Why War Came In Korea

BOOKS BY ROBERT T. OLIVER

KOREA: FORGOTTEN NATION

FOUR WHO SPOKE OUT: BURKE, Fox, SHERIDAN,
AND PITT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS
(WITH H. W. ROBBINS)

TRAINING FOR EFFECTIVE SPEECH

(REVISED WITH C. F. HAGER AND R. L. CORTRIGHT)

PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASIVE SPEECH
PERSUASIVE SPEECH: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS

ESSENTIALS OF COMMUNICATIVE SPEECH
(WITH D. C. DICKEY AND H. P. ZELKO)

PAMPHLETS
THE CASE FOR KOREA

DIVIDED KOREA: ITS ECONOMIC RESOURCES,
POTENTIALS AND NEEDS

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA LOOKS AHEAD

WHY WAR CAME
IN KOREA

ROBERT T. OLIVER

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Declan X. McMullen Company, Inc.

Distributors
New York 1950

CONTENTS

Foreword ix

1. The Communist Empire Strikes 1

2. Ferment in Asia 23

3. Patterns of "Colonialism" 38

4. Our Ailing Diplomacy 58

5. Land of the Morning Calm 78

6. History of a "Problem" 91

7. Plea for Recognition 107

8. Divided and Occupied 132

9. The United Nations Approve 161

10. Constitutional Hopes 180

11. Statesman of the New Korea 197

12. Two Years of Progress 212

13. Korea and Japan 236

14. What of the Future? 248

DEDICATED

to the development

of those

"exceptional Americans"
called for so wisely and urgently

by
DWIOHT EISENHOWER

FOREWORD

I HAVE LIVED WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION

on intimate terms since 1942. During all that
period it has been my unfortunate position to
warn of dangers which were not realized and to
suggest remedies which were not accepted. In
view of the war which has broken out, there
may be some pertinence in quoting from some
of the articles I have written during this period,
as a means of illustrating the successive stages
through which the Korean situation has ad-

IX

vanced, and in order to permit the readers to
judge for themselves whether the suggested pro-
grams would have been able to have averted the
Communist attack:

From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sunday,
March?, 1943:

"The Korean national program, as presented
by its commission in Washington, is forthright
and simple. Korea asks: ( 1 ) Immediate admit-
tance to the United Nations. [In those days there
was no Russian veto.] ( 2 ) Military supplies and
aid under the lend-lease agreement at once. (3 )
The recognition of the Provisional Government
of the Republic of Korea now." [At that time
the United States was free to take such action,
unilaterally, as the one nation bearing the brunt
of the Pacific war.]

From Asia and the Americas, March, 1943:
"In this global war Korea takes on new sig-
nificance ... It is an ideal base from which at-
tacks could be launched upon the industrial
areas of Nippon."

From World Affairs, June, 1943:
"Why, one may ask, should the State Depart-
ment treat Korea differently from the other gov-

ernments-in-exile? . . . The answer which any
impartial examiner will find is Russia.

"Does Russia want Korea incorporated into
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? The
London correspondent of the Chicago Sun re-
ported that that was precisely the solution of
the Korean question which Anthony Eden and
President Roosevelt discussed. Whatever his
sources of information may have been, his con-
clusion was doubtless correct. It is inevitable that
the topic must have come up. Present Russian
policy unquestionably is to 'secure her borders'
by the absorption of strategically important
neighboring states. And Korea is one of these.

"The question is whether it is good politics,
good statesmanship, or good sense for the State
Department to play this power politics game by
continuing to maintain a 'hands off' policy re-
garding Korea. Shall the situation be allowed to
drift along to what appears now the inevitable
solution? Are we ready to junk the Atlantic
Charter, to drop the whole idea of collective
security, and to reconstruct the world on a bal-
ance-of -power basis? Can we hope for peace by
taking the power away from the Fascist nations
and giving it to their chief foes? Or if we hope
to salvage a system of collective security at the
end of the war can we do so by letting such

XI

problems as the Korean question drift danger-
ously onto the shoals of power, politics with the
hope of rescuing, it at the peace conference?
Aren't we shaping the future world by our at-
titudes and policies right now?"

From The Case for Korea, a pamphlet pub-
lished by the Korean American Council, April
5, 1945:

"The purpose of this pamphlet is to call the
attention of the American public to a grave and
puzzling paradox in our own handling of the case
of Korea. This is a problem that is peculiarly
our own. We are able to settle it on our initiative,
much as Russia is determining the basis for set-
tlement of the disputed Baltic and Eastern Eur-
opean problems, and as England is asserting
leadership in fixing the postwar pattern in the
areas bordering the Mediterranean . . . The geo-
graphical position of Korea makes her inevitably
a vital factor in the future of the Orient. We
should make sure that in shaping her future we
shall have a friendly and welcome part. It is not
too late, but the time for decision is now!"

From The New Leader, August 18, 1945:
"Our policy in regard to Korea has drifted
aimlessly for so long that we cannot rectify it

xu

now without great boldness and decision. Every
day that passes makes any action at all to fore-
stall Russian control of Korea more difficult to
take. The one thing that would work would be
for us to seize the initiative and recognize the
Korean Provisional Government while it is still
possible to do so without deliberately affronting
Russia. // we should take that step the trump
cards would all be in our hands. Russia would
surely think twice before trying to push us vio-
lently from a position we had deliberately as-
sumed. If we wish to see an independent Korea
in the future (not for her sake, not even for the
sake of the pledges we have made, but as
Sumner Welles has pointed out for the sake of
future peace in the Orient) that is the one ef-
fective step we can take. And it is a step that
cannot succeed unless it is taken soon. Every day
that passes brings the possibility that Russian
recognition of the Yenan Korean Communists
may come first."

From The New Leader, December 1, 1945:
"Since the Korean question is relegated to the
inside pages of our newspapers, it ought to be
placed, in all decency, in the classified ad sec-
tion, under the heading: 'Lost: an opportunity
for statesmanship' ... If this seems overly blunt,

Xlll

the purpose is simply to ask our policy-makers:
'Gentlemen, tell us what you are about ! If you
have plans unrevealed to the public, what are
they? If you face difficulties of which we laymen
are unaware, what are they? If your intentions
are of the best, what are they? In the name of
humanity and the future welfare of the United
States in the tinder-box of Asia, come clean!' "

From The New Leader, December 21 and 28,
1946:

"Korea, acording to the Russian army and
diplomatic textbooks, has committed two major
crimes. One of them is to be located at a key stra-
tegic spot. The other crime is that of being too
weak to defend itself ... To let Korea slip into
Russian hands would be to invite Russian dom-
ination of Asia."

From the Syracuse University Alumni News,
March, 1947:

"In the Korean situation the moral issues are
clearer than in any other portion of the world
where international issues are pending . . .

"And, most important of all in Oriental eyes,
will the United States, despite its tremendous
power and prestige, abjectly back down before
the bold tactics and the sweeping demands of
Russia?

XIV

"The Orient, and I believe the rest of the
world as well, is hungry for moral leadership.
After the cat-and-mouse game England and the
United States played with China and after the
cynical attempt to picture war-time Russia as a
'democracy/ the plain people around the globe
have hoped that at least a decent peace might
be achieved at the price of the enormous slaugh-
ter of the most cold-blooded war in all history.

"The United States has at this moment an op-
portunity greater than any other people has ever
had to rally world support behind its leadership.
All it needs to do is to implement with positive
action the noble words our statesmen so fre-
quently utter. Let us convince the disillusioned
peoples of the world that a great power such as
we are believes that justice is the one safe basis
on which to erect the peace, and the response is
certain to be overwhelming/'

From Plain Talk, May, 1947:

"Korea is the chief testing spot in the Far
East perhaps in the whole world of the new
Truman Doctrine of supporting native dem-
ocratic regimes against Communist infiltration
and destruction. The crucial test of Russian-
American 'ability to solve their difficulties peace-
fully will come in Korea. And it is coming very-

soon."

XV

From The London, Spectator, May 23, 1947:
"The paramount question of whether we are
to have one world or two will receive a partial
answer in the negotiations by which Russia and
the United States are attempting to solve the
Korean question. Korea is the area where the
Russian policy of achieving security through ex-
tension of her borders and the new American
doctrine of erecting democratic bulwarks against
the further spread of Communism will meet
their first avowed and direct test."

From The Army and Navy Union News, June,
1947:

"The conference now being held in Korea is
widely regarded as a vital test of Russian-Amer-
ican relations . . . The evidence unhappily in-
dicates that the Truman Doctrine has not been
able to meet this first test with the Soviets . . .
After 20 months Koreans are still not allowed a
voice of their own in deciding their country's
fate. When will acts replace words to make our
advertised benevolence in foreign affairs become
real?"

From World Affairs, Spring 1947:
"The solution for the tragic mess we have
gotten into in Korea is simple.

XVI

"We should at once relieve Korea from the
restrictions that are applied against Japan. We
should actively help to build up the democratic
forces by making educational resources available
to them, and by helping to rehabilitate their ex-
hausted economy. We should try to aid, not
smother, the pro-American sentiment that still
exists.

"Our Military Government should be sum-
marily dissolved, and a native Korean govern-
ment established in its place. A token body of
American troops should be left in position along
the 38th Parallel line, to ensure that Russia will
not move down to take over the southern part
of the country.

"Every diplomatic pressure should be exerted
upon Russia to live up to her Moscow pledge to
reunite the dissevered halves of Korea and to
withdraw her own troops. Korea should be ad-
mitted to the United Nations where she can
plead her own cause before the united nations of
the world. Her currency should be freed so she
can use her own resources in her own defense.

"None of these recommended steps is difficult.
None is opposed to expressed and reiterated
American aims. All are clearly supported by
considerations of both justice and expediency."

XVll

From Freedom and Union, June, 1947:
"The whole Orient has its eyes on our actions
in Korea. The commitments we and Russia have
made are clear. The treatment of the two zones
is well known. Communism and democracy are
on trial. If the Orient had its own choice, on the
record it would have reason to reject both. But
in the present world balance of power it must
choose between the two. It is of tremendous con-
sequence that the U.S. so act that the free choice
of over a billion Asians will be the American
way. This is the real stake in this tug of war in
which Korea finds itself the nation in the middle
between the Soviet Union and the United
States/'

From The Progressive, October 6, 1947:
"The Korean question is one of the sorest
spots in Russian-American relations. It is a ma-
jor danger spot that must be handled properly
if the peace is to be safeguarded."

From The Philadelphia Forum, October,
1947:

"A spokesman for the American delegation
to the Joint Russian American Commission ex-
plained to me the failure of the meetings in this
way: 'The Russian delegates had full authority

xviii

to accept any concessions the Americans would
make. But they had no authority whatsoever to
make any concessions in return."

From The Standard, November, 1947:
"What happens to Korea may well be the best

indication of whether or not we are destined to

endure another world war."

From The Periscope on Asia, January 28,
1948:

"Developments in Korea are making that
country an inevitable scene for a show-down be-
tween the United Nations and Russia."

From The Christian Century, February 25,
1948:

"At the very time the Truman Doctrine was
stressing our support of any free people striving
to resist Communism, we were trying to win an
agreement with Russia in Korea by fostering
pro-Communist forces in south Korea through
an American-appointed 'coalition' in which the
dominant nationalist parties had no part. Al-
though every American instinct was to help the
Korean people, we have been forced by hastily
formulated commitments to keep them in a
straitjacket which has hampered their political

xix

and economic development. Even Germany and
Japan have not been so straitened. Handing over
the responsibility to the U.N. was by far the
simplest, and perhaps the only, solution for the
impasse into which our country has slipped."

From The New Leader, February 28, 1948:
"Economically and militarily, a government
in south Korea would certainly need some kind
of external support. This necessity is caused by
the 38th Parallel division."

From Church Management, May, 1948:
"The widening chasm between Russia and
the United States calls for basic reconsiderations
of the foundations upon which international re-
lations are based . . . The methods of power pol-
itics that have dictated Western policies in Asia
have proved barren."

From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, May 10,
1948:

"Today's election in Korea is the immediate
battleground of the Communist war to submerge
all Asia. Dr. Syngman Rhee's National Dem-
ocratic Unity Federation is the Asian counter-
part of the Dutch boy with his finger in the dike,
striving to hold back the Soviet flood."

XX

From The Far Eastern Survey, June 2, 1948:
"Dr. Syngman Rhee has reiterated his inten-
tion to implement his announced liberal pro-
gram to the fullest possible extent. The key to
how well he may be able to do so rests squarely
with the United States. If American support is
weak, the government will naturally have to
bolster its anti-Communist defences with the
help of the conservative 'landlord class.' But if
American support is adequate to hold off the
Communist (or Soviet) menace, the new gov-
ernment will develop programs designed to
strengthen the lower and middle classes and to
establish its strength through the welfare of the
whole people. The problem in Korea is essential-
ly the same as in France or Italy: danger from
the left naturally pushes the government further
toward the right."

From The Periscope on Asia, August 10,
1948:

"Both the nature of American policy in Asia
and the reasons for it have been clarified in re-
cent weeks, as events have moved swiftly toward
a showdown with Russia over Korea on one side
of the world and Germany on the other. Neither
issue is isolated; each one is the key to control
of a continent ; and, more largely, to the nature
of the world of the future . . .

XXI

"Uninformed observers have been freely pre-
dicting in recent weeks that the United States is
'withdrawing' from Korea . . . Actually, what is
happening is not in any sense an abandonment
of Korea by the United States. What is occurring
is the shift of American policy in Korea to the
only foundation upon which it can be main-
tained successfully that is, to firm American
support of Korean independence."

From The Periscope on Asia, November 18,
1948:

"Communist armies of the East are sending
advance forces into strategic Korea. Forty
northern Chinese Communists have been re-
ported by Republic of Korea officials to be now
operating in south Korea, with 1,000 more
awaiting a chance to slip across the 38th Parallel
line. Previously, Chiang Kai-shek has reported
that 60,000 north Korean Communists have
participated in the fighting in Manchuria."

From The Periscope on Asia, June 10, 1949:

"In naming Molotov to head its drive through

Asia, the Politburo has undeniably underlined

the fact that conquest of the Far East is now

the Number One item on its agenda."

XXll

From The Periscope on Asia, July 15, 1949:
"Events in Korea seem rushing toward a cli-
max that may determine the relative position of
the United States and Russia in all the vast stra-
tegic and valuable area of Asia and the Far
East."

From The Periscope on Asia, September 2,
1949:

"Korea will stand in the annals of the twen-
tieth century as the place in which Communism
was finally halted and turned back in Asia."

From United Asia, October, 1949:
"Events clearly show that the Communists
flood-tide in Asia will not simply die down; it
must be stopped. A line somewhere must be
held. The Republic of Korea is striving to hold
it, and in this struggle it feels itself an ally with
freedom-loving peoples in every part of the
world."

From The Periscope on Asia, January 23,
1950:

"It is still in Korea itself that the major
struggle must be made. It is there that the sacri-
fices must be undertaken. But the evidence in-
dicates that American support for this foremost

xxiii

outpost of freedom in Asia will not falter in the
months ahead."

From The New Leader, February 4, 1950:
"The cold war is essentially a war of nerves.
In every country threatened by Communist ag-
gression, the courage or weakness of its leaders
has swung the balance. Finland's tough leader-
ship kept its nerve and an amazing degree of
independence; Norway, Denmark and Italy, all
on the front line of the Communist advance, had
the nerve to say 'No 5 and make it stick. But in
Czechoslovakia the weary Benes and Masaryk
gave in without a struggle, and one of the tra-
gedies of China was the weakness of generals
who refused to fight. . . .

"I have lived with the Korean question on in-
timate terms for eight years as an adviser in
Washington, in Seoul, and at the United Na-
tions. I think it can be said without qualification
that the men who lead the Republic of Korea
will scorn every communist threat and resist
every communist attack. So long as flesh and
blood can hold back Stalin's Asian juggernaut,
Korea will stand firm,"

It is out of the background of thinking and
observation represented by these citations that

XXIV

this book has been written. If facts may be rea-
sonably depended upon as a basis for forming
conclusions, we should, it seems to me, have
learned from the Korean situation that the way
to deal with Russia is not weakness and hesita-
tion, not willingness to sacrifice morality for
what may seem to be expediency, and not ne-
glect of what we know should be done for fear
of giving the Soviets offence. Such methods did
not prevent the crisis in Korea ; it is doubtful if
they can work better elsewhere.

Our dealings with Korea leave us confronted
with a series of "ifs". // we had recognized the
Provisional Government prior to the Yalta Con-
ference, Korea might never have been divided.
// we had instantly matched Soviet actions in
north Korea by establishing a government and
an army in the south, Russia might have agreed
to unification back in 1946 or 1947. // we had
equipped the Republic with heavy weapons and
had refrained from giving the impression we
would never support it militarily, the attack of
June 25 might never have been launched.

It seems apparent that the time has come to
try strength, since weakness has failed. Provided
the outbreak of world-wide war does not again
postpone a Korean solution, it is to be hoped
that the present "United Nations police action"

XXV

in Korea will reunite the nation and supervise
an election in the northern part, to supply the
missing third of representatives for the National
Assembly. In all conscience, considerable econ-
omic and technical help will be required to re-
build the destroyed cities, industries and trans-
portation systems. With such aid, democracy in
Korea is capable of setting an effective example
for the billion Asians. When the time for rebuild-
ing in Korea comes, let us not muff the op-
portunities of the future as we have those of the
past.

RORERT T. OLIVER

August, 1950

XXVI

WHY WAR CAME
IN KOREA

THE COMMUNIST EMPIRE
STRIKES

WHEN i WAS LAST IN KAESONG, A CITY OF
100,000 located just three miles south of Korea's
fateful 38th Parallel line, one of the merchants
said to me: "We go to bed with fear and we
live through the days with our eyes on the hills."
This was in May, 1949. Just over a year later,
the horse-shoe bend of rugged hills encircling
Kaesong on the north erupted a vicious attack.
It was four o'clock on a Sunday morning, June
25, 1950, when powerful lines of Soviet-made

1

tanks, supported by fighter planes and heavy ar-
tillery, poured into and around the city. The
rifle-armed troops of the Republic of Korea
were crushed and the attack rolled on toward
Seoul, thirty-five miles farther south.

That date brought the Communist Empire
and the free world of the democracies to grips
for the first time. Always before, a clash had
been avoided. When Finland was invaded, the
democracies stood aside. The Soviet engulfment
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was deplored,
but, occurring as it did as part of a general war
movement, it met no further obstacle than an
official reminder by the Western powers that the
status of these Baltic States must be reviewed
as part of the eventual peace settlement. The
crass division of Poland between Nazi Germany
and Soviet Russia, however hotly debated and
denounced in the United States, was a sin pre-
sumed to be partially expiated by later Russian
resistance to the German invasion. As for the
impressive extension of the Communist Empire
in Eastern Europe, in Mongolia, and in China,
so long as the means were internal subversion
the Western democracies had neither the will
nor the method to deal with the veiled and indi-
rect aggression.

The case of Korea, however, was different.

The Communist Empire made it different by
launching a direct attack. The challenge had
taken a form the democracies could and must
meet.

To answer the question why Korea became
the testing ground requires a long and hard
look at that relatively remote peninsula, par-
ticularly during the years of Russian and
American interest in it. Prior to any detailed
examination, however, the most striking and
easily identifiable reasons may be summarized to
provide a sort of stylized pattern for the chap-
ters to follow. Of one thing there need be no
doubt: the selection of Korea as the area in
which the cold war of subversion was converted
into open military attack was no accident. The
explanation lies deeply rooted in history some
remote and some immediate. The more obvious
reasons are as follows:

( 1 ) Traditionally and historically, Korea
occupies the heart of the strategic triangle of
north Asia, with Siberia on one side, China on
another, and Japan on a third. When Korea
has been independent, north Asia has been at
peace. When Korea has been held by a domi-
nant military power, that same power has been
able to subjugate all north Asia. The Mongol
hordes first demonstrated this fact in the 13th

century (being restrained then from conquer-
ing Japan only by just such a catastrophe to
their fleet as happened to the Spanish Armada
in the storm off England's coast in the 16th cen-
tury). Hideyoshi, the great Japanese warlord,
sought to conquer Korea in 1592-97, as a pre-
lude to overrunning all Asia, and was beaten
back through the invention of the first ironclad
warship by Korean Admiral Yi Soon-Sin. Ja-
pan and China fought over Korea's position in
1894-95. Then, in a crucial test of strength, Ja-
pan and Russia fought the war of 1904-05 to
determine which should gain the strategic Korea
peninsula. After Japan won, she was able to
build rail lines and bases in Korea and proceed
on to the conquest of Manchuria in 1931, the
attack on China in 1937, and the descent on
Pearl Harbor in 1941.

(2) Russia has made possession of Korea a
prime aim of its foreign policy for at least 75
years. In 1896, in 1903, and again in 1910, Rus-
sia and Japan engaged in secret negotiations re-
garding a possible division of Korea between
them, along either the 38th or 39th Parallels.
Prior to the Russo-Japanese war, Czar Nicho-
las II wrote to his foreign minister: "Russia ab-
solutely needs a port free and open throughout
the whole year. This port must be located on

the mainland (southeast Korea) and must cer-
tainly be connected with our possessions by a
strip of land." Pursuing this same goal, Russia
demanded admittance to Korea as part of its
price for entering the war against Japan in Aug-
ust, 1945. This demand led to the "temporary"
division of Korea along the 38th Parallel, sup-
posedly merely to permit disarming of Japanese
troops north of that line by Russia and south
of the line by United States troops.

(3) Russia proceeded instantly to build a
militarily and politically strong puppet regime in
north Korea. She brought back to north Korea
some 300,000 Koreans who had fled into Siberia
from Japanese tyranny (during the period 1905-
1945 while Japan ruled Korea) and who had
there been communized. She also brought back
another two million who had fled into Manchu-
ria and north China, and who there had allied
themselves with Communist guerrillas in fight-
ing Japanese troops. With this large nucleus,
Russia established a Communist "People's Re-
public" and started building an army of up-
wards of 200,000 men. This army was equipped
with tanks, artillery and planes, and some 100,-
000 of its troops were battle-hardened in war-
fare against the Nationalist forces in China.
With a strict iron curtain around north Korea,

Russia subjected the north Korean populace to
five solid years of propaganda, along the basic
line that "American imperialism was preventing
the reunification of Korea for the purpose of
maintaining a military base in south Korea. 55
The fact that the United Nations voted in No-
vember, 1947, for an election in all Korea to
reunite the country under a government of its
own choice did not, of course, result in any quali-
fication of this propaganda barrage. Conse-
quently, the Soviet had in north Korea a de-
pendable totalitarian puppet regime, with a
strong army indoctrinated to believe it was
fighting for the reunification of its homeland,
and well trained and equipped for battle.

(4) In contrast to the north Korean
strength, the Republic of Korea was militarily
weak. This weakness was no accident, but was
deliberately planned. United States policy in
Korea consisted in part of "proving 5 * to both
Soviet Russia and the peoples of Asia that our
government had no colonial or military designs
of any sort upon south Korea. To the contrary,
all we wished to do was to withdraw at the
earliest possible moment. For two and a half
years, until September, 1947, the United States
held south Korea under military occupation, re-
fraining from building any Korean army and

refusing to permit establishment of any Korean
government, while we sought a joint agreement
with Russia for withdrawal. This failing, the
question was turned over to the United Nations.
After the Republic of Korea was inaugurated,
American policy again was to keep the Repub-
lic so weak that there would be no possibility
of charges that we were attempting to build
through it a military base from which to attack
Russia. The Republic was warned that any
movement north of the 38th Parallel, even to
repel attacks, would lead instantly to a cessation
of all American aid. The only weapons supplied
to the army of the Republic were light arms
sufficient to put down guerrilla uprisings within
the country. Repeated pleas of President Syng-
man Rhee for tanks, artillery, and fighting
planes were brushed aside. Thus, confronting
the formidable fighting machine of north Korea
was only an ill-armed force in south Korea. The
last American troops (except for a 500-man mil-
itary advisory force) were withdrawn on June
29, 1949.

(5) The weakness of the position of the Re-
public of Korea was accentuated by official and
unofficial indications from the United States
that our government did not intend to defend
the Republic. In January and February, 1950,

Secretary Acheson informed Congressional com-
mittees that there was "no moral obligation"
and "no commitment" to support Korea.
Authoritative spokesmen including Secretary
Acheson in his January 12, 1950, speech to the
National Press Club made it clear that the
American "defense line" in the Pacific ran
down through the main islands of Japan, Oki-
nawa, and the Philippines leaving Korea out-
side. Underscoring this apparent fact was
President Truman's decision in January of this
same year not to defend Formosa. To the Krem-
lin it must have appeared that the Republic of
Korea was not only hopelessly weak militarily
but also had been diplomatically abandoned.

(6) Paradoxically, it was not only the weak-
ness but also the strength of the Republic of
Korea which led to the attack upon it. The
Communist propaganda line in Asia has been
that imperialistic, capitalistic democracy is ded-
icated to the enslavement of the masses for the
benefit of a ruling class; whereas the people's
democracy (Communism) is dedicated to over-
throwing the master class for the benefit of the
farmers and workers. To this propaganda the
remarkable democratic success achieved by the
Republic of Korea was an effective and un-
answerable refutation. The Republic of Korea,

8

accordingly, had to be destroyed because it was
(in Soviet opinion) intolerably successful. It
was this success which led Paul Hoffman, Direc-
tor of the EGA, in December, 1948, to call the
Republic "a bastion of democracy in Asia" ; and
which led John Foster Dulles, in his speech on
July 4, 1950, to explain the Communist attack
by saying: "The society was so wholesome that
it could not be overthrown from within."

The clearest fact in relation to the demo-
cratic-Communist struggle over Korea is that in
five years of strenuous effort the Communists
were not able to make any headway in winning
over the twenty millions of south Koreans. De-
spite the mountainous terrain, the Communists
were not even able to stir up any considerable
amount of guerrilla opposition to the Govern-
ment. Never did Communist guerrillas hold any
large area in south Korea, as, for example, they
were so notably able to do in Greece. The loy-
alty of the masses of south Koreans to their
own elected democracy was never shaken.

Politically, south Koreans confounded even
their friendly critics, many of whom had feared
that a full generation of Japanese domination
had sapped their ability for self-government.
In their first election on May 10, 1948 92.5 %
of all eligible voters took part in selecting mem-

bers for their 200-man National Assembly. In
the election of May 30, 1950, some 86% of all
eligible voters selected 210 assemblymen from a
list of 2,052 candidates. Ray Richards, corre-
spondent for INS, who lost his life in the first
wave of the Communist attack, sent back a dis-
patch estimating that some 150 members of the
new Assembly were supporters of President
Rhee. Rhee's chief opponents, the Democratic
Nationalist Party, suffered a reduction from 70
members in the first Assembly to 27 in the sec-
ond. And all of Rhee's bitterest opponents in
the first Assembly (Paik Nam-Whoon, Kim Jun-
Nyun, Suk Sang-Il, and Ra Yong-Kyun) were
defeated. By the test of the polls (democracy's
fundamental test) the new Republic of Korea
was shown to have the strong allegiance of its
people.

Other achievements of the Republic are
equally impressive. The estimated 70% of adult
illiteracy left by the Japanese was reduced to
about 30%, despite the facts that the former
Japanese teachers had to be replaced by new
Korean trainees and that the old Japanese
school books had to be replaced with newly
written and published Korean books. Women
were granted full legal equality with men. The
Associated Press, in semi-annual reviews of

10

world-wide censorship conditions granted to the
Republic of Korea the treasured accolade of be-
ing among the select half-dozen nations granting
freest access to the news and fullest freedom in
reporting it. The Republic's police have been
damned by some critics on the grounds that
"fully half of them are men who served under
the Japanese and retain the old methods of deal-
ing with the populace;' 5 ' but perhaps it is even
more significant that in its two short years of
opportunity the Republic recruited and trained
enough policemen in western ways and psychol-
ogy to replace half its old police force with new
men indued with the spirit of public service.
From my personal knowledge of Lee Ho, the
35-year-old lawyer who headed the national
police, I know that he was doing his best to
thoroughly democratize the police force.

Economically, the Republic steadily continued
to fight its way out of the difficulties caused by
the 38th Parallel division (which cut the indus-
trial north off from the agricultural south) and
by the three-year stagnation resulting from mil-
itary occupation and consequent freezing of
most normal economic processes. With the
"pump-priming" effects of $140,000,000 in EGA
funds through June 30, 1950, Korean admini-
strators and industrialists, with EGA advice,

11

were able to achieve a food surplus to export
100,000 tons of rice; to step up manufacturing
output 92% higher in December, 1949, than it
was in December, 1948; to reduce the excess of
imports over exports from a quarterly average
of $47,319,000 in 1947 to $23,037,000 in the
fourth quarter of 1949; and to counter inflation-
ary trends sufficiently so that the Won in circu-
lation fell from its all-time high of 73 billions in
February, 1950, to a low of 57 billions four
months later. For the fiscal year 1951, Congress
appropriated $100 million, which was to be used
largely to finance long-term basic industrial de-
velopments.

Perhaps the greatest single achievement of the
Republic was its land-reform program. Some
American proponents of Asian land reform ap-
pear to forget all about democracy when they
discuss this subject. These critics "demand-
ed" instant abolition of the landlord-tenant sys-
tem as "the price of continued American sup-
port," as though the President of the Republic
should arrogate to himself dictatorial power,
seize the land from its owners, and distribute it
to tenant farmers. As a matter of fact, the Re-
public of Korea, being a democracy, dealt with
the problem just as our American Congress deals
with similar problems. As might be expected,

12

the first National Assembly contained a major-
ity of landlords and their sympathizers for
these men comprised the educated, articulate,
and accustomed leadership of the villages. Land
reform meant simply that these legislators
would have to vote away the property which
had been their families' chief props for genera-
tions. Despite this fact, they worked away in
committees on the problem for over a year, and
in May, 1950, passed a land reform bill which
provided for the sale of all lands owned by ab-
sentee landlords to their present tenant occu-
pants for a portion of the annual crop, payable
over a period of five years. Sale of these lands,
which had already started, would have reduced
farm tenantry in Korea far below the percent-
age figure for many states of the United States.
In summation, then, the Red army struck in
force against the Republic of Korea for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) Korea is of great strategic
military value in north Asia, providing a good
base from which to launch an attack upon Ja-
pan and southeast Asia; (2) Russian foreign
policy long has aimed to secure possession of
Korea; (3) the puppet regime in north Korea
was militarily strong and well propagandized;
(4) the Republic of Korea seemed too weak
militarily to be able to resist an attack; (5)

13

American authoritative statements indicated
that we would not defend Korea; and (6) the
success of democracy in south Korea constituted
an intolerable refutation of the Communist
propaganda line in Asia.

In view of American failure to arm south
Korea adequately and considering that our de-
fense line excluded the Republic of Korea, why
did President Truman so promptly and deci-
sively order all-out American resistance to the
Communist attack? The question mystified the
Kremlin so much that its propaganda mills were
silent for a full 36 hours after the Presidents an-
nouncement. The answer lies in the nature of
the attack itself and in the delicately balanced
political and military position of all Asia.

The attack of June 25, 1950, will be recorded
by historians as the great crystallizing event of
these postwar years. This is the first time in its
30-year history that the Communist Empire has
deliberately challenged the free world by an
armed assault. Since the Republic of Korea had
been established under United Nations auspicies,
it was peculiarly a ward of the democratic
world, and the attack could only be interpreted
as a decisive test of the ability and will of the
democracies to unite in resistance to armed ag-
gression. The shock caused by the attack is illus-

14

trated by the fact that within 24 hours after it
occurred the Security Council of the United
Nations was able to convene and its members
already had instructions from their Governments
as to how to vote. The Communist Empire (by
the same kind of miscalculation that marked
the Japanese and Nazi dictatorships) had issued
a challenge which could not be ignored.

Aside from the world-wide implications of
this appeal to force, the effect in Asia was cru-
cial. The United States has been exercising
moral suasion upon the peoples of Asia to resist
Communism and accept democracy. The big
unanswered question was the degree to which
the United States would help them to fend off
Communism if a crisis arose. The issuance of
the White Paper on China, and the subsequent
collapse of the Nationalist Government, were
disturbing indications to Asian peoples that per-
haps the United States would resist Communist
aggression only with complaints and excuses.
When eleven members of Congress traveled
through the Far East in October and November,
1949, they found political leaders everywhere
asking them: "What will the United States do
about Korea?" In Asian eyes, the United States
was clearly committed to support the Republic
of Korea, and, if we had not done so, faith in

15

our willingness or ability to check Communist
expansion would have dissolved. The defense of
Korea became directly a defense of democracy
in all Asia and indirectly a defense of freedom
all over the world. Faced with such conditions,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Depart-
ment could not but advise President Truman
that this was the time and place for a decisive
stand.

From less influential quarters, this advice had
been given over and over before. Senators Wil-
liam Knowland, Styles Bridges and Alexander
Smith, and Congressman Walter Judd, had re-
peatedly pleaded for realistic aid for the endan-
gered democracies that lay in the path of Rus-
sia's Asian advance. More specifically, in the
September 2, 1949, issue of Periscope on Asia, I
wrote: "Korea will stand in the annals of the
twentieth century as the place in which Com-
munism was finally halted and turned back in
Asia just as in the sixteenth century it was the
place in which Japan's all-out bid for world
conquest was defeated."

In order to indicate the trend of thinking of
those who deprecated the "wait till the dust
settles" type of foreign policy for the Far East,
the Periscope on Asia issue of October 14, 1949,
may be quoted extensively. This, then, is how

16

the Korean situation appeared in informed
circles eight months before the Communist at-
tack:

How close is war in Korea? This is a question re-
ceiving increasingly serious consideration from many
quarters.

The United Nations ad hoc committee on October 3
adopted a resolution (by a vote of 44 to 6, with 5 absten-
sions) favoring a continuance of the U. N. Commission
on Korea, and defining its first duty as follows: u (a) ob-
serve and report any developments which might lead to
or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea. . ."

The Chinese Ambassador to Korea, Shao Yu-lin, in
an October 10 statement, warned: "A great many
Korean Communist troops, under Moscow's orders, have
been and still are taking part in the Communist rebellion
against the Chinese Government. It is not at all impos-
sible that the Chinese Communists may in the foresee-
able future extend in return their cooperation to their
comrades in Northern Korea in a common attempt to
invade southern Korea."

And President Syngman Rhee, in a United Press in-
terview on October 7, said: "People in the north urged
me to give them a radio broadcast message asking the
loyal Koreans in the north to arise and overthrow the
Communist regime. Then they would expect us to join
them. I am sure that we could take Pyongyang, the
northern capital, in three days. And an all-Korean bor-
der with Manchuria would be easier to defend than the
38th Parallel. Then why not? Because the United Na-
tions and United States have warned that we might in a
hot-headed foolish way start a world war. So we are
still trying to be patient and get our Communist
lem settled with the world problem."

17

To Koreans in Korea, the situation looks like this:
After the Communist victory in China is fully consoli-
dated, it will be but a matter of time until the Chinese
and Korean Communists, coordinated under Moscow's
orders, launch a full-scale attack against the Republic.
When that attack comes it will probably prove irresist-
able unless definite help should be provided by the
United States.

Will the United States extend such help? Koreans
wonder. They cite the abandonment of China, made
explicit in the White Paper. They worry about the
slowness of Congress to pass the Korean aid bill. They
are aware of the recurrence of statements by American
public spokesmen indicating that the American defense
line extends from Japan, through Okinawa, down to the
Philippines, thus leaving Korea in Russian hands.

Looking at China, if no further, it is evident that
Communist power in Asia is still growing. American
help, then, to the anti- Communist democratic forces
must also increase. Unless added help does come, the
Republic of Korea can see no advantage in waiting pas-
sively for the inevitable end.

While this line of reasoning leads to but one conclu-
sion, there is another set of considerations that counsel
caution and it is these factors which led President Rhee
to conclude that his government is "still trying to be
patient."

(1) The United Nations has overwhelmingly reiter-
ated its full support of the Republic of Korea for three
successive years. In view of this fact, Russia may fear
to launch an attack across the 38th Parallel lest it might
prove "the straw that breaks the camel's back" and pre-
cipitate war,

(2) The United States is slowly but surely crystalliz-

18

ing a policy of preventing any further Communist con-
quests in the Far East.

(3) Despite the economic hardships and military dan-
gers of division, the Republic of Korea has demon-
strated its ability to survive and even to improve its
position, while waiting for the world's democracies to
unite in hurling back the Soviet tide of aggression.

Despite the horror of atomic warfare and the des-
perate eagerness of the world's peoples for peace, it may
be that the situation in Asia has already advanced so
far as to make World War III inevitable. Consider
these factors :

(1) Russia has already gained so much in Asia (just
as Japan had by 1941) that it simply cannot yield its
vast gains without fighting to try to preserve them.

(2) These gains by Russia are already so great that
the area of freedom in Asia and around the world can-
not be defended unless Soviet power is dislodged from
its more advanced bastions.

(3) If these two premises are true, Russia cannot re-
treat and we cannot permit her to stay where she is (let
alone advance further), so that war is inevitable.

This is essentially the situation, in regard to Japanese
conquests, that existed in 1941 and caused the impasse
in the Washington conferences that were still going on
when Pearl Harbor was attacked. The parallel between
1941 and 1949 is dismally apparent from a study of
Asia's map.

The gravity of the problem was stressed by Secretary
Dean Acheson in his Letter of Transmittal of the
White Paper on China, in which he wrote:

"One point, however, is clear. Should the Communist
regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperial-
ism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's
neighbors . . . international peace and security" would

19

be endangered. The language is closely parallel to Cor-
dell Hull's warnings to Japan.

The decision on whether to retreat still further or
finally to hold firm cannot be much longer delayed.

To many American newspaper readers, it may
have seemed that war broke out suddenly on
June 25, with only loud words and distant
rumblings before that date. Actually, there had
been almost countless skirmishes, reminiscent of
the raids on the American frontier in pioneer
days. A brief list of guerrilla attacks across the
38th Parallel during a period of three weeks in
January-February, 1950, will indicate clearly the
state of terror that prevailed.

Jan. 19: Seven groups of north Korea guer-
rillas attacked Republic troops at Chiarimi,
fighting continuing from 8:00 P.M. until 6:00
the following morning.

Jan. 20 : At 9 : 30 A.M., some 50 north Korean
guerrillas attacked Limjai Myun and were re-
pulsed after they suffered one killed.

Jan. 21 : At 2 : 00 A.M., 40 raiders armed with
M-l and M-G rifles invaded Chipum Myun.

Jan. 22: Republic forces attacked a rebel
stronghold at Sukbo Myun, killing ten guerrillas
with a loss of one dead and one wounded.

Jan. 22: Twelve Communist raiders swept

20

into Rokchun Myun at 1:00 A.M., stealing a
store of polished rice.

Jan. 22: Just before dawn, about 100 Com-
munists swooped down upon the town of
Chungpyungri and fired the headquarters of the
Chungpyung army unit. In an hour of fighting,
three guerrillas and six Republic troops were
killed, with six more captured.

Jan. 22: In a 40-minute action just past noon,
20 Communist rebels who attacked across the
38th Parallel line at Madapri were driven back.
Three of the guerrillas were killed and one
southern Korean policeman was wounded.

Jan. 22 : An attack with light machine guns
upon Republic Army positions on Mt. Eunpa,
launched at 11: 00 P.M., was repulsed without
loss.

* Jan. 30: Republic troops attacked a rebel
stronghold in Chayang Myun at 3 : 00 P.M., kill-
ing two Communists and capturing ten. Accord-
ing to one of the prisoners, Communist guerrillas
in the area numbered 160.

Jan. 30: At 11 :30 P.M., a group of 20 Com-
munists set fire to the town hall in Tanyang
Myun, then fled, pursued by troops of the 23rd
Regiment.

Jan. 31: Some 70 Communists swept into
Yungil Myun at 2:00 A.M., burned 20 houses,

21

killed 18 townsmen, and captured two more
before being driven off.

Jan. 31: North Korean guerrillas attacked
Chiam Ri at 6:00 P.M., in considerable force;
five were killed before they retired.

Feb. 4: At 10:10 P.M., 40 armed raiders
swept into Namchung Myun and set fire to
houses.

Feb. 4: At Songra Myun, 50 Communist
rebels attacked at 9 : 40 P.M., burning 50 houses
and killing 13 townsmen before they were driven
off.

Feb. 4: Approximately a company of north
Korean guerrilllas invaded Changsoo Myun and
were repulsed, with one Communist killed.

Feb. 7: 17 Communist rebels were killed in
fighting with the 25th Regiment, Republic of
Korea, around Changsoo Myun.

Feb. 8: 25 Communist raiders invaded
Chaisan Myun and killed two civilians.

This catalog of attacks is but a sample of the
raids against the Republic of Korea some with
forces as large as 4,000 men which continued
right up to the June 25th assault.

22

FERMENT IN ASIA

THE SIX REASONS FOR THE COMMUNIST ATTACK

upon Korea, previously summarized, represent,
of course, a simplification of many complex
factors. As these are discussed in more detail in
successive chapters, the postwar situation of all
Asia needs to be viewed as a backdrop. For the
Korean issue can never be considered properly
in isolation. Far from existing in a vacuum,
Korea has been in a very real sense the cross-
roads of Asia.

23

The diversity of Far Eastern peoples and the
differences dividing them are as great as in
other sections of the world, yet the interrelation-
ships are of basic importance. Whether one
looks at the cultural patterns of the past or at
the dangerous unrest of the present, the des-
tinies of the billion inhabitants of the Orient are
closely intertwined. This fact, together with
much else about Asia, has not been sufficiently
taken into account in the formation and admini-
stration of American Far Eastern policy.

The surrender of Japan, sealed on the Mis-
souri in Yokohama Harbor on September 2, 1 945,
presented to the United States and our allies a
situation we were sadly unready to meet. First
Western colonialism and then Japanese conquest
had fastened upon the Asian peoples patterns
of external control beneath which seethed a
swirling ferment of ill-defined but dangerous
discontent. Nationalist leaders all the way from
Korea in north Asia to India and Indonesia in
the south were determined upon independence.
Upon this foundation fact, however, the struc-
ture of government was not yet ready to be
erected. The leaders had been schooled in agi-
tation and rebellion, not in administration.
When Japan collapsed, they had not yet worked
out the programs (and in some instances not

24

even the policies) of the free governments they
expected to head.

The masses of the people largely illiterate
and without experience in nation-wide coopera-
tion wanted food, freedom, and the fullness of
life which they dimly realized the new tech-
nologies of the West made possible. To a very
considerable extent the mind of Asia was set in
a negative mold: anti- Japanese, anti-colonial,
and anti-landlord. It was far easier for them to
know what they were against than it was for
them to spell out in any detail what they were
for.

The defeat of Japanese militarism removed
the lid. Discontent boiled into revolt: against
still identifiable and detested masters such as the
Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indo-
china; against presumed internal oppressors, as
reflected in the rebellions in China, the Philip-
pines, Burma, and Malaya; against new pat-
terns that failed (at least immediately) to solve
old problems, as in India and Pakistan; and
(most frustrating of all) against international
agreements that still postponed independence,
as in Korea.

The United States, as the power which had
carried the brunt of the war against Japan and
which as postwar ruler of Japan inevitably be-

25

came the custodian of the new order in Asia,
was ill equipped to deal with the many prob-
lems which suddenly demanded immediate solu-
tion. This was partly because our attention was
primarily fixed upon Europe, where Washing-
ton felt the peace must be won first, as the war
had been. Partly it was because neither our
policy-makers nor our people had ever had ex-
tensive, detailed or intimate knowledge of or
interest in the Far East. And, in part, the rea-
son for our unpreparedness in Asia was our
failure at the end of the war to realize that the
Soviet Union was an enemy to be contained
rather than a friendly ally with which we could
negotiate frankly and confidently. Even more
basic, however, was the fact that Asian discon-
tent was the result of over a century of exploita-
tive policies which had created problems and
attitudes we had neither the wisdom nor the
power to eliminate. Far from having a clean
slate on which we could write new policies for
the Far East, we had to deal with deep-seated
conditions of suspicion and ill will.

The Soviet Union was far more free to deal
with the situation in Asia than was the United
States. The basic reason is that Russia's policy
was the simple one of stimulating and increas-
ing the discontent, whereas ours was the prob-

26

lem of solving it. The purposes of the Soviet
Union could best be achieved by accentuating the
hatred of Western colonial powers, of landlords,
and of those native leaders whose instincts and
education inclined them to favor democratic
free enterprise. The negative-mindedness of the
Asian masses played directly into Russian hands,
for this negativism could be directed to destruc-
tion of old colonialism, old landlordism, and
newly created democratic governments. Com-
munist organizers quickly gathered their forces
to take advantage of the increasing disorgani-
zation.

Another reason for impressive Soviet victories
should not be overlooked. Appalled critics of
the democratic failure to contain postwar Com-
munism sometimes assert that the Kremlin
clique is "smarter" than the more prosaic diplo-
mats of the West. Actually, the reason is not that
the Muscovites are more intelligent; it is be-
cause they are less moral. Communist successes
have been accomplished by deceit and ruthless-
ness which the mores of the United States,
Great Britain and France cannot encompass.
We could make agreements with the Russians
at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam without our
leaders being aware that to the Soviets an agree-
ment was merely a tactical maneuver to be

27

regarded precisely as military men regard an
advance by a tank corps camouflaged as hay-
stacks. In this view, deceitfulness itself becomes
moral, since it hastens and eases the accom-
plishment of a desirable goal. Similarly, Com-
munists in eastern Europe and China could and
did woo popular favor by murdering land-
owners and turning their property over to the
tenant farmers. This ruthless mass murder was
not only not regarded as shameful; it was, to
the contrary, acclaimed proudly (sometimes
even by apologists in our own country) as praise-
worthy "land reform." By such methods of de-
ceit and cruelty the Communist Empire was
able to provide immediate, if illusory, "benefits"
which the morals of democratic nations could
not so expeditiously produce.

The greater morality of the Western powers,
however, has been more superficial and formal
than we like to recall. We could not brutally
order the starvation of millions, as was done in
Russia's Ukraine and in Red China's northern
provinces. Nevertheless, we could and did par-
ticipate in a type of chauvinistic racism which
has produced results we long shall have cause to
regret. We could and did practice the softer
forms of deception, which consist of looking
the other way to avoid seeing unpleasant facts

28

(which has characterized most of our dealings
with Asia) ; of telling only conveniently selected
segments of the truth (as in the White Paper on
China) ; of seeking a profit even at the patent
cost of the welfare of our own and other coun-
tries (as in the pre-Pearl Harbor trade with Ja-
pan and in much of the trade with Russia during
the semi-truce of the cold war) ; and of trading
off the rights of other peoples on the presump-
tion that "the greatest good of the greatest num-
ber" would be served (as in the Yalta conces-
sions of Chinese territory, railways, and ports).
As a result of many factors, including the
American, Australian, and British South Afri-
can Oriental Exclusion Acts, the extraterritori-
ality and colonial polices of Western powers, and
the internal and external conditions that helped
to slow the industrialization of Asia, the Far
East developed through the twentieth century
a dangerous and unstable regional inferiority
complex. So many tourists, businessmen and
GIs have taken to and brought back reinforced
the stereotype of Asian peoples as inherently
inferior that we may have forgotten the pride
that all through the nineteenth century led the
Oriental peoples to regard themselves as the
custodians of civilization, and we Westerners as
a new incursion of barbarians. As a reminder,

29

we might glance at this reaction of a Chinese
when the first white men appeared in his coun-
try:

These "Ocean Men," as they are called, are tall beasts
with deep sunken eyes and beak-like noses. The lower
part of their faces, the backs of their hands, and, I un-
derstand, their entire bodies are covered with a mat of
curly hair, much as are the monkeys of the southern
forests. But the strangest thing about them is that, al-
though undoubtedly men, they seem to possess none of
the mental faculties of men. The most bestial of peas-
ants is far more human, although these Ocean Men go
from place to place with the self-reliance of a man of
scholarship and are in some respects remarkably clever.
It is quite possible that they are susceptible to training
and could with patience be taught the modes of conduct
proper to a human being.

However, under the humiliating regime of
colonialism, and as the Orient came to be aware
of how greatly the West excelled in material de-
velopments, the pride in ancient culture gave
way to a gnawing fear that the old Asian civili-
zation had decayed from dry rot. Like other
politico-psychological tensions, this self-ques-
tioning expressed itself alternately in fierce asser-
tiveness and in spells of national abnegation.
Japan in defeat has offered a prime example of
the latter reaction. The Korean and Indonesian
independence movements well illustrated the
former. China and the Philippines have fluctu-

30

ated nervously between the two states of mind.

This psychological condition in Asia became
an explosive threat more damaging than our
diplomats realized. More than an EGA or Point
Four program of aid to underdeveloped areas
was required to deal with such a situation. What
the postwar ferment in Asia required was a
depth of understanding based upon an honest
realization and frank admission of past mis-
takes, coupled with an intelligent respect for the
humanity and culture of the East. Instead, the
tensions were compounded by the Administra-
tion's reiteration that "Europe is more impor-
tant," "Europe must come first," and "The
issues in Asia are far from clear." Only hesi-
tantly, and then only in a dribble, was even the
EGA extended to Asia, and Point Four, arising
late as a topic of discussion, was not seriously
invoked.

At the Baguio Economic Conference of
eleven Asian nations, held in November-
December, 1947, President Manual Roxas of the
Philippines sharply raised the "persistent and
intriguing question whether a one world con-
cept is limited to the nations of Europe and the
Western Hemisphere." As though in answer,
Governor Thomas E. Dewey, addressing the
Columbia Law School alumni, charged: "The

31

free world is now in the desperate position of a
man who has gangrene in both legs in western
Europe and in Asia. As a doctor, our govern-
ment is telling the world we have a very good
cure for gangrene but we will apply it to one
leg only, while the other leg destroys the
patient."

This was the condition under which Com-
munism and democracy confronted one another
in the Far East. It may be stated flatly that
Asian peoples are not attracted to Communism.
This is partly because their values are spiritual,
not material; partly because they are farmers,
and Communism was tailored particularly for
industrial workers; and partly because, being
farmers, they are far too individualistic to wel-
come a totalitarian mold. Neither, however,
could they be ready, overnight, to adopt
Western-style democracy. Far from having
been bred on Lockian concepts of equality, their
Confucian teaching was respect for authority,
for wealth, for position, for learning, and for
age. Moreover, they lacked the literacy and
means of communication upon which an in-
formed electorate depends. Yet, caught as they
were in the middle of a colossal struggle be-
tween democracy and Communism, they were
forced to choose. And confronted as they were

32

by Russian strength and determination on the
one hand and American weakness and indeci-
sion on the other, many of them through the
postwar years began to reason: "Since we can-
not withstand Russia without American help,
and since the United States seems unwilling to
aid us, we shall probably fall under Russian
control sooner or later. Perhaps it would be bet-
ter for us to go in now, willingly, rather than
wait to be knocked down and dragged in later."
The White Paper on China, painfully spelling
out American abandonment of an anti-Com-
munist government which we nevertheless con-
tinued to recognize, greatly accentuated this
trend of thought.

So illogical are the postwar dealings with the
Far East, and so desirable is it that we Ameri-
can people understand the feelings of the
Asian peoples caught in their dilemma between
alien powers, that it seems worth while to pre-
sent the issue in the only form adequate to ex-
plain it in the topsy-turvey logic invented by
Lewis Carroll for his inverted world of Wonder-
land. Let us then, listen for a moment at the
rabbit hole :

"The truth is," said Alice firmly, "that people 'go
Communist' simply because they are pulled so hard they
cannot help themselves."

33

"Pish and tush!" exclaimed Humpty-Dumpty. "Push-
ing and pulling is no way for adults to behave. If they
have feet, their feet are for standing; and if they have
understanding, there are some things they cannot be
pushed into even if there is too little of pulling the other
way on the part of someone else." Humpty-Dumpty
looked very proud, as though he had said more in one
sentence to explain China, and Korea, and Greece, and
Czechoslovakia and Finland than Alice had been able
to do in the last half -hour.

The Red Queen snored happily in one corner, and
the White Queen stirred uneasily in another. The Mad
Hatter looked more bewildered than ever, and the
March Hare helped himself guiltily to another cup of
tea.

"The situation on Earth," Alice said, now thankful
indeed that her rabbit hole had led her so far and so
safely underground, "is not at all like that here in Won-
derland. On Earth there are Big Powers and Little Na-
tions. And the Little Nations have had their feet stepped
on so hard and so often that now they are quite, quite
too tender for standing on. They must be kept con-
stantly in warm water to ease their pain, and sometimes,
you must know, the water gets very hot."

"Unless a Nation has feet," said Humpty-Dumpty
disdainfully, "it is no Nation at all. Let it stand, and
understand, and stand alone. Or else it may as well
crawl into the pocket of a Big Power where it can sit
and light."

"Satellite, you mean," said Alice wisely, "and that is
just what many of them have become. But being pock-
eted, you know, deprives one dreadfully of the power
to move about at one's own free will."

The White Queen perspired and the Red Queen
smiled in her sleep, while the Mad Hatter and the

34

March Hare gazed vacantly into one another's eyes.

"The trouble is," said Alice, before Humpty-Dumpty
could think of what to say next, "the Big Powers con-
trol the channels of trade, and own the raw materials
and the manufacturing plants, and have the armies and
the navies and the airplanes. That," she explained, "is
why they are Big. It has very little, really, to do with
size."

"I know," said Humpty-Dumpty. "There used to be
several of them, but now there are only two and a half.
And half a Power is really uncertain as to whether it
is actually a Power or only a pow."

"I see you are learning," said Alice, while the Red
Queen stirred uneasily in her sleep. "And the next les-
son is to understand what happens when one of the Big
Powers acts like a Power, and the other one begins to
act as though it, too, were getting tender feet."

"You mean," asked Humpty-Dumpty, "that its un-
derstanding seems to be weak?"

"Yes," said Alice, "but also that it seems uncertain
whether it can stand alone, or sometimes whether it can
even stand. Then, no matter how Big it is, it begins to
act like a Little Nation. And that, you know, makes the
Little Nations in its pockets begin to feel very confined
and confused."

"And the next thing that happens," Humpty-Dumpty
added, "is that the Little Nations begin to clamber out
and climb into the pockets of the Big Power that acts as
though it is Big."

"Actually," explained Alice, "they are pulled so hard
that they cannot help going unless the other Big Power
is willing to pull back."

"But why," the White Queen asked shakily, "does not
the other Big Power begin to pull back?"

"Because," said Alice, "it would have to take its feet

35

out of the warm water and stand firmly on solid ground,
in order to make a hard pull. And the warm water feels
so good, and the firm ground is so hard, that it seems
quite unwilling to make the change."

"But," said the Mad Hatter, rolling his eyes, "the Lit-
tle Nations will soon all be in the pockets of the Big
Power that knows it is Big!"

"Yes," cried the March Hare, spilling his tea, "and
the feet of the uncertain Big Power will soon be so ten-
der that it cannot stand at all."

"And then," Humpty-Dumpty added sadly, "it will
actually be a Little Nation, too, and there will only be
one Big Power left. And all the other Nations will be
so crowded in its pockets that they will scarcely be able
to breathe."

"And that," said Alice, "is why I have decided to stay
right here in the rabbit hole, at least until the tender-
footed Big Power gets back on its own feet, and begins
to take a Firm Stand. It could really do quite a job of
pulling if it would only try."

At this the Red Queen yawned and stood up. "If you
will pardon me," she said, "I will go now and turn up
the heat. You know, I have to keep the water attrac-
tively warm until the time comes to make it really hot."

Sadly enough, the Red Queen continued to
heat the water until it came to a boil in Korea,
and the White Queen continued to keep her feet
in her own comfortably warm water, until (as
we learned in the Korean fighting) they were
almost too tender to permit a firm stand. Actu-
ally, what the United States had painfully to
achieve was to grow out of the concept of itself

36

as an island located in the middle of the Atlantic
Ocean. We had to outgrow the habit of dab-
bling absent-mindedly in Asia with our left hand
while our main attention and endeavors were
centered elsewhere. While our commitments in
Europe and our domestic political problems
proved far more interesting both to our govern-
ment officials and our people at large, this shift
of view came slowly and late. As a nation, how-
ever, we have had far more to do with the Far
East than the hypothetical man-in-the-street
readily realizes.

37

PATTERNS OF
'COLONIALISM"

THE INTEREST OF AMERICANS IN THE ORIENT

antedates the birth of our nation. Before the
Constitution was drawn, at least nine voyages
had been made to the Far East. Before Wash-
ington gave his "farewell 35 advice to avoid
entangling alliances, American ships were en-
riching their New England owners by trade with
China, Java, Sumatra, Siam, India, the Philip-
pines, and the lies de France.

The first treaty between the United States

38

and China, negotiated by Caleb Gushing, and
signed in 1844, set the pattern for our later
general policies in the Orient. The treaty fol-
lowed the "Opium War" of 1839-42, by which
England forced the Chinese government to
legalize the sale of opium, to give up Hong
Kong, and to open various ports to English
ships. The United States had no military bases
in the Far East, nor could it take any military
action without the difficult task of securing prior
approval from Congress. Hence, there was im-
provised for securing peacefully whatever ad-
vantages other nations were able to extort by
threats or force a device called the most-favored-
nation doctrine. Gushing persuaded the Chinese
Emperor to accept a clause in the treaty provid-
ing that the United States would be freely
granted whatever concessions were yielded to
any other power. Armed with this proviso, the
United States was able thereafter to deal with
China on a basis of conciliation and friendship,
merely accepting as our just due our share of
privileges resulting from the aggressive policies
of more assertive nations.

This policy of passively waiting for spoils to
drop into our laps was not consolidated, how-
ever, until after a struggle with the more force-
ful of the merchant princes who were reaping

39

rich harvests from the unprotected Chinese.
An American trading company seized the prin-
cipal port of Formosa and secured the protec-
tion of a detachment of Marines. Washington
thereupon warned them that Congress would
not approve of this action, and the seizure was
balked.

China reacted to pressure from the West with
an agrarian revolution, establishing a new
Taiping Government that abolished slavery, re-
distributed the land among the peasants, and
promised: "All shall eat food, all shall have
clothes, money shall be shared, in all things shall
there be equality." In the face of this move-
ment, which started in 1848, the Manchu
Dynasty collapsed, and during a period of twelve
years the Taipings extended their rule over most
of China. The possibilities for democratic pro-
gress, elevation of the Chinese standard of living,
and consequently for development of a genuinely
healthy trade with the West, were enormous.
But the immediate threat to the slave and
opium trade was of more concern to British and
American traders. American and French forces,
uniting with the British navy, put down the
rebellion and restored the pliant Manchus to
power. The price for this assistance was an
additional surrender of Chinese sovereignty to

40

the West. The four major concessions wrung
from the Chinese by their "benefactors" were
(1) acceptance of the principle of extrater-
ritoriality; (2) restriction of Chinese customs
duties to 5% ad valorem; (3) control of Chinese
customs revenues by the foreign powers; and
(4) legalization of the opium trade.

The opening of Japan to the West in 1854 by
Admiral Perry was followed by the garrisoning
of Western troops in Japanese cities and control
of Japan's tariffs by the Western powers. In
1868 the foreigners, led by the British, fomented
and supported the revolution that restored the
Meiji dynasty from its seclusion in Kyoto, re-
instituted Emperor worship, subordinated the
200 feudal principalities to the throne, and
placed the Samurai warrior class in power. This
was done in the interests of providing a single
central government with which the trading
powers could deal. They did not realize they
had unleashed a dragon they would soon be
unable to control.

Continuing their advances, Americans in
1882 opened Korea, "The Hermit Kingdom,"
to Western penetration, and in return for the
isolationism they had destroyed signed a treaty
(in 1883) with the King of Korea, providing for
mutual aid in case either country should be un-

41

justly treated by another. By this action the
United States unwittingly placed itself in the
middle of a rivalry that was soon to dominate
all north Asia the struggle for power between
Japan and Russia. In Japan, the Samurais
were rapidly developing their military power
and reviving their centuries-old dream of world-
wide conquest. Meanwhile, Russia had extorted
from China the largest single prize secured by
any Western power, the Siberian maritime prov-
inces. Both Russia and Japan realized that the
Korean peninsula was the military key to control
of north Asia, and commenced maneuvering for
it. The first blows were struck by the Japanese,
who in 1895 murdered the Korean patriot,
Queen Min, and in a whirlwind war forced
China to withdraw its support from Korea.

The gathering strength of both Japan and
Russia was causing increasing concern to the
British. Their first move was to encourage the
hesitant United States to attack Spain and to
take over the Philippine Islands, thus irretriev-
ably involving American interests in the Far
East. The effects of this action were almost
immediately demonstrated. A new nationalist
revolutionary movement in China, led by the
Boxers, threatened Western privileges, and the
United States, with its armed forces now in the

42

Philippines, was induced to supply the troops
needed to cut through to Peking and smash the
rebellion. England's next move was negotiation
of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, in 1902. Since
she had to face Russia in both Europe and
Asia, and Japan only in the latter area, it
seemed wise to encourage Japanese expan-
sion at Russian expense. Theodore Roosevelt
added his support, and the Japanese launch-
ed a surprise attack against Russia in 1904.
Roosevelt then sent his Secretary of War,
William Howard Taft, to Tokio to reach a
secret agreement with Katsura, the Foreign
Minister, offering American concurrence in the
seizure of Korea in return for a Japanese promise
not to attack the Philippine Islands. Not only
was the treaty of 1883 forgotten, but Roosevelt
in effect told the Korean King that the matter
was "none of his business" when he sought to
send emissaries to the treaty session in Ports-
mouth that formalized the Japanese acquisition
of a Protectorate over Korea.

The impracticality of this type of power-politics
log-rolling was soon demonstrated. By 1907
the Japanese and Russians had signed an agree-
ment in which each recognized the position of
the other in their respective spheres, and united
in blocking the efforts of American railroad in-

43

terests to buy a controlling interest in the South
Manchurian Railroad. By this sequence of
events, the dominant position established by the
United States in Manchurian and Korean trade
was ended.

The final disillusionment with America's
whole course in north Asia up to this time was
expressed by Theodore Roosevelt in 1910: "I
do not believe in our taking any position any-
where unless we can make good; and as regards
Manchuria, if the Japanese insist on following
a course of conduct to which we are adverse,
we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go
to war, and a successful war about Manchuria
would require a fleet as good as that of England
plus an army as good as that of Germany. The
Open Door policy in China was an excellent
thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in the
future . . . but as has been proved by the whole
history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and
Japan, the Open Door Policy . . . completely
disappears as soon as a powerful nation de-
termines to disregard it and is willing to go to
war rather than forgo its intention."

Two world wars, and the events leading up
to them, subjected our Asiatic policies to con-
siderable strain. Having remitted our share of
the indemnities exacted from China following

44

the Boxer rebellion, we were committed to an
amorphous friendship with that tortured land.
Yet, we were inextricably a part of the power
system based on special privileges there. Once
again a people's revolution broke out in China,
this time in 191 1, and once again we were forced
by prior commitments to stand aside from it.
Women were unbinding their feet, and in 1912,
seven years before the 19th Amendment was
adopted in the United States, were demanding
equal suffrage. Enthusiasm spread for modern
education. Chinese nationalists decided that,
instead of resisting the West, they would join
it. Then came World War I, and Japan joined
the Allies. Japan's main endeavors were de-
voted to taking for herself the extensive German
holdings in China, and to presenting China
with the Twenty-one Demands that would have
made her a Japanese satellite. Woodrow Wilson
was beguiled into supporting Japanese claims at
Versailles, in the vain hope that once the League
of Nations was established all wrongs could be
righted and old pledges redeemed.

The major American counter-attack against
the Japanese was led by Charles Evans Hughes,
then Secretary of State, through the Washington
Disarmament Conference of 1921-22. Japan
was forced to accept the short end of a 5-5-3

45

naval ratio with England and the United States,
It was also forced to give up some of its terri-
torial gains in China and to sign the Nine Power
Pact guaranteeing the territorial integrity of
China. But the effects of this diplomatic offen-
sive were undermined by American business-
men, who developed a profitable trade with
Japan that gave that country precisely what it
needed to build up its military machine. And the
benefits of the naval ratio agreement were nulli-
fied by an American promise not to fortify bases
in the Pacific area from which Japan might be
attacked or a Japanese attack repelled.

By 1931 the Japanese were ready and struck
in Manchuria, violating the Nine Power Pact,
the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Treaty of 1928,
and its obligations under the League of Nations
Charter. The League, however, was dominated
by England and France, both of whom were
delighted to see a new threat developing against
Russia's eastern border. But little as the League
was willing to do, the United States would
do even less. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of
State, declared that "reports from China do
not offer grounds for noting any violation of the
Kellogg Pact." When a League fact-finding
mission was suggested, Secretary Stimson op-
posed it, italicizing his reason: "I deprecated

46

the proposal of sending by the League at that
time an investigating commission to Manchuria
over and against the objection of Japan"* The
strongest action he would take was "non-re-
cognition" of the puppet state of Manchukuo.

Japan's attack upon China in 1937 was
strongly criticized in the United States, but
during 1938 we provided Japan with 90.9% of
her copper imports, 90.4% of her scrap iron and
steel, 76.9% of her aircraft and plane parts im-
ports, 65.6% of her petroleum needs, and many
of her other sinews of war. This trade continued
to the very eve of Pearl Harbor.

The outbreak of World War II brought a
tremendous wave of new hope to the down-
trodden peoples of all Asia. The war was
manifestly a crusade on behalf of subject peoples,
and the billion inhabitants of Asia regarded the
United States as a prince in shining armor
awakened from his long slumbers to rescue them
at last. Smuggled copies of the Atlantic Charter
and of Roosevelt's promise of the Four Freedoms
for all were passed about in remote villages.
The first smashing successes of the Japanese
persuaded only Aung San, the nationalist leader
of Burma, Soekarno of Indonesia, Phibul Song-

* Henry L. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, 1936.

47

gram of Siam, and Subhas Chandra Bose of
India to throw in their lot with the architects
of the "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." The
rest were confident that American strength
would win the war, and that American idealism,
as re-expressed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, would
help them cast off the old status as colonials.

The wave of disillusionment that swept
through Asia following the defeat of Japan has
scarcely been paralleled in history. Every
colonial people in the Far East except the
Filipinos, whose freedom was pledged had
demonstrated their complete separation from
their rulers by standing aside as neutrals while
the war went on. A brief glance at the various
colonial areas will show why.

In Indochina the French colonial rulers had
frankly sided with the Japanese invaders.
French concern for their subjects is indicated in
the fact that during 1943 they spent five times
as much for opium to sell through the govern-
ment monopoly as the total budget for schools,
hospitals, and libraries. During forty years of
French rule, 31 hospitals were built in Indochina
and 81 prisons; while elementary education was
provided for only 2% of the population.

The Dutch East Indies were successfully rep-
resented in official propaganda as "model

48

colonies." During 300 years of Dutch rule, the
Dutch East India Company averaged dividends
at the rate of 18 per cent a year. In 1936, the
European population of the colony constituted
0.5% of the population, but received 65% of
the total income. Adults in Indonesia were 93%
illiterate. While 70,000,000 Indonesians lived
in squalid poverty, the income from the rich
oil and rubber resources of the islands supported
fully one-fifth of the population of Holland.

The story of English rule in Sumatra, Malaya,
Borneo, Burma, and India parallels the French
and Dutch exploitation, but was even more
thorough. India, for instance, is a rich country
of high cultural achievements. Yet the mass of
its 390,000,000 people live in a depth of poverty
unmatched elsewhere in the world. Indians
high-grade iron-ore reserves are third in size
among the nations of the world; its hydro-
electric potential is second only to that of the
United States; and its manganese production
ranks third in the world. Indian cotton produc-
tion is second among all nations, and it has a
virtual monopoly in jute. Yet these resources
have been drained off to England under a policy
of blocking industrial development in India.
England's profits from India have been esti-
mated at 150,000,000 annually, while, in 1931,

49

74 % of the population of Bombay was living
in one-room tenement apartments, under con-
ditions so vile that half the babies died before
they were one year old.

Japan, in its forty-year rule of Korea, system-
atically took over more than 80% of all indus-
trial and commercial properties, and over 50%
of all agricultural lands. Although Korea is
one of the world's richest peninsulas, and in
1939 was third among all nations in its fisheries
production, the Japanese drained off the wealth
into their own coffers. To control the nationalist
fervor of 4,000-year old Korea, the Japanese
disarmed the people and established a police
force numbering one to every 1000 inhabitants.

By contrast with these other colonial posses-
sions, the American record in the Philippines
was excellent. On July 4, 1946, our 48-year
rule of the islands was ended with the establish-
ment of complete independence. If we over-
look the cruel three-year war in which we
destroyed the Philippine independence move-
ment led by Aguinaldo at the turn of the century,
our record is one of consistent development
under the guidance of superior administrators.
Without being cynical, however, it is only fair
to point out that there is a vast difference be-
tween the basic relationship of the huge and

50

wealthy United States with the tiny island group
containing only 19,000,000 people and the re-
lationship of little England and Holland with
their vast and rich colonial empires. The United
States had less temptation to resist. What the
Philippines could produce was principally sugar,
and this competed with the profitable sugar in-
dustries controlled by Americans in Hawaii,
Cuba, and in our own West. Whereas there
was every inducement of self-interest for English,
French, Dutch, and Japanese to exploit their
subject peoples, the chief advocates of Philippine
independence included the American sugar
trusts. Whatever ethical factors are involved
here might be summarized in the fact that the
interests of Filipino nationalists happily coin-
cided with the interests of American capital.

Nevertheless, the billion inhabitants of Asia
could and did compare the American rule of
the Philippines with the record of European
countries in the rest of the Far East. They
could and did listen to reiterated American ex-
pressions of support for freedom and justice
everywhere in the world. The result was the
development of a legend of American ben-
evolence that led to the highest expectations
as American strength relentlessly pushed the
Japanese out of the areas they had overrun.

51

The end of the war against Japan was the
signal for the commencement of a series of
local wars all through the Far East. In India
the war was merely diplomatic, and was soon
capped by success for the nationalists. On
August 15, 1947, two Indian states formally as-
sumed their independence, as full-fledged mem-
bers of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
In determining why there are two, it is neces-
sary to look back to the aftermath of World
War I, when the nationalist movement in India
achieved a notable Hindu and Moslem unity.
At that time the English encouraged a fanatical
Moslem named M. A. Jinnah, who led a de-
termined movement for "Pakistan," or separ-
ation of the Moslems from the Hindus. What-
ever the future fruits of this division may prove
to be, it became an established fact, with Mr.
Jinnah as Prime Minister of the two widely
separated areas comprised in the new Moslem
state.

In Indonesia, before the Dutch returned, the
nationalists led by Soekarno (who had col-
laborated with the Japanese and refused to be
apologetic about it) set up the Republic of
Indonesia. The Queen agreed that this govern-
ment should have complete independence in-
ternally, with Dutch guidance in its external

52

relations. After Dutch soldiers were back in
the islands, however, armed with American
equipment, disputes multiplied and quickly
flared into savage fighting. British troops using
American equipment spearheaded the Dutch
attacks. Indonesians appealed to the United
Nations and to the State Department, but the
first response they got was a request by the
State Department for the British to remove the
"USA" insignia from their equipment. Even
now, with the Indonesian Republic established,
these facts are not forgotten.

The story in Indochina is somewhat similar.
As a sop to the Chinese, Indochina was split in
two along the 16th Parallel, with Chinese troops
to accept the Japanese surrender in the north,
and French and English troops in the south.
The French administration, collaborating with
the Japanese, had remained in office until
March 9, 1945, at which time the Japanese
took over. The Viet Minh, a Communist-con-
trolled independence party established in 1939,
proclaimed the Viet Nam Republic in the
Chinese-occupied zone the week of the Japanese
collapse, and by September 2, 1945, it was
solidly in control, north and south. British
troops began arriving in large numbers by
September 12 and at once proceeded to destroy

53

the new government. By September 23 they
were able to hand over the government build-
ings and at least nominal authority to the
French. Instead of disarming the Japanese
troops in Indochina, the British-French com-
bination used them to fight the guerrilla soldiers
of the Viet Nam Republic. The Chinese agreed
to turn the northern zone back to the French in
return for a French surrender of all extraterri-
torial rights in China, and for special privileges
in shipping Chinese goods to the port of Hai-
phong. Meanwhile, the Viet Nam Communist
forces, led by Ho Chi-minh (also called Nguyen
Ai Quoc) continues its fight from the inland
hills, as the United States helps France to main-
tain the anti-Communist government of the
restored monarch, Bao Dai.

The situation of China is at the lowest ebb
since its penetration by the West began. It was
bled by twelve years of continuous warfare. At
Yalta, with China not even represented, Chur-
chill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed that Russia
would get Port Arthur and control of the South
Manchurian Railway. After the collapse of
Japan, Russian troops removed much of the
machinery from the Manchurian factories, and
turned key positions and captured Japanese
arms over to the Chinese Communists. Then,

54

General George C. Marshall spent thirteen
months in China, trying to force Chiang Kai-
shek to yield to the Communist forces their basic
demands, in order that a coalition government
might be established. The United States offered
China a $500,000,000 loan if certain "reforms 55
were made in its government, but by July, 1947,
the conditions were not met and the loan offer
was withdrawn. Ruinous inflation, graft, in-
ternal strife, and continued Communist control
would appear to be China's fate for the inde-
terminate future.

The occupation of Japan is often cited as an
outstanding American success. MacArthur in-
sisted that it be conducted by the Americans
alone, keeping out the English and Australians
in order to have a plausible excuse for keeping
the Russians out, too. Emperor worship has been
abolished, a democratic constitution adopted,
and several general elections have been held.
American experts and money are rehabilitating
Japanese industry and working at the problem
of restoring its proper share of world trade.
War criminals were punished. Order and ap-
parently good relations between the population
and the army of occupation are maintained.
The military caste and the business monopolies
are systematically being liquidated. Except for

55

their ruined cities and loss of colonies, the
Japanese people may be said to have won the
war. How deep the reforms have gone and how
thoroughly the old dream of conquest has been
eradicated, only the future can reveal.

The Zaibatsu monopolies have been broken
up, and their securities, valued at $200,000,000,
are currently held by the Japanese Holding
Company Liquidation Commission. But a
dilemma exists in that these securities must
either be resold to the leading families of Japan
(the War Lords) or else the properties will have
to be nationalized, thus instituting an economic
system that could easily become Communistic.
A strong attack against measures leading toward
economic democracy is being led by the con-
servative financier, Tanzan Ishibashi, with re-
sults that threaten the democratic gains made
in Japan since the war's end. In the schools, de-
spite the official banning of certain textbooks,
there is actually very little supervision and much
of the old-style education goes on. Politically,
the backward trend is even more striking. The
two parties that are making most rapid gains
are the Liberal and Democratic Parties both
utilizing attractive names, but in fact, dominated
by members of the old ruling order. These are
all factors that are causing considerable concern

56

over the future of Japan and her role in Far
Eastern politics.

Communist propaganda and Communist
agents have made fruitful use of the distraught
conditions in each of these Asian countries. To
a dangerous extent they have been enabled to
identify themselves with genuine nationalist
movements, while the United States and its allies
have been pictured as imperialistic forces of re-
action. How deep this feeling has gone was
revealed to me shockingly when I talked with
a "liberal 5 ' Japanese school teacher from the
northern Japanese provinces. "Many of our
people believe," he said, "that the real reason
you Americans oppose Communism is because
you are afraid Russian industrialism will become
a damaging competitor for world markets. 55 In
the face of this kind of reasoning among the
one Oriental people subjected most closely to
American supervision, it is apparent that we
have a long way to go to rectify the grievous
errors of the past.

57

OUR AILING DIPLOMACY

PEOPLES ALL OVER THE WORLD HAVE BEEN BE-
wildered by our diplimacy our defeated en-
emies as well as our disillusioned friends. This
country equipped and spearheaded the drive to
win the war, but didn't know what to do with
the peace. We rushed forth like St. George to
slay the dragon of evil, but we came back more
like a paunchy suburbanite, desirous of comfort
and power but unwilling to keep in fighting
trim. If the peoples of Asia emerged from the

58

war largely negative-minded, we came out of it
with the vague affirmative hopefulness that
much of the status quo could be maintained if
only we would surrender those portions of it
which the Communist Empire most vociferously
demanded. This type of affirmation was not
enough.

In my attendance at the United Nations I
have felt an enormous pride in the United States
because of the feelings of delegates from all
parts of the free world that we Americans
fundamentally stand for human decency and
fair play. Despite dollar diplomacy, tariff
barriers, and the growing concentration in our
country of most of the world's gold and most
technological consumer's goods, the representa-
tives of the non-Communist nations freely in-
dicate in smoking-room conversations their faith
that the United States wants world stability
based on justice more than it wants any special
privileges for itself. It is this conviction (rather
than the preponderant industrial and potential
military strength of our country) which accounts
for what the Soviet has called "the automatic
majority" of the democracies in the United
Nations. The achievement of unity among the
free nations is partly a natural reaction against
Russian aggression but also partly a tribute to

59

American intentions. If the little peoples of the
world felt there were no real choice between the
U. S. and the U. S. S. R., the "automatic
majority'" in the General Assembly would never
have been formed. But while we Americans may
well feel proud of this confidence, we need in
full humility to examine the reasons why we
have not done more to fulfill the faith.

Even a hasty review of the nature and effects
of American policies in Asia indicates that ethics
have not been the lode star by which our nation-
al course has been guided. For this, however,
our policy-makers can scarcely be blamed. Per-
haps civilization has not yet developed to the
point where ethics may be expected to have
governance in the relations of nations. This
stage can hardly be reached so long as insistence
upon national sovereignty prevents the develop-
ment of an effective body of international law.
American global power emerged late in a world
devoted to power politics. Perhaps duty to our
country's welfare demanded that our diplomats
try to learn to play the same game. A review
of the diplomatic history of the West in the East
clearly shows, at any rate, that the United States
has been but one among many (and certainly
not the worst) in preferring "realism" to
"idealism."

60

When, however, we turn from the ethical
approach and inquire simply whether American
diplomacy has furthered the long-term interests
of the United States in Asia, our responsible
statesmen must submit to the charge of having
failed even to exercise an enlightened selfishness.
They failed in the long-held dream of creating
a vast market for our exportable surplus; in
1935, for example, our entire trade with the
billion Asiatics was less than with the eleven
million Canadians. They did not secure special
military advantages, for, as Pearl Harbor
proved, our Pacific bastions were merely false
facades. They did, for a time, create enormous
prestige for the United States, based upon a
belief in our special benevolence as a nation,
but this belief crumbled in Asia under the
hammering of Communist pressure while Wash-
ington waited passively for the dust to settle.

Consequently, our Asian policies had the
effect of participation in the destruction of the
age-old stability by a rapacious colonialism.
We helped bring the East out of its old apathy
and isolationism, but supported the system by
which it has been looted and victimized. And
when European colonialism was threatened
by the far worse totalitarian aggression of Com-
munism, we had neither policies nor effective

61

will to prevent these new depredations. On the
part of the American people as a whole and
most of our officials, this has all been done in a
spirit of blundering good will; the mistakes
have largely been of the head rather than of
the heart. But ignorance of life, like ignorance
of the law, is not a very satisfactory excuse.

The American people are entitled to know
why our diplomacy has blundered. Indeed, we
must know, if the errors of the past are not to
be carried forward into the future. One of the
most disturbing reasons has proved to be the
actual presence of treason in the very inner
sanctuaries where our policies are formed. The
trial and conviction of Alger Hiss (who was so
important a figure that the organizational meet-
ing of the United Nations in San Francisco was
entrusted to him; and who was so intimately
trusted that Supreme Court Justices testified for
him and a Secretary of State "refused to turn
his back" on him even after his conviction)
greatly shook the confidence of the American
people. The revelation that our topmost Atomic
Research Council was penetrated by a Soviet
spy was a debilitating shock. The close friend-
liness and association of John Carter Vincent,
while Chief of the Far Eastern Division of
the State Department, with Owen Lattimore

62

whose defeatism concerning the future of anti-
Communism in Asia became widely distilled
through influential publications is merely
symptomatic of the point of view which led
the State Department into one retreat after
another in the face of Communist advances in
the Far East.

One evening in Seoul, in the summer of 1946,
I had a long conversation with the ranking State
Department official in Korea, during which
the current thinking of our State Department
policy-makers was clearly set forth. "Naturally
we shall have to stand against Russian ad-
vancement at some time and in some place/"
he told me, "but this [1946] is not the time,
and Korea is not the place." He went on to
explain that the Russians were a great and
vigorous people who for centuries had sought
to extend their borders; now, after having paid
with twenty million lives for their part in the
victory over Nazism, it was wholly to be ex-
pected that they would seek tangible fruits of
victory. He reasoned that the Soviet Union was
like a jellied mass dropped on a tabletop: it
would spread out until it reached its natural
limits of expansion, after which a lasting peace
could be negotiated. When I reminded him
that Nazi and Japanese expansion had grown

63

by what it fed upon and that one advance simply
led to another, he asked sharply: "What do
you want? War?" And when I stated my con-
viction that Soviet policy really was world
domination, he dismissed further discussion as
though I had revealed a shallowness of think-
ing that made further talk useless.

This was in 1946. In late 1947, General Al-
bert G. Wedemeyer was sent to Korea and
China to make a survey and bring back recom-
mendations as to what American policy should
be. While in the Orient, Wedemeyer sent back
word to the then Secretary of State, George C.
Marshall, that his investigation would lead to a
recommendation for considerably increased
American aid to the anti-Communist parties in
Korea and to Chiang Kai-shek in China. Wede-
meyer was informed that such a report would
prove embarrassing in view of American denun-
ciations of those very anti-Communist leaders.
Accordingly, in order to soften the blow to our
policy-makers, Wedemeyer issued a newspaper
release in Nanking denouncing the Kuomin-
tang for various shortcomings which must be
rectified. Chiang Kai-shek immediately went
before the Legislative Yuan and admitted that
Wedemeyer's charges were true and demanded
full unity in accomplishing the reforms. Wede-

64

meyer flew to Hawaii for a few days of rest and
to put into final shape his report recommending
aid for Nationalist China. When he arrived in
Washington, he was informed that his report
would have to go unpublished into the files. The
decision to abandon China had already been
made.

The inability of the Department of State to
deal with the postwar problems had been devel-
oping for many years. Cordell Hull was too
convinced of the isolationist determination of
American public opinion to present sound poli-
cies before the war, and too ill by war's end to
face the problems. Stettinius was too inexperi-
enced. Byrnes and Marshall, both also inexperi-
enced in international affairs, were kept fully
occupied in attending international conferences,
in which they could no nothing but adhere to
the policy directives drawn up by their career
specialists. Acheson served as Under-Secretary
of State long enough to gain the needed educa-
tion, but he was beset by a mass of unsolved
problems and hounded by decisions made long
before he took office. So, in the very years when
the Department of State was most desperately
called upon for leadership, it was least able to
serve. What, then, was wrong?

The commonest diagnosis of the ailment is

65

poor personnel. In the final analysis this may be
correct, but the problem is not a simple one.
Thirty years ago Charles Evans Hughes pleaded
and fought for a change from the ingrained sys-
tem of seniority in the department. The Hoover
Commission has recently reopened this same
battle. But the fight is a hard one to win. During
my own two years in the federal service I came
to the reluctant conclusion that for the ordinary
career man in any division of the government,
astute caution is the chief virtue. Federal em-
ployees, like other individuals, desire to hold
their jobs and win promotions. They soon learn
that the best way to do both is to say and do as
little as possible.

If a federal official makes a good decision, he
is likely to be assailed by the heads of other
departments as having infringed on their au-
thority. If he makes a bad decision, he is over-
whelmed with obloquy from all sides. The
easiest and safest thing to do is to make no deci-
sions at all. Keep the problems "under study";
report "progress" from time to time; "consult"
with every other agency involved ; request more
funds from time to time, and, when they are not
granted, point out how the work is being handi-
capped; defer any decision until "joint action"
can be taken, thus simultaneously spreading the

66

responsibility and winning a reputation for care-
ful thinking and cooperation. These are the
office-holder's success formulas, known collec-
tively to the citizenry as "red tape." No real
improvement in the Department of States's
working echelons nor in other governmental
agencies can be expected until these formulas
have been eliminated.

One thing people forget when they try to dis-
cover what ails the State Department is that its
employees are individuals pretty much like
everyone else. They range in ability from clerks
able to earn $1,800 a year to administrators who
can command $10,000 or more. They have their
prejudices and special interests and their own
quota of ignorance. Most of them are not super-
men afire with zeal to reform the world (and
some who are have drunk their draught of in-
spiration from the wrong bottles), but simple
family men who want security and a living wage.
Some are industrious and some are lazy. Most
of them do their assigned work with a decent
conscientiousness. Some work their hearts out
and ruin their health to serve the needs of this
tragic time, and others (like the great bulk of
the rest of the citizenry) want to close up their
desks when the clock strikes five and go home to
their hobbies and their families.

67

Physicians soon acquire an impersonal and
detached attitude toward suffering and disease.
State Department officials develop this same
professional immunity to international crises.
Cases of stomach ulcers are no more frequent
among its seasoned functionaries than in any
other critical segment of the population. They
know from long experience that one crisis will
pass and another will come to the fore. They
know that there will be newspaper editorials and
excited deputations demanding action upon
Peron's regime in Argentina or the recognition
of Franco's Spain or the situation that dragged
on for years in Korea. And they know that, if
they sit tight and assert stoutly that "the situ-
ation is being carefully studied," the crisis will
probably either dissolve or pass out of the pub-
lic's attention.

Beyond and aside from personnel problems,
however, the system by which international re-
lations is conducted has itself been much at
fault, especially since December 7, 1941. By defi-
nition, our Department of State is presumed to
have control over our relations with other na-
tions. But this has never been wholly true in fact
and in recent years has not been even half-true.
Pearl Harbor placed direct control of our most
important foreign relations in the hands of the

68

Departments of War and Navy. Presidential and
Congressional decisions placed other important
international functions in such newly-created
agencies as the Lend-Lease Administration, the
Office of Strategic Services, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Economic Cooperation Ad-
ministration, and the various bodies associated
with the United Nations. In theory, these
diverse bodies were all to work together toward
the same ends, but coordination has always been
difficult even on basic policies and non-existent
on details.

The confusion and inefficiency caused by
overlapping and ill-defined spheres of authority
were well illustrated by the postwar develop-
ments in Korea. Lt. General John R. Hodge was
named late in August, 1945, as commander of
all American forces of occupation. He declared
that the Department of State had full authority
in all policy matters, but spokesmen for the
Department of State repeatedly asserted that,
as field commander, Hodge was fully responsible
for all decisions affected by local conditions.
General Hodge was assigned the function of
negotiating directly with Guard Col. Chistiakov,
commander of the Russian forces in northern
Korea, to attempt to reach an agreement for the
reunification of the divided zones of occupation.

69

Chistiakov had no authority except to carry out
explicit orders from Moscow, yet the State
Department failed for over two years to open
direct consultation on Korea with the Kremlin.

On all matters pertaining to his military force
and supplies, General Hodge was obliged to
report to MacArthur in Tokio. Yet MacArthur
refused to accept responsibility for Korea, so
that the reports had to be forwarded through his
office for decision in the Pentagon. As military
ruler of southern Korea, Hodge was subject to
the "advice" of the State Department, but the
personnel and equipment with which he oper-
ated had to be secured from the Department of
Defense. The Far Eastern Division of the State
Department continually urged Hodge to secure
or train personnel able to deal effectively with
Korean problems, but the Pentagon kept recall-
ing his officers home and replacing them with
raw recruits.

Because Korea's basic economy had been
ruined by the 38th Parallel line drawn between
the industrial north and the agricultural south,
the Department of Commerce was given author-
ity to "study 95 remedial measures. The former
Japanese-owned plants in south Korea (com-
prising over 80% of the total number) were
held in trust by the United States Army of

70

Occupation to be turned over later to a Korean
government; but Congress refrained from voting
either the funds or authority required to keep
the plants in operation. Under the stress of
general economic deterioration, the Korean cur-
rency steadly lost value, and the Department
of the Treasury was charged with responsibility
for recommending reform measures and to work
out a plan by which the currency could be
readmitted to international exchange. Since
food shortages were severe, the Department of
Agriculture was called in to study and apply a
program of improved land utilization.

With so many hands trying to spin the wheel,
and no one having authority to call the turn, the
result was stagnation, confusion, and increasing
misunderstanding. Korea was part of the dust
that was left not so much to settle as to accumu-
late. And the Korean people along with the
rest of the Orient were left in puzzled bewil-
derment as to why our foreign policy was so
confused.

Of course the American public wondered, too.
Sometimes, citizen groups in Oshkosh or Peoria
got strongly enough worked up over a problem
to send deputations to Washington. A State
Department official would always courteously
give them time to state their case. Then he

71

would smoothly and accurately inform them
that due consideration would be given to their
point of view, but that he himself had no au-
thority to pass upon it. Only when persistent
individuals tried to thread their way through the
maze to discover (if they ever could) just where
the decisions are made did they learn how cum-
bersome and far removed from the people our
representative democracy often is.

What the delegations from Oshkosh and
Peoria are less likely to conclude, however, is
that a large measure of blame for the mistakes
and futilities of our foreign policy is their own
fault theirs, and their friends back home. This
is not only true in the sense that the elective
officials are there because our ballots put them
there. Much more significant, even, is that they
must formulate and apply policies within a
climate of national opinion. Washington does
not easily forget such lessons as the storm of
denunciation that poured upon President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt after his premature appeal in
Chicago, in 1938, for a "quarantine" of aggressor
nations. Nor should Washington forget. So long
as democracy is to exist, it must and in fact can
take its actions only in accord with prevailing
public opinion. When we denounce the Presi-
dent and the State Department for having

72

neglected the Orient, we should recall that the
American people the newspapers, the radio
commentators, and the community discussion
groups also largely ignored that part of the
world. When we impugn the Department of
Defense for permitting our defenses to decay, we
should in all realism remember the nation-wide
cry to "Bring the boys home!" and the vocifer-
ous demands for lower taxes, fewer controls, and
more consumer goods. In large part, the mis-
takes in American foreign policy are traceable
directly to the fact that the whole of our people
have had to learn slowly that what affects the
rest of the world also affects us.

We Americans are in a sense aware that in
international diplomacy the role of the United
States is a difficult one. Our deep-seated in-
stincts and natural habits are to disavow any
responsibilities beyond our own borders. We
have been isolationists, in the main, for 150
years, and old habits of thinking and acting are
difficult to shed. It is hard for us to step onto the
stage of world affairs and act now as though
every quarter of the globe is a matter of our
intimate concern. We know that we are a world
power. We fully realize our armed forces are on
every continent and every ocean. We are aware
that our decisions and intentions are studied in

73

every capital of the world. We understand that
we have exercised influence in shaping the des-
tinies of many peoples who know little of the
United States except our reputed fabulous
wealth and power. And we are somewhat dimly
aware that with this influence goes also the
responsibility of following through to see that it
does the maximum of good and the minimum of
harm.

All of these things we do at least partly under-
stand we who live in Oshkosh and Peoria, our
representatives in Congress, and our officials in
the Administration. Yet the fact of our world
responsibility is so new that we exercise it cau-
tiously, uncertainly and at times capriciously.
We can take a bold and effective stand in Greece
and Turkey, but then, as though frightened by
our own temerity, we must balance it by taking
a weak stand in Asia. We can vote EGA aid as
a frankly recognized necessity if our allies are to
win back to a position where they can help us
defend the free way of life, but we must satisfy
both old habits and the dissident voters in
divided constituencies by insisting that this aid is
precarious and may at any time be withdrawn.
Because of such factors as these we often appear
harsh or muddle-headed to peoples we intend to
befriend. Slowly we are gaining the sureness of

74

experience as a world power, but the process is
not a lovely one to watch.

The collective responsibility of all the people
for our foreign policy, and also the fact that
many governmental agencies are involved in its
planning and execution, is readily ignored in a
time of crisis. Then the State Department takes
all the blame. A Senator McCarthy, under-
standing the ways of politics, picks up a dead
fish and slaps it across the face of the Adminis-
tration, well knowing that any less gentle
method would result only in murmured pro-
testations and a few brief newspaper stories
buried on page eight. The public becomes
aroused, and the problem becomes one of focus-
ing that indignation into channels where it can
do some good.

The situation in Korea prior to the Com-
munist attack illustrated all the factors reviewed
in this chapter. The public was uninformed and
indifferent. The so-called "Korean experts" in
the Departments of State and Defense had
either never known Korea at all or had known
it under Japanese rule, and many of them
acquired the Japanese view that Koreans are
second-class citizens. There is not a single Con-
gressman who has any considerable bloc of
Korean-Americans in his constituency, so there

75

was no prodding at the ballot box to demand
attention. As has already been illustrated, the
responsibility for Korean decisions was so com-
plexly intertwined and ill-defined among many
agencies that it was far easier to take no action
at all than it could have been for any forthright
officials to devise and secure adoption for any
one consistent policy. With its attention at-
tracted elsewhere (and in any event with far
more to be done than human beings can accom-
plish), the top Administration made no effort
to educate the citizens regarding the problems
in Korea not, at least, until after the EGA
moved into Korea, and by then it was too late.

We may say, then, that the malady of the
State Department stems from two sources. One
is the cumbersome, overlapping and ill-defined
division of authority among too many agencies
and departments. The other is that the tre-
mendous problems of a world that has suddenly
become one must be dealt with by men whose
limitations are very much like our own.

Secretary Acheson has no medicine to cure
this ailment. The remedy must fit the dual
nature of the disease. There must be, first, a
drastic reorganization of the executive branches
of the government to bring all international
authority under one head or at least into close

76

working cooperation. The President and the
Congress together could do this, but the Secre-
tary of State cannot. And, second, there must be
better salaries, more attractive circumstances,
and a pressure of public demand which together
may bring wiser and more devoted men into the
service of the Department of State.

An observer of the Washington scene can
discern little reason to hope that either of these
remedies will soon be applied. The failure to do
them may already have cost us the opportunity
we won in the crucible of war to help remake
the world along democratic lines. It is still cost-
ing us the respect and confidence of bewildered
people everywhere, who probably couldn't do
better themselves but who assuredly expect
better of us. And as we watch the crumbling of
democratic defenses before the onward march
of Communism, we are forced to conclude that
this failure may cost us the necessity of waging
an atomic war.

77

LAND OF THE
MORNING CALM

KOREA HAS ALWAYS BEEN HIGHLY REGARDED BY
its Asian neighbors. The Chinese historians call it
"The Land of Scholars and Gentlemen." Japan
got its Buddhist religion and most of its cultural
developments from Korea. Combining a rug-
gedly independent spirit with a taste for art and
a respect for individuality, Koreans received
from China and India (and developed in their
own way) significant elements of the broad
cultural-philosophical character that stamps the

78

varied peoples of the Orient. It is both creature
and creator of the Asian mind of the past, just
as it is both victim and key opponent of the
crushing power of Communist ideology and
might in our own time of flux.

During its long history, Korean cultural
achievements were considerable. The oldest
existing brass, iron-work and pottery show ex-
quisite workmanship. The mariner's compass is
thought to have been invented in Korea and
there is evidence that metal movable type was
used in Korea earlier than in China. While
Europe was just emerging from the Crusades,
the first Korean encyclopedia, in 112 quarto
volumes, was published. In the fifteenth century
the great King Sei-Chong built a public hall
where the classics were expounded (a forerunner
of the American Chautauqua system), estab-
lished four colleges in the four corners of the
kingdom, reformed the penal system, edited
significant books, and stimulated the mechanical
arts.

Culturally, Korea fits into the general patterns
found elsewhere in north Asia and has made its
own share of significant contributions. Andreas
Eckhardt, author of A History of Korean Art,
felt it "no exaggeration to aver that Korea is
responsible for the production of by far the most

79

beautiful, or rather, the most classical works of
art in the Far East." W. B. Honey, Keeper of the
Department of Ceramics of the Victoria and
Albert Museum in London, thought the Korean
ceramics of the Koryu period "unsurpassed for
beauty of form. They have," he explained, "an
easeful serenity and grace, flowing and seem-
ingly effortless, yet never lapsing into facility or
trivial prettiness. Like the Corean people, even
today, they have strength and dignity, as well as
great charm."

In Korea, as in other Oriental countries, the
family is the most important social unit. GIs
stationed in Korea during our period of occupa-
tion found to their disappointment that there
could be no "fraternization"' with Korean girls.
The few girls who broke this strict moral code
were beaten by their friends or families and their
bodies thrown in the Han River. After marriage,
the sons continue to live at home, so that family
establishments may be large. Males outnumber
females by 104 to 100 and spinsterhood is almost
unheard of.

Marriages in Korea are arranged not in
heaven but by the parents in former days with
the assistance of professional "go-betweens."
Even at the present day, public courting is un-
heard of. Many times I was asked by wondering

80

Korean boys whether it was true that in the
United States the men and women kiss one
another. The Japanese had said it was so but
the Japs told them so many falsehoods ! When I
responded by asking the Korean youths why
they didn't marry girls of their own choice, they
looked at me gravely and answered: "In the
United States you marry the girl you love. In
Korea we love the girl we marry." Whatever
one may think of the system, their divorce rate
is much lower than ours !

The fertility ratio is higher for every province
and every city of Korea than for any part of
Japan. Available figures show the birth rate in
Korea was 42.3 per thousand in 1925, 45.5 in
1930, and 45.8 in 1935. This is below the rate
for Costa Rica, Guatemala, Salvador, and Pal-
estine, and approximately the same as for Egypt,
Argentina, and Bulgaria. The high birth rate of
Korea is directly traceable to early marriages,
social pressures for large families, and lack of
any tradition or methodology for birth regula-
tion. Neither abortion nor infanticide has been
culturally admissible in Korea, as they were in
the late Tokugawa period in Japan.

According to the 1930 census, 66 % of the
women aged 15 to 19, and 96% of all women
from 20 to 24, were married. Only one fifth of

81

1% of women above 50 were unmarried. The
average number of children per family in the
decade between 1925 and 1935 was seven. Dur-
ing this period, however, only 60% of the males
and 63% of the females survived to the age of
six. A sharp commentary on conditions in Korea
under Japanese rule is the fact that the life
expectancy at birth for males was 32.4 years for
Koreans in Korea, 38.8 for the Chinese in For-
mosa, and 44.8 for Japanese in Japan, during
the period 1926-30. The death rate for boys aged
4 to 12 was three times as high in Korea as in
Japan.

Mark Twain once wrote that the test of any
civilization is the way the people treat their
children. By this test, Korea is one of the most
highly civilized nations in the world. For there
is no country in which children are more loved,
and none in which the children are happier. The
sound of children's laughter is the dominant
sound in city or country wherever Koreans live.

"Child psychology" in Korea is a very simple
matter. The parents lavish love on their chil-
dren, spoil them outrageously, and enjoy them
fully. Girls are fully as much loved as boys, and
the normal family welcomes many of both. No
matter how poor a family may be, the first
matter upon which the parents pride themselves

82

is to have their children well-fed and well-
clothed. Visitors in the countryside have been
struck repeatedly by the neatness of the chil-
dren's dress, however hard the living conditions
may be.

With many children on the street, it is easy to
get acquainted with them. Since they don't
expect to be mistreated, they are very friendly
and will crowd around a stranger at the slightest
show of interest on his part. Even with a lan-
guage barrier to overcome, it is easy to engage
them in a conversation compounded of three
parts sign language and one part Koreanized
English, such as, Hello! Hubba hubba! and
O.K.

Even five and six-year-old youngsters are
likely to have on their backs a baby brother or
sister whom they watch over solicitously. Thus a
sense of responsibility and family affection is
early induced.

The games they play are similar to those of
American children without ready-made toys:
tag, hide-and-seek, hop scotch, and teeter-totter-
ing on miscellaneous pieces of boards. They are
very fond of a game with a handful of pebbles,
tossing them in the air and catching them as
they fall, on the backs of their hands. And they
have many athletic games, such as jumping rope,

83

high-jumping, wrestling, and a kind of boxing.
Since marathon running is one of Korea's
leading sports, this explains why a Korean set a
new record for the Boston Marathon in 1948
and why the three Korean entrants placed first,
second and third in 1950.

Following Confucian principles, respect for
age is very marked. When you meet a Korean
who is obviously older than you are, it is con-
sidered polite to ask his age, and then to bow
slightly and murmur, "Sung sannim" "My elder
one/ 9 Traditionally, the mother is ruler of the
household, with the sons' wives as her assistants.
The men of the family have separate quarters in
which they entertain male guests. All sit cross-
legged on the floor before small tables, drink
saki, and eat prodigiously of rice, fish or meat,
and kim-chi, a very popular and tasty mixture
of pickled vegetables. The women work end-
lessly, at keeping the houses clean, preparing the
food with infinite attention to detail, and wash-
ing and sewing the white garments which are
the national costume. The men work the rice
paddies cooperatively, all assisting each other in
preparing the ground, planting, cultivating, and
harvesting the crop. But each owns his own field
(or rents it) and takes his own crop.

One of Korea's strongest ties with the West

84

has been religion, for Korea has been among all
Oriental countries the most receptive to Chris-
tianity. After the opening of Korea by treaty
with the United States, the first Protestant mis-
sionary to take up regular work there was Dr.
Horace U. Allen, who arrived in September,
1884, under the Presbyterian Board of Foreign
Missions. He was followed in April, 1885, by Dr.
Horace G. Underwood, whose family is now in
its third generation of devoted service to the
Korean people. The Methodist Board opened
work at almost the same time, H. D. Appenzeller
arriving in Seoul in the summer of 1885. Cath-
olics, Episcopalians, Seventh Day Adventists, the
Salvation Army, and the Y. M. C. A. have been
the other principal mission groups.

Catholic efforts in Korea have been directed
by Maryknoll missioners, with headquarters in
New York, and by St. Columban's Foreign
Mission Society, with headquarters in Nebraska.
Maryknoll priests and sisters operated particu-
larly in the Pengyang district in the north. After
the occupation, many remained to work under-
ground, in cooperation with the native clergy.
At last report, Monsignor Patrick J. Byrne of
Maryknoll, Apostolic Visitor to Korea, stationed
at Seoul, was a prisoner of the Communist forces.

At one time there were at least 2,000 and

85

probably 3,000 Korean Christian churches. The
Korean people went a long way toward accept-
ing Christianity as their predominant religion
and as such they built their own churches and
supported their own pastors. Japan always op-
posed the Christianizing of Korea, just as it
frowned upon Christian efforts in its own coun-
try. As Japan's anti-Occidental program became
more and more apparent, it imposed ever-sterner
restrictions upon the Korean Christians. By
1940, all but a handful of missionaries had been
driven out. The rest were subsequently interned.
Church worship was practically prohibited and
Shinto shrines were erected before which the
worship of the Japanese Emperor was decreed.

Following the defeat of Japan, the missionar-
ies returned to south Korea and their work has
been accelerated. The President of the Korean
Republic, about half his cabinet, and well over
half the National Assembly members are Chris-
tians. Soviet occupation of northern Korea, on
the contrary, maintained much the same condi-
tions the Japanese had imposed. Missionaries
were not allowed to return. Many churches were
taken over for use as Communist meeting halls.
Korean preachers and their congregations have
been subjected to special surveillance and re-
strictions. As rapidly as possible, Christian lead-

86

ership amenable to full Communist control has
been recruited and placed in charge of the
remaining congregations in the north.

The Korean national character is based in
part upon a sense of humor which seldom fails.
The sound of laughter is endemic in Korean
villages. It was Kim Kwang Je, President of the
Korean Cultural Association, who told me the
best mother-in-law story I have ever heard. "A
husband and wife/ 5 he said, "who always quar-
reled about each other's relatives were sitting
quietly in their home one evening when the
husband took his long-stemmed pipe from his
mouth and said thoughtfully, 'Wife, I have de-
cided I will say something good about your
relatives this evening. 5 'Yes? 5 his wife asked ex-
pectantly. 'Yes, indeed, 5 he replied soberly. 'I
have decided that I like your mother-in-law
better than my mother-in-law. 5 " When I visited
Yun Po Sung, then Mayor of Seoul, he showed
me two huge cranes stalking about gravely in his
garden. "How long does a crane live? 55 I asked
him, for I knew that to Koreans the crane is a
symbol of longevity, "Oh, 55 he replied, dead-pan,
"a thousand years, so they say. For myself, I
don't expect ever to learn the truth. 55 A third
story reflects the pride which never lets a
Korean gentleman complain. A poor but proud

87

old scholar was sitting in thin and worn clothes
on the floor of his hut, with no fire, and with a
cold winter wind blowing through the broken
windows. An opulent stranger passing by spied
the old man and called out to him in a cheerily
sympathetic voice, "Ah, my poor old one, how
cold you must be !" "Not at all, Sir," the old man
replied in disdain, "Do you not observe how the
cold air passes out of one hole as soon as it enters
by another?" With a sense of humor like this,
the Koreans are able to take a lot of punishment
and keep coming back for more.

No outsider can possibly phrase the essence
of the Korean spirit as well as they have done it
for themselves. Most meaningful of any folk-
expressions are the proverbs which gain currency
as epigrammatic summations of the philosophy
of the workaday people. Any attempt to depict
the Korean character should include a represen-
tative selection of Korean proverbs:

Pinch yourself and you will know the pain another
feels when pinched.

Don't draw a sword to kill a mosquito.

A room easily warmed is also easily cooled.

The water downstream will not be clear if the water
upstream is muddied.

Beware of a sword hidden behind a smile.
88

Blame yourself, not the stream, when you fall in the
water.

A virtuous character is necessary even in driving a
cow.

If you love your own children, love also those of
others.

The darkest spot is just below a candle.

A man who has burned his tongue on hot soup is
likely to blow on cold water.

You cannot carry a stone up the mountain without
getting red in the face.

You cannot catch even one rabbit if you chase two
at once.

Don't try to cut water with a sword.

You cannot eat the picture of a loaf of bread.

Where there are no tigers, wildcats will be very self-
important.

It is useless to pour instruction into a sow's ear.

Don't kill a bullock for a feast when a hen would
suffice.

To make a mountain, you must carry every load of
earth.

A finger prick will demand attention, though the
worms be eating the heart unknown.

What looked like blossoms on the dead tree turned out
to be only the white mold of decay.

You cannot sit in the valley and see the new moon set
89

The flower that blooms in the morning is withered by
noon.

You can mend with a trowel today what it will take
a spade to mend tomorrow.

Seeking to formulate the unbeatable spirit of
this often-tried people, I put my faith and ad-
miration for them in the following words:

STEADFAST

Koreans are not Chinese-men,

Russian or American;
Koreans are not Japanese,

Never Japanese!

Koreans are a prideful race,

An ancient and a gracious race;

Korean kings have ruled for aye,
Koryu, Silla, Yi.

Watch Koreans' careworn faces,

Calm, impassive, knowing faces;
Eyes alight with spirit bold,

Stirred by tales oft-told.

The old South Gate is standing still,
The ancient wall winds o'er the hill;

Korean strength still works the land
They staunchly understand.

Though now the dawn with troubled skies

O'er Seoul and rice paddy lies,
When yet ten thousand years have passed

Korean faith will last.

90

HISTORY OF A PROBLEM'

THE KOREAN PROBLEM GOES BACK IN A WAY TO
the United Nations agreement of November,
1947, to assume responsibility for holding elec-
tions and to wipe out the 38th Parallel division.
Or to the Russian-American agreement to
divide the country into two zones. Or to 1919,
when Korean patriots arose in peaceful revolu-
tion and established their Republic-in-exile. Or
to 1910, when Korea was formally annexed by
Japan. Or to 1905, when, by the Treaty of

91

Portsmouth, Korea was placed under Japanese
"protection. 5 " Or to 1882, when the Hermit
Kingdom, as Korea was then known, was
opened to the West by the American Commo-
dore Schuf eldt and was assured of fair treatment
by a "mutual assistance 55 pact with our country.
Or to 1 835, when the first Occidental missionary
a French Catholic priest, Pierre Maubant
entered the peninsula. Or to 1597, when Korea,
after a seven-year war costing hundreds of
thousands of lives and virtual destruction of the
nation 5 s cultural and productive resources, de-
feated and turned back Japan's first attempt to
conquer the Asian mainland. Or to some 2,000
years B. c. when Western civilization was com-
mencing to stir and Korea, too, was becoming a
nation.

Although Koreans date the origin of their
nation from the supposed advent of Dan-goon,
4,283 years ago, the structure of their society is
believed to have been developed from the scan-
tily recorded flight to northern Korea of the
Chinese noble, Ki-ja, Counsellor to the last of
the Shang Emperors. When the Chou Dynasty
seized power in China in 1122 B. a, Ki-ja is
thought to have fled for sanctuary to the Ever-
white Mountains in northern Korea, taking with
him a following of 5,000 poets, musicians,

92

traders, and doctors, there to promulgate the
"Eight Laws* 31 of right relationships and to found
the kingdom of Chao-hsien (or Chosen). Thus
commenced the influx of Chinese culture which
the Korean people adapted as the basis of their
own homogeneous civilization.

The earliest detailed historic records of un-
doubted authenticity tell of the Chinese refugees
who came to Chin-han about 255 B. c., at the
time of the building of the Great Wall. Subse-
quently, there flourished the great period of Silla
civilization, lasting for 1,000 years, with its
capital in the southeastern city of Kyongju,
where still stands the oldest existing solar
observatory in the world, and ruins of the great
seven-story pagoda and other evidences of a
magnificent city that then contained over a
million enlightened inhabitants. Following the
fall of Silla, the capital was moved to Kaesong,
just south of the 38th Parallel line, and from the
new ruling dynasty, Koryu, came the modern
name Korea. In 1392, General Yi T'aejo re-
volted and established his own family as ruling
monarchs, in the present capital city of Seoul.
His descendants continued to reign for 518 years,
until the nation was annexed by Japan.

A brief chronology of Korean history com-
prises the following periods:

93

Dan-goon (traditional) 2333 to 1122 B. c.

Ki-ja (quasi-historical) 1122 to 193 B. c.

The Three Kingdoms

Kokuryu (north) 73 B. c. to 668 A. D.

Paikche (southwest) 18 B. c. to 660 A. D.

Silla (southeast) 57 B. c. to 935 A. D.

Koryu (capital at Kaesong) 918 to 1392

Yi Dynasty (capital at Seoul) 1392 to 1910
Japanese rule 1910 to 1945

Russian-American division and

occupation 1945 to 1948

Republic of Korea inaugurated August 15, 1948
(With area north of 38th Parallel held by a

Communist regime)

Before the Russian- American occupation there
existed the economic dislocation caused by the
harshness of Japanese rule in Korea. The
avowed intent of the rulers was to "Japanize"
Koreans. Economically, this meant a draining
off of Korean wealth to Japanese use. As
Hazumi, Chief of the Japanese Department of
Industry, admitted: "After the annexation of
Korea its industrial development was consciously
checked." By devious means, Japanese rapidly
gathered into their own hands almost all the
property of value. A study of Ikson County in
southern Korea, published in 1926, showed that
by then 68 % of all property was owned by the
8,000 Japanese residents, with the remaining
32% shared among the 120,000 Koreans. By
1938, 81.9% of all Korean farmers were full or

94

part tenants, with 58% owning no land at all
and only 13.7% owning all the land they fanned.
By the close of Japanese rule of Korea, Japanese
ownership extended to over 90% of all incor-
porated wealth. These Japanese holdings were
taken over as the Japanese residents in Korea
were repatriated to their own country, and were
turned over to the Republic of Korea upon in-
auguration of the new government in 1948.

Socially and politically, the effects of Japanese
rule were similar. The schools were taught in the
Japanese language and only Japanese-language
newspapers could be published during the latter
years. Freedom of assembly and freedom of
speech ceased to exist. Almost all the teachers,
professional workers, and government officials
were Japanese. In 1920, for example, when
Japanese made up 25% of the population of
municipalities, they elected 203 of the total of
268 members of municipal councils. The year
1920 is a significant one, for at that time Baron
Saito was appointed Governor General to reform
the administration of Korea (or Chosen, as the
Japanese called it) and to insure to the Koreans
the full rights of Japanese citizenship. As part of
his "reform" he increased the police force by
45%, from 14,358 to 20,771. Before his "re-
form," Japanese comprised 42% of the police

95

force; after it, 58.6%. And the proportion of
Japanese police officers rose from 58.7% to
73.3%. As an unintended tribute to the Korean
people, it was felt necessary by the Japanese
(despite their large police force) to disarm the
population so completely that only one kitchen
knife was permitted to every four families !

Against this Japanese rule occurred one of the
most remarkable revolutions in history. During
the spring of 1919, under the inspiration of
Woodrow Wilson's promise of "the self-deter-
mination of peoples," Korean patriots planned a
passive demonstration against Japanese rule
over two years before Gandhi's celebrated
"march to the salt marshes" in India. Under the
leadership of Pastor Kil and Yi Sang-jai in
Korea and Syngman Rhee in America, they
printed from carved wooden blocks a declaration
of independence, and circulated it around
Korea, tucked in the sleeves of school girls. To
all their followers they also sent strict instruc-
tions : "Whatever you do, do not insult the Jap-
anese. Do not throw stones. Do not hit with
your fists. For these are the acts of barbarians."

For perhaps the first time in history, this was
a revolution not against but for; not to destroy
Japanese rule but to offer so convincing a testi-
mony of united Korean will for freedom that the

96

peace-makers in Paris would be moved to make
Korean independence a part of the peace settle-
ment. With this in mind, on Saturday, March
1, 1919, 33 men met for lunch in Seoul, signed
the declaration of independence, and sent for
the police. Simultaneously, in villages and cities
all over Korea, more than two million demon-
strators drew forth home-made and forbidden
Korean flags, marched down the streets shout-
ing "Mansei!" ("May Korea live ten thousand
years"), and gathered to hear the declaration of
independence read. In response to this peaceful
demonstration, the Japanese, hysterical with
fear, fell upon the crowds with swords, firehooks
and guns, killing some 7,000 and leaving many
more cruelly wounded and beaten. As for the
peace-makers in Paris, they looked the other
way.

What this date of March 1 means to Korean
patriots is well illustrated in the opening para-
graphs of President Syngman Rhee's speech in
Seoul on March 1, 1950. So aptly does it echo
the sentiments of Korean determination for free-
dom that it is well worth reading in connection
with the tragic events in Korea today. The first
part of the address is as follows:

"There are days in the lives of men and of nations
that carry a significance none of us wish to minimize or

97

ignore. Today March the first is such a day in the
living history of Korea. It was on a Saturday at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon in 1919 thirty-one years ago
when the great spirit of the Korean people rose out of
the chains cast upon them by force and by treachery,
and reasserted the dignity and the eternal being of our
ancient nation.

"The world has had few occasions to observe such an
example of simple heroism as the people of Korea per-
formed on that day. Let us review the circumstances
and refresh our souls by contemplation of the courage
and the devotion to freedom demonstrated on that brave
day.

"In 1919 the world had recently emerged from a shat-
tering and destructive world war. The evil military
power of aggression had been smashed and the democ-
racies had won a war that, it was hoped, would end for
all time the selfish ambitions of imperialistic powers. In
Paris the statesmen of the world, led by America's im-
mortal Woodrow Wilson, were gathered to insure the
right of self-determination to all liberty-loving peoples
in every land. This was their ideal, proclaimed in ring-
ing words for all the world to hear.

"Korea was far from Paris. The eyes and the ears of
our people were shuttered by Japanese military power.
The words of the statesmen in Paris were not directed to
us, for Japan, our ruthless oppressor, had been their
war-time ally. Yet, in our cities and on our farms those
words were heard. In the fall of Germany our people
read the lesson of tyranny's defeat. In the depths of
their own hearts the patriots of 1919 heard whispering
echoes of freedom's promise. And they determined that,
come suffering or come death, they would cast off their
chains and stand before the forum of the democratic
world as free men and women.

98

"In January and February of 1919 a thrill of renewed
hope and courage ran through our oppressed land.
Daring men met in cellars to print in secret a declara-
tion of independence that had been hewed by hand on
wooden blocks. School girls trudged from village to
village, carrying copies of the declaration hidden in
their sleeves. In hundreds of communities from the
Straits of Korea to the Tumen and Yalu Rivers, men
and women met in hidden council to plan the day of
liberation.

"The soldiers and police and spies of the enemy
dwelt in our midst, watching alertly for any signs of re-
volt. Tens of thousands of our people joined in planning
and preparing for the day of liberation, yet no sign was
given to betray their purpose to our oppressors.

"Then the fateful day arrived. At the Bright Moon
Restaurant in Seoul, thirty-three leaders met calmly for
a last meal together. Then they read the Declaration
of Korean Independence, signed their names to it, and
called in the police. All over Korea, at the same hour,
huge crowds gathered to hear the same brave words.
"After the Declaration twas read, the millions of
patriots in every district of our land brought out our
forbidden flag and marched peacefully and joyously
down hundreds of village streets. There was no violence,
no hatred, no lashing at the oppressors in our midst.
With dignity and restraint, the people of Korea pro-
claimed the inalienable truth that they were and would
remain free and independent. Here in our homeland
those patriots swore eternal allegiance to the bold senti-
ments uttered by the peace-makers in Paris. We, too,
a nation over four thousand two hundred years old,
were and of right ought to be, the masters of our own
destiny despite the bayonets and the bullets of the
Japanese who had seized and who ruled our land.

99

"Such was the spirit of that first day of March, thirty-
one years ago. Thousands of our people died in the
following weeks to seal with their blood the living truth
that Koreans will not and cannot be enslaved. This was
the heritage they have left to us. This is the faith
theirs and ours in which our Republic was born and
in which it lives.

"Today we meet in the aftermath of another war
which was fought in order that tyranny might not pre-
vail. Once again the right of freedom was proclaimed
and the aggressors were struck down. And once again
we in Korea find the hard-won peace marred by for-
eign despots in our land.

"This tame, however, we have powerful friends. This
time half our country and two-thirds of our people are
free. This time we exercise our own government in at
least a part of our ancient nation.

"May this day be in our hearts a time of reverence
for the past, of courage for the present, and of dedica-
tion for the future. The seeds planted in 1919 have not
yet come to full harvest, but they have proved of hardy
growth. Doubters and traitors have sought to trample
down the tender growth of national freedom, but the
great mass of our people have sturdily cultivated and
nurtured the precious planting of March the first. Never
shall we falter or fail until the harvest of a reunited
and independent Korean nation is secure."

Congressman Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey
has said that the cold war could best be under-
stood by a study of Russian-American relations
in Korea. More broadly, it may be asserted that
a study of Korea will serve as an excellent intro-
duction to the complicated patterns of Oriental

100

history, culture, and psychology. For, all through
its history, Korea has been a crossroads of
civilization in the Far East. Its period of "her-
mitage" did not begin until after the 1592-97
war with Japan and even then close contacts
with China were maintained.

Korea is a "buffer state" 1 located in the heart
of the strategic triangle of North Asia, bounded
by China, Siberia, and Japan. Its people are a
distinctive race, called by the late Smithsonian
anthropologist, Ales Hrdlicka, "the best people
of the Orient." Larger, stockier and more indi-
vidualistic than the Japanese, they resemble
most closely the Manchurians who for centur-
ies were under Korean rule. Unified in race,
language, religion and culture, the Korean
people were and are one, despite the postwar
division forced upon them. Their language is a
unique achievement in the Orient, consisting in
its written form of twelve vowels and fourteen
consonants, as contrasted with the complexity of
the ideographs in the Chinese and Japanese
languages. Over 75 % of them earn their living
as farmers, tending plots of ground averaging
about two acres. Life in Korea has always been
hard by American standards, but, before the
Japanese seizure and exploitation of the country,

101

the Korean standard of living was the highest in
the Orient.

In peacetime, the country is as attractive as
its poetic name, "The Land of Morning Calm,"
indicates. It is a mountainous peninsula about
the size of New England, with New York and
New Jersey added; and Korea has about the
same population (30,000,000) and the same
climate as that area of the United States. The
average annual temperature, Fahrenheit, in
Mokpo, on the southwest coast, is 55.6; in
Seoul, the capital, 51.6, and in the northern
city of Heijo, 48.6. These temperatures may be
compared with the annual average of 55.4 in
Baltimore, Maryland. Along with the balmy
climate (unpleasant only during the June to
August rainy season), the beauty of the moun-
tainous scenery (with 36 mountain peaks above
7,000 feet and 62 above 6,000 feet) has led some
to call Korea "The Switzerland of Asia." The
peninusla is cut across by five rivers: the Yalu
and Tumen, running along the Korean-
Manchurian border, and the Han, Naktong, and
Taidong, further south. These rivers run east
and west, across the peninsula, and average from
near 500 to 250 miles in length as compared to
the 306-mile length of the Hudson and the 475-
mile extent of the Seine, An almost unbroken

102

wall of cliffs along the east coast contrasts with
the deeply indented and rolling coastlines of the
south and west. Near its 5,400 miles of coastline
are clustered 3,479 islands. It is no wonder that
ancient Korea was the seafaring nation of the
Far East and the greatest ship-building country
of the old Pacific Basin.

The major Korean cities (Seoul, Kaesong,
Taejon, Taegu, Mokpo and Pusan, in south
Korea) have westernized business districts not
unlike those in our less prosperous towns. Seoul
was the first city in the Orient to have an electric
streetcar system built by Americans. Even in
remote farming villages, the clay-walled, straw-
thatched farmers huts have electric lights. The
heating system of Korean homes is actually
superior to ours, for their heat vents go from the
kitchen stove under the floors of the living
quarters, and thus put all the heat where it is
most needed. Their garbage disposal and water
supply systems, however, are primitive indeed.
One of the things Americans in Korea soon learn
is to "breathe with the wind" when the "honey
carts" go by, hauling out scrapings of city toilets
and garbage cans for use as fertilizer in the rice
paddies.

When reunited, Korea will represent the most
hopeful potential of any nation in Asia. It is

103

one of the rich areas of the earth's surface.
Korea normally produced some of the best rice
grown in the Far East. It has more coal and
mineral resources than any other part of the Far
East except Manchuria. Its anthracite coal re-
serves were estimated in 1939 at 1,340 million
tons and its soft coal at 410 million tons, with an
annual consumption rate at that time of only 2
million tons. Its gold production through the
thirties averaged $36 million a year, and rose as
high as $50 million. The importance of its min-
erals lies less in their quantity than in their
variety. The known existence of coal, iron, gold,
silver, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, lithium, mica,
nickel, barytes, molybdenum, magnesite, alum,
shale graphite, fluorspar, and kaolin, together
with its forest lands, provides a foundation for
extensive industrialization. Prior to World War
II, Korea produced 3% of the world's gold, 30%
of its graphite, and provided half of Japan's
tungsten needs.

An official estimate of a potential hydro-
electric capacity of 5 million kilowatts provides
a power capacity exceeding the electricity gen-
erated in either Italy or France in 1937.

In 1939, Korean fisheries 5 production was
third among the nations of the world. With a
6,000-mile coastline, along which warm and

104

cold sea currents meet, Korean waters contain
75 kinds of edible fish, 20 kinds of edible shell-
fish, and 25 other commercial sea animals and
plants. Chief need for development of this in-
dustry on a world market is for additional
canning resources.

With 75% of its population on farms, Korean
agriculture is the most important factor in its
economic life. Rice comprises 58.9% of its total
farm production, making prewar Korea the
world's fourth largest rice producer. Considering
all food crops, in terms of yield per acre, A. J.
Grajdanzev has estimated that "if the average
figure for the United States is taken as 100, the
average is 92 for Korea." Greatest development
can come from increased irrigation of existing
and new fields, and from more diversification,
particularly to increase vegetable and livestock
production.

The southern zone comprised approximately
36,00 square miles; north Korea, about 48,300
miles. A 1944 estimate by the Natural Resources
Section of SCAP indicated that 85% of all min-
erals mined in Korea were produced north of
the 38th Parallel. Over 50% of the gold produc-
tion was from north of the line. Grajdanzev's
survey of Korea's mineral and power resources
concludes that "only the northern and east cen-

105

tral part of Korea have rich coal deposits. These
regions also possess great waterpower and iron-
ore reserves, and so are destined to become the
seat of Korea's heavy industry." In 1944, 22 coal
mines in all Korea produced 1,556,468 metric
tons of coal, while in May, 1946, five mines in
all south Korea produced 24,161 tons. Of seven
factories producing inorganic fertilizers during
1940-44, only two were located south of the 38th
Parallel. Korea's seven major cement plants,
with an annual capacity of 1,500,000 tons, were
all in the north.

It should not be assumed that the northern
zone was wealthy and the southern poor. Two-
thirds of the population did not deliberately
choose to crowd into the 44% of the area lying
south of the 38th Parallel because that was the
least desirable section. The contrary may be
assumed. South Korea not only had the best
farm lands, but the best climate, the best fisher-
ies* outlets, and a respectable amount of small
industries' development. Both north and south
suffered grievously from the division. The Kor-
ean peninsula was destined both by nature and
by its historic development to be one nation.
And as the Korean people have abundantly
proved, they feel themselves destined to rule
their own destinies.

106

PLEA FOR RECOGNITION

KlCHISABURO NcmUBA WILL ALWAYS BE RE-

membered as the two-faced Japanese Ambas-
sador who kept Secretary of State Cordell Hull
busied with negotiations for a peace settlement
up to the very minute Pearl Harbor was bombed
two-faced, but one-eyed. And therein is a part
of the story of how Korea came to be remem)-
bered.

Leaders of the passive revolution in 1919 met
secretly in Seoul and organized a Provisional

107

Republic. Then they fled to Shanghai and
elected Syngman Rhee as their President. This
new paper government was destined to become
the world's longest-lived Republic-in-exile and
to set a pattern for the exile governments of
World War II. With little more than the faith
of a handful of patriots to support it, the Provi-
sional Republic set out to organize an adminis-
tration, raise an army, wage war, and seek
diplomatic recognition.

The effort was naturally divided into two
parts one military, the other diplomatic. A
group of soldiers and guerillas, led by Kim Koo,
Kim Yak San, and Li Chung Chun, set up suc-
cessive bases in Shanghai, Nanking, and Chung-
king moving always just ahead of the Japanese
from which to carry on a war of exasperation
against Japan. The Annual Report for 1936-37
of the Governor General of Chosen admits that
16,000 Korean guerrillas were harrying the
border guards. The Provisional Government it-
self claimed an active field force of 30,000.
Whatever the number, it was enough so that
General Li Chung Chun could ambush and
annihilate the crack Japanese Ihitsuka regiment.
This fighting continued for twenty-five years,
with some aid from Chiang Kai-shek and with

108

annual budgets running as high as half a million
dollars.

Nomura's eye represents another phase of the
running war. Assassination of high Japanese
officials was considered a legitimate part of the
battle for independence. From among the
Korean "suicide squad," young Li Bong Chang
made a daring attempt in Tokio, on January 8,
1932, to assassinate the Emperor himself. He
succeeded in tossing a bomb into the imperial
procession and killed several officers, but the
Mikado was riding in another car. On April 29,
1932, an unusual assemblage of high-ranking
Japanese gathered in Honkew Park, Shanghai,
to celebrate the conquest of Manchuria. Yun
Bong Kil was the Korean selected to make the
most of this opportunity. With a huge hand
grenade concealed in a bandage on his arm, he
squirmed his way close to the reviewing platform
and tossed. Nomura's eye was not the only
casualty. Foreign Minister Shigemitsou, who
stumped aboard the Missouri on September 2,
1945, to sign the surrender papers, lost a leg.
The Japanese Commander-in-Chief Sirakawa
and General Kawahara lost their lives, and sev-
eral other top officials were wounded.

Thus, in China, along the Siberian border, in
Manchuria, and within Korea itself the fight

109

for independence continued. Never powerful
enough even to approach a decisive action,
Korean guerrilla bands at least kept both the
Japanese and the captive Korean population
aware that the Provisional Republic had never
surrendered.

Within the Provisional Government splits and
divergent parties arose, as happens in all exile
groups. But as war tension increased in Europe,
all the Korean elements in China except the
Communists reunited in one National Assembly
in January, 1939. And after the German attack
on Russia, the Korean Communists also came
back into the fold, "because," as their Manifesto
of 1942 read, "the democratic countries of the
world have now formed an anti-Fascist bloc and
gone to war with the Fascist powers."

The diplomatic phase of the independence
movement was directed by President Syngman
Rhee. He went to Shanghai in 1920 to meet
with his cabinet and the Assembly, but immedi-
ately returned to the United States. A scholar
rather than a militarist, he placed his faith in an
appeal to the conscience and good will of the
democratic peoples. Since he had earned a doc-
torate at Princeton under Woodrow Wilson-
and had been invited to the White House for the
wedding of Wilson'fc daughter he felt some

110

confidence that the force of moral sentiments
which Wilson had organized and enshrined in
the Covenant of the League of Nations might yet
provide a channel through which Korean pleas
for independence could be heard.

As a first step, on June 18, 1919, he wrote
directly to the Emperor of Japan "To give the
Japanese a chance" as he said in a spirit of grim
humor. Since his letter both fulfills the spirit of
the peaceful demonstration of March 1 and also
embodies the determination which kept Korean
nationalism alive, it is worthy of note:

"Permit me at once to assure your Majesty, and the
people of Japan, of our sincere intent to establish per-
petual peace, good will and cooperation between the
Peoples of Japan and Korea.

"We first address Japan, with the hope and may we
not say with the expectation, that our differences may be
explained and done away with, avoiding outside inter-
vention. May we not now bespeak from Japan her aid
and cooperation, appealing to her generous impulses, for
the welfare of a sister State?

"I am impelled by my duty to my People to officially
inform you, and without anger, animosity or offensive
intent, that on April 23rd, 1919, Korea became a com-
pletely organized, self-governed State. All formalities
were strictly followed and adhered to. A call and declar-
ation that had been prepared by consent and will of the
People of Korea, was publicly read and proclaimed in
over three hundred places in Korea, simultaneously, on
March 1st, 1919.

Ill

"Complying with that declaration and call, Delegates
were elected by the people from each of the thirteen
Provinces. These Delegates convened at Seoul, Korea,
on April 23rd, 1919, and there and then organized and
created the Korean National Council, a representative
legislative body, to govern Korea. The Korean National
Council, at the same session, honored me, by electing me
President of the Republic of Korea, and also elected
other executive officers.

"Other Powers, especially those with whom Korea has
Treaty covenants, calling for their good offices, have
been officially notified of these facts. No doubt you have
already been fully advised of them through other
channels.

"Korea is now in a position to govern herself, and in
her own way. She has chosen the representative form of
government, of and by the people, in regular, orderly
manner.

"It is my duty, and the desire of the People of Korea,
that in the name and by the authority of the Republic
of Korea I now ask Japan to withdraw all armed and
military forces from Korea, and all Japanese officials,
civilian and otherwise, of every description, with the
exception of the usual diplomatic envoys and consuls. It
is our desire that you, in regular form, recognize the
Republic of Korea as a distinct, independent, sovereign
State, and that all supposed Treaty covenants inconsist-
ent with these objects be acknowledged to be void.

"Let past differences and disputes be now adjusted*
and eliminated, and let us enter upon a new era of
perpetual peace and good will between our two nations."

Of course, the letter was never answered.
Rhee sought a passport to France so that he
could appeal in person to the Paris Peace Con-

112

f erence, but Wilson personally asked the State
Department not to issue it, in order to avoid
agitating the Japanese who were presumed to
form the keystone of the arch of perpetual peace
in the Pacific. When the Disarmament Confer-
ence was held in Washington in 1921-22,
elaborate efforts were made to get the Korean
case on the agenda, but all that resulted was a
spate of speeches in the Senate. Rhee's next
major effort was a visit to Geneva in 1933 to
appeal to the League of Nations. But the League
even avoided condemning Japan's aggression
in Manchuria and all that Korea gained was
some sympathetic consideration by a few dele-
gates. During all these years, and for many more
to come, Rhee kept the Korean Commission
alive in Washington as the unofficial representa-
tion of his unrecognized government.

Then came Pearl Harbor. The United States
was at war with Japan. The spirits of Korean
nationalists revived. Cho-sowang, Foreign Min-
ister of the Provisional Republic, cabled to
Secretary Hull from Chungking, pledging the
support of the Korean people in the fight against
Japan. In effect, he asked for recognition of
Korea as a co-belligerent. This cable was
ignored. When Rhee followed it up in person,
he met rebuff after rebuff. Whatever the real

113

reasons may have been, the State Department
felt it was still "unwise to agitate the question of
Korean independence." The Korean Commis-
sion files for the subsequent war years bulge with
the many communications addressed to the De-
partment of State ("May I have the honor of an
interview . . . " and "May I bring to your atten-
tion the facts . . . ") and the replies ("The
Secretary regrets . . . " and "The Secretary can-
not see ..."). Efforts to secure Lend-Lease aid
to train and arm Korean guerrillas and pleas
that the Korean underground movement be in-
tegrated with the plans of the Allied High Com-
mand similarly were rejected.

The refusal during the war years to recognize
any Korean government was paradoxically
tempered by a "recognition" of the Korean
people. Even though the State Department con-
tinued to insist that Korea was, and must be
considered as, merely another province of Japan,
the Korean aliens resident in this country were
in general accorded the same treatment granted
to "friendly aliens" from other lands. On March
1, 1943, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle
wrote to Dr. Rhee:

"It may be recalled that various steps have been taken
by various agencies of the United States Government
whereby Korean aliens are now treated as distinct from

114

Japanese aliens. These steps include the action of the
Department of Justice in allowing Korean aliens to reg-
ister as Koreans rather than as Japanese subjects, under
the Alien Registration Act of 1940, the action of the
Department of Justice in exempting Korean aliens from
applying for certificates of identification as enemy na-
tionals, the exemption by the Department of Justice of
Koreans from compliance with regulations controlling
travel and other conduct of aliens of enemy nationalities,
and the action of the Governor of Hawaii, in connection
with Executive Order No. 8832 amending Executive
Order No. 8389 (Treezing order'), whereby the position
of Korean aliens in Hawaii was ameliorated."

Despite the recognition of Korean nationality
implied in this letter from Mr. Berle, no govern-
ment for these Korean nationals was recognized.
The reasons were, prior to Pearl Harbor, to
avoid antagonizing Japan, and thereafter, to
avoid antagonizing Russia. In view of the
anxiety in many quarters to get Russia into the
Asiatic war, withholding any decision regarding
Korea's future status seemed necessary until
Russian intentions toward Korea were clarified.
To the extent that this was the view of the State
Department, however, it represented either a
willingness to trade off the independence of a
small nation to win the favor of a large one, or
else it demonstrated a fear of developing any
foreign policy that might have offended a
powerful ally.

115

It is conceivable, although it seems unlikely,
that State Department officials knew so little of
Asian history as to be unaware of any special
Russian interest in Korea. If this could have
been the case, they may simply have felt that,
inasmuch as Koreans had not had a government
of their own since 1910 brushing aside the
government-in-exile they surely could wait
another few years until after the defeat of Japan
made possible the holding of an election. It
seems hardly possible, however, that the experts
in the Far Eastern Division of the Department
of State could have combined so much ignorance
of Russia's consistent Far Eastern policies during
the past seventy-five years as to have reached so
naive a conclusion.

Sumner Welles expressed his view of the treat-
ment the Koreans were receiving by writing:
"With the restoration of Korean independence,
one of the great crimes of the twentieth century
will have been rectified, and another stabilizing
factor will have been added to the new interna-
tional system which must be constructed in the
Pacific." Franklin D. Roosevelt (who thought
far more highly of Welles than did Cordell Hull)
came to the same conclusion, and, at the Cairo
Conference of November-December, 1943, he,
Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek re-

116

solved that: "Mindful of the enslavement of the
Korean people, the aforesaid three great powers
are agreed that, in due course, Korea shall be
free and independent. 55 Russian agreement was
secured at Potsdam and was incorporated in the
Russian statement of aims upon entering the
Pacific war.

Meantime, the Yalta Conference had been
held. It was there that the price of Soviet help
against Japan was demanded and paid. Besides
what turned out to be a free hand in Eastern
Europe, Russia asked and gained control of the
South Manchurian Railway and of the ports of
Dairen and Port Arthur. Dr. Rhee, at the time
of the San Francisco organizational meeting of
the United Nations, charged that Russia had
also won an agreement for control over Korea.
This the State Department denied. When the
same question was asked Winston Churchill dur-
ing a debate in the House of Commons, he
replied that there was no secret agreement at
Yalta but that many things had been talked
over and basic understandings had been reached.
This statement of ChurchilPs is the most candid
ever officially revealed for the origin of the 38th
Parallel division of Korea. It was not until the
issuance of General Douglas MacArthur's Gen-
eral Order No. I, following the defeat of Japan,

117

that the line was publicly avowed. Russian
troops were to enter north Korea (as they did on
August 10, 1945) to receive the surrender of
Japanese troops in that area, while American
troops went into southern Korea a month later
for the same purpose. After the Japanese were
disarmed, Korea was to be reunited under a gov-
ernment of its own choice. Thus, at least, the
agreement ran.

Within a few days it became apparent that
the Russians, far from planning a withdrawal
from Korea, were hastily organizing a "People's
Committee" in their zone. Byrnes, Molotov, and
Bevin considered the problem at Moscow in
December of 1945 and there agreed to a four-
power trusteeship (with Great Britain and China
to join the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. ) to rule Korea
for five years. Korean nationalists immediately
protested and nation-wide demonstrations took
place in Korea. Rhee and his associates objected
that trusteeship was an insult to a nation that had
been self-governing for over 4,000 years. They
pointed out that trusteeship was not in accord
with the Cairo pledge. And they argued that a
trusteeship council representing four nations
(with Russia among them) never could agree.
They further prophesied that the five-year
period would be only a beginning. Communist

118

agitators could and would stir up so much
trouble that internal conditions could plausibly
be cited by the Soviet Union as a reason for con-
tinuing the trusteeship as long as might prove
necessary to fasten a Communist grip on the
entire peninsula.

As it turned out, Soviet obduracy itself made
trusteeship a dead issue. When two joint
Russian-American conferences were held in
1946 to devise means of reuniting the country,
Soviet delegates took the stand that all Koreans
who opposed trusteeship must be eliminated
from any administration that would be set up
thus assuring that only Communists would be
eligible. The United States insisted that all
Koreans be given full and free consideration.
Endless hours of discussion failed to even make
a dent in the impasse. In June, 1946, the Rus-
ians retired to the 38th Parallel and the stale-
mate was solidified.

Syngman Rhee had returned to Korea in
October, 1945, and in his first address to a
gathering of 200,000 in Seoul Stadium he set
forth clearly the Korean demand for reunifica-
tion of the country and complete independence.
"Through the years of Japanese oppression," he
said, "we remained unconquered and undivided.
We intend to remain so, even at the cost of our

119

lives. The Allied Powers might as well know that
now." A year later, on the anniversary of Japan's
defeat, he re-emphasized the same theme:

"I have a word or two for the world statesmen
the men who have the destinies of the human
race in the hollow of their hands. In their efforts
to establish peace upon earth they should forego
the mistaken policy of expediency and appease-
ment and stick to the principles of justice and
law. A patched up peace a peace purchased at
the sacrifice of human rights is not a lasting
peace. No nation can guarantee its own safety
and security by allowing an injustice to be done
to its weak neighbor. The history of the last forty
years proved this fact. Had the great powers
joined hands and stopped the international
gangsterism in time, they might have saved
themselves and the world from this horrible war.
Justice and liberty to all is the only foundation
of peace among men and nations. We demand
justice and no more or no less."

The Korean nationalists' concept of justice
was an immediate election in south Korea, since
Russia would not agree to reunion of the whole
country. Before yielding to any such half-
measure, however, George Marshall, who then
was Secretary of State, made one more attempt
to either win an agreement from Russia or

120

secure so positive a repudiation that the United
States might feel free to deal as it wished witJh
southern Korea. Consequently, while he was in
Moscow in March, 1947, he handed Molotov a
note requesting a revival of the Joint Russian-
American Commission of Korea, with the
proviso that all Koreans who agreed to let
trusteeship be discussed in the Commission
should be considered eligible for election to a
free Korean government. To Marshall's surprise,
Molotov promptly agreed to what on the surface
appeared a major retreat from the previous
Soviet position. In order to make assurance
doubly sure, Marshall repeated his proviso in a
second note, and again Molotov agreed. Much
as the State Department had learned about
Russia since 1945, it still had not fully learned
that agreements are considered by the Kremlin
merely as tactical maneuvers to gain time or
other advantages. An additional lesson on this
theme was taught to our diplomats when the
Russian- American conference convened in Seoul.
The daily meetings dragged along through June,
July, and August, and never got beyond the
point of argument over what the proviso really
meant. The Soviets argued that it meant only
Communists could be admitted to the govern-
ment, for only Communists were "sincere 55 in

121

agreeing to a discussion of the trusteeship ques-
tion. On this rock the discussions finally split and
foundered.

Rhee was already on record with a program
which he had presented in anticipation of the
failure of the conference. In essence, it was as
follows:

( 1 ) An interim government should be elected
for southern Korea, to serve until the two halves
of Korea could be reunited, with a general elec-
tion to be held immediately thereafter.

(2) Without disturbing the direct Russian-
American consultations on Korea, this interim
government should be allowed to negotiate di-
rectly with Russia and the United States con-
cerning the occupation of Korea and on other
outstanding questions.

(3) This interim government should be ad-
mitted to the United Nations.

(4) Korean claims for reparations from
Japan should be given early consideration, to
aid in the rehabilitation of Korean economy.

(5) Full commercial rights should be granted
to Korea, on a basis of equality with other na-
tions, and with no favoritism extended to any
nation.

(6) Korean currency should be stabilized and
established on the international exchange.

122

(7) United States troops should remain in
southern Korea until the two foreign armies of
occupation should simultaneously withdraw.

Secretary Marshall had ready a proposal of
his own, which on August 26, 1947, he sub-
mitted to Molotov, for discussion in a confer-
ence among representatives of Russia, the
United States, China, and Great Britain. This
proposal consisted of the following parts:

(1) In both the U. S. S. R. and U. S. zones
of Korea there shall be held early elections to
choose wholly representative provisional legis-
latures for each zone. Voting shall be by secret,
multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suf-
frage and elections shall be held in accordance
with the laws adopted by the present Korean
legislatures in each zone.

(2) These provisional zonal legislatures shall
choose representatives in numbers which reflect
the proportion between the populations of the
two zones, these representatives to constitute a
national provisional legislature. This legislature
shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional
government for a united Korea.

(3) The resulting Provisional Government of
a united Korea shall meet in Korea with repre-
sentatives of the four Powers adhering to the
Moscow Agreement on Korea to discuss with

123

them what aid and assistance is needed in order
to place Korean independence on a firm eco-
nomic and political foundation and on what
terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

(4) During all the above stages the United
Nations shall be invited to have observers pres-
ent so that the world and the Korean people
may be assured of the wholly representative and
completely independent character of the actions
taken.

(5) The Korean Provisional Government
and the Powers concerned shall agree upon a
date by which all occupation forces in Korea
will be withdrawn.

(6) The provisional legislatures in each zone
shall be encouraged to draft provisional consti-
tutions which can later be used as a basis for
the adoption by the national provisional legis-
lature of a constitution for all of Korea.

(7) Until such time as a united, independent
Korea is established, public and private Korean
agencies in each zone shall be brought into con-
tact with international agencies established by
or under the United Nations and the presence
of Korean observers at official international
conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate
cases.

These proposals were flatly rejected by the

124

Soviets, and the Korean question was then pre-
sented by the United States to the United
Nations. A new chapter of the Korea story thus
commenced. Before examining it, however, we
shall, in the succeeding chapter, describe condi-
tions inside Korea as they existed during the
period of military occupation. And both as a
preparation for this and as a summary here, it
seems pertinent to present the complete text of
a speech delivered by Syngman Rhee in Seoul,
on August 27, 1947, in which the aims and the
tragic dilemma confronting the Korean nation-
alists are revealed:

"The policy of the United States toward Korea dur-
ing the period since the defeat of Japan has been to
select the best available choice among three possible
alternatives:

"(1) To establish a coalition government for Korea
in agreement with Soviet Russia.

"(2) To establish a government in south Korea
which for a number of years would be controlled polit-
ically and economically by the United States, during
which time the Korean people would gain experience
in the administration of their own affairs and thus be
prepared for eventual complete independence.

"(3) To hold a general election and establish a na-
tional congress and a national government in accord-
ance with the sovereign will of the people.

"Among these three alternatives, the first has finally
been eliminated because of the deadlock that developed
between the delegates of the United States and Soviet
Russia in the Joint Commission. Therefore, the choice
now rests between the remaining two possibilities.

125

The plan for a partial government, limited and con-
trolled by the United States, seems at present to be
receiving the most attention by American policy makers.
Advocates of this policy declare that, since the Korean
people were under Japanese rule during the past forty
years, they necessarily lack political experience. They
incline naturally to party factionalism and indulge
needlessly in individual struggles for power. Such being
the case, they contend, independence would not only
confuse the Koreans in their domestic affairs, but would
also cloud international relations. Therefore, they con-
clude, the United States will have to continue its con-
trol over south Korea for some time.

"We, however, irrevocably demand the acceptance of
alternative number three. There are several reasons why
we take this stand.

"The basic reason is that we do as a people unques-
tionably possess the ability for self-control and self-
government. When we recover our political government
we shall be able to solve our many pressing problems,
both internal and international, better than any for-
eigners could solve them for us. This we absolutely
understand and believe.

"Equally as important, if limitations and controls are
placed upon us, under the theory that we are unable
to govern ourselves, such controls may well last for sev-
eral decades before a condition is achieved that would
appear satisfactory in the eyes of those who now urge
such external controls. We are deeply concerned by such
reasoning. Our people are resolved for immediate in-
dependence and demand it. A long period of foreign
control would not be tolerated. The result would be the
sacrifice of many Korean lives, the useless expenditure
by the United States of great sums of money, and a
tragic weakening of the traditional friendship between
Korea and America. Consequently, the adoption of the

126

second alternative would be a great disaster for both
Korea and the United States.

"We who live in the midst of these conditions and
who see these dangers must do our best to explain the
reasons for the inapplicability of continued external
control to the great statesmen and leaders of public
opinion in the United States. Our job is to make them
understand what is involved. The results of bad pub-
licity carried on by the Japanese against Korea for forty
years have implanted die idea in the world that
Koreans are unable to govern themselves. Many people
who influence world opinion and actions have that hazy
idea in their heads, and we must help them get rid of
it. In doing so, the best approach we can use is to show
the world that our country is one united and homo-
geneous.

"National unity does not mean that we should dis-
solve all our political and social organizations, and in
name and principle become one party. But if we have
the same purpose and have spiritual unity, we shall be
able to agree upon common procedures for the accom-
plishment of our common goal. Since our entire people,
including those of the north (in the Russian-occupied
zone), do have the same objective, our spiritual unity
has already been demonstrated.

"On the other hand, among those who advocate the
second alternative, there are certain ones who empha-
size the idea of disunity among the Korean people and
point toward the divided rule of our country. We who
see and know what is the purpose of this propaganda
must work to make it useless. We must prove to the
world that this propaganda is false. Let us forget about
political and factional differences and rise to a higher
level of common friendship. That is the only way by
which such propaganda may be destroyed.

"Still others among us say that if we want real in-

127

dependence we must not cooperate with any other
countries. This is empty talk, in view of the realities of
our situation. At the present time, even the largest and
richest countries, especially when they face a threat of
war, must have the cooperation of other nations to
strengthen them for such a venture. With empty hands,
if we stand alone, with no one to give us sympathy and
hope, how could we possibly clear avowed enemies of
our independence from our land? To talk of not wanting
help from other nations is misleading.

"The main stream of public opinion among our
people is that, in order to restore our independence, we
must hold an election and establish a government. But
there are certain politicians among the Americans who
differ with us, saying that it is their purpose to help
the Korean people to work toward independence, but
that at the present time independence is impossible.
Under such circumstances, we must do everything to
consolidate our unity in order to break up that idea
and to achieve complete independence as soon as pos-
sible. We must get the sympathy and understanding of
the American public in combatting this charge of in-
capacity to rule ourselves. If we should take the position
of not cooperating with the Americans who want to
help us, we shall lose a powerful supporting force. At
the same time, we must keep in mind that there are
some who have ulterior motives. By ourselves, how
could we combat those ambitious men and achieve our
goal of freedom?

"We want to cooperate with the United States. What
must be clearly understood is that we shall not sacrifice
our basic principles in an attempt to buy friendship.
Therefore, our cooperation is directed along every line
that brings us closer to our objective.

"There is a faction of public opinion in the United
States that asserts Koreans do not want American

128

troops stationed in our country. They declare, then, that
American troops may be withdrawn, regardless of what
Russia may do in the north. They urge that an Amer-
ican withdrawal will save occupation expenses, and will
remove one possibility of war. Any representation of
that as a Korean desire is simply not true and is the
result of either misunderstanding or the instigation of
those who hope to gain by it. We must realize that
there are certain groups among Americans who would
gladly see Korea lose her independence. They are the
ones who advocate withdrawal of American troops,
while the Russians remain.

"We have never demanded that Americans alone
withdraw, and iwe do not do so now. What the United
States may decide to do about it is its own business.
However, the division of Korea into two zones was
brought about by a Russian-American agreement. The
simple act of withdrawing could not relieve the Amer-
icans of their responsibilities. If certain Americans
wished to withdraw their troops, the American people,
who take seriously the principles of justice and responsi-
bility, would not permit them to do so. There is, there-
fore, a real need for basic and mutual cooperation
between Korea and the United States to solve the
problem of the 38th parallel division.

"There are certain people who contend that, as long
as American troops remain in Korea, our country can-
not possibly be independent. This may be true theoret-
ically, but it is not true actually. After the war ended,
American troops remained in China for several months,
but that did not interfere with Chinese independence.
Many other countries in which troops were stationed
retained their independence. This is a special arrange-
ment necessitated by the war. At the present time, we
are still in the midst of conditions born out of the war.
We are enduring a division of our country that was a

129

war measure. There will simply be a retention of a
small number of soldiers here to help us maintain peace
and order, due to those war-born conditions. They will
not interfere with our national rights nor with our
sovereignty. Therefore, to say that it is impossible to
have independence with occupation troops is not rea-
sonable.

"In America the view is being expressed that sooner
or later a conflict between the United States and Russia
will come. Therefore, many believe they should settle
their differences now, before the atomic bomb ceases to
be an American monopoly. This view is not expressed
by responsible officials, so that it cannot be said to be
an official policy. It would be difficult for anyone to
say when or whether the storm might break. But, if the
situation darkens, the whole world would be dragged
into it, and we alone could not avoid it. Since we are
necessarily involved in the world struggle, we must have
our own plans to govern our own actions on the inter-
national stage, not only for the sake of self-preservation,
but also to fulfill our responsibilities as a member of
the world family of nations. We cannot have a place in
the world except through fulfillment of our duties and
responsibilities.

"Regardless of how or when the next war might
come, we could not draw aside from it, for if we did,
when it concluded we should again be in the sad, miser-
able situation we are in today. After Pearl Harbor, we
tried to get belligerent status by every means in our
power, but certain officials in the State Department
blocked our every attempt. Because of this opposition,
we were never able to exert our full force toward the
defeat of our enemy.

"If, at that time, the American State Department
had heeded our pleas, we should have avoided this
disaster of the North and South division of our

130

country. The United States would not have this head-
ache today, caused by the troublesome Korean problem.
At that time, in the Far Eastern Division of the De-
partment of State, there were some officials who be-
lieved in the past Japanese propaganda, and did not
pay any attention to Korea. As a result, we are now
treated much worse than a defeated enemy nation.
Such a lesson teaches that we must do everything
possible to recover our sovereignty. We must rush
every preparation for national defense. And we must
solve the international and domestic problems con-
fronting us in order that we may hold our rightful
place among nations.

"As the essential element in solving all these inter-
national and domestic problems, we must establish
our own government ourselves.

"In order to do our duty towards our own people,
we must help them in their economic difficulties, re-
store our national sovereignty, and bear our part in
the construction of world peace. We must hold our
general election as soon as possible. We must recognize
this as the first step in the reconstruction of our na-
tional life."

131

8

DIVIDED AND OCCUPIED

THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN MEANT TO THE PEOPLE

of Korea the realization of a dream they had
treasured in their hearts for more than a full
generation. At last they would be able to bring
out of hiding their own flags. At last they could
give up their enforced Japanized names and
tear down the hated Shinto shrines. They
could speak their own language. They could
organize their own government and live under
their own laws. At last they were to be free.
At least, so they believed. It was in this spirit

132

that they joyously welcomed the arrival of the
Russian and American troops.

The shock of disillusionment was not long
delayed. They found to their incredulous
amazement that the defeat of Japan meant
they were losing one master in order to acquire
two. By a secret agreement of which the origin
has never been explained to them, their country
was slashed in half, along the 38th Parallel.
Their "liberators" wore a strange guise. The
Russians in the north commenced at once upon
a ruthless program aimed at destroying the
professional, business and land-owning classes,
at stamping out all independent nationalism,
and at bringing the populace under the iron
rule of a police state. In the south, the United
States fumbled, having no program at all ex-
cept the one based on the agreement with
Russia, namely, to disarm the Japanese troops,
send them home, and reunite the country under
a government of its own choice (or, following
the "trusteeship agreement" of December,
under a four-power trusteeship) . Since the State
Department continued to hope for Russian con-
currence in the plan to reunite Korea, our oc-
cupation of the south continued for three years
on a basis of improvisation and day-by-day ex-
pediency.

133

The dilemma confronting Korean national-
ists was tragic. In the north, from Cho Man-
sik, the great popular leader, on down to the
headmen of the villages, the independence
leaders were either jailed or escaped across the
38th Parallel. In the south, the nationalists
found that their demand for independence
brought them into sharp and direct conflict
with the nation of all nations they realized was
fundamentally their friend the United States.

The tragically curious situation that develop-
ed in the American occupation zone was that
the Korean nationalists stood for the American
principle of democracy, free elections, and self-
rule, whereas, the United States (attempting
to honor its agreements with Russia) refused
elections, denied independence, and found itself
allied with Communist elements which also
opposed independence and favored trusteeship
in direct conflict with the nationalists.

This was only part of the dilemma. Even
more maddening to the Americans in Korea
and increasingly bewildering to the Koreans
themselves was the fact that the American
Military Government was never able to do even
an elementary job of governing. The reasons
for our failure were many, although they all
stemmed from the fundamental fact that it

134

never was American policy to "govern" Korea.
Our aim never evolved beyond the simple one
of "preventing disease and unrest/' while we
awaited Soviet concurrence in the plan for a
joint withrawal.

No attempt was made to provide personnel
that knew the Korean language or even under-
stood its history and the psychology of the
people; the American occupation force always
remained far removed from any sympathetic
accord with the Korean people.

Our national genius for economic and tech-
nological development was never brought to
bear; on the contrary, a State Department re-
port for August, 1947, frankly admitted that
factory production in south Korea was only
20% of normal, and it subsequently got even
worse.

Nor was any progress made, beyond "study
of the problems" in Washington, toward solv-
ing the increasingly dangerous problem of in-
flation; indeed, during the summer of 1946,
Major General Archer Lerch, serving under
Hodge as Military Governor, told a Korean
news conference that "inflation is a Korean
problem, to be solved by Koreans" which, of
course, was impossible until a Korean govern-
ment was formed.

135

Aside from these basic omissions, the policies
which General Hodge did put into effect were
anathema to American feelings and contrary
to the gradually evolving world-wide foreign
policy of our country the policy of seeking
to contain further Communist advances while
granting positive encouragement and help to
independent democracy.

Charged as he was with attempting to reach
an agreement with Russia, Hodge sought to
expedite the possibility of reaching an accord
by tolerating Communism in the American
zone of occupation. In the fall of 1945 he
organized the "Representative Democratic
Council/' with 21 members, to serve as an
advisory body. Dr. Rhee was appointed Chair-
man, and the membership was overwhelmingly
nationalist. Shortly, the "leftists," led by Lyuh
Woon Heung (who favored coalition with the
Communist north) withdrew from the Council,
protesting that it was not "representative/ 5
Since the Council could not be shaken from its
demands for an election to set up a Korean
government, Hodge disbanded it.

His next move was to appoint a "Coalition
Committee" on which "rightist" (that is, anti-
Communist) and "leftist" membership should
be balanced. Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo refused

136

to participate, on the grounds that the Korean
people were overwhehningly anti-Communist
and that to enforce "coalition" would be in
effect to deliver the country over to Russia.
This abstention left Hodge with a plan for
coalition in which all anti-Communists refused
to take part. Nevertheless, he went ahead with
his plan and appointed as co-chairmen Lyuh
Woon Heung and Kimm Kiusic, both of whom
were denounced by Dr. Rhee and other nation-
alists as being Communists. Both Lyuh and
Kimm Kiusic won the confidence of the Mil-
itary Government by their suavity, genial good
humor, and general concurrence with the
trusteeship and coalition plans. Neither of
them, however, had any large amount of
popular support.

With the cooperation of the one-sided
"Coalition Committee" Hodge moved, in the
fall of 1946, to establish an Interim Legislature.
This body was to have no authority to deal
with international problems, nor with food, nor
with the disposition of expropriated Japanese
properties and it was to be subject to an ab-
solute veto by the Military Governor. Still
further to insure that it could not get out of
control, half its membership was to be appoint-
ed. The election of 45 members was held in

137

October, 1946, and resulted in the choice of
43 members of the nationalist federation and
two Communists. Thereupon, General Hodge
consulted the "Coalition Committee" and ap-
pointed 45 more members, one of whom was a
follower of Dr. Rhee, 28 of whom were avowed
"leftists" (the euphemism used in the Military
Government to designate Communists) and 16
of whom were "independents." Kimm Kiusic
was appointed by Hodge as President of the
Interim Legislature.

The result was a legislative body with no
powers and with a membership deliberately
loaded against the expressed will of the elector-
ate. This legislature organized itself and on
January 20, 1947, passed its first bill a denun-
ciation of the plan of trusteeship! It was im-
mediately informed that this bill was in the
field of international relations and therefore
outside its legal jurisdiction. Moreover, Ahn
Jai Hong, the only member to vote against
the bill, was immediately rewarded by the
Military Governor by appointment as Chair-
man of a new administrative set-up designated
as "The South Korean Interim Government."
This interim "government" was given various
administrative chores and was supposed to be
a training ground for later self-government.

138

Actually, with its appointed head being selected
because of his opposition to the will of the
people, it never won the confidence of the
masses. As a matter of fact, the acceptance of
appointments within it came to be regarded as
a form of treason, with the result that most of
the Koreans whom the Americans hand-picked
as the best available leadership were sub-
sequently left out of the structure of the Re-
public of Korea. Meanwhile, the Interim
Legislature became embroiled in a series of
brawls, from which it finally emerged on June
30, 1947, with a law calling for a general elec-
tion to be held at some early date to be specified
by the Military Governor.

The feelings of the Korean people, mean-
while, were never in doubt. Despite all the
persuasion and intimidation directed against
them, all except the Communists refused to
accept the trusteeship plan. In a survey con-
ducted in March, 1947, by the Military Govern-
ment, in the county of Kim Chun Pukto (which
was believed to be representative) 23,343
families were queried. Only 1.9% favored
trusteeship and 92.3% opposed it, with the rest
not registering an opinion. This poll was taken
just a few weeks before the last Russian-Amer-
ican Commission met to see whether some basis

139

might be found for reuniting Korea which the
Soviet Union would accept. With such facts
before it, the American delegation in this con-
ference refused to budge from the position that
all Koreans, regardless of their political views,
must have a fair chance of participation in any
all-Korea government.

If the American Military Government was
bumbling in its lack of planning and in its
curiously twisted policies, the Soviet occupation
of the north was ruthless in its totalitarian
"efficiency." Politically, north Korea was or-
ganized as a police state for the benefit of
Russia, operating through the medium of a
puppet state. To front for the Russians, a 35-
year old expatriate was picked up and given
the name of Kim Il-sung (a defunct patriot who
had been famed in Korea for his guerrilla ex-
ploits against the Japanese). Wearing this
proud name, and also a chestful of Soviet
medals, Kim Il-sung was pictured all over
north Korea on big posters, along side of that
other "liberator of the masses, 5 * Joseph Stalin.
On November 3, 1946, an "election'* was held
in north Korea (while the Americans were re-
fusing any election on the grounds that to do
so would violate the agreement with Russia).
This "election" consisted of presenting voters

140

with a slate of 41 candidates to fill 41 positions
on the Interim Peoples Committee of north
Korea. With 96% of all adults herded to the
polls, they were presented with the slate and
confronted by two tables. On one table rested
a white box, on the other a black box. The
voter was to march up, under the supervision of
Communist guards, and place a stone in the
white box to vote for the slate, in the black
box to vote against it. The result was a vote
of 92.2% for the slate. Kim Il-sung declared
with undoubted sincerity: "Although I won the
election, I will not forget the Red Army!" The
radio station in Pyongyang, the north Korean
capital, boasted: "Yesterday's election in North
Korea was really democratic for the first time
in human history." The people of north Korea
were in for a five-year period of constant prop-
aganda, in which a new terminology had to be
learned.

"Democratic" was to mean only "Com-
munistic." The so-called democracy advocated
by the United States and practised south
of the 38th Parallel was really "decadent,
capitalistic, imperialistic exploitation of the
masses." Absolute Soviet control of northern
Korea was "comradely assistance." American
aid to south Korea was "colonialism, viciously

141

intent upon establishing a base from which to at-
tack the free areas of Communism in Asia." The
Russian refusal to permit the reunification of
Korea was represented as "Soviet insistence
that Korea be reunited according to the will
of the people. 5 " The efforts by the United
States and the United Nations to reunite Korea
upon the basis of a free election was "the
hypocritical mask of imperialism, seeking to
enslave the free Korean people under the ruth-
less rule of the bloated American Wall Street
capitalists." The single-slate elections of north
Korea (three of which have by now been held)
were "democratic." The secret-ballot elections
in south Korea, with (on May 10, 1950) 2,052
candidates for 210 Assembly seats, held under
the observation of the United Nations Com-
mission and of foreign newsmen alert to dis-
cover any sensationalism they could report,
were to the Communist propagandists "fake
elections imposed on the people of south Korea
by bloody-handed police power." Kim Il-sung,
minion of the Soviets, was "a national hero
leading his people in freedom to unity and pros-
perity." Syngman Rhee, the life-long fighter
for Korean independence, who had battled both
Communism and American reluctance to secure
the final establishment of a truly independent

142

Republic, was tagged as "a blood-thirsty
dictator/' "a tool of American imperialism,"
"oppressor of the people," and called many
other less printable names. Thus ran the new
lexicography of the Communist north. What
we should not forget, however, was that this
line of propaganda was poured upon the eyes
and ears and minds of the people for five full
years, with truth from the outside rigorously
excluded. Many of the soldiers in the army
that attacked south Korea were mere children
when the Communist barrage was first loosed
upon them, and never had any opportunity to
view world conditions except as Moscow chose
to present them.

Militarily, north Korea was subjected at once
to conscription of its young men into an army
that soon reached a force of 200,000 men (this
while any army at all was denied to south
Korea on the grounds that to have one would
violate the Russian- American agreement ) . This
army was armed at first with Japanese
weapons, then with Soviet and German weapons
with tanks, planes, and heavy artillery. It
was rigorously trained by Soviet officers. It
was given battle experience by frequent in-
cursions across the 38th Parallel in attacks
against the south, and by heavy mass fighting

143

with the Chinese Reds against the Nationalist
Government of China.

The military situation in south Korea, mean-
while, was deliberately kept weak. It was in
part the American intention to prove beyond
the shadow of any doubt that the United States
was not building any military base from which
to threaten Vladivostok. In part, the weak-
ness stemmed from American fears that a
strong south Korean army would be tempted
to seek reunification of the country by an at-
tack upon the north thereby risking precipita-
tion of World War III. There was, of course,
some legitimate grounds for this fear. No
Koreans, either north or south, ever accepted
the fact of division of their country as anything
but a temporary, foreign-imposed interruption
of the 4,000-year-old Korean unity. Both the
northern "Peoples Republic" and the Republic
of Korea always claimed sovereignty over the
entire nation. It would have been both
politically impossible and morally inadmissable
for the Republic of Korea not to maintain the
determination that sometime, by whatever
means might be required, the north should be
brought back into union with the rest of the
Korean people. President Syngman Rhee al-
ways hoped that this might be accomplished

144

by international agreement. But he consistently
refused to admit that the Republic would rest
satisfied for the division to continue. As he
declared over and over again, however, so long
as the United States and the United Nations
retained responsibility for achieving the reun-
ification of Korea, he would not violate the
trust they placed in him by any attack across
the 38th Parallel.

The military situation that existed in Korea
during the past two years was extremely ir-
regular and difficult. As the price for provid-
ing light arms to the troops of the Republic,
the United States exacted a solemn promise
that under no provocation whatsoever would
the Republic troops ever set foot upon the
northern side of the 38th Parallel. To minimize
any possibility of clashes, they were to hold
defensive positions from one to three miles south
of the line. They could, of course, repel attacks,
but could never attack the bases from which
the attacks were launched.

In May, 1949, just thirteen months before
the Communist assault against the Republic, I
visited the city of Kaesong, lying just three
miles south of the 38th Parallel. The bridge
in the south of the city, streets, and walls were
torn and scared by mortar shells and rifle bul-

145

lets, from a Communist attack launched just
a few days before. Children and women were
still trembling with the horror of a night-long
rain of shells upon their homes, and from the
dread of when the next foray would come.

Rising above Kaesong and dominating the
city is a hill designated on military charts as
Hill No. 291. It lies south of the 38th Parallel,
yet was in no-man's-land, because of the agree-
ment made by the Republic to keep its troops
well back from the Communist-held line. On
a height rising in the very center of the city,
the Republic troops had erected a network of
trenches and barbed wire entanglements, from
which the city's defenses were to be maintained.
When the Communist troops swooped down in
an attack, they occupied Hill No. 291 without
resistance, and swept on to capture another
ridge flanking the city on the east. A counter
attack by Republic troops a few hours later
drove them back, where they enjoyed safe
sanctuary behind the 38th Parallel. On that
particular occasion, the government of the Re-
public was severely reprimanded by American
officials because the southern troops did, for a
few hours, occupy Hill No. 291.

This was the situation which occurred all
along the 38th Parallel for the past two years.

146

The Communist forces could choose their own
time and place of attack, at their own con-
venience and hundreds of such attacks were
made. They could choose any objective they
wished, and attack in whatever force they
pleased. And when their mission was accom-
plished, they could retreat to the 38th Parallel
and there laugh at the hapless south Korean
troops. This was the situation when, on June
29, 1949, the last 7,500 American troops in
Korea were withdrawn, leaving only a 500-man
military training mission behind.

When the army of the Republic of Korea
was first recruited in the summer of 1948,
American officials were determined that it
should not be a "political army/' with allegiance
to any particular individuals or parties. They
had had their fill of such armies in China.
Consequently, no tests of recruits were per-
mitted except physical examinations. No screen-
ing to keep out Communists was allowed. If a
volunteer had good teeth and a sound physique,
he was in. As a direct result of this policy,
infiltrated Communists organized a revolt with-
in the Republic army in October, 1948, and
seized the towns of Yosu and Sunchon in the
south, bloodily slaughtering hundreds of the
inhabitants. Cleaning up these rebellious troops

147

took a year of fighting; but cleaning out all
Communists from the army was a continuing
job which the Republic never could be sure
was completed.

The army of the Republic of Korea was
armed with equipment left behind by the
United States, with an estimated original value
of $110,000,000. This equipment consisted
primarily of rifles, machine guns, and light
bazookas. It was intended to serve for police
action within south Korea, and did serve that
need adequately. It never was intended to
serve as a defense against an attack in force
from outside; when the test came, it was, of
course, wholly inadequate to the need.

The boast of American military advisers
that this south Korean army was "the best
fighting force of its size in all Asia' 5 sounded
hollow indeed during the first weeks of the
fighting, while the northern tank-led battalions
were sweeping south. Many American com-
mentators rushed to the conclusion that the
force was weak in morale and in fighting spirit.
Some went on to conclude that the Republic
must have been a bad government or the troops
would fight better to preserve it. Then Amer-
ican troops went into action, armed very much
as the Korean army was. The same retreats

148

continued. When the Republic of Korea was
reorganized further south, it was repeatedly
commended in MacArthur's communiques for
its fine fighting spirit and for notable success
in holding its designated portions of the line.

The military disparity between northern and
southern Korea was only one of the many dif-
ferences between the two areas. The Com-
munist north hastened to put into effect its
widely advertised "land-reform 35 program a
program for which many half -informed Amer-
ican apologists had nothing but praise. Since
this Communist type of "land reform" is pre-
sumed to be the greatest single appeal of Com-
munist rule for the landlord-oppressed masses
of Asia (and Eastern Europe, too) it is well
to consider it in some detail.

In truth, the masses were landlord-ridden.
The annual rental on the farm plots ran from
50% to 60% and even 70% of the total crop.
There is little good that can or should be said
for the system. When the Communists entered
northern Korea they seized the land and im-
prisoned, drove out, or killed the landlords.
Then they set up Communist committees in
each of the "goons" or districts. These com-
mittees "distributed" the land to the farmers
who proved to be "cooperative." They neither

149

gave nor sold them the land. The farmers re-
ceived no title to it. They could not sell it,
leave it to their children, or even be assured
that they would have it for their own use from
month to month. All was to be as the Com-
munist committees should decide. This is "land
reform. 55 No rentals were collected from the
land, but "taxes 55 did have to be paid. More-
over, the taxation was set up on a basis of
assessment. Instead of arbitrarily taking a
certain proportion of the crop, Communist as-
sessors would determine how much rice or
other produce the land should produce. The
tax fixed was a given percentage of this "pro-
posed yield." Once again, the farmers who
were most "cooperative" could expect a low
assessment, whereas all those whose loyalties
to the new regime were suspect were subjected
to impossibly high quotas. "Land reform 55 thus
became a major weapon for holding the masses
under subjection.

The north Korean regime also made an
agreement with the Soviet Union to supply an
annual labor force of 50,000 young men. This,
again, was not only a drain upon the resources
of the north, but proved a very potent means
of subjecting the populace. The Communist
rulers could always use the threat of conscript-

150

ing the sons of a family as a means of ensuring
absolute obedience.

South Korea, under American occupation,
was relieved of all such totalitarian economic
measures. However, the situation in the south
was even more desperate economically than
in the north. The reasons were many.

In the first place, some two million north
Koreans fled from the supposedly beneficial
rule of the "land-reforming" Communists to
seek sanctuary south of the 38th Parallel. An-
other two million repatriates from Japan and
China returned to the south. These four mil-
lion people constituted a tremendous problem.
There were no houses for them, no clothing
for them, far too little of consumers goods, and
not even enough food. South Korea is the
agricultural part of the peninsula. Normally,
Korea produced so much food that the Jap-
anese, during their 40-year rule, were ac-
customed to taking from 40 to 50% of the
annual rice crop. But, during the war years,
the fields had not been fertilized. Food produc-
tion was further hampered by the fact that
Japanese fleeing from Korea at the end of the
war took with them all the fishing boats that
were large enough to cross the 125-mile Straits
of Korea to Japan. Restoring the productivity

151

of the fields was a major part of the American
task in Korea, and succeeded so notably that,
in 1950, 100,000 tons of rice were allocated
for export.

Factory and mining productivity did not
fare so well, however. Some 90% of all in-
corporated wealth in Korea had been taken
over by the Japanese. The Oriental Develop-
ment Company was a huge, sprawling organiza-
tion which owned most of the richest farm
lands, the mines, the factories, and held the
fishing rights. The American Military Govern-
ment assumed a trusteeship over this property,
until it could be turned over to a Korean
government. However, with no intention or
program to rule south Korea, no provision was
ever made for development of these productive
resources. The Administration in Washington
never asked, and Congress never appropriated,
funds for providing the necessary machinery,
repair parts, or raw materials. Consequently,
factories could be operated only on a basis of
"cannibalism;" that is, as various factories fell
into disrepair, parts were interchanged so that
one or more of them could be kept running.
Three years of "liberation" left Korea worse
off, physically, than it had been even under the
harsh rule of the Japanese. When I was in

152

Seoul in the summer of 1946, 10,000 families
were sleeping in the streets. In the second
largest city, Pusan, the Military Governor
estimated that 35,000 individuals were home-
less. General MacArthur's summation of con-
ditions in Korea in the late fall of 1946 cited
2 million families without homes. The first
of June, 1946, rice was selling on the black
market for 2,400 Won a bushel. By mid-August,
it was 4,500 Won. By 1950 the price had mul-
tiplied by ten. In the restaurants, a simple
"blue-plate special" businessmen's lunch for
three cost 375 Won. College professors were
being paid 2,000 Won a month. Since that
time, prices multiplied eight and ten times and
salary incomes for "white collar" workers more
than doubled.

Meanwhile, the majority of former Japanese-
owned plants were either closed entirely, or
operating at only 30 to 40 % of capacity. Less
than 20% of total productive facilities were
being utilized. Unemployment ranged as high
as 30% in some provinces.

Acute shortages of raw materials, replace-
ments, and machine tools were among the basic
causes of the factory closures. Another cause
was the lack of any adequate policy, pending
establishment of a Korean government, by

153

which ownership of the expropriated factories
could be transferred to Koreans. Other factors
were shortages of enterprise capital and skilled
management.

The difficulties confronting Korean business-
men are illustrated in the experience of one
of them, who had served for twenty years as an
aviator for Japanese companies. At the close
of the war, he paid two million Won for 24
Japanese army planes, with which he expected
to start an aviation school on the outskirts of
Seoul. Then, by order of the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers, all Japanese
army planes had to be dismantled or destroyed.
His planes were dismantled, and held for him
by the Military Government. He was granted
permission to buy United States army surplus
planes, but would have to pay for them in
American money. This he could not do, for no
exchange of Korean currency to American
dollars was permitted. His two million Won
were tied up, and he had no recourse except
to wait until it should be possible for him to
get the planes with which he might open his
school.

Statistically, the currency situation is high-
lighted in the facts that during the decade
1937-48 the amount of money in circulation

154

increased 300 times, prices of some items as
much as 533 times, and wages for manual
labor about 151 times. The Bank of Chosen
paper Won in circulation in 1937 amounted to
280 million. By the time the Republic was
inaugurated, it was well over 30 billion. Some
3.2 billion of this excess currency resulted from
the Japanese printing of this amount just prior
to their defeat, to pay as "separation bonuses"
to their employees. A large amount of it was
promptly remitted to Japan, but remained a
charge against the Bank of Chosen. Another
one and a half billion sifted down from the
Russian zone, where a military currency was
substituted for the Bank of Chosen notes. The
remainder of the postwar increase, about
twenty-two billion in paper Won was printed
during the American occupation to use for
meeting the governmental operating deficits,
and for governmental purchases of rice.

At the beginning of the occupation, the
official rate for internal exchange, to finance
purchases by the Military Government from
Koreans, was set at 15 to 1. Later it was
raised to 50 to 1. Black-market operations re-
portedly have been conducted on the basis of
from 1,000 to 4,000 to 1.

Meanwhile, the Korean Won was not ad-

155

mitted to international circulation, a restriction
applied otherwise only to Japan and Germany.
One reason was the difficulty of finding an
exchange ratio fair to Koreans and one that
presumably would remain stable. Another
difficulty lay in the zonal division of Korea,
and the lack of any over-all government.

The best American record in south Korea
was made in connection with the judiciary.
Shortly after arrival of the American troops in
Korea, a plan was put into operation that ac-
corded the Korean courts practical autonomy.
Cases involving Koreans alone were all tried
before Korean judges, without American super-
vision, and, before the occupation ended, even
cases involving American offenses against
Koreans were heard in Korean courts, subject
to American Military Government review.
Rapid progress was made in eliminating the
evils of the Japanese "thought-control" legal
processes. Jails were improved and the police
system thoroughly reorganized. A Police
Academy was established in Seoul, in which
thousands of officers were trained in Western
methods and psychology.

Necessarily, many of the details of admin-
istration of governmental departments and of
expropriated Japanese properties were entrust-

156

cd to Koreans. The Military Governor an-
nounced a "Koreanization" program, through
which he declared the intention of reducing
himself and his men to mere rubber stamps,
with Koreans doing the work, carrying the
responsibilities, and exercising the authority.
Unquestionably, a great deal of good was ac-
complished under this system. Many Koreans
received practical experience they could not get
under the Japanese. In many instances Korean
judgment prevented grievous errors that would
have been made through sheer ignorance of
the country had the whole administration been
left in the hands of the soldiers.

The program of 'Koreanization" suffered,
however, from two vital weaknesses. In the
first place, authority, while the Military
Government remained, could not in reality be
transferred to the Koreans. Only confusion,
misunderstanding, and a succession of personal
feuds resulted from the pretense that to some
degree it had been. Final authority simply is
not divisible. It rests, and must rest, with those
who really rule. In the second place, the
Koreans in administrative positions were there
by appointment of the Military Government,
They included many able and self-sacrificing
men. But they also included many self-seeking

157

opportunists who were willing to be completely
"cooperative" with the Military Government
and who did what they could to insure its
continuance at the expense of Korean inde-
pendence for their own personal advantage.
At the best, such an appointive system could
only fill the gap until an election should be
held.

Many Koreans told me during the period
of American occupation of south Korea that
actually they were worse off than they had
been even under the hated Japanese. Their
nation was divided. The 38th Parallel cut off
the normal exchanges of goods and persons
which ordinarily flowed freely and of course
regularly. Even mail could be exchanged be-
tween the north and the south only once a
week, and then it was heavily censored. The
street cars in the cities did not operate as well
as they had before the occupation. With
factories and mines closed down, unemployment
was serious. As one Korean explained to me:
"Under the Japanese we worked very hard for
very low wages. But now we have no work
and no wages at all." The Japanese had al-
ways taken the best houses and the best of all
available facilities for themselves. But so (quite
understandably) did the Americans. One young

158

American soldier explained to me how heart-
breaking his assignment was. His duty was to
stand guard for six hours a day over the huge
pile of firewood with which his barracks was
heated. Inside, were roaring fires; outside, the
winter was as cold as it is in New England.
Crowds of Koreans gathered around, many
dressed in rags and blue with cold, staring at
the pile of firewood. Those who could speak
a few words of English begged him to step
around the corner for a moment so that they
could snatch a piece and run. Of course, no
American and few Koreans wanted our troops
of occupation to sink to the living level the
Koreans themselves were then forced to endure.
But the notable disparity of living conditions
between the "liberators" and the "liberated"
nevertheless added to the difficulties of adjust-
ment.

Accompanying the political and economic
disruption there was an inevitable weakening
of the moral tone. A people without direction
of their own affairs, and without a chance to
feed and clothe their families by honest en-
deavor became understandably tolerant of the
means they had been able to use. Black-market
activities, beggary, or theft were the only al-
ternative expedients for some. Homeless, un-

159

employed refugees, without money and removed
from their friends, created a specially heavy
problem. Bribery proved as expeditious in some
instances under the Military Government as it
was necessary under the Japanese. Mob
terrorism seemed to some the only available
substitute for the lawful self-determination that,
as a people, they had been denied.

But the Communist attack upon the Republic
of Korea has ended all speculation about the
imposed differences between south and north.
Now that the battle has been joined, there
seems no reason to doubt that the ancient
boundaries, newly pledged by the United Na-
tions, will be restored.

160

THE UNITED NATIONS
APPROVE

THE UNITED NATIONS REACHED A DRAMATIC
climax in its sponsorship of the Republic of
Korea when the Security Council voted 9-0
(with Yugoslavia abstaining) to condemn the
Communist invasion of south Korea and to call
for an end to hostilities. This vote which per-
haps meant fully as much to the United Nations
as it did to Korea occurred just twenty-four
hours after the attack was launched. These cer-
tainly were the twenty-four most important

161

hours in the ages-long struggle to achieve collec-
tive security for peace. It is doubtful if their full
significance even yet has been assessed.

The promptness with which the action was
taken was no less remarkable than it was crucial
in setting the stage for the eventual Communist
defeat. When the north Korean Communist
army first rolled across the 38th Parallel, it was
believed to be merely another of the many
"forays in force" by which the border had been
violated. It was several hours before the full ex-
tent of the attack could be realized. The news
reached the Department of State in Washington
near midnight Saturday. By 3 A. M., Secretary
Acheson had checked with President Truman
(who was in Independence, Missouri) by phone
and the decision had been reached to appeal to
the United Nations. Secretary General Trygve
Lie was called out of bed. He immediately in-
formed the Security Council delegates of his
intention to summon an emergency meeting for
that (Sunday) afternoon. Within the next few
hours, the delegates were able to get in touch
with their home governments where every one
of them settled the difficult policy question of
how to vote on an issue so vital that it might cast
the balance between war and peace. Within a
few hours, the United Nations Commission in

162

Korea was able to get a report through to Lake
Success, certifying that the attack was indeed an
aggressive breach of the peace by the Commun-
ist regime. The fear of many that any interna-
tional organization must of necessity prove too
slow and cumbersome ever to meet an emerg-
ency was happily proved to be unfounded. And
the United Nations itself, which had been
floundering hopelessly and in helpless frustration
because of Soviet obstructionism and boycott,
found to its own amazement and relief that it
could act quickly, decisively, and (in Russia's
absence) practically unanimously. The vote that
saved Korea also may prove to have been the
decisive factor in saving the United Nations.

The action of the United Nations followed
promptly by the independent approval of 53
sovereign nations proved another fact which
had been slowly crystallizing : namely, that out-
side of the U. N., but parallel to it, another
unorganized but potent force had been develop-
ing the community of the free world. It had no
officers, no charter, no schedule of meetings. But
under the pressure of Soviet imperialism and
obstructionism in the United Nations, the free
nations of the world had been discovering a
depth of unity of purpose and kinship of feelings
far deeper and more significant than they had

163

hoped or expected. In reality, it was this amor-
phous "union of the free" (operating partly
within and partly outside the U. N. structure)
which affirmed and supported the action on
Korea. Regardless of what Russia may hereafter
do or try to do to block collective world action,
this community of democracies has now discov-
ered its will and ability to act in concert. Noth-
ing can prevent its further growth of unity.

The first movement by the United Nations to
deal with the Korean question was cautious and
gingerly. It was on September 17, 1947, that the
State Department, "finally convinced of the
futility of further negotiations with the Soviet
Union," asked the U.N. to place the question on
the agenda of the second regular session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The
Soviet Government promptly objected and coun-
tered with a proposal that all occupation troops
be withdrawn, leaving the Korean people to
settle the problem by themselves with an army
of 200,000 in the northern zone and none in the
south. Many delegates to the United Nations
were reluctant to take up the question. They felt
that the United States had a "hot potato" on its
hands which it desired to get rid of by saddling
responsibility on the U, N. Many conversations
had to be held to convince the delegations that

164

the United States fully intended to continue its
aid and special responsibilities in Korea, before
the British Commonwealth, the South American
republics, the Arabian League and other region-
al associations were convinced of the desirability
of making Korea a U. N. charge. After these
initial fears had been resolved, the General
Assembly voted on November 14, by 43-0, with
the Soviet bloc abstaining, that elections should
be held in all Korea under U. N. observation
and that as a result of the elections a Korean
government should be organized.

A U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea
convened in Seoul in the following January and
sought entry into northern Korea. The only reply
was a reminder by Andrei Gromyko of the
"negative attitude" of the Soviet Union toward
U. N. jurisdiction in Korea. Unable to carry out
its directive, the Temporary Commission ap-
pealed back to its parent body, and in February
the Interim Committee of the U. N. voted by
31-2 that the Commission should proceed to
observe elections "in all parts of Korea accessible
to" it. The debate in general dealt with the
problem of whether setting up a separate gov-
ernment in south Korea might not have the
effect of perpetuating the division of the country.
The conclusion of the great majority of the dde-

165

gates was that such a freely elected government
was the inalienable right of the Korean people
and might serve as a rallying point around which
eventual unity could be achieved.

The election date was set for May 10, and a
vigorous and extensive campaign was conducted.
The Communists ostentatiously "boycotted" the
election, as did Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic,
leading some foreign commentators to mourn
that the election could have little real signifi-
cance when such influential factions took no part
in it. Actually, the boycott had the primary
effect of showing how little influence these dis-
sident factions actually had, for over 86% of all
eligible adults (men and women) registered, and
on election day 92.5% of all those registered
went to the polls and cast their ballots.

Specifically, the election was to choose 200
members for a National Assembly, with an addi-
tional 100 seats being held vacant to be filled
when possible by a supervised election in north
Korea. This Assembly was to be charged with
the duty of preparing a constitution and organiz-
ing a government. Many delegates to the U. N.
still felt that this "government" should have
little more than advisory functions, under full
U. N. supervision, until union of the north and
south could be effected. However, the election

166

was won overwhelmingly by Korean nationalists
under the leadership of Dr. Rhee, and no such
temporizing with the Korean determination for
independence proved possible.

The Communists did their best to disrupt the
election. In February they called a general strike
(which never materialized) and instigated riot-
ing in which 48 persons were killed. During the
election they engaged in more terrorism, during
which 100 voters were slain. Nothing, however,
could keep the Korean people from the polls.
For all of them it was their first free election.
But they lined up at the polling places early in
the morning and patiently took their turns in the
closeted polling booths. When the day ended, the
determination of the people for a government of
their own was manifest to the world.

The United Nations Temporary Commission
on Korea withdrew to Shanghai to study the
reports of its observers, and on June 25 issued a
report that "a reasonable degree of free atmos-
phere wherein the democratic rights of freedom
of speech, press and assembly were recognized
and respected" had prevailed during the elec-
tions, and that the results of the ballotting con-
stituted "a valid expression of the free will of the
electorate in those parts of Korea which were
accessible to the Commission and in which the

167

inhabitants constituted approximately two-
thirds of the people of all Korea." Many Amer-
icans who were in Korea at the time, and of
whom a considerable portion had been opposed
to Rhee because of his opposition to the program
of the Military Government, declared that the
election was conducted with a fairness and a
fullness of free discussion which surpassed all
their expectations.

After the election, the Assembly convened and
proceeded rapidly to establish the machinery of
government. Observers were pleased (and sur-
prised) that this body of men, whom many had
doubted were yet capable of self-government,
"carried on its activities in extremely orderly and
democratic fashion and with intense enthusiasm
and purposefulness." On June 12 the Assembly
addressed an appeal to the people of north
Korea to permit a free election and through it to
join in the establishment of an independent
nation. The Communist regime refused to listen.

With no solidly organized political parties, 85
members of the new Assembly classed themselves
as "independents." Another 48 classed them-
selves as followers of Dr. Rhee, and 30 listed
membership in the Democratic party, with the
remainder scattered into various splinter parties.

When the Assembly first convened on May 31,

168

it elected Rhee as chairman by a vote of 189 to
8. On July 19, by a vote of 180 to 16, Dr. Rhee
was elected President of the Republic, President
Rheels appointee as Prime Minister, Lee Bum
Suk, was confirmed on August 3 by a vote of 1 10
to 84, thus giving evidence of a sound working
majority and also of the existence of a healthful
"watch dog" minority. During the succeeding
two years the Assembly behaved very much as
democratic legislative bodies always do. It was
dilatory in voting new taxes, it was compara-
tively lavish in its budgetary provisions, and it
voted with the Government on some issues and
against it on others. There was no sign of the
disciplined executive control which marks Com-
munist legislatures!

By the time the Korean question came up on
the agenda of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, meeting in Paris, in December,
1948, the U. N. Temporary Commission on
Korea had ample opportunity to study and re-
port on the workings of this new government.
The Republic had been inaugurated in Seoul
with impressive ceremonies on August 15. As
though nature intended to symbolize the course
of the struggle for independence, the day was
heavy with rain clouds, but just as President
Rhee stepped to the rostrum to read his in-

169

augural address, the sun broke through with a
warm stream of propitious light. Flanked by
Generals Hodge and MacArthur on one side and
members of the United Nations Commission on
the other. President Rhee presented his message:
"We must plan and work for the future."

Promising that "Liberalism must be under-
stood, respected, and protected," he declared:
"Liberals, certain intellectuals, and progressive-
minded youth are often critical of the necessary
processes of establishing an organized State.
Many patriots, judging too quickly of their
words and deeds, have condemned such critics
as dangerous and destructive. Actually, freedom
of thought is the basic foundation of a demo-
cratic State. Such people must be protected in
their right to disagree. If we seek to overwhelm
them, it must be with embarrassment from the
fullness of our respect and tolerance for their
views. In the eternal struggle between right and
wrong, we must stand firm in the faith that truth
eventually will prevail."

On the crucial issue of the continued division
of the country, President Rhee said : "We await
with hope and determination the missing third
of our representatives from the north. The 38th
Parallel division is no part of our choice and is
wholly foreign to our destiny. Nothing must be

170

neglected to keep wide open the door to reunion
of the whole nation. The Everwhite Mountains
are as surely our boundary to the north as are
the Straits of Korea to the south. No temporary
international situation can obscure what has
been established through the centuries as historic
fact."

The address concluded with a realistic ap-
praisal of the problems to be faced : "We realize
that, without the good will and assistance of free
nations, the many problems before us might be
insuperable. But we know we have their good
will and we feel we can count on their assistance.
Above all, we need and we count upon the
loyalty, the devotion to duty, and the determina-
tion of all Korean citizens. With hopeful hearts
and minds alert, we take into our own hands
today a sovereign republican government that
will long endure."

When the General Assembly of the U. N. in
Paris heard the report of its Korean Commission,
it voted 48-6 to approve the Republic of Korea
as "the only lawful government" in Korea. It
also voted to send back to Korea a U. N. Com-
mission charged with the following duties:

" ( 1 ) Lend its good offices to bring about the
unification of Korea and the integration of all
Korean security forces in accordance with the

171

principles laid down by the General Assembly
in the resolution of 14 November, 1947 ;

"(2) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers
to economic, social, and other friendly inter-
course caused by the division of Korea;

"(3) Be available for observation and consul-
tation in the further development of representa-
tive government based on the freely expressed
will of the people;

"(4) Observe the actual withdrawal of the
occupying forces and verify the fact of with-
drawal when such has occurred; and for this
purpose, if it so desires, request the assistance of
military experts of the two occupying Powers."

The Temporary Commission to Korea had
consisted of representatives of Australia, Can-
ada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the
Philippines, and Syria. The Ukraine had been
appointed to membership, but refrained without
even bothering formally to decline. The succeed-
ing Commission consisted of representatives of
the same governments, with the exception of
Canada.

The Commission spent an extremely frustrat-
ing year in Korea, during which time it sought
repeatedly to get into communication with the
Communist regime in north Korea, but it never
succeeded. It observed several by-elections held

172

in the Republic of Korea and from time to time
offered suggestions regarding the further imple-
mentation of democracy. But, faced by the stub-
born obstructionism of the Soviet Union, it never
was able to carry out its basic function of observ-
ing elections in the north.

Meanwhile, acting within the framework of
the United Nations sponsorship of the Republic
of Korea, and in accord with general American
policies of assisting free governments that were
resisting Communist subversion, the United
States extended its program of EGA aid to the
Republic. On January 1, 1949, the former Mili-
tary Government program of economic assist-
ance was transferred to the EGA, with funds for
the remainder of the fiscal year amounting to
$60,000,000. Mr. Arthur Bunce was appointed
EGA Administrator in Korea, and Dr. Edgar A.
J. Johnson as Director of the Korea program in
Washington. Both men had served under the
Military Government in Korea, and were aware
of the needs of the country. Within the limits of
the time, personnel, and funds available, sub-
stantial and most encouraging progress was
made by the EGA and the Korean government,
working in close harmony, toward the improve-
ment of economic conditions.

Appearing before Congressional committees

173

in January and February, 1950, Paul Hoffman,
Director of the EGA, and Secretary Acheson
testified to the steady and rapid progress of the
Republic. Hoffman described it as "nothing less
than spectacular," and reminded his hearers that
"Korea had been a very sick country at the close
of the war. Trade outlets to Japan were broken.
Important commercial relations with Man-
churia and other yen-block areas were cut off.
And vital domestic trade with north Korea was
completely blocked by the 'iron curtain 5 which
left south Korea desperately short of coal, fer-
tilizer and electric power." Secretary Acheson
praised the political stability achieved by the
Rhee government, and went on: "Despite the
problems with which the Republic of Korea is
beset, both internally and externally, and despite
its necessarily limited experience in self-govern-
ment and paucity of technical and administra-
tive know-how, conditions of stability and public
order have continued to improve, and the threat
of communist overthrow appears at least tem-
porarily to have been contained."

In a Puckish spirit of irresponsibility, the
House of Representatives in January defeated
further economic aid to Korea by one vote, then,
a few weeks later, reversed itself by a substantial
majority and voted $100,000,000 for the next

174

fiscal year. This was subsequently ratified by the
Senate.

President Rhee, meanwhile, was having
trouble with the National Assembly that is
somewhat reminiscent of the problems which
from time to time confront American Presidents.
Under the leadership of Speaker Shin Icky, a
group of Assemblymen sought to shear the Presi-
dency of its executive powers and to make the
cabinet responsible directly to the Assembly.
After weeks of debate and considerable excite-
ment, this proposed constitutional amendment
was defeated. The Assembly, also, mindful of the
fact that new elections were due in May, 1950,
showed a not unnatural reluctance to vote higher
taxes. Since it concurrently yielded to the re-
quests of cabinet members for larger and larger
appropriations, the budget became badly unbal-
anced. With no system for selling government
bonds, the only recourse was the printing of
more paper money. Thus, the amount of Won in
circulation continued to increase until it reached
the dangerous height of 73 billions. The salient
fact was that the nation faced far more urgent
demands for services than it had resources with
which to pay for them. Because of all the factors
reviewed in earlier chapters, arising in part from
the division of the country, in part from the

175

post-war confusion, in part from the presence
in the south of over 4,000,000 repatriates, and in
part from the heavy and continuous Communist
pressure from across the 38th Parallel, the vari-
ous ministries (Social Welfare, Education,
Defense, and Commerce and Industry, in par-
ticular) needed far more funds than were prop-
erly available in order to perform the basic
functions with which they were charged. Deny-
ing these essential demands was something few
responsible legislators could do. Especially with
an election coming up, their tendency was to
vote funds, avoid taxes, and hope the gathering
economic and fiscal problems could be left to
their successors in office. In order to impel them
to face, rather than escape from, these problems,
President Rhee proposed that, if need be, the
election be postponed from May to September.
In any event, he insisted, a balanced budget
must be adopted. Secretary Acheson and EGA
Director Hoffman both dispatched notes to
the Republic, urging that continued American
aid depended upon sound fiscal policies and
holding of the election on the scheduled date.
The Assembly responded by quickly adopting the
budget and approving the date of May 30 for
the election.

The U. N. Commission to Korea found at last

176

in the election a specific project in accord with
its instructions. Observing the campaigning of
the 2,052 candidates for 210 seats in the Assem-
bly, it certified that the campaigning was free
and vigorous and that the election of May 30
was "fair and free." Despite the presumed dif-
ficulties of developing democracy among an As-
ian people, and in the face of steady Communist
pressure, democracy worked in the Republic of
Korea. Following the pattern of the 1948
election, 140 of the new Assemblymen were
listed as "independents." The number of Assem-
blymen avowedly opposing Rhee's leadership
was reduced from 70 to 27. Rhee's personal
followers in the second Assembly numbered 48.
The Communist attack of June 25 came too soon
after the election to permit the new Assembly to
organize and indicate in voting tests the precise
strength of the pro- and anti-government group-
ings. Ray Richards, of INS, a newsman of
considerable experience in observing Korean
politics, estimated, however, that about 150 of
the new Assemblymen would support the general
tenor of the Rhee program. This estimate is
widely at variance with opinions expressed by
some American commentators who (knowing
little or nothing of the Korean penchant for run-
ning as "independents") had leaped to the

177

conclusion that the preponderant number of
independents in the new Assembly amounted to
"repudiation" of President Rhee"s government.

A New York Times editorial of June 2, 1950,
expressed a conclusion of genuine significance
when it said: "The character of the election that
has just been held in the independent republic
that is functioning in the southern half of Korea
is probably more important than its outcome.
Under the conditions of extreme pressure that
existed, it is remarkable that an election could
be held at all. Candid, objective comment has
been to the effect that it was genuinely 'free/ a
real opportunity for the voters to express them-
selves. . . . Democracy is being learned the hard
way and from the ground up, but the Koreans
are certainly showing a praiseworthy determina-
tion to learn it."

The Communist attack against the Republic
has confronted the United Nations with both a
challenge and an opportunity to end at last the
disastrous division of the country along the 38th
Parallel. This division never has had any legal
sanction, beyond a merely temporary line to
effect the surrender of Japanese armies. Neither
the Republic of Korea nor the "People's Demo-
cratic Republic" established by the Soviets in the
north recognized it as permanent. The United

178

Nations explicitly demanded the end of the divi-
sion in its vote of November 14, 1947, for an
election in all Korea, and through the subse-
quent efforts of the U. N. Commission in Korea
to achieve an all-Korea election. President
Truman and the Department of State have re-
peatedly declared that the United States
"never" intended the dividing line to be more
than a temporary expedient. As a result of the
Security Council demand of June 27, 1950, for
police action to restore "peace and security" in
Korea, it should be expected that one outcome
of the fighting in Korea will be the reunification
of the country, with a U. N.-observed election in
the north to choose the "missing one-third" of
the nation's representatives. Out of evil there
thus may emerge at least that amount of good.

179

1O

CONSTITUTIONAL HOPES

KOREA OFFERS AN ADMIRABLE ILLUSTRATION OF
the Intel-dependency of the "one world" which
this globe has become. Theoretically, a sovereign
government should be able to evolve its own
national pattern in its own way. Actually, Korea
has been subject to severe external pressures that
drastically limited and shaped the kind of deci-
sions it has been able to make. The status of
Korea is a simple example of the futilities and
tensions of the post- Yalta world.

The assets of the new Republic were impres-

180

sive. In the first place, it was being formed after
a full generation of Japanese rule, separating it
from its 40-century history of monarchial and
feudal control. Painful as was the period of
Japanese domination, it provided at least a com-
plete break with anachronistic elements of
Korea's past. The monarchial tradition was too
distant to be a factor in today's thinking. In this
sense, the new Republic started with a clean
slate, enabled to think forward rather than back;
free to draw at will from the world's stock of
fresh economic and political formulations.

In the second place, Korea had a strongly-knit
homogeneity. Foreign power could draw an iron
curtain across its middle, but no power can
separate the loyalties and destinies of a people
whose geographic boundaries have remained
unchanged for a thousand years. The thirteen
provinces of Korea are a closely integrated union.
The oceans and the mountains that enclose them
are natural boundaries that have encouraged
unity. In language, customs, history, and psy-
chology, the Koreans are one people; their
common struggle for freedom has sealed indis-
solubly the union of their hearts and minds.

In the third place, the people of Korea,
untrained in technology and large-scale admin-
istration, are industrious, intelligent, and adapt-

181

able. Moreover they retained an indomitable
will to self-determination, which they have
proved as few peoples are called upon to do,
eager to meet the opportunity and to bear the
burdens of the freedom they sought so long.

What is the Korean political pattern? Not the
old monarchy, for that is completely gone. Not
the Japanese governmental system, for that was
bitterly hated, and, besides, almost no Koreans
had a large enough part in it to be able to con-
tinue it. Neither, we must recognize, is the
ancient way either Communism or the present
Western-style democracy. Korean political tra-
ditions are almost as remote from present
American political organization on the one hand
as they are from Karl Marx on the other. Sheer
military power was able to impose one alien
pattern in the north, and real democracy had
begun to take root in the south. But the masses
of the people have been only slowly affected by
either in their ways of living and thinking.

The actual political roots of the Korean people
are twofold. The first fundamental fact is that
their government has always been chiefly local
in character. The second is that their system
of political ethics has always been Confucian.
Upon these two bases the structure of their new
government could be firmly and safely built.

182

Korean political units have from time im-
memorial had their roots in city blocks and
villages. Each base unit consists of several
hundred families. The block leader or village
mayor is the top government official with whom
the people were in close contact. It is through
him that laws were administered and taxes
collected. The Japanese police power was a
centralized force imposed upon this system, but
it was an alien and hated innovation. To the
average Korean the local "head man" was the
source of authority and the repository of govern-
mental responsibility.

As in American cities, these head men gained
their power by devious means, usually inde-
pendently of the people's direct choice. They
were, however, subject to the public opinion of
communities at once individualistic and unusual-
ly stable. Korean families normally occupy the
same homesteads for many generations. The
local units are bound together by intermarriage
and by bonds of common interest that transcend
personal ambitions. Everyone in the block or
village knows what basic policies are in the long
run good for them, and what are bad. The head
man is close to the pressure of his constituents'
opinion, and, moreover, his own welfare is bound
in with that of the community. The general

183

tendency is for responsible government that
operates for the good of all.

County government traditionally has been
conducted by the collective consent of the head
men, and provincial government by the county
leaders. Thus, in the days of the absolute mon-
archy this system operated so inexorably that
provincial governors were always removed when
the people protested against their rule. In China,
a somewhat similar system failed to operate
effectively because the country was so large and
heterogeneous that it tended to break up into
feudal fiefs, with absolute power seized by pro-
vincial governors. In Japan, there was never
this strong base of local self-determination.
Korea evolved a pyramidal system of political
controls that made the local community the
strongest element in the entire governmental
structure. Thus, a kind of democracy evolved
that is completely indigenous, and independent
of the mass communication and education
systems that make Western democracy possible.

The second major characteristic of Korean
political life is its adherence to Confucian ethics.
Whereas Lockian traditions have given to every
American the inbred conviction that he is as good
as anyone else, and perhaps better, Koreans are
steeped in a tradition of respect for age, position

184

and authority. Subordination and order, rather
than equality and contention, have been their
watchwords. To expect all Korean adults to ex-
ercise the suffrage with complete self-assertion
is to expect the impossible. Young men have been
taught not to argue with their elders, not to pro-
fess to know as much, and many do not even
smoke in their presence. When they are accused
of often letting their head men influence their
political judgments, the answer is that they have
always done so.

Critics of Korean democracy have been
amazed by the response of the people to the
elections of 1948 and 1950. For the first time,
women were eligible to vote. Farmers and poor-
ly educated laborers were given the opportunity
to express themselves without fear through a
secret ballot. The reaction of the people was
shown in a mass rush to the polls by some 90%
of all eligible voters about 30% more than a
hotly contested presidential election brings out
in the United States. In such an atmosphere,
the essentials of democracy, at least, are safe.

The new government of Korea had to be
erected upon the two bases of local controls and
Confucian ethics. As close communication with
the Western world is established, and as educa-
tional facilities are provided for all the people, a

185

new basis of information and independent judg-
ment will be provided. A prime responsibility
of the new government was to establish these
facilities as rapidly as possible. As an indication
of how seriously and well this responsibility was
assumed, adult illiteracy already was reduced by
over 50%. Under such conditions, the evolution
of democracy can continue if it is allowed to
do so.

A realistic appraisal of the Korean Constitu-
tion still a living document requires that it
be viewed in the light of the circumstances
affecting it. Like a battle plan, a Constitution
is drawn up not in a vacuum, but in a fluid
political situation and accordingly must take its
character in part from existing conditions, as
well as in part from historic attitudes and immut-
able political theories. In the attempt to tran-
scend the limitations of current problems, every
written Constitution must be to some extent a
declaration of good intentions.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea is
notable not only for the good intentions it pro-
claims, but also for the hampering limitations
within which it, perforce, has had to operate and
for the flexible provisions it contains for dealing
with unforeseeable emergencies. Considering
the document itself, its most noteworthy fea-

186

tures are its explicit guarantees of civil and in-
dividual rights and its emphasis upon a balance
of powers while yet insuring to the executive
ability to meet emergencies. Beyond and behind
the text of the document, however, factors vitally
affecting its operation have been the continued
division of the nation into two parts, Communist
aggression, and the relations of the new Republic
to the United States and the United Nations.

The Korean Constitution is no accidental or
transient production. It has roots deeply sunk
into the Korean past, just as it unquestionably
has been basically influenced by the political
traditions of the democratic West. As a beacon
light of the future, it indicates the direction in
which the Korean people hope to chart their
national progress. It also commemorates the
suffering and sacrifice and devotion by which
their ideals of individual liberty and dignity have
come into being.

Before considering the Constitution in detail
it would be well to examine the circumstances
under which it must operate. The Republic of
Korea come into being by international agree-
ment; its basis does not rest upon a forcible
arrogation of sovereignty, but upon the almost
unprecedented fact of international sponsorship.

187

This is the first factor detcrming the character
and operation of its Constitution.

Secondly, the Constitution of the Republic of
Korea was adopted while the nation was forcibly
and unlawfully divided and under conditions of
division that posed a constant threat against the
security and well-being of the Republic.

And thirdly, as a result of this division, the
Constitution had to operate under circumstances
of international intervention never contemplated
in the basic legal structure of a sovereign nation.

Adopted by the National Assembly on July
12, 1948, and formally proclaimed on July 17,
the Korean Constitution states in its Preamble
that its authority derives from the independence
of Korea "from time immemorial" and from the
reassertion of sovereignty in the 1919 movement.
Determining "to consolidate national unity," it
emphasizes that "The sovereignty of the Korean
Republic shall reside in the people as a whole."
The National Assembly, composed of 200 mem-
bers elected from southern Korea, reserved 100
seats to be filled as soon as circumstances permit
by free elections in northern Korea, each mem-
ber to be chosen from a district comprising
100,000 people.

The cardinal principle expressed in the Con-
stitution and maintained by the Government is

188

that the Republic of Korea comprises the entire
nation, and not merely the area south of the
38th Parallel. This view of the Government is
supported by the U.N. resolution of December
12, 1948, approving of the Republic as the "only
lawful government" in Korea. It is also support-
ed by the formal recognition accorded by the
U.S., France, England, and 50 other nations
with no reservations concerning the present
forcible detention of the northern area from the
Republic's jurisdiction. The U.N. Commission
in Korea observed this juridical right of the
Republic by carefully refraining from any formal
recognition of the regime established by the
Soviet Union in northern Korea.

In its general structure, the Korean Constitu-
tion resembles that of the United States in that
it centers executive authority in a President
elected for a four-year term (limited to one con-
secutive re-election) and establishes a "balance
of power" among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. The means by which these
ends are accomplished differ somewhat from the
American method.

The Presidency has even more authority in
Korea than in the U.S. in several respects. In
Korea, the President has very large appointive
powers. He appoints the mayors of cities and

189

the governors of the provinces. His appoint-
ment of cabinet members and diplomatic repre-
sentatives is not subject to approval by the
legislative body, except in the case of the Prime
Minister. Moreover, the Constitution specifical-
ly gives to the Korean President wartime emer-
gency powers to be assumed at his own
discretion, similar to those that traditionally
have been voted for American Presidents after
an emergency occurs. To show the extent of
these powers, and also the care with which
they are safeguarded, Article 57 may be quoted :

"When in time of civil war, or in a dangerous
situation arising from foreign relations, or in case of
a natural calamity, or on account of a grave economic
or financial crisis it is necessary to take urgent measures
for the maintenance of public order and security, the
President shall have the right to issue orders having
the effect of law or to make necessary financial dis-
positions, provided, however, that the President shall
exercise such powers exclusively if time is lacking for
the convocation of the National Assembly.

"Such orders or dispositions shall be reported without
delay to the National Assembly for confirmation. If
confirmation of the National Assembly is not obtained
such orders or dispositions shall lose their effect there-
upon, and the President shall announce it without
delay."

A major check by the National Assembly
upon the President lies in the fact that he is

190

elected by the full Assembly rather than by
popular vote. In case of vacancy in the office
of President, his successor will be elected "with-
out delay." Another check not contained in
the American Constitution is the provision that
governmental functions (13 of which are spec-
ifically noted) shall be decided by majority vote
of the State Council or Cabinet, the President
having "the right to vote and to break a tie
vote." He also has the right to dismiss any
member of the Cabinet.

Still another potent check upon the President
is the fact that the budget must be approved
and funds appropriated by the National As-
sembly. Vetoes by the President may be over-
ridden by a two-thirds vote of members present,
provided they constitute two-thirds of all duly
elected members.

The National Assembly is a unicameral body,
with each member elected from a district con-
taining approximately 100,000 population.
There is no need for a two-chamber legislature,
for there is no aristocratic class, and the 13
Korean provinces do not constitute a federal
union, but are merely administrative divisions.

The first National Assembly, elected May
10, 1948, served for only two years, but suc-
cessive bodies have a four-year term.

191

The judiciary is not clearly defined, Article
76 reading, "The organization of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts shall be determined
by law." Independence of the judiciary is
sought in the provisions that judges shall be
appointed for ten years, subject to reappoint-
ment; shall "judge independently in accordance
with the Constitution and the laws;" and
"shall not be dismissed, suspended from office
or have their salaries reduced except by im-
peachment or criminal or disciplinary punish-
ment."

A notable difference from the United States
Constitution lies in the provision for a Constitu-
tion Committee to have jurisdiction over all
cases involving constitutionality of a law. "The
Vice President shall be the Chairman of the
Constitution Committee and five justices of the
Supreme Court and five members of the Na-
tional Assembly shall serve as members of the
Constitution Committee." A two-thirds vote
by the Committee is required to find a law
unconstitutional. How the Assembly members
are selected "shall be determined by the law"
(Art. 81).

In considering the "checks and balances"
provisions of a constitution, attention is usually
focused upon the means by which one branch

192

of the government may serve as a brake upon
other branches. It is even more important to
provide adequate methods for fruitful inter-
action among them. So far as the judiciary is
concerned, its virtual independence of the ex-
ecutive and legislature is stressed. The President
appoints the judges, and the Assembly must
confirm the Chief Justice. The Constitution
Committee constitutes the one point of mutual
action among the three branches.

Between the executive and legislative branch-
es the Constitution contains various provisions
designed to minimize tension, preserve the in-
dependence of each, and facilitate cooperation.
So long as each is independent of the other,
some conflict, of course, is inevitable. To the
makers of the Korean Constitution this seemed
more desirable than the English system of dis-
solving the government whenever a division
occurs.

Under the Korean Constitution, members of
the Cabinet are eligible to sit in the Assembly
and to present their views to it. They must
appear to answer questions of Assemblymen up-
on request. They may or may not be elected
members with full voting rights. They have
the same right as any Assembly member to
present bills, so that in Korea the executive

193

branch need not go through the pretense of
having its measures introduced by a legislator.

The President, being elected by the Assembly,
is assured, at least initially, of majority support
for his major policies. He may at any time
appear before the Assembly to present his views.
The President and other public officials are
subject to impeachment by a Court composed
of five justices of the Supreme Court and five
members of the National Assembly, with a two-
thirds vote required to convict.

The Jefferson philosophy that "that govern-
ment is best which governs least" has been
generally renounced around the world, with
increasing regulation of individual "freedom"
in order to insure "equality" and "justice." The
Korean Constitution avows (Art. 84) that "The
principles of the economic order of the Republic
of Korea shall be to realize social justice, to
meet the basic demands of all citizens and to
encourage the development of a balanced econ-
omy." Hence, "Mines and other important . . .
resources . . . shall be owned by the State . . .
Farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling
farmers" thus outlawing absentee landlordism.
"Important transportation and communication
enterprises, financial and insurance institutions,
electricity, irrigation, water supply, gas and any

194

enterprises having public character, shall be
managed by the government . . . Foreign trade
shall be under the control of the government."

Within this framework of broad govern-
mental responsibilities, the rights of individuals
are safeguarded by a detailed and explicit "bill
of rights" comprising Articles 8-28. Along with
freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, the
Constitution seeks also to safeguard the citizens
from fear, want, and inequality of opportunity.

"All citizens shall be equal before the law,"
declares Article 8, with "no discrimination
derived from sex, religion, or social position."
Article 9 guarantees the citizens against arbi-
trary arrest. "The right of property shall be
guaranteed" (Art. 15). Art. 16 provides "equal
opportunity for education" and that "At least
elementary education shall be compulsory and
free of charge.

"All citizens shall have the right and duty
to work" (Art. 17) and both "collective bar-
gaining" and profit-sharing are provided for in
Art. 18. "Citizens who are incapable of making
a living because of old age, infirmity or in-
capacity to work shall be entitled to protection
by the state." Recognizing that such provisions
constitute a heavy drain upon governmental
resources that at present are inadequate to the

195

demands upon them, the Constitution labels
its welfare sections as "good intentions" rather
than as actual assurances by adding the qualify-
ing phrase "in accordance with the provisions
of law."

Hie rights of public trial, freedom from
double jeopardy, freedom from ex post facto
arrest, and the assistance of counsel are guar-
anteed. In addition, "When a defendant in a
criminal case who has been detained is found
not guilty he may in accordance with the pro-
visions of law request compensation from the
government."

Besides the very explicit rights indicated in
the Constitution, Articles 27 and 28 add sweep-
ing generalizations: "Public officials shall be
the trustees of the sovereign people and shall
at all times be responsible to the people;" and
"Liberties and rights of the people shall not
be ignored for the reason that they are not
enumerated in this Constitution."

In two years of operation, the Constitution
proved adequate to its purposes despite the
very heavy pressures exerted upon it.

196

11

STATESMAN OF THE
NEW KOREA

IT HAS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO PRESENT THE

story of Korea's struggle for freedom without fre-
quent reference to its long-time leader, Syngman
Rhee. Before turning to a detailed treatment
of the problems and progress of the Republic
of Korea, a fuller picture of the Republic's
President is required. I have known him in-
timately for eight years.

Spokesmen for the great powers capture the
headlines and occupy public attention. But

197

big statesmen are not the exclusive property of
big nations. In the chess game of international
politics, where power counts, the leaders of
small nations must be shrewd if they expect
their countries to be anything more than help-
less pawns. On the record, one of the clearest-
visioned statesmen of our times is the indomit-
able Syngman Rhee.

Few heads in international politics have been
battered longer or harder than his. During a
political career that began in 1894, Dr. Rhee
has spent seven years in prison, seven months
under daily torture, and forty-one years in exile
with a price on his head. He has directed a
revolution, served as President of the world's
longest-lived government-in-exile, has knocked
vainly at the portals of international confer-
ences, and finally shepherded his cause to success
only to see his nation torn asunder by a Com-
munist invasion.

As President of the Republic of Korea, he
entered a new phase of his active political
career. Instead of quietly enjoying the fruits of
success, however, he has had to lead a con-
tinuing fight against the ambitions of Russia,
just as for fifty years he led the movement for
independence from Japan.

Before the submission of the Korean question

198

to the United Nations, Dr. Rhee's situation was
admirably summed up in a one-sentence char-
acterization by a high-ranking officer in the
American occupation force in Korea: "Dr.
Rhee is so much the greatest of Korean states-
men that he might be said to be the only one;
but he has made himself so objectionable to
Russia that he can never have a part in any
American-sponsored government of southern
Korea." That was said in the summer of 1946,
when the American Military Government was
trying to bend the stiff Korean necks into a
Communist-Coalition collar. When this thank-
less effort was abandoned, Dr. Rhee came once
again into American favor. Now he is fighting
on our side, with no effort to "straddle the
fence" even before the cold war in that area
became hot.

Violent Korean nationalist factions long de-
nounced his forbearance with American policy
in south Korea during the period of military
occupation. Communists and their sympath-
izers pronounced him unfit for public life be-
cause of his charge that Russia used the
Communist party as a means of trying to secure
control of all Korea. The American Military
Government squirmed under his adamant re-
fusal to enter into its dream solution of a "Left

199

and Right Coalition." The State Department
trained its guns on his refusal to accept the plan
for trusteeship of Korea agreed to by Byrnes,
Bevin, and Molotov in December, 1945. He
has been at various times called anti- Japanese,
anti-Russian and even anti-American, though
the more accurate term in each instance is the
simple one of pro-Korean. Through all the
struggles, Dr. Rhee has found that, in a power-
politics world, an advocate of small-nation in-
dependence has to walk a steep and rocky road.

Dr. Rhee's life falls naturally into four
periods. From 1894 to 1905 he fought for re-
form of the old Dynasty and for the democratic
modernization of Korea. From 1905 to 1945
he struggled for the freedom of his country
from Japan. From 1945 to 1948 he stood
inflexibly for Korean reunification and inde-
pendence. And since August 15, 1948, he head-
ed the Republic of Korea in its continued efforts
to regain the Communist-held north and to
establish economic, political and military
stability.

Syngman Rhee was born on March 26, 1875.
He was educated in the Chinese classical tradi-
tion, but sought also Western education in the
Pai Jai Mission School.

From his twentieth year he became a leader

200

of democratic forces in Korea. He founded and
edited the first daily newspaper ever published
in Korea. He organized student and youth
groups to protest the corruption of the court
and the surrender to Japanese and Russian
pressure-groups. When the Japanese murdered
the great Korean Queen Min in 1895, young
Rhee declared personal warfare against them.
Two years later, he was arrested for his
political insurgence, and spent the next seven
years in the Kamoksu prison in Seoul.

For the first seven months of his imprison-
ment he was subjected to daily tortures, includ-
ing beatings with three-cornered bamboo rods,
and the burning of oiled paper wrapped around
his arms. His fingers were so horribly mashed
that even today, in time of stress, he blows
upon them. He wore constantly around his
neck a 20-pound wooden cangue, and sat with
his feet locked in stocks and his hands hand-
cuffed.

After his imprisonment was eased, Dr. Rhee
wrote a book called The Spirit of Independence,
which is still widely read by Koreans and has
served as the chief guide of the independence
movement. It has been reprinted several times
since Japan's defeat in 1945.

While attending the Mission School, Rhee

201

learned English, and was converted to Christian-
ity. After his release from prison, in August,
1904, Japanese influence was so strong in Korea
that he could not remain unless he would aban-
don his struggle for Korean independence. Con-
sequently, he made the hard decision to leave his
country and carry on the fight abroad.

Arriving in this country on the eve of the
Portsmouth Conference, Rhee made strenuous
efforts to secure the representation of his country
at that meeting. President Theodore Roosevelt
received him cordially at Oyster Bay, but in-
formed him Korea could not attend the Russian-
Japanese meeting. The first article of the
Portsmouth treaty provided for turning Korea
over to Japan.

Since nothing could be done at this point for
Korea, Rhee laid the basis for his later work by
attending George Washington, Harvard, and
Princeton Universities. In 1910, he received the
Ph.D. degree from Woodrow Wilson's own
hands, for a dissertation written on United
States neutrality policies.

For the next fifteen months Dr. Rhee carried
on Y.M.C.A. work and supervised a Methodist
Mission School in Korea. Then he was warned
that the Japanese were about to arrest him for
his dangerous "political thoughts" and once

202

again he returned to the United States. This was
the last he was to see of his country until after
the defeat of Japan in 1945.

From 1912 until 1932, and again from 1934
to 1938, he maintained a school in Hawaii. Then
he came to Washington, D. C., to take personal
charge of the Korean Commission, through
which he had appealed continually to the State
Department ever since 1919 for the recognition
of the Korean provisional government.

In 1919, on March 1, under the direction of
Dr. Rhee and other nationalist leaders, the
Koreans staged their country- wide passive revo-
lution against the Japanese. Representatives of
the new Provisional Republic elected Dr. Rhee
President, and then fled to China where the
provisional government was enabled to function
in Shanghai.

The Japanese government placed a large price
upon Dr. Rhee's head. Nevertheless, he went to
Shanghai to meet the members of the revolution-
ary government. After he had supervised the
organization of the Korean exiled Republic in
Shanghai, Dr. Rhee returned to the United
States to carry on the fight for recognition.

In 1920 he sought a passport to go to Paris to
present a plea for Korea to the Peace Confer-
ence, and in 1922 Dr. Rhee led a Korean

203

delegation to the Washington Disarmament
Conference.

Through the 1920s, when United States rela-
tions with Japan were close and friendly, Dr.
Rhee was often called a "radical" who sought to
engage this country in war with Japan for the
sake of effecting Korea's liberation. In 1933,
when the League of Nations was cautiously re-
fusing to consider Japan's seizure of Manchuria,
Dr. Rhee went to Geneva and unsuccessfully
sought to secure consideration of Korea's claim
to freedom.

It was in Geneva that he met Miss Francesca
Dormer, daughter of an ancient Viennese family,
who subsequently, in 1935, became his wife.

In 1940, Dr. Rhee published his book, Japan
Inside Out, which warned that Japan was plan-
ning to extend its empire by attacking the
United States.

After Pearl Harbor, Dr. Rhee hoped briefly
that his long fight was won. He immediately
offered to the State Department the full support
of Korean guerrillas, organized by the exiled
Korean Provisional Republic, and asked that the
government at last be recognized. He urged that
recognition would make possible the effective
organization of guerrilla attacks upon Japan's
supply line in Korea, and would prevent a pos-

204

sible seizure of Korea by Russia. But his request
was refused.

During the war years, Dr. Rhee held the Pro-
visional Government together, and sought by
every means in his power to inform the Amer-
ican public of the facts of Korea's plight. The
Cairo pledge of independence for Korea was the
first ray of real light in his 50-year fight, but
even that was dimmed by the phrase "in due

course."

Dr. Rhee offered his services to the Office of
War Information, and through its facilities made
several broadcasts to the Koreans, urging them
to prepare for the day when they could profit-
ably arise to strike the Jap army from behind its
lines.

After the surrender of Japan, Dr. Rhee re-
turned to Korea. He and other members of the
exiled Provisional Government promised to re-
turn "as private persons" and to assist the Amer-
ican Military Government of South Korea in
working out plans for the rapid realization of
independence.

Upon Dr. Rhee's return to Korea he was
greeted with wild enthusiasm by his countrymen,
to whom his name symbolized their determina-
tion to be free. Crowds of 200,000 and more
gathered when he spoke. Every political party in

205

Korea, including even the Communist-dom-
inated People's Republic Party, offered him its
chairmanship. But Dr. Rhee decided against
affiliating himself with any specific parties, and
instead established the Society for the Rapid
Realization of Independence, of which he be-
came chairman, and to which all political parties
except the Communists pledged their support.
This was the time when Dr. Rhee publicly de-
clared that Korea could never accept the
Moscow decision imposing a trusteeship on
Korea.

The story of the years of struggle during the
military occupation, and of the eventual estab-
lishment of the Republic of Korea under United
Nations auspices in the southern half of the
country has been told in other chapters. Through
this entire period Rhee was under continual
attack as "stubborn and uncooperative." During
the latter part of 1947 (following his four-month
visit in Washington, D. C., protesting the policies
of the Military Government) he was held under
virtual house arrest. But his leadership won the
fight for independence and he was the only
candidate considered for presidency of the new
Republic.

The problems to which President Rhee ad-
dressed himself fall into three major categories:

206

( 1 ) to provide for the defense of his nation; (2)
to develop both the forms and the spirit of a real
democracy; and (3) to restore a badly shattered
economy and lay a basis for sound economic
progress. The three problems were interwoven
and, together or singly, beset with heaviest diffi-
culties. Besides, there was a lack of trained and
experienced personnel. Many friendly critics
feared that the new government would collapse
in disorder, but, despite the handicaps, substan-
tial progress soon became apparent in each of
the three major areas of endeavor.

Since this fourth period of President Rhee's
life is continuing to unfold, it cannot be sum-
marized as conclusively as could the preceding
ones. A word or two, however, may be said about
each of the major problems with which he has
dealt.

( 1 ) An army had to be built from the ground
up, since no Korean army had been permitted
before inauguration of the new Republic. At the
same time, a north Korean Communist force
estimated at around 200,000 men had been re-
cruited, trained and armed. As rapidly as pos-
sible a Korean armed force of about 100,000
was put into training and armed with American
weapons. One of the questions involved in its
development has been the extent to which it

207

should be allowed to become a real army,
equipped for full-scale war. Should it have tanks,
planes, naval ships and heavy artillery? Should
it be allowed to stockpile ammunition and equip-
ment? President Rhee argued insistently for
equipment adequate to defend his nation against
a full-scale attack from the north. American
officials opposed this view on two grounds: that
such a development might encourage the Re-
public to launch an attack against north Korea,
thereby incurring the danger of a wdrld-wide
war; and that stock-piled weapons might be
captured by the northern Communists and sub-
sequently be used against the United States.

(2) Democracy had good soil in Korea in
which to grow, because of the natural sturdy
individualism of the Korean character, and be-
cause of the tradition of local government on
matters most intimately affecting the people.
However, there were tremendous obstacles to be
overcome : fear engendered by a full generation
of the totalitarian and ruthless Japanese rule;
and ignorance caused by lack of schools and lack
of radio, newspaper, magazine and motion pic-
ture facilities for widespread adult education.
However, under the new Constitution, full legal
equality was granted to women; an explicit bill
of rights was included ; and free public education

208

was guaranteed. Critics from the left condemned
the Republic for its failure to achieve overnight
all the characteristics of schoolbook democracy,
but in any long view it seems remarkable that so
much of the libertarian spirit developed so
quickly. The foreign press was allowed full free-
dom to find and report whatever news and views
it wished ; educational facilities were vastly and
rapidly expanded; foreign critics (including
groups of American Congressmen) were wel-
welcomed and shown everything they had time
to see, with their reactions normally ranging
from "well satisfied" to "amazed at the rapid
progress." Several by-elections have been held in
addition to the general elections of 1948 and
1950, with observers all agreed that the voters
acted in complete freedom and with a dignified
and mature understanding of the democratic
process.

(3) Economic rehabilitation consisted of two
major problems: to rebuild an economy shat-
tered by three years of neglect and bleeding to
death from its artificial division along the 38th
Parallel ; and to rectify the injustices of a land-
tenure system. The latter was the easier to
remedy, and the requisite steps were promptly
taken.

Restoration of Korean industry would have

209

been difficult enough at best, with the coal, min-
erals, heavy industries and hydro-electric power
of the north cut off from the agriculture and
fabrication industries of the south. It was ren-
dered much harder by the Communist action of
cutting off the flow of electricity from north
Korea immediately after the May 10, 1948,
election. During the subsequent period, south
Korea opened up its own coal mines, increased
its own production of electricity, restored its fish-
eries, developed its manufacturing all to the
point of sheer incredibility.

The name of Syngman Rhee will bulk larger
as the history of our time emerges in perspective.
He has consistently foreseen developing forces
and movements far in advance of the events
themselves. He has stood foursquare for interna-
tional justice, for the right of self-determination
of peoples, for national and individual demo-
cratic freedom. Against massive odds and in the
face of repeated rebuffs, he fought on for fifty
years for the reform and redemption of the
Korean people. Long before the eyes of the West
saw the dangers, he warned first of the threat of
Japanese militarism and then of the canker of
Russian Communism. Though his warnings were
unheeded, he kept his courage and his optimistic
determination. Seeing needless problems piled

210

up by the blindness of the men in power, he
pleaded the cause of enlightenment, but when
his pleas failed he buckled down to the heavy
task of remedying the accumulated evils. His-
tory, in assessing his role, must conclude: Here
was a man who represented the twentieth
century at its best.

211

12

TWO YEARS OF PROGRESS

THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT AP-

proached the challenges and opportunities of
independence very much in the spirit of an im-
poverished but hopeful young married couple
just setting up housekeeping. Like many a young
couple in such circumstances, the Korean inde-
pendence leaders were warned by various com-
fortably established friends that starting out on
their own with such slender resources was dan-
gerous and ill advised, that it would have been
better to put off the independence for a time

212

longer in order to enjoy the advantages of a pro-
tective dependence, and that they were too in-
experienced and young in the ways of democracy
to manage successfully the complicated demands
of nationhood. Starry-eyed young couples have
heard and ignored just such advice through
the centuries. And it is probable that no new
nation ever was founded without the older
countries being sure that these brash upstarts
were wholly unfit as yet to organize and conduct
a nation. Yet, like the American colonies in
1775, the Korean people were determined to
try.

My own first view of the experiment in in-
dependence came in March, 1949, when I re-
turned to Korea after an absence of two and
a half years. The physical impressions of pro-
gress and improvement were startling. Many
streets which had been honeycombed with deep
chuck holes were paved and clean. Buildings
which had been crumbling and unattended
were repaired and in use. The people on the
streets were better clothed and better fed. Wood
lots, food shops, and stores handling products
of the handicraft industries (which had been
all but bare in 1946) were actually filled. It
was an astonishing sight (in view of the serious
fuel shortages of the winters of 1945-46 and

213

1946-47, to see the fuel lots (in March!) piled
high with firewood. It was no less surprisingly
gratifying to see the shops selling kitchenware
displaying piles of kettles, reaching clear to the
ceilings, whereas in 1946 only two or three
patched pots were on display.

Further inquiry revealed that not all the
physical needs of the people were satisfied.
Despite the successive good crops and the pro-
duction quota for 1950 of surplus rice for ex-
port, speculators and smugglers had forced the
price of rice to the enormously high price of
around 1,800 Won per small mal (4.76 gal-
lons). Within another year it was to go on
up to 2,030 Won per mal, despite every effort
by the government, which changed Ministers
of Agriculture three times and engaged in ex-
tensive purchases of rice in the harvest season
and sale at a controlled price of around 300
Won per mal during the spring. Textiles were
another group of commodities so short in supply
that prices reached impossible heights. A
woman's dress or a man's suit, for example,
cost roughly from three to six month's of a
laboring man's wages. Housing continued to
be the most serious shortage of all, with three
and four families sometimes living in one small
house, and with some of the refugees still living

214

in hillside dugouts. Beggars, who were so scarce
in 1946 that I was able to find only five in
all Seoul during the course of the summer,
were now comparatively numerous. There was
no magic in independence which could elim-
inate the very great discrepancies between de-
mand and supply of basic commodities. But
the progress that had been made was nonethe-
less startling.

Even more striking than the material im-
provements was the change in the spirit of the
people. Replacing the cynicism and discourage-
ment of 1946 and 1947 (when independence
seemed throttled by international agreements
enforced by the American Democracy which
they knew was their last great hope), there
was in 1949 an atmosphere of hopefulness and
resolution manifest everywhere. Businessmen
who had suffered from black frustration while
the factories deteriorated during the occupation
were now astir with the opportunity for free
enterprise. I sat in on many discussions where
plans were being discussed much like those
pursued in American communities for expan-
sion of plants, introduction of more efficient
methods of production, evaluation of new in-
ventions, and considerations of proposed new
raw materials (such as the substitution of peat

215

for wood and coal as household fuel). Here
again, the picture was not all favorable. Many
of the government-owned plants (expropriated
from the Japanese) were run inefficiently by
untrained (and sometimes dishonest) managers.
Profits were sometimes regarded as of more
importance than production. Self-service was
sometimes more important than public-service.
But these were faults with which free-enterprise
systems in every part of the world have to con-
tend. The essential fact was a very notable
stirring and development of the productive and
constructive spirit of the people.

Under the able administration of Mayor Yun
Po Sung, the external face of Seoul had bright-
ened considerably. Policemen on guard before
public buildings were using their free time to
plant and tend flowerbeds. High-school students
were taking turns getting out at 7:00 A. M.
each morning to sweep the streets. Garbage
collections were far more thorough and system-
atic. Some public buildings (notably the Census
Bureau) were still in a state of disorganization
and disrepair, but most of them were clean,
orderly, and abuzz with activity. The chief
criticism heard of the government bureaus was
that (partly to offset the serious unemployment)
there were far too many employees, many of

216

whom apparently didn't know what they should
be doing. "Boon-doggling" unquestionably ex-
isted in the Republic of Korea as it did in the
United States during the depression of the
'thirties. Untrained and inexperienced admin-
istrators were making mistakes. President Rhee
juggled the eleven Ministries like a circus jug-
gler trying to keep eleven balls in the air at
once. Minor graft (much resembling the under-
the-counter deals in the United States during
the years of war scarcities and rationing) was
all too evident. But these faults, again, were
inevitable and thoroughly to be expected. What
was far beyond any reasonable expectation was
the amount of efficiency and the magnitude of
the achievements.

With fertilizer pouring in through the EGA
program, farmers were producing the best
crops in Korean history. Textile mills tripled
their 1947-48 output of silk and cotton goods.
Over 200 rubber-goods plants were turning out
all-time record productions, and rubber shoes
(the everyday wear of farmers and city people
alike) were actually in surplus. The 18-mile
industrial corridor between Seoul and Inchon
was coming to life. Out in the Youngwol-
Samchok area the vital problem of increasing
the output of steam-generated electricity was

217

being solved. Since this was the basic require-
ment for sound economic development, it merits
close examination.

Following the U. N.-sponsored election of
May 10, 1948, the Communist regime in north
Korea pulled the switches and cut off the flow
of electricity into south Korea from the great
northern hydro-electric plants. Fully 80% of
all south Korea's electricity came from the
north. Since all the manufacturing of south
Korea depended upon electricity as its source
of power, this act was intended as a death-
blow to throw the economy of south Korea into
chaos and thus prepare the way for Communist
subversion. The United States rushed several
power barges to Inchon and Pusan to provide
what help they could. Several small hydro-
electric power plants in south Korea were put
into maximum production. However, the major
effort necessarily centered around the steam-
generating plant at Youngwol. This plant had
a generating capacity of 97,000 kw. and was
powered by coal produced in mines sprawling
around it in a 30-mile arc.

During the three years of Military Govern-
ment control, very little was done either to
mine the coal or to operate the electric gen-
erating plant. There were two reasons. In the

218

first place, electricity was not needed because
the supply of cheaper electricity from the north
was sufficient to operate the small number of
manufacturing plants which were in production.
More basically, before the establishment of the
Republic of Korea there was no clear authority
by which anyone could take the responsibility
for developing the mines and power plant.

When the northern source of electricity was
cut off, the power available in south Korea
dropped from 120,000 kw. to less than 30,000.
By the spring of 1949 it had been pushed up
to 59,000 kw. With more and more manufac-
turing plants being rehabilitated, electric power
was the major bottleneck to greatly expanded
production.

The excellent steam-generating plant at
Youngwol had been restored to good operating
efficiency. Its generators were capable of pro-
ducing 100,000 kw. of electricity, and to do so
required 1,500 tons of coal daily with an ash
content of around 17 per cent, or 2,000 tons
of the poorer coal with a 5Q% ash content.
The chief coal supply came from the Machari
Mines, a network of 150 shafts and tunnels
covering about 30 square miles, and connected
to Youngwol by a seven-mile aerial tramway,
equipped with 300 half-ton buckets traveling

219

on two parallel steel cables. The problems were
to mine more coal and to get it delivered to
the tramway for transport.

In charge of the operation was a 35-year-
old lawyer, Tai Wan Son, who before his ap-
pointment had never so much as seen a coal
mine. When he went to Machari, the daily
production was only 100 tons. Shafts and
tunnels were in disrepair. The roads over which
the coal had to be hauled had solid roadbeds,
but with no asphalt binder available the surface
was cut into deep ruts by the heavy coal trucks.
The few rail lines that existed had 20-gauge
tracks, but the old Japanese rail cars were worn
out and new American cars required 24-gauge
tracks. Tai had been given "full authority, 55
but funds for payment of his crews were nor-
mally from six weeks to two months late in
arriving. Nevertheless, he was doing a phenom-
enal job.

When I visited the mines in April, 1949,
production was already up from the low of
100 tons daily to a daily average of 800 tons.
Moreover, this was being done "with the left
hand only, 55 for major effort was concentrated
on digging new tunnels, clearing out old ones,
and spreading the rail tracks to 24-gauge. The
goal of 1,500 tons a day seemed reasonably sure

220

of achievement. The chief difficulty, and one
that continued to plague the operation, was
with labor. The miners had many legitimate
grievances which had not properly been re-
solved. Housing had to be constructed hastily
and was inadequate. Wages were low (around
6,000 Won a month) and, because of govern-
ment difficulties with financing, were always
late. Only elementary schools were available.
Mr. Tai told me that the most urgent need
in the whole mining operation was for a voca-
tional high school. "The men can forget their
families for eight hours a day," he said, "while
they work in the mines. But when they go
home at night their hearts are sick. For their
boys and girls have no schools beyond the
primary grades. And they are too poor to sup-
port them at boarding schools in the nearby
cities." Neither Mr. Tai nor the government
in Seoul possessed the magic by which some-
thing could be created out of nothing, and such
basic grievances, left largely unsatisfied, resulted
in lowered morale and in consequent lowered
productivity. The Communist sympathizers,
naturally, took full advantage of this opportunity
to stir up discontent.

In another area, 19 mines from Youngwol,
at Hamhaing, are coal deposits which Japanese

221

surveyors had estimated at 200 million tons.
Five tunnels were being cut, and the coal
brought out had an ash content of only 17 per
cent, equal to the anthracite coal mined in the
Pittsburgh area. Korean contractors achieved
the tremendous feat of putting in a seven-mile
road to connect these mines with the Youngwol
highway in only three months. The roadbeds
were excellent, but, lacking asphalt, the surface
was so bad that trucks were constantly break-
ing down. When I was there, only 23 trucks
of the 52 available were in operation, the re-
mainder being in repair shops.

Mr. R. D. Woolley, of Doylston, Penn-
sylvania, who was the EGA advisor at Young-
wol, declared that the most essential factor in
the whole production effort was the rare fact
that "I have never seen a lazy Korean!" The
tasks were being faced, and the job was being
done. The Youngwol Power Plant and the coal
mines which supplied it were among the early
sites captured by the Communist invaders,
however.

Aside from coal mining and electric power
production, other basic economic conditions also
showed the progress that was being made.
Production of 23 of the 28 principal industrial
products of south Korea showed substantial in-

222

creases in the first six months of 1949 over the
comparable period in 1948. Over-all mining
and manufacturing production was 92% higher
in December, 1949, than in December, 1948.
Newly established employment offices in the
major cities found jobs, during 1949, for 9,619
men (out of 15,472 registrants) and for 2,322
women (out of 2,859 who applied). Greatest
increases in production (and matching exten-
sion of employment opportunities) were in
electrical insulators, up 685% in 1949 over
1948; paper and cotton cloth, up 100%; cotton
yarn 93%; coal briquettes, 86%; porcelain
pottery, 307%; and other items of lesser im-
portance, such as pencils, bicycle tires and
tubes, car and truck tires, etc., showing in-
creases of from 74 to 345%.

However impressive such figures may be, a
specific example of what was done to reduce
the cost of unloading shiploads of American
EGA supplies will make clearer what the Re-
public of Korea was accomplishing and how
it was done. Prior to assumption of authority
by the Republic, the average time for unload-
ing a ship at Pusan was one month, and de-
murrage charges averaged $2,000 a day.
Republic officials determined to save as much
as possible of this money, in order to have more

223

with which to buy basic commodities. Through
the cooperation of the Office of Supply and
the Stevedoring Association, the average un-
loading time was cut to one week. At Inchon,
where the tide of 33 feet makes it necessary
to unload ships on lighters, what is believed to
be a world's record was achieved when a ship-
load of ammoniated sulphate fertilizer was un-
loaded in 23 hours. Achievements such as these
augured well for the future.

As might be expected, however, improvement
in the general welfare of the Korean people
during the brief period since the founding of
the Republic has been more largely psychological
and prospective than material and immediate.
The picture can be painted in either gray or
rosy colors, depending on the point of view. The
economic problems were far too serious, and the
resources far too slender, to make possible an
early establishment of even reasonable pros-
perity. But, prior to the attack of June 25, the
situation was already greatly ameliorated.

What the Korean people want out of life is
pretty much what any other people want: jobs
that pay a living wage, food to eat, fuel to burn,
and a few additional comforts and luxuries to
keep life interesting. They want schools to which
they can send their children and hope for better

224

times to come. As in any other country, some
get more of these things than others. In Korea
there are almost no really wealthy families,
but the other end of the social scale shows too
many in desperate want. In between, the
farmers (who constitute some 75% of the
population) were relatively well off, and the city
dwellers suffered most.

The basic problem in Korea has been short-
ages, and the chief sympton was inflation. Dur-
ing the last two years, production of essential
supplies and services increased, and inflation
showed real promise of leveling off. The Won
in circulation dropped from 73 billion in Feb-
ruary, 1950, to 57 billion in May. The gap
between what the people needed and what they
were able to buy was still painfully wide. A
very intelligent and hard-working Korean pro-
fessional man whom I know managed, by hold-
ing two jobs simultaneously, to earn 30,000 Won
a month between five and six times the earn-
ings of a miner, truck driver, or semi-skilled
factory worker. He told me that this fell 10,000
Won short of being enough to maintain his
family on a modest living scale. A dress for his
wife cost 15,000 to 25,000 Won; a suit for him-
self twice that; a pair of leather shoes cost a
week's labor at his relatively high pay. The

225

greatest inflation was in the price of the rice
and other foodstufls that the farmers grew and
sold. But the farmers felt the hard pinch of
many higher costs: in clothing, in household
supplies, in bullocks and farm equipment, and
in fuel. A pencil, for instance, that cost half a
Won in 1940 sold for 500 Won in 1949. The
Korean housewives, who had the responsibility
of paying the bills with what their husbands
can provide, faced an impossible task.

The capital city of Seoul represented the
worst hardships. A city with housing, transpor-
tation, schools, and utility facilities for 500,000,
by 1950 it had a population swollen to over a
million and a half. The 123 streetcars, the
water, telephone, and electric light systems, the
stores, the repair shops, the schools all were
used by three times as many people as they
were meant to serve. Long lines of waiting
people were customary; so were shortages and
high prices. But so were patience and coopera-
tion, and the willingness to do without and to
share. Typical is the spirit of an old man from
the country who finally got on a crowded street-
car after waiting patiently in a long line. When
he handed the conductor a 10- Won note and got
back five Won in change, his face lighted up and
he exclaimed, "So, the price of transportation

226

has not gone up I" Even in overcrowded Seoul,
complaints were rare.

Since few Koreans were allowed to teach
under the Japanese, getting decently trained
teachers has been one of the major problems.
All the Japanese textbooks had to be discarded
for they were mostly propaganda and new
ones written.

With tremendous energy directed to what the
government recognizes as one of its primary
tasks, textbooks for all the elementary and
Middle School grades have been written and
printed. They were sold to the students at an
average cost of five cents each.

One of the greatest worries of Korean parents
has been the shortage of schools. There were
too few teachers, too few books, too few school
buildings, too few pencils, and too little paper.
With an influx of some four million refugees
into southern Korea since the end of the war,
the housing shortage made doubly difficult the
task of finding extra buildings for school rooms.
As a result, more than a third of the children
were playing on the streets when they ought to
have been in school. In order to offer a little
learning to them all, a rotation system was
adopted, with many pupils having only three
months of schooling at a time.

227

What was accomplished to improve educa-
tion in Korea may be indicated by these figures:

( 1 ) An expansion of primary school enroll-
ment from about I 1 /* million in 1945 to 2J4
million in 1948; an increase in primary school
teachers from 13,782 in 1945 to 34,757 in 1948;
and an increase in the number of primary
schools from 2,694 in 1945 to 3,442 in 1948.

(2) An increase in the number of Middle
Schools from 252 in 1945 to 423 in 1948; with
Korean enrollment increasing from 62,136 in
1945 to 226,960 in 1948, and of Korean Middle
School teachers from 833 to 8,238.

(3) Expansion of collegiate-grade institu-
tions from 19 in 1945 to 29 in 1948, with Korean
enrollment increasing from 3,039 to 21,250.

(4) An adult education program that in-
creased the proportion of the adult population
able to read the Korean script, Hangup from
about one-third in 1945 to an estimated 83%
in 1948.

(5) Inauguration of an on-the-job and tech-
nological training program operated in most
industries and government bureaus, with results
difficult to measure but widely praised by ad-
ministrators as productive of excellent effici-
ency.

One additonal sound measure of general wel-

228

fare was the people's health. Through the con-
certed efforts of Koreans and Americans, the
general level of health in southern Korea was
raised to such an extent that it became probably
the best in the Orient. In the summer of 1946,
there were 15,746 known cases of cholera in
southern Korea, with 10,191 deaths reported.
By the following year the number of reported
cases had dropped to 34, with only 10 deaths.
Similarly, the control of smallpox resulted in a
decline from 20,674 cases in 1946 to 1,197 cases
in 1948. Malaria, on the other hand, increased
from 49,185 recorded cases in 1947 to 71,064
in 1948. Diphtheria cases also either increased
or were recorded better, with a 1948 figure
of 2,231 cases, compared to 864 in 1946.

Under the Japanese regime in Korea, nurses
were regarded as mere servants, performing only
the most menial of duties. Nursing rapidly rose,
however, to the status of a profession. Doctors
have been educated to permit nurses to take
temperatures, administer medicines, give injec-
tions, assist with blood transfusions, and keep
daily records of patients' conditions. As a result,
girls from good families have taken up the study
of nursing, and the standards have approached
those enforced in the United States.

The Korean National Nurses Association,

229

founded in September, 1947, reached a mem-
bership of over 1,000. There were 17 schools
for nurses, of which 13 were fully accredited
by the Department of Public Health and Wel-
fare, and three more provisionally. During 1947,
245 girls graduated from a two-year nursing
course, with 60 more graduates in 1948. A new
three-year nursing curriculum was adopted, com-
paring favorably with that in American institu-
tions.

In addition to private hospitals maintained
by each of 1,500 doctors, there were 59 medical
institutions in southern Korea. These included
4 leprosaria (caring for only 8,660 of the 25,000
lepers), one tuberculosis sanatorium (although
from 10 to 20% of Koreans were estimated to
be suffering from tuberculosis), and 45 general
hospitals, with a total of 3,600 in-patients.
There were in Seoul three mental hospitals with
a total capacity of 200 patients.

Infant mortality remained very high. With
22 live births per 1,000 of the population, the
mortality rate was 48.8 in the first year, with
three maternal deaths each year per 1,000 of
the population.

General health conditions are, necessarily,
closely integrated with problems of education,
employment, and living conditions. A survey of

230

south Korea, completed in July, 1946, showed
that the number of doctors varied from 27 per
100,000 of the population, in Kyonggi Do Prov-
ince, to 1.7 per 100,000 in Chung Chong
Namdo. Hospitals, clinics, doctors, and medical
supplies are all far below minimum safety levels.
Extensive malnutrition is another related
problem.

Public health officials accustomed to condi-
tions in the United States will find such figures
indicative of a crying need for improvement.
The most significant thing about the public
health situation in southern Korea, however, is
the tremendous advancement that was made,
both in curative and in preventive medicine.

Hope not only for advancement, but even
for day-by-day security, always seemed pretty
slim in the Republic as long as the 38th Parallel
continued to cut through the middle of the
nation's resources and to present an armed
threat of imminent attack. President Rhee
boldly proclaimed the program of his govern-
ment when he said: "We shall become both
strong and prosperous : strong because we must,
and prosperous because we won't be satisfied
with less than a decent standard of living for
every Korean." President Rhee's sights were
set higher than those of most Orientals, because

231

he had spent most of his mature life in the
United States. But he fully realized the dif-
ficulties of transition.

It was at the great naval base in south Korea,
Chinhae, that President Rhee told a group of
us as we went together on a day's fishing trip :
"In my time I have seen many changes as the
East becomes more like the West, but the dif-
ferences still run deep. Knock a Chinese down
and he will get up, brush himself off, and walk
away. Why? Because he is afraid? No be-
cause he believes a civilized man should live
at peace with his fellow men; he must not
fight. If a dog bites you, you do not bite him
back again. But this is sometime hard for
Americans to understand. In the United States,
if a bully knocks you down, you get up fighting.
It doesn't matter whether you win or lose, but
it is necessary that you fight."

President Rhee paused a long moment as
he gazed out across Chinhae's waters, then he
said: "Someday, I think, the West will become
more like the East. But we cannot wait for
that day to come. Meanwhile, we Orientals
are rapidly changing into Westerners. We have
to if we are to continue to live."

The story of how and why the Republic of
Korea was forced to maintain only a small

232

and lightly armed force, intended merely for
internal police protection, has already been told.
I was in Seoul in May, 1949, when the decision
was reached in Washington to withdraw the
last American security troops, now reduced to
7,500 men, and this decision was transmitted
to President Rhee by Ambassador John Muccio.
President Rhee's reaction was a practical one.
"The question is not when or whether American
troops are withdrawn," he said. "The question
is: What are the policies of the United States
in regard to Korea." President Rhee pleaded
for a statement from the White House that
would serve as definitely to warn the Soviet
Union against encroachment as the "Truman
Doctrine" had served in Greece and Turkey.
The Republic of Korea had "bet its life on
Uncle Sam." In view of the Communist threat,
it was evident that only an American guarantee
could prevent overthrow of the Republic by
force anytime the Kremlin might give the word.
Instead of such a guarantee, however, the
spokesmen in Washington announced that the
"American defense line" lay on the other side
of the Straits of Korea, in Japan. What the
results of the guarantee might have been can
now never be known. But the results of troop
withdrawal without any explicit pledge of as-

233

sistance are now being reaped in bloody battle-
fields through south Korea.

Despite disappointments such as the with-
drawal of the troops, the Republic of Korea
realized fully that it owed both its inception
and its continued existence to American under-
standing and aid. In the spring of 1949 I
accompanied President Rhee on an 8-day swing
through south Korea, where earnestly and
patiently he spoke four and five times a day
to huge crowds assembled in every town.

"Without American aid, 35 he told the crowds,
"we could never hope to revive our divided
and blasted economy. United States military
aid is helping us to build the army that has
already subdued the guerrillas on Cheju Island,
in the Chiri Mountains, and around Taegu.
American technicians are helping us to organize
the coal mining and electricity generating pro-
grams upon which our hope of industrialization
is based. American fertilizers are providing the
basis for the best crop year in our history."

And every speech ended with the admonition,
"American . money can accomplish very little
unless it is matched by Korean labor and
patriotic devotion. Don't dream of Heaven on
earth, but work for the practical realities. We
shall have to work for longer hours, we may

234

have to eat less and do without all but the
barest necessities. It is the future of our nation
we are building, to make a better life for our
children/ 5

This was the dream and the goal which the
attack by the Communist Empire sought to
smash. It remains the goal of Korea for the
reconstruction job that lies ahead.

235

13

KOREA AND JAPAN

IN COMMON WITH THE REST OF ASIA, KOREA

has watched with acute interest and general dis-
appointment the American dilemma in Japan.
Our task there has basically been to restore to
the 80 millions of Japanese an opportunity to
earn their own way (thus relieving the Ameri-
can taxpayer of the burden), despite the loss of
such profitable prewar possessions as Korea and
Formosa. In effect, this goal could be achieved
only by providing in Japan an even better in-

236

dustrial economy than it had before the war. But
this, in turn, could only be accomplished as the
other areas of Asia played the precise role Japan
had assigned to them in the spurious "East Asia
Go-prosperity Sphere" program. That is, they
must supply raw materials and buy the finished
product, while Japan does the manufacturing.
The inevitable result, in the eyes of Koreans and
of many other Asians as well, must be to estab-
lish the Japanese standard of living well above
that of other Asian peoples, and also to place
them economically at the mercy of Japan's in-
dustrial policies. Naturally, this prospect has
been resented and feared.

No clearer statement of the American dilem-
ma in Japan has ever been made than that of-
fered by Kenneth C. Royall, while he was
Secretary of the Army, to the San Francisco
Commonwealth Club, in January, 1948. After
repeating earlier pledges that our policies will
"prevent Japan from again waging unprovoked
and aggressive and cruel war against any na-
tion," Royall added: "We hold to an equally
definite purpose of building in Japan a self-suf-
ficient democracy, strong enough and stable
enough to support itself and at the same time to
serve as a deterrent against any other totalitarian
war threats which might hereafter arise in the

237

Far East." Here is the problem in clearest es-
sence : to keep Japan weak enough to avoid ar-
ousing the fear and resentment of the peoples of
Asia whose help and trust we badly need, and at
the same time to make Japan strong enough to
help hold off the now desperately imminent
threat of Soviet invasion.

In Korea, where relations with Japan have
been inimical for centuries, the fear has been
that Japanese leaders may now be repeating to
themselves what the Foreign Minister, Count
Tadasu Hayashi, wrote frankly in 1895: "What
Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly quiet,
to lull the suspicions that have arisen against her,
and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foun-
dations of her national power, watching and
waiting for the opportunity which must one day
surely come in the Orient."

Such suspicions were scarcely lulled by official
statements of American policy in Japan. What
this policy has meant was set forth in hearings
before the House of Representatives Appropria-
tions Committee in June, 1948, when General
Daniel Noce was questioned by Representative
Clarence Cannon.

Mr. Cannon: "Japan is, in the Orient, what
Germany was in middle Europe, the processing
nation. They brought in raw materials and fab-

238

ricated them and exchanged them with sur-
rounding nations for food and other supplies."

General Noce: "Japan was the workshop of
the Far East industrially; yes, sir."

Mr. Cannon: "And you are endeavoring to
rehabilitate Japanese industry?"

General Noce: "Yes, sir, that is the purpose
for which I appear."

General Noce was just back from a mission to
China and the Philippines to try to secure ac-
ceptance for this kind of program, and he frank-
ly told the Committee: "We must face the fact
that these countries that were enemies of Japan
still have very much in their minds the Japanese
domination before the war of trade areas, and
it is slow business getting them to accept the
Japanese to come to their countries."

In Korea, where the exploitation of the
country and the people for the benefit of Jap-
anese had been severest, suspicion and dislike of
Japan persist. The feelings have been accent-
uated by ill treatment of the 600,000 Koreans
who still reside in Japan. They have neither
been accorded the special privileges granted to
"Allied nationals" resident in Japan since the
war, nor the same basic rights as Japanese cit-
izens. This has continued to be a point of sharp
dissention during the past five years. President

239

Rhee has made it one of his prime objects to
try to solve the difficulties. Korea's first trade
treaty was a $90-million-dollar trade agreement
with Japan, negotiated in 1949 through SCAP.

This attempt to build a future of cooperative
understanding was most clearly formalized by
President Rhee in a statement he issued in Tokio,
on February 16, 1950, as he arrived there for
conferences with General MacArthur:

"I myself have never been known as a friend
of Japan. Nevertheless, the present situation re-
quires reaching a common understanding be-
tween the Korean and Japanese people for their
common safety in facing their common danger
arising from the growing Communist expansion
directed chiefly toward the Pacific areas. In-
stead of quarreling over the unhappy past, if the
Japanese realize their danger as we do and are
willing to cooperate with us in fighting for life
and liberty not only of Japan and Korea but of
all Pacific nations, we certainly can solve any
problems existing between us."

The problems which President Rhee had
primarily in mind are three-fold:

(I) Rights of Korean residents in Japan. At
the conclusion of the war, approximately a mil-
lion and a half Korean residents in Japan, most
of whom had been taken there unwillingly for

240

war service, were repatriated. The remaining
600,000 have property or other interests in Japan
which make them desirous, for the time being
at least, of remaining. The Japanese charge that
many of these Koreans are black marketeers,
trouble makers, and Communists. The Korean
government points out that their language
schools have been closed, their properties hedged
by unique restrictions, and their status remains
largely undefined.

(2) Trade relations. While entirely agree-
able to selling surplus rice, fisheries products,
graphite, iron, magnesium, and other raw ma-
terials to Japan, Korea has insisted that the
trade be established on a basis of equality which
will also permit the full and free industrial de-
velopment of Korea itself. Like Japan, the pop-
ulation pressures in Korea are so great that a
high standard of living is impossible without
considerable industrialization. Even more truly
than in Japan, the necessary requisites for in-
dustrialization (except petroleum products) are
all present within Korea. One example to which
the government has already devoted some at-
tention is the presence in Korea of the only large
supply of good silicate sand in the Far East. The
Republic naturally prefers to manufacture glass,
rather than to sell the sand to Japan and then

241

buy the glass back again. The problem is def-
initely one of American concern, for our aid pro-
grams to both Korea and Japan give us the right
and the responsibility of deciding in large mea-
sure for what purposes the aid funds shall be
spent. What Korea wants, stated in simplest
terms, is that the international economic situa-
tion of the Far East shall be of a nature to
benefit all of the peoples concerned equally, ra-
ther than to favor one nation at the expense of
the others. The American dilemma lies in the
fact that only by favoring Japan can we escape
from the necessity of bolstering that country's
economy at the expense of American taxpayers.
(3) Korean claims for indemnity from Japan.
The eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission
which for five years has been studying the basis
of an eventual reparations settlement with Japan
does not include any representation from Korea.
Unofficially, the view in Washington officialdom
has been expressed that Japanese assets turned
over to the Korean government constitute all the
reparations Korea is likely to receive. The Kor-
ean view is that these assets were simply Korean
properties which had been seized and exploited
by Japanese, and that they are far from ad-
equate, in any event, to repay the considerable
sums of money and quantities of goods which

242

the Japanese removed from Korea during the
40-year occupation.

The Korean case is set forth explicitly in a
balance sheet prepared partly by Korean ec-
onomists and partly by Americans, who served
together upon the Special Economic Committee
appointed by the American Military Govern-
ment, with Lee Soon Taik serving as chairman.
Dr. Chey Soon Ju, the American-educated Di-
rector of the Bank of Korea, has organized the
findings of this Committee in the following
tables:

243

rJ Of

1^83

lei 5

S3*-g

&a.s
ila-8

iiM
iI

^j

-I^S-Sfga

i-sillili^l

244

g g

>>>>>*>

5

245

This compilation shows an outstanding debt
owed by Japan to Korea of over 40 billion Yen
(the equivalent of the Korean Won) , figured in
1945 values of the currency. Even if repaid in
the inflated values of 1950, this sum would be
sufficient to aid vastly in the development of
Korean industrialization. Efforts to write off
these sums as of no consequence can never be
regarded as acceptable by the Republic of
Korea.

Whatever the differences that exist between
the two countries, Korea and Japan are both
confronted by the fact of aggressive Communist
imperialism, and as such are inevitably drawn
closer together for common defense. The aggres-
sion which was launched upon Korea was un-
questionably intended in part to bring the
Communist Empire closer to the main Japanese
islands. The common enemy looming upon their
northern and eastern borders will render far
easier the solution of problems that otherwise
might defy negotiation.

The Communist attack has submerged all
other problems and differences for the moment,
but, in the long struggle of rehabilitation and
reconstruction that lies ahead, a prime question
will be the relations of Japan with Korea and
with the other peoples of the Far East. Such

246

questions may now be postponed, but they
should not be ignored. When the time for settle-
ment does arrive, it should be our hope and our
determination to build the peace structure this
time on sounder foundations than those laid at
Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam. In the long view
of what lies ahead for Asia, a prime considera-
tion is to solve the difficulties existing between
Japan and the other countries she has dominated
and ravished. A way of friendship may and must
be found. That way does not lie through restora-
tion of Japan to the pre-eminence in Asia which
it has so tragically abused.

247

14
WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

WAR CAME IN KOREA. AT THIS DATE THE
probability is that it will spread (rapidly
or gradually) into world- wide destruction.
Whether the Soviet Union now chooses to
launch into the terrible undertaking of another
global war, or whether it and we may be drawn
in willy-nilly by the impossibility of turning back
from the struggle in Korea and from other chal-
lenges already drawn up in Formosa, Indo-
china, Tibet, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and West-
ern Europe, will shortly become evident. At the
best, if large-scale war is avoided, we are already
started on a program of mobilization which, for
the sake of survival, will have to be continued and
expanded. The fighting in Korea is the fuse ; Sovi-
et imperialism is the explosive charge; the threat
of imminent explosion hangs over our heads.

248

The question of what American policies may
now be adopted to help avert the general war,
or to win it and to attempt to profit by it if it
comes, is now the crucial consideration.

Personally, I do not believe that peace can be
made secure by any mere juggling of outworn
techniques of statesmanship. The development
of the atomic bomb and of all the other tech-
nological advances which it so dramatically
symbolizes have cut to the very roots of tradi-
tional international relationships. New alliances,
fresh alignments of power, frenzied bargaining
to gain new allies, will not serve.

The whole concept of power politics, of play-
ing one nation against another, must go. England
is the most successful proponent of the old tech-
nique and is near the end of her strength. Russia
is the most belligerent present-day advocate of
this method and has succeeded in arousing
world-wide resentment and fear. The United
States has never been very successful at it, for it
runs contrary to the very instincts of our people.
This is not because we are better than other
peoples (we are simply an amalgam of them),
but because we have been more fortunate. A
century and a half of living in a rich continent
relatively safe from attack made it unnecessary
for us to develop skill in international log-rolling

249

and gave us an opportunity to develop a kind of
disgust with the whole proceeding. Wilson's
Fourteen Points and Roosevelt's Four Freedoms
and Atlantic Charter are simply expressions of
sentiments that run deep through American life.

Out of our feelings of decency, however, we
have not yet developed the practical realism to
see the world as it has become. It is scarcely an
exaggeration to aver that the American people
have developed two deep-seated cardinal inter-
national political faiths, both of which are false,
and which together led us unprepared into the
present crisis.

The first of these faiths is that, when a world
war breaks out, our allies will fight it for us
while we have time to get ready. This happened
in 1914-17 and again in 1939-41. Such experi-
ences lulled us into a deceptive belief that instant
readiness for defense was not required by a
nation as sheltered as ours.

The second faith has been the childlike con-
viction that the horrors of global war could not
come oftener than once every 25 years. For
young men to be placed twice in jeopardy of
military service simply is not fair ! Every major
conflict requires a period of rehabilitation, for-
giveness, and recovery. But, in holding such
faith, we were blind to the nature of the totali-

250

tarian menace inherent in the strong and brutal
dictatorships that thus far have marked our
century.

Twice during the last thirty-five years the
United States has appeared as a sort of prophet
to the frightened peoples of the world by our
forthright advocacy of simple ethical principles.
In both world wars, however, these principles
were used as slogans for war rather than as
programs on which to build the peace. Conse-
quently, after both wars a wave of cynical dis-
illusionment swept around the world. Rightly or
wrongly, the United States was the chief victim
of that reaction during the 'twenties. Russia has
shouldered us out of that position now by her
tactics of overt aggression. In this sense, at least,
we should be grateful to the Kremlin masters
for having rescued us from responsibility in the
eyes of the world for abandonment of the
Atlantic Charter-Four Freedoms idealism.

The menace with which the world is con-
fronted today is similar in essential respects to
the turmoil and terror of the early nineteenth
century in Europe. Now, as then, the struggle
was directed not only across national boundary
lines but also across class lines. The democratic
political revolution instigated by the equalitar-
ian doctrines of John Locke brought some

251

benefits of freedom, but largely to Englishmen
and Americans. Leaders in France demanded
similar benefits and the same natural determina-
tion spread through Europe. Then Napoleon
seized power and diverted this energy to serve
the imperialistic interests of the France he dom-
inated. England organized a European alliance
for his defeat. But, after that defeat was accom-
plished, the deep-rooted demands continued to
be heard in Europe, and in good time a wave of
revolutions brought changes in most of the
Western world.

Similarly, the later technological revolution
brought economic benefits to industrialized areas
again primarily to England and the United
States, with western Europe also benefitting
substantially. For a combination of reasons, the
benefits of this technological revolution failed
to penetrate deeply into Russia, South America
or Eastern Europe, and scarcely touched Asia
and Africa. Karl Marx offered one attractively
phrased denunciation of this limitation of the
benefits of the technological revolution, and once
again deprived peoples around the world were
stirred to rebellion. And once again an
imperialist-minded nation this time Russia
has attempted to organize the deep-seated unrest
for her own advantage. So urgent is the danger

252

that the United States has been impelled to
organize a world-wide alliance to contain or
defeat the aggressor. This defensive measure is
fully as necessary now as it was when Europe
shuddered under the threat of Napoleon's
legions.

But when the military phase of this new
revolution is defeated, the end will not have
been reached. The discontent is real and is based
upon tangible and striking differences in living
standards in various areas of the earth. The time
has passed when certain large populations will
remain content to live without the material
comforts and opportunities which they know are
possessed by others and which they know, too,
it should be practical to produce for them. Once
Russia has been defeated, contained, or
reawakened, the rebellion still will go on, by
whatever means prove effective, until all the
peoples of the world have full and free access to
the machinery of large-scale industrial produc-
tion. This is a fact of the present world condition
which must not be overlooked in planning for
the future.

The lexicon of international relations has been
too freely used and abused in the numerous
apologia of imperialistic adventurers. Thus,
three centuries of British colonialism become

253

transmuted into "the white man's burden."
Japanese expansion marched under the banner
of "Asia for the Asiatics." French, Dutch, Ger-
man, and Russian seizures in the Orient were
all dedicated to "the advance of civilization."
Treaties have often been expressions by sovereign
states of their intention to limit their own
actions, so far as they desire to do so, and for
so long as they may choose, in return for what
concessions they are able to exact. Such treaties
are no more than promises made to one another
by brigands who recognize no law; they are
holding actions or rear-guard defences erected
in one area while advances are being attempted
elsewhere. Even the right of defining specific
terms has remained individualistic. To cite but
a single illustration, "democracy," with its many
variants, is currently used with opposite mean-
ings by the Soviet Union and the United States.
The Golden Rule itself is often debased into
David Harum's cynical paraphrase: "Do others,
as they would like to do you, only do them first."

Father LaFarge, writing in America, August
19, 1950, well explained the alternative:

"If we do not succeed during the next two or
three years in making a tremendous step for-
ward on the spiritual front in this country, if we
do not use the opportunity that now presents
itself, we shall have set the clock for an ultimate

254

collapse in the spiritual field that must inevi-
tably bring disaster to those heroically defend-
ing our country in all the little wars, and in
"the" war, if and when it should come.

"To quote from the words which Korea's
Ambassador to the United States, Dr. John M.
Chang, wrote recently for NC News Service:

" 'I have been awesomely conscious that here is no
fight to be won by man alone. It is a fight to be won
by the prayers and faith of all men, if it is to be won
at all ... I can do no less as a man, as a Catholic and
as a Korean than to bespeak your attention. We need
many prayers, many more prayers than we need bullets.
We need a vast voice, rising to heaven, reaffirming our
faith in God and entrusting to Him our most sacred
hopes . . .'

"Such a view must be obvious from the very
nature of the fighting we are now engaged in.
Behind North Korean tactics is a world strategy,
and inspiring that world strategy is a fanatical
anti-God and anti-religious ideology. The es-
sence of that ideology is to make the ultimate
terminus of man's history identical with that of
the material, brute nature from which Karl
Marx declares man originally sprang. It is to
effect the complete brutalizing and de-spiritual-
izing of the human race, the destruction of all
the ideas, tendencies, aspirations which in any
way nourish or give life to man's spirit and move
him to the knowledge and love of God."

255

A mere sketch of present circumstances in
the Far East indicates that there has been little
gain for anyone, and much loss for all, from
the policies that have been pursued. These
circumstances revolve around the three prob-
lems of Communism, colonialism, and racism.
Divergent as they are in some respects, they all
spring from a common root: the failure of the
West to understand the East.

Communism, which is Asia's greatest danger,
is an imported problem. It has little attraction
for the Oriental mind. Marxism was tailored
for an industrial civilization, in which regiment-
ed activities and collective interests predominate.
It has no more basic applicability to the highly
individualistic farmers of the Orient than it
had for the fanning class which was forced to
accept it in Russia. Even more fundamentally,
the materialism and economic determinism of
the Communist credo are distinctly at odds with
the essential religiosity of the Asian mind. That
part of the world would never willingly sur-
render to an ideology that starts with a denial of
spiritual values.

Colonialism was supposed to have ended with
the second of the world wars. Both Western
and Asian statesmen declared freely that the
old principles of extraterritoriality and im-

256

perialism must end. In partial fulfillment of this
determination India and Burma are free, Ceylon
has been granted Dominion status, and the
Republic of the Philippines is established. How-
ever, Indochina is still forcibly held under
Western rule and Indonesia is still torn by dis-
sention. And China and Korea have been per-
mitted to be overrun.

Underlying both Communism and colonialism
is the more difficult and disagreeable question
of racism. Until the democratic nations learn
to regard the Orientals with respect and equal-
ity, rather than with disdain or, what is little
better, with tolerance, the question of racism
will continue to operate in favor of Russia and
against the West. It may be recalled that
Kipling's ballad which began with the assertion
that "East is East and West is West, and never
the twain shall meet" concluded with the dis-
covery that, where equality is recognized and
respect is generated, the fancied differences dis-
appear. "For there is neither East nor West,
border nor breed nor birth, when two strong
men stand face to face, though they come from
the ends of the earth." As among individuals, so
among nations, the eventual elimination of
strife and injustice depends to a great extent
upon the mutual recognition of equal rights and

257

the mutual acceptance of equal responsibilities.
Asia has had all that man required to make
him healthy, wealthy, and wise. Its people
have had imagination, intuition, and the gift
of appreciative meditation. In poetry, philoso-
phy, art, and family morals, the Orient became
great. It proved through long centuries to be
a most stable portion of the globe.

In one significant respect, however, the West
left Asia far behind. Science is the domination
of matter by the practical mind. Political
science extends the domination from material
resources to men. The practical mind of the
West has excelled in its mastery over matter and
men. When science became king, the Orientals
were reduced to a secondary role. The sub-
ordination of the Orient began when Western
man turned from the philosopher's lecture halls
to the scientist's laboratories. The Oriental con-
templation of what man is was rudely shaken
by the Occidental stress on what man could do.

Perhaps one day the wheel will come full
circle once again. Already, loud complaints are
heard that science has outstripped morals. The
energetic inventiveness of the West has given
man tools that he is not wise enough to know
how to use. The old fable of the Frankenstein
monster is being whispered again. Humanity
has hurled itself into the atomic age with a rule

258

book written in terms of individualism, self-ex-
pression, and freedom, only to find that it must
seek, instead, for a philosophy of cooperation,
restraint, and devotion if it hopes to survive.

The development of individual and social
ethics has brought us incalculable advantages in
the past. But now we face the fact that the
greatest threat to human security lies in the
monstrous striking capacity of the sole agencies
that remain above and beyond any ethical laws
the sovereign and therefore lawless States.
Unless we can quickly either bring them into the
moral realm or else confront them with the over-
whelming power of nations that are so organized,
we are lost.

On the vital question of what to do next, my
suggestion would be that, along with our neces-
sary mobilization of military power, the Admin-
istration and Congressional spokesmen should
also make every effort to mobilize the moral
power of mankind. They should follow up the
excellent start already made with the Truman
Doctrine, the E.C.A., the North Atlantic Mili-
tary Alliance, the Point Four program of aid to
underdeveloped areas, and the pointed hints that
the United Nations may have to be reorganized
without the Soviet Union. They should lay the
basis for lasting unity of the democratic world
through speeches which stress the need for an

259

ethical approach to international relations, and
which denounce the whole concept of national
sovereignty for the reason that it is directly con-
trary to such an ethical approach.

And they should conclude these educational
efforts by inviting the free nations of the world
into a new constitutional convention for the
purpose of drawing up a federal constitution to
succeed the present Charter of the United Na-
tions. The key consideration in such a constitu-
tion would be a provision for direct election of
representatives to the constituent assembly by
peoples, rather than their appointments by gov-
ernments. Only then could the new government
exercise the necessary power over the relation-
ship of its member states. Once this step were
taken, the assembly could be expected gradually
to extend its authority as necessity requires.

Many will reject such a suggestion as too
"radical" or "idealistic." But "at my back I
always hear time's winged chariot drawing
near." The echoes of destructive war are already
reaching our shores from Korea and may soon
be multiplied elsewhere. Scientists of every
nation are hard at work unraveling the secrets
of ever-greater destruction.

The human race simply does not have much
more time.

260

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