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STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Volume XCII] [Whole Number 209 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY 

Governor of Massachusetts, 1741-1756 
A HISTORY 

Volume I 



BY 

GEORGE ARTHUR WOOD, PH.D. 

Assistant Professor of American History 
Ohio State University 




jDork 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS 

LONDON : P. S. KING & SON, LTD. 

1920 



COPYRIGHT, 1920 

BY 
GEORGE ARTHUR WOOD 



to 
MY WIFE 

MY INSPIRATION TO PERSEVERANCE IN EFFORT AND 
MY LOYAL AND EFFICIENT CO-WORKER 



427992 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 
Lares and Penates n 

CHAPTER II 
The English Political and Administrative Background 15 

CHAPTER III 
Services as Advocate-General 35 

CHAPTER IV 
The Downfall of Governor Belcher 63 

CHAPTER V 
Taking Up the Reins of Government 92 

CHAPTER VI 
The Salary Question and the Problem of Defense no 

CHAPTER VII 
Establishing an Imperial Policy 132 

CHAPTER VIII 
Reforms, Chiefly Economic 155 

CHAPTER IX 
Meeting the Outbreak of War 181 

CHAPTER X 
Measures for Defense Annapolis 202 

CHAPTER XI 
Louisburg Organizing a Coup 220 



6 TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PACK 

CHAPTER XII 
Louisburg Preparations 257 

CHAPTER XIII 
Louisburg -The Expedition 281 

CHAPTER XIV 
Planning the Conquest of Canada 295 

CHAPTER XV 
The Conquest of Canada Undertaken and Abandoned 315 

CHAPTER XVI 
The Tide in America Changes , 338 

CHAPTER XVII 
Fighting for the Status Quo 359 

CHAPTER XVIII 
Politics Versus Gratitude 375 

CHAPTER XIX 

The Harvest of the War Reimbursement for the Louisburg Expe 
dition 398 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 414 

INDEX 425 



PREFACE 

PARADOXICALLY, Governor William Shirley has enjoyed 
the reputation of something approximating if not actually 
exemplifying greatness, while the history of his time has 
been regarded as one of monotony and heaviness relieved 
by occasional dramatic incidents which stood out in higher 
relief because of the obscurity in which a gray twilight has 
enveloped their background. The judgment has been 
generally expressed that the period of colonial history 
within which Shirley s career falls, that lying between the 
English Revolution and the events just before the American 
Revolution, is without great intrinsic significance. Re 
cently, however, a considerable number of monographs have 
been written dealing with matters falling within this period 
and the time is perhaps approaching when the darkness in 
which it has been shrouded will be dissipated. Meanwhile 
the writer ventures the judgment that it is not a gulf sep 
arating significant periods of history, not a no man s land in 
which the historical student is likely to happen upon dis 
aster, but a field whose essential significance is likely to re 
ceive an increased recognition with the passage of time. 
Without intensive study of it a proper evaluation cannot 
be made of the merits of the imperial policies of England 
under the house of Orange and the early Hanoverians nor 
of the reactions of the colonists to those policies which ulti 
mately led to the American Revolution. 

The present study was undertaken without other plan 

7 



3 .*. " -PREFACE 

than to place a colonial administrator in his proper setting. 
As the material for the work was collected it became ap 
parent that Shirley was more truly an imperial than a colon 
ial figure, despite geographic limitations. This fact made 
necessary an attempt to present an imperial background. 
It also furnished the guide to the method of treatment. 
This has been directed toward the production of a picture 
of colonial problems in a process of evolution in an im- 
penal-setting ; necessarily often partial and even fragmentary 
in scope but dealing with parts which found their unity in 
political, economic and social forces which bound together 
two hemispheres, making the Atlantic something more than 
an English lake. Along with this unity, representing the 
established and the " usual " in the English imperial system, 
there is a lesser unity, that of the Americans standing for 
a polity made up of elements some of which were wholly 
English and unchallenged at home and others rather de 
facto than regular and accepted. The latter, including 
those elements which the home government did not seriously 
attempt to regulate and those which they failed in the ef 
fort to control, make up the stream of forces which should 
prove most significant to the student of the causes of the 
American Revolution. 

It is perhaps needless to say that while Shirley has proved 
a very interesting personality he has been of the great 
est service to my work by his connection with so wide a] 
range of activities and in such significant ways that his 
public life included some of the most important phases of 
the history of his times. 

The period of Shirley s active career covered by this 
volume is that from 1731 to 1749, the first decade spent as 
a lawyer and much of it as advocate-general of the court of 
vice-admiralty .far (the northern district, \and the later 
period as governor of Massachusetts. In each period his 



PREFACE 9 

activity and influence were much more extensive than the 
offices held would suggest. 

For my introduction to Shirley I am indebted to the 
late Professor Herbert L. Osgood of Columbia University. 
It was also my privilege to collect considerable of my 
material in Boston under his general supervision and to sit 
at his side in the Public Record Office in London where he 
shared with me the use of the fresh proof-sheets of volume 
II of Professor Charles M. Andrews guide to the materials 
for American history in that depository. The work of 
composition had been begun but had not been carried far 
enough to receive the criticism which Professor Osgood was 
so richly equipped to give before his last sacrifice on be 
half of historical scholarship had been made. 

Professor William A. Dunning o<f Columbia University 
has given very valuable assistance and counsel in the prep 
aration of the manuscript for the press. I ami deeply in 
debted to Professor Henry R. Spencer of Ohio State 
University for his many very helpful suggestions for the 
improvemient of the manuscript. Professor Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, of the State University of Iowa, Professor 
Charles C. Huntington of Ohio State University and Pro 
fessor Elmer B. Russell, of the University of Nebraska, 
have each read portions of the earlier chapters of the 
volume, making valuable suggestions, chiefly as to form. 
The last also very kindly placed in my hands references 
to Shirley material in the Public Record Office which had 
come to his notice there while investigating another subject. 

The extent to which I am indebted to the first of the two 
volumes of Shirley correspondence edited by Mr. Lincoln 
appears from the frequent references to its contents. 

This study would not have been possible along the lines 
which have been followed without the light thrown upon 
almost all questions of importance by unpublished documents 



I0 PREFACE 

in the Public Record Office. Great assistance has also been 
received from manuscript material in the Massachusetts 
Archives, in the early court records of Massachusetts, and 
in several other collections listed in the bibliographical note 
at the end of the volume. 

GEORGE A. WOOD. 

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
FEBRUARY 23, 1920. 



CHAPTER I 
LARES AND PENATES 

AMPLE records which reverent historians of the Shirley 
family have patiently collected make it obvious that the 
governor was a gentleman connected by blood with many 
noble families, among whose members were some even of 
royal descent. 1 These aristocratic connections, however, 

1 The family emerges from the mists of tradition in the person of 
one iSaswalo or Sewallis de Eatingdon, who rouses interest by possessing 
large estates in four different counties just after the conquest of England 
by William the Norman. After two generations the head of the house 
of Sewallis chose to call himself by the surname Shirley, after one of 
his estates in Derbyshire, and from this time forth (save for a lapse 
of a generation) the family was known under the Shirley name. 

Later Shirleys acquired through marriage Wiston and Preston in 
Sussex which were the chief manors of the younger line from which 
the future governor sprang. The alliances of the Shirleys with numer 
ous noble families, in addition to bringing considerable landed estates 
to them, also gave them an enviable social position in the England of 
that day. Although the governor s line was a younger one it shared in 
the importance arising from alliances of elder lines, with the royal 
Plantagenet line of England through the earls of Essex, with those of 
the dukes of Buckingham, Norfolk and Rutland, and with those of the 
earls of Bath and Northampton. The governor s own line, in a much 
more modest way, acquired local importance in Sussex by intermarriage 
with neighboring nobility, among whom was included a descendant, five 
generations removed, of Llewellyn, Prince of Wales. An ancestor of 
Governor Shirley, of the same generation as Llewellyn, was the father- 
in-law of Thomas de la Warr, governor of Virginia in 1609. 

References for this note will be found in : Shirley, Stemmata Shirleiana 
(Westminster, 1841), pp. 2-247, passim , Burke, A Genealogical and 
Heraldic History of the Landed Gentry of Great Britain (London, 
1914), p. 1708; The Victoria History of the Counties of England, 
Warwickshire (London, 1004), vol. i, pp. 281-282, 327; Ancestor, 1902. 
no. 3, pp. 214-218; Shirley, Lower Eatington (London, 1869), pp. 6-22; 
Collins, Peerage of England (London, 1779), vol. i, pp. 267-278. 

II 



12 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

were auxiliary to native ability and intense application in 
bringing to Shirley distinction in life, for without the latter 
qualifications it is not conceivable that he would ever have 
risen to high station. In an age in which the normal 
grounds for political preferment ranged from personal 
friendship to bribery or treason, a career of large accomplish 
ment, based primarily upon merit, was distinctly unusual. 
Governor Shirley s political fortunes seem to have been 
nourished, aside from his record as a public servant, largely 
by the fruits of alliances contracted by his own branch of 
the family (that in Sussex) within four generations of his 
own times. 1 More especially, it is apparent that the alliances 
and succeeding intimacy between the Sussex Shirleys and 
the Pelhams constituted a vital factor in the friendly envir 
onment in which Shirley won success. In truth an essential 
fact in Shirley s career as a public man was his success in 
securing from Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, 

1 The Pelhams, with whom the Shirleys were connected by marriage, 
while possessed of large estates in many parts of England, were pri 
marily a Sussex family. Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of New 
castle, who became Shirley s patron, had his seat there. Shirley s an 
cestors were related to those of the duke, and other alliances between 
the Pelhams and the Sussex branch of the Shirley family had been 
formed within four generations of the governor s time. The great 
grandfather of the duke married a Shirley and there is evidence of 
great intimacy between the families during the lifetime of this ancestor. 

Second only to the alliances with the Pelhams in importance were 
those of the Shirleys with the Onslows. Their connection with this 
family was even closer than with the Pelhams. The chief representa 
tive of the Onslow family in Shirley s day was Arthur Onslow, Esquire, 
Speaker of the House of Commons. His ancestor, fourth removed in 
the direct male line, had married Isabel Shirley of Preston, apparently 
of the governor s line. 

The above facts relating to the connection between the Shirleys and 
the Pelhams and Onslows will be found in Collins, op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 
242-252, and vol. viii, pp. 122-134. Cf. also, British Historical Manu 
scripts Commission Report (London, 1874-1917), vol. xiv, appendix ix, 
P. 476. 



LARES AND PENATES 13 

his potent backing. 1 This raised him, though somewhat 
tardily, to an official eminence ensuring a sufficient field of 
activity for an able and ambitious man, and maintained him 
in it until he had impressed his personality upon affairs of 
large import. 

No especial lustre, however, attended the entrance of 
the future governor into this world. As the descendant of 
members of a younger line, he found the effect of earlier 
advantageous marriages upon the fortunes of his ancestors 
almost completely neutralized. The lowest ebb of material 
well-being was perhaps reached by his paternal grandfather, 
an apparently landless younger son. His father, William 
Shirley, presumably retrieved the situation somewhat by 
becoming a merchant of London. He also established his 
own status (and that of his son) as a country gentleman, 
by marrying the heiress of Ote Hall, Wivelsfield, Sussex. 2 
It was to such moderate prospects as these that William 
Shirley was born at Preston in Sussex in 1694, and even 
these became less flattering with the death of his father only 
seven years later. 3 

The future governor, however, received a liberal educa 
tion. He studied first at Cambridge and then was bred to 
the law at the Inner Temple. 4 Seven years were spent at 

1 Shirley, in addition to a personal acquaintance with the duke, also 
had prominent friends who were on free terms with him and well ac 
quainted with the whole Pelham family. Massachusetts Historical So 
ciety Collections, sixth series, vols. vi and vii, Belcher Papers (Boston, 
1893-1894), pt. ii, pp. 154, 525; The Correspondence of William Shirley 
(Lincoln, ed., New York, 1912), vol. i, p. 10. 

* This estate, which later fell to the governor, was apparently not ex 
tensive. Cf. Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 
vol. xii, p. 45. 

*Stemmata Shirleiana, p. 242. 

4 In the Inner Temple Book of Admissions from 1670 to 1750, p. 1321, 
there is an entry (translated below from the Latin) stating that "Wil 
liam Shirley, gentleman, son and heir of William Shirley, late of Lon- 



I4 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

the Temple, and some time before he was called to the bar 
in I/2O 1 he married Frances Barker, daughter of Francis 
Barker, of London. It thus happened that when he began 
practicing law in London, two daughters had been born 
to them, pledges of the numerous offspring who were 
later to bless and embarrass them. Nine years later 
their family included five daughters and three sons. The 
first eleven years of his practice of his profession were spent 
in London, where he is also said to have held an office. 2 
These years seem to have been productive of more re 
putation than wealth, for upon his departure for America 
to better his fortunes he was able to secure solid recom 
mendations from men prominent in the British government 
and at the London bar testifying to his professional at 
tainments and aptitude. 3 Like many another Englishman 
of slender fortune he turned to the colonies in America in 
the hope of finding a more ready road to ! success under the 
freer conditions of the new world. Possibly the adventure 
in the ruder society of America was prompted in part by 
a financial catastrophe.* In that environment we shall a 
little later find him, first as a private citizen practicing law 
and not long after as an officeholder under the crown. 

don, merchant, deceased, was generally admitted into the fellowship of 
this society in consideration of three pounds, six shillings and eight 
pence." The date of his admission was October 28, 1713. 

1 July 3d., Inner Temple List of Barristers, from 1590-, p. 388- 

Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts (Boston and London, 1795- 
1828) , vol. ii, p. 358. 

There are references to his recommendations in Bel. Ps., pt. i, pp. 
20-22, 25, 32-33, 44, 452-453- 

4 Governor Belcher, of Massachusetts, in 1740, while Shirley was being 
recommended as his successor, amiably suggested that he had been told 
that Shirley went to America " after being drowned in the South Sea " 
(South Sea Bubble), but His Excellency named no authority for the as 
sertion. Bel. Ps., pt. ii, p. 525. 



CHAPTER II 

THE ENGLISH POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
BACKGROUND 

THE period in which Shirley lived was a time of vigorous 
constitutional evolution. The scope of the constitutional 
changes which were occurring may be indicated by the state 
ment that while formerly the Stuarts had assumed mastery 
of the nation, the nation now employed a monarch. 1 In 
explanation of the effects of the changes in the system of 
government we hear much of prime ministers, cabinet coun 
cils and leaders in the House of Commons, while the 
monarch, who seemed superficially to direct the state, is, 
in the time of the early Georges, presented as essentially 
a liveried flunky of the nation. 

The interpretations of this period of English political life 
fall largely into two groups stressing respectively the gassing 
of the powers of the crown, and the beginnings of demo 
cratic rule. Broadly speaking, the first of these proces 
ses was already completed when George the First neglected 
to attend meetings of his ministers, and the second had not 
yet truly begun until a much later epoch. 

It seems a far cry from autocratic monarchy to thorough 
going democracy. A sudden change from one to the other 
has, it is believed, never been accomplished save by violent 
revolution, if even by that means. Fortunately it is not nec- 

1 The first two Georges were not entirely devoid of influence upon 
affairs domestic or foreign but their power of direction was not con 
siderable except in the foreign field, and even there partly because of 
their interests in Hanover. 

15 



16 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

essary to assume that the English constitution has bridged 
the gulf between them with a single span, That it did not 
do so is too obvious to escape recognition, explicit or im 
plicit, by many writers. It has been pointed out repeatedly 
that the aristocracy of great landholders held a position of 
great influence after the fall of the Stuarts until the pre 
miership of the elder William Pitt and even later. But no 
historian has yet adequately written the history of the supre 
macy of the Whig oligarchy. Yet it has recently been 
recognized that the ascendancy of this group of powerful 
landholders was the central fact in the political history of 
England from 1714 until the elder Pitt inaugurated a more 
national policy. The Whig supremacy wholly includes 
Shirley s connection with public affairs in the portion of 
his career with which we are concerned in this volume. 

Generally speaking, the policies of ministers in this period 
were not formed to meet the desires of either king or na 
tion. They were, to be sure, intended to keep either from 
protesting too loudly, since either might, if so disposed, 
cause much inconvenience. Nevertheless, the substance of 
power rested with a clique or faction of the aristocracy, 1 

1 The custom followed until recently of building the history of the 
period primarily around institutions which to the minds of present day 
readers connote conditions which belong before or after that time, rather 
than about the Whig political machine of the day, is doubtless largely 
due to the facts, first, that the ruling aristocracy used extensively the 
political machinery which they found, and second, that the cabinet and 
the prime minister, whose offices were evolved largely during the Whig 
ascendancy, were later associated with a popular system of government. 
Much concerning the Whig machine appears in many writers upon the 
period, but the inwardness of it has not been revealed. An article upon 
"The Duke of Newcastle and the Election of 1734" in the English 
Historical Review for July, 1897, by Basil Williams, based chiefly upon 
the Newcastle Papers, suggests how greatly our knowledge of the actual 
government of England in that period might be increased by a clear 
analysis of the contents of this collection and of the papers of other 
political leaders of the time. Notable contributions to our knowledge 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND ij 

which retained control of the government throughout the 
period. 

It is with this dominating group that this sketch so far 
as it touches English politics, is chiefly concerned. The 
group changed in personnel through death, and less fre 
quently through desertion, but the membership was notice 
ably stable and some of its leaders remained in power for 
long periods of time. The leadership of the group was 
sometimes in a single man and sometimes in an informal 
political partnership of two or more members. The most 
influential leaders of the group held high offices of state 
and combined the administration of government with the 
functions of the present-day political boss. They were 
members of the privy council and of that smaller body which 
was, in one aspect, the real council of state, and in another, 
an executive committee of the Whig aristocracy organized 
as a political party. This body came to be known as the 
cabinet council, and has developed into the present cabinet. 

Today the cabinet is responsible to the House of Com 
mons and through it to* the nation. At that time it would 
have been nearer to the truth to say that the House of Com 
mons was responsible to the cabinet council and to its as 
sociates and subordinates who managed the Whig party. 
The House of Commons sometimes repudiated individual 
leaders but it did not challenge the Whig machine, for the 
reason that it was part of it. The king must perforce ac 
cept the Whigs and work with them; for their opponents, 
the Tories, had favored the return of the Stuarts, and in 
fluential members of that party continued to intrigue to 
that end after the Hanoverians were established on the 
throne. 

of phases of political affairs in the time of the Whig supremacy by Von 
Ruville, Basil Williams (cf. supra and also his Life of Pitt [London, 
1914]), Alvord and E. R. Turner, still fall short of a clear exposition 
of the political system of the time 



1 8 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Party lines followed largely the lines of division between 
social classes, with a minor portion of the aristocracy at 
tached to the Tories. 1 Parties at that time, however, had 
no necessary relationship to the will or the interests of the 
nation as a whole. The franchise was far from having a 
democratic basis, and its exercise under the influence of 
vested interests was accompanied by wholesale corruption. 
It would be just to say in general that seats in the House 
of Commons and the votes of their holders were alike 
merchandise. This left the control of public affairs ultimately 
in the hands of the Whig aristocrats, whos.e great resources 
made it always feasible for them, to secure enough votes to 
perpetuate their control. The small body of voters ex 
acted such profits from the ruling class as their privileges 
allowed, while the general public remained more or less 
uninterested spectators of the proceedings. 

The bounds of the political influence of the different mem 
bers of the Whig aristocracy have never been accurately 
determined, but all authorities agree that a position of pri 
macy as a party manager belongs to the Duke of New 
castle. The duke was less influential personally with other 
leaders of his party than were some of his contemporaries, 
but he was par excellence the winner of elections. His 
vast wealth, including huge estates in several counties, gave 
him such strength in the political system of his time that he 
was indispensable to all administrations from, that of Sir 
Robert Walpole to and including that of Pitt. From 1717 
to 1766 he held high office in the government with but rare 
interruptions. Whenever he was allowed to* retire to private 
life he was promptly recalled. Yet no one has discovered 

1 The Whigs outside the large landed interests included the dissenters 
and the higher trading and commercial classes, while the country gentle 
men and country clergy, who hated dissenters, and the agricultural 
classes who were jealous of traders, supported the Tories. 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND IOy 

in the Duke of Newcastle a genius for leadership, nor es 
pecially able statesmanship, nor even more than moderate 
intellectual gifts of any sort. The inference seems irresis 
tible, therefore, that his eminence in the history of his times 
was due in considerable measure if not primarily to accidents 
ctf birth and fortune. The fact that the duke s hereditary 
advantages have impressed historians more forcibly than 
has his skill in utilizing them is a striking commentary ugon 
the character of the political system of his day. 

The Duke of Newcastle is not an attractive figure as he 
appears for the most part in the writings of his contem 
poraries. Most of his literary contemporaries, however, 
were among his political opponents. It is to be presumed, 
under the circumstances, that the consummately ridiculous 
conduct attributed to him partakes of the nature of carica 
ture. It may easily be supposed that Newcastle illustrated! 
the type of man who would furnish endless anecdotal 
material for political partisans of the Horace Walpole 
variety, although some of the traits attributed to him, such 
as vanity and fussy mannerisms, are not incompatible with 
high abilities. It is difficult, however, to believe that the 
person who was by general testimony, even if of his enemies, 
verbose in speech, inaccurate in statement and confused in 
thought, and unstable in his attitude toward men and meas 
ures, was a man of the highest qualities of mind and heart. 

Probably the most attractive characteristic of the duke, 
outside of nis purely private life, was his patronage of 
young men of talent who lacked independent fortunes. A 
notable example is afforded by the case of Philip Yorke, 
whom: Newcastle helped to make successively chief justice, 
member of the privy council and lord chancellor, and who, 
after becoming Lord Hardwicke, remained the duke s coun 
sellor and friend. In a somewhat similar spirit Newcastle 



20 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

played the part of patron, protector and friend to Shirley 
during most of his career in America. 1 

The English history which has been written of the time 
of Newcastle has been largely biographical, perhaps be 
cause there were no men in England in that day great enough 
to create a national theme which would seem impressive. 
It was a sort of English middle age in which acta ministro- 
ritm made up the staple of the accounts of the period. 
Foreign policy was continually complicated by the insistent 
stress placed by the reigning house upon its second-rate 
German principality of Hanover. Domestic policy was. 
clogged by the course of masterly inactivity of the landhold- 
ing aristocracy, watchful lest the sleeping English dog 
mistake their vested interests for a bone. Consistency of 
policy was exemplified by uniform efforts to chloroform the 
nation into quiescence while any problems which demanded 
solution were disposed of with a minimum o<f disturbance 
and change. 

Passing by this welter of inconsequences it is evident that 
the future of the nation lay not with the landed interest, 
who were distinctly provincial in spite of the necessity then 
upon them of sponsoring such English policy as existed, but 
with the merchants and others who, concerned in interests 
beyond seas, fostered at once trade and dominion. The 
evolution of England from a kingdom into an empire, how- 
beit an immature one, was already a fait accompli. The 
vital national interests had become distinctly imperial in 

1 Lecky s History of England in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 
1878-1887), vol. ii, p. 477, contains the following caustic comment on the 
career of Newcastle : " Newcastle is certainly the most remarkable in 
stance on record of the manner in which, under the old system, great 
possessions and family or parliamentary influence could place and main 
tain an incapable man in the first position in the state." In the pages 
following is a most unflattering estimate of Newcastle s public career in 
all its aspects. For a more favorable view cf. Harris, Life of Hard- 
wicke (London, 1847), vol. i, p. 427- 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 2 I 

nature. Between that time and the present there have been 
two periods of vigorous empire-building, one before and 
one after the American Revolution. Shirley s American 
career falls within the first of these periods and had an 
important relationship to the expansion that signalized it. 

Shirley, therefore, appeared against this imperial back 
ground when, by coming to Massachusetts, he entered the 
sphere of activity of Governor Jonathan Belcher, of Mas 
sachusetts and New Hampshire. From the imperial point 
of view Belcher s administration, which began in August, 
1730, was an experiment in killing provincial perversity 
with kindness. 

The notoriously intractable province of Massachusetts 
Bay had been forced into subdued ways by her efficient but 
unloved son, Joseph Dudley, governor from 1702 to 1715. 
His successor, Samuel Shute, governor from 1716 to- 1728, 
was an Englishman. After a time, he set the provincials 
by the ears, and finding it uncomfortable in Massachusetts 
retired to England in 1723, in which safe retreat he re 
mained for more than five years until the end of his term, 
while his deputy, Lieutenant-Governor Dumrner, a native 
of Massachusetts, administered the province. There fol 
lowed a brief and stormy administration under another 
Englishman, William Burnet, ending at his death in 1729. 

Shute had petitioned the king that the salary of the 
governor be fixed for the future, and he had then (April 
10, 1726) been directed to urge the assembly in the strongest 
terms to settle " a fixed and honourable salary .... not to 
be less than 1,000 sterling per annum from Massachusetts 
Bay." x This led later to a spirited battle with the assembly. 
This contest in which Shute had taken part before leaving 
Massachusetts was in abeyance while he was in England 

1 Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series (Hereford, 1910-1912), 
vol. iii, p. 107. The abbreviation "A, P. C." will be used. 



22 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

but was renewed with increased vigor under Burnet 1 The 
violence of the contest and the lack of success of the govern 
ors alarmed the Duke of Newcastle, then the secretary of 
state in charge of colonial affairs, leading him to believe 
Massachusetts wished "to throw off their dependency on 
the crown." Such a design might be dealt with by refer 
ring the matter to Parliament, but the ministers " wished 
that extremity might be avoided." Therefore Burnet was 
privately notified to ask for a grant for his own administra 
tion only. The maneuver was understood by the agents 
of the province in England, and the people of Massachusetts 
through them became convinced that threats made to 
take the matter before Parliament would not be fulfilled, 
and further that if the subject should come up the con 
tention of the colonists would probably be sustained. 2 

In connection with this controversy Jonathan Belcher 
emerged as a leading character. He was a wealthy Boston 
merchant, who had been engaged in the slave trade, had 
served seven years in the council of the province as a " pre 
rogative man," in Governor Shute s administration, and had 
been reelected under Burnet, but negatived by the governor. 
Thereupon Belcher experienced an " instantaneous conver 
sion " to the popular view and became intimate with the 
leading anti-administration members of the assembly. He 
presently presided over a town meeting in Boston at which 
it was unanimously voted to instruct the representatives 
of the town in the assembly to vote against settling a salary 
on the governor. Then Belcher was chosen to serve jointly 
with the previous agent of the assembly, Francis Wilks, to 

1 Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 301-321 ; Dickerson, American Colonial 
Government (Cleveland, 1912), pp. 185-186. 

1 Chalmers, An Introduction to the History of the Revolt of the 
American Colonies (Boston, 1845), vol. ii, pp. 128-129; Dickerson, op. cit., 
p. 186 and note 425. 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 23 

present the case of that body against Burnet before the privy 
council. While this cause was pending in England news, 
came of the death of Burnet, and Belcher with his accus 
tomed facility underwent another " instantaneous conver 
sion," this time to a clear advocacy of the king s preroga 
tive in America. 1 

According to his own statement Belcher owed his ap 
pointment to Lord Townshend, whose good-will he after 
ward retained. He also enlisted in his behalf former 
Governor Shute, who gave up in his favor an opportunity 
to resume the governorship, and that of Francis Wilks, 
who was influential at court. In his application he ignored 
the board of trade and secured the support of their super 
iors. 2 

Belcher took office under somewhat peculiar conditions 
of official backing; for his special patron, Townshend, re 
tired from the post of secretary of state almost at the time 
his protege began to serve, and Townshend s brother-in-law, 
Sir Robert Walpole, then prime minister, never sliowed 
especial liking for the governor. Doubtless the rivalry 
between Walpole and Townshend preceding the retirement 
of the latter predisposed Sir Robert against Belcher, and 
Martin Bladen, the chief figure at the board of trade, com 
bined devotion to the prime minister with a dislike, which 

1 References for the contents of the preceding paragraph are found 
as follows : List of Vernon-Wager Manuscripts in the Library of 
Congress (Washington, 1904), p. 23; Bel. Ps., pt. i, pp. xvi-xvii; Acts 
and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts 
Bay (Boston, 1869-1918), vol. ii, p. 523; A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 253-256; 
vol. vi, pp. 208-209; British Historical Manuscripts Commission, nth 
Report (London, 1887), App. 4, pp. 273-274; Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. 
ii, p. 318; Chalmers, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 132. 

* For the circumstances antecedent to and attending Belcher s ap 
pointment, cf. Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 294, 329; Matthews, Notes 
on the Massachusetts Royal Commissions (Cambridge, 1913), C- 63, 
note 5 ; Bel. Ps., pt. ii, pp. 16-18, 101-106, 138, 479. 



24 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

he made no effort to conceal, for the Massachusetts gover 
nor who had presumed to disregard his influence. 1 Belcher, 
in fact, was a man without a patron among the high of 
ficials at home, and from the start a scarcely veiled hostility 
existed between him and the board of trade. Belcher s 
pronounced efforts to attach himself to the Duke of New 
castle, and to follow a neutral course which would cause 
resentment from neither ministers nor Parliament were 
the natural results of the difficulties of his position. 3 

Belcher from the beginning attempted to create a political 
machine at court which would safeguard his tenure of office. 
Wilks had added to his influence at court by joining Belcher 
in the measures which had made the latter an acceptable 
candidate for governor. 3 He was also privately Belcher s 
representative and apparently fully in his confidence while 
still remaining agent for the Massachusetts assembly. 4 
Openly the governor was represented in London by his 
brother-in-law, Richard Partridge, and his son, Jonathan 

1 For the political conditions at home accompanying Belcher s ac 
cession, cf. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir 
Robert Walpole, earl of Orford (London, 1816), vol. ii, pp. 378-390; 
His. Mss. Com., nth Rep., App. iv, p. 120; T. Townshend to Hard- 
wicke, printed in " The Materials for the Study of the English Cabinet 
in the Eighteenth Century," by E. R. Turner in American Historical 
Association Report for 1911, vol. i, p. 96; Innes, A History of England 
and the British Empire (London, 1913-1915), vol. Hi, p. 138. 

For Belcher s backing at home and the relations between leading 
English statesmen of the day, cf. the references in note supra, and 
Bel. Ps., pt. i, pp. 32, 38, 61 note, 125-126, 225, 265, 279, 282, 311, 380-381, 
404. 

3 Cf. supra, p. 23. 

4 Bel. Ps., passim. Wilks continued to hold this position as agent for 
the assembly until his death in 1742. (Bel. Ps., pt. i, p. 33 note.) 
When, however, there arose opposition to him in the assembly, they 
apparently not regarding him as sufficiently devoted to their interest, 
Belcher used his influence to have him retained. Ibid., p. 505; pt. ii, 
pp. 2:5-216. 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 25 

Belcher, Jr., then a student at the Temple. 1 In reality they 
and Wilks formed a trinity in the governor s interest. In 
many instances they were able to serve those whom they 
represented by a common policy. 

Belcher kept up his alliance with ex-Governor Shute and 
the latter s kinsman, Lord Barrington, by making a protege 
of John Boydell, formerly Shute s private secretary. 2 He 
also constantly busied himself by correspondence, by send 
ing presents, and by securing introductions for his son to 
influential persons in England, and cultivating good rela 
tions wherever possible. 3 

As Belcher s methods became known in England the 
board of trade followed a policy which resulted in creating 
checks upon him in America. Sir Robert Walpole perhaps 
without deliberate intent promoted the same end by insist 
ing upon the naming of Benjamin Pemberton as clerk of 
the naval office at Boston. 4 It is noticeable, however, that 
appointments such as this strengthened the influence of the 
prerogative in America, and particularly in regard to mat 
ters which were likely to come under admiralty court juris 
diction, such as the king s woods and the acts of trade. 

Belcher began his administration at a time when New 
castle, as secretary of state for the southern department, 
was assuming control in large measure of the patronage and 
of the policy of the English government in the colonies. 
The board of trade was in this period an advisory body 

1 Bel. Ps., pt. i, p. 79. 

* Cf. The Boston Gazette, Oct. 15, 1722, quoted in Matthews, op. cit., 
p. 68; Bel. Ps., pt. i, pp. 4, 114, 209-210; Suffolk Files, Nos. 38108, 38297, 
40572, 41140, 41249, 43204, 43571, 44365, 45562, 45596, 47200, 47446, 47465, 
47491, 47964, 48393, 50894, 51013. 

*Bel. Ps., passim. 

4 The facts of the Pemberton affair from Belcher s point of view are 
to be found in ibid., pp. 376, 385-386, 413; pt. ii, pp. 155-156, 167-169. 



26 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

with but limited influence of a positive sort. Its most 
active member, Martin Bladen, was commonly known as 
" Trade " in distinction from; his colleagues who were dub 
bed the " Board." 1 Newcastle, in spite of his great strength 
in Parliament, must work with others to maintain the 
majority there which was the requisite foundation for a 
strong ministry; hence he was disposed to avoid bringing 
up questions of colonial policy that might divide and weaken 
the government s support in the legislature. Were another 
course adopted the Whig oligarchy might be compelled to 
obey Parliament instead of ruling it. 2 However, adminis 
trative authority in colonial matters lay in practice almost 
wholly with Newcastle and not with the board of trade. 3 

A plan for unifying and regulating the colonies had been 
vaguely conceived by English statesmen almost from the 
beginning of the colonial period and had been intermittently 
undertaken with energy by the various functionaries who 1 
served in sequence as spokesmen for the crown in colonial 
affairs during the periods of Stuart and Orange rule. The 
project remained in abeyance under the first two kings of 
the House of Hanover, apparently through inertia or lack 
of power rather than through sympathy with the diversity 
and the disconcerting unmanageableness of the existing 
governments in the colonies. 

The Stuarts, after all, were not clever enough, nor aside 
from Charles I valiant enough, to play the part of auto 
crats. Had they been so, doubtless the colonies would 
have been confronted with the task of maintaining their 
autonomy in local affairs against the naked prerogative of 
the crown a century, more or less, before the third George 

^ickerson, op. cit., pp. 37-38; Kellogg, "The American Colonial 
Charter" in Am. His. Assoc. Rep. for 1903, vol. i, p. 222. 
2 Cf. supra, pp. 15-18. 
3 Dickerson, op. cit., pp. 112-114; Kellogg, loc. cit., p. 225. 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 2 J 

and his ministers raised the issue through Parliament Asi 
things stood, half measures were in order. As the crown 
did not venture in general to override the colonial charters, 
efforts were made to revoke them, first by judicial action, 
.since such a method alone was in harmony with the dignity 
and politicial theory of the Stuarts ; later under the saffron 
imperialism of their Dutch successors revocation was sought 
through act of Parliament. 

To be sure, James II with unwonted hardihood, if little 
.prudence, provoked the nation to decree that he should be 
the last of his line, and at the moment of his fall was not 
only asserting his prerogative boldly in England but was 
building a highly centralized and autocratic political struc 
ture under his personal representative in America, the 
ground for which had been prepared by a mingling of 
judicial and mere prerogative action against charters; but 
this was only an expiring gesture, for after the flight of 
James from England the conception that the king s pre 
rogative might dominate the nation, never found general 
acceptance either in England or the colonies. 

This conception gave place to that of a monarchy con 
stitutionally safeguarded to hold the prerogative to a limited 
exercise. The logical end of that road was democracy; 
Jbut the nation being as yet unready for this, a basis for a 
stable regime was found, with the accession of the House 
of Hanover, by placing the government in the control of 
the Whig oligarchy, somewhat less irresponsible than an 
untrammelled king. While the Whig leaders thus held the 
proxies of king, Parliament and people for public affairs, 
they saw the utility of playing the part of a constitutional 
government. This policy was prudent even though they 
were primarily interested in maintaining their own power. 
To insure against its fall they avoided allowing the king, 
with whose rule they were in the popular mind associated, 



28 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

to give his approval to measures savoring more strongly of 
personal government than the jealous Parliament and people 
would regard as in keeping with his largely ceremonial 
station. With a like motive the Whig leaders refrained 
from raising issues of policy in Parliament which might be 
unpopular in the nation. Like all rulers not stupid who are 
reputed to be irresponsible, they recognized a potential power 
in the nation to hold them accountable. 

Thus Newcastle, along with the other members of the 
Whig clique, was actually limited in many ways in his poli 
tical action by considerations of expediency. 

As secretary of state for the southern department he not 
only was the administrative head for the colonies but also 
shared responsibility for home and foreign affairs. As* 
the chief English executive for the colonies he named the 
royal officials there l and later directed their policy in both 
civil and military affairs by correspondence, and dealt with 
issues raised by the colonists. Aside from the function of 
the board of trade in passing upon colonial laws, the secretary 
of state for the southern department need not consult them, 
nor abide by their advice when consulted. In Newcastle s 
time the earlier practice of referring nearly every matter of 
importance relating to the colonies to the board was not ob 
served and he relied for important matters more largely upon 
the advice of the committee of the privy council, 2 meaning, 
substantially, the more active members of the privy council 
acting as a smaller council to recommend action for the full 

1 However, the various departments of the English government, such 
as the treasury and the admiralty, had, in practice, much influence in 
selecting appointees to offices in America whose functions related di 
rectly to the work of those departments. 

~ A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. vii, ix ; Turner, " The Development of the Cabinet, 
1688-1760," pt. i, in Am. His. Rev., vol. xviii, pp. 758-760; Russell, 
The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council 
(New York, 1915), pp. 82-83; Kellogg, loc. cit., pp. 222, 225. 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 29 

body, who usually accepted the recommendations made. 
Bladen s influence as a member of the board, therefore, 
was probably due largely to ability, diligence, long ex 
perience with colonial questions, and activity along the line 
of colonial policy in the House of Commons. The board 
of which he was a member could claim neither force nor 
prestige. 1 

The increase of colonial business handled by the privy 
council in the same period in which the board of trade be 
came as a body less and less active and influential indicates 
an increased centralization of authority in colonial matters. 
Aside from the question of Newcastle s qualifications for 
administration or success as an administrator, such a cen 
tralization would undoubtedly offer an opportunity for over 
coming in a measure those defects in the government of the 
colonies arising from division of responsibility and the cum- 
brousness of procedure in England. 

In the decade preceding Belcher s elevation to the gover 
norship, there was indeed a serious effort to force the settle 
ment of salaries upon provincial governors by the assem 
blies. Beyond this, however, the privy council was content 
to deal with efforts on the part of colonial governments tj 
extend their powers, with violations of the rights of the 
crown by the people of the colonies, or the denial of private 
rights there, and with efforts to settle boundary disputes. 
The policy \vas on the whole defensive or mediatory rather 
than aggressive, static rather than dynamic.* 

The issue affecting the rights of the crown which bulks 
largest in the dealings of both privy council and board of 

1 Dickerson, op. cit., pp. 37-38, 188-189. 

* For the substance of measures affecting the colonies considered by 
the privy council in this period and the policy adopted toward them, 
cf. A. P. C., vol. iii, passim; Dickerson, op. cit., pp. 181-189. Cf. also, 
supra, pp. 21-22. 



30 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

trade with the New England colonies in that period related 
to the king s woods. It was also the issue with which Mr. 
Shirley dealt most largely during the decade which he spent, 
in America before his governorship. 

The value of the pine forests of New England and ad 
jacent districts as sources of supplies, especially masts, for 
the royal navy, had been understood from the beginning of 
settlement in Massachusetts Bay. An early visitor to the 
country published in England a glowing eulogy of the forest 
resources of that district. Within a generation of the set 
tlement the English government was taking an active interest 
in promoting in New England the production of naval 
stores. The best masts were from New Hampshire until 
the available supply there had been depleted, but there were 
also fine ones in Maine. The latter fact had not escaped 
the notice of Edward Randolph, the arch-enemy of New 
England, while serving as surveyor of woods and timber in 
Maine in I656. 1 Naturally enough, when a new charter for 
Massachusetts Bay was granted in 1691, including within 
that province the territory known as Maine, there was in 
serted in the document a clause, reserving for the crown 
" all trees of the diameter of twenty-four inches and upwards 
of twelve inches from the ground growing upon any soil 
or tract of land within our said province .... not heretofore 
granted to any private persons." 2 

Early efforts to enforce this reservation were weak and 
largely ineffective, and much timber so reserved was cut 
and sold for private profit by the colonists. 3 

That the ministry was already in earnest in promoting the 

1 Lord, Industrial Experiments in the British Colonies of North 
America (Baltimore, 1898), Johns Hopkins University Studies in His 
torical and Political Science, extra vol. xvii, pp. 1-3, 87. 

*Acts and Resolves, vol. i, p. 20. 

s Lord, op. cit., pp. 87-88. 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND $1 

sea power of Great Britain, and thereby her commerce and 
wealth, by securing a better supply of naval stores from 
America, appeared in October, 1721, when the subject re 
ceived especial attention in the king s speech upon the open 
ing of Parliament. 1 

Governor Shute in the course of a general arraignment 
of the Massachusetts assembly in 172^ included as its first 
item a complaint of their conduct in relation to waste in 
the woods. This complaint led to a condemnation of their 
action in the matter by the attorney-general and solicitor- 
general and a report of the committee of council in favor of 
employing " all proper legal methods .... to assert Your 
Majesty s Royal authority and prosecute all such who have 
contemned the same, unless a due obedience be paid to Your 
Majesty for the future." This show of severity did not 
daunt the provincials. 

In 1727 the privy council, in connection with the estab 
lishment of civil government in Nova Scotia (which that 
body then held to include the country between the Kennebec 
and St. Croix rivers), as a royal province directly under 
the crown, took up the question of the preservation of the 
woods there. The destruction of the woods in New Hamp 
shire had proceeded so far that the question of the pre 
servation of the mast trees in all New England was now a 
critical one. The efforts of the home government to solve 
the problem centered about a new surveyor-general of the 
woods, David Dunbar, who was named in I728. 3 

The new surveyor-general was sent to America to assume 
his duties in May, 1729, after extended and unfruitful con 
sideration of the problem of the woods and the northeastern 

Frisco, The Economic Policy of Robert Walpole, Columbia Uni 
versity Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol. xxvii (New 
York, 1907), pp. 156-157- 

*A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 92-94, 102-103. 

8 Ibid., pp. 152, 183-185, 187. 



32 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

frontiers of New England by the board of trade and the 
privy council. He was under the impression that he was 
to be commissioned as governor of a new province, bearing 
the name Georgia and lying between the Kennebec and St. 
Croix rivers. By rash action upon his arrival he precipi 
tated a conflict with the province of Massachusetts concern 
ing jurisdiction over that district. The upshot of the mat 
ter was an opinion by the attorney-general and solicitor- 
general that the claim of Massachusetts to control of the 
territory was good, and Dunbar was left in an extremely 
uncomfortable position. His lot was hardly ameliorated by 
his appointment as lieutenant-governor of New Hampshire 
for the professed purpose of giving him, added influence as 
surveyor-general of the woods, 1 since in that capacity he 
entered upon a most violent quarrel with Governor Belcher 
in the course of which they clashed at nearly every possible 
point. 

Belcher not only at the time of the inception of his quarrel 
with Dunbar, but repeatedly later, wrote in a heated manner 
to the board of trade and to persons in high office in Eng 
land, complaining of Dunbar s behavior and urging that 
he be removed from his position as lieutenant-governor of 
New Hampshire. 2 The implied reflections upon the officials 

l On this episode, cf. Maine Historical Society Collections, second 
series, vol. ix, pp. 342-344, 352-354, 357-358, 359, 3^8, 373-374- 449-45O; 
vol. x, pp. 450-453, 466, 468-469; vol. xi, pp. 31, 115; A. P. C., vol. iii, 
pp. 184-189, 275-283, 306-307; vol. vi, pp. 122-125, 194; Calendar of 
Treasury Papers, 1556-1728, preserved in Her Majesty s Public Record 
Office, Jos. Redington, ed. (London, 1868-1889), 1708-1714, pp. 489-490. 
Secondary accounts are in Johnston, A History of the Towns of 
Bristol and Bremen in the State of Maine, including the Pemaquid 
Settlement (Albany, 1873); Willis, "Scotch-Irish Immigration to 
Maine," in Me. His. Soc. Colls., vol. vi; Williamson, A History of the 
State of Maine, from its first Discovery, A. D. 1602, to the Separation, 
A. D. 1820, inclusive (Hallowell, 1832), vol. ii, pp. 169-178; Sullivan, 
The History of the District of Mmne (Boston, 1795), PP- 389-394- 

2 Bel. Ps., passim. 



POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND 33 

at home for having named Dunbar and for keeping him in 
office doubtless had the natural effect upon their minds and 
tempers, especially as a complaint by Dunbar regarding 
trade conditions in Massachusetts had already been sent to 
the board of trade and apparently also came to the attention 
of Newcastle. 1 Dunbar s declaration in another letter to 
the board of trade a few months later, that evasions and 
violations of the Acts of Trade at Boston were " connived 
at," 2 must have raised serious doubts as to Belcher s loyalty 
to the crown. In truth, when we consider together Belcher s 
policy, the complaints about him first by Dunbar and later 
by others, and the cool, not to say critical attitude of the 
home government, especially the board of trade, toward 
him, it is not too much to say that he was under suspicion 
and on the defensive from: the start. His treatment by the 
home government is the more striking when compared with 
their attitude toward Dunbar. 3 

In fairness to Belcher it should be said not only that he 
was in a difficult situation but also that the position he took 
regarding the eastern country was at least legally correct, 
as was shown by the opinions of the law officers of the 
crown. Nevertheless, he might wisely have contented him 
self with protesting against the action of the crown, pend 
ing the decision of the issue. Instead of this he asserted 
a jurisdiction then in dispute, and was met by a peremptory 
order of the privy council that he remain quiet, an order 
which, in the nature of things, had to be issued before he 
had a chance to be heard. 4 Thus his course hurt him in 

hitman. The Development of the British West Indies, 1700-1763 
(New Haven, 1917), p. 215 and note 59. 

*Ibid., p. 215 and note 61. 

*Cf. Me. H. S. Colls., loc. cit., vol. xi, pp. 95, 131-133, 134, 183-185. 

M. P. C., loc. cit., p. 306. Doubtless Belcher might without disaster 
have delayed the inspection of all forts under his control (which served 



34 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

England; but any other course would have hurt him in 
New England by making him seem to stand for royal 
rather than colonial interests. In truth, Belcher s conduct 
in this matter, as in many others, is much more easily ex 
plained from the point of view of a man of his antecedents 
than from that of a royal governor. 

From the New England point of view as well as from that 
of the home government, the country east of New Hamp 
shire was taking on a new importance. Not only was the 
shifting of the mast industry from the Piscataqua to Fal- 
mouth (the present Portland, Maine) in 1727,* of great 
importance in connection with that business in itself, but 
it was accompanied by a more active development of the 
eastern country generally, particularly along the seaboard 
and navigable rivers to a point beyond the Kennebec. The 
movement included the clearing of forests, 2 the settling of 
lands, the promotion of shipbuilding,* and a general pushing 
back of the frontier. As 1 this condition appeared, the Mas 
sachusetts government naturally felt an increased interest 
in keeping the control of the evolution in its own hands, and 
in that respect Governor Belcher acted the part not only of 
a Boston merchant but also of a patriotic New-Englander. 

as an excuse for action in the eastern country) even though this duty 
was prescribed by royal instruction. Me. H. S. Colls., loc. cit., vol. xi, p. 7. 

1 Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England (Boston, 
1890), vol. ii, p. 578. 

"The clearing of the forests was stimulated largely by the bidding 
of the French against the English West Indies for the New England 
lumber supply. Pitman, op. cit., pp. 216-222, 254 (note 29). 

Aside from the large fleet of New England trading vessels which 
were usually built there, New England was building many vessels for 
sale to the French and Spanish. (Ibid., pp. 214-215, 255, note.) Massa 
chusetts was said in 1731 to employ "some forty thousand tons of 
shipping in the foreign and coastwise trade, about half of which traded 
to Europe." Brisco, op. cit., p. 203. 



CHAPTER III 
BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 

INASMUCH as Mr. Shirley went to America hoping for 
the patronage of Governor Belcher, which, if granted, 
would result in a public career, he stepped at once, upon 
landing at Boston with his family on October 27, 1731, into 
the atmosphere of political intrigue by which the governor 
was surrounded. 

Shirley s arrival did not cause a ripple upon the placid 
stream of the governor s policy. To the numerous letters 
of introduction endorsing Mr. Shirley s professional attain 
ments and abilities, Belcher replied with protestations of his 
readiness to serve their bearer, phrased with gradations of 
warmth appropriate to the relative eminence of their re 
spective writers. In replying to Shirley s chief patron, New 
castle, the governor made an acknowledgment, cordial in 
tone but formal in content, and a pledge of assistance to his 
protege large in scope but slight in specific promises, and 
then passed adroitly to other matters, public and private. 
Meanwhile nothing more tangible was offered to Shirley 
than a recommendation of him "(for a pleader) to the sev 
eral setts of Judges of the Courts in both my governments," 
and Belcher confided to his confidant and unofficial agent, 
Francis Wilks, that he did not expect the impecunious Eng 
lish barrister to prosper. 1 

1 Letters containing the account of Shirley s arrival and of the gov 
ernor s consequent action are found in Bel. Ps., pt. i, pp. 20, 25, 32-33, 
44, 60, 88, 452-453, 455, 461. 

35 



3 6 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

For the present, therefore, the needy Shirley, who had 
been advised to remove to Boston, " having prospect of a 
numerous offspring," was to battle like any plebeian for a 
living in a provincial environment not likely to be altogether 
friendly. Newcastle, his patron, the busy public man in Eng 
land, was apparently not uninterested nor insincere in his 
friendship, but preoccupied, and embarrassed by other claims 
when patronage in America was to be distributed. 1 

For a decade Shirley led the professional life of one 
" learned in the law " in New England in the period in 
which that profession was producing the minds and the 
legal theories which were to be applied a generation later to 
the problems of the Revolution. Among New England 
lawyers his position was a distinguished one, but he was not 
in harmony with the legal evolution in the midst of which 
he lived, being loyal to the English rather than the New 
English conception of law, especially when those concep 
tions were in conflict. 2 Despite his sturdy English point of 

1 See on this phase of Shirley s experience, Hutchinson, Hist, of 
Mass., vol. ii, p. 358; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 9, 12, 18; Bel. Ps., pt. i, p. 25; 
pt. ii, p. 525- 

1 The legal system of New England before independence still offers a 
profitable field for investigation. Features which would repay further 
research are the development of a distinctively New England common 
law, the relations between the courts of New England and the British 
government in its various departments, the evolution of court procedure 
and legal forms, and the history of the stream of legal traditions and 
attainments which can be traced directly from the leading contemporaries 
of Shirley at the Massachusetts bar, such as John Read, Robert Auch- 
muty, Jeremiah Gridley, Edmund Trowbridge and Benjamin Pratt, 
through the generation of lawyers who won fame in revolutionary days, 
the most noted of whom were James Otis, Oxenbridge Thatcher, John 
Adams, William Gushing and Josiah Quincy, and continuing after the 
Revolution in the persons of Theophilus Parsons, Francis Dana, Rufus 
King, Christopher Gore, Harrison Gray Otis, Royall Tyler and Joseph 
Story, and finally producing the great apostle of American union and 
nationality, Daniel Webster. Much material relating to this subject will 
be found in the Suffolk Files, the Massachusetts Archives and the Acts 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 37 

view, however, his New England neighbors came to feel 
both liking and admiration for him. 

At the start the public career of the newly arrived bar 
rister, almost isolated from influences at home, was ob 
viously conditioned in almost every way by the attitude of 
Governor Belcher toward him. This attitude was a part of 
the governor s public policy. At first, Mr. Shirley was 
merely a pawn in the governor s struggle for political mas 
tery in New England, but after a decade, as the issues got 
beyond Belcher s control, the quiet but forceful English 
man was ready to take up the task of administration with 
a different vision and a different policy. 

In the midst of the party strifes, the personal enmities, 
and the hypocrisies of Belcher s administration, Shirley re 
mained, until the major part of it had passed, outwardly a 
neutral. To play such a part with success would have been, 
without integrity, difficult, without much penetration and 
prudence impossible. 

However, this neutrality on Shirley s part, though cor 
rect in form and reciprocated by the governor, differed 
little in substance from political enmity, since the newcomer 
worked with all his might throughout Belcher s governor 
ship, in opposition to the chief policies which the latter s 
measures were calculated to promote. Meanwhile, each 
professed the fullest loyalty to the crown. 

and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. Considerable in 
formation upon it appears in works by Warren, Washburn, Knapp, 
Davis, Thayer, John Adams, Swift, Bell and White, in the Diaries of 
Benjamin Lynde and Benjamin Lynde, Jr. (Boston, 1880), ed. by F. E. 
Oliver, and in many other works dealing with the history of the period. 
Aside from the stores of official records in London there are indications 
of the English influence upon the American legal system in general in 
A, P. C., Col. Ser., and in the works of Chalmers, Francis Fane, Kellogg 
and Dickerson, while valuable contributions to our knowledge of phases 
of this subject are found in those of Spencer, Russell, Schlesinger, 
Hazeltine and Reinsch. The titles of works referred to in this note 
will be found in the bibliographical note at the end of the volume. 



38 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

In the controversy over the eastern country Belcher 
served New England merchants and the possessors of lands 
in that district whose titles were derived from royal grants. 
He also upheld the Massachusetts jurisdiction there. His 
attitude toward New England commercial interests was 
further revealed in connection with admiralty-court affairs. 
It was of still more importance that he touched therein 
upon the chief issue between the crown and the colonists. 

The admiralty court was a piece of driftwood at which 
the home government caught for support of its policies in 
the flood of colonial hostility. Its jurisdiction had been 
detached from that of the governors under the impression 
that the loyalty of the latter to the king was being too 
severely tried by colonial public opinion and other forms of 
influence. In Massachusetts, which Martin Bladen pene 
tratingly characterized as a " kind of commonwealth, where 
the king is hardly stadtholder," 1 admiralty courts labored 
under more than usual difficulties. 

The creation of an admiralty-court jurisdiction apart 
from the other branches of the provincial governments con 
ferred upon those courts independence at the expense of 
prestige. As they now ceased to function through the ex 
ecutive and drew their authority from the admiralty in 
England, although a direct attack upon them through the 
colonial legislatures was made more difficult, attacks through 
the provincial courts were with more difficulty repelled. 

It was claimed by royal officials that these courts were 
authorized by an obscure act of Parliament, 2 but their only 
clear foundation was in the king s prerogative. 3 As has 

1 Bladen to Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1740, C. O. 5 899, 376. 

2 7 and 8 William III, c. 22. Attorney-General Northey gave an 
opinion that this act did not authorize admiralty courts in the planta 
tions but recognized them as already existing there. Chalmers, Opinions, 
p. SOL 

3 Commissions for vice-admiralty officers in Massachusetts were sub- 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 39 

already been indicated, the days of unquestioned preroga 
tive government were past in both England and America. 1 
A part of the struggle in England over such government 
had been waged between the admiralty and the common-law 
courts or courts of record, and the common-law courts had 
won a jealously-guarded victory over the king s prerogative. 
In reality, therefore, the crown was fighting over again 
in America a battle which it had lost in England, disguising 
the issue under the cloak of special conditions. 2 

The contest was waged in America along the same lines 
as in England, the common-law courts employing legal 
weapons to hold the admiralty courts in check. More than 
a decade before Belcher became governor these " encroach 
ments upon the jurisdiction of the admiralty " had gone so 
far in Massachusetts and elsewhere in America that the 
commissioners of the admiralty regarded the influence of 
these courts there as practically nil. 

Shortly after this opinion was formed, the board of trade 
referred the tangled question to Mr. West, counsel to the 
board, who in a spirit of justice and fairness placed the ad 
miralty and common-law court jurisdictions respectively 
upon the same bases in England and America, and sup 
ported the right of the common-law courts in the latter to 
issue prohibitions of proceedings in the admiralty courts. 3 

mitted by the board of trade on March 6, 1701. " List of Reports and 
Representations ... of the Board of Trade," ed. by C. M. Andrews in 
Am. His. Assoc. Rep. for 1913, vol. i, p. 353, and Calendar of State 
Papers . . . Colonial Series, 1701, 215. 

1 Cf. supra, p. 27. 

8 It was said that in America admiralty courts should be created and 
given power to try cases without juries, since it was impossible other 
wise to secure convictions for offenses against the acts of Parliament 
restricting American economic freedom. A. P. C., vol. vi, p. IQ4- 

8 For a brief discussion of the development of the admiralty courts in 
America, cf. Kellogg, op. cit., pp. 227, 259-267; also Chalmers, Opinions, 
PP- 5i5-5i8; Chalmers, Revolt, vol. i, pp. 274-275; Dickerson, op. cit., 

pp. I2I-I22. 



40 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Since this attitude merely resulted in placing the board 
of trade and the admiralty at odds upon the issue and did 
not bring an abandonment by the ministry of efforts to 
maintain the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts in Amer 
ica, the path of the governor of Massachusetts was not 
made less tortuous thereby. Probably, however, Belcher 
w r as not greatly disturbed by the situation. He thoroughly 
understood New England political conditions and had much 
knowledge of those in England. Inasmuch as his concep 
tion of statecraft was successful intrigue, 1 it was but nat 
ural that he should have sought the favor of both parties 
to the contest. 

Dunbar s complaint to the board of trade that violations 
of the Acts of Trade were " connived at " at Boston, 2 bore 
against the governor and even more pointedly against the 
officials who dealt directly with matters of trade at that 
port. Prominent among them were the judge of the ad 
miralty court, Nathaniel Byfield, 3 and his subordinate 

l He suggested this Machiavellian political philosophy in the words, 
" Secrecy is the soul of business." (Bel Ps., vol. i, p. 492.) His practice 
suggests that he regarded secrecy and duplicity as kindred spirits. 

2 Cf. supra, p. 33- 

3 Judge Byfield was a native of England, of clerical ancestry, a resident 
of New England more than half a century before Belcher s administra 
tion, a prosperous merchant, a self-taught lawyer and judge of the 
common law courts in New England, six times negatived as a coun 
cillor by different governors, a speaker of the Massachusetts assembly 
in 1693, supposed by Randolph to be " strict in ye Observacon of ye 
Acts of Trade," and hence judge of admiralty from 1703 to 1715, but 
later superseded for political reasons, again judge of admiralty in 1729, 
a zealous supporter of the popular party, it is alleged for the purpose 
of satisfying ambition and revenge, and accused of mendacity by the 
distinguished Jeremiah Dummer. He was allied by marriage with Gov 
ernor Belcher. Washburn, Sketches of the Judicial History of Massa 
chusetts (Boston, 1840), pp. 176, 178-183; Kellogg, loc. cit., p. 264; 
Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 213, 227; Spencer, Constitutional Conflict 
in Massachusetts (Columbus, 1905), p. 37* 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 41 

officials. Byfield, now nearly an octogenarian, jointly with 
his subordinates, presented to Belcher soon after his arrival 
as governor a memorial, the tenor of which seemed to testify 
to their zeal for the interests of the crown. This paper de 
nounced the recent encroachments of the provincial courts 
upon the admiralty court, called on the governor to support 
it against such encroachments, and declared the full inten 
tion of the memorialists to state their grievances to the 
king in council. 1 Presumably no appeal was made to the 
king in council, 2 and about a year later Belcher, remov 
ing from the Suffolk county court of common pleas two 
staunch upholders of royal interests, made the venerable 
Byfield chief justice of it and named as associate justice 
the versatile Boston physician, Dr. Elisha Cooke, equally 
ready to prescribe for the physical and political ills of the 
populace. During the next two years these astute jurists 
sat together upon that bench in a harmony outwardly undis^ 
turbed by Cooke s persistent enmity to the admiralty-court 
jurisdiction. 3 

Shirley must soon have seen that the effort to promote 
royal interests through the admiralty court in New England 
without a radical change in the personnel and policy of the 

1 Suffolk Files, 30398. 

2 No reference to such a memorial appears in the A. P. C. 

3 For Belcher s elevation of Byfield and Cooke, cf. Washburn, op. cit., 
pp. 179-180, 325, 329, 330-331 ; Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 336. Dunbar 
had complained to the home government three months before Belcher 
reached Boston against both Byfield and Cooke; against the former 
as superannuated and ignorant or partial to the country; against the 
latter as a popular champion who pleaded all cases against the crown 
in the admiralty court. (Me. H. S. Colls., loc. cit., vol. xi, p. 26.) Cooke 
was by heredity the chief foe of the king s prerogative and the chief 
champion of popular rights in Massachusetts. Father and son of the 
same name were marked men in the eyes of the home government. 
They were especially active in promoting the popular uprising against 
Shute which led that governor to retire to England. 



4 2 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

officeholders there under the crown was little unlike the 
task of Sisyphus. Nevertheless, as an Englishman, with 
that instinctive, conservative fidelity to his ideals which has 
throughout the ages made men of that race saints, heroes 
or fools, he without hesitation and regardless of colonial 
opposition began attempting to put in practice those con 
ceptions of colonial administration generally held by Eng 
lishmen of the official class in America. Devotion to the prin 
ciples of those laws of England which were applied through 
the king s prerogative to the plantations, was evidently a car 
dinal tenet of his political philosophy. 1 Shirley, however, 
in following this course was listening to- ambition as well 
as to principle, and avowed to the officials at home and to 
Belcher his intention to win recognition through services 
to the crown. His earliest case bearing upon controversial 
questions accomplished little more than to aline him clearly 
with the prerogative party in New England. 2 

A- l Shirley s attitude in America was consistently loyal to the prevailing 
ministerial view in England of the binding force of the king s preroga 
tive in the colonies, as exercised by his officials there, and during 
Belcher s administration this attitude appeared prominently in the 
English barrister s support of the claims of the admiralty court. Shirley 
perhaps had considerable familiarity with the civil law, essential as a 
basis for admiralty court practice, since he brought among his recom 
mendations to Governor Belcher one from Dr. Exton Sayer, advocate- 
general of the admiralty and a noted English lawyer. Bel. Ps., vol. i, 
pp. 452-453. Concerning Dr. Sayer, cf. A. P. C., vol. Hi, pp. 202-203, 
283, 895; Chalmers, Revolt, vol. ii, p. 128; List of Vernon-Wager MSS., 
PP. 27, 30. 

* In a case in which he was employed a few days after his arrival by 
the Massachusetts assembly to aid some destitute Palatine immigrants 
he cut sharply athwart the current of public opinion by bringing suit in 
the admiralty court, but counter suits developing in the province courts 

he seems to have been unable to secure justice for his clients. The 
story of the Palatines and the efforts to obtain redress in their behalf 
appear in documents found in the Suffolk Files and in the Suffolk court 
records as follows: Suffolk Files, nos. 33341, 33260, 33060, 34065, 32932; 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 43 

Belcher s kinsman, Judge Byfield, of the admiralty court, 
and his intimate enemy, Dr. Cooke, took seats together 
upon the bench of the Suffolk County Court of Common 
Pleas, on December 9, 1731. Almost at once the grand 
jury impanelled by this court, over which Byfield then began 
to preside, sought, at the instigation of his versatile colleague 
Cooke, to show how it could be used to undermine the ad 
miralty court of which Byfield still continued the head. 
Such procedure was a novelty, since the inferior courts of 
the province did not possess the right to interfere with pro 
ceedings in the admiralty court. Cooke, however, through 
the grand jury, charged the officials of the admiralty court 
with " unjustly and extorsively " exceeding the fees fixed 
for their services by a provincial law. The aim was plaus 
ibly stated by Shirley to be " to destroy the court totally 
by sinking the perquisites and fees of the judge from about 
thirty pounds a year sterling to fifteen." 

This was in truth only one phase of a concerted attack 
upon the king s prerogative in Massachusetts at that time. 
Other phases appeared in efforts to open the way for an 
expansion of the powers of the assembly by abridging the 
prerogative powers of the governor as defined in his in 
structions. The attack upon the admiralty court seemed to 
be intended as a form of intimidation to promote the suc 
cess of other daring measures hereafter referred to. 

Byfield, who seems to have felt no inclination to oppose 
Cooke until the latter sought to curtail his income as judge 

Massachusetts Admiralty Records, vol. iii, p. 106; Minute Book, Suffolk 
Superior Court of Judicature, 1731, 1733 (March 4, 1731/2) ; ibid., Barn- 
stable and Dukes, Plymouth, 1731, 1732, 1734, 1736, 1738, 1740 (April 18, 
1732). Cf. also, Massachusetts Archives, vol. xli, fol. 132; Massa 
chusetts Journal of the House of Representatives, June 23, 1732, p. 35, 
July 7, 1732, pp. 59-60; Massachusetts Council Records, vol. ix, pp. 
2 57, 352, 356, 369; Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, vol. iv, 
PP- 354-356; Bel. Ps., pt. i, pp. 109, 479; Acts and Resolves, vol. xi, p. 631. 



44 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

of admiralty, now employed Shirley as counsel. Cooke s 
plans were defeated by the latter, who secured an appeal to 
the privy council despite the refusal of the superior court 
of the province to allow one. This court, after continuing 
a number of cases against officials of the admiralty court 
from session to session, " the attorney-general being indis 
posed and not able to attend in person," in November, 1732, 
before the privy council had granted an appeal, dismissed 
all these cases at one time, without recording the grounds 
for their action. Before the appeal was granted, also, By- 
field was dead, which doubtless prevented the prosecution 
of it before the privy council. 1 

The result in this matter was not decisive on the issue be 
tween crown and province. But Shirley had employed 
a method of procedure which he was to use again in even 
more important matters for the defense of the prerogative. 
He proceeded upon the theory that in all cases of impor 
tance, regardless of the sum involved, the court of last 
resort was the privy council, in which his patron sat as the 
king s minister for colonial affairs. As counsel for parties 
concerned he appealed several cases involving public issues 
to the highest tribunal at home. This directly antagonized 
the Massachusetts policy, which sought to prevent appeal to 
the king in council and to make the superior court of the 
province in practice the court of last resort for all cases 
coming under its jurisdiction. Shirley s theory was in har 
mony with the existing legal relationships between province 
and empire; the policy of the province was prophetic of con 
ditions to come with independence. 

Meanwhile Belcher introduced a superficial change of 
policy. By winking at commercial practices condemned by 

1 For this affair, cf. Suffolk Files, 33104; Minute Book, Suffolk Sup. 
Ct. of Jud., 1731, 1733; A. P. C., vol. iii, p. 384; Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 3; 
Washburn, op. cit., pp. 158-159, 319- 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 45 

Dunbar, by forming an alliance with Cooke, by making 
early solicitation of the home government for permission to* 
accept annual grants of salary from the assembly in viola 
tion of his instructions, and by other measures popular in 
the province, he avoided prolonged friction with the assem 
bly. 1 In doing so he practically surrendered to the assem 
bly, whose dependent he in substance became. Such perhaps 
was his intention from the beginning. But Belcher in 
the nature of things could not be the leader of the assembly, 
and Cooke, the idol of the people, although friendly to a 
compliant governor, continued to fight the prerogative no 
less audaciously than under more conscientious executives. 
Oil and fire cannot long remain quiescent together and the 
alliance between the governor and Cooke was about a year 
old when the former began to show signs of combustion. 

In May, 1731, Cooke inspired an application by the as 
sembly to the privy council for the withdrawal of the in 
structions to the governor said to call for a limit on issues 
of paper money, a fixed salary for the governor, and a 
transfer of the treasury " from the care of the House of 
Representatives " to " the governor and council." Shortly 
after followed the attack on the admiralty court referred 
to above, made perhaps by way of emphasis of Cooke s 
other projects. This was quickly followed in 1732 by a 
petition of the assembly to the privy council covering the 
first and third items of that of the preceding year, with in 
structions to Wilks that if it should be denied, an appeal 
should then be made to the House of Commons. 

Belcher s opposition at Whitehall to the assembly s 
petitions protected his reputation with the ministry, although 
he referred to Cooke, their author, without aversion in a 

1 On Belcher s handling of the salary question, cf. Bel Ps., pt. i, pp. 
42-43 and passim; Hutchinson, op. cit., pp. 337-338; A. P. C. f vol. iii, 
Bp. 261-264; Chalmers, Revolt, vol. ii, p. 139. 



46 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

letter denouncing them to his agent in England, Francis 
Wilks. However, in the following year there came not 
only the expected condemnation of the position of the 
assembly from the privy council, but also a severe denun 
ciation from the House of Commons. This shows, con 
trary to what seems to have been the general impression, 
that the Massachusetts government appealed to the House 
of Commons, not for legislation, nor for direct action of 
any sort, but only that the House " become intercessors for 
them with His Majesty." * Thereupon Belcher deftly re 
moved Cooke from his judgeship and was gratified to see 
that the erstwhile popular idol, by partaking of his official 
bounty, had lost the sympathy of the masses. The 
people of Boston barely saved him from political death by 
electing him to the assembly by a margin of one or two 
votes. 2 

1 Cf. ibid., p. 135. The action by the Commons follows: 
"A memorial of the Counsel and Representatives of the province of 
the Massachusetts Bay was presented to the House, and read ; laying 
before the House the difficulties and distresses they labor under, arising 
from a royal instruction given to the present governor of the said 
province, in relation to the issuing and disposing of the publick monies 
of the said province; and moving the House to allow their agent to be 
heard, by counsel, upon this affair ; representing also the difficulties they 
are under, from a royal instruction given, as aforesaid, restraining the 
emission of bills of credit ; and concluding with a petition, that the 
House will take their case into consideration, and become intercessors 
for them with His Majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to with 
draw the said instructions, as contrary to their charter, and tending, in 
their own nature, to distress, if not ruin, them. 

" Resolved, that the complaint contained in this memorial and petition 
is frivolous and groundless, an high insult upon His Majesty s govern 
ment, and tending to shake off the dependency of the said colony upon 
this kingdom, to which, by law and right, they are, and ought to be, subject. 
" Resolved, that the said memorial and petition be rejected." 
Journal of the House of Commons, May 10, 1733, vol. xxii, p. 145. 
1 For the episode of the addresses, cf. Bel. Ps., pt. i, pp. 226-228, 229- 
230; Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 4; d. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 326-334; Palfrey, Com- 
pendious History of New England (Boston, 1884), vol. iv, pp. 50-52; 
Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 338; Chalmers, Revolt, vol. ii, pp. I35-I39- 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 47 

Belcher s policy was still to seek approval both at home 
and in the province, and he scored a point when the assem 
bly, convinced of the impossibility of gaining at home the 
points covered by the addresses, gave up the contest there. 
Also the discrediting of Cooke helped to make the gover 
nor s path easy. 

4 Upon Byfield s death in 1733, Belcher named Shirley 
judge of admiralty during pleasure. After serving for a 
brief period Shirley arranged with Belcher to exchange 
positions with Robert Auchmuty, then advocate-general of 
the court. Auchmuty held the post of judge until after 
Shirley became governor, and manifested somewhat the 
same spirit that was exhibited by the venerable Byfield. 
Shirley realized that the post was worth less than nothing 
to an honest supporter of the prerogative, in view of the 
hostility of the assembly and of prospective clients; and 
that, if administered to the satisfaction of the assembly, it 
must probably be a millstone about the neck of a man am 
bitious for a career under the crown. He made it clear to 
the Duke of Newcastle that should the home government 
provide a salary for the post, instead of making it dependent 
upon fees, he would be glad to hold it. Meanwhile he was 
too shrewd to accept responsibility without independence of 
provincial officials, and Belcher, having failed to make him 
his satellite or to place him where the upper and nether 
millstones of the British ministry and local opinion respec 
tively would presumably reduce him to dust, deplored to 
Newcastle that " there is hardly any place here in the gift 
of the governor worth Mr. Shirley s notice." * 

Shirley s new post as advocate-general was that of the 
prosecuting officer of the court of vice-admiralty for the 

1 Facts relating to Shirley s brief judicial career are found in Massa 
chusetts Admiralty Records, vol. iii, pp. 135, 136; C. O. 5 752; ibid., 899, 
74; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 2-4; Bel. Ps., pt i, pp. 300, 309-310. 



48 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

northern district. His chief duties related to the enforce 
ment of the Acts of Trade and of the acts of Parliament 
for the protection of the royal rights in the New England 
woods. He took office just in time to assume the task of 
enforcing the Molasses Act of 1733, and is said to have 
labored faithfully to that end despite strong opposition; 
but his most conspicuous and doubtless his most important^ 
sejvices related to the king s woods. His labors in support 
of English rights were diverse, arduous, costly of time and 
money in traveling over the district extending from Rhode 
Island to Maine, and injurious to his practice of law. 
These conditions he endured without compensation in the 
form of salary or fees, even without a lawyer s slight fee 
when, as he alleged was often the case, he acted upon his 
own initiative. His proceedings in connection with the 
king s woods were even less palatable to those affected than 
in the case of the enforcement of the Acts of Trade; but, 
as always, Shirley sought to serve at the same time his 
native country and himself. 1 

Shirley now enjoyed the independence which is possessed 
by those too poor to be despoiled. 2 Only a boycott of the 
Englishman by provincial clients could check him in his 
support of the crown, and since he proved both trustworthy 
and likable, that was not undertaken. He lost some clients, 
no doubt, but he also became permanent counsel for one of 
the wealthiest and one of the most litigious merchants and 

1 For the nature of his new position and of his service in it, cf. 
C. 0. 5 752; ibid., 899, 74. 

His post as advocate-general was perhaps as unprofitable as that of 
judge of admiralty would have been, but it was one in which he prob 
ably could not be successfully attacked before the home government if 
efficient in the discharge of duty, while had he remained in the latter 
post judgments in favor of the crown would have lost him clients, while 
those in favor of defendants could be represented as due to corrupt 
bargains with those who profited thereby. 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 



49 



landowners in New England, Samuel Waldo. His for 
tunes were reduced, and judging by the tone of appeals by 
himself and Mrs. Shirley for his advancement to a lucrative 
position, desperate; yet he managed to sustain his family 
until promotion came. 1 

In his activity as advocate-general Shirley touched upon 
and came to comprehend the nature of the basic differences 
between New England and the home government. He also 
came to understand Belcher s political system. Since Bel 
cher contributed next to nothing to the upholding of royal 
interests in New England save when such action was nec 
essary to his security in office, it was inevitable that those 
who, like Shirley and the surveyor-general of the woods, 
were earnest in upholding British interests there should 
distrust the governor or openly quarrel with him. To un 
derstand the course of Shirley one must first understand 
the policy of Belcher and that of the provincial statesmen 
of his day. 

The basic policy of Belcher was to remain popular in 
New England by allowing to its people that which they 
were most insistent upon possessing, opportunity to develop 
the natural resources of their country and to utilize them 
freely through commerce. The knowledge that the gov 
ernor favored this policy, in connection with sundry devices 
of political strategy, kept the Massachusetts assembly usu 
ally willing to vote annual grants, howbeit influenced by a 
prudent economy and a growing dislike of Belcher as years 
passed. In New Hampshire this policy drew to the sup 
port of Belcher a minority made up of, first, a small group 
of propertied men, whose prosperity was dependent upon 
success in evading the laws for the protection of the woods, 

1 Records of a long list of cases conducted by Shirley for Samuel 
Waldo, which were in several instances appealed to the king in council, 
are found in the Suffolk Files. The straits to which he and his family 
were reduced appear from Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 10, 38. 



50 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

and second, a rough and well-nigh lawless contingent of 
woodsmen, whose livelihood was secured by supplying the 
sawmill and ship-owners with the chief source of income to 
all alike, namely, the trees reserved for the crown. 

On the other hand, Belcher alienated from him the 
majority of the people of New Hampshire, chiefly upon the 
boundary issue, since he aided Massachusetts in the con 
troversy. Local patriotism in New Hampshire kept a ma 
jority of the assembly there consistently hostile to Belcher 
when his policy was once understood, but the governor, as 
the protagonist of his section, represented a larger patriot 
ism. For the general interests of New England \vould be 
promoted by confining the royal province of New Hamp 
shire to narrow limits, or still better by absorbing it within 
the much freer government of Massachusetts Bay. 

Belcher s indirect methods exemplified highly developed 
art. They not only prevented the contemporary home gov 
ernment from getting a clear view of his intentions, but 
they also effectually obscured the vision of the old-school 
historians of New England, so that a lucid and compre 
hensive narrative of his administration is still to be written. 1 

Massachusetts had been developing since her foundation 
an imperial policy which tended toward the absorption of 
all New England. After the colonies to the south of her 
had organized their governments under royal charters and 
were too firmly established to be submerged and too free 

1 His contemporary, Hutchinson, did not attempt to give such an ac 
count, not improbably because he was on intimate terms with Belcher 
and had supported his policy in regard to the New Hampshire boundary 
and other matters, and because he was, despite his later service as a 
royal governor and his loyalty to the crown at the Revolution, in essen 
tial sympathy with the Massachusetts position under Belcher. Cf. Bel. 
Ps., pt. ii, pp. 77, 334, 336, 341-343, 3&>, 386-390, 4P9, 426, 522, 523, 537, 
542; The Diary and Letters of His Excellency, Thomas Hutchinson, 
Esq., ed. by P. O. Hutchinson (Boston, 1884-1886), vol. i, p. 51; Hutch 
inson, Hist, of Mass., vol. ii, pp. v, 33I-35& 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 51 

to be a menace to her institutions, she reached out toward a 
dominion of northern New England which, if her measures 
had been unchecked, would logically have become a great 
commonwealth, under the Massachusetts charter, stretching 
from New York to the St. Croix river or beyond, and from 
Connecticut to Canada. This ambitious program, indi 
cated by the logic of events, was in this period opposed in 
New England chiefly by New Hampshire, influenced by a 
local patriotism, and by the personal aspirations of politi 
cians who could not hope for distinction under Massa 
chusetts. 

The Massachusetts policy had been rudely interrupted 
when the arbitrary Andros came to New England as the 
last emissary of Stuart absolutism, and the interruption was 
made permanent when New Hampshire was not included in 
the territory of Massachusetts under the second charter. 
There now gradually developed a substitute policy of un 
obtrusive penetration to the northward, under the guise of 
occupying lands claimed by New Hampshire but said to 
belong to Massachusetts under the extremely inconclusive 
boundary stated in the Massachusetts charter. This was 
easier to carry out since one governor presided over both 
provinces. 

The encroachments upon New Hampshire whereby that 
little province was well-nigh surrounded by a rising tide of 
settlement were merely a part of the general policy of ex 
pansion in which Massachusetts was engaged. Another 
portion of this movement was taking place in disregard of 
British restrictions in the country east of New Hampshire. 
_ Massachusetts in the colonial period had established a 
government which displayed a marvelous degree of central 
ized power under frontier conditions. The carefully directed 
expansion of the colony and province which followed the 
first dispersion of the early settlers in search of homes had 



52 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

been carried out through the progressive incorporation of 
towns by the legislature where and when it seemed wise; 
these towns, under the supervision of the colonial govern 
ment, serving in many instances as the marches of the 
commonwealth. 

By a process familiar to students of the evolution of in 
stitutions, Massachusetts now adapted this old machinery 
for colonization and local government to new conditions. 
Elisha Cooke was the provincial statesman who saw the 
opportunity and animated New England to seize it. 

In its earlier stages Cooke s strategy was directed pri 
marily toward the settlement and control of the former 
province of Maine. The jurisdiction of Massachusetts there 
was clear, but Cooke desired the organization of towns as 
a means of insuring beyond a peradventure that the New 
Englanders should enter into the land and possess it, in 
cluding the mast trees which the crown so eagerly sought 
to reserve. The Massachusetts officials were also charged 
with seeking the same ends in laying out towns in districts 
claimed by New Hampshire, in addition to the obvious 
effort to secure jurisdiction over the territory. This process 
was well begun while Shute was governor, and a phase of 
the activities of the Massachusetts assembly in Maine led 
to his return to England in 1723 to register his vigorous 
complaint against the attitude of the province toward the 
king s woods. 1 

1 Cooke had evolved the interesting theory that in lands now 
held by Massachusetts Bay in Maine, although a part of her domain 
and as yet mostly ungranted by her to private persons, it was neverthe 
less beyond the power of the crown to reserve mast trees, inasmuch 
as that district in its entirety had been in private ownership through 
the proprietorship over it granted to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, which 
proprietorship, Cooke declared, had been passed on by purchase to 
the colony of Massachusetts before 1691. Cooke held further that 
the rights of the colony of Massachusetts to Maine had been vested 
in the province by the inclusion of that territory within its limits by 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 



53 



Even as Shute voiced his complaint the process was going 
on apace all along the northern frontiers under the not un 
friendly eye of his lieutenant-governor, William, Dummer, 
a native of the province, too prudent to violate his instruc 
tions conspicuously, but too sympathetic with his country 
to object to the negation of their spirit In 1727, just as 
the contractor for masts for the crown was being forced 
by the scarcity of suitable trees to shift his base of opera 
tions from New Hampshire to Casco Bay in Maine, the 
Massachusetts assembly proposed to survey a line of towns 
to extend from Berwick on the New Hampshire frontier 
to Casco Bay. It had been proposed in the preceding year, 
but not voted by the council, that surveys be made for lines 
of towns extending from Northfield on the Connecticut to 
Dunstable on the Merrimac, and from, Dunstable north on 
both sides of the Merrimac to Penacook or Concord. This 
proposal was now joined with that for a line of towns in 
Maine. The lower house did not then succeed in getting 
adoption of wholesale plans for promoting colonization 
through committees to be named for the purpose, but sur 
veys for the various lines of towns were then made and the 
plans were later quietly put into effect from, time to time by 
the creation of single towns. 

the charter of 1691. Under this theory Cooke was buying and selling 
lands in the Maine forests, even outside townships, regardless of the 
reservation of mast trees. 

The province government, however, was giving as much color of 
law as possible to private claims by the granting of townships in the 
mast country, as a kind of argument could be made that such grants 
made the trees within them private property even though the grant 
came after 1691. 

For this phase of the New England situation, cf. A. P. C., vol. iii, 
PP- 93-94; vol. vi, p. 164; Matthews, op. cit., pp. 66-67; Hutchinson, 
op. tit., vol. ii, pp. 223-225, 228-230, 260-261; Bel. Ps., pt. i, p. 194; 
Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 111-154, 159-165, 179, 284-304 and appendix; 
Lord, op. cit., pp. 113-115; Andrews, "List of Representations," Am. 
His. Assoc. Rep. for 1913, vol. i, p. 368. 



54 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

This plan was extended for more intensive encroachment 
upon New Hampshire as the efforts of the latter to secure 
a settlement of the boundary dispute became more strenu 
ous. In 1736 a committee was named to survey and grant 
to settlers and to supervise the settlement of a double line 
of towns from Penacook to the falls of the Connecticut and 
another line southward upon the eastern bank of the river 
from that point to Winchester, thirteen in all. By an early 
grant of Penacook, by rewarding the descendants of those 
who had fought in previous wars with grants of newly 
surveyed townships, many of which were in the area 
in dispute fcvith New Hampshire, and by the creation, 
of three towns on Ashuelot river, fourteen other townships 
in New Hampshire had been granted by Massachusetts be 
fore commissioners for the settlement of the line met at 
Hampton, August i, 1737. These hastily-made grants 
were not yet fully settled when the boundary award nega 
tived the ambitions of Massachusetts to confine New Hamp 
shire to a harbor and its immediate hinterland. However, 
the alleged purpose of settling the more advanced lines, the 
defense of the frontiers, could no doubt have been more 
effectively attained under the control and with the backing 
of the immeasurably greater resources of Massachusetts. 
As it turned out, a considerable body of Massachusetts set 
tlers who had found homes in New Hampshire, gave much 
needed strength to its frail structure, and made appreciably 
easier the political leadership which the larger province main 
tained of its weaker neighbor until after the Revolution. 1 

Belcher s share in these matters will make a prettier study 
in intrigue for a future biographer than usually falls to the 

1 For the expansion in Maine and the encroachments upon New 
Hampshire cf. New Hampshire Provincial and State Papers (Concord, 
etc., 1867-1915), vols. iv, xix, xxiv; A. P, C., vol. iii, p. 184; Fry, 
New Hampshire as a Royal Province (New York, 1908), pp. 243-261. 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 55 

lot of the historical investigator. He was clearly partisan in 
the interest of Massachusetts, though representing himself 
at home as sympathetic with New Hampshire, and he omit 
ted no obvious device to prevent a settlement unfavorable to) 
Massachusetts Bay. He understood that a victory for New 
Hampshire would presage his removal as governor of that 
province, and perhaps from his post in Massachusetts, To 
that extent he appears less the patriot and more the parasite 
upon the body politic. Shirley was not at first drawn 
directly into this controversy. Later, when hostility broke 
out between the two men, he testified to the methods of 
administration in New Hampshire employed by Belcher in 
connection with his fight there to maintain his supremacy 
as governor, and thus became an important factor in discred 
iting the latter at home. 

While Belcher and the popular party in Massachusetts 
were thus mutually helpful to their respective interests, 
a situation developed in the country east of New Hampshire 
which caused much wrath to both, and gave an opportunity 
to Shirley to render a service to the crown both considerable 
and conspicuous. The train for this eruption had been laid 
by the conflict between provincial and imperial interests there, 
an the interplay of which private interests had sustained an 
important part. 

While Dunbar, as de facto governor of the mythical prov 
ince of Georgia, was causing fury and misgivings to the 
people of Massachusetts in general and to the individuals 
who possessed more or less valid titles to lands in the area 
afflicted by his harsh measures in particular, Samuel Waldo 
came forward as the Sir Galahad of New England and the 
protagonist for the grantees of lands in dispute. Having 
been assured of a generous reward if successful in securing 
recognition of the title to the lands east of the Kennebec 
claimed by himself and others, Waldo set out for England. 



56 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

He was then described by David Dunbar as one of " Dr. 
Cook s violent ones," and his petition to the privy council 
was on behalf of a group of proprietors which included 
Cooke, the steady opponent of the king s prerogative. 
Despite this handicap in the eyes of the English government 
Waldo possessed some elements of strength in his applica 
tion. He was the agent in New England of the contractor 
for masts for the royal navy, he appeared on behalf of vested 
interests, always tenderly regarded by the privy council, 
and he was not a representative of the provincial govern 
ment, always suspected of improper motives. 

The privy council, after considering the claims of pro 
prietors in the disputed district, known as Sagadahoc, the 
memorial of the Massachusetts general court claiming juris 
diction over it and the opinions upon the whole matter of the 
attorney-general and solicitor-general, indorsed the claims 
of private individuals to lands there and the right of the 
Massachusetts government to general jurisdiction over it. 
This judgment, however, was only partially a victory for 
the province. Under the provincial charter this territory was 
under the control of the provincial government but could not 
be granted to private individuals without the consent of 
the crown. As a result settlements there had been made by 
private initiative under authority of royal grants made be 
fore the country came under Massachusetts control, and 
these had been known as plantations or " towns " without 
being incorporated as such. 1 

While Dunbar was uprooting the settlements there, the 
provincial government had attempted to assert a doubtful 
jurisdiction over the region through the officials of York 

1 A clash of interest between the grantees and the province developed 
which in a later stage took the form of litigation involving the crown 
and the province. At this point Shirley appeared as the representative 
of the crown s interests. 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 57 

County. This was met by an order in council of November 
12, 1730, forbidding the exercise of the authority of Massa 
chusetts in the district during the pendency of the issue with 
Dunbar. The decision of the privy council on Waldo s peti 
tion, while recognizing that Sagadahoc lay within the juris 
diction of Massachusetts, explicitly pointed out the charter 
provision limiting the right of the province to grant lands 
there to individuals. Therefore when the crown recognized 
the title of Waldo and others to lands in this district, inas 
much as their settlements had not been incorporated as towns 
it asserted for the proprietors of these settlements a f reedomi 
to proceed with their plans. In the nature of the case this 
gave them semi-independence of the provincial government ; 
for the officials could not specify conditions of settlement 
such as were placed in town charters, or maintain the same 
closeness of supervision that was exercised over the for 
mally incorporated towns. 1 

Waldo now heid a large area east of the Kennebec, wag 
a royal agent known to be interested in the preservation of 
mast trees, and began applying his restless energy and ambi 
tion to the execution of large plans for the settlement and 
development of the domain which had been awarded him. 
He soon encountered difficulties in his undertakings in the 
eastern country and attributed his troubles with some reason 
to Belcher s influence. Before the end of 1733 the two 
men were on terms similar to those previously existing be 
tween the governor and David Dunbar. Throughout the 
remaining years of his governorship Belcher in letters to 
his friends and to officials at home showered wrath, scorn 
and innuendo upon this antagonist, who in return made the 

1 For the controversy over titles and jurisdictions in Sagadahoc, cf. 
supra, p. 32; A. P. C., vol. Hi, pp. 275-283; vol. vi, pp. 225-230; Me. 
H. S. Colls., loc. cit., vol. xi, pp. 2-3, 20-21, 25-29, 152-153; Lord, op. cit., 
PP- 51-55; Palfrey, History of New England (Boston, 1858-1800), vol. 
iv, pp. 568-569 ; Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 339-34- 



58 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

care of his estate an avocation, conducted in large measure 
through the hands of Shirley, and his vocation the ending 
of Belcher s career as governor. 1 

In the summer of 1733 Dimbar sought to make peace with 
the governor and at the same time proposed to bring the 
country about Pemaquid under the Massachusetts authori 
ties. Upon the withdrawal of the garrison to Nova Scotia 
Belcher seized the apparent opportunity to abate the opposi 
tion of his chief opponent in America. Soon after, 
Belcher s hopes of securing the appointment of a different 
lieutenant-governor for New Hampshire were dashed by 
news from home, and he then turned to schemes for persuad 
ing Dunbar to resign. Meanwhile the governor and his 
lieutenant were superficially friendly. Soon it appeared 
that the governor had not reduced his claims to control in 
New Hampshire, or changed his policy in matters relating 
to Dunbar s duties as surveyor-general, and that the latter 
proposed merely a personal rapprochement but continued 
his claims and opposition to the governor in England, andi 
his support of royal interests in America. 

So it fell out, that while Waldo was being exasperated, 
the governor, upon receiving favorable accounts of the atti 
tude of officials at home toward his conduct, deliberately 
broke again with Dunbar. which resulted in a general al- 

1 The difficulties of Waldo in the Penobscot country were, at least 
superficially, largely through the Indians, who annoyed his settlers and 
threatened his settlements. (Me. H. S. Colls., loc. cit., vol. xi, pp. 
149-172.) They seem, however, to have been secretly encouraged to 
oppose Waldo s claims by interested whites. (Shirley to Board, Mar. 
12, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 23.) Belcher later made the inadequate 
explanation that he was prevented by treaties formerly made with the 
Indians from supporting Waldo s claims. 

For the development of the feud between Waldo and Belcher, cf. 
Bel Ps., passim; Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 8; N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. iv, pp. 
14-15, 846; vol. xviii, pp. 6-7, 37, 159-160; Palfrey, Comp. Hist., vol. 
iv, pp. 136-137; Johnston, op. cit., f>. 472; Williamson, op. cit., p. 177. 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 59 

liance of his enemies in New England led by Elisha Cooke, 
Dunbar and Waldo. 

This was the turning point of Belcher s career, for from 
this time the opposition of all faithful servants of the crown 
in New England was reenforced by the personal animosity 
of a group of able men whose cherished plans had been 
shattered by the governor. They ultimately made his posi 
tion untenable in England. 

Contemporaneously with the development of the feud 
between Waldo and Belcher, which in its public aspect re 
lated to the administration of the lands between the Ken- 
nebec and the Penobscot, the Massachusetts legislature be 
came aggressive in forwarding their plans for the domina 
tion of the former province of Maine, lying between the 
Kennebec and New Hampshire. 1 

This activity of the Massachusetts legislature was in the 
nature of a challenge to the representatives of the king s 
prerogative in the country west of the Kennebec and was 
accompanied by the governor s efforts to establish the pro 
vincial control over the eastern country through the officials 
of York county. If he should succeed, the future develop 
ment of the country east of the Kennebec would naturally 
be directed by the province rather than by the crown. 

The challenge \vas quickly accepted, probably the more 
quickly because of recent happenings east of the Kennebec. 
Waldo acting for Gulston. the contractor for masts for the 
royal navy, at some time during the winter of 1733-4, sent 
workmen into a tract of woodland located in Berwick with 
directions to cut certain mast trees growing there which 

1 On November 6, 1733, the two houses of the legislature named a 
joint committee to supervise the settlement of Berwick, Maine, close 
to the New Hampshire border, on the western end of the line of towns 
planned in 1727, to extend from Berwick to Casco Bay. Cf. supra, 
p. 53; Jour., p. 106; Ct. Recs., vol. xv, p. 4/0. Cf. also, Sullivan, 
op. cit., pp. 245-248. 



60 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

had previously been viewed and " allowed " for masts by 
Dunbar as surveyor-general. The trees were accordingly 
cut, whereupon this defiance of the popular theory that 
the crown had no right to mast trees within any township, 
was at once taken up by the alleged owner of the tract upon 
which the trees stood. 

The result was a legal battle in which suit was brought 
against the workmen and prosecuted against o ne of them. 
Thereupon Waldo requested Shirley to defend his employee, 
and when both the inferior and superior courts of the prov 
ince decided against him, advanced the money to pay the 
execution, and also to support an application for an appeal 
to the privy council. This application, upon Shirley s peti 
tion, was allowed by that body despite the refusal of the 
superior court to permit an appeal. The issue was won 
by Waldo in law before the privy council, but the decision 
proved unenforceable in America at this time because of 
the essential refusal of both courts and governor to take 
steps to carry it out, despite the peremptory mandate of 
the privy council to both. 

This case, that of Frost v. Leighton, was a test case in 
which the real parties in interest were, on the one side the 
crown s officials concerned in the preservation of mast trees, 
and on the other the province of Massachusetts Bay, in 
cluding all branches of its government. The litigation was 
not welcome to the province, but was unavoidable unless 
it was ready to admit defeat when Waldo and Dunbar car 
ried the issue into the townships in defiance of the Massa 
chusetts polity in the frontier districts. The province made 
it a public issue by supplying Frost with funds with which toi 
maintain his defense against the appeal to the privy council. 

The net result of the efforts to enforce the decision was 
for the time being the enunciation by the superior court of a 
thinly veiled claim to judicial independence of the privy 



BARRISTER AND ADVOCATE-GENERAL 6l 

council, on grounds to be found in the provincial charter and 
the laws enacted under it. The conclusion of the case was 
reached only after Shirley became governor. 1 

While this issue was being contested in England the im 
mediate advantage as well as the probable ultimate advant 
age was so palpably with the provincials that all persons 
interested in the exploitation of the woods displayed a new 
boldness. This appeared Rotably in the affair in New 
Hampshire in the spring of 1734 known as the Exeter riot. 
Dunbar, after the truce between himself and Belcher had 
been dissolved, remained in New Hampshire in the effort 
to enforce the king s rights in the woods. A crisis came in 
April, 1734, when Dunbar, while in the performance of his 
official duty, was insulted by men in the woods, apparently 
loggers. At about the same time, also, he, as surveyor- 
general, sent some men to Exeter to act for him and they 
were viciously assaulted by a group of unknown roughs. 
Dunbar then assumed the position of acting governor in 
the absence of Belcher, but the New Hampshire council re 
fused to act with him to bring the offenders to justice. 
Belcher, although professing to uphold law and order, sa 
proceeded that no one was arrested for the offense, and the 
lumber from condemned logs which was at issue was 

1 For accounts of the case of Frost v. Leighton from the point of 
view of constitutional law, cf. articles by Andrew McFarland Davis 
in the Am. His. Rev., vol. ii, pp. 229-240, and in the Pub. Col. Soc. 
Mass., vol. iii, pp. 246-264, and for a more concise discussion, Schles- 
inger, in the Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxviii, pp. 434-437. 
The action of the privy council in the case is given in A. P. C., vol. 
iii, pp. 461-470. Cf. also Shirley to the Admiralty, May 6, 1739, Ad. I, 
3817; Bel. Ps., pt. ii, pp. 250, 276; Popple to Attorney-general and 
Solicitor-general, Sept. 18, 173 [5], C. O. 5 917, 146; ditto to ditto, 
Jan. 15, 1736, C. O. 5 917, 155; ditto to ditto, Feb. 18, 1736, C. 0. 5 
917, 157; Frost to General Court, Dec. 17, 1735, Ad. I, 3817; Popple to 
Wager, Feb. 12, 1736, C. 0. 5 917, 156; Popple to Attorney-general, 
May 4, 1736, C. 0. 5 917, 166. 



62 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

carried off before any effective action was taken by the 
governor to secure it for the crown. The evidence is strong 
that the New Hampshire local officials as well as a large 
majority of the council were then not only loyal members 
( of Belcher s political machine, but also in sympathy with, 
and very often personally interested in, the lucrative business 
of turning the king s mast trees into merchandise. 

This affair was inevitably followed by complaints by 
Dunbar at home against the governor and by complaints by 
the governor s supporters in New Hampshire against the 
surveyor-general, the latter apparently being prepared with 
the governor s knowledge and not improbably at his instiga 
tion. 1 

During the remaining years of Belcher s administration 
the frontiers of New England continued to be the scenes of 
successful encroachment upon the legal rights of the crown 
in the woods, and the venomous feud between governor and 
surveyor-general dragged on its wearisome length. The 
lawless loggers of the frontiers had won a victory ; but the 
governor, encumbered by ministerial observation, was rid 
ing to a fall which was inevitable despite the obtuseness, 
irresolution and dilatoriness of the officials at home. The 
chief forces which were to bring about his overthrow had 
already been set in motion. The governor s humiliation 
and Shirley s coincident success will be the theme of the 
succeeding chapter. 

1 Cf. upon this episode, Shirley to the Admiralty, May 6, 17395 
Dunbar to Shirley, Apr. 29, 1734; Matthew Livermore to Shirley, May 
2, 1734; Dunbar to Shirley, May 3, 1734; and Dunbar to Belcher, 
June 20, 1734, all in P. R. O., Ad. I, 3817. Cf. also, Bel Ps., pt. 
ii, pp. 45-92, passim; N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. iv, pp. 678-680, 840, 872, 874; 
vol. xviii, pp. 52-57; Bell, History of the Town of Exeter (Exeter, 
1888), pp. 72-75- 



CHAPTER IV 

;:. . t i 

THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 

AFTER Dunbar appeared to seek friendly relations with 
Belcher in the summer of -733, the latter gave every evi 
dence of believing that he had won at all points, and con 
fided to his trusted lieutenant in New Hampshire, Richard 
Waldron, that he would from this time follow a new policy. 
This, it seemed, was to be one of proscription of all who 
were not submissive to the governor s will. He professed 
to have letters from England showing a high degree of 
approval of his administration. The governor, however, 
was oversanguine. Shortly after he announced this policy, 
he learned that letters from Newcastle and Lord Wilming 
ton formally approving his administration could not be 
secured, and his position was still further embarrassed when 
complaints of the ugly-looking happenings in New Hamp 
shire in the following spring reached England. Before 
these matters were known in England, however, the board 
of trade, under the leadership of Bladen, had subjected 
his agents, Richard Partridge and Jonathan Belcher, Jr., 
to marked humiliation at a hearing. A report of the affair 
circulated in America even alleged that the son had been 
forbidden ever to appear again before the board. 1 

From this time the governor on the whole held his own 
in America until the closing years of his administration, 

1 For this phase of Belcher s policy and its results, cf. Bel. Ps., pt. i, 
pp. 317, 404; pt. ii, pp. 196, 227-230, 506, 513, 524, 556; List of Vernon- 
Wager Mss., pp. 45, 46, 47, 50. 

63 



64 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

but gradually lost control of the situation in England, where 
his enemies concentrated their attack upon him. Aside 
from the inertia of the clumsy and intricate British sys 
tem of colonial administration, always favorable to a 
governor under attack (if ably represented in England), 
Belcher now relied chiefly upon two of the king s ministers, 
Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the. Admiralty, and Lord 
Wilmington, President of the Privy Council. With the 
former he was on terms of some intimacy, which the gover 
nor relied on to secure support for his acts from, other 
members of the cabinet. Lord Wilmington, a personage 
of much dignity but also of much inertia, seems never toi 
have reached a clear judgment as to Belcher s reliability 
as a royal servant until the latter was about to be removed 
from his governments. 

During ithe earlier phases of the governor s contest with his, 
enemies Shirley maintained an attitude correctly impartial. 
He worked officially with Dunbar as surveyor-general but 
without obvious personal animus toward the governor. 
When Dunbar stopped ships loaded with boards sawed from 
logs condemned for the king s use, when passing the fort 
at the outlet of the Piscataqua, and asked Shirley s opinion 
of his power to do it, the advocate-general expressed doubt 
of his right, and the surveyor-general desisted. Shortly 
after, however, when Dunbar asked his opinion as to his 
right to serve as acting-governor of New Hampshire in the 
absence of Belcher from the province, Shirley upheld his 
right so to serve. The governor, always ready to purchase 
support with petty and showy baubles, secured Shirley s 
oral and written advice regarding his son s procedure as a 
student at the Temple, and finding Shirley favorable tcx 
Dunbar s claims, admonished his son to answer Shirley s 
letter " in the strongest politest manner." * 

1 Belcher illuminates these matters in the following pages of his cor- 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 6; 

*j 

The governor, however, was prepared to offer no largess 
to the struggling barrister beyond the unsubstantial specie 
of fair words. Shirley evidently saw that he could neither 
count upon the governor s support, nor, at that time, attack 
him openly with safety. Dunbar, when he sought Shirley s 
opinion upon the points at issue between himself and Belcher, 
was meditating an early trip to England to carry his com 
plaints before the ministers there; but he did not go at once. 1 
Hence Shirley s opinion did not receive the prominence in 
England that it might otherwise have had. 

Shirley had almost from his arrival sought promotion to 
a lucrative office in America, at first with no better title than 
his capacity and the duke s friendship. Shortly after his 
arrival in Massachusetts, Mr. Bradley, the king s attorney- 
general in New York, hearing that Shirley was applying 
for his post upon a " mistaken " report of his death, pleaded 
on behalf of himself, his wife and seven children that he 
might not " loose " his position so long as he behaved " un- 
blameably" in it. Mr. Bradley s vested interest in his posi 
tion was not disturbed. When Dunbar planned to dispose 
of his positions as surveyor-general of the woods and 
surveyor of the king s lands in Nova Scotia in 1733, Shirley 
tried to arrange to purchase the commissions, but Dunbar 
finally retained them. When in the next year the collector- 
ship of the customs in Rhode Island was vacant, applica 
tion was made to Newcastle on Shirley s behalf for that 
post; but although the duke remembered him kindly the 
post was bestowed elsewhere. Belcher had another candi 
date, but he seems not to have been appointed. With per 
severance and apparent optimism which one must admire 

respondence : pt. i, pp. 80-81, 128, 186; pt. ii, pp. 54-55- #>, &2> 9 2 a^d note - 
98, 122, 125, 126, 147, 154, 155, 161. Cf. also A r . H. Pr. Ps., vol. iv, p. 874; 
Dunbar to Shirley, Apr. 29, 1734, Ad. T, 3817; Shirley to Dunbar, May 6, 
1734, Maine Historical and Genealogical Recorder, vol. vi, p. 504. 
1 Dunbar to Shirley, April 29, 1734, Ad. I, 3817. 



66 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Shirley soon after sought through the Duke of Newcastle 
a salary as advocate-general of the court of admiralty. 
Belcher on this occasion recommended that Shirley be al 
lowed " some salary." No action at home seems to have 
followed this application. 

Two years later appeared the best opportunity which had 
yet arisen for him to get his claims considered at home. 
The belief that things were radically wrong with the king s 
woods in New England apparently was now generally held 
by the ministry. Thereupon Newcastle wrote Belcher with 
convenient vagueness urging that he care for the woods, 
and later Sir Charles Wager asked the governor to send 
over the draft of a bill to be passed by Parliament for the 
protection of the woods. Shirley s services and training as 
advocate-general made him a well-qualified person to draft 
the measure requested and Belcher therefore acted reason 
ably, if astutely, in directing him to prepare it. Shirley pre 
pared a draft of an act providing for vigorous procedure 
against mill men and shipowners concerned in sawing con 
demned logs or transporting away the lumber from them 
without the direction of the surveyor-general or his de 
puties. That this opportunity might be turned to full ac 
count he arranged that Mrs. Shirley should serve as the mes 
senger to deliver the draft to the Duke of Newcastle, and 
also to deliver a letter from Belcher recommending that 
Shirley be allowed a salary as advocate-general. In this 
letter Belcher courteously damned Shirley s draft with care 
fully restrained disparagement which leaves the reader un 
able to assert with confidence whether the " honour and rep 
utation" which he declared had characterized the career of 
Mr. Shirley in America were to be understood as the 
qualities which might be expected in a Caesar or in a Brutus. 

A few months later Shirley appeared again as the pro 
tagonist for the crown s rights in the woods. He now 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 67 

transmitted to the duke a case prepared for the opinion of 
the attorney-general and solicitor-general bearing upon the 
rights of the crown in the former province of Maine. He 
further suggested the purchase of the rights of Mr. Usher 
in that district, if they should be found valid, 1 and finally 
ventured to suggest the somewhat grandiose project of unit 
ing New Hampshire, the former province of Maine and 
the country east of the Kennebec in a single royal province. 
He expressed confidence that this could be accomplished by 
proper management without causing difficulty for the 
ministry. This case was presented by Dunbar to the board 
of trade, and by their direction was submitted to the auditor 
of the plantations. No record of further action upon it 
appears, although the statement of the value of the eastern 
country seems to have remained in the minds of the board- 2 
The needy barrister at the beginning of 1737 caught at a 
chance to apply for the post of attorney-general of Virginia 
reported vacant by death. Once more he suffered disap 
pointment. 3 

1 The Mr. Usher referred to was apparently a son of John Usher, 
a merchant of Boston and former lieutenant-governor of New Hamp 
shire. The elder Usher had purchased the province of Maine from 
the grandson of Sir Ferdinando Gorges, the original grantee, and 
transferred his title, so far as possible, to the colony of Massachu 
setts Bay in 1678. Later Mr. West, as counsel for the board of trade, 
gave his opinion that the colony did not possess the power under its 
charter to purchase Maine. If this opinion represented good law 
the title to Maine had, since its transfer to John Usher, been vested 
in him and his heirs. Shirley seems to have referred to this alleged 
title in his letter to the duke. Cf. Chalmers, Opinions, pp. 133-137. 

J C/. Dtmbar to Board, Feb. 8, 1743, C. 5 883, Ee, 75. 

For Shirley s efforts to secure office and salary previous to Mrs. 
Shirley s arrival in England, cf. C. 0. 5 1093, no; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
4-5, 6-8, 10-11; Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 19, 1734, C. 0. 5 899, 74; 
Bel Ps., pt. ii, pp. 33, 38, 460; Belcher to Newcastle, Nov. 26, 30, 1734, 
C. 0. 5 899; Belcher to Newcastle, July 8, 1736, C. O. 5 899, 164; 
Shirley to Newcastle, July 19, 1736, C. 0. 5 899, 171; Draft of bill to 
be passed by Parliament, C. O. 5 899, 184; Shirley to the King, 
C. 0. 5 752. 



68 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Meanwhile Mrs. Shirley entered upon her mission in 
England as her husband s representative with great energy, 
ability and tact. She probably reached London in the early 
autumn of 1736. She found the Duke of Newcastle at 
first too busy to be approached, but got Shirley s petition be 
fore him through his more accessible brother, Henry 
Pelham. Meanwhile she had made the acquaintance and 
secured the backing of the chief men on the board of trade. 
The duke had told his brother that he would do what he 
could for Mr. Shirley, and she was informed that the next 
step would be a reference of the petition to the admiralty 
or to the board of trade. Preferring the latter to Belcher s 
friend, Wager, at the admiralty, she wrote a letter to the 
duke begging that the reference might be to Bladen and 
his associates, who, she stated, were " well informed of the 
affair, and much disposed to assist me in it." Her appeal 
was filled with the humility of helplessness and the energy 
of desperation. It won her point and the matter was re 
ferred to the board of trade. At the same time Mrs. 
Shirley made an alternative plea that Mr. Shirley be named 
secretary of New York, should that post become vacant. 
This proved to be one more phantom opportunity. 

Relatively rapid action was secured upon the petition for 
a salary and on May 19, 1737, the board reported in favor 
of granting the petition. The absence of further record 
of official action upon the matter indicates that either op 
position or inertia appeared in the privy council. 

Perhaps it was not much after this that Mrs. Shirley 
petitioned the commissioners of the treasury for Mr. Shir 
ley s appointment to " the post of collector of the customs 
at the port of Boston, or some other of like value, as soon as 
any vacancy shall happen." In November, 1737, a con 
ference was arranged between the duke, Mr. Pelham and 
Sir Robert Walpole upon the subject of a " petition of Mr. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 69 

Shirley." Since posts in the customs service in America 
came under Sir Robert s jurisdicton, it is not unlikely that 
the petition related to the collectorship at Boston. Not 
improbably, also, the duke referred to the same matter on 
July 23, 1738, when he assured Mrs. Shirley he would " re 
peat my solicitations to Sr Robert Walpole, for the employ 
ment that you formerly mentioned to me, which is in the 
gift of the Treasury." Apparently at this time, or earlier 
the duke recommended Shirley " to His Majesty for some 
post in the customs in America." 

Meanwhile, Mrs. Shirley, at her first audience with New 
castle, perhaps early in 1737, had mentioned the position of 
naval officer at Boston. This was a post which Belcher 
had given to his son-in-law, Byfield Lyde, upon assuming 
the governorship, and when later directed by the ministry 
to appoint a Mr. Pemberton to perform its functions had 
done so with an ill grace, followed by repeated efforts to 
restore his son-in-law to his former sinecure. On January 
2, 1738, Shirley wrote to Newcastle upon the subject. He 
had information that a prominent financier and dissenter, 
Holden, acting for Belcher had secured a half promise from 
Sir Robert Walpole that his son-in-law, Mr. Lyde, should 
be restored to his post. When, therefore, Mr. Lyde sailed 
for England to plead his cause, Shirley appealed to the 
duke on his own behalf in case any change should be made. 
Shirley added that the governor, in an effort to prevent 
him from applying for the post, " threatens me with his 
displeasure, if I do; and tells me, if I should succeed, he 
shall be very troublesome to me." He therefore begs " that 
I may not be left in a situation which may expose me to 
the ill usages of this or any future governor." Thus, ap 
parently, did Belcher and Shirley fall out. 

Since Shirley burned his bridges behind him in making 
this application, it is not surprising to find that some time 



70 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

before midsummer of 1738 Mrs. Shirley was applying to 
the duke on his behalf for " the government of New Eng 
land." But ft was not a propitious time, and the duke soon 
answered with assurances of good will indeed, but with the 
statement that he knew nothing of a probable vacancy in 
the government of New England nor of a vacancy in the 
position of naval officer. However, he pledged his support 
to secure his appointment as chief justice of New York, in 
case the incumbent of that office should be removed. This, 
with his promise already noted to seek again Sir Robert 
Walpole s backing for a position for Shirley under the 
treasury, was all the duke was able to do for his protege at 
that time. 

It was apparent, however, that Newcastle was now gen 
uinely interested in the fortunes of the Shirleys and was 
committed to the support of his application for some finan 
cial amelioration through the government, and that Bel 
cher s position was now sufficiently weak at home to lead 
Mrs. Shirley to suppose that he might soon be displaced. 1 

Belcher s position at home was indeed becoming un 
comfortable. His subordination of New Hampshire in 
terests to those of Massachusetts, especially in regard to the 
boundary dispute, had resulted in the naming of an agent 
of the New Hampshire assembly to seek a settlement of the 

1 For matters relating to the efforts chronicled above on Shirley s 
behalf from Mrs. Shirley s arrival in England, cf. Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
8-12; Board of Trade to the King, May 19- 1737 (Prof. Andrews 
reference to this report of the board of trade in Am. His. Assoc. 
Rep. for 1913, vol. i, p. 378, describes it as dealing with " Mr. Shirley s 
petition for a fixed salary as attorney-general." Mr. Shirley s office 

was that of advocate-general) ; Thomas Pelham to , Nov. 3, 

1737 and Frances Shirley for Wm. Shirley, to the Commissioners of 
the Treasury, all in C. 0. 5 752; Board of Trade to Newcastle, May 
19, !737, C. O. 5 917, 218; Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 2, 1738, C. O. 
5 899, 239; N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. xxiii, p. 186. Cf. also, Palfrey, Comp. 
Hist., vol. iv, p. 136. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 7I 

boundary and later to seek also the naming of a separate 
governor for New Hampshire. John Rindge, a New 
Hampshire merchant with business in London, was originally 
given this commission, October 7, 1731, and he served 
his cause well by enlisting as his successor, John Thomlin- 
son, a London merchant of remarkable energy, ability and 
soundness of judgment, who was approved for the post, 
January n, I734. 1 His success in securing a settlement of 
the boundary question in a manner favorable to New 
Hampshire was one of the severest blows to Belcher s policy 
and prestige. 

Moreover, Belcher seems to have acted with doubtful 
wisdom upon his accession in demanding that his lieutenant- 
governor in New Hampshire, John Wentworth, renounce 
all claim to salary there save so far as he might receive it 
as the governor s bounty. It was said that the death of 
the proud but helpless lieutenant-governor, December 2, 
1730, after only a brief tenure under the arrogant Belcher 
was one of heartbreak at treatment which he could not 
effectively resent. However, his son, Benning Wentworth, 
became a bitter opponent of Belcher s administration in 
New Hampshire, and, going to England on business, joined 
the gathering clans of the governor s enemies in London. 
Also Theodore Atkinson, a prominent man and son-in-law 
of Lieutenant-Go vernor John Wentworth, turned against 
Belcher, and with Dunbar s backing was forced into the 
governor s council against his protest, and vigorously fought 
him until he was removed. David Dunbar, also, after re 
maining a thorn in Belcher s side in New England until 
1737, decided to appeal to the ministers at home in person in 
favor of an effective policy of protection of the king s 
woods. In doing so the chief onus of his discontent fell 
upon Belcher. In fact, Dunbar, upon arriving in London, 

1 N. H, Pr. Ps., vol. iv, pp. 612, 655. 



72 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

made a general onslaught upon the governor charging him 
openly with disloyalty to the imperial government and its 
policies. 

Samuel Waldo, also, after involving Belcher in the case 
of Frost v. Leighton, forgathered with the other insur 
gents in London. 

Still another addition was made to the London junto, 
when the Massachusetts assembly, dissatisfied with the ser 
vice of Belcher s henchman, Francis Wilks, as their agent, 
sent over, without the governor s approval, Christopher 
Kilby as their special agent. Earlier efforts to send Samuel 
Waldo in the same capacity had failed. 

Other enemies in England of less influence contributed 
their voices to the general outcry, and also some in America 
by correspondence advanced grievances against the facile 
but unpopular governor. Elisha Cooke, the great democrat, 
could not command a hearing at home. However, it was 
a different case when Paul Dudley, son of Governor Joseph 
Dudley of Massachusetts, having been judged unsuited to 
a seat in the council by Belcher, made complaint to his 
friend and patron, Horatio Walpole, brother of the prime 
minister. Dudley also charged that Belcher obstructed him 
in the affairs of his office as deputy-auditor under his 
patron. The latter in consequence became the consistent 
enemy of Belcher so long as he retained his governorship. 
Horatio Walpole also resented Belcher s failure to secure 
success in some matter which he intrusted to- him. 1 

1 For the assembling of Belcher s enemies in England, and the early 
cooperation of those there and at home, cf. Bel. Ps., pt. ii, pp. 204 
209, 215-216, 222-223, 231-233, 235-237, 248-249, 252, 264-268, 317, 351, 
382, 385, 394-395, 398, 491, 5o8, 521, 526; N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. iv, pp. 569, 
5?i, 587, 612, 650, 759; Suffolk Files, no. 100135; Adams, Annals of 
Portsmouth (Portsmouth, 1825), pp. 155-156; Brewster, Rambles about 
Portsmouth, etc. (Portsmouth, 1859-1869), sec. ser., p. 62; Collins, 
op. it., vol. i, p. 418. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 



73 



The efforts to advance Shirley and those to remove Bel 
cher were not at first joined, but they had entirely congru 
ous ends in view. The evidence regarding the attitude of 
Shirley toward the efforts to remove Belcher like that re 
garding Belcher s deserts is conficting. Nevertheless many 
essential facts can be established. 1 

It is doubtless true that Belcher s enemies planned to 
secure his removal from both his governments, but recog- 

1 One must use with caution practically all contemporary accounts 
dealing with matters affecting Belcher s removal, for they were written 
by New Englanders or by men concerned in public affairs in England 
who in the nature of things could not be impartial. In particular 
the testimony of Thomas Hutchinson should be used with reserve. 
This warning is necessary because practically all writers have accorded 
to Hutchinson high esteem for accuracy and impartiality, a judgment 
which is not here, in general, called in question. In regard to this 
matter, however, he was a partisan, and himself bore a part in the 
events he attempts to evaluate, going to England as the agent of 
landowners and inhabitants interested in saving what might be from 
the wreck of Massachusetts imperial ambition after the New Hamp 
shire boundary line had been settled to the advantage of the little 
province on the north. He also took with him a special power of 
attorney from Belcher, interested himself in keeping the governor in 
office, and had letters of introduction from him to men eminent in 
England. Moreover, Hutchinson was then a young man, and spent 
only about a year in England, too short a time to permit even a 
veteran statesman to fathom all the currents and eddies of English 
politics; yet he gives an unqualified and circumstantial account of the 
devices by which he alleges Belcher was removed from office. There 
appears in the Mass. His. $oc. Proc., vol. iii, p. 216, a reference to 
letters from Shirley to Waldo, said to show complicity of Shirley in 
some of the means, characterized by implication as unscrupulous, 
used to remove Belcher. No trace of these letters has been found. 
Cf. Bel. Ps., pt. ii, pp. 341-343, 380, 386-387, 389, 409, 426, 429, 522, 
537, 542; Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 355-358; A. P. C., vol. iii, 
PP- 59/-6oi ; "Board of Trade Report, June 12, 1741," Am. His. Assoc. 
Rep. for 1913, vol. i, p. 380; Hosmer, The Life of Thomas Hutchinson, 
etc. (Boston, 1896), p. 17 and passim; The Diary and Letters of Thos. 
Hutchinson (Boston, 1884-1886), vol. i, pp. 51-52; Tyler, The Literary 
History of the American Revolution (New York, 1897), vol. i, pp. 10- 
ii, vol. ii, pp. 394, 405. 



74 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

nizing the most vulnerable spot in the political anatomy of 
this reputed Achilles, at first concentrated their attacks upon 
his conduct in New Hampshire. Their weapons were per 
haps envenomed, but it is doubtful if they were more so 
than were Belcher s own. In any case it is clear that the 
primary and the most substantial grievance which then came 
to light lies at the door of Belcher in employing duplicity 
and intrigue to defeat the effort of New Hampshire to se 
cure a settlement of the boundary controversy. Indeed, 
the need of a drastic measure of relief was obvious to all 
candid witnesses of his administration of the province of 
New Hampshire. 1 

The attack upon Belcher in connection with New Hamp 
shire dated almost from the beginning of his administra 
tion, but increased vigor in the onset upon the governor ap 
peared after Dunbar reached England in 1737. Both he 
and Thomlinson made complaints against Belcher. The 
former charged him with various alleged delinquencies ; the 
latter detailed the sparring between the governor and his 
opponents over the putting in execution of the orders from 
home for the settling of the boundary, culminating in the 
proroguing of the New Hampshire assembly until too late 
to comply with directions for presenting their case to 
the boundary commissioners. 

Little more occurred during the year save the sending 
of a letter to Lord Wilmington, dated December 5, 1737, 
in the handwriting of Governor Belcher s secretary and 
signed by nine ministers of Boston and vicinity. This de 
nounced as a "malicious libel" a report seen in "public 
prints," " pretended to be written at Boston." which it was 
said alleged "an universal joy, thro out this province 
upon the news of His Majesty s appointing a new governor 

1 Ample foundation for this judgment appears in the records of the 
New Hampshire legislature while Belcher was governor. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 



75 



over us, more especially among the better sort of people, 
and ministers of all sorts." These ministers requested 
that Belcher be continued. This letter certainly took the 
edge off the alleged report referred to, if it did not leave 
the governor in a stronger position than before. 1 

The signs were clear, however, that a struggle was com 
ing. The storm broke in February of the following year 
when the privy council on the same day, referred to the 
committee an appeal by Thomlinson on behalf of the people 
of New Hampshire from the award of the boundary com 
mission, and a petition from the house of representatives of 
New Hampshire complaining of the proceedings of the 
governor and council for several years past, particularly 
regarding the boundary commission, requesting that Thom 
linson might be permitted to furnish proofs and praying 
that speedy relief might be given. A copy of this petition 
was promptly sent to Belcher for his answer. 

In the midsummer the exceptions of Massachusetts Bay 
to the boundary settlement arrived, and Thomlinson s coun 
sel appeared in opposition to them. 

At almost the same time Samuel Waldo, apparently scent 
ing the changed atmosphere at home, sailed for England, 
and upon his heels there appeared a letter to the Duke of 
Newcastle of an unusual type. This contained a denuncia 
tion of Belcher, an indorsement of Waldo s mission to 
England and a hope that Shirley might be made governor. 
It was signed with the name but not in the handwriting 
of J. Bowden, one of the richest merchants in Boston. The 
contents of this letter and the fact that the signature was 
not genuine much confused the situation. 2 

1 For the campaign of 1737 against Belcher and his policy, cf. 
Dunbar to Board of Trade, July 20, 1737; Thomlinson to Board of 
Trade, Aug. 24, 1737, both in C. 0. 5 752; His. Mss. Com. nth Rep., 
app. 4, p. 279. 

2 This letter was dated at Boston, July 27, 1738, and referred to the 



76 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Waldo, upon his arrival, followed very much the course 
outlined for him by the spurious Mr. Bowden. Some de- 

recent departure of Samuel Waldo for England " in order to lay be 
fore His Majesty in Council the great grievances, and damage he hath 
sustained, by our present Governor Belcher s opposing his settlements 
of the eastern lands, near Nova Scotia; which he the said Waldo was 
about to do, and hath been already at more than 30,000 this currency, 
expence in attempting a settlement there which would be of the great 
est service to this country as a barrier against the French and Indians, 
and also a great advantage to Great Britain . . ." It continued that 
" most of the considerable men here wishes him all success, and 
hopes he will deliver us from the mean fellow, that hath tyrannized 
so long over us, to the surprize of everybody that knows him, or that 
formerly knew him . . ." It brought a strong indictment against his 
treatment of New Hampshire and the king s woods there, mentioned 
a recent " most grievous complaint " against him from that province 
and asserted " everybody here knows what is set forth in that com 
plaint is strictly true." The writer saw hopes ahead for New 
Hampshire, " but what hopes we of this province have of getting ridd 
of him I dare not say . . ." He finally reached the point of asserting 
on behalf of himself and many of the best and most considerable 
subjects there that they hoped Waldo "will obtain the government 
of the Massachusetts for Mr. Shirley who is generally agreed on by 
all people and partys here to be a gentleman the best calculated to 
make this a happy and flourishing and also a dutyfull people, of any 
gentleman that ever appeared in this country being universally loved, 
and esteemed, by all sorts of people, for his great knowledge in the 
laws of the country and for his integrity and candore," etc. He as 
sured the duke Mr. Shirley was " the most likely to bring this country 
to obey all and every of His Majesty s Instructions, of any I know 
in the world, and let me add, that if it should be his and our good 
fortune that he should be appointed our governor, I will promise 
your Grace that not only myself, but allso a great number of the 
most considerable men in this town, will heartily assist him in getting 
the sallery settled, according to His Majesty s instruction. And my 
Lord Duke, let me say the thing will be done directly, should Mr. 
Shirley be the man." He then accused Belcher of abusive references 
to the prime minister, Lord Harrington, Lord Wilmington and others 
in the presence of the writer and Lieutenant-Governor Dunbar, of 
which he was surprised Dunbar did not write Newcastle. With final 
reference to the governor as " this sad fellow " and to Shirley as 
" the only man they could wish for " as governor, this strange epistle 
closed. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 



77 



tails of his proceedings in England are in dispute. Waldo 
himself afterward asserted that he went to England, after 
failing to compromise his differences with Belcher, upon 
Shirley s advice not to trust the governor, that he went 
wholly in Shirley s interest (he afterward presented an ac 
count to Shirley of expenses incurred while there) and that 
" I told your excellency before I embarked my intentions in 
your favor," " tho at the same time, I had a vie\v to the 
protection of my own property." Shirley on the other 
hand affirmed that while in England Waldo was upon his 
own business, but added : " I fully acknowledge many proofs 
of your attachment to me there." L 

What seems the probable motive of Waldo in going to 
England was set forth by Shirley on one occasion thus : In 
1736 the assembly approved a complaint of some Penobscot 
Indians against Waldo while the latter was trying to ex 
tend his settlements in the eastern country, these Indians 
seeming to have been stirred up and encouraged by some 
secret practices. Upon the recommendation of the as 
sembly Belcher assured the Indians that neither Waldo nor 
any other should have the countenance of the Massachusetts 
government in making any settlements there until it was 
satisfied that the Indian title had been justly extinguished. 
As a result Waldo was unable to pursue his settlements, 
broke openly with Belcher, and seems not unnaturally to 
have sought satisfaction in having him removed. 2 

Waldo conferred with Mrs. Shirley upon his arrival, 
apparently at once, and later declared that she was greatly 
dispirited and "had given over all expectation of success." 

1 Evidently Waldo s mission was for their joint benefit, to be secured 
chiefly through the substitution of Shirley for Belcher in the governor 
ship, but later on each very humanly refused to admit that his own 
interest had been the primary consideration in the self-appointed en 
voy s mind. 

2 Cf. Shirley to Board, Mar. 12, 1744, C. 0. 5 884 Ff, 23. 



78 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Waldo undoubtedly worked for Shirley s interests in Eng 
land, and for a time Shirley communicated with Newcastle 
through him. Later, however, a kinsman of Shirley s be 
came his agent and secured a promise of his appointment 
to the governorship of Massachusetts. 1 

Probably not long after the Bowden letter was written 
someone in New England (not improbably Belcher) com 
plained of Auchmuty as judge of admiralty because, in suits 
relating to condemned logs and lumber, he gave conflicting 
decisions in cases tried at the same time and upon the same 
evidence. This resulted in a reprimand to Auchmuty from 
the admiralty dated November 6, 1738. In the same com 
munication, however, was a statement of a complaint by 
Dunbar about conditions affecting the king s woods and 
particularly the events connected with the Exeter Riot, in 
which the responsibility for conditions was placed upon the 
governor and officers named by him or through his influence. 
" These matters " the lords of the admiralty thought " very 
extraordinary, and desire that you and His Majesty s Advo 
cate will examine into and acquaint them with what you 
know or can learn upon this subject and likewise whether 
the surveyors are negligent, defective, or make wrong use 
of their power." 

For the year 1738 the result of the attacks on Belcher 

1 Waldo asserted to Shirley that he " did expect to be backed by 
some powerfull interest of your friends, but was greatly disappointed 
and had not I assure you any assistance from them; but on the con 
trary they were timorous of the consequence of your appointment 
and would do nothing." It is clear that this was not an essentially 
true statement, as appears from Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. IS- 1 ^, 18; T. West 
ern to Newcastle, Sept. 27, 1740, C. O. 5 899, 355; Frances Shirley to 
Newcastle, Sept. 20, 1740, C. O. 5 899, 354; Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 
18, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 351- 

This letter seems to have been drafted by Dunbar and to be in the 
handwriting of his copyist. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 79 

by his enemies was inconclusive; but ground was prepared 
for a vigorous campaign later. 1 

In January, 1739, Thomlinson made a frontal attack by 
presenting a petition of complaint against Belcher and pray 
ing that New Hampshire might have a government separate 
from that of Massachusetts Bay. In the same month the 
Quakers in England bestirred themselves, presenting an 
appeal through Richard Partridge, himself a Quaker, to pre 
vent Belcher s removal from his governorship. 

Early in March Shirley was writing to Newcastle. He 
first assured the duke that he had most promptly taken ac 
tion recommended by him in the preceding October to ad 
just a claim of Sir Thomas Prendergast against Robert 
Auchmuty, judge of the court of admiralty. 2 Shirley 
then denounced the letter to Newcastle signed J. Bowden 
of which he had just heard, as counterfeit. He asserted 
further that when this letter was written he knew nothing 
of any application to the duke to make him governor of 
Massachusetts, that " the thing itself was not then in my 

1 In the fall Wilks and Partridge fruitlessly sought to get Thomlin- 
son s petition dismissed, but suffered the dismissal of a petition of their 
own protesting on behalf of Massachusetts Bay against the boundary 
settlement; while in December the solicitor for the New Hampshire 
house of representatives obtained an order directing that the house of 
representatives or persons designated to act for them be allowed to 
make copies of the public records of the province which they thought 
necessary for their case against the governor, and that the secretary 
should attest them and the governor seal them with the seal of the 
province. For the above happenings of 1738, cf. A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 
592-594; C. 0. 5 899, 250; Ar., vol. Ixxiii, fols. 494-495, 55, 5o6-5o8; 
Secretary of the Admiralty to Auchmuty, Nov. 6, 1738, and Dunbar to 
Secretary Burchett, Nov. 16, 1738, both in Ad. I, 3817. 

2 Belcher, who had excellent motives for involving both Shirley and 
Auchmuty in unpleasant relations, seems to have sought to use the 
incident to injure both. Cf. Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 18, 1742, C. O. 
5 900, 51 ; Newcastle to Belcher, Oct. 9, 1735, C. O. 5 899, 48. 



So WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

aim or thoughts," x and that no one there could reasonably 
have suspected him then of aspiring to the position. He 
intimated that he suspected the governor of being respon 
sible for the letter in an effort to destroy his standing with 
Newcastle, saying: 

it may seem hard and groundless to impute so mean and im 
probable an artifice to a gentleman in the highest station among 
us, but as I am thoroughly acquainted with his politicks, and 
am knowing to other instances of the like kind of treachery 
from him towards another gentleman now in England (one of 
which is now lying before the Board of Trade) I dare almost 
risque my credit upon the truth of my suspicion.* 

Shirley s final theme was his " uneasiness at Mr. Waldo s 
indiscretions in his application to your Grace in my favour." 
While expressing gratitude for Waldo s good intentions, 
Shirley offers to prove " that he had no> commission from 
me to be so troublesome to your Grace." 

It seems thus that Mr. Shirley objected to the manner of 
Mr. Waldo s application on his behalf rather than to the 
fact, and although he did not urge his own claims for the 
place he apparently remained a receptive candidate. 

In March. Belcher was defending himself in a letter to 
Lord Wilmington, more notable for denials than for 
evidence, against charges by Thomlinson relating to the 
delay in settling the boundary. The governor was accused 
by Thomlinson of being bribed to favor Massachusetts by a 
grant from the assembly. 

Early in May, 1739, Shirley made his report to the ad 
miralty upon Dunbar s complaint involving Belcher and 
his subordinates. In this document Shirley gave a detailed 



passage is not found in the copy in the Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 14, 
but is in the copy in C. 0. 5, 899, 263. 

2 He may have referred to Belcher s behavior toward either Dunbar 
or Waldo. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 8l 

account of evidence which he had found against the gover 
nor and his administration in New Hampshire in general, 
fully indorsed Dunbar and his work as surveyor-general, 
and declared that no evidence against the deputy surveyors 
had been found. The report in general was a scathing in 
dictment of the governor. Auchmuty also* reported some 
what later, and presumably in much the same strain. These 
reports, being official records and presented at the request 
of the admiralty, could not be met by Belcher with his usual 
procedure in dealing with petitions of complaint, which was, 
to ask for copies and for time to answer, and later to sub 
mit documentary evidence, often of uncertain authenticity, 
controverting the complaints. 

In July a memorial appeared before the privy council, 
signed by Joseph Gulston, contractor for masts for the 
royal navy, Benning Wentworth. aspirant to the governor 
ship of New Hampshire, Richard Chapman and John Thom- 
linson, London merchants, the last being also agent for the 
New Hampshire house of representatives. The purport 
of the document was that New Hampshire was " in a de 
fenceless condition .... and praying that effectual means 
may be taken to protect their propertys in that province, as 
w r ell as the propertys and lives of His Majestys good sub 
jects residing there." As a war with Spain was approach 
ing this was a matter of capital importance. 

No mention was made of Belcher, but when the memorial 
came to a hearing before the board of trade its supporters 
asked the separation of the government of New Hampshire 
from that of Massachusetts, and Thomlinson produced a 
letter signed by six members of the New Hampshire council 
and by nearly all the members of the assembly, earnestly re 
questing that they might have a distinct governor. The 
board of trade promptly reported in favor of the request. 
At the end of July also there was referred to the board of 



82 WILLIAM SHIRLEYA HISTORY 

trade a petition of certain Irish settlers in the eastern parts 
of Massachusetts making complaint against Belcher. 1 

Belcher, however, had been aware of what was going 
forward and in the same month his son presented a petition 
to the king praying that he be allowed to visit England on 
matters of importance to the king s interest, the ad 
vantage of the kingdom and the welfare of " these prov 
inces." At about the same time his agent Partridge suc 
ceeded in checking the action before the privy council, and 
several addresses were presented to that body from great 
numbers of the inhabitants of New Hampshire (amounting 
to about 500), " desiring to be continued under the govern 
ment of their present governor." A memorial by Partridge 
in their behalf was also presented. 

These documents were referred to the board of trade for 
consideration and for a new report on the whole matter. 
This report was presented October I7th, renewing the recom 
mendation that New Hampshire have a separate governor 
and also suggesting that the view of the New Hampshire 
assembly on the matter be sought, as likewise what they 
would do for the support of a governor. 2 

Copies of this revised report were delivered to both par 
ties, and after hearings upon the whole New Hampshire 
muddle, and time for consideration, the committee of the 
privy council reported that the governor had acted with 
great partiality in connection with the boundary controversy, 
had violated an order from home in that affair, and had by 
proroguing the assembly at a vital time deprived New 
Hampshire of opportunity to consider an appeal from the 

1 This petition not improbably was inspired by Waldo. 

The board reported regarding the signers of the addresses on behalf 
of Belcher that few of them were persons of note or substance (a 
number signed by making their marks) and that the document was not 
dated or signed at any public meeting " as is usual." 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 83 

boundary award. Thus did the committee of the privy 
council affirm its belief that New England was suffering 
from, a political malady which could be cured only by 
separating New Hampshire from its larger neighbor. 

Here, for the time being, the matter rested. Belcher heard 
that the privy council had agreed upon a report which he 
seemed to think would terminate his administration in New 
Hampshire, and conjectured that the delay in announcing 
it was probably due to uncertainty as to the final settlement 
of the line between the provinces. Whether this had an 
important bearing upon the matter or not, it was apparently 
not the chief motive for delay. Before the committee of the 
privy council made its report England was at war with Spain 
and the crisis was too acute to suggest an immediate change 
of governors. 

The king s ministers were engrossed in planning an ex 
pedition against the Spanish West Indies. Bladen upon 
request gave as his estimate of the number of troops which 
could be raised in America for the expedition, 2,500. This 
judgment brought out the observation that the militia of 
" New England and those parts have been known to be 
about 1 6 or 17 thousand men, this lead the discorse tot 
press Mr. Blayden is it not possible to find more and in con- 
clution he did belive with proper orders to severall Gover 
nors that about four thousand mout be had and according 
his Grace of Newcastle took minute to have the same put 
in Exsicution. . . ." x 

As it was decided to prepare for the expedition at once, 
orders were sent to Belcher as to other governors concern 
ing it, and the meditated change of governors was for the 
time not put into effect. 2 

1 Sir John Norris, Journals, Dec. 31, 1739, quoted by E. R. Turner in 
Am. His. Assoc. Rep. for 1911, vol. i, pp. 93-94. 

1 For the contest outlined above over the creation of a separate gov- 



84 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

This left Mr. Belcher and Mr. Shirley in the same posi 
tions respectively, and the latter consequently- without a 
salary. Mrs. Shirley was still seeking the governorship of 
Massachusetts for him, but was content, March 13, 1740. to 
acquiesce in a suggestion of the Duke of Newcastle that 
he accept "the government of New Hampshire together with 
the Post Office," not doubting in view of the small sum the 
province could pay a governor, that " the ministry will make 
such an additional allowance as will be necessary for the 
support of a governor appointed by his Majesty. . . ." In 
this office Mrs. Shirley professed her husband would seek 
to prove his fitness for the Massachusetts governorship 
" whenever your Grace sees proper to make a removal." 

For the present, however, Belcher seems to have been 
irremovable from either of his governments. Then, con 
trary to what might have been expected from one of his 
reputed mentality, the Duke of Newcastle resorted to an 
apparently clever measure. Shortly after Mrs. Shirley s 
letter to him of March I3th, and on the same date appearing 
upon the instructions * which he sent to Belcher and other 
governors for raising troops for the West Indian expedition 

ernment for New Hampshire, cf. A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 594-597. 637-638, 
639; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 13-15; Newcastle to Shirley, Oct. 27, 1738, 
C. 0. 5 899, 260; Newcastle to Belcher, Oct. 27, 1738, C. O. 5 899, 261; 
[Eight Quakers] to Whitworth and Corwin, Jan. 29, 1739, C. 0. 5 752; 
Petitions of many persons in New Hampshire received from Belcher 
by Partridge, Feb. 25, 1739, C. 0. 5 899, 281, 282, 283, 285; Shirley to 
Newcastle, Mar. 3, 1739, C. O. 5 899, 263; Belcher to Wilmington, Mar. 
7, 1739, His. Mss. Com., nth Rep. app. 4, p. 283; Shirley to Secretary 
of Admiralty, May 6, 1739, Ad. I, 3817; J. Belcher, Jr., to the King, 
July 7, 1739, C. 0. 5 752; Board to Committee of Privy Council, Aug. 
10, 1739, C. 0. 5 917, 218; ditto to Belcher, (Sept. 9, 1739, C. O. 5 917, 284; 
Sir John Norris, Journals, loc. cit.; Bel. Ps., pt. ii, pp. 201-282, passim. 
Instructions to the governors regarding the expedition, dated Jan. S 
[1740] are found in C. 0. 5 752. 

i Cf. supra, p. 83. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 85 

to be commanded by Lord Cathcart, Newcastle wrote Shir 
ley referring to the complaints against the Massachusetts, 
governor s conduct in office and the applications by the ad 
vocate s friends for his appointment in case of Belcher s re 
moval, intimating that the failure to remove the latter at 
that time perhaps rested upon the implied fact " that it might 
not be thought adviseable to appoint a new governor at a 
time when a commission of such great importance was 
upon the point of being executed, yet I may assure you, (as 
I have already done Mr. Western l ) that in case of a 
vacancy of the government of New England, I shall think 
of no other person to recommend to His Majesty to fill it, 
but yourself; in which I am persuaded all the King s ser 
vants will readily concur." 

The duke then mentioned reports that Belcher was so 
unpopular in both his governments that he would be handi 
capped in raising men for the expedition, and suggested 
that, in case this proved true, Shirley give all possible aid 
to Belcher in order that his majesty s service " might not 
suffer through Mr. Belcher s misfortune." He further, " as 
a sincere friend of yours," urged Shirley to make it im 
possible for Belcher s supporters to blame him for the 
governor s lack of success, by freely offering his services 
to him. 

After stressing the need for raising full levies as promptly 
as possible, the duke continued: "If it shall appear, 
that your weight and influence shall have contributed to the 
carrying of them on, with success and dispatch, it will ef 
fectually recommend you to his majty s favour; and I 
shall gladly take an opportunity of representing your ser 
vices, upon this occasion, in the most advantageous light." 

Truly, Shirley s path was made smooth and clear. All 

1 The Westerns were related to the Shirleys, and this was apparently 
an English kinsman of the duke s protege. 



86 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

that was required was to* offer friendly service to Belcher; 
f it were accepted, to render it, and if refused, to so be 
have as to remove grounds for criticism of himself. Such 
a program in the case of a loyal and successful governor 
would have been uncalled-for and would have suggested 
gross partiality on the part of the ministry. Yet the plan 
itself, though offering an opportunity to Belcher s rival, 
might be necessary to the success of the expedition. 

Shirley upon the receipt of this letter took up the task 
allotted him with alacrity. Meanwhile, aside from an order 
in council of March loth affirming the boundary of Massa 
chusetts and New Hampshire awarded by the recent com 
mission, matters in England lagged. 1 

Shirley was at this time enduring the governor s manifest 
displeasure, which he alleged with apparent truth some 
times took the form of devising means of preventing him 
from performing his proper functions as advocate-general. 
Nevertheless he had both influence and patriotism enough 
to persuade the deputy surveyors-general of the woods ten 
risk the displeasure of the navy board, and the agents of 
the contractor for masts to construe liberally orders from 
their principal. To secure his ends Shirley promised his 
personal intercession with the navy board and the Duke of 
Newcastle for the protection of the subordinates. The 
action of these officials thus secured was necessary to the 
prompt fitting-out of vessels for the expedition. This in 
cident came before Shirley received Newcastle s suggestion 
that he aid in furthering the expedition. 

1 It was in this period or perhaps earlier that Waldo affirmed that 
Mrs. Shirley was so disheartened as to be ready to substitute the chief 
justiceship of Gibraltar for her husband s claims to the governorship. 
Further memorials from both sides concerned in the contest over the 
New Hampshire government had for their net result a vote of the 
privy council in May rejecting the prayer of the major part of the New 
Hampshire council that their province might be continued under the 
same person "who is governor of the Massachusetts Bay." 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER g/ 

Shirley s behavior in the delicate situation in which he 
was placed was exceedingly able. Were he seeking either 
to promote the success of the expedition or to embarrass 
Belcher, or both, he could hardly have wrought more ef 
fectively. 

Colonel Blakeney, who was to be adjutant-general of the 
detachment of colonial troops, and Lieutenant-Governor 
Clarke, both at New York, supported Shirley in his efforts 
to raise men and otherwise to promote the expedition, and 
wished him well. When only four out of thirty commis 
sions for captains sent with Blakeney were awarded to 
/the governments under Belcher, and several companies 
which were raised in Massachusetts were left without legal 
organization or equipment, the colonel informed Shirley and 
apparently Belcher that commissions and equipment for 
these unattached companies would be awarded upon their 
joining the expedition; but it was Shirley and not the 
governor who by energetic efforts succeeded in continuing 
most of these men in the service for some time. 

Lord Cathcart, it seems, recommended a former officer 
to Blakeney as a captain, but when Shirley asked Belcher 
to grant him a commission, the governor refused. Belcher 
at first hesitated either to accept or to refuse Shirley s aid. 
Later, finding Shirley s activities calculated both to promote 
the expedition and to obscure the governor s share in it. the 
latter curtly requested Shirley to make no more recommenda 
tions. Thereafter Shirley worked without Belcher s know 
ledge in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and even Rhode 
Island to bring success to the New England levies. He 
claimed credit for the raising of 600 out of 1,000 men 
from Massachusetts, 100 from New Hampshire, and 200 
from Rhode Island. 

While matters were in this posture he reported what had 
been done to Newcastle, who, without formally consulting 



88 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

the board of trade, placed the documents relating to the 
matter in the hands of Martin Bladen of that body. The 
latter, after examining them, wrote the duke in substance 
approving Shirley s services and condemning Belcher s be 
havior in the matter of the levies. 1 

Shortly after Bladen s letter to Newcastle, an impressive 
statement of Shirley s services, combined with a complaint 
against Belcher on several counts and a strong indorse 
ment of Shirley for the post, was laid before the privy 
council. Before that august body had decided to act, 
however, Belcher had to a considerable extent altered con 
ditions. Accepting the recommendation of the Massa 
chusetts legislature, he dismissed from the service all the 
companies raised in that province, save the four for whom 
commissions had been provided. The ground alleged was, 
that arms for them had not been provided at Boston. 
Shirley succeeded in saving out of the wreckage one com 
pany only in addition to the four with commissions. This 
disappointed the home authorities. Still Shirley claimed 
the chief credit for raising all but one of the companies 
still in the service. 

Whether this development was a factor in delaying action 

1 As a practical politician Bladen added : " But I look upon these 
papers rather as testimonials in favour of Mr. Shirley than as matters 
of formal complaint against the governor; who would have a right, in 
that case, to be heard in his defence." He then expressed his belief 
" that there cannot be now any inconvenience in making an alteration in 
the government; and that your Grace cannot recommend to His Majesty 
any gentleman to succeed Mr. Belcher, that seems more capable of 
discharging the duty of a good Governor, or that would be more ac 
ceptable to the people there, than Mr. Shirley." Bladen further wisely 
observed that in view of the boundary dispute with New Hampshire 
an honest governor succeeding Belcher in Massachusetts " must expect 
no favour from the people " and would be " in a very disagreeable situ 
ation." This, therefore, as well as the interest of New Hampshire and 
of the crown he urged should lead to a separate governor for that 
province. 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 89 

in England on the governorship is not clear. There seems 
to have been no further reference of the matter to anyone 
before final action, and gradually the New Hampshire de 
bris was cleared away preparatory to the naming of gover 
nors for both provinces. December 5th the New Hamp 
shire petition for a separate government was received in the 
committee of the privy council, and on December 27th the 
full council approved the report of the committee of the 
previous year that Belcher had acted with great partiality 
in the boundary matter. 

On April 23, 1741, the privy council approved the re 
port that New Hampshire should have a separate govern 
ment. Seven days later Newcastle requested the board of 
trade to prepare a commission for Shirley as governor of 
Massachusetts and this was prepared and sent to the duke 
on May 2d. On May 6th, this draft was approved by the 
privy council. 1 

1 The final draft bears the date of June 25, 1741, although the date 
July 10, 1741, had been crossed out. Andrews in his list of commissions 
and instructions (Am. His. Assoc. Rep. for 1911, vol. i, p. 473) gives the 
date as June 25, 1741, with the notation " This date is only in the index 
volume." The dates quoted as given in Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 36, are found 
in the indorsement of the document in the P. R. O. but in handwriting 
different from that of the rest of the indorsement. According to the 
record in the Massachusetts Archives the copy sent to Shirley was dated 
May 25th (Cl. Rets., 1735-1742, p. 534). This date seems to be corrobor 
ated by an interlined statement in a different hand in Shirley s petition 
to the king, December 15, 1742, in C. O. 5 900, 77. In the Patent Rolls, 
George II, 1741, in the P. R. O., however, the commission is entered 
under the date of May 16, 1741. Shirley s commission as vice-admiral 
is in Ar., Crown Commissions, 1628-1663, pp. 40-45, and is printed in 
Pub. Col. Soc. Mass., vol. ii, pp. 237-246. 

A quite different picture of the removal of Belcher appears in 
Hutchinson, Hist, of Mass. He asserts that Belcher was undermined 
at home by unfair means and instances successful efforts to alienate the 
dissenters and Lord Wilmington. It is intimated, though not stated, 
that something of the sort happened also in the case of Sir Charles 
Wager. It is true that forged letters were sent and arguments made 
to destroy Belcher s standing. On the other hand charges were made 



90 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

that Belcher was concerned in the forgeries with the purpose of dis 
crediting the opposition party upon the discovery of the frauds. The 
truth of these charges one cannot confidently affirm or deny. Many 
of the charges made in the forged letters, however, were in fact true, 
and constituted good grounds for his removal in the eyes of the English 
government. Had the home government had at their command the 
sidelights upon Belcher s policy furnished by his letter-books, his ser 
vice as governor in New England would have been much briefer than it 
was. Perhaps similar methods were employed by both sides. Some 
of the men who supported Shirley were not above employing indirect 
means, and the same was true of their opponents. Sympathy for the 
loser in this case is less ready because the evidence of Belcher s con 
spicuous political depravity is so abundant and clear from his own 
letters, especially when read in the light of other contemporary evidence. 

Wager seems to have remained at least passively his friend and no 
evidence appears that Wilmington was active against him. Hutchin 
son seems to have given prime importance to the efforts of Waldo 
and Kilby in Shirley s favor (Waldo credited Kilby with giving much 
aid to his efforts), and in an account which if true suggests that truth 
is stranger than fiction, makes the final scene of the drama center about 
a Coventry merchant who, influenced by Shirley s friends, controlled 
the election of a member of Parliament, which led the Duke of Grafton, 
according to his previous promise, to secure the removal of Belcher 
a day or two after the result was known. 

The Duke of Grafton, however, if willing to name a governor of 
Massachusetts as an incident to an election to Parliament, was not the 
most prominent of the king s ministers, and not intrusted with colonial 
affairs. Newcastle and Bladen, also, had long been pledged to the 
naming of Shirley, and had made their plans accordingly, and it seems 
unlikely that his appointment soon after this election was held, was 
more than a coincidence. If it was brought about as Hutchinson re 
lates, it could hardly have been more than a brief season before the 
duke, who had the power to name colonial governors, would have re 
deemed his promise and named his friend to succeed Belcher. Per 
haps Hutchinson as a merchant and an unsuccessful petitioner for 
favors from the crown was more likely to be familiar with the current 
gossip of commercial circles than with the unpublished motives of the 
responsible members of the ministry. Finally, the opinion of Hutchin 
son that Belcher s drastic measures against those interested in a finan 
cial heresy in Massachusetts would, if known sooner in England, have 
prevented his removal, could be well founded only if the ministers of 
the crown were so impressed by this activity as to overlook the long 
series of proceedings by Belcher relating to New Hampshire which 
had resulted as Bladen remarked in denying that province " common 



THE DOWNFALL OF GOVERNOR BELCHER 91 

justice." Also, since new governors for both provinces were con 
sidered together and named on the same day, such a result would ap 
parently have defeated the plan for a separate governor for New 
Hampshire, to which the ministry was fully committed. Hutchinson s 
narrative, it may be observed, tends to distract attention from his own 
share in the boundary affair, wherein he was clearly in sympathy with 
Belcher s position. 

For the final phase of the efforts to remove Belcher, cf. A. P. C., vol. ii, 
PP- 597, 638-639, 676; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 15-36; Ar., vol. liii, fol. 69; vol. 
Ixxii, fols. 525, 537; vol. Ixxiii, fols. 504 et seq.; Hutchinson, op. cit., 
PP. 355-358; Shirley to Newcastle, May 26, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 293; June 
28, 1740, C. O. 5 899, 298; Sept. 18, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 351 ; Oct. 25, 1740, 
C. 0. 5 900, loose at end of vol.; Shirley to Belcher, Sept. 17, 1740, 
C. O. 5 900, loose; Sept. 27, 1740, C. O. 5 899; Oct. 2, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 
446; Bladem to Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 376; Frances Shirley 
to Newcastle, Sept. 20, 1740, C. O. 5 899, 354; T. Western to Newcastle, 
Sept. 27, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 355; Colman and Sparhawk to S. Waldo, 
June 4, 1740, C. O. 5 899, 295; Lt-Gov. Clarke to Shirley, July 7, 1740, 
C. O. 5 899, 363; July 21, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 3^4; Belcher to Shirley, July 
21, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 362; State of services performed by William 
Shirley raising troops for service of expedition under command of 
Lord Cathcart. Also supplying Admiral Vernon with stores for his 
Majesty s ships at Jamaica, received by Privy Council, Oct. 22, 1740, 
C. 0. 5 899, 379; Board to Newcastle, May 2, 1741, C. 0. 5 917, 34* J 
Order in Council, Apr. 23, 1741, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 47; Newcastle to Board, 
Apr. 30, 1741, State Papers Domestic, Entry Books, vol. 132. p. 73 ; New 
castle to Belcher, Apr. 5, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 341 ; Order in Council, May 
6, 1741, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 48; Gooch to Belcher, July 8, 1740, C. 0. 5 899, 
346; Belcher to Gooch, July 14, 1740, C. O. 5 899, 349; Draft of Went- 
worth s commission as governor of New Hampshire, June 25, 1741, C. 0. 
5 199, 1-20; Bel. Ps., pt. ii, pp. 282-408, passim. For several documents 
upon the share of Massachusetts in the expedition against the Spanish 
West Indies, cf. an article by Ellis Ames on the Cartagena expedition 
under Admiral Vernon, in the Mass. H. S. Proc., vol. xviii, pp. 364-378. 
Considerable information upon this expedition is also to be found in 
Storer, "Admiral Vernon Medals, 1739-1742," in Mass. H. S. Proc., 
vol. Hi, pp. 187-276. Cf. also, A. and R., vol. ii, pp. 1037, 1061, 1078, 
1104. For an unflattering but perhaps biassed judgment of Thomas 
Hutchinson by James Otis, in which he asserts that the former s ad 
vancement to many positions of importance was secured by " superficial 
arts of intrigue, rather than any solid parts, by cringing to governors 
and pushing arbitrary measures . . ," cf. Otis to Mauduit, Oct. 28, 1762, 
Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. Ixxiv, p. 77. 



CHAPTER V 
TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 

THE news of Shirley s appointment arrived by letter from 
one of the Massachusetts agents in London before his com 
mission was received. Belcher acted thereupon with dig 
nity, informing the legislature of the report of Shirley s 
appointment and expressing confidence that the general 
court would " do everything proper for receiving this gentle 
man with all due respect and honor, when the king s 
commission to him may arrive." In response to this sug 
gestion the assembly two 1 days later took the initiative in 
naming a committee of the two houses to take charge of 
the inaugural ceremonies, and in this Belcher and the 
council cooperated. 

Shirley s commission arrived August 13, 1741, more than 
a month after the news of his appointment, and on the next 
day it was published. In accordance with the impressive 
customs of the time the new governor was escorted from 
his house in Boston to the court house by a numerous con 
course of civil and military dignitaries. After the solemn 
reading of his commission, he took the oaths required by 
law and entered upon his duties as chief magistrate to the 
accompaniment of salvos of guns in the warships and forts 
in and around Boston harbor, and volleys from the infantry 
assembled to do him honor. 1 

1 For the events relating to the transition of the governorship from 
Belcher to Shirley, cf. A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 13; Cl. Recs., vol. x, pp. 
533-536; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), pp. 6, 105; Jour., July 8, p. 6; July 
10, p. 8. 
92 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 



93 



Belcher had adjourned the general court until the i/th 
of August, when Mr. Shirley first addressed them;. His 
instructions had not yet been sent to him. Their non-ar 
rival gave him an opportunity to lay the foundations of 
good-will in his relations with the legislature before it be 
came necessary to continue the inevitable contests between 
province and crown, over the exercise of prerogative rights. 

His policy then and later as it appeared in his public 
papers and his acts was one of mildness and firmness ap 
plied with much tact. He declared that the attitude of the 
imperial government was one of benevolence toward its 
subjects, and avowed as his own aim the good of the people 
under him. He referred to his long residence and service 
among his neighbors and asserted their mutual attachment. 

The matters he brought at once to the attention of the 
legislature related first to the existing war with Spain and an 
impending rupture with France. 1 He recommended ade 
quate provision for Castle William in Boston harbor, then 
in a state of decay and poorly equipped, and the prohibition 
of the exportation of provisions to foreign dominions dur 
ing the war. As to internal affairs he suggested an appeal 
(which he pledged himself to promote) from the recent 
settlement of the Massachusetts-Rhode Island boundary, 
a full statement of the facts regarding their paper currency 
to Parliament, which was then considering a means of 

1 A few days later Shirley transmitted to the Duke of Newcastle a 
number of papers taken from a French transport belonging to an 
expedition under the Marquis D Antin which had been sent on a West 
Indian cruise. A captured journal among the papers transmitted 
declared that this force was to make an attack upon Vernon s squadron 
at Jamaica. The writer expressed the belief that war between England 
and France was certain. The proposed attack was not made, probably 
because of the unexpected strength of Vernon s squadron. Shirley to 
Newcastle, Aug. 24, 1741, C. 0. 5 900, 4. For this episode cf. also, 
Declaration of war against the French king, Mar. 29, 1744, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 118-119. 



94 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

curing the evils connected with it, and^ the supplying of 
the treasury in a way acceptable to the crown. 1 

The house of representatives showed its confidence in 
Shirley s sincerity and judgment by soon taking up in a 
conciliatory spirit the matters recommended to them, 2 and 
by returning to the governor an address expressing respect 
and affection with regret that " your accession to this 
government should be at a time when this province is labour 
ing under so many difficulties and distresses." The address 
intimated a hope that he might lead them out of their wild 
erness of troubles, and commanded sufficient optimism to 
observe " we must not despair of the commonwealth." The 
house also promptly voted the generous sum of 2,000 in 
bills of credit to Shirley to pay his expenses between his 
accession to the government and his removal to the province 
house and for the expense of making the removal. 3 This 
being approved by the council, Shirley thanked them gra 
ciously. 4 The latter body, also, was equally prompt in 
congratulating the new governor upon his advancement. 5 

1 Jour., Aug. 17, 1741, pp. 57-60. 

2 Ibid., Aug. 18, 1741, pp. 61, 62; Nov. 25, 1741, p. 113; Dec. 2, 1741, 
P- ii7. 

* Ct. Recs., vol. xvii, p. 324. 

4 Ibid., vol. xvii (3), p. 101. 

*Ibid., vol. xvii (3), p. 82. iShortly after Shirley outlined his policy to 
the legislature the selectmen of Boston presented an address of con 
gratulation to him. They in common with all other official spokesmen 
of the people joined in expressions of joy too full and explicit to be 
other than sincere. After attributing his appointment to a " special 
smile of Providence," and enumerating his interests in and services to 
the people, they declared his " personal accomplishments for Govern 
ment are such that we can t but reflect on your advancement with 
singular joy and satisfaction, and esteem it as an happy presage of 
our future welfare." They closed with the hope that he might pro 
mote " religion, good order and trade, among us." These objects the 
governor promptly assured them he would give his best efforts to 
promote. Records of the Boston Selectmen, 1736-42 (Boston, 1886), 
P- 305. 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 95 

It was just at the close of the outpouring of laudation 
at his accession that Shirley sent to Newcastle an account 
of that event and of the conditions which he would have 
to face. He remarked upon the full and general testimony 
of the people s good-will " (Mr. Belcher s best wishers not 
excepted)," and the granting " in the most unanimous man 
ner, toward defraying the expence of my equipage, &c., of 
a larger sum than was ever granted before upon the like 
occasion, and that done when I was upon the spot at the 
time of my nomination, and of the arrival of his majy s 



commission." 



He showed his understanding of the problems ahead by 
referring to the failures of his predecessors, the empty con 
dition of the treasury and the opposition of the representa 
tives to the last royal instruction as to filling it, the defense 
less condition of the province, public excitement and re 
sentment over the land-bank scheme near the end of Bel 
cher s administration, and the decrease of the value of the 
governor s salary under Belcher from about 1,000 sterling 
to 650 sterling. 

In spite of these conditions Shirley was not downcast, 
but declared that the difficulties ahead " I shall not despair 
of wading through in some measure by the help of patience 
and moderation," even though "some disputes with the 
country seem unavoidable for the service of the crown, 
particularly with regard to the present state of the salary." 
He also announced the prudent intention of avoiding a 
personal dispute with the province whatever public differ 
ences might arise. 1 

In conclusion he pointed out that he probably would re 
ceive no salary for a considerable period, and entered & 

1 His position was made far easier through the fact that since the 
death of Elisha Cooke in 1737 (Hutchinson, Hist, of Mass., vol. ii, 
P- 351), no equally able and zealous popular leader had arisen to as 
sume his mantle. 



96 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

plea that his appointment of his son to the post of " Clerk 
of the Naval Office " be approved as a necessary means 
of supporting his family meanwhile. 1 This appointment 
the duke afterward approved. 2 

The ill-starred expedition against the Spanish West 
Indies, which had furnished Shirley with an opportunity 
to win his advancement to the governorship, encountered un 
favorable conditions in Cuba in the summer of 1741, es 
pecially from the pestilential climate. The commander of 
the land forces, Brigadier-General Wentworth, attempted, 
in accordance with his instructions, to secure needed re 
cruits in the American colonies. For this service in New 
England, he sent John Winslow, captain of one of the com 
panies originally raised there for the expedition. While 
Belcher still occupied the chair, the governor had been in 
structed to aid in raising recruits upon such an occasion, 
and the duty now fell to Shirley. 

Taking up the task the governor communicated to the 
legislature a roseate picture of the situation of the land 
forces in Cuba drawn by Winslow, and pointed out the 
value of Cuba to the commerce of the empire and especially 
to that of Massachusetts, with her commercial primacy 
among the English colonies in America. He asked that 
the house provide for 500 men to complete the 1,000 first 
voted, of whom but one-half actually entered the service, 
offer a bounty to encourage enlistment and arrange for 
transporting the recruits to Cuba. These proposals the rep 
resentatives seemingly met so far as possible by providing 
that 18,000 in bills of the old tenor or an equivalent should 
be set apart f rom the funds provided in the next supply of 
the treasury, to be applied substantially as Shirley requested 
for the encouragement of recruiting. 

l Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 39-43- 
*Ibid p. 86. 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 



97 



On October 9th, Shirley asked that the general court 
furnish the recruiting officer with necessary credit by draw 
ing bills on Henry Pelham, the paymaster-general of the 
army, and further that a joint committee of the general 
court be named to carry out this business, to inspect the use 
of the money and the officers accounts, and to report upon 
the whole affair to Mr. Pelham. and General Wentworth. 

Three days later he suggested that a committee be named 
to carry out the provisions of the vote for encouraging re 
cruiting by providing transports, subsistence, blankets, etc. 

Whether these proposals would have been acted upon 
favorably does not appear, for one of the inevitable dis 
putes between governor and assembly intervened. The bill 
for supplying the treasury had been passed in a form to 
which Shirley objected at length, and without its passage 
nothing could be done by the legislature promptly to pro 
vide public funds for the support of the expedition. How 
ever, recruiting went on. with the aid of funds advanced by 
Shirley, upon the security of the pledge of the legislature 
to pay the expenses when money was in the treasury. 1 

The success of the efforts to raise men in Massachusetts 
was limited, however, as a combination of circumstances 
repelled the people from enlisting. Reports had already 
reached the province of heavy mortality among the forces 
at Jamaica and Carthagena, and of the failure at the latter 
place. Many also were prevented from enlisting by the 
failure to supply arms at the place of enlistment, by the 
refusal to allow them to enlist under captains of their own 

1 Shirley had secured a change in the proposed wording of the vote 
for encouraging recruiting whereby the funds for this purpose were not 
necessarily to be taken from the sum to be raised by the supply bill 
then preparing but from the money raised in the next supply bill passed. 
Therefore, although he did not approve the bill then presented, the 
public faith was pledged to pay these expenses when money should 
become available. 



98 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

choice, and by the fear that they would not be discharged at 
the end of the expedition. 

Early in the next year, nevertheless, one hundred and 
fifty men had been raised, and about one hundred embarked 
for Cuba, while Shirley had hopes of adding one hundred 
more. This hope w r as dashed a few days later with the ar 
rival of news that 1,300 of Wentworth s men had died of 
sickness in Cuba, and that the survivors had withdrawn to 
Jamaica. 1 

In addition to military measures against Spain, Shirley 
also in November, 1741, issued a " commission of marque " 
to Captain James Roche of the privateer Caesar. 2 

Until January 16, 1742, Shirley was obliged to steer his 
course without instructions from home, meanwhile pro 
ceeding in general conformity to those earlier sent to Bel 
cher. 

1 This denouement left Captain John Winslow in an uncomfortable 
plight which Shirley sought to relieve by recommending him to New 
castle, asking the latter to redeem a pledge by Shirley that in case the 
expedition came to an early end Winslow should be given military 
employment in England. He suggested in his behalf a captain s com 
mission in England or half pay. In the latter case he would be useful 
in Massachusetts in the event of a war with France. Shirley to New 
castle, Dec. 27, 1742, C. O. 5 900, 92. 

For the proceedings in Massachusetts regarding Wentworth s expedi 
tion after Shirley became governor, cf. Jour., Sept. 23, 1741, pp. 80-82, 
Oct. 9, 1741, p. 101, Oct. 13, 1741, p. 103; Wentworth to Hopkins and 
Winslow, Aug. 12, 1741, C. O. 5 899 and 900, 21 ; Wentworth to Belcher, 
Aug. 12, 1741, C. O. 5 900, 17; Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 24 1741, C. O. 
5 900, 4; Shirley s proclamation for raising troops, Oct. 16, 1741,. 
C. O. 5 900, 22; ;Shirley to Newcastle Oct. 17, 1741, C. 0. 5 goo, 13; 
Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 23, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 81 ; Shirley to 
Newcastle, Jan. 28, 1742, C. O. 5 899; Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. 4, 
1742, C. 0. 5 900, 36; Shirley to sheriffs, Feb. 10, 1742, Ar., vol. Ixxii, fol. 
582; Shirley to Board, Feb. 22, 1742, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 59 J Apr. 30, 1742, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 83, 84; Winslow to Shirley (Jan., 1742), Ar., vol. 
Ixxii, fol. 581 ; ditto to ditto, Jan. 14, 1742, ibid., fol. 580. 

* Shirley to Roche, Nov. 10, 1741 (and enclosures) Ad. I, 3817. 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 



99 



The board of trade, in drafting Shirley s instructions, 
omitted one essential power that had been granted to his 
predecessor. Belcher had been authorized to approve the 
issue of a sum not exceeding 30,000 in paper money by the 
province annually for the current support and service of 
the government, 1 without a clause suspending the operation 
of the acts for such issues until the pleasure of the crown 
should be known. It was proposed to withhold such au 
thorization, and this, known in America before the instruc 
tions arrived, amounted to a restriction upon Shirley s free 
dom of action in dealing with a supply bill. Later he 
learned from agent Wilks that the privy council in Septem 
ber had granted the discretion originally enjoyed by Bel 
cher. 3 

Meanwhile Shirley had encountered one of his knottiest 
problems from both the political and economic points of 
view. From the latter point of view it was the problem of 
a badly depreciated paper currency, and from the former 
that of applying, in the face of determined opposition, in 
structions from home intended to remedy the evils arising 
from large issues of paper without adequate provision for 
supporting their value. 

One of the chief reasons for unpleasantness between 
Belcher and the legislature during the latter part of hisi 
administration had been his insistence that his instructions 
concerning paper money should be observed. These required 
laws fixing the amount of bills to be issued for the conduct 
of the government annually, and the dates at which they 
should be called into the treasury by taxation and destroyed. 3 

1 For fuller discussion of the paper money question in Massachusetts 
than is given at this point, cf. infra, pp. 159-180. 

2 This privilege had later been taken from Belcher because of his con 
senting to larger issues of paper money than were approved at home. 
A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 695-696. 

3 For salient features of Belcher s differences with the assembly over 



100 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Through his refusal to yield, the issues of the paper currency 
of the province had been greatly curtailed; and as prac 
tically no public money but bills of credit was in circula 
tion there, his firmness threatened a serious disturbance of 
business, inasmuch as a further radical reduction of the 
amount in circulation through the rapid drawing in of con 
siderable quantities still outstanding seemed imminent. 1 

When Shirley inherited this condition he met the dif 
ficulty squarely. The assembly passed a bill without a sus 
pending clause and he promptly refused to sign it, giving 
his reasons in good temper and good measure. He went 
further and suggested amendments designed to make the 
depreciation of bills of credit harmless to business. 

However, when he asked for a suspending clause, he 
struck fire from the assembly. He found them convinced 
that any instruction for the insertion of such a clause in 
a money bill was so " contrary to their charter and destruc 
tive of all their privileges, that they seem utterly regard 
less of any consequences which may ensue upon their refusal 
to comply with it." In view of this immovability of the 
assembly and the danger of a war with France in the spring 
(which would mean a war with Canada) with an empty 
treasury and a defenseless frontier, he recognized a crisis, 
and, giving the assembly at their request a short recess, he 
lost no time in laying the situation before Newcastle. 2 

this matter, cf. Jour., July n, 1739, p. 104; Sept. 20, 1739, p. no; Sept. 
21, 1739, P- 112; Oct. 5, 1739. PP. 134-136; Oct. 9, 1739, PP- I4I-H7; Dec. 
5, 1739, P- 150; Dec. 7, 1739, P. 152; Dec. 18, 1739, PP- 169-172; Dec. 27, 
1739, P- 193; Jan. i, 1740, p. 200; Jan. 3, 1740, p. 206; Jan. 4, 1740, p. 208; 
Jan. 7, 1740, pp. 211-212; Mar. 19, 1740, p. 232. 

1 The representatives challenged the instruction that no bill for the 
issue of bills of credit should be passed without a suspending clause, 
and the result was a deadlock in which no supply bill could pass and 
a chronic emptiness of the treasury. Cf. four., Jan. 15, 1742, p. 174- 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 17, 1741, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 77- 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT IO i 

In his despatch he explained to the duke that, in order 
to avoid further insistence upon a suspending clause with 
out specific directions from the crown, he thought it 
more for his majesty s service to lay this bill before the 
king for his previous approbation. He was confident that 
in case a suspending clause were dispensed with he could 
secure adoption of his proposed amendments, the most im 
portant result of which would be to insure to a creditor 
the sterling value oi his debt regardless of the depreciation 
of the currency. This, if accomplished, he observed, would 
make unnecessary the instructions from the crown upon 
the subject which were causing such a feud between crown 
and province. The results he foresaw were freedom of 
the crown from complaints due to the depreciated money 
and of the people from discontent, while public and private 
honesty would be restored. 1 

The voting of 6,000 more than allowed to be current 
at once by Belcher s instruction he defended as consistent 
with the intent of the instruction, inasmuch as it would be 
used to pay the extaordinary expense of the West Indian 
expedition. He further pointed out that permission to act 
as he suggested would do good through increase of his in 
fluence and the more tractable behavior of the province. 

The board of trade after examination, found the sug 
gested provision for protecting creditors from loss through 
depreciation of bills of credit unobjectionable, but held it 
to be properly a subject for a separate bill. 2 They wholly 
approved of Shirley s objections to the bill as passed by 

1 He also observed that in a sense the bill had been suspended until 
the king s will was known, and queried whether he should be given 
permission to sign it without a suspending clause if the assembly should 
previously agree to his most essential amendments. 

Shirley s seventh instruction, which he did not have when the bill 
was passed, required that he insist that matters of different natures be 
dealt with in separate acts. Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 45. 



102 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

the assembly, and favored a strict adherence by Shirley 
to his instructions regarding issues of paper money. They 
also suggested a scheme for securing a sound currency in 
lieu of further issues of paper money. Their lack of en 
thusiasm, for his suggested solution was partly balanced by 
the receipt of a letter from Lord Wilmington approving 
his course in dealing with the supply bill. 

About six weeks later Shirley was informed by Wilks 
of the revision of the instruction regarding paper money 
issues so that it allowed him to consent to an act for the 
issuing of 30,000 in bills of credit without a suspending 
clause. This made possible the finding of common ground 
between himself and the assembly. 1 

Before Shirley was informed of the views of the board 
of trade evoked by the bill submitted for their considera 
tion, he had put in operation the permission contained in 
his instructions, 2 to consent to the issue of 30,000 in bills 
of credit for the annual service and support of the govern 
ment. In this and an accompanying act, both passed 
January 15, 1742, he secured provisions for protecting 

1 For the controversy over the insertion of a suspending clause in 
all supply bills, cf. Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), p. 124; Jour., Oct. 14, 1741, 
pp. 104-109; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 76-78; Reference of instructions by 
Committee of Council back to Board of Trade, Aug. 7, 1741, C. 0. 5 883, 
Ee, 44; Approval of Instructions by Lords Justices, Sept. 8, 1741, 
C. O. 5 883, Ee, 50; Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 4, 1741, C. O. 5 ooo, 25; 
Reference by Lords of Committee of Council, Jan. 14, 1742, C. O. 
5 883, Ee, 55; Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 23, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
80, 81-82; Board to Committee of Privy Council, Mar. 2, 1742, C. O. 
5 918, 64; Shirley to Board, Feb. 22, 1742, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 59; Shirley 
to Wilmington (copy) Apr. 30, 1742, Hist. Mss. Com. nth rep., app. 
4, pp. 292-294; Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 30, 1742, C. O. 5 900; Shirley 
to Board, Apr. 30, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 83-84; Board to Shirley, 
Aug. 1 8, 1742, C. O. 5 918, 76. 

2 The instructions were in his hands on Jan. 16, 1742. (Sh. Cor., vol. 
i, P- 79-) His general instructions are printed in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
43-72. Ibid., pp. 73-76, contains the first of the instructions for trade 
but omits twenty-two others, which are in the P. R. 0. 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 103 

creditors against depreciation of the bills since a debt had 
been incurred and for an early retirement of the out 
standing bills. These provisions averted the displeasure of 
the board of trade. 1 

The passage of these bills marked the real beginning of 
progress under his administration. It established a com 
promise to the advantage of both parties. It was in har 
mony with Shirley s instruction limiting yearly issues of 
paper money, but not with another prohibiting the currency 
of more than 30,000 in paper money at one time. This 
latter was treated more or less as a dead letter. 2 The legis 
lation ameliorated but did not remove the evils of depre 
ciated currency, and performed the absolutely necessary 
service of supplying funds for public purposes, which were 
used in part for the payment of public servants, and alsot 
for ends which the home government had much at heart, 
like the West Indian expedition. By bringing up the cur 
rency question before the salary issue Shirley also avoided 
the possibility of the assembly s trading upon the desire for 
a salary to secure an issue of bills on their own terms, as 
Burnet charged that they had done under Dumtner in 1727- 
I728. 3 

During the early months of Shirley s administration, also, 
another currency problem which he inherited from his pred 
ecessor was passing through a stormy evolution. When 
it became evident in the spring of 1740 that Belcher would 

1 Shirley to Board, Apr. 30, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 83; A. and R., 
vol. ii, pp. 1077-1085. 

1 Shirley interpreted this instruction as meaning that the sum in bills 
of credit which might circulate at one time should not exceed the value 
of ^30,000 sterling. This interpretation the board of trade did not 
accept but did not actively combat. Board to Shirley, Aug. 18, 1742, 
C. 0. 5 918, 76; Board to Committee of Privy Council, Apr. 29, 1743, 
C. 0. 5 918. 85. 

3 Davis, " The Currency and Provincial Politics," in Pub. Col. Soc. 
Mass., vol. vi, p. 165. 



104 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

consent to no act for increasing or even maintaining the 
existing amount of provincial paper, two groups of alleged 
saviours of their country came forward with proposals for 
supplying a medium of exchange. The two plans evolved 
have been severally known as the land bank or manufactory 
scheme and the silver scheme. 1 Neither scheme was suc 
cessful, but notes were issued under both. The land-bank 
scheme, however, was the more popular and the more troub 
lesome to deal with. 

Belcher did nothing effectual to oppose the land-bank 
and silver schemes while they were in process of formation, 
in spite of the requests of the Massachusetts merchants, 2 
and his brother-in-law in London acted as agent for the 
promoters of the land bank. However, when the merchants 
applied to the home government for aid, and Parliament 
interested itself energetically in behalf of sound money in 
the dominions and prepared to pass an act intended to bring 
to an end the private currency schemes then on foot in the 

1 The first was actively promoted by John Colman, a largely auto 
biographical sketch of whom appears in Pub. Col. Soc. Mass., vol. vi, 
pp. 86-89. Cf. also, ibid., vol. iii, pp. 10, 12-14, 17. Among the other 
subscribers for the notes of the so-called bank were Samuel Adams, 
the elder, Robert Auchmuty, judge of admiralty, and many members 
of the house of representatives. Their number ultimately increased to 
include " between eight and nine hundred partners, chiefly countrymen." 
The bills issued were supposed to be secured by real estate and to be 
redeemable at the end of a twenty-year period " by sundry commodities 
therein enumerated." The second or silver scheme, chiefly promoted 
by Edward Hutchinson, and supported by the merchants in the effort 
to secure "hard money" for the province (cf. Hutchinson, op. cit., 
vol. ii, p. 354) proposed that the partners entering into the scheme 
should emit ^120,000 in notes redeemable at the end of fifteen years in 
silver or gold at stated rates. Ar., vol. cii, fols. 49-55; Davis, " Provin 
cial Banks, Land and Silver," in Pub. Col. Soc. Mass., vol. vi, pp. 12- 
14, passim. 

* Shirley declared that Belcher did not keep promises of action 
which he made to the merchants. Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 15, I74 2 *. 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 91. 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 



105 



province, Belcher suddenly became zealous for sound 
money. 1 

The land-bank scheme was undoubtedly fatuous. It pre 
cipitated a condition just short of revolution. The situa 
tion over this issue was so critical when Belcher left office 2 
that if no other reason had existed for his removal, it would 
have been justified by the calming influence of a successor 
so level-headed and conciliatory as Shirley. 

It would be difficult to overestimate the extent or pos 
sibilities of the public unrest which developed over the issue. 
One cause of the general excitement was the fact that the 
private bills of the sort devised by the land-bank partners 
seem to have been wholly legal at the time of issue, although 
a public currency of a similar character had depreciated so 
rapidly and so unceasingly that strict instructions had re 
quired the governors to limit its quantity. The land-bank 
scheme did not antagonize the letter of the instructions to the 
governors, and these latter were regarded by the provincials 
as themselves encroachments upon their liberties guaranteed 

1 He forbade all holding positions under the government to have 
anything to do with the land bank or its bills, on pain of removal 
from their positions, removed a number for alleged violation of this 
prohibition, and excluded several of those chosen to the council be 
cause concerned in the scheme. 

The chief facts relating to these schemes and Belcher s proceedings 
in regard to them are found in Ar., vol. cii, fols. 4-384, passim; Jour., 
Mar. 26, 1740, pp. 246-247; Mar. 28, 1740, p. 249; June 6, 1740, p. 22; 
June 18, 1740, pp. 43-44; June 19, 1740, p. 46; Sept. 12, 1740, p. 127; 
Nov. 22, 1740, p. 133; Jan. 2, 1741, pp. 186-187; Bel. Ps., pt ii, pp. 363- 
543, passim; Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 5, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
89-92; Shirley to Board, Sept. 15, 1742, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 68. 

* For documents relating to a conspiracy to defy the government and 
compel the circulation of land bank notes by force, cf. Ar., vol. cii, 
fols. 154-168, 179. Cf. also An account of the Rise Progress and con 
sequences of the two Late Schemes, commonly call d the Land-bank, or 
manufactory scheme and the silver scheme, in the province of the 
Massachusetts Bay. In a letter from a gentleman in Boston to his 
friend in London (Boston, 1744), PP- 41-42. 



106 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

by their charter. There was an act of Parliament for sup 
pressing such undertakings in England passed in 1/20 under 
the salutary influence of the South Sea Bubble, but the at 
torney-general, in harmony with a series of opinions by the 
law officers of the crown, held that this act, not specifically 
applied to the plantations by either Parliament or the local 
legislatures, did not apply there. 

The promoters of the scheme therefore were filled with 
the negative virtue always attaching to an undertaking 
which has not been forbidden by law. Also there were at 
tracted to it many who desired to justify the payment of 
debts in a currency bearing the stamp of a false standard 
of value by clothing the act with legality. 1 

Belcher s efforts at suppression were to these misguided 
folk persecution. The act of Parliament in 1741 applying 
the " Bubble Act " of 1720 to the plantations was, if any 
thing, worse, for it purported to make the land bank illegal 
from the beginning by a retroactive enactment. 2 The ef 
fort of Parliament to protect creditors from the essential 
alteration through the land bank of the contracts under 
which debts were due them involved the destruction of the 
contracts which the partners in the bank believed they had 
legally made. Retroactive legislation, although a beneficent 
means of applying the lessons of experience when used 
with wisdom and a sense of responsibility, is, under other 
conditions, likely to be unjust. It appears especially un 
just when it involves impairing the obligation of contracts. 
This feature added to the rage of the partners, whose en- 

1 Some of the partners who had met their obligations, after charac 
terizing the undertaking as " that tmluckey and unfortinate skeeme 
called the land bank or manaf actery," complained of the " obstinate and 
willful negligence or dishonest delays and deallings " of the delinquent 
members. The petition of the complainants is in Ar., vol. cii, fols. 
243-245. 

* 14 George II, c. 37. 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 107 

gagements with each other and with the holders of the bills 
were declared void, but who nevertheless found themselves 
collectively and severally liable upon demand to pay at 
once the face value of the bills in lawful money equal to 
sterling value, instead of merely responsible for the redemp 
tion of the bills at the end of twenty years in merchandise, 
according to their original agreements. 

John Adams writing in middle age to compare the events 
of which he retained the vivid recollection of childhood with 
those in the midst of which he had recently lived declared: 
" The act to destroy the land bank scheme raised a greater 
ferment in this province than the Stamp Act did." The 
menace to the public peace from the land bank excitement 
was undoubtedly critically grave, and. had Belcher s harsh 
measures been continued, could hardly have been removed 
without an outbreak, and perhaps a premature revolution. 

The supposition which has been advanced that this crisis 
contributed to the shaping of the minds and the policies of 
the leaders of the Revolution in Massachusetts, seems to be 
founded upon probability. 2 

When Shirley came to office, therefore, just as the com 
pany was struggling toward recovery from the shock ad 
ministered by the action of Parliament, his refusal to con 
tinue the harsh policy inaugurated by Belcher while at the 
same time discouraging the land bank by milder means un 
doubtedly was based upon good sense. This mollifying 
influence was allowed time to modify public opinion, since 
he refrained from mention of the subject when he first ad 
dressed the legislature. The directors thus had opportunity 
to demonstrate what they could accomplish through their 
efforts to wind up the affairs of the partners before remedial 

1 Works of John Adams, vol. iv, p. 49. 

2 Davis, " Currency," etc., he. cit., pp. 171-172. 



108 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

legislation was attempted. 1 The directors acted with bad 
grace, indeed, but apparently in good faith. By this policy 
Shirley avoided arousing an antagonism which would inevi 
tably have been violent, and as it would probably have made 
a majority of the members of the legislature his hearty 
enemies, it might have wrecked his administration. 

Shortly after the arrival of Shirley s commission the part 
ners had succeeded in withdrawing and destroying over 
one-third of their bills and were still making efforts to 
draw in the rest. 2 The final solution of the land bank dif 
ficulty was to wait for a later season. Meanwhile Shirley s 
moderation and good sense had attracted the confidence and 
liking of the members of the house of representatives who 
had been supporters of the land bank. This enabled him 
to wean them from the support of a money bill which he 
declared bad and to effect a compromise of the matter with 
them, whereby they substituted the supply bill of 1741. 
The latter provided that the periods set for the redemption 
of bills of credit extant or to be issued should not be defer 
red, and, in return for being allowed to issue 30,000 in bills 
of credit, the assembly also passed a bill securing to the 
creditor the value of his debt regardless of depreciation of 
the currency and providing the means for fixing the value 
of the paper bills at intervals of six months. 3 

The reins of power may well be said to have been firmly 

1 The legislature proposed to take action in the summer of 1741 to 
wind up the company s affairs, but the partners succeeded in preventing 
this, and they then made a voluntary effort to call in the bills through 
a committee of their own. Davis, " Legislation and Litigation connected 
with the Land Bank of 1740," in Proceedings, of American Antiquarian 
Society, new series, April 1896, pp. 88-89. 

1 Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 80. 

3 Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 23, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 80; Shirley 
to Board, Mar. 19, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 102-103; Shirley to Legis 
lature, Jour., Jan. 15, 1742, p. 174; A. and R., vol. ii, pp. 1077-1085. Cf. 
also, supra, pp. 102-103. 



TAKING UP THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT 

in Shirley s grasp when his instructions arrived in the middle 
of January, 1742; for the initial period of administration, 
without clear mandate from home, had been so managed 
by him as to preserve the liking and support of the people 
and also the confidence and approval of the home govern 
ment. 1 

1 The reality of Shirley s hold upon the province, in spite of his 
advocacy of measures distasteful to many, is attested by the address 
to the king sent by the legislature of Massachusetts three days after 
Shirley s instructions were received. This address declares : "we ... 
with a real sense of gratitude, acknowledge your majesty s special 
favour to this province in appointing William Shirley, Esquire, to be 
our governor of whose prudence and integrity we have for some years 
had experience, while in a private life, and hope to reap the fruits 
thereof in his more exalted station." C. 0. 5 900, 35. 



CHAPTER VI 

"j & 

THE SALARY QUESTION AND THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSE 

ALTHOUGH Shirley had come to his full estate as gover 
nor with the receipt of his instructions, he was still encum 
bered by difficulties handed down to him at his accession. 
As we have seen he had begun dealing with one of these, 
the problem of the bills of credit, before his instructions 
arrived. The working out of the solution will receive aj 
fuller treatment later. 

Another figured very prominently in the governor s re 
lations with the legislature for a season, but its prominence 
was largely camouflage. This was the perennial question 
of fixing a salary for the governor. In reality the main 
issue was abandoned by the home government before it was 
raised ; for they instructed Shirley to " recommend it in 
the most pressing and effectual manner to the assembly to 
pass an act settling a fixed salary of one thousand pounds 
sterling per annum clear of all deductions on your self and 
your successors in that government," but this was followed 
by the qualifying phrase, " or at least on your self during* 
the whole time of your government." Finally, as the 
measure which the ministry obviously expected to pass, he! 
was empowered, in case the assembly did not " readily 
comply," to accept an annual grant of the value of 1,000 
sterling, provided this were the first act of the session in 
which it was proposed. 1 

The only provision insisted on which had not been re- 

1 Instructions to Shirley, art. 23, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 52. 
no 



THE SALARY QUESTION III 

quired in Belcher s time was that the salary grant should be 
of the annual value of 1,000 sterling. 

Forthwith upon receipt of his instructions Shirley wrote 
to the duke reporting that he had at once carried out the 
one requiring that he should strongly recommend that the 
general court settle a salary of 1,000 sterling per annum 
upon himself and his successors, but joined with it in the 
same sentence thanks to his patron for " directing the latter 
part of that instruction to be so qualified, as that I am 
left at liberty, in case the assembly should persist in their 
refusal to settle the salary, to take an annual allowance from 
em of 1,000 sterl. as they shall vote it from year to year, 
untill his majy s pleasure shall be signified to the contrary." 1 
In view of Shirley s slender resources it was indeed not 
merely a kindness to him but a sensible measure on the 
part of the home government that he should as soon as 
convenient have a means of support which was not in 
jeopardy through a disagreement between crown and prov 
ince. I ] 

The assembly, while declining to accept the instruction 
as binding, voted a sum which the governor accepted in 
1742. After that he found it necessary to contend for 
grants large enough to satisfy the terms of his instruction. 

Having reached this ground upon the matter, Shirley 
made the suggestion to the home government that as the 
people, through the continued wrangling on the subject, were 
passionately opposed to the settlement of a salary, and the 
representatives through annual elections were extremely de 
pendent upon their constituencies, the only prospect for a 
future settlement such as the crown desired without the 
interposition o>f Parliament, must come "not by dint of dis 
pute when the people are upon their guard against it, but at 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 23, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 80. 



H2 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

some unexpected juncture when their settled affection for 
a governor may give the representatives courage to venture 
upon a short settlement at first, out of a personal regard to 
him, which might easily perhaps be followed with a settle 
ment of it during his administration, from which precedent 
it might be difficult for the province to recede upon the ap 
pointment of a new governor." * 

At intervals during his administration the question came 
up again, always through the failure of the assembly to 
increase the nominal sum voted him so that, after allowance 
for the depreciation of the bills of credit, his grant would 
equal 1,000 sterling. In urging the necessary increase 
Shirley spoke with dignity and force, but always remained 
faithful to his resolution not to enter upon a personal quar 
rel with the house. It is apparent that both parties to the 
controversy were aware that the victory had been won and 
rested with the assembly. Shirley displayed insight by rec 
ognizing that so long as his salary was voted by the as 
sembly, the payment of the sum demanded by his instruc 
tions was dependent not upon the instructions t>ut upon the 
good will of the people and their representatives. In 1745 

1 , Shirley to Board, June 23, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 88-89. 

Shirley was obliged to refuse grants at the rate of ^750 sterling and 
950 sterling per annum, as he estimated, and to dissolve the assembly 
without receiving any salary before bringing them to grant 1,000 per 
annum in accordance with the instruction, the whole discussion having 
covered about six months. 

For Shirley s controversy with the assembly over the fixing of a 
salary immediately following his accession, cf. Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
80, 85, 87-89; Shirley to Board, Oct. 21, 1742, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 66; 
Shirley to the King, Dec. 15, 1742, C. 0. 5 ooo, 77; Jour., Aug. 21, 1741, 
p. 66; Sept. 26, 1741, p. 85; Jan. 21, 1742, pp. 185-188; Jan. 22, 1742, 
p. 190; Mar. 19, 1742, p. 194; Mar. 27, 1742, p. 211; Mar. 30, 1742, p. 
215; Mar. 31, 1742, p. 218; Apr. i, 1742, p. 219; Apr. 13, 1742, p. 244; 
Apr. 16, 1742, p. 254; Apr. 20, 1742, pp. 257-258; Apr. 23, 1742, pp. 262- 
263; May 28, 1742, pp. 8, ii ; June 2, 1742, p. 17; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), 
pp. 91-92, 124 265, 288, 310. 



THE SALARY QUESTION 113 

a protest from the governor at the smallness of the grant 
led to an increase. The governor s protest came just after 
the fall of Louisburg and the house expressed " satisfac 
tion in your excellency s administration, and do assure you 
they are always ready to grant such a sum for your sup 
port as shall be suitable to the dignity of your station, and 
shall consist with the circumstances or ability of their con 
stituents." * In the following year disagreement between 
the houses as to the amount led Shirley to request that the 
matter of his salary be postponed so that it might not ob 
struct the preparation for the expedition then planned 
against Canada. When he brought the matter up again 
in the following January an acceptable grant was at once 
made without any protest as to the rights of the house, 2 
In 1747 he accepted a grant which he considered less 
than it should be rather than have a controversy at a critical 
time when it would have badly affected matters then 
pending in Great Britain (doubtless referring to the reim 
bursement of the province for the Louisburg expedition).* 
In 1748, however, he raised the issue in strong terms, charg 
ing the assembly with ingratitude in view of the reimburse 
ment now assured for the Louisburg expedition. The as 
sembly did not see the matter in that light, being, perhaps, 
more disappointed over the prospect of the return of Louis 
burg to the French, than grateful for the reimbursement. 
The result was a warm argument in which the governor 
combatted the assumption that the province was not able 
to pay more than 1,900 in badly depreciated bills of credit. 
The matter went over to the next session and the dispute 

1 Jour., June 20, 1745, p. 44; June 21, 1745, p. 45; A. and R., voL 
iii, p. 241. 

* Jour., June 19, 1746, p. 51; June 20, 1746, pp. 53-54; A. and R., vol. 
iii, p. 322. 

1 four., June 14, 1748, p. 43; A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 371-372. 



II4 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

was renewed after the assembly raised the grant to 2,000. 
Shirley admitted that his instructions were not binding upon 
the assembly but declared that they were upon himself, and 
argued that the assembly was not redeeming its own pledges, 
and was using arguments not based upon fact. The up 
shot of the matter was that the house increased the grant 
to 2,400, approximately the. figure asked, and this Shirley 
accepted. 1 

In 1749, the assembly cut 200 from the grant of the 
preceding year under the pretext that the province was fac 
ing a prospect of calamity through drouth, and this Shirley 
accepted, repudiating any desire to avoid his share in " any 
publick calamity of the people within my government." 2 

Another problem of the first importance and magnitude 
which had been left by Belcher for his successor to solve 
was that of the defense of the province in time of war. 
Although England was already at war with Spain, an at 
tack by the Spanish upon the New England coast was a re 
mote contingency. However, the mother country was more 
than likely soon to become embroiled with France, whose 
position in Canada would make attacks by land and sea 
upon the northern English colonies almost inevitable. 

The aggressive temper of the French was attested by 
recent encroachments upon English territory at Crown 
Point in New York. Official cognizance of these encroach 
ments upon the English possessions only a few miles from 
the northwestern frontier of Massachusetts, had been taken 
by the government of that province as early as December, 
1731. There was then talk of demanding the removal of 
the French from their post there, to> be followed in case of 

l jour., June 14, 1748, p. 435 June 15, 1748, p. 46; June 18, 1748, pp. 
52-53; June 22, 1748, p. 56; Nov. 9, 1748, p. 84; Nov. 15, 1748, pp. 96- 
101 ; June 24, 1749, p. 41 ; A. and R., vol. Hi, p. 422. 

2 Jour., June 24, 1749, p. 41 ; A. and R., vol. Hi, p. 465- 



THE SALARY QUESTION 115 

their refusal by " further methods to bring them to it " 
through cooperation with the adjoining governments, but 
these plans evaporated during the following year, 1 and the 
western settlements of Massachusetts remained within easy 
striking distance for raiding parties from the French strong 
holds. As the French and the Indians under their influence 
were past masters in the technique of la petite guerre, this 
was a matter worthy of consideration. 

Louisburg, the great French fortress and rendezvous 
for the trade with Canada and the Indies, was situated upon 
the island of Cape Breton near the entrance to the Gulf of 
St. Lawrence and in a military sense enfiladed the English 
colonies of Nova Scotia and New England. It was re 
puted the American Gibraltar and the strongest fortress 
west of the Atlantic. Moreover, as had been the case from 
the early days of French settlement in America, the agents 
of France, many of them Jesuit missionaries, were efficiently 
active on behalf of their government among the Indian 
tribes within striking distance of the frontier of the northern 
English colonies. Their potent influence insured that mas 
sacre and devastation would threaten every point of the 
land frontier in case of a rupture with France. 

It could not be assumed that New Englanders even in 
their highest dudgeon would fail to comprehend these dan 
gers, which were more serious now than when the horrors 
of border warfare had been experienced by their fathers. 
Had the issue been simply one of providing for defense 
there could have been no hesitation in any quarter; but 
when the carrying out of measures of defense depended 
upon the passage of a supply bill under restrictions which 
aroused the combativeness of every Puritan spirit in the 

1 Jour., Dec. 2, 1731, p. 3; Dec. 29, 1731, p. 40; Jan. i, 1732, p. 47 J 
Jan. 27, 1732, p. 103; June 16, 1732, p. 27; June 20, 1732, p. 32; Ct. Recs., 
vol. xv, pp. 239-240. 



n6 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

land, they placed freedom from irksome restraint above 
safety. 

An acrimonious controversy had been carried on between 
Belcher and the house in 1740 as to the form in which 
grants for the maintenance of seaboard fortifications should 
be made. Belcher challenged the customary form of such 
grants and insisted that the custom of naming a legislative 
committee to purchase materials and to employ and super 
vise the workmen, although this committee was to act under 
the general direction of the governor, was divesting the 
latter of powers lodged in him by the charter. The 
general court claimed that such legislative supervision of 
the application of funds for the building and repair of forti 
fications was a right always before exercised without chal 
lenge. 1 It is not strange, therefore, that the lower house 
on July 4, 1740, refused to pass " An Act for the security 
and defense of the frontiers." 3 

The most that could be secured for that time were votes 
" for purchasing a suitable vessel to guard the coast " etc., 
for enlisting or impressing men to man it, for enlisting sixty 
men for Castle William, the fortress in Boston harbor, and 
for organizing two independent companies of eighty men 
each composed of the best men in the regiments of militia 
nearest the Castle " for the service of that fortress in case 
of an attack . . . ," and that the proceeds from the truck 
trade with the Indians be employed for repairing forts and 
truck houses on the frontiers.* 

Votes also passed both houses in varying forms for a< 
comprehensive scheme of defense including the repair of 

i Shirley to Board, Oct. 25. 1742, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 72. 

*Jour., June 25, 1740, p. 54; July 4. 174, P- ?6- 

s Ibid., July 9, 1740, PP. 84, 85; July 10, 1740- P- oo; July II, 1740, 
p. 92; Ct. Rets., vol. xvii (2), pp. 383-384, 387, 388; A. and R., vol. xii, 
pp. 697, 698-699. 



THE SALARY QUESTION 117 

forts and truck houses, and for loaning money to seven 
seacoast towns to be used for fortifying them; but as the 
two houses could not reach an agreement with the governor 
on these matters, and there was no money in the treasury 
nor a prospect of raising any, these votes must be judged 
to have been intended for political effect. 1 

The house was continuing earlier unsuccessful efforts to 
get substantial control of military affairs through insistence 
upon the right of the assembly to pass upon muster rolls. 

The representatives finding Belcher immovable bewailed 
the fact that the people must part with their ancient liberty 
and usage or " still lie in their exposed condition. This is 
truly shocking! " They further affirmed that putting public 
moneys into the hands of persons uncontrollable and there 
fore unaccountable to the court was " what the representa 
tives in faithfulness to the liberties of their people can t 
comply with." 2 

Aside from the obvious difficulty in securing legislation 
in Massachusetts for the defense of the province, a further 
difficulty affecting one capital item in a program of defense 
arose between the province and the home government. 
This related to plans for enlarging and equipping Castle 
William and for the equipment of forts upon the frontiers, 
for which purpose the province hoped to benefit by the royal 
bounty. Of these plans, that relating to Castle William was 
paramount. On a previous occasion the crown had con 
tributed heavy guns and ammunition for the protection of 
this key to the most important harbor and naval base upon 
the coast of the English continental colonies in America. 
This was done with the understanding that the province 

l jour., July 10, 1740, p. 91; July u, 1740, p. 93. 

*Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (2), pp. 430, 476, 486; Jour., Dec. 5, 1740, p. 152; 
Dec. 13, 1740, p. 162; Dec. 23, 1740, p. 170; Dec. 26, 1740, p. 175; Dec. 31, 
1740, p. 179; Jan. 2, 1741, p. 183; Jan. 8, 1741, p. 194; Apr. 6, 1741, p. 220; 
Apr. 7, 1741, pp. 221-222. 



n8 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

would pay 500 guineas for powder and small arms supplied 
at the same time. 1 When, therefore, the province neglected 
to do this, the home government kept the omission vividly 
in memory. 

In 1734, and again in 1740, Massachusetts petitioned for 
a repetition of the crown s benevolence, whereby Castle Wil 
liam might be made adequate for the defense of the northern 
continental seaboard. The first of these petitions was refer 
red to the board of trade but the second seems to have got 
ten no further than the committee of the privy council. 
Another obstacle to such a gift from the crown was the 
neglect of the province to repair the fort at Pemaquid. 2 

Upon Shirley s accession, therefore, he found the problem 
of defense unsolved in a crisis likely to become shortly 
much worse. It was largely a problem of the supply of the 
treasury and of good will for the governor, and Shirley 
therefore worked to secure the necessary conditions. First 
he secured reports from, the commanders of various forts 
and blockhouses on the frontiers, eastern and western, and 
transmitted the information thus acquired to the legislature 
in the fall of I74I. 3 These reports showed that many of 
the forts on the frontiers were far from substantial in physi 
cal defenses and garrisons, especially the latter. As an ex 
ample, Fort Frederick, at Pemaquid. in spite of its important 
position was manned only by the commander and six un 
derpaid men. 4 

Through these reports Shirley secured the inclusion in the 

1 Order in Council, Jan. 10, 1745, C. 0. 5 885, 115, Ff, 75- 

Upon this episode, cf. A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 421, 694, 724-725; Ar., 
vol. liii, fol. 92; vol. Ixxii, fols. 438-439. 

Cf. Recs., vol. xvii (3), p. 122; Jour., Oct. 2, 1741, p. 94. 

4 Larrabee to Shirley, Sept. 14, 1741, Ar., vol. liii, fol. 98; Savage to 
Shirley, Feb. 23, 1742, ibid., fols. 107-108, printed in Me. H. S. Colls., 
sec. ser., vol. xi, p. 225; Savage to Shirley, Mar. 8, 1742, Ar., vol. liii, 
fols. 109-110. 



THE SALARY QUESTION 119 

supply act of January, 1742, of an appropriation of 6,500 
for the fortifications of the province. 1 This was followed by 
his prompt recommendation to the house, to make effective 
the grant in the supply act for the defense of the province 
before the recess of the court, such action being in his 
judgment necessary to the safety of the province. The 
house, however, postponed action until the next session, ex 
pressing a desire for a fuller house before acting further. 2 

The needs of the province now became the basis for a 
petition from the general court to the crown for cannon 
and supplies for Castle William, signed by Shirley and 
heartily endorsed by him in a letter to Newcastle. A 
former grant to Massachusetts in the time of Governor 
Dudley and recent grants of such aid to New York and 
Pennsylvania were urged by Shirley, as well as the political 
advantage to be gained by increasing his influence with 
the people.* 

In the next session, pending news of action on their 
petition, the house attacked the problem of defense by 
asking the governor to direct the commander of Castle Wil 
liam to inform 1 the house of the state of the fortress, so 
that they might better provide for repairs. In response the 
governor suggested that a committee of the two houses ac 
company him upon a visit to the Castle. Thus did Shirley 
tactfully smooth the way for cooperation between himself 
and the legislature in things military, and secure an oppor 
tunity for getting his views personally before the members 
of the committee. 4 

Shirley to Board, Apr. 30, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 84; A. and R., 
vol. ii, p. 1078. 

* Jour., Jan. 21, 1742, pp. 183, 184. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. 3, 1742, C. 0. 5 goo, 34; A. P. C., vol. 
iii, p. 724. - : ;] 

4 For this incident, cf. Jour., Mar. 18, 1742, p. 192; Mar. 22, 1742, 
P- 197- 



120 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

The result was the preparation by the house and the en 
actment by the middle of April of a comprehensive scheme 
for the defense of the seaboard, and for scouting parties on 
the frontiers, the former including not only Castle William, 
to which the major portion of attention was given, but 
also considerable batteries for the defense of Boston, and 
others of less magnitude for the defense of eight other 
Massachusetts seaports, including Falmouth in Maine. 
Within the same period also there was passed a vote for 
carrying on repairs begun by order of Belcher upon the 
truck house or fort on St. George s river in Maine. 1 In 
securing the defense of the seaboard Shirley was not only 
procuring the obviously necessary, but also carrying out 
a part of his fifty-sixth instruction. 2 

Shirley s task was only well begun, however, when he 
secured an appropriation of 6,500 for fortifications. 3 The 
defense of the points where batteries were as a result erected 
was made by no means impregnable, and other seacoast towns 
were undefended, while the defenses of the land frontiers 
were largely in ruins or non-existent. Most of the fund 
voted in the January supply bill was appropriated in the 
votes of the following April for fortifications, 4 and Shirley 
was not allowed by his instructions to consent to further 
issues of bills of credit (the only considerable means the 
province possessed of raising money) during that financial 
year. 

Shirley from 1 time to time during the spring and summer 
of 1742 brought up individual matters relating to defense 
needing attention but found the assembly efficient watch- 

1 Action on these appropriations is recorded in Jour., Apr. 9-10, 1742, 
pp. 239-242; Apr. 12, 1742, p. 243; Sept. 9, 1742, p. 77; Ct. Recs., voL 

i (3), pp. 329-333; A. and R., vol. xiii, pp. 109-114. 
*Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 63. 
9 A. and R., vol. ii, p. 1078. 
4 Cf. supra. 



THE SALARY QUESTION 121 

dogs of the treasury. Their economical tendencies were 
perhaps stimu 1 ated by the fact that Shirley was then con 
tending for a fixed salary, as well as by the difficulty attend 
ing the raising of money. 

In June the interests of the province and the apparent 
need of reinforcements for Fort George at Brunswick, in 
Maine, when urged by the governor failed to convince 
them. 1 He brought Castle William to their attention again 
to suggest an increase of wages for the garrison, as a means 
to securing efficient men, which led to the naming of a com 
mittee to investigate. 2 Four days later Shirley named the 
lieutenant-governor and six prominent members of the legis 
lature as a committee " to supervise, manage, and carry on " 
specified repairs at Castle William, subject to his direc 
tions. In doing so he met the legislature halfway in the 
matters involved in their controversy with Belcher. Later 
he accepted legislative committees named to act under the 
governor for managing the expenditure of money for mili 
tary purposes. He justified this policy to the home govern 
ment, by stating that the legislative committee respected 
rather the good economy and husbandry of public money 
than the governor s power. 3 The house at the end of June 
voted to reduce the number of guns to be supplied by Salem 
from sixteen to ten, apparently as an inducement to the 
town to meet the conditions of the grant. 4 

Thus matters were progressing but slowly until after 
the salary imbroglio had been settled. 5 Then with the 

l jour., June 15, 1742, p. 41; June 16, 1742, p. 43. 
*Ibid., June 25, 1742, p. 57. 

3 Shirley to Spencer Phips, etc., June 19, 1742, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 73; 
Shirley to Board, Oct. 25, 1742, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 72. 

4 Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), p. 448; A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 152. 

1 Perhaps the salary issue prevented Shirley from securing a grant in 
the July supply act for fortifications. Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 8-n; Ct. Recs., 



\ 



vol. xvii (3), p. 458. 

\ 



122 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

diplomatic artistry in which he was an adept he set out to 
persuade the general court to appropriate money they did 
not possess, and the home government to make an exception 
to their restrictions upon the issue of bills of credit, in view 
of the obviously perilous situation of the province. In the 
evolution of his plans he arranged for a tour in July and 
August of the Maine settlements, which consisted of a land 
and sea frontier intermingled a fringe along the seaboard. 
To inspect these outposts of New England, forming a spear 
head in the side of Canada, Shirley tactfully Jock with 
him a committee of the general court. 1 After holding a 
satisfactory conference with the Penobscot Indians at St. 
George s river, 2 they visited Pemaquid and the other posts 
along the Maine shore, concluding with a visit of the com 
mittee alone to Saco, deputed by the commander-in-chief 
to inspect and report to him to avoid the expense of a visit 
by himself, as he later explained to the assembly. a 

After this trip Shirley interpreted the eastern frontier 
problem in terms chiefly of two things. The first was the 
need of so handling the Indians as to hold them to the 
English in case of war, 4 to accomplish which he urged the 
selection of proper truck masters in that district, and es 
pecially one at St. George s who could speak the Penobscot 
tongue. The other was the great value of Maine, intrin- 

*For provision by the general court for this expedition, cf. A. and R., 
vol. xiii, p. 158. 

These Indians had sent delegates to Boston to pay their respects to 
the new governor soon after his accession. Cl. Recs., vol. x, p. 544. 

Shirley, A Conference held at the Fort at St. George s, Aug. 4, 1742 
(Boston, 1742). For this tour, cf. Jour., Sept. 3, 1742, pp. 70-72; Shirley 
to Newcastle, Aug. 30, 1742, Me. H. S. Colls., sec. ser., vol. xi, p. 251; 
Shirley to the King, Dec. 15, 1742, C. O. 5 900, 77. 

4 This policy was enjoined upon Shirley by his fifty-first instruction. 
Cf. Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 61. 



THE SALARY QUESTION 123 

.sically and as a granary for Massachusetts, and the need 
for defending it equally with the rest of the province. 1 

His wisdom and tact prevailed. Three of the four 
former truck masters were retired when the general court 
.soon chose those for the ensuing year. 2 The general court 
also voted 700 from the fund raised in 1741 to be used 
for defenses at Pemaquid, St. George s and Saco>. 3 

Having reached this point, Shirley made application to 
the home government for permission to consent to a special 
issue of 7,000 or 8,000 of bills of credit, retirable before 
1746, and to be used to complete the works at Castle Wil 
liam. He further pointed out that the province could not 
wage war against the French in case of a rupture without 
further emissions not allowed by his instructions, and re 
quested authority in such a contingency " to consent to 
emission of such a stated sum in paper bills as may be 
thought proper in time of war, or such further discretionary 
sum as I shall find his [the king s] service will necessarily 
require." 4 

Successive administrations before Shirley s time had 
been embittered by the stubborn opposition of the assembly 
to the execution of repeated injunctions from the crown 
that Pemaquid, an important stronghold near the extreme 
northeastern frontier, should be repaired. Shirley s per 
suasion now secured this important strengthening of the 
frontier. Possibly the willingness of the general court to 
provide for it at this time was partly due to the fact that 
no specific instruction had been given Shirley to insist 

1 Jour., Sept. 3, 1742, pp. 70-72. 

2 Ibid., Sept. 7, 1742, p. 74. 

3 Ibid., Sept. 9, 1742, p. 77; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), p. 483; A. and R. 
~v6l. xiii, pp. 163-164. 

4 Shirley to Board, Nov. 16, 1742, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 74; Shirley to Har 
rington, Lord President, Nov. 16, 1742, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 79. 



124 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

upon the point. 1 Probably, also, it was understood that the 
failure of the province to provide, for it was likely to be an 
obstacle to success in the petition which they had made 
that cannon and munitions of war be donated to them by 
the crown for Castle William,. 2 

On the heels of the appropriation for Fort Frederick at 
Pemaquid, came Shirley s recommendation for the support 
of a chaplain for the garrison and the neighboring settlers 
there as a means to encouraging settlement and strengthen 
ing the defense of the place in case of attack. After further 
urging by Shirley and a stipulation that one-half the sum 
for a chaplain s salary be paid by the inhabitants, the legis 
lature voted to provide for the spiritual needs of the garrison 
and settlers at Pemaquid. 3 

At about the same time, being informed that English 
citizens were being denied the freedom of the streets in Quebec 

1 Shirley s own instructions contained only a general direction to 
" require and press . . . fortifying all places necessary for the security 
of the said province by land," etc., 56th instruction, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 63. 

"Shirley wrote to Newcastle and the lord president of the council on 
November first following to present further arguments in favor of a 
grant of cannon and supplies for Castle William. To the objections 
which had arisen in the committee of the privy council, that the 
province had not provided for the defense of Pemaquid and had not 
paid five hundred guineas due from them in connection with the pre 
vious similar gift from the crown, he replied that Pemaquid was being 
repaired and already two-thirds finished and that he was having an 
investigation made in regard to the previous action of the general 
court upon the matter of the five hundred guineas, preparatory to a 
statement by the Massachusetts agents in London. Shirley to New 
castle, Nov. i, 1742, C. O. 5 900, 74; Shirley to the Lord President of 
the Council, Nov. i, 1742, Ar,, vol. liii, fol. 138, published in Sh. Cor. f 
vol. i, pp. 93-95; A. P. C., vol. iii, p. 725. Cf., also, Kilby to Shirley, 
Ar., vol. liii, fols. I74~ I 75- 

8 Jour., Sept. 10, 1742, p. 791 Nov. 19, 1742, p. 83; Dec. 30, 1742, pt 
132; Shirley to Board, Sept. 15, 1742, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 68; Shirley to 
Newcastle, Sept. 15, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 92; A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 193* 



THE SALARY QUESTION 125 

by the French, he ordered that all Frenchmen in Boston be 
iaken into custody and that they leave the town within five 
days. 1 

At the end of the year the governor returned to the sub 
ject of Castle William, reporting that fair progress had 
been made but that the appropriation for the purpose had 
already been exceeded and the new works were still un 
finished. The European situation, he said, was threatening 
and the completion of the works urgent; upon their com 
pletion the city of Boston would be secure and probably im 
mune from attack. Upon inviting a committee of both 
houses to accompany him upon a tour of inspection of the 
Castle, he secured within a day an appropriation of 1,100 
for completing the repairs. 2 This he soon followed by a mes 
sage pointing out that eighty-four great guns at the Castle 
and twenty more hoped for from the crown by spring 3 were 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 15, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 92. Cf. also, 
Records of Boston Selectmen, 1736-1742, p. 357. 

* During the preceding summer Shirley had secured from the pro 
vincial secretary information regarding the precedents for providing 
for repairs of Castle William. Secretary to Shirley, Aug. 27, 1742, 
C. O. 5 899. For the proceedings regarding the Castle in Dec.-Jan., 
1742-1743, cf. Jour., Jan. 14, 1743, p. 147; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), p. 612; 
A. and R., vol. xiii, pp. 205-206. 

3 On the granting of the request for these guns with the proviso that 
Ihe province first pay the sum due, cf. A. P. C., vol. in, pp. 725-726; 
Board to Shirley, July 6, 1743, C. 0. 5 918, 103 ; Sharpe to Committee 
of Council, Nov. 28, 1743, C. 0. 5 884, Ff ; Order in Council, Jan. 10, 
1745, C. O. 5 885, 115, Ff, 75. 

The news of the success of their petition arrived before the end of 
winter, and governor, council and house expressed gratitude and avowed 
"the strongest ties of duty, loyalty and affection to your sacred person 
and government and shall always endeavor with the utmost zeal and 
vigour to exert ourselves for promoting your majesty s honour and 
interest." (Governor, Council and House to the King, Feb. 8, 1743, 
C. O. 5 900, 83.) Later the assembly through Shirley presented their 
thanks to Newcastle for his intercession on their behalf. Shirley to 
Newcastle, Mar. 23, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 116-117. 



126 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

nearly useless without trained men to handle them. He 
estimated that about 150 men were needed. This led to the 
revival and passage on January 15, 1743, of a bill entitled 
" An Act for inlisting the inhabitants of Dorchester into His 
Majesty s service, for the defence of Castle William, as oc 
casion shall require." L 

The succeeding spring opened and was followed by the 
other seasons in course without the momentarily expected 
rupture with France. In the summer Shirley sent some 
Spanish prisoners to England with a statement that he was 
searching for all Spanish sailors to be sent home as 
prisoners of war, and with a warning that sailors on Span 
ish prizes had by custom been disposed of in ports of the 
American colonies by captors as sailors for English vessels, 
giving them every opportunity to get information about 
the harbors, towns and forts in the English colonies. 2 

In October Shirley had news from home of increased 
danger o>f an immediate break with France. He at once 
executed commissions from the lords justices and the ad 
miralty by sending letters from them to the other governors 
and to General Oglethorpe, and wrote to Newcastle that he 
would put the province in the best possible state of de- 
fense and guard against surprise. 3 

Having heard also of a privateer fitted out at Cape 
Breton, generally supposed to be a " Frenchman," he ordered 
the province snow to cruise off the New England coast in 

l jour., Dec. 21, 1742, p. 122; Dec. 22, 1742, p. 123; A. and R., vol. iii, 
pp. 44-45. Cf. also Shirley to Board, Jan. 30, 1743, Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
p. 100. 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, July 8, 1743, C. O. 5 QOO- 

Shirley to Admiralty, Oct. 11, 1743, Ad. I, 3817; Shirley to New 
castle, Mar. 19, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 115-116; Shirley to Newcastle, 
Oct. 11, 1743, C. 0. 5 900, 87; Shirley to Admiralty, Oct. n, 1743, Ad, 
I, 3817. 



THE SALARY QUESTION 

search of it. 1 At the same time he sent a warning to 
colonels in command of the regiments of militia upon the 
frontiers to take measures to protect the frontiers and to 
warn the settlers there of danger. 2 Almost at once he named 
a committee headed by Colonel William Pepperrell and in 
cluding other prominent residents of that district to take 
charge of fortifying the towns of York county, and another 
headed by Colonel John Stoddard and leading men in Hamp 
shire county, to perform a similar service there. Pep 
perrell and Stoddard were the chief commanders upon the 
eastern and western frontiers respectively and they and their 
committees were to exercise large discretion, taking care not 
to exceed the funds available. 3 

Meanwhile further steps to complete the defense of the 
province had waited upon permission from home to emit 
bills of credit for a special fund for that purpose. This 
permission was given willingly and in the usual leisurely 
fashion. By the same process Shirley s request for dis 
cretion to approve further issues of bills of credit in the 
event of a French war, either a stated amount or as many 
as should be necessary, was disapproved. The reasoning 
behind the refusal was wholly characteristic of the board 
of trade viewpoint. They saw " no reason for such an 
allowance forasmuch as there is already provision, made by 
His Majesty s instruction for emergencies, provided the 
acts for such emissions have the suspending clause in 

1 Shirley to Governor Greene, Oct. 10, 1743, Ar., vol. liii, fol. 162. 

*Me. Hist, and Gen. Rec., vol. iii, pp. 93-94; Dame, "Life and Char 
acter of Sir William Pepperrell" in Essex Institute Historical Col 
lections, vol. xxi, p. 169; Shirley to Stoddard, etc., Nov. 1743, Ar., vol. 
liii, fol. 160, printed in Me. H. S. Colls., sec. ser., vol. xi, p. 290. 

3 Shirley to Stoddard, etc., Nov. 30, 1743, New Eng. Hist, and Gen. 
Reg., vol. xiii, pp. 21-22; Shirley to Pepperrell, etc., Nov. 30, 1743, Ar., 
vol. Ixxii, fol. 674, printed in Goodwin, Records of the Proprietors of 
Narragansett Township, No. i (Concord, 1871), pp. 138-139. 



I2 8 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

them." x Here appear a mingling of tenderness lest the in 
structions they had drafted appear insufficient in an emer 
gency, of blindness to the results of provoking a contest 
with the assembly over a suspending clause in the face of the 
enemy, and of innocence of all comprehension of the mean 
ing O f an emergency. In truth emergencies were not sup 
posed to occur in colonial affairs. Colonial questions need 
not presume to disturb the decorum of the offices at home. 
In the case of the successful request of Shirley for a small 
emission of paper to complete the necessary defenses which 
might be needed at any time, even though there was full 
approval and more than ordinary dispatch in matters of 
the kind, it was nearly ten months after sending his applica 
tion before Shirley was able to bring the report of his suc 
cess before the legislature. It was but natural, since this 
seemed to meet the emergency as they saw it, that the 
board of trade should not see reason for more rapid action 
in any future emergency, unless that body were to abdicate 
its functions to a colonial governor, which even though the 
empire should fall, was unthinkable. 

1 Board to Committee of Council, Apr. 29, 1743, P. R. O. 

The whole question of permitting larger emissions of bills of credit 
was brought up in the privy council, Jan. 19, 1743, referred by them to 
the committee of council, and referred by the committee to the board 
of trade for report. The latter consulted the data sent in Shirley s 
letters upon the Massachusetts currency (cf. .Shirley to Board and 
enclosure, .Mar. 19, 1743, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 101-107) and submitted 
this with their recommendation approving Shirley s request to the com 
mittee of council. The latter reported to the council, whereupon the 
lords justices in council approved the recommendation and on June 2d, 
directed the board of trade to prepare instructions for Shirley ac 
cordingly. The board reported them on the fourteenth and in due 
season the instructions were approved. This had occupied five months 
and eleven days. Order in Council, June 2. 1743, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 92; 
Board to Lords Justices, June 14, 1743, C. O. 5 918, 96; Order in Coun 
cil, June 30, 1743, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 4; Board to Committee of Council, 
Apr. 29, 1743, C. 0. 5 9i8, 85. 



THE SALARY QUESTION I2 g 

However, it should be said, in justice to- the board of 
trade, that its insistence upon retaining actual control of 
governmental action in the home offices was largely confined 
to commercial questions, which were supposed to be its 
especial province, and that long experience had shown that 
there was small chance of securing the ends sought by the 
crown through a colonial governor under pressure from ai 
colonial legislature if he were free from restraint from 
home. The board of trade also* possessed the common 
British capacity of learning only by unpleasant experience. 

The contrast between the preliminary and the event was 
vivid. Shirley announced his freedom to accept a special 
emission of bills of credit, September 9, 1743. Then fol 
lowed a series of short messages from the governor urging 
action for the defense of one or two or three exposed 
places, usually getting a grant, not always as much as asked. 
Then came a report through the governor that war was 
likely with France, and a reminder that the king had lately 
presented the province with twenty guns, two mortars and 
thirty-six smaller cannon. The house promptly responded 
to his suggestion of a grant for defense, and also to the 
hint that further defense was necessary for a number of 
towns on the coast and inland. In a word, it was two 
months and three days from the time that the matter was 
laid before the house to the enacting into law of a compre 
hensive fortifications scheme, providing for the defense 
of the most exposed portions of the province on both sea 
and land frontiers. 1 

In carrying out this program for defense Shirley se 
cured the services of Mr. Bastide, an engineer then em 
ployed by the British government in America, especially to 

1 For the material upon which this paragraph is based, cf. Jour., 
Sept. 9, 1743, p. 76 to Nov. 11, 1743, p. 136, passim; Ct. Recs., vol. 
xvii (4), pp. 218-228; A. and R., vol. xiii, pp. 309-316. 



1 3 o 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



plan and supervise the construction of works and batteries 
at Castle William, Marblehead, Cape Ann, and Falmouth 
in Casco Bay. 1 

The governor, also, after being warned by the lords 
justices of trouble brewing, raised ten companies of snow- 
shoe men of fifty men each upon the frontiers, four of them 
in York county, to be ready for instant pursuit of any 
hostile Indians who might make an incursion in the winter 
season. He likewise supervised the erection O f the line 
of block-houses and garrisons voted by the general court 
to encircle the exposed settlements. Many of these he 
was informed would be completed by July next. 2 Finally 
a small appropriation for the defense of North Yarmouth 
was passed March 13, I744- 5 

Two days later the French king declared war. The 
French declaration was followed on March 29, 1744, by 
the reciprocal English declaration.* This was followed in 
turn by a general injunction from Newcastle to take all 
opportunities to distress the enemy through privateers and 
" in their settlements, trade and commerce." 5 

l Jour., Mar. 2, 1744, p. 182. 

3 Shirley to Newcastle, Mar. 19, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 115-116; 
Pepperrell, etc. to Shirley, Dec. 9, 1743, Ar., vol. liii, fol. 165, printed in 
Me. H. S. Colls., sec. ser., vol. xi, pp. 291-292. 

3 Jour., Mar. 13, 1744, p. 195; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), p ; 326; A. and R., 
vol. xiii, p. 345. 

*The French king s declaration of war, Mar. 15, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i> 
pp. 112-114; Jour., May 31, 1744, p. 7; Declaration of war against the 
French king, Mar. 29, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 117-121. 

6 Newcastle to Shirley, Mar. 31, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 122. 

The two declarations became known to Shirley unofficially at the 
same time by way of a trading vessel from Glasgow, on May 5th, 
thirty-seven days after the English declaration and fifty days after that 
of France. (Shirley to Newcastle, May 31, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 28.) 
The official English notification to him, however, did not reach him 
until June 2d (iShirley to Board, June 16, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 27). 



THE SALARY QUESTION I 3 ! 

Fortunately Shirley, although the war crisis was already 
imminent, had been allowed nearly three years of grace 
since his accession in which to perform the miracle of bring 
ing the provincial legislature and the home government to 
the same ground, by harmonizing contentions which had 
resulted in the violation of the public faith and an empty 
treasury. In the same period he had succeeded in creating 
out of the ruins of the partial fortifications of the frontiers 
a comprehensive system of defense in tolerable condition 
when the war storm broke. 

This delay was not wholly due to the slowness of the home government 
as the commander of the vessel bringing the news took time to capture 
two prizes on the way over. (Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 131-132. 



CHAPTER VII 
ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 

THE placing of adequate strongholds adequately garri 
soned about the environs of Massachusetts, however, was 
only the outer garment of Shirley s policy. He exemplified 
the belief that the proper function of a colonial governor 
was to be not an overseer of a plantation but a constructive 
statesman. He accepted the political and economic subor 
dination of Massachusetts to the home government but he 
also recognized obligations of the home government toi 
Massachusetts, and the rights and liberties of the province 
under her charter. He had the reverence of the lawyer 
for orderly action, and for the status quo so far and so 
long as protected by law. Yet although he was faithful 
to the letter of the law so long as its mandate did not en 
danger the state or involve the destruction of fundamental 
human rights, he drew his inspiration from the spirit of 
justice and equity. He recognized the power of public 
opinion and took note when laws were unenforceable. He 
also had both the vision and the courage to act without 
authority when the crisis demanded it. 

He had an almost Prussian aptitude and liking for ef 
ficiency. However, it was an Anglo-Saxon efficiency, aim 
ing at the realization of the law-protected freedom of Anglo- 
Saxon civilization, which he loved. He represented the 
best and most enlightened British thought of his times in 
Jiis attitude toward the colonies. 

His attitude is expressed in a paradox which in later 
132 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 



133 



times has often seemed a contradiction, that the colonies were 
both subordinate to and integral parts of the empire. Their 
subordination was in theory the position of dependence 
which every political unit not autonomous sustains toward 
the sovereign state to which it is attached. Practically, 
this status was made less palatable to the colonies through 
the fact that, constitutionally, supreme authority rested 
with the Britons at home, whose interests were frequently 
in opposition to those of the colonists, particularly in regard 
to many economic questions. The colonists were legally 
bound by laws enacted by Parliament, a body in which they 
were not represented. For the legal protection of their 
interests and for influence upon action in England they were 
dependent on (i) the right of petition to king and Parlia 
ment, which they shared with Britons at home; (2) the 
right of judicial appeal to the king in council in cases of 
importance; (3) the activities of agents who represented 
colonial governments before all officials in England con 
cerned in colonial administration; and (4) rights of local 
self-government granted in charters from the crown or al 
lowed by the instructions to royal governors where charters 
did not exist. 

The importance of this last factor was subject to great 
qualification. Instructions to governors might always be 
changed; and in the case cf the chartered province of 
Massachusetts Bay, it was assumed at home that the king s 
ministers might so instruct the governor as to prevent the 
passage of acts clearly within the competence of the provin 
cial legislature under the terms of the provincial charter. 
This was in effect an indirect method of amending the charter. 
King and Parliament also claimed, but did not fully exercise, 
as large powers over the colonies as over the realm. 

The subordination of the colonies therefore was real. 
Its chief significance lay in the fact that the home govern- 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

ment while allowing large liberties to the colonists, now 
and then intervened to place under regulation some vital 
matter in a fashion more for the advantage of the realm 
than for that of the colonies. It does not follow from 
this factor of selfishness that the colonies received no ad 
vantage from the British connection. On the contrary, 
English interference in colonial affairs was not infrequently 
for the benefit o>f both the realm, and the colonies, and the 
security of the colonies in time of war was immeasurably 
greater because of the British fleet and army. 

For purposes of defense and foreign relations generally 
the colonies were theoretically integral parts of the empire. 
Also such acts o>f Parliament as were declared by that body 
to apply to the plantations were generally admitted by the 
colonists to be binding upon them, in spite of frequent 
evasions of acts restricting their economic freedom,. 

Shirley clearly saw the interdependence of realm and 
colonies, and believed that the colonies should be adminis 
tered for the advantage of both. He saw that in some in 
stances British measures benefited neither, and in others 
were unwisely harsh. His policy was calculated to avoid 
these defects. It was in substance, that of an imperial 
statesman in a colonial environment, convinced that the em 
pire was built upon foundations essentially just and should 
endure to the mutual benefit of mother country and colonies. 
Perhaps his primary proposition would have been that a 1 
colony must enjoy reasonable content and prosperity in 
order to be truly beneficial to both the mother country and 
itself. 

Shirley was shrewd in his political measures, and enemies 
accused him of being unscrupulous. No convincing evi 
dence appears that he was not sincere and actuated by a 
sense of duty in public and private dealings. Shirley, ob 
viously, must work with the men and the conditions with 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 



135 



which he came in contact. He always addressed the Duke 
of Newcastle with profound respect which often seemed to 
verge upon undue humility. Nevertheless, he urged his 
proposals and defended his measures to his patron with 
frankness and force. He also wrote with the air o<f one 
sure of a sympathetic hearing. His letters were calculated 
to appeal both to Newcastle s liking and to his judgment. 
Nor did he neglect so necessary a step as to establish 
pleasant relations with the private secretary of the great 
man, which he promoted by sending to this powerful sub 
ordinate a pipe of Madeira wine. 1 Similarly, a hint from 
the duke to Mrs. Shirley to cultivate good relations with 
Lord Wilmington, lord president of the privy council, led 
Shirley to pay successful court to that exalted personage. 2 
Wilmington soon died and was succeeded by Lord Harring 
ton, with whom Shirley also maintained pleasant relations. 

Shirley corresponded regularly and fully with Newcastle 
and the board of trade. He also wrote frequently to the 
admiralty upon matters relating to their department, es 
pecially in time of war, and less frequently to the other 
offices in London, when matters coming under their juris 
diction were to be dealt with. His correspondence was 
enormous and his letters were usually full and clear. 

At first Shirley did not enter largely into details in his 
letters to the board of trade, perhaps partly because of the 
pressure of business, and partly because of a desire tot 
avoid wearying the board.* The board, however, was 

1 Shirley to Andrew Stone, Dec. 8, 1741, C. O. 5 899. 

3 Lord Wilmington commanded Mr. Thomlinson to inform Shirley 
that he would be his friend, and showed a readier approval of the early 
measures of his administration than did the cautious board of trade. 
Shirley to Wilmington, Apr. 30, 1742, His. Mss. Com., nth Rep., app. 
4, pp. 292-294; Shirley to Newcastle, May 4, 1742, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 86. 

8 He explained in January, 1743, that the details of certain mistakes 
in acts for issuing bills of credit " would be too long " to include in 
his letter. Shirley to Board, Jan. 24, 1743, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 95-96. 



136 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

more interested than he thought in questions of administra 
tion, and particularly in the problem of paper money. They 
were wholly enlisted in an effort to remove the evils growing 
out of unrestrained emissions of paper and were rather 
repelled by the promptness with which Shirley had approved 
an emission of 30,000 in such bills upon receiving per 
mission to do so, followed shortly by a request to exceed 
the amount allowed by his instructions. They, therefore, 
mingled approval with admonition, 1 and in the following 
July requested " a clear and explicit state of the paper cur 
rency as it now stands, that we may be able to judge, when 
there will be an end of this intricate affair." 2 

In the preceding month, however, Shirley wrote to the 
board giving detailed information on the subject, which 
was followed by another lengthy installment upon paper 
money in December of the same year. 3 Thus, since his policy 
in this instance was approved, the groundwork was laid for 
unqualified endorsement of his financial policy by the 
board, and this was accompanied by approval of the other 
measures which he had taken. 4 

A necessary basis for such approval by the ministry as 
well as by the board of trade was laid by substantial loyalty 
to his instructions not only in this capital point, but also 
in other matters. The board once noted that he had passed 
an act for the taking off of entails without a suspending 
clause and without a certificate that it had passed through 
specified stages required in the case of private acts by his 
seventeenth instruction. 5 Following this mild reminder 

1 Board to .Shirley, Aug. 18, 1742, C. O. 5 918, 76. 
Board to Shirley, July 6, 1743, C. O. 5 918, 103. 

3 Shirley to Board, June 29, 1743, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 9; Dec. 23, 1743,. 
C. O. 5 884, Ff, 19. 

4 Board to Shirley, Aug. 9, 1744, C. O. 5 918, 129. 

6 Board to Shirley, July 6, 1743, C. 0. 5 918, 103; I7th instruction, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 49-50. 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 

Shirley passed no more private acts during his administra 
tion, with the exception of three enacted after his return 
from England, each granting a divorce. 1 He demonstrated 
his regard for the rights of the crown, howbeit upon 
second thought, by stating his doubt " whether a subordin 
ate government has power to make an act of so extraordin 
ary a nature " as a private act for the sale of some wild 
lands of little value belonging to two minors, which he had 
signed without reflection upon being pressed to do so while 
in the chair. 2 He won from, the board positive approval 
for his refusal to assent to a bill for repealing a law grant 
ing a bounty for killing crows, without a suspending clause 
in accordance with his instructions. s He refused in 1748 
to assent to an excise act, signing which he deemed would 
violate his sixteenth instruction, inasmuch as the act was 
of an unusual and extraordinary nature and " the trade of 
Great Britain would be considerably affected thereby." 
Finally, after allowing through inadvertence, as he ex 
plained, some acts at the beginning of his administration to 
pass with the enacting clause so worded as seemingly to 
imply that acts were valid merely upon passage by the 
general court and without approval by the crown, he usually 
insisted in accordance with his seventh instruction upon the 
wording: "Be it enacted by the Governor, Council and 
House of Representatives." 5 

1 A. and R., vol. vi, pp. 161-170, passim. 

Shirley to Board, Jan. 30, 1743, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 101. 

Board to iShirley, Aug. 9, 1744, C. O. 5 918, 129; nth instruction, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 47. Shirley also declined to approve another law 
in 1748 on similar grounds. Jour., June 23, 1748, p. 60. 

4 Ibid., i6th instruction, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 49. 

5 Even after this time, however, occasional acts slipped through not in 
conformity with the prescribed language. Cf. A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 
18, 24, 38, vol. v, pp. 139-140; Shirley to Board, Aug. 30, 1742, C. O. 
5 883, Ee, 67; seventh instruction, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 45. Cf. also, for 
the later history of the question, A. and R., vol. v, p. 506. 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

The preceding incidents related to instructions for which 
the governor was not responsible, but in one instance he 
suggested, although he did not request, the addition of an 
instruction not included among those prepared for him in 
1741. The question at issue was primarily that of increas- 
ii2P^.lhennmher of townships in the province. Shirley might 
have approached this question from the angle of the effect 
which the erection of townships had and might have in Maine 
in encouraging the appropriation of reserved mast trees by 
private persons ; but he allowed this consideration to remain 
in the background, merely referring, among other matters, 
to the fact that sixteen new towns were erected during 
Belcher s administration. Shirley did not at first oppose 
the formation of new townships, but consented to acts for 
the organization o>f Western 1 and Pelham 2 in that form. 
He may have received a hint for a different policy from a 
petition presented from parts of Attleboro and Rehoboth, 
praying that they be set off as a separate precinct instead 
of being erected into a new township as provided in a bill 
which had passed both houses. 3 

It is not unlikely that Shirley was stimulated to take 
measures to check the formation of new towns when on 
June 4, 1742, the house voted a joint committee of the 
two houses to investigate the progress of the grantees of 
townships granted since 1725, and to consider a proper en 
couragement for settling them speedily. If the plan in 
dicated were carried to completion there would soon be a 
grist of new towns to go through the legislative mill. The 
purpose of the house appeared in clearer outline and scope 
in a vote of June 21, 1743, for a joint committee to sell 
after February i, 1744, all lands in the townships granted 

l Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), p. 236; A. and R., vol. ii, pp. 1088-1089. 
*Jour., Jan. 15, 1743, p. 153; A. and R., vol. Hi, p. 49- 
8 70 wr., Nov. 26, 1742, p. 92. 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 



139 



in Hampshire county, between -Hampshire county and the 
Merrimac river, and in Maine, respectively, in case the 
proprietors of the same were delinquent at that time in 
the performance of the conditions of their grants. The 
council succeeded in securing the adoption of a substitute 
motion that there should be a committee on grants of town 
ships in general " to project some suitable method for the 
more effectual settlement of. the said grants." 

The question came squarely before the governor in 1742, 
when the legislature passed bills for dividing three old 
townships, thereby creating three new ones. These bills 
Shirley refused to sign and wrote to Newcastle giving the 
reasons for his refusal fully. Shirley looked at the ques 
tion as one of policy, affecting the constitution of the 
government of Massachusetts. He did not question the 
power of the province under the charter to erect new towns, 
but he believed that the right was being used to change the 
balance of power among the different branches of the pro 
vincial government in a sense not intended by the makers 
of the charter, and that every beneficial end attainable by 
the creation of new towns could be secured equally well by 
other means. 

The chief points in his argument were as follows : under 
the charter of 1692 the members of the council were chosen 
by the general court. In the court s membership the rep 
resentatives vastly outweighed the council, and therefore 
might almost be said to be the constituents of the council. 
This dependence of the council upon the house suggested " a 
check upon if not a wrong bias in " the council in disputes 
between the house and the governor. The large increase 
in the number of representatives since 1692 had for several 
years past constituted an embarrassment to the government. 
Although normally many towns did not take advantage of 

l lour., June 21-22, 1743, pp. 64, 65, 67. 



140 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

their representation or were not fully represented, they 
were always prepared to double their numbers in the event 
of a dispute with the governor. He proposed to put an end 
to this method of increasing the number of representatives 
by erecting from new plantations, not towns, but precincts, 
parishes or villages, with all the privileges of towns except 
that of sending representatives to the general court. 

Shirley s arraignment of the system in vogue is forceful, 
and, from the point of view of a prerogative man, convinc 
ing. Moreover, it may be doubted whether the province- 
needed more representatives than might be sent by the 160 
towns then existing, nearly all entitled to two representa 
tives each and Boston to four. On the other hand, if the 
popular feature of the government was to be maintained 
upon an equitable basis, the new settlements should have 
had a share in it proportioned to> their numbers. Possibly 
such a result might have been approached by periodic redis 
tribution of representation with a proviso that the total 
number of representatives should not be increased. To 
such a measure Shirley might not have been opposed. His 
actual scheme would not have deprived the people in new 
settlements of the local self-government which had been 
carried out through the towns, but would have prevented 
the development of popular strength in the legislature. 1 

On the whole it was clearly the belief of Shirley that the 
Massachusetts politicians had set to work, under the guise 
of providing necessary local government for new communi 
ties, to undermine gradually, almost imperceptibly, the 
king s authority as embodied in the governor. They would 
ultimately leave the executive isolated even from his official 
advisers, who would be a royal council in name but popular 

1 This question arose at a time when representation in the English 
Parliament was far from equitable, and when no scheme for readjust 
ment of it was in sight. 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 



141 



representatives in fact. Undiluted popular control Shirley 
could not consider possible in a government in which the 
imperial element was to have effective expression. 

The board of trade fully agreed with Shirley s judgment 
as to the matter and proposed an instruction to the governor 
forbidding him for the future to consent to the erection of 
new towns. This was approved by the lords justices in 
council and Shirley was instructed accordingly. 1 

The house raised the new-township issue again in the 
spring of 1744, by voting that the people of Lincoln, on St. 
George s river in Maine, be allowed to bring in a bill for 
their erection as a township. The council non-concurred 
and voted that the petitioners be allowed all town privileges 
save that of sending a representative. This the house re 
jected, but it could not secure the adoption of its own vote. 2 
The position taken by the governor and council at this time 
was accepted in January, 1746, in the instance of Natick, 
which was made a precinct or parish with the local govern 
ment of a town. 3 

Shirley, however, departed from his earlier policy in this 
regard after his return from England in 1753. He then 
signed acts for erecting three new towns in April, 1754, in 
violation of the instruction of 1743, and was reminded of 
the latter by the board of trade. Whether this change in 

J The instruction is in Board to Lords Justices, July 27, 1743, C, 0. 
5 918, 108, printed in A. and R., vol. iii, p. 72. For this affair cf. Shirley 
to Newcastle, with enclosed State of the Province of the Massachusetts 
Bay, as to its Number of Representatives, Oct. 18, 1742, C. 0. 5 900, 69; 
Board to Committee of Council, June 8, 1743, C. 0. 5 918, 92; Order in 
Council, June 30, 1743, C. O. 5 884, Ff, I ; Board to Shirley, July 6, 1743, 
C. O. 5 918, 103; Board to Lords Justices, July 27, 1743, C. 0. 5 918, 108; 
A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 69-72. 

* Jour., Mar. 6, 1744, p. 187. 

*Jour., Jan. 4 1746, p. 144; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (5-1), p. 222; A. and R., 
vol. xiii, pp. 520-521. 



I4 2 WILLIAM SHIRLEY-A HISTORY 

attitude on his part was in any degree due to a belief that 
the representative system was inequitable when growing set 
tlements were excluded from it, does not appear. 1 

Upon receiving the instruction upon this point Shirley 
wrote to the board suggesting that it be extended to cover 
the dividing of counties for a like purpose which he found 
attended by inconveniences in many respects. To 1 this the 
board responded by advising that he approve no more acts 
for dividing counties, adding that if he regarded an ad 
ditional instruction forbidding it as absolutely necessary 
they would recommend one for the purpose to the king. 2 
However, such an instruction does not seem to have been 
needed. When a bill for dividing Suffolk county, a measure 
extensively agitated during Belcher s administration, came 
before Shirley in the spring of 1744, he stated that he could 
not sign it as it would repeal a part of a law for settling the 
bounds of the counties. He offered, however, to sign an 
act for removing the inconveniences aimed at in any other 
way. 3 

Shirley also remained loyal to those royal interests which 
had absorbed his attention while advocate-general of the 
admiralty. Almost at once after his appointment he named 
William Bollan, a very able Englishman, and later Shirley s 
son-in-law, as advocate-general, and this appointment was 
made permanent by the admiralty. 4 

Bollan seems to have promptly made an effort to break 
up illegal trade but found the attempt attended by such " dis- 

*For this later episode, cf. A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 728-729, 730-731, 745, 

s Board to Shirley, Aug. 9, 1744, C. O. 5 918, 129. 

9 Jour., June 18, 1735, p. 40; Dec. 23, 1735, p. 168; Jan. 9, 1736, p. 207; 
June 9, 1736, p. 36; June 14, 1738, p. 35; Mar. 22, 1744, p. 208; Ct. Recs., 
vol. xvi, pp. 166-167, 256. 

4 Shirley to Admiralty, Feb. i, 1742, Oct. i, 1743, Ad. I, 3817. 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 143 

coveries " and difficulties that Shirley ordered him to re 
port upon the situation to the board of trade. From the 
statements of both Shirley and Bollan, voluntary and elicited 
by queries from the board of trade, as to illegal trade in the 
province it appears that there was a very extensive com 
merce between Massachusetts and all parts of Europe. 
Stress was put by Shirley upon the Holland trade, which 
brought in large quantities of goods from Spain. In many 
cases the goods brought were prohibited from being im 
ported not only into the colonies but even into England, and 
Spanish goods especially were taboo during the war. In ex 
change for these goods, Shirley declared in 1743, vessels 
were fitted out in Massachusetts, loaded with provisions, 
manned by naturalized French refugees or persons who 
could pass as such, and with French passes were taken to 
the ports of Spain. Dutch merchants were underbidding the 
English for the New England broadcloth market, selling their 
goods through New England agents. Many Massachusetts 
merchants and some of the richest in the country were en 
gaged in this business, and they were bold enough to justify 
the trade publicly, thereby creating a public sentiment such 
that any illegal trade was now approved. He sounded a warn 
ing that the British trade to the colonies and their dependence 
upon Great Britain would be lost if care was not soon taken. 
The danger was emphasized by the statement that in the 
preceding year the illicit-trading ships from Holland at 
Boston were more numerous than the ships from London. 
He added that these illicit traders might soon become so 
powerful that orders and laws from England would come 
too late. 

Shirley explained that breaches of the statute of 15 
Charles II, chapter 7, were not cognizable in the admiralty 
court, and that in the common-law courts delays, with trials 
in distant counties and before hostile juries, were some of 



144 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



the difficulties encountered. Moreover, trial by jury in 
such cases was trying one illicit trader by his fellows or well- 
wishers. Excellent facilities for smuggling existed in 
numerous remote harbors where goods could be landed with 
out observation, and masters of vessels were adepts in 
perjury and in making witnesses invisible. 

The governor suggested as a remedy, that the court of 
admiralty be given jurisdiction of cases under the statute 
referred to above, or better, that any colonial court of 
admiralty have jurisdiction over any breach of any act of 
trade. He further suggested actions of detinue against 
chief offenders to recover the cost of the goods involved, 
with appeals to the king in council, by which means the 
cases could be won. 1 

In this connection it is just to observe that extensive 
illegal trading at Boston was not a new condition, although 
the war with Spain stimulated a contraband trade with 
her that was not necessary un time of peace. WMle 
Shirley, as advocate-general, was showing zeal on behalf 
of the king s woods, he gave a position o>f secondary im 
portance to the prosecution of illegal traders. No evidence 
has been found of collusion with them or of neglect of duty 
in that regard, but he, at that time, conducted no campaign 
against them with the purpose of stirring up the home 
government as he did in the case of the woods. The ex 
igencies of a time of war may have led him to stress the 
issue when he did. Considering Shirley s attitude through 
out his career, it is doubtful if he regarded the British 
commercial restrictions as they applied to New England 
as wholly just. On the other hand he clearly believed that 

1 For the situation affecting illegal trade in Massachusetts cf. Shirley 
to Board, Feb. 26, 1743, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 86; Bollan to Board, Feb. 28, 
1743, both printed in Pub. Col. Soc. Mass., vol. vi, pp. 297-304; Board 
to Newcastle, May 11, 1743, C. 0. 5 883, E e, 88; Shirley to Admiralty, 
Oct. 3, 1743, Ad. I, 3817- 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 



145 



acts passed by Parliament regulating New England trade 
should be obeyed and that the New England governments 
should loyally subordinate the commercial interests of their 
people to the interests of the empire, especially in time of 
war. His position at this time seems to have been sub 
stantially that without intervention by the home government 
the efficient enforcement of the acts of trade was impossible. 1 
In the autumn o>f 1742 Shirley was asked by the admiralty 
for advice in regard to an application by Judge Auchmuty 
of the admiralty court that his son be appointed as register 
of the courts over which he presided in Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire and Rhode Island. Shirley replied that the office 
of judge of admiralty was important and the fees attached 
were an inadequate compensation; that Auchmuty had 
served as judge with good abilities, a due regard for the in 
terests of the crown, the droits of the admiralty, and the 
ease of the subject; and he therefore considered his request 
was not unreasonable if the admiralty wished to remove 
the incumbent of the office. The latter, he added, was 
also register of the probate court for Suffolk county ancf 
had no active function save signing his name in either office, 
relying upon an able deputy. 2 Less than a month later 
Shirley wrote the admiralty again upon the subject to say 
that certain cases had come to his notice since his last writ 
ing which made him believe that the register should be a 
person " supposed to be a check upon the judge in some 
cases; particularly when money belonging to the suitors is 
ordered by the judge to be brought into court," in which 
case it was lodged in the register s hands. 3 He thought 

1 For later instances of Shirley s policy in matters of trade, cf. infra, 
pp. 146-148, 161-162, 164, 173-177, 189, 392-393- 

2 The incumbent was Andrew Belcher, son of ex-governor Belcher. 
Cf. Shirley to Admiralty, Sept. 24, 1742, Ad. I, 3817. 

8 Shirley never directly impeached Judge Auchmuty s honesty, al 
though he more than once referred to his embarrassed financial con- 



146 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

that if the judge and register were father and son and the 
son young, it " might have a tendency to give the father 
such an unlimited power over (money deposited in court as 
would be attended with inconveniences; which might also 
happen in other respects, that I don t mention, and for 
that reason I have altered my sentiments concerning the 
fitness of Mr. Auchmuty s son s being appointed register 
whilst the father is judge." This was followed by an in 
dorsement of Belcher s honesty, and a recital of his pledge 
that he would in future perform the duties of the office so 
far as possible in person. 1 

Meanwhile his first recommendation had been carried 
out, and merchants of Boston were petitioning that Auch- 
muty be removed and Belcher restored. Under the condi 
tions a letter from the governor in May, 1743, seemed to 
indicate that, contrary to his usual custom, he had upon this 
matter become a veritable weathercock, for he now wrote 
saying he had discouraged the merchants petition by tell 
ing them he had written to the admiralty on this point 
and upon the fitness of Mr. Belcher. He also observed 
that the petition came from enemies of Auchmuty, some 
of whom had been condemned by him for illicit trade, and 
that the petitioners should have waited for an instance of 

dition. When engaged by request of Newcastle in collecting from 
Auchmuty a debt due Sir Thomas Prendergast Shirley aided the judge 
to secure the post of agent for Massachusetts to prosecute their appeal 
in the matter of the Rhode Island boundary. Shirley explained at the 
time that aside from the aid it afforded in securing Sir Thomas debt, 
he would not have approved the choice of Auchmuty for that post, 
since the latter had at one time been at the head of the land bank and 
had thereby made himself obnoxious to the merchants of the province. 
(.Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 18, 1742, C. 0. 5 900, 51.) It is possible 
that Shirley lent himself to the advancement of Auchmuty s son to the 
post of register as a further step toward securing the debt which the 
father owed. 

Shirley to Admiralty, Oct. 19, 1742, Ad. I, 3817- 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 



147 



misconduct. 1 He added that although he had opposed 
father and son serving together, hoping his letter would be 
received before Belcher was removed, he did not wish to 
urge a change in their action if his former letter did not 
produce it. 2 

Ultimately in accordance with Shirley s second recom 
mendation and the petition of the merchants, Auchmuty was 
removed and Belcher restored. Finally, in the following 
October Shirley offered further explanation of his sudden 
coolness toward Mr. Belcher s restoration and his readiness 
to tolerate nepotism in the admiralty court. This, it seemed, 
was the occurrence of a new onslaught upon the court s 
rights and influence in enforcing the acts of trade which he 
felt would endanger its usefulness for the future in protect 
ing the crown s rights. Therefore, as the petition for Auch 
muty s removal represented the interests of those merchants 
who were trying to destroy the admiralty court, he felt that 
the defeat of their petition would conserve the prestige of 
both the court and the governor. 3 To prevent the success 

1 The petition referred to was signed by forty-one merchants and 
included such names as Thomas Hutchinson, Edmund Quincy, Thomas 
Hubbard, James Bowdoin, John Hill, Jacob Wendell, Benjamin Faneuil, 
Andrew Oliver and Jacob Royall. Shirley to Admiralty, May 5, I743 
Ad. I, 3817. 

Shirley to Admiralty, Oct. 3, 1743, Ad. I, 3817. 

He explained that an original device for defeating the court in its 
efforts to enforce the acts of trade, had been successfully employed by 
the principal merchant of Boston, who had since died. This leading 
trader induced seven or eight witnesses who had been compelled by 
process of the admiralty court to appear, to refuse to testify, and when 
they were committed to the Boston jail in custody "of the marshal of 
the court for contempt until they would testify, the defendant paid their 
bills in jail and secured writs of habeas corpus from the superior court 
on their behalf. The hearings upon these resulted in a ruling by that 
court that the admiralty court could not commit anyone to the town 
jail in the custody of its marshal, since he was not the customary 
keeper of that jail. This, Shirley observed, was excluding the court of 
admiralty from the use of the king s jails and rendering it impotent in. 



1 48 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

of this effort he suggested the passage of an act of Parlia 
ment giving the unquestioned right to the court of admiralty 
to> commit prisoners to the jails in the custody of the mar 
shal, despite a contrary ruling of the superior court. This 
new phase of the ingenious campaign against the admiralty 
jurisdiction in America, he explained, induced him to think 
it better that Auchmuty continue as register than that the 
party of enemies of the court should carry their point. The 
malcontents, however, whether through their own influence 
or by virtue of the previous recommendation of Shirley, 
received what they asked. 1 

It was natural, in view of Shirley s former interest in 
and activity concerning the eastern country, that the board 
of trade should have appealed to him in the summer of 
1743 for suggestions regarding ways and means for develop 
ing that district. The board upon consulting the charter 
of Massachusetts discovered that lands there could not be 
granted by either the province or the crown without the 
common consent of the two. This the board astutely con 
cluded had prevented settlement until that time and might 
continue to do* so indefinitely unless some expedient were 
found to reconcile these difficulties. They then expressed a 
wish, probably more or less formal, " that the people of 
Massachusetts might be induced to come into such measures 
as might render this tract of land of some utility to the 
public, and so much the rather, because the settling of it 
might not only be of great advantage to their mother 
country, but also a security to themselves, by becoming a 
barrier between them and their French and Indian enemies 

even the most criminal cases unless the marshal should use his own 
house for a jail. This ruling had been most vigorously opposed by 
Bollan as advocate until the death of the principal party put an end to 
the suit. Shirley to Admiralty, Oct. 3, 1743, Ad. I, 3817. 
1 Shirley to Admiralty, Oct. 3, 1743, Ad. I, 3817. 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 149 

in time of war." This introduced the recommendation that 
the governor consult the chief and the most sensible people 
of the province and report his own views and theirs as to 
the feasibility of securing action by Massachusetts which 
would allow settlement of the district. 1 

In November Shirley sent his assurances that he would 
obey their commands in this regard 2 and in the following 
March made report of the results reached by consultation 
with some of the most sensible and influential members of 
the assembly. His conclusion was, in brief, that there would 
probably be little difficulty in inducing the assembly to give 
up the claim of the province to the soil and government of 
the country between Sagadahoc and Nova Scotia, if the 
crown would confirm to the grantees property rights in 
grants made by the general court of Massachusetts before 
the New Hampshire boundary was settled, within towns 
awarded by that settlement to the latter province, and would 
further unite to Massachusetts the detached portions of 
certain towns which were severed by the boundary line as 
fixed by the award. 3 A petition for the latter purpose was 
then pending before the privy council from- the owners of 
the lands. 4 Shirley added a glowing tribute to the value of 
the eastern lands as one of the most valuable tracts between 
Nova Scotia and Florida, and the judgment that there was 
not the least prospect of settlement taking place beyond St. 
George s river so long as the district to the east remained 
part of Massachusetts. 5 

1 Board to Shirley, June 22, 1743, C. 0. 5 918, 101. 

Shirley to Board, Nov. 7, 1743, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. in. 

The towns referred to were Salisbury, Amesbury, Haverhill, 
Dunstable, Nottingham, Groton and Townshend. 

4 This was the petition which Thomas Hutchinson had gone to 
England to promote and which was finally acted upon adversely in 
1746. A. P. C., vol. iii, p. 601. 

Reasons for this difficulty in securing settlements in the eastern 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

He concluded that it would be better for that country 
to be separated from Massachusetts and settled by the 
crown under its more immediate control. If not so settled 
he warned that there was danger of encroachment by the 
French upon it, they having become very numerous in those 
parts, and being both very industrious and possessed of 
absolute influence over the Indians through missionaries, 
intermarriages and presents. 1 

This letter of advice elicited a statement from the board 
that the matter was very important, and that the proper 
persons must be consulted, and due consideration given. 
Apparently, however, the matter was too important ever to 
receive from the " proper persons " and from the board 
sufficient consideration to< lead to action. 2 

Last but not least, Shirley accomplished considerable as 
governor, following what he had done as advocate-general, 
for the preservation of m ast trees reserved for the crown. 
He early expressed his already well-known opinion to the 
admiralty that the preservation of the king s woods in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire was of the utmost con 
sequence to the royal navy, and pledged his special care for 
the protection of those in Massachusetts, announcing that 
he was preparing a scheme for the better attainment of the 
end in view. 3 

country were, he said, the opposition of the owners of wilderness 
lands in western Massachusetts, who feared depreciation in the value 
of their property if in competition with eastern lands, and the heavy 
expense of defending the eastern country in time of war. The result 
had been the practical yielding of the country up to the Indians in 
Belcher s time. Cf. supra, p. 77. 

1 Shirley also thought arrangements could be readily made for 
settling Protestant families in the district provided the lands selected 
for settlement were free from previous grants by the council of Plym 
outh and by the Indians. For Shirley s views upon this matter, 
cf. -Shirley to Board, Mar. 12, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 23. 

2 Board to Shirley, Aug. 9, 1744, C. O. 5 918, 129. 

3 Shirley to Admiralty, Feb. i, 1742, Ad. I, 3817. 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 

For about two years, however, Shirley did nothing notable 
affecting the woods. Meanwhile Dunbar, still ardent as 
surveyor-general, urged before the home government a com 
plaint that the workmen employed in cutting masts for the 
navy in New England were being interrupted in their work 
as a result of the spirit raised among the people because of 
the non-enforcement of the orders in council regarding the 
case of Frost v. Leighton. 1 He recalled to the board of 
trade that before Shirley s appointment as governor 
it had been stressed by both Shirley and himself that a 
proper governor might do much for the preservation of the 
woods, and observed that Mr. Shirley " now has the power, 
and I dare say does not want the inclination." Dunbar 
suggested writing to Shirley upon the subject, including the 
matter of Leighton s appeal in the case which Shirley had 
carried before the privy council. He further suggested 
asking Judge Auchmuty s opinion whether the order in 
council on Leighton s appeal 2 could then be enforced and 
by what steps in England. 3 The surveyor-general also peti 
tioned the king in regard to the Leighton affair and this 
came to Shirley s notice through a letter from the secretary 
of the privy council to him in the late summier of 1743, 
notifying him of the king s pleasure that he should " forth 
with cause those orders to be complied with, and transmit 
an account of my proceedings therein to His Majesty 
in Council." 

This direction resulted in an order from the governor 
to the judges of the provincial courts which had issued the 
decrees in Frost v. Leighton directing themi to reverse 
their decisions and to secure the reimbursement of the sums 
of money levied by those decrees upon the defendant. 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 14, 1743, C. O. 5 900, 88; supra, pp. 60-61. 

*Cf. supra, pp. 60-61. 

3 Dunbar to Board, Feb. 8, 1743, C. 0. 5 883, Ee, 75- 



!^2 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Shirley then reported to Newcastle : " Whereupon in 
obedience to His Majesty s commands I have caused those 
orders to be carried into execution, and two 1 sums of money, 
which had been paid by the said Leighton to the prosecutor 
Frost, in pursuance of a judgment obtained against him in 
the provincial court, to be restored to him; and have trans 
mitted an account of my proceedings to His Majesty in 
Council." 1 

The only record of this action which has been found in 
the Suffolk Files and the Massachusetts Archives is a: 
memorandum by the superior court that Shirley s order and 
accompanying documents had been received, and that the 
court had ordered its clerk to prepare a draught of a sum 
mons or other process to notify Frost to show cause why 
the order in council so far as it concerned him should, not be 
complied with, etc. 2 The explicit statement by Shirley, 
however, that the orders in council were carried out and 
that the costs levied upon Leighton were returned is ap 
parently conclusive upon those points. The mere absence 
of specific records of the provincial courts does not neutra 
lize such testimony, particularly as it was a matter con 
cerning which the provincial courts would naturally be better 
satisfied not to be embarrassed by records, 3 

From Shirley s statement it appears that the outcome 
of this case was a complete legal defeat for the friends 
of the wasters of the king s woods not only in England but 

*For facts regarding Dunbar s petition to the king and Shirley s 
consequent action, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 14, 1743, C. 0. 
5900, 88. 

2 Suffolk Files, 57788. 

Moreover, since the record books of the Massachusetts courts 
were kept with notorious lack of care in this period, and their court 
files have until recent years passed through many vicissitudes, a record 
of this sort might easily have been omitted or lost without intent 
on the part of the court or its clerk. 



ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIAL POLICY 



153 



in Massachusetts. So far as claims were presented that 
charter rights were being infringed by the action of Leigh- 
ton, those pretensions were in the conclusion defeated. 1 

At about the same time Shirley was consulted by the 
admiralty in regard to the situation in Massachusetts af 
fecting the king s woods and wrote on the matter at length. 
He found that the charter reservation of mast trees ap 
parently reserved only those trees which were twenty-four 
inches in diameter twelve inches above the ground, in 1690, 
although an act of Parliament had since reserved all trees 
of the stated size growing at any time upon lands that were 
not privately owned in i69O. 2 The act of Parliament, 
however, had failed to protect the workman from a suit for 
trespass in case he cut trees not allowed by the literal 
wording of the charter, even if he had a license from the 
crown. Shirley also stated, but held invalid, the argument 
that the lands of Maine were all in private ownership at 
the time of the grant from the crown to Sir Ferdinando* 
Gorges and ever since his time. 

He suggested an act of Parliament providing that with 
in the province of Massachusetts no one, without royal 
license, should cut or destroy any white pine trees which were 
of the stated size at the time cut unless they grew upon 
ground which was private property in 1690, and making 
it lawful to cut such reserved trees with royal license. He 
would fix a penalty for unlicensed cutting, and also for 
hindering or obstructing any person so licensed from cut- 

l Cf. supra, p. 61, note. 

2 2 George II, c. 35. He observed that a workman cutting trees 
which had not been of the stated size in 1690 but which had since 
exceeded that dimension, if growing upon land at the time belonging 
to a private person or a township, was, according to the literal terms 
of the charter, liable to a suit for trespass, even though he were cutting 
under a royal license. This was the ground taken by the province 
courts in Frost v. Leighton. 



154 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

ting reserved trees, such penalty to be recovered in the 
court of admiralty in Massachusetts. For the further pro 
tection of the agents of the crown he would have any such 
who were sued for cutting reserved trees allowed to plead 
the general issue, offer special matter in evidence, be entitled 
to treble costs if they won, and to an appeal to> the privy 
council if they lost. 

He added that such an act was very necessary unless 
he secured a provincial act to protect the woods, which he 
would try to do. To prevent evading the act of Parliament 
by hewing mast trees into the form of " balks " for export, 
he would have the export of mast trees in any form for 
bidden. This would aid the navy and injure the enemy 
in time of war. 1 

Shortly after sending this letter the governor succeeded 
in getting from, the legislature an act which was much like 
that which he had suggested for Parliament. This he de 
clared the first ever passed by the assembly in favor of the 
crown s interest in the woods. Because it was very un 
popular, he reported, it was limited to a three-year period, 
but he hoped to secure a renewal when it expired. 2 The 
act was renewed in 1747 and continued in force until 1756; a 
shortly before Shirley retired from office it was revived 
again. 4 Shirley s zeal and success in the service of the 
king s woods were well approved by the ministers. His 
meed of praise was that of the good and faithful servant. 5 

Shirley to Admiralty, Oct. i, 1743, Ad. I, 3817- 

M. and /?., vol. iii, pp. 116-117. For his account cf the act, cf. 
Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 14, 1743, C. O. 5 900, 88. 
8 A. and R., vol. iii, p. 326. 
Ibid., p. 984. 
Board to Shirley, Aug. 9, 1744, C. 0. 5 9i3, 129. 



CHAPTER VIII 
REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 

SHIRLEY entered office as a war governor and was under 
the pressure of military necessities, present or anticipated, 
throughout his administration. Consequently the prepara 
tion for and the waging of war often seems to be the 
major theme of his policy as governor. It was often of 
necessity the most prominent one, yet Shirley thought more 
naturally in terms of peace than in those of war. It was 
characteristic of his comprehensive intelligence that he 
planned for peace and war at the same time and by the 
same fundamental measures. He added to these the special 
preparations which are inseparable from successful warfare, 
but aside from 1 these his chief concern was to build strong 
foundations for a flourishing province. He realized that 
well-rounded strength in any society must include economic 
strength. His realization of this fact and his willingness to 
work for the development of a sound economic life in 
Massachusetts, even seeking in spite of ties binding him to 
the ministry the amelioration of conditions which were bad 
because of the selfish viewpoint or the ignorance of the 
home government, constitute perhaps his chief title to great 
ness. He realized that, contrary to the impression of many 
in both England and America, he would be most helpful to 
the empire and to Massachusetts by giving his people a 
healthy prosperity. 

One of Shirley s earlier governmental problems which 
had an economic bearing related to the regulation of the 

155 



1 56 WILLIAM SHIRLE YA HISTOR Y 

fees charged in the courts and public offices of the province. 
The governor was instructed to regulate salaries and fees 
with the advice and consent of the council, in such a man 
ner that they should be " within the bounds of moderation, 
and that no exaction be made upon any occasion whatever." 1 
Since fees had been regulated in Massachusetts by the 
general court, this apparently meant that the governor 
should act in the manner specified upon bills for regulating 
fees passed by the assembly. 

A bill for regulating fees, etc., came to the governor in 
the busy session of January, 1742. but he informed the 
legislature that the proposed act contained such a variety 
of matters that he could not pass upon it before the next 
session of the court. 2 When Shirley addressed the two 
houses upon the subject in April he stated that it was a 
matter of importance and that he had made an investigation 
since the last sitting of the legislature of that phase of the 
subject relating to court fees, securing data upon the fees 
charged and the usual number of suits in the courts of New 
York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, upon the fees charged 
in Connecticut and Rhode Island and the number of suits 
in the principal court of each, and also similar information 
for Massachusetts for the past year. This data he had 
collected, he said, that " I might the better judge which 
establishment best served the publick good." 

An analysis having shown that in the middle colonies 
the fees were much higher and the number of suits much 
fewer than was the case in Massachusetts and the other 
New England colonies investigated, he concluded that the 
multiplicity of lawsuits in New England was due to low 
court fees. This he thought a bad thing, because of loss 
of time to all concerned, the temptation to a debtor to defer 

instructions to Shirley, art. 31, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 55-56. 
*Jour., Jan. 15, 1742, pp. 176-177. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 157 

payment of his debt, 1 and to poor men to be litigious to 
their own injury. He decided therefore that the proposed 
act for reducing the former fees by one-half would have 
bad results. He offered, however, to sign it if the assembly 
would repeal the former act in specific terms and insert a 
suspending clause, in accordance with his seventh and 
eleventh instructions, respectively. 2 The assembly, how 
ever, prepared a new bill of fees which Shirley informed 
them he was unable to- sign but wquld transmit to the king. 3 
Returning to the subject in May, 1742, Shirley suggested 
a temporary law until the king s pleasure could be known 
upon the bill sent home, and also proposed an explanatory 
law to make it impossible to carry cases to the superior court 
upon appeal when the appellant had allowed the case to go 
against him by default in the inferior court. 4 The general 

1 Shirley elsewhere explained this chief indictment against the pre 
vailing scale of fees more fully and stated that because of the small- 
ness of the fees, which were paid in depreciated bills of credit, a 
debtor s ordinary costs of suit on the recovery of a debt clearly due 
were frequently less than the interest on the debt during the delay 
incident to the suit. Consequently, he added, the people had become so 
habituated to allowing themselves to be sued for an indisputable debt 
and had grown so insensible to the discredit of it, that it was not 
infrequent for persons of some circumstances and character to allow 
judgments to be given against them by default in open, court for just 
debts and to appeal from one court to another merely for delay, where 
by lawsuits were scandalously multiplied and a litigious, trickish spirit 
promoted among the lower sort of people. Shirley to Board, Dec. 23, 
1743, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 19. 

*Jour., Apr. 2, 1742, pp. 222-225; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 45, 47. 

Had the assembly accepted this offer the measure would have been 
submitted to the home government, where Shirley s objections would 
probably have killed it, and then he would have been prevented by his 
eleventh instruction from approving such an act for the future, which 
would no doubt have resulted in the continuance thereafter of the 
former or higher fees. 

3 Jour., Apr. 23, 1742, p. 263. 

4 This practice he held had grown up by a misconstruction of a 
provincial law. 



jcjg WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

court adopted the former of these measures on July i, 1742, 
by passing an act nominally reducing fees in general by one- 
half, but actually doubling them. 1 In this connection Shirley 
advocated, although he did not insist upon, his views as to the 
proper level for court fees. 2 This was followed by other 
temporary acts in September, 1743, and October, I744- 3 

In 1747 Shirley told the legislature that the effect of the 
act of 1742 doubling the fees was " to reduce the number 
of law suits in the province to considerably less than one- 
half of what they amounted to before." 4 He also wrote 
to the board of trade, with obvious reference to the same 
act, that in addition to the great reduction in the number of 
lawsuits in general, the number of suits for plain debt had 
been reduced two-thirds. 5 

It is apparent that legislation upon this subject and the 
act secured by Shirley in 1742 for the purpose of insuring 
to creditors the full value of their outstanding debts regard 
less of the depreciation of the bills of credit between the 
time the debts were contracted and the time of payment, 
had an intimate interrelationship. It will probably be 
generally agreed that the reduction of the volume of litiga 
tion is usually in the public interest, provided it is brought 
about without denying substantial justice to any citizen. 
Inasmuch as the fees were obviously not prohibitive unless 
in cases of extreme poverty, doubtless substantial justice 
was done, while the people could hardly avoid being more 
honest and more prosperous. 

1 A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 13-18. The increase arose from the fact 
that they were payable in the recently issued new-tenor bills having a 
value four times as great as old-tenor bills of the same nominal value. 

*Jour., May 28, 1742, pp. 8-9. 

*A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 101-107, 176-181. 

4 For Shirley s statement on this matter, cf. Jour., Feb. 14, 1747, 
pp. 254-255; printed, A. and R., vol. iii, p. 342. 

5 Shirley to Board, Dec. 23, 1743, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 19. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 159 

Of much greater magnitude and import for the economic 
health of the community was the management of the trouble 
some paper currency of the province, and so far as possible 
those of neighboring governments circulating there, and 
most important of all, the creation of a satisfactory substi 
tute for the paper bills which sound policy demanded should 
be reduced in volume or discarded entirely. 

The effort to reform the currency in provincial Massa 
chusetts consists of two phases, first, that before the great 
military efforts of the province in the war with France which 
date from 1745, and second, that accompanying and im 
mediately succeeding the reimbursement in 1748 for the ex 
penses of the Louisburg expedition. 1 The period between 
was one of war, during which reform was hardly thinkable, 
and not in the slightest degree so unless Parliament should 
attack the question vigorously and sanely. 

Shirley s early handling of the question has been out 
lined from the political point of view, in connection with 
the exigencies of administration. The problem, however, 
was in itself a difficult one, with many ramifications af 
fecting finance, business and the relations between classes 
in the community. To its solution Shirley brought much 
insight and ingenuity. 

Irredeemable paper money, in the experience of the prov 
ince (strong inflationist sentiment of the debtor class, forc 
ing large issues), depended for its stability of value upon 
the rapidity and precision with which it was retired and 
replaced by other transient issues. In truth the best that 
could be secured was a moving picture of stability, each 
individual section of the film representing a different emis 
sion of paper. Unless very quickly retired, the unsupported 
paper infallibly sank in value. 

Shirley had realized from the beginning that the prob- 

1 Cf. infra, chap, xix, passim. 



160 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

lem required skillful handling, involving as it did not only 
depreciated Massachusetts bills but similar bills from the 
surrounding governments, chiefly from Rhode Island, and 
private bills issued by the land bank. The land bank con 
stituted the most indefensible feature of the situation 
and Shirley as soon as it was feasible took steps to bring 
it to an end. 

At first he made efforts to enforce the act of Parliament 
for suppressing the land bank 1 and he expressed the belief 
that the attorney-general would by that means terminate 
the affair. 2 The legislature, however, seeing a need for 
further action in dealing with those partners who refused 
to meet their obligations, passed a bill in 1743 for creating 
commissioners who were to have, inside the limits prescribed 
by the act, practically dictatorial powers for completing 
the suppression of the land bank, including the unrestricted 
rights of forcible entry, of assessment upon the partners, 
and of sale of their property mortgaged to the land bank; 
but this measure Shirley regarded as too drastic and refused 
to sign. 3 His prudence in that regard was approved by the 
board, but they expressed a hope that an equitable bill for 
the same purpose might be passed that would be free from 
the objections to the present one. 4 A few months later 
Shirley sent for their approbation an act which he regarded 
as free from the defects of the former bill and suitable for 
the purpose. 5 This provided for the appointment of com 
missioners, their acts to be subject to approval by the general 

1 Cf. supra, p. 106. 

2 Shirley to Board, Sept. 15, 1742, C. O. 5 883, Ee, 68. 

*A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 138-139; Shirley to Board, Nov. 7, 1743, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 108. 

4 Ibid.; Board to Shirley, July 6, 1743, C. O. 5 918, 103. 

*A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 118-121; .Shirley to Board, Nov. 7, 1743, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 108. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 161 

court and to a review if desired in the superior court. In 
enforcing assessments upon delinquents, property originally 
mortgaged to the land bank might be mortgaged but not 
sold. It was specifically provided that the act of Parlia 
ment for suppression of the land bank should remain es 
sentially in effect, although supplementary machinery of a 
different sort was provided. The act was, in Shirley s 
words, " manifestly calculated to carry the act of Parliament 
into execution according to its full intent." 

This act was approved by the king as promptly as the 
normal inertia of the home government would allow, 2 and 
was the last important act affecting the land bank passed 
within the Deriod covered by this volume. 3 It was not success 
ful in bringing the bank wholly to a conclusion, but it did re 
duce the evil to small proportions, so that it was lost sight 
of in the French war which began in 1744 and among mat 
ters of moment which followed. 

Shirley brought to the solution of the problem of an un 
supported provincial paper currency a good knowledge of 
the nature of paper money, courage, initiative, and much 
common sense. He did not say, but evidently believed, 
that the bad paper currency existent in America was one of 
the by-products of the short-sighted British colonial system. 
Under this system the development of colonial resources 
was hampered, the commercial and military interests of 
the colonies were often disregarded in the foreign policy 

*Ibid., pp. 108-111; Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 14, 1743, C. 0. 5 900, 
90; A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 118-121. 

2 Board to Shirley, Aug. 9, 1744, C. 0. 5 918, 129; Order in Council, 
May 9, 1744, A. and R., vol. iii, p. 140. 

For explanatory acts for improving and expanding this statute, 
cf. A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 135-136, 172-175, 442-444, 551-554. 802-803. 
An act to remove difficulties caused by the destruction of records, etc., 
is in ibid., p. 442. An account of these occurrences is in Davis. " Legis 
lation and Litigation concerning the Land Bank of 1740," loc. cii., 
PP. 93-103- 



1 62 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

of the empire, and the prosperity of the colonies was so re 
duced that ordinarily they must constantly deny themselves 
a sound currency that they might employ the fugitive stores 
of coin which came to them to pay for the English goods 
which under that system they were forced to buy. 1 Shirley 
made it clear that he knew the effect of the colonial system 
upon colonial currency by observing to the board of trade 
that the evils of that currency system probably could not 
be eradicated so long as the primary cause, the existing 
balance of trade between Massachusetts and Great Britain, 
was not altered. Since that balance of trade probably 
would not be altered until British restrictions upon colonial 
economic development were considerably relaxed, this keen 
comment upon the effects of the British policy of exploiting 
the colonies by reserving for English merchants and manu 
facturers a lion-like share of the profits of colonial industry 
and trade, raised for discussion, by implication, the ques 
tion whether the whole " colonial system " was not upon 
a false foundation. 

However, Shirley probably did not expect the lion to 
forego his share, and seemingly pointed out the source of 
the difficulty merely to prevent the board of trade from 
taxing him later on with a failure to make unsupported 
paper a satisfactory currency. He recognized, then, at the 
outset that a cure being beyond expectation, amelioration 
of the pathological condition was the logical aim. 

The patient was, indeed, in a bad way. His malady pre 
vented him, from meeting many of his obligations to British 
merchants, and in the management of his own financial mat 
ters he apparently suffered from serious aberrations, Shir- 

1 Later he pointed out that New England had lost her silver currency 
and acquired a heavy burden of debt chiefly through the decay of her 
fishery which had been in large measure absorbed by the French after 
the treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Shirley to Board, July 10, 1745,. 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 243. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 163 

ley, however, by dint of very intimate observation of the 
progress of the malady for the preceding decade, was pos 
sessed of a careful and convincing diagnosis from the 
start. 

He observed that the evils inseparable from the system 
were aggravated by a number of harmful practices. These 
were: emitting unduly large issues of bills at one time; al 
lowing the bills to remain in circulation too- long before call 
ing them; in to be destroyed ; 1 issuing them as loans to 
serve as a medium, for trade; 2 postponing drawing in the 
bills beyond the time set in the acts emitting them ; and neg 
lect on the part of the governor to see that the treasurer 
issued executions according to law against constables or 
other collectors in the towns to compel bringing in the taxes 
levied. 

Shirley reported in considerable detail to the home govern 
ment the recent currency history of Massachusetts, begin 
ning with the first issue of bills of credit under the provincial 
charter in 1702. The essential facts as he presented them 
follow. The provincial bills of credit, he said, had sunk in 
the thirty years preceding his accession from forty percent to 
four hundred and forty percent below sterling money. 3 The 

1 Bills of credit were first issued to meet public charges, and utilized 
the public credit for that purpose. The public under such a system 
was under obligation to meet the debts which had been deferred instead 
of paid. The citizens then completed the cycle and met their public 
obligations individually by returning the bills of credit to the treasury 
in the form of taxes. The object of their emission had then been 
attained and they were presumably destroyed. 

1 Difficulty came when such bills, intended for a temporary public 
purpose, were appropriated for private business transactions and 
then issued with their function as a medium of exchange chiefly in 
view and in disregard of public interests and needs. The unfitness 
of such currency for private business purposes was soon apparent 
as many abuses grew up. 

3 This statement apparently must be interpreted as presenting a com- 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

depreciation of the bills became a problem in 1712, and the 
assembly by a law passed in that year attempted to buoy them 
up. By this law they were made a legal tender for debt 
at their face value except in the case of specialties or ex 
press contracts in writing. 1 The natural result under the 
circumstances was the reducing of the value of the debt 
rather than the increasing of the value O f the bills, and a 
carnival of sharp practice resulted at the expense of the 
ignorant and unwary. Prominent among the losers, Shir 
ley said, were English merchants and provincial widows and 
orphans. New issues cJf bills and depreciation were ac 
celerated, and creditors were compelled to accept bills emit 
ted after the debt was contracted, and which being depre 
ciated even when issued, had fallen far below the value at 
which similar bills had passed when the debt was incurred. 
The provisions of the act referred to above were reenacted 
in 1715, 1723 and I73I, 2 and in the last of these years i 
sterling was equivalent to 2^2 in bills of credit. Issues 
of bills of the same tenor in 1732, 1733, 1734 and 1735 
were accompanied by extremely rapid depreciation, 3 but the 

putation of the percentage of advance of sterling money over the Massa 
chusetts bills of credit, at the respective dates given. With such a 
meaning it would be in harmony with the known rate of exchange in 
1711, thirty years before Shirley s accession (Davis, Currency and Bank 
ing, pt. i, loc. cit., pp. 96-97), and it would approximately agree with a 
computation from another source of the rate of exchange for the year 
1741. Ibid., pp. 369-3/0- 

1 A. and R., vol. i, pp. 700-701. 

*Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 24, 267, 589-590. 

This was probably due in part to the action of the government 
in reissuing bills of credit already received for public dues. Snch 
reissues occurred in 1728, 1730, 1731 and 1732, and in 1728 the reissue, 
following the method earlier employed for new bills, took the form 
of a loan to be handled through the towns; in this case to bring 
to the province four per cent interest on the bills and to the towns a 
return of two per cent. Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 189-193, 470-471, 557, 593, 
614, 625. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 

least valuable were legally as good a tender for debt as were 
those of the same tenor in I732. 1 

Moreover, debtors, having seen their debts in effect re 
duced by more than three-fifths in three years, not only 
wisked to have the depreciation continue but used every 
means to defer payment to- allow their debts to dwindle still 
further, which would evidently occur if further similar is 
sues of paper were made a legal tender. 

The assembly, however, now becoming convinced that 
something was amiss with the currency, issued in 1737 bills 
of a " new tenor," but under conditions which depreciated 
them about one-third of their supposed value at the time 
of their emission. 2 

1 The following table based upon statements by Shirley indicates the 
rapid depreciation in those years. 

Percentages of the real value Percentages of depreciation at 

of similar bills in 1732 borne time of issue from the value 

at time of emission by bills of bills of 1732, in case of 

of the issues of the emissions of 

1733 83.33% 1733 16.67% 

1734 47-62% 1734 52.38% 

1735 38.46%, 1735 61.54% 

3 The table below shows that the assembly apparently drafted the law 
not with the purpose of maintaining the value of the new bills but of 
raising the value of the old ones. 

VALUES ASSIGNED BY LAW OF 1737 TO NEW AND OLD TENOR BILLS IN SILVER 
New Tenor Old Tenor, Silver 

6/8 equals 205 equals i oz. 

ACTUAL VALUE OF BILLS IN SILVER IN 1737 
New Tenor Old Tenor Silver 

QS equals 273 equals i oz. 

Twenty shillings in old-tenor bills would not pass above their actual 
value, which was about three-fourths of the value (one ounce of silver) 
assigned to them by this law, and the six shillings and eight pence new 
tenor, which were made equal in value to twenty shillings old tenor, 
would pass for no more in silver than the quantity of old-tenor bills 
for which they could be exchanged. Hence six shillings and eight 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

The same blunder in later acts for emitting new-tenor 
bills in 1737 and 1738, helped similarly to depreciate them. 
The assembly made a slight and ineffectual effort to maintain 
their value by providing that a fund of silver and gold 
should be established in the treasury for the redemption of 
the new-tenor bills of the issues of 1737 and 1738 outstand 
ing after December 31, 1742, at the rate of 6/8 per ounce of 
silver, to be secured from duties of impost, tonnage, etc., to 
be collected in those metals from May 31, 1737, to May 31, 
1742. However, the merchants, preferring to* pay duties 
in depreciated paper, persuaded the assembly to enact that 
from December, 1740, payment of such duties need not be 
in silver and gold, but that the bills of credit received in 
stead should be exchanged for silver and gold to be held in 
the treasury for the same purpose. 1 The merchants argued 
that when ships brought silver from countries where it was 
abundant it tended to raise the price of silver in the province 
and thereby depreciated the value of the bills of credit. 
After observing the operation of such alleged economic laws 
as this sponsored by the merchants, it is not to be wondered 
at that the country party in the province, however innocent 
of knowledge o>f the laws of business, should have been 
highly suspicious of Greeks bearing gifts. 2 

Further, the province, in an act of July, 1740, exhibited 
surprising versatility in experimenting with issues of paper. 

pence in new-tenor bills were worth only about three-fourths of an 
ounce of silver, which represented a much more violent depreciation 
than would probably otherwise have occurred. For the law under 
which these bills were emitted, cf. ibid., vol. ii, pp. 814-827. 

l lbid., vol. ii, p. 1050. 

2 The result of the new provision was that the treasurer, rinding that 
to buy silver or gold as directed would keep the bills of credit in 
circulation beyond the period set, would involve an immediate loss to 
the province of about thirty-three and one-third per cent, and would 
raise the price of silver still higher, failed to carry it out. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 167 

Having discovered that new-tenor bills depreciated as well 
as old, it was decided to return to> the old. 1 However, per 
haps feeling doubtful if the value of the issue of 80,000 
in old-tenor bills would justify making new plates and sign 
ing the bills, it was ultimately ordered that instead of new 
bills the treasury should reissue such of the bills of both 
the old and new tenors received in as were not worn or de 
faced. 3 Thereupon about 17,000 in bills of the (first)* 
new tenor which had been paid in as taxes were reissued 
without any earmark by which they might be known from 
the other bills of the new (or middle) tenor emissions of 
1737, 1738 and 1739. It thus came about that these 17,000 
issued in place of about 50,000 of old-tenor bills, and ac 
cording to the terms of the act for emitting them not sub 
ject to redemption in silver or gold after December, 1742, 
were indistinguishable from the bills of the emissions of 
the years 1737. 1738 and 1739* which the holders had a 
right to present to the treasury for redemption in specie. 
Since these bills were issued by the law of 1740 at the ratio 
of 3 old tenor to i new tenor they were at once depreciated 
about thirty-three and one-third percent below their face 
value, 5 but since they were apparently legally exchangeable 
for specie at face value, they were promptly hoarded to be 

l lbid., vol. ii, p. 1013. 

2 This was following precedent in the case of the old-tenor bills 
(r/. supra, p. 164), and the employment of the device may have been 
a following of the line of least resistance. It may, however, have 
been brought about in some degree by the desire to make funds avail 
able quickly for use in promoting the expedition against the Spanish 
West Indies, which was then being organized. 

3 A second new-tenor emission in 1742 caused the former new-tenor 
bills to be referred to as first new tenor or middle tenor. 

4 The emission of 1739 was of bills previously appropriated but sub 
sequently held in the treasury by order of the general court. A. and 
R., vol. ii, p. 973. 

5 Cf. supra, pp. 165-166. 



!68 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

presented for redemption. The assembly had unwittingly 
found a way of maintaining the future value of the bills 
in this instance, but had also driven them 1 out of circulation. 

Finally, the assembly artistically completed their handi 
work by failing to pass a tax act for drawing in the 80,000 
old tenor in place of part of which 17,000 new tenor was 
circulating; so that there remained in private hands after 
December, 1742, upwards of 42,000 in first new-tenor or 
middle-tenor bills, to redeem which the treasury had only 
2,900 in specie. 1 

Of the bills now ready to be presented for redemption 
17,000 in new tenor were not equitably entitled to it, but 
no effort could separate the goats from the sheep. There 
fore, in order that justice might be done to the holders, 
some of whom, doubtless, received the bills in good faith as 
new-tenor bills, Shirley secured a law providing that they 
be compensated in bills of credit estimated to be an equiva 
lent for specie, or that the bills be received in public pay 
ments at the value of specie, which was all that could be 
done. For this purpose the bills were received by the 
government at a premium of thirty-three and one-third per 
cent over the value stated at their emission, which was the 
value, Shirley observed, at which they ought to have been 
issued at first in 1737. In confirmation of this view he de 
clared that another new-tenor issue in January, I74 2 > na d 
been emitted with that stated value, 2 and had depreciated 
much less than had the first new-tenor issue. 

Shirley was justified in a feeling of satisfaction with the 
outcome, in view of the confused condition of the currency 

Shirley estimated that the amount of specie which would have been 
collected under the act for creating the fund for redemption of the 
bills as first passed would not have exceeded 4,500, if that act had not 
been altered. Cf. supra, p. 166. 

2 At the ratio of one new-tenor bill to four of the old tenor. A. and R., 
vol. ii, p. 1077. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC ^9 

and finances of the province. He had secured provision for 
current expenses, for the extraordinary expenses incident 
to the war, and for paying government employees who were 
unpaid at the end of Belcher s term, while at the same time 
the large arrears of taxes which had accumulated under 
preceding administrations x were being brought in rapidly 
by executive order, and the assembly had made provision that 
all the outstanding bills of credit should be called in by 
taxes by the end of I746. 2 

As a means of insuring the retirement of the bills of 
credit at the times set in the emitting acts, he secured from 
the assembly in every act for the supply of the treasury after 
he became governor a clause providing that in case the as 
sembly should not apportion the retiring tax among the 
towns of the province before the time set for retirement in 
any instance, the treasurer should proceed to apportion it 
upon the basis of the last tax bill which became law. He 
also proposed, what events prevented, that the retirement of 
old issues and the issue of new ones should keep even pace. 
Such a policy when once he had secured the retirement of 
each new emission at an early date, would perhaps have 
reduced the evils of a paper currency to a minimum. 

Shirley concluded from the experience of the province 
that bills of credit were fit only for paying the necessary 
charges of government, and that large emissions of the bills 
as a medium of exchange, such as had been made between 
1711 and 1728, were the bane of a paper currency. The 
realization of his plans in Massachusetts, however, as he 
observed, was contingent upon avoidance of extra charges 
for a French war. s 

1 He gave the figure as 322,407 old tenor. 

2 He also secured provision in the supply act of 1742 for retiring the 
sum of 105,125, said to be the balance outstanding for which no taxes 
had been laid. A. and R., vol. ii, pp. 1077-1083. 

8 The discussion of the Massachusetts currency by Shirley outlined 



j^o WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Shirley found some difficulties in carrying out the reforms 
of the currency that had been actually provided for. He 
found, for instance, that when the assembly issued bills 
which were valued by law 7^% higher than their actual 
value, the more ignorant people, \vho were usually the 
poorer, were unable so to calculate their value in business 
transactions as to protect themselves from being over 
reached. He therefore concluded that it was impractic 
able to have a currency adjusted to the standard of an 
imaginary value, such as silver money was to- the minds of 
the people of the province. 1 

Difficulty also appeared in applying the law requiring that 
debts should be paid by a sum equivalent to the value of 
the debt when incurred. Violent protests from debtors 
led Shirley to believe the law could not be enforced without 
amendment, and he found that there were grievances of the 
debtors involved, especially as they were being called upon 
by the provincial judges to pay 7J4% more than the real 
value of their debt. 3 He therefore secured an act removing 

above is found in Shirley to Board, June 29, 1743, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 9; 
Shirley to Board, Dec. 23, 1743, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 19; " State of the out 
standing bills of credit of the province of Massachusetts Bay," etc., 
enclosed in Shirley to Board, Dec. 23, 1743, supra, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 20. 
Cf. also, A. and R., vols. ii and iii, passim ; Shirley to Board, Mar. 19, 

1742, and enclosure, " Reasons against an immediate total suppression 
of paper bills of publick credit in New England," Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
101-107; Board to Shirley, July 6, 1743, C. O. 5 918, 103; Jour., Aug. 8, 
1741, pp. 50-51; Dec. 23, 1742, p. 125; Dec. 28, 1742, p. 130; Jan. 15, 

1743, P. 154; May 27, 1743, pp. 8-15; June 10, 1743, pp. 45-49- 
1 Shirley to Board, July, 1743, C. O. 5 884, Ff. 11. 

9 Ibid. There was a "joker" in the law first passed, it providing that 
a debt, specialties and express contracts excepted, should be paid at 
its true value in silver (which no debtor would be able to offer) or in 
default of that at its nominal value in bills of credit plus an allowance 
for depreciation since the debt was contracted. This latter provision 
was construed by the courts to require the payment of the debt in 
money corresponding in actual value to the value stated by law for the 
bills of credit in which it had been incurred, although they were 
overvalued 7 l /2%- 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 

this grievance, but requiring, as the former act purported 
to do, that the actual value of a debt be paid. 1 In recom 
mending action by the legislature he observed that " the in 
tent of the parties in all contracts is the principal governing 
rule of equity." He added that in the case of debts incur 
red before the law was passed the creditor counted upon de 
preciation and took the risk of it when he loaned money. 
He continued that, although creditors had steadily lost under 
their contracts, it was doubtful if that " makes it just to set 
em aside." 2 Clearly Shirley gave the impression that the 
judges had made an arbitrary ruling not in accord with 
the spirit of the law nor with the rules of equity. The 
governor would do justice to the creditor but he would not 
therefore gouge the debtor. He reported in March of the 
next year that debtors had begun to feel very seriously the 
mischief of the depreciating of the bills of credit, since 
they had been compelled to make an allowance to creditors 
for depreciation. 3 In this matter, then, Shirley may fairly 
be said to have greatly bettered a condition which was 
seriously weakening the province. 

However, Shirley found himself still embarrassed by ex 
tremists on both sides of the paper money question. He 
joined with those who saw that the evils of the situation 
were beyond local control because of the extensive circula 
tion of bills of credit from outside Massachusetts, especially 
from Rhode Island. 4 He had, indeed, attempted to get a 

1 A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 80-81. 
*Jour., May 27, 1743, p. 11. 

3 Shirley to Board, Mar. 19, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 24. 

4 In March, 1743, Shirley declared there were more bills of Connecticut 
and Rhode Island current in Massachusetts (he estimated they in 
cluded 350,000 in Rhode Island bills out of a total circulation of 
420,000 of bills of that government) than of Massachusetts itself, and 
pointed out that so long as those colonies were not restrained from 
large emissions, instructions to limit issues in Massachusetts would have 



1/2 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



bill through the legislature forbidding the passing in Massa 
chusetts of bills of other colonies, but had difficulty in get 
ting even a hearing for it in the council, while the representa 
tives were with the exception of one vote unanimously 
against it. 1 

The most that Shirley was able to accomplish in this 
direction was to secure a little later a vote for a committee 
of the two houses to cooperate with suggested similar com 
mittees representing New Hampshire, Connecticut and 
Rhode Island in order to propose measures dealing with the 
general subject of the bills of credit. The Massachusetts 
committee sought to arrange for a meeting, 2 but elicited no- 
response from the other governments. 3 

Early in 1744. however, after the law compelling th 
payment of the value of a debt in bills of credit had affected 

no effect in reducing the volume of bills of credit in Massachusetts. 
Shirley to Board, Mar. 19, 1743, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 104, 106. 

In February, 1744 Shirley presented to the legislature figures re 
lating to Rhode Island and Connecticut bills circulating in Massachu 
setts. He estimated that there were then passing in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut bills to tfce amount of 50,000 and Rhode Island bills to 
the amount of 350,000, and that one-half of the future issues of Con 
necticut bills and five-sixths of the future Rhode Island emissions 
would be absorbed by Massachusetts. Meanwhile he estimated that 
Massachusetts had suffered a loss of 25,000 old tenor in nine months 
through their currency there. He added that since Rhode Island 
merchants preferred to buy English goods at Boston with bills of 
credit than to send real money to England for them, larger emissions 
were to be expected in the future. Shirley to Legislature, Jour., Feb. 
19, 1744, pp. 140-143- 

For a full discussion of the Rhode Island and Connecticut emissions, 
cf. Davis, " Currency and Banking in the Province of the Massachusetts- 
Bay," Publications of the American Economic Association, 3d ser., 
vol. i, pp. 330-365. 

1 Shirley to Board, Mar. 19, 1743, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 105. 

2 Shirley to the governors of New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island, July, 1743, Ar., vol. liii, fols. 151-1513. 

s jcnr., Feb. 9, 1744, p. 142. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 173 

sentiment and the governor had impressed the legislature 
with the imminence of Parliamentary action, he succeeded 
in getting a law through the assembly forbidding the last 
emission of Rhode Island bills and future issues by govern 
ments outside Massachusetts from circulating there. 1 He 
was evidently doubtful of its being enforced, but observed 
that experience of the just payment of debts " seems to 
have begot a more general spirit in the people for reject 
ing the bills of the other governments (of which before they 
were very fond) than has ever yet been known in the prov 
ince." He thought, therefore, that the law, though not 
so strict as it might have been, might have some effect. 2 

An act had been passed in 1739 excluding from Massa 
chusetts bills of other governments emitted after May 31, 
1738, and not redeemable in lawful money within ten years 
of their emission. This was logically a blow at the Rhode 
Island bills, but was a dead letter until Shirley became 
governor. He issued a proclamation for carrying it out 
and further prohibited all officers of his appointment in the 
government to pass any bill of a neighboring government. 
The result was that such bills ceased to pass in the public 
offices of the province and their circulation was somewhat 
checked in the country districts. They continued to have an 
unabated currency in Boston, however, through the insis 
tence of some merchants and traders who had special 
motives for having them used. 3 

In view of expected Parliamentary action Shirley tried 

1 A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 122-124. This act was renewed in 1746 for 
three years (ibid., pp. 307-310), and by the act retiring the Massachusetts 
paper money in 1749, such bills were permanently excluded from cur 
rency in the province. Ibid., p. 436. 

2 Shirley to Board, Mar. 19, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 24. 

*/4. and R., vol. ii, p. 965; Shirley to Board, Dec. 23, 1743, C. 0. 5 884, 
Ff, 19. 



174 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



to get the assembly, for its own vindication, to represent the 
facts relating to the New England paper currencies to Parlia 
ment; but his effort failed. 1 Likewise a vote of the council, 
which Shirley doubtless favored, requesting him to make a 
full representation to the ministers of state of the need for 
distinguishing between the bills of Massachusetts and of 
her neighbors, in Parliamentary action, in order that justice 
be done to her, was disapproved by the house. 2 The legis 
lature doubtless felt confident that Shirley would so repre 
sent the matter in any case, and they were always wary of 
recognizing in any form the jurisdiction of the British 
government over them. Moreover, Shirley had just told 
them that coinage was not a charter privilege of the colonies, 
but was exercised by royal indulgence; 3 and this could 
hardly have recommended the governor to them as a rep 
resentative of what they doubtless conceived to be their 
charter rights in that respect. He in fact urged upon the 
home government the need for a uniform regulation of 
paper money in all four New England governments as the 
only real remedy for the existing evils. 4 

At the same time that he took this position he found it 
necessary to oppose extremists who wished Parliament not 
only to regulate paper money in New England, but to sup 
press it entirely at the end of seven years. In opposition 
to such a scheme he had already in 1743 pointed out that 
the bills were at the time the sole available currency for both 
public and private purposes, and that for a time suppression 
would entail an almost complete impotence of the govern 
ment. It would bring also, he declared, such a disturbance 

Shirley to Legislature, Jour., Feb. 9, 1744 pp. 142-143; Shirley to 
House, Jour., Mar. i, 1744, p. 180; Mar. 10, 1744, p. 194. 
Ubid. 

9 Ibid., Feb. 9, 1744, p. 142. 
4 Shirley to Board, Mar. 19, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 24. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 175 

of business that English trade would suffer severely, and 
might be almost destroyed through the growth of local 
manufactures to supply articles the colonists would be un 
able to buy in England for lack of money. It would further 
cripple Massachusetts trade in all branches, retard the settle 
ment of the province and injure the whale and cod fisheries. 1 

In March of 1744 he was more specific in suggestion, 
advising the board of trade that the New England govern 
ments combined should be limited to a maximum circula 
tion of 60,000 sterling value in bills; that the bills be emit 
ted only for necessary charges of the government, be ac 
companied by funds of taxes equal to the sums emitted and 
be retired in the same or the following year; that they be 
received at the respective treasuries in payment of taxes 
only, at 5% advance; and that they either have their value se 
cured to the creditor against depreciation between the time 
of contracting and paying debts, or cease to be a tender in 
private payments. If these conditions should be met and 
the prompt drawing in of the bills secured, he thought no- 
great inconvenience would arise. If entire suppression of 
the bills were contemplated, it should be reached only after 
further experiment with them for two or three years with 
these limitations, rather than suddenly at the end of seven 
years. 2 

On the coinage Shirley offered a very interesting sugges 
tion. This was that the policy of Holland might offer a 
solution for the New England problem. In coining schel- 
lings and guelders the Dutch used such an alloy that the 
silver could not be separated without an expense of 5%, thus 
making it commercially unprofitable to turn the coins into 
merchandise to be used where the coins as such would not 

*" Reasons against an immediate total suppression of paper bills of 
publick credit in New England," Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 106-107. 
2 -Shirley to Board, Mar. 19, 1734, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 24. 



!^6 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

circulate. Such coins in New England would, he thought, 
be safeguarded against being exported to Europe, and if 
receivable in the province at the treasury in payment of 
annual taxes at their value or more, would be sufficiently 
safeguarded against depreciation. If this were thought 
practicable, he suggested that 100,000 sterling in that form 
would, in connection with proportionate sums for the other 
New England governments, make it possible to suppress 
the bills of credit without bad results for either British 
trade or colonial development. New England, he pointed 
out, would be much worse crippled without a medium of 
exchange than Virginia, Maryland and the Sugar Islands, 
inasmuch as she unlike them had no staple to serve as a sub 
stitute for it. Such a deliverance from paper currency, he 
concluded, would be much for his majesty s service, and 
the most beneficial change which could happen to the country 
and the British trade thither. 1 

This, however, like most suggestions involving large in 
itiative on the part of the home government, aroused no 
enthusiasm at home. In the following August the board 
of trade, after approving his prudent handling of the paper- 
money question (as well as other matters) and suggesting 
the continuation of it, placed in a sentence at the end of 
their letter the following weighty judgment : " As to the 
proposition in your letter of March 19, for making a new 
sort of coin to sink the paper currency, we are afraid it 
will be liable to many difficulties." 2 

On June 20, 1744, he wrote to Lord Harrington, presi 
dent of the privy council, emphasizing the need for a general 
Parliamentary regulation of bills of credit for all New Eng 
land as a measure which would promote the reintroduction 



3 Board to Shirley, Aug. 9, 1744, C. O. 5 918, 129. 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 177 

of a silver currency. Without such regulation, he thought 
a silver currency impracticable in New England. 1 

There the matter for the present slept, but it is worthy 
of note that as early as the spring of 1744 Shirley had 
visualized a silver currency for Massachusetts (indeed for 
all New England) and urged it upon the home government. 
It then seemed visionary, yet in a brief season it was to be 
realized. 

As Parliament made no headway, meanwhile, in handling 
the currency question, paper money remained with its at 
tendant evils during the war with France. The indisput 
able statement has been made that under the existing circum 
stances Massachusetts without a paper currency could not 
have assailed Loursburg almost alone, nor have met the 
other large expenditures of that war. It seems equally 
true that but for the astute and surprisingly successful steps 
of Shirley in ameliorating a very discouraging situation 
Massachusetts would have been bound by paper bonds so 
large and so intricately tangled that even an effective de 
fense might have resulted in financial exhaustion. 2 

Shirley had found no panacea, but he had perhaps done 
better, by educating the people of the province to under 
stand the nature of paper money. Further, his progress 
in reducing the large quantities of paper left outstanding 
by Belcher and in preventing large accumulations for the 
future, whereby the evil of depreciation would have been 
perpetuated, had been striking, especially in view of large 
extraordinary outlays which had to be provided for in ad^ 
dition to the regular provincial expenses. This appears from 
the appended statement of the condition of the Massa 
chusetts paper currency before and after his accession. 3 

1 Shirley to Harrington, June 20, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 28. 

2 Cf. infra, pp. 178-180, 192-193. 

3 A statement of the condition of the Massachusetts paper currency 



178 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

for Belcher s administration and Shirley s to December, 1743, tabulated 
from reports by Governor Shirley to the board of trade. 

Old 
Tenor 

Outstanding at Belcher s accession (1730) beyond the 
periods stated in the acts of emission due to failure 
to issue executions against constables, collectors, etc. 157,706 
Increase (computed by Shirley) during Belcher s ad 
ministration (1730-1741) from above cause 164,701 



Sum total of arrears in outstanding bills at Shirley s 
accession due to failure to issue executions 322,407 

Bills in arrears at his accession drawn in and burned 
during Shirley s administration to August, 1743 109,798 

Bills in arrears at his accession drawn in and burned 
between issue of general writs of execution in Aug., 
1743 and Dec., 1743 36,000 



Total of such bills drawn in and burned under 
Shirley to Dec., 1743 145,798 145,79$ 



Such bills outstanding Dec., 1743, but expected in by 

May, 1744 176,609. 

Middle Old 
Tenor Tenor 

Outstanding, Aug., 1741, for drawing which into the 25,525 

treasury no funds existed, due to failure to levy taxes 30,000 

in 1739 and 1741 17,000 51,000 



Total 106,525 

(This total is slightly larger than the figures given by 
A. and R., vol. ii, p. 1082 and Davis, "Currency and 
Banking in the Province of Massachusetts Bay," [in the 
Publications of the American Economic Association, 
3d ser., vol. i, no. 4, p. 155] respectively.) 

Provision in supply bill of Jan., 1742 to cover above Old 
arrears of taxes : Tenor 

For tax to be apportioned in 1742 20,000 

" " " " " " 1743 50,ooo 

Balance to be covered in 1742 and 1743 by duties of 
excise, impost, etc., and taxes on towns for pay of 
representatives 36,525 

Total 106,525 106,525, 



REFORMS, CHIEFLY ECONOMIC 179 

Sums required under Shirley for extraordinary expenses of Old 
government: Tenor 

For expenditures for new works at Castle William and re 
pairing old works there and elsewhere, purchasing military 
stores and paying five hundred pounds due the king 50,000 

For maintaining the province ship 30,000 

For deficiency of fund raised under Belcher for redeeming 
middle-tenor bills in silver and gold in Dec., 1742, 8,000 
in ( second) new tenor 32,000 

For computed arrears of public debts at Shirley s accession 
not covered by money in treasury nor provision by act of 
assembly to meet them 32,000 

Total 144,000 

Available towards paying above : 

Balance of fund for encouraging West Indian expedition still 
in treasury 4,800 



Sum required for extraordinary expenses before Dec., 1743, for 
which provision had to be made by new issues 139,200 

Emissions of paper money under Shirley before Dec., 1743 : 

(Second) Old Computed: 

New Tenor Sterling 

Tenor Value Value 

January, 1742 * 30,000 120,000 20,000 

July, 1742 15,000 60,000 10,000 

January, 1743 20,000 80,000 13,400 

November, 1743 20,000 80,000 13,400 



Totals 85,000 240,000 56,800 

The dates of the emissions above are taken from the A. and R. Those 
given by Shirley were for the sessions, not the acts. 

Above emissions to be drawn in before end of 1746 by taxes so levied 
as to keep the amount issued under Shirley outstanding below 30,000 
sterling at all times during the intervening years. 

The figures given by Shirley for the emissions of bills of credit for 
the years indicated vary somewhat from those contained in the table 
appended to Davis, "Currency and Banking," loc. cit., p. 443. 

* For convenience the value of the issue of January, 1742, is given in,- 
(second) new tenor although the issue was in middle tenor. 



!8o WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Sums specified for retirement in acts for drawing in bills of credit 
issued under Shirley, passed or projected before December, 1743: 

Second Computed 

New Sterling 

Tenor Value 

Retired in 1742 21,638 : o : 3^4 

Voted in 1743 and largely in by Dec., 
1743 23,738 : 4 : 9M 



Total 45,376 : 5 : i 

Proposed taxes for 1744 and 1745 

equal to those for 1742 and 1743. 
Total issues of paper money under 

Shirley to Dec., 1743 85,000 

Total retired and voted to be retired 

in 1742 and 1743 45,37" : 5 : i 



Balance of issues under Shirley out 
standing after tax of 1743 was in ... 39,623 : 14: n 26,414: 9: i l /3 

Progress in retirement of bills estimated by Shirley : 

Second New Old 
Tenor Tenor 

Of those left out by Belcher: 

by May, 1744 400,000 

by December, 1744, an additional 50,000 

by December, 1744, also the sum emitted in 
December, 1742 to make good the deficiency 
of Belcher s fund 8,000 32,000 



Total 482,000 

By end of 1746 all other emissions under iShirley 

to December, 1743 240,000 



Total 722,000 

The data upon which this statement is based is drawn from Shirley 
to Board, Dec. 23, 1743, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 19, and a "State of the out 
standing bills of credit of the province of Massachusetts Bay ex 
tracted from the accounts of the several treasurers for the time being 
from the year, 1702, to the year, 1743," C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 20. 



CHAPTER IX 
MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

THE approach of the war with France had been so 
clearly discerned that obvious precautions had been taken 
before its actual arrival. Many of the steps taken for the 
protection of the frontiers and the coast, to cultivate good 
relations with the Indians, and to secure liberty to raise 
necessary funds have already been recounted. 1 

Other measures adopted before the actual break looked 
to the training of new Indian interpreters to replace two 
deceased and others become aged, 2 and to substituting for 
pensions to Indian chiefs (which had not bound the tribes 
living within the province to the government), gifts of 
powder, shot and provisions to the tribes. 3 Shirley also* 
asked for a grant of authority from the legislature to act 
for the defense of the province in case war began during 
a recess of the general court. In reply the representatives 
freely granted authority (which he already had through 
his commission and instructions) to> take necessary military 
steps to protect the inland frontier and coast with the as 
surance that he might " safely depend " that all charges in 
curred for such purposes by the advice of the council would 
be provided for in the next supply. The assembly added, 
however : " Should there be a power invested in any other 
than the general court to infer upon the province a large ex 
pense, it might be a precedent dangerous to us, altho we 

1 Cf. supra, pp. 114-131. 

*A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 253; Jour., June 3, 1743, p. 29. 
*Ibid., Nov. 24, 1742, pp. 93-94; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (3), p. 602. 
* 181 



1 82 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

do not imagine any immediate damage would accrue to 
the province by such a proceeding at this time." l After the 
existence of war was known, Shirley renewed his effort to 
make the lower house provide for prompt action in a 
military emergency arising in recess of the assembly, but 
without effect. 2 

Meanwhile Shirley held the legislature in session by four 
adjournments from March 22d to April 28th, before dis 
solution, apparently expecting notice of the outbreak of 
war. On May 5th he received unofficial news of the rupture 
which he had anticipated. He at once sent a notice of the 
fact to the frontier Indian tribes in alliance with Massa 
chusetts (Penobscots, Norridgewalks, Pigwackets, etc.), 
insisted upon their obligation to side with the English andi 
assured them of protection and friendship if faithful. 5 

There was an early demonstration of the need for the 
prompt exercise of discretion by some one in defending 
British interests in America when the French attacked the 
village of New England fishermen at Canso. This episode 
directly affected Nova Scotia instead of Massachusetts but 
was indirectly a blow to the latter and to a less extent to all 
New England. The primary responsibility for what hap 
pened lay with the British government, for failing properly 
to defend her outlying possessions and for further negli 
gently permitting delay in notifying her colonies in America 
of the outbreak of war. This delay gave M. Duquesnel, 
the commander at Louisburg, ample time to prepare and 
despatch an expedition against Canso, 4 before any effectual 

l jour., Apr. 27, 1744, p. 221. 
*Ibid., May 31, 1744, P- 9- 

3 Ibid,, p. 7 and Mar. 22 to Apr. 28, passim ; Shirley to Newcastle, 
May 3, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 28. 

4 This expedition against Canso was being prepared on May 6th, 
a day after the news of war reached Louisburg. Shirley to New 
castle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 133. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 183 

steps (if such were possible) could be taken in New Eng 
land to save it. 

Canso was located on a barren island off the eastern coast 
of Nova Scotia, about eighteen leagues from Louisburg. 
It had neither fort nor artillery, and since, as reported, the 
barracks for the men and officers and the other houses were 
all of unsubstantial deal, it was incapable of defense. The 
inhabitants were few, and the fishing industry of which it 
had been a center had dwindled in consequence of the 
Spanish war. There were four companies in the garrison, 
who, it was estimated, might equal eighty men. Their only 
security from capture and imprisonment was the chance 
that the French at Louisburg might not have a sufficient 
stock of provisions to support them. Under these circum 
stances, Kilby, the Massachusetts agent in England, sug 
gested that as the garrison was useless at Canso it should 
be at once sent to Annapolis Royal. This place was held 
by five companies, not over one hundred effective men, and 
greatly needed the reinforcement, even to hold their ground 
against the French inhabitants of the region, who were 
likely to starve the English troops unless they succeeded in 
getting some of the chief Frenchmen as hostages. As 
there were nearly 10,000 of these French inhabitants, and 
they could be reinforced from Canada and Cape Breton, 
and as communication with those districts was easy, it 
would likewise be easy for the French to hold Annapolis 
Royal if taken. The motive for taking it was strong be 
cause Nova Scotia, which it partly dominated, was the only 
certain source of provisions in America for the garrison at 
Louisburg. 1 

The suggestion that the Canso garrison be transferred 

r For a contemporary sketch of Canso, Annapolis Royal and the 
conditions then existing in Nova Scotia, cf. "An account of Nova 
Scotia" annexed to Kilby to Board, Apr. 3, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 22. 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

to Annapolis Royal was made after the declaration of war, 
and there was no time to carry it out before an expedition 
from Louisburg under Captain Duvivier pounced upon the 
helpless denizens O f Canso on May 24, 1744, accepted the 
inevitable surrender of Captain Heron, his men and the in 
habitants, and after burning the buildings carried their 
prisoners including the families of the garrison, in all seventy 
or more persons, to Louisburg. 1 Thus France scored the 
first and a bloodless victory in America. 

In the garrison thus put hors de combat were fourteen 
soldiers reported incurably lame, and five veterans who 
were both too crippled and too old to fight. This nondes 
cript force was generously permitted to sign terms of 
capitulation under which they were to be imprisoned at 
Louisburg for a year, after which they might return to 
New England or Annapolis Royal. 2 The same terms were 
extended to Lieutenant Ryal, in command of a British sloop, 
the Mary, and his men, who had been captured by the 
French expedition with the garrison at Canso, while serv 
ing upon the post assigned them the preceding summer be 
tween Canso and Cape Breton to prevent trade between 
Nova Scotia and the latter place. 3 



expedition consisted of two vessels. One of these a sloop 
carrying ninety-four men, eight carriage guns, swivels, etc., was 
captured about a month later by the Massachusetts guard ship in 
Massachusetts Bay. Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, p. 133. 

For the condition id capture of Canso, cf. Terms of surrender 
to Duvivier, May 24, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 96; Heron, etc., to Shirley, 
June 10, 1744, C. O. 5 poo, 104; Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744,- 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 132; Shirley to Duquesnel, July 26, 1744, C. 0. 
5 POO, 99. 

Terms of surrender to Duvivier, May 24, 1744, C. O. 5 9<x>, 96; 
Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 148; Shirley 
to Admiralty, Sept. 22, 1744, Ad. I, 3817; Shirley to Wentworth, Nov. 
10, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 151-152. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 

A week later and still before the arrival in America of 
official notification of the existence of war, Shirley met the 
Massachusetts legislature. The one engrossing topic of his 
speech to the legislature was defense. To their minds it 
meant the defense of New England, to his the defense of the 
empire as well, and no sophistry was needed to make his 
arguments equally telling for both. However, the group of 
measures which he urged upon them applied directly to the 
defense of Massachusetts: the prompt defense of the fron 
tiers that the settlers might be encouraged to stay in their 
settlements as a barrier for the rest of the province; defense 
specifically against the Indians near the frontiers as well 
as the French, including Indians supposed to be in alliance 
with the English as well as those clearly hostile; further 
appropriations to complete the works of Castle William 
and of other fortifications well advanced but not completed; 
the increase of garrisons to an adequate size ; the provision 
of pay for officers and men sufficient to secure efficient defen 
ders; the fortification of Governor s Island in Boston 
harbor to supplement and make effective the defenses of 
Castle William. 1 

On the same day Shirley was urging measures for the 
security of a portion of the frontier through the home 
government. On that date he wrote to Newcastle (and 
later to the board of trade and Lord President Harrington) 
regarding Fort Dummer, the chief defense of New Eng 
land toward the new French stronghold of Crown Point, 

l jour., May 31, 1744, pp. 7-10. Shirley had soundings made "of the 
channel and water about the islands adjacent to ... Castle William" 
and found " that it is necessary for the province to be at the expense 
of raising new batteries on an island over against the Castle to pre 
vent the enemy s not only forming a camp there but also bombarding 
the garrison from thence where their own men would be at the same 
time under a cover from the great artillery of the Castle." Shirley 
to Newcastle, May 31, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 28. 



l86 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

urging not that Massachusetts provide for its defense, but 
that she be relieved of that burden. 1 Fort Dummer, he 
pointed out, was o nly three or four days, march at the 
farthest from Crown Point, the recently built but already 
very strong fortress of the French which in turn was only 
a few leagues by easy water communications from Montreal 
in the heart of Canada and at the head of sea-going naviga 
tion of the St. Lawrence; hence the imperative need for 
maintaining Fort Dummer for the protection of the whole 
western frontier of New England was clear. The river 
towns of Massachusetts would be the obvious points of 
attack for a French or hostile Indian force which might get 
access to the Connecticut valley, although smaller settle 
ments in New Hampshire would in such a case be in im 
minent danger, while, should the western frontier of Massa 
chusetts collapse, northwestern Connecticut would be ex 
posed. 

The Fort Dummer episode was an incident in the general 
and ceaseless attempt of Massachusetts in time of war to 

1 After explaining that Fort Dummer and one or two garrison 
houses beyond it (the chief one was the fort at Number 4, now 
Charlestown, New Hampshire), which had been built and garrisoned 
by Massachusetts, had now by the settlement of the boundary been 
awarded to New Hampshire, he recounted that at his accession the 
fort was garrisoned by a Massachusetts officer and twenty men under 
the direction and receiving the pay of that province, and that in view 
of the probability of war with France, in order to preserve from 
burning by the Indians this most important outpost for protecting 
New England from raids or invasion from Canada by way of the 
Connecticut valley, he had secured from the assembly the maintenance of 
the garrison there. He then gave an account of his efforts to have 
the support of it assumed by New Hampshire, in which he had met 
delay, first to allow Governor Wentworth an opportunity to press the 
legislature to make the necessary provision, and then through the 
neglect of the legislature to do so. The legislature were thus negli 
gent notwithstanding they had established a civil government over 
the district. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 187 

induce the colonies holding the sections of the Connecticut 
valley on either side of her to assume an equitable share in 
the defense of all, they tending to rely upon the greater re 
sources and the greater need of Massachusetts to lead her 
to play the part of protector to the rest of New England. 
Massachusetts to a large extent played the role expected of 
her by her weaker neighbors, but often unwillingly, and in 
this case Shirley pointed out both that New Hampshire 
should justly maintain forts on her own territory, and that 
it had been difficult in the past to secure the support of 
Fort Dummer from 1 the Massachusetts assembly, who 
would be averse to continuing the large expense. He pledged 
his urgent support of what the protection of the fron 
tier required, but could not hope the assembly would con 
tinue to support a fort within another province. He thought 
this expense would prove an obstacle in the way of needed 
action O f the assembly for the defense of the English fort 
ress at Annapolis Royal in Nova Scotia, which he would 
also try to secure in addition to the defense of the long 
land and sea frontiers of the province. 

In writing to the board of trade in June he asked their 
directions regarding Ford Dummer. 1 The response was 
unwontedly prompt action. On August 28th, the board 
of trade (they having meanwhile been consulted upon 
Shirley s letters to Newcastle and Harrington on the sub 
ject) reported that New Hampshire should assume the 
support of Fort Dummer, and that the governor of that 
province be directed to warn the assembly that upon failing 
to comply, the crown would be forced to restore the fort 
to Massachusetts with " a proper district contiguous thereto," 
and that meanwhile Shirley be instructed to maintain it 

J For Shirley s discussion of this question, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, 
May 31, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 28; Shirley to Board, June 16, 1744, 
C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 27; Shirley to Harrington, June 20, 1744, C. 0. 5 884, 
Ff, 23. 



!88 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

until New Hampshire acted. 1 This was approved by an 
order in council of September 6, I744. 2 

Shirley also urged upon the legislature at the end of 
May measures less directly related to the defense of Massa 
chusetts. One of these, a law forbidding correspondence 
or trade with the enemies of England, was antagonistic to 
the more immediate interests of that portion of the mer 
chants concerned in illegal trade. Three days earlier (May 
28th) Shirley had issued a proclamation with the advice 
of the council explaining the dangers incident to supplying 
the enemy with provisions or ammunition, and " strictly 
forbidding all persons whatsoever within this province " 
from taking any part in trade directly or indirectly with the 
French colonies or territories, and directing all royal of 
ficials whose duty it was to supervise trade to enforce the 
prohibition so far as possible. 3 An act for the same pur 
pose was passed in June, I744- 4 Shirley suggested that 
Parliament pass an act of the same character applying to 1 all 
the plantations, since that would be necessary unless all 
the colonies acted, to prevent the French from securing sup 
plies from their chief storehouse for the support of their 
American settlements, the English colonies. 5 Finally he 
recommended as a measure of vital interest to Massa 
chusetts as well as the mother country, the provision of 
forces immediately needed for the defense of Annapolis 
Royal, to hold it against the French until reinforcements 
could be sent from England. 

1 Board to Privy Council. Aug. 28, 1744, C. 0. 5 giS, 133. 

2 C. O. 5 885, in, Ff, 74. A copy in Ar., vol. Ixxii, fols. 698-699. 
*Ar., vol. Ixxii, fols. 686-687; Shirley to Newcastle, June 2, 1744, 

Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 126; Shirley to Board, June 16, 1744, C. O. 5 884, 
Ff, 27. 

M. and R., vol. iii, pp. 152-153. 

Shirley to Board, June 16, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 27. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 189 

Upon the arrival of the unofficial report of war Shirley 
had acted at once for the defense of Annapolis Royal by 
ordering the commander of the province ship, then at Piscat- 
aqua in New Hampshire, to sail instantly to Annapolis 
Royal, and to put himself there for forty-eight hours under 
the orders of Lieutenant-Go vernor Mascarene. The ap 
pearance of the Massachusetts province ship was intended 
primarily to awe the unfriendly French inhabitants into a 
discreet behavior. 1 

In the defense of Nova Scotia and the neighboring fisher 
ies against French encroachment, which, if successful, 
would have meant constant peril for all New England 
shipping, the Massachusetts merchants had a heavy stake. 2 
Shirley was urgent in this policy because of the fate of 
Canso, of which he had just learned, and because of infor 
mation from Annapolis Royal of the very bad state of affairs 
there. Lieutenant-Governor Mascarene, of Nova Scotia, 
on May 21, 1744 (three days before the fall O f Canso), sent 
an appeal to Shirley 3 and on June 8th, following, he for 
mally appealed to the governor and assembly of Massa 
chusetts for aid. However, before this action was taken, 
Shirley had made a personal appeal to the legislature on 
that behalf. 4 

The appeal of Mascarene gave a sombre picture of a 
garrison weak in numbers and weaker in personnel, of ruined 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, May 31, 1744, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 28. 

3 For Shirley s recommendations of May 31, 1744, relating to trade 
with the enemy and the defense of Annapolis Royal, cf. extract from 
his message in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 122-124; Jour., May 31, 1744, pp. 7-io. 

3 The Correspondence of the Colonial Governors of Rhode Island, 
1723-1775, ed. by G. S. Kimball (Boston, 1902-1903), vol. i, pp. 265-266. 

*Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 122, note; Mascarene to Shirley, Dec. 8, 1744, 
T i 321 ; Representation of the President of the Council of Nova 
Scotia to the Governor and Assembly of Massachusetts Bay, June 
8, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 44. 



190 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



fortifications, of the additional weakening of their position 
through the fall of Canso, and of the imminent danger of 
attack before aid could arrive from England. This gave 
much force to the request that Shirley send at once at least 
two hundred well-armed men, properly officered and victual 
led, and allow them to remain as a defense until the home 
government could act for that end. 1 

The assembly, seeing the French menace creeping down 
the seaboard from Cape Breton toward their own territory, 
and realizing that the settlements in the eastern part of 
Massachusetts and Maine would be the next to be exposed 
should Annapolis Royal fall, voted on June 12, 1744, to 
raise two volunteer companies of sixty men each, exclusive 
of officers, for the immediate relief and defense of Annapolis 
Royal until such time as aided from home. As Shirley, in 
order to secure the vote for raising the men, had intimated 
that the crown would pay and subsist them, 2 the assembly 
voted a bounty of 20 old tenor for enlistment, but stipulated 
that the men should not be subsisted nor paid by Massachu 
setts and requested Shirley to use his influence with the com 
mander at Annapolis to secure pay and subsistence for 
them from the crown until they were returned home. 3 
However, after Shirley brought the matter up again the 
legislature, on June 2Oth, voted subsistence for three months 
for the men raised for service in Nova Scotia as well as a 
bounty of 20.* At the same time, having received 
Mascarene s memorial of June 8th, Shirley appealed to the 



2 Shirley to General Court, May 31, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 123. 

3 A. and R., vol. xiii, pp. 367-368; Jour., June 12, 1744, p. 28. 

4 A. and R., vol. xiii, pp. 371, 373; Jour., June 19, 1744, p. 38; June 
20, 1744, p. 41 ; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), pp. 426, 429. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR igi 

assembly to increase the number of men to be raised to 
200, but failed to secure the grant asked. 1 

In response to a request of the legislature in their vote 
of men for Annapolis, Shirley appealed to the neighboring 
governments with a view to their assisting in that enter 
prise, 2 but this failed to bring any aid. 3 However, 
Shirley issued his own proclamation for men on June I3th. 4 
The men were quickly raised and on July ist, Shirley em 
barked more than seventy of them for Annapolis Royal 
under convoy of a province guard ship and reported six days 
later that others were expected to follow shortly. Mean 
while things looked both worse and better at Annapolis. 
The French, as Shirley was informed, had raised a party 
of 500 Indians at Menis, not far from Annapolis, and were 
preparing to send a detachment of French with a large 
supply of small arms and two mortars, to join them. On 
the other hand, the engineer Bastide, whom Shirley had 
enabled to reach Annapolis safely at the outbreak of war, 
had been directing the effective labors of nearly TOO men in 
repairing the old works of the fort. Upon the whole, 
Shirley thought the crisis was probably past, although he 
did not propose to relax his efforts. 5 For the time being 
the place as it proved was safe. 

Thus Shirley not only had placed his own house militarily 
in tolerable order, but also had counteracted the effects of 
the culpable negligence of the home government in respect 
to an important post. The principle upon which Shirley 
acted in succoring Annapolis Royal was very like that ex- 

l jour., June 19, 1744, p. 38. 

1 A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 367; Cor. Col. Goz s. of R. /., vol. i, pp. 263-264. 
*Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, p. 180; Cor. Col. Govs. of R. L, vol. i, 
P- 263. 

4 Ar., vol. Ixxii, fols. 690-691. 

5 Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 131. 



I 9 2 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

pressed in the maxim that an offensive is the best de 
fense. To be sure Annapolis was on the defensive, but in 
holding it he was fighting the war largely beyond the borders 
of Massachusetts, and keeping the coast and frontiers rel 
atively safe through a very small expenditure of men and 
treasure. Safety, however, could be assured only by well 
fortified and adequately manned frontiers, and Shirley, while 
he aided Annapolis, was not less zealous to complete and 
man the defenses of the province. The need for this was 
obvious to the assembly as well as to himself. Shirley s 
splendid poise and vigorous leadership carried the assembly 
with him in a series of measures for the defense of the 
province, adopted with the promptness which the conditions 
demanded. During the first few months of the war, in 
fact, the legislature showed some signs of panic. The in 
grained distrust of and antipathy for the prerogative on 
the part of the representatives was almost swallowed up 
in their desire to cooperate in doing the things needful for 
the safety of all. The keen rivalries between the merchants 
and the country party in the province also were submerged 
and attention given without marked discrimination to both 
sea and land frontiers, whereby a serious breach of unity was 
avoided. Shirley, on his part, met the house halfway 
with unassuming dignity and candor, and through the pe 
culiarly gracious and convincing style which usually charac 
terized his public papers, made the necessary seem the inevit 
able. 

The situation was still beset by perplexities. The de 
fenses for the frontiers were not yet complete, and a gener 
ous program for completing, equipping and manning them 
seemed almost if not quite beyond the power of the prov 
ince. Shirley had been cramped in the matter of issuing 
bills of credit before the declaration of war and had already 
used his special liberty to allow an issue of 8,000 for ex- 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 193 

traordinary war expenses. Meanwhile he had been granted 
no liberty to consent to larger issues to meet the crisis which 
he had foreseen but of which the board of trade was oblivi 
ous. Ever with such liberty, issues would be followed by 
complications, since there would be rapid depreciation of 
the bills if the date fixed for drawing them in was distant, 
and an increase of the already heavy tax burden of the 
people if the date fixed was near. The latter alternative 
seemed mandatory under Shirley s instructions. In the 
case of large issues there was no small danger that deprecia 
tion would reduce the bills of credit to practical worthless- 
ness, and without them it seemed that the enemy would at the 
least force a large contraction of the commerce, fisheries 
and frontiers of the province, and perhaps conquer her and 
her neighbors. Either alternative involved huge future 
burdens for the people. 

The legislative action obtained by the governor was bet 
ter and quicker than could have been expected from the cum 
brous parliamentary procedure which it was necessary to 
employ in both houses upon even the most trifling matter 
requiring the grant of public money. The representatives, 
although including able men who conducted contests for 
popular rights with insight and skill, were unaccustomed 
to managing a legislative program of any complexity and 
lacked the mechanism for the task if one were presented. 
Consequently Shirley s program appears as a mosaic, every 
constituent part of which received individual and often 
undivided attention. Only a few points were ever pre 
sented to the assembly at one time, and by dint of oc 
casionally repeating proposals after an interval the gover 
nor usually secured the essential things asked. The initia 
tive lay almost wholly with him, the house infrequently 
acting without waiting for suggestions. Since action by 
the house upon proposals made by way of reference to a 



i 9 4 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



committee was usually prompt, the way was cleared for 
the presentation of a succession of matters upon a series of 
days separated by short intervals sometimes upon consecu 
tive days. 

Five days after the official copy of the declaration of 
war was received the house named a committee to prepare 
a bill for " the better regulating and carrying on the affairs 
of the war/ 1 Soon the administration of the war activities 
of the province developed a sort of permanent war council 
in the guise of a joint committee of the two houses for de 
fense. It was not apparently executive in functions further 
than in the giving of advice, but considered and reported 
upon practically all matters great and small relating to the 
war. It represented the response of the two houses to the 
invitation of the governor to offer such advice and assistance 
as were consistent with the nature of military affairs and 
the constitution of the government. 2 

Shirley at times asked the advice of this committee upon 
memorials and petitions, while matters relating to the war 
requiring legislation almost always received a reference to 
it, usually in response to a message from Shirley. In a 
legislative sense it may be said to have been a standing con 
ference committee of the two houses upon war legislation in 
advance of action by them, and served greatly to expedite 
proceedings. The committee also served in a measure as 
a bond between Shirley and the representatives and doubt 
less his tact in working with it and with the house hastened 
the fruition of many plans. 3 In addition to its membership 

l jour., June 7, 1744, p. 22. 

2 Ibid., June i, 17 44, PP- 10-11. 

"The legislative system thus devised was rapid in action. Measures 
urged by the governor were often introduced in the house as bills on 
the day following his recommendation of them, and sometimes on 
the same day, having usually passed through the committee on defense 
meanwhile. Except in dealing with the more troublesome questions 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 195 

on the important committee of defense, the house named 
special committees for temporary military functions, such 
as those to accompany the governor in inspecting fortifica 
tions, and one for investigating the question of fortifying 
Governor s Island. Such committee action was usually in 
vited by the governor, but when taken independently inter 
fered with the efficiency of the war machine. 1 Differences 
between the governor and council were unknown, and for 
a season bickering between the houses almost equally so. 
Differences of judgment between them were rapidly ironed 
out by compromise. 

To make room for the unwonted pressure of business 
due to the war the house, while refusing to defer the con 
sideration of matters of a private nature which had been 
put upon the calendar for the June session to the follow 
ing one, 2 reduced the consideration of such matters to a 
minimum. 

Strangely enough Shirley and the house had in a general 
way exchanged positions since his accession upon the matter 
of large issues of paper money. At the outset he had em 
ployed all his persuasion to check the inflation sentiment 
in the house, and when he succeeded in securing the accep 
tance of the principles that the tax in any year should be 
large enough to prevent the issues of that year from increas 
ing the volume of paper in circulation, and that all paper 
should be called in within a brief term of years after issue, 
this was accomplished. Now the governor placed the end 

the passage of such a bill through both houses might be expected 
within three or four days of its introduction. Committees dealing 
with questions relating to the war sat almost incessantly, including 
Sunday. 

VThe legislature was not ready to appropriate money for the forti 
fication of Governor s Island until Oct. 24, 1744, when 500 was voted 
for two small batteries and a blockhouse. A. and R., vol. xiii,, 
PP. 397-398. 

2 Jour., June 5, 1744, P- 17- 



I0 ,6 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

sought, the defense of the province, above the evils of paper 
money, and was obviously ready far to exceed the quantity 
which his instructions allowed as soon as the home govern 
ment should permit such action. The house was not blind 
to the urgent needs of the hour, but saw most clearly the 
burden which would fall upon their constituents. 

It happened, therefore, that the house kept a prudent 
hand upon the purse strings. It frequently provided for 
forces and supplies in smaller quantities than asked (forc 
ing Shirley to ask for augmentation) and delayed providing 
pay and subsistence for men in garrison until forced to do< 
so to keep the works from, being abandoned. In some cases, 
finding it impossible to secure funds from the assembly or 
the royal servants in America for vital purposes, Shirley 
cut the Gordian knot by executive action. His early rec 
ommendation that 500 barrels of gunpowder be purchased 
in London * having been ignored, and the committee of the 
general court for purchasing supplies having been unable to 
secure an adequate store of powder in the province. Shirley 
ordered the provincial agent to purchase 200 barrels in Lon 
don and urged that the house maintain the honor of the 
government by reimbursing the agent. 2 This he found 
them loath to do. 3 Also when no funds were available 
in America with which to purchase food and clothing for 
the garrison at Annapolis Royal, Shirley acted apparently 
without precedent by drawing bills without authority upon 
the lords of the treasury; but with the proceeds he kept the 
garrison efficient. 4 

l jour., June 4, 1744, p. 15. 

*Ibid., Aug. 10, 1744, p. 65. 

*Ibid., Aug. 10-17, 1744, PP- 65-73. 

4 Ibid., Jan. 8, 1745, p. 165. The Journals of the house of representa 
tives, the Court Records and the Council Records for the war period, 
passim, are the chief sources for the above picture of the way in which 
the different branches of the provincial government coalesced for 
war purposes. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 107 

Shirley s policy, aside from the self-defense of Massa 
chusetts and the protection of Nova Scotia, included efforts 
to secure the cooperation o<f New England and New York, 
for the purpose of making their united strength available 
against the common foe. Together they held a position 
parallel to the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, the great 
artery of communication for the French in Canada, consti 
tuting an elongated base, any section of which mighr be the 
scene of a rapid concentration of French and hostile Indians 
against the adjacent English. 

On June 2, 1744, Shirley having finally received official 
notification of war, asked the legislature to act to secure co 
operation with other colonies, especially with New York 
and others :i whose inland borders may be exposed to the 
assaults of the enemy," and made the further suggestion that 
Governor Clinton of New York be asked to use his influence 
with the Indians allied with him (meaning the Iroquois) 
to maintain peace with Massachusetts. 1 At the same time 
Shirley within three hours of their arrival sent on despatches 
to the other colonies to the southward (probably a like 
notification to them) by expresses overland, and persuaded 
the assembly to hire an express boat to deliver the packet 
addressed .o Nova Scotia. 2 

The house responded at once to his first request with a 
vote that despatches be sent to the governments of New 
York, Rhode Island, Connecticut and New Hampshire ask 
ing aid in protecting the frontiers for the time being. 3 
This was followed on June 4th by the election of five com 
missioners to treat with the governor of New York and 
representatives of the other neighboring governments for 
their mutual safety and defense or annoying the enemy, 

l jour., June 2, 1744, p. 12. 

"Shirley to Newcastle, June 2, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 126. 

8 Jour., June 2, 1744, p. 14; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), p. 394. 



I9 8 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

and to make treaties with Indian tribes. 1 These commis 
sioners were " fully authorized to treat with said govern 
ments (or commissioners chosen by them respectively) 
either separately or conjunctively at such times and places 
as they shall judge best. . . ." 2 

Shirley sent prompt notice of the calling of the conference, 
which it was suggested should be held at Albany in New 
York, to the governors interested. New York was the 
logical meeting place, that colony containing the most ex 
posed highway for invasion between the English colonies 
and Canada and also the home of the Iroquois, the chief 

l lour., June 4, 1744, p. 15; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), pp. 393-394- 
The commissioners were John Stoddard, the veteran commander on 
the western frontier, the chief of the " lords of the valley " as the 
military leaders of the Connecticut valley were called, Jacob Wendell, 
Thomas Berry, John Choate and Thomas Hutchinson. (Jour., June 
4, 1744, p. 16.) Stoddard was a power in the province in time of war, 
known and respected by the Indians, and a man of great ability, 
courage and independence of mind. In anticipation of the outbreak 
of war he had written Shirley about conditions upon the western 
frontier and suggested a plan for carrying on the war. This Shirley 
strongly approved and informed him that he should govern himself 
very much by it. At the same time he assured him that he would 
take care of Stoddard s own interest, which not improbably means 
that the governor suggested his heading the commission to confer with 
the other governments. Upon receiving the English declaration of 
war the governor wrote him of its receipt without waiting to have 
copies of it made that he might notify the frontier towns and settle 
ments and make dispositions against surprise and for learning the 
movements of the enemy accordingly. (Shirley to Stoddard, June 2, 
1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 127-128.) For an interesting story of the 
deference shown to this imperious chieftain- of the west by Shirley, 
cf. Dwight, Travels in New England and New York (New Haven, 
1821-1822), vol. i, p. 332. 

*Jour., June 7, 1744, p. 21. Their commission named Albany or 
elsewhere in New York as the place and June I2th or as soon after as 
possible as the time for their conference. Commission to John Stod 
dard, etc., June 8, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 129-130; Conn. H. S. Colls., 
vol. xi, pp. 174-176. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 199 

Indian allies of the English, with whom New York was to 
hold a conference on the coming June 12th. 1 

New York was, of course, pleased with the arrangement, 
and Connecticut sent commissioners, but the other New 
England colonies showed no interest. 2 

The conference with the Indians at Albany was fairly 
.successful, resulting not merely in a renewal of pledges of 
friendship between the Iroquois and Massachusetts, 3 but 



2 Rhode Island was covered by her neighbors, and New Hampshire 
was not pleased at the prospect of taking over Fort Dummer and 
other frontier posts. For action upon the matter by the New England 
colonies, cf. Law to Shirley, June 19, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 127, note, 
and Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 191-192; Willard to Greene, June 
5, 1744, and Greene to Shirley, June 8, 1744, Cor. Col. Govs. of R. L, 
vol. i, pp. 259, 262; N. H. Pr. Ps., Message of House to Governor, 
July 3, 1744, vol. v, p. 237. 

3 Cf. Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 185-189, 193-194, 195-197; 
Jour., June 29, 1744, p. 53; New York Historical Society Collections, 
Publication Fund, vol. ii, pp. 511, 515-522, vol. iii, pp. 129, 131, 135, 
137, 138, 140; Wraxall, An abridgement of the Indian Affairs, con 
tained in four folio volumes, transacted in the colony of New York, 
from the year 1678 to the year 1751, ed. by C. H. Mcllwain (Cambridge, 
1915), Harvard Historical Studies, vol. xxi, p. 235. 

Massachusetts had earlier sent commissioners to treat with the 
Six Nations in times of stress. This occurred in 1694, while Indian 
raids were taking place within and near her borders. In 1708, during 
Queen Anne s war, the Iroquois sachems proposed that a " fixt place 
should be appointed for the brethren of New England, Maryland, 
and Virginia to meet the Indians as occasion may offer, and that they 
had pitched upon Albany as the proper place." This, however, was 
not in accord with the policy of the New York government, and in 
particular with that of the Indian commissioners at Albany, in keep 
ing negotiations with the Six Nations as exclusively as the exigencies 
of intercolonial relations would permit in their own hands. As an 
illustration of this policy the Albany commissioners addressed the 
Iroquois on behalf of the other governments in 1719. 

In 1723 during Lovewell s war the strong interest of the Massa 
chusetts government in the attitude of the Iroquois led them to seek 
-a conference between their commissioners and the sachems of the 



200 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

also in a visit of two Mohawk chiefs representing the 
Iroquois confederacy to Massachusetts. These visitors 
Shirley persuaded to go 1 with gentlemen acting for the prov 
ince to visit each of the Indian tribes upon its eastern 
frontiers, and to insist that those tribes preserve a strict 
neutrality between the French and English during the war, 
upon pain of having the Mohawks join the English against 
them. The border Indians appeared terrified by this threat 
and promised " to lay their commands " upon the Cape 
Sable and St. John s Indians, who had lately engaged in 
hostilities in Nova Scotia, to desist from them. Further, 
on August loth, new evidence of the awe in which the 
Indians then held the Massachusetts government appeared 
with the arrival in Boston of " a chief sagamore and coun 
sellor, from the Cagnawagha Indians near Canada, com 
monly called the French Mohawks, with a belt of wampum 
from his tribe for the government of this province, in 
order to assure the government that the Cagnawagha In 
dians had made an agreement with the Six Nations to ob 
serve an exact neutrality between the French and English, 
and had declared to the governor of Canada, that they would 
not take up the hatchet on the side of the French as formerly, 
and to make a treaty of peace with this government." 

The fruits of Shirley s vigorous policy had already ap 
peared in the case of one of the eastern tribes named Pig- 
wackets, who had come to Boston and " put themselves and 
their wives, and children under his majesty s protection 
within this government; the men offering themselves to be 
employed in his majesty s service," something unheard of, 
Shirley said, since the French had " practiced upon the 
Indians." 

confederacy, and this occurred apparently without other participants. 
This initiated negotiations of some length at Albany and Boston 
resulting in neutrality of the Six Nations. For the above incidents, 
cf. ibid., pp. 25, 27, 62, 125, 145-149, passim. 



MEETING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 2 OI 

The governor saw in the situation a fair prospect of a 
general neutrality of the Indians, which would be not only 
a novelty but a great disappointment to the French who were 
reputed to have expected all the border tribes, even the 
Mohawks, to join them. Since the power of the French in 
Canada against the English settlements always consisted 
largely in their ability to stir up the Indians against them, 
he regarded a neutrality as a great point gained. Yet he 
foresaw that this was likely to be a temporary state, es 
pecially in the case of the eastern Indians, who were too 
weak, and too much under the influence of French mis 
sionaries to be likely to remain firm in such a policy. 1 
Shirley later reported that some of the Pigwackets Had been 
employed at Annapolis Royal and others in the eastern part 
of the province and had behaved pretty well. 2 

1 For Shirley s dealings with the tribes between his frontiers and the 
French, through the Mohawks and otherwise, cf. Shirley to Board, 
Aug. 10, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 138-140; Jour., July 18, 1744, p. 57. 

*Ibid., Nov. 29, 1744, p. no. 



CHAPTER X 
MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 

SHIRLEY S teamwork with the legislature made effective 
measures for the protection of the frontiers possible; his 
Indian policy reduced their necessary scope. Vigor, how 
ever, characterized the early measures taken. 

A vote was passed by the assembly on June 2d, to raise 
500 men for protection of the frontiers and to increase all 
the garrisons. The following day Shirley sent orders to 
the colonels of the militia regiments stationed upon the fron 
tiers to impress or enlist the men thus ordered and to post 
them, the whole operation requiring less than a week. A 
few days later these forces were augmented by 500 more 
men. 1 Shortly afterward it was also voted to erect forti 
fications between Colrain upon the western frontiers and 
the Dutch settlements. 2 

Among Shirley s early recommendations to the assembly 
was that they provide a guard to protect mast trees for the 
use of the navy, which led to a vote of the house requesting 
the captain-general to detail men to service for the protec 
tion of the mast cutters. 3 

Shirley also gave considerable emphasis to sea power in 
his plans for the war. The province had been modest in 
its naval establishment, usually limiting it to a sno\v, named 

l Jour., June 2, 1744, p. 14. June 13, 1744, P- 3; Ct. Recs.. vol. xvii (4), 
p. 412; Shirley to Board, Aug. 10, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 138. 

Jour., June 14, 1744, p. 32; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), p. 413; A. and R., 
vol. xiii, p. 368. 

8 Jour., June 8, 1744, p. 24; June 14, 1744, p. 32. 
202 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 203 

the Prince of Orange. This served to guard its fairly ex 
tensive coast in the absence of British warships, which were 
not usually stationed there. Shirley s proposals included 
measures to induce enlistments in the province snow, to 
encourage privateering by vessels from Massachusetts and 
also from other English colonies, and to provide one or more 
guard ships to protect the fishery. 1 The two houses voted one 
guard ship, carrying eighty men and six guns, to keep the 
fishery in operation, advising the governor to impress guns 
and stores in private hands to equip the sloop Orphan, 
which had already been impressed. This advice he in 
stantly followed. Later the houses made further provision 
for guarding the coast. They also passed a law to en 
courage privateering against the French. 2 

Before fall there were in the provincial service a snow, a 
brigantine and a sloop serving as guard ships. These, 
with eight or nine privateers fitted out at Boston, had taken 
by September 22d more than forty French vessels, besides 
greatly disturbing the French fishery. The fishery was 
attacked in part by breaking up some of their small settle 
ments and " burning their works and houses as the enemy 
did at Canso, which kind of hostility there I perceive they 
now think wrong, and repent of setting the example." 
Among the French ships taken was at least one store ship 
for Canada and three or four provision ships bound for 
Louisburg. 3 

Shirley secured in June, 1744, acts " for levying sol 
diers " and " to prevent soldiers and seamen in his majesty s 
service being arrested for debt," which prescribed the con- 

l lbid., June 8, 1744, p. 23; June 9, 1744, p. 25. 

*Ibid., June 12, 1744, p. 29, June 18, 1744, p. 37; A. and R., vol. iii, 
pp. 143-144; Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
pp. 132-133- 

Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 148; Shirley 
to Admiralty, Sept. 22, 1744, Ad. I, 3817. 



204 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

ditions under which troops were to be raised for service 
and protected in it from arrest. 1 

By this time, the first alarm having subsided, the house 
became critical of expenditure, and during the summer 
voted subsistence for the forces upon the frontiers for only 
a month or two at a time and limited to 200 the number of 
men for the western frontier to be supplied in the later 
period. 2 Although such a policy was apparently not neces 
sary to secure frequent meetings of the house, it did in fact 
make them inevitable. This policy of retrenchment also 
left the frontiers scantily manned. 

On October loth, the governor, in urging the renewal of 
the pay and subsistence of the men on the frontiers, pointed 
out that the Indians were restless, that they were being in 
cited by the French, and that, although the relief of An 
napolis Royal had probably saved the frontiers from a 
general attack, there was a plot on foot to secure the revolt 
of Nova Scotia from 1 England. The reply of the house was 
to reduce the forces upon the western frontier to sixty men 
to serve as scouts for four months, and to provide for re 
taining only 200 men in the forts to the eastward, till 
November I9th. 

Shirley, however, was still urbane. On November 
29th, he proposed in general to substitute marching forces 
upon the frontiers (especially adapted to the winter season) 
as a means of saving expense and securing earlier news of 
enemy movements. At the same time he suggested that pay 
ing the Penobscot warriors, without asking service of them, 
would cost hardly more than one-fourth as much as guarding 
against breaches, of their present neutrality, would en 
courage the frontier settlers to hold their ground, which 

1 A. and R., vol. Hi, pp. 144-147- 

*Jour., June 29, 1744, p. 541 July 19, 1744, P- 59; Aug. 16, 1744, p. 71; 
A. and R., vol. xiii, pp. 37$, 379, 33. 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 205 

some were already failing to do, and would at the same 
time discourage the French and their allied Indians from 
attacks. He added that he had demanded of the Penob- 
scots and neighboring tribes their quota of men to serve 
against the Cape Sable and St. John s Indians/ and ad 
vised that, in case they refused a firm, friendship, hostile 
measures be employed " to Deduce this handful o>f men to 
proper terms." 2 

A warning sent to Shirley by the New York Indian com 
missioners, apparently in the latter half of 1744, stated 
"that the influence of the French is so strong over the 
Indians living in and about Canada that they [the com 
missioners] are of opinion the French will prevail on those 
Indians to break the neutrality they agreed to with regard 
to the British colonies . . . ." 3 This shows that the policy 
of keeping those Indians neutral was, as Shirley had ex 
pected, proving short-lived. Even as the governor ex 
plained his policy to the house, commissioners named by 
him were attempting to conduct a conference with the eastern 
tribes at St. George s, 4 but with indifferent success. 5 

At the same time the governor reported that he had dis 
charged the vessels and crews taken into the provincial ser- 

1 Shirley had explained to the assembly in October at their request 
that the participation by these tribes in attacks upon Annapolis Royal 
and the killing of some Massachusetts men had forced him to declare 
war upon them. To make the warfare effectual and a lesson to other 
tribes be urged offering a bounty for scalps and prisoners taken from 
them. This, after some hesitation, was done. Declaration of war 
against the Cape Sable s and St. John s Indians (broadside), Oct. 19, 
1744, E, 10, 102, Boston Public Library; Jour., Oct. 19, 1744, p. 98; 
Oct. 22, 1744, p. 99; Oct. 25, 1744, pp. 106-107; A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 399. 

* Ibid., Nov. 29, 1744, p. in. 

Wraxall, op. cit., p. 237. 

*Jour., Dec. n, 1744, p. 129. 

5 Declaration by Pepperrell for Commissioners, Nov. 29, 1744, and 
Commissioners to Bradbury, Dec. i, 1744, Ar., vol. xxxi, fols. 516-517. 



2o6 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

vice because of the war crisis, as there were no funds for 
continuing them. 1 A financial dilemma was at hand, and 
Shirley took it up with the two houses. More funds, he 
pointed out, were needed for the treasury, and he could not 
consent to more issues of paper money unless a tax were 
laid that year to keep the sum outstanding within the limits 
set by his instructions. After recounting the ameliorating 
alterations made under his administration in the regulations 
by the home government for the issue of bills of credit, in 
cluding the remitting of the suspending clause and freedom 
to raise extra sums for fortifications, he added : " nor have 
my best endeavors been wanting to prevent the present diffi 
culty by making frequent applications to the offices of state 
for further inlargement of my liberty to issue bills during 
the continuance of the present war with France." These 
applications, however, had not received a reply. He had 
done his best for the province in the matter. 

He then suggested that the house was able by present 
taxation, to ease the situation in the future. The burden, 
he estimated, if indebtedness continued increasing on the 
existing scale, would at the end of five years equal 115,000, 
and at the end of ten years would crush the province. He 
further pointed out that in the last French war the tax 1 
had been heavier per capita than so far in this one. 2 

This suggestion of Shirley was too strong doctrine for 
the legislators who doubtless were greatly harassed by 
their constituents. Their evident disgust at the situation 
soon appeared. On December 5th, they voted to name, a 
committee " to consider of some proper method for the 

l jour., Nov. 29, 1744, p. 113. The general court thereupon voted 
after a short delay to support until further notice upon the provincial 
snow, the only public vessel remaining in service, a complement of six 
men only, including officers. A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 412. 

2 Jour., Nov. 29, 1744, p. in. 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 



207 



payment of the soldiers in the service of the province." 
This committee was apparently directed to take into question 
" the garrisons necessary to be continued in the service of 
the province and the exposed settlements in the eastern parts 
of the province." It reported in the afternoon of the same 
day that 200 men " be forthwith dismissed," and that 100 
men be distributed among various posts in stated propor 
tions and with specified duties, while 33 men apportioned 
among the eastern garrisons were to " be dismissed." 

The house upon the same day " Read and Ordered, that the 
above report be accepted, and that the committee appointed 
to prepare a bill for establishing the wages, ... of sundry 
persons .... in the service of the province, be directed 
to wait upon his excellency the captain general, and ac 
quaint him with the resolution of the house upon this affair, 
and desire him to give his orders accordingly." 

Shirley replied to this message at the end of three days 
expressing his regret " that you have entirely mistaken 
your province in this affair." After admitting that they 
and the council had the function of raising money for the 
support of troops he added : 

but as to the part of the militia out of which they are to be 
drawn, the posting of those soldiers when raised, and the duty 
upon which they are to be employed, the determination of it 
appertains only to the captain-general, who by the royal char 
ter of this province, as well as by His Majesty s commission, 
has the sole government of the militia; and I believe this in 
stance of intrenching upon that power (take it in all in [sic] 
its circumstances) is new and without precedent in this prov 
ince, since His Majesty had the appointment of a governor 
over it. 

He deprecated any breach "of that mutual confidence 
1 Ibid. ) Dec. 5, 1744, p. 119. 



2 oS WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

which ought always to subsist between you and me," which 
he would do all that was reasonable to maintain. After 
further analysis of the report he expressed a hope that the 
house would " be sensible of your mistake." Continuing 
he requested that they consider further the wisdom of 
withdrawing thirty-three men from the eastern garrisons, 
which he believed would endanger the province. Pema- 
quid, he observed, was less effectively defended than be 
fore the war with France, and weakening the other forts 
would invite Indian incursions. 

The house promptly retreated from its position and 
voted to " desire " Shirley to raise 100 men for the defense 
of the eastern frontiers, " if his excellency shall think 
proper," and to be apportioned " in such division as His 
Excellency shall direct." Thus the way was prepared 
for hearty cooperation in the future. 

Certainly the assumption of the right to direction of 
military affairs by the house was in part one of the fruits 
of Shirley s earlier forbearance. He did not make an issue 
when the house named committees to regulate the expendi 
ture of public money for military purposes or voted funds 
for the support of troops in such a form as to specify the 
number who were to receive pay. On the other hand Bel 
cher by following the contrary course had found it im 
possible for a season to secure appropriations for public pur 
poses. As a means to securing the cooperation of the 
house in all affairs of government a man of tact and force 
would find Shirley s method immeasurably better, while 
a governor not possessed of those qualities would be un 
able by any device to get effective action without surrender 
to the assembly. 

J For Shirley s reply and the subsequent action of the house, cf. 
Jour., Dec. 8, 1744, p. 124. For a discussion of earlier instances of the 
assumption of like control of military affairs, cf. Spencer, op. cit., 
pp. 120-121. 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE-ANNAPOLIS 



209 



Meanwhile, matters outside the province were claiming 
no little attention. The captives taken at Canso had been 
at Louisburg little more than a month, before a flag of truce 
and a schooner from the commander there appeared at 
Boston bringing women and children, fourteen " lame in 
curable soldiers o>f the Canso companies," five able-bodied 
prisoners who- had worked their way as able seamen, and 
Ensign Bradstreet (who had also been at Canso) as the 
bearer of a letter from M. Duquesnel, proposing an ex 
change of prisoners. Thereby the French were relieved of 
many mouths to feed and the English received few men 
capable of bearing arms. 1 

Provisions were short at Louisburg and the prisoners 
were soon suffering privations, as a consequence of which 
Bradstreet was made an intercessor with Shirley for the 
officers and their families, 2 and also for the common sol 
diers who had been taken at Canso , that they might be 
furnished with provisions necessary to keep them alive. a 
Shirley was very cautious about sending provisions for 
fear they would be used by the French, but finally sent one- 
third to one-half of what was requested for the officers, re 
fusing altogether to send any to the men. 4 

Duquesnel was desirous of exchanging prisoners, of whom 
Shirley had a considerable number through the capture of 
ships at sea. 5 Shirley, after investigating the conduct of 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 132. The whole 
number of persons sent was about 90, including women and children. 
Jour., Oct. 16, 1744, pp. 88-89. 

2 Patt Heron, etc., to Shirley, June 10, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 104. 

3 Heron, etc., to Bradstreet, C. O. 5 900, 105; Shirley to Board, July 
25, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 136. 

4 Ibid. ; Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 147 ; 
Heron, etc., to Shirley, and accompanying data, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 45. 

6 Duquesnel to Shirley, June 28, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 102; Shirley to 
Duquesnel, July 26, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 99. 



2io WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

other governors in time of war, decided that his commission 
gave authority to proceed with an exchange of prisoners, 1 
and agreed to Duquesnel s proposal, but with the reservation 
that able-bodied Frenchmen subject to confinement for the. 
duration of the war should not be exchanged on equal 
terms for crippled or invalid soldiers to be released by the 
terms of their surrender at the end of a year, but who mean 
while would be a burden upon the country in which they 
might be. 2 Shirley therefore sent a smaller number of 
prisoners than the French had done. 

Nevertheless, seemingly wishing to: meet the standards 
of humanity in the conduct of warfare of a relatively en 
lightened age, even though in the midst of American wilds 
and savage allies, Duquesnel preferred not to hold the 
English in a condition of starvation. He sought, however, 
to release them, upon better terms than Shirley would grant, 
and therefore made a new agreement \vith Captain Heron re 
garding the men captured at Canso, which would have ex 
tended the period of their incapacity to bear arms more than 
three months. 3 Meanwhile Duquesnel had professed to 

1 Shirley to Board, July 25, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 136. 

Shirley to Duquesnel, July 26, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 99. Nine of the 
incapacitated men returned by the French were " cured of their in 
dispositions so as to be very fit in the opinion of two of their officers 
for garrison duty " by July 2Oth. Shirley to Board, July 25, 1744, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 134. 

3 This provided that in consideration of their not being taken to 
Canada as a necessary step to secure food, which would inevitably 
delay their release beyond the time set by their capitulation, they gave 
their pledge not to serve against France until Sept. i, 1745. Under 
the agreement the men would be of little service during the campaign 
of the following year instead of being ready for service as their 
capitulation specified on May 24, 1745. Meanwhile the English and 
not the French must support them. Agreement of Duquesnel and 
Heron, Sept 14, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 128; Heron to Shirley, Sept. 20, 
1744, C. O. 5 900, 127 ; Shirley to Duquesnel, Sept. 22, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 125. 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 2 II 

be unable to exchange the able-bodied of the Canso garrison 
till the expiration of the year for which they had surren 
dered, being bound by the terms of capitulation. 1 

Shirley received the troops who were sent after the 
making o>f this agreement, including the Canso garrison and 
others to* the number of about three hundred and forty, 
but repudiated the new agreement made by Heron, denying 
his authority to make it. The troops were stationed in 
Castle William, and Shirley referred the question of their 
disposition to the home government. 2 He returned some 
Frenchmen for those sent at this time, but since he claimed 
to have secured English prisoners three or four times as 
many in number as the Frenchmen returned to Louisburg, 
he presumably counted non-combatants in his estimate.* 
Among those sent from Louisburg who 1 were accepted by 
Shirley were a number belonging to New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania. This 
led to feeling on the part of the house, they considering that 
Massachusetts was paying for the exchange of prisoners not 
her own.* 

It appears from these events that Shirley secured more 
men, whom he needed to protect Annapolis Royal, and: 
that Duquesnel conserved provisions, which he needed to 



Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 145, 147-148; 
Shirley to Admiralty, Sept. 22, 1744, Ad. I, 3817; Jour., Oct. 16, 1744, 
pp. 88-89. 

Ibid. 

4 Shirley agreed that it was not just for her to do so and asked the 
advice of the house as to proper procedure when men not natives of 
Massachusetts but in the service of the province or of its merchants,, 
or men not belonging to the province but sent with Massachusetts men, 
were offered for exchange. The house would go no further than to 
exchange men in the public service of Massachusetts. For this episode, 
cf. Jour., Oct. 16, 1744, pp. 88-90; Oct. 17, 1744, pp. 92, 93. 



212 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

maintain his garrison; but the balance of advantage clearly 
remained with the Englishman. 

The question of provisions at Louisburg was obviously 
acute, another sign of which was the effort of Duquesnel 
to secure an agreement from Shirley to a neutrality in 
regard to the English and French fisheries in North 
American waters (after the English fishing post at Canso 
had been destroyed). This Shirley declared he was unable 
to agree to, and pointed out in a letter home that the French 
not only had great need of the fishery but would employ a 
neutrality to secure an advantage in that industry which the 
existing conditions would favor. 1 

Amid these diverse episodes of local concern, Annapolis 
Royal had been occupying the center of the American stage 
an the war between England and France. Shirley s first 
reinforcement to the garrison arrived July fourth and found 
the garrison besieged by a body of about 300 Indians, led 
by a French priest and three other Frenchmen, one calling 
himself an officer. These enthusiastic allies of the French 
had demanded the surrender of the fort, burned some out 
lying buildhigs, killed Itwo soldiers, and also most of the 
garrison s cattle. The savages went gaily down to the 
shore upon the arrival of the Massachusetts troops to wel 
come them with open arms, under the impression that the 
latiter were French who were expected from Louisburg. 
This mistake having been rectified, the besiegers took to 
their heels. 

Meanwhile the French inhabitants of the district were 
exhibiting the discreet behavior which Shirley had sought 
to induce. The arrival of the Massachusetts reinforce 
ments drew from Mascarene an epistolary sigh of relief. 
This was made a little less hearty through the writer s per- 

Duquesnel to Shirley, June 28, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 102; Shirley to 
Board, July 25, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 137; Shirley to Duquesnel, 
July 26, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 99- 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 



213 



plexity over taking care of seventy men when he had but 
twenty beds, and over trying to fight the Indians without 
rangers, for a supply of whom with a competent leader he 
repeated a request to Shirley. At the same time the 
engineer, Bastide, sent the Massachusetts governor a paean 
of praise of the conduct of a few Indians sent by him, and 
begged their numbers might be increased. 

The remainder of the detachment of 120 granted by the 
Massachusetts assembly, plus nine salvaged from the relics 
of the Canso garrison, were sent by Shirley, July 20th. 1 

These proceedings becoming known in England caused 
the sentiments of gratitude which all men should feel upon 
being extricated from difficulties beyond their power to cope 
with. The upshot of the action taken (through the usual 
channels) was that 

His majesty in council . . . being well pleased with the duti- 
full and zealous behaviour of William Shirley, Esqr., his 
governor of the Massachusetts Bay in obtaining the afore 
mentioned succours for his province of Nova Scotia, doth 
therefore hereby signifye his royal approbation of the said 
governor s conduct therein and his majesty is likewise pleased 
to declare that he will make good the engagement entred into 
by the said governor for the pay of the succours. . . . 2 

Three days later there was approved by the king also a 
special instruction to Governor Shirley which should be 
read in connection with the events leading to the order in 
council quoted in part above. The new instruction revised 
the twelfth instruction of the original series to the effect that 
since 

J For this early phase f the campaign, cf. Mascarene to Shirley, 
July 4, 1744, C. O. 5 884, 479, Ff, 46; ditto to ditto, July 7, 1744, C. O. 
5 900, 109; Bastide to Shirley, July 7, 1744, C. O. 5 884, 483, Ff, 46; 
Jour., July 18, 1744, p. 57; Shirley to Board, July 25, 1744, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, p. 134; Mascarene to Warren, Oct. 22, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 143. 

Order in Council, Sept. 6, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 143. 



214 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



it has been represented to us, that the said sum of thirty thou 
sand pounds [the sum Shirley was allowed to emit annually 
in bills of credit without a suspending clause] may not be suffi 
cient during the time of war for the defense and necessary 
support of our government, and forasmuch as many unfore 
seen accidents may arise which may demand an immediate 
supply, it is therefore our will and pleasure to dispense with 
our said twelfth instruction, and we do hereby allow you in 
case of emergencys to give your consent to such acts as may 
be necessary for the supply of the treasury of our said prov 
ince with bills of public credit during the continuance of the 
present war, provided the money thereby raised be appro 
priated to the necessary support and defense of our said 

province only. 

t 

When the knowledge that war had come reached America, 
Shirley became emphatic upon the need for permission to 
issue bills of credit required for the conduct of the war with 
out a suspending clause. The response at home, although 
relatively rapid as the startled government found itself over 
taken by the Nemesis of war, was grudging in spirit, and 
was so tardy that Massachusetts was left straining at her 
bonds throughout the first year of the French war before 
the permission was known there. It was this delay that 
forced Shirley to struggle along with only a partial pro 
vision for war needs. 1 

Thus did Shirley s rescue of Annapolis by means neces 
sarily unauthorized show that under the system of adminis 
tration of the colonies then obtaining the only way in 
which a colonial governor could win the unqualified ap 
proval of his superiors in emergencies might be by exceeding 

Shirley to Board, Aug. 10, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol i. p. 141. For Shirley s 
attitude and the action at home, cf. ibid., and Shirley to Newcastle, 
May 31, 1744, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 28; Board to Privy Council, Aug. 28, 
1744, C. O. 5 918, 133; Instruction to Shirley, Sept. 9, 1744, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp- 144-145. 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 



215 



or breaking their instructions, and thereby submitting for 
their approval a success not otherwise attainable. 

Meanwhile Shirley had raised a third company of Massa 
chusetts mien and a company of rangers, largely picked 
Indians and frontiersmen, under the command of Captain 
Gorham, thus increasing the forces for the relief of An 
napolis to four companies. 1 Before these reinforcements 
arrived Captain Duvivier with seventy or eighty men and 
officers from Louisburg landed on the northern coast of the 
province, attracted deserters among the inhabitants by 
offering pardon, and rallied all nations of Indians in the 
region, thereby collecting 600 or 700 men who camped about 
a mile and a half from; the fort. 2 

It was at this time that Shirley, while pledging every effort, 

Shirley to Board, July 25, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 135; Kilby to 
Newcastle, Apr., 1/45, T i 321, attached to Order in Council, Sept. 
6, 1744, approving Shirley s conduct; A. and R., vol. xiii, p. 389. The 
order in council is printed in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 142-144, but the 
memorial from Kilby does not appear. For action upon the raising 
of the other two companies, cf. Jour., June 22, 1744, pp. 45-46; A. and 
R., vol. xiii, p. 374. The third company was sent Sept. I5th. Shirley 
to Board, Oct. 4, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 33. 

At first they appeared near the fort with great boldness, which 
except at night was soon tempered with caution. For about a month 
the fort was cut off from supplies from the surrounding country. 
Preparations for an assault were futile as the Indians had no taste 
for such work. The French commander then informed the garrison 
he daily expected three men-of-war and 250 more men with artillery 
from Louisburg and proposed the surrender of the garrison upon 
their arrival. Mascarene at first replied that their coming would 
be a proper time to consider the matter but September 6th held a 
council of war and conducted negotiations for three or four days for 
surrender. However, as the coming of the French expedition was 
uncertain, these were broken off, and nine days later Shirley s third 
reinforcement, of Indian rangers, arrived, and the besiegers retired 
leaving only a covering body of Indians. Shirley to Board, Oct. 4, 
1744, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 33; Shirley to Board, Oct. 16, 1744, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, p. 150; Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 21, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 132; 
Kilby to Newcastle, Apr., 1745, T i 321. 



2l6 v WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

especially in the matter of securing supplies for the gar 
rison, 1 warned .the home government that more effective 
assistance than Massachusetts could supply would be neces 
sary to protect Annapolis by the following spring. 2 

The garrison, meanwhile, was not under attack but was 
nervous. The New England men were as well cared for 
in most ways as circumstances allowed; but were without 
medical attention, since the surgeon of the garrison, al 
though acknowledging the signal and happy deliverance of 
Annapolis Royal b)| the providential care and vigilance of 
Governor Shirley, could see no security for his pay for 
serving the Massachusetts men ; and the storekeeper there 
could see no reason for furnishing bedding or clothing to 
men not in the king s service. None of the New England 
governments but Shirley s would raise a finger to help- 
maintain Annapolis. 3 During the summer Shirley wrote to 
Commodore Warren at New York suggesting a short visit 
to Annapolis with his men-of-war to give moral support to 
the garrison, but Warren replied on September 22d, that al 
though his ships were not in condition, and the season so 
late as to make the trip almost impracticable, yet in case 
the New York government should send any assistance to 
Annapolis (which they had no intention of doing) he would 
endeavor to get iit safely there. 4 

*In the fall of 1744, Shirley, in order to prevent the withdrawal of 
the New England forces from Annapolis, ordered the agent in Boston 
for the victualling of the king s ships to supply provisions and clothes 
for that fortress, giving in payment his bills drawn without instructions 
upon the treasury at home. Cf. supra, pp. 196, 213; Shirley to New 
castle, Nov. 9, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 135; Shirley to Board, Nov. 9, I744r 
C. O. 5 885, 9, Ff, 50. 

2 Shirley to Board, Oct. 4, 1744, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 33; Shirley to New 
castle, Nov. 9, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 135. 

3 Skene to Shirley, July 28, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 114; Shirley to New 
castle, Aug. 30, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 112. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 21, 1744, C, O. 5 900, 132. 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 2 IJ 

The Massachusetts assembly showed natural discontent 
at being called upon to support the men at Annapolis in 
addition to other heavy charges. 1 It had already done fairly 
well by spending about 3,000 sterling for the relief of the 
fortress. 2 Eventually the house realized the advantage gained 
by Shirley s policy, and on October I3th sent the governor a 
vote of appreciation for his foresight and wisdom in pro 
posing and securing the carrying out of the expedition for 
its relief. 3 

By the end of summer Shirley foresaw that should the 
reinforcements be withdrawn the French at Lcxiisburg 
would make an attempt upon Annapolis in the fall or in 
the early spring, when forces from England would not be ex 
pected upon their coasts. In view of this prospect he sought 
to hurry a third reinforcement to its aid. The difficulty of 
getting either men in the royal service from England or men 
in the service of the colonies in America to Annapolis and of 
maintaining them there, led Shirley to suggest recruiting 
the regiments posted in America from Americans. General 
Phillip s now sadly depleted regiment, posted at Annapolis, 
was to be included ini this policy. By this means those reg 
iments would be better filled with more healthy men. 
Shirley declared it feasible to enlist New Englanders for 
service at Annapolis for a moderate bounty, provided they 
were to serve for three or five years. 4 

In September the arrival of a considerable squadron of 
French merchant and war vessels at Louisburg caused alarm 
for Annapolis, but it appeared that they had no aggressive 
intentions. It was said that the French had been deterred 

1 On July I9th, the house refused to vote money for pay and bedding 
for the men at Annapolis. Jour., p. 58. 
Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 30, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 112. 

3 Jour., Oct. 13, 1744, P- 85. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 30, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 112. 



218 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

from an earlier attack, after preparations for it were be 
gun, by a report, picked up by the commander of the first 
flag of truce which came to Boston, that Commodore War 
ren, stationed with a squadron at New York, was to be 
joined at Boston by a considerable: fleet for a secret ex 
pedition, supposed to be against Louisburg. This report, 
Shirley said, " I did not think fit to discourage at that junc 
ture." * 

While these conditions were developing in Nova Scotia 
Shirley sent a small expedition from Massachusetts (and 
fruitlessly invited aid from the neighboring governments) 
to run all risks to save Annapolis, and if feasible to oust the 
intruding French from the region of Menis. 2 Before his 
little armada reached Annapolis a forty-gam ship and a 
briganitine from Louisburg visited the harbor, but after 
taking two small New England vessels which were there, 
retired after three days. 3 

Even when the middle of October was past Shirley was 
still nervous for the safety of the place and began making 
plans for its recovery if captured. He suggested a force to 
consist of 250 recruits from home, two forty-gun ships or 
one fifty-gun ship with some shells. 4 He thought the ar 
rival of these land and sea forces by February would make 
po-ssible, in connection with forces to be raised by him in 
New England, the reoccupation of Annapolis, before a 
French force from Europe could establish their hold upon 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 145-146; 
Shirley to Admiralty, Sept. 22, 1744, Ad. I, 3817; Shirley to Board, 
Oct. 4, 1744, C. O. 5, 884, Ff, 33, 367; (Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 21, 
1744, C. O. 5 900, 132. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 21, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 132. 

Mascarene to Warren, C. O. 5 900, 143; Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 
9, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 135. 

4 Ammunition for mortars to be used for bombardment of forti 
fications. 



MEASURES FOR DEFENSE ANNAPOLIS 219 

it, since the French could not spare a large garrison from 
Louisburg, which had no more than 800 men. 

Soon after the visitation by the armed vessels from 
Louisburg, however, it was discovered that Duvivier had 
withdrawn his troops to that fortress. The expedition from 
Massachusetts, therefore, found no greater task than to 
awe the inhabitants of the district, which they accomplished 
effectively. The people sent deputies to the fort to profess 
unshaken allegiance to the English and to reopen free com 
munication with the garrison for the purpose of supplying 
provisions, and materials for the repair of the fort. Where 
upon Shirley concluded that everything was probably safe 
until spring, as it proved (to be. 1 

In addition to the safety of Annapolis and its tributary 
country another source of joy came to the Massachusetts as 
sembly \vhen in early January, 1745, Shirley announced to 
them that he had news from home that the Massachusetts 
troops sent for the relief of Annapolis Royal would be paid 
by the king from the time of their first enlistment, that their 
subsistence would be financed from the same source after 
the first three months, that the men would be discharged upon 
the arrival of reinforcements from Great Britain, and that 
the behavior of the province in the matter had been ap 
proved at home. 2 By this time 1 Shirley s ever active mind 
was humming with the details of a much larger enterprise 
which was to bring him what has been generally considered 
his greatest fame. In connection with this enterprise came 
the turning point of the early portion of the war in America, 
a development which is traced in succeeding chapters. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 8, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 138. 
*Jour., Jan. 8, 1745, p. 165. 



CHAPTER XI 
LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 

THE erection of the fortress of Louisburg by the French 
in 1720 was an inspiration, the occasion for which had been 
furnished by England, who by conceding Cape Breton to 
France by the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, at the same time 
annexing the French bases in Acadia and Newfoundland, 
in themselves valuable, but strategically less dominating 
than the seemingly worthless island of Cape Breton, pre 
sented her with an opportunity similar in kind to that which 
she more recently conferred upon Germany by the cession 
of Heligoland. The result was a formidable fortress sa 
placed as to dominate long stretches of coast belonging to 
England, and trade routes between England and her colonies. 
Moreover, under the protection of its guns and those of the 
ships which frequented its haven the French \vere creating 
new and valuable industries in America. Before Louisburg 
arose among the marshes of Cape Breton, France s con 
tinental American possessions had but one important re 
source, the fur trade. With Louisburg came a quickening 
of French enterprise in America. 

The most important development was of the French fish 
ery, which centred at Louisburg and flourished greatly, 
thereby competing actively with the English fishery operat 
ing partly from Newfoundland and partly from New Eng 
land, on either side of Louisburg. By thus occupying the 
central position the French, as an English writer observed, 
followed the policy of " divide et impera" x Before the 

a Massachusettensis (pseud, for Robert Auchmuty), Importance of 
the Island of Cape Breton considered; in a letter to a member of 
Parliament, from an inhabitant of New England (London, 1746) pp. 6-7. 
220 



LOU IS BURG ORGANIZING A COUP 22 1 

war came in 1744, the fishery had grown until it was as 
serted by a competent English witness that it employed at 
least 1,000 vessels of from 200 to 400 tons, and 20,000 men, 
and had an average annual output of 5,000,000 quintals of 
fish. 1 

In consequence while the St. Lawrence valley and to a 
less extent the Mississippi valley remained the centers of 
the fur trade, Louisburg acquired a sudden prominence as 
the chief seat and natural haven of the vastly important 
fishery. With it went a rapid increase of shipping and trade, 
many fish being sold in Spain. Other goods purchased 
with the proceeds were bought and sold in many ports. 
Thus many seamen were trained and the navy expanded. 2 

On the St. Lawrence, moreover, protected by Louisburg 
beside the entrance to the waterway, a shipbuilding business 
was springing up. In 1744 a sixty-gun ship built there set 
out from Louisburg and played an important role in prey- 
Ing upon English shipping and protecting that of France. 3 
In the same year two other men-of-war were said to be 
building on the St. Lawrence. 4 

The great fortress was an incubus upon all the colonies 
as far south as the mouth of the Delaware, threatening; in 
proportion to the ease with which they could be reached from 
it as a base. New England, both from her proximity to 
the stronghold and because she possessed the largest com- 

1 Auchmuty, The Importance of Cape Breton to the British Nation 
(London, 1745), p. 3. Another source put the number of men em 
ployed at 25,000 to 30,000 and the value of the catch at nearly ; 1,000,000 
sterling a year (Massachusettensis, op. cit., pp. 4, 5), while Shirley 
testified that the French employed in that fishery 7,000 men from 
Louisburg alone. Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 14, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. 
I, p. 162. 

1 Massachusettensis, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 

* Ibid., pp. 2-3. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 133. 



222 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

merce and fishery and the chief port of the English colonies, 
lived in the greater dread. 1 New England, moreover, not 
only feared but hated the French domination there and else 
where with a holy hatred. All the deepset religious in 
stincts of the Puritans, who still pitched the spiritual life 
of New England in a high key, were in revolt against the 
formalism, of the Catholic faith. Louisburg, therefore, 
was a name to conjure with in North America, and partic 
ularly in New England. 

The clearness w r ith which New England comprehended 
the significance of Louisburg made possible Shirley s plans 
for conducting the French war. The major items in his 
preparations for the war and in his measures for conduct 
ing it during the first two 1 years were all conditioned by the 
presence of the great fort. His coast defenses were to 
thwart any expedition which might issue from beneath its 
walls, and his guard vessels were -to protect the fishery, to 
keep vessels from Louisburg at a distance and to cut off sin> 
plies intended for it and for Canada. The leaders in the 
Massachusetts assembly also grasped the fact that Nova 
Scotia, as the frontier of the English colonies toward Louis 
burg, was in fact the New England frontier. This was the 
truer since Canso on the shore of Nova Scotia had been the 
site of a fishing station. Thus the fall of Canso was a 
Massachusetts defeat and the maintaining of Annapolis 
Royal a Massachusetts victory. 

At the end of 1744, however, despite the retention of 
Annapolis Royal, the result upon the Nova Scotia frontier 
was advantageous for the French. They had taken Canso, 
thereby leaving the New England fishery with no safe haven 
nearer than its home ports. They had occupied the in- 

^or the facility with which the French thence might harass and 
attack the English seaboard colonies and the trade to and from them, 
cf. Auchmuty, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 223 

terior ot Nova Scotia, supplied thence the garrison at Louis- 
burg with much needed provisions, 1 and influenced many 
French-speaking inhabitants of the region to turn against 
the English. 

Shirley s success at {Annapolis ;Royal, therefore, was 
purely defensive, and left the English in possession not of 
the first, but the second line of defense. The French ad 
vance into Nova Scotia gave a negative advantage to the 
English by taking their enemies farther from, their base at 
Louisburg, while they themselves were nearer to their own 
base in New England, which was for the time being the 
real English base of operations in America. The French, 
however, experienced the elan of the offensive and were 
operating in a friendly country. 

The success of the French in Nova Scotia in 1744 was 
due to their having the control of the sea in that district at 
the outset and during most of the campaign, despite periodic 
visits of Massachusetts vessels to the coast. The French 
fleet, except late in the season for a period, was not con 
siderable, but the mosquito fleet of Massachusetts was not 
a match for it. The non-appearance of a considerable 
English squadron in continental North American waters was 
the decisive factor, and in view 7 of the unquestioned Eng 
lish preponderance upon the sea and the importance of the 
American fishery and trade, was an anomaly. 

The Jacobite demonstration against England at that time 
might have been met as well as it actually was met with a 
smaller naval force than was employed; since a direct in 
vasion of England from France was made impossible by a 
considerable English squadron in the channel, and another 
good-sized force retained in home waters was not effec 
tive in preventing the Pretender from reaching Scotland, 

1 Shirley to Board, July 25, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 137; Shirley to 
Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, ibid., pp. 146-147. 



224 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



whence the disturbance almost exclusively arose. The 
French, meanwhile, having held the bulk of the British fleet 
at and near home, despatched their East India fleet from the 
African coast to Louisburg in entire safety, 1 and thence, in 
the colder weather, home. Hence despite the English naval 
superiority the English-American campaign of 1744 was a 
defensive one, and but for Shirley s insight, promptness 
and persistence would have been a disastrous one. 

In failing to prepare for the essential needs of the war 
in America the English ministry was guilty of the criminal 
negligence which all pacifistic governments display in the 
face of a war crisis. The ministry gave no sign of un 
derstanding what was required and, besides being incapable 
by temperament of aggressive action, was busy with com 
putations of patronage and war costs rather than of troops 
and ships. The Whigs, to avert the threatened collapse of 
their administration, were discussing as the most vital ques 
tion of the time the inducing of the Tories to join in a coali 
tion in which they should enjoy honor and profit without 
power. Under these circumstances, Lord Chancellor Hard- 
wicke, perhaps the most sagacious of the ministers, could 
find no more fertile military suggestions to offer at the 
end of 1744 than that "the principal point of the public 
service is to carry on the war till a reasonable peace can be 
obtained," and that some means should be sought to make 
the war popular. 2 Shirley, therefore, could not solve the 
problem of American military success which had been by 
common consent shunted upon his shoulders, unless and un 
til the ministry could be persuaded to act strongly in 
America, at least through an adequate naval force. 

; 1 Massachusettensis, op, cit., p. 3. 

2 For a discussion of the political situation in England in December, 
1744, with sidelights on military plans, cf. "Minute of a paper by 
Lord <Ch r on the Present Posture of Affairs," Dec., 1744, Hardwicke 
Papers, Miscellaney Mss., 77, New York Public Library, and also Harris, 
Hardwicke, vol. ii, pp. 106-110. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 225 

To an English-American the course of future empire 
was patent first Louisburg and then the St. Lawrence 
basin in the heart of Canada must be taken. Adequate 
forces, however, were needed, and all eyes were turned upon 
England, whence, it seemied, they, or a large proportion of 
them, would come. 

So obvious did this procedure appear to the minds of 
intelligent men in America that a series of suggestions bear 
ing upon the desirability, possibility and method of taking 
Louisburg were presented to the English government by 
public officials in America, or colonial representatives in 
England, the authors of all of which clearly wrote with the 
belief that England must lead and furnish the bulk of the 
armament and men in such an attempt. Such had been the 
plan of the ill-starred expedition of Walker against Canada 
in 1711, which under an abler leader should have succeeded. 
Such, it seemed, must be the method followed in any sue- 
cessful attempt against the stronghold of Louisburg. 

The depth of the impress made by Louisburg upon the 
American mind is shown by the fact that in 1743 an official 
located as far south as Lieutenant-Go vernor Clarke of New 
York wrote to urge upon the home government the need ar^l 
feasibility of taking Louisburg from the French in case of a 
war with them, as a first step in the conquest of Canada, 
even before the control of Lake Ontario and of Crown Point 
was wrested from ithe enemy. The lieutenant-governor 
observed that since the stronghold was such a " thorn in 
the sides of the New England people " it was probable ai 
large body of men could be raised there " to assist in any 
such design," .and if trained from the preceding summer 
by " proper officers .... from England, . . . may by 
the ensuing spring be well disciplined." He added that 
since the French had few men in Louisburg during the 
winter save the garrison the most favorable season for an 



226 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

attack was in the spring, " before the men of war and fish 
ing vessels come from France." To accomplish this a 
British fleet might winter in Boston harbor. 1 No apparent 
influence upon the policy of the ministry followed this sug 
gestion and the subject seems to have slept until the decla 
ration of war in March, 1744. 

At the time of the declaration two citizens of Massachusetts, 
in London to represent the province in different capacities, 
raised the question anew. Christopher Kilby, the regular 
agent of the province in London, had the knowledge oi the 
question of a Massachusetts merchant, and perhaps special 
information as agent of the colony. Shirley wrote from. 
New England on May 31, 1744, to assure Newcastle that 
" Mr. Agent Kilby .... is very well acquainted with 
the consequence of Annapolis Royal and the Canso fishery 
to the interests as well of Great Britain as New England " 
and would " give your Grace a very particular account of 
em." Shirley was then especially interested in saving 
Nova Scotia, which was in obvious jeopardy since the fall 
of Canso. No doubt he had sent or was sending informa 
tion to Kilby bearing upon the question of which he de 
clared he knew the latter could give a particular account. 
Whether he had also sent him, data upon the situation of 
Cape Breton does not appear. 

In any case Kilby seems to have been acting upon his 
own initiative when, on April 3d, five days after the Eng 
lish declaration of war, he submitted to the board of trade 
a statement on behalf of New England, which he con 
ceived to be in imminent danger through the probable 
prompt seizure of Nova Scotia by the French. After! 

1 " Governor Clarke s Report On the State of the British Provinces 
with respect to the French who surround them, 1743," Documentary 
History of New York (Albany, 1849-1851), vol. i, p. 469- 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, May 31, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 28. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 



227 



stressing the peril in which the Newfoundland and New 
England fisheries, the masting of the royal navy (in Maine 
and New Hampshire), the whole trade of British America, 
" and the safe and quiet possession of all His Majesty s 
northern colonies " then were from the continued presence 
of the French in those parts, Kilby suggested an attack on 
the French " in their strong island of Cape Breton," and 
offered to communicate information warranting his con 
viction " that the reduction of the island is not only practi 
cable but easy, and that in the present conjuncture which 
brings the war upon them in the midst of a famine, a well- 
conducted and vigorous attempt, would entirely subdue all 
their possessions on the continent of North America." 
The result of a success against Cape Breton he said 
would be to extend Great Britain s commerce, enlarge its 
fisheries, augment its natural increase of seamen and dis 
tress the French in the most sensible manner. He explained 
that he was chiefly influenced in submitting this paper by 
" the doubt I have of there being any other person in Eng 
land furnisht with an account of those particulars that will 
be necessary information in case an attack of such impor 
tance should be thought proper." 1 

Mr. Kilby s information regarding Cape Breton may 
have been more particular than was available elsewhere in 
England, but he was not the only person who felt able tc* 
offer information and to suggest to the government that it 
be taken. Another citizen of Massachusetts, Robert 
Auchrnuty, 2 on April 9th, dated a paper for the considera 
tion of the British government upon the " Importance of 
Cape Breton to the British Nation." It was a plea for the 

1 Kilby to Board, Apr. 3, 1744, C. 0. 5 884, Ff, 22. 

Judge of admiralty, and now in England as agent to secure a settle 
ment of the Massachusetts-Rhode Island boundary favorable to the 
former. 



22 8 WILLIAM SHIRLEY-A HISTORY 

capture of Louisburg. It was the paper of a lawyer, sketch 
ing the economic value of Louisburg to the French, the con 
sequent damage to them from losing it, and the correspond 
ing gain that would come to England from its capture 1 
its strategic value during the war to French and English as 
a base for naval and military operations, the relative ease 
with which it might be captured, and a plan, prepared in 
some detail, for its capture. This plan proposed an attempt 
upon the same lines as those adopted for the Walker ex 
pedition against Canada, in 1711. It would have brought 
before Louisburg by the middle o,f April, 1745, a naval force 
consisting of ships of the line from) England, which should 
be sent in 1744 as station ships to help protect Virginia, 
Maryland, New York, Massachusetts and Canso, and five 
twenty-gun ships, the regular station ships off the above 
points in time of peace. In addition there would have been 
a military force of 2,000 regular troops from England and 
an equal number to be raised by apportionment from among 
the colonies as far south as and including Virginia. Un 
der ithis plan 1,000 men, or one-half of the American troops, 
would have been raised in Massachusetts. The army was 
to have a full siege equipment. Both fleet and army, of 
course, would have commanders named at home, 2 

Auchmuty has sometimes been given credit for plan 
ning the Louisburg expedition of 1745. The expedition 
which took place, however, had little relationship in origin, 
composition, equipment, or command, to the one proposed 

*He estimated that the increased English fishing would result in the 
purchase in the plantations of English manufactured goods worth 
2,000,000 sterling per annum from its proceeds. English possession 
of Louisburg would also embarrass if not cut off communication with 
Canada, and lead to the absorption of the fur trade by the English, 
who would have the only goo ds available for the Indians during the 
war and could sell better and cheaper goods in time of peace. 

Auchmuty, op. cit., p. 6. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 229 

by him. 1 It is not at all unlikely, however, that his pro 
posals made some impression upon the ministry in drawing 
their attention to the need for preventing the French from 
using their Cape Breton base effectively against the Eng 
lish, and to some extent influenced the home government to 
support the attempt against Louisburg. Nevertheless the 
intention of the home government at the beginning of 1745 
was to fight another essentially defensive campaign during 
that year in America. 2 

Just how the project which was executed for the capture 
of Louisburg germinated, who first visualized it as it took 
place, how far the man who made it a reality also con 
ceived it, have been moot questions. In comment upon the 
numerous contradictory claims to prior and exclusive re 
sponsibility for the origination of it, it may be said that 
there is no evidence to show that the expedition sprang full- 
armed from the brow of any Mars. 

Shirley s part in it most clearly appears by following his 
footsteps as he struggled to prevent the power which had 
its seat there from engulfing New England and the rest of 
the English colonies. To his mind the control of Louisburg 
was necessary, when possible, as a matter of defense, to 
remove the menace to Nova Scotia and New England, to 



statement of the General Evening Post of London after the 
capture of Louisburg (quoted by Wood, The Logs of the Conquest 
of Canada [Toronto, 10x39], p. 59) that "The whole plan of the ex 
pedition was laid, or at least concerted, in New England . . ." 
shows that it was generally understood at home at the time that plans 
presented to the ministry by persons in England could have had but a 
very indirect share in producing the expedition. 

Anything short of the taking of Louisburg would be essentially 
defensive, and there is no indication that this was seriously con 
templated. Discretion allowing Commodore Warren to attack if con 
ditions were favorable was aside from the announced primary purpose 
of his operations, which was the defense of Nova Scotia and other 
British interests. Cf. Newcastle to Shirley, Jan. 3, 1745, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 155-156. 



230 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

carry the frontier back to where it was before 1713. This 
achieved, the war would become one between the English 
ribbon of colonies along the seaboard and the old Canada 
fringing the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, with a 
tempting opportunity for Britain s might to tip the scales. 

All through the efforts to save Annapolis Royal, as puny 
in proportions as the resources which provided them, but 
timely, unrelaxing, and finally successful, Louisburg was 
always in the background. Shirley did not appear in the 
council chamber to deliver upon all occasions the cumulative 
dictum " Ceterum cense o esse delendam " Louisburg. Had 
he done so it is not likely that Louisburg would have fallen. 
Shirley W 7 as not a propagandist through popular appeal, as 
those are who rely upon others to produce measures for 
realizing their aspirations. Ordinarily his appeal was for 
the support of a concrete program and frequently one al 
ready under way, rather than a resort to a priori reasoning. 

It is clear that the plan for taking Louisburg was grad 
ually evolved in Shirley s mind. It requires little imagina 
tion to suppose that at the outbreak of war with France he 
regarded the taking of it as the first important step of an 
aggressive war in America. It requires even less imagina 
tion to infer that he had too much information and too 
sound a judgment to risk his reputation for sanity \vith the 
British ministry or the Massachusetts legislature by pro 
posing the conquest of Louisburg to either in the then ex 
isting state of affairs. Yet both apparently must take part 
in any successful attempt; for Massachusetts could not do it 
alone and England would not attempt it without colonial 
support, which would naturally come chiefly from New 
England. 

We shall see how the Louisburg tour de force grew upon 
him. In the middle of June, while largely employed in res 
cuing Annapolis Royal, Shirley wrote to the board of trade 



LO UISB URG ORGANIZING A COUP 231 

upon the importance of preventing provisions from reach 
ing any of the French colonies, and particularly Louisburg, 
during the existing war. The soundness of this suggestion 
was promptly confirmed. 1 On the following July 4th, there 
arrived in Boston a company of prisoners from Louisburg 
and a messenger from those remaining there appealing 
for food. It was doubtless from these new arrivals that 
Shirley secured the information which he wrote to New 
castle three days later that although the people of Louis 
burg had then plenty of bread and fish, they were in great 
want of all other provisions and would soon be in distress 
for lack of bread, on account of the numbers of people who 
resorted to that port from adjacent regions. 2 

The supplies sent the prisoners by Shirley in response 
to their appeal were scanty. In keeping the supply of pro 
visions for the prisoners at Louisburg at a minimum he was 
seeking two ends, to expedite the exchange of prisoners 
(which the French would be the more ready to arrange on 
favorable terms when their support w r as a problem) and to 
reduce the garrison itself to straits. 3 Regarding the same 
problem 1 from another angle. Shirley considered the fall of 
Canso not so much as a loss to the English as a benefit to the 
French in Louisburg from their increased fishery, and from 
the free access now theirs to the grain and livestock of 
Nova Scotia. 4 

Meanwhile the situation at Louisburg had developed un 
suspected possibilities. For three months in spite of a 

1 Shirley to Board, June 16, 1744, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 27. 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i. p. 133; Heron, etc., 
to Shirley, June 10, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 104; Heron, etc., to Bradstreet, 
June 10, 1744, C. O. s 900, 105. 

3 Shirley to Board, July 25, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 136; Shirley to 
Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, ibid., p. 147; Heron, etc., to Shirley, and 
accompanying data, C. O. 5 884, Ff, 45. 

4 Shirley to Board, July 5, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 137- 



232 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

shortage of provisions the commander, Duquesnel, refused 
to exchange prisoners. His chief reason was probably his 
unwillingness to allow information of the situation at Louis- 
burg to reach the enemy. Finally he seems to have been 
forced to act partly to relieve himself of the burden of 
feeding so many unproductive persons. Hence on Sep 
tember 2ist, a large detachment of prisoners from Louis- 
burg arrived at Boston and at once Shirley hastened to re 
port to the government at home the developments, expected 
and unexpected, at Louisburg. The expected condition 
was that they were "in great want of provisions" (a con 
dition to which he had contributed so far as possible by 
greatly interfering with their fishery), 1 despite the fact that 
their capture of Canso and the consequent opening of a 
route to Nova Scotia had, by allowing them to secure thence 
700 head of cattle and 2,000 sheep, apparently prevented 
their starving during the summer just past. 2 The unex 
pected condition at Louisburg, of which Shirley seems 
to have been much surprised to learn, was the presence 
there of a considerable fleet including six East India mer 
chantmen which would normally have gone directly to 
France, but to escape in time of war, had been directed 
from the African coast to Louisburg as a safe refuge until 
conditions were favorable for slipping across the Atlantic 
home. 3 

VShirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, ibid., pp. 146, 148; Shirley to 
Newcastle, Dec. 8, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 138. 

*Ryal and Bradstreet to Shirley, iSept. 21, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 120. 

Shirley received an account of this fleet and forecasts of its plans 
from several persons who had just returned from Louisburg. The 
most informing and as Shirley believed most reliable account was 
by Lieutenant Ryal of the British warship Kinsale, and Ensign Brad- 
street, both of whom had been taken at Canso. By their statement 
supplemented by others it appeared that the fleet at Louisburg had the 
equipment of a formidable squadron. The six East Indiamen came 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 233 

The presence of this fleet at Louisburg, probably for the 
warm weather only but likely to be followed by similar 
visitations in succeeding years, completely altered the as 
pect of the war in America. The naval strength of the 
French at and near Louisburg had undoubtedly been greater 
at all times during 1744 than that at the disposal of Massa 
chusetts, but through dispersion and lack of ability to fore 
cast Shirley s action had not been effective to prevent free 
communication between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, or 
destructive forays in the vicinity of Louisburg. Had the 
cutting off of Annapolis been attempted in the earlier 
months, the little Massachusetts squadron would have been 
strong enough to try conclusions with the enemy. But 
with the coming of large warships to Louisburg, it was 
clear that they dominated the coast of the continent. From 
that time not only communication with Nova Scotia but the 
English hold upon Annapolis were continued only by the 
sufferance of the French at Louisburg. Up to this time 
the resources of Massachusetts had been barely sufficient 

with thirty-two guns each but two of them had since been supplied 
with a total of fifty-four guns each. Another East India ship had 
also arrived from France with fifty-four guns. In addition there were 
at Louisburg warships in the service of France including a sixty-six- 
gun ship, a fifty- four-gun ship newly built in Canada and partly fitted 
out at Louisburg, and a twenty-four-gun ship, not counting a thirty- 
gun ship then at Canada to return to Louisburg for the winter. 
There were also at Louisburg two small provision ships from France 
and three vessels carrying twenty-eight, twenty and twenty guns re 
spectively, loading with furs and fish. Finally there were four priva 
teers operating from that port. Neglecting the last, there were five 
heavily armed ships and eight of less strength then there, and a ninth 
moderately armed ship expected later. Ryal and Bradstreet to Shirley, 
Sept. 21, 1744, C. O. 5 goo, 120; Mason to Shirley, Sept. 20, 1744, 
C. O. 5 900, 119; Richards, Nealson and De Joncourt to Shirley, Sept. 
20, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 124, published in Cor. Col. Govs. of R. I., vol. 
i, pp. 271-272; Declaration of Montgomerie and Trimble, Sept. 22, 
1744, C. 0. 5 900, 122. 



234 WILLIAM SHIRLEY -A HISTORY 

to meet the situation. With the assembling of the French 
war dogs of the sea they became clearly inadequate. It 
appeared evident that Shirley s success in saving Annapolis 
had been partly due to the preoccupation of the French in 
other things, particularly in equipping, manning and des 
patching the valuable East Indiamen to France under ade 
quate convoy. 

Shirley realized also that a force which could bottle up 
Annapolis would be equally potent in bottling up Boston. 
In fact he declared in November that one French forty-gun 
ship could now block up Massachusetts by cruising between 
Cape Cod and Cape Ann. 1 Conversely a similar English 
ship stationed at Canso, he said, would have kept that im 
portant fishing station for the English, been in position to 
watch ships going to Cape Breton and shut off food supplies 
for the latter from Nova Scotia. Such a ship and a brigan- 
tine from Louisburg failed to take Annapolis in October 
only because Indian rangers from Massachusetts had in the 
nick of time rendered it impracticable for Duvivier s land 
forces to* cooperate. 

Shirley, at once upon learning of the presence of the East 
India ships at Louisburg, appealed to Warren, commanding 
the English squadron at New York, to visit Annapolis "for 
its countenance; " but Warren said he would not be fit for 
sea until fall. 2 A month later, just after the visitation of 
Annapolis by sea from Louisburg, Mascarene appealed to 
Warren in a letter sent through Shirley s hands, a copy of 
which the latter sent home, pointing out the need for visits 
from a man-of-war to Annapolis, even if it were not to be 
stationed there, partly because all the supplies for the gar 
rison then came from Massachusetts and a privateer off the 

Shirley to Admiralty, Nov. 14, 1744, Ad. I, 3817. 
9 Ibid. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 235 

coast could cut them off. 1 Nothing, however, served as 
sufficient inducement to Warren to cruise during that season 
in the Louisburg area. A visit from him would doubtless 
have been of service to the garrison at Annapolis. He could 
not, however, have hoped to measure strength with the 
squadron at Louisburg. 

Shirley had relied largely upon the resources of Massa 
chusetts not from choice but necessity ; the same compulsion 
now turned his attention to means of bringing British naval 
power to bear upon the American war and particularly upon 
the core of it at Louisburg. At once upon hearing of the 
presence of the French fleet there and the supposed purpose 
to sail thence for France in late October or the middle of 
November, he sent notice of the facts to Newcastle and 
the admiralty by six different vessels. He hoped that an 
English fleet might be able to intercept and capture the 
Frenchmen. To increase the likelihood of English success 
in this he held the French packet boats sent with a flag of 
truce for exchange of prisoners " as long as I decently 
could," that is, till the beginning of November, on suspicion 
that the French prisoners would be used for these ships. 2 

At the same time he summarized the situation for the ad 
miralty : an English ship was needed that fall to thwart the 
French in Nova Scotia; the officers at Annapolis believed 
that place would be attacked early in the spring ; the French 
at Louisburg had all the year been apprehensive of an 
attack by an English expedition and were in great want 
of provisions ; several storeships for Louisburg and. Canada 
and many fishing and other craft had been taken by the 
New England vessels. 3 For further information he rec- 

*Mascarene to Shirley, Oct. 22, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 143. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 145-148; 
Shirley to Admiralty, Sept. 22, 1744, Ad. I, 3817; Shirley to Newcastle, 
Dec. 8, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 138. 

3 The very modest statement made by Shirley here is supplemented 



236 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

ommended the enclosed statements of Lieutenant Ryal and 
Ensign Bradstreet. 1 A few weeks later, on November 
loth, Shirley had formed hopes that Lieutenant Ryal, who- 
was soon to sail for England, " will be of considerable ser 
vice to our part of the world, with the lords of admiralty 
and other parts of the ministry, from his particular know 
ledge of Louisburg, and of its harbor, and of the great con 
sequences of the acquisition of Cape Breton and the keeping 
of Cansoand Annapolis to his majesty s northern colonies." : 
At the same time Shirley sent to Newcastle " an accurate 
plan of the harbor of Louisburg at Cape Breton taken by 
one Captain Harrison while a prisoner there as also a good 
plan of the island of Cape Breton and gut of Canso." He 
added: "For the explanation of both which Lieutenant 
Ryal, who .... is well acquainted both with the strength 
and weakness of all the fortifications there, as well on the 
land side as to the seaward, and goes home in this ship, may 
be useful if consulted upon it." 3 

by a Massachusetts man who had been a prisoner at Louisburg. He 
recounts the exploits of Capt. Rouse, the commander of the little 
Massachusetts squadron consisting at the time of a fourteen-gun ship 
with loo men and another of nearly the same strength. With them 
Rouse, in August, 1744, made a descent upon Fishot, Cape Breton, and 
with the loss of but eighteen men, defeated and captured five vessels, 
carrying 450 men, including two eighteen-gun ships, and others carrying 
sixteen, fourteen and twelve guns, respectively. In addition he took 
a sixteen-gun ship at St. Julian s, ten ships and 306 men on the 
banks, retook a British ship which had been made a prize, burnt all 
the French houses and stores of seven different harbors, with four 
vessels and upwards of 800 fishing shallops, and all within a month. 
(Little, The State of Trade in the Northern Colonies considered; with 
an account of their produce, and a particular description of Nova 
Scotia [London, 1748], p. 79, note.) To realize the full import of this 
achievement it should be said that although the fact was not known to 
Rouse it was taking place while large French men-of-war were in the 
harbor of Louisburg only a few miles away. 

1 Shirley to Admiralty, Sept. 22, 1744, Ad. I, 3817. 

2 Shirley to Wentworth, Nov. 10, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 152. 
Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 9, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 135. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 237 

It is therefore clear that Shirley had hopes of interesting 
the home government in the taking of Louisburg, and in 
considerable measure through an English officer who had 
been a captive there. How far Lieutenant Ryal suc 
ceeded in interesting them in such a project does not ap 
pear. 

The increased stress put by Shirley upon naval assistance 
from England after learning of the presence of the East 
India fleet and convoy at Louisburg, and his apparently 
greater confidence in securing it, were coincident with the 
creation of a substantial English interest in sending it. So 
long as the chief existing injury, however real, from the 
French at Louisburg, was to the American fishery it was a 
little difficult to arouse English ardor ; but when East India 
ships, the natural prey of the home fleets, eluded capture 
by hiding at that port, the American fortress became to an 
extent a European issue. 

Meanwhile the governor continued in October and Nov 
ember to impress upon the home government the need for 
naval support for Annapolis Royal, the fact that one thirty- 
gun ship was to winter at Louisburg, and the likelihood 
of an attack upon Annapolis. In the discouragement 
of the hour in which Annapolis was in the greatest danger, 
he proposed to manage the recapture of the place if lost, 
with the aid of 250 regulars from home and two forty- 
gun ships or one fifty-gun ship with some shells, if they 
should arrive by February. In that case a force which 
he could raise in Massachusetts and the neighboring govern 
ments would with this aid succeed in its recapture before 
any troops could be sent from France. 1 

On December 7th, Shirley received news of the sailing in 
the preceding month from Louisburg for France of a fleet 

^Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 21, 1744 C. 0. 5 900, 132; Shirley to 
Newcastle, Nov. 9, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 135. 



238 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

of fifty-four vessels, consisting of five heavily armed ships, 
one of thirty-six guns, seven of lighter armament, twenty- 
five ships " of little force," five snows, nine brigantines, and 
two schooners. Of particular interest to Shirley was the 
report from reliable witnesses who had been prisoners at 
Louisburg, that there had been taken with this flotilla three 
able pilots familiar with Cape Breton and adjacent coasts, 
for the purpose of piloting warships, transports and store- 
ships to reach those coasts by February or early in the 
spring, with a design (as these declarants were credibly 
informed) to make a descent on Annapolis Royal and to 
cruize on the coasts of New England." x 

Upon receipt of this interesting but not surprising in 
formation Shirley not only sent a copy of the deposition 
containing it to the admiralty by a fast ship, but hoping that 
the vessel might outsail the French fleet, sent also by the 
master of it four copies of that document addressed to any 
admirals, vice-admirals or commodores of any squadron of 
British ships who might be met on the way over. He added 
for the admiralty the observations that intercepting the 
French storeships, recruits, ctc. } intended to reach Cape 
Breton in February would be a killing blow to< the enemy as 
well as a protection to Annapolis Royal ; that Louisburg was 
then ill-manned and the Swiss of the garrison very dis 
contented, and that Duvivier, who had been the leader in 
all the attempts against Nova Scotia during the past year, 
had gone over to secure the aid expected for the next spring. 2 

Shirley wrote to the same effect to Newcastle, adding that 
since Louisburg was then very weak in troops and short of 
all sorts of stores, especially of provisions, if it could not 

declaration under oath of Major Otis Little, Captain Joshua Loring, 
Captains Nathaniel and Thomas Donnel, all of his majesty s province 
of Massachusetts Bay in New England, Dec. 7, 1744, C. O. 5 900, 142. 

2 Shirley to Admiralty, Dec. 7, 1744, Ad. I, 3817. 



LOU IS BURG ORGANIZING A COUP 



239 



be assisted from France before ships were sent from Eng 
land to block up the harbor, it might be forced to sur 
render merely by distress by the end of summer. He ad 
ded that he had credible information from persons know 
ing the harbor at Louisburg very well that six ships of war 
of from fifty to seventy guns, entering it with 1,500 to 
2,000 troops to land at the same time and take the royal bat 
tery at the bottom of the bay or basin in the rear, might 
capture the place without much difficulty. An alternative 
plan was that a squadron of four ships, with some small 
tenders, should go close to the shore, seal up the harbor and 
force surrender by the end of the summer. 

The governor suggested that without the conquest of 
Cape Breton by England there would be a conquest of Nova 
Scotia by France, with the danger of losing all the English 
continental colonies, and he intimated that promptness in 
action would probably be decisive. 1 

Shirley had no official assurances that aid would be sent 
from England, or in case it came that it would be sent in 
time. Nevertheless the project had been germinating 
rapidly at home. Kilby had been active in September and 
later in urging it upon the president of the privy council, 
Newcastle, and other members of the ministry, and it was 
regarded with sufficient favor to lead the Massachusetts 
agent " by every opportunity afterwards " to recommend 
" the attempt in my letters to New England, with the 
strongest assurances of their being supported from hence." 
Action by the ministry was deferred until January, how 
ever, when without sending troops, " orders were sent to 
Commodore Warren at Antigua to proceed with some of 
the king s ships from thence to Boston where the scheme 
was to be formed, and from thence put into execution." 

This was decided upon at a season when news of the 

Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 8, 1744, C. 0. 5 900, 138. 



240 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

action could not readily be sent to Boston, and Shirley there 
fore planned and acted somewhat in the dark. 1 He had, 
however, received in the fall of 1744, unofficial information 
(even more trustworthy than that which Kilby sent) from 
Mr. Stone, Newcastle s private secretary. Writing from 
Louisburg a year later Shirley acknowledged his letter, 
asserting of its contents that it " first signified to me the 
promise of support from the ministry, by means whereof 
I have now the pleasure of dating this letter from the citadel 
of Louisburg." Since his information was not official he 
could not give assurances to the Massachusetts general 
court that aid would be given from home, but must present 
such arguments as would appeal to their minds as sufficient 
for undertaking the expedition alone. 

If contrary to his expectations, no substantial force were 
sent from England the situation looked unpromising, for if 
reinforcements and supplies were thrown into Louisburg, 
and a substantial naval force were in its harbor it would be 
impregnable against any force which might be prepared in 
America to take it, and from it as a base the French might 
drive colonial commerce (especially that of New England), 
largely from the seas, pluck Nova Scotia like a ripe apple, 
and ravage the frontiers of the other English colonies by 
sea and land if not subdue them. The next campaign must 
be fought either in New England or in Cape Breton. 

For a time the question which battleground should be 
chosen was left in the background and Shirley gave his at 
tention to* the problem of ways and means. To this sub 
ject he addressed himself in a letter to Governor Wentworth 
of New Hampshire on December 2Oth. In that he urged 
cooperation of the two provinces (suggested by the Massa 
chusetts general assembly) in conducting the war and " that 

1 Kilby to Harrington, Apr. 22, 1745, C. O. 5 900, loose at end. 

2 Shirley to Stone, Nov. 13, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 280. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 



2 4 I 



we should agree together as well concerning the measures 
to be pursued in the action of war, as the proportion of men 
which each province should furnish, and of the charge to 
be respectively borne by them." This he foresaw would 
tend to promote the service and benefit of both provinces. 
He urged prompt action and, if it were favorable, the naming 
of commissioners for New Hampshire, unless Wentworth 
chose to appear in person, " his majesty s service re 
quiring us to act with the utmost vigour for the safety of 
his subjects in these provinces." 

Just at the end of the year the ordnance given to the 
province by the home government arrived, 2 and was used for 
the batteries recently provided on Governor s Island. 

Returning early in January to the subject apparently up 
permost in his thoughts, the governor, with a realization of 
the need of driving the emergency home to the ministry, 
once more stressed the necessity of protecting Annapolis 
very early in the spring from Great Britain by one of his 
majesty s ships, and informed Newcastle that he was just 
about to send Warren in the West Indies a statement of the 
same need. In conclusion he added: "If any opportunity 
of annoying the enemy s settlements from hence shall pre 
sent itself to me, your Grace may depend upon the most in 
defatigable attention from me to improve it for his majesty s 



Shirley to Wentworth, Dec. 20, 1744, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 154-155. 

The report of the joint committee of ways and means for meeting 
the expense of the war, which was accepted by both houses of the legis 
lature, recommended that commissioners from Massachusetts be ap 
pointed under commission from the captain-general to treat with the 
governor of New Hampshire to secure cooperation in scouting on the 
frontiers of the two provinces, and in annoying their enemies on 
sea and land. Jour., Dec. 13, 1744 p. 132. 

This consisted of twenty forty-two pounders and two mortars. 
Winsor, Memorial History of Boston (Boston, 1881), vol. ii, pp. lio- 
112 (note). 

Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 5, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 158-159. 



242 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

This last innocent-looking- generality covered what must 
already have been a matured plan for the coming campaign. 
This became apparent through a message of the governor 
to the legislature four days later. On the preceding day 
he had informed them that the king would pay the troops at 
Annapolis from the time of their enlistment, and their sub 
sistence after the first three months, that the men would be 
discharged upon the arrival of reinforcements from Great 
Britain and that their patriotism in providing for Annapolis 
had been praised at home. On that same day he had -also 
told them that New Hampshire had been called upon to sup 
port Fort Dummer on pain of forfeiting the adjacent ter 
ritory to Massachusetts. 1 

Meanwhile the province was still struggling with the 
financial problem. In response to suggestions from Shirley 
the legislature provided a guard ship of sufficient force to 
guard the coast against swarms of French privateers re 
ported to be then in the West Indies (and which might soon 
be upon their coast) and undertook to maintain Fort Dum 
mer until New Hampshire s answer to the order in council 
was known. 2 The house accompanied the vote for the 
former purpose, however, with a proviso that the funds be 
raised, if possible, without a tax on polls and estates, and 
followed this by proposing tonnage taxes on all Massachu 
setts shipping, foreign, intercolonial, coasting and fishing, 

l Jour., Jan. 8, 1745, pp. 165, 166. 

* Shirley s message regarding a larger vessel for coast protection 
was sent January 4th, and is printed in Am. Ant. Soc. Proc., n. s., 
vol. xiv, p. 274. iShirley had recently been covering the area of Fort 
Dummer by detailing fifty men for service above the New Hampshire 
line for scouting, and ten to be posted at Fort Dummer, out of those 
raised for the defense of the western frontier of Massachusetts. The 
assembly now provided for a garrison for three months, which pro 
vision Shirley expected would be extended later. Shirley to New 
castle, Jan. 9, 1745, C. O. 5, 901. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 



243 



and also named a committee to investigate terms for bor 
rowing money for the purpose. 1 

While these matters were being considered another finan 
cial expedient was coming to fruition. The committee of 
ways and means had reported on December I4th in favor 
of a government lottery for raising 7.500. This was pas 
sed by the two houses on January 8th, the day of Shirley s 
report of action indicating a benevolent attitude of the 
government at home toward the province, and was signed 
by the governor on January Qth. 2 

Shirley had then recently received notice of the permission 
granted him by special instruction to allow the emission of 
more than 30,000 of bills of credit annually for war 
purposes, 3 but had not yet had occasion to employ this free 
dom. 

It appears from these measures that legislature and 
governor, in view of the heavy debt then upon the province, 
were agreed in a policy of avoiding if possible further direct 
taxes. Yet upon the day Shirley signed the lottery bill, he 
took advantage of the excellent humor which his statement 
of the previous day was calculated to produce, to lay before 
them a proposal which by its nature and the expense it must 
cause in its execution may well have surprised them. 

The proposal was that Massachusetts capture Louisburg. 
At the time, although he had unofficial assurances of aicl 
from England, he was unable to rely upon help from other 
colonies. It seemed eminently appropriate that the scheme 
should have been proposed on the day that a government lot- 

l jour., Jan. 4, 1745, p. 160; Jan. 8, 1745, p. 165; Jan. 9, 1745, P- 167; 
Jan. 16, 1745, p. 175 ; Shirley to legislature, Jan. 4, 1745, loc. cit., 
pp. 275-276. 

*Jour., Dec. 14, 1744, P- 135; Jan. 8, 1745, p. 166; Ct. Recs., vol.. 
xvii (4), p. 632; A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 195-199, 219. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 9, 1745, C. O. 5 901. 



244 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

tery was approved. Yet the gamble might be even more 
desperate if it were decided not to attempt the reduction 
of Louisburg. Shirley believed not unreasonably that the 
expense of holding Nova Scotia against the French while 
the latter held Louisburg would probably be as great as 
that of capturing and holding the fortress. 1 Moreover, un 
less the home government helped, Nova Scotia probably 
could not be held, and if it were lost, at least part of New 
England would likewise almost inevitably fall to the French. 
But a bold blow against Cape Breton, if successful, would 
remove all serious present danger to 1 New England. 

A little group of four or five men who were enthusiastic 
advocates of the attempt upon Cape Breton had com 
municated their views to Shirley and he worked with them 
in promoting the general scheme. Their chief spokesman 
was William Vaughan, of Damariscotta in Maine. Much 
abler but less vocal was Captain John Bradstreet, later 
highly commended by General Wolfe, the conqueror of 
Quebec. 2 Bradstreet had seen much at Louisburg as a 
prisoner and thought the time opportune for a blow. A 
third, Captain Joshua Loring, had also returned from 
captivity there with like views as to the practicability of its 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 14, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 163. 

2 Wolfe wrote in 1758: "There are in America three or four ex 
cellent men in their way. Bradstreet for the battoes and for ex 
peditions is an extraordinary man." Wolfe to Lord Sackville, May 
24, 1758, His. Mss. Com., gth rep., app. 3, p. 75. 

A eulogy upon Bradstreet at his death declared that he " first 
distinguished himself in planning, and recommending to Lieutenant- 
General Shirley [Shirley held this rank many years later] the design, 
which was in 1745 executed with equal gallantry and success by the 
forces of New England, against Louis the XVth in the conquest of 
Louisbourg . . . ." (Rivington s New York Gazetteer, Sept. 29, 1774, 
quoted in N. Y. H. S. Colls., pub. fund, vol. iii, p. 248.) Bradstreet s 
share in the councils of the group for promoting the Louisburg ex 
pedition was a prominent one. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 



245 



capture. Their group included also a Mr. Kilby, 1 and per 
haps a Mr. Vardy who was sufficiently in their confidence 
to place a private room at their disposal. 2 

William Vaughan was the first to propose the capture of 
the fortress by surprise. Belknap, the historian of New 
Hampshire, says of Vaughan that, " nothing being in his 
view impracticable," he " even proposed going over the 
walls in the winter on the drifts of snow." 

It is just to Mr. Vaughan to say that Governor Shirley 
made use of his proposals and his energy in supporting them 
to promote interest in and sentiment for the Louisburg ex 
pedition, and just to the governor to add that, since his 
mind was not only bold but also sane, he did not contemplate 
accomplishing a surprise by levying and equipping an army 
in January, transporting it and all its accessories over wintry 
seas, landing it upon the ice-bound shores of Cape Breton, 
and marching it through or over snow drifts deep enough 
to form an approach to the summit of walls thirty-six 
feet in height, all to be completed before the snows began 
to melt in the spring. 4 Without going to this length the 

1 Probably the Thomas Kilby later commended to the Duke of 
Newcastle for his " indefatigable pains in assisting me with intelli 
gence, and every way forwarding and promoting the expedition in a 
most necessary manner, whilst it was forming . . ." Shirley to New 
castle, Nov. 6, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 289. 

For the group and its activities, cf. Vaughan to Shirley, Jan. 14, 
1745, Certificate by Shirley, Mar. 18, 1745, both in C. O. 5 753. 

Belknap, The History of New Hampshire . . . (Boston, 1813), vol. 
ii> P- I 5S- Cf. also, Hutchinson, op. fit., vol. ii, p. 364. 

4 Four days after the expedition was approved by the general court 
Shirley referred to the plan which they had considered as " a rough, 
inaccurate and imperfect scheme which has been enquired into and 
approved of so far by the assembly as to induce em to make pro 
vision for my carrying on the expedition,"- and he added that, " what 
ever may come of the proposed surprise, upon which I have not the 
least dependance or expectation," he believed that essential success 



246 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

expedition offered difficulties enough to satisfy the most 
romantic. 

Shirley s message of January ninth upon the subject of 
the taking of Louisburg, while lacking literary finish, as 
most of his writings do, was trenchant and was addressed 
to the questions in which the general court would feel the 
deepest interest. After adverting to the extreme inter 
ference with the trade of Massachusetts in general, and the 
frequent captures of their provision ships and the destruction 
of their fishery irom Louisburg, in particular, which must 
be expected while the existing war continued, he stated it 
as an axiomatic truth " that nothing would more effectually 
promote the interests of this province at this juncture than 
a reduction of that place." 

could be won. (Shirley to Warren, Jan. 29, 1745, Ad. I, 3817.) This 
plan was perhaps suggested chiefly by Bradstreet, instead of Vaughan. 
Shirley said it was prepared by "a person perfectly well acquainted 
with the island and the harbor of Louisburg." (Shirley to Newcastle, 
Feb. i, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 157.) Hutchinson s statement that Vaughan 
"had been a trader at Louisburg," (Hist, of Mass., vol. ii, p. 364) 
suggests that the latter might have been possessed of personal knowl 
edge of conditions at the great fortress. Vaughan s own testimony, 
however, makes it clear that this was not the case. He asserted that 
he left home in the winter of 1744-5, and traveled about Massa 
chusetts and New Hampshire, " to enquire into the strength and cir 
cumstances of Louisburg, and the other French settlements on, or 
adjoining to the Island of Cape Breton," and that he "met with 
several intelligent men who had been prisoners there the summer 
before and were good pilots; from which he learnt the strength (or 
rather weakness) of the enemy . . . ." (Vaughan to the King, Nov., 
1745, Chatham Papers, 95, P. R. O.) Vaughan, however, claimed 
credit for having digested the information he had secured " into a 
regular scheme." Ibid. 

Again shortly afterward Shirley informed Newcastle "as to that 
part of the scheme, which is proposed for taking the town by sur 
prise, so many circumstances must conspire to favour it, and so many 
accidents may defeat it, that I have no great dependance upon it, and 
shall guard as well as I can by orders against the hazard that must 
attend it." Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. i, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 157. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 247 

He expressed confidence that each " gentleman s zeal for 
the welfare and prosperity of his country will sufficiently 
animate him to lay hold of any favourable opportunity for 
procuring so inestimable an advantage and benefit to it, 
without any arguments from me for that purpose." An 
opportunity to accomplish this end " seems now to present 
itself," and this he would make clear to them. 

He then explained that according to the best information 
he could secure of the conditions in the town of Louisburg, 
of the number of soldiers and militia in it and of the situa 
tion of the harbor, he had good reason to believe that if two 
thousand men were landed upon the island as soon as they 
could be conveniently equipped and trained (the landing- 
being, he was credibly informed, possible in the proper place 
with little or no* risk), 

such a number of men would, with the blessing of Divme 
Providence upon their enterprise, be masters of the field at all 
events, and not only possess themselves of their two most im 
portant batteries with ease, break upon their out settlements, 
destroy their cattle and magazines, ruine their fishery works, 
and lay the town in ruines, but might make themselves mas 
ters of the town and harbour. 1 

He continued : 

It cannot be expected that I should enter here into a detail of 
the manner of executing such an attempt. 2 There are (I 

1 The copy of this document in the Ct. Rets., uses the word " cattle," 
instead of " cable " as in Sh. Cor. 

2 William Vaughan afterward declared that about the 7th of January, 
1745, his scheme was laid by Governor Shirley "before both houses 
of the general assembly then sitting; and a committee was chosen of 
both houses to consider the affair." (Vaughan to the King, Nov., 1745, 
Chatham Ps, 95.) The best inference which seems possible from the 
facts available is that Vaughan afterward claimed the authorship of 
a plan for taking Louisburg, which was the outgrowth of conferences 
of the group among whom Bradstreet was the most important figure, 



248 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

doubt not) some gentlemen in your house who are in a great 
measure judges of the practicableness of the thing in general; 
which is sufficient at present; and as I am very desirous of 
embracing every opportunity for the service of the country, I 
would earnestly recommend it to you to make a suitable pro 
vision for the expenses of such an expedition, which, if it 
should succeed no further than with respect to laying open the 
enemies harbour and destroying their out settlements and 
works, must greatly overpay the expence of it, by its conse 
quences to this province, and if it should wholly succeed, it 
must bring an irreparable loss to the enemy and an invaluable 
acquisition for this country. 1 

Then followed two days of earnest de~bate in the assem 
bly. The proposal was one which was already in the 
hearts of the people of the province, and especially in those 
of the fishermen, 2 but heretofore had seemed to many so 
impossible of realization as to furnish no foundation for 
the faith which confers substance upon things hoped for, 

But the expedition was as yet an inert thing. The as 
sembly could not breathe the breath of life into it, and an 
swered the governor that w r hile, " w r ere it in any measure 
in the power of this province in conjunction with the other 
governments to effect so happy an event, we should chear- 
fully engage in it," they considered the attempt too hazard 
ous for the province alone to undertake. They then begged 
Shirley to convey to the king the danger in which Massa 
chusetts and her neighbors lay because of the French oc 
cupation of Louisburg, and to " intreat his majesty s com- 

and that Shirley having later presented this plan to the assembly, 
Vaughan claimed much credit for the governor s action and for the 
later success of the expedition. Vaughan laid the scheme before 
Shirley and -Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire about Dec. i, 
1744. Ibid. 

*Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), pp. 630-631, printed in Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
pp. 159-160. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 14, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 161. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 249 

passionate regards to these his governments in reducing 
Cape Breton, and represent to his majesty the ready dis 
position of this province as far as they are able to exert 
themselves in conjunction with the other governments on 
such an occasion." 

Thus the assembly rejected the plan only as a proposal 
to attempt the capture single-handed and practically pledged 
their support of the expedition whenever the official news 
of the intent of the crown to support it should arrive. This 
vote also left the road open for reviving the matter even 
before the arrival of such news. Meanwhile Shirley sup 
ported their request for aid from home with a vigorous 
despatch to Newcastle. He again pointed out that the 
French at Louisburg were injuring the trade of the northern 
colonies, capturing provisions sent thence to the English 
West Indies, and breaking up the fishery; that in divers 
ways the port was o>f advantage to the French ; 2 and since 
that fortress would be the key to the large future develop 
ment in America under French or English control in a 
healthful country where future increase of population could 
hardly be limited, he urged the apparent necessity that the 
English control that place not only for the protection of 
Nova Scotia but also to safeguard British dominion in 
America. 

He added that the fall of Nova Scotia would mean the 
loss of the eastern settlements of Massachusetts and prob 
ably those of New Hampshire, and would give the French 
such a hold upon the continent of North America as " might 
possibly in time make em think of disputing the mastery 
of it with the crown of Great Britain." He even suggested 

l Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), p. 639. This appeal appears with slight 
variations in Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 14, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
p. 161 ; C. 0. 5 900, 156. 

2 Cf. supra, pp. 220-22 1. 



250 WILLIAM SHIRLEY-A HISTORY 

that the reduction of Louisburg " might seem almost of 
itself to be near an equivalent for the expense of a French 
war." 

In conclusion he gave a picture of conditions at Louis- 
burg favorable to its capture, stressing the scarcity of pro 
visions, the small garrison, mutinous Swiss troops, a hill 
favorable to attack back of the town only partly levelled by 
the French, and declared the real willingness of Massachu 
setts to aid to the extent of her ability, in connection with 
neighboring governments. 1 

The matter, however, was not allowed to rest until the 
home government should act upon it, which would doubtless 
have been too late for results during that year. Mr. Vaughan 
assumed the role of chief sponsor for the plan. On the 
same day that Shirley wrote to Newcastle transmitting and 
indorsing the assembly s appeal for action by the home 
government, Mr. Vaughan made an effort to revive the 
project. He wrote Shirley of his efforts to get the group to 
gether with the intention of devising ways and means of 
overcoming the objections urged against the plan by the as 
sembly, and if this seemed to be feasible, to send a memorial 
to the general court asking that it be revived. This course 
of action was contingent upon Shirley s approval. Mr. 
Vaughan, however, was in no doubt of the essential 
character of his trusteeship in the matter, observing: "All 
Englishmen, and all friends of Great Britain, by me now 
press Your Excellency to make one push more at this time in 
the affair ; praying that men knowing in these affairs may be 
brought face to face before the opponents." He avowed 
much public spirit and also professed ability to raise 1,000 
men for the expedition, " if it be Your Excellency s pleasure 
to commit the conduct of the affair to myself." At the 

Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 14, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 161-165. 
2 Vaughan to Shirley, Jan. 14, 1745, C. O. 5, 753. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 251 

same time he displayed a becoming freedom from egotism 
by adding: "If Your Excellency think proper to give the 
same to another (in case there is an opportunity) I am ready 
with the same diligence by day and night at my own ex- 
pence to encourage men to act in the affair with the utmost 
vigour and then retire to my own private business." 1 

Apparently he thought Shirley satisfactorily equipped 
to carry out the undertaking if given proper suggestion and 
assistance. 2 Nevertheless he seems to have felt some slight 
uncertainty as to whether Shirley would display the qualities 
required. 3 

Following this it seems that Vaughan, who until this time 
seemed much like a prophet crying in the wilderness, went, 
with the governor s approval, to Marblehead, the chief 
fishery town of the province, and among the fishermen and 
other seamen received " encouragement to furnish vessels 
in fourteen days for 3,500 men." More than 100 citizens 
of Marblehead having signed a petition for reviving the 
scheme for the expedition, he presented this to the general 
court on January I9th, and another signed by more than 
200 principal gentlemen in Boston, merchants and traders, 
for the same purpose was presented on January 23d. 4 

1 Ibid. Vaughan s zeal for the expedition may have arisen partly 
from the fact that he had large property holdings in the region of the 
Kennebec which were likely to fall into French hands if Louisburg 
were not taken. Vaughan to the King, Nov., 1745, Chatham Ps., 95. 

1 " I do assure Your Excellency that I should be exceedingly pleased 
if Your Excellency could be the means of effecting this great work, 
which must be the greatest honour and establishment to yourself . . ." 
Ibid. 

3 He continued : " but at the same time if it can t be brought to pass 
here, I purpose to proceed further westward . . . where I doubt not 
of success." Ibid. 

4 Ibid., a memorandum attached; Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. i, 1745, 
C. O. 5 900, 157; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), pp. 649-650, 656-657; Johnson, 
A Boston Merchant of 1745: or Incidents in the Life of James Gibson, 
volunteer at the Expedition to Louisburg; with a Journal of that 



252 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

The first of these petitions, for which Vaughan seems to 
have been largely responsible for securing signers, was ac 
companied by a brief message from 1 Shirley. In it he said 
he was informed that the spirit which appeared in the peti 
tion "prevails all over the maritime parts of the province." 
He therefore recommended, in spite of the recent unfavor 
able action upon the proposition, " inasmuch as a particular 
scheme for effecting the enterprise therein mentioned is 
proposed by some gentlemen (as the petitioners suggest) " 
that the general court " give those gentlemen an hearing by 
a committee of both houses, or otherwise, as you shall judge 
most proper, upon the practicableness of that particular pro>- 
posal, and to determine upon it according as it shall appear 
to you upon the inquiry." 1 

This w^as followed by secret sessions of the two houses 
as the question which seemed to involve the fate of the prov 
ince was discussed. The public were not supposed to have 
an inkling of even the subject under discussion, but it is re 
ported that one pious member, forgetting his family in the 
presence of his God, published the secret unawares. 2 

On the same day with the foregoing Shirley sent a longer 
message, arguing that, even though it should not prove 
possible to take Louisburg by surprise (as the plan presented 
proposed), such an expedition could still be a success. He 
expressed his belief that such a force of men as could 
be raised in Massachusetts, supported by the artillery 

Siege, never before published in this country (Boston, 1847), pp. 16-17. 
It is recorded that while the question remained in the balance Shirley, 
meeting a merchant of Boston on the street and finding him favorable 
to the expedition, set him at the task of securing the signatures of the 
200 Boston merchants who joined in the petition asking that it be re 
vived. This petition was hastily prepared and was the one presented 
to the general court on the twenty-third. Ibid. 

1 Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), p. 649. 

J Johnson, op. cit., pp. 15-16; Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 365-366; 
Belknap, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 155. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 253 

that could be sent with them, could at least remain 
" masters of the field " against not only the garrison, but any 
reinforcements which might be expected from France, if the 
latter succeeded in landing despite such a naval force as 
could be sent from the province. He thought that the hope 
of a successful surprise need not be abandoned. In case 
it were not successful, however, the place might be invested 
until a naval force and troops from England sufficient to 
complete the reduction of the island could arrive, as he be 
lieved they undoubtedly would if prompt news of the ex 
pedition were sent home. Shirley, meanwhile, would use 
every means of notifying the ministry and the commanders 
of English squadrons in America, " from some or others oi 
whom also we might probably have some naval force sea 
sonably sent for our assistance upon such an occasion." He 
therefore recommended " in the strongest terms, to lay hold 
on the present favorable opportunity, which Providence 
seems to have put into our hands, of securing to the province, 
by the single reduction of Cape Breton, every advantage 
which can contribute to its prosperity both by land and sea, 
and for embracing which opportunity, so general a spirit in 
the people seems happily to be raised." 

Upon the score of expense he felt sure that in view of 
the benefits to their neighbors and Great Britain herself by 
its conquest, the home government would not allow Massa 
chusetts to " finally bear more than its just and reasonable 
proportion of the burthen." Moreover, he would make ap 
plications to the adjacent governments for assistance by land 
and sea, and Massachusetts, he believed, " might reasonably 
depend upon their furnishing their respective quotas to>- 
wards this enterprise; in the success of which the interest 
and welfare of their provinces and colonies are likewise very 
nearly concerned as well as that of this province." 1 

l Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), p. 656. 



254 WILLIAM SPIIRLEYA HISTORY 

Thus Shirley at last presented the plan to the assembly, 
unable to promise specifically the aid he expected from, home, 
but giving reason for supposing it would be sent. - It seems 
not unlikely that faith in the governor s integrity and judg 
ment in giving so strong grounds for hoping for such as 
sistance had a larger influence upon the minds of the legis 
lators than the expectation of taking Louisburg by surprise. 

The committee of the two houses upon the affair gave 
a critical hearing continuing for several days to two gentle 
men who had been prisoners at Louisburg (perhaps Brad- 
street and Loring) and to many others who had been traders 
or prisoners there and knew it both in peace and war, some 
of whom had come from there at the beginning of the 
winter, and had a good knowledge of the place. 1 Their 
testimony was, that there were not over five or six hundred 
regular troops in the garrison and not over three or four 
hundred fighting men among the inhabitants, that they had 
only a small stock of provisions, that there were no vessels 
of force in the harbor and " that the place is at this time 
less capable of being defended against an attack than it is 
probable it will ever be hereafter." 

Meanwhile, Shirley left the representatives wholly un 
embarrassed by importunity on his part, and they devoted 
themselves to a discussion on the merits of the proposal. 2 
The committee after three days deliberation formed the 
" opinion that it is incumbent upon this government to em 
brace this favorable opportunity to attempt the reduction 
thereof." 3 When a vote was finally taken on January 25th, 

1 William Vaughan appeared to inform the committee of the facts 
which he had collected. Certificate by Shirley, Mar. 18, 1745, C. O. 
5 753- 

Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 368. 

3 Report of joint committee on Louisburg expedition, Ct. Recs. r 
vol. xvii (4), pp. 657-659, printed in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 169-170, and 
Pennsylvania Archives (Philadelphia, 1852-1856 and Harrisburg, 1874- 
1919), vol. i, p. 666; Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. i, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 157. 



LOUISBURG ORGANIZING A COUP 255 

on the adoption of the committee s report, the result was " a 
chearfull and almost unanimous resolution of the court to 
undertake this important business in such manner, as is par 
ticularly expressed in the report of the committee accepted 
by the whole com I which I herewith enclose." 

Thus by the joint efforts of the governor and a group 
of enthusiastic assistants, of whom William Vaughan was 
most in the public eye, was the Louisburg expedition given 
birth. 2 

Shirley to Law, Jan. 29, 1745 (circular letter to all governors as far 
as Pennsylvania), Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, p. 254, Sh. Cor., vol. 
i, pp. 171-172. 

Hutchinson, however, asserts that after the petition of the merchants 
concerned in the fisheries revived the affair, " a second committee, 
appointed upon this petition, reported in favour of it, and the 26th of 
January their report came before the house, who spent the day in 
debating it, and at night a vote was carried in favour of it by a 
majority of one voice only." (Hutchinson. op. cit., vol. ii, p. 368.) 
Shirley s contemporary statement in a circular letter to the other 
governments as far south as Pennsylvania which would be likely to be 
given wide publicity at the time seems to be in conflict with the record 
made by Hutchinson many years after, perhaps from memory, since 
the house apparently made no record of its votes on measures acted 
upon by it. Shirley would naturally desire to make the prospects for 
the expedition seem as favorable as possible; but it seems doubtful if 
the governor, were he inclined to abandon his accustomed veracity, 
would do so in a document so likely to at once confound him before 
the public. 

Belknap (op. cit., vol. ii, p. 155) asserts further, without quoting a 
source, that the action on the matter was taken " in the absence of 
several members who were known to be against it ; " a condition at 
which Hutchinson s narrative does not hint. 

2 William Vaughan, after taking an honorable part in the expedition, 
although his suggestion that he be given chief command of it was not 
adopted, sought vigorously to secure recognition at home for his 
indefatigable services to promote it. In doing so he seems to have 
believed that he was not fairly treated by the governor and by the 
commander-in-chief , both of whom, historians have intimated, were actu 
ated by jealousy of the irrepressible Mr. Vaughan and his leading part 
in the affair. This charge so far as Shirley was concerned seems not 



256 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

to be supported by the governor s letter to Pepperrell on Mar. 23, 
1745, in which he speaks of him (Vaughan) very appreciatively and 
kindly (6-Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, pp. 120-124, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 195, 
note), nor by a certificate by Shirley of Mar. 18, 1745, in which he 
testified that " William Vaughan of Damariscotta . . . was very in 
strumental in setting on foot the present expedition against the 
French settlements on Cape Breton," with a considerable catalogue of 
later services in connection with the expedition. Certificate of Shirley, 
Mar. 18, 1745, Ar. Secretary s Book of Powers of Attorney . . . , p. 284, 
copy in C. O. 5 753- 

Vaughan, while in England, sought as a reward for his services the 
positions which had been held by General Phillips, as governor of 
Nova Scotia and colonel of the regiment stationed at Annapolis, but 
becoming doubtful of his success finally begged Newcastle " if I am 
thought unequal to the services I offer to undertake [for the settling 
of Nova Scotia with Protestants], I pray your Grace s favour that I 
may have a sum of money for my services and expenses, and be per 
mitted to return home to my private affairs, that the world may no 
longer say that I was first in this affair, and the last in consideration." 
Vaughan to Newcastle, Feb. 28, 1746, C. O. 5 753. 

Vaughan was undoubtedly useful in bringing public opinion to bear, 
and he was a brave soldier who served gallantly as a volunteer, but the 
feature of surprise which he so earnestly urged was impracticable (as 
Shirley realized) and no judicious historian is likely to accept him at 
his own valuation. 

Information regarding Vaughan s share in the expedition in addition 
to the other material already quoted is found in certificates from 
Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire, General Pepperrell (June 
21, 1745), and Captain David Wooster (Oct. 25, 1745), all in C. O. 
5 753- For a plea on his behalf cf. Goold, " Col. Wm. Vaughan of 
Matinicus and Damariscotta" in Me. H. S. Colls., vol. viii, pp. 302-313. 

The vote to undertake the expedition is found in Ct. Recs., vol. 
xvii (4), p. 659, printed in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 169-170. 



CHAPTER XII 
LOUISBURG PREPARATIONS 

THE vote of the general court on January 25th fixed the 
main features of the expedition. The governor was asked 
to raise 3,000 volunteers and officer them. Each soldier en 
listing was to be paid twenty-five shillings per month and 
to receive a blanket, one month s pay in advance, and his 
share of all plunder. Pledges were made for the securing 
of necessary warlike stores for the expedition, and for four 
months provisions. A committee was to be appointed to 
procure and fit out vessels to* serve as transports, ready to 
depart by the beginning of March (a scant five weeks away). 
A suitable naval force was to be provided by the general 
court to serve as a convoy. It was also voted " that ap 
plication be forthwith made to the governments of New 
York, the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Con 
necticut and Rhode Island to furnish their respective quotas 
of men and vessels to accompany or follow the forces of 
this province." * 

While the government of Massachusetts was agog with 
the splendid dream of Louisburg captain, the home govern 
ment in critical mood rejected a petition from them that 
the province be supplied at the expense of the crown with 
small arms. 2 However, the situation in England was quite 
as encouraging for Shirley s plans as could be expected. 

l Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 170. 

The home government recalled that the small quantity of small 
arms and powder sent in 1704 had not been paid for until the province 

257 



258 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Shirley s energy on behalf of Nova Scotia and the other 
English American colonies had been extended to London 
through Christopher Kilby, the Massachusetts agent there. 
Mr. Kilby late in November, 1744, petitioned the crown for 
two or three small cruising ships " to attempt the passage 
to New England (which though difficult is not impractic 
able) it being absolutely necessary that one of them [more 
being asked for fear of accidents] should appear at An 
napolis before the French ships from Europe arrive at 
Cape Breton and that a sufficient force may be appointed 
and sent forward as early as possible the next year to cover 
and protect your majesty s colonies in North America, or 
to attack the French in theirs, which may be prosecuted 
with the utmost prospect of success." x 

Before this had been acted upon, Newcastle had written 
to Shirley that for protecting Annapolis, which was likely 
to be attacked early in the spring, it had been decided " to 
employ such a strength of ships of war in those seas under 
the command of Commodore \Yarren as may be sufficient 
to protect the said province and the other neighboring 
colony s in North America, and the trade and fishery of his 
majesty s subjects in those parts and may also as occasion 
shall offer, attack and distress the enemy in their settlements, 
and annoy their fishery and commerce." In carrying out 
this program Shirley was directed, in case Warren applied 
to him for assistance in the form of men, provisions or ship 
ping, to aid and assist him in the most effectual manner in 
accordance with plans to be worked out by consultation be 
tween them, and to be ready to " concert and advise " with 

was compelled to do so in order to secure the supply of ordnance 
recently donated to them, and they declined to establish a precedent 
for supplying with firearms all the American colonies who should 
plead poverty. Order in Council, Jan. 10, 1745, C. O. 5 885, 115, Ff, 75. 
i Order in Cl., Feb. 7, 1/45, C. O. 5 885, 119, Ff, 76; A. P. C., 
vol. iii, p. 790. 



LO UISB URGPREPARA TIONS 259 

him in regard to all questions that might arise in connec 
tion with his service, and especially to inform him as fully 
as possible of " the state and condition of the enemy s set 
tlements and of the ships in their harbours, that he may be 
enabled to judge whether it may be practicable and advis 
able to make an attempt upon any of the ports." On 
January 8th, Kilby s petition was referred to the admiralty, 
who reported that they had " given directions for a ship of 
war of forty-four guns to proceed to Annapolis Royal in 
Nova Scotia with recruits on board for the regiment there 
and also to convoy there three other ships bound to Piscata- 
qua in New Hampshire, Boston in New England, and St. 
Johns in Newfoundland," with cannon and ordnance stores 
for the defense of those places, " which ship would have 
proceeded on her voyage before now, had not her sailing 
been deferred till the beginning of February at the particular 
desire of Mr. Kilby, the aforementioned agent, and other 
merchants concerned in the ships going thither." They added 
that they had under consideration sending out a proper force 
as early as possible, " which we hope will be sufficient not 
only to cover and protect his majesty s colonies in North 
America but even to annoy the enemy as occasion may 
offer." 2 

Thus despite a -faux pas of Mr. Kilby, which apparently 
did not ingratiate him with the authorities at home, the 
assistance which Shirley had asked and expected was being 
prepared, if somewhat tardily, for the coming American 
campaign. Meanwhile Shirley was planning for a campaign 
into which it would fit when it might arrive, and which 
could sustain itself until it did arrive. 

Shirley upon his part lost no time in taking steps to assure 

1 Newcastle to Shirley, Jan. 3, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 155-156. 

2 Order in Cl., Feb 7, 1745, C. O. 5 885, 119, Ff, 76; A. P. C., vol. iii, 
PP. 790, 791. 



2 6o WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

so far as possible the cooperation of British naval and other 
forces not only hypothetical ones from England but those 
actually in the American area. To this end he wrote to 
Commodore Warren in the West Indies explaining the plans 
for the expedition, the conditions at Cape Breton and the 
popular enthusiasm in New England. He added that he 
hoped to have 3,000 men raised in Massachusetts by the 
beginning of March, and to have them landed at Cape 
Breton soon after. Further as a means of preventing news 
O f the expedition from reaching the French and of securing 
transports and seamen for the fleet promptly he had at 
once laid an embargo upon all shipping for thirty days. 
He then expressed confidence that the land forces to be 
raised in Massachusetts and in the neighboring govern 
ments to whom he should apply for aid " will be supported 
by the utmost naval force which you sir can possibly spare 
out of his majesty s ships under your command," pointing 
out that upon such assistance the success of the undertaking 
greatly depended. Shirley then explained that he had been 
much encouraged in undertaking it by the hope of receiving 
aid from him, adding: "If the service in which you are 
engaged would permit you to come yourself and take upon 
you the command of the expedition, it would I doubt not 
be a most happy event for his majesty s service and your 
own honour." 

Apropos of naval possibilities at Louisburg Shirley in 
formed Warren that " nothing can probably prevent our 
troops from making themselves masters of the royal battery 
which is the most galling battery in the harbor," and that by 
information of Captain Durell, two forty-gun ships, especi 
ally if assisted by a bomb vessel, could silence the island 
battery and thus leave the harbor practically open to the 
fleet. 

Shirley stressed as the most essential condition for the 



LOUISBURG PREPARATIONS 261 

success of the expedition the presence of a sufficient naval 
force before the harbor of Louisburg before the middle of 
March at the farthest, 

not only to intercept the enemy s provision vessels but M. Du- 
vivier who is expected by that time with recruits and supplies 
for the garrison, and perhaps some troops designed against 
Annapolis Royal under convoy of a fifty-four and sixty-gun 
ship intercepting of which last would be a killing blow in 
deed to the town and garrison of Louisburg, and soon decide 
the affair between us and the enemy. But it will be impossible 
for us to muster up here a sufficient naval force for that 
purpose without the assistance of two fifty or forty-gun ships, 
which would secure the point ; and I hope if you can possibly 
spare em that you will instantly despatch em away upon re 
ceipt of this, but if it is impracticable for you to spare two, 
let us have one, and perhaps we may possibly do with that, as 
I hope one if not two of his majesty s ships may arrive here 
with stores for New Hampshire and Annapolis Royal, and 
with recruits for the latter by the middle of March, but there 
is no absolute dependance to be made upon it. 

He explained that he was hopeful of assistance from 
Captain Gayton (then at Boston in command of a prize 
taken from the French, who was to take a load of masts 
for Admiral Knowles in June but was meanwhile at liberty), 
and of Warren s approval of his giving it. He expected 
further to secure three twenty-gun privateers, the province 
snow, the Rhode Island and Connecticut sloops, and as 
many cruisers in addition as possible from the New York, 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island governments. Also he was 
sending an appeal for aid to Virginia where he had heard 
there were stationed two English ships of forty and twenty 
guns, respectively. In this connection he begged Warren 
to send orders to them to proceed directly to his aid. He 
suggested that Warren s vessels proceed to Canso, which 
was to be the rendezvous, where a detachment of troops and 
information would be found. 



262 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

He added that he was to send an account of the expedi 
tion home on the morrow and that he was 

in hopes we may have assistance from England by the latter 
end of May or June, but as that will be too late for the success 
of the expedition we entirely rely upon you to send us in 
stantly what ships you can spare, and if you should come in 
time to be there before the arrival of the recruits and stores 
from Old France, it would so far secure the point, as that if 
you follow soon with your other ships I am persuaded you 
must take the place before May is over without any other help 
than the ships you will find before the harbour ; and if we 
should fail of that success, we might I think depend upon such 
a reinforcement from home by June as would certainly carry 
the place, but I doubt not of its being carryd before, if you 
come yourself. 

He then interpreted the meaning of success as being the 
salvation of Nova Scotia and the downfall of Canada, 
" which would secure his majesty the whole northern con 
tinent, gaining the whole fishery exclusive of the French, 
increasing greatly the nursery of seamen for the royal navy, 
and securing the navigation of Great Britain to and from 
her northern colonies as far as Virginia, as which would 
be an equivalent for the expence of a French war let the con 
tingencies of it in Europe be what they will, and I hope the 
procuring of these invaluable benefits to his majesty s British 
dominions is reserved for you." 

To insure the safety of vessels that might be sent he 
despatched two pilots with his letter and begged an early 
reply by the vessel that bore them. Finally, that any ships 
sent might be known by the land forces upon their ap 
proach to Canso or Louisburg, he suggested a signal to be 
flown- for that purpose. 1 

For the above exposition of Shirley s plans, cf. Shirley to Warren, 
Jan. 29, 1745, Ad. I, 3817; Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. i, 1745, C. O. 
5 QOO, 157- 



LO UISB URGPREPARA TIONS 263 

Shirley s vision of a wholly British North America as 
far as the Spanish settlements was but a prophecy of the 
dream which Pitt made real to the British nation a decade 
later. However, when Shirley propounded it, it was much 
less difficult of realization than when Pitt found it necessary 
to arouse every energy of the mother country to bring it to 
pass. In 1745 Louisburg was easily vulnerable, and in the 
succeeding years of the war Canada was weakly garrisoned 
and incapable of large or sustained effort. No formidable 
attacks upon the English colonies occurred during its 
duration. In the days of Pitt s activity, however, Canada s 
strength had been considerably increased, and a new fron 
tier had been created to the southwest along the Alleghanies. 
The increased vigor of the French appeared in the disasters 
to the English at Oswego, under Braddock, at Fort William 
Henry and at Ticonderoga. 

In apprising Newcastle of the venture, Shirley announced 
that he was already carrying the scheme into execution, and 
hoped to have the forces ready to embark with a train of 
artillery by the middle of March. This force he assured 
Newcastle could not fail of taking Louisburg, if the neigh 
boring governments gave aid and if an adequate naval force 
could be gotten before the town in time to prevent its being 
relieved from France. Even if the Massachusetts troops 
were forced to act alone, they would be able to win a com 
plete success should they have proper naval support. He 
was able to report as already available a 4OO-ton ship of 
twenty guns and the province snow of sixteen guns, while 
he had a prospect of securing a twenty-gun ship and a 
twelve-gun sloop from Rhode Island and a twelve-gun sloop 
from Connecticut. 

He added that if he could have the aid of, the Eltham 
(Captain Durell) of forty guns, Rippon s prize of twenty 
guns and the ff Bien Ami " prize (Captain Gayton) of 



264 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

thirty-four guns, then all at Boston, they in combination 
with the smaller craft available would probably be stronger 
than the French convoy expected at Louisburg. But the 
first must presently convoy four mast ships to England, 
and the second was under orders to convoy a mast ship to> 
the West Indies. The third had a like commission but 
could not execute it before June, and therefore Shirley hoped 
he and the assembly would succeed in engaging its services 
for the expedition meanwhile. 

He had been informed that ordnance stores for Annapolis 
and New Hampshire were expected soon, and likewise re 
cruits for Annapolis, and that the admiralty planned to 
send guard ships to protect the New England coasts and 
fishery. He therefore hoped one or more of his majesty s 
ships would arrive from Great Britain and join the ex 
pedition in time to intercept recruits and supplies intended 
for Louisburg. Moreover he had sent a packet boat ex 
press to Warren which might reach him before the middle 
of February. 1 

In addition to his hopes of assistance from Warren he 
reported his application to the governments of New York, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania for some privateer cruisers, 
and to the commanders of British ships stationed at Vir 
ginia and South Carolina for assistance, from any of which 
sources aid might arrive in time. Thus he made clear the 
means by which he hoped to bottle up Louisburg. 

He sent the rough draft of a plan for the capture of the 
fortress, apparently the one which the assembly had acted 
upon, 2 with an explanation of its limitations. He then 

1 Warren s squadron was stationed at Antigua . 

This is without doubt the plan published in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
173-177; N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, pp. 273-274; New Jersey Historical 
Society Collections, vol. iv, pp. 211-213. Shirley also sent a copy of 
it to Admiral Warren and probably to all the governors who were 
asked to aid the expedition. 



LOUISBURG PREPARATIONS 265 

outlined his own plan as follows : The transports should go 
from Boston to Canso, which was to be taken and held. 
The main expedition was then to proceed to " Gabarouse " 
or Chapeaurougc bay, about twenty leagues from Canso 
and two hours march from either the town of Louisburg or 
the royal battery, one of the chief protections of the bay. 
The royal battery, usually weakly garrisoned and unpro 
vided with facilities for defense on the land side, and there 
fore " capable of being suddenly taken," was to be assaulted 
by a party of 500 men " by the help of a fascine way and 
a few scaling ladders without any cannon." In case of 
failure in this attempt the battery was to be destroyed with 
ease and safety from a hill behind it. The position thus 
gained should, if tenable, be used against the town, against 
which also the artillery brought with them should be put 
into play from a hill about a half-mile distant from: the 
fortress. In any case the royal battery was to be made use 
less for the defense of the harbor against an English fleet, 
and if it contributed nothing to the fall of the town, the 
blockading fleet, if strong enough, would soon compel a 
surrender. 

If the town should be relieved, he hoped the land forces 
might hold their o\vn (especially since he had at the moment 
been assured of aid from New Hampshire and Rhode Island, 
and the expedition would probably be aided by Connecticut) 
until the king should have time to send " some battering 
ships able to enter the harbor and such a number of marines 
or other troops as he shall think proper." Meanwhile the 
American forces would be able to destroy the outlying set 
tlements, the cattle, magazines, fishing houses, stages, shal 
lops and boats, " which would most especially break up the 
fishery of the island for one or two years at least." 

In case of any unforeseen necessity of leaving Cape 
Breton before the arrival of English ships and troops, he 



266 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

proposed to withdraw the forces to Canso and encamp until 
they received advice from England whether reinforcements 
were coming to their aid. If in that case aid were not sent 
the damage already outlined to Louisburg and its neighbor 
hood would have been accomplished. Nova Scotia would 
be secured against invasion so long as the troops remained 
at Canso, and a blockhouse and battery would have been 
erected at the latter place to insure its reoccupation until 
the pleasure of the crown regarding it should be known. 

Having explained the value of Canso and plans recently 
made by the ordnance board to strengthen its fortifications, 
he added that Massachusetts would be unwilling to maintain 
a garrison there or to pay for resettling it " when they begin 
to perceive my intention in erecting the blockhouse upon it." 

The sudden enthusiasm in Massachusetts, he explained, 
was partly due to the opportunity to strike Louisburg while 
it was weak, which led to sudden preparations, as the ad 
vantage which surprise would give would probably be lost 
by more formal preparation for an expedition, " all which 
circumstances had so promising an aspect that I could not 
avoid complying with the general spirit of the people to lay 
hold on so favorable an opportunity against the enemy." 

Finally he asked prompt directions in case Louisburg were 
taken before English forces arrived, whether to keep or de 
molish it, 1 

Meanwhile Shirley was carrying forward with great 
energy the preparations for that part of the expedition 
which could be executed without action at home or by 
the commanders of British naval forces. By January 29th, 
a circular letter had been drawn up by the secretary of the 
province and was within two days thereafter despatched to 
all the governors as far south as Pennsylvania. 2 This 

^or the above outline of his plans and the progress he had made in 
realizing them, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. I, 1745. C. 0. 5 900, 157. 
2 Shirley to Law, Jan. 29, 1745, COWL H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 253-255. 



LOUISE URGPREPARA TIONS 267 

document stated the action taken by Massachusetts, the 
strong public sentiment there for the attempt, and the " full 
confidence and expectation that all his majesty s govern 
ments in North America, who are concerned in duty and 
interest as well as we, will readily join with us. . . ." The 
burdens already borne by Massachusetts at Annapolis were 
set forth, and each governor addressed was urged to secure 
full participation by his colony by both land and sea and as 
promptly as possible. Shirley explained in the circular that 
the plan was one he had proposed to and earnestly urged 
upon the ministry at home " before I had any thought of 
the thing s being attempted in this way," that he would now 
write pressingly to both the ministry at home and com 
manders of British naval forces in American waters " to 
send a naval force to meet us and support us in our design." 
Meanwhile, he stated, he had " ordered an embargo of all 
vessells whatsoever," and had " siezed all French men among 
us and have endeavored to have them! kept under such safe 
custody as to prevent them from sending any intelligence," 
measures which "will be necessary (as I apprehend) in your 
government." 1 

Shirley s embargo, however, was not wholly effective in 
suppressing news of the enterprise, as the master of a sloop 
who succeeded in escaping either before or in spite of the 
restrictions, published in Pennsylvania the interesting de 
velopments a week before Shirley s letter to Governor 
Thomas was received there. 2 Shortly afterward Governor 
Morris of New Jersey reported the probability that the 
facts then known everywhere in the middle colonies would 
reach the French in Canada by way of Albany. 3 

Circular letter (Shirley to Law, Jan. 29, 1745), loc. cit. 

2 Thomas to Morris, Feb. 12, 1745, N. J. H. S. Colls., vol. iv, p. 231. 

"Morris to Shirley, Feb. 22, 1745, ibid., p. 233. 



268 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

In addition to the circular, Shirley wrote personally to 
the several governors to urge special considerations upon 
them. In the case of Rhode Island he stressed the ex 
posed situation of the colony upon the sea and the induce 
ment to the French to visit it in retaliation for the activity 
of its privateers. The messengers by whom this message 
was sent were charged to explain to Governor Greene the 
great need for having a naval force before Louisburg by 
the middle of March, to which force he hoped Rhode 
Island would contribute. He further asked for heavy 
artillery of which " we have not sufficient in our Castle." 1 

The request to Rhode Island was followed by a vote to 
fit out that colony s sloop to join the forces before Louis- 
burg. 2 After Connecticut had voted to enter heartily into 
the expedition, 3 her smaller neighbor voted to raise 150 men 
for land service. 4 The men, however, were not then raised. 5 
Later Shirley sent an appeal for aid to a former Rhode 
Island client, Godfrey Malbone, offering to secure pay from 
Massachusetts for 500 men if they were raised in that 
colony. The Rhode Island assembly then voted to allow 
three persons to enlist men to total not more than 500 for 
the Cape Breton expedition, and to be reimbursed their 
necessary expense incurred in doing so. 6 This brought no 

Shirley to Greene, Jan. 29. 1745, Records of the Colony of Rhode 
Island and Providence Plantations, in New England (Providence, 
1856-1865), vol. v, p. 74, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 172-173, Cor. Col. Govs. 
of R. I., vol. i, pp. 298-299. Cf. also, Shirley to Morris, Jan. 29, 1745, 
and enclosures sent through Morris to governors Thomas of Penn 
sylvania and Gooch of Virginia, N. J. H. S. Colls., vol. iv, pp. 209-211. 

2 R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 100. 

3 The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut [1636-1776] 
(Hartford, 1850-1890), Feb. 26-29, 1745, vol. ix, pp. 83-89. 

*R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, pp. 102-103. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Mar. 27, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 196. 

*R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, pp. 105-106. 



LOUISE URGPREPARA TIONS 269 

useful results, however, and the preparing of the colony 
sloop was a pretense. In fact Rhode Island not only did 
nothing actively for the expedition, but Shirley intimated 
that her embargo to keep information from the enemy was 
not enforced. 1 In May the assembly again voted to raise 
150 men, 2 but they were not ready for service until after 
the siege was over. 3 

Finally, after two applications by Shirley for seamen 
to man a prize taken at Louisburg, Rhode Island voted 
a bounty to secure the enlistment of 200 seamen for that 
purpose. 4 Shirley also applied at the same time for the 
same purpose to New York and New Hampshire, and soon 
after suggested the need to Connecticut, but with emphasis 
to Rhode Island. 5 

The governors of the provinces southwest of New Eng 
land as far as Pennsylvania, were cordial in their attitude to 
ward the proposed expedition and sent assurances that they 
would use their most hearty endeavors to secure support 
for it from their respective governments. 6 In the case of 
Governor Clinton of New York, although he secured no 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Mar. 27, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 196. 

*R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 114. 

8 Rhode Island remained a trial to Shirley throughout the struggle 
for Louisburg. The ancient stronghold of spiritual and other liberty 
served as a hiding-place for men who had fled from Massachusetts after 
impressment whether for service for protection of the frontiers, or in 
the expedition. Shirley to Wanton, June 6, 1745, R. I. Col. Rets., vol. 
v, p. 136; Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 227-228, and note 3. 

4 Shirley to Wanton, June 6, 1745, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 136; 
ibid., June 18, 1745, p. 118. 

6 Shirley to Newcastle, June i, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 188; Shirley to Law, 
June 15, 1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 302-304; Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
p. 229. 

Shirley to General Court, Apr. 3, 1745, Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), 
PP- 713-719; Morris to Shirley, Feb. 20, 1745, and Thomas to Morris, 
Feb. 12, 1745, N. J. H. S. Colls., vol. iv, pp. 231-232. 



270 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



aid from his assembly he promptly furnished on request " a 
considerable train of artillery " to be used against the de 
fenses of Louisburg. 1 This consisted of ten eighteen 
pounders. 2 Clinton also sent provisions for the support of 
the expedition. 3 

Governor Morris of New Jersey regretted to inform 
Shirley that the Quaker influences in both Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey gave little hope that the enterprise would 
be supported in that quarter. 4 His forecast was correct 
in both instances. However, upon a later application by 
Shirley to New Jersey for aid, with the statement that the 
king had given his support to the expedition, 5 the assembly 
unanimously voted to transfer 2,000 held in the treasury for 
other purposes, to a fund for the purchase of provisions 
for the expedition. 6 This was enacted into law June ist. 7 
Governor Morris explained that this unexpected action did 
not arise from interest in the expedition, but from a desire 
to empty the treasury and create grounds for demanding 
an issue of 40,000 in bills of credit. 8 

Governor Thomas of Pennsylvania combined with his 
cordial good-will and pledges to urge the matter upon the 
assembly the candid opinion that dependence upon aid out 
side of New England of the varieties to which Shirley 
had referred would be " very wild." 

l Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), pp. 713-719. 

J Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 371. 

3 Catherwood to Morris, June 16, 1745, N. J. H. S. Colls., vol. iv, p. 252, 

4 Morris to Shirley, Feb. 20, 1745, ibid., pp. 231-232. 

5 Shirley to Morris, May 18, 1745, ibid., pp. 241-242. 
Morris to Shirley, May 24, 1745, ibid., pp. 247-248. 
Ubid., p. 249. 

8 Morris to Shirley, June 21, 1745, ibid., p. 253; Morris to Phips, Sept, 
2, 1745, ibid., p. 267. 

9 Thomas to Morris, Feb. 12, 1745, ibid., p. 231. 



LO UISB URGPREPARA TIONS 271 

The Pennsylvania assembly went further, however, by 
pointing out that they had not been consulted beforehand 
as to undertaking the enterprise or the manner of conducting 
it, and that it was then too late for alterations if they were 
desired by other colonies. They considered that " if the 
design succeed, they will be entitled to but small part of the 
honour, if it miscarry, they may indeed be time enough to 
share a principal part of the disgrace." Moreover, they 
added, " we should think it not prudent to unite in an enter- 
prize where the expence must be great, perhaps much blood 
shed, and the event very uncertain." 

In May Governor Thomas, having received a letter from 
Shirley and another from Warren begging him to send men 
and provisions to Louisburg, called a session of the assembly 
and presented the matter to them anew. 2 After more than 
a month s delay * he elicited from them: the judgment that 
" the enterprise against Cape Breton is a private undertak 
ing of the government of New England, in which they did 
not think fit to consult the neighboring colonies, and wherein, 
if the design succeeds, they themselves will receive the 
principal benefit, and therefore they have no right to involve 
us in the expence." The assembly requested delay until 
specific information as to what share in the expedition had 
been directed from home before " coming to any further 
resolution in the affair." Nevertheless it placed an em 
bargo upon all powder to be kept for use at Cape Breton. 4 
In July, upon hearing of the surrender of Louisburg and 
being informed of Newcastle s plans of the preceding 

1 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, from the Or 
ganisation to the Termination of the Proprietary Government [Mar. 
10, i68s-Sept. 27, 1775} (Phila., 1851-1852), Mar. 4, 1745, vol. iv, p. 755- 

*Ibid., May 27, 1745, pp. 761-762. 

9 Ibid., July 4, 1745, P- 763. 

*Ibid., July 5, 1745, pp. 763-764- 



272 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

January for the protection of the colonies or for attacking 
the French, they voted 4,000 to purchase provisions for 
the king s service. 1 

To Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire Shirley ex 
pressed the opinion that that province was " more deeply 
interested in the event of this expedition than any of the 
other colonies," since without the conquest of Louisburg, 
Nova Scotia and the eastern settlements of Massachusetts 
must fall, leaving New Hampshire the frontier of New 
England, while the capture of Louisburg would mean the 
fall of Canada. 2 Realizing that Wentworth might be 
bound by his instructions from home to refuse his assent to 
issues of paper money necessary to the raising of forces in 
New Hampshire, Shirley revealed that he himself had re 
ceived permission to consent to emergency issues of paper 
for necessary war purposes, expressed confidence that Went 
worth would be approved rather than censured for violat 
ing his instructions upon that point in the existing emer 
gency, 3 and in response to Wentworth s request sent a copy 
of his own instructions upon that head for inspection. 4 

The matter was submitted to the New Hampshire as 
sembly on February ist and 2d, and they promptly passed a 

Ubid., July II, 1745, p. 764; July 22, 1745, p. 768; July 27, 1745, p. 769. 

2 .Shirley to Wentworth, Jan. 31, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 932, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 177- 

3 -Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 2, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 933. 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 178; Feb. 3, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 933, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 178-179 (extract). 

4 The New Hampshire assembly proposing to put on distant years the 
drawing in of bills of credit for the support of the expedition, he 
suggested, in case the assembly would not yield, that the men raised in 
New Hampshire serve in the pay of Massachusetts, a lieutenant-colonel 
and major to be selected from New Hampshire and arms to be 
furnished by that province. Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 9, 1745, 
N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 934- 



LO UISB URGPREPARA TIONS 273 

vote for raising 250 men to join the expedition, afterward 
increasing the number to 350 men. 1 

The action of Connecticut was more deliberate than that 
of New Hampshire. It was necessary to call a special ses 
sion of the assembly, which sat from the 26th to* the 29th 
of February, to> act upon the great enterprise. By that time 
the participation of Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
troops was assured and Rhode Island had provided for 
fitting out her colony sloop. Connecticut thereupon de 
cided to make it a thoroughgoing New England enterprise 
by joining to it a body of 500 troops, 2 to be accompanied 
by the colony sloop as a convoy for the transports on the 
way to Cape Breton. The embarkation point was New 
London and Roger Wolcott was named to command the 
Connecticut levies. Afterward Wolcott was made second 
in command under Pepperrell, who was commissioned by 
Connecticut, and the force was merged with the other troops 
of the expedition. 3 These forces were voted four months 
provisions. 4 

Upon hearing of the action in New Hampshire and the 
apparently favorable sentiment in Rhode Island Shirley 
sent out another circular letter to the other governments, 
recounting what was under way in the small neighboring 
colonies (giving, as it proved, a somewhat over-optimistic 
forecast of the action to be expected in Rhode Island), and 
also reporting rapid progress in Massachusetts. 5 This, 

1 Ibid., pp. 271, 275, 279, 291. 

3 A false report seems to have reached Shirley on March 6th, that 
Connecticut was to raise 1,000 men. Shirley to Wentworth, Mar. 6, 
1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 940. 

3 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, p. 497. 

* Conn. Col Recs., Feb. 26, 29, 1745, vol. ix, pp. 83-89. 

1 It was sent to Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and 
probably to the others outside New England to whom appeals had 
been made. Shirley to Law, Feb. 4, 1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. 



274 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

however, seems to have had slight influence upon develop 
ments. 

Meanwhile, Shirley was beginning to carry into execu 
tion the program authorized by the Massachusetts general 
court. By March 3ist, he had entered in earnest upon the 
task of raising the forces. It has been represented that 
the governor had much difficulty in selecting a suitable com 
mander, 1 but such difficulties probably were largely political. 
It was hardly to be questioned that the chief command would 
go to a Massachusetts man, since most of the men to serve 
under him would clearly be from that province. Since no> 
large body of New England troops had been in the field 
for a generation there were no available leaders experienced 
in the handling of such operations as were now contemp 
lated. The province, however, had a military organiza 
tion, the militia. The amount of technical military train 
ing derived through it was slight, but nevertheless those 
units of the militia stationed or residing on or near the fron 
tiers had had a taste of service in guarding against Indian 
depredations. It was in this service that such military 
leaders as Massachusetts possessed had been trained. 

The province had two frontiers, the eastern and the 
western, on either side of New Hampshire, and the two 
areas were entirely independent of each other in military 
matters. It thus happened that there was one organization 
in Maine and the eastern settlements and another in the Con 
necticut and Housatonic valleys and adjacent territory, the 
respective chiefs of which knew no superior but the gover 
nor, and exercised large discretion under him in time of 
crisis. It may be inferred that the responsibility for nmin- 

xi, pp. 255-256; Shirley to Morris, Feb. 4, I745> N> / H- $ Colls., vol. 
iv, pp. 230-231; Shirley to Thomas, Feb. 4, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i,. 
pp. 179-180. 

Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 369- 



LOUISE URGPREPARA TIONS 2 ?$ 

taining a ceaseless guard against Indian surprises along a 
frontier of from fifty to 100 miles was calculated to develop 
some of the qualities of a successful commander. 

The men who would logically be considered for the com 
mand of the expedition were the men who had served in 
these responsible posts, Colonel William Pepperrell O f 
Kittery in Maine and Colonel John Stoddard of Northamp 
ton in the Connecticut valley. Of the two it is not im 
probable that Stoddard was the abler, and the better fighter. 
On the other hand he was needed to hold secure his frontier 
against any diversion which might be attempted from 
Crown Point or Canada. Besides, Stoddard, while yet 
active was no longer young and might not prove equal to the 
fatigues attending the command of an army in the field. 

By contrast, Pepperrell, if leading the expedition, would 
be covering the frontier which he customarily commanded, 
and he was then in the prime of life. As a further qualifi 
cation, Pepperrell had a pleasing personality, and his 
popularity among the inhabitants east of New Hampshire 
would ensure a large enlistment there for the expedition,, 
and to a less extent help to attract recruits everywhere. 
Shirley doubtless took note of these considerations in naming 
Pepperrell to the command. 1 

According to a time-honored story Pepperrell hesitated 
whether to take the proffered honor and responsibility and 
finally accepted after being advised to do so by Whitefield, 
the evangelist, who was just then engaged in arousing the 
New England idealism to unprecedented instances of re 
ligious fervor. By this act and by furnishing the assembling 
legions with a slogan of spiritual import, the great revivalist 
proved himself a patriot and materially aided in the secur- 

1 He received his commission as lieutenant-general on January 31 St., 
6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, p. 497. 



276 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

ing of men. 1 Thus Shirley s enterprise, to which he had 
given the momentum of a battering ram at the gates of 
Canada, became a crusade against Catholicism, which to 
the New England mind of the day was pagan in spirit and 
sacrilegious in form. 

Pepperrell also received commissions from Governors 
Law of Connecticut and Wentworth of New Hampshire 
under which he was authorized to command the troops 
raised in those colonies for the expedition. 2 The selection 
of the other higher officers for the land forces was com 
pleted by the naming of Roger Wolcott, of Connecticut, as 
a major-general, second in command, and of Samuel Waldo 
and Joseph Dwight as brigadier-generals. Waldo was 
second to Pepperrell in command of the Massachusetts 
troops. 3 

The raising of the New Hampshire levies lagged for 
about two weeks, while Wentworth and the assembly 
sparred over the terms for issues of bills of credit. Went 
worth constantly consulted Shirley, as he continued to do 
whenever possible, and Shirley not being able to break the 
New Hampshire deadlock began to despair of any troops 
thence. On the fourteenth of February he repeated to 
Wentworth a suggestion of the ninth of that month that 
for fear it might prove impossible to secure troops in New 



motto attributed to Whitefield is " Nil dcsperandum Christo 
duce" For Whitefield s connection with the expedition, cf. Philip, 
The Life and Times of the Reverend George Whitefield (New York, 
1838), pp. 308-309; De Normandie, "Sir Wm. Pepperrell," in 2 Mass. 
H. S. Proc., vol. xvii, p. 89; Johnson, op. cit., p. 24; Parsons, The 
Life of Sir Wm, Pepperrell (Boston, 1855), PP- 51-52- 

*6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, p. 497; Conn. Col Recs., vol., ix, p. 92. 

3 iShirley to Wolcott, Mar. 8, 1745, Conn, H. S. Colls., vol. ii, p. 259, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 193-194; Commission to Waldo, Feb. 5, 1745, C. 0. 
5 753 , Shirley to Pepperrell, July 7, 1745, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. 
x, pp. 322-324, 497, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 238. 



LO UISB URGPREPARA TIONS 277 

Hampshire in her own pay Wentworth raise men to be paid 
by Massachusetts ; and he now suggested further that he use 
six blank beating orders 1 signed by Shirley for raising them. 
At the same time he informed Wentworth : " It would have 
been an infinite satisfaction to me, and done great honour 
to the expedition, if your limbs would have permitted you 
to have taken upon you the chief command." 

At once activity appeared in New Hampshire. The next 
day after Shirley s letter was sent a reply was back from) 
that province recording that Wentworth had succeeded in 
securing from the assembly a more favorable act for issues 
of bills of credit, and offering his services as commander-in- 
chief of the expedition. 3 There was no doubt now of 
Wentworth s patriotism and gallantry, sans peur de la gout. 

Shirley after a seemingly necessary delay during a day 
spent in inspecting Castle William with " a number of 
gentlemen," expressed gratification at the posture of af 
fairs in New Hampshire, suggested raising if possible and 
as rapidly as might be 150 men beyond the New Hampshire 
quota of 250 men, to be paid by Massachusetts but " ag 
gregated to " the New Hampshire contingent, and promised 
to lay Wentworth s offer of his personal services in the 
expedition before his council and officers at the first op 
portunity. In conclusion he said : " Should it turn out that 
you proceed upon this service, I do assure you it will be a 
great satisfaction to me." 4 Another letter from Shirley cm 
the same day informed Wentworth, in the postscript : "Upon 
communicating your offer of your taking the command of 
the expedition and proceeding in it, to two or three gentle- 

1 Orders for beating drums in designated localities to attract 
volunteers. 

Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 9 and 14, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, 
PP. 934 935- 

3 Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 16, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, pp. 935-936. 

4 1 bid. 



278 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

men in whose prudence and judgment I most confide, I 
found em clearly of opinion that any alteration oi the 
present command would be attended with great risque, both 
with respect to our assembly, and soldiers being entirely 
disgusted." 1 

The provision for the New Hampshire forces was now 
complete, however, and although 100 of them were in the 
pay of Massachusetts, a total of about 350 New Hampshire 
men went in the expedition. 

A few days later Shirley wrote Wentworth to transmit 
to him the order in council directing New Hampshire to 
provide for Fort Dummer. This had been received from 1 
home before the Louisburg expedition was proposed in Mas 
sachusetts. The delay in transmission Shirley explained as 
due to reluctance " to divert your excellency with any new 
business, from the great and important affair of the ex 
pedition, . . . together with the close application of my 
own mind to that affair." 2 

As early as February 3d, the recruiting of troops began 
through the Massachusetts system of authorizing selected 
individuals to raise companies of volunteers with the prom 
ise of the command of the company when raised. 3 These 
companies were then organized into regiments under 
colonels named by the governor. As the men thus enlisted 
were taken out of the militia of the province the forces 
available for the defense of the frontiers were decreased in 
number, resulting in a real problem upon both the eastern and 
western borders. The difficulty, however, was much more 
acute to the eastward, where the settlements were sparser 

l lbid., p. 936. 

Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 25, 1745, ibid., p. 303; New Hampshire 
Historical Society Collections, vol. i, pp. 146-147. 

Proclamation for raising troops, Feb. 3, 1745, Boston Public 
Library Mss., Oi. E, 10, 103 ; such a proclamation is printed in Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, p. 181. 



LO UISB URGPREPARA TIONS 279 

and the enthusiasm for the expedition greater. There, 
partly through the influence of Brigadier-General Samuel 
Waldo, the settlers in the Pemaquid district and eastward, 
where he had established flourishing settlements, joined 
in the expedition with such unanimity that the fron 
tier was well-nigh abandoned. Seeing this, the frontier 
Indian tribes took advantage of the opportunity to destroy 
the settlements at Lincoln and Leverett in the country east of 
the Kennebec. 1 

The expedition evoked enthusiasm everywhere in the 
province, and therefore detachments were rapidly raised, 
marched to rendezvous and there billeted and drilled until 
the time for general mobilization came. 2 A detachment of 
150 grenadiers for hand-grenade service was organized and 
trained at Boston, and a careful inventory taken of all 
ordnance and other military material. 3 To secure neces 
sary war supplies Shirley did not hesitate to impress them 
wherever found. 4 Skilled men for non-combatant services 
required for the expedition were eagerly sought and when 
necessary received exemption from military service. 5 The 
raising of men was made the first consideration and the 
bestowing of offices or the raising of companies of uniform 
size a secondary one. 6 On February i/th, Shirley sent 

1 Certificate by Pepperrell, Mar. 4, 1747, C. O. 5 753. 

Proclamation, Feb. 13, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 182; Shirley to 
Pepperrell, Feb. 13, 1745, ibid., p. 183. 

3 Ibid.; Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 16, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, 
PP. 935-936. 

4 Shirley to Wanton, June 24, 1745, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 137, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 231 ; Ar., vol. Ixxii, fols. 709-710. 

6 For Shirley s order exempting twenty iron workers from military 
service, April 13, 1745, cf. Pub. Col. Soc. Mass., vol. vii, pp. 89-90. 

6 Shirley to Pepperrell, Feb. 14, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 184-185; 
Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 26, 1745, ibid., p. 187, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. 
v P- 93^ ; Shirley to Pepperrell, Feb. 26, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 189. 



2 8o WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

directions to Pepperrell to order a general mobilization 
from his district at Boston, where the troops would be 
armed and drilled. 1 

The Massachusetts assembly acted vigorously to insure 
success by making the necessary appropriations for land 
and sea forces. 2 Later they provided loyally for the debts 
incurred on account of the expedition. 9 They also* freed 
volunteers until their return from the expedition from lia 
bility to arrest for debt. 4 

It was perhaps inevitable in view of the shortness of the 
time available that the strength of the expedition should be 
drawn almost wholly from New England. Moreover, the 
colonies beyond New England were outside the natural 
sphere of influence of Shirley, who had at the time no basis 
for acting as their political mentor. Within New England, 
however, the Massachusetts governor, by the exercise of 
tact and skill in urging an issue whose intrinsic appeal 
throughout that region was powerful, succeeded in over 
coming the ever-present jealousy and dislike of two out of 
three of the colonies to the north and south of her. How far 
the aloofness of Rhode Island was due in general to her 
notorious selfishness and how far to resentment over the 
boundary dispute, in which Shirley had been active, is not 
clear. 

l Shirley to Pepperrell, Feb. 17, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 185; Feb. 
18, 1745, ibid., p. 186. 
2 A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 199, 204. 
*Ibid., pp. 245, 255, 261, 293. 
4 Ibid., p. 194. 



CHAPTER XIII 

LOUISBURG THE EXPEDITION 

THE preparation of the vessels for embarking the Massa 
chusetts forces was practically complete by the end of Feb 
ruary, 1 and the number of seamen required for the trans 
ports and the armed vessels of the province was so great 
that Shirley had already applied to Wentworth in New 
Hampshire to< supply the captain of a British man-of-war 
with twenty men needed for his crew. 2 Shirley sought to 
have the New Hampshire forces sent to Boston for em 
barkation, 3 but this plan proved inconvenient for the de 
tachment from that province. 4 On March 8th, the Massa 
chusetts forces began to embark. 5 

Before the preparations for departure were completed 
Shirley sent gradually the larger part of the little Massa 
chusetts navy, including three twenty-gun ships, two sixteen- 
gun snows, and a brigantine to cruise off Louisburg to in 
tercept news, recruits or supplies which might be sent there 
before the troops arrived. 8 He held as convoy for the 
transports a snow of twenty-four guns, and other weaker 
vessels. He counted also upon the aid of the Connecticut 
colony sloop when the troops were sent thence, and was 
hopeful but not confident of the Rhode Island colony sloop 

Shirley to Pepperrell, Feb. 26, 1745, Sh, Cor., vol. i, p. 189. 

Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 25, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. xviii, 
p. 216, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 18/9, note. 

Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 27, 1745, N. H, Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 937; 
Mar. i, 1745, ibid.; Mar. 2, 1745, ibid., p. 938, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 190-191. 

4 Ibid. 

Shirley to Pepperrell, Mar. 8, 1745, ibid., p. 193. 

* Shirley to Wentworth, Mar. 27, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 941. 

281 



282 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

and the 150 men voted by that colony; but neither were 
ready at the end of March. 

Meanwhile the governor s application to Commodore 
Warren had been only moderately fortunate." Shirley s 
appeal reached him February 22d and Warren replied two 
days later that he had been ordered by the admiralty to 
proceed to New England in the Weymouth some time in 
March but that that vessel had been lost. In a few days, 
however, he would send the Launceston to New England 
and the Mermaid to New York, pursuant to orders from 
home. This division of the naval strength along the sea 
board, however necessary because of orders, was not con 
ducive to success at Louisburg. Shirley believed Warren 
free to send both vessels directly to Louisburg, and thought 
he should have done so, whereby the English naval force off 
the harbor would have exceeded any French force likely 
to appear. 

Shirley also encountered what looked much like pro 
fessional jealousy (but may have been due to other causes) 
in the case of Admiral Knowles at Jamaica. That officer 
learned that the "Bien Amy Prize which he had sent to 
New England partly for masts, could not secure a cargo till 
July, but was desired by Shirley to cruise off Louisburg till 
the middle of May. The admiral 

thereupon dispatch d orders for the Bien Amy Prize to return 
to Antigua instantly without staying for masts fit for repairing 
the Jamaica ships, that suffered in the hurricane, which seems 
to have a tendency to disappoint the service at Jamaica as well 
as the expedition ; whereas had my request of the assistance 
of that ship been allowed it would have answered both ser 
vices. 1 

1 Shirley, however, at about this time was apparently still counting 
upon Captain Gayton, in command of the "Bien Amy," to sail for 
Louisburg in a few days. (Shirley to Wentworth, Mar. 27, 1745, N. H. 



LOUISBURGTHE EXPEDITION 283 

Despite the uncertainty of the outcome, in the absence 
of any naval force other than that of Massachusetts with 
slight reinforcements from New England, Shirley was still 
resolute enough to go forward, hopeful for large success, 
confident of valuable results even if Louisburg were re 
lieved and maintained. 1 When the fleet was ready he issued 
his sailing orders for the expedition prescribing the line of 
battle for the ships. 2 To avoid if possible the giving of 
warning to the enemy of the approach of the large squadron 
of transports and fighting ships to Cape Breton, he arranged 
to send a privateer and another vessel with fifty soldiers on 
March 27th, a day or two ahead of the fleet, to capture or 
destroy any small fishing sloops or shallops which might be 
near Canso, and in general to clear the coast of any vessels 
by whom news of approach of danger could reach Louis- 
burg. 3 

The first squadron of the expedition took on 2,800 sol 
diers at Nantasket on March 24th, the remaining 200 raised 
by Massachusetts were aboard the transports two days later, 
and the squadron, sailing soon after, proceeded to Canso, 
where they joined the New Hampshire men. 4 The Con- 

Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 941.) Three days later, he informed General Wolcott 
of his disappointment in not securing Gayton to convoy the .Connecticut 
forces to Louisburg. (Shirley to Wolcott, Nov. 30, 1745, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, p. 201.) The order to Gayton to report at once in the West 
Indies was very likely due to the presence there early in the spring of 
a strong French fleet. (Clinton to Morris, Apr. 12, 13, 1745, N. I. H. S. 
Colls., vol. iv, pp. 233-234.) This fact, however, could not be known 
to Shirley. 

J For the situation relating to the strength and disposition of the 
sea power available for the expedition, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, Mar. 
27, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 196-199. 

*Mass. Admiralty Recs., vol. v. 

3 Shirley to Wentworth, Mar. 10, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 940; 
ibid., Mar. 27, 1745, p. 941. 

4 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, pp. 124-125; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (4), 



284 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

necticut levies of 500 men were necessarily later, but sailed 
about the middle of April. 1 

Shirley s instructions to Pepperrell gave him control of 
both fleet and army. These also directed the operations 
later carried out at Canso and St. Peter s. As to the opera 
tions against Louishurg, they were what previous utterances 
by Shirley would suggest. They provided a plan for a 
surprise attack in case it were feasible, but not relying upon 
that method. Pepperrell was also to send news of his ar 
rival before Louisburg to the British squadron at New 
foundland and of the taking of the grand battery, when ac 
complished, to the Duke of Newcastle. 2 

A few days after issuing these instructions additional ones 
were added by Shirley to insure, if possible, the coopera 
tion of the Massachusetts vessels to safeguard the landing 
of the troops, and after the landing to secure proper com 
munications between them and Boston and also between 
them and the provincial vessels off the coast. A final in 
struction in the postscript left Pepperrell to use his own 
discretion in any case. 3 

If in view oi the absence of assurances of adequate and 
timely naval support the darkness enveloping the Louisburg 
expedition when it left the shores of New England wasi 
relieved by few signs of dawn, the gloom only presaged the 
quick arrival of the sunlight. The orders from the ad 
miralty to Commodore Warren directing him to proceed 
with the Superbe, Launceston and Mermaid to Boston to 

p. 714. The New Hampshire force arrived at Canso four days ahead 
of the Massachusetts levies, and probably soon enough to nullify the 
effort to prevent the news of the approach of troops from reaching 
Louisburg. Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 371; supra, p. 281. 

1 Saltonstall to Law, Apr. 17, 1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, 
pp. 281-282. 

Shirley to Pepperrell, Mar. 19, 1745, Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. i, pp-5-i 1 - 
Shirley to Pepperrell, Mar. 22, 1745, ibid., pp. 12-13. 



LOUISBURGTHE EXPEDITION 285 

concert measures with Shirley for the protection of the 
northern colonies 1 reached him on March 8th, 2 less than 
two weeks after his unsympathetic response to Shirley s 
appeal for aid. 3 Upon receipt of them Warren notified 
Shirley promptly of their contents, his letters upon the 
subject reaching Boston on March 3Oth, 4 just after the 
Massachusetts forces sailed. 5 Thereupon Shirley at once 
wrote Warren suggesting that he send one ship at least 
directly to Louisburg to join the squadron off the harbor. 
Having heard nothing further from Warren five days after 
the receipt of his letters announcing his coming, Shirley 
suspected he had sailed with his entire squadron to Louis- 
burg. This suspicion was verified on the nth. 6 Warren 
acted with great energy and judgment, directing his course 
for Boston as ordered until within thirty leagues of that 
port, when, learning from a passing vessel that the expedi 
tion had sailed for Canso, he picked up a skilled pilot from 1 a 
fishing vessel and steered at once to that place, without 
waiting to take on supplies of food or full ordnance stores 
and with one vessel not wholly fit for immediate service. 
From Canso, after conference with Pepperrell, he proceeded 
at once to Louisburg, making the blockade of that place 
effective. 7 Shortly after came Warren s order to the Bien 

l Cf. Newcastle to Shirley, Jan. 3, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 155-156. 

2 Shirley to Newcastle. Apr, 4, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 171; Shirley to 
Board, Apr. 4, 1745, C. O. 5 885, 127, Ff, 78. 

3 Cf. supra, p. 282. 

4 Shirley to Board, Apr. 4, 1745, C. O. 5 885, 127, Ff, 78; Shirlej 
to Newcastle, Apr. 4, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 171. 

6 Shirley to Wolcott, Mar. 30, 1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 
272-273, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 201. 

6 For the news of Warren s course, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 
4, 1745, P. S., Apr. 11, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 171. 

7 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 28, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 245. (This portion 
of this letter is omitted from the copy published in Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
pp. 273-279.) Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 372. 



286 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Aime and the Eltham to proceed at once to Louisburg. 
Shirley by prompt action intercepted the latter as it was 
sailing for London. 1 While this squadron remained before 
Louisburg all uncertainty as to the English naval superiority 
there vanished. 

There was a temporary doubt whether some of Warren s 
vessels would not be detailed for service in the West Indies 
to aid Knowles, who seemed to be menaced by a consider 
able French fleet, which might attack the British possessions 
there or the southern mainland ; 2 but it was decided that this 
interference with the Louisburg campaign was not practic 
able and probably not necessary. 3 

Meanwhile Shirley s letter to Newcastle of February 
1st announcing the undertaking of the expedition had 
reached England on March i6th. For once America fur 
nished a sensation. 

The Duke of Newcastle was absent from London when 
Shirley s urgent letter arrived, but Mr. Stone, the duke s 
secretary, saw the need for action and " instantly lay d my 
letters before his majesty." It was recognized that an 
emergent American question had arisen, and therefore not 
only did his majesty upon reading the letters approve the 
expedition, and refer the letters to the lords of the admiralty, 
but that board was hurriedly called together at eleven o clock 
at night, and showed so much haste as hardly to allow 
Captain Loring (one of the group who had devised the 
much discussed plan for the expedition), whom Shirley had 
sent as a pilot for any vessels ordered to Louisburg, any 
time for sleep before being " sent to Portsmouth from 

1 Shirley to Wentworth, Apr. 15, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. xviii, p. 224 ; 
Shirley to Admiralty, Apr. 18, 1745, Ad. I, 3817. 

2 Cf. supra, p. 282. 

Shirley to Warren, Apr. 17, 1745, C. O. 5 9OO, 175, Ad. I, 3817; 
Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 18, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 173; Shirley to New 
castle, Apr. 30, 1745, C. O. 5 ooo, 177. 



LOUISBURGTHE EXPEDITION 287 

whence he proceeded in his majesty s ship Princess Mary 
on the 1 9th in company with some other men-of-war, 
directly for Cape Breton, in expectation of meeting the 
New England forces there." 1 Thus was the project of 
the admiralty of the month before to send aid to the north 
ern colonies as early as possible ~ brought to an unexpectedly 
early fruition. With the sending of this squadron and the 
implied intention to send troops promptly to occupy and if 
necessary to complete the conquest of the fortress, the ex 
pedition was insured against any reasonable expectation of 
failure, and the soundness of Shirley s judgment in seiz 
ing the psychological moment for launching New England 
against the fortress was vindicated. He had read the 
minds of his people and of the ministry aright. 

The Princess Mary arrived at Boston on May 5th 3 for 
slight repairs, whence she proceeded for Louisburg after a 
few days. 4 Without counting the forty-gun ship Hector, 
hourly expected, there were now available for service off 
Louisburg the vessels indicated by the appended table. 5 

1 Kilby to Newcastle, Apr. 3, 1745, C. O. 5 900, loose at end ; Shirley 
to Pepperrell, May 5, 1745, Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. i, p. 25 ; Shirley to 
Wentworth, May 5, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. xviii, p. 225. 

2 Order in CL, Feb. 7, 1745, C. 0. 5 885, 119, Ff, 76. 

8 Shirley to Pepperrell, May 5, 1745, Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. i, p. 25. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, May 12, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 179. 

5 Large English Ships. Guns. Total Guns. 

2 6O I2O 

1 50 (reduced) 50 

2 (third expected) 40 80 
J_ 34 34 

Totals . . 6 284 

Smaller New England Ships. Guns. Total Guns. 

4 20 80 

2 16 32 

I 16 (brigantine of nearly) 16 

Totals.. 7 128 (approximately) 



288 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Meanwhile, the only French vessel which had entered 
Louisburg that spring, Warren reported, was a fourteen- 
gun ship, loaded with wine and brandy, which had slipped 
through in the fog. Warren, however, in anticipation of 
the arrival of the large ships from England, sent to New 
foundland for warships stationed there. 1 

Even before hearing that Warren had proceeded to 
Louisburg Shirley wrote to Pepperrell a suggestion which 
seems to have been based upon keen insight into the 
character of the men concerned. " It is a general obser 
vation," the governor said, " that the land and sea forces, 
when joined upon the same expedition, seldom or never 
agree, but I am persuaded it will not be so between you and 
Commodore Warren, as any misunderstanding between you 
might prove fatal to his majesty s service in the expedi 
tion." Later friction between the two commanders, 
though not injurious to the success of the undertaking, 
gave point to the warning. 3 

Before this stage had been reached the land forces were 
also under way. No mishap attended the transportation of 
the army. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire fleets 
were together at Canso, with the exception of a few in a 
neighboring harbor, by April loth. Pepperrell landed his 
troops and held a review on Canso hill, finding therm in 
good condition, while there had been but three deaths among 
1,400 seamen in the Massachusetts fleet. 4 Eighty men who 

1 Warren to Shirley, May 12, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 187. 

Shirley to Pepperrell, Apr. 10, 1745, Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. i, p. 17, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 205. 

3 Pepperrell to -Shirley, July 17, 1745, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, 
pp. 329-331, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 250-251 ; iShirley to Pepperrell, July 29, 
1745, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, pp. 338-342, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 259-260. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 30, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 177. Cf. also 
"Journal or Minutes made in an Expedition against Louisburg, Anno 



LOUISBURGTHE EXPEDITION 289 

were posted there erected during the spring and summer a 
well-defended blockhouse with eight cannon. 1 

The expedition was held at Canso for nearly three weeks 
while the exceptional quantities of ice in " Chappeaurouge " 
bay, where the landing on Cape Breton was to be made, 
was melting. 2 Meanwhile the commander at Louisburg 
discovered the fleet of New England vessels cruising off 
the harbor, and suspecting a contemplated attack, brought 
1,000 men from the outlying settlements into* Louisburg. 3 

It was later learned that the presence of the expedition at 
Canso was known at Louisburg, which made a successful 
surprise improbable. 4 It was also later learned that the 
French in Canada had been informed by the Indians of the 
preparations in New England against Louisburg, but they 
were not sufficiently impressed to send reinforcements to the 
fortress, evidently counting upon its relief from France. 5 

Warren, having taken up his station off Louisburg, April 
25th, according to a despatch to the substantial Gentle 
man s Magazine, " sent for the troops at Canso to come im 
mediately and join him." Meanwhile it was reported he 
had captured a sloop, two brigs and a ship from Martinique 
attempting to enter the harbor. 6 News was received in 
England a few weeks later through a French vessel which 
had escaped from Louisburg that six men-of-war and forty- 

Domini, 1745," Am. Ant. Soc. Proc., n. s., vol. xx, pp. 141-144; Shirley, 
Journal of the Siege of Louisburg . . . , appended to his Letter to the 
Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 28, 1745 (London, 1746), pp. 17-18. 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, May 21, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 179; Pepperrell to 
Cutter, Apr. 14, 1745 and account for building fort at Canso, T i 321. 

2 Shirley, Journal, loc. cit., p. 17; iShirley, Letter to the Duke, p. 4. 
8 Shirley to Board, July 10, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 242. 

4 Waldo to Shirley, May 12, 1745, C. O. 5 900. 

5 Shirley to Admiralty, June 17, 1745, Ad. I, 3817. 

6 Gentleman s Magazine, vol. xv, p. 334. 



290 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

one transports were lying before Louisburg and had taken 
a French sixty-four-gun ship, portending the reduction of 
the place at an early date. 1 

On the 29th of April, the conditions at Louisburg war 
ranting the attempt to land, the forces under Pepperrell 
sailed from Canso, the squadron of transports in four divi 
sions convoyed by three Massachusetts vessels. In the 
middle of the following forenoon they reached Chapeau- 
rouge bay, and landed with few casualties after a brisk 
skirmish. 2 

The landing of the troops occupied two- days. That 
of the supplies went forward gradually and with difficulty, 
as there was no harbor and consequently no wharves or 
other conveniences, and the surf was often high. This 
task occupied about two weeks of arduous labor. 3 

On the second day after their arrival 400 men were sent to 
the rear of the town and destroyed houses and stores with 
in a mile of the grand or royal battery. This work was one 
of the chief defenses of the harbor, commanding its entrance 
as well as the citadel and town ; 4 nevertheless the French 
promptly and apparently in panic, abandoned the position. 
Thereupon a party of about fifteen New Englanders upon 
the following day took possession of it with astonishment 
and aplomb, and defended it against recapture with distin 
guished gallantry. 5 This advantage was promptly utilized 
by turning the guns, which required little labor to fit them 

l lbid., p. 335- 

"Shirley, Letter to the Duke, pp. 4-5, Journal, loc. cit., pp. 19-20. 

1 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 

4 Ibid., p. 21 ; Shirley, A letter, etc., op. cit., p. 5; Louisburg in 1745; 
the anonymous Lettre d un Habitant de Louisbourg (Cape Breton) ..., 
ed. by Geo. M. Wrong (Toronto, 1897), p. 30. 

5 Ibid., p. 41; Shirley, A Letter, etc., op. cit., p. 6; Journal, loc. cit., 
pp. 22-23. 



LOUISBURGTHE EXPEDITION 291 

for service, against the town and the island battery at the 
entrance to the harbor. 1 

The siege was begun with a spirit which took advantage 
of the obvious confusion of the garrison. The attackers, 
although their numbers were relatively few to withstand a 
determined sortie, for some time covered their base on 
Chapeaurouge bay only by scouts and skirmish lines, and 
also discouraged sorties by placing scouts close to the walls. 2 
The New Englanders, moreover, after overcoming great 
difficulties in getting their cannon into place, erected five 
batteries in succession progressively nearer the walls of 
the town, until at the end of twenty-three days, the fifth 
was only 250 yards away, so close that the loading of the 
cannon had to be done under protection of musketry fire. 3 
From this position they were able to batter a breach in the 
wall, beat down the west gate and greatly distress the town.* 
Also another battery at some distance along the shore was 
raised and joined its fire against the west gate. 5 

The chief immediate object of operations, after shutting 
the besiegers within their walls and initiating measures 
calculated to bring about a capitulation, was to open the 
harbor to the fleet, which from the other side of the huge 
basin would be able to contribute more than any other factor 
to the prompt yielding of the fortress. The key to the de 
fense of the harbor was the island battery, close to the ship 
channel and dominating it at point-blank range. 

1 Ibid., pp. 22-23; Shirley, A letter, etc., op. cit., p. 6; Habitant, p. 41. 
Shirley, Journal, loc. cit., p. 22. 

3 Ibid., pp. 23-27; Shirley, A letter, etc., op. cit., pp. 6-8; Habitant, 
pp. 44-45. 

*Ibid., p. 44; Shirley, Journal, loc. cit., pp. 26-27; Shirley, A letter, 
etc., op. cit., p. ii. 

5 Shirley, Journal, loc. cit., p. 28; "Journal or Minutes made in an 
Expedition against Louisburg, Anno Domini, 1745," Am. Ant. Soc. Proc.> 
n. s., vol. xx, p. 154. 



292 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



The lack of soldierly training or of discretion among 
the New Englanders showed more clearly in the method of 
handling this problem than elsewhere. Only a few days 
after the opening of the siege a night assault upon the island 
battery was planned, but unfavorable weather conditions 
prevented a serious attempt. 1 On the evening of May 26th, 
however, a foolhardy assault was made, resulting in heavy 
losses in killed and captured. 2 Meanwhile a valuable addi 
tion to the resources of the besiegers had been made by the 
discovery of twenty-three cannon in the water near the 
lighthouse across the channel from the island battery. 3 
After taking a week in which to reflect upon their reverse 
it was decided to erect a battery upon the lighthouse point, 
which commanded the ship channel and the island strong 
hold. This lighthouse battery required but a few days for 
its completion and caused much havoc among the garrison 
of the island defenses, 4 As supplies were very low inside 
the fortress, its surrender seemed near if the besiegers could, 
despite much sickness, continue the siege. 

Meanwhile Warren s squadron had maintained the block 
ade effectively. Their most important exploit was the 
capture of the Vigilant, a sixty- four- gun ship, which was 
trying to get into Louisburg with supplies, and especially 
munitions of war. The capture of this support from: home 
within the sight and hearing of the garrison, convinced 
Louisburg that it was doomed. The captured stores, more 
over, supplied the besiegers with ammunition and other 
equipment necessary for the prosecution of the siege. 5 

l lbid., pp. 152-153- 

*Ibid., pp. 158-159; Shirley, Journal, loc, cit., p. 29; Habitant, p. 51. 
3 " Journal or Minutes," etc., loc. cit., p. 154. 

4 Ibid., pp. 161, 162, 163; Shirley, Journal, loc. cit., pp. 29-31; Habitant, 
P- 52- 
The credit for this capture has usually been given to Warren, and 



LOUISBURGTHE EXPEDITION 293 

As the middle of June approached, the defenses of the 
fortress were in a bad way. Not only had the wall been 
breached, the west gate destroyed and other portions of the 
walls nearly ruined, but the island battery had been put 
nearly out of commission, the grand battery was a strong 
hold of the besiegers, two other batteries were untenable, one 
of them with all but three guns dismounted, the town was 
so badly damaged that but one house was unhurt, and the 
ammunition of the defenders was nearly exhausted. 1 The 
fleet outside, after several accessions of ships of strength, 
was by this time clearly too strong to be overcome by any 
French armament which would have been sent, and the 
distress of the island battery, though not yet reducing it to 
submission, presaged a time not far distant when the squad 
ron would bring its heavy guns within the basin to harass if 
not destroy the fortress and town. 

Thoughts of capitulation were now generally entertained. 
On Warren s part they led to a fruitless suggestion from 
him that the fortress surrender to himself rather than to 
Pepperrell. 2 It seems that the latter desired the town to 
surrender before the fleet had become a factor in the re 
duction of it. s The officers of the garrison at first pre- 

the assumption that the ships of the royal navy deserved the chief 
credit seems not to have been challenged by Shirley or other spokes 
men for the Americans. It appears, however, from the statement of 
a Frenchman within the town, that but for the address of Captain 
Rouse of one of the Massachusetts vessels in leading the Vigilant 
within reach of the English fleet, she would have escaped into Louis- 
burg. (Habitant, pp. 45-49, 56.) According to Hutchinson the 
Vigilant was lured within reach of the English fleet by Captain 
Douglas of the Mermaid, one of Warren s ships. (Hist, of Mass., 
Vol. ii, pp. 374-375.) For other accounts of this affair, cf. "Journal 
or Minutes, etc., loc. cit., pp. 156, 157; Shirley, A letter, etc., op. cit., pp. 
13-14; Shirley, Journal, loc. cit., p. 28. 

Shirley, Journal, loc. cit., p. 31. 

3 Habit ant, p. 57. 

z lbid. 



294 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



ferred to surrender to Pepperrell rather than to Warren 
and made advances toward that end, which, however, were 
not sufficiently submissive. 1 After the failure with Pep 
perrell, it appears that Warren was approached and that 
with him the terms of the capitulation were fixed. 2 More 
over the keys of the town were delivered to him, 3 and it is 
reported that the intendant insisted that the marines from 
the fleet be the first to enter the town. 4 The capitulation 
prevented the carrying into execution of plans for a general 
assault upon the place which seemed not unlikely to succeed. 5 
Shirley s initiative had thus been crowned with success 
through the cooperation of New England enthusiasm and 
British naval power, two highly incongruous elements which 
perhaps Shirley alone could have brought together and made 
efficient in combination. Moreover, the province had been 
blessed by the smiles of fortune in the great lottery of war. 

1 Ibid., p. 59. 

2 Ibid., pp. 59-60; "Journal or Minutes," etc., loc. cit., p. 165. 
Durell, A particular account of the taking Cape Breton from the 

French . . . (London, 1745), p. 3. 

4 A Letter from an officer of marines to his friend in London . . . 
appended to Durell, op. cit. 

5 Habitant, p. 60; "Journal or Minutes," etc., loc. cit., p. 164; "Journal 
of Roger Wolcott, at the Siege of Louisburg, 1745," in Conn. H. S. 
Colls., vol. i, p. 136. 



CHAPTER XIV 
PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 

WHILE Governor Shirley gave the impression to his con 
temporaries (which has been passed on to their descendants) 
that he was an enthusiast, and perhaps a little unbalanced, 
over the Louisburg expedition, in reality that was to his 
mind but a prelude to a much greater achievement, the 
conquest by England of the great basin upon the flank and 
rear of the English colonies, with its enormous tributary 
lands, its unrivalled system of inland waterways and its 
rich fur trade. He foresaw the great future development 
which would occur in America, and saw that France was 
striving mightily to secure the mastery of the North Amer 
ican continent as she had already striven for that of the 
European. It was a simple matter of deduction that if she 
once controlled America the control of Europe would soon 
be hers. 

It is interesting to note that English statesmen in the 
chief administrative positions at home seemed almost in 
variably to suffer from a lack of imagination, which, com 
bined with their real detachment from conditions in Amer 
ica, resulted in a policy for the empire grotesquely out of 
perspective. This was not due to necessary ignorance of 
conditions in America, but to neglect or inability to compre 
hend the future in the light of the past. Able and alert 
representatives of the crown repeatedly informed the min 
istry and the board of trade, who served as a fountain of 
information for the ministry, of the rapid progress being 
made by both French and English in America by diverse 

295 



296 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

paths. These warnings led to a. representation by the board 
of trade as early as 1720, pointing out that the French were 
following an aggressive policy and " one day promise them 
selves an universal empire in America, which may possibly 
happen, if proper measures are not taken to prevent a 
design so destructive to the British interest and commerce." x 
But to meet this threat the suggested safeguard was merely 
forts on the frontier and four battalions of foot for the 
flanks of the English colonies in Nova Scotia and Carolina 
respectively. 2 

The British ministry in Shirley s time manifestly had 
no clear conception of the issue, imagining that to maintain 
the European balance was of vastly greater significance than 
to upset the American. They had supported the Louisburg 
enterprise as an excellent opening to strike at the enemy, but 
apparently would have been even readier to strike in Europe, 
and probably in India. Shirley had handed Louisburg to 
the ministry and they had been graciously pleased to ac 
cept the gift. It was extremely unlikely that they would 
have attempted the conquest of it upon their own initiative. 
It was virtually inconceivable that they would of their own 
volition undertake to extirpate the French in Canada. Yet, 
as Shirley saw, that should follow Louisburg as noonday 
the dawn. 

While the Louisburg expedition was in preparation and 
under way its support was apparently the all-engrossing oc 
cupation of Shirley. It necessarily dwarfed his other ac 
tivities for the time, but it was by no means his only vital 
interest. Two other matters of prime importance claimed 
attention; the defense of the Massachusetts frontiers while 
a large fraction of the fighting men of the province were at 
Louisburg, and plans for future aggressive warfare against 

1 A. P. C., vol. vi, p. 122. 
*Ibid., pp. 124-125. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 297 

the enemy. These two sorts of operations were different 
in time and method, but were essentially alike in aim; 
for the only means of making the frontiers of New Eng 
land safe from the hostile intrusion of the French or of 
Indians under their influence was to wrest from France their 
base of operations in Canada. The rival settlements were 
too close together to avoid contact and each nation already 
felt the need for elbow room. Shirley s immediate task, 
however, was the defensive protection of the frontier. 

The expedition had not yet reached Louisburg when the 
veteran duke of the western marches, John Stoddard, 
warned that danger was looming up in that direction. He 
had been engaged in prudently testing the inclinations of 
the Six Nations and found them cool to the English, and in 
creasingly inclined toward the French. An improbable yarn 
that the English and Dutch were plotting their destruction 
had been plausibly presented to them and the resulting sus 
picion had not been dispelled. Whereupon Stoddard suc 
cinctly remarked : " These people are very numerous, and 
if they should be drawn to the French interest they will be 
worse to us than all Canada." Stoddard suggested efforts 
<by Massachusetts to pacify them, since the Dutch at Albany 
seemed incapable of doing it. 2 

Upon hearing this news Shirley at once renewed an earlier 
request to Governor Law of Connecticut for men to help 
defend the western Massachusetts frontier, as a measure 
urgently necessary, and much more valuable before an at 
tack than afterward. 3 However, the conditions upon the 

1 Stoddard to Shirley, Apr. 24, 1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, 
p. 282, (extracts) Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 209-211. Cf. also for the false 
rumor circulated among the Iroquois, Wraxall, o.p. cit., pp. 241-242. 

Stoddard to Shirley, Apr. 24, 1745, loc. cit. 

3 Shirley to Law, Mar. 18, 1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 265- 
266; Apr. 27, 1745, ibid., pp. 283-284, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 211-212. 



298 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

western border did not become immediately critical, and the 
Nova Scotia frontier for the time held the stage. 

The French in Canada had assembled a strong detach 
ment of Indians and French early in the spring, and actually 
began the siege of Annapolis with about 900 men without 
waiting for the arrival of sea and land forces expected from 
France. Shirley exerted himself to procure reinforcements 
for the garrison, and secured the despatch of the troops 
taken at Canso in the preceding spring, who, after their ex 
change had been stationed at Castle William. He also ap 
plied to Warren to send assistance by sea. 1 The fortress 
was successfully maintained although Shirley had heard 
nothing by the middle of June of the 150 recruits expected 
from home for its defense. 2 Meanwhile, before the end of 
May, the forces before Annapolis became disheartened and 
raised the siege. This action suggested doubts as to whether 
they had gone to strike Canso or to attack the besiegers of 
Louisburg; 3 but it later appeared that they lacked the 
stamina for attempting either. 

The attack on Annapolis, however, was a shrewd move 
on the part of the French, even if no success was directly 
attained; for it had more effect upon the minds of the 
Indians on the New England frontier than did the Louis- 
burg expedition, especially when they noted the weak line of 
defense remaining after the expedition had decimated some 
of the settlements, and when they were told by the French 
that the enterprise had resulted in an English disaster. 4 

Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 30, 1745, C. 0. 5 goo, 177; Shirley to 
Aldridge, May 26, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 192; Shirley to Newcastle, June 
i, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 188. 

2 Shirley to Admiralty, June 17, 1745, Ad. I, 3817. 

3 Shirley to Newcastle, June 2, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 221. 

4 The long Maine frontier was being defended in part by two scouting 
parties detailed from one company, each to complete its allotted cycle 
weekly. Ar.. vol. Ixxii, fols. 711-712. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 299 

With the fall of Louisburg on June I7th, the general situa 
tion for New England was vastly bettered. Both the respon 
sibilities and the opportunities of the English colonies were 
increased; for on the one hand the New England frontier 
now extended from Long Island sound to Louisburg, but 
on the other, the fortress no longer obstructed the realization 
of Shirley s real purpose in hurling New England at the 
French stronghold. 

That purpose became known in England contemporan 
eously with the news that New England would soon be de 
manding from the French the key to her front door at 
Louisburg. The new project was almost if not quite as 
striking as the enterprise against that fortress. To explain : 

Mr. Shirley employed proper persons before the departure of 
the advice boat [for England] to sound the inclinations of the 
inland inhabitants of his own province, and those of the con 
tiguous English governments, on. an attempt, to entirely ex 
tirpate the French from North America, by following the blow 
at Cape Breton if that should be successful, with an attack 
upon Canada and by the returns that were made him it was 
very evident that in New England only, 10,000 men might be 
raised at very short notice for such an enterprise, and there is 
the strongest probability that his majesty s subjects in the rest 
of his majesty s North American provinces will heartily concur 
and assist therein. 1 

This intimation that Louisburg was but a stepping stone 
to Quebec and Montreal, by the occupation of which the ter 
ror that lurked by night all about the inland frontier villages 
and hamlets of New England might be stayed forever, was 
calculated to arouse as much enthusiasm! in the interior of 
that section as the downfall of Cape Breton would cause in 
the seaport districts. This larger aim doubtless had more 
influence than any other consideration in rallying to the sup- 

a Kilby to [Newcastle], April 3, 1745, C. O. 5 900, loose at end. 



300 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

port of the Louisburg expedition the folk upon the exposed 
frontiers of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connec 
ticut. 

As soon as the sailing of the expedition for Canso gave 
him some measure of leisure, and the knowledge that it 
would have adequate naval support relieved his fears that 
it might fail of full success, Shirley gave his attention to 
plans for taking advantage of what success might be won. 
As a first step he wrote to Newcastle his conviction that 
success in the expedition then in progress would excite in 
the colonies of New England the greatest spirit and ardor 
to follow it up with an immediate attempt against the French 
settlements in Canada. And, he added : 

As all the colonies to the southward of New England as far 
as Virginia inclusive are equally and some of them more en 
gaged by their particular interests to join in the reduction of 
Canada, it seems not to be doubted that upon his majesty s 
recommendation of such an expedition to the several govern 
ments they would most readily do it; and indeed as there 
might be time after the reduction of Cape Breton in case it 
should be reduced soon, to fit out such an expedition here be 
fore the ensuing winter if forwarded with the same despatch 
as has been used in that against Cape Breton, I would submit 
whether a more favorable opportunity could be laid hold on 
than in the present year. 1 

This plan was obviously suited only to the most favorable 
combination of circumstances, but it was well calculated to 
take advantage of such a combination should it appear. 

While the Massachusetts and New Hampshire forces were 
at Canso awaiting an opportunity to proceed to Louisburg, 
Shirley took the first step in America toward promoting this 
scheme by consulting Governor Wentworth, of New Hamp 
shire, upon its practicability. Shirley raised queries upon a 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 4, 1745, C. 0. 5 900. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 301 

number of points, including the strength of the enemy, the 
desirability, possibility and method of taking Crown Point 
as a first step, and what support from England would be 
necessary. Especially, he queried whether it would not be 
feasible to raze all the outlying settlements of Canada and 
drive the inhabitants into- Quebec and Montreal, and whether 
campaigns against these towns in succeeding years, if ac 
companied by effective blockade of the seaboard, would not 
lead to their conquest by mere distress. 1 

Wentworth replied in optimistic vein, assuming a ready 
conquest of Louisburg and favoring a further campaign 
for Canada with additional troops, if they could have ade 
quate naval cooperation. Such an expedition could pro 
ceed as far as Montreal, with " no difficulty, but at Quebec." 
Continuing he added : " How strong that may be, I am not 
able to discover." He was informed, however, that the 
fortress might be taken easily with 4,000 effective men. 
The rest of Canada could make no resistance to a good-sized 
force. By this plan Crown Point would become the last 
objective, to be taken by closing in on it fromi the Canadian 
?ide. 

This scheme required, Wentworth thought, but two ad 
ditional favoring circumstances to promote it in case of suc 
cess at Louisburg. These were that " the governments as 
far as Philadelphia would heartily and speedily unite in 
this grand enterprise . . . ," and that a supply of arms from 
some source then unknown should be procured. These 
slight obstacles, however, did not deter the doughty governor 
from holding a " fixed opinion," that at the first news of 
success at Louisburg " every hand and every heart should 
be imploy d in pursuing the conquest to Montreal. . . ." 2 

1 Shirley to Wentworth, Apr. 8, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 949, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 203-204. 

Wentworth to Shirley, Apr. 12, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 950, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 206-208. 



3 02 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

The outstanding feature of Wentworth s reply was that 
he was ready to cooperate in the conquest oi Canada when an 
opportunity arose, to which attitude of mind Shirley had 
doubtless contributed by seeking his counsel upon the mat 
ter. His aid would be useful in the launching of a future 
plan. 

Shortly afterward Kilby in England again suggested the 
conquest of Canada, pointing out, as a preliminary, that 
further naval forces should be sent to relieve the American 
army at Louisburg and to capture the valuable fleet which 
would then be there. He added that in case of success at 
Louisburg it would be expedient to send after the force 
already sent " as soon as possible ... as many ships as 
can be spared that a competent number may be landed at 
Cape Breton to be joyned with as many of the New England 
forces as will compleatly garrison the town," and that the 
remainder of the British forces proceed promptly to Boston 
and join troops to be raised there for the reduction of Canada, 
" which is the principal object in view of his majesty s 
American subjects, and will undoubtedly engage their utmost 
efforts." As further features of the plan Kilby suggested 
that 10,000 men be raised in America for land service, where 
the cost of levying and supporting them would be much less, 
they being already there and in pay only while serving, and 
he thought the colonies would bear the cost of raising them. 
He thought two regiments from England desirable, but if 
that were impracticable, one would do. 1 

By the time Louisburg actually fell it was manifestly 
chimerical to suppose that an expedition could still be set 
in motion against Canada that year. The English govern 
ment had been slow in pushing the plans and had so delayed 
sending regulars to garrison Louisburg as to force many of 

to Harrington, Apr. 22, 1745, C. O. 5 900, loose at end. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 303 

the New England soldiers then in the field to remain in gar 
rison there. Hence the immediate need was to hold or 
advance the New England frontiers until another season 
opened. 

Tho-se frontiers were not heavily attacked in 1745, but 
there was much trouble of a minor character from the 
Indians especially among the exposed eastern settlements, 
while lesser raids also took place upon the western borders. 1 
After the fall of Louisburg Shirley sought to quiet the 
eastern Indians by sending them an account of that success. 2 
But they were already under French influence and had begun 
hostilities before Shirley s message arrived. 3 This menace, 
while not acute, led to a feeling in both official and private 
circles that the frontiersmen at Louisburg, especially those 
from the eastern country, should return for the defense of 
their homes. 4 Shirley, however, sent one of the Massachu 
setts ships to Maine to cruise up the rivers among the settle 
ments, and at the same time sent reinforcements to the 
western frontiers (where skulking Indians were giving 
trouble, although there was no organized attack) and or 
dered out scouting parties to clear the woods of the foe. 5 

Shirley to Newcastle, July 21, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 216; Shirley to Hill, 
July 12, 1745, N. E. Hist, and Gen. Reg., vol. xii, p. 264. 

2 Shirley to Penobscot and Norridgewalk Indians, July 12, 1745, 
N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 948, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 337-338, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 247-248. 

3 Shirley to Newcastle, July 21, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 216; Shirley to 
Bradbury, July 22, 1745, Cor. Col. Govs. of R. I., vol. i, p. 376, Conn. 
H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 349-350, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 253-254 ; Shirley to 
Pepperrell, July 29, 1745, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, pp. 338-342, 
(extracts) Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp 257-259; Bradbury to Shirley, July 29, 
1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, pp. 353-354, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 261. 

4 Shirley to Pepperrell, July 29, 1745, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, 
pp. 338-342. 

Ibid. 



204 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Later Lieutenant-Governor Phips in the absence of Shirley 
applied to the surrounding governments for cooperation in 
making war upon the eastern Indians. 1 

As no further serious trouble developed Shirley gave the 
larger share of his attention for the balance of the year to 
keeping Louisburg safely for the crown. This required 
some address on his part, for after the siege was. over 
Pepperrell and Warren dwelt together in a unity which 
already showed signs of disintegrating, while the New Eng 
land troops were wholly united in the desire to go home at 
once, since the expedition was now thought to be over. 2 
Moreover, Warren, by taking possession of the town with 
his marines before Pepperrell s troops marched in and by 
apparently overriding Pepperrell s judgment in several 
points was creating conditions which were not conducive to 
future felicity at Louisburg in several respects- 

The chief difficulty arose from the attitude of half- 
contemptuous toleration which Warren like other orthodox 
Englishmen assumed toward colonial society and the purely 
American elements which entered into it. It seemed natural 
to him that he should be the chief in command of the entire 
expedition, since he commanded the only regular English 
forces in it. But applying this simple formula would result 
in his treating Pepperrell, the general in command of all the 
land forces by commission from three New England gov 
ernments, as an inferior. This Shirley did not propose to 
allow. Not only was his own prestige as the chief grantor 

1 Phips to Wentworth, Aug. 19, 1745, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. xviii, p. 232; 
Phips to Wanton, Aug. 19, 1745, Cor. Col. Govs. of R. I., vol. i, pp. 
374-375; Phips to Law, Aug. 19, 1745, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xiii, 
pp. 29-30. 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, July 10, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 198; Pepperrell 
to Shirley, July 4, 1745, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, pp. 310-313, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 232-234; Pepperrell to Shirley, July 17, 1745. 6 Mass. H. S. 
Colls., vol. x, pp. 329-33 1 , Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp.- 250-251. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 305 

of Pepperrell s authority involved but also the enthusiasm 
of the New Englanders against the French. This led to a 
suggestion from Shirley to Pepperrell that he should not 
submit to Warren s taking over the command of the place ; 
and he added : 

To say the truth I am in great pain for the mischiefs that will 
ensue to his majesty s service upon such an attempt, which I 
have mentioned to the commodore, and to prevent the danger 
of em is the chief reason of my coming to Louisburg. You 
must not have the least thought of quitting Louisburg till we 
know his majesty s pleasure concerning it. If you should 
desire to do it, there will be the utmost confusion and dis 
order, and your king and country and own honour will suffer 
exceedingly. 

Shirley said further he was satisfied that an attempt by 
Warren to command the land forces " will produce great 
discontent here as well as in the army, and be very preju 
dicial to his majesty s service in all the colonies of New 
England by putting an end to expeditions from hence for 
his majesty s service." The jealousy already appearing 
would in such a case " soon burst out, I am afraid, into an 
unquenchable flame." 

This view is to be contrasted with Warren s declaration 
that if he remained at Louisburg he should find it absolutely 
necessary to assume command of land as well as sea forces 
" in order to prevent the garrison and territory from falling 
into the enemy s hands." 

Yet Shirley showed that it was no small jealousy which 
prompted his position regarding Warren by adding : 

But I hope he will live to carry one of the most principal flags 
in England into their harbour [Martinique], as he has carry d 
his commodore s into that of Louisburg. He is too valuable a 
man for his country to lose yet awhile. I have as high an 



306 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

opinion of his merit as you have, but he is certainly mistaken 
in the point I have before mentioned. 1 

Shortly after the fortress fell Shirley was busy with 
schemes for securing permanent English settlers for the 
island. He thought it might be best peopled by fishermen 
and ethers from Massachusetts whom he proposed to attract 
by land grants, and by temporary exemption from liability 
for debt, the last only because of the great need for settlers. 2 

The governor proceeded to Louisburg as he had planned 
and succeeded in preventing an outbreak among the soldiers 
who were disturbed to find garrison duty necessary if the 
place were not to be immediately abandoned to the enemy. 
The discontent had reached an acute stage when he arrived, 
but by firmness, moderation and tact, the threatened mutiny 
was prevented. 3 

Louisburg, he wrote Newcastle, needed repairs and 
completion of the works, much battered by the siege, to 
guard against efforts at recapture, sure to be made by 
France. For such an effort they might employ 1,000 

1 For the facts relating to the differences between Warren and 
Pepperrell, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, July 10, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 198; 
Shirley to Pepperrell, July 7, 1745, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, pp. 
322-324, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 236-238. 

Shirley to Board, July 10, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 244-245, 246; 
Shirley s declaration to the Louisburg garrison, Aug. 23, 1745, C. O. 
5 900, 227. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 221; Shirley s 
declaration to the Louisburg garrison, Aug. 23, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 227; 
Shirley s second declaration to the Louisburg garrison, Sept. 17, 1745, 
C. O. 5 900, 235. Before leaving for Louisburg he had secured 600 
men from Massachusetts, 200 from Connecticut, 150 from Rhode 
Island (cf. supra, p. 269, and note 2) and 120 from New Hampshire 
to relieve the garrison, while Massachusetts was raising 400 more and 
Connecticut 300. This made it possible to secure the release of the 
sick and some especially needed for the frontiers. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 307 

French troops in Nova Scotia as a nucleus and rally a force 
of the French inhabitants and Indians of 7,000 more, with 
a prospect of drawing perhaps 4,000 Canadians to their aid. 
These forces with others from France would be capable of a 
formidable attack upon the place. These conditions led hint 
to propose measures which might be effectual to secure a 
loyal population in Nova Scotia, and remove a menace to 
Annapolis, Louisburg and New England. 1 

After doing everything possible for the defense of the 
place and for the comfort and health of the garrison, he pro 
posed to return to Massachusetts at the end of October 3 
leaving 2,250 men in the garrison. He suggested a perman 
ent garrison of 4,000 until English settlers in the neighbor 
hood added to its potential strength, and after that time 
3,ooo. 3 

While at Louisburg he again brought to the attention of 
the home government his plan for the reduction of Canada. 
In September he assured Newcastle that it would be easier 
to raise 10,000 men in the colonies " to go upon an expedi 
tion against Canada upon common pay, than 1,000 to be 
garrison soldiers," 4 while in the same month the Massachu 
setts legislature, in an appeal as a result of the expedition, 
remarked that they hoped the capture of Louisburg " is but 
the beginning of your majesty s conquests as it renders it 
much more easy to subject or extirpate your majesty s 
enemies the French in Canada." 5 

In October Shirley wrote upon the subject at length, re- 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 29, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 281-284. 

1 He did not finally get away until about a month later. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 29, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 280-281; 
Shirley to Bastide, Sept. 17, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 230; Bastide to Shirley, 
Sept. 21, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 232; ditto to ditto, Sept. 26, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 
234; iShirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1745, . O. 5 900, 221. 



5 Mass. General Court to the King, Sept. 25, 1745, C. O. 5 885, 320. 



308 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

peating and amplifying previous arguments relating to the 
value of the Canadian fur trade and fishery and adding that 
since the continent possessed so healthful a climate and had 
experienced so rapid an increase of population 

it may be expected that in one or two more centuries there will 
be such an addition from hence to the subjects of the crown 
of Great Britain, as may make em vye for numbers with the 
subjects of France, and lay a foundation for a superiority of 
British power upon the continent of Europe at the same time 
that it secures that which the royal navy of Great Britain has 
already at sea; and this is a remarkable difference between 
the other acquisitions in America belonging to the several 
crowns in Europe and this continent, that the others diminish 
the mother country s inhabitants, as Jamaica, Barbadoes, and 
the other southern colonies belonging to Great Britain have 
done, and the Spanish West Indies have done even to the ex 
hausting of Old Spain. 1 

Thus while not able to foresee the American Revolution 
Shirley recognized with a good deal of insight the remark 
able future development of North America. 

The governor then presented a plan for the conquest of 
Canada, by which it was suggested that 20,000 men be 
raised in the colonies from North Carolina to New England, 
both inclusive, according to quotas to be fixed by the crown, 
Of this force one-half or a considerable proportion should 
go to Quebec by sea, this expedition to be accompanied by 
a squadron able to blockade the mouth of the St. Lawrence, 
and by as many regular troops as could be spared. The other 
army he proposed should attack the " back of the coun 
try " some time before the harvest and drive the outlying 
settlers into Montreal, Quebec, Crown Point and their other 
strongholds and then block them up. He was confident 
that by this plan the enemy would be forced to surrender 

Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 29, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 284-285. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 309 

before spring by lack of provisions, while the English forces 
might easily be supplied with stores from New England and 
other colonies. Finally Shirley assured Newcastle that he 
would take no steps without express commands. 1 

Meanwhile the crown had formed plans for garrisoning 
Louisburg by two regiments from; Gibraltar and two regi 
ments of Americans on the English establishment to be 
commanded by Shirley and Pepperrell, as rewards in part 
for their respective shares in the expedition. 

Pepperrell was also given the unique distinction of being 
made a New-England-bred baronet, while Warren was made 
an admiral. Newcastle wrote to Shirley to inform him that 
the lords justices took "great satisfaction in your conduct" 
in connection with the expedition and that the king at 
Hanover had received the news of the victory " with the 
highest satisfaction." After informing him of the honors 
conferred upon Warren and Pepperrell, and of the nomi 
nation of the former to be governor of Louisburg, New 
castle added : 

I cannot conclude without assuring you of the particular satis 
faction that it is to me, that one, whom I have so long known, 
and for whom I have so true a regard, and friendship, has had 
it in his power to set on foot, and carry into execution, a 
scheme of such importance as the reduction of Cape Breton 
to his majesty s obedience, is to the interest of your king and 
country, and to see how true a sense his majesty and all his 
faithful servants have of the service you have done upon this 
occasion. . . . And I am persuaded that his majesty would be 

1 He suggested a force to be apportioned as follows: North Carolina 
600, Virginia 2,100, Maryland 1,000, Pennsylvania 2,500, the Jerseys 
1,000, New York 4,500, Connecticut 2,100, New Hampshire 700, Massa 
chusetts 4,500, Rhode Island 1,000. All expenses for the expedition 
save a bounty for enlistment he proposed should be paid by the crown. 
(Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 29, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 255.) This plan is 
not included in the extracts of the letter published in Sh. Cor., vol. 
i, pp. 280-286. 



3 io WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

equally disposed to show you any proper mark of his royal 
favour, as a proof of his gracious acceptance of your services ; 
for which I hope some occasion may soon happen. 

He then gave his assurance that upon all occasions the 
governor would find him ready to promote his interest to 
the utmost of his power. 1 At Shirley s later request that 
his reward should not be such as to degrade his services be 
low Pepperrell s, since he believed they had not been es 
teemed in America inferior to those of anyone else con 
cerned in the expedition 2 he was commissioned to command 
the first of the two 1 American regiments created. 3 

Upon learning of these developments Shirley generously 
praised Warren, Pepperrell, the men who had aided in set 
ting the expedition on foot and those who had served well 
in it. He expressed gratification that Pepperrell and War 
ren had been rewarded. But underneath the calm surface 
he was bitterly disappointed. In truth Shirley s recognition, 
aside from the counterfeit currency of verbiage which those 
in positions of influence at Whitehall were in many instances 
accustomed to utter, seemed scanty. 

At the end of summer in 1745, after the fall of Louisburg, 
he sent his son, William Shirley, Jr., to England. 4 Upon his 
arrival the younger Shirley applied on his father s behalf for 
his appointment to succeed General Phillips as governor of 
Nova Scotia and as colonel of the regiment stationed there, 
upon the decease of the incumbent, then soon expected, 

1 For the plans for garrisoning Louisburg from Gibraltar and the 
rewards for service in connection with the expedition, cf. Newcastle 
to Shirley, Aug. 10, 1745, C. O. 5 45, 193. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 27, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 268. 

*Cf. Shirley s commission as colonel, Aug. 31, 1745, War Office 
Papers, 25 135, 56; Pepperrell s commission, Sept. i, 1745, ibid., 55; 
Newcastle to Shirley, Sept. n, 1745, C. O. 5 45, 209. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 3, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 220. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 31! 

giving as the chief reasons for applying for the post that: 
( i ) the preservation of Nova Scotia chiefly depended upon 
speedily settling it with loyal Englishmen, (2) these set 
tlers must come from: New England, (3) Governor Shirley 
by residing part of the time in Massachusetts could promote 
such settlement, (4) since the burden of carrying out such 
a program must fall chiefly upon him as governor of Mas 
sachusetts, whoever might be entrusted with the task, he 
thought it just that the honors and rewards attending it 
should be his also. 1 

In response to this application Newcastle wrote the gov 
ernor : " You may be assured, that, when such a vacancy 
shall happen, I shall not fail to lay your pretensions before 
his majesty." 

Meanwhile the governor wrote to Stone, the duke s 
secretary, that he had " found so much anxiety, disquiet, and 
chagrin amidst as great success as could even be wished for " 
that though he did not feel free to decline any service re 
quired of him he desired to be a spectator only of public 
affairs for the future and spend the few years his impaired 
health would permit in ease and quiet in England, especially 
if he might be useful in his majesty s service there. 3 

The original but unrealized intention of the ministry was 
that the regiments from Gibraltar should reach Louisburg 
before winter. 4 As they failed to appear Shirley s prepara 
tions for holding the fortress till spring were essential. 

The plan of the home government for raising the two 
American regiments from Pepperrell s troops at Louisburg 
was impracticable, especially as most of the commissions for 
those regiments were given to Englishmen, under whom the 

1 William Shirley, [Jr.] to Stone, Mar. 9, 1746, C. 0. 5 900, 165. 
8 Newcastle to Shirley, Mar. 14, 1746, C. O. 5 45, 217. 
"Shirley to Stone, Nov. 13, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 280. 
4 Newcastle to Shirley, Sept. n, 1745, C. O. 5 45, 209. 



3 I2 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



colonials were far from desiring to serve. Consequently 
Shirley and Pepperrell were obliged to send the few 
Americans they were allowed to appoint, as recruiting of 
ficers as far south as Pennsylvania (English officers being 
useless for recruiting service in America). Meanwhile 
the discharge of the New Englanders at Louisburg must 
await the arrival of troops from some quarter to relieve 
them, to prevent dangerous weakening of the garrison. 1 

The next spring the Duke of Bedford made the ex 
perience with these two American regiments the text for a 
sermon against creating others there upon the British es 
tablishment for the future. 2 

Toward winter, having received no instructions regard 
ing garrisoning Canso, Shirley with the approval of Warren 
and Pepperrell proposed to withdraw the New England 
troops and stores there, regarding that place as of less con 
sequence when Louisburg was in English hands. He, how 
ever, gave assurances that Warren and himself were taking 
careful measures for the security of Louisburg and Nova 
Scotia upon hearing of the assembling of 6,000 Canadians 
and Indians. 3 Nevertheless in January the garrison was 
still at Canso, and Shirley was sending supplies to secure 
them against the French and Indians, who had lately raised 
the siege of Annapolis. 4 

Returning in November to the subject apparently nearest 
his heart, Shirley pointed out that raising the men for an 
expedition against Canada and reaching an agreement be 
tween the governments concerned as to plans, would require 

1 Ibid. ; <Fox to Lords of Treasury, July 24, 1746, T I 321. Shirley, 
however, by May or June had secured over 700 men for his regiment. 
Shirley to , May 10, 1746, T I 321 ; ibid., June 3, 1746. 

Bedford to Newcastle, Mar. 24, 1746, C. O. 24 13, 48. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 6, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 269. Not printed in 
the extract in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 287-290. 

4 Shirley to Cutter, Jan. 4, 1746, T 1 321. 



PLANNING THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 313 

considerable time. He contrasted the difficulties in the way 
with the situation met in attacking Louisburg, when he was 
dealing substantially only with the New England govern 
ments and depending only upon Massachusetts, from whom 
he could be sure of securing 4,000 men. 1 

Writing to the admiralty he urged the conquest of Canada 
as a means of securing Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, and the 
whole American continent as far as the Mississippi valley. 
His plan for conducting it, he added, had been sent to New 
castle, while for suggestions as to naval preparations he re 
ferred to Warren, whom he thought the best man to com 
mand the sea forces, partly because he would be taken ser 
iously by the colonists and would be especially influential in 
New York. 2 

A little later he reported that at a conference with the Six 
Nations at Albany in which representatives of New York, 
Massachusetts and surrounding colonies took part, those 
powerful tribes had been reclaimed to the English interest 
and declared themselves willing to take up the hatchet 
against the French. Thus a vital influence which seemed to 
flow directly from the success at Louisburg favored a suc 
cessful attack upon Canada. 3 

Meanwhile he reported to Newcastle that the situation in 
Nova Scotia was threatening, both because of the palpable 
lack of loyalty of the French inhabitants and because of the 
prospect that the French would choose Annapolis as the 
objective for a strong attempt in the spring, in hopes of 
offsetting the loss of Louisburg. He also had news from 
Clinton at New York that the French had plans for follow 
ing the recent destruction of Saratoga by the taking of 
Albany (which would undoubtedly result in the defection of 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 6, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 269. 
Shirley to Admiralty, Nov. 16, 1745, Ad. I, 3817- 
Shirley to Newcastle, Nov. 20, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 275 ; Wraxall, op. cit., 
pp. 241-242, 244. 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

the Six Nations) and for a general attack upon the frontiers 
of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 

He then remarked that " it is a point settled in New Eng 
land that if we don t drive the French off the continent, they 
will one day drive the English settlements into the sea," 
adding that at least there would be a struggle for mastery 
of the continent, as a quiet partition seemed hardly possible. 
He believed, however, that Canada under English control 
combined with the existing English colonies could be main 
tained at less expense than the latter alone. 1 

In January the governor was in the midst of plans for 
immediately utilizing the Iroquois and the forces of the 
neighboring colonies against the enemies most accessible to 
each. But this plan did not come to fruition. 2 

By the following month the recruits who had been 
promised from home for Annapolis the preceding year had 
reached Boston, with stores for that garrison. 3 At the same 
time Shirley was bringing to bear upon the ministry at home 
cumulative masses of information relating to conditions in 
Nova Scotia, stressing once more the need for securing the 
subjection of the French inhabitants. 4 Thus after his great 
success at Louisburg Shirley came to the eve of another 
campaign without news of the attitude of the home govern 
ment toward his plans for it. 

1 For Shirley s summary of conditions and prospects at this time, 
cf. Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 23, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 289. 

2 For the facts regarding this plan, cf. Jour., Jan. 21, 1746, p. 164; 
Jan. 23, 1746, p. 167; Jan. 28, 1746, p. 174; Feb. 4, 1746, p. 182; Feb. 11, 
1746, p. 189; .Shirley to Wentworth, Jan. 12, 1746, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. 
xviii, p. 253; ibid., Jan. 27, 1746, p. 254; Shirley to Wentworth, Jan. 20, 
1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 302. 

3 Of the 206 who sailed from England, however, there were not 
over half remaining, after a severe attack of scurvy, who seemed capable 
of becoming effective for the garrison. Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. n, 
1746, C. O. 5 45, 8; Shirley to Yonge, Feb. 10, 1746, T i 321. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. 11, 1746, C. O. 5 45, 8. 



CHAPTER XV 
MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 

WHILE affairs in America thus halted to permit plans for 
future action to be evolved the mill of the "lords " ground 
with its accustomed lack of speed and precision. This fact 
appeared in the middle of March in letters from Newcastle 
to the several governors in North America, stating that in 
case the ministry judged it advisable to attack the French 
settlements there, they should take the proper measures for 
raising a body of men within their respective provinces for 
that service. 1 At the same time Commodore Knowles was 
named to succeed Warren as governor at Louisburg, thus re 
leasing the latter to serve as the commander of any naval 
forces which might be assigned to such an expedition. 2 

To Shirley Newcastle sent assurances that his letters had 
led to co-ntinued approval of his conduct. He hoped the 
regiments from Gibraltar were now at Louisburg, and added 
that Major-General Frampton s regiment was being pre 
pared to join them with large supplies of ordnance stores. 
Warren, he said, had been ordered to consult with Shirley 
in Boston, 

in what manner his majesty s squadron may be employed with 
the greatest probability of success, in making any further 
attempt upon any of the French settlements in North Amer 
ica; what number of land forces may be necessary for that 
purpose, and what number of men may be raised in his maj 
esty s colonies of North America. And His Majesty will ex- 

1 Newcastle to Governors in America, Mar. 14, 1746, C. 0. 5 45, I. 
Newcastle to Shirley, Mar. 14, 1746, C. O. 5 45, 217. 

315 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

pect with impatience to receive yours and Mr. Warren s 
opinion upon this point. . . . a 

This was nearly seven weeks after Shirley s plan for the 
conquest of Canada sent in the preceding fall (the receipt of 
which the duke now acknowledged) had been in his hands. 2 

Shirley and Warren drew up the plan suggested, with the 
natural consequence that it arrived too late to be of use for 
the campaign contemplated, whereupon it was considered at 
the beginning of the following year. 3 

Meanwhile the admiralty was engaged in digesting the 
papers already sent by Warren and Shirley and what other 
information was available upon the project for reducing 
Canada. The result of this research was a lengthy state 
ment on March 24, 1746, from the Duke of Bedford, first 
lord of the admiralty, to Newcastle upon the whole proposi 
tion. Discussing at the outset the chief results to be expected 
from the conquest of the French continental colonies, he 
concluded : ( i ) this would forever secure for England the 
whole fish and fur trade there and would increase her sea 
forces; (2) it would leave the French unable to supply their 
sugar islands with provisions, lumber and other articles 
necessary for sugar and indigo works. Those French in 
dustries would thus be ruined or it would be possible for 
English competitors to undersell them in European markets ; 
(3) the trade of old France would be greatly reduced; (4) 
France would no* longer be able to build warships in America, 
nor to procure masts except from the " Eastland country." 
Her naval power would thus be kept within limits and Eng 
land would be relatively strengthened in that respect; (5) 
it would make all the English possessions in North America 

Newcastle to Shirley, Mar. 14, 1746, C. 0. 5 45, 217. 
2 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 29, 1745 (indorsed date of receipt, Jan. 25), 
C. 0. 5 900, 255. 
Cabinet notes, heads of business, Jan. 1747, S. P. D., Various. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 

secure from the inroads to which they were now exposed. 
Especially, it would secure the mast country to England and 
would allow the better settling of eastern New England and 
Nova Scotia, the latter of which was then much exposed. 

Bedford observed that all the suggested plans agreed in 
proposing to have regular troops in America as early as the 
ice w r as out of the St. Lawrence, and the season sufficiently 
advanced for forces to take the field. This he thought would 
be by the end of May or the first of June, by which time he 
hoped the troops, train of artillery, stores, victuals and all 
necessaries might be in that stream. 

All these plans also proposed that troops be raised from all 
the colonies north of the Carolinas to be paid by the crown. 
The total and the quotas would depend much on the number 
of regulars to be sent from England upon whom he placed 
the chief reliance. The American troops he thought would 
be of great service (if supported by regulars) for scouring 
the woods " and making war in the American manner." He 
therefore suggested that the governors of all the govern- 
menits to the north of the Carolinas be ordered to raise 
men in as large numbers and as rapidly as possible. Those 
raised in New York and southward should rendezvous at 
Albany to proceed by land against Montreal as soon as they 
were informed that the English fleet was in the St. Lawrence. 
They were to serve under commanders to be named by the 
king. 

For the naval portion of the expedition he thought that in 
addition to the considerable fleet already in North American 
waters, a reinforcement could be sent from England to 
make up a squadron of nearly twenty ships-of-war besides 
bomb vessels and fire vessels. He hoped, also, for colonial 
vessels, which with whale boats and other small craft would 
be of infinite service by going ahead of the fleet in the St. 
Lawrence, especially as pilots for that stream were scarce 
and not very dependable. 



318 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Bedford said the terms proposed by Shirley s plan of 
October 2Qth for the troops raised in America, in accordance 
with which the Americans would pay only for recruiting 
them while the troops would have all the plunder and a 
bonus of captured lands, and would also retain their arms, 
were " such as I believe could never be agreed to by this 
country." He added that even if he believed the scheme 
practicable, which he did not, he should have great objec 
tions to it, both because he was unwilling to trust this im 
portant affair wholly to American regiments, after the ex 
perience they had had with them, and on account of 

the independence it may create in those provinces towards 
their mother country, when they shall see within themselves 
so great an army possessed in their own right by conquest, of 
so great an extent of country, which tho to be enjoyed by 
them, is yet to be attained at the expense of their mother coun 
try, who is to arm, pay, cloath and subsist them. 



to 



He proposed to obviate these and many other objections 
Shirley s plan by placing the chief reliance 

upon your fleet and the troops you will send from hence, and 
to look upon the Americans, only as useful troops, when joined 
to battallions of your own which you can trust, but not to be 
depended on when singly by themselves either to make head 
against an army of the enemy, or to form a regular siege; 
but to be employed in scouring the woods, driving the enemy s 
cattle, and breaking up their plantations and settlements, 
which has been a kind of war they have been accustomed to. 

Thus spoke the head of the admiralty upon the morrow of a 
successful siege of one of the strongest existing fortresses, 
conducted by land wholly by the colonial troops he thus 
characterized. This had been made possible by the blockade 
maintained by British naval forces, but those forces had not 
otherwise directly contributed materially to the operations 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 3:9 

against Louisburg. The real implication of his suggestion 
seems to have been that he feared the Americans would con 
quer too much rather than too little. 

Bedford believed that his proposals would obviate ob 
jections made by Admiral Warren against undertaking the 
expedition during 1746. Warren s chief objection was 
that the settling of quotas and the other preliminaries to 
the raising of so large a force in America could not be com 
pleted in time. In case Bedford s plan was followed enough 
troops to suffice would be sent from England and raised on 
short notice in the colonies. 

Bedford was strongly for immediate action, continuing: 
" I believe I may in general venture to< affirm, that half the 
expence and trouble properly staked now, will go farther 
towards obtaining what we hope and wish for, than the 
double of it will the next year." Then the French would 
probably have strengthened their fortifications, collected 
stores and provisions, and above all, cultivated the Indians, 
resulting probably in alienating the Iroquois if the English 
had not meanwhile followed up the success at Cape Breton. 

He was informed that the whole standing French force 
in America in time of peace was only thirty companies of 
twenty-five or thirty men each, not exceeding 900 men. 
He thought that with the St. Lawrence blocked the country 
could be forced to surrender for want of provisions by 
operations from Albany. He therefore urged Newcastle, 
in case his plan or any part of it was approved, to consult 
with the ablest land and sea officers and to submit his rec 
ommendations to the king, so that if they were approved, 
immediate orders might be given for carrying them into 
execution, " as I think the success of it greatly depends (I 
may say wholly) upon not being prevented by the alertness 
of our enemies." 1 

1 For this very informing document, cf. Bedford to Newcastle, Mar. 
24, 1746, C. 0. 42 13, 48. 



320 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Thus it appears that Bedford, while very far from pos 
sessing the viewpoint of the Americans, manifested some 
insight into American tendencies. Nevertheless his clear 
comprehension of some important factors of the American 
problem was vitiated by what seemed to be a thoroughly 
English inability on his part to grasp others. Thus he pro 
posed to obviate the difficulties in the way of raising troops 
by quotas by abolishing quotas and leaving each govern 
ment the judge of its own capacity in that respect with full 
opportunity for shirking and evasion. He was perhaps 
similarly unpractical in demanding of the ministry, equally 
lacking in real interest in the problems of the American 
war and in energy to execute plans for solving them, a 
largeness and promptness of action wholly exceeding any 
reasonable expectation of their performance 1 , Bedford s 
attitude toward the matter also displays not only an 
attempt of the head of the navy to play the role of an ex 
pert in military affairs, but also a pronounced effort on his 
part to overshadow Newcastle and the other members of the 
ministry, whose supineness perhaps invite^ the presumption. 

This matter seems to mark the beginning of an abiding 
suspicion on Bedford s part that Shirley was not sufficiently 
zealous for imperial interests when they were in competition 
with those of the colonies. In this later period also he dis 
played a tendency to oppose the governor s policies. Pos 
sibly he thought the latter presuming to suggest so volu 
minously how the war could be won. Perhaps, however, 
Bedford s opposition was quite as much to Newcastle as to 
Shirley. 

The matter was brought up in the cabinet on April 3d, 
and a plan which was apparently a compromise between 
those suggested by Shirley and Bedford respectively was 
in general approved. 1 By April Qth, the plan for the ex- 

1 Cabinet notes, Apr. 3, 1746, 6". P. D. t Var., bundle 5. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 321 

pedition had been approved in final form. The scheme pro 
vided for 4,000 regular troops to be commanded by Lieuten 
ant-General St. Clair, which with supplies of all sorts were 
expected to sail from England for Louisburg under con 
voy of five men-of-war of the line, a fire ship and a bomb 
vessel, by the end of April or the beginning of May. 

Newcastle wrote to the governors of the New England 
colonies directing them to raise as many men as possible to 
serve in the king s pay and to send them: in transports to 
Louisburg by the middle of May to join the forces under 
St. Clair there. These forces, in company with any which 
could be spared from the Louisburg garrison, were to start 
up the St. Lawrence by the beginning of June for Quebec. 

The colonial secretary also wrote to the same governors 
to secure as many armed vessels as possible to accompany the 
fleet which was to serve in the expedition under Warren, 
and also small craft of different sorts to precede the fleet 
up the St. Lawrence, since the pilotage was difficult and little 
known to the English. They were also to secure pilots if 
possible. 

St. Clair was to command all the land forces and Warren 
the squadron, which was to be made up by agreement be 
tween the latter and Vice- Admiral Townshend, who was to 
remain in command of the main squadron detailed for the 
protection of Louisburg and the Newfoundland fisheries, 
and to send convoys to Europe. 

Newcastle also wrote to Shirley and Pepperrell directing 
them to hasten as much as possible the completion of their 
regiments so that they might serve in garrison at Louis 
burg during the expedition. Shirley was also directed 
to assist the commissary of stores in contracting for such 
supplies as were needed. 

Lieutenant-Governor Gooch of Virginia was commissioned 
a brigadier-general and given the command of the troops 



322 WILLIAM SHIRLEYA HISTORY 

to be raised in the colonies south of New England. To se^ 
cure these forces Newcastle directed the governors of the 
colonies from Virginia to New York inclusive, to raise as 
many men as possible to be paid from England and to be at 
Albany or other rendezvous named by Gooch by June ist. 
Thence Gooch was to proceed in accordance with the plan 
of campaign, under orders from the commander-in-chief of 
the land forces, to besiege Montreal, or if that was im 
practicable, to ravage the settlements between Montreal and 
Quebec with the aid of the Six Nations, for the purpose of 
starving the garrisons into submission. 

As to arms and clothing for the American troops, they 
were to be provided by the colonial governments, to whom 
General St. Clair was to make " a reasonable allowance " 
for that expense. The Americans were also to< have a 
share of the booty and return home at the end of the ex 
pedition if they desired. 

Shirley was to proceed to Louisburg with the Massa 
chusetts troops to> confer and counsel there with St. Clair and 
Warren, and in case they decided " that any other scheme 
for the reduction of Canada may be more practicable, and 
advisable, it will certainly be left to you there to do as you 
shall think proper in that respect." 

Newcastle further explained that the disturbances in Eng 
land attending the Jacobite rebellion and threats of invasion 
from France during the preceding year made it impractic 
able during the winter "to be preparing for an expedition 
of ithis kind, which required great armaments by sea and 
land " which it did not sfeem likely could be spared from 
England in the immediate future. But the rebellion had 
collapsed, France had apparently given up the intention of 
invading England, and England had further security 
through operations in Flanders and elsewhere. Therefore 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 323 

it now seemed both possible and opportune to send a con 
siderable force. 1 

Meanwhile the garrison at Louisburg, from which it was 
proposed to draw men for the expedition, had been badly 
affected by sickness and otherwise. More than half of those 
left in it had either died or were in hospital and those fit for 
duty were less than i,ooo. 2 

About the middle of May Newcastle sent a circular letter 
to all the governors as far south as the Carolinas directing 
them to aid St. Clair to the utmost in executing his orders. 3 
The orders from England for raising troops for the in 
vasion of Canada reached Shirley May 26th and he at once 
forwarded packets presumably containing similar orders to 
the other governors upon the continent as far as Virginia. 
In writing of the expedition to- Wentworth of New Hamp 
shire, Shirley asked his views regarding several points. The 
aim of these queries might have been to lay the groundwork 
for a scheme whereby the conquest of Quebec would be 
committed to the fleet and the British regulars, while the 
American troops would all or most of them join in a land 
expedition against Montreal. Or it might be to engage 
Wentworth s self-esteem as an ally in the raising of troops 
in New Hampshire, or a combination of these aims. 4 Al 
most at once Wentworth asked for a fuller statement of the 
terms upon which the expedition was to be conducted. This 

1 For the steps taken at home in connection with setting on foot an 
expedition for the conquest of Canada in 1746, cf. Plan of intended 
expedition against Canada, Apr. 9, 1746, C. O. 5 45, 243; Newcastle to 
Shirley, Apr. 9, 1746, C. O. 5 45, 229; Newcastle to Warren, Apr. 9, 
1746, C. O. 5 45, 236; Newcastle to Gooch, Apr. 9, 1746, C. 0. 5 45, 
238; Newcastle to Wanton, Apr. 9, 1746, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, 
pp. 162-163. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 14, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 293; PepperrelL 
and Warren to Shirley, Jan. 28, 1746, ibid., p. 303. 

Newcastle to Governors, May 15, 1746, C. O. 5 45, 246. 

4 Shirley to Wentworth, May 27, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 318-319. 



324 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

elicited from Shirley, among other things, the fact that the 
ultimate assignment of troops to service against Quebec or 
Montreal lay \vith St. Clair, Warren and himself. 1 A few 
days later Wentworth had secured provision by the New 
Hampshire assembly for raising as many men as could be 
gotten ready to embark by the last day of the following 
July. 2 As an inducement to men in that province to enlist, 
Shirley promised to use his influence to have many of them 
assigned to the land expedition. 3 

Meanwhile Shirley had secured a vote from the Massa 
chusetts general court for raising 3,000 men for the ex 
pedition. 4 Thereupon he promptly issued his proclamation 
for raising the men authorized, upon the terms prescribed 
by the home government and with provision by the provin 
cial government for a bounty and for necessaries not other 
wise available. 5 Soon, also, he had begun issuing beating 
orders for raising troops, 6 A few days after the vote for 
raising 3,000 men, something seems to have damped the 
ardor of the legislature. Hesitancy appeared in a vote to 
stay further proceedings in relation to providing transports 
and other necessaries for the troops for the expedition. 
This Shirley refused to accept without explanation of their 

1 Shirley to Wentworth, May 31, 1746, ibid., pp. 321-322. 

* This action was taken on June 4th. Cf. N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, 
pp. 430-43L 

Shirley to Wentworth, June 6, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 324-325. 

*Iour., May 31, 1746, p. 15; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (5-1), p. 427; A. and R. t 
vol. xiii, p. 594. 

Proclamation for raising troops, June 2, 1746. The copy of the 
document in the Suffolk Files 61899, and the printed copy in C. 0. 5 
ooi, 209, as well as the copy in Ar., vol. Ixxii, fol. 718, are free from 
the error in spelling noted in Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 324. 

6 Shirley to Stanbury, June 8, 1746, T i 321. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA *> 2 Z 

4 U *J 

intentions, since the vote seemed to frustrate earlier plans. 
The vote had already delayed progress and he requested vig 
orous measures. 1 This tactful prodding was followed by 
a vote to raise 25,000 for the expenses of the expedition. 2 

It is not strange that doubts appeared as to the future of 
this expedition troops for which could be raised in Amer 
ica only at the beginning of summer to cooperate with Eng 
lish forces which had not yet arrived ; and plans for which 
would be decided upon only at the moment that the expedi 
tion should be set in motion, by three persons, all of whom 
were English officials and two of whom were presumably not 
sympathetic toward colonial forces. All that Shirley could 
do to turn the energies which he had sought to create for 
intercolonial action into this new channel could not make 
the prospect look encouraging. Moreover, Shirley himself 
had serious doubts; for in a letter to Newcastle while the 
levies were being raised, he referred to the possibility of a 
" disappointment in the present attempt for the reduction 
of Canada." 

Nevertheless, the die was cast and the task of preparing 
for the expedition was undertaken with energy. There was 
an enthusiasm among the youth of the province for the 
attempt to destroy the continuing menace to the frontiers. 
At an early date the lower house thought it necessary to 
appoint a committee to prevent children under sixteen from 
enlisting for the expedition.* The committee of war of the 
two houses became the center of measures for equipping the 
expedition, being empowered by the governor upon re- 

l jonr., June 10, 1746, pp. 32-33. 

*Ibid., June u, 1746, p. 25; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (5-1), p. 456; A. and R., 
vol. iii, p. 292. 

*Jour., June 13, 1746, p. 40. 



326 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

quest of the two houses, to impress transports, provisions 
and other necessaries for the forces. 1 

The governor urged members of the legislature when 
returning home for a recess at the end of June to aid en 
listments in their counties. He added that Canada was the 
Carthage of the northern colonies, and that a merely defen 
sive war against the French and Indians if continued for a, 
few years would be insupportably costly. 

But it was necessary to secure the troops even more 
quickly than a like number had been raised for the Louis- 
burg expedition, if they were to be in time to accomplish 
their task. Shirley therefore hastened the process by en 
listing the mien in service on the frontiers, who preferred 
going on the expedition to service under the province, and 
then impressed men from the militia to take their places. 2 
This caused protest on the part of the house, 3 but Shirley 
defended his action while promising it should not be carried 
further.* 

Meanwhile the pulse of the continent had been rising. 
However dubious might be the prospects for success, the 
crown had sent commands for raising troops, they were 
to be paid by the home government, and the goal was the 
destruction of the hated French in Canada. 

As usual Rhode Island proved a poor gauge for the colon 
ies at large. She voted to raise three companies of 100 
men each and to send the colony sloop, 5 but only 100 were 
made ready to embark. 6 

l lbid., June 19, 1746, p. 51; Ct. Recs., vol. xvii (5-0- P- 475- 
*Jour., July 15, 1746, pp. 73-74. 
9 Ibid., July 1 6, 1746, pp. 75-76. 
*Ibid., July 17, 1746, p. 79. 
6 R. /. Col. Recs., vol. v, pp. 172, 173. 

Greene to iShirley and Warren, July 18, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 33O, 
note, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 187. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 327 

Connecticut acted with her usual moderate zeal by at 
first voting 600 men, " or more if they shall offer them 
selves." x Getting warmed to the task in hand a few weeks 
later she increased the number to 1,000, and if any of the 
companies should be incomplete, the governor was author 
ized to impress men to fill them. 2 

New York showed her interest by voting 1,600 men. 3 

Although Governor Morris had intimated that the Quaker 
sentiment of New Jersey had been proof against the temp 
tation to aid in reducing Louisburg, it proved no bar to 
voting 500 men to help conquer Canada, and a prospective 
officer who had raised 100 men in excess of those voted was 
apparently directed to the governor of New York. 4 

Pennsylvania, more consistently non-combatant than her 
neighbor, provided for no troops, but passed an act granting 
5,000 for the king s use. 5 This sum the governor em 
ployed in raising four companies of men for the expedition. 6 

Meanwhile Warren went to Boston at the end of June to 
consult with Shirley. St. Clair had not arrived and the 
circumstances eloquently proclaimed the necessity of an 
agreement upon at least a tentative plan. St. Clair was to 

l Conn. Pr. Recs., vol. ix, p. 211. 
a Ibid., pp. 231-232, 233. 

3 Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New 
York (Albany, 1853-1887), vol. vi, p. 657. 

4 "Minutes of the Council of iNew Jersey, Aug. 13, 1746," in Docu 
ments relating to the Colonial History of the State of New Jersey, 
New Jersey Archives (Newark, etc., 1880-1918), vol. vi, p. 371 ; Alexander 
and Morris to Board, Dec. 24, 1746, ibid., p. 419. 

1 Min. Pr. Cl. Pa., vol. v, p. 49. 

6 Ibid., p. 52. Parkman refers to the raising of these men in full 
accordance with the indirectly expressed desire of the assembly (ibid., 
p. 43) and with public money, as being accomplished through a popular 
movement. Parkman, A Half Century of Conflict (Boston, 1892), vol. 
ii, P- 153- 



328 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

be appealed to upon his arrival for approbation and was to 
be asked to come to Boston to save time. Warren and Shir 
ley addressed a circular letter to the different governors 
pointing out the ripeness of the hour both for striking the 
French and for raising troops and exhorting them to 

consider themselves as one body united in the common cause 
in which, if any one particular colony should exert itself be 
yond either its just proportion or abilities, it may (we doubt 
not) be depended upon that the exceedings of such colony will 
be made up to it, either by an average to be afterwards settled 
among all the colonies concerned or by a reimbursement from 
his majesty or the Parliament of Great Britain. 1 

They also attempted by a method of informal assignment 
to secure something approaching quotas of armed vessels 
from the various colonies. 2 

Shirley was then hoping to have the Massachusetts forces 
ready to proceed by July 2Oth, and the Connecticut and 
Rhode Island forces planned to rendezvous at Boston to pro 
ceed with them. 3 

Shortly after this effort to spur on the latent energies 
of the other colonies, Shirley wrote to his patron, reporting 
progress. He stated that he had collected all the informa 
tion possible to serve as a basis for a plan of operations 
against Canada, and had sent copies of his tentative scheme 
to governors Clinton of New York, Thomas of Pennsyl 
vania, and Gooch of Virginia. He suggested sending a 

Shirley and Warren to Greene, July 4, 1746, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, 
p. 185, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 329-330; Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1746, 
C. O. 5 901, 14, (not in extract in Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 33^)- 

2 Ibid. , Shirley and Warren to Wentworth, July 4, 1746. N. H. Pr. 
Ps., vol. v, p. 818; Shirley and Warren to Thomas, July 4, 1746, Pa. Ar., 
vol. i, pp. 689-691. 

Shirley and Warren to Greene, July 4, 1746, R. /. Col. Rccs., vol. v, 
pp. 185-186; Greene to Shirley and Warren, July 18, 1746, ibid., p. 187. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 329 

body of 10,000 men, English and colonial (he hoped the lat 
ter might be raised in New England), by way of the St. 
Lawrence, and a force of 3,000 or 4,000, to be raised out 
side of New England, by land against Montreal. He ad 
vised againsit attempting to send a larger detachment by the 
difficult land route, believing that such a force would be 
adequate for a diversion, to assist those proceeding against 
Quebec. He thought the transports would be in good season 
for a campaign up the St. Lawrence if they could leave 
Louisburg by August loth. In case the troops and ships 
could winter in Canada (as to the advisability of which he 
was undecided) he hoped success might be certain. Other 
details for which he was providing related to pilots, charts 
of the St. Lawrence and the maintaining of communications 
between the different forces. 1 

Shirley believed the capture of Quebec would result in 
the submission of Montreal before the following spring, and 
in case neither were taken he was informed troops could be 
quartered in buildings on the Isle of Orleans near Quebec. 
He was convinced that an effective blockade of the mouth 
of the St. Lawrence was essential to success. He estimated 
the fighting men of Canada as including 500 regulars, 10,000 
to 15,000 militia and 500 to 800 Indians. 2 

Meanwhile interesting situations were developing on the 
European side of the Atlantic. These were, substantially, 
that France was preparing a large squadron at Brest with a 
considerable body of troops, and that the British ministry 
had developed a state of complete paralysis in connection 
with the proposed expedition. It was not likely that the 
Brest fleet was aimed at England, and it was more than likely 
that it was prepared for the task of retrieving the disaster 

Shirley to Newcastle, July 7, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 14 (not in extract in 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 332-334)- 
* Ibid., Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 332-334- 



330 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



to French arms in America during the preceding year, yet 
inaction pervaded the ministry. 

Kilby, the Massachusetts agent, on July ist presented a 
memorial urging the need of supporting the expedition in 
America. For this purpose he suggested that such part of 
the troops which had been prepared for it as could be 
spared from other uses should be retained in readiness to 1 
proceed to America in case news thence should show they 
were needed. 1 The troops were for the time held inactive, 
but were not sent to America, 

Meanwhile the absence of direct news left Americans to 
infer the state of affairs from: the unbroken silence of the 
ministry. A result of the inaction at home was that the 
levies in the colonies were bringing together bodies of troops 
without properly authorized heads or effective organization. 
At the end of July Shirley was apparently still proceeding 
upon the supposition that the expedition was being seriously 
intended by the ministry. He then represented to Newcastle 
that progress was halting, especially because of the lack of 
commissions, the lateness of the season and a bad impression 
made by the retaining of American troops so long in gar 
rison at Louisburg. As a result the number raised would 
not be as large as expected. He now estimated there would 
be less than 4,000 men from New England and less than 
2,800 from the five other governments. He continued with 
suggestions for a late campaign, lasting through the winter 
if necessary. He also observed that proper quotas could 
not be secured until the crown directed them to be raised. 

Admiral Townshend, he reported, had paid no attention 
to the blockading of the St. Lawrence. 2 This policy was 
perhaps due to a desire to have the ships together at Louis- 
burg, to meet the expected Brest squadron. Shirley sug- 

1 Kilby to Newcastle, July i, 1746, C. 0. 5 753. 

2 Cf. supra, p. 329- 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 331 

gested that if it was intended for America it was probably 
ordered to Canada or Annapolis rather than to Louisburg. 
In Nova Scotia it would have a convenient base against the 
latter fortress in a friendly country where numerous allies 
were to be had. News from Nova Scotia also showed a 
spirit of defiance on the part of the inhabitants in expecta 
tion of an armament from France. 1 

Meanwhile the Massachusetts preparations went on. An 
increase in the vessels provided for the expedition was made 
in late July, 2 and at the same time the house refused to 
listen to the protest of masters against the enlistment of 
Indian and negro slaves for the expedition. 3 August 5th, 
Shirley reported to the house that there were " above 2,000 
already enlisted and more continually offering themselves." 
The house, however, refused to take necessary steps for 
the carrying on of the expedition in the absence of definite 
information from home that it was to take place, and ulti 
mately they declined to provide for the transportation of 
Massachusetts troops after October ist. 4 

Meanwhile the wind seemed to have veered in England, 
for Kilby intimated in the latter part of August that the ex 
pedition had been revived, and claimed to have had as much 
influence as any private person in bringing it about, " after 
it was laid aside." 5 

*For this effort to adapt the expedition to a winter campaign, cf. 
Shirley to Newcastle, July 28, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 17 (extract in Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 334-335). 

3 /owr., July 22, 1746, p. 85; July 24, 1746, pp. 90-91; Ct. Recs., vol. 
xvii (5-1 ), pp. 533-534- 

1 Jour., July 25, 1746, p. 92. 

4 Ibid., Aug. 5, 1746, p. 953; Aug. 6, 1746, p. 96a; Aug. 7, 1746, p. 101 ; 
Aug. 12, 1746, pp. 107-108; Aug. 13, 1746, p. 109; .Shirley to Committee 
of War, Aug. 9, 1746, Ar., vol. liii, fol. 203. 

5 Kilby to Hancock, Aug. 25, 1746, Boston Public Library Mss., Ch. F, 
i, 49- 



332 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



Kilby, however, was over-optimistic. The resuscita 
tion of the expedition was only apparent. There were 
forces at work to prevent its proceeding which do not 
clearly appear. Newcastle afterward made a statement 
which is far from adequate as an explanation. He de 
clared that the troops for the American enterprise were em 
barked at Portsmouth by the end of May and w r ere under 
orders to sail with the first fair wind, but that contrary winds 
having kept them from sailing for a considerable time, 
" Admiral Lestock and Lieutenant-General St. Clair about 
the middle of August last laid before His Majesty their 
opinion they could not that season get farther than Boston." 
This was several weeks after the Brest squadron had pro 
ceeded to America. The responsibility for the hesitation 
in the period in which it seemed clearly practicable to get the 
expedition to sea presumably lay at the door of the 
ministry. That sapient group of statesmen decided, ae 
Newcastle reported, to have it remain in England until the 
following spring. It was assumed that upon proceeding 
then it would be ready to undertake operations " as early in 
the year as though they had wintered at Boston," and that 
the troops after wintering in Ireland would be in better con 
dition. 

And in the meantime more information was expected from 
Shirley and Warren to enable the ministry to judge more. 
certainly whether the force provided for the expedition 
might be sufficient for the end proposed. Therefore all of 
those officers letters were carefully examined and consid 
ered, and, Warren happening to arrive in England just 
as this important matter was being discussed, 1 he was called 



was apparently at the end of 1746 or the beginning of 1747, 
as Warren seems not to have left America until late in 1746. Shirley 
and Warren to Greene, Boston, Oct. 23, 1746, R. /. Col Recs., vol. v, 
p. 195, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 359-361 ; -Shirley to Lords of the Treasury, 
Jan. i, 1747, T i 324; Shirley to Warren, Jan. 2, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. 
i, P. 376. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 333 

in. The king s servants then finding that he believed that 
more men ithan had previously been supposed were necessary 
to success, and that it would not then be possible to raise that 
many in America in time to proceed that season (1747) the 
king decided, though very unwillingly, to lay aside the plan 
for sending St. Glair s expedition to North America. 

This was necessary because there had not been time since 
Warren s arrival nor " any possibility in other respects," 
to provide in that session of Parliament " for such a great 
command by sea and land, and such an immense expense as 
must be incurred by it." x Besides, troops wei needed for 
a large force in Flanders, and a further contingent and a 
considerable squadron were required to defend Holland, 
which also made it more difficult to send any considerable 
land and sea forces to America at that time. Therefore, 
since great and extensive conquests in North America were 
for the present impracticable, measures were forthwith con 
sidered for the defense of the English possessions there and 
for doing what incidental damage to the French was feas 
ible. A plan for sending a naval force over under Warren 
had been approved, but the admiralty had represented that 
in view of a French armament at Brest, the home fleet might 
be too weak if they were immediately sent. Therefore they 
would be held, with the exception of two ships of the line, 
until news had been received that the Brest squadron or part 
of it had sailed for America. When such news was re 
ceived Warren w r ould be at once despatched after it, with a 
sufficient force to defend the English possessions on that 
continent. This force would include the remainder of 
Frampton s regiment, a part of which was already in gar 
rison at Louisburg. 

Meanwhile the colonies in America were commended to 

1 Cf. infra, pp. 34 6 -347- 



334 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



the care of Shirley and Knowles, 1 who were jointly to plan, 
supply the wherewithal, and execute; to meet the French 
forces already in America, and to be prepared to meet any 
coming from Europe. Xova Scotia and Louisburg were 
to receive their especial guardianship. But as the ex 
pense of these Americans [who had been raised for the 
Canada expedition in the preceding year] is very great " it 
was directed that aside from such as might be needed in ad 
dition to other forces there for protecting those places, which 
Newcastle hoped would be " a small number," Shirley and 
Knowles should " thank them in such manner as you think 
proper, and immediately discharge them upon the best and 
cheapest foot you can. They were to consult with the 
different governors upon the manner of doing it, and to send 
home an immediate account of their proceedings. Upon 
receiving their report with vouchers, the accounts would be 
laid before Parliament for payment. They were especially 
enjoined to discharge the men " as cheap as possible." It 
was intimated that the men who had not inarched out of 
their own colony, should not receive full pay. 

As a seeming step toward the defense of Xova Scotia 
Lieutenant Governor Mascarene was to be ordered by the 
secretary at war to follow his previous custom of obeying* 
orders from Shirley and Knowles in matters referring to 
the defense of his province. 

Further, as the treasury was complaining that bills drawn 
upon them in America were very irregular. Shirley and 
Knowles were directed that no further draught be made in 
that manner. 

Evidently aside from the limitations already noted Shirley 
and Knowles were to have carte blanche, for Newcastle 
added : 

It is impossible to send you more particular directions for 
1 Warren s successor as governor at Louisburg. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 335 

your conduct; his majesty s view and intention is, that you 
should with the force you have, put Acadia and Louisburg in 
the best condition of defense, and if the enemy send any force 
from Europe, to make any new attempt in North America, in 
that case, Rear-Admiral Warren will immediately follow them. 

Having presented these necessary details the duke turned 
to regrets and appreciation. It was impossible to send 
word until it was finally determined what to do in America 
that year, " and as that has varied often and necessarily 
changed, according to the preparations carrying on by the 
French in Europe . . . ," it would have been useless to have 
written sooner. 1 

However, the colonial secretary was deeply regretful that 
the attempt upon Canada had proved impracticable for that 
year and observed " that would have been a glorious work." 2 

Thus the ministry reached their first stable decision re 
garding the proposed conquest of Canada, that no con- 

1 After reaching the conclusion that the season was too far advanced 
to allow the expedition to proceed in 1746, it had been decided by the 
ministry to use its forces for a descent upon the coast of France, and 
then to utilize them for the following year in America. Admiral 
Lestock s Instructions, Aug. 26, 1746, Hardwickc Papers, Miscellaney 
Mss., 75, 6, New York Public Library. 

The degree of despatch employed by Newcastle is illustrated by the 
fact that not only had Admirals Anson and Warren, who were referred 
to in the beginning of the letter as preparing for sea, met a French 
fleet and captured six men-of-war and some armed Indiamen in part 
destined for America before its close, but the duke was able to enclose 
an account of the engagement printed by authority. This victory, 
however, made a further attempt by the French to send an armament 
to America that year improbable. A few transports escaped, but New 
castle believed that they had few or no troops, and were accompanied 
by no ships of force. For an account of this engagement, cf. Anson to 
Stone, May 28, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 124; Boston Weekly Post Boy, Aug. 
3, 1747- 

For this belated conclusion of an unattempted enterprise, cf. New 
castle to Shirley, May 30, 1747, C. O. 5 45, 247 (extract, Sh. Cor., vol. 
i, pp. 386-389) ; Newcastle to Knowles, C. 0. 5 45, 258. 



336 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

quest should for the present be attempted, more than a year 
after giving orders that it should forthwith be undertaken. 1 

Meanwhile Shirley and Warren were left for several 
months after it was apparent that no expedition could 
proceed in the year 1746 with no explanation of the situa 
tion and with no instructions for their conduct. When 
Warren returned to England, presumably to use his personal 
influence to secure adequate provision for the conquest 
during the succeeding season, Shirley was left the sole 
trustee in America, of the crown s discretion regarding such 
an expedition. He was then allowed to remain uninformed 
for many months longer before the truth, which he could 
not fail to suspect, was verified, on Aug. 14, 174?, by a 
letter from the ministry. 2 And while awaiting this notifi 
cation the troops were neither in service nor out of it, but 
a great burden upon the colonies, and the lack of action was 
a source of irritation to the people. 

At the time that Kilby was sending what proved unre 
liable news to America the plot was thickening there. This 
was apparent when news reached Shirley at or just after the 
time of his struggle to secure the embarkation of the ex 
pedition, that some French men-of-war had entered the St. 
Lawrence, and that several of their transports were ex 
pecting to rendezvous in Bay Verte in Nova Scotia, thereby 
menacing Annapolis and the rest of the peninsula. He f ore;- 
saw that the occupation of Nova Scotia would enable the 
French to bring against Louisburg a force twice as large 
as that which took it from them. He had also heard that 
some French vessels had entered " Jebucto" 1 harbor to aid 
the French inhabitants to erect fortifications there. These 
developments led him to urge Admiral Townshend in com- 

1 Cf. supra, pp. 321-322. 

2 Shirley to Clinton, Aug. 15, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 393. 

8 More often spelled Chebucto. It is the site of the present Halifax. 



MEASURES FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA 337 

mand of the fleet at Louisburg to take steps to prevent the 
French from getting a footing at Chebucto, Bay Verte, or 
any neighboring harbors, to suppress the French inhabitants 
in Nova Scotia, and to protect Annapolis. 1 

With this compulsory change in the character of the 
campaign, the attempt upon Canada was abandoned in 
America, unless the home government should revive it. 

Shirley to Townshend, Aug. 14, 1746, C. O. 5 753. 



CHAPTER XVI 
THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 

SHIRLEY now seemed securely hobbled between the pro 
ceedings of the ministry and those of the general court. 
Possibly that condition was not unwelcome to most of the 
ministry, for his exploit at Louisburg had been more ap 
plauded than rewarded. Moreover, Bedford, who obviously 
had much influence in war policies, had shown clearly that 
the demonstration of independent power given by New 
England on that occasion was regarded with jealous distrust 
by him. Possibly, underneath the unconscionable indeci 
sion which the ministry were apparently displaying, Bed 
ford and perhaps others were not unwilling that matters 
should be so shaped in America that the aggressive Shirley 
should not be able .to play too fully the part of a Caesar in 
the Canadian Gaul. 

It is possible that the provision of the plan of campaign 
suggested by Bedford, that the American levies should be 
raised without quota, 1 whereby it was made as certain as any 
merely administrative device could well make it that the 
troops raised from the colonies should by themselves be in 
adequate for the task of duplicating in Canada the coup at 
Louisburg, was not based upon stupidity but upon shrewd 
foresight. There were, indeed, embarrassments connected 
with the Brest squadron and otherwise which may explain to 
an extent the delays in England. These difficulties, however, 
do not throw any appreciable light upon the behavior of the 

1 Cf. supra, p. 317- 
338 r 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 339 

English government toward the American project. They 
directed the assembling of a large army in America, post 
poned for a year the plan in which that force was to play 
a part, and meanwhile left the men responsible for prepara 
tions in America for months without an inkling as to 
whether the plans had been changed or abandoned. 

It is not to be supposed that there was real suspicion O f 
Shirley s loyalty to the home government, but there was un 
doubted distrust of the means which he was employing in its 
service. 

While busy with the difficulties about him Shirley, who 
had evidently become convinced that another campaign 
would be needed to win Canada, drafted both a report upon 
the present operations and a suggestion of future lines of 
procedure. He stressed particularly the fixing of suitable 
quotas for the different colonies, and especially for those 
south of New England, since they had notoriously shirked 
in the campaigns of the last two years. 

He reported further that Warren and himself agreed that 
the conquest of Canada could not be successfully accom 
plished with less than 20,000 men, 18,500 of whom should 
go: by sea to the St. Lawrence, where 10,000 should besiege 
Quebec, 8,000 go on to take Montreal and 500 in small 
vessels hold the river between those places open to the Eng 
lish and closed to the French. To insure success the follow 
ing year, if the expedition devised for this year did not 
proceed, he suggested that directions be sent to all the 
governments to have assigned quotas filled, by impressment 
if necessary, and to transport the men to< Louisburg by a 
fixed date early in the spring, to join a fleet and regular 
troops in an attack upon Quebec. 1 

Shortly after this Shirley was moved to write to New- 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 22, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 126. 



340 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



castle again by a report that Admiral Knowles, governor at 
Louisburg, had advised the home government to demolish 
the fortifications there, to fill up the harbor, and to abandon 
the island, and that he was expecting orders to do so. This 
led Shirley to observe that there was another very good 
harbor at St. Ann s on the east side of the island, which 
might be fortified by the French with the same strength and 
ease as Louisburg had been. At the same time he pointed 
out that Crown Point was clearly within the limits of the 
English colonies. This stronghold commanded the approach 
to Montreal by way of Lake Champlain and the Indians 
were issuing thence and harassing the frontiers of New 
England and New York. He therefore suggested, in case 
it should not be captured before the war ended, that it 
might be stipulated in the treaty of peace that it be turned 
over to the English. He further urged that the English 
insist that their limits extend as far north as 48 north lati 
tude, according to the limits of the grant by King James to 
the Council of Plymouth. 1 

The irresolution of the English policy in America was so 
patent that it could not escape the notice of the French and 
Indians upon the frontiers, and this, combined with the 
news of large preparations in France, naturally stimulated 
aggression. Even as Shirley and Warren, in search of 
expert advice, consulted Stoddard, 2 his frontier was the 
scene of the heaviest attack which had come upon it during 
the war. Earlier raids upon the frontier facing Crown 
Point and Canada were now followed by an attack in con- 
Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 24, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 330-341. It 
appears by Harrington to Trevor, June 20, 1746, that England had been 
negotiating for the return of Cape Breton to France for several months 
before Shirley wrote. Hardwicke Papers, Misccllaney Mss., 77 13, New 
York Public Library. 

2 Warren and Shirley to Wentworth, Aug. 25, 1746, 6 Mass. H. S. 
Colls., vol. x, p. 482, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 345. 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 



341 



siderable force directed at the chief Massachusetts fortress 
protecting the Housatonic and Connecticut valleys, The 
garrison at Fort Massachusetts, in the present town of 
Adams held out gallantly against 500 French 1 but were 
forced to surrender when their ammunition was exhausted. 2 
This disaster emphasized the nature of the issue which 
Shirley had already recognized as something different from 
the conquest of Canada. Canada, thanks to the watchful 
waiting of the English ministry, was beginning to- con 
quer Massachusetts. Hence, a few days later, Shirley cut 
the Gordian knot in a message to the legislature. He an 
nounced that as there was no 1 news of the sailing of the 
British troops it was probable that they had not sailed by 
the middle of June. He added that Admiral Warren and 
himself were informed by persons acquainted with the St. 
Lawrence 3 that it was too late in the season to attack Quebec 
with reasonable hope of success. As the American forces 
were raised, were in the king s pay and almost ready for action, 
he believed it within the instructions and the general plan of 
operations for General St. Clair, Admiral Warren and him 
self to direct an attack upon Crown Point, the key to Canada 
on the land side. 4 He added that, barring sudden instruc 
tions to the contrary, Admiral Warren and himself, in the 
absence of St. Clair, had decided on this plan. 5 This at- 



s to Stoddard, Nov. 24, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 90. 
2 August 20, 1746. Daniel Warren to the General Court, Nov. 4, 1747, 
Ar., vol. Ixxiii, fol. 4. 

2 Colonel Stoddard of Massachusetts and Colonel Atkinson of New 
Hampshire. Cf. supra, p. 340, note 2. 

4 Shirley had suggested this plan to Warren. Shirley to Newcastle, 
Aug. 22, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 26. 

5 The carrying out of this plan was made simpler from the adminis 
trative point of view when Lt.-Gov. Gooch sent word early in August 
that his health prevented him from taking command of the troops from 



342 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

tempt if successful, would be a great protection to the 
western frontiers against the Indians. It would also pre 
vent the disaster of a defection of the Six Nations, and put 
them into active service. 1 Shirley also expressed the hope 
that the success of this expedition would facilitate the con 
quest of Canada during the following year." 

The immediate result of this message was feverish activ 
ity by the house to prevent any unnecessary expense through 
the clearly defunct expedition against Canada. 3 Shirley 
and Warren had already appealed to New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island and Connecticut for their cooperation in the 
expedition thus announced. 4 Shirley also requested Clinton 
to get artillery in readiness for use against Crown Point, 
and proposed to send ordnance stores from Massachusetts. 5 

In a few days Shirley returned to the subject and an 
nounced that commissioners sent by Massachusetts to Al 
bany 6 had succeeded, jointly with New York, in making a 

the more isouthern colonies. Thereupon, Brig.-Gen. Waldo of Massa 
chusetts, a hearty supporter of Shirley s policies, was named by the 
latter and Warren to succeed him. Warren and Shirley to Newcastle, 
Oct. 16, 1746, C. O. 5 901. 

l Jour., Aug. 27, 1746, p. 116. 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 22, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 26. 

*Jour., Aug. 28, 1746, p. 117; Aug. 29, 1746, p. 119. 

4 War.ren and Shirley to Wentworth, Aug. 25, 1746, 6 Mass. H. S. 
Colls., vol. x, pp. 482-485, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 342-345; Warren and 
Shirley to Greene, Aug. 25, 1746, Cor. Col. Govs. of R. I., vol. ii, pp. 3-8; 
Whipple to .Shirley and Warren, Aug. 29, 1746, ibid., pp. 8-9 ; Warren 
and Shirley to Law, Aug. 25, 1746, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xiii, pp. 288- 
292; Law to Shirley and Warren, Sept 2, 1746, ibid., pp. 292-294. 

Warren and Shirley to Wentworth, Aug. 25, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
P- 345- 

Shirley found difficulty in securing action by the general court ap 
proving the sending of these commissioners to Albany with suitable 
presents to the Indians and full authority to act. No other colony 
provided similar presents except Virginia, which voted 400 sterling for 
that purpose. Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 22, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 26. 



THE CHANGE OF TM.E TIDE IN AMERICA 343 

treaty with the Six Nations, by which the latter were to co 
operate against Crown Point. 1 He therefore asked prompt 
provision for the campaign against that place. To give 
point to his appeal, he declared that the presence of the 
French there caused the bad conditions upon the western 
frontiers exemplified by the disaster at Fort Massachusetts, 
and the plundering at Northampton, of which he had re 
ceived information by letter the night before. 2 

Thereupon the legislature provided for transporting 2,000 
men to the Hudson river. 3 By a later vote, however, the 
provision was to be for 1,500 men only. 4 

A complication appeared when Shirley proposed that in 
view of the preparations being made by ithe French, seem 
ingly against Annapolis or Louisburg, men raised for the 
Canada expedition who were not fitted for long marches in 
the woods should be detached for service in the defense of 
these places. They were to be joined with others whom he 
hoped to secure from New Hampshire and Connecticut. 
He also hoped to secure a naval force, in part from Admiral 
Townshend, to accompany them in an attack upon the 
French in Nova Scotia before the latter became too strong. 5 

The legislature, however, failed to respond, and Shirley 
brought the subject up again a few days later with solemn 
emphasis. He explained that the crisis in Nova Scotia 

1 Wraxall, op. cit., pp. 247-248. 

* Jour., Sept. 3, 1746, pp. 122-123. 

9 Ibid., p. 124. 

Ibid., Sept. 12, 1746, p. 138. 

6 Mascarene had lately written that he had only about 220 effectives 
in his garrison and that many of the recent recruits from England were 
of little value. As his barracks would hardly hold more, his plan was 
to use troops in the field, thus avoiding the crowding of quarters. 
Mascarene to Shirley, Aug. 20, 1746, 6 Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. x, pp. 
479-482 (extracts, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 337-339). For Shirley s proposals 
to the legislature, cf. Jour., Sept. 5, 1746, pp. 127-128. 



344 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



was not known when the enterprise against Crown Point 
was proposed. He had now learned that thirty French 
officers, including the Chevalier de Ramsay, an officer of 
distinction from Canada, were in the district of Menis, and 
that several French transports had gone to Bay Verte, while 
two large French ships were at Chebucto. The evidence 
altogether was conclusive that an attack on Annapolis was 
in preparation. 1 He believed the French forces could be 
dispersed without difficulty, but that if left undisturbed 
they would win over the French inhabitants and make 
a formidable attack upon the garrison with the support of 
artillery, besides creating fortified positions by which to 
hold the rest of the country. He sketched the disastrous 
results to the English from such neglect in connection with 
Maine, New Hampshire, the mast country, the fishery, and 
the attitude of the Indians. He even prophesied, in case 
Nova Scotia were lost and New England could not regain 
iit, that the crown might be forced, if possible, to exchange 
Cape Breton for it, to again secure a barrier for New Eng 
land against the French. As to the Crown Point expedi 
tion, he hoped there would be forces enough to carry on 
both that and one against the French in Nova Scotia. 2 

The reply of the general court voiced profound discour 
agement. They had gone as far in taxing the financial and 
fighting strength of the province as the people could bear; 
they were now scarcely able to resist the attacks of the 
French and Indian enemy. However, if Shirley wished to 
employ part of the forces raised for the Canada expedition 
in Nova Scotia the legislature did not object, provided that 

x That Shirley s deduction of the nature of the plans of the French was 
probably correct appears by Vice-Admiral Anson to Stone, May 28, 1747, 
C. O. 5 901, 124. The reference is to the campaign of the following 
year, but it is probable that operations were planned on the same lines 
in 1746. 

*Jour., Sept. 9, 1746, pp. 131-134, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 346-349- 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 



345 



1,500 men were sent against Crown Point, that none of 
those going to Nova Scotia be kept there after the campaign 
had closed, and that the expenses of the expedition should 
not fall upon the province. 1 

Meanwhile Shirley wrote a letter to Mascarene for the 
purpose of having it published among the people of Nova 
Scotia, to assure them that he knew nothing of a rumored 
plan of the English government to deport them generally 
from their homes. He added that he would properly rep 
resent their case to the king to secure his favor and protec 
tion for those who* were loyal and peaceable. He stated, 
however, that if disloyal they must expect the same treat 
ment that would be accorded other English subjects under 
the same circumstances. 2 By this means he reduced the 
probability of revolt on the part of the French inhabitants, 
and therefore the need for English troops. 

Just at this juncture, when the absence of English forces 
seemed to be reducing Shirley almost to his role of 1744 as 
the guardian of Nova Scotia, a new factor suddenly dis 
turbed all calculations. The campaign which was expected 
to develop a supposedly triumphal thrust by England at the 
vitals of Canada now disclosed a French Juggernaut ready 
to ride ruthlessly over the English colonies. Shirley had 
foreseen, what the English ministry apparently refused to 
credit, that France would not accept the loss of Louisburg 
without an earnest effort to retrieve herself. To be sure, the 
home government learned that a French fleet from Brest and 
elsewhere had put to sea about June 2oth. 3 Admiral Les- 

l four., Sept. 10, 1746, p. 135, Sh. Cor,, vol. i, p. 350. 

2 Shirley to Mascarene, Sept. 16, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 354-355. 

Townshend and Knowles to Shirley and Warren, Sept. u, 1746, 
Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xiii, pp. 301-302; Deposition of Lawrence Payne, 
Sept. 19, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 48. Payne, who had been a prisoner at 
Hispaniola, had heard the news of their approach there. 



346 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

tock was expected to pursue it with an English squadron 
but was diverted from that task to join with St. Clair in 
an expedition to the French coast, where they were to create 
a diversion in favor of the forces in Flanders. 1 

It cannot be supposed that Shirley counted implicitly upon 
a serious effort from home for the conquest of Canada, 
either before or after the English government directed that 
it should be undertaken. His original plan was devised with 
the intention of making dependence upon such assistance 
largely unnecessary. What might have been accomplished 
under such a plan, had it been accepted without qualification 
at home and adequate quotas assigned to the different 
colonies, cannot be stated. However, it is not possible to 
doubt that the English colonies would in that case have been 
in a better position to meet the crisis now approaching than 
that in which they were after the mischievous alteration, if 
not deliberate obstruction, by the English government. 

In view of what must have been Shirley s mental reserva 
tions regarding the action at home it seems probable that 
his zeal in continuing enlistments after the probability of 
an effective expedition was past, his urgency that the troops 
be transported to Louisburg, and then that transports be 
fitted out for use when required, the proposed expeditions 
against Crown Point and against the French in Nova Scotia, 
all had in view the stimulating of the colonists to raise, 
equip and maintain in the field as adequate a force as pos 
sible, and in as favorable a situation as possible, either for 
an expedition against Canada, or to meet the French on 
slaught which he foresaw in case the English allowed the 
initiative to pass to their opponents. 

It was now about to< be demonstrated that such prepara 
tions were those which the French plans would suggest. 

Admiral Lestock s Instructions and Journal, Hardwicke Papers, 
Miscellaney Mss., 75 6, 7, New York Public Library. 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 347 

The French fleet had a long passage but approached the 
coasts south of the Gulf of St. Lawrence about September 
ist. The English at Louisburg seem to have received, on 
.September 8th, the earliest news reaching any place of im 
portance, of the presence of a large French squadron in 
their vicinity. 1 Their information indicated a very large 
armament under the Due D Anville, including eighteen war 
ships and numerous transports, in the total nearly seventy 
vessels. It was reported also that there were 8,000 troops 
aboard. 2 It appeared that the immediate danger was some 
what lessened by the fact that there had been much sickness 
and a large number of deaths in the long passage. The 
fleet, also, had been scattered by a storm just before reach 
ing the coast, whereby one small vessel had been wrecked 
on the Isle of Sable. Thus far, no indication of the destina 
tion of the expedition as a whole was available, and Town- 
shend sent a ship along the shore of Nova Scotia to seek 
in its harbors further information. He likewise hastened 
to strengthen the defenses of Louisburg and to notify Shir 
ley that if the attack were against Massachusetts he would 
send all the aid he could spare. 3 

1 One French vessel was taken on August 25th while trying to enter the 
St. Lawrence; another bound thither was wrecked on the Isle of Sable, 
September 3d. A Marblehead fishing boat saw three large warships in 
adjacent waters on September 7th. Townshend and Knowles to Shirley 
and Warren, Sept. n, 1746, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xiii, pp. 301-302. 

2 Another report which reached New York a few days later credited 
D Anville with having 26 warships and 40 transports carrying 15,000 
troops, and with bringing with him siege equipment and all the French 
prisoners sent to France after the surrender of Louisburg. Later re 
ports by prisoners held by the forces under D Anville put the number 
of his ships higher, one witness saying there were 97 at the start, in 
cluding 30 men-of-war. The same person estimated the troops at 
7,000 or 8,000. Declaration of Sanders, Oct. 22, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 66; 
Deposition of Rene Het, Sept. 15, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 46. 

3 Townshend and Knowles to Shirley and Warren, Sept. n, 1746, 
Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xiii, pp. 301-302. 



348 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Meanwhile the news was brought to Boston by fishermen 
who had seen the fleet September 9th and loth, about ten 
leagues west of Chebucto, the present Halifax. At this 
time Shirley thought the squadron might be a part of the 
Brest fleet intended to attack Nova Scotia, and perhaps 
Louisburg, and afterward defend Canada. Thereupon he 
suggested to Newcastle, in case the French made an imme 
diate and successful attack upon Nova Scotia, and St.Clair 
arrived in time with a fleet, that his troops be used at once to 
recover it. At the same time Shirley was sending to 
Chebucto a man who had undertaken to enter the mouth of 
the harbor in a whale boat for the purpose of securing for 
Townshend at Louisburg news of the strength of the French 
fleet. 1 

Just at this time when dangers seemed to be thickening 
about him and plans brilliant in conception were falling 
about his ears like a house of cards through the maladroit ex 
ecution of the home government, Mrs. Shirley, his compan 
ion and helpmeet, died. In the preceding year, while his 
great coup at Louisburg was in preparation, his beloved 
daughter Frances had been snatched from him, 2 while now 
the mother, whose aid and encouragement had contributed 
much to his success, was likewise taken away. 3 

But the urgency of the crisis allowed no leisure for the 
indulgence of his grief. News received at New York indi 
cated that a French fleet in the West Indies had received 
orders to proceed upon a secret mission. The action of the 
commander in securing pilots for the North American coast, 
implied a purpose to join D Anville s squadron. The same 
informant had been assured that the huge armament was 
directed against Newfoundland and Cape Breton. 4 On 

Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 19, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 33. 

2 Shirley to Pepperrell, Feb. 18, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 185-186. 

On Aug. 31, 1746. 

4 Deposition of Rene Het, Sept. 15, 1/46, C. O. 5 901, 46. 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 349 

September I9th there arrived in Newport, R. L, a prisoner 
of war (from San Domingo) who testified that four French 
men-of-war, which had come there from France, had gone 
north to join the Brest fleet shortly before he sailed for New 
England. This fleet itself, he declared, had as its primary 
object the capture and maintenance of Cape Breton, and if 
too late to succeed there, it proposed to attack Boston. 1 

This was uncomfortably interesting news and, taken in 
connection with other reports from New York and elsewhere 
of the magnitude of the fleet, 2 looked quite as though a 
descent upon the New England coast was intended. This 
impression was strengthened by a deposition affirming that 
four French ships near the Nova Scotia shore w r ere sailing 
southward, declaring that they were bound to Annapolis, 
but inquiring the location of Cape Sable and Cape Cod. 3 

Steps had been taken immediately upon receiving news 
that the squadron was upon the Cape Sable shore for send 
ing 300 men to reinforce Annapolis. 4 These plans were 
not abandoned, and New Hampshire was urged to send 200 
more men. 5 In making these dispositions Shirley was acting 
upon the strength of the assurances, contained in " British 
prints" which had reached him, that St. Clair with a squad 
ron and British troops would shortly arrive at Louisburg. 6 

1 Deposition of L. Payne, Sept. 19, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 48. 

- The report was that thirty sail had been seen about fifteen leagues 
west of Chebucto harbor on the Cape Sable shore, about 150 leagues 
from Boston, sixty from Louisburg, and eighty from Annapolis. Shirley 
to Newcastle, Sept. 19, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 33. Cf. also, Shirley to New 
castle, Sept. 29, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 39. For further data regarding the 
size of the fleet, cf. Admiral Lestock s Journal, he. cit. 

3 Deposition of Ingersoll and Lufkin, Sept. 22, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 47. 

4 Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 19, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 33. 

5 Warren and Shirley to Wentworth, Sept. 23, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
P- 357- 

6 Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 29, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 39. 



350 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

For the defense of the New England coast, however,. 
Shirley, although convinced of the improbability of in 
vasion, 1 had already made prodigious efforts to prevent a 
successful surprise. 2 He wrote to Governor Thomas of 
Pennsylvania urging the preparation of as large a land 
and sea force as possible to be ready to sail to Rhode Island 
" upon the first advice of the approach of the enemy." 
Similar appeals were made to the other colonies between 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, 4 but he received little or 
no aid from them. 5 

The general court was not in session, and Shirley, before 
he was able to consult them, exercised his full authority as 
commander-in-chief under his commission. Thereby he 
trenched upon functions which in ordinary times would have 
been accorded to that august body. He issued orders for 
completing the works at Castle William and Governor s 
Island and for supplying them with needed cannon and good 
garrisons. He also ordered the mobilization of the militia, 
with the exception of those serving upon the frontiers, to 
proceed at once to the defense of Boston. As a further 
security he took steps for protecting the ship channel, while 
the town built batteries for its own defense. 6 The regiment 



Shirley to Wentworth, Sept. 20, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 355. 

3 Mm. Pr. Cl. Pa., vol. v, p. 55. 

4 Jour., Sept. 30, 1746, pp. I43-M5. 

5 Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 11, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 87. 

6 Jour., Sept. 30, 1746, pp. 143-145. The defenses of the town against 
a fleet were elaborate, including not only hulks to be sunk in the 
channel, but a cable boom across it and a squadron of armed ships 
behind these obstructions, while the enemy in attempting to force an 
entrance would be under the direct fire of the Castle. Shirley realized 
that Boston might be battered into ruins and laid under contribution if 
the fleet once passed the defenses, but believed troops could not be 
landed, as he would have 15,000 good men within twenty- four hours 
march of Boston to oppose them. Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 29, 1746, 
C. 0. 5 901, 39- 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 351; 

commanded by Colonel Plaisted of Salem was called out 
for the defense of that town and the neighboring shores of 
Essex county. 1 

As the enemy did not immediately appear, he sent half of 
the militia home to help get in the harvest with orders to be 
ready to march upon an alarm, and upon request of the 
legislature agreed on October ist to send home those living 
in and near Boston upon the same conditions. 2 

By way of adjustment Shirley brought into play the troops 
in the king s pay, ordering 500 of them under Brig. -Gen. 
Dwight to the western frontiers, and the rest to do garrison 
duty at Castle William and Governor s Island, thus reliev 
ing the militia who had been stationed there. 3 

Meanwhile the behaviour of the French fleet, in remain 
ing for about twenty days in nearly the same position off the 
Nova Scotia coast and not far from the point w r here an 
English fleet would be likely to- approach land, led to the 
belief that they might be lying in wait for the fleet expected 
under Lestock. Hence Warren and Shirley sent four ves 
sels to attempt to deliver despatches to Lestock at sea, ap 
prising him of the situation. 4 

While seeking to guide the English admiral safely to the 
shores of America and while apparently absorbed in the de 
fense of Boston, Shirley was also writing to Newcastle to 
stress the supreme importance of Nova Scotia to England. 
He declared that province more essential to the empire than 
Cape Breton, for upon its fall the French might be en 
couraged to undertake the conquest of the continent, even 

1 Plaisted to Jenks, Sept. 22, 1746, N. E. His. and Gen. Reg., vol. ix, 
p. 204. 

*Jour., Sept. 30, 1746, p. 145; Oct. I, 1746, p. 146. 

9 Ibid. 

4 Warren and Shirley to Lestock, Sept. 27, 1746, Cor. Col. Govs. of R. L, 
vol. ii, pp. 16-19, Conn. H. S. Colls., vol. xiii, pp. 320-322; Sept. 29, 1746, 
ibid., p. 324; Shirley to Wentworth, Sept. 29, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 358. 



352 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



though the war might thereby be protracted for several years 
at great cost to France. 

England, however, could reduce Canada to> a feeble state 
by closing the mouth of the St. Lawrence (by which it re 
ceived its sustenance). So long as the English held Nova 
Scotia, provided Cape Breton could be kept from the 
French, the latter was of little importance to Great Britain. 
Nevertheless, as the French had fortified it in violation of 
a solemn agreement, when yielded to them in exchange for 
Placentia in Newfoundland, it seemed inadequate to merely 
destroy the fortifications there or to pledge the French not 
to rebuild them. 1 

Upon the whole he thought that whenever the interest of 
the empire made it appear advisable to give up Cape Breton, 
say at the winding up of the war, it would not be difficult 
for England to retake it at will. This conclusion, however, 
was subject to the provisos that the English keep Nova 
Scotia, that the inhabitants there be put on the footing of 
loyal subjects, and especially that the present Halifax be 
fortified and a settlement made there instead of at Canso. 

On the other hand, the combined control of Nova Scotia, 
Cape Breton and Canada by the French would be fatal to 
the English colonies. Further, it was advisable to secure 
Crown Point in the treaty of peace. 

As to the reduction of Canada, if undertaken the next 
year, he thought the regular troops should number at least 
8,000 and the colonials 20,000. He observed that the will 
ingness of the French to risk the destruction of most of 
their ships of the line while upon the present expedition 
seemed to be a measure of the value put by them upon their 

1 Newfoundland was ceded to England and the French claim to Cape 
Breton was recognized by the treaty of Utrecht, but that pact, ap 
parently contrary to Shirley s impression, allowed France to fortify 
it. Cf. H. of C. four., vol. xvii, p. 329. 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 353 

interests in North America, and particularly upon the re 
duction of Nova Scotia. 1 

As the popular apprehension of an attack upon Massa 
chusetts gradually waned with the inaction of the French 
fleet, 2 Shirley took further steps to relieve what seemed the 
desperate plight of Nova Scotia. 3 He allotted for the de 
fense of it 600 men from those raised for the Canada ex 
pedition, secured 300 more from Governor Wentworth of 
New Hampshire, and in company with Warren appealed to 
Governor Greene of Rhode Island to send the same number 
from his province.* 

While these measures were still in progress Shirley in 
conjunction with Warren sent home a fully developed plan 
for a campaign against Canada during the following year. 
The inaction of the home government had allowed the 
golden hour in which Canada was probably within easy 
grasp to elapse. France was now upon her guard and it must 
therefore, it seemed, be a sterner task, especially if Nova 
Scotia were lost. 

Hence, the estimates of forces needed now included 
eighteen ships of the line, frigates, sloops, fire ships, bomb 
ketches and tenders. Of these it was proposed that twelve 

1 For this calm though urgent discussion of the situation as it appeared 
in the presence of D Anville s armament, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 
29, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 39. 

The threat from D Anville s expedition made a tremendous impres 
sion upon the public mind at the time. This was testified to by an eye 
witness who declared : " I remember the spirit here when the Duke 
D Anville s squadron was upon this coast, when 40,000 men marched down 
to Boston, and were mustered and numbered upon the Common, com 
plete in arms, from this province only, in three weeks ..." Extract 
of a letter from a gentleman in London, Jan. 21, 1775, Force, American 
Archives, 4th ser., vol. i, col. 1168. 

3 Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 29, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 39. 

4 Shirley and Warren to Greene, Oct. 14, 1746, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. 
v, p. 192. 



354 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



ships of the line with frigates, sloops, fire ships and trans 
ports should go up to Quebec, while the remaining six ships 
of the line with two or three sloops and frigates should re 
main to watch Louisburg and the mouth of the St. Lawrence, 
and to furnish news of any enemy movements. There 
should be at least 8,000 regulars from England, with a large 
train of artillery and siege materials, and the force should 
be provisioned for twelve months while a supply for four 
months more should be stored at Louisburg. In case 
Canada were not reduced in one summer campaign he pro 
posed that wooden barracks be erected for the troops from 
materials which should be provided. 

It was suggested that the colonies should raise 22,000 
troops, to be apportioned according to population, the quotas 
to be filled by drafts from the militia by the governors 
if necessary, unless prevented by charter privileges. In such 
cases the governors were to be directed to urge most pres- 
singly necessary action by the legislatures to provide for the 
raising of the quotas allotted. 

Twelve thousand colonials were to proceed with the fleet 
to Quebec and the remainder by land against Montreal. 
The colonials should serve under American officers from 
generals down, whether proceeding by sea or land. At the 
end of the campaign arms and equipment supplied the 
Americans should be stored for future service in the differ 
ent colonies in proportion to the number of men furnished 
by each, and the arms captured from the enemy should be 
divided among the troops. 

It was moreover proposed that the Americans upon reach 
ing the enemy s country be clothed in British uniforms to 
make them appear like regulars, which they would soon 
become. Aside from the marines, three-fourths of the sea 
men should also be armed with muskets, cutlasses and pistols, 
and the whole ships crews should be trained to the use of 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 



355 



small arms and grenades. The Americans should also be 
kept from contact with the regulars as much as possible. 

Equal and joint command of the expedition by com 
manders of the land and sea forces was recommended. As 
a special contribution to the expedition, New England was 
to furnish 6,000 pairs of snowshoes, as many moccasins, and 
5,000 hatchets. It was thought armed vessels from the 
colonies would be useful, as also light armament upon fifty 
or sixty sloops and schooners among the American trans 
ports would be necessary to fit them for river service on 
both sides of Quebec. 

The expedition was to rendezvous at Louisburg or 
Spanish river by May loth, to proceed to the St. Lawrence 
by May 25th, where they were to assemble at Tadousac. 

To avoid delay in securing funds from legislatures to 
meet any expenses which it should be decided to have paid 
by the colonies the project proposed that the generals-in-chief 
and the governors be allowed to draw bills on the treasury 
at home for necessary sums. In such cases nojtice was to- 
be given to the colonial governments that after the expedi 
tion was over each of them would be expected to bear a! 
reasonable share of the expense. 1 

J The following table shows the quotas and service proposed for the 
different colonies. 

COLONIES MEN FOR THE EXPEDITION 

To Go By Sea To Go By Land Total 

New Hampshire 500 500 1,000 

Massachusetts 2,000 2,000 4,000 

Rhode Island 1,000 1,000 

Connecticut 1,000 1,500 2,500 

New York 1,000 2,000 3,000 

New Jersey 500 1,000 1,500 

Pennsylvania 2,000 3,000 5,ooo 

Maryland 1,500 1,500 

Virginia 2,500 2,500 

For the above plan for the 1747 campaign, cf. Warren and Shirley te- 
Newcastle, Oct. 12, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 51. 



356 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

The best conjecture as to the authorship of the scheme 
just given seems to be that Warren was largely responsible 
for that part relating to the fleet and that Shirley similarly 
suggested most of the features dealing with land operations. 

On the day following the date of this plan, Shirley wrote 
the duke personally upon conditions. After expressing the 
opinion that the French would not remain at Chebucto long 
in view of bad conditions in the fleet he urged that the Eng 
lish government should not rebuild Annapolis nor strongly 
fortify Canso, but should develop at Chebucto a fortress 
and port which, with its fine harbor, would be worth ten 
times as much to the province as Annapolis, " and particul 
arly remove the great dread of the ifl consequences of Cape 
Breton s returning into the hands of the French, if the ex 
igency of affairs in Europe should inevitably require that, 
more than anything else that can be thought of, except the 
reduction of Canada." x 

A few days earlier the situation regarding D Anville s 
fleet was brought to a crisis. The news now available led 
Shirley to doubt the intent of the Frenchman to do< more 
than make a show of force against Annapolis, 2 before leav 
ing the region. Nevertheless, near the middle of October, 
the sending of further forces to Annapolis (then standing 
a siege from Canadians and Indians) was temporarily in 
terrupted by the declaration of a prisoner released from. 
Chebucto, representing conditions much more favorably for 
the French than the facts warranted. 3 The caution prac- 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 13, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 57- 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 23, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 64; Foster s declara 
tion, Oct. 24, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 69; Shirley to Wentworth, Oct. 25, 1746, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 362-363. 

Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 23, 1746, C. 0. 5 9Oi> 64; Shirley and 
Warren to Greene, Oct. 23, 1746, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 195; Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, p. 360; Mascarene to Shirley and Warren, Oct. 26, 1746, C. 0. 
.5 90i, 72. 



THE CHANGE OF THE TIDE IN AMERICA 



357 



ticed was no doubt greater after a list of the fleet found upon 
a French prisoner at New York showed how huge the 
armament had been upon its leaving France. 1 

A few hours later, however, fuller news revealed that the 
grand fleet, so imposing in appearance was but a weakling 
in reality, wholly unable to meet an opponent of considerable 
strength. It was then discovered that the sickness on board 
the fleet had left them almost wholly helpless.. Before most 
of the fleet reached Chebucto the commander, D Anville, 
died, perhaps of grief, though it was suspected that he had 
taken poison. So much dissension followed that the second 
in command fell upon his sword and apparently committed 
suicide, w r hereupon he was succeeded by M. La Jonquiere. 

Ill fortune did not cease to follow the squadron, for 
while on the way to Annapolis it picked up one of the ves 
sels sent out by Shirley to warn Admiral Lestock of the pres 
ence of the French fleet and learned from sailors aboard 
it that Lestock was hourly expected. The French then at 
once abandoned all thought of an attempt on Annapolis, 
turned southward, and separated the forty-one vessels of 
which the fleet now consisted into two< squadrons. One 
of these proceeded to France and the other to the West 
Indies. Almost immediately after this change of course 
they encountered a severe storm from which they suffered 
severely in their weakened condition. 2 Being unable to man 
all their vessels they burnt several, including a fifty-gun 
ship, before their departure. 3 The forces before Annapolis 

lieutenant-governor and Council of New York to Shirley, Oct. I, 
1746, enclosed in Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 13, 1746, C. 0. 5 901, 57. 

8 For the conditions in the French fleet, cf. Memorandum of Stephen 
Brown, Oct. 24, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 65; Deposition of Seally and Furness, 
Dec. 31, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 373-375; Statement of Harmon and 
Deas, Oct. 24, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 67; iShirley to Newcastle, Oct. 23, 1746, 
C. O. 5 901, 64. 

9 Ibid. 



358 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

now promptly broke up and raised the siege, leaving Shirley 
once more the savior of Nova Scotia. 1 

Thus the great thrust by France in America in 1746 came 
to an end, leaving both Nova Scotia and Louisburg to the 
English and the situation substantially unchanged. That 
this was true, however, was the equivalent of a victory for 
the English, since the latter kept both their conquest at 
Louisburg and their allies, the Iroquois. The loyalty of 
the latter was maintained somewhat dubiously 2 during the 
following winter, 3 and they were still ready for the war 
path against the French the next spring. 4 



to Shirley and Warren, Oct. 27, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 75 ; Mascarene 
to Shirley, Oct. 27, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 76; Gorham to Shirley, Oct. 27, 

1746, C. O. 5 901, 74- 

Shirley s repeated urging of an attack upon Crown Point was chiefly 
to prevent the defection of the Six Nations, which he foresaw in case 
nothing were done by the English after announcing a campaign against 
Canada. Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 11, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 87. 

Lydius to Stoddard, Nov. 24, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 90; Johnson to Lydius, 
Jan. 26, 1747, R, I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 210; Shirley to Greene, Feb. 7, 

1747, ibid., p. 209, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 378-379. 

*Shirley to Wanton, May 18, 1747, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, pp. 216-217, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 384-386. 



CHAPTER XVII 
FIGHTING FOR THE Status Quo 

AFTER the fiasco of D Anville s expedition, Shirley re 
ported to the admiralty that since many French ships had 
reached Canada in 1746 with stores, etc., and perhaps troops, 
it would require a stronger force the following year to sub 
due it. 1 Evidence of increased vigor in Canada appeared 
at Thanksgiving time when it was learned that 1,200 French 
were being sent thence to Nova Scotia to conduct a spring 
campaign with the aid of the Indians and of forces ex 
pected from France. 2 

Shirley at that time had been busy for nearly a month in 
preparing an expedition intended to drive the French out of 
their haunts in Nova Scotia, forestall such an expedition 
as was now in preparation, and firmly establish the English 
control there. 3 Upon this errand he sent 800 men, 4 a de 
tachment of whom under Lieutenant-Colonel Noble occupied 
Menis, the former base of the Canadians. His force was 
smaller than expected, however, because of the shipwreck of 
some Massachusetts and Rhode Island forces and the disobe- 

1 Shirley to Admiralty, Nov. i, 1746, Ad. I, 3818. Information secured 
when Admiral Lestock captured one of D Anville s ships off the coast 
of France in the fall of 1746, after its return from America, showed that 
nine ships of the convoy were loaded with arms and ammunition 
destined for Canada. Admiral Lestock s Journal, loc. cit. 

Lydius to Stoddard, Nov. 24, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 90. 

Shirley to Greene, Nov. 4, 1746, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 203, Sh. 
Cor^ vol. i, pp. 366-367. 

4 Shirley to Admiralty, Jan. 10, 1747, Ad. I, 3818; Shirley to Greene, 
Jan. 5, 1747, Cor. Col. Govs. of R. L, vol. ii, pp. 34-35, Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
p. 378. 

359 



360 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

dience of orders by a New Hampshire captain. This diffi 
culty Shirley attempted to remedy by securing the despatch 
of further forces from New Hampshire and Rhode Island. 
Those colonies might more readily send men to Menis than 
to Crown Point, for the expedition against which all avail 
able Massachusetts troops were needed. 1 The task in Nova 
Scotia was now placed ahead of the capture of Crown Point, 
although the plan for the latter was not abandoned. 2 

Fruition of the Crown Point project was made impossible 
by the appearance of smallpox among the forces of New 
York and the southern colonies at and near Albany. This 
discouraged both the sending of New England troops to 
join them and, for the time, the attempt itself. 3 

While these plans were under way Shirley found it nec 
essary to combat the influence of a definite report that 
Knowles at Louisburg, \vith the cooperation of the Massa 
chusetts governor, was intending to drive, all the French in 
habitants out of Nova Scotia in the following spring. 
This, following the similar report earlier in the year, would 
naturally lead to their adherence bodily to the French cause. 
This report he met, with no great hope of success, by as 
surances that he had presented their case as favorably as 
possible to the English government, and that he believed a: 
favorable answer might be expected. 4 

New Hampshire and Rhode Island failed to furnish rein 
forcements for Nova Scotia, with serious results for Noble 
and his troops at Menis. This force was lulled into a false 
security by the apparent inaccessibility of their position in 

Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 9, i/47, A r - H. Pr. Ps., vol. xviii, pp. 
299-301; Shirley to Greene, Feb. 9, 1747, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, pp. 
210-211, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 379~38i. 

Shirley to Wentworth, Nov. n, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 368; Nov. 
12, 1746, ibid., pp. 368-369. 

1 Jour., Dec. 30, 1746, pp. 184-187. 

4 Shirley to Mascarene, Dec. 19, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 37<>372. 



FIGHTIXG FOR THE STATUS QUO 361 

the midst of the winter season. As a result they were sur 
prised on January 3ist and a considerable number killed 
(including the commander) and taken prisoners, by a force 
which would probably have been driven out of the peninsula 
had the troops asked for been sent. 1 

After this reverse Mascarene suggested (i) an effort to 
drive the French out (with slight apparent hope of success 
without larger forces), (2) the punishment of the inhabi 
tants w r ho had received them, by devastation of the invaded 
districts, (3) the seizure of hostages from the inhabitants in 
case the enemy retired. He further suggested that the in 
habitants might be transplanted, to prevent the French from 
increasing their subjects on English soil. 2 

Meanwhile Shirley was busy once more in securing a sea 
and land force sufficient to repossess the peninsula. He 
also repeated to Newcastle a proposal made in the preced 
ing year for the building of strong blockhouses at Menis 
and Schignecto, which, had they then existed, might have 
prevented the disaster to Noble s force. He also now urged 
an even larger establishment at Chebucto. He said these 
measures, with defenses at Annapolis and Canso, would ade 
quately secure the province with garrisons totaling 1,000 
men. He planned to secure the necessary men from the 
balance of General Phillips regiment, the personnel of which 
had been increased, with the addition of some Indian ran 
gers. To emphasize his suggestions he asserted that Nova 
Scotia was of most importance to the crown of all its prov 
inces upon the continent. 8 

1 Mascarene to Shirley, Feb. 8, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 103; Feb. 20, 1747, 
C. O. 5 901, 108; Feb. 21, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 107; Shirley to Newcastle, 
Feb. 27, 1747, C. O. 5 901 ; Goldthwait to Shirley, Mar. 2, 1747, C. O. 
5 901, 105; Shirley to Newcastle, Mar. 9, 1747, C. 0. 5 901, 106; Jour., 
Alar. 5, 1747, pp. 257-258. 

J Mascarene to Shirley, Feb. 21, 1747, C. O. 5 753. 
3 Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. 27, 1747, C. 0. 5 901. 



362 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Two months later the governor, jointly with Admiral 
Knowles, made similar recommendations, but with the ad 
ditional suggestions (i) that a strong fort should be built 
at Bay Verte which would command the isthmus upon 
which the Canadians and the inhabitants of St. John s 
usually landed when invading the peninsula, (2) that Che- 
bucto seemed to be designed by nature to be the chief harbor 
of Nova Scotia. Measures based upon these suggestions, 
they observed, would go far toward making that province 
the barrier of the English colonies, as it should be, instead 
of allowing it to remain the key for giving the enemy ad 
mission into them. 

Meanwhile Massachusetts troops were again in Menis, 
although there were prospects of renewed invasion which 
Knowles fleet was too weak to prevent. The little naval 
force which Shirley and Knowles could muster by their 
joint efforts was being sent to Bay Verte to capture some 
French vessels there, and thus check attempts on the prov 
ince from Canada. 1 

February saw Shirley pressing again for action against 
Crown Point, as a means of encouraging the Six Nations 
to act against the French. 2 Although Connecticut would 
do nothing, he would have sent the available Massachusetts 
troops if New York had been willing to cooperate. How 
ever, a sudden change in opinion by the New York council 
prevented Governor Clinton from doing so, and therefore 
the attempt was abandoned for that winter. The governor 
hoped that all might still be well, if the Indians were not 
alienated, and if the expedition against Canada were car 
ried out during the coming season. 31 

Shirley and Knowles to Newcastle, Apr. 28, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 20- 

2 Shirley to Greene, Feb. 7, 1747, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 209, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 378-379. 

3 Shirley to Newcastle, Feb. 21, 1747, C. 0. 5 901, 93- 



FIGHTING FOR THE STATUS QUO 363 

The spring which now opened found the English cause 
in America at a low ebb. Shirley took steps to strengthen 
both the western and eastern frontiers of his province (the 
latter of which had now been contracted by withdrawal of 
settlers to Damariscotta) in an effort to avoid experiences 
like that at Fort Massachusetts. 1 Meanwhile Admiral 
Knowles at Louisburg reported that his sea forces were so 
reduced that he was alike powerless to destroy French priva 
teers infesting the waters of Nova Scotia and to keep open 
communication between Louisburg and Boston. He further 
stated that Ramsay, still in Nova Scotia, was expecting re 
inforcements from both Canada and France. He also testi 
fied that the New England troops, despite their reverse, had 
been the salvation of that province during the past winter. 2 

The one favorable feature of the situation was that the 
Six Nations were eager for the fray. They were kept 
keyed up largely through the influence of William Johnson 
and John Lydius, the agents of New York and Massachu 
setts. 3 

While America was thus neglected England exerted many 
times the strength probably required to tip the balance there 
in her favor to miaintain an indecisive contest upon the con 
tinent of Europe. 4 

In June the annual French onslaught was preparing in 
Nova Scotia. 5 However, the Massachusetts assembly had 

1 Shirley to Stoddard, Apr. 10, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 383-384; 
Shirley to Waldo, Apr. 13, 1747, Ar., vol. Ixxii, fols. 739-741. Cf. supra, 
PP. 340-341. 

Knowles to Newcastle, Apr. 26, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 109. 

3 Stoddard to Shirley (extract) May 13, 1747, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, 
p. 869; Shirley to Wanton, May 18, 1747, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, pp. 
216-217, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 384-386; Shirley to Wentworth, May 18, 
1747, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, pp. 869-870. 

4 Convention for campaign, Jan. 12, 1747, Hardwicke Papers, Mis. Mss., 
vol. Ixxvii, .V. Y. Pub. Lib. 

5 De Ramsay was fortifying the approaches to Bay Verte and collecting 
5000 Canadians and Indians for the renewal of the intermittent attack 
upon Annapolis. Shirley to Newcastle, June 25, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 127: 



364 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

opened the new season with a proposal that the troops and 
vessels of the province should be used only to attack Canada 
or to defend itheir own borders. 1 This policy was based upon 
the shortage of men caused by death and the absence from 
the province of men already called into service. It included 
forcing upon New Hampshire the entire defense of her 
western frontier. Thus the number of men required for the 
frontiers within Massachusetts would not be over one-half 
what had been required to defend the province at more dis 
tant points. This stand led to an order by the governor for 
the withdrawal of the Massachusetts garrison which had 
heretofore defended Fort Dummer, and for the temporary 
posting there of troops raised for the Canada expedition 
until New Hampshire should have a good opportunity to 
relieve them. The general court haggled over votes to raise 
or support men for the frontiers, seeking to secure the 
assignment of those raised against Canada to such service,, 
until they were ordered elsewhere. 2 

l jour., Mar. 7, 1747, pp. 260-261; Mar. 13, 1747, p. 268; Mar. 17, 1747, 
pp. 272-273. 

*Jour., Apr. 2, 1747, p. 292; Apr. 7, 1747, p. 298; Apr. 16, 1747, pp, 
301-302; Apr. 23, 1747, p. 312. 

The final settlement of the Fort Dummer question did not occur until 
the war was over and the home government had considered the repre 
sentations of both sides. These pleas included a petition from Massa 
chusetts for reimbursement of her expenses for services within the 
New Hampshire line, and one of New Hampshire that Fort Dummer 
be removed within the Massachusetts line and that New Hampshire be 
allowed to build a stronger fort farther up the river. The privy council 
decided that New Hampshire should take over the fort in its existing 
location and adequately maintain it until she had created defenses else 
where which made it unnecessary, and that she should reimburse Massa 
chusetts for her expenses in maintaining it. They decided, however, that 
Massachusetts should not be reimbursed for other operations within 
the New Hampshire border, as the latter province had paid heavily for 
the defense of her own western frontiers. Board to Privy Council,. 
Aug. 3, 1749, C. O. 5 918, 225; A. P. C., vol. iv, pp. 16-17. 



FIGHTING FOR THE STATUS QUO 365 

The evidently passive policy thus begun invited an attack 
by 700 French and Indians upon the fort at Number Four, 
the present Charlestown, New Hampshire. The place was 
then held by Massachusetts men raised for the Canada ex 
pedition, who gallantly defended it until the assailants re 
treated. This led to the assigning of all the Canada soldiers 
to frontier duty, the raising of more men to help man the 
frontiers, and an appeal to Connecticut to send 500 men to 
help secure the western border. 1 These results raised doubts 
as to the economy or wisdom of the general court s retrench 
ment. As summer came on Nova Scotia was yet in the 
balance. However, as the threat against that province re 
quired aid from France to make it effective, when this did 
not arrive, De Ramsay ultimately retired to Canada. 2 

In the early summer, also, detachments from Crown 
Point were attacking or menacing the New York and New 
England frontiers, thus threatening to force the Six Nations 
to break with the English. Meanwhile not even rumors of 
troops were coming from England. Shirley s reflections 
upon the situation show plainly that he was not counting 
upon English aid, and that he had singled out the great de 
fect which made the English colonies largely helpless in the 
presence of their foes. His conclusion stated to Newcastle 
was that the French of Canada had a great advantage over 
the English colonies in time of war, by being under one 
government and that absolute. He pointed out that four 
or five strong governments, then acting upon the defensive 
only, had met with very different success from that achieved 
by one of them (Massachusetts) in a very difficult enter 
prise against the French. This difference he thought easily 
explicable, inasmuch as Massachusetts depended upon her 

l Jour., Apr. 24, 1747, pp. 313-314, 3*5; A P r - 2 S, 1747, P- 3i6; June n, 
1747, P- 36. 
*Ibid., Aug. 12, 1747, p. 81. 



366 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

own strength, with the assistance of his majesty s ships, for 
executing the expedition against Cape Breton, and there 
fore exerted herself with suitable vigor and proportioned 
the forces she raised to the attempt. 1 Thus did the govern 
or place in relief the military advantage to be gained from a 
colonial union. This comment was followed shortly by 
efforts on his part to bring about an offensive and defensive 
union of the colonies. To promote this he secured a vote 
from the assembly to appoint commissioners to meet those 
of the other governments as far south as Virginia, on 
September 2d at New York. 2 He stated to the governor of 
New Hampshire that this action was in consequence of 

the great danger which all his majesty s colonies in North 
America are in (as well as their own particular danger) of 
being destroyed by the French and Indians under their influ 
ence without a firm union between themselves, for their mutual 
defense and for weakening and destroying the power of the 
enemy and more especially for driving the French from the 
borders of the province of New York. . . . 

The congress thus called was to treat and agree upon meas 
ures for encouraging the Six Nations to attack the enemy 
vigorously, " as also to agree upon the method and propor 
tion of raising men and money for carrying on the war 
both offensively and defensively, and to project and settle 
such enterprises and plans of operation as the common in 
terest shall require." Meanwhile he urged the separate 
colonies to furnish presents to keep the Six Nations loyal, 
as Massachusetts had done and continued to do generously. 3 
Thus did Shirley attempt to follow the path which des 
tiny, with the able but unintentional assistance of British 

Shirley to Newcastle, June 25, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 127. 

Jour., June 26, 1747, p. 68. 

"Shirley to Wentworth, June 29, 1747, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 115. 



FIGHTING FOR THE STATUS QUO 367 

ministries, was already marking out for the future political 
progress of the American colonies. But the path was yet too 
thorny to be comfortable, and the need which he so keenly 
realized had not yet been sufficiently grasped by the pro 
vincial statesmen of America to lead them to clear and im 
prove it for the safe and prosperous passage of the teeming 
millions who were destined to travel it. In attempting this 
task he had no encouragement or support from England 
and possibly the ministry were not disappointed that his 
efforts failed of fruition. 1 

The result proved that there was no general sentiment for 
united action of the colonies and that the remaining colonies 
were content to leave the management of the problem of 
defense to those governments whose frontiers would be im 
mediately affected by the defection of the Iroquois. Prob 
ably, also, the belief that peace would not be long delayed, 
and the fact that the French and Indians were not appear 
ing in strength upon the frontiers of most of the colonies 
had an influence upon their action. 

The selfish attitude of the other colonies in allowing 
Massachusetts. New Hampshire and New York, with the 
assistance of the Iroquois, and \vith occasional aid from 
Connecticut, to assume much of the burden of defending the 
rest, led to a memorial to Shirley and Clinton from the com 
missioners of Massachusetts to the Albany conference in 
1 748. The commissioners asked them to apply to the crown 
to compel the other governments to pay a just proportion of 
the expense for defending the inland frontiers of the three 
first named colonies. 2 

1 On the outcome of this attempt at colonial cooperation, cf. Shirley 
to Wanton, Dec. 28, 1747, R. I. Col Recs., vol. v, p. 235, Sh. Cor., vol. i, 
pp. 419-420; Shirley to Clinton, Mar. 22, 1748, N. Y. Col. Docs., vol. vi, 
pp. 421-422, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 427-428. 

Clinton and Shirley to Board, Aug. 18, 1748, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 
453-454- 



368 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Before the Albany congress met the garrison at Louisburg, 
ragged and uncomfortable from the neglect of the home gov 
ernment, were notified that according to a regulation of the 
British army, the cost of their provisions was to be deducted 
from their pay. Shirley had asked that this regulation be 
dispensed with as impossible of application there without 
almost insupportable hardship for the soldiers. The result 
of the attempt to apply it was an instantaneous and unanimous 
mutiny of the whole garrison, who laid down their arms, and 
began a "hunger strike." Governor Knowles was thus 
forced to violate the order and report the situation at home. 1 

A few days later Shirley sent Newcastle a sketch of 
another product of his fertile mind a plan for reclaiming 
and holding Nova Scotia through the use of 1,000 of the 
Louisburg garrison and 2,000 New Englanders. When the 
lateness of the season made an attack upon Louisburg from 
France no longer feasible, he proposed to seize the isthmus 
by which the French entered Nova Scotia from Canada. 
He would then deport to New England the inhabitants who 
had been clearly disloyal and reward the New Englanders 
in the force by bestowing the vacated lands upon them 1 on 
condition that they settle there with their families and de 
fend the region. 2 

Such was the posture of affairs when Shirley received 
on August 1 4th, the long expected news that the infant ex 
pedition against Canada had expired in its second year, 
after many consultations of specialists had failed to find a 
means of prolonging its life. 3 Its untimely but not pre 
mature decease not only left the struggle in America 
almost wholly a colonial one, unless either home government 

Knowles to Newcastle, June 28, 1747, C. 0. 5 901, 128. 
- Shiiley to Newcastle, July 8, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 136. 
3 Cf. supra, pp. 299, 302-303, 315-323, 329-330, 331-337 ; Shirley to Clinton, 
Aug. 15, 1747, N. Y. Col. Docs., vol. vi, pp. 384-385, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 393- 



FIGHTING FOR THE STATUS QUO 369 

should later send considerable forces to America, but it 
somewhat impaired Shirley s prestige. His reputation as a 
potent influence with the ministry was clouded. His sug 
gestions to other colonial governments would for the future 
be regarded less as forecasts of the probable policy of the 
government in England. Particularly, it tended to reduce 
the probability that he could lead the colonies into the union 
he was seeking to establish for military purposes. 

More than that, the news, although couched in language 
superficially cordial, seemed to bear the tidings of unpop 
ularity at Whitehall. It could not be doubted that the 
ministry regarded the effort to make the \var one for the 
domination of America with disfavor, and the author of 
the sweeping plans for that purpose in the same light A 
hint of such an attitude was found in the fact that where 
as the orders for undertaking the expedition had been 
enclosed to Shirley and sent to the various governors from 
Boston, the orders to dismiss the troops were addressed to 
Shirley through the hands of Governor Clinton at New 
York. 1 

Again, Admiral Warren, who had acted jointly with 
Shirley to promote the expedition, had returned home, osten 
sibly to secure its adoption, but, upon finding the ministry 
averse to the plan as previously agreed upon between 
Shirley and himself, he had thrown the onus for the lack of 
harmony thus revealed between the plan and the views of 
the ministry chiefly upon Shirley. 2 It is just to recall in 
that connection that Warren had show r n signs of jealousy 
of the Massachusetts governor almost from the beginning 
of the war: while stationed at New York, when he found 
himself unable to send vessels to 1 help save Nova Scotia ; a 



Newcastle to Shirley, May 30, 1747, C. 0. 5 45, 247. 
3 Cf. supra, pp. 234-235. 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

while in the West Indies, when he viewed his instructions 
as opposed to his active participation at Louisburg, until 
specific orders came ; * while at Louisburg, when he sought 
to assume for himself the supreme command on land as well 
as sea, whereby Shirley s authority as governor would have 
been subjected to a slight. 2 

Further, there was a situation in New York not favorable 
to Shirley s success in the role which he had assumed as 
colonial leader. There was a long-standing jealousy and 
friction between New York and Massachusetts which had 
appeared in part in connection with boundary disputes. 
Unfortunately, a large factor in any policy for defeating 
the French centered about the Six Nations who resided in 
New York, and in dealing with whom that government as 
sumed, and was by the home government accorded, a pri 
macy. Shirley found it necessary to make frequent sug 
gestions to Clinton as to policies in which these Indians 
were involved, since Clinton did not display the initiative 
of a strong leader, and his province did not then possess 
either the resources or the spirit to fit it to play the role 
which its geographical position suggested, that of the ad 
vance guard of the English column against Canada. 

Shirley had proceeded with consideration for Clinton, 
always scrupulously asking his consent to treat with the 
Iroquois, and acting jointly with him. Nevertheless there 
had been some suppressed lack of harmony between the prov 
inces. It appears that the Indians themselves resented the 
ajttitude of the New York Indian commissioners in obstruct 
ing free relations between themselves and Massachusetts, 
particularly in 1745. In that year, it appeared that the 
threatened defection of the Indians from the English was 
partly due to this condition. 3 Moreover, the naming of 

1 Cf, supra, pp. 260-262, 282. 

2 Cf. supra, pp. 304-306. 
3 Wraxall, op. tit., pp. Ixxxiii-lxxxiv. 



FIGHTING FOR THE STATUS QUO 371 

William Johnson by Governor Clinton to take control of 
Indian affairs * did not wholly remove friction with Massa 
chusetts. 

Shirley relied for his Indian and frontier policy largely 
upon John Stoddard, the veteran Massachusetts frontiers 
man, and Stoddard, although for the most part a staunch 
supporter of the agents who dealt with the Six Nations, fret 
ted at times under what he considered defects in the New 
York proceedings relating to the Indians. 2 By sending Mr. 
Lydius to Albany as the representative of Massachusetts in 
dealing with the Iroquois, Shirley promoted promptness 
in meeting the needs of the Indians, and reduced the chances 
that his plans would be betrayed to the French. Unfortun 
ately he also aroused a decided jealousy on the part of Wil 
liam Johnson, the New York Indian agent. This was 
brought to Shirley s attention just at the time that the 
change in the attitude of the home government toward his 
plans was apparent. 3 The jealousy which here appeared 
was to reappear in a more violent form in connection with 
the last intercolonial war in 1755.* 

It seems not wholly improbable that this New York sit 
uation had some indirect influence at home through Warren,, 
who was the brother-in-law of Chief Justice and Lieutenant- 
Governor De Lancey, 5 and the uncle of William Johnson, 
the New York Indian agent. However, Shirley s share in 
dealing with New York questions seems to have been de 
manded by the circumstances. Moreover, he showed that 

1 Ibid., pp. Ixxxiv, 248 and notes. 

2 Cf. supra, p. 297. 

8 Shirley to Clinton, Aug. 15, 1747, loc. ciL; Johnson Mss., 23, 40-47, 
Calendar of the Sir William Johnson Manuscripts in the New York 
State Library, comp. by R. E. Day (Albany, 1909), pp. 14-15. 
[ ( 4 Wraxall, op. cit., pp. cvi-cvii. 

*N, Y. Col. Docs., vol. vi, p. 417. 



372 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



he bore no ill will to Johnson in consequence of his resent 
ment by writing to Clinton most generously for his services. 1 

Finally, the Duke of Bedford had clearly formed an un 
favorable opinion of Shirley s policy, and his power presum 
ably would be used to prevent the increase of the influence 
of its author. He might have been even more strongly in 
clined to that attitude by Warren s letters and statements. 
This attitude was important since Bedford was then becom 
ing a power in colonial affairs. 2 

The turning point of the war in America was the disas 
ter to D Anville s squadron. In this affair only that bene 
volent power which it is alleged watches over the safety of 
the non compos mentis prevented the English from suffer 
ing as severe a reverse as that which befell the French. 
This good fortune was continued in the following year by 
the defeat of a smaller armament under De Jonquiere. 
However, this fleet was to reinforce India, not America. 8 

Shirley continued to strive in cooperation with the New 
York government to hold the Six Nations firm, and their 
joint efforts were successful. 4 This was easier since the 
French strength which might have made the Iroquois form 
idable to the English never reached the shores of Canada. 

Nevertheless Shirley believed that a crisis in relations with 
the Iroquois and dependent tribes had been reached which 
would justify Clinton in securing their loyalty at the charge 

1 Shirley to Clinton, Aug. 31, 1747, N. Y. Col. Dots., vol. vi, p. 385, 
Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 398-399. 

2 John Russell, fourth Duke of Bedford, became secretary of state for 
the southern department with charge of the colonies, in the following 
year. Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 457, note 2. 

*Innes, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 195. 

4 For Shirley s share in this effort, cf. Conference with the Indians at 
Albany, July 23, 1748, N. Y. Col. Docs., vol. vi, pp. 447-452, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 429-437; -Shirley to Galissoniere, July 29, 1748, ibid., vol. i, 
pp. 437-440; Shirley and Clinton to Board, Aug. 18, 1748, ibid., pp. 
449-455- 



FIGHTING FOR THE STATUS QUO 373 

of the crown, for he was convinced that otherwise they 
would soon go over to the French. He saw clearly that 
the Indians held the balance of power between the French 
and English in America and thajt by securing their support 
generally the English could easily dispose of the French 
alone. 1 The Iroquois were secured to the English interest 
probably largely through Shirley s influence and efforts. 
They did good work by harassing the French settlements in 
Canada and by forcing the abandonment of some of them 
near Montreal. 2 

Ample evidence that an able and aggressive French In 
dian policy fully warranted Shirley s emphasis upon the 
need for serious efforts by the English to overcome it, ap 
peared within the next two years. 3 

Shirley also, acting with Knowles, once more secured Nova 
Scotia for the winter by sending to Annapolis 400 men re 
tained from the Canada forces, supported by the Massachu 
setts sloop in the pay of the crown, since the province re 
fused to fit it out for the service. But he had no forces 
with which to drive the French from Bay Verte, or to at 
tack Crown Point. He w r as obliged to report that the prov 
ince had done as much as it could, and had incurred heavy 
expenses, which they asked to have represented to the min 
istry. 4 

Shirley to Clinton, Feb. i. 1748, C. O. 5 901, 92. 

2 Clinton to Shirley and Knowles, Oct. 21, 1748, C. 0. 5 ooi, 175 and 235. 

* Galissoniere to Mascarene, Jan. 15, 1749, N. Y. Col. Docs., vol. vi, 
pp. 47&-479J Williams to -Shirley, Feb. 13, 1749, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 568, 
note; Shirley to Hamilton, Feb. 20, 1749, Pa. Ar., vol. ii, p. 20, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 468-469; Report on French encroachments, Jour., Apr. 18, 
1749, p. 181; Shirley to Bedford, Apr. 24, 1749, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 478; 
Mas^arene to Galissoniere, Apr. 25, 1749, N. Y. Col. Docs., vol. vi, pp. 
479-481; Shirley to Bedford, May 10, 1749, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 485-487; 
Clinton to Shirley, May 19, 1749, ibid., p. 487; Shirley to Bedford, June 
18, 1749, ibid., p. 488. 

4 Shirley and Knowles to Corbet, Nov. 28, 1747, Ad. I, 3818. 



374 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



The Massachusetts governor s significant work in con 
nection with the war ended with this last phase. His final 
effort was not to win a great triumph, but, in company with 
others, chiefly in New York, to prevent a disaster. With 
the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, in 1748, this task was success 
fully completed. 

Shirley s chief services In this war were ( i ) the mainten 
ance of a substantially unbroken frontier for his province 
and the aiding of adjacent provinces to maintain theirs, (2) 
the continuous preservation of Nova Scotia, (3) the con 
quest of Louisburg, (4) the evolving of a plan for the sub 
jugation of Canada, which was followed in its essential pro 
visions in the final contest of (the English and French for 
the control of that colony. 

A few years later the British empire was in a death strug 
gle which probably would not have arisen had Shirley s plans 
been given whole-souled support by the ministry when pre 
sented. Substantially the same plans received such sup 
port in the time of Pitt s greatness, and Canada was then 
wrested from the French. In the later period, a govern 
ment refined by the fires of adversity dreamed Shirley s 
dream anew, and although the task had meanwhile become 
much more complicated, difficult and costly in blood and 
treasure, the British lion fully aroused finally planted him 
self firmly at Quebec and Montreal. 

Moreover, had it been done when Shirley first urged the 
plan, before France had time to strengthen Canada or to 
regain her balance after the fall of Louisburg, the huge bur 
den of debt, which furnished the chief occasion for driving 
the Americans into* revolt, probably would not have existed. 
Without such provocation it is far from certain that they 
would have justified Bedford s fear of their spirit of inde 
pendence by severing their connection with the British 
empire. 



CHAPTER XVIII 
POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 

AFTER it was known in America that the attempt upon 
Canada had been abandoned, Shirley was in some sort a 
shorn Samson. He was still a man of renown, and his views 
were still received with respect, but the treatment accorded 
him lacked something of the deference in America and the 
consideration in England which he had formerly experienced. 
Shirley himself also underwent a change. His zeal for the 
public service was apparently undiminished, but there was 
a subtle difference. His enthusiasm was no longer keyed 
to the bell-like clearness of other times, and a faint note of 
supplication appeared again in his letters to Newcastle, re 
miniscent of other days when an English gentleman had! 
humiliated himself continuously for a term of years by 
asking of his patron the alms of an employment in which 
he might do the work for which he was fitted. 

He had been hopeful of receiving the governorship of 
Nova Scotia in addition to that of Massachusetts, thereby 
giving larger scope to his restless spirit for strengthening 
by new devices the British hold upon America, and for 
further satisfying the lofty ambition which animated him. 
This hope had been encouraged by Newcastle s pledge of 
April, 1746, that he would present Shirley s pretensions td 
that office to* the king upon the death of the aged incumbent. 
Since that time Shirley had sought to secure his immediate 
appointment to the post in view of the inability of General 
Phillips to render service. Possibly this request was partly 
due to the recognition on Shirley s part that Newcastle s 

375 



376 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

star was no longer in the ascendant and might soon be 
eclipsed by Bedford s, in which case his prospects for ad 
vancement would be seriously obscured. The reply inti 
mated that this situation might already have arrived, for 
shortly after Warren reached England, Newcastle responded 
through the medium of a letter from the admiral to Shirley, 
the duke not then having time to write. Warren s letter in 
formed the governor that the king would not consent to the 
removal of General Phillips from his governorship or his 
regiment, but that in case of his death Newcastle would use 
his interest that the Massachusetts governor should receive 
both. Shirley thereupon recalled to his patron that he had 
not only repeatedly prevented Nova Scotia from being lost 
to England, but had really carried much of the burden of 
the governorship of that province. Mascarene, he declared, 
not only sought his advice upon all important points, but 
even sent his letters to England open through his hands, 
to be withheld if his mentor judged it wise. In this way 
he had actually administered Nova Scotia for three years 
and he thought it would probably be necessary for him ta 
do so much longer. These services had led him to believe 
that his immediate appointment as governor might be reason 
able, as also his command of the regiment, if that could be 
done without injury to General Phillips. He then suggested 
an adjustment by which the incumbent should receive his 
present income during his lifetime while Shirley should at 
once take the offices, and upon Phillips decease, the full 
emoluments. In conclusion he asked leave in any case to 
be absent from his government for a short time to settle 
affairs in England which the interest of his family absolutely 
required. 1 

J For this episode, cf. Shirley to Newcastle, June 18, 1746, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, p. 327; Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 1747, C. 0. 5 901, 145; Shirley 
to Newcastle, Mar. 28, 1750, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 499-501. 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 377 

Newcastle followed his announcement through Warren, 
intimating decreased influence for Shirley if not for his 
patron, with a Delphic one in his letter of October 3, i/47- 
Therein he announced : " I have formerly acquainted you 
that, in case of a vacancy of the government of Nova Scotia, 
His Majesty has thoughts of bestowing it upon you to be 
held with your government of Massachusetts Bay." The 
letter in which Newcastle gave this somewhat dubious as 
surance he had drawn up with the able assistance of Lord 
Anson and Sir Peter Warren "and humbly submitted to his 
majesty s approbation." These circumstances may sug 
gest the value which the assurance was likely to have for 
Shirley. There the matter seems to have rested until Shir 
ley returned to England. 

His duties and services regarding Nova Scotia, however, 
continued. The same letter of Newcastle which repeated a 
past promise for a future favor, directed a conference with 
Knowles upon the defense of Nova Scotia and Louisburg, 
announced the appointment of Colonel Hopson as governor 
of Cape Breton to succeed Knowles, and stated that he had 
been ordered to correspond with Shirley in regard to steps 
necessary for the defense of the buffer province. 3 

Shirley s proposed policy for that province, however, was 
being subjected to critical examination, for his suggestion that 
Knowles send 1,000 men from the Louisburg garrison to be 
joined by 2,000 New Englanders for the purpose of clear 
ing Nova Scotia of the French had been referred by the king 
to Lord Anson and Sir Peter Warren. These two admirals, 
then stationed at home, reported their judgment that the 
season was already too far advanced for the plan to be 

Newcastle to Shirley, Oct. 3, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 152, not included in 
extracts in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 401-404. 

*Sh. Cor., vol. i. p. 401, note i. 

Newcastle to Shirley, Oct. 3, 1747, C. 0. 5 901, 152; Newcastle to 
Hopson, Oct. 3, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 162. 



378 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

practicable. 1 If Newcastle had issued orders instead of 
allowing the question to be referred ito two of Bedford s 
henchmen, it might have been feasible. In lieu thereof, the 
admiralty, after leaving the province thus far during the 
war without regular protection, now sent a warship to re 
main at Annapolis during the winter. Shirley was also in 
formed that it had been represented that in case the French 
were ejected from the peninsula, a small fort on the isthmus 
would be of great value to prevent their return. Therefore 
the erection of such a fort was recommended. 2 At the same 
time the taking of Crown Point was commended to him. 
Finally the injunction was laid upon him that he should 

transmit hither for His Majesty s consideration a scheme for 
the civil government of the province, whereby the inhabitants 
may be secured to His Majesty s obedience, and also for the 
erecting of forts, and making such works, as may be sufficient 
hereafter for defending it against any attempt that may be 
made upon it. 

This injunction was accompanied by the flattering ex 
planation that the king had observed that he was so well- 
acquainted with the country and had been so instrumental in 
the preservation of it that he was persuaded " these, his 
orders, could not be sent to any person, more able or willing 
to execute them than yourself. And it is His Majesty s 
pleasure, that all his officers and subjects whom it may con 
cern, shall be assisting to you in the execution of these His 
Majesty s commands." 

1 Newcastle to Shirley, Oct. 3, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 402. Cf. also, 
supra, p. 368. 

2 Mr. Cowley, the royal engineer in Nova Scotia, later reported that a 
small wooden fort, such as was recommended, would not have been 
defensible in that position. Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 18, 1748, C. O. 
5 45, no; Cowley to Shirley, undated, extract, C. O. 5 45, "S- 

"Newcastle to Shirley, Oct. 3, 1747, loc. cit., pp. 402-404. 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 379 

Shirley, in truth, had shown such knowledge and zeal as 
to justify this confidence. Before the arrival of these instruc 
tions, he had returned repeatedly in his letters home to the 
problem of securing a loyal population for Nova Scotia as 
a future security for the province. His plans were clearly 
outlined as early as the late spring of 1746. 

At that time the orders from England to prepare for the 
Canada expedition were not known in America. 1 Shirley 
apparently despaired of support from home for such a 
campaign and returned to the subject of the safety of the 
northern wing of the English possessions, dependent in con 
siderable measure upon Nova Scotia. He assured New 
castle that upon the arrival of the Gibraltar regiments and a 
fleet, Louisburg seemed safe. France could hardly send 
troops for a siege, and without them a defense by the fleet 
and batteries combined could hardly be overcome. As to 
Nova Scotia, the danger from the French inhabitants was 
still urgent, and the paramount importance of making their 
loyalty unquestioned was to him increasingly clear. He 
also quoted a letter by Monsieur de Frontenac, "Intendant of 
Canada," to the French government, published in a history 
of seeming authority at Paris in 1744, stressing the impor 
tance to France of seizing Nova Scotia. The means sug 
gested by Shirley for rendering the anticipated French plan 
ineffective was the removal of the more dangerous of the 
French families from the country, and the settling of Eng 
lish families in their places. Such settlers he believed could 
be secured from New England. Meanwhile the garrison at 
Annapolis, after the dismissal of most of the New England 
troops, was less than 200 effective privates. 2 

1 Cf. supra, p. 323- 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, May 10, 1746, 2 Me. H. S. Colls., vol. xi, 
pp. 316-323. 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

He returned to the subject again in June of the same 
year to inquire whether, in case o<f the failure of the Canada 
expedition to proceed, " the immediate removal of some at 
least of the French inhabitants of Nova Scotia, and secur 
ing the province in the best manner would not be advisable 
and even necessary." 1 He suggested further that some of 
the troops sent against Canada might be used to perform 
this service before their return or that it might be possible 
to spare men enough from the Louisburg garrison for a 
short time to do 1 it. 2 

Shirley, however, was by that time being made to feel 
that his ambition to become governor of that province had 
been urged somewhat too impetuously, and he seems to have 
felt that his proposals might be construed as devices to for 
ward his own fortunes. 

Possibly it was the sensing of such an attitude on the 
part of the home government which led Shirley to write to 
Newcastle in the middle of August, after once more sub 
mitting his scheme for dealing with the French and Indian 
inhabitants with much clearness, " I shall finish troubling 
your grace upon the affairs of Nova Scotia with this letter." 
In this connection Shirley made no mention o<f himself as an 
agent for carrying the scheme into effect. His plan was 
that the home government should authorize and instruct the 
governor and council, or some other person or persons, to 
deal with the inhabitants. The procedure should be by ap 
prehending a convenient number of those considered most 
obnoxious and dangerous to English rule, " and upon find 
ing em guility of holding any treasonable correspondence 
with the enemy &c. to dispose of them and their estates " in 
such manner as the directions from home should prescribe. 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, June 18, 1746, C. O. 5 901, 13, (not in extract 
in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 327-328). 
3 Ibid., Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 328. 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 381 

However, promise should be given of " His Majesty s most 
gracious pardon and general indemnity to the rest for what 
is past upon their taking the oaths of allegiance to his 
majesty." Thus he would have ended the " neutral " status 
of the French speaking inhabitants. 

In addition he would have had two strong garrisons 
located in the heart of the French settlements at Menis and 
Chignecto, 1 or at least one at the former, where a trading 
post for the Indians, to be operated on favorable terms, 
should also be located. Further, the Catholic priests should 
be replaced by French Protestant ministers, and English 
Protestant schools established. Finally, the inhabitants who 
conformed to the Protestant religion and sent their children 
to the English schools should be given " due encourage 
ment." 2 

By such measures Shirley believed that 

the present inhabitants might probably at least be kept in sub 
jection to His Majesty s government, and from treasonable 
correspondences with the Canadeans; and the next generation 
in a great measure become true Protestant subjects, and the 
Indians there soon reclaimed to an entire dependance upon and 
subjection to His Majesty; which might also have an happy in 
fluence upon some of the tribes, now in the French interest. 

That some effective measures along this line were neces 
sary was obvious, since the Canadian invasion of the penin 
sula was then receiving at least the passive aid of the in 
habitants. 3 It also seems likely that measures carried out 
by legal process, such as Shirley recommended, and induce 
ments to accept Protestantism and an English education 

1 Spelled in this place, Schiegnecto. 

2 For this scheme, cf. .Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 15, 1746, 2 Me. H. S. 
Colls., vol. xi, pp. 337-340, extract in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 336-337. 

Shirley to Newcastle, July 28, 1746, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 335. 



382 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

instead of persecution, may have been as well adapted to 
meet the very difficult and delicate problem in the province 
as any practicable steps that could have been devised. 

An inkling of these plans for their future disposition 
seems to have reached the " neutral French," and to have 
caused the apprehensions which Shirley sought to allay in 
the fall and early winter of I746. 1 With the more serious 
situation in the province during the winter of 1746-7, 2 
severer measures toward the inhabitants were thought of 
by Shirley and Knowles to supplement military operations. 

The suggested measures were ( i ) that the most obnoxious 
of the French inhabitants be by degrees removed into other 
English colonies, (2) that the Catholic priests be driven 
out and Protestant French ministers introduced, (3) that 
other measures for Anglicizing the inhabitants earlier sug 
gested by Shirley, 3 be employed. The results, they thought, 
would be likely to be satisfactory for the present generation 
and better in the future, especially if intermarriage with the 
English were encouraged, and a considerable mixture of 
other Protestants, such as existed in Pennsylvania, were in 
troduced. This they thought safer than an attempt to 
remove all the inhabitants, which might result in a general 
revolt or an exodus to Canada. The latter would add about 
30,000 Catholic inhabitants to that province, and lead to 
strong efforts to retake the country. 

Before returning to England Shirley issued a declaration 
to the inhabitants of the peninsula in the king s name to dis 
abuse them of the impression that they would be bodily de 
ported or otherwise maltreated by the British government. 
In this document he said nothing of the continuance of the 
Catholic faith, in the absence of further instructions from 

1 Cf. supra, pp. 345, 360. 

2 Cf. supra, pp. 360-361. 

3 Cf. supra, pp. 380-381. 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 383 

the crown. The omission was due to the belief that the con 
tinuance of that faith would perpetuate the influence of the 
French priests over the inhabitants. 1 His other chief service 
affecting Nova Scotia in that period was the preparing of 
the plan of government referred to above. 2 

Before that scheme could be prepared, Bedford was in 
charge of colonial affairs, and Shirley therefore submitted 
it to him. This proposed government was based in general 
upon the existing Massachusetts charter, but with modifi 
cations. 

First, he suggested the vacating of any claim which Massa 
chusetts might have to Nova Scotia based upon its charter. 
The other provisions suggested by way of departure from 
the Massachusetts system were chiefly for the purposes ( i ) 
of insuring to the royal prerogative and to : the executive 
branch of the government a larger share in its control than 
the charter of that province allowed, (2) of discouraging 
the Catholic religion, (3) of insuring a better administra 
tion of justice by having the supreme court act as a court 
of equity instead of having equity functions exercised by the 
general court, (4) of effectually reserving mast trees, (5) 
of providing a temporary government by the governor and 
council until the French inhabitants should be reasonably 
familiar with the English language and English settlers 
should arrive in sufficient numbers to establish a civil govern 
ment, a large degree of local self-government meanwhile 
being granted to the French inhabitants. 3 

In this period Shirley found it again necessary to enter 

Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 20, 1747, C. 0. 5 901, 164, (extracts), Sh. 
Cor., vol. i, pp. 404-405. 

2 Cf. supra, p. 378. 

For this plan of government sent to Bedford, Feb. 18, 1747, cf. Sh. 
Cor., vol. i, pp. 472-477; Shirley to Bedford, Feb. 27, 1749, ibid., pp. 
470-471. 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

into earnest controversy with the assembly to secure an 
annual grant of the value of 1,000 sterling for his sup 
port, and in 1749 he accepted an excuse for their failing to 
make the grant of the customary amount. 1 

Also, it was in the fall of 1747 that there occurred in 
Boston an affair more directly concerning Admiral Knowles 
and the officers of his fleet, who had been engaged in the 
wholly customary occupation of impressing seamen needed 
to replace deserters. In doing so they resorted to the not 
unusual device of taking men from shipping in the harbor. 
This practice was thoroughly hated by the people of Boston, 
as, among other hardships, many natives of the province 
might thus be secured. Shirley had reduced the rigors of 
this practice by interceding to secure the release of natives 
of Massachusetts, and he also frequently issued warrants for 
impressing seamen on shore through the provincial authorit 
ies, so worded as to exempt " inhabitants of the province, 
fishermen, mariners belonging to coasting and outward ves 
sels." 

The general conditions were such as to* offer good soil 
in which to plant seeds of sedition. Boston had shared in 
the heavy burden of the war with the rest of the province 
and had borne the additional burden of supplying large 
numbers of seamen. Men were supplied for the temporary 
service of vessels fitted out to serve ( i ) under the province 
for a coast guard, (2) for the Louisburg expedition, (3) 
for the contemplated expedition against Canada, (4) for 
the defense of Nova Scotia, (5) as despatch-boats, (6) to> 
carry supplies and men to New York for the contemplated 
expedition against Crown Point, and (7) as privateers. 
Finally, Boston had also been the chief port of call for all 
British squadrons in northern waters who were in need of 
men, and under war conditions Shirley had regularly sup- 

1 Cf. supra, pp. 113-114. 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 385 

ported them in taking them. So severe had been the drain 
of men and so strong the encouragement to sailors to go 
elsewhere, that at times Boston was almost destitute of 
seamen, while crowds of idle sailors lounged upon the streets 
of the more hospitable ports of Newport, Rhode Island, and 
New York. 

This condition became acute while the Louisburg expedi 
tion was preparing, and it was then thought that the im 
pressment of seamen by the governor s warrant, while pro 
tecting the excepted classes, injured the province by driving 
away the men needed for its trade and its privateers, and by 
raising the wages of seamen. At the same time British 
vessels were impressing seamen from inward-bound vessels, 
thus cutting off the supply which might have relieved the 
shortage. 

A change of policy did not come, however, until the fall 
of 1745, while Shirley was at Louisburg. At that time 
Lieutenant-Governor Phips allowed men from a warship to 
join with a provincial officer in impressing seamen. The 
press gang from the ship acted with great brutality resulting 
in the death of two seamen who, according to the terms of 
the warrant, were exempt from impressment. A provincial 
court rendered a verdict of aggravated murder in the case 
and in this Shirley concurred. 

The result of this outrage was to make the impressment 
of seamen so odious in the town as to provoke outbreaks 
whenever attempted, and the governor s council refused to 
approve further warrants for doing it. This left captains 
of vessels entering Boston harbor free to impress from ves 
sels there without exemption, and they were given a stronger 
motive for doing so by the recent passage of an act of 
Parliament forbidding the impressment of seamen in the 
West Indies. Therefore, they were virtually certain to be 
short of men when they visited Boston, the commercial 



386 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



center of the northern colonies. Thus it seemed not un 
likely, in view of the liking of naval commanders for New 
England seamen, that Boston would be reduced to ruin by 
the kidnapping of her seamen and the destruction of her 
trade. Incidentally, the same process would cut off a large 
part of the provisions and fuel for the town, which were 
brought by sea, except when the town was in effect block 
aded by man-hungry British warships. 

Such was the situation when Knowles brought his fleet ta 
Boston. He had commanded at Louisburg when the at 
tempt was made to levy upon the garrison the cost of their 
provisions, and a considerable number of Massachusetts 
men in Shirley s and Pepperrell s regiments, who were then 
in garrison, had participated in the successful mutiny 
against the obnoxious rule. 

Moreover, Knowles, in conjunction with Shirley, was now 
engaged in settling the accounts for the proposed expedition 
against Canada upon terms which were not regarded as 
generous to the men who had enlisted for that service. 

However, the issue which was raised was squarely that 
of impressment. On the night o<f November i6th Knowles 
made a general sweep of all the vessels in the harbor for sea 
men, taking among others three carpenter s apprentices be 
longing to the town, besides seamen on outward-bound ves 
sels. Shirley believed that he would have released the lands 
men and enough of the seamen to prevent crippling the 
trade of the port upon application, but this proved to be far 
from the thoughts of those most interested. 

Like most popular uprisings, this one was apparently more 
popular in sympathy than in participation. It appears that 
the mob consisted, as the governor said, " of three hundred 
seamen, all strangers, (the greatest part Scotch) with cut 
lasses or clubs," or as a Boston town meeting declared, " of 
foreign seamen, servants, negroes, and other persons of 
mean and vile condition." 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 387 

This undigested element in Boston s population was active 
early on the morning after Knowles coup, assaulted some 
officers from the fleet then on shore, took others in custody, 
and defied and wounded the sheriff of Suffolk county. 
Shirley thereupon called on the militia to put down the riot, 
but before this could be done the mob confronted the gover 
nor at his house. He succeeded in rescuing their prisoners, 
but was himself insulted and an officer on guard outside 
his house was carried off. Most of the English officers on 
shore now assembled at the governor s house where they 
were under the guard of some officers, who alone of the 
militia would appear, the men generally apparently being 
in sympathy with the riot. 

That afternoon the governor was beset for a time by the 
mob in the town house, they being importunate for the re 
lease of the impressed men, the surrender to them of the 
English officers, and the execution of the sailor convicted of 
murder on an earlier occasion, whose sentence had been 
suspended by royal order. 

Various other riotous proceedings followed, a number of 
inhabitants joining in them, and as the militia failed to ap 
pear, the governor assisted the English officers with him to 
elude the mob and got aboard their vessels at night. The 1 
following day the officers who were held by the mob were 
released, the latter apparently having intended to use them 
merely as a basis for demanding the liberty of the impressed 
men. That day, likewise, Knowles proposed to bring his 
whole squadron before the town to awe them into submis 
sion. This Shirley prevented by prompt request, but as 
the disturbance continued the governor retired to Castle 
William until it was possible to execute his orders that the 
regiment of horse and three regiments of militia from Cam 
bridge, Roxbury and Milton, appear under arms. 

Very exaggerated stories of the extent and circumstances 



388 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



of the impressment had been circulated, and some of them 
may have been started by merchants in the town who were 
losers by the taking of the seamen. 

Shirley sought from Knowles the release of those seamen 
who would have been exempt under the old regime but the 
latter refused, especially while officers of his ships were held 
by the mob. The admiral, however, offered two hundred 
marines to reinforce the Castle. These the governor de 
clined, stating that he had gone there as a mark of public 
resentment at proceedings in Boston and not from concern 
-as to his personal safety. 

The governor s retirement to the Castle and steps for call 
ing out the country militia were followed by the appearance 
of part of the Boston militia, who kept watch that night. 
The next day a committee of the house of representatives re 
ported to him upon conditions. A day later a committee 
from the town of Boston appeared with a copy of a vote 
passed unanimously in a town meeting denouncing and re 
pudiating all proceedings connected with the riot. 

This vote Shirley accepted as sufficient ground for exten 
uating their behavior to the ministry, and upon request of 
the assembly, for representing the grievances which the 
province was suffering from impressments. 1 

1 For the events relating to this affair, cf. Suffolk Files, 60125 ; 
Shirley to Newcastle, Apr. 20, 1746, C. O. 5 45, 20; Shirley to Willard, 
Nov. 19, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 406-409; Minute of Boston Town 
meeting, Nov. 14, 1747, C. O. 5 886, Gg, 6; Proclamation against rioters, 
Nov. 21, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 410-411 ; Foote, Annals of King s 
Chapel . . . (Boston, 1882-1896), vol. ii, p. 40; Boston Weekly Post Boy, 
Nov. 23, and Dec. 14, 1747; (Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. i, 1747, C. O. 
5 901, 224; Shirley to Board, Dec. i, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 412-419; 
Boston Weekly News Letter, Dec. 17, 1747; Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 
31, 1747, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 420-423; Board to Shirley, June 18, 1748, 
C. O. 5 918, 214. For contemporary accounts, cf. Douglass, A Summary, 
Historical and Political (Boston, 1749-1751), vol. i, passim; Hutchinson, 
Hist, of Mass., vol. ii, pp. 386-390. The former, however, is not to 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 389 

It now appeared, however, that despite the recession of 
Shirley s popularity and influence he possessed large recup 
erative powers. He had too much ability and still enjoyed 
in too large a degree the confidence of the ministry to be 
submerged. He had already served as the mentor of the 
lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia and, in large measure, 
of the governor of New Hampshire, besides evolving plans 
which had secured mere or less support from the executives 
of Rhode Island, Connecticut and the other colonies as far 
south as Virginia. He was now called in as an adviser by 
Governor Clinton of New York. 

That administrator was having much trouble with his 
assembly, who refused to accept his leadership in the cause 
of future security, and would not earnestly support the con 
quest o f Canada, as Massachusetts, with perhaps no more 
reason, had done under Shirley. On the contrary the as 
sembly, according to New York precedents, hid behind the 
barrier of the Iroquois and used the embarrassments of a 
state of war to compel reductions in the governor s powers. 

This resulted in Clinton s writing to Shirley in August, 
1748, expressing the opinion that " the present state of His 
Majesty s government within this province requires the im 
mediate attention oi the ministry." Shirley had come to* 
New York to attend a recent conference with the Indians, 
and had been able to become fully informed of the situation 
through " the public papers, and other information which 
your excellency has directed Mr. Colden ito lay before me." 
Clinton, in view of his full knowledge, requested him to 

be taken without suspicion of partisanship since his account of these 
events led to a suit by Admiral Knowles against him for libel. Suffolk 
Files, Nos. 63469, 64145, 64529, 64940, 65515, 65550; Rec. Bo_ok Suf. Sup. 
Ct, 1747-1750, fols. 194, 276; A. P. C., vol. iv, p. 107. For a later account, 
cf. Noble, " Notes on the Libel suit of Knowles v. Douglass in the 
Superior Court of Judicature, 1748 and 1/49," in Pub. Col, Soc. Mass., 
vol. :ii, pp. 213-239. 



390 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

represent the situation to the Duke of Bedford, believing he 
would find things in such a state that he would think it his 
duty to give his views upon them. 

Shirley acceded to Clinton s request to the extent of con 
sidering the state of the New York government and drawing 
up his views of the situation. He suggested that his reflec 
tions might be employed by Clinton either for his private 
consideration or for his use in drafting a representation to 
the Duke of Bedford. Such a document, he thought, would 
come more properly from the New York governor than 
from himself. Shirley implied that he was moved to pre 
pare a statement partly by the fact that the " several late in 
novations .... and encroachments made upon his 
majesty s prerogative " greajtly tended " to weaken His 
government, not only in the colony of New York but in His 
Majesty s other colonies in North America, through the in 
fluence which so bad an example (in this colony especially) 
may have among them." 

Shirley observed that beginning with Clinton s accession 
in 1743 the assembly had begun ( i) making grants of salary 
to the governor annually instead of for a period of five years 
as previously, (2) passing acts appropriating public money 
in items for specified purposes instead of in a general grant 
to be drawn on by the governor and council, and (3) numer 
ous " other innovations tending to create an entire depend 
ency of the governour and other officers upon the assembly, 

and to weaken His Majesty s government in this colony 
j) 

He continued that he had learned that the assembly had 
(i) voted pay to agents, who were later employed in libel 
ling Clinton s administration, in the same act which ap 
propriated the governor s salary, (2) sent an agent to Eng 
land apart from the governor and council, (3) taken into 
their own hands part of the warlike stores and the applica- 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 391 

tion of public money for certain war purposes through their 
agents, (4) specified by the terms of their acts what sums 
should be issued by warrant of the governor and council, 
(5) specified that the salaries of provincial officials should 
not, in case of their decease, be paid in any part to their 
successors without a new grant, (6) passed the act for the 
governor s salary as the last of the session and intimated that 
unless the earlier acts were accepted the salary act would 
not be passed, (7) usurped in part the governor s function 
of naming and removing officers, and (8) taken into their 
own hands the erection of fortifications. 

Whereupon Shirley remarked that " the assembly seems 
to have left scarcely any part of His Majesty s prerogative 
untouched, and that they have gone great lengths towards 
getting the government, military as well as civil, into their 
hands." 

Shirley s general conclusion was that Clinton ought to 
demand that the assembly restore the government to the 
state it was in before these innovations were introduced, as 
it would be easier for him than for a successor to accomplish 
this. He suggested that it would aid to bring this about 
to secure, if possible, the disallowance by rthe crown of one 
or more of the acts by which the innovations had been 
brought about. He proposed also an additional instruction 
forbidding the governor for the future to consent to such 
acts. 1 

This episode shows what Shirley regarded as the proper 
status of a provincial government in America and as the 

Shirley to Clinton, Aug. 13, 1748, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 441-449; 
Clinton to Newcastle, Feb. 13, 1748, N. Y. Col. Docs., vol. vi, pp. 416- 
418. A discussion of the behavior of the New York faction which was 
making trouble for Clinton appears in A. P. C., vol. iii, pp. 269-272. 
From this statement it appears that the governor attributed to the 
faction as motives " a levelling, republican spirit and a desire for a 
kind of neutrality between New York and Canada." Ibid., p. 270. 



392 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A PI I STORY 

most effective methods to employ in maintaining the pre 
rogative in opposition to the assemblies. It may be added 
that Shirley s suggested remedies are what one would have 
expected from an able and alert board of trade, after the 
experience of that body in colonial administration. 

It is not improbable that Shirley thought something like 
this as he wrote his analysis and recommendation, for he 
had earlier in the same year written to> that august body 
pointing out defects in the acts of trade, which although 
certainly more obvious in their effects in America than in 
England were by no means hidden from the observant at 
home. In making these suggestions Shirley was trying to re 
move technical grounds upon which the judges of provincial 
courts broke in upon the admiralty jurisdiction " so 1 as in a 
great measure to elude the acts and defeat the intent of them 
for preserving the benefit of the plantation trade to Great 
Britain." This evil, he observed, was daily increasing. He 
said that customs officers often complained to him that if the 
admiralty courts were not soon given a general jurisdiction 
by act of Parliament in express terms, including the enforce 
ment of the several acts for the preservation of the plantation 
trade, the execution of them would soon become imprac 
ticable in America. He added that it had already become 
so in many matters which those courts were plainly intended 
to include within their purview. 

He said further that the colonies were abusing flags of 
truce to the injury of their own country. In this practice 
Rhode Island had specialized, sending upwards of sixty ves 
sels to the French West Indies within eighteen months, laden 
chiefly with provisions. This not only helped the enemy, 
but so reduced the food supply in the colonies as to make 
it doubtful if any considerable body of troops, or even the 
king s ships which might call, could for the future readily 
secure supplies. To legalize such traffic one prisoner per 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 393 

vessel for exchange was thought sufficient. Massachusetts, 
he added, had carried on no commerce with the enemy, but 
nothing short of an act of Parliament would be effectual to 
abolish such practices. 1 

When England declined to push the advantages which 
French disasters in 1746 and 1747 placed within her reach 
in America, the war there was practically at an end. There 
still remained only the payment of the bill. 

This bill consisted of two classes of liabilities, those which 
England would pay and those the payment of which she de 
clined. The latter were represented chiefly by huge issues 
of paper money on the part of those colonies which had been 
most active in the war, particularly by the New England 
colonies. Massachusetts, thanks to the large undertakings 
which Shirley had induced her to attempt, and especially to 
the Louisburg expedition and its aftermath, was well-nigh 
swamped. However, not all the charges assumed by the 
colonies would necessarily be paid ultimately by them. 

The large expenses incurred on account of the proposed 
expedition against Canada were in a class by themselves, 
inasmuch as the crown had promised to pay the larger 
portion of them. 2 

The arrangement made by the home government for meet 
ing its obligations in connection with that unappreciated 
effort, whereby Shirley and Knowles were to 1 discharge the 
men and settle the charges in consultation with the other 
governors, was marred by the same defect which had vitiated 
so many features of colonial administration, namely, divided 
authority and responsibility. The naming of two agents of 
the crown to do this work \vas perhaps based upon sound 
principles, for they could advise, check and assist each 

1 Shirley to Board, Feb. 6, 1748, C. O. 5 886, Gg, 3. 

2 Cf. supra, pp. 321-322. 



394 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 



other in an arduous and responsible task, but the direction 
that they consult with the various governors reduced the pro 
spect of good results. It gave the impression that the 
agents possessed no real authority (as in reality they did 
not), and encouraged the governors to go their own way in 
settling those bills relating to their respective colonies. 

Perhaps no arrangement could well have been devised 
more likely to create unsatisfactory relations between Shirley 
and his colleagues in the different colonies than this, and 
although it was a commission oi much dignity, it did not per 
ceptibly enhance his prestige. The work was further em 
barrassed by a direction that all the accounts and vouchers 
be sent together to England to be laid before Parliament. 

The outcome was what the ministry might have, and per 
haps had, foreseen. Knowles came to Boston; the men 
were discharged by proclamation; a tentative scheme was 
drawn up for settling the accounts, which was wholly un 
satisfactory to the different governments and was modified 
to allow a higher compensation to the men. There were 
still difficulties, as some of the governments thought to get 
better terms by presenting their cases at home. In the midst 
of these cumulative vexations, Knowles, like Warren in an 
earlier stage of the Canada imbroglio, received orders to go 
elsewhere, in this case to Jamaica. Shirley was thus left 
with full responsibility and next to no authority. Ulti 
mately Shirley received the New Hampshire accounts to 
transmit home. 

There were difficulties with Clinton at New York, who 
had been obliged {to provision not only his own levies but 
also those from the provinces farther south, since they re 
fused to provide their men with supplies. Finally, Shir 
ley had difficulty in settling his accounts in Massachusetts, 
which perhaps illustrated the old jealousy between regular 
and colonial troops from a new angle, although personal 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 395 

greed seemed to play a part. The trouble arose solely 
through Samuel Waldo, the governor s chief client in the 
days of his law practice, and one of the group of supporters 
who secured his appointment to the governorship. Until 
this time Waldo had been one of his staunchest supporters, 
serving as brigadier-general and commander of a regiment 
at Louisburg and as commander of the troops designed for 
the unrealized Crown Point expedition of 1746-1747. 

General Waldo, however, had now grown so great that 
he could no longer recognize a superior in the governor, 
now apparently to some extent under a cloud at home. 
He insisted that he was entitled not only to all the perquisites 
which an officer in the regular British army holding his 
offices of brigadier-general in command of forces and of 
commander of a regiment might claim, but also, as Shirley 
declared, others which no officer in the regular service had 
ever enjoyed. Shirley asserted that his instructions did not 
allow him to consent to these claims, and Waldo thereupon 
refused to account to the governor for sums placed in his 
hands to be used for the payment of the troops which had 
been in his command. Shirley then sued him, to force 
delivery of his vouchers to enable the governor to account 
with the government at home. Finally Waldo took the 
matter before the home government, and it seems to have 
done Shirley some harm in England, partly, no doubt, be 
cause of charges made by Waldo that Shirley had encour 
aged the officers appointed by him to present him with a 
costly gift. This Shirley denied, declaring that the pro 
posal of a gift had come from one of the chief officers and 
had been represented as a spontaneous token of respect from 
the men in the service bearing commissions, and that when 
he learned that it had been reported that a contribution was 
being levied upon them to meet the cost of it, he had at 
once ordered the matter dropped, and before his difficulty 



396 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

with Waldo arose had insisted that sums collected be re 
turned. 

The implied charge of an effort to force a contribution 
from the officers who were to be paid by him is supported 
only by Waldo s inexplicit statement; and Waldo was the 
sort of person whose bond was somewhat better (than 
his word. 1 

The difficulties growing out of this distasteful task 
furnished one of the reasons for Shirley s return to Eng 
land, a little later, that he might explain the tangled affair 
upon the spot, and it cannot be doubted that he found it a 
disadvantage to appear upon such an errand. 2 

1 It is recorded, that upon receiving in London the news of his father s 
decease, he took advantage of a provision of his parent s will which 
provided that each of the members of his immediate family should be 
supplied with a suit of mourning, and charged to the estate a mourning 
equipment which in variety and costliness would have been adequate for 
royalty itself. (Suffolk county Probate Records, vol. xxix, pp. 89, 397; 
Suffolk Files, 166854). Waldo also illustrated his disposition and char 
acter by at once falling out with the co-executors of his father s will 
and carrying a series of cases to England on appeal to the privy council 
from the decisions of the provincial courts, finally losing all of them. 
(Minute Book, Suffolk Superior Court, 1730, 1733, pp. 190, 244, 246, 251, 
306; Suffolk Files, 6114, 6713, 7415, 38964, 40223, 41914- 44055, 4584 1 , 
54160, looioi, 166854, fragments, 385.) In general, Waldo probably es 
tablished a record for litigiousness in a period in which law suits were 
almost a popular diversion. 

One of the perquisites which W aldo claimed was to be at the expense 
of widows or heirs of soldiers who had died in the service. Waldo 
demanded the accrued pay of the dead men as his own in case a will 
or letters of administration were not presented to prove a right to 
such sums. 

2 A calendar of the documents dealing with the settlement of the ac 
counts of the proposed Canada expedition would be extensive. There 
are many documents in the P. R. O. and also among the public records 
for that period of the different colonies concerned in the expedition. A 
few of the more significant ones are : Newcastle to Shirley, May 30, 1747, 
R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 229, extracts, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 386-388; Proc 
lamation by Shirley and Knowles discharging the men, Oct. 28, 1747, 



POLITICS VERSUS GRATITUDE 397 

[Note continued.] 

Min. Prov. Cl. Pa., vol. v, p. 142; Shirley to governors of colonies con 
cerned in the expedition, Oct. 29, 1747, C, O. 5 45, 48; Shirley and 
Knowles to Newcastle, Nov. 28, 1747, C. O. 5 901, 93 ; Shirley to Clinton, 
Dec. 19, 1747, C. 0. 5 901, 172; Shirley to Newcastle, Dec. 28, 1747, 
C. 0. 5 901, 230; Shirley to Bedford, Feb., 1748, extract, Chalmers Mss., 
Canada, 1692-1792, New York Public Library ; Shirley to Bedford, July 
2, 1748, C. O. 5 45, 119; Shirley to Bedford, January 10, 1749, Sh. Cor., 
vol. i, pp. 460-461 ; "A state of the sums charged by Governor Clinton 
for his own extraordinary services and expenses, and other monies 
expended by him in carrying on the expedition against Canada, which 
have been disallowed," etc., T I 327; "Account of expenses incurred 
during the war in his majesty s service in North America, on account of 
the intended expedition against Canada, and for other services arising 
therefrom and for the succour of Nova Scotia" (this gives the accounts 
of all the colonies which participated), T i 328. 

For the Waldo imbroglio, cf. Case of :Samuel Waldo of Boston in 
New England, Mar. 4, 1748, Shirley to Newcastle and Pelham, 1747 (?), 
Shirley to Waldo, Oct. 31, 1746, all in C. 0. 5 753; Shirley to Bedford, 
July 2, 1748, C. O. 5 45, 119; Shirley to Waldo, July 7, 1748 (extract) 
T i 330, full letter in Ar., vol. Ixxiii, fols. 492-495, 498. Cf. also for 
documents on the differences between Shirley and Waldo, Ar., vol. 
Ixxiii, fols. 473-511. Cf. also, the 118 documents relating to the suit of 
Shirley v. Waldo in Suffolk Files, 65640. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 

REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE LOUISBURG EXPEDITION 

THE settlement of the charges for the unrealized Canada 
expedition offered Shirley no opportunity for large service. 
It was uninspiring work of the sort which well illustrates 
the ingratitude of governments and of peoples. 

Apropos of the payment of the accounts for the Louis- 
burg expedition, however, as the undertaking was more 
glorious in its circumstances, so also were the succeeding! 
financial adjustments more prolific of opportunities for 
public benefit. 

The news that the home government had assumed the 
charge for the relief of Nova Scotia by Massachusetts in 
1744 1 naturally aroused expectations that the conquest of 
Cape Breton, which was so much more notable an exploit, 
would produce a like action at home. 2 Doubtless this ex 
pectation was partly responsible for the request by the 
Massachusetts general court to Shirley that he would, upon 
reaching Louisburg, " give orders that a full account of the 
proceedings of the New England forces rais d under my 
commission for the reduction of Cape Breton during the 

1 This news was known to the assembly before they voted to support 
the Louisburg expedition. Jour., Jan. 8, 1/45, p. 165. 

2 For the action of the home government for reimbursing Massa 
chusetts for her expenses in Nova iScotia in 1744, cf. A. P. C., vol. iii, 
pp. 787, 788. 
398 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 399 

late siege of this place to the time of its surrender should 
be transmitted in the most effectual manner, and as soon as 
possible, to His Majesty." x 

This prudent care that the deserts of the province should 
not be overlooked was necessary. The exploit appealed 
to the public imagination but to the British mind Brittania 
was the heroine of the campaign. As a corrective for this 
bias, a small group of Americans, writing from the colonial 
viewpoint, in the next few years made Cape Breton almost 
as familiar as Gibraltar to the British reading public. Not 
only did Shirley, while at Louisburg, collect information 
regarding the siege and send it to Newcastle in the form of 
a report, 2 which was after a time in print, but accounts by 
General Pepperrell, William Bollan and an anonymous 
author supposed to be Robert Auchmuty were also shortly 
published in London. 3 Therefore there was little excuse 
vouchsafed to the English government for ignoring the 
claims of Massachusetts in that connection. 

Bollan, who was Shirley s son-in-law, and William 
Shirley, Jr., went to England at the end of summer, 1745; 
the former with an unofficial commission to inform the 
Duke of Newcastle of the state and circumstances of the 
northern colonies, and particularly regarding Louisburg 
and Nova Scotia, with which he was said to be thoroughly 
acquainted.* The latter was also said to be familiar with 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 28, 1745, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 273. 

2 Shirley to Newcastle, Oct. 28, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 245, printed only in 
part in Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 273-279. 

3 Cf. Shirley, A Letter to the Duke of Newcastle, op. cit.; Pepperrell, 
A Letter to Captain Henry Stafford with an accurate Journal and Ac 
count . . . (Oxford, 1746) ; Bollan, The Importance and Advantages 
of Cape Breton truly Stated and Impartially Considered (London, 1746) ; 
Massachusettensis, op. cit. 

* Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 3, 1745, C. O. 5 900, 219. A few months 
later Shirley sent a letter introducing Bollan to Bedford, importing that 



400 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

the details of the expedition. 1 Doubtless the functions of 
these agents were intended to be partly personal to the 
governor but Bollan apparently made his chief task for the 
time the soliciting of reimbursement for the province s ex 
penses in taking and holding Louisburg. 2 In this task the 
assembly voted that he was to act with the cooperation of 
Kilby, the regular agent of the province, who, however, 
gave little aid. 

Upon his arrival he found thrust upon his attention the 
fact that British self-esteem was strongly arrayed against 
him. Brittania not only ruled the waves but declined to 
rule otherwise, especially through the efforts of undis 
ciplined colonials. 3 

part of his son-in-law s functions in England related to the admiralty 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of the acts of trade in America, con 
cerning which he was able to report and advise. Shirley to Bedford, 
Oct. 31, 1745, Ad. I, 3817. 

1 Shirley to Newcastle, Aug. 3, 1745, C. 0. 5 900, 220. 

2 Jour., July 31, 1745, p. 92; Aug. i, 1745, p. 94. His trip had been 
decided on before the assembly voted to employ him but perhaps with 
some understanding that he would be thus employed. James Otis later 
expressed the opinion that Bollan ,vas primarily the representative of 
Shirley " and what is here called the Shirlean faction/ made up of 
officeholders and high churchmen and including Thomas Hutchinson. 
Otis to Mauduit, Oct. 28, 1762, Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. Ixxiv, pp. 76-77. 

s The Gentleman s Magazine (vol. xv, p. 386) contained a diverting 
plaint from Jeffery Broadbottom, "writer of Old England Journal," 
expressing deep concern that England seemed to have in this instance 
deserted the element where she was naturally supreme, and also dis 
playing a troubled mind at the prospect that an act of Parliament be 
stowing captures upon those making them might be applied in this case. 
If that were done he foresaw that it might not be possible for England 
to facilitate the making of peace by offering the recent conquest to 
France as a propitiatory gift. His grief of spirit was doubtless assuaged 
by the astute and veracious author of the historical chronicle in the 
same publication who observed that his fears were apparently ground 
less since the act in question " relates only to captures made by private 
adventurers and Cape Breton was taken by His Majesty s fleet." Evi- 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 401 

Upon reaching London, Bollan found the stage set for a 
wholly British play in which the Americans should be merely 
spear-bearers. It was to be heresy to consider the con 
quest as other than a naval one. As much was said " by 
a noble lord then in the ministry." So Bollan boldly ac 
cepted the alternative of being a heretic, as otherwise he 
could find no foundation for claiming that the Americans 
had served their country in such wise as to deserve considera 
tion. 

But the ear of the ministry was filled by the din of war 
abroad and of rebellion at home, and when approached 
upon the subject of reimbursing New England the proposal 
seemed as discordant as the other clamors. But Bollan with 
much perspicacity determined that if his suit must be un 
pleasant he would not stand in it alone, but, if possible, en 
list on his side the great British public, usually inarticulate 
upon colonial questions. Therefore he and Kilby presented 
to Newcastle a petition that Shirley s letter of October 28, 
1745, and the accompanying journal should be published 
by authority, so thait the services of the New England troops 

dently Warren s address in elbowing himself into the leading role at 
the capitulation was received very approvingly at home, and it was 
naturally pleasing to the chief of the admiralty, who consequently could 
not be deprived of the only honor available from the campaign. Since 
it was well-known that Britain s might upon the seas was her chief 
reliance such reasoning seemed convincing. 

A further illustration of the prevalence of the natural English 
appreciation of their unsolicited victory was brought to Bollan s at 
tention upon his landing, when the first British newspaper to meet his 
eye recorded " an address to His Majesty on the success of his navy 
in taking Cape-Breton, without making the least mention of the land 
forces employed on that occasion." Bollan to Willard, Apr. 23, 1752, 
Mass. H. S. Colls., vol. i, pp. 53-54. 

One expert, however, triumphed over all difficulties by suggesting 
that "The keeping therefore of Cape Breton, the improving of the 
fishery there . . . and in a word, pursuing our successes at sea, which 
is our proper element, is the only means we have of sustaining and 
increasing our own power ..." Gentleman s Magazine, vol. xv, p. 428. 



402 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

might become known to their country. With this request 
the duke after several months solicitation complied. 1 Verbal 
compliance, however, was far from performance, which 
seemed as unlikely as in the case of the Canada expedition, 
and Bollan thereupon pressed more earnestly for what had 
been pledged. 2 

Although the duke ultimately redeemed his promise, be 
fore this point had been settled the main issue had been 
raised in such form as to demand all Bollan s attention. A 
petition from the province for reimbursement had been 
thrown into the ministerial hopper by June, I746, 3 and then 
began a series of events which Bollan thought surprising. 

Upon first presenting the matter to the privy council 
Bollan found them ready to agree that the province should 
be given " satisfaction " for their expenses, etc., in connec 
tion with the expedition. 4 With the rise of Bedford s in 
fluence in the cabinet, however, there was an increasing 
tendency to reconsider the part which Massachusetts had 
played in that affair, so that after a delay until November 
for action, it transpired that the committee of council had 
advanced to the position that the province should receive 
" some satisfaction." 5 

Bollan took this in the sense in which it doubtless was 
intended, as a proffer of a not too gracious gratuity to the 
province. By great efforts he got the ear of the lord presi 
dent of the council, who reluctantly took the matter up anew 

Presumably Bollan also considered that the publication in this wise 
of these accounts of the siege would tend to increase the prestige of 
Shirley. 

Bollan and Kilby to Newcastle, undated, C. 0. 5 900, 254; Bollan 
to Willard, Apr. 23, 1752, loc. cit., p. 54. 

/&/. 

*Ar., vol. xx, fol. 369- 

Bollan to Willard, Nov. 15, 1746, ibid., vol. xx, fols. 367-368. 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 403 

with the chief ministers. They then demonstrated their 
serene disregard of impertinent suggestions by unanimously 
deciding that the report stood well. Unabashed, he rejoined 
that after waiting so long such action would leave the prov 
ince worse off than as though nothing had been done, and 
that if a better report could not be secured he would go to 
Parliament without it. The committee of council, however,, 
apparently remained determined to make a report to that 
effect up to the morning for presenting it, when Bollan de 
clared that he would not agree to what was proposed what 
ever the consequences should be. Such presumption was 
hardly to be borne, but would be inconvenient to ignore in 
so clear a case, wherefore the report was made that the 
province should receive " reasonable satisfaction." * 

Then followed a long series of conferences, explanations, 
arguments and memorials on Bollan s part in the effort to 
get, in sequence, a " reasonable " interpretation of this 
statement from the various executive and legislative bodies 
and functionaries concerned. First, it was referred to the 
board of trade and the secretary at war. The former after 
Examining much data furnished by Bollan, calling in the 
ever-useful Warren to testify regarding expenses at Lotiis- 
burg, and conscientiously searching into the peculiarities of 
provincial accounts, reported the facts as they found them 
but without recommendation, which they believed them!- 
selves unable to make in the absence of many of the 
vouchers. These, Bollan explained, had not been sent be 
cause they were very voluminous and subject to capture by 
the enemy. Nevertheless, the board was moved to testify 
to their opinion that the expedition had been conducted with 
great frugality, and that they were satisfied of the truth 
and accuracy of the accounts presented. 2 

1 Bollan to Willard, Feb. 5, 1747, ibid., vol. liii, fol. 213. 

1 Ibid., vol. xx, fol. 369; Board to King, Apr. 7, 1747, C. 0. 5 918, 176. 



4 4 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

Thereupon the privy council, after prolonged inaction, 
referred the matter to the lords of the treasury. 1 To some 
underlings of the lords of the treasury was then delegated 
the task of examining anew the accounts and other data 
already reported upon by the board oi trade and the secre 
tary at war. 2 They, having been persuaded with difficulty 
to accept the position already taken by the board of trade, 
reported to the lords of the treasury. a However, the lords 
of the treasury were doubting Thomases. The first lord in 
troduced the subject by appreciatively remarking that, since 
the province had undertaken the expedition without orders, 
any allowance made them for their expenses would be 
" bounty." Bollan repudiated the implication of mendic 
ancy, and rejoined with respectful subtlety that if they had 
waited for orders the expedition could not have succeeded, 
that notice of it was promptly sent to the secretary of state, 
and that the approval of it by the king and his having ac 
cepted the fruits of it seemed a full equivalent for orders.* 
It was still necessary, however, to persuade their lordships, 
as it had been in the case of all servants of the crown who 
had previously considered the question, that the payment 
should be a sum equal to the value of the money which the 
province had paid when the expedition was financed, in 
stead of to the value of an equal number of pounds of 
Massachusetts bills at the time of reimbursement, those 
bills having meanwhile sunk greatly in value. 

The home government s attitude on this point showed the 
not surprising fact that they were scarcely less ready to 

1 Bollan to Willard, June 9, 1747, Ar., vol. xx, fol. 392 and vol. liii, 
fol. 2133. 

Bollan to Willard, Apr. 23, 1752, he. cit. 
3 Bollan to Willard, Nov. 5, 1747, Ar., vol. xx, fols. 400-401. 
* Bollan to Willard, Feb. 29, 1747, t Wrf., fols. 411-413. 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 405 

profit by the depreciation of the colonial bills of credit than 
was any other debtor. 1 

Bollan seems to have been told as early as December 4, 
1747, that Parliament had voted to appropriate money for 
the reimbursement. This report he later stated to be prema 
ture. There was apparently no more than an informal un 
derstanding that the money would be voted. 2 Meanwhile, 
Massachusetts, relying upon his assurances, voted authority 
to Bollan to receive the sums granted on behalf of the 
province.* 

While the question was before Parliament Bollan became 
more aggressive. Apparently to the equal surprise and dis 
gust of the ministry he had the Massachusetts case printed 
and distributed to every member of the House of Commons. 
This, one noble lord said, was not usual. 4 Equally surpris 
ing was the subsequent agreement of the ministry that the 
province was justly entitled to 1 reimbursement to the amount 
of 183,649:2 7}^, sterling, the sum claimed by Bollan. 5 

There remained the task of getting a bill appropriating 
that sumi through the House without any hearty support 
from the ministry, which Bollan accomplished by a personal 
canvass of members. He also defeated a proposal to make 
the payment piecemeal proportioned to the retirement of 
the bills of credit in Massachusetts. 

Having gotten the grant through Parliament he found the 

*For the attitude of the home government regarding the basis for 
computing the sum to be paid, cf. Bollan to Lords of the Treasury, Feb. 
25, 1747, AY., vol. xx, fols. 414-418; Bollan to Willard, Feb. 29, 1747, 
ibid., fols. 411-413; Bollan to Willard, Apr. 23, 1752, loc. cit. 

2 Willard to Greene, Mar. 5, 1748, R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 212; 
Bollan to Willard, Dec. 10, 1747, Ar., vol. xx, fol. 405; ditto to ditto, 
Jan. i, 1748, ibid., fol. 407. 

3 Ibid. , fol. 420. 

4 Bollan to Willard, Apr. 23, 1752, loc. cit. 
Ibid. 



40 6 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

lords of the treasury very much disinclined to listen to 
requests for payment. After some months of waiting these 
prudent gentlemen offered to pay one-third of the grant 
down, and the remainder according to the desires of the 
governors of the colonies concerned upon the giving of 
security to account in the English court of exchequer for 
the sums paid. Apparently, under this arrangement, the 
grant could be disposed of by Massachusetts only in such 
ways as might be approved of by that court. 1 

Bollan then retorted in a memorial to the lords of the 
treasury that Parliament had granted the money without 
restriction and that Massachusetts was entitled to immediate 
payment without conditions in the same way that any other 
creditor of the nation might be. The lords of that eminent 
board now saw, as they had not seemed to do before, that 
the money was due at once and that their sole function was 
to pay it, which they stated they were ready to do. 
Finally, after several further delays, the payment was 
made to Bollan and Sir Peter Warren, who had been author 
ized to act with him on behalf of the province, and the only 
remaining question was the disposition of the grant. 2 

Upon being finally assured by a vote o>f the Commons in 
committee of the whole house that the Massachusetts claim 
would be paid Bollan wrote home by way of advice as 
follows : 

1 This peculiar proposal was doubtless partly due to the attitude of 
Kilby, agent for Massachusetts, who opposed payment without some 
supervision of the disposition of the money by the home government. 
(Bollan to Willard, Sept. 7, 1748, Ar., vol. xx, fol. 435.) Kilby s attitude 
resulted in his prompt dismissal from his agency by the provincial 
government. A. and R., vol. iii, p. 455. 

For the Parliamentary grant and the securing of it from the 
treasury, cf. House of Commons Jour., vol. xxv, pp. 568-569, 614-615 ; 
Bollan to Willard, Apr. 23, 1752, he. tit.; Apr. 2, 1748, Ar., vol. xx, fols. 
221-222; Sept. 7, 1748, ibid., fol. 435; Sept. 21, 1748, ibid., fol. 450; Bollan 
to Treasury, Sept. 29, 1748, ibid., fol. 447; Davis, "Currency and Bank 
ing," loc. cit., pp. 212-214, 218-229, 234-241. 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 407 

In my humble opinion it will be for the honour and interest 
of the province to carry one point, viz., to have the money, when 
received, brought over into the province and exchanged so far 
as it will go for the bills of credit. What was said in Parlia 
ment as well as other considerations make it necessary for me 
to say this; and if it be agreeable to the sentiments of the 
province it may undoubtedly, I think, be attained ; but upon this 
head I presume I shall certainly receive orders. 1 

That Bollan s insight into the official state of mind in 
England was good was shown by the suggestion of the 
board o-f trade to Shirley a few months later, that an op 
portunity for remedying in some measure the evils of paper 
money was furnished by the reimbursement granted by 
Parliament, " in the orders for the repayment of which, we 
hope, care will be taken to sink an adequate quantity of 
bills of credit. The effectual execution of these orders will 
much depend upon your care, integrity and circumspection." 
They therefore particularly recommended this service to 
him, " and that you would by all possible means discourage 
any new emissions of paper-bills . . . ."* 

In view of the course of events attending this reim 
bursement, one is led to query whether it is not probable that 
one important reason why the ministry did not proceed with 
the Canada expedition proposed in 1746 was a fear that 
success in such an undertaking would be a basis for further 
drafts by America upon British gratitude, which (aside 
from the expenses which would have to be met) the ministry 
was not inclined to honor. 

This train of events brought up with emphasis the issue 
which Shirley had strongly and sanely sought to carry to a 
solution before the French war : the reform of the Massa- 



to Willard, Apr. 2, 1748, Ar., vol. xx, fols. 221-222. 
Board to Shirley, June 18, 1748, C. O. 5 918, 214, 



408 WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

chusetts currency. His removal in large measure of the 
chief motives for continuing 1 a depreciated currency, by 
making it usually unprofitable for the debtor as well as the 
creditor, 1 and his proposal that the home government supply 
sound money for circulation in Massachusetts were both 
efforts in the direction which events were taking. With 
the grant from Parliament the reform movement was stim 
ulated by the opportunity to combine the retirement of the 
greatly depreciated paper with the wiping out of the huge 
burden of taxation which had been piled up for the next 
few years. These motives, and apparently a desire to win 
the approval of the ministry while reimbursement was at 
issue, had sufficient strength to lead to the introduction and 
the passage through two readings of a bill to secure the 
application of the reimbursement money to the retirement 
of the bills of credit. This was done before definite news 
of the action of Parliament had been received. 

At this point the assembly hesitated. In view of the ap 
parent need for cooperation of the other New England 
governments in the matter, they voted to name commis 
sioners to confer with representatives who might be named 
by those governments. The purpose was to 1 secure a com 
bined effort to retire all bills of credit in New England. 
This would also prevent, it was thought, the payment of 
the expenses for the Louisburg venture in English goods. 
A reimbursement of that character would probably be upon 

1 The machinery for securing equitable payment of debts had broken 
down in considerable degree during the stress of the war. After the law 
providing for this regulation expired, Mar. 31, 1747 (A. and R., vol. ii, 
p. 1083), no law for the purpose existed for several months, and when 
in September, 1747, another law was passed to replace it, it differed 
substantially from its predecessor. It made allowance for changes in 
the cost of living as well as of exchange to London, thereby reducing 
the stability of business relationships in the effort to secure an adjust 
ment of burdens to the capacity of the people to bear them. A. and R., 
vol. iii, pp. 373-375- 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 409 

terms more profitable to English merchants than to the colo 
nies concerned, whereas the suggested solution would be 
profitable to both. It seemed desirable to act early to pre 
vent the forming of plans in England inimical to the real 
ization of the scheme. Shirley therefore at once wrote to 
all the other New England governors upon the matter. 1 

A few days after thus writing, the news (later contra 
dicted) that Parliament had made the expected grant came 
in a letter from Bollan on December ioth, 2 and Secretary 
Willard promptly sent a letter voted by the general court to 
the other New England governors notifying them of this. 3 
In this letter he referred to the fact that " there have been 
some proposals and endeavors, that the payment might be 
made by debentures," and added that " nothing seems so 
likely to prevent it, as applying the money granted to redeem 
and finish our fatal paper currency, so absolutely necessary 
o the establishment and preservation of justice in our com 
merce, and so much for the interest of Great Britain, as well 
as ourselves." 

Continuing, he added : " This, we are sensible cannot be 
done effectually, without the meeting of the several assem 
blies, interested in this grant ; it is therefore hoped that your 
honor will call your general court together as soon as may 
be," that commissioners might meet by the following April 
1 2th. Prompt knowledge of the intent to apply the grant 
in that way, it was suggested, would prevent the payments 
being made by debentures, "or any dilatory methods of 
payment." 4 This effort for joint action, however, was 

1 Shirley to Wentworth, Feb. 20, 1748, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 565. 

* Hollan to Willard, Ar., vol. xx, fol. 405. 

8 Willard to Wentworth, N. H. Pr. Ps., vol. v, p. 566; Willard to Greene, 
R. I. Col. Recs., vol. v, p. 212, Sh. Cor., vol. i, pp. 382-383, both Mar. 
5, 1748. 

4 Ibid. 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

not received favorably. Apparently the other colonies 
lacked either faith or desire. 

While this was being done the Massachusetts assembly 
authorized Bollan to receive her share of the grant, 1 and 
there for the time the matter rested. 

Bollan used the uncompleted action in Massachusetts as 
a basis for memorializing the lords of the treasury upon 
the need for reforming the paper currency of the province, 
which the government, he said, had determined upon but 
could not carry out until the promised reimbursement was 
made. 2 

Thus there had been created in both England and America 
a sentiment in favor of the retirement of the bills of credit 
by -means of the money which Parliament would furnish, for 
the mutual benefit of colony and mother country. 

Shirley did what the circumstances would allow to bring 
about the necessary act of the legislature for putting this 
scheme into effect. As a royal governor he could not ex 
pect to be fortunate in a direct appeal that they apply the 
Parliamentary grant as he might think wise, especially since 
he had lately been obliged to enter into a continuing con- 

l four., Mar. 5, 1748, p. 237; Ar., vol. xx, fol. 420. 

Bollan to Lords of Treasury, June 15, 1748, Ar., vol. xx, fols. 428-429. 
Shirley referred to this measure as " the bill transmitted to your 
agents, containing a scheme for sinking the whole paper currency of 
this province by means of the late reimbursement voted by Parliament 
and which pass d both houses of the last assembly ..." (.Shirley to 
Legislature, Oct. 27, 1748, A. and R., vol. iii, p. 455.) As this bill had 
not become a law the governor apparently referred somewhat ambigu 
ously to passage through the first two readings and not to final passage. 
The board of trade seem to have been misled by this statement into 
supposing that the bill had become law. Bollan in explaining the affair 
to them, it seems, frankly stated the facts in regard to it, alleged that 
Shirley had made a mistaken statement, and implied that the governor 
presented the matter in that way to win support for the plan to retire 
the outstanding bills of credit. Davis, "Currency and Banking," loc. 
cit., pp. 225-226. 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 411 

troversy with the assembly to secure payment of his salary 
in a manner that would secure him from loss by the de 
preciation of the bills. 1 As usual he used the means that 
seemed most likely to succeed. Success, however, seemed 
as difficult in this instance as in that of the taking of Louis- 
burg. Perhaps it was actually more so, but in this case 
Thomas Hutchinson proved a better co-worker in the under 
taking than had appeared in the former case. Thomas 
Hutchinson, later royal governor of Massachusetts, was 
then the speaker of the house of representatives and a 
popular and influential member. He was also earnestly in 
favor of reforming the currency. 

The governor, after referring to the reasons favoring the 
retirement of the bills of credit, later told the story of what 
followed simply and with generous praise of Hutchinson in 
the following words : 

But I am persuaded these motives would not of themselves 
have prevail d in the house of representatives, had not their 
present speaker, Mr. Hutchinson, in concert with whom alone 
this act was originally plann d, and all measures previously 
settled, by his extraordinary abilities and uncommon influence 
with the members, managed and conducted it through the op 
position and difficulties it long laboured under in passing the 
house ; being almost the whole business of five weeks there. 2 

This act had been passed with the proviso that it should 
be valid in case the grant were paid by the end of March, 

1 Cf. supra, pp. 113-114. 

Shirley to Bedford, Jan. 31, 1749, Sh. Cor., vol. i, p. 467. 

For fuller information regarding the preparation and passage of this 
act, including Shirley s messages urging action, cf. A. and R., vol. iii, 
pp. 454-457; Davis, "Currency and Banking," loc. cit., pp. 214-216, 
229-232. 

For Hutchinson s own brief account of these events, cf. Hutchinson, 
op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 390-395; Diary and Letters of Thos. Hutchinson, 
vol. i, pp. 53-54- 



WILLIAM SHIRLEY A HISTORY 

1750, and it was expected that it would in that case, in com 
bination with a tax of 75,000, have the effect of retiring all 
the Massachusetts bills of credit then circulating in the 
province. 1 

As the lords of the treasury had promised immediate 
payment before this was passed, and the chief ostensible 
reason previously given for the delay had been the need 
for securing a satisfactory method of retiring the bills of 
credit, the arrival of this act in England early in the spring 
of 1749 was followed by its confirmation in the summer of 
that year, thus pledging the executive branch o<f the home 
government to the Massachusetts plan for utilizing the reim 
bursement fund. 2 

The expectation that all outstanding Massachusetts bills 
would be retired at once was not realized, however. Ex 
penses in connection with the payment and transportation of 
the money to Massachusetts to some extent deranged 
financial plans already made, and delay in getting the news 
that payment had been made in England forced the as 
sembly to extend the time allowed for the consummation 
of the reimbursement. 3 

Mr. Hutchinson has usually been given the chief credit 
for this grqat success. To him belongs a chief part in 
carrying the point at that time in the legislature. Shirley 
could not have secured the reform, in all probability, with 
out his aid. On the other hand, if Shirley s previous efforts 
in the direction of currency reform and for creating a debt 
of the mother country to> the province had not been taken, 

1 A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 430-441. The act was passed Jan. 26, 1749. 

* A. P. C., vol. iv, pp. 85, et seq. 

3 On this phase of the matter, cf. A. and R., vol. iii, pp. 480-481, 
Hutchinson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 395. For a full discussion of the events 
connected with the payment of the money and the transition to a hard 
money basis, cf. Davis, "Currency and Banking," loc. cit., pp. 228-229, 
233-252. 



THE HARVEST OF THE WAR 413 

Hutchinson could not have supposed that the retirement of 
the bills lay within the bounds of possibility, much less have 
carried it to a successful issue. 

With the retirement of the bills of public credit through 
the agency of the money reimbursed by the home govern 
ment, a cycle in Massachusetts history and a distinct period 
in the life of Shirley were alike completed. The governor 
returned to England just as the arrangements for the reim 
bursement were brought to completion. After several 
years spent in other duties abroad, he returned to America 
to take up his governorship and the task of defending 
British interests there just as the last struggle between Eng 
lish and French for the control of the continent was about 
to commence. The record of these activities, widely diverse 
in environment and scope from those recounted above, can 
not be included in this volume. 1 

1 At a later time the writer hopes to present Mr. Shirley in his setting 
as commissary at Paris for the settlement of the Nova Scotia boundary, 
as governor and general in the early phases of the decisive struggle for 
Canada, and as governor of the Bahamas. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

[The following bibliography lists the manuscript and printed material 
which has proved most useful in the preparation of this volume.] 

PRIMARY SOURCES 
I. MANUSCRIPT 

Belcher Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society. Include and supple 
ment the published Belcher Papers. 
Boston Public Library Mss. Include several documents throwing light 

upon (Shirley s career. 

Chalmers Mss., Canada, 1692-1792, New York Public Library. Contain 
a good deal of material on the contests between the English colonies 
and Canada. 

Early Court Records in the office of the clerk of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County Court House, Boston. 
These consist of the following groups : 

Early Court Files (cited as Suffolk Files}. These contain a great 
variety of documents often throwing much light on political, 
economic, military and other questions. Valuable both for 
Shirley s activity as a barrister and for his later career. 
Early record books of the provincial courts for the different coun 
ties. Often incomplete and carelessly kept but informing. 
Records of the Massachusetts provincial court of Vice- Admiralty. 
Some information is given concerning the Louisburg expedi 
tion of 1745. Also facts relating to cases tried before the 
court, and other records. 

Hardwicke Papers, Miscellaney Mss., 75, 77, New York Public Library. 
Of value for this work, chiefly, for the light thrown upon the atti 
tude of the ministry toward the war against France from 1744 to 
1748, and for European conditions and events affecting the war in 
America during those years. 
Inner Temple Book of Admissions from 1670 to 1750. At the Inner 

Temple in London. 
Inner Temple List of Barristers, from 1590-. In the Inner Temple 

archives in London. 

Massachusetts Archives. The general collection of public documents, 
chiefly manuscript, relating to all departments of the Massachusetts 
414 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



415 



government before independence. There are fewer documents re 
lating to judicial matters than to legislative and executive. Very 
rich in material upon all phases of provincial action. Within this 
collection are found the following classes of documents: 

1. Journals of the House of Representatives. (Cited as Jour.) 
The printed journals of the lower house of the provincial 
legislature. 

2. Court Records. (Cited as Ct. Recs.) The manuscript legis 
lative records of the governor and council, as the upper house 
of the provincial legislature. 

3. Council Records. (Cited as Cl. Recs.) The manuscript exe 
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4. Documents, chiefly manuscript,, not included in I, 2 and 3, 
relating to all phases of governmental affairs (Cited as Ar.) 

Parkman Manuscripts, Massachusetts Historical Society. Transcripts 
chiefly from .London and Paris. Contain considerable information 
upon the relations between the English and French colonies in 
America. 

Public Record Office Records, London. (Cited as P. R. O.) As it 
must clearly appear from a reading of the preceding pages, a very 
large mass of the material upon which they are based was secured 
from the Record Office. The official correspondence between per 
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which is found there, made it possible to treat the problems of 
Shirley s career with both the imperial and the provincial points of 
view in mind. Material for this volume was drawn from the 
following groups of documents : 
Admiralty Papers, Secretary s Department, Class I. (Cited as 

Ad. I.) 

Chatham Papers. (Cited as Chatham Ps.) 
Colonial Office Papers. (Cited as C. 0.) Classes 5, 24, 42. 
Patent Rolls. 

State Papers Domestic. (Cited as S. P. D.) 
Treasury Papers, Class I. (Cited as T I.) 
War Office Papers, Class 25. 

Suffolk County [Massachusetts] Probate Records, vol. xxix. 
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II. PRINTED 

A. Public Records and Writings of Public Men 

Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massa 
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41 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Acts of the Privy Council of England; Colonial Series: edited through 
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Adams, John, Diary, in Works. 10 vols. Boston, 1850-1856. Vol. ii. 

Adams, .Samuel, The Writings of Samuel Adams, collected and ed. by 
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Andrews, C. M., List of Reports and Representations of the Plantation 
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Chalmers, George, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers on Various Points of 
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Davis, A. M., Calendar of the Papers and Records relating to the Land 
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, Tracts and other Papers relating principally to the Origin, Settle 
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Harris, George, The Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. 3 vols. 
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417 



Kimball, G. S., ed., The Correspondence of the Colonial Governors of 
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INDEX 



Acadia, cf. Nova Scotia 
Adams, John, 36 n., 107 
Adams, Samuel, 104 n. 
Admiralty, The, 38, 40, 68, 78, 

80-81, 126, 135, 142, 145-148, 

150, 153, 313, 3i6, 359, 3/8, 399 

n. 4 

Aix la Chapelle, treaty of, 374 
Albany, 313-314, 317, 319, 322, 

342, 366-368, 371 
Alleghanies, frontier created 

along, 263 
American Revolution, influence 

of land-bank excitement upon, 

107 

Amesbury, town of, 149 n. 3 
Andros, Edmund, 51 
Annapolis Royal, cf. Nova 

Scotia 
Anson, George, Lord Anson, 335 

n. i, 377 

Antigua, 262 n. i, 282 
Antin, Marquis d , 93 
Anville, N. de la Rochefoucauld, 

Due d , expedition of, 347-351, 

353, 356-357, 359, 372 
Ashuelot river, 54 
Atkinson, Theodore, 71 
Attleboro, town of, 138 
Auchmuty, Robert, 36 n., 78, 79, 

104 n., 145-148, 151, 227-229, 399 
Barbadoes, 308 
Barker, Francis, father-in-law of 

Governor Shirley, 14 
Barrington, Lord, cf. Shute, 

John, Viscount Barrington 
Bath, Earl of, cf. Pulteney, Wil 
liam, Earl of Bath 
Bay Verte, 336, 344, 362, 363 n. 5, 

373 
Bedford, Duke of, cf. Russell, 

John, fourth Duke of Bedford 
Belcher, Andrew, 145-147 
Belcher, Jonathan, 21, 23; and 

Shirley, 14 n. 4, 21, 35, 37, 42, 



47, 49, 55, 64-93 passim, 98; 
backing of in England, 23-25, 
63-64; enmity between David 
Dunbar and, 32-33, 57-65 pas 
sim; policies of as governor, 
22-23, 24-25, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44- 
47, 49-50, 54-55, 56-66 passim, 
70-71, 99-100, 104-105, 116-117; 
and Waldo, 57-61 passim, 75- 
78, 80; removal of from gov 
ernorship, 63-91 passim; re 
tirement of, 92-93; and finan 
cial questions, 90, 95, 99-100, 
103-105, 106, 169, 177 and n. 3 

Belcher, Jonathan, Jr., 24-25, 63, 
64,82 

Belknap, Jeremy, 245, 255 n. i 

Berwick, Me., 53, 59 and n. 

Bills of credit, cf. under colony 
names, currency problem in. 
Cf. also Currency, in Massa 
chusetts 

Bladen, Martin, 23-24, 26, 29, 38, 
63, 68, 83, 87-88, 90 

Blakeney, William, 87 

Board of Trade, cf. Trade, 
Board of 

Bollan, William, 142-143, 147 n. 
3, 399-407, 409-410 

Boston, 94 n., 120, 125, 143, 144, 
146, 147 n. 3, 171 n. 4, 173, 251, 
259, 264, 265, 279, 280, 281, 284, 
285, 302, 315, 328, 349, 350, 351, 
353 n. 2, 384-388 

Bowdoin (Bowden), James, 75- 
76, 78, 79-80, 147 n. i 

Boydell, John, 25 

Braddock, Edward, 263 

Bradley, R., 65 

Bradstreet, John, 209, 232 n. 3, 
235-236, 245 n. 4, 247 n. 2 

Brest, 329, 333 

Brunswick, Me., cf. Fort George 
at 

Burnet, William, 21, 22-23, 103 
425 



426 



INDEX 



By field, Nathaniel, 40-41,43-44,47 

Cabinet, English, 16 n., 17, 320 

Cabinet Council, 15, 17 

Cambridge, Mass., 387 

Canada, 100, 114, 124-125, 203, 
267,272, 359,.382; proposed ex 
pedition against, plans for, 113, 
295-314, 339-340, 342, 352, 356, 
368; measures for, 315-337; fur 
trade in, 220, 221, 308; ship 
building in, 221, 232 n. 3 

Canso, 182-184, 265, 266, 283-285, 
288-290, 298, 300, 312, 352, 361 

Cape Ann, 130 

Cape Breton, cf. Louisburg 

Cape Sable Indians, cf. Indians, 
under French control 

Carolina, defense of, 296 

Carthagena, 97 

Casco Bay, 53, 130 

Castle William, 93, 117-118, 119, 
120, 121, 124, 125-126, 130, I7< 
211, 277, 298, 350, 351, 387, 3^ 

Cathcart, Charles, Lord, 85, 87 

Champlain, Lake, 340 

Chapeaurouge (" Gabarouse ") 
bay, landing place for Louis- 
burg expedition (1745), 265, 
289, 290, 291 

Chapman, Richard, 81 

Charles I, 26 

Charlestown, N. H., 365 

Chebucto (Halifax), 336-337, 344, 
348, 352, 356, 357, 361, 362 

Chignecto, 381 

Clarke, George, 87, 225-226 

Clinton, George, 197, 269-270, 
3I3-3M, 328, 342, 362, 367, 369, 
370, 371, 372-373, 389-391, 394 

Colden, Cadwallader, 389 

Colman, John, 104 n. 

Commons, House of, cf. Parlia 
ment 

Compton, Spencer, Earl of Wil 
mington, 63, 64, 74, 75 n. 2, 80, 
89 n., 102, 135 

Comptons, The, Earls of North 
ampton, related to Shirleys, 
n n. 

Concord, N. H., 53 

Connecticut, court fees in, 156; 
and the French and Indians, 
186-187, 198-199, 365, 366, 367; 
and Louisburg, 257, 265, 266, 
268, 269, 273-274, 276, 280, 281, 
282-284, 306 n. 3; and Canada, 



299, 300, 309 n., 317, 321, 323, 
327, 328, 355 n.; and Crown 
Point, 342, 362; and Nova Sco 
tia, 191, 216, 343; and D An- 
ville s expedition, 350; cur 
rency problem in, 160, 171- 
174, 408-410 

Connecticut river and valley, 53, 
54, 274, 275, 341 

Cooke, Elisha, the younger, 41, 43- 
44, 45-47, 52, 56, 59, 72, 95 " 

Council of Plymouth, cf. Ply 
mouth, Council of 

Courts, admiralty, 25, 38-44, 45, 
47-49, 143, 144, 145-148, 154, 
392; of common law, 39, 41-44, 
60-61, 143-144, 145, 147 n. 3, 148, 
I5I-I53, 155-158, 392; court of 
exchequer, 406 

Coventry, Eng., 90 

Cowley, Mr., 378 n. 2 

Crown Point, 114-115, 301, 308, 
340-346, 352, 358 n. 2, 360, 362, 
365, 373, 378 

Cuba, 96, 98 

Currency, in Massachusetts, 09- 

I08, 112, 113, 120, 122, 123, 127- 

129, 131, 135-136, 157 n. i, 158- 
180, 192-193, 195-196, 206-207, 
213-214, 243, 280, 393, 404-405, 
407-413. Cf., also, under col 
ony names, currency problem 
in 

Gushing, William, 36 n. 

Damariscotta, Me., 244, 255 n. 2, 

363 

Dana, Francis, 36 n. 

D Antin, Marquis, cf. Antin, 
Marquis d* 

D Anville, Due, cf. Anville, N. 
de la Rochefoucauld, Due d 

De Lancey, James, 371 

de la Warr, Thomas, alliance of 
with Governor Shirley s an 
cestor, ii n. 

De Ramsay, Chevalier, cf. Ram 
say, Chevalier de 

Devereux, The, Earls of Essex, 
related to Shirleys, n n. 

Dorchester, Mass., 126 

Douglass, William, 388 n. 

Dudley, Joseph, 21, 72, 119 

Dudley, Paul, 72 

Dummer, Fort, N. H., cf. Fort 
Dummer, N. H. 

Dummer, Jeremiah, 40 n. 3 



INDEX 



427 



Dummer, William, 21, 53, 103 
Dunbar, David, 31, 32, 56-57, 65 ; 
policies of, 32, 33, 40, 44-45, 49, 
55-56, 59-60, 61-62, 63-64, 67, 
71-72, 151; and Belcher, 32-33, 
40, 49, 55, 56-57, 57-65 passim, 
74-81 passim 

Dunstable, town of, 53, 149 n. 3 
Duquesnel, Jean Baptiste Pre- 

vot, 182, 209-212, 232 
Durell, Capt., 260, 263 
Duvivier, Francois Dupont, 188, 

215, 219, 234, 238, 261 
Dwight, Joseph, 276, 351 
Essex, Earls of, cf. Devereux, 

The, Earls of Essex 
England, evolution of govern 
ment in, 15-21, 26-29; Amer 
ican policies of, 30-31, 38-4, 
56-57, 60, 66, 93, no, 117-118, 
127-129, 133-154, 161-162, 213- 
214, 219, 223, 224, 257, 258-259, 
295-296, 309, 311-312, 315-323, 
329-336", 338-341, 345-346, 366- 
367, 369, 372, 374, 370-380, 384- 
388, 393-394, 398-4io; .war of, 
with Spain, cf. Spam, war 
with; war of, with France, cf. 
France, war with 
Exeter, N. H., riot at, 61-62, 78 
Falmouth (Portland), Me., 34, 

1 20, 130 

Faneuil, Benjamin, 147 n. i 
Fitzroy, Charles, Duke of Graf- 
ton, 90 
Flanders, operations in, 322, 333, 

346 
Fort Dummer, N. H., 185-188, 

242, 278, 386 
Fort George at Brunswick, Me., 

121 

Fort William Henry, 263 
Frampton, General, regiment of, 

315 

France, war impending with, 93, 
100, 114, 125, 126-127, 129, 131; 
war with, 130-132, 182-374; 
trade of, 221, 224, 316, 392; 
American policy of, 295, 296. 
Cf. also Louisburg, Nova Sco 
tia, Canada, Crown Point, In 
dians 
Frontenac, Louis de Buade, 

Compte de Palluau et de, 379 
Frost, John, 60, 152 



Frost v. Leighton, case of, 60-61, 

72, I5I-I53 

Gay ton, Capt., 261, 263-264, 282 n. 
George I, 15 
George III, 26-27 
Georgia, proposed province of, 

Gibraltar, chief justiceship of, 86 
Gooch, Sir William, 268 n. i, 321- 

322, 328, 341 n. 5 
Gore, Christopher, 36 n. 
Gorges, Sir Ferdinando, 52 n., 

Gorges, Sir Ferdinando, the 
younger, 67 n. i 

Gorham, Capt., 215 

Grafton, The Duke of, cf. Fitz- 
roy, Charles, Duke of Grafton 

Greene, William, 268, 353 

Gridley, Jeremiah, 36 n. 

Groton, town of, 149 n. 3 

Gulston, Joseph, 59, 81 

Halifax, N. S., cf. Chebucto 

Hampshire County, Mass., 127 

Hampton, N. H., 54 

Hanover, electorate of, 15 n., 20, 
309 

Hanover, House of, 15, 20, 26, 27 

Hardwicke, Lord, cf. Yorke, 
Philip, Lord Hardwicke 

Harrington, Earl of, cf. Stan 
hope, William, Earl of Har 
rington 

Harrison, Captain, 236 

Haverhill, town of, 149 " 3 

Heron, Patt, 184, 210-211 

Hill, John, 147 n. i 

Holden, Samuel, 69 

Holland, 143, 333 

Hopson, Peregrine Thomas, 377 

Housatonic valley, 274, 341 

Howards, The, Dukes of Nor 
folk, related to Shirleys, n n. 

Hubbard, Thomas, 147 n. i 

Hutchinson, Edward, 104 n. 
Hutchinson, Thomas, 50 n., 73 n., 
89 n., 147 n. i, 149 n. 4, 255 n. 
i, 400 n. 2, 411-413 
Indians, of New England, 58 n., 
77, 116, 122, 150, 181, 182, 200- 
201, 204-205, 213, 215, 298, 331, 
344, 361; under French con 
trol, 115, 130, 150, 200, 204-205, 
212-213, 215, 298, 303-304, 312, 
319, 340, 342, 366, 380, 381; the 
Six Nations, 197, 198-200, 297, 



428 



INDEX 



3I3-3M, 319, 322, 342-343, 358, 
362, 363, 365, 366, 367, 370-373, 
389. 

Jacobites, uprising of, 223-224, 322 
Jamaica, 93 n., 97, 98, 282, 308, 

r 394 T 
lames I, 340 

fames II, 27 

Iesuits, 115 

fohnson, William, 363, 371-372 
lennebec river, 31, 32, 34, 55, 
57, 59, 67, 251 n. i 

Kilby, Christopher, 72, 90, 183, 
226-227, 239-240, 258-259, 302, 
330, 331-332, 336, 400, 401, 406 
n. i 

Kilby, Thomas, 245 

King, Rufus, 36 n. 

King s woods, The, issue be 
tween home government and 
colonials over, 25, 29-32, 48, 
52-53, 56, 57, 59-62, 64, 66-67, 
71, 75 n. 2, 78, 86, 138, 144, 150- 
154, 202, 227, 317, 344, 383 

Kittery, Me., 275 

Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles, 
261, 282, 286, 315, 334-335, 340, 
360, 362, 363, 368, 373, 377, 382, 
384-389, 393-394 

Knowles riot, 384-388 

La Jonquiere, Jacques Pierre de 
Taffanel, Marquis de, 357, 372 

Land Bank, The, in Massachu 
setts, 104-108, 160-161 

Law, Jonathan, 276, 297 

Leighton, William, 60, 151-153 

Lestock, Richard, 332, 345-346, 
351, 357 

Leverett, Me., 279 

Lincoln, Me., 141, 279 

Llewellyn, Prince of Wales, re 
lated to Shirleys, n n. 

Lords Justices, The, 126, 130, 
141, 309 

Loring, Joshua, 244-245, 286-287 

Louisburg, 115, 126, 182-184, 203, 
209-212, 217-218, 219, 220-290 
Passim; expedition against 
(1745), plans for, 220-256, prep 
arations for, 257-280, execution 
of, 281-294, 300-302, reimburse 
ment for, 398-413; fishery at, 
220-221, 308; French title to 
recognized, 220, 352 and n.; as 
an English possession, 304-307, 
311-312, 313, 323, 329, 330, 33i, 



334-335, 336-337, 339-340, 343, 

344, 346, 347. 348, 349, 352, 354, 
355, 358, 363, 368, 377, 379, 380; 
return of to France, 352, 356 

Lyde, Byfield, 69 

Lydius, John, 363, 371 

Maine, economic matters affect 
ing, 30, 34, 52-53, 59-62; towns 
in, 52-53, 138-139, 141; title to, 
52, 66-67, 153; and adjacent 
districts, 67; defense of, 120, 
122-123, 124, 127, 298 n. 4, 303; 
land titles in, 55-56, 153 

Malbone, Godfrey, 268 

Manners family, The, related to 
Shirleys, n n. 

Marblehead, Mass., 130, 251-252 

Martinique, 289, 305 

Maryland, and Louisburg, 228; 
and Canada, 309 n., 317, 322, 
323, 328, 355 n.; and Crown 
Point, 360; and Six Nations, 
366 

Mascarene, John Paul, 189, 212- 

213, 215 n. 2, 234, 334, 343 n. 5, 

345, 361, 376 
Massachusetts Bay, colony of, 

50-52 

Massachusetts Bay. province of, 
administration of before Bel 
cher, 21-23; salary question in, 
21-23, 29, 45-47, 94, 95-96, 103, 
110-114, 383-384; charter of, 30, 
51, 56, 132, 139, 148, 153; rela 
tions of with English govern 
ment, 30, 31, 43-49, 56-57, 59- 
61, 93, 99-103, 117-118, 119, 
122, 123-124, 127-154, 398-413; 
" eastern country " of, 32, 33- 
34, 55, 57-59, 66-67, 75 n. 2, 81- 
82, I48 : i50, 317, 363; policy of 
expansion of, 34, 50-62, 70-71, 
73 n., 74, 75, 80, 83, 93, .14^ n. 3, 
149-150, 280; commercial inter 
ests of, 34 and n. 3, 38, 142- 
148, 166, 173, 175, 188, 189, 220, 
246, 249; Belcher s administra 
tion in, 35-91 passim; financial 
problems in, 45-47, 94, 95, 96- 
97, 99-108, 1 10, 112, 115, Ii7> 

119, I2O-I2I, 122, 123, 125, 127- 

129, 136, 145 n. 3, 158, 159-180, 
192-193, 195-196, 205-207, 213- 

214, 242-244, 405-413; towns, 
establishment and functions of 
in, 51-54, 56, 57, 59~6o, 138-142; 



INDEX 



429 



war activities of assembly of, 
96-97, 101, 116-117, 118-123, 
124, 125-126, 129, 130, 188, 190- 
198, 202-208, 213, 217, 242-255, j 
324-326, 331; preparations of 
for war with France, 114-131, 
181-182, 185-209; fees in, 155- 
158; fisheries of, 162 n., 175, 
182, 183, 189, 203, 212, 222, 246, 
249; problem of forests in, cf. 
King s woods, The; expedition 
against Spanish West Indies, 
cf. Spain, war with; and Louis- 
burg, cf. Louisburg; and Can 
ada, cf. Canada; and Nova 
Scotia, cf. Nova Scotia; and 
Crown Point, cf. Crown Point; 
and Indians, cf. Indians; and 
Knowles riot, cf. Knowles 
riot 

Matinicus, Me., 255 n. 2 
Menis, N. S., 191, 218, 344, 359- 

361, 362, 381 
Merrimac river, 53 
Milton, Mass., 387 
Mississippi valley, 221, 313 
Montreal, 301, 308, 317, 322, 329, 

339, 340, 354. 373 

Morris, Lewis, 267, 270, 327 

Nantasket, Mass., 283 

Natick, Mass., 141 

Newcastle, Duke of, cf. Pelham- 
Holles, Thomas, Duke of New 
castle 

New England, 289, 290, 291, 292; 
natural resources of, 30, 31; 
industry in, 34; expansion of, 
34; legal development in, 36 
and n. 2; Belcher and, 37, 38, 
40, 50; and West Indian expe 
dition, 96; Puritanism in, 115- 
116; trade of, 143, 144-145; 
fishery of, 220, 227, 344 

Newfoundland, 220, 259, 284, 
288, 321, 348, 352 

New Hampshire, administration 
of Belcher in, 21, 30, 32, 49-50, 
54-55, 58, 61-62, 63, 64, 70-72, 
74-91 passim; relations of with 
Massachusetts, 50-55, 67, 70- 
71, 73 n., 74, 75 and n. 2, 80, 
83, 88 n., 89 and n., 149-150, 
185-188, 364; separation of 
from Massachusetts, 71, 74-91 
passim; and West Indian ex 
pedition, 87; currency prob 



lem in, 160, 171-174, 272, 276- 
277, 394, 408-410; the problem 
of the forests in, cf. King s 
woods, The; and Louisburg, 
240-241, 257, 265, 266, 268, 269, 
272-273, 276-278, 280, 281, 283 
and n. 4, 306 n. 3; and Can 
ada, 299, 300-302, 309 n., 317, 
321, 323-324, 328, 355 n.; and 
Crown Point, 342; and Six 
Nations, 366; and Nova Sco 
tia, 191, 216, 343, 353, 359-360 
New Jersey, court fees in, 156; 
and Louisburg, 257, 264, 266, 
267, 268, 269, 270, 273-274; and 
Canada, 309 n., 317, 322, 323, 

327, 328, 355 n.; and D Anville s 
expedition, 350; and Crown 
Point, 360; and Six Nations, 
366; currency problem in, 270 

New London, Conn., 273 

Newport, R. L, 385 

New York, 65, 68, 70, 114, 119, 
198-199, 366, 367; government 
of, 156, 389-391; jealousy ol 
toward . Massachusetts, 370- 
372; town of, 385; and Louis 
burg, 228, 257, 264, 266, 268, 
269-270, 273-274; and Canada, 
299, 309 n., 317, 322, 323, 327, 

328, 355 n.; and Crown Point, 
340, 342, 360, 362, 365; and Six 
Nations, 197-199, 342-343, 363, 
365, 3.66, 370-373, 389; and 
D Anville s expedition, 350 

Noble, Lieutenant-Colonel, 359- 

361 
Norfolk, Dukes of, cf. Howards, 

The, Dukes of Norfolk 
Norridgewalks, cf. Indians, of 

New England 
Northampton, Mass., 275 
Northampton, Earls of, cf. Comp- 
tons, The, Earls of North 
ampton 

North Carolina, 308, 309 n., 323 
Northfield, Mass., 53 
North Yarmouth, Me., 130 
Nottingham, town of, 149 n. 3 
Nova Scotia, 31, 58, 65, 75 n. 2, 
149, 211, 220, 314, 317; in the 
war (1744-1748), 115, 182-192 
passim, 197, 201, 204, 212-241 
passim, 258-267 passim, 298, 
312, 313, 331, 336-383 passim; 
inhabitants of, 183, 212, 215, 



43 



INDEX 



219, 223, 313, 314, 334, 337, 344, 
352, 361, 368, 379-383; gover 
norship of sought, 310-311, 375- 
3775 government of, 378-383, 

389 

Number Four, cf. Charlestown, 
N. H. 

Oglethorpe, General James, 126 

Oliver, Andrew, 147 n. I 

Onslow, Arthur, Esquire, Speaker 
of the House of Commons, 
related to Governor Shirley, 
12 n. 

Orange, House of, 26, 27 

Oswego, N. Y., 263 

Otis, Harrison Gray, 36 n. 

Otis, James, 36 n., 91, 400 n. 2 

Palatines, the case of the, 42 and 
n. 2 

Parkman, Francis, 327 n. 6 

Parliament, as a branch of Eng 
lish government, 15, 17, 18, 22, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 45, 46, 90, 1 06, 
133, 134, 333; and colonial 
questions, 29, 45-46, 66, 93-94, 
104-105, 106, 145, 147-148, 153- 
154, 173, 334, 393, 394, 4O3, 405- 
406; acts of, 106, 145, 147, 153, 
160, 161, 385, 400 n. 3, 405 

Parsons, Theophilus, 36 n. 

Partridge, Richard, 24, 63, 79, 82, 
104 

Pelham, Mass., 138 

Pelham, Henry, 68, 97 

Pelham-Holles, Thomas, Duke 
of Newcastle, as political 
leader, 16 n., 18-19, 20 n., 28; 
and Philip Yorke, Lord Hard- 
wicke, 19; as colonial admin 
istrator, 22, 25-26, 28, 29, 63, 
66, 83, 85, 89, 311, 315-316, 320, 
321-323, 332-336; and Shirley, 
cf. Shirley, William, and New 
castle 

Pemaquid, country about, 58, 
279; Fort Frederick at, 118, 
122, 123-124, 208 

Pemberton, Benjamin, 25, 69 

Penacook, N. H., 53, 54 

Penobscot river, 59 

Pennsylvania, grant to by home 
government for defense, 119; 
court fees in, 156; and Louis- 
burg, 257, 264, 266, 267, 268, 
269, 270-272, 273-274; and Can 
ada, 309 n., 317, 322, 323, 327, 



328, 355 n.; and D Anville s 
expedition, 350; and Crown 
Point, 360: and Six Nations, 
366 

Penobscots, cf. Indians, of New 
England 

Pepperrell, William, 127, 255 n. 

2, 273, 275-276, 284, 285, 288, 
290, 293-294, 304-306, 309-312, 

321, 386, 399 
Phillips, Richard, 217, 255 n. 2, 

310-311, 375-376 
Phips, Spencer, 304, 385 
Pigwackets, cf. Indians, of New 

England 

Piscataqua river, 34. 64, 189, 259 
Pitt, William, 16, 18, 263 
Placentia, 352 
Plaisted, Colonel, 351 
Plymouth, Council of, 150 n. I, 

340 

Portland, Me., cf. Falmouth 
Portsmouth, England, 332 
Pratt, Benjamin, 36 n. 
Prendergast, Sir Thomas, 79, 

145 n. 3 
Prerogative, The king s, 23, 25, 

26-27, 29-30, 31, 38-40, 41-46, 

56, 59, 60, 93, 95, 192, 383, 391 
Preston, a Shirley family manor, 

ii n. 
Privy Council, 144, 154; colonial 

questions before, 23, 28-30, 31, 

32, 33, 44, 45-46, 56-57, 60-61, 

68, 75 and n. 2, 81, 82, 83, 86 

and n., 88-89, 9i. 99, J i8, 124 n. 

2, 128 n., 149, 151, 152, 188-189, 

364 n. 2, 402-404, 412 
Pulteney, William, Earl of Bath, 

related to Shirleys, n n. 
Puritans, in New England, 222 
Quakers, 79, 270-272, 327 
Quebec, 124, 301, 308, 321, 329, 

339, 354, 355 

Quincy, Edmund, 147 n. I 

Quincy, Josiah, 36 n. 

Ramsay, Chevalier de, 344, 363, 
365 

Randolph, Edward, 30, 40 n. 3 

Read, John, 36 n. 

Rehoboth, Mass., 138 

Rhode Island, 48, 65, 93, 145 and 
n. 3, 156; and West Indian ex 
pedition, 87; and Louisburg, 
257, 265, 266, 268, 273, 280, 281- 
282, 306 n. 3; and Canada, 299, 



INDEX 



431 



309 n., 317, 321, 323, 326, 328, 
355 n.; and Crown Point, 342; 
and Nova Scotia, 191, 216, 
353, 360; and D Anville s ex 
pedition, 350; and Six Nations, 
366; and flags of truce, 392- 
393; currency problem in, 160, 
171-174, 408-410 

Rindge, John, 71 

Roche, James, 98 

Rouse, John, 235 n. 3 

Roxbury, Mass., 387 

Royall, Jacob, 147 n. I 

Russell, John, fourth Duke of 
Bedford, 312, 316-320, 338, 372, 
374, 376, 378, 383, 390, 399 n. 4, 
400 n. 3, 402 

Rutland, Dukes of, cf. Manners 
family, The 

Ryal, Lieutenant, 184, 232 n. 3, 
235-237 

Sable, Isle of, 347 

Saco, Me., 122, 123 

Sagadahoc, jurisdiction over, 55- 
59 passim, 149-150 

St. Ann s, Cape Breton, 340 

St. Clair, John, 321-324, 327, 332, 

o 333, 34i, 346, 348, 349 

St. Croix river, 31, 32 

St. George s river, 120, 122, 123, 
141, 149, 205 

St. John s Indians, cf. Indians, 
under French control 

St. Lawrence, gulf, 115, 301, 308, 
347; valley, 221, 295; river, 
308, 317, 319, 321, 329, 330, 
330, 339, 34i, 347 n. I, 352, 354, 
355 

St. Peter s, N. S., 284 

Salary question, in Massachu 
setts, cf. under Massachusetts 

Salem, Mass., 121, 351 

Salisbury, town of, 149 n. 3 

Saratoga, 313 

Saswalo or Sewallis de Eating- 
don, ii n. 

Sayer, Dr. Exton, 42 n. i 

Scotland, Jacobite uprising in, 
cf. Jacobites, uprising of 

Shirley, a Shirley family estate, 
ii 

Shirley, Frances, daughter of 
Governor Shirley, 348 

Shirley, Mrs. Frances Barker, 
wife of Governor Shirley, 14, 
49; her husband s agent, 66, 



67-70, 77, 84, 86 n.; death of, 
348 

Shirley, Isabel, of Preston, 12 n. 

Shirley, William, merchant of 
London, father of Governor 
William Shirley, 13 

Shirley, Governor William, qual 
ities, 11-12; family, 12 and n., 
13 and n. 2, 14; and Newcastle, 
12-13, 19-20, 35, 36, 47, 65-91 
passim, 93 n., 95-96, 98 n. I, 
100-101, in, 119, 124 n. 2, 130, 
135, I39-I4I, 145 n. 3, 152, 185, 
226, 241, 258-259, 263-266, 286, 
300, 306-309, 311, 315-316, 320- 
323, 328-329, 330-331, 332-335, 
339-340, 351-353, 356, 361, 362, 
365-366, 368, 375-38i, 399, 401- 
402; birth, 13; estate, 13 and 
n. 2, 14; education, 13-14; mar 
riage, 14; sought fortune in 
America, 14, 21; career as a 
lawyer, 14, 35-49, 58, 60-61, 64, 
77; and Belcher, 14 n. 4, 21, 35, 
37, 42, 47, 49, 55, 64-93 passim, 
98; his times, 16, 21; imperial 
policies and measures of, 30, 
41-42, 44, 48, 55, 64, 66-67, 93, 
96-98, 100-103, IH-II2, 119, 
126, 132-154, 206, 215-216, 217, 
218, 220-255, 260-268, 283-284, 
295-309, 312-314, 3i8, 320-321, 
325, 328-329, 330-331, 339-346, 
350-356, 359-368, 370-383, 389- 
394, 407-413; judge of ad 
miralty, 47; advocate-general 
of the court of admiralty, 47- 
49, 66, 68, 86, 144; applicant 
for office, 65-91 passim; acces 
sion of as governor, 92-93, 95; 
instructions of, 93, 96, 98-99, 
100-102, 108-109, no-ill, 112, 
127-128, 136-142, 156, 157, 206, 
213-215, 395; and the currency, 
93-94, 99-io8, 112, 119, 120, 122, 
123, 127-129, 159-180, 407-413; 
and the salary question, 94, 
95-96, 103, 110-114, 121, 383- 
384, 410-411; and the defense 
of Massachusetts, 114-132, cf. 
also, 347-359 passim; and eco 
nomic reforms, 155-180, 407- 
413; and early war measures, 
181-219; and Louisburg expe 
dition, 220-294; and proposed 
expedition against Canada, 



432 



INDEX 



295-337, 339-340; American 
regiment of, 309, 386; and 
Bedford, 320, 338-339; de 
creased prestige of, 368-372, 
375-377; services of in the war 
(1744-1748), 374; asked leave 
to visit England, 376; admin 
istration of Nova Scotia by, 
376-383, and Knowles riot, 
384-388; adviser to Governor 
Clinton, 389-391; and settle 
ment of the expenses for the 
proposed Canada expedition, 
393-397; and reimbursement 
for the Louisburg expedition, 
398-401, 407-413; completion of 
a distinct period in the life of, 
413; later career of, 413 and 
n.; and war with Spain, cf. 
Spain, war with; and preser 
vation of Cape Breton, cf. 
Louisburg, as an English pos 
session; and Nova Scotia, cf. 
Nova Scotia; and proposed 
expedition against Crown 
Point, cf. Crown Point; and 
D Anville s expedition, cf. An- 
ville, N. de la Rochefoucauld, 
Due d , expedition of 

Shirley, William, Jr., 310-311, 
399-400 

Shute, John, Viscount Barring- 
ton, 25 

Shute, Samuel, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 

52-53 

Silver scheme in Massachusetts, 
104 

Six Nations, cf. Indians 

South Carolina, 264, 323 

Spain, war with, 81, 83-88, 93, 96- 
98, 101, 103, 114, 126, 143, 144; 
trade with, 143, 144; colonies 
of in West Indies, 308 

Stamp Act, 107 

Stanhope, William, Earl of Har 
rington, 75 n. 2, 135 

Stoddard, John, 127, 198 n. I, 
275, 297, 340, 371 

Stone, Andrew, 135, 240, 286, 311 

Story, Joseph, 36 n. 

Stuart, house of, 15, 16, 26-27, 51 

Suffolk county, Mass., 142, 145 

Sussex, England, n n., 12 n., 13 

Tadousac, 355 

Temple, The Inner, Shirley 
trained in law at, 13-14; Jona 
than Belcher, Jr., at, 25 



Thatcher, Oxenbridge, 36 n. 

Thomas, George, 267, 268 n. I, 
270-271, 327, 328, 350 

Thomlinson, John, 71, 74, 75, 79, 
80, 81, 135 n. 2 

Ticonderoga, 263 

Tory party, 17-18, 224 

Towns, cf. under Massachusetts 
and Maine 

Townshend, town of, 149 n. 3 

Townshend, Charles, Viscount 
Townshend, 23 

Townshend, Admiral Isaac, 321, 
330, 336-337, 343, 347, 348 

Trade, Acts of, 25, 33, 40, 48, 
142-145, 146, 147-148, 392, 399 
n. 4 

Trade, board of, influence of, 23, 
25-26, 28, 29; functions of, 25- 
26, 28, 09, 127-129, 392; and 
colonial questions, 33, 39, 67, 
68, 80, 81-82, 89, 99, 101-102, 
103, 127-129, 135-144, 148-150, 
151, 160, 175-176, 187-188, 296, 
392-393, 403, 404, 407, 4io n. 2 

Treasury, control of in Massa 
chusetts, 116-117, 121, 131, 181- 
182, 194, 204-208 

Treasury, Lords of, 404, 405-406, 
410, 412 

Trowbridge, Edmund, 36 n. 

Tyler, Royall, 36 n. 

Union (colonial), plans for, 26, 
314, 325, 366-367 

Usher, John, 67 

Usher, Mr., 67 

Utrecht, treaty of (1713), 220 

Vardy, Mr., 245 

Vaughan, William, 244, 245, 247 
n. 2, 250-256 

Vernon, Admiral Edward, 93 n. 

Virginia, 67, 261, 264; and Louis 
burg, 228; and Canada, 309 n., 
317, 321-322, 323, 328, 341 n. 5, 
355 n.; and Six Nations, 342 n. 
6, 366; and Crown Point, 360 

Waldron, Richard, 63 

Walpole, Sir Robert, 18, 23, 25, 
68-69, 70 

Wager, Sir Charles, 64, 66, 68, 
89 n. 

Waldo, Samuel, 55-6i passim, 7 2 , 
73 n., 75-78, 80, 86 n., 90, 276, 
279. 342 n. 5, 395-396 

Walpole, Horace, 19 

Walpole, Horatio, 72 

Walker, Sir Hovenden, 225, 228 



INDEX 



433 



Warren, Sir Peter, 216, 218, 229 
n. 2, 234-235, 239, 241, 258-264 
passim, 271, 282-356 passim, 
369-377 passim, 394, 400 n. 3, 
403, 406 

Webster, Daniel, 36 n. 

Wendell, Jacob, 147 n. I 

Wentworth, Benning, 71, 81, 186 
n., 255 n. 2, 272, 276-278, 281, 
300-302, 323-324, 353 

Wentworth, John, 71 

Wentworth, General Thomas, 96, 
97,98 

West, Richard, 39, 67 n. 

Western, Mr., 85 

Western, Mass., 138 

West Indies, 260, 264, 282 n.; 
trade with, 34; warfare in, cf. 
under nations concerned 

Whig party, 16-21, 26, 27-29, 224 

Whitefield, George, 275 



Wilks, Francis, 22-25 passim, 35, 
45, 46, 72, 79 n. i, 99, 102 

Willard, Josiah, 125 n. 2, 409 

William Henry, Fort, cf. Fort 
William Henry 

Wilmington, Earl of, cf. Comp- 
ton, Spencer, Earl of Wil 
mington 

Winchester, N. H., 54 

Winslow, John, 96, 98 n. 

Wiston, a Shirley family manor, 
ii n. 

Wolcott, Roger, 273, 276, 282 n. 

Wolfe, James, 244 

Woods, The King s, cf. King s 
woods 

Wooster, David, 255 n. 2 

York County, Me., 56-57, 59, 127, 
130 

Yorke, Philip, Lord Hardwicke, 
19, 224 



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By YBTARO KINOSITA, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [42] The Employment of Women In the Clothing Trade. 

By MABEL KURD WILLBT, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. J43] The Centralization of Administration in Ohio. 

By SAMUEL P. ORTH, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XVII, 1903. 635 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [44] ""Centralizing Tendencies in the Administration of Indiana. 

By WILLIAM A. RAWLES, Ph.D. Price, $2.50 

2. f45] Principles of Justice In Taxation. By STEPHEN F. WBSTON, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XVIII, 1903. 753 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [46] The Administration of Iowa. By HAROLD MARTIN BOWMAM, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
. [47] Turgot and the SIX Edicts. By ROBERT P. SHEPHERD, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. f 48] Hanover and Prussia, 17 95-1803. By Guv STANTON FORD, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XIX, 1903-1905. 588 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [491 Josiah Tucker, Economist. By WALTER ERNEST CLARK Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. 6OJ History and Criticism of the Labor Theory of Value In English Polit 

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8. [51] Trade Unions and the I<aw In New York. 

By GEORGE GORHAM GROAT, Ph.D. Price. $1.00. 

VOLUME XX, 1904. 514 pp. Price, cloth. $3.50. 

1. [5*] The Office of the Justice of the Peace In England. 

By CHARLES AUSTIN BBARD, Ph.D. Price, $1.90. 

a. [6] A History of Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of 
the United States. By DAVID Y. THOMAS, Ph.D. Price, $&.oo. 

VOLUME XXI, 1904. 746 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [544 Treaties, their Making and Enforcement. 

By SAMUEL B. CRANOALL, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [55] The Sociology of a New York City Block. 

By THOMAS JESSE JONES, Ph.D. Price, gi.oo. 

3. [56] Pre-Malthuslau Doctrines of Population. 

By CHAULBS E. STANGBLAND, Ph.D. Price, ^9.50. 



VOLUME XXII, 1905. 520 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50 ; paper covers, 

[57] The Historical Development of the Poor L^w of Connecticut. 

By EDWAKD W. CAPKN, Ph. D. 

VOLUME XXIII, 1905. 594 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [581 The Economics of Land Tenure In Georgia. 

By ENOCH MARVIN BANKS, Ph.D. Price, fc.oo. 

2. [59] Mistake In Contract. A Study In Comparative Jurisprudence. 

By EDWIN C. McKuAG, Ph.D. Price, Ji.oo. 

3. [6OJ Combination In the Mining; Industry. 

By HSNRY R. MUSSBY, Ph.D. Pnc, *.oo. 

4. [61] The English Craft Guilds and the Government. 

By STHILA KRAMER. Ph.D. Prk*, Ji.oo. 

VOLUME XXIV, 1905. 521 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [63] The Place of Magic in the Intellectual History of Europe. 

By LYNN THORNDIKB, Pn.D. Price. x.oo. 

2. [63] The Ecclesiastical Edicts of the Theodosian Code. 

By WILLIAM K. BOYD, Ph.D. Price, Ji.oo. 

3. [64] *The International Position of Japan as a Great Power. 

By SEIJI G. HISHIDA, Ph.D. Price, Ja.oo, 

VOLUME XXV, 1906-07. 600 pp. (Sold only in Sets.) 

1. [65] Municipal Control of Public Utilities. 

By O. L. POND, Ph.D. (Not sold separately.) 

2. [66] The Budget In the American Commonwealths. 

By EUGENB E. AGGER, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. [67] The Finances of Cleveland. By CHARLES C. WILLIAMSON, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XXVI , 19?)7. 559 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [68] Trade and Currency In Early Oregon. 

By TAMES H. GILBERT, Ph.D. Price, |i.oo. 

2. [691 Luther s Table Talk. By PRESERVED SMITH, Ph.D. Price, 1.00. 

3. [7OJ The Tobacco Industry In the United States. 

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4. [71] Social Democracy and Population. 

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VOLUME XXVII, 1907. 578 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [78] The Economic Policy of Robert Walpole. 

By NORRIS A. BRISCO, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
3. [73] The United States Steel Corporation. 

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3. [74] The Taxation of Corporations In Massachusetts. 

By HARRY G. FRIEDMAN, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXVm, 1907. 564 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [75] DeWitt Clinton and the Origin of the Spoils System in New York. 

By HOWARD LEE McBAiN, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
3. [76] The Development of the Legislature of Colonial Virginia. 

By ELMER I. MILLER, Ph.D. Price, $1.30. 



3. [77] The Distribution of Ownership. 

By JOSEPH HARDING UNDERWOOD, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXIX, 1908. 703 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [78] Early New England Towns. By ANNE Eusa MACLBAR, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. 179] New Hampshire as a Koyal Province. 

By WILLIAM H. FRY, Ph.D. Price, 3.00. 

VOLUME XXX, 1908. 712 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50 ; Paper covers, $4.00. 

[SO] The Province of New Jersey, 1664-1738. By EDWIN P. TANNER, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XXXI, 1908. 575 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [81] Private Freight Cars and American Railroads. 



3. [S3] Ohio before 185O. By ROBERT E. CHADDOCK Ph.D. 

3. [83] Consanguineous Marriages in the American Population. 

By GHOHGH B. Louis AHNER, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents, 

4. [84] Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician. By FRANK H. HANKINS, Ph.D. Price, gi.a 5 . 

VOLUME XXXII, 1908. 705 pp. Price, cloth, 4.50; paper covers, $4.00. 

85] The Enforcement of the Statutes of Laborers. 

By BERTHA HAVEN POTNAM, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XXXIII, 1908-1909. 635 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [86] Factory Legislation in Maine. By E. STAGG WHITIN,A.B. Price, 

2. [87] *Psychological Interpretations of Society. 

By MICHAEL M. DAVIS, Jr., Ph.D. Price, 

3. [881 *An Introduction to the Sources relating to the Germanic Invaeiozta. 

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VOLUME XXXIV, 1909. 628 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [.89] Transportation and Industrial Development In the Middle West. 

By WILLIAM F. GEFHART, Ph.D. Price, $2.0*. 
ft. [9OJ Social Reform and the Reformation. 

By JACOB SALWYN SCHAPIRO, Ph.D. Price, Ji.5. 
S. [91] Responsibility for Crime. By PHILIP A. PARSONS, Ph.D. Price, $1.30. 

VOLUME XXXV, 1909. 568pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. 193] The Conflict over the Judicial Powers In the United States to 187O. 

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ft. [93] A Study of the Population of Manhattan vllle. 

By HOWARD BROWN WOOLSTON, Ph.D. Price, $1.25, 
8. [943 * Divorce: A Study In Social Causation. 

By JAMBS P. LICHTBNBBRGBR, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXXVI, 1910. 542 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. jj95l * Reconstruction In Texas. By CHARLES WILLIAM RAMSDELL, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 
3. [96| * The Transition In Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth. 

By CHARLES RAMSDELL LIWGLEY, Ph.D. Price, 1.50, 

VOLUME XXXVII, 1910. 606 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [97] Standards of Reasonableness in Local Freight Discriminations. 

By JOHN MAURICE CLARK, Ph.D. Price, 11.25. 
8. [98] Legal Development in Colonial Massachusetts. 

By CHARLBS J. HILKEY, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 
8. [99] * Social and Mental Traits of the Negro. 

By HOWARD W. ODUM, Ph.D. Price, fs.oe. 

VOLUME XXXVIII, 1910. 463 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

1. [1OO1 The Public Domain and Democracy. 

By ROBERT TUDOR HILL, Ph.D. Price, $.oo. 
8. [1O1] Organismic Theories of the State. 

By FRANCIS W. COKBR, Ph.D. Price, f i.fo. 

VOLUME XXXIX, 1910-1911. 651 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [1OS] The Making of the Balkan States. 

By WILLIAM SMITH MURRAY, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
8. [1O31 Political History of NeW York State during the Period of the Civil 

"War. By SIDNEY DAVID BRUMMHK, Ph. D. Price, 3.00. 

VOLUME XL, 1911. 633 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [1O4] A Survey of Constitutional Development In China. 

By HAWKLING L. YEN, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 
8. [1O5] Ohio Politics during the Civil War Period. 

By GEORGE H. PORTER, Ph.D. Price. $1.75. 

8. [1O6] The Territorial Basis of Government under the State Constitutions. 

By ALFRED ZANTZINGBK REED, Ph.D. Price, $1.75. 

VOLUME XLI, 1911. 514 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50; paper covers, $3.00. 

[1O7] New Jersey as a Royal Province. By EDGAR JACOB FISHER, Ph. D. 

VOLUME XLII, 1911. 400 pp. Price, cloth, $3.00; paper covers, $2.50. 

[1Q8] Attitude of American Courts in Labor Cases. 

By GEORGE GORHAM GROAT, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XLIII, 1911. 633pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1, [1O9] "Industrial Causes of Congestion of Population in New York City. 

By EDWARD EWING PRATT, Ph.D. Pries, Je.oo. 

11O] Education and the Mores. By F. STUART CHAPIM, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

Ill] The British Consuls in the Confederacy. 

By MXLLBDGK L. BOXHAM, JR., Ph.D. Price, $.<>. 

VOLUMES XLIV and XLV, 1911. 745 pp. 
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[118 and 113] The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School. 

By CHEN HUAH-CHAMG, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XLVI, 1911-1912.^ 623 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. > 

1. [1141 The Rlcardlan Socialists. BY ESTHER LOWENTHAL, Ph.D. Price.fi.o 

9. L116j Ibrahim Pasha, Oiraud Vizier of Suleiman, the Magnificent. 

BY HBSTEK DONALDSON JUNKINS, Ph.D. Price, 1.00. 
tt. [116] *Syndlcalisin in France. 

BY Louis LEVINB, Ph.D. Second edition, 1914. Price, f 1.50. 

A. [A IT] A Hoosier Village. BY NEWELL LBROY Sms, Ph. . Price. $1.50, 



1:1 



VOLUME XLVII, 1912. 544 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [118] The Poll tics of Michigan, 1805-1878, 

BY HARRIETTS M. DILLA, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 
8. [119] "The United States Beot Sugar Industry and the Tariff. 

BY ROY G. BLAKEY, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XL VIII, 1912. 493 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [ISO] Isidor of Seville. BY ERNEST BREHAUT, Ph. D. Price, |a.oo. 

3. [131] Progress and Uniformity In Chlld-Jl.abor Legislation. 

By WILLIAM FIELDING OGBURN, Ph.D. Price, 1.75, 

VOLUME XLIX, 1912. 592 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [182] British Radicalism 1791-1797. BY WALTER PHELPS HALL. Price, $2.00. 

S. [133J A Comparative Study of the Law of Corporations. 

BY ARTHUR K. KUHN, Ph.D. Price, 1.30. 
8. [1S4] *The Negro at Work in New Tork City. 

BY GEORGE E. HAYNES. Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

VOLUME L, 1911. 481 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [1351 *The Spirit of Chinese Philanthropy. BY YAI YUK Tsu. Ph.D. Price. $1.00. 
3. [136] *The Allen in China. BY Vi. KYUIN WELLINGTON Koo, Ph.D. Price, 2.50. 

VOLUME LI, 1912. 4to. Atlas. Price: cloth, $1.50; paper covers, $1.00. 

1. [187] The Sale of Liquor in the South. 

BY LEONARD S. BLAKKY, Ph.D. 

VOLUME LH, 1912. 489 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [1*8] *Provlnclal and Local Taxation in Canada. 

BY SOLOMON VINBBBRC, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
1. [129] *The Distribution of Income. 

By FRANK HATCH STRBIGHTOFF, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
8. [ISO] *The Finances of Vermont. By FREDERICK A. WOOD, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME LIH, 1913. 789 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50; paper, $4.00. 

[131] The Civil War and Reconstruction In Florida. By W. W. DAVIS, Ph.D. 

VOLUME LIV, 1913. 604pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. j[133] * Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States. 

By ARNOLD JOHNSON LIEK, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 
3. [133] The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation. 

By BLAINB FREE MOORE, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

S. [134] *Indlan Slavery In Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the 
United States. By ALMON WHEELER LAUBEK, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

VOLUME LV, 1913. 665 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [ 135] *A Political History of the State of New York. 

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8. [136] *The Early Persecutions of the Christians. 

By LEON H. CANFIELD, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME LVI, 1913. 406pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

1. [137] Speculation on the New York Stock Exchange, 19O4-19O7. 

By ALGERNON ASHBURNER OSBORNE. Price, $1.50. 
8. [138] The Policy of the United States towards Industrial Monopoly. 

By OSWALD WHITMAN KNAUTH, Ph.D. Price, 2.00. 

VOLUME LVII, 1914. 670 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [139] "The Civil Service of Great Britain. 

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8. [14O] The Financial History of New York State. 

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VOLUME LVIII, 1914. 684 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50; paper, $4.00. 

[141] Reconstruction In North Carolina. 

By J. G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, Ph.D. 

VOLUME LIX, 1914. 625 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [143] The Development of Modern Turkey by means of its Press. 

By AHMED EMIN, Ph.D. Price, Ji.oo. 
*. [143] The System of Taxation in China, 1614-1911. 

By SHAO-KWAN CHEN, Ph. D. Price, $1.00. 

8. [1441 The Currency Problem In China. By WEN PIN WEI, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

4. [145] "Jewish Immigration to the United States. 

By SAMUBL JOSEPH, Ph.D. Price, $1.90. 



VOLUME LX. 1914. 516 pp, Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [ 146] *Constantlne tlie Great and Christianity. 

By CHRISTOPHER BUSH COLEMAN, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

2. [147] The Establishment of Christianity and the Proscription of Pa 

ganism. By MAUD ALINE HUTTMAN, Ph.D. Price, 2.00. 

VOLUME LXI. 1914. 496pp. Price, cloth, $4 00. 

1. [148] *The Railway Conductors: A Study in Organized Labor. 

By EDWIN CLYDE ROBBINS. Price. 81.50, 

2. [149] *The Finances of the City of New York. 

By YIN-CH U MA. Ph D Price, $2.50. 

VOLUME LXII. 1914. 414 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

[ 15O] The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction. 
39th Congress, 18651867. By BENJAMIN B. KBNDRICK, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

VOLUME LXIII. 1914. 561 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [151] Emile Dnrkheim s Contributions to Sociological Theory. 

By CHARLES ELMER GHHLKE, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [152] The Nationalization of Railways in Japan. 

By TOSHIHARU WATARAI, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

3. [153] Population: A Study in Malthusianism. 

By WABRKN S. THOMPSON, Ph.D. Price, $1.75. 

VOLUME LXIV. 1915. 646 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [154] *Recoiistructioii In Georgia. By C. MILDRED THOMPSON, Ph.D. Price, 3.00. 

2. [155] *The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in 

Council. By ELMFR BHECHER RUSSELL, Ph.D. Price, $1.75. 

VOLUME LXV. 1915. 524pp. Price, cloth, $4-00. 

1. [156] *The Sovereign Council of New France 

By RAYMOND Du Bois CAHALL, Ph.D. Price, $2 25 

3. [157] *ScIentlfic Management (2nd. ed. 1918). 

By HORACE B. DRURY, Ph.D. Price, $2.00 

VOLUME LXVI. 1915. 655 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [158] *The Recognition Policy of the United States. 

By JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., Ph.D. Price, $2.oc. 

2. [159] Railway Problems in China. By CHIH fisu, Ph.D. Price. $1.50. 

3. [16O] *The Boxer Rebellion. By PAUL H. CLEMENTS, Ph.D. Price, 2.oe. 

VOLUME XXVII. 1916. $38 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [161] *Russlan Sociology. By JULIUS F. HECKER, Ph.D. Price, $2.50 

2. [162] State Regulation of Railroads In the South. 

By MAXWELL FERGUSON, A. M., LL.B. Price, 1.75 

VOLUME LXVIII. 1916. 518 pp. Price, cloth, $4 50. 

[ 163] The Origins Of the Islamic State. By PHILIP K. HITTI, Ph.D. Price, $400 

VOLUME LXIX. 1919. 489 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [164] Railway Monopoly and Rate Regulation. 

By ROIJERT J. McFALL, Ph.D. Price, $2 oo 

2. [165] The Butter Industry in the United States. 

By EDWARD WIBST, Ph D. Price, $2.00 

VOLUME LXX. 1916. 540pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

[166] Mohammedan Theories of Finance 

By NICOLAS P. AGHNIDES, Ph.D. Price, 4.00. 

VOLUME LXXI. 1916. 476 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [167] The Commerce of Louisiana during the French Regime, 16991763. 

By N. M. MILLER SURREY, Ph.D. Price, $3.50. 

VOLUME LXXII. 1916. 542pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. r !68] American Men of Letters: Their Nature and Nurture. 

By EDWIN LBAVIIT CLARKE, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. [169] The Tariff Problem In China. By CHIN CHU, Ph D. Price, $1.50 
3. 1 1 7O] The Marketing of Perishable Food Products. 

By A. B, Adams, Ph,D Price, $1.50 



VOLUME LXXIII. 1917. 616pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [171] *The Social and Economic Aspects of the Chartist Movement. 

By FRANK F. ROSENBLATT, Ph.D. Price, $2.00 

2. [172] *The Decline of the Chartist Movement. 

By PRESTON WILLIAM SLOSSON, Ph D. Price, |a.oo. 

3. [173] Chartism and the Churches. By H. U. FAULKNER, Ph.D. Price, $i.*<. 

VOLUME LXXIV. 1917, 546 . Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [174] The Rise of Ecclesiastical Control In Quebec. 

By WALTER A. RIDDELL, Ph.D. Price, $1.75 

2. [175] Political Opinion in Massachusetts during the Civil War and Re 

construction. By EDITH ELLEN WARE, Ph.D. Pnce, $1.75. 

3. [176] Collective Bargaining In the Lithographic Industry. 

By H. E. HOAGLAND, Ph.D. Price, Ji.oo 

VOLUME LXXV. 1917. 410 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

An extra-Illustrated and bound volume Is published at $5.OO. 

1. [177] New York as an Eighteenth Century Municipality. Prior to 1731. 

By ARTHUR EVERETT PETERSON, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

2. [178J New York as an Eighteenth Century Municipality. 1731-1776. 

By GEORGE WILLIAM EDWARDS, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME LXXVI. 1917. 489 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [179] *Economic and Social History of Chowan County, North Carolina. 

By W. SCOTT BOYCB, Ph.D. Price, 2.50. 

2. [ISO] Separation of State and Local Revenues in the United States. 

By MABEL NEWCOMER, Ph.D. Price, $1.75. 

VOLUME LXXVII. 1917. 473 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00 

[ 18 1J American Civil Church Law. By CARL ZOLLMANN, LL.B. Price, $3.50 

VOLUME LXXVIII. 1917. 647pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

[182] The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution. 

By ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, Ph.D. Price, 14.00. 

VOLUME LXXIX. 1917-1918. 535pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [183] Contemporary Theories of Unemployment and Unemployment 

Relief. By FREDERICK C. MILLS, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [184] The French Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doc 

trine. By EUGENE NEWTON CURTIS, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

VOLUME LXXX. 1918. 448 pp. Price, cloth, $4-00. 

1. [185] *Valuation and Rate Making. By ROBERT L. HALH, Ph.D. Price, 1.50. 

2. [186] The Enclosure of Open Fields In England. 

By HARRIET BRADLEY, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

3. [187] The Land Tax In China. By H. L. HUANG, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME LXXXI. 1918. 601 pD. Price, cloth $4.50. 

1. [188] Social Life in Rome In the Time of Plautus and Terence. 

By GEORGIA W. LEFFINGWELL, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

2. [189] *AustralIan Social Development. 

By CLARENCE H. NORTHCOTT, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 

3. [19O] *Factory Statistics and Industrial Fatigue. 

By PHILIP S. FLORENCE, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

VOLUME LXXXII. 1918-1919. 576pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [191] New England and the Bavarian Illumlnatl. 

By VBRNON STAUFFER, PH.D. Price, $3.00. 

2. [192] Resale Price Maintenance. By CLAUDIUS T. MURCHISON, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME LXXXIII, 1919. 432 p . Price, cloth, $4.00. 

[193 j The I. W. W. By PAUL F. BRISSENDEN, Ph.D. Price, $3.50 

VOLUME LXXXIV. 1919. 534 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [194| The Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-1775. 

By PERCY SCOTT FLIPPIN, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

2. [195] Hellenic Conceptions of Peace. By WALLACE E.CALDWBLL, Ph.D. Price.JSias. 

VOLUME LXXXV. 1919. 450 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [196J The Religious Policy of the Bavarian Government during the 

Napoleonic Period. By CHESTER P. HIGBY, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

2. [197] Public Debts of China. By F. H. HUANG, Ph.D. Price, Ji.oo. 

VOLUME LXXXVI. 1919. 460pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

[198] The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York. 

By DIXON R?AN Fox, Ph.D. Price, $3.50. 

VOLUME LXXXVII. 1919. 451pp. Price, cloth, $4. 00. 

[199] Foreign Trade of China. By CHONG Su SEE, Ph.D. Prte*, $3.50 



VOLUME LXXXVI1I. 1919. 444pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [SOO] Tlie Street Surface Railway Franchises of Kew York City. 

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2. [SOI] Electric Light Franchises in New York City. 

By LEONORA ARENT, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME LXXXIX. 1919. 558pp. Price, cloth, $5.00 

I. [3O3] Women s Wages. ByEiwiLiEj. HUTCHINSON. Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. [3O3I The Return of the Democratic Party to Power in 1884. 

By HARRISON COOK THOMAS, Ph.D. Price, $2.25. 
3. [3O4] The Paris Bourse and French Finance. 

By WILLIAM PARKER, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XC. 1920. 547 pp. Price, cloth, $5.25. 

1. [SOS] Prison Methods In New York State. By PHILIP KLEIN, Ph.D. Price, | 3 50. 
3. |3O6i India s Demand for Transportation. 

By WILLIAM E. WKLD, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 

VOLUME XCI. 1920. 626pp. Price, cloth, $6.25 

1. f3O7 i *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 17OO. 

By JAMES E. GILLESPIE, Ph.D. Price, $3 oo. 
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VOLUME XCII. 1920, 

[3O9] The Public Life of William Shirley. By GEORGE A. Woo D. (In press) 

VOLUME XCIII. 1920. 

1. [31O1 The English Reform Bill of 1867. By JOSEPH H. PARK. (In press). 

2. [311] The Policy of the United States as Regards Intervention. 

By CHARLES E. MARTIN, (In press). 



The price for each separate monograph is for paper-covered copies; separate monographs marked*, raf 
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The set of ninety-one volumes, covering monographs 1-208, is offered, bound, for $315; except that 

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IV No. 3, and Volume VII No. 2, being out of print. Volumes II, III, and IV, as described in the 

last sentence, and Volume XXVcan now be supplied only in connection with complete sets, but the 

separate monographs of each of these volumes are available unless marked "not. sold separately " 

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