What about the secret treaties?By the foreign editor of "The New age".

^ M .

:it||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||lllllllllllllllllirilllllllllllllllllllllllllllli.'

What About the
Secret Treaties?

By The Foreign Editor of "THE NEW AGE'*

"I do not agree that no explanations
of the secret treaties are needed. The
texts, however they have been made
known to us, are now public knowl-
edge and of public concern. Appre-
hension concerning their meaning is
perfectly natural and perfectly legiti-
mate. Consideration of them is a
public duty."

APPLICATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO

The Library of War Literature

511 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK

Price, Ten Cents

r<lillllllllllllllllilllllilllllilllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllli||||||||||||||||in=

5

f^^.

GA^

\

0

Walter Clinton Jackson Library

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Special Collections & Rare Books

World War I Pamphlet Collection

What About the
Secret Treaties?

IN view of the misunderstandings, some honest and some not, that have
been produced by the unofficial publication of certain secret treaties
made between this country and several of its Continental Allies dur-
ing the war, I am venturing to inquire at some length into their purpose
and character. I must disclaim at once the possession of any official or
secret information. My information is such only as is accessible to the
diligent student of public affairs ; and my deductions are open to be made
or questioned by any intelligent citizen. My sole claim for them is that,
at the same time that they are more favorable to our statesmen, they are
also more probable than the deductions of the pacifists ; for whereas the
hypotheses of the pacifists cover only a selection of the facts, my
hypotheses cover all the facts, or, at least, as many as have been brought
to public notice.

Demand for Explanation Justifiable

I may begin by saying that I do not agree that no explanations of
the secret treaties are needed. The texts of the secret treaties, however
they have been made known to us, are now public knowledge and of public
concern. Apprehension concerning their meaning is perfectly natural and
perfectly legitimate. Consideration of them is a public duty; and I, cer-
tainly, have no complaint to make of the fact that the pacifists have
insisted upon discussing them. On the other hand, we must not fall into
the error of suspecting, as the pacifists do, that because the secret treaties
require to be explained, therefore no satisfactory explanation of them
exists, and that all explanation is a vain attempt to explain away. Usu-
ally when a man "demands an explanation" he is looking for a bone
of contention and means to find one, meat or no meat upon it. It is not
in this mood, however, that we ought to demand an explanation of the
secret treaties, but in the mood of being hopeful of finding an explanation
and willing to accept a satisfactory answer.

As I have been able to gather them, the main charges brought against
the secret treaties are these : They are, or were designed to be, secret ;
they propose to transfer territory from one Power to another, without
regard to the principle of no annexations and of the self-determination
of peoples ; they are inconsistent with the anti-imperialist and democratic
declarations of the Allies in the present war ; and, finally, and in conse-
quence of these defects, they are responsible, if not for Germany's initia-
tion of the war, at least, then, for Germany's desperate prolongation of

the war. There are other charges and suspicions entertained in regard
to the secret treaties, for example, that they betray an imperiahzing
tendency on the part of England and her Allies, or again, that they are
designed to ruin the commerce of Germany, with the sole object of bene-
fiting Allied trade ; but these apprehensions will, I think, be found to be
included in the four charges I have enumerated; and it is therefore to
these four that I propose to limit my replies.

Why the Treaties Were Secret

To the first and last of the four it is possible to return comparatively
brief answers. In view of the fact that we were at war with Germany,
and, before the first treaty was signed, had been long enough (eight
months) at war with her to take her full measure, there is nothing to be
wondered at if the terms of the treaties were not disclosed for the infor-
mation of her militarist rulers. Moreover, the purpose of the treaties
could not but include, among other objects, the object of strengthening
the alliance against Germany and of correspondingly weakening Germany,
being, as they must in part have been, proposals for a political and diplo-
matic defense precisely similar in character to the plans for a joint mil-
itary and naval defense. If, therefore, it would have been unwise (to
say the least of it) to publish broadcast our military and naval plans, it
would surely have been no less unwise to publish broadcast our political
and diplomatic plans. The secrecy of the treaties, in other words, was
enjoined on us by elementary policy; and it may be pointed out that so
long as there are dangerous autocracies in the world, the secrecy of even
the most democratic diplomacy will need to be imperative.

As for the charge that the secret treaties, if they did not induce Ger-
many to begin the war, at any rate provoked her into continuing it long
after she might otherwise have ended it, I am only surprised at the mod-
eration of its authors. Why make a reservation of the initiation of the
war and confine the effect of the secret treaties merely to prolonging it?
By an intelligent anticipation of what the Allies were about to agree
upon, and of what they would plan together if attacked, Germany might
well have employed the secret treaties, even before they came into actual
existence, as a reason for declaring war. Were not the secret treaties in
the Allies' hearts if not on paper ; and must not Germany be justified
by one means or another? The truth is, however, that monstrous as it
would be to regard the secret treaties as having driven Germany to declare
war, it is equally ridiculous to hold them responsible for Germany's con-
tinuation of the war. Eight months of war, we must remember, had
passed before a single treaty was made ; and during that time the most
obliging observers had failed to discover one trustworthy sign that Ger-
many was prolonging the war for anything less than an abounding con-
quest. The only reasonable deduction to be made is that Germany would
have prolonged the war to the present moment and for as long as she has
hopes of victory, even if no secret treaty had ever existed. A punishment
you expect to be able to avoid, if not to turn upon the other party, is no
deterrent to crime.

The Functions of the Foreign Minister

To deal with the two remaining charges brought against the secret
treaties will require, as a preliminary, the rehearsal of a certain number
of elementary but often forgotten facts. It is surprising how many people
criticize a Foreign Minister without having formed an exact idea of his
duties, and, still more, without taking into account the circumstances in
which he must perform them. Both considerations are essential, how-
ever, if a just judgment is to be passed, whether favorable or unfavorable,
on the Minister or Cabinet in question. Moreover, it would be as well
to point out that both the duty and the circumstances in which a Foreign
Minister is placed are not by any means of his own creation or dependent
upon his own personal or even party likes and dislikes. The duty of a
British Foreign Minister is defined in the nature of his office ; and it would
be the same for Mr. MacDonald or Mr, Snowden, let us say, as it has
been for Viscount Grey or Mjr. Balfour. Similarly, the circumstances
in which any Foreign Minister takes up his office are a legacy not only
of his immediate predecessors, but of the foreign policies of all the other
nations of the world. His duty is such and such, the circumstances given
are such and such ; and it is necessary to realize both facts in order to
arrive at a judgment of his conduct. Now what is implied in the offipe
of a British Foreign Minister? What is the duty he is appointed and
paid to discharge at the risk of dismissal? It is high-falutin' to pretend
that his immediate and only concern is to bring heaven upon earth, or to
elaborate international fraternity within the period of his tenure of office.
I am not affirming that these are not noble objects of policy, or that a
British Foreign Minister ought not to keep them in view as his guiding
stars. They are, indeed, the ultimate purpose for which the relative
purposes of temporal policy ought to exist. On the other hand, though
hitched to a star, it is the wagon as well as the direction for which a
British Foreign Minister is officially responsible ; and the wagon in our
particular case is, in a phrase, the maintenance of the British Common-
wealth.

Policy and the British Commonwealth

People sometimes talk as if the maintenance of the British Common-
wealth, or of any other national group, for that matter, were an event of
nature and not of policy. Like Topsy, the British Commonwealth is
supposed to have "growed," and to owe its continuance to the same mys-
terious process. But, in truth, a nation, like all the other works of man,
is a creation of art, and, therefore, like all other works of art, liable to
change and decay with the ability and temper of the men who are respon-
sible for its maintenance. History is the record of the fall as well as
of the rise of nations. The rise and maintenance of nations are the
result of good policy, as their decline and fall are the result of bad pohcy.

This being the case, we have now to inquire whether there are any
particular conditions upon which the maintenance of the British Com-

monwealth depends ; to be brief, the maintenance of England, which is
the keystone of the arch of the Commonwealth. Is there any particular
danger to be feared and guarded against by any Foreign Minister en-
trusted with the duty of his office? The reply is that there are several
and, perhaps, many such conditions; but that the chief of them (and,
in any event, the one most relevant to our present purpose) is the
maintenance of the "balance of power" on the European Continent. I
cannot conceive the state of mind of any man, and, above all, of any
Englishman, who does not appreciate, when it has once been pointed out
to him, the importance, the vital importance, for this country of preserv-
ing the European "balance of power." It is not the fact that the pres-
ervation of the balance of power is a mere advantage to this country —
and, hence, to all the ideas and ideals of which England is the symbol —
it is a necessity of our existence. For what is meant by the preservation
of the balance of power in Europe is nothing less than the prevention of
the subjection of Europe to a single Power capable, at one and the same
moment, of enslaving Europe and conquering England. There is really
nothing recondite about either the phrase or the policy it stands for ; nor
is there any occasion for attributing its invention and pursuit to this or
that Foreign Minister, or to this or that governing class. It is the simple
expression of the prime condition of the maintenance in a state of inde-
pendence of England, and, therefore, of the British Commonwealth ;
and since this is the unchallengeable fact, we may particularize the duty
of the British Foreign Minister as being that of preventing the creation of
a hegemony or dominating Power in Europe.

Were the Treaties Designed by hnperialists?

Before going on to consider the circumstances in which, at the out-
break of war, a British Foreign Minister, any British Foreign Minister,
was placed for the performance of his simple duty of maintaining the
balance of power in Europe; and, thereafter, the steps actually taken to
maintain it — which will bring us to the secret treaties — we may glance at
the character of the man who was then holding this office. Of all the
men, without exception, who have held the office of British Foreign
Minister, it is probable that the last to be accused by his countrymen of
"imperialism" (by which I mean the will to increase the power of Eng-
land regardless of right and wrong, or of the interests of the rest of the
world) is Viscotmt Grey. In addition to this, it is to be noted that the
Cabinet to which he belonged was a Liberal Cabinet, which may, there-
fore, be supposed rather to have aided and abetted his policy of simple
maintenance than to have urged him, against his inclinations, into an
"imperialist" policy. Yet, it was Viscount Grey who signed the secret
treaties on behalf of the Liberal Cabinet of Mr. Asquith ; and upon Vis-
count Grey, in consequence, all the charges brought against them must
finally rest. I do not envy the task our pacifists have set themselves in
bringing their charges of imperialism and all the rest of it against Vis-
count Grey. They are to be pitied rather than condemned in their choice
of a person on whom to lay the responsibility of their suspicions ; they

would have been safer with any other man than him. But, as it is, their
case against the secret treaties must stand or fall with their case against
Viscount Grey. If he is not to be convicted of the charges they have
brought against the secret treaties, neither can the treaties themselves be
so convicted. Nobody, therefore, can charge them with intentional, or
even potential, imperialism, who is not prepared to prove Viscount Grey
an intentional or unwitting imperialist. And we have Prince Lichnow-
sky's memorandum to silence that charge.

Maintaining the Liberties of the World

There is a simple rule for those who would understand the actions
of others, even the most complicated and apparently contradictory actions :
it is to put yourself by imagination into their circumstances. All criticism
of value, whether of politics, art or men, whether favorable or unfavor-
able, presupposes this act of Christian charity. Without this "charity,"
everything else profiteth nothing. Having defined the duty of any British
Foreign Minister, and having taken intO' account the character of Vis-
count Grey, who was our Foreign Minister at the moment when war
broke out, w^e have now to consider what were the circumstances in
which his principal duty was to be discharged. How, in short, and under
what circumstances, was he to maintain the balance of power in Europe
as a condition of maintaining the British Commonwealth, and as the more
remote but still necessary condition of maintaining the liberties of the
world? For that the liberties of the world do, in fact, depend on a chain
of this kind is a matter of demonstration, though the occasion for making
the demonstration is not the present.

The circumstances are too familiar to need elaboration ; but they must,
nevertheless, be recalled if our argument is to be followed. To premise,
it must, above all, be remembered that they could not, in any case, have
appeared exactly as we have now come to realize them. When war
broke out, who realized that it would last four years, and spread from
Europe over the whole world? Who, again, could estimate what would
prove to be the strength of Germany or the weakness of some of the
other European nations? Let not wisdom after the event be mistaken
for wisdom before or in the event. The most ignorant of us to-day knows
more than the wisest knew four years ago. There were certain facts,
however, for a British Foreign Minister to go upon. There is an etiquette
of diplomacy the breaches or observances of which, while ceremony to
the general public, are significant to experienced diplomats ; and it needed,
therefore, no special gift in Viscount Grey, beyond the gift of experience,
to surmise, in fact to be certain, that from the omission by Germany of
these forms and observances in her approach to and conduct of the events
that brought about the war, her action was deliberate, calculated and
aggressive. But what, again, did this portend? To what lengths would
Germany's aggression proceed? Would it be satisfied with the "punish-
ment" of Serbia, or with the "defense" against Russia, or with another
"lesson" to France ? Common knowledge of the psychology of Germany

7

indicated that, exactly as in her military tactics it is her policy to make
a push and to exploit what may come of it, so in diplomacy her policy
would be to cross the Rubicon first and to trust to {rightfulness for the
sequel. And the sequel in this case was precisely what was to be feared
by any British Foreign Minister, for it was precisely the establishment
or the attempt to establish a German hegemony of Europe,

German Aims and German Deeds

It is strenuously affirmed by many people in Germany — and it appears
to be accepted as gospel in certain circles in this country — that in entering
upon the war Ge'rmany had no such object in view as the hegemony of
Europe as the means to the domination of the world. The notion, they
say, is ridiculous, though it was admittedly entertained by a few unin-
fluential Pan-German dreamers. The denial, however, is of no value,
in view of the national strategy already defined as characteristic of Ger-
man psychology, and in view, still more, of the unfolding of events as
we have witnessed them. For not only was the Rubicon crossed, the
Pan-Germans leading, but the subsequent speeches of these "dreamers"
leave us in no doubt that but for the unexpected resistance offered by a
large part of Europe and, finally, by the rest of the world, Germany
would at this moment be master of Europe and mistress of the world.
This consummation, now frustrated, was therefore latent as a calculated
possibility in Germany's first act of war. We may even say, on looking
back, that it was a consummation humanly probable ; and that, far from
having been mere dreamers, the Pan-Germans who persuaded the Ger-
man people to cross the Rubicon were no less practical than criminal.

Viscount Grey, as the British Foreign Minister responsible for the dis-
charge of the duty of his office, could not therefore have been mistaken
in interpreting German policy as designed to disestablish the balance of
power in Europe. Any other Power in Europe, it is conceivable, might
have gone to war without of necessity aiming at a European hegemony.
But Germany, alone of all the Continental Powers, could not possibly
embark upon a war without either aiming at hegemony or, if she won the
war, arriving at hegemony even in spite of herself. The end was implicit
in the means. The situation before Viscount Grey was thus a challenge
to the first condition of the maintenance of the British Commonwealth, a
challenge, moreover, thrown down by the most formidable Power in
Europe ; and if panic had seized upon our Cabinet at the prospect, we
should not have been entitled to be surprised at it. Suspecting, indeed,
what we have come to know, concerning the unpreparedness of this
country and of our European Allies, and of the preparedness of the
"uninfluential," "dreaming" Pan-Germans, it is surprising, in fact, that
our Cabinet in particular displayed, on the whole, so few signs of alarm.
Had it entered into secret treaties of the most extravagant kind, had it
committed the very sins with which it is now charged by the pacifist
critics of the actual secret treaties, I, for one, should still have hesitated
before condemning its members utterly. Mad and bad as such conduct

would have been, it would have been human and intelligible. The fact is,
however, that, whether from a false sense of security or from some better
cause. Viscount Grey kept his head — a human and a fallible head, no
doubt; a head not to be compared, of course, with the heads of some of
his critics ; but what head he had he kept, with results that we may now
examine.

The Allies' Governing Principles

What were the governing principles to be held in mind by any British
Foreign Minister finding himself in Viscount Grey's position? In the first
place, it was necessary to secure Allies for the purpose of defeating Ger-
many's immediate attempt at hegemony ; in the second place, it was neces-
sary to devise plans for ensuring Europe, if that were possible, against
any future repetition of that attempt; in the third place, and qualifying
the former, it was desirable to see to it that in attempting to avoid one
danger we did not run into another.

That England has had to "secure" Allies in a war against an attempt
to dominate Europe has been made a subject of reflection upon the motives
of both this country and our Allies. But nothing is more ill-conceived
than such a charge. It is true that for a nation that fancies liberty the
prospect of slavery is alone sufficient to induce its people to take up the
sword without the addition of any other motive ; but to a nation, however
much in love with liberty, that does not realize the imminence of slavery,
something supplementary to the motive of deliverance from a perhaps
imaginary fear may be necessary. I am not, it must be understood, cast-
ing reflections upon any of our Allies ; they have all suffered too much
too readily to have their complete good faith so much as questioned.
But I am assuming that it was not of necessity the case that each and
every one of our Allies saw the war, from the moment of its outbreak,
in the same light as ourselves. The incredibility of what has only in
course of time become clear to everybody — and not even yet to every-
body ! — was as likely to occur among nations as among individuals ; and
it is therefore no reproach upon either this country or its Allies that one
or other of them needed to be persuaded at first to take the German
menace as seriously as it deserved.

To Prevent German Aggression in the Future

But what can the outbreak of the war be said to have proved if not
that the actual balance of power in Europe was such that Germany
thought herself safe in presuming upon it? We have seen that for Ger-
many it was a war of calculation, of reasonable calculation. Thus and
thus, she said to herself, are the forces in Europe distributed ; and thus
and thus, in consequence, can the war be decided. The balance of power,
in other words, was already presumed to be in her favor ; and all that
was expected of the war was to prove it. In this pre-war disposition of
forces we can see, if we like, the occasion of the war itself. No country,

not even Germany, would initiate an aggressive war if she knew for
certain that she would be defeated ; for even militarist nations love con-
quest rather than war. But with the calculable chances of victory appar-
ently on her side, it was inevitable, Germanly speaking, that sooner or
later the Pan-Germans would prevail upon their country to make war.
This consideration, however, leads to another still more relevant to our
argument. If a professedly militarist Power is always likely to go to war
when the balance of forces seems to be on her side, what else can her
peaceful neighbors do but attempt to withhold from her the opportunity?
If it is opportunity alone that is wanting to Germany to make war, the
plain duty of her neighbors is to secure themselves against the repetition
of the opportunity — in other words, to see that never again, while Ger-
many remains militarist, shall the balance of forces in Europe be even
calculably in her favor. It is this consideration, I believe, that inspires
the second of the two governing principles that were necessarily present
in the mind of Viscount Grey in his negotiations with our Allies. Not
only were they to be confirmed in the common defense of the liberty of
Europe, but measures were to be devised to secure that liberty when it
was won by removing from Germany the temptation to future aggression.
In a word, the former balance of power, proved by the war to have been
unstable, was to be replaced, if possible, by a balance more nearly equal.
Perfidious Germany was to be weakened, and the rest of Europe rightly
strengthened at her expense.

Here, however, arose a consideration which must be touched with a
tender hand. I purposely will not dwell upon it. The best of nations
are liable to have their heads turned by power — the worst their hearts
as well ; and it might conceivably have been the case that in rearranging
the balance of power in Europe for the purpose of sobering Germany,
we should be intoxicating some other nation. The menace, in any case,
could never be so formidable, since no other nation is Germany, and none
occupies her peculiar position. But a menace which we had put out of
the front door should not be allowed to come in again at the back, even
in a less threatening attitude ! The point need not be labored to be realized
as involving a further necessary consideration in the mind of our Foreign
Minister,

The Text of the Treaties

In the light of these governing principles, inseparable from a proper
conception of the duty of our Foreign Minister in the circumstances as
given, I should like now to refer my readers to the texts of the secret
treaties as published. They will be found set out, with a commentary,
both in Mr. C. A. McCurdy's "The Truth About the Secret Treaties,"
published by W. H. Smith and Son, and elsewhere. It is not my inten-
tion to examine them in detail, for that would be wearying to the sfeneral
reader, and superfluous to the student of the texts themselves. All I ask
of those who are sore oppressed with doubts concerning them, is that
they should examine the texts in the light of the three governing prin-

10

ciples which I have just laid down; when it will be found, I think, that
every clause of the treaties, every effect of them, is designed to answer
one or two or all three of the elementary demands of the foreign policy
of the British Commonwealth. They are designed, that is to say, to secure
our Allies, to safeguard Europe against an early repetition of Germany's
attempt at hegemony, and, in President Wilson's phrase, to make the
world safe for democracy. I will not go so far as to say that they are
(or were) all perfectly designed to one or other of these ends. They are,
in fact, open to criticism in detail, if not in principle. But that, as a
whole, they are not only so designed, but satisfactorily and justifiably so
designed, would be evident, I think, if a comparison be made of the map
of Europe in all its aspects as it existed before the war with the map of
Europe as it would be left when all the treaties had been carried out.
For what should we find? Evidence, in the first place, that Germany
had in the interval between the two maps been unmistakably defeated ;
in the second place, a redistribution of power, economic, political, strategic
and national, making for the strengthening of Europe against Germany,
and, hence, against the renewal of Germany's war of conquest; yet, in
the third place, not so much strengthening of any other Power that when
the chamber had been swept and garnished, fresh devils would be likely
to enter in and take possession. Had I to defend the treaties before an
assembly of the Union of Democratic Control, I could think of no better
justification of them than that they would actually, if carried out, have
established these results. Nor do I think that a better justification is
needed.

Hoiv the Treaties Stand To-day

Here I could lay down my pen as if my inquriy were ended; as,
indeed, it would be if events had not moved since the last of the treaties
had been signed. But since it is the case that in very few respects are
the conditions to-day the conditions under which the secret treaties were
drawn up, it is necessary to add to their justification at the period of their
signature, an account of how they stand at this moment. Whatever the
plausibility of the charges brought against the treaties in their fixed
condition up to the middle of March, 1917, it is certain that no plausibility
can attach to charges brought against them since that date. For, as we
shall see, the truth of the matter is that the treaies no longer exist in a
binding or definite form. They are propositions, not dispositions ; and
not all of them are any longer even propositions.

The conditions naturally assumed by the contracting Allies as condi-
tions governing the treaties were, apart from the main condition, namely,
the defeat of Germany, the inviolability of the Alliance and the absence
of any fresh factor of importance. If Germany should not, in the end,
be defeated, it is obvious, of course, that the terms of the treaties between
her presumptive conquerors would become null and void. Equally, it is
obvious that in the event of the secession from the Alliance of one of the
contracting parties, or, again, in the event of the adhesion to the Alliance
of a new principal party, the treaties, if they should not become totally

11

null and void, would at least need to be revised. Both these latter events
have actually occurred. Russia, one of the chief contracting parties to
the secret treaties, went out of the Alliance, and America, a not negligible
party, came into it.

At the blow of the first of these two events it might be supposed that
the elaborate erection of the treaties would fall like the walls of Jericho.
Of the six main secret treaties published in the various editions, four are
almost wholly, and two are partly, concerned with Russia. It is a fair
estimate that three-fourths of the substance of the treaties were dependent
upon the continued adherence of Russia. Again, it might have been
supposed that with the substitution of America for Russia in the Alliance,
its atmosphere would have been so changed that not even the surviving
treaties could live in it. At the least, it might be assumed that the double
event must profoundly affect the whole diplomatic structure.

Future Action

Various opinions did, indeed, arise concerning what should be done
with the treaties. There were those — there are still those — who would
have had the Allies, and England in particular, denounce the whole body
of the secret treaties, Russian, French, Italian, Serbian, Roumanian, and,
I suppose, Belgian, and start again with a new slate on which nothing
should be written save what might be shown to the world, including
Germany. These are the pacifist out-and-outers, the men who, never
conceivably having put themselves in the place of a responsible Foreign
Minister, have never realized the obligations of his office. There were
and are those, again, who would allow the mainly Russian agreements to
have lapsed with the secession of Russia, but who are of opinion that
the rest of the treaties can still be held good. Finally come those who
would "leave everything to President Wilson," and who, in the mean-
while, regard the treaties as not dead but never born.

Of the members of the first group it may be remarked that in spite
of their professed internationalism they seem never to think of honor,
even among the Powers they regard as thieves. The solemn international
covenants called treaties, whether secret or open, are, in the opinion of
this school, to be denounced by ourselves without regard to the wishes
of our cosignatories and Allies. It is true that this country is in alliance
with France and Italy among other Powers ; it is also admitted that we
owe a great deal to our Allies. But we are, nevertheless, to denounce
the treaties on which they confirmed their alliance with us at any moment
it may happen to appear to suit us ! It is unnecessary to say more in
reply to this school than that France and Italy are not disposed to accept
their ruling. The denunciation of the secret treaties is for the signatory
Allies to make ; for them and for no single party. The second school of
opinion is no less extreme ; but for a different reason it is no less im-
practicable. Admitting that the mainly Russian treaties have lapsed, it
cannot be said that they have left unaffected the remaining and only

12

partly Russian treaties, for these had those in view, and were, in a sense,
fitted into them. It is impossible to take away the major parts of an
organic whole and leave the minor parts still organically intact. In them-
selves and apart from their context the surviving parts are either too
much or too little. Even supposing, therefore, that the non-Russian
treaties should be left, they must submit to modification before they can
enter a fresh complete organism.

Finally, as regards the American school, I may at once point out that
the members of the school are not to be found in America. America
is among our military and naval Allies ; but America is not yet among our
political and diplomatic Allies. The substitution of America for Russia
was, in other words, not a perfectly complete substitution. It follows
from this that those who, at the present moment, propose to "leave every-
thing to America," are reckoning without their host, presuming upon a
political and diplomatic alliance that does not yet exist.

For Consideration by the Peace Conference

But if, as is the case, the main treaties of the group have lapsed and
the minor ones are, in consequence, subject to indefinite amendment, what
can be said to be the present state of the treaties — are they dead or alive,
operative or inoperative? All good pacifists, I trust, will observe my
reply, since it has the warrant of the authoritative speeches of our present
Prime Minister, our present Foreign Minister, our present Assistant
Foreign Minister, Mr. Asquith, and many others. It is that the treaties
are neither dead nor alive, neither operative nor non-operative, neither
denounced nor reaffirmed — they are in suspense. But what is it to be "in
suspense"? Cannot a plain answer be given such as a plain pacifist can
understand? It can. To be in suspense, as the secret treaties now are,
is to be on the agenda of the Peace Conference for discussion ; it is to
be the subject of resolutions to be moved and supported, but not neces-
sarily to be carried. In relation to the secret treaties, this state of sus-
pended animation may be taken as meaning that their texts may be
brought up before a Peace Conference and discussed there, but that
neither upon the Conference as a whole, nor even upon any or all of the
signatories of the treaties will such texts be binding verbatim et literatim.
This is what I conceive to be the present state and status of the secret
treaties. It is not a dignified position, perhaps ; it is not a position to be
envied by any official and self-respecting treaty. On the other hand, even
if the charges brought against the secret treaties in their prime were true,
they could not be laid at the door of treaties in this state ; and since the
former charges, as we have seen, are not true but false, the treaties in
their present plight must be allowed to leave the court without so much
as a charge on their character.

The Constitution of the Peace Conference

In conclusion, I may, perhaps, be permitted to speculate on the prob-
able nature of the Peace Conference, at which, it is to be presumed, the

13

secret treaties will come up for discussion. Nobody knows, at present,
what the actual character of the Conference will be, how long it will last,
what will be the order of its procedure, or the sum of matters with which
it will deal. All these questions depend for their answers upon two main
factors at present uncertain: the cast of mind of the representatives of
Germany; and the credentials of the representatives of America. Will
Germany attend as a criminal caught and brought to the bar unrepentant,
or as a contrite partner in the work of reconstruction? Will America
attend as a principal and co-plenipotentiary or as a deeply interested but
third party with the power of veto by counter-signature? These, as I say,
are unsettled matters, but I would draw the attention of pacifists to them
as more formative material for consideration than the half-dead, half-alive
secret treaties. The policy represented by the secret treaties will, in any
case, be obligatory upon the Peace Conference ; since it is, as regards the
future, no less than the prevention of another world-war such as the
present ; but the texts of the treaties will, also, in any case, be but a small
fraction of the m.atters that will need to be discussed. Their body may
thus perish, having served its turn, but their purpose and soul will go
marchinsT on.

14

A List of
Important Publications
Bearing on the War

"THE IRISH QUESTION: FEDERATION OR SECESSION," by F. S.

Oliver, author of "Alexander Hamilton." Price 10c.

"GREAT BRITAIN FOR DEMOCRACY," by Lt.-Col. G. G. Woodwark.
Price 10c.

"TREASURY OF WAR POETRY." 289 pages. Price $1.25. (Houghton
Mifflin).

"THE WESTERN FRONT," drawings by Muirhead Bone— in two volumes.
Price $2.50. (George H. Doran).

"THE WOMAN'S PART," by L. K. Yates. Price 50c. (George H. Doran).

"MY MISSION TO LONDON," by Prince Lichnowsky. Price 10c. (George
H. Doran).

"WOMEN OF THE WAR," by Hon. Mrs. Francis MacLaren. Price $1.25.
(George H. Doran).

"THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE
CHURCH," by Charles Gore, Bishop of London. 28 pages. Price 10c.
(George H. Doran).

"THE BRITISH NAVY AT WAR," by Prof. W. Macneile Dixon. 90 pages.
Price 75c. (Houghton Mifflin).

"SUMMARY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOR INDIA."

Proposals of Secretary of State Montagu and the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford.
24 pages. Price 10c.

"GEMS (?) OF GERMAN THOUGHT," by William Archer. 120 pages.
Price 25c. (Doubleday, Page).

"ENGLAND AND THE WAR," by Andre Chevrillon, with a preface by
Rudyard Kipling. 250 pages. Price $1.60. (Doubleday, Page).

"A CLEAN PEACE," by Charles A. McCurdy, M. P. 26 pages. Price 10c.
(George H. Doran).

"ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES." Their future relations and Joint
International Obligations, by George Louis Beer. 322 pages. Price $1.50.
(Macmillan).

15

"THE VANDAL OF EUROPE." _ An Expose _ of the Inner Workings of
Germany's Policy of World Domination and its Brutalizing Consequences,
by Wilhelm Miihlon. 335 pages. Price $1.50 net. (Putnam).

"THE GUILT OF GERMANY." For the War of German Aggression— Prince
Karl Lichnowsky's Memorandum. Being the Story of His Ambassadorship
at London from igi2 to 1914, also Foreign Secretary von Jagoufs Reply.
Introduction by Viscount Bryce. By Lichnowsky. 122 pages. Price 75c.
(Putnam).

"IMPERIAL ENGLAND," by Cecil F. Lavell and Charles E. Payne. Price
$2.00. (Macmillan).

"A DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE." Commemoration in
London in igi8, of the 4th of July, 1776. Introduction by George Haven
Putnam. 32 pages. Price 10c.

"THE CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE," by Ramsay Muir.

Price 5c. (Doran).

i
"THE ROOTS OF A WORLD COMMONWEALTH," by P. T. Forsyth,

M.A., D.D. Price 10c. (Doran).

"GENERAL SMUTS'S MESSAGE TO SOUTH WALES." Price 5c.
(Doran).

"THE TANKS," by Colonel E. D. Swinton, C.B., D.S.O., Royal Engineers.
Price 5c. (Doran).

"LINGUISTIC OPPRESSION IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE," by Ernest
Barker. Price 25c. (Harper).

"THE ECONOMIC WEAPON" (In the War Against Germany), by A. E.

Zimmern. Price 5c. (Doran).

"WAR ON HOSPITAL SHIPS." With Narratives of Eye-Witnesscs and
British and German Diplomatic Correspondence. Price 25c. (Harper).

"BRITISH WAR AIMS." Statement by Right Honorable David Lloyd George.
Price 10c. (Doran).

"THE BLACK SLAVES OF PRUSSIA." An Open Letter addressed to
General Smuts, by Frank Weston, D.D., Bishop of Zanzibar. Price 10c.
(Houghton Mifflin).

"ALLEGED GERMAN OUTRAGES." Report of ^ the Committee appointed
by the British Government and presided over by Right Hon. Viscount Bryce.
Price 15c.

16