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C./l
from the library of:
Elizabeth S. Edvards

UNE diatti lUrary

Sr««fDRD UNIVERSirf
MEOIOAl CENtai-
SIANFORD. CALIF. 9«05

) -

WIT AND ITS RELATION TO
THE UNCONSCIOUS

WIT AND ITS RELATION
TO THE UNCONSCIOUS

Peofessob Db. SIGMUN:

D^TREJID,

LL.D.

Aathorized English Edition, with Introduction by
A. A. BRILL, PhB., M.D.

In Ptvchofuulygia Bud Abnomiiil PaychotocTi
New Voik Unlveraity; (Ormer Chief of Clinic
of Parchiatrv. Columbia UotKnitr

NEW YORK

MOFFAT, YARD AND COMPANY

1917

HY. STANTORD TONtKSgia

Copjriglit, 1016^ BY

XOfFAT, YARD AND COMPANT

Nbw Tobk

AH BiohU B 9 M nMä
Btßrimi^d Ifoptmkmrt 1917

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

In 1908 when it was agreed between Professor
Freud and myself that I should be his translator,
it was decided to render into English first the
following five works: Selected Papers on Hys-
teria and Psyckoneuroses,^ Three Contributioru
to the Theory of Sex,' The Interpretation
of Dreams* Psychopatkology of Everyday
Ldfe* and the present volume. These works
were selected because they represent the varlous
stages of development of Professor Freud's Psy-
choanalysis,* and also because it was thought that
they contain the material which one must master
before one is able to judge correctly the author's
theories or apply them in practice. This under-
taking, which was fraught with many linguistic
and other difficulties, has finally been aecom-

' Monograph Seriu, Journal of Nerrous and Mental Diseases
Pnb. Co., 2od Ed-, 1918.

'Monograph Sertes, Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases
Pub. Co., 9nd Ed., 1916.

■ Ute Maemillu) Co., New York, and Allen & Unwin, London,

*T1ie HacmUlan Co., New York, and T. Fisher Unwln, London.

'lUa expresdon b used advisedlj in order to dIaUngulsh it
from other methods of "analysis," whkh Profes.ior Freud fullj
dtsavmrs. Cf. The Bütoty of th» Ptychoanalytie Movement,
trsaslated by A. A. Brill, The Ptychoaiuilytic Btvitv, June-Sept.«
U1&

Ti TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

plished with the edition of the present volume,
and it is therefore with a sense of great satis-
faction that the translator's preface to this work
is written. But although the original task is
finished the translator's work is only beginning.
Psychoanalysis has made enormous strides. On
the foundation laid by Professor Freud there
developed a hterature rich in ideas and content
which has revolutionized the science of nervous
and mental diseases, and has thrown much hght
on the subject of dreams, sex, mythology,' the
history of civilization and racial psychology,*
philology,' »sthetics,* child psychology and
pedagogics," philology," and mysticism and oc-
cultism. With the Interpretation of Dreams and
Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Professor
Freud has definitely bridged the gulf between
normal and abnormal mental states by demon-
strating that dreams and faulty acts like some
forms of forgetting, slips of the tongue, slips of
reading, writing, etc., are closely allied to psycho-

' Cf. the works of Freud, Abraham, Rank, and others.

'Cf. Freud: Totem and Taboo, a translation In preparation,
and the works of Jones, Rank and Sadis, Jung, and Storfer,

•Cf. Freud, Bemy, Rank, and Sachs, and Sperber.

•Of. Freudi Leonardo da Vinci, a translation in prepnraÜon.
and tlie works of man^ others.

*Cf. e. Hug-Mcltmulh : Ant dem Berlmhbtn det Kinder, and
the works of Jones, Pflater, and many others.

•Cf. the works of Freud, Putnom, Hitschmann, Winteratdn,
uid others.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE vü

pathological states and represent the prototypes
of such abnormal mental conditions as neurotic
symptoms, hallucinations, and deliria. He also
shows that all these productions are senseful
and purposive, and that their strange and pecu-
har appearance is due to distortions produced by
various psychic processes. These views are con-
firmed in the present volume, where it is demon-
strated that wit, wliich belongs to lestbetics, is
subject to the same laws, shows the same mecha-
nism, and serves the same tendencies as the
other psychic productions. With his wonted
profundity and ingenuity the author adds the
solution of wit to those of the neuroses, dreams,
and psychopathological acts.

I take great pleasure in tendering my thanks
to Mr. Horatio \A''inslow, who has read the manu-
script and has given me valuable suggestions in
the choice of expressions and in the selection of
substitutes for those witticisms that could not be
translated.

A. A. Behx.

JTay. leiO.

CONTENTS

A. ANALYSIS OF WIT

L Inteoduction • .. • i., » ^ 8

II. The Technique of Wrr • i.i w i« 16

in. The Tendencies of Wrr • • :. • 127

B. SYNTHESIS OF WIT
IV. The Pleasure Mechanism and the Pst-

CH06ENESIS OF WiT . • • . 177

V. The Motives of Wit and Wit as a So-

ciAi« Process 214

a THEORIES OF WIT

VI. The Relation of Wit to Dkeams and

TO THE Unconscious . • • • 249

Vn. Wrr AND THE Various Forms of the

Comic .. .. ... ... . .. . 288

k". .T^

A. ANALYSIS

WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE
UNCONSCIOUS

INTKODUCnON

Whoeveb has had occasion to examioe that
part of the literature of aesthetics and psychol-
ogy dealing with the nature and affinities of
wit, will, no doubt, concede that our philo-
sophical inquiries have not awarded to wit the
important role that it plays in our mental life.
One can recount only a small number of think-
ers who have penetrated at all deeply into the
problems of wit. To be sure, among the au-
thors on wit one finds the illustrious names of
the poet Jean Paul (Fr. Richter), and of the
philosophers Th. Vischer, Kuno Fischer, and Th.
Lipps. But even these writers put the sub-
ject of wit in the background whue their chief
interest centers around the more comprehen-
sive and more alluring problems of the comic.

In the main this literature gives the impres-
sion that it is altogether impractical to study

t except when treated as a part of the comic.

Presentation of the Subject by Other Authors

According to Th. LJpps {Komik und Humor,
1898') wit is "essentially the subjective side
of the comic; i.e., it is that part of the comic
which we om'selves create, which colors our con-
duct as such, and to wluch our relation is that
of Superior Subject, never of Object, certainly
not Voluntary Object" (p. 80). The follow-
ing comment might also be added: — In general
we designate as wit " every conscious and clever
evocation of the comic, whether the comic ele-
ment lies in the viewpoint or in the situation
itself" (p. 78).

K. Fischer explains the relation between wit
and the comic by the aid of caricature, which,
according to his exposition, comes midway be-
tween the two {Über den iVitz, 1889). The
subject of the comic is the hideous element in
any of its manifestations. " Where it is con-
cealed it must be disclosed in the light of the
comic view; where it is not at all or but slightly
noticeable it must he rendered conspicuous and
elucidated in such a manner that it becomes
clear and intelligible. Thus arises caricature "
(p. 45). "Our entire psychic world, the in-
tellectual realm of our thoughts and concep-

■ Btitragr zwr Atilhtlik. edited b^ Theodor t.ipps and Rkbard
Maria Werner. W.—n book to which I em Indebted (or the
courage and capsdtf to undertake this «tteinpt.

INTRODUCTION

' tions, does not reveal itself to us on superficial
consideration. It cannot be visualized directly
either tigurativeiy or intuitively, moreover it
contains inhibitions, weak points, disfigurements,
and an abundance of ludicrous and comical con-
trasts. In order to bring it out and to make
it accessible to esthetic examination, a force is
necessary which is capable not only of depict-
ing objects directly, but also of reflecting upon
these conceptions and elucidating them —
namely, a force capable of clarifying thought.
This force is nothing but judgment. The judg-
ment which produces the comic contrast is
wit. In caricature wit has played its part un-
noticed, but only in judgment does it attain
its own individual form and the free domain of
its evolution."

As can be seen Lipps assigns the determin-
ing factor which classifies wit as part of the
comic, to the activity or to the active behavior
of the subject, whereas K. Fischer characterizes
wit by its relation to its object, in which char-
acterization he accentuates the hidden hideous
element in the realm of thought. One cannot
put to test the cogency of these definitions of
wit; one can, in fact, hardly understand them
tmless one studies the text from which they were
taken. One is thus forced to work his way
through the author's descriptions of the comic

6 ANALYSIS

in order to learn anything about wit. From
other passages, however, one discovers that the
same authors attribute to wit essential char-
acteristics of general validity in which they dis-
regard its relation to the comic.

K. Fischer's characterization of wit which
seems to be most satisfactory to this author runs
as follows: "Wit is a playful judgment" (p,
51). For an elucidation of this expression we
are referred to the analogy: "How esthetic
freedom consists in the playful contemplation
of objects" (p. 50). In another place (p. 20)
the aesthetic attitude towards an object is char-
acterized by the condition that we expect noth-
ing from this object— especially no gratification
of our serious needs-^but that we content our-
selves with the pleasure of contemplating the
same. In contrast to labor the aesthetic attitude
is playful. " It may be that from testbetie free-
dom there also results a kind of judgment, freed
from the conventional restrictions and rule of
conduct, which, in view of its genesis, I will
call the playful judgment. This conception con-
tains the first condition and possibly the entire
formula for the solution of our problem. ' Free-
dom begets wit and wit begets freedom,' says
Jean Paul. Wit is nothing but a free play of
ideas " (p. 24).

Since time immemorial a favorite definitioft

INTRODUCTION «

of wit has been the abUity to discover similarities
in difsiniilarities, i.e., to find hidden similarities.
Jean Paul has jocosely expressed this idea by
saying that " wit is the disguised priest who
unites every couple." Th. Vischer adds the
postscript: "He likes best to imite those cou-
ples whose marriage the relatives refuse to
sanction." Vischer refutes this, however, by
remarking that in some witticisms there is no
question of comparison or the discovery of
similarities. Hence with very little deviation
from Jean Paul's definition he defines wit as
the skill to combine witli surprising quickness
many ideas, which through inner content and
connections are foreign to one another. K.
Fischer then calls attention to the fact that
in a large mmiber of these witty judgments one
does not find similarities, but contrasts; and
Lipps further remarks that these definitions
refer to the wit that the humorist possesses and
not to the wit that he produces.

Other viewpoints, in some measm^e connected
with one anotber, which have been mentioned in
defining and describing wit are: "the contrast
of ideas" " sense in nonsense," and " confusion
and clearness."

Definitions like those of Kraepelin lay stress
upon Üie contrast of ideas. Wit is " the volun-
tary combination or linking of two ideas which

in some way are contrasted with each other,
usxially through the medium of speech associa-
tion." For a critic like Lipps it would not be
difficult to reveal the utter inadequacy of this
formula, but he himself does not exclude the
element of contrast — he merely assigns it else-
where. " The contrast remains, but is not
formed in a manner to show the ideas connected
with the words, rather it shows the contrast or
contradiction in the meaning and lack of mean-
ing of the words " (p. 87) . Examples show the
better understanding of the latter. " A contrast
arises first through the fact that we adjudge a
meaning to its words which after all we cannot
ascribe to them."

In the further development of this last con-
dition the antithesis of " sense in nonsense " be-
comes obvious. " What we accept one moment
as senseful we later perceive as perfect nonsense.
Thereby arises, in this case, the operation of the
comic element" (p. 85). "A saying appears
witty when we ascribe to it a meaning through
psychological necessity and, while so doing, re-
tract it. It may thus have many meanings. We
lend a meaning to an expression knowing that
logically it does not belong to it. We find in
it a truth, however, which later we fail to find
because it is foreign to our laws of experience or
usual modes of thinking. We endow it wilii tt

INTRODUCTION 9

Ic^cal or practical inference which transcends
its true content, only to contradict this inference
as soon as we finally grasp the nature of the ex-
pression itself. The psychological process
evoked in us by the witty expression which gives
rise to the sense of the comic depends in every
laise on the immediate transition from the bor-
rowed feeling of truth and conviction to the im-
pression or consciousness of relative nullity."

As impressive as this exposition sounds one
cannot refrain from questioning whether the con-
trast between the senseful and senseless upon
■which the comic depends does not also contribute
to the definition of wit in so far as it is dis*
tinguished from the comic. Also the factor of
" confusion and clearness " leads one deeply into
the problem of the relation of wit to the comic.
Kant, speaking of the comic element in general,
states that one of its remarkable attributes is
the fact that it can delude us for a moment only.
Heymans {ZeiUchr. /. Psychologie. XI, 1896)
explains how the mechanism of wit is produced
through the succession of confusion and clear-
ness. He illustrates his meaning by an excellent
■witticism from Heine, who causes one of his fig-
ures, the poor lottery agent, Hirsch -Hyacinth,
■to boast that the great Baron Rothschild treated
him as an equal or quite F AMILLION AIRE.
Here the word which acts as the carrier of the

witticism appears in the first place simply aa a
faulty word-formation, as something incompre-
hensible, inconceivable, and enigmatic. It is for
these reasons that it is confusing. The comic
element results from the solution of the enigma
and from the miderstanding of the word. Lipps
adds that the first stage of enlightenment, show-
ing that the confusing word means this or that, is
followed by a second stage in which one perceives
that this nonsensical word has first deluded us
and then given us the true meaning. Only this
second enlightenment, the realization that it is
all due to a word that is meaningless in ordinary
usage — this reduction to nothingness produces
the comic eflfect {p. 95).

Whether or not either the one or the other
of these two conceptions may seem more clear
we are brought nearer to a definite insight
through the discussion of the processes of con-
fusion and enlightenment. If the comic effect of
Heine's famillionmre depends upon the solution
of the seemingly senseless word, then the wit
would have to be attributed to the formation of
this word and to the character of the word so
formed.

In addition to the associations of the view-
points just discussed there is another character-
istic of wit which is recognized as peculiar to it
by all authors. " Brevity alone is the body and

INTRODUCTION H

soul of wit," declares Jean Paul {Vorschule der
Aesthetik, I, 4d) , and modifies it with a speech of
the old longue-wagger, Poloniiis, from Shake-
speare's Hamlet {Act II, Scene 2) :

" Therefore, since brevity is the soul of wit,
And tediousnesB the limbs and outward Sourishes,
I will be brief."

Lipps's description (p. 90) of the hrevity of
wit is also significant. He states that wit saya
what it does say, not always in few, but always
in too few words; that is: " It expresses itself in
words that will not stand the test of strict logic
or of the ordinary mode of thought and expres-
sion. In fine it can express itself by leaving the
thing unsaid."

That " wit must unearth something hidden and
concealed" — to quote K. Fischer (p. 51) — we
have already been taught from the grouping of
wit with caricature. I re-eniphasize this deter-
minant because it also has more to do with the
nature of wit than witli its relation to the comic.

I am well aware that the foregoing scanty
quotations from the works of the authors on wit
cannot do j ustice to the excellence of these works.
In view of the difficulties that confront one in
reproducing clearly such complicated and such
delicately shaded streams of thought I cannot

ANALYSIS

spare inquiring minds the trouble of searching
for the desired information in the original
sources. However, I do not know whether they
will return fully satisfied. For the criteria and
attributes of wit mentioned by these authors,
such as — activity, the relation of the content of
wit to our thoughts, the character of the playful
judgment, the union of dissimilarities, contrast-
ing ideas, " sense in nonsense," the succession of
confusion and clearness, the sudden emergence
of the hidden, and the peculiar brevity of wit,
seem to us, at first glance, so very pertinent and
so easily demonstrable by examples that we can-
not succumb to the danger of underestimating
the value of such ideas. But they are only dis-
jointed fragments which we should Uke to see
welded into an organic whole. In the end they
contribute no more to the knowledge of wit than
a number of anecdotes teach us of the true char-
acteristics of a personality whose biography in-
terests us. We do not at all understand the con-
nection that is supposed to exist between the in-
dividual conditions; for instance, what the brev-
itj' of wit may have to do with that side of wit
exhibited in the playful judgment; besides we do
not know whether wit must satisfy all or only
some of these conditions in order to form real
wit; which of them may be replaced and whicH
ones are indispensable. We should also like a

INTEODUCTION IS

grouping and classification of wit in respect to
its essential attributes. The classification as
given by the authors is based, on the one hand, on
the technical means, and on the other hand, on
the utilization of wit in speech (sound- wit, play
on words, the wit of caricature, characterization
wit, and witty repartee) .

Accordingly we should not find ourselves in a
dilemma when it comes to pointing out goals for
a further eflFort to explain wit. In order to look
forward to success we must either introduce new
viewpoints into the work, or try to penetrate
further by concentrating our attention or by
broadening the scope of our interest. We can
prescribe for ourselves the task of at least not
permitting any lack along the latter lines. To
be sure, it is rather remarkable how few examples
of recognized witticisms suffice the authors for
their investigations and how each one accepts
the ones used by his predecessors. We need not
shirk the responsibility of analyzing the same ex-
amples which have already served the classical
authors, but we contemplate new material besides
to lay a broader foundation for our deductions.
It is quite natural that we should select such ex-
amples of wit as objects for oin: investigation as
have produced the deepest impression upon our
own lives and which have caused us the greatest
amount of laughter.

Some may inquire wbeÜKr tbe subject of wit
18 worthy of sudi effort. In my opinion there is
DO doubt about it, for even if I disregard tbe
personal motives to be revealed during tbe de-
velopment of this tbeme ( tbe motives whkh drove
me to gain an insight into the problon of wit),
I can refer to tbe fact that there is an intimate
connection between all psychic occurrences; a
ICDnnection which promises to furnish a psycho-
I logical insight into a sphere which, although re-
mote, win nevertheless be of considerable value
to tbe other spheres. One may also be reminded
what a peculiar, overwhelmingly fascinating
charm wit offers in our society. A new joke
operates almost as an event of universal interest
It is passed on from one person to another just
like the news of the latest conquest. Even prom-
inent men who consider it worth while relating
how they attained fame, what cities and countries
they have seen, and with what celebrated per-
sons they have consorted, do not disdain to dwell
in their autobiographies upon this and that ex-
cellent joke which they have heard.'

■J. T. Falke: Ltbnutrimunaigfn, 1897.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WTT

We follow the beckoning of chance and take
up as our first example of wit one which has al-
ready come to our notice in the previous chapter.

In that part of the Reiaebtlder entitled " Die
Bäder von Lucca," Heine introduces the precious
character, Hirsch-Hyacinth, the Hamburg lot-
tery agent and eurer of corns, who, boasting to
the poet of his relationship with the rich Baron
Rothschild, ends thus: "And as true as I pray
that the Lord may grant me all good things I
sat next to Solomon Rothschild, who treated me
just as if I were his equal, quite famillionaire."

It is by means of this excellent and very funny
example thatHeymans and Lipps have illustrated
the origin of the comic effect of wit from the suc-
cession of " confusion and clearness." However,
we shall pass over this question and put to our-
selves the following inquiry: What is it that
causes the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth to be-
come witty? It can he only one of two things;
either it is the thought expressed in the sentence
which carries in itself the character of the witti-
cism; or the witticism adheres to the mode of ex-

J6 ANALYSIS

pression which clothes the thought. On which-
ever side the nature of the wit may lie, there we
shall follow it farther and endeavor to eluci-
date it.

In general a thought may be expressed in dif-
ferent forms of speech — that is, in different
words — which may repeat it in its original ac-
curacy. In the speech of Hirsch -Hyacinth we
have hefore us a definite form of thought ex-
pressed which seems to us especially peculiar and
not very readily comprehensible. Let us attempt
to express as exactly as is possible the same
thought in other words, Lipps, indeed, has al-
ready done this and has thus, to some degree,
elucidated the meaning of the poet. He says (p.
87), " We understand that Heine wishes to say
that the reception was on a familiar basis, that
is, that it was of the friendly sort." We change
nothing in the sense when we assume a different
interpretation which perhaps fits better into
the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth: "Rothschild
treated me quite as his equal, in a very familiar
way; that is, as far as this can he done by a
millionaire." We would only add, " The con-
descension of a rich man always carries some-
thing embarrassing for the one experiencing it." '

* Since Ulis Joke will occup}' uh again and we do not wish to
Histurb the discussion following here, we sliall And occasion later
to point out a correction ia Lipps's given interpretaUoo which
follows our own.

" Wh

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

^_ «nee

Whether we shall remain content with this or
with another equivalent formulation of the
thought, we can see that the question which we
have put to ourselves is already answered. The
character of the wit in this example does not
adhere to the thought. It is a correct and in-
g^ous remark that Heine puts into the mouth
of Hirsch-Hyacinth — a remark of indubitable
bitterness, as is easily understood in the case of
the poor man confronted with so much wealth;
but we should not care to call it witty. Now if
any one who cannot forget the poet's meaning
in the interpretation should insist that the
thought in itself is also witty, we can refer him
to the definite fact that the witty character is
lost in the interpretation. It is true that Hirsch-
Hyacinth's speech made us laugh loudly, but
though Lipps's or our own accinate rendering
may please us and cause us to reflect, yet it can-
not make us laugh.

But if the witty character of our example does
not belong to the thought, then it must be sought
for in the form of expression in the wording.
We have only to study the peculiarity of thia
mode of expression to realize what one may terra
word- or form-technique. Also we may discover
the things that are intiaiately related to the very
nature of wit, since the character as well as the
effect of wit disappears when one set of expres-

18 ANALYSIS

sions is changed for others. At all events we
are in full accord with our authors when we put
80 much value upon the verhal form of the wit.
Thus K. Fischer (p. 72) says: " It is, in the first
place, the naked form which is responsible for
the perception of wit, and one is reminded of a
saying of Jean Paul's which affirms and proves
this nature of wit in the same expression. ' Thus
the mere position conquers, he it that of warriors
or of sentences.' "

Formation of Mired Word»

Now wherein lies the " technique " of 'Üiis
wit? What lias occurred to the thought, in our
own conception, that it became changed into wit
and caused us to laugh heartily? The compari-
son of our conception with the text of the poet
teaches us that two processes took place. In the
first place there occurred an important abbrevia-
tion. In order to express fully the thought con-
tained in the witticism we had to append to the
words " Rothschild treated me just as an equal,
on a familiar basis," an additional sentence
which in its briefest form reads: i.e., so far as
a millionaire can do this. Even then we feel the
necessity of an additional explanatory sentence.*
The poet expresses it in terser terms as follows:
" Rothschild treated me just like an equal,

■The same bolds true for Lfpps'a InterpreUtloii.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 19

quite famiUionaire." The entire restriction,
which the second sentence imposes on the first
thus verifying the familiar treatment, has been
lost in the jest. But it has not been so entirely
lost as not to leave a substitute from which it
can be reconstructed. A second change has also
taken place. The word " familiar " in the wit-
less expression of the thought has been trans-
formed into " famiUionaire " in the text of the
wit, and there is no doubt that the witty char-
acter and ludicrous effect of the joke depends
directly upon this word-formation. The newly
formed word is identical in its first part with
the word " familiar " of the first sentence, and
its terminal syllables correspond to the word
" millionaire " of the second sentence. In this
manner it puts us in a position to conjecture the
second sentence which was omitted in the text
of the wit. It may be described as a composite
of two constituents " familiar " and " million-
aire," and one is tempted to depict its origin from
the two words graphically.

FAMIL I AR

MILLIONAIRE

FÄMILLIONAIRE

The process, then, which has carried the
thought into the witticism can be represented in

the following manner, which, although at first
rather fantastic, nevertheless furnishes exactly
the actual existing result: "Rothschild treated
me quite familiarly, i.e., as well as a millionaire
can do that sort of thing."

Now imagine that a compressing force is act-
ing upon these sentences and assume that for
some reason or other the second sentence is of
lesser resistance. It is accordingly forced to-
ward the vanishing point, but its important com-
ponent, the word " millionaire," which strives
against the compressing power, is pushed, as it
were, into the first sentence and becomes fused
with the very similar element, the word " famil-
iar " of this sentence. It is just this possibility,
provided by chance to save the essential part of
tiie second sentence, which favors the dis-
appearance of the other less important com-
ponents. The jest then takes shape in this
manner: "Rothschild treated me in a very
famillionaire way."
(mili) (aire)
Apart from such a compressing force, which is
really unknown to us, we may describe the origin
of the wit-formation, that is, the technique of the
wit in this case, as a condensation with substitu-
tive formation. In our example the substitutive
formation consists in the formation of a mixed
word. This fused word " famillionaire," in-

B comp

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

comprehensible in itself but instantly under-
stood in its context and recognized as senseful,
is now the carrier of the niirth-provoking
stimulus of the jest, whose mechanism, to be
sure, is in no way clearer to us through the
discovery of the technique. To what extent
can a linguistic process of condensation with
substitutive formation produce pleasure through
a fused word and force us to laugh? We
make note of the fact that this is a different
problem, the treatment of which we can post-
pone imtil we shall find access to it later. For
the present we shall continue to busy ourselves
with the technique of wit.

Our expectation that the technique of wit can-
not be considered an indifferent factor in the ex-
amination of the nature of wit prompts us to in-
quire next whether there are other examples of
wit formed like Heine's " famillionaire." Not
many of these exist, but enough to constitute a
small group which may be characterized as the
blend-word formations or fusions. Heine him-
self has produced a second witticism from the
word " millionaire " by copying himself, as it
were, when he speaks of a " millionarr " {Ideen,
Chap. XIV). This is a visible condensation
of "millionaire" and "narr" (fool) and, like
the first example, expresses a suppressed by-

thought. Other examples of a similar nature
are as follows.

During the war between Turkey and the Bal-
kan States, in 1912, Punch depicted the part
played hy Rumania by representing the latter
as a highwayman holding up the members of
the Balkan alliance. The picture was entitled:
Kleptorumania. Here the word is a fusion of
Kleptomania and Rumania and may be rep-
resented as follows:

KLEPTOMANIA
RUMANIA

KLEPTORUMANIA

A naughty jest of Europe has rebaptized a
former potentate, Leopold, into Cleopold be-
cause of his relation to a lady surnamed Cleo.
Tliis is a clear form of condensation which by
the addition of a single letter forever vividly
preserves a scandalous allusion.

In an excellent chapter on this same theme
Brill gives the following example.'

" De Quincey once remarked that old persons
are apt to fall into ' anecdotage.' " The word
Anecdotage, though in itself incomprehensible,
can be readily analyzed to show its original full
sense ; and on analysis we find that it is made up
of two words, anecdote and dotage. That is, in-

' PtyehanalijiiM : lu Theoiks ead Application, 2nd Ed., p. 331.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 25

stead of saying that old persons are apt to fall
into dotage and that old persons are fond of tell-
ing anecdotes, De Qurncey fuses the two words
into a neologism, anecdotage, and thus simulta-
neously expresses both ideas. The technique,
therefore, lies in the fusion of the two words.
Such a fusion of words is called condensation.
Condensation is a substitutive formation, i.e., in-
stead of anecdote and dotage we have anecdotage.
" In a. short story wliich I have recently read,
one of the characters, a ' sport,' speaks of the
Christmas season as the alcoholidays. By reduc-
tion it can be easily seen that we have here a com-
pound word, a combination of alcohol and holi-
days which can be graphically represented as
follows:

alcoHOL

HOLidays

ALCOHOLIDAYS

Here the condensation expresses the idea
that holidays are conducive to alcoholic indul-
gence. In other words, we have here a fused
word, which, though strange in appearance, can
be easily understood in its proper context. The
witticism may be described as a condensation
with substitution,

" The same mechanism is found in the foUow-
ing: A dramatic critic, summarizing three para-

the words " stupid ass " are omitted and when,
as a substitute for tliem, the first " t " of the
second " tete " is changed to " b." This shght
modification brings back to expression the sup-
pressed " bete." The technique of this group
of witticisms may be described as " condensa-
tion with a shght modification." And it would
seem that the more insignificant the substitu-
tive modification, the better is the wit.

Quite similar, although not without its com-
plications, is the technique of another form of
witticism. During a discussion about a person
in whom there was something to praise and
much to criticise, N. remarked : " Yes, vanity
is one of his four heels of Achilles." ' This
modification consists in the fact that instead of
the one vulnerable heel which was attributed to
Achilles we have here four heels. Four heels
means four feet and that number is only found
on animals. The two thoughts condensed in
the witticism are as follows: Except for his
vanity he is an admirable fellow; still I do not
care for him, for he is more of an animal than
a human being.'

•This same witticism was supposed to have been coined be-
fore by Heine concerning Alfred de Musset.

'One of the cotnplicntions Involved in the tedinique of this
example lies in the fuct that the mudlflcation through which the
omitted abuse is substituted is to iDe taken as sn allusion to the
latter, for it leads to it only through a process of deduction.

W A si

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

A similar but simpler joke I heard statu
nascendi in a family circle. One of two brothers
who were attending college was an excellent
scholar while the other was only an average
student. It so happened that the model boy
had a setback in school. The mother discussed
this matter and expressed her fear lest this event
be the beginning of a lasting deterioration.
The boy who until tlien had been overshadowed
by his brother willingly grasped this oppor-
tunity to remark : " Yes, Carl is going back-
ward on all-fours."

Here the modification consists in a small
addition as an assurance that in his judgment
his brother is going backward. This modifica-
tion represents and takes the place of a pas-
sionate plea for his own cause which may be
expressed as follows: After all, you must not
think that he is so much cleverer than I am
simply because he has more success in school.
He is really a stupid ass, i.e., much more stupid
than I am.

A good illustration of condensation with
slight modification is furnished by a well-known
witty jest of Mr. N., who remarked about a
character in public hfe that he had a "great
future behind him." The butt of this joke
was a young man whose ancestry, rearing, and
personal qualities seemed to destine him for the

^K pcrwu

recall that Lipps has attempted to describe
more fully the peculiarity of the brevity of
wit (u.*.,p.ll). Here our investigation started
and demonstrated that the brevity of wit is
often the result of a special process which has
left a second trace — the substitutive formation —
in the wording of the wit. By applying the
process of reduction, which aims to cause a
retrogression in the peculiar process of con-
densation, we find also that wit depends only
upon the verbal expression which was produced
by the process of condensation. Naturally our
entire interest now centers upon this peculiar
and hitherto almost neglected mechanism.
Furthermore, we cannot yet comprehend how
it can give origin to all that is valuable in wit;
namely, the resultant pleasure.

Condensation in Dreams

Have processes similar to those here de-
scribed as the technique of wit already been
noted in another sphere of our psychic life?
To be sure, in one apparently remote sphere.
In 1900 I published a book which, as indicated
by its title (The Interpretation of Dreams^),
makes the attempt to explain the riddle of the
dream and to trace the dream to normal psychic

' Transtation of 4th Ed. bf A. A. Brill, the Macmlllaii Co.,
New York, and Allen & Unwln, London.

^r operatioi

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

i operations. I had occasion to contrast there the
manifest and often peculiar dream-content with
tbe latent but altogether real thoughts of the
dream from which it originated, and I took up
the investigation of the processes which make
the dream from the latent dream-thought. I
also investigated the psychological forces which
participated in this transposition. The sum
of the transforming processes I designated as
the dream-work and, as a part of this dream-
work, I described the process of condensation.
This process has a striking similarity to the
technique of wit and, like the latter, it leads to
abbreviations and brings about substitutive
formations of like character.

From recollections of his own dreams the
reader will be familiar with the compositions
of persons and objects that appear in them;
indeed, the dream makes similar compositions
of words wliich can then be reduced by analysis
(e.g., Autodidasker — Autodidakt and Lasker ') .
On other occasions and even much more fre-
quently, the condensation work of the dream
produces no compositions, but pictures which
closely resemble an object or person up to a
certain addition or variation which comes from
another source, like the modifications in the
witticisms of Mr. N. We cannot doubt that

■ The Inttrpnlalion of Dreami, p. 390.

foolish boy, a toux et sot." To be sure, I was
able to add and insert something, but this
attempt at reduction does not annul the wit.
It remains fixed and attached to the sound
similarity of Rousseau. This proves that con-

roux sot
densation with substitution plays no part in
the production of this witticism.

With what else do we have to deal? New
attempts at reduction taught me that the joke
will persistently continue until the name Rous-
seau is replaced by another. If, e.g., I sub-
stitute the name Racine for it I find that al-
though the lady's criticism is just as feasible
as before it immediately loses every trace of wit.
Now I know where I can look for the technique
of this joke although I still hesitate to formu-
late it. I shall make the following attempt:
The technique of the witticism lies in the fact
that one and the same word — the name — is
used in a twofold application, once as a whole
and once divided into its syllables like a charade.

I can mention a few examples of identical
technique. A witticism of this sort was utilized
by an Italian lady to avenge a tactless remark
made to her by the first Napoleon. Pointing
to her compatriots at a court ball he said:
" Tutti gli Italian danzano »t male" (all
Italians dance so badly). To which she quickly

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

iieplied: " Non tutti, ma buona parte" (Not
l&ll, but a great many) — Buona parte.' Brill
Buonaparte,
reports still another example in which the wit
depends on the twofold application of a name:
" Hood once remarked that he had to be a lively
Hood for a livelihood." '

At one time when Antigone was produced
in Berlin a critic found that the presentation
entirely lacked the character of antiquity. The
wits of Berlin incorporated this criticism in
the following manner: "Antique? Oh, nay"

l(Th. Vischer and K. Fischer).
^H Mamfold Application of the Same Material
^* In these examples, which will suffice for this
species of wit, the technique is the same. A
name is made use of twice; first, as a whole, and
then divided into its syllables — and in their
divided state the syllables yield a different
meaning.' The manifold application of the
same word, once as a whole and then as the
component syllables into which it divides itself,
was the first case that came to our attention
in which technique deviated from that of con-

■ Cited by BriU: Piychaiuilyii», p. 335.

' 1. c, p. 334.

"The excellence of these jokes depends upon the fact that they,
^^^ Bt the same time, present another technical meuu of a much
^^L Vgfaer order.

Mr. N., but it differs from them in lacking the
condensation. Everything that was to be said
has been told in the joke. "I know that you
yourself were formerly a Jew, therefore I am
surprised that you should rail against the
Jew."

An excellent example of such wit modification
is also the familiar exclamation: " Traduttore —
Traditore." '

The similarity between the two words, al-
most approaching identity, results in a very im-
pressive representation of the inevitability by
which a translator becomes a transgressor — in
the eyes of the author.

The manifoldness of slight modifications pos-
sible in these jokes is so great that none is
quite similar to the other. Here is a joke which
is supposed to have arisen at an examination for
the degree of law. The candidate was translat-
ing a passage from the Corpus juris, " Labeo
ait." "'I fall (faU),' says he," volunteered
the candidate. " ' You fall (fail),' says I," re-
plied the examiner and the examination ended.
MTioever mistakes the name of the celebrated
Jurist for a word to which he attaches a false
meaning certainly deserves nothing better. But
the technique of the witticism lies in the fact

■Drill dtM a nry analogoos modificatioa witi AtnmUM—'
Jmfnttt (lorerf— luDBtlcB).

PTHE TECHNIQUE OF WIT
„.^ examiner used almost the same words

in punishing the appHcant which the latter used
to prove his ignorance. Besides, the joke is an
example of repartee whose technique, as we
shall see, is closely allied to the one just
mentioned.

Words are plastic and may be moulded into
almost any shape. There are some words which
have lost their true original meaning in cer-
tain usages which they still enjoy in other
applications. In one of Lichtenberg's jokes
just those conditions have been sought for in
which the nuances of the wordings have re-
moved their basic meaning.

"How goes it?" asked the blind of the lame
one. " As you see," replied the lame one to the
blind.

Language is replete with words which taken
in one sense are full of meaning and in another
are colorless. There may be two different
derivatives from the same root, one of which
may develop into a word with a full meaning
while the other may become a colorless suffix or
prefix, and yet both may have the same sound.
The similarity of sound between a word having
full meaning and one whose meaning is color-
less may also be accidental. In both cases
the technique of wit can make use of such
r relationship of the speech material. The

following examples illustrate some of these
points.

" T)o you call a man kind ioho remit» noth-
ing to his family while away? " asked an actor.
" Call that kindness? " " Yes. unremitting
kindness," was the reply of Douglas Jerrold.
The wit here depends on the first syllable un
of the word unremitting. Un is usually a pre-
fix denoting " not," but by adding it to " re-
mitting " a new relationship is unexpectedly
established which changes the meaning of the
context. " An undertaker is one who always
carries out what he undertakes." The strik-
ing character upon which the wit here depends
is the manifold application of the words under-
taker and carry out. Undertaker commonly
denotes one who manages funerals. Only when
taken in this sense and using the words carry
out literally is the sentence witty. The wit
lies in the manifold application of the same
words.

Double Meaning and Play on Words

If we delve more deeply into the variety of
" manifold application " of the same word we
suddenly notice that we are confronted with
forms of " double meaning " or " plays on
words " which have been known a long time and

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 41

ivliich are universally acknowledged as belong-
ing to the technique of wit. Then why have we
bothered our brains about discovering something
new when we could just as well have gleaned it
from the most superficial treatise on wit? We
can say in self-defense only that we are pre-
senting another side of the same phenomena
of verbal expressions. What the authors
call the " playful " character of wit we treat
from the point of view of " manifold appUca-
ticm."

Further examples of manifold application
which may also be designated under a new and
third group, the class of double meaning, may
be divided into subdivisions. These, to be sure,
are not essentially differentiated from one an-
other any more than the whole third group from
the second. In the first place we have :

(a) Cases of double meaning of a name and
its verbal significanoe: e.g., "Discharge thy-
self of our company^ Pütol" {Henry IV, Act
II). "For Suffolk's duke may he suffocate"
{Henry IF, Act I). Heine says, "Here m
Hamburg rules not the rascally Macbeth, but
Banko (Banquo)."

In those cases where the unchanged name
cannot be used, — one might say " misused," —
one can get a double meaning by means of
familiar slight modifications: "Why have the

French rejected Lohengrin? " was a question
asked some time ago. The answer was, " On
Eha's (Alsace) account."

(b) Cases where a double meaning is obtained
by using a word which has both a verbal and
metaphoric sense furnish an abundant source
for the technique of wit. A medical colleague,
who was well known for liis wit, once said to
Arthur Schnitzler, the writer: "I am not at all
surprised that you became a great poet. Your
father Jiad already held vp the mirror to his
contemporaries." The mirror used by the
father of the writer, the famous Dr. Schnitzler,
was the larjTigoscope. According to the well-
known quotation from Hamlet (Act III,
Scene 2), the object of the play as well as
the writer who creates It is to " hold, as 't were,
the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her
own feature, scorn her own image, and the very
age and body of the time his form and pres-
sure."

(c) Cases of actual double meaning or play
on words — the ideal case, as it were, of manifold
application. Here no violence is done to the
word. It is not torn into syllables. It need
not undergo any modifications. It need not
exchange its own particular sphere, say as a
proper name, for another. Thanks to certain
circumstances it can express two meanings just

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT iS

as it stands in the structure of the sentence.
Many examples are at our disposal.

One of the first royal acts of the last Na-
poleon was, as is well known, the confiscation
of the estates belonging to the House of Or-
leans. " C'eat le premier vol de I'aigle " was
An excellent play on words current at that time.
" Vol " means hoth flight and theft. Louis XV
wished to test the wit of one of his courtiers
whose talent in that direction he had heard
about. He seized his first opportunity to com-
mand the cavalier to concoct a joke at his
(the king's) expense. He wanted to be the
" subject " of the witticism. The courtier an-
swered him with the clever bonmot, " Le rot
n'est pas sujet." " Subject " also means '* vas-
sal." (Taken from K. Fischer.)

A phymcian, leaving the sick-bed of a mfe,
whose husband accompamed him, exclaimed
dovhtfully: "I do not like her looks." "I
have not liked her looks for a long time," tea»
the quick rejoinder of the husband. The
physician, of course, referred to the condition
of the wife, but he expressed his apprehension
about the patient in such words as to afford
the husband the means of utilizing them to
assert his conjugal aversion. Concerning a
satirical comedy Heine remarked : " This satire
would not have been so biting had the author

M ANALYSIS

of it had more to bite." This jest is a better
example of metaphoric and common double
meaning than of real play upon words, but
at present we are not concerned about such
strict lines of demarcation. Charles Matthews,
the elder, one of England's greatest actors,
•was asked what he was going to do with Ms
son {the young man was destined for architec-
ture). "Why," answered the comedian, "he
is going to draw houses like his father." Foote
once asked a man why he forever sang one
tune. " Became it haunts me," replied the man.
" No wonder," said Foote, " you are continually
murdering it." Said the Dyspeptic Philoso-
pher : " One swallow doesn't make a summer,
nor quench the thirst"

A gentleman had shown much ingenuity in
evading a notorious borrower whom he had
sent away many times with the request to call
when he was " in." One day, however, the
borrower eluded, the servant at the door and cor-
nered his victim.

"Ah," said the host, seeing there was no Way
out of it, " at last I am in."

"No," returned the borrower in anticipation,
"at last I am in and you are ovt."

Heine said in the Harzrcise: "I cannot re-
call at the moment the names of all the students,

^f as it s

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

as it stands in the structure of the sentence.
Many examples are at our disposal.

One of the first royal acts of the last Na-
poleon was, as is well known, the confiscation
of the estates belonging to the House of Or-
leans. " C'est le premier vol de I'aigle " was
an excellent play on words current at that time.
" Vol " means both flight and theft. Louis XV
wished to test the wit of one of his courtiers
whose talent in that direction he had heard
about. He seized his first opportunity to com-
mand the cavalier to concoct a joke at his
(the king's) expense. He wanted to be the
" subject " of the witticism. The courtier an-
swered him with the clever honmot, " Le roi
n'est pas sujet." " Subject " also means " vas-
sal." (Taken from K. Fischer.)

A physician, leaving the sich-bed of a täfe,
whose husband accompanied Mm, exclaimed
doubtfidly: "I do not Uke her looks" "I
have not liked her looks for a long time," was
the quick rejoinder of the husband. The
physician, of course, referred to the condition
of the wife, but he expressed his apprehension
about the patient in such words as to afford
the husband the means of utilizing them to
assert his conjugal aversion. Concerning a
satirical comedy Heine remarked: "This satire
would not have been so biting had the author.

was responsible for the joke mentioned on
page 42 is likewise responsible for this joke,
current during the trial of Dreyfus:

" This girl reminds me of Dreyfus. The
army does- not believe in her innocence."

The word innocence, whose double meaning
fm-nishes the basis of the witticism, has in one
connection the customary meaning which is the
opposite of guilt or transgression, while in the
other connection it has a sexual sense, the
opposite of which is sexual experience. There
are very many such examples of double meaning
and in each one the point of the joke refers
especially to a sexual sense. The group could
be designated as " ambiguous." A good ex-
ample to illustrate this is the story told of a
Wealthy but elderly gentleman who showed
his devotion to a young actress by many lavish
gifts. Being a respectable girl she took the
first opportunity to discourage his attentions by
telling him that her heart was already given
to another man. " I never aspired as high as
that," was his polite answer.

If one compares this example of double-
meaning-with-ambiguity with other examples
one cannot help noticing a difference which is
not altogether inconsequential to the technique.
In the joke about " innocence " one meaning of
the word is just as good for our understanding

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 47

of it as the other. One can really not decide
whether the sexual or non-sexual significance
of the word is more applicable and more
familiar. But it is different with the other
example mentioned. Here the final sense of
the words, " I never aspired as high as that,"
is by far more obtrusive and covers and con-
ceals, as it were, the sexual sense which could
easily escape the unsuspecting person. In sharp
contrast to this let us examine another example
of double meaning in which there is no attempt
made to veil its sexual significance — e.g., Heine's
characterization of a complaisant lady : " She
could pass {abschlagen) nothing except her
water." It sounds like an obscene joke and
the wit in it is scarcely noticed.' But the
peculiarity that both senses of the double mean-
ing are not equally manifested can occur also in
witticisms without sexual reference providing
that one sense is more common or that it is
preferred on account of its connection with the
other parts of the sentence (e.g., c'est le premier
vol de I'aigle). All these examples I propose
to call double meaning with allusion.

' Compsre here K. Fischer (p. 85), who applies the term "double
raeanlDg " to those witticisms in which both meanings are not
equaUy prominent, but where one overshadows the other. I
bave applied ttiis term difTcrently. Such a nomenclature is a mat-
ter of choice. Usage of speech has rendered no definite de-
claioD about them.

«0 ANALYSIS

densation without substitutive formation. Con-
densation thus remains as the chief category. A
compressing or — to be more exact — an eco-
nomic tendency controls all these techniques.
As Prince Hamlet says: " Thrift, Horatio,
thrift." It seems to be all a matter of economy.

Let us examine this economy in individual
cases. " C'est le premier vol de I'aigle." That
is, the first flight of the eagle. Certainly, but
it is a depredations flight. Luckily for the gist
of this joke " vol " signifies flight as well as
depredation. Has nothing been condensed and
economized by this? Certainly, the entire sec-
ond thought, and it was dropped without any
substitution. The double sense of the word
" vol " makes such substitution superfluous, or
what is just as correct: The word "vol" con-
tains the substitution for the repressed thought
without the necessity of supplementing or
varying the first sentence. Therein consists the
benefit of the double meaning.

Another example: Gold mine, — gold apoon,
the enormous economy of expression the single
word " gold " produces. It really tells the his-
tory of two generations in the life of some
American families. The father made his for-
tune through hard toiling in the gold fields dur-
ing the early pioneer days. The son was bom
with a golden spoon in his mouth; having been

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

brought up as the son of a wealthy man, he he-
comes a chronic alcohohc and has to take the
gold cm-e.

Thus there is no doubt that the condensation
in these examples produces economy and we
shall demonstrate that the same is true in all
cases. Where is the economy in such jokes
as "Rousseau — rcyux et sot," or "Antigone —
antique-ok-nay " in which we first failed to
find the prime factors in causing us to establish
the technique of the manifold application of the
same material? In these cases condensation
will naturally not cover the ground, but when
we exchange it for the broader conception of
*' economy " we find no difficulty. What we
save in such examples as those just given is
quite obvious. We save ourselves the trouble
of making a criticism, of forming a judgment.
Both are contained in the names. The same is
true in the " Uvelihood " example and the others
thus far analjTied. Where one does not save
much is in the example of " I am. in and you
are out," at least the wording of a new answer is
saved. The wording of the address, "/ am in,"
serves also for the answer. It is little, hut in
this little hes the wit. The manifold appUca-
tion of the same words in addressing and answer-
ing surely comes under the heading of economy.
Note how Hamlet sums up the quick succession

of the death of his father and the marriage of
his mother:

" the funeral baked meats
Did coldl; furnish forth the marriage tables.**

But before we accept the " tendency to econo-
mize " as the universal character of wit and ask
whence it originates, what it signifies, and how
it gives origin to the resultant pleasure, we shall
concede a doubt which may justly be con-
sidered. It may be true that every technique
of wit shows the tendency to economize in ex-
pression, but the relationship is not reversible.
Not every economy in expression or every
brevity is witty on that account. We once
raised this question when we still hoped to
demonstrate the condensation process in every
witticism and at that we justly objected by
remarking that a laconism is not necessarily
wit. Hence it must be a peculiar form of
brevity and economy upon which the character
of the wit depends, and just as long as we are
ignorant of this peculiarity the discovery of the
common element in the technique of wit will
bring us no nearer a solution. Besides, we have
the courage to acknowledge that the economies
caused by the technique of wit do not impress us
as very much. They remind one of the man-
ner in which many a housewife economizes

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 58

when she spends time and money to reach a
distant market because the vegetables can there
be had a cent cheaper. What does wit save by
means of its technique? Instead of putting to-
gether a few new words, which, for the most
part, could have been accomphshed without any
effort, it goes to the trouble of searching for
the word which comprises both ideas. Indeed,
it must often at first transform the expression
of one of the ideas into an unusual form until
it furnishes an associative connection with the
second thought. Would it not have been
simpler, easier, and really more economical to
express both thoughts as they happen to come
even if no agreement in expression results? Is
not the economy in verbal expression more than
abrogated through the expenditure of intel-
lectual work? jVnd who economized through it,
whom does it benefit? We can temporarily cir-
cumvent these doubts by leaving them unsolved
until later on. Are we really familiar enough
vrith all the forms of techniques of wit? It will
surely be safer to gather new examples and
submit them to analysis.

Puns

Indeed, we have not
to one of the largest
techniques of wit may

yet given consideration
groups into which the
be divided. In this we

Si ANALYSIS

have perhaps been influenced by the low esti-
mate in which this form of wit is held. It
embraces those jolies which are commonly called
" puns." These are generally counted as the
lowest form of wit, perhaps because they are
" cheapest " and can be formed with the least
effort. They really make the least demands on
the technique of expression just as the actual
play on words makes the most. Whereas in
the latter both meanings find expression in the
identical word, and hence usually in a word
used only once, in the pun it is enough if two
words for both meanings resemble each other
through some slight similarity in structure, in
rhythmic consonance, in the community of
several vowels, or in some other similar manner.
The following examples illustrate these points:

" We are now fallen into that critical age
wherein censores hberorum are become censorea
Ubrorum: Lectores, lActores."

Professor Cromwell says that Rome in ex-
changing her religion changed Jupiter to Jew
Peter.

It is related that some students wishing to
play a trick on Agassiz, the great naturalist,
constructed an insect made up of parts taken
from different bugs and sent it to him with the
question, " What hind of a hug is this? " Hi$
answer was " Humbug,"

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

Puns are especially fond of modifying one
of the vowels of the word; e.g., Hevesi (Alma'
naccando. Reisen in Italien, p. 87) says of an
Italian poet who was hostile to tlie German
emperor, but who was, nevertheless, forced to
sing his praises in his hexameters, " Since he
cottid not exterminate the Cirsars he at least
annihilated the ccE^uras"

From the multitude of puns which are at
our disposal it may be of special interest to
us to quote a really poor example for which
Heine (Book he Grand, Chapter V) is responsi-
ble. After parading for a long time before his
lady as an " Indian Prince " the suitor mddenly
lays aside his mask and confesses, " Madam, I
have lied to yon. I have never been in Cal-
cutta any more than that Calcutta roast which
I relished yesterday for lunch." Obviously the
fault of this witticism lies in the fact that both
words are not merely similar, but identical.
Tlie bird which served as a roast for his lunch
is called so because it comes from, or at least
is supposed to come from, the same city of
Calcutta.

K. Fischer has given much attention to this
form of wit and insists upon making a sharp
distinction between it and the " play on words "
(p. 78) . " A pun," he says, " is a bad play on
words, for it does not play with the word as

NE UBRURt STAMQXD \i«\NWSffl

ANALYSIS

a word, but merely as a sound." The play on
■words, however, " transfers itself from the
sound of the word into the word itself." On
the other hand, he also classifies such jokes as
" famillionaire, Antigone (Antique-Oh-nay),"
etc., with sound-wit. 1 see no necessity to fol-
low him in this. In the plays on words, also,
the word serves us only as a sound to which
this or that meaning attaches itself. Here also
usage of language makes no distinction, and
when it treats " puns " with disdain but the play
on words with a certain respect it seems that
these estimations are detei-mined by others as
technical viewpoints. One should bear in mind
the forms of wit which are referred to as puns.
There are persons who have the ability, when
they are in a high-spirited mood, to reply with
a pun for a long time to every sentence ad-
dressed to them. Brill ' relates that at a gather-
ing some one spoke disparagingly of a certain
drama and wound up hy saying, "It wag ao
poor that the first act had to be rewritten"
" And now it w rerotten" added the punster of
the gathering.

At all events we can already infer from the
controversies about the line of demarcation be-
tween puns and play on words that the former
cannot aid us in finding an entirely new tech-

't c, page 339.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 57

nique of wit. Even if no claims are made for
the pun that it utUizes the manifold application
of the same material, the accent, nevertheless,
falls upon the rediscovering of the familiar and
upon the agreement between both words form-
ing the pun. Thus the latter is only a sub-
species of the group which reaches its height
in the real play on words.

Displacements

There are some witticisms, however, whose
techniques baffle almost every attempt to classify
them under any of the groups so far investi-
gated. It is related that while Heine and the
poet SouUe were once chatting together in a
Parisian drawing-room, there entered one of
those Parisians "whom one usiudly compared to
Midas, but not alone on accowtit of their money.
He was soon surrounded by a crowd which
treated him with the greatest deference. " Look
over there," said Soulie to Heine, "and see
how the nineteenth century is worshipping the
Golden Calf." Heine cast one glance upon the
object of adoration and replied, as if correct-
ing his friend: " Oh, he must he older than
that" (K. Fischer, p. 82).

Wherein lies the technique of this excellent
■witticism? According to E. Fischer it lies in

the play on words. Thus, for example, he says,
" the words ' Ciolden Calf ' may signify Mam-
mon as well as idol-worship, — in the first case
the gold is paramount; in the second case it is
the animal picture. It may likewise serve to
designate in a rather uncomplimentary way one
who has very much money and very little
brains." If we apply the test and take away
the expression "Golden Calf" we naturally
also abrogate the wit. We then cause Soulie
to say, " Just see how the people are throng-
ing about that blockhead only because he is
rich." To be sure, this is no longer witty. Nco*
would Heine's answer be possible under these
circumstances. But let us remember that it is
not at all a matter of Soulie's witty compari-
son, but of Heine's retort, which is surely much
more witty. We have then no right to dis-
turb the phrase " the golden calf " which re-
mains as a basis for Heine's words and the
reduction can only be applied to the latter. If
we dilate upon the words, " Oh, he must be
older than Uiat," we can only proceed as fol-
lows:

" Oh, he is no longer a calf; he is already a
full-grown ox." Heine's wit is therefore based
on the fact that he no longer took the " golden
calf" metaphorically, but personally by refer-
ring it to the moneyed individual himself. If

this double meaning is not already contained
in the opinion of Soulie !

Let us see. We believe that we can state
that this reduction has not altogether destroyed
Heine's joke, but, on the contrary, it has left
its essential element untouched. It reads as if
Soulie were now saying, " Just see how the
nineteenth century is worsliipping the golden
calf," and as if Heine were retorting, " Oh, he
is no longer a calf. He is already an ox." And
even in this reduced form it is still a witticism.
However, another reduction of Heine's words
is not possible.

It is a pity that this excellent example con-
tains ,such complicated technical conditions.
And as it cannot aid us toward enlightenment
we shall leave it to search for another in which
we imagine we can perceive a relationship with
the former one.

It is a " bath " joke treating of the dread which
some Jews are said to have for bathing. We de-
mand no patent of nobility for our examples
nor do we make inquiries about their origin.
The only qualifications we require are that they
should make us laugh and ser\'e our theoretical
interest. It is to be remarked that both these
demands are satisfied best by Jewish jokes.

TiEO Jews meet near a bathing establishment.
" Halve you taken a hath? " asked one. " How

60 ANALYSIS

ig that?" replies the other. "Is one missing?"
A\Tien one laughs very heartily about a joke
he is not m the best mood to investigate its
technique. It is for this reason that some
difficulties are experienced in delving into their
analyses. " That is a comic misunderstanding"
is the thought that comes to us. Yes, but how
about the technique of this joke? Obviously
the technique lies in the double meaning of the
word take. In the first case the word is used
in a colorless idiomatic sense, while in the sec-
ond it is the verb in its full meaning. It is,
therefore, a case where the same word is taken
now in the " full " and now in the " empty "
sense (Group II, f). And if we replace the
expression " take a bath " by the simpler
equivalent " bathed " the wit disappears. The
answer is no longer fitting. The joke, there-
fore, lies in the expression " take a bath."

This is quite correct, yet it seems that in
this ease, also, the reduction was applied in
the wrong place, for the joke does not lie in
the question, but in the answer, or rather in the
counter question: "How is that? Is there
one missing? " Provided the same is not de-
stroyed the answer cannot be robbed of its wit
by any dilation or variation. We also get the
impression that in the answer of the second
Jew the overlooking of the bath is more signifi-

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 61

cant than the misconception of the word " take."
However, here, too, things do not look quite
clear and we will, therefore, look for a third
example.

Once more we shall resort to a Jewish joke
in which, however, the Jewish element is in-
cidental only. Its essence is xmiversally human.
It is true that this example, too, contains un-
desirable complications, but luckily they are
not of the kind so far which have kept us from
seeing clearly.

In his distreaa a needy man borrowed twenty-
jive dollars from a wealthy acquaintance. The
same day he was discovered by his creditor in a
restaurant eating a disk of salmon with mayon-
naise. The creditor reproached Mm in these
words: " You borrow money from me and then
order salmon with mayonnaise. Is that what
you needed the money for? " " I don't under-
stand you," responded the debtor, " when I have
no money I can't eat salmon with mayonnaise.
Wlien I liave money I mustn't eat it. WeU
then, when shall I ever eat salmon with mayon-
naise^"

Here we no longer discover any double mean-
ing. Even the repetition of the words " salmon
with mayonnaise " cannot contain the technique
of the witticism, as it is not the " manifold appli-
cation of the same material," but an actual»

6i ANALYSIS

identical repetition required by the context.
We may be temporarily nonplussed in this
analysis, and, as a pretext, we may wish to dis-
pute the character of the wit in the anecdote
which causes us to laugh. What else worthy
of notice can be said about the answer of the
poor man? It may be supposed that the strik-
ing thing about it is its logical character, but,
as a matter of fact, the answer is illogical. The
debtor endeavors to justify himself for spending
the borrowed money on luxuries and asks, with
some semblance of right, when he is to be al-
lowed to eat salmon. But this is not at all
the correct answer. The creditor does not blame
him for eating salmon on the day that he bor-
rowed the money, but reminds him that in his
condition he has no right to think of such lux-
lu-ies at all. The poor bon vivant disregards
this only possible meaning of the reproach,
centers liis answer about another point, aüd acts
as if he did not understand the reproach.

Is it possible that the technique of this joke
lies in this deviation of the answer from the
sense of reproach? A similar changing of the
viewpoint — displacement of the psychic accent —
may perhaps also be demonstrated in the two
previous examples which we felt were related
to this one. This can be successfully shown
and solves the technique of these examples.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

Soulie calls Heine's attention to tlie fact that
society worships the " golden calf " in Uie nine-
teenth century just as the Jewish nation once
did in the desert. To this an answer from
Heine Uke tJie following would seem fit: " Yes,
that is human nature. Centuries have changed
nothing in it ; " or he might have remarked
something equally apposite. But Heine devi-
ates in his manner from the instigated thought.
Indeed, he does not answer at all. He makes
use of the double meaning found in the phrase
" golden calf " to go off at a tangent. He seizes
upon one of the components of the phrase,
namely, " the calf," and answers as if Soulie's
speech placed the emphasis on it — " Oh, he is
no longer a calf, etc." '

The deviation is much more evident in the
bath joke. This example requires a grraphic
representation. The first Jew asks, " Have
you taken a bath? " The emphasis lies upon
the bath element. The second answers as if the
query were: "Have you taken a bath?" The
displacement would have been impossible if
the question had been: "Have you bathed?"
The witless answer would have been: " Bathed?
What do you mean? I don't know what that

' Heine's answer is » combiiiHtion of two wlt-technlquea — a d!s<
placemoit and an alludoB— for he does not uj directlfi "Ha

ANALYSIS

means." However, the technique of the wit lies
in the displacement of the emphasis from " to
bathe " to " to take." '

Let us return to the example " salmon with
mayonnaise," which is the purest of its kind.
What is new in it will direct us into various
paths. In the first place we have to give
the mechanism of this newly discovered tech-
nique. I propose to designate it as having
displacement for its most essential element.
The deviation of the trend of thought consists
in displacing the psychic accent to another
than the original theme. It is then incumbent
upon us to find out the relationship of the
technique of displacement to the expression of
the witticism. Our example (salmon with
mayonnaise) shows us that the displacement
technique is absolutely independent of the verbal
expression. It does not depend upon words,
but upon the mental trend, and to abrogate it
we are not helped by substitution so long as
the sense of the answer is adhered to. The re-
duction is possible only when we change the

'The word "lake," owing to Its meanings, lends itself verj
well towards the formation of plays upon words, a pure example
of which I wish to cite as a contrast to the displacement men-
tioned above. While walking; with his friend, in front of a
catt, a well-known stock-plun^r and bank director made this
proposal: "Let us go in and take something." His friend
held tiim back oad atiii " Mj deu* sir, remember there are peopla
iBtlieR.''

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 65

mental trend and permit the gastronomist to
answer directly to the reproach which he eluded
in the conception of the joke. The reduced
conception will then be: " What I like I cannot
deny myself, and it is all the same to me where
I get the money for it. Here you have my
explanation as to why I happen to be eating
salmon with mayonnaise today just after you
have loaned me some money." But that would
not be a witticism but a cynicism. It will be
instructive to compare this joke with one
which is closely allied to it in meaning.

A man who was addicted to drink supported
kimaelf in a small city by giving lessons. His
vice gradually became known and he lost moat
of his pupils in consequence. A friend of hit
took it upon himself to admonish him to re-
form. " Look here," he said, " you could have
the best scholars in town if you would give up
drinking. Why not do it?" " What are you
talking about? " was the indignant reply. " I
am giving lessons in order to he able to drink.
Shall I give up drinking in order to obtain
scholars? "

This joke, too, carries the stamp of logic
which we have noted in the case of " salmon
with mayonnaise," but it is no longer displace-
ment-wit. The answer is a direct one. The
cynicism, which is veiled there, is openly ad-

66 ANALYSIS

mitted here, " For me drink is the most im-
portant thing." The teclinique of this witticism
is really very poor and cannot explain its
effect. It lies merely in the change in order
of the same material, or to be more exact, in
the reversal of the means-and-end relationship
between drink and giving lessons or getting
scholars. As I gave no greater emphasis in
the reduction to this factor of the expression
the witticism is somewhat blurred; it may be
expressed as follows: "What a senseless de-
mand to make. For me, drink is the most im-
portant thing and not the scholars. Giving
lessons is only a means towards more drink."
The wit is really dependent upon the expres-
sion.

In the bath wit, the dependence of the witti-
cism upon the wording " have you taken a
bath " is unmistakable and a change in the
wording nullifies the joke. The technique in
this case is quite complicated. It is a com-
bination of double meaning (sub-group f) and
displacement. The wording of the question
admits a double meaning. The joke arises
from the fact that the answer is given not in
the sense expected by the questioner, but has a
different subordinate sense. By making the
displacement retrogressive we are accordingly
in position to find a reduction which leaves the

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 67

double meaning in the expression and still does
away with the wit,

" Have you taken a bath? " " Taken tohat?
A hath? What is thai? " But that is no longer
a witticism. It is simply either a spiteful or
playful exaggeration.

In Heine's joke about the " golden calf " the
double meaning plays a quite similar part. It
makes it possible for the answer to deviate from
the instigated stream of thought — a thing which
happens in the joke about " salmon and mayon-
naise " — without any such dependence upon the
wording. In the reduction Soulie's speech and
Heine's answer would be as follows : " It re-
minds one very much of the worship of the
golden calf when one sees the people throng
around that man simply because he is rich."
Heine's answer would be: "That he is made
so much of on account of his wealth is not the
■worst part. You do not emphasize enough the
fact that his ignorance is forgiven on account
of his wealth." Thus, while the double mean-
ing would be retained the displacement-wit
would be eliminated.

Here we may be prepared for the objection
■which might be raised, namely, that we are
seeking to tear asunder these delicate differen-
tiations which really belong together. Does
not every double meaning furnish occasion for

68 ANALYSIS

displacement and for a deviation of tKe stream
of thought from one sense to another? And
shall we agree that a " double meaning " and
" displacement " should be designated as rep-
resentatives of two entirely different types of
wit? It is true that a relation between double
meaning and displacement actually exists, but
it has nothing to do with our differentiation
of the techniques of wit. In cases of double
meaning the wit contains nothing but a word
capable of several interpretations which allows
the hearer to find the transition from one
thought to another, and which with a little
forcing may be compared to a displacement.
In the cases of displacement-wit, however, the
witticism itself contains a stream of thought
in which the displacement is brought about.
Here the displacement belongs to the work
which is necessary for its imderstanding.
Should this differentiation not be clear to us we
lan make use of the reduction method, which is
an unfailing way for tangible demonstration.
We do not deny, however, that there is some-
thing in this objection. It calls our attention
to the fact that we cannot confuse the psychic
processes in the formation of wit (the wit-work)
with the psychic processes in the conception of
the wit {the understanding-work). The object

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 69

of our present investigation will be confined
only to the former.'

Are there still other examples of the tech-
nique of displacement? They are not easily
found, but the fallowing witticism is a very
good specimen. It also shows a lack of over-
emphasized logic found in our former ex-
amples.

A horse-dealer in recommending a saddle
horse to his client said: " If you mount this
horse at four o'clock in the morning you xmü
he in Monticello at sir-thirty in the morning."
" What •will 1 do in Monticello at six-thirty m
the morning?" asked the client.

Here the displacement is very striking. The
horse-dealer mentions the early arrival in the
small city only with the obvious intention of
proving the efficiency of the horse. The client
disregards the capacity of the animal, about
which he evidently has no more doubts, and
takes up only the data of the example selected

I* For the latter see a later chapter. It trill perhaps not be
Buperfluoua to add here a few words for better understanding.
The dUpiatement regularly occurs between a statement and an
answer, and turos the stream of thought to a direction different
from the one started in the statement. The justiflcation for
separating the dlaplaeement from the double meaning is best
seen in the examples where both are combined, that is, where the
wording of the statement admits of a double meaning which
was not intended bj the Epesinr, but which reveals in tbo
answer the wajr to the displacement (see examples}.

ANALYSIS

for the test. The reduction of this joke is com-
paratively simple.

More difficulties are encountered by another
example, the technique of which is very obscure.
It can be solved, however, through the applica-
tion of double meaning with displacement. The
joke relates the subterfuge employed by a
"schadchen" (Jewish marriage broker). It
belongs to a class which will claim more of our
attention later.

The "schadchen" had assured the suitor
tJiat the father of the girl was no longer living.
After the engagement had been announced the
news halted out that the father was still living
and serving a sentence in prison. The suitor
reproached the agent for deceiving Aim.
" Well," said the latter, " what did I tell yofti?
Do you call that living? "
■ The double meaning lies in the word " living,"
and the displacement consists in the fact that
the " schadchen " avoids the common meaning
of the word, which is a contrast to " death," and
uses it in the colloquial sense: " You don't call
that living." In doing this he explains his
former utterance as a double meaning, although
this manifold application is here quite out of
place. Thus far the technique resembles that
of the "golden calf" and the "bath" jokes.
Here, however, another factor comes into con-

OmI

We a

of tiK

Its
We dtttt

THE TECHXIQCX OF WIT

sideration ithkh distnrfas the
the technique throu^ its obtn a s i reaem.
might say that this joke ii a
wit." It exxkxron to il lu s tiate bgr
marriage agent's cliaracte
mendacioua impudence and rep at teei
learn that this is only the "Aow-m
facade of the witticism, that b, ita
object serves a different p nr poae.
also defer our attempt at redoctian.' '

After these ccanplkated examplo; «iodi an
not at all easy to analyze, it wül be gratifying
to find a perfectly pare and transparent ex-
ample of " displacement-wit*' A beggar im-
plored the help of a wealthy baron for a trip
to Oatend, tchere he a**erted the pkytiäana had
ordered htm to take sea bath* for his health,
" Very tcell, J shaB assist you" said the rieh
baron, " but is it absolutely necessary for you to
go to Ostend, which is ike most expensive of aU
vxttering-places? " " Sir," zcas the reproving
f^piy, " nothing is too expensive for my health/*
Certainly that is a proper attitude, but hardly
proper for the supplicant. The answer is given
from the viewpoint of a ridi man. The beggar
acts as if it were his own money that he was
willing to sacrifice for his health, as if monqr
and health concerned the same person.

'Sec Chapter UL

Nonsense as a Technical Means

Let us take up again in this connection the
instructive example of " sahnon with mayon-
naise." It also presents to us a side in which
we noticed a striking display of logical work
and we have learned from analyzing it that
this logic concealed an error of thought, namely,
a displacement of the stream of thought.
Henceforth, even if only by way of contrast
association, we shall be reminded of other jokes
which, on the contrary, present clearly some-
thing contradictory, something nonsensical, or
foolish. We shall be curious to discover wherein
the technique of the witticism lies. I shall
first present the strongest and at the same time
the purest example of the entire group. Once
more it is a Jewish joke.

Ike was serving in the ariiUery corps. He
teas seemingly an intelligent lad, hut he was
unwieldy and had tig interest in the service.
One of his superiors, who was kindly disposed
toward him, drew him aside and said to him:
" Ike, you are out of place among vs. I would
advise you to buy a cannon and make yourself
independent."

The advice, which makes us laugh heartily,
is obvious nonsense. There are no cannon to
be bought and an individual cannot possibly

I
I

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

make himself independent as a fighting force
or estabh'sh himself, as it were. One cannot
remain one minute in doubt but that this ad-
vice is not pure nonsense, but witty nonsense
and an excellent joke. By what means does
the nonsense become a witticism?

We need not meditate very long. From the
discussions of the authors in the Introduction
we can guess that sense lurks in such witty
nonsense, and that this sense in nonsense trans-
forms nonsense into wit. In our example the
sense is easily found. The officer who gives
the artilleryman, Ike, the nonsensical advice
pretends to be stupid in order to show Ike how
stupidly he is acting. He imitates Ike as if to
say, " I will now give you some advice which is
exactly as stupid as you are." He enters into
Ike's stupidity and makes him conscious of it by
making it the basis of a proposition which must
meet with Ike's wishes, for if Ike owned a can-
non and took up the art of warfare on his own
account, of what advantage would his intelli-
gence and ambition be to him? How would
he take care of the cannon and acquaint
himself with its mechanism in order to meet '
the competition of other possessors of can-
non?

I am breaking off the analysis of this example
to show the same sense in nonsense in a shorter

ANALYSIS

and simpler, though less glaring case of non-
sense-wit.

" Never to he horn tcovM be best for mortal
man." " But," added the sages of the Fliegende
Blätter, " hardly one man in a hundred thou-
sand has this luck."

The modern appendix to the ancient philo-
sophical saying is pure nonsense, and becomes
still more stupid through the addition of the
seemingly careful " hardly." But this appen-
dix in attaching itself to the first sentence in-
contestably and correctly limits it. It can thus
open our eyes to the fact that that piece of
wisdom so reverently scanned, is neither more
nor less than sheer nonsense. He who is not
born of woman is not mortal; for him there
exists no " good " and no " best." The nonsense
of the joke, therefore, serves here to expose
and present another bit of nonsense as in the
case of the artilleryman. Here I can add a
third example which, owing to its context,
scarcely deserves a detailed description. It
serves, however, to illustrate the use of non-
sense in wit in order to represent another ele-
ment of nonsense.

A man about to go upon a journey intrusted
his daughter to his friend, begging him to watch
over her chastity during his absence. When
he returned some months later he found that

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 75

ake was pregnant. Naturally he reproached
his friend, Tlie latter alleged that he conld not
explain this unfortunate occurrence. " Where
Jias she been sleeping?" the father finally asked.
" In the same room with my son," replied the
friend. " How is it that you allowed her to
sleep in the same room with your son after I
had begged you so earnestly to take good care
of her?" remonstrated the father. "Well,"
explained the friend, " there was a screen be-
tween them. There was your daughter's bed
I and over there was my son's bed and between
' them stood the screen." " And suppose he
went behind tfie screen? What then?" asked
the parent. " Well, in that case," rejoined the
friend thoughtfully, " it might he possible."
r In this joke — aside from the other quahties
I of this poor witticism — we can easily get the
reduction. Obviously, it would read like this:
'* You have no right to reproach me. How
could you he so foolish as to leave your daughter
in a house where she must live in the constant
companionship of a young man? As if it were
possible for a stranger to be responsible for
the chastity of a maiden under such circum-
stances!" The seeming stupidity of the friend
here also serves as a reflection of the stupidity
of the fatlier. By means of the reduction we
have eliminated the nonsense contained in the

ANALYgiS

witticism as well as the witticism itself. We
have not gotten rid of the " nonsense " element
itself, as it finds another place in the context of
the sentence after it has been reduced to its
true meaning.

We can now also attempt the reduction of
the joke about the cannon. The officer might
have said: " I know, Ike, that you are an in-
telligent business man, but I must tell you that
you are very stupid if you do not realize that
one cannot act in the army as one does in
business, where each one is out for himself
and competes with the other. Military service
demands subordination and co-operation."

The technique of the nonsense witticisms
hitherto discussed really consists in advancing
something apparently absurd or nonsensical
which, however, discloses a sense serving to
illustrate and represent some other actual
absurdity and nonsense.

Has the employment of contradiction in the
technique of wit always this meaning? Here is
another example which answers this affirma-
tively. On an occasion when Phocion's speech
was applauded he turned to his friends and
asked: " Did I say something foolish? "

This question seems paradoxical, but we
immediately comprehend its meaning. " What
have I said that has pleased this stupid crowd?

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

I ought really to be ashamed of the applause,
for if it appealed to these fools, it could not
have been very clever after all."

Other examples teach us that absurdity is
used very often in the technique of wit without
serving at all the purpose of uncovering another
piece of nonsense.

A well-known university teacher "who was
toont to spice richly with jokes his rather dry
specialty was once congratulated upon the
birth of his youngest son, who was bestowed
upon him at a rather advanced age. " Yes,"
»aid he to the ■well-wishers, " it is remarkable
what mortal hands can accompliah." This reply
seems especially meaningless and out of place,
for children are called the blessings of God to
distinguish them from creations of mortal hands.
But it soon dawns upon us that this answer has
a meaning and an obscene one at that. The
point in question is not that the happy father
wishes to appear stupid in order to make some-
thing else or some other persons appear stupid.
The seemingly senseless answer causes us as-
tonishment. It puzzles us, as the authors would
have it. We have seen that the authors deduce
the entire mechanism of such jokes from the
change of the succession of " clearness and con-
fusion." We shall try to form an opinion about
this later. Here we content ourselves by re-

ANALYSIS

marking that the technique of this witticism
consists in advancing such confusing and sense-
less elements.

An especially peculiar place among the non-
sense jokes is assimied by this joke of Lichten-
berg.

"He was surprised that the two holes were
cut in the pelts of cats just -where their eyes
were located." It is certainly foolish to be
surprised about something that is obvious in
itself, something which is really the explanation
of an identity. It reminds one of a seriously
intended utterance of Michelet (The Womaei)
which, as I remember it, runs as follows: " How
beautifully everything is arranged by nature.
As soon a» the child comes into the xvorld it
finds a mother who is ready to care for it."
This utterance of Michelet is really siUy, but
the one of Lichtenberg is a witticism, which
makes use of the absurdity for some purpose.
There is something behind it. What? At
present that is something we cannot discuss.

Sophistic Faulty Thinking

We have learned from two groups of ex-
amples that the wit-work makes use of devia-
tions from normal thought, namely, displace-
ment and absurdity, as technical means of pre*

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 79

senting witty expressions. It is only just to
expect that other faulty thinking may find a
similar application. Indeed, a few examples of
this sort can be cited.

A gentleman entered a shop and ordered a
fancy cake, which, however, he soon returned,
asking for some liqueur in its stead. He drank
the liqueur, and was about to leave without
paying for it. The shopkeeper held him back.
" What do you want of me? " he asked.
"Please pay for the liqueur," said the shop-
keeper. " But I have given you the fancy cake
for it," " Yes, hut yoti have not paid for that
either." " Well, neither have I eaten it."

This little story also bears the semblance of
logic which we already know as the suitable
facade for faulty thinking. The error, ob-
viously, lies in the fact that the cunning cus-
tomer establishes a connection between the re-
turn of the fancy cake and its exchange for the
liqueur, a comiection which really does not
exist. The state of affairs may be divided into
two processes which as far as the shopkeeper
is concerned are independent of each other.
He first took the fancy cake and returned it,
so that he owes nothing for it. He then took
the liqueur, for which he owes money. One
might say that the customer uses the relation
*' for it " in a double sense, or, to speak more

correctly, by means of a double sense he forms
a relation which does not hold in reality.'

The opportunity now presents itself for mak-
ing a not unimportant confession. We are
here busying ourselves with an investigation of
technique of wit by means of examples, and
we ought to be sure that the examples which
we have selected are really true witticisms.
The facts are, however, that in a series of
cases we fall into doubt as to whether or not
the example in question may be called a joke.
We have no criterion at our disposal before
investigation itself furnishes one. Usage of
language is unreliable and is itself in need of
examination for its authority. To decide the
question we can rely on nothing else but a
certain " feeling," which we may interpret by
saying that in our judgment the decision fol-
lows certain criteria which are not yet accessi-
ble to our knowledge. We shall naturally not
appeal to this " feeling " for substantial proof.
In the case of the last-mentioned example we
cannot help doubting whether we may present
it as a witticism, as a sophistical witticism, or

' A similar nonsense technique results when the joke stms to
tnalntain a Connection whEch seenis to tw removed through the
■pecial conditionE of its content. A Joke of this sort is related
l^ J. Pallte (1. e.) : " /* Ihit the place v>here Che Duke of Wetl-
bigton »poke theie viordi! " " Fm, lAw i> tA« placi; bvt A« iMvcr
»poka thtte aoTdt."

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 81

merely as a sophism. The fact is that we do
not yet know wherein the character of wit lies.
L On the other hand the fallowing example,
l^rfiich evinces, as it were, the complementary
faulty thinking, is a witticism without any
doubt. Again it is a story of a marriage agent.
The agent is defending the girl he lias proposed
gainst the attacks of her prospective fiancS.
" The mother-in-law does not suit me," the
latter remarks. " She is a crabbed, foolish per-
aon" " That's true," replies the agent, " hut
you are not going to marry the mother-in-law,
hut the daughter." " Yes, hut she is no longer
young, and she is not pretty, either." " That's
nothing: if she is not young or pretty you can
trust her all the more." "But she liasn't much
money." " Why talk of money? Are you go-
ing to marry money? You want a wife, don't
you?" "But she is a hunchback." "Well,
tehat of that? Do you expect her to have no
blemishes at all? "

It is really a question of an ugly girl who is
no longer young, who has a paltry dowry and a
repulsive mother, and who is besides equipped
with a pretty bad deformity, relations which are
not at all inviting to matrimony. The marriage
agent knows how to present each individual
fault in a manner to cause one to become
TeconcUed to it, and then takes up the

ecome ■

e un- M

pardonable hunch back as the one fault which
can be excused in any one. Here again there
is the semblance of logic which is characteristic
of sophisms, and which serves to conceal the
faulty thinking. It is apparent that the girl
possesses nothing but faults, many of which
can be overlooked, but one that cannot be passed
by. The chances for the marriage become very
slim. The agent acts as if he removed each
individual fault by his evasions, forgetting that
each leaves behind some depreciation which is
added to the next one. He insists upon dealing
with each factor individually, and refuses to
combine them into a sum-total.

A similar omission forms the nucleus of an-
other sophism which causes much laughter,
though one can well question its right to be
called a joke.

A. had borrowed a copper kettle from B., and
upon returning it was sued by B. because it had
a large hole which rendered it unserviceable.
His defense was this: " In the first place I
never borrowed any kettle from B., secondly
the kettle had a hole in it when I received it
from B., thirdly the kettle was in perfect coti-
dition when I returned it." Each separate pro-
test is good by itself, but taken together they
exclude each other. A. treats individually
what must be taken as a whole, just as the

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

marriage agent when he deals with the imper-
fections of the bride. One can also say that A.
uses " and " where only an " cither^-or " is
possible.

Another sophism greets us in the foUowing
marriage agent story. The suitor objects he-
cause the bride has a short leg and therefore
limps. The agent contradicts kim. " You are
torong," he says. " Suppose you marry a
Vjoman whose legs are sound and straight.
What do you gain by it? You are not sure
from day to day that she tßiü not fall down,
break a leg, and then be lame for the rest of
her life. Just consider the pain, the excite-
ment, and the doctor's biU. But if you marry
this one nothing can happen. Here you have
a finished job."

Here the semblance of logic is very shallow,
for no one will by any means admit that a
" finished misfortune " is to be preferred to a
mere possibility of such. The error in the
stream of thought will be seen more easily in a
second example.

In the temple of Cracoto sat the great Rabbi
N. praying with his disciples. Suddenly he
emitted a cry and in response to his troubled
ditciples said: " The great Rabbi L. died just
note in Lemberg." The congregation thereupon
v>ent into mourning for tlie deceased. In the

ANALYSIS

course of the next day travelers from, ILemberg
were asked how the rabbi had died, and what
had caused his death. They knew nothing
about the event, however, as, they said, they
had left him in the best of health. Finally it
teas definitely ascertained that the Rabbi of
Lemberg had not died at the hour on which
Rabbi N. had felt his death telepathically, and
that he was still living. A stranger seized the
opportunity to banter a pupil of the Cracow
rabbi about the episode. " That was a glorious
exhibition that your rabbi made of himself
when he saw the Rabbi of Lemberg die." he
said. " Why, the man is still living! " " No
matter," replied the pupil. " To look from
Cracow to Lemberg was wonderful anyhow."
Here the faulty thinking common to both
of the last examples is openly shown. The
value of fanciful Ideas is unfairly matched
against reality; possibility is made equivalent
to actuality. To look from Cracow to Lem-
berg despite the miles between woxdd have been
an imposing telepathic feat had it resulted in
some truth, but the disciple gives no heed to
that. It might have been possible that the
Rabbi of Lemberg had died at the moment
when the Rabbi of Cracow had proclaimed his
death, but the pupil displaces the accent from
the condition under which the teacher's act

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 85

would be remarkable to the unconditional ad-
miration of this act. " In magnis rebus voluisse
»at est " is a similar point of view. Just as in
this example reality is sacrificed in favor of
possibility, so in the foregoing example the
marriage agent suggests to the suitor that the
possibility of the woman's becoming lame
through an accident is a far more important
consideration to be taken into account; whereas
the question as to whether or not she is lame
is put altogether into the background.

Automatic Errors of Thought

Another interesting group attaches itself to
thb one of sophistical faulty thinking, a group
ID which the faulty thinking may be designated
as automatic. It is perliaps only a stroke of
fate that all of the examples which I shall cite
for this new group are again stories referring
to marriage agents.

The agent brought along an assistant to a
conference about a bride. This assistant was
to confirm hü assertions. " She is as well made
as a pine tree" said the agent. " hike a pine
tree," repeated the echo. " She has eyes which
cne must appreciate." " Wonderful eyes," con-
firmed the echo. " She is cultured beyond
ieord». She possesses ewtraordinary culture"

iatant, I
.J it.. "

" Wonderfully cultured," repeated the assistant.
"However, one thing is true," confessed the
agent. "She. has a slight hunch on her hack."
"And what a hunch!" confirmed the echo.

The other stories are quite analogous to this
one, but they are cleverer.

On being introduced to his prospective bride
the suitor teas rather unpleasantly surprised,
and drawing aside the marriage agent he re-
proachfully whispered to him: " Why have you.
brought me here? She is ugly and old. She
squints, has had teeth, and hleary eyes."
" You can talk louder," interrupted the agent.
"She is deaf, too."

A prospective bridegroom made his first call
on his future bride in company with the agent,
and while in the parlor waiting for the appear-
ance of the family the agent drew the young
man's attention to a glass closet containing a
handsome diver set. " Just look at these
things," he said. " You can see how wealthy
these people are." " But is it not possible that
these articles were just borrowed for the occa-
sion," inquired the suspicious young man, "so
as to give the appearance of wealth? " " What
an idea" answered the agent protestingly.
" Who in the world would lend them any-

In all three cases one finds the same thing.

THK TECHNIQUE OF WIT

A person who reacts several times in succession
in the same manner continues in the same
manner on the next occasion where it becomes
unsmted and runs contrary to his intentions.
Falling into the automatism of habit he fails
to adapt himself to the demands of the situa-
tion. Thus in the first story the assistant forgot
I that he was taken along in order to influence
I the suitor in favor of the proposed bride, and
f as he had thus far accomplished his task by
emphasizing through repetition the excellencies
attributed to the lady, he now emphasizes also
her timidly conceded hunch back which he
should have belittled.

The marriage agent in the second story is so
fascinated by the failings and infirmities of the
bride that he completes the list from his own
knowledge, which it was certainly neither his
business nor his intention to do. Finally in
the third story he is so carried away by his
zeal to convince the young man of the family's
wealth that in order to corroborate his proofs
he blurts out something which must upset all
his efforts. Everywhere the automatism tri-
umphs over the appropriate variation of
thought and expression.

That is quite easy to understand, although

it must cause confusion when it is brought to

I our attention that these three stories could just

as well be termed " comical " as " witty." IJke
every act of unmasking and self-betrayal the
discovery of the psychic automatism also be-
longs to technique of the comic. We suddenly
see ourselves here confronted with the problem
of the relationship of wit to the comic element —
a subject which we endeavored to avoid (see
the Introduction). Are these stories only
"comical" and not "witty" also? Does the
comic element employ here the same means as
does the wit? And again, of what does the
peculiar character of wit consist?

We must adhere to the fact that the tech-
nique of the group of witticisms examined last
consists of nothing else but the establishment of
" faulty thinking." We are forced to admit,
however, that so far the investigation has led
us further into darkness than to illumination.
Nevertheless we do not abandon the hope of
arriving at a result by means of a more thor-
ough knowledge of the technique of wit which
may become the starting-point for further in-

Unification

The next examples of wit with which we wish
to continue our investigation do not give us as
much work. Their technique reminds us very
much of what we already know. Here is one

I
I

lichtenberg's jokes. "January," he says,
" i» the month in which one extends good wishes
to his friends, and the rest are months in which
the good wishes are not fulfilled."

As these witticisms may be called clever
rather than strong, we shall reinforce the im-
pression by examining a few more.

" Human life is divided into two halves; dur-
ing the first one looks forward to the second,
and during the second one looks backward to
the first."

" Experience consists in experiencing what
one does not care to experience." (The last
two examples were cited by K. Fischer.)

One cannot help being reminded by these ex-
amples of a group, treated of before, which is
characterized by the " manifold application of
the same material." The last example espe-
cially will cause us to ask why we have not
inserted it there instead of presenting it here
in a new connection. " Experience " is de-
scribed through its own terms just as some of
the examples cited above. Neither would I be
against this correction. However, I am of the
opinion that the other two cases, which are
surely similar in character, contain a different
factor which is more striking and more im-
portant than the manifold application of the
same word which shows nothing here touching

ANALYSIS

upon double meaning. And what is more, I
wish to emphasize that new and unexpected
identities are here formed which show them-
selves in relations of ideas to one another, in
relations of definitions to each other, or to a
common third. I would call this process unifica-
tion. Obviously it is analogous to condensation
by compression into similar words. Thus the
two halves of human life are described by the
inter-relationship discovered between them :
during the first part one longs for the second,
and in the second one longs for the first. To
speak more precisely there were two relation-
ships very similar to each other which were
selected for description. The similarity of the
relationship that corresponds to the similarity of
the words which, just for this reason, might
recall the manifold application of the same
material — (looks forward)
(looks backward).
In Lichtenberg's joke, January and the
months contrasted with it are characterized
again by a modified relationsliip to a third
factor: these are good wishes which one re-
ceives in the first month, but are not fulfilled
during the other months. The difFerentiation
from the manifold application of the same ma-
terial which is really related to double meaning
is here quite clear.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 91

A good example of unification-wit needing
no explanation is the following ;

J. B. Rousseau, the French poet, wrote an
ode to posterity (a la postente). Voltaire,
thinking that the poor quality of the poem in
no way jtistified its reaching posterity, wittily
remarked. " This poem will not reach its detti-
nation" (K. Fischer).

The last example may remind us of the fact
that it is essentially unification which forms
the basis of the so-called repartee in wit. For
ready repartee consists in using the defense for
aggression and in " turning the tables " or in
" paying with the same coin." That is, the
repartee consists in establishing an unexpected
identity between attack and counter-attack.

For example, a baker said to a tavern keeper,
one of whose fingers was festering: " I guess
your finger got into your beer." The tavern
keeper replied: " You are wrong. One of your
rolls got under my finger nail" (Ueberhorst:
Baa Komische, II, 1900).

While Serenissimus was traveling through his
domains he noticed a man in the crowds who
bore a striking resemblance to himself. He
beckoned him to come over and asked: "Was
your mother ever employed in my home?"
" No, sire," repUed the man, " but my father

While Duke Karl of Wiirtemberg was riding
horseback he met a dyer working at his trade.
" Can you color my white horse blue? " " Yes,
nre," was the rejoinder, "if the animal can
stand the boiling!"

In this excellent repartee, which answers a
foolish question with a condition that is equally
impossible, there occurs another technical
factor which would have been omitted if the
dyer's reply had been: " No, sire, I am afraid
that the horse could not stand being boiled."

Another peculiarly interesting technical
means at the disposal of unification is the addi-
tion of the conjunction " and." Such correla-
tion signifies a connection which could not be
understood otherwise. WhenHeine (Harzreise)
says of the city of Göttingen, " In general the
inhabitants of Göttingen are divided into gtur
dents, professors, Philistines, and cattle," we
understand this combination exactly in the sense
which he furthermore emphasized by adding;
" These four social groups are distinguished lit-
tle less than sharply." Again, when he speaks
about the school where he had to submit " to
so much Latin, drubbing, and geography," he
wants to convey by this combination, which is
made very conspicuous by placing the drubbing
between the two studies, that the schoolboy's
conception unmistakably described by the drub-

V bing

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

I
I

bing should be extended also to Latin and
geography.

In Lipps's book we find among the examples
of "witty enumeration" (Koordination) the
following verse, which stands nearest to Heine's
" students, professors, Philistines, and cattle."

" With a fork and with muck effort his
mother pulled him from a mess."

" As if effort were an instrument like the
fork," adds Lipps by way of explanation. But
we get the impression that there is nothing
witty in this sentence. To be sure it is very
comical, whereas Heine's co-ordination is im-
doubtedly witty. We shall, perhaps, recall these
examples later when we shall no longer be
forced to evade the problem of the relationship
between wit and the comic.

Representation Through the Opposite

We have remarked in the example of the
Duke and the dyer that it would still have been
a joke by means of unification had the dyer
replied, " No, I fear that the horse could not
stand being boiled." In substituting a " yes "
for the " no " wliich rightly belonged there, we
meet a new technical means of wit the apphca-
tion of which we shall study in other examples.

This joke, which resembles the one we have

just cited from K. Fischer, is somewhat sim-
pler. " Frederick the Great heard of a Silesian
clergyman who had the reputation of communi-
cating leith spirits. He »eni for him and re-
ceived him. tcith the following question: 'Can
you call up ghosts?' 'At your pleasure, your
majesty,' replied the cUrgymxin, ' hut they
toon't come.' " Here it is perfectly obvious
that the wit lies in the substitution of its op-
posite for the only possible answer, " No." To
complete this substitution " but " had to be
added to " yes," so that " yes " plus " but "
gives the equivalent for '* no."

This " representation through the opposite," as
we choose to call it, sen'es the mechanism of
wit in several ways. In the following cases it
appears almost in its pure form:

" This woman resembles Venus de MHo in
Tnany points. Like her she is extraordinarily
old, has no teeth, and has white spots on the
yellow surface of her body" (Heine).

Here ugliness is depicted by making it agree
with the most beautiful. Of com-se these agree-
ments consist of attributes expressed in double
meaning or of matters of slight importance.
The latter applies to the second example.

" The attributes of the greatest men were aU
united in himself. Like Alexander his head
•was tilted to one side: like Ccesar he always had

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 9S

tomething in his hair. He could drink coffee
Uke Leibnitz, and once settled in Ids armchair
he forgot eating and drinking Uke Newton, and
like him had to be awakened. He wore a wig
Uke Dr. Johnson, and like Cervantes the fly of
hi» trousers was always open" (Lichtenberg:
The Great Mind).

J. V. Falke's Lebenserinnerungen an eme
Heise nach Ireland (page 271) furnishes an ex-
ceptionally good example of " representation
tlirough the opposite " in which the use of
■words of a double meaning plays absolutely no
part. The scene is laid in a wax figure museum,
like Mnie. Tussaud's. A lecturer discourses on
one figure after another to his audience, which
is composed of old and young people. " This is
the Duke of Wellington and his horse," he says.
Whereupon a young girl remarks, " Which is
the duke and which is the horse?" "Just as
you Uke, my pretty child." is the reply. " You
pay your money and you take your choice."

The reduction of this Irish joke would be:
" It is gross impudence on the part of the
museum's management to offer such an exhibi-
tion to the public. It is impossible to distin-
guish between the horse and the rider (playful
exaggeration), and it is for this exhibit that
one pays one's hard-earned money!" The in-
dignant expression is now dramatized and ap-

plied to a trivial occurrence. In the place of
the entire audience there appears one woman
and the riding figure becomes individually de-
termined. It is necessarily the Duke of Well-
ington, who is so very popular in Ireland. But
the insolence of the museum proprietor or lec-
turer who takes money from the public and
offers nothing in return is represented by the
opposite, through a speech, in which he extols
himself as a conscientious business man whose
fondest desire is to respect the rights to which
the public is entitled through the admission
fee. One then realizes that the technique of this
joke is not very simple. In so far as a way
is found to allow the swindler to assert his
scrupulosity it may be said that the joke is a
case of " representation through the opposite."
The fact, however, that he does it on an occa-
sion where something different is demanded of
him, and the fact that he replies in terms of
commercial integrity when he is expected to dis-
cuss the similarity of the figures, shows that it
is a case of displacement. The technique of
the joke lies in the combination of both technical
means.

Outdoing-wit

This example is closely allied to another
small group which might be called " outdoing-

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

wit." Here " yes," which would be proper in
the reduction, is replaced by " no," which, owing
to its context, is equivalent to a still stronger
" yes." The same mechanism holds true when
the case is reversed. The contradiction takes
the place of an exaggerated confirmation. An
example of this nature is seen in the following
epigram from Lessing.'

" The good Galathee! 'Tis said that she dyes
her liair black, yet it was black when she bought
it"

Lichtenberg's make-believe mocking defense
of philosophy is another example.

" There are more things in heaven and earth
than are dreamt of in your philosophy," Prince
Hamlet had disdainfully declared. Lichten-
berg well knew that this condemnation was
by no means severe enough, in that it does not
take into account all that can be said against
philosophy. He therefore added the following:
"" But there is also much in philosophy which ts
found neither in heaven nor on earth." To be
sure, his assertion supplements what was lack-
ing in Hamlet's philosophical utterance, but in
doing this he adds another and still greater re-
proach.

More transparent still, because they show
no trace of displacement, are two Jewish

' Following an example of the Gretk dnthologf.

of the coarse

98 ANALYSIS

jokes ^diich are, however,
kind.

TtDo Jews were conversing about bathing.
" I take a bath once a year," said one, " whether
J need one or not."

It is clear that this boastful assurance of his
cleanliness only betrays his state of uncleanli-
ness.

A Jew noticed remnants of food on the beard
of another. " I can tell you what you ate yes-
ierday," he remarked. " Well, let's hear it,"
said another. " Beans," said the first one. " You
are wrong," responded the other. " I had beans
the day before yesterday."

The following example is an excellent " out-
doing " witticism which can be traced easily
to representation through the opposite.

The king condescended to pay a xnsit at a
surgical clinic, and found the professor of sur-
gery engaged in amputating a leg. He watched
the various steps of the operation with interest
and expressed his royal approval with these
loud utterances: " Bravo, bravo. Professor."
When the operation was over the professor
approached the king, bowed low, and asked:
"Dobs your majesty also command the amputa-
tion of the other leg?"

Whatever the professor may have thought
during this royal applause surely could not

have been expressed unchanged. His real
thoughts were: "Judging by this applause he
must be under the impression that I am ampu-
tating the poor devil's diseased leg by order
of and for the pleasure of the king. To be
sure. I have other reasons for performing this
operation." But instead of expressing these
thoughts he goes to the king and says: " I have
no other reasons but your majesty's order for
performing this operation. The applause you
accorded me has inspired me so much that I
am only awaiting your majesty's command to
amputate the other leg also." He thus suc-
ceeded in making himself understood by ex-
pressing the opposite of what he really thought
but had to keep to himself. Such an expres-
sion of the opposite represents an incredible
exaggeration or outdoing.

As we gather from these examples, repre-
sentation through the opposite is a means fre-
quently and effectively used in the technique
of wit. We need not overlook, however, some-
thing else, namely, that this technique is by
I no means confined only to wit. When Marc
' Antony, after his long speech in the Forum
had changed the mood of the mob listen-
ing to Caesar's obsequies, at last repeats the
[words,

*'For Brutus was an honorable man,"

100 ANALYSIS

he well knows that the mob will scream the
true meaning of his words at him, namely,
" They are traitors : nice honorable men ! "
Or when SimpUcissimus transcribes a col-
lection of unheard-of brutalities and cynicisms
as expressions of " people with temperaments,"
this, too, is a representation through the oppo-
site. However, this is no longer designated as
wit, but as " irony." Indeed, the only technique
that is characteristic of irony is representation
through the opposite. Besides, one reads and
hears about " ironical wit." Hence there is no
longer any doubt that technique alone is not
capable of characterizing wit. There must be
something else which we have not yet dis-
covered. On the other hand, however, the fact
that the reduction of the technique destroys the
wit still remains uncontradicted. For the pres-
ent it may be difficult for us to unite for the
explanation of wit the two strong points which
we have already gained.

Indirect Expression

Since representation through the opposite
belongs to the technical means of wit, we may
also expect that wit could make use of its re-
verse, namely, the representation through the
similar and cognate. Indeed, when we continue

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 101

our investigation we find that this forms the
technique of a new and especially extensive
group of thought-witticisms. We can describe
the peculiarity of this technique much better
if instead of representation through the " cog-
nate " we use the expression representation
through " relationships and associations." We
shall start with the last characteristic and illus-
trate it by an example.

Indirect Expression witk Alltmon

It is an American anecdote and runs as
follows. By undertaking a series of risky
schemes, two not very scrupulous business men
had succeeded in amassing an enormous for-
tune and were now intent on forcing their way
into good society. Among other things tliey
thought it advisable to have their portraits
painted by the most prominent and most ew-
pensive painters in the city, men whose works
were considered masterpieces. The costly pic-
tures were exhibited for the first time at a great
evening gathering, and the hosts themselves led i
the most prominent connoisseur and art critic
to the wall of the salon o7i which both portraits
were hanging side by aide, in order to elicit
from him a favorable criticism. He examined
the portraita for a long time, then shook his

102 ANALYSIS

head 08 if he were missing something. At
length he pcdnted to the bare space between
the pictures, and asked, "And where is the
Savior? "

The meaning of this expression is clear. It
is again the expression of something which can-
not be represented directly. In what way does
this "indirect expression" come about? By a
series of very obvious associations and conclu-
sions let us work backwards from the verbal
setting.

The query, " where is the Savior? " or " where
is the picture of the Savior? " arouses the con-
jecture that the two pictures have reminded the
speaker of a similar arrangement familiar to
him as it is familiar to us. This arrangement,
of which one element is here missing, shows the
figure of the Savior between two other figures.
There is only one such case: Christ hanging
between the two thieves. The missing element
is emphasized by the witticism, and the similar-
ity rests in the figures at the right and left of
the Savior, which are not mentioned in the jest.
It can only mean that the pictures hanging in
the drawing-room are likewise those of thieves.
This is what the critic wished to, but could
not say, " You are a pair of scoundrels," or
more in detail, " What do I care about your
portraits? You are a pair of scoundrels, that

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

I know." And by means of a few associations
and conclusive inferences he has said it in a
manner which we designate as " allusion."

We hnmediately remember that we have
encountered the process of allusion before.
Namely, in double meaning, when one of the
two meanings expressed by the same word
stands out very prominently, because being used
much oftener and more commonly, our atten-
tion is directed to it first, whereas the other
meaning remains in the background because it
is more remote — such cases we wished to de-
scribe as double meaning with allusion. In an
entire series of examples which we have hitherto
examined, we have remarked that tlieir tech-
nique is not simple and we realized that the
process of allusion was the factor that com-
plicated it. For example, see the contradiction-
witticism in which the congratulations on the
birth of the youngest child are acknowledged by
the remark that it is remarkable what human
hands can accomplish (p. 77).
, In the American anecdote we have the process
of allusion without the double meaning, and we
find that the character of this process consists
in completing the picture through mental asso-
ciation. It is not difficult to guess that the
utilized association can be of more than one
kind. So as not to be confused by large num-

104 ANALYSIS

bers we shall discuss only the most pronouneed
variations, and shall give only a few examples.

The association used in the substitution may
be a mere sound, so that this sub-group may
be analogous to word-wit in the pun. How-
ever, it is not similarity in sound of two words,
but of whole sentences, characteristic combina-
tions of words, and similar means.

For example, Lichtenberg coined the saying j
" New baths heal taell," which immediately re-
minds one of the proverb, " New brooms clean
well," whose first and last words, as well as
whose whole sentence structure, is the same as
in the first saying. It has undoubtedly arisen
in the witty thinker's mind as an imitation of
the familiar proverb. Thus Lichtenberg's say-
ing is an allusion to the latter. By means of
this allusion something is suggested that can-
not be frankly said, namely, that the efficacy
of the baths taken as cures is due to other
things beside the thermal springs whose attri-
butes are the same everywhere.

The solution of the technique of another one
of Lichtenberg's jokes is similar: "The girl
barely twelve modes old." That sounds some-
thing like the chronological term " twelve
moons" (i.e., months), and may originally have
been a mistake in writing in the permissible
poetical expression. But there is a good deal

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 105

of sense in designating the age of a feminine
creature by the changing modes instead of by
the changing of moons.

The connection of similarity may even con-
sist of a single slight modification. This tech-
nique again runs parallel with a word-technique.
Both kinds of witticisms create almost the
identical impression, but they are more easily
distinguishable by the processes of the wit-
work.

The following is an example of such a word-
witticism or pun. The great singer, Mary
Wilt, who was famous not merely on account
of the magnitude of her voice, suffered the
mortification of having a title of a play, drama-
tized from the well-known novel of Jules
Verne, serve as an allusion to her corpulency.
"The trip around the Wilt (world) in eighty
days."

Or: "Every fathom a queen." which is a
modification of the familiar Shakespearian
quotation, "Every inch a king," and served as
an allusion to a prominent woman who was un-
usually big physically. There would really be
no serious objection if one should prefer to
classify this witticism as a substitution for con-
densation with modification (cf. tete-ä-bete,
p. 25).

Discussing the hardships of the medical pro-

fession, namely, that physicians are obliged to
read and study constantly because remedies and
drugs once considered efficacious are later re-
jected as useless, and that despite the physi-
eiiin's best efforts the patient often refuses to
pay for the treatment, one of the doctors present
remarked: "Yes, every dnig has ita day," to
which another added, " But not every Doc gets
his pay." These two witty remarks are both
modifications with allusion of the well-known
saying, " Every dog has his day." But here,
too, the technique could be described as fusion
with modification.

If the modification contents itself with a
change in letters, allusions through modifica-
tions are barely distinguishable from condensa-
tion with substitutive formation, as shown in
this example: " MelUngitis," the allusion to the
dangerous disease meningitis, refers to the
danger which the conservative members of a
provincial borough in England thought im-
pended if the socialist candidate Mellon were
elected.

The negative particles make very good allu-
sions at the cost of very little changing. Heine
referred to Spinoza as:

" My fellow «nbeliever Spinoza."

" We, by the Ungrace of God, L'aborers,
Bondsmen, Negroes, Serfs," etc., is a manifesto

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT

(which Lichtenberg quotes no further) of these
unfortunates who probably have more right to
that title than kings and dukes have to the un-
modiüed one.

Omission

Finally omission, which is comparable to con-
densation without substitutive formation, is also
a form of allusion. For in every allusion there
is really something omitted, namely, the trend
of thought that leads to the allusion. It is
only a question of whether the gap, or the sub-
stitute in the wording of the allusion which
partly fills in the gap, is the more obvious
element. Thus we come back through a series
of examples from the very clear cases of omis-
sion to those of actual allusion.

Omission without substitution is found in
the following example. There lived in Vienna
a clever and bellicose writer whose sharp in-
vectives had repeatedly brought him bodily
assault at the hands of the persons he assailed.
During a conversation about a new misdeed by
one of his habitual opponents, some one said,
" When X. hears this he will receive another
box on his ear." The technique of this wit
shows in the first place the confusion about
the apparent contradiction, for it is by no means

dear to us why a box on one's ear should be
the direct result of having heard something.
The contradiction disappears if one fiUs in the
gap by adding to the remark: "then he will
•write such a caustic article against that person
that, etc." Allusions through omission and con-
tradiction are thus the technical means of this
witticism.

Heine remarked about some one: " He praises
himself so much that pastils for fumigation are
advancing in price." This omission can easily
be filled in. What has been omitted is replaced
by an inference which then strikes back as an
allusion to the same. For self-praise has al-
ways carried an evil odor with it.

Once more we encounter the two Jews in
front of the bathing establishment. " Another
year has passed by already," says one with a
sigh.

These examples leave no doubt that the omis-
sion is meant as an allusion.

A still more obvious omission is contained
in the next example, which is really a genuine
and correct allusion-witticism. Subsequent to
an artists' banquet in Vienna a joke book was
given out in which, among others, the follow-
ing most remarkable proverb could be read:

" A tmfe is lile an umbrella, at worst one may
also take a cab."

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 109

An umbrella does not afford enough protec-
tion from rain. The words " at worst " can
mean only: when it is raining hard. A cab
is a public conveyance. As we have to deal
here with the figure of comparison, we shall put
off the detailed investigation of this witticism
until later on.

Heine's " Bäder von Lucca " contains a veri-
table wasps' nest of stinging allusions which
make the most artistic use of this form of wit as
polemics against the Count of Platen. Long
before the reader can suspect their application,
a certain theme, which does not lend itself espe-
cially to direct presentation, is preluded by
allusions of the most varied material possible;
e.g., in Hirsch-Hyacinth's twisting of words:
You are too corpulent and I am too lean; you
possess too much conceit and I the more busi-
ness ability; I am a practicus and you are a
diarrheticus, in fine, " You are altogether my
Antipodex " — " Venus Urinia " — the thick Gu-
del of Dreckwall in Hamburg, etc. Then the
occurrences of which the poet speaks take a
turn in which it merely seems to show the im-
polite sportiveness of the poet, but soon it dis-
closes the symbolic relation to the polemical in-
tention, and in tills way it also reveals itself as
allusion. At last the attack against Platen
bursts forth, and now the allusions to the sub-

ject of the Count's love for men seethe and
gush from each one of the sentences which
Heine directs against the talent and the char-
acter of his opponent, e.g.:

" Even if the Muses are not well disposed
to him, he has at least the genius of speech in
his power, or rather he knows how to violate
him; for he lacks the free love of this genius,
besides he must perseveringly run after this
youth, and he knows only how to grasp the
outer forms which, in spite of their beautiful
rotundity, never express anything noble."

" He has the same experience as the ostrich,
which considers itself sufficiently hidden when
it sticks its head into the sand so that only its
backside is visible. Our illustrious bird would
have done better if he had stuck his backside
into the sand, and had shown us his head."

Allusion is perhap.-i the commonest and most
easily employed means of wit, and is at the basis
of most of the short-lived witty productions
which we are wont to weave into our conversa-
tion. They cannot bear being separated from
their native soil nor can they exist independ-
ently. Once more we are reminded by the
process of allusion of that relationship which
has already begun to confuse our estimation of
the technique of wit. The process of allusion
is not witty in itself; there are perfectly formed

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 111

allusions which have no claims to this character.
Only those allusions which show a " witty "
element are witty, hence the characteristics of
wit, which we have followed even into its tech-
nique, again escape us.

I have sometimes called allusion " indirect ex-
pression," and now recognize that the different
kinds of allusion with representation through
the opposite, as well as the techniques still to be
mentioned, can be united into a single large
group for which " indirect expression " would
be the comprehensive name. Hence, errors of
thought — unification — indirect representation —
are those points of view under which we can
group the techniques of thought-wit which be-
came known to us.

Representation Through the Minute or the
Minutest Element

On continuing the investigation of our ma-
terial we think we recognize a new sub-group
of indirect representation which though sharply
defined can be illustrated only by few examples.
It is that of representation through a minute
or minutest element; solving the problem by
bringing the entire character to full expression
through a minute detail. Correlating this
group with the mechanism of allusion is made

possible by looking at the triviality as con-
nected with the thing to be presented and as a
result of it. For example:

A Jew who Was riding in a train had made
himself very comfortable; he had unbuttoned
his coat, and Had jrut his feet on the seat, when
a fashionably dressed gentleman came in. The
Jew immediately put on his best behavior and
assumed a modest position. The stranger
turned over the pages of a book, did some cal~
culation, and pondered a moment and suddenly
addressed the Jew. "I beg your pardon, how
soon will we have Vom Kippur?" (Day of
Atonement). "Oh, oht" said the Jew, and
put his feet back on the seat before he an-
swered.

It cannot he denied that this representation
through something minute is allied to the tend-
ency of economy which we found to be the final
common element in the investigation of the
technique of word-wit.

The following example is much similar.

The doctor who had been summoned to help
the baroness in her confinement declared that
the critical moment had not arrived, and pro~
posed to the baron that they play a game of
cards in the adjoining room in the meantime.
After a while the doleful cry of the baroness
reached the ears of the men. " Ah, mon Dieu,

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 118

que je souffre! " The husband jumped up, but
the phi/sician stopped kirn saying, " That's
nothing; let us play on." A little while later
the woman in labor-pains wag heard again:
" My God, my God, what pains! " " Don't
you want to go in. Doctor? " asked the baron.
" By no means, it is not yet time," answered the
doctor. At last there rang from the adjacent
room the unmistakable cry, " A-a-a-ai-e-e-e-e-e-e-
E-E'E! " The physician then threw down the
cards and said, " jVohj it's time."

How the pain allows the original nature to
break through all the strata of education, and
how an important decision is rightly made de-
pendent upon a seemingly inconsequential utter-
ance — both are shown in this good joke by the
successive changes in the cries of this child-
bearing lady of quality.

Comparison

Another kind of indirect expression of which
wit makes use is comparison, which we have not
discussed so far because an examination of com-
parison touches upon new difficulties, or rather
it reveals difficulties which have made their
appearance on other occasions. We have al-
ready admitted that in many of the examples
examined we could not banish all doubts as to

whether they should really he counted as witty,
and have recognized in this uncertainty a serious
shock to tlie principles of our investigation.
But in no other material do I feel this luicer-
tainty greater and nowhere does it occur more
frequently than in the case of comparison-wit.
The feeling which usually says to me — and I
dare say to a great many others under the same
conditions— this is a joke, this may be written
down as witty before even the hidden and
essential character of the wit has been uncov-
ered — this feeling I lack most. If at first I
experience no hesitation in declaring the com-
parison to be a witticism, then the next instant
I seem to think that the pleasure I thus found
was of a different quahty than that which I am
accustomed to ascribe to a joke. Also the fact
that witty comparisons but seldom can evoke
the explosive variety of laughter by which a
good joke proves itself makes it impossible for
me to cast aside the existing doubts, even when
I limit myself to the best and most effective
examples.

It is easy to demonstrate that there are some
tspecially good and effective examples of com-
parison which in no way give us the impres-
sion of witticisms. A beautiful example of this
kind which I have not yet tired of admiring,
and the impression of which still clings to me.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT BIS

I shall not deny myself the pleasure of citing.
It is a comparison with whicli Ferd. Lassalle
concluded one of his famous pleas {Die Wissen-
schaft und die Arbeiter) : " A man like myself
who, as I explained to you, had devoted his
whole life to the motto ' Die Wissenschaft und
die Arbeiter' (Science and the Workingman),
■would receive the same impression from a con-
demnation which in the course of events con-
fronts him as would the chemist^ absorbed in
his scientific experimenis, from the cracking of
a retort. With a slight knitting of his brow at
the resistance of the material, he would, as soon
as tlie disturbance was quieted, calmly con-
tinue hia labor and investigations."

One finds a rich assortment of pertinent and
witty comparisons in the writings of Lichten-
berg (2 B. of the Göttingen edition, 1853).
I shall take the material for our investigation
from that source.

" /( is almost impossible to carry the torch
of truth through a crowd •without singeing
somebody's beard." This may seem witty, hut
on closer examination one notices that the witty
effect does not come from the comparison it-
self but from a secondarj' attribute of the same.
For the expression " the torch of truth " is no
new comparison, but one which has been used
for a long time and which has degenerated into

118 ANALYSIS

a fixed phrase, as always happens when a com-
parison has the luck to be absorbed into the
common usage of speech. But whereas we
hardly notice the comparison in the saying,
" the torch of truth," its original full force is
restored it by Lichtenberg, since by building
further on the comparison it results in a de-
duction. But the taking of blurred expressions
in their full sense is already known to us as a
technique of wit; it finds a place with the Mani-
fold Application of the Same Material {p. 85).
It may well be that the witty impression created
by Lichtenberg's sentence is due only to its re-
lation to this technique of wit.

The same explanation will undoubtedly hold
good for another witty comparison by the same
author.

" The man was not exactly a shining light,
but a great candlestick. . . . He was a pro-
fessor of phUosopky."

To call a scholar a shining light, a " luTtien
mundi" has long ceased to be an effective com-
parison, whether it be originally qualified as a
witticism or not. But here the comparison was
freshened up and its full force was restored to
it by deducting a modification from it and in
this way setting up a second and new com-
parison. The way in which the second com-
parison came into existence seems to contain

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 117

the condition of the witticism and not the two
comparisons themselves. This would then be
a case of Identical Wit Technique as in the
example of the torch.

The following comparison seems witty on
other but similarly classifiable grounds: "/
look upon reviews as a kind of children's dis-
ease which more or less attacks new-born books.
There are cases on record where the healthiest
died of it, and the puniest have often lived
through it. Many do not get it at all. At-
tempts have frequently been made to prevent
the disease by means of amulets of prefaces and
dedications, or to color th^m up by personal
pronunciamentos; but it does not always help."

The comparison of reviews with children's
diseases is based in the first place upon their
susceptibility to attack shortly after they have
seen the light of the world. Whether this
makes it witty I do not trust myself to decide.
But when the comparison is continued, it is
found that the later fates of the new books may
be represented within the scope of the same or
by means of similar comparisons. Such a con-
tinuation of a comparison is undoubtedly witty,
hut we know already to what technique it owes
its witty flavor ; it is a case of unification or the
establishment of an unexpected association.
The character of the unification, however, is not

changed by the fact that it consists here of a
relationship with the first comparison.

Doubt in Witty Comparisons

In a series of other comparisons one is
tempted to ascribe an indisputably existing
witty impression to another factor which again
in itself has nothing to do with the nature of
the comparison. These are comparisons which
are strikingly grouped, often containing a com-
bination that sounds absurd, which comes into
existence as a result of the comparison. Most
of Lichtenberg's examples belong to this group.

" It is a pity that one cannot see the learned
boicela of the writers, in order to find out what
they have eaten." "The learned bowels" is a
confusing, really absurd attribute which is
made clear only by the comparison. How
would it be if the witty impression of this com-
parison should be referred entirely and fully to
the confusing character of tlieir composition?
This would correspond to one of the means of
wit well known to us, namely, representation
through absm-dity.

Lichtenberg has used the same comparison of
the imbibing of reading and educational ma-
terial with the imbibing of physical nourishment.

" He thought highly of studying in his room

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 119

and was heartily in favor of learned stable
fodder."

The same absurd or at least conspicuous attri-
butes, which as we are beginning to notice are
the real carriers of the wit, mark other com-
parisons of the same author.

" This is the weatherside of my moral con-
stitution, here 1 can stand almost any-
thing."

" Every person has also his moral backside
which he does not show except under the stress
of necessity and which lie covers as long as
possible with the pants of good-breeding."

The " moral backside " is the peculiar attri-
bute which exists as the result of a comparison.
But this is followed by a continuation of the
comparison with a regular play on words
("necessity") and a second, still more unusual
combination ("the pants of good-breeding"),
which is possibly witty in itself; for the pants
become witty, as it were, because they are the
pants of good-breeding. Therefore it may not
take US by surprise if we get the impression of
a very witty comparison; we are beginning to
notice that we show a general tendency in our
estimation to extend a quality to the whole
thing when it clings only to one part of it.
Besides, the " pants of good-breeding " remind
us of a similar confusing verse of Heine.

"Until, at last, the buttons tore from the
pants of my patience."

It is obvious that both of the last comparisons
possess a character which one cannot find in all
good, i.e., fitting, comparisons. One might say
that they are in a large manner " debasing," for
they place a thing of high category, an abstrac-
tion (good -breeding, patience), side by side with
a thing of a very concrete nature of a very low
kind (pants). Whether tliis peculiarity has
something to do with wit we shall have to
consider in another connection. Let us attempt
to analyze another example in which the de-
grading character is exceptionally well defined.
In Nestroy's farce " Einen Jux will er sick
machen," the clerk, Weinberl, who resolves in
his imagination how he wiU ponder over his
youth when he has some day become a well-
established old merchant, says: " When in the
course of confidential conversation the ice is
chopped up before the "warehouse of memory;
tsohen the portal of the storehouse of antiquity
is unlocked again; and iahen the mattings of
phantasy are stocked full xvith -wares of yore."
These are certainly comparisons of abstractions
with very common, concrete things, but the
witticism depends — exclusively or only par-
tially — upon the circumstance that a clerk
makes use of these comparisons which are taken

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 121

from the sphere of his daily occupation. But
to bring the abstract in relation to the common-
place with which he is otherwise filled is an act
of wnification. Let us revert to Lichtenberg'»
comparisons.

Peculiar Attributuma '

" The Tnotives for our actions may he ar-
ranged Uke the thirty-txvo winds, and their
names may he classified in a similar way, e.g..
Bread-bread-glory or Glory-glory-hread."

As so often happens in Liehtenberg's witti-
cisms, in this case, too, the impression of appro-
priateness, cleverness, and ingenuity is so
marked that our judgment of the character of
the witty element is thereby misled. If some-
thing witty is intermingled in such an utterance
with the excellent sense, we probably are de-
luded into declaring the whole to be an excep-
tional joke. Moreover, I dare say that every-
thing that is really witty about it results from
the strangeness of the peculiar combination
bread-bread-glory. Thus as far as wit is con-
cerned it is representation through absurdity.

The peculiar combination or absurd attribu-
tion can alone be represented as a product of a
comparison.

Lichtenberg says : " A twice-sleepy woman —

a once-sleepy church pew." Behind each one
there is a comparison with a bed; in both cases
there is besides the comparison also the tech-
nical factor of allusion. Once it is an allusion
to the soporific effect of sermons, and the second
time to the inexhaustible theme of sex.

Having found hitherto that a comparison as
often as it appears witty owes this impression
to its connection with one of the techniques of
wit known to us, there are nevertheless some
other examples which seem to point to the fact
that a comparison as such can also he witty.

This is Lichtenberg's characteristic remark
about certain odes. " They are in poetry what
Jacob Böhm's immortal writings are in prose —
they are a kind of picnic in which the author
supplies the words, and the readers the mean-
ing."

" When he philosophizes, he generally sheds
an agreeable moonlight over his topics, which is
in the main quite pleasant, but which does not
show any one subject clearly."

Again, Heine's description : " Her face resem-
bled a kodex palimpsestus, where under the new
block-lettered text of a church father peek forth
ike half-obliterated verses of an ancient Hel-
lenic erotic poet."

Or, the continued comparison of a very de-
grading tendency, in the " Bäder von Lucca."

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 12«

" The Catholic priest is more like a clerk
who is employed in a big business; the church,
the big house at the head of which is the Pope,
gives him a definite salary. He works lazily
like one who is not working on his own account,
he has many colleagues, and so easily remains
unnoticed in the big business enterprise. He is
concerned only in the credit of the house and
still more in its preservation, since he would be
deprived of his means of sustenance in case
it went bankrupt. The Protestant clergyman,
on the other hand, is his own boss, and carries
on the religious businesses on his own account.
He has no wholesale trade like his Catholic
brother- tradesman, but deals merely at retail;
and since he himself must understand it, he
cannot be lazy. He must praise his articles of
faith to the people and must disparage the
articles of his competitors. Like a true small
trader he stands in his retail store, full of envy
of the industry of all large houses, particularly
the large house in Rome which has so many
thousand bookkeepers and packers on its pay-
roll, and which owns factories in all four cor-
ners of the world."

In the face of this, as in many other examples,
we can no longer dispute the fact that a com-
parison may in itself be witty, and that the
witty impression need not necessarily depend

on one of the known techniques of wit. But
we are entirely in the dark as to what deter-
mines the witty character of the comparison,
since it certainly does not cling to the similarity
as a, form of expression of the thought, or to
the operation of the comparison. We can do
nothing but include comparison with the differ-
ent forms of " indirect representation " which
are at the disposal of the technique of wit, and
the problem, which confronted us more dis-
tinctly in the mechanism of comparison than
in the means of wit hitherto treated, must re-
main unsolved. There must surely be a special
reason why the decision whether something is a
witticism or not presents more difficulties in
cases of comparison than in other forms of ex-
pression.

This gap in our understanding, however, of-
fers no ground for complaint that our first in-
vestigation has been unsuccessful. Considering
the intimate connection which we had to be pre-
pared to ascribe to the different types of wit,
it would have been imprudent to expect that
we could fully explain this aspect of the prob-
lem before we had cast a glance over the others.
We shall have to take up this problem at
another place.

THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT ISS

Review of the Techniques of Wit

Are we sure that none of the possible tech-
niques of wit has escaped our investigation?
Not exactly; but by a continued examination
of new material, we can convince ourselves that
we have become acquainted with the most nu-
merous and most important technical means of
wit-work — at least with as much as is necessary
for formulating a judgment about the nature
of this psychic process. At present no such
judgment exists; on the other hand, we have
come into possession of important indications,
from tbe direction of which we may expect a
further explanation of the problem. The inter-
esting processes of condensation with substitu-
tive formation, which we have recognized as
the nucleus of the technique of word-wit, di-
rected our attention to the dream-formation in
whose mechanism the identical psychic processes
were discovered. Thither also we are directed
by the teclinique of the thought-wit, namely dis-
placement, faulty thinking, absurdity, indirect
expression, and representation through the op-
posite — each and all are also found in the tech-
nique of dreams. The dream is indebted to
displacement for its strange appearance, which
hinders us from recognizing in it the continua-
tion of our waking thoughts; the dream's use

126

ANALYSIS

of absurdity and contradiction has cost it the
dignity of a psychic product, and has misled the
authors to assume that the determinants of
dream- formation are: collapse of mental activ-
ity, cessation of criticism, morality, and logic.
Representation through the opposite is so com-
mon in dreams that even the popular but en-
tirely misleading books on dream interpreta-
tion usually put it to good account. Indirect
expression, the substitution for the dream-
thought by an allusion, by a trifle or by a
symboHsm analogous to comparison, is just ex-
actly what distinguishes the manner of expres-
sion of the dream from our waking thoughts.'
Such a far-reaching agreement as found be-
tween the means of wit-work and those of
dream-work can scarcely be accidental. To
show those agreements in detail and to trace
their motivations will be one of our future tasks.

• Cf. my Interpretation of Dream), Chap. VI, The Dream Work,
translated bj A. A. Brill, The Macmillan Co., New York, and
Allen Ik Unwin, London.

Ill

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT ^

Neae the end of the preceding chapter as I
was writing down Heine's comparison of the
Catholic priest to an employee of a large busi-
ness house, and the comparison of the Prot-
estant divine to an independent retail dealer,
I felt an inliibition which nearly prevented me
from using this comparison. I said to myself
that among my readers probably there would
be some who hold in veneration not only re-
ligion, but also its administration and admin-
istrators. These readers might take offense at
the comparison and get so wrought up about
it that it would take away all interest in the
investigation as to whether the comparison
seemed witty in itself or was witty only through
its gamishings. In other examples, e.g., the
one mentioned above concerning the agreeable
moonlight shed by a certain philosophy, there
would be no worry that for some readers it
might be a disturbing influence in our investi-

* The word tendentT' encountered hereafter In the expression
* Tendeney-Wit " (Tendtni Wili) is used adjectivdy in the sune
sense u in the familiar phrase " Tendency Play."

gation. Even the most religious person would
remain in the right mood to form a judgment
about our problem.

It is easy to guess the character of the wit-
ticism by the kind of reaction that wit exerts
on the hearer. Sometimes wit is wit for its
own sake and serves no other particular pur-
pose; then again, it places itself at the service
of such a purpose, i.e., it becomes purposive.
Only that form of wit which has such a tend-
ency runs the risk of ruffling people who do
not wish to hear it.

Theo. Vischer called wit without a tendency
" abstract " wit, I prefer to call it " harmless "
wit

As we have already classified wit according
to the material touched by its technique into
word- and thought-wit, it is incumbent upon us
to investigate the relation of this classification
to the one just put forward. Word- and
thought-wit on the one hand, and abstract- and
tendency-wit on the other hand, bear no relation
of dependence to each other; they are two en-
tirely independent classifications of witty pro-
ductions. Perhaps some one may have gotten
the impression that harmless witticisms are pre-
ponderately word-witticisms, whereas the com-
plicated techniques of thought-witticisms are
mostly made to serve strong tendencies. There

HE TENDENCIES OF WIT 1«9

are harmless witticisms that operate through
play on words and sound similarity, and just as
harmless ones which make use of all means of
thought-wit. Nor is it less easy to prove that
tendency-wit as far as technique is concerned
may be merely the wit of words. Thus, for ex-
ample, witticisms that " play " with proper
names often show an insulting and offending
tendency, and yet they, too, belong to word-wit.
Again, the most harmless of all jests are word-
witticisms. Examples of this nature are the
popular "shake-up" rhymes (Schüttelreime)
in which the technique is represented through
the manifold application of the same material
■with a very peculiar modification:

" Having been forsaken by Dane Luck, he
degenerated into a Lame Duck,"

Let us hope that no one will deny that the
pleasure experienced in this kind of otherwise
unpretentious rhyming is of the same nature as
the one by which we recognize wit.

Good examples of abstract or harmless
thought-witticisms abound in Lichtenberg's com-
parisons with which we have already become ac-
quainted. I add a few more. " They sent a
»mall Octavo to the University of Göttingen;
and received back in body and soul a quarto "
(a fourth-form boy).

^ In order to erect tJtia bvüding toeÜ, one

viust lay above all things a good fowndation,
and I know of no firmer than by laying im-
mediately over every pro-layer a contra-layer."

" One man begets the thought, the second
acts as its godfather, the third begets children
by it, the fourth visits it on its death-bed, and
the fifth buries it " (comparison with unifica-
tion) .

" Not only did he disbelieve in ghosts, but he
was not ever afraid of them." The witticism in
this case lies exclusively in the absurd repre-
sentation which puts what is usually considered
less important in the comparative and what is
considered more important in the positive de-
gree. If we divest it of its dress it says; it is
much easier to use our reason and make light
of the fear of ghosts than to defend ourselves
against this fear when the occasion presents it-
self. But this rendering is no longer witty; it
in merely a correct and still too little respected
psychological fact suggesting what Lessing ex-
presses in liis well-known words:

" Not all are free who mock their chains."

Harmless and Tendency Wit

I shall take the opportunity presented here
of clearing up what may still lead to a possible

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT ISl

misunderstanding. " Harmless " or " abstract "
wit should in no way convey the same mean-
ing as " shallow " or " poor " wit. It is meant
only to designate the opposite of the " tend-
ency " wit to be described later. As shown
in the aforementioned examples, a harmless
jest, i.e., a witticism without a tendency, can
also be very rich in content and express some-
thing worth while. The quality of a witticism,
however, is independent of the wit and repre-
sents the quality of the thought which is here
expressed wittily by means of a special contri-
vance. To be sure, just as watch-makers are
wont to enclose very good works in valuable
cases, so it may likewise happen with wit that
the best witty activities are used to invest the
richest thoughts.

Now, if we pay strict attention to the dis-
tinction between thought-content and the witty
wording of thought-wit, we arrive at an insight
which may clear up much uncertainty in our
judgment of wit. For it turns out — astonish-
ing as it may seem — that our enjoyment of a
witticism is supplied by the combined impres-
sion of content and wit-activity, and that one
of the factors is likely to deceive us about the
extent of the other. It is only the reduction of
the witticism that lays bare to us our mistaken
judgment.

MNE umvs. ^m'm viss

The same thing apphes to word-wit. Wüen
we hear that " experience consists simply of eay
periencing what one wishes he had not experi-
enced," we are puzzled, and believe that we
have leamt a new truth; it takes some time be-
fore we recognize in this disguise the platitude,
'* adversity is the school of wisdom " ( K.
Fischer). The excellent wit-activity which
seeks to define " experience " by the almost
exclusive use of the word " experience " de-
ceives us so completely that we overestimate
the content of the sentence. The same thing
happens in many similar cases and also in
Lichlenberg's unification-witticism about Jan-
uary (p. 89), which expresses nothing but what
we already know, namely, that New Year's
wishes are as seldom realized as other wishes.

We find the contrary true of other witticisms,
in which obviously what is striking and correct
in the thought captivates us, so that we call
the saying an excellent witticism, whereas it
is only the thought that is brilliant while the
wit-activity is often weak. It is especially true
of Lichtenberg's wit that the path of the
thought is often of more value than its witty
expression, though we unjustly extend the
value of the former to the latter. Thus the
remark about the " torch of truth " (p. 115) is
hardly a witty comparison, but it is so striking

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 133

that we are inclined to lay stress on the sen-
tence as exceptionally witty.

Lichtenberg's witticisms are above all re-
markable for their thought-content and their
certainty of hitting the mark. Goethe has
rightly remarked about this author that his
witty and jocose thoughts positively conceal
problems. Or perhaps it may be more correct
to say that they touch upon the solutions of
problems. When, for example, he presents as
a witty thought:

" He always read Agamemnon instead of the
German word angenommen, so thoroughly had
he read Homer " (technically this is absurdity
plus sound similarity of words). Thus he dis-
covered nothing less than the secret of mistakes
in reading.' The following joke, whose tech-
nique (p. 78) seemed to us quite unsatisfactory,
is of a similar nature.

" He was »urprised that there were two holet
cut in the pelts of cats just where the eyes were
located." The stupidity here exhibited is only
seemingly so; in reahty this ingenuous remark
conceals the great problem of teleology in the
structure of animals; it is not at all so self-evi-
dent that the eyelid cleft opens just where the

' Cf. tny PigehopaChology of Everyday Lift, translated by A.
A. Brill, Tbe HacmUlan Co, New Yorl^ «nd T. FUbcr Unwlii.

134 ASJLLT5IS

ecrsea is exposed, untfl the ^nrvft of cvula-
tica expLiiEä to cs tim co inridm c e.

Let OS fae^r in zniod tfaxt m witty «mtmce
gave us a gryvnl impRssäoa in wbidi we were
nnaible to dfstfE^:u5sh the »twcMgrf of tfaoqglit-
eontait from ti&e usocnt of wit-wark; poliaps
e^en a more sxgnixScuxt parallri to it will be
found lata*.

PUcjure S^nlts from tke Tedkmiqme

Tor cur theoreticsl explanation of tiie nature
of wit. harmless wit must be of greater value
tc us than tendencv-wit and shallow wit more

tti^n profound wit. Harmless and shallow
plaji en words present to us tiie problem of
wit in its purest form, because of tiie good
^erjs0z therein and because there is no purposive
faßt*:? nor underlyinij philosophy to confuse
the judgment. With such material our under-
itatr/iir g can make further progress.

At the end of a dinner to xchkh I had heen
mzited, a pastry called Roukard was Meroed; it
^zcjt a culinary accomplishment rchich pretup'
po$ed a good deal of skill on the part of the
CTjok. "Is it home-made?** asked one of the
guests. ''Oh, yesr replied the host, ''it is a
Hctme-Eoulard " (Home Rule).

This time we shall not investigate the tech*

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 1S5

nique of this witticism, but shall center our at-
tention upon another, and that one the most
important factor. As I remember, this impro-
vised joke delighted all the guests and made us
laugh. In this case, as in countless others, the
feeling of ^jleasure of the hearer cannot have
originated from any purposive element nor the
thought-content of the wit; so we are forced to
connect the feeling of pleasure with the tech-
nique of wit. The technical means of wit which
we have described, such as condensation, dis-
placement, indirect expression, etc., have there-
fore the faculty to produce a feeling of pleas-
ure in the hearer, although we cannot as yet
see how they acquired that faculty. By such
easy stages we get the second axiom for the
explanation of wit; the first one (p. 17) states
that the character of wit depends upon the mode
of expression. Let us remember also that the
second axiom has really taught us nothing new.
It merely isolates a fact that was already con-
tained in a discovery which we made before.
For we recall that whenever it was possible to
reduce the wit by substituting for its verbal
expression another set of words, at the same
time carefully retaining the sense, it not only
eliminated the witty character but also the
laughableness {Lacheffekt) that constitutes the
I pleasure of wit.

ANALYSIS

At present we cannot go further without
first coming to an understanding with our phil-
osophical authorities.

The philosophers who adjudge wit to be a
part of the comic and deal with the latter itself
in the field of esthetics, characterize the aes-
thetic presentation by the following conditions:
that we are not thereby interested in or about
the objects, that we do not need these objects
to satisfy our great wants in life, but that we
are satisfied with the mere contemplation of the
same, and with the pleasure of the thought it-
self. " This pleasure, this mode of conception
is purely ssthetical, it depends entirely on it-
self, its end is only itself and it fulfills no other
end in life" {K. Fischer, p. 68).

We scarcely venture a contradiction to K.
Fischer's words — perhaps we merely translate
his thoughts into our own mode of expression
— when we insist that the witty activity is, after
all, not to be designated as aimless or purpose-
less, since it has for its aim the evocation of
pleasure in the hearer. I doubt whether we
are able to undertake anything which has no
object in view. When we do not use our
psychic apparatus for the fulfillment of one of
our indispensable gratifications, we let it work
for pleasure, and we seek to derive pleasure
from its own activity. I suspect that this is

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT

really the condition which underlies all aesthetic
thinking, but I know too little about ^Esthetics
to be willing to support this theory. About
wit, however, I can assert, on the strength of
the two impressions gained before, that it is
an activity whose purpose is to derive pleas-
ure — be it intellectual or otherwise — from the
psychic processes. To be sure, there are other
activities which accomplish the same thing.
They may be differentiated from each by the
sphere of psychic activity from which they wish
to derive pleasure, or perhaps by the methods
which they use in accomplishing this. At pres-
ent we cannot decide this, but we firmly main-
tain that at last we have established a connec-
tion between the technique of wit partly con-
trolled by the tendency to economize {p. 53)
and the production of pleasure.

But before we proceed to solve the riddle of
how the technical means of wit-work can pro-
duce pleasure in the hearer, we wish to mention
that, for the sake of simplicity and more lucid-
ity, we have altogether put out of the way all
tendency witticisms. Still we must attempt to
explain what the tendencies of wit are and in
what manner wit makes use of these tendencies.

Hostile and Obscene Wit.

We are taught above all by an observation
not to put aside the tendency-wit when we
are investigating the origin of the pleasure in
wit. The pleasurable effect of harmless wit
is usually of a moderate nature; all that it
can be expected to produce in the hearer is a
distinct feeling of satisfaction and a slight rip-
ple of laughter; and as we have shown by fit-
ting examples (p. 132) at least a part of this
effect is due to the thought-content. The sud-
den irresistible outburst of laughter evoked by
the tendency-wit rarely follows the wit without
a tendency. As the technique may be identical
in both, it is fair to assume that by virtue of
its purpose, the tendency-wit has at its disposal
sources of pleasure to which harmless wit has
no access.

It is now easy to survey wit-tendencies.
Wherever wit is not a means to its end, i. e.,
harmless, it puts itself in the service of but two
tendencies which may themselves be united
under one viewpoint; it is either kostäe wit
serving as an aggression, satire, or defense, or
it is obscene wit serving as a sexual exhibition.
Again it is to be observed that the technical
form of wit — be it a word- or thought-witticism
■ — bears no relation to these two tendencies.

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT

It is a much more complicated matter to
show in what way wit serves these tendencies.
In this investigation I wish to present first
not the hostile but the exhibition wit. The lat-
ter has indeed very seldom been deemed worthy
of an investigation, as if an aversion had trans-
ferred itself here from the material to the sub-
ject; however, we shall not allow ourselves to
be misled thereby, for we shall soon touch
upon a detail in wit which promises to throw
light on more than one obscure point.

We all know what is meant by a " smutty '*
joke. It is the intentional bringing into prom-
inence of sexual facts or relations through
speech. However, this definition is no sounder
than other definitions. A lecture on the anat-
omy of the sexual organs or on the physiology
of reproduction need not, in spite of this defini-
tion, have anything in common with an obscen-
ity. It must be added that the snmtty joke
is directed toward a certain person who ex-
cites one sexually, and who becomes cognizant
of the speaker's excitement by listening to the
smutty joke, and thereby in turn becomes sex-
ually excited. Instead of becoming sexually
excited the listener may react with shame and
embarrassment, which merely signifies a reac-
tion against the excitement and indirectly an
admission of the same. The smutty joke was

IM ANALYSIS

originally directed against the woman and is
comparable to an attempt at seduction. If a
man tells or listens to obscene jokes in male
society, the original situation, which cannot be
realized on account of social inhibitions, ia
thereby also represented. Whoever laughs at
a smutty joke does the same as the spectator
who laughs at a sexual aggression.

The sexual element which is at the basis of
the obscene joke comprises more than that
which is peculiar to both sexes, and goes be-
yond that which is common to both sexes, it
is connected with all these things that cause
shame, and includes tlie whole domain of the
excrementitious. However, this was the sexual
domain of childhood, where the imagination
fancied a cloaca, so to speak, within which the
sexual elements were either badly or not at all
differentiated from the excrementitious.' In
the whole mental domain of the psychology of
the neuroses, the sexual still includes the ex-
crementitious, and it is understood in the old,
infantile sense.

The smutty joke is like the denudation of a
person of the opposite sex toward whom the
joke is directed. Through the utterance of ob-

' Cf. ThTM Contribution* to tk« Tfteorj of 8ex, 2nd Ed., 1018,
translated hy A. A. Brill, Monograph Series, Jovrtutl of it
omd Jtfralal Dittaitt.

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 111

scene words the person attacked is forced to
picture the parts of the body in question, or
the sexual act, and is shown that the aggressor
himself pictures the same thing. There is no
doubt that the original motive of the smutty
joke was the pleasure of seeing the sexual dis-
played.

It will only help to clarify the subject if
here we go back to the fundamentals. One of
the primitive components of our libido is the
desire to see the sexual exposed. Perhaps this
itself is a development — a substitution for the
desire to touch which is assumed to be the pri-
mary pleasure. As it often happens, the de-
sire to see has here also replaced the desire to
touch.' The libido for looking and touching is
found in every person in two forms, active and
passive, or masculine and feminine; and in ac-
cordance with the preponderance of sex char-
acteristics it develops preponderately in one or
the other direction. In young children one can
readily observe the desire to exhibit themselves
nude. If the germ of this desire does not ex-
perience the usual fate of being covered up and
repressed, it develops into a mania for exhibi-
tionism, a familiar perversion among grown-up
men. In women the passive desire to exhibit

*HoU'a KontrtktatioMlTiab (UDtersachiuigen Ober die Libido
MmU«. 1898).

is almost regularly covered by the ma^ed re-
■ctioD of sexual modesty; despite this, bowever.
remnants of this desre may always be seen in
wcHiien's dress. I need only mention how flexi-
ble and rariable cwiventioo and circumstances
make that remaining pttttion of exhibitifmism
still allowed to ^

The Tnuuformatitm of the Obtcemty into Oh-
scent Wit

In the case of men a great part of this strir-
ing to exhibit remains as a part of the libido
and serves to initiate tbe sexual act. If this
striving asserts itself on first meeting the
Woman it must make use of speech for two mo-
tives. First, in order to make itself known to
the woman; and secondly, because the awak-
ening of the imagination through speech puts
the woman herself in a corresponding excite-
ment and awakens in her the desire to passive
exhibitionism. This speech of courtship is not
yet smutty, but may pass over into the same.
Wherever the yieldingness of the woman mani-
fests itself quickly, smutty speech is short-
lived, for it g^ves way to the sexual act. It
is different if the rapid yielding of the woman
cannot be counted upon, but instead there ap-
pears the defense reaction. In that case the

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT IM

sexually exciting speech changes into obscene
wit as its own end ; as the sexual aggression
is inhibited in its progress towards the act, it
lingers at the evocation of the excitement and
derives pleasure from the indications of the
same in the woman. In this process the ag-
gression changes its character in the same way
as any libidinous impulse confronted by a
hindrance; it becomes distinctly hostile and
cruel, and utilizes the sadistical components of
the sexual impulse against the hindrance.

Thus the imyieldingness of the woman is
therefore the next condition for the develop-
ment of smutty wit; to be sure, this resistance
must be of the kind to indicate merely a defer-
ment and make it appear that further efforts
will not be in vain. The ideal case of such
resistance on the part of the woman usually re-
sults from the simultaneous presence of another
man, a third person, whose presence ahnost
excludes the immediate yielding of the woman.
This third person soon becomes of the greatest
importance for the development of the smutty
wit, but next to him the presence of the
woman must be taken account of. Among
rural people or in the ordinary hostelry one
can observe that not till the waitress or the
hostess approaches the guests does the obscene
wit come out; in a higher order of society just

the opposite happens, here the presence of a
woman puts an end to smutty talk. The men
reserve this kind of conversation, which orig-
inally presupposed the presence of hashful
women, until they are alone, " by themselves."
Thus gradually the spectator, now turned the
listener, takes the place of the woman as the
ohject of the smutty joke, and through such
a change the smutty joke already approaches
the character of wit.

Henceforth our attention may be centered
upon two factors, first upon the role that the
third person — the listener — plays, and secondly,
upon the intrinsic conditions of the smutty joke
itself.

Tendency-wit usually requires three persons.
Besides the one who makes the wit there is a
second person who is taken as the object of
the hostile or sexual aggression, and a third
person in whom the purpose of the wit to pro-
duce pleasure is fulfilled. We shall later on
inquire into the deeper motive of this relation-
ship, for the present we shall adhere to the
fact which states that it is not the maker of
the wit who laughs about it and enjoys its
pleasurable effect, but it is the idle listener who
does. The same relationship exists among the
three persons connected with the smutty joke.
The process may be described as follows: As

I
■

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 145

soon as the libidinous impulse of the first per-
son, to satisfy himself through the woman, is
blocked, he immediately develops a hostile at-
titude towards this second person and takes the
originally intruding third person as his confed-
erate. Through the obscene speech of the first
person the woman is exposed before the third
person, who as a listener is fascinated by the
easy gratification of his own libido.

It is curious that common people so
thoroughly enjoy such smutty talk, and that it
is a never-lacking activity of cheerful humor.
It is also worthy of notice that in this compli-
cated process which shows so many character-
istics of tendency-wit, no formal demands, such
as characterize wit, are made upon " smutty
wit." The unveiled nudity aflFords pleasure to
the first and makes the third person laugh.

Not until we come to the refined and cul-
toired does the formal determination of wit
arise. The obscenity becomes witty and is tol-
erated only if it is witty. The technical means
of which it mostly makes use is allusion, i.e.,
substitution through a trifle, something re-
motely related, which the listener reconstructs
in his imagination as a full-fledged and direct
obscenity. The greater the disproportion be-
tween what is directly oflfered in the obscenity
and what is necessarily aroused by it in the

1*6

ANALYSIS

mind of the listener, the finer is the witticism
and the higher it may venture in good society.
Besides the coarse and dehcate allusions, the
witty obscenity also utilizes all other means of
word- and thought-wit, as can be easily demon-
strated by examples.

The Function of Wit in the Service of the
Tendency

It now becomes comprehensible what wit ac-
complishes through this service of its tendency.
It makes possible the gratification of a craving
(lewd or hostile) despite a hindrance which
stands in the way; it eludes the hindrance and
so derives pleasure from a source that has be-
come inaccessible on account of the hindrance.
The hindrance in the way is really nothing
more than the higher degree of culture and edu-
cation which correspondingly increases the ina-
bility of the woman to tolerate the stark sex.
The woman thought of as present in the final
situation is still considered present, or her in-
fluence acts as a deterrent to the men even in
her absence. One often notices how cultured
men are influenced by the company of girls of
a lower station in life to change witty obscen-
ities to broad smut.

The power which renders it difficult or im-

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT U7

possible for the woman, and in a lesser degree
for the man, to enjoy unveiled obscenities we
call " repression," and we recognize in it the
same psychic process which keeps from con-
sciousness in severe nervous attacks whole com-
plexes of emotions with their resultant affects,
and has shown itself to be the principal factor
in the causation of the so-called psychoneuroses.
We acknowledge to culture and higher civili-
zation an important influence in the develop-
ment of repressions, and assume that under
these conditions there has come about a change
in our psychic organization which may also
have been brought along as an inherited dis-
position. In consequence of it, what was once
accepted as pleasureful is now counted unac-
ceptable and is rejected by means of all the
psychic forces. Owing to the repression
brought about by civilization many primary
pleasures are now disapproved by the censor
and lost. But the human psyche finds re-
nunciation very difficult; hence we discover that
tendency-wit furnishes us with a means to make
the renunciation retrogressive and thus to re-
gain what has been lost. \^Tien we laugh over
a delicately obscene witticism, we laugh at the
identical thing which causes laughter in the ill-
bred man when he hears a coarse, obscene joke;
in both cases the pleasure comes from the

U8 ANALYSIS

same source. The coarse, obscene joke, how-
ever, could not incite us to laughter, because
it would cause us shame or would seem to us
disgusting; we can laugh only when wit comes
to our aid.

What we had presumed in the beginning
seems to have been confirmed, namely, that
tendency-wit has access to other sources of
pleasure than harmless wit, in which all the
pleasure is somehow dependent upon the tech-
nique. We can also reiterate that owing to
our feelings we are in no position to distin-
guish in tendency-wit what part of the pleas-
ure originates from the technique and what
part from the tendency. Strictly speaking, toe
do not know what we are laughing about. In
all obscene jokes we succumb to striking mis-
takes of judgment about the "goodness" of
the joke as far as it depends upon formal con-
ditions; the technique of these jokes is often
very poor while their laughing effect is
enormous.

Invectives Made Possible Through Wit

We next wish to determine whether the role
of wit in the service of the hostile tendency
is the same.

Right from the start we meet with similar

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT

conditions. Since our individual childhood
and the childhood of human civilization, om"
hostile impulses towards our fellow-beings have
been subjected to the same restrictions and the
same progressive repressions as our sexual
strivings. We have not yet progressed so far
as to love our enemies, or to extend to them
our left cheek after we are smitten on the
right. Furthermore, all moral codes about the
subjection of active hatred bear even to-day
the clearest indications that they were originally
meant for a small community of clansmen. As
we all may consider ourselves members of some
nation, we permit ourselves for the most pari
to forget these restrictions in matters touch-
ing a foreign people. But within our own cir-
cles we have nevertheless made progress in the
mastery of hostile emotions. Lichtenberg
drastically puts it when he says: " Where now-
adays one says, ' I beg your pardon,' formerly
one had recourse to a cuff on the ear." Vio-
lent hostility, no longer tolerated by law, has
been replaced by verbal invectives, and the bet-
ter understanding of the concatenation of hu-
man emotions robs us, tlirough its consequen-
tial " Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner,"
more and more of the capacity to become angry
at our fellowman who is in our way. Having
been endowed with a strong hostile disposition

in our childhood, higher personal civilization
teaches us later that it is undignified to use
abusive language; even where combat is still
permitted, the number of things which may be
used as means of combat has been markedly
restricted. Society, as the third and dispassion-
ate party in the combat to whose interest it
is to safeguard personal safety, prevents us
from expressing our hostile feelings in action;
and hence, as in sexual aggression, there has
developed a new technique of invectives, the
aim of which is to enlist this third person
against our enemy. By belittling and hum-
bUng our enemy, by scorning and ridiculing
him, we indirectly obtain the pleasure of his
defeat by the laughter of the third person,
the inactive spectator.

We are now prepared for the role that wit
plays in hostile aggression. Wit permits us
to make our enemy ridiculous through that
which we could not utter loudly or consciously
on account of existing hindrances; in otlier
words, wit affords us the means of surmount-
ing restrictions and of opening up othertoüe
inaccessible pleasure sources. Moreover, the
listener will be induced by the gain in pleas-
ure to take our part, even if he is not alto-
gether convinced, — just as we on other occa-
sions, when fascinated by harmless Tvitticism,

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT

were wont to overestimate the substance of the
sentence wittily expressed. " To prejudice
the laughter in one's own favor " is a com-
pletely pertinent saying in the German lan-
guage.

One may recall Mr. N.'s witticism given in the
last chapter (p. 28). It is of an insulting na-
ture, as if the author wished to shout loudly:
But the minister of agriculture is himself an ox!
But he, as a man of culture, could not put
his opinion in this form. He therefore ap-
pealed to wit which assured his opinion a re-
ception at the hands of the listeners which,
in spite of its amount of truth, never would
have been received if in an unwittj' form.
Brill cites an excellent example of a similar
kind: Wendell Phillips, according to a recent
biography by Dr. Lorenzo Sears, was on one
occanon lecturing in Ohio, and •awhile on a
railroad journey going to keep one of his ap-
pointments met in the car a number of clergy-
men returning from some sort of convention.
One of the ministers, feeling called upon to
approach Mr. Phillips, asked him, " Are you
Mr. Phillips? " " 1 am, air." " Are you trying
to free the niggers?" "Yes, kV; / am an
abolitionist." " Well, why do you preach your
doctrines up here? Why don't you go over
into Kentucky? " " Excuse me, are you a

preacher?" "I am, sir." "Are you trying to
save souls from, hell? " " Yes, sir, that's my
business." " Well, why don't you go there? "
The assailant hurried into the smoker amid a
roar of unsanctified laughter. This anecdote
nicely illustrates the tendency-wit in the
service of hostile aggression. The minister's
behavior was offensive and irritating, yet
Wendell Phillips as a man of culture could
not defend himself in the same manner as a
common, ill-hred person would have done, and
as his inner feelings must have prompted him
to do. The only alternative under the circum-
stances would have been to take the affront
in silence, had not wit showed him the way,
and enabled him by the technical means of
unification to turn the tables on his assailant.
He not only belittled him and turned him
into ridicule, but by his clever retort, " Well,
why don't you go there?" fascinated the other
clergymen, and thus brought them to his side.
Although the hindrance to the aggression
which the wit helped to elude was in these
cases of an inner nature — the lesthetic re-
sistance against insulting — it may at other
times be of a purely outer nature. So it was
in the case when Serenissimus asked the
stranger who had a striking resemblance to
himself: " Was your mother ever in my home? "

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT US

and he received the ready reply, " No, but
my father was." The stranger woxdd cer-
tainly have felled the imprudent inquirer who
dared to make an ignominious allusion to the
memory of his mother; but this imprudent
person was Serenissimus, who may not be felled
and not even insulted unless one wishes to
pay for this revenge with his life. The only
thing left was to swallow the insult in silence;
but luckily wit pointed out the way of requit-
ing the insult without personally imperiling
one's self. It was accomplished simply by
treating the allusion with the technical means
of unification and employing it against the
aggressor. The impression of wit is here so
thoroughly determined by the tendency that
in view of the witty rejoinder we are inclined
to forget that the aggressor's inquiry is itself
made witty by allusion.

Rebellion Against Authority Through Wit

The prevention of abuse or insulting retorts
through outer circumstances is so often the
case that tendency-wit is used with special
preference as a weapon of attack or criticism
of superiors who claim to be an authority.
Wit then serves as a resistance against such
authority and as an escape from its pressure.

In this factor, too, lies the charm of carica-
ture, at which we laugh even if it is badly done
simply because we consider its resistance to
authority a great merit.

If we keep in mind that tendency-wit is so
well adapted as a weapon of attack upon i^iat
is great, dignified, and mighty, that which is
shielded by internal hindrances or external
circumstance against direct disparagement, we
are forced to a special conception of certain
groups of witticisms which seem to occupy
themselves with inferior and powerless persons.
I am referring to the marriage-agent stories, —
with a few of which we have become familiar
in the investigation of the manifold techniques
of thought-wit. In some of these examples,
" But she is deaf, too 1 " and " Who in the world
would ever lend these people anything!" the
agent was derided as a careless and thoughtless
person who becomes comical because the truth
escapes his lips automatically, as it were. But
does on the one hand what we have learned
about the nature of tendency-wit, and on the
other hand the amoimt of satisfaction in these
stories, harmonize with the misery of the per-
sons at whom the joke seems to be pointed?
Are these worthy opponents of the wit? Or,
is it not more plausible to suppose that the
wit puts the agent in the foreground only in

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 155

order to strike at something more important;
does it, as the saying goes, strike the saddle
pack, when it is meant for the mule? This
conception can really not be rejected.

The above-mentioned interpretation of the
marriage-agent stories admits of a continua-
tion. It is true that I need not enter into
them, that I can content myself with seeing
the farcical in these stories, and can dispute
their witty character. However, such subjec-
tive determination of wit actually exists. We
have now become cognizant of it and shall
later on have to investigate it. It means that
only that is a witticism which I wish to con-
sider as such. What may be wit to me, may
be only an amusing story to another. But if
a witticism admits of doubt, that can be due
only to the fact that it is possessed of a show-
side, — in our examples it happens to be a
fa^de of the comic, — upon which one may be
satisfied to bestow a single glance while another
may attempt to peep behind. We also suspect
that this facade is intended to dazzle the pry-
ing glance which is to say that such stories
have something to conceal.

At all events, if our marriage-agent stories
are witticisms at all, they are all the better
witticisms because, thanks to their fa(;ade, they
are in a position to conceal not only what they

136 ANALYSIS

have to say but also that they have something
— forbidden — to say. But the continuation of
the interpretation, which reveals this hidden
part and shows that these stories having a com-
ical facade are tendency-witticisms, would be
as follows: Every one who allows the truth to
escape his lips in an unguarded moment is
really pleased to have rid himself of this
thought. This is a correct and far-reaching
psychological insight. Without the inner assent
no one would allow himself to be overpow-
ered by the automatism which here brings the
truth to light.' The marriage agent is thus
transformed from a ludicrous personage into
an object deserving of pity and sympathy.
How blest must be the man, able at last to un-
burden himself of the weight of dissimulation,
if he immediately seizes the first opportunity
to shout out the last fragment of truth! As
soon as he sees that his case is lost, that the
prospective bride does not suit the young man,
he gladly betrays the secret that the girl has
still another blemish which the young man had
overlooked, or he makes use of the chance to
present a conclusive argument in detail in
order to express his contempt for the people

' It Is the same mechanism that i^ontroh " «lips of the tongoe *
nnd other phenomena of Belf-betrafiil. Cf. Tht PiyekopatMofg
of Evtryaay Lift.

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 157

who employ him: "Who in the world would
ever lend these people anything!" The ludi-
crousness of the whole thing now reverts upon
the parents, — hardly mentioned in the story, —
who consider such deceptions justified to clutch
a man for their daughter; it also reflects upon
the wretched state of the girls who get mar-
ried through such contrivances, and upon the
want of dignity of the marriage contracted
after such preliminaries. The agent is the
right person to express such criticisms, for he
is best acquainted with these abuses; but he
may not raise his voice, because he is a poor
man whose livelihood depends altogether on
tm-ning these abuses to his advantage. But the
same conflict is found in the national spirit
which has given rise to these and similar
stories ; for he is aware that the holiness of wed-
lock suffers severely by reference to some of
the methods of marriage-making.

We recall also the observation made during
the investigation of wit-technique, namely, that
absurdity in wit frequently stands for derision
and criticism in the thought behind the witti-
cism, wherein the wit-work follows the dream-
work. This state of affairs, we find, is here
once more confirmed. That the derision and
criticism are not aimed at the agent, who ap-
pears in the former examples only as the whip-

ping boy of the joke, is shown by another series
in which the agent, on the contrary, is pictured
as a superior person whose dialectics are a
match for any difficulty. They are stories
whose facades are logical instead of comical —
they are sophistic thought-witticisms. In one
of them (p. 83) the agent knows how to cir-
cumvent the limping of the bride by stating
that in her case it is at least " a finished job ";
another woman with straight limbs would be
in constant danger of falling and breaking
a leg, which would be followed by sickness,
pains, and doctor's fees — all of which can be
avoided by marrying the one already limping.
Again in another example (p. 81) the agent
is clever enough to refute by good argu-
ments each of the whole series of the suitor's
objections against the bride; only to the
last, which cannot be glossed over, he re-
joins, " Do you expect her to have no blem-
ishes at all?" as if the other objections had
not left behind an important remnant. It is
not difficult to pick out the weak points of the
arguments in both examples, a thing which we
have done during the investigation of the tech-
nique. But now something else interests us.
If the agent's speech is endowed with such a
strong semblance of logic, which on more care-
ful examination proves to be merely a sent-

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 159

blance, then the truth must be lurking in the
fact that the witticism adjudges the agent to
be right. The thought does not dare to admit
that he is right in all seriousness, and replaces
it by the semblance which the wit brings forth;
but here, as it often happens, the jest betrays
the seriousness of it. We shall not err if we
assume that all stories with logical facades
really mean what they assert even if these as-
sertions are deliberately falsely motivated.
Only this use of sophism for the veiled pres-
entation of the truth endows it with tlie char-
acter of wit, which is mainly dependent upon
tendency. What these two stories wish to in-
dicate is that the suitor really makes himself
ridiculous when he collects together so sedu-
lously the individual charms of the bride which
are transient after all, and when he forgets at
the same time that he must be prepared to
take as his wife a human being with inevitable
faults; whereas, the only virtue which might
make tolerable marriage witli the more or less
imperfect personality of the woman, — mutual
attachment and willingness for affectionate
adaptation, — is not once mentioned in the
whole affair.

Ridicule of the suitor as seen in these ex-
amples in which the agent quite correctly as-
sumes the role of superiority, is mucli more

160 ANALYSIS

clearly depicted in other examples. The more
pointed the stories, the less wit-technique they
contain; they are, as it were, merely border-
line cases of wit with whose technique they
have only the fa9ade-forraation in common.
However, in view of the same tendency and
the concealment of the same behind the facade,
they obtain the full effect of wit. The poverty
of technical means makes it clear also that
many witticisms of that kind cannot dispense
with the comic element of jargon which acts
similarly to wit-technique without great sacri-
fices.

The following is such a story, which with all
the force of tendency-wit obviates all traces
of that technique. The agent asks: " What
are you, looking for in your hridc?" The
reply is: " She must be pretty, she must be
rich, and she must be cultured." " Very well,"
was the agent's rejoinder. " But what you
want will make three matches." Here the re-
proach is no longer embodied in wit, but is
made directly to the man.

In all the preceding examples the veiled ag-
gression was still directed against persons; in
the marriage-agent jokes it is directed against
all the parties involved in the betrothal — ^the
bridegroom, bride, and her parents. The ob-
ject of attack by wit may equally well be in-

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT

161

stitutions, persons, in so far as they may act
as agents of these, moral or religious precepts,
or even philosophies of life which enjoy so
much respect that they can be challenged in no
other way tlian under the guise of a witticism,
and one tluit is veiled by a facade at that. No
matter how few the themes upon which tend-
ency-wit may play, its forms and investments
are manifold. I believe that we shall do well
to designate tliis species of tendency-wit by a
special name. To decide what name will be
appropriate is possible only after analyzing a
few examples of this kind.

The Witij Cynicism

I recall the two little stories about the im-
pecunious gourmand who was caught eating
" salmon with mayonnaise," and about the tip-
pling tutor; these witty stories, which we have
learned to regard as sophistical displacement-
wit, I shall continue to analyze. We have
learned since then that when the semblance of
logic is attached to tlie facade of a story, the
actual thought is as follows: The man is
right; but oa account of the opposing contra-
diction, I did not dare to admit the fact ex-
cept for one point in which his error is easily
demonstrable. The " point " chosen is the cor-

iCä

ANALYSIS

rect compromise between liis right and his
■wrong; this is really no decision, but bespeaks
the conflict within ourselves. Both stories are
simply epicurean. They say, Yes, the man is
right; nothing is greater than pleasure, and it
is fairly immaterial in «hat manner one pro-
cures it. This sounds frightfully immoral, and
perhaps it is, but fundamentally it is nothing
more than the " Carpe ilicm " of the poet who
refers to the uncertainty of life and the bare-
ness of virtuous renunciation. If we are re-
pelled by the idea that the man in the joke
about " salmon with mayormaise " is in the
right, then it is merely due to the fact that it
illustrates the sound sense of the man in in-
dulging himself — an indulgence which seems to
us wholly unnecessary. la reality each one of
us has experienced hours and times during
which he has admitted the justice of this
philosophy of life and has reproached our sys-
tem of morality for knowing only how to
make claims upon us without reimbm-sing us.
Since we no longer lend credence to the idea
of a hereafter in which all former renuncia-
tions are supposed to be rewarded by gratifica-
tion — (there are very few pious persons if one
makes renunciation the password of faith) —
" Carpe diem " becomes the first admonition. I
am quite ready to postpone the gratification.

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT

but how do I know whether I shall still be
alive to-morrow?

" Di doman' non c'e certezza." '
I am quite willing to give up all the paths
to gratification interdicted by society, but am
I sure that society will reward me for this re-
nunciation by opening for me — even after a
certain delay — one of the permitted paths?
One can plainly tell what these witticisms
whisper, namely, that the wishes and desires of
man have a right to make themselves percepti-
ble next to our pretentious and inconsiderate
morality. And in our times it has been said in
emphatic and striking terms that this morality
is merely the selfish precept of the few rich
and mighty who can gratify their desires at
any time without deferment. As long as the art
of healing has not succeeded in safeguarding
our lives, and as long as the social organiza-
tions do not do more towards making condi-
tions more agreeable, just so long cannot the
voice within us which is stri\-ing against the
demands of morality, be stifled. Every honest
person finally makes this admission — at least
to himself. The decision in this conflict is pos-
sible only through the roundabout way of a
pew understanding. One must be able to knit

"There Is nothing certain about to-morrow," Loienio dei
UedlcL

ANALYSIS

one's life so closely to that of others, and to
form such an intimate identification with
others, that the shortening of one's own term
of life becomes surmountable; one should not
unlawfully fulfill the demands of one's own
needs, but should leave tliem unfulfilled, be-
cause only the continuance of so many unful-
filled demands can develop the power to re-
cast the social order. But not all personal
needs allow themselves to be displaced in such
a manner and transferred to others, nor is
there a universal and definite solution of the
conflict.

We now know how to designate the wit-
ticisms just discussed; they are cynical wit-
ticisms, and what they conceal are cynicisms.

Among the institutions which cjiiical wit is
wont to attack there is none more important
and more completely protected by moral pre-
cepts, and yet more inviting of attack, than the
institution of marriage. Most of the cynical
jokes are directed against it. For no demand
is more personal tlian that made upon sexual
freedom, and nowhere has civilization at-
tempted to exert a more stringent suppression
than in the realm of sexuality. For our pur-
poses a single example sufiices: the "Entries
in the Album of Prince Carnival '* mentioned
on page 108.

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT

'A toife ia like an umbrella, at xcorat one
may always take a cab."

We have already elucidated the complicated
technique of this example; it is a puzzling and
seemingly impossible comparison which how-
ever, as we now see, is not in itself witty; it
shows besides an allusion (cab=puhlic con-
veyance), and as the strongest technical means
it also shows an omission which serves to make
it still more unintelligible. The comparison
may be worked out in the following manner.
A man marries in order to guard himself
against the temptations of sensuality, but it
then turns out that after all marriage affords
no gratification for one of stronger needs, just
as one takes along an umbrella for protection
against rain only to get wet in spite of it. In
both cases one must search for better protec-
tion; in one case one must take a public cab,
in the other women procurable for money.
Now the wit has almost entirely been replaced
by cynicism. Tliat marriage is not the organi-
zation which can satisfy a man's sexuality, one
does not dare to say loudly and frankly unless
indeed it be one hke Christian v. Ehrenfels,'
who is forced to it by the love of truth and the
zeal of reform. The strength of tliis witticism

* See bla omj» ia the PolUUch-anthropologitehtn Rivu4, It,

166

ANALYSIS

lies in the fact that it has expressed the
thought even though it had to be done through
all sorts of roundabout ways.

Cynical Witticisms and Self-criticism
A particularly favorable case for tendency-
wit results if the intended criticism of the
inner resistance is directed against one's own
person, or, more carefully expressed, against a
person in whom one takes interest, that is, a
composite personality such as one's own peo-
ple. This determination of self-criticism may-
make clear why it is that a number of the most
excellent jokes of which we have shown here
many specimens should have sprung into exist-
ence from the soil of Jewish national life.
They are stories which were invented by Jews
themselves and which are directed against Jew-
ish peculiarities. The Jewish jokes made up
by non-Jews are nearly all brutal buffooneries
in which the wit is spared by the fact that the
Jew appears as a comic figure to a stranger.
The Jewish jokes which originate with Jews
admit this, but they know their real shortcom-
ings as well as their merits, and the interest
of the person liimself in the thing to be crit-
icised produces the subjective determination of
the wit-work which would otherwise be difficult
hring about. Incidentally I do not knoi^

^ THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 167

^H whether one often finds a people that makes
^V merry so unreservedly over its own shortcom-
B ings.

As an illustration I can point to the story
cited on page 112 in which the Jew in the train
immediately abandons all sense of decency of
deportment as soon as he recognizes the new
arrival in his coupe as his coreligionist. We
have come to know this joke as an illustration
by means of a detail — representation through
a trifle; it is supposed to represent the dem-
ocratic mode of thought of the Jew who rec-
ognizes no difference between master and serv-
ant, but unfortunately this also disturbs dis-
cipUne and co-operation. Another especially
interesting series of jokes presents the relation-
ship between the poor and the rich Jews: their
heroes are the " shnorrer,'" and the charitable

■ gentleman or the baron. The shnorrer, who
was a regular Sunday-dinner guest at a cer-
tain house, appeared one day accompanied hy
a young stranger, who prepared to seat himself
at the table. " Who is that? " demanded the

■ host. "He became my son-in-law last week,"
was the reply, "and I have agreed to supply
his board for the first year." The tendency of
these stories is always the same, and is most
distinctly shown in the following story. The

^^^ * An babitual beggar. ^^_

ANALYSIS

ahnorrer supplicates the baron for money to
visit the bathing resort Ostend, as the phy-
sician has ordered him to take sea-baths for
his ailment. The baron remarks that Ostend
is an especially expensive resort, and that a
less fashionable place would do just as well.
But the shnorrer rejects that proposition by
saying, " Herr Baron, nothing is too expensive
for my health." That is an excellent displace-
ment-witticism which we could have taken as
a model of its kind. The baron is evidently
anxious to save his money, but the shnorrer ra-
phes as if the baron's money were his own,
which he may then consider secondary to his
health. One is forced to laugh at the insolence
of the demand, but these jokes are exception-
ally unequipped with a facade to becloud the
imderstanding. The truth is that the shnorrer
who mentally treats the rich man's money as
his own, really possesses almost the right to
this mistake, according to the sacred codes of
the Jews. Naturally the resistance which is
responsible for this joke is directed against the
law which even the pious find very oppressing.
Another story relates how on the steps of a
rich man's house a shnorrer met one of his own
kind. The latter counseled him to depart, say-
ing, " Do not go up to-day, the Baron is out
of sorts and refuses to give any one more than

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 169

a dollar." " 1 will go up anyway," replied the
first. " Why in the world should I make him
a present of a dollar? Is he making me any
presents? "

This witticism makes use of the technique of
absurdity by permitting the shnorrer to declare
that the baron gives hini nothing at the same
moment in which he is preparing to beg him
for the donation. But the absurdity is only
apparent, for it is almost true that the rich
man gives him nothing, since he is obligated by
the mandate to gi^'e alms, and strictly speak-
ing must be thankful that the shnorrer gives
hhn an opportunity to be charitable. The
ordinary, bourgeois conception of alms is at
cross-purposes with the rehgious one; it openly
revolts against the rehgious conception in the
story about the baron who, having been deeply
touched by the shnorrer's tale of woe, rang
for his servants and said: " Throw him out of
the house; he is breaking my heart." This ob-
vious exposition of the tendency again creates
a case of border-line wit. From the no longer
witty complaint; " It is really no advantage to
be a rich man among Jews. The foreign
misery does not grant one the pleasure of one's
own fortune," these last stories are distin-
guished only by the illustration of a single sit-
uation.

170 ANALYSIS

Other stories as tfae following, which, tedt- I
nically again presenting border-lines of wit, (
have tbeir origin in a deeply pessimistic cyn-
icism. A patient xchose hearing was defective I
conndted a physician who made the correct
diagnosis, namely, that the patient probably
drank too much tchiskey and consequently too»
becoming deaf. He advised him to desist from.
drinking and the patient promised to foüow
his advice. Some time thereafter the doctor
met him on the street and inquired in a loud
Voice about his condition. " Thank you. Doc-
tor," was the reply, " there is no necessity for
speaking so loudly, I have given up drinldng
tchiskey and consequently I hear perfectly."
Some time afterwards they met again. The ]
doctor again inquired into his condition in the
usual voice, but noticed that he did not make
himself understood. " It seems to me that you
are deaf again because you have returned to
drinking 'whiskey." shouted the doctor in the
patient's ear. " Perhaps you are right," an-
swered the latter, " 1 have taken to drinking
again, and I shaR teU you why. At long as I
did not drinJc I could hear, but all that I
heard rcas not as good a» the whiskey."
[ Tedmically this joke is nothing more than an
' illustration. The jargon and the ability of the
namteur must aid the producing of laughter.

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 171

But behind it there lies the sad question, " Is
not the man right in his choice?"

It is the manifold hopeless misery of the
Jews to which these pessimJstical stories allude,
which urged me to add them to tendency-wit.

Critical and Blaaphemoua Wittidtma

Other jokes, cynical in a similar sense,
and not only stories about Jews, attack re-
ligious dogmas and the belief in God Himself.
The story about the " telepathic look of the
rabbi," whose technique consisted in the faulty
thinking which made phantasy equal to reality,
(the conception of displacement is also tena-
ble) is such a cynical or critical witticism di-
rected against miracle-workers and also, surely,
against belief in miracles. Heine is reported
to have made a directly blasphemous joke as
he lay dying. When the kindly priest com-
mended kirn to God's mercy and inspired him
with the hope that God would forgive him his
sins, he replied: " Bien sür qu'ü me pardon'
nera; c'est son metier." That is a derogatory
comparison; technically its value Ues only in
the allusion, for a metier — business or vocation
— is plied either by a craftsman or a physician,
and what is more he has only a single metier.
The strength of tlie wit, however, lies in its

1T8 ANALYSIS

tendency. The joke is intended to mean noth-
ing else, but; Certainly he will forgive me; that
is what he is here for, and for no other pur-
pose have I engaged him (just as one retains
one's doetor or one's lawyer). Thus, the help-
less dying man is stÜl conscious of the fact that
he has created God for himself and has clothed
Him with the power in order to make use of
Him as occasion arises. The so-called creature
makes itself known as the Creator only a short
time before his extinction.

Skeptical Wit

To the three kinds of tendency-wit discussed
so far — exhihitionistic or obscene wit, aggres-
sive or hostile wit, and cynical wit (critical, blas-
phemous) — I desire to add a fourth and the
most uncommon of all, whose character can be
elucidated by a good example.

Two JeiDS met in a train at a Galidan rail-
way station. " Where arc you traveling? "
asked one. " To Cracow" was the reply. " Now
see here, what a liar you are!" said the first
one, bristling, " When you say that you are
traveling to Cracow, you really wish me to be-
lieve that you are traveling to Lemberg. Weü,
but I am sure that you are really traveling to
Cracow, so why He about it?"

I
I

THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 173

This precious story, which creates an impres-
sion of exaggerated subtlety, evidently oper-
ates by means of the technique of absurdity.
The second Jew has put himself in the way of
being called a liar because he has said that he
is traveling to Cracow, which is his real goal I
However, this strong technical means — absurd-
ity — is paired here with another technique —
representation through the opposite, for, ac-
cording to the uncontradicted assertion of the
first, the second one is lying when he speaks
the truth, and speaks the truth by means of a
lie. However, the more earnest content of this
joke is the question of the conditions of truth;
again the joke points to a problem and makes
use of the uncertainty of one of our commonest
notions. Does it constitute truth if one
describes things as they are and does not con-
cern himself with the way the hearers will in-
terpret what one has said? Or is this merely
Jesuitical truth, and does not the real truthful-
ness consist much more in having a regard for
the hearer and of furnishing him an exact pic-
ture of his own mind ? I consider jokes of this
type sufficiently different from the others to
assign them a special place. What they attack
is not a person nor an institution, but the cer-
tainty of our very knowledge — one of our
speculative gifts. Hence the name " skeptical "

174 ANALYiSIS

atticism wiU be the most expressive for
them.

In the course of our discussion of the tend-
encies of wit we have gotten perhaps many an
elucidation and certainly found numerous incen-
tives for further investigations. But the results
of this chapter combine with those of the pre-
ceding chapter to form a difficult problem. If
it be true that the pleasure created by wit is de-
pendent upon the technique on one hand and
upon the tendency on the other hand, under
what common point of view can these two ut-
terly different pleasure-sources of wit be
united?

B. SYNTHESIS

THE FLEASTJEE MECHANISM AND THE PSYCHO-
GENESIS or WIT

We can now definitely assert that we know
from what sources the peculiar pleasure arises
furnished us by wit. We know that we can be
easily misled to mistake our sense of satisfac-
tion experienced through the thought-content
of the sentence for the actual pleasure derived
from the wit, on the other hand, the latter it-
self has two intrinsic sources, namely, the wit-
technique and the wit-tendency. What we now
desire to ascertain is the manner in which
pleasure originates from these sources and the
mechanism of this resultant pleasure.

It seems to us that the desired explanation
can be more easily ascertained in tendency-wit
than in harmless wit. We shall therefore com-
mence with the former.

The pleasure in tendency-wit results from
the fact that a tendency, whose Ratification
would otherwise remain unfulfilled, is actually
gratified. That such gratification is a source
of pleasure is self-evident without further dis-
cussion. But the manner in which wit brings

178

SYNTHESIS

about gratification is connected with special
conditions from which we may perhaps gain
further information. Here two cases must be
differentiated. The simpler case is the one in
which the gratification of the tendency is op-
posed by an external hindrance which is eluded
by the wit. This process we found, for exam'
pie, in the reply which Serenissimus received
to his query whether the mother of the stranger
he addressed had ever sojourned in his home,
and likewise in the question of the art critic
who asked: "And where is the Savior?" when
the two rich rogues showed him their portraits.
In one case the tendency serves to answer one
insult with another; in the other case it offers
an affront instead of the demanded expert
opinion; in both cases the tendency was op-
posed by purely external factors, namely, the
powerful position of the persons who are the
targets of the insult. Nevertheless it may seem
strange to us that these and analogous tend-
ency-witticisms have not the power to produce
a strong laughing effect, no matter how much
they may gratify us.

It is different, however, if no external fac-
tors but internal hindrances stand in the way
of the direct realization of the tendency, that
is, if an inner feehng opposes the tendency.
This condition, according to our assumption»

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

179

was present in the aggressive joke of Mr. N.
(p. 28) and in the one of Wendell Phillips, in
whom a strong inclination to use invectives was
stifled by a highly developed aesthetic sense.
With the aid of wit the inner resistances in
these special cases were overcome and the in-
hibition removed. As in the case of external
hindrances, the gratification of the tendency is
made possible, and a suppression with its con-
comitant " psychic damming " is thus obviated.
So far the mechanism of the development of
pleasure would seem to be identical in both
cases.

At this place, however, we are inclined to
feel that we should enter more deeply into the
differentiation of the psychological situation be-
tween the cases of external and internal hin-
drance, as we have a faint notion that the re-
moval of the inner hindrance might possibly
result in a disproportionately higher contribu-
tion to pleasure. But I propose that we rest
content here, that we be satisfied for tlie pres-
ent with this one collection of evidence which
adheres to what is essential to us. The only
difference between the cases of outer and inner
hindrances consists in the fact that here an al-
ready existing inhibition is removed, while
there the formation of a new inhibition is
avoided. We hardly resort to speculation when

we assert that a "psychic expenditure" is re-
quired for the formation as well as for the re-
tention of a psychic inhibition. Now if we find
that in both cases the use of the tendency-wit
produces pleasure, then it may be assumed
that »ach. resultant pleasure corresponds to the
economy of psychic expenditure.

Thus we are once more confronted with the
principle of econ^omy which we noticed first in
the study of the technique of word-wit. But
whereas the economy we believed to have foxmd
at first was in the use of few or possibly the
same words, we can here foresee an economy
of psychic expenditure in general in a far more
comprehensive sense, and we think it possible
to come nearer to the nature of wit through
a better determination of the as yet very ob-
scure idea of " psychic expenditure."

A certain amount of haziness which we could
not dissipate during the study of the pleasure
mechanism in tendency-wit we accept as a
slight punishment for attempting to elucidate
the more complicated problem before the sim-
pler one, or the tendency-wit before the harm-
less wit. We observe that " economy in the ex-
penditure of inhibitions or suppressions " seems
to be the secret of the pleasurable effect of
tendency-wit, and we now turn to the mechan-
ism of the pleasure in harmless wit.

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM 181

While examining appropriate examples of
harmless witticisms, in which we had no fear
of false judgment through content or tend-
ency, we were forced to the conclusion that the
techniques of with themselves are pleasure-
sources; now we wish to ascertain whether the
pleasure may be traced to the economy in
psychic expenditure. In a group of these wit-
ticisms {plays on words) the technique con-
sisted in directing the psychic focus upon the
sound instead of upon the sense of the word,
and in allowing the (acoustic) word-disguise
to take the place of the meaning accorded to it
by its relations to reaUty. We are really justi-
fied in assuming that great relief is thereby af-
forded to the psychic work, and that in the
serious use of words we refrain from this con-
venient procedure only at the expense of a
certain amount of exertion. We can observe
that abnormal mental states, in which the pos-
sibility of concentrating psychic expenditure on
one place is probably restricted, actually allow
to come to the foreground word-sound associa-
tions of this kind rather than the significance of
the words, and that such patients react in their
speech with " outer " instead of " inner " as-
sociations. Also in children who are still ac-
customed to treat the word as an object we
notice the inclination to look for the same

IM SYNTHESIS

meaning in words of the same or of similar
sounds, which is a source of great amusement
to adults. If we experience in wit an unmis-
takable pleasure because through the use of the
same or similar words we reach from one set
of ideas to a distant other one, (as in " Home-
Roulard " from the kitchen to poHtics), we can
justly refer this pleasure to the economy of
psychic expenditure. The pleasure of the wit
resulting from such a " short-circuit " appears
greater the more remote and foreign the two
series of ideas which become related through
the same word are to each other, or the greater
the economy in thought brought about by the
technical means of wit. We may add that in
this case wit makes use of a means of connec-
tion which is rejected by and carefully avoided
in serious thinking.^

*ir I may be permilfed to anticipate what later Is dlscnased
In the lext I ran here throw some light upon the condition wfat^
seems to be authoritative in the usage of language when It Is s
question of calling a jolte "good" or "poor." If by means of
a double meaning or slightly modified word I have gotten from
one idee to another by a short route, and if this does not also
Bimultaneousiy result In senscful association between the two
ideas, then I have made a "poor" jobe. In this poor Joke one
word or the "point" forms the only existing association !>»•
twefn the two widely separated ideas. The jolte " Mom«-
Boulnrd " used aboTe is such an example. But a "good' joke
results if the infantile expectation Is right In the end and if with
the similarity of tlie word another essential similarity In mean*
Ing is really simultaneously produced — as In the eiuimples Tradut-
tore— Traditore (translator— traitor), and Amantes— Amentea

™ A fif

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

A second group of technical means of wit — ■
unification, similar sounding words, manifold
application, modification of familiar idioms, al-
lusions to quotations — all evince one common
character, namely, that one always discovers
something familiar where one expects to find
something new instead. To discover the fa-
miliar is pleasurable and it is not difficult to
recognize such pleasure as economy-pleasure
and to refer it to the economy of psychic ex-
penditure.

That the discovery of the familiar — " recog-
nition " — causes pleasure seems to be uni-
versally admitted. Groos says:' "Recognition
is everywhere bound up with feelings of pleas-

(loven — lunatics). The two disparate Ideas which are here
linked by an outer asEocialion are held together besides by a
Eenceful connection which expresses an important relationship
between them. The outer association only replaces the Inner con-
nection; it serves to indicate the latter or to clarify it. Not only
does "translator" sound somewlial similar to "traitor," but he
Is A sort of a traitor whose claims to that name are good. The
same may be said of Amantcs— Amentes. Not only do the words
bear a resemblance, l)ut the similarity between " love " and
* lunacy" has l^een noted from time immemorial.

The distinction made here Agrees with the differentiation, to be
made later, between a "witticism" and a "jest." However, it
would not be correct to exclude examples like Home-Roulard
frotn the discussion of the nature of wit. As soon as we take
Into consideration the peculiar pleasure of wit, we discover that
the "poor" witticisms arc by no means poor as witticisms, i.e^
th^ are by no means unsuited for the production of pleasure.

■ Di» Spiele der Meniehen. 1S99, p, 1&3,

IM SYNTHESIS

ure where it has not been made too mechanical,
(as perhaps in dressing . . .). Even the mere
quality of acquaintanceship is easily accom-
panied by that gentle delight which Faust ex-
periences when, after an uncanny experience, he
steps into his study." If the act of recognition
is so pleasureful, we may expect that man
merges into the habit of practicing this activ-
ity for its own sake, that is, he experiments
playfully with it. In fact, Aristotle recognized
in the joy of rediscovery the basis of artistic
pleasure, and it cannot be denied that this
principle must not be overlooked even if it has
not such a far-reaching significance as Aris-
totle assimies.

Groos then discusses the games, whose char-
acter consists of heightening the pleasure of
rediscovery by putting hindrances in its path,
or in other words by raising a " psychic dam '*
which is removed by the act of recognition.
However, his attempted explanation leaves the
assumption that recognition as such is pleasur-
able, in that he attributes the pleasure of rec-
ognition connected with these games to the
pleasure in power or to the surmounting of a
difficulty. I consider this latter factor as sec-
ondary, and I find no occasion for abandoning
the simpler explanation, that the recognition
per se, i.e., through the alleviation of the psy-

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM 185

chic expenditure, is pleasurable, and that the
games founded upon this pleasure make use
of the damming-mechanism merely in order to
intensify their eflfect.

We know also that the source of pleasure in
rhyme, alliteration, refrain, and other forms of
repetition of similar sounding words in poetry,
is due merely to the discovery of the familiar.
, A " sense of power " plays no perceptible role
I in these techniques, which show so marked an
agreement with the " manifold appHcation " in
wit.

Considering the close connection between rec-
ognition and remembering, the assumption is
no longer daring that there exists also a pleas-
ure in remembering, i.e., tliat the act of remem-
bering in itself is accompanied by a feeling of
pleasure of a similar origin. Groos seems to
have no objection to such an assumption, but
he again deducts the pleasure of remembering
from the " sense of power " in which he seeks —
as I believe unjustly — the principal basis of
pleasure in almost all games.

I The Factor of Actuality

The use of another technical expedient of
•wit, which has not yet been mentioned, is also
dependent upon " the rediscovery of the fa-

186

SYNTHESIS

miliar." I refer to the factor of actuality
(dealing with actual persons, things, or events),
which in many witticisms provides a prolific
source of pleasure and explains several pe-
culiarities in the life history of wit. There are
witticisms which are entirely free from this con-
dition, and in a treatise on wit it is incumbent
upon us to make use of such examples almost
exclusively. But we must not forget that we
laughed perhaps more heartily over such peren-
nial witticisms than over others; witticisms
whose application now would be difficult, be-
cause they would require long commentaries,
and even with that aid the former effect could
not he attained. These latter witticisms con-
tained allusions to persons and occurrences
which were " actual " at the time, which had
stimulated general interest and were endowed
with tension. After the cessation of this
interest, after the settlement of these par-
ticular affairs, the witticisms lost a part of
their pleasurable efTect, and a very consider-
able. Thus, for example, the joke which
my friendly host made when he called
the dish that was being served a " Home-
Roulard," seems to me by no means as good
now as when the question of Home Rule was
a continuous headline in the political columns
of our newspaper. If I now attempt to ex-

I
I

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

press my appreciation of this joke by stating
that this one word led us from the idea of the
kitchen to the distant field of politics, and
saved us a long mental detour, I should have
been forced at that time to change this descrip-
tion as follows : " That this word led us from
the idea of the kitchen to the very distant field
of politics; but that our hvely interest was all
the keener because this question was constantly
absorbing us." The same thing is true of
another joke: " This girl reminds me of
Dreyfus; the army does not believe tn her in-
nocence," which has become blurred in spite of
the fact that its technical means has remained
unchanged. The confusion arising from the
comparison with, and the double meaning of,
the word " innocence " cannot do away with the
fact that the allusion, which at that time
touched upon a matter pregnant with excite-
ment, now recalls an interest set at rest. The
many irresistible jokes about the present war
will sink in our estimation in a very short time.
A great many witticisms in circulation reach
a certain age or rather go through a course
composed of a flourishing season and a mature
season, and then sink into complete oblivion.
The need that people feel to draw pleasure
from their mental processes continually creates
new witticisms which are supported by current

188 SYNTHESIS

interests of the day. The vitality of actual wit-
ticisms is not their own, it is borrowed by way
of allusion from those other interests, the ex-
piration of which determines the fate of the
witticism. The factor of actuality which may
be added as a transitory pleasure-source of wit,
although it is productive in itself, cannot be
simply put on the same basis as the rediscovery
of the familiar. It is much more a question of
a special qualification of the familiar which
must be aided by the quality of freshness and
recency and which has not been affected by for-
getfulness. In the formation of the dream one
also finds that there is a special preference for
what is recent, and one cannot refrain from in-
ferring that the association with what is recent
is rewarded or facihtated by a special pleas-
ure premium.

Unification, which is really nothing more
than repetition in the sphere of mental as-
sociation instead of in material, has been ac-
corded an especial recognition as a pleasure-
source of wit by G. Th. Fechner." He says:
" In my opinion the principle of uniform con-
nection of the manifold, plays the most im-
portant role in the field under discussion; it
needs, however, the support of subsidiary de-
terminations in order to drive across the thresh-

' rortehMi» d*r Aetthelik, 1, XVII.

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM 18£>

old the pleasure with its peculiar character
which the cases here belonging can furnish." '

In all of these cases of repetition of the same
Association or of the same word-material, of re-
finding the familiar and recent, we surely can-
not be prevented from referring the pleasure
thereby experienced to the economy in psychic
expenditure; providing that this viewpoint
proves fertile for the explanation of single
facts as well as for bringing to light new gen-
eralities. AVe are fully conscious of the fact
that we have yet to make clear the manner in
which this economy results and also the mean-
ing of the expression " psychic expenditure."

The third group of the technique of wit,
mostly thought-wit, which includes false logic,
displacement, absurdity, representation through
the opposite, and other varieties, may seem at
first sight to present special features and to be
unrelated to the techniques of the discovery
of the familiar, or the replacing of object-as-
sodations by word-associations. But it will not
be difficult to demonstrate that this group, too,
shows an economy or facilitation of psychic
expenditure.

It is quite obvious that it is easier and more
convenient to timi away from a definite trend
of thought than to stick to it; it is easier to

• Chapter SVll.

190 SYNTHESIS

mix up diflferent things than to distinguish
them; and it is particularly easier to travel
over modes of reasoning unsanctioned by logic;
finally in connecting words or thoughts it is
especially easy to overlook the fact that such
connections should result in sense. All this is
indubitable and this is exactly what is done by
the techniques of the wit in question. It will
sound strange, however, to assert that such
processes in the wit-work may produce pleas-
ure, since outside of wit we can experience only
unpleasant feelings of defense against all these
kinds of inferior achievement of our mental ac-
tivity.

Word-pleasure and Pleasure in Nonseme

The " pleasure in nonsense," as we may call
it for short, is, in the seriousness of our life,
crowded back almost to the vanishing point.
To demonstrate it we must enter into the study
of two cases in one of which it is stUl visible
and in the other becomes visible for the second
time. I refer to the behavior of the learning
child and to the behavior of the adult under un-
stable toxic influences. When the child leams
to control the vocabulary of its mother tongue
it apparently takes great pleasure in " ex-
perimenting playfully " with that material

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

'(Groos) ; it connects words without regard for
their meaning in order to obtain pleasure from
the rhyme and rhythm. Gradually the child
is deprived of this pleasure until only the sense*
fill connection of words is allowed him. But
even in later life there is still a tendency to
overstep the acquired restrictions in the use of
words, a tendency which manifests itself in
disfiguring the same by definite appendages,
and in changing their forms by means of cer-
tain contrivances (reduplication, trembling
speech) or even by developing an individual
language for use in plajTng, — efforts which re-
appear also among the insane of a certain cate-
gory.

I believe that whatever the motive which
actuated the child when it began such playings,
in its further development the child indulges in
ibem fully conscious that they are nonsensical
and derives pleasure from this stimulus whic4i
is interdicted by reason. It now makes use
of play in order to withdraw from the pressure
of critical reason. More powerful, however,
are the restrictions which must develop in edu-
cation along the lines of right thinking and in
the separation of reality from fiction, and it is
for tins reason that the resistance against the
p r ea suieg of thinking and reality is far-reach'
i n^ and persistent; even the pbeooroena of

phantasy formatioQ come under this point of
view. The power of reason usually grows so
strong daring the later part of childhood and
during that period of education which extends
over the age of puberty, that the pleasure in
" freed ocmsense " rarely dares manifest itself.
One fears to utter ntmsense; but it seems to
me that the inclination characteristic of boys
to act in a contradictory and inexpedient man-
ner is a direct outcome of this pleasure in non-
sense. In pathological cases one often sees
this tendency so accentuated that it again con-
trols the speeches and answers of the pupils.
In the case of some collie students who
merged into neuroses I could convince myself
that the unconscious pleasure derived from the
nonsense produced by them is just as mudi
responsible for their mistakes as their actual
ignorance.

Seproductioti of Old UberUea

The student does not give up his demonstra-
tions against the pressiires of thinking and
reality whose domination becomes unceasingly
intolerant and unrestricted. A good part of
the tendency of students to skylarking is re-
sponsible for this reaction. ^lan is an " untir-
ing pleasure seeker " — I can no longer recall

which author coined this happy expression —
and finds it extremely difficult to renounce
pleasure once experienced. With the hilarious
nonsense of "sprees" (Bierschwefcl) , college
cries, and songs, the student attempts to pre-
serve that pleasure which results from freedom
of thought, a freedom of which he is more and
more deprived through scholastic discipline.
Even much later, when as a mature man he
meets with others at scientific congresses and
class reunions and feels himself a student
again, he must read at the end of the session
the " Kneipzeitung," or the comic college paper,
which distorts the newly gained knowledge into
the nonsensical and thus compensates him for the
newly added mental inhibitions.

The very terms " Bicrschwefel " and "'Kneip-
zeitung " are proof that the reason which has
stifled the pleasure in nonsense has become so
powerful that not even temporarily can it be
abandoned without toxic agency. The change
in the state of mind is the most valuable thing
that alcohol offers man, and that is the reason
why this " poison " is not equally indispensable
for all people. The hilarious humor, whether
due to endogenous origin or whether produced
toxically, weakens the inhibiting forces among
which is reason and thus again makes acces-
sible pleasure-sources which are burdened by

194

SYNTHESIS

suppression. It is very instructive to see how
the demand made upon wit sinks with the rise
in spirits. The latter actually replace wit, just
as wit must make an effort to replace the men-
tal state in which the otherwise inhibited pleas-
ure possibilities (pleasure in nonsense among
the rest) assert themselves.

" With little wit and much comfort."

Under the influence of alcohol the adult
again becomes a child who derives pleasure
from the free disposal of his mental stream
without being restricted by the pressure of
logic.

We hope we have shown that the technique
of absurdity in wit corresponds to a source of
pleasiu-e. We need hardly repeat that this
pleasure results from the economy of psychic
expenditure or alleviation from the pressure
of reason.

On reviewing again the wit-technique classi-
fied under three headings we notice that the
first and last of these groups — the replacement
of object-association by word-association, and
the use of absurdity as a restorer of old lib-
erties and as a relief from the pressure of
intellectual upbringing — can be taken collect-
ively. Psychic relief may in a way be com-
pared to economy, which constitutes the tech-
nique of the second group. Alleviation of the

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM 195

already existing psychic expenditure, and econ-
omy in the yet to be offered psychic expendi-
ture, are two principles from which all tech-
niques of wit and with them all pleasure in
these techniques can be deduced. The two
forms of the technique and the resultant pleas-
ures correspond more or less in general to the
division of wit into word- and thought-witti-
cisms.

Play and Jest

The preceding discussions have led us imex-
peetedly to an understanding of the history of
the development of psychogenesis of wit which
we shall now examine still further. We have
become acquainted with the successive steps in
wit, the development of which up to tendency-
wit will undoubtedly reveal new relationships
between the different characters of wit. An-
tedating wit there exists something which we
may designate as " play " or " jest." Play —
we shall retain this name — appears in children
while they are learning how to use words and
connect thoughts; this playing is probably the
result of an impulse which urges the child to
exercise its capacities (Groos). During this
process it experiences pleasurable effects which
originate from the repetition of similarities,
the rediscovery of the familiar, sound-associa-

19ff SYNTHESIS

tions, etc., which may be explained as an un-
expected economy of psychic expenditure.
Therefore it surprises no one that these result-
ing pleasures urge the chUd to practice play-
ing and impel it to continue without regard
for the meaning of words or the connections
between sentences. Playing with words and
thoughts, motivated by certain pleasures in
economy, would thus be the first step of wit.

This playing is stopped by the growing
strength of a factor which may well be called
criticism or reason. The play is then rejected
as senseless or as directly absurd, and by virtue
of reason it becomes impossible. Only acci-
dentally is it now possible to derive pleasure
from those sources of rediscovery of the fa-
miliar, etc., which is explained by the fact that
the maturing person has then merged into a
playful mood which, as in the ease of merri-
ment in the child, removes inhibitions. In this
way only is the old pleasure-giving playing
made possible, but as men do not wish to wait
for these propitious occasions and also hate to
forego this pleasure, they seek means to make
themselves independent of these pleasant states.
The further development of wit is directed by
these two impulses; the one striving to elude
reason and the other to substitute for the adult
an infantile state of mind.

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

This gives rise to the second stage of wit, the
jest (Scherz). The object of tlie jest is to
bring about the resultant pleasure of playing
and at the same time appease the protesting
reason which strives to suppress the pleasant
feeling. There is but one way to accomplish
this. The senseless combination of words or
the absurd linking of thoughts must make sense
after all. The whole process of wit production
is therefore directed towards the discovery of
words and thought constellations which fulfill
these conditions. The jest makes use of almost
all the technical means of wit, and usage of
language makes no consequential distinction
between jest (Scherz) and wit (Witz). What
distinguishes the jest from wit is the fact that
the pith of the sentence withdrawn from criti-
cism does not need to be valuable, new, or even
good; it matters only that it can be expressed,
even though what it may say is obsolete, super-
fluous, and useless. The most conspicuous fac-
tor of the jest is the gratification it affords by
making possible that which reason forbids.

A mere jest is the following of Professor
Kästner, who taught physics at Göttingen in
the 16th century, and who was fond of mak-
ing jokes. Wishing to enroll a student named
Warr in his class, he asked him his age, and
upon receiving the reply that he was thirty

198

SYNTHESIS

years of age he exclaimed: "Aha, so I have
tlie honor of seeing the thirty years' War." ^
When asked what vocations his sons followed
Rokitansky jestingly answered: " Two are heal-
ing and two are howling," (two physicians and
two singers). The reply was correct and there-
fore imimpeachable, but it added nothing to
what is contained in the parenthetic expression.
There is no doubt that the answer assumed
another form only because of the pleasure
which arises from the unification and assonance
of both words.

I believe that we now see our way clear. In
estimating the techniques of wit we were con-
stantly disturbed by the fact that these are not
peculiar to wit alone, and yet the nature of wit
seemed to depend upon them, since their re-
moval by means of reduction nullified the char-
acter as well as the pleasure of wit. Now we
become aware that what we have described as
techniques of wit — and which in a certain sense
we shall have to continue to call so — are really
the sources from which wit derives pleasure;
nor does it strike us as strange that other
processes draw from the same som-ces with the
same object in view. The technique, however,
which is peculiar to and belongs to wit alone
consists in a process of safeguarding the use

* KklDp&uli Di4 tUUt4i d*T Spraefu, 1890.

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

f of this pleasure- forming means against the
protest of reason which would obviate the pleas-
ure. We can make few generalizations about
this process. The wit-work, as we have already
remarked, expresses itself in the selection of
such word-material and such thought-situations
as to permit the old play with words and
thoughts to stand the test of reason; but to ac-
complish this end the cleverest use must be
made of all the peculiarities of the stock of
words and of all constellations of mental com-
binations. Later on perhaps we shall be in a
position to characterize the wit-work by a
definite attribute; for the present it must re-
main unexplained how our wit makes its ad-
vantageous selections. The tendency and ca-
pacity of wit to guard the pleasure-forming
word and thought combinations against reason,
ab-eady makes itself visible as an essential cri-
terion in jests. From the beginning its object
is to remove inner inhibitions and thereby ren-
. der productive those pleasure-sources wliich have
I become inaccessible, and we shall find that it
remains true to this characteristic throughout
the course of its entire development.

We are now in a position to prescribe a cor-
rect place for the factor " sense in nonsense,"
{see Introduction, page 8), to which the authors
ascribe so much significance in respect to the

recognition of wit and the explanation of the
pleasurable effect. The two firmly established
points in the determination of wit — its tendency
to carry through the pleasureful play, and its
effort to guard it against the criticism of reason
— make it perfectly clear why the individual
witticism, even though it appear nonsensical
from one point of view, must appear full of
meaning or at least acceptable from another.
How it accomplishes this is the business of the
wit-work; if it is not successful it is relegated
to the category of " nonsense." Nor do we find
it necessary to deduce the resultant pleasure
of wit from the conflict of feelings which
emerge either directly or by way of " confu-
sion and clearness," from the simultaneous
sense and nonsense of the wit. There is just
as little necessity for our delving deeper into
the question how pleasure can come from the
succession of that part of the wit considered
senseless and from that part recognized as
senseful. The psychogenesis of wit has taught
us that the pleasure of wit arises from word-
play or from the liberation of nonsense, and
that the sense of wit is meant only to
guard this pleasure against suppression through
reason,

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

Jeit and Wit

Thus the problem of the essential character
of wit could almost be explained by means of
the jest. We may follow the development of
the jest until it reaches its height in the tend-
ency-wit. The jest gives tendency a prior
position when it is a question of supplying us
with pleasure, and it is content when its utter-
ance does not appear utterly senseless or in-
sipid. But if this utterance is substantial and
valuable the jest changes into wit. A thought,
which would have been worthy of our interest
even when expressed in the most unpretentious
form, is now invested in a form which must in
itself excite our sense of satisfaction. Such
an association we cannot help thinking cer-
tainly has not come into existence unintention-
ally; we must make effort to divine the inten-
tion at the bottom of the formation of wit.
An incidental observation, made once before,
will put us on the right track. We have al-
ready remarked that a good witticism gives
us, so to speak, a general feeling of satisfac-
tion without our being able to decide offhand
which part of the pleasure comes from the
witty form and which part from the excellent
thought contained in the context (p. 181). We
are deceiving ourselves constantly about this

di r k ion; win liiw s wc anrnkat die qodfty^ of
dfee wit OD ^iiHB i l of cnr mdaamtitrnk for tiie

• I I I ■ '^ ( I

orerestmixtr tiie tsIdc of tiie Ihrn^ght oo
eocmt €fi the {deasnrc afforded us by the witty
mrcstmeiiL We know not wluit gires os pleas-
ure nor at wbat we are langtHUg. Hub un-
eertainty of our judgment, a^wimmg it to be
a fact, may hare gircn the motive for tiie
formation <rf wit in the Uteral sense. The
tiioag^ sedcs the witty disguise because it
tfaerebv recommends itsdf to oar attention and
can tfaos appear to os more impcntant and val-
uable than it really is; but above all because
this di^^uise fascinates and omf uses our rea-
son« We are apt to attribute to tbe tfaouglit
the pleasure derired from tiie witty form, and
we are not inclined to consider improper wbat
bas given us pleasure, and in this way deprive
ourselves of a source of pleasure. For if wit
made us laugh it was because it established in
us a mood most unfavorable to reason, which
in turn has forced upon us that state of mind
which was once contented with mere plajring
and which wit has attempted to replace with
all the means at its command. Although we
have already established the fact that such wit
is harmless and does not yet show a tendency»
we may not deny that, strictly speaking, it is

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM S03

the jest alone which shows no tendency; that
is, it serves to produce pleasure only. For wit
is really never purposeless even if the thought
contained therein shows no tendency and
merely serves a theoretical, intellectual interest.
Wit carries out its purpose in advancing the
thought by magnifying it and by guarding it
against reason. Here again it reveals its orig-
inal nature in that it sets itself up against an
inhibiting and restrictive power, or against the
critical judgment.

The first use of wit, which goes bej'ond the
mere production of pleasure, points out the
road to be followed. Wit is now recognized
as a powerful psychic factor whose weight can
decide the issue if it falls into this or that side
of the scale. The great tendencies and im-
pulses of our psychic life enlist its service for
their own purposes. The original purposeless
wit, which began as play, becomes related in a
secondary manner to tendencies from which
nothing that is formed in psychic life can
escape for any length of time. We already
know what it can achieve in the service of the
exhibitionistic, aggressive, cynical, and scepti-
cal tendencies. In the case of obscene wit,
which originated in the smutty joke, it makes
a confederate of the third person who orig-
inally disturbed the sexual situation, by giving

904

SYNTHESIS

him pleasure through the utterance which
causes the woman to be ashamed in his pres-
ence. In the case of the aggressive tendency,
wit by the same means changes the original in-
diflFerent hearers into active haters and scom-
ers, and in this way confronts the enemy with
a host of opponents where formerly there was
but one. In the first case it overcomes the in-
hibitions of shame and decorum by the pleas-
ure premium whicli it offers. In the second
case it overthrows the critical judgment which
would otherwise have examined the dispute in
question. In the third and fourth cases where
wit is in the service of the cynical and sceptical
tendency, it shatters the respect for institu-
tions and truths in wliich the hearer had be-
lieved, first by strengthening the argument,
and secondly by resorting to a new method of
attack. Where the argument seeks to draw
the hearer's reason to its side, wit strives to
push aside this reason. There is no doubt that
wit has chosen the way which is psychologically
more efiScacious.

The Development into Tendency-mt

What impressed us in reviewing the achieve-
ments of tendency-wit was the effect it pro-
duced on the hearer. It is more important.

^f liowevei

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

lowever, to understand the effect produced by
wit on the psychic life of the person who makes
it, or more precisely expressed, on the psychic
life of the person who conceives it. Once be-
fore we have expressed the intention, which we
find occasion to repeat here, that we wish to
study the psychic processes of wit in regard
to its apportionment between two persons.
We can assume for the present that the psychic
process aroused by wit in the hearer is usuaUy
an imitation of the psychic processes of the wit
producer. The outer inlilbitions which are to
be overcome in the hearer correspond to the
inner inhibitions of the wit producer. In the
latter the expectation of the outer hindrance
exists, at least as an inhibiting idea. The inner
hindrance, which is overcome in tendency-wit,
is evident in some single cases; for example, in
Mr. N.'s joke (p. 28) we can assume that it
not only enables the hearer to enjoy the pleas-
ure of the aggression through injuries but it
also makes it possible for him to produce the
wit in the first place. Of the different kinds
of inner inhibitions or suppressions one is
especially worthy of our interest because it is
the most far-reaching. We designate that
form by the term " repression." It is char-
acterized by the fact that it excludes from con-
sciousness certain former emotions and their

?!<K} BTK

ix:t::

|H'<xiiiH4. We shall learn -flott h mlimj wA
M^Jt* in capable of liheratmg
iiiHiic*('<i (Iml have undergane
i^vuc'cMuiiW of outer hizidri
ftiicci, (ti the manner indicated
iHliihlllcHiM and repressions
tiHilciM'y wit proves more denSj- iftm
niUcr cic'vc'topmcntal stage of wit Ikat tte
I'luiiMiic r of wit-nialdng is to act free pleaaiiEe
hy it-iHoviiiK inhibitions. It reinf oracs tadeDcks
(•) wbuJi it ifivos its serviees by bringn^ Abb
NfiibicilMiii^c) from repressed emotions; or ft pob
übt If n( (be disposal of the repressed tcDd*
ciuiüti ilircrily.

Oiu? iiiitv rc'iicblv concede that these are tte
fiiiiiiiiuiti of ioiidoncy-wit, but one must ne^-
c^rUu'Ueitt Htbiiii that wc do not understand in
M^bHi iimiuic*r those functions can succeed in
niviniipbtthin^ iboir end. The power of tend-
eiu\Y-wit iHin.NiNts in the pleasure which it de-
rives from the MHinvs of word-plays and lib-
erated luuismse, and if one can judge from
tlie iinpressiiuis rtHvivtnl from purposeless jests»
one cannot possil>ly consider the amount of the
pleasure so great as to l)elieve that it has the
power to annul dtvp-nx^ted inhibitions and re-
pressions. As a matter of fact we do not deal
here with a simple propelling power but rather
with a more complicated mechanism. Instead

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM 807

r tof covering the long circuitous route through
■which I arrived at an understanding of this re*
lationship, I shall endeavor to demonstrate it by
a short synthetic route.

G. Th. Fechner has established the principle
of aesthetic assistance or enhancement which he
explains in the following words : " From the
unopposed meeting of pleasurable states (Be-
dingungen) which individually accomplish lit'
tie, there results a greater, often much greater
resultant pleasure than is warranted by the
rum of the pleasure values of the separate
Hates, or a greater result than could be ac-
counted for as the sum of the individual ef-
fects; in fact the mere meeting of this kind can
result in a positive pleasure product which
overflows the threshold of pleasure when the
factors taken separately are too weak to ac-
complish this. The only condition is that in
comparison to others they must produce a
greater sense of satisfaction." ' I am of the
opinion that the theme of wit does not give us
the opportunity to test the correctness of this
principle which is demonstrable in many other
artistic fields. But from wit we have learned
something, which at least comes near this prin-
ple, namely, that in a co-operation of many

• Vonchule der dtilhvlik. Vol. 1, V, p. 51, 8nd Ed., Leipdfi

pieasiire-producdng factors we are in no posi-
tion to assign to each one the resultant part
which really belongs to it (see p. 131 ) . But the
situation assumed in the principle of assistance
can be Taried. and for these new conditions we
can formulate the following combination of
questions which are worthy of a reply. What
usually happens if in one constellation there is
a meeting of pleasurable and painful condi-
tions? Upon what depwids the result and the
previous intimations of the result? Tendency-
wit particularly shows these possibilities.
There is one feeling or impulse which strives
to liberate pleasure from a certain source and
under unrestricted conditions certainly would
liberate it, but there is another impulse whidi
works against this development of pleasure,
that is, which inhibits or suppresses it. The
suppressing stream, as the result shows, must
be somewhat stronger than the one suppressed,
which however is by no means destroyed.

The Fore-pUaaure Principle
But now there appears another impulse
which strives to set free pleasure by this identi-
cal process, even though from different sources
it thus acts like the suppressed stream. What
can be the result in such a case? An example
can make this clearer than this sdiematizati<m.

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

209

There is an impulse to insult a certain person;
but this is so strongly opposed by a feeling
of decorum and testhetic culture that the im-
pulse to insult must be crushed. If, for exam-
ple, by virtue of some changed emotional state
the insult should happen to break through, this
insulting tendency would subsequently be pain-
fully perceived. Therefore the insult is omit-
ted. There is a possibility, however, of mak-
ing good wit from the words or thoughts which
would have served in the insult; that is, pleas-
ure can be set free from other sources without
being hindered by the same suppression. But
the second development of pleasure would have
to be foregone if the insulting quality of the
wit were not allowed to come out, and as the
latter is allowed to come to the surface, it is
connected with the new release of pleasure.
Experience with tendency-wit shows that under
such circumstances the suppressed tendency
can become so strengthened by the aid of wit-
pleasure as to overcome the otherwise stronger
inhibition. One resorts to insults because wit
is thereby made impossible. But the satisfac-
tion thus obtained is not produced by wit
alone; it is incomparably greater, in fact it is
by so much greater than the pleasure of the
wit, that we must assume that the former sup-
pressed tendency has succeeded in breaking

£10 SYNTHESIS

through, perhaps without the need of an out-
let. Under these circumstances tendency-wit
causes the most prolific laughter.

Perhaps the investigation of the determina-
tions of laughter will aid us in forming a
clearer picture of the process of the aid of wit
against suppression. But we see even now
that the case of tendency-wit is a special case
of the principle of aid. A possibility of the
development of pleasure enters into a situation
in which another pleasure possibihty is so
hindered that individually it would not result
in pleasure. The result is a development of
pleasure which is greater by far than the added
possibility. The latter acted, as it were, as an
alluring premium; with the aid of a small sum
of pleasure a very large and almost inaccessi-
ble amount is obtained. I have good grounds
for thinking that this principle corresponds to
an arrangement which holds true in many
widely separated spheres of the psychic life,
and I consider it appropriate to designate the
pleasure serving to liberate the large sum of
pleasure as fore-pleasure and the principle as
the principle of fore-pleasure.

Play-pleasure and Bemoval-pletaure

The effect of tendency-wit may now be
formulated as follows: It enters the service of

^r tenden

THE PLEASTBE MECHANISM

tendendes in order to produce new pleasure by
removing suppressions and repressions. This it
does, using wit-pleasure as fore-pleasure.
When we now review its development we may
say that wit has remained true to its nature
from b^inning to end. It begins as play in
order to obtain pleasure from the free use of
words and thoughts. As soon as the growing
reason forbids this senseless play with words
and thoughts, it turns to the jest or joke in
order to hold to these sources of pleasure and
in order to be able to gain new pleasure from
the liberation of the absurd. In the role of
harmless wit it assists the thoughts and forti-
fies them against the impugnment of the criti-
cal judgment, whereby it makes use of the
principle of intermingling the pleasure-sources.
Finally, it enters into the great struggling
suppressed tendencies in order to remove inner
inhibitions in accordance with the principle of
fore-pleasure. Reason, critical judgment, and
suppression, these are the forces which it com-
bats in turn. It firmly holds on to the original
word-pleasure sources, and beginning with the
stage of the jest opens for itself new pleasure
sources by removing inhibition. The pleasure
which it produces, be it play-pleasure or re-
moval-pleasure, can at all times be traced to
the economy of psychic expenditure, in so far

«1«

SYNTHESIS

as sucfa a conception does not contradict UK
nature of pleasure, and proves itself produc-
, tire also in other fields.'

I b Oil trcaUM^ dcMTie ■

la *irv «r tiK slgnifleuce attrOwtal bf out oooecpUiMi fa» UM
bctor 'waat I* noaaatte," one migbt be tempted to ■*——-*
Itet enrj witUciaai rtKNild be ■ tMrnaenw-joke. Bat tfaii b not
a tca» t r j. became onlj the pUy with thoii|ltb iDcritaM; leadi
to DOnamcc^ wbetcu tbe other source of wit-pleasure, Hk pUf
wfth word*, nukes tbii imprcsiian inddental and does not rtgor
Urlf invoke tbe criticisin connected with it Tbe donbk root of
wll-pleasure — frooi the play with words and thoughts, which
corre&ponds to the most Important diiision into word- and thou^t-
witUdnn« — sets its face against a sliort fonnatation of general
prindplct about wit as a tangible aggraiatJoa of HUKphIh^,
Ibe plaf with words produces laughter, as is well known, in con-
aeqnence of tlie factor of recofnition described above, and tber»-
fore suffers suppression only in a small degree. TTie play with
thoughts conoot be motivated through such pie »sure; it has
suffered a very energetic suppression and the pleasure which It
«n give is only Uie pleasure of released inhibltioiis. AmiTdingly
one may say that wit-pleasure shows a kernel of tbe original
play-pleasure and a shell of removal-pleasure. Naturally we
do not grant that the pleasure in nonsense-wit is due to the
fact that we have succeeded in making nonsense despite tbe sup-
pression, while we do notice that the play with words gives ti5
pleasure. Nonsense, which has remained fixed in thought wit,
acquires secondarily the function of stimulating our attention
through confusion. It serves as a reinforcement of the effect of
wit, but only when it fs insistent, so that tbe confusion coa
anticipate the intellect by a definite fraction of time. Hilt
nonsense In wit may also he employed to «present a judgment
contained within the thought faas been demonstrated by the ex-
unple on p. 73. But even this h not the primal signification of
Bonsense In wit.

A series of wit-like productions for which we have no appn^
priate oame, but which may lay claim to the designation of

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

SIS

*«ftty BOBKBM»* miy be added to the nonsense- Jokes. They

bat I shall cite only two examples i As the
to a guest at the table he put both hnnds twice
faito the mqromiaiie uid then ran them through his hair, nctng
looked at fajr Us nei^ibor with astonishment he seemed to have
noticed Ids nriitakr and excnsed liimself» sayings ** Pardon me»
I tbooght it was sptnadL**

Ort "Ute it Bke a suspension bridge^ said the one. ** How la
that?* aiked the other. ''How should I know?*' was the answer.

Thew e xtr e m e eaamples produce an effect through the fact that
Ifaej give rise to tbe expectation of wit, so that one makes the
effort to find the hidden sense behind the nonsense. Dut none
if foondt tfaej axe really nonsense. Under that deception it was
IMTwtW* for one moment to liberate the pleasure in nonsense.
These wittielsms are not altogether without tendrncics, thry fur-
bUi the narrator a certain pleasure in that they drcriTe and
annoy the hearer. The latter then calms his anger by resolving
that he hfantelf dionld take the place of the narrator.

THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL
PE0CES8

It seems superfluous to speak of the motives
of wit, since the purpose of obtaining pleasure
must be recognized as a sufficient motive of the
wit-work. But on the one hand it is not im-
possible that still other motives participate in
the production of wit, and on the other hand,
in view of certain well-known experiences, the
theme of the subjective determination of wit
must be discussed.

Two things above all urge us to it. Though
wit-making is an excellent means of obtaining
pleasure from the psychic processes, we know
that not all persons are equally able to make
use of it. Wit-making is not at the disposal
of all, in general there are but a few persons
to whom one can point and say that they are
witty. Here wit seems to be a special ability
somewhere within the region of the old " psy-
chic faculties," and this shows itself in its ap-
pearance as fairly independent of the other
faculties such as intelligence, phantasy, mem-
ory, etc. A special talent or psychic de-

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 315

termination permitting or favoring wit-making
must be presupposed in all. wit-makers.

I am afraid that we shall not get very far
in the exploration of this theme. Only now
and then do we succeed in proceeding from
the understanding of a single witticism to the
knowledge of the subjective determinations in
the mind of the wit-maker. It is quite acci-
dental that the example of wit with which we
began our investigation of the wit-technique
permits us also to gain some insight into the
subjective determination of the witticism. I
am referring to Heine's witticism, to which also
Heymans and Lipps have paid attention.

"I was sitting next to Solomon Rothschild
and he treated me just as an equal, quite fa-
mälionaire " {" Bäder von Lucca ") .

Subjective Determination of the " Famillion~
aire " Witticism,

Heine put this word in the mouth of a com-
ical person, Hirsch-Hyacinth, collector, oper-
ator and tax appraiser from Hamburg, and
valet of the aristocratic baron, Cristoforo Gum-
pelino (formerly Gumpel). Evidently the
poet has experienced great pleasure in these
productions, for he allows Hirsch-Hyacinth to
talk big and puts in his mouth the most amus-

«Iff SYNTHESIS

ing and most candid utterances; he positively
endows him with the practical wisdom of a
Sancho Panza. It is a pity that Heine, as it
seems, had no liking for this dramatic figure
and that he drops the delightful character so
soon. From many passages it would seem that
the poet himself is speaking behind the trans-
parent mask of Hirsch-Hyacinth, and we are
quite convinced that this person is nothing but
a parody of the poet himself. Hirsch tells of
reasons why he has discarded his former name
and now calls himself Hyacinth. " Besides I
have the advantage," he continues, " of having
an H on my seal already, and therefore I am
in no need of having a new letter engraved."
But Heine himself resorted to this economy
when he changed his surname " Harry " to
" Heinrich '* at his baptism. Every one ac-
quainted with the life of the poet will recall
that in Hamburg, where one also meets the
personage Hirsch-Hyacinth, Heine had an un-
cle of the same name, who played the greatest
role in Heine's life as the wealthy member of
the family. The uncle's name was likewise Sol-
omon, just like the elderly Rothschild who
treated the impecunious Hirsch on such a fa-
millionaire basis. \\Tiat seems to be merely
I jest in the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth sooo
reveals a background of earnest bitterness

THE MOTIVES OF WIT

«17.

when we attribute it to the nephew Harry-
Heinrich. For he belonged to the family, nay,
more, it was his earnest wish to marry a
daughter of this uncle, but she refused him,
and his uncle always treated him on a some-
what famillionaire basis, as a poor relative.
His rich relatives in Hamburg always dealt
with him condescendingly. I recall the story
of one of his old aunts by marriage who, when
she was still young and pretty, sat next to some
one at a family dinner who seemed to her un-
prepossessing and whom the other members
of the family treated shabbily. She did not
feel herself called upon to be any more con-
descending towards him. Only many years
later did she discover that the careless and
neglected cousin was the poet Heinrich Heine.
We know from many a record how keenly
Heine suffered from these repulses at the
hands of his wealthy relatives in his youth and
during later years. The witticism " famillion-
aire " grew out of the soil of such a subjective
emotional feeling.

One may suspect similar subjective determin-
ations in many other witticisms of the great
scoffers, but I know of no other example by
which one can show this in such a convincing
way. It is therefore hazardous to venture a
more definite opinion about the nature of this

«I« SYNTHESIS

jwrsonal determination. Furthermore, one is
not inclined in the first place to claim similar
complicated conditions for the origin of each
and every witticism. Neither are the witty
productions of other celebrated men better
suited to give us the desired insight into the
subjective determination of wit. In fact, cme
gels the impression that the subjective de-
termination of wit production is oftentimes not
unrelated to persons suflfering from neurotic
diseases, when, for example, one learns that
Lichtenberg was a confirmed hypochondriac
burdened with all kinds of eccentricities. The
great majority of witticisms, especially those
produced from current happenings, are anoay-
mous; one might be inquisitive to know niiat
kind of people they are who originate them.
The physician occasionally has an opportunity
to make a study of persons who, if not re-
nowned wits, are recognized in their circle as
witty and as originators of many passable wit-
ticisms; he is often surprised to find sudi per^
sons showing dissociated personalities and a
predisposition to nervous affectiaos. However,
owing to insufficient data, we certainly cannot
maintain that such a psychoneurotic constitu-
ticm is a regular or necessary subjective coo-
1 for wit-making.
. dearer case is afforded by Jewidi vitt^

THE MOTIVES OF WIT

dsms which, as before mentioned, are made ex-
clusively by Jews themselves, whereas Jewish
stories of different origin rarely rise above the
level of the comical strain or of brutal mock-
ery (p. 166). The determination for the self-
participation here, as in Heine's joke " fa-
miliionaire," seems to be due to the fact that
the person finds it difficult to express directly
his criticism or aggression and is thus com-
pelled to resort to by-ways.

Other subjective determinations or favora-
ble conditions for wit-making are less shrouded
in darkness. The motive for the production of
harmless wit is usually the ambitious impulse
to display one's spirit or to " show off." It is
an impulse comparable to the impulse toward
sexual exhibition. The existence of numerous
inhibited impulses whose suppression retains
some weakness produces a stale favorable for
the production of tendenc^'-wit. Thus certain
single components of the sexual constitution
may appear as motives for wit-formation. A
whole series of obscene witticisms lead one to
the conclusion that a person who gives origin
to such wit conceals a desire to exhibit. Per-
sons having a powerful sadistical component in
their sexualitj', which is more or less inhibited
in life, are most successful with the tendency-
"wit of aggression.

The ImpuUe to Impart Wit

The second fact which impels one to examine
the subjective determination of wit is the com-
mon experience that nobody is satisfied with
making wit for himself. Wit-making is insep-
arably connected with the desire to impart it;
in fact this impulse is so strong that it is often
realized after overcoming strong objections.
In the comic, too, one experiences pleasure by
imparting it to another person; but this is not
imperative; one can enjoy the comic alone
when one happens on it. Wit, on the other
hand, must be imparted. Apparently the
process of wit-formation does not end with the
conception of wit. There remains something
which strives to complete the mysterious process
of wit-formation by imparting it.

We cannot conjecture, in the first place,
what may have motivated the impulse to im-
part wit. But in wit we notice another pe-
culiarity which again distinguishes it from the
comic. If I encounter the latter I can laugh
heartily over it alone; I am naturally pleased
if by imparting it to some one else I make him
laugh too. In the case of wit, however, which
occurs to me or which I have made, I cannot
laugh over it in spite of the unmistakable feel-
ing of pleasiire which I experience in the wit-

Bat «i^ do I not kn«^ aver arr o«a joke?
Aad «fcst rale does the otber penon plij in
it?

Let us conaider the last odctt firsL In the
^"f"** oaMlly two ppr^'Mifc ecue into coosidenk*
ban. Bcsna n^ onm ego tnerc h anotner pcp-
soa in vlran I fiwJ «nw^rf l f i ng eocnic; if ol>-
jeeta appcu comkad to me, it takes [dace by
means of a sort of penomficatton wfaich is not
imriwiiiinn in our ootioDal life. The eoniie
I HUc ea s is satisfied with these two persoos, the
c;gD and the object person: there may also be
a third person, but it is not obligatory. Wit
as a pUv with one's own words and thoughts
at first dispenses with an object person, but
already, upon the first step of the jest, it de-
mands another person to whom it can impart
its result, if it has succeeded in safeguarding
play and nonsense against the remonstrance
of reason. The second person in wit does not,
however, correspond to the object person, but
to the third person who is the other perstm in
the comic. It seems that in the jest the deci-
sion as to whether wit has fulfilled its task is
tnmsf erred to the other person, as if the ego

S29

SYNTHESIS

were not quite certain of its opinion in the
matter. The harmless wit is also in need of
the other person's support in order to ascer-
tain whether it has accomplished its purpose.
If wit enters the service of sexual or hostile
tendencies, it can be described as a psychic
process among three persons, just as in the
comic, with the exception that there the third
person plays n different role. The psychic
process of wit is consummated here between
the first person — the ego, and the third person
— the stranger, and not, as in the comic, be-
tween the ego and tlie object person.

Also, in the case of the third person of wit,
the wit is confronted with subjective determina-
tions which can make the goal of the pleasure-
stimulus imattainable. As Shakespeare says
in Love'» Labor's Lost (Act V, Scene 2) :

" A jest's prosperity lies in the ear
Of him that hears it, never in the tongue
Of him that makes it."

He whose thoughts ran in sober channels is
incompetent to declare whether or not the jest
is a good one. He himself must be in a jovial,
or at least indifferent, state of mind in order
to become the third person of tlie jest. The
ksame hindrance is present in the case of both

THE MOTIVES OF WIT ttS

hiLniiless and tendency wit; but in the latter
the aDtagonism to the tendency which wishes
to serve wit, appears as a new hindrance. The
readiness to laugh about an excellent smutty
joke cannot manifest itself if the exposure con-
cerns an honored kinsman of the third person.
In an assemblage of divines and pastors no one
would dare to refer to Heine's comparison of
Catholic and Protestant priests as retail deal-
ers and employees of a wholesale business. In
the presence of my opponent's friends the wit-
tiest invectives with which I might assail him
would not be considered witticisms but invec-
tives, and in tbe minds of my bearers it would
innate not pleasure, but indignation. A cer-
tain amount of willingness or a certain indif-
ference, the absence of all factors which might
evoke strong feelings in opposition to the tend-
ency, are absolute conditions for the participa-
tion of the third person in the completion of
the wit process.

The Thvd Perton of ike WitticUm

Wherever such hindrances to the operation
of wit fail, we see the phenomenon which we
are now investigating, namely, that the pleas-
ure which the wit has provided manifests itself
more clearly in the third person than in the

STNTHESIS

originator of the wit. We must be satisfied to
use tlie expression " more clearly " where we
should be inclined to ask whether the pleasure
of the hearer is not more intensive than that of
the wit producer, because we are obviously
lacking the means of measuring and comparing
it. We see, however, that the hearer shows his
pleasure by means of explosive laughter after
the first person, in most cases with a serious
expression on his face, has related the joke.
If I repeat a witticism which I have heard, I
am forced, in order not to spoil its effect, to
conduct myself during its recital exactly like
him who made it. We may now put the ques-
tion whether from this determination of
laughter over wit we can draw conclusions con-
cerning the psychic process of wit-formation.

Now it cannot be our intention to take into
consideration everything that has been asserted
and printed about the nature of laughter. We
are deterred from this imdertaking by the
statement which Dugas, one of Ribot's pupils,
put at the beginning of his book Psychologie
du rire (1902). "II n'est pas de fait plus
banal et plus etudie que le rire, U n'en est pas
qui ait eu le don d'exciter davantage la curi-
osite du vulgaire et celle des phUosopbes, il n'ent
est pas sur lequel on ait recueUli plus d'ob-
servations et bäti plus de theories, et avec cela

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 225

I n'en est pas qui demeure plus inexpliqu^, on
"serait tente de dire avec les sceptiques qu'il
faut etre content de rire et de ne pas chercher
iL savoir pourquoi on rit, d'autant que peut-etre
le reflexion tue le rire, et qu'il serait alors con-
tradictoire qu'elle en decouvrit les causes "
(page 1).

On the other hand, we must make sure to
utilize for our purposes a view of the mechan-
ism of laughter which fits our own realm of
thought excellently. I refer to the attempted
explanation of H. Spencer in his essay entitled
Physiology of Laughter^

According to Spencer laughter is a phenom-
enon of discharge of psychic irritation, and an
evidence of the fact that the psychic utilization
of this irritation has suddenly met with a
hindrance. The psychological situation, which
discharges itself in laughter, he describes in the
following words : " Laughter naturally results
only when consciousness is unawares trans-
ferred from great things to small — only when
there is what we call a descending incongru-
ity."'

' H. Spencer, Th» PXytiology of LaughttT <flrrt publbhed fa
MaemiHa^'i Magatiiie for March, 1860), Essays, Vol. II, 1901.

•Different poinls in this deelaratlon woold demand an ei-
hanstlTe Inquiry into an inTestigation of the pleasure of the
comie, a thing that other authors have already done, and which,
ftt all CTcnts, does not touch our diKusaion. It (cema to ma

restraiDt," seems to me to appnwdi .
Spencer's conceptions nearer than many
authors would have us believe.

However, we experience Ibe desire to mod-
ify Spencer's thought; to give a more definite
meaning to some of the ideas and to change
others. W'c would say that laughter arises
when the sum total of psychic energy, formerly
used for the occupation of certain psychic
channels, has become unutilizable so that it can
experience absolute discharge. We know what
criticism such a declaration invites, but for our

that Sp«iu«r was not happj in his explanation of wfaf the dia-
charge happens to find just that path, the excJIempnt of whidi
results In the phfsicol picture of laughter. 1 should like to add
one Jiingle contrihulion to the subject of tiie phj-siologkal ex*
planntion of laughter, that ia, to the derivation or interpretation
of tlie niuBculur acttons that characteriie laughler— a subject
that has been often treated before and since Darwin, but which
bag never been conclusively settled. According to the best of
my knowledge the grimaces and contortions of the corners of Öie
mouth Uiat characteriie laughter appear first in the satisfied and
aatiatcd nursling when be drowsily quits the breasts. There It
Is a correct motion of expression since It bespeaks the detcr-
minalion to lake no more nouri.shment, an " enough," so to speak,
or rather a "• more than enough." This primal sense of pleunr-
«ble satiation may have furnished the smile, which ever remalni
the basic phenomenon of laughler, the later connection
pleasurable processes of discharge.

THE MOTIV HS OF WTT ÄET

dcfcoK we daax exte <i pertliiait quiitatioit firam
lipps's treatiae oa Krjmik find Humor, an
analyab widdi tiiraw!« ligfat on otfier problems
besides tbe omiic and faumnr. He svs: "^ In
tbe end indmdnal puTcimLoincal problems at-
ways kad as fairly deeply into ^wj^iioiaf^^ so
tiiat fimdamnrtally nn psychnlnincal problem
may be oonsdered by itself*' /p. 71;. Tbe
terms '^psydde €ncn?yr'' ** discfaarge^'^ and tiie
treatment of psychic energy as a quantity have
beeome babitoal modes of rfifti^TTTg since I be*
gm to explain to myself the fact of psycho»
pathology philosophically. Being of the same
opinion as lipps I ha^e essayed to represent
in my Interpretaünn of DreaTtm the nn-
oonscions psydiic processes as real entities, and
I have not represented the conscious contents
as the " real psychic activity/' ' Only when I
speak aboot the ** investing energy (Besetzung)

'Cf. Tl# Imi^rprttatum nr Dm*wmä, Outp. VTI, also O» tks
Pwytkie Fwrc9, «tew in 0« «Jwv« rtted btiok of lipps (p. 125),
where he scjs: "Thto b the jpeneral principfe: The daramaiit
fMors of the psychic life «re not represented bj the cunlcnts
of consdoiisness bfit by those psychic processes which «re v»>
coDscioiis. The task of psyrholofsj, pn ifi d ed it does not fimH
Rseif to a mere description of the content of conscioasness» anst
also consist of rereaiing the natnre of these nn co na r ion s processes
fhini the nstnre of the contests of conschnisuess and its ten»*
poral relationship. PsycholoirT most itself be a theorj of tiiese
processes. But such a psjdiology wiD sooo And that tiiere
exist quite a mnnber of diaracteristics of tibese processes which
•fe nnreprescBted in tiie eonespoD&ig co ntents of

of psychic channels," do I seem to devi-
ate from the analogies that Lipps uses. The
knowledge that I have gained about the fact
that psychic energy can be displaced from one
idea to another along certain association chan-
nels, and about the almost indestructible con-
servation of the traces of psychic processes,
have actually made it possible for me to at-
tempt such a representation of the unknown.
In order to obviate the possibility of a misun-
derstanding I must add that I am making no
attempt to proclaim that cells and fibers, or i
the neuron system in vogue nowadays, repre-
sent these psychic paths, even if such paths
would have to be represented by the organic
elements of the nervous system in a manner
which cannot yet be indicated.

Laughter as a Dückarge

Thus, according to our assumption, the con-
ditions for laughter are such that a sum of
psychic energy hitherto employed in the occu-
pation of some paths may experience free dis-
charge. And since not all laughter, (but '
surely the laughter of wit), is a sign of pleas-
ure, we shall be inclined to refer this pleasure
to the release of previously existing static
energy {Besetzungsenergie) . When w

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 229

that the hearer of the witticism laughs, while
the creator of the same camiot, then that must
indicate that in the hearer a sum of damming
energy has been released and discharged,
whereas during the wit formation, either in the
release or in the discharge, inhibitions resulted.
One can characterize the psychic process in the
hearer, in the third person of the witticism,
hardly more pointedly than by asserting that
he has bought the pleasure of the witticism
with very little expenditure on his part. One
might say that it is presented to him. The
words of the witticism which he hears necessar-
ily produce in him that idea or thought-connec-
tion whose formation in him was also resisted
by great inner hindrances. He would }iave
had to make an effort of his own in order to
bring it about spontaneously like the first per-
son, or he would have had to put forth at least
as much psychic expenditure as to equalize the
force of the suppression or repression of the
inhibition. This psychic expenditure he has
saved himself; according to our former discus-
sion (p. 80) we should say that his pleasure
corresponds to this economy. Following oiu*
tmderstanding of the mechanism of laughter
we should be more likely to say that the static
energy utilized in the inhibition has now sud-
denly become superfluous and neutralized be-

«M SYNTHESIS

cause a forbidden idea came into existence on
the way to auditory perception and is there-
fore ready to be discharged through laughter.
Essentially both statements amount to the
same thing, for the economized expenditure
corresponds exactly to the now superfluous in-
hibition. The latter statement is more obvious,
for it permits us to say that the hearer of the
witticism laughs with the amount of psychic
energy which was Uberated by the suspension
of inhibition energy; that is, he laughs away,
as it were, this amount of psychic energy.

Why the First Person Does Not Laugh

If the person in whom the witticism is
formed cannot laugh, then it indicates, as we
have just remarked, that there is a deviation
from the process in the case of the third per-
son which concerns either the suspension of the
inhibition energy or the discharge possibihty of
the same. But the first of the two cases is in-
conclusive, as we must presently see. The in-
hibition energy of the first person must have
been dissipated, for otherwise there would have
been no witticism, the formation of which had
to overcome just such a resistance. Otherwise,
too, it would have been impossible for the first
person to experience the wit-pleasure which the

THE MOTIVES OF WIT

removal of the inhibition forced us to deduce.
But there remains a second possibility, namely,
that even though he experienced pleasure the
first person cannot laugh, because the possibil-
ity of discharge has been disturbed. In the
production of laughter such discharge is es-
sential; an interruption in the possibiUty of dis-
charge might result from the attachment of
the freed occupation energy to some immediate
endopsychic possibility. It is well that we have
become cognizant of this possibility; we shall
soon pay more attention to it. But with the
wit-maker still another condition leading to the
same result is possiMe. Perhaps, after all, no
appreciable amount of energy has been liber-
ated, in spite of the successful release of occu-
pation energy. In the first person of the wit-
ticism wit-work actually takes place wliich
must correspond to a certain amount of fresh
psychic expenditure. Thus the first person
contributes the power which removes the inhibi-
tions and which surely results in a gain of
pleasiu-e for himself; in the case of tendency-
wit it is indeed a very big gain, since the fore-
pleasiu"e gained from the wit-work takes upon
itself the further removal of inhibitions. But
the expenditure of the wit-work is, in every
case, derived from the gain which is the result
of the removal of inhibitions; it is the same

expenditure which escapes from the hearer of
the witticism. To confirm what was said above
it may be added that the witticism loses Its
laughter effect in the third person as soon as
an expenditure of mental work is exacted of
him. The allusions of the witticism must be
striking, and the omissions easily supplemented;
with the awakening of conscious interest in
thinking, the effect of the witticism is regularly
made impossible. Here lies the real distinction
between the witticism and the riddle. It may
he that the psychic constellations during wit-
work are not at all favorable to the free dis-
charge of the energy gained. We are not here
in a position to gain a deeper understanding;
our inquiry as to why the third person laughs
we have been able to clear up better than the
question why the first person does not laugh.

At any rate, if we have well in mind these
views about the conditions of laughter and
about the psychic process in the third person,
we have arrived at a place where we can sat-
isfactorily elucidate an entire series of peculiar-
ities which are familiar in wit, but which have
not been understood. Before an amount of
interlocked energy, capable of discharge, is to
be liberated in the third person, there are sev-
eral conditions which must be fulfilled or which at
least are desirable. 1. It must be definitely

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 238.

established that the third person really pro-
duces this expenditure of energy. 2. Care
must be taken that when the latter becomes
freed that it should find another psychic use
instead of offering itself to the motor dis-
diarge. 8. It can be of advantage only if the
energy to be liberated in the third person is
first strengthened and heightened. Certain
processes of wit-work which we can gather to-
gether under the caption of secondary or auxil-
iary techniques serve all these purposes.

The first of these conditions determines one
of the qualifications of the third person as
hearer of the witticism. He must throughout
be so completely in psychic harmony with the
first person that he makes use of the same inner
inhibitions which the wit-work has overcome in
the first person. Whoever is focused on smutty
jokes will not be able to derive pleasure from
clever exhibitionistic wit. Mr. N.'s aggressions
will not be understood by uncultured people
who are wont to give free rein to their pleas-
ure gained by insulting others. Every witti-
cism thus demands its own public, and to laugh
over the same witticisms is a proof of absolute
psychic agreement. We have indeed arrived at
a point where we are at libert>' to examine even
more thoroughly the process in the third per-
son's mind. The latter must be able habitually

to produce the same inhibition which the joke
has surmounted in the first person, so that, as
soon as he hears the joke, there awakens within
him compulsively and automatically a readiness
for this inhibition. This readiness for the in-
hibition, which I must conceive as a true ex-
penditure analogous to the mobilization of an
army, is simultaneously recognized as super-
fluous or as belated, and is thus immediately
discharged in its nascent state through the
channel of laughter.'

The second condition for the production of
the free discharge, a cutting off of any other
outlets for the liberated energ>', seems to me of
far greater importance. It furnishes the theo-
retical explanation for the uncertainty of the
effect of wit; if the thoughts expressed in the
witticism evoke very exciting ideas in the
hearer, {depending on the agreement or antag-
onism between the wit's tendencies and the
train of thought dominating the hearer), the
witty process either receives or is refused at-
tention. Of still greater theoretical interest,
however, are a series of auxiliary wit-tech-
niques which obviously serve the purpose of
diverting the attention of the listeners from the

■ Heymalis (ZeiUchrift far Fiyehol, XI) has taken np the
viewpoint of the nascent state In a somewhat different con-
nection.

THE MOTIVES OF WIT

wit-process so as to allow the latter to proceed
automatically. I advisedly use the term " auto-
matically " rather than " unconsciously " be-
cause the latter designation might prove mis-
leading. It is only a question of keeping the
psychic process from getting more than its
share of attention during the recital of the wit-
ticism, and the usefulness of these auxiliary
techniques permits us to assume rightfully that
it is just the occupation of attention which has
8 large share in the control and in the fresh
utilization of the freed energy of occupation.

The Automatism of the Wit-procest

It seems to he by no means easy to avoid
the endopsychic utilization of energy that has
become superfluous, for in our mental processes
we are constantly in the habit of transferring
such emotional outputs from one path to
another without losing any of their energy
through discharge. Wit prevents this in the
following way. In the first place it strives
for the shortest possible expression in order
to expose less points of attack to the attention.
Secondly, it strictly adheres to the condition
that it be easily understood (v. «.), for as soon
as it has recourse to mental eflFort or demands
a choice between difiFerent mental paths, it

ss6

SYNTHESIS

imperils the effect not only through the un-
avoidable mental expenditure, but also through
the awakening of attention. Besides this, wit
also makes use of the artifice of diverting the
attention by offering to it something in the ex-
pression of the witticism which fascinates it so
that meanwhile the liberation of inhibition
energy and its discharge can take place undis-
turbed. The omissions in the wording of wit
already carry out this intention. They impel
us to fill in the gaps and in this way they keep
the wit-process free from attention. The tech-
nique of the riddle, as it were, which attracts
attention is here pressed into the service of the
wit-work. The fa9ade formations, which we
have already discovered in many groups of
tendency-wit, are still more effective (see p.
155). The syllogistical fa<;ades excellently ful-
fill the purpose of riveting the attention by an
allotted task. While we begin to ponder
wherein the given answer was lacking already
we are laughing; our attention has been sur-
prised, and the discharge of the hberated emo-
tional inhibition has been effected. The same
is true of witticisms possessing a comic faqade
in which the comic serves to assist the wit-
technique. A comic fa<;ade promotes the ef-
fect of wit in more than one way; it makes
possible not only the automatism of the wit-

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 237

process by riveting the attention, but also it
facilitates the discharge of wit hy sending
ahead a discharge from the comic. Here the
effect of the comic resembles that of a fascinat-
ing fore-pleasure, and we can thus understand
that many witticisms are able to dispense en-
tirely the fore-pleasures produced by other
means of wit, and make use of only the comic
as a fore-pleasure. Among the true techniques
of wit it is especially displacement and rep-
resentation through absurdity which, besides
other properties, also develop the deviation of
attention so desirable for the automatic dis-
charge of the wit-process."

We already surmise, and later will be able
to see more clearly, that in this condition of
deviation of attention we have disclosed no un-

* Through an eitample of ilisplocemeDt-wlt I desire to discnis
another interesting charaftcr of tlie tfchnlquc of wit. The
genial actress Gallmeycr when once asked hnw old s?ie was is
ssid to have answered this unwelcome question with ahashed and
downcast eyes, l>y saying, " In Brunn." This is a very good
example of displacemcnl. Hnvinjc been aslted her age, she re-
plied by naming the place of her hirth, thus anttelpating tbe
next query, and In this manner she wishes to Imply: "Thfa la a
question wliirh I prefrr to pnsa by." And still we feel (hat the
character of the witHrl5m does not here come to CTpresslon un-
dimmed, the deviation from the question Is too obvfous; ttie
displacement is much loo conEpieuous. Our attention under-
stands immediately thai it is a matter of an intentlnnat dis-
placement. In other displncement-witticlsms the dispin cement
Is disguised and our attention U riveted by the efTort to dis-
cover it. In one of the displacement-witticisms (p. 09) the reply

238 SYNTHESIS

essential characteristic of the psychic process
in the hearer of wit. In conjunction with this,
we can understand something more. First,
how it happens that we rarely ever know in a
joke why we are laughing, although by an-
alytical investigation we can determine the
cause. This laughing is the result of an auto-
matic process which was first made possible by
keeping our conscious attention at a distance.
Secondly, we arrive at an understanding of
that characteristic of wit as a result of which
wit can exert its full effect on the hearer only
when it is new and when it comes to him as
a surprise. This property of wit, which causes
wit to be short-lived and forever urges the
production of new wit, is evidently due to the
fact that it is inherent in the surprising or the
unexpected to succeed but once, When we re-

to the recommendation of the horse — " What in the world should
I do in Montioello at 6:30 in the morning?"— the dispWemenI is
also an obtrusive one, but as a substitute for it it acts upon
the attention in a. senseless and confusing manner, whereas in
the interrogation of the actress we know immediately bow to
dispose of her displaeement answer.

The so-cailed "facetious questions" which may make lue of
the best techniques deviate from wit in other wuys. An example
of the facetious question with displacement is the following:
•* What is a cannibal who devours his father and mother? — An-
swer: An orphan. — And when he has devoured all his other rela-
tives? — Sole-heir. — And wliere can such a monster ever find
sympathy? — In the dictionary under S." The facetloui ques-
tions arc not full witticisms because the required w
csoDot be guessed like the allusions, omissionsj etc., of wit.

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 239

peat wit the awakened memory leads the at-
tention to the first hearing. This also explains
the desire to impart wit to others who have not
heard it before, for the impression made by
wit on the new hearer replenishes that part of
the pleasm-e which has been lost by the lack of
novelty. And an analogous motive probably
urges the wit producer to impart his wit to
others.

Elements Favoring the Wit-process

As elements favoring the wit-process, even
if we can no longer consider them essentials,
I present in the third place three technical
aids to wit-work which are destined to increase
the sums of energy to be discharged and thus
enhance the effect of the wit. These technical
aids also very often accentuate the attention
directed to the wit, but they neutralize its in-
fluence by simultaneously fascinating it and
impeding its movements. Everj-thing that
provokes interest and confusion exerts its in-
fluence in these two directions. This is espe-
cially true of the nonsense and contrast ele-
ments, and above all the *' contrast of ideas,"
which some authors consider the essential char-
acter of wit, but in which I see only a means
to reinforce the effect of wit. All that is con-

840

SYNTHESIS

fusing evokes in the hearer that condition of
distribution of energy which Lipps has desig-
nated as "psychic damming"; and, doubtless,
he has a right to assume that the force of the
" discharge " varies with the success of the
damming process which precedes it. Lipps's ex-
position does not explicitly refer to wit, but to
the comic in general, yet it seems quite prob-
able that the discharge in wit, releasing a gush
of inhibition energy, is brouglit to its height
in a similar manner by means of the damming.
At length we are aware that the technique
of wit is really determined by two kinds of
tendencies, those which make possible the
formation of wit in the first person, and those
guaranteeing that the witticism produces in the
third person as much pleasurable effect as pos-
sible. The Janus-like double- facedness of
wit, which safeguards its original resultant
pleasure against the impugnment of critical
reason, belongs to the first tendency together
with the mechanism of fore-pleasure; the other
complications of technique produced by the
conditions discussed in this chapter concern the
third person of the witticism. Thus wit in it-
self is a double-tongued villain which serves
two masters at the same time. Everj'thing
that aims toward gaining pleasure is calculated
by the witticism to arouse the third person, as

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 241

if inner, unsurmountable inhibitions in the first
person were in the way of the same. Thus one
gets the full impression of the absolute neces-
sity of this third person for the completion of
the wit-process. But while we have succeeded
in obtaining a good insight concerning the na-
ture of this process in the third person, we feel
that the corresponding process in the first per-
son is still shrouded in darkness. So far we
have not succeeded in answering the first of
our two questions: Why can we not laugh
over wit made by ourselves? and: AVhy are we
urged to impart our own witticisms to others?
We can only suspect that there is an intimate
connection between the two facts yet to be ex-
plained, and that we must impart our wit-
ticisms to others for the reason that we our-
selves are unable to laugh over them. From
our examinations of the conditions in the third
person for pleasure gaining and pleasure dis-
charging we can draw the conchision that in
the first person the conditions for discharge
are lacking and that those for gaining pleasure
are only incompletely fulfilled. Thus it is not
to be disputed that we enhance our pleasure
in that we attain the — to us impossible —
laughter in tliis roundabout way from the im-
pression of the person who was stimulated to
laughter. Thus we laugh, so to speak, par

242

ricochet.

SYNTHESIS

Dugas expresses it. Laughter
to those manifestations of psychic
states which are highly infectious; if I make
some one else laugh by imparting my wit to
him, I am really using him as a tool in order
to arouse my own laughter. One can really
notice that the person who at first recites the
witticism with a serious mien later joins the
hearer with a moderate amoimt of laughter.
Imparting my witticisms to others may thus
serve several purposes. First, it serves to give
me the objective certainty of the success of the
wit-work; secondly, it serves to enhance my
own pleasiu-e through the reaction of the hearer
upon myself; thirdly, in the case of repeating
a not original joke, it serves to remedy the loss
of pleasure due to the lack of novelty.

Economy and Full Expenditure

At the end of these discussions about the
psychic processes of wit, in so far as they are
enacted between two persons, we can glance
back to the factor of economy which impressed
us as an important item in the psychological
conception of wit since we offered the first ex-
planation of wit-technique. Long ago we dis-
missed the nearest but also the simplest con-
ception of this economy, where it was a matter

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 2M

of avoiding psychic expenditure in general by
a maximum restriction in the use of words and
by the production of associations of ideas. We
had then already asserted that brevity and
laconisms are not witty in themselves. The
brevity of wit is a peculiar one; it has to be
a " witty " brevity. The original pleasure
gain produced by playing with words and
thoughts resulted, to be sure, from simple
economy in expenditure, but with the develop-
ment of play into wit the tendency to econ-
omize also had to shift its goals, for whatever
might be saved by the use of the same words
or by avoiding new thought connections would
surely be of no account when compared to the
colossal expenditure of our mental activity.
We may be permitted to make a comparison
between the psychic economy and a business
enterprise. So long as the latter's transactions
are very small, good policy demands that ex-
penses be kept low and that the costs of op-
eration be minimized as much as possible.
The economy still follows the absolute height
of the expenditure. Later on when the vol-
ume of business has increased, the importance
of the business expenses dwindles; increases in
the expenditure totals matter little so long as
the transactions and returns can be sufficiently
increased. Keeping down running expenses

244

SYNTHESIS

would be parsimonious; in fact, it would mean
a direct loss. Nevertheless it would be equally
false to assume that with a very great expendi-
ture there would be no more room for saving.
The manager inclined to economize would now
make an effort to save on particular things and
would feel satisfied if the same establishment,
with its costly upkeep, could reduce its ex-
penses at all, no matter how small the saving
would seem in comparison to the entire ex-
penditure. In quite an analogous manner the
detailed economy in our complicated psychic
affairs remains a source of pleasure, as may be
shown by everj'day occurrences. Whoever
used to have a gas lamp in his room, but now
uses electric light, will experience for a long
time a definite feeling of pleasure when he
presses the electric light button; this pleasure
continues as long as at that moment he remem-
bers the complicated arrangements necessary
to light the gas lamp. Similarly the economy
of expenditure in psychic inhibition brought
about by wit — small though it may be in com-
parison to the sum total of psychic expendi-
_ ture — will remain a source of pleasure for us,
ise we thereby save a particular expendi-
i which we were wont to make and which
before we were ready to make. That the
iture is expected and prepared for is a

THE MOTIVES OF WIT SW

factor which stands unmistakably in the fore-
grotmd.

A localized economy, as the one just consid-
ered, will not fail to give us momentary pleas-
ure, but it will not bring about a lasting al-
leviation so long as what has been saved here
can be utilized in another place. Only when
this disposal into a different path can be
avoided, will the special economy be trans-
formed into a general alleviation of the psychic
expenditures. Thus, with clearer insight into
the psychic processes of wit, we see that the fac-
tor of alleviation takes the place of economy.
Obviously the former gives us the greater feel-
ing of pleasure. The process in the first person
of the witticism produces pleasure by remov-
ing inhibitions and by diminishing local ex-
penditure; it does not, however, seem to come
to rest until it succeeds through the interven-
tion of the third person in attaining general
relief through discharge.

C. THEORETICAL PAKT,

VI.

THE HELÄTION OF WIT TO DBEAMS AND TO THE
UNCONSCIOUS

At the end of the chapter which dealt with
the elucidation of the technique of wit (p. 125)
we asserted that the processes of condensation
with and without substitutive formation, dis-
placement, representation through absurdity,
representation through the opposite, indirect
representation, etc., all of which we found par-
ticipated in the formation of wit, evinced a
far-reaching agreement with the processes of
" dream-work." We promised, at that lime,
first to examine more carefully these similari-
ties, and secondly, so far as such indications
point to search for what is common to both wit
and dreams. The discussion of this compar-
ison would be much easier for us if we could
assume that one of the subjects to be com-
pared — the " dream-work " — were well known.
But we shall probably do better not to take
this assumption for granted. I received the
impression that my book The Interpretation
of Dreams created more " confusion " than
" enlightenment " among my colleagues, and I

250 THEORETICAL PAET

know that the wider reading circles Have con-
tented themselves to reduce the contents of
the book to a catchword, " Wish fulfillment "
— a term easily remembered and easily abused.

However, in my continued occupation with
the problems considered therein, for the study
of which Diy practice as a psychotherapeutist
affords me much opportunity, I found nothing
that would impel me to change or improve on
my ideas; I can therefore peacefully wait until
the reader's comprehension has risen to my
level, or until an intelligent critic has pointed
out to me the basic faults in my conception.
For the purposes of comparison with wit, I
shall briefly review the most important features
of dreams and dream-work.

We know dreams by the recollection which
usually seems fragmentary and which occurs
upon awakening. It is then a structure made
up mostly of visual or other sensory impres-
sions, which represents to us a deceptive pic-
ture of an experience, and may be mingled
with mental processes (the " knowledge " in
the dream) and emotional manifestations.
What we thus remember as a dream I call
" the manifest dream-content." The latter is
often altogether absurd and confused, at other
times it is merely one part or another that is
so affected. But even if it be entirely coherent.

THE RELATION OF WIT

as in the case of some anxiety dreams, it stands
out in our psychic life as something strange,
for the origin of which one camiot account.
Until recently the explanation for these pe-
culiarities of the dream has been sought in the
dream itself in that it was considered roughly
speaking an indication of a muddled, dissoci-
ated, and " sleepy " activity of the nervous ele-
ments.

As opposed to this view I have shown that
the excessively peculiar " manifest " dream-
content can regularly be made comprehensible,
and that it is a disfigured and changed
transcription of certain correct psychic forma-
tions which deserve the name of " latent dream-
thoughts." One gains an understanding of
the latter by resolving the manifest dream-con-
tent into its component parts without regard
for its apparent meaning, and then by follow-
ing up the threads of associations which ema-
nate from each one of the now isolated ele-
ments. These become interwoven and in the
end lead to a structure of thoughts, which is
not only entirely accurate, but also fits easily
into the familiar associations of our psychic
processes. During this " analysis " the dream-
content loses all of the peculiarities so strange
to us; but if the analysis is to be successful,
we must firmly cast aside the critical objections

THEORETICAL PART

which incessantly arise against the reproduc-
tion of the individual associations.

The Dream-work

From the comparison of the remembered
manifest dream-content with the latent dream-
thoughts thus discovered there arises the con-
ception of " dream-work." The entire sum of
the transforming processes which have changed
the latent dream-thought into the manifest
dream is called the dream-work. The aston-
ishment which formerly the dream evoked in
us is now perceived to be due to the dream-
work.

The function of the dream-work may be
described in the following manner. A struc-
ture of thoughts, mostly very complicated,
which has been built up during the day and
not brought to settlement — a day remnant —
clings firmly even during night to the energy
which it had assumed— the imderJying center
of interest — and thus threatens to disturb sleep.
This day remnant is transformed into a dream
by the dream-work and in this way rendered
harmless to sleep. But in order to make pos-
sible its employment by the dream-work, this
day remnant must be capable of being east
into the form of a wish, a. condition that is not

THE «ELATION OF WIT

difficult to fulfill. The wish emanating from
the dream-thoughts forms the first step and
later on the nucleus of the dream. Experience
gained from analyses — not the theory of the
dream — teaches us that with children a fond
wish left from the waking state suffices to
evoke a dream, which is coherent and senseful,
but almost always short, and easily recogniz-
able as a " wish fulfillment." In the case of
adults the universally valid condition for the
dream-creating wish seems to be that the latter
should appear foreign to conscious thinking,
that is, it should be a repressed wish, or that
it should supply consciousness with reinforce-
ment from unknown sources. Without the as-
simiption of the unconscious activity in the
sense used above, I should be at a loss to de-
velop further the theory of dreams and to ex-
plain the material gleaned from experience in
dream-analyses. The action of this unconscious
wish upon the logical conscious material of
dream-thoughts now results in the dream. The
latter is thereby drawn down into the uncon-
scious, as it were, or to speak more precisely,
it is exposed to a treatment which usually
takes place at the level of unconscious mental
activity, and which is cliaracteristic of this
mental level. Only from the results of the
" dream-work " have we thus far learned tQ

234 THEORETICAL PART ^H

know the qualities of this unconscious mental
activity and its differentiation from the " fore-
conscious " which is capable of consciousness.

The Unconscious

A novel and difficult theory that runs
counter to our habitual modes of thinking can
hardly gain in lucidity by a condensed exposi-
tion. I can therefore accomphsh little more
in this discussion than refer the reader to the
detailed treatment of the unconscious in my
Interpretation of Dreams, and also to Lipps's
■work, which I consider most important. I
am aware that he who is under the spell of
a good old philosophical training, or stands
aloof from a so-called philosophical system,
will oppose the assumption of the " unconscious
psychic processes " in Lipps's sense and in mine
and will desire to prove the impossibility of it
preferably by means of definitions of the term
psychic. But definitions are conventional and
changeable. I have often found that persons
who dispute the unconscious on the grounds of
its absurdity or impossibility have not received
their impressions from those sources from
which I, at least, have found it necessary to
draw, in order to become aware of its existence.
These opponents had never witnessed the ef-

THE BELATION OF WIT

feet of a posthypnotic suggestion, and they
were inunensely surprised at the evidence I
imparted to them gleaned from my analysis of
unhypnotized neurotics. They had never
gained the conception of the imconscious as
something which one does not really know,
while cogent proofs force one to supplement
this idea by saying that one understands by
the unconscious something capable of con-
sciousness, something concerning which one has
not thought and which is not in the field of
vision of consciousness. Nor had they at-
tempted to convince themselves of the existence
of such unconscious thoughts In their own
psychic life by means of an analysis of one
of their own dreams, and when I attempted
this with them, they could perceive their
own mental occurrences only with astonish-
ment and confusion. I have also gotten
the impression that these are essentially af-
fective resistances which stand in the way of
the acceptation of the " unconscious," and that
they are based on the fact that no one is de-
sirous of becoming acquainted with his un-
conscious, and it is most convenient to deny al-
together its possibility.

256 THEOEETICAL PART

Condeiuation and Displacement in the Dream-
work

The dream-work, to which I return after
this digression, subjects the thought material
uttered in the optative mood to a very peculiar
elaboration. First of all it proceeds from the
optative to the indicative mood; it substitutes
" it is " for " would it werel " This " it
is " is destined to become part of an hallucina-
tory representation which I have called the
" regression " of the dream-work. This re-
gression represents the path from the mental
images to the sensory perceptions of the same,
or if one chooses to speak with reference to
the still unfamiliar — not to be understood
anatomically — topic of the psychic apparatus,
it is the region of the thought-formation to the
region of the sensory perception. Along this
road wliich runs in an opposite direction to the
course of development of psychic complications
the dream- thoughts gain in clearness; a plastic
situation finally results as a nucleus of the
manifest " dream picture." In order to arrive
at such a sensory representation the dream-
thoughts have had to experience tangible
changes in their expression. But while the
thoughts are changed back into mental images
they are subjected to still greater chaDges»

THE RELATION OF WIT 257

some of which are easily conceivable as neces-
sary, while others are surprising. As a nec-
essary secondary result of the regression one
understands that nearly all relationships within
the thoughts which have organized the same
are lost to the manifest dream. The dream-
work takes over, as it were, only the raw ma-
terial of the ideas for representation, and not
the thought-relations which held each other in
check; or at least it reserves the freedom of
leaving the latter out of the question. On the
other hand, there is a certain part of the dream-
work which cannot be traced to the regression
or to the recasting into mental images; it is
just that part which is significant to us for the
analogy to wit-formation. The material of the
dream-thoughts experiences an extraordinary
compression or coTidensaiion during the dream-
work. The starting-points of this condensa-
tion are those points which are common to two
or more dream-thoughts because they naturally
pertain to both or because they are inevitable
consequences of the contents of two or more
dream-thoughts, and since these points do not
regularly suffice for a prolific condensation
new artificial and fleeting common points come
into existence, and for this purpose preferably
words are used which combine different mean-
ings in their sounds. The newly framed com-

S9S THEORETICAL PAST ^|

mon points of condensation enter as represent-
atives of the dream-thoughts into the manifest
dream-content, so that an element of the dream
corresponds to a point of junction or intersec-
tion of the dream-thoughts, and with regard
to the latter it must in general be called " over-
determined." The process of condensation is
that part of the dream-work which is most
easily recognizahle; it suffices to compare the
recorded wording of a dream with the written
dream-thoughts gained by means of analysis,
in order to get a good impression of the pro-
ductiveness of dream condensation.

It is not easy to convince one's self of the
second great change that takes place in the
dream-thoughts through the agency of the
dream-work. I refer to that process which I
have called the dream displacement. It man-
ifests itself by the fact that what occupies the
center of the manifest dream and is endowed
with vivid sensory intensity has occupied a
peripheral and secondary position in the dream-
thoughts, and vice versa. This process causes
the dream to appear out of proportion when
compared with the dream-thoughts, and it is
because of this displacement that it seems
strange and incomprehensible to the waking
state. In order that such a displacement
should occur it must be possible for the occu-

THE RELATION OF WIT

pation energy to pass uninhibited from im-
portant to insignificant ideas, — a process which
in normal conscious thinking can only give the
impression of " faulty thinking."

Transformation into expressive activity, con-
densation, and displacement are the three
great functions which we can ascribe to the
dream-work. A fourth, to which too little at-
tention was given in The Interpretation of
Dream«, does not come into consideration here
for our purpose. In a consistent elucidation
of the ideas dealing with the " topic of the
psychic apparatus " and " regression," which
alone can lend value to these working hy-
potheses, an effort would have to be made to
determine at what stages of regression the vari-
ous transformations of the dream-thoughts oc-
ciu*. As yet no serious effort has been made
in this direction, but at least we can speak
definitely about displacement when we say that
it must arise in the thought material while the
latter is in the level of the unconscious proc-
esses. One will probably have to think of
condensation as a process that extends over the
entire course up to the outposts of the percep-
tive region; hut in general it suffices to assume
that there is a simultaneous activity of all the
forces which participate in the formation of
dreams. In view of the reserve which one must

860 THEORETICAL PART

naturally exercise in the treatment of sucK
problems, and in consideration of the inability
to discuss here the main objections to these
problems, I should like to trust somewhat to
the assertion that the process of the dream-
work which prepares the dream is situated in
the region of the unconscious. Roughly speak-
ing, one can distinguish three general stages
in the formation of tlie dream; first, the trans-
ference of the conscious day remnants into the
unconscious, a transference in which tlie condi-
tions of the sleeping state must co-operate;
secondly, the actual dream-work in the
unconscious; and thirdly, the regression of
the elaborated dream material to the region
of perception, whereby the dream becomes
conscious.

The forces participating in the dream-forma-
tion may be recognized as the following: the
■wish to sleep; the sum of occupation energy
which still clings to the day remnants after the
depression brought about by the state of sleep;
the psychic energy of the unconscious wish
forming the dream; and the opposing force of
the " censor," which exercises its authority in
our waking state, and is not entirely abolished
during sleep. The task of dream-formation is,
above all, to overcome the inhibition of the
censor, and it is just this task that is fulfilled

THE RELATION OF WIT 261

by the displacement of the psychic energy
within the material of the dream-thoughts.

The Formula for Wit-work

Now we recall what caused us to think of
the dream while investigating wit. We found
that the character and activity of wit were
bound up in certain forms of expression and
technical means, among which the various
forms of condensation, displacement, and indi-
rect representation were the most conspicuous.
But the processes which led to the same results
— condensation, displacement, and indirect ex-
pression — we learned to know as peculiarities
of dream-work. Does not this analogy ahnest
force us to the conclusion that wit-work and
dream-work must be identical at least in one
essential point? I believe that the dream-work
lies revealed before us in its most important
characters, but in wit we find obscured just
that portion of the psychic processes which we
may compare with the dream-work, namely,
the process of wit-formation in the first per-
son. Shall we not yield to the temptation to
construct this process according to the analogy
of dream-formation? Some of the characteris-
tics of dreams are so foreign to wit that that
part of the dream-work corresponding to them

S62 THEORETICAL PART

cannot be carried over to the wit-formation. The
regression of the stream of thought to percep-
tion certainly falls away as far as wit is con-
cerned. However, the other two stages of
dream-formation, the sinking of a forecon-
scious ' thought into the unconscious, and the
unconscious elaboration, would give us exactly
the result which we might observe in wit if we
assumed this process in wit-formation. Let us
decide to assume that this is the proceeding of
wit-formation in the case of the first person.
A foreconscious thought is left for a moment
to unconscious elaboration and the results are
forthwith grasped by the conscious perception.
Before, however, we attempt to prove the
details of this assertion we wish to consider an
objection which may jeopardize our assumption.
We start with the fact that the techniques of
wit point to the same processes which become
known to us as peculiarities of dream-work.
Now it is an easy matter to say in opposition
that we would not have described the tech-
niques of wit as condensation, displacement,
etc., nor would we have arrived at such a com-
prehensive agreement in the means of repre-
sentation of wit and dreams, if our previous
knowledge of dream-work had not influenced
our conception of the technique of wit; so that

' Cf. Th« InttrprttatUm of Drtamt, Chspter VII.

THE RELATION OF WIT 268

at the bottom we find that wit confirms only
those tentative theories which we brought to it
from our study of dreams. Such a genesis of
agreement would be no certain guarantee of its
stability beyond our preconceived judgment.
No other author has thought of considering
condensation, displacement, and indirect ex-
pression as active factors of wit. This might
be a possible objection, but nevertheless it
would not be justified. It might just as well
be said that in order to recognize the real
agreement between dreams and wit our ordi-
nary knowledge must be augmented by a
specialized knowledge of dream-work. How-
ever, the decision will really depend only upon
the question whether the examining critic can
prove that such a conception of the technique
of wit in the individual examples is forced, and
that other nearer and farther-reaching inter-
pretations have been suppressed in favor of
mine; or whether the critic will have to admit
that the tentative theories derived from the
study of dreams can be really confirmed
through wit. My opinion is that we have
nothing to fear from such a critic and that
our processes of reduction have confidently
pointed out in which forms of expression
we must search for the techniques of wit.
That we designated these techniques by names

264 THEOEETICAL PAET

which previously anticipated the result of the
agreement between the technique of wit and
the dream-work was our just prerogative, and
really nothing more than an easily justified
simpUfication.

There is still another objection which would
not be vital, but which could not be so com-
pletely refuted. One might think that the
techniques of wit that fit in so well considering
the ends we have in view deserve recognition,
but that they do not represent all passible
techniques of wit or even all those in use.
Also that we have selected only the techniques
of wit which were influenced by and would suit
the pattern of the dream-work, whereas others
ignored by us would have demonstrated that
such an agreement was not common to all
cases. I really do not trust myself to make the
assertion that I have succeeded in explaining
all the current witticisms with reference to
their techniques, and I therefore admit tlie
possibility that my enumeration of wit-tech-
niques may show many gaps. But I have not
purposely excluded from my discussion any
form of technique that was clear to me, and I
can affirm that the most frequent, the most es-
sential, and the most characteristic technical
means of wit have not eluded my attention.

THE RELATION OF WIT 265

Wit as an Inspiration

Wit possesses still another character whicK
entirely corresponds to our conception of the
wit-work as originally discovered in our study
of dreams. It is true that it is common to hear
one say " I made a joke," but one feels that
one behaves differently during this process
than when one pronounces a judgment or of-
fers an objection. Wit shows in a most pro-
nounced manner the character of an invol-
untary " inspiration " or a sudden flash of
thought. A moment before one cannot tell
what kind of joke one is going to make, though
it lacks only the words to clothe it. One
usually experiences something indefinable
which I should like most to compare to an
absence, or sudden drop of intellectual tension;
then all of a sudden the witticism appears,
usually simultaneously with its verbal invest-
ment. Some of the means of wit are also
utilized in the expression of thought along
other lines, as in the cases of comparison and
allusion. I can purposely will to make an al-
lusion. In doing this I have first in mind (in
the inner hearing) the direct expression of my
thought, but as I am inhibited from expressing
the same through some objection from the situ-
ation in question, I almost resolve to substi-

S66 THEORETICAL PAET

tute the direct expression by a form of indirect 1
expression, and then I utter it in the form
of an allusion. But the allusion that comes
into existence in this manner having been
formed under my continuous control is never i
witty, no matter how useful it may be. On J
the other hand, the witty allusion appears
without my having been able to follow
up these preparatory stages in my mind.
I do not wish to attribute too much value to
this procedure, it is scarcely decisive, but it 1
does agree well with our assumption that in
wit-formation a stream of thought is dropped |
for a moment and suddenly emerges from the
unconscious as a witticism.

Witticisms also evince a peculiar behavior ,
along the lines of association of ideas. Fre-
quently they are not at the disposal of our
memory when we look for them; on the other
hand, they often appear unsolicited and at
places in our train of thought where we cannot
understand their presence. Again, these are
only minor qualities, but none the less they
point to their unconscious origin.

Let us now collect the properties of wit ■
whose formation can be referred to the uncon-
scious. Above all there is the peculiar brevity I
of wit which, though not an indispensable, is a
marked and distinctive characteristic feature.

THE RELATION OF WIT

267

When we first encountered it we were inclined
to see in it an expression of a tendency to
economize, but owing to very evident objec-
tions we ourselves depreciated the value of this
conception. At present we look upon it more
as a sign of the unconscious elaboration which
the thought of wit has undergone. The
process of condensation which corresponds to
it in dreams we can correlate with no other
factor than with the localization in the uncon-
scious, and we must assume that the conditions
for such condensations which are lacking in the
foreconscious are present in the unconscious
mental process." It is to be expected that in
the process of condensation some of the ele-
ments subjected to it become lost, while others
which take over their occupation energy are
strengthened by the condensation or are built
up too energetically. The brevity of wit, like
the brevity of dreams, would thus be a neces-
sary concomitant manifestation of the con-
densation which occurs in both cases; both
times it is a result of the condensation process.

' Besides the dream-work and the teclinique of wit I have been
able lo demonstrate condensation as a regular and sijcniflcant
proeew In another psychic occurrence, in tlie mechanistu of
norma] (not purposive) forg:ettlng. Sin^ar impressions put
dUficulties in the way of forgetting; impressions in any way
analogous arc forgotten hy becoming fused at their points of
contact. The confusion of uudogoiu imprftaiona ia one of the
first steps in forgetting.

S6S THEORETICAL PART

The brevity of wit is indebted also to this
origin for its peculiar character which though
not further assignable produces a striking im-
pression.

The Unconscioua and the Infantile.

We have defined above the one result
of condensation — the manifold applicatloD
of the same material, play upon words, and
similarity of sound — as a localized economy,
and have also referred the pleasure produced
by harmless wit to that economy. At a later
place we have found that the original purpose
of wit consisted in producing this kind of pleas-
ure from words, a process which was permitted
to the individual during the stage of playing,
but which became banked in during the course
of intellectual development or by rational crit-
icism. Now we have decided upon the assump-
tion that such condensations as serve the tech-
nique of wit originate automatically and with-
out any particular purpose during the process
of thinking in the unconscious. Have we not
here two diflferent conceptions of the same fact
which seem to be incompatible with each other?
I do not think so. To be sure, there are two
different conceptions, and they demand to he
brought in unison, but they do not contradict

THE RELATION OF WIT 269

each other. They are merely somewhat
strange to each other, and as soon as we have
estahlished a relationship between them we
shall probably gain in knowledge. That such
condensations are sources of pleasure is in per-
fect accord with the supposition that they
easily find in the unconscious the conditions
necessary for their origin; on the other hand,
we see the motivation for the sinking into the
unconscious in the circumstance that the pleas-
ure-bringing condensation necessary to wit
easily results there. Two other factors also,
which upon first examination seem entirely
foreign to each other and which are brought
together quite accidentally, will be recog-
nized on deeper investigation as intimately
connected, and perhaps may be found to
be substantially the same. I am referring
to the two assertions that on the one hand
wit could form such pleasure-bringing con-
densations during its development in the stage
of playing, that is, during the infancy of rea-
son; and, on the other hand, that it accom-
plishes the same function on higher levels by
submerging the thought into the unconscious.
For the infantile is the source of the uncon-
scious. The unconscious mental processes are
no others than those which are solely produced
during infancy. The thought which sinks into

S70 THEORETICAL PART

the unconscious for the purpose of wit-forma-
tion only revisits there the old homestead of
the former playing with words. The thought
is put back for a moment into the infantile
state in order to regain in this way childish
pleasure-sources. If, indeed, one were not al-
ready acquainted with it from the investigation
of the psychology of the neuroses, wit would
surely impress one with the idea that the pe-
culiar unconscious elaboration is nothing else
but the infantile type of the mental process.
Only it is by no means an easy matter to
grasp, in the unconscious of the adult, this pe-
culiar infantile manner of thinking, because it
is usually corrected, so to say, statu nascendi.
However, it is successfully grasped in a series
of cases, and then we always laugh about the
" childish stupidity." In fact every exposure
of such an unconscious fact affects us in a
" comical " manner.'

It is easier to comprehend the character of
these unconscious mental processes in the utter-
ances of patients suffering from various psy-

■ Many of my patients while imder psychoanalytic treatment
«re wonl to prove regularly by their laughlcr that 1 have suc-
ceeded in demonstrating faithfully to their conscious perception
the veiled unconscious; they Isu^ also when tlie content of
what Is disclosed does not at ail justify thi; laughter. To be sure.
It is conditional that they have approached this onconsciooj
closely enough to grasp It when the physician hog conjectured it
sad presented It to them.

THE RELATION OF WIT «71

crac disturbances. It is very probable that,
following the assumption of old Griesinger,
we would be in a position to understand the
deliria of the insane and to turn them to good
account as valuable information, if we would
not make the demands of conscious thinking
upon them, but instead treat them as we do
dreams by means of our art of interpretation/
In the dream, too, we were able to show the
" return of psychic life to the embryonal state." *
In discussing the processes of condensation
we have entered so deeply into the signiücation
of the analogy between wit and dreams that we
can here be brief. As we know that displace-
ments in dream-work point to the influence of
the censor of conscious thought, we will con-
sequently be inclined to assume that an inhibit-
ing force also plays a part in the formation of
wit when we find the process of displacement
among the techniques of wit. We also know
that this is commonly the case; the endeavor of
wit to revive the old pleasure in nonsense or
the old pleasure in word-play meets with re-
sistance in every normal state, a resistance
which is exerted by the protest of critical rea-
son, and which must be overcome in each in-

' Id doing this we must not forget to reckon witli the diitor-
tian brought about bj the censor which 1b stUl •ctlra in the
psf chores.

'Th4 l»t9rpT»tatio« of Drtomt.

«7«

THEORETICAL PART

dividual case. But a radical distinction be-
tween wit and dreams is shown in the manner
in which the wit-work solves this difficulty. In
the dream-work the solution of this task is
brought about regularly through displacements
and through the choice of ideas which are re-
mote enough from the objectionable ones to
secure passage through the censor; the latter
themselves are but offsprings of those whose
psychic energy they have taken upon them-
selves through full transference. The dis-
placements are therefore not lacking in any
dream and are far more comprehensive; they not
only comprise the deviations from the trend of
thought but also all forms of indirect expression,
the substitution for an important but offensive
element of one seemingly indifferent and harm-
less to the censor which form very remote allu-
sions to the first, they include substitution also
occurring through sj'mbols, comparisons, or
trifles. It is not to be denied that parts of this
indirect representation really originate in the
foreconscious thoughts of the dream, — as, for
example, symbolical representation and repre-
sentation through comparisons — because other-
wise the thought would not have reached the state
of the foreconscious expression. Such indi-
rect expressions and allusions, whose reference
to the original thought is easily findable, are

THE RELATION OF WIT 278

really permissible and customary means of ex-
pression even in our conscious thought. The
dream-work, however, exaggerates the applica-
tion of these means of indirect expression to an
imlimited degree. Under the pressure of the
censor any kind of association becomes good
enough for substitution by allusion; the dis-
placement from one element to any other is
permitted. The substitution of the inner as-
sociations (similarity, causal connection, etc.)
by the so-called outer associations (simultane-
ity, contiguity in space, assonance) is partic-
ularly conspicuous and characteristic of the
dream-work.

The Difference between Dream-technique and
Wit-technique

AH these means of displacement also occur
as techniques of wit, but when they do occur
they usually restrict themselves to those limits
prescribed for their use in conscious thought;
in fact they may be lacking, even though wit
must regxilarly solve a task of inhibition. One
can comprehend this retirement of the process
of displacement in wit-work when one remem-
bers that wit usually has another technique at
its disposal through which it defends itself
against inhibitions. Indeed, we have discov-

«7* THEORETICAL PART

ered nothing more characteristic of it than just
this technique. For wit does not have recourse
to compromises as does the dream, nor does it
evade the inliibition; it insists upon retaining
the play with words or nonsense unaltered, but
thanks to the ambiguity of words and multi-
plicity of thought-relations, it restricts itself to
the choice of cases in which this play or non-
sense may appear at the same time admissible
(jest) or senseful (wit). Nothing distin-
guishes wit from all other psychic formations
better than this double-sidedness and this dou-
ble-dealing; by emphasizing the "sense in non-
sense," the authors have approached nearest
the understanding of wit, at least from this an-
gle.

Considering the unexceptional predominance
of this peculiar technique in overcoming inhibi-
tions in wit, one might find it superfluous that
wit should make use of the displacement-tech-
nique even in a single case. But on the one
hand certain kinds of this technique remain
useful for wit as objects and sources of pleas-
ure — as, for example, the real displacement
(deviation of the trend of thought) which in
fact shares in the nature of nonsense, — and on
the other hand one must not forget that the
highest stage of wit, tendency-wit, must fre-
quently overcome two kinds of inhibitions which

I
I

THE RELATION OF WIT 275

oppose both itself and its tendency {p. 147),
and that allusion and displacements are qual-
ified to facilitate this latter task.

The numerous and unrestricted application
of indirect representation» of displacements,
and especially of allusions in the dream-work,
has a result which I mention not because of
its own significance but because it became for
me the subjective inducement to occupy my-
self with the problem of wit If a dream
analysis is imparted to one unfamiliar with the
subject and unaccustomed to it, and the pe-
culiar ways of allusions and displacements
(objectionable to the waking thoughts but
utilized by the dream-work) are explained, the
hearer experiences an uncomfortable impres-
sion; he declares these interpretations to be
*' witty," but it seems obvious to him that these
are not successful jokes but forced ones which
run contrary to the rules of wit. This impres-
sion can be easily explained; it is due to the
fact thai the dream-work operates with the
same means as wit, but in the application of
the same the dream exceeds the bounds which
wit restricts. We shall soon learn that in con-
sequence of the role of the third person wit
is boimd by a certain condition which does not
affect the dream.

THEOfiETICAi: PAET

Iromg—Negatidtm.

Among those techniques wfaidi are oommoo
to both wit and dreams representation through
the opposite and the apphestion of absurdity
are especially interesting. The first belongs
to the strongly effectire means of wit as shown
in the examples of "out-doing wit" (p. 98).
The representation through the opposite, un-
like most of the wit-techntques, is unable to
withdraw itself from conscious attention. He
who intentionally tries to make use of wit-
work, as in the case of the *' habitual wit," soon
discovers that the easiest way to answer an as-
sertion with a witticism is to conc«itrate one's
mind on the opposite of this assertitm and
trust to the chance flash of tbou^t to bnisfa
aside the feared objection to this opposite by
means of a different interpretation. Maybe
the representation through its opposite is in-
debted for such a preference to the fact that
it forms the nucleus of another pleasurable
mode of mental expression, for an understand-
ing of whidi we do not have to consult the un-
conscious. I refer to irony, which is very sim-
ilar to wit and is considered a sub-species of
the comic. The essence of irony consists in im-
parting the very opposite of what one intended
to express, but it precludes the anticipated

THE RELATION OF WIT

contradiction by indicating through the inflec-
tions, concomitant gestures, and through slight
changes in style — if it is done in writing — that
the speaker himself means to convey the op-
posite of what he says. Irony is applicable
only in cases where the other person is pre-
pared to hear the reverse of the statement
actually made, so that he cannot fail to be in-
clined to contradict. As a consequence of this
condition ironic expressions are particularly
subject to the danger of being misunderstood.
To the person who uses it, it gives the advan-
tage of readily avoiding the difficulties to which
direct expressions, as, for example, invectives,
are subject. In the hearer it produces comic
pleasure, probably by causing him to make
preparations for contradiction, which are im-
mediately foimd to be unnecessary. Such a
comparison of wit with a form of the comical
that is closely allied to it might strengthen us
in the assumption that the relation of wit to
the imconscious is the peculiarity that also dis-
tinguishes it from the comical.'

In dream-work, representation through the
opposite has a far more important part to play
than in wit. The dream not only delights in

' The character of the oomlcal which is refened la aa tt«
"drjneaa" also depends In the broadest sense npon the differen-
tiation of ttie things spoken fram the antics accompanying it.

«78 THEORETICAL PART

representing a pair of opposites by means of
one and the same composite image, but in ad-
dition it often changes an element from the
dream-thoughts into its opposite, thus causing
considerable difBculty in the work of interpre-
tation. In the case of any element capable of
having an opposite it is impossible to tell
whether it is to be taken negatively or posi-
tively in the dream-thoughts/

I must emphasize that as yet this fact has
by no means been understood. Nevertheless,
it seems to give indications of an important
characteristic of unconscious thinking which in
all probability results in a process comparable
to "judging." Instead of setting aside judg-
ments the unconscious forms " repressions."
The repression may correctly be described as
a stage intermediate between the defense re-
flex and condemnation.'

' Th» InttTpratatiim of Drtami, p. 99S.

*Thls Tciy remarkable and still inadequately understood be-
bATJor of antagonistic relationsiiipa is probably not without value
for the understanding of the symptom of negativism In neurotics
and in the insane. Cf. the two latest works on the subject: Bleu-
ler, " Über die negative Suggeatibilitüt," PiycÄ.-jVem-oi. (TocJUm-
tehrifC, ld(H, and Otto Groas'a Zur Differential diaffnollik n*ga~
tinittUchsr Phänomen«, also my review of the Oegetuinm dn
VneOTtt, In Jahrb. f. PäyehoMlyt» II, IDIO.

THE RELATION OF WIT 279

The Unconscious as the Psychic Stage of the
Wit-work

Nonsense, or absurdity, which occurs so
often in dreanis and which has made them the
object of so much contempt, has never really
come into being as the result of an accidental
shuffling of conceptual elements, but may in
every case be proven to have been purposely
admitted by the dream-work. Nonsense and
absurdity are intended to express embittered
criticism and scornful contradiction within the
dream-thoughts. Absurdity in the dream-con-
tent thus stands for the judgment: " It's pure
nonsense," expressed in dream-thoughts. In
my work on the Interpretation of Dreams,
I have placed great emphasis on the demon-
stration of this fact because I thought that I
could in this manner most strikingly contro-
vert the error expressed by many that the
dream is no psychic phenomenon at all — an
error which bars the way to an understanding
of the unconscious. Now we have learnt (in

I the analysis of certain tendency-witticisms on
p. 73) that nonsense in wit is made to serve
the same purposes of expression. We also
know that a nonsensical faj^ade of a witticism
is peculiarly adapted to enhance the psychic
expenditure in the hearer and hence also to in-

280

THEORETICAL PART

crease the amount to be discharged through
laughter. Moreover, we must not forget that
nonsense in wit is an end in itself, since the
purpose of reviving the old pleasure in non-
sense is one of the motives of the wit-work.
There are other ways to regain the feeling of
nonsense in order to derive pleasure from it;
caricature, exaggeration, parody, and travesty
utilize the same and thus produce " comical
nonsense." If we subject these modes of ex-
pression to an analysis similar to the one used
in studying wit, we shall find that there is no
occasion in any of them for resorting to un-
conscious processes in our sense for the pur-
pose of getting explanations. We are now
also in a position to understand why the
" witty " character may be added as an em-
bellishment to caricature, exaggeration, and
parody; it is the manifold character of the per-
formance upon the " psychic stage " ' that
makes this possible.

I am of the opinion that by transferring the
wit-work into the system of the unconscious we
have made a distinct gain, since it makes it pos-
sible for us to understand the fact that the
various techniques to which wit admittedly ad-
heres are on the other hand not its exclusive

' An expression of G. T. Fechner's whldi has «quired Bignifl-
cuice from the point of view of my coDceptlon.

THE RELATION OF WIT

property. Blany doubts, which have arisen in
the beginning of our investigation of these
techniques and which we were forced temporar-
ily to leave, can now be conveniently cleared
up. Hence we shall give due consideration to
the doubt which expresses itself by asserting
that the undeniable relation of wit to the un-
conscious is correct only for certain categories
of tendency-wit, while we are ready to claim
this relation for all forms and all the stages of
development of wit. We may not shirk the duty
of testing this objection.

We may assume that we deal with a sure
case of wit-formation in the unconscious when
it concerns witticisms that serve unconscious
tendencies, or those strengthened by uncon-
scious tendencies, as, for example, most " cyn-
ical " witticisms. For in such cases the un-
conscious tendency draws the foreconscious
thought down into the unconscious in order to
remodel it there; a process to which the study
of the psychology of the neuroses has added
many analogies with which we are acquainted.
But in the case of tendency-wit of other vari-
eties, namely, harmless wit and the jest, this
power seems to fall away, and the relation of
the wit to the unconscious is an open question.

But now let us consider the case of the witty
expression of a thought that is not without

282

THEORETICAL PART

value in itself and that comes to the surface in
the course of the association of mental
processes. In order that this thought may be-
come a witticism, it is of coiu-se necessary that
it make a choice among the possible forms of
expression in order to find the exact form that
will bring along the gain in word-pleasure.
We know from self-observation that this choice
is not made by conscious attention; but the
selection will certainly be better if the occu-
pation energy of the foreconscious thought is
lowered to the unconscious. For in the uncon-
scious, as we have learnt from the dream-work,
the paths of association emanating from a
word are treated on a par with associations
from objects. The occupation energj' from
the unconscious presents by far the more fa-
vorable conditions for the selection of the ex-
pression, Moreover, we may assume without
going farther that the possible expression
which contains the gain in word-pleasure exerts
a lowering effect on the still fluctuating self-
command of the foreconscious, similar to that
exerted in the first case by the unconscious
tendency. As an explanation for the simpler
case of the jest we may imagine that an ever-
watchful intention of attaining the gain in
word-pleasure seizes the opportunity offered
in the foreconscious of again drawing the in-

THE RELATION OF WIT

Testing energy down into the unconscious, ac-
cording to the famihar scheme.

I earnestly wish that it were possible for me
on the one hand to present one decisive point
in my conception of wit more clearly, and on
the other hand to fortify it with compelling
arguments. But as a matter of fact it is not
a question here of two failures, but of one
and the same failure. I can give no clearer
exposition because I have no further testimony
on behalf of my conception. The latter has
developed as the result of my study of the
technique and of comparison with dream-work,
and indeed from this one side only. I now
find that the dream-work is altogether excel-
lently adapted to the peculiarities of wit. This
conception is now concluded; if the conclusion
leads us not to a familiar province, but rather
to one that is strange and novel to our modes
of thought, the conclusion is called a " hy-
pothesis," and the relation of the hypothesis to
the material from which it is drawn is justly
not accepted as " proof." The hypothesis is
admitted as " proved " only if it can be reached
by other ways and if it can be shown to be the

I junction point for other associations. But
such proof, in view of the fact that our knowl-
edge of unconscious processes has hardly be-
gun, cannot be had. Realizing then that we are

S84 THEORETICAL PAET

on soil still virgin, we shall be content to pro-
ject from our viewpoint of observation one nar-
row slender plank into the unexplored region.
We shall not build a great structure on such
a foundation as this. If we correlate the dif-
ferent stages of wit to the mental dispositions
favorable to them we may say: The jest has
its origin in the happy mood; what seems to
be peculiar to it is an inclination to lower the
psychic static energies (Besetzungen). The
jest already makes use of all the characteristic
techniques of wit and satisfies the fundamental
conditions of the same through the choice of
such an assortment of words or mental associa-
tions as will conform not only to the require-
ments for the production of pleasure, but also
conform to the demands of the intelligent critic.
We shall conclude that the sinking of the men-
tal energy to the unconscious stage, a process
facilitated by the happy mood, has already
taken place in the case of the jest. The mood
does away with this requirement in the case of
harmless wit connected with the expression of
a valuable thought; here we must assume a
particular personal adaptation which finds it as
easy to come to expression as it is for the fore-
conscious thought to sink for a moment into
the unconscious. An ever watchful tendency
to renew the original resultant pleasure of wit

I
I
I

THE RELATION OF WIT

exerts thereby a lowering effect upon the still
fluctuating foreconscious expression of the
thought. Most people are probably capable of
making jests when in a happy mood; aptitude
for joking independent of the mood is found
only in a few persons. Finally, the most pow-
erful incentive for wit-work is the presence of
strong tendencies which reach back into the un-
conscious and which indicate a particular fit-
ness for witty productions; these tendencies
might explain to us why the subjective condi-
tions of wit are so frequently fulfilled in the
case of neurotic persons. Even the most in-
apt person may become witty under the influ-
ence of strong tendencies.

Differences Between Wit and Dreams

This last contribution, the explanation of
wit-work in the first person, though still hy-
pothetical, strictly speaking, ends our interest
in wit. There still remains a short comparison
of wit to the more familiar dream and we may
expect that, outside of the one agreement al-
ready considered, two such diverse mental ac-
tivities should show nothing but differences.
The most important difference lies in their so-
cial behavior. The dream is a perfectly asocial
psychic product. It has nothing to tell to any-

»86

THEORETICAL PART

one else, having originated in an individual as
a compromise between conflicting psychic
forces it remains incomprehensible to the per-
son himself and has therefore altogetlier no
interest for anybody else. Not only does the
dream find it unnecessary to place any value
on intelligibleness, but it must even guard
against being understood, as it would then be
destroyed; it can only exist in disguised form.
For this reason the dream may make use
freely of the mechanism that controls uncon-
scious thought processes to the extent of pro-
ducing undecipherable disfigurements. Wit, on
the other hand, is the most social of all those
psychic functions whose aim is to gain pleas-
ure. It often requires three persons, and the
psychic process which it incites always requires
the participation of at least one other person.
It must therefore bind itself to the condition
of intelligibleness; it may employ disfigiu-e-
ment made practicable in the unconscious
through condensation and displacement, to no
greater extent than can be deciphered by the
intelligence of the third person. As for the
rest, wit and dreams have developed in alto-
gether different spheres of the psychic life, and
are to be classed under widely separated cate-
gories of the psychological system. No matter
how concealed the dream is still a wish, while

I
I

THE RELATION OF WIT 287

■wit is a developed play. Despite its apparent
unreality the dream retains its relation to the
great interests of life; it seeks to supply what
is lacking through a regressive detour of hal-
lucinations; and it owes its existence solely to
the strong need for sleep during the night.
Wit, on the other hand, seeks to draw a small
amount of pleasure from the free and unen-
cumbered activities of our psychic apparatus,
and later to seize this pleasure as an incidental
gain. It thus secondarily reaches to important
functions relative to the outer world. The
dream serves preponderately to guard from
pain while wit serves to acquire pleasure; in
these two aims all our psychic activities meet.

VIT AND THE TABIOUS FO&MS OF THE COM

We have approached the problems of
comic in an unusual manner. It appeared to usi
that wit, which is usually regarded as a sub-1
species of the comic, offered enough peculiarities
to warrant our taking it directly under consid-
eration, and thus it came about that we avoided .
discussing its relation to the more comprehen-J
sive category of the comic as long as it waal
possible to do so, yet we did not proceed with- 1
out picking up on the way some hints that 1
might be valuable for studying the comic. We I
found it easy to ascertain that the comic differs I
from wit in its social behavior. The comic can I
be content with only two persons, one who
finds the comical, and one in whom it is found.
The third person to whom the comical may be
imparted reinforces the comic process, but adda«
nothing new to it. In wit, however, this third]
person is indispensable for the completion c^l
the pleasure-bearing process, while the second I
person may be omitted, especially when it
not a question of aggressive wit with a tend<*|

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 289

ency. Wit is made, while the comical is found;
it is found first of all in persons, and only
later by transference may be seen also in ob-
jects, situations, and the like. We know, too,
in the case of wit that it is not strange per-
sons, but one's own mental processes that con-
tain the sources for the production of pleas-
ure. In addition we have heard that wit oc-
casionally reopens inaccessible sources of the
comic, and that the comic often serves wit as
a facade to replace the fore-pleasure usually
produce by the well-known technique (p.
236). All of this does not really point to a
very simple relationship between wit and the
comic. On the other hand, the problems of the
comic have shown themselves to be so compli-
cated, and have until now so successfully de-
fied all attempts made by the philosophers to
solve them, that we have not been able to
justify the expectation of mastering it by a
sudden stroke, so to speak, even if we approach
it along the paths of wit. Incidentally we
came provided with an instrument for investi-
gating wit that had not yet been made use of
by others; namely, the knowledge of dream-
work. We have no similar advantage at our
disposal for comprehending the comic, and we
may therefore expect that we shall learn noth-
ing about the nature of the comic other than

290 THEOEETICAL PART

that which we have already become aware of
in wit; in so far as wit belongs to the comic
and retains certain features of the same un-
changed or modified in its own nature.

The Naive

The species of the comic that is most closely
allied to wit is the naive. Like the comic the
naive is found universally and is not made like
in the case of wit. The naive cannot be made
at all, while in the case of the pure comic the
question of making or evoking the comical may
be taken into account. The naive must re-
sult without our intervention from the speech
and actions of other persons who take the place
of the second person in the comic or in wit.
The naive originates when one puts himself
completely outside of inhibition, because it
does not exist for him; that is, if he seems to
overcome it without any efi'ort. What condi-
tions the function of the naive is the fact that
we are aware that the person does not possess
this inhibition, otherwise we should not call it
naive but impudent, and instead of laughing
we should be indignant. The effect of the
naive, which is irresistible, seems easy to under-
stand. An expenditure of that inhibition en-
ergy which is commonly already formed in us

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC «fll

suddenly becomes inapplicable when we hear
the naive and is discharged through laughter;
as the removal of the inhibition is direct, and
not the result of an incited operation, there is
no need for a suspension of attention. We be-
have like the hearer in wit, to whom the econ-
omy of inhibition is given without any eflfort
on his part.

In view of the understanding about the
genesis of inhibitions which we obtained while
tracing the development of play into wit, it
will not surprise us to learn that the naive is
mostly found in children, although it may also
be observed in uneducated adults, whom we
look on as children as far as their intellectual
development is concerned. For the purposes
of comparison with wit, naive speech is nat-
urally better adapted than naive actions, for
speech and not actions are the usual forms of
expression employed by wit. It is significant,
however, that naive speeches, such as those of
children, can without straining also be desig-
nated as " naive witticisms." The points of
agreement as well as demonstration between
wit and naivete will become clear to us upon
consideration of a few examples.'

A little girl of three years was accustomed
to hear from her German nurse the exclamatory

' Given by Translator.

898

THEORETICAL PART

word "Geaundkett" (God Mesa you!; liter-
ally, may you be healthy!) whenever she hap-
pened to sneeze. While sufering from a se-
vere cold during which the profuse coughing
and sneezing caused her considerable pain, she
pointed to her chest and said to her father,
" Daddy, Gesundheit hurts."

Another little girl of four years heard her
parents refer to a Jewish acquaintance as a
Hebrew, and on later hearing the latter's wife
referred to as Mrs. X, she corrected her
mother, saying, " No, that is not her name; if
her husband is a Hebrew she is a Shehretc."

In the first example the wit is produced
through the use of a contiguous association in
the form of an abstract thought for the con-
crete action. The child so often heard the
word " Gesundheit " associated with sneezing
that she took it for the act itself. While the
second example may be designated as word-
wit formed by the technique of sound similar-
ity. The child divided the word Hebrew into
He-brew and having been taught the genders
of the personal pronouns, she naturally
imagined that if the man is a He-brew his wife
must be a She-brew. Both examples could
have originated as real witticisms upon which
we would have unwillingly bestowed a little
mild laughter. But as examples of naivet6

I
I

^H nui

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 293

they seem excellent and cause loud laughter.
But what is it here that produces the difference
between wit and naivete? Apparently it is
neither the wording nor the technique, which is
the same for both wit and the naive, but a fac-
tor which at first sight seems remote from both.
It is simply a question whether we assume that
the speakers had the intention of making a wit-
ticism or whether we assume that they — the
children — wished to draw an earnest conclusion,
a conclusion held in good faith though based
on imcorrected knowledge. Only the latter
case is one of naivete. It is here that our at-
tention is first called to the mechanism in which
the second person places himself into the psy-
chic process of the person who produces the
wit.

The investigation of a third example will
confirm this opinion. A brother and a sister,
the former ten and the latter twelve years old,
produce a play of their own composition before
an audience of uncles and aunts. The scene
represents a hut on the seashore. In the first
act the two dramatist-actors, a poor fisherman
and his devoted wife, complain about the hard
times and the difficulty of getting a Uvelihood.
The man decides to sail over the wide ocean
in his boat in order to seek wealth elsewhere,
and after a touching farewell the curtain is

89* THEORETICAL PART

drawn. The second act takes place several
years later. The fisherman has come home
rich with a big bag of money and tells his wif^
whom he finds waiting in front of the hut,
what good luck he has had in the far countries.
His wife interrupts him proudly, saying: " Nor
have I been idle in the meanwhile," and opens
the hut, on whose floor the fisherman sees
twelve large dolls representing children asleep.
At this point of the drama the performers
were interrupted by an outburst of laughter
on the part of the audience, a thing which they
could not imderstand. They stared dum-
founded at their dear relatives, who had thus
far behaved respectably and had listened at-
tentively. The explanation of this laughter
lies in the assumption on the part of the audi-
ence that the young dramatists know nothing
as yet about the origin of children, and were
therefore in a position to believe that a wife
would actually boast of bearing offspring
during the prolonged absence of her husband,
and that the husband would rejoice with her
over it. But the results achieved by the dram-
atists on the basis of this ignorance may be
designated as nonsense or absurdity.

These examples show that the naive occu-
pies a position midway between wit and the
comic. As far as wording and contents are

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 295

concerned, the naive speech is identical with
wit; it produces a misuse of words, a bit of
nonsense, or an obscenity. But the psychic
process of the first person or producer which,
in the case of wit, offered us so much that was
interesting and puzzling, is here entirely ab-
sent. The naive person imagines that he is
using his thoughts and expressions in a simple
and normal manner; he has no other purpose
in view, and receives no pleasure from his
naive production. All the characteristics of
the naive lie in the conception of the hearer,
who corresponds to the third person in the case
of wit. The producing person creates the
naiive without any effort. The complicated
technique, which in wit serves to paralj^e the
inhibition produced by the critical reason, does
not exist here, because the person does not pos-
sess this inhibition, and he can therefore read-
ily produce the senseless and the obscene with-
out any compromise. The naive may be added
to the realm of wit if it comes into existence
after the important function of the censor, as
observed in the formula for wit-formation, has
been reduced to zero.

If the affective determination of wit con-
sists in the fact that both persons should be
subject to about the same inhibitions or inner
resistances, we may say now that the determina-

THEORETICAL PAET

tion of the naive consists in the fact that one
person should have inhibitions which the other
lacks. It is the person provided with inhibi-
tions who understands the naive, and it is he
alone who gains the pleasure produced by the
naive. We can easily understand that this
pleasure is due to the removal of inhibitions.
Since the pleasure of wit is of the same origin
— a kernel of word-pleasure and nonsense-
pleasure, and a shell of removal- and release-
pleasure, — the similarity of this connection to
the inhibition thus determines the inner rela-
tionship between the naive and wit. In both
cases pleasure results from the removal of in-
ner inhibitions. But the psychic process of the
recipient person (which in the naive regularly
corresponds with our ego, whereas in wit we
may also put ourselves in place of the produo
ing person) is by as much more complicated in
the case of the naive as it is simpler in the pro--
ducing person in wit. For one thing, the
naive must produce the same effect upon the
receiving person as wit does, this may be fully
confirmed by our examples, for just as in wit
the removal of the censor has been made pos-
sible by the mere effort of hearing the naive.
But only a part of the pleasure created by the
naive admits of this explanation, in other case»
of naiVe utterances, even this portion would I

ion would ba

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 297

endangered, as, for example, while listening to
naive obscenities. We would react to a naifve
obscenity with the same indignation felt to-
ward a real obscenity, were it not for the fact
that another factor saves us from this indigna-
tion and at the same time furnishes the more
important part of the pleasure derived from
the naive.

This other factor is the result of the condi-
tion mentioned before, namely, that in order to
recognize the naive we have to be cognizant of
the fact that there are no inner inhibitions in
tiie producing person. It is only ■ when this is
assured that we laugh instead of being indig-
nant. Hence we take into consideration the
psychic state of the producing person; we
imagine ourselves in this same psychic state
and endeavor to understand it by comparing
it to our own. This putting ourselves into the
psychic state of the producing person and com-
paring it with our own results in an economy
of expenditure which we discharge through
laughing.

We might prefer the simpler explanation,
namely, that when we reflect that the person
has no inhibition to overcome our indignation
becomes superfluous; the laughing therefore
results at the cost of economized indignation.
In order to avoid this conception, which is, in

S98 THEORETICAL PART

general, misleading, I shall distinguisH man
sharply between two cases that I had treat«
as one in the above discussion. The naive, as
it appears to us, may either he in the nature
of a witticism, as in our example, or an obscen-
ity, or of anything generally objectionablea
which becomes especially evident if the uain
is expressed not in speech but in action,
This latter case is really misleading; foa
it might lead one to assume that the pleaaJ
ure originated from the economized and tran
formed indignation. The first case is the
laminating one. The naive speech in the ex«|
ample " Hebrew " can produce the effect of i
light witticism and give no cause for indig
tion; it is certainly the more rare, or the men
pure and by far the more instructive case,
so far as we think thai the child took the sylla-
ble " he " in " Hebrew " seriously, and without
any additional reason identified it with the
masculine personal pronoun, the increase ii|
pleasxu-e as a result of hearing it has no longea
anything to do with the pleasure of the wit^
We shall now consider what has been $ai(|
from two viewpoints, first how it came int(
existence in the mind of the child, and
ondiy, how it would occur to us. In foUow«|
ing this comparison we find that the child 1
discovered an identity and has overcome

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 299

riers which exist in us, and by continuing still
further it may express itself as follows: "If
you wish to understand what you have heard,
you may save yourself the expenditure neces-
sary for holding these barriers in place." The
expenditure which became freed by this com-
parison is the source of pleasure in the naive,
and is discharged through laughter; to be sure,
it is the same expenditure which we would
have converted into indignation if our under-
standing of the producing person, and in this
case the nature of his utterance, had not pre-
cluded it. But if we take the case of the naive
joke as a model for the second case, viz., the
objectionable naive, we shall see that here, too,
the economy in inhibition may originate di-
rectly from the comparison. That is, it is un-
necessary for us to assume an incipient and
then a strangulated indignation, an indigna-
tion corresponding to a different application of
the freed expenditure, against which, in the
case of wit, complicated defensive mechanisms
were required.

Source of Comic Pleasure in the Naive
This comparison and this economy of ex-
penditure that occur as the result of putting
one's self into the psychic process of the pro-
ducing person can have an important bearing

800 THEORETICAL PART

on the naiVe only if they do not belong to the ]
naive alone. As a matter <
that this mechanism which is so completely
foreign to wit is a part — perhaps the essential
part — of the psychic process of the comic
This aspect — it is perhaps the most
portant aspect of the naive — thus repre- '
sents the naive as a form of the comic
Whatever is added to the wit-pleasure by the
naive speeches in our examples is " comical "
pleasure. Concerning the latter we might be I
inclined to make a general assumption that '
this pleasure originates through an economized
expenditure by comparing the utterance of
some one else with our own. But since we are
here in the presence of very broad views
shall first conclude our consideration of the 1
naive. Tlie naive would thus be a form of the
comic, in so far as its pleasure originates from
the difference in expenditure which results in
our effort to understand the other person; and
it resembles wit through the condition that the
expenditure saved by the comparison must be
an inhibition expenditure.'

» I have everywhere Identified the naive with the nalre-comt^
a practice which is certainly not permissible iu all caaes. But
it is sufficient for our purposes to study llie characteristics of the
naive as exhibiled by the " naive joke" and the " naive obscenity.*
It Is onr intentloD to proceed from here with the ii
the Dstuie of Uk comic.

il
I

the inveaUgaUon of -^H

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 801

Before concluding we shall rapidly point out
a few agreements and differences between the
conceptions at which we have just arrived and
those that have been known for a long time
in the psychology of the comic. The putting
one's self into the psychic process of another
and the desire to understand him is obviously
nothing else than the " comic burrowing "
{komisches Leihen) which has played a part
in the analysis of the comic ever since the time
of Jean Paul; tbe " comparing " of the psychic
process of another with our own corresponds
to a " psychological contrast," for which wc here
at last find a place, after we did not know
what to do with it in wit. But in our ex-
planation of comic pleasure we take issue with
many authors who contend that this pleasure
originates through the fluctuation of our atten-
tion to and fro between contrasting ideas.
We are unable to see how such a mechanism
could protluce pleasure, and we point to the
fact that in the comparing of contrasts there
results a difference in expenditure which, if
not used for anything else, becomes capable of
discharge and hence a source of pleasure.'

'Also Bergson (Lavghler, An essay on (he Meaning of the
Comic, translated by Brrreton and Rothwell, The Maemillan Co.,
191*) rejects with sound arguments this sort of explanation of
comic pleasure, which has unmislakabljr been Influenced by the
effort to create an analogy to the laughing of a person tickled.

SOS THEORETICAL PART

It is with misgiving only that we approad
the problem of the comic. It would be pre-
sumptuous to expect from our efforts any de-
cisive contribution to the solution of this problem-l
after the works of a large number of excellen
thinkers have not resulted in an explanatia
that is in every respect satisfactory. As a mat-
ter of fact, we intend simply to follow out into '
the province of the comic certain observations
that have been found valuable in the study of wit.

Occurrence and Origin of the Comic

The comical appears primarily as an
tentional discovery in the social relations
human beings. It is found in persons, that 'laM
in their movements, shapes, actions, and chai
acteristic traits. In the beginning it is found '
probably only in their psychical peculiarities
and later on in their mental qualities, especially
in the expression of these latter. Even an
and inanimate objects become comical .
result of a widely used method of personifica-
tion. However, the comical can be considered
apart from the person in whom it is found, if _
the conditions under which a person

The explanation of comic pleasure hy Llpps which might, I
connection with his conception of the comic, be represented u ■
1 trifle^" is of an entirely different nature.

ipecially
animal^l
as th^

I
I

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 303

comical can be discerned. Thus arises the com-
ical situation, and this knowledge enables us
to make a person comical at will by putting
him into situations in which the conditions nec-
essary for the comic are bound up with his ac-
tions. The discovery that it is in our power to
make another person comical opens the way to
unsuspected gains in comic pleasure, and forms
the foundation of a highly developed tech-
nique. It is also possible to make one's self
just as comical as others. The means which
serve to make a person comical are trans-
ference into comic situations, imitations, dis-
guise, unmasking, caricature, parody travesty,
and the like. It is quite evident that these
techniques may enter into the service of hostile
or aggressive tendencies. A person may be
made comical in order to render him contemp-
tible or in order to deprive him of his claims
to dignity and authority. But even if such a
purpose were regularly at the bottom of all at-
tempts to make a person comical tliis need not
necessarily be the meaning of the spontaneous
comic.

As a result of this superficial survey of the
manifestations of the comic we can readily see
that the comic originates from wide-spread
sources, and that conditions so specialized as
those found in the naive cannot be expected

SM THEORETICAL PART

in the ease of the comic. In order to gel ;
clue to tbe conditions that are applicable t
the comic the selection of the first example i
most important, ~^^'e will examine first the
comic movement because we remember that
the most primitive stage performance, the
pantomime, uses this means to make us laugh.
The answer to the question, ^^^IJ■ do we laugh
at the actions of clowns? would be that they
appear to us immoderate and inappropriate;
that is, we really laugh over the excessive ex-
penditure of energy. Let us look for tha
same condition outside of the manufactured
comic, that is, under circumstances where
may unintentionally be found. The child's
motions do not appear to us comical, even if i
jumps and fidgets, but it is comical to see i
little boy or girl follow with the tongue the
movement of his pen-holder when he is trying
to master the art of writing; we see in these
additional motions a superfluous expenditure^
of energy which under similar conditions
should save. In the same way we find it com-
ical to see unnecessary motions or evai
marked exaggeration of expressive motions in
adults. Among the genuinely comic cases we
might mention the motions made by tbe bowler
after he has released the ball while he is fol-
lowing its course as though he were stiU ablfi

I
I
I

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 80S

to control it; all grimaces which exaggerate
the normal expression of the emotions are com-
ical, even if they are involuntary, as in the
case of persons suffering from St. Vitus'
dance (chorea) ; the impassioned movements
of a modern orchestra leader will appear com-
ical to every unmusical person, who cannot
imderstand why they are necessary. Indeed,
the comic element found in bodily shapes and
physiognomy is a branch of the comic of motion,
in that they are conceived as though they were
the result of motion that either has been carried
too far or is purposeless. Wide exposed eyes,
a crook-shaped nose bent towards the mouth,
handle-like ears, a hunch back, and all similar
physical defects probably produce a comical
impression only in so far as the movements
that would be necessary to produce these
features are imagined, whereby the nose and
other parts of the body are pictured as more
movable than they actually are. It is cer-
tainly comical if some one can *' wiggle his
ears," and it would undoubtedly be a great
deal more comical if he could raise and lower
his nose. A large part of the comical impression
that animals make upon us is due to the fact that
we perceive in them movements which we cannot
imitate.

THEORETICAL PAST

Comic of Motion

Sut bow does it come about that we laugh
as soon as we hare recognized that the actions
of some one else are immoderate and inap-
propriate? I believe that we laugh because we
compare the motions obseired in others with
those which we ourselves should produce if we
were in their place. The two persons must
naturally be compared in accordance with the
same standard, but this standard is my own
innervation expenditure connected with my
idea of motion in the one case as well as the
other. This assertion is in need of discussion
and amplification.

What we are here putting into juxtaposition
is, on the one hand, the psychic expenditure of
a given idea, and on the other hand, the con-
tent of this idea. We maintain that the
former is not primarily and principally inde-
pendent of the latter — the content of the
idea — particularly because the idea of some-
thing great requires a larger expenditure
than the idea of something small. As long as
we are concerned only with the idea of differ-
ent coarse movements we shall encounter no
difficulties in the theoretical determination of
our thesis or in establishing its proof through
observation. It will be shown that in this case

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 307

an attribute of the idea actually coincides with
an attribute of the object conceived, although
psychology warns us of confusions of this sort.

I obtain an idea of a definite coarse move-
ment by performing this motion or by imitat-
ing it, and in so doing I set a standard for
this motion in ray feelings of innervation.'

Now if I perceive a similar more or less
coarse motion in some one else, the surest way
to the understanding — to apperception — of the
same is to carry it out imitatively and the com-
parison will then enable me to decide in which
motion I expended more energy. Such an im-
pulse to imitate certainly arises on perceiving
a movement. But in reality I do not carry
out the imitation any more than I still spell
out words simply because I have learnt to read
by means of spelling. Instead of imitating the
movement by my muscles I substitute the idea
of the same through my memory traces of the
expenditures necessary for similar motions.
Perceiving, or " tliinking," differs above all

* The recollection of this innervation expenditure will remalii
the essential part of the idea of this motion, and there will
always be mcthoda of thoupht In my psychic life in which the
Idea will be represented by nothing eUe than this expenditure.
In other conneclions a substitute for tliis element may possibly
be put in the form of other ideas, for instance the visual idea
of the object of the motion, or it may be put in the form of the
word-idea; and in certain types of abstract thought « aign tn-
Etead of the foU content itself may suffice.

808 THEORETICAL PABT ^^H

from acting or carrying out tilings by the fact 1
that it entails a very much smaller displace-
ment of energj' and keeps the main expendi-
ture from being discharged. But how is the ,
quantitative factor, the more or less big ele-
ment of the movement perceived, given ex-
pression in the idea? And if the representa- '
tion of the quantity is left off from the idea that
is composed of qualities, how am I to difiFer-
entiate the ideas of different big movements,
how am I to compare them?

Here, physiology shows the way in that it [
teaches us that even while an idea is in the
process of conception innervations proceed to |
the muscles, which naturally represent only a i
moderate expenditure, It is now easy to as-
sume that this expenditure of innervation
which accompanies the conception of the idea
is utilized to represent the quantitative factor
of the idea, and that when a great motion is
imagined it is greater than it would be in the
case of a small one. The conception of greater
motions would thus actually be greater, that
is, it would be a conception accompanied by
greater expenditure.

Ideational Mimicry

Observation shows directly that human be-
ings are in the habit of expressing the big and 1

I
I

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 309

small things in their ideation content by means
of a manifold expenditure or by means of a
sort of ideational mimicry.

When a child or a person of the common
people or one belonging to a certain race im-
parts or depicts something, one can easily ob-
serve tiiat he is not content to make his ideas
intelligible to the hearer through the choice of
correct words alone, but that he also repre-
sents the contents of the same through his ex-
pressive motions. Thus he designates the
quantities and intensities of " a high moun-
tain " by raising his hands over his head, and
those of " a little dwarf " by lowering his
hand to the ground. If he broke himself of
the habit of depicting with his hands, he would
nevertheless do it with his voice, and if He
should also control his voice, one may be sure
that in picturing something big he would dis-
tend his eyes, and describing something httle
he would press his eyes together. It is not liis
own affects that he thus expresses, but it is
really the content of what he imagines.

Shall we now assume that this need for
mimicry is first aroused through the demand
for imparting, whereas a good part of this
manner of representation still escapes the at-
tention of the hearer? I rather believe that this
mimicry, though less vivid, exists even if all

«0 THEOHETICAI, PART

imparting is left out of the question, that Ä
coiues about when the person imagines for
himself alone, or thinks of something in a
graphic manner; that then such a person, just
as in talking, expresses through his body the
idea of big and small which manifests itself at
least through a change of innervation in the
facial expressions and sensory organs. Indeed,
I can imagine that the bodily innervation
which is consensual to the content of the idea
conceived is the beginning and origin of mim*
icry for purposes of communication. For, in
order to be in a position to serve this purpose,
it is only necessary to increase it and make it
conspicuous to the other. Wlien I take the
view that this " expression of the ideation con-
tent " should be added to the expression of the
emotions, which are known as a physical by-
effect of psychic processes, I am well aware
that my observations which refer to the eate*
gory of the big and small do not exhaust
the subject. I myself could add still other
things, even before reaching to the phenom-
enon of tension through which a person
physically indicates the accumulation of his at-
tention and the niveau of abstraction upon
which his thoughts happen to rest. I maintain
that this subject is very important, and I be-
lieve that tracing the ideation mimicry in other

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 311

fields of esthetics would be just as useful for
the understanding of the comic as it is here.

To return to tlie comic movement, I repeat
that with the perception of a certain motion
the impulse to conceive it will be given through
a certain expenditure. In the " desire to
imderstand," in the apperception of this move-
ment I produce a certain expenditure, and I
behave in this part of the psychic process just
as if I put myself in the place of the person
observed. Simultaneously I probably grasp
the aim of the motion, and through former ex-
periences I am able to estimate the amount of
expenditure necessary to attain this aim. I
thereby drop out of consideration the person
observed and behave as if I myself wished to
attain the aim of the motion. These two idea-
tional possibilities depend on a comparison of
the motion observed with my own inhibited
motion. In the case of an immoderate or inap-
propriate movement on the part of the other,
r my greater expenditure for understanding be-
I €X)mes inhibited statu nascendi during the mob-
ilization as it were, it is declared superfluous
and stands free for further use or for dis-
charge through laughing. If other favorable
conditions supervened this would be the na-
ture of the origin of pleasure in comic move-
ment, — an innervation expenditure which.

SJ2 THEORETICAL PART

when compared with one's own motion, bfr
comes an inapplicable surplus.

Comparison of Two Kinds of Expenditure
Pleasure-sources

We now note that we must continue our
discussion by following two different paths;
■first, to determine the conditions for the dis-
charge of the surplus; secondly, to test
whether the other cases of the comic can
conceived similarly to our conception of comic
motion.

We shall turn first to the latter task axA
after considering comic movement and actioii
we shall turn to the comic found in the psy^
chic activities and peculiarities of others.

As an example of this kind we may
sider the comical nonsense produced by
norant students at examinations; it is more dif-
ficult, however, to give a simple example
the peculiarities. We must not be confused
by the fact that nonsense and foolishness whidi
so often act in a comical manner are neverthe-
less not perceived as comical in all cases, just
as the same things which once made us laugh
because they seemed comical later may appear
to us contemptible and hateful. This fai
which we must not forget to take into accou

THE VARIOUS FOEMS OF THE COMIC 313

seems only to show that besides the comparison
familiar to us other relations come into con-
sideration for the comic effect, — conditions
which we can investigate in other connections.
The comic found in the mental and psychic
attributes of another person is apparently
again the result of a comparison between him
and my own ego. But it is remarkable that it
is a comparison which mostly furnishes the
result opposite to that obtained through comic
movement and action. In the latter case it is
comical if the other person assumes a greater
expenditure than I believe to be necessary for
me; in the case of psychic activity it is just
the reverse, it is comical if the other person
economizes in expenditure, which I consider
indispensable; for nonsense and foolishness are
nothing but inferior activities. In th^ first
case I laugh because he makes it too difficult
for himself, and in the latter case because he
makes it too easy for himself. In the case of
the comic eflfect it seems to be a question only
of the difference between the two energy ex-
penditures — the one of " feeling one's self into
something" (Einfühlung) — and the other of
the ego — and it makes no difference in whose
favor this difference inclines, Tliis peculiarity,
which at first confuses our judgment, disap-
pears, however, when we consider that it is in

914 THEORETICAL PART

accord with our personal development towards
a higher stage of culture, to limit our muscular
work and increase our mental work. By
heightening our mental expenditure we pro-
duce a diminution of motion expenditure for
the same activity. Our machines bear witness
to this cultural success.'

Thus it coincides with a uniform understand-
ing that that person appears comical to us who
puts forth too much expenditure in his psychical
activities and too little in his mental activities;
and it cannot be denied that in both cases our
laughing is the expression of a pleasurably
perceived superiority which we adjudge to
ourselves in comparison with him. If the re-
lation in both cases becomes reversed, that is,
if the somatic expenditure of the other is less
and the psychic expenditure greater, then we
no longer laugh, but are struck with amaze-
ment and admiration.^

Comic of Situation.

The origin of the comic pleasure discussed here, I
that is, the origin of such pleasure in a com- |

'"What one has not in his head," as the saying goes, "hs I
must have in his legs."

' The problem has been greatly confused by the general condi-
tions determining the comic, whereby the comic pleasure Is s
to have its source now in a too-muchness and now Id • not- 1
cnougbness.

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S15

parison of the other person with one's own self
in respect to the difference I)etween the iden-
tification expenditure {Einfühlungsaufwand)
and normal expenditure — is genetically proba-
bly the most important. It is certain, however,
that it is not the only one. We have learned
before to disregard any such comparison be-
tween the other person and one's self, and to
obtain the pleasure-bringing difference from
one side only, either from identification, or
from the processes in one's own ego, proving
thereby that the feeling of superiority bears
no essential relations to comic pleasure. A
comparison is indispensable, however, for the
origin of this pleasure, and we find this com-
parison between two energy expenditures
which rapidly follow each other and refer to
the same function. It is produced either in
ourselves by way of identification with the
other, or we find it without any identification
in our own psychic processes. The first case,
in which the other person still plays a part,
though he is not compared with ourselves, re-
sults when the pleasure-producing difference
of energy expenditures comes into existence
through outer influences which we can compre-
hend as a " situation," for which reason this
species of comic is also called the " comic of
situation." The peculiarities of the person who

816

THEORETICAL PART

furnishes the comic do not here come into es-
sential consideration; we laugh when we admit
to ourselves that had we been placed in the
same situation we should have done the same
thing. Here we draw the comic from the re-
lation of the individual to the often all-loo-
powerful outer world, which is represented in
the psychic processes of the individual by the
conventions and necessities of society, and evea
by his bodily needs, A typical example of the
latter is when a person engaged in an activity,
which claims all his psychic forces, is suddenly
disturbed by a pain or excremental need. The
opposite case which furnishes us the comic
difference through identification, lies between
the great interest which existed before the
disturbance occiu-red and the minimum left
for his psychic activity after the disturb-
ance made its appearance. The person who
furnishes us this difference again become»
comical through inferioritj'; but he is only in-
ferior in comparison with his former ego and
not in comparison with us, for we know that
in a similar case we could not have behaved
diflFerently. It is remarkable, however, that
we find this inferiority of the person only in
the case where we " feel ourselves " into some
one, that is, we can only find it comical in the
other, whereas we ourselves are conscious only

I
I
I

THE VARIOUS FOEMS OF THE COMIC 817

of painful emotions when such or similar em-
barrassments happen to us. It is by keeping
away the painful from our own person that we
are probably first enabled to enjoy as pleas-
urable the difference which resulted from the
comparison of the changing energy.

Comic of Expectation

The other source of the comic, which we find
in our own changes of investing energy, lies
in our relations to the future, which we are
accustomed to anticipate through our ideas of
expectation. I assume that a quantitatively
determined expenditure underlies our every
idea of expectation, which in case of disap-
pointment becomes diminished by a certain dif-
ference, and I again refer to the observations
made before concerning " ideational mimicry."
But it seems to me easier to demonstrate
the real mobilized psychic expenditure for the
cases of expectation. It is well known con-
cerning a whole series of cases that the mani-
festation of expectation is formed by motor
preliminaries; this is first of all true of cases
in which the expected events make demands
on my motility, and these preparations are
quantitatively determinable without anything
further. If I am expecting to catch a ball

81S THEORETICAL PART

thrown at me, I put my body in states of ten- 1
sion in order to enable me to withstand the I
collision with the ball, and the superfluous mo- 1
tions wliich I make if the ball turns out to bei
light make me look comical to tlie spectators, !
I allowed myself to be misled by the expecta-J
tion to exert an immoderate expenditure of I
motion. A similar thing happens if, for exam-|
pie, I lift out a basket of fruit which I took I
to be heavy but which was hollow and formed!
out of wax in order to deceive me. By its up*:!
ward jerk my arm betrays the fact that I have!
prepared a superfluous innervation for thisfl
purpose and hence I am laughed at. In factj
there is at least one case in which the expecta-
tion expenditure can be directly demonstrated I
by means of physiological experimentation with!
animals. In Pawlof's experiments with sali- J
vary secretions of dogs who, provided with sali- 1
vary fistulse, are shown different kinds of food, i
it is noticed that the amount of saliva secreted J
through the fistuls depends on whether the 1
conditions of the experiment have strengthened!
or disappointed the dogs' expectation to
fed with the food shown them.

Even where the thing expected lays claimafl
enJy to my sensory organs, and not to my mo- 1
tility, I may assume that the expectation mani^l
fests itself in a certain motor emanation t

I
I

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 319

ing tension of the senses, and I may even con-
ceive the suspension of attention as a motor
activity which is equivalent to a certain amount
of expenditure. Moreover, I can presuppose
that the preparatory activity of expectation
is not independent of the amount of the ex-
pected impression, but that I represent mim-
ically the bigness and smallness of the same
by means of a greater or smaller preparatory
expenditure, just as in the case of imparting
something and in the case of thinking when
there is no expectation. The expectation ex-
penditure naturally will be composed of many
components, and also for my disappointment
diverse factors will come into consideration; it
is not only a question whether the realized
event is perceptibly greater or smaller than the
expected one, but also whether the expectation
is worthy of the great interest which I had of-
fered for it. In this manner I am instructed
to consider, besides the expenditure for the
representation of bigness and smallness (the
conceptual mimicry), also the expenditure for
the tension of attention {expectation expendi-
ture), and in addition to these two expendi-
tures there is in all cases the abstraction ex-
penditure. But these other forms of expendi-
ture can easily be reduced to the one of big-
ness and smallness, for what we call more in-

THEORETICAL PART

teresting, more sublime, and even more ab-
stract, are only particularly qualified special
cases of what is greater. Let us add to this
that, among other things, Lipps holds that the
quantitative, not the qualitative, contrast is
primarily the source of comic pleasure, and we
shall be altogether content to have chosen the
comic element of motion as the starting-point
of our investigation.

In working out Kant's thesis, " The comic
is an expectation dwindled into nothing,"
Lipps made the attempt in his book, often
cited here, to trace the comic pleasure alto-
gether to expectation. Despite the many in-
structive and valuable results which this at-
tempt brought to light I should like to agree
with the criticism expressed by other authors,
namely, that Lipps has formulated a field of
origin of the comic which is much too narrow,
and that he could not subject its phenomena
to his formula without much forcing.

Caricature

Hmnan beings are not satisfied with enjoy-
ing the comic as they encounter it in life, but
they aim to produce it purposely, thus we dis-
cover more of the nature of the comic by
studying the methods employed in producing

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 821

the comic. Above all one can produce comical
elements in one's personality for the amuse-
ment of others, by making one's self appear
awkward or stupid. One then produces the
comic exactly as if one were really so, by com-
plying with the condition of comparison which
leads to the difference of expenditure; hut one
does not make himself laughable or contempti-
ble through this; indeed, under certain circimi-
stances one can even secure admiration. The
feeling of superiority does not come into exist-
ence in the other when he knows that the actor
is only shamming, and this furnishes us a good
new proof that the comic is independent in
principle of the feeling of superiority.

To make another comical, the method most
commonly employed is to transfer him into
situations wherein he becomes comical regard-
less of his personal qualities, as a result of hu-
man dependence upon external circumstances,
especially social factors; in other words, one
resorts to the comical situation. This trans-
ferring into a comic situation may be real as
in practical jokes, such as placing the foot in
front of one so that he falls like a clumsy per-
son, or making one appear stupid by utilizing
his credulity to make him believe some non-
sense, etc., or it can be feigned by means of
speech or play. It is a good aid in aggression.

Sii THEORETICAL PART

in the semce of which production of thel
comic is wont to place itself in order that the I
comic pleasure may be independent of the I
realitj- of the comic situation; thus every per- I
son is really defenseless against being made.!
comical.

But there are still other means of makingl
one comical which deserve special attentionl
and which in part also show new sources of I
comic pleasure. Imitation, for example, be- 1
longs here; it accords the hearer an extraor-l
dinary amount of pleasure and makes its i
subject comic, even if it still keeps away from
the exaggeration of caricature. It is mudi
easier to fathom the comic effect of caricature
than that of simple imitation. Caricature» i
parody and travesty, like their practical!
counterpart — unmasking, range themselves
against persons and objects who command
authority and respect and who are exalted in
some sense — these are procedures tending to-j
wards degradation.^ In the transferred psy--
chic sense, the exalted is equivalent to some-
thing great and I want to make the statement,
or more accurately to repeat the statement,
that psychic greatness like somatic greatness i

■Degradation: A. Bain (The Bmotioiu and th» Will, 9od Ed, I
1SS5) states: "The occasion of tlie ludicrous ts the dcgradatioB I
Of some person of interest possessing dignity. In cirnunstUKOi I
thata excite no other strong emation" (p. 348).

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S23

is exhibited by means of an increased expendi-
ture. It needs little observation to ascertain
that when I speak of the exalted I give a dif-
ferent innervation to my voice, I change my
facial expression, an attempt to bring my en-
tire bearing as it were into complete accord
with the dignity of that which I present. I
impose upon myself a dignified restriction not
much different than if I were coming into the
presence of an illustrious personage, monarch,
or prince of science. I can scarcely err when
I assmne that this added innervation of con-
ceptual mimicry corresponds to an increased
expenditure. The third case of such an added
expenditure I readUy find when I indulge in
abstract trains of thought instead of in the
concrete and plastic ideas. If I can now
imagine that the mentioned processes for de-
grading the illustrious are quite ordinary, that
during their activity I need not be on my
guard and in whose ideal presence I may, to
use a military formula, put myself " at ease,"
all that saves me the added expenditure of
dignified restriction. Moreover, the compari-
son of this manner of presentation instigated
by identification with the manner of presenta-
tion to which I have been hitherto accus-
tomed which seeks to present itself at the
same time, again produces a diiference in

cxptiiditiirc vlikii can be <liiiliBiggil lliwingh

» M

*t ,Ui\'m

As is kimmiy camestnre Ltiuj^ alwiiil tiie
de^ndatioD by resdciiDg praninent one f es-
tuRy oomic in itself, from the entire pkliiie of
the exalted object, a featore wUch would be
creriookcd if viewed wxtfa the entire picture.
Only bjr iscJatiiig this feature can the eomie
effect be obtained wfaicfa spreads in our mem-
Q17 orer the whole picture. This has, how-
erer, this condition; the presence of the exalted
itself must not force us into a disposition of
reverence. Where such a comical feature is
reaUy larking then caricature unhesitatingly
creates it by exaggerating one that is not ocnn-
ical in itself. It is again diaracteristic of the
origin of comic pleasure that the effect of the
caricature is not essentially impaired through
such a falsifying of reality.

UnmoMldng

Parody and travesty accomplish the d^^ra^
dation of the exalted by other means; they
destroy the uniformity between the attributes
of persons familiar to us and their speech and
actions; by replacing either the illustrious per-
sons or their utterances by lowly ones.
Therein they differ from caricature, but not

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 825

through the mechanism of the production of
the comic pleasure. The same mechanism also
holds true in unmasking, which comes into
consideration only where some one has attached
to himself dignity and authority which in
reality should be taken from him. We have
seen the comic effect of unmasking through
several examples of wit, for example, in the
story of the fashionable lady who in her first
labor-pains cries: "Ah, mon Dieu!" but to
whom the physician paid no attention xmtil she
screamed: " A-a-a-ai-e-e-e-e-e-e-E-E-E 1 " Be-
ing now acquainted with the character of the
comic, we can no longer dispute that this story
is really an example of comical unmasking and
has no just claim to the term witticism. It
recalls wit only through the setting, through
the technical means of " representation through
a trifle"; here it is the cry which was found
sufficient to indicate the point. The fact re-
mains, however, that our feeling for the nice-
ties of speech, when we call on it for judg-
ment, does not oppose calling such a story a
witticism. We can find the explanation for
this in the reflection that usage of speech does

I not enter scientifically into the nature of wit
so far as we have evolved it by means of this
painstaking examination. As it is a function
of the activities of wit to reopen hidden

SS6

THEORETICAL PART '

sources of comic pleasure (p. 150), every
fice which does not hring to light barefaced'
comic may in looser analogy be called a wit-
ticism. This is especially true in the case of
unmasking, though in other methods of comio-
making the appellation also holds good.'

In the mechanism of " unmasking " one can^
also utilize those processes of comic-making
already known to us which degrade tlie dignity
of individuals in that they call attention to one
of the common human frailties, but particu-i
larly to the dependence of his mental fune-'
tions upon physical needs. Unmasking them]
becomes equivalent to the reminder: This or
that one who is admired like a demtgod
only a human being like you and me after
Moreover, all efforts in this mechanism servi
to lay bare the monotonous psychic automatism
which is behind wealth and apparent freedom
of psychic achievements. We have become
acquainted with examples of such " unmask-j
ing " through the witticisms dealing with mar-]
riage agents, and at that time to be sure we
felt doubt whether we could rightly count
these stories as wit. Now we can decide with
more certainty that the anecdote of the echo
who reinforces all assertions of the marriage

• " Thus every conscious and clever evocation of the cotnk
called nit, be it the comic of views or situatians, Naturollf
caotiot lue tbis view of wit bere." Upps, L c, p. TS.

^ airent j

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 327

agent and in the end reinforces the latter's
admission that the hride has a hunch hack with
the exclamation "And what a hunch!" is es-
sentially a comic story, an example of the un-
masking of the psychic automatism. But here
the comic story serves only as a faijade; to
any one who wishes to note the hidden meaning
of the marriage agent, the whole remains a
splendidly put together piece of wit. He who
does not penetrate so far sees only the comic
story. The same is true of the other witticism
of the agent who, to refute an objection, fi-
nally confirms the truth through the exclama-
tion : " But who in the world would lend them
anything? " This is a comic unmasking which
serves as a facade for a witticism. Still the
character of the wit is here quite evident, as
the speech of the agent is at the same time an
expression through the opposite. In trying to
prove that the people are rich he proves at the
same time that they are not rich but very poor.
Wit and the comic unite here and teach us
that a statement may he simultaneously witty
and comical.

We eagerly grasp the opportunity to re-
turn from the comic of unmasking to wit, for
our real task is to explain the relation between
wit and comic and not to determine the na-
ture of the comic. Hence to the case of un-

fiSR TU l-TIPPTT r.4T. PAÄT

OTTeriD^ tiie psvciiic antcmitiiBii» ■/!!*■■ i^m our
feeding kft us in dodbt as to ^pfaetlier tiie mai-
ter was camical or wittr, we add MnoAer^ tfae
case of nonsense-wit ^dieram likefnse wit and
Hie comic fuse. But our investigatioii will
ultimatelT show us that in this seooDd case the
meeting of wit and comic may be tfae areti cally
deduced.

In the discussion of Hie tedmiqoes of wit
we have found that giving free play to audi
modes of thinking as are common in the un-
ocmsdous and which in ccmsciousness are om-
ceived only as '* faulty thinking,^ furnishes the
technical means of a great many witticisms.
We had then doubted their witty character
and were inclined to classify them simply as
comic stories. We could ccMne to no decisioii
regarding our uncertainty because in the first
place the real character of wit was not familiar
to us. Later we found this character by fol-
lowing the analogy to the dream-work as to
the compromise formed by the wit-work be-
tween the demands of the rational cnitic and
the impulse not to abandon the old word-pleas-
ure and nonsense-pleasure. What thus c:ame
into existence as a cx)mpromise, when the fore-
conscious thought was left for a moment to
unconscious elaboration, satisfied both demands
in all cases, but it presented itself to the critic^

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC SiQ

in various forms and had to stand various crit-
icisms from it. In one case wit succeeded in
surreptitiously assuming the form of an unim-
portant but none the less admissible proposi-
tion; a second time it smuggled itself into the
expression of a valuable thought. But within
the outer limit of the compromise activity it
made no effort to satisfy the critic, and defi-
antly utilizing the pleasure-sources at its dis-
posal, it appeared before the critic as pure
nonsense. It had no fear of provoking con-
tradiction because it could rely on the fact that
the hearer would decipher the disfigurement of
the expression through the operation of his un-
conscious and thus give back to it its meaning.
Now in what case will wit appear to the
critic as nonsense? Particularly when it makes
use of those modes of thought, which are com-
mon in the unconscious, but forbidden in con-
scious thought; that is, when it resorts to
faulty thinking. Some of tlie modes of think-
ing, of the unconscious, have also been re-
tained in conscious thinking, for example,
many forms of indirect expression, allu-
sions, etc., even though their conscious use
has to be much restricted. Using these
techniques wit will arouse little or no op-
position on the part of the critic; but this only
happens when it also uses that technical means

SSO THEORETICAL PAKT

with which conscious thought no longer can
to have anything to do. Wit can still further^
avoid offending if it disguises the faulty think-
ing by investing it with a semblance of logic
as in the story of the fancy cake and liqueur,
salmon with mayonnaise, and similar ones.J
But should it present the faulty thinking un-l
disguised, the critic is sure to protest.

The Meeting of Wit and the Comic
In this case, something else comes to the aid I
of wit. The faulty thinking, which as a form I
of thinking of the unconscious, wit utilizes fori
its technique, appears comical to the critic,!
although this is not necessarily the case. The!
conscious giving of free play to the unconsciousl
and to those forms of thinking which are re-i
jected as faulty, furnishes a means for the pro-
duction of comic pleasure. This can be easily;
imderstood, as a greater expenditure is surely
needed for the production of the foreconscious
investing energy than for the giving of free
play to the unconscious. When we hear the i
thought which is formed like one from the un-|
conscious we compare it to its correct fonn.!
and this results in a difference of expenditure 1
which gives origin to comic pleasure. A wit-'
ticism which makes use of such faulty thinking 1
as its technique and therefore appears absmdJ

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC «31

can produce a comic impression at the same
time. If we do not strike the trail of the wit,
there remains to us only the comic or funny
story.

The story of the borrowed kettle, which
showed a hole on heing returned, whereupon
the borrower excused himself by stating that
in the first place he had not borrowed the ket-
tle; secondly, that it already had a hole when
he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he had re-
turned it intact without any hole {p. 82), is an
excellent example of a purely comic effect
through giving free play to one's unconscious
modes of thinking. Just tliis mutual neutrali-
zation of several thoughts, each of which is well
motivated in itself, is the province of the un-
conscious. Corresponding to this, the dream in
which the unconscious thoughts become mani-
fest, also shows an absence of either — or.'
These are expressed by putting the thoughts
next to one another. In that dream example
given in my Interpretation of DreaTna,' which
in spite of its complication I have chosen as
a type of the work of interpretation, I seek
to rid myself of the reproach that I have not
removed the pains of a patient by psychic
treatment. l\Iy arguments are: 1. she is her-

* At the most this is inserted bj tbe dreamer u aa explanation.
•L c, p. 99*.

S3S THEORETICAL PART

self to blame for her illness, because she does
not wish to accept my solution, 2. her pains
are of organic origin, therefore none of my
concern, 3. her pains are connected with her
widowhood, for which I am certainly not to
blame, 4. her pains resulted from an injection
with a dirty syringe, which was given by
another. Ail these motives follow one another
just as thougli one did not exclude the
other. In order to escape the reproach that
it was nonsense I had to insert the words
" either — or " instead of the " and " of the
dream.

A similar comical story is the one which teH»
of a blacksmith in a Hungarian village who ha»
committed a crime puniahable by death; the
burgomaster, however, decreed that not the
smith but a tailor was to be hanged, as there
were two tailors in the village but only one
blacksmith, and the crime had to be expiated.
Such a displacement of guilt from one person
to another naturally contradicts all laws of
conscious logic, but in no ways the mental
trends of the unconscious. I am in doubt
whether to call this story comic, and still I put
the story of the kettle among the witticisms.
Now I admit that it is far more correct to des-
ignate the latter as comic rather than witty.
But now I understand how it happens that my

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 333

feelings, usually so reliable, can leave me in
the lurch as to whether this story be comic
or witty. The case in which I cannot come
to a conclusion through my feelings is the one
in which the comic results through the uncov-
ering of modes of thought which exclusively
belong to the unconscious. A story of that
kind can be comic and witty at the same time;
but it will impress me as bemg witty even if
it be only comic, because the use of the faulty
thinking of the unconscious reminds me of
wit, just as in the case of the arrangements
for the uncovering of the hidden comic dis-
cussed before {p. 325).

I must lay great stress upon making clear
this most delicate point of my analysis, namely,
the relation of wit to the comic, and will there-
fore supplement what has been said with some
negative statements. First of all, I call at-
tention to the fact that the case of the meeting
of wit and comic treated here (p. 827) is not
identical with the preceding one. I grant it
is a fine distinction, but it can be drawn with
certainty. In the preceding case the comic
originated from the uncovering of the psychic
automatism. This is in no way peculiar to the
unconscious alone and it does not at all play a
conspicuous part in the technique of wit. Un-
masking appears only accidentally in relation

SSi

THEORETICAL PART

with wit, in that it serves another technique of
wit, namely, representation through the oppo-
site. But in the case of giving free play to
unconscious ways of thinking the union of wit
and comic is an essential one, because the
same method which is used by the first person
in wit as the technique of releasing pleasure
will naturally produce comic pleasure in the
third person.

We might be tempted to generalize this last
case and seek the relation of wit to the comic
in the fact that the effect of wit upon the third
person follows the mechanism of comic pleas-
ure. But there is no question about that; con-
tact with the comic is not in any way found
in all nor even in most witticisms; in most
cases wit and the comic can be cleanly sep-
arated. As often as wit succeeds In escaping
the appearance of absurdity, which is to say
in most witticisms of double meaning or of al-
lusion, one cannot discover any effect in the
hearer resembling the comic. One can make
the test with examples previously cited or witfa'
some new ones given here.

Congratulatory telegram to be sent to
gambler on his 70th birthday.

" Trente et quarante"' (word-diviaitHi
allusion) .

'"Trente et quar&ntc" ia a gambling gacoe.

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC SS5

Madame de Maintenon was called Madame
de Maintenant (modification of a name).

We might further beüeve that at least all
jokes with nonsense fa(;ades appear comical
and must impress us as such. But I recall
here the fact that such witticisms often have
a diflFerent effect on the hearer, calling forth
confusion and a tendency to rejection (see foot-*
note, p. 212). Therefore it evidently depends
whether the nonsense of the wit appears comical
or common plain nonsense, and the conditions
for this we have not yet investigated. Accord-
ingly we hold to the conclusion that wit, judg-
ing by its nature, can be separated from the
comic, and that it unites with it on the one
hand only in certain special cases, on the other
in the tendency to gain pleasure from intel-
lectual sources.

In the course of these examinations con-
cerning the relations of wit and the comic there
revealed itself to us that distinction which we
must emphasize as most significant, and which
at the same time points to a psychologically
important characteristic of the comic. We had
to transfer to the unconscious the source of
wit- pleasure ; there is no occasion which can be
discovered for the same localization of the
comic. On the contrary all analyses which we
have made thus far indicate that the source

a$6 THEORETICAL PART

of comic pleasure lies in the comparison of
two expenditures, both of which we must
adjudged to the foreconscious. Wit and the
comic can above all be differentiated in the
psychic localization; "wit is, so to speak, tke
contribution to the comic from the sphere oj
the unconscious.

Comic of Imitation

We need not blame ourselves for digressing'
from the subject, for the relation of wit to the
comic is really the occasion which urged us to
the examination of the comic. But it is time
for us to return to the point under discussion,
to the treatment of the means which serve f
produce the comic. We have advanced the
discussion of caricature and unmasking, be-
cause from both of them we can borrow several
points of similarity for the analysis of the
comic of imitation. Imitation is mostly
placed by caricature, which consists in the ex-
aggeration of ■ certain otherwise not striking
traits, and also bears the character of degrada-
tion. Still this does not seem to exhaust the
nature of imitation; it is incontestable that in
itself it represents an extraordinarily rich
source of comic pleasure, for we laugh partio
ularly over faithful imitations. It is not easjT

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S37

to give a satisfactory explanation of this if we
do not accept Bergson's view/ according to
which the comic of imitation is put next to the
comic produced hy imcovering the psychic
automatism. Bergson heh'eves that everything
gives a comic impression which manifests itself
in the shape of a machine-like inanimate move-
ment in the human being. His law is that
" the attitudes, gestures, and movements of
the human body are laughable in exact pro-
portion as that body reminds us of a mere
machine." He explains the comic of imitation
by connecting it with a problem formulated
by Pascal in his Thoughts, why is it that we
laugh at the comparison of two faces that are
alike although neither of them excites laughter
by itself. " The truth is that a really hving
life should never repeat itself. Wherever
there is repetition or complete similarity, we
always suspect some mechanism at work behind
the living." Analyze the impression you get
from two faces that are too much alike, and
you will find that you are thinking of two
copies cast in the same mould, or two impres-
sions of the same soul, or two reproductions of
the same negative, — in a word, of some manu-
facturing process or other. This deflection of
life towards the mechanical ia here the real

* BerpOD. 1. c, p. 29.

8S8 THEORETICAL PAET

cause of laughter (1. c, p. 34) . We might say, it
is the degradation of the human to the me-
chanical or inanimate. If we accept these
winning arguments of Bergson, it is moreover
not difficult to subject his view to our own
formula. Taught by experience that every
living being is different and demands a definite
amount of expenditure from our understand-
ing, we find ourselves disappointed when, as
a result of a perfect agreement or deceptive
imitation, we need no new expenditure. But
we are disappointed in the sense of being re-
lieved, and the expenditure of expectation
which has become superfluous is discharged
through laughter. The same formula will also
cover all cases of comic rigidity considered b;
Bergson, such as professional habits, fixed
ideas, and modes of expression which are re-
peated on every occasion. All these cases aim
to compare the expenditure of expectation
with what is commonly required for the under-
standing, whereby the greater expectation de
pends on observation of individual variety ani
human plasticity. Hence in imitation the
source of comic pleasure is not the comic ol
situation but that of expectation.

As we trace the comic pleasure in general
to comparison, it is incimibent upon us to in*
vestigate also the comic element of the

■ pariser

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC SS9

parison itself, which likewise serves as a means
of producing the comic, Our interest in this
question will be enhanced when we recall that
in the case of comparison the " feeling " as
to whether something was to be classed as
witty or merely comical often left us in the
lurch (v. p. 114).

The subject really deserves more attention
than we can bestow upon it. The main qual-
ity for which we ask in comparison is whether
it is pertinent, that is, whether it really calls
our attention to an existing agreement between
two different objects. The original pleasure
in refinding the same thing (Groos, p. 108)'
is not the only motive which favors the use
of comparison. Besides this there is the fact
that comparison is capable of a utilization
which facilitates intellectual work; when for
example, as is usually the case, one compares
the less familiar to the more familiar, the ab-
stract to the concrete, and explains through
this comparison the more strange and the more
difficult objects. With every such compari-
son, especially of the abstract to the concrete,
there is a certain degradation and a certain
economy in abstraction expenditure (in the
sense of a conceptual mimicry) yet this nat-
urally does not suffice to render prominent
the character of the comic. The latter does not

840 THEORETICAL PART

emerge suddenly from the freed pleasure of
the comparison but comes gradually; there
axe many cases which only touch the comic, in
which one might doubt whether they show the
comic character. The comparison undoubtedly
becomes comical when the niveau difference
of the expenditure of abstraction between the
two things compared becomes increased, if
something serious and strange, especially of
intellectual or moral nature is compared to
something banal and lowly. The former re-
lease of pleasure and the contribution from
the conditions of conceptual mimicry may per-
haps explain the gradual change — which is de-
termined by quantitative relations, — from the
universally pleasurable to the comic, which
takes place during the comparison. I am
certainly avoiding misunderstandings in that
I emphasize that I deduce the comic pleasure
in the comparison, not from the contrast of
the two things compared but from the differ-
enee of the two abstraction expenditures.
The strange which is difficult to grasp, the ab-
stract and really intellectually sublime, throu^,
its alleged agreement with a famiUar lowl;
one, in the imagination of which every abstrac-'
tion expenditure disappears, is now itself m»-i
masked as something equally lowly.

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S4I

' comic of comparison thus becomes reduced to
a case of degradation.

The comparison, as we have seen above, can
now be witty without a trace of comic admix-
ture, especially when it happens to evade the
degradation. Thus the comparison of Truth
to a torch which one cannot carry through a
crowd without singeing somebody's beard is
pure wit, because it takes an obsolete expres-
sion ("The torch of truth") at its full value
and not at all in a comical sense, and because
the torch as an object does not lack a certain
distinction, though it is a concrete object.
However, a comparison may just as well be
witty as comic, and what is more one may be
independent of the other, in that the compari-
son becomes an aid for certain teclmiques of
wit, as, for example, unification or allusion.
Thus Nestroy's comparison of memory to a
"Warehouse" {p. 120) is simultaneously comi-
cal and witty, first, on account of the extra-
ordinary degradation to which the psychologi-
cal conception must consent in the comparison
to a " Warehouse," and secondly, because he
who utilizes the comparison is a clerk, and in
this comparison he establishes a rather unex-
pected unification between psychology and his
Tocation. Heine's verse, " until at last the
buttons tore from the pants of my patience,"

»4i THEORETICAL PART

seems at first an excellent example of a comic
degrading comparison, but on closer reflection
we must ascribe to it also the attribute of wit-
tiness, since tbe comparison as a means of al-
lusion strikes into the realm of the obscene and
causes a release of pleasure from the obscene, i
Through a imion not altogether incidental the I
same material also gives us a resultant pleas-
ure which is at the same time comical and
witty; it does not matter whether or not the
conditions of the one promote the origin of tbe J
other, such a union acts confusingly on the ^
" feeling " whose function it is to announce to
us whether we have before us wit or the comic,
and only a careful examination independent
of the disposition of pleasure can decide
question.

As tempting as it would be to trace Üiese
more intimate determinations of comie pleas-
ure, the author must remember that neither
his previous education nor his daily vocation
justifies him in extending his investigations be-
yond the spheres of wit, and he must confess
that it is precisely the subject of comic com-
parison which makes him feel his incompetence.

We are quite willing to be reminded that .
many authors do not recognize the clear no- ]
tional and objective distinction between wit J
and comic, as we were impelled to do, and Hialfa

IhaM

f they

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC SiS

they classify wit merely as " the comic of
speech " or " of words." To test this view let
us select one example of intentional and one
of involuntary comic of speech and compare
it with wit. We have already mentioned be-
fore that we are in a good position to dis-
tinguish comic from witty speech. " With a
fork and with effort, his mother pulled him
out of the mess," is only comical, but Heine's
verse about the four castes of the population
of Göttingen: "Professors, students, Phihs-
tines, and cattle," is exquisitely witty.

As an example of the intentional comic of
speech I will take as a model Stettenheim's
Wippchen. We call Stettenheim witty be-
cause he possesses the cleverness that evokes
the comic. The wit which one " has " in con-
tradistinction to the wit which one " makes,"
is indeed correctly conditioned by this ability.
It is true that the letters of Wippchen are
also witty in so far as they are interspersed
with a rich collection of all sorts of witticisms,
some of which very successful ones, (as " fes-
tively imdressed " when he speaks of a parade
of savages), but what lends the peculiar char-
acter to these productions is not these iso-
lated witticisms, but the superabundant flow
of comic speech contained therein. Originally
Wippchen was certainly meant to represent

THEORETICAL PART

a satirical character, a modification of Frey-
tag's Sclmiock, one of those uneducated per-
sons who trade in the educational treasure of
the nation and abuse it; but tlie pleasure in
the comic effect experienced in representing
this person seems gradually to have pushed to
the background the author's satirical tendency.
Wippchen's productions are for the most part
*' comic nonsense." The author has justly
utilized the pleasant mood resulting from the
accumulation of such achievements to present
beside the altogether admissible material all
sorts of absurdities which would be intolerable
in themselves. Wippchen's nonsense appears
to he of a specific nature only on account of
its special technique. If we look closer into
some of these " witticisms," we find that some
forms which have impressed their character ott
the whole production are especially conspicu-
ous. Wippchen makes use mostly of composi-
tions (fusions), of modifications of familiar
expressions and quotations. He replaces some
of the banal elements in these expressions by
others which are usually more pretentious and
more valuable. This naturally comes near to
the techniques of wit.

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 3i5

TIte Comic of Speech

Some of the fusions taken from the preface
and the first pages are the following: " Tur-
key's money is like the hay of the sea." This
is only a condensation of the two expressions,
" Money like hay," " Money like the sands of
the sea." Or; "I am nothing but a leafless pü-
lar which tells of a vanished splendor," which
is a fusion of " leafless trunk " and " a pillar
■which, etc." Or: " Where is Ariadne's thread
•which leads out of the Scylla of this Augean
»table? " for which three different Greek myths
contribute an element each.

The modifications and substitutions can be
treated collectively without much forcing; their
character can be seen from the following exam-
ples which are peculiar to Wippchen, they are
regularly permeated by a dififerent wording
which is more fliuent, most banal, and reduced
to mere platitudes.

" To hang mij paper and ink high" The
saying: " To hang one's bread-basket high,"
expresses metaphorically the idea of placing
one under difficult conditions. But why not
stretch this figure to other material?

" Already in my youth Pegasus was alive m
me" When the word " pegasus " is replaced
by " the poet," one can recognize it as an ex-

»Iff THEOftrriCAL PAST

preanoD often used in uitoinpgnplnes. Kife
jin33j "pegasas" is Dot the proper word
repUee the words "the poet," but it hil
tiiougfat associations to it and is a higfa-sount
iag word.

Fran Wippcben's other nomerous produc-
tions some examples can be shown which pre-
sent the pure comic. As an example of couue
dtsiUusiomuent the fc^owing can be cited:
" For hourg the battle raged, ßnaUy it f»-
nutined undecisive"; an example of comicd
unmasking (of ignorance) is the foHowing:
" Clio, the Medtua of history, " at quotatww
like the following: " Habent sua fata
gana." But our interest is aroused nwre bf
the fusions and modifications because tbey rt-
call familiar techniques of wit. We may ooi
pare them to sudi modification witticisma ■
the following: " He has a great future i
him," and Lichtenberg's modification witt
such as : " New baths heal well," etc Should
Wippchen 's productions having the same tech-
nique be called witticisms, or what distinguishes
them from the latter?

It is surely not difficult to answer thii.
Let us remember that wit presents to tfae
hearer a double face, and forces him to
different views. In nonsense-witticisms such'
as those mentioned last, one view, which con-

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 347

^ders only the wording, states that they are
nonsense; the other view, which, in obedience
to suggestion, follows the road that leads
through the hearer's unconscious, finds very
good sense in these witticisms. In Wippchen's
wit-like productions one of these views of wit
i« empty, as if stunted. It is a Janus head
with only one countenance developed. One
would get nowhere should he be tempted to
proceed by means of this technique to the un-
conscious. The condensations lead to no case
to which the two fused elements really result
hi a new sense; they fall to pieces when an
Attempt is made to analyze them. As in wit,
the modifications and substitutions lead to a
current and familiar wording, but they them-
selves tell us little else and as a rule nothing
that is of any possible use. Hence the only
thing remaining to these '* witticisms " is the
nonsense view. Whether such productions,
which have freed themselves from one of the
most essential characters of wit, should be
called " bad " wit or not wit at all, every one
must decide as he feels inclined.

There is no doubt that such stunted wit pro-
duces a comic effect for which we can account
in more than one way. Either the comic
originates through the uncovering of the un-
conscious modes of thinking in a manner sim-

MS THEORETICAL PART

ilar to the cases considered above, or the wit,
originates by comparison with perfect wit
Nothing prevents us from assuming that we
here deal with a union of both modes of origin
of the comic pleasure. It is not to be denied
that it is precisely the inadequate dependence
on wit which here shapes the nonsense into
comic nonsense.

Comic of Inadequacy

There are, of course, other quite apparent
cases, in which such inadequacy produced by
the comparison with wit, makes the nonsense
irresistibly comic. The counterpart to wit, tlie
riddle, can perhaps give us better examples
for this than wit itself. A facetious question
states: WJiat is this: It hangs on the -wall and
one can dry his hands on it? It would be
foolish riddle if the answer were: a towel. On
the contrary this answer is rejected xmth the
statement: No, it is a herring. — "But. for
mercy's sake," is the objection. " a herring
does not hang on the wall," — "But ymt can
hang it there," — " But who wants to dry U»
hands on a herring?" — "Well," ia the soft
answer, "you don't have to." This explana-
tion given through two typical displacement;
show how much this question lacks of being

I
I

THE VAHIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 849'

1
real riddle, and because of this absolute insuf-
ficiency it impresses one as irresistibly comic,
rather than mere nonsensical foolishness.
Through such means, that is, by not restricting
essential conditions, wit, riddles, and other
fonns, which in themselves produce no comic
pleasure, can be made into sources of comic
pleasure.

It is not so difficidt to understand the case
of the involuntary comic of speech which we
can perhaps find realized with as much fre-
quency as we like in the poems of Frederika
Kempner.'

ANTI-VIVISECTION.

Fraternal Bcntiment should urge as
To champion the Guinea-pig,
For has it not a soul like ours,
Although most likely not as big?

Or a conversation between a loving couple.

THE CONTRAST.

The young wife whispers " I'm so happy,"
" And I ! " chimes in her husband's voice,
" Because your virtues, dearest help-mate,
Reveal the wisdom of my choice."

■Sixth Ed., Berlin, 1891.

THEORETICAL PABT

There is nothing here which makes one think
of wit. Doubtless, however, it is the inadequate
of these " poetic productions/' as the very ex-
traordinary clumsiness of the expressions which
recall the most commonplace or newspaper
style, the ingenious poverty of thoughts, the
absence of every trace of poetic manner of
thinking or speaking,— it is all these inad*
equacies which make these poems comic. Nev-
ertheless it is not at all self-evident that we
should find Kempner's poems comical; many
similar productions we merely consider very
bad, we do not laugh at them but are ratbef
vexed with them. But here it is the great dis-
parity in our demand of a poem which impels
us to the comic conception; where this differ-
ence is less, we are inclined to criticise rather*
than laugh. The comic effect of Kempner's
poetic productions is furthermore assured by
the additional circumstances of the lady
thor's unmistakably good intentions, and by
the fact that her helpless phrases disarm oar
feeling of mockerj' and anger. We are now
reminded of a problem the consideration of
which we have so far postponed. The differ-
ence of expenditure is surely the main condi-
tion of the comic pleasure, but observation
teaches that such difference does not atways
produce pleasure. What other conditions must

THE VARIOUS FORMS OP THE COMIC 351

be added, or what disturbances must be
checked in order that pleasure should result
from the difference of expenditure? But be-
fore proceeding with the answers to these
questions we wish to verify what was said in
the conclusions of the former discussion,
namely, that the comic of speech is not synony-
mous with wit, and that wit must be some-
tiling quite different from speech comic.

As we are about to attack the problem just
formulated, concerning the conditions of the
origin of comic pleasure from the difference of
expenditure, we may permit ourselves to facili-
tate this task so as to cause ourselves some
pleasure. To give a correct answer to this
question would amount to an exhaustive
presentation of the nature of the comic for
which we are fitted neither by ability nor author-
ity. We shall therefore again be content to
elucidate the problem of the comic only
so far as it distinctly separates itself from
wit

All theories of the comic were objected to
by the critics on the ground that in defining
the comic these theories overlooked the essen-
tial element of it. This can be seen from the
Mlowing theories, with their objections. The
comic depends on a contrasting idea; yes, in
, so far as this contrast effects one comically and

SS2 THEORETICAL PART

in no other way. The feeling of the comic re-
sults from the dwindling away of an expecta-
tion; yes, if the disappointment does not prove
to be painful. There is no doubt that these
objections are justified, but they are overestr
mated if one concludes from them that the es-
sential characteristic mark of the comic has
hitherto escaped our conception. VVbal depre-
ciates the general validity of these definitions
are conditions which are indispensable for the
origin of the comic pleasure, but which will be
searched in vain for the nature of comic pleas-
ure. The rejection of the objections and the
explanations of the contradictions to the defini-
tions of the comic will become easy for us,
only after we trace back comic pleasure to the
difference resulting from a comparison of two
expenditures. Comic pleasure and the effect
by which it is recognized^Iaugbter, can orig-
inate only when this difference is no longer
utilizable and when it is capable of discharge.
We gain no pleasurable effect, or at most
flighty feeling of pleasure in which the comic
does not appear, if the difi'erence is put to
other use as soon as it is recognized. Just
as special precautions must be taken in wit,
in order to guard against making new use of
expenditure recognized as superfluous, so also
can comic pleasure originate only under rela-

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 353

tions which fulfil this latter condition. The
cases in which such differences of expenditure
originate in our ideational life are therefore
uncommonly numerous, while the cases in
which the comic originates from them is com-
paratively very rare.

The Conditions of Isolation of the Comic

Two obser\'ations ohtrude themselves upon
the ohserver who reviews even only superficially
the origin of comic pleasure from the difference
of expenditure; first, that there are cases in
which the comic appears regularly and as if
necessarily; and, in contrast to these cases,
others in which this appearance depends on the
conditions of the case and on the viewpoint of
the observer; but secondly, that unusually
large differences very often triumph over un-
favorable conditions, so that the comic feeling
originates in spite of it. In reference to the
first point one may set up two classes, the in-
evitable comic and the accidental comic, al-
though one will have to he prepared from the
beginning to find exceptions in the first class
to the inevitableness of the comic. It would
be tempting to follow the conditions which are
essential to each class.

What is important in the second class are

9S4

THEORETICAL PAET

1^^^. pi

the conditions of which one may be designaixi
as the " isolation " of the ccanic case. A closer
analysis renders conspicuous relations 901
thing like the following:

a) The favorable condition for the origis
of comic pleasure is brought about by a geo'
eral happy disposition in which " one is in the
mood for laughing." In happy toxic states al-
most everything seems comic, which probably
results from a comparison with the expendi-
ture in normal conditions. For wit, the comic;
and all similar methods of gaining pleasurt
from the psychic activities, are nothing but
ways to regain this happy state — euphoria—
from one single point, when it does not exist
as a general disposition of the psyche.

b) A similar favorable condition is pro*
duced by the expectation of the comic or hf
putting one's self in the right mood for comic
pleasure. Hence when the intention to maktf^
things comical exists and when this feeling i
shared by others, the differences required are
so slight that they probably would have beeir
overlooked had they been experienced in un-
premeditated occurrences. He who decides tff
attend a comic lecture or a farce at the theater
is indebted to this intention for laughing orcT
things which in his everyday life would hardl;^
produce in him a comic effect. He final^

THE VABIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC SSS

lau^s at the recollection of having laughed, at
the expectation of laughing, and at the appear-
ance of the one who is to present the comic,
even before the latter makes the attempt to
make him laugh. It is for this reason that
people admit that they are ashamed of that
which made them laugh at the theater.

c) Unfavorable conditions for the comic re-
sult from the kind of psychic activity which
may occupy the individual at the moment.
Imaginative or mental activity tending towards
serious aims disturbs the discharging capacity
<rf the investing energies which the activity
needs for its own displacements, so that only
unexpected and great differences of expendi-
ture can break through to form comic pleas-
ure. All manner of mental processes far
enough removed from the obvious to cause a
«ispension of ideational mimicry are unfavora-
ble to the comic; in abstract contemplation
there is hardly any room left for the comic,
except when this form of thinking is suddenly
interrupted.

d) The occasion for releasing comic pleas-
ure vanishes wlien the attention is fixed on the
comparison capable of giving rise to the comic.
Undw sudi circumstances the comic force Js
lost from that which is otherwise sure to pro-
4ucß a «omie effect. A movement or a mental

SS8

THEORETICAL PART

activity cannot become comical to him wbose
interest is fixed at the time of comparing this
movement with a standard which distinctly
presents itself to him. Thus the examiner does
not see the comical in the nonsense produced
by the student in his ignorance; he is simply
annoyed by it, whereas the offender's class-
mates who are more interested in his chances
of passing the examination than in what he
knows, laugh heartily over the same nonsense.
The teacher of dancing or gymnastics seldom
has any eyes for the comic movements of hia
pupils, and the preacher entirely loses sight of
humanity's defects of character, which the
writer of comedy brings out with so much ef-
fect. The comic process cannot stand examina-
tion by the attention, it must be able to pro-
ceed absolutely unnoticed in a maimer similar
to wit. But for good reasons, it would con-
tradict the nomenclature of " conscious proo*
esses " which I have used in The IvterpretOf
tion of Dreams, if one wished to call it of
necessity unconscious. It rather belongs to
the foreconscious, and one may use the fitting
name " automatic " for all those processes
which are enacted in the foreeonscious and
dispense with the attention energy wliich is
connected with consciousness. The process
of comparison of the expenditures must re-

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 357

I main automatic if it is to produce comic
■pleasure.

Conditions Disturbing the Discharge

e) It is exceedingly disturbing to the comic
if the case from which it originates gives rise
at the same time to a marked release of af-
fect. The discharge of the affective difference
is then as a rule excluded. Affects, disposition,
and the attitude of the individual in occasional
cases make it clear that the comic comes or
goes with the viewpoint of the individual per-
son; that only in exceptional cases is there an
absolute comic. The dependence or relativity
of the comic is therefore much greater than
of wit, which never happens but is regularly
made, and at its production one may already
give attention to the conditions under which
it finds acceptance. But affective development
is the most intensive of the conditions which
disturb the comic, the significance of which is
well known.' It is therefore said that the
comic feeling comes most in tolerably indiffer-
ent cases which evince no strong feelings or
interests. Nevertheless it is just in cases with
affective release that one may witness the pro-
duction of a particularly strong expenditure-

' " You maj well laugh, that no longer concerns joa."

MS THEORETICAL PAKT

differenoe id the automatism of
When Colonel Butler answers Octario's
monitions with " bitter Liugfater," exd

"Thanits from the boow of Atutoa.!*'

his bitteroess has thus not prerented the lauglhl
t^r which results from the recollection
disappointment which be believes he has
ieoced; and on the other hand, the magnitude
of this disappointment could not hare been
more impressively depicted by the poet than
by showing it capable of affecting laughter in
the midst of the storm of unchained sffe<^
It is my belief that this explanation may be
applicable in all cases in which laughing occun
on other than pleasurable occasions, and inj
conjunction with exceedingly painful or teoMM
affects. '

t) If we also mention that the development
of the comic pleasure can be promoted I^
means of any other pleasurable addition to the
case wbicli acts like a sort of contact-eflfect
(after the manner of the fore-pleasure princi-
ple in the tendency-wit), then we have
cussed surely not all the conditions of
pleasure, yet enough of them to serve our pur-"
pose. We then see that no other assumption
so easily covers these conditions, as well as the
inooQstam^ and dependence of the comic ef-/

prma-
ve di»J
comiiM

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 359

feet, as this: the assumption that comic pleas-
ure is derived from the discharge of a differ-
ence, which under many conditions can be di-
verted to a different use than discharge.

It still remains to give a thorougli consider-
ation of the comic of the sexual and obscene,
but we shall only skim over it with a few ob-
servations. Here, too, we shall take the act
of exposing one's body as the starting-point.
An accidental exposure produces a comical
effect on us, because we compare the ease with
which we attained the enjoyment of this view
with the great expenditure otherwise necessary
for the attainment of this object. The case
thus comes nearer to the naive-comic, but it is
simpler than the latter. In every case of ex-
hibitionism in which we are made spectators —
or, in the case of the smutty joke hearers, —
we play the part of the third person, and the
person exposed is made comical. We have
heard that it is the purpose of wit to replace
obscenity and in this manner to reopen a
source of comic pleasure that has been lost.
On the contrary, spying out an exposure forms
no example of the comic for the one spying,
because the effort he exerts thereby abrogates
the condition of comic pleasure; the only thing
remaining is the sexual pleasin-e in what is

560 THEORETICAL PART

seen. If the spy relates to another what he
has seen, the person looked at again becomes
comical, because the viewpoint that predom-
inates is that the expenditure was omitted
which would have been necessary for the con-
ceahnent of the private parts. At all events,
the sphere of the sexual or obscene offers the
richest opportunities for gaining comic pleas-
ure beside the pleasurable sexual stimulation,
as it exposes the person's dependence on his
physical needs (degradation) or it can uncover
behind the spiritual love the physical demands
of the same (immasking.)

The Psychogenem of the Comic

An invitation to seek the understanding of
the comic in its psychogenesis comes sur-
prisingly from Bergson's well written and
stimulating book Laughter. Bergson, whose
formula for the conception of the comic char-
acter has already become known to
" mechanization of life," " the substitution of
something mechanical for the natural " —
reaches by obvious associations from autwn-
atism to the automaton, and seeks to trace
a series of comic effects to the blurred memories
of children's toys. In this connection he once
reaches this viewpoint, which, to be sure, he sooq

THE VARIOUS FOBMS OF THE COMIC S6I

drops; he seeks to trace the comic to the after-
effect of childish pleasure. " Perhaps we
ought even to carry simplification still farther,
and, going back to our earliest recollection,
try to discover in the games that amused us
as children the first faint traces of the com-
binations that make us laugh as grown-up
persons." ..." Above all, we are too apt
to ignore the childish elementj so to speak,
latent in most of our joyful emotions " (p. 67).
As we have now traced wit to that childish
playing with words and thoughts which is
prohibited by the rational critic, we must be
tempted to trace also these infantile roots of
the comic, conjectured by Bergson.

As a matter of fact we meet a whole series
of conditions which seem most promising, when
we examine the relation of the comic to the
«hild. The child itself does not by any means
seem comic to us, although its character fulfills
all conditions which, in comparison to our own,
would result in a comic difference. Thus we
see the immoderate expenditure of motion as
well as the slight psychic expenditure, the con-
trol of the psychic activities through bodily
functions, and other features. The child gives
us a comic impression only when it does not
behave as a child but as an earnest grown-up,
and even then it affects us only in the same

8dS THEORETICAL PART

manner as other persons in disguise; but .
long as it retains the nature of the child ■
perception of it furnishes us a pure pleasure
which perhaps recalls the comic. We call it
naive in so far as it displays to us the absenoe
of inhibitions, and we call naive-comic those <
its utterances which in another we would haw
considered obscene or witty.

On the other hand the child lacks all feel-
ing for the comic. This sentence seems to say]
no more than that this comic feeling, like i
others, first makes its appearance in the course
of psychic development; and that would by do"
means be remarkable, especially since we must
admit that it shows itself distinctly even dur-
ing years which must be accredited to child«J^
hood. Nevertheless it can be demonstrati
that the assertion that the child lacks feeling*
for the comic has a deeper meaning than one
would suppose. In the first place it will read-
ily be seen that it cannot be different, if ou
conception is correct, that the comic feeling i
suits from a difference of expenditure pn
duced in the effort to understand the oth^J
Let us again take comic motion as an exampl&j
The comparison which furnislies the difference
reads as follows, when put in conscious formu-
lee: "So he does it," and: "So I would doi
it," or " So I have done it." But the •

dur-
hüdj
-ate«
^iing ,

ODC

ead-

;q|

froM

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 86S

lacks the standard contained in the second
sentence, it understands simply through imita-
tion; it just does it. Education of the child
furnishes it with the standard: " So you shall
do it," and if it now makes use of the same
in comparisons, the nearest conclusion is : " He
has not done it right, and I can do it better."
In this case it laughs at the other, it laughs
at him with a feeling of superiority. There
is nothing to prevent us from tracing this
laughter also to a difference of expenditure;
but according to the analogy with the exam-
ples of laugiiter occurring in us we may con-
clude that the comic feeling is not experienced
by the child when it laughs as an expression
of superiority. It is a laughter of pure pleas-
ure. In our own case whenever tlie judgment
of our own superiority occurs we smile rather
than laugh, or if we laugh, we are still able
to distinguish clearly this conscious realization
of our superiority from the comic which makes
us laugh.

It is probably correct to say that in many
cases which we perceive as " comical " and
■which we cannot explain, the child laughs out
iof pure pleasure, whereas the child's motives
are clear and assignable. If, for instance,
some one slips on the street and falls, we laugh
because this impression — we know not why —

THEORETICAL PART

is comical. The child laughs in the same case
out of a feeling of superiority or out of jcy
over the calamity of others. It amounts to
saying: "You fell, but I did not." Certain
pleasure motives of the child seems to be lost
for us grown-ups, but as a substitute for these
we perceive under the same conditions the-
" comic " feeling.

The Infantile and the Comic

If we were permitted to generalize, it would
seem very tempting to transfer the desired
specific character of the comic into the awak-
ening of the infantile, and to conceive tb
comic as a regaining of " lost infantile laugh"
ing." One could then say, " I laugh every tir
over a difference of expenditure between
other and myself, when I disco\'er in the otha
the child." Or expressed more precisely,
whole comparison leading to the comic '
read as follows:

"He does it this way — I do it differently—
He does it just as I did when I was a child.**

This laughter would thus result every ■
from the comparison between the ego of
grown-up and the ego of the child. The UDcei^
tainty itself of the comic difference,

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S6s

now the lesser and now the greater expendi-
ture to appear comical to me, would corre-
spond to the infantile determination; the comic
therein is actually always on the side of the in-
fantile.

This is not contradicted by the fact that the
child itself as an object of comparison does not
make a coniic impression on me hut a purely
pleasurable one, nor by the fact that this com-
parison with the infantile produces a comic
effect only when any other use of the differ-
ence is avoided. For the conditions of the
discharge come therebj' into consideration.
Everything that confines a psychic process in
an association of ideas works against the dis-
charge of the surplus occupation of energy
and directs the same to other utilization; what-
ever isolates a psychic act favors the discharge.
By consciously focussing on the child as the
person of comparison, the discharge necessary
for the production of comic pleasure therefore
becomes impossible; only in foreconscious en-
ergetic states is there a similar approach to the
isolation which we may moreover also ascribe
to the psychic processes in the child. The ad-
dition to the comparison : " Thus I have also
dcme it as a child," from which the comic ef-
fect would emanate, could come into consider-
fttitm for the average difference only when no

366 THEORETICAL PART

other association could obtain control over the
freed surplus.

If we still continue with our attempt to find
the nature of the comic in the foreconscious
association of the infantile, we have to go a
step further than Bergson and admit that the
comparison resulting in the comic need not
necessarily awake old childish pleasure and
play, but that it is enough if it touches the
childish nature in general, perhaps even child-
ish pain. Herein we deviate from Bergson,
but remain consistent with ourselves, when we
connect the comic pleasure not with remem-
bered pleasure but always with a comparison-
This is possible, for cases of the first kind com-
prise in a measure those which are regularly
and irresistibly comic. Let us now draw up
the scheme of the comic possibilities instanced
above. We stated that the comic difference
would be found either

(a) through a comparison between the other
and one's self, or (b) through a comparison al-
together within the other, or (c) through a
comparison altogether within one's self.

In the first case the other would appear to
me as a child, in the second he would put him-
self on the level of a child, and in the third I
would find the child in myself. To the first
class belong the comic of movement and of

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 367

forms, of psychic activity and of character.
The infantile corresponding to it would be the
motion-impulse and the inferior mental and
moral development of the child, so that the fool
would perhaps become comical to me by re-
minding me of a lazy child, and the bad per-
son by reminding me of a naughty child.
The only time one might speak of a childish
pleasm-e lost to grown-ups would he where the
child's own motion pleasure came into consid-
eration.

The second case, in which the comic alto-
gether depends on identification with the other,
comprises numerous possibilities such as the
comic situation, exaggeration (caricature), imi-
tation, degradation, and unmasking. It is
under this head that the presentation of in-
fantile viewpoints mostly take place. For the
comic situation is largely based on embarrass-
ment, in which we feel again the helplessness
of the child. The worst of these embarrass-
ments, the disturbance of other activities
through the imperative demands of natural
wants, corresponds to the child's lack of con-
trol of the physical functions. 'Where the
comic situation acts through repetitions it is
based on the pleasure of constant repetition
peculiar to the child (asking questions, telling
stories) , through which it makes itself a

S6B TH£OBBTICAL PART

nuisance to grown-ups. Exaggeration, whidi
also affords pleasure even to the grown-up in
so far as it is justified by his reason, corre*
spends to the characteristic want of moderation
in the child, and its ignorance of all quanti-
tative relations which it later really learns to
know as qualitative. To keep within bounds,
to practice moderation even in permissible feel«
ings is a late fruit of education, and is gained
through opposing inhibitions of the psychic
activity acquired in the same assodatioa.
Wherever this association is weakened as in the
unconscious of dreams and in the monoideation
of the psychoneiu'oses, the want of moderatioD
of the child again makes its appearance.

The understanding of comic imitation
caused us many difficulties so long as we left
out of consideration the infantile factor. But
imitation is the child's best art and is tiie im-
pelling motive of most of its playing. The
child's ambition is not so much to distinguish
himself among his equals as to imitate the big*
fellows. The relation of the child to tfatf
grown-up determines also the comic of degTsd»*
tion, which corresponds to the lowering of tfaff
grown-up in the life of the child. Few things
can afford the child greater pleasure than wbe9
the grown-up lowers himself to its level, disre*
gards bis superiority, and plays with the diild

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S69

as its equ&I. The alleviation which furnishes
the child pure pleasure is a debasement used by
the adult as a means of making things comic
and as a source of comic pleasure. As for un-
masking we know that it is based on degrada-
tion.

The infantile determination of the third case,
the comic of expectation, presents most of the
difficulties; this really explains why those au-
thors who put this case to the foreground in
their conception of the comic, found no occa-
sion to consider the infantile factor in their
studies of the comic. The comic of expecta-
tion is farthest from the child's thoughts, the
abihty to understand this is the latest quality
to appear in him. Most of those cases which
produce a comic effect in the grown-up are
probably felt by the child as a disappointment.
One can refer, however, to the blissful ex-
pectation and gullibility of the child in order
to understand why one considers himself as
comical " as a child," when he succumbs to
comic disappointment.

If the preceding remarks produce a certain
probability that the comic feeling may be
translated into the thought; everything is comic
that does not fit the grown-up, I still do not
feel bold enough, — in view of my whole posi-
tion to the problem of the comic — to defend

»70 THEORETICAL PART

this last proposition with the same earnestness
as those that I formulated before. I am una-
ble to decide whether the lowering to the level
of the child is only a special case of comic
degradation, or whether everything comical
fundamentally depends on the degradation to
the level of the child.'

Humor

An examination of the comic, however super-
ficial it may be, would be most incomplete if
it did not devote at least a few remarks to the
consideration of humor. There is so little
doubt as to the essential relationship between
the two that a tentative explanation of the
comic must furnish at least one component for
the understanding of humor. It does not mat-
ter how much appropriate and important ma-
terial was presented as an appreciation of hu-
mor, which, as one of the highest psychic fuDo
tions, enjoys the special favor of thinkers, we
still cannot elude the temptation to express
its essence through an approach to the formul«,
given for wit and the comic.

*Iliat comic pleasure has Its source In the " quBntltBUve
trast," in the comparison of big and gmall, which ultimate!]'
expresses the essential relation of the child to the gtowtt-vpt'
would indeed lie a peculiar eoiocidence if the comic lud
else to do with the infantile.

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S71

We have heard that the release of painful
emotions is the strongest hindrance to the
comic effect. Just as aimless motion causes
harm, stupidity mischief, and disappointment
pain; — the possibility of a comic effect eventu-
ally ends, at least for him who cannot defend
himself against such pain, who is himself af-
fected by it or must participate in it, whereas
the disinterested party shows by his behavior
that the situation of the case in question con-
tains everything necessary to produce a comic
effect. Humor is thus a means to gain pleas-
ure despite the painful affects which disturb
it; it acts as a substitute for this affective de-
velopment, and takes its place. If we are in
a situation which tempts us to liberate painful
affects according to our habits, and motives
then urge us to suppress these affects statu
naacendij we have the conditions for humor.
In the cases just cited the person affected by
misfortune, pain, etc., could obtain humoristic
pleasure while the disinterested party laughs
over the comic pleasure. We can only say that
the pleasure of humor results at the cost of
this discontinued liberation of affect; it orig-
inates through the economized ewpenditure of
feet.

»78 THEORETICAL PART

The Economy in Expenditure of Afect

Humor is the most self-sufficient of the
forms of the comic; its process consummating
itself in one single person and the participation
of another adds nothing new to it. I can
enjoy the pleasure of humor originating in my-
self without feeling the necessity of imparting
it to another. It is not easy to tell what hap-
pens during the production of humoristic pleas-
ure in a person; hut one gains a certain in-
sight by investigating these cases of humor
which have emanated from persons with whom
we have entered into a sympathetic under-
standing. By sympathetically understanding
the humoristic person in these cases one get«
the same pleasure. The coarsest form of hu-
mor, the so-called humor of the gallows or
grim-humor {Galgenhumor) , may enlighten
us in this regard. The rogue, on heing led to
execution on Monday, remarked: "Yes, this
week is heginning well." This is really a wit-
ticism, as the remark is quite appropriate in it-
self, on the other hand it is displaced in the
most nonsensical fashion, as there can be no
further happening for him this week. But it
required humor to make such wit, that is, to
overlook what distinguished the beginning of
this week from other weeks, and to deny the

HE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S7S

difference which could give rise to motives for
very particular emotional feelings. The case
is the same when on the way to the gallows he
requests a neckerchief for his bare neck, in
order to guard against taking cold, a precau-
tion which would be quite praiseworthy under
different circumstances, but becomes exceed-
ingly superfluous and indifferent in view of
the impending fate of this same neck. We
must say that there is something like greatness
of soul in this blague, in this clinging to his
usual nature and in deviating from that which
would overthrow and drive this nature into
despair. This form of grandeur of himior thus
appears unmistakably in cases in which our
admiration is not inhibited by the circum-
stances of the humoristic person.

In Victor Hugo's Emani the bandit who
entered into a conspiracy against his king,
Charles I, of Spain, (Charles V, as the G«r-
man Emperor) , falls into the hands of his
most powerful enemy; he foresees his fate; as
one convicted of high treason his head will
fall. But this prospect does not deter him
from introducing himself as a hereditary
Grandee of Spain and from declaring that he
has no intention of waiving any prerogative
belonging to such personage. A Grandee of

874 THEORETICAL PART

Spain could appear before his royal
with his head covered. Well:

" Nos tetes ont le droit
De tomber couvertes devant de toi,"

This is excellent humor and if we do not lau^
on hearing it, it is because our admiration cov-1
ers the humoristic pleasure. In the case of the
rogue who did not wish to take cold on the
way to the gallows we roar with laughter.
The situation which should have driven
criminal to despair, might have evoked in
intense pity, but this pity is inhibited because
we understand that he who is most concerned
is quite indifferent to the situation. As a re- _
suit of this understanding the expenditure :
pity, which was already prepared in us, becam
inapplicable and we laughed it off. The in-
difference of the rogue, which we notice has
cost him a great expenditiu-e of psychic labor,
infects us as it were.

Economy of sympathy is one of the most
frequent sources of humoristic pleasure, j
Mark Twain's humor usually follows
mechanism. When he tells us about the hfe (
his brother, how, as an employee in a largi
road-building enterprise, he was hurled into
the air through a premature explosion of

' " Onr heads ban the right to fall covered before tbee.*

;hter.
thi^

R UM

-ause I
med
I re-

(asM
lanufl

HE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 375

blast, to come to earth again far from the place
where he was working, feelings of sympathy
for this mifortunate are invariably aroused in
us. We should like to inquire whether he sus-
tained no injury in this accident; but the con-
tinuation of the story that the brother lost a
half-day's pay for being away from the place
he worked diverts us entirely from sympathy
and makes us almost as hard-hearted as that
employer, and just as indifferent to the possi-
ble injury to the victim's health. Another time
Mark Twain presents us his pedigree, which he
traces back almost as far back as one of the
companions of Columbus, But after describ-
ing the character of this ancestor, whose entire
possessions consisted of several pieces of linen
each bearing a different mark, we cannot help
laughing at the expense of the stored-up piety,
a piety which characterized our frame of mind
at the beginning of this family history. The
mechanism of humoristic pleasure is not dis-
turbed by our knowing that this family history
is a fictitious one, and that this fiction serves
a satirical tendency to expose the embellish-
ments which result in imparting such pedigrees
to others; it is just as independent of the con-
ditions of reality as the manufactured comic.
Another of Mark Twain's stories relates how
his brother constructed for himself subter-

THEORETICAL PART

ranean quarters into which he brought a brf, i
table, and a lamp, and that as a roof he used
a large piece of sail-cloth with a hole through
the centre; how during the night after the
room was completed, a cow being driven home
fell through the opening in the ceiling on to
the table and extinguished the lamp; how his
brother helped patiently to hoist the animal out
and to rearrange everything; how he did the
same thing when the same distiu-bance was re-
peated the following night; and then every
succeeding night; such a story becomes com*
ical through repetition. But Mark Twain
closes with the information that in the forty-
sixth night when the cow again fell througfai
his brother finally remarked that the thing wat
beginning to grow monotonous; and here we
can no longer restrain our humoristie pleasure^
for we had long expected to hear how tbö
brother would express his anger over this
chronic tncdheur. The slight humor which w»;
draw from our own life we usually produce a6,
the expense of anger instead of irritating our>-
selves,'

*The excellent humorisUc effect of a character like Ibat of
the fat knight, Sir John Faistaff, ia based on ecooomiaed eon*'
tempt and indignation. To be sure we recognise in him tta
tinworth]r glutton and fashioDablf dressed swindler, but our coo*
demnatlon is disarmed througli a whole aeries of factors. T#<
understand tbat be knows blmself to be Just as we estimate Uib|.

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC

Forma of Humor

The forms of humor are extraordinarily
varied according to the nature of the emotional
feelings which are economized in favor of hu-
mor, as sympathy, anger, pain, compassion,

be Impresses us through his wit ; and besides that, his physical
dcfoTmit7 produces a cootoet-effect in favor of s comic con-
ception of his personality instead of a serious one; as If our de-
monds for morality and honor must recoil from auch a big
stomach. His activiUes are altogether harmless and are almost
excused by the comic lowness of those he deceives. We admit
.that the poor devil has a right to live and enjoy himself lllce any
ate else, and we almost pity him because in the principal situa-
tion we find him a puppet in the hands of one much his superior.
It ii for this reason that we rsnnat bear him any grudge and
turn all wc economise In him in Indignation into comic pleasure
which be otherwise provides. Sir John's own bomor really
emanates from the superiority of an ego which neither his physical
Oor hte moral defects can rob of its joviality and security.

On the otlier hand the courageous knight Don Quixote de U
Moncha is a figure who possesses no humor, and In his seriou»-
nesa furnishes us a pleasure which can be called humoristic
Although its mechanism shows a decided deviation from that of
bnmor. OrlgiiiiJly Don Quixote is a purely comic figure, a big
child whose fancies from his tiooks on knighthood have gone to
his head, tt is known that at first the poet wanted to show only
that phase of his character, and that the creation gradually out'
grew the author's original Intentions. But after the poet en-
' dowed this ludicrous person with the profoundest wisdom and
noblest aims and made him the symbolic representation of an
idealism, a man who iwlievcd in the realiiatton of his alms, who
took duties seriously and promises literally, be ceased to be a
comic personality. Like humoristic pleasure which results from
a prevention of emotional feelings It originates here through the
disturbance of comic plensore. However, in these example* we
already depart perceptibly from the sfanpk cases of bm&or.

THEOBETICAL PARZ

etc. And this series seems incomplete because
the sphere of himior experiences a constant en-
largement, as often as an artist or writer suc-
ceeds In mastering humoristically the, as yet,
unconquered emotional feelings and in making
them, through artifices similar to those in the
above example, a source of humoristic pleas-
ure. Thus the artists of SmpUcissimut
have worked wonders in gaining humor at the
expense of fear and disgust. The manifesta-
tions of humor are above all determined by two
peculiarities, which are connected with the con-
ditions of its origin. In the first place, humor
may appear fused with wit or any other form
of the comic; whereby it is entrusted with the
task of removing a possible emotional devel-
opment which would form a hindrance to the
pleasurable effect. Secondly, it can entirely
set aside this emotional development or only
partially, which is really the more frequent
case, because the simpler function and the dif-
ferent forms of " broken " ' humor, results in
that humor which smiles under its tears. It
withdraws from the affect a part of its energy
and gives instead the accompanying humoristic
sound.

As may be noticed by fonner examples the

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC «79

htimoristic pleasure gained by entering into
sympathy with a thing results from a special
tedmique resembliBg displacement through
vihich the liberation of affect held ready is dis-
appointed and the energy occupation is de-
flected to other, and, not often, to secondary
matters. This does not help us, however, to
understand the process by which the displace-
ment from the development of aflFeet proceeds
in the humoristic person himself. We see that
the recipient intimates the producer of the
humor in his psychic processes, but we
discover nothing thereby concerning the
forces which make this process possible in
the latter.

We can only say, when, for example, some-
body succeeds in paying no heed to a painful
affect because he holds before himself the
greatness of the world's interest as a contrast
to his own smallness, that we see in tliis no
function of humor but one of philosophic
tiiinking, and we gain no pleasure even if we
put ourselves into his train of thought. The
humoristic displacement is therefore just as
impossible in the light of conscious attention as
is the comic comparison; like the latter it is
connected witii the condition to remain in the
foreconscious — that is to say, to remain auto-
.matic.

880 THEORETICAL PART

One reaches some solution of humoristic cUs-
placement if one examines it in the light of &
defense process. The defense processes are
the psychic correlates of the flight reflex and
follow the task of guarding against the origin
of pain from inner sources; in fulfilling this
task they serve tlie psychic functiqn as an
automatic adjustment, which finally proves
harmful and therefore must be subjected to
the control of the conscious thinking. A
definite form of this defense, the failure of re-
pression, I have demonstrated as the eflFective
mechanism in the origin of the psychoneuroses.
Humor can now be conceived as the loftiest
variant of this defense activity. It disdains to
withdraw from conscious attention the ideas
which are connected with the painful affect, as
repression does, and thus it overcomes the de-
fense automatism. It brings this about by
finding the means to withdraw the energy re-
sulting from the liberation of pain which is held
m readiness and through discharge dianges the
same into pleasure. It is even credible that it is
again the connection with the infantile that
puts at humor's disposal the means for this
function. Only in childhood did we experience
intensively painful aflfects over which to-day u
grown-ups we would laugh; just as a humorist
laughs over his present painful affects. The

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC S8I

elevation of liis ego, of which humoristic dis-
placement gives evidence, — the translation of
which would read: I am too hig to have these
causes affect me painfully — he could find in
the comparison of his present ego with his in-
fantile ego. This conception is to some extent
confirmed hy the role which falls to the infan-
tile in the neurotic processes of repression.

I The Relation of Humor to Wit and Comic

On the whole humor is closer to the comic
than wit. Like the former its psychic locali-
Bfltion is in the foreconscious, whereas wit,
as we had to assume, is formed as a compro-
mise between the unconscious and the forecon-
scious. On the other hand, humor has no share
in the peculiar nature in which wit and the
comic meet, a peculiarity which perhaps we have
I not hitherto emphasized strongly enough. It
I is a condition for the origin of the comic that
we be induced to apply — either simultaneously
or in rapid succession — to the same thought
function two different modes of ideas, between
which the " comparison " then takes place and
thus forms the comic difference. Such differ-
ences originate between the expenditure of the
stranger and one's own, between the usual ex-
penditure and the emergency expenditure, be-

SM THEORETICAL PAET

tween an anticipated expenditure and one
which has already occurred.'

The diiference between two forms of concep-
tion resulting simultaneously, which work with
diflferent expenditures, comes into considerfl'
tion in wit, in respect to the hearer. The one
of these two conceptions, by taking the hints
contained in the witticism, follows the train of
thought through the unconscious, while the
other conception remains on the surface and
presents the witticism hke any wording from
the foreconscious which has become conscious.
Perhaps it would not be considered an unjusti-
fied statement if we should refer the pleasure
of the witticism heard to the difference be-
tween these two forms of presentation.

Concerning wit we here repeat our former
statement concerning its Janus-like double-
facedness, a simile we used when the relation
between wit and the comic still appeared to us
unsettled.*

* If one does not hesitate to do some violence to tfae eoDccp-
tion of expectation, one may ascribe — according to the procesl
of Upps — a verj large sphere of the comic to the comic of ex-
pectation; but probably the most origins) cases of the comic which
result through a comparison of a strange expenditure with oae's
own will fit least into this conception.

'The characteristic of the "double face" naturally did not
escape the authors. Melinaud, from whom I borrowed the abore
expression, conceives the condition for laughing in the following
formula: "Ce qui fait rire c'est qui est h la fois, d'un col^
absurde et de Taatre, familier" ("Pourqum rit-on?" Aant* d^

THE VARIOUS FOEMS OF THE COMIC S8S

The character thus put into the foreground
becomes indistinct when we deal with humor.
To be sure, we feel the humoristic pleasure
where an emotional feeling is evaded, which we
might have expected as a pleasure usually be-
longing to the situation; and in so far humor
really falls under the broadened conception of
the comic of expectation. But in humor it is
no longer a question of two different kinds of
presentations having the same content; the
fact that the situation comes under the dom-
ination of a painful emotional feeling which
should have been avoided, puts an end to pos-
sible comparison with the nature in the comic
and in wit. The humoristic displacement is
really a case of that different kind of utiliza-
tion of a freed expenditure which proved to
be so dangerous for the comic effect.

FormulcE for Wit, Comic, and Humor
Now, that we have reduced the mechanism
of humoristic pleasure to a formula analogous

ilmu) TOonde», FebniRry. 199S). This fonnulB flU in better «rllh
«rit than with the comic, but it reailf dews not altogether cover
the former. Bergson (1. c. p. 96) defines titc comic situation bj
the "reeiprocnl interference of Berles," nnd slatesi "A lituatton
Is Invsriablf comic when it belongs simultaneously to two al-
together indepenilcnt scries of events and is capable of bdng
interpreted in two entirely dilferent meanings at the same time."
According to Lipps the comic is " the greatness and smallness of
the same."

384 THEORETICAL PART

to the formula of comic pleasure and of wit,
we are at the end of our task. It has seemed
to us that the pleasure of wit originates from
an economy of eocpenditure in inhibition, of
the comic from an economy of expenditure in
thought, and of humor from an economy of ex-
penditure in feeling. All three activities of
our psychic apparatus derive pleasure from
economy. They all strive to bring back from
the psychic activity a pleasiu*e which has really
been lost in the development of this activity.
For the euphoria which we are thus striving
to obtain is nothing but the state of a bygone
time in which we were wont to defray our
psychic work with slight expenditure. It is
the state of our childhood in which we did not
know the comic, were incapable of wit, and did
not need humor to make us happy.

^^^^^^^^^^E^^.^^^

^^^m

^^^p ^^1

Comic, of speech, 346 ^|

motion, 304 ^1

V l&bftnet wit, 128

pleasure, its origin, 361 ^M

^ Abiurdlty, 77

situations, 303. 314 ^^^H

Actuality, 186

Comical character, 277 ^^^^^H

ieatheticB, 2

CompariBon. 113 ^^^^M

AgaMU, 64

with uniflcation, 130 ^^^^M

ARgrcMioii, 138, 1S2, 160, 232

Composition, 31 ^^^^H

Alluring-premiumB. 210

AlluBions. 107. 108. 232

examples of, 21, 22, 23 ^H

Ambiguity. 45

In dreams, 31, 49, 256 ^1

Ambitious impulse. 219

with modification and ■nb' ^M

Applicntian of une roateriftl.

Btitutlon, 26 ^^^^1

Conflict, 163 ^^^H

Aristotle, 184

8 ^^^^B

Attributions. 121

Critical witticisms. 171 ^^^H

Cynical tcndene?. 204 ^^^H

■ Ant«matiuiiB, 8S. 80, 87, 235,

witticisms and »elferfUolMn. ^M

■ 358

166 ^M

Cyniciam, 65, 161 ^M

pessimistic. 170 ^H

B»in. 228, 322

^^H

Bargson, 301, 337, 380

^^^1

BiBgpbentous witticisms, 171
Bleuler. 278

Darwin, 226 ^^^^H

^ Bonmot, 43

Defence. 138 ^^^H

K Brevity, 10. 29. 62. 243

reaction, 142 ^^^^H

■ Brill, 22, 31, 35, 37, 38, 50

DeriBion, 157 ^^^H

■

De Quincey. 22 ^^^^H

Disguise. 303 ^^^H

Displacement, 57. 61, 161 ^H

Caricature. 280. 303, 320

Id dreams. 256 ^M

Censor, 260

Displacement-wit, 68, 71, 237 ^M

Characterixation-wit. 71

Don Quiiote, 377. H

Child, 190. 300, 362

Double meaning. 40, 103 ■

Childhood. 149

Comic. 4. 10. 221, 287, 313

Ota name. 41 ■

element, 88

Doubt in witty compariMns, ,^M

facade. 236

118 ^^M

m its origin. 302

Dream- format ion, 260 _^^^^^H

■ Its psychogeneiis. 360

Dream-work, 249. 27S ^^^^H

■ or eipeeUtion, 317

Dreams. 250. 261 ^^^^1

■ Of iniUtioii, 330

Dugu, 224. 242 ^^^^M

L^ 1

INDEX ^^^1

InliibitlOD«. 140. 197. 2M, 2M.
231. 236, 290

^1 Economr. *^. 62. i*^. S4S

expenditure ot, ISO

Innilte. 209

^H Ehrenfela, 165

Iiweotivei. 148. 277

^H ExBggeniUoD, 280

Irani«»] wit, 100

^M ExhibiUoDism. 142

Irony, 276

^1 Fac*de, 16&, IBS
^^B Pintious questions, 23B
^^B F&lbe 14. eO SS

Je«t,197, 201, 211, 274,88*
JohoMn. 45
Jokes, C}iücal. 164

^H FalsUff. Sir John. 376
^H Faulty tfainkiog. 81. S4
^H Fecbuer, ISS, 207. S80

good or poor. 182

Jewish, fi9. 72. 97, 10«. 21B

BDut^, 139. 140, 145, 2tt

^H FischfT, 3. 4, 8, n, 43, 4T,

B^ 89. isa, 13«

■ Flaubert 24

■ Fore-pleaiUK, 200, 211

Kuit. 320
Kleinpaul, IW
Kraepelitt, 7

H Qoetta, in

^K Grim hamor, 372

Laugh. 221

^H GiwM. 183. IM, lai, US

Längster aa a »mkum «

^H GniM, 278

fU detennlnaUon. SM. 126
Lewing, B7, ISO

Libido, 141

104.115. 118, Ut.U^ ICO.

^H 222, 284

132, 149, 218

^M and tcBd«iK7-nt. 190

Lipp^ 3. 4. «, 10. 30. Bib U%

^m Heine, ». 15. SQ, 43. 44. 47,

ttT.2H.3ti,SU

H 57. »2. 94. ItM. IM. lis.

■ 12« 171, 215, 216,223, MI

H He^uu. S, 216

^H Botnm. 37

Manifold an«alii^4it 4»

^B BnfD. ST3

MattliFw«. 44

^1 Humor. 370

Midielrt. 78

^H Mark Tw9ia\ ST4

Modifieitio*. 42
MolL 141

Morally. 169 ^^
Uati-n», 214. 23S ^^^H

H lalMfaM, MS. 322

■ ESSS^tÄ-iS."

Nam. CM ^^^H

^^^^ »ia «DmIim. 101

^^^^^ bfutile and Um eomie, 3M

eiamplN ^ 2U ^^^H

NegatirifiB, VI 6
Nestroy. 120, 341
Nohmdm, 72. 1»S. 200, 2t9
Nonwnw-witticiimB, TS

ObsMne wit, 138, 203
Otwconibr, 142
OmiMion, 82. 107, 232
Outdolng wit, S6, B7

Faiody, 880, SU

PucaJ, 337

Paul, 3. 7. S, IS, 29, SOI

Persons in tuideiicy-wit, 144,

221, 222, 230, 231, 240
PerreraioB. 141
PhillipB, Ut
Play, 211

and jeat, ISfi

on words, 40
Playing with wordi, 190
Pleaaure Id noDMnae, ISO, 271

mechanism« of wit, 177
, 150

Paychic energy, 227
Paychoneuioaea, 147
Pddh, 53

183

BegreiBic
RepreaentatioD through the op-
poaite, 93. GS
through the minute, 111, 112
RfpreaaioD. 147, 20S, 211
Riddle, 232
Rouaseau, J. B., 91
Bouascftu, J. J., 33

Sexual tlementa, 130, 140, 810
Shakesp^re, 222
Shake up rhymcB, 120
Skylarking, 1112
Smutty jokes, 139, 146, 233
Society, 160
Sophiam, 82. 83, 160
Sophistic displacement, 181
faulty thinking, 78. 79

Sonne, 57

Bound, ainiiUrity. SO

Spencer, 225

Spinoia, 100

Btettenheim, 343

Buhjective dptenainadonB, 156,

16«, 186, 216, 217
Substitutive formation, 20

Tendencies of wit, 127, 20S
Tendency to economy, 49
Tendency-wit, 130

lU effect, 210
Thought-wit, 128

its techniques, 154
Travesty, 280, 324

Ueberhorat, 91

Unconacious, 264, 255, 269, 279,
281, 329
and the infantile, 26S
Uniflcation. 45, 88. 117, 121,

Unmasking, 303, 3

Suieho Puua. 219

Satire. 43, 137 Winalow, 46

Bchnitcler. 42 Wish fulfilment, 240. 263

Sense in oonsenie, 73, 74, 75, Wit, 4

IB» ud oomic, 4, 330

389

INDEX

Wit, ftnd draim, 249, 278, 285
and rebellion ftgainit author-
ity, 188
as an inapiration, 268
as a soeiat prooeai, 21i
by word-division, 82
definitioBB of, 6, 7, 8
desire to impart it, 289
double-f aeedness of, 240
harmless, 128
hostile and obscene, 188
in the seryice of tendencies,

146
ironical, 100
its motives, 214
its subjective determinations,

186
its tndeneies, 127

Wit; literafurer of, 134

outdoing^ 96, 97

pleasure mechanisms of, 177,
280

p^yohogenesis of, 177, 196,
200

shallow, 181

skeptical, 172, 178

taAnique of, 14, 194, 240
Wit-work, its formula, 261
Witticism and riddle, 282

critical, 171
Witticisms, blasphemous, 171
Witty nonsense, 211, 212
Woman, unyieldingness of, 143
Word-division, 32, 83, 34
Word-pleasure, 190 .
iWord-wit» 128, 181

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