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Full text of "Why we are at war; Great Britain's case"

LIBRARY OF 
WELLESLEY COLLEGE 




ANONYMOUS GIFT 



(#aO> X 



THE FRONTIERS OF FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND LUXEMBUR 




Scale o 10 20 30 so 50 Eng. Miles 
Frontiers , • • 



li.SMaUui, 



The shaded portions represent higher ground. 



WHY WE ARE AT WAR 

GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE 

BY 

MEMBERS OF THE 
OXFORD FACULTY OF MODERN HISTORY 



With an Appendix of Original Documents 

including the Authorized English Translation 

of the White Book issued by the 

German Government 

Third Edition revised (tenth impression) 

containing the Russian Orange Book and 

Extracts from the Belgian Grey Book 



OXFORD 
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 

1914 



315146 



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK 
TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY 

HUMPHREY MILFORD M.A. 

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY 



517 
l(j5 

Iii4 



PREFACE 

We are not politicians, and we belong to different 
schools of political thought. We have written this book 
to set forth the causes of the present war, and the prin- 
ciples which we believe to be at stake. We have some 
experience in the handling of historic evidence, and we 
have endeavoured to treat this subject historically. Our 
fifth chapter, which to many readers will be the most 
interesting, is founded upon first-hand evidence— the 
documents contained in the British White Book (Parlia- 
mentary Paper, Cd. 7467 ; hereafter cited as Correspon- 
dence respecting the European Crisis), and the German 
White Book, which is an official apology, supplemented 
by documents. The German White Book, as being 
difficult of access, we have printed in extenso. It exists 
in two versions, a German and an English, both pub- 
lished for the German Government. We have repro- 
duced the English version without correcting the 
solecisms of spelling and expression. From the 
English White Book we have reprinted, in the second 
appendix, a small selection of the more significant 
documents ; many more are quoted in the body of our 
work. 

Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erie Richards, Chichele 
Professor of International Law and Diplomacy ; and to 
Mr. W. G. S. Adams, Gladstone Professor of Political 



6 PREFACE 

Theory and Institutions, for valuable suggestions and 
assistance. 

The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, 
with those who sign this Preface. 

Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be 
sent to the Belgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy 
and respect for the Belgian nation, and especially for 
the University of Louvain. 

E. Barker Arthur Hassall 

H. W. C. Davis L. G. Wickham Legg 

C. R. L. Fletcher F. Morgan 

Preface to Second Edition. 
By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian 
Ambassador we are now able to print in an appendix 
(No. VI) those documents contained in the Russian 
Orange Book which have not been already published in 
the German and the British White Books. In the light 
of the evidence afforded by the Russian Orange Book, 
we have modified one or two sentences in this edition. 
21 September, 1914. 

Preface to Third Edition. 
By the courtesy of His Excellency the Belgian 
Minister we are now able to print some extracts from 
the Belgian Grey Book, which is not yet generally 
accessible in this country. 
10 October, 19 14. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Table of Dates .-■.,. , . , , ' , 10 

CHAPTER I 
The Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg . . 13 

§ 1. Belgian neutrality, p. 13— The origin of Belgium, p. 15 — 
England and the smaller Powers, p. 16— The Treaty of 1839, 
p. 18 — Belgium's independence and neutrality, p. 39. §2. 
The neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, p, 20— 
Its origin, p, 21 — The Treaty of 1867, p. 24 — The collective 
guarantee, p. 25. § 3. The strategic importance of Belgium, 
p. 26— German plans long suspected, p. 27. 

CHAPTER II 

The Growth of Alliances and the Race of 

Armaments since 1871 . . . . . .29 

Introduction, p. 29 — The Triple Alliance, p. 31 — Bismarck's 
dismissal, p. 33 — French colonial advance, p. 33 — Ger- 
many's demands for compensations, p. 34 — The Anglo- 
French agreement concerning Morocco, p. 35 — German 
objections, p. 35 — England and Russia, p. 37— The Agadir 
incident, p. 37 — Anglo-French exchange of notes, p. 38 — 
Disputes in the Balkans, p. 39— The ' Boulanger Law' of 
1886, p. 41— Count Caprivi's law of 1893, p. 42— Franco- 
Russian entente, p. 42— German military preparations, p. 43 
— France's response, p. 46 — Russia's reorganization, p. 46 
— England's Army and Navy, p. 48. 
Note. Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco, 

CHAPTER III 

The Development of Russian Policy . -53 

Estrangement of Russia and Germany, p. 53— Austria and 
the Balkans, p. 54— German penetration through the 
Balkans, p. 54— Servia and Russia, p. 54 — Germany and 
the Slavs, p. 55 — Russia and England, p. 56. 



8 CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

PAGE 

Chronological Sketch of the Crisis of 1914 • . 57 
Diary of the Events leading to the War . . . .64 

CHAPTER V 

Negotiators and Negotiations 67 

Dramatis personae, p. 67. § 1. Germany's attitude to Russia 
and Austria, pp. 68-80 — Presentation of the Austrian 
Note to Servia, p. 68— Germany shields Austria, p. 70 — 
Conduct of Germany considered, p. 70 — Sir Edward Grey 
proposes mediation, and then a Conference of Four Powers, 
p, 71 — Germany's objections to a 'Conference', p. 72 — 
Direct conversations between the Powers, p. 73— Austria 
invited to suspend military action, p. 74 — Mobilization ; on 
whom does responsibility lie ? p. 75 — War inevitable, p. 78. 
§2. Germany's attitude to France, pp. 80-1 — Germany 
accuses France of military preparations, p. 80— Germany 
invades France, p. 8r. § 3. The question of British neutrality, 
pp. 81-92— Possibility of England being involved, p. 81 
— Germany warned, p. 82— German ' bid for British 
neutrality ', p. 82— England's refusal, p. 83— France agrees, 
and Germany refuses, to respect Belgian neutrality, p. 85 — 
Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, p. 86 — Neutrality 
of Luxemburg violated, p. 87 — Germany demands a free 
passage through Belgium, p. 88 — Sir Edward Grey protests, 
p. 88 — Belgium invaded, p. 89— England's ultimatum, 
p. 89— The Imperial Chancellor urges necessity of Ger- 
many's action, p. 91. §4. England and Servia, pp. 93-5 
Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in Servia, p. 93 
— He is only concerned for the peace of Europe, p. 94 — 
He urges mediation, p. 94— He proposes a Conference, 
P- 95- §5- Great Britain declines ' solidarity ■' with Russia 
and France, pp. 96-100 — Proposals by MM. Sazonof and 
Poincare, p. 96— England's refusal, p. 97 — Was it wise? 
p. 98— The Austrian dossier, p. 99. § 6. Italy's comments on 
the situation, pp. 100-3 — Significance of Italy's position, 
p. 100— Italy's endeavours to prevent war, p. 101 — Italy's 
declaration of neutrality, p. 102. 

Note. Abstract of A ustro- Hungarian note to Servia, and 
Servians reply. 



CONTENTS 9 

CHAPTER VI 

PAGE 

The New German Theory of the State . . 108 

The principles of raison d'etat and the rule of law, p. 108— 
Treitschke's teaching, p. 108 — The results of this philosophy, 
p. 109— Contempt for public law, p. no— The glorification of 
war, p. in — The philosophy pagan, p. 113 — Its adoption by 
Prussian soldiers and Government, p. 1T4— A plea for 
Prussia, p. 114— England fights for law, p. 115. 

Epilogue . . . . . . . . .118 

APPENDIXES 

I. The German White Book 123 

II. Extracts from Sir Edward Grey's Corre- 
spondence RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS . 175 

III. Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's 

Ambassador at Berlin respecting the Rup- 
ture of Diplomatic Relations with the 
German Government 198 

IV. The Crime of Serajevo 202 

V. Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's 

Ambassador at Vienna respecting the Rup- 
ture of Diplomatic Relations with the 
austro-hungarian government . . . 207 

VI. Extracts from the Russian Orange Book . 215 
VII. Extracts from the Belgian Grey Book . 253 

Map of the Frontiers of France, Belgium, and 

Luxemburg to illustrate Chapter I, § 3. Frontispiece 



CHIEF DATES 

1648 Jan. The Treaty of Miinster. 

Oct. The Treaty of Westphalia. 

1713 April. The Treaty of Utrecht. 

1772 First Partition of Poland. 

1783 William of Nassau becomes Grand Duke of Luxemburg. 

1788 July. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and Prussia. 

1789 The French Revolution begins. 

1792 Nov. 6. Battle of Jemappes. French Conquest of the 

Austrian Netherlands and Liege. 
Nov. 19. French decree offering 'freedom to all nations'. 
Dec. 15. Compulsory freedom declared. 

1 793 J an - Second Partition of Poland. 

Feb. 1. Declaration of War by France against England and 
Holland. 
1795 Third Partition of Poland. 

1801 Feb. 9. The Treaty of Luneville. France guarantees the in- 

dependence of Holland (then called ' Batavian Republic'). 

1802 Mar. 27. The Treaty of Amiens. 

1803 Mar. 13. Napoleon's famous interview with Lord Whitworth. 
May 12. Declaration of War by England against France. 

1814 Mar. 1. The Treaty of Chaumont. 
May 30. The First Peace of Paris. 

Sept. 29. Opening of the Congress of Vienna. 

1815 Mar.-June. The Hundred Days. 

May 31. Belgium and Luxemburg placed under the Prince 

of Orange as King of the United Netherlands. 
Nov. 20. The Second Peace of Paris. 

1830 Revolutions in France (July) and in Belgium (Aug.). 
1830-1878 Servia autonomous. 

1831 Nov. 15. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium guaranteed 

by England, Austria, France, Prussia, and.Russia. 

1839 April 19. Final recognition of the Independence and Neu- 
trality of Belgium by the above-named Powers. 

1867 May 11. European guarantee of the Neutrality of Luxem- 
burg. Declaration by Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon. 

1870 Aug. 9. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium again 

guaranteed by Germany and France. 

1871 May 10. The Treaty of Frankfort. 



CHIEF DATES n 

1872 The Dreikaiserbund ; Alliance of Russia, Germany, and 

Austria. 
1875 Threatened attack on France by Germany prevented by 

Russia and England. 

1878 The Treaty of Berlin. 

Proclamation of Servian Independence under King Milan. 

1879 Secret Treaty between Germany and Austria. 

1883 Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy. 

1885 Formation of United Bulgaria. 
War between Bulgaria and Servia. 

1886 Peace between Bulgaria and Servia. 

1890 Fall of Bismarck. Cession of Heligoland to Germany. 

1891 Beginning of an understanding between Russia and France. 
1893 Caprivi's Army Act. 

1896 Germany begins to show aggressive tendencies in the field 

of Colonial Expansion. 
Treaty between England and France regarding their interests 

in Indo-China. 
Definite Alliance between Russia and France. 

1898 Reconquest of the Sudan. 

Tsar's rescript for an International Peace Conference. 

1899 Anglo-French Agreement respecting Tripoli. 
June. First Peace Conference at the Hague. 
New German Army Act. 

1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

The Peace of Vereeniging closes the South African War. 

1903 Revolution in Belgrade. 

1904 April. The Treaty of London between England and France 

with regard to North Africs. 

1905 Mar. Visit of the German Emperor to Tangier. 

June. Germany demands the dismissal of M. Delcasse. 
Aug. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan. 

Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
German Army Act. 

Sept. France agrees to the holding of the Algeciras 
Conference. 

1907 Agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia, 

Afghanistan, and Tibet. 
June-Oct. Second Peace Conference at the Hague. 

1908 Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople. 

Oct. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. 
German Navy Law. 

1909 Mar. Servia declares she will no longer protest against the 

annexation of Bosnia by Austria. 



i2 CHIEF DATES 

1909 Mr. Asquith's speech on necessity for increasing the Navy. 

1910 The Potsdam interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser. 

1911 European Crisis over the question of Morocco, followed by 

a closer Anglo-French entente. 
German Army Act. 

1912 Sensational German Army Bill. 
War in the Balkans. 

Nov. 26. German Navy construction estimates ,£11,416,700. 
Dec. 29. Peace Conference of Balkan States with Turkey 
broken off. 

1913 Jan. 17. M. Poincare elected French President. 

Jan. 23. The Young Turkish Party overthrow the Govern- 
ment at Constantinople. 

May 26, Peace made between Turkey and the Balkan States. 

May 28. The New German Army Bill passes the Budget 
Committee of the Reichstag. 

June 20. Universal military service in Belgium. 

June 26. Conference between the French President, the 
French Foreign Minister, and Sir Edward Grey. 

June 30. Bulgaria is attacked by Servia and Greece. 

New German Army Bill. 

July. Roumania attacks Bulgaria. 

The Turks re-occupy Adrianople. 

New Russian Army Bill. 

French Army Bill. 

Aug. 6. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Servia, 
Greece, and Roumania. 

Sept. 22. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey. 

Oct. 20. Servia at Austria's demand abandons Albania. 

Austrian War Fund increased. 

1914 Attacks by the German Press upon France and Russia. 



CHAPTER I 

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND 
LUXEMBURG 

I 

The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new 
creation, but the idea of a Belgian nation is older 
than the kingdom. Historically and geographically 
the kingdom has no doubt an artificial character; 
its boundaries have been determined by the Great 
Powers and cut across the ancient provinces of the 
Netherlands. And it must be added that its population 
is heterogeneous both in race and language. These 
facts, however, in no sense diminish the legal rights of 
Belgium as a nation, She is a sovereign state by the 
same charter as Italy or Greece ; and for the convenience 
of Europe she has been solemnly declared a neutral 
state, endowed with special privileges but burdened with 
corresponding obligations. While those privileges were 
maintained — and they have been rigidly maintained Coi 
more than eighty years — the Belgian people punctuc 
fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have 
declined to betray Europe by becoming the dependant 
of a powerful neighbour, or by participating in the 
violation of European public law, their country is 
a wilderness of smoking ruins. 

In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of 
August, 1914, Belgium has proved that she possesses 
other titles to existence and respect than those afforded 
by treaties, by the mutual jealousies of neighbours, or 
by the doctrines of international law. She has more 



i 4 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

than satisfied the tests which distinguish the true from 
the fictitious nationality. Those who have hitherto 
known Belgium only as a hive of manufacturing and 
mining industry, or as a land of historic memories and 
monuments, are now recognizing, with some shame for 
their past blindness, the moral and spiritual qualities 
which her people have developed under the aegis of 
a European guarantee. It is now beyond dispute that, 
if Belgium were obliterated from the map of Europe, 
the world would be the poorer and Europe put 
to shame. The proofs which Belgium has given of 
her nationality will never be forgotten while liberty has 
any value or patriotism any meaning among men. We 
cannot do less than echo the general sentiment of 
admiration for a constancy to national ideals which has 
left Belgium at the mercy of Huns less forgivable than 
those of Attila. But the case against her oppressor is 
not to be founded solely or mainly on her peculiar 
merits. In a special sense it rests upon the legal rights 
and duties with which she has been invested for the 
convenience of her neighbours and for the welfare of 
the European state system. It was in their interest, 
rather than her own, that the Great Powers made her 
a sovereign independent state. As such she is entitled, 
equally with England or with Germany, to immunity 
from unprovoked attack. But the Powers which made 
her a sovereign state, also, and for the same reasons of 
convenience, made her a neutral state. She was there- 
fore debarred from consulting her own safety by making 
alliances upon what terms she would. She could 
not lawfully join either of the two armed camps into 
which Europe has fallen since the year 1907. And, if 
she had been as contemptible as she is actually the 
reverse, she would still be entitled to expect from 
England and from every other of her guarantors the 
utmost assistance it is in their power to give. In fighting 
for Belgium we fight for the law of nations; that is, 



AND LUXEMBURG 15 

ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right 
of the weaker to exist. 

The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of 
Belgium— with the exception of the bishopric of Liege, 
which was until 1795 an ecclesiastical principality — were 
known in the seventeenth century as the Spanish, in the 
eighteenth as the Austrian, Netherlands. They received 
the first of these names when they returned to the 
allegiance of Philip II, after a short participation in 
the revolt to which Holland owes her national existence. 
When the independence of Holland was finally recog- 
nized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands were sub- 
jected to the first of the artificial restrictions which 
Europe has seen fit to impose upon them. The Dutch 
monopoly of navigation in the Scheldt was admitted by 
the Treaty of Miinster (1648), and Antwerp was thus 
precluded from developing into a rival of Amsterdam. 
In the age of Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands 
were constantly attacked by France, who acquired at 
one time or another the chief towns of Artois and 
Hainault, including some which have lately come into 
prominence in the great war, such as Lille, Valenciennes, 
Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk, however, of the 
Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht 
to Austria, then the chief rival of France on the 
Continent. They passed with the reservation that 
certain fortresses on their southern border were to be 
garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as 
a barrier against French aggression. This arrangement 
was overthrown at the French Revolution. The French 
annexed the Austrian Netherlands and Liege in 
November, 1792 ; and immediately afterwards threw 
down a gauntlet to England by opening to all nations 
the navigation of the Scheldt. This, and the threatened 
French attack on Holland, her ally, drew England into 
conflict with the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp in 



16 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

French hands and as an open port would be a dangerous 
menace ; and secondly, the French had announced a new 
and anarchic doctrine hostile to all standing treaties : 
' Our reasons are that the river takes its rise in France 
and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot 
recognize a system of feudalism, much less adhere to it/ 1 
The answer of William Pitt, which in effect declared 
war upon the Revolution, contains a memorable state- 
ment of the attitude towards public law which Eng- 
land held then, as she holds it to-day : ' With regard 
to the Scheldt France can have no right to annul existing 
stipulations, unless she also have the right to set aside 
equally the other treaties between all Powers of Europe 
and all the other rights of England and her allies. . . . 
England will never consent that France shall arrogate 
the power of annulling at her pleasure and under the 
pretence of a pretended natural right, of which she 
makes herself the only judge, the political system of 
Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed 
by the consent of all the Powers/ 2 

This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. 
It was an attitude which we adopted with regard to all 
the minor Powers of Western Europe when they were 
threatened by Napoleon. On precisely the same grounds 
England defended in 1803 the independence of Holland, 
a commercial rival if an old political ally, and of Switzer- 
land, where she had no immediate interests to protect. 
By the Treaty of Luneville (February, 1801) France and 
Austria had mutually guaranteed the independence of the 
Batavian Republic and the right of the Dutch to adopt 
whatever form of government seemed good to them. In 
defiance of these stipulations Napoleon maintained a garri- 
son in Holland, and forced upon her a new Constitution 
which had been prepared in Paris (November, 1801). Iden- 
tical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic 

1 Cam. Mod. Hist. viii. 301. 2 Ibid. 30^. 



AND LUXEMBURG 17 

and had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England 
demanded that the French should evacuate Holland and 
Switzerland : to which Napoleon replied that ' Switzer- 
land and Holland are mere trifles \ His interview with 
the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has many 
points of resemblance with the now famous interview 
of August 4, 1914, between Sir Edward Goschen and Dr. 
von Bethmann-Hollweg. The First Consul then, like 
the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was unable, or professed 
himself unable, to understand why Great Britain should 
insist upon the observance of treaties. 

To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the 
Napoleonic Wars that Belgium and Holland were 
individually too weak to protect themselves or the 
German people against an aggressive French Govern- 
ment. The allies therefore, in the year 1813, handed over 
to Holland the Austrian Netherlands and the bishopric 
of Liege in order ' to put Holland in a position to resist 
attack until the Powers could come to its aid\ This 
arrangement was ratified at the Treaty of Chaumont 
(1814). As there was no government or visible unity in 
the Belgian provinces after the retirement of the French, 
the union with Holland, originally suggested by Lord 
Castlereagh, seemed reasonable enough. It gave the 
Belgians the great privilege of freely navigating the 
Scheldt. It was confirmed at the Congress of Vienna, 
and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands 
was declared neutral by the common consent of the 
Powers. 

But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved con- 
clusively that this union was unsatisfactory to the 
Belgian population. The Belgians complained that they 
were not allowed their just share of influence and 
representation in the legislature or executive. They 
resented the attempt to impose the Dutch language 
and Dutch Liberalism upon them. They rose in revolt, 
expelled the Dutch officials and garrisons, and drew 



18 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

up for themselves a monarchical and parliamentary 
constitution. Their aspirations aroused much sympathy 
both in England and in France. These two countries 
induced the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia, 
Russia) to recognize the new kingdom as an in- 
dependent neutral state. This recognition was em- 
bodied in the Treaty of the Twenty- Four Articles signed 
at London in October, 1831 ; and it was not too generous 
to the aspirations of Belgian nationality. Since the 
Belgians had been defeated in the field by Holland and 
had only been rescued by a French army, they were 
obliged to surrender their claims upon Maestricht, parts of 
Luxemburg, and parts of Limburg. Some time elapsed 
before this settlement was recognized by Holland. But at 
length this last guarantee was obtained ; and the Treaty 
London, 1839, finally established the international 
si i"us of Belgium. Under this treaty both her in- 
def ,udence and her neutrality were definitely guaranteed 
by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 

We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor 
that the Treaty of 1839 is nothing but ' a scrap of paper \ 
It is therefore desirable to point out that Bismarck made 
full use of it in 1870 to prevent England from supporting 
the cause of France. It was with this object that he 
published the proposal alleged to have been made to 
him by the French representative, Benedetti, in 1866, 
that Prussia should help France to acquire Belgium 
as a solace for Prussian annexations in Northern 
Germany. Then, as now, England insisted upon the 
Treaty of 1839. The result was that, on the instance of 
Lord Granville, Germany and France entered into an 
identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to the effect 
that, if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, Great 
Britain would co-operate with the other for the defence 
of it. The treaty was most strictly construed. After 
the battle of Sedan (Sept. 1870) the German Govern- 
ment applied to Belgium for leave to transport the 



AND LUXEMBURG 19 

German wounded across Belgian territory. France 
protested that this would be a breach of neutrality 
and Belgium refused. 

Such is the history of the process by which Belgium 
has acquired her special status. As an independent 
state she is bound by the elementary principle of the 
law of nations, that a neutral state is bound to refuse to 
grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This is a well- 
established rule, and was formally affirmed by the Great 
Powers at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. The 
fifth Article of the Convention * then drawn up respecting 
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons 
in War on Land runs as follows : — 

'A neutral power ought not to allow on its territory any of 
the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4.' 

Of the Articles thus specified the most important is 
No. 2 :— 

' Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of 
a neutral power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war 
or supplies/ 

By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is 
contingent upon her perpetual neutrality :— 

'Article VII. Belgium within the limits specified in 
Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and per- 
petually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such 
neutrality towards all other states/ 2 

It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. 
That, it seems, has been admitted by the Imperial Chan- 
cellor before the German Reichstag. What is necessary 
to remember is that, in regard to Belgium, Germany has 
assumed the position which the Government of the 

1 Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, 
pp. 281-9. 

2 The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, Map of Europe by 
Treaty, vol. ii, pp. 979-98. 

B 2 



2o THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

French Revolution adopted towards the question of the 
Scheldt, and which Napoleon adopted towards the 
guaranteed neutrality of Switzerland and Holland. Now, 
as then, England has special interests at stake. The con- 
sequences of the oppression or the extinction of the 
smaller nationalities are bound to excite peculiar alarm 
in England. In particular she cannot forget how she 
would be menaced by the establishment of a militarist 
state in Belgium. But since in England's case the dangers 
and uncertainties of a state of things in which Might is 
treated as Right are particularly apparent, it is only to 
be expected that she should insist with special emphasis 
upon the sanctity of treaties, a sanctity which in the long 
run is as necessary to the strongest nation as to the 
weakest. If treaties count for nothing, no nation is secure 
so long as any imaginable combination of Powers can 
meet it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms ; and the 
stronger nations must perforce fight one another to the 
death for the privilege of enslaving civilization. Whether 
the progress of such a competition would be a trifling 
evil, whether the success of any one among such 
competitors would conduce to the higher interests of 
humanity, impartial onlookers may debate if they please. 
England has answered both these questions with an un- 
hesitating negative. 

II 

Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxem- 
burg stands for all practical purposes in the same legal 
position as its northern neighbour; and the ruler of 
Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion * 
of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, 
though with less power of giving expression in action 
to her just resentment. If the defence of Belgium has 

1 Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, [Cd. 7467], No. 
147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2. 



AND LUXEMBURG 21 

appealed more forcibly to the ordinary Englishman, it is 
because he is more familiar with the past history of 
Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate 
issues that are involved in the German violation of her 
rights. As the following narrative will show, the neu- 
trality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in the interests 
and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protection 
against French aggression. The legal case could not 
be clearer, and it might perhaps be asked why the 
attack on Luxemburg, which preceded that on Belgium, 
was not treated by this country as a casus belli. 
England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she 
has consistently adopted towards those smaller states 
of Europe which lie outside the reach of naval power. 
It is an attitude which she has maintained in the case of 
Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. 
England holds herself bound to exert her influence in 
procuring for the smaller states of Europe equitable 
treatment from their more powerful neighbours. But 
the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment falls first 
upon those Powers whose situation enables them to 
support a protest by effective action. Just as Servia is 
the special concern of Russia, so Luxemburg must look 
to France in the first instance for protection against 
Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from the French 
side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound 
to exercise our influence, but not as principals. Any 
other course would be impossibly quixotic, and would 
only have the effect of destroying our power to help 
the states within our reach. 

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of 
an ancient state which had lost its existence during 
the French Revolution. Although it was placed under 
the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a descendant 
of its former sovereign, it was not incorporated in 
his kingdom, but retained its own identity and gave to 



22 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

its ruler the secondary title of Grand Duke of Luxem- 
burg. The position it occupied after 1815 was in 
some ways anomalous ; for lying as it did between the 
Meuse and the Rhine, and possessing in the town of 
Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength some 
competent critics reckoned as second only to that of 
Gibraltar among the fortresses of Europe, it was con- 
sidered to be an indispensable link in the chain of 
defences of Germany against French aggression. Not 
being able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress 
against the French, the Congress of Vienna laid down 
as a principle that all land between the Meuse and 
the Rhine must be held by Prussian troops on behalf 
of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus 
Luxemburg was held by Prussian troops on behalf of 
this foreign confederation, and over this garrison the 
only right allowed to the Grand Duke, the sovereign of 
the country, was that of nominating the governor. 

This strange state of affairs was not modified by the 
Belgian Revolution of 1830 ; for though more than half 
the Grand Duchy threw in its lot with Belgium to form 
the modern province of Belgian Luxemburg, the Grand 
Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still contained the 
great fortress with its garrison of Prussian troops. It is 
not surprising that,under these circumstances, the Grand 
Duchy joined the Prussian Zollverein, and so drew 
nearer to Germany, in spite of the independent character 
of its inhabitants, who have strenuously resisted any 
attempt at absorption into Germany. France naturally 
continued to cast envious eyes upon the small state with 
the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented itself 
for reopening the question until 1866. 

In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war 
between Prussia and Italy on one side and Austria and the 
small German states on the other would be long and 
exhausting, and would end in France imposing peace 
on the weary combatants with considerable territorial 



AND LUXEMBURG 23 

advantage to herself. His anticipation was entirely 
falsified ; the war lasted only seven weeks and Prussia 
emerged victorious and immensely strengthened by the 
absorption of several German states and by the formation 
of the North German Confederation under her leader- 
ship. This, the first shattering blow which the French 
Emperor's diplomatic schemes had received, led him to 
demand compensation for the growth of Prussian power, 
and one of his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg 
to France. 

This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart 
from the question of the balance of power. For the 
Prussian garrison held Luxemburg in th* name of the 
German Confederation, which had been destroyed by 
the war of 1866 ; and, the authority to which the garrison 
owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that 
the garrison should go too. After much demur 
Count Bismarck acknowledged the justice of the argu- 
ment (April, 1867), but it did not by any means follow 
that the French should therefore take the place vacated 
by the Prussians. At the same time the fortress could 
not be left in the hands of a weak Power as a tempta- 
tion for powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The 
question of Luxemburg was therefore the subject 
discussed at a Congress held in London in the following 
May. 

Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely 
politic and reasonable. Realizing that, with the advance 
of artillery, the great rock-fortress no longer had the 
military value of earlier days, they not only raised no ob- 
jections to the evacuation of Luxemburg by their troops, 
but in the Congress it was they who proposed that the 
territory of the Grand Duchy should be neutralized 
1 under the collective guarantee of the Powers \ 1 A 

1 Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. iii, p. 1806, 
no. 406. ' Proposal of Prussia of Collective Guarantee by Powers 
of Neutrality of Luxemburg, London, 7th May, 1867.' 



24 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

treaty was therefore drawn up on May n, 1867, of 
which the second article ran as follows : — 

'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits 
determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th 
April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great 
Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall hence- 
forth form a perpetually Neutral State. 

1 It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards 
all other States. 

'The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the 
principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article. 

' That principle is and remains placed under the sanction 
of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to 
the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is 
itself a Neutral State/ 1 

The third article provided for the demolition of the 
fortifications of Luxemburg and its conversion into an 
open town, the fourth for its evacuation by the Prussian 
garrison, and the fifth forbade the restoration of the 
fortifications. 

Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality 
of Luxemburg, which was proposed, it may be observed, 
by Prussia herself; but, until the treaty was broken by 
the very Power which had proposed the neutrality, only 
one incident need be noted in the history of the country, 
namely, the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On 
December 3, 1870, Count Bismarck issued from Ver- 
sailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, calling 
attention to the fact that both the French and the 
Luxemburgers had violated the neutrality of the Grand 
Duchy, mainly by giving facilities for French soldiers 
to return to France. Precautions were taken by the 
Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such 

1 Hertslet, utsup., vol. iii, p. 1803. The High Contracting Powers 
were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, the Nether- 
lands, Prussia, and Russia. 



AND LUXEMBURG 25 

abuses occurring in the future, and as no violation of 
the neutrality of Luxemburg was committed by the 
Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were satisfied 
with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. 
At the end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted 
to obtain Luxemburg as compensation for the loss 01 
Metz. 

In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the 
Grand Duchy passed on the death of the late King of 
Holland to Prince Adolphus of Nassau, to whose throne 
the present Grand Duchess ultimately succeeded. 

There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls 
for special comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy 
is ' placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers 
signing'. The phrase originally proposed by Count 
Bismarck was ' the formal and individual guarantee of 
the Powers', and it was altered at the instance of the 
English Foreign Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase 
actually adopted was suggested by the Russian 
diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by 
England and by Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had 
been based upon the fear that England might incur an 
unlimited liability to assist Luxemburg single-handed if 
all other Powers failed to meet their obligations. In 
other words, Luxemburg might have been used as the 
infallible means of dragging us into every and any war 
which might arise between Germany and France. From 
that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley's ob- 
jection; as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his 
own words, ' a right to make war, but would not neces- 
sarily impose the obligation,' should Luxemburg be 
attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in 
the British White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward 
Grey informs M. Cambon of ' the doctrine' concerning 
Luxemburg, ' laid down by Lord Derby and Lord 
Clarendon in 1867.' It may also be observed that two 
of the co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy 



26 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

and Holland, have also not thought it necessary to make 
the violation of Luxemburg a casus belli. 



Ill 

It is evident to all who study closely the map of 
France that her eastern frontier falls into two sharply 
contrasted divisions, the north-eastern which reaches 
from the sea to the valley of the Sambre, and the south- 
eastern which extends from that river to, and along 
the Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy 
for military operations ; the latter is mountainous, inter- 
sected with many deep valleys. After the loss of 
Alsace-Lorraine, the French set to work to rectify 
artificially the strategical weakness of their frontier; and 
in a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges Mountains 
they erected a rampart which has the reputation of 
being impregnable. This is the line Belfort, Epinal, 
Toul, Verdun. A German attack launched upon this 
line without violating neutral territory would have to be 
frontal, for on the north the line is covered by the 
neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg, while on the 
south, although the gap between the Vosges and 
the Swiss frontier apparently gives a chance of out- 
flanking the French defences, the fortress of Belfort, 
which was never reduced even in the war of 1870-1, 
was considered too formidable an obstacle against which 
to launch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris 
was therefore deemed impossible if respect were to be 
paid to the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, and 
it was for this purely military reason that Germany has 
to-day violated her promises to regard the neutrality 
of these states. This was frankly admitted by Herr von 
Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen : ' if they had gone by 
the more southern route they could not have hoped, in 
view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the 



AND LUXEMBURG 27 

fortresses, to have got through without formidable 
opposition entailing great loss of time.' x 

In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded 
into French territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past 
Liege and thence into France past Namur and through 
what is known as the Gap of Namur. A German army 
could debouch into France through this gap the more 
easily inasmuch as the French, relying on the neutrality 
of these two states, had not strongly fortified the frontier 
from the sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as the country 
to the west of the Sambre was very easy country for 
manoeuvring and furnished with good roads and rail- 
ways, it was reckoned that the formidable French lines to 
the south could be turned in this manner, and the German 
army could march upon Paris from the north-east. 

As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme 
remain neutral. It would lie between the two wings of 
the German army, and controlling as it did the roads 
to Brussels, Metz, and Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not be 
allowed to cause such inconvenience as to prevent easy 
communication between one portion of the German army 
and another. 

That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans 
has been for some years past a matter of common know- 
ledge in England; and it has been also a matter of 
common opinion that the attempt to execute this 
plan would involve the active resistance of the British 
forces, to whom the duty was supposed to have been 
assigned of acting on the left flank of the French opposing 
the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. The 
plea therefore that has been put forward that the British 
have now dealt the Germans ' a felon's blow ' can only 
be put forward by persons who are either ignorant or 
heedless of what has been a matter of casual conversation 

1 Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting the 
rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government [Cd. 7445] 
Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914. 



28 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM 

all over England these last three years ; and Sir Edward 
Grey himself was so convinced that the German Govern- 
ment knew what the consequences of a violation of 
Belgian neutrality would be that he informed Sir Francis 
Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do not 
expect our neutrality V There has been no secret about 
it whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and 
surprise of the Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of 
the ultimatum of August 4th should have been genuine, 
seeing that it involves miscalculation or misinforma- 
tion entirely incompatible with what we know of the 
thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the 
Agadir crisis the military situation was the same, and 
the German War Office knew quite well what our part 
would then have been. Surprise at such action on our 
part in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only 
have been expressed in order to throw the blame of 
German aggression on to the shoulders of Great Britain. 
This argument that Great Britain has taken the 
aggressive falls to the ground entirely when it is con- 
fronted with the hard facts of chronology. Far from 
attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the 
peace that we were actually three days late in our 
mobilization to join the French on their left wing; and 
had it not been for the defence offered by Liege, our 
scruples would have gravely imperilled the common 
cause. For it was not until we were certain that 
Germany had committed what was tantamount to an 
act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of 
Belgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to 
the war. 

1 Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, p. 62, no. 116. 
July 31, 1914. See also infra pp.82 et seqq. 



CHAPTER II 

THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE 
RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871 

Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we 
should sketch in outline the events which have produced 
the present grouping of belligerent states, and the 
long-drawn-out preparations which have equipped 
them for conflict on this colossal scale. To under- 
stand why Austria-Hungary and Germany have thrown 
down the glove to France and Russia, why England 
has intervened not only as the protector of Belgium, 
but also as the friend of France, we must go back to 
the situation created by the Franco-German War. Start- 
ing from that point, we must notice in order the forma- 
tion of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, and Italy, of the Dual Alliance between 
France and Russia, of the Anglo-French and the Anglo- 
Russian understandings. The Triple Alliance has been 
the grand cause of the present situation; not because 
such a grouping of the Central European Powers was 
objectionable, but because it has inspired over-con- 
fidence in the two leading allies ; because they have 
traded upon the prestige of their league to press their 
claims East and West with an intolerable disregard for 
the law of nations. Above all it was the threatening 
attitude of Germany towards her Western neighbours 
that drove England forward step by step in a policy of 
precautions which, she hoped, would avert a European 
conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to 
represent as stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin 
Germany's well-being. These precautions, so obviously 



3 o THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

necessary that they were continued and expanded by 
the most pacific Government which England has seen 
since Mr. Gladstone's retirement, have taken two forms : 
that of diplomatic understandings, and that of naval 
preparations. Whichever form they have taken, they 
have been adopted in response to definite provocations, 
and to threats which it was impossible to overlook. 
They have been strictly and jealously measured by the 
magnitude of the peril immediately in view. In her 
diplomacy England has given no blank cheques ; in her 
armaments she has cut down expenditure to the 
minimum that, with reasonable good fortune, might 
rible her to defend this country and English sea- 
borne trade against any probable combination of hostile 
Powers. 

Let us consider (i) the development of the diplomatic 
situation since 1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments 
since 1886. 

The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which 
France submitted to the demands of the new-born 
German Empire, opened a fresh era of European diplo- 
macy and international competition. The German 
Empire became at once, and has ever since remained, the 
predominant Power in Western Europe. The public 
opinion of this new Germany has been captured to no 
small extent by the views of such aggressive patriots as 
Treitschke, who openly avowed that ' the greatness and 
good of the world is to be found in the predominance there 
of German culture, of the German mind, in a word of the 
German character \ The school of Treitschke looked 
for the establishment of a German world-empire, and 
held that the essential preliminary to this scheme would 
be the overthrow of France and England. But until 
1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck remained 
Chancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted 
by the German Government. Bismarck was content to 
strengthen the position of the Empire and to sow dis- 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 31 

union among her actual or suspected enemies. In 1872 
he brought about a friendly understanding with Austria 
and Russia, the other two great Powers of Eastern 
Europe, the so-called Dreikaiserbiwdnis, which was 
designed to perpetuate the status quo. But the friend- 
ship with Russia quickly cooled ; it received a sharp 
set-back in 1875, when the Tsar Alexander II came 
forward rather ostentatiously to save France from the 
alleged hostile designs of Germany; it was certainly 
not improved when Bismarck in his turn mediated be- 
tween Russia and her opponents at the Congress of 
Berlin (1878). On the other hand, a common interest in 
the Eastern Question drew closer the bonds between 
Germany and Austria. The latter felt herself directly 
menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia ; the former 
was not prepared to see her southern neighbour de- 
spoiled of territory. Hence in 1879 was initiated that 
closer union between Germany and Austria which has 
been so largely responsible for the present situation. The 
Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was 
purely defensive in its character ; but the terms showed 
that Russia was the enemy whom both the contracting 
Powers chiefly feared. Neither was bound to active 
measures unless the other should be attacked by Russia, 
or any Power which had Russian support. In 1882 the 
alliance of the two great German Powers was joined by 
Italy — a surprising development which can only be ex- 
plained on the ground of Italy's feeling that she could not 
hope for security at home, or for colonial expansion in 
the Mediterranean, so long as she remained in isolation. 
The Triple Alliance so constituted had a frail appear- 
ance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy would 
receive strong support from partners in comparison with 
whose resources her own were insignificant. But the 
Triple Alliance has endured to the present day, the 
most permanent feature of the diplomatic system of the 
last thirty-two years. Whether the results have been 



32 THE GROW . 4 OF ALLIANCES 

commensurate with tlv sacrifices of sentiment and ambi- 
tion which Italy has mauc, it is for Italy to judge. On 
the whole she has been a sleeping partner in the Alli- 
ance ; its prestige has served almost exclusively for the 
promotion of Austrian and German aims ; and one of its 
results has been to make Austria a formidable rival of 
Italy in the Adriatic. 

Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe 
had continued, as Prince Bismarck hoped, to pursue 
their separate paths, though England was on friendly 
terms with France and had, equally with Russia, laboured 
to avert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After 
1882 the English occupation of Egypt constituted for 
some years a standing grievance in the eyes of France. 
The persistent advance of Russia in Asia had in like 
manner been a source of growing apprehension to Eng- 
land since 1868 ; and, for a long time after the Treaty of 
Berlin, English statesmen were on the watch to check 
the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. But 
common interests of very different kinds were tending to 
unite these three Powers, not in any stable alliance, even 
for mutual defence, but in a string of compacts concluded 
for particular objects. 

One of these interests was connected with a feeling that 
the policy of the principal partners in the Triple Alliance, 
particularly that of Germany, had become incalculable 
and was only consistent in periodic outbursts of self- 
assertiveness, behind which could be discerned a steady 
determination to accumulate armaments which should 
be strong enough to intimidate any possible competitor. 
The growth of this feeling dates from the dismissal of 
Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser. Bismarck had 
sedulously courted the friendship of Russia, even after 
1882. He entered in fact into a defensive agreement with 
Russia against Austria. While he increased the war 
strength oi the army, he openly announced that Germany 
would always stand on the defensive ; and he addressed 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 33 

a warning to the Reichstag against the ' offensive-defen- 
sive ' policy which was even then in the air, though it 
was still far from its triumph : — 

If I were to say to you, " We are threatened by France 
and Russia; it is better for us to fight at once; an offensive 
war is more advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of 
a hundred millions, I do not know whether you would grant 
it — I hope not.' * 

But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of 
German policy in less cautious hands. The defensive 
alliance with Russia was allowed to lapse ; friction 
between the two Powers increased, and as the result 
Germany found herself confronted with the Dual Alliance 
of France and Russia, which gradually developed, during 
the years 1891-6, from a friendly understanding into a 
formal contract for mutual defence. There is no doubt that 
this alliance afforded France a protection against that 
unprovoked attack upon her eastern frontier which she 
has never ceased to dread since 1875 ; and it has yet to 
be proved that she ever abused the new strength which 
this alliance gave her. 

It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she 
has shown aggressive tendencies since 1896 ; and even 
here the members of the Triple Alliance have never 
shown serious cause for a belief that France has invaded 
their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in Morocco 
was permitted by Italy and Spain ; her vast dominion in 
French West Africa has been recognized by treaties 
with Germany and England ; in East Africa she has 
Madagascar, of which her possession has never been 
disputed by any European Power ; her growing in- 
terests in Indo-China have impinged only upon an 
English sphere of interest and were peacefully defined 
by an Anglo-French Agreement of 1896. France has 
been the competitor, to some extent the successful 
competitor, of Germany in West Africa, where she 
1 Quoted from Headlam's Bismarck, p. 444. 

P 3113 Q 



34 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But 
the German Government has never ventured to state 
the French colonial methods as a casus belli. That the 
German people have viewed with jealousy the growth 
of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. Quite 
recently, on the eve of the present war, we were form- 
ally given to understand that Germany, in any war with 
France, might annex French colonies; 1 and it is easy 
to see how such an object would reconcile the divergent 
policies of the German military and naval experts. 

Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has 
consistently refused to believe that Germany would be 
mad enough or dishonest enough to enter on a war 
of aggression for the dismemberment of colonial em- 
pires. German diplomacy in the past few weeks has 
rudely shattered this conviction. But up to the year 
1914 the worst which was generally anticipated was 
that she would pursue in the future on a great scale 
the policy, which she has hitherto pursued on a 
small scale, of claiming so-called ' compensations ' when 
other Powers succeeded in developing their colonial 
spheres, and of invoking imaginary ' interests' as a reason 
why the efforts of explorers and diplomatists should not 
be allowed to yield to France their natural fruits of in- 
creased colonial trade. It is not our business to impugn or 
to defend the partition of Africa, or the methods by which 
it has been brought about. But it is vital to our subject 
that we should describe the methods by which Germany 
has endeavoured to intimidate France at various stages 
of the African question. The trouble arose out of a 
Moroccan Agreement between England and France, 
which was the first definite proof that these two Powers 
were drifting into relations closer than that of ordinary 
friendship. 

1 Correspondence respecting the European Crisis (Cd. 7467), No. 85. 
Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. Seeinfra, Appendix II. 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 35 

In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel 
about Egypt. France recognized the English occupa- 
tion of Egypt ; England, on her side, promised not to 
impede the extension of French influence in Morocco. 
It was agreed that neither in Egypt nor in Morocco 
should there be a political revolution ; and that in both 
countries the customs tariff should make no distinction 
between one nation and another. This compact was 
accompanied by a settlement of the old disputes about 
French fishing rights in Newfoundland, and of more 
recent difficulties concerning the frontiers between 
French and English possessions in West Africa. 1 The 
whole group formed a step in a general policy, on both 
sides, of healing local controversies which had little 
meaning except as instruments of diplomatic warfare. 
The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco is dis- 
tinguished from that concerning West Africa and New- 
foundland in so far as it recognizes the possibility of 
objections on the part of other Powers. It promised 
mutual support in the case of such objections ; but not 
the support of armed force, only that of diplomatic 
influence. 

At the moment of these agreements Count Bulow told 
the Reichstag that Germany had no objection, as her 
interests were in no way imperilled by them. Later, how- 
ever, Germany chose to regard the Moroccan settlement 
as an injury or an insult or both. In the following year 
the Kaiser made a speech at Tangier (March, 1905) in 
which he asserted that he would uphold the important 
commercial and industrial interests of Germany in 
Morocco, and that he would never allow any other 
Power to step between him and the free sovereign of 
a free country. It was subsequently announced in the 
German Press that Germany had no objection to the 
Anglo-French Agreement in itself, but objected to not 

1 For these agreements see The Times, April 12, 1904, and 
November 25, 1911. See note at end of this chapter. 

C 2 



36 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

having been consulted before it was arranged. This 
complaint was met, on the part of France, by the retire- 
ment of M. Delcasse, her Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and by her assent to an International Conference 
regarding Morocco. The Conference met at Algeciras, 
and German pretensions were satisfied by an inter- 
national Agreement. 1 It is to be observed that in this 
Conference the original claims of Germany were opposed, 
not only by Russia, from whom she could hardly expect 
sympathy, but even by Italy, her own ally. When Germany 
had finally assented to the Agreement, her Chancellor, 
in flat contradiction with his previous utterance 'that 
German interests were in no way imperilled by it', 
announced that Germany had been compelled to inter- 
vene by her economic interests, by the prestige of German 
policy, and by the dignity of the German Empire. 

The plain fact was that Germany, soon after the 
conclusion of the Anglo-French agreements, had found 
herself suddenly delivered from her preoccupations on 
the side of Russia, and had seized the opportunity to 
assert herself in the West while Russia was involved in 
the most critical stage of her struggle with Japan. But 
this war came to an end before the Convention of 
Algeciras had begun ; and Russia, even in the hour of 
defeat and internal revolutions, was still too formidable 
to be overridden, when she ranged herself beside her 
Western ally. 

Of the part which England played in the Moroccan 
dispute there are different versions. W T hat is certain is 
that she gave France her diplomatic support. But the 
German Chancellor officially acknowledged, when all 
was over, that England's share in the Anglo-French 
Agreement had been perfectly correct, and that Germany 
bore England no ill-will for effecting a rapprochement with 
France. Still there remained a strong impression, not 
only in England and France, that there had been on 
1 White Paper, Morocco No. i (1906). 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 37 

Germany's part a deliberate intention to test the strength 
of the Anglo-French understanding and, if possible, to 
show France that England was a broken reed. 

It is not surprising that under these circumstances 
England has taken, since 1906, the precaution of freeing 
herself from any embarrassments in which she had pre- 
viously been involved with other Powers. In 1905 she 
had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising her 
influence to moderate the terms of the settlement with 
Japan. This was a wise step, consonant alike with Eng- 
lish treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests 
of European civilization. It led naturally to an amic- 
able agreement with Russia (1907) concerning Persia, 
Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three countries which touch 
the northern borders of our Indian Empire. It cannot 
be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of 
a local character, exactly as was that with France ; that 
our friendly understandings with France and with 
Russia were entirely separate ; and that neither related 
to the prosecution of a common policy in Europe; 
unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to 
the precaution, which was from time to time adopted, 
of permitting consultations between the French and 
English military experts. It was understood that these 
consultations committed neither country to a policy of 
common action. 1 England was drifting from her old 
attitude of 'splendid isolation'; but she had as yet no 
desire to involve herself, even for defensive purposes, 
in such a formal and permanent alliance as that which 
had been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy. 

But her hand was forced by Germany in 191 1. Again 
the question of Morocco was made to supply a pretext 
for attacking our friendship with France. The German 
occupation of Agadir had, and could have, only one 
meaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France on 

1 Correspondence, No. 105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M. Cambon, 
November 22, 1912. See Appendix II. 



38 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

a question that was the subject of a special agreement 
between France and us'. 1 The attack failed in its 
object. War was averted by the prompt action of the 
British Government. Mr. Asquith 2 announced that 
Great Britain, in discussing the Moroccan question, 
would have regard to British interests, which might 
be more directly involved than had hitherto been the 
case, and also to our treaty obligations with France. 
Somewhat later Mr. Asquith announced that if the 
negotiations between France and Germany did not 
reach a satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would 
become an active party to the discussion. 3 The nature 
of British interests was appropriately defined by 
Mr. Lloyd George in a Guildhall speech as consisting 
in the peace of the world, the maintenance of national 
honour, and the security of international trade. 4 The 
last phrase was a significant reference to the fact that 
Agadir, though valueless for commercial purposes, 
might be invaluable to any Power which desired to 
molest the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubted 
then, or doubts to-day, that England stood in 191 1 on 
the brink of a war which she had done nothing to 
provoke. 

The situation was saved in 191 1 by the solidarity of 
England and France. Two Powers, which in the past 
had been separated by a multitude of prejudices and 
conflicting ambitions, felt at last that both were exposed 
to a common danger of the most serious character. 
Hence a new phase in the Anglo-French entente, 
which was cemented, not by a treaty, but by the 
interchange of letters between the English Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the French 
Ambassador in London (M. Paul Cambon). On 

1 Correspondence, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29, 
1914. 

2 Times, July 7, 1911. 3 Times, July 27, 1911. 
4 Times, July 22, 191 1. 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 39 

November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey 1 reminded 
M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 
1 that if either Government had grave reason to expect 
an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might 
become essential to know whether it could in that 
event depend on the armed assistance of the other.' 
Sir Edward Grey continued : — ' I agree that if either 
Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked 
attack by a third Power, or something that threatened 
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with 
the other whether both Governments should act together 
to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if 
so, what measures they would be prepared to take in 
common. If these measures involved action, the plans 
of the General Staffs would at once be taken into con- 
sideration, and the Governments would then decide 
what effect should be given to them/ 

M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was 
authorized to accept the arrangement which Sir E. Grey 
had offered. 2 

The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic 
nature. Neither party was bound to co-operate, even 
diplomatically, with the other. The undertaking was 
to discuss any threatening situation, and to take common 
measures if both agreed to the necessity; there was 
an admission that the agreement might result in the 
conduct of a joint defensive war upon a common plan. 
Such an understanding between two sovereign states 
could be resented only by a Power which designed to 
attack one of them without clear provocation. 

The date at which these notes were interchanged is 
certainly significant. In November, 1912, the Balkan Allies 
were advancing on Constantinople, and already the spoils 
of the Balkan War were in dispute. Servia incurred the 
hostility of Austria- Hungary by demanding Albania and 

1 Correspondence, p. 57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See Appendix II. 

2 Ibid. p. 57 (Enclosure 2 in No. 105). 



4 o THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

Adriatic ports ; and the Dual Monarchy announced that 
it could never accept this arrangement. Behind Servia 
Austrian statesmen suspected the influence of Russia ; it 
was, they said, a scheme for bringing Russia down to a sea 
which Austria regarded as her own preserve. Austria 
mobilized her army, and a war could hardly have been 
avoided but for the mediation of Germany and England. 
If England had entertained the malignant designs with 
which she is credited in some German circles, nothing 
would have been easier for her than to fan the flames, 
and to bring Russia down upon the Triple Alliance. The 
notes show how different from this were the aims of Sir 
Edward Grey. He evidently foresaw that a war between 
Austria and Russia would result in a German attack 
upon France. Not content with giving France assur- 
ance of support, he laboured to remove the root of the 
evil. A congress to settle the Balkan disputes was held 
at London in December, 1912 ; and it persuaded Servia 
to accept a reasonable compromise, by which she obtained 
commercial access to the Adriatic, but no port. This for 
the moment pacified Austria and averted the world-war. 
To whom the solution was due we know from the lips of 
German statesmen. The German Chancellor subse- 
quently (April 7, 1913) told the Reichstag :— 

* A state of tension had for months existed between Austria- 
Hungary and Russia which was only prevented from develop- 
ing into war by the moderation of the Powers. . . . Europe will 
feel grateful to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the 
extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation with which he 
conducted the discussion of the Ambassadors in London, 
and which constantly enabled him to bridge over differences/ 

The Chancellor concluded by saying : ' We at any rate 
shall never stir up such a war ' — a promise or a prophecy 
which has been singularly falsified. 

It is no easy matter to understand the line of conduct 
which Germany has adopted towards the great Slavonic 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 41 

Power on her flank. Since Bismarck left the helm, she 
has sometimes steered in the direction of subservience, 
and sometimes has displayed the most audacious inso- 
lence. Periodically, it is to be supposed, her rulers have 
felt that in the long run the momentum of a Russian 
attack would be irresistible ; at other times, particularly 
after the Russo-Japanese War, they have treated Russia, 
as the Elizabethans treated Spain, as ' a colossus stuffed 
with clouts'. But rightly or wrongly they appear to 
have assumed that sooner or later there must come a 
general Armageddon, in which the central feature would 
be a duel of the Teuton with the Slav ; and in German 
military circles there was undoubtedly a conviction that 
the epic conflict had best come sooner and not later. 
How long this idea has influenced German policy we do 
not pretend to say. But it has certainly contributed to 
her unenviable prominence in the ' race of armaments ' 
which all thinking men have condemned as an insup- 
portable tax upon Western civilization, and which has 
aggravated all the evils that it was intended to avert. 

The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France ; 
but, if so, it was to a France which viewed with just 
alarm the enormous strides in population and wealth 
made by Germany since 1871. The ' Boulanger Law' 
of 1886 raised the peace footing of the French army above 
500,000 men, at a time when that of Germany was 427,000, 
and that of Russia 550,000. Bismarck replied by the 
comparatively moderate measure of adding 41,000 to the 
German peace establishment for seven years ; and it is 
significant of the difference between then and now that 
he only carried his Bill after a dissolution of one Reichs- 
tag and a forcible appeal to its successor. 

France must soon have repented of the indiscretion 
to which she had been tempted by a military adventurer. 
With a population comparatively small and rapidly 
approaching the stationary phase it was impossible that 
she could long maintain such a race. In 1893 Count 



42 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

Caprivi's law, carried like that of Bismarck after a stiff 
struggle with the Reichstag, raised the peace establish- 
ment to 479,000 men. Count Caprivi at the same time 
reduced the period of compulsory service from three 
years to two ; but while this reform lightened the burden 
on the individual conscript, it meant a great increase 
in the number of those who passed through military 
training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. 
The Franco-Russian entente of 1896 was a sign that 
France began to feel herself beaten in the race for 
supremacy and reduced to the defensive. In 1899 the 
German peace strength was raised to 495,000 for the 
next six years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of 
these occasions the German Government justified its 
policy by pointing out that the French war strength was 
still superior to that of Germany, and would become 
still stronger if France should change the period of 
service from three years to two. The German law was 
announced in 1904 ; it had the natural effect. The 
French Senate not only passed the new law early in 
1905, but also swept away the changes which the Lower 
House had introduced to lighten the burden of annual 
training upon territorial reserves. France found her justi- 
fication in the Moroccan episode of the previous year. 

This was not unreasonable ; but since that date 
France has been heavily punished for a step which 
might be taken to indicate that Revanche was still 
a feature of her foreign policy. Since 1886 her utmost 
efforts have only succeeded in raising her peace estab- 
lishment to 545,000 (including a body of 28,000 colonial 
troops stationed in France), and her total war strength 
to 4,000,000. In the same period the peace establish- 
ment of Germany was raised to over 800,000, and her 
total war strength of fully trained men to something like 
5,400,000. It is obvious from these figures that a policy 
of isolation has long ceased to be possible to France ; 
and that an alliance with Russia has been her only 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 43 

possible method of eounterbalancing the numerical 
superiority of the German army, which is certainly not 
less well equipped or organized than that of France. 

This Russian alliance of France has been the only 
step in her continental policy which could be challenged 
as tending to overthrow the European balance. Un- 
doubtedly it is France's prime offence in German eyes ; 
and her colonial policy has only been attacked as 
a pretext for picking a quarrel and forcing on a decisive 
trial of strength before the growth of Russian resources 
should have made her ally impregnable. 

Let us now look at the German military preparations 
from a German point of view. The increases of the last 
twenty years in military expenditure and in fighting 
strength have been openly discussed in the Reichstag ; 
and the debates have usually run on the same lines, 
because the Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent 
policy, framed for some years ahead and embodied in an 
Army Act. The underlying principle of these Army Acts 
(1893, 1899, 1905, 191 1) was to maintain a fairly constant 
ratio between the peace strength and the population. 
But the war strength was disproportionately increased 
by the Caprivi Army Act of 1893, which reduced the 
period of compulsory service from three years to two. 
The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff 
was to increase its war resources as rapidly as was 
consistent with the long-sufferance of those who served 
and those who paid the bill. It was taken as axiomatic 
that an increasing population ought to be protected by 
an increasing army. National defence was of course 
alleged as the prime consideration ; and if these pre- 
parations were really required by growing danger on 
the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could 
do otherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power 
could feel itself legitimately aggrieved. 

Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in 
recent years that national independence means the power 



44 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

of taking the aggressive in any case where national 
interests or amour-propre may prompt it. The increase 
of the German army, either in numbers or in technical 
efficiency, seems to be regularly followed by masterful 
strokes of diplomacy in which the ' mailed fist ' is plainly 
shown to other continental Powers Thus in 1909, at 
the close of a quinquennium of military re-equipment, 
which had raised her annual army budget from 
^27,000,000 to ^41,000,000, Germany countenanced the 
Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and 
plainly told the authorities at St. Petersburg that any 
military action against Austria would bring Russia into 
a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step ; 
radix malorum we may call it, so far as the later de- 
velopment of the continental situation is concerned. 
Russia withdrew from the impending conflict in 1909, 
but it is improbable that she has ever forgiven the 
matter or the manner of the German ultimatum. 

In 191 1 followed the episode of Agadir, which was 
clearly an attempt to ' force a quarrel on France \ But 
in 191 1 Germany realized that her military calculations 
had been insufficient, if she wished to continue these un- 
amiable diplomatic manners. It was not a question of self- 
preservation ; it was a question, as the German Chan- 
cellor told the Reichstag, of showing the world that 
1 Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed aside \ 
Hence the sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated, 
as the Government told the Reichstag, by the events 
of 191 1. The Russian peril could hardly be described 
as imminent. The Prussian Minister of War said 
publicly in 191 1 that 'there was no Government which 
either desired or was seeking to bring about a war with 
Germany \ Russia had recently taken steps which, at 
Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs of weakness, but 
elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for general 
peace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan 
ideals, had retired from office ; his successor, M. Sazonof, 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 45 

had accompanied the Czar to the Potsdam interview 
(1910) ; the outstanding disputes of Germany and Russia 
over their Persian interests had been settled by 
agreement in 191 1. 

But the German Army Bill 01 1912 was followed by 
Russia's intervention in the Balkans to secure for Servia 
at least commercial access to the Adriatic. This com- 
promise, ostensibly promoted and belauded by German 
statesmanship, only increased the determination of the 
German Government to ' hold the ring ' in the Balkans, to 
claim for Austria the right of settling her own differences 
with Servia as she would, and to deny Russia any interest 
in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort of the 
German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the 
peace strength by instalments until it reached 870,000, and 
for the eventual provision of a war strength 01 5,400,000 
men. This enormous increase was recommended 'by 
the unanimous judgement of the military authorities ' as 
being 'necessary to secure the future of Germany'. 
The Chancellor warned the Reichstag that, although 
relations were friendly with Russia, they had to face the 
possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement ; 
while in Russia itself they had to reckon with a mar- 
vellous economic development and an unprecedented 
reorganization of the army. There was also a reference 
to the new law for a return to three years' service which 
France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her 
peace establishment. But it was obvious that Russia 
was the main preoccupation. Germany had forced the 
pace both in the aggrandizement of her military strength 
and in the methods of her diplomatic intercourse. 
Suddenly she found herself on the brink of an abyss. 
She had gone too far ; she had provoked into the compe- 
tition of armaments a Power as far superior to Germany 
in her reserves of men as Germany thought herself 
superior to France. It was not too late for Germany to 
pause. On her future behaviour towards other Powers 



46 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

it depended whether the Bill of 1913 should be taken as 
an insurance against risks, or as a challenge to all possible 
opponents. 

The other Powers shaped their policy in accordance 
with Germany's example. In France, on March 4, the 
Supreme Council of War, having learned the outline of 
the German programme, decided to increase the effective 
fighting force by a return to the rule of three years' 
service. Before the German Bill had passed (June 30), 
the French Prime Minister announced (May 15) that he 
would of his own authority keep with the colours those 
who were completing their second year's service in the 
autumn. The French Army Bill, when finally passed 
(July 16), lowered the age limit for commencing service 
from twenty-one to twenty, and brought the new rule 
into force at once. A few weeks earlier (June 20) 
Belgium introduced universal military service in place 
of her former lenient system. In Russia a secret session 
of the Duma was held (July 8) to pass a new Army 
Budget, and the term of service was raised from three 
to three and a quarter years. Austria alone provided for 
no great increase in the numerical strength of her army ; 
but budgeted (October 30) for extraordinary naval and 
military expenditure, to the extent of £28,000,000, to be 
incurred in the first six months of 1914. Thus on all 
sides the alarm was raised, and special preparations 
were put in hand, long before the crisis of 1914 actually 
arrived. It was Germany that had sounded the tocsin ; 
and it is difficult to believe that some startling coup was 
not even then being planned by the leaders of her 
military party. 

We have been told that, whatever the appearance of 
things might be, it was Russia who drove Germany to 
the extraordinary preparations of 1913; that Germany 
was arming simply in self-defence against a Slavonic 
Crusade. What are the facts ? Economically Russia, as 
a state, is in a stronger position than the German Empire. 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 47 

In 1912 we were told that for the past five years the 
revenue of Russia had exceeded expenditure by an 
average sum of £20,000,000 per annum. The revenue of 
Russia in 1913 was over £324,000,000 ; she has budgeted 
for £78,000,000 of military expenditure in 1914, of which 
some £15,000,000 is emergency expenditure. The total 
revenue of the German Empire in 1913 was £184,000,000; 
she has budgeted for a military expenditure in 1914 of 
£60,000,000. To adopt the usual German tests of com- 
parison, Russia has a population of 173 millions to be 
defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has 
a population of 65 millions to be defended on only two. 
The military efforts of Russia, therefore, have been made 
on a scale relatively smaller than those of Germany. 

We must, however, add some further considerations 
which have been urged by German military critics ; the 
alleged facts we cannot test, but we state them for what 
they may be worth. The reorganization of the Russian 
army in recent years has resulted, so we are told, in 
the grouping of enormously increased forces upon the 
western frontier. The western fortresses also have been 
equipped on an unparalleled scale. New roads and 
railways have been constructed to accelerate the mobili- 
zation of the war strength ; and, above all, strategic rail- 
ways have been pushed towards the western frontier. 
Thus, it is argued, Russia has in effect gone behind the 
Potsdam Agreement of 19 10, by which she withdrew her 
armies to a fixed distance behind the Russo-German 
frontier. We confess that, in all this, while there may 
have been cause for watchfulness on the part of Germany, 
we can see no valid cause for war, nothing that of neces- 
sity implies more than an intention, on the part of Russia, 
not to be brow-beaten in the future as she was in 1909 
and 1912. 

These military developments did not escape English 
notice. They excited endless speculation about the 
great war of the future, and the part which this country 



48 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

might be asked to bear in it. Few, however, seriously 
supposed that we should commit ourselves to a share in 
the fighting upon land. The problem most usually 
discussed in this connexion was that of preparation to 
resist a sudden invasion from abroad. Was it possible 
to avoid compulsory service? Was the Territorial 
Force large enough and efficient enough to defend the 
country if the Expeditionary Force had gone abroad ? 
Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for land 
warfare in August, 1914, than she had ever been in the 
nineteenth century. But her Expeditionary Force was 
a recent creation, and had been planned for the defence 
of India and the Colonies. In practice the country had 
clung to the ' Blue Water ' policy, of trusting the 
national fortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox 
theory was that so long as the Navy was kept at the 
1 Two Power ' standard, no considerable invasion of the 
British Isles was possible, 

But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy 
Laws constituted a growing menace to the ' Two Power ' 
standard, which had been laid down as our official 
principle in 1889, when France and Russia were our 
chief European rivals at sea. That France or Russia 
would combine with Germany to challenge our naval 
supremacy was improbable ; but other states were 
beginning to build on a larger scale, and this multiplied 
the possible number of hostile combinations. That 
Germany should wish for a strong fleet was only 
natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, her 
colonial interests, and her own seaports. That Germany 
should lay down a definite programme for six years 
ahead, and that the programme should become more 
extensive at each revision, was no necessary proof of 
malice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when 
the programme of 1898 was unexpectedly and drastically 
revised, so that the German Navy was practically 
doubled. England was at that moment involved in the 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 49 

South African War, and it was hard to see against 
whom the new fleet could be used, if not against England. 
This was pointed out from time to time by the Socialist 
opposition in the Reichstag. The orthodox official 
reply was that Germany must be so strong at sea that 
the strongest naval Power should not be able to challenge 
her with any confidence. But the feeling of the semi- 
official Navy League was known to be violently hostile 
to England; and it was obvious that the German navy 
owed its popularity to the alarmist propaganda of that 
league. 

It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the 
suspicion that, on the sea as on land, the Germans meant 
by liberty the right to unlimited self-assertion. Common 
prudence dictated close attention to the German Navy 
Laws ; especially as they proved capable of unexpected 
acceleration. The 'Two Power' standard, under the 
stress of German competition, became increasingly 
difficult to maintain, and English Liberals were inclined 
to denounce it as wasteful of money. But, when a 
Liberal Government tried the experiment of economizing 
on the Navy (1906-8), there was no corresponding 
reduction in the German programme. The German 
Naval Law of 1906 raised the amount of the naval 
estimates by one-third; and German ministers blandly 
waved aside as impracticable a proposal for a mutual 
limitation of armaments. 

In 1909 this country discovered that in capital ships — 
which now began to be considered the decisive factor in 
naval warfare — Germany would actually be the superior 
by 1914 unless special measures were taken. The British 
Government was awakened to the new situation (it arose 
from the German Naval Law of 1908), and returned 
unwillingly to the path of increasing expenditure. The 
Prime Minister said that we regretted the race in naval 
expenditure and were not animated by anti-German 
feeling ; but we could not afford to let our supremacy at 



5 o THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

sea be imperilled, since our national security depended 
on it (March 16, 1909). The 'Two Power' standard 
was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became the object 
of special attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord 
said on March 13, 191 1, that we should make our navy 
superior to any foreign navy and to any probable com- 
bination which we might have to meet single-handed. 
In practice this meant a policy of developing, in the 
matter of Dreadnoughts, a superiority of sixty per cent, 
over the German navy ; this, it was officially explained 
in 1912, had been for some years past the actual 
Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. Winston 
Churchill, March 18, 1912). 

But even this programme had to be stiffened when 
the year 1912 saw a new German Navy Bill which 
involved an increased expenditure of ^"1,000,000 
annually for six years, and had the effect of putting 
nearly four-fifths of the German navy in a position of 
immediate readiness for war. Earlier in the year the 
British Government had announced that, if the German 
policy of construction were accelerated, we should add 
to our programme double the number which Germany 
put in hand ; but if Germany relaxed her preparations 
we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The 
German Bill came as an answer to this declaration ; and 
it was followed in this country by supplementary 
estimates on naval account, amounting to nearly a 
million pounds ; and this was announced to be ' the first 
and smallest instalment of the extra expenditure entailed 
by the new German law \ The new British policy was 
maintained in 1913 and in 1914, though in 1913 the First 
Lord of the Admiralty made a public offer of a ' naval 
holiday ', a suspension of new construction by mutual 
consent. The Imperial Chancellor responded only by 
suggesting that the proposal was entirely unofficial, by 
asking for concrete proposals, and by saying that 
the idea constituted a great progress; and his naval 



AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS 51 

estimates in 1913 were half a million higher than those 
of 1912. 

From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, 
it is clear that on sea as on land Germany has set the 
pace. Thirty years ago the German navy did not enter 
into England's naval calculations. For the last six years, 
if not for a longer period, it has been the one navy which 
our Admiralty felt the necessity of watching from year 
to year, and indeed from month to month. It is the 
first time for more than a hundred years that we have 
had to face the problem of ' a powerful homogeneous 
navy under one government and concentrated within 
easy distance of our shores '. 

On German principles we should long ago have 
adopted the 'offensive-defensive'. We have been at 
least as seriously menaced by Germany at sea as 
Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. But 
we can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our 
fleet has never been used as a threat, or turned to 
the purposes of an aggressive colonial policy. Rightly 
or wrongly, we have refused to make possible intentions 
a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position 
that only a breach of public law would justify us in 
abandoning our efforts for the peace of Europe. 

NOTE 

Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco. 

In April, 1904, England and France concluded an 
agreement for the delimitation of their interests on the 
Mediterranean littoral of North Africa. The agreement 
included five secret Articles which were not published 
until November, 191 1. The purport of the Articles which 
were published at the time was as follows. By the first 
Article England stated that she had not the intention of 
changing the political state of Egypt; and France de- 
clared that she would not impede the action of England 
in Egypt by demanding that a term should be fixed for 
the British occupation or in any other way. By the 

d 2 



52 THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES 

second Article France declared that she had not the 
intention of changing the political state of Morocco ; and 
England recognized that it appertained to France, as 
the Power conterminous with Morocco, to watch the tran- 
quillity of this country and to assist it in all administrative, 
economic, financial, and military reforms which it required. 
France promised to respect the customary and treaty 
rights of England in Morocco ; and tyy the third Article 
England made a corresponding promise to France in 
respect of Egypt. By the fourth Article the two Govern- 
ments undertook to maintain ' the principle of commercial 
liberty ' in Egypt and Morocco, by not lending themselves 
in either country to inequality in the establishment of 
Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway rates. The 
sixth and seventh Articles were inserted to ensure the 
free passage of the Suez Canal and of the Straits of 
Gibraltar. The eighth declared that both Governments 
took into friendly consideration the interests of Spain in 
Morocco, and that France would make some arrange- 
ments with the Spanish Monarchy. The ninth Article 
declared that each Government would lend its diplomatic 
support to the other in executing the clauses relative to 
Egypt and Morocco. 1 Of the secret Articles two (Nos. 3 
and 4) related to Spain, defining the territory which she 
was to receive ' whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise 
authority over it', and providing that the Anglo-French 
agreement would hold good even if Spain declined this 
arrangement. Article 1 stipulated that, if either Govern- 
ment found itself constrained, by the force of cir- 
cumstances, to modify its policy in respect to Egypt 
or Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and seventh 
Articles of the public declaration would remain intact ; 
that is, each would under all circumstances maintain 
the principle of ' commercial liberty ', and would permit 
the free passage of the Suez Canal and the Straits of 
Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming any 
intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the 
judicial organization of Egypt, reserved the right to 
reform the Egyptian legislative system on the model 
of other civilized countries ; and France agreed on con- 
dition that she should not be impeded from making 
similar reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related 
to the Egyptian national debt. 

1 Times, April 12, 1904. 



CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY 

Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been 
in close touch. Dynastic connexions united the two 
imperial houses ; and the common policy of repression 
of Polish nationality — the fatal legacy of the days of 
Frederic the Great and Catharine II — united the two 
empires. National sentiment in Russia was, however, 
always anti-German ; and as early as 1885 Balkan 
affairs began to draw the Russian Government away 
from Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under 
William II German policy left the Russian connexion, 
and in close touch with Austria embarked on Balkan 
adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while 
Russia on her side turned to new allies. 

The new direction of Russian policy, which has 

brought the aims of the Russian Government into 

close accord with the desires of national Slav sentiment, 

was determined by Balkan conditions. Bismarck had 

cherished no Balkan ambitions : he had been content 

to play the part of an ' honest broker ' at the Congress 

of Berlin, and he had spoken of the Bulgarian affair of 

1885 as 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier'. 

William II apparently thought otherwise. At any rate 

Germany seems to have conducted, for many years past, 

a policy of establishing her influence, along with that of 

Austria, through South- Eastern Europe. And it is this 

policy which is the fons et origo of the present struggle ; 

for it is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated 

by Russia, so long as Russia is true to her own Slav 

blood and to the traditions of centuries. 

After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, 
she turned for compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia 
was lost, it seemed some recompense when in 1878 



54 DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY 

Austria occupied Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Hence 
she could expand southwards — ultimately perhaps to 
Salonica. Servia, which might have objected, was 
a vassal kingdom, the protege of Austria, under the 
dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope 
to follow the line to Salonica, 1 so Germany, before the 
end of the nineteenth century, seems to have conceived 
of a parallel line of penetration, which would carry her 
influence through Constantinople, through Konieh, to 
Bagdad. She has extended her political and economic 
influence among the small Slav states and in Turkey. 
In 1898 the King of Roumania (a Hohenzollern by 
descent) conceded direct communication through his 
territories between Berlin and Constantinople : in 1899 
a German company obtained a concession for the Bagdad 
railway from Konieh to the head of the Persian Gulf. 
In a word, Germany began to stand in the way of the 
Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in 
Constantinople : she began to buttress the Turk, to 
train his army, to exploit his country, and to seek 
to oust Russia generally from South-Eastern Europe. 

In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received 
a check. A blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted 
the pro-Austrian Obrenovitch, and put in its place 
the rival family of the Karageorgevitch. Under the 
new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian tutelage, 
and became an independent focus of Slav life in close 
touch with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, 
when Austria took advantage of the revolution in 
Turkey, led by the Young Turks, to annex formally the 
occupied territories of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 

1 Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912), 
started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the rail- 
ways of Bosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See also 
Correspondence, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25 : * There 
is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica 
railway.' 



DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY 55 

Servia, which had hoped to gain these territories, once 
a part of the old Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, 
and would have gone to war with Austria, if Russia, her 
champion under the new dynasty, could only have given 
her support. But Russia, still weak after the Japanese 
war, could not do so ; Russia, on the contrary, had to 
suffer the humiliation of giving a pledge to the Austrian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she would not sup- 
port Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. 
She has saved money, she has reorganized her army, 
she has done everything in her power to gain security 
for the future. And now that Austria has sought utterly 
to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge (unproved, 
in the sense that no legal proof was offered) x of com- 
plicity in the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
and his wife, Russia has risked war rather than surren- 
der her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav sentiment 
imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia : 
no government could refuse to listen to the demand. 
The stake for Russia is not merely the integrity of Servia: 
it is her prestige among the Slav peoples, of which she 
is head ; and behind all lies the question whether South- 
Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and 
lost to Russian influence. 

Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South- 
Eastern Europe : she has irritated Slav feeling on her 
own Eastern frontier. The vitality and the increase of 
the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep German 
alarm. The German Government has therefore of late 
years pursued a policy of repression towards its own 
Slav subjects, the Poles, forbidding the use of the Polish 
language, and expropriating Polish landowners in order 
to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism is 
really alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical 
vigour of the Slavs ; but Russia has not loved Teutonic 
policy, and there has been an extensive boycott of 

1 For a summary of so-called proofs, see Appendix IV, infra. 



56 DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY 

German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made 
by the Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would 
re-create the old Poland, ana give it autonomy, shows 
how far Russia has travelled from the days, not so far 
distant in point of time, when it was her policy to 
repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany ; and it 
has made the breach between Germany and Russia final 
and irreparable. 

It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to 
the great Slav Empire in South-Eastern Europe and 
on her own eastern borders. But why, it may be asked, 
should Russian policy be linked with English? Is 
there any bond of union except the negative bond of 
common opposition to Germany ? There is. For one 
thing England and Russia have sought to pursue a 
common cause — that of international arbitration and of 
disarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been some- 
thing of a bond between the two that both have attempted 
to succeed. But there are other and more vital factors. 
England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought Russia 
for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to 
fight Russia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On 
the contrary, the interest of England in maintaining 
independence in the South-East of Europe now coincides 
with that of Russia. Above all, the new constitutional 
Russia of the Duma is Anglophil. 

1 The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were 
learnt chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional 
history had aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelli- 
gible to a present-day Englishman. All three Dumas . . . 
were remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied 
the staple of the precedents and parallels for quotation.' 1 

In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism 

not only coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian 

agreement of 1907, but owed much to the inspiration 

of England. 

1 Camb. Mod. Hist. xii. 379. 



CHAPTER IV 

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS 

The following sketch of events from June 28 to 
August 4, 1914, is merely intended as an introduction 
to the analytical and far more detailed account of the 
negotiations and declarations of those days which the 
reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine 
the narrative to a plain statement of the successive 
stages in the crisis, neither discussing the motives of 
the several Powers involved, nor distinguishing the fine 
shades of difference in the various proposals which were 
made by would-be mediators. 

The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen develop- 
ment in the old quarrel of Austria- Hungary and Russia 
over the Servian question. On June 28 the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, 
paid a visit of ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in 
Bosnia, the administrative centre of the Austrian pro- 
vinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the 
town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped 
being killed by a bomb which was thrown at their carriage. 
Later in the day they were shot by assassins armed with 
Browning pistols. The crime was apparently planned 
by political conspirators who resented the Austrian 
annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (supra, p. 54), 
and who desired that these provinces should be united 
to Servia. 

The Austrian Government, having instituted an in- 
quiry, came to the conclusion that the bombs of the 
conspirators had been obtained from a Servian arsenal ; 
that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the Servian 



58 CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 

capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who pro- 
vided the pistols ; that the criminals and their weapons 
had been conveyed from Servia into Bosnia by officers 
of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian customs-officials. 
At the moment the Austrian Government published no 
proof of these conclusions, 1 but, on July 23, forwarded 
them to the Servian Government in a formal note con- 
taining certain demands which, it was intimated, must 
be satisfactorily answered by Servia within forty-eight 
hours. 2 This ultimatum included a form of apology to 
be published on a specified date by the Servian Govern- 
ment, and ten engagements which the Servian Govern- 
ment were to give the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
The extraordinary nature of some of these engagements 
is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7). 

On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria- 
Hungary to the other Powers of Europe, 3 and on July 25 
it was published in a German paper, the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung. It was therefore intended to be 
a public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German 
Government told the Powers that it approved the 
Austrian note, as being necessitated by the ' Great- 
Servian ' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation 
in the Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces 
belonging to Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished 
to remain a Great Power, could not avoid pressing the 
demands contained in the note, even, if necessary, by 
military measures ; and that the question was one which 

1 Extracts are printed in the German version of the German 
White Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of 
July 27. We print the extracts (the original not being accessible 
in this country) in Appendix IV. 

2 Full text infra in Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 18-23) '■> 
more correctly in Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, 
No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24 ; but the differ- 
ences between the two versions are immaterial for our present 
purpose. 

3 See the communication to England in Correspondence, No. 4. 



CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 59 

concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and 
Servia. 1 

Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was 
directed against Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs told the British Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was provocative 
and immoral; that some of her demands were impos- 
sible of acceptance ; that Austria would never have 
taken such action unless Germany had first been con- 
sulted ; that if Austria began military measures against 
Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian 
Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity 
with France and Russia on the subject of the Austrian 
note; doubtless Servia could accept some of the Austrian 
demands. 2 To the Austro-Hungarian Government the 
Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, 
July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her 
reply was quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help 
in smoothing the situation ; and he urged that Austria- 
Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges against 
Servia. 3 On July 25 Russia told England 4 that Servia 
would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not 
accept all the demands of Austria ; that no independent 
state could do so. If Servia appealed to arbitration, as 
seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave 
the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Ger- 
many, and Italy — the four Powers whom Sir Edward 
Grey had suggested as possible mediators. 

On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, 

1 Correspondence, No. 9, Note communicated by the German 
Ambassador, July 24. 

2 Correspondence, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, 
July 24. 

3 Correspondence, No. 13, Note communicated by Russian Am- 
bassador, July 25. 

4 Correspondence, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, 
July 25. 



6o CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 

July 25, the Servian Government replied to the Austrian 
note, conceding part of the Austrian demands, and an- 
nouncing its readiness to accept, on the other points, 
the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great 
Powers. The Austrian Government found the Servian 
note unsatisfactory, and criticized its details in an official 
memorandum. 1 The Austro-Hungarian Minister left 
Belgrade on July 25 ; on July 26 a part of the Austro- 
Hungarian army was mobilized ; and on July 28 Austria- 
Hungary declared war on Servia. 

Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 
1 announce England's solidarity ' with Russia and France 
on the Servian question. On and after July 26 he was 
taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, 
Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia 
had already agreed, July 25 ; and Italy and France were 
ready to co-operate with England. 2 Germany, however, 
made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal 
intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria 
and Russia consented to it. 3 Russia had already (July 
25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization, 4 but had 
not yet issued it ; on July 27 the Russian Foreign 
Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian 
question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna. 5 
This offer was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, but subsequently accepted ; and conversa- 
tions were actually in progress between the representa- 
tives of the two Powers as late as August i. 6 

1 For text of Servian note see infra Appendix I (German White 
Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there. 

2 Correspondence, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 27 ; 
ibid. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27. 

3 Correspondence, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. 

4 German White Book, p. 46 {infra in Appendix I). The Tsar 
to His Majesty, July 30. 

5 Correspondence, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey. 

6 Austria declined conversations on July 28 {Correspondence, 



CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 61 

No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the 
fact that, on July 28, the Russian Government warned 
Germany of the mobilization of the southern military 
districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July 29. 1 
Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances 
that she would respect the integrity and independence 
of Servia; 2 these assurances, considered inadequate by 
the Russian Government, seem to have been the subject 
of the last conversations between Russia and Austria- 
Hungary. 

Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle 
to a friendly settlement; and this conviction was not 
affected by the appeals for peace which the Kaiser 
telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and July 31. 3 
On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian 
mobilization was alarming, and that France was also 
making military preparations; 4 at the same time Germany 
threatened to proclaim ' imminent state of war ' (drohende 
Kriegsgefahr) as a counter measure to the French pre- 
parations ; 5 German military preparations, by July 30, 
had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which 
she thus indicated. 6 Germany had already warned 
England, France, and Russia that, if Russia mobilized, 
this would mean German mobilization against both 
France and Russia. 7 But on July 27, Russia had ex- 
plained .that her mobilization would in no sense be 

No. 93) ; but for conversations of July 31 see Correspondence, No. 
in ; of August 1, see Appendix V. 

1 Correspondence, No. 70 (1). M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador 
at Berlin, July 28. 

2 Correspondence, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, 
July 28. 

3 German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (in Appendix I, infra). 

4 Correspondence, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 

5 German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 {infra, Appendix I). 

6 Correspondence, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30. 

7 German White Book, p. 7 ; the date of the warning seems to be 
July 27. 



62 CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 

directed against Germany, and would only take place if 
Austrian forces crossed the Servian frontier. 1 On 
July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the 
southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to 
participate in the ' quadruple conference ' now proposed 
by England, for the purpose of mediating between 
Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the 
German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. 2 Germany in 
fact believed, or professed to believe, that the Russian 
mobilization, though not proclaimed, was already far 
advanced. 3 

On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with 
Russia were still in progress, began the bombardment 
of Belgrade. The next day, July 31, Russia ordered 
general mobilization ; on August 1 France and Germany 
each took the like step ; Germany presented an ultimatum 
to Russia, demanding that Russian mobilization should 
cease, and another ultimatum to France asking what 
course she would take in the event of war between 
Germany and Russia. 

Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and 
while Sir Edward Grey was still engaged in efforts of 
mediation, Germany made overtures to England, with 
the object of securing England's neutrality in the event of 
a war between Germany and France. On July 29 
Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to 
give assurances that, if victorious, she would make no 
territorial acquisitions at the expense of France ; but 
refused to give a similar assurance respecting French 
colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality. 4 
These proposals were refused by England on July 30. 5 
On August 1 the German Ambassador unofficially asked 
England to remain neutral on condition that Germany 

1 German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit 11. 

2 Ibid. p. 9. 8 Ibid, p. 10. 

4 Correspondence, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 

5 Ibid. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30. 



CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 63 

would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey 
replied that England's hands were still free, and that he 
could not promise neutrality on that condition alone. 1 

Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told 
by France that she would not remain neutral in a war 
between Germany and Russia. 2 On July 31 the 
English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare 
definitely on her side, replied that England could give 
no pledge at present. 3 On the same day England asked 
France and Germany to engage to respect Belgian 
neutrality. France assented, Germany evaded giving 
a reply. 4 But, on August 2, German forces entered 
the neutral state of Luxemburg ; and England promised 
to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked 
by the German fleet in the Channel, or through the 
North Sea. 5 On August 4 the King of the Belgians 
telegraphed to King George announcing that Germany 
had demanded passage for her troops through Belgian 
territory, and appealing to England for help. 6 On the 
same day, August 4, England sent an ultimatum to 
Germany asking for assurance, before midnight, that 
Germany would jespect Belgian neutrality. 7 This 
demand was taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declara- 
tion of war by England against Germany. 

1 Correspondence, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1. 

2 Ibid. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30. 

3 Ibid. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31. 

4 Ibid. No. 114, 120, 122. 

5 Ibid. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2. 

6 Ibid. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4. 

7 Ibid. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4. 



64 CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 



DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR 

June 28. Assassination at Serajevo of the Archduke Franz 

Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg. 
July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters. 
July 9. Results of Austro- Hungarian investigation into the 

Servian crime laid before the Emperor. 
July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army. 
July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway 

Shares, especially by Berlin operators. 
July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the 

Hungarian Chamber, describes war as a sad ultima ratio, ' but 

every state and nation must be able and willing to make war 

if it wishes to exist as a state and a nation.' 
The Times leading article 'Austria- Hungary and Servia ' is com- 
mented on in Berlin as an ' English warning to Servia '. 
July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home- 
Rule problem. 
July 21. The Frankfurter Zeitung warns Austria-Hungary of the 

folly of its campaign against Servia. 
July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving 

her 48 hours in which to accept. 
July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro- 

Hungarian demands considered as an indirect challenge to 

Russia. — Strike at St. Petersburg. 
Failure of the conference on Home Rule. 
July 25. Saturday. Servian reply ; considered unsatisfactory by 

Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave 

Belgrade. 
Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension 

of time-limit allowed to Servia. 
Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate 

at Vienna and St. Petersburg.— Serious riot in Dublin. 
July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, 

and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference 

immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which 

would prevent complications. 
Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered. 
Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that 

Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Servia. 
Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night. 
July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a con- 



CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 65 

ference. German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of 

a ' conference '. 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation 

between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres. 
Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement con- 
cerning the attitude of Great Britain. 
The Times Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned 

this afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam. 
July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia. 
Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin. 
Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the 

Servian reply. 
The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar. 
July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military 

districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. 
Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise terri- 
torial integrity of France, but will not extend the same 

assurance for French colonies. 
Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not 

necessarily stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace 

failed. 
Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain indifferent. 
The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser ; the latter replies. 
July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hun- 

garian forces. 
The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the 

gravity of the situation, and postpones discussion of the 

Home Rule Amending Bill. 
The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser. 
July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered. 

Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect 

neutrality of Belgium. 
France promises to respect Belgian neutrality ; Germany is 

doubtful whether any answer will be returned to this request. 
Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its 

ultimatum to Servia. 
Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar. 
Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her 

mobilization should cease within 12 hours. 
Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define 

her attitude in case of a Russo-German war. 
English bankers confer with the Government about the financial 

situation. 



66 CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF CRISIS 

Aug. i. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of 
English ships at Hamburg. 
Orders issued for general mobilization of French army. 
Orders issued for general mobilization of German army. 
Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg. 
Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet 
will protect the North Coast of France against the German 
fleet. 
Germans enter French territory near Cirey. 
Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other 
members of the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive 
war. 
Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium. 
Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of 
Commons. 
Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory. 

Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an 

answer by midnight. 
The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, 
practically announcing war against Germany and explaining 
the British position. 
Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia. 
Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his pass- 
port. 
Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria- Hungary. 



CHAPTER V 
NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

For purposes of reference the following list of dramatis personae 
may be useful : — 

Great Britain : King George V, succ. 1910. 
Foreign Secretary : Sir Edward Grey. 
Ambassadors from France: M. Paul Cambon. 

Russia : Count Benckendorff. 

Germany : Prince Lichnowsky. 

Austria : Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly- 

Dietrich stein. 
Belgium : Count A. de Lalaing (Minister). 
Russia : Emperor Nicholas II, succ. 1894. 
Foreign Secretary : M. Sazonof. 

Ambassadors from Great Britain : Sir George Buchanan. 
France : M. Paleologue. 
Germany : Count Pourtales. 
Austria : Friedrich Count Szapary. 
France : Raymond Poincare, President, elected 1913. 
Premier : M. Viviani. 

Acting Foreign Secretary : M. Doumergue. 
Ambassadors from Great Britain : Sir Francis Bertie. 
Russia : M. Isvolsky. 

M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d Affaires). 
Germany : Baron von Schoen. 
Austria-. Count Scezsen. 
Germany : Emperor William II, succ. 1888. 

Imperial Chancellor: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. 

Foreign Secretary : Herr von Jagow. 

Ambassadors from Great Britain : Sir Edward Goschen. 

Sir Horace Rumbold (Coun- 
cillor). 
Russia : M. Swerbeiev. 

M. Bronewsky (Charge d' Affaires). 
France : M. Jules Cambon. 
Austria: Count Ladislaus Szogyeny-Marich. 
Austria-Hungary : Emperor Francis Joseph, succ. 1848. 
Foreign Secretary : Count Berchtold. 

E 2 



68 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

Ambassadors from Great Britain : Sir Maurice de Bunsen. 
Russia: M. Schebeko. 

M. Koudachev {Charge d' Affaires). 
France : M. Dumaine. 

Germany: Herr von Tschirscky - und- 
Bogendorff. 
Italy : King Victor Emmanuel III, succ. 1900. 
Foreign Secretary : Marquis di San Giuliano. 
Ambassador from Great Britain : Sir Rennell Rodd. 
Belgium : King Albert, succ. 1909. 

Minister of Great Britain : Sir Francis Villiers. 
Servia : King Peter, succ. 1903. 
Minister of Great Britain : C. L. des Graz. 

D. M. Crackanthorpe {First Secretary). 
Russian Charge d' Affaires : M. Strandtmann. 



Germany* 's attitude to Austria and Russia. 

From the very beginning of the conversations between 
the Powers on the assassination of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the Austrian note to 
Servia, the German Government took up the attitude 
that it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia 
and Austria alone'. 1 Subsequently in their White 
Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian 
agitation was part of Russian propagandism. 2 In the 
negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is 
that Russia is not to interfere in this matter, although 
M. Paul Cambon pointed out that ' Russia would be 
compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon 
as Austria attacked Servia \ 3 

After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, 
Germany continued to maintain the position that the 
crisis could be localized, and to reject Sir Horace 
Rumbold's suggestion that ' in taking military action in 

1 Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, No. 2. Sir E. 
Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914. 

2 German White Book, p. 4. 

8 Correspondence, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 69 

Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion 
in Russia'. 1 

At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambas- 
sador, was very frankly told by the German Ambassador 
that Germany was shielding Austria in the Servian 
business : — 

1 As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about 
in backing up Austria- Hungary in this matter. . . . Servian 
concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well 
knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate 
demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making 
her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of 
Government from Belgrade/ 2 

M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to 
have divined this policy of Germany pretty soon : — 

' My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my 
impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the 
uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin 
Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis 
developing, appear to be exercising no influence upon their 
ally. . . . There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to 
be found at Berlin/ 3 

When at the beginning of August the crisis had led 
to war, it is interesting to observe the opinions expressed 
by high and well-informed officials about German 
diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion thus:— 

'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and 
immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, 
secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the 
policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced 
policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government 



1 Correspondence, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25. 

2 Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. See 
also German White Book, p. 5. 

3 Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July ||, 1914 
(communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28). 



7o NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum ; 
what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian 
Government had been postponed until the moment had 
passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany 
was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and 
St. Petersburg ; the former was a violent Russophobe who 
had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Govern- 
ment that Russia would never go to war/ 1 

And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote 
that he agreed with his Russian colleague that 

'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the 
first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his 
action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the 
German Government also desired war from the first/ 2 

Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion 
concerning the attitude of the German Government, but 
there can be no doubt that this general attitude was 
most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and that 
if the German Government had desired war they could 
scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end. 
No diplomatic pressure was put upon Vienna, which 
under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any 
lengths against Servia. Over and over again the 
German diplomats were told that Russia was deeply 
interested in Servia, but they would not listen. As 
late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused 
'to discuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's 
standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel 
with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which 
Russia had nothing to do\ 3 Next day the German 
Ambassador at Vienna was continuing ' to feign surprise 

1 Correspondence, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, 
August 1. 

2 Ibid. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August 1. 

3 Ibid. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 71 

that Servian affairs could be of such interest to Russia'. 1 
But in their White Book, in order to blacken the 
character of Russia, the Germans remark that they 
'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude 
of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia 
into the field'. 2 Both stories cannot be true : the German 
Government have, not for the last time in the history of 
these negotiations, to choose between ineptitude and 
guilt ; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, 
and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act 
in such a way that Russia was bound to come into the 
field. 

When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward 
Grey did all he could to obtain the good offices of 
Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia, and to per- 
suade the German Government to use influence with 
Austria so that she should take a friendly attitude to 
Servia. On the day of the presentation of the Austrian 
note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the German 
Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, 
Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour 
of moderation at Vienn? and St. Petersburg, and when 
the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took 
the important step of proposing that the French, 
Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in 
conference immediately ' for the purpose of discovering 
an issue which would prevent complications \ 3 The 
proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and 
Italian Governments. The German Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, on the other hand, 
was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal, 
and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable 
to impress its real character upon the Government of 

1 Correspondence, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 

2 German White Book, p. 4 (see infra Appendix I). 

3 Correspondence, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. 
Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26. 



72 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receipt of the pro- 
posal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward 
Goschen, that the conference suggested 

' would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could 
not in his opinion be called together except at the request of 
Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it/ 

Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that 

' the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that 
representatives of the four nations not directly interested 
should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous 
situation V 

Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French 
and Italian Ambassadors, who discussed the matter 
with their British colleague. Some doubt seems to 
have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the 
German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire 
for peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they 
concluded that the objection must be to the ' form of the 
proposal '. l Perhaps \ added Sir Edward Goschen, ' he 
himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he 
would find it possible to work with us/ 2 The next day 
the same idea was pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon 
Prince Lichnowsky: — 

'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was 
ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany 
could suggest if mine was not acceptable/ 3 

But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events 
had by then gone so far that the very gravest questions 
had arisen for this country. 
With the refusal of the German Government to 

1 Correspondence, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, 
July 27. 

2 Ibid. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. 

3 Ibid. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 73 

propose a form of mediation acceptable to themselves 
before graver events had occurred, the first period of 
the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility 
of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil 
day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls 
solely on the shoulders of Germany. The reasons 
advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and 
though Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chan- 
cellor, was more conciliatory and sympathetic, it may 
be noted that the German White Book 1 continues to 
misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a con- 
ference on the particular question of the Austro-Servian 
dispute, and not on the general situation of Europe. 

In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at 
negotiation by direct conversations between the parties 
concerned, with no advantage, but rather with the growth 
of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st both Sir 
Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find 
some formula which might be accepted as a basis for 
postponing hostilities between the Great Powers. And 
here it may be well to point out that Prince Lich- 
nowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his 
chiefs. On July 24th, the day after the Austrian note 
was presented, he was so little acquainted with the 
true state of affairs, that speaking privately he told 
Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourable on some 
points must be sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse 
against immediate action might be afforded to Austria \ 2 
And in the matter of the conference, on the very day 
that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against 
entering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky 
informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Govern- 
ment accepted in principle mediation between Austria and 
Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their 

1 p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see infra Appendix I). 

2 Correspondence, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, 
July 24. 



74 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

right as an ally to help Austria if attacked'. 1 The 
mutual incompatibility of the two voices of Germany 
was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di 
San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted 
a reconciliation between them, on information received 
from Berlin, that ' the difficulty was rather the " con- 
ference " than the principle \ 2 But we may ask whether 
Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not 
really show that the whole principle of a conference was 
objected to, seeing that he said that such a ' conference 
was not practicable ', and that ' it would be best to await 
the outcome of the exchange of views between the 
Austrian and Russian Governments \ 3 But, if it was 
not the principle that was objected to, but only the form, 
where are we? We can do nothing else but assume 
that the German Government objected to the terms 
employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of 
a mere quibble they wasted time until other events 
made the catastrophe inevitable. Impartiality will have 
to judge whether such action was deliberate or not; 
whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has 
to be laid at the door of the German Government. 

The proposed conference having been rejected by 
Germany, an attempt was then made by several Powers 
to invite Austria to suspend military action. Although 
Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, 
had made on July 25th a distinction between military 
preparations and military operations, and had urged that 
his Government had only the former then in view, it was 
reported two days later from Rome that there were great 
doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite 
Austria to suspend military action pending the con- 
ference'. Even if she had been willing to do so, it 
is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian declara- 

1 Correspondence, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 27. 

2 Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 

3 Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 75 

tion of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simul- 
taneous Austrian decree for general mobilization, the 
position of Europe could have been improved, for on 
July 29th that declaration was followed by news of the 
Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa, 
Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. 1 

Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 
' if Russia mobilized against Germany, latter would have 
to follow suit'. On being asked what he meant by 
1 mobilizing against Germany ', he said that 

'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not 
mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would 
have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was 
so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate 
her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very 
careful not to be taken by surprise.' 2 

This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have 
been unreasonable. But when on July 29th Russia 
mobilized the southern districts no grounds for German 
mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made 
about this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at 
Berlin, 3 but it is perhaps as well to point out here the 
remark made by Sir George Buchanan, the British 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language used 
by his German colleague concerning the mobiliza- 
tion of the four southern districts : ' He accused the 
Russian Government of endangering the peace of 

1 Although the German White Book attempts to make out that 
Russia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more 
satisfactory than the information of the German Imperial attache 
in Russia, whose account of the Russian military preparations 
supports only in part the allegations made at Berlin. See German 
White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7 ; also Correspondence, No. 78, Sir G. 
Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29. For the Austrian decree of 
general mobilization, see the Russian Orange Book No. 47 {infra 
in Appendix VI). 

2 Correspondence, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. 

3 Ibid. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29. 



76 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I re- 
ferred to all that had recently been done by Austria, 
that he could not discuss such matters/ 1 It would 
perhaps be rash to assume that the German Ambassador, 
Count Pourtales, used such language to his home 
Government, for there is no evidence of it in the German 
White Book. What dispatches appear there from the 
German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly 
honest. The military attache says, ' I deem it certain 
that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa \ 
He adds : 'it is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and 
improbable elsewhere \ 2 

There was therefore, according to the evidence pro- 
duced by the Germans themselves, no mobilization 
'against Germany'. The only thing that looks at all 
like hostile action is contained in the news sent by 
the Imperial German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, 
that a 'state of war' (Kriegszustand) had been pro- 
claimed in that district. But this is a very different 
thing from mobilization ; it was almost bound to follow 
in the northern provinces of the Empire as the result 
of mobilization elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at 
Kovno announced it on July 27th before any Russian 
mobilization at all had taken place,, and the fact that 
Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the 
end of July that Government did not consider Kriegs- 
zustand in Kovno to be equivalent to 'mobilization 
against Germany '. 

Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia 
would not make war. Perhaps there was no real fear 
that Russia would take an aggressive attitude, for 
many people believed that ' Russia neither wanted, 
nor was in a position to make war \ 3 This attitude of 

1 Correspondence, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, 
July 29, 1914. 

2 German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26. 

3 Correspondence, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 77 

mind was known and deplored in Rome, where the 
Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed to be 
a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was 
in earnest'. 1 Such an opinion seems to have been 
shared by Count Pourtales, who on July 29 reported 
that the German Government were willing to guarantee 
that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. 
This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus 
become an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolu- 
tion in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of 
affairs. The next day the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors ' that 
absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian 
Government that Germany was making military and 
naval preparations against Russia — more particularly in 
the direction of the Gulf of Finland \ 2 

After this, is it difficult to see how German states- 
men regarded the situation ? Russia, in their eyes, 
was playing a game of bluff, and strong measures 
against her were in the interest of Germany. But, 
though under no illusion as to German preparations, 
M. Sazonof offered on July 30 to stop all military pre- 
parations if Austria 'would eliminate from her ulti- 
matum to Servia points which violate the principle of 
the sovereignty of Servia'. 3 ' Preparations for general 
mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is 

July 28. See also quotation in Times of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from 
the Militdr-Wochenblatt: ' The fighting power of Russia is usually 
over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than moral, 
the higher command, armaments. . . . All military preparations 
for war, of whatever sort, have been taken with that attention to 
detail and that order which marks Germany. It can therefore be 
said, without exaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of 
grave events with complete calm, trusting to God and her own 
might.' 

1 Correspondence y No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 

2 Ibid. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cfi 
Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 {infra in Appendix VI). 

3 Ibid. 



78 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

rejected by Austria/ wrote Sir George Buchanan. 1 
The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that 
all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation 
had failed, and that she was moving troops against 
Russia as well as against Servia. 2 

Face to face therefore with war against another 
Power, Russia ordered a general mobilization. 3 This 
was answered on the same day by a proclamation of 
Kriegsgefahr at Berlin, ' as it can only be against 
Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed \ 4 

Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come 
to be this, that Russia, feeling herself threatened by 
the military preparations of Austria and Germany, 
decided to issue orders for a general mobilization. 5 
Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope 
that mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian 
interests as against Servia might yet be accepted. 6 
But his efforts were useless, for Germany had 
launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demand- 
ing demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed 
out, the demand was made ' even more difficult for 
Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in the 
south as weir. 7 The only explanation actually vouch- 
safed was that this had been asked to prevent Russia 
pleading that all her mobilization was only directed 
against Austria, Such a quibble, when such interests 
are at stake, seems to call for severe comment. 

War between the three empires seemed now inevit- 

1 Correspondence, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. 

2 Ibid. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31. 

3 Ibid. 

4 Ibid. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. 

5 Ibid. No. 113, ut sup. On August 1 The Times published a 
semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July 31, 
that ' the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the 
frontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein '. 

6 Ibid. No. nr. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31. 

7 Ibid. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 79 

able, for though the Emperor of Russia and the German 
Emperor had exchanged telegrams each imploring the 
other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying 
that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the 
other's demands, 1 the officials at Berlin were now taking 
up the position that ' Russia's mobilization had spoilt 
everything'. 2 This attitude is as inexplicable as it 
proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31 
Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. 
The Austrians, apparently alarmed at the prospect of 
a general war, were ready to discuss the substance of 
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia announced 
that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to 
preserve her waiting attitude'. 3 Having issued her 
ultimatum to Russia, Germany naturally mobilized, 
but what kind of diplomacy is this in which, with 
the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party 
issues an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud 
country can give but one answer ? 

The sequence of events seems to be as follows. 
Austria mobilized against Servia. Russia, rightly or 
wrongly, took this as a threat to herself, and mobilized 
all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany 
threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military 
preparations — an inexcusable step, which increased 
Russia's apprehensions of a general war, and made a 
general Russian mobilization inevitable. 4 If Russia was 
the first to mobilize, she took this step in consequence of 
German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three 
empires taking this action, discussion was still possible 
between Russia and Austria, 5 and might have had good 

1 See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21, 22, 
23, 23 a (see infra Appendix I). 

2 Correspondence, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. 

3 Ibid. Nos. 131, 133, 135. 

4 Russian Orange Book, No. 58 {infra Appendix VI). 

6 Ibid. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1, 
encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that ' The Austro- 



8o NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

results. In fact, the situation was not irretrievable, if Ger- 
many had not rendered it so by issuing her ultimatum to 
Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly ? 

II 

Germany 's attitude to France 
We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, 
and observe the diplomacy of Germany with regard to 
France and Great Britain. On the 27th of July we are 
told that the German Government received ' the first 
intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken 
by France : the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres 
and returned to its garrison \* Will it be believed that, 
except for the assertion ■ of rapidly progressing prepara- 
tions of France, both on water and on land ', 2 this is the 
only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced 
to prove the aggressive intentions of France ? And it 
may be worth while to point out that on July 29, when 
the German White Book says that Berlin heard of the 
' rapidly progressing preparations of France ', the French 
Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State 
that 'they had done nothing more than the German 
Government had done, namely, recalled the officers on 
leave \ z 

The very next day the French Government had 
' reliable information that the German troops are con- 
centrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war', 4 
and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated 
Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government 
to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. 
M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was 
desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the 
participation of the Great Powers.' 

1 German White Book, p. 8. 2 Ibid. p. 9, Exhibit No. 17. 

3 Correspondence, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29 : 
' His Excellency denied German Government had done this. 
Nevertheless it is true.' 

4 Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 81 

into French territory. 1 With great forbearance the 
French Government withdrew its troops ten kilometres 
from the frontier ; and, although German reservists had 
been recalled from abroad l by tens of thousands ', the 
French Government had not called out a single reservist. 
Well might the French Minister for Foreign Affairs say 
1 Germany has done it \ 2 

Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the 
German Government presented an ultimatum (July 31) 
demanding what were the French intentions, and on 
August 1st the French Government replied that it would 
consult its own interests. 3 



Ill 

The Question of British Neutrality. 

Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country 
into the quarrel. If Germany were making war primarily 
on Russia, and France were only involved as the auxiliary 
of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidly against 
Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against 
France ; and England would not have been dragged into 
war. 4 The question of British neutrality first appears in 
the British White Book on July 25th, when Sir Edward 
Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said : ' if war 
does take place, the development of other issues may 
draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent 
it \ 6 Two days later he wrote again : — 

'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in 
German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any 

1 Correspondence. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon. 

2 Ibid. 3 German White Book, p. 48 (see infra, Appendix I). 

4 Correspondence, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, Aug. t. 

5 Correspondence, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 
July 25- 

p 3113 F 



82 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

event we would stand aside . . , This impression ought, as 
I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have 
given to the First Fleet . . . not to disperse for manoeuvre 
leave. But . . . my reference to it must not be taken to mean 
that anything more than diplomatic action was promised/ * 

On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously 
discussed at both the Courts of St. James' and Berlin 
independently. Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with 
Prince Lichnowsky, told him 'he did not wish the 
Ambassador to be misled . . . into thinking we should 
stand aside'. Developing this,. Sir Edward Grey 
solemnly warned the German Ambassador that 

'there was no question of our intervening if Germany was 
not involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the 
issue did become such that we thought British interests 
required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the 
decision would have to be very rapid. . . . But ... I did not 
wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly 
tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Govern- 
ment into supposing that we should not take action/ 2 

Before the news of this had reached Berlin the 
Imperial Chancellor had made his notorious 'bid for 
British neutrality ' on July 29 : — 

' He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the 
main principle which governed British policy, that Great 
Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed 
in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the 
object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of 
Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given 
to the British Government that the Imperial Government 
aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, 
should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. 

' I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, 
and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in 

1 Correspondence, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 
July 27. 

2 Ibid. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 83 

that respect. As regards Holland ... so long as Germany's 
adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the 
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's 
Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It 
depended on the action of France what operations Germany 
might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war 
was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not 
sided against Germany.' 1 

This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the 
British Government : — 

' His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment enter- 
tain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind them- 
selves to neutrality on such terms. 

1 What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as 
Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the 
colonies. 

' From the material point of view the proposal is un- 
acceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe 
being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her 
position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German 
policy. 

' Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us 
to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, 
a disgrace from which the good name of this country would 
never recover. 

'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away 
whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the 
neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain 
either.' 2 

He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep 
her hands absolutely free and hinted at some scheme 
for preventing anti-German aggression by the Powers 
of the Triple Entente : — 

1 Correspondence, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29 
(received July 29). 

2 Ibid. No. iot. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30. 

F 2 



84 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

' If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present 
crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote 
some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by 
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile 
policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, 
Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately . . . The idea 
has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite 
proposals, but if this crisis ... be safely passed, I am hopeful 
that the relief and reaction which will follow will make 
possible some more definite rapprochement between the 
Powers than has been possible hitherto/ 

Thus two points were made clear : we were seriously 
concerned that France should not be crushed, and that 
the neutrality of Belgium should not be violated. It is 
interesting to note how this extremely serious warning 
was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg: — 

' His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the 
Russian measures along the frontier . . . that he received 
your communication without a comment/ * 

But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he 
could scarcely complain that no warning had been given 
to him. 

With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to 
make any deduction as to the effect which this warning 
had upon Berlin ; but it may be remarked that at Rome 
that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir Rennell 
Rodd that he had 

' good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to 
give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed con- 
vinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was 
most anxious to avoid issue with us/ 2 

As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the 
next day, it is not impossible that the Italian Minister 

1 Correspondence, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. 

2 Ibid. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 85 

gave this information to Sir Rennell Rodd late in the 
day, after having received news from Berlin sent under 
the impression made by Sir Edward Grey's warning. 

Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been 
of short duration, for when the British Government 
demanded both of France and Germany whether they 
were 'prepared to engage to respect neutrality of 
Belgium so long as no other Power violates it'/ the 
French gave an unequivocal promise the same day, 2 
while the German answer is a striking contrast : — 

' I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he 
must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can 
possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he 
thought any reply they might give could not but disclose 
a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of 
war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they 
would return any answer at all. , His Excellency, neverthe- 
less, took note of your request. 

1 It appears from what he said that German Government 
considers that certain hostile acts have already been com- 
mitted in Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that 
a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under 
an embargo already.' 3 

It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality 
was a contingency that would have to be faced, and 
Prince Lichnowsky was warned the next day that ' the 
neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country ', 
and he was asked to obtain an assurance from the 
German Government similar to that given by France : — 

1 Correspondence, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie and 
Sir E. Goschen, July 31. 

2 Ibid. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31. 

3 Ibid. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. 
It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, 
Belgium was bound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of 
Germany to Russia (Art. 2). 



86 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

'If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by 
one combatant, while the other respected it, it would be ex- 
tremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country/ 1 

The Ambassador then, on his own personal respon- 
sibility and without authority from his Government, 
tried to exact a promise that Great Britain would remain 
neutral 'if Germany gave a promise not to violate 
Belgian neutrality ', but Sir Edward Grey was bound to 
refuse such an offer, seeing that it left out of account 
all question of an attack on France and her colonies, 
about which it had been stated already that there could 
be no bargaining. Even the guarantee of the integrity 
of France and her colonies was suggested, but again 
Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse, for the reasons 
he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in rejecting what is 
now known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamous 
proposal', namely, that prance without actually losing 
territory might be so crushed as to lose her position as 
a Great Power, and become subordinate to German 
policy. And if there should be still any doubt about 
Sir Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would 
refer to his statement in the House of Commons on 
August 27. 2 The important points are that the offers of 
August i were made on the sole responsibility of Prince 
Lichnowsky, and without authority from his Govern- 
ment ; that the Cabinet on August 2 carefully discussed 
the conditions on which we might remain neutral, and 
that, on August 3, so far was the German Ambassador 
from guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium that he 
actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey l not to make the 
neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions'. What- 
ever Prince Lichnowsky may have said privately on 
August 1, the one fact certain is that two days later the 
German Government were making no concessions on 

1 Correspondence \ No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 
August 1. 

2 The Times, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 87 

that point ; on the contrary they were asking us to with- 
draw from a position we had taken up on July 30, four 
days before. 

One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe 
seems to have been made by Sir Edward Grey. On 
the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky whether, if 
France remained neutral, Germany would promise not 
to attack her. The impression seems to have prevailed 
in Berlin that this was an offer to guarantee French 
neutrality by the force of British arms, and the German 
Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence 
of the relief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect 
that the good relations between the two countries 
would be maintained. Unfortunately for such hopes, 
France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was 
there ever any idea of coercing France into neutrality, 
and even the original proposal had to be abandoned on 
consideration as unpractical. 1 

Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in 
London were still discussing whether a violation of 
Belgian neutrality would be an occasion for war, the 
news came of the violation of that of Luxemburg. Sir 
Edward Grey informed M. Cambon 2 that Lord Stanley 
and Lord Clarendon in 1867 had agreed to a 'collective 
guarantee' by which it was not intended that every 
Power was bound single-handed to fight any Govern 
ment which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross 
disregard by the Germans of their solemn pledge did 
not entail the same consequences as the subsequent 

1 See The Times, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor 
telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky : ' Germany is reacty to take up 
the English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the 
absolute neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict. . . . We 
promise that the French frontier shall not be passed by our troops 
before 7 p.m. on Monday, August 3, if England's consent is given 
in the meantime.' 

2 Correspondence, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 2. 



88 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally reprehensible 
from the point of view of international law, and the 
more cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker 
than Belgium. Against this intrusion Luxemburg pro- 
tested, but, unlike Belgium, she did not appeal to the 
Powers. 1 

Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians 
appealed to the King for f diplomatic intervention to 
safeguard the integrity of Belgium \ 2 The German 
Government had issued an ultimatum to the Belgian, 
asking for 

1 a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising 
to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom 
and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in 
case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer 
was requested within twelve hours V 

Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to 
protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany 
in common with ourselves was a party, and to ask an 
assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would 
not be proceeded with. At the same time the Belgian 
Government was told to resist German aggression by all 
the means in its power, as Great Britain was prepared 
to join France and Russia to maintain the independence 
and integrity of Belgium. 4 On receipt of the protest of 
Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow 
made one more desperate effort to bid for British 
neutrality : ' Germany will, under no pretence whatever, 
annex Belgian territory ' : to pass through Belgium was 
necessary because the * German army could not be 
exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was 

1 Correspondence, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to 
Sir E. Grey, August 2. 

2 Ibid. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4. 

3 Ibid. 

4 Ibid. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August 4. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 89 

planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa- 
tion \ It was for Germany ' a question of life and death 
to prevent French advance '} But matters had gone too 
far : that day (August 4) the Germans violated Belgian 
territory at Gemmenich, and thereupon the British 
demand to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, issued 
earlier in the day, was converted into an ultimatum : — 

'We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government 
will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, 
the measures considered indispensable. 

'We are also informed that Belgian territory has been 
violated at Gemmenich. 

' In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that 
Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting 
Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request 
made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat 
that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my 
telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock 
to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, 
and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take 
all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium 
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much 
a party as ourselves.' 2 

The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was 
given of disappointment and resentment at such a step 
being taken, and the 'harangue' of the Chancellor to 
Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishment at the value 
laid by Great Britain upon the ■ scrap of paper ' of 1839 
would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's 
desperate bid for neutrality at the last moment, to show 
that the German Government had counted on the 
neutrality of this country and had been deeply dis- 

1 Correspondence, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince 
Lichnowsky, August 4. 

2 Ibid. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4. 



go NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

appointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the 
eleventh hour to bargain for our neutrality were genuine 
efforts to keep the peace between Great Britain and 
Germany, it is our belief that their origin must be found 
in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom 
we believe, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited 
since the war broke out, to have been sincerely and 
honestly working in favour of European peace, against 
obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen. But 
certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of 
the German hierarchy, war with this country had been 
decided on, and that Sir Edward Grey was not far 
wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on July 31, 
' I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has 
been a decisive factor in situation. German Govern- 
ment do not expect our neutrality/ 1 On what other 
grounds than that orders had been sent out from Berlin 
can the fact be explained that the German Customs 
authorities, three days before the declaration of war, 
began detaining British ships, 2 and compulsorily un- 
loading cargoes of sugar from British vessels ? In the 
former case, indeed, the ships were ordered to be 
released ; in the latter case, of which the complaint was 
made twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries 
was the ominous statement that 'no information was 
to be had\ 3 

This, however, is a digression from the main question. 
History will doubtless attribute the outbreak of war 
between ourselves and Germany to the development of 
the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will judge 
that had it not been for the gratuitous attack made 
on a neutral country by Germany, war with Great 
Britain would not have ensued on August 4, 1914. The 
excuses put forward by the German Government for 

1 Correspondence, No. 116, July 31. 

2 Ibid. Nos. 130, 143, 145. 

3 Ibid. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 91 

this wanton outrage on international agreements are 
instructive. In conversation with Sir Edward Goschen, 
neither Herr von Jagow nor the Chancellor urged that 
the French had violated the neutrality; the argument 
is purely and simply that the route by way of the 
Vosges is difficult, time is everything, and it is a matter 
of life and death to Germany to crush France as quickly 
as possible, in order that she may be able to meet the 
Russians before they reach the German frontier. This 
excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory 
even to those who put it forward, though it was in- 
dubitably the real reason; so vice paid homage to 
virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince Lichnowsky 
that he had ' absolutely unimpeachable information ' that 
the German army was exposed to French attack across 
Belgium. On the other hand, the Chancellor, as late as 
August 4th, seems to have known nothing of any such 
action by France ; at any rate he made no mention of 
it in his speech to the Reichstag : — 

' We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows 
no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps 
are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to 
the dictates of international law. It is true that the French 
Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing 
to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as her opponent 
respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for 
invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A French 
movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have 
been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just 
protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The 
wrong — I speak openly — that we are committing we will 
endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been 
reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, 
and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one 
thought — how he is to hack his way through.' * 

1 The Times, August n, p. 5, col. 1. 



92 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

In this double-faced position of the German Govern- 
ment, we have an example either of unsurpassed 
wickedness or of insurpassable folly. The violation of 
Belgium must have been designed either in order to 
bring us into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in 
spite of treaties and warnings, we should yet remain 
neutral. Yet the foolishness of such a calculation is as 
nothing to that which prompted the excuse that Germany 
had to violate Belgian neutrality because the French 
were going to do so, or had done so. In such a case 
undoubtedly the wisest course for Germany would have 
been to allow the French to earn the reward of their 
own folly and be attacked not only by Belgium but also 
by Great Britain, to whom not five days before they had 
solemnly promised to observe the neutrality, and whom 
such a gross violation of the French word must in- 
dubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on 
to the side of Germany. In regard to Belgium the 
Germans have indeed put forward the plea that the 
French had already violated its neutrality before war 
was declared. This plea has been like a snowball. 
It began with the ineffective accusation that the French 
were at Givet, a town in French territory, and that this 
constituted an attack on Germany, though how the 
presence of the French in a town of their own could be 
called a violation of their neighbour's neutrality it is 
difficult to see. From that it has gradually grown into 
a more formidable story of the French supplying a gar- 
rison to Liege. There can be little doubt that all these 
attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French 
violated Belgian neutrality are another illustration of 
Swift's dictum to the effect that ' as universal a practice 
as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems ', it is astonish- 
ing that it has been brought to so little perfection, ' even 
by those who are most celebrated in that faculty '.- 1 

1 Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting (October, 
1706). 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 93 

IV 

England and Servia. 

We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany 
in the crisis which followed upon the Serajevo murders 
and more definitely upon the presentation of the Austrian 
note. It is equally important, and to English readers at 
least more interesting, to realize what attitude was taken 
by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout maintained 
the position, which he was so justly praised for adopting 
in 1912, that England had no direct interest in Balkan 
disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to prevent 
a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Ger- 
many would not see, that Russia was so much interested 
in Servia, for both political and religious reasons, that 
any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian Government to 
coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrity 
or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably 
rouse Russia to military action. For Russia had greater 
interests in the security of Servia than Great Britain had 
in the security of Belgium. In each case the Great 
Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to 
interfere to protect the smaller Power, but Russia was 
also bound to Servia by racial and religious bonds. This 
being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself, not as the Ger- 
man White Book says 1 to localize the conflict, but to 
prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary 
and Servia which would inevitably involve Russia and 
probably other European powers. He stated his policy 
with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons 
on July 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the 
policy which he then explained. On July 24th he told 
Count Mensdorff that he would concern himself 

1 with the matter simply and solely from the point of view 01 
the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between 

1 p. 6. 



94 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's 
Government/ l 

In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he 
told the German Ambassador : — 

4 If the presentation of this ultimatum, to Servia did not 
lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not 
concern ourselves about it; but if Russia took the view of 
the Austrian ultimatum which it seemed to me that any Power 
interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in 
face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating 
influence/ 2 

Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, 
Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain, should act 
together in the interests of peace at the courts of 
St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further and 
tried to induce Servia to ' express concern and regret ' 
and to ' give Austria the fullest satisfaction ', ' if it is 
proved that Servian officials, however subordinate, were 
accomplices in the murders at Serajevo.' 3 Further than 
that no British Foreign Minister could go ; Sir George 
Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazo- 
nof when he laid stress on the need of the sanction of 
British public opinion. 4 Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this 
when he wrote : — 

' I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to 
sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, how- 

1 Correspondence, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 
July 24. 

2 Ibid. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. Cf. No. 24, 
Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25 : ' The sudden, brusque, 
and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost 
inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will 
have mobilized against each other.' 

3 Ibid. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July 24. 

4 Ibid. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24 : ' I said 
. . . direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf 
of that country would never be sanctioned by British public 
opinion.' 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 95 

ever, war does take place, the development of other issues 
may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.' * 

However, matters were moving rapidly : the Servian 
reply 2 was presented on July 25; it was considered 
unsatisfactory by the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
and the Minister, with the Legation-staff, withdrew from 
Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that a 
conference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain 
should meet in London immediately 'for the purpose of 
discovering an issue which would prevent complications', 
and 'that all active military operations should be sus- 
pended pending results of conference \ 3 This proposal 
failed, as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), 
and on July 28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. 
Sir Edward Grey remained firm to his original attitude of 
non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'the dispute 
between Austria and Servia was not one in which we 
felt called to take a hand'. 4 And on the same day 
he declined to discuss with Count Mensdorff 'the merits 
of the question between Austria and Servia'. 5 

No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude 
was diplomatically correct and consistent. It was also 
inspired by a genuine desire for peace, and stands out 
in sharp contrast with the ' equivocal and double-faced ' 
policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in 
refusing to permit the Powers to mediate ; for it was 
with truth that M. Sazonof remarked that 
' a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would 
render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to 
the very basis of international relations.' 6 

1 Correspondence, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 
July 25. 2 See note at the end of this chapter. 

3 Correspondence, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 26. 

4 Ibid. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29. 

5 Ibid. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 29. 

6 Ibid. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the Russian 
Ambassador, July 25. 



96 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 



V 

Great Britain declines \ Solidarity ' with 
Russia and France. 

There is however another question which involves 
the whole foreign policy of Great Britain. Could Sir 
Edward Grey have prevented the war by boldly declaring 
at once that England would support Russia and France, 
if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged 
on him from several quarters, and it is possible that such 
action might have been successful. It is to Sir Edward 
Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take 
so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine 
these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 
' hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to 
proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France ' x The 
French Ambassador at St. Petersburg joined in the 
request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that 

'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did 
break out ; we should have rendered war more likely if we 
did not from the outset make common cause with his country 
and with France.' 2 

On July 30th the President of the French Republic 
expressed his conviction that 

'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. 
If His Majesty's Government announced that England would 
come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between 
France and Germany, as a result of the present differences 
between -Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for 
Germany would at once modify her attitude.' 3 

1 Correspondence, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24. 

2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. No. 119, 
Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 97 

Even more important was the opinion of the Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose country was a mem- 
ber of the Triple Alliance : — 

' As Germany was really anxious for good relations with 
ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with 
Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect/ * 

Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but 
Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassadors were 
equally firm in withstanding them. Sir George Buchanan 
at once told M. Sazonof that he 

' saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from 
His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional 
engagement on their part to support Russia and France by 
force of arms V 

On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by 
pointing out that, so far from such a policy conducing to 
the maintenance of peace, it would merely offend the 
pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present 
attitude. 3 Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out 
to M. Cambon that 

' even if the question became one between Austria and 
Russia, we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. 
It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or 
Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans ; and our idea 
had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan 
question \* 

That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based 
on history and on Britain's foreign policy in past years. 

1 Correspondence, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 

2 Ibid. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24. 

3 Ibid. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27 : ' Their 
(sc. the German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such a 
menace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her 
influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity 
of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace.' 

4 Ibid, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29. 

P 3113 Q 



98 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

Sir Edward Grey had another answer. It was to the 
effect that Germany could not, and ought to have known 
she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the 
Russian Ambassador told him that an impression pre- 
vailed in German and Austrian circles that in any event 
England would stand aside, he pointed out that 

'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we 
have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it 
happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave V 

The situation continued to develop unfavourably for 
the cause of peace owing to the Austrian declaration of 
war on Servia, and the consequent mobilizations in 
Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward 
Grey said: — 

' I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been 
a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not 
expect our neutrality. 5 2 

It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief 
was justified. England's attitude may have been an 
important factor in the situation, but still in our opinion 
Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing to 
commit England to a new Continental policy, but could 
not, with due observance of constitutional usages, have 
taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether 
the German Government did or did not rely on our 
neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs later affected great surprise 
at our action. Germany, however, as we have shown 
above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward 
Grey on July 29th 3 that she could not rely on our 
remaining neutral under all circumstances. 

1 Correspondence, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 
July 27. 

2 Ibid. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31. 

3 Ibid. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 99 

Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his 
estimate ot Germany's prudence is a small matter ; what 
is important is that his action was throughout perfectly 
straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably he 
had a very difficult part to play. The near East was 
like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings ; Ger- 
many was, if not stirring up the conflagration, certainly 
not attempting to pour water on the flames, while 
Austria, possibly — and even probably 1 — with Ger- 
many's knowledge, would allow no one to make the 
attempt. 

It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively 
in Europe and elsewhere, if the Government had com- 
municated 2 ' the dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues 
and the connexion between these intrigues and the 
murder of 28th June ', which it said it held at the disposal 
of the British Government, 3 For even Count Mensdorfl 
' admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem 
to be satisfactory \ 4 

To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, 
it was, and is, necessary to examine the evidence on 
which the Austro- Hungarian Government based the 
accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd. But 
even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as 
the German White Book says they are, 5 it is only a 
stronger reason for allowing the Powers to examine 
this evidence; and it does not explain the persistent 



1 Correspondence, No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, 
July 30 : ' Although I am not able to verify it, I have private 
information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and 
telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German 
Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.' 

2 But see Appendix IV. 

3 Correspondence, No. 4, p. 8. 

4 Ibid. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 27. 

5 pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see infra Appendix I). 

G 2 



ioo NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

refusal, 1 until July 31st, 2 to permit any negotiations on 
the basis of the Servian reply. 

Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see 
what more Sir Edward Grey could have done to prevent 
the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the 
first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to 
moderation and even to submission ; he tried to induce 
the four Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and 
Vienna ; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to 
prevent further complications ; he did everything in his 
power to restrain Russia from immediate armed support 
of Servia; he declined to join Russia and France in 
eventual military action ; and even up to the violation of 
the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the 
horrors of war from Europe. 

VI 

Italy s comments on the situation. 

We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became 
a member of the Triple Alliance, and how, in spite of its 
apparent frailty and of the somewhat divergent aims of 
its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two 
years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted 
in the critical situation created by the presentation of 
the Austro- Hungarian note to Servia, and to appreciate 
the significance of that policy. It is supremely significant 
that Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, was not 
consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to Servia ; 
that she worked persistently side by side with England in 
endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when 

1 Correspondence, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 28 ; 
No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Gre}^ July 29 ; No. 96, Sir M. 
de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30. 

2 Correspondence, No. no, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, 
July 31 ; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 101 

that failed, to induce the states actually at war, or on the 
brink of war, to suspend all military operations in order 
to give diplomatic intervention an opportunity ; and it is 
equally significant that, when the great war broke out, 
Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from 
her allies and the tempting bait of a share of the 
spoil, which, it is said, is even now being offered to 
her. 1 This is but a bald description of Italy's policy, 
but it can be substantiated in detail from official docu- 
ments. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador 
in a conversation with Sir Edward Grey ' made no secret 
of the fact that Italy was desirous to see war avoided ', 2 
and he cordially approved the idea of mediation by the 
four Powers. Two days later Italy again approved the 
proposed conference of four to be held immediately in 
London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to 
recommend most strongly to the German Government 
the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia to suspend 
military operations pending the result of the conference, 
and went even further in undertaking to ask what pro- 
cedure Germany thought most likely to be successful at 
Vienna. 3 He thought it very doubtful whether Germany 
would consent to ask Austria to suspend military opera- 
tions, but made a further suggestion that 

' Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on 
the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and 
this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe 
and not to Austria- Hungary alone'. 4 

Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention 
to a point in Servia's reply to Austria which might form 

1 The Times, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of the 
contents of the Austrian note, see App. V. 

Correspondence, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, Jul}'' 25. 



2 

3 Ibid. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27. 



4 Ibid. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. No. 78, 
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 



102 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

a starting-point for mediation. 1 On July 29th he tried to 
get over Germany's objection to the idea of a ' Confer- 
ence' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an exchange 
of views in London. 2 Next day he added to this the 
practical suggestion that 

1 Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms 
which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee 
that she would neither deprive her of independence, nor 
annex territory. . . . We might, on the other hand, ascertain 
from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the 
standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be 
commenced at once.' 3 

Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the 
hope of pacifying Russia, made the useful suggestion 
that Austria should 

' convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declara- 
tion which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that 
she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia, 
nor to acquire Servian territory '. 4 

All efforts to preserve peace proved futile ; Germany 
delivered her ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then 
arose the question, what was Italy to do ? The answer 
to this was given by the Italian Foreign Minister : — 

'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences 
which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambas- 
sador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in 
conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple 
Alliance ; in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' 5 

1 Correspondence, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. 
Cf. supra, p. 97. 

2 Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. No. 92, 
Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29. 

3 Ibid. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30. 

4 Ibid. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29. 

5 Ibid. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 103 

The German White Book says ' Russia began the war 
onus' 1 and ' France opened hostilities ' 2 ; if these state- 
ments were true, Italy would have been obliged, if she 
were to remain faithful to her engagements, to take 
part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the 
Triple Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own 
conclusions. 



NOTE 

A ustro- Hungarian note to Servia, and Servians reply. 

On July 23rd the Austro- Hungarian Government presented 
an ultimatum to Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance 
within 48 hours, an ultimatum which the Temps next day 
described as ' unprecedented in its arrogance and in the 
extravagance of its demands \ Of it Sir Edward Grey said : — 

1 1 had never before seen one State address to another 
independent State a document of so formidable a character. 
Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the mainten- 
ance of Servians independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, 
as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be 
invested with a right to appoint officials who would have 
authority within the frontiers of Servia.' 3 

It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained, 4 that 
the Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step 
to be regarded as an ultimatum, but as a demarche with 
a time-limit. 

In this extraordinary document 5 the Austro-Hungarian 
Government demanded : — 

A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 
' Official Gazette', and in the ' Official Bulletin ' of the Army, 

1 p. 15 (see Appendix I infra). 2 p. 16 (ibid.). 

3 Correspondence, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, 
July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book 
(pp. 18-23), which will be found in Appendix I. 

4 Ibid. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25. 

6 Ibid. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorif, July 24 



io 4 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

and should communicate to the Army as the order of the day 
a declaration 

(i) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hun- 
gary; 

(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries 

participated in the propaganda ; 

(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against 

persons who may be guilty of such machinations. 
B. That Servia should undertake 

(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and 

contempt of Austria-Hungary ; 

(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and 

similar societies and to confiscate their means of 
propaganda ; 

(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all 

teachers and all methods of instruction responsible 
for fomenting opinion against Austria-Hungary ; 

(4) to remove from the military service and from the 

administration all officers and functionaries guilty of 
such propaganda, whose names and deeds the Austro- 
Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right 
of communicating ; 

(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives 

of Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the sub- 
versive anti-Austrian movement ; 

(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to 

the Serajevo plot, with the co-operation of Austro- 
Hungarian delegates ; 

(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija 

Tankositch and of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian 
State employe^ who have been compromised by the 
results of the inquiry at Serajevo; 

(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit 

traffic in arms and explosives, and to dismiss and 
punish those officials who helped the perpetrators 
of the Serajevo crime; 

(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian 

officials, at home and abroad, after the Serajevo 
crime. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 105 

On July 25th the Servian reply 1 was presented to the 
Austro- Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with 
Austrian sympathies this reply seems to go a long way 
towards meeting the demands. The Servian Government 
agreed 

A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration 

(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed 

against Austria- Hungary ; 

(2) regretting that, according to the communication from 

the Imperial and Royal Government, Servian officers 
and officials participated in the propaganda ; 

(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against 

all persons who are guilty of such acts. 

B. That Servia would undertake 

(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing 

for the most severe punishment of incitement to 
hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary and to 
introduce an amendment to the Constitution provid- 
ing for the confiscation of such publications; 

(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar 

societies; 

(3) to remove at once from their public educational 

establishments all that serves or could serve to 
foment propaganda, whenever the Austro- Hungarian 
Government furnish them with facts and proofs of 
this propaganda ; 

(4) to remove from military service all such persons as 

the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of 
acts directed against the territorial integrity of 
Austria-Hungary ; 

(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the 

scope of the demand, to accept the collaboration of 
Austro-Hungarian officials so far as is consistent 
with the principle of international law, with criminal 
procedure and with good neighbourly relations ; 

1 Correspondence, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian Minister, 
July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), infra in 
Appendix I. 



io6 NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to 

the Serajevo plot; but they cannot admit the co- 
operation of Austro-Hungarian officials, as it would 
be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of 
criminal procedure ; 

(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was 

arrested as soon as the note was presented, and that 
it has not been possible to arrest Ciganovitch, who 
is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been 
employed (on probation) by the directorate of 
railways ; 

(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing 

illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the 
frontier ; 

(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian 

officials, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment have communicated the passages and as soon 
as they have shown that the remarks were actually 
made by the said officials. 
The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as 
unsatisfactory and inadequate ; they withdrew their Minister 
from Belgrade the same evening, and on July 28th declared 
war on Servia. Meanwhile they published a long official 
explanation 1 of the grounds on which the Servian reply 
was considered inadequate ; in it they criticized and found 
unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to 
demand No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of 
this ; one sample may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey com- 
mented on demand No. 5 and pointed out 2 that it 

' would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's 
independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed 
that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with 
a right to appoint officials who would have authority within 
the frontiers of Servia/ 

Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of 
this demand, and the next was equally vague. The Servian 

1 German White Book, pp. 24 et sqq. ; see infra Appendix I. 

2 Correspondence, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24. 



NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS 107 

reply to these two demands was* necessarily guarded : yet the 
Austro- Hungarian Government treated this as deliberate 
misrepresentation : — 

'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has 
nothing to do with this question ; it is purely a matter of the 
nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special 
agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore in- 
comprehensible, and on account of its vague general form it 
would lead to unbridgeable difficulties. 

' If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is 
done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference 
between "enquete judiciaire" and simple police researches. 
As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation 
which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable 
results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in 
a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents 
for such police intervention exist in great number), it tries to 
justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.' 1 

It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had 
been a genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation 
here given by Austria might prove satisfactory to Servia, 
as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested. 2 The 
persistent refusal of Austria- Hungary to permit any discussion 
on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to justify Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen's impression 

'that the Austro- Hungarian note was so drawn up as to 
make war inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved 
to have war with Servia, that they consider their position as 
a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has 
been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen 
to proposals of mediation \ 3 

1 German White Book, pp. 29 et sqq. ; see infra Appendix I. 

2 Correspondence, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. 

3 Ibid. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF 
THE STATE 

The war in which England is now engaged with 
Germany is fundamentally a war between two different 
principles — that of raison d'etat, and that of the rule of 
law. The antagonism between these two principles 
appeared in our own internal history as far back as the 
seventeenth century, when the Stuarts championed the 
theory of state-necessity and the practice of a pre- 
rogative free to act outside and above the law in order to 
meet the demands of state-necessity, and when Parlia- 
ment defended the rule of law and sought to include 
the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now 
appears externally in a struggle between two nations, 
one of which claims a prerogative to act outside and 
above the public law of Europe in order to secure the 
1 safety ' of its own state, while the other stands for the rule 
of public law. The one regards international covenants 
to which it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of 
paper' when they stand in the way of salus populi) the 
other regards the maintenance of such covenants as a 
grave and inevitable obligation. 

Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their 
great national historian, and whose lectures on Politik 
have become a gospel, the Germans of to-day assume as 
an ultimate end and a final standard what they regard 
as the national German state. 1 ' The state ', says Treit- 

1 The unity of the German state is in no small measure a matter 
of artificial Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke 
was the great advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic 
origin, and immediately of Saxon birth. 



NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE 109 

schke, ' is the highest thing in the external society of man : 
above it there is nothing at all in the history of the 
world.' There is here no room for comity of nations ; 
for a societas totius humani generis ; for international law 
in any true sense. What really exists is the exclusive 
state — der geschlossene Staat — and in another sense than 
that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national : it 
excludes all foreign words from its vocabulary, and 
it would fain exclude all foreign articles from its shores 
in order to found a real * national' economy such as 
List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke 
this exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly 
saw ', essentially power : der Staat ist Macht. It 
may be defined as ' the public might for defence and 
offence '. As the highest duty of the individual is self- 
perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preserva- 
tion ; and self-preservation means power. ' To care for 
its power is the highest moral duty of the state.' ' Of 
all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most 
abominable and despicable: it is the sin against the Holy 
Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship 
of might, and it is in effect nothing else than the 
mere worship of might; but we should misrepresent 
Treitschke if we did not add that power is not conceived 
by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state 
is precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle 
of culture : the armed sword of the German state is 
precious because that state is the colporteur of German 
culture. And thus Treitschke holds that Machiavelli, 
the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he 
failed to see that might must justify itself by having 
a content, that is to say, by being used to spread the 
highest moral culture. It is naturally assumed by 
German nationalists that this is German culture. 

Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, 
the other positive. The negative result is the repudia- 
tion of any idea of the final character of international 



no THE NEW GERMAN THEORY 

obligation ; the other is the praise of the glory 
of war. 

Salus populi suprema lex ; and to it all international 
' law ' so called must bend. The absolute sovereignty 
of the state is necessary for its absolute power; and 
that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by any obli- 
gation, even of its own making. Every treaty or 
promise made by a state, Treitschke holds, is to be 
understood as limited by the proviso rebus sic stantibus. 
1 A state cannot bind its will for the future over against 
other states.' International treaties are no absolute limi- 
tation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and 
only for such time as the state may find to be convenient. 
The state has no judge set over it, and any 'legal' obli- 
gation it may incur is in the last resort subject to its own 
decision — in other words, to its own repudiation. 1 That 
the end justifies the means (in other words, that the 
maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies 
the violation of an international obligation) 'has a certain 
truth \ ' It is ridiculous to advise a state which is in 
competition with other states to start by taking the 
catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his master 
were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful 
disciple of Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were 
attended in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by 
soldiers and officials as well as by students. There is no 
such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international 
law. ' Each nation evolves its own conception of Right 
(Recht): none can say that one nation has a better con- 
ception than another.' ' No self-respecting nation would 
sacrifice its own conception of Right' to any international 
rule : ' by so doing it would renounce its own highest 
ideals.' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign 
words and foreign wares will reject international law as 
something 'foreign '. Again, Bernhardi makes play with 

1 We are reminded of the famous sentence in The Prince: — 
Dove non e giudisio da richiamare si guar da alfine. 



OF THE STATE in 

the proviso rebus sic stantibus) and this, curiously enough, 
he does in reference to Belgium. Things are altered 
in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany 
may no longer be binding. i When Belgium was pro- 
claimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would 
lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It 
may well be asked whether the acquisition of such terri- 
tory is not ipso facto a breach of neutrality/ * 

But it is the glorification of war — war aggressive as 
well as war defensive — which is the most striking result 
of the doctrine of the all-sufficing, all-embracing national 
state. In the index to Treitschke's Politik, under the 
word War, one reads the following headings — 'its 
sanctity': 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God ' : 
1 is the most powerful maker of nations ' ; 'is politics 
par excellence \ Two functions, says Treitschke, the state 
exists to discharge ; and these are to administer law, 
and to make war. Of the two war, since it is politics 
par excellence, would appear to be the greater. War 
cannot be thought or wished out of the world : it is 
the only medicine for a sick nation. When we are 
sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war comes 
to make us realize that we are members one of another. 
' Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty indi- 
vidual altogether vanishes before the great thought of 
the state/ War alone makes us realize the social 
organism to which we belong : ( it is political idealism 
which demands war/ And again, "'what a perversion 



1 Bernhardi adds : ' The conception of permanent neutrality is 
entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which can only 
attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states.' It 
would seem to follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium 
Germany is helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. 
The suggestion that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not 
adopted by the German Government before the war, nor by Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech to the Reichstag on the Belgian 
question (see supra, p. 91). 



ii2 THE NEW GERMAN THEORY 

of morality it were, if one struck out of humanity 
heroism' (Heldentum) — as if Heldentum could not 
exist in peace ! ' But the living God will see to it 
that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for 
humanity/ 

Thus the idealization of the state as power results 
in the idealization of war. As we have seen that 
the state must be ' power ' in order to preserve 
itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state 
to preserve itself from ' sickness '. If it does not fight, 
individualism will triumph over the social organism ; 
heroism will perish out of the world. Hence Bern- 
hardi writes : ' the maintenance of peace never can or 
may be the goal of a policy'. War, war — the ' strong 
medicine ', the teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi 
adds to Treitschke, the inevitable biological law, 
the force that spreads the finest culture — war is the 
law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well 
as defensive — primarily, indeed, offensive. For the 
growing nation must preserve all its new members in 
its bosom : it must not let them slip away by emigra- 
tion to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself 
colonies ; and since the world is already largely occu- 
pied, it must find them by conquest from other powers. 1 
Treitschke already cried the watchwords — ' Colonies ! ' 
' Sea-power to gain colonies ! ' Treitschke already 
designated England as the object of German attack, 
and began to instil in Germany a hatred of England. 
England blocked the way to the growth of Germany 
from a European into a World-power; Germany, to 
preserve intact for German culture the surplus of the 
growing population, must be a World-power or perish. 



\It was significant that Germany, while offering to England at 
the end of July a guarantee of the integrity of the soil of France, 
would not offer any guarantee of the integrity of French colonies 
(supra, p. 82). 



OF THE STATE 113 

And besides, England was a ' sick ' state — a sham, an 
hypocrisy. 1 

The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather 
barbarism, with a moral veneer. It seems barbarism, 
because it brings us back to the good old days when 
mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right 
of conquest of new territory inherent in a growing 
people, tells us that in such cases l might is at once the 
supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is 
decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a 'bio- 
logically just decision ' ! And he expresses wonder and 
surprise at those who think that ' the weak nation is to 
have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous 
nation \ In a word, then, might is right. The 
doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity : what is 
utterly revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its 
moral veneer — the talk of war as the fruit of ' political 
idealism ' and the expression of the ' social organism ' : 
the talk of ' historical development ' as invalidating sup- 
posed ' rights ' like the neutrality of Belgium ; above all, 
the talk of power as l the vehicle of the highest culture \ 
Treitschke, a stern Protestant, seeks to reconcile the 
doctrine with Christianity ; but the doctrine is all the 
same pagan. It is the worship of brute force disguised 
as Heldentum, and of vicious cunning disguised as 
political morality : it is a mixture of Nietzsche 2 and of 

1 Nothing has here been said, though much might be said, of the 
distortion of history and ethnology by German nationalism, or Pan- 
Germanism. It is well known that the Pan-Germans regard 
England as Teutonic, and destined to be gathered into the German 
fold. In these last few weeks we have been reproached as a people 
for being traitors to our ' Teutonic ' blood. Better be traitors to 
blood than to plain duty ; but as a matter of fact our mixed blood 
has many other strains than the Teutonic. On the aims of the 
Pan-Germanists readers may with profit consult a book by Paul 
Vergnet, La France en danger (Oct. 1913). 

2 In fairness to Nietzsche it should be said that in his later years 
he revolted against the Prussian military system. 

P 3113 H 



ii4 THE NEW GERMAN THEORY 

Machiavelli. It is a doctrine of the omnipotence of the 
super-nation, which ' to maintain its state', as Machiavelli 
said, ' will go to work against faith and charity and 
humanity and religion ', and which will stride ruthlessly 
to war when l the day ' comes. And when it goes to 
war, all the veneer of culture goes. ' Have a care ', 
Mommsen once said, ' lest in this state, which has been 
at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the 
intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure 
military state should remain.' Mommsen's warning has 
come true in August, 1914. By their fruits ye shall 
know them. The fruits of Heldentum are Louvain 
smoking in ashes to the sky. 

It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy 
of life, because it is not only the philosophy of a pro- 
fessor like Treitschke, but also that of a soldier like 
Bernhardi ; and not only so, but it is the philosophy of 
the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chan- 
cellor himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is 
true) to justify Germany in 'hewing its way' through 
Belgium. Let us only remember, in justice to a great 
people, that it is not really the doctrine of Germany, but 
rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will 
tell us that Germany is 'just merely an extended 
Prussia '). And let us remember, in extenuation of 
Prussia, that she has suffered from two things— geo- 
graphical pressure springing from her mid-European 
situation, and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest per- 
petuated by her Hohenzollern rulers since the days of 
the Great Elector, and especially since Frederic the 
Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has made 
Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation ; 
and a man who feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly 
for breath. To get breathing space, to secure frontiers 
which would ease an intolerable pressure, Frederic the 
Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his 
father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could 



OF THE STATE 115 

suggest the partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus 
led to ruthless conquest irrespective of rights ; and that 
tradition has sunk deep. It has been easier for England, 
an island state in the West exempt from pressure, to 
think in other terms : it has been possible for Russia, 
secure in the East, to think, and to think nobly (as 
the present Tsar has done), of international obligation. 
Nor is it an accident that sees England and Russia 
united in the common cause of Europe to-day — that sees 
both championing the cause of small nations, one in the 
East, the other in the West. 1 

But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must 
fight Prussia; and we fight it in the noblest cause for 
which men can fight. That cause is the public law of 
Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, 
great and small, and especially the small. To the doc- 
trine of the almightiness of the state — to the doctrine 
that all means are justified which are, or seem, necessary 
to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of 
a European society, or at least a European comity of 
nations, within which all states stand; we oppose the 
doctrine of a public law of Europe, by which all states 
are bound to respect the covenants they have made. 
We will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations 
are 'in the state and posture of gladiators' in their 
relations one with another; we stand for the reign 
of law. 

Our cause, as one would expect from a people that 

1 German professors have recently reproached England for being 
allied with ' Muscovite barbarism '. Is Russia so barbarous, whose 
sovereign convened the first Peace Conference ? Have not England 
and Russia striven together in peace (as they now strive together 
in war) for a great common cause? The German White Book, 
which seeks to fasten on Russia the blame of the present war, is 
oblivious of all that has happened in these matters since 1898. The 
reader may with advantage refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by 
Professor Vinogradoff, Russia : the Psychology of a Nation (Oxford, 
1914). 

H 2 



u6 THE NEW GERMAN THEORY 

has fought out its own internal struggles under the forms 
of law, is a legal cause. We are a people in whose 
blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is no 
new thing in our history that we should fight for that 
cause. When England and Revolutionary France went 
to war in 1793, the cause, on the side of England, was 
a legal cause. We fought for the public law of Europe, 
as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
We did not fight in 1870, because neither France nor 
Germany had infringed the public law of Europe by 
attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were ready 
to fight if they did. A fine cartoon in Punch, of August, 
1870, shows armed England encouraging Belgium, 
who stands ready with spear and shield, with the 
words — 'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't 

trouble you, dear friend. But if they do ' To-day 

they have ; and England has drawn her sword. 
How could she have done otherwise, with those tradi- 
tions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood — traditions 
as real and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to 
Anglo-Saxon England ; traditions which are the funda- 
mental basis of Anglo-Saxon public, life all the world 
over ? America once fought and beat England, in long- 
forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground 
of law — that law-abidingness which is as deeply en- 
grained in the men of Massachusetts to-day as it is in 
any Britisher — is a bond of sympathy between the two 
in this great struggle of the nations. 

To Germans our defence of public law may seem 
part of the moral hypocrisy of which in their view we 
are full. What we are doing, they feel, is to strike at 
Germany, our competitor for 'world-empire', with its 
dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life 
and death struggle with France and Russia. We too, 
they feel, are Machiavellians ; but we have put on what 
Machiavelli called 'the mantle of superstition', the 
pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It 



OF THE STATE 117 

is true that we are fighting for our own interest. But 
what is our interest ? We are fighting for Right, 
because Right is our supreme interest. The new 
German political theory enunciates that ' our interest 
is our right \ The old — the very old — English political 
theory is, 'The Right is our interest'. It is true that 
we have everything to gain by defending the cause 
of international law. Should that prevent us from 
defending that cause ? What do we not lose of 
precious lives in the defence ? \ 

This is the case of England. England stands for the 
idea of a public law of Europe, and for the small nations 
which it protects.^ She stands for her own preservation, 
which is menaced when public law is broken, and the 
'ages' slow-bought gain ' imperilled. 

[Treitschke's Politik, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years 
1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General 
Bernhardi's book, Deutschland und der ndchste Krieg,was published 
in 1911, and has been translated into English under the title 
Germany and the Next War. See also J. A. Cramb, England and 
Germany, 1914.] 



EPILOGUE 

In conclusion something must be said of the process 
by which our understanding with France, still so elastic 
in 1912 and 1913, became the solid alliance which now, 
on sea and land alike, confronts the German forces. 
England gave France no positive engagements until the 
eleventh hour ; it may be argued that England gave them 
far too late, and that the war might never have occurred 
if England had been less obstinately and judicially 
pacific. But the English case for the delay is clear. 
We hesitated to throw in our lot with France, because 
France would not stand neutral while Germany made 
war on Russia. We shrank from the incalculable en- 
tanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied 
ourselves with a power which was so committed. Why, 
we were asking ourselves, should we fight the battles of 
Russia in the Balkans ? 

We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that 
France might contemplate this policy. She could not 
define beforehand the limits which she would observe 
in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, as we now 
know, that a war with Russia meant, to German states- 
men, only a pretext for a new attack on France, even 
more deadly in intention than that of 1870. France 
could not do without the help of Russia. How then 
could she afford to forfeit Russia's friendship by declar- 
ing, at Germany's command, that she would do nothing 
to help Russia ? 

This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during 
the last days before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, 
however well disposed, could not help her ally in the 
first weeks of a war ; and for France these were the 
critical weeks, the weeks upon which her own fate must 
depend. She appealed urgently to England for support. 



EPILOGUE 119 

But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that 
it could make no definite engagement. This answer, it 
is true, had been foreshadowed in earlier communica- 
tions. Sir Edward Grey had made it abundantly clear 
that there could be no prospect of common action unless 
France were exposed to ' an unprovoked attack ', and no 
certainty of such action even in that case. But France 
had staked everything upon the justice of her cause. 
She had felt that her pacific intentions were clear to all 
the world ; and that England could not, with any self- 
respect, refuse assistance. The French mobilization 
had been delayed until July 31st, to convince the British 
Cabinet of French good faith ; and the French fleet had 
been left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests 
of England no less than those of France. We can 
imagine how bitter was the disappointment with which 
France received the English answer of July 31st. 

But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood 
them. If our answers to France were guarded, our 
answers to the German overtures of July 29th and 
August 1st show that we were fighting the battle of 
France with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we 
went still further, by undertaking to defend the French 
coasts and shipping, if the German fleet should come 
into the Channel or through the North Sea. To justify 
our position of reserve from July 31st to August 4th 
we may quote what Mr. Asquith said the other day 
(September 4th) : — 

' No one who has not been in that position can realize the 
strength, the energy, and the persistence with which we 
laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that 
diplomacy could suggest, straining almost to breaking-point 
our most cherished friendships and obligations/ 

Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation 
had never any prospects of success, because Germany 
had resolved that it should not succeed. Ought we to 
have known this from the first ? It is easy to be wise 



i2o EPILOGUE 

after the event. But in England we have Cabinet govern- 
ment and we have Parliamentary government. Before 
an English minister can act, in a matter of national 
importance, no matter how positive his own convictions 
may be, he must convince his colleagues, and they must 
feel certain of convincing a democracy which is essen- 
tially pacific, cautious, slow to move. Nothing short of 
the German attack on Belgium would have convinced 
the ordinary Englishman that German statesmanship 
had degenerated into piracy. That proof was given us 
on August 4th; and on that day we sent our ultimatum 
to Berlin. 

To-day all England is convinced ; and we are fighting 
back to back with the French for their national existence 
and our own. Our own, because England's existence 
depends not only on her sea-power, but upon the main- 
tenance of European state-law. The military spirit which 
we have described above (Chap. VI) tramples upon the 
rights of nations because it sees a foe in every equal ; 
because it regards the prosperity of a neighbour as a 
national misfortune ; because it holds that national great- 
ness is only to be realized in the act of destroying or 
absorbing other nationalities. To those who are not 
yet visibly assailed, and who possibly believe them- 
selves secure, we can only give the warning : Tua res 
agitur, paries cum proximus ardet. 

Of the issue England is not afraid. The most un- 
favourable issue would find her still convinced that she 
has taken the only course compatible with honour and 
with public law. Military anarchism shall be destroyed 
if England, France, and Russia can destroy it. On this 
object England and France have staked their last ship 
and their last soldier. But, it may be asked, what state- 
system do we hope to establish, if and when we are 
successful in this great crusade ? 

What England not only desires but needs, and needs 
imperatively, is, first, the restitution to Belgium of her 



EPILOGUE 121 

former status and whatever else can be restored of all 
that she has sacrificed. This is the indispensable pre- 
liminary to any form of settlement. The next essential 
is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never 
experience such another invasion as we have seen in 
August, 1914; without a France which is prosperous, 
secure, and independent, European civilization would be 
irreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, 
as essential as the other two, is the conservation of those 
other nations which can only exist on sufferance so long 
as Realpolitik is practised with impunity. 

To minor nationalities it should be clear that England 
is their friend, and cannot choose but stand their friend. 
Three times in her history she has made war upon 
a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the ' Balance 
of Power ' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be 
too great. In these struggles she assisted the small 
Powers, less from altruism than because their interest 
was her own. She supported Holland against Philip II 
of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon 
she supported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, 
to the best of her power, Switzerland and Piedmont. 

We do not argue — it would be absurd to argue — that 
England has always been free from reproach in her 
dealings with the smaller states. Holland may well 
remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century 
and the English Navigation Laws. But Holland should 
also remember that, in the seventeenth century, England 
was not yet a great Power ; Holland and England fought 
as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent 
alliances have healed, over a policy which England has 
long since renounced as mischievous and futile. On 
Denmark we inflicted a great wrong in 1807 ; it can only 
be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark knows now 
though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had 
conspired with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use 
it against England. Denmark, indeed, has better cause 



122 EPILOGUE 

to complain that we gave her no assistance in 1864. 
That mistake — for it was a mistake of weakness, not 
deliberate treachery— has brought its own nemesis. We 
are still paying for that particular mistake, and we are 
not likely to forget the lesson. The case of Schleswig- 
Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as 
Denmark may react on such a state as England. 

England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours 
should become less prosperous or less independent than 
they are. So far as the long arm of naval power reaches, 
England is bound to give them whatever help she can. 
From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, 
she could not tolerate their subordination to such a 
power as Germany aspires to found. Her quarrel is 
not with the German people, but with the political 
system for which the German Empire, in its present 
temper, stands. That system England is bound to 
resist, no matter by what power it is adopted. 

English sympathies and English traditions are here 
at one with English interests. England is proud to 
recollect how she befriended struggling nationalities in 
the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece 
and Italy for the sake of any help that they could give 
her. The goodwill of England to Holland, to Switzer- 
land, to the Scandinavian states, is largely based upon 
their achievements in science and art and literature. 
They have proved that they can serve the higher 
interests of humanity. They have contributed to the 
growth of that common civilization which links together 
the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred 
and more durable than those of race, of government, of 
material interest. In this fraternity each nation has 
a duty to the rest. If we have harped on England's 
interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we 
have forgotten England's duty. But England stands 
to-day in this fortunate position, that her duty and her 
interest combine to impel her in the same direction. 



APPENDIX I {Type facsimile} 

Z$t (Bermmt Q90ife*Q£o©8 

The only authorized translation. 



Price 10 cents (40 Pf.) 



How Russia and her Ruler betrayed 

Germany's confidence and thereby 

made the European War. 



WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS 

AND NOTES. 



Druck und Verlag : Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin. 



[ Type facsimile] 

GERMANY'S REASONS 

FOR 

WAR WITH RUSSIA 



How Russia and her Ruler betrayed 

Germany's confidence and thereby 

made the European War. 



WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS 

AND NOTES. 



Druck und Verlag : Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin. 



[ Type facsimile^ 



GERMANY'S REASONS 

FOR 

WAR WITH RUSSIA 



How Russia and her Ruler betrayed 

Germany's confidence and thereby 

made the European War. 



WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS 

AND NOTES. 



Foreign Office, 

Berlin, August 1914. 



On June 28 th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the 
throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess 
of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band 
of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime 
through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the 
fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and 
successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade 
with the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with 
arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have 
opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in 
regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against 
the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which 
the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in 
employing for the achievement of these aims. 

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing 
and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. 
This direction of Servias policy has not been altered in the 
least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of 
Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies 
toward Austria- Hungary as well as the cultivation of good 
and neighborly relations. 

In this manner for the third time in the course of the 
last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war. 

It could only do this because it believed itself supported 
in its intentions by Russia. 



i 3 o APPENDIX I 



Russia soon after the events brought about by the 
Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavored to found a union 
of the Balcan states under Russian patronage and directed 
against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded 
in 191 1 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her 
European possessions, collapsed over the question of the 
distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dis- 
mayed over this failure. According to the idea of the 
Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under Russian 
patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer 
against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against 
the existence of the Austro- Hungarian monarchy. It was 
the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts 
of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balcan 
war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which 
were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall 
in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached 
to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia 
promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that 
it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of 
self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer 
this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal 
Government appraised Germany of this conception and 
asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able 
to agree with our allys estimate of the situation, and assure 
him that any action considered necessary to end the 
movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the 
monarchy would meet with our approval. 

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike 
attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring 
Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve 
us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We 
could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, 
which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding 
attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our 
assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the 



APPENDIX I 131 

5 

less as our own interests were menaced trough the continued 
Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia 
and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, 
the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all 
the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the con- 
sequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic 
race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria 
under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no 
longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we 
could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view 
of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and 
westerly neighbors. We, therefore, permitted Austria a 
completely free hand in her action towards Servia but have 
not participated in her preparations. 

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian 
Government a note, in which the direct connection between 
the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not 
only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian 
Government, was explained, and in which a complete 
cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the 
guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria- Hungary 
demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment 
of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in 
the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the 
final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against 
Austria- Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave 
a period of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of 
its demands. 

The Servian Government started the mobilization of 
its army one day after the transmission of the Austro- 
Hungarian note. 

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government 
rendered a reply which, though complying in some points 
with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all 
essentials the endeavor through procrastination and new 
negotiations to escape from the just demands of the 
monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations 

1 2 



i 3 2 APPENDIX I 

6 

with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or 
accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its 
loss, she had sufficiently experienced. 

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of 
war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 
28 th of July by declaring war. 

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the 
position that there were here concerned the affairs of 
Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Servia. 
We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of 
the war, and toward convincing the other powers that 
Austria- Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self- 
defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphati- 
cally took the position that no civilized country possessed 
the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with 
barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians 
see exhibits 1 & 2. against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed 
our representatives with the foreign powers. 

Simultaneously the Austro • Hungarian Government 
communicated to the Russian Government that the step 
undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive 
measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary 
must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly 
behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary 
had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power 
see exhibit 3. in the Balcan. 

In answer to our declaration that the German Govern- 
ment desired, and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, 
both the French and the English Governments promised an 
action in the same direction. But these endeavors did not 
succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the 
Austro-Servian disagreement. 

The Russian Government submitted an official communi- 
que on July 24 th , according to which Russia could not 
possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. 
The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, 



APPENDIX I 



i33 



Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26 th . The German 
Government declared again, through its Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg, that Austria- Hungary had no desire for 
conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the 
official explanation by Austria- Hungary to Russia that it 
did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision con- 
cerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with 
St. Petersburg. 

The same day the first news of Russian mobilization 
reached Berlin in the evening. 

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and 
St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the 
danger of this Russian mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following 
declaration to the Russian Government : 

„ Preparatory military measures by Russia 
„will force us to counter-measures which must 
,, consist in mobilizing the army. 
,,But mobilization means war. 
„As we know the obligations of France 
„ towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed 
,, against both Russia and France. We cannot 
„assume that Russia desires to unchain such a 
„ European war. Since Austria- Hungary will not 
„touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we 
„are of the opinion that Russia can afford to 
,, assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the 
,,more support the desire of Russia to protect the 
,, integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not 
^intend to question the latter. It will be easy in 
„the further development of the affair to find a 
„basis for an understanding." 
On July 27 th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchom- 
linow, gave the German military attache his word of honor 
that no order to mobilize had been issued, merely prepara- 
tions were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor 
reserves called in. If Austria- Hungary crossed the Servian 



see exhibit 4. 



see exhibit 5. 



see exhibits 
6, 7, 8, 9. 

see exhibits 
10, 10a, 10b. 



!34 



APPENDIX I 
8 



frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, 
i.e. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, 
under no circumstances those situated on the German 
frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon 
inquiry into the object of the mobilization against 
Austria- Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied 
see exhibit n. by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. 
The military attache then pointed to these mobilization 
measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing 
also for Germany. 

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobili- 
zation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about 
preparations on the German- Russian frontier, as for instance 
the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure 
of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the 
Alexandrovo garrison. 

On July 27 th , the first information was received con- 
cerning preparatory measures taken by France : the 14 th Corps 
discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison. 

In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the 
conflict by most emphatic steps. 

On July 26 th , Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal 
to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and 
Serviato a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, 
and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard 
to this proposal that we could not, however much we 
approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we 
could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a 
see exhibit 12. European tribunal. 

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, 
but it foundered upon Austrias declining it, as was to be 
expected. 

Faithful to our principle that mediation should 
not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which 
is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian 
affair, but merely to the relations between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our 



APPENDIX 1 135 



endeavors to bring about an understanding be- see exhibits 13, 14 
tween these two powers. 

We further declared ourselves ready, after 
failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second 
proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which 
he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that see exhibit 15. 
either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be 
used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro- 
Hungarian Government remarked with full appreci- 
ation of our action that it had come too late, the 
hostilities having already been opened. see exhibit 1 5, 

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the 
utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every 
possible advance compatible with the dignity of the 
monarchy. 

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the 
military preparations of Russia and France. 

On July 29 th , the Russian Government made the official 
notification in Berlin that four army districts had been 
mobilized. At the same time further news was received 
concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of 
France, both on water and on land. see exhibit 17. 

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign 
Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, 
as follows : 

„The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should 
„urge my Government to participate in a quadruple 
„conference to find means to induce Austria- 
,, Hungary to give up those demands which touch 
,,upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely 
„promise to report the conversation and took the 
„position that, after Russia had decided upon the 
„baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of 
„ ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not 
„impossible. Besides, Russia now was demand- 
ing from us in regard to Austria-Hungary 



136 APPENDIX I 

10 

„the same which Austria-Hungary was being 
„blamed for with regard to Servia, i. e. an 
,, infraction of sovereignty. Austria- Hungary 
„ having promised to consider the Russian 
^interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration, 
,, — a great concession on the part of a state engaged 
,,in war — should therefore be permitted to attend 
„to its affair with Servia alone. There would 
„be time at the peace conference to return to 
„the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty 
„of Servia. 

,,I added very solemnly that at this moment 
„the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by 
„the danger of a general European conflagration, 
,,and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the 
„magnitude of this danger. 

,,It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from 
„the idea that Servia could not now be deserted 
„by Russia". 
On July 29 th , the German Military Attache at St. Peters- 
burg wired the following report on a conversation with the 
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army : 

,,The Chief of the General Staff has asked 
„me to call on him, and he has told me that he 
„has just come from His Majesty. He has been 
„requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate 
„once more that everything had remained as the 
,, Secretary had informed me two days ago. He 
„offered confirmation in writing and gave me 
„his word of honor in the most solemn manner 
„that nowhere there had been a mobilization, 
„viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to 
,,the present time, i. e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 
,,He could not assume a guaranty for the future, 
„but he could emphasize that in the fronts 
„directed towards our frontiers His Majesty 
„desired no mobilization. 



APPENDIX I 137 



11 



„As, however, I had received here many 
„pieces of news concerning the calling in of 
„the reserves in different parts of the country 
„also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general 
„that his statements placed me before a riddle. 
„On his officers word of honor he replied that 
„such news was wrong, but that possibly here and 
„ there a false alarm might have been given. 

„I must consider this conversation as an 
,, attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the 
„ measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant 
„and positive information about the calling in of 
„ reserves/' 

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its 
threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly 
pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no con- 
versation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
sador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29 th , 
at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with 
Sasonow. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to 
the Russian minister the note to Servia though it had been 
overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion 
on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow 
all questions touching directly upon the Austro- Russian 
relations. 

Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored inces- 
santly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which 
we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of see exhibit 19. 
the conflict. We even as late as the 30 th of July forwarded 
the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, 
that Austria- Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, 
i. e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia 
would accept this basis. 

During the interval from July 29 th to July 31 st there 
appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian 



138 APPENDIX I 

12 



20, 2f, 22, 23, 23 a. 



measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the 
East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of 
war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier 
allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was 
in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such 
measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg 
on word of honor. 

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the 
Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must 
have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have 
been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mo- 
bilization. 

During the same days, there took place between His 
Majesty the Kaiser, and Czar Nicolas an exchange of tele- 
grams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar 
to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization during 
see exhibits 18, the continuance of his own mediating activities. 

On July 31 st , the Czar directed the following telegram 
to His Majesty the Kaiser : 

„I thank You cordially for Your mediation 
„which permits the hope that everything may yet 
„end peaceably. It is technically impossible to 
^discontinue our military preparations which have 
„been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. 
„It is far from us to want war. As long as the 
„ negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, 
,,my troops will undertake no provocative action. 
„I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide 
„with all my faith in the grace of God, and I 
„hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna 
„for the welfare of our countries and the peace 
„of Europe. 

Your cordially devoted 
Nicolas." 
This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, 
sent by H. M. the Kaiser, also on July 31 st , at 2 p.m.: 



APPENDIX I 139 

,,Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your 
„request for my aid I have engaged in mediation 
^between Your Government and the Government 
„of Austria-Hungary. While this action was 
,,taking place, Your troops were being mobilized 
„ against my ally Austria- Hungary, whereby, as 
„I have already communicated to You, my 
„mediation has become almost illusory. In spite 
„of this, I have continued it, and now I receive 
„reliable news that serious preparations for war 
„are going on on my eastern frontier. The 
Responsibility for the security of my country 
„ forces me to measures of defence. I have gone 
„to the extreme limit of the possible in my 
„ efforts for the preservation of the peace of the 
„world. It is not I who bear the responsibility 
„for the misfortune which now threatens the entire 
^civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert 
„it. No one threatens the honor and peace of 
„ Russia which might well have awaited the 
„success of my mediation. The friendship for 
„You and Your country, bequeathed to me by 
„my grand-father on his deathbed, has always 
„been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully 
„by Russia while it was in serious affliction, 
„especially during its last war. The peace of 
„ Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia 
„decides to discontinue those military prepa- 
rations which menace Germany and Austria- 
„ Hungary/' 
Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobi- 
lization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against 
us and already ordered during the afternoon of the 31 st of 
July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of 
the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon. 

After the Russian general mobilization became known 
in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was 



140 



APPENDIX I 



14 



instructed on the afternoon of July 31 st to explain to the 
Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war 
see exhibit 24. as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the 
Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobi- 
lization if Russia did not cease its military measures against 
Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified 
Germany thereof. 

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris 
was instructed to demand from the French Government a 
declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral 
see exhibit 25. j n a Russo-German war. 

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobili- 
zation, menacing the security of our country, the laborious 
action at mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian 
mobilization in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian 
Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, 
in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that 
Russia wanted war. 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered 
his note to M. Sasonow on July 31 st at 12 o'clock midnight. 

The reply of the Russian Government has never 
reached us. 

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit 
the Czar telegraphed to H. M. the Kaiser, as follows : 

„I have received Your telegram. I comprehend 
„that You are forced to mobilize, but I should 
„like to have from You the same guaranty which 
„I have given You, viz., that these measures do 
„not mean war, and that we shall continue to 
„ negotiate for the welfare of our two countries 
„and the universal peace which is so dear to our 
„hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible 
„to our long tried friendship to prevent the 
,, shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence 
„Your urgent reply/' 



APPENDIX I 141 

To this H. M. the Kaiser replied : 

,,I thank You for Your telegram. I have 
„ shown yesterday to Your Government the way 
^through which alone war may yet be averted. 
„ Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, 
„no telegram from my Ambassador has reached 
„me with the reply of Your Government. 
„I therefore have been forced to mobilize my 
, ; army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable 
„reply of Your Government is the sole way to 
„avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply 
„I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon 
„the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most 
„earnestly that You, without delay, order Your 
„troops to commit, under no circumstances, the 
„ slightest violation of our frontiers." 



As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the 
receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H. M. the Kaiser ordered 
the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on 
August I st at 5 p. m. 

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was in- 
structed that, in the event of the Russian Government not 
giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he 
should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of see exhibit 26. 
war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a 
confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, 
that is to say, already in the afternoon of August i st , i. e., 
the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited 
above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and 
marched into German territory. 

Thus Russia began the war against us. 

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our 
question to the French Cabinet on July 31 st at 7 p. m. 

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and 
unsatisfactory reply on August I st at 1. p. m. which gave no 



14* APPENDIX I 

16 

see exhibit 27. clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself 
to the explanation that France would do that which her 
interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. m., the 
mobilization of the entire French army and navy was 
ordered. 

On the morning of the next day France opened 
hostilities. 



THE ORIGINAL 

TELEGRAMS 

AND 

NOTES. 



i 4 4 APPENDIX I 

18 



The Note of Austria-Hungary to Servia, 

Presented July 23 rd in Belgrade. 

„On March 31 st , 1909, the Royal Servian Minister 
to the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by 
order of his Government : 

,, Servia declares that she is not affected in 
„her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, 
„and that she will therefore adapt herself to the 
^decisions which the powers are going to arrive at 
„in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By 
^following the councils of the powers, Servia 
„binds herself to cease the attitude of protest 
„and resistence which she has assumed since last 
,, October, relative to the annexation, and she 
,, binds herself further to change the direction of 
„her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, 
„and, in the future, to live with the latter in 
,, friendly and neighborly relations. 
„The history of the last years, and especially the painful 
events of June 28 th , have demonstrated the existence of a 
subversive movement in Servia whose aim it is to separate 
certain territories from the Austro- Hungarian monarchy. 
This movement, which developed under the eyes of the 
Servian Government, has found expression subsequently 
beyond the territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a 
series of assassinations and murders. 

„Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained 
in the declaration of March 31 st , 1909, the Royal Servian 
Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. 



APPENDIX I 145 

She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and 
associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled 
language of the press, the glorification of the originators of 
assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in 
subversive intrigues ; she suffered the unwholesome pro- 
paganda in public education, and lastly permitted all 
manifestations which would mislead the Servian people into 
hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions. 

,,This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government 
made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which 
the events of June 28 th demonstrated to the entire world 
the ghastly consequences of such sufferance. 

,,It becomes plain from the evidence and con- 
fessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of 
June 28 th , that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived 
in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms 
and bombs with which they were equipped, from 
Servian officers and officials who belonged to the 
Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transporta- 
tion of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was 
arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier 
officials. 

„The cited results of the investigation do not permit 
the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer 
the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years 
towards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, 
and which from there radiate into the territory of the 
monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the 
Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate 
intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the 
peace of the monarchy. 

,,In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal 
Government is forced to demand official assurance from the 
Servian Government that it condemns the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e. the entirety of the 
machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the 



146 APPENDIX I 

20 



monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself 
to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing 
propaganda. 

„In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, 
the Royal Servian Government will publish on the first 
page of its official organ of July 26 th , 1914, the following 
declaration : 

„The Royal Servian Government condemns 
„the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, 
„i. e. the entirety of those machinations whose 
„aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian 
„monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she 
„ regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of 
„these criminal actions. 

„The Royal Servian Government regrets that 
„Servian officers and officials have participated 
„in the propaganda, cited above, and have thus 
„threatened the friendly and neighborly relations 
„which the Rxtyal Government was solemnly 
,, bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 
„3i st , 1909. 

,,The Royal Government which disapproves 
„and rejects every thought or every attempt at 
influencing the destinations of the inhabitants 
„of any part of Austria- Hungary, considers it its 
„duty to call most emphatically to the attention 
„of its officers and officials, and of the entire 
„population of the kingdom, that it will hence- 
forward proceed with the utmost severity against 
,,any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent 
„and suppress which it will make every effort." 

„This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the 
cognizance of the Royal Army through an order of H. M. the 
King, and it is to be published in the official organ ot 
the Army. 



APPENDIX I 147 

21 



„The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, 
as follows : 

1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, 
and contempt for, the Austro- Hungarian monarchy, and 
whose general tendency is directed against the latters 
territorial integrity ; 

2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society 
Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of 
propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against 
the other societies and associations in Servia which 
occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria- 
Hungary. The Royal Government will take the ne- 
cessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may 
not continue their activities under another name or in 
another form; 

3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction 
in Servia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as 
the means of instruction are concerned, that which 
serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against 
Austria- Hungary ; 

4. to remove from military service and the administration 
in general all officers and officials who are guilty of 
propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, 
with a communication of the material which the Im- 
perial and Royal Government possesses against them, 
the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right 
to communicate to the Royal Government ; 

5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and 
Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a 
movement directed against the territorial integrity of 
the monarchy ; 

6. to commence a judicial investigation against the 
participants of the conspiracy of June 28 th , who are 
on Servian territory. Officials, delegated by the 
Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the 
examinations ; 

K 2 



148 APPENDIX I 

22 

7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja 
Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State 
officials, who have been compromised through the result 
of the investigation ; 

8. to prevent through effective measures the participation 
of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and 
explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials 
of Shabatz and Loznica, who assisted the originators 
of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier/' 

9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government ex- 
planations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high 
Servian functionaries in Servia and abroad who have 
not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express 
themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against 
Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28 th . 

to. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply 
from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday 
25 th inst, at 6 p. m. A memoir concerning the results 
of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern 
points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this note." 



Enclosure. 

The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip 
and accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of 
the assassination on June 28 th has, so far, yielded the following 
results : 

1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during 
his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by 
Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain 
Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid 
of Major Voja Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were 
used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic 
and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabri- 
nowic in Belgrade 



APPENDIX I 149 

2 3 

3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the 
arsenal of the Servian Army in Kragujevac. 

4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciga- 
nowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the 
grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Brown- 
ing pistols to Princip Grabez in a forest near the 
targed practice field of Topshider — (outside Belgrade). — 

5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, 
and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system 01 
transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The entry 
of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of 
Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by 
the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica 
with the aid of several other persons. 

The Servian Answer. 

Presented at Vienna, July 25 th ' 19 14. 

(With Austria's commentaries [in italics].) 

The Royal Government has received the communi- 
cation of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23 rd inst. 
and is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunder- 
standing which threatens to destroy the friendly and 
neighborly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the 
kingdom of Servia. 

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere 
there have been renewed protests against the great neighborly 
monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in 
the Skuptschina, as well as in the declaration and actions of 
the responsible representatives of the state at that time, 
and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of 
March 31 st 1909; furthermore that since that time neither 
the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials 
have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial 
condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The 



i 5 o APPENDIX I 

Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government has 
made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case 
of a text book, in regard to which the I. und R. Government 
has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia 
has given during the time of the Balcan crisis in numerous 
cases evidence of her pacific and moderate policy, and it is 
only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she has 
brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this 
peace has been preserved. 

The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establish- 
ing that since the declaration of March ji st 1909, there 
has been no attempt on the part of the Servian Government 
to alter the position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 

With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our 
note, as we have not insisted that she and her officials 
have undertaken anything official in this direction. Our 
gravamen is that in spite of the obligation assumed in the 
cited note, she has omitted to suppress the movement directed 
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy. 

Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and 
the entire direction of her policies, and in entering into 
friendly and neighborly relations with the Austro- Hungarian 
monarchy, and not only not to interfere with the possession 
of Bosnia. 

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for 
expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper 
articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which 
are of very common appearance in other countries, and which 
ordinarily are not under the control of the state. This, all 
the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy 
in the solution of a whole series of questions which have 
arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has 
succeeded to solve the greater number thereof, in favor of 
the progress of both countries. 

The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the 
expressions of the press and the activity of Servian associations 
possess a private character and thus escape governmental 



APPENDIX I 151 

2 5 

control, stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern 
states and even the most liberal of press and society laws, 
which nearly everywhere subject the press and the societies to 
a certain control of the state. This is also provided for by the 
Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian Govern- 
ment consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to super- 
vise its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their 
direction to be hostile to the monarchy. 

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised 
by the assertions that citizens of Servia had participated in 
the preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Government 
expected to be invited to cooperate in the investigation of 
the crime, and it was ready in order to prove its complete 
correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to 
whom it would receive information. 

This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was 
accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite 
definite personalities and not only in the position, but also 
obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. 
The Servian Government has done nothing in this direction. 
According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, 
the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, 
without regard to position and rank, every Servian citizen, 
for whose participation in the crime of Sarajevo it should 
have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the 
first page of the official organ of the 26 th of July to publish 
the following enunciation : 

„The Royal Servian Government condemns 
„every propaganda which should be directed 
,, against Austria- Hungary, i. e. the entirety of 
,,such activities as aim towards the separation of 
„ certain territories from the Austro- Hungarian 
„monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable 
,, consequences of these criminal machinations." 
The Austrian demand reads : 

„The Royal Servian Government condemns the 
,, propaganda against Austria- Hungary " 



152 APPENDIX I 

26 

The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which 
has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant 
to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria- Hungary 
does not exist, and that it is not aware of such. This 
formula is insincere, and the Servian Government reserves 
itself the supterfuge for later occasions that it had not disavowed 
by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor recognized 
the same as hostile to the monarchy, whence it could deduce 
further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a 
propaganda similar to the present one. 

The Royal Government regrets that according to a 
communication of the I. and R. Government certain Servian 
officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda 
just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered 
the amicable relations for the observation of which the Royal 
Government had solemnly obliged itself through the 
declaration of March 31 st , 1909. 

The Government . . . identical with the demanded text. 

The formula as demanded by Austria reads : 

„The Royal Government regrets that Servian 

,, officers and functionaries have parti- 

„cipated " 

Also with this formula and the further addition ^according 
to the declaration of the I. and R. Government 11 , the Servian 
Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to 
preserve a free hand for the future. 

The Royal Government binds itself further : 

I. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina 
to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the 
incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the monarchy is 
to be must severely punished, as well as every publication 
whose general tendency is directed against the territorial 
integrity of Austria-Hungary. 

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the 
constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the 
constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such 



APPENDIX I 153 

publications as is at present impossible according to the clear 
definition of Art. 22 of the constitution. 
Austria had demanded : 
1. »7o suppress every publication which incites to hatred 
and contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is 
directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy. « 
We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia 
to take care that such attacks of the press would cease 
in the future. 

Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are 
meant as means towards this end, viz. : 

a) A law according to which the expressions of the press 
hostile to the monarchy can be individually punished, 
a matter, which is immaterial to us, all the more so, 
as the individual prosecution of press intrigues is 
very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement 
of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not 
be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not 
meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the 
least guarantee for the desired success. 

b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which 
would permit confiscation, a proposal, which does 
not satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Servia 
is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of 
the Government to enforce it and that has not been 
promised us. 

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory 
and evasive as we are not told within what time these laws 
will be passed, and as m the event of the notpassing of 
these laws by the Skuptschina everything would remain as 
it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of the 
Government. 

2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note 
of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the 
society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have 
committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this 
manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding 



i 5 4 APPENDIX I 

28 

this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the 
I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna 
Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against 
Austria-Hungary. 

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and 
affiliated societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire 
public life of Servia ; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable 
reserve if the Servian Government asserts that it knows 
nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not 
completely fulfilled ', as we have asked besides : 

,,To confiscate the means of propaganda of 
,, these societies to prevent the reformation of the 
„dissolved societies under another name and in 
„ another form/' 

In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly 
silent, so that through this semi- concession there is offered 
us no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the 
associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna 
Odbrana. 

3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without 
delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia 
anything which might further the propaganda directed against 
Austria-Hungary provided the Land R. Government furnishes 
actual proofs. 

Also in this case the Servian Government first demands 
Proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the 
public instruction of Servia while it must know that the text 
books introduced in the Servian schools contain objectionable 
matter in this direction and that a large portion of the 
teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and 
affiliated societies. 

Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled 
a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted 
in its text the addition desired by us: „ as far as the body 
of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction" 
— a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda 
hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools. 



APPENDIX I 155 

4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss 
those officers and officials from the military and civil ser- 
vices in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial 
investigation that they have been guilty of actions against 
the territorial integrity of the monarchy; it expects that the 
I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose 
of starting the investigation the names of these officers and 
officials, and the facts with which they have been charged. 

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil 
services of those officers and officials who are found guilty 
by judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its 
assent to those cases, in which these persons have been 
charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, 
however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials 
as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which 
is generally not punishable in Servia, our demands have not 
been fulfilled in this point. 

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear 
about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and 
R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part 
of the Royal Servian Government to permit the cooperation 
of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, 
but it declares that it is willing to accept every cooperation 
which does not run counter to international law and criminal 
law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations. 

The international law, as well as the criminal law, has 
nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of 
the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of 
a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is 
therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague 
general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties. 

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a 
matter of course to begin an investigation against all those 
persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28 th 
and who are in its territory. As far as the cooperation in 
this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and 
R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as 



156 APPENDIX I 

30 

this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal pro- 
cedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation 
might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials. 
The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable : 

1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants 
in the outrage. 

2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the 
examinations (,, Recherche' * in contrast with „enquete 
judiciaire 11 ). 

3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government 
officials participate in the Servian court procedure ; they 
were to cooperate only in the police researches which had 
to furnish and fix the material for the investigation. 

If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this 
is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference 
between „enquete judiciaire 11 and simple police researches. 
As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation 
which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable 
results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a 
plausible manner the cooperation of our officials (precedents 
for such police intervention exist in great number) it tries to 
justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible. 

7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening 
of the day on which the note was received the arrest of 
Major Voislar Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciga- 
nowic is concerned who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28 th with 
the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to 
locate him, wherefor a warrant has been issued against him. 

The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, 
as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the 
investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the 
proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo. 

This reply is disingenuous. According to our investi- 
gation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, 
left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had 



APPENDIX I 157 

become known that Ciganowic had participated in the 
outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that 
Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28 th . In the 
second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade 
who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and 
who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview that a man 
by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade. 

8. The Servian Government will amplify and render 
more severe the existing measures against the suppression 
of smuggling of arms and explosives. 

It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once 
against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier 
service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty 
and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to 
cross the frontier. 

9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations 
about the expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad 
have made in interviews after the outrage and which, 
according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, 
were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. 
Government points out in detail where those expressions 
were made and succeeds in proving that those expressions 
have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the 
Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary 
evidences and proofs are collected therefor. 

The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the 
interviews in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Govern- 
ment that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the 
said interviews and if it reserves for itself the right of a 
formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention 
seriously to fulfill the demand. 

10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. 
Government, so far as this has not been already done by 
the present note, of the execution of the measures in question 
as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and 
put into execution. 



158 APPENDIX I 

3 2 

The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the 
common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and 
it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not 
consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to 
accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision 
of this question to the International Court at the Hague or 
by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have 
participated in the working out of the declaration given by 
the Servian Government on March 31 st 1909." 



The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time. 



APPENDIX 1 159 

33 

Exhibit 1. 

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, 
London, and St. Petersburg, on Juli 23 rd 1914. 

The publications of the Austro- Hungarian Government 
concerning the circumstances under which the Assassination of 
the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, 
disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has 
set itself and the means which it utilizes for their realization. 
Through the published facts the last doubt must disappear 
that the center of action of the efforts for the separation of 
the south slavic provinces from the Austro- Hungarian 
Monarchy and their union with the Servian Kingdom must 
be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity with 
the connivance of members of the Government and of 
the Army. 

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series 
of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb 
chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only 
to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession 
of the powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations 
to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on 
the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance 
of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government 
gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, 
at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the 
pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope 
and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime 
the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become 
evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity 
nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across 
the border through which the safety and the integrity of the 



160 APPENDIX I 

34 

Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of 
affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro- 
Hungarian government can be viewed only as justifiable. 
Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well 
as by the government in Servia does not preclude the fear 
that the Servian government will decline to meet these de- 
mands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into 
a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing 
would remain for the Austro-Hungarian government, unless 
it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to 
press its demands with the Servian government and, if need 
be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in 
regard to which the choice of means must be left with it. 

I have the honor to request you to express yourself 
in the sense indicated above to (the present representative 
of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and 
therewith give special emphasis to the view that in this 
question there is concerned an affair which should be settled 
solely between Austria- Hungary and Servia, the limitation 
to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to 
insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict 
because every intercession of another power on account of 
the various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable 
consequences. 

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report 
about the course of your interview. 

Exhibit 2. 

The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. 
Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

You will make the following report to the Government 
to which you are accredited : 

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government 
has published in its note to the Servian Government, the 
last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the 
Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, 



APPENDIX I 161 

35 

was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance 
of members of the Servian government and army. It is a 
product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series ot 
years have become a source of permanent disturbance for 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of 
Europe. 

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked 
during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching 
self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian 
government and the energetic intercession of the 
powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations 
to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time, 
did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well- 
behaviour, which the Servian government gave at that time, 
it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the 
tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda 
has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. 
It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with 
its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian govern- 
ment persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond 
the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of 
the monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state 
of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. 

The reply of the Servian government to the demands 
which the Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23 rd inst. 
through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the domina- 
ting factors in Servia are not inclined to cease their former 
policies and agitation. There will remain nothing else for 
the Austro-Hungarian government than to press its demands, 
if need be through military action, unless it renounces for 
good its position as a great power. 

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a 
matter of course and a task of Russia's to actively become 
a party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary 
and Servia. For the European conflagration which would 
result from a similar step by Russia, the „Nowoje Wremja" 

P. 3113 L 



162 APPENDIX I 

36 

believes itself justified in making Germany responsible in 
so far as it does not induce Austria- Hungary to yield. 

The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. 
It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict 
with Servia, but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous 
favor toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in her 
existence and creates conditions, which eventually found 
expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia 
believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this 
matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must 
realize that it makes the Serb activities its own, to under- 
mine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out 
of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers 
desire to localize, there arises a European war. This respon- 
sibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more 
heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia 
that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian 
territory or to touch the existence of the Servian King- 
dom, but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues 
threatening its existence. 

The attitude of the Imperial government in this question 
is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan- 
Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction 
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or 
weakening of the triple alliance with a complete isolation 
of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest 
therefore calls us to the side of Austria- Hungary. The duty, 
if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, 
points to the support by ourselves of those endeavors which 
aim at the localization of the conflict, faithful to the course 
of those policies which we have carried out successfully for 
forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the 
peace of Europe. 

Should, however, against our hope, through the inter- 
ference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to 



APPENDIX 1 163 

37 

support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbor-monarchy 
with all the power at our command. We shall take the 
sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness 
that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring 
upon the peoples of Europe. 

Exhibit 3. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna 
to the Chancellor on July 24 th 191 4. 

Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge 
d'affaires in order to explain to him thoroughly and cor- 
dially Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After 
recapitulation of the historical development of the past few 
years, he emphasized that the Monarchy entertained no 
thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would 
not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this 
step was meant as a definite means of checking the 
Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstance, Austria- 
Hungary must have a guaranty for continued amicable rela- 
tions with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring 
about a change in the balance of powers in the Balcan. 
The Charge d'affaires who had received no instructions from 
St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary „ad 
referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to 
Sasonow. 

Exhibit 4. 

Telegram 01 the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to 
the Chancellor on July 24 th 1914. 

I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a 
prolonged interview with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) 
indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary 
and he was very much agitated. He declared most positi- 
vely that Russia could not permit under any circumstances 
that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between 
the parties concerned. 

L 2 



164 APPENDIX I 

38 

Exhibit 5. 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. 
Telegram of July 26 th 1914. 
The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended 
interview with Sasonow this afternoon. Both parties had 
a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The 
assurance of the Ambassador that Austria- Hungary had no 
idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her 
frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary. 

Exhibit 6. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
to the Chancellor on July 25 th 1914. 

Message to H. M. from General von Chelius (German 
honorary aide de camp to the Czar). 

The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were 
suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their 
garrisons at once. The manoeuvres have been cancelled. 
The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers 
instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great 
excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the im- 
pression that complete preparations for mobilization against 
Austria are being made. 

Exhibit 7. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
to the Chancellor on July 26 th 1914. 
The military attache requests the following message to 
be sent to the general staff : 

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered 
for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow 
and improbable elsewhere. 

Exhibit 8. 

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the 

Chancellor on July 27 th 1914. 
Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war. 1 
1 [Note that the official translator means Krieqszustand.] 



APPENDIX I 165 

39 

Exhibit 9. 

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor 
on July 27 th 1914. 

Have learned reliably that French XIV th corps has dis- 
continued manoeuvres. 

Exhibit 10. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
London. Urgent. July 26 th 1914. 

Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially 
and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in 
Servia; that it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, 
but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. According 
to news received here, the call for several classes of the 
reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to 
mobilization. 1 If this news proves correct, we shall be forced 
to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our 
desire to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of 
Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense 
St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis. 

Exhibit 10 a. 

Telegram 01 the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial 
Ambassador at Paris. July 26 th 1914. 

After officially declaring to Russia that Austria- Hungary 
has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the 
existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to 
be a European war rests solely with Russia which has to 
bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France with 
which we are at one in the desire for the preservation 01 
the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at 
St. Petersburg in favour of peace. 

1 [The German text inserts auch gegen uns, i. e. also against us.] 



166 APPENDIX I 

40 

Exhibit 10 b. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg on July 26 th 1914. 

After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial dis- 
interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance 
of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests 
solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake 
no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe. 

Exhibit 11. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
to the Chancellor on July 27 th 1914. 

Military Attache* reports a conversation with the Secretary 
of War : 

Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the 
situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of 
honor that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though 
general preparations are being made, no reserves were called 
and nohorsesmustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, 
such military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., 
Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under 
no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, 
Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired 
very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilization 
against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the 
diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the 
friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even against 
Austria as very menacing. 

Exhibit 12. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at London on July 27 th , 1914. 

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward 
Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is 



APPENDIX I 167 

impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia 
before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited 
to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. 

Exhibit 13. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at London on July 25 th , 1914. 

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an 
Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly 
correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any 
more than England, and as heretofore we take the position 
that this question must be localized by virtue of all powers 
refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that 
Russia will refrain from any action in view of her respon- 
sibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, 
in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart 
from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia 
and Austria jointly with the other powers. 

Exhibit 14. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg on July 28 th , 1914. 

We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to 
elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the 
Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and 
satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has 
meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter. 

Exhibit 15. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in 
London on July 27 th , 1914. 

We have at once started the mediation proposal in 
Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We 



i68 APPENDIX I 

have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire 
of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna. 



Exhibit 16. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the 
Chancellor on July 28 th , 1914. 

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your 
Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English 
mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the 
opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent decla- 
ration ot war, the step appears belated. 

Exhibit 17. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at Paris on July 29 th , 1914. 

News received here regarding French preparations of 
war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that You call 
the attention of the French Government to this and accen- 
tuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures 
on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening 
state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would 
not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the 
tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for 
the preservation of peace. 

Exhibit 18. 

Telegram ol the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to 
H. M. the Kaiser on July 30 th , 1914. 

Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing 
Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar 
Nicolas : Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has 
come. He has just told me the telegram has made a deep 
impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization against 



APPENDIX I 169 

43 

Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had con- 
vinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, 
His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. 
I then told him that the guilt for the measureless con- 
sequences lay at the door of premature mobilization against 
Austria- Hungary which after all was involved merely in 
a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear 
and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored 
Austria- Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions ot 
territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized against 
Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for 
an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added 
that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's 
phrase that „she could not desert her brethren in Servia", 
after the horrible crime ot Sarajevo. I told him finally he 
need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilized. 

Exhibit 19. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at Rome on July 31 st , 1914. 

We have continued to negotiate between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams 
between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, 
as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through 
the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been greatly 
handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite 
of pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching 
measures against us that the situation is becoming continually 
more menacing. 

Exhibit 20. 

I. His Majesty to the Czar. 

July 28 th , 10.45 p. m. 

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression 
which is caused by the action of Austria- Hungary against 



i 7 o APPENDIX I 

44 

Servia. The inscrupulous agitation which has been going 
on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of 
which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. 
The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King 
and his consort, still dominates that country. Doubtless 
You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, 
and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist 
that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder, 
shall suffer their deserved punishment. 

On the other hand I by no means overlook the diffi- 
culty encountered by You and Your Government to stem 
the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friend- 
ship which has joined us both for a long time with firm 
ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria- 
Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding 
with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me 
in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may 
yet arise. 

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin 

signed: Wilhelm. 



Exhibit 21. 

II. The Czar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof Palace, July 29 th , 1 p. m. 

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this 
serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An igno- 
minious war has been declared against a weak country and 
in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. 
I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure 
exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures 
which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a Euro- 
pean war would be, I urge You in the name of our old 
friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally 
from going too far. 

signed: Nicolas. 



APPENDIX I 171 

45 

Exhibit 22. 
III. His Majesty to the Czar. 

July 29 th , 6.30 p. m. 

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire 
for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot — as 
I told You in my first telegram — consider the action of 
Austria-Hungary as an „ignominiouswar". Austria-Hungary 
knows from experience that the promises of Servia as long 
as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. 

According to my opinion the action of Austria- Hungary 
is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty 
that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into 
deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the expla- 
nation of the Austrian cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended 
no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore 
of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain 
a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing 
Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe 
that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between 
Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which 
— as I have already telegraphed You — my Government 
endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military 
measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace 
by Austria- Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which 
both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position 
as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friendship 
and aid — I willingly accepted. 

signed : Wilhelm. 

Exhibit 23. 

IV. His Majesty to the Czar. 

July 30 th , 1 a. m. 

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention 
of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences 
of a mobilization; I have told You the same in my last 



1 72 APPENDIX I 

46 

telegram. Austria- Hungary has mobilized only against 
Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to 
be the case according to Your advice and that of Your 
Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of 
the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such 
friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your 
express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The 
entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, 
You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace. 

signed : Wilhelm. 

Exhibit 23 a. 

V. The Czar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof, July 30 th , 1914, 1.20 p. m. 

I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I 
am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the 
Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking 
form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason 
of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with 
all my heart that these measures will not influence in any 
manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very 
highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so 
that an understanding can be arrived at with us. 

Nicolas. 

Exhibit 24. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg on July 31 st , 1914. Urgent. 

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we 
have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, 
Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, hence 
also against us. On account of these Russian measures we 
have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim 



APPENDIX I 173 

47 

the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply 
mobilization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if 
Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and 
against Austria- Hungary within 12 hours and notifies us 
definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once 
to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication. 



Exhibit 25. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador 
in Paris on July 31 st , 1914. Urgent. 

Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and 
fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending 
mediation. We have therefore declared the threatening state 
of war which is bound to be followed by mobilization 
unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war 
against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. 
Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain 
neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 
18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed 
necessary. 

Exhibit 26. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg on August i st , 12.52 p. m. Urgent. 

If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply 
to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this 
afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following 
statement : 

„Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les 
debuts de la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. 
Se rendant a un desir que lui en avait ete exprime par 
Sa Majeste TEmpereur de Russie, Sa Majeste TEmpereur 
d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre etait applique a 
accomplir un role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne 
et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le 



i 7 4 APPENDIX I 

43 

resultat, proceda a. la mobilisation de la totality de ses 
forces de terre et de mer. 

A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun 
preparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Alle- 
mand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. 
Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce 
peril il aurait compromis la securite et l'existence meme 
de l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand 
se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste" 
TEmpereur de toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation 
des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire 
droit a cette demande et ayant manifesto par ce refus, que 
son action etait dirigee contre TAllemande, j'ai l'honneur 
d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir a Votre 
Excellence ce qui suit : 

Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom 
de l'Empire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre 
avec la Russie/' 

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out 
this instruction by Russian time. 

Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection 
and affairs to the American Embassy. 

Exhibit 27. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the 
Chancellor on August i st > 1.05 p. m. 

Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France 
would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, 
the Prime Minister declared that France would do that 
which her interests dictated. 



-^r-J^r 



APPENDIX II 



EXTRACTS FROM 

SIR EDWARD GREY'S 
CORRESPONDENCE 

RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN 
CRISIS 



For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous 

No. 6 (19 14) [Cd. 7467], presented to both Houses of 

Parliament by Command of His Majesty August 19 14 



No. 13. 

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25. 

(Translation.) 

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Charge d'Affaires 
at Vienna on the nth (24th) July, 1914 : 

"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the 
Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at 
Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite 
insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might 
help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. 

il In order to prevent the consequences, equally incal- 
culable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from 
the course of action followed by the Austro- Hungarian 
Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the 
period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. 
Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform 
the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the 
Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, 
should equally allow them sufficient time to study them. 

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of 
the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in 
a position to offer advice to the Servian Government. 

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would 
render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction 
to the very bases of international relations. 

" Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above 
to the Cabinet at Vienna. 

"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Govern- 
ment will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he 
trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar 
instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna." 

P. 3113 M 



178 APPENDIX II 

No. 17. 
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.— {Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914. 

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. . . . 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was 
quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those 
proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be 
expected to accept the political demands which had been put 
forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from 
a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister 
yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking 
Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, 
and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would 
at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His 
Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He 
would like to see the question placed on an international 
footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which 
reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not 
to Austria, but to the Powers. 

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be 
quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the 
hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was 
possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit 
the question to arbitration. 

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not 
precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use 
your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me 
that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take 
no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in 
reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing 
the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her 
own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany 
really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If 
we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there 
would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood 
would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. 
I said that England could play the role of mediator at 



APPENDIX II 179 

Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her 
counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be 
converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself 
Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately 
Germany was convinced that she could count upon our 
neutrality. 

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, 
Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or 
give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably 
declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia 
could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the pre- 
dominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the 
support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He 
assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate 
a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I 
could regard the situation as desperate. 

No. 18. 
Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received July 25.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of the 24th July acted on. 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt 
of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at 
London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at 
Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak 
to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from 
press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of 
State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay 
and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of 
State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had 
ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro- 
Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, 
and that they meant to take military action. He also 
admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain 
of the Austro-Hungarian demands. 

M 2 



180 APPENDIX II 

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation 
was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative 
at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no inten- 
tion of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his 
opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. 
I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking 
military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously 
excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. 
He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said 
that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not 
look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view 
with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the 
Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany 
wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power 
to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria 
and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in 
with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour 
of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. 

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the 
note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He 
repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of 
knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had 
no such knowledge. 

No. 41. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received 
July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues repre- 
senting the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind 
is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to 
make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian Government 
are fully resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider 
their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until 
punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely 
that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country 
has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, 



APPENDIX II 181 

and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be 
a great disappointment. 

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to 
send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may 
yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency 
whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. 

No. 43. 
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

YOUR telegram of 26th July. 

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would 
practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in 
his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria 
and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your sugges- 
tion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance 
of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to 
do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four 
nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest 
means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, 
however, that such a conference as you proposed was not 
practicable. He added that news he had just received from 
St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the 
part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berch- 
told. He thought that this method of procedure might lead 
to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing 
anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views 
between the Austrian and Russian Governments. 

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State 
said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that 
if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to 
follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising 
against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised 
in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised 
in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian 
system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be 



i82 APPENDIX II 

difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would 
therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. 

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Peters- 
burgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the 
general situation. 

No. 56. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received 
July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914- 

TH E Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and 
earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under- 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, 
having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well 
acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and 
the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him 
that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impos- 
sible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way 
again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially 
during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped 
that something would be done before Servia was actually 
invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be 
difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, 
in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian 
Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the 
Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take 
place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to 
induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as 
possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time 
so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. 
He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the 
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had 
agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia 
had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically 
reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia 
might reasonably be asked to give to Austria- Hungary for 



APPENDIX II 183 

her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged 
that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be 
furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing 
to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her 
as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to 
submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

No. 62. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received 
July 28.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 19 14. 

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the 
sense of your telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided 
the word " mediation/' but said that ; as mentioned in your 
speech/ which he had just read to me, you had hopes that 
conversations in London between the four Powers less 
interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro- 
Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as 
rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you 
had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just 
demands of Austria-Hungary ; that you thought it constituted 
a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations 
might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in 
Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign 
Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be 
accepted on basis of Servian note ; that war would be 
declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of 
Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be 
accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. 
This was a matter that must be settled directly between the 
two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would 
hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as 
you feared that they might lead to complications threatening 
the peace of Europe. 

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe 

1 " Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933. 



184 APPENDIX II 

that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view 
should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from 
want of sympathy with the many just complaints which 
Austria- Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, 
whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, 
you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. 
I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal 
with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also 
in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose opera- 
tions like those impending, which did not aim at territorial 
aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed. 



No. 85. 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His 
Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. 

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a Euro- 
pean conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing 
to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his con- 
tinued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to 
make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He 
said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main 
principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain 
would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any 
conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object 
at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of 
Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to 
the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed 
at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should 
they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. 

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, 
and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking 
in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excel- 
lency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected 
the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany 
was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance 



APPENDIX II 185 

that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of 
France what operations Germany might be forced to enter 
upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian 
integrity would be respected if she had not sided against 
Germany. 

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had 
been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you 
were aware, to bring about an understanding with England ; 
he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that 
understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind 
a general neutrality agreement between England and Ger- 
many, though it was of course at the present moment too 
early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality 
in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, 
would enable him to look forward to realisation of his 
desire. 

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his 
request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it 
probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind 
yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion 
that you would desire to retain full liberty. 

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, 
I communicated the contents of your telegram of to day to his 
Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you. 

No. 87. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 19 14. 

AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the 
situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the 
German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by 
the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false 
security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to 
preserve the peace, which we were now making in common 
with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon 
that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public 
opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite 
different point of view from that taken during the difficulty 



186 APPENDIX II 

as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the 
dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, 
and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to 
crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a 
question that was the subject of a special agreement between 
France and us. In the present case the dispute between 
Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to 
take a hand. Even if the question became one between 
Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take 
a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy 
of Teuton or Slav— a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; 
and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into 
a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved 
and France became involved, we had not made up our minds 
what we should do ; it was a case that we should have to 
consider. France would then have been drawn into a 
quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her 
alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. 
We were free from engagements, and we should have to 
decide what British interests required us to do. I thought 
it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking 
all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to 
warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, 
but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be 
misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided 
what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not 
arise. 

M. Cambon said that 1 had explained the situation very 
clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and 
in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we 
should not feel called to intervene ; should other issues be 
raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that 
the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we 
should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He 
seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no 
criticism upon it. 

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He 
anticipated a demand from Germany that France would 
be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance 



APPENDIX II 187 

France, of course, could not give ; she was bound to help 
Russia if Russia was attacked. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 

No. 89. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 19 14. 

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this after- 
noon about the European situation, I said that I wished to 
say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something 
that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. 
While it was restricted to the issues at present actually 
involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if 
Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue 
might be so great that it would involve all European 
interests ; and I did not wish him to be misled by the 
friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped would 
continue — into thinking that we should stand aside. 

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked 
whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, 
intervene ? 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use 
anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply 
pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should 
intervene. There would be no question of our intervening 
if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not 
involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did 
become such that we thought British interests required us to 
intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would 
have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers 
had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversa- 
tions would continue as at present, and that I should be able 
to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in 
working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep 
the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved 
practically every European interest, I did not wish to be 
open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all 



188 APPENDIX II 

our conversations had misled him or his Government into 
supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach 
that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things 
might have been different. 

The German Ambassador took no exception to what 
I had said ; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he 
had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 



No. 98. 
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. 

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on 
receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last 
conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment whether they would be willing to accept mediation on 
basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some 
other point and issue their conditions from there. He has 
up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisa- 
tion against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria- 
Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will 
probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of 
State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to 
above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the 
meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an 
act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance 
that European peace may be preserved. 

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's 
position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures 
which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall 
of officers on leave — a measure which had been officially 
taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador 
yesterday — Imperial Government had done nothing special 
in way of military preparations. Something, however, would 
have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they 
mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He 



APPENDIX II 189 

regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it 
would be a military necessity. 

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince 
Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard 
with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events 
he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which 
you had spoken. 

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin 
very late last night ; had it been received earlier Chancellor 
would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done. 

No. 101. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 191 4. 

YOUR telegram of 29th July. 1 

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain 
the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to 
neutrality on such terms. 

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as 
Germany does not take French territory as distinct from 
the colonies. 

From the material point of view such a proposal is un- 
acceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe 
being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her 
position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to 
German policy. 

Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us 
to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, 
a disgrace from which the good name of this country would 
never recover. 

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away 
whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the 
neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain 
either. 

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether 

1 See No. 85. 



i 9 o APPENDIX II 

the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between 
England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient 
to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must pre- 
serve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem 
to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable 
development of the present crisis as the Chancellor con- 
templates. 

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, 
and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the 
good relations between England and Germany is that they 
should continue to work together to preserve the peace of 
Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations 
of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto 
improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's 
Government will work in that way with all sincerity and 
good-will. 

And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be pre- 
served, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour 
will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany 
could be a party, by which she could be assured that no 
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her 
or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or 
separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as 
I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having 
a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. 
The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject 
of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more 
acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, 
be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction 
which will follow may make possible some more definite 
rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible 
hitherto. 

Enclosure i in No. 105. 

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon. 

My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 19 12. 

FROM time to time in recent years the French and 

British naval and military experts have consulted together. 



APPENDIX II 191 

It has always been understood that such consultation does 
not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at 
any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed 
force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is 
not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that 
commits either Government to action in a contingency that 
has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at 
the present moment is not based upon an engagement to 
co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government 
had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third 
Power, it might become essential to know whether it could 
in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to 
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something 
that threatened the general peace, it should immediately dis- 
cuss with the other whether both Governments should act 
together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if 
so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. 
If these measures involved action, the plans of the General 
Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the 
Governments would then decide what effect should be given 
to them. 

Yours, &c. 

E. GREY. 

No. 119. 
Sir Edivard Grey to Sir F. Bertie. 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 

M. CAMBON referred to-day to a telegram that had 
been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the 
French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the un- 
certainty with regard to whether we would intervene which 
was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would 
only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it 
would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. 

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left 



192 APPENDIX II 

Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. 
I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain 
neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we 
would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as 
to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Ger- 
many became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. 
That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engage- 
ment to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that 
we had not left Germany under the impression that we would 
stand aside. 

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had 
said yesterday. 

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet 
to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. 
Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, 
we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the 
present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not 
feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were 
involved. Further developments might alter this situation 
and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view 
that intervention was justified. The preservation of the 
neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, 
but an important factor, in determining our attitude. 
Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not 
to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how 
we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it 
might be that I should ask both France and Germany 
whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement 
that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of 
Belgium. 

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help 
France if Germany made an attack on her. 

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as 
things had gone at present, we could not take any engage- 
ment. 

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning 
rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could 
not be to England's interest that France should be crushed 
by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished 



APPENDIX II 193 

position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made 
a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German 
strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He 
asked me whether I could not submit his question to the 
Cabinet again. 

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as 
soon as there was some new development, but at the present 
moment the only answer I could give was that we could not 
undertake any definite engagement. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 



No. 122. 
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 19 14. 

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram 
of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie. 

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he 
must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he 
could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that 
he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose 
a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of 
war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether 
they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, never- 
theless, took note of your request. 

It appears from what he said that German Government 
consider that certain hostile acts have already been com- 
mitted by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged 
that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed 
under an embargo already. 

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss 
the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite 
answer seems to me remote. 

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that 
Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned 
to you by the French Government. 

P. 8113 n 



194 APPENDIX II 

No. 123. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 

Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 19 14. 

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply 1 of 
the German Government with regard to the neutrality of 
Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the 
neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If 
Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as 
that which had been given by France it would materially 
contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other 
hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium 
by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be 
extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. 
I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet 
meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him 
a memorandum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not 
to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain 
neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still 
free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. 
All I could say was that our attitude would be determined 
largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of 
Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. 
I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on 
that condition alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not 
formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He 
even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies 
might be guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to 
remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we 
must keep our hands free. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 

1 See No. 122. 



APPENDIX II 195 

No. 133. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. 

M. DE ETTER came to-day to communicate the contents 
of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which 
are as follows : — 

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readi- 
ness of his Government to discuss the substance of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by 
expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that 
the discussions should take place in London with the partici- 
pation of the Great Powers. 

" M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would 
assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of 
Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very 
important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop pro- 
visionally to her military action on Servian territory." 

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) 

No. 134. 

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. 

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that 
German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the 
responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general 
mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor 
of Russia ordered a general mobilisation ; that, although the 
measures which the German Government have already taken 
are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated ; 
that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in 
self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours 
behind Germany as regards German military preparations ; 
that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the 
German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid 
any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, 

N 2 



196 APPENDIX II 

whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually 
on the French frontier and have made incursions on it ; that, 
notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has 
expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with 
the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace ; 
that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, 
sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite 
despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. 

No. 148. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. 

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the 
following memorandum : — 

" I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German 
fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to 
undertake hostile operations against French coasts or 
shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in 
its power. 

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His 
Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, 
and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government 
to take any action until the above contingency of action by 
the German fleet takes place." 

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most 
difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that 
they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany 
necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany 
to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, 
whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, 
to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast 
entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to 
give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war 
with Germany unless the German fleet took the action 
indicated, but it did give a security to France that would 
enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediter- 
ranean fleet. 

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. 



APPENDIX II 197 

I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord 
Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we 
should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. 
I said that was a much more important matter; we were 
considering what statement we should make in Parliament 
to-morrow— in effect, whether we should declare violation of 
Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what had 
been said to the German Ambassador on this point. 

No. 153. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914- 

TH E King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His 
Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of 
Belgium in the following terms : — 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's 
friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly 
attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you 
have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the 
diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to 
safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the 
German Government has delivered to the Belgian Govern- 
ment a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free 
passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain 
the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its pos- 
sessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of 
refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was 
requested within twelve hours. 

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused 
this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. 

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against 
this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in 
common with themselves, and must request an assurance that 
the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with 
and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You 
should ask for an immediate reply. 



APPENDIX III 

Extract from the Dispatch from His 
Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin re- 
specting the Rupture of Diplomatic 
Relations with the German Govern- 
ment 

[Cd. 7445.] 



Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir, London , August 8, 1914. 

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your 
telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of 
State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His 
Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government 
would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von 
Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his 
answer must be " No," as, in consequence of the German 
troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian 
neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again 
went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been 
obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance 
into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able 
to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to 
strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a 
matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the 
more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of 
the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to 
have got through without formidable opposition entailing 
great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time 
gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the 
German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German 
asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of 
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait 



APPENDIX III 199 

accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as 
he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, 
and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw 
back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and 
I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had 
given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. 

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of 
the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein 
contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office 
and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial 
Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night 
that they would proceed no further with their violation of the 
Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed 
to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government 
that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps 
in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the 
observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party 
as themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could 
give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier 
in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it 
absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance 
through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary 
of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 
12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would 
expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible 
consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not 
possible even at the last moment that their answer should 
be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even 
twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. 
I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. 
This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short 
conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his 
poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that 
of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with 
Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer 
to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin 
was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, 
but that he must understand that under the circumstances 



2oo APPENDIX III 

and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government 
could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. 
1 then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, 
as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an 
opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found 
the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began 
a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that 
the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to 
a degree; just for a word — "neutrality," a word which in 
war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of 
paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred 
nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with 
her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered 
useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, 
as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to 
office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we 
had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from 
behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. 
He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events 
that might happen. I protested strongly against that state- 
ment, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von 
Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons 
it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance 
through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would 
wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 
"life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she 
should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to 
defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn com- 
pact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone 
have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future ? 
The Chancellor said, " But at what price will that compact 
have been kept. Has the British Government thought of 
that ? " I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that 
fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse 
for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so 
excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, 
and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from 
adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was 
leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining 



APPENDIX III 201 

Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the 
last moment he and his Government had been working with 
us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between 
Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy 
which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when 
the relations between them had been more friendly and 
cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, not- 
withstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia 
and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face 
to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, 
we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed 
our separation from our late fellow- workers. He would 
readily understand that no one regretted this more than I. 

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the 
embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had 
passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Tele- 
graph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that 
office, but apparently never despatched. 1 

1 This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. 



APPENDIX IV 

THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO 

Selections from the Austrian dossier of the crime 

The following document is contained in the German version 
of the German White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds 
little to our knowledge of the Austrian case against Servia, 
it deserves to be reprinted, as it is omitted altogether in the 
official version in English of the German White Book. The 
authorship of the document is uncertain. It has the appear- 
ance of an extract from a German newspaper. 

2lus bent o[tertet<^ungari[djen SCRatettal. 

2Bien, 27. Suit £)a3 in ber oftermd?ifd)*imgarifdjen 3^ u ^ n ^ te 
an bie augrcdrtigen 35otfc^aften in Qlngelegenljett be§ ferfnfcfyen J?onflitt§ 
errcd^nte 5)of(ter tmrb fjeute ijeroffentli^t. 

3n biefem S^emotte wirb barauf Ijtngeunefett, bap bie fcon (serfcten 
auggegangene SSetregung, bie jid) gum j$ith gefefct §at, bie fitblid)en 
Seile £)eftevreid)*Ungam8 Son bcr $?onatc(?ie lo^utei^en, um fie mtt 
(ser&ten ju einer ftoatltdjen (Sin^ett ju fcetfcinben, roeit jurucfgreift. 
£>iefe in ifjren @nb$UIen fietg gleidjfcleifcenbe unb nttr in ttyren SKttteut 
unb an Sntenfttdt nxcfyfeutbe $ro£aganba erretd?te gur 3^it ber 
QbmerionStnfe i^ren <£51je£untt unb trat bamalS offen mtt t^ren £en* 
ben^en t;emr. SBdfjrenb einetfettS bie gefamte ferBifc^e $reffe $um 
Jtampfe gegen bie 2ftonarcfyte aufrtef, Btlbeten fid) — fcon auberen %xq* 
Vaganbamttteln afcgefe^en — Slffojiationen, bie btefe JJantyfe fcorBereiteten, 
unter benen bie Statobna ObBrana an 95ebeutung ^erfcortagte. 5ut3 
einem rettolutionaten ^omttee l)eri?orgegangen, tonftituterte fid) btefe fccm 
Selgraber 5tugivdrtigen Qlmte ttoflig afrljdngige Drganifatton unter £eitnng 
t)on (StaatSmdnnevn unb Dffigierm, barunter bem ©eneral Sanfo&ic unb 



APPENDIX IV 203 

bent e^emaligen Snifter Sijattoinc. Qlucfy 33?ajor Dja $anfom'c unb 
Wdan $riBicesic getydven $u biefen ©rimbern. SMefer Q3erein tyatte fid) 
bic SBilbung unb QluSruftung fcon ^reifdjaren fitr ben Beyorftetyenben 
StxitQ gegen bie 6j!erreid)tfd^ungarifd?e 3Wonard)ie jum 3^^ gefe^t. 3n 
einer bem 2)?emoire angefugten mintage icirb etn 5(u§§ug au% bem 00m 
3entralaugfdntffe ber Sttarobna DbBrana l^erauggegeBenen SSereinSorgane 
gleicfyen 9tamen8 yeroffentlid)t, veorin in nte^jreren Slrtifeln bie £atigfeir 
unb Stele biefeg 93erein3 augfutyrlicfy bargelegt werben. @8 §eijjt batin, 
baj? ju ber 4?au£taufgaBe ber 0larobna DbBrana bie 23erBinbung mit it)ren 
nafjen unb femeren SSrubem ienfeit§ ber ©ren$e unb unferen uBrigen 
Breunben in ber $Rdt getjoren. 

Defhrreid? ift alS erjter unb greater fteinb Be$eid)net. 2Bie 
bie SUarobna DbBrana bie SRotroenbigfeit be§ $am£fe0 mit Defterreid) 
jwebigt, Jprebtgt fte eine f)eilige SGBa^r^eit unferer nationaten Sage. 3)aS 
€>d)lu§fa:pitel enttyaTt einen Ql^ett an bie SRegierung unb ba3 SSoIf 
©er&ieng, ftcfy mit alien SWitteln fur ben .ftamipf sor^uBereiten, ben bie 
Qtnnerion sorangejeigt tyat. 

£)a3 2#emoire fdnlbert nafy einer QluSfage eineS yon ber Sftarobna 
DbBrana angeworBenen Jtomitatfcfyi§ bie bamalige £dtigfeit ber Sftarobna 
DbBrana, bie eine oon gn?ei ^auptleuten, barunter £anfooic, gefeitete 
@d?ule $ur QluSBilbung oon SBanben unter^ielt, (Sdmten, tcelc^e 
you ©eneral Sanfoyicunb yon «£>au£tnmnn fSlihn $riBiceyic regelmdfig 
infyiu'ert untrben. SBeiter nmrben bie $omitatfd;iS int <Sd)ie£en unb 
aSomBentyerfen, im SJUnenlegen, (s^rengen soon (SifenBafjn* 
Br u den ufw. unterric^tet. 91ad; ber feierlid)en Ghfldrung ber <SerBifd;en 
3ftegierung yom Safyre 1909 fdn'en and) baS (£nbe biefer Drganifation 
gefommen gu fein. 2)iefe (£nyartungen tyabtn fid) aBer nidjt nur nicBt 
erfutlt, fonbern bie $ro£aganba tyurbe burd? bie ferBifd^e $reffe fortgefe|t. 
3)a3 S^emotre fu|rt aU 9Betft>ieI bie 2(rt unb SEBeife an, nrie bag Attentat 
gegen ben Bo6nifd)en £anbe3d?ef SSarefanin £uBli$iftifd? yertyertet rourbe, 
inbem ber Qlttentdter alg ferBtfcfyer 0tational§elb gefeiert unb feine Xat 
yertyerrlicfyt uuirbe. 5)iefe SBIdtter nmrben nicfyt nur in (SerBien yerBreitet, 
fonbern aucfy auf tvo^Iorganifterten (Sc^(eict;ix)egen in bie 2)ionard;ie 
f)ineingefctnuuggett. 

Unter ber gleic^en Seitung wie Bei i^rer ©runbung trurbe bie ^larobna 
DbBrana neuerlic^ ber 3entrafyunft einer Q(gitation,iueIet;er ber (Scf;it^en= 
Bunb mit762 3Sereinen, ein (SofolBunb mit 3500 SKitgliebern, 
unb oerfc^iebene anbere 3Sereine ange^orten. 

3m ^(eibe eineS ^ulturoereing auftretenb, bem nur bie geiftige unb bie 



2o 4 APPENDIX IV 

Br£erlid)e (SntnncMung ber SBeoolferttng (Serbieng fowie beren ntatertette 
•ftrdftigung am ^er^en liegt, enttjuflt bie Sftarobna Do&vana it)x icafyreg 
reorganifterteg $rogramm in ijorjitiertem QluSjug aug i^rem 33ereing* 
organ, in roeld)em „ bie ^eilige SBa^eit" geprebigt tr>irb, baf eg eine 
unerlajjlidje 0totwcnbigfett ijl, gegen Defterreid), feinett erfien 
groj?ten ^einb, biefen Qtugrottunggfam^f mit ©etrer)r nnb 
Jlanone $u fufjren, unb bag SSoXf mit atten 3JUtteln auf ben ^am^f 
oorjubereiten, $ur SBefreiung ber untertrorfenen ©ebiete, in benen oiele 
Sftittionen unterjocfyter ©ruber fdjmadjten. SHe in bent 2ftemoire jitierten 
$lufrufe unb Oteben dfmlicfyen Gtfyarafterg beleud)ten bie irielfeitige aug* 
todrtige Sdtigfeit ber 9tarobna Dbbrana unb i^rer afftlierten 33eretne, bie 
in QSortraggreifen, in ber ^eilna^me an ^ejten oon bognifcfyen 23ereinen, 
bei benen offen Sftitglieber fur bie emmfmte ferbifct)e QSereinigung 
geivorben rourben, beftefjt. ©egemrdrttg ijt nod? bie Itnterfuct/ung 
baritber im 3uge, bafi bie ©ofoloereine (Serbteng analoge SSeretnigungen 
ber 2ftonarct/ie beftimmten, fid) mit ifnten in einem bigger ge^tim 
ge^altenen 23erbanbe ju veretntgen. 5)urd) 93ertrauengmdnner unb 
S^iffiondre nmrbe bie $luftciegelung in bie Jtreife (Srtr<ad?fener unb ber 
itrtetl^Iofen Sugenir gebrad)t. @o rourben oon Wiian $ribicen?itfcr; 
e^emalige ^onoebofft^iere unb etn ©enbarmerieleutnant $um Q3erla(|en 
beg £eeregbienfteg in ber 3ftonarct/ie unter bebentTicfyen Umftdnbett 
oerleitet. 3n ben @d)ulen ber £ef?rerbilbungganftalten npurbe eine 
weitge^enbe Agitation entrcicfelt. £er getuunfcfyte ^rieg gegen bie 
2tfonard)ie nntrbe militdrifcfy aud) infofern oorberettet, alg ferbtfd)e 
©miffdre im ^atte beg 5lugbrutf)g ber Seinbfeligfeiten mit ber 3^ 
ftorung oon Srang^ortmittein uftr>., ber Qlnfacfyung yon Oteoolten unb 
$anifen betraut rcurben. Meg bieg tr-irb in einer befonberen SSeilage 
belegt. 

£)ag -Uftemoire fdnTbert ferner ben 3ufantmeu^ang £nrifd)en biefer 
Sdtigfeit ber 0larobna Dbbrana unb ben afftlierten Drganifationen 
mit ben Qlttentaten gegen ben $onigIid?en ^ommiffdr in digram (£ttoaj 
im %uli 1912, bent Attentat oon 2)oj;cic in migrant 1913 gegen (Sferleq 
unb bem mifjgiMten Attentat <Sd?dferg am 20. $Rai im Cramer 
Sweater. (£g oerbreitet ftc^ ^ierauf ttber ben 3nfamment)ang beg 
Qlttentatg auf ben Styronfolger unb beffen ©ema^lin, itber 
bie Qlrt, n?ie fid) bie Sungen fc^on in ber (Scfyute an bem ©ebanfen 
ber Sftarobtta Dbbrana oergifteten unb wie ftcfy bie %ttmtaUx mit ^>ilfe 
oon ^Jribicewic unb 2)acic bie 2Bert>uge ^u bem Attentat oerf^afften, 
loobei ingbefonbere bie 9flotte beg 2ftajorg ^anfoflc bargetegt trirb, ber 



APPENDIX IV 205 

bie STOorbwapn tieferte, \w and) bie OlotCe etneg getr-iffen (Siganooic, 
etneg gercefenen ^omttatfdn' unb iefcigen 93eamten ber ferBifcfyen (gifen* 
Baljmbireftion 93elgrab, ber fctyon 1909 atg Bogftng ber SBanbenfcfyuTe 
ber bamaligen Sftarobna DbBrana auftaucfyte. Werner rcirb bie Qlrt 
bargelegt, rcie 93omBen unb SBaffen unBemerft nacfy SBognien eingc= 
fdjmuggelt routben, bie feinen B^etfel baritBer loft, bag bieg ein wo^t 
yorBeretteter unb fur bie gel)eintmgt>ou'en 3^ecfe ber SRarobna oft 
Begangener ($tf)teid)tr>eg vcax. 

(Sine SSeilage entfjdtt eitten 9lu$$ug aug ben 5lften beg Jtreiggericfytg 
in ©erajen^o uBer bie lint erf uc^ung beg Attentats gegen ben 
@r$er$og 8ran$ ^erbinanb unb beffen @entaf)lin. 2)anad) jlnb $rincty, 
(SaBrinoftic, ©raBe^, <5ru^iloi>tc imb $a£osic geftdnbig, in ©emeinfcfyaft 
mit bent ftitcfytigen SftefjntebBaflc ein $ont£lott gur ©rmorbung beg 
@r$er$og8 geBilbet unb Ujm ^ u biefent 3^ecf aufgelauert $u tyaBen. 
SaBrinositc ijt gejldnbig, bie SBomBc geirorfen unb ©aBrito $rincir> 
bag Attentat mit ber SSroirning^iftole anggefitf)rt §u tyaBen. SBeibe 
$dter gaBen $u, Bei ber 33eruBung ber £at bie $(Bf?cfyt beg Stforbeg 
ge^aBt §u tyaBen. S)ie tr-eiteren Seile ber mintage ent^alten njeitere 
QlngaBen ber SBefdjuIbigten fcor bent llnterfudntnggrict/ter uBer @nt* 
jle^ung beg Jtont^Iottg, ^erfunft ber SBomBen, tcelct)e faBrifmdgig fjer= 
geftetft rcurben, fur militdrifcfye S^etfe Befiimntt tcaren unb iljrer 
Driginafyacfung nacfy aug bent ferBifcfyen SKaffenlager aug ^ragujei?ac 
ftammten. (Snblicf) giBt bie 35eitage Qlugfunft uBer ben Srang^ort ber 
brei 5lttentatcr unb ber Saffen Son <SerBien nacfy SBognien. Qlug bent 
treiteren Beugen^rotofoU ergiBt j!d), bafy ein Qlnge^origer ber 2ftonarcfyie 
etntge $age oor bent Qtttentat bent ofterreidn'f^=ungarifcl)en Jtonfulat in 
SBelgrab SWelbung $on ber SSermutung erjlatten oolite, bof ein $lan 
jur QSeruBtmg beg Qlttentatg gegen ben (Sr^er^og watyrmb beffen 5ln= 
lrefentyeit in SSognien Beftetye. 5)iefer Sftann foil nun burcfy SBelgraber 
$oli$eiorgane, rcelcfye i^n unntittelBar cor 93etreten beg JtonfuIatS aug 
nidjtigen ©ri'mben ijer^afteten, an ber ©rftattmtg ber Mbung uerf)inbert 
worben fein. SSeiter gelje aug bent 3 e "9en£n>toMl ^er^or, bag bie Be* 
treffenben $o!i$eiorgane oon bent ge^Ianten Vtttzntat ^enntnig 
ge^aBt fatten. 5)a biefe QtngaBen noc^ nic^t nad;ge^ruft flnb, fann 
i'tBer beren ©ti^^attigfeit oorldufig nocfy fein llrteil gefdHt werben. 3n 
ber SBeilage gum 3Kentoire tyetfrt eg : SSor bent ©nt^fanggfaal beg ferBifc^en 
Jtrieggntinifteriuntg Beftnben ficfy an ber SCanb i?ier attegorifcfye SBtlber, 
i?on betten brei 2)arpetlungen ferBifc^er ^rieggerfolge flnb, trd^renb bag 
fcierte bie 3SertrirHidntng ber ntonartfn'efeinblicfyen ^enben^en (SerBieng 



2o6 APPENDIX IV 

&erjlttri6itblid)t. Uefcer etner £cmbfd)aft, bie teits (Mirge (9Bo3nien), 
tetl§ (SBene (©ubungarn) barftcttt, gefjt bte Qoxa, bie 2ftorgenrote ber 
fer&tfd)en Ǥoffnungen, auf. 3m Sorbergnmbe jte^t cine fcewaffnete 
Srauengeftatt, auf berett ©djilbe bte tauten atler „nod) $u Befreienben 
9)ro&in$en " : 23o3men, «§er$egonjina, SBojwobtna, <3fynmen, ©almatten 
ufro. fte^en. 



APPENDIX V 

Extract from the Dispatch from His 
Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna re- 
specting the Rupture of Diplomatic 
Relations with the Austro- Hungarian 
Government. 

[Cd. 7596] 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. 

Sir, London, September 1, 19 14. 

The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led 
up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the 
time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I pro- 
pose now to add a few comments. 

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note 
to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the 
Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchirsky, who must have been 
aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none 
of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 
22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long 
interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of 
State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impres- 
sion that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to 
the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and 
that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain 
nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. 
At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that 
the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or 
that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. 
Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed 
been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true 



2o8 APPENDIX V 

character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the 
time we were speaking. 

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what 
was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of 
absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few 
days when events compelled him to return. It might have been 
supposed that Due Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian 
Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh 
complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the 
confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point 
of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for 
myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the 
impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received 
on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which 
I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all 
this time the " Neue Freie Presse " and other leading Viennese 
newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to 
war with Servia. The official " Fremdenblatt ", however, was more 
cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion 
among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses 
calculated to involve her in grave European complications. 

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. 
By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its 
integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, 
and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in 
Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was 
a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly 
corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that 
the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had 
broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of 
delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic 
songs till the small hours of the morning. 

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the 
most part of organised processions through the principal streets 
ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make 
hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated 
by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the 
principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the 
people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other 



APPENDIX V 209 

principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity 
of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt 
that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen 
by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly 
the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the 
people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited 
by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in 
many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the 
annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent 
Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little 
sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, 
and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for imme- 
diate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The 
country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative 
of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation 
at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been 
attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention 
of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great 
Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to 
be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country 
should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or 
prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity 
which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of 
Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the 
German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand 
aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced 
no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no 
effort should 'have been made to secure by means of diplo- 
matic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe 
as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian 
question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and 
intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of 
adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved 
upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied 
to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against 
Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria 
met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia 
again responded with results which have passed into history. The 
fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for 



210 APPENDIX V 

the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the 
European Crisis. 1 On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and 
urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned 
in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day 
should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settle- 
ment of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me 
a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had 
gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and 
she could never accept the conference which you had suggested 
should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis 
of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled 
directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said 
His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities 
could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European 
complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with 
Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, 
and pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these 
the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were 
bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of 
the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two 
countries might easily drift apart. 

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European 
aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that 
Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his 
assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His 
Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, 
though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about 
the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial con- 
ferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had 
much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was 
necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests 
which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly 
divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour 
throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the 
determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed 
with the invasion of Servia. 

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end 
in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals 
1 " Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." 



APPENDIX V 211 

in the interest of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from 
inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian 
Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and 
I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from 
the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully 
informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his 
own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko 
endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full 
powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations 
which had there been taking place between the latter and 
M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two 
days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had 
partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko 
again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to 
the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From 
now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much 
greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter 
an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August 
I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last 
conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof 
that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in 
the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the main- 
tenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko 
added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria 
would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in 
fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this 
point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the com- 
munication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, 
to the effect that Austria had neither " banged the door " on com- 
promise nor cut off the conversations. 1 M. Schebeko to the end 
was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory 
language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, 
as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. 
Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would 
hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been 
settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he 
was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. 

1 See No. 137, " Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914).' 
O 2 



212 APPENDIX V 

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and 
Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the 
more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany 
and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means 
of her doable ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The 
ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, 
and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on 
France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all prob- 
ability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in 
history. 

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko 
had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually 
be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold 
informed the foreign missions at Vienna that " the Austro-Hun- 
garian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to 
notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing 
attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that 
Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria- 
Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia." 

M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the 
Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had 
urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so 
that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was 
taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him 
at Berne. 

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. 
On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his 
passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed 
against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left 
Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from 
Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian 
troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement 
was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count 
Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been 
moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving 
from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way 
that they might replace German troops employed at the front. 
These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in 



APPENDIX V 213 

reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under 
instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's 
departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but 
his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a 
harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd 
assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured 
the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that 
the President of the Republic had been assassinated. 

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known 
in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on 
the 5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of 
Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the 
Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the 
text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details 
of the great events of these days transpired. The " Neue Freie 
Presse " was violently insulting towards England. The " Frem- 
denblatt " was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the 
columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of 
Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alter- 
native but to take part in the war. 

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, 
but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. 

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction 
of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of 
war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to 
be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did 
not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular 
communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You 
stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course 
expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without 
the notice required by diplomatic usage. 

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to 
receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been com- 
pelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French 
Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between 
France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war 
on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and 
that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under 
conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture 



2i 4 APPENDIX V 

having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask 
for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that 
you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would 
exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August. 
After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who 
accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that 
his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests 
in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, 
I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's 
Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at 
midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did 
not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long 
telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet 
been brought to him. His Excellency received my communica- 
tion with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the 
unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as 
Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, 
Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though 
diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I ex- 
plained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwel- 
come conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. . . . 



APPENDIX VI 



EXTRACTS FROM 

THE RUSSIAN ORANGE 
BOOK 

Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques : 
Negotiations ay ant pre'ce'de' la guerre 

™/^J U illet-^i 9I4 



PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI 

This important collection of documents, which has only 
reached us since the publication of our first edition, confirms 
the conclusion, which we had deduced from other evidence in 
our fifth chapter (supra, pp. 66-107), that Germany consistently 
placed obstacles in the way of any proposals for a peaceful 
settlement, and this in spite of the willingness of all the other 
Powers, including Austria-Hungary and Russia, to continue 
discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis took Russia 
by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors 
accredited to Paris, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts 
when friction began with Austria- Hungary. (Infra, Nos. 4, 7, 8.) 

The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany 
threatened to mobilize if Russia did not desist from military 
preparations. This threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an 
additional reason for taking all precautions ; ' since we cannot 
accede to Germany's desire, the only course open to us is to 
accelerate our own preparations and to assume that war is 
probably inevitable.' (Infra, No. 58.) The reader will also 
notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the 
German army and navy was published, only to be immediately 
withdrawn ; and that the German Government explained that the 
publication had been premature and accidental. (Infra, Nos. 61.62.) 
We know from the British White Book (Correspondence, No. 99, 
Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany 
showed signs of weakening in her attitude to Russia. 

It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia 
was not officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany 
had declared war on Russia. (Infra, No. 79.) 

In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the 
methods employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay 
the publication of the Servian reply to Austria-Hungary. 



[Type facsimile] 



MINISTERS BES AFFAIRES ETRAMERES. 



EECUEIL 



DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOIATIQUES. 



Negotiations ayant precede la guerre, 

10/ T .„ 24 TuiUet lnl A 

/23juillet^^^-r 1914. 



Petrograde. 

Imprimerie de PEiat. 

1914. 



N" i. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Belgrade, le 10 / 23 Juillet 19 14. 

Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, a 6 hemes du 
soir, au Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, 
une note ultimative de son Gouvernement flxant un delai de 
48 heures pour l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl 
a ajoute verbalement que pour le cas 011 la note ne serait pas 
acceptee integralement dans un delai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre 
de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la Legation. Pachitch 
et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en tournee electorate ont 
6t6 rappele's et sont attendus a Belgrade demain Vendredi a 
10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a communique le contenu 
de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et declare qu'aucun 
Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de 
l'Autriche. 

(Signd) Strandtman. 



N° 2. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Te'legramme). Belgrade, le 10 /23 Juillet 19 14. 

Texte de la note qui a ete transmise aujourd'hui parle Ministre 
d'Autriche-Hongrie au gouvernement Serbe : . . . 

[For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22 (supra in 
Appendix /.)] 

Un m^moire concernant les resultats de Finstruction de Sarajevo 
a l'egard des fonctionnaires mentionne's aux points 7 et 8 est 
annexe a cette note V 

(Sign^) Strandtman. 

1 This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3 {supra, 
Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book. 



22o APPENDIX VI 

No 3. 

Note Verbale transmise personnellement par TAmbassa- 
deur d'Autriche-Hongrie a St. -Peter sbourg au Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres le n / 2i Juillet 1914 a 10 heures 
du matin. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est trouvd dans la ne*ces- 
sit6 de remettre le Jeudi l0 / 2:i du mois courant, par l'entremise du 
Ministre Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au 
Gouvernement Royal de Serbie : 

(Suit le texte de la note). 

Voir document N° 2. 

N° 4. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'affaires 
en Autriche-Hongrie. 

(Tele'gramme). St.-Pe'tersbourg, le n / 2 4 Juillet 19 14. 

Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie ce qui suit. . . . 

[This communication is printed in the British White Book 
(Correspondence, No. if) ; see p. ijj supra for the text in English?^ 

Communique a Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

No 5. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants 
de Sa Majeste l'Empereur en Angleterre, en Alle- 
magne, en Italie et en France. 

(Te'legramme). St.-Pe'tersbourg, le 11 / 24 Juillet 19 14. 

Me refere a montelegramme a Koudachewd'aujourd'hui; nous 
espe'rons que le Gouvernement aupres duquel Vous etes accredit^ 
partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d'urgence a son Repre- 
sentant a Vienne de se prononcer dans le raeme sens. 

Communique a Belgrade. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

No 6. 

Telegramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent de 
Serbie a Sa Majesty 1'Empereur. 

Belgrade, le u / 24 Juillet 19 14. 
Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gou- 
vernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. 
Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie des les pre- 
miers jours de l'horrible crime a declare qu'elle le condamnait et 
qu'elle etait prete a ouvrir une enquete sur son territoire si la 
complicity de certains de ses sujets dtait prouvee au cours du 



APPENDIX VI 221 

proems instruit par les autorit^s Austro-hongroises. Cependant 
les demancles contenues dans la note Austro-hongroise sont inutile- 
ment humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignite 
comme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton 
peremptoire une declaration du gouvernement dans l'officiel et un 
ordre du souverain a l'armee, ou nous r^primerions l'esprit hostile 
contre l'Autriche en nous faisant a nous memes des reproches 
d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menses perfides. — On nous 
impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en 
Serbie pour participer avec les notres a l'instruction et pour sur- 
veiller l'execution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note. 
Nous avons regu un delai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute 
de quoi la Legation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous 
sommes prets a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont 
compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat independant, ainsi que 
celles dont l'acception nous sera conseilMe par Votre Majeste ; 
toutes les personnes dont la participation a l'attentat sera demon- 
tree seront severement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces 
demandes ne pourraient etre executees sans des changements de 
notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne un 
delai trop court. Nous pouvons etre attaques apres l'expiration 
du delai par Farmed austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre 
frontiere. II nous est impossible de nous defendre et nous sup- 
plions Votre Majeste de nous donner Son aide le plus tot possible. 
La bienveillance pr^cieuse de Votre Majeste qui s'est manifested 
tant de fois a, notre egard nous fait esperer fermement que cette 
fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son g6n6reux cceur 
slave. 

En ces moments difficiles J interprete les sentiments du peuple 
serbe qui supplie Votre Majeste de vouloir bien s'int^resser au 
sort du Royaume de Serbie. 

(Signe) Alexandre. 

N° 7. 

Le Charge d 'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

{Te'legramme). Berlin, le n / 24 Juillet 19 14. 

Tous les journaux du matin, meme ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent 
l'impossibilite pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posees, 
accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton 6nergique adopte 
par l'Autriche. L'officieux « Local- Anzeiger » est particulierement 
agressif ; il qualifie de superflus les recours eventuels de la Serbie 
a. St. Petersbourg, a Paris, a, Athenes et a Bucarest, et termine en 
disant que le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura 
appris que la situation dans la p^ninsule Balcanique va enfin 
s'eclaircir. 

(Signd) Bronewsky. 



222 APPENDIX VI 



No 8. 



Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Paris, le 11 /24 Juillet 1914. 

La copie de la note officiellement remise a Belgrade a ete 
communique^ par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche au Gouvernement 
Francais. Plus tard l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visite le 
Ministre et lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments 
autrichiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, 
l'Autriche serait obligee de recourir a une pression et, en cas 
de besoin, a des mesures militaires ; la communication se termi- 
nal par la remarque qu'a l'avis de l'Allemagne cette question 
devrait etre resolue directement entre l'Autriche et la Serbie et 
qu'il etait de l'interet des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire en 
l'abandonnant aux Parties interesse'es. Le Ge>ant du Departe- 
ment Politique, qui assistait a l'entretien, demanda a. l'Ambassa- 
deur s'il fallait considerer Taction autrichienne comme un 
ultimatum — en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas 011 la Serbie ne se 
soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes, les 
hostilites etaient inevitables ? L'ambassadeur evita une reponse 
directe en all^guant l'absence d'instructions. 

(Signe") Sevastopoulo. 

N° 9. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Belgrade, le n / 24 Juillet 19 14. 

Pachitch est rentre a, Belgrade. II a l'intention de donner dans 
le delai fixe, c'est a dire demain Samedi a 6 heures du soir, une 
reponse a l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inac- 
ceptables. On adressera aujourd'hui meme aux Puissances la 
priere de defendre l'independance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta 
Pachitch, si la guerre est inevitable — nous ferons la guerre. 

(Signe) Strandtman. 

N° 10. 
Communique du Gouvernement Imperial. 

St.-Petersbourg, le 12 / 25 Juillet 19 14. 
Les derniers evenements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un 
ultimatum a, la Serbie preoccupent le Gouvernement Imperial au 
plus haut degre\ Le Gouvernement suit attentivement revolution 
du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie 
indifferente. 



APPENDIX VI 223 

N° 11. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Vienne, le n / 25 Juillet 19 14. 

Le comte Berchtold se trouve a Ischl. Vu l'impossibilite d'y 
arriver a temps, je lui ai telegraphie notre proposition de pro- 
longer le delai de Pultimatum et l'ai repetee verbalement au Baron 
Macchio. Ce dernier m'a prom is de la communiquer a temps au 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, mais a ajoute qu'il pouvait predire 
avec assurance un refus categorique. 

(Signe) Koudachew. 

N° 12. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Vienne, le 12 / 2 5 Juillet 19 14. 

Suite a mon telegramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de 
Macchio la reponse negative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois 
a notre proposition de prolonger le delai de la note. 

(Signe) Koudachew. 

N° 13. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Belgrade, le 12 / 25 Juillet 19 14. 

Recu avec retard le 14 — 27 Juillet 19 14. 

Je transmets la reponse que le President du Conseil des Mi- 
nistres Serbe a remis au ministre Austro-Hongrois a Belgrade 
aujourd'hui avant l'expiration du delai de l'ultimatum. . . . 

[ The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book 
(Correspondence, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, 
pp. 23-32 (supra, Appendix I.] 

N° 14. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des 
affaires Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Berlin, le 12 /25 Juillet 1914. 

Ai recu Votre telegramme du 11 / 24 Juillet. Ai communique 
son contenu au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. II me dit que 
le Gouvernement Anglais l'a egalement prie de conseiller a Vienne 
la prolongation du delai de Pultimatum ; il a communique cette 



224 APPENDIX VI 

demarche telegraphiquement a. Vienne, il va en faire autant pour 
notre demarche, mais il craint qu'a la suite de l'absence de Berch- 
told parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses telegrammes 
ne restent sans resultats ; il a, en outre, des doutes sur l'opportu- 
nite pour l'Autriche de ceder au dernier moment et il se demande 
si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai 
repondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait ceder 
sans porter atteinte a son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments 
conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus precises. 
Merae lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir a Vienne pour 
eviter la possibility de consequences redoutables, le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres r^pondait chaque fois negativement. 

(Sign6) Bronewsky. 

No 15. 

Le Charge d'affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Tele'gramme). Paris, le 12 /25 Juillet 1914. 

Ai recu le telegram me du 11 / 2A Juillet concernant la prolonga- 
tion du delai de Pultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication 
prescrite. Le Representant de France a Vienne a e*te muni d'in- 
structions conformes. 

(Sign6) Sevastopoulo. 

No 16. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Londres, le 12 /25 Juillet 1914. 

Recu telegramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a present a, l'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne d'appuyer notre d-marche con- 
cernant la prolongation du de*lai de rultimatum. II m'a dit en 
meme temps que 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche ^tait venu le voir et 
avait explique" qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer a la note autrichienne 
le caractere d'un ultimatum ; il faudrait la consid^rer comme une 
d-marche qui, en cas d'absence de response ou en cas de reponse 
insuffisante au terme fixe^ aurait comme suite la rupture des rela- 
tions diplomatiques et le depart immediat de Belgrade du Ministre 
d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer cependant le commencement 
immediat des hostilites. — Grey a ajoute qu'a la suite de cette 
explication il a indique" a 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne 
que dans le cas ou il serait trop tard pour soulever la question de 
la prolongation du delai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arret des hostilites 
pourrait peut-etre servir de base a, la discussion. 

(Signe) BenckendorfT. 



APPENDIX VI 225 

No 17. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur 
a Londres. 

(Te'fegramme). St.-Pe'tersbourg, le 12 / 25 Juillet 1914. 

Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant 
provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, 
nous comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nette- 
ment du cote de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir 
l'^quilibre europe'en, en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constam- 
ment dans le passe et qui serait sans aucun doute compromis dans 
le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

No 18. 

Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le 12 / 25 Juillet 1914. 

II nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle repandue 
par quelques journaux d'apres laquelle la d-marche du Gouverne- 
ment d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade aurait e'te faite a Tinstigation 
de l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand 
n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant 
qu'elle ait e'te" remise et n'a exerce' aucune influence sur son con- 
tenu. C'est a tort qu'on attribue a l'Allemagne une attitude 
comminatoire. 

L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allie de l'Autriche 
les revendications a son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne 
contre la Serbie. 

Avant tout elle desire comme elle l'a d£ja declare des le 
commencement du differend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste 
localise. 

No 19. 

Le Charge d'affaires en France au Ministre des affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te7e 'gramme). Paris, le 12 /25 Juillet 1914. 

Me reTere a mon telegramme du 11 / 24 Juillet. 

Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a public, sous une forme 
pas entierement exacte, les declarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attri- 
buent a cette d-marche le caractere d'une menace. L'Ambassa- 
deur d'Allemagne, tres impressionne* par ces divulgations, a visite 
aujourd'hui le Gerant du D^partement Politique pour lui dire 
que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caractere de menace 
qu'on leur attribue. II a de'clare* que l'Autriche avait pre'sente' 
sa note a la Serbie sans entente precise avec Berlin, mais que 

P 3113 p 



226 APPENDIX VI 

cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche 
et que certainement 'la neche une fois partie' (ce sont la ses 
propres paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par 
ses devoirs d'alliee. 

(Signe") Sevastopoulo. 

N° 20. 

L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'Ugramme). Londres, le 12 / 25 Juillet 1914. 

Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a declare que 
le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas et^ informe du texte de la 
note autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entierement la demarche 
autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demande en meme temps si 
FAngleterre pouvait consentir a agir a St.-Pe'tersbourg dans un 
esprit de conciliation. Grey a repondu que cela etait complete- 
ment impossible. Le Ministre a ajoute que tant que les complica- 
tions n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les interets 
Anglais n'etaient engages qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait pre- 
voir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la 
mobilisation de la Russie et que des ce moment on se trouverait 
en presence d'une situation a laquelle seraient interessees toutes 
les Puissances. L' Angleterre se reservait pour ce cas une com- 
plete liberte d'action. 

(Sign£) Benckendorff. 

N° 21. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'le'gramme). Belgrade, le 12 / 25 Juillet 19 14. 

Malgre le caractere extremement conciliant de la reponse serbe 
a l'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, a 6Y 2 du 
soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas recu au 
delai nxe" une reponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le 
personnel de la Legation. La Scoupchtina est convoquee a Nich 
pour le 14 /27 Juillet. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplo- 
matique partent ce soir pour la meme ville. 

(Signe) Strandtman. 

N° 22. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Te'legramme). Londres, le 12 / 25 Juillet 1914. 

Grey a dit a. l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'a son avis la 
mobilisation autrichienne devait entrainer la mobilisation de la 



APPENDIX VI 227 

Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre gendrale et 
qu'il ne voyait qu'un seul moyen pour une solution pacifique : qu'en 
presence des mobilisations autrichienne et russe, PAllemagne, la 
France, l'ltalie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation 
immediate et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey m'a 
dit que ce plan necessitait avant tout l'agrdment de l'AUemagne et 
l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas mobiliser. En con- 
sequence il a adresse tout d'abord a Berlin une question ace sujet. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 

N° 23. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 

Italic 

(Telegramme). St. Petersbourg, le 13 /26 Juillet 1914. 

L'ltalie pourrait jouer un role de tout premier ordre en faveur 
du maintien de la paix, en exercant l'influence necessaire sur 
l'Autriche et en adoptant une attitude nettement defavorable au 
conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait etre localise. II est desirable 
que vous exprimiez la conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie 
de ne pas venir en aide a la Serbie. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

N° 24. 

Le Gerant du Consulat a Prague au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Prague, le 13 / 26 Juillet 19 14. 

La mobilisation a ete decretee. 

(Signe) Kazansky. 

N° 25. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 
Autriche-Hongrie. 

{Telegramme). St. Petersbourg, le 13 /26 Juillet 19 14. 

J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec 
l'Ambassadeur d' Autriche-Hongrie. Apres avoir examine avec lui 
les 10 demandes adressees a la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'a part 
la forme peu habile sous laquelle elles sont presentees, quelques- 
unes parmi elles sont absolument inexecutables, meme dans le cas 
011 le gouvernement Serbe declarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, 
par exemple, les points 1 et 2 ne pourraient etre executes sans un 
remaniement des lois serbes sur la presse et sur les associations, 
pour lequel le consentement de la Scoupchtina pourrait etre 
difficilement obtenu ; quant a l'execution des points 4 et 5, elle 
pourrait produire des consequences fort dangereuses et meme faire 

P 2 



228 APPENDIX VI 

naitre le danger dactes de terrorisme dirige*s contre les membres 
de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrerdans 
les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me 
semble, qu'avec certains changements dans les details, il ne serait 
pas difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y 
contenues etaient confirmees par des preuves suffisantes. 

Dans l'interet de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de 
Szapary, est precieuse a l'Autriche au meme degre qu'a toutes les 
Puissances, il serait ne'cessaire de mettre au plus tot possible une 
fin a la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semble- 
rait tres desirable que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fut 
autorise d'entrer avec moi dans un ecbange de vues prive* aux 
fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques articles de la note 
autrichienne du 10 /23 Juillet. Ce procede permettrait peut-etre de 
trouver une formule qui fut acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en 
donnant satisfaction a l'Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes. 
Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le sens de 
ce telegramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Communi- 
que aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et 
en Italic 

(Sign£) Sazonow. 



N° 26. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 
Allemagne. 

{Telegramme). St. Petersbourg, le 13 / 26 Juillet. 

Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon telegramme a Vienne 
d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Allemand et lui 
exprimer l'espoir, que de son cote il trouvera possible de conseiller 
a Vienne d'aller au-devant de notre proposition. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

N° 27. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Paris, le 13 / 26 Juillet 1914. 

Le Directeur du Departement Politique m'informe, que lors de 
la communication qu'il a faite a l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du con- 
tenu de la reponse serbe a l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas 
cache son etonnement de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donne* satisfaction a. 
Giesl. L'attitude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du 
Directeur du Departement Politique, produire la meilleure im- 
pression en Europe. 

(Signe) Sevastopoulo. 



APPENDIX VI 229 

No 28. 

Le Charge d' Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'le'gramme). Paris, le 13 /26 Juillet 1914. 

Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur dAllemagne a de nouveau rendu 
visite au Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et lui a fait 
les declarations suivantes : 

«L'Autriche a declare a la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des 
acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'integrite de la 
Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite. Par 
consequent il depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. L'Alle- 
magne se sent solidaire avec la Prance dans le desir ardent de 
conserver la paix et espere fermement que la France usera de son 
influence a Petersbourg dans un sens moderateur». Le Ministre 
fit observer que l'Allemagne pourrait de son cote entreprendre 
des demarches analogues a Vienne, surtout en presence de l'esprit 
de conciliation dont a fait preuve la Serbie. LAmbassadeur 
repondit que cela n'etait pas possible, vu la resolution prise de ne 
pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre 
demanda, si les quatre Puissances — l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, 
l'ltalie et la France — ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des demarches 
a St.-Petersbourg et a Vienne, puisque l'affaire se reduisait en 
somme a un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur 
allegua l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa 
d'adherer a la proposition allemande. 

(Signe) Sevastopoulo. 

N° 29. 

Le Charge d' Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Paris, le 12, / 2 q Juillet 19 14. 

Le Directeur du Departement Politique a declare qu'a son avis 
personnel, les d-marches successives allemandes a Paris ont pour 
but d'intimider la France et d'amener son intervention a St-Peters- 
bourg. 

(Sign£) Sevastopoulo. 

N° 30. 

Le Charge d* Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Berlin, le 13 /26 Juillet 19 14. 

Apres la reception a Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation 
de l'arm^e autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, com- 
posee, aux dires des journaux, en partie d'elements autrichiens, 



2 3 o APPENDIX VI 

se livra a une se*rie de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de 
l'Autriche. A une heure avancee de la soiree les manifestants 
se masserent a plusieurs reprises devant le palais de l'Ambassade 
Impe'riale en poussant des cris hostiles a. la Russie; la police 
e*tait presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure. 

(Sign£) Bronewsky. 

N° 31. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etr anger es. 

(Te'legramme). Londres, le 14 / 2 7 Juillet 19 14. 

Ai recu votre tel^gramme du 13-26 Juillet. Prie me tel£- 
graphier si, a Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet 
de Vienne s'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la media- 
tion des 4 Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur 
d' Angleterre a St.-Petersbourg que Vous etiez dispose a accepter 
cette combinaison, Grey a decide' de la transformer en une pro- 
position officielle qu'il a faite hier soir a Berlin, a Paris et a 
Rome. 

(Sign6) Benckendorff. 

N° 32. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs 
en France et en Angleterre. 

{Te'legramme). St.-Petersbourg, le u / 27 Juillet 19 14. 

[Printed in the British White Book (Correspondence, No. yj).] 

N° 33. 
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs 
en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche- 
Hongrie et en Italie. 

{Te'legramme). St.-Petersbourg, le 14 /27 Juillet 1914. 

Ai pris connaissance de la reponse transmise par le Gouverne- 
ment Serbe au Baron Giesl. Elle depasse toutes nos previsions 
par sa moderation et son desir de donner la plus complete satis- 
faction a l'Autriche. Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient etre 
encore les demandes de FAutriche, a moins que le Cabinet de 
Vienne ne cherche un pr^texte pour une guerre avec la Serbie. 

(Signe^ Sazonow. 
N° 34. 
Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Tele'gr amine). Paris, le u /27 Juillet 19 14. 

L'Ambassadeur d' Allemagne a confere aujourd'hui de nouveau 
longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du Departement 



APPENDIX VI 231 

Politique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insist^ sur l'exclusion de 
toute possibility d'une mediation ou d'une conference. 

(Signe) Sevastopoulo. 

N°35- 
L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Tek'gramme). Paris, le 14 /27 Juillet 19 14. 

Ai confe're avec le Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, 
en presence de Berthelot, immediatement apres mon relour a. 
Paris. Tous les deux m'ont confirme les details concernant les 
demarches de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous 
a communiques dans ses telegrammes. Ce matin le Baron de 
Schoen a confirme par e"crit sa declaration d'hier, savoir : 1) 
l'Autriche a declare a la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas d'ac- 
quisitions et n'attente pas a Fintegrite de la Serbie. Son unique 
but est d'assurer sa propre tranquillity. 2) Par consequent il 
depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. 3) L'Allemagne et la 
France, completement solidaires dans l'ardent d^sir de ne pas 
rompre la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens moderateur. 
Le Baron de Schoen a specialement souligne Fexpression de la 
solidarity entre l'Allemagne et la France. D'apres la conviction 
du Ministre de la Justice, les demarches susdites de l'Allemagne 
ont pour but evident de desunir la Russie et la France, d'entrainer 
le Gouvernement Francais dans la voie des representations a St- 
Petersbourg et de compromettre ainsi notre allie a nos yeux ; enfin, 
en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la responsabilite' non sur l'Allemagne, 
qui emploie soi-disant tous ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix, 
mais sur la Russie et la France. 

(Signe) Iswolsky. 

N°36. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Paris, le u / 21 Juillet 19 14. 

II ressort de vos telegrammes du 13 / 26 Juillet que vous ne connais- 
siez pas encore la rdponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le telegramme 
par lequel cette nouvelle m'a 6t6 communiquee de Belgrade a 6t6 
egalement en route pendant 20 heures. Le telegramme du 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Francais exp^die avant-hier, au 
triple tarif, a onze heures du matin, et contenant l'ordre d'appuyer 
notre demarche, n'est parvenu a sa destination qu'a 6 heures. II 
n'y a aucun doute que ce telegramme n'ait ete retenu intention - 
nellement par le teiegraphe autrichien. 

(Signe) Iswolsky. 



232 APPENDIX VI 

N° 37. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Paris, le 14 / 27 Juillet 19 14. 

D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche 
a communique au Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 
que la r^ponse de la Serbie a 6t6 }ug6e insufflsante a Vienne et 
que demain, mardi, 1' Autriche procederait a des ' actions ^nergi- 
ques' dont le but serait de forcer la Serbie de lui donner les 
garanties necessaires. Le Ministre ayant demand^ en quoi con- 
sisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur r^pondit qu'il n'avait pas 
de renseignements exacts a ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un 
passage da la frontiere serbe, d'un ultimatum et meme d'une 
declaration de guerre. 

(Sign6) Iswolsky. 

N« 38. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Berlin, le u /27 Juillet 19 14. 

J'ai prid le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'appuyer a Vienne 
votre proposition tendant a autoriser Szapary d'elaborer, par la voie 
d'un echange de vues prive" avec Vous, une redaction des demandes 
austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a 
repondu qu'il dtait au courant de cette proposition et qu'il 
partageait Favis de Pourtales que, puisque Szapary avait com- 
mence cette conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. II 
telegraphiera dans ce sens a l'Ambassadeur d' Allemagne a Vienne. 
Je l'ai prie de conseiller d'une facon plus pressante a Vienne de 
s'engager dans cette voie de conciliation ; Jagow a rdpondu qu'il 
ne pouvait pas conseiller a l'Autriche de c£der. 

(Signe) Bronewsky. 

N« 39. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Berlin, le 14 /27 Juillet 19 14. 

Aujourd'hui, avant-ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 
ce dernier avait regu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait 
tente" de lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative a une 
action en faveur de la paix, action qui serait exerce'e simultanement 
a St.-Petersbourg et a Vienne par l'Angleterre, 1' Allemagne, l'ltalie 
et la France. Cambon a propose" que ces Puissances donnent a 
Vienne un conseil dans les termes suivants : « S'abstenir de tout 
acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle». En 



APPENDIX VI 233 

adoptant cette formule voile'e on eViterait de mentionner la 
necessity de s'abstenir d'une invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a 
opposd a cette proposition un refus categorique, et cela malgre' 
les instances de l'Ambassadeur qui a fait valoir, comme un bon 
cote de la proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances grace 
auquel on eVitait l'opposition de 1' Alliance a PEntente, ce dont 
s'e'tait si souvent plaint Jagow lui-meme. 

(Signe) Bronewsky. 



N° 40. 

Telegramme de Sa Majeste Imperiale l'Empereur a Son 

Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du 

14 / 27 Juillet 1914. 

Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant a Moi dans un moment 
particulierement difficile ne s'est pas trompe'e sur les sentiments 
qui M'animent a Son egard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le 
peuple serbe. 

Ma plus s^rieuse attention est attiree par la situation actuelle et 
Mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les 
pr^sentes difficultes. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le 
Gouvernement Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tache en ne negli- 
geant rien pour arriver a une solution qui permette de prdvenir les 
horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignite' de 
la Serbie. 

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eViter une effusion de sang, 
tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre' Notre plus 
sincere de'sir, Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut etre 
assured qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se desinteVessera du sort de 
la Serbie. 

(Signe) Nicolas. 

N°4i. 

L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des 
Affaires Etr anger es. 

{Telegramme). Vienne, le 14 / 17 juillet 1914. 1 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres est absent. Pendant un 
entretien prolong^, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en 
termes tout a fait amicaux, attire' son attention sur l'impression 
deTavorable qu'a produite en Russie la presentation par l'Autriche 
a la Serbie de demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque 
£tat independant, bien que petit. J'ai ajoute que ce proce"d6, qui 
pourrait amener des complications les moins desirables, a provoque' 

1 Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27. 



234 APPENDIX VI 

en Russie une profonde surprise et une reprobation gene'rale. II 
faut supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence des assurances du 
Representant Allemand a. Vienne, lequel pendant toute cette crise 
a joue' un role d'instigateur, a compte sur la probability de la 
localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibility de 
porter a cette derniere impunement un coup grave. La declara- 
tion du Gouvernement Imperial concernant l'impossibilite pour 
la Russie de rester indifferente en presence d'un tel proce'de' a 
provoque ici une grande impression. 

(Sign6) Schebeko. 



N° 42. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Londres, le 14 /i7 Juillet 1914. 1 

Grey vient de repondre a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui etait 
venu le questionner sur la possibilite d'une action a, St.-Petersbourg, 
que cette action devrait se produire a, Vienne et que le cabinet de 
Berlin serait le mieux qualifie pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer 
en meme temps que la reponse serbe a la note autrichienne de- 
passait par sa moderation et son esprit de conciliation tout ce a 
quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a ajoute qu'il en concluait que 
la Russie avait conseille a Belgrade de donner une reponse moderee 
et qu'il pensait que la reponse serbe pouvait servir de base a, une 
solution pacifique et acceptable de la question. 

Dans ces conditions, a continue Grey, si l'Autriche malgre' cette 
reponse commencait les hostilites, elle prouverait son intention 
d'aneantir la Serbie. La question place'e sur ce terrain produirait 
une situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient 
impliqu^es toutes les Puissances. 

Grey a enfin declare que le Gouvernement Anglais etait bien 
sincerement dispose a collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand 
tant qu'il s'agirait de la conservation de la paix ; mais que pour le ■ 
cas contraire 1' Angleterre se reservait une pleine liberte d'action. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 

No 43. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 
Angleterre. 

{Telegramme). St.-P^tersbourg, le 15 /28 Juillet 19 14. 

[Pri?iied in the British White Book (Correspondence, No. 54)>] 

1 Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27. 



APPENDIX VI 235 



N° 44. 

Le Consul general a Fiume au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Tele'gramme). Fiume, le 15 / 28 Juillet 19 14. 

L'e'tat de siege a 6t6 proclam£ en Slavonie, en Croatie et a 
Fiume et en meme temps les reservistes de toutes les categories 
ont e'te' mobilises. 

(Signe*) Salviati. 



No 45. 

L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

(Tele gramme). Vienne, le 15 /28 Juillet 1914. 

\Printed in the British White Book (Correspondence, No. 0? (/)).] 



N° 46. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Berlin, le 15 /28 Juillet 19 14. 

Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publie le texte de la note responsive 
serbe qui lui avait ete communique. Jusqu'a ce moment cette 
note n'a paru in extenso dans aucun des journaux locaux, qui 
selon toute evidence ne veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs 
colonnes, se rendant compte de l'effet calmant que cette publica- 
tion produirait sur les lecteurs allemands. 

(Signe) Bronewsky. 



N° 47. 

L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Vienne, le 15 / 2 s Juillet, 19 14. 

Le decret sur la mobilisation g^nerale a ete' signe. 

(Sign£) Schebe'ko. 



236 APPENDIX VI 

N° 48. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur a 
Londres. 1 

Teligramme). St.-Petersbourg, le 15 /28 Juillet, 19 14. 

En presence des hostilites entre PAutriche-Hongrie et la Serbie 
il est ne'cessaire que PAngleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action 
mediatrice et que Taction militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie 
soit imme'diatement suspendue. Autrement la mediation ne 
servira que de pretexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la 
question et donnera entre temps a l'Autriche la possibility d'ecraser 
completement la Serbie et d'occuper une situation dominante dans 
les Balcans. 

Communique a Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

N° 49. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'Affaires 
en Allemagne. 

(Te'le'gramme). St.-Petersbourg, le 16 / 29 Juillet, 1914. 

[Printed in the British White Book (Correspondence, No. 93 (2)).] 

N° 50. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs 
en Angleterre et en France. 

{Tele'gramme). St.-Petersbourg, le 16 /29 Juillet 19 14. 

[Printed in the British White Book (Correspondence, No. 93 (j))-] 

No 51. 

Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

(Tele'gramme). Berlin, le 16 /29 Juillet 19 14. 

Sur ma question s'il avait une reponse de Vienne relativement 
a Votre proposition de pourparlers prives a St.-Petersbourg, le 
Secretaire d'Etat a repondu negativement. 

II declare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout 
ouvertement. Parlant a Cambon, il a meme ajoute qu'en cas d'une 
pression trop evidente l'Autriche se haterait de mettre 1* Allemagne 
en presence d'un fait accompli. 

1 An English (abbreviated) version of this telegram is given in the British 
White Book {Correspondence, No. 70 (2)). 



APPENDIX VI 237 

Le Secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il a recu aujourd'hui un telegramme 
de Pourtales d'011 il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous 
etes dispose a trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai 
replique que probablement Vous avez ete des le commencement 
en faveur d'un compromis, bien entendu a la condition qu'il soit 
acceptable non seulement pour l'Autriche, mais egalement pour 
nous. II m'a dit ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commence 
a mobiliser sur la frontiere autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci 
rendrait plus difficile pour l'Autriche la possibility de s'entendre 
avec nous, d'autant plus que l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre 
la Serbie et ne faisait pas de preparatifs sur notre frontiere. J'ai 
repondu que, d'apres les renseignements dont je disposals, 
l'Autriche mobilisait egalement sur notre frontiere et que par 
consequent nous devions prendre des mesures analogues. J'ai 
ajoute que les mesures que nous avons peut-etre prises de notre 
cote n'etaient nullement dirigees contre l'Allemagne. 

(Signe) Bronewsky. 



N° 52. 

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Nich, le 16 /29 Juillet 19 14. 

Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, au nom de son Gouverne- 
ment, a declare a Pachitch que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralite. 

(Signe") Strandtman. 



N°53 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Paris, le 16 /<^ Juillet 1914. 

A l'occasion de Parrive'e du President de la Republique Fran- 
chise le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres avait prepare* un court 
expose* de la situation politique actuelle, a peu pres dans les termes 
suivants : L'Autriche, craignant la decomposition inte'rieure, s'est 
emparee du prdtexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'ob- 
tenir des garanties qui pourront revetir la forme de l'occupation 
des communications militaires serbes ou meme du territoire serbe. 
L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix depend 
de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit etre 
«localis^e» entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est a. dire de la punition 
de la politique prdce'dente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'ave- 
nir. De ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action 



238 APPENDIX VI 

moderatrice a, Petersbourg. Ce sophisme a etc refute a, Paris 
comme a. Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a en vain tache 
d'entrainer la France a une action solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur 
la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les memes tentatives 
ont 6t6 faites a, Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a e'te repondu 
que Taction devrait etre exercee a Vienne, car les demandes exces- 
sives de 1'Autriche, son refus de discuter les rares reserves de la 
Serbie, et la declaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre 
generate. La France et PAngleterre ne peuvent exercer une action 
moderatrice sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus 
grande moderation, surtout en conseillant a la Serbie d'accepter 
ce qui etait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui l'Alle- 
magne parait renoncer a l'idee d'une action sur la Russie seule et 
incline vers une action mediatrice a, Petersbourg et a, Vienne, 
mais en meme temps l'Allemagne comme 1'Autriche tachent de 
faire trainer 1'afTaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose a la Conference sans 
indiquer aucune autre maniere d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mene 
des pourparlers manifestement dilatoires a Petersbourg. En meme 
temps elle prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont toie- 
rees, ses pretentions augmenteront proportionnellement. II est tres 
desirable que la Russie prete tout son appui au projet de media- 
tion que presentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire 1'Autriche, 
sous pr^texte de «garantie», pourra, en fait, changer le status terri- 
torial de l'Europe orientale. 

(Signe) Iswolsky. 



No 54. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etr anger es. 

(Telegramme). Londres, le 16 / 29 Juillet 19 14. 

Ai communique le contenu de Vos teiegrammes du 15 / 2S Juillet 
a Grey. II a declare aujourd'hui a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que 
les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et 1'Autriche avaient echoue, 
et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Peters- 
bourg que la Russie mobilisait contre 1'Autriche a la suite de la 
mobilisation de cette derniere. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gou- 
vernement Allemand s'est declare en faveur de la mediation, mais 
qu'il rencontre des dimcultes quant a la forme. Grey a insiste 
pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquat la forme laquelle a. 
l'avis de TAUemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 Puissances d'exercer 
leur mediation pour eviter la guerre ; vu le consentement de la 
France, de l'ltalie et de 1' Angleterre la mediation pourrait avoir 
lieu seulement dans le cas ou l'Allemagne consentirait a se ranger 
du cote de la paix. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 



APPENDIX VI 239 

N°55- 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

{Telegramme). Paris, le 16 / 29 Juillet 19 14. 

Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entiere resolution du Gouverne- 
ment Fran9ais d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette resolution est 
soutenue par les cercles les plus etendus et par les partis, y 
compris les radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui presenter une 
declaration exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patrio 
tiques du groupe. Des son arrivee a. Paris, Viviani a telegraphie 
d'urgence a Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs 
entre Petersbourg et Vienne il £tait ndcessaire que le Cabinet de 
Londres renouveiat le plus tot possible sous telle ou autre forme 
sa proposition concernant la mediation des Puissances. Avant 
moi Viviani a recu aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui 
lui a renouvele* l'assurance des tendances pacifiques de l'Allemagne. 
Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Allemagne desirait la paix elle 
devrait se hater d'adherer a la proposition de mediation anglaise, 
le Baron Schoen a repondu que les mots « conference* ou 
« arbitrage* erTrayaient 1'Autriche. Viviani a replique qu'il ne 
s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre 
forme de mediation. D'apres l'avis du Baron de Schoen, pour le 
succes des negociations entre les Puissances il serait n^cessaire de 
savoir ce que 1'Autriche compterait demander a la Serbie. Viviani 
a repondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en 
enqu^rir aupres de 1'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note 
responsive serbe pourrait servir de base a la discussion ; il a 
ajoute que la France ddsirait sincerement la paix, mais qu'elle 
etait en meme temps resolue d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses 
allies et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se con- 
vaincre que cette resolution rencontrait la plus vive approbation 
du pays. 

(Signe) Iswolsky. 

N« 56. 

Telegramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre 
de Serbie a sa Majeste l'Empereur. 

Profondement touche par le telegramme que Votre Majeste a 
bien voulu M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de 
tout mon coeur. Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuadee que la 
cordiale sympathie, dont Votre Majeste est animee envers Mon 
pays, nous est particulierement precieuse et remplit notre ame de 
l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est assure etant devenu l'objet de 
la Haute sollicitude de Votre Majeste. Ces moments penibles ne 
peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui 
unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russie slave, et les sentiments de 



2 4 o APPENDIX VI 

reconnaissance cternelle pour l'aide et la protection de Votre 
Majeste seront conserves pieusement dans Fame de tous les 
Serbes. 

(Sign£) Alexandre. 

No 57. 

Le Charge d' Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Nich, le 1G / &d Juillet 19 14. 

J'ai communique a Pachitch le texte du te'le'gramme responsif 
de Sa Majeste PEmpereur au Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apres 
l'avoir lu, se signa et dit : « Seigneur ! Le Tzar est grand et clement* ! 
Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'emotion qui l'avait 
gagne. L'heritier est attendu a Nich dans la nuit. 

(Signe) Strandtman. 

No 58. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 

France. 

(Telegramme). St. Petersbourg, le 16 /29 Juillet 1914. 

Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communique la 
resolution prise par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie 
ne cessait pas ses preparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons com- 
mence ces derniers qu'a la suite de la mobilisation a laquelle avait 
deja proce'de l'Autriche et vu l'absence e"vidente chez cette 
derniere du d^sir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution 
pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie. 

Puisque nous ne pouvons pas acce'der au desir de l'Allemagne, 
il ne nous reste que d'accele'rer nos propres armements et de 
compter avec rinevitabilite probable de la guerre. — Veuillez en 
avertir le Gouvernement Francais et lui exprimer en meme temps 
notre sincere reconnaissance pour la declaration que l'Ambassadeur 
de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons 
compter entierement sur l'appui de notre allie'e de France. Dans 
les circonstances actuelles cette declaration nous est particuliere- 
ment pr^cieuse. Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, 
Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

No 59. 

Le Charge d 5 Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(TeMgramme). Nich, le 17 /3o Juillet 191 4. 

Le Prince- Regent a publie hier un manifeste signe par tous les 
Ministres a l'occasion de la declaration de la guerre par TAutriche 



APPENDIX VI 241 

a la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes : 
«DeYendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie ». Lors de 
l'ouverture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le Regent lut en son nom 
le discours du trone, au d6but duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la 
convocation de'montrait l'importance des evenements actuels. Suit 
l'expose des faits des derniers jours — l'ultimatum autrichien, la 
reponse serbe, les efforts du gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce 
qui dtait compatible avec la dignite de l'Etat pour eviter la guerre 
et enfin l'agression armee du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie, 
aux cote's de laquelle se tient le Montenegro. En passant a l'examen 
de l'attitude des Puissances en presence du conflit, le Prince insista 
tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est animee la Russie et sur 
laTouteGracieuse Communication de sa Majeste l'Empereur disant 
que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque 
mention du nom de Sa Majeste Imperiale et de la Russie un «jivio» 
formidable et febrile secouait la salle des stances. Les marques 
de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent aussi 
relevees separ^ment et provoquerent des «jivio» d'approbation de 
la part des deputes. Le discours du trone se termine par la declara- 
tion d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par l'expression du vceu 
que toutes les mesures soient prises pour faciliter la tache du 
Gouvernement. 

(Signe) Strandtman. 

N° 60. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en 

Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, 

et en Italie. 

{Telegramme). St. Petersbourg, le 17 / 80 Juillet 19 14. 

L'Ambassadeur d' Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a de- 
mande si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que 
1'Autriche pourrait donner — de ne pas porter atteinte a l'integrite 
du Royaume de Serbie — et indiquer a quelles conditions nous 
pourrions encore consentir a suspendre nos armements; je lui 
ai dicte, pour etre transmise d'urgence a Berlin, la declaration 
suivante : «Si 1'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro- 
serbe a assume^ le caractere d'une question europeenne, se declare 
prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte 
aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage a cesser ses 
preparatifs militaires.» 

Veuillez tel^graphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouverne- 
ment Allemand en presence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre d^sir 
de faire le possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car 
nous ne pouvons pas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne 
servent qu'a faire gagner du temps a l'Allemagne et a 1'Autriche 
pour leurs preparatifs militaires. 

(Sign^) Sazonow. 

P 3113 Q 



242 APPENDIX VI 

N°6i. 

L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Berlin, le 17 /3o Juillet 19 14. 

J'apprends que le decret de mobilisation de l'armee et de la 
flotte allemandes vient d'etre promulgue. 

(Signe) Swerbeew. 

No 62. 

L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Berlin, le 17 /3o Juillet 19 14. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me telephoner 
pour me communiquer que la nouvelle lancee tout a l'heure de la 
mobilisation de l'armee et de la flotte allemandes est fausse ; que 
les feuillets des journaux etaient imprime's d'avance en provision 
de toutes eVentualites, et mis en vente a l'heure de l'apres-midi, 
mais que maintenant ils sont confisques, 

(Signe) Swerbeew. 

N° 63. 

L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Berlin, le 17 /3o Juillet 19 14. 

Ai recu Votre telegramme du 16-29 Juillet et ai transmis le 
texte de Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 
que je viens de voir ; il m'a dit qu'il avait recu un telegramme 
identique de l'Ambassadeur d' Allemagne a St.-P£tersbourg et m'a 
declare ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour 
l'Autriche. 

(Signe) Swerbeew. 

No 64. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 19 14. 

Ai communique le contenu de Vos telegrammes du 16 et 17 
Juillet a Grey lequel considere la situation comme tres serieuse, 
mais desire continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer a Grey 
que depuis que Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout 
ce qu'il proposerait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que 
l'Autriche ne put profiter de ces atermoiements pour ^eraser la 
Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous vous trouviez s'dtait appa- 
remment modifie'e. A cette £poque nos rapports avec l'Allemagne 
n'etaient pas compromis. Apres la declaration de l'Ambassadeur 



APPENDIX VI 243 

d'Allemagne a St.-Petersbourg concernant la mobilisation alle- 
mande, ces rapports avaient change* et sa demande avait re9u de 
Votre part la seule rdponse que pouvait donner une grande Puis- 
sance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne e'tait revenu aupres 
de Vous et s'etait enquis de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez 
formule'es dans des circonstances tout-a-fait speciales. J'ai en 
meme temps de nouveau insiste aupres de Grey sur la necessity 
de prendre en consideration la situation nouvelle cre'e'e par la 
faute de l'Allemagne a la suite de Taction de l'Ambassadeur d'Alle- 
magne. Grey a repondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait 
compte de ces arguments. 

(Sign6) Benckendorff. 

No 65. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Londres, le ll /% Juillet 19 14. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demande* a Grey pour quelle 
raison l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur 
mer. Grey a repondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractere 
agressif, mais que la situation e'tait telle que chaque Puissance 
devait se preparer. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 

No 66. 

L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des 

Affaires Etrangeres. 

{Te'legramme). Vienne, le 18 / 31 Juillet 19 14. 

Malgre' la mobilisation generale je continue a ^changer des vues 
avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent 
sur l'absence chez l'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques 
contre la Russie et de vis^es de conquete a l'egard de la Serbie, 
mais tous insistent e"galement sur la n^cessite' pour l'Autriche de 
poursuivre jusqu'au bout Faction commenced et de donner a la 
Serbie une lecon serieuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine 
garantie pour l'avenir. 

(Sign£) Schdbeko. 
N° 67. 
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs 
en Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angle- 
terre et en Italie. 1 
(Tele'gramme). St. Petersbourg, le 18 / 31 Juillet 1914. 

Me refere a mon telegramme du 17 / 30 Juillet. D'ordre de son 
gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d' Angleterre m'a transmis le desir 

1 The second paragraph is printed in the British "White Book {Correspondence, 
No. 132). 

Q2 



244 APPENDIX VI 

du Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans 
la formule que j'ai proposed hier a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. 
J'ai rdpondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous 
je vous transmets la formule modified en consequence. 

1 Si l'Autriche consent a, arreter la marche de ses armees sur le 
territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a 
assum6 le caractere d'une question d'interet europe'en, elle admet 
que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie 
pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser 
porter atteinte a ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son inde'pen- 
dance, — la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante.' 

(Sign£) Sazonow. 



N°68. 

L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

[Telegramme). Berlin, le 18 /3i Juillet 19 14. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me dire que nos 
pourparlers, qui dtaient deja difiiciles a la suite de la mobilisation 
contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en presence des 
graves mesures militaires que nous prenons contre 1' Allemagne ; 
des nouvelles y relatives sont, d'apres lui, regues ici de tous les 
cote's et devront provoquer inevitablement des mesures analogues 
de la part de 1' Allemagne. A eel a j'ai r^pondu que, d'apres des 
renseignements surs dont je disposais et qui etaient confirmes par 
tous nos compatriotes arrivant a Berlin, la prise contre nous des 
mesures susdites se poursuivait egalement en Allemagne avec 
grande activite. Malgre cela, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 
affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les ofneiers de leurs conges 
et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres. 

(Signe) Swerbeew. 

N 69. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en 
Angleterre. 

(Te7/gramme). St.-Pe'tersbourg, le 18 /3i Juillet 1914. 

J'ai prie l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre a Grey 
l'expression de ma plus sincere reconnaissance pour le ton amical 
et ferme dont il a us6 pendant les pourparlers avec 1' Allemagne 
et l'Autriche, grace a quoi l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique 
de la situation actuelle n'est pas encore perdu. 

Je l'ai aussi prie de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que 



APPENDIX VI 245 

ce n'e'tait qu'a Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quel- 
ques chances d'un succes quelconque, en facilitant a l'Autriche la 
ne'cessite d'un compromis. 

Communique a l'Ambassadeur en France. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

N° 70. 

Telegramme secret aux Representants de Sa Majeste 
l'Empereur a l'etranger. 

(Telegramme). Le 19 Juillet/i Aout 19 14. 

A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a declare, d'ordre de 
son Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est-a-dire a midi, 
Samedi, nous ne commencions pas la demobilisation, non seule- 
ment a l'egard de PAllemagne, mais aussi a l'egard de l'Autriche, 
le Gouvernement Allemand serait force' de donner l'ordre de 
mobilisation. A ma question si c'etait la guerre, l'Ambassadeur 
a repondu par la negative, mais en ajoutant que nous e'tions fort 
pres d'elle. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 

N° 71. 

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Tele'gramme). Londres, 19 Juillet/i Aout 1914. 

Grey m'a dit qu'il a telegraphie a Berlin qu'a son avis la der- 
niere formule acceptee par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la 
base de negociations qui presente le plus de chances pour une 
solution pacifique du conflict. II a exprime' en raeme temps 
l'espoir qu'aucune grande Puissance ne commencerait les hostilite's 
avant l'examen de cette formule. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 

N° 72. 

L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Telegramme). Londres, le 19 Juillet/i Aout 19 14. 

Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a pose* aux Gouverne- 
ments Francais et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la 
neutralite de la Belgique. 

La France a repondu dans l'affirmative, tandis que le Gouverne- 
ment Allemand a declare* ne pouvoir r^pondre a cette question 
cate'goriquement. 

(Signe) Benckendorff. 



246 APPENDIX VI 

N° 73. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

{Tele'gramme). Paris, le 19 Juillet/i Aout 19 14. 

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visits hier Viviani et lui a declare* 
que l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter 
atteinte a l'inte'grite territoriale de la Serbie, mais etait prete 
a discuter avec les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec 
la Serbie. Le Gouvernement Francais est tres preoccupe par les 
pr^paratifs militaires extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontiere 
fran9aise, car il est convaincu que sous le voile du «Kriegszu- 
stand » se produit une veritable mobilisation. 

(Sign£) Iswolsky. 

N° 74. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Tele'gramme). Paris, le 19 Juillet/i Aout 19 14. 

A la reception ici du telegramme de l'Ambassadeur de France 
a St.-Petersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faite 
TAmbassadeur Allemand concernant la resolution de l'Allemagne 
de decreter aujourd'hui la mobilisation generale, le President de 
la Republique a signe le d^cret de mobilisation. Dans les rues 
on procede a l'affichage des listes d'appel des reservistes. 
L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite a Viviani, 
mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvelle communication, en alleguant 
l'impossibilite' de d^chiffrer les telegrammes qu'il a re9us. Viviani 
l'a informe* de la signature du decret de mobilisation en reponse 
a la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait part de son etonnement 
de ce que l'Allemagne eut pris une telle mesure a un moment ou 
se poursuivait encore un echange de vues amical entre la Russie, 
l'Autriche et les Puissances ; il a ajoute que la mobilisation ne 
prejugeait pas n^cessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne pourrait rester a Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de 
Russieest reste* a Vienne et celui d'Autriche a St-P^tersbourg. 

(Signe*) Iswolsky. 

No 75. 

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

(Te'legramme). Paris, le 19 Juillet/i Aout 19 14. 

Je tiens du President que pendant les dernieres journeys 
l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a assure* avec force le President du 



APPENDIX VI 247 

Conseil des Ministres et lui meme, que l'Autriche nous aurait 
declare etre prete a, respecter non seulement l'inte'grite' territoriale 
de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous 
aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur cette declaration. 
J'ai oppose un dementi categorique a cela. 

(Signe) Iswolsky. 

N° 76. 

Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-Peters- 
bourg le 19 Juillet 1914 a 7 h. 10 du soir. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la 
crise de la mener a, une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir 
qui lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, 
Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre 
s'e'tait applique a accomplir un role m^diateur aupres des Cabinets 
de Vienne et de St.-Pe'tersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre 
le resultat, proce'da a la mobilisation de la totality de ses forces de 
terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menacante motive e 
par aucun presage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, FEmpire 
Allemand s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si 
le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce p£ril, il aurait 
compromis la securite et l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Par 
consequent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit force de s'adresser 
au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies 
en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La Russie 
ayant refuse de faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre a 1 ) 
cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus (cette attitude x ) 
que son action etait dirigee contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, 
d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir a Votre Excellence 
ce qui suit : 

Sa Majeste l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au 110m de 
l'Empire, relevant le defi se considere en e*tat de guerre avec la 
Russie. 

St.-Pe'tersbourg, le 19 Juillet/ 1 Aout 19 14. 

(Signe) F. Pourtales. 

N° 77. 

Communique du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres con- 

cernant les evenements des derniers jours. 

Le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. 

Un expose* ddfigurant les evenements des derniers jours ayant 
paru dans la presse dtrangere, le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 

x ) Les mots places entre parentheses se trouvent dans l'original. II faut 
supposer que deux variantes avaient ete preparees d'avance et que par erreur 
elles ont et^ inserees toutes les deux dans la note. 



248 APPENDIX VI 

croit de son devoir de publier l'apercu suivant des pourparlers 
diplomatiques pendant le temps susvise. 

Le 10/23 Juillet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade 
presenta au Ministre President Serbe une note oil le Gouverne- 
ment Serbe etait accuse" d'avoir favorise le mouvement panserbe 
qui avait abouti a. l'assassinat de l'heritier du trone austro-hongrois. 
En consequence rAutriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement 
Serbe non seulement de condamner sous une forme solennelle la 
susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le controle de 
l'Autriche-Hongrie, une serie de mesures tendant a la decouverte 
du complot, a la punition des sujets serbes y ayant participe et 
a la prevention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le sol du Royaume. 
Un delai de 48 heures fut fixe au Gouvernement Serbe pour la 
reponse a la susdite note. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- 
Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg avait communique le texte de la note 
1 7 heures apres sa remise a Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des 
demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi 
elles etaient inexecutables quant au fond,tandis que d'autres etaient 
presentees sous une forme incompatible avec la dignite d'un Etat 
independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignite 
de la Serbie contenue dans ces demandes, ainsi que la tendance 
de rAutriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa preponderance dans les Balcans 
demontree par ces memes exigences, le Gouvernement Russe fit 
observer dans la forme la plus amicale a l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il 
serait desirable de soumettre a un nouvel examen les points con- 
tenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Austro- 
Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir a une discussion de la 
note. L'action moderatrice des autres Puissances a Vienne ne 
fut non plus couronn^e de succes, 

Malgre* que la Serbie eut reprouve" le crime et se fut montree 
prete a donner satisfaction a l'Autriche dans une mesure qui 
depassa les previsions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des 
autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade jugea 
la reponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette ville. 

Reconnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees par 
l'Autriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait 
impossible de rester indifferente, sans se refuser toutefois a employer 
tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue paciflque qui fut acceptable 
pour l'Autriche et menageat son amour-propre de grande puissance. 
En meme temps la Russie etablit fermement qu'elle admettait une 
solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui 
n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignite" de la Serbie comme 
Etat independant. Malheureusement tous les efforts d^ployds 
par le Gouvernement Imperial dans cette direction resterent sans 
effet. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, apres s'etre derobe a 
toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son conflit 



APPENDIX VI 249 

avec la Serbie, proceda a la mobilisation, declara officiellement la 
guerre a la Serbie, et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombarde'e. Le 
manifeste qui a accompagne' la declaration de guerre accuse ouverte- 
ment la Serbie d'avoir prepare et execute le crime de Serai'ewo. 
Une pareille accusation d'uii crime de droit commun lancee contre 
tout un peuple et tout un Etat attira a la Serbie par son inanite' 
evidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la socidte europeenne. 

A la suite de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernement Austro- 
Hongrois, malgre la declaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait 
rester indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Imperial 
jugea necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions 
militaires de Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une 
telle decision s'imposait parce que depuis la date de la remise de 
la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement Serbe et les premieres 
demarches de la Russie cinq jours s'dtaient e'coules, et cependant 
le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant 
de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la mobilisation de la 
moitie de l'armee austro-hongroise avait etd decretee. 

Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures 
prises par la Russie ; il lui fut en meme temps explique qu'elles 
n'etaient que la consequence des armements autrichiens et nulle- 
ment dingoes contre l'Allemagne. En meme temps, le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial declara que la Russie etait prete a continuer les 
pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la 
voie de negociations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soit en 
suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une 
Conference des quatre Grandes Puissances non interessees di- 
rectement, voire l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'ltalie. 

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie e^choua egalement. 
L'Autriche-Hongrie declina un echange de vues ulterieur avec 
nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se d£roba a la participation a la 
Conference des Puissances projete'e. 

N^anmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur 
de la paix. Repondant a la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Alle- 
magne, a quelles conditions nous consentirions encore a suspendre 
nos armements, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres declara que 
ces conditions seraient la reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie 
que la question Austro-Serbe avait revetu le caractere d'une 
question europeenne, et la declaration de cette meme Puissance 
qu'elle consentait a ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles 
avec les droits souverains de la Serbie. 

La proposition de la Russie fut jugee par l'Allemagne inaccep- 
table pour l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanement on regut a St- 
Petersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation 
generale par TAutriche-Hongrie. 

En meme temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoire 
Serbe et Belgrade fut bombardee derechef. 



250 APPENDIX VI 

L'insucces de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'elargir 
les mesures de precaution militaires. 

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adresse une question a. ce 
sujet, il lui fut repondu que la Russie etait forcee de commencer 
ses armements pour se premunir contre toutes eventualites. 

Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en 
discontinuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une 
issue de cette situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout 
moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait l'observation des 
conditions posees par nous. 

Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Alle- 
mand, le 18 / 31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la demande 
d'avoir a suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du 19 Juillet/ 
1 Aout, en menagant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une- 
mobilisation gendrale. 

Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/ 1 Aout, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne 
transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, au nom de son 
Gouvernement, la declaration de guerre. 

N° 78. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants 
de S. M. l'Empereur a l'etranger. 

{Telegramme). St.-Petersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 19 14. 

II est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce des a present 
de rejeter sur nous la responsabilite' de la rupture. Notre mobili- 
sation a 6t6 provoquee par l'e'norme responsabilite que nous aurions 
assumee, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution 
a un moment ou l'Autriche, se bornant a des pourparlers d'un 
caractere dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procedait a une mobi- 
lisation gdnerale. 

Sa Majeste' l'Empereur s'dtait engage vis-a-vis de l'Empereur 
d'Allemagne par sa parole a n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif 
tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Apres une 
telle garantie et apres toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie 
pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de 
notre declaration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue 
pacifique compatible avec la dignity et l'independance de la Serbie. 
Une autre issue, tout en £tant completement incompatible avec 
notre propre dignite, aurait certainement ebranle l'equilibre Euro- 
pean, en assurant l'heg^monie de l'Allemagne. Ce caractere 
Europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important 
que le pr&exte qui Fa cre^. Par sa decision de nous declarer la 
guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les negociations entre les 
Puissances, l'Allemagne a assume une lourde responsabilite. 

(Signe) Sazonow. 



APPENDIX VI 251 

N° 79. 

Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a 

St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 

le 24 Juillet a 6 h. du soir. 

D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigne* Ambassadeur d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur 
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Russie ce qui suit : 

«Vu l'attitude menacante prise par la Russie dans le conflit 
entre la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en presence 
du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'apres une communica- 
tion du Cabinet de Berlin, a cm devoir ouvrir les hostilites contre 
l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par consequent en etat de 
guerre avec ladite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considere 
egalement en etat de guerre avec la Russie a partir du present 
moment. 

(Signd) Szapary. 
St.-Petersbourg. 
6 Aout/24 Juillet 1914. 



APPENDIX VII 



EXTRACTS FROM THE 

BELGIAN GREY BOOK 

(Correspondance diplomatique relative d la Guerre de 1914) 



PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VII 

The points of interest in the Belgian Grey Book are not 
very numerous. But we see how early in the development of 
the Servian imbroglio the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
M. Davignon, made preparations to meet a possible invasion 
(No. 2, No. 8). We see also that France, on July 31, before 
she was approached by Sir Edward Grey on the subject, gave 
assurances that she would not violate Belgian neutrality 
(No. 9). On the same day M. Davignon wrote to the represen- 
tatives of Belgium at Berlin, London, and Paris, authorizing 
them to state that Belgium would do her utmost to defend her 
neutrality (No. n). In No. 12 we are told of the assurances 
given by Germany, privately in 191 1 and publicly in 1913, of 
her intention to respect Belgian neutrality ; and we learn that 
these assurances were confirmed by the German Minister 
at Brussels on July 31, 1914. The text of the German ultima- 
tum of August 2 to Belgium, and the. interview of Baron van 
der Elst with the German Minister at Brussels in the small 
hours of August 3, give the excuses alleged by Germany for 
her invasion of Belgium (Nos. 21, 20). The case for Belgian 
neutrality is stated clearly and with dignity in the reply given 
on August 3 to the German ultimatum (No. 22). We are 
given also the precise terms of the offers of support given by 
Great Britain to Belgium (Nos. 28, 49), and of very interesting 
offers by Great Britain to Holland and Norway (No. 37). 



APPENDIX VII 

N° 2. 

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
etr anger es, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Berlin, Londres, 
Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Gouvernement du Roi s'est demande si, dans les circon- 
stances actuelles, il n'y aurait pas lieu d'adresser aux Puis- 
sances qui ont garanti son independance et sa neutrality, une 
communication destinee a leur confirmer sa resolution de 
remplir les devoirs internationaux que lui imposent les traites 
au cas ou une guerre viendrait a eclater aux frontieres de la 
Belgique. 

II a ete amene a la conclusion qu'une telle communication 
serait prematuree a l'heure presente mais que les evenements 
pourraient se precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps de faire 
parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes a ses 
representants a l'etranger. 

Dans cette situation, j'ai propose au Roi et a mes collegues 
du Cabinet, qui se sont rallies a ma maniere de voir, de vous 
donner, des a present, des indications precises sur la demarche 
que vous auriez a faire si l'eventualite d'une guerre franco- 
allemande devenait plus menacante, 

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signee, mais non datee 
dont vous aurez a donner lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre 
des Affaires etrangeres si les circonstances exigent cette 
communication. 

Je vous indiquerai par telegramme le moment d'agir. 

Le telegramme vous sera adresse a l'heure ou la mobilisation 
de l'armee beige sera decretee, si, contrairement a notre 
sincere espoir, et aux apparences de solution pacifique, nos 
renseignements nous amenaient a prendre cette mesure 
extreme de precaution. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



256 APPENDIX VII 

Annexe au N° 2. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

La situation internationale est grave ; Teventualite d'un 
conflit entre plusieurs puissances ne peut etre ecartee des 
preoccupations du gouvernement du Roi. 

La Belgique a observe avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude 
les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui imposent les traites du 19 
avril 1839. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera inebranlablement a 
les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstances. 

Les dispositions amicales des puissances a. son egard ont ete 
affirmees si souvent que la Belgique a la confiance de voir son 
territoire demeurer hors de toute atteinte si des hostilites 
venaient a se produire a ses frontieres. 

Toutes les mesures necessaires pour assurer Tobservation 
de sa neutralite n'en ont pas moins ete prises par le Gouverne- 
ment du Roi. L'armee beige est mobilisee et se porte sur les 
positions strategiques choisies pour assurer la defense du pays 
et le respect de sa neutralite. Les forts d'Anvers et de la 
Meuse sont en etat de defense. 

II est a peine necessaire, Monsieur le Ministre, d'insister sur le 
caractere de ces mesures. Elles n'ont d'autre but que de 
mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obligations 
internationales ; elles ne sont et n'ont pu etre inspirees, cela 
va de soi, ni par le dessein de prendre part a une lutte armee 
des puissances, ni par un sentiment de defiance envers aucune 
d'elles. 

Me conformant aux ordres recus, j'ai l'honneur de remettre 
a Votre Excellence une copie de la declaration du gouverne- 
ment du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acte. 

Une communication identique a ete faite aux autres Puis- 
sances garantes de la neutralite beige. 

Je saisis, etc. 

No 8. 

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Berlin, Paris, Londres, 
Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, La Haye, Luxembourg. 

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
Le Gouvernement du Roi a decide de mettre Tarmee sur le 
pied de paix renforce. 

Cette mesure ne doit etre en aucune facon confondue avec 
la mobilisation. 

A cause du peu d'etendue de son territoire, la Belgique toute 



APPENDIX VII 257 

entiere constitue en quelque sorte une zone frontiere. Son 
armee, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une classe 
de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforce ses 
divisions d'armee et sa division de cavalerie, grace au rappel 
de 3 classes, ont des effectifs analogues a ceux des corps entre- 
tenus en permanence dans les zones frontieres des Puissances 
voisines. 

Ces renseignements vous permettraient de repondre aux 
questions qui pourraient vous etre posees. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



N° 9. 

rig 

i 1 

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. 



Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Berlin, Paris et Londres. 



Monsieur le Ministre, 

M. le Ministre de France etant venu me montrer un tele- 
gramme de l'Agence Havas, decretant Tetat de guerre en 
Allemagne, m'a dit : Je profite de cette occasion pour vous 
declarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes francaises n'aura lieu 
en Belgique, m&ne si des forces importantes etaient massees 
sur les frontieres de votre pays. La France ne veut pas avoir 
la responsabilite d'accomplir, vis-a-vis de la Belgique, le 
premier acte d'hostilite. Des instructions dans ce sens seront 
donnees aux autorites francaises. 

J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de sa communication et j'ai 
cru devoir lui faire remarquer que nous avions toujours eu la 
plus grande confiance dans la loyaute que nos deux Etats 
voisins mettraient a tenir leurs engagements a notre egard. 
Nous avons aussi tout lieu de croire que Tattitude du Gouverne- 
ment allemand sera identique a celle du Gouvernement de la 
Republique francaise. , 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 

No 11. 

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. 

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
Le Ministre d'Angleterre a demande a me voir d'urgence 
et m'a fait la communication suivante, qu'il souhaitait etre 
a meme de m'exposer depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de 

P 3113 R 



258 APPENDIX VII 

la possibilite d'une guerre europeenne, Sir Edward Grey 
a demande aux Gouvernements francais et allemand, separe- 
ment, si chacun d'eux etait pret a. respecter la neutralite de 
la Belgique pourvu qu'aucune puissance ne la viole. 

«Vu les traites qui existent, je suis charge d'informer le 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Belgique de ce qui pre- 
cede et de dire que Sir Edward Grey presume que la Belgique 
fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neutralite et qu'elle 
desire et s'attend a ce que les autres puissances l'observent 
et la maintiennent.)) 

Je me suis empresse de remercier Sir Francis Villiers de 
cette communication que le Gouvernement beige apprecie 
particulierement et j'ai ajoute que la Grande-Bret agne et 
les autres nations garantes de notre independance pouvaient 
etre assurees que nous ne negligerions aucun effort pour 
maintenir notre neutralite, et que nous etions convaincus 
que les autres puissances, vu les excellents rapports d'amitie 
et de confiance, que nous avions toujours entretenus avec 
elles, observer aient et maintiendraient cette neutralite. 

Je n'ai pas manque d'affirmer que nos forces militaires, 
considerablement developpees a la suite de notre reorgani- 
sation recente, etaient a meme de nous permettre de nous 
defendre energiquement en cas de violation de notre terri- 
toire. 

Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi, Sir Francis m'a 
paru un peu surpris de la rapidite avec laquelle nous avions 
decide la mobilisation de notre armee. J'ai fait remarquer 
que les Pays-Bas avaient pris une resolution identique avant 
nous et que d'autre part la date recente de notre nouveau 
regime militaire et les mesures transit oires que nous avions 
du decider a cette occasion, nous imposaient des mesures 
urgentes et completes. Nos voisins et garants devaient voir 
dans cette resolution le desir de manifester notre profonde 
volonte de maintenir nous-memes notre neutralite. 

Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait de ma reponse et m'a annonce 
que son Gouvernement attendait cette reponse pour con- 
tinuer les negociations avec la France et l'Allemagne, negocia- 
tions dont la conclusion me serait communiquee. 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 



APPENDIX VII 259 

N° 12. 

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. 

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Ce matin, au cours d'une conversation que le Secretaire 
General de mon Depart ement a eue avec M. de Below, il 
a explique au Ministre d'Allemagne la portee des mesures 
militaires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles etaient 
une consequence de notre volonte d'accomplir nos obliga- 
tions intern ation ales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune facon 
une attitude de defiance en vers nos voisins. 

Le Secretaire General a demande ensuite au Ministre 
d'Allemagne s'il avait connaissance de la conversation qu'il 
avait eue avec son predecesseur M. de Flotow, et de la reponse 
que le Chancelier de l'Empire avait charge celui-ci de lui 
iaire. 

Au cours de la polemique soulevee en 1911 par le depot 
du projet hollandais concernant les fortifications de Fles- 
singue, certains journaux avaient affirme qu'en cas de guerre 
franco-allemande, notre neutralite serait violee par l'Alle- 
magne. 

Le Departement des Affaires Etrangeres avait suggere 
l'idee qu'une declaration faite au Parlement allemand a 
l'occasion d'un debat sur la politique etrangere serait de 
nature a apaiser Topinion publique et a calmer ses defiances, 
si regrettables au point de vue des relations des deux pays. 

M. de Bethmann-Holweg fit repondre qu'il avait ete tres 
sensible aux sentiments qui avaient inspire notre demarche. 
II declarait que l'Allemagne n'avait pas l'intention de violer 
notre neutralite, mais il estimait qu'en faisant publiquement 
une declaration, l'Allemagne affaiblirait sa situation militaire 
vis-a-vis de la France qui, rassuree du cote du Nord, porterait 
toutes ses forces du cote de l'Est. 

Le Baron van der Elst poursuivant, dit qu'il comprenait 
pa, fakement les objections qu' avaient faites M. de Bethmann- 
Holweg a la declaration publique suggeree et il rappela que 
depuis lors en 1913, M. de Jagow avait fait a la Commission 
du budget du Reichstag, des declarations rassurantes quant 
au respect de la neutralite de la Belgique. 

M. de Below repondit qu'il etait au courant de la con- 
versation avec M. de Flotow et qu'il etait certain que les 
sentiments exprimes a cette epoque n'avaient pas change. 
Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Davignon. 
R3 



26o APPENDIX VII 



Annexe au N° 12. 

Lettre adresseepar le Ministre du Roi a Berlin, a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 2 mai 1913. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaitre, d'apres l'omcieuse 
« Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung», les declarations faites, 
au cours de la seance du 20 avril de la commission du budget 
du Reichstag, par le secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres 
et le Ministre de la Guerre, relativement a la neutrality de la 
Belgique. 

«Un membre du parti social-democrate dit: En Belgique 
on voit avec apprehension s'approcher une guerre franco- 
allemande, car on craint que FAllemagne ne respectera pas 
la neutralite de la Belgique. 

» M. de Jagow, Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres 
repondit : la neutralite de la Belgique est determinee par 
des conventions internationales et TAllemagne est decidee 
a respecter ces conventions. 

» Cette declaration ne satisfit pas un autre membre du 
parti social-democrate. M. de Jagow observa qu'il n'avait 
rien a aj outer aux paroles claires qu'il avait prononcees 
relativement aux relations de l'Allemagne avec la Belgique. 

» A de nouvelles interrogations d'un membre du parti 
social-democrate M. de Heeringen, Ministre de la Guerre, 
repondit : la Belgique ne joue aucun role dans la justifica- 
tion du projet de reorganisation militaire allemand ; celui-ci 
se trouve Justine par la situation en Orient. L'Allemagne 
ne perdra pas de vue que la neutralite beige est garantie 
par les traites internationaux. 

» Un membre du parti progressiste ayant encore parle de 
la Belgique, M. de Jagow fit remarquer a nouveau que sa 
declaration concernant la Belgique etait sumsamment claire. » 

Veuillez agreer, etc. 

(s) Baron Bey ens. 



APPENDIX VII 261 

N° 20. 

Note remise le 2 aotit, a 19 hemes, par M. Below Saleske, 
Ministre d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires 
Etr anger es. 

Brussel, den 2. August 1914. 
Kaiserlich 
Deutsche Gesandtschaft 
in Belgien. 

TRES CONFIDENTIEL. 

Der Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlassige Nachrichten 
vor iiber den beabsichtigten Aufmarsch franzosischer Streit- 
krafte an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen 
Zweifel iiber die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches Gebiet 
gegen Deutschland vorzugehen. 

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht 
erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande 
sein wird, ohne Hulfe einen franzosischen Vormarsch mit so 
grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine 
ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands 
gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung 
fur Deutschland, dem feindlichen An griff zuvorzukommen. 
Mit dem grossten Bedauern wurde es daher die deutsche 
Regierung erfullen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit 
gegen sich darin erblicken wurde, dass die Massnahmen seiner 
Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegen wehr auch seinerseits 
belgisches Gebiet zu betreten. 

Urn jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, erklart die Kaiser- 
liche Regierung das Folgende : 

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeit en gegen 
Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, 
Deutschland gegenuber eine wohlwollende Neutralitat ein- 
zunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim 
Friedensschluss Besitzstand und Unabhangigkeit des Konig- 
reichs in vollem Umfang zu garantieren. 

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Vorausset- 
zung, das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder zu raumen, sobald 
der Friede geschlossen ist. 

3. Bei einer freundschaftlichen HaltungBelgiens ist Deutsch- 
land bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Koniglich Belgischen 
Behorden alle Bedurfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung 
anzukaufen und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch 
deutsche Truppen verursacht werden konnte. 

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen 
tret en, insbesondere ihrem Vorgehen durch Widerstand der 
Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstorungen von Eisen- 



262 APPENDIX VII 

bahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten 
Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem 
Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu 
betrachten. In diesem Falle wurde Deutschland dem Konig- 
reich gegeniiber keine Verpflichtungen iibernehmen konnen, 
sondern mxisste die spatere Regelung des Verhaltnisses beider 
Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen iiberlassen. 
Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoff- 
nung hin, dass diese Eventualitat nicht eintreten, und dass 
die Konigliche Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnah- 
men zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhindern, dass Vor- 
kommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwahnten, sich ereignen. In 
diesem Falle wiirden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die beide 
Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festi- 
gung erfahren. 

No 21. 

Note sur I'entrevue demandee le 3 aoiit a une heure et demie, 
par M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, a M. le Baron 
van der Elst, Secretaire General au Ministere des Affaires 
E tr anger es. 

A une heure et demie de la nuit, le Ministre d'Allemagne 
a demande a voir le Baron van der Elst. II lui a dit qu'il 
etait charge par- son Gouvernement de nous informer que 
des dirigeables francais avaient jete des bombes et qu'une 
patrouille de cavalerie francaise, violant le droit des gens, 
attendu que la guerre n'etait pas declaree, avait traverse la 
frontiere. 

Le Secretaire General a demande a M. de Below ou ces 
faits s'etaient passes ; en Allemagne, lui fut-il repondu. Le 
Baron van der Elst fit remarquer que dans ce cas il ne pouvait 
s'expliquer le but de sa communication. M. de Below dit que 
ces actes, contraires au droit des gens, etaient de nature 
a faire supposer d'autres actes contre le droit des gens que 
poserait la France. 

N° 22. 

Note remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Elran- 
geres, a M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne. 

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914. 
(7 heures du matin). 
Par sa note du 2 aout 1914, le Gouvernement allemand 
a fait connaitre que d'apres des nouvelles sures les forces 



APPENDIX VII 263 

franchises auraient Tintention de marcher sur la Meuse par 
Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgre sa meilleure 
volonte ne serait pas en etat de repousser sans secours une 
marche en avant des troupes franchises. 

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans l'obligation 
de prevenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire beige. 
Dans ces conditions, TAllemagne propose au Gouvernement 
du Roi de prendre vis-a-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et 
s'engage au moment de la paix a garantir l'integrite du 
Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur et endue. La 
note ajoute que si la Belgique fait des difficult es a la marche 
en avant des troupes allemandes, TAUemagne sera obligee de 
la considerer comme ennemie et de laisser le reglement 
ulterieur des deux Etats Tun vis-a-vis de l'autre a la decision 
des armes. 

Cette note a provoque chez le Gouvernement du Roi un 
profond et douloureux etonnement. 

Les intentions qu'elle attribue a la France sont en con- 
tradiction avec les declarations formelles qui nous ont ete 
faites le ier aout, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique. 

D'ailleurs si contrairement a notre attente une violation de 
la neutralite beige venait a etre commise par la France, la 
Belgique remplirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son 
armee opposerait a l'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse resistance. 

Les traites de 1839 confirmes par les traites de 1870 con- 
sacrent Tindependance et la neutralite de la Belgique sous la 
garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de 
Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse. 

La Belgique a toujours ete fidele a ses obligations inter- 
national ; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de 
loyale impartialite ; elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour main- 
tenir ou faire respecter sa neutralite. 

L'atteinte a son independance dont la menace le Gouverne- 
ment allemand constituerait une flagrante violation du droit 
des gens. Aucun interet strategique ne Justine la violation 
du droit. 

Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les propositions qui 
lui sont notifiees sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation en meme 
temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de TEurope. 

Conscient du role que la Belgique joue depuis plus de 80 ans 
dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse a croire que Tinde- 
pendance de la Belgique ne puisse etre conservee qu'au prix 
de la violation de sa neutralite. 

Si cet espoir etait d6cu le Gouvernement beige est f ermement 
decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute 
atteinte a son droit. 



264 APPENDIX VII 

No 28. 

Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Ministre a" Angle- 
terre, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. 

Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement beige que si 
l'Allemagne exerce une pression dans le but d'obliger la 
Belgique a abandonner son role de pays neutre, le Gouverne- 
ment de Sa Majeste britannique s'attend a ce que la Belgique 
resist e par tous les moyens possibles. 

Le Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique, dans ce cas, est 
pr6t a se joindre a la Russie et a la France, si la Belgique le 
desire, pour offrir au Gouvernement beige sans delai une 
action commune, qui aurait comme but de resister aux mesures 
de force employees par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en 
meme temps d'offrir une garantie pour maintenir l'indepen- 
dance et l'integrite de la Belgique dans l'avenir. 

No 37. 

Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi a Londres a 
M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Londres, 4 aout 1914. 
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a fait savoir aux Minis- 
tres anglais en Norvege, Hollande, Belgique, que l'Angleterre 
s'attend a ce que ces trois Royaumes resistent a la pression de 
l'Allemagne et gardent la neutralite. Dans leur resistance ils 
seront soutenus par l'Angleterre qui, dans ce cas, est prete 
a cooperer avec la France et la Russie si tel est le desir de ces 
trois Gouvernements en offrant alliance aux dits Gouverne- 
ments, pour repousser Temploi contre eux de la force par 
l'Allemagne, et garantie, pour le maintien futur de l'indepen- 
dance et de l'integrite des trois Royaumes. J'ai fait remarquer 
que la Belgique est neutre a perpetuite. Le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres a repondu : c'est pour le cas de neutralite 
violee. (s) Comte de Lalaing. 

N° 49. 

Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi a Londres a 
M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Londres, 5 aout 1914. 
L'Angleterre accepte de cooperer comme garante a la 
defense de notre territoire. La flotte anglaise assurera le 
libre passage de FEscaut pour le ravitaillement d'Anvers. 

(s) Comte de Lalaing. 

Oxford : Horace Hart Printer to the University 



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