sum
that Germany is asked to pay. It is, in fact, the
whole German indemnity. The interest charge
on this amount would be $312,500,000 a year
until 1926, and thereafter an annual payment
of $750,000,000 to take care of interest and
amortization. This amount does not include, or
even touch upon, the general war costs of the
Allies, representing only a reasonable estimate of
the damage done to non-combatants and their
property. As Mr. Keynes is compelled to admit :

A great part of Annex I is in strict conformity with the
pre-armistice conditions, or, at any rate, does not strain
them beyond what is fairly arguable. Paragraph I claims
damage done for injury to the persons of civilians, or, in the
case of death, to their dependents, as a direct consequence of
acts of war; Paragraph 2, for acts of cruelty, violence, or
maltreatment on the part of the enemy toward civilian
victims; Paragraph 3, for enemy acts injurious to health
or capacity to work or to honor toward civilians in occupied
or invaded territory; Paragraph 8, for forced labor exacted
by the enemy from civilians; Paragraph 9, for damage done
to property with the exception of naval and military works
or materials as a direct consequence of hostilities; and
Paragraph 10, for fines and levies imposed by the enemy
upon the civilian population. All these demands are just
and in conformity with the Allies' rights.

Nor is the amount of $15,000,000,000, minus

1 A recent press despatch gives the information that Germany
is estimating these credit items in excess of five billions.

246

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

credit items, less than just. Mr. Keynes him-
self presents this estimate of damage:1

Belgium £2,500,000,000

France 4,000,000,000

Great Britain 2,850,000,000

Other Allies 1,250,000,000

Total $10,600,000,000

Mr. Keynes admits that "no figures exist on
which to base any scientific or exact estimate,"
and so he frankly gives his own "guess for what
it is worth." It is a guess that should have
destroyed his book in the hour of its publication.
His Belgian figure is based upon the sneer that
hostilities were "confined to a small corner of
the country, much of which in recent times was
backward, poor, sleepy, and did not include the
active industry of the country." The French
claim of damage in the sum of $13,000,000,000,
without counting war levies, losses at sea, the
roads, etc., is arbitrarily cut down to $4,000,000,-
ooo. Serbia is dismissed with a reference to her
"low economic development," and Italy, Ru-
mania, and Greece are not even considered in
detail, all being lumped together as "other
Allies," and allowed $1,250,000,000 as con-
trasted to England's $2,850,000,000. To be
sure, he has the grace to remark: "It is sur-
prising, perhaps, that the money value of Great
Britain's claim should be so little short of that of
France, and actually in excess of that of Belgium.
But measured either by pecuniary loss or real

1 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 134.
247

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

loss to the economic power of the country, the
injury to her mercantile marine was enormous."
Amazing!

x" Between the Keynes-German estimate of
' $10,000,000,000 and the Allied estimate of
$40,000,000,000 honest opinion will decide that
the sum of $15,000,000,000 strikes a balance that
is indeed merciful to a nation that plunged a
world into bloodshed and chaos. This amount,
less an anticipated offset of $2,500,000,000, is
all that Germany is committed to pay. It were
well indeed if the treaty had decreed that the
amount was all that Germany was under any
obligation to pay. Throughout his book Mr.
Keynes bemoans the fact that a lump indemnity
was not fixed — a sum within Germany's power to
pay — but he does not state the fact, as he knew
it to be a fact at the time, that this was the con-
tention of the President from the first. Mr.
Bernard M. Baruch, economic adviser to the
American Peace Commission, has stated openly
and repeatedly that the President and his eco-
nomic advisers insisted at all times upon the
imposition of a "fixed and reasonable sum," and
that this sound proposition went down to defeat
before the bitter, unyielding opposition of Lloyd
George and Clemenceau. At this point it is
necessary to quote Mr. Miller again, for not only
is his an authoritative voice, but his statement
of conditions is singularly clear and convincing:

It is essential to look at the circumstances surrounding
the Conference in the early months of 1919. No one then
seriously thought that Germany could pay an indemnity
equivalent to the capital sum of forty billions. Some

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

economists did make estimates of a possible total of twenty-
five billions, but such a figure represented the blue sky of
optimism.

There were, however, some known factors in the situa-
tion. One of these was that the amount which Germany
could in reason pay was unknown. Whether that sum was
ten billions, as Mr. Keynes thinks, or fifteen billions, or
perhaps even twenty, as others thought, could not be pre-
dicted then, and I venture to say cannot be predicted now.
A second factor, moreover, was that any amount which
Germany could fairly pay was less than the German debt.
A third factor was public sentiment in Europe, particularly
in Great Britain and France. Public sentiment is a fact.
To yield to a wrong public sentiment may be a crime, but
to adopt a course which without yielding permits sentiment
to change and passions to cool is the part of wisdom.

The conduct of the British election campaign of Decem-
ber, 1918, and the utterances of politicians and economists
on the Continent, had created a very wide-spread feeling
among the peoples who had suffered by the war and who
could not understand the mysteries of international trade,
that their financial burdens would be greatly lessened and
perhaps even removed by payments from Germany. This
was a delusion which existed, however unfortunate or
deplorable its origin.

The question presented to the framers of the treaty was \j

whether the existence of this delusion should be recognized
by a form of the treaty which did not increase Germany's
obligation to pay, but which left time for appreciation of
realities by the Allied peoples, or whether they should adopt
another form of the treaty and shock and enrage the senti-
ment of a public suffering, depressed, and almost hyster-
ical. The framers of the treaty chose the former course.
I believe that their decision was wise and that history I
will sustain this view.

Mr. Keynes, as a matter of fact, agrees with
this view, for while he declares on page 147 that
the sum to be paid by Germany should have
been fixed at $10,000,000,000 at the very out-

249

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

set, on page 158 he admits that "this was im-
possible for two reasons. Two different kinds of
false statements had been promulgated, one as
to Germany's capacity to pay, the other as to
the amount of the Allies' just claims in respect
of the devastated areas. The fixing of either
of these figures presented a dilemma."

In reaching his decision the President found
himself face to face with this dilemma. In the
first place, Germany was bound by the armistice
terms to pay in full for her cruel devastations.
The Fourteen Points provided for damage done
in invaded territory — Belgium, France, Ru-
mania, Serbia, and Montenegro being specifically
mentioned — but they did hot include the loss
caused by submarine sinkings, bombardments,
or air raids. It was to cover these omissions,
and any others, that the Allies suggested an
addition to the effect that Germany must make
compensation "/or all damage done to the civilian
population of the Allies and to their property by
the aggression of Germany by land, sea, and the
air" There was also a provision that "any
future claims of the Allies and the United States
of America remain unaffected."

The President had agreed to these additions.
They had been included in the armistice. Ger-
many, after careful examination, had signed the
armistice. There was, therefore, no question as
to German liability. It was even the case that
under the armistice terms the Allies could have
held Germany responsible for the devastations
of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, "imposing con-
tingent liabilities," as Mr. Keynes admits,

250

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

"without running seriously contrary to the
general intention of their engagements/*

The President knew well, however, that it
was not within the power of Germany to pay the
full sum or even a half of the sum that stern
justice could have demanded. He knew equally
well that the governments of France, England,
and Italy would fall if this fact should be ad-
mitted openly in the treaty. It was not only
the case that their statesmen, Lloyd George par-
ticularly, had dealt in glowing promises, but also
that the hopes of the peoples themselves ran
naturally and inevitably along the line that it
was right and necessary for Germany to restore
pre-war conditions. As the one escape from
national despair and international collapse, he
assented to an agreement that did not increase
Germany's obligation to pay, but which con-
tinued the hope of the Allied peoples until the
recovery of normality enabled them to look
facts in the face.

A Reparations Commission was created and
in this civil body was vested full power in con-
nection with the settlement. The sum of $15,-
000,000,000 was fixed as the amount that Ger-
many should pay, and an additional bond issue
of $10,000,000,000 was recognized as permissible.
This obligation was the last word in indetermi-
nateness, for it was to be issued "when and not
until the Reparations Commission is satisfied
that Germany can meet the interest and the
sinking-fund obligations." As a matter of course,
this additional ^10,000,000,000 bond issue will
never be authorized. Mr. Miller, in an able

251

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

consideration of the Reparations Commission,
makes this explanation of procedure:

How is the Commission to be convinced? In the first
place, it is to be "guided by justice, equity, and good faith,"
although "not bound by any particular code or rules of law
or by any particular rule of evidence or of procedure." In
the second place, the Commission, to be convinced, must
be unanimously convinced. This is specifically provided by
Annex II, clause ijb.

In other words, the representatives of the United States,
of Great Britain, of France, of Italy, and of Belgium must
all be convinced, according to justice, equity, and good
faith, that a further sum is payable or it will never be paid.
But there is still another safeguard. The question cannot
be decided without a hearing. The Commission in this
matter is to act judicially; it must receive evidence and it
must hear argument on behalf of Germany, and not until
then can it decide. (Annex II, 9)

Mr. Keynes strangely enough criticizes the requirement
of unanimity, because the Commission must be unanimous
in order to cancel or reduce the debt; but the debt, so far as
it is not to be paid, either principal or interest, is a figment
of the imagination. It is the payment that matters, and
nothing else.

In short, Mr. Keynes's conclusions (pages 167-168) are
wholly unwarranted by the terms of the treaty. He says
that the treaty fixes a sum far beyond Germany's capacity,
which is then to be reduced at the discretion of a foreign
commission acting with the object of obtaining each year
the maximum. The contrary is the case. The treaty pro-
vides for a payment reasonably within Germany's ability
and permits its increase only upon evidence and proof
which will convince all the representatives of the five
powers that in justice and equity it should be increased.

With respect to the Commission, Mr. Keynes
admits that "it was necessary, therefore, to set
up a body to establish the bill of claim, to fix the
mode of payment, and to approve necessary

252

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

abatements and delays." Having granted this,
however, he proceeds to distort and misrepresent
its powers and purposes. He is not original in
this. Almost word for word he follows the
German attack made by Brockdorff-Rantzau in
the reply of May 2gth, and to which the Allies
replied:

The observations of the German delegation present a
view of this Commission so distorted and so inexact that it
is difficult to believe that the clauses of the treaty have
been calmly or carefully examined. It is not an engine of
oppression or a device for interfering with German sov-
ereignty. It has no forces at its command; it has no ex-
ecutive powers within the territory of Germany; it cannot,
as is suggested, direct or control the educational or other
systems of the country. Its business is to ask what is to
be paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to
report to the powers, whose delegation it is, in case Ger-
many makes default. If Germany raises the money re-
quired in her own way, the Commission cannot order that
it shall be raised in some other way; if Germany offers
payment in kind, the Commission may accept such pay-
ment, but except as specified in the treaty itself, the Com-
mission cannot require such a payment.

The Reparations Commission, in plain, is the
President's provision for tempering justice with
mercy. If accepted by the Germans in faith
and honesty, it will prove a speedy and effective
agency for the restoration of their economic life.
The purposes of the body go far beyond the mere
collection of an indemnity, and are primarily
concerned with the rehabilitation of Europe as
a whole. It has the power to receive proposals
from Germany for a lump-sum settlement,
and it has the authority also to handle the

253

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

fifteen-billion-dollar imposition in such manner
as to guard absolutely the interests of Germany.
Mr. Keynes, in one of his bursts of contradiction,
says: "Transferred to the League of Nations,
an appanage of justice and no longer of interest,
who knows that by a change of heart and object
the Reparations Commission may not yet be
transformed from an instrument of oppression
and rapine into an economic council of Europe,
whose object is the restoration of life and of
happiness, even in the enemy countries?"
This was its object at the time and it is more
than ever its object to-day.

These assertions are not based upon conject-
ure. Long before the rise of Mr. Keynes
there was open and official recognition of the
facts that he presents in his book as "revela-
tions." Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, economic
adviser to the American delegation, appeared
as a witness before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee of the Senate on August i, 1919, and
testified that the President had fought always
for the naming of a "fixed and reasonable sum,"
and that while this was not done, he did succeed
in vesting power in the Reparations Commission
to adjust the German indemnity in such manner
as to make it meet Germany's abilities. The
following excerpts from his testimony well dis-
close the spirit and intent of the President and
his advisers:

SENATOR JOHNSON (of CaKfornia): So that, on the
figures as obtainable and presentable now, the bill is one
that you say you do not think Germany can pay, but you
rely upon the fact that the good sense of the Reparations

254

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

Commission will scale the amount down to a point com-
mensurate with the ability of Germany?

MR. BARUCH: Yes; and within that power it has been
left so that it would work. It is workable; there is no
question about that.

SENATOR JOHNSON (of California): They have the power
and the contrary power as well?

MR. BARUCH: Contrary power? What do you mean?

SENATOR JOHNSON (of California) : That is, the power to
scale down and the discretion to fix as well the amount
that might not be scaled down.

MR. BARUCH: To fix the amount. But, of course, if the
amount is fixed, personally, I think that will be the most
workable treatment — to fix with Germany the amount
which they themselves think they could pay. Of course,
no one would fix an amount against a debtor that he did
not think the debtor could pay.

SENATOR HARDING: Why do you say that it (Germany's
solvency) is to the interest of America, when the Central
Powers are the most formidable commercial rival?

MR. BARUCH: Can you imagine the world being prosper-
ous while 130,000,000 people right in the center of the in-
dustrial population are not prosperous? Can you imagine
prosperity without the financial prosperity of the Central
Powers, with the finances of Italy, France, and of Belgium
and their industrial life, and to a large extent England's,
depending on what they are going to receive from these
people? In that way this reflects upon us. It is a great
big partnership. We cannot separate ourselves from it.
It is of vast consequence to America. . . .

SENATOR JOHNSON: I want to get your viewpoint. Our
activities will be wholly altruistic?

MR. BARUCH: I would say no to that, for this reason:
the spirit and the wisdom of the carrying out of this Repara-
tions Commission is a matter of dollars and cents in the
United States of America, because upon the wisdom of
those decisions depend the financial and the industrial
conditions of the world for years to come, perhaps for many
generations.

255

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

SENATOR JOHNSON: Then it is from the world standpoint
and for the stabilizing of the world ?

MR. BARUCH: And from our own personal interests.
Germany was a very large customer of ours. And this
Reparations Commission does not deal alone with Germany,
but with all the great Central Empires, and there are some
130,000,000 to 150,000,000 people involved in this. And it
is a matter about which we are moved by great altruistic
ideas primarily, but it is also a matter of deep self-interest.

How, then, does Mr. Keynes reach his con-
clusion that the total amount demanded of
Germany is $40,000,000,000? His process is
simple. He takes the first payment of $5,000,-
000,000, and by disregarding the probable credit
items of $2,500,000,000, puts down the full
amount. To this he adds the second com-
mitment of $10,000,000,000. Then, thrusting
aside the fact that the third obligation of $10,-
000,000,000 is permissive only and cannot be
authorized until public hearings have convinced
the Reparations Commission unanimously that
Germany can pay this additional amount, he
assumes it as an already collectible debt, thereby
bringing his total up to $25,000,000,000. The
inclusion of the third item is imaginative enough,
in all truth, but in his next performance Mr.
Keynes severs all connection with reality.
Because the Allies possess the right to make claim
for all damages, Mr. Keynes asserts that Ger-
many will be expected to pay the amounts dis-
bursed for pensions, allowances, and like com-
pensations. This total, by one of his "guesses,"
is placed at $15,000,000,000 and added to the
accounts due and payable, thereby gaining the
figure of $40,000,000,000 that he holds up to a

256

WHAT MUST GERMANY PAY?

pitying world as the sum that Germany must
pay. ^

For the confusion of such German-Americans
as have resurrected the hyphen, and for the
information of the honest, let it be stated again
that the sum total of Germany's specified obliga-
tion under the treaty is $15,0x20,000,000, and
that against this is a credit item conservatively
estimated at $2,500,000,000. The President
agreed to the inclusion of a further implied
obligation, not because it stood as an expressed
armistice right of the Allies, but because he
saw it as the one bridge to the future. No man
at the Peace Conference had any idea that the
indemnity would ever be increased beyond
the $15,000,000,000, but, on the other hand,
many were of the opinion that the tentative
amount would have to be scaled down — not
from any sympathy with Germany, but out of

• •i i i • • * • '•"^•li*y**l>"— ***aillW*|(l9t-

the conviction that the rehabilitation of Ger-
many's economic life was necessary to the health
of the world.1 The President's course is already
justified. At this time of writing (April 25th)
a saner Europe is already suggesting the "fixed
and reasonable sum" that will give Germany a
chance not only to restore prosperity, but a
chance to cleanse the honor that she has dragged^
through blood and mire.

1 At the time of the armistice Germany's immediately trans-
ferable wealth was about $625,000,00x5. This, as a matter of
course, was an available source of reparation, and could have
been demanded by the Allies. Instead of this ruthless method,
Germany was permitted to use $250,000,000 in gold for the i
purchase of food, also to export another $50,000,000 from the
Reichsbank to meet her obligations in neutral countries. ——4

XVII

THE QUESTION OF COAL

MR. KEYNES, in considering the coal clauses
of the treaty, is even more untrustworthy
and contradictory than in his analysis of the
cash indemnity. Commencing with the flat
assertion that "the judgment of the world has
already recognized the transaction of the Saar
as an act of spoliation and insincerity," he paints
a picture of industrial ruin that gives the manu-
facturing districts of Germany tragic resemblance
to the devastated areas of France, Belgium, and
Italy. His method, as per habit, is to make the
blackest possible statement of the case at the
outset, and then, in later pages or in unobtrusive
foot-notes, admit qualifying facts which, while
not altering the force of his original attack, saves
him from the direct charge of dishonesty. In the
matter of coal, he juggles figures until he has
them to his liking, and then sums up his arraign-
ment of the treaty provisions in this confident
sentence :

"Our hypothetical calculations, therefore, leave
us with post-war German domestic requirements
on the basis of a pre-war efficiency of railways
and industry of 110,000,000 tons against an out-
put not exceeding 100,000,000 tons, of which 40,-

258

THE QUESTION OF COAL

000,000 tons are mortgaged to the Allies." And
on this flat statement he bases a somewhat pas-
sionate assertion of Allied depravity, and a
pathetic appeal in behalf of German industry.

What are the facts? In the first place, Mr.
Keynes ignores at every point this precise pledge
of the treaty: "If the commission shall de-
termine that the full exercise of the foregoing
options would interfere unduly with the indus-
trial requirements of Germany, the commission
is authorized to postpone or to cancel deliveries,
and in so doing to settle all questions of priority:
but the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines
shall receive priority over other deliveries."

In page after page he insists upon 40,000,000
tons as the coal that Germany "must" supply
annually, and it is only in the fine type of a foot-
note, tucked away at the bottom of page 97,
that he makes the admission that as early as
September, 1919, the coal demands upon Germany
were modified from a delivery of 43,000,000 tons
per annum to 20,000,000 tons.

On pages 90 and 91 he states that the coal
production of Germany, without the Saar,
Alsace-Lorraine, and Upper Silesia, cannot pos-
sibly exceed 100,000,000 tons, yet on page 97,
in the usual foot-note, he admits that in Septem-
ber, 1919, the level of production was 108,000,000
tons. Also, through the usual medium of the
inconspicuous foot-note on page 92, he confesses
a German production in 1913 of 13,000,000 tons
of rough lignite in addition to an amount con-
verted into 21,000,000 tons of briquette, modestly
adding, "I am not competent to speak on the

18 259

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

extent to which the loss of coal can be made
good by the extended use of lignite or by econ-
omies in its present employment; but some
authorities believe that Germany may obtain
substantial compensation for her loss of coal by
paying more attention to her deposits of lignite."

He does not spare space in reciting the de-
liveries of coal that Germany must make —
always 40,000,000 tons instead of 20,000,000 —
but he is careful not to call them "options,"
which is what they are, nor does he point out
that every single ton is to be paid for at the
German pithead price plus freight to the frontier.

On page 83 Mr. Keynes attacks the Saar
settlement as "an act of spoliation and insin-
cerity," and on page 84 he denounces the Upper
Silesia arrangement, but on pages 263 and 264,
far removed from the original accusations, he
admits that both settlements, with some modi-
fications, "should hold good."

His whole attempt is to give the impression
that the Saar Basin has been annexed by France
as spoils of war. To quote his exact words in one
instance, "The French wanted the coal for the
purpose of working the iron-fields of Lorraine,
and in the spirit of Bismarck they have taken it."
As a matter of truth, the district has been trans-
ferred, not to French sovereignty, but to the con-
trol of the League of Nations. This method has
the double advantage that it involves no annexa-
tion, while it maintains the economic unity of
the district, important to the interest of the in-
habitants, and relieves France from entire de-
pendence on German faith. At the end of

260

THE QUESTION OF COAL

fifteen years the mixed population, which in the
mean while will have had control of its own local
affairs under the governing supervision of the
League of Nations, will have complete freedom
to decide whether it wishes union with Germany,
union with France, or the continuance of the
regime provided for in the treaty. In event
that the people vote to reunite with Germany,
the Germans are required to repurchase the mines
at a figure to be determined by fair appraisal. In
the mean time, as an answer to Mr. Keynes's
charge of spoliation, the mines are to be duly
credited to Germany on the reparation account
as compensation for the destruction of French
mines, and as part payment toward the indem-
nity as a whole.

These paragraphs were rewritten from the
first draft, as the Germans made a point of
the right to repurchase. As a further con-
cession, Germany is given the right to declare
the purchase price as a prior charge upon her
assets.

Mr. Keynes's estimate of Germany's post-war
domestic requirements at 110,000,000 tons is
based, as he frankly admits, "on the basis of a
pre-war efficiency of railways and industry" As
a consequence of German destruction, the Euro-
pean coal situation is the great problem of recon-
struction. Germany, however, instead of sharing
in the general privations of which she is the sole
cause, must be permitted to have a supply of
coal equal to every pre-war requirement. The
industries of France, Belgium, Italy, and the
new states may stand with cold chimneys, but

261

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

under no circumstances must a German factory
be allowed to shut down.

Brushing hypocrisy and misrepresentation
aside, the facts in the case do not admit of dis-
tortion. At present the coal production of Ger-
many, minus the output of the Saar Basin,
Alsace-Lorraine, and Upper Silesia, is 108,000,000
tons per year. Of this she is to deliver 20,000,000
tons to other countries, if the Reparations Com-
mission decides that she is able to meet this
requirement. Assuming that the commission
so decides, this will leave 88,000,000 tons for
German domestic consumption. It can be seen,
therefore, that the Germans are left with exactly
80 per cent, of their pre-war requirements, a far
larger percentage than is enjoyed by France or
Italy or Belgium, even if Germany makes de-
liveries to them in accordance with the treaty
provisions. Mr. Baruch, answering the question
as to whether the coal clauses of the treaty
would work serious injury to Germany, said:

"No. There seems to be a great misunder-
standing regarding those clauses. In addition
to the coal to make up for the loss from France's
destroyed mines, the only coal Germany is
required to export to the Allied countries is the
same amount she exported to them before the
war, and even this is required only for a limited
period, and only if it does not interfere with Ger-
many's industrial life. As a matter of fact there
are large amounts of coal Germany can mine
when she gets ready. The trouble with her at
present is that she won't work. She won't dig
the coal out of the mines. If the German and

262

THE QUESTION OF COAL

other coal-fields in Europe were being properly
developed now, Europe would not need coal."

By way of clearing up the whole matter, it
may be wise to deal in detail with the Saar and
Upper Silesia settlements. In neither case is
there even the hint of annexation. As for Upper
Silesia, the whole question of sovereignty is left
to a vote of the people themselves. In the mean
time the province is not in the hands of Poland,
but remains under the government of an Allied
commission until the plebiscite. Although Ger-
many gained title by force of arms, the decision
of the future is left to the people. If they want
German rule they can have it. Self-determina-
tion, however, does not suit Mr. Keynes in the
case of Upper Silesia, or in any other case where
there is a chance that Germany will lose. Be-
cause he knows that the population of Upper
Silesia is Polish indisputably, he enters the plea
that "economically it is intensely German; the
industries of eastern Germany depend upon it
for their coal, and its loss would be a destructive
blow at the economic structure of the German
state." And in his "Remedies" he actually
advances the suggestion that the Allies should
attempt to influence the vote by declaring that
"in their judgment, economic conditions require
the inclusion of the coal districts in Germany."

Germany's needs and desires are conclusive.
Poland's rights and Poland's needs are not to be
considered. After taking a further fling at the
"bankruptcy and incompetency of the new Polish
state," Mr. Keynes appeals to prejudice still
further by stating that "the conditions of life in

263

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

such matters as sanitation and social legislation
are incomparably better in Upper Silesia than in
the adjacent districts of Poland, where similar
legislation is in its infancy." He forgets to men-
tion that these were the German assertions and
that they are disputed at every point by the
Poles. Nor does he put proper emphasis upon
the treaty clause that provides in event of the
vote favoring Poland that Germany shall have
"the right to purchase mineral products, includ-
ing coal, free from all export duties or other
charges or restrictions on exportation, and on
terms as favorable as are applicable to like
products sold under similar conditions to pur-
chasers in Poland or in any other country/*

Coming to the Saar Basin, it is possible to
quote the printed opinion of Mr. Miller, legal
adviser to the American Peace delegation. He
has said:

The truth is that no arrangement of the treaty is fairer
or more defensible than the arrangement regarding the
Saar. The coal situation in Europe is set out in Mr.
Keynes's book at page 93, particularly in the foot-note.
The diminished supply in France is due not only to the war,
to loss of man-power, to the difficulties of transport, but to
the deliberate destruction by Germany, so far as destruc-
tion was physically possible, of the French coal-mines at
Lens and elsewhere. The Saar Basin is on the border of
France, on its very frontier; the delivery of the coal-mines
to French ownership for fifteen years is not only an equitable
way of assuring to France some repletion of her coal-supply,
but the only physical way of giving her any effective assur-
ance whatever. Deliveries of coal from Germany may
prove, as to some extent they have already proved, illusory.
That France should receive nothing but a hope of coal
deliveries by Germany, under the circumstances of the coal-

264

THE QUESTION OF COAL

supply of Europe, of her own needs, and of her coal losses
during the war, would have been so unjust as to be wholly
indefensible.

As for the Keynes charge that "the judgment *
of the world has already recognized the transac-
tion as an act of spoliation and insincerity,"
previous disproofs may well be capsheafed by
this historical comment from Professor Hazen
of Columbia:

In other words, the world recognized that the Allies in
Paris were robbers and hypocrites, for these are the vulgar
synonyms for those who engage in spoliation and insincerity.
When one makes a charge like that there is perhaps some
obligation to try to prove it. It is significant and it is en-
tirely characteristic that the only evidence Mr. Keynes
offers is the argument submitted by the German delegates
in their reply to the Allies. This argument he accepts
with approval and without the slightest critical analysis.
One of the assertions in the German statement is that the
Saar district has been German for more than a thousand
years; that for only sixty-eight of those years has it been
French. This is the classic Pan-German argument, long
urged with great vigor and iteration, that what belonged
to the Holy Roman Empire lawfully belonged to the Hohen-
zollern Empire of 1871 and must not be touched. It has
been constantly urged in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, and
the Pan-Germanists of 1914 were ready to apply it to other
areas that had belonged to the medieval empire. This
German reply of last May, which Mr. Keynes accepts as
adequate authority, also says what when in the treaty of
1814 a small portion of the Saar was retained for France
the population raised the most energetic opposition and
demanded "reunion with their German fatherland"; to
which they were "related by language, customs, and re-
ligion," and that this desire was taken into account in the
following year. No. mention is made either in the German
reply or in Mr. Keynes's text that there is a literature worthy
of study which shows that the separation of the Saar from

265

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

France in 1815 was a typical illustration of the Prussian
art of land-grabbing and that the alleged great popular
clamor was the intrigue of a small clique of Germans in-
terested in feathering their own nests in a mining venture.

Despite this basis for a just claim to the right
to annex, the Saar goes to the League of Nations
for administration, and in fifteen years the peo-
ple will decide their future by independent
ballot. A fitting conclusion to the whole coal
consideration is the following survey by David
Hunter Miller:

Let us look at the matter from the point of view of the
statesmen who framed the treaty. The coal situation in
Europe was one of great complexity, of great difficulty, and
of great uncertainty. Nobody could determine exactly
what would in the years immediately succeeding the treaty
be an equitable distribution of coal in Europe; Germany
might have a large surplus of coal for export. Whether
this would prove to be the case was, of course, unknown, but
taking into account the transport situation and the coal
situation generally, nothing could be more just than that
Germany should contribute this exportable surplus, if she
had it, both as a payment on the indemnity and at the same
time as a relief to the economic and physical conditions of
other peoples.

The scheme of the treaty followed logically and justly.
Germany agrees to deliver her exportable surplus up to the
maximum amount which it could probably reach, approx-
imately 40,000,000 tons. The treaty itself shows the doubt
that existed as to the figure being reached or as to any
figure of exportable surplus being reached. The 40,000,000
tons of deliveries mentioned in the treaty are "options."
All of them are stated to be options, and as to the whole of
the 40,000,000 tons, and as to any part of them, the Repara-
tions Commission by majority vote may postpone or cancel
deliveries if the exercise of the options would interfere "with
the industrial requirements of Germany." So, as framed,

266

THE QUESTION OF COAL

the treaty provides, and justly provides, a maximum
amount of coal which Germany can be required to furnish
and leaves the actual amount to be determined from time
to time by a commission charged with the duty of considering
German needs.

If it is objected that the treaty might operate unjustly to
Germany, that the Reparations Commission might be
arbitrary, the answer is that a deplorable coal situation
existed in Europe, due to the war, and that no detailed dis-
tribution for the years to come could justly be fixed in the
treaty, but had to be left to decision on equitable principles
in the future.

But the conclusive answer is the action already taken by
the Coal Commission, which is for this purpose practically
the Reparations Commission, in reducing by more than
50 per cent, the amount of coal to be furnished by Ger-
many, in promising to give consideration to further reduc-
tion if German production should decrease, and in limiting
to 50 or 60 per cent, the amount to be supplied from any
such future increase.

The treaty, according to Mr. Keynes, sweeps
the German mercantile marine from the seas
for many years to come. It must be admitted
that this is hardly a fair description of the
arrangement that compels Germany to turn
over her own ships to take the place of the
tonnage ruthlessly destroyed by her submarines
during the war. The Germans did not seek
to escape responsibility in this regard and the
one appeal was for modifications that would
permit Germany to retain and use her mercan-
tile marine while she built other ships for the
Allies. While Mr. Keynes denounces the ship-
ping provisions of the treaty on page 67, his
indignation has spent itself Jby the time he reaches
page 261, for under the head of "Remedies"

267

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

he suggests quite calmly that "the surrender of
merchant-ships and submarine cables required
under the treaty, etc., should be reckoned as
worth the lump sum of $2,500,000,000, and
should be deducted" from a lump indemnity of
$10,000,000,000.

As showing the erratic quality of his mind,
(/""'on page 174 he says: "Estimating the tonnage
of German shipping to be taken over under the
treaty at 4,000,000 gross tons and the average
value per ton at $150 per ton, the total money
value involved is $600,000,000."

Mr. Baruch, asked whether it would be pos-
sible for Germany to re-establish a mercantile
marine, made this answer: "Certainly it is
possible. It depends partly, however, upon the
wisdom and generosity of the Allies. The
ownership of a merchant marine in time of peace
is not very different from the ownership of raw
materials. In time of war or blockade we over-
emphasize their importance because the channels
through which they move are disrupted. Under
peaceful conditions both ships and raw mate-
rials will move naturally to the highest-paying
market." i

Mr. Keynes, however, insists that, "The
prosperity of German ports and commerce
can only revive, it would seem, in proportion
as she succeeds in bringing under her effective
influence the merchant marines of Scandinavia
and of Holland." As Mr. Miller caustically
comments, "If ports and commerce require
for their prosperity ships of a particular flag,
then the United States was without prosperous

268

THE QUESTION OF COAL

ports or important foreign commerce before the
war."

In discussing the clauses relating to the river
system of Germany, Mr. Keynes declares:
" These are largely unnecessary and are so little
related to the supposed aims of the Allies that
their purport is generally unknown. Yet they
constitute an unprecedented interference with a
country's domestic arrangements, and are capa-
ble of being so operated as to take from Germany
all effective control over her own transport
system." Whereupon he attacks the plan as
part of the general policy to "impoverish
Germany" and to "obstruct her development
in future." One hesitates to characterize the
type of mind that can permit itself such state-
ments. Instead of their purport being "un-
known," the theory of international river control
was established in the Allied answer as one of
the fundamentals of peace, and these great
principles were asserted: that it was vital to
the free life of young, landlocked states to have
secure access to the sea along rivers which are
navigable through their territory; that if viewed
according to the discredited doctrine that every
state is engaged in a desperate struggle for
ascendancy over its neighbors, no doubt such
arrangement may be an impediment to the
artificial strangling of a rival; but if it be the
idea that nations are to co-operate in the ways
of commerce and peace, they are natural and
right.

Instead of being "unprecedented," even be-
fore the war an international commission regu-

269

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

lated the Rhine and the Danube. What the
Peace Conference did was merely to extend the
principle not only to other German rivers, but

(to all the rivers of Europe. It is a plan as vast
as it is commendable to end the autocracies
of national privilege by internationalizing all the
great waterways of the Continent so that the
stream that passes through one nation shall be
just as free in all its length to the sea as if that

/ nation owned the whole of it.

As a matter of fact, the German counter-
proposals admitted the wisdom and justice of
the plan, and objected only on the ground that
reciprocity was not provided for, although sug-
gesting various changes and making certain
demands. The Allied answer stated that re-
ciprocal rules would be arranged as soon as the
League of Nations laid down general conventions.
Concessions were made, however, in a strength-
ening of the clauses assuring freedom of transit
across West Prussia to Germany, the increase
of Germany's representation on the Oder from
one to three, the representation of Germany
on the commission to establish a permanent
status for the Danube, the submission of the
future Rhine-Danube Canal to the general
regime of international waterways, and the sup-
pression of the clauses as to the constructing of
railroads through Germany and of the Kiel
Canal Commission.

XVIII

SHANTUNG AND HYPOCRISY

NOT the President nor supporters of the Peace '
Treaty have ever advanced an opinion that
the Shantung settlement was ideal, but there has
been frank admission at all times that a widely
different arrangement was hoped for and worked
for. As it stands, however, the agreement with
relation to Shantung holds out a brighter promise
to China than has ever before illumined her
helplessness, for in it is the certainty of protec-
tion against further despoliation and explicit
guaranties that will lead to the restoration of
lost sovereignties. On the other hand, those
who preach the treaty's defeat on account of
the Shantung provision have nothing to offer
except their false sympathy, and even as they
cry out their pretended indignation they know
that their course, if successful, can have no
other end than the dooming of China to a greater/
hopelessness, a more profound despair.

Americans, as a whole, are invincibly antago- *
nistic to the Japanese. This dislike, originating
in California, has been spread by the malign
activities of demagogic politicians and papers,
and the general policies of the Japanese govern-
ment have not helped to bring about a better
understanding. Militaristic and imperialistic,

271

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the spirit of Japan has rasped the United States
at every point, and this irritation has closed the
average mind to any fair consideration of
issues in which Nippon has a stake. Not one
citizen in 10,000 knows the details of the Shan-
tung settlement, or has any exact knowledge
of the Chinese conditions that led up to it.
These prejudices and ignorances have fitted
perfectly into the plans of partizaris who have
banded to defeat the treaty and to discredit
the President. Their hypocrisy is a matter of
proof, not assumption, for while the citizens
may be excused on the score of non-understand-
ing, the members of the Senate of the United
States can enter no such plea, for they know, or
should know, the record of rapacity that has
been written at China's expense during the last
quarter of a century. Shantung was the begin-
ning of spoliation even as it promises to be the
| end.

The first act in the sordid tragedy of China
was staged in 1894, when Japan declared war
under pretense of saving Manchuria from Russian
domination. The fruit of Japanese victory was
Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, but
Russia stepped in, backed by France and Ger-
many, and forced Japan to surrender the terri-
tory. Tokio exhausted effort to obtain a pledge
that Russia had no designs upon Manchuria,
but a treaty to this end was refused, and in 1897
the Russians effected a virtual occupation.
The war-ships of the Czar entered the harbor of
Port Arthur and in April, 1898, it was announced
that China had granted Russia a lease that was,

272

SHANTUNG AND HYPOCRISY

to all intents, a surrender of Manchurian sover-
eignty. Port Arthur was fortified, garrisons
were established, railroads were built, and the
whole country was treated as a Russian province.

In 1898 two German missionaries were killed
by Chinese mobs. Despite the disavowals of
the Chinese government, and its plain proof
that the murders were due entirely to an outburst
of local passion, the Germans invaded China
with drawn swords under pretense of restoring
order. By way of gratitude for the Kaiser's
aid, China was compelled to grant certain con-
cessions to Germany in Shantung, the lease
including the seaport of Tsing-Tau and embrac-
ing the privilege of building a railroad and
exploiting ore deposits. Senator Hiram John-
son, more particularly than any other, has
spared no pains to create the impression that the
"Shantung question" involves the entire prov-
ince with its area of 56,000 square miles and its
population of 38,000,000. The grimy history
of political debate is without record of any
greater falsehood. The ceded area covers 117
square miles and a zone of suzerainty 76 miles —
a total of 193 square miles — and the population
of the grant to-day is about 60,000.

Emboldened by the success of Russia and
Germany, England seized the port of Wei-Hai-
Wei and France then took Tonking, with its
80,000 people. Nothing was left to China but
Peking, and even there a joint army of occupa-
tion masqueraded under the name of "legation
guards."

William McKmley was President at the time,
273

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

and John Hay was his Secretary of State, yet
from America no word of protest went forth
against the aggressions of Germany, France,
England, and Russia, but only a warning that
there must be no interference with America's
trading rights in China — that the invaders must
keep an "open door" for American merchandise.
As long as we were permitted to do business
in the stolen territories we were willing to let
them be stolen. And not Senator Lodge, nor
any other Republican leader now prominent
in the Shantung agitation, lifted his voice to
cry out against the rape of unhappy China.

In 1904 came the war betweeen Russia and
Japan. The peace, it will be remembered,
was concluded at Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
under the benevolent auspices of President
Roosevelt, and as a result of the treaty framed
on American soil Japan took over the Russian
"leases" in Manchuria, Port Arthur and its
fortifications, the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and
Korea. Again no protest was raised, but on the
contrary press and people commended President
Roosevelt for his "great achievement" in secur-
ing a "just peace," and Japan was praised as a
"noble victor."

The outbreak of the Great War found Japan
the ally of England, and without delay she en-
tered into the fulfilment of her treaty obliga-
tions, declaring war on Germany on August 23,
1914. The consideration of tremendous interest
to the Allies, as a matter of course, was that
Germany's bases of operations in the Pacific
should be destroyed, for not only did the German

274

SHANTUNG AND HYPOCRISY

occupation of Shantung forbid the transport of
troops from Australia, but it gave a position of
advantage for continual knife-thrusts into Eng-
land's back. Without delay Japan attacked
the strong forts of Tsing-Tau, captured them,
and swept German power from the Pacific.

In May, 1915, China signed a solemn agree-
ment to the effect that she recognized Japan's
rights to the Shantung leasehold, and would
assent to any future arrangement effected be-
tween Japan and Germany. In the spring of
1917, when Japan's larger participation in the
war was necessary, England and France signed
a treaty agreeing to recognize the Japanese claim
to Shantung, and in 1918 China yielded a similar
guaranty.

This, then, was the situation that faced the
President on April 29th. The ideal arrange-
ment, as he saw it, was an outright cancelation
of the Shantung lease in order that the League
of Nations might build from the beginning on a
foundation of honor and territorial integrity. A
variety of things joined to make any such settle-
ment impossible. In the first place, Japanese
feeling was already very bitter on account of the
refusal of the Peace Conference to recognize the
"equality of the nations and the just treatment
of their nationals," and this bitterness had ample
justification. The only excuse for this discrimi-
nation, as the President frankly explained, was an
American prejudice, and, while the future might
remove it, it had to be dealt with as a factor at
the time. Wounded in their pride, and deeply
angered by what seemed a breach of faith, the
19 275

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Japanese insisted that if their claim to the Shan-
tung concession was to be ignored, they would
quit the Conference and refuse to sign the Peace
Treaty. No one was suggesting that either
England or France should surrender Chinese
leases. Why, then, should the entire burden of
sacrifice be placed upon Japan? To consent to
any such arrangement was tantamount to a
confession that England and France were to be
trusted in China, but that Japan was to be
excluded as an untrustworthy nation.

As the Japanese delegates pointed out, it was
not that they were asking anything from China,
but merely taking over the German lease granted
by China in 1898, and which still had seventy-
eight years to run. By an expenditure of blood
and money they had dispossessed the Germans
and were now the legal possessors of the lease.
England, France, and China had affirmed the
transfer. Under no circumstances would Japan
allow these treaties to be turned into scraps of
paper. As has been remarked, Lloyd George
and Clemenceau informed the President that
they could not, in common honor, repudiate the
pledges that they had given to Japan.

At the very outset the President indulged in
some very plain speech. Speaking for the
United States, he refused absolutely to recognize
the treaties of 1915 and 1918 by which China
agreed to transfer the German rights in Shantung
to the Japanese. He proved conclusively that
the signature of China in both instances was
obtained under threat of war, and he proved
also that China would have entered the war

276

SHANTUNG AND HYPOCRISY

against Germany in 1914 but for Japan's veto.
Tokio did not want to see a Chinese army in
the field, and it was only after America's entrance
into the world struggle that Japan grudgingly
consented to let China become a belligerent.
Japan, in answer, merely pointed to the fact
that Spain had ceded Porto Rico and the Philip-
pines to the United States under duress. She
held up the solemn promise of England and
France and stated flatly that her delegates
would leave Paris at once unless her claim to
Shantung was granted.

What was the President to do? It was not
only the case that Japan was supported at every
point by the strict letter of international law,
but it was equally true that there was not one
single compulsion that could be applied to make
her consent to a course of which her statesmen
did not approve. By no means was it a study in
the abstract. Japan was in actual and absolute
possession of Shantung, able to enforce her rights
regardless of any decision of the Peace Confer-
ence. It was not only the case that the departure
of the Japanese delegates would defeat the Peace
Treaty and continue world chaos, but it stood
plain that China would not be helped in any
degree. The President, however, met firmness
with firmness and out of the clash of wills there
came a decision which, while not ideal, may yet
stand as one of the most remarkable victories of
the whole Conference. The President agreed
that the German lease should be transferred
without reservation to Japan, while the Japanese
delegates agreed "to hand back the Shantung

277

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining
only the economic privileges granted to Germany
and the right to establish a settlement under the
usual conditions at Tsing-Tau." All fortifica-
tions were to be razed, all Japanese troops were
to be withdrawn, and any police force that might
be needed for the protection of Japanese proper-
ties was to be recruited from the Chinese popula-
tion. Where Germany ruled as a sovereign in
Shantung Japan will operate only as an economic
concessionnaire, enjoying no rights but the eco-
nomic and commercial rights that go with its
lease to operate a railroad and to develop
mines.

The President did not stop with this arrange-
ment. Calling Lloyd George and Clemenceau
into the council-chamber again, he explained the
nature of the agreement, and asked flatly
whether he might expect that England and
France would follow the laudable example of
Japan. The two Premiers stated that they were
willing that the French and English concessions
should be passed upon by the League of Nations
and that the President might count upon their
influence in securing the surrenders necessary to
restore the territorial integrity of China.

r Those who strike at the Peace Treaty, under
pretense of friendship and pity for China, are in
reality the enemies of China. The defeat of the
treaty will not cancel the Shantung lease or put
an end to Japanese control of the former German
holdings. These are things that can be done
only by force. America would have to take
arms against Japan, and inasmuch as France and

278

SHANTUNG AND HYPOCRISY

England are in China, these two nations would
also have to be fought and expelled. It is sig-
nificant, however, that not a Republican Senator
has had the courage or honesty to suggest this
course, for it is not China that they want to help,
but the President that they want to discredit.
If the League of Nations does not become a fact,
with America in it as a champion of fair dealing,
China has been robbed of her one great chance
to regain her ravished sovereignty. Japan, re-
leased from her obligation, will undoubtedly
treat Shantung as the Germans treated it —
fortifying, colonizing, expanding — striking always
deeper into the heart of China. France and
England, no longer bound by their promises to
the President, will strengthen their holds in
China, and the unhappy country will more than
ever become the prey of strength.

Only in the ratification of the treaty — only in
the operation of the League of Nations — is there
any hope for China. This great tribunal, when
it is set up, will see to it that Japan stands by her
bargain, receiving no rights other than as an
economic concessionnaire, and at the end of her
lease quitting China entirely. France and Eng-
land will also be held to their words, and quick
action may be expected that will either put them
outside of China or else continue them as mere
tenants and not as sovereigns. The whole in-
tent of Article X is to respect and preserve
the territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of nations, and not only is China to be a
member of the League, with full power of pro-
test, but the other nations of the world are at

279

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

last in a position to voice their own protests
against the intolerable grievances to which the
Chinese have been subjected.

There is no question that Japan will live up to
her agreement in event of the constitution of a
League of Nations. Contrary to general opinion,
Japan, as a nation, has been more scrupulous
than any other in the observance of treaty
obligations. Another factor, overlooked by the
average American, is the existence and increas-
ing strength of the liberal movement in Japan.
In the last few years, particularly, democratic
sentiment has had an amazing growth in the
Flowery Kingdom, and there is every certainty
that the military tradition will soon be over-
thrown. Arbitrary and discriminatory treat-
ment in the matter of Shantung would have
caused a revulsion in Japanese feeling, restoring
the imperialistic party to all of its old power, but
the League of Nations, with its accent upon
peace and justice, is virtually a guaranty of
victory for the forces of liberalism.

Japan wants the friendship of the world, but
more than anything else she needs the friendship
of China. In the opinion of the best informed,
there is little doubt that Japan will not only
hold to her agreement, but that she will go even
farther, perhaps to the length of canceling the
entire Shantung concession as the first step in
winning the confidence of the Chinese.
"""* Whether this is done or whether this is not
done, the arrangement forced by the President,
and depending upon the formation of a League
of Nations, is China's one hope. The only

280

SHANTUNG AND HYPOCRISY

other way is for America to demand the return
of Shantung under threat of war, and every
person of intelligence knows that this is not
going to be done.

It is also the case that the President did not
rest satisfied with the settlement, but proceeded
at once to put the future of China upon firm
ground. The representatives of the United
States, France, Great Britain, and Japan met
in conference and associated in a consortium
based upon these principles:

(a) That no country should attempt to culti-
vate special spheres of influence;

(b) That all existing options held by a mem-
ber of any of the national groups should, so far
as practicable, be turned into the consortium
as a whole;

(c) That the four banking groups of the coun-
tries in question should act in concert and in an
effective partnership for the interests of China;
and

(d) That the consortium's operations should
deal primarily with loans to the Chinese Republic
or to provinces of the Republic, or with loans
guaranteed or officially having to do with the
Republic or its provinces, and in each instance
of a character sufficient to warrant a public issue.

Here was plain agreement that not only would
China be protected from spoliation in the future,
but that the partitions of the past would be
remedied. Here was an open, honest offer of
financial help — an unselfish concert of nations
for the purpose of lifting China out of debt \
and putting her on the road to solvency.

281

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Emboldened by the position of the Republican
majority in the Senate, Japan is showing signs
of a desire to repudiate the consortium, a course
she would not dare to pursue were the United
States a member of the League of Nations. It
is a course that every other nation will com-
mence to adopt if America persists in with-
holding her voice and influence. It is not only
the welfare of China that is being imperiled by
Senator Lodge and his Republican majority,
but the hopes of every weak nation in the world.

XIX

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

THE impregnability of the President's position
with respect to Fiume is proved absolutely
by the written record. It may not be seriously
questioned that the Treaty of London is to be
considered as a complete statement of Italy's
war objectives. England and France, facing
what seemed to be certain defeat, were little
disposed to quibble over the terms that would
bring a new ally into the war, especially as the
rewards that Italy was to receive were entirely
at the expense of the enemy. What Italy asked
was the Trentino, as a matter of course, the
province of Triest, the peninsula of Istria,
most of Dalmatia, the chief Dalmatian islands,
and the Dodecannesus. This parceling rectified
the northern frontier, reclaiming Italian territory
long held by the Austrians, and also gave Italy
virtual control of the Adriatic. France and
England agreed to these demands, and incor-
porated them into the Treaty of London. No
one can doubt that the two nations, in their
extremity, would have granted anything that
Italy chose to request, and Fiume would have
been signed over without demur had the city
been asked for. Instead of that, the Italian

283

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

representatives specifically insisted upon the
exclusion of Fiume and Spalato.

Fiume, therefore, was not an Italian objective
when Italy set down the terms upon which she
stood ready to enter the war. Nor was Fiume
in the mind of Italy even at the time of the
armistice, for on December 2, 1918, the Italian
Bureau of Information in Washington issued a
statement in denial of imperialistic pretensions,
making this formal reference to Fiume:

The Treaty of London is the only document supported
by the Allies in which there are precise promises in favor
of the Jugoslavic peoples, and these promises were asked
by Italy before the Allies. Italy, which might have
egotistically treated only with regard to her own rights,
has wished, in entering the war, to assure also to the Jugo-
slavs their rights for a just balance of power in the Adriatic.

Note 2 attached to Article V of the treaty (of London)
establishes:

The following districts upon the Adriatic shall be by
virtue of the powers of the Entente included in the territory
of Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro: . . . the entire coast
of Croatia, the port of Fiume, and the little ports of Nevi
and of Carlopago.

This stipulation, as it gives proof of the generous loyalty
of the Italian people, so it gives the first measure of what
should be and is a just accord of all rights; of the rights
of a people such as the Italians, which cannot be renounced.

If this is not proof enough that Fiume was
merely an afterthought of certain Italian poli-
ticians, the record contains other confirmatory
evidence. Signer Orlando not only held friendly
conversations in London with Trumbic, the
Croatian leader, but arranged for a meeting in
Rome for the purpose of cementing an alliance

284

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

between Italy and the Jugoslavia peoples. At
the time Czechoslovaks, Croats, Serbs, and
Slovenes were fighting under the Italian colors
in the front-line trenches, and the congress gave
promise of burying forever the ancient feud
between Italian and Jugoslav. The action of
the Jugoslav committee in congratulating Or-
lando upon the great Piave victory was a fitting
climax to the projection of the accord. There
was much talk of the new state that should rise
from the ruins of Austria-Hungary, and Signor
Orlando led the dominant group that preached
the wisdom of a close and co-operative alliance.
It was this policy, no doubt, that dictated the
exclusion of Fiume and Spalato from the Treaty
of London. Orlando saw that the friendship
of the Balkans would prove of incalculable
benefit to Italian commerce, while the voluntary
cession of Italy's rights in Fiume would win
world approval.

This statesman-like conception was brought
to naught by the antagonism of Baron Sonnino,
Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs, a diplomat
brought up in the tradition of Metternich and
unable to grasp any other political method than
that of appealing to the basest passions of the
masses. As though it were his object to isolate
Italy entirely, this old man shattered the under-
standing with the new Jugoslavia state, con-
temptuously rejected the overtures of Greece,
and set about the disruption of friendly relations
with France. Fiume was the idea of Sonnino
and Sonnino alone. The Italian people knew
nothing about the demand for weeks, and when

285

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

it was tentatively suggested to President Wilson
soon after his arrival in Paris he called Sonnino's
attention to the fact that Fiume did not figure
in the Treaty of London and that Italy had
accepted the Fourteen Points without a single
reservation. Stubbornly, cleverly, Sonnino swept
both the President and Orlando to one side, and
commenced the promotion of the agitation that
resulted in the resurrection of Italian jingoism
and D'Annunzio's seizure of Fiume.

As has been pointed out in a previous chapter,
never at any time did the President change his
mind with regard to Fiume. He made his posi-
tion clear when the matter was first broached in
Paris, and it was with difficulty that he was
dissuaded from stating his views to the Italian
people during his visit in Rome. Italy was to
receive the Trentino, the province of Triest,
principal parts of Istria and Dalmatia, the naval
base at Pola, and other important accessions.
These were Italian rights and the President
supported them wholeheartedly. Fiume, how-
ever, had been promised to the Serbs and the
Czechoslovaks as their one outlet to the sea,
and it was a promise that must be kept. His
statement of April 23d — the so-called appeal
to the Italian people over the heads of Orlando
and Sonnino — was no more than a public declara-
tion of the stand that he had held from the very
beginning. The Italian delegation left Paris on
April 24th in ostentatious fury, but it was notable
that the economic representatives remained, con-
tinuing the daily business of getting money, fuel,
and raw materials from the United States.

286

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

The vote of confidence received by Orlando
on his return to Rome must be regarded as more
political than popular, for it was not long before
the Premier and his Cabinet were forced to
resign. The sane papers of Italy commenced to
point out that the lunatic insistence upon the
comparatively insignificant question of Fiume
had not only lost Italy valuable and necessary
friendships, but that it had blinded the delega-
tion to Italy's real necessities. While the battle
over Fiume was being waged with rage and
bitterness, not one single intelligent effort had
been made to forward Italy's economic interests
by arrangements with regard to finance, coal,
food, iron, and steel.

Until the day of his departure, the President
hoped for an amicable settlement of the Adriatic
tangle, and persisted in these efforts even after
his return. Principally as a result of his interest,
an agreement was reached on December 9, 1919,
the proposals being signed by Lloyd George and
Clemenceau, with Frank Polk representing the
President as a member of the American com-
mission. There was no question as to the joint
nature of the note, and even as late as December
23d Clemenceau made this frank statement
to the Chamber of Deputies: "The Fiume
question has been agonizing. Italy promised
Fiume to the Jugoslavs, but went back on her
promise. France, England, and the United
States have sought a solution, and the latest
indications are that it will finally be reached.
Only when this is solved can we commence to
breathe freely." The feature of the settlement

287

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

was the creation of the free state of Fiume, a
compromise that safeguarded the Jugoslavia
interests even as it held a salve for Italian pride.
In all else the Italian claims were granted even
beyond the first expectations.

Shortly afterward the American delegation re-
turned to the United States, the attitude of the
Senate making impossible any further stay in
Paris. On January 6, 1919, Signor Nitti, the
new Italian Premier, answered the joint note
of December 9th, making counter-proposals that
were no more than a restatement of the original
Sonnino demands. Whereupon Clemenceau and
Lloyd George, acting in entire independence and
without even informing the President of the new
Italian note, met hurriedly on January 9th
and came to a fresh understanding that repudi-
ated in every particular their signed agreement
of December 9th.

Under this new arrangement, the free state of
Fiume was cut down to include the city only,
and a further strip of territory was given to
Italy in order to connect Fiume with Italian
Istria; additional islands were ceded to Italy,
the Jugoslavia city of Zara was recognized as a
free city, and various other concessions were
made. By way of appeasing the Jugoslavs,
they were given permission to step in and take
a considerable slice of northern Albania, a pro-
posal that New Europe denounced in these
terms :

The Jugoslavs are asked to sacrifice half a million of their
kinsmen, and to accept as "compensation" — in other words,
as a shameless bribe — chose northern districts of Albania

288

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

which the secret Treaty of London had assigned to them.
This means that France and Britain have robbed a weak
ally of its rights in order to meet obligations which they
had wrongly contracted, and which they are not prepared
to redeem with their own property; and that they now
invite their victim to indemnify himself and descend to
their own level by plundering a still weaker neighbor.

Premier Nitti, as a matter of course, "con-
sented," and without more ado Lloyd George
and Clemenceau sent for the representatives of
the Jugoslavs and told them that unless they
accepted the new proposition within four days
the Treaty of London would be put in force.
The London Times, describing the scene, states
that "Pasitch and Trumbic were rated in a
fashion not usual in diplomacy. They were told
that discussion could not continue, that if they
did not give way England and France were going
not only to apply the Treaty of London, but
to allow Italy to apply it and apply it in its
integrity. 'That,' said Clemenceau, 'is the al-
ternative. There is no third course to which it
is possible to accede.' Lloyd George was 'in
full agreement with Clemenceau."

These actions, communicated to Washington,
resulted in a telegram to Ambassador Wallace
on January I9th, in which it was stated that
"the United States is being put in the position
of having the matter disposed of before the
American point of view can be expressed, as
apparently M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd
George have sought only the views of the
Italian and Jugoslav governments before ascer-
taining the views of the United States govern-

289

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

ment. Is it the intention of the British and
French governments in the future to dispose of
the various questions pending in Europe and to
communicate the results to the government of
the United States? There are features in
connection with the proposed Fiume settlement
which both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd
George must realize would not be acceptable
to the President. As was pointed out by Mr.
Polk before his departure, the Dalmatian and
other questions should be taken up through
regular diplomatic channels, and the fact that
you are not charged with full powers could have
no bearing on the question/'

This communication was answered under date
of January 23d by a joint cable from Lloyd
George and Clemenceau in which the two
Premiers denied any intent to make "a definite
settlement of the question without obtaining
the views of the American government." There
were glib explanations that they had merely pro-
ceeded upon the theory that it was best, in view
of conditions, "to proceed with the negotiations
as rapidly as possible, and to submit the results
to the United States government as soon as
definite conclusions had been reached." The
answer also protested that "practically every
important point of the joint memorandum of
December 19, 1919, remains untouched and has
now been indorsed by the Prime Minister of
Italy." In reply the President despatched his
famous note of February loth, dealing not only
with Fiume, but setting forth the American
position with reference to the whole question of

290

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

European territorial readjustment. Its impor-
tant passages may well be quoted:

The President fully shares the view of the French and
British governments that the future of the world largely
depends upon the right solution of this question, but he
cannot believe that a solution containing provisions which
have already received the well-merited condemnation of
the French and British governments can in any sense be
regarded as right. Neither can he share the opinion of
the French and British governments that the proposals
contained in their memorandum delivered to the Jugoslav
representative on January I4th leave untouched practically
every important point of the joint memorandum of the
French, British, and American governments of December
9, 1919, and that only two features undergo alterations,
and both these alterations are to the positive advantage
of Jugoslavia. On the contrary, the President is of the
opinion that the proposal of December gth has been pro-
foundly altered to the advantage of improper Italian ob-
jectives, to the serious injury of the Jugoslav people and
to the peril of world peace.

The memorandum of December 9th rejected the device
of connecting Fiume with Italy by a narrow strip of coast
territory, as quite unworkable in practice and as involving
extraordinary complexities as regards customs control,
coast-guard services, and cognate matters in a territory of
such unusual configuration. The French and British
governments, in association with the American government,
expressed the opinion that "the plan appears to run counter
to every consideration of geography, economics, and ter-
ritorial convenience." The American government notes
that this annexation of Jugoslav territory by Italy is
nevertheless agreed to by the memorandum of January I4th.

The memorandum of December 9th rejected Italy's
demand for the annexation of all of Istria, on the solid
ground that neither strategic nor economic considerations
could justify such annexation, and that there remained
nothing in defense of the proposition save Italy's desire
20 291

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

for more territory admittedly inhabited by Jugoslavs.
The French and British governments then expressed their
cordial approval of the way in which the President had met
every successive Italian demand for the absorption in Italy
of territories inhabited by peoples not Italian and not in
favor of being absorbed, and joined in the opinion that
"it is neither just nor expedient to annex as the spoils of
war territories inhabited by an alien race." Yet this un-
just and inexpedient annexation of all of Istria is provided
for in the memorandum of January I4th.

The memorandum of December 9th carefully excluded
every form of Italian sovereignty over Fiume. The Amer-
ican government cannot avoid the conclusion that the
memorandum of January I4th opens the way for Italian
control of Fiume's foreign affairs, thus introducing a
measure of Italian sovereignty over, and Italian inter-
vention in, the only practicable port of a neighboring
people; and taken in conjunction with the extension of
Italian territory to the gates of Fiume, paves the way for
possible future annexation of the port by Italy, in con-
tradiction of compelling considerations of equity and right.

The memorandum of December 9th afforded proper pro-
tection to the vital railway connecting Fiume northward
with the interior. The memorandum of January I4th
establishes Italy in dominating military positions close to
the railway at a number of critical points.

The memorandum of December 9th maintained in large
measure the unity of the Albanian state. That of January
1 4th partitions the Albanian people, against their vehement
protests, among three different alien powers.

The American government, while no less generous in its
desire to accord to Italy every advantage to which she
could offer any proper claims, feels that it cannot sacrifice
the principles for which it entered the war to gratify the
improper ambitions of one of its associates, or to purchase a
temporary appearance of calm in the Adriatic at the price
of a future world conflagration. It is unwilling to recognize
either an unjust settlement based on a secret treaty the
terms of which are inconsistent with the new world condi-

292

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

tions or an unjust settlement arrived at by employing that
secret treaty as an instrument of coercion. It would wel-
come any solution of the problem based on a free and un-
prejudiced consideration of the merits of the controversy,
or on terms of which the disinterested great powers agreed
to be just and equitable. Italy, however, has repeatedly
rejected such resolutions. This government cannot accept
a settlement the terms of which have been admitted to be
unwise and unjust, but which it is proposed to grant to
Italy in view of her persistent refusal to accept any wise
and just solution.

It is a time to speak with the utmost frankness. The
Adriatic issue as it now presents itself raises the fundamental
question as to whether the American government can on
any terms co-operate with its European associates in the
great work of maintaining the peace of the world by remov-
ing the primary causes of war. This government does not
doubt its ability to reach amicable understandings with the
associated governments as to what constitutes equity and
justice in international dealings, for differences of opinion
as to the best methods of applying just principles have
never obscured the vital fact that in the main the several
governments have entertained the same fundamental con-
ception of what those principles are. But if substantial
agreement on what is just and reasonable is not to deter-
mine international issues, if the country possessing the
most endurance in pressing its demands rather than the
country armed with a just cause is to gain the support of
the powers; if forcible seizure of coveted areas is to be
permitted and condoned, and is able to receive ultimate
justification by creating a situation so difficult that decision
favorable to the aggressor is deemed a practical necessity;
if deliberately incited ambition is, under the name of
national sentiment, to be rewarded at the expense of the
small and the weak; if, in a word, the old order of things
which brought so many evils on the world is still to prevail —
then the time is not yet come when this government can
enter a concert of powers the very existence of which must
depend upon a new spirit and a new order. The American
people are willing to share in such high enterprise, but

293

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

many among them are fearful lest they be entangled in
international policies and committed to international ob-
ligations foreign alike to their ideals and their traditions.
To commit them to such a policy as that embodied in the
latest Adriatic proposals, and to obligate them to maintain
injustice as against the claims of justice, would be to pro-
vide the most solid ground for such fears. This government
can undertake no such grave responsibility.

The President desires to say that if it does not appear
feasible to secure acceptance of the just and generous
concessions offered by the British, French, and American
governments to Italy in the joint memorandum of those
powers of December 9, 1919, which the President has
already clearly stated to be the maximum concession that
the government of the United States can offer, the President
desires to say that he must take under serious considera-
tion the withdrawal of the treaty with Germany and the
agreement between the United States and France of June
28, 1919, which are now before the Senate and permitting
the terms of the European settlement to be independently
established and enforced by the associated governments.

The devious nature of French diplomacy was
evidenced again in connection with this cor-
respondence. Appreciating the fact that secrecy
could be maintained no longer, and fully realiz-
ing the moral strength of Wilson's position, the
French government followed its usual practice of
presenting the case to the world in the colored
and distorted form best suited to French pur-
poses. Instead of giving the notes to the press,
inspired articles commenced to appear, the ob-
ject being to gain currency for the impression
that France and Great Britain and Italy had
agreed upon a sensible settlement, eminently
fair to the Jugoslavs, and that this settlement
had been rudely cast aside by President Wilson

294

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

under threat of withdrawing entirely from con-
cern with European affairs. The Echo de Paris,
mouthpiece of the French Foreign Office, was
guilty of one great indiscretion, however, when
it declared, "It is inadmissible that Wilson —
an autocrat, truly, but an autocrat who is about
to fall — should be allowed to impose his political
conceptions upon us when within a year Re-
publicans will rule in the White House and in all
probability will immediately denounce all his
conceptions.*'

What else was this but a confession that
European imperialism looked upon the Repub-
lican Senate as its ally, and that under the terms
of this new alliance authority was given to break
every agreement entered into with President
Wilson ?

Certainly the action of Senator Lodge gave
them the right to take this position. At one of
the most critical stages of the controversy he
sent an open telegram to various Italian societies
in Boston, declaring that Fiume should be handed
over to Italy, "not only for her own protection,
but as an essential barrier against any future
attempt of Germany to attack the rest of the
world as she did in the recent war." Having
addressed this appeal to the Italian vote, he
then turned about and cajoled the German vote
by insisting that the United States should make
a separate peace with Germany without con-
ditions of any kind. It was this sort of political
claptrap, in the United States as well as in
Rome, that aroused passions that clouded Italian
intelligence.

295

The publication of the President's note put
an end to intrigue. Its stirring sentences and
unanswerable logic forced a quick reconsidera-
tion of the whole Fiume matter, and the Anglo-
French reply was a complete backdown. Every
word was a virtual admission that the settlement
was nothing more than a hasty, ill-considered
attempt to adjust a difficulty, and in addition
there was specific admission that the Albanian
partition was unfair. The European press re-
acted favorably to the new attitude as leading
"to the only sensible settlement of the dangerous
and embarrassing position."

President Wilson, in a note of February 24th,
explained that he "would, of course, make no
objection to a settlement mutually agreeable to
Italy and Jugoslavia regarding their common
frontier in the Fiume region, provided that such
an agreement is not made on the basis of com-
pensations elsewhere at the expense of nationals
of a third power." And he restated the principle
on which he stood:

The President believes it to be the central principle
fought for in the war that no government or group of
governments has the right to dispose of the territory or to
determine the political allegiance of any free people. The
five great powers, though the government of the United
States constitutes one of them, have in his conviction no
more right than had the Austrian government to dispose
of the free Jugoslavic peoples without the free consent and
co-operation of those peoples. The President's position is
that the powers associated against Germany gave final and
irrefutable proof of their sincerity in the war by writing
into the Treaty of Versailles Article X of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, which constitutes an assurance

296

THE ADRIATIC TANGLE

that all the great powers have done what they have com-
pelled Germany to do — have foregone all territorial aggres-
sion and all interference with the free political self-deter-
mination of the peoples of the world. With this principle
lived up to, permanent peace is secured and the supreme
object of the recent conflict has been achieved. Justice
and self-determination have been substituted for aggres-
sion and political dictation. Without it, there is no security
for any nation that conscientiously adheres to a non-
militaristic policy.

The only possible solution of the Fiume ques-
tion lies in the friendly and sincere agreement of
Italy and Jugoslavia, and such an agreement
will not be reached until the Italian people
realize that their politicians have led them into
a quicksand. The Fiume claim was manu-
factured after the armistice in open defiance of
solemn pledges, and there is small doubt that
D'Annunzio's coup had Sonnino's approval, if
not his complete support. This challenge to
the Peace Conference, instead of forcing a sur-
render to the Italian demands, has had only
the opposite effect, and as a result Italy is
standing outside the good opinion of the world.
She has Fiume, by right of force, but against
this barren victory there are to be placed her
losses in friendship and material support. No
nation is more in need of economic reinforce-
ment, yet the certainty of this aid has been
thrown away for the sake of a port that Italy
does not need.

Under the quick impulsiveness of the Italian
there is a rare fineness of spirit and a very shrewd
common sense. When passion has cooled it is
safe to assume that the people of Italy will return

297

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

to the original policy of Orlando, working out
an amicable settlement with the Jugoslavs that
will safeguard every Italian interest even as it
will build solid foundations for an accord with
the Jugoslavic state. This was and is the hope
of the President.

WERE THE FOURTEEN POINTS IGNORED?

1VTOTHING is more certain than that the calm I
•»• N judgment of the future will bear witness
to the amazing justice of the Peace Treaty.
Deliberated at a time when the passions of the
world ran high, and framed against a back-
ground of ruin worked by the premeditated
cruelties of Prussianism, the document is re-
markable for its exclusion of the spirit of revenge.
There is severity in it, to be sure, for the thing
that Germany did called for punishment that
should stand forever as a lesson and a warning,
but at every point there are redemptive possi-
bilities and in every provision there is opportunity
for the exercise of a wise clemency. The whole
emphasis of the treaty is upon the future, not
the past, and in its dream of a new world there
is a proud place for Germany if her people have
the vision and the courage to claim it.

Both courage and vision are lacking as yet.
Instead of comparing the terms of the Peace
Conference with the conditions that Prussianism
would have imposed in the event of victory, the
German people are still indulging in an orgy
of self-pity, and not even the propaganda of
poison with which they deluged the world
throughout the war was more vigorous than

299

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the present propaganda of appeal. It may not
be denied that the effects are being felt in the
United States. Naturally enough, the great
mass of Americans of German blood and descent
are still possessed of their former sympathies,
and the cry that comes to them from their kindred
strikes down to the old affections . This fact,
unfortunately, has been seized upon by politi-
cians with keen appreciation of the strength of
the German vote, and no attempt has been
spared to convince every citizen of Teutonic
extraction that a savage revenge has been
inflicted upon the Fatherland. Mr. Hays, chair-
man of the Republican National Committee,
once passionate in his fear that President Wilson
meant to let "the accursed Hun" escape, is now
leading his party in a chorus of pained expostula-
tion, and Senator Knox, most clamant in his
demand for a "hard peace/* raises his voice
to-day only to attack the harshness of the terms
j| inflicted upon unhappy Germany.

To justify their position they now assert that
the Germans did not surrender unconditionally,
but laid down their arms under an agreement that
peace terms should be based upon the Fourteen
Points of President Wilson, and that this agree-
ment was "repudiated." It is a comparatively
safe position, for not one in a thousand remembers
the Fourteen Points and not one in a hundred
thousand knows the exact provisions of the Peace
Treaty. As a consequence of its repetition, the
great majority of the men and women of the
United States have come to complete and un-
questioning acceptance of the falsehood, and even

300

WERE THE FOURTEEN POINTS IGNORED?

among those who approve the peace there is a
general opinion that the Fourteen Points were
cast aside.

This position has the advantage of simplicity,
calling for nothing more than bare assertion.
Truth, on the other hand, is a thing of detail,
particularly so in the present instance. The
Fourteen Points, as a matter of fact, were in
no sense a definitive practical formula, but a
broad announcement of principles. As Mr.
Keynes himself admits, "a large part of the
addresses is concerned with spirit, purpose, and
intention, and not with concrete solutions,"
and "it is difficult to apply on a practical basis
those passages which deal with spirit, purpose,
and intention." If it were necessary, the gen-
eralizing nature of the Fourteen Points could be
used as a shield against attack, but there is no
such necessity. Taken up one by one, and com-
pared with the terms of the Peace Treaty, it is
seen that the Fourteen Points were not only not
repudiated, but were put into effect as solemnly
and effectively as though each had been worded
with the legal precision of a contract. It is a
comparison that should have been made months
ago in the interests of information and fairness,.
Considering the famous Points in their order,
this is the result:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which
there should be no private international understandings
of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly
and in the public view.

The fulfilment of this is found in Article
XXVIII of the Covenant which reads as fol-

301

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

lows: "Every treaty or international engage-
ment entered into hereafter by any Member
of the League shall be forthwith registered
with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possi-
ble be published by it. No such treaty or in-
ternational engagement shall be binding until
so registered." This marks the end of "secret
diplomacy." As the President said in one of
his speeches: "From this time forth all the
world is going to know what all the agree-
ments between nations are. It is going to
know, not their general character merely, but
their exact language and contents, because the
provision of the League is that no treaty shall
be valid which is not registered with the general
secretary of the League, and the general secretary
of the League is instructed to publish it in all
its details at the earliest possible moment.
Just as you can go to the court-house and see
all the mortgages on all the real estate in your
county, you can go to the general secretariat
of the League of Nations and find all the mort-
gages on all the nations. This treaty, in short,
is a great clearance-house. It is very little short
of a canceling of the past and an insurance of the
future."

2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside
territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as
the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international
action for the enforcement of international covenants.

Contrary to false assertion, the freedom of the
seas was not withdrawn from discussion by
Great Britain. What England insisted upon

302

WERE THE FOURTEEN POINTS IGNORED?

was that the phrase should be defined before
any agreement was reached. Nor was it possible
for the Peace Conference to lay down the defini-
tion. The essence of the "freedom of the seas"
is that the governance of the seas shall rest
upon the consent of the governed. Fourteen
neutral nations were not represented at the Peace
Conference. These countries are now in the
League of Nations, and it will be the duty of
this world court to frame a sea code that will
forever free the ocean lanes from tyranny and
obstruction. It will be done and it is the only
way in which it can be done. ...

3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers
and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions
among all the nations consenting to the peace and asso-
ciating themselves for its maintenance.

The treaty provides specifically for the re-
moval of duties on German's exports and im-
ports in many cases where such reduction is
necessary to her economic rehabilitation. It
was not "possible" to grant blanket exemptions,
for the simple reason that while German manu-
factures continued throughout the war, the
manufactures of France, Italy, Belgium, and
England were either crushed outright or partially.
A certain protection is wise and necessary until
Allied industries have been restored in some
degree, but the barriers are temporary, and the
League of Nations is given full power to put the
spirit of the third Point into effect.

4. Adequate guaranties given and taken that national
armaments will be reduced to the lowest points consistent
with domestic safety.

303

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

This pledge is nobly fulfilled in Article VIII
of the Covenant.1

•— •

5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjust-
ment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance
of the principle that in determining all such questions of
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must
have equal weight with the equitable claims of the govern-
ment whose title is to be determined.

This pledge was fulfilled by an abrogation
of the secret treaty that divided Germany's
colonial possessions among England, France, and
Japan. It was one of the President's first battles
and one of his greatest victories. Lifted out of
the chattel class, Germany's former colonies
are now independent entities under the adminis-
tration and protection of the League of Nations.

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a
settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure
the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the
world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembar-
rassed opportunity for the independent determination of
her own political development and national policy and
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free
nations under institutions of her own choosing, and more
than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she
may need and may herself desire.

The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations
in the months to come will be the acid test of their good
will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished
from their own interests, and of their intelligent and un-
selfish sympathy.

President Wilson defeated the attempt to use
armed force for the overthrow of the Bolshevik

'See Chapter XXI.

304

WERE THE FOURTEEN POINTS IGNORED?

regime, secured the withdrawal of conflict
troops, protected the territorial integrity of
Russia against schemes of conquest, and gained
the adoption of a policy that puts the future of
Russia in the hands of the Russians themselves.
As far as the antagonistic policy of Lenin has
permitted, aid has been given, and when the
distracted country desires a return to civilized
intercourse her place in the League of Nations
is waiting for her, likewise every assistance in
her economic rehabilitation.

•M

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evac-
uated and restored, without any attempt to limit the
sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free
nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve
to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which
they have themselves set and determined for the govern-
ment of their relations with one another. Without this
healing act the whole structure and validity of interna-
tional law is forever impaired.

Is there any question that this has been done?

•VM

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded
portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia
in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has un-
settled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should
be righted, in order that peace may once more be made
secure in the interest of all.

Is there any question that this has been done ?

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be
effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

The Trentino and Triest have been restored
to Italy, also part of Istria, part of Dalmatia,

305

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

and various Adriatic islands. Only Fiume has
been withheld and Fiume was never an Italian
war objective, but a post-armistice demand.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among
the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should
be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous develop-
ment.

As the President explained in his note to Ger-
many on October i8th, this point had undergone
a radical change. "Since that sentence was
written and uttered to the Congress of the
United States," he said, "the government of the
United States has recognized that a state of
belligerency exists between the Czechoslovaks
and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires,
and that the Czechoslovak National Council
is a de facto belligerent government clothed
with proper authority to direct the military and
political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. It has
also recognized in the fullest manner the justice
of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugoslavs
for freedom."

These changes were accepted by the Central
Powers and became part of the basis of settle-
ment. As a consequence Czechoslovakia is a
republic and the Jugoslavic state is pursuing its
destiny. Galicia and Silesia have had the
Austrian yoke lifted from them, and the stolen
portions of Rumania have been restored.

•Q

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evac-
uated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded
free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the
several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly
counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and

306

WERE THE FOURTEEN POINTS IGNORED?

nationality; and international guaranties of the political
and economic independence and territorial integrity of
the several Balkan States should be entered into.

Evacuation has been brought about in full
degree: Serbia's right to a free and secure access
to the sea was responsible for the President's
resistance to the Italian claim to Fiume, and
Article X in the Covenant of the League of
Nations gives the promised guaranties of inde-
pendence and territorial integrity to the new

states.

*«•

12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire
should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other
nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be
assured an undoubted security of life and an absolute
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and
the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free
passage to the ships and commerce of all nations, under
international guaranties.

The Dardanelles are open to the world, and
every one of the oppressed nationalities is being
given help that will enable it to come to
strength and independence. The action of the
Senate compelled the withdrawal of the United
States from the further discussion as to the full
settlement of the Turkish question, and as a
consequence the exact status of Turkish sover-
eignty is still undetermined.

Both British and French governments are of
the opinion that the Sultan should be permitted
to keep his hold on Constantinople. Banking
interests are back of the French demand, while
the English position is the result of a fear that
the Mohammedans of India will resent the
21 307

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND, WILSON

expulsion of the Turk from the holy city of
Stamboul. The President, however, though
barred by the Senate from taking any share in
the debate, has insisted upon American interest
in the settlement. He is steadfast in his insist-
ence that the "anomaly of the Turks in Europe
should cease" and "no arrangement that is made
can have any permanency unless the vital in-
terests of Russia in these problems are carefully
provided for and protected, and unless it is
understood that Russia, when it has a govern-
ment recognized by the civilized world, may
assert its right to be heard in regard to the
decision now made." A final settlement is yet

to be reached.

••»

13. An independent Polish state should be erected which
should include the territories inhabited by indisputably
Polish populations, which should be assured a free and
secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic
independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed
by international covenant.

An independent Poland has been erected,
and, as in the case of Russia, its future depends
upon its people. The indisputably Polish parts
of Galicia and Silesia have been restored and
plebiscites are planned for districts where the
ethnic lines are not clearly drawn. Dantzig
has been made a free city under the administra-
tion of the League of Nations, and Poland has a
corridor that leads to the port.

•*

14. A general association of nations must be formed under
specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual
guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity
to great and small states alike.

308

WERE THE FOURTEEN POINTS IGNORED?

This has been done and forty countries have
entered the League of Nations. The Central
Powers, temporarily excluded until they evince
a willingness to fulfil treaty obligations, Mexico,
banned for very much the same reasons, and the
United States of America, dragged back by a
Republican majority in the Senate, are the only
great states still outside the society of nations.

Let there be an end to the lie — circulated by
malignants and accepted by the half-baked —
that the Fourteen Points were "thrown into the
discard." Every one of them was written into
the treaty, and the result will stand for all time
as a monument to the courage and faith of
Woodrow Wilson. With the Republican Senate
demanding a "hard peace" and screaming
denunciation of the Fourteen Points, and with
the Premiers of Europe standing like iron for
the letter of the bond, the President might well
have surrendered to overwhelming odds, but
instead of that he fought the fight and conquered.^}

The Germans, in their heart of hearts, knowA
well that the peace is written in fairer terms
than they ever expected. Had it not been for
the attitude of Senator Lodge and his Republi-
can associates, Germany would have accepted
the treaty without any large demur, and by
now would be working back to prosperity and
the esteem of the world. As it is, she counts
upon the Republican party to force America
into a repudiation of the peace, thereby entail-
ing a confusion, a general weakness, that may '
enable her to escape entirely.

XXI

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BEFORE taking up the tortuous course of the
political intrigue that resulted in America's
exclusion from the League of Nations, the inter-
ests of clarity and understanding may be served
best by a detailed consideration of the Covenant
that stirred the Americanism of Republican
Senators to the depths, or, rather, to the dregs.
That so short a document, and one so simple,
should stand confused and distorted in the
popular mind is at once a bitter commentary
upon the impudence of politicians and the intel-
ligence of the citizenship. In view of the pass
to which the country has been brought by this
combination of falsehood and ignorance, it were
well to give national application to the Oregon
pamphlet law, putting a printed copy of every
fundamental proposal in the hands of each
elector for his information and protection.
•—- The most cursory reading of the Covenant
of the League of Nations gives the lie to every
attack made upon it. In no sense is it a super-
state that has been created, nor yet an inter-
national legislature. It is, at most, merely an
international conference for purposes of dis-
cussion, co-operation, and peace, its powers
dependent entirely upon the free consent of

310

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

members. To those confident enough to expect
that the horrors of the Great War would win
the nations of the world to a courageous advent-
ure in real partnership, >the outcome is disap-
pointing, for the Covenant is essentially a cau-
tious document, instinct with concession to
precedent and prejudice. It is, however, a
corner-stone upon which to build, and there is
always the great hope that the nations of earth,
realizing eventually the necessity and practica-
bility of the League, will complete the structure
in pride and power and glory. Even to-day,
with all its weaknesses, its careful obeisance to the
traditions of sovereignty, it stands as the greatest
aspiration since the cry of the Galilean — human- ]
ity's one ladder from the pit.

The first draft of the Covenant — fruit of weeks
of consultation, compromise, and revision — was
published February 14, 1919, and was not only
referred back to the nations party to the
Peace Conference, but was also submitted to
the representatives of thirteen neutral -govern-
ments. President Wilson, for instance, return-
ing to America, advised with the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee of the Senate, as well as with
many leaders of thought, and carried back to
Paris a large number of suggestions, criticisms,
and actual amendments. Other delegates acted
similarly, and the Covenant, vastly revised, was
adopted unanimously by the representatives of
the Allied and Associated Powers in plenary
conference on April 29, 1919. This painstaking
preparation is reflected in the language and pro-
visions of the Covenant.

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Article I sets down conditions governing
admission and withdrawal. The thirty-two Al- I
lied and Associated states and thirteen neutral |
states are regarded as original members, and J
arrangement is made for the future admission
of the Central Powers and Russia. Any nation
may withdraw by giving two years' notice, pro-
vided that "all its international obligations are
fulfilled," but the question of fulfilment is left
absolutely to the conscience of the state itself.

Articles II to VII, inclusive, are concerned en-
tirely with the organization of the League. There
is to be a permanent Secretariat, with positions
equally open to men and women. Geneva is
selected as the seat, and the membership is
divided into an Assembly and a Council. In
the Assembly each nation will have three repre-
sentatives, but only one vote. It is without
executive authority, being simply a conference
body. What power the League possesses is
vested in a Council of nine, with the United
States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and
Japan as permanent members and the other
four members to be elected by the Assembly.
Provision is made for the inclusion of Germany
and Russia in this Council when they are ready
for membership.

It is stated explicitly that both Council and
Assembly shall meet from time to time as
occasion requires, but that the Council shall
meet once a year without fail. If the Covenant
held nothing else, this provision would justify
its adoption. The Great War demonstrated be-
yond question that conference between the na-

312

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tions of earth is one of the most certain means
of preventing the international misunderstand-
ings that lead to war. Heretofore such con-
ference could not be held except by the voluntary
action of all the parties. In July, 1914, Sir
Edward Gray exhausted effort to bring about a
meeting of the powers to consider the dispute
between Austria and Serbia. Germany rejected
the proposal and World War resulted. Had the
League of Nations existed at the time, a meeting
would have been called on the instant and Ger-
many would have been obliged to attend. Be-
cause there was no such conference, with its open
discussion, 7,000,000 dead men fill soldiers'
graves, 20,000,000 maimed and blinded men
constitute a world problem, and $200,000,000,000
— the cost of it all — burdens the back of human-
ity with debt and despair.

It is a fact that Germany has admitted that
Berlin expected Great Britain to keep out of
the war. If a conference had been held in 1914,
Great Britain would have made clear to Germany
that she meant to stand by her treaty obliga-
tions, and the Kaiser would not have dared to
strike. The regular meetings of the Assembly
and Council will not only make for peace, but
they will make for friendship and understanding.

Article VIII proceeds to the fulfilment of one
of America's principal war aims, even as it has
been a world dream. There is frank admission
that the maintenance of peace requires the reduc-
tion of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety. All members
of the League agree that they will not conceal

313

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

military and naval information from one another,
and that there shall be full and frank inter-
change of advice as to their military and naval
programs. The Council is to determine and
recommend for the consideration of each govern-
ment what military equipment and armament
is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale
fixed in the general program of disarmament,
taking into account the geographical situation
and circumstances of each state. Thereupon
each state, acting in its own sovereignty and
according to its own laws, shall consider the
recommendations of the Council, and decide
how they can be made effective.
"^ The weakness of it all lies in the fact that the

» Council can only "recommend." It remains in
the power of Congress, the House of Commons,
the Chamber of Deputies, or any other parlia-
mentary body, to disregard the recommenda-
tion, plunging the world anew into armament
competition. There is, however, a force of moral
opinion that may be depended upon. If, for
instance, the rest of the world agrees to quit
the mad business of mortgaging the national
energy for battle-ships and standing armies, it
is not conceivable that America will permit

' Congress to upset the program.

Article VIII also declares against private man-
ufacture and traffic in the munitions and imple-
ments of war, and the Council is given authority
to work out a plan to end the evil. Article IX
constitutes a permanent commission to advise
the Council on these matters, and on military,

, naval, and air questions generally.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The much-discussed Article X reads as follows :\

The Members of the League undertake to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial
integrity and existing political independence of all Mem-
bers of the League. In case of any such aggression or in
case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council
shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall
be fulfilled.

In its essence it is nothing more than the
application of the Monroe Doctrine to the whole
world. Ever since 1823 the United States has
said, "We will respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and
the political independence of every state in the
Western Hemisphere." All that Article X does
is to extend this protection to "tfieTliew nations
called into being by the arms and ideals of
America. As a result of the Great War, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, the Jugoslavic Federation, and
scores of other oppressed peoples have come at
last to a place in the sun. The question that the
Peace Conference had to face was this: Were
these young, hopeful states to be left to struggle
in daily fear of aggression and conquest, or
were they to be guaranteed the peace that was
their one hope of successful growth? There
was but one answer that could have been given
in decency and honor, and it is contained in
Article X.

Instead of involving America in every Euro-
pean quarrel, as enemies allege, it is America's
one chance of keeping out of European quarrels.
Every great war in history has had its origin
in the territorial ambitions that strong nations

315

TttE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

have sought to advance at the expense of weak
nations. Unless these ambitions are checked,
America may not know peace any more than
the rest of the world. When an Austrian prince
was killed in the unknown city of Sarajevo was
it dreamed then that his death would call two
million young Americans to arms? That South
America, Asia, Africa, and the Orient would be
compelled to unsheathe the sword? Tjiere is

tno longer any such thing as isolation for any
nation. Every quarrel holds the danger of be-
coming a world quarrel. The one intelligent
action is" to strike at the root of the evil, and this
is the sole purpose of Article X. For the first
time in the annals of humanity there is a world
agreement that one nation will not attempt to
seize the possessions of another, and the pledge
i is guaranteed by international concert.
ZZ- There is no greater lie than that Article X
* impairs the right of an oppressed people to
rebel or that it abridges the right of a people
to change their form of government whenever
they see fit. The word "external" means just
what it says. If the populations of India,
Egypt, and India choose to fight against what
they conceive to be tyranny, that is Great
Britain's business. If the Italians come to pre-
fer democracy to constitutional monarchy, that
is Italy's business. Internal revolution has
nothing to do with the, League. It is obvious,
however, that domestic rebellion may possibly
affect the peace of the world, and the Covenant,
while admitting this, also gives a very human
recognition to the fact that rebellions are never

316

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

without cause. Article II, therefore, contains a
paragraph of amazing significance:

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting
any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby de-
clared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any
such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on
request of any Member of the League forthwith summon
a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Mem-
ber of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly
or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting
international relations which threaten to disturb inter-
national peace or the good understanding between nations
upon which peace depends.

The closing paragraph was written by the
President himself and is his method of fulfilling
America's war pledge that bound us to the rescue
of the "rights of small nations." Ireland, for
instance, could not possibly figure at the Peace
Conference because she was not a territory
directly affected by the war. Nor can Ireland
be considered by America to-day under the
present diplomatic system. Under Article II,
however, America has the right to appear before
the bar of world opinion as counsel for Ireland
and for any other people whose treatment has
outraged the American sense of fair play. While J
the various delegations of the Irish, the Hindus,
and the Egyptians were listening enchantedly to
the playing out of their tragedy of futility before
the Senate in Washington, the President was
challenging the world with this statement of
purpose :

317

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

nWe can force a nation on the other side of the globe to
jring to that bar of mankind any wrong that is afoot in
that part of the world which is likely to affect good under-
standing between nations, and we can oblige them to show
cause why it should not be remedied. There is not an
oppressed people in the world which cannot henceforth
get a hearing at that forum, and you know what a hearing
will mean if the cause of those people is just. The one thing
that those who are doing injustice have most reason to
dread is publicity and discussion, because if you are chal-
lenged to give a reason why you are doing a wrong thing
it has to be an exceedingly good reason, and if you give a
bad reason you confess judgment and the opinion of man-
kind goes against you.

At present what is the state of international law and
understanding? No nation has the right to call attention
to anything that does not directly affect its own affairs.
If it does, it cannot only be told to mind its own business,
but it risks the cordial relationship between itself and the
nation whose affairs it draws under discussion; whereas,
under Article XI the very sensible provision is made that
the peace of the world transcends all the susceptibilities
of nations and governments, and that they are obliged to
consent to discuss and explain anything which does affect
the understanding between nations.

Where before, and when before, may I ask some of my
fellow-countrymen who want a forum upon which to con-
duct a hopeful agitation, were they ever offered the oppor-
tunity to bring their case to the judgment of mankind?
If they are not satisfied with that, their case is not good.
The only case that you ought to bring with diffidence before
the great jury of men throughout the world is the case that
you cannot establish. The only thing I shall ever be afraid
to see the League of Nations discuss, if the United States
is concerned, is a case which I can hardly imagine, where
the United States is wrong, because I have the hopeful and
confident expectation that whenever a case in which the
United States is affected is brought to the consideration
of that great body we need have no nervousness as to the
elements of the argument so far as we are concerned. The

318

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

glory of the United States is that it never claimed anything *
to which it was not justly entitled. *"•

Sir Frederick Pollock, in his valuable work on
The League of Nations, comments on this privilege
very pointedly:

Various Irish writers, including some who deserve serious
attention, have raised the question whether the standing
problem of Irish autonomy can come before the League of
Nations. There is only one way in which this could happen
— namely, that the government of the United States should
declare Irish-American sympathy with unsatisfied national-
ist claims in Ireland to be capable of disturbing good under-
standing between Great Britain and the United States.
That is a possible event if a solution is not reached within
a reasonable time, but it is more likely that a confidential
intimation from the United States would not only precede
a formal reference to the Council, but avoid the necessity
for it.

Articles XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, and
XVII deal entirely with the fundamental pur-
pose of the League — that is, the prevention of
war. Every member of the League solemnly
agrees that it will never go to war without
first having done one or another of two things:
(i) either submitting the matter in dispute to
arbitration, in which case it promises abso-
lutely to abide by the verdict, or (2) submit-
ting it to discussion by the Council of the
League of Nations, agreeing to place all the
documents and all the pertinent facts before
the Council for discussion and publication. The
Council is to have a maximum of six months in
which to consider the matter, and if the decision
is not acceptable, the aggrieved nation further
agrees that it will wait an additional three

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

months to permit of mediation, conciliation,
and compromise. Even allowing no time for
preliminaries, there are nine months of discus-
sion, not private discussion, not discussion be-
tween disputants, but discussion between those
who are disinterested except in the maintenance
of the peace of the world, and, above all, a dis-
cussion held in the open for all the world to hear
and judge.

A constant and popular attack has been that
these provisions will bring purely domestic
questions within the purview of the League.
The language of the Covenant is explicit :

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any
question of international law, as to the existence of any
fact which if established would constitute a breach of any
international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of
the reparation to be made for any such breach, are de-
clared to be among those which are generally suitable for
arbitration.

Mr. Elihu Root wrote this definition himself,
and the President, carrying it back to Paris,
had it inserted verbatim.

nln event that any member of the League dis-
.egards the provisions for arbitration and dis-
cussion it shall be thereby deemed ipso facto to
have committed an act of war against the other
members of the League, which undertake im-
mediately to "subject it to the severance of all
trade and financial relations, the prohibition
of all intercourse . . . and the prevention of
all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse"
with the Covenant-breaking state. It is the
economic boycott — a thing more terrible than

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

armies. Not a nation in the world, with the
possIHle exception of the United States, could
endure it for six months.

In the event of the improbability that the
economic boycott is not efficacious, the Council
of the League is empowered to recommend what
effective force the members of the League shall
severally contribute to the armed force of the
League in proceeding against the Covenant-
breaking state. In view of the explicit safe-
guards placed around this provision, it is incred-
ible that Republican Senators should dare to
continue the assertion that the League has the
power to declare war and to send American
soldiers to their death in foreign countries.
It is the right of the Council merely to recom-
mend. The recommendation must be unani-
mous, so that the American representative will
have to concur first of all. It is then referred
to Congress, in the case of America, and it would
be for the Senate and the House to approve or
reject, for it is in Congress alone that the Con-J
stitution vests power to declare war.

Articles XVIII, XIX, and XX deal a death-)
blow to secret diplomacy. Every treaty and
international engagement in the future is to be
registered with the Secretariat for immediate pub-
lication, and is not to be considered binding until
so registered. All previous obligations inconsistent
with the Covenant are abrogated, and there is pro-
vision for the reconsideration of treaties from time
to time in order to see that their justice is a con-
tinuing quality. This also was written by the
President, and is the method by which he hopes

321

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

to do away with all the secret, unjust arrange-
ments of the past that the Peace Conference was

! without power to touch.

•f Article XXI excludes the Monroe Doctrine
from the operation of the League in these ex-
plicit words, "Nothing in this Covenant shall
be deemed to affect the validity of international
engagements such as treaties of arbitration or
regional understandings, like the Monroe Doc-
trine, for securing the maintenance of peace."
Yet this plain language did not suit Senator
Lodge and his associates, and more than twenty
reservations were submitted to "protect the

I Monroe Doctrine."

^-. Article XXII deals with those colonies and ter-

I rijtories which, as consequence of war, have ceased
to be under the sovereignty of the state which
formerly governed them, and which are inhabited
by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves.
The principle is declared that their well-being
and development form a sacred trust of civiliza-
tion. Provision is made for putting these peo-
ples under the protection of advanced powers
who will be responsible for the administration
of the territory under conditions which will
guarantee freedom of conscience or religion,
subject only to the maintenance of public order
and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the
slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor
traffic, and the prevention of the establishment
of fortifications or military and naval bases and
of military training of the natives for other than
police purposes and the defense of territory,
and will also secure equal opportunities for the

322

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

trade and commerce of other members of the
League. A permanent commission is to be
constituted to receive and examine the annual
reports of the Mandatories and to advise the
Council on all matters relating to the observ-j
ance of the mandates. I

Article XXIII provides for periodic interna- )
tional conferences to secure and maintain fair
and humane conditions of labor for men, women,
and children; for the supervision of agreements
with regard to the traffic in women and children,
opium and other dangerous drugs; for the general
supervision of the trade in arms and ammuni-
tion; to secure and maintain freedom of com-
munications and of transit and equitable treat-
ment for commerce; and to take steps in matters
of international concern for the prevention and
control of disease. As the President has said
truly, it is the heart of humanity that beats
in these noble provisions. For the first time in
history there is international recognition of the
rights of those who toil, and an inspiring deter-
mination to view industry in the light of two
thousand years of Christian progress.

Article XXIV places under the direction of the
League all international bureaus already estab-
lished by general treaties if the parties to such
treaties consent. Article XXV puts the League
behind Red Cross organizations, and Article
XXVI provides that amendments shall take
effect when ratified by the Council and by a
majority of the Assembly. Nations are given
the option of accepting the amendment or with-
drawing from the League.

22 323

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

n Where is there any surrender of sovereignty?
Where is the necessity for that "Americaniza-
tion" so passionately demanded by Republican
Senators? At most the Covenant is no more
than the subscription of the nations of the world
to certain principles of conduct that have their
base in honor, justice, and high aspiration.
When all is said "and done, its powers rest entirely
? upon an appeal to public opinion.

Nor is it the case that these principles are
put forward as academic propositions: they are
already in action. It is no longer a question
whether any country is for the League or for a
League. The thing is done: the fact is accom-
plished. On January 10, 1920, the League of
Nations came into being and is at work! At
this time of writing its membership is as fol-
lows: Argentine, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia,
Brazil, British Empire, Canada, Chile, Colom-
bia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece,
Guatemala, Italy, Japan, India, Liberia, New
Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Para-
guay, Persia, Salvador, Siam, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela.

China has joined by ratifying the Austrian
treaty, and the following four states have applied
for admission to the League: San Marino, Lux-
embourg, Iceland, Georgia. Only the United
States, of all the great nations, holds aloof.

The League of Nations, therefore, is a going
concern. The first meeting of the Council was
held in Paris on January i6th, when the initial
organization was effected and the Saar Basin
Frontier Commission appointed. A second meet-

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ing was held on February nth in London, when
the Council named a governing commission
for the Saar Basin, a High Commissioner tor
Danzig, accepted the obligation offered in the
Polish Treaty for the protection of minorities,
approved plans for the organization of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice, for free-
dom of communication and transit, and for the
International Health Office, and summoned an
International Finance Conference. The Saar
Basin Governing Commission, consisting of
Rault of France, Alfred von Boch of Sarrelouis,
Major Lambert .of Belgium, Count de Molkte
Hvitfeldt of Denmark, and Waugh of Canada,
assumed its duties February 26th with a proc-
lamation to the people notifying them of their
administration by the League, and will continue
in office until the plebiscite in 1935 decides the
permanent fate of the district.

The High Commissioner of Danzig has already
proposed plans for a constituent assembly and a
permanent constitution, and an election has
been called.

As a first step for the creation of a permanent
court of international justice, these world-famous
jurists were appointed: Elihu Root of the United
States, Akidzuki of Japan, Altamira of Spain,
Devilaqua of Brazil, Descamps of Belgium, Drago
of the Argentine, Fadda of Italy, Fromageot of
France, Fram of Norway, Loder of Holland,
Phillimore of Great Britain, and Vesnitch of
Jugoslavia. Pending their convening, a special
committee of experts has brought together all
the pertinent data and prepared a general scheme.

325

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

A third meeting of the Council, held in Paris on
March I3th, approved plans for sending a League
Commission of Inquiry into Russia and took the
first steps for the prevention of typhus in Poland.

A fourth meeting, held in Paris on April 9th,
answered the request of the Supreme Council
that the League take a mandate for Armenia
with 'v the statement that it would assume a
general oversight, but did not have the necessary
.force to administer the territory directly.

The Secretariat, a permanent trained interna-
tional staff chosen for special knowledge rather
than for nationality, and intrusted with gather-
ing information, preparing plans, and carrying out
recommendations, has been organized and divided
into these sections: Legal, Mandates, Interna-
tional Health, Transit, International Bureaus, Po-
litical, Administrative Commissions, Economics,
Public Information, Financial.

The International Labor Office is already at
work under the direction of Albert Thomas of
France, with a governing body of twenty-four
representatives of labor and capital drawn from
the most important industrial states : the Inter-
national Health Office has been established, and
the Permanent Commission of Freedom of Com-
munications and Transit is preparing to call a
world conference for the purpose of working
out plans that will put the great highways of
nature at the disposal of all peoples. Treaties
are being registered and prepared for publica-
tion, and, most important of all, the Permanent
Commission on Disarmament has commenced
its great work.

326

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The budget of the League, as tentatively
agreed upon, calls for $2,500,000 for the first
fiscal year, a sum to be divided among the mem-
bers. Already over half the money has been
paid in, Canada, for instance, contributing
$64,000 as her share. And a battle-ship costs
$15,000,000!

The question for decision is not, "Shall there
be a League of Nations?" but, "Shall the United
States join the League of Nations?"

It is only a question of months when every
other nation in the world will be a member of the
international conceit. Germany, Austria, Hun-
gary, and Russia will undoubtedly be invited to
join when the assembly meets in September and
Rumania, the Hedjaz and the Serbs-Croat-Slo-
vene state will come in with the completion of
the Turkish treaty.

Is the United States to stay out and to stand
alone, denying and defying the aims and aspira-
tions that we ourselves gave to the world?

XXII

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

I HPHE Senate received the Peace Treaty on
A June 10, 1919. The Senate killed it on
March 19, 1920. The Paris Conference con-
sumed less than four months in framing the
document, and was subjected to daily denuncia-
tion for its dilatory tactics, Republican leaders
blaming the President particularly for what they
professed to consider "criminal delay." The
Senate took ten months merely to destroy.
It was time that could have been saved by the
practice of elementary honesty, for the defeat
of the treaty was the bitter and unchanging
resolve of Senator Lodge and his fellow-partizans
from the very first. The ten months of haggle
had rio other purpose than the poisoning of the
public mind by every variety of falsehood, every
appeal to prejudice that could be devised by

5 ' unscrupulous minds.

"" The "round robin" of March 4, 1919, declaring
the hostility of thirty-seven Republican Senators
to the League of Nations, no matter what the
form, was followed by parliamentary moves of a
nature to guarantee the success of the plot.
A Republican filibuster ended the regular session
of the Sixty-fifth Congress without the passage
of a single appropriation bill, leaving every

328

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

department of government bare of money to
discharge obligations or to carry on its work.
This shameless disruption of the public business
was the method adopted to force the President
to call a special session, thereby enabling the
Lodge group to continue its nagging, obstructive
attack upon the work of the Paris Conference.
With the government facing bankruptcy, the
President had no alternative and the Sixty-sixth
Congress was called in special session on May

Taking advantage of their majority of one,
for the conviction of Truman Newberry as an
office-purchaser dismisses him from decent con-
sideration, the Republicans reorganized the
Senate with no other view than the discrediting
of the President and the rejection of the treaty.
Senator Lodge, whose hatred of Mr. Wilson had
reached the point of mania, was made chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and other
members of the safe Republican majority were
Borah, Johnson of California, Brandegee, Fall,
Knox, Moses, New, Harding, and McCumber.
All of them, save the last, shared Senator Lodge's
bitter enmity to the President, and were openly
and violently opposed to the League of Nations,'
Senator Borah declaring that he would fight it
even though advocated by the "Saviour of man-
kind." The treaty, as a matter of course, was
referred to this committee, and in this hostile
keeping it remained until September loth, when
it was finally reported out, burdened down with
reservations that made ratification a farce.

Throughout this period neither Senate nor
329

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

[ouse concerned itself with any other business,
ind the record of Congress may be searched in
rain for months more empty of service, so utterly
disregardful of the national welfare. Through-
out March and April Republican leaders had
shaken the country with their cries for a special
session, specifically protesting that they did not
desire to bother the President, but were merely
desirous to proceed to the immediate enactment
of necessary reconstruction legislation. The
President in his message was at pains to set forth
the domestic problems that pressed for solution.
The Republican majority paid as little attention
to these suggestions as they did to their own
pledges. Of all the vital questions that pleaded
for settlement — taxation, the industrial problem,
the increased cost of living, reclamation bills,
railroads, army reorganization, the mercantile
marine — none of these things was carried through
to any conclusion except the railroad bill, and
not even that until the last days of February,
1920, saw the passage of a slipshod measure.
Casting aside all pretense of interest in any
program of reconstruction, the Republicans in
Congress gave themselves enthusiastically to the
mean besmirckment of America's war achieve-
ment and the base repudiation of American
ideals.

A veritable madness seemed to possess them,
and each day saw the delivery of blows at
the very foundation of American unity. The
forces of hyphenation were boldly called
into being and no effort was spared to revive
and exaggerate the divisive prejudices of

330

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

American life. Professional Germans, silent
throughout the war for fear of treason charges,
emerged from retirement, Charles Nagel going
so far as to issue a pamphlet attacking the
League of Nations and arguing against the\
return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Dele-
gations of Irish, Italians, Egyptians, Hindus,
and other races were brought to Washington
and given elaborate hearings under the false
assumption that the Senate had power to redress
their grievances. Than Senator Lodge none
knew better that the undoubted wrongs of these
oppressed peoples could be remedied by two >
methods only: either by armed force or by the
moral pressure of the League of Nations. Since
it was madness to assume that the United States
would declare war against Great Britain in
behalf of Ireland, India, and Egypt, the only
course was an appeal to the world court provided
by the Covenant — a court in which America ,
would have the right to plead the case of op- :
pressed peoples. Blind with prejudice and pas-
sion, and urged on at every step by the hypo-'
critical applause of the Republican group, Irish,
Hindus, and Egyptians deserted the sanities of
judgment and joined in the attack upon the
League in which lay their one hope. It is note-
worthy that not at any time did Senator Lodge
support any of the numerous proposals to express
American dissent from English rule in India or
Egypt, and when the Democratic Senators, at
the last moment, introduced a reservation
declaring for Irish independence, he fought it •
with the utmost vigor.

THE WAR, 'THE WORLD, AND WILSON

A synopsis of the Peace Treaty was given
to the world on May 8th, but at the insistent
request of France and England it was decided
that the complete document should not receive
publication until signed by the Germans. This
synopsis was branded as a "cheat" by the Re-
publican Senators, and even when it was seen
to be a very complete and faithful summary
there was no word of apology or retraction.
Day after day the Republican majority played
the game of European imperialism, denouncing
the President for his efforts to secure a peace
of justice and upholding the reactionaries of
France and England in every contention. On
June 9th Senator Borah presented a copy of
the Peace Treaty to the Senate, admitting frankly
that he had received it from the correspondent
of the Chicago Tribune, who had smuggled it into
the United States from Germany. He justified
his action by charging that other copies were
in the country, even intimating that the President
had permitted the financiers of Wall Street to
receive these advance copies for their own
sinister uses. The President by cable demanded
an instant investigation and these facts were
developed: that Mr. Thomas W. Lament, one of
the financial advisers of the American Peace
Delegation, had given a copy of the treaty to
Mr. Henry P. Davison in his capacity as head
of the Red Cross, and that Mr. Davison, although
aware that it was to be held in confidence, had
passed on his copy to Senator Root, and that
Senator Root, in turn, had given it to Senator
Lodge. Meanwhile Senator Lodge sat silent

332

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

throughout Senator Borah's speech in which
the President was accused of giving advance
information to Wall Street.

Germany signed the Peace Treaty on June
28th and the President returned to America on
July 8th. He presented the treaty personally to
the Senate on July nth and placed himself unre-
servedly at the disposal of the Committee on-\
Foreign Relations, virtually asking to be invited
before it. Senator Lodge and his associates
sneered at the request, and in order to gain any
contact at all the President was forced to
summon individual Senators to the White House.
After some fifteen or twenty had taken advantage
of this opportunity to get first-hand information,
Senator Lodge decided that it would be wise for
the Committee on Foreign Relations to meet
with the President, but he managed to delay
the conference until August I9th. The printed
report of the meeting shows that the President
submitted himself to interrogation and cross-
examination without reserve, going into every
detail of the treaty and conducting himself with
the utmost frankness. He recalled that when
he had consulted with the committee in March,
taking up with them the first draft of the Cove-
nant, suggestions and criticism had been asked,
even urged, in the hope that every objection
might be brought out into the open. \

Such representative Republicans and public
men as ex-President Taft, Judge Hughes, and
Senator Root had also been furnished with
copies of the Covenant and requested to analyze
it with a purpose to correct its weaknesses and

333

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

its faults. Mr. Taft, as a result of his careful
study, submitted four amendments: (i) that the
vote of the Council should be unanimous in
order to safeguard the United States against any
combination on the part of the other powers;
(2) exclusion of all domestic questions from the
purview of the League; (3) explicit provisions
for withdrawal; (4) revision of the armament
schedule every five or ten years.

Judge Hughes joined in the recommendations
of Mr. Taft and made the further suggestion
that there should be specific exemption of the
Monroe Doctrine, also that it should be made
plain that a nation would not have to accept
a mandatory without its consent. Mr. Root
supported the amendments of Mr. Taft and Mr.
Hughes and proposed these original amendments
of his own: that subjects suitable for arbitration
should be clearly defined, that a permanent
court of international justice should be created,
and that the guaranty of territorial integrity in
Article X should run for five years only.

These amendments, the President explained,
had been presented to the Peace Conference and
all but one of them had been accepted without
question, and were now part of the Covenant.
The proposal that the guaranty of territorial
integrity should be limited to five years had been
rejected on the ground that the matter was
covered by the provision that gave any nation
the right to withdraw from the League two
years after giving notice. In every other respect
the suggestions of Mr. Taft, Judge Hughes, and
Senator Root had been followed.

334

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

The Monroe Doctrine was expressly reserved,
immigration, tariffs, and naturalization were rec-
ognized as domestic questions with which the
League would not deal; not one single recom-
mendation of the League could become binding
upon the United States without the formal con-
sent of Congress; America could not be made a I
mandatory except by congressional act; the
right of withdrawal at the end of two years
was absolutely unconditional, the question as to
whether the nation had fulfilled its international
obligations being a question for the nation's ' fc
own decision; the provision that the action of the
Council must rest upon an unanimous vote
guarded the United States against any danger
of a combination by other countries; in case of
attack upon the United States there was no
question as to our right to defend ourselves
without reference to the League.

Answering the charge that the Covenant had
been interwoven with the Peace Treaty for the
purpose of forcing the Senate to accept the one
in order to get the other, he pointed out that the
execution of the treaty rested entirely upon the
League machinery. What was asked of Ger-
many could not be delivered in a day or in a
month, but stretched over many years. It was
not merely a question of enforcing the terms,
but even more a matter of adjusting the terms
from time to time in the interests of justice
and restoration. The form of old governments
had been changed and new ones were established,
creating intricate problems which called for the
constant attention of an independent, impartial,

335

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

and civil body. France, Italy, and England,
antagonistic to the Covenant at first, had been
won to its support only when they saw that its
machinery was indispensable for the continuous
administration of the treaty.

It is difficult to understand the attack upon
the President for his "obstinacy." As directed
by the Constitution of the United States, he had
assisted in the preparation of a treaty. When
he returned from Paris and handed this treaty
to the Senate his work was concluded. There
was nothing further for him to do in the matter.
He could not suggest alterations or agree to
changes without repudiation of his own signa-
ture. When his advice was asked he gave it.
At all times he was willing to accept any reserva-
tion which did not impair validity or compromise
integrity. During the conference, and repeatedly
thereafter, he assured the Senate that it was
perfectly legitimate to interpret the articles,
for while he was convinced that their meaning
was clear, it was their right to make the obvious
still more obvious. He had no objection what-
soever to reservations explaining our constitu-
tional method, declaring that Congress alone
can declare war or determine the causes or oc-
casions for war, and that it alone can authorize
the use of the armed forces of the United States
on land or on the sea. If they could make
clearer the intention to reserve the Monroe
Doctrine he would be glad to have them do it.
If they could find any more explicit words to
exempt our domestic affairs from the operation
of the League, he would welcome them. If they

336

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

wanted to state that each nation should be the
judge as to whether its international obligations
had been fulfilled, well and good.

Notwithstanding these explanations, and dis- '
regarding the plain meaning of the Covenant
itself, the Republican Senators commenced an
attack that is without parallel for sheer dis-
honesty. Senator Sherman insisted that the _\A~
whole seat of American government was to be
transferred to Geneva, and that Congress was!
left without power to pass an appropriation bill
unless specifically authorized by the Council of the
League. In one of his outbursts of billingsgate
he shouted that "history would forget the reign
of Caligula in the excesses and follies of the
American government operated under the League
of Nations by President Wilson and Colonel
House.'* The charge was made repeatedly that
the Council had usurped the right of Congress to
declare war, and that "one million American ;

men would be required to meet the responsi-/
bilities and duties of soldiers in foreign lands. >

Senator Sherman even went so far as to j
attempt to appeal to religious prejudice, insisting
that "twenty-four of the forty equal votes of the
Christian nations, members of the League, are
spiritually dominated by the Vatican." On the
other hand, Senator Reed of Missouri clamored
that the black races would rule the world through
the League of Nations, while Senator Johnson was
convinced that England would control the earth.
As these partizan arguments fell of their own
weight, the attack switched and an outcry arose
that Great Britain had six votes to America's one,

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

owing to the fact that Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, and India were individual
members of the League of Nations. Not a
Senator, however, took the trouble to point out
that the League also included Panama, Cuba,
Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Honduras, and Sal-
vador, every one of them virtually under control
of the United States. Nor was it explained that
all of these countries have membership in the
Assembly only, a body without executive power.
In the face of these facts Senator Lodge, Senator
Lenroot, Senator Johnson, and Senator Reed
introduced reservations that "the United States
shall be entitled to cast a number of votes equal
to that which any member of the League and
its self-governing dominions, or parts of empire
in the aggregate, shall be entitled to cast," other-
wise America would refuse to consider itself
bound by any note. As a result, the friendship
of Canada changed to bitterness, and the Winni-
peg Free Press expressed Canadian resentment
in these words: "They ought to know that
Canada's actual status in the world is that of a
nation quite free from external control. Yet
they persist in their demand that Canada — a
kindred nation, their nearest neighbor and their
best customer — should be degraded and put lower
in the scale of countries than the half-caste
Greaser republics of the West Indies and Central
America, which are mostly, in point of fact,
political and commercial dependencies of the
f United States."

I More than one hundred and sixty reservations
and amendments were offered from first to last,
338

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

the whole attempt being to deceive the people
into believing that the Monroe Doctrine had
not been protected, that the right of Congress
to declare war had been taken away, that
domestic questions had not been exempted, etc.,
etc. This alleged "Americanization" of the
treaty, however, was no more than a blind for
Senator Lodge's real purpose, which was con-
cealed in the following reservation to Article X:

The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the
territorial integrity or political independence of any other
country or to interfere in controversies between nations —
whether members of the League or not — under the pro-
visions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval
forces of the United States under any article of the treaty
for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress,
which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare
war or authorize the employment of the military or naval
forces of the United* States, shall by act or joint resolution
so provide.

Here was a direct repudiation of responsibility,
a flat refusal to subscribe to the principles of
the League, a surly declination to accept any
obligation of partnership. In its essence it was
a return to the policy of isolation. If war should
come, Congress would take notice of the matter,
deliberate the causes, and in due time decide
upon a proper course. But as for standing
shoulder to shoulder with the nations of the
world in an effort to prevent war — that was un-
thinkable! What was it to the Senate that new
nations appealed to us for protection? That
it was the voice of America that had thrilled
the world with a call to disarmament and arbitra-
23 339

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

tion? That the airplane and submarine had
proved that our supposed "isolation" was a
delusion? There was a Democratic President
to be discredited — a national election to be won !
The President's tour was a fatal blunder. In
Paris he had slaved night and day, and the tre-
mendousness of the strain had told heavily upon
a constitution already impaired by the drudgeries
and anxieties of war. Breaking but indomitable,
he gathered himself together for one last appeal
to the people, and the effort carried him to the
grave's edge. In the hour of his collapse the
Republican press and Senate leaders jeered that
his illness was a "fake," and when its serious-
ness became apparent Senator Moses led the
chorus that the President had suffered a stroke.
With Woodrow Wilson ill — the one man in
"**• Washington with the Covenant in his heart
and soul, as well as on his lips — the tragedy of
political intrigue rushed swiftly to its appointed
conclusion.

On November I4th the "knife-thrust" reser-

HTie Chicago Tribune succeeded in enlisting the services of a
^ Dr. Arthur Dean Bevan, who did not scruple to declare in a written
statement that the trouble was "permanent and not a temporary
condition," and that Mr. Wilson "should under no circumstances
be permitted to resume the work of such a strenuous position as
that of President of the United States. The strain and responsi-
bility of such a position would bring with them the danger of a
recurrence of such attacks and might hasten a fatal termination."
On February loth Dr. Hugh H. Young of Johns Hopkins, one of
the physicians in attendance on the President, declared Mr. Wilson
to be "organically sound, able-minded and able-bodied, and
branded current reports as 'lies without justification.' . . . The
President walks sturdily now without assistance and without
fatigue. And he uses the still slightly impaired arm more and more
every day. As to his mental vigor, it is simply prodigious. In-
deed, I think in many ways the President is fn better shape than
before the illness came."

340

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

vation of Senator Lodge was adopted and the
seven compromise reservations of Senator Hitch-
cock were rejected. On November igth, the
closing day of the special session, the Republican
alignment was a Macedonian phalanx. Throw-
ing off disguise, the so-called "mild reserva-
tionists" stood shoulder to shoulder with the
.outright "nullifiers," and gibed at Hitchcock's
determined effort to gain a hearing for sub-
stitute reservations.

"Leave the door open!" cried the Democratic
leader.

"The door is closed," Lodge answered.

Moving forward with energy and precision,
the Lodge program swept through, and the
Treaty of Peace was rejected and a state of war
continued. Senator Brandegee shouted glee-
fully that this was the end of "a pipe dream,"
and Senator Lodge announced his determination
to force the President to negotiate a separate
treaty of peace with Germany.

After the Christmas holidays the Democratic
Senators, hopeful of compromise, arranged a
series of bipartizan conferences. The one hun-
dred and sixty reservations were boiled down
to fourteen and agreement was reached on all
but one, Senator Lodge refusing to change so
much as a comma in his "knife-thrust." Sud-
denly enough there was announcement from the
Republican camp that the treaty would be
called up again on February lyth. There is
little doubt that this was due to the insistence
of party leaders, all of whom found themselves
in a position of exceeding embarrassment. On

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

one side stood the people of the United States,
sincerely desirous of a League of Nations and
sick of the interminable Senate wrangle, while
on the other side there was the painful fact
that Senator Lodge had committed the party
against the League of Nations. His hatred of
Wilson made him impossible of control and his
position as Senate leader made it impossible
to repudiate him. The one remaining course,
therefore, was further discussion in order to

On January 3 1st the debate was punctuated

confuse public opinion.

i by an interruption of amazing significance.
Lord Grey, arriving in England from his service
in Washington as British ambassador, wrote
an open letter to the London Times in which he
made it plain that Great Britain had no objec-
tions to the Lodge reservations as a whole.
What had been confused now stood clear.
Throughout his adult life Senator Lodge has
been an ardent supporter of the Anglo-American
accord, and his attitude on the treaty was at
once a surprise and a bewilderment. The Grey
letter came as a key to the puzzle, for it was
now apparent that Lodge and his group had been
acting throughout in British interests if not
under British inspiration.

No sooner had the President left Paris in
February, 1919, than the Conference, under the
direction of Lloyd George and Balfour, pro-
ceeded to repudiate the agreement of January
25th that provided for the League of Nations
as an integral part of the treaty. On March
4th, the day before the President's sailing, Lodge

342

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

and thirty-seven Republican Senators signed
the "round robin" of protest against the inclu-
sion of the League of Nations in the treaty,
linking up tightly with the Balfour action in
Paris. As has been described, the President
defeated the plot, and the British and French
imperialists, having failed to destroy the Cove-
nant as a whole, naturally decided that the next
best thing was to take out its heart. The Lodge
reservation to Article X, which guaranteed the
small nations of the world from annexation
and plunder, was the method chosen.

What more could the British Empire ask
than the refusal of the United States to safe-
guard the territorial integrity and political
independence of weak peoples? At its hand,
waiting to be seized, were the wide stretches of
Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Hedjaz, and an
Egyptian protectorate that might well be turned
into a title in fee simple! America alone had
the will and the power to block the program of
imperialism, and the Republican majority stood
ready to tie America's hands. France was no
less delighted with the prospect, having the
Saar Basin and the Rhine Valley in sight, and
Japan saw in the Lodge reservation an escape
from its bothersome obligation to abstain from
Chinese conquest. All the old rapacities, seem-
ingly laid forever by the adoption of the League
of Nations Covenant with its solemn promises,
were restored in all their former virulence by
the "knife-thrust" that destroyed the guaranty
of territorial integrity against external aggression. 1
It was at the Grey letter, and the whole con-

343

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

spiracy of the European medievalists, that the
President struck in his letter of March 8th when
he said:

Any reservation which seeks to deprive the League of
Nations of the force of Article X cuts at the very heart
and life of the Covenant itself. Any League of Nations
which does not guarantee as a matter of incontestable
right the political independence and integrity of each of its
members might be hardly more than a futile scrap of paper,
as ineffective in operation as the agreement between Bel-
gium and Germany which the Germans violated in 1914.

Article X, as written into the Treaty of Ve sailles, repre-
sents the renunciation by Great Britain and Japan, which
before the war had begun to find so many interests in com-
mon in the Pacific, by France, by Italy — by all the great
fighting powers of the world, of the old pretensions of politi-
cal conquest and territorial aggrandizement. It is a new

doctrine 'fl f^** mnrWn affair* -»r>A ««ii.* ±,r~rrrnfrn'ni>Al QT

there is no secure basis for the peace which the whole world
sojongingly desires and so desperately needs. If Article
X is not adopted and dLltd upon the governments which
reject it will, I think, be guilty of bad faith to their people
whom they induced to make the infinite sacrifices of the
war by the pledge that they would be fighting to redeem
the world from the old order of force and aggression.

Every imperialistic influence in Europe was hostile to
embodiment of Article X in the Covenant of the League

Nations, and its defeat now would mark the complete
snsummation of their efforts to nullify the treaty. I hold
the doctrine of Article X to be the essence of Americanism.
We cannot repudiate it or weaken it without at the same
time repudiating our own principles.

The imperialist wants no League of Nations, but if, in
response to the universal cry of the masses everywhere,
there is to be one, he is interested to secure one suited to
his own purposes, one that will permit him to continue the
historic game of pawns and peoples — the juggling of prov-
inces, the old balances of power, and the inevitable wars

344

HOW THE TREATY WAS KILLED

attendant upon these things. The reservation proposed
would perpetuate the old order.

Does any one really want to see the old game played
again? Can any one really venture to take part in reviving
the old order? The enemies of a League of Nations have
by every true instinct centered their efforts against Article
X, for it is undoubtedly the foundation of the whole struct-
ure. It is the bulwark, and the only bulwark, of the
rising democracy of the world against the forces of im-
perialism and reaction.

It was a voice crying in the wilderness. The
Republican majority, secure in the backing of
the Anglo-American banking interests, counting
happily upon the revival of pro-Germanism, the
irritation of the Italians over Fiume, and the
just but headlong angers of the Irish, were
committed to their course. Senator Root, tak-
ing orders as always, swallowed his original
advocacy of Article X and solemnly urged the
"Americanization" of the treaty. Mr. Taft,
after offering a compromise reservation that was
accepted by the Democrats and as promptly
rejected by the Lodge group, subsided and
soon began to purr against the Organization '
knee.

On March iQth the treaty, with the Lodge
knife deep in its heart, came up for a final vote,
and was rejected a second time.

This was not the end. The final act in the
drama of treachery remained to be played. In
early May the Republican majority in the House
passed a resolution declaring an end to the state
of war with Germany. On May I5th the Re-
publican majority in the Senate approved a
peace resolution by Senator Knox ending the

345

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

state of war with Austria-Hungary as well as
with Germany.

Only six months before — in December, 1918 —
Senator Cabot Lodge had shouted these words:
"We cannot make peace in the ordinary way.
We cannot, in the first place, make peace except
in company with our allies. It would brand us
with everlasting dishonor and bring ruin to us
if we undertook to make a separate peace.**

It is this "everlasting dishonor'* that the Knox
resolution entails; it is this "ruin" that the
Knox resolution invites.

XXIII

THE GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION

IT is distinctly a question whether the virtues]
of traditions are not outweighed by their
vices, for while benefits are negative, the injuries
are positive. Granted that they serve as in-
centives and standards, it is even more the case
that they dull the edge of independent action
and close the mind to the necessities of change.
There is also the fact that every tradition, at
some time or other, loses its original meaning
and becomes a mere incantation. Certainly a
wise people will never disregard the lessons and
experiences of the past, but their wisdom will
put equal emphasis on the importance of studying
every new question in the light of progress. y

The principal argument against the League
of Natiojis, alid the one having greatest weight
with the average citizen1 whu "has__a worship of
names rather than a respect for facts, is the
constant assertion — rfrat — Washington, in his
Farewell Address, warned the people of the United
States against "efffaflgfiSg-Ialliances." As a
matter of fact, the phrase was coined by Thomas
Jefferson in his Inaugural speech in 1800. By
way of proving that the author himself did not
regard it as an inflexible rule of conduct, Jeffer-
son was willing to "marry the British fleet" in

347

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

1802 and urged an offensive and defensive alli-
ance with Great Britain in 1823.

Throughout the trying days of the American
Revolution there was no fear as to the dangers
of "entangling alliances." The embattled Col-
onies asked help wherever they thought that
they could get it, and the request was not based
upon any appeal to selfishness, but upon the
broad ground that a triumph for popular govern-
ment in America would react beneficially upon
European institutions. Franklin in France and
Adams in Holland specialized in this type of
pleading, and the alliance with the French in
1778 was brought about by love of liberty rather
than by any hope of material gain.

The first stages of the French Revolution
evoked only sympathy and enthusiasm in the
United States, but as moderate leaders were
overthrown and Paris ran red with blood, senti-
ment changed radically. As Washington saw
it from where he sat, democracy had ceased,
leaving anarchy as a threat. When France
went to war with England in 1793 she sent
Genet to the United States to demand a fulfil-
ment of our treaty obligations. Hamilton,
always British in his sympathies, argued that
the alliance had been made with Louis XVI
and that the dethronement of the king canceled
the contract. Jefferson, on the other hand,
insisted that the treaty was between the two
nations, and that honor demanded a scrupulous
adherence to our pledges. The logic of Jeffer-
son's contention has long since been conceded,
and there is no question that the proclamation

348

THE GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION

of neutrality was a repudiation of our bargain.
Washington, however, justified it on the theory
that the alliance was defensive only, but his
principal argument was based upon our "de-
tached and distant situation." What he de-
clared then, and what he set forth In detail
in his Farewell Address, was a policy of isolation.
His words were these: "Europe has a set of
primary interests which to us have none or a
very remote relation. Hence she must be en-
gaged in frequent controversies, the causes of
which are essentially foreign to our concerns.
Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to
implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the
ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her
friendships or enmities. Our detached and dis-
tant situation invites and enables us to pursue
a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages
of so peculiar a situation?"

Will it be said that the conditions described
by Washington remain unchanged? That fast
boats, the cable, the wireless, the airplane, and
the submarine have left untouched our "de- '
tached and distant situation"? Washington
also warned against "the spirit of innovation"
and "dangerous experiments." Why not con-
strue them as declarations against the incan-
descent light, steamships, aircraft, and railroads ?_J

As a matter of fact, the words of Washington's
Farewell Address had barely ceased to echo
before events proved that America's "detached
and distant situation " was more imaginary than
real. In less than twelve years we were com-

349

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

pelled to enter upon three wars with trans-
atlantic peoples — France, the Barbary pirates,
and England. When Napoleon forced Spain to
cede Louisiana to France, and launched his ill-
fated expedition against Santo Domingo, Presi-
dent Jefferson expressed his willingness to "marry
ourselves to the British fleet and nation,'* if such
action should be necessary to guard the New
World against imperialism.

Instead of minding their own business the
fathers never lost an opportunity to declare in
favor of democratic movements, no matter in
what part of the world. Washington, receiving
the colors of the French, said, "My anxious
recollections, my sympathetic feeling, and my
best wishes are irresistibly excited whensoever,
in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl
the banner of freedom."

President Monroe, in his annual message to
Congress in 1822, specifically referred to Amer-
ican sympathy for the Greek revolt against
Turkish tyranny, and also spoke boldly of our
interest in the revolutionary movements in
Spain, Italy, and Portugal. The crushing of
these democratic uprisings by the Holy Alliance
aroused our indignation and protest, and as a
consequence of our apprehensions, entangling
alliances were not only considered, but seriously
proposed. When the Holy Alliance resolved to
re-establish Spain's despotic control over her
South American colonies President Monroe
called upon Jefferson and Madison for advice
in the crisis, and the correspondence is rich in
illumination for those modern statesmen who

350

THE GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION

insist that the fathers were parochial in their
outlook. In order to check the spread of
imperialism to the New World, Jefferson was
willing to enter into an alliance with Great
Britain, urging that it would "prevent instead
of provoking war." Madison went even farther
in his consideration of the world as a whole.
It was his idea that America and Great Britain
should stand together in support of free govern-
ment everywhere, declaring in favor of the Greek
cause and expressing "avowed disapprobation"
with respect to the ruthless policy of the Holy
Alliance in Spain. As he stated flatly in a letter
to Jefferson, "With the British power and navy
combined with our own we have nothing to fear
from the rest of the world, and in the great
struggle of the epoch between liberty and
despotism we owe it to ourselves to sustain
the former in this hemisphere at least." Under
the influence of John Quincy Adams, his Secretary
of State, President Monroe dissented from the
suggestions of Jefferson and Madison, and
decided upon an independent declaration against
European interference in the affairs of the New
World. The argument of Adams was based
upon the fear that an English alliance might tie
America's hands in the acquisition of Louisiana,
also on the sure knowledge that the British fleet
would back up the declaration anyway.

As early as 1824 the policy of isolation was
openly recognized as a thing of the past. Daniel
Webster, then Secretary of State, urged the
appointment of a commissioner to Greece and
made the following statement as to American

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

policy in words that might have been written
to-day in support of the League of Nations:

As one of the free states among the nations, as a great
and rapidly rising Republic, it would be impossible for us,
if we were so disposed, to prevent our principles, our senti-
ments, and our example from producing some effect upon
the opinions and hopes of society throughout the civilized
world . . . the great political question of this age is that
between absolute and regulated governments . . . whether
society shall have any part in its own government . . . our
side of this question is settled for us even without our
volition . . . our place is on the side of free institutions.

It may now be required of me to show what interest we
have in resisting this new system. What is it to us, it may
be asked, upon what piinciples or what pretenses the
European governments assert a right of interfering in the
affairs of their neighbors? The thunder, it may be said,
rolls at a distance. The wide Atlantic is between us and
danger; and, however others may suffer, we shall remain safe.

I think it is a sufficient answer to this to say that we are
one of the nations of the earth; that we have an interest,
therefore> in the preservation of that system of national law
and national intercourse which has heretofore subsisted so
beneficially for us all. . . . The enterprising character of
the age, our own active, commercial spirit, the great increase
which has taken place in the intercourse among civilized
and commercial states, have necessarily connected us with
other nations and given us a high concern in the preservation
of those salutary principles upon which that intercourse is
founded. We have as clear an interest in international
\ law as individuals have in the laws of society.
I— »

*~- When the liberal thought of Europe rose in
' revolt against the theory of divine right America
did not sit idly by, but took an active and
decisive part in encouraging the revolutionary
movement. No sooner had the representatives
of the various German states met at Frankfort

352

THE GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION

to form a new government than Mr. Donelson,
our Minister in Berlin, was ordered by the Presi-
dent "to proceed to Frankfort and there, as
the diplomatic representative of the United
States, recognize the provisional government of
the new German confederation; provided you
shall find such a government in successful
operation." These instructions were issued on
July 24, 1848, and in August of that year Donel-
son was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary to the Frankfort gov-
ernment. In 1849 Mr. Donelson received fur-
ther an even more authoritative instruction, and
the following passage will show America's faith:

From what intelligence we have been enabled to gather
on this side of the Atlantic we understand that there are,
at this time, two parties in Germany, each seeking to
establish a constitution for a Germanic .Empire; and that
the essential difference between them consists in this —
that one of them desires to form a constitution, which has
for its basis a recognition of the principle that the people
are the true source of all power; and the other, a constitution
based on the despotic principle that kings hold their power
by divine right, and that the constitutions to be established
under their auspices are boons granted to the people, by
them, as the only legitimate sources of power. It is hardly
necessary for me to say to you that all the sympathies of the
government and the people of the United States are with j
the former party.

Louis Kossuth, coming to the United States in
1849, stirred Americans to intense sympathy
with the Hungarian revolt against Austrian
absolutism, and President Taylor even went
so far as to appoint a special agent with authority
to recognize the independence of the Hungarian

353

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

state "in event of her ability to sustain it."
When the Hungarian rebels were crushed Presi-
dent Fillmore approved a joint resolution of
Congress, passed March 3, 1851, declaring the
sympathy of the people of the United States
with Kossuth and his associates, and authorizing
"the employment of some of the public vessels
which may be now cruising in the Mediterranean
to receive and convey to the said United States
the said Louis Kossuth and his associates in
captivity." An American ship, proceeding to
Turkey, rescued Kossuth and his fellow-exiles,
and on their arrival in the United States they
were formally received by the President and by
Congress, and were the guests of honor at a great
official dinner. The Austrian government en-
tered vigorous protest against these various
breaches of neutrality, but the reply of Webster
/ contained no single word of regret or apology,
and transgressed every rule of diplomatic cor-
respondence in its bold assertion of American
interest in popular government.

In 1870, when the French Republic came into
being for the third time, President Grant cabled
instructions to recognize it instantly and to con-
gratulate the French people on restoring a
government "disconnected with the dynastic
traditions of Europe."

More and more, as time went by, the policy of
isolation was disregarded as occasion demanded,
although still retaining its hold upon the Amer-
ican imagination. Liberia, the negro republic
in Africa, was founded by the Colonization
Society of the United States, and was and is,

354

THE GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION

to all effect, an American protectorate. In 1884
we sent delegates to an international conference
in Berlin to put firmer foundations under the
Congo Free State, and in 1890 the United States
took part in another conference of world powers
at Brussels for the prevention of the Central
African slave traffic.

In 1900 American troops joined with those of
England, France, Russia, and Japan in the
suppression of the Boxer uprising and shared
in the joint occupation of Peking. Had we had
the courage then to assert ourselves as a world
power, with a definite stake in world peace and
justice, China would not have been partitioned
and a new order might have been inaugurated.
As it was, we contented ourselves with a bom-
bastic assertion of interest in China's "territorial
and administrative entity," and then retired to
our "detached and distant situation'* while the
other powers looted and annexed.

In 1906 President Roosevelt sent Mr. Henry"!
White to serve as America's representative at
the Algeciras conference, called by the Kaiser
to dispute French control in Morocco. The
United States was absolutely without direct
interest in Moroccan affairs, and our participa-
tion had no other purpose than the preservation
of the European balance of power. Even at that
time the Kaiser was eager for war with France,
and under President Roosevelt's instruction
America took her place by the side of England,
Italy, and France in serving notice that the
peace must be kept. At every point the ac-
tion was in flat violation of the policy of isola-
24 355

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

tion and an intelligent acceptance of changed
j| conditions.**

rAt various times, and always pointedly, we
have protested against the treatment of Jews,
Armenians, and other oppressed peoples, risking
diplomatic ruptures with Rumania, Russia, and
Turkey, and no outcry was raised when the
United States met with other world powers
at The Hague in 1899 to work out a program of
peace. Even while politicians were mouthing
the words of Washington international co-opera-
tion was progressing by leaps and bounds, and
in 1914 the peoples of the world were banded
together in these activities: the Universal Postal
Union, the International Radio-Telegraphic Bu-
reau, the Danube and Suez Canal Commission,
the International Office of Public Health, the
Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs,
the Sugar Commission, the International In-
stitute of Agriculture, the International Union
for the Protection of Industrial Property, the
International Bureau at Zanzibar for the Repres-
sion of the Slave Traffic, as well as in sanitary
councils and various monetary and metric unions.
It remained for the Great War, however, to
shatter forever the fantastic theory that we were
still living in the days of the Colonies, with sailing-
craft as the only means of transatlantic communi-
cation. From the first our "detached and dis-
tant situation'* was an absurdity disproved by
British Orders in Council primarily, and then out-
raged by the unrestricted operations of the
German U-boats. For three and a half years
we clung to the rags of an outworn policy before

356

THE GREAT AMERICAN TRADITION

daring to face facts. The question to be decided
to-day is whether we are to face the future with
open eyes or resume : the bandages of tradition.
Washington's words in opposition to perma-
nent alliances with other countries are quoted
continually, but little indeed is said about other
portions of the Farewell Address that explain
and qualify. For instance, there is this passage:

With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor
to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet
recent institutions, and to progress, without interruption,
to that degree of strength and consistency which is neces-
sary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own
fortunes.

And again; pointing out the benefits of the
union of the thirteen states:

What is of inestimable value, they must derive from
union an exemption from those broils and wars between
themselves which so frequently afflict neighboring countries
not tied together by the same government. . . . Here, like-
wise, they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown
military establishments which under any form of govern-
ment are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be
regarded as peculiarly hostile to republican liberty. . . .
Is there a doubt whether a common government can embrace
so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to
mere speculation in such a case were criminal. . . . The ex-
periment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment
which ennobles human nature.

It will thus be seen that permanent isolation
was not in Washington's mind, and that his
vision swept the future and saw the enormous
benefits of union. Just as his soul sickened at
the sight of nations banding in selfish groups for

357

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

the attainment of mean objectives or to secure
protection against rapacity, so did it leap to the
dream of a great fraternity. Neither isolation
nor neutrality was his end, but merely the
means. Peace was his goal, and were he alive
to-day, looking out over a country grown to a
population of 110,000,000, seeing the guardian
* oceans bridged by modern science, and hearing
the supplication of war-sick nations, pleading for
a universal alliance in the interests of disarma-
ment and peace, can there be any doubt as to
/ his decision ?

CONCLUSION

fact in the case has the clearness"]
•*— ' of crystal.

America did not take arms to avenge Belgium
or in repayment of any debt of gratitude to
France or as a duty demanded by the peril of
civilization. Our entrance into the Great War
was compelled by the sound instinct of self-
preservation. We fought for ourselves, for our
institutions, for our right to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness in accordance with our
own desires and definitions.

It required three and a half years of violated
neutrality to tear the bandages of tradition
from our eyes, but when the wrappings were
finally removed we saw that America's "de-
tached and distant situation" had never been
more than a vain hope. Just as the murder of
an Austrian archduke in an obscure Balkan
town was turning the United States into a vast
military camp, so had we been drawn into every
world war of the past, and so would we be
drawn with equal inevitability Tnto every world \
war of the future.

The vision of the President shot light through \
the gathering darkness. If forty-eight sovereign
states, each with its diverse interests, were able
to live in friendly and profitable union, why not
the several nations of the world? What end

359

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

was served by armaments that could not be
better served by arbitration and adjudication?
To such a tremendous simplicity were all of his

I proposals reducible.

The whole world, sick of the dog-eat-dog
tradition, rose in gladness at his call. Every-
where people looked with new eyes upon the
horror of destruction that laid Europe waste,
and saw it as the logical consequence of their
tribal hates and superstitions. The voice, of the
Nazarene, ringing ineffectually through two
thousand years, was heard at last, and deeps of
fraternity were stirred.

The Allied governments accepted the prin-
ciples of the League of Nations as though they
had been handed down from Sinai, and the
thundering ideals of the President imparted a
sublime militancy to the invincible pacifism of
America. A war against war! Mothers gave
their sons that the dream might be made to
come true, and men went to death with a new
courage. Shouted as a great slogan, it reached
the deluded peoples of the Central Powers, under-
mining the structure of fears and lies that kept
their hearts in shadow. The collapse of the
Prussian war machine was not physical only,

I but a sheer spiritual disintegration.

*•" In the hour of victory the President went to
Paris, a decision forced upon him both by the
Constitution and his conscience. He had laid
down the principles that enemy and Allies alike
were now accepting as the terms of the peace,
and they called for interpretations that he alone
had the right and the power to make. Before his

360

CONCLUSION

ship was well at sea a program of repudiation
was under way. The Republican majority in
the Senate, concerned only with officeholding
and office-seeking, set about his ruin, careless
of hurt to the nation.

The President sailed to frame a peace of
justice, to lay the foundations of a new world
order in which the sanities of discussion should
replace the brutalities of bloodshed. The Senate
snarled that the peace must be "hard" and that
the League of Nations was a "visionary project"
that should be left to the future. The President
was denounced as one without authority to
speak for America, and the Senate placed itself
at the disposal of the Allies for the ratification
of any treaty that they chose to make.

The imperialists of Europe, reviving at this
offer of partnership, hastily substituted knives
for palm branches. Instead of a conference of
comrades, thinking in terms of the New Day,
the President found a clique of enemies thinking
in the old terms of balanced power and secret
diplomacy. He fought them and he beat them.
Without help from a single source, betrayed at
home and ambushed abroad, ringed about with
foes and deserted by a world returned to its
selfish personal preoccupations, he won. ^

In its essence the Peace Treaty marks man-
kind's greatest victory over the baser emotions.
Its angers and greeds are matters of word and
gesture rather than defined intent, and wait

361

merely for a ealmer mood to be wiped out en*-
tirely. The Covenant of the League of Nations
lacks much of the virility that was hoped, but
in its solemn agreements are provisions for dis-
armament, arbitration, open dealing, and respect
for the territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of weak peoples. Frail enough in all
seeming, but still a ladder from the quicksands

I to the heights.

*f For ten months the Republican majority held
the treaty in its hostile keeping. For ten months
the politicians avoided discussion of the Cove-
nant's noble purposes, confining themselves to the
meannesses of misrepresentation and distortion.
Where once a Webster, a Clay, and a Calhoun de-
bated great issues in conscience and high ability
there was the squabble of hucksters. And at last
the definite repudiation of every war aim, every
ideal, every hope for which mothers gave their
sons, for which youth died or lived to know the
disfigurements that are worse than death.
With what result?

The world that loved us now hates us. We
nate ourselves. The unity that was our pride
has been torn into tatters by the pull and haul
of a revived and multiplied hyphenation. The
voice of America is a polyglot screech, every
separate blood strain chorusing some hymn of
passion under the leadership of this or that
political group. A war record unparalleled for
courage, initiative, nobility, and utter unselfish-
ness has been dragged through the gutters of

362

CONCLUSION

abuse and slander. The shame of it, the sadness J
of it all, is relieved by no ray of light.

The Republican party, as it stands at present,*^
represents the lowest form of political life. Those \
once fought against so nobly by an outraged rank"*
and file are in despotic control and the "lions" of
1912 are now jackals hopeful of scraps. Babbling
about "poor Germany'* where a year before it
hurled obscene hatred at the "accursed Hun,"
taking money from Anglo-American banking
interests one moment and wheedling Irish-
Americans the next, crying out against the czar-
ism of Palmer even while it applauds the "Sail
or Shoot" program of Wood, yelling Ameri-
canism and indefatigably fanning the angers of
Italians and Greeks and Germans, cheering a
Sims as he shames the war record of the navy
of the United States, and sneering at every
military achievement of America, preaching a
gospel of provincialism and repudiation in the
interests of a high-tariff and ship-subsidy policy
— the Republican organization has the touch
of some poisonous nettle, bringing a rash wher-
ever it touches. Drunk with a conviction of
triumph, lavish with millions collected from
war profiteers, the party of Lincoln lurches to
the election without other standards, principles,
or ideals than the division of spoils. The per-
sonal platforms of its candidates range from
demagoguery to rankest reaction, from an absurd
provincialism to militarism, yet every man oper-

363

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

ates his convictions under an agreement to sur-
render them in the interests of "harmony/*
'r— There is no compromise. Honesty is not a
thing that lends itself to fifty-fifty arrangements.
Pledges are either kept or broken. America
should join the League of Nations in faith and
honor or else America should stay out. Middle
ground is marsh and quagmire. The so-called
"Americanization" 'of the Covenant is nothing
more than the Republican attempt to poison the
wells of public opinion. Mr. Taft, Senator Root,
and Judge Hughes studied the first draft criti-
cally and thoroughly, and their amendments
were incorporated virtually as written. As for
reservations, if there are words in the English
language that can make clearer the exclusion
of the Monroe Doctrine and domestic questions,
the right of withdrawal, recognition that not
one American soldier can be called to arms
without the formal action of Congress, and that
"external aggression" is a phrase that has no
concern with internal revolution, the President
has stated repeatedly that he will welcome them.
All but one of the so-called reservations are
merely bombastic restatements of the plain
meaning of the Covenant. This one — the Lodge
"knife-thrust" — is in no sense a reservation,
but a nullification. It seeks to obtain the bene-
fits of the League for the United States without
assuming a single responsibility or exerting the
least influence to shape the world forces that our

364

CONCLUSION

ideals called into being. It demands dishonor
as an American privilege, and stands jis an
insane attempt to return the country to an
"isolation" that it never possessed at any time
and which is now a patent madness. The
"knife-thrust" goes hand in hand with the
Lodge resolution for a "separate peace," even
as it paved the way for it. The President spoke
truly when he declined to draw any fine dis-
tinction between "nullifiers" and "mild nulli- I
fiers." There is no difference.

The issues are clean cut. On the one hand !
there is the League of Nations with its relief
from the crushing burdens of armament, its
removal of the causes of war, its recognition of
human rights and human aspiration, its simple
machinery for the amicable adjustment of inter-
national disputes, and its release of the fraternal
impulse from the dead weights of savage tradi-
tions— a tremendous theory of spiritual progress
that will permit America and the world to go
about the decent business of life in peace and
friendship. Flexible, elastic, invitational to
change, the present and future defects of the
Covenant can be remedied and will be remedied,
just as the Constitution of the United States
has been amended.

On the other hand there is refusal to enter
the League of Nations, the repudiation of
pledges, the betrayal of small nations and weak
peoples, a return to the "balance of power,"
and a perpetuation of the old order with its evil
emphasis on navies, armies, division, intrigue,
and rapacity.

365

THE WAR, THE WORLD, AND WILSON

Peace and prosperity versus war and bank-
ruptcy! Honor versus dishonor! Intelligence
• versus insanity!

RThe peoples of earth are ready and waiting.
Jheir hate of America is no more than the bitter-
ness of a great disappointment, born of America's
seeming betrayal. The evils and injustices of
the Old World — the tragedies of oppression such
as Ireland and Egypt — are not the result of
popular demand, but the perversions of govern-
ments. Given a League of Nations, with its
lifting of ancient fears, and the men and women
of England, France, Italy, Japan, and other
predatory powers will rise to control and point
the way to the high ground of justice and fra-
ternity. Hurled back on their hopes, who can
tell to what extremes the peoples of the world
will be carried in their agony, grief, and despair?
At this moment the wretched populations of
central and eastern Europe are perishing by
the thousands, blown like leaves on the icy winds
of death. Men, women, and little children starve
singly or in huddles — gnawing the roots of the
field, padding city streets like famished beasts —
victims of a misery so vast, so profound, that
the ravages of disease are welcomed as a merciful
release from the horror of living. Not a factory
is in operation in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, Serbia, and parts of Austria, the
workers sitting idle, hopeless, yet the docks of
Liverpool and Rotterdam are piled high with
the raw materials that would start the wheels
of industry in every stricken land, restoring
health, courage, and prosperity. Charity is not

366

CONCLUSION

the remedy: all that these people ask is the
chance to help themselves. Credit is the one
answer. Had the United States entered the
League of Nations in the beginning, this concert
of the world would have long since worked out a
system of credit, and instead of idleness, despair,
famine, and pestilence there would now be order
and energy and dawning happiness.

This is the thought that is bitter in the mind '
of Europe, and out of that bitterness, if permitted
to continue, what dark purposes may not come ? ./
And if, in the arrogance of our strength, we *
declare ability to beat back the armed hate of
the world, what barrier may be erected against the
creep of disease, the contagion of anarchy? And
if such a wall be raised— high enough and strong
enough to shut out the angers and the pleadings of
betrayed humanity — how shall our traitor lives ,
be guarded from the loathing of our souls ?

THE END

' ~ - **w

' :- - ••• « :

University of Toronto
Library

Acme Library Card Pocket
LOWE-MARTIN CO. LIMITED

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "The war, the world and Wilson"

See other formats