WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
COMMANDER C. C. GILL, U. S. NAVY
WHAT HAPPENED
AT JUTLAND/ ;
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
BY
C. C. GILL
• COMMANDER, U. S. NAVY
ATJTHOB OF "NAVAL POWEB IN THE WAS," ETC.
WITH 26 DIAGRAMS
NEW XBJr YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
COPYRIGHT, 1921,
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA
FOREWORD
THIS work of Commander Gill, U. S. Navy,
is a thoughtful, painstaking and thorough re-
search into all the evidence bearing upon the
now historic battle of Jutland and constitutes
a valuable contribution to the list of publica-
tions upon the Art of War on the Sea.
H. B. WILSON,
Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
Atlantic Fleet.
UJS.S. Pennsylvania,
Flagship.
PREFACE
A GREAT deal has already been written about the
battle of Jutland. The most recent contribution
is a 600-page official record of the original English
reports and despatches. The British have pre-
sented their side of the battle — the Germans have
described the action as it appeared from the other
point of view. Admiral Jellicoe, the British Com-
mander-in-Chief, and Admiral Scheer, the German
Commander-in-Chief, have both written books and
explained their respective maneuvers fully and
frankly. For these two books students of naval
affairs should be deeply grateful. It should be
recognized, however, that they are, necessarily, one-
sided treatments. The subject, moreover, has be-
come highly controversial, and, as a consequence,
has been confused by somewhat misleading argu-
mentative discussions.
Important questions of present and future naval
policy depend, in large measure, upon conclusions
drawn from the experiences of Jutland. The study
of this engagement is an urgent matter and does
not admit delay. No apology, therefore, is made
for this attempt to gather together in one narrative
authentic information available from both British
[vii]
PREFACE
and German sources, and to give, as accurately as
may be, an unbiased analysis of the battle.
Acknowledgment is made to officers of the War
College and officers of the U. S. S. Pennsylvania
for valued criticism and comment received dur-
ing preparation of the manuscript. Acknowledg-
ment is also made to Lieutenant G. J. Hazard,
U.S.N.R.F., for his skill and courtesy in the work
of making the diagrams.
C. C. GILL.
[viii]
CONTENTS
PAGE)
I THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE . .17
II FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE
BATTLE ... . . . . . . . 32
HI THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE . . 58
IV THE BATTLE: FIEST PHASE ... 60
V THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE ... 80
VI THE BATTLE: THIBD PHASE ... 117
VII THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE . . . 137
VIII THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE ... 150
IX CONCLUSION ....... 165
APPENDICES:
LOSSES AND DAMAGE ...... 171
DESIGN OP WAR VESSELS AS AFFECTED BY
JUTLAND , . 175
[ix]
LIST OF DIAGRAMS
DIAGRAM
NO. PAOB
1 CHART OF NORTH SEA, SHOWING STRATEGIC
DISPOSITIONS 22
2 BATTLE CRUISERS AND FAST BATTLESHIPS
(SHOWING TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR, AND
ARMAMENT) 33
3 GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET IN CRUISING FORMA-
TION (SHOWING TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR,
AND ARMAMENT) 35
4s BRITISH BATTLE FLEET OF 24 DREADNAUGHTS
(SHOWING TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR, AND
ARMAMENT) 39
5 RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ALL FORCES AT
2:00 P.M., 31 MAY, 1916 43
6 CRUISING FORMATION OF FORCES UNDER IMME-
DIATE COMMAND OF ADMIRAL JELLICOE AND
REAR ADMIRAL HOOD 47
7 CRUISING FORMATION OF FORCES UNDER IMME-
DIATE COMMAND OF VICE ADMIRAL BEATTY
AND REAR ADMIRAL EVAN-THOMAS . . 51
8 CRUISING FORMATION OF RECONNAISSANCE
FORCE COMMANDED BY VICE ADMIRAL HIP-
PER .... « 55
9 TRACK OF THE BATTLE CRUISERS DURING
THEIR BATTLE APPROACH (2:00 P.M. TO
3:48 P.M., 31 MAY) 61
[xi]
LIST OF DIAGRAMS
DIAGRAM
NO. PAGE
10 TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE
FIRST PHASE (2:00 P.M. TO 4:55 P.M.) . 63
11 AT 3 :48 P.M. THE OPPOSING BATTLE CRUISERS
OPEN FIRE 67
12 AT 4 :08 P.M. ADMIRAL BEATTY INCREASES THE
RANGE AND ADMIRAL EVAN-THOMAS CLOSES
ENOUGH TO OPEN FIRE AT LONG RANGE . 71
13 AT 4:45 P.M. BOTH SIDES DELIVER TORPEDO
ATTACKS 75
14 AT 4 :55 P.M. ADMIRAL BEATTY TAKES NORTH-
WEST COURSE, AND ADMIRAL SCHEER JOINS
IN BATTLE 81
15 TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE
SECOND PHASE (4:55 P.M. TO 6:40 P.M.) 87
16 AT 5 :45 P.M. ADMIRAL HOOD'S LIGHT FORCES
ENGAGE ADMIRAL HIPPER'S ADVANCE
SCOUTS. IN THE MEANWHILE SCHEER SLOWS
DOWN AND REFORMS His FLEET ... 91
17 AT 6 :16 P.M. ADMIRAL JELLICOE DEPLOYS THE
BRITISH BATTLE FLEET TO PORT AND SLOWS
DOWN, WHILE ADMIRAL BEATTY CLOSES
GERMAN VAN AT UTMOST SPEED ... 95
18 BRITISH BATTLESHIPS IN APPROACH FORMA-
TION WITH DESTROYERS IN POSITION No. 1
FOR DEPLOYMENT ON LEFT FLANK DIVISION 101
19 AT 6:35 P.M. ADMIRAL JELLICOE COMPLETES
His DEPLOYMENT AND ADMIRAL SCHEER
EXECUTES A "SWING- AROUND" WITHDRAWING
MANEUVER • • • 107
[xii]
LIST OF DIAGRAMS
DIAGRAM
NO. PAGE
20 TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE
THIRD PHASE (6:40 P.M. TO 7:17 P.M.) 119
21 AT 7:17 P.M. ADMI&AL SCHEER, AFTER AT-
TACKING THE BRITISH CENTER, AGAIN EXE-
CUTES His WITHDRAWAL MANEUVER . . 125
22 TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE
FOURTH PHASE (7:17 P.M. TO 9:00 P.M.
—DARK) 139
23 AT 8:30 P.M. ADMIRAL BEATTY Is AGAIN
ENGAGED. ADMIRAL JELLICOE TURNS TO
THE SOUTHWEST 143
24 TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE
FIFTH PHASE (9:00 P.M. 31 MAY TO 3:00
A.M. 1 JUNE) 151
25 BRITISH NIGHT CRUISING FORMATION SIGNALED
SHORTLY AFTER 9 :00 P.M., 31 MAY . . 155
26 MANEUVERS ON JUNE IST AFTER THE BATTLE 159
[xiii]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
WHAT HAPPENED
AT JUTLAND
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
"STRATEGY" prepares battles ; "tactics" fights them.
Strategy decides the force to be sent to any theater
of operations, assigns the task or mission, arranges
logistics — the supply of food, fuel and munitions,
— coordinates effort by land and sea on all fronts,
and in general deals with the larger considerations
in the conduct of war. The decisions of strategy
regarding the disposition and employment of fleets
and armies are carried out by tactical maneuvers.
It is thus seen that strategy and tactics are closely
related. Tactics, in fact, is an instrument of strat-
egy. There is no clear line of demarcation between
the two, and confusion rather than clarity is likely
to result if attempt is made to consider the one as
quite distinct from the other.
Tactics may be defined broadly as embracing
that part of strategy which has to do with maneu-
vers in the field. For instance, strategy decide* to
[IT]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
move a fleet from one port to another, and the
maneuvers used to carry out the decision are "tac-
tical." Maneuvers in the face of the enemy, for
approach, for battle, for chase, or for retirement,
comprise battle tactics.
Although the highest form of tactics is an aggres-
sive offensive to destroy the fighting power of the
enemy, it sometimes happens that a temporary de-
fensive attitude by certain forces is essential to the
success of the general plan. A premature attack,
even if a local tactical victory is achieved, may be
detrimental rather than helpful in the accomplish-
ment of the principal objective; or the cost of a
victory may be greater than it is worth ; or the situ-
ation may be such that it is not prudent to risk a
battle. War is a serious business in which quixotic
motives, however worthy they may be from a senti-
mental point of view, have no place.
Strategy is the master of tactics and determines
their character, which, according to the war objec-
tive and the circumstances of the special situation,
may be aggressive or evasive, offensive or defen-
sive. Tactical decisions have to be made in the
light of strategic considerations.
With this brief digression to explain the term
"tactics" and the relation of "tactics" to "strategy,"
we shall now turn to a study of the battle of Jut-
land.
Throughout the war the main Naval Battle
[18]
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
CFront was in the North Sea. Here the fleet of
Great Britain, officially named the Grand Fleet,
faced the German fleet, named the High Sea Fleet.
In this area of about 120,000 square miles these two
most powerful fleets in the world were continually
engaged in a great strategic contest. The stake
was absolute control of the seas and on this con-
trol hinged ultimately the issue of the World War.
In main features the strategy employed by both
England and Germany followed normal lines.
, England's naval policy was to establish control of
all the great ocean areas by destroying enemy ships
abroad, and to stop Germany's ocean trade and con-
tain her home fleets by a so-called "distant block-
ade." The menace of off shore mine and torpedo
operations covered by an inferior but powerful
German battle fleet made a close blockade of Ger-
man ports impracticable. The Grand Fleet, under
Commander-in-Chief Admiral Sir John Jellicoe,
was ready to fight in the open sea, but the margin
of superiority was not deemed sufficient to warrant
seeking an engagement with the High Sea Fleet
under conditions of Germany's own choosing, in the
vicinity of her mine fields and submarine bases.
Except for occasional excursions to the South,
England's battleships were held on watch in the
less dangerous waters to the northward, in the vi-
cinity of Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands. An out-
post detachment of light cruisers, destroyers and
submarines operated from Harwich, the nearest
[19]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
suitable port on the English coast to the enemy fleet
base behind Heligoland, while the Dover patrol
guarded the Straits. These outpost vessels were
supported by Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruiser
fleet based at Rosyth; and in April, 1916, an addi-
tional support of eight predreadnaughts and four
cruisers was stationed in the Humber to safeguard
the coast against sudden invasion. Fast German
cruisers could make sudden raids upon the coast
or even the channel, but they always ran the risk of
being intercepted by a superior force and could
hardly expect to do damage of military signifi-
cance. (Diagram I.)
The war plan of Germany assigned her navy an
offensive-defensive role. It was the objective of
the High Sea Fleet to keep the Allied Naval forces
at a distance from German shores ; to safeguard the
North and West frontiers joining the Army flanks
in Russia and Belgium; to blockade Russia's Baltic
ports ; and at the same time maintain open German
sea communications with the northern neutrals.
Germany did not wish to challenge the superior
British fleet to decisive action on the high seas, but
preferred to operate her battleships within re-
stricted areas as a fleet in being, that is to say, hold-
ing the High Sea Fleet as a continual menace,
within supporting distance of shielding mine fields
and submarines among which it would not be
prudent for the British fleet to advance to attack.
In addition it was the plan of Germany to institute
[20]
. 6A6 AM., SIGHTED
8BATTLBSH1P3 WITH, LT CR.U1SER3
AND-DB5TROYBRS.
5:30A1A., SIGHTED
2BA.TT1.BSHIP3, ZCROISBRS
AND DESTROYERS.
CHART OF NORTH SEA, SHOWING STRATEGIC
DISPOSITIONS
1. Beatty at 3:48 P.M. 5. Beatty at 6:50 P.M.
2. " " 4:40 " 6. Jellicoe " 7:41 "
3. Scheer " 4:55 " 7. " " 9:00 "
4. Jellicoe " 6:14 "
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
raids for moral effect and also to endeavor to bring
about such a division of the British Fleet as might
permit a locally superior German force to engage
and destroy a British detachment. By tactics of
attrition Germany hoped to reduce Britain's supe-
riority until her fleet could be engaged on more
equal terms.
Mines and submarines, always useful for the
weaker naval power, were assiduously used by the
Germans. When it was seen that the war was to
be a long one, German strategists realized that the
pressure of the sea blockade would fall heavily on
German economic life. A counter naval offensive
was necessary and the only weapon Germany could
use was her submarines. The U-boat campaign
against commerce was inaugurated and came peril-
ously near to success. But it should be borne in
mind that it was the protection of German dread-
naught guns that released these U-boats from
coast defense duties and permitted them compara-
tive freedom of operation.
It has been contended that Great Britain, by
her North Sea blockade, enjoyed all the advantages
which would have been gained by the destruction
of the High Sea Fleet. This is not correct. Ger-
many's fleet was an important factor throughout
the war. It was the power of this fleet that made
the Baltic practically a German Lake, maintained
open the trade routes between Germany and the
North European neutrals, closed Russia's chief
[25]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
ports, and protected the German frontiers from
the Gulf of Riga to Holland. It would be diffi-
cult to overestimate the influence, both direct and
indirect, which the German High Sea Fleet ex-
erted in bringing about the collapse of Russia.
And, finally it was the cover of the High Sea Bat-
tle Fleet that permitted the U-boats freedom to
come and go in the prosecution of their campaign
against commerce. In estimating the tactical sit-
uation in the North Sea there should be no mis-
understanding as to the essential task performed
by the German battleship fleet, and the great in-
fluence a decisive British victory at Jutland would
have had on the course of the war.
Turning now to the particular strategy which
culminated in the battle of Jutland, it will be re-
called that in May, 1916, the general military situ-
ation was not particularly pleasing for Germany.
Russia was a powerful enemy. Her Baltic Fleet
was then by no means negligible and had been co-
operating in the Gulf of Riga with the right flank
of the Russian Army. On the Western front the
German offensive at Verdun had not succeeded.
While the German General Staff did not, in all
probability, feel any great anxiety as to the condi-
tions on the land frontiers, still, the promise of
victory made to the German people had not ma-
terialized. Although the submarine campaign
against commerce was in operation, it was re-
[26]
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
stricted, and as yet no great amount of tonnage had
been sunk. In 1916 Germany was not ready to
risk an open rupture with America, and the vigor-
ous protest of the United States against unlawful
sinkings had resulted in a diplomatic humiliation
damaging to German prestige. Under these cir-
cumstances it was logical strategy for Admiral
Scheer, Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea
Fleet, to seek a successful naval demonstration in
order to strengthen national morale.
In studying the dispositions which led up to the
battle of Jutland and the tactical decisions made by
Scheer and Hipper during the engagement, it is
important to understand the German point of view.
The German people at this time were demanding
greater activity on the part of their fleet in justi-
fication of the vast sums spent for its creation and
maintenance, and to make more distinctly manifest
its war-time usefulness. In view of the general sit-
uation, and further in view of this popular demand
for greater fleet activity, in the spring of 1916,
the German strategists had decided to launch a
more aggressive naval campaign the object of
which was to strike at England by sea in such a way
as to deprive her of inclination to continue the war.
-*•
/ Commander-in-Chief Scheer reasoned that this
could be achieved by a successful blow at English
sea power centered in the navy, or by a blow at
British financial life centered in commercial ship-
[27]
ping, or — better yet — by a combination of both
these courses.*
Admiral Scheer, in estimating the situation,
argued that if the High Sea Fleet was withheld on
the defensive while the U-boats instituted a vigor-
ous campaign against merchant ships, then, if the
submarines were successful, Admiral Jellicoe might
lead out the Grand Fleet on an aggressive offensive
which might compel Germany to fight a fleet to
fleet action at Admiral Jellicoe's selected time ; that
there was disadvantage in thus giving the initiative
to the British, as Admiral Jellicoe might choose a
time when part of the German forces were under
repairs, or otherwise unfit for service, or absent in
the Baltic for exercises; and, therefore, that the
wiser plan was for Germany to assume the initia-
tive, and conduct definite, systematic operations to
induce the British to send out forces and afford the
High Sea Fleet opportunity to attack them under
conditions favorable to Admiral Scheer, at his —
not Admiral Jellicoe's — selected time.f
The minor raids already conducted against Eng-
land had made an impression. The successful bom-
bardment of Lowestoft on April 25th, and the
escape of the raiders, had caused public dissatis-
faction, and Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, had announced!that should the German
ships again venture to show themselves off the Brit-
* Reference, Admiral Scheer's book "The German High Seas Fleet
in the World War."
t Reference, Admiral Scheer's book.
[28]
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
ish coast, measures had been taken to insure their
being severely punished. (After this raid the 3rd
Battle Squadron of predreadnaughts and the 3rd
Cruiser Squadron were withdrawn from Scapa and
stationed in the Humber to guard the English
coast.)
Reasoning from these premises, Admiral Scheer
planned operations to bring about a naval battle
on terms advantageous to Germany during the pe-
riod May 23rd to June 1st, 1916. It should be
added that Admiral Scheer was not seeking a de-
cisive fleet battle unless he could succeed in drawing
the British fleet into a trap. What he sought was
an opportunity to engage and destroy with superior
force an inferior detachment of the British fleet
before the main body could arrive in support. To
do this Admiral Scheer was ready to risk a "tip
and run" encounter with the British Main Fleet,
and for this contingency he had a carefully re-
hearsed maneuver of retirement by which he in-
tended to withdraw the High Sea Fleet should it
become involved against a superior British concen-
tration.
In brief, the German enterprise involved a
cruiser bombardment of Sunderland to draw out
British naval forces, and an endeavor to lead these
British forces toward the supporting German Bat-
tle Fleet so that Admiral Scheer might attack them
under favorable conditions. During this week,
May 23rd to June 1st, about 24 U-boats were sta-
[29]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
tioned off the British ports of sortie and along the
probable enemy routes of advance, to observe and
attack. Also, a large number of Zeppelins were
assigned to assist the enterprise by reconnaissance
from the air. (Diagram 1.)
The fact that the U-boats could not remain out
longer than June 1st imposed this limit to the
operation. The attack on Sunderland required
clear weather. Of this Admiral Scheer states: "An
extensive aerial reconnaissance was an imperative
necessity for an advance on Sunderland in the
northwest, as it would lead into waters where we
could not allow ourselves to be forced into giving
battle."
If the weather continued unfavorable for scout-
ing from the air, a substitute plan was provided by
which, in place of the Sunderland bombardment,
an advance against cruisers and shipping, in and
near the Skaggerak, was to be employed in order
to draw out the British forces. Operating in this
direction made it possible to do without the air
reconnaissance as the Jutland coast offered a cer-
tain amount of cover against surprise, and also the
distance to the British points of support was con-
siderably greater.
The order issued by Admiral Scheer on May
18th was as follows:
"The bombardment of Sunderland by our
cruisers is intended to compel the enemy to send
[30]
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
out forces against us. For the attack on the ad-
vancing enemy the High Sea Fleet forces to be
south of the Dogger Bank, and the U-boats to be
stationed for attack off the east coast of England.
The enemy's ports of sortie will be closed by mines.*
The Naval Corps will support the undertaking with
their U-boats. If time and circumstances permit,
trade-war will be carried on during proceed-
ings. . . ."
Each day proved unfavorable for airship obser-
vation and on the 31st Admiral Scheer decided to
use the modified plan by which the advance against
shipping in the Skaggerak was substituted for the
bombardment of Sunderland. That reconnaissance
from the air could not be depended upon during the
entire period from May 23rd to June 1st directs
attention to one of the limitations of aircraft as
scouts.
* One of these mines later caused the loss of the Cruiser Hampshire
with Earl Kitchener and his staff.
[81]
II
FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE
BATTLE
AT early dawn of May 31st, Vice Admiral Hip-
per, commanding the German advance reconnais-
sance force of 5 battle cruisers attended by 5
light cruisers and 33 destroyers, left the Jade Basin
and stood out to sea followed one half hour later
by the supporting High Sea Battle Fleet. (Dia-
grams 2, 3.) The "Third Squadron," 7 of Ger-
many's most modern dreadnaughts, was in the van
with the Flagship Koewg leading; then came
Squadron One, 9 dreadnaughts of the Heligoland
and Nassau type, led by the Fleet Flagship,
Friedrich der Grosse, flying the flag of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Admiral Scheer; and bringing up
the rear was the "Second Squadron," 6 predread-
naughts of the Deutschland class. The entire fleet
numbered 22 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light
cruisers and about 78 destroyers. This second
most powerful fleet in the world was a compar-
atively new creation. Germany had^ almost no
naval traditions. At this time, fiowe^er, Admiral
Scheer's force was in a high state of efficiency with
[82]
BfcATTY.
0 TIGER 28.500. 8-13.5', WK..9X
OQUUNMNW \ 26.330 TONS.
-
0 FRIWXS3 ROYAL . ARMOR*
0 NEW ZEALAND ") 16.800 TONS, E6K.
0 INDEFATIGABLE J 6-tt"GlMS. ARMOR 6!
HOOD,
INFLEXIBLE )
BVAN THOMAS
0 BARHAM
0 VALIANT
0 WARSPITE
0 MALAYA
ZT.500TONS, 25 K.
6-15'GUNS, ARMOR W.
HIPPBR
I OERFFL1NGER 1
• LUTZOW J 8-12"GUNS, Z8K, ARMOR
• 5EYDUTZ Z4.6»0, »0-M
• MOLTKL ZZ.640, 10-U" 27.25 K,H"A
• VONDERTANN 19,100, . B-M"
DIAGRAM No. 2
BATTLE CRUISERS AND PAST BATTLESHIPS (SHOWING
TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR AND ARMAMENT)
[33]
m.
KONIG
GROSSER KURFORST
MARKGRAF
KRONPRINZ
KAI8W )
PRINZ REGENT UJ.TPOLO
ICA1SEWH
25,390 TONS.
IO-I2"GUNS, SPEED 23.
ARMOR I4T
2*440 TOMS.
^It&nK. SPEED 2..
ARMOR 15.75'
I.
FR1EDRICH DER GROSSE
OSTFRIESLAND
THURWGEM
HELGOLAND
OLDENBURG
POSEN
RHE1NLAND
NASSAU
WESTFALEN
24AIO, 10-li",
I2-|2"GUNS, SPEED 20.5:
ARMOR H.75'
18,600 TONS.
ARMOR U.75!
E.
• DEUTSCHLAND
I POMMERM
I SCHLESIEN
• SCHLESWIG-HOLSTE1N
• HANNOVER
I H ESSEN
4-UMGUNS. SPEED ia.
ARMOR ais:
DlAGRAJH No. 3
GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET IN CBUISING FORMATION
(SHOWING TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR AND ARMAMENT)
Distance between ships 760 yards. Distance between
squadrons 3,800 yards. For battle formation distances
were closed to: 550 yards between ships and 1,100 yards
between squadrons
[85]
FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE
a personnel as yet untainted by the sinister influ-
ences which later broke down its morale and finally
culminated in mutiny.
Mine sweepers had cleared a way through the
British fields and screening destroyers zig-zagged
in and out to keep down any submarines that might
be lying in wait. When west of Amrum Bank,
the course was laid north, and Admiral Hipper
with his advance force proceeded to carry out his
orders, which were to pass out of sight of Horn
Reefs and the Danish coast, show himself off the
Skaggerak before dark, cruise in the Skaggerak
during the night, and at noon of the next day join
up with the Main Fleet. Groups of English cruis-
ers had been reported off the Norwegian coast. It
was expected that the presence of Hipper off the
Skaggerak would be reported, that British forces
would start from England soon after the receipt
of this information, and that, in all probability, a
battle would result on the following day, June 1st.
On this day the British Grand Fleet was also at
sea. It was part of British naval strategy to
make periodic sweeps through the waters of the
North Sea, and one of these sweeps was now in
progress.*
It appears that on the 30th the German Flag-
* Admiral Jellicoe has stated: — "In accordance with instructions
contained in their Lordship's telegram, No. 434, of 30 May, the
Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for the purpose of carrying out one
of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea.*
[37]
ship had been sending an unusually large number
of messages. Although these code messages could
not be deciphered, the sending ship was identified,
and by directional radio instruments the British had
determined a movement of the German Flagship
of about 7 miles, indicating that she had shifted
from the inner harbor of Wilhelmshaven to an outer
anchorage in the Jade Basin. The British knew
that the German fleet was ready for sea, and naval
activity of some sort was inferred.
Because of this inference and the consequent
timely sailing of the British Grand Fleet, however,
it does not follow that Admiral Jellicoe had fore-
knowledge that a fleet to fleet action was pending.
It is also to be remembered that a considerable force
of British light cruisers and destroyers were held
in port at Harwich. It is reasonable to suppose
that had the British Admiralty been informed of
the German plan this Harwich force would have
been sent out to take part in the battle.
On the evening of May 30th, the British battle
fleet of 24 dreadnaughts, attended by 3 battle cruis-
ers, 12 light cruisers, 8 armored cruisers, and 46
destroyers had sailed from the northern bases,
and a few hours later Admiral Beatty's advance
force of 4 fast dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 15
light cruisers, and 31 destroyers had set out from
Rosyth. (Diagrams 2 and 4.) The entire British
fleet formed a veritable armada totaling 28 dread-
naughts, 9 battle cruisers, 27 light cruisers, 8 ar-
[88]
VI. Y.
I AGINCOURT @ ST. VINCENT
27.500T. 22K. 1W50T. ZIK.
W-IZ'G. 9'A. 10-IZ'G. 10' A.
) HERCULES 0 NEPTUNE
2QOOOT. ZIK. ZO.OOOT. *IK
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DIAGRAM No. 4
BRITISH BATTLE FLEET OF 24 DREADNAUGHTS (SHOW-
ING TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR AND ARMAMENT)
[39]
FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE
mored cruisers, and 77 destroyers. It represented
the acme of naval development. Never before in
history had such a powerful array of fighting ships
been grouped under one command. These ships
were manned, moreover, by a personnel steeped in
the traditions of England's long mastery of the
seas, traditions epitomized in the names of Blake,
Hawke, and Nelson.
At this period of the war, no continuous British
submarine observation was maintained off the Ger-
man bases, and Admiral Jellicoe received no re-
ports of the departure of the High Sea Fleet. The
advantage of the initiative enabled Germany to
send out observing U-boats which were stationed
approximately as indicated on the chart (Diagram
1) : — Some off Scapa Flow; one off Moray Firth;
a large number off the Firth of Forth; several off
the Humber; and the remainder north of Ter-
schelling Bank watching the approaches to the
Straits and Harwich.
At 5 :30 A.M., on the 30th, U-32, about 70 miles
east of the Firth of Forth, reported two British
battleships, two cruisers, and several destroyers
making a southeast course. These were probably
part of Sir David Beatty's force which had sailed
from Rosyth. An hour later this same submarine
reported that she had intercepted English radio
messages to the effect that two battleships and
groups of destroyers had sailed from Scapa.
Shortly after this, U-66 reported from about 60
[41]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
miles east of Kinnaird Head, a squadron of eight
British battleships, attended by light cruisers and
destroyers, on a northeast course. These evi-
dently belonged to Sir Martin Jerram's Squadron
which was en route from Cromarty to rendezvous
at sea with the rest of the battle fleet which had
sailed from Scapa.
From the above reports Admiral S cheer esti-
mated that the diverging courses of the detach-
ments sighted did not indicate a large operation
such as an advance on the German bight; nor, to
his mind, did they appear to have any connection
with the German enterprise. To Admiral Scheer
this information from his submarine scouts pre-
saged, not a British fleet concentration, but rather
a likelihood that his hope of meeting with separate
British detachments might be fulfilled. He was,
therefore, the more encouraged to carry out his
plan.
At 2 :00 P.M., on May 31st, the opposing forces
were in the relative positions shown in Diagram 5.
The main body of the British Grand Fleet, com-
manded by Admiral Jellicoe, was about 70 miles off
the Norway coast in Lat. 57° 57' N., Long. 3° 45'
E. From Jellicoe Beatty bore S. 23° E. and was
distant 77 miles, while Scheer bore about S. 40° E.
and was distant about 150 miles. The Grand Fleet
was disposed as indicated in Diagram 6. The 24
dreadnaught battleships were steaming in six col-
umns of four ships each with a close anti-submarine
screen of 4 light cruisers and about 34 destroy-
[42]
B/AN THOMAS I
BEKTTY
'German Destroyers
ixamininq neural steamer
DIAGRAM No. 5
RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ALL FORCES AT 2:00 P.M.
[43]
FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE
ers; 5 light cruisers covered the front of the capi-
tal ships 3 miles in advance of the main body, 6
armored cruisers were spread 6 miles apart on a
line 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet and a link-
ing armored cruiser to relay signals was placed 6
miles toward the Commander-in-Chief's Flagship,
the Iron Duke. Each armored cruiser was attended
by one destroyer. The Third Battle Cruiser
Squadron, Hood's three Invincibles, with two light
cruisers and four destroyers, was stationed 20 miles
ahead of the Battle Fleet. All this force had a
fleet speed of 20 knots and was now zig-zagging,
speed of advance 14 knots in the direction S. 50° E.
The advance force under Vice Admiral Beatty,
consisting of six battle cruisers and four 25-knot
battleships with attending light cruisers and de-
stroyers, was disposed as shown in Diagram 7. The
1st Squadron of four battle cruisers was in single
line ahead, led by Admiral Beatty's Flagship, the
Lion, and screened by the light cruiser Champion
and ten destroyers of the 13th Flotilla. The 2d
Squadron of two battle cruisers was 3 miles E.N.E.
of the Lion and screened by six destroyers. The
5th Battleship Squadron, four dreadnaughts of the
Queen Elizabeth class, was 5 miles N.N.W. of the
Ldon and screened by one light cruiser and nine
destroyers of the 1st Flotilla.* A scouting and
screening line of eleven light cruisers was eight
*The name ship Queen Elizabeth was undergoing repairs after
severe service in the Dardanelles Campaign.
[45]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
miles S.S.E. of the IAon, spread in a direction
E.N.E. and W.S.W., distance between ships five
miles. The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was also
with these light cruisers. The link ship Yarmouth
was midway between the line of light cruisers and
the Lion. All this advance force had a fleet speed
of twenty-five knots and was now advancing on a
course north by east toward the rendezvous with
the Battle Fleet, at a speed of nineteen and one
half knots.
By the plan of the sweep Jellicoe was to be at
position "A," Lat. 57° 45' N., Long. 4° 15' E. at
2:00 P.M. (Diagram 1.) The Battle Fleet had
been delayed, however, to wait for a destroyer to
examine some trawlers and was eighteen miles be-
hind schedule. Beatty's 2:00 P.M. position, ac-
cording to the plan, was Lat. 56° 40' N., Long. 5°
00' E. (Point "A'" in Diagram 1.) He actually
was about twelve miles N. 64° W. from this point,
Lat. 56° 46' N., Long. 4° 40' E., thus bringing
the relative positions of Beatty and Jellicoe within
six or seven miles of the plan, but geographically
some twelve or fifteen miles to the westward. Ad-
miral Beatty had been informed that Admiral Jel-
licoe would sweep to the south from point "A."
Considerable criticism has been made of this dis-
position of the British forces, to the effect that
Beatty was too far away from Jellicoe. They were
then operating seventy-seven miles apart. This is
a matter of opinion, and depends upon the plan of
[46]
p Cochrane
<•
7
4-TH. LIGHT CRUISER
SQUADRON:
/*
AND.
/ s<
CRUISER
SQ.UADRON
Shannon
"V" Minotaur
DuKe of Edinburgh
>ST CRUISER
SQUA.DRON.
BlacKPrinc
HOOD
* Canterbury
Chester
DIAGRAM No. 6
[47]
FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE
coordination. It will be noted later on that a dis-
crepancy of twelve miles developed in the naviga-
tional reckoning of Jellicoe and Beatty. This
caused confusion at the critical juncture when Jelli-
coe joined Beatty in action against the enemy.
While it is not considered tactically unsound to
operate a fast detachment this distance in advance
of the supporting battle fleet, it is of utmost im-
portance that proper touch be maintained by link-
ing up ships or other means, and suitable precau-
tions taken to assure that the detachment be not
trapped and cut oif by a superior enemy force.
The main body of the High Sea Fleet, com-
manded by Admiral Scheer, was now fifty miles
west of Lyngvig on the Jutland coast. The twenty-
two battleships were steaming in column with the
seven most modern dreadnaughts in the van squad-
ron, the eight older type dreadnaughts led by the
Fleet Flagship, Friedrich der Grosse, in the center,
and the predreadnaught squadron of six ships
bringing up the rear. The distance between ships
was 763 yards and the interval between squadrons
was 3,800 yards. (Diagram 3.) Six light cruisers
with destroyers were spread ahead as a protective
scout line, and the balance of the forty-four destroy-
ers attending the battleships operated as a close-up
anti-submarine screen. All this force had a maxi-
mum fleet speed of seventeen knots and was now
on course north, speed fourteen knots. Compar-
ing the cruising formations of the two fleets, it is
[49]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
seen from Diagram 6 that Jellicoe was in line of
divisions with his strength fairly well distributed,
favoring his left and center; the right center car-
ried the weaker ships, while the right flank division
was strengthened by the MarlborougTi and the Re-
venge: on the other hand, Diagram 3 shows that
Scheer was in extended column, his most powerful
ships in the van, the intermediate strength in the
center, and the weak predreadnaughts in the rear.
Diagrams 2, 3 and 4 show the order of ships, their
heavy gun strength, their main armor protection,
and their speed.
The advance German force, technically named
the "Reconnaissance Force," under Vice Admiral
Hipper, comprising 5 battle cruisers, 5 light
cruisers and 33 destroyers, was about 50 miles
ahead of Scheer and about 50 miles east of Beatty.
(See Diagram 8.) The 5 battle cruisers were in
column, attended by a close-up anti-submarine de-
stroyer screen, while the light cruisers and other
destroyers were spread out in a semicircle about ten
miles ahead and on either flank. All this advance
force had a fleet speed of about 26% knots and was
proceeding on a northerly course at a speed of
about 24 knots. Comparing the opposing battle
cruisers, it is to be noted that the British were
superior in gun power and the Germans in armor
protection. German naval construction had, at a
sacrifice in gun power, devoted a larger percentage
of ship tonnage to armor protection.
[50]
J^VAN THOMAS
>o Galatea
o Phaeton
BirKenhead ,.
o*- Diqaame,
A Nottinqham
Xo Dublin
o Southampton
o Birminqham
DIAGRAM No. 7
CRUISING FORMATION OF FORCES UNDER IMMEDIATE
COMMAND OF VICE ADMIRAL BEATTY AND REAR AD-
MIRAL EVAN-THOMAS
[51]
FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE
TABLE COMPARING STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES
Type. British. German.
(Beatty) (Hipper)
Dreadnaught Battleships ...... 4 0
Battle Cruisers .............. 6 5
Light Cruisers ............... 15* 5
Destroyers . . ................ 31
* Including one Sea-plane Carrier.
Type. British. German.
(Jellicoe) (Scheer)
Dreadnaught Battleships ...... 24 16
Predreadnaught Battleships .... 0 6
Battle Cruisers ............... 3 0
Armored Cruisers ............ 8 0
Light Cruisers ......... ...... 12 6
Destroyers ................... 46 45
There is still some question as to the exact num-
ber of destroyers present. Lieutenant Commander
Frost in the Naval Institute Proceedings gives
the following comparative table: —
Dreadnaught Battleships 28 647,550 16 363,360 1.78 to 1
Battle Cruisers 9 196,900 5 118,710 1.66 to 1
Light Cruisers 26 108,290 11 44,726 2.42 to 1
Destroyers 78 77,200* 77 or less 60,300* 1.28 to 1
* Approximate
Comparing the totals of the two fleets on a ton-
nage basis, the British had an aggregate superiority
of about 7 to 4 or 1.75 to 1. (The armored cruisers
of the British and the predreadnaughts of the
Germans are not included in this comparison. ) In-
cluding the German predreadnaughts the aggre-
gate tonnage of German capital ships was 561,110
as against the British 844,450.
[53]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
The British had a total of 344 heavy guns: 48
15-inch, 10 14-inch, 142 13.5-inch, and 144 12-inch.
The Germans had a total of 244 heavy guns: 144
12-inch, and 100 11-inch.
A 15-inch shell weighs 1,950 Ibs., a 14-inch shell
weighs 1,600 Ibs., a 13.5-inch 1,400 Ibs., a 12-inch
850 Ibs.,* and an 11-inch 760 Ibs. A single dis-
charge of all British heavy guns in the battle of
Jutland weighed 713,600 Ibs. as compared with
217,264 Ibs. for the German side.f
In armor protection the German ships were bet-
ter provided than the British. Tonnage is the fair-
est basis of comparison, as it represents capital
that can be invested at discretion for offense and de-
fense.
In the battle itself, submarines and aircraft took
no actual part. The British had a sea-plane car-
rier which flew some planes during the approach
but they accomplished nothing of note. No British
submarines were in the battle. The Germans had
twenty-four submarines and ten airships which took
part in the operations, but none of these were pres-
ent on the field of action during the afternoon and
* A 12-inch British weighs 850 Ibs. The German 12-inch is heav-
ier and Comdr. Bellairs gives its weight as 981 Ibs.
f All the British 15-inch, 14-inch and 13.5 inch, except the Erin's
13.5-inch, were in center line turrets bearing on both broadsides. All
the 12-inch and 11-inch, however, were not capable of being fired on
both sides. The Germans suffered particularly in this respect. The
four Heligoland* lost four 12-inch guns each, and the four Nassaus
lost four 1 1-inch each. Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt gives the superiority
of the Grand Fleet to the High Sea Fleet at Jutland as 175 per cent
in weight of broadsides, or nearly 3 to 1. ("Naval Construction
During the War" by Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt)
[54]
% FranKf art
f» XH Half Flotilla
iWiesbaden
A xi naif flotilla & <;,,
* Pillau
*»»Torpedo Boats
.
Screen v
^Reqensburq
*»*»Torpplo Boats
* Dbinq
DIAGRAM No. 8
CRUISING FORMATION OF RECONNAISSANCE FORCE COM
MANDED BY VICE ADMIRAL HIPPER
[55]
FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE
evening of May 31st. Although between the hours
of two and three P.M. five Zeppelins ascended for
long distance reconnaissance in the sector north to
west of Heligoland, they did not see their own
fleet, nor the British fleet, nor did they hear any-
thing of the battle.*
* In speaking of U-boat enterprises and their tactical employment,
Admiral Scheer states: —
"Cooperation with separate units or with the entire Fleet could not
be sufficiently well organized to prove dependable for certain opera-
tions. Tactical cooperation would have been understood to mean
that on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of en-
countering the enemy, numbers of U-boats would be present from
the beginning in order to be able to join in the battle. Even as
certain rules have been evolved for the employment of cruisers and
torpedo boats in daylight battle to support the activity of the battle-
ship fleet, so might an opportunity have been found for the tactical
employment of the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been
done in that respect and it would have been a very risky experi-
ment to take U-boats into battle without a thorough trial. The two
principal drawbacks are their inadequate speed and the possibility
of their not distinguishing between friend and foe.
"Only temporary cooperation was possible in the case of enter-
prises by the Fleet and attacks by the U-boats when each unit had
a special duty, to be mutually supplemented but without exacting
any tactical union. If, for instance, there was the intention to
bombard a certain coastal town, it might be assumed that English
fighting forces would at once rush out from different harbors where
they were lying to drive off or capture the disturbers of their peace.
If U-boats had been stationed off such towns, where it was pre-
sumed there were enemy ships, they would probably have a chance of
attacking.
"Consideration was given as to what would be the most desirable
way to station U-boats off enemy harbors; how they could be used
in the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank protection, or other-
wise render assistance. . . ."
[57]
Ill
THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE
THE battle of Jutland is conveniently divided into
the following five phases (each of these will be
considered separately and in turn) :
First Phase: (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 P.M.)
British Advance Force under Beatty encounters
German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper
leads the action to the southeast and effects June-
ture with the High Sea Battle Fleet under Scheer.
(Diagrams 9 and 10.)
Second Phase: (4:55 P.M. to 6:40 P.M.)
British Advance Force engaged with van of Ger-
man High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north
and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. JelU-
coe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to
the southwest. (Diagram 15.)
Third Phase: (6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.)
Scheer turns back and attacks the British center
with guns and torpedoes. After a brief engage-
[58]
THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE
ment Sckeer again withdraws to the west under
cover of a smoke screen. (Diagram 20.)
Fourth Phase: (7:17 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. Dark.)
In the gathering twilight S cheer, avoiding action,
hauls around from west to southeast, and seeks
to draw closer to Horn Reefs. Jellicoe tries to re-
gain touch on westerly courses, then turns to the
southwest, and finally to south. (Diagram 22.)
Fifth Phase: (9:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M.)
During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south
while Scheer steers for Horn Reefs. British light
forces are intermittently engaged with the High
Sea Fleet. (Diagram 24.)
The day of the battle was partly cloudy to over-
cast, but the sun broke through in places most of
the time. Except for a moderate swell the sea was
smooth. There was very little wind. Visibility was
reported as good in the first stages of the action, but
later in the afternoon was considerably reduced by
mist and smoke which hung low in the heavy atmos-
phere.
NOTE: The tracks of the heavy ships throughout the battle are
shown in Diagrams Nos. 9, 10, 15, 20, 22, and 24 of the five phases.
Important situations during these phases are portrayed in more de-
tail by position diagrams which aLso show light forces. These dia-
grams have been constructed by combining data gleaned from the
writings of Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Scheer, Commander von Hase,
Gunnery Officer of the Derffiinger, and other authoritative sources,
both British and German. No attempt has been made to plot in all
the light forces. The positions of these are given approximately to
indicate how the destroyers and light cruisers entered as factors,
influencing the major tactics of the battle.
[59]
IV
THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE
(2:00 P. M. to 4:55 P. M.)
British Advance Force tinder Beatty encounters
German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper
leads the action to the southeast and effects junc-
ture with the High Sea Battle Fleet under Scheer.
(Diagrams 9, 10.)
IN the early afternoon of the day of the battle
the western destroyers of Hipper's advanced scout-
ing line were diverted to the left to examine a
steamer. This proved a small incident carrying in
its train large events. While so engaged these Ger-
man destroyers made smoke contact with Beatty 's
eastern scout. A few minutes before this contact,
the British Advance Force had turned to the north
and as Beatty and Hipper were then on about
parallel courses they would have just cleared each
other had it not been for the timely appearance of
this neutral steamer. Both sides proceeded at once
to develop this contact, and by 2:30 Beatty and
Hipper knew by radio of the presence of enemy
light forces. Jellicoe also received the report and
directed Hood to proceed with the three battle
cruisers under his command to head off the enemy
[60]
BUM THOMAS
DIAGRAM No. 9
TRACK OF THE BATTLE CRUISERS DURING THEIR BATTLE
APPROACH (2:00 TO 3:48 P.M., 31 MAY)
[61]
PPER
S « » 6 9
N
\
X
N
DIAGRAM No. 10
TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE FIRST PHASE
(2:00 P.M. to 4:55 P.M.)
British Advance Force under Beatty encounters German
Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action
to the southeast and effects juncture with the High Sea
Battle Fleet under Scheer
[68]
THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE
should he attempt to escape via the Skaggerak.
Hipper headed to the west and northwest to inves-
tigate. Beatty turned to the southeast to cut off
the enemy in case he attempted to retire toward
the Horn Reefs passage. Shortly after 2:30,
Beatty was informed of the presence of Hipper's
heavy ships. As the opposing battle cruisers ap-
proached each other the light forces became en-
gaged, and the battle had begun.
In this approach (Diagram 9) Beatty maneu-
vered at a speed of nineteen and one-half knots.
When assured of bringing the German ships to
action, he changed from southeasterly courses and
steered to the northeast toward the enemy. One
hour later, at 3:25, Hipper's battle cruisers were
sighted to the east, distant fifteen miles. By this
time Beatty had concentrated his six battle cruisers,
but, although the British had been maneuvering at
a speed of only 19.5 knots, the four fast battleships
under Evan-Thomas were still five miles away to
the northwest. Admiral Beatty evidently esti-
mated his battle cruisers as a sufficiently powerful
force to destroy Hipper's ships unassisted. The
British Admiral now increased speed to twenty-five
knots, took a line of bearing formation to clear the
smoke, and attacked. Hipper turned to the south-
east. This placed the two columns about twelve
miles apart on converging courses. When a little
over eight miles from each other both sides opened
fire simultaneously at 8:48. '(Diagram 11.)
[65]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
Admiral Evan-Thomas with his slower squadron
of four battleships was now endeavoring to close
up. He was so far astern, however, that he was
unable to take an effective part in this first phase
of the battle, and failure to concentrate before at-
tacking proved costly to the British. The German
fire was rapid and accurate. The Lion was hit twice
three minutes after fire was opened and within ten
minutes the roof of one of her turrets was blown
off and two guns put out of action. By this time
the Tiger and Princess Royal had also been hit and
in a few minutes the Indefatigable was overwhelmed
by a salvo. She fell out of line, sinking by the
stern, was hit by another salvo forward, turned over
and sank at 4:04. The range was now opening.
Beatty had altered course to the south to confuse
the enemy's fire control, and also to give Evan-
Thomas opportunity to get into action by cutting
a corner. (Diagram 12.) At 4:08 the Derfflinger
ceased firing. Her target ship was out of range.
(The Derfflinger' s limit of gun elevation was for
20,000 yds.) There was now a brief lull in the en-
gagement between the battle cruiser lines.
At this time Evan-Thomas's battleships were
able to open at the extreme range of 19,000 yards
to 20,000 yards on the Von Aer Tann, Hipper's rear
ship. At 4:16 the second ship from the rear was
also taken under fire by the battleships, but, partly
due to smoke, and partly to unfavorable light con-
ditions to the eastward, difficulty was experienced
[66]
y2nd Scouting
V
&/AM THOMAS
rapoo
16000
»**.
BtKTTf
.->..„..
\
•.
v
\
DIAGRAM No. 11
AT 3:48 THE OPPOSING BATTLE CRUISERS OPEN FIRE
[67]
THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE
in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being
visible at a time. That the fire of Evan-Thomas's
battleships was of slight effect is shown by the fact
that the target ships of these battleships suffered
little damage during this run to the south.
Beatty and Hipper soon closed again, and, as the
range decreased, the battle cruiser big gun action
was renewed. Hipper's third ship was seen to be on
fire. The gunnery officer of the Derfflinger re-
ported that the Lion had temporarily left the line,
and that this had caused him to shift his fire from
the Princess Royal to the Queen Mary. The latter
was thus under the concentrated fire of the Derf-
flinger and the Seydlitz. At 4:26, after having
been hit repeatedly, the Queen Mary sank in a ter-
rific explosion, evidently caused by the blowing up
of a magazine. The Tiger, following close astern,
passed through a dense cloud of smoke and a great
deal of debris fell on her decks, but except for this
the Queen Mary had completelydisappeared. This
happened 38 minutes after the engagement started
and 20 minutes after the loss of the Indefatigable.
Eighteen of the Queen Mary's complement of 1,300
men* were subsequently picked up by a destroyer.
At 4:15 about twelve British destroyers moved
out to attack Hipper's line. At the same time
about eleven German destroyers also advanced to
attack the British line. These light forces met in
close range action between the lines. A German
light cruiser and several supporting destroyers
[69]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
joined in this engagement. The Germans fired
twelve torpedoes at British capital ships at dis-
tances ranging from 10,000 to 8,000 yards. Evan-
Thomas turned his battleships away to avoid them
— two torpedoes were seen to cross his track. The
British destroyers also fired torpedoes, for the most
part at a range of about 7,000 yards, and Hipper
turned his ships away to escape them. (Diagram
13.) Most of these torpedoes were fired between
4:80 and 4:45.
It was reported that the swell handicapped the
speed of the German destroyers. This may account
for the fact that only about eleven of the thirty-
three destroyers with Hipper took part in the at-
tack. On the British side about twelve out of
thirty-one took part. Also, the destroyers on both
sides apparently did not get far enough ahead to
push home an effective close range torpedo attack.
Although no torpedoes hit, they exerted an impor-
tant influence on the battle tactics at a critical part
of the gun-fire action by causing ships of both sides
to turn away and open the range just as S cheer's
battleship fleet was effecting juncture with Hip-
per's battle cruisers.
At 4 :30 Scheer sighted the fighting battle cruiser
lines to the north by west. At 4:38 one of the
British advance light cruisers, the Southampton,
reported the High Sea Battle Fleet to Beatty.
Jellicoe and Hood, now advancing at their best
speed to reenforce Beatty, also received this report.
[TO]
\\lftt LC.&
\ X*
\
WPfCB
DIAGRAM No. 12
AT 4:08 ADMIRAL BEATTY INCREASES THE RANGE AND
ADMIRAL EVAN-THOMAS CLOSES ENOUGH TO OPEN FIRE
AT LONG RANGE
[71]
THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE
Beatty stood on until he sighted Scheer's van at
4:42, when he turned the battle cruisers sixteen
points in succession to starboard. At this time Hip-
per was about 20,000 yards away and Beatty was
not under an effective fire. A few minutes later
Hipper turned his ships around and took station
ahead of Scheer's van. The German battle fleet
was now on course N.N.W., in line of divisions
north, engaging the British battle cruisers at a
range of 19,800 yards. Hipper was ahead of
Scheer to the north, also firing at Beatty 's and
Evan-Thomas's ships at a range of 15,400 to 16,400
yards. At 4 :49 five German destroyers tried, with-
out success, to attack with torpedoes. A little after
5 :00, two British destroyers also fired torpedoes at
Hipper's ships, but without effect. At 4 :53 Evan-
Thomas's ships, after engaging Hipper on an op-
posite course, also countermarched, and turned up
astern of Beatty. This placed the heavier ships in
a favorable position to fight a rear guard action
against the van of Scheer's column. (Diagram
14.)
Just before and during this turn, Evan-Thomas
reported that the light was in favor of the enemy,
and that the British battleships could only lay on
and fire at the gun flashes, visibility being twelve
miles to the west and six miles to the east. The
smoke made by the destroyers during their attack
hung between the lines and helped decrease the visi-
bility. This, in addition to the opened range, due
[78]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
to the "turn away" maneuvers to evade torpedoes,
caused the gun-fire of both sides to be ineffective.
Otherwise, this juncture with S cheer might have
proved a critical period for Beatty's force. Upon
the arrival of the High Sea Battle Fleet, Beatty
had no alternative; he had to withdraw his ships.
At the time he countermarched, had the Germans
been pressing him closely, considerable damage
might have been done the British force, as the
maneuver is an awkward one to perform under
heavy gun-fire. This marks the end of the first
phase of the battle.
Before turning to the second phase, it should be
pointed out that Scheer had a plan to envelop
Beatty's force between the German battleships and
Hipper's battle cruisers. This plan was abandoned
during the approach.
The first contact with light forces had been re-
ported to Scheer at 2:30. He had continued the
German Battle Fleet on a north course until he
received a second radio report from Hipper that
British battle cruisers had been sighted. Scheer
then closed his line into battle formation, 500 meters
(545 yards) between ships and 1,000 meters (1,090
yards) between squadrons, cleared his ships for ac-
tion, increased speed to fifteen knots, and changed
course first to the northwest, then to the west.
Scheer has explained his plan and estimate as
follows :
\>^-— •>-
,—- -^VKLPP&TI turns away to
/** Vx*^^ avoid torpedoes.
/ JEVAMTHOM^S-
away to avoid torpedoes^
\
N ( \ A
- ^17000 vk - ? — Vr— ^^. <
pedoes) \ v.v-<-' // i;;HlPPBR
Homadaippled t
Nestor crjpple(y*
20000
yards
\
\ X
DIAGRAM No. 13
4 {30 TO 4:45 BOTH SIDES DELIVER TORPEDO ATTACKS
[75]
THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE
"The message received at 3:45 P.M. from the
Chief of Reconnaissance that he was engaged with
six enemy battle cruisers on a southeasterly
course showed that he had succeeded in meeting the
enemy, and as he fought was drawing him closer to
our Main Fleet. The duty of the Main Fleet was
now to hasten as quickly as possible to support the
battle cruisers, which were inferior as to material,
and to endeavor to hinder the premature retreat of
the enemy. At 4:05, therefore, I took a north-
westerly course at a speed of fifteen knots, and
a quarter of an hour later altered it to a westerly
course in order to place the enemy between two
fires, as he, on his southerly course, would have
to push through between our line and that of the
battle cruisers."
The plan to envelop Beatty was abandoned when
Scheer received word that the six British battle
cruisers were being supported by battleships. Of
his new estimate and changed decision Scheer
writes:
"While the Main Fleet was still altering course,
a message came from Scouting Division Two that
an English unit of battleships, five ships, not four
[Scheer then supposed that there were five instead
of four battleships engaged], had joined in the
fight. The situation thus was becoming critical for
Scouting Division One (Hipper's battle cruisers),
[77]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
confronted as they were by six battle cruisers and
five battleships. Naturally, therefore, everything
had to be done to get into touch with them and a
change was made back to a northerly course. . . ."
When Scheer made this estimate and decided to
change his plan of approach, he had not heard of
the destruction of the Indefatigable and Queen
Mary. This news did not reach him until night.
He evidently drew an erroneous picture of Hipper
as hard pressed by the superior British force,
whereas, in fact, as has been seen, he was doing very
well. Under the altered plan the juncture was ef-
fected in such a way that Beatty succeeded in ex-
tricating his ships without further loss.
In looking back at the positions of Hipper and
Beatty at 2:30, it would appear a fair criticism to
observe that Hipper was then in grave danger of
being cut up by the greatly superior force under
Beatty and Evan-Thomas. The British, however,
did not concentrate this superior force against Hip-
per's command and, as a consequence, Evan-
Thomas took no very effective part in the first phase
of the action, and Hipper succeeded in getting well
out of a difficult position.
Again, viewing the 4 :30 situation in the light of
Scheer's plan, the question may be raised as to
whether or not the tables had then been turned.
Had Beatty allowed himself to be drawn into a
position where he might have been cut off and de-
[78]
THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE
stroyed by Scheer and Hipper? Scheer's inten-
tion, as above stated, was to lead the Battle Fleet
west of Beatty, allowing him to proceed on to the
south in pursuit of Hipper until the British could
be pinched between two fires. It is interesting to
speculate as to what might have happened had
Scheer persisted in this plan. It cannot be denied
that risks were taken, in the first place by Hipper,
and in the second place by Beatty. But war can-
not be waged without running risks.
[79]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
(4:55 to 6:40)
British Advance Force engaged with van of Ger-
man High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north
and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jelli-
coe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws
to the southwest. ( Diagram 15. )
Sighting Scheer's battleships presented to Beatty
an enlarged situation. Up to now, his objective
had been to cut off and destroy Hipper's detach-
ment. The unexpected advent of Scheer, however,
made the destruction of the German battle fleet
the primary objective. Henceforth, Beatty's es-
sential mission was to maintain contact with Scheer
and keep Jellicoe informed of the enemy's course,
speed and formation, so that the Grand Fleet might
be brought into action quickly and effectively.
Admiral Jellicoe, at 2 :30, upon receiving the first
report that enemy light cruisers and destroyers had
been sighted, had directed Hood to proceed with
his three battle cruisers to head off the enemy should
he try to escape through the Skaggerak. The bat-
tle fleet had ceased zig-zagging and had increased
[80]
2nd. Scouting Div.
DIAGRAM No. 14
AT 4:55 P.M. ADMIRAL BEATTY TAKES NORTHWEST
COURSE, AND ADMIRAL SCHEER JOINS IN BATTLE
[81]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
speed. A little over an hour later Jellicoe heard
of the presence of Hipper's battle cruisers. At
4:00 P.M. Hood's orders had been changed and he
had been directed to reenforce Beatty. By 4:00
P.M. the Battle Fleet was also closing the advance
force at a speed of twenty knots. When Jellicoe
received report that Beatty was in contact with the
enemy battle fleet and retiring, the Grand Fleet
was about 60 miles away to the N.N.W., and has-
tening to the support of the battle cruisers at a
speed of twenty knots. As Beatty was making
twenty-five knots, the two forces, while on opposite
courses, were coming together at the rate of forty-
five sea miles an hour. (Diagram 15.)
As Beatty hauled out of range at 5:15, Hipper
shifted his fire to Evan-Thomas. This brought the
four British battleships under the fire of five battle
cruisers at about 16,000 yards, and also the van of
the German battle fleet at about 18,500 yards. At
5:20 Scheer ordered all fighting forces "to give
chase." The ships of the Koemg class were able to
make twenty-three knots for a short period and
Evan- Thomas reported that at his best speed he had
difficulty in drawing ahead.
The two leading British battleships fired at Hip-
per's ships and the two rear battleships fired at
Scheer's van. The British do not record any par-
ticular damage received at this time. During this
phase the weather became less clear, and the wind
shifted from N.W. to S.W. Powder fumes and
[83]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
smoke hung over the sea and cut off the view to the
north and east. Only now and then could S cheer
see Hipper's ships. The light, however, was in
favor of the Germans, being clearer to the west than
to the east. At 5:30 Beatty gradually changed
course to the right, and at 5 :42, after having been
out of action for half an hour, again opened fire
on Hipper at about 14,000 yards, and during the
next ten minutes the Lion alone fired some fifteen
salvoes. Hipper also turned to the eastward on an
interior concentric curve.
Turning now to Hood, we find that, due to the
previously-mentioned 12-mile discrepancy in navi-
gation, he had missed juncture with Beatty and,
on a course S. by E., had passed to the eastward
of the fighting area. At 5:30 Hood's western
protective scout cruiser heard firing to the south-
west and, in heading over to investigate, became
engaged with Hipper's outpost light cruiser and
destroyers. Hood then turned around to N.W. and
at 5:55 opened an effective fire with his port bat-
tery against the German light cruisers. During
this cruiser fighting, four British destroyers at-
tacked, and about the same time ten or twelve
German destroyers advanced and fired torpedoes
from within 60 h.m. (6,500 yards) of Hood's line.
Hipper had turned his battle cruisers to starboard,
away from the torpedo threat, and being further
influenced by the poor visibility which made it dif-
ficult to return Beatty's fire, Hipper continued to
[84]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
maneuver to close the distance which had opened
between him and S cheer. Hood's battle cruisers
saw the German torpedoes and evaded them by in-
dividual ship maneuvers, two ships turning away
and one toward the menace. No torpedoes hit.
The German light cruiser Wiesbaden was disabled.
The British destroyer Shark was disabled and later
sunk. The Chester was damaged. The German
light cruiser Pillau was also damaged. This con-
tact with Hood gave the German command the im-
pression that Jellicoe was approaching from the
N.E.
Almost simultaneously with Hipper's veer round
to starboard, Admiral Scheer had observed that his
leading battleships were turning to an easterly
course in conformity to Beatty's change of direc-
tion. The High Sea Fleet, during the chase to the
north had opened out, and the faster divisions in the
van had drawn ahead. Scheer now decided to re-
form his line. The order "Leader in Front" was
signaled at 5:45 P. M. (Diagram 16) and speed
temporarily reduced to 15 knots to give the divi-
sions a chance to get into position. Before
Jellicoe arrived, therefore, Hipper had turned to
close the High Sea Fleet, and had taken station
just ahead of the battleships. Consequently Scheer
had his fleet closed up and well in hand. This slow-
ing down and maneuvering added to the difficulty
Jellicoe and Beatty experienced in fixing the exact
position of the High Sea Fleet.
[85]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
The ensuing period was a crowded one. In addi-
tion to the contacts between the light forces of
Hood and Hipper, the outpost cruisers of Jellicoe
had also become engaged. This juncture of forces
on approximately opposite courses at high speeds
caused events to follow in rapid succession. Both
Jellicoe and Scheer had to do quick thinking and,
in the midst of uncertainties, make important
tactical decisions under a weight of responsibility
as great as has ever been borne by any naval com-
mander. In order to get a balanced conception of
the tactics used, we shall try, first, to look at them
from the British Commander-in-Chief's point of
view in the Iron Duke., and then transfer to the
German flagship to get the other aspect of the
situation as it appeared to Admiral Scheer.
The British Commander-in-Chief, as he ap-
proached the scene of action, was perplexed by
meager and conflicting information. The plots on
the chart from the reports of the Lion and South-
ampton had led Jellicoe to expect contact ahead.
There was, however, a discrepancy of at least 12
miles in the navigation. This had already caused
Hood to miss Beatty and pass by him to the east-
ward. Moreover, another message from the South-
ampton, as received on board the Iron Duke, said
that the German battle fleet was to the northeast
of the battle cruisers. This was an unlikely forma-
tion. It was apparent that Hood would have
sighted Scheer's battleships had it been the case, so
[86]
WXD
I t
4 & 6
MILES
7 6 9 10
DIAGRAM No. 15
TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DUR-
ING THE SECOND PHASE (4:55 P.M.
TO 6:40 P.M.)
British Advance Force engaged with van of German
High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north and effects
juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jellicoe deploys the
battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to the southwest
[87]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
the report was discredited on the face of it as im-
probable. Additional information was received by
Jellicoe as follows:
At 5:40 the Black Prince,, the starboard wing
armored cruiser, reported that battle cruisers were
in sight bearing south, distant five miles. At 5 :45
the Comus, stationed three miles ahead of the Battle
Fleet, reported heavy gun-fire on a south bearing.
Shortly after this, flashes of gun-fire were visible
bearing S.S.W. At 5:50 Admiral Arbuthnot, com-
manding the armored cruisers in the Defense,
reported ships in action bearing S.S.W. and steer-
ing N.E. At 5 :55 the Marlborough reported gun
flashes and heavy gun-fire on the starboard bow;
at 5:56 strange vessels bearing S.S.W.; and at 6:00
British battle cruisers bearing S.S.W., three to four
miles distant. Shortly after 6:00 the Iron Duke
sighted these vessels under Admiral Beatty about
five miles away on an easterly course. (Diagram
ir.)
The British tactics and the estimates that led
to them are described by Admiral Jellicoe in the
below-quoted passages:
"At this stage, shortly after 6:00 P.M., there
was still great uncertainty as to the position of
the enemy's Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire were
visible from ahead round to the starboard beam,
and the noise was heavy and continuous. Our
cruisers ahead seemed to be hotly engaged, but
[89]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
the fact that they were not closing the Battle Fleet
indicated to me that their opponents could hardly
be battleships.
"In order to take ground to starboard, with a
view to clearing up the situation without altering
the formation of the Battle Fleet, a signal had
been made to the Battle Fleet at 6:02 P.M. to
alter course leaders together, the remainder in
succession, to south (a turn of three points).
Speed at the same time was reduced to 18 knots
to allow of the ships closing up into station.
"The conflicting reports added greatly to the
perplexity of the situation, and I determined to
hold on until matters became clearer. The con-
viction was, however, forming in my mind that I
should strike the enemy's Battle Fleet on a bearing
a little on the starboard bow, and in order to be
prepared for deployment I turned the Fleet to
a southeast course, leaders together and the re-
mainder in succession, and the destroyer flotillas
were directed by signal at 6:08 P.M. to take up
the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. (Diagram
18.) There was, however, a very short interval
between this signal to the destroyers and the signal
for deployment, and consequently the destroyers
did not reach their positions before deployment.
The subsequent alterations of course to the south-
ward and westward added to their difficulties and
delayed them greatly in gaining their stations at
the van of the Fleet after deployment. . . .
[90]
DIAGRAM No. 16
AT 5:45 P.M. ADMIRAL HOOD'S LIGHT FORCES ENGAGE
ADMIRAL HIPPER'S ADVANCE SCOUTS. — IN THE MEAN-
WHILE SCHEER SLOWS DOWN AND REFORMS HIS FLEET
[91]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
"At 6:01 p.m., immediately on sighting the
Lion, a signal had been made to Sir David Beatty
inquiring the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet.
This signal was repeated at 6:10, and at 6:14 P.M.
he signalled: 'Have sighted the enemy's Battle
Fleet bearing south-southwest.' This report gave
me the first information on which I could take
effective action for deployment. . . . The enemy
battle fleet position given placed it thirty degrees
before the starboard beam of the Iron Duke, or
fifty-nine degrees before the starboard beam of the
Marlboroughj and apparently in close proximity.
There was no time to lose, as there was evident
danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle
Fleet being engaged by the whole German Battle
Fleet before deployment could be effected. So at
6:16 P.M. a signal was made to the Battle Fleet
to form line of battle on the port wing column, on
a course southeast by east, it being assumed that
the course of the enemy was approximately the
same as that of our battle cruisers. Speed was at
the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our
battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet,
as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet
being blanketed by them." (Diagram 17.)
Before considering the German point of view,
in order more clearly to understand Admiral
Scheer's decisions, it might be well to explain that
the High Sea Fleet had been drilled to perform a
[93]
certain withdrawing maneuver generally regarded
in British naval circles as dangerously difficult if
not quite impracticable to execute under gun-fire.
This maneuver, by which Scheer hoped to retire
the inferior High Sea Fleet whenever the superior
British gun-fire became too hot, was a simultaneous
"swing-around" of all ships under cover of a smoke
screen made by cruisers and destroyers. Admiral
Scheer had carefully exercised his fleet in this
maneuver so that the ships could perform it,
whether they were all on the same course in a
straight battle line, or steering various courses dis-
posed on a curved battle line.* In short the Ger-
mans had a definite offensive-defensive plan of
battle and the High Sea Fleet had been assiduously
rehearsed in a novel method of attack and with-
drawal.
At this stage of the battle, shortly before 6:00,
Admiral Scheer explains his estimate and decisions
as follows:
"While this encounter with the advance guard
of the English Main Fleet was taking place, we,
on our flagship, were occupied debating how much
longer to continue the pursuit in view of the ad-
vanced time. There was no longer any question
of a cruiser campaign against merchantmen in the
Skaggerak, as the meeting with the English fight-
* Scheer himself says: "At our peace maneuvers great importance
was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and
every means employed to insure the working of the signals."
[94]
^N^zndts,
•s^>^£fi£ ""*
ff,
^Wiesbaden cripplaj * • /
S" ""•^^•^r" { ^**psta doniaqed \
V {. ( \ \\ KSharR crippled and later sunK
^.i&'' \\
DIAGRAM No. 17
AT 6:16 P.M. ADMIRAL JELLICOE DEPLOYS THE BRITISH
BATTLE FLEET TO PORT AND SLOWS DOWN, WHILE AD-
MIRAL BEATTY CLOSES GERMAN VAN AT UTMOST SPEED
[95]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
ing forces which was to result from such action
had already taken place. But we were bound to
take into consideration that the English Fleet, if
at sea, which was obvious from the ships we had
encountered, would offer battle the next day.
Some steps would also have to be taken to shake
off the English light forces before darkness fell
in order to avoid any loss to our Main Fleet from
nocturnal torpedo-boat attacks. . . .
"At 6:02 came a wireless: 'Wiesbaden incap-
able of action.' On receipt of the message I turned
with the fleet two points to port so as to draw nearer
to the group and render assistance to the Wies-
baden/'
Even at this late hour Admiral Scheer did not
know of the close proximity of Jellicoe. The .Ger-
man Commander-in- Chief apparently felt that he
could delay making his night dispositions long
enough to help the Wiesbaden. Had he known
that the fleet battle which he expected to take
place the following day would be precipitated by
his maneuver to the north, there is no evidence
that he would have attempted to postpone the en-
gagement. But in such circumstances the plight
of the Wiesbaden would have hardly constituted
a large enough consideration to influence the tactics
of the major fleet, unless it so happened that going
to her assistance fitted in with the plan of battle.
This maneuver toward the Wiesbaden brought
[97]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
the British ships under Beatty and Evan-Thomas
into S cheer's view as well as the confused cruiser
fighting to the north and northeast. Another
message from destroyers ahead reported twenty
British battleships following a southeast course.
Admiral Scheer thus describes the 6:16 circum-
stances :
"It was now quite obvious that we were con-
fronted by a large portion of the English Fleet,
and in a few minutes their presence was notified
on the horizon directly ahead of us by rounds of
firing from guns of heavy caliber. The entire arc
stretching from north to east was a sea of fire. The
flashes from the muzzles of the guns were distinctly
seen through the mist and smoke on the horizon,
though the ships themselves were not distinguish-
able.
"There was never any question of our line veer-
ing round to avoid an encounter. The resolve to
do battle with the enemy stood firm from the first.
The leaders of our battleship squadrons, the Fifth
Division, turned at once for a running fight, carried
on at about 13,000 m. (14,200 yds.). The other
divisions followed this movement on orders sig-
nalled from the flagship."
Just before the opposing battleship squadrons
became engaged, Arbuthnot's armored cruisers
stationed ahead of Jellicoe, while pressing after
enemy light forces, had become involved with the
[98]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
capital ships. Three of these had crossed ahead
of Beatty and had turned up on an opposite course
between the lines coming under the fire of Scheer's
fleet. The flagship Defense was sunk; the Black
Prince was badly damaged and during the follow-
ing night was destroyed by German battleships;
the Warrior was disabled and later abandoned in
a sinking condition.
Beatty, upon sighting Jellicoe to the north,
crossed ahead of him on easterly courses at utmost
speed. Hood, now approaching on a northwest
course, sighted Beatty at 6 :10, and eleven minutes
later, in obedience to orders signalled by Beatty,
counter-marched, taking station ahead of the Lion
and engaging Hipper on an east-southeast course.
At 6 :25 Hood had closed Hipper to 8,000 yards,
and at 6 :33 his flagship, the Invincible, was sunk by
gun-fire. At about the same time Hipper's flag-
ship, the lAitzow, was heavily hit and put out of
action.
In the meanwhile, the British battleships had
become engaged during deployment. At 6:19
Evan-Thomas, who was following at some distance
behind Beatty, realized that the battleship fleet
was deploying on the port wing and, in order not
to blanket fire by crossing ahead, decided to make
a wide turn to the left and form astern of Jellicoe's
battleships. The Warspite's helm had jammed
just before this and she made a complete circle to
starboard toward the enemy line. Although put
[99]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
out of action by the concentrated German fire, she
succeeded subsequently in reaching port. At 6:17,
before turning to port to deploy, the Marlborough
division opened fire on German ships of the Kaiser
class at a range of 13,000 yards. By 6 :30 the en-
gagement had become general and the Grand Fleet
deployment was completed at 6:38. (Diagram
19.)
Scheer was now in the disadvantageous position
of being capped by a greatly superior force. This
was a contingency, however, for which he had pre-
pared the previously-mentioned "swing-around"
withdrawing maneuver. The tactics used are de-
scribed in the following excerpts from Admiral
Scheer's account of the battle:
"I observed several enemy hits and consequent
explosions on the ships at our leading point. Fol-
lowing the movement of the enemy they had made
a bend which hindered free action of our Torpedo
Boat Flotilla II stationed there.
"I could see nothing of our cruisers, which were
still farther forward. Owing to the turning aside
that was inevitable in drawing nearer, they found
themselves between the fire of both lines. For this
reason I decided to turn our line and bring it on
to an opposite course. Otherwise an awkward
situation would have arisen round the pivot which
the enemy line by degrees was passing, as long dis-
tance shots from the enemy would certainly have
[100]
6th.0iv. StHDiv. Ath.Div. 3rdDivi 2nd.Divi latDiv.
i ou
MARUBOROUGH \ JRONOUKE K1WG GEORGE U
I Flotilla
Ilia/'
Y
DIAGRAM No. 18
BRITISH BATTLESHIPS IN APPROACH FORMATION WITH
DESTROYERS IN POSITION NO. 1 FOR DEPLOYMENT ON
LEFT FLANK DIVISION
[101]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
hit our rear ships. As regards the effectiveness
of the artillery, the enemy was more favorably
situated, as our ships stood out against the clear
western horizon, whereas his own ships were hidden
by the smoke and mist of the battle. A running
artillery fight on a southerly course would there-
fore not have been advantageous to us. The swing
around was carried out in excellent style. At our
peace maneuvers great importance was always at-
tached to their being carried out on a curved line
and every means employed to ensure the working
of the signals. The trouble spent was now well
repaid; the cruisers were liberated from their
cramped position and enabled to steam away south
and appeared as soon as the two lines were sepa-
rated, in view of the flagship. The torpedo boats,
too, on the lee side of the fire had room to move to
the attack and advanced.
"While the veering round of the line was pro-
ceeding, two boats of Torpedo Boat Flotilla III
(G-88 and V-78) and the leading boat of Tor-
pedo Boat Flotilla I (S-32) had attacked. [It
was probably one of these torpedoes that hit the
Marlborough.] The remaining boats of the Tor-
pedo Boat Flotilla had ceased the attack on an
order to retire from the leader. The weakening
of the enemy fire had induced the First Leader to
give the order, being persuaded that the enemy
had turned away and that the flotilla, which would
be urgently needed in the further development of
[108]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
the battle, would find itself without support.
Owing to the shortening of the line at the head,
the boats of the other flotillas were not able to
attack. One division (Torpedo Boat Flotillas
IX and VI) had just returned from the 6 o'clock
attack. The enemy line did not follow our veer
round. In the position it was to our leading point,
it should have remained on, and could have held
us still further surrounded if by a simultaneous
turn to a westerly course it had kept firmly to our
line.
"It may be that the leader did nof grasp the
situation, and was afraid to come any nearer for
fear of torpedo attacks. Neither did any of the
other officers on the enemy side think of holding
firmly to our line, which would have greatly im-
peded our movements and rendered a fresh attack
on the enemy line extremely difficult. Immediately
after the line was turned the enemy fire ceased
temporarily."
Although the British ships observed that their
targets turned away, it does not appear that either
Admiral Jellicoe or Admiral Beatty fully grasped
this maneuver of the High Sea Fleet. In the dia-
grams published in the official reports and also in
Admiral Jellicoe's book, there is no indication of
this simultaneous wheeling away of all ships in
the German battle line. Doubtless the smoke made
by the destroyers and cruisers prevented the
[104]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
British from observing exactly what had hap-
pened. The light wind, now from the southwest,
favored the Germans in their turn away movement
as it left the British involved while Scheer quickly
cleared it on his west course and was able to re-
form his fleet in good visibility and clear of the
enemy fire.
As has already been remarked, the British in
general had not regarded such a maneuver as a
practicable one to perform under gun-fire. In ex-
plaining the Grand Fleet movements Jellicoe has
stated:
"The objection to altering by turning all the
ships together was the inevitable confusion that
would have ensued as the result of such a maneuver
carried out with a very large fleet under action
conditions in misty weather."
Admiral Scheer's prepared tactics, therefore,
came as a surprise and were not only a complete
success, but were undetected. The secret was kept
and this meant that the same surprise maneuver
might be repeated with equal chance of success.
There was now a lull in the battle. Beatty
hauled away to the east, reduced speed, and
ordered the remaining two ships of Hood's squad-
ron to take station astern. Jellicoe turned a few
points to the right in an effort to regain touch, but
it is obvious that much more radical maneuvering
would have been required to hold the German
[105]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
fleet under gun-fire. This ended the second phase
of the battle.
Although Admiral Jellicoe has stated that it had
been foreseen that the Germans would employ with-
drawing tactics under cover of smoke, it would
appear that this particular simultaneous "swing-
around" maneuver had not been anticipated, and
that the British plan of battle did not afford an
effective counter-stroke.
This second phase of the battle raises many
tactical questions. Coordination of forces — battle-
ships, cruisers, and destroyers — in the preliminaries
and during a fleet engagement presents intricate
problems. Under the circumstances, it is not sur-
prising that the somewhat dispersed British units
under Jellicoe, Beatty, Hood, and Evan-Thomas,
experienced difficulties. It is important, however,
to examine these difficulties, and endeavor to read
aright the lessons which they teach.
In the first place, there was confusion and failure
in the service of information. Information is the
ground work upon which plans are constructed.
Accuracy is vital, but the most accurate informa-
tion is of no value if not received in time. Accurate,
timely information bestows the power of initiative
and surprise, which, if properly used, may be de-
cisive factors. Victory may hinge upon the re-
liability and opportuneness of the information re-
ceived.
[106]
liooo
ards
y
/
«Wiesbaaen
•s
DIAGRAM No. 19
AT 6:35 P.M. ADMIRAL JELLICOE COMPLETES HIS DE-
PLOYMENT AND ADMIRAL SCHEER EXECUTES A "SWING-
AROUND" WITHDRAWING MANEUVER
[107]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
Up to this point in the action events have fol-
lowed in logical sequence; the advance forces made
contact ; the more powerful British detachment
under Beatty compelled the weaker German squad-
ron under Hipper to retire; Beatty was thus led
to a contact with the High Sea Battle Fleet under
Scheer; in turn, being pressed by the superior force
under Scheer, Beatty retired toward Jellicoe;
then, upon the arrival of Jellicoe, the inferior .Ger-
man fleet employed retiring tactics.
During the preliminaries the scout forces made
and kept contact with Scheer, but accurate and
timely information was not transmitted to Jellicoe.
There were no linking up ships or other means em-
ployed to guard against discrepancies in navigation,
and it appears a fair criticism that system and
method to assure the accomplishment of the scout
mission were lacking.
In addition to this failure of the advance recon-
naissance force to accomplish fully its scout mis-
sion, there was confusion in the conduct of the
attached light forces in the immediate van of the
British battle fleet.
The light forces attached to a battle fleet have
a two-fold function: First, to screen their own
capital ships, denying information to the enemy,
while at the same time they drive in the enemy's
screen to get information of his main body; and
second, to take such stations for action as will
give opportunities for an offensive with torpedoes
[109]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
against the enemy capital ships, while at the same
time they are on guard to break up any contem-
plated enemy destroyer and light cruiser attacks.
At this juncture of the battle, the British light
forces, instead of helping the major ships in ma-
neuvering into action, actually hindered them.
In pressing after the enemy, Arbuthnot's armored
cruisers suddenly broke across Beatty's line of
advance; the Defense, Warrior and Black Prince
came up on an opposite course between the lines
blanketing the fire of the battle cruisers, and there
the Defense was sunk and the Warrior and Black
Prince disabled, to no apparent useful purpose
other than temporarily drawing the enemy's fire.
German destroyers broke through the British light
forces and reported to Scheer the presence of the
British battle fleet.
Turning now to the offensive function of the
light forces, we find that little was accomplished.
When Hood first appeared he was compelled to
evade by maneuvering the torpedoes fired by eleven
German destroyers. Also Hipper turned back to
close Scheer because of the menace of a British
torpedo attack. Otherwise there was only desul-
tory torpedo firing. There is no report of torpe-
does being sighted by the capital ships of either side
between 6:15 and 6:35, although conditions were
favorable for destroyer work. The delay in order-
ing the British battle fleet destroyers to their action
[110]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
positions accounts for some of the lack of destroyer
activity on the British side, and Scheer has stated
that the radical changes of course to the right em-
barrassed the German destroyers in the van. Only
three German destroyers succeeded in attacking at
about 6:30. One hit was scored on the Marl-
borough.
The British had a superiority of 36 cruisers
against 11. The British destroyers were numer-
ically about equal to the German, but the former
were better gunned, larger and more seaworthy,
although the German destroyers carried more tor-
pedoes. Under the circumstances, it is a conspicu-
ous fact that the British flotillas did not push home
an attack on the German battleships either just
before, or during, or immediately after, the "swing-
around" maneuver.
Of the British plan and doctrine for the de-
stroyers, Admiral Jellicoe writes:
"The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a
great deal in the way of discussion and instructions
on the subject of torpedo attack in a Fleet action.
The duties of light cruisers and destroyers in this
connection were dealt with at considerable length,
and stress was laid on the supreme importance of
both making early torpedo attacks on the enemy's
line and of immediately countering such attacks,
and it was pointed out that an early attack by our
own destroyers would not only tend to stop an
cm]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
enemy attack, but would place our attacking ves-
sels in the best position to meet a hostile attack.
"The battle stations of both light cruisers and
destroyers were so fixed that they should be in the
best positions to effect these two objects, such
positions being obviously in the van of the Fleet;
in order to provide against a 16-point turn on the
•part of the enemy, or deployment in the opposite
direction to that anticipated, one or two flotillas,
according to the numbers available, and a light
cruiser squadron, were also stationed in the rear."
Under this plan and doctrine it is difficult to
understand why there was not greater offensive
activity on the part of the British destroyers. It
would appear that they were, for the most part,
kept busy in trying to attain their assigned
geometric battle stations.
The method used in deploying the British Battle
Fleet has been severely criticized. In defending
it Admiral Jellicoe has presented the following
argument:
"My first and natural impulse was to form on
the starboard wing column in order to bring the
Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment,
but it became increasingly apparent, both from
the sound of gun-fire and the reports from the
lAon and Barham, that the High Sea Fleet was in
such close proximity and on such a bearing as to
[112]
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
create obvious disadvantages in such a movement.
I assumed that the German destroyers would be
ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that
owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers at-
tacking from a commanding position in the van
would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to
place the Battle Fleet in a position where it might
be open to attack by destroyers during such de-
ployment.
"The further points that occurred to me were,
that if the German ships were as close as seemed
probable, there was considerable danger of the 1st
Battle Squadron, and especially the Marlborough's
Division, being severely handled by the concen-
trated fire of the High Sea Fleet before the re-
maining divisions could get into line to assist. In-
cluded in the 1st Battle Squadron were several of
our older ships, with only indifferent protection
as compared with the German capital ships, and
an interval of at least four minutes would elapse
between each division coming into line astern on
the 6th Division and a further interval before the
guns could be directed on to the ship selected and
their fire become effective.
"The final disadvantage would be that it ap-
peared from the supposed position of the High Sea
Fleet, that the van of the enemy would have a very
considerable 'overlap' if line were formed on the
starboard wing division, whereas this would not be
the case with deployment on the port wing column.
[113]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
The overlap would necessitate a large turn of the
starboard wing division to port to prevent the 'T'
being crossed, and each successive division coming
into line would have to make this turn, in addition
to the 8 point turn required to form the line. I
therefore decided to deploy on the first, the port
wing division.
"The further knowledge which I gained of the
actual state of affairs after the action confirmed
my view that the course adopted was the best in
the circumstances.
"The reports from the ships of the starboard
wing division show that the range of the van of the
enemy's battle fleet at the moment of deployment
was about 13,000 yards. The fleets were converg-
ing rapidly, with the High Sea Fleet holding a
position of advantage such as would enable it to
engage effectively, first the unsupported starboard
division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as
they formed up astern. It is to be observed that it
would take some 20 minutes to complete the
formation of the line of battle.
"The German gunnery was always good at the
start, and their ships invariably found the range
of a target with great rapidity, and it would have
been very bad tactics to give them such an initial
advantage, not only in regard to gunnery, but also
in respect of torpedo attack, both from ships and
from destroyers."
[114] '
THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE
On the other hand, if has been said that this
deployment sacrificed the advantage of surprise,
delayed support to Beatty's hard pressed ships,
and also surrendered to a certain extent the initia-
tive. There is, perhaps, more than a modicum
of truth in this. Certainly, turning away from the
enemy and slowing down cannot be characterized
as highly aggressive tactics. But Admiral Jelli-
coe's plan of battle was not an aggressive offensive.
His plan was manifestly a cautious offensive and
his deployment was made accordingly. From the
beginning to the end of the battle the maneuvers
of Admiral Jellicoe were consistently of a nature
which can be described in a general way as tactics
of a "cautious offensive." It should be understood
that this was his plan of battle, and it is significant
that it was officially approved by the Admiralty
both before and after the battle.
Notwithstanding this, and without presuming to
pass judgment on the British plan of battle, it
may be pointed out that there was lack of coor-
dination in carrying it out at this critical juncture.
Jellicoe slowed the battle fleet down and turned
away; Hood and Beatty closed the enemy van at
utmost speed; Evan-Thomas was in a quandary —
the battle orders said in case of deployment away
from Heligoland the fast battleship squadron will
take station in the van — but this would have en-
tailed crossing the entire front of the Fleet, so
Evan-Thomas decided to make a wide sweep and
[115)
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
turn up astern. As a consequence of all this, we
find Beatty and Hood bearing the brunt of a close
range fire without much support. Evan-Thomas's
ships were hauled away from the engagement in
maneuvering for position astern, and it is reported
that battleships in the rear were temporarily slowed
down and even stopped during the deployment.
Shortly after 6:30, just as the deployment was
completed, Scheer executed a simultaneous ship
movement to the southwest, and, as the British
battle plan did not provide any maneuver to hold
the enemy in action, these evasion tactics of an in-
ferior fleet with less speed were a complete success.
[116]
VI
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
(6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.)
Scheer turns back and attacks the British center
with guns and torpedoes. After a brief engage-
ment Scheer again withdraws to the west under
cover of a smoke screen. (Diagram 20. )
Up to this time the battle had gone decidedly
in favor of the Germans. Of the heavy ships, three
British battle cruisers had been sunk, while on the
German side, Hipper's flagship, the Liitzow, had
been put out of action. The other battle cruisers
had suffered some damage but still remained ef-
fective fighting units. The Derfflinger, for ex-
ample, although all of her turrets were ready to
continue the action, had masts and rigging badly
cut up, and her torpedo net had been shot away
aft, in such a way that the ship had to be stopped
in order to clear it from the port screw. It is sig-
nificant that the Derfflinger was able to take ad-
vantage of the lull in the battle after Scheer's
withdrawing maneuver to accomplish this precari-
ous operation unmolested. (This experience led
[117]
to the subsequent discard of these torpedo nets.)
Hipper now decided to abandon the Liitzow and
transfer his flag in a destroyer to another battle
cruiser. He went first alongside the Seydlitz but
was informed that her radio had been shot away.
Before he could reach another ship the battle
cruisers were engaged again, and it was not until
9:00 P.M. that Hipper finally succeeded in get-
ting on board the Moltke. In the meanwhile the
Derfflinger, under Captain Hartog, was directed to
take the lead.
The British forces were apparently baffled by
the German tactics. At 6:50 Beatty slowed to
18 knots and reformed his line with the two re-
maining ships of Hood's squadron astern. It seems
that the Lion passed the wreck of the Invincible
twice, indicating a loop. Jellicoe's course on de-
ployment was S.E. by E., but the van had hauled
in to S.E., without signal, to close the enemy. At
6:50 Admiral Jellicoe signaled to change course
by divisions in succession to south. Several tor-
pedoes were now seen crossing the track of the rear
of the battle line. These were probably fired by
the three destroyers which advanced to the attack
just as Scheer executed his withdrawal maneuver.
At 6 :54 one hit the Marlborough but she was able
to retain station in the battle line. During the
night she was compelled to proceed to port at re-
duced speed. This was the only torpedo hit scored
on a British capital ship.
[118]
&.40
scree*
635
1S.OOO yards
8500yds
JUPPER
':H- — -.15000
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fan
0 I Z 3456 7 «
10
DIAGRAM No. 20
TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE THIRD PHASE
(6:40 P.M. TO 7:17 P.M.)
Scheer turns back and attacks the British center with
guns and torpedoes. After a brief engagement Scheer
again withdraws to the west under cover of a smoke
screen
[119]
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
At 6:33 the speed of the battle fleet had been
increased from 14. knots to 17 knots and this
speed was maintained from now on throughout the
day and night. The following extract from Ad-
miral Jellicoe's book explains these speed decisions,
which were part of the plan and doctrine of a cau-
tious offensive that dominated the British battle
fleet tactics throughout the engagement:
"Experience at all Fleet Exercises had shown
the necessity for keeping a reserve of some three
knots of speed in hand in case of a long line of
ships, in order to allow of station being kept in
the line under conditions of battle, when ships were
making alteration of course to throw out enemy's
fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent
action on the part of single ships, or of divisions
of ships, became necessary, as well as to avoid ex-
cessive smoke from the funnels ; for this reason the
Fleet speed during the action was fixed at 17 knots.
In the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships had at
times to steam 20 knots, showing the necessity for
this reserve. Up to 7:10 P.M. also the torpedo
flotillas were not in station ahead."
These maneuvers of Jellicoe and Beatty would
have proved ineffective to close the German Fleet
had it not been for the fact that Scheer himself
decided at this time to assume the offensive. This
decision was remarkable in many respects.
[121]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
The following statements of the German Com-
mander-in-Chief merit close scrutiny:
"It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If
the enemy followed us our action in retaining the
direction taken after turning the line would par-
take of the nature of a retreat, and in the event
of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet
would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to de-
cide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure,
and not adopted voluntarily, which would therefore
be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still
less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself
from the enemy, leaving it to him to decide when
he would elect to meet us next morning. There
was but one way of averting this — to force the
enemy into a second battle by another determined
advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo boats to
attack. The success of the turning of the line while
fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and
decided me to make still further use of the facility
of movement. The maneuver would be bound to
surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest
of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would
facilitate the breaking loose at night. The fight
of the Wiesbaden helped also to strengthen my
resolve to make an effort to render assistance to
her and at least save the crew.
"Accordingly, after we had been on the new
course about a quarter of an hour, the line was again
[122]
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
swung round to starboard on an easterly course
at 6:55 P.M. The battle cruisers were ordered to
operate with full strength on the enemy's leading
point; all the torpedo boat flotillas had orders to
attack.
"The battle that developed after the second
change of course and led to the intended result
very soon brought a full resumption of the firing
at the van, which, as was inevitable, became the
same running fight as the previous one, in order to
bring the whole of the guns into action. This time,
however, in spite of 'crossing the T,' the acknowl-
edged purpose was to deal a blow at the center of
the enemy line. The fire directed on our line by
the enemy concentrated chiefly on the battle cruisers
and the Fifth Division. The ships suffered all
the more as they could see but little of the enemy
beyond the flash of fire at each round, while they
themselves apparently offered a good target for
the enemy guns. The behavior of the battle
cruisers is specially deserving of the highest praise,
— crippled in the use of their guns by their numer-
ous casualties, some of them badly damaged, obey-
ing the given signal, 'At the enemy,' they dashed
recklessly to attack."
Scheer's furn to an easterly course quickly closed
the British. At 7:05 Jellicoe had turned three
more points to starboard to close, but at 7:10 enemy
destroyers were seen approaching and a report
[123]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
was received that a submarine had been sighted on
the port bow and he brought the fleet back to course
south again, "to turn on the submarine and bring
the ships in line ahead ready for any required
maneuver." (This report of a submarine was evi-
dently an error as Scheer has stated no submarines
were present.)
Scheer's attack landed a little abaft the British
center. At 7:12 German battle cruisers emerged
from the mist and smoke at a range of 10,000
yards abeam of the Colossus, the seventeenth bat-
tleship in line. Four British battleships were now
able to open an effective fire. The German van
turned to a southerly course. At 7:14 Beatty re-
gained touch, sighting two battle cruisers and two
battleships at a range of 15,000 yards. The visi-
bility conditions were to the advantage of the Brit-
ish who were firing to windward at targets which
had the western sky for a background. (Diagram
20.)
It is thus seen that the situation which now de-
veloped was similar to that which existed at 6:35
when Scheer executed his first withdrawal
maneuver. The High Sea Fleet was again in the
tactically disadvantageous position of being T'd
by a superior force. This time the light conditions
were very unfavorable for the Germans, and the
High Sea Fleet was suffering severe damage while
inflicting punishment on the enemy so slight as to
be negligible. Admiral Scheer, therefore, at 7:12,
[124]
DIAGRAM No. 21
AT 7:17 ADMIRAL SCHEER, AFTER ATTACKING THE
BRITISH CENTER, AGAIN EXECUTES HIS WITHDRAWAL
MANEUVER
[125]
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
made signal once more to perform the simultane-
ous "swing-around" withdrawing maneuver. This
was executed at 7:17 and the High Sea Fleet
again hauled out of action on a westerly course.
(Diagram 21.) At the time of turning, Scheer
observed that his line was somewhat congested,
the Friedrich der Grosse was approaching the
pivot while the van squadron had already turned
to the south; although the signal was flying to
turn to starboard, Scheer ordered his flagship, the
Friedrich der Grosse, to turn to port. His pur-
pose was to afford more room for maneuvering, and
with this modification, the "swing-around" was ex-
ecuted without mishap.
At 7:12, when Scheer made signal for the battle-
ships to withdraw from the T-ing position, the
cruisers and destroyers were signalled to push home
a torpedo attack. The four remaining German
battle cruisers, already heavily engaged in the van,
continued to close the British line and provided
a protecting curtain of fire for the attacking de-
stroyers. Under cover of destroyer attack and
smoke screen, the High Sea Battle Fleet was able,
for the second time, and again without the exact
nature of the maneuver being detected by the
British, successfully to withdraw by simultaneously
swinging the line to an opposite course.
The German battle cruisers, however, were sub-
jected to a severe fire and suffered heavily. In the
Derfflinger, for example, at 7 :13, a shell penetrated
[127]
one of the after turrets and exploded inside. The
flames ignited a powder charge in the handling
room but it burned without an explosion and did
not reach the magazines. All but 5 of the turret
crew of 78 were wiped out. It was only a few
minutes later that another heavy shell penetrated
the roof of the second after turret exploding in-
side with much the same result, except that only
one of the turret crew of 80 was saved. The ship
was hit again and again. A direct heavy shell
hit was scored on the conning tower, but did not
penetrate. Of the broadside battery of six 15-
centimeter guns, all but two were put out of action.
Practically all communications were carried away,
and the two remaining turrets fired independently
under individual control. Three thousand four
hundred tons of water entered the ship and fires
were burning in numerous places. The light con-
ditions were such, at this time, that the Germans
could not see the British hulls and could only fire
at the gun flashes.
At 7:37 the cruisers had hauled out of action,
all severely punished but, with the exception of
the Liitzow, still in formation. The Seydlitz in
particular was badly damaged, flames were leaping
upward from one of her turrets, and she was well
down by the head with several thousand tons of
water on board.
In the meanwhile, the German destroyers had
advanced to attack in two waves. The first wave
[128]
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
of ten to fifteen boats was sighted by Jellicoe at
7:10 bearing S. 50° W. from the Iron Duke.
Under a heavy fire they advanced to within 6,000
to 7,000 yards of the center of the British battle-
ship line, fired torpedoes, and retired making a
dense smoke screen. One, the S-35, was sunk.
At this time the British light forces had not yet
reached their assigned positions in the van favor-
able to counter the attack, so the battleship line
was turned four points to port, away from the
menace, to avoid the torpedoes. Of this maneuver
Admiral Jellicoe writes:
"At a sufficient interval before it was considered
that the torpedoes fired by the destroyers would
cross our line, a signal was made to the Battle
Fleet to turn two points to port by subdivisions.
Some minutes later a report was made to me by
Commander Bellairs (the officer on my Stan3 espe-
cially detailed for this duty, and provided with an
instrument for giving the necessary information)
that this turn was insufficient to clear the torpedoes,
as I had held on until the last moment; a further
turn of two points was then made for a short time.
As a result of this attack and another that fol-
lowed immediately, some twenty or more torpedoes
were observed to cross the track of the Battle
Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority of
them passing the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle
Squadrons at the rear of the line. It was fortunate
[129]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
that, owing to the turn away of the Fleet, the tor-
pedoes were apparently near the end of their run,
and were consequently not running at high speed.
They were all avoided. . . ."
At 7:25 the second wave of attacking German
destroyers, about 20 boats, advanced through the
smoke; but by this time the British cruisers and
destroyers were in position to meet them. Also
the German capital ships had withdrawn and could
not afford the cover of heavy gun-fire. Upon
emerging from the smoke, the German destroyers,
besides being fired upon by the British battleships,
were counter-attacked by British light forces and
driven back before they could fire torpedoes at the
battleship line. This ended the third phase of the
battle.
During this phase of the action it is again a con-
spicuous fact that the British flotillas did not press
home an attack against the German capital ships.
The tactics used by S cheer illustrate clearly the
German offensive-defensive battle plan — a surprise
blow with the battleships and battle cruisers, sup-
plemented by destroyer attack, and followed by a
quick withdrawal executed under cover of a smoke
screen.
This does not mean, however, that Scheer fore-
saw, or sought, the exact situation in which he
found himself just before 7:00 P.M. On the con-
trary, there is evidence that he considered the High
[130]
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
Sea Fleet then in something like a predicament.*
Scheer had good cause to be satisfied with the results
of the fighting up to that point, and it is quite pos-
sible he would not have sought to reengage the
British fleet had it not been for the fact that he was
concerned to keep open his route of retirement
toward Heligoland. For this reason, Scheer's
estimate and consequent decision to return to the
attack are particularly noteworthy.
The German Commander-in-Chief did not wish
to give Admiral Jellicoe the initiative in pressing
the High Sea Fleet to the west by attacks during
twilight, thus perfecting the British encircling
maneuver, getting in position to harass the Ger-
man Fleet with torpedoes during the dark hours
and finally reengaging on terms of Admiral
Jellicoe's choosing the next morning. Admiral
Scheer, therefore, decided on a surprise attack
aimed at the British center with a view to upsetting
the British dispositions and plans to such an extent
as would permit the High Sea Fleet to get clear
and gain by daylight the Horn Reefs Passage
where the advantage of position and initiative would
be on the German side. Fortunately for the High
Sea Fleet, its rehearsed battle maneuver was well
adapted to this purpose.
At first glance, it would appear questionable
tactics deliberately to charge the center of the
"The German Chief of Staff is quoted as saying that if any
admiral had involved himself in such a position in peace time
maneuvers he would never again have obtained a command afloat.
[131]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
British line, thus placing the German Fleet in
the disadvantageous position of being T'd by a
superior force. The advantage of light to the
British was an important consideration. As far
as results in material damage were concerned, the
Germans suffered heavily in this attack and the
British practically not at all. It cannot be denied,
however, that this aggressive maneuver, at least to
a great extent, accomplished its purpose. The
British fleet was pushed to the eastward: Scheer
gained ground toward his base and was able to
reach the shelter of his mine fields off Horn Reefs
by daylight. It would appear that the results
vindicated Scheer's decision. At the same time,
it is to be remembered that this attack was not a
pushed home offensive; it was only a limited of-
fensive with a defensive objective.
Since the situation which developed in the third
phase of the fighting was similar to that of the
second phase in its general aspects, it has followed
that criticisms, resting on the same general grounds,
have been made of the British tactics used in both
these phases. It has been pointed out that, shortly
after seven, as a result of Scheer's turn to the
eastward toward the British, the High Sea Fleet,
was placed under the guns of the Grand Fleet,
and a second opportunity thus presented to destroy
the slower inferior enemy force. Critics have
argued that it was only necessary to follow the lead
of Beatty's battle cruisers, hold firmly to the van,
[132]
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
and develop an encircling maneuver from which
S cheer would have been unable to escape.* To
these critics Admiral Jellicoe has replied:
" (a) The retiring fleet places itself in a position
of advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the
following fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates,
to a large extent, danger of torpedo attack by the
following fleet.
"(&) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet
of drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine
track.
" (c) Smoke screens can be used with effect to in-
terfere with the observation of gun-fire by the fol-
lowing fleet.
"(d) Considerations of moral effect will force
stronger fleets to follow the weaker, and play into
the hands of the enemy."
Here again it can be seen that the controversy
hinges on Admiral Jellicoe's plan of battle. His op-
ponents claim that he should have used aggressive
offensive tactics, while Admiral Jellicoe maintains
that his plan and tactics of a cautious offensive
were correct.
The "turn-away" tactics to avoid torpedoes were
a particular application of this doctrine, just as the
method of deployment was another particular ap-
* These critics attach much importance to Admiral Beatty's signal
— "Urgent. Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We
can then cut off whole of enemy's battle fleet."
[133]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
plication of the same doctrine — the cautious offen-
sive. Admiral Jellicoe's arguments in justification
of his tactics should be fully appreciated. In re-
gard to the "turn-away" tactics to avoid torpedoes
he writes :
"When the first attack by German destroyers
took place and the first of the enemy's flotillas was
seen to be approaching on a bearing 30 degrees
before the beam of the Iron Duke, and had reached
a distance of 9,000 yards or less, the 'counter' of
a turn toward or away was essential. Our own
flotillas had been using every endeavor to get to the
van, but the frequent turns to starboard and the
movement of our battle cruisers across the bows
of the battle fleet had delayed their movement, and
it was evident that neither they nor the light cruis-
ers could prevent the attack from developing.
"The moment of discharge of torpedoes could
not be determined with sufficient accuracy for a
turn towards and therefore the Battle Fleet was
turned away in subdivisions [of 2 ships each],
"It may be asked whether it was necessary to
turn the whole line of battle away for this attack,
or whether the leading squadron could not have
held the original course. Such a movement was
provided for in the Battle Orders, but the de-
stroyers were observed at a range of 9,000 yards
on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the
Iron Duke, the leading ship of the center battle
[134]
THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE
squadron, and therefore the leading Battle Squad-
ron was as open to attack by torpedoes as was the
center or rear squadron; indeed the destroyers were
standing in a direction to attack the van squadron.
The rear of the leading Battle Squadron was also
not at the tune clear of the van of the center
squadron, as the turns that had been made had pre-
vented line ahead being reformed, and the Iron
Duke's division could not turn unless the division
ahead also turned. These facts strengthened the
reasons which led me to make the signal general
to the Battle Fleet.
"The German torpedo attacks at Jutland did
not produce any great effect, and their importance
should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British
Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards,
but it was not this turn which led to the difficulty
of keeping touch with the enemy. That difficulty
was due to the fact that the German Fleet made
a very large turn to the westward under cover of
a smoke screen at the moment of launching the
earliest destroyer attacks."
This contention of Admiral Jellicoe that "the
German torpedo attacks at Jutland did not pro-
duce any great effect, and their importance should
not be exaggerated" should be pondered by students
of tactics. While the torpedo is an important
weapon and, potentially rather than actively, took
a significant part in the battle of Jutland, still the
[135]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
admonition not to exaggerate its importance should
be heeded. The torpedo was not the controlling
factor. The controlling factors were the respective
battle plans. With the German "offensive-de-
fensive" pitted against the British "cautious of-
fensive," it would have taken some stroke of
fortune to bring the forces together in decisive
battle. History has taught — no matter what the
weapons may be, whether sailing ships with smooth
bores or dreadnaughts with high power rifles — a
"cautious offensive" never gives decisive results.
It takes an "aggressive offensive" to gain complete
victory, such as was Nelson's at Trafalgar. Nor
can it be admitted that an "aggressive offensive"
battle plan is impracticable with modern fleets and
modern weapons. Whether an "aggressive offen-
sive" by the British at Jutland would have ended
in victory or defeat is, and must remain, subject
matter for conjecture, but it is certain that one
way or the other a definite decision would have
resulted.
[136]
VII
THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE
(7:40 P.M. to 9:00 P.M., dark)
In the gathering twilight Scheer, avoiding action,
turns from west to southeast and seeks to draw
closer to Horn Reefs. Jellicoe tries to regain touch
on westerly courses -, then turns to the southwest and
finally to south. (Diagram 22.)
Shortly after 7 :30 the German battle cruisers fol-
lowed Scheer's battle fleet in withdrawing to the
west under cover of smoke, and there was another
lull in the fighting. The British battleships were
not again engaged. By 7:33 Jellicoe had turned
to a south by west course. At 7:41 a further
change of 3 points to a southwest course was made.
About this time, Beatty signaled that the enemy
bore northwest by west from the Lion, distant 10
to 11 miles, and that Lion's course was southwest.
Other enemy battleships were observed to the west-
ward of the Iron Duke, and at 8:00 the course of
the fleet was changed by divisions to west to close
them. Enemy destroyers were sighted to star-
board of Jellicoe's line. British light cruisers,
[137]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
while advancing to attack them, were engaged by
enemy battleships. The Calliope fired a torpedo
at the leading battleship, range 6,500 yards, and an
explosion was heard.
Had Jellicoe continued to the west, he would
have regained touch with Scheer or forced him to
move over to the west, but the mist and smoke,
combined with the threat of torpedoes, influenced
him, at 8:21, to turn the Grand Fleet two points
to port for four minutes, then back to west for
5 minutes, and at 8:30 to form column on course
southwest. In like manner as they have con-
demned the deployment of the second phase and
the "turn away" to avoid torpedoes of the third
phase, Admiral Jellicoe's critics have condemned
these tactics as lacking aggressiveness — especially
in view of the silhouette advantage on the British
side. In fact, it would appear that the British
had an excellent opportunity, even at this late
hour, to engage Scheer under favorable conditions
or to force him over to the west far enough to
assure a battle the next morning before he could
reach shelter off Horn Reefs. Whether right or
wrong, it is to be noted that Admiral Jellicoe con-
sistently held to his battle plan of a cautious of-
fensive. (Diagram 23.)
In the meanwhile, Beatty, after being out of
touch since about 7:40, made contact with enemy
battle cruisers at 8:22, holding them under an
[138]
DIAGRAM No. 22
TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE FOURTH PHASE
(7:17 P.M. TO 9:00 P.M.— DARK)
In the gathering twilight Scheer, avoiding action, hauls
around from west to southeast, and seeks to draw closer
to Horn Reefs. Jellicoe tries to regain touch on westerly
courses, then turns to the southwest and finally to south
[139]
THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE
effective fire until 8:28 when they turned away.
Admiral Scheer says of this brief encounter:
". . . The ships, already heavily damaged, were
hit again without being able to return the fire to
any purpose. Nothing could be seen of the enemy
beyond the flash of the guns at each round."
It so happened that the German Squadron of
predreadnaughts in maneuvering to take their
station ahead of Squadron One, crossed between
Hipper and Beatty at just this time and took the
fire of the latter. As they were unable to return
it effectively, they also hauled away to the west.
Beatty, being unsupported, did not follow them.
Up to now, these slower German ships had taken
little part in the action and during the previous
fighting had dropped astern. Jellicoe's surmise
that the enemy fleet had become temporarily di-
vided was correct. The German ships were last
seen by the light cruiser Falmouth at 8:38.
Turning now to the German maneuvers during
this phase, it is seen that Scheer, after withdrawing
to the west, soon changed to southerly courses.
His aim was to prevent an encircling maneuver and
to gain ground toward Horn Reefs so that he could
surely reach there by daylight. Under cover of
a smoke screen to leeward he kept over as far to
the east as Beatty and Jellicoe would permit. At
9:00 P.M., the two fleets were barely out of sight
[141]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
of each other when the dispositions for the night
were made.
Admiral Jellicoe describes the British night dis-
positions as follows:
"At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight,
and the threat of torpedo-boat-destroyer attacks
during the rapidly approaching darkness made
it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for
the night, with a view to its safety from such at-
tacks, while providing for a renewal of action at
daylight. I accordingly maneuvered to remain be-
tween the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas
in a position in which they would afford protection
to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same
time be favorably situated for attacking the enemy's
heavy ships."
Admiral Beatty made the following estimate:
"In view of the gathering darkness and the fact
that our strategical position was such as to make it
appear certain that we should locate the enemy at
daylight under most favorable circumstances, I
did not consider it desirable or proper to close the
enemy battle-fleet during the dark hours."
The British Commander-in- Chief's reasons for
not seeking a night action were : — first, that he did
not wish to subject the battle fleet to night torpedo
[142]
6 Squadron
DIAGRAM No. 23
AT 8:30 P.M. ADMIRAL BEATTY IS AGAIN ENGAGED.
ADMIRAL JELL1COE TURNS TO THE SOUTHWEST
[148]
THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE
attack by the well equipped and efficient enemy
destroyer flotillas; second, that the German Navy
had an advantage in night fighting, as they pos-
sessed a superior searchlight system, supplemented
by the star-shell, a better fire control installation,
more effective explosive shell, and moreover, had
demonstrated an ability to gain an initial advantage
with their guns by greater accuracy and rapidity
of fire; third, that British naval constructors had
been restricted in giving the dreadnaughts beam by
the size of their docks and that in compromising
between long range gun power and armor protec-
tion they had devoted a larger percentage of ton-
nage to the former than had German naval con-
structors, that this had made the British ships more
vulnerable, while the German ships had better
armor protection and watertight sub-divisioning at
a proportionate sacrifice of gun power, and that
while this condition might favor the British in a
long range day action, it worked against them in a
short range night action; and, fourth, that the ele-
ment of chance enters into a night encounter, con-
cerning which Admiral Jellicoe states that there
was present in his mind "the necessity for not leav-
ing anything to chance in a fleet action, because
our fleet was the one and only factor that was vital
to the existence of the Empire, as indeed of the
Allied cause."
The estimate that the strategic position of the
British was such as to make it appear certain that
[145]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
the enemy would be located at daylight under
favorable circumstances, seems to have been made
on an erroneous assumption as to the position of
the High Sea Fleet, although it is not clear why
either force should have been deceived as to the
approximate location of the other. Since Admiral
Jellicoe did not wish to fight a night action nor an
early morning twilight action in the vicinity of
Horn Reefs, the initiative as to whether or not
action would be fought the next day rested with
Admiral Scheer. At 9:00 P.M. this, apparently,
was not appreciated by the British high command.
The German Commander-in-Chief 's estimate and
decisions for the night were:
"It might safely be expected that in the twilight
the enemy would endeavor by attacking with strong
forces, and during the night with destroyers, to
force us over to the west in order to open battle with
us when it was light. He was strong enough to do
it. If we could succeed in warding off the enemy's
encircling movement, and could be the first to reach
Horn Reefs, then the liberty of decision for the
next morning was assured to us. In order to make
this possible all flotillas were ordered to be ready
to attack at night, even though there was a danger
when day broke of their not being able to take part
in the new battle that was expected. The Main
Fleet in close formation was to make for Horn
Reefs by the shortest route, and, defying all enemy
[146]
THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE
attacks, keep on that course. In accordance with
this, preparations for the night were made. In
view of the fact that the leading ships of the Main
Fleet would chiefly have to ward off the attacks of
the enemy, and in order that at daybreak there
should be powerful vessels at the head, Squadron
II [predreadnaughts] was placed in the rear. Out
of consideration for their damaged condition,
Scouting Division I [battle cruisers] was told off
to cover the rear, Division II [light cruisers] to the
vanguard, and the IVth [light cruisers] to cover
the starboard side. The Leaders of the torpedo-
boat forces placed the flotillas in an E.N.E. to
S.S.W. direction,* which was where the enemy
Main Fleet could be expected. A great many of
the boats had fired off all their torpedoes during
the battle. Some were left behind for the protec-
tion of the badly damaged Lutzow [speed reduced
to 15 knots] ; others were retained by the flotilla
leaders in case of emergency.
"At 9:00 P.M. the head of the line stood at
Lat. 56° 37' N., Long. 5° 30' E. At 9:06 the or-
der for the night was 'Course S.S.E. % E., speed
16 knots.' "
Admiral S cheer held rigidly to his plan to reach
the shelter of Horn Reefs by daylight. During the
late afternoon, although it cannot be said that op-
* This probably means in a sector E.N.E. to S.S.W. rather than
in a line.
[147]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
portunity was lacking, the British took no effective
steps to frustrate it. If the British had wished to
assure an action in the open sea the next morning,
and at the same time wished to avoid night fight-
ing, it would have been necessary to push the
German fleet farther to the westward during the
late afternoon. This was not done. Admiral Jel-
licoe did not wish to fight during the night nor in
the Horn Reefs Passage at early daylight. It is
apparent, therefore, that Admiral Scheer, at 9:00
P.M., held the initiative as to whether or not he
would engage the following day.
In this last phase of the day fighting it is re-
corded that the light cruiser Calliope fired one
torpedo. A summary of the torpedo attacks dur-
ing the day action indicates that the destroyer work,
on the whole, was disappointing. In the day action
of the 31 destroyers with Beatty about 12 attacked
at 4 :15 ; four destroyers with Hood attacked shortly
before six ; of the 42 destroyers with Jellicoe none
attacked enemy capital ships during daylight. On
the German side about 11 of the 33 destroyers
with Hipper attacked at 4:15; at 4:49 five more
attacked; at 6:00 some 10 or 12 destroyers attacked
Hood's ships; at 6:35 during the first veering
around and withdrawal of the German line, three
destroyers attacked (it was probably a torpedo
from one of those that hit the Marlborough) ; at
7:15, during the second withdrawal of the German
fleet, 10 to 15 destroyers attacked under cover of
[148]
THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE
gun-fire, fired torpedoes and made a smoke screen;
and these were followed about fifteen minutes later
by a second wave of about 20 destroyers which,
however, were not afforded the cover of gun-fire —
they were engaged and turned back by British
heavy and light forces before they could attack the
battleships. In addition light cruisers and de-
stroyers on both sides did some detached fighting
during which torpedoes were fired.
Making a rough estimate, it is thus seen that
during the day battle, out of about 77 destroyers
on the British side, about 16 to 20 fired torpedoes
at capital ships, while out of about 78 German
destroyers about 35 to 40 fired torpedoes at British
capital ships. Considering the fact that conditions
were favorable for torpedo work, it does not ap-
pear that, on the British side at least, a very effec-
tive use was made of the destroyers as an offensive
weapon. It may be added, as a point to empha-
size, that the German plan for coordinating battle-
ships, cruisers, and destroyers in a daylight action,
as carried out during the third and fourth phases,
presents one of the most important tactical con-
siderations of the battle.
[149]
VIII
THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE
(9:00 P.M., 31 May to 3:00 A.M., 1 June)
During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south
while Svheer steers for Horn Reefs. British Light
Forces are intermittently engaged with the High
Sea Fleet. (Diagram 24.)
AT 9:00 P.M. the British Battle Fleet was dis-
posed in night cruising formation, course south,
speed 17 knots, in four parallel squadron columns,
one mile apart with light cruisers ahead and astern.
From east to west the order of Squadrons was
5th, 1st, 4th, and 2nd. Beatty's battle cruisers
maintained a position about 14 miles on the star-
board hand of the battleships. The flotillas were
spread five miles astern to screen the fleet and also
to be in favorable position to attack the enemy.
(Diagram 25.) A mine layer was sent to lay a
mine field in the Horn Reefs Passage, and during
the night three British submarines were stationed
in that vicinity, 4, 12, and 20 miles, respectively,
west of Vyl lightship.
[150]
. ZKD.I.T.CTUISCT SQUADRON ATTSCTCD SCOUtrf^ OW4. -
It OUBLI N OMAAGtD 6Y GUNFIRE.
MMMVMMk
»Nfc-«OBWCK TORPEDOED. -tl-S»6 IN COUISIOKIWnrWSOl- SSW5TOWHWI WBKMta-
. *TH FLOTILLA 8. reARLES$ TlffCMKTSUtiH
) 2ND. BATTUE SQUADRON.
fORTUNC iARDtNT SUNH.
: 5UNH.lt 00 P.M.
BWTLE SSUAOKOTI 4POMWCRHWWI
•nOENS TJtET L3.
S Kbdieftoid mines in
defined area about IS miles
DIAGRAM No. 24
TRACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DURING THE FIFTH PHASE
(9:00 P.M. MAY 31sT TO 3:00 A. M. JUNE IST)
During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south while
Scheer steers for Horn Reefs. British light forces are
intermittently engaged with the High Sea Fleet
THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE
Scheer's battle squadrons proceeded during the
night in modified inverted order, speed 16 knots;
the Westfcden led Squadron I in the van, then
came Squadron III, then Squadron II (the pre-
dreadnaughts), while the battle cruisers brought
up the rear. The Germans carried out the decision
— "The Main Fleet in close formation was to make
for Horn Reefs by the shortest route, and, defying
all enemy attacks, keep on that course."
Throughout the short summer night of about
five hours the British destroyers and cruisers, which
were gradually drawn to the eastward, maintained
intermittent contact with the enemy battle fleet.
At different times by various destroyers all of the
enemy battle squadrons were sighted before day-
light.
At 10:04 the western destroyers of the llth
Flotilla sighted and attacked enemy cruisers. At
10:20 the 2nd light cruiser squadron engaged
Scout Division IV. The German Frauenlob was
torpedoed and sunk, while the British Southampton
and Dublin suffered from gun-fire. At 11 :00 the
4th Flotilla was engaged and the German S-32
was put out of action by a hit in her boiler com-
partment.
At 11:30 the 4th Flotilla attacked the enemy
cruisers Rostock and Elbing on the port side of
the German Battle Squadron I. In withdrawing
the cruisers passed through the battleship line.
While doing this the Rostock was hit by a torpedo
[153]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
and the Elbing collided with the Posen. Both the
Elbing and Rostock were put out of action and
later blown up. On the British side, in this attack,
the Tipperary was disabled by gun-fire and later
sank; the Sparrowhawk rammed the Broke and the
former was abandoned a few hours later; the Spit-
fire also collided with an enemy cruiser.
At 11 :35 the Birmingham reported enemy battle
cruisers steering south in Lat. 56° 46' N., 5° 46'
E. At 12:00 the 4th Flotilla and Fearless at-
tacked the German 2nd Battle Squadron. The
Fortune and Ardent were sunk by gun-fire. Also,
at midnight the Black Prince suddenly appeared
within 1,500 meters of Squadron I. The Thuringc*
and Ostfriesland switched on searchlights and
opened fire. In a few seconds the Black Prince
was on fire and four minutes later sank with a
terrific explosion.
At 12:15 the German battleship Nassau turned
out of column to evade a torpedo attack and cut
through the British destroyer Turbulent which in-
stantly sank. The Nassau also damaged the de-
stroyer Petard by gun-fire. These destroyers were
of the 13th Flotilla which had become scattered.
The Nassau did not rejoin that night but met the
High Sea Fleet at the Horn Reefs rendezvous next
morning.
The damaged Lutzow, accompanied by destroy-
ers, was falling astern and shortly before 2:00
A.M. she had 7,000 tons of water forward which
[154]
j Cruiser Squadron*
HtH 4th. I2tk 9th. 10th Sth.
_V V V V V V
IzndU.Cruiser
Squadron
jeaicoe
• Wmitea
Znd B4th
1st. I
I r
1 44HU Cruiser
I Squadron.
DIAGRAM No. 25
BRITISH NIGHT CRUISING FORMATION SIGNALLED SHORTLY
AFTER 9:00 P.M. 31 MAY
[155]
THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE
caused her propellers to fan the air. Thereupon
she was abandoned and torpedoed. The crew,
totaling 1,250, including wounded, were taken off
by four destroyers.
At 2:00 the 12th Flotilla, having been drawn
some miles to the northeast, made contact with
the German Battle Squadron II and attacked.
The Pommern was torpedoed and sank with all
hands. The signal reporting the location of the
Squadron was not received by Jellicoe or any ship,
presumably because of the strong interference
caused by the German wireless.*
At 2:30 the MarlborougH reported she could
make only 12 knots. Vice Admiral Sir Cecil
Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge, and the
Marlborough, under escort of Fearless, proceeded
to port. This caused the 6th British battleship
Division to stray, and it was not until the next
evening that this Division with the Vice Admiral
rejoined the fleet.
At 2 :35 the destroyer Moresby sighted four Ger-
man battleships of the Deutschland class and fired
one torpedo. This was the last shot in the night
fighting. At 2:40 dawn was breaking.
Although the British destroyers which made
* The loss of this message sent by the destroyer Fcmlknor has been
featured in the press as a stroke of good fortune for the Germans
which presented the British Fleet from intercepting the High Sea
Fleet at daylight. This is misleading. As Admiral Jellicoe did not
wish to risk either a night action, or an early morning action in the
vicinity of the mine fields off Horn Reefs, it is evident that the
battle would not have been renewed at daylight even if the Faulk-
nor't message had been received by the British Commander-in-Chief.
[157]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
contact with the enemy pushed home spirited at-
tacks, it would appear that the general purpose of
the night British dispositions was to use the de-
stroyers for defense rather than offense. The
British destroyers were assigned to take station five
miles astern of the battle fleet as a defensive screen.
There might have been no attacks had not the
course of the German High Sea Fleet cut through
the screen. This caused the night fighting which
has been recounted. It was generally of a hap-
hazard nature and did no damage to enemy capital
ships with the exception of the attack of the 12th
Flotilla on the 2nd Battle Squadron just before
dawn. This latter attack was well planned and
efficiently executed. It resulted in the destruction
of the predreadnaught Pommern.
Admiral Scheer states that destroyers of five
flotillas proceeded to the attack during the night,
that they had various nocturnal fights with enemy
light forces, but that they did not sight the British
Main Fleet. He also states that a great many of
the destroyers had expended their torpedoes dur-
ing the day action. The cover of night presents
opportunity for destroyer attack, and the night
immediately following a day action is generally
regarded as a favorable time to launch an effective
destroyer offensive. It would appear, however,
that the German destroyers did not search out the
British Fleet, but kept comparatively close to their
own ships. All the attacking flotillas except one
[158]
fv '"••••• • • • -
DIAGRAM No. 26
MANEUVERS ON JUNE 1ST AFTER THE BATTLE
[159]
THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE
joined the Main Fleet at daybreak. The missing
flotilla had been pressed by the British light forces
to the north and made its escape the next day via
Skagen.
At dawn Jellicoe was far to the southwest of
the Horn Reefs course. Instead of closing the
Horn Reefs as had been his intention the night
before, he decided to sweep to the north and
gather together his scattered forces. In order to
be ready for battle should the German Fleet attack,
at 2 :47 the Battle Fleet formed single line on course
north. Visibility was now a little over 3 miles,
weather fine, wind of force 3 from S.S.W., sea
smooth. At 2 :52 Jellicoe had 20 battleships in line
accompanied by one destroyer and three cruisers.
Admiral Jellicoe has explained his early morn-
ing estimate and decision:
". . . Partly on account; of the low visibility,
and partly because of the inevitable difference in
dead reckoning between ships, due to their many
movements in course of the action and in the night,
considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting
the Fleet. This applied particularly to the de-
stroyer flotillas, as they had been heavily engaged,
and their facilities for computing their positions
under these conditions were only slight; but the
same difficulty was experienced with all classes of
ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause
me any surprise.
[161]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
"The difficulties experienced in collecting the
Fleet (particularly the destroyers), due to the
above causes, rendered it undesirable for the Battle
Fleet to close the Horn Reefs at daylight, as had
been my intention when deciding to steer to the
southward during the night. It was obviously nec-
essary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the de-
stroyers before renewing action. By the time this
concentration was effected it had become apparent
that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn
Reefs, had passed behind the shelter of the German
mine fields in the early morning on the way to
their ports. The information obtained from our
wireless directional stations during the early morn-
ing showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet must
have passed the Horn Reefs on a southerly course
shortly after daylight."
During the night five German airships were sent
out to make an early reconnaissance. At 3:10
twelve battleships were reported to the westward
of Horn Reefs on a north course, and a little later
more battleships and battle cruisers to the north
of those first reported. Also numerous light forces
were reported. At 3:00 A.M. another airship re-
ported a unit of 12 ships in Jammers Bay steam-
ing rapidly to the south.
Soon after daylight Admiral Scheer had with
him: sixteen dreadnaught battleships — the Koewg
division of the four newest dreadnaughts had ex-
[162]
THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE
pended most of their ammunition and three of them
had sustained damage. The other twelve ships
were practically undamaged; five predreadnaught
battleships, practically undamaged; three light
cruisers, slightly damaged; sixty destroyers (ap-
proximate), many with all torpedoes expended.
On arriving at Horn Reefs at about 3 :00 A.M.,
Admiral Scheer decided to wait for the Liitzow,
but a little later, having been informed of her fate,
he made the following estimate and decision:
"In our opinion the ships in a southwesterly
direction as reported by L-ll could only just
have come from the Channel to try, on hearing the
news of the battle, to join up with their Main Fleet
and advance against us.* There was no occa-
sion for us to shun an encounter with this group,
but owing to the slight chance of meeting on ac-
count of visibility conditions, it would have been
a mistake to have followed them. Added to this
the reports received from the battle cruisers showed
that Scouting Division I would not be capable of
sustaining a serious fight, besides which the leading
ships of Squadron III could not have fought for
*It does not appear that the British force of 8 predreadnaughts
and four cruisers in the Humber, put to sea at all. The Harwich
force of light cruisers and destroyers (about 30) were held in port
by Admiralty orders until the morning of June 1st. They were then
sent to reenforce JeUicoe but were too late to be a factor and were
turned back before joining. Four of these destroyers were used to
escort the injured Maryborough to port. Admiral Jellicoe has stated
that this Harwich force would have been a welcome reenforcement
during the night and at dawn.
[163]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
any length of time, owing to the reduction in their
supply of munitions by the long spell of firing.
The Frankfurt, Pillau and Regensburg were the
only fast light cruisers now available and in such
misty weather there was no depending on aerial
reconnaissance. There was, therefore, no certain
prospect of defeating the enemy reported in the
south. An encounter and the consequences thereof
had to be left to chance. I therefore abandoned
the idea of further operations and ordered the
return to port."
As has been said, the arrival of the High Sea
Fleet off Horn Reefs gave Scheer the initiative in
regard to the renewal of the battle. His decision
to return to port may be considered the final act
of the engagement.
En route to the German bases the Ostfriesland
hit a mine but suffered no great damage. A Ger-
man destroyer also hit a mine and sank with all
hands. Admiral Scheer reported that submarines
were encountered, and their attacks frustrated.
(Diagram 26.)
Considerable difficulty was experienced in re-
assembling the British Grand Fleet. At 3:33 the
5th Battle Squadron rejoined, but the 6th Divi-
sion of three battleships did not join up until eve-
ning. The cruisers were not sighted until 6:00
A.M., and the destroyers did not join up until
9 :00 A.M. The Grand Fleet, after sweeping the
battlefield, proceeded to its bases.
[164]
IX
CONCLUSION
SUCH, in brief, were the tactics of the Battle of
Jutland. The action was indecisive. Therefore,
it had no decisive influence upon the naval situa-
tion or the general course of the war. The battle
is unique in that it was the only major fleet en-
gagement in the World War, and, considering the
size, power, and scientific development of the ships
and weapons used, together with the magnitude of
the issue which hung in the balance, ranks with the
greatest battles in history. This truth is not gen-
erally appreciated because the battle was not
fought to the decisive conclusion which would have
clearly demonstrated it.
Before attempting a judgment of the tactical
plans and doctrines used respectively by the Brit-
ish and Germans at Jutland it would be necessary
to take into consideration the larger questions of
policy governing the conduct of the war. The
ramifications of policy and strategy which may or
may not have justified Admiral Jellicoe's plan and
doctrine of a "cautious offensive," and Admiral
Scheer's plan and doctrine of an "offensive-de-
[165]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
fensive," are not within, the scope of this discussion.
It is enough for the present to point out these
respective plans and doctrines with their conse-
quences— in short, to explain what happened at
Jutland. The importance to the United States of
reading aright the lessons of this engagement is
obvious.
From the German viewpoint the battle was a
success, and it cannot be denied that the official
announcement of a German victory in a great fleet
action had an important moral effect. The British
Admiralty announcement of heavy losses was ac-
cepted as confirmation of the German claim to
victory. The popular demand for greater fleet
activity had received a satisfactory answer, and the
people of Germany were filled with pride for their
Navy. This strengthened the hands of the Govern-
ment at a critical period in the war.
As a matter of fact, as has been said, the battle
was indecisive and had no marked effect on the
naval and military situation. The British Navy
still controlled the High Seas, while the German
Navy continued its dominance of the Baltic and
home coastal waters. Great Britain still enjoyed
the benefits of open sea communications leading to
all parts of the world, while German sea com-
munications were confined to a restricted area em-
bracing only the North European neutrals.
On the other hand, the contention made after
the battle by Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the
[166] '
CONCLUSION
British Admiralty, a contention maintained by high
British authority to this day, that England already
enjoyed all the benefits which could have been de-
rived from a Jutland victory, is misleading. On
the contrary it would appear that the destruction
of the High Sea Fleet at Jutland would have pro-
duced a change of far-reaching significance in the
war situation. Mine fields not protected by guns
may be swept up. With the German battle fleet
eliminated the German mine fields out of range
of guns ashore could have been swept up, while
British mine fields could have been maintained
comparatively close up to the German harbors.
Submarines would have continued to give trouble,
but the removal of their mobile heavy gun support
would have greatly reduced their effectiveness.
For the most part they would have been kept busy
guarding the German coast line. It is also to be
remembered that as the war advanced anti-subma-
rine measures attained greater efficiency. Another
consequence of a decisive British victory at Jutland
would have been to open Allied sea communications
to Russia's Baltic ports. With Russia thus saved
to the Allied cause and the German Baltic coast
threatened with invasion, Germany would have
been subjected to severe additional pressure.
Moreover, the removal of the menacing German
* 'fleet in being" would have released great numbers
of workers engaged in English naval industries
and permitted the transfer of considerable energy
[167]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
to army activities. And finally the unrestricted
German submarine campaign against commerce
would have been greatly hampered if not completely
frustrated had the British fleet destroyed the Ger-
man fleet at Jutland. It was the High Sea Battle
Fleet that not only held the gates for the U-boats,
but also, to a large extent, supplied the skilled
personnel to man them. On the whole, it would
not appear an exaggeration to say that a second
Trafalgar on the day of Jutland would have
crushed Germany's hope and brought Allied vic-
tory into view.
The tactics of two fleets in battle may be com-
pared to the tactics employed by two chess players
in moving their pieces on the game board. The
ships have various values and abilities just as the
chessmen have various values and abilities. But
the tactics of maneuvering ships in battle pre-
sent much more complex and baffling problems
than the tactics of the chess game. In the latter
the relative value of the pieces are invariable and
the rules for moving are fixed; skill can be devel-
oped by long years of practice under conditions
which never change. On the other hand, in naval
tactics, numerous variables enter and interact on
each other to produce a multiplicity and complicity
of combinations. On the day of battle, as at Jut-
land, the two commanders may face each other
without previous experience in actual war. Under
such circumstances it would indeed be astonishing
[168]
CONCLUSION
if tactical mistakes were not made. Skill, how-
ever, is relative, and the high command better
equipped by study, peace time maneuvers, war col-
lege training, and experience afloat, possesses an
advantage, which, if the forces are otherwise near
a parity, will inevitably decide the victory.
To naval administrators and professional men,
the Jutland battle presents a study of absorbing
interest. For the first and only time, modern types
of ships and weapons were placed on trial. As a
result, it cannot be said that there were very start-
ling surprises. The heavy gunned line of battle-
ships with their ability to give and receive the
hardest blows again demonstrated their supreme
function in the struggle for control of the Seas.
The battle cruisers showed their value as scouts
and also their limitations — as now developed — when
called upon to take station in the line of battle. The
need for light cruisers in a balanced fleet was em-
phasized. The varied usefulness of destroyers both
for offense and defense was clearly shown at Jut-
land and has assured this type the recognition it
deserves. Although aircraft and submarines took
part in the operations they had no influence in the
actual fighting of the battle. That this will not
be a condition in future naval battles is a question
hardly open to argument. Aircraft and submarines
will undoubtedly come into their own and take their
proper place as important tactical factors. But it
remains a fact that they were practically negligible
[169]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
at Jutland. This consideration provides a valuable
check to extravagant claims made for these com-
paratively new elements in naval warfare.
Reviewing the tactical features of the action, it
is seen that, both by commission and omission, the
principles taught by the experiences of history
are strikingly portrayed under the new light af-
forded by the use of modern ships and modern
weapons. In the course of the analysis of the
action it has been attempted to point by illustra-
tion these principles of offense and defense, con-
centration, coordination, information, surprise,
initiative, plan, indoctrination, and cooperative
skill. The conclusion is clear enough, that no
matter how great the preponderance of material
power, the navy that neglects these principles will
be found wanting when tried by the test of battle.
[170]
APPENDIX
LOSSES AND DAMAGE
THE losses are summarized in the following table :*
British
THEEE BATTLE CEUISEES
Tonnage
Queen Mary ,. 26,350
Indefatigable 18,800
Invincible 17,250
THEEE AEMOEED CEUISEES
Defense 14,600
Warrior 13,550
Black Prince 13,350
EIGHT DESTEOYEES
Tipperary 1,430
Nestor 890
Nomad 890
Turbulent 1,100
Fortune *, ..... 965
A relent ,...,. 935
Shark 935
Sparrowhawk . . 935
Total 111,980
* The High Sea Fleet at Jutland, by Lieutenant Commander H. H.
Frost, U. S. N., Naval Institute Proceeding*.
[171]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
Germans
ONE BATTLE CRUISER
Tonnage
Liitzow 26,180
ONE PRE-DREADNAUGHT
Pomrnem 13,200
FOUR LIGHT CETTISERS
Wiesbaden 5,400
Elbmg 4,500
Rostock 4,900
Frauenlob 2,700
FIVE DESTROYERS
V-4 570
V-48 750
V-27 640
V-29 640
S-35 700
Total 60,180
PERSONNEL KILLED AND WOUNDED
British: Killed or missing 6,447
Wounded , 564
Total 7,011
German : Killed or missing 2,400
Wounded . 400
Total 2,800
(British figures quoted from Commander Bellairs ; Ger-
man figures from Admiral Scheer.)
[172]
APPENDIX
The ship damage is indicated in the following
table:
BRITISH SHIPS DAMAGED AND PUT OUT OF ACTION
Dreadnaught Battleships
War spite Hit by major caliber shells be-
tween 20 and 25 times. Re-
joined fleet during July.
Maryborough Torpedoed. Continued in day
action but was forced to fall
out during night.
BRITISH SHIPS DAMAGED BUT NOT PUT OUT OF ACTION
Battle Cruisers
Lion Hit many times. One turret
put out of action.
Tiger Hit a considerable number of
times.
Princes* Royal . . . . . Hit a considerable number of
times. One turret put out of
action.
New Zealand Hit several times.
Dreadnaught Battleships
Barham Hit by about five heavy shells.
Malaya Hit by about eight heavy shells.
Colossus Hit by one heavy shell.
Light Cruisers
Calliope Hit by one heavy shell and by
several lighter shells.
Dublin Hit many times by small caliber
shells.
Southampton Hit many times by small caliber
shells (89 casualties).
Chester .......... ...Hit many times and severely
damaged (81 casualties).
Rejoined fleet on July 29.
[173]
GERMAN VESSELS CONSIDERABLY DAMAGED
(NUMBER OF HITS APPROXIMATE ONLY)
Battle Cruisers (4)
Derfflmger 25 hits
SeycClitz 25 hits ; 1 torpedo hit
MoltJce • . „ . * i * . 5 hits
Von der Town. ., 4 hits
Battleships (4)
Koenig <* .... ., 7 hits
Grosser Kurfurst .... 7 hits
Markgraf ............ 13 hits
Ostfrieslamd -. 1 mine
Destroyers (2)
G-40 Engines damaged
6-32 Boilers damaged
GERMAN VESSELS MODERATELY DAMAGED
Dreadnaught Battleships (2)
Heligoland 1 hit
Kaiser 1 hit
Predreadnaught Battleship (1)
Holstem 1 hit
Light Cruisers (5)
Frankfurt » 4 small caliber hits
Pttlau , f ,,........,.. 1 large caliber hit
Stettin >,_...,..... , ., 2 small caliber hits
Mwnchen ............. 6 small caliber hits
Hamburg *.,..,*..... 4 small caliber hits
In addition several ships were hit by small caliber shells
fired by British destroyers during the night action and a
few destroyers were hit and slightly damaged.
[174.]
APPENDIX
DESIGN OF WAR SHIPS AS AFFECTED BY
JUTLAND
The following excerpts are taken from a paper by Rear
Admiral D. W. Taylor, Chief Constructor, U. S. Navy
(The Franklin Institute) :
The losses and heavy damages sustained by the vessels
of battle cruiser type bear out to some extent the pre-war
contentions of those who maintained that it was not fit to
take its place in the line of battle. On the other hand,
excepting their greater vulnerability, it cannot be denied
that they acquitted themselves with credit even when pitted
against the more heavily armed and armored battleship.
Another result from this action of general influence on
type is found in connection with the use of older battle-
ships, generally referred to as of the "predreadnaught"
era. The German Fleet included one squadron of vessels
of this type, and this squadron not only failed to be of any
essential assistance to them but proved actually to be a
handicap on their freedom of maneuver. The force of this
lesson was shown by the fact that subsequent to the battle
most of the German battleships of this type were retired
from active commission. The material weakness of this
type of older ships, when opposed to the most modern
weapons, was shown in the case of the Pommern, which
blew up and sank immediately as a result of a single
torpedo, During the war there were sunk by hostile ac-
tion 21 predreadnaught battleships and 27 armored
cruisers ; of this total of 48, 11 were sunk by gun-fire and
37 by mine or torpedo, only a single explosion in nearly
every case being necessary to inflict the fatal damage.
The ability of the large, modern, heavily-armored ships
not only to survive, but to continue in action after the
most severe punishment, was perhaps best shown by the
British battleship Warspite, which, due to an unfortunate
[ITS]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
accident to the steering gear, sheered out of the battle
line and made two complete circles within short range of
the German Fleet. This vessel was hit by major caliber
shell between 20 and 25 times. The net result of this tre-
mendous hammering was that one out of eight 15-inch
guns was put out of action; there was no damage of any
kind to her main machinery plant ; the upper works and
unprotected portions of the ship were riddled ; communica-
tions were interrupted to a considerable extent ; and some
compartments at and below the waterline were flooded
by water which came in from above, but none of the main
compartments were affected to such an extent that the
entering water could not be handled by the pumping ar-
rangements provided. In short, although the ship had lost
a certain amount of her margin of safety, due to decreased
buoyancy and stability, and her speed had suffered on ac-
count of increased resistance due to her greater draft, she
was entirely capable of resuming action after adjustments
to her steering gear.
The Marlborough was another example of a battleship
continuing in action after receiving what we were inclined
formerly to consider would be a disabling attack. This
vessel, although of the "dreadnaught" era, has not what
is now considered a highly efficient form of protection
against torpedo attack, yet, after being struck by a tor-
pedo, resulting in the flooding of a number of compart-
ments, which produced a list of about 7 degrees, the vessel
continued in action at a speed of 17 knots.
Similarly, the German battleship Ostfriesland (of the
"dreadnaught" era) was struck by a torpedo which pro-
duced some flooding, but the vessel was otherwise unaf-
fected and continued on with the German Fleet.
No other British battleships received any considerable
amount of punishment, but three of the modern German
ships of this class received, respectively, 7, 7 and 13 hits
[176]
APPENDIX
from major caliber guns, but none of them were disabled
or even damaged to an extent sufficient to prevent their
continuing in action. The Markgraf, which was struck 13
times, is a particularly illuminating example of the amount
of punishment which a modern heavily armored ship can
stand. The only damage affecting the efficiency of the
ship was the cutting of the communications from the
masthead fire control positions, and this only resulted in
shifting the control to the lower armored station pro-
vided for this purpose. The casualties on this ship were
likewise remarkably low, as there were only 8 dead and 9
wounded, or only a little more than one casualty for
each major caliber hit.
One particular class of hit of special interest to Ameri-
can designers is that in which turrets or their barbettes
have been hit. Taking the case of four British and four
German vessels which suffered heavy damage, it is found
that out of a total of about 116 hits, 19, or 16.5 per cent,
were on turrets or barbettes, of which 16 were struck.
Of this number, four were completely put out of action
and one gun in each of four others was disabled, while the
remaining eight escaped without serious damage. In other
words, out of 66 big guns carried by these ships, the em-
placements of 32 were struck, but only 12 were sufficiently
damaged to prevent their further use. This comparatively
low proportion of casualty in the major offensive arma-
ment, together with the demonstration of the ability of
the mechanism of a turret to continue to function even
after the turret has had a direct hit, appears to dispose
of the argument of "too many eggs in one basket" so fre-
quently advanced against the American three-gun turret.
Turning to the damage sustained by the battle cruisers,
one's attention is naturally taken first by the tragic loss
of the three great British vessels of this type. Although
in one case the Germans claimed a torpedo hit on one of
[177]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
them, it is generally accepted that the loss of all three was
directly attributable to gun-fire, but the immediate cause
of the loss in each case is still, and always will be, shrouded
in mystery. It is, of course, known that each one sank in
an appallingly short interval of time and that in each case
at least a portion of the magazines blew up. The mystery
lies in the immediate cause of the magazine explosion.
Many different explanations have been advanced, but all
of these affect details rather than the general character-
istics of type. There seems little doubt that one of two
things happened : German shell either entered the magazine
through penetration of the protective deck, or, having
pierced turret or barbette and exploded, flame was com-
municated to the magazine along the path followed by the
ammunition from magazine to gun. From the fact that in
the case of British ships that survived, there was only one
case of penetration below the protective deck at any part
(no harm resulted from this), it would seem to be highly
improbable that the three battle cruisers were all sunk by
protective deck penetrations directly over the magazines,
and not very probable that any one of them was so sunk.
We must not permit our judgment to be swayed too
largely by this particularly spectacular phase of the
battle. Just as in the case of the battleships previously
referred to, the remaining battle cruisers on both sides
demonstrated ability of modern ships of large size to with-
stand heavy punishment without losing their fighting effi-
ciency. The battle cruiser type is essentially and unavoid-
ably less thoroughly protected than the battleship type.
This greater vulnerability must result in greater loss of
the battle cruiser type, other things being equal; but in
the Jutland fight the battle cruisers were engaged much
longer and much more severely than the battleships, so
that a greater percentage of loss of this type should have
[178]
APPENDIX
resulted even had their protection been equal to that of
the battleships.
A notable fact in regard to the modern ships, both bat-
tleships and battle cruisers, on both sides, is that not a
single one experienced a disabling casualty to its machin-
ery, either as a result of damage from enemy fire or as a
result of engineering breakdown. In the case of one Brit-
ish ship and one German ship, fires were drawn from under
the boilers in one fireroom, due in each case to leakage
from adjacent compartments, but in each case this leakage
was controlled by the pumping plant provided for the
purpose. Leaving out the three lost battle cruisers, for
which no data are available, the dozen large ships in the
two fleets which bore the brunt of the punishment were hit
a total of about 150 times by large caliber shell, or an av-
erage of more than 12 times each. Only one of these dozen
ships, namely, the German battle cruiser Liitzow, sank
as the result of the damage received. Even this vessel
sank only after six hours. She had received 17 large
caliber hits and one torpedo. She continued to try to
make the best of her way to port, but the struggle was
given up about one o'clock in the morning; her crew was
taken off by destroyers and she was finally sunk by a
friendly torpedo.
The results of the battle, as a test of the defensive
qualities of capital ships, show that in the entire action
only four modern armored ships, all of them of the battle
cruiser type, were lost as a result of the action. This was
out of a total of 14 engaged and at least seven out of the
remaining 10 survived heavier punishment than most de-
signers in pre-war days would have considered possible.
Before the war there were two distinct schools of naval
thought in regard to the main armament for the largest
fighting ships. This difference of opinion existed inter-
nally in probably every navy, but internationally the
[179]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
American and British navies represented the "Big Gun"
advocates, as is shown by the fact that in the former we
find successive increases from 12-inch to 14-inch to
16-inch, and in the latter from 12-inch to IS^-inch to
15-inch. On the other hand, the Germans adhered for a
number of years to the 11-inch gun and increased their
caliber to 12-inch with apparent reluctance, and a larger
caliber did not appear until close to the end of the war.
There were undoubtedly excellent theoretical arguments
on both sides of this contention. Even now the argument'
cannot be definitely settled in terms of absolute material
results, for too many other factors, which cannot be elim-
inated, enter into the problem. A convincing answer, how-
ever, appears to be provided in the very decided trend of
German naval opinion since the Battle of Jutland. Prac-
tically every report from German sources and every Ger-
man publication bearing on the Battle of Jutland lays
stress on the superiority in range and accuracy of the
British 15-inch guns. Even if no definite material advan-
tage for the larger caliber gun could be established, there
appears to remain a marked moral superiority on the side
possessing the biggest guns. This, of course, only con-
firms the previous views and policies followed in our
service.
Summing up, therefore, we find that four outstanding
facts of interest to the designer appear to emerge from
the smoke and flames of the battle :
First. The value of armor protection.
Second. As a corollary to this, the necessity for the
maximum number of major caliber guns ; for, if the mod-
ern ship can withstand great punishment, we must, for
purposes of offense, provide a sufficient number of guns
to inflict a degree of punishment which will be fatal.
Third. The tactical value of speed.
[180]
APPENDIX
Fourth. The futility of subjecting older ships to the
attack of modern weapons.
In other words, the value of each one of the three major
elements entering into capital ship design was demon-
strated and it cannot be said that any single one has
emerged with an importance transcending that of the
others. If, however, one must choose among them, the
consensus of opinion will probably attach more impor-
tance to protection than before the battle. This arises
largely from two causes :
1st. The deep impression on the human mind by such
an outstanding tragedy as the almost instantaneous loss
of the three great British battle cruisers.
2d. The impression that German ships, generally
speaking, stood punishment better than the English. Ad-
miral von Tirpitz has been reported to have laid down as
the fundamental principle of German design: That ves-
sels before everything else must float ; that they must not
sink, and if possible, not even list, and that all else is of
secondary importance.
This emphasis on the feature of protection is shown
already by the intensified and successful efforts of both
the British and the American navies to perfect an efficient
form of torpedo protection. In this connection, I think I
can safely say that both services have solved this problem
so far as the torpedo has been developed to date. It is
also interesting to know that during the war the two
services frankly and fully compared their solutions of this
problem, and that although the solutions differ radically
in details, they do not differ much in underlying ideas and
both are believed to be successful in result. This emphasis
of the protective feature is further shown by the fact that
our battle cruisers, whose construction was delayed, due
to the necessity for our concentrating on the construction
of torpedo craft and merchant vessels during the war,
[181]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
have been re-designed and given much heavier and more
complete protection than was originally contemplated, ac-
cepting at the same time the slight decrease in speed neces-
sitated thereby. We find precisely the same influence in
the case of the latest British battle cruiser, the Hood,
which was laid down shortly after the battle of Jutland
and in which we find more than a 50 per cent increase in
size as compared to the Renown, which I have previously
referred to, an increase of protection almost to a battle-
ship standard and a decrease in speed.
Passing to the general phases of the war, we come at
once to the outstanding feature of the war at sea, the
submarine campaign and the methods adopted to combat
it. Now that the veil of secrecy has been lifted, we all
know how close the German submarine campaign came to
being an outstanding factor in the final result. Without
entering into the legality and ethics of the German use
of the submarine against merchant shipping, which all
thoughtful and enlightened men join in condemning, we
cannot escape the fact ^hat we must in the future be pre-
pared to find the submarine playing an important part
in attacking and throttling enemy commerce, even on
their own coasts. The use of submarines during the war
has led to placing very great emphasis on the value of
radius of action of these vessels, and with radius of action
there must go hand in hand improvements in the living
conditions on board, so that the physical endurance of
the personnel may be sufficiently conserved to permit it
to make full use of the material capabilities of the vessel.
Both of these elements, even without the usual and con-
current demands, for higher speed and greater offensive
power, inevitably lead to increased size, except for a
limited class of small boats, which, due to a particular
strategic situation, such as that occupied by the Germans
on the Belgian Coast, makes it possible to use with good
[182]
results a large number of submarines of small size and
limited speed and cruising radius. The technic of mine-
laying has, during the war, so kept pace with the
strategical and tactical demands for the use of this
weapon, that the demonstrated practicability of laying
them on the enemy's coast by means of submarines must
in the future be taken into account, but this does not
affect the general characteristics of the type, as the mine-
laying feature can easily be substituted in whole or in
part for the torpedo armament. Although the submarine
was throughout the war something of a disappointment
in the actual results which it obtained in inflicting loss
or damage on the fighting ships of the enemy, its indirect
effect on the freedom of the action of the main fighting
fleets was so considerable that the problem of the develop-
ment of the so-called fleet submarine is still with us and
must be solved largely from theoretical and engineering
considerations, rather than from direct experience in ac-
tion. Another use of the submarine, not largely foreseen,
which developed considerable importance during the war,
is that of scouting. It has been conclusively demon-
strated that these underwater craft form one of the most
valuable assets to a navy in obtaining and transmitting
information in regard to the movements of the enemy's
forces.
War experience developed and emphasized certain facts
regarding submarines as a type which are very important
from the point of view of a designer, and even more im-
portant from the point of view of those who have to de-
termine the constitution of a navy. The submarine is
essentially an instrument of stealth. Once detected, it
must take refuge in the depths where, for any design as
yet known, its offensive powers become nil, and to the
depth charge or explosive bomb developed during the war
it is exceedingly vulnerable. In other words, once de-
[183]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
tected and accurately located, a submarine is at the mercy
of a surface vessel. While detection devices, in spite of
the enormous effort expended upon them during the war,
did not reach perfection, they made much progress and
will undoubtedly be steadily improved as time goes on.
If we had to-day an accurate device which would locate
a submerged submarine with reasonable approximation
several miles off, and with accuracy when one or two
hundred feet directly under the surface vessel, the sub-
marine would be already obsolete as a weapon of war*
While we may never reach this ideal, and while the sub-
marine may be given offensive features to enable it to
deal in some fashion with the surface vessel from beneath
the surface, the submarine is essentially a vulnerable, and,
if I may so express it, a precarious type ; is necessary to-
day and probably will be for many years to come, but
could not be relied upon as the main feature of a navy.
We read at times of proposed submersible battleships and
other such imaginations, but the experience of the war
does not seem to indicate this as a probable future de-
velopment even if mechanically possible.
On this same subject Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt, the Di-
rector of Naval Construction for the British Admiralty,
very recently stated his views in the course of a paper
presented before the British Institution of Naval Archi-
tects. He said:
"A good deal has been written and talked of lately
about the surface capital ship being dead and the neces-
sity for submersibles. But with our present knowledge it
would be quite impossible to design a submersible ship
which on the same displacement and cost had anything
like the fighting qualities on the surface, which are pos-
sessed by the Hood (the latest British battle cruiser).
Every ship is a compromise, and if in addition to the
ordinary qualities of a battleship, she is required to sub-
[184]
APPENDIX
merge, or even partially submerge, a very considerable
percentage of weight has to be added to give her this ad-
ditional capability of submergence. She becomes still
more of a compromise, and the added weight must detract
from the fighting qualities of the ship when on the sur-
face, so that whatever is done, other things being equal,
the submersible ship must be inferior to a surface ship
in an ordinary action. There are many difficulties of
details in the design of a submersible battleship which
would take too long to go into fully now, and although
there is no doubt that submarines are capable of great
development, a little thought will make it clear to any-
body that if naval warfare is to continue, the surface
ship of the line must still hold the field as the principal
fighting unit of any great navy."
The actual offensive use of aircraft against naval ves-
sels was little developed during the war. Perhaps the
most prominent case was that of the Goeben, which was
ashore near the Dardanelles, and for six days exposed
to aircraft attack, it being stated that some 217 bombs
were dropped against her. There is no doubt that there
will be a great development of aircraft for naval use as
a result of the war experience, and some enthusiasts have
visions of navies of the air rendering obsolete the navies
of the ocean.
The United States Navy, which has in its own hands
the development and control of its aircraft for use over
the water, should take lead in any air naval development ;
but there is no doubt that, step by step with the air of-
fensive, there will be developed a defensive. The defensive,
moreover, will not be passive. We have seen in the late
war how the light craft, destroyers, etc., on one side met
and countered the attacks of similar craft on the other
side. Had either side been deprived of its light craft, it
would have been at most serious disadvantage. Similarly,
[185]
WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND
developments in the air will undoubtedly be along the
line of defending the capital ship by auxiliary and of-
fensive aircraft. The big ship which must be protected
from projectiles of a ton weight falling at angles of 30
degrees, fired from ships almost out of sight below the
horizon, is not yet in serious danger from bombs carried
by present-day aircraft, with chances of hitting small
indeed.
At the moment it appears that the torpedo plane is the
most promising development ; its weapon of attack is the
torpedo which the capital ship must already be prepared
to defend itself from, whether fired by a surface vessel or
a submarine. A torpedo from a ship in the air is no more
deadly than from a submarine under the surface. It
seems probable that aircraft will sooner become danger-
ous to destroyers and light vessels generally than to the
large ships of the line. The former are more vulnerable
and will be less able to protect themselves.
Even these early developments of naval uses for air-
craft made it evident that they could not efficiently per-
form such functions with the fleet unless they could be
carried with the fleet, not only on long cruises but actu-
ally in battle, with the result that special types of ships
have appeared to fill this requirement. The first essential
of this type is that it should be capable not only of
launching aeroplanes but also of receiving them back
after the accomplishment of their mission. With the
present development of aeroplanes and seaplanes, the only
practicable method of providing the latter requirement
is the provision of an enormously large and absolutely
clear deck upon which the planes can light and be brought
to rest. The next requirement is that such a vessel shall
have a speed sufficient to permit it to keep up with the
main battle fleet when it is going into action. This means
a speed of 20 to 25 knots. These qualities, together with
[186]
APPENDIX
the need for sufficient space to house and care for a con-
siderable number of planes, together with their personnel,
have resulted in vessels of 10,000 to 25,000 tons displace-
ment. To obtain a clear upper deck requires special ar-
rangements for funnels, navigating bridges, etc., which
has resulted in the only absolutely new type of naval
vessels of large size and cost which has appeared as *
result of the war experience*
THE END
[W]
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582 What happened at Jutland
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